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Orthodox-Greek Catholic Relations in Galicia and their Influence on the Religious Situation in Ukraine

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For the past 15 years Orthodox-Greek Catholic relations in Galicia and what they signify have been of continuing interest to professional analysts and the media alike. Along with intra-Orthodox confrontations, this seems to be the area of fiercest religious conflict in Ukraine; and both areas have had their influence on religious choice and jurisdictional relations in Ukraine today.

Six Myths about Orthodox-Catholic Relations in Ukraine

People think that a lot has been said and written about Orthodox-Catholic relations, and that the main issues are well known to professionals, and in some detail; but in reality the subject is still in thrall to mythologising and subjectivism; the last word has not yet been said. This applies to those who are directly involved in these relations as well as to those who observe the situation from the sidelines. In this article I shall identify and systematically analyse some of the most persistent myths which have endured since the late 1980s to the present day.

Myth 1: Direct Contact between the Orthodox and Catholic Churches is Limited to Two Ukrainian Regions: Galicia and Transcarpathia

It is true that the absolute majority of Orthodox-Catholic conflict situations have arisen in the four *oblasti* of two regions, Galicia and Transcarpathia (Zakarpattia), as have most ordinary (non-conflictual) contacts between the two confessions, but it would be wrong to limit the issue of Orthodox-Catholic relations, and specifically Orthodox-Greek Catholic relations, to these two regions, for several reasons.

Issues arising from direct contact between Orthodox and Catholic communities are alive in many other Ukrainian *oblasti*. These *oblasti* fall into three groups. The first group comprises those *oblasti* which border on Galicia and Transcarpathia and where there are Greek Catholic and Roman Catholic church organisations, either traditional or recently established (Chernivtsi, Khmel'nyts'kyi, Volynia *oblasti*). The second group comprises those *oblasti* to which thousands of Ukrainian Greek Catholics were sent as immigrants from south-east Poland after the Second World War (Donets'k, Mykolaiv, and parts of Zaporizhzhia and Kiev *oblasti*). In the 1990s dozens of Greek Catholic parishes appeared in these regions, and in 2001 the leadership of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC) set up a system of exarchates to run these

new parishes and provide for the spiritual needs of Greek Catholics in regions outside this church's traditional areas. The third group comprises those *oblasti* where significant numbers of Roman Catholic communities have appeared, either in line with historical tradition or as the result of postwar migrations (Vinnitsa, Zhytomir, Khmel'nyts'kyi and parts of Rovno and Kiev *oblasti*).

Moreover, Orthodox-Catholic relations affect the whole of Ukraine not only because parishes of the two confessions (Orthodoxy and Catholicism) come into direct contact with each other, or because Catholicism is spreading geographically, but also because public debate on this issue has reached national dimensions, and because the Catholic Church has established (or reestablished) its influence at the level of the state. As evidence for this we may cite the following facts. The proposal was made that Pope John Paul II should visit Ukraine, and this happened with great resonance in 2001; a similar visit to some other postcommunist countries, including Russia, is still more or less inconceivable. Roman Catholic and Greek Catholic services are broadcast on television on the same basis as Orthodox liturgies. And discussions about the sharpest points of conflict between the two confessions in western Ukraine have attracted keen interest and involvement from the traditional churches at parish level. In all parishes, even in areas where there is no confessional alternative yet, the question of relations with a rival confession has become not just a subject of theoretical speculation in a historical framework, or a matter of civilisational self-identification, but a question of topical importance in the context of everyday realities, inasmuch as each parish is obliged to define its position (even if only by confirming and asserting its traditional confessional identity) and even its jurisdictional orientation in the context of the global interaction of two confessional systems.

We can thus see that confining the question of Orthodox-Catholic relations in Ukraine to one (albeit key) region does not permit a systematic analysis of the situation, since it does not present the full picture today and hence cannot reveal tendencies which are going to influence the development of the situation in the future. The reality of the present situation is that Catholicism in Ukraine has definitely emerged from the areas to which it was formerly confined. On the other hand, Orthodoxy has convincingly established itself in those regions (Galicia and Transcarpathia) where previously Catholicism was obviously predominant. These two tendencies have led to a situation in which the whole country, rather than a few (albeit most characteristic) regions, has become the arena of contact and interaction between Orthodoxy and Catholicism.

Myth 2: The Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate is the Natural Orthodox Interlocutor with Catholicism (Particularly the Greek Catholic Church)

Representatives of the Moscow Patriarchate clearly assert that their church, in the shape of its structural subdivision in Ukraine, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP), is the most important, if not the only, Orthodox partner in all relations with the Catholic Church (the Greek Catholic Church as well as the Vatican). In this context the UOC-MP represents itself as the most injured party, and hence the one which can claim most dividends in the context of current interconfessional relations and their future prospects.

The UGCC goes along with this position (if only formally); it has to take into account the position of the Vatican, which aims to minimise any conflict situations with the Moscow Patriarchate, and also to some extent the question of canonicity (the traditional Orthodox churches do not recognise the canonicity of the Ukrainian

Orthodox churches which have split from the Moscow Patriarchate). The UGCC thus supports the relatively high profile of the Moscow Patriarchate in the context of addressing Orthodox-Catholic dialogue issues in Ukraine today.

There is a paradox, however: the Moscow Patriarchate may be the main Orthodox player in the relationship, from a theoretical and ideological point of view, but in fact it is involved very little in the practical sphere of everyday relations with the UGCC, because in Galicia, the heart of the UGCC historically and today, where the absolute majority of UGCC parishes are located, the UOC-MP has lost all or most of its ground:¹ in L'viv *oblast'* only 7 per cent of the total number of Orthodox parishes (60 out of a total of 817) belong to the UOC-MP, while in Ivano-Frankivs'k *oblast'* there are even fewer (5.5 per cent, or 25 out of 455). The profile of the UOC-MP is higher in Ternopil' *oblast'* (19 per cent; 119 out of 613); this is because after the Second World War three *raiony* which had belonged to traditionally Orthodox Volynia were added to Ternopil' *oblast'*. Without these *raiony* the presence of the UOC-MP in the Ternopil' area would be no higher than in the rest of Galicia.

We should note the unexpected exception in the region: Zakarpattia *oblast'*, where the UOC-MP maintains an exclusive presence. It has 562 religious organisations as against 16 for the two main autocephalous Orthodox churches together (15 for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kiev Patriarchate (UOC-KP) and just one for the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC)).

In Galicia today the UGCC has 2993 registered organisations (86 per cent of its total; 9 per cent are in Transcarpathia and 5 per cent in the rest of Ukraine). Its direct confessional neighbours are 926 organisations belonging to the UOC-KP, 754 belonging to the UAOC, and just 204 belonging to the UOC-MP (and about 100 of these are in the three traditionally Orthodox 'Volynian' *raiony* of northern Ternopil' *oblast'*).

Emphasis on the role of the Moscow Patriarchate in relations between the Orthodox and Catholic churches in Ukraine means, then, that the issue is addressed on two levels. The UOC-MP is the major Catholic partner as far as theory and theology are concerned, but on the practical level the dominant role is played by the two autocephalous Ukrainian churches in Ukraine, the UOC-KP and the UAOC.

