SCOTTISH BULLETIN OF EVANGELICAL THEOLOGY

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EDITORIAL

I sense, as others have before me, the privilege in taking up editorial duties for *SBET*. My immediate predecessors were Alistair I. Wilson and, before him, Alasdair I. Macleod. The change in name with this transition is somewhat more marked! I trust that the goals and standards maintained through their editorships will be observed through my tenure as well. A special word of thanks, too, for Alistair Wilson's assistance during this transition, and for continuing in the role longer than he may have wished!

When Alasdair Macleod took up the role in 2003, he articulated his aspirations for the *Bulletin* under five headings. He looked for it to provide theological resources which were *personal*, issuing from a commitment to Christ and his church; *canonical*, arising from a deep engagement with Scripture; *evangelical*, articulating the gospel; *communal*, participating in fellowship across time and space; and *pastoral*, contributing to growth in discipleship. Such a framework is as timely now, entering the 'teens' of the century, as it was in 2003.

Although over my years in Edinburgh I have been aware of the work of Rutherford House and the Scottish Evangelical Theology Society, it took being engaged in a delightful detective case by my late and still lamented colleague, David Wright, to be drawn more closely into their orbit.[1] For me as the new editor of the *Bulletin*, that is a significant marker. There are many journals which cater for academic theology, but few which attempt the difficult exercise of being directed *both* to the church *and* to the academy. David's work here is exemplary: fine and careful scholarship was no end in itself. Rather, it had both its origin and goal in the life of faith.

While there may be some minor cosmetic changes in the *Bulletin*, I trust that the commitment to providing theological resources which serve the church will not change. Looking over tables of contents from past issues, I am struck by how many articles issued from the manse or other ministry setting, rather than from academic offices. Long may it continue.

To coincide with this editorial hand-over, the Society, one of the partners in the *Bulletin*'s production, has mounted a new website. Those interested will find the new site at the old URL (www.s-e-t-s.org.uk). While still much remains to be added, the structure is in place for growth. There

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[1] This was David's preparation for his Finlayson Lecture, which appeared as 'The Great Commission and the Ministry of the Word: Reflections Historical and Contemporary on Relations and Priorities (Finlayson Memorial Lecture, 2007)', *SBET* 25/2 (2007), 132–57.

are already resources available for those interested in contributing to the *Bulletin*. Meanwhile, Rutherford House continues to provide the infrastructure and practical support for the running of the Bulletin. This is an opportune moment to thank both its director, Dr Jason Curtis, and administrator, Carmela Batluck, for their abundant assistance as I embark on this venture. On the side of the Society, Dr Fergus Macdonald's characteristic encouragement has been greatly appreciated. I am grateful, too, to *SBET*'s energetic Review Editor, James Merrick, for his significant contributions, not limited to the book reviews.

IN THIS NUMBER

On the side of biblical theology, by way of 'introduction' I offer an essay of my own on the relationship of 'diaspora' to the language of 'exile' in the Old Testament. Glen Shellrude, Associate Professor of New Testament at the Alliance Theological Seminary in Nyack, New York, re-examines Paul's language of 'imputation'.

As I write, I am only a few hundred meters from 'Moffat Cottage' in Inverkeithing, Fife. It was the home of Robert Moffat's parents; I imagine precious letters making their way here, telling of the progress of the mission in southern Africa. Bruce Ritchie, minister of Dingwall Castle Street Church of Scotland, brings into perspective Moffat's views on the dignity of all people against some currents of his day.

Dane Ortlund (Wheaton) and Jason Sexton (St Andrews) both contribute work from their on-going doctoral research, the former sketching lines of intersection between Bavinck and Berkouwer, the latter tracing the intersection of Stanley Grenz with British theologians.

Our final article concerns the Christian life and contemporary culture, as Richard Mouw (President of Fuller Theological Seminary) re-considers the continuing impact of H. Richard Niebuhr.

David Reimer

Exile, Diaspora, and Old Testament Theology

David J. Reimer

INTRODUCTION

A virtual, online exhibit (mounted in reality during 2002) provides stimulating resources for thinking about the nature of 'exile'.[1] When were people first thrust from their homes, and forced to live in a foreign land? One biblical answer would give us the story of Adam and Eve. The exhibit explores three different moments of Jewish diaspora set alongside the African-American diaspora, and demonstrates how those living deported lives attempt to map 'home' onto their new place of abode. What begins as alien and feared is in some measure domesticated. But it is also noteworthy that while the exhibit's primary focus is on *diaspora*, the exhibit bears the title 'Exodus and Exile', with the term 'diaspora' relegated to the subheading. This neatly introduces the issue addressed in this essay: the need to coax 'diaspora' out of the shadow of 'exile'.

The long reach of exile in the literature of the OT can be seen in many ways.[2] The threat of 'exile' appears in anticipation while Israel and Judah have a national life, indeed at the very zenith of that life—in the Judaean context, at any rate: if they should sin, one outcome is that God would be angry, 'and give them to an enemy, so that they are carried away captive to the land of the enemy' (1 Kgs 8:46). Even further back, before Israel arrives in the land, the covenant curses culminate in the ultimate disaster of being removed from the land they do not yet possess (Lev. 26:33; Deut. 28:64). Pushing forward, the importance of exile looms even larger.[3] Since

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1 Osher Map Library, 'Exodus and Exile: The Spaces of Diaspora', University of Southern Maine. http://bit.ly/Osher10 (accessed 9 May 2010).

2 Broadly on this point see J. G. McConville, 'Faces of Exile in Old Testament Historiography', in *After the Exile: Essays in Honour of Rex Mason*, ed. by John Barton and David J. Reimer (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1996), pp. 27-44.

3 On the historical aspects of the exile, see (from many possibilities) R. Albertz, 'Die Exilszeit als Ernstfall für eine historische Rekonstruktion ohne biblische Texte: die neubabylonishen Königsinschriften als "Primärquelle"', in *Leading Captivity Captive:'The Exile' as History and Ideology*, ed. by Lester L. Grabbe (JSOTSup, 278; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press 1998), pp. 22-39, Hans M. Barstad, 'After the Myth of the "Empty Land": Major Challenges in the Study of Neo-Babylonian Judah', in *Judah and the Judeans in the Neo-Babylonian*

the pioneering work of Martin Noth, biblical scholars have identified the exilic age and beyond as the locus for much (most?) of the literary activity that produced the Hebrew Bible as we have it today.

The net effect is to see vast swathes of the HB/OT reverberating with 'exile', whether Babylonian or not. No wonder, then, that theological reflection on these texts as scripture gives a prominent place to 'exile', and its symbolic value looms large in the Christian tradition.[4] Scripture itself gives warrant for such prominence—indeed, it requires it. Northrop Frye, for instance, eloquently described the way in which exile participates in the great 'narrative myth', a pattern of apostasy and restoration running throughout the Bible. In Frye's selective elucidation of this pattern, the Babylonian exile is the third 'apostasy', the first being the fall of Adam and Eve, the second the period of servitude in Egypt, and so on: 'a sequence of *mythoi*, only indirectly of historical events'.[5] This use of exile, aligned with exodus, has become a powerful literary symbol, and has been used as such almost continuously throughout the past two thousand years of Western literature.

This predominantly symbolic appreciation has its drawbacks. Commonly the term 'Babylonian exile' is used with only the slightest connection to the historical event, and sometimes less than that. Symbol has definitively displaced historical prototype. Beyond that, as Daniel Smith-Christopher argues, theological reflection on exile can only proceed from a full appreciation of the experience itself—not easy, then, for non-participants.[6]

Period, ed. by O. Lipschits and J. Blenkinsopp (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2003), pp. 3-20. See also the literature cited in n. 21, below.

4 On the symbolic use of exile in the Christian tradition, see David J. Reimer, 'Exile', in *The Oxford Companion to Christian Thought*, ed. by A. Hastings, A. Mason, and H. Pyper (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 226-7. These motifs have different contours in the Jewish tradition.

5 Northrop Frye, *The Great Code: The Bible and Literature* (Toronto: Academic Press, 1982), pp. 170-1; for Frye, these storied 'metaphorical' resonances held greater significance than their simple recording of history. The pattern discerned by Frye has resonances with much earlier schemas: cf. the rhythms of history outlined by Hugh of St. Victor in the account given by Richard Southern, *History and Historians: Selected Papers*, ed. by R. J. Bartlett (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), pp. 36-7.

6 Daniel L. Smith-Christopher, 'Reassessing the Historical and Sociological Impact of the Babylonian Exile (597/587-539 BCE)', in *Exile: Old Testament, Jewish, and Christian Conceptions*, ed. by James M. Scott (JSS Supplement, 56; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1997), p. 36.

This essay elaborates an observation and a claim. The observation is that this widespread use of 'exile' has displaced a more nuanced reading of related concepts within the Hebrew Bible. The claim is that a renewed appreciation for the Bible's language offers something valuable to the Christian project of Old Testament theology. A closer look at the language used in relation to 'exile' suggests a different profile for the event and experience in the lives of 'biblical people', one that generates different theological trajectories as well. My claim in a nutshell is that *diaspora* language deserves a greater claim to our attention than it is usually given, having been too quickly passed by because of the powerful magnetic attraction of the symbolic language of 'exile'. The essay proceeds in three phases. First, the perceived dominance of the theme of exile requires some discussion. I will then examine the cluster of terms relating to exile and diaspora in the Hebrew Bible, briefly attending to their Greek counterparts. This leads finally to a pointed comparison/contrast of the exile and diaspora motifs, before some suggestions are offered in conclusion for different trajectories traced by these terms for reflection in biblical theology.

EXILE IN RECENT DISCUSSION

Daniel Smith-Christopher's several important studies of 'exile' provide a convenient starting point. His fullest treatment of this theme is found in his 2002 monograph, *A Biblical Theology of Exile*.[7] This valuable work contains much of interest, but for my purpose here I attend only to a couple of curiosities. First, he makes the claim that 'any Christian theology of exile will necessarily begin by reviewing nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century internal debates in European Jewish contexts'.[8] Despite the visceral appeal of such an assertion, my own sense is that there is, in fact, a different way into this subject. A 'Christian theology' will certainly grapple with the lived experience of faith communities; but a 'starting point' may well be found in the Scriptures that frame and illuminate all human experience. A second curiosity, and more pervasive in his study, is the mixing of the language exile and diaspora. The former is privileged and embedded in the book's title, even though the latter seems to be the more fundamental concept, as he writes of 'a normative diasporic Christian theology'.[9] This tension between a dominant term—'exile'—and the biblical language which informs it—'diaspora'—requires exploration and resolution.

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7 Daniel L. Smith-Christopher, *A Biblical Theology of Exile* (Overtures to Biblical Theology; Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2002).

8 Smith-Christopher, *Biblical Theology*, pp. 7-8.

9 Smith-Christopher, *Biblical Theology*, p. 8.

In Anglophone scholarship, two scholars in particular have attended closely to 'exile' and challenged cherished beliefs about it, albeit in quite different ways. In much of his prolific output, Walter Brueggemann provides a privileged place for exile as a guiding metaphor for doing biblical theology, especially in his context in the United States. The late Robert Carroll, on the other hand, was troubled both by the Hebrew Bible's account of the exile, and by its subsequent handling on the part of many biblical scholars. Comparing and contrasting their differing approaches sets up the analysis of biblical language which follows.

Walter Brueggemann. While the motif of exile is pervasive in Brueggemann's writings, three works in particular give it pride of place: a 1995 article, and two books from 1997, one a brief paperback for preachers, the other his *magnum opus*, *Theology of the Old Testament*.[10] A consistent picture emerges of a real historical experience which shaped the social and theological outlook of the people who survived it, and decisively shaped the literature born out of it. Each of these three elements is already present in his 'Shattered Transcendence' article, and it was part of the business of that essay to explore the realities of these claims not only for sixth century Judaeans, but for their God as well.[11] The provocative question Brueggemann poses is whether the 'discontinuity' experienced by people was felt, too, by God: is 'the character of God decisively changed by the crisis of exile' as was that of God's people?[12] Brueggemann answers in the affirmative, demonstrating out of three texts (Deut. 4:23-31; Isa. 54:7-10; Jer. 31:35-37) the shifts that occurred. Deuteronomy shows God moving from jealousy to compassion; Isaiah sees a move from abandonment to *ḥesed 'ôlām*; while Jeremiah gives evidence of a shift from conditions ('if') to certitude. Thus exile shapes not only the community, but its God as well.

Cadences of Home explores the notion that the displacement brought about by exile was not only geographic, but also social. It entails the '(1) loss of a structured, reliable "world" where (2) treasured symbols of meaning are mocked and dismissed'. This allows Brueggemann to make a metaphorical link between the biblical horizon and modern situations ('a pertinent point of contact'), so that 'exilic circumstances' take on the

[10] W. Brueggemann, 'A Shattered Transcendence: Exile and Restoration', in *Biblical Theology: Problems and perspectives*, ed. by S.J. Kraftchick, C.J. Myers, Jr. and B.C. Ollenburger (Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 1995), pp. 169-182; *idem*, *Cadences of home: Preaching among Exiles* (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1997); *idem*, *Theology of the Old Testament: Testimony, Dispute, Advocacy* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1997).

[11] 'Shattered Transcendence', p. 169.

[12] 'Shattered Transcendence', p. 172.

quality of metaphorical shorthand.[13] Some effort is then expended in aligning scriptural resources with modern concerns, since one feature of exilic life is the desire to maintain faith in a context where pressures run counter to it.

At various points in his major work, Brueggemann asserts (or assumes) the centrality of exile,[14] whether in the production of biblical literature (pp. 74-5), or in giving rise to a voice of protest (pp. 321-2). The section 'Israel Recalcitrant and Scattered' (pp. 434-40) is most suggestive in its recognition of 'scattering' as an expression of a 'historical mode of nullification' (including the nice Brueggemannian claim that 'in exile Israel is a people celebrating and practicing presence in absence' (p. 438). Later, however, Brueggemann equates 'scattering' with exile. Citing the shepherd imagery of Jer. 23:1-2, he comments: 'It is the kings who have "scattered", that is, caused exile.' He goes on with the related passage in Ezekiel 34, observing that 'the indictment against the monarchy is severe, with the repeated sounding of the word "scatter"', although the overarching concern in this section is with kingship and exile (p. 615).

By privileging exile in this way, Brueggemann by implication points us toward a monolithic experience for displaced peoples, which curiously, even ironically for one writing so richly as Brueggemann, has the effect of flattening the Bible's witness to the displacement of God's people. By implication, it also points towards homecoming as the terminus of the experience.[15]

Robert Carroll. The problematic aspects of exile engaged Carroll in what proved to be the final years of his life, although hardly claiming the whole of his attention. His work was typically suggestive—even provocative. His 1992 *Semeia* article, 'The Myth of the Empty Land', spawned a small monograph with the same title by Hans Barstad, as well as (at least!) a

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[13] W. Brueggemann, *Cadences of home: Preaching among Exiles* (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1997), quotes from pp. 2-3.

[14] W. Brueggemann, *Theology of the Old Testament: Testimony, Dispute, Advocacy* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1997); page numbers in this paragraph refer to this work. The CD-ROM edition bears out the observations that follow: beside 350 references to 'exile', there is only a single in-text reference to 'diaspora'. As seen below, when various 'scattering' terms are invoked, they are defined not in terms of 'diaspora', but of 'exile'.

[15] Cf. his treatment of Isaiah 40-55 as 'Homecoming to a New Home' in *Hopeful Imagination: Prophetic Voices in Exile* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986), pp. 90-108.

couple of colloquia.[16] Already in 1992 Carroll was reluctant to use the language of 'exile' to describe this experience, given the attendant 'ideological presuppositions and historical assumptions' which impede proper analytical work.[17] In any case, in that piece he sits lightly towards historical questions, the focus of his argument attending rather to the overtly political purposes that this symbolic language served in Second Temple Jerusalem.

History looms larger in the 1998 article, in which Carroll is keen to resuscitate the views of C. C. Torrey that there was a catastrophic scattering of Israel [*sic*] after 586, but that it is 'this catastrophe, not the exile, which constituted the dividing line between the two eras'; any compounds with language of 'exile' 'ought to be banished forever... for they are merely misleading, and correspond to nothing that is real in Hebrew literature and life'.[18] Torrey's views have never won a wide following, and Ackroyd's forcible rejection of them in his classic study, *Exile and Restoration*, seemed to lay them to rest.[19] I expect that Carroll's attempt at reviving Torrey's views will suffer the same fate.[20] Recent work on the material life of sixth century Judah renders it as certain as any inquiry into ancient history can be that there was a catastrophe, there was an exile, even if experience of it in Judah was more regionally variegated and yet more demographically

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16 Robert P. Carroll, 'The Myth of the Empty Land', *Semeia* 59 (1992), 79-93; Hans M. Barstad, *The Myth of the Empty Land: A Study in the History and Archaeology of Judah during the 'Exilic' Period* (Symbolae Osloenses Supplement, 28; Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1996), which I refer to in its updated form as chapter 6 of *History and the Hebrew Bible* (FAT, 61; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), pp. 90-134; J. Blenkinsopp, 'The Bible, Archaeology and Politics; or the Empty Land Revisited', *Journal for the Study of the Old Testament* 27 (2002), 169-187, further explores this concept.

17 Carroll, 'Myth', p. 87.

18 C.C. Torrey, *Ezra Studies* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1910), p. 289, as cited by Robert P. Carroll, 'Exile! What exile? Deportation and the Discourses of Diaspora', in *Leading Captivity Captive: 'The Exile' as History and Ideology*, ed. by Lester L. Grabbe (JSOTSS, 278; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998), pp. 62-79 (quote from p. 77).

19 Peter Ackroyd, *Exile and Restoration: A Study of Hebrew Thought of the Sixth Century B.C.* (Old Testament Library; London: SCM Press, 1968), pp. 21-2.

20 Carroll adopts equally bold rhetoric: 'bold capitals', 'emblazon[ing]', of 'ideological contamination' (all from 'Exile!', p. 77), and so on; cf. the assessment of Torrey's legacy in Barstad, *History*, pp. 96-7, 110, 114, and Smith-Christopher, *Biblical Theology*, pp. 30-3.

differentiated than might previously have been thought.[21] That aspect, at any rate, of Carroll's argument has been definitively countered.

There remains the other aspect, that of his clear mistrust of language of 'exile' as a 'determinative or regulative principle for the reading of the Hebrew Bible',[22] as he notes five scholarly works which feature 'exile' prominently in their titles dating from the 1950s to the 70s. Although Brueggemann does not register on Carroll's radar here, given the observations above he merits inclusion in a larger list coming up to the time of Carroll's writing. By contrast, Carroll prefers to speak rather about 'deportations'. As was his wont, Carroll poses many penetrating questions and they are suggestive. Does not the use of the terminology of 'exile' force us to collaborate in ideological complicity with the late shapers and framers of the biblical tradition? What about Egyptian Jews? Or homelanders? Did they, too, see themselves as 'exiles'? Rather, Carroll asserts, 'life in the diaspora may not have been seen as exilic at all. ... In the diaspora people may regard themselves as living in a diaspora or they may regard it as home (*Heimat*)'.[23]

I wonder if it is always 'bad faith' to read *with* the grain of the text, as if reading *against* it, as Carroll urges us to do, is any less politicizing, any less constructed, achieving greater merit or accuracy.[24] At the same time, the baby of the Torrey/Carroll observations concerning deportation and diaspora should not be thrown out with the bathwater of their arguments relating to 'exile'. In a somewhat obscure (to me, anyway) passage, Carroll claims that 'we should not expect to read in the Bible a properly relativ-

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21 'Only the most nihilistic relativist would claim that no deportations took place at all', asserts Barstad (*History*, p. 106). Cf. also O. Lipschits, 'Demographic Changes in Judah between the Seventh and Fifth Centuries B.C.E.', in *Judah and the Judeans in the Neo-Babylonian Period*, ed. by O. Lipschits and J. Blenkinsopp (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2003), pp. 323-76. The evidence gathered by William Schniedewind is applied not only to Torrey, but also the discussion revolving around the 'empty land' issue in recent scholarship; it speaks forcefully of the nature of the disruption of this event: *How the Bible Became a Book: The Textualization of Ancient Israel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 141-7.

22 'Exile!', p. 66.

23 'Exile!', p. 67.

24 Barstad offers some valuable thoughts on this theme in 'The Strange Fear of the Bible: Some Reflections on the "Bibliophobia" in Recent Ancient Israelite Historiography', in *Leading Captivity Captive: 'The Exile' as History and Ideology*, ed. by Lester L. Grabbe (JSOTSS, 278; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998), pp. 120-7.

ized account of the matter'.[25] I wonder. Coming at the question from quite a different direction, I think it is possible to show language of 'exile' has been given undue prominence, and that greater attention should be given to the deportee, the fugitive, the diaspora resident. I turn next to my evidence for this suggestion.

BIBLICAL LANGUAGE FOR 'DEPORTATION' AND 'EXILE'

Hebrew. Although the discussion of the pertinent biblical language below remains broad-brush, it nonetheless bears out the contention that language of 'exile' has exerted inappropriate dominance over 'diaspora' in Old Testament theology.[26] Our starting point for thinking our way into this language is Jeremiah 29:14 (here cited from the ESV):

> I will be found by you, declares the LORD, and I will restore your fortunes[27] and gather you from all the nations and all the places where I have driven [vb. *ndḥ*] you, declares the LORD, and I will bring you back [vb. *šwb*] to the place from which I sent you into exile [vb. *glh*].

This text of restoration brings together two notions: (1) a *gathering* from all the nations and places (plural) to which they have been *driven*; and (2) a *return* from the place,[28] by implication, to which they have been *exiled*. The first points us towards the experience of diaspora, the second clearly towards exile. I think we read these two concepts together quite naturally, as naturally as we do, say, Kings and Chronicles. And yet, like those biblical books, these two concepts found in a single verse of Jeremiah are different and, from certain vantage points, even held together in tension. At least we must concede that there is *both* a dispersion to many places, *and* an exile to a single place.[29] In fact, this verse is almost unique in the Old

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[25] 'Exile!', p. 68.

[26] Naturally, this discussion will require attention to the Hebrew and Greek terms. Here I cite their lexical forms only so as to avoid unnecessary complexity for those whose biblical languages might be rusty.

[27] On this problematic phrase and its intractable *Ketiv/Qere* problem, see John M. Bracke ('*šûb šebût*: A Reappraisal', *Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft*, 97 (1985), 233-244) who resists an etymological explanation, understands it to be a fixed technical term, and glosses it in the manner of E. L. Dietrich as 'render a restoration'.

[28] The Hebrew syntax is awkward at this point; although the singular 'place' is a reference to homecoming, the Hebrew formulation implies there has been a single place of exile as well.

[29] Note that only the first clause of the verse is represented in the LXX.

Testament in joining these two concepts together,[30] and thus attention to it alerts us to the fact that intersection between 'diaspora' and 'exilic' language in the OT is remarkably slight. Their seemingly natural co-incidence is not so straightforward as first appears.

In teasing apart the two sets of language, what distinctive contours come into view? I begin with the 'diaspora' or scattering group. It includes predominantly the *hiphil* of *ndḥ* ('drive out, banish', 26×), the *hiphil* of *pwṣ* ('scatter', 36×), and various forms of the verb *zrh* ('scatter, sift', 39×).[31] These terms are themselves widely scattered throughout the Hebrew Bible, and naturally not all occurrences are relevant to this study. It is immediately striking, however, that there is a pronounced bulge in the prophets of the period around the fall of Jerusalem, Jeremiah and Ezekiel.[32] Between them they account for almost half of the 'scattering' language in the Hebrew Bible (47.5%).

That 'scattering' should be a bad thing is especially apparent in the story of Babylon (better known as the 'Tower of Babel') in Genesis 11:1-9, where the desire to live together in security is confounded when the people of 'Babylon' (= Heb. *bābel*) are 'scattered' (*pwṣ*, 11:8-9). Likewise, as mentioned in the introductory observations to this essay, scattering appears as the climax of the treaty curses in Leviticus 26:33*ff.* (*zrh*) and Deuteronomy 28:64 (*pwṣ*). The 'scatter' terms relate predominantly to direct action as punishment; that is, they tend not to be used so much for reporting outcomes as for threatening intended action in response to some behaviour. This takes the form of divine action, as for example in Jeremiah 9:16 (Heb. v. 15): 'I will scatter (*pwṣ*) them among the nations whom neither they nor their fathers have known, and I will send the sword after them, until I have consumed them' (cf. also esp. Ezek. 5:2, 10; 12:15 = 30:26, etc.). But human action can bring about scattering as well, through the negligence of the nation's leaders, e.g., Jeremiah 23:2: 'thus says the LORD, the God of Israel, concerning the shepherds who care for my people: "You have scattered (*pwṣ*) my flock, and have driven them away (*ndḥ*), and you have not attended to them..."'

It is striking, too, that dispersion seems to be the central concern of the prophet par excellence of the 'golah' (see below on this term) commu-

[30] Deuteronomy 30:3 may be another such; cf. also Jer. 30:10-11 // 46:27-29; and Ezek. 6:8-9; perhaps also Ezek. 12:3, 14-15.

[31] One might also include *grš* here, but it tends not to intersect with this cluster, and is used rather of driving *other* people out; but cf. Hos. 9:15.

[32] Respectively for Jeremiah + Ezekiel, 13+1 out of 26 for *ndḥ*; 6+9 out of 36 for *pwṣ*; 6+13 out of 39 for *zrh*. The distinctive preferences of the two are clear, *ndḥ* predominating in Jeremiah, the latter two in Ezekiel. No other book has more than four occurrences of any given term.

nity, Ezekiel. In this example from one of the central theological passages in the book (Ezek. 36:19, 21; cf. 6:8-9), the 'exile' is completely ignored, or at best is simply subsumed under the greater concern for the scattered people:

> I scattered them (*pwṣ*) among the nations, and they were dispersed (*zrh*) through the countries; in accordance with their conduct and their deeds I judged them. ... But I had concern for my holy name, which the house of Israel caused to be profaned among the nations to which they came.

The picture changes as we look now at the 'exile' terms. The main set of terms derive from *glh*. The *hiphil* verbal form is commonly used to *report* forcible deportation (e.g., 2 Kgs 15:29; 25:21), not only of Israel and Judah, but also in 'theological' settings where Yahweh is responsible for the deportation of further nations (e.g. the displaced former inhabitants of the land of promise in 2 Kings 17:11). The nominal forms, *golah* (41×) and *galut* (15×) overlap both in meaning and use. Of the more common term, *golah*, half the occurrences are split almost evenly between Jeremiah and Ezekiel; a further dozen occurrences are found in Ezra (although only one in Nehemiah; Neh. 7:6), always as a means of identifying the group returned from Babylon to Yehud.[33] Naturally, in Jeremiah and Ezekiel, the language works in the opposite direction, referring to those Judaeans who have been carried off to Babylon (e.g., Jer. 29:1; Ezek. 1:1). The distribution of the less frequent *galut* is similar, again with half to Jeremiah/Ezekiel but without the Persian period occurrences. It is difficult to see much semantic difference from *golah*, unless it is to emphasize somewhat the action of being exiled, rather than simply the state of being exiled (although even this does not always hold true).

The role of the language of 'captivity' associated with *šbh* is more difficult to place. It might seem most readily associated with *golah*. Yet at those points where captivity becomes the focus of attention, it seems to be glossed, interpreted, or defined in terms of the broader context of scattering. Sorrow over captive (*šbh*) Jerusalem in Jeremiah 13:17 is followed by the observation of Judah's exile (*glh*), both events explained in 13:24 in terms of scattering (*pwṣ*). Similarly, the captivity (*šᵉbiy*) of Jeremiah 15:2 is simply one of a catalogue of calamities, and not the universal experience of those coming under judgment. There are points at which captivity lan-

[33] 'Yehud', the designation of the province Judah in this period. On the shape of this rhetoric as reinforcing diaspora-homeland relations, see Peter R. Bedford, 'Diaspora: Homeland Relations in Ezra-Nehemiah', *Vetus Testamentum* 52 (2002), 147-165.

guage can be used interchangeably with *golah*,[34] but at times it aligns with scattering terms too (cf. Jer. 30:10-11 // 46:27-28; Ezek. 6:8-9 as mentioned above). Attention here remains fixed, then, on *glh*. Thus the picture for *šbh* remains somewhat mixed.

What I find most striking here is what *glh*, 'exile', does *not* do: rarely, if ever, is it used in threat. It is clear that it is often seen as the response or outcome to some negative behaviour, but not a threat in prospect. This job belongs almost entirely to the 'scattering' group.

In sum, I note again the lack of intersection between these two trajectories that we might have guessed would be more frequently connected. They express different modes of 'egress', but much more than that. The disjunction begins to suggest that behind the fear of 'exile'—bad enough in any case—is the yet more deep-seated anxiety concerning scattering, concerning *diaspora*.

Greek. A brief glance at the Greek counterparts to our Hebrew terms informs, indeed is required by, a 'biblical theology' interest. Louis Feldman's study of Josephus's remarkably ambiguous handling of 'exilic' language and episodes provides a helpful starting point. It is a rich study, with much to digest. The claim of greatest interest for my concerns is this: 'When the LXX deals with exile (גולה [*golah*]), it uses the language of emigration and colonization'.[35] Usually this takes the forms of *apoikia* or *apoikizein* (migration/colony). When Ezra 2:1 refers to the returnees from Babylon 'from the captivity of the exiles' (*mišše bi haggolah*), the LXX gives us 'prisoners who were removed'.[36] As Feldman makes clear, the Greek for banishment-as-punishment is *phugē*. The picture emerges in the Hellenistic Jewish literature of emigration and colonization: forced, to be sure, but not given the same profile as 'exile'.

Feldman has little interest here in the NT writings, but already these observations are helpful. The word for banishment-as-punishment noted above (i.e. 'exile'), *phugē*, is used in Matthew 24:20 (of eschatological flight). References to the Babylonian exile in Matthew 1:11, 12, and 17 use *metoikesia*, which Feldman regards as a synonym for *apoikia*: 'mere-

[34] E.g., 'the captives of Egypt and the exiles of Cush', Isa. 20:4 (Tanak translation).

[35] Louis H. Feldman, 'The Concept of Exile in Josephus', in *Exile: Old Testament, Jewish, and Christian conceptions*, ed. by James M. Scott (JSS Supplement, 56; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1997), pp. 145-72 (quote on p. 145).

[36] 1 Esdras 5:7; this is Brenton's rendering. Perhaps 'captives who were settled...'? Greek: *apo tēs aichmalōsias tēs apoikias*. R. Glenn Wooden offers 'out of the captivity in exile' in *A New English Translation of the Septuagint* (Oxford: OUP, 2007), *ad loc*.

ly a change of abode or a migration'.[37] However, Feldman does not cite the transformation of the 'exile' of Amos 5:27 (using *glh*), into the LXX's 'removal' (*kai metoikiō*) which figures in Stephen's speech in Acts 7:43. Nor does he attend to the NT's language of 'diaspora' in 1 Peter 1:2; 2:11 (cf. 5:13), and James 1:1, where life-in/as-diaspora people helps to shape Christian identity and lifestyle[38]—a positive usage, then, but inclined differently than that discussed by Feldman in the Jewish literature.

To sum up: in the Hebrew Bible, the language of exile and diaspora intersect surprisingly seldom: deportation is feared, unified exile occurs, but scattering is the threat. In Greek dress, these ideas take on a more positive connotation, that of a more settled existence. Having, I hope, begun to drive a wedge between 'diaspora' and 'exile', it is time to contrast the concepts of 'exile' and 'diaspora' to see what might be at work here.

'DIASPORA' ... AND 'EXILE' — TRAJECTORIES

In post-biblical Jewish usage, the sharp outlines of the linguistic landscape sketched above began to blur. The *galut* was pre-eminently the Babylonian community. But the term could incorporate those scattered to other locales as well, so that Jastrow's dictionary can gloss the term as 'the exiled community, diaspora'.[39] Even the shifting terms, however, show 'diaspora' to be the more pervasive concept.

All of this requires at least a deliberate nuance of the dominance of the 'exilic' period, and 'exile' as theological symbol. While rejecting Torrey's historical views as well as their restatement by Carroll, there is merit in the view they espouse that importance of exile (both as history and symbol) has been overplayed, and that of diaspora undervalued. My reasons for thinking so are different from theirs, and I do not share their historical scepticism, but there is a pointer here to a more careful assessment of 'exile' and 'diaspora' in biblical thought. Following this trajectory, then, I offer three signposts from the discussion above:

1. Biblical language anticipating negative aspects of deportation more consistently aligns with 'scattering' than with a unified 'exile' or *golah*. Naturally, 'scattering' language moves us towards the concept of 'diaspora'.

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[37] Feldman, 'Concept', p. 146.

[38] Cf. on this point M. Volf, 'Soft Difference: Theological Reflections on the Relation between Church and Culture in 1 Peter', *Ex Auditu* 10 (1994), 15-30.

[39] M. Jastrow, *A Dictionary of the Targumim, the Talmud Babli and Yerushalmi, and the Midrashic Literature* (New York: Pardes, 1950), vol. 1, p. 247.

2. This brings with it as a corollary the corresponding language of restoration: that is the restorative remedy of *gathering* presupposes *scattering* as prior experience.[40]

3. The Greek terms—whether 'exile' or 'scattering' lies behind them in Hebrew—look towards a continuing reality of diaspora life: settled life away from the homeland, but not punishment, and not forced, i.e. not 'exile', as strictly understood.

4. Although seemingly counter-intuitive, 'diaspora' language frames *both* the threat *and* the promise of life-under-God.

They are two different kinds of displacement: whereas exile implies loss of home, diaspora suggests a home-away-from-home. But there is more to these concepts than simply displacement—as traumatic and fundamental as that is. Exile is immediate, brings with it rupture and removal, is forced, and consequently tends to reinforce boundary markers. Diaspora, on the other hand, may be all of those things—*and* it may be chosen, may be inherited. Diaspora might involve being flung from a homeland, but might equally be a state of equilibrium and settled life. It might involve loss of identity, but it might simply imply a 'different' identity from a dominant, host culture.[41]

Biblical Theology (especially the OT variety as exemplified by Brueggemann above) has tended privilege 'exile'. This analysis suggests on the contrary that 'exile' is a sub-set of 'diaspora', not the other way around. Such a reversal of perception brings a number of implications in its train. Most immediately, it is clear that 'diaspora' is an expression both of judgment and of grace.[42] At first blush, there appears to be some

[40] Cf. J. Lust and P.-M. Bogaert, '"Gathering and return" in Jeremiah and Ezekiel', in *Le livre de Jérémie: Le prophète et son milieu, les oracles et leur transmission*, ed. by P.-M. Bogaert (BETL, 54; Leuven: University Press, 1981), pp. 119-142.

[41] An additional nuance is found in distinguishing the related terms of 'alien' and 'sojourner' which often occur in this sort of discussion (e.g., Stanley Hauerwas, Jim Wallis). In particular, the notion of 'sojourn' seems to provide an anticipatory counterpart to 'diaspora': a kind of qualified belonging, a 'home away from home', or of 'being in the world, but not of the world'. See further the suggestive work of Elisabeth Robertson Kennedy, 'Seeking a Homeland: Sojourn and Ethnic Identity in the Ancestral Narratives of Genesis' (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2010).

[42] Or, as John Hobbins put it: 'The one who brings judgment is the one who saves from judgment' ('The Truth about Noah's Ark (2)', Ancient Hebrew Poetry blog, posted 8 May 2010; http://bit.ly/NoahTruth2). Hobbins's observation is

sleight of hand about a reading which sees in 'scattering' both the prime (even primal) threat and fear, and yet from another perspective, a situation to be embraced and in which life can flourish. Similarly, one can see a tension between the fundamental provision of 'land', that rootedness of place where God's people are intended to be, and the extended dislocation which would appear to risk diminishing or relativizing that gift. However, the roots of grace-in-judgment go down deep in the biblical witness, and should not surprise us when we encounter this phenomenon again here. For this reason Brueggemann's account of the changing character of God can be seen to have missed the point: God's character does not 'change' when purposeful grace results from a judgment delivered.[43]

If exile represents the imposition of punishment which those exiled wish to reverse as quickly as possible, diaspora on the other hand suggests a situation which can be embraced. John Howard Yoder described the scenario with typical power finding his stimulus in the 'poem-drama', *Jeremiah*, by Stefan Zweig: 'dispersion is mission', was Yoder's pithy formulation.[44] Unlike those in exile seeking escape from captivity, 'return' for the diaspora community is not 'something the people in Babylon or elsewhere should be bringing about by their own strength, or waiting around to see happen, or planning for... It is functional as a metaphor for God's renewing the life of faith anywhere.'[45] In his extrapolation of this theme, Yoder returns to the story of 'Babel' in which a community sought security apart from God (Genesis 11:4). The dispersal that came in judgment on Babel re-asserted the divine intention of diversity, against the autonomous, absolutizing tendency of the human creatures. From this perspective, 'diaspora' is a sign of grace. The resonances between this first dispersal *from* 'Babylon' (= Heb. 'Babel') and a later dispersal *to* Babylon shed further light on how it is that in *galut*/diaspora in Babylon, God's people find a vocation to the wider world (Jeremiah 29:7).[46]

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of a piece with the dynamic often observed of Genesis 1-11, where the judgments imposed each contain within them provision for renewal.

