Philosophical Paradoxes of Darwinian Evolutionary Naturalism

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Introduction

Darwinian evolutionary naturalism (DEN) is the strongest force for the legitimate expression of research in the sciences or the humanities today. I attempt to address some issues that DEN still needs to take under consideration. This paper is divided into three parts.

Part 1 is a struggle to find a coherent definition of DEN as it is currently understood. The common thread I find running through all definitions is the following: *DEN is a belief or research paradigm that excludes any teleological, theological or supernatural explanations for the elucidation of phenomena in the universe.* It assumes that the best explanations are causal, non-purposive explanations, ultimately depending on the causal regularities of the physical sciences. Moreover, if anything cannot be explained by the machinery of the hard sciences, such as consciousness, morality, or beauty, then it either is a mystery waiting to be resolved by the hard sciences, or it is epiphenomenal , or it does not exist except as a social or linguistic convention.

In Part 2, I address the supposed unscientific presuppositions of DEN. This discussion leads us to the question of scientific methodology. Famous philosopher of science Karl Popper wrote, "the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability." If we cannot, or are not allowed to, consider the falsifiability or refutability of DEN, then, according to Pooper, it would not qualify as scientific in nature. Does this critique have merit? Is DEN a non-scientific theory?

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Finally in Part 3, I articulate some arguments against DEN and its community by following the leads of Alvin Plantinga and Richard Taylor, (whose arguments are different than the ones raised by C. S. Lewis). This line of argumentation states that, if our cognitive faculties have arisen by purely natural, unguided forces, then, although they can be trusted to arrive at pragmatic conclusions, they cannot be trusted to arrive at truthful conclusions. The point is that beliefs that have survival value are not the same as beliefs that are reasonable or have a purpose. This distinction is something that proponents of DEN need to address to make DEN a more reasonable hypothesis.

The main hypothesis of my thesis is taken from a line often quoted by the literary character Sherlock Holmes:

> That process' [of finding things out], said I, 'starts upon the supposition that when you have eliminated all which is impossible, then whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth. It may well be that several explanations remain, in which case one tries test after test until one or other of them has a convincing amount of support.'[2]

I will show that naturalistic explanations of consciousness are impossible and thus ought to be eliminated. Then, whatever remains, however improbable, for example that Descartes was right and that our consciousness is instantiated in another immaterial substance, must be the truth. It may well be that several other explanations remain, but I will show that substance dualism has a convincing amount of support which is sufficient to bring it back into rigorous academic discussions.

1. Defining Naturalism

I begin with a theory referred to as *materialism*, *scientific materialism*, *ontological physicalism*, *methodological naturalism* or *scientism*. At times different authors make a distinction between *naturalism* and *scientism (scientism*

[2] Robson, *The Case-Book of Sherlock Holmes*, ed. Doyle, Arthur Conan (Oxford, England: Oxford University, 1999), 169. There are several different versions of this saying in Arthur Conan Doyle's works on Holmes: "'Eliminate all other factors, and the one which remains must be the truth." in A. C. Doyle, A Study in Scarlet (Oxford, England: unknown, 1994), 154, and "'How often have I said to you that when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth?" on pg. 195; "'We must fall back upon the old axiom that when all other contingencies fail, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth." in A. C. Doyle, *His Last Bow*, ed. Edwards, Owen Dudley (Oxford; New York: unknown, 1993), 58

is also called *materialism* or *physicalism*). I will be addressing these differences within the different views of naturalism itself. However, for the purpose of this thesis, all the above will be referred under the umbrella of *naturalism.*

What is naturalism? There is no uniform agreement on what it is, but I can at least present a basic understanding of this theory.

