CHRISTIANITY AND VIOLENCE: JUST WAR AND CHRISTIAN TRADITION

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1. INTRODUCTION

It cannot be denied that aside from ethnicity,[1] religion plays a significant role in various social conflicts that have taken many lives.[2] The main cause of the World Trade Centre tragedy on September 11, 2001, for example, cannot be separated from the spirit of *jihad* claimed by the Muslim terrorists. Indeed, not a single religion can ever free itself from any form of violence.[3] As a conflict instigator, religion is considered dangerous. Therefore John Rawls pushes religion away from the public arena. For Rawls, the public domain has to remain neutral, so as not to be distorted by religious values.[4] Consequently, religion is marginalized to the private domain.

However, in his book, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation*, R. Scott Appleby tries to show that religion is ambivalent rather than dangerous. He describes the ambivalence of religion as lying on the fact that on the one hand it is capable of instigating conflict, but on the other, for the same reason, of bringing about peace. For Appleby, religions that produces fanaticism for violence (the extrem-

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1 See Stefan Wolff, *Ethnic Conflict: A Global Perspective* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Scott Strauss, *The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2006); and Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

2 See, for example, Martin E. Marty and R.Scott Appleby, eds., *Religion, Ethnicity and Self-Identity: Nations in Turmoil* (Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 1997).

3 See, for example, Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Minds of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003); and Mark Juergensmeyer and Margo Kitts, eds., *Princeton Readings in Religion and Violence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).

4 John Rawls, 'The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus', *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies* 7 (1987), 1, 4, 12-13.

ist) can just as easily produce fanaticism for peace (the peacemaker).[5] As he puts it: 'Both the extremist and the peacemaker are militants. Both types 'go to extremes' of self-sacrifice in devotion to the sacred; both claim to be 'radical,' or rooted in and renewing the fundamental truths of their religious traditions.'[6]

A survey through Christian tradition would show that with regard to religious ambivalence we have to admit that many conflicts and violence had happened,[7] but on the other hand, Christian tradition also records Christianity as a peacemaker. It is interesting to note that when having to deal with conflict and violence, Christian theology proposes the concept of just war which, according to the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, is 'probably the most influential perspective on the ethics of war and peace'.[8] The application of the just war theory is not limited to Christian circles only but has reached a wider community—it has become a resource for philosophers as well as non-Christian politicians in their struggle against oppressors and in upholding justice.[9]

Without overlooking the origins of just war in Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero, this article presents the theological thoughts of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, as well as Martin Luther and John Calvin, in the formation of a structural and systematic concept of just war and its theological and ethical contents—thoughts that are later developed further by 'canonists, theologians, codes of military practice, and political philosophers'.[10] Critiques to this theory will also be discussed in order to establish its validity, as well as the respective backgrounds and struggles

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5 '[T]he peacemaker', says Appleby, 'renounces violence as an acceptable extreme and restrict the war against oppressors and injustice to noncoercive means,' the extremist, 'by contrast, exalts violence as a religious prerogative or even as a spiritual *imperative* in the quest for justice.' R. Scott Appleby, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), p. 11.

6 Ibid.

7 See, for example, Benjamin J. Kaplan, *Divided by Faith: Religious Conflict and the Practice of Toleration in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007).

8 B. Orend, 'War', in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 edition),* ed. by Edward N. Zalta <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/war/> [accessed 10 October 2016].

9 See, for example, Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (New York: Basic Books, 1977).

10 Richard B. Miller, 'Introduction', in *War in the Twentieth-Century: Sources in Theological Ethics*, ed. Richard B. Miller (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1992), p. xiii.

of the above-mentioned church theologians in their attempt to find the legitimation of war in light of Scripture.

2. THE LEGITIMATION OF WAR

In Christianity war has often been viewed as closely related to the Fall of humanity into sin (Gen. 3:1-24). At the beginning of creation, the relation between the first humans was characterized by a mutual suitability and mutual assistance between the partners (Gen. 2:18). A mutually suitable relationship between two parties implies that both parties are of the same standing, although they are not of the same order. For example, the relation between husband and wife is a relationship between two persons who are of the same standing but of a different order, since God has given to the husband an authority of headship—albeit limited—to become the head of the wife. However, as a result of sin, there occurs in human beings a desire to dominate or control one over the other, as Genesis 3:16 states: 'Your desire shall be for your husband, and he shall rule over you.' Reinhold Niebuhr has correctly observed that prior to the Fall man has the will-to-live, but after the Fall man has the will-to-power. While the will-to-live has led human beings to creativity, the will-to-power, on the other hand, has resulted in destruction due to the rise of conflicts and wars.[11]

Now since war occurs because of sin, it is deemed evil and laden with cruelty, violence and brutality—all of which result from the wickedness and avarice of man. It is therefore useless to hope for reaching a meeting-point between war and Christianity, as the Anabaptist Menno Simons observes, 'Tell me, how can a Christian defend Scripturally retaliation, rebellion, war, striking, slaying, torturing, stealing, robbing and plundering and burning cities, and conquering countries?'[12] Thus it is concluded that the existence of war cannot be justified for whatever reason.

But is it true that war is basically evil? If war is evil and against the will of God, so Martin Luther argues, then we have to judge Abraham, Moses, Joshua, David, and other biblical figures who served God by engaging in war.[13] And if war is evil, adds Augustine, how do we explain Jesus' praise

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[11] Reinhold Niebuhr writes, 'Man's pride and will-to-power disturb the harmony of creation.' Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man: A Christian Interpretation*, Vol. 1, *Human Nature* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941), p. 179.

[12] Menno Simons, 'Reply to False Accusations,' in *The Complete Writings of Menno Simons*, ed. by John Christian Wenger, trans. by Leonard Verduin (Scottdale, Arizona: Herald Press, 1966), p. 555.