43 See above, note 12.

44 J. H. Yoder, "See How They Go with Their Faces to the Sun", ch. 3 in *For the Nations: Essays Evangelical and Public* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1997), pp. 51-78 (quote on p. 52).

45 Yoder, *For the Nations*, p. 57. Cf. the eschatological hopes which came to be expressed concerning the end of diaspora as dependent on the renewal of God's reign over the nations in a new world order, described by Michael Knibb, 'The Exile in the Literature of the Intertestamental Period', *Heythrop Journal* 17 (1976), 253-72.

46 Yoder, *For the Nations*, pp. 61-5.

In these ways, and others, bringing the theme of 'diaspora' out of the shadow of 'exile' provides a more accessible and even faithful model for those attempting to live in the world, but not be of the world (cf. John 17). It is not simply a matter of being an alien, cut off from 'home', but a resident with potential for engagement. This results in a very different way of thinking about what it means to go home, or whether there even is a 'home' that is 'somewhere else'. One of the things that troubled Carroll was the difficulty in knowing when exile is over. If you *can* go home, are you still in exile? What constitutes a 'homecoming' for a settled people? Diaspora implies a different and more complex relationship between where-I-live, and where-I-belong. Security, as the people of Genesis 11 found, is not to be found in a place, but in the presence of God. Thus, the model of 'diaspora' which recognizes only a qualified belonging and articulates no sharp impulse to 'return' seems to me a better metaphor for Christian biblical theology than that of 'exile' in which the desire for a 'return home' remains urgent.[47] In sum, 'diaspora deflects desire to God'.[48]

[47] Cf. the description of the prolongation of diaspora in Leviticus 26:40-45 in which Yahweh asserts that 'in the land of their enemies, I will not spurn them'.

[48] David J. Reimer, 'Exile and Diaspora: Leaving and Living', *Guidelines* 23/2 (May-August 2007), 107-123 (quote on p. 122).

Imputation in Pauline Theology: Christ's Righteousness or a Justified Status?

Glen Shellrude

A foundational assumption in much of evangelical theology is that the imputation of Christ's righteousness provides the basis on which God justifies or acquits the sinner. Thus, for example, in 1999 a confessional statement, 'The Gospel of Jesus Christ: An Evangelical Celebration', was produced with a view to unifying evangelicals around common essentials. It contains three strongly worded affirmations of the imputation of Christ's righteousness as the basis for justification, e.g. 'We affirm that the doctrine of the imputation ... both of our sins to Christ and of his righteousness to us...is essential to the biblical Gospel (2 Cor. 5:19–21).' [1]

This approach to conceptualizing the process of justification was first introduced by Martin Luther and then developed by Melanchthon and John Calvin.[2] In his *Institutes*, Calvin writes that '...justified by faith is he who, excluded from the righteousness of works, grasps the righteousness of Christ through faith, and clothed in it, appears in God's sight not as a sinner but as a righteous man.'[3] The concept of imputed righteousness as

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1 'The Gospel of Jesus Christ: An Evangelical Celebration,' *Christianity Today* (June 14, 1999), pp. 51–6. Available online at: http://www.thiswebelieve.com/statement.htm#gospel. Cf. also Millard Erickson, *Christian Theology* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1983), pp. 968–72; Wayne Grudem, *Christian Theology* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994), pp. 726– 9.

2 Alister McGrath, *Iustitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification* (2 vols.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), vol. 1, pp. 182–87; vol. 2, pp. 1–39. For a popular treatment cf. Alister McGrath, *Justification by Faith* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1988), pp. 47–72.

3 John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, III.xi.2. Other formulations of the concept: 'From this it is also evident that we are justified before God solely by the intercession of Christ's righteousness. This is equivalent to saying that man is not righteous in himself but because the righteousness of Christ is communicated to him by imputation....' (III.xi.23); '...the Father embraces us in Christ when he clothes us with the innocence of Christ and accepts it as ours that by the benefit of it he may hold us holy, pure, and innocent. For Christ's righteousness, which as it alone is perfect alone can bear the sight of God, must appear in court on our behalf, and stand surety in judgment. Furnished with this righteousness, we obtain continual forgiveness of sins in faith. Covered with this purity, the sordidness and uncleanness of our imperfections are not ascribed to us but are hidden as if buried....' (III.xiv.12).

the basis for justification has been axiomatic in Reformed theology since the time of Luther and Calvin. In the tradition of Arminian and Wesleyan theology there has been a general acceptance of this construct but with some dissenters.[4] Arminius himself clearly stated that the imputation of Christ's righteousness was the basis for justification.[5] Philip Limborch was the first to implicitly reject the concept.[6] John Wesley was criticized for abandoning the concept of the imputation of Christ's righteousness. This at least suggests that he was expressing himself in ways that those in the Reformed tradition found problematic. In his sermon *Christ, Our Righteousness*, John Wesley defends himself against this criticism and states that he has always affirmed a theology of the imputation of Christ's righteousness.[7] However his definition is hardly a traditional one: 'But in what sense is this righteousness imputed to believers? In this: all believers are forgiven and accepted, not for the sake of anything in them, or of anything that ever was, that is, or ever can be done by them, but wholly and solely for the sake of what Christ hath done and suffered for them.' He is essentially saying that the imputation of Christ's righteousness means that we are justified on the basis of what Christ has done for us. In Reformed theology the imputation of Christ's righteousness meant much more than this so it is not surprising that Wesley was criticized on this point. Wesley also expressed concern that the idea that believers are clothed in Christ's righteousness was commonly used as a rationale for an antinomian ethical stance.[8] There was a division in later Wesleyan theolo-

4 Roger Olson, *Arminian Theology: Myths and Realities* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2006), pp. 202–20, has an excellent survey of Arminian/Wesleyan perspectives. Olson himself strongly affirms the traditional imputation construct but argues that it should not be a test of orthodoxy (220).

5 *Private Disputation* XLVIII.5: '...God bestows Christ on us for righteousness, and imputes his righteousness and obedience to us' (also paragraphs 2, 4, 8). Cf. *Apology Against Thirty-One Theological Articles*, XXIV (IV), in which Arminius refutes the accusation that he denies the imputation of Christ's righteousness as the basis for justification.

6 Olson, *Arminian Theology*, pp. 208–9.

7 Thomas Oden, *John Wesley's Scriptural Christianity* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994), pp. 206–11, brings together the key texts from Wesley's writings on this topic. Oden argues that Wesley affirmed the traditional construct of the imputation of Christ's righteousness. Olson, *Arminian Theology*, pp. 211–13, supports Oden's conclusions. While Wesley endorsed the language of imputed righteousness, I suspect that he understood the concept very differently from Calvin and the Reformed tradition.

8 Thomas Oden, *Wesley's Scriptural Christianity*, pp. 210–11.

gians, with some affirming and others denying the imputation of Christ's righteousness construct in formulating their theology of justification.[9]

The approach of most contemporary Pauline scholars is to interpret Paul's theology of justification without any reference to the imputation of Christ's righteousness.[10] The imputation construct is neither discussed nor critiqued but simply ignored. This tendency to set aside the imputation construct has prompted some rigorous defenses.[11] However it is noteworthy that for the most part it is not New Testament scholars but theologians in the Reformed tradition who are coming to the defense of this theological construct.

EXAMINING THE PAULINE TEXTS

Advocates of the imputation construct appeal to a number of Pauline texts as the exegetical basis for this theology (e.g. 2 Cor. 5:21; Phil. 3:9; Rom. 4:3–8).[12] The common denominator in these texts is the term *dikaiosunē*

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9 Olson, *Arminian Theology*, pp. 213–20.

10 Robert Gundry, 'Why I Didn't Endorse 'The Gospel of Jesus Christ: An Evangelical Celebration',' *Books and Culture* 7/1 (January-February 2001), pp. 6–9, writes that 'It is no accident, then, that in New Testament theologians' recent and current treatments of justification, you would be hard-pressed to find any discussion of an imputation of Christ's righteousness. (I have in mind treatments by Mark Seifrid, Tom Wright, James Dunn, Chris Beker, and John Reumann, among others.) The notion is passe, neither because of Roman Catholic influence nor because of theological liberalism, but because of fidelity to the relevant biblical texts' (p. 9). Robert Gundry, 'The Nonimputation of Christ's Righteousness,' in *Justification: What is at Stake in the Current Debates* (ed. M. Husbands and D. Treier; Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2004), pp. 17–45, critiques the imputation construct with a different approach to the Pauline texts then the one proposed here.

11 John Piper, *Counted Righteous in Christ* (Wheaton: Crossway, 2002), Brian Vickers, *Jesus' Blood and Righteousness* (Wheaton: Crossway, 2006), are the fullest recent defenses of the imputation construct. Michael Bird, 'Incorporated Righteousness: A Response to Recent Evangelical Discussion Concerning the Imputation of Christ's Righteousness in Justification,' JETS 47/2 (2004), p. 258, cites other defenders such as R.C. Sproul, Wayne Grudem, James White and Philip Eveson.

12 Piper, *Counted Righteous*, pp. 90–114, cites the following texts as providing the strongest support for the imputation construct: 2 Cor. 5:21; Phil. 3:9; 1 Cor. 1:30; Rom. 9:30–10:4; 5:12–19. George Ladd, *New Testament Theology* (Rev. ed.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993), p. 491, argues that while Paul never explicitly says that Christ's moral righteousness is imputed to us, this construct is assumed in 2 Cor. 5:21 and Rom. 4:3–8.

which describes a gift given to or received by the one who has faith in Jesus.

The consensus view in contemporary scholarship is that Paul uses the term *dikaiosunē* in at least two quite different ways: moral righteousness (e.g. Rom. 6:13, 18–20; 14:7), and a soteriological status (e.g. Gal. 2:21; 3:21; 5:5).[13] Definitions of soteriological status described by the term vary: a right relationship, a right standing and a justified or acquitted status. It is possible that the term is a multifaceted one conveying all these nuances, with emphasis on one shade of meaning or another depending on the context. However the contextual evidence strongly suggests that the forensic meaning of a justified or acquitted status is the primary meaning of the word *dikaiosunē* when used in a soteriological sense.[14] However this conclusion is not essential to the present argument. The *dikaiosunē* texts to which advocates of imputation appeal are all those which have a soteriological status in view. Thus while there are differences of opinion as to how to define the status, the point remains that what is credited or given the believer is not 'moral righteousness' but a 'soteriological standing' before God.[15] Once this is recognized then an exegetical basis for the imputation of Christ's righteousness as the basis for justification evaporates. These points can be seen in a summary review of the main texts where Paul uses the term *dikaiosunē* to describe a soteriological status.

In Romans 5:16–18 Paul develops an Adam-Christ comparison. Adam's sin resulted in condemnation (*katakrima*) and death for all humanity. Christ's obedience resulted in justification (*dikaiosunē*, *dikaiōma*, *dikaiōsis*) and life for all humanity. The context indicates that the three Greek nouns (*dikaiosunē*, *dikaiōma*, *dikaiōsis*) are used synonymously and that they point to a reality that is the opposite of condemnation (*katakrima*), i.e. justified or acquitted status.

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[13] Cf. Stephen Westerholm, *Perspectives Old and New on Paul* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), pp. 261–96, for a clear presentation of the different uses of this term in Paul. Douglas Moo, *Epistle to the Romans* (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), pp. 87–8, also distinguishes the moral and forensic uses of the noun.

[14] E.g. Westerholm, *Perspectives*, pp. 273–84, argues that when describing a soteriological status *dikaiosunē* refers to a justified or acquitted status.

[15] N.T. Wright, *Justification* (Leicester/Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2009), p. 92, summarizes the main point of this article when in his critique of John Piper he points out that in the texts to which Piper appeals the word *dikaiosunē* means not 'moral righteousness' but has in view the forensic status of one whom the court has vindicated, i.e. an acquitted status.

Piper argues that the imputation construct is necessarily implied in Romans 5:12–19 by the parallel between Adam and Christ.[16] The argument is that just as Adam's sin is imputed to all of his heirs as the basis for their condemnation so Christ's righteousness is imputed to all believers as the basis for their justification. There are two flaws with this argument: 1. Paul does not explicitly say that Adam's sin is imputed to all humanity as the ground of their condemnation; 2. this paragraph focuses on the *fact* that Adam and Christ have impacted humanity in different ways, not the mechanics of how the impact was expressed.[17] One could only argue that Paul is working with an imputation construct in Romans 5:12–19 if there was clear evidence for this in the total context of Pauline theology.

2 Corinthians 3:9 provides further contextual support for this understanding of *dikaiosunē*. Paul contrasts the ministry based on the Mosaic Covenant/Law which brought condemnation (*katakrisis*) with the ministry based on Christ/the Spirit which brings justification/acquittal (*dikaiosunē*).[18]

It is also significant that Paul uses the noun *dikaiosunē* in contexts where he is using the verb *dikaioō*. While the nuancing of the verb is debated, contextual evidence again points to the forensic understanding of justification. Thus, for example, in Romans 8:33ff. Paul says, 'Who will bring any charge against God's elect? It is God who justifies/acquits (*dikaioō*). Who is to condemn (*katakrinō*)?'

The point is that when Paul has been repeatedly using the verb *dikaioō* to describe the forensic reality of justification and then uses the noun

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16 Piper, *Counted Righteous*, pp. 90–114. Vickers, *Righteousness*, pp. 113–57, also relies heavily on this text to make his case.

17 Cf. C. E. B. Cranfield, *Epistle to the Romans* (2 vols; ICC; Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 1975), vol. 1, pp. 269–95, for an excellent discussion of these issues.

18 Paul Barnett, *The Second Epistle to the Corinthians* (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), p. 185, writes that the term *dikaiosunē* '...must in this context carry a forensic meaning like forgiveness, acquittal or vindication'. David Garland, *2 Corinthians* (NAC, Vol 29; Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 1999), p. 176, writes that 'Righteousness must be the opposite of condemnation and refer in this instance to acquittal (see also 1 Cor 1:30; 4:4; 6:11; 2 Cor 5:21)'. Murray Harris, *The Second Epistle to the Corinthians*, (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), pp. 287–8, rejects the view that *dikaiosunē* means justification or acquittal and argues instead that *dikaiosunē* '...is a relational rather than an ethical term, denoting a right standing before God, given by God ... the status of being "in the right" before the court of heaven. God's approval, not his commendation, rests on those who are "in Christ"'. The context favors the forensic emphasis but does not exclude other nuances suggested by Harris.

dikaiosunē in the same context, the natural assumption is that the noun is describing the same reality as the verb. Thus, for example, in Galatians 2:15ff., Paul uses the verb *dikaioō* to explore the options of justification by works of the law or faith in Christ. In his concluding statement he says, 'I do not nullify the grace of God, for if *dikaiosunē* came through the law, Christ died in vain.' The noun must be describing the same reality described by the verb in 2:15–17, and that is forensic justification. The same argument applies to the interpretation of Galatians 3:21: 'Is the law, therefore, opposed to the promises of God? Absolutely not! For if a law had been given that could impart life, then *dikaiosunē* (justification) would certainly have come by the law.'

This evidence suggests that Paul can use the noun *dikaiosunē* to refer to a justified or acquitted status before God.[19] Paul uses this noun to describe the gift which we receive from God. In Romans 5:17 he speaks of the gift of *dikaiosunē*. In the context of Galatians 2:15–21, the *dikaiosunē* in v. 21 refers to justified status that is received by faith in Jesus rather than works of the law (also true for Gal. 3:21). In Philippians 3:9 Paul states that he wants to be found in Christ, not having a justified status (*dikaiosunē*) of his own which would come through obedience to the Law, but the justified status (*dikaiosunē*) which comes from God. This gift is received through faith in Christ. [20]

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[19] Gordon Fee, *Paul's Letter to the Philippians* (NICNT; Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1995), p. 326, acknowledges that this is the majority view but then disputes it. He argues that the noun *dikaiosunē* is not synonymous with *dikaiōsis* and that Paul only uses the latter term for the concept of justification. Several points can be made in response: 1. evidence surveyed to this point suggests that *dikaiosunē* can mean 'justification'; 2. in Romans 5:16–18 the three nouns *dikaiosunē*, *dikaiōma*, *dikaiōsis* are clearly being used synonymously; 3. in Romans 4, the word *dikaiosunē* is used repeatedly to speak of justification and then in the final statement Paul varies his wording by using *dikaiōsis* (Rom. 4:25); 4. if Fee is correct, then while Paul frequently used the verb *dikaioō* to speak of justification, he only used a noun to speak of justification on two occasions (*dikaiōsis*, Rom. 4:25; 5.18). Fee himself argues that the noun *dikaiosunē* simply means 'right relationship' (p. 322). For the purposes of this discussion the difference is inconsequential since what is given the believer as a gift is a soteriological status, not moral righteousness.

[20] John Piper, 'Justification and the Diminishing Work of Christ' (Crossway Lecture, November 2007; http://bit.ly/PiperETS2007), sets forth a passionate defense of the imputation construct in which he focuses on Philippians 3:9 as clear evidence for the imputation of Christ's righteousness as the basis for justification. The key to his argument is the assertion that *dikaiosunē* must always mean moral righteousness, never simply a soteriological status. This enables him to argue that the gift of *dikaiosunē* (= moral righteousness) which

In each of these texts Paul speaks of *dikaiosunē* (soteriological status) as a gift coming from God and given to the one who believes. It is noteworthy that he does not use imputation imagery in the texts surveyed to this point. However, imputation imagery does occur in the two places where Paul uses Genesis 15:6 as Torah support for his theology of justification: Galatians 3:6 and Romans 4.

Paul's point in Romans 4 is to demonstrate that his theology upholds/affirms the Law (Rom. 3:31) since the Torah itself enshrines the principle of justification by faith. He does this with the examples of Abraham and David. Paul begins by excluding the possibility that Abraham was justified (*dikaioō*) by works (Rom. 4:2). He then quotes the LXX version of Genesis 15:6: 'Abraham believed God and it was credited to him for *dikaiosunē*' (4:3). When interpreted in the context of Paul's linguistic usage, this can only mean that God responded to Abraham's faith by crediting/imputing the gift of a soteriological status, i.e. justification. This is not the clearest way of expressing this idea but the syntax of the statement is determined by the LXX translation of the Genesis text. Paul then uses that Greek phrase to express his theology of justification. That this is what Paul means is supported by Romans 4:4: 'But to the one who does not work but believes the one who justifies (*dikaioō*) the ungodly, his faith is reckoned for *dikaiosunē*', i.e. God responds to the person's faith with the gift of a justified or acquitted status. The 'justification of the ungodly' and having '*dikaiosunē* credited' are two ways of saying the same thing.

This interpretation is reinforced by Paul's use of the example of David (Rom. 4:6–7): 'thus David speaks of the blessedness of the person to whom God credits/imputes *dikaiosunē* apart from works.' Again what is given/imputed to the one who believes is a justified or acquitted status. Paul then quotes Psalm 31:1 which provides images illuminating his understanding of *dikaiosunē*: 'Blessed are those whose iniquities are forgiven, whose sins are covered. Blessed is the one to whom the Lord will not reckon their sin.' Justification conveys the ideas of forgiveness of sins and of God not holding our sins against us. Furthermore, it seems clear that within this context the verb *dikaioō* and noun *dikaiosunē* refer to the same reality: justification/acquittal. Nothing suggests that while the verb refers to fo-

comes from God must be Christ's righteousness. One gets the impression that this unwillingness to distinguish the ethical and soteriological status uses of *dikaiosunē* undergirds his argument in his book *Counted Righteous*. It is noteworthy that he does not cite any New Testament scholar who takes this idiosyncratic approach to understanding *dikaiosunē* terminology in Paul. In reality what Piper describes as an anamolous interpretation (*dikaiosunē* = a soteriological status) is the consensus view in New Testament scholarship.

rensic justification, the noun refers to an imputed moral righteousness which is the basis for justification.

In Romans 4:9–12 Paul excludes the possibility that justification by faith is only for the circumcised, i.e. the Jew, on the grounds that according to Genesis 15:6 Abraham was justified by faith prior to being circumcised. In v. 11 he states that Abraham received circumcision as a seal of the *dikaiosunē* which he had by faith while still uncircumcised. This enables Abraham to be the father of Gentile and Jewish Christians who receive justification on the basis of faith.

The idea that *dikaiosunē* (a soteriological status) is a gift appropriated by faith is also expressed in a cryptic, shorthand expression in the next paragraph when Paul says that Abraham received the promised blessing from God not through obedience to the Law but 'through the *dikaiosunē* which comes by faith' (Rom. 4:13).

In Romans 4:17–22 Paul explores the character of Abraham's faith and, using the language of Genesis 15:6, concludes by saying that God responded to his faith by 'crediting *dikaiosunē* (a soteriological status) to him'. Paul goes on to say that this was written for us so that 'it will be credited/imputed to us who believe in him that raised Jesus from the dead' (v. 23). What is credited/imputed is the gift of *dikaiosunē* (a justified status). This is confirmed by the concluding statement of this section: 'who was put to death for our trespasses and raised for our justification/*dikaiōsis*' (v. 25).

In Romans 9:30–10:4 Paul explores Jewish unbelief and Gentile responsiveness with extensive use of *dikaiosunē* terminology and once again the noun refers to a soteriological standing before God.[21] He states that while Jews were pursuing *dikaiosunē* while Gentiles were not, in light of Christ's coming it was Gentiles who found *dikaiosunē* while Jews missed out. He concludes by saying that Christ brought to an end the era of the Mosaic Law in order that there may be *dikaiosunē* (a soteriological status) for all who believe.

In 1 Corinthians 1:30 Paul again uses the term *dikaiosunē* in a forensic sense: 'It is because of him that you are in Christ Jesus, who has become for us wisdom from God—that is, our justification, sanctification and redemption.' This understanding is confirmed by the related statement in 1 Corinthians 6:11 where Paul uses the verb to describe justification: 'But you were washed, you were sanctified, you were justified in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ and by the Spirit of our God.' The point is that union with Christ is the basis for receiving the fullness of salvation and a justi-

[21] Moo, *Romans*, p. 88 n. 41, also takes the view that all uses of *dikaiosunē* in Romans 4 have a soteriological (forensic) status in view.

fied or acquitted status is one of the three soteriological metaphors used here.[22]

2 Corinthians 5:21 is often thought to provide clear support for the view that Paul works with a theology of Christ's righteousness being imputed to us: 'God made him who had no sin to be sin for us, in order that in him we might become the *dikaiosunē* of God.' Here one finds the familiar Pauline ideas that Christ's redemptive work is the basis for salvation and that 'union with Christ' (in him) is the basis for benefiting from what He has done. The question is what he means by the phrase 'in him we become the *dikaiosunē* of God'. This is an example of Paul's use of cryptic, shorthand expressions which need to be unpacked in order to render them intelligible. The unpacking of these shorthand expressions needs to be done in light of how Paul expresses himself elsewhere on the subject of forensic *dikaiosunē*. The texts surveyed to this point suggest that this cryptic phrase means 'that in him we might have a justified or acquitted status which comes from God [or, a justified status before God].'[23] This interpretation is confirmed by the immediate and wider literary context. In 5:19 Paul says that God reconciles the world to himself and this is done by 'not counting their trespasses against them.' This is similar the way Paul defines justification in Romans 4:7–8. Furthermore the use of the term *dikaiosunē* at 2 Corinthians 3:9 to describe a justified or acquitted status strengthens the case for giving *dikaiosunē* the same meaning in 5:21. One could only unpack the shorthand expression 'becoming the *dikaiosunē* of God' by referencing an imputation of Christ's moral righteousness if this concept could be clearly established as part of Paul's theology of justification.

To summarize, in the texts surveyed to this point the noun *dikaiosunē* consistently refers to the gift of a soteriological status and the contextual evidence suggests that this status is one of being justified or acquitted.

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[22] Gordon Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987), p. 86, here states that *dikaiosunē* = justification and defines it as 'the believer's undeserved stance of right standing before God'.

[23] Paul Barnett, *The Second Epistle to the Corinthians* (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), pp. 314f.; Murray Harris, *Second Corinthians*, pp. 455f.; Colin Kruse, *2 Corinthians* (TNTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987), pp. 129f.; Margaret Thrall, *The Second Epistle to the Corinthians* (2 vols.; ICC; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1994), vol. 1, pp. 442–4, all interpret this statement along the lines proposed here. Harris denies that one can find the idea of the imputation of Christ's righteousness in this statement even though he believes that this concept was part of Paul's theology (p. 445 n. 207).

This gift of a justified status is given to the person who has faith in Jesus.[24]

SIX OBSERVATIONS

Having reviewed the most important texts, I would like to make a number of observations.

First, most English translations, whether literal or dynamic equivalent, have done the church a significant disservice by failing to distinguish in translation between the uses of the term *dikaiosunē* to describe ethical conduct (righteousness) and to describe a soteriological status (an acquitted status, right standing).[25] When one consistently reads the soteriological uses of the word *dikaiosunē* translated as 'righteousness', it is easier to believe that Paul is expressing himself within a framework of imputed moral righteousness. How is the reader untrained in Greek to know that the English word 'righteousness' in translations of Paul's writings can refer not only to moral righteousness but to a soteriological status?

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[24] How one defines 'justification' in Paul could potentially make some difference. If the concept is interpreted to mean that God declares the believer to be righteous or regards them as righteous, then one could follow Calvin and argue that this is only possible if Christ's righteousness is so imputed to the one who has faith in Jesus so that the believer 'appears in God's sight not as a sinner but as a righteous man'. This would not be a necessary inference from this understanding of justification language, but one can see how the jump could be made. However if justification language signifies God's forgiveness of sins, his not counting our sins against us, his releasing the believer from condemnation and God's establishing us in relationship with himself, then it is much harder to argue that the justification texts assume the imputation of Christ's righteousness as providing the basis for justification. Those texts which speak of Christ's taking upon himself God's judgment against sin provide a fully adequate basis for justification understood in this latter manner.

[25] Commendable exceptions are the Good News Bible and the New Century Bible. However they understand the language more relationally than forensically, i.e. being made right with God. The New Living Translation is extremely inconsistent in its translation of the soteriological status uses of dikaiosunē. In the majority of instances the NLT works with the concept of 'being made right with God'. However in Romans 4 the translators lapse into righteousness terminology and in reality fail to adopt a consistent approach: accepted (Rom. 4:2, 11a), declared righteous (Rom. 4:3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11a, 22, 23, 24), made right (Rom. 4:11a), new relationship (Rom. 4:13). In other contexts the NLT can interpret the soteriological status uses of *dikaiosunē* with a variety of other terms: righteousness (Rom. 5:17; Gal. 5:5), right standing with God (e.g. Rom. 5:23), become righteous (Phil. 3:9).

Second, Paul only uses the imagery of imputation (crediting) when he is using Genesis 15:6 as a framework for expressing his theology of justification (Rom. 4:3–8, 11, 21–25 and Gal. 3:6). In other cases he describes the 'acquitted status' as something coming 'from God', either with the use of a preposition (Phil. 3:9; Rom. 9:30) or the simple genitive of source (Rom. 4:11, 13; 2 Cor. 5:21)[26]. Paul can also describe *dikaiosunē* as a gift (Rom. 5:17). In many cases he simply speaks of *dikaiosunē* as justification/acquittal without any of these qualifiers (Rom. 5:21; 6:16; 8:10; 9:30–10:6; Gal. 2:21; 5:5; 1 Cor. 1:30; 3:9).

Third, it is noteworthy that when Paul uses the term *dikaiosunē* in the sense of moral righteousness, it never refers to Christ's own moral righteousness. This is not what one would expect if Paul believed that the imputation of Christ's moral righteousness was the basis for justification.

Fourth, if Paul did believe that the imputation of Christ's moral righteousness played a role in justification, then he would in reality have a theology of double imputation. Christ's moral righteousness is first imputed to the believer and then, as a next step, a justified status is imputed. As has been argued, Paul's linguistic usage clearly supports the imputation/gifting of a justified status. However there is a lack of evidence suggesting that for Paul the imputation of Christ's righteousness plays a role in justification.

Fifth, if Paul believed that the imputation of Christ's moral righteousness was central to the mechanics of justification then one would expect this to find clear expression somewhere. By contrast, Paul clearly articulates those elements which he regards as essential to justification: Christ's redemptive work as the foundation, union with Christ as the basis for receiving all the gifts of God's grace, and faith as the means whereby one is united with Christ and receives the gift of a justified status. However Paul does not link the imputation of Christ's righteousness to justification.

It is noteworthy that contemporary New Testament scholars in the Reformed tradition who themselves subscribe to imputation can exegete the key texts and provide a coherent account of Paul's theology of justification without any reference to the imputation of Christ's righteousness. Thus, for example, neither Douglas Moo nor Thomas Schreiner interpret the *dikaiosunē* language in Romans 3:21–4:25 by arguing that the imputa-

[26] I am inclined to the view that in Romans 1:17 and 3:21 the phrase *dikaiosunē theou* is a genitive of source and refers to the gift of a justified or acquitted status which comes from God. Cf. C. E. B. Cranfield, *Epistle to the Romans* (2 vols.; ICC; Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 1975), vol. 1, pp. 95–9.

tion of Christ's righteousness is the basis for justification.[27] It is especially striking that in Schreiner's book on Pauline theology, the word imputation is not in the index and his admirable presentation of Paul's theology of justification makes no reference to the imputation of Christ's righteousness as the basis for justification.[28] If Paul did work with the imputation construct then it should be impossible to provide a coherent account of Paul's theology of justification without reference to the imputation of Christ's righteousness. The fact that it is possible to do this suggests that the imputation construct is grounded in the tradition of Reformed theology rather than in Pauline theology.

Finally, it is methodologically problematic simply to postulate the assumption that for Paul the imputation of Christ's righteousness is the basis for justification without exegetical evidence to support the assumption. D. A. Carson appears to make this mistake. He argues that while Paul never explicitly says that our sins are imputed to Christ, most evangelical theologians believe that this concept is central to Paul's understanding of the work of Christ. He argues that by analogy the same is true for the imputation of Christ's moral righteousness, i.e. while Paul never explicitly speaks of the imputation of Christ's moral righteousness, the concept is necessarily implied.[29] This is not an appropriate comparison. Paul speaks of Christ's redemptive work in ways which clearly assume that he takes upon himself our sin and thereby God's judgment on it (e.g. Rom. 3:25; 8:3; Gal. 3:13; 2 Cor. 5:21; Col. 2:14). However in speaking about the justification/acquittal of the sinner, Paul says nothing which necessarily implies that

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[27] Douglas Moo, *Romans*, pp. 218–90; Thomas Schreiner, *Romans*, pp. 178–249. While the word *imputation* does not occur in the index of Moo's commentary, he subscribes to it in his comments on Romans 8:4 (pp. 483f.). The only affirmation of the imputation of Christ's righteousness that I can find in Schreiner's Romans commentary is a brief comment in the discussion of 5:15–19 (p. 290).

[28] Thomas Schreiner, *Paul: Apostle of God's Glory in Christ* (Leicester/Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2001), pp. 188–217. George Ladd, *New Testament Theology*, pp. 478–91, has an extended discussion of Paul's theology of justification. It is only in a brief statement on the last page that he introduces the assertion that the imputation of Christ's righteousness is assumed in Paul. If this were the case then it should have been integrated into the treatment of the relevant texts.

[29] D. A. Carson, 'The Vindication of Imputation', in: *Justification*, pp. 77–8. It could be pointed out that the reason Paul does not use 'imputation/crediting' language when speaking of Christ taking upon himself our sin is that there was no text like Genesis 15:6 which would require Paul to use this terminology. As already noted, Paul only uses crediting or imputation imagery when appealing to Genesis 15:6 where that language is part of the LXX text.

the gift of Christ's moral righteousness plays a role in the process of justification. Paul's use of *dikaiosunē* language is consistent with the way he uses a variety of soteriological metaphors; it is as believers are 'in Christ' that the benefits of his redemptive work are applied to them. It is as the believer is 'in Christ' that they receive the gifts of adoption, redemption, sanctification, reconciliation, being a new creation, transfer to the realm of Christ/the Spirit, and justification. Injecting the concept of the imputation of Christ's moral righteousness as the basis for one of these gifts, viz. justification, lacks contextual support in the texts where Paul develops his theology of justification.

CONCLUSION

It is often argued that giving up the concept of the imputation of Christ's righteousness means a serious dilution of the Gospel. This cannot be logically true if the concept itself lacks exegetical support. But one can also argue that the grace and mercy of God shine all the more brightly without the imputation of Christ's righteousness. God sees our sin with utter clarity, in no way diminished or obscured by our being 'clothed in Christ's righteousness'. The good news is that he chooses to forgive us, not to count our sins against us, to enter into relationship with sinners, and to engage the messy, life long process of enabling sinners to grow in righteousness. Foundational to the life of the believer is the truth that from the moment of their being connected to Jesus until the day of their death, God justifies or acquits the ungodly even as he seeks to transform them into the image of Christ.

Robert Moffat and Human Equality

Bruce Ritchie

Robert Moffat (1795-1883) was born in the village of Ormiston, East Lothian, near Edinburgh, and he became a major figure of the *London Missionary Society* in its heyday of the 19th century. From 1817 to 1870 Moffat worked as a missionary in southern Africa, with only one visit home from 1839 to 1843 before final retirement from the mission-field. Moffat's base was at Kuruman, on the edge of the Kalahari, many hundreds of miles north of Cape Town. His daughter Mary married David Livingstone. Over a period of 30 years he translated the entire Bible into Setswana; and he laid the foundation for Christianity in what is now modern Botswana.

The immediate reason for his home visit from 1839 to 1843 was to supervise the printing of Setswana New Testaments. But during that visit he toured the length and breadth of Britain, speaking at meeting after meeting, as the most celebrated missionary of the *LMS*. It was towards the end of this tour that Moffat became aware of allegations concerning the supposed innate intellectual inferiority of Africans: allegations which he stoutly rejected.

Like the overwhelming majority of Christian missionaries of his era, Moffat accepted the *monogenetic* theory of human origins, rather than the *polygenetic* model. He believed that all humanity had a single common origin rather than a multiple of independent origins. Thus, for Moffat, all humanity was of the same family. And, for the 19th century Christian missionary, the ultimate physical foundation of this *monogenetic* theory was Adam, the progenitor of all humanity. Moffat also held that not only did all humanity have a common physical origin but, because of this common origin, all humanity had a common innate intellectual capacity.