This situation is very interesting and in many ways unique. The result is that diplomatic activity at the highest level in one church (the UOC-MP as a constituent part of the Moscow Patriarchate) becomes the background, or even the 'conversational cover', for practical and tactical steps in relations with the Greek Catholic Church on the part of the two other Orthodox churches in Ukraine. This division of forces was certainly not consciously planned; but this is how things have worked out.

Myth 3: The Revival of the Greek Catholic Church in Galicia was at the Expense of the Moscow Patriarchate

The UOC-MP and the Department of External Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate actively propound the thesis that in the process of the revival of the UGCC, its emergence from the underground and the restoration of its former property, the structures of the Moscow Patriarchate in Galicia were completely, or almost completely, destroyed. This myth has lodged itself in people's minds and has been hindering an objective appreciation of the real nature of Orthodox-Catholic relations in Galicia today.

Superficially, on the basis of a general survey of the situation, this assertion looks plausible. In Soviet times L'viv-Ternopil' diocese (split into L'viv-Drohobych and Ternopil'-Kremenets' dioceses in 1989) and Ivano-Frankivs'k diocese were the

dioceses of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) with the highest number of religious organisations. According to official figures from the Ukrainian SSR, in early 1990 there were 2718 ROC organisations in the three Galician *oblasti*: 1289 in L'viv, 809 in Ternopil' and 620 in Ivano-Frankivs'k. As noted above, today there are somewhat over 200 parishes and other church structures. What is more, in the course of the redistribution of church buildings (including former Catholic churches) none of the three Galician dioceses has obtained a suitable building for a diocesan cathedral in the cities which are regarded as diocesan centres. In Ternopil' a building was consecrated as the diocesan cathedral in 2000; it was a new building erected over the previous few years in one of the city's new suburbs; the city authorities in L'viv and Ivano-Frankivs'k are still refusing permission for cathedrals to be built.

Spokesmen for the ROC in Ukraine and Moscow link the almost total destruction of the infrastructure of these dioceses with the process of legalisation of the UGCC, which assumed the leading (although not monopolistic) position in the confessional pecking order in Galicia. It was natural that when it emerged from the underground the UGCC would obtain most of the church buildings which had formerly belonged to the ROC. It is indisputable that the UGCC played a very important role in reducing the influence of the ROC in Galicia to a minimum. However, it would be a gross oversimplification and schematisation to say that this was the cause of every problem. Intra-Orthodox developments and jurisdictional upheavals played just as prominent a part in the liquidation of the diocesan structures of the ROC as did the revival of the UGCC.

First of all there was the proclamation of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) on 19 August 1989 by Fr Volodymyr Yarema (from 1993 Patriarch Dymytrii of the UAOC) in the Church of the Apostles Peter and Paul in L'viv, following which most of the Orthodox parishes in Galicia went over to the jurisdiction of this church. It was in fact this movement of Orthodox parishes into the UAOC which was the decisive factor in the almost complete disabling of the hitherto powerful local dioceses of the ROC, rather than the emergence from the underground of the UGCC; a proportion of the Orthodox parishes then functioning joined the UGCC, but fewer than joined the UAOC.

These changes of 1989–92 cut seriously into the number of parishes in the Ivano-Frankivs'k diocese of the ROC (the diocese had 620 religious organisations in 1988, 38 in late 1990 and 19 in late 1992). Somewhat smaller losses (as a percentage) were sustained by the ROC in L'viv *oblast'* (1289 religious organisations in 1989, 431 in 1990 and 139 in late 1992) and Ternopil' (809 religious organisations in 1989, 213 in 1990 and 158 in early 1993).

At the same time the three Galician dioceses of the UAOC exhibited real growth and organisational consolidation. By early 1991 L'viv diocese comprised 247 Orthodox religious organisations, Ivano-Frankivs'k diocese 211 and Ternopil' diocese 333. Thus in the course of a year and a half (August 1989 to December 1990) the total number of UAOC parishes in Galicia (791) surpassed the number of parishes formally remaining under the jurisdiction of the ROC (682; this number included a good number of parishes which really belonged to the UAOC but had not yet achieved reregistration, and so according to official statistics still belonged to the ROC).

The parishes which had broken away from the jurisdiction of the ROC achieved an absolute predominance and even a monopoly after the events of 1992, when the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kiev Patriarchate (UOC-KP) was formed on the basis of a merger between all the parishes and structures of the UAOC and most of the

religious organisations in Galicia which were still under the jurisdiction of the ROC. We should note that by this time the movement of Orthodox parishes into the UGCC had almost come to an end: after 1992 only a handful of Galician parishes changed their confessional allegiance, and these changes had no influence on the overall alignment of forces or confessional priorities.

By the end of 1992, six months after the establishment of the UOC-KP as a new Orthodox jurisdiction, the number of ROC parishes in Galicia had fallen from 682 to 316: there were 139 left in L'viv *oblast'*, 19 in Ivano-Frankivs'k *oblast'* and 158 in Ternopil' *oblast'*. At the same time there was a significant increase in the number of Orthodox religious organisations announcing their membership of the UOC-KP. For more than six months the UOC-KP was the only autocephalous Orthodox jurisdiction in Ukraine (and not in canonical fellowship with the Moscow Patriarchate). In line with the decisions of a unifying council in June 1992 the UAOC was completely absorbed into the UOC-KP, and a new church structure under the old name, the UAOC, proclaiming its continuity with the traditions of the UAOC of 1989, was formed only in the first half of 1993, nearly a year after the formation of the UOC-KP.

By the end of 1992 there were already 621 religious organisations of the UOC-KP functioning in L'viv *oblast'*, 380 in Ivano-Frankivs'k and 357 in Ternopil': a total of 1358. Thus just one year saw the Kiev-centred jurisdiction independent of the ROC grow by 576 organisations. This means that the UOC-KP was growing in Galicia at the expense of the ROC – during the same period the latter's dioceses in Galicia lost 366 parishes – as well as because of the founding of new religious organisations.

There is another piece of evidence showing that the development of the autocephalous jurisdictions in Galicia took place at the expense of the Moscow Patriarchate. Churches were awarded to the local dioceses of the ROC by the local authorities as compensation when the ROC was supplanted from cathedral buildings which had previously (before the Second World War) belonged to the UGCC. These churches then gradually passed under the jurisdiction either of the UOC-KP, as in L'viv (where the Cathedral of the Virgin Mary Protectress (*Pokrova*), previously the Church of St Nicholas, given to the ROC diocese in autumn 1990 after the latter had been moved out of the Cathedral of St George, passed in June 1992 under the jurisdiction of the UOC-KP, together with the diocesan bishop), or of the UAOC, as in Ivano-Frankivs'k (where the Cathedral of the Virgin Mary Protectress, earlier the cathedral of the Armenian Apostolic Church, which the local ROC diocese received after being moved out of the Cathedral of the Resurrection in spring 1990, within a few months recognised the jurisdiction of the UAOC along with almost all the cathedral clergy).

