
A table of contents for *Theological Students Fellowship (TSF) Bulletin (US)* can be found here:

https://biblicalstudies.org.uk/articles_tsfbulletin-us.php

TSF BULLETIN

ANUARY-FEBRUARY 1987
VOL. 10, NO. 3
$4.50

A Publication of
THEOLOGICAL STUDENTS FELLOWSHIP

represent God's righteous anger against those who are just as guilty of wanting to be "lord of history" as the Romans themselves are.

(8) And so, in verses 5-8, Paul asks us again to "be subject"—always loving; never resisting, contesting, trying to impose our own wisdom and will. And this is why you pay taxes (better: do not resist their being collected), so as not to have Jesus accuse *you* (as Paul got himself accused) of "kicking against the goads" (Acts 26:14)—i.e., trying to obstruct God's *Roman* servants as Paul had tried to obstruct his *Christian* ones. Never owe anybody—*anybody*—anything except to love them.

Nobody ever said loving Assyrian warriors was going to be easy; but when they are obeying God by loving instead of resisting them, don't let any holy-joes try to make you feel guilty by telling you that you are actually approving and supporting Assyrian evil. There is not one word in Romans 13, or anywhere else in the New Testament, implying that to "not resist one who is evil" (Mt. 5:39) is tantamount to legitimizing him—this no more than Isaiah's nonresistance legitimized Assyrian militarism, Jeremiah's Babylonian, Deutero-Isaiah's Persian, Paul's Roman, or a modern Christian's nonresistance legitimizes American militarism.

Finally, notice that, our way, Romans 13 reads as *anarchically* as all get out. It carefully declines to legitimize either Rome or resistance against Rome. It will give neither recognition nor honor to any political entity whatever—nation, party, ideology, or cause group. There is only one Lord of History—and that is God. And he shows no cognizance of our commonly-accepted distinction between the holy arkys he supposedly sponsors and the unholy ones he opposes (though this is not to deny that he acknowledges a degree of relative difference between the moral performance of one arky and another). Yet, after the model of the Israelite original, *every* arky starts out under the sinful illegitimacy of messianic pretension, claiming for itself recognition as world-savior and a true lord of history. Nevertheless, though the arkys all be under judgment (as all of us individuals are, too), God will *use* as "servant" whatever arky he chooses (when he chooses and how he chooses). He will also *punish* these servants the same way—even while *loving* each and every human individual involved the whole time. That's Christian Anarchy.

Love and War: Augustine And The Problem of Nuclear Weapons

by Bernard T. Adeney

Introduction

One of the major problems in the history of Christian ethics has been how to reconcile the rigorous requirements of Jesus' teaching on love with the morally ambiguous "necessities" of politics in a fallen world. Reinhold Niebuhr commented, for example, that the greatest problem for ethics is to bridge the gap between the ideal and the real. The purpose of this article is to redefine and explore this question.

The most extreme test of this problem is the test of war. Whatever may be held abstractly about Jesus' command to love your enemy, most Christians throughout history have also believed in national defense. Today many believe that national defense is impossible without nuclear weapons. The contrast between love of enemy and nuclear war could not be more extreme. This article will explore the nature of ethical dualism, first through Augustine's justification of Christian participation in war and then through the unique problems of the nuclear issue. Ethical dualism is the holding of two (or more) methods of moral evaluation for different sets of people or situations.

Augustine: Justifiable War in Tension

Augustine hated war. Not only was he the first Christian architect of a theory of justifiable war, he was also the first great anti-war writer. Augustine's view of war is especially startling when compared with classical thinkers. Like Plato and Cicero, Augustine saw war as a fact of life. However, unlike them, he never saw it as an honorable, let alone glorious activity. Nor was Augustine's just war theory simply a Christianization of Cicero's natural law thinking. Augustine's thought was born in the crucible of strongly conflicting elements in his mind. Augustine struggled to synthesize the rigorous demands of Christian love with a keen understanding of political realities and a pessimistic view of human nature.