This year, 2010, sees the celebration of the centenary of the 1910 Edinburgh Missionary Conference. It is therefore timely to stress that, contrary to widespread modern assumptions, the vast majority of the 19th century missionaries, who worked before 1910, had in fact a high appreciation of the moral, spiritual, and intellectual capacities of the peoples amongst whom they worked. The perceived truth today is that missionaries, like other colonists, had a low regard for indigenous peoples. But the opposite was overwhelmingly the case. Indeed, it was the missionary societies who consistently stood steadfast against growing pseudo-scientific racist theories which developed as the 19th century progressed. It is within this con-

text that, in this article, we examine Robert Moffat's missionary defence of African innate intellectual ability.[1]

I. THE PHRENOLOGY PROBLEM

Moffat's defence of African intellectual ability during his 1839-1843 tour was ignited by the aspersions cast on Africans by some phrenologists. Phrenology is the pseudo-science of character analysis, based on characteristics of the skull. It was founded by Franz Joseph Gall (1758-1828), and elaborated by Johann Caspar Spurzheim (1776-1832), and it enjoyed fashionable approval through the 19th century and into the 20th century. Franz Joseph Gall proposed that particular brain regions are associated with controlling particular parts of the body: not dissimilar to modern theories of the brain.[2] However, and much more controversially, Gall also assumed that abstract moral qualities such as integrity or depravity were similarly localized and he associated them with specific bumps and ridges of the skull. Most phrenologists usually concentrated upon the shape of

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1 This article impinges upon central areas of debate in modern studies on classical missions. Did 19th century missionaries have racist presuppositions, whether these were conscious or unconscious? To what extent did attitudes change during the 19th century? What was the effect of Enlightenment thought on missionary attitudes? Has the paternalistic and apparently 'judgmental' language sometimes employed by missionaries been misunderstood out of its 19th century context? By the end of the 19th century, and thus by the time of the 1910 Missionary Conference in Edinburgh, had a 'racialized perception of human identity' emerged alongside the 'traditional evangelical emphases on the unity of human nature'? A recent article which discusses some of these issues, starting with the example of Robert Moffat and charting changing attitudes, is Brian Stanley's, 'From 'the poor heathen' to 'the glory and honour of all nations': Vocabularies of Race and Custom in Protestant Missions: 1844-1928', *International Bulletin of Missionary Research* 34/1, 3-10. If Stanley has a relatively favorable view of the missionary enterprise, then a more critical position, which argues that language and art were used as imperialistic tools in conversions by missionaries, is argued by Paul Landau, in: *The Realm of the Word: Language, Gender and Christianity in a Southern African Kingdom* (Cape Town: David Philip, 1995), and by Paul Landau and Deborah Kaspin in *Images and Empires: Visuality in Colonial and Postcolonial Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). For a wide ranging discussion on the whole impact of Enlightenment thought on the changing nature of missionary methodology see the series of essays in Brian Stanley (ed.), *Christian Missions and the Enlightenment* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001).

2 George H. Calvert (ed.), *Illustrations of Phrenology* (Baltimore: Neal, 1832), pp. 11-17.

the skull, not simply its size. However, in the popular mind, phrenology implied a correlation between skull size and intelligence. Thus, even a serious 19th century writer on phrenology such as George Calvert declared: 'The broad phrenological doctrine is that a small brain *cannot* manifest a powerful capacious mind.'[3] On such assumptions, sweeping conclusions were made concerning the intellectual, moral, emotional and spiritual capacity of various people groups. Races with small bodies and correspondingly small skull size, such as in southern Africa and Polynesia, were assumed to have lesser intelligence and inferior moral capabilities.

In Britain phrenology reached its zenith during the middle decades of the 19th century, and prompted a vigorous debate concerning the nature of humanity. Its negative conclusions concerning foreign races brought it into direct opposition to Missionary organizations. This was because it was a *sine qua non* of the missionary community that all peoples, including aboriginal indigenous peoples, had immortal souls given by God, and therefore were intelligent human beings in the full sense.[4] Without this conviction the whole missionary enterprise, and the dedication of missionary lives to the conversion of such peoples, lacked sense. Yet, although these assumptions were accepted within the missionary community, wider European society had doubts concerning the capacities of some races, and phrenology gave a pseudo-scientific basis for these doubts. Indeed, some extreme phrenologists such as George Combe of Edinburgh doubted whether some non-European peoples had any adequate religious capacity.[5]

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3 Calvert (ed.), *Illustrations of Phrenology*, 1832, p. 29. On p. 22 Calvert attempts to 'prove' this thesis by comparing drawings of the skull of the artist Raphael who had a 'full, round, capacious skull', with that of a native from New Holland (Australia), who had a 'flattened skull with shallow retreating forehead'. Calvert's conclusion from skull shape alone was that Raphael's skull showed a man of extraordinary artistic and intellectual gifts, whereas the other displayed low potential for either. Raphael's skull was larger, but also more developed in the frontal skull region, hence his genius!

4 Moffat's theological tutor, the Rev. William Roby of Manchester, taught that the soul was 'a thinking substance subsisting distinctly of itself' (Roby, *Theological Lectures*, Lecture 37: 'The Creation of Man'). Roby's theology was in line with most Calvinist thinking which equated the soul with the rational part of human nature. It therefore followed that if foreign peoples had immortal souls then they were also rational, intelligent, thinking persons. Moffat's copy of Roby's *Lectures* is available in the *LMS* archives of the *School of Oriental and African Studies* (SOAS), London.

5 In classical phrenology the capacity for 'religious reflection' was linked to a person's ability to experience *veneration, wonder* and *awe*. Capacity for *veneration, wonder* and *awe* was indicated by the size of the appropriate area of

2. GEORGE COMBE

George Combe[6] (1788-1858) was largely responsible for popularizing phrenology in Britain. He was an Edinburgh Lawyer's Clerk, becoming a Writer to the Signet in 1812. Combe was first attracted to Johann Spurzheim's ideas around 1817, and in 1820 Combe became a founder member of the Phrenological Society. Combe published his *Elements of Phrenology* in 1824, but it was his 1829 *Essay on the Constitution of Man* which became his most famous book, with fifty thousand copies being sold by 1838, just before Moffat returned to Britain in 1839. The book caused a sensation, and many religiously inclined members left the Phrenological Society as a consequence of Combe's *Essay on the Constitution of Man*. Thus, by the time Moffat arrived back in Britain the whole phrenology issue was a hot topic, especially in Edinburgh. Combe claimed that phrenology demonstrated there were certain groups of 'humanity' who quite simply did not have the required intellectual or religious capacity to adopt civilization or Christianity. Combe wrote: 'Certain savage tribes are incapable of so slight a thing as civilization, even though we attempt to thrust civilization upon them.'[7] Combe further stated: 'It appears to me that the Na-

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the skull. However, this area was not the same as the area which indicated intellectual ability; hence it was feasible for some skull types to be high in the capacity for *veneration, wonder* and *awe*, but low in the capacity for *intellectual reflection*. When the capacity for *veneration etc.* was deemed large, but that of intellectual reflection was deemed low, then, in such cases the person (or race) was deemed to be predisposed toward *superstition* rather than pure religion, and therefore would find difficulty in grasping a 'higher' intellectual religion such as Christianity. Was phrenology inevitably atheistic? David de Giustino, *Conquest of Mind: Phrenology and Victorian Social Thought* (London: Croom Helm, 1975), points out: 'Free-thinkers as well as atheists derived encouragement from phrenology, which they advertised in their books and journals. Thus, while the philosophy of Combe and Spurzheim was not explicitly atheistic, it was suspicious by the company it kept' (p. 128). De Giustino adds: 'Combe [explained] that the fundamental 'error' of Christian society had always been to 'seek a basis of religion in the supernatural instead of the natural'. This basis ... made it unduly difficult for any two persons to agree on the proper use and objects of man's religious impulse, the inborn faculty of *veneration*' (p.128f.). De Giustino also stresses that although some phrenologists accepted the idea that certain races were inherently inferior, many were strongly against slavery (p. 69ff.).

6 *National Dictionary of Biography*, Vol. 4, 'George Combe', pp. 883-5.

7 Quoted in Gillespie, *Exposure of the Unchristian and Unphilosophical Principles set forth in Mr. Combe's 'Constitution of Man'* (Edinburgh: pamphlet, 1837: National Library of Scotland, ABS.2.97.33 (19)) p. 5.

tive American savages and Native New Hollanders,[8] cannot, with their present brains, adopt Christianity or civilization.'[9]

Combe's teaching caused an outcry in religious circles, especially in groups which were missionary minded. It is true that not all phrenologists shared Combe's conclusions, but he did represent a significant body of opinion. Responses to Combe's work were published, and in Edinburgh in 1837 W.H. Gillespie published an influential pamphlet in response to Combe, entitled: *Exposure of the Unchristian and Unphilosophical principles set forth in Mr. Combe's 'Constitution of Man'*. Gillespie did not always represent Combe's thinking accurately, but it is his reaction to Combe's perceived position on innate racial distinctions based on phrenology which is important.

3. WILLIAM H. GILLESPIE

William H. Gillespie[10] (1808 -1875) was a prominent member of the Nicolson Square Methodist Church in Edinburgh, and, like Combe, he belonged to Edinburgh's legal profession. Significantly, Gillespie's fundamental axiom in his argument against Combe was theological, and it had two points of attack. First, Gillespie argued that the Great Commission of Jesus (Matthew 28:19) to evangelize the entire world undermined Combe's basic thesis.[11] Gillespie argued that Jesus' command was to take the Gospel to all peoples: *therefore* all peoples must be intellectually, emotionally, and spiritually capable of responding. Second, Gillespie pointed out that Combe's *a priori* argument could not cancel the actual fact of conversions having already taken place amongst some of the very peoples whom Combe had described as inherently incapable of becoming Christians. Drawing his evidence from the *Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society Report* for April and October 1836,[12] Gillespie stated: 'The facts set

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8 New Hollanders were Aboriginal Australians.

9 Gillespie, *Exposure of the Unchristian and Unphilosophical Principles*, p. 8.

10 See: 'Gillespie, William H.', in *Dictionary of Scottish Church History and Theology*, p. 361. Gillespie wrote a number of apologetic works, including a book against the German philosopher D. F. Strauss entitled *The Truth of the Evangelical History* (1856). He also published: *The Theology of Geologists* (1859); plus a defence of the cosmological and ontological arguments entitled *The Argument, a priori, for the Being and Attributes of the Lord God the Absolute One and the First Cause* (1872).

11 Gillespie, *Exposure of the Unchristian and Unphilosophical Principles*, p. 11.

12 Gillespie, *Exposure of the Unchristian and Unphilosophical Principles*, pp. 12ff.

forth in these extracts are not reconcilable with phrenology as set out by Mr. Combe'. Gillespie continued:

> The dogma that no human being whose skull resembles the common type of the skulls of American Indians, or New Hollanders, can become a Christian is legibly enough written in *The Constitution of Man.* The dogma is sufficiently contrary to Scripture. It opposes the expectations, it mocks the sacrifices, of Christians.[13]

In Gillespie's view, real-life missionary activity had both an *a priori* and an *a posteriori* impact on Combe's version of phrenology. (a) *A priori*: missionaries could not accept the conclusions of Combe's phrenology since that would mean that their enterprise was doomed before it started, and that the Great Commission given by Jesus was incapable of fulfilment. (b) *A posteriori*: missionary results showed that Combe's predictions were demonstrably untrue since profound and lasting conversions were actually taking place amongst the very peoples whom Combe had declared to be inherently incapable of receiving Christianity.[14]

Gillespie did not reject the whole science of phrenology. He simply stated his disagreement with Combe's conclusions concerning certain races being excluded from the possibility of understanding and responding to the Gospel. That was the fundamental anthropological point which Gillespie would not yield: the capacity for meaningful religious response. Thus, Gillespie was prepared to concede some ground to the phrenologist. But he argued that even if some of phrenology's conclusions were correct, and even if certain skull sizes and shapes are possibly indicative of lesser intellectual or moral capability, did intellectual and moral ability have to be possessed to an incredibly high level before a person could become a Christian?[15] Gillespie's conclusion was that any difference of intellectual,

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[13] Gillespie, *Exposure of the Unchristian and Unphilosophical Principles*, p. 17.

[14] It is true that Combe had in fact accepted that conversions, religious advance and civilization (to a certain extent) among south sea islanders had taken place, and he wanted some skulls to examine; George Combe, *A System of Phrenology* (Edinburgh: John Anderson, 2nd Edition, 1825), pp. 474f. However Combe also stated quite clearly that the power of mental manifestation bore a proportion to the *size* of the cerebral organs, and the Hindu head was small, and the European large, 'in precise conformity with the different mental characters' (p. 465). Moreover, even the 10th edition of one of Combe's works stated: 'all other things being equal, the mental manifestations are vigorous in proportion to its ***size***. ... the larger and more prominent the forehead, the greater will be the intellectual powers'. Combe: *Elements of Phrenology* (Edinburgh: Maclachlan & Stewart, 10th Edition, 1873), p. 16.

[15] Gillespie, *Exposure of the Unchristian and Unphilosophical Principles*, p. 8.

moral or spiritual capacity which *may* result from differences in skull capacity could never be so great as to make a race unable to fully know, understand, or respond to the Gospel.

Robert Moffat was to have a similar approach to that of Gillespie, disagreeing with some of phrenology's conclusions but not necessarily with the whole science.[16] However, Moffat, from his actual contact in southern Africa with the San, Khoikhoi, Tswana, and Ndebele, took a much stronger line than Gillespie regarding the intellectual abilities of such races. Moffat argued for full equality of intellectual capacity between races, whereas Gillespie, who had no significant direct experience of other races, conceded the possibility that phrenological analysis might point to some peoples having lesser abilities. Moffat robustly rejected such thinking. He vigorously affirmed that Africans had an intellectual potential equal to any European.[17]

4. ROBERT MOFFAT AND THE PHRENOLOGY DEBATE

As a missionary who had committed his life to evangelism, and as someone with experience of actual conversions in the field, Moffat was concerned to dispel the prejudice that the indigenous peoples of South Africa had inadequate intellectual, emotional, spiritual, or social capacities. As already noted, when Moffat returned to Britain in 1839 the phrenology debate was in full swing especially in Edinburgh, and thus references to phrenology in Moffat's writings come from that period. It is particularly interesting that it was after Moffat visited Edinburgh in early November 1842, that he began to refer to the issues raised by phrenology.[18] Thus, on the 22nd of January 1843 Moffat preached in London, stating:

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16 Moffat, *Barbican Sermon*, 22nd January 1843, in: Campbell (ed.), *The Farewell Services of Robert Moffat in Edinburgh, Manchester and London* (London: Snow, 1843), p. 110.

17 This was the general *LMS* viewpoint, not just Moffat's. The LMS southern Africa Superintendent John Philip wrote: 'So far as my observation extends, it appears to me that the natural capacity of the African is nothing inferior to that of the European. At our schools, the children of Hottentots, of Bushmen, of Caffres, and Bechuanas, are in no respect behind the children of European parents.' John Philip, 'Letter to J.B. Purney, May 1833', in *Letters of the American Missionaries: 1835-1838*, ed. by D. J. Kotze (Cape Town: The Van Riebeeck Society, 1950), p. 28.

18 The first references to phrenology in Moffat's extant writings and speeches come in late 1842, near the end of his furlough. There are no references to phrenology in his 1842 book, *Missionary Labours*, which was written for the most part during 1841. But after Moffat's speaking tour to Edinburgh in the autumn of 1842, references to phrenology appear in his presentations. After

> People [thought Bushmen to be madmen] because wise men and philosophers and phrenologists, who could measure by the inch all the bumps on the head (I am not reflecting on phrenology) had concluded that the Hottentot was only just an animal to fill up a gap between the ourang-outang[19] and the human species.[20]

A few months earlier, at Walworth Church in Manchester in late November 1842, shortly after his Edinburgh visit, Moffat had been even more forceful:

> Most of you have heard an awful character of the Africans - that they were just the connecting link between the baboons, or the ourang-outang and the human species. People of the greatest gravity imaginable, after a sober enquiry into the subject, after a rigid investigation into all the angles and developments of the skulls of Scotchmen and Irishmen and Englishmen and Africans, and no one knows who else, brought together from the east and the west, from the north and the south, and placed under the judgment of some great phrenologist, have come gravely to the conclusion that while the heads of the rest were heads of men, the head of a Hottentot was not the head of a man, and therefore he got classified in the position in which they in their wisdom placed him, between the ourang-outang and the human species. The first missionaries, consequently, to the Hottentots, were regarded by such characters as enthusiasts; they were spoken of as fanatics because they went to preach the Gospel to beings, or rather to animals that were supposed to be incapable of comprehending the great doctrines of divine revelation. But let our Hottentot churches bear testimony.[21]

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returning to Africa he made several additional references, especially in his *Journals*.

19 'Ourang-outang' is Moffat's spelling. Modern orthography has 'orang-utan'. A century before Charles Darwin, Lord Monboddo in Scotland and Jean Jacques Rousseau in France had speculated that human beings had descended from primates such as the Orang-utan. Under this scheme even if various races were 'human', different races may be at a different stage of development (or 'evolution') from the primal type of ancestor. Hence the Monboddo/Rousseau school, in breaking away from the biblical idea that all humanity was essentially the same, brought in the possibility that there were immense variations of status depending upon different rates of progress. It was probably the Monboddo/Rousseau speculations which Moffat had heard of.

20 Moffat, *Barbican Sermon*, 22nd January 1843, in: Campbell (ed.), *Farewell Services*, p. 110.

21 Moffat, *Walworth Address*, 21st November 1842, in: Campbell (ed.), *Farewell Services*, p. 70f.

The relatively small physical stature of the typical Khoikhoi [Hottentot], with correspondingly small skull size, had led some phrenologists to assume that they had lower intelligence, or even occupied a lower place in the order of living creatures. But Moffat rejected this reasoning on two counts: (a) he rejected it on the basis of his experience of native intelligence; and (b) he rejected it on the basis of an *ad hominem* argument that, even if this dubious phrenology were accepted, then the size of some African heads should actually indicate greater intelligence, not less. And here we can cite examples of Moffat arguing on both fronts:

(a) Robert Moffat's view of 'Native Intelligence'

In his Edinburgh address of the 3rd November 1842, and probably mindful of Edinburgh being at the forefront of the phrenological debate through the publications by Combe and Gillespie, Moffat stated:

> Let me assure you, after twenty-three years of experience of Africans, that they [Africans] *can* be taught and that they *will* be taught until that infamous libel that they are incapable of learning, with which they have been branded, shall have been forever wiped away.[22]

Moffat saw evidence of intellectual ability not only in the Tswana eagerness to learn, but also in the sophisticated nature of their societal arrangements:

> Go into one of their public parliaments, and there you will see the profoundest order, while orator after orator, or senator – call them if you please – after senator, rises and describes the state of the nation, the different movements that are to be attended to, or plans that are to be devised, or exertions made, in order to save the state or the town.[23]

In his book *Missionary Labours and Scenes in Southern Africa*, Moffat wrote that although the Tswana's general 'untidy' appearance did little to impress the outsider, they were in fact 'acute reasoners and observers of men and manners'.[24] Moffat's use of the term 'reasoner' is significant.

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[22] Moffat, *Edinburgh Address*, 3rd Nov. 1842, in: Campbell (ed.), *Farewell Services*, p. 16.

[23] Moffat, *Walworth Address*, 1843, in: Campbell (ed.), *Farewell Services*, p. 75. Moffat argued that the intellectual abilities of the Tswana (p. 75f.) and also the emotional qualities of the Tswana (p. 76f.), confirmed they were unmistakably human in the same sense as any European.

[24] Moffat, *Missionary Labours and Scenes in Southern Africa* (London: John Snow, 1842), p.237.

In the Scottish Calvinism which moulded Moffat's thinking as a young man, one of the main features which distinguished a human being from other species was the ability to 'reason', with 'reason' being regarded as an essential component of the *Imago Dei* in humankind. *The Westminster Confession* described humanity as being created with 'reasonable and immortal souls'.[25] It was this 'reasonable and immortal soul' plus the gift of 'knowledge, righteousness and true holiness' which constituted the *Imago Dei*. Hence, stating that a people were 'acute reasoners' was recognizing them as true human beings with abilities and talents given by God, equal to those possessed by their European counterparts.

(b) Robert Moffat's view of 'Cranial Capacity'

But what of the popular view that small head size resulted in reduced intellectual ability? Here again Moffat was unequivocal. Moffat knew that small physical stature was certainly not the case with the Ndebele peoples, and Moffat exploited that point. Moffat argued that phrenologists, who made disparaging conclusions based on skull size, were contradicting their own logic when it came to the Ndebele. Moffat pointed out that *even if* skull size indicated intelligence – and his emphasis was very much 'even if' - then the average Ndebele must be the equal of the European in brainpower, if not more! Moffat stated that Moselekatse, the chief of the Ndebele, had a head more advanced phrenologically than his own. Thus, in 1857, Moffat wrote in his *Journal*: 'I feel sure phrenologists would pronounce his developments (bumps) to be far superior to mine. They, with shaven head, can be seen to effect.'[26] In 1857, on the same missionary

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[25] The *Westminster Confession of Faith*, Chapter 4, section 2. See also the *Larger Catechism*, Question 17. The *Shorter Catechism*, Question 10, leaves out the phrase 'reasonable and immortal souls' and concentrates on God giving 'knowledge, righteousness and holiness'.

[26] Moffat, *Journal*, 16th November 1857, in J. P. R. Wallis (ed.), *The Matabele Journals of Robert Moffat, 1829-1860. Volume 2* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1945), p. 119. In fairness it should be stressed that Combe, certainly by 1856 (after sustained critique by missionary organisations), was aware that some Africans, especially Negroes, had large cranial capacity: 'The argument that the Negroes are incapable of civilization and freedom is prematurely urged ... The Negro head presents great varieties of moral and intellectual development, and I have seen several which appeared fully equal to the discharge of the ordinary duties of civilized men' (Combe: *The Constitution of Man considered in Relation to External Objects*, p. 272). And even as early as 1825 Combe had been aware of large Negro skulls: 'The skull of the Negro evidently rises in the scale of development of the moral and intellectual organs' (Combe: *A System of Phrenology* (Edinburgh: John Anderson, Second Edition, 1825), p.

journey to the Ndebele, Moffat added that some Ndebele had heads appropriate for a University don:

> Those who listened to me today are my fellow creatures from the common stock; many, very many, having countenances and heads, one would think, enough to entitle them to the philosopher's or professor's chair.[27]

Moffat was at pains to stress that the Ndebele were not hampered by lack of intelligence. In Moffat's view, if they were hampered by anything, then it was the conservatism of their culture:

> It has always been a mystery to me in human nature that people with capacities and heads that might stand beside our great geniuses cannot of themselves go a handbreadth beyond what was done by their earliest forefathers.[28]

Moffat wrote this after forty years in Africa, and there is nothing in his earlier writings to indicate that he ever thought differently. But what he now found was that he could refute the derogatory pseudo-scientific racism of some phrenologists on their own grounds. Moffat had no doubts regarding the innate intellectual capacity of indigenous Africans. In Mof-

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468). However, Combe's argument was that the overall *shape* of the African skull, quite apart from its size, indicated a basic deficiency in intelligence and in an ability to reflect intellectually: 'One feature is very general in description of the African tribes; they are extremely superstitious. They purchase fetishes, or charms, at a high price, and believe them to be sure preservatives against all the evils of life. This character corresponds with the development which we observe in the Negro skull, for they exhibit much Hope, Veneration, and Wonder, with comparatively little reflecting power. Their defective Causality incapacitates them for tracing the relation of cause and effect, and their great Veneration, Hope and Wonder, render them prone to credulity' (Combe: *A System of Phrenology*, p. 470). Here Combe admits that the religious capacity was high, but because the intellectual capacity was low, then religion was manifested as *superstition* and not as a *rational faith*.

27 Moffat, *Journal*, 11th October 1857, MJRM-2, p. 94. Moffat's view of the intellectual abilities of the African was quite different from the view of a man such as Carl Mauch who, in 1871, was the first European to see the Zimbabwe ruins. Mauch 'never imagined that these ruins might be the work of black men' (E. H. Gann, *A History of Southern Rhodesia: Early Days to 1934* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1965), p. 2). Mauch speculated that Hebrew and Phoenician architects and artisans were responsible during the days of the Queen of Sheba and King Solomon. Unlike Mauch, who came to Africa much later than Moffat, Moffat believed in the equal abilities of black and white.

28 Moffat, *Journal*, 30th October 1857, *MJRM-2*, p. 108.

fat's view it was climate and circumstances which had resulted in them not 'fulfilling their potential', plus the major inhibiting factors of culture and tradition. In his view, these fostered a reluctance to utilize intellectual curiosity, and were why, in Moffat's phrase, these people did not go 'a handbreadth beyond what was done by their earliest forefathers.'

A modern cultural anthropologist would severely criticise Moffat's conclusion that culture and tradition had hampered the peoples he worked with in Africa. Today, Moffat would also be criticised for assuming that European culture was superior to African culture. Comparisons are odious, and cultural comparisons are particularly invidious. After all, European progress and development in technology and the fine arts did not necessarily mean that European Society had advanced in human dignity over other societies. Moffat, as a man of his time, assumed that it had. He assumed that sophisticated European culture had 'progressed' further than it's simpler, less complex, African counterpart. But his comments must be understood from the perspective of his times. On this issue he can be criticised. But Moffat was crystal clear on the question of innate intelligence: all humanity - European, African , or other - had equal intellectual ability.

CONCLUSION

Moffat's understanding of humanity, and therefore his overall anthropology, informed and moulded by his faith and his experience, was of an enlightened and liberal nature in comparison to the creeping racist philosophies of the 19th century. Moffat totally rejected any notion of an innate intellectual superiority of the European. And Moffat's view was the general missionary view. All humanity had immortal souls, created by one God, as one human family. This was why the missionaries campaigned against slavery; why they educated both males and females; and why they preached the Gospel of the Cross to all -whether black or white. A missionary such as Robert Moffat was often heavily paternalistic. But he would have had the same paternalistic attitudes to his flock if he had ministered in Scotland rather than in Africa. It was the manner of the times. Despite that paternalism, which is often at odds with 21st century culture, Robert Moffat and his fellow missionaries were not racist. This was because a belief in the equality of humanity, in terms of its intellectual and spiritual potential, was a pre-assumption of the thousands of missionaries who spent their lives in evangelism, fulfilling Jesus' Great Commission: *'Go and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and teaching them to obey everything I have commanded you.'*

SANCTIFICATION BY JUSTIFICATION: THE FORGOTTEN INSIGHT OF BAVINCK AND BERKOUWER ON PROGRESSIVE SANCTIFICATION

DANE C. ORTLUND

What is the key to healthy sanctification? And how is sanctification linked with justification? Such questions have been matters of perennial discussion, going back to the Apostle Paul himself, who understood that his explication of justification by faith in the early chapters of Romans would be misunderstood as a license to sin (Rom. 5:20–6.1; 6:14–15). Recent developments—one thinks especially of the 'new perspective on Paul' as well as ecumenical dialogue between Protestants and Catholics—have again brought justification and its connection to sanctification to the fore. This essay does not intend to 'solve' this question but rather point out a neglected insight of two thinkers in the Dutch Reformed tradition regarding the relationship between gracious initiation into salvation and subsequent moral development. We will argue that Herman Bavinck and G. C. Berkouwer, each in his own way, explained spiritual progress—what we are calling 'sanctification"[1]—as taking place not by moving beyond justification but by feeding on it.[2] That is, sanctification does not occur

[1] I place the word in quotation marks here not because it is being used here in an innovative way but in deference to the fact that the NT does not normally use the *hagia-* ('holy') root to speak of progressive but of definitive sanctification (e.g. 1 Cor. 1.2, 30; 6.11; 2 Thess. 2.13; 1 Pet. 1.2). One who has been sanctified has been—once and for all—*cleansed*. The term in the NT is often just as definitive as justification, the difference being one of metaphorical denotation: while justification employs a lawcourt metaphor, sanctification draws on a cultic metaphor. On the definitive nature of sanctification in the NT see D. Peterson, *Possessed by God: A New Testament Theology of Sanctification and Holiness* (NSBT; Downers Grove: IVP, 2001). References to 'sanctification' in what follows, however, refer to *progressive* sanctification, which remains valid as a theological concept (see D. A. Carson, 'The Vindication of Imputation: On Fields of Discourse and Semantic Fields', in *Justification: What's at Stake in the Current Debates*, ed. by M. Husbands and D. J. Treier (Downers Grove: IVP, 2004), pp. 47–9).

[2] As with 'sanctification', 'justification' is being used in this paper theologically and confessionally (in line especially with the Heidelberg Catechism, Belgic Confession, and Westminster Confession) and not, in the first instance, etymologically or philologically. I use the term to speak of the moment in history at which a sinner is counted legally righteous by God through faith

by graduating on from God's justifying grace in the gospel but by reflecting on, enjoying, and appropriating it more and more deeply throughout one's life. Counterintuitive though it be, one is sanctified not by moving past justification but by ever-deepening re-orientation toward it.

This essay proceeds in three basic movements. We first explore the way Bavinck expresses his understanding of sanctification's relation to justification. Second, we do the same for Berkouwer. Third, we synthesize the basic point held in common between these two thinkers. This synthesis will include incorporating Jonathan Edwards into the discussion in light of a neglect in Berkouwer's understanding of sanctification, as well as briefly placing the Bavinck/Berkouwer insight into the larger soteriological context of union with Christ.

HERMAN BAVINCK

The recent completion of the publication of Herman Bavinck's (1854–1921) magisterial four-volume dogmatics has made this thinker far more accessible to the English-speaking world than the smattering of previously translated works had allowed.[3] In what follows we rely most heavily on the fourth volume, made available in 2008, in which Bavinck discusses soteriology, the church and sacraments, and last things. The scope of Bavinck's theological vision has been summed up in the caption, 'grace restores

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in Jesus Christ's atoning work. Thus this paper focuses on the dimension of justification that lies behind the believer, though this is not to deny, from a more trenchantly exegetical perspective at the ground level of the NT, an eschatological and future dimension to justification (namely, the open revealing of an already fully accomplished justification). Indeed, built into the NT conception of justification is the truth that the final acquittal has broken into the present for those who trust Christ (on which see esp. P. Stuhlmacher, *Biblische Theologie und Evangelium: Gesammelte Aufsätze* (WUNT, 146; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002), p. 25; R. B. Gaffin, *By Faith, Not by Sight: Paul and the Order of Salvation* (Carlisle: Paternoster, 2006), pp. 83–100).

3 H. Bavinck, *Reformed Dogmatics* (ed. J. Bolt; trans. J. Vriend; 4 vols.; Grand Rapids: Baker, 2003–2008). The most significant English-language volumes prior to his *Reformed Dogmatics* being translated were his *The Philosophy of Revelation* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1979; repr.), which was a publication of the Stone Lectures Bavinck delivered at Princeton Seminary in 1908; *Our Reasonable Faith: A Survey of Christian Doctrine* (trans. H. Zylstra; Grand Rapids: Baker, 1956), an abridgment of the *Reformed Dogmatics; The Doctrine of God* (ed. and trans. W. Hendriksen; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1951), a portion of his *Reformed Dogmatics*; and the epistemologically oriented *The Certainty of Faith* (St. Catharines: Paideia, 1980).

nature'.[4] He saw God's redemptive programme, climaxing in Christ, as a return to the wholeness and peace of Eden, and better than Eden. A particularly satisfying dimension of the *Reformed Dogmatics* for biblical scholars is Bavinck's facility not only with the biblical languages but also with the Jewish intertestamental literature.

We hasten on to sanctification in Bavinck. Already in his discussion of justification one finds hints of where Bavinck will ultimately go in explaining justification's relation to sanctification. 'The gospel is the food of faith and must be known to be nourishment', he writes.[5] Drawing upon Luther's Romans commentary, Bavinck later explains that believers are to trust solely in God's righteousness imputed to them on account of Christ's work. He then says: 'At the start of their lives as believers *as well as in the course of their lives*, they continue to take God at his word. They continue to believe that they are sinners and that their righteousness is grounded solely in the righteousness of God.'[6] Though not as explicit as later statements in his treatment of sanctification, it is not surprising in hindsight to see Bavinck speaking of justification as relevant to believers their whole lives long before moving on to discuss sanctification.

In explaining sanctification, Bavinck early on expresses his concern that some orthodox branches of the Church—Pietism, Methodism, Wesleyanism—have promulgated the widespread but erroneous notion that sanctification is a subsequent, humanly-resourced postscript to justification.

> All the sects that arose in Protestant churches more or less proceeded from the idea that the confession of justification by faith was, if not incorrect, at least defective and incomplete and had to be augmented with sanctification. Pietism prescribed a specific method of conversion and then gathered the de-

[4] See *Reformed Dogmatics*, vol. 4, pp. 92–5, 598, 715–24. It is noteworthy that Bavinck treats justification and sanctification not in vol. 3, 'Sin and Salvation in Christ', but in vol. 4, 'Holy Spirit, Church, and New Creation'. He saw the traditional elements of the ordo salutis as being part of a much broader redemptive project involving not just the individual sinner but the entire cosmos. See J. Veenhof, *Nature and Grace in Herman Bavinck* (trans. A. M. Wolters; Sioux Center, Iowa: Dordt College Press, 2006). Bavinck stood on Calvin's shoulders in this regard, though the grace-restoring-nature paradigm was more fundamental and pervasive to Bavinck's theology as a whole; see P. Helm, *John Calvin's Ideas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 383–4. For a contemporary exposition of this key dimension to Bavinck's thought, see A. M. Wolters, *Creation Regained: Biblical Basics for a Reformational Worldview* (2nd ed.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005).

[5] *Reformed Dogmatics*, vol. 4, p. 96.

[6] Ibid., pp. 193–4; emphasis added.

> vout in small sealed-off circles . . . marked by a rigorous but also in many ways narrowly defined moral life. Methodism not only advanced a specific method of conversion but also gradually arrived at a special doctrine of sanctification. John Wesley not only distinguished justification from sanctification but separated the two. . . .[7]

From here Bavinck goes on to refute the theological and exegetical viability of Wesley's understanding of perfectionism before returning more broadly to sanctification positively conceived. It is here that we come to the heart of Bavinck's insight on sanctification.

He begins by asserting that Christ wins for us holiness no less than righteousness. 'To understand the benefit of sanctification correctly,' he says, 'we must proceed from the idea that Christ is our holiness in the same sense in which he is our righteousness. He is a complete and all-sufficient Savior. He does not rest until, after pronouncing his acquittal in our conscience, he has also imparted full holiness and glory to us.'[8] Note how Bavinck then explains the way Christ's work provides not only our righteousness but also our sanctification.

> By his righteousness, accordingly, he does not just restore us to the state of the just who will go scot-free in the judgment of God, in order then to leave us to ourselves to reform ourselves after God's image and to merit eternal life. But Christ has accomplished everything. He bore for us the guilt and punishment of sin, placed himself under the law to secure eternal life for us, and then arose from the grave to communicate himself to us in all his fullness for both our righteousness and sanctification (1 Cor. 1.30). The holiness that must completely become ours therefore fully awaits us in Christ.[9]

Bavinck then argues that a failure to include sanctification completely under the work of Christ (and not only justification) leaves one under the law.

> Many people still acknowledge that we must be justified by the righteousness that Christ has acquired but believe or at least act in practice as if we must be sanctified by a holiness we bring about ourselves. If that were the case, we would not—contrary to the apostolic witness (Rom. 6.14; Gal. 4.31; 5.1, 13)—live under grace and stand in freedom but continue always to be under

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7 Ibid., p. 245. On the errors of Pietism and Wesleyanism see also ibid., p. 259; idem, *Reformed Dogmatics*, vol. 3, pp. 535–40.

8 Ibid., vol. 4, p. 248. He reiterates this a few pages later: 'Christ is [believers'] righteousness (δικαιοσύνη [dikaiosunē]) but in the same sense also their sanctification (ἁγιασμός [hagiasmos]; 1 Cor. 1.30)' (ibid., p. 250).

9 Ibid. See also *Reformed Dogmatics*, vol. 3, p. 528.

> the law. Evangelical sanctification, however, is just as distinct from legalistic sanctification as the righteousness that is of faith differs from that which is obtained by works.[10]

In light of these statements one wonders if Bavinck has retained at all the notion of progressive sanctification. Indeed he has. Sanctification, he says, 'is continued throughout the whole of life and, by the renewing activity of the Holy Spirit, gradually makes the righteousness of Christ our personal ethical possession'.[11] Holiness must be worked out; it is 'an organic process'.[12] At the same time, however, justification and sanctification 'grant the same benefits, rather, the entire Christ; they only differ in the manner in which they grant him'.[13]

Bavinck goes on to explain that this is sanctification by faith. By this he means that the same trust in Christ by which one is forgiven and adopted is that by which spiritual growth occurs. He defines sanctifying faith as 'a practical knowledge of the grace that God has revealed in Christ, a heartfelt trust that he has forgiven all our sins and accepted us as his children'.[14] It is striking that this description of faith comes in his discussion of sanctification, not justification. 'For that reason this faith is not only needed at the beginning in justification, but it must also accompany the Christian throughout one's entire life, and also play a permanent and irreplaceable role in sanctification. In sanctification, too, it is exclusively faith that saves us'.[15] *Sola fide* applies to sanctification no less than justification.