All these examples and figures show that the catastrophic loss of parishes suffered by the ROC was the result of, and simultaneous with, not only the meteoric rise of the UGCC, but the no less rapid growth of autocephalous branches of Ukrainian Orthodoxy independent of the ROC. The growth of the UGCC was only partly at the expense of former ROC parishes, while the rise of the UAOC, and a little later of the UOC-KP, was mostly at their expense. Meanwhile the Moscow Patriarchate was deliberately directing the attention of society to the so-called 'Catholic-instigated' process which had led to the destruction of the ROC in Galicia, for two reasons. First, it wanted to play down the role and significance of the other Orthodox jurisdictions in the cataclysmic transformations in Galicia, as well as reduce their role in any negotiations; and second, it wanted to raise the level of the claims of the Moscow Patriarchate during diplomatic contacts with the UGCC, the Roman Catholic Church and the Vatican directly.

Myth 4: Galicia is Unique as the Historical Stronghold of Uniatism

The next myth it is necessary to address in a systematic analysis of Orthodox-Greek Catholic relations is one which is propagated, this time, by ideologists and social activists on behalf of the UGCC and which is strongly disputed by the Orthodox side in the dialogue: that Galicia has a unique role as the historical stronghold of Uniatism, and in its very nature is exclusively Catholic and anti-Orthodox. The main argument is always based on prewar statistics which show that in what are now the three Galician *oblasti*, then part of Poland, there were virtually no Orthodox parishes at all (actually just ten small communities without any real social or ethnic influence), and that clearly, then, Galicia today must remain faithful to its historical image, which means that it needs to restore its traditional monoconfessional Catholic status.

Apart from its ideological and historical aspects, this concept entails, directly or indirectly, practical consequences: the complete rehabilitation of the UGCC and the return to it, as the rightful owner, of all church buildings which belonged to it in 1939 and which were forcibly taken from it, with the full cooperation of the NKVD, after the L'viv Council of 1946 which liquidated the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church.

The claim to Catholic exclusivism in Galicia may seem well-founded, but it meets with a range of rebuttals based on quite different perspectives.

The classical example which is adduced to illustrate the relative nature of any claim to confessional exclusivism in the region is Transcarpathia, Galicia's neighbour and also 'traditionally Catholic'. After the Union of Uzhgorod in 1646 there were officially no Orthodox churches left in the region. Monoconfessionalism was actively supported by all the states which ruled Transcarpathia. The situation seemed clear, and for over 200 years there were no official Orthodox structures in Transcarpathia. Nevertheless Orthodoxy continued to exist in the form of various Orthodox church groupings in the ethnolocal Rusyn (Ruthenian) movement, which was spiritually orientated towards Russia. This pro-Russian Orthodox identity was consciously selected by the Transcarpathian Rusyn ethnic group as one of the most important features distinguishing them from the Ukrainians. These Orthodox church groupings nurtured the indigenous, unorganised and informal spiritual tendencies of the time, and as a result the first Orthodox parishes appeared in Transcarpathia in the early twentieth century. This so-called 'Orthodox action' (*Pravoslavna aktsiia*) was amazingly successful: according to official statistics from Czechoslovakia (which Transcarpathia was part of at the time) by the mid-1930s more than a third of the local Ukrainian (Rusyn) population were claiming to be Orthodox. This was happening, moreover, at a time when the state was trying quite actively to prevent the population going over to Orthodoxy. (The religious freedom situation in Czechoslovakia was nevertheless much easier than, for example, in interwar Poland; and we should also remember that a few years before the First World War the previous (Austro-Hungarian) government had even arranged a series of show trials of activists in the Orthodox movement, accusing them of spying for Russia.)

The Orthodox movement in Transcarpathia in the first half of the twentieth century provided a real basis for a council held in Uzhgorod in 1949 which liquidated the local Greek Catholic Church (for certain historical reasons the local Byzantine-rite diocese, which was fully united with the Vatican, did not come under the jurisdiction of the metropolitan in L'viv). Despite the coercive nature of the council, which proceeded under the guidance of the NKVD and other enforcement agencies, and which ignored the wishes of half the Ukrainian population of Transcarpathia, it nevertheless obtained enough ideological and practical support from the other half of the local

Ukrainian population, which for several decades had been moving into the bosom of Orthodoxy and enthusiastically working for the confessional reorientation of the region.

The situation in Galicia, which was almost completely 'Catholic' until 1939, was not the same as the situation in Transcarpathia, but nevertheless parallel processes are evident. We should remember that the Galician Orthodox dioceses were the last in Ukraine to accept the Union with Rome: Peremyshl' in 1691 and L'viv in 1700; that is, more than a century after the Union was proclaimed in Kiev, Volynia and Belorussia, areas which are now seen as the stronghold of Orthodoxy (just one more example illustrating the conditional nature of established confessional-territorial stereotypes).

The last Orthodox communities in Galicia were liquidated in the eighteenth century (the Dormition Brotherhood in L'viv accepted the Union in 1708 and the last monastery, the Maniavs'kyi *skyt* in Prykarpattia, now in Ivano-Frankivs'k *oblast'*, was closed in 1774), but as in Transcarpathia a very strong and influential movement, Muscophile and orientated towards the traditions and values of Orthodoxy, continued to exist, especially in the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, and in fact until 1870 it determined the internal policies of the UGCC, as a large number of facts attest.

Many former Greek Catholic priests and public figures, for example, went over to Orthodoxy. One outstanding such figure was Yakiv Golovatsky, who moved to Russia in 1867. He was one of the founders of an informal group of three young Galician intellectuals, the so-called *Rus'ka Triitsia*, whose names are associated with the birth of Ukrainian national selfconsciousness in Galicia and its orientation towards a common Ukrainian literary language. Another outstanding figure was the priest Ivan Naumovych. In 1884 he moved to Kiev where he served as an Orthodox priest, but before that was one of the leading public figures in the Muscophile movement, for which activity he was sentenced to eight months' imprisonment.

Another phenomenon was the acceptance of Orthodoxy by entire parishes. The first such case was in 1882 in the village of Hnylychky in Podillia (now in Ternopil' *oblast'*). The Austrian government brought the instigators to court, and thereby dissuaded other parishes from doing likewise. However, the tendency revived in no uncertain terms during the first occupation of Galicia by Russian forces in 1914. With a certain amount of (mostly nonviolent) assistance from the new administration, some 200 formerly Greek Catholic parishes, almost ten per cent of the total, recognised the spiritual authority of Archbishop Yevlogi of Volynia, who had been placed in charge of the spiritual care of the Orthodox parishes in Galicia by the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church.

The L'viv Council of 1946 was organised by force and ignored the opinion of the large number of Greek Catholics who did not want to be merged with the Russian Orthodox Church. Nevertheless it had a certain social base. Today it is difficult to establish what percentage of Greek Catholics welcomed, or had a positive attitude towards, union with Orthodoxy. There is no doubt, however, that such an attitude existed among some proportion of formal Greek Catholics, and that the process of the formation of Orthodox parishes in Galicia had hitherto been held back by the repressive measures of the Austrian and (later) the Polish government.

It seems to me to indisputable that without these pro-Orthodox sympathies and a potential for identification with Orthodoxy within a formally unified Greek Catholic identity, the use of force alone could not have led to the swift move to Orthodoxy of several thousand Greek Catholic parishes and some 83 and 87 per cent of the white Greek Catholic clergy, the parish priests, between 1946 and 1949. Among other

reasons for joining the Orthodox Church, especially among the married clergy, were the desire to avoid arrest and the hope of preserving existing church structures. We must of course note the fact that not a single UGCC bishop supported the merger with the ROC, and that most monastics rejected it too.