We do not have space here for an extensive analysis of Augustine's hatred of war, or of his theory of justifiable war, but a brief survey should be sufficient. "God did not intend," Augustine lamented, "that his rational creature, who was made in his image, should have dominion over anything but the irrational creation—not man over man but man over beasts."[1] To Augustine war enslaved not only the loser but the winner. It is better to be a slave than to be captured by the emotions unleashed by war.[2]

Augustine saw the horror in all war, whether justifiable or not. "But they say, the wise man will wage just wars. As if he would not all the rather lament the necessity of just wars, if he remembers that he is a man."[3] The evil of war could not be over exaggerated, according to Augustine.

> Let everyone who thinks with pain on these great evils, so horrible, so ruthless acknowledge that this is misery. And if anyone either endures or thinks of them without mental pain, this is a more miserable plight still, for he thinks himself happy because he has lost human feeling.[4]

The words "glory" and "victory" are evil masks that hide the true character of warfare. Asked Augustine, "Why allege to me the mere names and words of 'glory' and 'victory?' Tear off the disguise of wild delusion, and look at the naked deeds; weigh them naked, judge them naked."[5] Augustine denied that any war could bring lasting peace. Even the noblest and best intentioned victory cannot keep peace for long. "Of this calamitous history we have no small proof, in the fact that no subsequent king has closed the gates of war."[6] The "man of war," said Augustine, is worse than a slave because he is ruled by lust:

> What prudence is there in wishing to glory in the greatness and extent of the empire, when you cannot point out that the happiness of men, who are always

Bernard T. Adeney is a TSF Bulletin Resource Scholar and Professor of Ethics at New College Berkeley.

rolling with dark fear and cruel lust in warlike slaughters and in blood, which, whether shed in civil or foreign war, is still human blood.[7]

The universal outrage that Augustine expressed toward war is a welcome addition to ancient moral literature which was certainly more familiar with the terms of honor and fatalism than compassion and love. Augustine's hatred of war is matched by his longing for peace. Peace for Augustine was not simply the absence of conflict, but the "perfectly ordered, harmonious enjoyment of God and one another in God."[8] This peace is the true end of humanity and will come when the human city is swallowed up by the city of God.

If it is supposed that God could not enjoin warfare because . . . Jesus said . . . 'Resist not evil' . . . the answer is that what is here required is not a bodily action but an inward disposition . . . Moses, in putting to death sinners, was not moved by cruelty but by love. Love does not preclude a benevolent severity nor that correction which compassion itself dictates.[12]

Augustine made this ethic of love almost beyond the pale of human wartime virtue by suggesting that a soldier or magistrate who is forced by duty to kill must do so with love in his heart. "No one indeed is fit to inflict punishment save the one who has first overcome hate in his heart. The love of

The universal outrage that Augustine expressed toward war is a welcome addition to ancient moral literature which was certainly more familiar with the terms of honor and fatalism than compassion and love.

In keeping with his love of peace, Augustine did not believe that the Christian individual should ever use violent force, even in self defense. The foundation of Augustine's whole theology and ethics is love. Augustine believed that the Sermon on the Mount should be literally followed by the believer. The individual citizen must not defend him or herself, even from robbery, rape or murder, not because it would not be just but because a person cannot do so without passion, self-assertion and a loss of love for their enemy.

As to killing others to defend one's own life, I do not approve of this, unless one happens to be a soldier or a public functionary acting not for himself but in defense of others or of the city in which he resides.[9]

How then could Augustine justify any warfare for the Christian? Augustine held two paradoxical views of the state. On the one hand, the state is ordained by God and as such is the instrument of his justice. As God's instrument of justice, Augustine conceded to the state a right to wield the sword which could never be right for the individual Christian:

They who have waged war in obedience to the divine command or in conformity with His laws have represented in their persons the public justice or the wisdom of government, and in this capacity have put to death wicked men; such men have by no means violated the command, 'Thou shalt not kill.'[10]

Augustine would not allow even the barest self-defense to the Christian as an individual, but as delegated by the state, justice could be accomplished by killing.

