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Nationalism and Reconciliation: Orthodoxy in the Balkans*

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Introduction¹

The issue I intend to deal with here is a delicate and difficult one. There are not only many nationalities and cultures in the Balkans but also a great deal of division and conflict. Religious factors are often mentioned as a possible explanation for these. There is a tendency, too, to speak *pro domo sua* and to attempt to prove that one's own religious community and one's own nation are 'right'. I am trying to write objectively, as a scholar. I am a westerner; I realise that throughout history so much has been 'settled' and 'arranged' for the Balkans by the West and also that western perceptions of the Balkan countries, with their mainly Orthodox and Islamic populations, have been marked by self-interest and prejudice. As a student I lived in the Balkans for three years: in Thessalonica. Since then I have maintained contacts with many people living there and have returned several times. I hope that the experiences I have gained there can be felt in this article.

I am convinced that a knowledge of history is necessary for an understanding of current phenomena, and hence this article deals to a large extent with historical developments. Further studies on this subject will need to look at research data from the social sciences, especially in the fields of anthropology, social psychology and political science, regarding the relation between religion and ethnicity, as well as socio-economic factors such as poverty, social modernisation processes and feelings of discrimination.

My article falls into five sections. Firstly, I look at various understandings of homeland and alienism from the New Testament period and the second century. Secondly, I examine the close bonds between Christianity and the nation or state which developed during and after the era of the Emperor Constantine. Thirdly, I briefly discuss nationalism and some common reactions on the part of Orthodox theologians to nationalism within their churches. Fourthly, I describe the situation in two Balkan countries, Greece and Serbia. Finally, I discuss several initiatives by the Patriarchate of Constantinople which are aiming at reconciliation in the Balkans.

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Some New Testament Ideas and the *Epistle to Diognetus* on Homeland and Alienism²

‘For our citizenship is in heaven ...’, we read in the Letter to the Philippians (Phil. 3: 20). A similar conviction is found in a passage from the Letter to the Hebrews:

... by faith Abraham took up his residence in the promised land, as in a foreign land, living in tents together with Isaac and Jacob, who were co-heirs of the same promise. For he could look forward to the city with foundations of which God is the designer and builder ... they acknowledged that they were strangers and passers-by on earth ... they are looking for a homeland ... they long for a better homeland; that is: a heavenly homeland. (Hebr. 11: 9–16)

The First Letter of Peter also stresses alienism: ‘Beloved, I request you as sojourners and passers-by to abstain from carnal lust ...’ (1 Pet. 2: 11).³

The author of the *Epistle to Diognetus*, which supposedly dates from the second century,⁴ makes it very clear that Christians do not have a country, language or customs on Earth which distinguish them from the rest of mankind:

For Christians do not differ from other people, neither in homeland, nor in language, nor in clothing. Nowhere do they live in their own cities. They do not use a special dialect, nor is there anything special about their way of life. ... They live in Greek and barbarian [i.e. non-Greek] cities, according to each man’s lot, and follow the local customs for clothing, food and other habits while obeying the extraordinary and paradoxical laws of their spiritual republic. Christians live in their native land, but as strangers; they take part in everything as citizens but endure everything as foreigners. Every foreign country is their homeland and every homeland is a foreign country. ... They pass their lives on earth but are citizens of heaven.⁵

Subsequent developments in the Christian world, however, produced a range of different understandings and experiences of homeland and nationality. Let me present a general survey of these.⁶

Development of the Link between Church and Nation or State

By the so-called Edict of Tolerance of 311, during the reign of the Roman Emperor Galerius, Christianity became a permitted religion (*religio licita*). The Edict of Milan, issued by the Emperors Constantine and Licinius in 313, confirmed religious freedom in the Roman Empire.⁷ Subsequently, when Constantine had absolute power, Christianity became the favoured religion and later, by the Edict of Thessalonica issued by the Emperors Theodosius and Gratian in 380, the official religion of the Empire. The Edict of Thessalonica, entitled *Cunctos populos*, states:

All peoples, whom the moderation of our Clemency rules, we wish to be engaged in that religion, which the divine Peter, the apostle, is declared ... to have transmitted to the Romans and which it is clear the pontiff Damasus and Peter, bishop of Alexandria, a man of apostolic sanctity, follow: this is that according to apostolic discipline and evangelic doctrine we should believe the sole Deity of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit under an equal Majesty and under a pious Trinity ...⁸.

It is interesting that here the consubstantiality of the three godly persons is affirmed and Arianism rejected. This edict also states that heretics will be punished by divine revenge and by the state authorities. On the basis of this edict in later centuries heretics and schismatics were to be dealt with rigorously and faced with the loss of civil status, imprisonment, torture, even death.