In view of all this we should hardly be surprised that although in the past Galicia was considered an exclusively Catholic region, Orthodoxy should have survived and even revived there during the upheavals of the late 1980s and early 1990s, destroying traditional conceptions of it as an essentially monoconfessional Catholic region. Orthodoxy has a large-scale following in Galicia today. There are a number of reasons for this. As noted above, a section of the population has traditionally been pro-Orthodox. The arrival of a pluralistic society has meant that people are now free to choose their faith and show their confessional sympathies. There are also a number of factors which have stimulated the development and consolidation of an Orthodox orientation among the population and the limitation of Catholic influences in the region, but which are not related directly to church life. These include the following: the influence of mass-scale anti-Catholic propaganda in Soviet times, on the part of the state and the Russian Orthodox Church alike, aimed at undermining Catholic self-identification among the population; the complete ban on the UGCC from 1946 to 1989; and support for the rapid development of the Galician dioceses of the ROC in 1988–89 and the structures of the UAOC in 1989–90 on the part of individual local authority figures in Galicia.

It is very important to note that traditional conventional ideas about the regional distribution of religious confessions lead to problems not only as far as Galicia is concerned, but throughout Ukraine as a whole. In early 2001, for example, the UGCC had 153 religious organisations outside Galicia and Transcarpathia. Many of these were founded by émigrés from Galicia, but in many cases they are the result either of a conscious choice by a local population which was previously Orthodox to change its confessional allegiance (as in the case of the Greek Catholic parish in Vyshhorod near Kiev), or of successful activity by a Greek Catholic priest (as in the case of the Greek Catholic parish founded in the village of Holdashivka, Bershads'kyi raion, Vinnyts'a oblast').

At all events, the fact that Greek Catholic parishes are being founded outside the areas traditional to this confession shows that we can no longer view eastern and central Ukraine as an exclusively Orthodox region with a very clearly expressed anti-Catholic orientation. The appearance and successful functioning of 153 Greek Catholic and almost 500 Roman Catholic parishes shows that a significant proportion of the traditionally Orthodox population of this area does not have a clearly negative attitude towards Catholicism.

The UGCC has expanded as far as it can in Galicia and Transcarpathia, and its second direction of development, towards the east, has become its main strategic focus. Orthodox leaders are constantly raising this issue and trying to convince people that it is a real phenomenon. At the same time the UGCC is continuing to found new Greek Catholic parishes in those towns and villages in Galicia and Transcarpathia (about one in ten) where hitherto there have been only Orthodox parishes.

Myth 5: There are Now Some Five Million Greek Catholics in Ukraine as a Whole

Closely linked with the previous myth is another myth propagated by the UGCC, that there are somewhere in the region of five million Greek Catholics in Ukraine today.

We should note that the total population of Galicia and Transcarpathia, where 96 per cent of the religious organisations belonging to the UGCC are located, is 6,677,000;² this means that 75 per cent of the population here must be Greek Catholics. The result is even more striking if we take the figures not for the western region as a whole but for Galicia alone. Its three *oblasti* are home to 5,388,000 people. Now it is quite obvious that Greek Catholics are a minority in Transcarpathia, where they cannot total more than 500,000 out of a total population of 1,288,000 (besides Ukrainians there are a number of small national minorities in Transcarpathia: Hungarians, Slovaks, Roma). This means that the remaining four and a half million Greek Catholics out of the total of five million constantly quoted by official and unofficial spokesmen for the UGCC live in Galicia, where Greek Catholics must therefore make up 83–85 per cent of the population.

So far nobody in Ukraine or abroad has subjected this figure to serious analysis. I myself find it dubious, for several reasons.

If we accept these figures and their logical consequences, we have to concede that the 8–900,000 Galicians who are not Greek Catholics (and no doubt including some atheists) have founded 1885 Orthodox parishes (817 in L'viv *oblast'*, 613 in Ternopil' *oblast'* and 455 in Ivano-Frankivs'k *oblast'*), 249 Roman Catholic structures (138 in L'viv *oblast'*, 81 in Ternopil' *oblast'* and 30 in Ivano-Frankivs'k *oblast'*) and 532 Protestant organisations of various types. It seems to me quite obvious that fewer than a million non-Greek Catholic believers in Galicia could not have founded nearly 3,000 religious organisations and that the figure of 4.5 million Greek Catholics does not therefore correspond with reality. In any case, the logical and sensible way, if not the ideal way, of estimating the real number of Greek Catholics would be to compare the number of parishes belonging to the Greek Catholics and the Orthodox (as the two biggest religious confessions in the region) and to extrapolate the proportions.

As noted above, in Galicia today there are 1885 Orthodox parishes belonging to the three jurisdictions. There are 2993 Greek Catholic religious organisations (1534 in L'viv *oblast'*, 772 in Ternopil' *oblast'* and 687 in Ivano-Frankivs'k *oblast'*). As percentages of the total these are 39 and 61 respectively. In my view, this shows that three-fifths (55–60 per cent) of the active believers in the region are Greek Catholics and two-fifths (35–40 per cent) are members of the various Orthodox jurisdictions.

In trying to establish the number of believers belonging to the various confessions we would also do well to look at reliable sociological and statistical data.

The 'Geneza' political studies centre carried out a sociological survey in L'viv *oblast'* in 1997–98 as part of a bigger project (Rezultaty, 1997, p. 190). The results revealed that 42.43 per cent of those questioned identified with the UGCC and 37.04 per cent with Orthodoxy (3.06 per cent UOC-MP, 15.32 per cent UAOC and 18.66 per cent UOC-KP); a relatively high percentage (12.26) did not reveal their confessional preference. These results show that Greek Catholic preponderance in Galicia is in fact considerably less than predicted by my theoretical calculations.

Very similar figures, this time just for the city of L'viv, were produced by Orest Drul', former editor-in-chief of the local newspaper *Postup*, which represents the standpoint of the UGCC. He conducted a study (Drul', 2002)³ under the auspices of the Institute of City Development (*Institut rozvytku mista*) which is also ideologically close to the UGCC leadership. He is hardly likely to have juggled the figures in favour of the Orthodox. They show 45 per cent of the population of L'viv declaring themselves Greek Catholics and 39 declaring themselves Orthodox (31 per cent UOC-KP, 5 per cent UAOC and 3 per cent UOC-MP). These figures coincide overall, within a few percentage points, with the results of the poll mentioned above. The only

difference is among the Orthodox: the UOC-KP has gained at the expense of the UAOC. All these polls and estimates may differ in detail (are Orthodox 37 or 39 per cent of the population?), but one thing is clear from them: the idea that the population of Galicia is 80–90 per cent Greek Catholic does not reflect reality.

Sociological surveys carried out in the rest of Ukraine confirm that this conclusion is correct. The Democratic Initiatives (*Demokratychni initsiatyvy*) foundation conducted a survey in 2000, in cooperation with the Sociology Institute of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, as part of its project 'Public Opinion as a Measure of the Openness of Ukrainian Society' (*Hromads'ka dumka yak vymir vidkrytosti ukraiins'koho suspil'stva*) (Relihiinyi, 2000, pp. 10–20). Eight per cent of the population of Ukraine said they supported the UGCC. This is 3,800,000 people: considerably fewer than the UGCC officially claims.