In tension with this view of the state, Augustine denied that any earthly state was founded on justice. The fundamental criteria of justice, according to Augustine, is worship of the only true God. Augustine rejected Cicero's requirement that a state must be just in order to be a true state. A state is simply a group of people who have a common agreement. "A robber band has the essential features of a state."[11]

Even if the state as ordained by God must wield the sword, it does not necessarily follow that Christians should do so. Does Augustine abrogate the love commandments for Christians in public office? This is the point at which Augustine proposed his solution to the contradiciton between love and political necessity. Love, argued Augustine, is not incompatible with killing because it is an attitude of the heart, not an action.

enemy admits no dispensation, but love does not exclude wars of mercy waged by the good."[13]

While there is a distinction in Augustine's thought between political responsibility and perfect love, these are by no means to be considered polarities. Love is to rule responsibly and must be incarnated in just political action. This is only possible through a radical emphasis on love as an inward disposition. Augustine's political ethics heavily rely on subjective intent. If a magistrate must cause the death of a person it should be done with love and sorrow. Hence, Augustine's "mournful magistrate." Those who go to war must cherish the spirit of a peacemaker. If they must kill they should let necessity and not their own hand do the killing.

Augustine knew that the tension between responsibility and the Gospel could never be fully resolved so he emphasized the difference between different callings. Different demands are placed by God on the ruler, the soldier, the citizen and the cleric or monk. Only the cleric or monk is bound by the "counsels of perfection." The highest or most perfect calling requires a nonviolent life. But not all Christians have that calling.[14] Thus Augustine made room for political necessity without making it normative.

The intellectual virtues of Augustine's resolution of the problem of dualism are apparent. Neither side of the dilemma is compromised. The radical absolute of love is preserved as the basic norm of every situation. Justice and love are not in conflict. Political realism is not sacrificed. Necessity does not compromise Christian discipleship. Augustine's solution allows for an individual to seek perfect union with God through monastic withdrawal from the ambiguous requirements of public life yet does not release any Christian from the ethics of Jesus. Even public officials must keep the love commandments internally.

But the problems with this solution are also serious. The interiorization of love promotes a spirit/flesh dichotomy and separates love from its concrete manifestation in the real world. The requirement that Christian soldiers must kill with love in their hearts for the enemy invites extreme hyprocrisy or guilt. The door is opened for subjective rationalization of any act as long as the requisite good motivation is there. Furthermore, Augustine ends up with two kinds of dualism: private versus public ethics and cleric versus lay ethics.

The agonizing approach of Augustine is still instructive for today's problems. This does not mean that Augustine solved the problem even for his own day. Augustine shared many

of the blindnesses of a high-born Roman citizen in the fifth century. But he grasped the tension between freedom and necessity, between justice and love and between Christian morality and practical politics. Augustine's solution of internalizing love was inadequate. But the tension he displayed illuminated the problem.

The Problem of Dualism in Ethics

The dilemma addressed by Augustine has been a perennial one for Christian ethics. Augustine's contrast between the city of God and the city of "man," Luther's two kingdoms, the Anabaptist contrast between Kingdom ethics and worldly ethics, Reinhold Niebuhr's dualism of individual and corporate ethics and Jacques Ellul's contrast between freedom and necessity are but a few examples of thinkers who have resorted to dualism in grappling with this problem. H. Richard Niebuhr's classic text, *Christ and Culture*, provides a typology of different approaches to a closely related problem.

Nuclear ethics brings the problem of dualism to an acute head. The simplest formulation of the political problem of nuclear weapons is that they are both intolerable and permanent.