We therefore err if we understand the gospel, the good news of God's redeeming work in Christ freely offered to sinners and grasped only through faith, as exclusively associated with an initial justification upon conversion. The gospel is rather for all of life. Trusting faith in Christ is 'the one great work Christians have to do in sanctification according to the principles of the gospel (John 6:29); it is the means of sanctification par excellence. . . . Faith breaks all self-reliance and fastens on to God's promise'.[16]

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10 *Reformed Dogmatics*, vol. 4, p. 248.
11 Ibid., p. 249.
12 Ibid., p. 264.
13 Ibid., p. 249.
14 Ibid., p. 257.
15 Ibid.; cf. ibid., p. 243; see also *Reformed Dogmatics*, vol. 3, pp. 523, 528.
16 *Reformed Dogmatics*, vol. 4, p. 257.

G. C. BERKOUWER

Like Bavinck, Berkouwer (1903–1996) was a man of immense learning and that rare combination of historical and theological awareness on the one hand with well-honed exegetical instincts and biblical rootedness on the other.[17] One of Berkouwer's enduring legacies was his ability to incisively engage those with whom he disagreed, especially Karl Barth and various Roman Catholic theologians, while remaining a leading ecumenical figure of his day. In what follows we focus on his volumes on sanctification and justification in his 'Studies in Dogmatics' series.

Berkouwer is even more radical in describing sanctification in terms of grace and the gospel than is Bavinck. We will see that this may have led him to neglect an important dimension to general soteriology—a neglect not shared by Bavinck—but first let us get clearly before us Berkouwer's view of progressive sanctification.

A fundamental concern of his, evident in the title *Faith and Sanctification*, is that sanctification be thought of in terms of faith. He writes that 'we can speak truly of sanctification *only* when we have understood the exceptionally great significance of the bond between Sola-fide and sanctification'.[18] As with Bavinck, one must not view justification as circumscribed by faith in a more fundamental way than sanctification. 'We may never speak of sanctification as if we are entering—having gone through the gate of justification—upon a new, independent field of operation'.[19]

At critical junctures thereafter throughout *Faith and Sanctification*, Berkouwer returns to this notion that sanctification takes place by the nourishment generated in self-consciously enjoying one's free justification. For instance:

> Holiness is never a 'second blessing' placed next to the blessing of justification. . . . Our completion is only realized in Christ (Col. 2.10) 'for by one offering he hath perfected forever them that are sanctified' (Heb. 10.14). The exhortation which comes to the Church is that it must live in faith out of this

[17] Note the opening pages to his volume on justification, in which Berkouwer says that 'theology is occupied in continuous attentive and obedient listening to the Word of God. . . . The word of theology has too often witnessed to itself rather than to the living Word of God. It has too often been articulate without first being attentive. When this has been so, theology has invited reproach—and deserved it' (*Faith and Justification* (trans. L. B. Smedes; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1954), pp. 9–10).

[18] G. C. Berkouwer, *Faith and Sanctification* (trans. J. Vriend; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1952), p. 42; emphasis original.

[19] Ibid.

> fullness; not that it must work for a second blessing, but that *it must feed on the first blessing, the forgiveness of sins*. The warfare of the Church, according to Scriptural testimony, springs from the demand really to live from this first testimony.[20]

Here Berkouwer hijacks the language of Wesleyanism to speak of justification (here described as 'the forgiveness of sins") as the 'first blessing,' yet also the enduringly relevant blessing. The lawcourt acquittal proleptically brought into the present for those who trust Christ is the 'fullness' out of which believers are to continually live.[21]

Berkouwer goes on to reiterate that 'the Reformed Confessions never teach that believers, having gone through the gate of justification, now enter upon a new territory where they must, without outside help, take their sanctification in hand. It is not true that sanctification simply succeeds justification'.[22] That is, 'there is never a stretch along the way of salvation where justification drops out of sight. Genuine sanctification—let it be repeated—stands or falls with this continued orientation toward justification and the remission of sins'.[23] Healthy Christian living, then, is not a matter of being freely justified and then moving on as a now-justified person to the 'next step' of sanctification. 'The believer's constant 'commerce' with the forgiveness of sins and his continued dependence on it must—both in pastoral counseling and in dogmatic analysis—be laid bare, emphasized, and kept in sight'.[24]

Berkouwer's great concern is the mistake of viewing justification more absolutely monergistically than sanctification. He wants to ascribe just as much priority to God's grace and the necessity of faith in *sanctification* as in justification, for 'the life of faith . . . feeds on God's grace alone'.[25] Again,

> The heart of sanctification is the life which feeds on . . . justification. There is no contrast between justification as act of God and sanctification as act of man. The fact that Christ is our sanctification is not exclusive of, but inclusive of, a faith which clings to him alone in all of life. Faith is the pivot on which

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20 Ibid., p. 64; emphasis added; cf. p. 14.

21 See similarly B. B. Warfield's comments on justification, sanctification, and the notion of a 'second blessing' in his *Perfectionism* (ed. S. G. Craig; Philadelphia: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1967), pp. 357–8.

22 *Faith and Sanctification*, p. 77.

23 Ibid., pp. 77–8.

24 Ibid., p. 84.

25 Ibid., p. 87.

> everything revolves. Faith, though not itself creative, preserves us from autonomous self-sanctification.[26]

Consequently, as soon as sanctification begins to lift its eyes beyond justification—or, when spiritual progress begins to be partly viewed as self-resourced in some way in which justification is not—the error of self-sanctification or moralism is encroaching. Berkouwer remarks that 'any view of regeneration, faith, and sanctification, must be weighed and tested by the criterion of whether it does justice to the forgiveness of sins as the only ground and source of sanctification'.[27] In *Faith and Justification*, written two years later, he underscored his conviction that 'sanctification is continually rooted in justification.' Stated negatively, justification 'may never become a station along the way, a harbor which, once passed through, may be forgotten. On the contrary, only in intimate connection with justification does talk of sanctification make any real sense'.[28]

Up till this point Berkouwer sounds roughly like Bavinck, though the former perhaps puts the point a bit more starkly. Sanctification is 'commerce with,' or 'feeding on,' justification. The quest for sanctification will rise no higher than faith-fueled reflection on and appropriation of justification. Yet Berkouwer is far more reluctant to speak of sanctification as a 'process,' even wondering if such a notion has proven destructive by ineluctably infecting the orthodox concept of sanctification with misplaced and even prideful self-effort.[29] 'Sanctification is not a 'process,'' he writes, 'certainly not a moral process, but it is being holy in Christ and having part, through faith, in his righteousness'.[30] Berkouwer wants to use the term 'process' only with the utmost caution, due to the natural human propensity to forget that 'progress in sanctification can never consist in building up ourselves on our morality'.[31] While he claims to 'agree wholeheartedly that progressive sanctification is compatible with a faith-connected sanctification,' it is clear that Berkouwer believes the former has been emphasized to the neglect of the latter.[32] Thus the dominant note struck in his own theology is that sanctification is not 'a process of 'improvement.'"[33] Berkouwer wants to describe sanctification instead

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[26] Ibid., p. 93.

[27] Ibid., p. 96.

[28] *Faith and Justification*, p. 100; cf. p. 201.

[29] Note that Berkouwer devotes a whole chapter to 'Sanctification and Humility' (*Faith and Sanctification*, pp. 117–34).

[30] Ibid., p. 104.

[31] Ibid., p. 112.

[32] Ibid., p. 107.

[33] Ibid., p. 129.

as simply increased marveling over the grace that invaded one's life upon conversion, 'as Christ becomes more wonderful to us'.[34] He likewise believes that certain passages are often mistakenly taken to refer to progressive sanctification. An example is the 'I press on . . .' of Philippians 3:12—"Paul's "pressing on" in Philippians 3,' he says, 'is certainly not aimed at moral improvement; his aim is to gain Christ (3.8)'.[35]

While Berkouwer takes the doctrine of sanctification in a direction here with which Bavinck may have been uncomfortable, both essentially agree that Christians are sanctified by the gospel; they are, in a sense, sanctified by their justification. The last paragraph of *Faith and Sanctification* makes this the very note on which the book ends: 'In the bond between faith and sanctification we perceive, no less than in the bond between faith and justification, the pulsebeat of the Gospel. If faith will but lift its blossoms to catch the sunlight of God's grace, the fruit will be a life imbued with holiness'.[36]

SYNTHESIS

Much more would need to be said to gain a comprehensive understanding of sanctification in the theologies of Bavinck and Berkouwer. We have said little, for instance, of the role of the Holy Spirit, an important dimension to both theologians' holistic understanding of sanctification.[37] And below we will speak to the relationship between the Bavinck/Berkouwer insight and union with Christ. This essay focuses on one specific element, a critical and seemingly forgotten one, in understanding how sanctification works as far as *the consciousness of the believer* is concerned. Though Berkouwer makes the point somewhat more radically than Bavinck, these two Dutch Reformed thinkers are united in their understanding of justification as the self-conscious means of sanctification. The point is not merely that justification must be viewed (logically) as preceding sanctification rather than the other way round. Nor is the point that justification provides the ground for sanctification. Nor are they simply agreeing that

[34] Ibid., p. 112.

[35] Ibid., p. 130. One reason for Berkouwer's downplaying of the process of moral development is his desire to retain awareness of the depravity of the human heart even after conversion. 'Our confession leaves room only for "a small beginning", even for the saintliest soul, throughout the process of sanctification' (ibid., p. 113).

[36] Ibid., p. 193.

[37] Bavinck, *Reformed Dogmatics*, vol. 4, p. 251–53; Berkouwer, *Faith and Sanctification*, pp. 42, 79–83, 86–7.

sanctification must not be thought of as moralistic self-effort. On all this orthodox Protestant theology of various stripes is agreed.

Bavinck and Berkouwer are making a more penetrating point. They understand that it is quite possible to decry self-resourced progress in holiness while retaining an unhealthy disconnect between justification and sanctification that sees justification as something beyond which one 'graduates' in Christian living. They argue that justification is to be seen as 'settled' in that the verdict is irreversibly delivered, yet justification is not to be seen as 'settled' in the sense that one must now therefore *move on* to sanctification. Justification is settled materially but retains critical ongoing epistemic import in Christian living. They would dissent from Charles Hodge's view that justification is simply 'the first step' in sanctification.[38] Rather, sanctification takes place to the degree that, and no further than, one remembers and enjoys one's justification. We are justified by self-renouncing faith; we are sanctified by that same faith.

LONELY VOICES?

Even the cursory overview provided in this essay makes it clear that Bavinck and Berkouwer are not identical in their thinking on sanctification. For instance, Bavinck tends to emphasize that Christ is our sanctification just as he is also our righteousness, and that the same faith that grants us righteousness also grants sanctification; Berkouwer, from a slightly different angle, suggests that sanctification itself is simply the increasing enjoyment of one's justification. The differences between them ought not to be flattened out. Both were, after all, speaking (as they should have) to their own times—Bavinck to the late nineteenth century and Berkouwer to the mid-twentieth. Moreover, while both frequently contrast their teaching with Roman Catholicism on one side and (less stridently) Luther on the other, Bavinck chooses Wesley, Schleiermacher, and Ritschl for his primary interlocutors on sanctification while Berkouwer chooses Kohlbrügge, Barth, and Kuyper.[39]

Differences notwithstanding, Bavinck and Berkouwer, each in his own way, provide a single insight into the Christian life that is as relevant to daily living as it is neglected in Reformed dogmatics. One is hard pressed, for instance, to find this notion of 'sanctification by justification'

[38] C. Hodge, *Systematic Theology* (3 vols.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1946), vol. 3, p. 226.

[39] Kohlbrügge is the one name here that will be unfamiliar to some. Hermann Friedrich Kohlbrügge (1803–1875) was a conservative Dutch pastor remembered for his emphasis on God's absolute sovereignty in salvation. Kohlbrügge critically influenced Barth as well as Berkouwer.

in the works of Reformed stalwarts Charles Hodge,[40] Louis Berkhof,[41] and Anthony Hoekema.[42] Not even the five hundred-year-old father of the Reformed faith himself cast sanctification as the deliberate feeding on justification. Like Bavinck, Calvin is keen to emphasize that both justification and sanctification are found only in Christ, yet Bavinck describes sanctification as self-consciously depending on justification in a way that is not as clearly articulated in Calvin.[43] To be sure, rare is the Protestant theologian who fails to deny that sanctification consists in self-effort or moral reformation. Spiritual progress, it is widely agreed, takes place only by God's grace. And the notion of 'sanctification by faith' is common parlance to many.[44] Bavinck and Berkouwer, however, are unique in satisfactorily explaining *how* this happens. Sanctification by faith, they assert, is not the notion that one is sanctified in the sweat of moral effort that is done while trusting that the Holy Spirit will take this work and conform one to Christ's image (is this how 'sanctification by faith' is generally perceived in the church today?). Rather, their answer to what it means to be 'sanctified by faith' is that the faith that justifies is the same faith that

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40 *Systematic Theology*, vol. 3, pp. 213–33.

41 L. Berkhof, *Systematic Theology* (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1958). Berkhof comes nearer than Hodge to affirming what we have seen in Bavinck and Berkouwer. The closest approximation is when Berkhof says that 'it is necessary to stress the fact over and over again that sanctification is the fruit of justification, that the former is simply impossible without the latter, and that both are the fruits of the grace of God in the redemption of sinners' (ibid., p. 535). Yet despite calling sanctification the 'fruit' of justification, Berkhof does not linger here but goes on immediately to speak of humanity's need to depend on the Holy Spirit for sanctification. While this is certainly true, Berkhof does not spell out the same insight we have seen in Bavinck and Berkouwer that the content or focus of the Holy Spirit's sanctifying activity in the mind of the believer is the work of Christ, the gospel of free justification.

42 See Hoekema's contribution in M. E. Dieter, et al, *Five Views on Sanctification* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1987), pp. 65–6; also Hoekema's *Saved by Grace* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989), pp. 192–233.

43 J. Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion* (2 vols.; ed. J. T. McNeill; trans. F. L. Battles; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1960), III.iii.5–20. On Calvin's understanding of the relation between justification and sanctification, the duplex gratia coordinated in union with Christ, see C. P. Venema, *Accepted and Renewed in Christ: The 'Twofold Grace of God' and the Interpretation of Calvin's Theology* (Reformed Historical Theology, 2; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007); J. T. Billings, 'John Calvin's Soteriology: On the Multifaceted "Sum" of the Gospel', IJST 11 (2009), 428–47, esp. pp. 445–6.

44 Most recently see J. M. Frame, *The Doctrine of the Christian Life* (Phillipsburg, N.J.: Presbyterian & Reformed, 2008), pp. 916–7.

sanctifies; or more precisely, the kind of faith that sanctifies is the faith that views resolutely one's free justification. As paradoxical as it seems, it is fixing on the forgiveness of moral failures—not moving beyond it—that cultivates holiness.

This is not to say Bavinck and Berkouwer stand alone absolutely in their insight into the organic connection between justification and sanctification and the way the latter is self-consciously fueled by the former. One finds a similar notion, for instance, in (not surprisingly) Luther, who calls sanctification 'the doctrine of the godliness which is caused by the justification of the heart'.[45] Adolf Schlatter (1852–1938), Swiss professor of Tübingen, wrote that Paul sees 'in justification the effective motivation for one's conduct of life, so that it produces obedience'.[46] In some ways Karl Barth, too, with his radical emphasis on definitive sanctification (believers, he provocatively says, are *simul peccator et sanctus*[47]) and the indissoluble link between justification and sanctification, expounds the latter similarly.[48] John Calvin, Francis Turretin, Jonathan Edwards, J. Gresham Machen, and Hendrikus Berkhof at various places hint at the Bavinck/Berkouwer thesis.[49] Among the Reformed confessions the most pertinent

[45] *What Luther Says: A Practical In-Home Anthology for the Active Christian* (compiled by E. M. Plass; St. Louis: Concordia, 1959), p. 720; cf. p. 723. See also e.g. M. Luther, *Luther's Works*, vol. 44, pp. 285–6; idem, *The Freedom of a Christian* (trans. M. D. Tranvik; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2008), p. 55.

[46] *The Theology of the Apostles* (trans. A. J. Köstenberger; Grand Rapids: Baker, 1998), p. 248; see the whole discussion on pp. 248–50; cf. pp. 236–7; also idem, *The Church in the New Testament Period* (trans. P. P. Levertoff; London: SPCK, 1961), pp. 25–6.

[47] *Church Dogmatics*, IV/2, p. 575.

[48] Ibid., pp. 499–511. See G. Hunsinger, *Disruptive Grace: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), pp. 298–304; idem, 'A Tale of Two Simultaneities: Justification and Sanctification in Calvin and Barth', in *Conversing with Barth* (ed. J. C. McDowell and M. Higton; Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), pp. 68–89. Barth may have neglected, however, the *progressive* dimension to sanctification.

[49] Calvin, *Institutes*, II.v.15; III.iii.19; III.vi.2; Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology, Vol. 2: Eleventh through Seventeenth Topics* (ed. J. T. Dennison, Jr.; trans. G. M. Giger; Phillipsburg: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1994), pp. 692–93 (thanks to Uche Anizor for this reference); Edwards, 'The Spirit of True Saints Is a Spirit of Divine Love', in *The Glory and Honor of God: Volume 2 of the Previously Unpublished Sermons of Jonathan Edwards* (ed. M. D. McMullen; Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 2004), pp. 288–9; Machen, *What Is Faith?* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1925), p. 153; H. Berkhof, *Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Study of the Faith* (rev. ed.; trans. S. Woudstra; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986), pp. 456–57, 475 (thanks to David Reimer for point-

statement comes from the assertion in the Canons of Dort that 'just as it has pleased God to begin this work of grace in us by the proclamation of the gospel, so he preserves, continues, and completes his work by the hearing and reading of the gospel, by meditation on it, by its exhortations, threats, and promises' (5.14). Perhaps the most significant precursor to what Bavinck and Berkouwer suggest is the 1692 work by the little-known Puritan Walter Marshall entitled *The Gospel Mystery of Sanctification*.[50]

All of these, however, speak of conscious reflection on justification as integral to sanctification either passingly or ambiguously. Bavinck and Berkouwer, on the other hand, express the point with such clarity, frequency, and in a way so foreign to Protestant thinking about sanctification at the popular level that their articulation of this dimension of sanctification is worthy of singling out.

BERKOUWER'S NEGLECT

We cannot end here, however, for there is an important difference between this pair of Dutch thinkers that has not yet been raised. While both speak of sanctification as fueled by believers' self-conscious reflection on the freeness of their justification, Bavinck retains the historic Reformed doctrine of the new moral inclination imparted in regeneration, allowing his understanding of sanctification to be appropriately informed by it, while Berkouwer does not. Indeed, Berkouwer interacts directly with Bavinck on this as a point of disagreement and is loath to concede the reality of any kind of newly imported foreign power, wrought in the new birth, energizing sanctification.[51]

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ing me to this volume). See also W. Hulme, *Counseling and Theology* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1956), esp. pp. 179–180, 184, 193–4; H. Ridderbos, *Paul: An Outline of His Theology* (trans. J. R. de Witt; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975), p. 166.

50 W. Marshall, *The Gospel Mystery of Sanctification: Growing in Holiness by Living in Union with Christ* (ed. Bruce H. McRae; Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2006; reprint), esp. pp. 145–238. According to the book's introduction, John Murray of Westminster Theological Seminary considered this to be the most important book on sanctification ever produced. I am grateful to Dan Orr for drawing my attention to this volume.

51 *Faith and Sanctification*, pp. 82–4. It may be of interest to the reader to note here that both Bavinck (*Reformed Dogmatics*, vol. 4, pp. 261–2) and Berkouwer (*Faith and Sanctification*, 58–63) view Romans 7:7–25 as describing the experience of one who has been regenerated.

Bavinck is happy to speak of regeneration as 'the implantation of the spiritual life'.[52] It is 'a spiritual renewal of those inner dispositions of humans that from ancient times were called 'habits' or 'qualities.'"[53] While he is eager to clarify that these newly infused qualities are a restoration of humanity into God's image and not a re-creation of something utterly new—a somewhat unique contribution that Bavinck brings to the Reformed table—he remains clearly in the Reformed tradition as he affirms the impartation of a new moral impulse in regeneration.

Berkouwer, however, considers such a notion a regrettable vestigial remnant of Roman Catholicism's teaching on infused grace.[54] He is concerned, moreover, that a focus on this alleged new inclination toward holiness will reinforce the wrongheaded notions of 'improvement' in Christian spirituality. Such misplaced optimism will in turn undermine the salutary remaining awareness of depravity. While the guilt incurred by such depravity is fully overcome in the gospel, Berkouwer believes that sober consciousness of remaining sinfulness remains critical to healthy Christian living.[55] While he does see the Christian life as one of growth, this growth is essentially knowledge of 1) one's own depravity and 2) Christ's abundant grace which conquers such depravity.[56] Berkouwer is thus suspicious of explications of sanctification that speak of ethical or moral development rooted in a new spiritual impulse or inclination, and in his interaction with Bavinck regarding the new *habitus* he believes that 'Bavinck seems to leave himself wholly vulnerable' on this point.[57]

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52 *Reformed Dogmatics*, vol. 4, p. 76; cf. pp. 83–4. Note also Bavinck's contrast between Reformed and Lutheran theology and the former's robust emphasis on regeneration (ibid., p. 243; cf. *Reformed Dogmatics*, vol. 3, pp. 522–8).

53 *Reformed Dogmatics*, vol. 4, p. 94.

54 *Faith and Sanctification*, pp. 82–3. Here is a typical statement of Bavinck's with which Berkouwer would have been uncomfortable: 'Rome's doctrine of grace or 'infused righteousness' is not incorrect as such; wrong, only, is that it makes infused righteousness the ground for forgiveness and thus builds religion on the basis of morality. But believers do indeed obtain the righteousness of Christ by infusion' (*Reformed Dogmatics*, vol. 4, p. 249).

55 *Faith and Sanctification*, p. 129.

56 See ibid., pp. 112, 117 (relying on A. Kuyper), 129. Bavinck too believed progress in holiness included increasing awareness of sinfulness, but neither emphasized this dimension to the degree Berkouwer did nor allowed this dimension to mitigate the need for moral improvement or the reality of the new regeneration-wrought inclination (e.g. *Reformed Dogmatics*, vol. 4, p. 257; see also H. Berkhof, *Christian Faith*, 475).

57 *Faith and Sanctification*, p. 82.

INCORPORATING EDWARDS?

Is it necessary, however, to choose between the spiritual *habitus* implanted in the new birth (Bavinck) and the growing sense of sinfulness throughout a believer's life (Berkouwer)? We suggest not. Perhaps the single most profound grasp of the new 'taste' given to believers to incline after holiness in regeneration since the reformation belongs to Jonathan Edwards. The point to be made briefly here is that if Berkouwer had more sufficiently incorporated this central contribution of Edwards's theology, he may not have explained sanctification so one-sidedly and yet could have retained his profound insight into the way healthy sanctification focuses on one's free justification.

In numerous writings Edwards argued that a believer's regeneration introduces 'a change made in the views of his mind, and relish of his heart; whereby he apprehends a beauty, glory, and supreme good, in God's nature, as it is in itself'.[58] True Christians thus necessarily experience some degree of sanctification or moral change due to the fundamental change wrought in the new birth. In as clear and representative a statement as any, Edwards says that

> the first effect of the power of God in the heart in regeneration, is to give the heart a divine taste or sense, to cause it to have a relish of the loveliness and sweetness of the supreme excellency of the divine nature; and indeed this is all the immediate effect of the divine power that there is, this is all the Spirit of God needs to do, in order to a production of all good effects in the soul. If God, by an immediate act of his, gives the soul a relish of the excellency of his own nature, other things will follow of themselves without any further act of the divine power than only what is necessary to uphold the nature of the faculties of the soul.[59]

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[58] *The Works of Jonathan Edwards*, vol. 2, *Religious Affections* (ed. J. E. Smith; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), p. 241.

[59] From *A Treatise on Grace*, in *The Works of Jonathan Edwards*, vol. 21, *Writings on the Trinity, Grace, and Faith* (ed. S. H. Lee; New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), p. 174. Similar statements from the Edwards corpus concerning the new 'taste' granted in regeneration could be multiplied: along with *Religious Affections* and *Treatise on Grace*, see the important sermon 'A Divine and Supernatural Light', in *The Works of Jonathan Edwards*, vol. 17, *Sermons and Discourses 1730–1733* (ed. M. Valeri; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), pp. 405–26. For secondary literature handling Edwards' understanding of the new sense of the heart wrought in regeneration that propels sanctification, see *inter alia* H. Simonson, *Jonathan Edwards: Theologian of the Heart* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974), esp. pp. 37–40, 60–61, 118–20, 142–3; M. Vetö, 'La connaissance spirituelle selon Jonathan Edwards', *Revue de theologie et de philosophie* 111 (1979), pp. 233–45; R. W. Jenson, *America's Theo-*

Regeneration is the gift, Edwards elsewhere says, of 'a rectified palate,' inaugurating a life of delight-fueled sanctification.[60] Spiritual taste buds are transformed—not perfectly, but decisively. To be sure, sin remains: 'the godly, after they have grace in their hearts, many times do gradually sink down into very ill frames . . . their lusts prevail'.[61] Nevertheless, in the new birth, that which is good and holy becomes essentially beautiful instead of repulsive. '[A] holy person is led by the Spirit, as he is instructed and led by his holy taste, and disposition of heart'.[62] Progressive sanctification, in other words, flows out of regeneration. Moral transformation is wrought from the inside out by the vital spiritual metamorphosis wrought by God such that holiness/sanctification now appears attractive.[63]

While Bavinck did not develop it with the concentrated precision and depth that Edwards did, he affirmed this idea of a new spiritual sense of the heart granted in regeneration that ignites the new desires that impel believers forward in sanctification.[64] Berkouwer, however, is suspicious of such an idea and, in his zeal to emphasize sanctification's deliberate dependence upon justification, neglects this helpful strand of Reformed teaching on sanctification. Berkouwer should have more satisfactorily incorporated Edwards' notion of the newly awakened attraction to God and holiness wrought in regeneration.[65]

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logian: A Recommendation of Jonathan Edwards (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 65–78; W. Wainwright, 'Jonathan Edwards and the Sense of the Heart', *Faith and Philosophy* 7 (1990), pp. 43–62; G. M. Marsden, *Jonathan Edwards: A Life* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), pp. 96–7, 157–8, 286; D. Ortlund, *A New Inner Relish: Christian Motivation in the Thought of Jonathan Edwards* (Fearn: Christian Focus, 2008).

60 *Religious Affections*, p. 281.

61 Edwards, 'The Subjects of a First Work of Grace May Need a New Conversion', in *The Works of Jonathan Edwards*, vol. 22, *Sermons and Discourses, 1739–1742*, ed. by H. S. Stout and N. O. Hatch (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), p. 189. Cf. Marsden, *Edwards*, p. 137; Ortlund, *New Inner Relish*, pp. 122–38.

62 *Religious Affections*, p. 282.

63 Cf. G. R. McDermott, *Jonathan Edwards Confronts the Gods: Christian Theology, Enlightenment Religion, and Non-Christian Faiths* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 136.

64 Bavinck cites Edwards only rarely in his *Reformed Dogmatics*, including only one reference in Bavinck's discussion of regeneration (vol. 4, p. 94 n. 122). Edwards is not cited at all in Bavinck's discussions of either justification and sanctification.

65 For a similar critique of Berkouwer's view of sanctification, siding closer to (though without citing) Bavinck, see C. F. H. Henry, *Christian Personal Ethics* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1957), pp. 468–9.

A CONCLUDING EVALUATIVE OBSERVATION

At this point we turn to a brief final evaluation of the dimension of Bavinck's and Berkouwer's understanding of sanctification that this essay has sought to illuminate. As has been hinted throughout, we are convinced that Bavinck and Berkouwer articulate an important and neglected insight for the twenty-first century church. Justification is not only relevant for entrance into the people of God and for final acquittal, but, in between these two events, is the critical factor in the mind of the believer for healthy progressive sanctification.[66]

This insight should, however, be placed into the larger soteriological framework of *union with Christ*. As has been argued by many in the tradition to which Bavinck and Berkouwer belong, union with Christ should be seen as the broadest soteriological rubric, within which both justification and sanctification are subsumed.[67] This is to suggest neither that a robust appropriation of union with Christ is somehow in tension with the Bavinck/Berkouwer insight nor that they overlook union with Christ. Both (Berkouwer to a lesser degree) incorporate union with Christ into

[66] Though it is beyond the scope of this paper, we believe Galatians to articulate just this vision of justification and its relevance for everyday Christian living. While this epistle has traditionally been associated with *past* entrance into Christian faith, and more recent writers are making the *future* dimension to justification primary in Galatians, e.g. Y.-G. Kwon, *Eschatology in Galatians: Rethinking Paul's Response to the Crisis in Galatia* (WUNT, 2/183; Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 2004), it appears from the opening verses of Galatians 3 that it is the ongoing lives of believers with which Paul is concerned. Moreover, in dealing with Peter's ethnically alienating withdrawal from table fellowship with gentiles, Paul says *not* that Peter (already a believer!) needed to develop a more sophisticated strategy of progressive sanctification, but that his 'conduct was not in step with the truth of the gospel' (2:14)—a 'gospel' that Paul goes on immediately to explicate in terms of justification by faith (2:16–17). The reference to those seeking to be justified by the law in 5:4 seems similarly to be referring to the present lives of believers. Consistently throughout Galatians, then, Paul *primarily* focuses neither on the past event of justification nor the future dimension to justification but the present implications of a justification materially accomplished in the past and yet to be revealed and openly vindicated in the future. Helpful here is M. Silva, 'Eschatological Structures in Galatians', in *To Tell the Mystery: Essays on New Testament Eschatology in Honor of Robert H. Gundry*, ed. by T. E. Schmidt and M. Silva (JSNTSup, 100; Sheffield: JSOT, 1994), esp. p. 148.

[67] See e.g. Calvin, *Institutes*, III.i.1, III.xi.10; Ridderbos, *Paul*, pp. 166–9; Gaffin, *By Faith, Not by Sight*, pp. 35–52. Cf. Schlatter, *Theology of the Apostles*, pp. 235–6, 245, 248; Venema, *Accepted and Renewed in Christ*, pp. 83–94, 130, 138, 145–49, 152–62.

their discussions of sanctification.[68] Still, these two Dutch thinkers—especially Berkouwer—could have been truer to the soteriology of the NT if they had more self-consciously placed their discussions of 'sanctification by justification' within the broader conceptual category of being united to Christ. Paul himself, after all, countered the objection that justification provides a license to sin by first appealing to union with Christ (Rom. 5:20–6:23).

While Bavinck and Berkouwer have an important insight into how sanctification actually works in the daily lives of believers, then, it is not the only thing to be said in a full explication of progressive sanctification. Their insight must itself be incorporated into a broader portrait of salvation in which union with Christ encompasses the other salvific metaphors such as justification, sanctification, reconciliation, adoption, and so on.[69] It is *in Christ* that believers are both justified (2 Cor. 5:21; Phil. 3:9) and sanctified (1 Cor. 1:2, 30; 6:11).[70]

Though this is a mild critique, it is more importantly a reminder that this essay has concentrated on only one aspect of Bavinck's and Berkouwer's understanding of progressive sanctification. Much more—union with Christ, the Spirit, regeneration—must be incorporated for a theologically holistic portrayal of their understanding of sanctification.

CONCLUSION

Herman Bavinck and G. C. Berkouwer articulate a neglected dimension to progressive sanctification that helpfully speaks to the perennial question of the relationship between justification and sanctification.[71] Both

[68] See Bavinck, *Reformed Dogmatics*, vol. 4, pp. 248–51, 263; Berkouwer, *Faith and Sanctification*, pp. 107–8, 156–8.

[69] Gaffin is right, however, to detect something unique about justification within these soteriological metaphors (R. B. Gaffin, Jr., *Resurrection and Redemption: A Study in Paul's Soteriology* (2d ed.; Phillipsburg: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1987), p. 132). Justification communicates most clearly the sheer gratuity and utter objectivity of the God's gift of salvation.

[70] The title of a recent volume on justification is appropriate: K. S. Oliphint, ed., *Justified in Christ: God's Plan for Us in Justification* (Fearn, Scotland: Christian Focus, 2007).

[71] The view propounded by Bavinck and Berkouwer holds relevance to Pauline studies and discussions concerning justification within the past few generations. An influential German strand of thought on Pauline justification expounds this doctrine to include within it a transformative element. See (with divergent nuance between them) E. Käsemann, 'The Righteousness of God in Paul', in *New Testament Questions of Today* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1969), pp. 168–82; P. Stuhlmacher, *Revisiting Paul's Doctrine of Justification:*

assert that sanctification takes place, counterintuitively, by fixing one's mind on justification. It is deliberate, self-conscious focus on justification, in all its startling freeness, by which one experiences spiritual progress. The same faith that justifies also sanctifies. Berkouwer makes the point more starkly than Bavinck, and in so doing wrongly downplays the new inclination or sense of the heart implanted in regeneration. Had Berkouwer listened more closely to an American strand of his own Reformed tradition (especially Jonathan Edwards), he could have had the more balanced view of Bavinck while retaining his basic point as to the critical role justification plays in ongoing sanctification. And it would be helpful if both Bavinck and Berkouwer placed their understanding of sanctification more explicitly against the broader soteriological backdrop of union with Christ. Nonetheless, Bavinck and Berkouwer share a significant insight into the nature of healthy progressive sanctification—one which wonderfully preserves the centrality of the gospel for all of life.

A Challenge to the New Perspective (Downers Grove: IVP, 2001), pp. 62–7; idem, *Biblische Theologie des Neuen Testaments* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005), pp. 332–4; E. Jüngel, *Justification: The Heart of the Christian Faith. A Theological Study with Ecumenical Purpose* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001), pp. 208–11, 259. Similar is M. J. Gorman, who includes within his notion of justification the concept of transformative co-crucifixion with Christ or 'cruciformity', in *Inhabiting the Cruciform God: Kenosis, Justification, and Theosis in Paul's Narrative Soteriology* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), pp. 40, 55, 57, 79. In contrast to these views, Bavinck and Berkouwer would argue that it is precisely by keeping transformation out of justification, and by viewing how utterly absolute the justifying verdict is apart from any transformative element, that transformation is most decisively assured.

Stanley Grenz's Relatedness and Relevancy to British Evangelicalism

Jason S. Sexton

INTRODUCTION

Stanley Grenz did not have a close, direct relationship with British evangelicalism. After university and seminary education in the US, he took doctoral work in Munich (1976-78) before returning to North America for a short pastorate (1979-81) that allowed him to teach adjunct theology courses in Winnipeg. This continued until he received a post at the Midwestern seminary of his denominational upbringing in 1981.[1] On his early theological journey, then, Grenz effectively passed over the British context. He neither studied nor taught in Britain. By the end of his life, his career and ministry only led him to England once in 1997[2] and to Scotland on a different occasion in 2003.[3] One might wonder about the significance of an essay on Grenz and British evangelicalism. Although the query would contain very little understanding of Grenz's deep interest in the 'worldwide, multicultural phenomenon' that marked 'the global evangelical ethos' he was interested in,[4] which warranted his attention and shaped his work as a theologian.

A conscious awareness of the connectedness to the 'global village' making up the 'evangelical family'[5] prompted Grenz's desire to be conversant with, among others, the British scene. He has been keenly related to British evangelicalism since the early 1980s. While transatlantic theological cross-pollination is nothing new within evangelicalism, it is

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1 Sioux Falls Seminary, Sioux Falls, SD, USA (formerly North American Baptist Seminary).

2 Here he gave the annual Laing Lecture at London Bible College (now London School of Theology), 'Christian Integrity in a Postmodern World'.

3 Further details of Grenz's trip to the UK can be found in an earlier version of this paper, presented at *The Evangelicalism and Fundamentalism in Britain Project*, 16 June 2009, The Royal Foundation of St. Katharine, London, England (PDF: <http://bit.ly/91jFRt> accessed 19 April 2010).

4 Stanley J. Grenz, 'Die Begrenzte Gemeinschaft (the Boundaried People) and the Character of Evangelical Theology,' *JETS* 45/2 (June 2002), p. 312.

