THE KENOTIC THEORY

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

THEOLOGICAL OUTLINES. THREE VOLUMES.

VOL. I. THE DOCTRINE OF GOD.

VOL. II. THE DOCTRINE OF MAN AND OF THE GOD-MAN.

VOL. III. THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH AND OF LAST THINGS.

THE HISTORICAL POSITION OF THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH.

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THE KENOTIC THEORY

CONSIDERED WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO ITS ANGLICAN FORMS AND ARGUMENTS

BY THE

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PREFACE

THE writer is much indebted to the Rev. Dr. Bright, Regius Professor of Ecclesiastical History in the University of Oxford, for a series of letters containing valuable hints and criticisms. And he wishes to thank him most earnestly for his kind permission to make quotations from these letters. A number of such quotations appear in the footnotes of this work.

He also desires to thank the Rt. Rev. W. E. McLaren, D.D., D.C.L., Bishop of Chicago; the Rev. Wm. J. Gold, S.T.D., of Chicago; the Venerable Archdeacon Taylor, of Springfield, Illinois, and the Rev. J. R. Broughton, of Taunton, Somerset, for kind encouragement and criticism.

Finally, he wishes to acknowledge kind assistance in proof-reading by the Rev. D. F. Smith, of Evanston, Illinois.

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II. The immediate and permanent result of the Incarnation is the Hypostatic Union of two natures, one truly Divine, the other perfectly human, inseparably and unconfusedly united in one Divine Person. Christ is whole in both natures.

III. This involves the *Communicatio idiomatum*, or predication of all the properties and operations of our Lord's two natures to His undivided Person. Luther's perversion of this truth corrected by Scripture and the Fathers. It justifies our attributing Divine and human power and knowledge to the same Christ simultaneously.

IV. Another consequence is the doctrine that our Lord possessed two wills and two operations—two powers and two knowledges—during His humiliation. Not as possessing both in each nature, but as possessing in Himself the distinct power and knowledge of each.

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II. Our Lord's self-impoverishment was an assumption of a nature which was poor that it might be enriched.

III. Phil. ii. 6–8 should be interpreted in the light of the lesson which is illustrated by it—of not being anxious about one's own things, but looking *also* to the things of others. No real kenosis involved.

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II. It is urged that the ethical aspects of the Incarnation require us to disregard the metaphysical immutability of God. The limitations of Christ were Self-imposed and voluntary all along.

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V. An alleged incompatibility between certain Divine and human attributes said to require an abandonment of the former to give reality to the latter.

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The ethical aspects of the Incarnation obscured by treating it as a metaphysical change in the Godhead. They are vindicated by the Catholic view of a stooping down of compassion.

The love of Christ infinite *during* the humiliation, and an ignorant and impotent love is not infinite.

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Immutable holiness consistent with freedom, since it determines the will from within.

Liability to temptation does not require liability to yield, but capacity to feel inducements to sin and pain in resisting them.

To say that Christ won His battle, not by power in Himself, but by the aid of the Spirit, is to forget that the Spirit is Christ's own Spirit, and that the Divine Persons exist and act indivisibly in each Other. The Spirit is also sent by the Son as well as by the Father.

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As pertaining to two natures they operated distinctly, "without separation, change, division, or confusion." But they belonged to one Subject and were intimately related.

I. His human mind was ever limited, although illuminated supernaturally to a unique extent.

1–2. That mind acquired knowledge by observation and reflection.

3–4. Unhindered by sin and possessed of unique facility and range because of grace and an inspiration extending to all the mysteries of His Kingdom.

5. That mind looked inward upon a Divine Person or Self.

II. His Divine knowledge necessarily uninterrupted and unshortened. Although inscrutable, we know that it transcends space and time, is different from human knowledge, and did not interfere with the essential limitations of that knowledge in Himself.

1. It was exercised uninterruptedly in cosmical functions without division of His Person or life centre.

2. Also in achieving the mysteries of Redemption, the fulfilment of which surpasses human wisdom.

3. His internal knowledge and contemplation of the Father was not interrupted.

4. The knowledge which had been His from eternity could not have been forgotten or lost in time.

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III. The range of His Divine knowledge covered and surpassed that of His human knowledge, so that what He knew humanly He knew with two knowledges.

IV. The Divine mind lay open to His human understanding; but what human understanding could not appropriate remained hidden from it, and it could not be exercised upon Divine things

contrary to the Divine will of Christ. This illustrated by the law of finite attention, and the phenomena of memory and recollection.

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III. The Manhood of Christ is disparaged in unduly emphasizing its likeness to ours. Generic likeness exists, but the conditions of His Manhood were unique, since it was the Manhood of a Divine Person. Moreover, our manhood is disparaged by denying that it can be taken into God without a kenosis of Divine attributes. This also appears in the Lutheran idea of a deification of the Manhood of Christ.

IV. The Hypostatic Union of two whole and perfect natures in one Person cannot be maintained consistently by those who claim that the Godhead in Christ lost something at the Incarnation. Their position contains monophysite implications.

V. The *communicatio idiomatum* is perverted into the idea of an imparting of Divine attributes to the Manhood, and is then rejected with reference to our Lord's earthly life.

VI. The doctrine that there are two simultaneous operations in Christ is nullified.

VII. The Incarnation itself becomes a conversion of our Lord's personal Godhead into something finite, if kenoticism is consistently pressed.

VIII.–IX. Certain Divine attributes are deprived of their reality under the phrase "metaphysical," and the eternal immutability of God is similarly disparaged.

X. The doctrine of the Trinity is violated by denying the uninterrupted Divine fulness of the Son, and by neglecting the truth of Divine coinherence and the indivisibility of the Eternal Three in their operations.

XI. The doctrine of Divine mission—the sending of the Son by the Father, and of the Spirit by the Father and the Son—is so treated as to nullify the internal relations of the Trinity.

XII. The example of Christ is so treated as to reduce Him to the moral level of His saints, and the truth that He revealed what we are to become hereafter, rather than what we can be now, is overlooked.

XIII. The twofold work of Christ as Redeemer and Revealer is prejudiced by His being conceived of as reduced in power and knowledge.

XIV. Our Lord's glorified state is perverted by the theory of a deification of His Manhood, a theory which has to be adopted in order to avoid the necessity of holding a permanent kenosis.

Résumé of what has been shown.

This book not written to minimize the reality of our Lord's Manhood and human limitations.

THE KENOTIC THEORY

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

THE kenotic theory may be briefly described as maintaining that the Divine Logos, in order to take our nature upon Him and submit in reality to its earthly conditions and limitations, abandoned somewhat at least of what was His before He became incarnate. In particular, it is alleged most commonly, that He abandoned what kenoticists call His relative or His metaphysical attributes, of omnipotence, omnipresence and omniscience, so as to be dependent upon the aid of the Spirit, wholly circumscribed by space, and deprived of knowledge. The theory has been stated in various forms, and has by some been qualified into a view which is, to say the least, hardly intelligible. But the idea of abandoning something

which belonged to the Logos before His Incarnation, for the period of His earthly humiliation, constitutes its distinctive mark.

In this book an effort is made to show that the theory in question is (*a*) a modern novelty: (*b*) contrary to the Faith of the Church: (*c*) rejected deliberately by Catholic doctors: (*d*) not warranted by the facts contained in the Gospels, or the statements of Holy Scripture: (*e*) fallacious in its reasoning: and (*f*) perilous in its logical results.[1]

The method of procedure will be, after giving, by way of introduction, a brief account of the origin and development of the kenotic theory, firstly to exhibit the Catholic doctrine of the Incarnation and its bearing on the truth of our Lord's self-sacrifice; secondly, to consider the kenotic theory, and the arguments by which it is supported, in detail; thirdly, to consider especially the contention that our Lord was bereft of Divine omniscience during His earthly life; and finally, to make clear some of the issues which are at stake.

[1] While all forms of kenoticism are to be considered, particular attention will be paid to the views and arguments of Anglican writers, of whom Canon Gore is the most prominent.

I

It is acknowledged that this theory is not supported by the writings of St. Augustine, or of the Fathers who came after him.[1] And the claim that it received support from certain eminent writers prior to his time is not substantiated by sufficient citations from their works.[2]

Their positive statements touching the doctrine

[1] Gore's *Bampton Lectures*, p. 177.

[2] Gore makes several citations (*Bamp. Lecs.*, note 48) to substantiate this. But these passages do not bear out his contention. Thus, St. Irenæus (*Cont. Haer.*, III., xix. 3) says, "For as He was Man, that He might be tempted, so was He also the Word, that He might be glorified: the Word remaining inactive, ἡσυχάζοντος, in His temptation and dishonour and crucifixion and death, but going along with the Man in His victory and endurance, and works of goodness, and resurrection and ascension." The quiescence here alluded to does not mean that the Word was emptied of Divine power, but that He did not employ that power in such wise as to hinder His Manhood from incurring temptation and suffering.

He refers to Origen (in *Jerem.* x. 14), but both he and Mr. Swayne (*Our Lord's Knowledge as Man*, p. 48) appear to misunderstand the passage. Origen speaks of the Divine humbling Itself to "Divine folly." The allusion is to I. Cor. i. 25, as Mr. Powell indicates (*Principle of the Incarnation*, p. 285), where the phrase "foolishness of God" is used as describing the way in which the Divine wisdom, exhibited in Christ Crucified, was regarded by the Gentiles—*i.e.*, its low repute. Origen's language on the subject of the kenosis must also be interpreted in the light of his peculiar view of the pre-existence of Christ's human soul, and his consequent reference of the kenosis to it. He expressly denies

of Christ's Person plainly exclude the theory in question.[1] Again and again they maintain that Christ was in possession, while on earth, of the fulness of the Godhead, as well as of the completeness of our manhood. St. Leo expresses

that Christ was personally wanting in Divine knowledge while on earth (*Contr. Celsus*, iv. 5). Cf. Powell, pp. 285–290.

St. Cyril of Alexandria is quoted as saying (*Quod Unus sit Christus*, Migne, *P. G.*, lxxv. 1332) that the eternal Son suffered "the measures of our Manhood to prevail over Him." As both Dr. Bright (*Waymarks of Church History*, p. 179, and App. G.) and Mr. Powell (*Prin. of Incarn.*, p. 290) have pointed out, this is a mistranslation. It should read that He suffered "the measures of our Manhood to prevail in His own case." That is, the laws and limitations of human nature were left unaltered in Him. There is no kenoticism involved in this idea.

St. Hilary of Poitiers says (in *Psa.* lxviii. 4), "*Haurienda fuit natura coelestis, ut exinaniens se ex Dei forma in formam servi hominisque decideret.*" To interpret this rightly we only need to remember that he uses the word "*forma*" as equivalent to "*habitus*" or external semblance. This appears in his assertion (*De Trin.*, ix. 14) that there was an "*evacuatio formae*" without any "*abolitio naturae.*" See Bright, *Sermons on the Incarnation*, p. 275.

Gore concedes (*Dissertations*, p. 202) that "the great bulk of the language of ecclesiastical writers" is against the kenotic theory so far as the consciousness of Christ is concerned.

[1] It is impossible to quote extensively from the Fathers in a book of this compass. Powell's *Principle of the Incarnation* (pp. 246–251, 272–299, 422–434) should be studied. Numerous passages are quoted in Gore's *Dissertations* (pp. 98–166), and in Swayne's *Our Lord's Knowledge as Man*, although the comments and translations of these two writers require close examination at times. Patristic references in this book are usually taken from the most available translations, for the reader's convenience.

their consent when he says in his Tome, subsequently sanctioned by the Council of Chalcedon, "Accordingly, while the distinctness of both natures and substances is preserved, and both meet in one Person, lowliness is assumed by majesty, weakness by power, mortality by eternity, and . . . the inviolable nature has been united to the passible, so that . . . one and the same 'Mediator between God and men, the Man Christ Jesus,' might from one element be capable of dying, and from the other be incapable. Therefore in the entire and perfect nature of very man was born very God, whole in what was His, whole in what was ours."[1]

This consent appears in the formula often repeated, although with slight variations, *Μένων ὃ ἦν ἔλαβεν ὃ οὐκ ἦν*, "Remaining what He was, He took what He was not."[2] It also appears in the

[1] *Epist.* xxviii. 3. See Bright's *St. Leo on the Incarnation*, p. 113.

[2] Tertullian (*De Carne Chr.*, c. iii.) says, "You cannot express the apprehension that, if He had been born and truly clothed Himself with man's nature, He would have ceased to be God, losing what He was, while becoming what He was not." Translated in *Ante Nicene Fathers*, Vol. III., 523.

Origen (*De Prin.*, i. 4) says, "while made a Man, remained what He was, God." Quoted by Powell, p. 276.

St. Athanasius (*c. Apollin.*, ii. 7) says, "the Word, remaining God, became Man." Quoted in Bright's *St. Leo*, note 4.

St. Hilary (*De Trin.*, iii. 16), "He did not leave what He was,

practice of accounting for the miracles of Christ by the fact of His personal possession of Divine power; and in the antitheses which the Fathers so often employed, wherein they contrasted those operations and experiences of Christ on earth which revealed His possession of the Godhead with such as exhibited His obedience to the conditions and laws of human life.[1]

A few passages have been cited from early writers

but began to be what He was not." Quoted by Hawkesworth, *De Incarn.*, p. 76.

St. Gregory Nazianzen (*Orat.*, xxix. 19) says, "What He was He continued to be; what He was not He took to Himself." Translated in *Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers*, 2d Series, Vol. VII., p. 308.

St. Cyril of Alexandria (*3d Ep. ad Nest.*, c. 3) says, "not ceasing to be what He was, but even when He became Man by taking upon Him flesh and blood, still continuing what He was,—God in nature and truth." Translated in Heurtley's *Faith and the Creed*, p. 166.

Theodoret (*Epis.* 130) says, "For He was not made man by mutation, but, remaining just what He was, assumed what we are," etc. Transl. in *Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers*, 2d Series, Vol. III., 362.

St. Leo the Great (*Serm.* xxi.) says, "the Word of God . . . became Man, . . . remaining what He was, and putting on what He was not." Trans. in Bright's *St. Leo*, p. 3.

In contrast to all this, the kenoticist Hofmann says, "He remains *Who* He was, though He ceased to be *what* He was." Quoted in Bruce's *Humiliation of Christ*, p. 409.

[1] St. Ignatius Ant. (*Ephes.* vii.), "There is one Physician Who is possessed both of flesh and spirit; both made and not made; God existing in flesh; true life in death; both of Mary and of

which have been thought to bear out modern kenoticism. But our examination of them has shown that they have been misunderstood.[1] In any case,

God; first passible and then impassible—even Jesus Christ our Lord." Trans. in *Ante Nicene Fathers*, Vol. I., 52.

Melito (*Frag.* 13), "Invisibilis videtur, neque erubescit; incomprehensibilis prehenditur, neque indignatur; incommensurabilis mensuratur, neque repugnat; impassibilis patitur, neque ulciscitur; immortalis moritur, neque respondet verbum," etc.

St. Irenæus (iii. 16. 6), "Hominem ergo in semetipsum recapitulans est invisibilis visibilis factus, et incomprehensibilis factus comprehensibilis, et impassibilis passibilis," etc.

Tertullian (*Adv. Praxeas*, 27) says, "that the property of each nature is so wholly preserved, that the Spirit [used as equivalent to the Divine nature] on the one hand did all things in Jesus suitable to Itself, such as miracles, and mighty deeds, and wonders; and the flesh, on the other hand, exhibited the affections which belong to it. It was hungry," etc. Transl. in *Ante Nicene Fathers*, Vol. III., 624.

St. Athanasius says (*Orat. c. Arian.*, III., 31), "Being God, He has His own body, and using this as an instrument, He became man for our sakes. And on account of this, the properties of the flesh are said to be His, since He was in it, such as to hunger, to thirst, to suffer, to weary, and the like, of which the flesh is capable; while on the other hand the works proper to the Word Himself, such as to raise the dead, to restore sight to the blind, and to cure the woman with an issue of blood, He did through His own Body. And the Word bore the infirmities of the flesh, as His own, for His was the flesh; and the flesh ministered to the works of the Godhead, because the Godhead was in it, for the body was God's." Trans. in *Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers*, 2d Series, Vol. IV., 410.

Elsewhere (*Orat. c. Arian.*, III., 38) he adds, "Therefore this is plain to everyone, that the flesh indeed is ignorant, but the Word

[1] See p. 3, note 2.

they are too few and isolated to outweigh the numerous anti-kenotic passages to be found in the same writers, and the Tome of St. Leo, adopted by the Church. St. Leo says: "He took on Him the 'form of a servant' without defilement of sins, augmenting what was human, not diminishing

Himself, considered as the Word, knows all things even before they come to be. For He did not, when He became Man, cease to be God; nor, whereas He is God, does He shrink from what is man's," etc. Transl. in the same series, Vol. IV., 414.

St. Gregory Naz. (*Epist.* CI, *to Cledonius*) speaks of Christ as One "Who in these last days has assumed Manhood also for our salvation; passible in His flesh, impassible in His Godhead; circumscript in the body, uncircumscript in the Spirit [Godhead]; at once earthly and heavenly, tangible and intangible, comprehensible and incomprehensible; that by One and the Same Person, Who was Perfect Man and also God, the entire humanity fallen through sin might be created anew." Transl. in *Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers*, 2d Series, Vol. VII., 439.

St. Cyril of Alexandria (*3d Epist. to Nestorius*, § 3) says, "We say that the Son of God, while visible to the eyes, and a babe in swaddling clothes, and still at the breast of His Virgin Mother, filled all creation as God, and was seated with His Father." Again (§ 8), "For when, speaking as befits God, He says of Himself, 'He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father,' and 'I and the Father are one,' we recognize His Divine and ineffable nature. . . . But when, not shrinking from acknowledging what belonged to His human nature, He says to the Jews, 'Now ye seek to kill Me, a Man, Who have spoken unto you the truth,' we no less recognize Him even under the conditions of His human nature, God the Word equal and like to His Father." Transl. in Heurtley, *Faith and the Creed*, pp. 166, 170.

Theodoret (*Epis.* 130) says, "With them that are right-minded

what was Divine; because that emptying of Himself, whereby the Invisible made Himself visible, and the Creator and Lord of all things willed to be one among mortals, was a stooping down of compassion, not a failure of power. Accordingly, the Same Who, remaining in the form of God,

some names are plainly appropriate as to God, and others as to Man; and in this way both the passible and impassible are properly used of the Lord Christ, for in His humanity He suffered, while as God He remained impassible." Transl. in *Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers*, Vol. III., 302.

The propriety of employing such antitheses received ecumenical approval in the Tome of St. Leo. He says, "For each 'form' [nature] does the acts which belong to it, in communion with the other; the Word, that is, performing what belongs to the Word, and the flesh carrying out what belongs to the flesh; the one shines out in miracles, the other succumbs to injuries. . . . To hunger, to thirst, to be weary, and to sleep, is evidently human. But to feed five thousand men with five loaves, and to bestow on the woman of Samaria that living water, to drink of which can secure one from thirsting again; to walk on the surface of the sea with feet that sink not, and by rebuking the storm to bring down the uplifted waves, is unquestionably Divine. As then—to pass by many points—it does not belong to the same nature to weep with feelings of pity over a dead friend, and, after the mass of stone had been removed from the grave where he had lain four days, by a voice of command to raise him up to life again; or to hang on the wood, and to make all the elements tremble after daylight had been turned into night; or to be transfixed with nails, and to open the gates of Paradise to the faith of the robber; so it does not belong to the same nature to say, 'I and the Father are one,' and to say, 'the Father is greater than I,'" etc. *Epis.* xxviii., transl. in Bright's *St. Leo on the Incarnation.*

made man, was made Man in the form of a servant."[1]

It is admitted by all that the ancient Fathers did not countenance the idea that the Son of God abandoned His omniscience when He assumed our nature.[2] There was, indeed, no uniformity in the interpretation of our Lord's mysterious saying concerning the time of the judgment.[3] But all assumed that if our Lord was speaking of real *nescience*, He was *nescient* "as touching His Manhood" and redemptive economy only—not "as touching His Godhead."[4]

We need not stop to consider the views of med-

[1] *Epist.* xxviii. 3. Canon Gore (*Dissertations*, p. 163, note) says that "the dogmatic authority of a letter approved by a Council as a whole is not identical with the dogmatic authority of the actual formula decreed by the Council." But this is slightly misleading. The letter was accepted not simply "as a whole," but after close examination of the very passages which contain the juxtapositions to which Canon Gore objects. Moreover, the Council incorporated its approval of the Tome in the same document which contains its own definition of the Faith, plainly intending that it should be taken as an accurate exposition of what the Council was defining. Bright (*St. Leo on the Incarn.*, note 173) gives the facts which substantiate this.

[2] See Gore's *Dissertations*, p. 202.

[3] St. Matt. xxiv. 36, and St. Mark xiii. 32.

[4] Powell (*Prin. of the Incarn.*, p. 422 *et seq.*) gives a list of these interpretations. They are as follows:

(*a*) That Christ was giving pre-eminence to the Father in know-

iæval writers, for it is not maintained that they countenanced kenotic theories. The fact is, that they are criticised, not always with justice or discrimination, for opposite and docetic tendencies. The Fathers are criticised in the same way and with still less justice.[1]

II

The kenotic theory is clearly of modern date. It arose from attempts to solve the problem in-

ing this secret. He knew it Himself only as the Father knew it.

(*b*) Although He knew as God, He did not as Man.

(*c*) He knew not the time as fixed, since it is determined conditionally only.

(*d*) As Head of His Body, the Church, He knew not.

(*e*) "The Son" is not used personally, but as standing for His adopted people.

(*f*) He knew both as God and Man, but not as commissioned to reveal it.

(*g*) He knows the time, but not practically, since He has not yet executed the judgment.

(*h*) The "day and hour" means the absolute blessedness of seeing God as He is. He did not possess this knowledge as Man.

(*i*) He knew in His human mind, but not by its powers.

It is clear that the objectional nature of some of these interpretations cannot be urged in the kenotic interest, unless it can be shown that no one of them can be maintained. The second one is discussed in Chapter X of this work.

The Agnoetae of Alexandria, A.D. 520, believed that of some things Christ had no Divine knowledge, but they were Monophysites. See Blunt's *Dictionary of Sects and Heresies.*

[1] This criticism is considered in Chapter IV of this volume.

volved in the Hypostatic Union. Certain writers have tried to explain *how* the Son of God could take our nature into union with the Godhead in His own Person and subject Himself to the conditions of human life and growth. They have criticised the Fathers adversely for not contributing to the solution of this problem, and for merely stating in antithetic phrases the truths which suggest it. This very limitation, however, in what the Fathers undertook to do constitutes the merit of their position.[1]

The seeds of modern kenoticism were sown by Martin Luther, although he did not adopt the idea that the Divine nature was changed by the Incarnation.[2] The ancient Fathers, in agreement with Scripture, considered the Incarnation from the point of view of our Lord's Person. In that mystery a Divine Person condescended to take our nature into Himself, and submitted to its conditions for the purposes of His economy of Redemption. Luther inverted this order of treatment and began with the two natures, which he conceived to be united so as to produce a Divine-

[1] We shall return to this in Chapter IV.

[2] Luther's Christology is given in Dorner's *Person of Christ*, II., ii. 53–107. Also in Powell's *Prin. of the Incarn.*, p. 300 *et seq.*

human Person.[1] He dwelt especially upon the Manhood, perverting the Catholic doctrine of the *communicatio idiomatum* into the theory that the Incarnation caused an imparting of Divine attributes to the Manhood, and asserting its ubiquity.[2] The Formula Concordiae taught that this ubiquity was held in abeyance during our Lord's earthly life.[3] Thus the kenosis, referred to in Phil. ii. 5–9, was referred to the Manhood, and that passage was treated as concerned entirely with our Lord's incarnate life.[4]

Such exegesis could not be maintained, and the followers of Chemnitz saw the impossibility of a complete deification of our nature. Between 1616 and 1624 this difference of view issued in a controversy between the Tubingen and Giessen theologians as to whether the Divine attributes were concealed merely or really absent from our Lord's Manhood during His earthly life. The Giessen theologians broached a theory of two

[1] Dorner, II., ii. 79, 80, 99.

[2] Ibid., II., ii. 72, 103, 104. His assertion of the Manhood's ubiquity became closely connected with his Eucharistic controversy against Zwinglius. See Neander's *History of Doctrine*, II., 652, 653; Bruce's *Humil. of Christ*, 85–112.

[3] Neander, II., 653.

[4] Dorner, II., ii. 95, 96; Gore's *Dissertations*, 181, 182.

states,—the earthly one, in which the Divine attributes were in abeyance so as to leave room for human growth, and the heavenly state, in which these attributes had been won back. The Tubingen writers refused to make any such distinction of states, except in relation to an initial concealment followed by a manifest use of Divine attributes in Christ's Manhood. The controversy was ended by the Thirty Years' War without coming to any determinate result. But the Giessen theology obtained popular currency, and led to a vague idea of a progressive Incarnation—one which was merely potential at first.[1]

Meantime certain movements of thought paved the way for genuine kenoticism. A weariness of doctrinal controversy set in, which caused a special emphasis to be put upon practical and ethical considerations. This tendency led to a renewed emphasis upon the human aspects of our Lord's earthly life, and to a desire to modify traditional conceptions of the Incarnation in the supposed interests of reality in our Lord's intellectual and moral growth.

The kenotic theory in its present forms came

[1] Powell, pp. 308–312; Bruce, *Humil. of Christ*, pp. 105–107; Dorner, II., ii. 298.

to birth in the second quarter of this century, although Zinzendorf had anticipated the new movement by a century. His position was, however, exceptional.[1] The old Lutheran exegesis of Phil. ii. 5–9 was given up.

1. In its most radical form, as held by Gess, Gaupp, Hahn, Schmieder, Reuss, Godet and others, the Godhead is conceived as *converted* into a human soul. The ancient heretic, Apollinaris, had said that the Logos *took the place* of a rational soul in Christ. These writers, on the other hand, brought forward the idea of conversion, *metamorphosis*, in the place of substitution. Hofmann says the Logos "remains *Who* He was, though He ceased to be *what* He was."[2] The "form of God" was changed into the "form of a servant." The Divine functions of the Word were left in the Father's hands until resumed by the Word at His glorification. Godet says that omnipotence gave place to obedience, omniscience to the ignorance of a learner, omnipresence to circumscribed bodily presence, immutable holiness to a liability to temptation and power to sin, infinite love to finite and progressive love, and consciousness of Divine Sonship to possession of

[1] Bruce, p. 137. [2] Quoted by Bruce, p. 409.

bare personality and progressive consciousness. He says, "Here we see the prodigy of love which is realized in the life of Christ, and revealed to us by His Word. If this miracle is not possible, God is not free, and His love has limitations imposed upon it."[1]

2. Thomasius, König, Daelitzsch, and Kahnis held a modified form of this theory. Distinguishing between what are called the absolute and relative or economic attributes, they said that the latter, including omnipotence, omniscience and omnipresence, do not belong to God as God, strictly speaking, but express the relation of His essence to creation. Since creation came by the will of God, these attributes also depend upon the will of God and can be abandoned by that same will. They were abandoned in the Incarnation without violating Divine immutability. There was a kenosis of relative attributes in order that the essential and ethical attributes of God might be more perfectly revealed. Somewhat inconsistently it was also said that Divine power was

[1] *New Testament Studies*, pp. 138–140. Cf. *Studies on the Epistles of St. Paul*, p. 251; *Introduction to the Epistles of St. Paul*, pp. 502–504. Also Bruce, pp. 145–153, 396–413; Powell's *Prin. of the Incarn.*, pp. 1–16; Gore's *Dissertations*, pp. 184–189.

really demonstrated by being contracted upon the inner self of the Logos and by self-control.[1]

3. Ebrard introduced another modification of the kenotic theory. He said with the extreme kenoticists that the Logos was changed into the human soul of Christ, but added that no loss resulted, since this metamorphosis allows for the retention of Divine attributes in translated and human forms. Thus Christ possessed power to work such miracles as He willed to work, a mind to see what He willed to see, and could transport Himself where He willed to go. Yet omnipotence, omniscience and omnipresence were limited, although not abolished, by the human and therefore finite conditions of their exercise. He was a Monophysite in his view of our Lord's two natures. He treated them as abstract relations or conditions of Christ's Divine-human Personality, maintaining that to regard them as distinct and concrete realities involves Nestorianism.[2]

4. The Danish Lutheran theologian, Martensen, advocated the theory of two life-centres of the

[1] Bruce, pp. 139–144, 388–396. This theory was also propounded by Fairbairn, whose view is explained in Gore's *Dissertations*, pp. 189–192. The plea that power is demonstrated by being contracted is considered in a later chapter.

[2] Ibid., pp. 153–160, 414–418.

Logos — that in which, "as the pure *Logos of Deity*, He works through the kingdom of nature by His all-pervading presence," and that in which, "as the Christ, He works through the kingdom of grace, of redemption, and perfection, and points back to His pre-existence."[1] "We must conceive, therefore, of the Deity as wrapped up or clothed in the humanity of Christ; of the external infinitude of the Divine attributes as converted into an inner infinitude, in order that it might find room within the limits of human nature. In the measure in which human nature grew and developed, in that measure did the Divine nature also grow in it; in the measure in which, whilst advancing in development, He became conscious of His *historical* significance, in the same measure did the *recollection* of His pre-existence and of His going out from the Father rise more clearly to His mind."[2] Martensen makes a sharp separation of "spheres," in which he has been followed by some of our own writers,[3] who agree with Martensen in saying that our Lord abandoned certain

[1] *Christian Dogmatics*, § 134.

[2] Ibid., § 136.

[3] See Gore, *Dissertations*, pp. 94, 95, 206; and in the *Guardian*, January 20, 1897, p. 107.

Divine attributes in the human sphere while retaining them in the Divine sphere, as if these spheres were somehow separate from each other.[1]

The various schools of kenoticism agree in asserting that our Lord depended upon the aid of the Spirit, as upon Another, for the supernatural power and knowledge which He displayed on earth, denying that He exhibited them as proceeding from His Person.

Our survey of continental kenoticism would be incomplete without taking notice of Dorner's attempt to get rid of the kenotic theory by substituting a theory of his own equally rationalistic. He started with the irrelevant premise that "a man who is still undergoing development and growth cannot form a personal unity with the Logos as absolutely self-conscious and actual." Assuming this, he also urged that "the idea of true growth does not admit of the old [Lutheran] expedient of constituting a unity by representing human nature as absolutely raised above itself from the beginning." He therefore

[1] Bruce, pp. 160–164, 418–424: Gore's *Dissertations*, pp. 192, 193.

[2] Irrelevant because the Incarnation is not, as he appears to assume, a union of "a man" with the Logos, but "the taking of the Manhood [impersonal except in the Logos] into God."

said that we have no alternative but to assume that in some way or other the Logos limited Himself for His being and activity *in this man*, so long as the same was still undergoing growth. The Divine was, therefore, not appropriated in its entirety at once, but gradually. In short, there was a *progressive Incarnation.* "The Logos put a limit on His self-communication [not on His Godhead] till human susceptibility had attained more complete development."[1] Dorner thus perpetuated the Lutheran error of merging the two natures into one Divine-human person and consciousness.

III

It is not easy to trace all the avenues through which continental kenoticism invaded Anglican theology. But the writings of Martensen and Godet have been translated into English, and have been over much deferred to in some quarters. Dr. Bruce's *Humiliation of Christ* has made the history and arguments of kenoticism better known.[2]

[1] *Person of Christ*, Div. II., Vol. III., p. 248 *et seq.*; Powell, 332–334; Gore's *Dissertations*, 193–195.

[2] See Powell (*Prin. of Inc.*, Introd.), who notices that, while Anglicans could not accept the bald position of a writer like Godet, they were none the less influenced by his rationalistic method.

The whole subject was forced into prominence by a disquieting passage in Canon Gore's paper on *The Holy Spirit and Inspiration*, in the *Lux Mundi*, 1889.[1] Referring to certain alleged results of the higher criticism of the Old Testament, he questioned the assertion often made "that our Lord's words foreclose certain critical positions as to the character of Old Testament Literature."[2] He went on to say, "It is contrary to His whole method to reveal His Godhead by any anticipations of natural knowledge. The Incarnation was a self-emptying of God to reveal Himself under conditions of human nature and from the human point of view." "He willed so to restrain the beams of Deity as to observe the limits of the science of His age, and He puts Himself in the same relation to its historical knowledge. He never exhibits the omniscience

[1] See Sixth Edition, pp. 358–360.

[2] The *Church Quarterly Review*, January, 1898, p. 268, suggests an intimate connection as existing between kenoticism and the views of certain higher critics. It says, "The readiness to accept modern theories of kenoticism, . . . in certain quarters, seems to proceed not so much from the supposed satisfactory nature of the theories themselves, as from the fact that they afford an easy mode of getting rid of certain sayings of our Lord about Noah and Moses and David and Jonah. If this be so, those who adopt such modern theories must beware lest in trying to save something they lose all."

of bare Godhead in the realm of natural knowledge."[1]

Strong protests were made against such language, and the late Canon Liddon felt compelled to enter into a public controversy with Gore. This controversy saddened his closing days.[2] Gore returned to the subject in his *Bampton Lectures* of 1891, and again in his *Dissertations on Subjects Connected with the Incarnation*, 1895. He also contributed an important statement to the *Guardian* of January 20, 1897.

Gore's position has been dealt with in a weighty

[1] It is, of course, possible to limit the application of this last line of statement to the exegetical question, whether our Lord did in fact make any assertions touching Mosaic authorship, etc., or no. But the passage as a whole contains kenotic ideas.