[13] Martin Luther, 'Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved', in *Luther's Works* 46, ed. by Robert C. Schultz (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967), pp. 97-8.

of the Roman centurion in Capernaum in saying that 'no one in Israel [has He] found such faith' (Matt. 8:10). Likewise, how do we explain the fact that Cornelius, another Roman centurion, had his prayer and alms received by God, who then sent the apostle Peter to preach the gospel to him (Acts 10:1-48)? And how should we take the answer that John the Baptist gave the soldiers who asked him what they should do, 'Do not extort money from anyone by threats or by false accusation, and be content with your wages' (Luke 3:14)? By advising the soldiers to be content with their wages, John seems to agree with their profession.[14] Thus it could be concluded that war, in itself, is not evil. What is evil of war, says Augustine, is the motivation that lies behind it: 'The real evils in war are love of violence, revengeful cruelty, fierce and implacable enmity, wild resistance, and the lust of power, and such like.'[15] Luther calls this evil motivation of war 'the wars of desire'.[16]

Without denying the close connection between war and sin, John Calvin sees war as an inseparable part of the institution of government as Paul describes in Romans 13. Governments belong to God's creation ordinance since they were created by God before the Fall. After the Fall, however, God gave them the sword—a new dimension in the execution of their duties. Governments bear the sword in order to avenge evildoers—carrying out God's wrath on the wrongdoer (Rom. 13:4).[17] Calvin's view in this case is very similar to Luther's. Roland Bainton describes Luther's view about governments in this statement: 'The state goes back to the order of creation and arose in paradise because of man's urge to association. The coercive power of the state was introduced after the Fall by reason of Cain's murder in order to prevent a general anarchy of revenge.'[18] In other words, before the Fall, the main duty of the government is focused on distributive justice, namely, the distribution and allocation of goods, such as access to education and to society. After the Fall, however, the government's duties include retributive justice, which is the avenge of evil. So

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14 Augustine, 'Letter CLXXXIX, to Boniface', in *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*, 1st Series, Vol. I, ed. by Philip Schaff (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1979), § 4, p. 553.

15 Augustine, 'Reply to Faustus the Manichæan', in *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*, 1st Series, Vol. IV, ed. by Philip Schaff (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1979), § xxii.74, p. 301.

16 Luther, 'Soldiers', p. 121.

17 John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, ed. by John T.McNeill, trans. by Ford Lewis Battles (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2006), IV.xx.10-11.

18 Roland H. Bainton, *Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace: A Historical Survey and Critical Re-evaluation* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1960), p. 137.

for Calvin, war has to be seen in this context of retributive justice; in this sense war, if motivated by the execution of God's judgment on those who practice evil, could be justified.

> But here a seemingly hard and difficult question arises: if the law of God forbids all Christians to kill (Ex. 20:13; Deut. 5:17; Matt. 5:21), and the prophet prophesies concerning God's holy mountain (the church) that in it men shall not afflict or hurt (Isa.11:9; 65:25)—how can magistrates be pious men and shedders of blood at the same time? Yet if we understand that the magistrate in administering punishment does nothing by himself, but carries out the very judgments of God, we shall not be hampered by this scruple. The law of the Lord forbids killing; but, that murders may not go unpunished, the Lawgiver himself puts into the hand of his ministers a sword to be drawn against all murderers.[19]

Luther calls war, in this context, 'wars of necessity'.[20] Hence, not only is the existence of war not sinful, instead it is a necessity. It means that if war is understood as 'wars of necessity' but it is not executed, then it becomes sin.

This means that although sin has resulted in war, the occurrence of war must be seen first of all as God's providence to curb sin. Augustine, according to Frederick Russell, understands war not merely as 'a consequence of sin' but also as 'a remedy for it'.[21] We remember what Joseph said to his brothers, 'As for you, you meant evil against me, but God meant it for good, to bring it about that many people should be kept alive, as they are today' (Gen. 50:20). From Joseph's story we learn that no matter how grand the plans of man and the devil are, they are still far below God's plan. The Lord declares, 'For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, declares the Lord. For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways and my thoughts than your thoughts' (Is. 55:8-9). In Reformed theology this principle is known as the Creator-creature distinction.[22] Creatures cannot be

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19 Calvin, *Institutes*, IV.xx.10.

20 Luther, 'Soldiers', p. 121.

21 Frederick H. Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 16.

22 Herman Bavinck writes, 'From the very first moment, true religion distinguishes itself from all other religions by the fact that it construes the relation between God and the world, including man, as that between the Creator and his creature. The idea of an existence apart and independently from God occurs nowhere in Scripture. God is the sole, unique, and absolute cause of all that exists.' Herman Bavinck, *In the Beginning: Foundations of Creation Theology* (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1999), p. 24.

compared to the Creator because there exists between them what Søren Kierkegaard terms as the 'infinite qualitative distinction'[23]—an essential distinction referring not only to a 'different degree' but also to a 'different kind'. Thus the occurrence of war has to be understood first of all as an order of preservation from God.

Within this order of preservation, war must be motivated by peace. Quoting Cicero, Calvin stresses that the 'seeking of peace' must become the objective of war.[24] It means that when declaring war, a government's attitude should, according to Calvin, be far from hatred: 'not be carried away with headlong anger, or be seized with hatred, or burn with implacable severity'.[25] Therefore when waging war, says Luther, one must distinguish between 'what you want to do' and 'what you ought to do', between 'desire' and 'necessity', between 'lust for war' and 'willingness to fight'.[26] In other words, war is only a means to peace and not an end in itself. For Augustine, if war is a means to peace, then when one engages in war 'the spirit of a peacemaker' has to be kindled so that those who lose the war or are captured could be persuaded to live in peace.[27]

It is interesting to note that for Calvin, without justice it is impossible to establish peace. Peace can be achieved only if justice is upheld. Based on Jeremiah 22:3 Calvin concludes, 'Justice, indeed, is to receive into safekeeping, to embrace, to protect, vindicate, and free the innocent. But judgment is to withstand the boldness of the impious, to repress their violence, to punish their misdeeds.'[28] This means that justice has two functions, namely, the protection of the innocent and retributive violence.[29] The first function of justice—the protection of the innocent—exercises distributive justice in the broader sense. As explained above, before the

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23 According to Kierkegaard, 'The fundamental error of modern times (which runs into logic, metaphysics, dogmatics, and the whole of modern life) lies in the fact that the yawning abyss of quality in the difference between God and man has been removed.' See Alexander Dru, ed., *The Journals of Søren Kierkegaard* (London: Oxford University Press, 1938), p. 222. See also Karl Barth, *The Epistle to the Romans* (London: Oxford University Press, 1933), p. 10.