Most writers tend to come down on one side of the duality, however they may define it. Thus Anabaptist ethics emphasize separation from political compromise and strict allegiance to Kingdom ethics. Reinhold Niebuhr, on the other hand, emphasized the impossibility of purity and the need to take moral risks for the sake of political justice. Luther held the two in tension but allowed too sharp a separation between personal and public responsibility. The result was to separate personal morality from political and social problems.

Nuclear Ethics and the Problem of Dualism

Nuclear ethics brings the problem of dualism to an acute head. The simplest formulation of the political problem of nuclear weapons is that they are both intolerable and permanent. They are intolerable morally because they make willingness to commit genocide and destroy most of the world a routine part of politics. The evils Augustine lamented are paltry compared to the necessary results of a nuclear war. Nuclear weapons are permanent for two reasons. First, unless industrial society is destroyed there will always be people who know how to make nuclear weapons. Even if total disarmament were achieved, nuclear weapons could be rapidly manufactured by an advanced industrial society in the event of war. Nuclear weapons will always be a threat. Second, despite the rhetoric of both Soviet and U.S. leaders, the political possibilities of complete disarmament are so slim as to be negligible. Apart from a fundamental change in the patterns of international political behavior that have persisted for all of recorded history, rational suspicion and self-protection will not disappear. Nuclear weapons are not hard to hide or break down into components. Even if disarmament were agreed upon, there would be no way to stop cheating.

Another way to state the problem is to say that they are immoral and politically necessary. They are immoral for obvious reasons. Nuclear weapons are a potent symbol of immmorality in international relations. Routine willingness to commit nuclear genocide is subversive of ethical commitment.

The political necessity of nuclear weapons is in one sense merely a matter of the polls. If enough people could be persuaded to change their mind and support disarmament then it would be possible. If it happened in Holland, why not here? There are many reasons why not. Holland's weapons are insignificant in relation to the perceived balance of power in international relations. Those of the United States are essential. Roger Shinn articulates a fear that cannot be simply denied. While he supports dramatic unilateral initiatives he rejects unilateral disarmament. He says:

> It would not enhance the peace of the world. The one situation more dangerous and more fraught with injustice than a balance of terror is a monopoly of terror. The unilateral renunciation of nuclear weapons may be a rational and ethically responsible act for some nations. It is not a political possibility for all nations.[15]

As it stands this is an empirical prediction, not necessarily a normative judgment. The Soviets might very well increase aggressive and oppressive activity all over the world if they were unimpeded by nuclear deterrence. The same might be true of the United States. But this is not certain for either the Soviet Union or the United States. There might be other kinds of deterrence made available to a nation with the political and moral courage to renounce nuclear weapons. Of course both sides will not disarm for many reasons besides fear. These include technological and bureaucratic momentum, the international influence and prestige of being a nuclear superpower, both internal and foreign economic interests, ideological commitment, etc.[16]

The immorality and political necessity of nuclear weapons cannot be reconciled within a single political/ethical strategy. Part of the problem has to do with the necessity for the use of power in political relations. Reinhold Niebuhr wrestled cogently with this issue. The need for justice in the relationship between groups requires that each group's power be limited by the power of others. Unimpeded power is dangerous. Kenneth Waltz argues that it is also impossible.[17] Nation states will do all they can to prevent their rivals from gaining an unqualified advantage over them. For Niebuhr this was an ethical issue. Unimpeded power would lead to great injustice in the world. No nation is virtuous enough to be trusted with an unopposed ability to work its will on the world. The inescapable conclusion of this line of reasoning is that if one nation has nuclear weapons, justice and/or necessity requires that at least one other nation also have them.

In conflict with this line of thought is the stark truth that the evils restrained by nuclear deterrence are far outweighed by the evils of nuclear war. Even the horrors of world-wide Stalinism pale in comparison to nuclear war. It has always been questionable whether the issues that wars are fought over outweigh the destructiveness of war. In the past it was at least plausible to argue that they did. It is no longer plausible. If the destructiveness of conventional warfare could be seen as preventing an even greater evil, the same could never be said for nuclear war. The evil it threatens cannot be surpassed.