[2] Liddon's view is contained in his *Bampton Lectures*, p. 461 *et seq.*, where he considers St. Luke ii. 52 and St. Mark xiii. 32. He asserts that our Lord learned through experience what He knew already by infused knowledge (pp. 465, 466); that He was really ignorant of the time of judgment, but as Man only (p. 467 *et seq.*); that the coincidence of two knowledges does not involve Nestorianism, but emphasizes the mystery of the Hypostatic Union (pp. 471, 472); that His human mind possessed all along an infused universal knowledge, "ordinarily and practically equivalent to omniscience" (pp. 472-474); that His ignorance of the day and hour was an exception which does not warrant general inferences. Great as is the theological weight of Canon Liddon, it cannot be admitted that our Lord's human mind was in any sense omniscient. We must maintain that Christ was omniscient, but only "as touching His Godhead."

manner by Bishops Ellicott and Stubbs in important charges. Some very valuable articles have appeared in the *Church Quarterly Review*, and Archdeacon Gifford has written a brief but important book on the interpretation of Phil. ii. 5–9. But, with the exception of Mr. H. C. Powell's able work on *The Principle of the Incarnation*, no extended theological treatment of the subject has appeared on the Catholic side. Meantime quite a number of writers have adopted kenotic ideas, and much confusion of thought concerning the doctrine of Christ's Person appears to prevail.[1]

Gore's position is not easy to understand. This difficulty seems to arise from a conflict between his desire to abide by the teachings of the Catholic Church and his adoption of a novel terminology and a modern method of approaching the doctrine of the Incarnation, the method pursued by the kenoticists on the continent. But the following propositions, compiled from his *Dissertations*,

[1] Among those Anglicans who have shown traces more or less of kenotic ideas are Kedney, in *Mens Christi*, 1890; Swayne, in *Our Lord's Knowledge as Man*, 1891; Bishop Moorhouse, in *The Teaching of Christ*, 1891; Du Bose, in *The Soteriology of the New Testament*, 1892; Mason, in *The Conditions of Our Lord's Life on Earth*, 1896; Ottley, in *The Doctrine of the Incarnation*, 1896; Bishop Hall, in *Christ's Temptation and Ours*, 1896; and Hawkesworth, in *De Incarnatione*, 1897.

appear to constitute a fair summary of his position.

1. "For love of us He [the Son] abjured the prerogatives of equality with God. By an act of deliberate self-abnegation, He so emptied Himself as to assume the permanent characteristics of the human or servile life. . . . Thus, remaining in unchanged personality, He is exhibited as (to use Dr. Westcott's words[1]) 'laying aside the mode of divine existence' (*τὸ εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ*) in order to assume the human."[2] Elsewhere he includes among the prerogatives abandoned "the glory which He had with the Father before the world was."[3]

2. This kenosis is not absolute, but confined to a certain "sphere." "We are forced to assert that within the *sphere* and *period* of His incarnate and mortal life, He did . . . habitually . . . cease from the exercise of those divine functions and powers, including the divine omniscience, which would have been incompatible with a truly human experience."[4]

3. The Son retained His possession of the God-

[1] Speaker's *Commentary*, *St. John* i. 14.
[2] *Dissertations*, p. 89. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 90.
[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 94, 95. Cf. p. 206.

head,[1] and also His cosmic functions. "We must be content to hold that, even in a way we cannot conceive, this state of limitation within the sphere of the humanity must have been compatible with the exercise in another sphere, by the same divine Person, of the fulness of Divine power."[2] "The conception at which we have arrived . . . seems to involve us in thinking of the Incarnation somewhat after the manner of Bishop Martensen. . . . And this seems to postulate that the personal life of the Word should have been lived as it were from more than one centre."[3]

4. It is necessary "to put into the foreground and to emphasize the human state as it is described in the Gospels. The truth of the New Testament is impaired or destroyed if the divine state is put into immediate juxtaposition with this."[4]

In view of the prominence of Canon Gore's writings in the kenotic controversy, a few general remarks concerning his position may be appropriate here, although certain of his arguments will be noticed separately elsewhere. In the first place, it is remarkable that one who has written

[1] Cf. *Dissertations*, p. 95.
[2] Ibid., pp. 206, 207.
[3] Ibid., p. 215.
[4] Ibid., p. 105.

so strongly concerning the necessity of being guided by Catholic consent should wave aside "the great bulk of the language of ecclesiastical writers." He admits that this language is against his view of our Lord's abandonment of omniscience.[1] It is difficult to reconcile his present attitude with what he says in his *Roman Catholic Claims*. "According to the older and really Catholic view, the later Church can never know what the early Church did not."[2] Again he cites St. Vincent of Lerin's statement with approval, that, "if a new question arises on which no Council has spoken, then he is to collect the sentiments of the ancients; of those, that is, who remained in the communion of the Church, masters of repute. And here care is to be taken to adhere to no individual opinion of however great a Christian, but to that teaching only in which they are found to agree."[3]

We have said that Canon Gore's position is difficult to understand. This difficulty appears particularly when we consider his use of the word "sphere," and his restriction of the kenosis to the human sphere. If it were possible to interpret his phrase "human sphere" as meaning simply

[1] *Dissertations*, p. 202. [2] Ibid., Fourth Edition, p. 43.
[3] Ibid., pp. 47, 48.

"in respect of His Manhood" or "as touching His human faculties," all would be clear, and we should not be obliged to classify him with those who insist upon a real abandonment by the Son of some of His pre-incarnate prerogatives and attributes. Orthodox writers agree in repudiating the notion that our Lord communicated Divine attributes and powers to His Manhood when He became incarnate. But Gore says it is not enough "to recognize that our Lord was ignorant of the divine secret of the day and hour of the end in respect of His human nature, unless we recognize also that He was so truly living under human conditions as *Himself to be ignorant*." [1] This language is ambiguous, but its connection seems to imply an exclusion of knowledge of the day and hour from our Lord's *Person*, as well as from his human nature.[2] He says, "We cannot, I think,

[1] *Dissertations*, p. 97.

[2] Any one who holds in good faith that our Lord did not know this secret in respect of His human nature will admit that it was *the Son Himself* Who, in this respect, did not know. But Gore apparently requires more, and thus seems to imply the view that a personal ignorance existed in Christ extending beyond what is involved in the qualifying phrase "in respect of His human nature." The *Church Quarterly Review* for January, 1896, p. 306, points out that the ambiguity of Canon Gore's expositions is removed when we consider his method of argument, which is distinctly kenotic.

be contented with a view which simply puts in juxtaposition, during our Lord's earthly life, the divine and human consciousnesses . . . and which attributes to Him simultaneously omniscience as God and limitation of knowledge as man."[1]

Then too he substitutes the word "region," in one place at least, for the word "sphere,"[2] as if denying that our Lord possessed omniscience at all in the *local* sphere of His Manhood. This seems like an exclusion of His Godhead, or at least of His Divine knowledge, from this locality —as if God could be without omniscience in any place where He is, that is, in any place whatsoever.

Finally, in replying to Powell's *Principle of the Incarnation*, he insists upon retaining the idea of "abandonment."[3] This can only mean that a real kenosis occurred, when our Lord assumed human nature, of something which He

[1] *Dissertations*, p. 97.

[2] *Guardian*, January 20, 1897.

[3] Ibid., January 20, 1897. "I am quite sure we want to take a prolonged or fresh view of the facts and language of the New Testament before we go back to metaphysics. It is for that reason that I cannot refrain from the use of some word representing abandonment, such as kenosis."

possessed in Himself before the Incarnation. The word "abandon" could not rightly be used by one who meant simply that our Lord refrained from imparting His Divine attributes to the Manhood, and permitted the laws of our nature "to prevail in His own case," as St. Cyril expresses it.[1] To refrain from imparting something to the Manhood is one idea, to abandon or literally to empty one's Person of that thing is quite another. Before the Incarnation our Lord possessed nothing in Himself except the Divine nature and attributes. If, therefore, He "abandoned" anything when He became incarnate He must have excluded something Divine from His Person.[2]

[1] *Quod Unus*, p. 399, Pusey's Edition. Cf. Bright's *Waymarks*, pp. 179, 180.

[2] The term "sphere" is an important one in the kenotic theory, and needs careful definition. As used in the phrase "human sphere," it might mean "as touching the Manhood." When used in this sense, the exclusion of Divine attributes from the human sphere would mean simply that human nature did not receive these attributes. This would be in accordance with the truth, but would, as has been shown above, make the term "abandon" inapplicable. But the phrase "human sphere" might also mean the region or boundary of space and time within which human nature exercises its functions. The exclusion of Divine operations and attributes from the "human sphere" in this sense would necessarily involve a change in the Divine Nature; for God is by His proper nature present in every spatial and temporal sphere, and is in possession of His fulness wherever He is. In this

Canon Gore's language appears inconsistent at times, but the above considerations compel us to regard him as a genuine kenoticist; and the paramount influence of his writings accounts for the particular attention which is given to his views and arguments in this work.

It remains to be said that the purpose of this book is simply to refute any and every theory which suggests that the Son of God ceased to possess or exercise, in His own Person, certain

sense, the Divine and human spheres are concentric, the Divine sphere filling and transcending the human.

So far as we can make out, Canon Gore appears to use the phrase "human sphere" in this last sense. If so, he is surely mistaken in his use of the authority of Dr. Bright. That writer does acknowledge that our Lord was "limited in knowledge *within the sphere of His humanity*," but he does not use such language, as Canon Gore seems to think, with the idea of improving upon or correcting the alternative phrase "*in respect of His human nature.*" (See *Dissertations*, p. 201.) Dr. Bright in a personal letter writes, "In the *Church Quarterly Review* for January, 1896, p. 309, is a note correctly interpreting some words of mine which appear to have been misunderstood." The passage referred to says: "Very careful consideration of it [the passage cited by Canon Gore] convinces us that when Dr. Bright says: 'He willed to think and feel humanly through organs of thought and feeling which, being human, were limited,' he means that the Word condescended to be limited in knowledge within the sphere of the Incarnation *qud Man only.*" Dr. Bright also writes, "All that we can say is that when He had to think, speak, and act, under human limitations, He did not pour into such human thought, speech, or action, the infinity of Godhead."

of His eternal prerogatives and attributes, when He became incarnate. The writer does not venture to minimize the important truth that our Lord assumed a real Manhood and personally submitted, "as touching His Manhood," to human conditions and limitations.

CHAPTER I

THE INCARNATION

THE truth of the Incarnation occupies a central place in the Catholic Faith; and all other revealed truths are so intimately related to it that, if it is held erroneously, much confusion and many dangerous heresies follow.

In considering it, the following particulars may be distinguished: (*a*) the Incarnation proper, or the initial mystery which was wrought when our Lord was conceived in the Virgin's womb: (*b*) the union of two natures in His Person which resulted: (*c*) the predicates which become applicable to the Person of Christ by reason of this union: (*d*) the operations attributable to the Word incarnate.

I

The Faith of the Church concerning the assumption of our nature by the Word is summed up in the Nicene Creed in the words, "Who

for us men, and for our salvation, came down from heaven, and was incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary, and was made Man."

In the Athanasian Symbol we learn that this being made Man was "not by conversion of the Godhead into flesh, but by taking of the Manhood into God."

The mystery is described in two ways in Holy Scripture. In the first place, it is described as the coming down of the Son into our nature and His submission to its conditions. "The Word was made flesh and dwelt among us."[1] "For ye know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, that, though He was rich, yet for your sakes He became poor, that ye through His poverty might be rich."[2] "God sent forth His Son, made of a woman, made under the law."[3] "Wherefore in all things it behooved Him to be made like unto His brethren."[4] "Now all this was done, that it might be fulfilled which was spoken of the Lord by the prophet, saying, Behold a Virgin shall be with child, and shall bring forth a Son, and they shall call His Name Emmanuel, which being interpreted is, God with us."[5]

[1] St. John i. 14. [2] II. Cor. viii. 9. [3] Gal. iv. 4.
[4] Heb. ii. 17. [5] St. Matt. i. 22, 23.

On the other hand, Holy Scripture describes the Incarnation as an assumption of our nature into the Divine Person of the Word. "He took not on Him the nature of angels; but He took on Him the seed of Abraham."[1]

Both ideas are taught together when it is said, "And no man hath ascended into heaven, but He that descended from heaven, even the Son of Man."[2] Also when it is said, "He emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men."[3]

The purpose of the Incarnation is described as twofold. In the first place He took our nature that He might reveal the Father and His purposes toward us. Since He remained what He was, consubstantial with the Father, He could say, "He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father."[4] And He made our flesh His own

[1] Heb. ii. 16.

[2] St. John iii. 13. It is clearly implied that our Lord's becoming incarnate or descent from heaven involved what is described as an ascent of the Son of Man into heaven. The disputed words, "which is in heaven," are not needed for this inference.

[3] Phil. ii. 7. We shall show in the next chapter that the Greek for "Emptied Himself," ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε, must be taken metaphorically, in obedience to the context and the epexigetical clauses which follow. St. Paul uses κενόω thus elsewhere.

[4] St. John xiv. 9.

in order that He might be "seen with our eyes . . . and handled," so that "the life was manifested."[1] "No man hath seen God at any time; the Only-begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him."[2] "And we beheld His glory, glory as of the Only-begotten from the Father, full of grace and truth."[3] "For in Him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily."[4]

It is also indicated that He was made man "for our salvation;"—a work which caused His submission to the conditions of our nature, sin excepted, and the achievement in it of deeds which required the concurrence of Divine power and wisdom with human limitation and passibility in His one Person. "For it became Him . . . in bringing many sons unto glory, to make the Captain of their salvation perfect through sufferings. . . . Forasmuch then as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, He also Himself likewise took

[1] I. St. John i. 1, 2.

[2] St. John i. 18.

[3] Ibid. i. 14.

[4] Colos. ii. 9. The *Church Quarterly Review* (July, 1897, p. 292) says, "It is clear that on the kenotic theory Revelation disappears altogether. The Gospel is not a voice from Heaven, but a voice from Judæa, as Judæa was nineteen hundred years ago."

part of the same, that through death He might destroy Him that had the power of death, that is the devil."[1] "For we have not an High Priest which cannot be touched with the feeling of our infirmities; but was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin."[2] On the other hand, it is "the Lord" Who is said to have "made bare His holy arm in the eyes of all nations; and all the ends of the earth shall see the salvation of our God."[3] "Had they known it, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory."[4] But they could not defeat Him Who was "mighty to save,"[5] in Whose mouth are put the words, "I looked, and there was none to help, . . . therefore Mine own arm brought salvation unto Me; and My fury it upheld Me."[6] Therefore, although put to death, "it was not possible that He should be holden of it."[7] Of His life our Lord said, "I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again."[8] This concurrence of the Divine and human in our Lord's work on earth will appear more clearly when we consider the truths which follow.

[1] Heb. ii. 10, 14. [2] Ibid. iv. 15. [3] Isa. lii. 10.
[4] I. Cor. ii. 8. [5] Isa. lxiii. 1.
[6] Ibid. lxiii. 5. [7] Acts ii. 24. [8] St. John x. 18.

II

The immediate and lasting effect of the Incarnation is the Hypostatic Union of the Divine and human natures in our Lord. We cannot better express what is involved in this than by the classic language of the judicious Hooker. He says, "there are but four things which concur to make complete the whole state of our Lord Jesus Christ: His Deity, His Manhood, the conjunction of both, and the distinction of one from the other being joined in one. . . . In four words, ἀληθῶς, τελέως, ἀδιαιρέτως, ἀσυγχύτως, truly, perfectly, indivisibly, distinctly; the first applied to His being God, and the second to His being Man, the third to His being of both One, and the fourth to His still continuing in the one both: we may fully by way of abridgment comprise whatsoever antiquity hath at large handled."[1]

By way of expansion it may be noted that the Person Who is the subject of both natures is one and the same before and after His assumption of "the form of a servant," viz., God, the Word.[2]

[1] *Ecclesiastical Polity*, V., liv. 10.

[2] St. Cyril, Alex., says, "For the one and sole Christ is not twofold, although we conceive of Him as consisting of two dis-

Whatever personality this Manhood possessed was derived entirely from the Word. Moreover, since He is truly Divine from eternity and perfectly human from the moment of His Incarnation, there existed simultaneously in Him, during His earthly life, "the fulness of the Godhead bodily," and the completeness of our manhood taken into God. This union is the closest of unions, and is perpetual. Yet, at the same time, to quote Hooker again, while there was "a *coöperation* often, an *association* always," there could never be "any mutual *participation*, whereby the properties of the one are infused into the other."[1] There was a mutual interpenetration which elevated the human, but no destruction of the human kind or infringement upon the Divine.

John of Antioch, a sympathizer with Nestorius, joined with St. Cyril of Alexandria, the opponent of Nestorius, in adopting a declaration which acknowledges that our Lord Jesus Christ was, by reason of the Incarnation, "consubstantial with the Father as touching His Godhead, and consub-

tinct substances inseparably united, even as a man is conceived of as consisting of soul and body, and yet is not twofold but one of both." *Third Epist. to Nest.*, § viii. Trans. in Heurtley's *Faith and the Creed*, p. 170.

[1] *Eccles. Pol.*, V., liii. 3.

stantial with us as touching His Manhood: for of two natures there hath been an union. For which cause we confess one Christ, one Son, one Lord."[1] With this agrees the language of St. Leo's Tome, "In the entire and perfect nature of very man was born very God, whole in what was His, whole in what was ours."[2]

The ecumenical council of Chalcedon, in addition to its adoption of this Tome, required in its Decree of Faith, "One and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only-begotten, to be acknowledged in two natures, without confusion, without conversion, without division, never to be separated (*ἀσυγχύτως, ἀτρέπτως, ἀδιαιρέτως, ἀχωρίστως*); the distinction of natures being in no wise done away because of the union, but rather the characteristic property of each nature being preserved,[3] and concurring into one Person and one subsistence, not as if Christ were parted or divided into two persons, but one and the same Son and Only-begotten God, Word, Lord, Jesus Christ.[4]

[1] Found in *St. Cyril's Letter to John*, translated in Heurtley's *Faith and the Creed*, p. 180. [2] *Epistle* xxviii. 3.

[3] Language which precludes the idea of an abandonment of Divine attributes and prerogatives.

[4] Denzinger's *Enchiridion*, § 134. Translated in Heurtley's *Faith and the Creed*, pp. 216, 217.

To conclude, the Athanasian Symbol declares the right faith concerning the Incarnation to be, "that our Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is God and Man. God, of the substance of the Father, begotten before the worlds; and Man, of the substance of His mother, born in the world. Perfect God, and perfect Man, of a reasonable soul and human flesh subsisting. Equal to the Father as touching His Godhead, and inferior to the Father as touching His Manhood. Who, although He be God and Man, yet He is not two but one Christ. One, not by conversion of the Godhead into flesh, but by taking of the Manhood into God. One altogether, not by confusion of substance, but by unity of Person. For as the reasonable soul and flesh is one man, so God and Man is one Christ."

III

Immediately and necessarily involved in our Lord's possession of the Godhead and the Manhood, each in its integrity, is the truth that whatever is rightly said of these two natures is rightly said of our Lord Himself as their one and only personal subject. This truth is called the doctrine of the *Communicatio idiomatum*. It was set forth

by the Fathers of old,[1] but has been grievously perverted by Lutheran theology. Luther held that the idioms or attributes of the Godhead

[1] So early a writer as St. Ignatius of Antioch (*Epis. ad Rom.*, 6) alludes to "the passion of My God."

Tertullian (*Adv. Prax.*, 27) says, "We see plainly a twofold state which is not confused, but united in one Person . . . and . . . the property of each nature is preserved."

St. Athanasius says (*Orat. c. Arian.*, III., 31), "Hence the properties of the flesh, as hunger, thirst, suffering, . . . are called *His*, because He was in it; and the peculiar works of the Word, as to raise the dead, . . . He used to do through His own Body, . . . it was *the Body of God*." In c. 32 he adds, "While the flesh suffered, the Word was not external to it, and therefore the Passion is called the Word's." See also *Orat.*, III., 41.

St. Cyril, Alex., says (*Second Epis. to Nest.*, § viii.), "But if we hold the right faith, we shall believe both the human language and the Divine to have been used by one Person. For when . . . He says of Himself, 'He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father,' . . . we recognize His Divine and ineffable nature. . . . But when, . . . He says to the Jews, 'Now ye seek to kill Me, a man, who have spoken unto you the truth,' we no less recognize Him even under the conditions of His human nature, God the Word, equal and like His Father. . . . To one Person, therefore, must be attributed all the expressions used in the Gospels, the one incarnate Hypostasis of the Word, for the Lord Jesus Christ is one according to the Scriptures."

St. Leo the Great says in his Tome, §§ 4, 5, "For, although in the Lord Jesus Christ there is one Person of God and Man, yet that whereby contumely attaches to both is one thing, and that whereby glory attaches to both is another. . . . Accordingly . . . we read, on the one hand, that 'the Son of Man came down from heaven,' inasmuch as the Son of God took flesh from that Virgin of whom He was born; and on the other hand, the Son of

were communicated to our Lord's Manhood,[1] which is a species of Monophysitism or confusion of the two natures. Unhappily his perversion of

God is said to have been crucified and buried, inasmuch as He underwent this, not in His actual Godhead, . . . but in the weakness of human nature."

St. John of Damascus writes (*Orth. Fid.*, III., iv.), "When we name the Godhead we by no means assign to it what is proper to the Manhood, for we do not say that the Godhead is passible or created. Nor again do we attribute to the Manhood those things which properly pertain to the Godhead, for we do not say that either the flesh or the Manhood is uncreate. But when we speak concerning the Person, whether we Name it with reference to both natures together or with reference to one of the natures simply, we attribute to it [the Person] the properties of both natures."

St. Thomas Aquinas says (*Sum. Theol.*, III., xvi. 4), "Since one and the same Hypostasis is supposed by the name of both natures, it is clear that those things which are of the Divine nature can be said of the Man as the Hypostasis of the Divine nature, and those which are of the human nature can be said of God as the Hypostasis of the human nature." "And the reason of this is that since the Hypostasis of each of the two natures is the same, the same Hypostasis is signified by the name of each nature. Whether Man therefore or God is uttered, the Hypostasis of the Divine and of the human nature is meant." "Yet, when anything is predicated of anything, both the thing predicated and that by virtue of which it is predicated must be noticed. For what pertains to the Divine nature is predicated of Christ by virtue of the Divine nature, while that which pertains to the human nature is predicated of Him by virtue of His human nature."

Hooker says (*Eccles. Pol.*, V. liii. 1), "The sequel of which conjunction of natures in the Person of Christ is no abolishment of

[1] See Dorner's *Pers. of Christ*, II., ii. 72; Hagenbach's *History of Doctrine*, Vol. III., 199.

this doctrine has become widely current,[1] and by taking the place of the original doctrine of the Church has seemed to many to justify the objections often raised against it.

But a statement of its true contents should remove these objections. It is not taught by Catholic theology that the properties of the

natural properties appertaining to either substance, . . . but whatsoever is natural to Deity the same remaineth in Christ uncommunicated unto His Manhood, and whatsoever natural to Manhood His Deity thereof is uncapable." Again (§ 4), "A kind of mutual commutation there is whereby those concrete names, *God* and *Man*, when we speak of Christ, do take interchangeably one another's room, so that for truth of speech it skilleth not whether we say that the Son of God hath created the world, and the Son of Man by His death hath saved it, or else that the Son of Man did create, and the Son of God die to save the world. Howbeit, as oft as we attribute to God what the Manhood of Christ claimeth, or to Man what His Deity hath right unto, we understand by the name of God and the name of Man neither the one nor the other nature, but the whole Person of Christ, in Whom both natures are."

Dr. Bright sums up the matter by saying (*St. Leo on the Incarn.*, p. 129), "Because He is 'God and Man' in one Person, therefore all His acts and properties are the acts and properties of that one Person, and may be predicated of 'God' or of 'Man.'" The whole note in which this remark occurs should be carefully studied.

[1] Ottley (*The Incarnation*, Vol. II., 271–273) seems to misapprehend the doctrine. Also Hawkesworth (*De Incarnatione*, p. 79 *et seq.*) and Du Bose (*Ecumenical Councils*, pp. 305–306). Even Blunt's *Dictionary of Doctrinal and Historical Theol.* says "the properties of one nature are to be predicated of the other nature."

two natures are mutually communicated or exchanged; but that, while each nature retains its own properties distinct from the other, all these properties belong to that one *Person* to Whom the natures in which they are found belong. Moreover, this truth plainly holds good, whatever title the one Person may be signified by. Therefore it is said that the Son of Man had ascended into heaven,[1] while still on earth—not as if the Manhood had so ascended, but as teaching that He Who owns the Manhood, and is for that reason called Son of Man, thus ascended. Again, the Jews are said to have "crucified the Lord of glory"[2]—not as having crucified the Godhead, but as having crucified that Person, as touching His Manhood, Who is rightly called the Lord of glory, as touching His Godhead. It can be seen from these examples that the juxtaposition of a predicate taken from one nature with a personal title derived from the other is justified by the usage of Holy Scripture and unassailable, so long as the predicates are not conceived as transferred from one nature to the other.

Such is the doctrine which was maintained by the third Ecumenical Council, held at Ephesus,

[1] St. John iii. 13. [2] II. Cor. ii. 8.

when it declared the Blessed Virgin to be θεοτόκος;—meaning, not that the Godhead was borne by a woman, but that He Who, by reason of His Godhead, is rightly called God is none other than He Who, as touching His Manhood, was borne by the Virgin.[1]

The importance of the doctrine lies in this, that its truth justifies our predicating of the one Person Jesus Christ, and that simultaneously, such attributes as omnipotence and omniscience as touching His Godhead on the one hand, and finite power and knowledge as touching His Manhood on the other.

If the properties of the two natures are not to be confused with each other, neither are they to be regarded as nullifying each other in the Person of Christ. Our Lord possessed, from the moment of His conception, the properties of both natures; so that the limitations of His human attributes did not destroy the fulness of His Divine attri-

[1] St. Cyril, Alex. (*Third Epis. to Nest.*, § xi.), says, "But forasmuch as the Holy Virgin brought forth after the flesh God personally united to flesh, for this reason we say of her that she is 'the Mother of God' (θεοτόκος); not as though the nature of the Word had its beginning from the flesh, . . . but, as we said before, because having personally united man's nature to Himself, He vouchsafed also to be born of her womb in the flesh." Trans. in Heurtley's *Faith and the Creed*, p. 173.

butes. He possessed both in their integrity, and possessed them simultaneously. How this could be is an inscrutable mystery, but it possesses no greater intrinsic difficulty than the mystery of the Hypostatic Union, of which it is but a branch. The difficulty is precisely the same, and is merely placed in sharper light.

IV

Another branch of the same mystery, and one which has also been set forth ecumenically by the Church, is that of the twofold will and operation of Christ. The natures possessed by Christ "are as causes and original grounds of all things which Christ hath done."[1] Therefore, with the ancient Fathers, we observe that some of His operations and experiences on earth were made possible by His Manhood, such as eating, increasing in wisdom and stature, being tempted, suffering and dying; while others manifested His Godhead, such as causing the waves to be still, raising Lazarus from the dead, taking His own life again when He had laid it down, knowing what was in the hearts of men, and retaining consciousness of His

[1] Hooker, *Eccles. Pol.*, V. liii. 3.

oneness with the Father. Finally, at times, both natures were manifested concurrently in one effect, without confusion of their respective properties; as is seen in His impeccability under temptation, in His working miracles through human *media*, and in His dying with infinite power for the redemption of mankind.

St. Athanasius says, "when inspired writers speak of Him as eating and being born, understand that the body, as body, was born and sustained with food corresponding to its nature, while God, the Word Himself, Who was united with the body, while ordering all things, also by the works He did in the body shewed Himself to be not man [merely], but God, the Word."[1]

[1] *De Incarn.*, 18. Patristic passages containing or implying this doctrine have been given already. But one very important quotation may be given here. St. Leo says in his Tome (§ 4), "For as God is not changed by the compassion (exhibited), so Man is not consumed by the dignity (bestowed). For each 'form' does the acts which belong to it in communion with the other; the Word, that is, performing what belongs to the Word, and the flesh carrying out what belongs to the flesh; the one of these shines out in miracles, the other succumbs to injuries." As Dr. Bright points out (*St. Leo on the Incarn.*, note 156), this passage was criticised as Nestorian in tendency in the Council of Chalcedon, but was vindicated from the charge and deliberately approved by the Council. In this connection it is well to correct a misinterpretation of the Fathers in Westcott's *Epistle to the Hebrews* (p. 66), which is cited with approval by Gore (*Dissertations*, p. 166). Westcott says,

The final stamp of ecumenical authority was given to the doctrine we are considering by the sixth General Council, held at Constantinople, A.D. 680, the ecumenicity of which is indisputable. This council decreed as follows. "We declare that there are in Him two natural wills and two natural operations, without separation, change,

"It is unscriptural, though the practice is supported by strong patristic authority, to regard the Lord during His historic life, as acting now by His human and now by His Divine nature only. The two natures were inseparably combined in the unity of His Person." Mason apparently repeats this mistake, understanding ancient writers to believe that "He interrupted from time to time the exhibition of His Divine energy, in order to give His humanity its turn; or He interrupted the normal homeliness of a human life by wondrous vindications of His Godhead."—*Conditions of our Lord's Life*, pp. 84, 85.

So far as the greatest of the Fathers at least are concerned, this does them grave injustice. They did not separate the natures, nor did they regard our Lord's actions as proceeding exclusively from one or other nature in turn. St. Leo's phrase "in communion with the other," quoted above, vindicates him from the charge. St. Athanasius says (*Orat. c. Arian.*, III., 32), "Whence it was that, when the Flesh suffered, the Word was not external to it; and therefore is the passion said to be His: and when He did divinely His Father's works, the flesh was not external to Him, but in the body itself did the Word do them." The Fathers saw rightly that the Divine nature is *required* to account for some of our Lord's works, and that others *exhibited* the reality of His Manhood. But they recognized the unity of His Person, and did justice to the truths that His Divine works on earth were wrought in and through His Manhood, and that His human life was not what it would have been had Christ been merely human.

division, or confusion, according to the doctrine of the holy Fathers; and that the two natural wills are not opposed to each other . . . but His human will follows and does not oppose or contend against, but rather is in subjection to His Divine and Almighty will." [1]

Certain modern writers have been too positive in their assertions as to what may be predicated of a single person. They do not appear to see how utterly unable we are to give an exact definition of person. We say that it is the subject or self, *αὐτός*, of a rational nature, especially of will and consciousness. Boethius says *Persona est animae rationalis individua substantia.* This, however, does not define it, but merely distinguishes it from the nature of which it is the subject and from other subjects which do not possess a rational nature. What person is in itself escapes definition. We merely identify it by declaring what it invariably possesses and subsists in. It invariably possesses will and consciousness, but is itself neither will nor consciousness. It is their indivisible and mysterious subject. This distinction being observed, we see that what we know of person does not involve a metaphysical impossibil-

[1] Denzinger, *Enchiridion, Symb.*, p. 77.

ity that more than one will and consciousness should have a common subject, *i.e.*, belong to one person. Whether or no such is the case in the Person of Christ is not to be determined by metaphysical considerations. If He is the subject of two wills and two consciousnesses, He is still but one subject of both, and, therefore, but one Person. If the question be asked what is referred to when it is taught that our Lord did not take a human person, the answer is plain. He did not take a human *subject*, but made Himself the subject of the rational nature which He took,—the coming into being of that nature coinciding in time with His becoming its subject. To conclude, all that can be said with metaphysical certainty as to what constitutes a person is that the presence of will and consciousness, whether single or dual, is necessary to indicate the presence of person as their subject. The number of persons is to be determined by other considerations. Psychology tells us that in the case of human persons, two wills and two consciousnesses involve the presence of two personal subjects; but our Lord's Person is Divine, and our belief in His case must be governed by revelation.

This teaches us, in accordance with the mind of the Church Universal, that in the one Person of

Christ there have existed, from the moment of the Incarnation, two wills and two consciousnesses, which manifested themselves concurrently in His one earthly life, although mutually distinct, one Divine and infinite, the other human and finite. The difficulty of conceiving the possibility of this is but a branch of the difficulty of conceiving the veritable possession by one Person, at the same time, of two natures, each complete, one infinite and the other finite.[1] We do not say that in the Incarnation one nature came into possession of the other; but that the Person Who possessed one nature from eternity came to possess the other also, and gave it personal subsistence by assuming it.

[1] Du Bose (*Soteriology of the N. T.*, p. 144) says, "When the Church insists upon the 'One Person in two natures,' by one Person it means one personal subject."

CHAPTER II

THE HUMILIATION OF CHRIST

THE Incarnation involved a condescension and humiliation of the Divine Word, and this humiliation is described in the New Testament under the figures of self-sacrifice, impoverishment and kenosis.

I

Our Lord became incarnate in order that He might offer Himself upon the Cross as a Sacrifice for the sins of men.[1] Holy Scripture shows that two truths are involved in this Sacrifice, the thing or Victim offered and the conditions under which it was offered.

Touching the Victim offered, it is said, "For God so loved the world that He gave His Only-begotten Son."[2] "And, Christ also loved you, and gave Himself up for us, an offering and a

[1] Ephes. v. 2, 25; Heb. ix. 22–28; x. 11–14, and many other texts.

[2] St. John iii. 16.

Sacrifice to God."[1] We learn therefore that what was offered was no less than a Divine Person. And it is one of the commonplaces of Catholic theology that the infinite nature of the Person Who offered Himself is what gives to the Sacrifice its infinite value and efficacy. For this reason it becomes true that He "needeth not daily like those high priests [of the Old Law], to offer up sacrifices, first for His own sins, and then for the sins of the people: for this He did once for all, when He offered up Himself."[2] The Sacrifice has value for all men, all places, and all times. And it is certainly not too much to say that such considerations are incongruous with the idea that, when He offered Himself upon the Cross, He was bereft of those Divine attributes which signify the world-wide power of His Person and Its capacity for efficacious contact with all conditions and all times.[3]

[1] Ephes. v. 2. [2] Heb. vii. 27.