David Armstrong says that naturalism is "the doctrine that reality consists of nothing but a single all-embracing spatial-temporal system."[3] Some naturalists do not entirely deny that ghosts, angels and such entities or forces exist, but merely that one cannot use them within scientific explanations, and that they are, thus, for all practical purposes, irrelevant and might as well not exist. However, there still remain a few writers who outright deny any non-natural aspects of the universe. This group includes Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett, Professor of Philosophy at Tufts University. They are part of a recent organization whose whole point is the denial of anything supernatural, calling themselves the "Brights." Dennett writes:

> The time has come for us brights to come out of the closet. What is a bright? A bright is a person with a naturalist as opposed to a supernaturalist world view. We brights don't believe in ghosts or elves or the Easter Bunny—or God. We disagree about many things, and hold a variety of views about morality, politics and the meaning of life, but we share a disbelief in black magic—and life after death.[4]

Thus, as commonly understood, naturalism is a position in philosophy that attempts to explain all phenomena and account for all values by means of strictly natural as opposed to supernatural means. Naturalism claims that there is no higher tribunal for truth than natural science itself. The scientific method is the best and only reliable method for judging truth claims about the universe. Philosophy, sociology, politics, religion or economics must all submit to the hard sciences such as biology, physics and chemistry. Any claim that is contrary to the findings from the scientists in these fields is false or superfluous. Thus, naturalism is a dogmatic theory, although many of its proponents deny such a description. Its proponents claim that the physical world is a closed system

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[3] D. M. Armstrong, "Naturalism, Materialism and First Philosophy," *Philosophia* 8 (1978) : 261; cited in S. Goetz, "Naturalism and Libertarian Agency,"in *Naturalism A Critical Analysis*, ed. W. L. Craig and J. P. Moreland (New York: Routledge, 2000), 156.
[4] D. Dennett, "The Bright Stuff," *New York Times*, July 12, 2003. For more information of Brights, see their webpage, available at http://the-brights.net.

requiring nothing beyond itself. There have been many writers who have advocated this strong type of naturalism, such as Bertrand Russell, W.V.O. Quine and Paul Churchland. Others, such as Donald Davidson, Richard Rorty, Hilary Putnam and P.F. Strawson advocated a weaker version of naturalism that accepted thoughts as concepts, though not necessarily physical ones. Nonetheless, this weaker naturalism still sees all events of the world, concepts or otherwise, as ontologically dependent on physical ones.[5]

The common thread that I find embraced by all of these definitions (including eliminative, reductive, or non-reductive forms of naturalism) is the following, as I stated in the introduction: *Naturalism is the system of belief or research paradigm that excludes any teleological, theological or supernatural explanations for the elucidation of phenomena in the universe.* It assumes that the best explanations are causal, non-purposive explanations, ultimately depending on the causal regularities of the physical sciences. Moreover, if anything cannot be explained by the machinery of the hard sciences, such as consciousness, morality, or beauty, then it either is a mystery waiting to be resolved by the hard sciences, or it is epiphenomenal , or it does not exist except as a social or linguistic convention.

2. Naturalism as Science

Is naturalism unscientific? In this section, I will argue that it is both unscientific and paradoxical.

Let us begin by asking "What is science?" According to the *American Heritage Science Dictionary:*

> [Science is t]he investigation of natural phenomena through observation, theoretical explanation, and experimentation, or the knowledge produced by such investigation. Science makes use of the scientific method, which includes the careful observation of natural phenomena, the formulation of a

[5] See K. Nielsen, *Naturalism without Foundations* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1996), 26; see also "The Center for Naturalism" (CFN) at http://www.naturalism.org/center_for_naturalism.htm; last accessed 28 August 2004. "The CFN is a non-profit educational organization devoted to increasing public awareness of naturalism and its implications for social and personal well-being. By means of local activities, publications, research, conferences, educational programs, and policy development, the CFN seeks to foster the understanding that human beings and their behavior are fully caused, entirely natural phenomena, and that human flourishing is best achieved in the light of such understanding."