Christian ethics cannot be simply applied to the state. Too often Christians ignore reality and, as William Temple put it, "bleat fatuously of love." The major gap Niebuhr pointed to between the ideals of love and the necessities of practical politics cannot be denied (though it may be narrower than he thought). As he said, to assert that if only people loved each

other all the complex problems of the political order would be solved, begs the most basic problem in human history.[18] Most people do not love each other.

A Christian individual's response to nuclear weapons is not necessarily a gauge of how he or she would formulate policy if put in the pressurized position of a government executive. Political policy makers must use strategic, teleological reasoning. Most decisions are the outcome of a complex, bureaucratic process through which competing interests are compromised. The realist writings of Reinhold Niebuhr, John Herz and others, convincingly suggest that politics involves tragic, moral risk. As Niebuhr commented:

> Political morality must always be morally ambiguous because it cannot merely reject but must also reflect, beguile, harness and use self-interest for the sake of a tolerable harmony of the whole.[19]

faith and implicitly allowing a different set of rules for their job or their politics. This is especially acute in the economic and political realms of national defense. Thousands of Christians, who believe they should love their enemies, are employed in the nuclear defense industry. At best they may adopt an Augustinian inwardness to their understanding of love. Few are likely to share his anguish over the contradictions involved in preparing for war in a spirit of peace. Yet the production and deployment of nuclear weapons threatens a form of war far more evil than the worst nightmares of Augustine. Nuclear missles are not neutral until fired. They incarnate a blasphemous threat to the future and purpose of the earth.

How then can a Christian participate in a political order that is premised on the necessity of these weapons?

No politician can simply construct what they consider the best policy. Choices must be made from real possibilities. Politicians must distinguish between the present, actual policy, the politically possible (as things stand), the realistic (given certain changes), the desirable (conceivable but unlikely), and the ideal (a utopian vision). To mistake the ideal for the possible not only consigns one to irrelavance, it may well strengthen the status quo. As Richard Falk said, "... genuine moral encounter requires that we choose only from among those genuine possibilities implicit within the living tissue of human affairs."[24] Moral action is always contextual, not abstract.

When Christians take office they will have to act according to the prudential perspectives, possibilities and responsibilities that adhere to their position. This will inevitably result in the tensions and paradox of a double calling.

Insofar as Christians take part in policy formation they will have to share in the tension, or even anguish of working through a political process in which ethical fervor and moral clarity are sapped. Politics is a method, to use Niebuhr's words, "of finding proximate solutions to insolvable problems."[20] What then becomes of the radical simplicity of the Sermon on the Mount? Are we left, as Paul Ramsey put it, "wandering over the wasteland of utility since the day we completely surrendered to technical political reason the choice of the way to the goals we seek?"[21]

Ways Out of the Impasse

Like John Howard Yoder, I am convinced that the teaching of Jesus strongly requires pacifism of the believer, but that, "in our present age it is impossible to do away with the need for violent action in the political or economic realm."[22] Yoder rejects the separation of personal from political ethics. Christian ethics are inescapably political but one cannot require the same standards of behavior from the state as are incumbent upon the Christian. He says:

> We need to distinguish between the ethics of discipleship which are laid upon every Christian ... and an ethics of justice within the limits of relative prudence and self-preservation, which is all one can ask of the larger society.[23]

Yoder suggests that the ideals of discipleship revealed in Jesus Christ are indirectly relevant to the state in that relative, middle axioms can be derived from them. These middle axioms call the state to alternative ways of acting that are politically conceivable. Yoder's methodology undercuts the idealism that expects the state to embody nonviolent morality. At the same time Yoder refuses to erode the radical politcal challenge Jesus gave to those who wish to follow him.