24 Calvin, *Institutes*, IV.xx.12.

25 Ibid.

26 Luther, 'Soldiers', p. 118.

27 Augustine, 'Letter to Boniface', § 6.

28 Calvin, *Institutes*, IV.xx.9.

29 Paul mentions these two functions of justice in Romans 13:3-4, as Peter also states in 1 Peter 2:13-14, 'Be subject for the Lord's sake to every human institution, whether it be to the emperor as supreme, or to governors as sent by him to punish those who do evil and to praise those who do good.'

Fall, the government holds the duty to exercise distributive justice. Protecting the innocent is the government's duty *before* the Fall, whereas the second function of justice—retributive violence—exercises retributive justice. This is the government's duty *after* the Fall. In exercising retributive justice, the government is responsible not only for punishing the guilty, but more than that, it has to renew and reconcile them to become good citizens. In other words, retributive justice is not an end in itself; it has to serve distributive justice. Therefore, only when both distributive justice and retributive justice are established, can peace be maintained.

Engaging in war for the sake of justice is in line with the principle of love. For Calvin, a war that brings affliction and hurting is basically not in line with the love principle. But if it is carried out in the context 'to avenge, at the Lord's command', then this war, according to Calvin, is 'not to hurt or to afflict'.[30] In this context, war is not motivated by hatred.[31] It contains no desire to avenge or passion to kill. Such a war, according to Augustine, is motivated by love.[32] Thus a war carried out for the sake of establishing justice is in line with the love principle.

This article has shown so far that justifiable war could be accounted for in accordance with the Scriptures. The next part of this article will survey the theological foundation and basis of just war in Christian tradition.

3. JUST WAR

3.1 The Theological Foundation of Just War in Christian Tradition

With the cessation of Roman persecution of Christianity in 312 A.D., when the Emperor Constantine claimed himself to be a Christian, and with his declaration in 416 A.D. that only Christians could enlist in the military,[33] the Christian view of war had radically changed. Since that time Christians, who previously opposed war for whatever reason, began to realize that in certain situations and conditions war could be justified. Ambrose was the first theologian to advocate a justification for war in particular conditions. He wrote, 'The courage which protects one's country in war against the incursions of barbarians or defends the weak at

30 Calvin, *Institutes*, IV.xx.10.

31 Ibid., IV.xx.12.

32 Russell, *Just War in the Middle Ages*, p. 17; Bainton, *Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace*, p. 98.

33 James F. Childress, 'Pacifism', in *The Westminster Dictionary of Christian Ethics*, ed. by James F. Childress and John Macquarrie (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1986), p. 446.

home or one's friends from the attacks of robbers is absolutely just.'[34] Since then, through Ambrose's writings Christians had thought of the importance for a state to punish criminals who could internally damage it. They started to realize the significance of defending their country against the attacks of barbarians which could at any moment destroy their civilization. But Ambrose intended to apply his concept of just war only to ordinary Christians and not to the clergy (monks and priests). To the latter Ambrose asserted, 'The thought of warlike matters seems to be foreign to the duty of our office, for we have our thoughts fixed more on the duty of the soul than on that of the body, nor is it our business to look to arms but rather to the forces of peace.'[35] Thus the idea of a justifiable war and the absence of the clergy from war was Ambrose's contribution to just war.

History records that between the end of the fourth century and the beginning of the fifth, under the leadership of Augustine, Christians had started to accept the concept of just war, namely, that in certain conditions war is justifiable. It is interesting to note that for Augustine, it is Christian love that becomes the starting point of his thoughts on justifiable war. He writes,

> If it is supposed that God could not enjoin warfare, because in after times it was said by the Lord Jesus Christ, 'I say unto you, That ye resist not evil....' the answer is, that what is here required is not a bodily action, but an inward disposition...by using the sword in the punishment of a few.... that Moses acted as he did, not in cruelty but in great love, may be seen from the words in which he prayed for the sins of the people: 'If Thou wilt forgive their sin, forgive it; and if not, blot me out of Thy book.'....We see the same in the apostle [Paul], who, not in cruelty, but in love, delivered a man up to Satan for the destruction of the flesh, that the spirit might be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus.[36]

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[34] David F. Wright, 'War in a Church-historical Perspective,' *Evangelical Quarterly* 57 (April 1985), 149-50. Wright quotes from Ambrose's work, *De Officiis*, 1:27:129.

[35] Bainton, *Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace*, p. 90. Bainton quotes from Ambrose, *De Officiis*, 1:37:186.

[36] Augustine, 'Reply to Faustus the Manichæan,' pp. 301, 304. In this context, Frederick Russell writes, 'By this distinction between the inward disposition of the heart and outward acts, to be accepted by without serious question in the Middle Ages, Augustine claimed to reconcile war and the New Testament. Since according to the "inwardness" of his ethics the intention rather than the hostile act was normative, any hostile act was justified provided it was motivated by charity.' Russell, *Just War in the Middle Ages*, p. 17.

This is important for those who question the 'what is' (descriptive) and 'what ought to be' (prescriptive) elements in the thought of Augustine, as Lisa Sowle Cahill maintains,

> It is difficult to resolve the question of whether Augustine really begins with the perceived necessity of waging war to preserve the civil order and so tries to square it with the New Testament, or whether he begins with the Christian ideal of love of neighbor and enemy and inquires how best to put it into practice in a fallen world.[37]

Because his starting point is Christian love, Augustine puts to the fore the 'normative perspective' instead of the 'situational perspective'.[38]

There are two reasons why Christian love becomes the foundation of Augustine's thought on justifiable war. First, Augustine thinks that Christian love will distance us from egotism and selfish desire. So strongly did Augustine want to distance himself from selfish desire that he even renounces war or violence carried out in self-defence. He asserts,

> As to killing others in order to defend one's own life, I do not approve of this, unless one happens to be a soldier or public functionary acting, not for himself, but in defence of others or of the city in which he resides, if he acts according to the commission lawfully given him, and in the manner becoming of his office.[39]

Secondly, the presence of Christian love would require the duty to help one's fellow man. On seeing an Israelite being beaten by an Egyptian, Moses helped and defended the Israelite by killing the Egyptian (Exod. 2:12). For Augustine, Moses' action was justified because he did it not in

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37 Lisa Sowle Cahill, 'Nonresistance, Defense, Violence, and the Kingdom in Christian Tradition', *Interpretation* 38 (1984), 382.

