Some Fallibilist

Conceptions of Rationality:

An Intuitive Approach

Thomas A. Provenzola

Proponents of Cartesian notions of the indubitability of beliefs, and the evidentialist corollary of proportioning one's beliefs to the evidence, argue that a belief is rational for a person only if that person has sufficient evidence, arguments, or reasons for that belief. Sufficient evidence under this conception of rationality typically follows a classical foundationalist system of justification which argues that the belief that p is rational if and only if p is (1) self-evident, evident to the senses, or incorrigible, or else (2) inferable from a set of beliefs that are self-evident, evident to the senses, or incorrigible. In order to be rational about one's beliefs, a person must be able to trace all of one's non-basic beliefs back to self-presenting basic beliefs that coerce, either rationally or probabilistically, one's non-basic beliefs. This approach to rationality carries with it profound implications for the possibility of rational belief, including theistic belief. It seems, after all, that the possibility of actually having a rational belief on this account is dismal, to say the least, if not neigh unto impossible. Most non-theistic evidentialists, for example, argue that theistic belief does not satisfy the criteria for rationality because it typically fails to supply the sufficient evidence required to maintain it.

Perhaps we can increase the prospects of rational belief, whether theistic or otherwise, by taking some initial steps to tame the ubiquitous demands of the principle of sufficient evidence so characteristic of modern conceptions of rationality. The purpose of this paper is to suggest that one can arrive at a model of rationality in which sufficient evidence for the rationality of a person's beliefs, including theistic

belief, incorporates a reason-based conception of justification which *may* coincide with, but *need not*, a person's *attempts* to offer rationally convincing evidence that one's beliefs are true or certain. On another level, being rational about one's beliefs involves attempts to marshal enough of the appropriate kind, quality, and amount of evidence so as to be so rationally convinced of the truth or certainty of a given belief that one can no longer maintain a reasonable doubt.[1]

It seems intuitively reasonable that if a person is considered rational in holding a belief, we would expect that person to hold it on the basis of sufficient evidence, that is, on the basis of good reasons, evidence or arguments. Sufficient evidence on this conception is evidence offered to show that one does have good reasons for one's beliefs, and that those reasons are not arbitrary. Furthermore, this sense of rationality maintains that it is not rational to hold a belief in the absence of sufficient evidence or on the basis of blind faith. But there is another sense in which to be rational about one's beliefs involves the process of *verification*, that is, attempts to marshal enough of the appropriate kind, quality, and amount of evidence so as to be so rationally convinced of the truth or certainty of a given belief that one can no longer maintain a reasonable doubt. In this sense of the term, to be rational about one's beliefs, one is at least attempting to be *right* about one's belief. And while one can be rational without actually verifying a belief by marshaling the appropriate kind, quality, and amount of evidence, or even *attempting* to verify one's beliefs as true (e.g., one can be rational simply by having goods reasons for one's beliefs), there is also a sense in which being rational about one's belief involves being in a position to verify one's beliefs as true on the basis of good arguments and evidence. In other words, there is a sense in which rationality involves a reason-based conception of justification which *may* coincide with, but need *not*, attempts to establish the truth or certainty of a proposition.

This approach to rationality recognizes that it is too high a standard to maintain that one is rational in holding a belief only when a person has in fact *verified* (i.e., marshaled the appropriate evidence) that belief as true or certain. One may be rational in holding a belief arising out of a reason-based conception of justification in which sufficient evidence can rest on other basic or non-basic beliefs, or it can rest on

mental or perceptual states for which a person believes he has good reasons to think are true, even if a person makes no attempt to verify his beliefs as true, or even if those beliefs, mental states, or perceptual states turn out to be false. So long as a person holds those beliefs for reasons he *thinks* are likely true (a seemingly intuitive minimal criterion for a reason), he is rational in holding them. This model of rationality further suggests that the more likely it is that others will challenge the truthfulness of a belief due to insufficient or underdetermined evidence, the more one is expected to provide evidence for that belief if one is to be rational in holding it, although that evidence need not be indubitable or involve conclusive arguments.[2] It also suggests that, given insufficient or underdetermined data, a person is more likely to be rational in holding such a belief more tentatively. So while our model of rationality allows room for the possibility that some of a person's beliefs may be provisional on evidence, it does not expect this possibility to be a governing criterion for the rationality of one's beliefs.