My thesis that no more than 45–50 per cent of the population of Galicia are active members of the UGCC (although as many as 60 per cent may claim formal allegiance), and that the Orthodox are 35–40 per cent, ought to be, and could be, proved on the basis of more extensive material using more factual evidence culled at local level. The question can be finally settled only on the basis of special studies done at the level of each *raion*. For the present study I am not able to make an analysis of records kept by the various *shematysms* (historical statistical records relating to each parish) or of statistics from local government offices, but it is clear that a study of this kind would yield very interesting results.

It is evident that the religious situation is different in different *raiony*, even within the same *oblast'*. In Zhydachiv's'kyi *raion* in L'viv *oblast'*, for example, the UGCC is clearly prevalent, with more than 90 per cent of the parishes there, while in other *raiony* in the same *oblast'* not only are the majority of believers Orthodox (Starosambir's'kyi and Kamianka-Bus'kyi *raiony*) but there are also more Orthodox than Greek Catholic parishes (Turkiv's'kyi *raion*). Without going into similar details for the other Galician *oblasti*, I must nevertheless reiterate that it is an indisputable fact, historically and also today, as proved by contemporary statistical and analytical material, that Galicia is not a monoconfessional Catholic region.

Myth 6: Orthodox-Greek Catholic Relations in Galicia are Essentially Conflictual and Unproductive

One very important myth about Orthodox-Greek Catholic relations in Galicia, which is not undisputed but which is nevertheless very persistent, concerns the nature and content of these relations, describing them as essentially conflictual and without any prospects as far as ecumenism or any other kind of mutual theological or ecclesiological exchange or interaction is concerned.

It is a matter of common knowledge that over the last decade and a half relations between the Greek Catholic and Orthodox communities in Galicia have not been easy and have often involved conflict. Nevertheless it would be an oversimplification to schematise all aspects of Orthodox-Catholic relations as uniformly conflictual.

We need to look at the whole issue in its historical context, because it has been a lively one for as long as Christianity in two of its basic forms – Eastern and Western – has been present in the region. Orthodoxy has been in direct contact with Roman Catholicism ever since the first Christian communities were founded here in the ninth century and episcopal sees were established in Peremyshl' in the eleventh century and then a little later in Halych (1157). Orthodoxy has been in contact with Greek Catholicism ever since the latter was founded at the Council of Brest in 1596. This

centuries-long experience of interaction inevitably brings its influence to bear on today's realities. We always need to bear this historical component in mind when we come to analyse all the various contemporary developments which started in 1988 with turbulent religious transformation, widescale development of religious organisations and the alteration of confessional relations in Galicia.

Like any other phenomenon in the religious sphere, Orthodox-Greek Catholic relations are not fixed in stone for ever. When we are studying them as a whole we need to bear in mind their specific character and the dynamics of their alteration over various successive stages. This is certainly true as far as the conflict potential which has always been present, and still is to a certain degree, in Orthodox-Greek Catholic relations is concerned. At some periods it has been dominant, while at other periods it has been eclipsed by other types of relationship.

The Main Stages in Orthodox-Greek Catholic Relations in Galicia since 1988

I shall now attempt to identify the main stages in Orthodox-Greek Catholic relations in Galicia since 1988, concentrating on the dynamics of their development and on the presence and nature of conflict potential between the two confessions.

The First Period: 1988 to Autumn 1989

The first period was from 1988 to autumn 1989. At this time the UGCC was still operating illegally, without official registration (the decision to start registering Greek Catholic parishes was taken by the Ukrainian Council for Religious Affairs on 1 December 1989). Nevertheless it had already been holding services from spring 1989. In some villages hitherto unused church buildings had been opened without official permission; in towns and cities prayer meetings were held on squares, in front of churches and in other public places. It had also been organising public events such as meetings to press for legalisation and a fast, lasting several months, by supporters of the UGCC on the Arbat in Moscow.

At this time the strategy of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) was to attempt to register as many of its parishes as possible and to occupy church buildings in as many towns and villages as possible in order to head off the UGCC, which was gathering its strength on the threshold of registration, now seen by all as inevitable. The number of ROC parishes in the Galician dioceses rose by more than a third in 18 months. The majority of the 1070 new ROC parishes registered in Ukraine in 1988 were in Galicia.

There were no official relations of any kind between the two churches at this time. Representatives of the UGCC repeatedly expressed their desire and readiness to discuss the relegalisation and redistribution of church property in Galicia with the Orthodox church leadership, but both the leadership of the local ROC dioceses and the then head of the Ukrainian Exarchate Metropolitan Filaret (Denysenko) categorically rejected the possibility of starting discussions about this obvious problem on the grounds that there was in fact no problem at all, inasmuch as the UGCC was an illegal, and hence nonexistent, organisation supported by only a small minority of the region's population, who could perfectly well satisfy their religious needs in the existing churches of the Roman Catholic Church.

Throughout this period, then, there was as yet no organisational contact between the two churches. They existed as it were on two levels which did not intersect until autumn 1989: the legal and official ROC and the underground or semi-underground UGCC. The local authorities lent their full support to the ROC, while political

organisations of a nationalist, pro-independence and anticommunist orientation which were looking towards a strategic partnership with Ukrainian churches were still very weak or in the early stages of formation. In this context, without serious political support, the UGCC had not yet made up its mind to enter into open competition with the ROC. Conflict in the relationship between the two churches at that time was therefore to do with ideology rather than with organisation or property. Specific conflicts developed naturally at village level when de facto self-legalised UGCC priests wanted to serve in churches belonging to the ROC, but these conflicts did not alter the bigger picture.

The situation altered radically in autumn 1989. This was not because of the document officially legalising the UGCC which Mikhail Gorbachev signed on 1 December after his meeting with Pope John Paul II in the Vatican: this decree merely registered what had already happened in reality. The change was the result of a whole set of circumstances obtaining in Galicia at that time.

Anticipating the imminent recognition of the UGCC by the government, a large number of ROC clergy took an unprecedented and unforeseen step in an effort to preserve the Orthodox presence in nationally active Galicia. They set about the founding, or more precisely the third regeneration in the twentieth century, of a national Orthodox church: the UAOC. In its initial stages, and in some particular locations, this movement had some support from local state authorities which sympathised with Orthodoxy. It has often been claimed that the movement was entirely an initiative of the KGB in direct opposition to the revival of the UGCC, and that there were no natural internal reasons for it, but these claims have never been confirmed by concrete evidence, and it seems that they originated with groups and leaders who did not welcome the revival of Orthodoxy in postsoviet Galicia. The UAOC took final shape in August 1989 and was welcomed with open enthusiasm in Galicia. It was welcomed even by activists of the UGCC, who at the outset saw the new structure as a transitional stage in the process of a general (or at least mass-scale) return to the Union.

The newly-declared autocephalous Orthodox movement soon had the support of hundreds of parishes, but it became clear that its leaders had no intention of changing their confessional orientation or merging organisationally with the UGCC. Rather the reverse: it was in fact they who assumed the leadership of informal local spiritual opposition to the UGCC, rather than the hierarchs and priests of the ROC, who no longer enjoyed the confidence of most of the local population. Conflict therefore arose between these two nascent intra-Ukrainian church structures, and this led to direct organisational confrontations between believers of the two churches.