38 I borrow the terms 'normative perspective' and 'situational perspective' from John Frame. Here Frame proposes two kinds of approach. The first focuses on 'Scripture' and then seeks its application in 'problem areas.' This approach is often used by 'evangelicals.' The second approach, conversely, focuses on the 'problem areas' and then on 'Scripture'. This is the approach frequently used by 'liberals' and 'secularists'. John Frame, *Medical Ethics: Principles, Persons, and Problems* (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1988), pp. 3-4. Thus Augustine's thought about war uses the evangelical approach because it emphasizes 'Scripture' more than 'problem areas'.

39 Augustine, 'Letter XLVII, to Publicola', in *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*, 1st Series, Vol. I, ed. Philip Schaff (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1979), § 5, p. 293.

self-defence but in order to help a fellow human being.[40] In like manner a government's stringent actions by using arms in upholding justice, preserving peace, and maintaining order in society could also be justified. Thus war is justifiable as long as its execution is motivated by Christian love that spurs self-denial and the desire to help others.

The problem is, how could a war that involves violence—though with the purpose of fighting evil—correlate with Christian love and brings peace? Augustine gives three reasons for this. First, Augustine views war as chastisement. As chastisement, punishment may encourage reform, and even if death results, punishment cannot harm its object in any essential (spiritual) way.[41] Russell summarizes this thought of Augustine in this sentence, 'The just warriors restrained sinners from evil, thus acting against their will but in their own best interest.'[42] Here Augustine distinguishes 'the inward disposition' from 'the hostile act', and sees that the former is more important than the latter.[43] Therefore, in order to correlate war with Christian love, there should be a clear reason for it—a just cause.

Secondly, in order to prevent war from becoming an arena for revenge, Augustine insists that war and violence could not be waged by individuals or private citizens. A war would be legitimate and just if it obeys the command of God or the command of the state,[44] and executed only by soldiers 'in behalf of the peace and safety of the community'.[45] In this way both clergy and individuals are prohibited from engaging in war. So in order that war reflects Christian love, the element of legitimate authority has to be taken into consideration. The third reason, aside from a just cause and legitimate authority, is the right intention, which is essential in assessing the morality of war. According to Augustine, violence that manifests Christian love and brings peace will ultimately depend on the intention of those who wage war. In order for war to be justifiable, those engaging in war 'should punish with the same goodwill which a father has towards his little son'.[46] It has been mentioned above that for Augustine the evil of war is not the injury and death that it causes but rather the 'love of violence, revengeful cruelty, fierce and implacable enmity, wild resistance, and the

40 Augustine, 'Reply to Faustus the Manichaean', § 90, p. 309.

41 Ibid., §§ 74, 78.

42 Russell, *Just War in the Middle Ages*, p. 17.

43 Ibid.

44 Augustine, 'Reply to Faustus the Manichæan', § xxii.74-75.

45 Ibid., § xxii.75.

46 Augustine, 'Our Lord's Sermon on the Mount,' in *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*, 1st Series, Vol. VI, ed. Philip Schaff (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1979), § i.xx.63, p. 27.

lust of power, and such like'.[47] Thus, the three reasons for going to war (*jus ad bellum*)—just cause, legitimate authority, and right intention—must be present in order that war may reflect Christian love and be justifiable.[48]

By embracing the concept of just war, Augustine renounces crusades and the various manifestations of holy war. According to Bainton, the crusading idea 'requires that the cause shall be holy (and no cause is more holy than religion), that the war shall be fought under God and with his help, that the crusaders shall be godly and their enemies ungodly, and that the war shall be prosecuted unsparingly'.[49] But war with a 'holy cause,' waged in the belief in a 'divine guidance and aid,' while viewing its executors as 'godly crusaders' and their enemies as 'ungodly enemies,' and requiring an 'unsparingly prosecution,' could become a brutal and sadistic war. From the perspective of just war, the right intention factor presents the greatest problem in crusades and holy war to make them justifiable.

The only legitimate holy war, according to Augustine, is the holy war waged by Israel in the Old Testament, when it fought the seven Canaanite tribes in the context of God's salvation history. For Augustine, the wars led by Moses, for example, are just wars because they originate in divine commands. When God gave his command, He did that not in cruelty but in righteous retribution. And when Moses obeyed God's command, he did it in obedience to God but not in ferocity.[50] Augustine discerns some exceptions in the sixth commandment, 'You shall not murder.' One of them is that God gave 'a special commission granted for a time to some individuals'. When those who went to war in obedience to God committed murder, they did not trespass the sixth commandment.[51] Hence the wars waged by Moses and Joshua were just wars. Outside the Old Testament context, holy wars are no longer normative.

That means we renounce Roland Bainton's view that holy war is still normative for Christians because the New Testament teaches it. For Bainton, the New Testament even teaches crusades which are a major manifestation of holy war.[52] The clearest example of a crusade in the New Tes-

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47 Augustine, 'Reply to Faustus the Manichæan', § xxii.74.

48 Bainton, *Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace*, p. 98.

49 Ibid., p. 148.

50 Augustine, 'Reply to Faustus the Manichæan', § xxii.74.

51 Augustine, 'The City of God,' in *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*, 1st Series, Vol. II, ed. Philip Schaff (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1979), § i.21, p. 15.

52 For Roland Bainton, crusades are the main interpretation of holy war. 'The crusade', he says, 'stemmed out of the holy war... [and]... went beyond the holy war in the respect that it was fought not so much with God's help as on God's

tament, according to Bainton, is when Jesus cleanses the temple using a whip of cords to drive out the merchants and money changers who were doing their business there.

> Support for the crusade has found its most congenial passage to be Jesus' cleansing of the temple with a whip of cords, a detail mentioned only in John's gospel [Jn. 2:15]. Here was undeniably an instance of fiery indignation against the profanation of the sacred, but the whip of cords, if genuine, was no hand grenade, and the success of Jesus in routing the hucksters was scarcely due to physical prowess. For what was one man, even with strands of rope, against such a company? They must have dispersed because they cowed by a wrath which they recognized as right.[53]

Bainton is correct that the cleansing of the temple is a manifestation of holy war in the New Testament. But different from the holy war in the Old Testament, the New Testament holy war takes a spiritual and not a physical form. Vern Poythress emphasizes that '[w]hereas Old Testament holy war was waged primarily against human opponents, on the level of symbol, New Testament holy war is waged against the ultimate opponents, Satan and his demonic assistants'.[54] Here Poythress sees a continuation of the Old Testament holy war in the New Testament, in which the former becomes a symbol for the latter. Thus holy war still applies to Christians, but it is holy war of a different nature. As Poythress maintains, 'We are to wage holy war. But the nature of that holy war is redefined because of Christ. Holy war takes the form of evangelism rather than physical conflict.'[55] As such holy war in terms of physical conflict is no longer normative for Christians.