For a long time – mainly for reasons of political and ecclesiastical unity with the so-called ‘Monophysites’ in Syria and Egypt – the teachings of the Council of Chalcedon (451) were highly controversial in the Eastern Roman Empire. Nevertheless they became its official doctrine. From about the sixth century onwards the Eastern Empire became increasingly Greek, the Greek language superseding Latin as the administrative language; close links between religion and state developed.⁹

The Christian influences on Greek Byzantine culture are manifold. Church architecture and painting (icons) adapted secular models. Theology used concepts from Greek philosophy. Christ and Mary were depicted wearing the imperial garments: Christ is in imperial purple; the icon showing the birth of Christ has the Mother of God lying dressed as an empress. Angels look like courtiers or members of the imperial bodyguard, the apostles like administrators and the saints like imperial counsellors. Conversely, the Byzantine Emperor borrowed distinctive features of Christ. Christ and the Emperor were addressed by the same titles: *despotes*, absolute ruler, and *basileus*, king/emperor. The Mother of God and the Empress were both addressed as *despoina*. This made identification between triumphs easy: imperial conquests on the battlefield could be equated with the conquests of Christ; peace and order within the Roman Empire with those established by Christ.¹⁰ The Emperor ruled the *basileia*, the Christian commonwealth, which was the earthly equivalent of the heavenly Kingdom of God. During the iconoclastic controversies of the eighth and ninth centuries statements such as ‘We venerate the holy images and the cross, just as we venerate the invincible and most devout emperors’ were often made.¹¹

There was, however, a movement which countered this tendency. In the works of St John Chrysostom (d. 407), one of the most important Church Fathers and Christian saints, two lines of argument can be discerned. On the one hand the saint makes numerous comparisons between the Emperor and Christ; on the other, however, he emphasises the distinctive character and the suffering of Christ and his Church, which preclude a ‘political’ Christ.¹² In the promotion of monasticism, too, efforts were made to prevent confusion between the sacred and the profane.¹³

Dogmatic and political opposition to Latin Christianity and cultural, social and ecclesiastical alienation finally caused a rift between Constantinople and Rome in 1054. The capture, sacking and long occupation of the imperial city by western crusaders during the thirteenth century and the compulsory replacement of the Greek hierarchy by a Latin one deepened the schism and put the seal of hatred upon it. These developments encouraged the citizens of the Byzantine Empire to identify western Catholics with the ‘enemy’. Moreover, the idea that westerners were coarse and illiterate barbarians was already widely accepted in the Empire.¹⁴ Meanwhile Islam was becoming associated with Arabic conquerors. The campaigns undertaken by the Emperors Nikeforos Fokas (963–69) and Ioannes Tzimiskes (969–76) against the Arabs breathed the character of a holy war, or a crusade.¹⁵ Later, as the Byzantine state continued to shrink, Islam was identified with the Ottoman Turks. The Byzantines felt threatened, cornered between Catholics to the West and Muslims to the East. In this way the bonds between Greek Orthodoxy, the Byzantine Empire and Byzantine tradition continued to be reinforced.¹⁶

During the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth centuries almost the entire Balkans were conquered by the Turkish Ottomans. Constantinople fell in 1453 and became, under the name of Istanbul, the capital of the Ottoman Empire. In that new, Islamic empire there was also room for non-Islamic peoples. For the Christians, religion continued to determine their identity, even though the Byzantine Orthodox state had been destroyed. Indeed, now that this state did not exist any longer religion became for them the fundamental characteristic of identity. The Orthodox who adhered to the doctrines of the Council of Chalcedon were united within the *millet Rum*, the 'nation of the Romans' (*Romaioi*), as the citizens of the Eastern Roman Empire called themselves. The *millet Rum* was led by the Patriarch of Constantinople. Not only Greek-speaking people but also Bulgarian, Serbian, Albanian, Romanian and Arabic-speaking people belonged to this *millet*. The ecumenical patriarch acted as ethnarch and owed responsibility to the sultan.¹⁷ It is obvious that this state of affairs, in which faith and nation are interwoven, is quite different from that described in the *Epistle to Diognetus*.

The new national states which came into existence in the Balkans during the nineteenth century after liberation wars against the Ottomans almost automatically adopted Orthodoxy as their state religion. In Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria and Romania the strong link between Orthodoxy on the one hand and being Serb or Greek, Bulgarian or Romanian on the other was continued. Moreover, political and ecclesiastical independence went together; autocephaly was proclaimed *vis-à-vis* the Constantinople Patriarchate, which was subordinate to the Ottoman authorities. At the same time, moreover, the pursuit of independence often isolated the new Balkan churches from each other and led to mutual animosity.