The Greek Catholic leaders realised that Orthodoxy in its new autocephalous manifestation was establishing itself quite successfully in Galicia. They therefore decided to take a more aggressive stance: if they adopted a wait-and-see policy they ran the risk of losing the initiative completely. First in isolated villages, and then in regional centres, individual parishes started going over to the UGCC, and hitherto unified church communities started splitting into groups supporting the two rival confessions. One of the first rural parishes to go over to the UGCC was in the village of Stara Sil' in Starosambirs'kyi *raion*, L'viv *oblast'*. The case was examined in detail at the time in the local as well as the national press.

The highest-profile change of allegiance, which resonated throughout Galicia, took place in L'viv at the end of October 1989. On 29 October one of the three priests at the Church of the Transfiguration announced that his church was going over to the UGCC. This church has unique significance not only for L'viv but for the whole of

Galicia. It is the biggest church, located in the very centre of the city, with unique architecture and art. It was built in the last quarter of the nineteenth century at public expense on a site donated to the Ukrainian community of the city by the Emperor Francis Joseph after the events of 1848. During the Second World War and until his death in September 1948 Fr Gavryil Kostel'nyk, the initiator of the merger of the UGCC with the ROC, served here as priest. The dean and another priest protested; but after large-scale confrontations between Orthodox and Greek Catholics the latter held the church with the help of a large number of fellow-believers who came in from all over Galicia. The secular authorities decided not to use force to restore the church to the Orthodox, and this gave the green light to other parishes and priests who had been hesitating to join the UGCC through fear of reprisals. A tidal wave of changes of allegiance swept through L'viv and into the localities, with jurisdictional upheavals and sometimes violence.

The Second Period: Late 1989 to Late 1990

During the course of this year relations between the churches entered the stage of open confrontation, although the diocesan authorities of all the churches as well as the *oblast'* governments were still trying to resolve the conflict by legal means, through a process of negotiation on the basis of juridical principles or agreements of any kind. Two striking examples will illustrate the situation.

A quadripartite interconfessional commission involving the UGCC, the ROC, the UAOC and the local authorities began work in March 1990. Its aim was to work out general recommendations for resolving interconfessional conflicts and to try to find a solution to a number of especially difficult individual cases. From the very start the Greek Catholic proposal for joint use of church buildings met with categorical rejection from the Orthodox, who saw no possibility of compromise here. At the outset, then, the Greek Catholic delegation was prepared to make some compromises, but within a few months it was refusing to take part in any more talks. It had become increasingly aware of the growth of Catholic influence in the region, and was also increasingly influenced by individual radical activists in church and society who had moved on from the idea of proportional redistribution of church property and had begun thinking in terms of complete revenge and the return of all church property in Galicia to the UGCC. After this the commission *de facto* and *de jure* ceased to function.

As well as attempting to minimise the potential for interconfessional conflict from the centre, as it were, by bringing the most active participants in the interconfessional confrontation together for talks, the local authorities also tried to influence the situation by proposing their own solution to the quarrels about property ownership. On 5 May 1990 L'viv *oblast'* council took the decision to conduct local referenda at town and village level, and to rule that local conflicts were henceforth to be decided on the basis of the results of these referenda.

The aim of the referenda was to determine how many adherents each confession had in each locality where conflict had arisen. Where there were two or more church buildings the majority confession was to receive the main building and the minority the less important building. If there was only one church building in a particular locality it was to be awarded to the majority confession, but the latter would be obliged to give material help to the losing minority in obtaining or building its own church.

For several months this is indeed how the church property issue was resolved in many parts of L'viv *oblast'*, depending on whether the two sides who had agreed to the

referendum accepted the responsibility of abiding strictly by its outcome. A majority of a handful of votes (which happened quite frequently), or even one single vote, had just the same consequences as a convincing victory by one side or the other with a significant majority.

From autumn 1990, however, under pressure from the Greek Catholics, this scheme for resolving the conflict ceased to function. When they had agreed to the referenda in the spring of 1990 the local UGCC leaders and activists had assumed that practically everywhere the majority would come out in support of their church. In the course of these democratic referenda it became clear, however, that in approximately one-third of localities the majority was on the Orthodox side, and this meant that in all such cases the Greek Catholics had to give up their claims to a church building which they already regarded as their own. The Greek Catholics therefore took the initiative in putting an end to the referenda.

The Third Period: Late 1990 to Late 1992

This period saw the most serious interconfessional quarrels and conflicts, involving direct clashes and even violence, and the most intensive redistribution of church property.

No regulatory agreements or provisions were in force during this period. Many if not most situations were resolved by the use of force by one side or the other (the seizure and occupation of church buildings, guards mounted in churches round the clock for months or even years, clashes between communities). Any given church building might change hands several times.

It was the transfers during this third period which to a large extent (albeit not finally) determined the pattern of confessional distribution in Galicia today. Particularly at local level, in each individual town or village, a great deal depended on the orientations of the local clergy and their decisions. Frequently whole deaneries would transfer from one confession to another. In the L'viv diocese, for example, the wholesale transfer of the Zhydachiv deanery to the UGCC at that time means that today the majority of religious communities (and hence most of the population) now belong to that church. Meanwhile in the same diocese the majority of clergy in the Kamianka-Bus'ka deanery took the decision to join the UAOC; as a result of this move the majority confession in this *raion* and its main town today is Orthodoxy, and there are not even any Greek Catholic parishes in up to a dozen towns and villages.

During this period relations between the confessions were clearly conflictual in nature. More precisely, we can say that the conflict at the organisational and jurisdictional level was a manifestation of a more fundamental conflict which was ideological and theological in nature.

The Fourth Period: Late 1992 to Late 1995

This period more or less saw the completion of the confessional reorientation process. This meant that the salient type of direct conflict between the confessions hitherto, which had been about organisation and jurisdiction, gave way to conflict which was essentially ideological and ecclesiological. This also gradually altered its character, however: crude propaganda designed to produce a swift response among the faithful gave way to polemics at a higher analytical level designed at this stage to lodge more complex ideas in believers' minds.

Such jurisdictional changes as took place in this period were within confessions rather than between them. The prime example is the wholesale transfer of the UAOC in Galicia to the UOC-KP (founded in June 1992) and the subsequent difficult and painful process whereby Orthodox parishes and even whole diocesan structures transferred from one jurisdiction to another. But these changes affected Orthodoxy only and did not upset the overall balance between Orthodoxy and Catholicism which had established itself by late 1992. (There were a few cases of transfer between the two but these did not change the general situation.)

The general feature of this period, then, was that the Orthodox-Greek Catholic conflict which had dominated the religious scene in Galicia in the period from 1988 to 1993 faded into the background as conflict, actual and potential, amongst the various Orthodox jurisdictions took prominence.

The founding of the UOC-KP dealt one more blow to the structures of the ROC in Galicia. The ROC had already virtually ceased functioning in Ivano-Frankivsk's diocese, where in 1990 at a meeting in Halych organised by Archpriest Myron Sas-Zhurakivsky most of the clergy had announced their break with the Moscow Patriarchate and their transfer to the UAOC. By 1992 only the L'viv diocese of the ROC was still functioning; it had managed to retain some 200 parishes and the cathedral it had been given after being ejected from the Cathedral of St George. When the new church (the UOC-KP), led formally by Patriarch Mstyslav (Skrypnyk) but in reality by Metropolitan Filaret (Denysenko), was founded most of the parishes in this diocese, together with their bishop, Andrii Horak, left the ROC and joined it.