In later centuries Augustine's doctrine of just war was further developed by the church at times when it faced warring situations. The thirteenth century was marked by wars between Christian kings and nobilities. Their concept of war, aside from abiding by the thoughts of Augustine and the Bible, was also influenced by the thought of Gratian expressed in his book, *Decretum*.[56] Based on the concepts of war prevalent in the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas developed Augustine's concept of

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behalf, not for a human goal which God might bless but for a divine cause which God might command.' Bainton, *Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace*, pp. 44-5.

53 Ibid., 56.

54 Vern Sheridan Poythress, *The Shadow of Christ in the Law of Moses* (Brentwood: Wolgemuth & Hyatt, Publishers, Inc., 1991), p. 147.

55 Ibid., p. 148.

56 See Russell, *Just War in the Middle Ages*, pp. 55-85.

war in a more systematic fashion. Aquinas basically emphasizes the three reasons for going to war (*jus ad bellum*) defined by Augustine: just cause, legitimate authority, and right intention. These three reasons must be present before one decides on waging war.[57] However, in order that war could be justified, only *jus ad bellum* is insufficient. Another reason is needed, says Aquinas, which is called *jus in bello*, the morality of means in war.[58]

According to Russell, when speaking about *jus in bello* Aquinas focuses on '[war's] legitimate conduct and consequences'.[59] He justifies ambushes as a means of war. He allows the use of deceiving the enemy as a strategy in war. For Aquinas there are two kinds of deception. The first is in the form of lying and not doing as promised. Such a deception is unlawful, whatever the reason. Quoting Ambrose, Aquinas writes, 'No one ought to deceive the enemy in this way, for there are certain *rights of war and covenants, which ought to be observed even among enemies*.'[60] But there is a second kind of deception in which 'a man may be deceived by what we say or do, because we do not declare our purpose or meaning to him.'[61] A deception that hides part of the truth, says Aquinas, is justified in war. The Bible itself, he claims, does this to unbelievers, as stated in Matthew 7:6, 'Do not give what is holy to dogs.'[62] Thus waging war by deception in ambushes could be justified.

With regard to the morality of means in war, Aquinas abides by the principle of discrimination. To him, for the sake of the common good war has to be waged against sinners. War must be able to distinguish sinners from the innocent. Those who are innocent cannot become the target of war because they 'preserve and forward the common good'.[63] For Aquinas, fighting the innocent means making four mistakes:

> first, because he injures one whom he should love more, and so acts more in opposition to charity; secondly, because he inflicts an injury on a man who is less deserving of one, and so acts more in opposition to justice; thirdly, because he deprives the community of a greater good; fourthly, because he

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57 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 1916), § ii-ii.40.1.

58 Lisa Sowle Cahill, *Love Your Enemies: Discipleship, Pacifism, and Just War Theory* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994), p. 85.

59 Russell, *Just War in the Middle Ages*, p. 271.

60 Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, ii-ii.40.3. Aquinas quotes from Ambrose, *De Officiis* i (italics as in edition cited).

61 Ibid.

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid., ii-ii.64.6.

> despises God more, according to Luke x.16, *He that despiseth you despiseth Me*.[64]

In sum, the discrimination principle requires that war distinguishes combatants from non-combatants.

Aside from the discrimination factor, Aquinas sees the principle of proportionality as extremely important in the criteria of *jus in bello*. This principle appears in the discussion on self-defence. Aquinas rejects Augustine's view that disagrees with self-defence as a reason for waging war. For Aquinas, self-defence in itself is not wrong. But the problem lies in the fact that self-defence could cause two effects. The first is one's intention to save one's own life. For Aquinas, saving one's own life is lawful because 'it is natural to everything to keep itself in *being*, as far as possible'.[65] However, the first effect will result in a second effect, which is the slaying of the aggressor. If the second effect is unproportional and contains 'more than necessary violence,' then self-defence could not be justified. In order to be justifiable, self-defence must be done in moderation.[66] Therefore, a plan to commit murder based on the reason of self-defence can never be tolerated. '[I]t is not lawful,' writes Aquinas, 'for a man to intend killing a man in self-defence.'[67] Thus, aside from discrimination, proportionality becomes a determining factor in the morality of war.

Augustine's thoughts that Aquinas developed in the middle of the thirteenth century becomes more crystallized during the Reformation era in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which were coloured by religious wars among Christians. As a *reformator* adhering to *Sola Scriptura*, Martin Luther uncompromisingly asserts that the validity of all doctrine, including the doctrine of war, must be tested against the Bible. Based on Old and New Testament texts, Luther takes the position of just war, and essentially agrees with Augustine about the importance of just cause, legitimate authority, and right intention in declaring war.[68] Luther's concept of just war is strongly influenced by his theology of the Two Kingdoms: the Kingdom of God or Christ and the kingdom of the world. The church, Christians, and spiritual matters all belong to the Kingdom of

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64 Ibid., ii-ii.64.6. r. obj.2.

65 Ibid., ii-ii.64.7.

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid.

68 Martin Luther, 'The Sermon on the Mount', in *Luther's Works* 21, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan (Saint Louis: Concordia, 1956), pp. 39-40; Martin Luther, 'Temporal Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed', in *Luther's Works* 46, ed. Walther I. Brandt (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1962), p. 99; Luther, 'Soldiers', p. 96.

God, while governments, war, and secular matters belong to the kingdom of the world. Both kingdoms are established by God. Whereas the Kingdom of God deals with sin, the kingdom of the world deals with evil. Luther separates these two kingdoms strictly and does not associate them.[69] Therefore Luther renounces the involvement of the church in war due to matters of religion. For example, he rejects the support of the church in the war against the Ottoman Turks that threatens Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.[70] And because he does not associate the legal with the spiritual, Luther rejects crusades and all forms of holy war.