[3] Ottley (*Doc. of the Incarn.*, II., 314, 315) acknowledges this and says, "His Divine Person imparts immeasurable grace and power to the actions and sufferings of His humanity. For (quoting Liddon's *Univ. Sermons*, I., ix.) 'our nature is His own; He carried it with Him through life to death, He made it bear and do that which was utterly beyond its own native strength. His eternal Person gave infinite merit to its acts and its sufferings.'" Cf. *Church Quarterly Rev.*, Oct., 1897, p. 166, and

The conditions under which He offered Himself were those of obedience and a death issuing in victory over death — the first being required for the meritoriousness of His Sacrifice, and the second for its propitiatory value and redemptive power. Accordingly our Lord is represented as saying concerning His Incarnation, "Lo I come to do Thy will, O God!"[1] That His obedience might be a human obedience, He took our nature and "was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin;"[2] and, "though He was a Son, yet learned He obedience by the things which He suffered."[3]

"The wages of sin is death,"[4] and "without shedding of blood is no remission."[5] Accordingly our Lord "became obedient unto death, even the death of the Cross."[6] "He was wounded for our transgressions, He was bruised for our iniquities: the chastisement of our peace was upon Him; and with His stripes we are healed."[7]

Bright's *St. Leo on the Incarn.*, note 6. The conclusion of the matter is that, although our Lord offered Himself *in His Manhood*, His Manhood became an infinite Sacrifice, and was offered with infinite intelligence and power, only because the Divine Son *was offering His unimpaired Self in it.*

[1] Heb. x. 9. [2] Ibid. iv. 15. [3] Ibid. v. 8. [4] Rom. vi. 2, 3. [5] Heb. ix. 22. [6] Phil. ii. 8. [7] Isa. liii. 5.

Had our Lord not risen from the dead, we should still be in our sins.[1] Had He not possessed power to take His life again as well as to lay it down,[2] He could not have redeemed us. But being very God as well as very Man, and having received of His Father "all power in heaven and earth,"[3] He was Lord of the powers of darkness, so that it was not possible that He should be holden of death.[4] Having overcome death "by His own blood, He entered in once into the Holy place, having obtained eternal redemption for us."[5] Such in brief is the Catholic doctrine of our Lord's self-sacrifice, so far as it bears upon the subject before us.

This self-sacrifice required our Lord's assumption of human nature and its conditions. But neither does self-sacrifice in general nor did His self-sacrifice in particular require or admit of an impoverishment of nature. When we surrender ourselves for others, we do not change our proper nature, but merely prefer the advantage of others to our own, and adopt conditions, perhaps, which are beneath what pertains to our rightful position and dignity. The sacrifice of self does not mean

[1] I. Cor. xv. 17. [2] St. John x. 18. [3] St. Matt. xxviii. 18.
[4] Acts ii. 24. [5] Heb. ix. 12.

self-mutilation or self-annihilation, but humiliation and self-surrender. An impoverishment of one's nature or a kenosis of what pertains to it, signifies failure of power and forfeiture of prerogative, and robs self-sacrifice of its ethical significance and value by changing it into self-ruin. The merit of our Lord's death was due to His obedience. But its infinite value for our salvation, and the impossibility that He should be holden of it, arose from His possession of the fulness of the Godhead when He died. It seems clear enough, therefore, that our Lord's self-sacrifice required the mystery of very God subsisting in our Manhood and dying in it, "whole in what was His, whole in what was ours."

II

These considerations teach us how to interpret the figures of impoverishment and self-emptying employed by St. Paul. When St. Paul says of Christ that, "though He was rich, yet for your sakes He became poor, that ye through His poverty might become rich,"[1] we are not to think that our Lord's Divine nature is described as becoming impoverished, but that He assumed an additional

[1] II. Cor. viii. 9, R. V.

nature and in that nature endured the conditions of poverty, communicating of His own richness to it and making it the source to us of the riches of grace. In like manner, when our Lord is said to have "emptied Himself," [1] we are not to impute to St. Paul a meaning which is subversive of the doctrine of Christ's Redemption.

III

It is desirable to consider more fully the critical passage from which this phrase is taken.[2] In order to appreciate its true bearing we should begin with the preceding words of exhortation, which St. Paul is here enforcing by the example of Christ. He says, "Doing nothing through vainglory, but in lowliness of mind each counting other better than himself; not looking each of you to

[1] Phil. ii. 7.

[2] Gifford (*The Incarnation*, p. 105 *et seq.*) gives some "Notes on the History of the Interpretation" of this passage. Powell (*Prin. of the Incarn.*, pp. 246–255) gives a more complete list. It is noteworthy that Theodore of Mopsuestia, the representative of literal interpretation among ancient writers, who also emphasized the Manhood of Christ, explains the phrase ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε as meaning that our Lord "did not manifest Himself: for by taking the form of a servant He concealed that dignity which was His, being thought by those who saw Him to be what He seemed." —Migne, *P. G.*, lxvi. 924.

his own things, but each of you also to the things of others." Such is the exhortation. Then follows immediately the illustration. "Have this mind in you, which was also in Christ Jesus: Who being [1] in the form of God, counted it not a prize [2] to be on an equality with God, but emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant, being made [3] in the likeness of men." [4]

Our Lord's Self-emptying must be interpreted in harmony with what it is given to illustrate—not looking to one's own things, but also to the things of others. The word "also" is significant. St. Paul did not set out to illustrate an *abandonment* of one's own things to make room for something else, but such a freedom from anxious care about them as would allow for looking *also* to the things of others. In short, the lesson is not one of self-robbery, but of sympathy with and care for the needs of others.[5] And what is thus urged by

[1] Margin, "being originally."

[2] Ibid., "a thing to be grasped."

[3] Ibid., "becoming in."

[4] Phil. ii. 5–7. *Τοῦτο φρονεῖτε ἐν ὑμῖν ὃ καὶ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, ὃς ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ ὑπάρχων οὐχ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο τὸ εἶναι ἴσα Θεῷ, ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε, μορφὴν δούλου λαβών, ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων γενόμενος.*

[5] Bishop Stubbs, in his charge of April, 1893, says, "There must be a parallel between the example of our Lord's action, and our duty

St. Paul will be found to be embodied in the example which he subsequently cites.

Our Lord is described as "being in the form of God," and the whole passage is concerned with what was done by Him while "in the form of God."[1] The word for "being," ὑπάρχων, involves two ideas; (*a*) being *originally*, as suggested in the margin of the R. V. (cf. I. Cor. xi. 7 and Gal. ii. 14); which meaning excludes the early Lutheran idea that the passage refers wholly to the time of our Lord's earthly life;[2] (*b*) being *continuously;*

which it is cited to illustrate. There is in fact no parallel whatever between such a kenosis as that which I have described and that by which it is in our power to imitate the Lord Jesus, as we are exhorted to do on this principle. It is self-surrender, self-effacement, and humiliation for the sake of others, that we are to attempt to practise—not the limitation of our power of helping them, but the devotion of our whole self for them, as He devoted Himself for us."—*Church Union Gazette*, Sep. 8, 1893.

Dr. Bright writes in a personal letter as follows: "I doubt not that in the context you would emphasize the καὶ in Phil. ii. 4. It proves decisively that St. Paul, in thinking of an unselfish person, did not imagine him to surrender or strip himself of what was his own, but to retain it and all that followed from the retention of it,—*adding on* thereto a genuine care for the interests of others. But this absolutely bars out the notion of a real 'kenosis' as to Divine attributes or excellencies or prerogatives, as involved in the humiliation. It attests, implicitly, a co-existence of what was originally our Lord's own, with that which He adopted when He assumed our nature." This same idea is implied in his *Sermons on the Incarn.*, p. 277.

[1] Gifford, *The Incarnation*, p. 7. [2] Ibid., pp. 8–11.

which makes the word apply both to our Lord's pre-incarnate existence and to His earthly life. This meaning is suggested by the use of a present participle with an aorist following, and is borne out by St. Paul's use of *ὑπάρχων* elsewhere (cf. II. Cor. viii. 17; xii. 16). It is possible, perhaps, to find instances in which the thought of permanent continuance is not implied in *ὑπάρχων*, but the word always appears to involve continuance *throughout the time of the action which it introduces;* and this is all that needs to be maintained for a correct understanding of this passage.[1]

The phrase "form of God," *μορφῇ Θεοῦ*, does not refer to anything separable from God. It is not the "Divine appearance," or "the glory visible at the throne of God," but the nature or essence of God—considered not in the abstract, but as it actually subsists. This is sufficiently established by Lightfoot,[2] whose argument is ably seconded by Gifford.[3] It is borne out also by the

[1] See Gifford, *The Incarnation*, pp. 11–21. Canon Gore in the *Guardian* (Aug. 4, 1897) cites II. Macc. xiv. 35, 45 as an exception to this; but the *Church Quarterly Rev.* (Oct., 1897, pp. 169–171) disproves this contention.

[2] *Epistle to Philippians*, pp. 127–133.

[3] *The Incarnation*, pp. 26–36. Cf. Bright's *Sermons on the Incarn.*, p. 275. Liddon (*Passion-tide Sermons*, pp. 20, 21) says, "The 'Form' of God would have meant, in St. Paul's mouth

distinction clearly involved in the text between "being in the form of God" and "to be on an equality with God." Our Lord's way of regarding the latter is described as growing out of the former; which would not be the case if they were both external. The implication is that "to be on an equality with God" was not regarded by Christ as something "to be grasped" for the reason that His being in the form of God makes His possession of such a state secure and inalienable. Such an argument would be fallacious if by the "form of God" was meant something external and capable of being put in abeyance. The phrase may be taken rightly to mean "subsisting all along in the essence of God."

It is added that, for this reason, "He thought it not a prize to be on an equality with God." The word for "prize," *ἁρπαγμόν*, is rendered more fully, "a thing to be grasped" — that is, as if it were not an inalienable possession but needed to be grasped in order to be retained. The word involves the idea of precarious tenure, requiring one to hold on to equality anxiously lest it be lost. This fits in with St. Paul's argument. He ex-

and St. Paul's thought, all those attributes which belong to the Reality and Perfection of the One Supreme Self-existent Being."

horts the Philippians not to be so anxious about their own things as to neglect an accompanying care for the things of others; and, in exhibiting the example of Christ, he shows that there is no necessity for centring our thoughts upon ourselves, since our proper status is secure in any event and cannot be put in peril by looking after the things of others. It does not need "to be grasped."[1]

[1] Gifford fails to allow for the lesson which is being illustrated, and the causal connection between our Lord's "being in the form of God" and His not regarding His state of equality with God as a thing to be grasped. Both of these imply, not a readiness to surrender the state of equality, but, a freedom from anxiety as to the consequences of self-disparagement—a sense of security. Moule (*Philippian Studies*, p. 93) says, "He viewed His possession of the fulness of the eternal Nature as securely and inalienably His own, and *so* He dealt with it for our sakes with a sublime and *restful* remembrance of others." In a foot-note he adds, "So sure was His claim that, so to speak, with a sublime *un-anxiety*, while with an infinite sacrifice, He made Himself void." Some of the Fathers took the phrase to mean that He did not regard His state of equality with God as needing to be displayed. This would be in harmony with the context, and would not imply the false interpretation of the phrase following as signifying an abandonment, but rather the idea of *veiling* His Divine state in the form of a servant. See Lightfoot's *Epis. to Phil.*, p. 133 *et seq.*

The view here given agrees substantially with that of St. Chrysostom (*Nicene and P. Nicene Fathers*, Vol. XIII., 213). Lightfoot asks pertinently (p. 137), "For how could it be a sign of humility in our Lord not to assert His equality with God, if He were not Divine?" Or, to put it more largely, How could His appearing

The phrase "to be on an equality with God," *τὸ εἶναι ἴσα Θεῷ*, expresses what it is that Christ did not think to be a thing which needed to be grasped. The use of the neuter plural, *ἴσα*, gives an adverbial force to the phrase, which signifies that *state* of equality with God which grows out of our Lord's enduring possession of the form or subsisting essence of God. This is brought out in the Revised Version.

To paraphrase the whole verse, St. Paul says of Christ that, "subsisting all along in the essence of God, He did not think that His state of equality with God was a thing which needed to be grasped anxiously."

The course of St. Paul's argument thus far helps us to understand the critical words which follow—"But emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men," etc. The context which we have been analyzing plainly suggests a metaphorical interpretation of *ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν*. If St. Paul meant to assert that Christ literally emptied Himself of something, that thing must have been His state of equality

on an equality with man be a sign of humility, if He had ceased to be on an equality with God? Cf. Bright's *Sermons on the Incarn.*, pp. 278, 279.

with God, for St. Paul could not have meant that our Lord abandoned the form or subsisting essence of God,[1] and the context does not suggest anything else to which he could have referred. But he could hardly have introduced an assertion that Christ emptied Himself of His being on an equality with God with language which implies, as we have shown, that Christ regarded His being on an equality with God as inalienable. Moreover, as we also have shown, the lesson which the example of Christ is here given to confirm is not one of abandonment of any thing at all, but an example of freedom from absorption in one's own things and of thoughtfulness for the things of others. Finally the clauses which follow—"taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men"—are epexegetical and limit the meaning of ἐκένωσε, according to Greek idiom. St. Paul, therefore, cannot have meant more by the phrase, "emptied Himself," than is signified by the phrase, "taking the form of a ser-

[1] Gore says, "The question has been asked, Does St. Paul imply that Jesus Christ abandoned the μορφὴ Θεοῦ? I think all we can certainly say is that He is conceived to have emptied Himself of the divine mode of existence (μορφή), so far as was involved in His really entering upon the human mode of existence (μορφή)."

vant, being made in the likeness of men."[1] We do not forget that kenoticists assume that our Lord's taking the form of a servant involved necessarily a real Self-emptying on His part. But this assumption is rationalistic and unwarranted, as we shall endeavor to show later on, and in any case is not contained in the text before us.[2]

The above considerations should be sufficient to prove that St. Paul was not asserting a literal Self-emptying on our Lord's part. The only possible reply would be that the word κενόω is

[1] Pearson says, "If any man doubt how Christ emptied Himself, the text will satisfy him, by *taking the form of a servant*," etc.—*Apostles' Creed*, p. 217. Moule (*Phil. Studies*, p. 94, note) says, "The exinanition was, in fact, just this—the taking the form of the δοῦλος: neither less nor more."

[2] Dr. Bright says in a personal letter, "As in verse 8 the scope of ἐταπείνωσεν ἑαυτόν is precisely defined by the requirements of γενόμενος ὑπήκοος, so that the humiliation in question was exactly as much as the submission to crucifixion involved, neither less nor more,—so it must be in verse 7. Did the assumption of humanity require our Lord to part with, surrender, give up, His Divine attributes 'as touching His Godhead'? All who believe Him to be both God and Man will say it did not; only Psilanthropists will say it did, and they will say so by a dogmatic assumption, not sustained by the context. For us, then, it is clear, I think, that ἐκένωσε must have its scope as exactly determined by λαβων κ. τ. λ., even as ἐταπείνωσεν ἑαυτόν in the next verse is dependent for significance on γενόμενος ὑπήκοος—the conclusion in both cases being identical; and that λαβων κ. τ. λ. does not require a kenoticist interpretation of the aorist: therefore such interpretation does not justify itself on exegetical grounds."

never used metaphorically. The fact is, however, that the word is so employed by St. Paul in the four other instances in which he uses it. Thus, in Rom. iv. 14, he writes, "For if they which are of the law be heirs, faith is made void, *κεκένωται*, and the promise is made of none effect." He is speaking of the act of faith and cannot mean that it has something literally taken out of it, but that its value is reduced in impressiveness. Again, in I. Cor. i. 17, he says, "For Christ sent me, not to baptize, but to preach the Gospel: not in wisdom of words lest the cross of Christ should be made void, *κενωθῇ*." What is meant is lest the Cross should suffer disparagement, not lest it should have something taken out of it. In the same epistle, chapter ix. 15, he says, "It were better for me rather to die, than that any man should make my glorying void, *κενώσει*." Glorying cannot literally be emptied, but St. Paul feared that it might lose its justification and impressiveness. Finally, in II. Cor. ix. 3, he writes, "But I have sent the brethren, that our glorying on your behalf may not be made void, *κενωθῇ*, in this respect"—that is, be made unjustifiable or less impressive. In all these instances the verb *κενόω* seems to signify

the disparagement of something—not a real emptying of it.[1]

We conclude that the phrase ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε is metaphorical. This is obscured by rendering it "emptied Himself," although the revisers have followed the Peshito and Vulgate in translating etymologically. We cannot use a translation, however well considered, as the final basis of exegesis. We must consider the original Greek. The difficulty here lies in the fact that the phrase "emptied Himself," does not so readily suggest a metaphorical meaning to an English reader as does the phrase ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε to a Greek reader. The two phrases are etymologically equivalent, but the idiom of the two languages is not precisely the same. We think that the phrase might be translated with substantial accuracy by the words "disparaged Himself." To disparage is to lower in rank or estimation, to make "of no reputation" as the Authorized Version renders it. Our Lord

[1] Powell's *Prin. of the Incarn.*, pp. 241, 242, may be profitably examined here. Dr. Bright says in a personal letter, "I do not feel at all sure that ἐκένωσε, in Phil. ii. 7, is literally 'emptied.' The verb in other texts seems rather to indicate the sense of depriving of impressiveness or of subjective value." The *Church Quarterly Rev.*, Oct., 1897, pp. 171, 172, also objects to a literal interpretation.

lowered the estimation in which He would otherwise have been held by veiling His majesty in the form of a servant. This idea is borne out by St. Paul's statement a little further on that as a reward for His self-disparagement God gave Him "a *Name* which is above every name"—that is, made of repute what had been made of no repute. The reward is suited to the action which earned it. The point of the illustration which St. Paul was citing, then, is that Christ put His being on an equality with God in the background by taking the form of a servant and being made in the likeness of men.[1]

[1] The translation "disparaged Himself," was suggested to the writer by a well-known English theologian in the sense of "the adoption of a lower rank." The idea is illustrated by Dr. Bright (*Waymarks*, p. 393) in the well-known line from Sir Wm. Davenant.

"He walked as if His Godhead were deposed."

Canon Mason (*Conditions of our Lord's Life*, p. 21) says, "A κενοῦν, upon which so much has sometimes been made to turn, does not exactly mean 'to empty,' but has passed through various shades of meaning, such as 'to exhaust' (in the natural sense), until it comes to mean something like 'to reduce the force, or significance, or reputation of a thing.'" Liddon says (*Passion-tide Sermons*, p. 31), "If He did not set store on glory which was rightfully, inalienably His, why should we? If He shrouded it, buried it away out of sight, lived amongst men as if it had no existence, took on Him the form of a servant, why should we do otherwise?"

St. Cyril, Alex. (*Quod Unus*, Migne, lxxv. 1348 *sq.*), says, "Our

We are now in a position to paraphrase the entire passage. St. Paul exhorts the Philippians to do nothing through faction or vainglory, but in lowliness of mind to prefer others to themselves, not regarding exclusively their own things but considering also the things of others. To illustrate and confirm this exhortation, he bids them to have this mind in them which also was in Christ Jesus. Subsisting all along in the essence of God, He did not think that His state of equality with God was a thing which needed to be grasped anxiously, but on the contrary disparaged Himself [which He would not have done had He regarded His position as likely to be imperilled thereby], that is, He took the form of a servant and was made in the likeness of men.

Lord thought it not robbery to be equal with God, but came down in a manner to that which was not in glory, in that he appeared as Man."

St. Thomas Aq. (in *Phil.* ii.) says, "Beautifully he says *exanimit*, for emptiness is opposed to plenitude. . . . Human nature, and the soul, is not full but *in potentia ad plenitudinem*, because it is made as it were a *tabula rasa*. . . . He says *exanimit*, therefore, because He assumed human nature." In short the assumption of a cloak of emptiness is metaphorically described as a self-emptying. This agrees with Bright's remark (*Waymarks*, p. 393), "If we take ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν in logical connection with what precedes and follows, we shall see that practically it means 'He became inferior to the Father as touching His Manhood.'"

We cannot but believe that much error on the part of certain and some special pleading on the part of others, who are unwilling to impute to St. Paul a meaning which contradicts more than one doctrine of Scripture, would have been saved had modern commentators taken the context and St. Paul's use of the verb κενόω elsewhere into account, and interpreted the word ἐκένωσε in its metaphorical sense. It is as unsound and unwarranted to maintain that St. Paul meant to assert that Christ emptied Himself of His state of equality with God, as it is to contend that He meant to describe an abandonment of the form of God. —

CHAPTER III

KENOTIC ARGUMENTS

THE modern kenotic theory in all its forms is to be distinguished by the idea that when the Divine Logos took our nature He "abandoned" something which He possessed before the Incarnation.

If we classify the kenoticists according to what they believe our Lord to have abandoned, we shall find that they fall into three groups. The first one consists of those who say that the Logos abandoned the form of God, and contend that He ceased to be what He was, while remaining Who He was—retaining simply His bare personality. The second group consists of those who distinguish between what they call the absolute and relative, or the ethical and metaphysical, attributes of God, and say that the Word abandoned the latter—the relative or metaphysical attributes, including omnipotence, omnipresence and omniscience. Some of these writers add the qualification, "within the human sphere," insisting none the less upon

a "real" kenosis. The third group includes those who say that the Word abandoned His pre-incarnate glory and state of equality with God simply. All agree in holding that He really abandoned something during His earthly life which He had possessed before He became incarnate.[1]

The following considerations have been advanced by kenoticists to support their position ;— not that all kenoticists are responsible for all of them, but each has been urged by one or more of the groups which we have distinguished above.

1. It is said that the ancient Fathers did not really face the problem which kenoticism is intended

[1] Anglican kenoticists fall into the second and third groups. It needs to be emphasized, however, that the fundamental difficulties and erroneous tendencies of kenoticism are present in all its forms. If the Son ceased to be what He was when He became incarnate, He ceased to be very God; and this conclusion is unaffected by the amount of change which is thought to have taken place. Moreover, when we speak of "what He was" before the Incarnation, we must include *all* of His eternal prerogatives and attributes; for He was in His proper nature all that could rightly be predicated of His Person.

Dr. Bright writes in a personal letter, "What I always dwell upon . . . is, that the Godhead is indivisible or 'simplex.' You cannot, in thought, cut off this or that 'part of it, and say He acted or lived as God minus that part.' If He was not, in the manger, in the garden, on the cross, *quoad* His original Divine nature, fully and absolutely and indefeasibly Divine, He was not God, not Divine at all. There is no escape from it."

to solve, and for this reason are not competent authorities on the subject. Moreover, it is added that certain of them, with many of their orthodox successors, were under the influence of a docetic tendency, which hindered them from doing justice to our Lord's Manhood and human limitations.[1]

2. It is also urged that the ethical aspects of the Incarnation are better realized when we consider that, for love of us, our Lord abandoned whatever would interfere with His full acceptance of our limitations of power and knowledge. His perfect sympathy, it is said, required His full participation in our conditions. He really emptied Himself in order to be touched truly with the feeling of our infirmities. To insist upon a metaphysical immutability of God is to miss this ethical aspect of the Incarnation. Moreover, the kenosis was voluntary all along. His limitations of power and knowledge were self-imposed and maintained by Himself from moment to moment, and could have been abolished at any instant had He so willed. This continual self-suppression constitutes an exercise of Divine power rather than a succumbing to weakness.[2]

[1] This is considered in Chapter IV.
[2] Considered in Chapter V.

3. In connection with this ethical argument it is said that we must maintain a real moral development in our Lord, a progress like ours in the acquisition of virtue and holiness, if we are to look upon Him as our example. In the interests of this idea it is said that our Lord could not have met His temptation by means of inherent Divine power, but must have depended as we do upon assistance from above, the assistance of the Spirit. To say otherwise is thought by some to nullify our Lord's human freedom and the reality of His temptation.[1]

4. Certain writers in the second group of kenoticists add that those Divine attributes which are called relative—omnipotence, omnipresence, and omniscience—do not belong to God as God, but grow rather out of the relations subsisting between God and the universe. These relations were created by the will of God, so that the attributes which spring from them are not essential to God. Their abandonment does not constitute a change in the Divine essence.[2]

5. It is added still further that we must acknowledge a real kenosis, in the human sphere at

[1] Considered in Chapter VI.
[2] Considered in Chapter VII.

least, in order to do justice to the reality of our Lord's Manhood and earthly conditions. This is urged on the metaphysical ground of an alleged incompatibility between certain Divine attributes and human conditions which precludes their simultaneous existence in the same person.[1]

6. Finally, kenoticists appeal to Scripture, deprecating *a priori* methods of argument, and insisting that the truth or falsity of their position must be tested by the facts and statements of the New Testament. And it is urged that we must not read into the New Testament what we think it ought to mean, but should allow its facts and statements to speak for themselves. A fresh study of the Scriptures is called for, and one unbiassed by metaphysical preconceptions.[2]

We have given the above arguments without accompanying comments in order that we may not be suspected of slighting them. But we are confident that all of them can be met satisfactorily, and we shall consider them one by one in the following chapters.

In the meantime, it will be well to summarize our reasons for rejecting the kenotic theory. Be-

[1] Considered in Chapter VIII.
[2] Considered in Chapters IX and X.

fore this volume is completed, these reasons will all have received such fuller statement as seems necessary. They are as follows:

1. The Scriptures do not justify the kenotic theory, but on the contrary contain truths and statements which are inconsistent with it.

2. The theory is inconsistent with the dogmatic decrees of the Ecumenical Councils touching the Incarnation and our Lord's Person.

3. It is rejected by Catholic doctors in general of every age.

4. The arguments by which it is supported are fallacious.

5. It is inconsistent with more than one fundamental truth of our religion, and tends inevitably to Socinianism.

CHAPTER IV

THE APPEAL TO CATHOLIC ANTIQUITY

IT is admitted by Canon Gore that "the great bulk of the language of ecclesiastical writers" is against him. But he adds, "as a matter of argument, the theologians who refuse to recognize the real human limitations in the consciousness of the incarnate Son, from Clement of Alexandria down to our own day, have said nothing which can alter our judgment. They have hardly attempted to examine continuously the intellectual phenomena of our Lord's human life during the period of His humiliation: they have at best but taken particular texts and explained them away in the light of an *a priori* assumption as to the effect of the Godhead on the manhood, and they have unwarrantably applied expressions written of our Lord in glory to our Lord in His mortal state."[1]

We have already pointed out the inconsistency

[1] *Dissertations*, p. 202. Cf. pp. 171–178, 205, 206, 213, 214. Also see Ottley, *The Incarnation*, Vol. II., 81 *et seq.* and 300.

of such language with his own position in his *Roman Catholic Claims*, where he asserts the Anglican position to be an appeal to the Scriptures as interpreted by Catholic consent, and maintains that, in matters not specifically determined by the Church, we must gather the consensus of Catholic writers on the subject. The Church, he says in various portions of his works, is the teacher, and we go to Scripture not to discover but to prove the contents of the Church's teaching.[1]

[1] Cf. his *Mission of the Church*, pp. 32, 33, where he says, "'The Church to teach, the Bible to prove'—that is the rule of faith." Somewhat inconsistently with this he writes (*Dissertations*, pp. 170, 171) that the dogmas of the Church "are primarily intended as limits of ecclesiastical thought rather than as its premises . . . they block us off from lines of error rather than edify us in the truth. . . . But thus warned off from cardinal errors, we are sent back to the New Testament, especially to the Gospels, to edify ourselves in the positive conception of what the incarnation really meant."

The inaccuracy of all this appears when we consider that the dogmas of the Church took the form, not of warnings or negations, but of positive definitions of what is to be believed. They are *credenda*, not *neganda*. Moreover the decrees of faith of the Ecumenical Councils were but expansions of the baptismal formula, which formed the primitive Creed. This primitive Creed was positive in form and was intended to give edifying expression to the truths which form the premises of true Christian thought. When we realize this, we shall not, as kenoticists do, undertake to *correct* Catholic consent by our scriptural exegesis, but we shall assume that the Scriptures *prove* what the Church teaches.

The tendency of kenoticists to disparage the authority of eccle-

But it will be well to consider his criticisms of the Fathers. They may be reduced to three heads: (*a*) That the Fathers refused to recognize the real human limitations in the consciousness of the incarnate Son; (*b*) that their exegesis was inadequate and mistaken; (*c*) that they reasoned on the basis of an *a priori* assumption as to the effect of the Godhead on the Manhood.

I

When kenoticists criticise the Fathers for refusing to recognize "the real human limitations in the consciousness of the incarnate Son," they occupy a point of view which often causes them to misinterpret the Fathers. We do not accuse Canon Gore of Monophysitism, but he has borrowed phraseology which implies the existence of but one consciousness in the incarnate Son. Such language is clearly monophysite in its implication, and comes more naturally from continental kenoticists, who share in the Lutheran habit of merg-

siastical tradition and consent appears in Ottley, *The Incarnation*. His position is criticised in the *Church Quarterly Rev.*, Oct., 1896, pp. 32–36. There is also a fine discussion of Gore's attitude toward the Fathers in the same Review, Jan., 1896, pp. 311–322.

ing together certain of the properties of our Lord's two natures.

The ancient Fathers were wont to acknowledge the fulness of both natures and their distinctness in our Lord's Person. Accordingly they took into account the operations of both, and distinguished between the two. This kept them from regarding our Lord's human knowledge and consciousness as if it were His only knowledge and consciousness. When they denied that our Lord was really ignorant they were not necessarily imputing omniscience to His human mind, whatever may have been the case with some writers. They held, as the Faith required them to hold, that, along with His limited and human knowledge, our Lord also possessed Divine knowledge, so as to be omniscient at all times "as touching His Godhead." Writers like St. Athanasius, St. Gregory Nazianzus and St. Ambrose believed that our Lord was at once limited in knowledge "as touching His Manhood" and infinite in knowledge "as touching his Godhead."[1] To explain how this

[1] This appears in a common interpretation of our Lord's words concerning knowledge of the day of the end (St. Mark xiii. 32), of which the following are important examples.

St. Athanasius (*Orat. c. Arian.*, III., 43): "For since He was made man, He is not ashamed, because of the flesh which is igno-

could be they knew to be impossible, but no more so than to explain the mystery which lies behind it—the coexistence of the Divine and human natures in one Person, without mutual infringement or confusion. When, therefore, an ancient writer is found to deny that our Lord was ignorant, we may understand, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that such a writer is taking both of our

rant, to say 'I know not,' that He may shew that knowing as God, He is but ignorant according to the flesh." Transl. in *Nicene and P. Nic. Fathers*, 2d Series, Vol. IV., 417.

St. Gregory Naz. (*Orat.*, xxx. 15): "Every one must see that He knows as God, and knows not as Man. . . . We are to understand the ignorance in the most reverent sense, by attributing it to the Manhood, and not to the Godhead." *Nic. and P. Nic. Fathers*, Vol. VII., 315.

St. Ambrose (*Of the Christian Faith*, Bk. IV., c. iv., § 193): "The Name of 'Son' embraces both natures. For He is also called Son of Man, so that in the ignorance attached to the assumption of our nature, He seems not to have known the day of the judgment to come. For how could the Son of God be ignorant of the day, seeing that the treasures of wisdom and knowledge of God are hidden in Him?" *Nic. and P. Nic. Fathers*, 2d Series, Vol. X., 307, 308.

Powell (*Prin. of the Incarn.*, p. 425) also gives the following references: Tertul., *Adv. Prax.*, c. xxvi.; Origen, *Comm. Ser. in Matt.*, § 55; St. Eustathius, *apud.* Facund., *Def. Tr. Capp. M.*, xi. 1; St. Hilary Pict., *De Trin.* ix *fin.*, and x. § 8; St. Basil. *Epist.* 236, 1 *fin.*; St. Gregory Nyss., *Adv. Apoll.*, xxiv, xxviii; *De Deit. Fil. et Sp. S.*; St. Hieron., *Adv. Pelag.*, ii. 14; St. Cyril, Alex., *Com. in Matt.*, xxiv. 36; *Thesaur. Assert.*, xxii.; Theodoret, *Repr.* xii.; *Capp. Cyr.*, c. iv., etc.

Lord's knowledges into account, since He was continuously in possession of both. We need not interpret him to mean that our Lord's human mind was omniscient, unless other proof is available that such was His meaning.[1]

That a tendency is exhibited by the later Fathers to ignore the finiteness and consequent limitations of the human mind of Christ may not be denied, but the significance of their position has been exaggerated. The more balanced theologians of the Athanasian period should be better appreciated and reckoned with. Their contention

[1] Du Bose (*Ecumenical Councils*, p. 339) makes this error. He says, "The time is past when we can ascribe to the humanly developing and incomplete Manhood of our Lord on earth any act of immediate and non-human omnipotence or omniscience. Against this fundamental truth the great Leo himself and many able theologians then and now offend when they represent the human Jesus as now manifesting the properties of man and now those of God." This is quite misleading. The writers referred to had in mind the Divine *Person* of the Word incarnate, and in distinguishing works which revealed Divine power and knowledge from those which exhibited human conditions, were distinguishing the natures of Christ. They were not referring Divine properties to His Manhood.