5 Stanley J. Grenz, 'Postmodern Canada: Characteristics of a Nation in Transition', *Touchstone* 18/1 (Jan 2000), p. 27; Stanley J. Grenz, *Revisioning Evangelical Theology* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1993), p. 11.

a quality that marked part of the relationship of Stan Grenz and British evangelicalism. Accounting for this connection is the central aim of this paper, which will be structured in three parts. The first explores specific trinitarian developments within the UK that Grenz found both helpful and instructive for his own development. Next, phenomena reflective in UK developments that later began to emerge within North American evangelicalism's recent history are explored, which also include Grenz's personal involvement in (and reception of) the theological happenings across the pond. The third part highlights ways that British evangelicalism benefited from and can still learn from Grenz's work. While a plea for continued British-American conversation is not the primary purpose of this paper, key components of Grenz's program uniquely lend themselves to those who desire to engage and articulate serious theology that serves the church's mission for today. Accordingly, this final section will look at the British reception of Grenz, and suggest further possibilities for continued engagement.

2. THE RESURGENCE OF BRITISH TRINITARIANISM

2.1. British Trinitarian Theology

After Barth the resurgence of trinitarian theology had long been underway on the European continent, notable in the works of Rahner, Moltmann and Pannenberg, among others. And while trinitarian engagement was not absent in the latter half of twentieth century Britain, as seen at least in the work of Thomas Torrance for example,[6] like so much else in recent trinitarian theology, it occurred more or less as a result of Barth's influence and in no way independent of it.

The attempt at a thoroughgoing recovery of the doctrine of the Trinity in recent British theology seems to have primarily occurred amidst the work of the British Council of Churches' Study Commission on Trinitarian Doctrine Today. This group met ten times from Nov 1983 to May 1988 and produced three volumes under the heading, *The Forgotten Trinity*.[7]

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[6] Paul D. Molnar, *Thomas F. Torrance: Theologian of the Trinity* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2010) and seen early in Torrance, *Theology in Reconstruction* (London: SCM, 1965), and later, *The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being, Three Persons* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), yielding a fuller trinitarian exposition which Grenz considered 'the last comprehensive Trinitarian theological offering of the century' in *Rediscovering the Triune God: The Trinity in Contemporary Theology* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2004), p. 3.

[7] London: The British Council of Churches, 1991. Vol. 1 contains the Study Commission's report; vol. 2 is a Study Guide on the report's main issues;

The work of the BCC occurred in light of the observation that the doctrine of the Trinity had receded in British history before then, as reflected in a noticeably dominant *unitarian practice* of worship, correspondingly inadequate models of theology, and the lack of correlation between human and divine personhood, which James Torrance noted in the first essay of the Study Commission's published papers.[8] Each of these unfortunate descriptions, it was deemed by Torrance and others, belonged to the influence of Enlightenment thinking which, by its key tenets, had given birth to Western individualism.

This observation made way for a renewed interest in the more Eastern social model of the Trinity which began to penetrate British theology. In particular, Colin Gunton, noted as 'a major figure in retrieving... the Trinity from the periphery and returning it to the center of British theology',[9] began to integrate the Cappadocians into systematic theology.[10] And yet until the early-mid 1980s, this feature was virtually absent from Gunton's work on the Trinity, which was much more Barthian (ie, Augustinian or Western). In Gunton's earlier works, before the integration of aspects of Zizioulas's thinking, there is 'an awareness that the Trinity matters to Christian doctrine, unusual enough in 1970s English-language theology', but not much more.[11]

2.2. British Trinitarian Praxis

Gunton serves as a case in point of the weight of influence that fully relational accounts of the Trinity began to have on British trinitarian thinking resultant largely of the BCC work, and primarily Zizioulas's influential ideas.[12] It seems like this turn toward the relational Trinity, away from

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vol. 3 contains ten papers from the Study Commission's meetings.

8 James B. Torrance, 'The Doctrine of the Trinity in our Contemporary Situation', *The Forgotten Trinity* (London: Inter-Church House, 1991), vol. 3, pp. 1–17.

9 John Webster, 'Systematic Theology After Barth', in *The Modern Theologians*, 3rd edn, ed. by David F. Ford and Rachel Muers (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), p. 259.

10 A point recently acknowledged by John D. Zizioulas himself in *Communion and Otherness: Further Studies in Personhood and the Church*, ed. by Paul McPartlan (London: T&T Clark, 2006), p. 124, n. 40.

11 Stephen R. Holmes, 'Towards the Analogia personae et relationis: Developments in Gunton's Theology of the Trinity,' in *Essays in the Theology of Colin E. Gunton*, ed. by Lincoln Harvey (London/New York: T&T Clark, 2010), *forthcoming*.

12 See references to Zizioulas in *The Forgotten Trinity*: James Torrance, 'The Doctrine of the Trinity in our Contemporary Situation', p. 16; Colin Gun-

Barth's, largely arose from a desire for a transcendent basis to serve as a corrective for societal ills. In Gunton's words, as his thought began to shift: 'Essential is that the notion of God as triune makes it possible for us to see the origin and rationale *of all things* neither in ourselves nor in an undifferentiated and heteronomous unity',[13] And therefore a social model of the Trinity could solve the problems of 'alienation' resultant from Enlightenment thought, which would then lead to a more appropriate basis for theological ethics,[14] inviting further clarification for a better (relational) theological anthropology drawn from a pastoral thrust.[15]

The pastoral implications of the relational models of the Trinity were not only serving theological ends, but also interacted with and perhaps paved part of the way for engagement with some of the most pressing ethical issues on the horizon within British evangelicalism, including controversial issues such as women's ordination,[16] homosexuality,[17] and engagement with postmodernism.[18] Beyond this, the social Trinity began

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ton, 'The Spirit in the Trinity', p. 123; Andrew Walker, 'The Concept of the Person in Social Science: Possibilities for Theological Anthropology', p. 137; and Costa Carras, 'The Doctrine of the Trinity in Relation to Political Action and Thought', p. 159. If not engaging Zizioulas directly, each of these essays engages other Eastern thinkers, either in ancient or recent history.

13 Colin E. Gunton, *Enlightenment and Alienation: An Essay towards a Trinitarian Theology* (Basingstoke: Marshall Morgan and Scott, 1985), p. 88 (emphasis mine).

14 Gunton, *Enlightenment and Alienation*, pp. 97–101.

15 E.g., Paul S. Fiddes, *Participating in God: A Pastoral Doctrine of the Trinity* (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 2000).

16 Though the ordination of women had been part of churches within the Baptist Union of Great Britain, along with the Methodist, Nazarene, and Pentecostal traditions since The Great War, it would become sanctioned by the Church of England with the 1993 Ordination of Women Measure, and is still somewhat of a controversial issue among British evangelicals.

17 Soon to be raised particularly by the late Anglican Evangelical homosexual advocate, Michael Vasey in *Strangers and Friends: A New Exploration of Homosexuality and the Bible* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1995). I am grateful to Steve Holmes for this reference.

18 To some degree, this had already been engaged in Gunton, *Enlightenment and Alienation*, but would be further probed in Lesslie Newbigin, 'Religious Pluralism: A Missiological Approach' (see this essay in Paul Weston (ed.), *Lesslie Newbigin: Missionary Theologian: A Reader* (London: SPCK, 2006), pp. 172–84), and Andrew Walker, *Telling the Story: Gospel, Mission and Culture* (London: SPCK, 1996).

informing *doxology*, as reflected in the works of James Torrance[19] and his son Alan, whose own critique of Zizioulas is quite devastating.[20]

Beyond the anthropological, ethical and doxological roles that the resurgence of trinitarian theology served in Britain, it also served a missional role. And yet this missional emphasis began to pulsate at least thirty years prior to the BCC's efforts, in the writings of the South Indian missionary, Lesslie Newbigin.[21] Certainty about the precise influence Newbigin may have had on Gunton is not clear, but the request he made to Newbigin to write the 'Foreword' of *Enlightenment and Alienation* gives some clue, as does Newbigin's other participation in BCC work,[22] and their mutual attachment as United Reformed Church ministers.[23] Early in his BCC essay James Torrance also referred to Newbigin's assessment of the British trinitarian demise.[24]

Part of a further reflection on the trinitarian resurgence within British evangelicalism concerns the recent phenomenon dubbed by many labels, among which are the *emerging church* or *deep church*.[25] The practitioners

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19 James B. Torrance, *Worship, Community and the Triune God of Grace* (Carlisle: Paternoster, 1996), pp. 18–25. James Torrance elsewhere highlighted the Triune God as not only the object of our worship but also the *agent* by which 'our worship is seen as the gift of participating through the Spirit in Christ's communion with the Father' ('The Doctrine of the Trinity in our Contemporary Situation', p. 7).

20 Alan J. Torrance, *Persons in Communion: Essay on Trinitarian Description and Human Participation* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), pp. 283–306.

21 Grenz noted that the recent root of at least one trinitarian ecclesiological metaphor (i.e., Nation of God–Body of Christ–Temple of the Spirit) is seen in British theologian Arthur W. Wainwright (1962), but finds it earlier in Lesslie Newbigin, *The Household of Faith* (New York: Friendship, 1953); see Grenz, *Theology for the Community of God*, 2d ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), p. 466 n. 10.

22 Other BCC work in the early 1980s gave birth to Newbigin's book, *The Other Side of 1984* and the BCC's 'Gospel and our Culture' program. For account of these developments see Weston, 'Introduction', in *Lesslie Newbigin: A Reader*, p. 13.

23 While Gunton worked in the context of a legacy Newbigin established, he occasionally references Newbigin in his work. See both Colin E. Gunton, *Father, Son, and Holy Spirit: Essays Toward a Fully Trinitarian Theology* (London: T&T Clark, 2003), pp. 13, 32; and his *The Promise of Trinitarian Theology*, 2nd edn (London: T&T Clark, 2006), pp. 162–3.

24 'The Doctrine of the Trinity in our Contemporary Situation', p. 5.

25 See a discussion of the development of this phenomenon in the UK and significant aspects of these terms in Luke Bretherton, 'Beyond the Emerging Church', in *Remembering Our Future: Explorations in Deep Church*,

within the UK stand in the stream of these British developments, have been highly reflective of Newbigin's writing,[26] and see the doctrine of the Trinity as deeply informing their work.[27] This has come about often in the works of those same practitioners and theologians who were involved in the earlier charismatic movement in Britain, but who recognized its serious theological deficiencies[28] and had indeed found a much more sustainable substance in trinitarian theology,[29] especially as explored anthropologically through *imago dei*,[30] which reflects the Trinity, accessible through the man Jesus.[31]

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ed. by Andrew Walker and Luke Bretherton (London: Paternoster, 2007), pp. 30–58.

26 See the comments by Jason Clark (former coordinator of Emergent-UK, which was an affiliate organization to the US's Emergent Village): 'You have to read Newbigin, if you want to do missiology and theology in a postmodern context' <http://jasonclark.ws/2004/02/02/leslie_newbigin/> accessed 12 June 2009. Paul Weston also stated that Newbigin is "essential reading" for contemporary missional engagement (personal email correspondence, 9 July 2009).

27 This also was seen in a recent presentation by Pete Ward and Paul S. Fiddes, 'The Dance of the Warrior Bride: Theological Reflections on Observed Worship' (Society for the Study of Theology 2009 Conference, Amersfoort, The Netherlands, 31 March 2009), whose presentation task was to observe 'an act of worship' and then provide 'a theological "reflection" arising from Trinitarian theology', which attempted to 'discern the nature of what is taking place from the perspective of a trinitarian theology'. An obvious critique of Ward and Fiddes is that the worship event of young people in Thurso, Scotland (2002) may not have had worshippers with any sort of trinitarian theology at all (or even belief in God as Trinity), which would then seem to challenge the integrity of a trinitarian description or accounting of the empirical activity as part of the worship at the event.

28 Tom Smail, Andrew Walker, and Nigel Wright, *Charismatic Renewal: The Search for a Theology* (London: SPCK, 1993).

29 See Alister McGrath, 'Trinitarian Theology', in *Where Shall My Wond'ring Soul Begin: The Landscape of Evangelical Piety and Thought*, ed. Mark A Noll and Ronald F. Thiemann (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), pp. 54-55, which highlights the earlier book by Thomas A. Smail, *The Forgotten Father* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1980) as offering a trinitarian emphasis over giving primacy to Christ or the Spirit.

30 Andrew Walker, 'The Concept of the Person in Social Science', pp. 137-57; and Tom Smail, *Like Father, Like Son: The Trinity Imaged in Our Humanity* (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2005).

31 Walker, 'The Concept of the Person in Social Science', p. 154; and Smail, *Like Father, Like Son*, pp. 61-2.

3. THE RESURGENCE OF NORTH AMERICAN TRINITARIANISM

3.1. The Mainline and Ensuing US Evangelical Interest

Consistent with the sharing of ideas that has taken place between European and North American Protestant theologians, a largely one-directional movement,[32] Claude Welch predicted (1952) that the doctrine of the Trinity was about to become 'mainstream again because of the insights being proffered by Barthian theology',[33] Welch was not the only American who turned to Barth for help with this, but so had others, including Robert Jenson in the early 1960s.[34] The doctrine of the Trinity continued to be a part of North American mainline theology in the 1970s (in a sort of 'retrofitting' way)[35] with process theologians. The 1980s saw continual discovery of trinitarian theology, with continued work by Jenson,[36] whom Pannenberg called 'one of the most original and knowledgeable theologians of our time', and American David Hart called '"our" systematic theologian',[37] The progress trinitarian thinking began to make was enhanced with visiting professorships to the US by Pannenberg, and Moltmann, and their increasing influence, along with the steady contribution by Jenson, and quite simply that 'most theologians writing in North America either trained in Europe or at least in European traditions',[38]

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[32] I am thinking in particular of the incredible influence from Barth, Pannenberg, and Moltmann on the N. American theological landscape during the second half of the twentieth century, not just resulting from published works, but also from extended visits and lectureships. The unilateral nature of this trinitarian reception may find at least one exception in Pannenberg's dialogue with process theologians.

[33] Ted Peters, 'Trinity Talk: Part I', *Dialog* 26/1 (Winter 1987), p. 44. Peters cites Welch's doctoral dissertation, *In His Name: The Doctrine of the Trinity in Contemporary Theology* (New York: Scribner's, 1952).

[34] John Webster, 'Systematic Theology After Barth', pp. 256-58. Jenson's first book engaging with the Trinity was *Alpha and Omega: A Study in the Theology of Karl Barth* (New York: Nelson, 1963).

[35] By 'retrofitting', Peters points out the 'encumbered' and 'rather formal task' of attaching 'existing process categories to the trinitarian symbols' ('Trinity Talk: Part II', *Dialog* 26/2 [Spring 1987], pp. 134-5).

[36] Including *The Triune Identity: God According to the Gospel* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982); and with Carl Braaten, *Christian Dogmatics*, 2 vols. (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984).

[37] Wolfhart Pannenberg, 'Review of *Systematic Theology: Volumes I and II*', *First Things* 103 (May 2000), pp. 49–53; David B. Hart, 'The Lively God of Robert Jenson', *First Things* 156 (October 2005), pp. 28-34.

[38] Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, *The Trinity: Global Perspectives* (Louisville, Westminster John Knox, 2007), p. 154.

And then in the early 1990s the doors flung wide open with abundant publication on the Trinity,[39] eliciting seemingly unlimited trinitarian engagement, and not always in the most helpful places.

By Nov 2004, according to Fred Sanders, there were no evangelical authors (especially from the US) doing 'significant work' in the field of trinitarian studies.[40] This assertion might be contested by the works of at least a few American evangelicals stretching back into the mid-1990s[41] (certainly from a number of British *evangelicals*).[42] It was also during the mid-1990s that practitioners from the US emerging church (in its variegated shades, though particularly those involved with the Young Leaders Network) 'who were part of the early missional conversation had been influenced by men like Lesslie Newbigin and were discussing the role of the church in culture'.[43] It is uncertain, however, how much of Newbigin's trinitarian basis for mission was a part of what summoned a robust engagement with the doctrine of the Trinity. Tony Jones of Emergent Village spoke of seeing a 'robust trinitarianism' in Emergent that may perhaps be 'a legacy of Stan [Grenz]'.[44]

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[39] See Catherine Mowry LaCugna, *God for Us: The Trinity and Christian Life* (San Francisco: Harper, 1991); Elizabeth A. Johnson, *She Who Is: The Mystery of God in Feminist Theological Discourse* (New York: Crossroad, 1992); and Ted Peters, *God as Trinity: Relationality and Temporality in Divine Life* (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox, 1993).

[40] Fred Sanders, 'The State of the Doctrine of the Trinity in Evangelical Theology', *Southwestern Journal of Theology* 47/2 (Spring 2005), pp. 153-4.

[41] E.g.,Millard J. Erickson, *God in Three Persons: A Contemporary Interpretation of the Trinity* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1995); Open Theists like Clark H. Pinnock, *Flame of Love: A Theology of the Holy Spirit* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1996); perhaps Miroslav Volf, '"The Trinity is Our Social Program": The Doctrine of the Trinity and the Shape of Social Engagement', *Modern Theology* 14/3 (July 1998), pp. 403–23; and *After Our Likeness: The Church as the Image of the Trinity* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998). Also, see the transatlantic contributions in Kevin J. Vanhoozer, ed. *The Trinity in a Pluralistic Age: Theological Essays on Culture and Religion* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996).

[42] E.g.,Alister McGrath, *Understanding the Trinity* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1990); and Alister McGrath, 'Trinitarian Theology', in *Where Shall My Wond'ring Soul Begin*, pp. 51-60 (see his nuanced description of US and British evangelicals, pp. 51-52), along with those British theologians who might not be opposed to the label, 'evangelical,' like Gunton and Smail.

[43] This information divulged from one of the early leaders involved in this organization, Mark Driscoll. Personal email correspondence with Driscoll (12 May 2009).

[44] Personal email correspondence with Tony Jones (18 May 2009).

3.2. Grenz's Contribution

While parallel developments were taking place on both sides of the Atlantic by the 1990s, Stan Grenz was becoming a leading voice in North American evangelicalism.[45] His early works, none of which would have been read widely (or at all) in Britain, were specifically dealing with either ethical, eschatological, or ecclesial matters, all of which were written to have direct bearing on the life of the church at the time.[46] As such, these early works carried interesting (sometimes subtle) trinitarian hints and emphases.[47]

Throughout Grenz's early writings, he can be observed as inching toward the accession of a transcendent basis to serve as a corrective for ethical and societal ills, not unlike other Europeans working in the US context,[48] and not unlike the BCC's Study Commission on Trinitarian Doctrine Today in the 1980s, which began meeting at the time that British evangelicalism was facing precisely the same issues Grenz was (ie, women in ministry, homosexuality, postmodernism, etc.). As early as 1994 in *Theology for the Community of God* he indicated his discovery of this

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45 Ed L. Miller, 'How I Took Barth's Chair, and How Grenz Almost Took It From Me', *Princeton Theological Review* 12/1 (Spring 2006), p. 3; and Roger E. Olson, 'Stanley J. Grenz's Contribution to Evangelical Theology', *Princeton Theological Review* 12/1 (Spring 2006), p. 27.

46 Two exceptions to this are *Reason for Hope: The Systematic Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); and coauthored with Roger E. Olson, *Twentieth Century Theology: God and the World in a Transitional Age* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1992). Yet Grenz would have certainly argued that Pannenberg and twentieth century theological developments had significant impact on the church's life.

47 E.g., *The Baptist Congregation* (Valley Forge: Judson, 1985; reprint ed., Vancouver, BC: Regent College, 2002), p. 18; *Prayer: The Cry for the Kingdom* (Peabody: Hendrickson, 1988; rev. ed. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), pp. 8-30; coauthored with Wendell Hoffman, *AIDS: Ministry in the Midst of an Epidemic* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1990), pp. 175-91; *Sexual Ethics: An Evangelical Perspective*, rev. ed. (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1997), pp. 44-51, originally published as *Sexual Ethics: A Biblical Perspective* (Dallas: Word, 1990); *The Millennial Maze: Sorting Out Evangelical Options* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1992), p. 198; coauthored with Denise Muir Kjesbo, *Women and the Church: A Biblical Theology of Women in Ministry* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1995), pp. 169-79; coauthored with Roy D. Bell, *Betrayal of Trust: Confronting and Preventing Clergy Sexual Misconduct* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1995; 2d ed., Grand Rapids: Baker, 2001), pp. 61-7, 80-81; and *A Primer on Postmodernism* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), pp. 168-9.

48 E.g.,Volf, 'The Trinity is Our Social Program', pp. 403–23; and Kärkkäinen, *The Trinity*, pp. 396-7.

theological basis in 'the social Trinity' which provided him a satisfactory theological basis for dilemmas left behind by modernism.[49]

In the 1997 Laing Lecture at London School of Theology entitled, 'Christian Integrity in a Postmodern World', Grenz continued to work out implications of what Christian ethics grounded in 'the only true God... the social Trinity' (both as a transcendent reference point for terms and as a model) might look like in the contemporary postmodern context.[50] This essay was an expanded edition of a chapter in *The Moral Quest* (1997) where Grenz had been moving toward 'the goal of constructing a community-based ethic of being',[51] In 2000, he stated the relevance of the social Trinity for human ethics succinctly:

> We believe that the Christian vision, focused as it is on God as the triunity of persons and humankind as created to be the *imago dei*, sets forth more completely the nature of community that all religious belief systems in their own way and according to their own understanding seek to foster. This vision, we maintain, provides the best transcendent basis for the human ideal of life-in-relationship, for it looks to the divine life as a plurality-in-unity as the basis for understanding what it means to be human persons-in-community.[52]

By the early part of the century, Grenz had become 'the most well known evangelical theologian calling for recognition of the importance of the "communitarian" turn for the casting of evangelical theology',[53] And it was the early working out of Grenz's ethics that served a major role in the development of his theological method, one that saw the present culture

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[49] Grenz, *Theology for the Community of God*, 2d ed., p. 76; and *A Primer on Postmodernism*, pp. 168-9. Interestingly, he refers to God as a 'social reality' in *Revisioning Evangelical Theology*, p. 187, though nowhere yet as 'the social Trinity'. One year earlier in 1992 he noted that Pannenberg's 'elevation of the social Trinity to the center of theology provides the foundation for a move to community, but he leaves others the challenge of developing the idea itself' ('The Irrelevancy of Theology', p. 311).

[50] Delivered 13 Feb 1997 and later published as 'Christian Integrity in a Postmodern World (Theological Ethics)', in *New Dimensions in Evangelical Thought: Essays in Honor of Millard J. Erickson*, ed. David S. Dockery (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1998), pp. 394-410.

[51] Stanley J. Grenz, *The Moral Quest: Foundations of Christian Ethics* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1997), pp. 227-39.

[52] Stanley J. Grenz, 'Beyond Foundationalism: Is a Nonfoundationalist Evangelical Theology Possible?' *Christian Scholar's Review* 30/1 (Fall 2000), p. 81.

[53] F. LeRon Shults, 'The "Body of Christ" in Evangelical Theology', *Word and World* 22/2 (Spring 2002), p. 183.

(with intrinsic language, issues and questions from its own context)[54] as an indispensable source for theology's construction.[55] But in addition to culture, in which the Spirit is said to speak, Grenz had two other sources for theology's construction: scripture and tradition. This threefold source for theology's construction, deemed a 'trialogue', refers to 'the activity of "thinking through" a particular topic in a manner in which canonical scripture, the theological heritage of the church, and the intellectual currents of the wider culture are brought together in a constructive conversation',[56] The sources Grenz found for his revisioning program allowed him to seek and identify distinct questions being asked by the contemporary culture,[57] which then make way for the doctrine of the Trinity to respond to them. For Grenz's justification of his use of the doctrine of the Trinity here (and how the 'culture' source most adequately makes way for the Trinity to be brought to bear on it) and its relationship to his other two sources for theology, he borrows from Emil Brunner. Brunner asserted, 'The ecclesiastical doctrine of the Trinity, established by the dogma of the ancient Church, is not a Biblical *kergyma*, therefore it is not the *kergyma* of the Church, but it is a theological doctrine which defends the central faith of the Bible and of the Church',[58] This is where, in light of the demise of foundationalism in the postmodern situation, Grenz's theo-

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54 Stanley J. Grenz and John R. Franke, *Beyond Foundationalism: Shaping Theology in a Postmodern Context* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2001), pp. 130-66.

55 This does, however, seem to be in somewhat reversed order, since Grenz asserted that the 'revisioning of evangelical theology demands a revisioning of evangelical ethics' (*Revisioning Evangelical Theology*, p. 19), though his own evolution happened in reverse – ethics led him toward a particular theology.

56 The term 'trialogue' was first used by Grenz in Stanley J. Grenz and Roger E. Olson, *Who Needs Theology? An Invitation to the Study of God* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1996), pp. 112-15; and later appears in *The Social God and the Relational Self: A Trinitarian Theology of the Imago Dei*, The Matrix of Christian Theology, vol. 1 (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2001), x, as a playful label that speaks of a theological construction arising out of 'the perichoretic dance of a particular, ordered set of sources of insight', Roger E. Olson says that 'the "trialogue" is stated in virtually all of [Grenz's] books' (*Reformed and Always Reforming: The Postconservative Approach to Evangelical Theology* [Grand Rapids: Baker, 2007], p. 112).

57 This includes the contemporary *theological* culture as well (Grenz and Franke, *Beyond Foundationalism*, pp. 163-6).

58 Emil Brunner, *The Christian Doctrine of God*, trans. Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1950), p. 206, cited in Stanley J. Grenz, 'What Does It Mean to Be Trinitarians?' unpublished paper presented at the Baptist World Alliance Doctrine Commission, Charlottetown, PEI (5 July 2001).

logical structure begins.[59] One might here begin to see Grenz's relatedness to trinitarian developments on the British scene, from which he drew deeply, both as part of the contemporary (theological) context and also as part of the ('open' and 'eschatologically-oriented') confessional tradition which 'provides an interpretive context' for the theologian,[60] and through which the Spirit speaks. Indeed, '[i]nsofar as the tradition of the Christian church is the product of the ongoing reflection of the Christian community on the biblical message, it is in many respects an extension of the authority of scripture',[61]

It seems clear enough that while Grenz embarked on a comprehensive trinitarian theology, he saw the British theological context as providing robust options. When scanning the trinitarian canvas from which to draw for the shape of his own theology in the progress of *The Matrix* series, he draws from eleven theologians, among whom three have been either precursors or part of the British trinitarian resurgence: T. F. Torrance, Zizioulas, and Jenson (Oxford University, 1965-68).[62] Also noteworthy is that in earlier drafts of the outline proposal for *Rediscovering the Triune God*, Colin Gunton had a significant role in the proposal.[63] This observation indicates how catalytic he was for Grenz in the early part of the project and in his own thinking and reception of the British trinitarian development.

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59 Grenz and Franke, *Beyond Foundationalism*, pp. 43-54, 190-92; Roger Olson notes that Pannenberg also makes the Trinity the 'structural principle of theology' ('Wolfhart Pannenberg's Doctrine of the Trinity', *Scottish Journal of Theology* 43 [1990], p. 177).

60 Grenz and Franke, *Beyond Foundationalism*, pp. 124-7.

61 Grenz and Franke, *Beyond Foundationalism*, p. 119.

62 Stanley J. Grenz, *Rediscovering the Triune God*.

63 In one book proposal draft Grenz had a single chapter entitled, 'Colin Gunton: Solving the Problem of the One and the Many'. Another draft of the outline proposal had the same title in sub-theme, placed in a chapter with T. F. Torrance. In another proposal draft for the same book, Grenz placed Gunton with LaCugna and Zizioulas under the heading, 'The Triumph of the Cappadocians' (these proposals are part of Grenz's personal records for the ms., *Rediscovering the Triune God*). Grenz also maintained a friendship with Colin Gunton that led to Gunton's recommendation (along with Nicholas Wolterstorff and Ellen Charry) for Grenz to receive the Luce Fellowship that gave him the time to commence *The Matrix* series, with *The Social God and the Relational Self* as the first installation. James Torrance's essay from *The Forgotten Trinity* also was catalytic for Grenz according to introductory comments in *The Social God and the Relational Self*, pp. 6-7, 10.

4. THE RELATEDNESS AND RELEVANCE OF GRENZ'S PROGRAM TO BRITISH EVANGELICALISM

4.1. Grenz's Relationship to British Evangelicalism

While Grenz's dependence on and parallel relationship to the British resurgence of the (social) Trinity has been set forth, this brief section addresses the question of how Grenz's program related to and was received within Britain. Only five titles of Grenz's writing were sold in Britain, totaling 11,703 volumes (7.75% of global book sales of same titles, totaling 150,938). He published two articles and one review in *Baptist Quarterly*, served as series editor with two British publishers (Paternoster and Ashgate), and reviewed British authors with some frequency.

In a letter Grenz wrote to Paul Fiddes (2 Nov, 1998) soliciting his support for a research grant, the appeal to Fiddes noted 'the crucial importance of my proposed work in advancing the scholarly enterprise especially as it relates to you own field of study', In saying this much, he believed the work that became *The Social God and the Relational Self* (as well as, perhaps, his larger explorative *Matrix* series) would have some bearing on Fiddes's work. Fiddes did not see the direct influence, but saw himself and Grenz working in parallel directions on two sides of the Atlantic. Fiddes recently stated,

> I recognize [Grenz's] *Revisioning Evangelical Theology* as containing the substance of what I have been trying to do in theology, but I cannot say that Stan's work had any direct influence on me or the development of my thought. In retrospect I detect the following common themes between us: the grounding of theology in community; reflection on the evangelical faith of the people of God, but not a systematic arrangement of biblical truths;[64] the Bible as shaping community, and the authority of scripture being the 'Spirit of God speaking in the scripture'; illumination here and now brought into close conjunction with inspiration; Trinity as fundamental for both community and theology; and appeal to the postmodern critique of enlightenment subjectivity and individuality. In short, I have sympathy with Grenz's building on the 'three pillars' of scripture, tradition and present culture.[65]

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[64] Grenz's 'systematic' work in *The Matrix* and his *Theology for the Community of God* clearly differ from Fiddes's perception of Grenz's approach. Grenz was thoroughly 'systematic' in his theology.

[65] An excerpt from an unpublished paper by Paul S. Fiddes, 'Paul S. Fiddes and Stanley Grenz in Retrospect' (n.d.). In this paper, Fiddes notes that he first met Grenz in 1982 at BWA's International Conference for Theological Educators in North Carolina.

Also relevant is that Grenz would not have produced what he did apart from his engagement with British thinkers and their methodologies. And certainly, as in the case of Fiddes, British theologians were well aware of Grenz's work, though not always engaging directly with it.

Recent British theologians seem to have engaged Grenz more heavily after the publication of *The Social God and the Relational Self* (2001), which established him as a significant thinker in the world of trinitarian studies. Recently British theologians and practitioners have engaged his work on *imago dei*,[66] community and ecclesiology,[67] and have acknowledged him as a major player in the evangelical world.[68] On the other hand, a number of recent works on the Trinity in Britain have commenced with no reference to Grenz whatsoever,[69] showing that British trinitarian theology (and evangelicalism) developed quite independent of him, though certainly not unaware of and devoid of conversation with him.

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66 Tom Smail, *Like Father, Like Son*; and Anthony C. Thiselton, *The Hermeneutics of Doctrine* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007).

67 Peter R. Holmes, *Trinity in Human Community: Exploring Congregational Life in the Image of the Social Trinity* (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2006); and Ian Mobsby, *The Becoming of G-d: What the Trinitarian nature of God has to do with Church and deep Spirituality for the Twenty-First Century* (n.p.: YTC Press, 2008).

68 Rob Warner, *Reinventing English Evangelicalism, 1966-2001: A Theological and Sociological Study, Studies in Evangelical History and Thought* (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2007).

69 Among these are Roger Forster, *Trinity: Song and Dance God* (Milton Keynes: Authentic Media, 2004); Robin Parry, *Worshipping Trinity: Coming Back to the Heart of Worship* (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2005); Tim Chester, *Delighting in the Trinity* (Oxford: Monarch, 2005); Tim Chester, *Mission and the Coming of God: Eschatology, the Trinity and Mission in the Theology of Jürgen Moltmann and Contemporary Evangelicalism* (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2006); and Richard Bauckham, *Bible and Mission: Christian Witness in a Postmodern World* (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2003). Incidentally, the final chapter in Bauckham's book, 'Witness to the Truth in a Postmodern and Globalized World,' pp. 83-112 thematically parallels Stanley J. Grenz, 'The Universality of the "Jesus-Story" and the "Incredulity Toward Metanarratives"', in *No Other Gods Before Me? Evangelicals and the Challenge of World Religions*, ed. John G. Stackhouse, Jr. (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2001), pp. 85-111. And yet Bauckham uses Lesslie Newbigin as an early dialogue partner in that essay while Grenz rarely considers Newbigin throughout the corpus of his work.

4.2. Grenz's Relevance for British Evangelicalism

Throughout his life, Grenz remained a Baptist situated in North America, greatly committed to the church in that context and to developing a theology that would serve that locale,[70] which may give a partial account of why he is less known in Britain. Yet it is not as though Grenz was unrelated to British evangelicalism and other theologians intersecting with it, as this paper has sought to establish.[71] Indeed, his relationship with British evangelicalism keenly marks theological developments occurring simultaneously. But can it be said that Grenz was doing something different than what was already happening in British evangelical theology? If so, what does his program have to say to the evangelical church in Britain today? In short, what can British evangelicals learn from Stanley Grenz?

British evangelicals can learn from his desire to serve the church. Grenz was a theologian of the church, who wanted to see evangelicals become better theologians. He also saw himself as a servant of other theologians, especially younger ones.[72] He saw himself as a servant of and missionary to the disheveled (and increasingly dismantled) emerging church, desiring to serve their leaders by helping them to have a theology.[73] Ac-

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70 Wolfhart Pannenberg recounts a conversation where Grenz asked if Pannenberg wanted him to become Lutheran. Pannenberg recounts his response: 'My answer then was that no, I would prefer that he in the context of his own tradition should find [a way] to incorporate the elements of truth from all other Christian traditions towards the formulation of a truly contemporary Christian theology. This was precisely what Stanley went to do in his later development, in the series of his later publications' (See the editorial comments by Erik C. Leafblad, 'Prolegomena: In Dedication to Professor Stanley Grenz', *Princeton Theological Review* 12/1 [Spring 2006], p. 1).

71 For a further account of evangelicalism in the British academy see also Stephen R. Holmes, 'British (and European) Evangelical Theologies', in *Cambridge Companion to Evangelical Theology*, ed. Timothy Larson and Daniel J. Treier (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 250. E.g.,Gunton might have not wanted to be called an evangelical, but he trained many of them from Britain to the US; Fiddes might also not want to be called an evangelical, though his work with BWA can hardly be detached from similar aspects that have also developed in US evangelicalism in particular.

72 Former coordinator of Emergent-UK and pastor of Vineyard Church, Sutton, Jason Clark attributes a personal conversation with Stan Grenz at a meeting in 1999 and subsequent emails that led him back into academic study as a theology student, into DMin studies at George Fox University and PhD work at King's College, London (personal email correspondence, 25 May 2009).

73 Personal conversation with Roger Olson (23 April 2009). Olson also commented: 'He told me privately on a number of occasions that he was "gravely concerned" about open theism and the emergent church network. He con-

cordingly, Grenz is as a model for how theologians can and should see themselves as servants of the churches. He was greatly misread by emerging church theologians (and others), who took only what they liked from Grenz, benefitting from his critique of modernism, but not considering the manner in which he sought to construct theology for the church that would effectively bridge gaps, bringing healing for the sake of the church's mission in her present situatedness. British evangelicals (especially young leaders) can learn from that. But it doesn't seem to be anything new, since similar engagement has occurred in other places throughout Britain.

If Grenz has something to offer to British evangelicalism today, it lies within his 'trialogue', the intent of which was to provide an entire systematic exploration that would produce a theology, every part of which would be informed by God's triunity.[74] This seems similar in some ways to what he saw happening in the UK (perhaps with BCC, and elsewhere), though with a different, intentionally trialogical structure, and definitely not isolated from conversation with British voices. So, going back to school with Grenz might consist of paying attention to the three sources for theology's structure, following the outline of his triad (though presented here in reverse order).