For Luther, one example of Christians participating in the kingdom of the world is through jobs that would open up opportunities for Christians to serve their fellow man. With regard to matters of war in the kingdom of the world, Christians should, says Luther, as much as possible distance themselves from it. For Luther, war is not something people want or desire, although it is basically right and 'a divine and useful ordinance'.[71] Quoting Psalm 60:8, Luther reminds that 'He [God] scatters the peoples who delight in war'. So Luther condemns those who lust for war. For Luther, war is a necessity, not desire. War should be waged only if necessary.[72] In response to Jesus' teaching in Matthew 5:9, 'Blessed are the peacemakers,' Luther writes,

> Therefore anyone who claims to be a Christian and a child of God, not only does he not start war or unrest, but he also gives help and counsel on the side of peace wherever he can, even though there may have been a just and adequate cause for going to war.[73]

Luther understands war as a last resort—it would be waged only after all efforts for peace have come to a dead end.

Yet it is necessary to understand that Luther's concept of the 'last resort' is based on his pessimism towards government in waging war. By separating strictly the kingdom of the world (i.e., government) from the Kingdom of God (i.e., Christ, the church, and believers), Luther implies that he prohibits the substantial involvement of the church and Christians in transforming government, because Luther has a pessimistic and negative attitude toward government, especially in regard of its retribu-

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69 Luther, 'Temporal Authority', pp. 88, 91-92; Luther, 'Soldiers', p. 99; Luther, 'The Sermon on the Mount', p. 105.

70 See Martin Luther, 'On War Against the Turk,' in *Luther's Works* 46, ed. Robert C. Schultz (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967), pp. 155-205.

71 Luther, 'Soldiers', p. 99.

72 Ibid., p. 118.

73 Luther, 'The Sermon on the Mount', p. 40.

tive duty, namely, war, after the Fall of humanity into sin. By drawing an analogy between the Kingdom of God with Christ, and the kingdom of the world with culture, Richard Niebuhr in his book, *Christ and Culture*, labels Luther's position as 'Christ and Culture in Paradox,' and not as 'Christ the Transformer of Culture'.[74]

In other words, although for Luther war in itself is not sinful, but due to his low view of government, he reminds that soldiers who engage in war are sinful people. Therefore Luther sees war as the lesser of two evils. He writes,

> such a war is only a very brief lack of peace that prevents an everlasting and immeasurable lack of peace, a small misfortune that prevents a great misfortune. What men write about war, saying that it is a great plague, is all true. But they should also consider how great the plague is that war prevents.[75]

Thus what Luther means by the 'wars of necessity' refers more to war in the sense of 'it is evil but necessary'.

Different from Luther, Calvin sees the presence of government in a more positive and more hopeful light. But similar to Luther, Calvin also distinguishes a twofold government, the spiritual and the political:

> there is a twofold government in man: one aspect is spiritual, whereby the conscience is instructed in piety and in reverencing God; the second is political, whereby man is educated for the duties of humanity and citizenship that must be maintained among men....The one we may call the spiritual kingdom, the other, the political kingdom.[76]

How these two governments are related—this is what distinguishes Calvin from Luther. Whereas Luther sees the two kingdoms as being absolutely separated, Calvin, on the other hand, while regarding civil government as 'distinct' from the spiritual and inward Kingdom of Christ, considers both as 'not at variance' because 'we go as pilgrims upon the earth while we aspire to the true fatherland'.[77] Alister McGrath describes Calvin's concept of the spiritual and political aspects as *distincto sed non separatio:* they may be distinguished, yet not separated.[78] Although Calvin does not

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74 See Richard Niebuhr, *Christ and Culture* (San Fransisco: Harper and Row, 2001).

75 Luther, 'Soldiers', p. 96.

76 Calvin, *Institutes*, III.xix.15.

77 Ibid., IV.xx.2.

78 Alister E. McGrath, *A Life of John Calvin: A Study in the Shaping of Western Culture* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), p. 173.

separate the two aspects he notes that neither could they be unwisely mingled, because each one has 'a completely different nature'.[79] W. Stanford Reid summarizes Calvin's spiritual-political thought as 'that of mutual independence, but also of mutual helpfulness and support'.[80] In other words, even though Calvin separates church and state, he does not separate them absolutely as Luther does. For Calvin, the state is responsible to the church and the church is responsible to the state. Michael Welker employs the term 'differentiation' to describe the relation between church and state in Calvin's thought.[81]

Thus according to Calvin, government's duties in this context are:

> to cherish and protect the outward worship of God, to defend sound doctrine of piety and the position of the church, to adjust our life to the society of men, to form our social behavior to civil righteousness, to reconcile us with one another, and to promote general peace and tranquillity.[82]

In brief, Calvin has a high view of government. Similar to Augustine but different from Luther, Calvin sees government's retributive duty in war as a remedy for sin. Ralph Hancock thinks that Calvin's view regarding government is even more positive and hopeful than Augustine because for Calvin, the existence of government is not only 'necessary' but also 'noble'.[83]

Therefore, in Calvin's view, government should be very careful in declaring war. In order that war could be justified, as explained above, it is important for government to seek restoration of peace as its objective and to develop a far-from-hatred attitude. Government should also see war as a matter of 'extreme necessity' and declared war only if all attempts to avoid it have been made and failed.[84] In other words, for Calvin war must be a last resort.[85] Thus the criteria of *jus ad bellum* includes not only

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79 Calvin, *Institutes*, IV.xx.1.

80 W. Stanford Reid, 'Calvin and the Political Order', in *John Calvin: Contemporary Prophet*, ed., Jacob. T. Hoogstra (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1959), p. 252.

81 Michael Welker, 'Calvin's Doctrine of the "Civil Government": Its Orienting Power in Pluralism and Globalizaton', in *Calvin Today: Reformed Theology and the Future of the Church*, ed. by Michael Welker, Michael Weinrich, and Ulrich Möller (London: T & T Clark International, 2011), p. 211.

82 Calvin, *Institutes*, IV.xx.2.

83 Ralph C. Hancock, *Calvin and the Foundations of Modern Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 29.

84 Calvin, *Institutes*, IV.xx.12.

85 See Cahill, *Love Your Enemies*, p. 115.

just cause, legitimate authority, and right intention, as stated by Augustine, but also the last resort element.