> hypothesis, the conducting of one or more experiments to test the hypothesis, and the drawing of a conclusion that confirms or modifies the hypothesis.[6]

This definition presupposes methodological naturalism. What if a miracle occurred, such as a man rising from the dead, a person completely healed from an amputated leg, or a car driving without an engine after a prayer? How would a methodological naturalist view such an event? According to the center for teaching evolution at Berkley, science is non-dogmatic. Science Asks Three Basic Questions:

1. What's there?
2. How does it work?
3. How did it come to be this way?[7]

The advocates at the center assert that "nothing in the scientific enterprise or literature requires belief. To ask someone to accept ideas purely on faith, even when these ideas are expressed by "experts," is unscientific. While science must make some assumptions, such as the idea that we can trust our senses, explanations and conclusions are accepted only to the degree that they are well founded and continue to stand up to scrutiny." This claim constitutes a naive definition because, after all, it is also a belief. Alvin Plantinga writes that "what is and isn't science could be settled just by appealing to a *definition*. One thinks this would work only if the original query were really a verbal question -- a question like: *Is the English word 'science' properly applicable to a hypothesis that makes reference to God?* But that wasn't the question. The question is instead: *Could a hypothesis that makes reference to God be part of science?* That question can't be answered just by citing a definition."[8]

Dismissing a theory such a Intelligent Design, for example, merely by saying that it violates the definition of science is not a rational argument at all. It would be wise not to limit our epistemic base of knowledge to only what we can test physically. Science is supposed to be a developing an open arena for

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[6] Article "Science." *The American Heritage® Science Dictionary*. Retrieved June 21, 2008, from Dictionary.com website available at http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/science.

[7] "Understanding Evolution for Teachers." University of California Museum of Paleontology, Berkeley, Calif. http://evolution.berkeley.edu/evosite/evohome.html; last accessed 21 June, 2008.

[8] Alvin Plantinga, "Methodological Naturalism Part 2" in "Philosophical Analysis Origins & Design" 18:2 available at http://www.arn.org/docs/odesign/od182/methnat182.htm last accessed 15 November, 2009.

understanding and research. To legislate against ideas such as the Intelligent Design movement contravenes the very principles of science.

Why can't science allow for the research of evidence for God or the soul? In principle, there should be no problem with this at all, according to what science is supposed to do. However, I argue that science has been hijacked by naturalistic people who hide behind their anti-religious or anti-supernatural inclinations and call it "science."

Many scientists not only hold to naturalism, but appear to manifest unconcealed opposition to those who do not share their view. For example, Richard Lewontin clarifies that current science requires a prior commitment to both methodological and philosophical naturalism, which cannot allow other worldviews to invade its academic turf:

> It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counterintuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door.[9]

This dogmatic method is not intrinsic to the nature of the scientific enterprise. It is not science by any means; it is dogmatism. As another example, *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy* states:

> There has been a virtual consensus, one that has held for years, that the world is essentially physical, at least in the following sense: if all matter were to be removed from the world, nothing would remain . . .[10]

William Provine, Professor of Biological Sciences at Cornell University avers:

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[9] R. Lewontin, "Billions and Billions of Demons," Review of Carl Sagan's The Demon-Haunted World: Science as a Candle in the Dark. New York Review of Books, Vol. 44, No. 1, January 9, 1997.

[10] J. Kim, "mind–body problem, the" The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Ed. Ted Honderich. Oxford University Press, 1995. Oxford Reference Online (Oxford University Press). http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t116.e1469 ; last accessed 21 August 2004.

> [M]odern evolutionary biology . . . tells us . . . that nature has no detectable purposive forces of any kind . . . There are no gods and no designing forces that are rationally detectable. . . . we must conclude that when we die, we die and that is the end of us. . . . There is no hope of life everlasting. . . . [F]ree will, as traditionally conceived, the freedom to make uncoerced and unpredictable choices among alternative possible courses of action, simply does not exist. . . . [T]he evolutionary process cannot produce a being that is truly free to make choices. . . .The universe cares nothing for us. . . . Humans are nothing even in the evolutionary process on earth. . . . There is no ultimate meaning for humans.[11]

It is my hope that you are following me and perceiving the antagonism against any teleological or theological advances in the scientific sphere. It is thus no wonder that the academy automatically rules out of court any scientific movements that try to establish the existence of God or provide any verification for the supernatural, even before their evidence is presented.