It may not be denied, of course, that writers of the time of St. Augustine and subsequent generations did attribute omniscience to our Lord's human mind. Gore gives examples of this (*Dissertations*, pp. 132–138), from which it appears that St. Augustine and others held that our Lord pretended to an ignorance which He did not really possess.

that our Lord was always in possession of Divine omniscience is not rightly to be regarded as due to a tendency to minimize the real limitations of His Manhood, for they do not exhibit the tendency referred to. It is not reasonable to reject Catholic consent because some Catholic writers are found to add vagaries of their own. It is peculiarly unreasonable in this connection, because the tendency to impute omniscience to our Lord's human mind does not appear so early as does the consent that He retained His Divine omniscience while on earth. It is clear, therefore, that the erroneous tendency referred to cannot have been the *cause* of the Catholic consent as to our Lord's personal omniscience. The vagary in question was in fact the result of individual limitations and of a lack of theological balance. It proceeded from a one-sided logic, and was not the legitimate outcome of Nicene theology, as crystallized in the antithetic phrases of St. Leo and the Council of Chalcedon.

Nicene theology was content to assert both sides of the truth, placing the Divine and human predicates of our Lord's Person in juxtaposition, without attempting the impossible task of explaining their harmony. This has been criticised, but

the criticism is unwarranted. Such juxtapositions occur in Scripture. Thus the Jews are said to have "crucified the Lord of glory;"[1] the Son of Man is said to have descended from heaven;[2] and God is declared to have purchased the Church "with His own Blood."[3] It is in fact the true test of theological balance and a Catholic temper to hold opposite truths in close connection with each other. Calvinists fasten their attention exclusively upon the almighty sovereignty and will of God, and Pelagians magnify the integrity and freedom of man's will. But Catholic theologians place these truths in juxtaposition and hold them together, making the manner of their holding each truth such as to allow for the other, and recognizing their inability to make an explanation of their harmony. It cannot be wrong to hold in connection with each other truths found in Scripture. To say that we may not put such truths in juxtaposition seems to imply that they are mutually contradictory. Those who object to such juxtapositions are likely to end in preferring one truth at the expense of the other. And this is the fault of modern kenoticists. They prefer to emphasize the reality of

[1] I. Cor. ii. 8. [2] St. John iii. 13. [3] Acts xx. 28.

our Lord's Manhood regardless of His Godhead and Divine attributes, and in their one-sidedness interpret the theological balance of Athanasian writers as involving a disparagement of the truth which they themselves exaggerate.[1]

[1] Dr. Thomas Richey in his *Truth and Counter Truth* (Introd.), a book of rare value unfortunately out of print, says, "There are certain fundamental truths of revealed religion which it is impossible to state explicitly without running counter to other truths, as necessary and as well established as themselves. What, in such case, are we to do? May we receive the one and reject the other? Such is the way of heresy. May we side with the one and neglect the other? That were partisanship. We are to receive both, and to hold to both; this is to prove and test our Faith. . . . The most we can do, in the way of adjustment, is to use the one truth to correct our *misapprehension* of the other; it is by balancing truth against truth that we are to continue steadfast in the Faith [*i.e.*, by the very juxtaposition of opposite truths to which kenoticists object so strongly]. This, to many, appears a very narrow way. It is a narrow way, but, as always, when we prefer faith to self-will, it is the way to liberty. He is a bigot, who, in the spirit of narrow partisanship, resigns himself wholly to some one truth, or aspect of truth, and refuses to have his extreme views corrected by an opposing truth, although Divinely attested."

There is also a valuable passage bearing on the need of theological balance in Mozley on *Predestination* (opening portion of Chap. II.). He calls attention to the fact that many truths are "incipient," in that our conceptions of them are inadequate, remaining tendencies of thought rather than full-formed ideas. Such truths cannot be used as premises from which to draw conclusions unless we take into account other truths seemingly opposed to them. This principle must be borne in mind in considering the truth of our Lord's Person. The truth of our Lord's Manhood is "incipient." We cannot form an adequate conception of it, since we

II

That the ancient Fathers were often uncritical in their biblical exegesis is not to be denied. In particular, we find some of them at fault in their attempts to deal with the scriptural assertions of our Lord's increase in wisdom and nescience of the day and hour of the judgment. Interpretations of both passages can be found in patristic writings which involve unreality and that sort of economy which is nearly associated in our minds with deceit.[1]

cannot grasp fully the superhuman conditions—the Divine Person—in which it exists and by which it is elevated above our manhood. We must therefore employ the premise of His Godhead along with that of His Manhood in order to avoid erroneous inferences. This principle is of the utmost importance.

[1] Swayne (*Our Lord's Knowledge*, p. 20 *et seq.*) gives some examples. St. John Damascene (*Orth. Fid.*, III., 21, 22) maintains that "the human intellect of Christ, which was by nature imperfect, participated from the very beginning in the all comprehensive Divine knowledge. When it is said in the Gospel that He grew in years, wisdom, and favour, we must understand it to mean that Christ as He grew in years . . . manifested ever more and more the treasures of His wisdom, and more and more completely fulfilled the will of God. But whoso supposes that in these latter points He really and truly made progress, necessarily denies that the union of the Logos with the flesh was fully accomplished from the commencement," etc.

Swayne, however, quotes passages from St. Athanasius (*Orat. c. Arian.*, III., 52) and St. Ambrose (*De Incarn.*, VII., 72) in which a real progress in wisdom is acknowledged, as touching the human mind of Christ.

But orthodox theology often coexists in the same mind with poor exegesis, and the logical consequences of erroneous scriptural interpretations often require much time and criticism to bring them to light. Moreover, two considerations should be borne in mind. In some cases the real meaning of the Fathers is obscured by their brevity. They sometimes neglected to express qualifications which would none the less have been assented to if brought to their attention. The evidence of this lies in passages to be found elsewhere in their writings. Thus, when it is said or implied that our Lord was filled with wisdom from His infancy, so that His increase in wisdom is to be taken economically, we may, in some instances at least, understand them to mean that His increase in wisdom was restricted to the economy of the Incarnation, that is, to His Manhood. Inasmuch as our Lord possessed the fulness of His Godhead in infancy, He could not be said to lack *personally* in wisdom at any moment, whatever might be said with reference simply to His human mind.

Again, their particular lines of one-sidedness in exegesis are sometimes due to controversial exigencies of passing nature, and do not always signify

a rejection of the truth which for the moment is not allowed for. Thus, when the scriptural passages above referred to were cited in the interests of a heretical attack upon our Lord's true Divinity, it was natural that orthodox writers should, without intending to repudiate the truth of His human limitations, interpret such texts in the sense most clearly opposed to the interpretations of the heretics against whom they were contending.[1] Such exegesis was indeed mistaken, and we may not force the meaning of Scripture even in the interests of orthodoxy; but mistaken though it was, it did not *necessarily* signify the fundamental error in doctrine which is now charged against them.

[1] Thus St. Cyril of Alexandria (*Adv. Nest.*, p. 154), as quoted by Bruce (*Humil. of Christ*, p. 370), says, "Therefore there would have been shown to all an unwonted and strange thing, if, being yet an infant, He had made a demonstration of His wisdom worthy of God; but expanding it gradually and in proportion to the age of the body, and (in this gradual manner) making it manifest to all, He might be said to increase (in wisdom) very appropriately." Elsewhere St. Cyril wavers between language which unmistakably acknowledges genuine ignorance in our Lord's human mind and phrases which imply a pretence of ignorance only. But it is a mistake to interpret his phrase "economic" as meaning "pretended" in every instance. It often means practically "as touching His Manhood."

III

The assertion that the Fathers reasoned on the basis of an *a priori* assumption as to the effect of the Godhead on the Manhood in Christ is in a very large measure unsubstantiated and unwarranted.

By an *a priori* assumption is meant, apparently, one which is based solely upon human reason, which is made prior to a consideration of the facts of revelation, and which pre-determines one's doctrinal interpretation of Scripture. To accuse the Fathers of making such an assumption is grievously to misinterpret their whole position—at least so far as the Nicene Fathers are concerned. The entire exclusion of metaphysical conceptions is of course impossible in any case,[1] and we may take it for granted that the Fathers could not exclude them from their minds. But that their doctrinal

[1] The common disparagement of metaphysical thought is mistaken. It is impossible to consider any great truth seriously without taking into account its metaphysical implications. Mozley gives some useful remarks on this subject (*Essays Historical and Theological*, Vol. II., p. 414 *et seq.*). There is indeed a false use of metaphysics. It consists in using *a priori* conceptions to determine beforehand or to subvert what is revealed or otherwise made known to be fact. Its true use in Theology is to throw light upon the bearing and connection of truths otherwise established.

position was determined beforehand by such conceptions does not agree with the facts.

The assumption which really governed the Nicene Fathers in their interpretation of texts touching upon our Lord's human conditions was simply this, that the Godhead coexisted in our Lord with the Manhood while He was on earth. This assumption was not *a priori* but *a posteriori*, being derived from the historic Faith once for all delivered to the saints. Their doctrinal views were not governed by assumptions as to the effect of the Godhead upon the Manhood.[1] But they refused to admit that the limitations of the Manhood infringed upon or subtracted from the fulness of the Godhead in Christ. This refusal was not due to *a priori* conceptions, but was in direct obedience to what had been revealed and handed down to them for preservation and transmission without compromise or surrender.[2] The notion of a kenosis of Divine attributes was not to be

[1] We are not, of course, speaking of those Post Nicene writers who attributed omniscience to our Lord's human mind.

[2] No one can deny that the expressed purpose of those who assembled in the Ecumenical Councils was to register the contents of common tradition. In giving the reasons for their determinations they ignored metaphysical considerations altogether, and professed to define what had been *received* in every instance.

found in the primitive deposit of Faith, and to acknowledge such an idea was, in their view, to contradict certain contents of that Faith. Our view agrees with theirs, and we believe that it is impregnable.

An *a priori* assumption has indeed been made, and it has determined the exegesis of too many theologians; but the assumption referred to is modern, and consists in this—that our Lord *must* have abandoned the Divine mode of existence and certain Divine prerogatives and attributes in order to submit in reality to the human conditions exhibited in the Gospels.

It is desirable at this point to consider briefly the charge of Docetism so frequently made by modern writers against the Fathers. After granting, as we have done, the mistakes in exegesis which were made by some of them, often under the stress of immediate controversy, and the tendency to neglect the truth of our Lord's Manhood which appeared during the theological decline of the fifth and immediately succeeding centuries, we still feel warranted in denying the truth of the accusation, so far as it touches upon the general position of early writers and their competency as

consentient witnesses to the doctrine of our Lord's Person.

This fact is "writ large" upon the history of Christian thought, that whenever Docetism exhibited itself in forms sufficiently distinct to be discerned, it was emphatically repudiated and condemned by the great theologians of antiquity. Beginning with St. Ignatius of Antioch,[1] we can trace a line of writers, including the greatest divines of each generation, who took pains to assert the completeness and reality of our Lord's Manhood against every heretical denial. St. Irenæus[2] undertook this battle against the Gnostics, and was seconded by Tertullian.[3] St. Athanasius[4] and other giants of his age met the Docetism of Apollinaris, and St. Cyril of Alexandria, a much misinterpreted theologian, asserted the complete Manhood of Christ in unambiguous language.[5]

[1] Cf. *Ad. Trall.*, 9, 10.

[2] *Adv. Haeres.*, III., xvii. 4, where he speaks of Christ as "having become incarnate in man for the sake of man, and *fulfilling all the conditions of human nature.*" Cf. V., i., xxi.

[3] Cf. his treatise *On The Flesh of Christ.*

[4] Cf. *Two Books against Apollinarianism.* Also note the remarkable Epistles of St. Gregory Naz. *Ad Cledonium.* See Bright's *St. Leo on the Incarn.*, note 32.

[5] This appears in his *Letter to John of Antioch* (translated in

The assertions of these writers were gathered up and crystallized in the Tome of St. Leo[1] and in the antithetic phrases of Chalcedon. Again and again, Docetism is referred to and anathematized in all its forms as heretical by those very writers and Councils to whom we chiefly appeal as against modern kenoticism. It is manifestly unjust to accuse writers who brought about the condemnation of Docetism by the Church of the very error which they anathematized—and that merely because they were too well balanced to adopt the reactionary position of modern kenoticists at the expense of the truth which Docetism had caricatured, viz., the fulness of the Godhead in Christ.[2]

In some instances, at least, we are convinced that the true cause of the charge made against the Fathers lies in the *a priori* assumption of those

Heurtley's *Faith and the Creed*, p. 177 *et seq.*), and in *De Fest. Pasch.*, Hom. xvii.

[1] See Bright's *St. Leo on the Incarn.*, note 73.

[2] It has been admitted that some of them did not always do justice to the limitations of our Lord's human mind. This mistake, however, was not due to any unwillingness on their part to acknowledge the reality of His Manhood. It arose simply from their failure to perceive that if our Lord's Manhood was real, His human mind was finite and subject to the conditions of human growth.

who make it—that the truths of our Lord's Divine attributes and of His human conditions cannot be placed in juxtaposition without the latter being practically sacrificed. Kenoticists seem to take for granted that, when the Fathers assert our Lord's possession of almighty power and Divine omniscience during His earthly life, they must be disregarding the reality of His Manhood, in spite of anything they may say elsewhere to the contrary.

A few words should be said in conclusion as to later and mediæval writers. We have freely acknowledged that passages occur in their writings which appear one-sided and docetic in tendency. But we are justified in saying that this grew out of a theological decline and an inability to grasp opposite truths in mutual connection and juxtaposition.

They isolated the truths of our Lord's Godhead and Manhood from each other, in practice, to the injury of both. But their strong allegiance to ecclesiastical tradition saved them from positive heresy. While employing crude language, suggestive to us of Docetism, they anathematized that heresy whenever they recognized it. The logical tendency of their inaccurate phrases

was not realized, and mediæval preaching did ample justice to the human life of Christ.[1]

[1] The *Church Quarterly Review* (Oct., 1897, pp. 163–167) gives reasons for charging English kenoticists with having "underestimated the real hold on the humanity of Christ in the traditional theology of the universal Church;" and with having "overlooked the extent to which the value even of the Manhood of our Lord depends not only on His being personally God, but also on His being in possession of His Divine attributes at every stage of His earthly life."

CHAPTER V

THE ETHICAL ARGUMENT

MUCH emphasis is placed upon the ethical aspects of the Incarnation by those who believe in a real kenosis. And orthodox writers are criticised for dwelling too much upon metaphysical considerations at the expense of ethical ones. One writer, for example, reminds us that St. Athanasius "insists against the Arians that it is an error to insist on what is possible (*τὸ δυνατόν*) for a Divine Being; we must rather consider what is morally fitting (*τὸ πρέπον*)." He adds also "If Love is the supreme attribute of the Divine nature, the metaphysical difficulties raised as to the 'unchangeableness' of God seem to give way to moral considerations; the abstract attributes of Deity must in the last resort be compatible with a real power of condescension, a real display of pity.[1] Attention is called to the continued voluntariness of our Lord's state of exinanition, and

[1] Ottley, *The Incarnation*, Vol. II., pp. 287, 288.

Godet says, "if this miracle [of Self-emptying] is not possible, God is not free, and His love has limitations imposed upon it." [1]

The unanimity and persistency with which this argument has been urged is truly surprising in view of its weakness. It is, of course, true that whatever is morally fitting to the Divine Son is possible to Him. And we should not determine beforehand what is possible by *a priori* considerations of our finite devising. But when God has revealed certain of His attributes to us, we are surely warranted in drawing the inference that

[1] *New Test. Studies*, p. 140. It is to be noted that one of Godet's contentions is that His love does have limitations imposed upon it, since, according to his view, infinite love gives place to finite and progressive love. This argument is also to be found in Du Bose (*Ecumenical Councils*, pp. 331–333), who says, "Again we need to remember that the Incarnation is an incarnation not of the physical properties but of the spiritual, moral and strictly personal qualities of God. . . . It was not the nature of man to share the natural or physical, but only the spiritual and personal qualities of God." This is quite misleading. The Incarnation is not a sharing by the Manhood in the qualities of God, but a Hypostatic Union of the Manhood with the Godhead, the distinctness of properties being preserved in the Union. Mason (*Conditions of our Lord's Life*, pp. 27, 28) also argues that, if our Lord was not Himself "affected by the nature which He assumed, then it is vain for us to turn to Him for sympathy, or even for example." If "affected" here means simply that Christ made the Manhood and its experiences *His own*, very well. But he seems to mean more.

nothing is morally fitting to the Son which is in obvious contradiction to what is thus revealed.

To speak of abstract or metaphysical attributes is misleading. It may require abstract thought to appreciate the significance of Divine attributes, but to call any of these attributes themselves "abstract" seems to imply that they are the creations of human thought and not real. This is quite erroneous. The attributes in question — omnipotence, omnipresence and omniscience — are revealed, and are therefore as real and necessary as are those which are called ethical.

There is no warrant whatever for making an antithesis between metaphysical and ethical aspects of the Incarnation at the expense of the former. It is very easy to disparage by means of an adjective where plain language would be too radical, and an antithetical epigram is usually more brilliant and plausible than illuminating and accurate.[1] The antithesis in this case is quite uncalled

[1] Dr. Bright says, in a personal letter, "'Metaphysical attributes' appears to me an invidious phrase which theologians had better avoid. It will certainly get them into trouble. . . . Thus to disparage metaphysical as distinct from ethical may look smart as an antithesis, but (like so many antithetical epigrams) it is sure to place us on dangerous ground. . . . There are those who will take advantage of it. 'Why insist on any metaphysical ideas of Deity? Why not content yourself with a moral

for. It cannot be inconsistent with one class of Divine attributes that the rest should remain inviolate.[1] Moral considerations cannot nullify the fundamental modes of Divine existence; and, when these modes are revealed to us, we must maintain their uninterrupted reality, if we would be faithful to the Word of God.

The phrase "metaphysical immutability" needs definition. It may mean a speculative immutability born of metaphysics, and having no objective validity; or it may mean a truth of revelation, called metaphysical simply because its theological consideration requires abstract thought. Some kenoticists seem to have the former meaning in mind. It is impossible that we should accept the view thus implied. Divine immutability is a

character in God? Why raise such questions as those of omnipresence, omnipotence, infinity, personality?'" It is clear that the very nature of God is in question. As Dr. Bright says (*Waymarks*, pp. 391, 392), "We have before us nothing less than a new Theism, which pretends to be better than the old as being 'ethical' and not 'metaphysical.'"

[1] It is also pointed out in an able pamphlet by the Rev. Alban Richey, published since this book entered the press, and entitled *The Incarnation and the Kenosis* (see p. 17), that "Without some manifestation of omnipotence and omniscience, our Lord becomes readily to be considered the divinely inspired Man" merely. Apart from the revelation of His Divine power and knowledge, what the Apostles witnessed was human perfection simply.

truth of revelation, although metaphysical training is needed in order to theologize accurately concerning it. Moreover, no one who acknowledges that omnipotence, omnipresence and omniscience are real Divine attributes can consistently insist upon an ethical immutability of God while denying His immutability as touching these attributes. The Divine attributes may not be set over against each other, nor may one class of them be ignored and sacrificed in the interests of another.[1]

But the issue is larger than one of bare immutability. If it were possible to believe that God could change in any of the attributes of His nature, the question would remain, "Is He still God? Would He not be reduced in the scale of being and be converted into something not Divine?" It is supposable that a man might lose those attributes which differentiate him from an

[1] Bruce (*Humil. of Christ*, pp. 172, 173) urges against those who speak of Divine immutability the argument of Strauss, that, if God acts at all, He ceases to be immutable in that fact. To reason thus is to mistake Divine immutability, which refers to His nature. The Divine *nature* is not changed by Divine action. Moreover, mysterious as is the fact, there is no change in the operations of God considered as His operations. The change appears in the temporal *effects* of His action. His will and operation are eternal and changeless, although He wills and causes effects which are mutable. To will and cause changes is not to change the will and action of the Eternal.

ape, but in that case he would no longer be man. He would be an ape.

It is strange that theologians should consider themselves to be emphasizing the ethical aspects of the Incarnation—as distinguished from what they disparage as its metaphysical aspects—when broaching a theory the chief purpose of which is to assert a metaphysical change in the Godhead, and that on metaphysical grounds. It is also remarkable that, when orthodox writers criticise such metaphysics, they are accused of being too metaphysical. This phenomenon should receive more attention from theologians than it has obtained heretofore. We do not agree with the common disparagement of metaphysics. It may, of course, be misused, but as the handmaid of theology—not the mistress—the value of metaphysics is undoubted.[1]

In this argument, however, the tables may well be turned. It is the kenoticists who have robbed the ethical aspects of the Incarnation of their strength. They intend to emphasize the ethical nature of the mystery of the Incarnation. So far as mere words go, they do not fail in this. But the logic of their position is metaphysical, and

[1] Cf. note on p. 89.

must prove fatal in the end to the ethical element. Catholic doctrine makes the Incarnation to be "a stooping down of compassion, not a failure of power." Kenoticism makes it to be a metaphysical subversion, and an abandonment of the very attributes and prerogatives the possession of which gave infinite value to the love and sympathy of Christ while on earth and made His hand "mighty to save."

The love of Christ was infinite, and must have been uninterrupted *during* His humiliation. It could not have exhibited itself by shortening itself at the outset.[1] It must have been an infinite love all along. But love is deepest when most discerning and most full of resource. An ignorant love is at best imperfect, and an impotent one is no better. Tennyson describes our Lord as

"Strong Son of God, immortal Love."

[1] As even Bruce acknowledges (*Humil. of Christ*, p. 176) a depotentiation of the Logos involves the consequence that "the love which moved the Son of God to become man consumed itself at one stroke. There is a breach of continuity in the mind which gave rise to the Incarnation." Yet he goes on to say, "A mighty impulse of free, self-conscious love constrained the eternal Son to descend into humanity, and in the descent that love *lost itself* for years." Italics our own. Godet says, "He had been loving with all the force of a perfect, infinite love, and this kind of love He exchanged for one which implies progress both in respect of intensity and of comprehension." Quoted by Powell.

It is His strength which glorifies and gives value to His love, and which did glorify and energize it whilst He walked on earth, "mighty to save" in the midst of mortal pain. What love can equal that which moved One Who was possessing infinite majesty, wisdom, power and holiness to wear our flesh as an inglorious veil over it all, to exercise our finite faculties of power and knowledge, to breathe our sin-laden atmosphere, and to be "touched with the feeling of our infirmities" in a nature which He had united hypostatically with His own. Clearly it was His continued possession of Divine prerogatives which made His obedience and submission to the conditions of the form of a servant such an amazing mystery of love. Possessing the Godhead in all its fulness, He walked among men "as if the Godhead were deposed."

Kenoticists say much about the sympathy of Christ. We cannot, of course, afford to ignore that glorious truth. But true sympathy involves necessarily the ideas of pity and condescension, and in their perfection these require a personal vantage ground. To put one's self in an inferior's place so as to feel with him is pre-eminently an ethical movement, as kenoticists for the sake of

consistency must acknowledge. It does not involve a change in one's own nature or a loss of personal prerogatives, but rather a stooping down and entrance upon inferior conditions. To undergo personal change or to lose personal power and prerogative robs condescension of its value. The quality in sympathetic contact which gives it significance and value is the superior personal status and vantage ground which is possessed during the time of contact by the one who is exercising sympathy.

It is undoubtedly true that genuine sympathy involves a real identification of the stronger with the weaker, but this identification needs analysis. We do not show sympathy with the weak by ceasing to be strong, or with the ignorant and foolish by ceasing to have knowledge and wisdom,[1] but by

[1] Such considerations meet what Canon Gore says (*Bampton Lectures*, p. 174; cf. *Dissertations*, pp. 218–220) touching the necessity that a teacher should accommodate himself to the limitations of the child's mind. Such accommodation is in no real sense an abandonment of knowledge, but a retracing of its elements along the lines of childish progress. The security of this retracing depends upon the teacher's retaining his larger knowledge. No wise teacher wishes, as Gore suggests, to "fling away" such knowledge. Ottley (*The Incarnation*, Vol. II., 291) is equally at fault in using the illustration of a father dealing with his children. He says, rightly enough, that "there would be a simplicity of dealing prompted by love." But surely it would be prompted by present wisdom and

exercising our strength and wisdom under the conditions of weakness and folly, and by such accommodation and contact with them as will enable us to realize in some measure their misery. Being but men we cannot do this perfectly. Moreover, if it were possible, and we could assume another's conditions in full reality, we should in doing this destroy our vantage ground, perhaps, and become the subjects rather than the bestowers of pity. Our Lord, however, was not thus limited. By assuming the very nature of man He was able to be "touched with the feeling of

larger knowledge as well. There certainly would not be involved any real "nescience—in so far as the wider knowledge and experience gathered in the large sphere would be useless or unintelligible in the smaller one," as he suggests. Neither of the above illustrations are happy. Accommodation is one thing, self-limitation or abandonment of knowledge is quite another.

Dr. Bright says, in a personal letter, "Now can we conceive of Divine love (as resident, say, in the Father) apart from Divine knowledge? Are they not simply inseparable? It is just because God knows divinely all about man's condition, man's needs, capacities, etc.—as no human mind can know them—that His love is what it is. . . . This would be true, I think, if we had no Incarnation to consider. But now suppose the Son, admittedly ὁμοούσιος and truly Divine, to love divinely and know divinely, before He became incarnate: He becomes incarnate: by hypothesis He continues to love divinely, but He has lost the Divine knowledge of man's condition. Therefore He does not know *how* pitiable that condition is, how much of Divine love it requires!"

our infirmities," and this taking of our Manhood did not require a "conversion of the Godhead into flesh." Accordingly our Lord possessed in His own undivided Person both the vantage ground of Divine love and the means of perfect contact with our sorrows.

Moreover, one of the consequences of the Hypostatic Union of the fulness of the Godhead with our passible nature appears to have been an endowment of His Manhood with a unique sensitiveness to suffering and a transcendent capacity to enter into all the elements of human pain without a paralysis of faculties. Thus the very almightiness of our Lord's Godhead came into exercise and made His manhood a perfect instrument of contact with our pains. It will be seen that the juxtaposition of the Divine and human attributes of our Lord, to which kenoticists object, is in fact the best means by which to enforce the ethical aspects of the Incarnation—the aspects of *effectual* love and sympathy.[1] The collect for the eleventh Sunday after Trinity speaks of God as

[1] The *Church Quarterly Review* for Oct., 1897, pp. 167, 168, says, "In one life He gained the possession of experimental sympathy with a multitude of other lives of the most varying circumstances, because the Divine attributes which were His as He passed through His earthly life enabled Him to find in a single set of cir-

declaring His "almighty power most chiefly in showing mercy and pity"; and we may surely infer from such a truth that this showing of Divine mercy and pity is a proof that the almighty power which it declared was being exercised.

When certain of the kenoticists assert that our Lord's keeping in abeyance His omnipotence in the human sphere was an exercise of Divine power all along, in view of its voluntariness,[1] they practically surrender their whole position. They are driven to do this by the force of the orthodox reply that a Mediator Whose power is shortened is not sufficiently equipped for the work of Redemption which our Lord came into the world to achieve. A being who does not possess almighty power cannot in the nature of things take to himself such power. Infinite power ceases to be infinite when it has been reduced to finite limitations,

cumstances contact with and experience of other circumstances, of which these were but typical."

Gifford (*The Incarnation*, p. 101) says, "The continuance in Christ of the *form of God* assures us that at least the moral attributes of the Godhead are faithfully represented in the one perfect image of the Father, His Incarnate Word. And thus His every act of tender compassion, of patient endurance, and of loving self-sacrifice shines out in its perfect beauty as a revelation of God's own nature, and of His gracious disposition towards us."

[1] Ottley, *The Incarnation*, pp. 288–290.

and it cannot be restored by the Person Who has thus been made weak. A power which is really infinite cannot be finite in any region, and a power which is finite cannot convert itself into omnipotence.[1]

The phrase "self-restraint," as applied to our Lord, is often misinterpreted. It does not signify a reduction of power, but a voluntary limitation of its effects. Really to abandon power is to enter a state in which the power abandoned is no longer capable of voluntary reassertion. To say that Christ could at any moment resume His exercise of Divine power is to concede that He was

[1] Says Dr. Bright, in a personal letter, "I do not see how a Divine person, having once parted with Divine power—and therein, I contend, with the fulness of Divine life and action—could at will resume them. He has ceased, by hypothesis, to be omnipotent: how can He lift Himself up into omnipotence? So far as omnipotence (and the like holds as to omniscience) is concerned, He is on a level with other men. By what process is a man like other men to reassume such Divine prerogative by an act of will? If it is said, the Father restored these prerogatives to the Son after (say) the glorification, then, *pro tanto*, here is a case of deification."

Ottley (*The Incarnation*, Vol. II., p. 286) says, "The entire process of condescension is a display not of weakness, but of infinite moral strength." If so where is the abandonment of power? Is "infinite moral strength" something different from "almighty power?" If it is not, how can we regard the Incarnation as at once a loss of power and an exercise of it?

omnipotent all along and merely refrained from manifesting it in phenomenal effects. To be the agent of limited phenomena is as possible for an omnipotent Person as to achieve any infinite work of God. God is not less omnipotent while causing the finite operations of nature than He was when He made primitive matter *ex nihilo.* If He wills to produce finite phenomena under finite conditions, such for example as result from an assumption of our nature, He does not for that reason cease to be omnipotent. The force of gravitation is not shortened when it causes a feather to fall instead of hurling worlds through space. The laws according to which almighty power is exercised, whether in nature at large or in the human nature of Christ, do not constitute limits of Divine power, but are the methods of operation voluntarily and sovereignly employed by the Almighty.[1]

[1] Ottley (*The Incarnation*, Vol. II., p. 285) says that "In creation God voluntarily limited Himself" (cf. Gore's *Dissertations*, pp. 222–224). The same thought is found in non-Anglican writers; and it is urged that the production of finite things is an abandonment of power, in so far as God condescends to be bound in His cosmical operations by the limitations of physical laws. This is to confuse the Divine method with the Divine power. Uniformity in the effects of power exercised in a given direction by God does not signify limitation of Divine power in that direction, but is the

These considerations save us from mistaken interpretations of what certain Fathers say concerning the self-restraint and quiescence of Divine activity which they discerned in the earthly life of our Lord. As has been shown by others, St. Cyril of Alexandria is not correctly reported as saying that our Lord suffered "the measures of our manhood to prevail over Him."[1] The last two words of the Greek are ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ, which should be translated, "in His own case." St. Cyril meant that the Manhood was allowed to fulfil its own law, in accordance with the ends of the economy which our Lord was fulfilling.[2] To put it in another

manifestation of His will. His infinite nature and attributes remain unchanged and unchangeable.

It should also be pointed out to those who acknowledge our Lord's continued exercise of cosmical functions and of omnipotence in such functions, that among these functions is the maintenance of human nature in being and action. This applies to our Lord's own Manhood. While living on earth in His Manhood and permitting its laws to hold their course, He was also, as the Divine Word in Whom all things consist, sovereignly and *immanently* sustaining that Manhood in being and action. In short His Person was related to His Manhood in two ways—as Orderer of the universe and as personal Subject of His Manhood. This illustrates the impossibility of walling off the sphere of His Divine omnipotence from that of His human action.

[1] Gore, *Bampton Lectures*, p. 176 (corrected in his *Dissertations*); Ottley, *The Incarnation*, Vol. II., p. 289.

[2] Bright, *Waymarks*, p. 179; Powell, *Prin. of the Incarn.*, p. 290.

way, Christ was acting voluntarily along certain finite lines, and that habitually, so far as His Manhood was concerned.[1] But, as we have said, it is as possible for One Who retains possession of Omnipotence to do this as it is for Him to act in ways which manifest His omnipotence more clearly. An abandonment of power is entirely unnecessary. We shall find that other patristic passages of the same type admit of this reasonable and orthodox interpretation.

We are in no position to say that the Fathers failed to appreciate the ethical aspects of the Incarnation. Their best known theological works, it is true, were limited in purpose. They were led by force of circumstances to define the Faith of the Incarnation as to its contents more often than as to its ethical bearing. The prevalence of fundamental heresy was responsible for this. But, even in doing this, they can be shown to have been controlled by the ethical considerations which we have been exhibiting. Their extant sermons give ample proof that they perceived the infinite love

[1] Even in His glorified Manhood He is operating along finite lines habitually, although the lines are higher than those of His earthly life. We must acknowledge this, unless we deny that His Manhood is now finite, which would be heretical.

and sympathy which was displayed by our Lord in taking the form of a servant and becoming obedient unto death.[1] This is in a large measure true also of mediæval sermons. The patristic doctrine of our Lord's Person is the only one which protects the infinite condescension of our Lord while on earth from obscuration; and it was the realization of this, among other reasons, which animated the polemics of the Nicene Fathers. If Christ was not God, in the full sense of that title, while on earth, He was not then infinite in love nor mighty to save.

[1] Obedience is a moral action. It proceeds from the will and does not signify or involve limitation of power. St. Leo's sermons recur to the love displayed in the Incarnation again and again.

CHAPTER VI

THE EXAMPLE OF CHRIST

CLOSELY connected with the argument which we have just considered is the plea that our Lord must have passed through the same kind of moral progress which we pass through in order to be a real example to us.[1] It is also urged that, if our

[1] The most elaborate presentation of this plea is to be found in Mason's *Conditions of our Lord's Life on Earth*, Chap. II., especially pp. 79, 80. He says, "All the phenomena of Christ's inward experience during His life on earth which are recorded for us, combine to suggest that His moral growth—as He 'increased in favour with God,' and with the men of God—was of the same kind as ours at its best, only so immeasurably better." It is admitted that Christ did not have "our primary difficulty of overcoming a hereditary disposition to go wrong." But His moral progress is likened to that which was possible for Adam, "who was created with all his faculties perfect, and with every impulse wholesome" (p. 54). On p. 72, he says, "Christ is not only our pattern, as I have said, but our example; and His methods of attaining to moral perfection are our methods. He will not allow the rich young ruler to imagine that His goodness proceeds from within Himself," etc. He also says, p. 58, "To start in human life with untainted springs of desire and thought, is not the same thing as to have attained the perfection of moral character."