For about six months (from June to the end of 1992) all Orthodox in Galicia were within the UOC-KP, which was not in canonical communion with the ROC. At the end of 1992, however, a movement started up among UOC-KP clergy who had formerly belonged to the UAOC to leave the UOC-KP, which was under the control of Metropolitan Filaret, and to refound the UAOC (for the second time since 1989).

This movement consolidated itself by early 1993. It was joined by the then archbishop of L'viv-Drohobych, Petro Petrus', and gained the support of a significant number of Orthodox parishes (although most decided to stay in the UOC-KP). The year 1993 therefore saw jurisdictional division again, but this time within the Orthodox camp. The UOC-KP ended up with a slight majority of parishes over the UAOC.

The next serious jurisdictional reshuffling within Orthodoxy took place in 1995, when a significant number of parishes left the UAOC to rejoin the UOC-KP. These changes meant that for the second time the UOC-KP had the majority of Orthodox parishes in Galicia (about two-thirds of their total number) and a leading influence on religious developments in the region.

The Fifth Period: 1996 to Today

In this period direct interconfessional organisational conflict and ideological quarrels between the supporters of the various confessions both quietened down. Ecumenical contacts and cooperative activity became almost the norm in interconfessional relations.

It became clear that there had been a substantial evolution in Orthodox-Greek Catholic relations. Things that would have been completely unimaginable in the late 1980s and early 1990s – common prayers, and frequent shared use of churches – became reality. Interconfessional relations developed in such a way as to cast doubt on the myth that conflict between Orthodox and Greek Catholics in Galicia was deep-rooted and insoluble.

A symbol, almost a cliché, about Orthodox-Catholic relations today is common participation in public activities at all levels, from the local town or village with several religious congregations to the *oblast'* and even the regional level: prayers and blessings conducted by priests of the UGCC and one or other of the Orthodox churches, or even all of them together. Virtually all social, political and academic events today include such acts of worship; when organising any kind of celebration it is the rule to invite bishops or priests of the various confessions, and this bears witness to the fact that the idea of interconfessional cooperation and the recognition of the heterogeneous religious nature of Galicia today are taking ever deeper root.

It would be wrong to maintain that interconfessional tension and conflict have completely disappeared; but at the present time they have changed their nature somewhat. Organisational quarrels (mainly disputes over property) are confined to two or three hundred parishes, and not thousands as earlier. People no longer resort to seizing church buildings by force in order to solve such conflicts, as in the early 1990s, but now tend to have recourse to the courts (there have been several dozen court cases dealing with individual interconfessional disputes; in one case the fate of a single church building was examined at 90 legal sessions). And intolerant slogans aimed at the faithful of different confessions which were common a few years ago, such as 'The UAOC is a tool of the KGB', 'The UGCC is the enemy of the Ukrainian Cossack tradition' and 'Rome is not our father, Moscow is not our mother', have almost completely disappeared from the public sphere (the press, debates, pronouncement by politicians and public figures).

Over the last 10 to 14 years there have been some fundamental changes in the way religious believers in Galicia understand their own identity. The following development is an illustration of this fact. While the UGCC was emerging from the underground and reestablishing its parish structures its supporters were virtually unanimous in rejecting the word 'Orthodox' to describe and define their own orientation. There was a popular movement to rename the church in line with its name in the diaspora, the Ukrainian Catholic Church, cutting out the epithet 'Greek' which clearly linked the church with an essentially Orthodox eastern tradition. In some dioceses (Ivano-Frankiv's'k, for example) the bishop ordinary even issued a special edict forbidding the use of the word 'Orthodox' in the text of the liturgy of St John Chrysostom, on the grounds that it was directly associated with the religious opposition and had nothing to do with the traditions and practice of the exclusively 'Catholic' UGCC. In the last few years, however, a new identificational model for the UGCC has gained wide support, including support at the highest level, with input from the theologians at the L'viv Theological Academy (renamed the Ukrainian Catholic University in 2002). This model is based on the acceptance and maximum deployment of the term 'Orthodox', which is regarded as a synonym for the rich original eastern Christian heritage with Orthodox roots dating from the time of Volodymyr the Great. The view is that this identificational concept will potentially be very productive and successful as the UGCC gradually expands into eastern Ukraine: this is the area which the UGCC has recently made its main target for organisational consolidation and expansion in order to escape confinement in just one region. Two facts indicate that this assessment of the strategic plans of the UGCC is correct. The UGCC has set up three exarchates in central and eastern Ukraine; and it has officially announced plans to move its administrative centre to Kiev in the next year or two. (In 2000 the site for a new cathedral for the UGCC was consecrated on the left bank of the Dnepr (Dnipro) in Kiev, and construction is nearing completion.)

One More Myth

Myth 7: the Confessional Orientation of the Galicians Influences how they Vote

One more myth has arisen, in connection with the fact that the population is undoubtedly highly active religiously and deeply engaged with church life. It is a myth which often influences political life in the region, especially just before elections. It is the assumption that the confessional orientation of the Galicians has a substantive influence on their electoral sympathies and on their voting behaviour.

The propagation of this myth requires a direct projection of the religious heterogeneity of the Galician population onto a social issue: the conclusion is based on the assumption that confessional differences must inevitably express themselves in differences in political orientation. It also requires the support of several interesting facts which seem to bear out the successful application of this theory at local level and under certain conditions.

In the first half of the 1990s, the period of greatest tension in interconfessional relations in Galicia, there certainly were cases when a clear confessional orientation and the overt support of one or another confessional group could decide the outcome of elections. This happened most easily in elections at local government level: at that time a large number of confessionally committed deputies, including priests, were being elected to village, town and *oblast'* councils (one of the best known cases being that of the UAOC priest Mar'ian Balash who was elected a deputy to L'viv *oblast'* council).

Also well known at that time were cases of individuals being elected to the Ukrainian Supreme Rada on the basis of overt support from the majority confession. In the Horodok constituency in L'viv *oblast'*, for example, Iryna Kalynets', a radical who was closely associated with the leadership of the UGCC (at that time still at the initial stage of open activity), was elected to the Supreme Rada on the basis of her overtly pro-Catholic slogans. At the same time Liliia Hryhorovych, an activist in the Galician part of the Transcarpathian mountains, was elected to the Supreme Rada for Nadvirna constituency in Ivano-Frankivs'k *oblast'* on the basis of the support of the Orthodox majority in that part of Galicia: she was one of the founders of the Brotherhood of the Apostle Andrew the First-Called (*Bratstvo Apostola Andriia Pervozvannoho*) which at one time played a key role in the formation of the UAOC, and later in the formation of the UOC-KP at the all-Ukrainian as well as some regional levels.

Besides these clear examples of conscious deployment of the confessional factor in electoral campaigns we should bear in mind other relevant points. At that time virtually every politician in Galicia would touch directly or indirectly on the question of interconfessional relations in his or her manifesto. We should note, however, several tendencies which were characteristic of that early transformational period.

First, there were relatively few cases of overt orientation upon or clear support for just one confession, even at the simple declarative level. Most candidates would take account of the prevailing multiconfessionalism and would demonstrate their respect for all religious organisations, coming out in clear opposition only to that Orthodox jurisdiction which was part of the Moscow Patriarchate.