With this said, I will present four arguments demonstrating that, dogmatic self-assertions notwithstanding, naturalism presented as a scientific movement actually does not constitute true science.

First, naturalism cannot account for nonphysical things like consciousness. Consciousness is as real as anything else we experience. As William Hasker put it, naturalism is the view that "in any instance of mechanistic causation, the proximate cause of the effect does not involve a goal, objective, or *telos*; rather, it consists of some disposition of masses, forces and the like . . . it appeals to antecedent conditions involving only nonpurposive, nonintentional entities."[12] But humans do have goals and objectives, and are very purposive and intentional entities. We have conscious experiences that are very authentic; in fact they are more real than inferred things like the solidity of the moon or historical questions of who was the first president of the USA. For example, you know beyond a shadow of a doubt that you are experiencing the sentences you are hearing right now. That is what cognitive scientists call *qualia* and "first-person experience." Philosopher Thomas Nagel called it, "The View From Nowhere" because it is nowhere to be found in our physical brains, and, although

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[11] W. Provine, "Progress in Evolution and Meaning in Life," in *Evolutionary Progress*, ed. M. H. Nitecki, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 49-74; cited in D. R. Griffin, *Religion and Scientific Naturalism*, (New York: State University of New York Press, 2000), 32.

[12] W. Hasker, *The Emergent Self* (London: Cornell University Press, 1999), 63.

it is subjective, it is very undeniably genuine. Qualia would not register on any physical system in the known world (although the results of you hearing this paper, such as your neurons firing, would). It would follow that such mental events are caused by teleological agents called persons, not just ganglions, fibres and other material substances. Thus we have an inconsistency for the naturalist because human beings, according to naturalism, are physical entities and nothing more.

Second, on a naturalistic worldview, the explanation of the concept of objective logic or truth would be impossible. These notions would have to be basic abstracts and artificial conventions. What if someone believed that this year was 1872? Would that be false?[13] According to naturalism, it cannot be true or false. There is no truth save that which we can measure with the hard sciences. How can the modus ponens be true? If Socrates is a philosopher, and all philosophers are mortal, then it follows that Socrates is mortal. How can this simple logical analysis be true, and continue to be true if there are no set logical laws in the universe? This is problematic. This idea, that only what can be measured with the hard sciences is true, is false, because it is an idea that you can't measure with the hard sciences, and is, thus, self-defeating. So, to say that naturalism is true, is anti-naturalistic! That is a paradox for naturalism. The very structure of the scientific enterprise today is a naturalistic one; consequently, it is no wonder that the soul, miracles and God are automatically dismissed as nonexistent or as the conjecture of religious people.

Third, objective ethics would be automatically eliminated. If naturalism is correct with its denial of non-physical reality, there can be no moral truths. Consequently, ethical relativism becomes the moral system. Rape would only be wrong if the society subjectively declared it to be wrong. If one were to deny objective ethical standards, the Nazis' experiments would be good since that subculture saw their actions as acceptable. These instances go against our intuitions and against the natural laws that have guided civilizations. Even many of us did not follow these rules, the rules still obtained. Thus to deny objective ethics is unscientific, or, conversely, naturalism provides the freedom to engage in atrocities in the name of science.

Forth, naturalistic scientists and philosophers do not allow naturalism to be challenged, thereby automatically making them, if not their theory, unscientific. Karl Popper, a famous philosopher of science, wrote, "the criterion

[13] Norman Geisler and Paul Feinberg, *Introduction to Philosophy*. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1980), 182.

of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability."[14] This is not to say that a theory must be shown to be false, but it must be possible to identify what would be the case if it were false. If we cannot or *are not allowed* to find the falsifiability, or refutability, or testability of naturalism, then, according to Popper, it is a not an authentic scientific theory. It is still not necessarily a false theory; but it is definitely not a scientific theory. (Although, to keep the record clear, I also believe it to be a false theory.)