Due to his high view of government, Calvin consequently has a high appreciation of government officials—the magistrates. He respects them so highly that he writes, 'No one ought to doubt that civil authority is a calling, not only holy and lawful before God, but also the most sacred and by far the most honourable of all callings in the whole life of mortal men.'[86] So honourable are magistrates that for Calvin resisting them is similar to resisting God.[87] Basically Calvin does not allow resistance against government. Christians must be obedient even to a bad government. He writes, 'We are not only subject to the authority of princes who perform their office toward us uprightly and faithfully as they ought, but also to the authority of all who, by whatever means, have got control of affairs, even though they perform not a whit of the princes' office.'[88] Obedience to such authorities, says Calvin, has to be accompanied by prayer asking God to change their heart.[89]

However, if authorities act in resistance to God, then it is lawful to oppose them. While forbidding private individuals to carry out resistance against government, Calvin allows the lesser or inferior magistrates to do so. He writes,

> For if there are now any magistrates of the people, appointed to restrain the wilfulness of kings.... I am so far from forbidding them to withstand, in accordance with their duty, the fierce licentiousness of kings, that, if they wink at kings who violently fall upon and assault the lowly common folk, I declare that their dissimulation involves nefarious perfidy, because they dishonestly betray the freedom of the people, of which they know that they have been appointed protectors by God's ordinance.[90]

For Calvin, the resistance of the lesser magistrates is justifiable because it is done in conjunction with obedience to God, the superior power to whom all kings and authorities must obey. Calvin's principle is clear: 'Obedience [to a ruler] is never to lead us away from obedience to [God].' Here Calvin sees the conflict of power first and foremost as a religious matter and not a political one.[91] Calvin's principle on the lesser magistrates is, accord-

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86 Calvin, *Institutes*, IV.xx.4.

87 Ibid., IV.xx.23.

88 Ibid., IV.xx.25.

89 Ibid., IV.xx.29.

90 Ibid., IV.xx.31.

91 Ralph Keen, 'The Limits of Power and Obedience in the Later Calvin', *Calvin Theological Journal* 27 (1992), 265.

ing to James Nichols, very unique and 'unknown in Roman Catholic and Lutheran societies'.[92]

By referring to God's authority, the resistance executed by the lesser magistrates not only receives legitimation and justification, but has also reasonable chance of success. By adhering to Romans 13, which states that all authority and power of government comes from God, Calvin sees that the success or failure of the lesser magistrates depends strongly on God. Here Calvin implicitly adds to the criteria of *jus ad bellum* a reasonable hope for success, namely, that before going to war one has to consider the possibility of success. War, as Ralph Potter suggests, should not be trapped in a suicidal action.[93] In sum, *jus ad bellum* includes not only just cause, legitimate authority, right intention, and last resort, but also a reasonable hope for success.

In other words, in order to be justifiable, war must first and foremost fulfil the criteria of *jus ad bellum*—the reasons for going to war which include just cause, legitimate authority, right intention, last resort, and reasonable hope for success. Yet only *jus ad bellum* is insufficient since it only answers the question of 'when' or 'whether' one should wage war and does not explain 'how' or what 'methods' should be used in fighting the right war.[94] Just war also needs *jus in bello*—the morality of means in war that includes discrimination and proportionality.

The criteria of just war could be applied before, during, or after the war in terms of assessment: *before* the war in order to see whether the reasons for going to war are justifiable; *during* the war in order to assess the methods used, whether they could be justified; and *after* the war in order to see which party is right and which one is wrong.[95]

We proceed in the next part to discuss the criticisms of just war.

3.2 Criticisms of Just War

The first criticism of just war questions the authorities' ability to easily manipulate the *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* criteria without considering

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92 James Hastings Nichols, *Democracy and the Churches* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1951), p. 26.

93 Ralph B. Potter, Jr., 'The Moral Logic of War', in *War in the Twentieth Century: Sources in Theological Ethics*, ed. by Richard B. Miller (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1992), p. 207.

94 Miller, 'Introduction', p. xiv.

95 On the application of the criteria of just war in contemporary wars see Paul Ramsey, 'Is Vietnam a Just War?', in *War in the Twentieth Century: Sources in Theological Ethics*, ed. by Richard B. Miller (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1992), pp. 185-97; and James Turner Johnson, 'Just-War Tradition and the War in the Gulf,' in *War in the Twentieth Century*, pp. 449-53.

their underlying moral principles in order to justify their own actions in war, which actually oppose these criteria. For example, President Bush claimed that the Gulf War is a just war. However, after applying the criteria of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* to the Gulf War, Jim Wallis came to the conclusion that 'the war with Iraq cannot be justified on moral grounds.'[96] Thus the fault lies on those who misuse or abuse just war theory and not on the intrinsic weakness of the theory itself.

The second criticism questions the relevance of just war in this modern era in which wars would become a total war. Is it possible to apply the principles of proportionality and discrimination that distinguish non-combatants from combatants, in view of the use of modern, sophisticated weaponry that are highly destructive? Such weaponry includes not only chemical and biological weapons and carpet bombs but also atomic bombs and nuclear weapons. In response to this criticism we should first note that with the sophistication of advanced technology, these weapons can be fired and reach its targets far more precisely than in previous wars. In the Gulf War against Iraq, for example, one could watch in amazement how bombs and missiles were fired using computers and instruments equipped with laser technology and how they hit their targets with great precision. This means that the advancement of high technology even guarantees the fulfilment of the proportionality and discrimination reasons. Thus whether the proportionality and discrimination reasons are fulfilled, as Joseph Allen asserts, depend very much on who is using the weapons, and not on the weapons itself.[97]

The problem is, is it possible to apply the concept of just war to wars that use atomic bombs and nuclear weapons? William O'Brien admits that war in this nuclear era is irrational. However, it does not mean that the concept of just war cannot be applied. O'Brien explains, 'Experience has taught us that, irrational or not, war is still a threat to be deterred and resisted as well, in some cases, as a needed instrument of justice.'[98] One example is Reinhold Niebuhr's theory on the 'balance of power' that influenced the United States during the Cold War with Soviet Union. By developing the concept of 'nuclear deterrence,' Niebuhr supports the development and increase of US nuclear weapons in order to balance Soviet Union's nuclear weaponry. For Niebuhr, the 'balance of power' would pre-

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[96] Jim Wallis, 'This War Cannot Be Justified', in *War in the Twentieth Century*, p. 466.