Bishop Hall (*Christ's Temptation and Ours*, pp. 18–21) pursues a similar line of thought. He defines our Lord's moral progress

Lord's human freedom and His temptation were real, His obedience could not have been immutably determined beforehand by Divine power inherent in Himself, but that He must have fought His battle just as we fight ours, with no other safeguard than that assistance of the Spirit which is at our service as well.[1]

as an advance "from a perfection of flawlessness and innocence to a perfection of ripened maturity"—language which would be unexceptionable, except for its inadequacy, were it not accompanied by an approving reference to Mason's treatment of the subject.

Dr. Kedney (*Mens Christi*, p. 18) says, "Postulating His innocence or sinlessness, His moral development would consist in the acquisition of spiritual strength, and for this it would be needful that He should undergo and resist temptation."

[1] Mason (*Conditions of our Lord's Life*, p. 66 *et seq.*) reasons against the idea that our Lord drew upon "forces within Himself, whether human or superhuman, for the conflict with temptation." He paraphrases our Lord's reply to the man who called Him good as follows: "If you think Me good, . . . I can assure you that that goodness comes from a source that is higher than Myself," etc. On p. 112, he speaks of Christ as "not only refusing, as has been often said, to use His Divine omnipotence for His own advantage, but also refusing to use it even for ours—preferring rather to work out our restoration by the toilsome and far-reaching exertions and sufferings of His human body and soul and spirit, in reliance upon Another, Who is Our Father and His Father, His God as well as our God."

Ottley (*The Incarnation*, Vol. II., 296) says, "Thus the victory of Christ is an ethical and real one not 'necessary' in the sense that the power of indwelling Deity overbore the free moral liberty of Christ's human will. He was free, though His victory was inevitable in virtue of the unction of the Holy Spirit that rested upon

Such modes of statement are too unguarded. They seem to imply that Christ had to acquire an internal determination of will toward righteousness in which He was originally lacking. It would be nearer the truth to say that He came to reveal the ideal of moral progress, an ideal which no mere man can fulfil. That there was a true *human* progress is not denied for a moment, but a fuller realization of the unique conditions of this progress is needed. His progress was not that of a mere man but of God incarnate, and as such differed from what is possible for us in ways which distinguish it materially even from what was possible for Adam. Our Lord was not only in possession of "flawless innocence" from the beginning, but was a Divine Person and could not sin. This fact lifts His moral progress out of the category of ours. In a very true sense He possessed perfect holiness

Him." He speaks (p. 297) of His Godhead as "not coercing His human will, but acting upon it morally in the way of constraining appeal." Christ's victory was indeed not the result of Divine overbearing. It was moral. But "constraining appeal" does not express the internal relation existing between our Lord's Divine nature and His human conduct.

Godet goes far beyond Anglican writers and boldly says, "He accepted a state of being of which one of the fundamental laws is liberty of choice, the possibility of undergoing real temptation, and consequently *the power to sin*" (quoted by Powell). Italics ours.

in Himself at the outset, and exhibited it to men under the conditions of each stage of growth from childhood to manhood. It is not meant that the infant Jesus possessed human virtue in its realized and active forms; but that He possessed in His Manhood, by reason of the Hypostatic Union, that which would inevitably reveal and realize itself in human virtue when the conditions of human growth and experience permitted such realization. The potential and determining principles of perfect righteousness and holiness were inherent in Him *ab initio.*

His moral progress, if we may use such a phrase, consisted in gradually putting into practice and giving active reality to His inherent perfection, as the growth of His Manhood and the enlargement of His human experience afforded opportunity. The point to be maintained is that an internal principle of moral determination made such a revelation of perfection inevitable.[1] In this respect

[1] This inevitableness was not, of course, a physical necessity of external constraint, as if the Godhead "overbore" His Manhood. Rather it was a personal and moral necessity. A Divine Person cannot sin even in a nature which, apart from Him, is capable of sinning. The *communicatio idiomatum* must not be treated as involving negative moral results in His Person. All the human acts of Christ were the acts of a Divine Person. His Divine will must therefore have determined His human will toward

we must distinguish His progress even from that which was possible for Adam before his fall. As a Child, He could not have been lacking in the virtues of a child, nor as a Youth could He need greater virtue than He possessed inherently. Every new experience brought into exercise the fulness of those

righteousness from the beginning—not from without (which would have nullified human freedom), but from within, by an internal impulse and inspiration which left His human spontaneousness unimpaired. If Christ was not impeccable (as distinguished from being merely sinless) *by reason of His Godhead*, His impeccability must be accounted for otherwise. This cannot be done except at the expense of the exaggerated likeness which is insisted upon between His moral progress and ours. To say that the aid of the Spirit was invariably sufficient for the avoidance of sin does not show *incapacity* to sin, but simply that He did not sin *in fact*.

The undue insistence upon a likeness between our Lord's moral progress and that which is possible for us may lead some to the modern idea that man's moral progress is grounded in his own natural gifts and endowments. Whereas it consists really in our advance by the power of Christ's Godhead, imparted to us through the agency of the Spirit, to that state of perfection which Christ exhibited in His entire human life. This is shown in Wilberforce's '*Doctrine of the Incarnation*, pp. 8–11. He says that "there are two ways in which Christ might be set forth as that Pattern Man, in Whom our nature attained its perfection. Either He might be the happy example in Whom its native qualities found their perfect expression, in Whom all that belongs to mere humanity obtained the utmost development of which it was susceptible; or the perfection of His Manhood might be due to the influence of that Divine nature, with which it was personally united. The first of these is the system of Rationalism—the second, the system of the Church."

virtues which were called for. He derived nothing in moral perfection from experience except increased opportunities of realizing in action what was latent in His Person. The opportunity being supplied, a perfect exhibition of holiness suitable to the occasion followed inevitably and necessarily. There were no vicissitudes or uncertainties in His moral life. So far as the conditions and laws of human growth required, the type or external form of His perfection underwent growth; but the highest possible perfection was revealed in each age, and perfection is not itself the subject of progress. He was a perfect Child, a perfect Youth, and a perfect Man, exhibiting impeccable holiness all along—a holiness which is the goal toward which we must press, and which we fully attain only when we awake after His likeness hereafter.

Our Lord increased "in favour with God," but this was not due to His having improved His internal and flawless sanctity, but to His more complete exhibition in active forms of His inward human perfection. We are to be judged according to our deeds, and the favour of God is won not only by internal or potential holiness, but also by an external exhibition of this holiness in life. We mean progress in virtue in its *active* sense, the

sense in which we ordinarily use the term "virtue."[1] Accordingly, as our Lord increased in His manifestation and concrete realization of holiness in human action, He also increased in favour with God.[2]

It is along the same line that we may explain the statement that our Lord "learned obedience by the things He suffered, and being made perfect, became the Author of eternal salvation to all them that obey Him."[3] He learned obedience through suffering in the sense of practising obedience for the first time under the conditions of suffering. It is not meant that the disposition of obedience

[1] Dr. Bright says, in a personal letter, "In regard to advance in God's favour, I admit a moral advance—of a kind—just as I admit an intellectual. I do not suppose that the undeveloped human mind of Christ, as an infant, had the whole human intelligence operative and powerful. Some persons think so, but for myself I cannot. Very well. Our Lord's soul, in its moral aspect or department, did not, I conceive, energize in love or holiness from the very nativity. Those moral excellencies were unfolded in it. . . . In this sense it is said that He 'learned obedience.' Events drew out qualities into action. Each opportunity of exercising these inherent moral powers was 'redeemed' and utilized. More and more acts, absolutely pleasing to the Father were done."

[2] He also increased in favour with God by reason of His progress in fulfilling the work which He came to do. That work was meritorious in itself, being the ground of all merit in us, and could not but win the favour of God according to the measure of its fulfilment.

[3] Heb. v. 8, 9.

was then acquired, or that He was ignorant of the meaning of obedience, but that obedience then became a *part of His human experience*, and thus an acquisition to His human knowledge. Thus He was made perfect as touching the practice of obedience, not as touching His internal capacity and willingness to obey. It was inevitable that He should obey the Father's will under all conditions whatsoever. He was perfected by unfolding perfection in action, and was equipped by His endurance of suffering to be "the Author of eternal salvation to all them that obey Him."

The truth that our Lord was immutable in holiness from the outset and impeccable does not preclude His possession of human freedom. Freedom does not require peccability. God is absolutely free, but He is not peccable. A state of impeccability is undoubtedly to be realized by the saints in glory, but not by means of a loss of freedom.[1] Freedom is not the liberty to

[1] The difference between the impeccability of Christ and ours is twofold. His was inherent, since He was a Divine Person, and was His from the beginning. Ours is derived from Christ by grace and is the future outcome of moral progress. To put this last again, in relation to moral progress, His progress was the progress of One Who was already impeccable, ours is from a state of peccability to one of impeccability.

choose evil, but the power to fulfil one's will without moral failure. In choosing evil we put ourselves in opposition to the Divine will and invite ultimate and inevitable defeat. To will without governing principle is license, but to will in conformity to the Divine will is to gain perfect liberty and to fulfil our will beyond all peradventure, for the Almighty is with us. The gearing of wheels in a machine does not hamper their liberty. But if the wheels succeed in getting out of their appointed place their freedom of action is lost. Moral freedom means moral power and success. It indeed requires that the will should act spontaneously, and not by constraint. But one whose character is perfect is none the less spontaneous in his choice of righteousness. Character may determine the will beforehand, but this determination constitutes an internal inspiration. It is not an external hindrance to the will. This throws light on our Lord's fasting, considered as self-discipline. He did not need self-discipline to avoid sin, as is the case with mere men; but He submitted to it because it is part of the law for man, and in order to set us an example.

Nor does our Lord's immutable holiness destroy the reality of His temptation. To be tempted

does not require a liability to sin. It means the presentation of an opportunity to resist the seductions of sin. If, as in the case of Christ, this resistance is inevitable, it is a real resistance none the less, and may involve great suffering. Christ was liable to temptation because He could feel in His Manhood the inducements to sin. But His human will was perfectly conformed beforehand to the Divine will. He could not morally yield to such inducements.[1] The pain which He endured in His inevitable resistance was greater than ours in the degree that His holiness transcended ours. His possession of the Godhead and the union of His Manhood with It had a double effect. It made moral failure on His part impossible; but it also made His contact with temptation more discerning. He felt the force of temp-

[1] Dr. Bright (*St. Leo on the Incarn.*, note 15) gives some valuable remarks on this subject, and refers to Liddon's *Bampton Lectures*, pp. 524, 525; *Church Quarterly Review*, July, 1883, Art. on "*Our Lord's Human Example*;" Hutching's *Mystery of Temptation*, p. 116 *et seq.*; Trench's *Studies in the Gospels*, p. 27; etc. Ottley (*The Incarnation*, Vol. II., p. 292 *et seq.*) also gives valuable hints, but likens the conditions of His temptation too unconditionally to that of Adam, and says, "The Deity conferred on His human nature just such strength as was 'infallibly sufficient, but not *more* than sufficient to sustain Him in conflict and bear Him through the fearful strife.'" This last is rather too dogmatic, and obscures the internal relations subsisting between our Lord's Divine Person and His Manhood.

tation more than we do, and it was more awful and abhorrent in its significance to His soul. When a blow falls upon one whose sensitive faculties are keen and who is held up so as to be incapable of giving way, it is felt more terribly than when it strikes one whose sensations are benumbed and who falls under the blow from lack of support. The Divine nature of Christ held up His Manhood to the foul assaults of Satan and imparted to it a unique capacity to suffer. These considerations are needed to give us a proper appreciation of Christ's love for us and of the full significance of His being "touched with the *feeling* of our infirmities."

In order to enforce their contention that Christ must have passed through a moral development strictly parallel to ours, and have won a human victory over Satan, kenoticists say that He fought His moral battle and performed His works of power with the aid of the Spirit rather than by power inherent in His personal Godhead. This assertion is inconsistent with the ninth anathema of St. Cyril, adopted at least by the fourth if not also by the third Ecumenical Council.[1] Nothing could be

[1] This anathema reads, "If anyone says that the one Lord, Jesus Christ, was glorified by the Spirit, as though the power

more misleading. The Holy Spirit was in the most proper sense of the phrase Christ's own Spirit, and was imparted to His Manhood by Christ Himself.

which He exercised was Another's, received through the Spirit, and not His own, and that He received from the Spirit the power of countervailing unclean spirits, and of working Divine miracles upon men, and does not rather say that it was His own Spirit by Whom He wrought Divine miracles, be he anathema."—Denzinger, *Enchiridion*, § 81. Transl. in Heurtley's *Faith and the Creed*, pp. 175, 176. Mason answers this objection (*Conditions of our Lord's Life*, p. xv) with the remark that his view "is one which does not appear to have entered into the mind of either Nestorius or Cyril, and which, therefore, is altogether outside the scope of Cyril's censure. . . . Cyril's anathema, then, is not directed against a view in the smallest degree resembling that which is advanced in these lectures." He defines his view as one which supposes "our Lord to have voluntarily assumed, and consistently maintained upon earth, a position which was not that to which His Divine nature entitled Him, and which He might at any instant have abandoned, had He so willed."

It is, of course, true that St. Cyril had no such opinion in mind. But the issue is avoided rather than met by such language. The real question is, assuming the ninth anathema to be true (which we must assume, unless we are prepared to reject the action of the Council of Chalcedon in adopting it), can the position which Mason defends be reconciled with it? It makes no difference what point of view the assertion comes from, to say that our Lord won His victory by power which was Another's and not inherently His own is to contradict the anathema in question. It is not the only instance in which ancient language meets modern forms of error by anticipation. It should be added that Hawkesworth (*De Incarn.*, pp. 47–51) also incurs St. Cyril's anathema in the same manner.

It is a vital part of the doctrine of God that the eternal Three possess, and subsist in, one indivisible essence. They exist in each other, and where One of the Persons is present the other Two are present in Him. They also work indivisibly in all their operations, although the relation of each Person to these operations is distinct. Moreover, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son as well as from the Father, although in a different manner, and receives His temporal mission from the Son.[1] The Son is not, therefore, inferior to the Spirit in His own economy, but rather employs the Spirit as His own in the exercise of prerogatives grounded in the eternal nature of God. The Incarnation could not have changed the internal relations of the Divine Persons to each other.[2] Thus when it is said that Christ was "led up of the Spirit into the wilderness,"[3] we must under-

[1] St. John xvi. 7.

[2] Our Lord says, "For their sakes I sanctify Myself" (St. John xvii. 19). The sanctifying operations of the Spirit upon His Manhood were in a real sense His own operations. To substitute the operations of the Spirit upon His Manhood for His own operations is an error akin to the popular idea that the work of the Holy Ghost in the Church takes the place of the Son's work. We must believe that the Son is working for our sanctification in, with and by means of His Spirit. The Son and the Spirit are invariably working in and with each other. Cf. St. Athan., *Orat. c. Arian.*, I., xii. 46.

[3] St. Matt. iv. 1.

stand that it was His own Spirit that led Him, and not One Who was external or superior to Him. He was indeed subject to the Spirit as touching His Manhood, but this was because of the Son's own act in assuming the Manhood, and by means of such assumption filling it with His Spirit. And our Lord's Manhood was filled with His Spirit from the beginning. The descent of the Spirit upon Him after His Baptism was a special communication of that Spirit to His Manhood for special ends; but it was not an abolition of our Lord's personal relation to the work of the Spirit, described above.

Underlying the argument of many kenoticists is the assumption that our Lord gave an example which is exclusively human. This mistake is closely connected with the vague but common idea that Christ's life on earth did not transcend the life which we can and should live. We have already shown that our Lord's example does not exhibit what we can fully imitate in this life, but reveals a character which is the *final goal* of our endeavours, and which we attain hereafter. What is required of us now is that we should be in the process of attaining it.

When we consider what Scripture declares this

goal to be, we shall learn that our Lord's example is Divine as well as human. He says, by way of a summary of what we are to attain, "Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect."[1] In short, inasmuch as we were made after the likeness of God,[2] we are required to develop in ourselves the character of God, His interior holiness and immutable perfection. St. Paul says, "Be ye therefore imitators of God as beloved children,"[3] and deduces this exhortation from the example of Christ in forgiving us. The example of Christ is the example of God in Christ. In short, Christ came, among other reasons, to reveal Divine perfection in Himself under human conditions, to show how God conducts Himself when made subject in the form of a servant to the law for man.[4]

[1] St. Matt. v. 48.

[2] Gen. i. 26.

[3] Ephes. v. 1.

[4] The *Church Quarterly Review*, Oct., 1897, p. 168, says, "It is part of the force of His example, again, that He is showing what human life ought to be by revealing the life of God in human action and words."

Gifford (*The Incarnation*, pp. 101, 102) says, "If . . . the *form of God* is laid aside in *taking the form of a servant*, and the influence of the Divine nature thus suppressed, as in kenotic theories, the life of Christ on earth may still serve for our example, by showing what *man* may possibly attain when endued

It is a serious mistake to ignore the Divine aspects of our Lord's life on earth. He was not merely a pattern Man, but also our example as God-incarnate. To miss this truth is to miss what is vital to the ethical significance of the life and obedience of Christ—an obedience which was indeed human, but which was informed and transfigured by the circumstance that God Himself was fulfilling the moral conditions which He imposes upon us, and was making Himself and none other the pattern to which we are to conform ourselves.

with the fulness of grace and power by the Holy Spirit; but by ceasing to be a direct revelation of the character of God it loses the power 'to clothe eternal love with breathing life.'" As it is, as Gifford has just said, "His every act . . . shines out in its perfect beauty as a revelation of God's own nature."

CHAPTER VII

THE RELATIVE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD

WE are told that certain attributes of God—His omnipotence, omnipresence and omniscience—are descriptive of His relation to creation rather than of His own essence.[1] Thus omnipotence describes His absolute and active sovereignty over all that happens or can happen in the universe. It signifies that all the operations of nature and all the forces contained therein, including the powers of man, are energized and controlled by

[1] See Bruce, *Humil. of Christ*, pp. 143, 144. He says, "This distinction between the relative and essential attributes of God is the speculative foundation of the Thomasian Christology." He refers to *Christi Person und Werk*, Vol. I., pp. 47–136.

Anglican writers have not adopted the Thomasian form of argument, but it constitutes the only speculative foundation for the false antithesis between the metaphysical and ethical attributes which we have already considered in Chapter V. It is impossible that metaphysical attributes, as they are called, should give way to ethical ones, unless it is because they are relative and not absolute—*i.e.*, contingent upon the relations of God to creation, relations subject to His will. It is for this reason that we devote a chapter to the subject.

God, so that no possible event can escape His power or surpass His ability to perform.

Again, omnipresence describes the relation of God to the universe considered under the category of space. Nothing exists in the universe from which God is absent. But all things, wherever they may be, are filled with God, although they are not God, and cannot contain Him. God is immanent in all the things which He has made, although He transcends them as well.

Finally, omniscience signifies the relation of God to created things considered as objects of knowledge. He knows them all, and none of them can escape His contemplation and understanding, since He is present in them and sustains them in their being.

It is urged that the relations which are signified by these attributes depend for their reality upon the existence of created things; which means that they depend upon the will of God and do not belong necessarily to His essence, since the universe came into being by the will of God, and does not pertain to His essence.

There is a mixture of truth and error in all this which makes it somewhat misleading. The words omnipotence, omnipresence and omniscience are

indeed suggested by what is known of the external operations of God—*i.e.*, in the operations of nature. But it is quite erroneous to limit their meaning to what is there discerned. The attributes which are signified by the words referred to are infinite realities, and are grounded in the internal essence of God. It is what God is in Himself from all eternity which compels us to say that nothing can come into existence or happen that is able to escape either His power, presence or knowledge. It was not necessary that creation should be, in order that God should possess these attributes. It is, of course, true that He could not exercise them in relation to temporal and spatial things until He had created such things. But two truths need to be maintained, viz.: (*a*) God possessed that which involves His omnipotence, omnipresence and omniscience in the world "before the world was;" (*b*) The existence of created things being pre-supposed, it is impossible that God should fail to be omnipotent, omnipresent and omniscient in any creaturely region, without ceasing to be Himself.

This may be shown in detail. Thus, omnipotence is the infinite energy and sovereign power of God. It is that attribute by reason of which He

is able to perform and direct all that is done or can be done, and which makes it impossible for anything to be done without the exercise of power supplied and controlled by Him. But this attribute pertains not only to His external operations of creation, preservation and providence, but also to His internal action. The generation of the Son, and the procession of the Holy Ghost are as truly referred to His almighty power as are the operations of nature. God is not quiescent apart from creation, but as triune, is eternally active. Moreover this eternal activity is a fact of His essence, constituting Him to be what He is, so that the omnipotence which is exercised in such activity, is one of His eternal and essential attributes which cannot be lost or abandoned without His ceasing to be God. This being so, the fact that created things came into existence by the will of God, does not do away with the necessity that He should be omnipotent in their sphere after and so long as they exist. This truth holds good as touching the region of Christ's human activity. If Christ was truly God He was truly omnipotent, and His omnipotence could not be excluded from the human region. What occurred at the Incarnation, therefore, was

not an abandonment of Divine omnipotence on earth, but the assumption of conditions in which it was partially *concealed*. The limitations of the nature which He assumed could not shorten His Divine power in any region. He remained everywhere omnipotent as touching His Godhead, although He did not impart omnipotence to His Manhood. The sphere of His Godhead comprehended the region of His human activity, although the natures were distinct and His Manhood was not made omnipotent.

The Divine omnipresence is also grounded in the essence of God. The word signifies presence in all things, and thus seems to imply the existence of those things in which God is present. But this is merely one aspect of the reality in God which the term omnipresence signifies. The Divine attribute of which it expresses the creature-ward relation is His incomprehensibility, or, as Latin theology puts it, His immensity. This immensity belongs to the very essence of God. Nothing which exists, therefore, can escape His presence, for He fills all things and cannot be comprehended by them.[1] So far then as omnipres-

[1] The Athanasian Symbol says, "Pater immensus, Filius immensus, Spiritus Sanctus immensus."

ence implies the existence of things and places in which God is present, it is relative. But the reality in God which makes the phrase true is a fact of His essence and inalienable. It follows that, as in the case of omnipotence, if created things exist at all, God must be wholly present in them without being comprehended by them. Such presence is the necessary and natural result of creation. It cannot cease so long as creatures exist. If, therefore, our Lord was God during His humiliation, He was then omnipresent as touching His Godhead, although locally present and circumscribed as touching His Manhood. If the Son of God was on earth, the Son of Man was in heaven,[1] whatever may be the true reading of the text to which we allude, since the phrases Son of God and Son of Man signify one and the same Person—a Person Who cannot be circumscribed except as touching His Manhood.

Finally, the Divine omniscience is also an internal fact of the Divine essence. He is omniscient, not simply because He contemplates the things which He has made, nor because of the relations which He has constituted between created things and Himself, but because He is God. Did not

[1] St. John iii. 13.

omniscience signify what pertains to God as God, and therefore a necessary attribute of God, since all that is in the essence of God is eternal and inalienable, there could be no such thing as omniscience. That word signifies infinite knowledge, a knowledge transcending altogether the ability of any being to assume who has it not from eternity as a part of his essence. God is eternally alive to, or conscious of, all things. If anything exists, or any event takes place, God cannot fail to see it from eternity, for His knowledge is not a coming to know. It is not a process having degrees of advance towards full comprehension, nor is it the result of recalling what has been without form in the latent stores of memory. God neither begins to attend nor ceases to attend. We cannot truly say that He discerns something at one moment, and not at another, or that there is an interval of time between His knowing and the event known, as if His knowledge were not immediate and intuitive. His knowledge transcends both temporal and spatial conditions. In short, it is infinite both in mode and content. It is eternal, and therefore never quiescent, but ever actual. God is eternally alive to the whole course of history in all its details, whether they be actual or possible.

This kind of knowledge does not require the existence of created things for its exercise. From all eternity God was contemplating and comprehending Himself in the Son, Who is His own Image, and the Blessed Three eternally contemplate and know each other. Such knowledge is truly infinite, whether we consider its timeless mode or its infinite object. It follows that, if any creature exists, or if any event occurs, God cannot but discern it with the same necessary action wherewith He knows Himself. Our Lord, if He was truly God, knew all things as God while on earth, whatever may be said as to the limitations of the human mind which He assumed. His assumption of that mind could not either obliterate or render quiescent such knowledge, for it is the attribute of an eternal essence—an attribute, therefore, which is eternally and uninterruptedly active, if active at all.

To conclude, inasmuch as the attributes of God which are called relative or economic are not merely relative, but signify what pertains to the essence of God, and since it is because of what God is in Himself that the relations creatureward which they express become possible and inevitable, we are compelled to believe that these attri-

butes are eternal and necessary, and cannot be abandoned in any region. It being supposed that created things and the conditions pertaining to them exist at all, they must exist by the creative activity of God. God must be in them, and, wherever He is or under whatever conditions He may operate, He is essentially omnipotent, omnipresent and omniscient. These attributes may be veiled by the finite effects which He works or the limited conditions under which He condescends to operate, but abandoned they cannot be, unless God ceases to be God.

No place remains for the assertion that our Lord ceased to be omnipotent, omnipresent and omniscient, as touching His Godhead, during His earthly life, except upon the Arian and Socinian ground that He was not God. This is not to base our ideas upon metaphysical considerations, but to take what is revealed concerning the nature of God in Holy Scripture as eternal truth.

CHAPTER VIII

THE *A PRIORI* ARGUMENT

IT is urged by kenoticists that an incompatibility exists between certain Divine attributes and human conditions which makes it impossible to believe in their simultaneous existence or juxtaposition in one person. Accordingly, they argue, if the Son of God truly took our nature and submitted really to human conditions, He must have abandoned such attributes as would have interfered with the limitations of His Manhood.[1]

[1] Canon Gore (*Dissertations*, pp. 94, 95) says, "He did . . . cease from the exercise of those divine functions and powers, including the divine omniscience, which would have been incompatible with a truly human experience." Again, p. 204, "The real Incarnation involves a real self-impoverishment, a real self-emptying, a real self-limitation on the part of the eternal Word of God."

Ottley (*The Incarnation*, Vol. II., p. 286) says, "We believe that He did 'become poor' in such sense that He voluntarily laid aside the exercise of those attributes of Deity that would have hindered a real human experience."

Bishop Hall (*Christ's Temptation and Ours*, pp. 2, 3) says, "The Son of God 'emptied Himself,' put in abeyance, that is, for the purpose of his earthly life, the Divine prerogatives which

The writers who reject the kenotic theory, whether ancient or modern, are criticised for failing to grapple with the problem involved in the Hypostatic Union and for contenting themselves with a mere juxtaposition of the two natures and their attributes in one Person.

Such an argument is strictly *a priori* and

belonged to His Divine nature, that He might become very man, sharing our lot," etc.

Du Bose (*Ecumenical Councils*, pp. 332, 333) says, "All the personal, spiritual, moral qualities can incarnate themselves, but the physical or natural properties of God cannot be incarnate, because it is not the nature or within the potentiality of man to contain or possess them." "To say that the Logos became man is in itself to say that the Infinite entered into limitations. Omniscience, omnipotence and omnipresence cannot so enter but love can" (p. 336).

Bishop Moorhouse (*Teaching of Christ*, p. 47) says, "I believe that the eternal Son of God, had during His human life, so emptied Himself of all those Divine attributes which would have interfered with the reality of His Manhood," etc.

Mason (*Faith of the Gospel*, Chap. V., § 12) says, "Certainly any refusal to believe in the self-emptying of the Eternal Son, any attempt to minimise it and explain it away, seems to impair the completeness of the Incarnation. Unless we frankly accept the doctrine, difficult as it is, our Lord's earthly life assumes to us an aspect of unreality."

Cf. also Hawkesworth, *De Incarn.*, p. 35.

[1] Canon Gore (*Dissertations*, p. 155) complains "that there was no real help given by the orthodox thought of the time [the time of the Monophysite controversy] towards solving the question of the relation of the divine and human natures, which the dogma of Chalcedon left simply juxtaposited in the unity of Christ's Person." In a footnote he admits that "the function of a dogmatic

rationalistic. It assumes that, if our Lord really thought, spoke and acted in obedience to human laws, He must, *a priori*, have ceased to exercise the omniscience and omnipotence of His Godhead. No argument can be more distressing to a Catholic mind, and yet no argument is more frequently urged and more leaned upon by kenoticists of every type.

The criticism brought against Catholic writers for failing to grapple with the problem of the Hypostatic Union is also strictly rationalistic. What Catholic writers have insisted upon all along is the mysteriousness of that Union—a mysteriousness which necessarily baffles every attempt to explain or solve the problem involved. It is distinctly rationalistic to undertake a solution of the mystery, and every such solution must involve ultimately a sacrifice of one of the factors of the problem. The Apollinarian and Eutychian attempts involved a sacrifice of the truth of

decision is not to supply the philosophy of the subject." Cf. pp. 162, 163, where the same complaint is repeated.

Ottley (*The Incarnation*, Vol. II., p. 101) says, "Leo's famous letter to Flavian exhibits all the characteristics of an understanding practical, . . . but . . . incapable of contributing more to the solution of the problem than a clear antithetic statement of its factors." Cf. his unsatisfactory treatment of the Chalcedonian decree, pp. 105–110.

the Manhood, and the kenotic attempt prejudices the truth of the Godhead in Christ.[1]

In this connection, it may be well to consider the charge of *a priori* methods in exegesis which kenoticists make against the ancients.[2] It is quite unwarranted, so far as the generality of Nicene writers is concerned. It is, of course, true that the ancients, in common with all biblical students of every age, came to the study of the Scriptures with some pre-conceptions. To do otherwise is simply impossible. But the assumption which governed their exegesis more than any other was strictly *a posteriori*. It was this, that the Scriptures should be read in the light of the circumstances under which, and the purposes for which, they were written. Historically, they knew that the New Testament books were written by and to persons who held "the Faith once for all de-

[1] Du Bose (*Soteriology*, p. 143) says, "Everything in the man Christ Jesus is properly and truly human. His knowledge is wholly human knowledge; His power a human power; His whole personal life as man a human life." This passage must be viewed, however, in the light of an undue assimilation of the Divine and human elsewhere in his writings, of pantheistic tendency. But the Socinian drift of the above language is clear.

[2] Ottley, *The Incarnation*, Vol. II., p. 286; Du Bose, *Soteriology*, p. 142; Bp. Hall, *Christ's Temptation*, p. 23; Gore, *Dissertations*, p. 202.

livered to the saints;"[1] and that they were written in order to edify the "saints" in their Faith, already received. This Faith had been transmitted through many separate avenues of tradition, and the Fathers were certain that those doctrines which had been received by common tradition must constitute the Faith which the Scriptures were intended to confirm and irradiate. Bringing this historic Faith to the Scriptures, they found its contents witnessed to and established therein. Such a method, we must insist, is not *a priori* but purely *a posteriori* and scientific. It is in fact acknowledged to be the true method by some of the Anglican kenoticists.[2]

We are not to understand that the freedom of genuine exegetical scholarship is destroyed by this method. The only conceivable aim of such scholarship is to ascertain the real meaning of Scripture; and it is clear enough that this meaning cannot be ascertained, if the circumstances under which, and the purposes for which, the Scriptures were written are not taken fully into account. The real freedom of Catholic exegesis also appears when we consider that the Church

[1] St. Jude 3.

[2] Cf. Gore's *Mission of the Church*, pp. 32, 33.

does not undertake to define the meaning of particular passages in Scripture. They are left to speak for themselves. All that the Church does is to set forth at large the Faith which will be found in the Scriptures when rightly understood. The Catholic exegete, therefore, is not hindered from undertaking "fresh investigations into the meaning of Scripture," but is simply protected from the mistaken methods of private judgment, which substitutes for the traditional Faith some other key to the meaning of Scripture evolved from one's inner consciousness and reason.[1]

Correct exegesis must always result in strengthening our hold upon the Faith of the Church. If the case should prove otherwise, and the true meaning of Scripture should prove to be inconsistent with the Church's ecumenical teaching, the result would not only be fatal to the dogmatic authority of the Church, as "the pillar and ground of the truth," but it would also be fatal to our assurance that the Scriptures are the Word of God. Our knowledge of what constitutes inspired

[1] The Catholic student is not debarred from using the aids afforded by critical and archæological scholarship, but will always find them of service, when rightly used.

Scripture comes from the Church, and not from private judgment or historical research. It is because of the Church's authentication that we accept the Epistle to the Philippians, for example, as divinely inspired. We could not be assured of this with the certainty of faith by any other means. If, therefore, that Epistle or its second chapter is really inconsistent with what the Church teaches, our dependence upon the Church's dogmatic authority is mistaken, and her authentication of the Scriptures ceases to be final. That a loss of belief in the Church's final authority in the field of dogma does undermine our hold upon the Scriptures is shown by the drift of Protestants toward a disparagement and rejection of certain portions of the Bible.