Where does that leave the naturalists? I think Troy Cross of Yale University said it well in his review of Michael Rae's book, *World Without Design: The Ontological Consequences of Naturalism*: "If naturalism is to follow science wherever it leads … it cannot rule out specific kinds of entities [such as a soul] before science is complete. More generally, the problem is whether the science providing ontological guidance is *current* science or *ideal* science. If it is *current* science, then naturalism is probably false. If it is *ideal* science, then naturalism is metaphysically vacuous."[15] Cross says that "[e]pistemological naturalism fares no better. If it is at the mercy of future developments in science, it cannot follow science wherever it leads. But if it is immune to empirical results, then it is self-refuting, because it is just the sort of hypothesis that epistemic naturalism insists must be grounded on scientific investigation rather than armchair theorizing."[16] Now, I argue along the same lines that naturalism is a system that is postulating a theory and imposing it on the evidence. Thus, naturalism, by its own rules, is not science.

3. Naturalism Self-Defeated

According to the Alvin Plantinga's "Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism,"[17] the conjunction of the two theories of Darwinian evolution and

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[14] K. R. Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge* (London: Routledge, 1962), 37.

[15] See T. Crane and D. H. Mellor, "There Is No Question of Physicalism," *Mind* 99 (1990); cited in Tony Cross, review of Michael Rae, *World Without Design: The Ontological Consequences of Naturalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews* 2003.07.14.

[16] Cross, review of Michael Rae, *World Without Design*.

[17] For more information on this argument see A. Plantinga, *Warrant and Proper Function* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) chap. 12, A. Plantinga, "Naturalism Defeated," Unpublished manuscript, 1994, A. Plantinga, *Warranted Christian Belief* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 229-240, and *Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism*, J. Beilby, ed. (London: Cornell University Press, 2002).

naturalism (hereafter: **E & A**) on the one hand, and the belief that our cognitive faculties are reliable contributors of true beliefs on the other hand, are incompatible. On a Darwinian account of evolution there is no reason why the adaptive benefits of awareness and cognition should give rise to true beliefs rather than just survival beliefs. In the Darwinian account, the causal closure of the physical world is an assumed truth.

According to current evolutionary theory, we human beings, like other forms of life, have developed from aboriginal unicellular life by way of such mechanisms as natural selection and genetic drift working on sources of genetic variation, the most popularly accept factor being random genetic mutation. Natural selection discards most of these mutations (they prove deleterious to the organism in which they appear), but some turn out to have survival value and to enhance fitness; they spread through the population and persist. According to this story, it is by way of these mechanisms, or mechanisms very much like them, that all the vast variety of contemporary organic life has developed; and it is by way of these same mechanisms that our cognitive faculties have arisen.

The argument here is that our cognitive faculties, if they have arisen from **E & R**, are not a reliable mechanism, nor can they be trusted to be accurate about what they report in the sense of the information being true even if it is beneficial to survival. The fact that a belief aids in our survival does not mean that it is true belief, only a helpful one for the moment. Now, according to traditional Christian (and Jewish and Muslim) thought, we human beings have been created in the image of God. This means, among other things, that he created us with the capacity for achieving [true] *knowledge."*[18]

Plantinga's argument begins from certain doubts about the reliability of our cognitive faculties. A cognitive faculty—memory, perception, reason—is reliable if the majority of its deliverances are true. The reason we should doubt our cognitive faculties if we believe **E & R** is because natural selection doesn't care what you believe; it is interested only in how you behave. It selects for certain kinds of behavior, (i.e. those that enhance fitness) which is a measure of the chances that one's genes are widely represented in subsequent generations. It does not select for belief per se, except insofar as the latter is appropriately related to behaviour. Therefore, Plantinga says, it is not truth that our cognitive processes pursue, according to E & R **,** but survival.