This approach may suffice for Christians who remain outside public office but leaves unresolved difficulties for those who hold governing positions in a pluralistic society. When Christians take office they will have to act according to the prudential perspectives, possibilities and responsibilities that adhere to their position. This will inevitably result in the tensions and paradox of a double calling. Christians in America have typically responded to this tension by privatizing their

Overcoming Ethical Dualism: Eight Directions

I would like to suggest eight avenues for overcoming ethical dualism in a nuclear age. These are not "solutions" to the problem posed in this article. Rather they are directions for bypassing the problem.

1. When a question cannot be answered, a good approach is to redefine the question! The realist-idealist split has produced many questions which assume one side of the dichotomy. Such questions include, "How may wars be fought justly? How can the balancing of power produce security? How can we live without war? How may we abolish nuclear weapons?"

Like the question, "How can I reconcile the real and ideal?," these problems have no answer. Nevertheless, they must be asked. But the primary moral political question in international relations today is this: How can we reduce the criminal burden of the possesion of nuclear weapons? This question defines the problem as a technical, corporate, political, moral, costly and ongoing problem. It takes the focus off the quest for hypothetical personal purity or safety and onto the immediate context which we all face.

2. Rather than starting with theological or strategic abstractions, we need to begin with praxis: with concrete activities of peacemaking and resistance. Such activities are solidly based in commitments to real people and (for Christians) to the values of the Kingdom of God. Peacemaking and resistance can and must take place at all levels of human political relations: in the family, the church, the community, the nation and the world. Political/ethical theory can grow piecemeal out of committed action. Since World War II there has not been a single successful attempt to formulate a convincing political morality that can link military strategy to modern technological reali-

ties. Perhaps such a master theory of political ethics is impossible. In any case it should not hinder us from action or the theoretical insights which spring from it.

3. The values of the Gospel of reconciliation should guide us to set clear limits to what we may do as Christians and what we may advocate as policy. Morality requires that we choose the imperfect real over the abstract ideal. This does not mean that political ethics is exclusively teleological. It is not possible to predict all the good and bad consequences of questionable political means. Nowhere is this more obvious than in nuclear weapons policy. Teleological ethics overvalue human control of history. People need clear moral and, if possible, legal limits to political behavior. While a Christian politician may not choose the ideal, there should be clear limits to what she may choose in the realm of the real.

vision of the future that indicates a clear direction for political struggle. Gustavo Gutierrez's idea of "utopia" is a helpful concept in this regard. "Utopia" is a synthesis of a theological vision of peace (shalom), and a social scientific construction of the political requirements for the creation of material peace in the real world. A community provides a context for the development of such a vision. A community can keep alive the idea of peace even when its immediate applicability is doubtful.

8. The final synthesis of a Christian's faith and politics does not happen at the level of ideas or principles, but is incarnated in the total response of a person to God. We respond in the context of our communities and of our analysis of our world. This response to God is not abstract but expresses who we are as people in the world. Christian faith is valid only as it

The values of the Gospel of reconciliation should guide us to set clear limits to what we may do as Christians and what we may advocate as policy. Morality requires that we choose the imperfect real over the abstract ideal.

A good starting place for such limits in Augustine's motivation of love. Whatever cannot be reconciled with love should be excluded. However, more concrete principles relevant to the context and consistent with love also need to be developed. These principles operate deontologically but are contextually formulated. They include limitations on what a policy maker could support as national policy in a fallen world (for example, no first strike in nuclear policy). They would also include limitations on what any Christian could personally do as a follower of Jesus Christ (for example, order a nuclear strike of any kind).

4. The combination of moral urgency and political complexity which surrounds nuclear policy indicates that there is room both for the politics of reform and the politics of protest. The need for sophisticated political realism in addressing national policy does not nullify the moral outrage which nuclear defense should inspire in all human beings ("if they remember that they are human"). The politics of protest operate by a different set of rules than the politics of reform, but they can be complementary, not contradictory.