To return to patristic methods. The Fathers did resort, in some instances, to metaphysics; but this resort was critical and defensive largely. When confronted by the *a priori* arguments of heretics like Arius, they met them in their own field, showing the fallacy of such arguments on metaphysical grounds. What the orthodox did not do, at least ordinarily, was to make *a priori* conceptions the predetermining basis of their convictions and theology. Two characteristics

marked their theology; an adherence to concurrent tradition, and a theological balance which enabled them to hold in juxtaposition those truths which they had received, but the harmony of which they could not exhibit.[1]

The incompatibility which is alleged between certain Divine attributes and human conditions needs analysis. It reduces itself ultimately to this, that our Lord's Manhood could not be endowed with Divine omnipotence, omniscience and omnipresence. Whatever may have been the case with certain of the later Fathers, we do not find that Nicene writers in general attributed any of these Divine attributes to the Manhood of Christ. What they maintained was that the *Godhead* of Christ did not cease to possess them when the Manhood was taken into Hypostatic Union with it. They attributed omnipotence, omniscience and omnipresence to the Person of Christ, not to

[1] St. Athanasius (*Orat. c. Arian.*, III., 35) gives a splendid illustration of this balance—one which kenoticists might notice with advantage—when he says, "But if a man looking at what is done divinely by the Word, deny the body, or looking at what is proper to the body, deny the Word's presence in the flesh: or from what is human entertain low thoughts concerning the Word, such a one, as a Jewish vintner, mixing water with the wine, shall account the cross an offence, or as a Gentile, will deem the preaching folly."

His Manhood. It is clear that these attributes cannot coexist with human limitations in one *nature*. But, when we consider that the Divine and human natures of Christ remained distinct in their union, we should have no hesitation in accepting the revealed truth that all the proper attributes of both natures coexisted in that *Person* Who possessed them both. How these natures could be united in one Person is a question which we cannot answer. But granting that they were so united, we must also grant that their attributes concurred in one Person.

It is to be noticed that certain kenoticists acknowledge the failure of their efforts to solve the problem of the Hypostatic Union. They object to a juxtaposition of Divine and human attributes in the Person of Christ on the ground of their incompatibility. But when they discover that their own view of two life centres baffles human conception and imagination, they deprecate any objection based upon this seeming conflict.

Canon Gore[1] finds Himself baffled in attempting to understand how the eternal Son "should in one sphere not know what in another, and that

[1] *Dissertations*, pp. 215–218.

His own proper sphere, He essentially knows." But, by the aid of an illustration drawn from the supposed properties of ether, he comes to the conclusion that "we shall be in no irrational position if we are obliged to confess that our imagination is absolutely baffled by the condition of things which the facts of the Incarnation seem to postulate. At least, we shall not, in the interest of an easier conception abandon the facts." We may be pardoned, perhaps, if we say that this last is just what kenoticists seem to have done. "In the interests of an easier conception," or, as they put it, "in order to grapple with the problem," they appear to "abandon the facts" which teach the presence of the fulness of the Godhead in Christ during His humiliation. At all events they minimize these facts and explain them away.

There is a curious one-sidedness in the argument of kenoticists which should be noticed in this connection. They reason that, if we are to maintain the reality of our Lord's Manhood, we must maintain a genuine limitation in the power and knowledge of Christ. It does not seem to occur to them that, for reasons strictly similar, if we are to maintain the verity of our Lord's Godhead, we must

maintain a genuine possession by Christ of infinite power and knowledge.[1]

Catholic writers do not make the mistake of sacrificing one side of the truth to simplify the problem, although it is an error to suppose that they merely put our Lord's two natures in juxtaposition. Without undertaking to explain the mystery of the Hypostatic Union, they suggested lines of thought which assist our faith and enable us to believe that what is beyond our ability to understand is not in real conflict with enlightened reason.

Thus, the truth that man was made in the image of God teaches us that his nature, although finite, is akin to the Divine. The rational nature of man seems peculiarly fitted to afford a proper medium and condition of a revelation of Divine

[1] This may be brought out in another way. Kenoticists say that we learn in the Gospels that Christ was really Man, and argue that this excludes certain Divine attributes because of their incompatibility with human conditions. In reply it may be said that the Gospels teach us that Christ is God, so that, if the incompatibility urged by kenoticists forbids His simultaneous exercise of Divine and human attributes, we must deny His possession of human attributes in the interests of the reality of His Godhead. The two arguments are parallel but both exhibit a material fallacy. The Divine and human attributes can be and were possessed and exercised simultaneously by one Divine Person. It is their coexistence in one *nature* that we must reject.

power, knowledge and character in the world—that revelation being along finite lines, but none the less real within the limits of possible revelation of God to man.[1]

On the other hand, there is a real difference between the Divine and human natures, one being infinite and simplex and the other finite and composite, which helps us to believe the revealed truth that in Christ they remained distinct and unimpaired, although inseparably united in one Person. This difference has been exaggerated by some writers.[2] There is no impassible gulf between the two, for man was made in the image of God. Their union in Christ was an internal union, one nature being in the other; but the two

[1] A Christ, however, Who had ceased to be almighty and omniscient could hardly be the personal *medium* of a revelation of the Almighty and Omniscient.

[2] Canon Gore (*Dissertations*, pp. 220–222) and Mr. Powell (*Prin. of the Incarn.*, p. 132 *et seq.*) appear to have exaggerated it, although from opposed points of view. The *Church Quarterly Review*, July, 1897, pp. 284–286, points out the error. A realization of the truth that our nature is made by God and that He has united it with His own will prevent such a mistake. Then too, with reference to our Lord's two knowledges, we must remember that knowledge whether Divine or human is always, in its final analysis, the same thing. A real difference of mode is consistent with a real likeness and internal relationship. The contents of Divine knowledge are capable of being translated, to a certain extent at least, into the forms and terms of human knowledge.

were not entirely homogeneous in their respective properties. There were two *natures*, in the full and proper sense of the word nature, not one only. If we could regard the Divine and human properties as entirely homogeneous, one of two consequences would seem to follow their union. Either the infinite nature would absorb and remove the limitations of the finite one, as Eutyches supposed, or, as kenoticists seem to argue, the finite would exclude somewhat of the infinite.

But, to use a particular example, Divine omnipotence differs greatly in mode as well as in degree from human power. Infinite power may use finite *media* and may cause finite effects, but is not shortened by them. It is always sovereign and can transcend them at will. But finite power is limited to finite *media* and effects, and is necessarily subject to finite conditions. It cannot transcend even its normal limitations except by supernatural aid, and then its limitations are merely enlarged and not abolished. It can never act independently of limitations, nor can it become omnipotence.

So it is with knowledge. Human knowledge is conditioned as to its mode as well as its extent by certain limitations of space and time. The

laws of finite attention and temporal process are inseparable from its operations. But Divine omniscience transcends all such conditions. God indeed knows the temporal and spatial as such, but His act of knowing is not conditioned by space or time. All His knowledge is immediate and eternal; and there is no spatial or temporal interval between Himself, or His act of knowledge, and the thing or event known, whether it be in one place or another or whether it be past, present or future.

These considerations encourage us to believe that, in the Word incarnate, the two modes of activity and knowledge which belonged respectively to His Divine and human natures could and did concur, without mutual confusion or impairment, to the fulfilment of His economic purposes. To explain how, we do not venture to undertake.[1]

[1] St. Leo says, "As often as we think, to the best of our power, about His omnipotence, which belongs to Him as of one co-equal essence with the Father, the lowliness which we see in God amazes us more than the power. . . . But it helps us greatly in understanding, if we remember that although the Creator is one, and the creature another,—the inviolable Godhead one, and the passible flesh another,—yet the two distinct substances concur in one Person, so that, alike in infirmities and in mighty acts, the contumely and the glory belong to one and the same. For

This distinctness of our Lord's two natures and their respective operations does not militate against the internal relation existing between the natures, brought about by their union in one Person. Accordingly we are free to accept the truth that our Lord's Manhood was endowed with supernatural power and knowledge by reason of that union. We may reasonably acknowledge such an effect without surrendering our belief in the continuance of a real human nature, so long as we do not introduce the idea of a removal of finite limitations, and so long as we remember that, however much elevated, our Lord's Manhood retained its human *genus* and finite nature.

The juxtaposition of our Lord's two natures and of His Divine and human power and knowledge must be maintained with reference to the period of His earthly life. To urge against this an incompatibility of Divine and human attributes proves too much. It proves an everlasting kenosis, one still submitted to in heaven. If, as Gore maintains, "The real Incarnation in-

all the acts which belong to the God or the Man were at once accomplished by the Manhood and the Godhead; so that while the Impassible is present in the passible, neither can strength be affected amid weakness, nor weakness overcome amid strength."—Bright's *St. Leo on the Incarn.*, Serm. viii., pp. 41, 42.

volves a real self-impoverishment, a real self-emptying . . . on the part of the eternal Word of God,"[1] then the reality of such "self-emptying" must be as enduring as the reality of the Incarnation. We see no escape from this consequence except on the heretical basis of a full deification of the Manhood in glory. If the kenotic argument which we are considering is valid, then one of two conclusions must be accepted;—either our Lord is now bereft of Divine omnipotence, omniscience and omnipresence in the sense maintained by kenoticists with reference to the time of His earthly life, or else His Manhood has been endowed with these infinite attributes and is no longer a finite nature—no longer human.[2]

[1] *Dissertations*, p. 204.

[2] There is indeed another alternative, but it is anti-Christian. If our nature is infinitely capacious, so that it remains human when endowed with infinite attributes, we need not argue a permanent kenosis of the Word. But this is distinctly pantheistic, although certain Lutherans seem to adopt the idea.

In this connection we may well call attention to a remark of Ottley (*The Incarnation*, Vol. II., p. 286). "There is a kenosis in what we may call the Sacramental life of our Lord, which is an extension of the incarnate life." The Sacraments are related to our Lord in glory. Does Ottley mean that an extension of our Lord's incarnate life in glory involves a kenosis? If so, then he must, to be consistent, hold that our Lord is submitting to a kenosis at the Father's right hand.

CHAPTER IX

THE TEACHING OF SCRIPTURE

WE come finally to the scriptural argument. This is considered last, not in the order of its importance, but because the meaning of Scripture cannot rightly be understood until the preconceptions which account for the kenotic interpretations of it have been considered and shown to be unwarranted.

As has been seen in the last chapter, Catholic theologians insist upon the Divine authority and finality of the Sacred Scriptures. It is also one of their fundamental principles that the Scriptures must be studied afresh in every generation, and that without the *a priori* assumptions of private judgment which tend to obscure their real meaning. They are committed to an endeavour to ascertain their real meaning; and this requires that the Scriptures should be studied in the light of the Faith which they were intended to confirm.

With implicit and unqualified submission, therefore, to the true and Divinely inspired meaning of the Scriptures, we shall endeavour to consider their teaching upon the questions at issue. We reserve, however, an examination of their teaching concerning our Lord's knowledge to another chapter, and now take up the passages which bear on our Lord's self-humiliation in general, and those which throw light upon the question of His power and presence during His earthly life.

1. Several texts employed in the support of kenoticism have already been considered in Chapter II. It was there shown that our Lord's becoming poor in order to make us rich[1] means simply an assumption of the poverty of our nature into union with the richness of His own, and an obedience to its conditions which enabled Him not only to enrich what He assumed, but also to make it the *medium* of grace to the members of His mystical Body.

2. It was also shown that the phrase ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε is not to be taken literally, as asserting a real kenosis, but metaphorically. This interpretation was seen to be required by the context; by the epexegetical phrases which follow and

[1] II. Cor. viii. 9.

limit its meaning; and by St. Paul's use of the verb κενόω in other instances.

3. It was also indicated, in the chapter referred to, that the teaching of Scripture as to what was offered on the Cross, and as to the infinite value of that offering, is "incongruous with the idea that, when He offered Himself, He was bereft of omnipotence, omnipresence and omniscience. For it was the possession of these attributes which gave His passion its world-wide power, and brought Him into efficacious contact with all conditions and all times."

4. Finally it has been shown, in Chapter VI., that, whatever may have been the relation of the Spirit to our Lord's Manhood, that Spirit was Christ's own Spirit, consubstantial with and inseparable from Himself. Christ communicated the Spirit to His Manhood in His assumption of it. The Godhead, by virtue of which the Spirit performs His operations, is also the Godhead of Christ and internal to Him. The Divine Persons possess but one indivisible essence and exist in each other, coinhering not only in essence but in all their operations.[1]

[1] This is the doctrine of Circumcession (*circumcessio, commeatio,* περιχώρησις) or the "existence of one Divine Person in the Other,

Except in a purely relative or economic sense, no Divine Person can be said to be quiescent in any Divine operation, although the relation of each Person to the same operation is distinct. It follows, therefore, that when our Lord is said to have done anything by the Spirit, we are to attribute such operation to Christ's own Spirit, and may not regard the Person of Christ as excluded from having part in it. Thus, while it pertained to the economy or dispensation of the Spirit to aid our Lord's Manhood in temptation and to illuminate His human mind, this does not mean that the Son was inactive in that operation. The Divine

without confusion of Person." "He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father." "Believe Me that I am in the Father, and the Father in Me." St. John xiv. 9–11. That it was held even before the Council of Nicea is shown in Newman's *Tracts Theological and Ecclesiastical*, p. 161. Bright's *St. Leo on the Incarn.*, note 83, and Forbes's *Nicene Creed*, pp. 81–83, should be studied. Forbes quotes St. Fulgentius (*Lib. de Fid.*, c. i., n. 4) as saying, "The whole Father is in the Son and in the Holy Spirit: the whole Son is in the Father and in the Holy Spirit: the whole Holy Spirit is in the Father and the Son." Also St. Basil, "If anyone truly receive the Son, he will find that He brings with Him, on the one hand, the Father, on the other, the Holy Spirit . . . for we must not conceive separation or division in any way. . . . For there is discovered between them some ineffable and incomprehensible both union and distinction." See St. Thos., *Sum. Theol.*, I., xlii.5; Petavius, *De Trinitate*, lib. iv., cap. xvi. I may be pardoned, perhaps, if I refer to my own *Doctrine of God*, Quest. 67.

economies do not exclude each other; although they determine the phraseology of revelation.[1]

The Divine Son was the true and only personal subject of the Manhood of Christ, so that whatever Christ did by the aid of the Spirit He did by power proceeding from His own Divine Person as well.[2] These considerations meet many of the scriptural difficulties raised by kenoticists. If the internal unity of the Divine Persons had been taken into account, the reference of certain actions of Christ to the assistance vouchsafed by the Holy Spirit to His Manhood would not have been er-

[1] The phrase "Divine economies," as here used, signifies "the particular external operations which revelation teaches us to attribute to the several Divine Persons." These operations are distinguished in the Church Catechism, "First I learn to believe in God the Father, Who hath made me," etc. The term economy, *οἰκονομία*, has various uses in patristic writings. It is a failure to distinguish them which accounts for some of the misinterpretations of the language of the Fathers by modern writers. It was used by the ancients with reference to (*a*) the progressive method of Divine revelation: (*b*) the special work and revelation of each Divine Person: (*c*) certain successive dispensations in the history of God's chosen people—especially the Incarnation: (*d*) the "*disciplina arcani*," or method of reserve in communicating religious knowledge to catechumens. See Lightfoot's *Apostolic Fathers*, Pt. II., Vol. II., p. 75; Newman's *Arians*, pp. 49–89. See my *Doctrine of God*, Questions 69, 70.

[2] St. Leo says (Bright's *St. Leo on the Incarn.*, Serm. iv., p. 25) of Christ, that He, "in the nature of Manhood received from the Father what in the nature of Godhead He Himself also bestowed."

roneously interpreted as excluding Christ's personal and Divine power.

5. We have dwelt again upon these considerations of the Divine coinherence and the distinctness of Divine economies because they help us to understand rightly our Lord's frequent reference of His works to the will of the Father. Although the Father and the Son operate indivisibly in all things, yet their economic relations to their operations differ in such wise that we employ different language in attributing certain actions to One and the Other. Thus it pertains to the economy of the Father to send the Son into the world, and whatever the Son performs in fulfilling this Divine Mission He fulfils according to the will of the Father, and not—*i.e.*, economically speaking—according to His own will. The economic relation of His own will to His work on earth is to fulfil the Father's will in all things. Inasmuch as His own will is also Divine it cannot be in conflict with the Divine will of the Father, for the Father and the Son are one.[1] When, therefore, He disclaims power to do what has not been given Him to do,[2] He is but expressing two truths:—the eternal necessity that the Divine

[1] St. John x. 30. [2] Ibid. v. 19, 30; viii. 28, 29.

Persons should remain indivisible in action, and the fact that "such exercise of will or power was incompatible with the conditions under which He had placed Himself."[1] His putting Himself under such conditions was the result of Mission, and pertained to His economy. But His own will was also behind it all, and His internal relation to the Father could not be altered. His omnipotent power was exercised under economic conditions, but was in nowise shortened.

The truth of this appears in our Lord's saying that He had received of the Father to have life in Himself.[2] The Son is begotten of the Father, so that His very Godhead is derived eternally from the Father. This does not make the Son inferior as touching His Godhead, but only as touching His personal relation and, after the Incarnation, as touching His Manhood. In like manner, when He says that He has received what He is to do, He but expresses a truth which flows from His internal and personal relation to the Father, and does not imply any subtraction from His own Divine essence and power. When He says He can do nothing of Himself,[3] He means He can do

[1] Bishop Stubb's *Charge* of 1893. [2] St. John v. 26.
[3] Ibid. v. 19.

nothing *apart from* the Father,[1] from Whom He receives all that He is, and in Whom He eternally exists[2] and acts.[3]

There are two wills in Christ. His acceptance of the Father's will in coming into the world, and His undertaking the work which He came to do, was the act of His Divine will; and the economic conditions under which He lived and acted could not produce a relation of essential inferiority in that will toward the will of the Father. For the Son to fulfil the will of the Father and to perform what was given Him of the Father to do, expresses relations economically subsisting between equals.[4]

[1] St. John x. 37, 38; viii. 16. [2] Ibid. v. 26.

[3] Ibid. v. 17.

[4] The doctrine of the temporal Mission of the Son (cf. St. John v. 36, 37; vi. 38; xvi. 5; xvii. 21) may be defined as the procession of the Son from the Father, having relation to a temporal effect. The external effect of Divine Mission "does not pertain to the whole Trinity except by way of efficiency. The relation of each Person to that effect is different, and the difference is such that we attribute the action to one Person. For example, it is the Son, not the Father or the Holy Ghost, Who became Incarnate." But we must note that the new relation in which a Divine Person stands to the object for which He is sent does not signify a change in the Person, but in the economic relation. The Person remains Divine, existing still in the other Divine Persons and continuing to be coequal with Them. Moreover, as has been shown, there is no division of action. The efficient cause of every Divine action is the entire Trinity. See St. Thomas, *Sum. Theol.*, I., xliii.; Forbes's *Nicene Creed*, pp. 124, 125.

The human will of Christ was indeed subject to the Father in the sense of essential inferiority. And to that will is to be referred His human obedience unto death. But this obedience consisted also in the perfect conformity of the human will of Christ to His own Divine will.[1] It expressed the subjection of His Manhood to His Person.

6. One of the leading texts advanced by kenoticists is the saying of Christ, "And now, O Father, glorify Thou Me with Thine own Self with the glory which I had with Thee before the world was."[2] This language is said to show that our Lord did not possess the glory which He had with the Father before the world was during His earthly life, inasmuch as He prayed for its restoration.[3] We cannot accept such an interpretation. In the first place the verb translated glorify, δόξασον, from δοξάζω, does not mean necessarily to impart an intrinsic glory not already possessed, but is used in the sense either of praising or of making one's glory manifest. Again, St. Augus-

[1] This position is involved in the decision of the Sixth Ecumenical Council affirming the perpetual conformity of our Lord's human will to His Divine will.

[2] St. John xvii. 5.

[3] Cf. Gore's *Dissertations*, p. 90; Mason's *Conditions of our Lord's Life*, pp. 86–88.

tine, who was followed by St. Thomas, considered that the glory referred to is the glory of His Manhood, which existed before the world was, in God's predestination of it. They considered that our Lord was praying for the fulfilment of what had thus been ordained from eternity,—the glorification of His Manhood.

It seems preferable, however, to interpret the glory, as the essential glory of His Godhead. This He could not abandon, but could and did hide from man under the veil of His flesh. What He asked of His Father was either that this glory might be made manifest to His saints, inasmuch as His humiliation was reaching its end, or that His Manhood might be clad with that glory, *i.e.*, enthroned and transfigured at the right hand of God. Possibly His prayer included both ideas.

Our Lord possessed two kinds of glory. He had an essential glory as touching His Godhead, which could not be abandoned and which was His glory before the Incarnation. He also possessed a relative glory, or honour among men, which only began to exist when He was revealed in flesh. Since this glory had not previously existed, it could not have been abandoned when He became incarnate. It was the glory attendant upon His

revelation of Himself in the human sphere. But this glory, or His repute among men, was undoubtedly subject to growth, and its fulness was not realized until His final glorification.[1] This realization was not a *restoration* of such glory but His first full entrance upon it.

That our Lord really possessed His essential glory while on earth, is proved by His mysterious Transfiguration.[2] This followed soon upon St. Peter's noble confession of His Person,[3] and appears to have been intended as a confirmation of its truth. The essential glory of His Person was apparently permitted to manifest itself through the veil of His flesh, so far as the disciples could bear to contemplate it. St. John also says distinctly, referring apparently to the Transfiguration, "We beheld His glory, glory as of the only-begotten from the Father."[4] Canon Mason endeavours to evade the force of this passage by emphasizing the preposition *παρά*, and translating, "glory as of an only-begotten come to represent a Father."[5] Without criticising the remarkable freedom of his translation, and without discussing the correctness of his remark that it was "a glory

[1] Phil. ii. 9–11. [2] St. Matt. xvii. 1–9. [3] Ibid. xvi. 16.
[4] St. John i. 14. [5] *Conditions of our Lord's Life*, pp. 86, 87.

which carried the thoughts of a spiritual observer back to Another than the Saviour Himself," it is enough to reply that as Canon Mason Himself concludes, "the glory was indeed our Saviour's own, which He could not fail to bear about with Him, inseparable from His Person, whether perceived by men or not." A glory which can be described thus must be Divine. In short, our Lord possessed the essential glory of His Godhead, while on earth, "whether perceived by men or not."

7. We now come to the consideration of His miracles. It is first to be noticed that they were on certain occasions referred to by our Lord Himself as proofs of His Person. "The works which the Father hath given Me to finish, the same works that I do, bear witness of Me, that the Father hath sent Me."[1] "The works that I do in My Father's Name, they bear witness of Me."[2] "Say ye . . . thou blasphemest; because I said, I am the Son of God? If I do not the works of My Father believe Me not. But if I do, though ye believe Me not, believe the works: that ye may know and believe, that the Father is in Me, and I in Him."[3] "Believe Me that I am

[1] St. John v. 36. [2] Ibid. x. 25. [3] Ibid. x. 36–38.

in the Father, and the Father in Me; or else believe Me for the very works' sake."[1] "If I had not done among them the works which none other man did, they had not had sin; but now have they both seen and hated both Me and My Father."[2]

Canon Mason says of these utterances that, while "He appeals often to the witness of His works, . . . it is always to establish the same truth—not His personal Godhead, although He leaves us in no doubt about His personal Godhead—but, more than that, it is to establish His unique relationship to God, to the Father."[3] Two remarks need to be made in reply. In the first place, our Lord governed the method of the revelation of His Person with strict reference to the state of the Jewish mind. The one truth concerning God which the Jews realized fully was His unity. "The Lord our God is one Lord,"[4] was a phrase which had become a commonplace among

[1] St. John xiv. 11. [2] Ibid. xv. 24.

[3] *Conditions of our Lord's Life*, p. 88. Bishop Hall (*Christ's Temptation*, p. 22) says that "Jesus lived His life, wrought His works . . . not by the inherent power which belonged to Him as the Second Person; . . . but in His human nature by the sanctifying and enabling power of the Holy Spirit of God which rested on His Manhood."

[4] Deut. vi. 4.

them. It was desirable, therefore, in order to avoid an appearance of contradiction between Moses's teaching and His own, that the truth of His Divinity should be exhibited in its proper connection, as coming to light in a fuller revelation of the mode of Divine unity. Our Lord's Godhead appears in His oneness with the Father and in His filial relation to Him. Had He asserted His Divinity apart from such considerations, He would have seemed to the Jews to be denying the primary truth of Old Testament Revelation—the Divine unity.[1]

In the second place, it will be seen that this method of asserting His Divinity is required in the interests of truth, independently of a consideration of Jewish limitations. The Son is not God apart from the Father, but in internal union with Him and as begotten of Him. A bare assertion, therefore, of His Godhead would tend to the obscuration of the truth that His Divine essence is a derived essence, received from the Father. The true doctrine of the Divinity of Jesus Christ is involved in and inseparable from

[1] It must also be noticed that our Lord did not assert His Godhead in ways which would interfere with His humiliation. Ordinarily it formed a latent presupposition, lying behind His life and action, and needing a discerning mind to detect it.

the doctrine of His Divine Sonship. To reveal the former apart from the latter imperils the doctrine of Divine unity, while to exhibit the latter apart from the former suggests Arianism. If, therefore, our Lord willed to reveal His Divine Person at all, He must have done so in connection with the closely related truths of His oneness with the Father and Divine Sonship. He could not rightly or effectually reveal His Divinity except by revealing His internal relation to the Father. Accordingly, when He cites His works as proofs of this relation, He is in the truest sense appealing to His works to establish His Personal Godhead.

There is no question but that the Jews thus understood His language. This appears in the fact that when He had said "the works that I do in My Father's Name, they bear witness of Me," and, after pointing out the cause of their unbelief, had interpreted the meaning of His works by saying "I and My Father are one," the Jews took up stones to stone Him. When asked by Christ why they stoned Him, they replied, "because that Thou, being a man, makest Thyself God," Our Lord accepted this interpretation of His language, saying, "If I do not the works of My

Father believe Me not. But if I do, though ye believe not Me, believe the works; that ye may know and believe, that the Father is in Me and I in Him."[1]

The ancient Fathers so interpreted our Lord's works. Not that they regarded the Lord during His historic life as acting now by His human and now by his Divine nature only, as certain modern writers have supposed. But they asserted that while some of the works of Christ *required and exhibited* the reality of His Manhood, others required and exhibited His personal possession of Divine power and of the Godhead.[2] It is a mistake on the part of kenoticists to suppose that the traditional view on this subject requires us to assert an exhibition of *bare* omnipotence by our Lord. It would have been utterly inconsistent with the economy to which He was submitting Himself, as well as metaphysically impossible, that He should do this.[3] He willed to work under the conditions of human life, and even His greatest wonders were performed in manners which were

[1] St. John x. 25–38.

[2] This is the meaning, for example, of the antitheses in St. Leo's Tome, § 4.

[3] Bare omnipotence is purely infinite. The infinite cannot be revealed to men except through finite *media*.

consistent with the fact that He had taken our nature upon Him. Their evidential value, as proofs of His Godhead, lay not in an open exhibition of His Godhead, which would have been impossible, but in the utterances which accompanied them, and in the fact that they were wrought expressly as works proper to His Person.

Certain of His miracles were wrought in connection with prayer, as in the case of the raising of Lazarus. Finite *media* were employed at times. He touched the sick with His human hand, anointed the eyes with clay, and sent certain to wash themselves. Faith also seemed necessary on the part of those who were healed of sickness. These conditions may be regarded in two ways. They were, in the first place, of didactic nature, and exhibited conditions required in men in order to receive such blessings from God, and the laws which were to govern the works which His disciples were to perform in His Name. In the second place, it pertained to the economy of the Incarnation, that our Lord should veil His Divine power and glory by conforming usually to the methods employed by ordinary men when performing miracles in God's Name.

But, lest there should be any mistake as to His Person in the minds of His disciples, He allowed His Godhead to flash forth at times in words and methods of action which sharply differentiate His miracles from those of mere men, however great the supernatural powers may be which God bestows upon them. Thus He stilled the waves of the sea without any other means than His fiat, "peace be still."[1] Moreover, the Centurion, reasoning from the analogy of his own personal prerogative and power to direct his soldiers by a word, made the inference that Christ also possessed personal prerogatives in a higher sphere, with power to heal the sick at a distance without the use of other means than His bare fiat. Our Lord at once commended His reasoning and faith, and proved its correctness by exercising His prerogative, healing the Centurion's servant without going to him.[2] On one occasion He was asked to work a miracle of healing with the express acknowledgment that His granting the request depended upon His own will. The acknowledgment was followed by our Lord's demonstration of its truth. "There came a leper and worshipped Him, saying, Lord, if Thou wilt, Thou canst

[1] St. Mark iv. 37–41. [2] St. Luke vii. 6–10.

make me clean. And Jesus put forth His hand and touched Him, saying, I will; be thou clean."[1]

A remarkable and unique peculiarity of our Lord's miracles was the sovereign authority with which He performed them. Others might perform more wonderful miracles than His, but they were to be wrought in His Name and with power received from Him, and were to be based upon a relation to Himself, growing out of His departure to the Father.[2] He Himself wrought with His own power by reason of His internal relation to the almighty Father, a relation which was eternal, and inalienable.[3] The limitations which appear in His works on earth all grew out of the economy to which He was voluntarily conforming Himself, not out of an abandonment of power.

This truth appears most clearly, perhaps, in our Lord's saying concerning His own life, "I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it up again. This commandment have I received of My Father."[4]

[1] St. Matt. viii. 2, 3; St. Mark i. 40, 41.

[2] St. John xiv. 12.

[3] Ibid. v. 14, 21.

[4] Ibid. x. 18. The word for power is ἐξουσίαν, which may be translated authority. But authority and power (δύναμις) involve each other. If Christ had authority Himself to take His

The power to raise others from the dead had been given to men before.[1] But to take one's life again, when in the state of death, clearly lies beyond the limit of power which mere men receive. Such a miracle must proceed from personal omnipotence, and our Lord's claim to be able to raise Himself from the dead is a claim to possess Divine omnipotence in His own Person. No contradiction of this is implied in the words which follow, "This commandment have I received of My Father." Our Lord came to do the will of His Father. In raising Himself from the dead He was fulfilling this will. But His obedience does not subtract from the power veiled in obeying—a power in this case nothing short of Divine omnipotence.[2]

life again, He had the power also. Authority to do this without the power would be an absurdity.

[1] I. Kings xvii. 17–23; II. Kings iv. 32–37.

[2] With His claim of power to raise Himself from death may be compared His claim to be "the Way, the Truth, and the Life. No man cometh unto the Father, but by Me" (St. John xiv. 6). To give life and access to the Father in and through oneself is pre-eminently a work of Divine power. Yet our Lord claimed His present possession of this power while in His state of humiliation. He did not say "I *shall be*," but "I *am*."

Add also what is said in Hebrews i. 3, "when He had *by Himself* purged our sins, sat down on the right hand of the majesty on high." The purging was done by means of His

It is noteworthy that the Apostles had to be convinced of the fact of His having raised Himself by the sure evidence of their senses; and, when the truth dawned upon the hesitating mind of St. Thomas, he instantly perceived that He Who performed the wonder could be no other than His Lord and God.[1] Moreover, the act in question was undertaken when our Lord was in the lowest state of His humiliation. No conclusion is possible except that our Lord was in possession of Divine omnipotence during His humiliation. As St. Paul expresses it, He was "declared to be the Son of God *with power*, according to the Spirit of holiness, by the resurrection from the dead."[2]

8. It remains to consider the passages advanced to prove that our Lord was not personally omnipresent while on earth. Mary, the sister of Lazarus, fell down at His feet, saying unto Him, "Lord, if Thou hadst been here, my brother had

death, but death cannot purge our sins except by Divine power. Our Lord was therefore wielding such power in His death—in His lowest humiliation.

Again, St. John Baptist says of our Lord, "He that cometh from above is above all" (St. John iii. 31), which could hardly have been true if our Lord was then, as kenoticists urge, bereft of omnipotence.

[1] St. John xx. 24–29. [2] Rom. i. 3.

not died."[1] It is said that our Lord at no time exhibited other than a local and circumscribed presence on earth. He conformed in all respects to spatial conditions, moving like other men from place to place, and never appearing in more than one place at the same time. The instances frequently given of His coming to certain places, it is urged, clearly imply His previous absence from these places; and when He is said to have left a place, He cannot be said to have remained there present.

It ought to be a sufficient answer to such arguments to distinguish between our Lord's human presence and His Divine presence. As touching His Manhood He was necessarily subject to the conditions of finite and local presence, and it is with His human movements that the Gospels are primarily concerned. His body had but one physical and local presence at a time, and no other presence of Christ was open to the observation of men. Omnipresence cannot be sensibly exhibited. The accounts of His life are naturally concerned chiefly with matters of sensible observation, and when His body moved from place to place, ceasing to be present in one place and com-

[1] St. John xi. 32.

ing to be present in another, there was no error involved in attributing such movements and circumscriptions of presence to our Lord Himself. He then possessed a circumscribed presence as touching His body, just as we say that His natural bodily presence is now confined to one place in Heaven.[1] We do not accept the Lutheran error of an ubiquity of our Lord's body. But this local and circumscribed presence of Christ as touching His glorified body does not exclude an omnipresence as touching His Godhead. So with reference to His circumscribed presence on earth, we may confidently maintain that it did not destroy His Divine omnipresence in all things.

There are indications of this in the Gospels. Our Lord said, "And no man hath ascended up to heaven, but He that came down from heaven, even the Son of Man."[2] There is no indication that our Lord made a bodily ascent into heaven before His glorification. It is a reasonable inference, therefore, that the gloss which follows, if it be a gloss and not a part of the original text, is correct—"which is in heaven." That is, He

[1] The Eucharistic presence of His Body and Blood does not remove this limitation, for it is not a natural presence, but supernatural and supra-local.

[2] St. John iii. 13.

Who came down from heaven, as touching His Manhood, is none other than He Who, as touching His Godhead, continued to be in Heaven.

Another indication is our Lord's working miracles of healing at a distance, not with prayer that God might heal, but by His own power, in response, for example, to the Centurion's acknowledgment that He had such power.[1] Power and presence are closely connected, and we cannot believe that our Lord could have exercised Divine power upon a distant patient had He not been present with that patient as touching His Godhead.[2]

[1] St. Luke, vii. 6–8. It is to be noted again that, while we may distinguish authority (ἐξουσία) and power (δύναμις), we cannot separate them in practice. One goes along with and implies the other. Mason (*Conditions of our Lord's Life*, pp. 98–101) forgets this apparently.