[18] Alvin Plantinga, "Naturalism Defeated," manuscript.

Furthermore, just because some entity operates according to a survival instinct does not necessarily mean that all the information it conveys is true (in the sense that it the information corresponds to reality). Thus, since on a naturalistic account the probability that our cognitive mechanisms are reliable would be either low or inscrutable, we ought not to trust our reasoning abilities to give us accurate reports of truth claims regarding the world and/or our ideas. Thus, to say that naturalism is true, and to arrive at this truth from reason and to hold on to **E & R** at the same time, is inconsistent. Thus, the claim that "naturalism is true" is self-defeating. It cannot be true any more than any statements made by the naturalist can be true. Certain "truth-claims" can only, using evolutionary lingo, be "adaptively successful," but not necessarily true.

James Beilby wrote that, although the naturalist cannot produce an argument against Plantinga's argument, the naturalist has no reason that necessitates that he doubts his cognitive faculties in the first place.[19] This pragmatic objection, in my understanding, entails the assumption that it does not matter if our experiences or thoughts of the world are true, the only thing that matters is if they are useful for adaptive behaviour for natural selection and survival.

I asked Plantinga about this pragmatic objection levelled against his theory. Plantinga responded that his evolutionary argument against naturalism is not an argument against the naturalist who thinks that naturalism is pragmatic, but it is only against the naturalist who claims that naturalism is in fact true.[20] I take this reply to add an extra step. If the pragmatic naturalist tries to hold that his naturalism escapes Plantinga's argument, the naturalist would have to believe his own argument is not true, which is absurd. However if he believes it to be merely pragmatic, then he must also logically believe that the belief "it is pragmatic" is also true. Thus, this attempted route of escape leads him right back into the jaws of the same argument again.

Thus, we cannot rely on our cognitive facilities for truth claims about the world if naturalism and evolution are true, but equally we cannot rely on any cognitive facilities which suggest that naturalism is false if E & R is true. To suggest that naturalism is false is to make the truth claim "naturalism is false." This preceding sentence is either true or false, and the "evolutionary argument

[19] J. Beilby, "Alvin Plantinga's Pox on Metaphysical Naturalism," *Philosophia Christi* Vol. 5, No.1 (2003) : 131-142.

[20] Personal meeting with Plantinga in his office at the University of Notre Dame, May 4th 2004.

against naturalism" shows that we cannot trust our facilities at all if **E & R** is true about anything.

Approximately forty years before Plantinga's argument was published, Richard Taylor, (now deceased) Professor of Philosophy at Union College, gave an interesting thought experiment regarding something similar to the EAAN. Taylor asked us to imagine that the sign welcoming visitors to Wales, "THE BRITISH RAILWAYS WELCOMES YOU TO WALES," is an accidental coincidence of nature. If it is an accidental coincidence, then we have no reason, argues Taylor, to trust its veracity. The stones have no purpose such that we think they do, that is, to welcome visitors to Wales. Taylor argues that if you were to believe that the stones did give you a reason, a true reason to believe you were entering Wales, then you must also believe that they were arranged by an intelligent entity with a *telos* or purpose in mind, namely to welcome visitors to Wales. However,

> it would be irrational for you to regard the arrangement of the stones as evidence that you were entering Wales, and at the same time to suppose that they might have come to have that arrangement accidentally, that is, as the result of the ordinary interactions of natural or physical forces. If, for instance, they came to be so arranged over the course of time, simply by rolling down the hill, one by one, and finally just happening to end up that way, or if they were strewn upon the ground that way by the forces of an earthquake or storm or whatnot, then their arrangement would in no sense constitute evidence that you were entering Wales, or for anything whatever unconnected with themselves.[21]