5. Attitude is as important as ideas in our response to the nuclear crisis. A follower of "the way of the cross" should not be primarily concerned with personal survival. Rather we should be driven to seek peace with all human beings. Often peace activists project the attitude that our nation is evil while our opponents are innocent. Strong defense advocates argue exactly the reverse. All the evil in the political realm is projected "out there." Augustine's pessimistic realism about the tendency of all humans toward egoism should lend us all humility, while his conviction of the almost infinite value of every person should lend us hope. Of course the heart of any Christian approach to peacemaking is love.

6. A Christian ethic of peacemaking is a communal ethic. The individual lone ranger peacemaker is almost a contradiction in terms. We need a community of people in which to learn the skills of being a peaceful people. We also need a community to lend corporate power to our quest for political peace. Third, a community will provide the context for seeking peace within ourselves. Those who wish to spread peace need to develop the character of peacemakers.

7. While it is important to distinguish between the politically possible and the ideal, it is equally important to have a

is expressed in the context of a person's life and social situation. The challenge to love God, our neighbor and our enemy cannot be adequately articulated in abstract terms that are separate from the life and "story" of an individual or community. The task of the Church in relation to the bond is to be a community that expresses the truth it has received in the style of its life. The nature of Christian ethics is expressed in the being of the Church as it responds to God and to the concrete historical/political events of its day. Dietrich Bonhoeffer asked:

> Who stands fast? Only the man whose final standard is not his reason, his principles, his conscience, his freedom or his virtue, but who is ready to sacrifice all this when he is called to obedient and responsible allegiance to God—the responsible man who tries to make his whole life an answer to the question and call of God.[25]

---

[1] Augustine, *The City of God*, Marcus Dods, Trans., Book XIX, Ch. 15, p. 521.
[2] *City*, Book XIX, Ch. 15, p. 521.
[3] *City*, Book XIX, Ch. 7, p. 515.
[4] *City*, Book XIX, Ch. 7, p. 515.
[5] *City*, Book III, Ch. 13, p. 174.
[6] *City*, Book XIX, Ch. 14, p. 176.
[7] *City*, Book XIX, Ch. 3, p. 190.
[8] *City*, Book XIX, Ch. 11, p. 519.
[9] *Epist.* 47 5. Quoted in Roland Bainton, *Christian Attitudes to War and Peace*, (Nashville: Abingdon Press), 1960, p. 96.
[10] *City*, Book I, Ch. 21, p. 142.
[11] *City*, Book XIX, Ch. 24, p. 528.
[12] *Contra Faustum*, XXII, pp. 76 & 79. Quoted in Bainton, pp. 95ff.
[13] *Sermo Dom* I, XX, pp. 63 & 70. Quoted in Bainton, p. 96.
[14] *Epist.* 99, CSEL XXIV, pp. 553f.
[15] Roger Shinn, "A Dilemma Seen from Several Sides," *Christianity & Crises* 41, No. 22 (Jan. 18, 1982), p. 375.
[16] Alan Geyer's book, *The Idea of Disarmament* (Elgin, IL: Brethren Press, 1985), amply documents the myriad political factors that have dogged and defeated attempts at disarmament.
[17] Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Relations*, (Menlo Park, CA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
[18] Reinhold Niebuhr, *Christianity and Power Politics*, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940), p. 14.
[19] *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness*, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944), p. 73.
[20] *Children of Light*, p. 118.
[21] Paul Ramsey, *War and the Christian Conscience*, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1961), p. 6.
[22] John Howard Yoder, *The Christian Witness to the State*, (Newton, Kansas: Faith and Life Press, 1964), p. 7.
[23] *Witness*, p. 23.
[24] Richard A. Falk, *Law Morality and War in the Contemporary World* (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1963), p. 6.
[25] Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Letters and Papers From Prison*, Eberland Bethage, ed. (New York: MacMillan, 1972), p. 5.