[97] Joseph L. Allen, *War: A Primer for Christians* (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 2001), p. 50.

[98] William V. O'Brien, 'Just-War Doctrine in a Nuclear Context', in *War in the Twentieth Century*, p. 312.

vent both sides—the US and Soviet Union—from starting a nuclear war. Whoever starts a nuclear war would be trapped into a suicidal action and 'any distinction between victor and vanquished irrelevant'.[99] Through the concept of 'balance of power' and 'nuclear deterrence,' Niebuhr applies just war theory in the nuclear era. In the context of the Cold War with its competition in nuclear weaponry, the presence of just war is directed towards 'the presumption against war' as stated by the U.S. Catholic Bishops in their book, *The Challenge of Peace*.[100]

The third criticism questions the basic assumptions of just war, whether its purpose is to prevent war as expressed by the Bishops, or whether it begins with a presumption against injustice. The Bishops' statement is based on their conviction that war in itself is evil.[101] However, as explained above, for Augustine war in itself is not evil, but what is evil in war is not the injuries and deaths that it causes but instead the motivation that lies behind it. Relying on just war tradition, James Turner Johnson questions the position of the Bishops:

> What, then, of the claim made in *The Challenge of Peace* that just war doctrine begins with a 'presumption against war'? ...such a presumption is not to be found in just war tradition in its classic form, or even in the specifically churchly theorists Augustine and Aquinas to whom Catholic just war theorists generally refer for authority. The idea of such a 'presumption' seems to owe more to the influence of Catholic pacifists on the development of *The Challenge of Peace* and to a general uneasiness with the destructiveness of modern war and the venality of modern states than to the heritage of just war tradition. I would say it more emphatically: the concept of just war does not begin with a 'presumption against war' focused on the harm which war may do, but with a presumption against *injustice* focused on the need for respon-

[99] Reinhold Niebuhr, 'The Cold War and the Nuclear Dilemma', *Cross Currents* 9 (1959), 212. See also David S. Fischler, 'Nuclear Weapons in the Ethics of Reinhold Niebuhr', *Perspectives in Religious Studies* 12 (1985), 69-84.

[100] See U.S. Catholic Bishops, *The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Catholic Conference, 1983).

[101] They write, 'The Church's teaching on war and peace establishes a strong presumption against war which is binding on all; it then examines when this presumption may be overriden, precisely in the name of preserving the kind of peace which protects human dignity and human rights....The moral theory of the "just-war" or "limited-war" doctrine begins with the presumption which binds all Christians: we should do no harm to our neighbor; how we treat our enemy is the key test of whether we love our neighbor; and the posibility of taking even one human life is a prospect we should consider in fear and trembling. How is it possible to move from these presumptions to the idea of a justifiable use of lethal force?' Ibid., pp. 22, 26.

> sible use of force in response to wrongdoing. Force, according to the core meaning of just war tradition, is an instrumentality that may be good or evil, depending on the use to which it is put.[102]

If the purpose of just war is to oppose war, then just war must act in self-defence and be limited to defensive warfare. But if its purpose is to oppose injustice, then the presence of just war would not be limited to 'defensive warfare' but would include 'offensive warfare.' Augustine's concept of just war, according to Frederick Russell, does not distinguish between 'defensive warfare' and 'offensive warfare,' as long as the reasons for going to war is justified.[103]

The fourth criticism questions the scope of the validity of the *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* criteria, since the reasons for these criteria have kept increasing. The reasons for *jus ad bellum*, for example, are now six, seven, or even more than that.[104] As explained above, just war theory has been developing over the years in accordance with the struggles of each particular era concerning war. With the addition of more reasons according to the needs of each particular era, just war theory has been refined since it is perfected by these additions. Nevertheless it is necessary to distinguish between the primary reasons and the secondary. For the criteria *jus ad bellum*, the three reasons proposed by Augustine—just cause, legitimate authority, and right intention—are the primary reasons, and a necessity, since without them it would be impossible to justify war.[105]

4. CONCLUSION

The presence of just war theory is crucial in the midst of a sin-ridden world. Due to the spread of the consequences of sin, human relationships have been characterized by injustice. Here we have to choose: to let injustice continue to predominate, or to stop it with the risk of going to war. The basic assumption of just war is to resist injustice by protecting the innocent from ruthless actions. The presence of just war would make evildoers think of restraining from their evil deeds. The existence of just war is not merely to remove evil, but also to prevent it. The criteria *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* with its strict moral principles would make those who want to oppress their fellow man think twice before doing it.

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[102] James Turner Johnson, *Morality and Contemporary Warfare* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1999), p. 35.

[103] Russell, *Just War in the Middle Ages*, p. 21.

[104] See, for example, James F. Childress, 'Just-War Criteria', in *War in the Twentieth Century*, pp. 351-72.

[105] Johnson, *Morality and Contemporary Warfare*, pp. 41-70.

Just war attempts to establish justice in order to bring about peace. As Calvin says, without justice it is impossible to obtain peace. Just war assumes, as Paul Ramsey observes, that '"social charity" comes to the aid of the oppressed'.[106] This means that for just war, peace that does not walk in the corridor of justice is peace that has lost its legitimacy—a peace that is oppressive. Peace, therefore, is more than just an absence of conflict.[107] If necessary, one should engage in war for the sake of obtaining peace that includes justice. Here Augustine reminds us that war could become a tool for building peace: 'Peace is not sought in order to start the kindling of war, but war is waged in order that peace may be obtained.'[108]

After the Fall, it is indeed impossible to separate violence from human life. Even religion—whichever it is, including Christianity—is unable to free itself from violence. But Christian tradition testifies that upon coming in contact with violence, Christianity has produced the just war theory in its attempt to fight injustice. 'Christianity without violence'—that is unrealistic. But 'violence without Christianity' would only create injustice, brutality, sadism, cruelty, ruthlessness, ferocity ... which in the end would create chaos.

[106] Paul Ramsey, *Speak up for Just War or Pacifism: A Critique of the United Methodist Bishops' Pastoral Letter 'In Defense of Creation'* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1988), p. 109.

[107] J. Daryl Charles, *Between Pacifism and Jihad: Just War and Christian Tradition* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2005), p. 19.

[108] Augustine, 'Letter to Boniface', § 6.