And finally, we will suggest that our model of rationality can follow a broadly foundationalist structure, while refraining from the stronger forms of foundationalism, which require that all non-basic beliefs must be inferred from a privileged set of self-justifying beliefs.[3]

Rationality and Certainty

Crucial to our model of rationality is the notion that a statement's truth is not the same thing as its certainty. The truth of any statement is a different matter from whether or not it can in fact be verified as true. On our model of rationality, we have been arguing that the Enlightenment idea of Cartesian certainty (i.e., one in which the evidence for a belief leads to the infallibility or indubitability of that belief) is far too rigorous a criterion to be workable. This would seem to suggest that a more workable model should lessen the requirement for what counts as sufficient evidence for justification and rationality. Part

of suggesting such a model relies on important distinctions between objective and subjective certainty.[4]

Stated briefly, objective certainty relates to the matter of truth and certainty, that is, whether a person has a right to say something is in fact verified.[5] Objective certainty has to do with the amount, kind, and quality of evidence that is marshaled for the truth of a proposition. Subjective certainty, on the other hand, has to do with the degree of persuasion or conviction a person has, that is, the degree of certitude one has about the truthfulness of a given proposition. Subjective certainty deals with the psychological factors a person brings to the matter of a proposition's truth. Of course, in our model of rationality, the goal is to have one's subjective certainty stem from objective certainty, that is, the degree to which a statement can be verified on evidence. But we face the problem that subjective certainty can come about from factors not related to the verification of a proposition. One may choose to be subjectively certain for all kinds of reasons not related to the quality and quantity of the evidence. One may, for example, go against what the evidence seems to suggest, or choose to be subjectively certain even when there is insufficient evidence for the belief in question.

When considering the matter of certainty and the rationality of one's belief, we are primarily concerned with the amount and kind of evidence available for the truth of a given proposition. This is what is meant by objective certainty. But to have an idea of what that evidence might look like, one must distinguish between different kinds of statements and the manner in which the available evidence argues for or against them. And it is here that we can glean from notions from the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein.

Wittgenstein argued that some statements (e.g., "I have a mind") are beyond any question of doubt because they are so foundational that we cannot imagine the kind of evidence that could reasonably be marshaled against them.[6] This is what is said of analytic statements (e.g., statements of math and logic). Analytic statements (i.e., statements which assert that some relation among ideas exists, that, for example, 2+2=4) are true by definition. Such statements have 100 percent objective certainty. In other words, we are saying that there is no other kind of evidence that could be marshaled in favor of their certainty.

Other statements, however, can be doubted on a meaningful basis, although one may be in a position to marshal enough of the appropriate kind of evidence to be rationally convinced that it no longer makes sense to doubt them. This is the case with synthetic statements, that is, assertions of empirical matters of fact. The difference here is that a person can, at most, marshal 99 percent objective certainty for synthetic statements. It is always possible that some future evidence could count against one's belief, even though a person does not expect that to be the case. So when one is considering whether it is rational to hold a given synthetic statement, one is concerned with the extent to which one can marshal sufficient evidence (i.e., objective certainty) to conclude that a proposition of this sort has a 99 percent probability (or as close to it as possible) of being true.