For those countries with so-called 'real socialism' the ecclesiastical situation changed radically after the Second World War. In Bulgaria, Romania and Albania Orthodoxy was severely repressed. In former Yugoslavia, with its important Serbian Orthodox Church, after initial strong repression a milder climate began to prevail in the mid-1950s, but the church still suffered from important restrictions. After the political monopoly of the communist regimes was broken at the end of the 1980s the legal position of these churches also changed. However, they have been profoundly shaken by sustained repression and now need time, material support and education to recover and prepare to meet the new situation.

Nationalism and Orthodox Reactions to Ecclesiastical Nationalism

There is tension between the universal and the particular, between the identity of an individual as belonging to the whole of mankind and his or her identity as part of a smaller group which has a common language and history, common myths and customs. Modern nationalism has traditionally based itself on the existence of a nation with characteristic features; it has put the interests of this nation first and vigorously pursued this nation's political independence.¹⁸

There are many forms of modern nationalism (just as there are diverse opinions on people, ethnicity, nation and national identity). In conservative forms of nationalism the common tradition, language and culture of a people are accentuated. Here the people is not only a collection of individuals but an organic entity; the meaning of individual existence shows up well only within a larger entity, 'the people'. In fascist forms of nationalism one's own people and state are glorified, other peoples and states are seen as inferior, and imperialistic goals are pursued, often through military means. In democratic and liberal forms of nationalism a people's common interests

and rights are at the forefront along with the rights and interests of the individuals of whom this people consists. Aggression is no monopoly of fascist nationalism. Liberal and democratic nationalism, too, may use aggression. Nineteenth- and twentieth-century Balkan nationalism developed in the context of wars of liberation and territorial claims.

Modern nationalism is often regarded as one of the most dangerous contemporary movements. Reference is made not only to statements about the superiority of a particular people, culture or religion and to the ensuing eclipse of the universal dimension of that people, but also to armed conflicts, discrimination and violence against other communities, ethnic cleansing and genocide. But nationalism also has its positive aspects. Peoples who for centuries lived in multinational states, such as the Danube Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire, and experienced the repression of their own language, culture and religion were eventually able to implement the right of self-determination and create their own autonomous areas and states where they could flourish.

The Orthodox Churches make up a group, one might say a 'commonwealth', of (mostly) independent national or local churches, such as the Romanian, Bulgarian, Serbian and Russian Orthodox Churches. Their common characteristics are the same liturgy, the same Creed (that of Nicaea–Constantinople) and the same canons. They originate from Byzantine tradition; that is, they are located in the territories of the former Eastern Roman Empire or were christianised by missionaries from that empire. Nowadays we find Orthodox churches all over the world; they have become global. Because these churches consider themselves to be part of the One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church in the image of the Holy Trinity, one might speak of 'the Orthodox Church' (singular). However, amongst these autocephalous¹⁹ and autonomous churches there are tensions, which for the most part are connected with national and nationalistic issues.

Well over a century ago, in 1872, a synod of the Patriarchate of Constantinople condemned Bulgarian 'ethnophyletism'. In 1870, with the permission of the sultan, a Bulgarian exarchate has been set up in Istanbul. The Bulgarian nation was thereby granted its own ecclesiastical hierarchy. The consequences quickly became symptomatic of subsequent political and ecclesiastical nationalism in the Balkans. The exarchate served the purposes of the Bulgarian political leaders in Sofia as far as their territorial ambitions were concerned. Like many nationalities in the Balkans at that time, Bulgarians were widely distributed, often among Greeks, Serbs and other communities. From 1870 it could be claimed that anybody, wherever he lived, who belonged to the so-called 'Bulgarian nation' was part of an independent Bulgarian exarchate. Constantinople took issue with the assumption being made that a particular church was identified with a particular nation ('ethnophyletism'). The Orthodox tradition was that Orthodox churches were defined territorially rather than ethnically. The Bulgarian exarch resided in Istanbul. The participants in the patriarchal synod maintained that this was a violation of the old Orthodox principle that there could not be more than one bishop in one territory.²⁰ In a letter written to the Orthodox churches in 1904 the Patriarch of Constantinople Ioakeim III denounced nationalism within Orthodoxy.²¹

For a better understanding of the Bulgarian point of view at the end of the nineteenth century it should be pointed out that, in particular during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Slavic elements in the Christianity and culture of the Balkans had been discouraged and Greek language and culture promoted by the activities of Greeks in the Phanar, the neighbourhood in Istanbul where influential Greek

merchants lived and where the headquarters of the Patriarchate were located. By the middle of the eighteenth century Church Slavonic had been replaced by Greek as the liturgical language in the Bulgarian territories. A Bulgarian cultural and ecclesiastical revival was the consequence.²² The schism between Sofia and Constantinople was terminated only in 1945, when the latter recognised Bulgarian autocephaly.