Second, the effect of confessional preferences and orientations was felt more in elections to local government organs than in elections to the Supreme Rada. By putting forward its own candidates for election to local representative bodies each confession was attempting to solve its own problems: confirming its own legal right to the use of church buildings, obtaining grants to construct new buildings, obtaining plots of land and so on.

Third, although most politicians at regional level declared their confessional neutrality, most of them were nevertheless orientated towards the UGCC: this orientation coincided completely with the prevailing mood of political radicalism which determined success or failure at elections in the early 1990s. What is more, closeness to the UGCC brought direct dividends since members of this confession comprised the majority of the population in Galicia as a whole and in some of its individual regions, and a very active and monolithic majority at that.

The gradual normalisation of interconfessional relations in Galicia in the mid-1990s saw a decline in the salience of the religious factor during elections. Other issues, particularly economic problems, became more important. In the 1998 elections to the Ukrainian parliament the abovementioned Iryna Kalynets' once again campaigned on religious issues and the regional priorities of the UGCC, but was not reelected in her own Horodok constituency, and Liliia Hryhorovych gained a seat in the Supreme Rada not by being reelected in her constituency but by being included on a party list for the Ukrainian People's Movement (*Narodnyi Rukh Ukrainy*) (Ukrainian elections now included a system of proportional representation). In this campaign there was no large-scale support for candidates with links with churches, either radicals like Kalynets' or liberals like Ihor' Ozhivys'kyi, the head of the UGCC's Department of External Relations, standing for the Supreme Rada in the Stryi constituency in L'viv *oblast'*.

The continuing declining role of the confessional factor and of its influence on election results was again demonstrated in the most recent parliamentary elections in Ukraine in 2002. Previously the decline had been evident mainly at elections to the highest legislative organ, but now it became evident at the level of local elections too. One example is the failure of Mar'ian Lozyns'kyi, director of the 'Misionar' printing-house of the Basilian Fathers, who had the overt support of the UGCC, to get elected as deputy to the *oblast'* council in Zhovkva *raion*, L'viv *oblast'*, where UGCC believers were in a clear majority.

Clearly I am not saying that the confessional factor has no influence at all on the outcome of elections, or that political groups or individual politicians do not use confessional arguments in the course of electoral campaigns. Nor is it realistic to suggest that in a region with as much religious activity as Galicia the confessional factor is going to fall by the wayside with the development of modern electoral technology. Nevertheless it is clear that over the last decade the religious factor has altered in character and content during electoral campaigns. Earlier it could be a decisive factor in success at elections at all levels (with variations depending on regions), but now it is deployed along with other elements, as a supplementary reinforcement for arguments.

The most recent elections to local councils show that appeals to the confessional identity of fellow-believers are still productive and conducive to success at the level of village and town councils. Examples can be found quite easily and, although they are not widely reported in the press, this is precisely because they are considered typical and not worthy of special note. In the village of Zhovtantsi in Kamiianka-Bus'kyi *raion*, L'viv *oblast'*, full-scale mobilisation of the Orthodox community, which formed the majority in the village, led to the replacement of the chairman of the village council, a Greek Catholic supporter, with a candidate favoured by the Orthodox. Meanwhile in the village of Staryi Dobrotvir in the same *raion* the efforts of the Orthodox community were unsuccessful: the former chairman of the village council, the Greek Catholics' candidate, was reelected. These patterns are repeated in other villages where there are two powerful religious groups with rival authority.

As already noted, however, although the influence of the confessional affiliation of the Galician population can be analysed at the level of local electoral choices and processes, at the macro-level, at the level of the whole region, its influence is barely discernible. In all electoral campaigns since 1990 the people of Galicia, irrespective of their confessional affiliation, have constantly given their majority vote to candidates or political groups with an exclusively national and patriotic Ukrainian programme and supporting Ukrainian independence. Orthodox and Greek Catholics in Galicia have always been of one mind in this respect, which shows that the two most influential confessional groups in the region have the same social and political aims.

The electoral campaign in L'viv *oblast'* in 2002 was interesting in this respect. Over the course of the year before the elections a special relationship developed between the Orthodox bishops of the *oblast'* (UOC-KP and UAOC) and the regional branch of the Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine (United) (*Sotsial-Demokratychna Partiiia Ukrainy (obiednana)*) (SDPU(o)), which most Galicians regard as the party of the oligarchs, pro-government, pro-president, and hence patently opposed to the patriotic Ukrainian parties which came together on the eve of the elections in the 'Our Ukraine' ('*Nasha Ukraina*') bloc. Sensing widespread opposition, the SDPU(o) looked around for support. It sought this in the Orthodox community, having good relations with the Orthodox leadership (bishops and deans) and even some individual priests. In return for their fairly substantial material support for the Orthodox dioceses the SDPU(o) leaders were counting on significant support from Orthodox believers which would take them over the four per cent electoral threshold. Despite the best efforts of the church leadership at trying to persuade the faithful, however, the SDPU(o) gained only a little over two per cent of the vote in L'viv *oblast'*.

This example shows once again that the predominant political preferences in Galicia win out over pragmatic considerations about possible advantages or prospects for one's own confession if new politicians come to power in the region who will guarantee a new approach to interconfessional relations but who do not coincide with traditional ideas about a party which will defend and guarantee an independent strategic course for the Ukrainian state. The ideological and political commitments of Galicians take precedence over their confessional preferences.

Conclusion

I have described and analysed several myths to do with Orthodox-Greek Catholic relations in Galicia today. There are other aspects of religious life in the region which relate to this question, but which I have not dealt with in this article: the role of the Roman Catholic Church in interconfessional dialogue in Galicia; the religious policies of the central and regional governments; the role of religious education in shaping relations between the confessions; the part played by lay groups and brotherhoods in this process; and how influence and financial assistance from abroad directly or indirectly determine the course of political developments in Galicia.

It seems to me that the more closely one looks at the all the elements which taken together comprise a given phenomenon or process, the more one's analysis corresponds to reality. This is what I have tried to do in my study of how Orthodox-Greek Catholic relations are developing in Galicia today in the context of religious developments in Ukraine as a whole.

Notes

- 1 The statistics I have used in this article are taken from the yearbooks of official material published by the State Committee for Religious Affairs (*Derzhavnyi komitet u spravakh religii*) (formerly the Council for Religious Affairs, part of the Ministry of Migrations, Nationalities and Cults (*Rada u spravakh religii i viddil Ministerstva mihratsii, natsional'nostei i kul'tiv*), which give the most complete and reliable information on the religious situation in all the administrative subjects of Ukraine (the Republic of Crimea, the 24 *oblasti* and two cities with special status, Kiev and Sevastopol') and describing all the religious organisations functioning in Ukraine. Information on the religious situation in Ukraine as of 1 January 2002 is taken from a volume published for the first time by the Committee for Religious Affairs: Bondarenko, 2002.
- 2 The following statistics on the population of the various regions of Ukraine come from Shablii, 2001, p.660.
- 3 The version of this article published in *Yi* does not include a table giving the percentages of the various religious confessions in the city of L'viv, but such a table appears in the original version of the article which I received from the author and which is now in my personal archive.

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(Translated from the Russian by Philip Walters)