[2] The fact that God is causing events in all the different portions of the universe simultaneously is one of the chief arguments for His simultaneous presence in all portions of the universe.

CHAPTER X

THE SCRIPTURES AND THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST

HAVING considered the teaching of the New Testament as to the power and presence possessed by our Lord during His earthly life, we now come to an examination of its teaching concerning His knowledge during that period.

Kenoticists hold that our Lord abandoned His omniscience within the sphere and period of His earthly life, so as to be without personal knowledge of many things, and wholly ignorant of what did not come within the range of His human understanding—an understanding which they acknowledge to have been much aided and illuminated by grace, but which was none the less finite, and subject to the laws of human growth.[1]

[1] Gore, *Dissertations*, p. 97 (cf. pp. 81, 94, 95); Ottley, *The Incarnation*, Vol. II., 298–306; Mason, *Conditions of our Lord's Life*, pp. 155, 177, 178, 190–193. We may distinguish the assertions that our Lord was ignorant "*as* Man," and "*while* Man." The former is undoubtedly true; the latter is ambiguous, but seems to

The Fathers held a very different view, viz.: that there was nothing of which our Lord ceased to have Divine knowledge during His earthly life, although many of them acknowledge that there were matters of which He was *nescient* as touching His Manhood and redemptive economy, not knowing them with His human mind.[1]

An examination of the New Testament will, I believe, justify the view held by the Fathers. We find abundant scriptural evidence that our Lord's human mind was finite, that it grew like ours in wisdom and knowledge, and that its knowledge was limited throughout His earthly life, although much greater than ours. But we do not find the slightest proof that the knowledge of Christ was confined to that possessed by His human mind. On the contrary, our conviction that He possessed

imply an exclusion of knowledge from His Person, which is erroneous. In the same way we may distinguish the statements that He was ignorant "as touching His Manhood," and "in the sphere of His Manhood." As before, the former statement is true and the latter ambiguous, because of the different senses which belong to the term "sphere." If we mean that Christ ceased to be omniscient *where* His Manhood was, or during its existence in Him, we have fallen into error. If He was omniscient at all, He was so everywhere and always.

[1] See Petavius, *De Incarn.*, XI., i., for a survey of patristic opinion on this subject. Cf. *De Trinitate*, Lib. II., c. 3, § 5. See also Forbes A Corse, *Instruc. Hist. Theol.*, Bk. III., c. 19, 20.

Divine omniscience all along is confirmed rather than shaken by the facts and statements of the New Testament.

1. It will be convenient to consider first the two passages on which Kenoticists place the strongest emphasis—those which speak of our Lord's increase in wisdom,[1] and of His not knowing the day and hour of the judgment.[2]

"And Jesus increased in wisdom and stature, and in favour with God and man." This text is an excellent illustration of the doctrine of the *communicatio idiomatum.* In it certain properties of His Manhood are predicated of His Person. In interpreting such language, however, we need to avoid making negative inferences. To predicate positively of our Lord's Person the property of increase in human wisdom is one thing, to deny the propriety of predicating also of that same Person the Divine properties of infinite knowledge and wisdom is another thing; and it is quite unnecessary, unless we are prepared to exclude the Divine nature and attributes from our Lord's Person during His humiliation. Divine wisdom differs widely from human wisdom in mode and ex-

[1] St. Luke ii. 52.

[2] St. Matt. xxiv. 36; and St. Mark xiii. 32.

tent, although there is a real relation between the two. It is possible for a Divine Person to possess both—so as not to be subject to increase in the former, while experiencing a real progress in the latter. This, in fact, is the truth of the matter. To say that an affirmation of His increase in human wisdom involves a lack in Him of Divine wisdom is to beg the question at issue. It cannot be maintained unless we assume that human wisdom was the only wisdom possessed by Christ during His human growth—an assumption which the whole argument of this book is intended to disprove.

The true view of the text is, therefore, that He in Whom are hidden all the stores of wisdom and knowledge, as touching His Godhead, allowed the measures of His Manhood "to prevail in His case," as St. Cyril expresses it, and condescended to acquire human wisdom in addition to His Divine wisdom, in accordance with the laws of human growth. The difficulty of believing that there was a coincidence in Christ's one Person of Divine wisdom which cannot grow with human wisdom which did grow is but a branch of the initial difficulty of acknowledging a real union of the Divine and human natures in His Person, without separation or mutual infringement.

In the light of such an interpretation as we have given, we can better understand the language of certain Fathers who denied that our Lord increased personally in wisdom, and said that the text we are considering must be taken economically, as applying to His human mind simply. When they deny that He increased in wisdom, they do not necessarily deny the reality of His human advance. They are considering His Person in its totality as possessing along with His human wisdom a Divine wisdom, which is infinite and incapable of increase. In the totality of His Person, He was no wiser in adult years than in childhood, although His human mind did truly increase in wisdom. The increase of His human wisdom could add nothing to the totality of His Personal wisdom, which was infinite from the outset. As St. Athanasius says: "It was not the Word considered as the Word, Who advanced, Who is perfect from the perfect Father, Who needs nothing, nay, brings others forward to an advance; but humanly is He here also said to advance, since advance belongs to man. Of the body then is the advance; for, it advancing, in it advanced also the manifestation of the Godhead to those who saw it. And, as the Godhead was more and more revealed,

by so much more did His grace as man increase before all men, . . . however wilfully the Jews . . . shut their eyes, lest they see that to advance in wisdom is not the advance of Wisdom Itself, but rather the Manhood's advance in It."[1]

It is not denied that certain ancient writers, in setting forth our Lord's hidden possession of Divine wisdom from the outset, neglected to guard sufficiently the truth that His human wisdom underwent a real increase, and used language of docetic implication. But we may conclude that it is consistent to say on the one hand that our Lord as the Word was in possession of infinite wisdom all along, and on the other hand that He truly increased in wisdom as touching His Manhood.

2. Our Lord said to His disciples "But of that day and that hour knoweth no one, not even the angels in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father."[2] We have already noticed that there is no agreement in the patristic exegesis of this difficult passage, although the Fathers agree in denying that

[1] *Orat. c. Arian.*, III., 51, 52.

[2] St. Mark xiii. 32. Περὶ δὲ τῆς ἡμέρας ἐκείνης καὶ τῆς ὥρας οὐδεὶς οἶδεν, οὐδὲ οἱ ἄγγελοι οἱ ἐν οὐρανῷ, οὐδὲ υἱός, εἰ μὴ ὁ πατήρ. Cf. St. Matt. xxiv. 36, where the closing phrase is εἰ μὴ ὁ πατὴρ μόνος.

our Lord could have meant that He had no personal knowledge of the day and hour of the judgment. Mr. Powell has given a very full list of patristic interpretations, with accompanying references.[1] It is unnecessary to enter into a detailed examination of them here, but one interpretation may well be noticed.

According to this, our Lord was speaking in His human capacity as Man simply. He knew the day and hour as God, but in the relation in which He was speaking, as touching His Manhood, He was *nescient*.[2] It is urged that the context shows our Lord to be speaking of Himself in human relations and by His human title, Son of Man. This interpretation is very widely supported. St. Athanasius is a good representative. He says, "He made this and other declarations as Man by reason of the flesh. For this . . . is not the Word's deficiency, but of that human nature whose property it is to be ignorant. It is reasonable to ascribe to His Manhood everything which, after He became man, He speaks humanly. . . . He is not ashamed because of the flesh which is igno-

[1] *Prin. of the Incarn.*, pp. 424–433.

[2] He also says that the Father has put knowledge of the times or seasons in His own power. Acts i. 7.

rant, to say 'I know not,' in order to show that knowing as God, He is but ignorant according to the flesh." [1]

3. We come next to a variety of passages in the Gospels in which our Lord is spoken of as coming to know,[2] implying that He had not known before; as expressing wonder,[3] as if the matter to which His attention had been drawn was new or mys-

[1] *Orat. c. Arian.*, III., 43. Dr. Bright says, in a personal letter, "What I suppose to be implied . . . is, that our Lord (in His Person) did not will to communicate to His human mind, at that time, the knowledge of a certain point. . . . In regard to the interpretation of 'the Son,' . . . I take it as a shortened form of 'the Son of Man,' which occurs several verses earlier." Bishop Bull, *Defens. Fid.*, II., 5, § 8 (quoted by Wilberforce, *The Incarnation*, p. 72), says, "The Divine wisdom produced its impression on our Lord's human soul according to the occasion, and therefore there is no absurdity in supposing that our Lord, during the time of His mission on earth, when such knowledge was needless for Him, was ignorant of the day of Judgment" [*i.e.*, as Man]. Bishop Stubbs, *Charge* of 1893, says that "even the Son could not translate the Father's determination into words or language of our knowledge [therefore, of His own human knowledge]. And He does not say 'I know not;' but . . . it is no function of the Sonship to know that which the Father hath kept in His own power. . . . Although 'What things soever the Father doeth these things also doeth the Son likewise; for the Father . . . showeth Him all things that Himself doeth.'"

[2] St. Matt. xii. 15; xxvi. 10; St. Mark ii. 9; viii. 17; St. John iv. 1; vi. 15; etc. Cf. Isaiah viii. 4; l. 4.

[3] St. Mark vi. 6; St. Luke vii. 9; etc. Cf. Isaiah lix. 16; lxiii. 5.

terious to Him; as making inquiries,[1] as if for information concerning matters of which He was ignorant; as offering prayer,[2] implying a certain amount of uncertainty about the future; as asking in His dying agony why God had forsaken Him,[3] implying that He could not discern God's presence.

These passages indicate the reality of the human conditions to which our Lord submitted when He assumed our nature.[4] It is not necessary to consider them at length or in detail. Some of them exhibit the mysteriousness of the Incarnation in a startling manner. But they make no real or substantial addition to the original mystery of the Hypostatic Union. If the Godhead and Manhood were truly possessed simultaneously by our Lord

[1] St. Luke ii. 49; viii. 45, 46; etc.

[2] Note especially His prayer in the Garden of Gethsemane (St. Matt. xxvi. 36–44), which appears to imply a hope that His cup might be removed—*i.e.*, a state of uncertainty.

[3] St. Matt. xxvii. 46. Mason gives a large list of passages indicating the limitations of our Lord's human knowledge (*Conditions of our Lord's Life*, ch. iv.).

[4] Without any desire to qualify our acknowledgment of human limitations in Christ, we may call attention to the fact that much language is used in the Old Testament which implies human methods and therefore human limitations in the Divine knowledge *before* the Incarnation. Many texts describe God as hearing, seeing, remembering, repenting and the like. It is true that such

while on earth, we must acknowledge that the properties and natural conditions of these natures were present simultaneously as well. If He really possessed both natures, He must also have been experiencing the natural conditions of both. The union of the two natures being once granted—a truth which is mysterious and baffling in itself—we may not argue from His submission to the conditions of one nature that He abandoned the conditions of the other nature. We can only say that, just as we are unable to understand how He could subsist in the Godhead and in the Manhood at the same time without division of His Person, so likewise we cannot understand how He could be exercising the functions and conforming to the conditions of the Godhead and of the Manhood simultaneously. We must maintain the integrity of both natures; and to this end it is as necessary to main-

language is metaphorical. But it shows that God habitually accommodates His revelation of Himself to human limitations, and under circumstances which preclude our imputing real ignorance to God in any sense. This shows that we cannot treat language which implies limitation of knowledge as proving a real limitation in the mind of a Divine Person. Other considerations than those which can be drawn from the immediate text must be taken into account. Catholic theology must be employed, and such theology teaches us to refer all limitations of knowledge in Christ to His Manhood.

tain His enjoyment of the conditions of His Godhead as it is to insist upon His submission to the conditions of His Manhood. The kenoticists argue that we must do the latter in order to vindicate the reality of His Manhood. We merely apply the same method of argument when we add that we must also insist upon His full possession of the attributes and prerogatives of the Godhead in order to vindicate His real possession of the Godhead. It is by reason of our contemplation of these dual conditions that we more fully realize how baffling to human understanding is the union of very Godhead and very Manhood in one indivisible Person; but the mystery is one, and all is involved in acknowledging unreservedly the truth of the Hypostatic Union.

4. That our Lord was in the habitual enjoyment of superhuman knowledge and wisdom is apparent from many indications in the Gospels.[1] We are certainly not exaggerating the significance of the scene in the Temple when we say that the doctors discovered an understanding in Him at the age of twelve which they could not account

[1] Mason (*Conditions of our Lord's Life*, chap. v.) gives many examples, although with some interpretations which we cannot accept.

for on human grounds. And His reply to His mother, "Wist ye not that I must be in the things of My Father,"[1] shows that even the Child was conscious of His relation to the Father, and of His heavenly appointed Mission.

During His subsequent ministry He was continually giving signs of superhuman insight and knowledge. Thus He saw Nathaniel before his approach and discerned his guileless character.[2] He knew the previous history of the Samaritan woman, and convinced her by His discernment that He was what He claimed to be, the Christ.[3] On numerous occasions He discerned the thoughts of men[4]—a power never so frequently exercised by mere man. So great was His discernment that it is said that "He knew all men. And needed not that any should testify of man; for He knew what was in man."[5]

He was aware that an individual had touched His clothes when a crowd was pressing upon Him.[6] He knew of St. Peter's interview with the tribute

[1] St. Luke ii. 49. [2] St. John i. 47, 48. [3] Ibid. iv. 16 ff.

[4] St. Matt. ix. 4; xii. 15, 25; xxvi. 21–25; St. Mark ii. 8; xii. 15; xiv. 18–21; St. Luke vi. 8; vii. 39, 40; St. John vi. 70, 71; xiii. 21–26.

[5] St. John ii. 24, 25.

[6] St. Mark v. 30–32; St. Luke viii. 45, 46.

collectors, and of the coin to be found in the fish's mouth.[1] He foresaw not only the general fact, but the very details of His passion, death, and resurrection.[2] He knew that Lazarus's sickness had ended in death;[3] the place where the colt would be found tied and what its owner would do;[4] the occupation of the man who was to guide the disciples to the upper room;[5] and the denial of St. Peter both beforehand and when it occurred.[6] No doubt in the case of a mere prophet these and other instances of insight, considered separately, might be regarded as examples of special inspiration merely. But He was not a mere prophet, and the habitual and sovereign manner in which He exercised superhuman knowledge was that of One Who possessed in Himself all the stores of wisdom and knowledge. Their effect was to draw attention, not merely to His prophetic power but also to

[1] St. Matt. xvii. 24–27.

[2] Ibid. xvi. 21; xvii. 22, 23; xx. 18, 19; xxvi. 2; St. Mark viii. 31; ix. 31; x. 33, 34; St. Luke ix. 22; xviii. 32, 33; St. John ii. 19–21; xii. 32, 33; xiii. 1–3; xviii. 4.

[3] St. John xi. 11–14. Mason (*Conditions of our Lord's Life*, p. 164) attributes this to an intimation. There is no indication of such an intimation.

[4] St. Mark xi. 2; St. Luke xix. 30.

[5] St. Mark xiv. 13; St. Luke xxii. 10.

[6] St. Matt. xxvi. 34; St. Mark xiv. 30; St. Luke xxii. 34, 61; St. John xiii. 38.

His Person; and His assertions of an internal relation to the Father already considered, indicate what sort of Person was being manifested.[1] He does not display knowledge as then and there communicated to Him from above, but always in a manner which suggests that such knowledge pertains to His own Person. If His Manhood was illuminated by the Spirit, it is expressly stated that He perceived in *His* Spirit.[2] No such description is applied to the supernatural knowledge of the prophets.

Moreover, His knowledge extends in its range above the ordinary level of prophetic knowledge. His acquaintance with Divine things is altogether unique. This knowledge was exercised as personal, final, and infallible. He taught "as one having authority, and not as the scribes."[3] His knowledge of the Old Testament was complete and searching. He understood all the enigmas of prophecy, so as designedly to make His own life their complete solution.[4] The clew to His famil-

[1] Cf. St. John xv. 15, where He contrasts the ignorance of a servant with His own knowledge. Cf. St. John viii. 38.

[2] St. Mark ii. 18.

[3] St. Matt. vii. 29; St. Mark i. 22; St. Matt. xxiv. 34; St. Luke xxi. 33.

[4] St. Luke xxxiv. 44. Cf. St. Matt. xxvi. 54; St. Mark xiv. 49;

iarity with the Scriptures is given in His saying, "Your father Abraham rejoiced to see My day."[1] He knew the Scriptures because He was contemporary with their writers, and with the events which they contain. He had first hand knowledge of prophecy. He was, in fact, the true Revealer of what the Holy Ghost moved holy men of old to write. St. Peter represents the ancient prophets as "searching what or what manner of time the Spirit *of Christ* which was in them did signify."[2]

In view of these facts we need not now share in the surprise and questioning of those who asked, "How knoweth this Man letters [*i.e.*, learning] having never learned?"[3] One Who had been behind the work of the prophets did not need to learn what they meant. Moreover, it is incredible that He should not have known the Scriptures better than any man, since they were concerned from end to end with Himself.[4] No theory of Christ's knowledge which puts Him in the same category with the prophets of old, can do justice to the statement that "God Who at sundry times

St. Luke xxii. 37; St. John v. 39, 45–47; xix. 36; and many other passages in which Christ is said to have done or said something that the Scripture might be fulfilled.

[1] St. John viii. 56–58. [2] I. St. Pet. i. 11. [3] St. John vii. 15.
[4] St. Luke xxiv. 27; Gal. iii. 24.

and in divers manners spake in times past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us by His Son."[1] Here a contrast is drawn which shows why Christ spake as never man spake[2]—because He was the Son of God,—and which justifies His claim to have greater wisdom than Solomon,[3] the wisest of mere men who had ever lived. All the wisdom which was manifested by the Apostles was in fact promised to them by Christ, while yet in His humiliation, as His own gift. "For I will give you a mouth and wisdom which all your adversaries shall not be able to gainsay nor resist."[4]

It is to be noticed that His knowledge and wisdom altogether transcended that of all the prophets together in things pertaining to God. He Who was immersed in the things of His Father even in childhood[5] was fully aware of His own Person, and clearly distinguished between His own relation and that of His listeners to the Father. He never says, as from a common point of view, "our Father"; but employs such phrases

[1] Heb. i. 1, 2. [2] St. John vii. 46.

[3] St. Matt. xii. 42; St. Luke xi. 31. [4] St. Luke xxi. 15.

[5] Ibid. ii. 49. It is to be noticed that although His human consciousness of His Person grew according to the law of human growth, His Divine self-consciousness needed no growth.

as "My Father" and "Your Father."[1] The only place in which He says "Our Father," is where He is dictating a prayer to be used by others than Himself.[2] He was conscious of being from eternity,[3] and of being from above.[4] He claimed to be one with the Father, and allowed Himself without correction to be interpreted as claiming to be equal with God.[5] The Gospels are full of His declarations concerning His Divine Sonship, which, as we have seen in the last chapter, formed the true and only practical method by which He could display His consciousness of personal Godhead.

Conscious of such a position, He was but exhibiting a Divine knowledge natural to Himself when He claimed to know the Father in a manner altogether unique,[6] the same and therefore infinite manner in which the Father knows Him.[7] Nor is His knowledge confined to His relations to the Father, but He also knows the Holy Ghost and teaches His Apostles concerning Him and His Mission.[8] Claiming that all things that the Father

[1] Especially note St. John xx. 17.
[2] St. Matt. vi. 9; St. Luke xi. 2. [3] St. John viii. 58.
[4] Ibid. viii. 23, 42. [5] Ibid. viii. 30–38.
[6] St. Matt. xi. 27; St. John vii. 29. [7] St. John x. 15.
[8] Cf. Ibid. xiv. 26; xv. 26; xvi. 7–15.

hath are His,[1] He reveals them in parables to those without, while making known to His Apostles the mysteries of His kingdom;[2] and since they were not able then to bear all that He had to reveal, He promises that the Spirit shall receive of His and shall show it unto them, guiding them into all truth.[3] So impressed were His Apostles with His claims to be the Light of the World,[4] that even in His state of humiliation they uttered the acknowledgment, "Now are we sure that Thou knowest all things."[5]

There is no indication that our Lord was receiving revelations while on earth, as did the Old Testament prophets. It is true that He claimed to teach nothing which He had not received of His Father, but as has been indicated in another connection,[6] this assertion is wrapped up in the mystery of His Divine Mission, a mystery which does not intrench upon the internal relations subsisting between Him and the Father. This mystery grows out of the larger mystery that He had received even "to have life in Himself" from the Father.[7]

[1] St. John xvi. 15. [2] St. Matt. xiii. 10, 11.
[3] St. John xvi. 14; xiv. 26.
[4] Ibid. viii. 12. Cf. i. 4, 9; iii. 11.
[5] Ibid. xvi. 30. [6] See the last chapter.
[7] St. John v. 26.

By virtue of His eternal generation all things the Father hath were His,[1] but since this made them His by derivation, it was right that He should reveal them on earth as received from the Father, and under the limitations of the Mission from the Father which He was fulfilling. Yet in the midst of these limitations He said, "all things that the Father hath are Mine"—a claim utterly inconsistent with an abandonment on His part of Divine power and knowledge.

We are now in a position to sum up the teaching of the New Testament concerning our Lord's knowledge. It is clear that our Lord acquired knowledge and wisdom as touching His Manhood, along the lines and in accordance with the laws of human growth and experience. But there are also indications in some instances that what He condescended to learn was already known to Him in another manner. Again, it is clear that His knowledge, considered in its totality, was altogether unique in range and variety. Finally it must be admitted that some of His language is best to be accounted for by the supposition that He was exercising the infinite knowledge of God. In short, our Lord appears in the Gospels as being

[1] St. John xvi. 15.

at once finite in knowledge as touching His Manhood, and omniscient as touching His Godhead.[1] In the light of this revelation of the reality of the mysterious union of the Divine and human natures in one Person, we can but believe without attempting to solve the insoluble.

[1] It is misleading to put omniscience and nescience in antithesis here. It is less liable to misconstruction to say that our Lord possessed two *knowledges*, one universal the other partial. See Ottley, *The Incarnation*, Vol. II., p. 291, top.

CHAPTER XI

THE DOCTRINE OF OUR LORD'S KNOWLEDGE

OUR study of the New Testament has shown that our Lord possessed during His humiliation two real and distinct knowledges, which He exercised simultaneously, each according to its own laws. One of these was the omniscience of God, transcending all conditions of space and time, and including all things within its range. The other was human and finite, and subject to the conditions of human knowledge, in that it was capable of increase by experience and, however much enhanced in facility and enlarged in extent by grace, could not escape finite limitations.

Since these two knowledges pertain to two distinct natures, each of which remains unshortened in the Person of Christ, they are themselves distinct, each obeying the laws of its own nature, and both preserving their reality without mutual confusion. As the Sixth Ecumenical Council says, "There are in Him two natural wills and two natural opera-

tions, without separation, change, division or confusion, according to the doctrine of the holy Fathers." This truth flows out of the Hypostatic Union, by reason of which our Lord, from the moment of His Incarnation, ever possesses in His own Person all the properties of the Godhead and all those of the Manhood, "whole in what was His, whole in what was ours," yet without confusion or mutual infringement of natures.

On the other hand the union between these two knowledges is very close, since they are become the knowledges of one and the same Person, God, the Word incarnate. Thus, while there are two Self-knowledges in our Lord, *i.e.*, a knowledge of Self in each of His two natures, the Self is one and the same in each instance. The internal relations between the knowledges thus conjoined cannot be otherwise than most intimate. Of these we shall speak so far as we may, in the next chapter. We here consider the two knowledges separately, endeavouring to set forth briefly what we know of each.

I

It is to be granted and maintained that our Lord possessed a real human mind like ours—a

mind subject to human limitations, which never did and never can escape the nature of its kind, or the finite limitations of its human capacity. It is also to be maintained that His human mind, within the limits of what such a mind can receive without ceasing to be human, was supernaturally illuminated, informed, and aided by grace—to an extent and in a manner altogether unique. If we analyze our Lord's human knowledge we shall discern the following elements in it.

1. He possessed an acquired or empirical knowledge derived from human observation and experience. The Gospels contain many indications of this, the nature of which have already been indicated. He "came to know" many things in this way; and it does not subtract from the reality of His coming to know by observation, that He possessed a different kind of knowledge already which covered the same field.[1]

2. Moreover, if our Lord had a mind like ours, He must also have reasoned within Himself, and developed in His mind a body of inferential knowl-

[1] Our Lord must have received instruction from His parents touching the Mosaic Law and the Jewish religion. He also probably learned the carpenter's trade from his foster-father. To sum up the matter, He must have "been touched with the feeling of our infirmities" by experiencing what it is to learn like a child.

edge and wisdom, the outcome of His human observation and reflection. In this sense He increased in wisdom. And this increase was none the less real because in the same Person another and Divine wisdom existed, which was infinite *ab initio*, and which embraced even those subjects and problems upon which His human mind was exercising a finite and growing wisdom.

3. But the truth of this subjection of our Lord's human understanding to the laws of growth should not obscure from our view the unique perfection, facility, and precision of His intellect. His mind was unclouded and unhampered by the effects of sin. He was sinless, and much of our dulness of mind and of spiritual vision and wisdom, is caused by the sinful propensities of our nature. This might be enlarged upon, but is sufficiently obvious. It is the alien state of our minds which darkens them and hinders the light of Divine wisdom from flowing into them. Our Lord's mind was free from all such difficulties.[1]

[1] We need to be on our guard against a very common disparagement of human understanding, the history of which is given in a masterly way in the *Church Quarterly Review*, July, 1897, p. 268 *et seq.* The "fettered mind" theory is there shown to produce a revolutionary effect upon Theology, Ethics, and Science generally. It is pointed out (pp. 287, 288) that such a view nulli-

4. Moreover, His mind was elevated by grace, and that to an extent absolutely without parallel. The Spirit was not given by measure to Him,[1] but illuminated His soul with a fulness which was limited only by the receptive capacity of the most capacious human mind that ever existed. The experience of countless saints teaches us what the effect of grace is upon the human mind, particularly when directed upon the deep things of God. Facility of understanding, depth of spiritual wisdom, largeness of knowledge, and precision of judgment are enjoyed which supernatural grace alone can account for. The spiritual intelligence of an Athanasius transcends that of a Plato, but the spiritual understanding of Christ, His human understanding, transcended that of Athanasius far more than his did that of Plato. All the intellectual gifts of the Spirit were His in their greatest fulness. He was a genius, but no genius among men can be compared with

fies the belief that our minds shall be able hereafter to see God as He is (I. St. John iii. 2). We may go on to say that, granting the truth of the revelation that our minds are capable, by grace, of seeing God, we cannot deny to our Lord's human mind the ability to look inward and behold the beatific vision, as its introspective powers developed.

[1] St. John iii. 34.

Him. He understood man better than the wisest philosopher, and God better than the greatest theologian. These transcendent endowments of His Manhood were suited to His office of Prophet. But His prophetic office involved a range and degree of Divine inspiration found in no other prophet. The Old Testament prophets were inspired to set forth in terms which were often enigmatical and imperfectly understood by themselves, certain fragments of truth concerning the Kingdom of God. Our Lord translated into the forms of His human intelligence the meaning of all prophecy, the mysteries of which the greatest prophets before Him were ignorant of, and from a full mind taught His Apostles clearly and adequately, without effort or uncertainty, concerning His Kingdom. It is precarious to name any bounds to such knowledge short of the ultimate limits of finite power to receive illumination from God.

5. Our Lord's human mind was the mind of the Son of God, although truly human. Like our minds it was capable of looking inward. The human self-consciousness of Christ had for its object of contemplation one of the Persons of the Blessed Trinity. That contemplation was finite

and increased in capacity because it pertained to human intelligence. But the mind which we are considering was, as we have seen, no ordinary mind, and in its inward vision must have possessed a power of discernment and understanding greater than we can realize. What lay open to a self-consciousness such as His soul was capable of we can but conjecture. But depths in the Divine nature must have been sounded as His mind grew which lie far beyond our ken. Hooker says that His human soul must have been "so far forth universal as to be privy to all that God worketh, although not in possession of the infinite knowledge peculiar to Deity."[1] In short, all things Divine which a finite mind is capable of receiving must have been reflected in that Self upon which His soul turned its inward gaze. What is such a gaze but the beatific vision—a vision indeed which differs widely in method and content from external and physical observation, and which, therefore, need not have interfered with or have lessened the reality of His empirical knowledge.

Enough has been said to exhibit the combina-

[1] *Eccles. Pol.*, V., liv. 7. This language needs guarding. Our Lord's human soul could not be privy to things which God worketh, where such things transcended finite power to comprehend.

tion of finite limitations and transcendant range in our Lord's human knowledge. His human mind was not omniscient. It acquired knowledge and increased in wisdom, in truth and reality. But it also excelled our minds in power, facility, accuracy, range, and understanding, being altogether unique in its conditions, endowments, and excellency.

II

We may now consider His Divine knowledge—the knowledge pertaining to His Godhead. As we have seen, He could not abandon this without ceasing to be God,[1] and therefore was in no wise lacking in omniscience during His life among men.

Our ripest thoughts as to the nature and methods of Divine intelligence are fragmentary and inadequate. The Divine mind is inscrutable. And

[1] Bishop Stubbs (*Charge* of 1893) says that "the limitation of knowledge is a very different thing from the limitation of the exercise of power. Power itself has its essence *in posse*, its manifestation in exercise of will; knowledge has its essence *in esse*. We cannot in our thought, define or intelligently explain away the knowledge of the Lord incarnate. We cannot conceive that He could have knowledge and not use it, as He could have power and not exercise it [*i.e.*, in a given direction]; His omniscience is of the essence of the personality in which Manhood and Godhead united in him."

yet we know some truths concerning it. We know that it is not subject in its exercise to the conditions of bodily observation or to those of space and time. The mode of Divine knowledge differs widely from that of human knowledge. Our perception of this difference enables us to accept without confusion of mind, although without understanding the manner, the fact revealed to us—that it exists in the same Person Who made human intelligence His own without nullifying the laws of growth to which it is naturally subject. Many of the things which the Son of God knew in a Divine manner, from eternity and without process of temporal observation, He was also able to learn humanly and in accordance with the laws of human growth.

1. Our Lord's Divine knowledge must have been exercised while He was wearing the form of a servant, in exercising His cosmic functions. None but extreme kenoticists allege that He abandoned these functions while on earth, and some of them acknowledge that in fulfilling them He was necessarily exercising Divine omniscience.[1] In Him all things were consisting[2] and He was ever

[1] Cf. Gore, *Dissertations*, pp. 91–93.
[2] Col. i. 16, 17; Heb. i. 3.

the Divine Agent through Whom they were being upheld in being and operation. Unless, therefore, we are to fall into Nestorianism and divide His Person, we must refuse to grant that Christ was bereft of Divine omniscience while increasing in human wisdom.[1]

2. Again, to our Lord pertained the economy of Redemption and Revelation. And for this reason, in the midst of His submission as touching His Manhood to the limitations of finite intelligence, He must have been exercising Divine knowledge—a knowledge which was necessary for the work which He came to do. The mysteries of that work transcend human finding out, and it is unreasonable to suppose that His work was a blind work.[2]

3. Then too, there could not have been a rupture

[1] The two sphere theory, which postulates two life centres, certainly has a Nestorian tendency, although some of those who adopt it would condemn Nestorianism as strongly as the Fathers did. The Rev. Alban Richey (*The Incarnation and the Kenosis*, pp. 7–9, 23) draws attention to the Nestorianism involved in Anglican kenoticism.

[2] St. Paul, after speaking profoundly of the plan of Redemption, exclaims, "O, the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are His judgments, and His ways past finding out." Rom. xii. 33. The work of Redemption was His personal work. He was an *Agent*, not a mere instrument in the hands of Another. See Hebrews i. 3.

during His humiliation of the internal relations eternally binding together in one the Persons of the Godhead. The Son was in the Father while on earth, and knew the Father as the Father knew Him, *i.e.*, with infinite intelligence.[1]

4. Finally, it is denied by none but Unitarians that prior to the Incarnation the Son of God knew all things as God with Divine omniscience. But Divine omniscience is eternal knowledge. It is not derived from coming to know, nor is it capable of ceasing; for an eternal state is a state which is unaffected and uninterrupted by temporal relations, since it altogether transcends them. God eternally contemplates all time and all temporal events. There is no interval of time between His act of knowing and the event discerned. All events are present immediately to Him. In view of this, it is simply unintelligible to speak of His forgetting or otherwise ceasing to know.[2]

Nothing is subtracted from this truth when we acknowledge that the Son's omniscience is a derived omniscience, for the very essence and self-existent life of the Son is derived from the Father. He is God of God, and His derivation does

[1] St. John xiv. 10, 11; viii. 38; x. 30; xvii. 21, 22.

[2] See p. 205, note 1.

not subtract from the eternity and consequent inalienable nature of His attributes, since His derivation or generation is as eternal and timeless as is the Nature of the Father Itself which He has received.

We are driven by the obedience of faith to the conclusion that His Person possessed on earth both the Divine knowledge and the human knowledge, each complete and real, without confusion or mutual infringement.

CHAPTER XII

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR LORD'S KNOWLEDGES

WE have referred in various connections to the mysterious and baffling nature of the Hypostatic Union of two natures in Christ, and have pointed out the fact that the concurrence in His Person of two knowledges is but a necessary consequence of the reality of this union. This concurrence does not, therefore, raise a new difficulty, but simply makes more manifest the mysteriousness of the Hypostatic Union. It is our duty in this mystery to believe what we cannot explain, and to refrain from attempting impossible solutions of the problem. Such attempts must result ultimately in an obscuration and loss of one of the two truths, the harmony of which we are unable to show, but which Divine revelation requires us to hold together.