Wittgenstein's notions on objective and subjective certainty are designed to show that doubting and proving are matters of objective certainty, while the conviction that something is true is a matter of subjective certainty. He argues that the *kind* of certainty is the kind of language-game (i.e., objective certainty).[7] The emphasis here is on the distinction between the *kind* of certainty and the *degree* of certainty. The point of this distinction is to show that one can achieve subjective certainty (i.e., the conviction that a statement is true) to the same degree in the language-game of religion, history, or science as in the language-game of mathematics and logic, but the kind of objective certainty upon which it is based will differ. In other words, the methods a person uses to verify the statements of math and logic (along with one's awareness of the kind of evidence appropriate to such statements) are different from those used in science or history, because the language-games are different. So when a person claims to have subjective certainty about a given synthetic statement (whether in science, philosophy, or religion), that claim is rational to the extent to which he is aware of the appropriate evidence for that belief, together with the extent to which his conviction that the belief is true is based on the kind and quality of evidence marshaled for that belief (i.e., its objective certainty).

It is important to note that if a person has 99 percent objective certainty of a synthetic statement, there is no sense in which he can be more objectively certain about it. So he is rational in being as

subjectively certain about that belief as he is about some analytic statement. But a further question for rationality has to do with cases in which we have less than 99 percent objective certainty relative to empirical matters of fact. What degree of subjective certainty is allowed in these cases if a cognizer is to remain rational in holding such beliefs? This is a more difficult matter to ascertain. If the way one goes about obtaining objective certainty in the language-games of religion, science, or history is different than the way one goes about getting objective certainty in math or logic, as Wittgenstein suggests, then the matter of how one knows whether there is appropriate evidence upon which to establish a statement's truth will differ according to the language-game in question.

In response to Wittgenstein, we may suggest that there are appropriate kinds of evidence and appropriate amounts of evidence when considering the objective certainty of specific synthetic statements. The appropriate *kind* of evidence is evidence relevant to the issue under discussion, evidence that is true, and evidence that is used properly when structuring one's argument. As to the appropriate *amount* of evidence, we may suggests that the evidence is sufficient when the evidence of the appropriate kind is so rationally convincing that it no longer makes sense to hold a reasonable doubt.[8] Of course, with synthetic statements, we will not always have enough evidence to make them rationally convincing. But for those instances in which enough objective certainty has been marshaled for the truth of a statement, it makes no sense to continue doubting until one thinks some *final explanation* has been reached. The reason for this is because a person may already have that explanation and simply not realize it, or he may have no idea of what that explanation might look like should it be offered. In the final analysis, we cannot determine in advance the specific amount of argumentation or evidence that is required for a person to know whether there is an appropriate amount of evidence to establish a statement's truth.[9]

On our model of rationality, then, it seems reasonable to suggest that a person is rational in holding one's beliefs when one retains the degree of rational conviction that is warranted by the objective certainty (i.e., the appropriate kinds, quality, and amounts of evidence). This will have much to do with the quality of the evidence or arguments. This is

easier to accomplish in the language-games of math and logic, since the kinds of procedures one uses to determine an analytic statement's truth involve rational proofs and the possibility of uncovering contradictions in arguments. So one may be in a better position to offer evidence for the objective certainty of analytic statements (and consequently have a right to a greater degree of subjective certainty about them) than for the synthetic propositions of theism. But this does not rule out the possibility of one being equally subjectively certain about the statements of theism, or at least having a degree of subjective certainty that is consistent with the evidence.

Furthermore, while our model of rationality can accept certain aspects about the distinctions between objective and subjective certainty, we are not forced to conclude with Wittgenstein that the language-game of theism does not deal with factual claims that are open to being verified or falsified on evidence.[10] One does present evidence for the synthetic claims of theism; they are in fact synthetic and in need of inductive procedures for verification, but they are, nonetheless, assertions like those of science, history, and philosophy. As Wittgenstein asserts, once a certain degree of evidence is produced, it is difficult to imagine how we can hold a reasonable doubt with respect to the statement's truth. In other words, it makes little rational sense to question whether objective certainty warrants subjective certainty, and that is true whether we are considering statements of history, science, mathematics, or religion.[11] If one can marshal 99 percent objective certainty for a synthetic statement's truth, one is warranted in having complete subjective certainty of the statement's *truth*, even though it is synthetic. But we cannot be as dogmatic about such statements where the objective certainty is not as strong. Still it is important to point out that a statement's truth does not depend on either subjective or objective certainty. Rather, a statement's truth is a matter of whether it satisfies certain conditions and referents in the world. And we simply may not be in a position to verify a statement as true.