I would add that it is irrational to believe that any sign that is accidentally formed, that is, has a non-purposeful origin, be it in an ancient pyramid or in a downtown subway in London or New York, would also have a true (corresponding to reality) referent. For example, imagine that I found some writing in an ancient pyramid. With the help of the expertise of some archaeologist and linguists, I deciphered the writing to indicate the following: "Below the black sarcophagus, which is buried 50 meters under the gold one, you will find a tunnel leading to the pharaoh's most treasured possession." If, after digging, I found a black sarcophagus with a tunnel underneath leading toward a greater treasure, I would be *irrational* to suppose that the message had been

[21] See R. Taylor, *Metaphysics* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963), 96-102.

accidentally formed. But, for this belief of mine to be rational, I must believe that the message was designed by an intelligent agent. That is Taylor's thesis.[22]

Taylor says that some people may object, namely naturalists, holding that we can, in fact, trust our minds because we found our cognitive faculties reliable in the past, and thus have a sound reason for trusting them now. Taylor says this thinking is "absurd, if not question-begging." [23]

Taylor argues that truths that have survival values are not the same as truths that are reasonable or have a purpose. He argues that his argument is not based on religious but metaphysical and philosophical considerations. One cannot imply that a personal God exists from these considerations, he argues.[24] I think that it does not prove a personal God *directly*, but it at least it shows that once again that the EAAN is sound and that naturalism, as is it being presented, is false or question begging.

It is important to point out that the EAAN does not claim that, if our cognitive faculties have arisen from determined forces, they cannot give us adequate rational accounts of the world. That argument is the claim that determinism is self-defeating because if it is true, then the person who arrived at that truth, is himself determined and cannot trust his own rational faculties to

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[22] He then applies this observation to the human cognitive facilities:
"We saw that it would be irrational for anyone to say both that the marks he found on a stone had a natural, nonpurposeful origin and also that they reveal some truth with respect to something other than themselves, something that is not merely inferred from them. One cannot rationally believe both of these things. So also, it is now suggested, it would be irrational for one to say both that his sensory and cognitive faculties had a natural, nonpurposeful origin and also that they reveal some truth with respect to something other than themselves, something that is not merely inferred from them. If their origin can be entirely accounted for in terms of chance variations, natural selection, and so on, without supposing that they somehow embody and express the purposes of some creative being, then the most we can say of them is that they exist, that they are complex and wondrous in their construction, and are perhaps in other respects interesting and remarkable. We cannot say that they are, entirely by themselves, reliable guides to any truth whatever, save only what can be inferred from their own structure and arrangement. If, on the other hand, we do assume that they are guides to some truths having nothing to do with themselves, then it is difficult to see how we can, consistently with that supposition, believe them to have arisen by accident, or by the ordinary workings of purposeless forces, even over ages of time.
[23] Ibid., 102.
[24] Ibid., 100-101.

arrive at a true argument.[25] However, and I agree with Richard Swinburne, that this argument has "no force at all."[26] If a person or a computer's intelligence is determined, this fact does not mean that they cannot logically calculate a formula, and that their conclusion must be false, unreliable or illogical. In the same way, a man may hear good arguments and wilfully accept them while being determined to do so, and yet be justified in believing what he arrived at. Swinburne writes of a conversation he had with Rodger Penrose, author of the *Emperor's New Mind*[27] and *Shadows of the Mind*,[28] that the brain "contains an essentially non-algorithmic element. This would imply that the future would not be computable from the present, even though it might be determined by it."[29]

This argument involving determinism is not the argument presented by Plantinga and Taylor. They are *not* arguing that if our cognitive facilities are determined that they cannot deliver truth rather they argue that if our cognitive facilities are determined by blind forces then we cannot be rational to believe that they can give us a trustworthy account of reality. If we wish to trust them, then we must also believe that there was an intelligent agent who created them. **N&E** vigorously deny this inference. If **N&E** are true, then our cognitive facilities should only give us adaptive information about the world that may or may not be

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[25] This was C. S. Lewis's argument against Elizabeth Anscombe in his book *Miracles*, which he subsequently took back and revised in a 2nd edition. It is available from many different publishers.