First, British evangelicals should listen to other voices from the culture and context,[75] and not just their own voices, or those from the party lines they have been taught to advertise. British evangelicals should learn from Grenz's willingness to learn from a variety of voices (inside and outside of one's camp), not uncritically, but reading and listening to them very carefully for valuable input. Grenz keenly learned from his own mentors, and yet was not afraid to subject even them to critique, especially when church history gave a stronger testimony to alternate positions or to better methodologies. May British evangelical theology be marked by listening especially to those voices and the questions of those most hurting in the world around them. As Grenz's journey went, so too British evangeli-

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sidered people in both movements friends, but he was dismayed by what he regarded as their all too easy and quick abandonment of theological tradition in favor of theological or ecclesiastical innovation', ('Stanley J. Grenz's Contribution to Evangelical Theology', p. 27).

74 Grenz, *Rediscovering the Triune God*, x.

75 This understanding is similar to that of Tim Keller of Redeemer Presbyterian Church, New York City, who defines contextualization in this way: 'giving God's answers to the questions [people] are asking, in forms that they can comprehend' ('Being the Church in Our Culture', May 2006, < http://bit.ly/bGhlGi > accessed 27 Feb 2010).

cal theologians need to study and engage the critical ethical issues in the world.[76]

Second, British evangelicals should ground their theology in church history, deeply drinking from how theology has been formulated, and how the Bible has been interpreted historically throughout the church's tradition. While inheriting a deep German Baptist pietistic heritage, and having been steeped in a rich US evangelical tradition, Grenz was much more conversant with contemporary theology than historical theology. This myopia is a weakness of much contemporary theology in the twentieth century, which has often found scholars looking back to history to see if someone at some time held to their particular view. And yet in the rapidly-changing contemporary world, with global conversations among radically dynamic theological scenes, the construction of relevant theology will have to be conversant with East/West, North/South and Central, in the search to see Christian theology not as something recently invented or new and improved, but as grounded in the faith that was once for all delivered to the saints.

Finally, British evangelicals must be biblical. Evangelicals are the people of the book. Contrary to some of his interpreters,[77] Grenz was a serious exegete of the biblical text, as can be seen in his two volumes of *The Matrix Series*.[78] Roger Olson acknowledged:

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[76] Just months before his death, Stan was working on a book with Phil Zylla, the proposal description being as follows:

> Essentially, *God and the Experience of Suffering* will be an academic treatment of the reality of suffering from a Christian theological perspective written for the sake of enhanced pastoral ministry. As an integration of pastoral theology (which Phil will represent) and systematic theology (supplied by Stan), the volume will set forth a theology of suffering, written in a manner that takes seriously postmodern sensitivities and the particular problematic endemic to the contemporary context. Consequently, the project seeks to reframe the issue of suffering, viewing it not as an intellectual problem to be solved but as a reality to be apprehended and confronted by means of rigorous theological reflection and inspired moral vision (Stanley J. Grenz and Phillip C. Zylla, 'Book Proposal for *God and the Experience of Suffering*', 15 June 2000 [unpublished]).

[77] Stephen Denis Knowles, 'Postmodernism and Evangelical Theological Methodology with Particular Reference to Stanley J. Grenz', PhD thesis (University of Liverpool 2007), p. 197; and Ben Witherington III, 'Epilogue to a Frank Discussion,' 12 Sept 2008 < http://bit.ly/d6BsxQ > accessed 1 July 2009.

[78] Grenz, *The Social God and the Relational Self*, chs. 5-7; Grenz, *The Named God and the Question of Being*, chs. 4-7.

> as I interpret even his last books, Stan followed a fairly traditional Protestant methodology of allowing the written, inspired Word to determine the shape of his thought and his conclusions. That is not to say he was secretly or covertly a fundamentalist. But he most definitely treated scripture as more than merely a 'first among equals' in constructing theology.[79]

Grenz held scripture as his primary authority, knew his Bible well, and used it often. His practice was something closely related to what certain scholars have advocated in the so-called theological interpretation of scripture school.[80]

5. CONCLUSION

One British evangelical theologian recently suggested that in light of some of the unfair criticism he received in the North American evangelical context, Grenz would have enjoyed working in the convivial UK theological setting. And while he had a bit less difficulty in Canada than in the US, perhaps he had learned from the irenic, ecumenical work of the BCC in the 1980s that seems to have served British evangelicalism well. Had Stanley Grenz not died at such an early age, his engagement with British evangelicalism would have no doubt continued to develop further, especially had he received the appointment of the Professorship of Evangelical Theological Studies at Harvard Divinity School in 2005,[81] and continued his constructive proposal on the East Coast of the United States. Stan's vision was of a distinctly evangelical theology grounded in the doctrine of the Trinity. His work flowed from a constructive program that tried to make sense of the world around, building a relevant theology that would serve the church. The need, then, for robust cultural engagement, seeped in the evangelical tradition that holds out scripture as the church's active authority is the echo left by the legacy of Stan Grenz for the church's mission today.

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79 Olson, 'Stanley J. Grenz's Contribution to Evangelical Theology', p. 28.

80 Exemplified in recent works such as Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Craig G. Bartholomew, Daniel J. Treier, N. T. Wright, eds., *Dictionary for Theological Interpretation of the Bible* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2005); Daniel J. Treier, *Introducing Theological Interpretation of Scripture* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2008); and the recent periodical series inaugurated Spring 2007, ed. by Joel B. Green, *Journal of Theological Interpretation*. See also Jason S. Sexton, 'The *Imago Dei* Once Again: Stan Grenz's Journey Toward a Theological Interpretation of Gen 1:26-27', *Journal of Theological Interpretation* (2010): forthcoming.

81 Grenz was 'a top candidate for this [new] position' and while generating considerable discussion among the members of the search committee, 'his death meant a rethinking of the finalists' (Personal email correspondence from Francis Fiorenza, 15 July 2009, used by permission).

Cultural Discipleship in a Time of God's Patience

Richard J. Mouw

There was a time in the not-so-distant past when H. Richard Niebuhr's 1951 book, *Christ and Culture*, was treated as the standard study of the options for thinking about the relationship between Christian faith and cultural context. Several generations of Christians who have explored that relationship have made reference to Niebuhr's categories for sorting out their own thoughts about cultural involvement: Christ against culture, the Christ of culture, Christ above culture, Christ and culture in paradox, and Christ the transformer of culture.

Niebuhr's book has not exactly fallen off the sales charts, but there has been some slippage. Some of it has to do with a shift of focus from the general to the particular: in instead of spending much time on the notion of culture in general, contemporary explorations of religion and culture are more likely to concentrate on specific areas of cultural expression: film, popular fiction, hip-hop, politics, gender and the like. Furthermore, to the degree that there *is* a continuing Christian scholarly interest in very general questions about culture, the focus has in large part shifted away from culture as a generic phenomenon to a more nuanced exploration of intercultural and cross-cultural concerns—we are more likely these days to talk about Christ and *the cultures* than we are to focus on God's concern for culture-in-general

The fading influence of Niebuhr's discussion of the Christ-and-culture options cannot be attributed, however, simply to shifting foci. Niebuhr's book has also been subject to sustained critique during the past two decades by some scholars who do not see his past influence in wholly positive terms. In his recent exploration of Christ-and-culture topics from an evangelical perspective, for example, D. A. Carson—who expresses some appreciation for Niebuhr's typology—has helpfully pointed to points in Niebuhr's discussion where the argument tends to undermine historic orthodoxy, especially on the important issue of the unity of revealed truth in the Scriptures.[1]

Some others, however, have insisted that the whole Niebuhrian project is a dangerous one. Most prominent in this group is the late Mennonite theological John Howard Yoder, who argued that Niebuhr stacks the deck in favour of the transformationalist perspective, and in such a way that

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[1] D. A. Carson, *Christ and Culture Revisited* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), pp. 40–4.

Niebuhr implicitly endorses certain culturally dominant values, ones that Yoder and others in the Anabaptist tradition see as inimical to faithful Christian discipleship.[2] This negative assessment of Niebuhr has been repeated by Stanley Hauerwas and William Willimon in their influential little book, *Resident Aliens: Life in the Christian Colony.*

It is this kind of critique that I will be reflecting upon here. Recently it has been developed at some length by Craig A. Carter, a Canadian evangelical scholar, in his book, published in 2006, *Rethinking Christ and Culture: A Post-Christendom Perspective.*[3] Carter builds and expands upon the Yoder perspective, offering a detailed alternative typology to what he sees as Niebuhr's highly defective classificatory scheme. The tone of Carter's discussion of Niebuhr is captured nicely in one of several endorsements that appear on the book's cover. 'H. Richard Niebuhr's days are numbered', writes Mark Nation. 'Or so one can only imagine. This carefully argued and well-written book should bring the curtains down on the more than fifty-year reign of Niebuhr's typology in *Christ and Culture*'.

My contention here is that we should not be too quick to pull down those curtains. While I have my own criticisms of the way Niebuhr makes his case at several points, I still think that his overall presentation of the issues of Christ and culture is a helpful one. Not only do his basic categories capture with rough accuracy the basic tendencies among Christians in their relationship with their surrounding culture, but I also am convinced that some modest version of his Christ transforming culture perspective—the one that he obviously endorses—is the right way to view things.

I will make my case here for a continuing—albeit nuanced—appreciation for Niebuhr's typology, by first by looking at this charge that Niebuhr's kind of perspective is not adequately 'post-Christendom'. Then I will set forth my own positive assessment of what I see as some key insights in Niebuhr's theological understanding of culture.

BEYOND 'CHRISTENDOM'

Terms such as 'postmodern', 'post-Enlightenment', and 'post-Christtendom' are used so frequently these days that they are sometimes treated as if they require little explanation. While there are important developments

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[2] The place where Yoder lays his views about Niebuhr's overall treatment of culture is his essay, 'How H. Richard Niebuhr Reasoned: A Critique of *Christ and Culture*', in *Authentic Transformation: A New Vision*, ed. by Glen Stassen (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1995), pp. 31–89.

[3] Craig A. Carter, *Rethinking Christ and Culture: A Post-Christendom Perspective* (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2006), pp. 61–3, 66–8.

that are highlighted by the use of these labels, there is also a danger that they can become rhetorical tools that mask some important distinctions and nuances. This is certainly the case with 'post-Christendom', That label is frequently used interchangeably with 'post-Constantinian', pointing to the serious drawbacks for the witness of the church that occurred when the Emperor Constantine, having converted to Christianity, aligned the church so closely with political power that Christian identity and citizenship in the empire were virtually indistinguishable.

Craig Carter's critique of Niebuhr's perspective makes much of what Carter insists is Niebuhr's uncritical endorsement of the Christendom context for understanding the cultural task of the Christian community. Indeed, like John Howard Yoder, Carter sees the presumption of Christendom as so pervasive in the way Niebuhr makes his case that Niebuhr's categories as such must be rejected in favour of a very different way of setting up the options.

The discussions these days about 'Christendom' and 'post-Christendom' are important ones. They have inspired many helpful explorations of what it means for Christians in North America and Europe to embrace a 'missional church' theology. The theologian who has inspired much that is associated with this theological perspective is the late Lesslie Newbigin, who served for many years as a missionary in India. His reflections, upon returning to the North Atlantic context, about the role of the church in culture were telling. If there was ever a 'Christian' culture in the West, he argued, it no longer exists—'the *corpus Christianum* is no more'.[4] We are now 'post-Christendom' and the church today—wherever the church is called to serve the Lord—must engage in the kind of sustained 'missionary encounter with our culture' that will require of us 'the courage to hold to and to proclaim a belief that cannot be proved to be true in terms of the axioms of our society'.[5]

This is an insightful analysis, and it should not surprise us that a book like Niebuhr's *Christ and Culture*, written over a half-century ago and presupposing some different cultural 'axioms', would see the actual contours of the larger culture quite differently than we do today. Niebuhr was a representative of an older form of liberal American Protestantism that prospered at a time when the liberal churches thought of themselves as 'mainline', and even as constituting something like a Christian 'establishment' in their cultural contexts. Today things have moved in a very different direction.

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4 Lesslie Newbigin, *Foolishness to the Greeks: The Gospel and Western Culture* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986), p. 101.

5 Newbigin, *Foolishness*, p. 148.

I have no problem, then, with critics who say that we have to revise Niebuhr here and there if we are going to have a useful understanding of Christ and culture in our post-Christendom context. I do worry, though, about what some of these critics identify as the features of Christendom that they insist on rejecting. Craig Carter, for example, in his critique of Niebuhr takes Niebuhr to task for assuming that Christians can work within the existing political power structures to achieve certain social goals. And even worse from Carter's perspective is the fact that Niebuhr does not simply reject the use of violence as always incompatible with the demands of Christian discipleship. [6]

Now, there is nothing new about Christian disagreements on these matters. The question of what it means for a Christian to be a citizen of a nation, and the question of the moral legitimacy of the use of violence—these questions were the subjects of passionate debates, especially between Calvinists and Anabaptists, at the time of the Reformation, and the debates have continued to our present day. The Anabaptist perspective has been given new life in recent years, particularly because of the influence of Stanley Hauerwas, whose writings have had considerable influence, both among evangelicals, who are attracted to the strong Christocentric themes in his perspective, and in the broader Christian community, where many are disillusioned with liberal theology. When *Time* magazine ran a series in 2001 featuring the people who, according to the magazine's researchers, were considered to be the most influential in their fields of leadership, Hauerwas, who teaches at Duke University, was awarded the title 'America's Best Theologian'.

Hauerwas, following his Mennonite mentor, John Howard Yoder, refuses to accept any definition of properly formed cultural reality that is not grounded directly in the redemptive ministry of Jesus. The Way of Jesus is the exclusive normative reference point for the moral life. This means that the Kingdom of Jesus Christ embodies economic, political and social norms that are so antithetical to the patterns of collective life in the larger human culture that Christians are required, in effect, to create an alternative culture. Thus the Anabaptist-type call for the formation of a Kingdom community living in separation from the practices of the larger human community, especially those practices that are closely aligned with the political assumptions of secular thought.

This is a powerful perspective, from which I have learned much. It certainly exposes the confusions that can result from a simple-minded application of Niebuhr's categories. One might be inclined, for example, to treat the Amish as a clear case of Christ against culture convictions. But

[6] Carter, *Rethinking*, p. 62.

Hauerwas's perspective suggests that the Amish might better be thought of as creating an *alternative* culture. They certainly do not reject farming—rather, they transform the typical patterns of farming. Nor do they reject technology as such, insisting instead on alternative technologies: the horse-drawn buggy is as much a piece of transportation technology as an SUV!

Furthermore, the present day Anabaptists and their fellow pilgrims are right to call us to account for the ways in which we often identify Christian discipleship with specific political programs and ideologies. The church's record in aligning itself with political power, and in freely giving its blessing to various military campaigns, is not a noble one.

For all of that, though, I am not ready to concede that the solution for Christian disciples is to abandon all efforts to employ the political means available to us as citizens to pursue Christian goals. Nor am I convinced that a thoroughgoing pacifism is mandated for Christian disciples. I will not argue these matters here, but I can at least point out that the late great missionary-theologian Lesslie Newbigin, himself—as I have already noted—one of the leading thinkers in shaping the call for a 'post-Christendom' Christian witness in the West, and who provided us with lengthy critiques of the Constantinian heritage, nonetheless refused simply to reject everything that was associated with the Constantinian arrangement. 'Much has been written', he observed, 'about the harm done to the cause of the gospel when Constantine accepted baptism, and it is not difficult to expatiate on this theme. But could any other choice have been made?' The Constantinian arrangement emerged, Newbigin argued, in a time of spiritual crisis in the larger culture, and people 'turned to the church as the one society that could hold a disintegrating world together'. What should the church have said in response? asked Newbigin. Should it simply 'have refused the appeal and washed its hands of responsibility for the political order?' This is not to ignore the ways in which Christians 'fell into the temptation of worldly power', he quickly added. But do we really think that the cause of the Gospel would have been better served 'if the church had refused all political responsibility, if there had never been a 'Christian' Europe?' Newbigin's own answer: 'I find it hard to think so'.[7]

I agree with Newbigin, and I am convinced that his historical observation applies nicely to our own cultural situation. We live in a time of cultural crisis, and our obligation is to reflect carefully on how we can contribute to at least partial and temporary remedies for the ills that plague us. And this is where I dissent from the 'post-Christendom' approach advocated by Carter and others. The Anabaptist perspective which informs

[7] Newbigin, *Foolishness*, pp. 100–1.

their critique of Niebuhr offers, as I see it, inadequate resources for us to pursue the mandate delivered by the prophet Jeremiah to ancient people of Israel, when they found themselves newly exiled as 'resident aliens' in the city of Babylon: 'seek the welfare of the city where I have sent you into exile, and pray to the Lord on its behalf, for in its welfare you will find your welfare' (Jer. 29:7).

To be sure, my Anabaptist friends would have a stern rebuke for me at this point. I am taking it for granted, they would argue, that God judges us on the basis of how 'effective' we can be at making good things happen in the world. But this is not the Way of Jesus, they would tell me. To be his disciples is not to worry about effectiveness but about faithfulness. In a much-quoted phrase, Stanley Hauerwas says that the church does not *have* a social ethic, it *is* a social ethic. The primary Christian ethical task is for believers to '*be* a particular kind of people' so that both 'we and the world [can] hear the [Christian] story truthfully'.[8]

I appreciate this emphasis on what we *are*, as opposed to what we *do*. But I am not prepared to give up on striving for effective political action in the world—in the standard worldly sense of 'political'. Indeed, I think that one of the reasons why Lesslie Newbigin could offer a somewhat different assessment of Constantinianism than we find in the Anabaptist critics is precisely his identification with the situations of Christians in the Two-Thirds World

A few years ago, while visiting in mainland China with a small group of Fuller Seminary faculty members, we engaged in a dinner discussion one evening with members of a provincial government's office for regulating religious affairs. When they discovered that two members of our group were psychologists, the government officials—all of them members of the Communist party—began to share some candid concerns about trends in urban centres. While the introduction of a free market system was beneficial in many ways, they observed, there were also some negative trends that were occurring: a rising divorce rate, increasing intergenerational conflict in families, and a rise in the number of suicides. 'We are not equipped to provide the necessary mental health services', they told us. They went on to express the desire to have the church offer this sort of outreach—'but the churches are not equipped to do it either', they said. They wondered whether Fuller Seminary could provide the training of faith-based marriage and family counselling in China. We are now actively doing this.

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[8] Stanley Hauerwas, *Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), p. 100; emphasis mine.

Given the political realities of China, there is no way that this kind of service can occur without Christians closely aligning themselves with government regulations and policies. Is cooperating with the political powers in this case a 'Constantinian' arrangement? If it is, my inclination is to say, 'So be it'.

And as Christians in places like China seek theological guidance for their cooperative efforts in a larger culture shaped by non-Christian ideologies, the more basic theological issues of Christ and culture loom large. What norms should guide us in these cooperative activities? How do we view the continuities and discontinuities between Christian thought and non-Christian worldviews? What do we have in common with other human beings, whether or not they share our most basic convictions?

CREATION AND FALL

Here we must face the question of moral epistemology. The present day defenders of the Anabaptist position in ethics insist that the Way of Jesus must be the sole reference point for shaping our patterns of Christian discipleship. This became very clear to me in an extensive dialogue that I engaged in during the 1970s with John Howard Yoder—both in public debates and in various publications. Some of our debates focused on the sorts of practical issues that one would expect a Calvinist and a Mennonite to disagree about, such as whether consistent non-violence is a Christian obligation and whether a Christian can legitimately serve as an agent of government. But each of us realized that these issues could never really be settled apart from addressing a more fundamental issue, one which Yoder once described succinctly in one of our public exchanges: On questions of culture, he observed, 'Mouw wants to say, "Fallen, but *created*," and I want to say, "Created, but *fallen*."'

For Yoder, the appeal to the Way of Jesus as the sole normative reference point for guidance in cultural discipleship is necessitated by the fact that, as he sees it, there is no other reference point available to us under present sinful conditions. Specifically, he rejects the sort of appeal that people like me want to make to an original normative ordering of creation that all human beings still have some sort of access to.

Yoder's basic problem with this perspective stems from his assessment of what theologians have traditionally labelled 'the noetic effects of sin'. Not only has the fall unleashed principalities and powers that have seriously perverted God's original design for the creation, but it has also distorted our own human ability to detect any of that original design that might otherwise still be discernible to us.

We are left in a desperate condition, then, where our only recourse is to follow what the New Testament explicitly reveals as the Way of Jesus. All other sources for moral-cultural discernment will only perpetuate our sinful rebellion. In the Way of Jesus we are given clear guidance for the restructuring of our communal life in accordance with Kingdom norms. And this is not a pattern that we can hope to implement on any large scale in the contemporary world. It is only possible where human beings have covenanted together to live in conformity to the demands of radical discipleship. Thus the Christian community is called to live in anticipation of a new order that is yet to come in its fullness. In doing so we are manifesting, in Yoder's own words, 'the preserving patience of God toward a world that has not yet heard of its redemption'.[9]

A big concern that I have about this kind of perspective is that it does not leave much room for exploring commonalities with people who profess very different worldviews than the one we embrace as Christians. And Stanley Hauerwas, for one, explicitly acknowledges this. He has been willing, for example to follow his counter-cultural convictions to the point of questioning whether Christians can even legitimately use terms like 'justice' and 'peace' in addressing issues of public policy. The assumption that Christians can assume a common core of meaning that we share with non-Christians when we employ such language, Hauerwas insists, is fundamentally misguided. These terms can have no meaning, he argues, 'apart from the life and death of Jesus of Nazareth'—it is only the biblical witness to Jesus' ministry that 'gives content to our faith'.[10]

This does not give, for example, Chinese Christians much encouragement in dealing with the opportunities—however limited—they are presently being offered to actively 'seek the welfare' of their larger culture. And it is interesting to note that Hauerwas has been receiving some criticism lately from ethicists who have been influenced by his writings, but who worry that he has begun to concede too much to the possibility of a common language. Robert W. Brimlow highlights some comments in Hauerwas's writings where Hauerwas seems to allow for some sort of 'translation' of particularistic Christian language into terms that make sense to non-Christians. These concessions, argues Brimlow, blunt the force of Hauerwas's emphasis on radical discipleship.[11] Brimlow calls

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9 John Howard Yoder, *The Politics of Jesus: Vicit Agnus Noster*, 2nd edn (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), p. 141.

10 Stanley Hauerwas and William Willimon, *Resident Aliens: Life in the Christian Colony* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1989), p. 23.

11 Robert W. Brimlow, 'Solomon's Porch: The Church as Sectarian Ghetto', in *The Church as Counterculture*, ed. by Michael L. Budde and Robert W. Brimlow (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2000), p. 115.

Hauerwas to return to an uncompromising insistence that Christian 'are called to the margins; we are called to be weak and separate and to view ourselves as such. We therefore must turn our back on all that is incompatible with the Gospel'.[12]

John Howard Yoder himself acknowledged on occasion the need for a larger moral perspective than is available in an exclusive reliance on the Way of Jesus. At one point in his major work, *The Politics of Jesus*, he expresses the need to draw on a wider variety of resources. We cannot hope to gain 'a specific biblical ethical content for modern questions', he says, without also making use of 'broader generalizations, a longer hermeneutic path, and insights from other sources'.[13]

CULTURE AND CREATION

It is significant, I suggest, that these Anabaptist thinkers hedge a bit on the claim that the New Testament witness to the Way of Jesus is our only resource for understanding God's guidance for the task of cultural discipleship. As I see things, it is important to see the Way of Jesus against the background of the purposes that shaped God's original creative activity. In that sense, what Jesus taught and did cannot be isolated from the designs of the good creation. With the necessary aid of biblical spectacles we can still discern vestiges of the original created order. No matter how perverse the processes and products of cultural formation have become, human beings still work within the structures of the good creation.

This is what Abraham Kuyper was getting at when he boldly (and a bit too triumphantly) proclaimed that the incarnation was not a project in moral and cultural innovation:

> Can we imagine that at one time God willed to rule things in a certain moral order, but that now, in Christ, He wills to rule it otherwise? As though He were not the Eternal, the Unchangeable, Who, from the very hour of creation, even unto all eternity, had willed, wills, and shall will and maintain, one and the same firm moral world-order! Verily Christ has swept away the dust with which man's sinful limitations had covered up this world-order, and has made it glitter again in its original brilliancy... [T]he world-order remains just what it was from the beginning. It lays full claim, not only to the believer (as though less were required from the unbeliever), but to every human being and to all human relationships.[14]

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12 Brimlow, 'Solomon's Porch', p. 123.

13 Yoder, *Politics of Jesus*, p. 187.

14 Abraham Kuyper, *Lectures on Calvinism* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1931), pp. 71–2.

I have already noted that while Yoder acknowledges the fact of an original unfallen creation, he does not allow for ways in which an understanding of that pre-fallen state of affairs can guide us in our present pursuit of cultural discipleship. The good creation has been so distorted by rebellion—both human and angelic—that its original patterns are no longer discernible. And even if some aspects of the original design are still intact, we should not trust our capacity to discern them. We are left, then, with what has been clearly revealed to us: the Way of Jesus.

Niebuhr, on the other hand, does want us to look to the good creation as a reference point for cultural guidance. He not only offers us a rather comprehensive definition of culture as such, but he sees cultural formation as an extension of God's creating designs. Here is Niebuhr's definition: 'culture', he tells us, 'is the 'artificial, secondary environment' which man superimposes on the natural. It comprises language habits, ideas, beliefs, customs, social organization, inherited artefacts, technical processes, and values'.[15]

It is telling, I think, that Niebuhr's contemporary critics typically launch their critiques of Niebuhr without attending to this definition that he offers. They rather quickly focus instead on some selected features of culture, such as coercive politics, military violence, and the nature of power arrangements, proceeding to argue that any sort of attempt to 'transform' these cultural phenomena inevitably compromises the church's witness.

But Niebuhr begins at a more basic stage, offering a vision of cultural formation as something that human beings form, in his words, as 'the 'artificial, secondary environment'' that we add to the primary creation. And this human-produced layer includes such basic things as language, customs, social arrangements and tools.

This comports well with the 'cultural mandate' theology that has been a central theme in Reformed theology's understanding of God's creating purposes for human beings. In his book *The Calvinistic Concept of Culture*, Henry Van Til contends that human cultural activity, 'that activity of man, the image-bearer of God, by which he fulfils the creation mandate to cultivate the earth, to have dominion over it and to subdue it', is not an incidental feature of our created nature. Rather, '[i]t is an expression of man's essential being as created in the image of God, and since man is essentially a religious being, it is expressive of his relationship to God, that is, of his religion'.[16]

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[15] H. Richard Niebuhr, *Christ and Culture* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1951), p. 32.

[16] Henry R. Van Til, *The Calvinistic Concept of Culture* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001), p. xvii.

Here is how that works out as an interpretation of the creation story in Genesis 1. On this way of reading the story, while the command to 'Be fruitful and multiply' is about having babies, the mandate to 'fill the earth and subdue it, [having] dominion over' the non-human creation—these latter instructions are about the cultural 'filling' of what God has already created. God placed Adam and Eve, says Van Til, in the natural environment that he had prepared—a Garden containing animal and vegetative life—with the understanding that human beings would fashion a 'secondary environment', a cultural one, out of those primal materials.

We can imagine, then, a scenario of this sort for the first pair of humans. On their first day together, they decided that they would clear away one small area of the Garden as their domestic space, and Adam begins brushing away leaves and twigs with his hands. 'No, try this', Eve says to him, and she breaks a large branch off a nearby tree, and strips it of some of its smaller branches. She then uses it to create a clear space on the ground. 'See', she says, 'we can use this. Let's call it a *rake*. And you be the one who uses it today and then after that we'll take turns every other day clearing away the leaves and twigs.'

In that brief transaction several projects of cultural formation have already taken place, of the sort that Niebuhr points to in his definition. Eve has created a piece of technology: out of raw nature she has fashioned a tool. Then she has given it a name—'rake'—thus articulating a rudimentary labelling system. She has also outlined a pattern of social organization for distributing labour—'we'll take turns'—as well as setting up a schedule. In all of this she has added several things to the primary Garden environment that the Creator has designed, thus developing 'the artificial, secondary environment' that Niebuhr postulates.

Nor, on this view, has the centrality of cultural formation been in any way diminished by the entrance of sin into the creation. Under fallen conditions the question becomes one of cultural obedience versus cultural disobedience. Our chief end, as the old catechism puts it, is 'to glorify God and to enjoy him forever'. But rebellious humanity distorts and perverts cultural activity. This can be seen clearly as the Genesis story unfolds. In the pre-fallen state, technological innovation was a good thing. It was one of the ways in which human beings lived out their mandate to glorify God in all that they do. But when, in Genesis 11, sinful people decided to 'build ourselves a city, and a tower with its top in the heavens', so as 'to make a name for ourselves' (v. 4), we have a clear example of technology gone awry.

But the distortions brought about by sin have not irreparably damaged the good creation. The situation is not one of a total obliteration of God's original designs. Niebuhr is eloquent on this point, as he states what I take

to be one of the most important insights of his book. Because of sin, he says, our 'culture is all corrupted order rather than order for corruption... It is perverted good, not evil; or it is evil as perversion and not as badness of being'.[17]

Earlier I reported a comment that John Howard Yoder once made about our differences. He saw me as saying, 'Fallen, but *created*', at points where he was inclined to say, 'Created, but *fallen*'. This was a helpful way of putting the contrast, and it captures the way in which these two different ways of viewing the relationship between created and fallen culture leads to two quite different dispositions in approaching cultural phenomena.

Whatever the shortcomings of H. Richard Niebuhr's scheme for setting forth the possible dispositions in this area, he was rightly pointing the way for how to engage in some important conversations about Christian faith and cultural engagement. We still need to look to him for that kind of guidance.

[17] Niebuhr, *Christ and Culture*, p. 194.

REVIEWS

We Speak Because We Have First Been Spoken: A Grammar of the Preaching Life. By Michael Pasquarello III. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009. ISBN 978-0-8028-2917-7. viii + 158 pp. £11.99.

In this intense little book, Professor Pasquarello continues the polemic against the cultural captivity of contemporary preaching and the retrieval of the homiletical wisdom of the *communio sanctorum* that he began in *Sacred Rhetoric: Preaching as a Theological and Pastoral Practice* (2005) and *Christian Preaching: A Trinitarian Theology of Proclamation* (2006). Here the focus shifts from foundations and saints to Pastor Bloggs himself as the one who is called to be 'a living sermon' (Augustine).

Contesting the hegemony of the managerial paradigm of relevance and effectiveness, skills and technique, the author argues that the crux of preaching is the disciplined formation of the character of the preacher himself. Eschewing all dualisms, he relentlessly insists on the integration of the intellectual and the affective, the doctrinal and the moral, the personal and the ecclesial, the contemplative and the practical as the comprehensive 'grammar' of the preacher's life and work.

Pasquarello is a Methodist who yet, like John Wesley himself, has a catholic sensibility and vision. Ireneaus, Augustine, and Thomas Aquinas, the star witness in the case, join the conversation from the early and medieval church, while Bonhoeffer, Rowan Williams, and Stanley Hauerwas are prominent among modern interlocutors. Ellen Charry, cited in critique of what she calls the 'recipe approach' to homiletics, really struck a chord with this reviewer, who remembers with utter dismay the recent re-branding of our synod Education Officer as... the 'Training' Officer! As if ministerial formation and Christian discipleship were a matter of following the instructions.

So is Pasquarello tapping into the currents of 'spirituality' with which the world is awash? On the contrary, he likewise detects a technology of ego-engineering in this fashionable therapeutic, in contrast to the kenotic rigours involved in classical Christian approaches to sanctification, including the reordering of desires and the praxis of cruciformity. And sanctification takes time, a scarce commodity in the postmodern gym of inner fitness where speed is of the essence.

The author's pivotal point is that preaching is the practice of wisdom. As 'the just man justices' (Hopkins), so (I would put it) 'the preacher prudences'. *Prudentia*, 'good sense' (Jane Austen), street savvy, patiently, prayerfully, painfully acquired and issuing in truthful speech with performative intent—this is the heart of the book's pedagogy.

Yet if there is something lacking in the thesis, it is perhaps Pastor Bloggs himself, whose life will always be more or less conflicted, whose vocation is an affliction, and whose sermons will never be better than near-misses. Of course Pasquarello is aware that the finest preacher is an earthen vessel, but I would like to have seen some honest recognition of the cracks in the clay, say of some of his paragons—Thomas' grotesque gluttony, for example, or Wesley's muddled sexuality—precisely in order to avert any facile identification of *holiness* with *wholeness*. Otherwise, moreover, there is the danger that the author's preacher becomes rather like John Milbank's church: he bears little resemblance to anyone we actually know.

Finally, an editorial quibble: the book, despite its emphasis on word-care, suffers from repetition, and a patchwork quality of over-quotation. Short as it is, it could be more concise.

Of course it is a book reviewer's job to red-pen the odd 'could do better'. But all things considered, Pasquarello could not have done much better in this timely critical and constructive contribution to a homiletics that is not purpose-driven but Spirit-led.

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As It Is Written: Studying Paul's Use of Scripture. Edited by Stanley E. Porter and Christopher D. Stanley. (Society of Biblical Literature Symposium Series 50). Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2008. ISBN 1589833597. xi + 376 pp. £23.99.

The present monograph represents the first fruits of the Society of Biblical Literature's Paul and Scripture Seminar. In broad terms, it provides insight into the current state of research on Paul's use of Scripture. More specifically, the book's thirteen essays address questions pertaining to the nature, form, function, and effect of Paul's interaction with the Hebrew scriptures. The book's diverse content will likely make its usefulness vary, but both specialists and non-specialists can benefit. Although the stated goal of the monograph is 'to "push the envelope" in the study of Paul's use of Scripture' (p. 8), its greatest asset may be its ability to introduce the reader to an increasingly vast and variegated field of study.

The four major sections of the work are preceded by a succinct introduction on 'Paul and Scripture: Charting the Course' by Christopher Stanley, which outlines the historical progression of the Seminar and announces the intent of the following sections.

The four essays in Part 2 ('Paul's Engagement with Scripture') deal with methodological questions. Taken together they form a critical in-

troduction to the ways in which Paul engages Scripture, with material on quotations (Steve Moyise), allusions or echoes (Stanley Porter), scriptural language and ideas (Roy Ciampa), and biblical narratives (Steven DiMattei). The precise definition of the field's particular vocabulary and the authors' interaction with primary and secondary literature make this section an informative and helpful analysis of the nature and form of Paul's use of Scripture. DiMattei's reassessment of Pauline typology in particular provides a unique portrait of the contrast between Paul's scriptural hermeneutic and the typological exegesis characteristic of certain portions of later Christianity.

Part 3 ('Paul and His Audiences') features three essays: Stanley Porter, 'Paul and His Bible: His Education and Access to the Scriptures of Israel'; Christopher Stanley, 'Paul's "Use" of Scripture: Why the Audience Matters'; Bruce Fisk, 'Synagogue Influence and Scriptural Knowledge among the Christians of Rome'. These focus on different dimensions of education and literacy in the first century C.E., introducing broader sociological and cultural questions. Porter's material on oral and book cultures, for example, furnishes readers with a concise summation of several aspects of media criticism and their impact on Paul's frequent use of Scripture.

Part 4 ('Paul's Intertextual Background(s)') contains two case studies on Romans, Douglas Campbell's 'The Meaning of δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ in Romans: An Intertextual Suggestion'; and Neil Elliot's '"Blasphemed among the Nations": Pursuing an Anti-Imperial "Intertextuality" in Romans'. Both explore the way in which intertextual associations may shape the course of Paul's rhetoric. In terms of the collection as a whole, the importance of these essays is not derived primarily from their specific arguments, but from their ability to highlight the complexity involved in determining whether a particular textual tradition influenced Paul's discourse (cf. p. 11).

The three essays that form Part 5 ('"Paul and Scripture" through Other Eyes') stem from divergent hermeneutical perspectives, serving to broaden the discussion beyond traditional Pauline interpretation. They approach the book's topic through the lenses of deconstruction (Mark Given), postcolonial hermeneutics (Jeremy Punt), and feminist criticism (Kathy Ehrensperger). The section achieves its goal of providing external insight to the topic, though certain conclusions, such as Given's dichotomy between Scripture and the Spirit, may ultimately prove unconvincing.

Especially on account of the increasing interest in Paul's use of Scripture, this collection likely will be necessary reading for any who wish to stay current with Pauline scholarship as well as for those who desire to do justice to this aspect of Paul's rhetoric.