The above distinctions help to clarify the matter of what kind of evidence is sufficient if one is to be rational about one's beliefs. Furthermore, a good deal of our synthetic statements will be based on less conclusive evidence, and there still may be legitimate room for doubt and explanation. Nevertheless, although the evidence for one's

belief may be public, a given person's investigation of it may be wrong or just underdetermine the issue. And while this is certainly possible, it can be held in check when we do our investigating and theorizing (whether theistic, scientific, or otherwise) in community. That is, if the public evidence is conclusive in one direction, then its probability of falsehood is not high, and doubting, proof and explanation must end at some point.[12]

Rationality and Justification

What, then, is the relationship between rationality and justification? It is difficult to deny the cognitively intuitive sense that we regularly hold true beliefs while also holding those beliefs in the absence of adequate reasons and reliable processes. If I only feel a hunch that my friend is holding four aces in his hand, my belief, while it may turn out to be true, is not based on good reasons or evidence. In contrast, my friend, because he can see the cards in his hands, has more than likely appealed to the best evidence that his cognitive equipment has to offer for saying that he is holding four aces. We would say that he has *perceptual grounds* for his belief. So while both beliefs are true, only my friend has appealed to reasons consistent with objective certainty.[13]

This suggests that we perhaps need a rational model that illustrates more intuitively the exact nature of justification and its relation to verification. *Epistemic justification* is the cognitive procedure of offering acceptable *reason-giving* answers in support of our beliefs and claims to knowledge. On our model of rationality, justification involves the reasons, evidence, or arguments (i.e., the objective certainty to which one appeals) for holding a given belief. Where possible, it *may* involve attempts to verify one's beliefs as true with good arguments and appropriate evidence. But it does not necessarily *demand* that a person verify a belief as true, or even *attempt* to verify a belief as true. And this points to a significant distinction in our proposed model of rationality. There are two different senses in which a person can be rational in holding a belief. In the first place, as earlier indicated, there is a sense in which rationality is tied to the stronger notions of truth

and certainty. In this sense of rationality, one is rational in holding a belief in virtue of the fact that one has verified one's belief as true by appealing to the appropriate kind, quality, and amount of evidence for the belief in question. In such a case, it no longer makes sense to say that one's belief does not satisfy the conditions of being rational. One can do no better than to verify one's belief as true on the evidence.

But there is another sense in which rationality relates to the matter of justification, and this sense of rationality is not identical to the first. It is clear that we are not always in a position to verify a belief as true, but we are typically in a position to offer reasons for why we think our beliefs are true. In doing so, we are dealing with a sense of rationality in which one is rational for holding a belief that, while not *verified* as true (a matter of objective certainty), one is at least *attempting* to offer a reason-based conception for why he thinks it is true. In making this distinction, it is important to recognize that a rational (or justified) belief is not necessarily the same thing as knowledge. The reason for this is because, on our model of rationality, justification can lead to knowledge only if a person has in fact verified a belief as true by marshaling enough of the appropriate kind of evidence for it. But a person's *approach* to epistemic justification is a different thing from one's *ability* to verify a given belief. And further, one's approach to justification does not necessarily determine one's theory of truth. So, given our notion of objective certainty, if a person's verification of a belief provides good reasons for believing it, then such a person has adequate justification for claiming that one's belief is knowledge.