In considering the relations existing between our Lord's two knowledges we have no intention of

trying to explain the mystery of their union. Nor do we intend to construct a complete theory or rationale of Christ's knowledge. Nothing further is intended than to consider what little can be known or conjectured concerning the mutual relations between the Divine omniscience and human knowledge of Christ. We do know something of these relations, and we may conjecture more. And although the totality of our knowledge and conjecture falls far short of an explanation, it may strengthen our conviction that, if we were able to explore the mysteries of God, some explanation of this mystery would be possible, which would justify our faith.

1. The Faith concerning the Incarnation requires us to believe that the relation which existed between our Lord's Divine and human knowledges while He was on earth was one which left unimpaired the distinct integrity and reality of His two natures. This means that the two knowledges were mutually distinct, each being exercised in accordance with the laws of its own nature, and neither infringing upon the reality of the other.

2. The Faith also requires that we should regard these knowledges as exercised by one Person, since

the two natures to which they belong are the natures of one and the same Jesus Christ, God, the Word. The relation thus involved must be of the closest nature, and, in some sense consistent with the distinctness of natures, internal. This appears particularly when we consider the self-consciousness of Christ. He was self-conscious in each of His two natures, and, while the modes of these self-consciousnesses were different and obeyed the laws of diverse natures, the Self upon which His gaze in each nature was directed was one and indivisible. That Self was the meeting point of His two knowledges; and since It was internal to both of His natures, the two knowledges may not be regarded as occupying separate regions, but as having one centre—one Subject or Self. Their distinctness lies in a distinctness of nature, not in a separation of centres.[1]

3. Again, the objective range of Divine omniscience is universal and all inclusive. To say otherwise is to deny omniscience. It includes the entire range of human knowledge, actual or possi-

[1] It is remarkable that a theory which grew out of the Lutheran and monophysite merging of the Godhead into the Manhood should, in the hands of Martensen and Anglican kenoticists, take a Nestorian form. But to speak of two life-centres in Christ implies unmistakably a division of His Person.

ble. To put it in another way, the spheres[1] of our Lord's knowledges were concentric. His Divine knowledge included in its range the contents of His human knowledge. We may not, therefore, regard the relations which existed between His two knowledges as permitting the idea that He was exercising them in *separate* spheres or regions, omniscience in one region and finite intelligence in another. We must hold that whatever He knew with His human mind He also knew with His Divine omniscience. The sphere of His Divine knowledge in this sense, the sense apparently adopted by Canon Gore, transcended infinitely the sphere of His human knowledge, but, within the sphere or range of human knowledge, both of His knowledges were exercised upon the same objects.[2] Their distinctness lies in the diversity of the modes of this exercise, a diversity arising from the difference of the natures.

The possibility of knowing the same thing in two ways should be sufficiently clear to a thought-

[1] Using the word sphere in the sense of range of objects upon which knowledge is exercised. See note in the Introduction on the use of this word (p. 29, note 2).

[2] This does not mean that Christ exercised Divine omniscience through His human mind, but simply that what His human mind knew His Divine knowledge also covered.

ful mind ; and we are continually coming to know to a limited extent by physical observation what we also know universally, with intuitive certainty or as the result of scientific generalization. The larger range and anticipatory nature of intuitive and scientific knowledge, does not do away with either the limitations, or the reality of the subsequent coming to know by physical observation. It is not claimed, of course, that the difference between such knowledges affords an adequate illustration of the difference between Divine and human knowledge. The latter difference is far greater. But in so far as it is greater, it is more easy to accept the truth revealed in the Gospels, of our Lord's simultaneous possession of Divine and human knowledge, without mutual infringement or confusion.[1]

4. As belonging to the same indivisible Person, the two knowledges of Christ possessed a relationship which, as we have seen, was internal. They could not have been altogether independent of each other, but their habitual relations must have

[1] Thus we are told that "Jesus saw Nathaniel coming to Him," which was an act of human observation. But it is added "Before that Philip called thee, when thou wast under the fig-tree I saw thee," which was an exercise of superhuman knowledge. Both were exercised upon the same object of knowledge. St. John i. 47, 48.

involved a continual illumination of the inferior mind by the higher one. It would be precarious to limit this illumination to communications made from time to time, as from an external source. It would be safer to say that the supernatural knowledge of our Lord's Manhood was grounded in and flowed naturally from the habitual and continuous internal relation in which His human mind stood to His Divine mind. They were the minds of one Person, and although distinct, could not have been walled off from each other as occupying, or exercised in, separate regions.

It is not going too far, perhaps, to say that this internal relation of the two knowledges of Christ unveiled the contents of the Divine mind to His human understanding, although under two very obvious limitations—viz. : the growing capacity of finite intelligence to appropriate such contents, and the human will of Christ to do so.

Our Lord's human mind was endowed with grace and developed very great and supernatural capacity, but that capacity was never infinite. Accordingly, although its inward gaze was directed upon an infinite Self, and although, as Hooker says, a little unguardedly, perhaps, a soul thus illuminated could not but be "privy unto all things

which God worketh," yet, as he adds, it was not endued "with infinite knowledge peculiar to Deity itself."[1] It was directed upon an infinite object, but with finite power of perception. There had to be a translation of the Divine into the finite forms of human intelligence, and what could not be translated thus could not be received by His human mind.[2] In short, our Lord's human mind was so constituted as apparently to have within the range of its inward vision all such contents of

[1] *Eccles. Pol.*, V., liv. 7.

[2] Nor could it be revealed to others. What Mason (*Conditions of our Lord's Life*, p. 118) says is true, that all of Christ's knowledge, *as conveyed to us*, is human knowledge; since nothing could be revealed from His Divine mind until it had been translated into the forms of human intelligence within Himself. But we must not infer that what was revealed by Christ had its *source* in His human understanding. What was translated came from the Divine mind, and from His *own* Divine mind. Gore says (*Dissertations*, p. 80), "He does not teach out of an absolute Divine omniscience, but rather as conditioned by human nature." That is, while truly teaching from omniscience, He had to speak through the medium of His own human mind. Principal Rainy (*Critical Review*, April, 1892, p. 120) says, "There is evidence enough that our Lord's human speech and action proceeded from One Who was never less or other than the eternal Son of God. But is there evidence that His human speech and action proceeded from any *immediate principle* other than a human consciousness—that is, from human faculties or capacities; this human nature . . . being participant of all knowledge of His own and His Father's being that befitted His person and work, yet participant always in a manner proper to human nature."

His Divine mind as a growing intelligence endowed with grace is capable of receiving.

A human mind is limited by the law of finite attention. It is not, and cannot, be continually conscious of all the stores of knowledge which are at its service, as is the Divine mind. It can attend to but a limited range of objects at once, and its attention is controlled by the will.[1] Such must have been the case with the human mind of our Lord. Its supernatural endowments could not have emancipated it from the law of finite attention without destroying its nature as a human mind. And thus it was conscious at a given moment of those things only to which He was directing its attention. If He willed to direct its attention inward, and upon something contained in His Divine mind, then it became aware of that toward which its attention was thus directed. But it was unconscious for the time being of all else.

All this can be illustrated by the phenomena of memory and recollection. The memory contains considerable stores of knowledge gained by our previous experience. But we are not conscious of the contents of memory unless we recall them to

[1] See Powell, *Prin. of the Incarn.*, p. 43 *et seq.*

our consciousness and attend to them. Moreover, our attention is governed by our will, and it is in fact so directed that much of what we have learned is never recalled again. We may conjecture that the Divine mind with its contents was within reach of our Lord's human attention in a manner somewhat analogous to this, with the limitation which has been stated above, that nothing could be called forth into His human consciousness which a finite and growing mind is incapable of receiving even when endowed with grace.[1]

5. We must, of course, believe that our Lord's human mind was governed in all things by the Divine will. His human will could not have directed the attention of His mind otherwise than in harmony with the purposes for which He became incarnate. Therefore, His human mind could not have become aware of anything of which the economy of the Incarnation required that it should remain unconscious. The human gaze could never

[1] This is admirably stated in the *Church Quarterly Review*, July, 1897, pp. 288–292. The analogy is, of course, incomplete. We could not rightly describe the process of our Lord's calling forth the contents of Divine knowledge and giving them form in His human mind as a process of recollection. But the idea of giving form in His human consciousness to what was previously in reserve and, so far as His human consciousness was concerned, without form would seem to hold good in both cases compared.

have broken in upon secrets reserved in the Father's hands, for the Son came into the world to do the Father's will in all things.[1] Whatever limitations of human knowledge were involved in the conditions of His humiliation must have been observed, not always because of mental incapacity, but for a reason equally conclusive—obedience to the Father's will.

6. If the above considerations are valid, they seem to throw some light upon the fact that, although the human mind of Christ was limited in knowledge, it was none the less absolutely infallible. If that mind was able to look inward upon the contents of His Divine mind, we may be sure that it would do this whenever necessary in order to teach and judge rightly concerning any subject. And we may be sure that no drafts upon Divine knowledge and wisdom which the exigencies of His mission demanded would be inconsistent with that will of the Father which He obeyed. Granting, therefore, the possibility that Christ did not know with human knowledge certain things which lay beyond the range of the science and criticism of His day, we must hold none the less that whatever He meant to say upon any subject whatsoever

[1] St. John viii. 29.

was guided by such Divine wisdom as was needed, and was absolutely true.[1]

[1] The *Church Quarterly Review*, Oct., 1897, p. 165, says, "The appeals to the authority of Christ as Man have their special significance because, as He speaks, He is true God. If, at any moment when He uttered the words which the Gospels record, He was not in possession of the attributes of God, His sayings might indeed be regarded as on a level with those of a great prophet or an inspired Apostle; they would cease to be the human utterances which have a value beyond all other human utterances, because they were spoken by one Who is personally God." Bishop Stubbs (*Charge* of 1893) says, "I feel that I am bound to accept the language of our Lord in reference to the Old Testament Scriptures as beyond appeal. . . . I am not affected by doubts thrown on the authorship of the 110th Psalm, except so far as to use His authority to set those doubts aside."

One might hold as matter of exegesis, perhaps, that our Lord did not intend to assert or imply anything concerning the authorship of the Pentateuch or the 110th Psalm. So says Bishop Moorhouse (*Teaching of Christ*, pp. 40–42). But if it is once shown that He did intend to do so, we must accept His language as final on these points, or surrender the Catholic Faith concerning His Person.

CHAPTER XIII

ISSUES INVOLVED

THE vital importance of the controversy raised by the appearance of modern kenoticism, can best be brought out by a comprehensive consideration of the chief issues which are involved. These issues have been indicated in various portions of our argument either directly or indirectly; but they need to be exhibited together and in connected order before we can realize adequately how much is at stake.

1. The primary issues raised by the kenotic theory are undoubtedly those which are connected with the doctrine of Christ's Person. Foremost of all is that of His true Divinity. Was He God or not? If he possessed the fulness of the Godhead—*i.e.*, all Divine attributes—He was God. But, if He was lacking in any of these attributes, He certainly was not God. It is possible to fail in perceiving the fact, but the logic of kenoticism

is utterly inconsistent with a real acceptance of the Christian dogma that Jesus Christ was very God. We do not doubt for a moment the honesty of those kenoticists who assert their belief in Christ's Divinity. But we are convinced that they are inconsistent. They do not appear to see the logic of their position. The Divine nature is to be recognized as Divine only because of its possessing certain determinate attributes. Assuming that It can lose such attributes as surpass the ability of mere men to receive,[1] It will then cease to be recognizable as the Divine nature, just as human nature would cease to be human if it were to lose those attributes which transcend the nature of an ape. The Divine nature, indeed, transcends our highest conceptions of It, yet enough is revealed concerning It to justify us in distinguishing It by Its possession of certain attributes, including omnipotence, omnipresence, and omniscience. The revealed attributes of God constitute the means by which we distinguish and identify what is Divine. Moreover, we cannot pick and choose. Whatever belongs to the Divine nat-

[1] It has been pointed out that our Lord's retention of Divine power and knowledge does not signify that His Manhood received them. The natures remain distinct in His Person.

ure, as such, is essential in this sense at least that, if any Person has lost it, that Person has thereby ceased to be Divine. If Christ ceased to possess any of the distinctive attributes of the Divine nature, He ceased to possess the Divine nature, and was no longer very God. To remain truly Divine, Christ must be "whole in what was His" as well as "whole in what was ours."

Accordingly, the question of our Lord's Divinity is raised by any theory whatsoever which asserts a real kenosis on our Lord's part of something which He had before the Incarnation. Until that event nothing existed in His Person which did not pertain to His Divine nature and Person as Divine. Those who say, for example, that our Lord abandoned his state of equality with God are not only resting upon mistaken exegesis, as we have shown, but are, unintentionally no doubt, playing into the hands of Socinianism. It is simply impossible to consider the Godhead as becoming inferior in state to itself. Even while on earth, Christ must either have been on a state of equality with God as touching His Godhead or else have sacrificed His Godhead. No amount of argument can remove this dilemma. He was either in full and personal possession at all times of whatever

He had possessed from eternity or else He was not God.[1]

2. Involved in this primary issue is the larger one of Faith *versus* rationalism. Shall we receive what is revealed because it is revealed, whether we understand it or not, or are we to receive only that which commends itself to our private judgment? "He who rejects any one revealed truth, does not hold whatever other truth he does not part with, out of submission to the authority of God who has revealed it, but because it approves itself in some way to his own natural mind and judgment. What he holds, he holds of himself."[2] Kenoticists, as we have seen, begin with a rationalistic attempt to solve the mystery of the taking of our manhood into God; and, being necessarily baffled in this attempt, they conclude that there is an incompatibility between certain Divine and human attributes which precludes their coexistence in the same Person. This is also rationalistic. Being

[1] Du Bose (*Soteriology*, p. 143) says boldly, "Everything in the man Christ Jesus is properly and truly human." Other passages suggest a pantheistic form of thought. But such language, if taken in the light of the diversity of our Lord's two natures, is baldly Socinian.

[2] Pusey, *Real Faith Entire*, p. 53. Quoted in Liddon's *Life of Pusey*, Vol. IV., p. 8.

convinced rightly enough that the Gospels teach a real submission of our Lord to human conditions, they add the unprovable inference that He must have abandoned some of the Divine attributes in order to assume such conditions. The supposed incompatibility cannot be maintained in the face of the scriptural teaching that Christ was in fact both God and Man, for the same method of argument which leads kenoticists to insist upon His limitations in order to vindicate the reality of His Manhood should lead them to insist upon His omnipotence, omnipresence, and omniscience in order to vindicate the truth of His Godhead.

3. As is often the case with undue emphasis upon single truths, kenoticism has perverted the very truth which it seeks to vindicate—the Manhood of Christ. Kenoticists insist that His Manhood was like ours.[1] As touching what constitutes human nature as such, they are undoubtedly right. But they fail to do justice to the truth that the conditions under which His Manhood existed were altogether unique. We may not regard His Manhood as if it were that of a

[1] Du Bose (*Soteriology*, p. 144) says, "There is absolutely *no* difference between Jesus Christ as man and us as men, as we are to be in Him, so far as the Manhood is concerned."

human person. Our Lord was very Man, but not such as He would have been had He not been also very God. His Manhood had power and knowledge habitually at its service which kenoticists entirely overlook. In short, when insisting upon the reality of Christ's Manhood they neglect the counter truth of its exaltation and peculiar conditions.[1]

[1] It is true, as Ottley says (*The Incarnation*, Vol. II., p. 290), quoting Martensen, that "God felt the limitations of human nature as His own limitations, that He experienced the states of human nature as His own states." But we cannot grant that those limitations and states were unaffected by the union. As St. Athanasius (*Orat. c. Arian.*, I., 60) says, Christ rendered the flesh "capable of the Word." Mason (*Conditions of our Lord's Life*, p. 113) acknowledges that the Godhead increased the Manhood's capacity for suffering. But it also increased the Manhood's power and value in various ways. His Manhood was not only an ideal manhood—one which, as Ellicott says (*Foundations of Sacred Study*, First Series, p. 149), we cannot view as if vitiated by sin—but it was also elevated by an infusion of grace of union far above the state which we enjoy. Mozley (on *Predestination*, p. 93) says, "The doctrine of our Lord's Divinity modifies the truths connected with His Humanity in this way, that He Who was both God and Man cannot be thought of even as Man exactly the same as if He were not God." To present the Manhood of Christ effectually we must present it truly, as the Manhood of a Divine Person. The *Church Quarterly Review*, Oct., 1896, p. 51, dwells upon the value of Christ's human life, but says, the fact that "the Divine knowledge which He personally possessed was undiminished, and that His human actions necessarily bore the impress of His eternal Being, does not lessen the value of that which He does as Man for those who, being united unto Him sacramentally, share in His life and receive His grace." Cf. also Oct., 1897, pp. 163–167.

Moreover, their teaching concerning human nature in general is open to just criticism. In saying that the Son had to abandon certain Divine attributes in order to assume a real human nature, they disparage human nature and underrate its capacity. Man is made in the image of God, and his nature, although infinitely inferior to the Divine, is capable of being taken into hypostatic union with the Divine nature without infringement of either nature upon the other.

Certain kenoticists, in order to avoid the notion of an everlasting kenosis, also maintain a final deification of the Manhood, whereby it comes to possess the omnipresence of God and other Divine attributes.[1] In short, unable to admit the capacity of a real manhood to be united without alteration of nature in one Person with the fulness of the Godhead, they regard the mystery of the Incarnation as beginning with a conversion of infinite Godhead into finite measures, and as ultimately resulting in a conversion of finite man-

[1] Du Bose (*Soteriology*, p. 143) says, "If in Him we see humanity lifted infinitely above itself as it is in us; if we see it with its growing capacities growing . . . until in His exaltation the human becomes wholly equal and coterminous with the Divine—in all this there is nothing that contradicts the nature or the laws of the human." A pantheistic form of thought appears here.

hood into something infinite. Both of these ideas are departures from the Faith, and the latter idea, as presented by some writers, suggests a pantheistic point of view—as if the Incarnation were but a stage in an evolution terminating in the deification of creation as represented in its highest product.

4. It is inevitable, when both natures of our Lord are viewed erroneously, that the doctrine of the Hypostatic Union should be perverted. According to the teaching of the Catholic Church, there have always existed in our Lord, since the moment of His taking the form of a servant, two whole and perfect natures, mutually distinct but united inseparably in one Person—the Godhead and the Manhood. But kenoticists all assert that Christ's Godhead lost something in Him at the outset, and many of them hold that when its perfection was regained the Manhood lost that finitude which pertains to its distinctive essence. None of them can acknowledge consistently that our Lord, during His earthly life was, as the Council of Chalcedon defines, "perfect in Godhead and also perfect in Manhood . . . the distinction of natures being by no means taken away by the union, but rather the propriety of each nature

being preserved, and concurring in one Person and one subsistence."[1] Thoughtful readers will see that the ancient heresy of Monophysitism is here revived. As extreme kenoticists have candidly and consistently acknowledged, their argument involves a conversion of the Godhead into a human soul, so that there was really but one nature in our Lord during His earthly life. Moreover, from their point of view, if the Divine attributes thus surrendered are to be regained, it can only be by an evolution and conversion of our Lord's Manhood thus constituted into the Divine nature. A real distinction of natures never appears. In truth, no genuine kenoticist can altogether escape the taint of Monophysitism, for what need is there of two natures, two wills, and two knowledges in Christ during His earthly life, if the Divine has been reduced to human measures? The only alternative thus far discovered is the theory of two life-centres in our Lord, adopted by Martensen and certain Anglican writers. This is clearly Nestorian in tendency, for a person is an indivisible subject, and one person cannot in the nature of things have two life-centres. The person or self is the life-centre.

[1] Denzinger, *Enchiridion*, § 134.

5. Kenoticists naturally reject the doctrine of the *communicatio idiomatum—i.e.*, the truth that the properties of the Divine and human natures are all predicable of the Person of Christ, whether we speak of Him under Divine or human titles. If our Lord surrendered certain attributes of the Godhead during His humiliation, as kenoticists maintain, it is of course erroneous to attribute them to the Son of Man at that time. He could not have been omnipotent, omnipresent, or omniscient. Moreover, Lutheranism has developed a perverted and monophysite form of the doctrine which we are considering; and the wide prevalence of this has, as we have shown elsewhere, misled certain Anglican writers, and has prevented them from asserting the *communicatio idiomatum* in the orthodox form held by such writers as St. Leo and St. John of Damascus.[1]

[1] Hawkesworth (*De Incarn.*, pp. 76–81) is hopelessly confusing on this subject. He says, "I utterly fail to see how any 'communicatio idiomatum' can properly be predicated in the Incarnation." The reason for his confusion appears when he speaks of a "communicatio idiomatum" "between our Lord's Two Natures." The Catholic doctrine does not admit of the word "between." It teaches a communication of the idioms of both natures to His Person; which does not mean a *mutual transference* of attributes, but a *predication* of them to the Person Who truly possesses them, in that the natures in which they exist are His own.

6. The Catholic doctrine set forth by the sixth Ecumenical Council, that in our Lord's one Person there were two wills and two operations, has also been violated by kenoticism. If our Lord's omnipotence was abandoned, there could not have been two wills in Him, and if His omniscience was abandoned, there could not have been two knowledges in Him. If His omniscience was not abandoned but reduced to finite measures simply, then there would seem to be no real place left for another finite knowledge in the same Person. But if, as the Faith teaches, Christ was "whole in what was His, whole in what was ours," each of His natures must have possessed its own power and intelligence, in accordance with its own laws, and Christ must have possessed both, their distinctness being preserved by the distinctness of the natures to which they pertain.[1]

7. To sum up this part of the subject, the kenotic theory expressly contravenes the doctrine of

[1] Hawkesworth (*De Incarn.*, p. 46) says curiously, "While there were 'two wills' in the Logos, . . . yet there were not, it seems to me, properly speaking, 'two wills' in *Christ*—*i.e.*, in the *Logos Incarnate*,—but 'one will,' or 'ἐνέργεια' only; which sole 'ἐνέργεια' was His 'human will'—or, speaking more accurately, His Divine Will as working through, and limited by His humanity,—and that alone." We do not pretend to unravel this.

the Incarnation. According to St. Paul, the Incarnation consists in the truth that One Who was subsisting in the form of God, and for that reason did not think it necessary to grasp His state of equality with God as if it might be lost, made Himself of no reputation by taking the form of a servant. As the Athanasian Symbol expresses it, the Incarnation signifies "the taking of the Manhood into God." But, according to kenoticism, when pressed consistently, the Incarnation was a conversion of our Lord's personal Godhead into something finite.

It is inevitable that such methods of speculation should ultimately be fatal to other truths besides those connected with the Person of Christ. The Faith is one, and its truths are vitally related, so that no one of them can be sacrificed without such error being either the effect or the cause of other errors. Then too, the doctrine of Christ's Person occupies a central position among the truths of revelation, being as it were the connecting link and interpretive principle of the whole Faith. One cannot hold such a doctrine erroneously without falling into other serious errors and much confusion. That such has been the case with kenoticism is certain.

8. The true doctrine of God is changed in various ways. Kenoticists are led to place what they call the metaphysical attributes of God in opposition to His ethical attributes. The latter alone they regard as essential, and think that in such a drama of love as the Incarnation the metaphysical attributes must give way. They seem to treat the metaphysical attributes as somewhat unreal, or at least as unstable. They do not realize that all true Divine attributes are grounded in the very being of God, so as to belong to Him necessarily as God.[1]

9. We have shown that it is unnecessary to hinge our argument against kenoticism upon the truth of Divine immutability. There is, however, no question but that immutability of attributes is an essential truth of the Divine nature. To say this is merely to say that God is eternal and therefore can never cease to be God, and this is a revealed truth beyond all question.[2] As has al-

[1] Ottley (*The Incarnation*, pp. 272, 273) says, "So far as we can speculate on so profoundly mysterious a subject, we may dare to think that in some sense the 'measures of humanity' were suffered to 'prevail' over the Deity, in such degree and sense that the Divine attributes themselves became modified or coloured by the union of the manhood with the Godhead."

[2] Mal. iii. 6; Heb. i. 12; xiii. 8. See Forbes, *Nicene Creed*, pp. 47, 48; St. Thos., *Sum. Theol.*, I. ix. The anathema of the

ready been shown, to lose Divine attributes is to cease to be God, for that is not God which does not possess the Divine nature, and the Divine nature is that and that only which possesses all Divine attributes. Kenoticists undoubtedly sacrifice the truth of Divine immutability.[1]

10. Moreover, the doctrine of the Trinity is violated by Kenoticism. Whatever the Trinity is It is eternally. The three Persons are co-eternal and co-equal. But if the Son of God was at any time

first Ecumenical Council reads, "Those who say that there was when the Son of God was not, or that before He was begotten He was not, or that He came into existence out of things which were not, or that He was of a different essence or substance, or was created, or *was changed*, the Catholic Church anathematises." Transl. in Smith and Wace, *Dictionary of Christian Biography*, "Creed." St. Augustine (*De Trin.*, V., 17) says that temporal predicates in relation to God, found in Scripture, signify a change in the creature, not in God.

[1] Cf. Gore, *Dissertations*, p. 173. Mason (*Conditions of our Lord's Life*, pp. xx, xxi) cites with apparent approval Bishop O'Brien (*Charge* of 1863) as saying, "From the impossibility of conceiving any change in the infinite, they seem to have inferred, if they did not confound the two things, that any such change is impossible. But, however safely we may hold that it is impossible that any such change can take place through any other agency, it would seem very rash and presumptuous to deny the possibility of its being effected by the will of the Infinite Being Himself." This ignores the contents of revelation, and also the truth that the Divine will is necessarily an attribute of the Divine nature. It is not other than what the Godhead makes it. Cf. St. Athanasius, *Orat. c. Arian.*, I., 35, 36.

lacking in Divine attributes He was not then co-equal with the Father and the Holy Spirit.

It is also a part of the doctrine of the Trinity that the Divine Persons exist eternally in each other, and act indivisibly in all their operations. Whatever may be the differences in the relations existing between the several Persons and their operations, no one of the Persons can be excluded or rightly regarded as inefficient in any of them. If the Spirit was working in our Lord's Manhood, illuminating His human mind and working His miracles, that Spirit was internal to the Son and was His Spirit; and the Son Himself was necessarily working with the Spirit by the power of their common, indivisible and inalienable Godhead. All this kenoticism ignores.[1]

11. The Doctrine of Divine Mission is also perverted by kenoticists. The truths that the Son was sent into the world by the Father to become incarnate, and that the Holy Spirit was sent by

[1] Du Bose (*Soteriology*, p. 143) says, "Whatever of divine there was then or is in the knowledge, power, or any other function of Jesus Christ *as man*, it is the communicated divinity of the Third Person of the Trinity, and not the original and underived divinity of the Second Person." To speak of the Divinity of the Son as "underived" is an error. But the mistake which we are noticing is his separation of the Holy Spirit from the Son in the economy of the Incarnation.

the Father and the Son to fill the Manhood of Christ and to guide His Church into all truth, are closely connected in Scripture and in the Catholic Faith with the Divine processions. They do not involve any disturbance of the internal relations of the Trinity which are grounded in these processions. But kenoticism makes use of the scriptural indications of Mission to prove that Christ had surrendered certain Divine prerogatives, and treats the Mission of the Holy Spirit to illuminate, sanctify, and energize the Manhood of Christ as if it excluded the Mission and Divine energy of the Son, acting in and employing the Manhood as His own in union with His Spirit.

The doctrines of God and of the Trinity are not the only truths which are corrupted by the kenotic perversion of Catholic doctrine concerning Christ's Person. The things which He came to do, and the final state upon which He entered are also misconceived.

12. In emphasizing onesidedly the human aspects of our Lord's Person, kenoticists fail to grasp the true significance of His example. They appear to consider that He came to exhibit an example of progress strictly parallel to that which is afforded by the lives of the saints, only free from their

backslidings. They overlook and in some cases even deny the truth that His example consists in a revelation in each stage of human growth of that holiness which is put before us as our ultimate goal. He possessed this holiness fully, though latently, *ab initio;* and His progress consisted in realizing and manifesting with increasing clearness, in human life, and as the conditions of human growth permitted, the perfection which was latent in Him all along.

13. The twofold work of our Lord as Redeemer and Revealer is certainly prejudiced by a theory which exhibits Him as reduced in power and knowledge while achieving such work. One who depended upon the Spirit as upon Another, and in a manner analogous to the dependence of Christ's saints upon Him, could hardly be described as "mighty to save" mankind. And one who did not have at his personal service and command the stores of Divine knowledge and wisdom could not rightly be looked upon as the Light of the world, and as the infallible and final Revealer of the mysteries of God.[1]

Moreover, while we may not deny that the

[1] Powell (*Prin. of the Incarn.*, Bk. II., ch. i.) deals with this subject in a weighty manner.

meritoriousness of His death arose from the obedience which caused Him to submit to it, we are bound to maintain that unless His Person then possessed almighty power He could not have overcome death, nor could the sacrifice of a Self Which had been reduced to finite measures have possessed infinite value for the redemption of mankind.[1]

14. Kenoticists are also in error or else inconsistent when treating of our Lord's glorified state. The Faith teaches us that our Lord's Manhood is as truly human and finite now as it was when He was on earth. Its power, presence, and knowledge are undoubtedly increased by its glorification. But they are still finite. The *a priori* assumption that certain Divine attributes are incompatible with the limitations of human nature, if valid against their co-existence in Christ's Person while He was on earth, is also valid against their union now. The knowledge of our Lord's human mind is still finite, and if such a limitation excluded omniscience while He was on earth, it does so now. Our Anglican kenoticists do not, of course,

[1] Hawkesworth (*De Incarn.*, p. 61) regards the merit of the Passion as finite, because He suffered as Man. This is to forget that He Who suffered was God while suffering.

hold that Christ is now lacking in any of the Divine attributes. But the *a priori* portion of their argument, if it were consistently applied, would lead them to such a conclusion. There is but one escape, an escape not available to loyal Anglicans. It is to adopt the heretical notion of German kenoticists that our Lord's Manhood came to possess the Divine attributes when glorified.[1]

It is quite possible that some of the particular points made in this chapter will not appear to every reader to be sufficiently established. But it should be clear to all that, if any one of them is rightly made, the kenotic theory is subversive of the Faith and cannot be maintained permanently without imperilling souls.

This book now draws to its close. The writer trusts that he has succeeded to some extent in showing what he set out to show. This may be summed up in the following propositions.

1. Kenoticism is a modern novelty, first broached distinctly by a writer of the eighteenth century, and not supported to any extent until the second

[1] Du Bose (*Soteriology*, pp. 143, 147, 148) does this. He says, "There is nothing that contradicts the law of the human mind in our belief that our Lord's human mind now shares the omniscience of His divinity." We have already noticed the pantheistic form of this writer's thought.

quarter of this century. This circumstance alone suggests what has been shown to be a fact, that the fundamental modes of thought which lie behind the theory are different from those of traditional orthodoxy. They are essentially modern and Lutheran.

2. The theory is contrary to the Faith of the Church as expressed in certain decrees of the Ecumenical Councils—especially that of Chalcedon, in which the perfection of each nature in Christ is asserted; and that of the sixth Council, in which the concurrence in Him of Divine and human operations is maintained. It also conflicts with the letters of St. Cyril of Alexandria and St. Leo the Great, which were formally adopted by the Council of Chalcedon.

3. Kenoticism was rejected deliberately, although incidentally, by the great majority of Catholic writers of antiquity. Their reasons were sufficient, and remain unanswerable in spite of the changed point of view occupied by modern writers. But, aside from reasons, the above fact makes it inconsistent for those who accept the principle of Catholic consent to adopt the theory.

4. It is not warranted by the facts and statements of Holy Scripture which exhibit our Lord

as making human conditions His own, since these conditions were but the consequences of His having assumed a real Manhood, and do not prove the contention that He abandoned the attributes which His Manhood could not receive. His Godhead was confessedly retained all along, and His continued possession of Divine power and knowledge is clearly indicated in the Gospel narrative.

5. The theory is based upon fallacious reasoning. That reasoning starts with a mistaken idea of the patristic position. It misconceives the ethical aspects of the Incarnation, and makes a false antithesis between the metaphysical and ethical attributes of God. Kenoticists fail to understand rightly the nature and purpose of our Lord's example and temptation. Some of them disparage the relative attributes of God, as if they were not grounded in His eternal essence. They base their argument upon the *a priori* assumption that it is impossible for certain Divine and human attributes to co-exist in one Person—an assumption which determines their biblical exegesis, and hinders them from taking sufficiently into account the scriptural indications of our Lord's Divine power and knowledge.

6. Kenoticism is perilous in its logical results,

undermining, as has been shown in this chapter, various fundamental doctrines of the Faith.

It appears impossible that one who retains the ancient Faith of the Church should accept the kenotic theory, after its true bearing is understood. If the writer has succeeded in convincing his readers that this is so, he has attained his purpose.

All that needs to be said in conclusion is that the writer has no desire to minimize the truth of our Lord's Manhood. That truth is a vital part of our Faith. If Christ did not take a real Manhood, a Manhood like ours as touching what constitutes human nature, and if He did not really submit to the conditions of human life and growth, He is not our Saviour. What is urged, however, is that the truth of His perfect Godhead is equally vital to His work as Redeemer and Revealer. Moreover, the same mode of argument which leads us to insist upon the reality of our Lord's human limitations in order to vindicate the truth of His Manhood, should lead us to insist upon His retention of all Divine attributes in order to vindicate the truth of His Godhead. Theological balance is needed, such as will enable us to hold opposite truths together without caricaturing or disparaging either.

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