Jeffrey W. Aernie, King's College, University of Aberdeen

The Cradle, the Cross, and the Crown: An Introduction to the New Testament. By Andreas J. Köstenberger, L. Scott Kellum, and Charles L. Quarles. Nashville: B&H Academic, 2009. ISBN 978-0-8054-4365-7. xxii + 954 pp. £54.99.

Weighing in at nearly 1,000 pages, this hefty but attractively formatted volume aims to be a comprehensive text book that maintains the conservative tradition of the standard works by Donald Guthrie and by Donald Carson and Douglas Moo with (in the first edition) Leon Morris. Rather pedantically each chapter begins with an attempt to identify what will be the matters of basic, intermediate, and advanced knowledge that readers should expect to acquire at these different levels of study and closes with quiz questions for self-testing (but these are not graded). The fairly solid bibliographies do not indicate which works are less and which are more technical. Sidebars take up special topics and there are 'Something to Think About' sections to help students relate what they are studying to their own personal spiritual growth.

Other distinctives include a lengthy opening chapter on the nature and scope of Scripture which includes a simple introduction to the history of the New Testament canon that helpfully assesses recent study of the problem and a short discussion of the text. The exposition of inspiration and inerrancy follows conventional conservative lines. There is also a summary chapter of basic material on political and religious background.

The treatment of the separate Gospels is preceded by a chapter on 'Jesus and the Relationship between the Gospels'. It is focused on contemporary Jesus-research and offers a useful critical survey of leading figures and methods. The Synoptic Problem is solved in terms of literary dependence and specifically of Markan priority, but the question of Q is left hanging. The oral transmission of the material is treated too briefly to be of much help to students, particularly those exposed to radical questioning of the historicity of the Gospels. The individual Gospels are treated in canonical order, thus avoiding an interpretation of Matthew as building on a Markan foundation (even though Mark was written earlier). Questions of dating are answered on the basis of an early date (before Paul's death) for Acts. A major part of the treatment of each Gospel is a simple summary of the contents whose function is not clear. The characterizations of their theological messages are much more helpful, though it is surprising that more is not made of the role of Jesus as teacher in Matthew.

The tricky questions relating to the historicity of John are mentioned but not really tackled. To say 'John frequently transposed elements of the Gospel tradition into a different key' (p. 325) is not helpful if the metaphor is not clearly explained. One example is that 'parables are replaced

by extended discourses on the symbolism of Jesus' signs', another is that Kingdom of God teaching in the Synoptics corresponds to eternal life in John: but does this mean that John rewrote what Jesus had said, so that the teaching in John is not word-for-word what Jesus said, or does it mean that John had access to different eye-witness accounts of separate streams of teaching that are as historically reliable as the Synoptic accounts? Or what? This crucial question demands a clearer answer than we are given.

On Acts the authors stand firmly in the tradition of Ramsay, Bruce, Hemer, and Witherington, but are in danger of leaving students with the impression that there are no serious questions remaining concerning Luke's historical and theological accuracy; this is probably an oversimplification of the situation. The treatment of the Pauline letters (all thirteen of them) affirms their integrity and authenticity. Galatians comes first chronologically. The authors learn from the so-called 'new perspective' but retain a critical stance towards some of its manifestations. A closing chapter briefly discusses unity and diversity in the New Testament, but the emphasis is on the former and the diversity within the unity scarcely appears.

The book is a mine of up-to-date information from which any student can profit. Whether the aim of a book to be helpful at all of the three levels envisaged is practicable, I am not sure; the material contained is a mix of the elementary and the advanced, but it is probably the advanced students who will find it most profitable.

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Biblical Theology: Introducing the Conversation. By Leo G. Perdue, Robert Morgan, and Benjamin D. Sommer. The Library of Biblical Theology; Nashville: Abingdon, 2009 (UK: Alban Books). ISBN 978-0-687-34100-9. 337 pp. £13.99.

In the opening essay, 'Dialogical Biblical Theology: A Jewish Approach to Reading Scripture Theologically', Sommer asserts that 'dialogical biblical theology' refuses to 'limit itself to large, hard-cover two-volume works' or to 'a crosscut of the whole of scripture' (p. 50). Rather, it tends to focus on discrete texts or particular issues. It commits itself to a close reading of the biblical text (for 'close reading' understand 'creative deconstruction') in interaction with: for Jewish scholars, (1) the large post-biblical rabbinic, medieval, and other traditions, and (2) contemporary concerns and issues; or, for Christian scholars, (1) subsequent Christian tradition and (2) contemporary concerns and issues.

> If dialogue between biblical and postbiblical figures is the most productive model for biblical theology, then the participants on the biblical side need not be limited to the canonizers or the redactors. On the contrary: the goal of this venture is to foster discussion among ancient, medieval, and modern voices, and for this reason too much attention to the voice of the redactor or canonizer would squelch other voices who deserve a place at the table. . . . For example, Jewish biblical theologians would think about appropriating, accepting, or rejecting biblical teachings in light of the ways rabbinic traditions have appropriated, accepted, and rejected the Bible over the past two millennia. (pp. 50–51)

This dialogical approach, Sommer contends, is 'unambiguously confessional' in the sense that it evaluates biblical texts out of the matrix of the confession of particular communities (Jewish or Christian). The hermeneutic Sommer describes 'will allow biblical criticism to become a constructive part of theological discourse' (p. 53).

In the first of his two essays, Perdue traces the course of Old Testament theology since Barth's *Romans*. The lesson to be learned from this survey, as Perdue sees it, is that we have arrived 'at the end of one dominant age of theological interpretation and at the beginning of another' (p. 134). The grand Old Testament theologies of, say, von Rad and Eichrodt have largely teetered and collapsed under the uncertainties of our age, an age characterized by 'military capitalism' (the expression is Brueggemann's), especially the Religious Right. The self-assured method of unpacking meaning was historical criticism, but in the postmodern world we are confronted by pluralism of faith and of interpretive communities. The old Eurocentric theologies by (largely) white males no longer hold sway. In short, the hero of Perdue's recital is Brueggemann and those who are aligned with him.

Morgan's 'New Testament Theology in the Twentieth Century' is (as might be expected) a thoroughly competent survey—though why some New Testament theologians are labeled 'conservative' while their counterparts are never labeled 'liberal' but are left nicely unlabeled, I can only guess. Morgan ends up with a few paragraphs recognizing the broader range of interests that have engaged New Testament theologians during the past three decades.

> As societies become pluralist, a New Testament theology unconstrained by church authority is likely to follow, for better or worse. The main lines of twentieth-century New Testament theology have been critical and historical, whether linked with theologies of the word or of history. The new diversity of methods and interests toward the end of the century have complicated the picture but have not undermined the basic tasks of biblical studies. These re-

> main linguistic, literary, and historical, and they continue to raise theological questions. The future shape of New Testament theology will depend on the tasks it is designed to fulfill. . . . If it is still to play a decisive role in determining the identity of religious communities or communions, then textual determinacy will remain indispensable, and the classical forms of New Testament theology will provide essential guidelines (pp. 207-208).

Finally, Perdue ends the collection with a highly selective hermeneutical sketch that drives from 'classical' approaches (under which both Albertz and Bultmann fall, for the OT and the NT respectively) to literary approaches, theologies of liberation (including postcolonial, feminist, womanist, and other interpretations), and 'other forms of liberation theology'.

The three essays by Sommer or Perdue are not heading in the same direction as Morgan's essay. The latter rightly recognizes the growing diversity of the field of New Testament theology, but still holds to the indispensability of 'textual determinacy'. The former are constantly and rather triumphantly driving toward postmodern and trendy ends, transparently skeptical about what Morgan calls 'the classical forms of New Testament theology'. So the book, quite frankly, does not hang together.

Despite its subtitle, it does not introduce 'the conversation'. Rather, one quarter of it manages that feat in its survey of New Testament theology (though that quarter is a bit upmarket for an 'introduction'), and three quarters of it is a slightly manipulative appeal to one trendy edge of the discipline. Detrimentally for an introduction, the book manages to avoid sustained discussion of the relationships between the Old and New Testaments (surely necessary if there is any hope for what is often called *eine ganze biblische Theologie*), of the possible relationships between history and theology in general and between the historical Jesus and the New Testament texts in particular and of the place (or otherwise) of salvation history (and what that expression has variously been understood to mean in the history of the discipline). In short, the book is not an introduction, so the subtitle is misleading, and it is only derivatively biblical theology, as opposed to Old Testament theology and New Testament theology, so the main title is misleading.

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Christ's Victory over Evil: Biblical Theology and Pastoral Ministry. Edited by Peter G. Bolt. Nottingham: Apollos, 2009. ISBN 978-1-84474-379-7. 260 pp. £14.99.

This collection is the result of a meeting held at Moore College School of Theology in Sydney on 'the relationship between Christians and the forces of evil'. Its stated aim is to listen to 'the present clamour drawing attention to the demonic, in order to hear the whisper of the gospel message more clearly, and to explore the power it promises—even in the face of the demonic'. The 'present clamour' comes from cross-cultural experiences and the growth of certain strands of charismatic evangelicalism.

As the subtitle suggests, the essays fall into two categories: biblical theology, and pastoral practice. Those concentrating on the Bible are of a conservative Reformed view. Peter Bolt's overview of the biblical sources rightly objects to a systematised demonology and insists on the centrality of christology. Mark Thompson conducts his exegesis of Colossians 2:13-15 through the lens of a traditional justification by faith hermeneutic, and Willis Salier writes of Jesus' complete mastery over evil in John's gospel. On 1 John, Matthew Jensen emphasises the glorification of the incarnate Christ, while Constantine Campbell writes on the intersection between union with Christ and the powers. The essays are competent enough, but the Scriptures and secondary sources dealt with are 'safe' theologically. It is especially noticeable that narratives in the Synoptics, Acts, and Old Testament which speak of the powers are not tackled at all. This is regrettable, since it is often precisely this material from which many, including the 'expansives' (shorthand for those influenced by the likes of Derek Prince and John Wimber), draw support for their emphasis on healing and deliverance. There is, on the whole, not enough engagement with different hermeneutical stances, and, as a result, the conclusions are predictable.

The essays dealing with pastoral practice are more stimulating, opening valuable avenues for theological investigation and practical hermeneutics. Tony Payne gives a helpful historical overview of ideas from Wesley through to Pentecostalism, outlining the development of 'expansive demonology', with its claims that demonic influences can prevent Christians from living victoriously. From a missiological perspective, Greg Anderson and Jonathan Lilley recognise the strong belief in supernatural beings among many aboriginal Australian Christians, and suggest that an emphasis on confidence in the face of the powers could be a way forward for evangelism. Donald West on prayer in the light of Christ's victory is straightforward and again, hardly original stuff. A final essay by Peter Bolt and Donald West on pastoral practice rightly warns against overemphasis on the demonic and no emphasis at all, advocating a middle way.

Commendably, the book avoids polemics. However, there is still a tendency to didacticism, which compromises its ability to relate to those whose worldviews are less rationalist than the writers' own. It is not enough simply to say what is wrong with the views of others. We cannot dismiss the fact that 'expansive demonology' is attractive to many, an attraction which (surprisingly) is evidenced by Tony Payne, who finds appealing the idea that the spirit of Jezebel may be at the root of feminism. Comments like this need to be explored. Nor can we ignore the experiences of Christians from cultures uninfluenced by the European Enlightenment for whom the demonic world is part of their cultural background. I hope that the voices of the missiologists and pastoral practitioners, which are rather muted here, will be given the hearing they deserve, and their views mined for the hermeneutical possibilities which are, at present, largely hidden.

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The Theological Epistemology of Augustine's De Trinitate. By Luigi Gioia. Oxford Theological Monographs; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. ISBN 978-0-19-955346-4. xvi + 330 pp. £65.00.

Luigi Gioia's study of St Augustine's *De Trinitate* is a long hard look at one of the major influences on Western thought, a text that shaped the landscape for many generations of theologians to follow. Augustine says he wrote *De Trinitate* so that Christians would 'perceive the essence of truth'. For him this truth is knowable only through the economic action of the Trinity. His aim is not simply to teach that God is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, but to establish that, as Gioia describes it, 'without Christ's soteriological and epistemological mediation, in the Holy Spirit, no knowledge of God, no union with God, no exposition of the Trinitarian mystery is conceivable' (p. 33). Hence, Augustine's *De Trinitate* is not merely a trinitarian theology, but equally a trinitarian epistemology.

In the first chapter, Gioia claims that recognition of this trinitarian epistemology illumines the coherence of a work that, with its argumentative complexity and numerous 'digressions', has often confused its readers and led them to find it hopelessly disjointed. Accordingly, in chapter 2, Gioia casts doubt upon such interpretations and points to the recent work of Rowan Williams and Lewis Ayres, which identify a certain christology at the centre of *De Trinitate*, as exemplary and foundational to his own work.

Because Gioia contends Augustine's is a trinitarian epistemology, he must successfully defend Augustine from accusations of pursuing an 'onto-theological' account of the Trinity. The litigating question may be

posed like this: Does the *De Trinitate* ever try to 'prove' the Trinity exists? Why this is a problem for some modern theologians (e.g. Barth) is ultimately related to concerns with modernity itself: any 'proof' of the Trinity, drawn on the basis of nature, is no less the exercise of an autonomous (and therefore Christ-less) reason. Unfazed by Barth's criticisms of Augustine, he spends a good part of his book showing why Augustine does not fall victim to the same 'epistemological dead-end' Barth condemned in modernity

The briefest of distillations will have to do: for Augustine, reconciliation and revelation make an inseparable pair. 'Enquiry into the way God has revealed himself through reconciling us to himself is only retrospective' (p. 188). Believers only know God as Trinity because they first believed. Yet before they can believe they must be purified, they must be reconciled through the *humilitas* of God, Christ the Incarnate Word of God. This ordering of revelation, faith and knowledge means that Augustine's answer to the question, How do we love through believing what we do not see?, is that 'we are known, reminded, converted, reconciled, enlightened by God and thus granted the form of knowledge of God belonging to our present condition, that is faith' (p. 188). The original action belongs entirely to God, that is, to the Father's action in Christ. Gioia thus shows Augustine is at one with Barth in fashioning a thoroughly revelational epistemology.

On this strictly revelational basis, too, Gioia argues there is no place for philosophizing about God the Father without mediation in Christ through the Holy Spirit. The human will is never neutral; sin always prevents it from true wisdom and from loving the highest eternal good. Which is why Christ has come to reveal the Father to us: by loving the Son, the Holy Spirit (which is love for Augustine) 'constitutes us believers in Christ, i.e. he creates in us that faith which works through love (*fides per dilectionem*), through which we adhere to Christ' (p. 115).

Gioia concludes that the 'primacy of love' is what Augustine's *De Trinitate* is all about. 'Love comes first' means not only must we love God in order to know him, but that God, who is love, has known and loved us first. *De Trinitate*, then, is not an apologetic work that appeals to natural knowledge. It is rather for those who already love he whom they do not see, its purpose is to show Christians that they *do* see him, on account of already being reconciled in Christ through the Holy Spirit.

One may question whether Gioia's 'Barthian' defence remains sensitive to Augustine's own concerns in the treatise. For example, Gioia argues that Augustine restricts the use of ontological categories to rhetorical and polemical purposes (e.g. to attack the Arian heresy). Rhetorical he certainly was, yet Augustine did not have modern autonomous reason

as a concern. Maybe at times he was less Barthian than Gioia makes him appear. Does natural theology have any 'non-polemical' foothold or interest in the *De Trinitate*, in favour or against Gioia's strictly revelational emphasis?

In the end, Gioia's study contains contributions beyond Augustine scholarship. The depth of analysis will enable Christian epistemologists to recognize *De Trinitate* as an essential resource for today. Indeed, this book arrives at an important moment in academic conversation: Today the notion of a *religious* epistemology is not only intellectually defensible (thanks to the work of Alston, Plantinga, Wolterstorff, *etc.*), but is in a rigorous way also theologically informed. Now open to theological considerations, contemporary epistemology is ripe for a return to the once standard work of Augustine, and Gioia's book is indispensable to those who seek such a recovery.

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Christ and Creation: Christology as the Key to Interpreting the Theology of Creation in the Works of Henri de Lubac. By Noel O'Sullivan. Religions and Discourse, 40; Bern: Peter Lang, 2008. ISBN 978-3-03911-379-8. 490 pp. £52.00.

When in 1938 the French Catholic theologian, Henri de Lubac (1896-1991) published *Catholicisme: Les Aspects soxiaux du dogme*, he laid the groundwork for many of his future publications and, in so doing, also for the theological renewal in the Catholic Church since the Second Vatican Council (1962-65). The recent spate of publications on the Jesuit theologian is of interest, therefore, not only to scholars specializing in de Lubac's thought but to all who want to understand the changes that have occurred in Catholicism. Neal O'Sullivan's *Christ and Creation* should thus be of broad interest. Written as a dissertation under Vincent Holzer at the Institut Catholique in Paris, the book presents an in-depth study of Henri de Lubac's understanding of creation, repeatedly returning to de Lubac's 1938 publication.

Arguing that christology is the key to interpreting de Lubac's doctrine of creation, O'Sullivan demonstrates that this christological approach is dynamic in character: the supernatural end of human beings, created in the image of God, is entry into the trinitarian life of God and so to have their humanness, as the likeness of God, restored and completed. According to O'Sullivan, de Lubac regards the mystery of Christ—and, in particular, of the cross—as central to this process. The cross, explains O'Sullivan, 'is the key to understanding the anthropology and the theology of creation in the works of Henri de Lubac' (p. 383). O'Sullivan does

acknowledge that de Lubac never saw his way clear to write a christology and that his early work suffered of a certain christological 'impoverishment' (p. 278). The author is nonetheless able to show that for de Lubac, Christ brought about a radical newness, which implied that eschatological renewal would far surpass a mere restoration of the paradisiacal origins of creation.

After a general introduction, O'Sullivan begins his study with a presentation of the overall context and of the underlying approach of de Lubac's theology. This is followed by a chapter on the doctrine of creation, in which the author admirably outlines de Lubac's appropriation of the patristic distinction between image and likeness. In the third chapter, the author deals with the controversial issue of de Lubac's reworking of the nature-supernatural relationship. Drawing in part on an unpublished article of de Lubac ('Sur la liberté du Christ'), O'Sullivan next discusses the transcendent newness highlighted by de Lubac, a newness that involves a divine 'Act of Love', which is better characterized as a transformation of humanity from within than as a redemptive satisfaction for sin (p. 346). Chapter 5 deals with Christ as the revelation of the Trinity. Here, de Lubac appears as a mystical theologian who at the same time recognized the centrality of the church. O'Sullivan also highlights here the significance of the Cross and of the doctrine of the Trinity for de Lubac's theology. In his final chapter, O'Sullivan discusses de Lubac's understanding of the church as sacrament—a notion influential in later Catholic theology. In the process, the author also outlines de Lubac's appropriation of Irenaeus's notion of recapitulation. For de Lubac, it is the church that enables humanity to enter into the trinitarian life and so to achieve the supernatural end of divine likeness.

O'Sullivan's study does have its weaknesses. Expositions on other theologians' thought (Rahner, Barth, Moltmann, Congar, Balthasar, Sesboüé) do not contribute to the book's value. Nor do exegetical expositions on the distinction between 'image' and 'likeness' or on the significance of the use of the aorist in the Lord's Prayer. The extensive background discussions on issues like the various quests for the historical Jesus and on postmodernity contribute little to our understanding of de Lubac's thought. The discussion is a bit slow-moving, and some trimming would have made the central argument stand out more clearly. In a few places, explanations remain somewhat inadequate. For example, de Lubac's interpretation of St Augustine's distinction between *adiutorium sine qua non* and *adiutorium quo* does not become entirely clear. Although the author mentions Balthasar's disagreement with Moltmann on the suffering of God, he fails to mention von Balthasar's own quite creative reworking of the doctrine of analogy with regard to the suffering of Christ. And the author seems to

suppose that for de Lubac the natural desire for God could not be in vain, something the French theologian was actually at pains to deny, precisely to be able to retain the gratuity of grace.

I am also less than convinced by O'Sullivan's critique of de Lubac's notion of 'paradox'. The author argues that de Lubac's reworking of the nature–supernatural relationship would have been more convincing if christology (rather than 'paradox') had been at its centre. It seems to me that de Lubac would have responded by insisting that the incarnation itself was the greatest paradox. After all, the mystery of the incarnation does not rationally explain how it is possible for God to create us with a natural desire for the beatific vision without owing us the fulfilment of this desire.

All the same, O'Sullivan's careful reading of de Lubac contributes to our understanding of the French theologian. The author rightly emphasizes that for de Lubac, it is christology that provides the key to the doctrine of creation (including anthropology). This christological starting-point implies that nature is not self-sufficient or radically autonomous, as was often implied in the approach of Catholic neo-scholasticism. By reintegrating nature and the supernatural by means of the doctrine of Christ, de Lubac greatly contributed to the twentieth-century renewal of Catholic theology and, by implication, to the possibilities for ecumenical dialogue with Protestants. O'Sullivan's fine study is an important reminder of this theologically and ecumenically crucial development within Catholic theology.

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The Holy Spirit: Classic and Contemporary Readings. Edited by Eugene F. Rogers, Jr. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. ISBN 978-1-4051-3624-2. xvi + 360 pp. £20.99.

This collection of essays on the Holy Spirit serves as a follow-up to editor's previous volume, *After the Spirit: A Constructive Pneumatology from Resources outside the Modern West* (Eerdmans, 2005). Indeed, Rogers explains, this book 'argues by display what that one argued by exposition' (p. 2). Consequently, readers should not expect this volume to reflect dispassionately the diversity of views on the Holy Spirit expressed throughout church history. Rather, Rogers' selections are hand-picked to bolster his thesis that a pneumatology of 'incorporation', wherein the Spirit 'introduces [human beings] into God as participants' (p. 3), is preferable to those theologies which allegedly overshadow the Spirit with an all-encompassing christology.

That said, Rogers nevertheless has collated a fascinating collection of material, ranging from the relatively obscure writings of Ephrem the Syrian and Isaac of Nineveh, to more well-known treatments such as those by Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Martin Luther, and Jürgen Moltmann. The bulk of the chapters are arranged linguistically, touching on certain Syriac, early Greek, Latin, German, Russian, and Romanian writings. Also included is a chapter of so-called 'Mystical Resources', which contains portions from the writings of Symeon the New Theologian, St John of the Cross, and Adrienn von Speyr, among others.

The scarlet thread identifying the volume's *raison d'être*, however, can be seen in the first and concluding sections, 'Late Twentieth-Century Questions' and 'Late-Twentieth Century Applications'. Therein, Rogers includes essays which variously criticize the overbearing christocentrism of modern theology (Robert Jenson), as well as those which advocate pneumatologies which can better inform concrete Christian practices such as prayer (Sarah Coakley) and biblical interpretation (Stephen Fowl). Throughout all the essays, the message is clear: a more robust doctrine of the Spirit not only puts the contemporary church in closer connection with her parents, but also energizes her reading of Scripture, worship, and ultimately her sanctification.

With helpful chapter introductions, manageable chapter lengths, and even full-colour images of relevant ecclesial art, this volume clearly lends itself to classroom use. While admittedly edited with an agenda, Rogers' book no doubt offers an illuminating slice of Christian thought on the Spirit which may re-ignite readers' imagination on this topic.

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The Future of Love: Essays in Political Theology. By John Milbank. London: SCM, 2009. ISBN 978-0-334-04326-3. 382 pp. £25.00.

'Hugo—*hélas*!' Gide declared, in identifying the greatest nineteenth-century poet. 'Milbank—*hélas*!' we might exclaim, in welcoming another collection of essays from this dominating figure in British religious philosophy. How incomparably dull we should be without him! Yet since *Theology and Social Theory* first established his reputation, the constant flow of Milbank essays has excited as much anxiety among admirers, who want to see a more focused, considered development of Milbankian ideas, as among the critics in whom the showmanship of 'radical orthodoxy' induces a frozen fury. *The Future of Love* is the third collection of these to have appeared. Written over the course of a quarter-century, its contents have a more heterogeneous character than their predecessors. Where *The Word Made Strange* had a set of metaphysical questions at its heart, and

Being Reconciled a set of theological and moral questions, *The Future of Love* presents itself as a contribution to 'political theology'.

That term is not given a precise accounting anywhere in these pieces, which range fairly wide. Two groups of three essays, however, focus on fundamental politico-theological questions. The first group is concerned with Christian socialism, and among these 'The Body by Love Possessed' is an important programmatic piece. A second group is concerned with aspects of liberalism and the market economy, and of these 'Liberality versus Liberalism' will, I think, deserve the careful attention of Milbank's interpreters.

Need a political theologian actually understand what is going on in politics? Milbank treats us freely to his own political judgments, and I have to confess I find many of them implausible. Inclined to see all history metaphysically in terms of vast intellectual currents, he lacks the parochial instinct to put himself inside the minds and motivations of trivial political actors. If, as a great scholar famously said of a great philosopher, 'Plotinus did not know he was a Neoplatonist', how would such a commonplace political manager as Margaret Thatcher know that she was a neoliberal? Or the younger George Bush understand himself as part of a 'gleeful' plot 'to reinscribe state sovereignty'? It is as though Milbank could not credit the implications of his own modernity-narrative. If 'modernity' as a concept is to mean anything, it must surely mean that not *they*, the politicians, but *we*, the chattering masses, think the thoughts that invoke the curses of crassness and cruelty upon our age.

This is not the volume I would recommend to those who want to understand why Milbank is of importance for theology. That must be *Being Reconciled*. But for those already following his unfolding thought these essays add new dimensions to the Milbank they already know. Some of the most interesting ones explore his allegiance to the nineteenth century Anglican tradition, in a manner that is essentially liberal and only loosely Catholic. The brief round of applause for Benedict XVI with which the collection ends is less revealing, in the end, than the articles on Coleridge, Matthew Arnold, Newman and the Christian socialists, all of which point to the spiritual wells from which Milbank has drawn his idiosyncratic but indubitably Anglican disposition. His more splenetic theological prejudices, too, which he has always delighted to display in public, have a nineteenth-century liberal flavour. (Evangelical readers, be warned!) In including three essays in response to others' critical essays, he has taken a risk, since listening to one half of a telephone conversation is not always very easy or very productive. But these responses offer self-interpretative moments of undoubted interest, especially a slightly testy series of observations on the misplaced charge of intolerance and fideism, and a reply to

Rowan Williams about his understanding of the church, both of which display a more liberal-Protestant face than we are used to seeing.

If Milbank has learned from his favourite, Chesterton, not to be ashamed of his own prejudices, he has certainly not followed the master's advice on another matter. In a fine passage of *The Dumb Ox*, Chesterton explains how Aquinas is a better philosopher than Nietzsche because he took the trouble to purge his thought of metaphor and to write plainly. Given how much Milbank's thought revolves around the themes of beauty, art, and the poetic work of thought, it is strange that he should constantly express himself in prose that is ill-formed, congested, and inexpressive, giving the appearance of being simply spilled onto the page. 'One should exhibit and offer a ruin', he tells us, justifying the incomplete character of his thought. As those who live in Scotland have reason to know, ruins may be beautiful; Milbank's, most of the time, are not. Yet from time to time a phrase sticks out, like a tower on a hill against the sky, perfectly capturing the tension between heaven and earth. For the sake of those momentary glimpses, so dramatic and inspiring, his readers will continue to think the long and uncomfortable journeys worthwhile.

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Politics and the Order of Love: An Augustinian Ethic of Democratic Citizenship. By Eric Gregory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008. ISBN 978-0-225-30751-0. xv + 417 pp. £31.00.

This is the first major work from Eric Gregory, a significant new figure in Christian ethics. It is eminently worth a read. Gregory seeks to develop a 'vision of citizenship open to social transformation by attending to virtue' (p. 9). He builds his case by neatly presenting the debate concerning modern liberalism as a struggle over Augustine's legacy. In opposition to Augustinian realists, who suggest that politics is simply a tool for restraining sin and to Augustinian proceduralists, who present a denuded vision of justice as bare fairness, Gregory defends what he calls 'Augustinian civic liberalism,' a political theory that offers an account of civic virtue centering on love.

Gregory argues that civic liberalism can encompass the best of realism and proceduralism because, for Augustine, love is internally related both to sin and to justice. Sin is a 'species' of love, thus love and sin exist on a continuum that allows each to 'constrain' the other in political ethics. That love always borders on sin should limit perfectionism that can lead to paternalism; that sin is simply defective love suggests the propriety of an ethic that seeks to train in virtue, constraining purely negative forms of liberalism. In much the same way, there is a kind of 'hypostatic

union' between love and justice: these virtues are neither to be confused nor separated, and neither is complete without the other. For Gregory, then, realists and proceduralists present truncated ethical accounts because they attend only to one half of a dialectical relation, treating sin and justice apart from love. An ethic of love corrects this imbalance, providing a thicker account of social obligation that is more conducive to human flourishing than the minimalist concern for the 'creation of a space where we do not kill each other' (p. 9).

Gregory spends much of his book showing why an ethic of love is not antithetical to liberalism. He devotes a chapter each to two common worries about love in social ethics, and it is largely in responding to these that his own position emerges. The first concerns the perceived 'irrationality' of love and its propensity to break down the intersubjective 'distance' required for politics. Gregory argues that this criticism is based on a failure to perceive that affections have a 'rationality' of their own; love, he argues, 'admits a cognitive and volitional structure' (pp. 248-55). To deny this is to arbitrarily privilege reason as most basic to the self and allow it alone to shape how we experience and engage with the world.

The second criticism, which has long been leveled at Augustine's theology, is that Christianity demands so total a love for God that the neighbour is reduced to an object of use in the believer's ascent to God. Gregory proposes that this criticism fails to take into account Augustine's theology of creation and his Christology. It is in his use of these strands of Augustine's thought that Gregory's book is perhaps most original and significant. For Augustine, all that is created is good and has its value 'secured' in Christ. Thus, all that is, merits love, and the question is not *what* we should love but *how*. Rather than inquiring into the order and relation between different objects of love, Gregory argues that, because of the goodness of creation, attention ought to fall on the disposition of the lover, the character, motivations, and virtues of citizens. He proposes that a good lover ought to love objects 'in God,' a mode of love that 'protects' the neighbour from 'the self's prideful distortion that the neighbour exists only in terms of one's own ends' (p. 42). We may love objects 'in God' because, in becoming the neighbour of humanity, Christ brings it about that God is 'all in all'. Thus, 'to love God is to love the whole of creation existing in God,' and God is loved 'in loving God's world' (p. 323). For Gregory, then, Christ establishes a 'coincident relation between love of God and love of neighbour that provides an integrated motivational ideal for human action' that can lead to a more just society (p. 45).

In addition to offering an important new perspective in political theology, the lucidity with which Gregory treats an extraordinary range of material makes this book a valuable introduction to contemporary po-

litical ethics. Yet it might be fair to wonder whether attention to contemporary questions is so controlling that important aspects of Augustine's thought are lost. Gregory is clear that his interest is in 'what Augustine has become' and not in 'what he was' (p. 77). The question is whether Augustine's theology of love comes through this transition intact. It is curious, for instance, that Gregory scarcely mentions the Holy Spirit, who figures so prominently in Augustine's theology of love.

This leads to two problems. First, where Augustine presents the Holy Spirit as bringing a new, radically interruptive love that breaks the habits of humanity's sinful will (*Conf.* 13.7.8), Gregory suggests that there is a 'fundamental continuity' between all loves, 'whether or not they are distinguished as "natural" or "supernatural"' (p. 22). This rejection of a qualitative difference between sinful and reformed love means that Gregory can appease liberal sensibilities by saying that Augustinians 'cannot expect liberals to "confess Christ is Lord" in order to become good lovers' (p. 256). But Augustine's theology would be hard pressed to accommodate this concession.

Second, where Augustine appears to reconcile the two halves of the dual love command by suggesting that Christians love their neighbours with the self-giving love of God, enabled by the Holy Spirit, (*De Trin.* 8.12; 15.31), Gregory, as we have seen, attempts to unite love of God and love of neighbour christologically. Yet the critic's fear that neighbour love gets lost in love of God may be justified, for Gregory appears at times to suggest that the neighbour is loved as an instance of the eternal presence of Christ in the world.

It may be, then, that Gregory finds himself in difficulty as a result of requiring christology to bear parts of the conceptual load that Augustine supports pneumatologically. Yet this is a question that cannot be treated here and that should not discourage any from reading and evaluating Gregory's work.

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Desiring the Kingdom: Worship, Worldview, and Cultural Formation. By James K. A. Smith. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2009. ISBN 978-0-8010-3577-7. 238 pp. £12.99.

In the first of three proposed volumes, Smith considers the relation among Christian education, worldview, and anthropology. Worried that the world more pervasively and effectively forms Christians than the church, he attempts to rejuvenate the church's formation of its members by developing its anthropology and reforming its pedagogy. The problem is that the church has subscribed to a flawed anthropology which has led it to fo-

cus on the intellect and see formation as indoctrination. Here, the church prioritizes the sermon as the pastor attempts to impart a Christian worldview or biblical data to his congregation under the assumption that right knowledge will produce right desire and action. Smith dissents from this approach due to his acceptance of new insights in philosophical anthropology and social theory. Humans are fundamentally lovers. Their desires are oriented through the rituals that comprise the culture and society in which one moves and lives and has being. The church, therefore, must form its people not merely through lectures on doctrine but primarily and preeminently through liturgy. Thus, Smith's proposal calls for a recovery of liturgy as the mode of Christian education and formation. Throughout the book, Smith treats his readers to fascinating exegeses of culture and insightful reflections upon its formative influence.

Smith begins by taking a look at how people are formed by everyday culture. He shows that an average shopping mall is no mere modern convenience, but a contemporary cathedral, a place of worship in which humanity's loves are at once ordered and satiated. The mall, it turns out, is a place of ritual and liturgy.

Smith's ability to reveal the subtle but deep ways in which culture forms us demonstrates his contention that liturgical action is the main instrument by which one's identity and loves are formed. Humans are liturgical animals. In other words, humans are primarily formed from the body *in* rather than from the head *down*. Smith appeals to St Augustine and defends an anthropology that sees the affections as central. To say that humans are affective is not to deny the rational and noetic aspects of human personhood, but to subordinate them to the heart. People are defined by what they love, and what inscribes desire on the heart of a person, says Smith, is his habits and dispositions, his liturgical embodiment in the world.

With this anthropology in place, Smith suggests that the church's traditional commitment to worldview formation should be modified to account for what Charles Taylor calls the 'the social imaginary'. The social imaginary is the cultural mentality and system of values and goals which engender and make sense of the social, political, and cultural patterns, practices, and stories. Smith accordingly argues for a liturgical understanding of worldview formation where ecclesial practices and liturgies are the means by which an alternative, Christian social imaginary is developed. Liturgical habituation into the rhythms of the kingdom is crucial for a Christian understanding of the world.

Smith masterfully examines cultural liturgies and shows how they form us. He rightfully implores the church to recover liturgical formation and, along the way, introduces several key components, not least of

which are his affective anthropology and his appropriation of the social imaginary.

The shortcoming of this volume is Smith's ignorance of *doctrine* and its effect, his preference for contemporary philosophy. Consequently, he does not conceive formation in theological terms, but follows the canons of contemporary social and anthropological theory. Furthermore, in the Reformed tradition in which Smith stands, there are deep wells of affective anthropologies, christologically oriented heart-formation, and pneumatologically robust accounts of Christian formation. But Smith does not drink from these fountains and so oddly relies more on voices outside the very tradition he thinks bears the Christian social imaginary.

While Smith may account for these lacunae in future volumes, the lack of doctrinal reasoning leaves this volume ironically secular; Smith offers an account of *human* formation, not yet a specifically *Christian* account. He thus fails to see a difference between the way culture forms and the way God forms. Had he been more attentive to doctrine, Smith might have realized that christology and pneumatology give rise to the language of regeneration and sanctification, which is a very different happening than simple human growth, formation, or moral self-realization. While Smith does attempt to integrate Christ and the Spirit, neither play substantial roles, in either a material or formal sense, in his work.

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Living Gently in a Violent World: The Prophetic Witness of Weakness. By Stanley Hauerwas and Jean Vanier. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2008. ISBN 978-0-8308-3452-5. 117 pp. £9.99.