While we may agree that hunches, guesses, conjectures, and wishful thinking do not yield cases of knowledge even if they are true, there is still the matter of what *reasons* a person must have for a belief if she is thought to be rationally justified in holding that belief. On our model of rationality, we have been arguing that one can be rational in believing a proposition without verifying it or attempting to verify it. Of course, one can be rational in holding a belief in which one's reason-based conception of justification coincides with attempts to verify one's belief as true or certain in light of the appropriate available evidence, but this is not necessary for justification. What this means is that one can be justified in holding a belief that he has not in fact verified, that is, verified in terms of offering public, unbiased rational

or empirical evidence. Furthermore, it does not mean that any reason offered for a belief must be irrefutable if that belief is to be justified. It is difficult to argue against the simple thesis that a person may be rationally justified in believing x at time t given a background set of beliefs y. So while a person's belief *may* be justified without verifying it as true, or even attempting to verify it, nevertheless, it is not held arbitrarily or without some basis in reason.

So on our model of rationality, justification is a reason-based conception in which a person could hold a false belief but be justified in doing so.[14] As stated above, this does not necessarily mean that one's reasons will be right, but it does suggest that one has reasons for one's beliefs, reasons he thinks make that belief true. They can be reasons based on other beliefs a person thinks are true, but they can also be based in other nondoxastic states, that is, states of mind other than one's other beliefs of which a person is in some way aware. As John Pollock reminds us, for example, a person may be aware that reasoning according to *modus ponens* is somehow a correct cognitive process, and yet initially not go so far as to form a belief about it.[15] But once again, a person's justification for a belief can be a different matter from a belief's truthfulness or certainty. But in the same way that a statement's truthfulness does not depend on a person's ability to verify it, so, too, a person's reasons for being justified about a given belief do not depend on its truthfulness, or even the kind of objective certainty that could verify the belief.

Can a person be rational, then, in holding a belief for which she is *not* justified? If we mean by justification, at the very least, the reasons that a person offers for a belief, that is, reasons that are thought consistent with the kinds of reasons people typically give for their everyday putative beliefs, then a person is rational in holding only a belief for which there is some level of justification for it. But as our model of rationality suggests, the reasons that a person offers in support of a belief can be considered justified only to the extent that they are reasons which a person *thinks* are true. Such reasons may seem initially intuitive to a person. Reasons can also be based on testimony, or authority, or especially prior beliefs that one already accepts as true. Reasons are also based in perception, or memory, or some other experiential or rational state of which a person is aware.

But the point is that a person thinks she has some non-arbitrary reasons for thinking that her belief is true, even if it turns out to be false.

Summary and Conclusion

Must the rationality and justification of a cognitive belief (theistic or otherwise), then, conform to the standards of certainty and evidentialism associated with Enlightenment epistemology? It seems that we are not rationally compelled to accept this thesis. Rather, we have seen that a person's justification for a belief may be based in various kinds of reasons, such as a child's being told something by its parent, or a student by his teacher. Justification can be doxastic, that is, it can be based on a person's other beliefs. But it can be more than this. It can be nondoxastic, that is, it can be based on factors in addition to or apart from a person's other beliefs, so long as a person is offering reasons for her beliefs. So when a person seeks to justify a belief on some reason-based conception, those reasons may take a variety of acceptable forms, whether rational evidence, perceptual evidence, beliefs of memory, or from merely having some level of awareness about one's mental states.

Additionally, the criteria for rationality outlined above calls for a modified form of foundationalism. It argues that the features of foundationalist theories, that is, its conceptions of truth, evidence, the doxastic and nondoxastic relation among beliefs, objectivity, and the rationality from which it receives its epistemic structure, are essentially correct. While certain modifications and revisions of the epistemic and rational features of foundationalist theories may prove necessary, one may argue that there is still an essentially foundationalist structure for rational belief that does not conform to the tentative and provisional status of beliefs. And further still, we can agree with Alvin Plantinga's critiques of classical foundationalism that it is difficult to arrive at agreement on the criteria for basic beliefs, and conclude that we are not necessarily forced to trace all our non-basic beliefs back to basic beliefs.[16] This is not to say that a person *could not* trace one's non-basic beliefs back to basic beliefs, but rather, that there is no need to do so once enough evidence has been supplied.