[26] R. Swinburne, *The Evolution of the Soul*, Revised ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 233.

[27] (London: Penguin Books, 1991).

[28] (London: Vintage, Random House, 1995).

[29] *Emperor's New Mind*, 431, quoted in Richard Swinburne, *The Evolution of the Soul* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 353; Karl Popper writes, referring to J.B.S. Haldane, ". . . if materialism is true, it seems to me that we cannot know that it is true. If my opinions are the result of the chemical processes going on in my brain, they are determined by the laws of chemistry, not logic."(J. B. S. Haldane, *The Inequality of Man* [London: Chatto & Windus, 1932], 157, cited in K. Popper and J. C. Eccles, *The Self and Its Brain*, [London: Routledge, 1977], 75). Halden subsequently repented of this assertion. Popper says this is an argument against determinism not [naturalism], however Popper revives the argument on pages 75-81 of his book with Eccles, *The Self and Its Brain*.) Popper gives the example of the computer. It was designed by intelligent people, and thus the argument does not work for it. If a lion arrived at a logically good choice it would be by accident not by intelligent deliberation. Also, he points out that the laws of logic that hold the naturalist's argument together are not physically located laws, yet real nonetheless. If naturalism is true it cannot be true based on logical laws because concrete, that is real, logical laws, which make things rational, cannot exist in a materialist world, but only in our minds as artificial conventions.

true, and the veracity of any other information is low or inscrutable, and thus unreliable.[30]

What about the evolutionary rationalization of consciousness? The evolutionary naturalists may hold that our patterns of beliefs/desires/actions are rational ones. They are causal features that can be explained by the evolutionary benefits of rationality. Again, the argument is not that our desires are rational, in the sense of them being practical, but that the probability that our cognitive mechanisms are reliable indicators of true claims (aside from practical and survival value) is either low or inscrutable, and thus they cannot be trusted to be *true* accounts of the world. The EAAN does not refute the naturalist who holds that beliefs/desires/actions are practical for living, but the naturalist who insists that naturalism and evolution are in fact true.

Yet most naturalist philosophers do posit mental states and hold to **N&E**. Thus, they destabilize their own position in two ways 1) if **N&E** are true then they cannot trust their cognitive facilities to give them true accounts of the world (aside from practical and survival value) and 2) if **N&E** are true then mental events are irrelevant to concrete intentional and phenomenal events in which we human beings participate daily. Both of these conclusions are anti-intuitive, but must be true if **N&E** are true.

I close with what Howard Robinson perceptively wrote in 1982:

> [T]he materialist makes a show of being tough-minded. He is in fact a dogmatist, obedient not to the authority of reason, but to a certain picture of the world. That picture is hypnotising but terrifying: the world as a machine of which we are all insignificant parts. Many people share Nagel's fear of this world view, but, like Nagel, are cowed into believing that it must be true (T, Nagel ""Physicalism," *Philosophical Review*, 74 [1965] : 340) But reason joins with every other constructive human instinct in telling us that it is false and that only a parochial and servile attitude towards physical science can mislead anyone into believing it. To opt for materialism is to choose to

[30] Even Roger Penrose, a professor of mathematics at the University of Oxford is sympathetic to this idea. Daniel Dennett wrote of Penrose, "If our brains were equipped with algorithms, Penrose argues, natural selection would have to have designed those algorithms, but, [Penrose wrote] "The 'robust' specifications are the ideas that underlie the algorithms. But ideas are things that, as far as we know, need conscious minds for their manifestation"" (R. Penrose, *The Emperor's New Mind*, 415, cited in D. Dennett, *Darwin's Dangerous Idea* [New York,: NY: TouchStone, 1995], 447).

believe something obnoxious, against the guidance of reason. This is not tough-minded, but a wilful preference for a certain form of soulless, false and destructive modernism.[31]

[31] H. Robinson, *Matter and Science: A Critique of Contemporary Materialism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 125.