A product of a 2006 conference organized by the Centre of Spirituality, Health and Disability at the University of Aberdeen, this book marks the first occasion on which Stanley Hauerwas, renowned theologian and Christian ethicist, and Jean Vanier, founder of the worldwide L'Arche communities, have worked in direct partnership. In this book they, in their respective and unique styles, call the church to take seriously its role in demonstrating to the world that a different way of living has been made possible, one characterized by gentleness, peacemaking and faithfulness. They do so by directing our attention to the ministry of L'Arche (http://www.larche.org.uk/), an organization oriented by Christian principles intent on caring for and befriending people with disabilities.

In addressing issues of theology and disability, Hauerwas and Vanier challenge the reader to see the world through the eyes of those who have been placed at the margins of society. As John Swinton writes in the introduction, they make it clear that 'it is not the world of disability that is

strange, but the world "outside," which we dare to call normal. It turns out that the world of disability is the place that God chooses to inhabit'.

The beauty of L'Arche, as Vanier describes it, is that it provides us with a unique opportunity to experience the kind of love that we find Jesus bringing in the Gospels where the poor, the disabled (blind, lame, disturbed), the outcast, the peasant masses, the sinners are elevated and objects of his attention and care. While the 'normal' world is actively trying to make the existence of the 'least of these' redundant, L'Arche sees the world through God's eyes and so finds God's love in friendship with those whom the world finds odd and marginalizes. As Vanier puts it, 'if you become a friend of somebody who is excluded, you are doing a work of unity. You are bringing people together. You are doing God's work.'

L'Arche provides us with the means for developing and maintaining these meaningful and unifying friendships, Hauerwas explains, by teaching us the importance of slowing down. In his words, 'L'Arche embodies the patience that is absolutely crucial if we are to learn to be faithful people in our world'. While he implores the reader to listen to the weakest members of society, one cannot help but wonder whether, according to the main theme of the book, those on the margins actually are the weakest members of society. It seems as though those who are more in tune with the love of God and the necessity of meaningful friendships over frantic activity might in fact have a leg up on the rest us, and therefore be an instance of what Jesus meant when he spoke of the last being first. This is why L'Arche is so important, both for the world and for the church: it is a place that teaches us to learn this hope in a world that can only see the 'weakness' of disability as a 'problem' to be solved and corrected. By 'living gently', by practicing patient friendship with those with whom Christ identified, we will learn the love of Christ and discover the truths of creation and redemption, that *all* human life is a gift from God and *all* are welcome in his Kingdom.

Short in pages but rich in content, *Living Gently in a Violent World* is a very important book for the church, particularly in a time when a meaningful response to theological and ethical issues surrounding personhood is in high demand. If the church is indeed meant to demonstrate to the world that a different way of living has been made possible through Christ, then faithful disciples have no choice but to be engaged in the practices of friendship and peace. We do live in a broken world that becomes more fractured day-by-day, and Hauerwas and Vanier call our attention to the challenge L'Arche puts to us, a challenge to slow down and behold in friendships with the weak the true life Jesus offers, a life of weakness, humility and trust, not power, upward mobility, and self-sufficiency.

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Money, Greed, and God: Why Capitalism Is the Solution and Not the Problem. By Jay W. Richards. New York: HarperOne, 2009. ISBN 978-0-06-137561-3. 255 pp. £15.60.

Jay Richards, an evangelical political apologist, defends capitalism against eight myths he believes socialist propagandists and religious elites spin in order to mislead unsuspecting, pious innocents. His purpose is to liberate those innocent dupes by giving them the truth—capitalism is always the solution, never the problem. These eight myths constitute the eight chapters of his book. They are as follows: 1. Anti-capitalists set forth an impossible ideal against which capitalism is measured. 2. They emphasize good intentions, such as a 'living wage', which social scientists know cannot establish an efficient economic order without attention to unintended consequences. In other words, directly intending the good can do more harm than following the laws of the free market. 3. They set forth a zero-sum economy. 4. They disparage wealth by teaching that it comes at someone else's expense. 5. They teach that capitalism works through greed. 6. They trumpet Christianity's traditional usury prohibition as evidence that making money on money is immoral. 7. They teach that capitalism creates an ugly world, confusing aesthetic judgments with economic arguments. 8. They teach that capitalism has a voracious appetite that will use up all the world's resources. Richards wants to explode these 'myths', freeing us from the 'they'.

Who exactly 'they' are is not clear. He provides anecdotes from past professors he had in college and takes occasional swipes at Jim Wallis, Ron Sider, Tony Campolo, Rod Dreher, and Wendell Berry. But we do not get any sustained attention as to who the left-wing socialist conspirators are spinning these foolish myths. In fact, this is a populist work that does not take into account most of the serious work done in Christian theology on economics. It trots out old canards like the usury prohibition assumed a zero-sum game, even though few today seriously studying the church's traditional teaching on monetary exchange accept such silliness was primarily behind the usury prohibition. The ancients were not so foolish as to think every exchange was zero-sum. It was secular economists, especially the Austrians, who taught that in order to exemplify how ridiculous they found the Christian scholastics and fathers to be. But it was a caricature then as it is now.

Richards needs these caricatures of capitalism's critics to make his arguments. He consistently makes six 'arguments,' which are more rhetorical assertions than anything else. First, capitalism may not be the best system, but all the alternatives are worse. Here, he is guilty of a version of the first myth he identified—he compares extremes; our alternatives are

Pol Pot or capitalism. Second, critics of capitalism are ignorant and don't understand it. It is the only system that can alleviate poverty. Third, a cost-benefit analysis of every moral or theological principle must be done. In other words, Richards cannot think outside utilitarianism. Every action or thing can be given a number, a value, and compared to another. No two actions or things are incommensurable. Fourth, capitalism is primarily about ideas; they are what generate wealth. Fifth, the moral critiques of capitalism fail to account for unintended consequences. (It always strikes me as odd that defenders of the stoic rationality of the free market claim to know how *unintended* consequences will work to increase utility. Evidently they are not 'unintended' to the truly enlightened!) Finally, the opposing side is part of an elite, envious, resentful class who keep the truth from the masses. Nearly every chapter in Richards' book blasts away with one of these arguments. What you will not find, even though the book was published in 2009, is any discussion of credit default swaps or how unregulated banking industries might actually be a problem. This is a book intended to assuage Christians who might find something like the Great Recession to be a sign not all is well with capitalism.

Richards' tone deafness to any possibility that capitalism might have the slightest problem with it is stunning. You wonder what inequities he would not countenance. He defends the reality that the market will pay coffee pickers 10 cents a day for picking coffee while Starbucks charges $4.28 for a double latte (p. 40). Likewise, he justifies the fact that the top 500 CEO's made an average of $13.5 million in 2005 while a minimum wage worker made $10,700 (p. 67). If any of that seems intuitively wrong or sinful, do not worry. Once you understand how markets work, you will see that such inequities are necessary for efficiency. And, of course, any redistribution of wealth would be counter-productive. Why is this? It is because labour must be seen as only a commodity if capitalism is to work properly. And, of course, it will need the force of law to insure it is only construed as such.

Richards' liberal utilitarianism shows itself again in his description of what labour is. He writes, 'To a business, employee wages are costs... . A wage is a price on a commodity—labor'. It must not be understood as anything more than that. If it is, the system will not work. For this reason, we must not have any minimum wage let alone a just wage (p. 38). This is classic liberalism, pure utilitarianism. It also directly and defiantly contradicts Catholic social teaching since Leo XIII, if not Thomas Aquinas. Other telling rejections of traditional Christian teaching can be readily found in Richards' defence of capitalism. It is at least a heterodox work.

Like many others who argue in this vein, Richards sets forth China as a shining example of what free markets can do. He contrasts China with

socialist African countries and argues it is the former's free markets combined with the rule of law that 'continue a steady glide up and to the right as their economies grow freer' (p. 92). At some point Christian apologists like Richards must explain why China can allow McDonalds and Starbucks on every corner but continue its crackdown on house churches. I would think that a Christian apologist like St Paul would not allow the latter to go unmentioned in favour of extolling the former. Richards' book leads me to think that he finds Wallis and Sider more dangerous to Christianity than the Chinese government. Can that be right (pun intended)?

Perhaps capitalism is not always the answer if you ask a question other than the utilitarian one that dominates Richards' argument. If the question is, how do we value efficiency above everything else, then Richards' 'argument' works. But that may be because the answer is already contained in the question. If any other question gets raised, the argument falters. One should not read his book armed only with that question, it might lead to being taken in by the 'argument'. Instead, readers should have in their minds questions prompted by Christian moral theology: How does my use of money exegete God's name? How might it fit God's intentions for creation? How will it bear witness to God's eschatological rule? How can I use money to love my neighbour? When the Christian theological vision is allowed its hermeneutical priority, the moral texture of our world suddenly appears differently than it does from the perspective of liberal utilitarianism out of which Richards works.

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The New Shape of World Christianity. By Mark Noll. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2009. ISBN 978-0-8308-2847-0. 212 pp. £15.60.

Christianity is in the midst of dramatic and unprecedented changes. The demographic shift from a Western and Northern hemisphere centered Christianity to an Eastern and Western hemisphere centered Christianity has irrevocably changed the face of Christianity. As Philip Jenkins inquires, however, 'What . . . do most Americans know about the distribution of Christians worldwide? I suspect that most see Christianity very much as it was a century ago—a predominantly European and North American faith' ('The Next Christianity', *The Atlantic* (October 2002)). It is welcome, therefore, that the reality of the changing face of Christianity is announced by one of America's foremost church historians in his latest book.

Mark Noll addresses the question: 'What has been, is and should be the relationship between Christian development in North America and Christian development in the rest of the world' (p. 11)? While missiolo-

gists and theologians explore the future implications of these changes, Noll chooses to explore various historical factors that led to them. 'The book's major argument is that Christianity in its American form has indeed become very important for the world' (p. 11). That is, American Christianity has given the possibility of cultural adaptation for world Christianity to follow.

Towards that end, Noll examines three different possible analyses of the impact of American Christianity on global Christianity: (1) the power of American Christianity manipulates global Christianity, (2) American Christianity influences global Christianity which voluntarily chooses to adopt aspects of American Christianity, and (3) there is a shared historical experience that leads to a parallel development between global and American Christianity (see pp. 67-68). Noll offers the combination of position two and three as the reasons for the similarities between global Christianity and American Christianity. He seems to reject intentional American manipulation and moves towards indirect influence and historical parallelism as an explanation.

Using examples such as the growth of the church in South Korea and the revivals in East Africa, Noll asserts that the impact of American Christianity on these regions of the world should focus on the ability of the indigenous cultures to adapt the gospel. 'The new shape of world Christianity offers a mosaic of many, many varieties of local belief and practice... . In many places it is possible to find traces—or more—of American influence. But the multiplicity goes far beyond what any one influence can explain, except the adaptability of the Christian faith itself' (p. 27). Noll's analysis of the adaptive power of the gospel, despite what may be perceived as American cultural baggage, reveals the positive influence of American Christianity in the development of global Christianity.

While Noll effectively connects cultural relevancy and adaptation gleaned in the context of American Christianity to global Christianity, he leaves some questions unanswered about the dynamic relationship between the two streams. For example, Noll speaks about the role of power, but ultimately seems to diminish the impact of American Christianity's power upon global Christianity. In discussing the impact of American missionaries, he gives the example of the declining number of missionaries and the declining influence of American missionaries. The book doesn't seem to address, however, that even if the number of missionaries may have declined, ultimately, the transmission of American Christian culture no longer relies upon the American missionary. The proliferation of literature, television, internet, and other forms of mass media (i.e., the globalization of American culture) means that American Christianity's cultural impact continues without explicitly missionary activity. An

American mega-church pastor or televangelist's influence are felt in all corners of the globe, because they have a media, print, and even a political ministry that directly shapes Christianity in other regions of the world.

This, however, does not take away from the main thrust of Noll's message. The strongest aspect of the book is the call for indigenous movements to take on greater responsibility for the formation of their own Christian expression. If indeed, part of the power of the gospel is cultural adaptability, then that power exercised by the indigenous population, without interference, can continue to foster the growth of global Christianity.

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Global Dictionary of Theology. Edited by William A. Dyrness and Veli-Matti Kärkäinen. Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2008. ISBN 978-0-8308-2454-0. 996 pp. £29.99.

Educators and pastors find no shortage of theological dictionaries, so why publish a *'Global' Dictionary of Theology* (*GDT*)? According to the editors, the twenty-first century church is in the midst of a global 're-formation' that necessitates a corresponding shift in the understanding and practice of theology (p. ix). Christianity must be understood not only as a world religion but as a 'world Christianity'. Theology, then, must acknowledge the authority of Scripture and the Christian tradition, but it must also affirm rather than mute Christian difference 'multiperspectivalism'). The type of theology sought by the editors is one uniquely 'global' but only inasmuch as it is authentically '"local" in the sense of being reflective of particular locations' (p. xi). The goal is not a universal theology—one able to speak to all peoples in all times—but one that brings together, listens carefully to, and puts into dialogue voices from different contexts. This impacts the shape and emphases of the volume.

For example, *GDT* defines theology as 'that which reflects the faith and practice of Christian groups around the world' experienced in actual faith communities, churches in other words (p. xiii). So, the entries are on themes, country and area studies, movements, and traditions rather than individuals. Also, larger entries like 'Trinity', 'Systematic Theology', and 'Atonement' are multi-authored with contributors from different geographical locals. Tensions and differences of viewpoint are retained to allow for 'the diversity and richness of theological reflection from various locations' (p. xiii). The 'Capitalism' entry is a telling example in which the editors' goal of dialogue and difference runs on the surface. A Latin American theologian is paired with one from California, and their divergence of opinion is readily apparent.

The editors also sought contributors able to speak *from* unique, contextual perspectives rather than simply *about* those perspectives. Entries on African background theologies in Latin America, Asian Theology, Pacific Island Theology, Caribbean Theology, and South African Theology are representative examples. Each is written by able scholars who embody these perspectives rather than simply refer to them. This isn't true for every entry (e.g. 'Buddhism'), but overall the effect is achieved.

GDT also intends all entries to keep an eye on global concerns. W. D. Persaud's piece on Lutheran theology and James K. A. Smith's treatment of Radical Orthodoxy (RO) are fine examples. Each explicates their topic while putting it in its global context. For example, Smith indicates RO's surprising resonances with the 'ontological assumptions implicit in traditional or "primal" religions in the non-Western world, particularly in Africa'; both share a common commitment to a 'sacred' versus 'secular' understanding of the material world (p. 727). The entry on Reformed theology was an unfortunate exception. Considering it was written by a North Korean scholar it could have offered intriguing insight into the popularity and influence of the Reformed tradition there.

GDT recommends itself strongly on at least three levels. First, educators will find diverse perspectives on topics commonly addressed in classes on Christian doctrine, the Bible, and World Religions. It would further serve excellently as a resource for students researching and writing on a wide range of topics. Second, a great many churches in the West have some distance to go before they fully grasp the dramatic shifts in contemporary Christianity in the developing world. *GDT* would be a highly accessible resource for pastors desiring to teach and preach with an eye to the perspective of 'world Christianity'. Finally, *GDT* offers researchers some of the most recent contributions of first rate scholars from across the world on topics with a unique 'global' approach.

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Globalization and the Mission of the Church. By Neil J. Ormerod and Shane Clifton. Ecclesiological Investigations; London: T&T Clark, 2009. ISBN 978-0-567-26183-0. x + 217 pp. £65.00.

Globalization and the Mission of the Church brings together a pair of chaps who, on the face of it, may seem strange partners indeed. Neil Ormerod, a Roman Catholic professor of theology, and Shane Clifton, academic dean and lecturer in theology at Alphacrucis, an Australian Pentecostal college, tackle the complex problems posed to the church by increased globalization. They argue that the church in mission is uniquely equipped to handle these problems.

Ormerod and Clifton begin by exploring the multifaceted notion of globalization. They argue with scholars like Giddens and Lonergan that globalization is a reality that penetrates the personal, cultural, structural, and religious spheres of life. To capture the totality of globalization's effect, Ormerod and Clifton use Robert Doran's 'scale of values' as a guide for their analysis. They look first at globalization's effect on 'vital values': food, shelter, health, etc. Here Ormerod and Clifton emphasize the church's ability to confront increased poverty, for instance, by identifying with the poor, following Christ's example. Regarding 'social values', Ormerod and Clifton highlight globalization's impact on the family, the economy, and world governance.

The church's commitment to the preservation of the family, fair economic practice, and just governance, they argue, uniquely equips the church in mission to address these issues. Ormerod and Clifton also argue the church is able to offer the world cultural healing and redemption and confront abuses in 'cultural values' affected by corrupt neo-liberal economic policies, human rights violations, and poor environmental care. Ormerod and Clifton explore the resources Christianity may have to sustain a truly global virtue ethic, that is, a commitment to action with an 'internal good' which inhabits a 'mean' between transcendence and immanence. As examples they cite the virtues of sustainability, attentiveness, and hope. Finally, Ormerod and Clifton address 'religious values', those 'meanings and symbols that give rise to and sustain religious institutions' (p. 171). They argue that the gospel enables the church's openness in interdenominational ecumenism and interreligious dialogue bringing unity to a divided world. Furthermore, the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love can mediate between science and faith, or counteract the despair often found in the globalized contact, or generate the action that reveals the love of God.

Globalization and the Mission of the Church is a useful introduction to the nature of globalization and the church's opportunities for response. Those who are yet to engage this topic will find here a condensed and broad introduction to the issues facing the world. Ormerod and Clifton's use of the 'scale of values' as an organizing principle is a helpful way for the church to think about its work in the world and potential contexts for mission.

However, the work is somewhat cluttered and fundamentally 'thin', trying to do too much. This may simply be due to the nature of globalization, but the analysis needed more focus. The work's imprecision often leads to dissonance in the argument, one example being the repeated reference to the 'ecological crisis' facing the world. A robust theology of creation and its relation to environmental issues (which they note but do

not explore) would have grounded a call for ecological responsibility regardless. But in light of recent scandals regarding the legitimacy of climate change data, Ormerod and Clifton's argument may seem alarmist and out of touch in the eyes of the larger public. Given that environmental responsibility is important for theological reasons regardless of data, the church's potential contribution lies precisely in its ability to transcend scientific and political uncertainties. The partnership of Catholic with Pentecostal too is a disappointment. There is no attempt to integrate their perspectives and the Roman Catholic perspective dominates the discussion with the Pentecostal's quite literally bringing up the rear. Ultimately, clergy and lay persons will find a helpful introduction to some complex problems, but suggestions for specific engagement will have to come from elsewhere.

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Mission in the 21st Century: Exploring the Five Marks of Global Mission. Edited by Andrew Walls and Cathy Porter. London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 2008. ISBN 0-232-52720-2. xvi + 219 pp. £14.95.

Mission in the 21st Century was designed, in part, as 'a helpful resource for Lambeth 2008'. The forward is by Rowan Williams, Archbishop of Canterbury, and, according to my reckoning, seven of eighteen contributors, and one of the editors, are from the Anglican Communion. The general tone of the book seems to me to be more in tune with the Global Anglican Future Conference (GAFCON), Jerusalem 2008, than Lambeth 2008. Indeed, two contributors, Emmanuel Egbunu, Bishop of Lokoja in the Church of Nigeria, and D. Zac Niringiye, Suffragan Bishop of Kampala, declined to attend Lambeth and were present in Jerusalem. Nonetheless, taken over all, this group of contributors reflect a wide ecclesiastical and national diversity, giving the book a value and appeal that far transcends the Anglican context.

The book has two sections. The first expounds the five marks of mission adopted by the Synod of the Church of England in 1998: 1. To proclaim the Good News of the Kingdom; 2. To teach, baptise and nurture new believers; 3. To respond to human need by loving service; 4. To seek to transform unjust structures of society; 5. To strive to safeguard the integrity of creation and sustain and renew the life of the earth. Although, as editor Cathy Ross reminds us, there are other important facets of mission, these five 'form a good working basis for a holistic approach...'.

Two articles discus each principle: one deals with theoretical issues, the other with praxis. I particularly enjoyed Gnanakan and Niringiye on proclaiming the kingdom; Emmanuel Egbunu on Christian nurture in

the face of the credibility gap between the phenomenal growth in Christianity in the developing world and the lack of evidence of positive changes in society; and Bev Haddad's spirited call to South African Christians to channel the energy used in the struggle against apartheid into tackling the current HIV/AIDS crisis. A very thoughtful case for safeguarding the integrity of the creation, as the present context of all human existence and activity, including the other four marks of mission, is set out by Calvin B. de Witt and Dave Bookless.

The second section is an eclectic collection of seven short chapters. Kwame Bediako, in the African context, provocatively asks, 'Whose Religion is Christianity?' Jehu J. Haniciles considers the missiological significance of migration. Lamin Sanneh explores 'The Islamic Frontline in a Post-Christian West'. Issues of biblical hermeneutics are discussed by Moonjan Lee in 'Reading the Bible in a Non-Western Church: An Asian Dimension'. A Japanese perspective on worship as mission is provided by Ken Miyamoto, and Gerald J. Pillay investigates 'Education as Mission'. Finally, Andrew Walls' incisive afterward surveys 'Christian Mission in a Five-hundred-year Context'.

Walls' analysis of post-Christian Scotland rings true, but his Scottish readers may well be shocked by his solution. Although Scotland is the 'country that once sent missionaries across the world' and, astonishingly, still celebrates two of the most famous on its bank notes (Mary Slessor and David Livingstone), it is now, according to Walls, 'too late for revival; the need is basic, primary evangelisation, cross-cultural evangelisation such as the missionaries once sought to carry out in other continents'. Ironically, as a Methodist would know, it is precisely when the Gospel is preached as Walls suggests, as it was in eighteenth century England by George Whitfield and John Wesley, that the most profound revivals may occur. In addition, it is a humbling but thrilling thought that today, when mission is from anywhere to anywhere, such an evangelistic challenge may be taken up by missionaries from the two-thirds-world.

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The World Missionary Conference, Edinburgh 1910. By Brian Stanley. Studies in the History of Christian Missions; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009. ISBN 978-0-8028-6360-7. xxii + 352 pp. £24.99.

This volume could hardly be more timely. Brian Stanley's comprehensive study of the Edinburgh World Missionary Conference, which began on 14 June 1910, has arrived exactly on cue for the conferences planned to mark the centenary of this event during 2010. The cover picture shows the conference in session in the Assembly Hall of what was then the United

Free Church of Scotland on the Mound in Edinburgh, and depicts a sea of white, mostly male, faces, with observers, mostly female, seated in the gallery. This photographic record serves to illustrate both the significance of this event within the history of Western missions, while also signaling the ambiguities and problems which the author proceeds to explore with scholarly rigour, great insight and genuine sympathy.

Brian Stanley sets the Edinburgh Conference within its historical context, showing how it reflected its time while also anticipating some of the massive changes soon to take place. He describes the planning of the event, highlighting the role of key players like J. H. Oldham and John R. Mott, and provides us with a fascinating description of the conduct of the sessions themselves. This includes the contributions of the handful of non-Western Christians present (nineteen 'at the most'), encapsulated in the famous cry of the Indian Bishop, V. S. Azariah: 'You have given your bodies to be burned. We also ask for *love*. Give us FRIENDS!'

In reading the more than 350 pages of this definitive study of Edinburgh 1910, one is constantly discovering new and surprising information. For example, Stanley points out that despite the significance this event has been seen to have within ecumenical Christian history, it was, in fact, 'decidedly Protestant' and represented only one segment of the world church. Nonetheless, the single contribution from a Roman Catholic source came from the remarkable Bishop Geremia Bonomelli who wrote a long letter of greeting to the assembled delegates. This same Bonomelli, Stanley informs us, was a close friend of a young priest named Angelo Roncalli, to whom he suggested that the time was ripe for 'a great ecumenical council'. Roncalli was later to become Pope John XXIII and the architect of the Second Vatican Council in 1962-65!

This brief review cannot begin to convey the comprehensive nature of Stanley's work, or the richness of his text. It will become the definitive study of this event and its great merit is that, while providing us with a masterly historical record of the conference, it also prompts searching questions with regard to the future of mission in the twenty first century. Despite all the preparation which preceded this Edinburgh 1910 and the enormous concentration of experience, wisdom and theological acumen present among the delegates, what is striking is how many things they got wrong. The optimism which pervaded the event proved short-lived and evaporated within a matter of a few years; the neglect of Africa and the failure to see its significance for Christian advance has been shown by history to have been the result of a huge blind spot in understanding the significance of primal religions; and the concentration on high levels of education and training overlooked the dynamic power of the Spirit and the significance of humble witnesses to Christ who were able to find

bridges between the Gospel and new cultural worlds. None of this should cause us to devalue planning and strategy in mission, but Stanley observes at the conclusion of this magnificent book that it was an 'Anglo-Catholic outsider' at Edinburgh who asked what proved to be a key question of the gathered fathers: 'Are there no demoniacs now from whom the man of God by the finger of God should cast out the devil? That is the question I ask.' This lone voice proved to be, as Brian Stanley says, the most 'accurate anticipation of the remarkable course that world Christianity was very soon about to take'. And perhaps it remains the voice that Western Christianity needs to hear today.

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The Promise of Baptism: An Introduction to Baptism in Scripture and the Reformed Tradition. By James V. Brownson. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007. xiii + 223 pp. £9.99.

In this book James Brownson elucidates some of the difficult issues surrounding the doctrine of baptism, and aims to 'provide a "road map" through some of the more common problems and questions' (p. xi). The author, a Professor of New Testament at Western Theological Seminary (Reformed Church of America), is well-equipped to do so, being firmly acquainted not only with the scriptural material on baptism, but also with the Reformed tradition. To describe this book as a 'road map', however, is misleading: a road map offers an overview of an area but does not in itself recommend one particular destination. In theology, there is 'no view from nowhere'; from the start, Brownson indicates both his denominational affiliation and his intention to advocate its Calvinist position.

The book is divided into six sections. The first considers some basic issues in the area of baptismal theology, providing working definitions of what it is to be a Christian and a member of the church, and what a sacrament is and does. In the second, the author focuses on baptism itself, unpacking its relationship to the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, to the imagery of cleansing, and to the reception of the Holy Spirit. This unpacking continues through the third section, where the implications of baptism are worked out in relation to faith and salvation. The fourth and fifth sections respectively make and defend the case for infant baptism against those who believe in believer baptism. In the final section, the author turns to some pastoral decisions around the sacrament of baptism, among other things considering (and ultimately rejecting) the validity of the practices of confirmation, rebaptism, and dedication.

Just as there is 'no theology from nowhere', however, so too there is 'no review from nowhere', and it would be remiss not to comment on certain

theological aspects of the book. First, Brownson is a staunch defender of what he describes as the 'sacrament' view of baptism rather than the 'ordinance' view. The latter, as the author knows, is not inimical to the work of Reformed theologians such as Zwingli, Schleiermacher, and Barth, to name three, and also in broad swathes of the evangelical tradition more generally. It is disappointing, therefore, that this 'ordinance' view is caricatured in places. In one simplistic table, Brownson describes the 'ordinance' view as being about our promise to God rather than God's promise to us; as focusing primarily on our action in response to God's grace rather than on what God does to extend grace to us in particular; and as about God's past offer of grace calling us to present obedience rather than God's present grace calling us to future obedience (p. 25). The author does seem conscious of oversimplification, on one occasion observing that 'many advocates of an ordinance theology are more carefully nuanced' (p. 38). However, given that this quotation directly precedes his claim that, in the perceptions of 'many' who hold the 'ordinance' view, 'one does not need the church for any of the essentials of Christian faith and life' (p. 38), it is clear that the argument is not always particularly balanced.

Second, Brownson is a staunch defender of infant baptism. Yet disappointingly, his presentation of alternative positions in this (aporetic) argument is perhaps less than fair, both materially and rhetorically. Materially, Brownson posits another unfortunate dichotomy, this time between those who see the church as 'a voluntary association of like-minded individuals' (p. 20) and those who see the church as 'defined at its core by God's *calling*' (p. 20). Whether these are a *priori* mutually exclusive is debatable. Moreover, Brownson seems arbitrarily to correlate these two construals of the church directly with those who are against infant baptism and those who are for it (p. 154). Rhetorically, corresponding problems emerge which denigrate the 'believer baptist' view. For example, Brownson states on one page that 'Proponents of believer baptism ... believe that there is no scriptural basis for [X]' (p. 125), but two pages later acknowledges, in contrast, 'Of course, some proponents of believer baptism accept [X]' (p. 127). The very need for rhetorical phrases such as 'Of course, I know of no believer baptists who hold such a position' (p. 146) suggests a rather unbalanced argument.

In terms of its purpose, the book succeeds. It offers a 'road map' to baptism, its role in Scripture and the Reformed tradition, and its inherent theological complexities, and consistently advances one particular doctrinal position. The chapters are concise enough not to deter a novice, yet detailed enough to resource meaningful discussion, and the study aids at the end of each chapter are helpful. However, theologically—and indeed pastorally—one might have wished for a more balanced and more sen-

sitive view of alternative positions. The Reformed tradition is perhaps a little broader, and hopefully a little more generous, than this book may appear to indicate.

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The Next Evangelicalism: Freeing the Church from Western Cultural Captivity. By Soong-Chan Rah. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2009. ISBN 978-0-8308-3360-3. 229 pp. £9.99.

In June 2006, Lark News, a website offering satirical news reports about religious matters, had the headquarters of the mainline Presbyterian denomination in the United States announcing a bold new program called 'The Minus Five Campaign' (http://bit.ly/minus5). The program's goal was to lose only five percent of the denomination's membership in the next decade, rather than the ten per cent losses experienced in previous decades. The account quoted one fictional pastor from Pittsburgh who greeted the announcement with enthusiasm: 'This is the rallying cry we've been needing', he said. 'It's heartening to people at the local level to know we're determined not to shrink as rapidly.'

That is bittersweet humour for those of us who care deeply about the Christian cause in Europe, the British Isles, and North America. But the fact that underlies the joke will not surprise us, at least if we have been paying attention to Philip Jenkins and others arguing that the center of gravity in global Christianity has been shifting from the Northern to the Southern Hemisphere. Congregations in Asia, Africa and Latin America are flourishing, while churches in North America, Europe, and Britain are experiencing significant decline.

The title of Soong-Chan Rah's important book, *The Next Evangelicalism*, was obviously chosen to signal an extension of the discussion that Jenkins launched in his 2002 study, *The Next Christendom*. Rah makes the important point that while the numbers of Christians in most major North American denominations are indeed shrinking, this does not mean that there are no numerical increases. The reality is that 'American Christianity may actually be growing, but in unexpected and surprising ways'; while 'the white churches are in decline, the immigrant, ethnic and multiethnic churches are flourishing' (p. 12). For example, there were approximately 200 churches in Boston in 1970; three decades later there were 412. What accounts for the growth in numbers of people attending church in that city, he observes, is the increase of Christians representing new immigrant groups. As a case in point, Haitian believers in Boston began planting churches in the late 1960s, and today there are at least fifty Haitian-American congregations. What all of this means, Rah argues, is

that it is not so much that American society is being 'de-Christianized' as it is that American Christianity is being 'de-Europeanized'.

Rah opens his book with examples of this sort as a reality check for the North American evangelical establishment. Both the leadership and the cultural-theological agenda of evangelicalism are dominated by patterns that are out of step with the grass roots realities. If evangelicalism is to flourish, it must be liberated from its 'cultural captivity' in order to embrace an understanding of the Gospel that is sensitive to multicultural and multiracial realities.

Some of what Rah covers in making his overall case is familiar ground, at least to those who have being paying attention to what has long been standard fare in the pages of *Sojourners* magazine (and even *Christianity Today* in recent years) regarding consumerism, racial justice, concern for the marginalized, and the like. But even here there is some bracing stuff: an account, for example, of Vacation Bible School materials featuring an Asian 'Rickshaw Rally' theme that sets forth blatant caricatures of Asian cultures. Similarly, while Rah rehearses some of the trenchant critiques that have be lodged in the past against 'church growth' theory, he updates and expands much of this by addressing what he sees as the cultural biases, not only of some of the 'megachurches', but also of the more recent 'emerging church' phenomenon.

There is considerable theological wisdom in this book. Much of the wisdom is expressed in the form of some important nuancing of points that often get overstated or oversimplified by other writers. In condemning the 'individualism' that he sees pervading white evangelicalism, for example, Rah insists that we must not issue that condemnation without at the same time recognizing the importance of 'individuation', a process by which a person comes to differentiate himself or herself from the group (family, people, culture) in a way that provides the psychic basis necessary for realizing the importance of 'the individual expressions of faith and the need for individual salvation' (p. 31).

There is also fascinating material here for understanding the importance of contextualization. While Rah is uniquely situated to address cultural-theological topics from an Asian-American context, he offers many compelling insights from, among others, Latino, African-American, and Native-American perspectives.

While much of this book addresses the North American evangelical context, it has much to say to folks in the UK and on the European continent. Rah's illustrations about growing immigrant churches in cities like Boston and Los Angeles have their parallels in Amsterdam and London. More importantly, the 'cultural captivity' of evangelicalism which he challenges in these pages is more than a North American phenomenon.

The peoples to whom our spiritual forebears sent missionaries have now become our Christian neighbors. More than that, they are missionaries who have been sent to us, bearing messages that can revitalize our own commitment to the Gospel. Rah's book is a gift to those of us who are willing to hear those messages.

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In the Aftermath: Provocations and Laments. By David Bentley Hart. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009. ISBN 978-0-8028-4573-3. xiii + 204 pp. £12.99.

If you have already read David Bentley Hart, then you shouldn't need any encouragement to seek out *In the Aftermath*. If you have not read him, then I assure you that you should. The very fact that this collection of twenty-one essays was assembled—well over half of which consists of glorified book reviews—is a remarkable testament to the value of Hart's writing in whatever form one can get one's hands on it, and on whatever topic. I, for one, am not aware of any other theologian of whose work the same is true.

This does not mean I agree with everything Hart writes; I do not. I am trained as an analytic philosopher, I have little time for genealogies of philosophies or cultural trends, and I happily accept some of the views that Hart ridicules most vehemently. It is thus unlikely that I would be a member of his admirers. But thankfully, one need not agree with Hart to enjoy or be taught by him. Indeed, it is precisely in those moments that I take issue with one of his contentions that his thought is most beneficial to me: This volume contains more genuinely *Christian* insights into the modern world than just about any book of which I am aware, and when one is confronted with the thought of someone who so consistently sees things from the grand, inimitable vantage point of the Gospel, one cannot help but consider whether one has gone off the path.

At least in this respect—and probably in others—I think that it is helpful to regard Hart as the Chesterton of our time. When Hart makes the wild claim that the only alternative to Christianity is nihilism, berates naïve Calvinists, takes Daniel Dennett to task, or simply discusses a bit of travel writing, what one cannot help but note is that even his most inflammatory comments are unapologetically offered. But what one might miss—largely because it is easy to confuse Hart's bluntness for arrogance—is that his remarks flow from the assumption that God's creative, redemptive and restorative activities provide the best foundation for interpretations of, and comments on, the relevant topics. Consider, for example, the

opening of a marvelous essay on the dangers that Christians face when they uncritically appropriate arguments from the just war tradition:

> An Antiochene Orthodox priest of my acquaintance—not long liberated from bondage to the ECUSA—recently told me, with every appearance of sincerity, that he had converted to the Eastern Orthodox Church because he was a pacifist. For a moment, I was uncertain as to whether he was attempting to baffle me with some cunningly constructed paradox. I would have found it a no more impenetrable *non sequitur* had he announced that he had joined the local Elks' lodge because of his passion for beautiful young women, or that he enjoyed reading Calvin for the witticisms. But it soon became clear that he had meant his remark not only in earnest, but without any sense at all of its absurdity... (p. 148).

Harsh (albeit hilarious) words to be sure. But they are warranted because, as Hart goes on to show, his acquaintance's foible is representative of a deep and pervasive ignorance in the church: We are not entitled to assert, *simpliciter*, that war is unjust; we as often as not fail to see that our reasoning about war is not tied to the appropriate theological moorings; we do not notice that theorizing about war from the perspective the Christian community is *not* congruous with the secularized arguments that sometimes pass for Christian reflection. And this is what makes Hart so valuable. Although there may be no chasm between the world and the church in the minds of humankind, there is surely one in reality, and we ought to be thankful for those who will not let us forget it.

In the Aftermath is a treasure of a book. It is a pleasure and a challenge to read, and for those reasons I cannot recommend it highly enough.

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BOOK REVIEWS