In addition, as we have indicated above, our proposed notion of rationality argues for two respects or senses of rationality which are not identical: the first sense of rationality involves truth and certainty, that is, what we have been calling verification in the sense of objective certainty. But there is also a second sense of rationality that involves justification without attempts to verify a belief as true on evidence. In both respects, we are referring to what amounts to a modified or moderate foundationalism. The reasons for this are modest in nature. In the first place, as it has been suggested earlier, not all non-basic beliefs need to be traced back to basic beliefs for their justification. All we need do is supply sufficient reasons or explanations. This allows us to circumvent the stronger forms of evidentialism, while continuing to offer evidence, reasons, and explanations for our beliefs and theories.

And secondly, moderate foundationalism is a fallibilist position that is not committed to the indefeasibility of foundational beliefs. That is, one is open to the possibility that further evidence could show a given belief to be false, even though it is not expected that such will be the case. Such an epistemic structure argues for a fallibilist system in at least three ways. First, one's foundational beliefs may turn out to be unjustified *or* false, or unjustified *and* false; second, non-basic (or inferential) beliefs are only inductively, and consequently fallibly, justified by foundational beliefs. One's non-foundational beliefs can turn out false, even when the foundational beliefs from which they are inferred are true; and third, the possibility of discovering error, even among foundational beliefs, is left open.[17]

In addition, a fallibilist position raises the further question of the manner in which evidence relates to a person's foundational beliefs. If it is granted that there is always the possibility of discovering error among one's basic beliefs, then it seems reasonable to suggest that a person may at some point legitimately reassess those beliefs in light of additional evidence. That is, if at some later point, at least for me, my basic beliefs are challenged by me, I may apply evidence against those beliefs in a manner similar to the way in which I apply evidence against my non-basic beliefs. For example, as my wife and I frantically rush out the door to do our Christmas shopping, I may have the basic perceptual belief that the book I put in my front pocket is in fact the check book. This seems to meet the criteria for a belief that

is evident to my senses, and as such, it rightfully belongs among my basic beliefs. But suppose my wife challenges my basic belief. She suggests that it's quite possible that the book I have in my pocket is the savings book, and not the checking book that I perceived it to be. She reminds me that both books have blue covers, look exactly the same on the outside, and are kept in the same drawer. What choice do I have but to quickly open the book to see if the transactions recorded in the book's register are what we would expect them to be if it is in fact the check book? In such a case, it is difficult to know whether my basic belief continues to remain among my foundational beliefs. But it seems reasonable to suggest that, should I be in a position to marshal enough of the appropriate kind of evidence so as to satisfy my own challenge and become so rationally convinced that it no longer makes sense to reasonably maintain a doubt, then there seems to be no good reason why my belief cannot once again resume its place among the basic beliefs of my noetic structure.

Furthermore, since the coherence among one's beliefs plays a significant role in what is rational for a person to believe in a fallibilist position, then *incoherence* among one's beliefs may defeat verification or knowledge, even of a foundational belief. For example, my justification for believing that unicorns do not exist prevents me from remaining justified in believing that there is one in front of me. Coherence may also account for an increasing number of independent mutually consistent factors a cognizer believes to support the truth of a proposition. My justification for believing that the bag of apples is from the Clarkes, for example, increases with each new belief I acquire, all of which independently support that conclusion. Perhaps the Clarkes are good friends and are known to own a small apple orchard just outside of town. Perhaps further, they are often known to drop off bags of apples bearing a label of the family name at the homes of their friends. And further still, perhaps I have recently learned from my wife that the Clarkes have graciously agreed to supply apples for the town's apple pie bakeoff contest at the weekend community fair. Since coherence increases with each newly acquired belief in support of one's initial belief, one's being rational in holding the initial belief is further increased, even though one could ultimately be wrong about one's inferences. Perhaps, for example, I later learn from

my wife that she used an empty bag bearing a label of the Clarkes' family name to purchase apples from the market. At such a point, my earlier coherence is now defeated.[18] But while fallibilism grants that incoherence can defeat the verification of foundational beliefs, it does not regard coherence as a basic source of justification. Coherence by itself is not sufficient for justification.

　　To be sure, the conceptual qualifications offered in our model of rationality are quite modest in relation to the broader field of epistemology, but it is not unreasonable to think that the Christian theist can benefit from such a conception in bolstering a more effective apologetic. A good apologetic must be reflective if it is to be effective, and correctly thinking through the categories of rationality go a long way in this direction.

Notes

1.　The model of rationality under consideration was initially conceived as a synthesis of the epistemologies of Nancey Murphy, *Theology in the Age of Scientific Reasoning* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990); Alvin Plantinga, "Is Belief in God Properly Basic?" *Nous* 15, no.1 (March 1981); "Reason and Belief in God," in *Faith and Rationality*, ed. Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983) ; "Epistemic Justification," *Nous* 20 (1986); and Richard Swinburne, *The Existence of God* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) and *Faith and Reason* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981).

2.　See, for example, Paul K. Moser, Dwayne H. Mulder, and J. D. Trout, *The Theory of Knowledge: A Thematic Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 185. The authors suggest that such a model of rationality aims at the twofold cognitive goal of achieving truth in the correspondence sense and avoiding error.

3.　For a similar and extended treatment of the use of modified foundationalism in fallibilist conceptions of rationality, see Steven L. Porter, *Restoring the Foundations of Epistemic Justification: A Direct Realist and Conceptualist Theory of Foundationalism* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006).

4.　For a helpful discussion on the standards employed in objective investigations, see Israel Scheffler, *Science and Subjectivity* (Indianapolis, ID:Hackett Publishing Company, 1982). Cf., John S. Feinberg, "Rationality, Objectivity, and Doing Theology: Review and Critique of Wentzel van Huyssteen's *Theology and the Justification of Faith*," *Trinity Journal* 10 (Fall 1989): 161-84.

5. Questions of the distinctions and relations of objective certainty to subjective certainty, including the role of language-games, are extensively treated in Ludwig Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), sect. 559, p. 73 and sect. 257, p. 34 and several other sections and *Philosophical Investigations* (New York: Macmillan, 1968), p. 224, sect. 87, pp. 40-41, and p. 180. Wittgenstein's notions are effectively utilized with critical modifications in John S. Feinberg, "Truth: Relationship of Theories of Truth to Hermeneutics," in *Hermeneutics, Inerrancy, and the Bible*, ed. Earl D. Radmacher and Robert D. Preus (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1984): 20-24 and 46, notes 60-62. I offer here a brief summary of Feinberg's discussion.

6. Feinberg, "Truth," 21.

7. Wittgenstein, *Investigations*, 224e. Cf., John S. Feinberg, "Noncognitivism: Wittgenstein," in *Biblical Errancy: An Analysis of its Philosophical Roots*, ed. Norman L. Geisler (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1981), 184-5.

8. Feinberg, "Truth," 46, n. 62.

9. Ibid.

10. See, for example, Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*, ed. Cyril Barret (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966), 61-2.

11. Feinberg, "Truth," 21. Cf., Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, sect. 257, 34; and Wittgenstein, *Investigations*, sect. 87, 40-41 and 180.

12. Wittgenstein, Investigations, 180.

13. Louis P. Pojman, *What Can We Know? An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1995), 8.

14. See Stephen Robert Jacobson, "What's Wrong with Reliability Theories of Justification?" (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1989), 122.

15. Cf., John L. Pollock and Joseph Cruz, ed. *Contemporary Theories of Knowledge*, 2nd ed. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999), 25.

16. See, for example, Alvin Plantinga, "Is Belief in God Properly Basic?", in *Contemporary Perspectives in Religious Epistemology*, ed. R. Douglas Geivett and Brendan Sweetman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 135, and "Is Belief in God Rational?" in *Rationality and Religious Belief*, ed. C. F. Delaney (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), 7-27.

17. See Robert Audi, *The Structure of Justification* (Cambridge University Press, 1993), 135.

18. Robert Audi, *Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge* (New York & London: Routledge, 1998), 205.