Nowadays prominent Orthodox theologians complain that all Orthodox churches suffer from the distortions of nationalism. Kallistos Ware, an auxiliary bishop of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Great Britain, asserts that during the past ten centuries nationalism has been the 'bane' of Orthodoxy.²³ According to John Meyendorff, a Russian-American theologian, Orthodox nationalism took root during the Byzantine period and flourished under the Turkish regime among both the Greeks and the Slavs. As a consequence the church frequently came to be regarded as an organisation useful primarily for the preservation of the national language and customs.²⁴ Meyendorff argues that the nineteenth-century autocephaly movement within Orthodoxy in the Balkans sprang from nationalist motives and that the churches could not avoid being absorbed into the nationalist agenda. The result was a rift with Orthodox canonical tradition and division among the churches.²⁵ Another Russian-American theologian, Alexander Schmemmann, asserts that for the Orthodox Church the modern age is characterised by division, provincialism and nationalism. Autocephaly does not stem from ecclesiology but from nationalism. The Greek Orthodox Church confuses 'Hellenism', which is a nationalistic concept, with 'Christian Hellenism', which refers to Orthodox theology, worship and spirituality. Constantinople's primacy, too, must be purified of Greek nationalistic connotations.²⁶ A third Russian-American theologian, Georges Florovsky, maintains that Hellenism, as expressed in the teachings of the Church Fathers and the Ecumenical Councils, is of the essence of the Church, but that modern national Hellenism leads the Church astray.²⁷ The Greek Ioannes Karmires claims that nationalistic ideals run counter to the New Testament message, which is intended for all peoples and nations, and counter to the Church's unity and catholicity. Moreover, nationalism sows unwanted division. Of course, argues Karmires, local churches may adopt healthy national elements, but nationalism itself, as espoused by Greek, Romanian and Russian hierarchies in the Orthodox diaspora, is to be rejected.²⁸ Another Greek theologian, Damaskenos Papandreou, who is also the metropolitan of Switzerland for the Ecumenical Patriarchate, asserts that while nations belong essentially to humanity they grow together in the Church and become the Body of Christ. Nationalism is an aberration, he says, but the Church has the power to conquer it.²⁹ With regard to the nationalistic explosions in the Balkans and elsewhere in Eastern Europe in the early 1990s, he claims that these were prompted by various factors: firstly, by the intervention of western superpowers, including the Roman Catholic Church, which tried to exploit the void in those regions in order to promote their own interests; secondly, by the needy situation of these Eastern European peoples and societies; and thirdly, by the new religious freedom, which brought to the surface the suppressed nationalistic and ecclesiastical tensions which had not been resolved by the imposed internationalism of 'real socialism'.³⁰

Not only theologians criticise ecclesiastical nationalism. The Frenchman François Thual, an Orthodox Christian and a specialist in strategic and geopolitical issues, asserts that in Orthodox countries the religious element sanctifies the national element and the latter makes the former ethnic. He also contends that Orthodoxy promotes a nationalistic ideology which reinforces a people's national feeling and that this feeling for its part perpetuates the people's identification with Orthodoxy.³¹

According to Thual this dialectical relationship constitutes the collective conceptual universe of a given people; it is in large part not defined officially by the ecclesiastical authorities and certainly is not correlated with the spiritual quality of Orthodoxy or with church attendance in a given country; but it is most influential and long-lasting. It also determines the enemies of the given nation and of Orthodoxy: primarily Roman Catholicism and Islam.³²

In spring 1994 a comparative investigation was conducted in Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Greece and the so-called Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia into these Balkan peoples' feelings about the minorities living within their borders and about the populations of neighbouring countries. The results showed that a substantial proportion of the population in each country felt great aversion. It was suggested that one of the causes of this was that the education system in the various countries focussed attention on the traditions of the majority people and thus instilled a feeling of national and cultural superiority. Working groups argued in favour of the introduction of 'self-critical, antiracist education'.³³

Let us now look at the current situation of the Orthodox churches in the two Balkan countries I know best, Greece and Serbia. I make no claim that my survey is complete; my aim is to present my impressions and highlight some tendencies.

*Greece*³⁴

The current Greek constitution, which dates from 1975, was drafted 'in the name of the holy, consubstantial and indivisible Trinity'. Article 3 states that the 'dominant religion in Greece is that of the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ' and that, regarding dogma, 'the Orthodox Church of Greece, whose head is our Lord Jesus Christ, is indissolubly united with the Great Church of Christ in Constantinople and with any other Church of Christ which has the same creed'. About 97 per cent of Greeks have been baptised in the Orthodox Church. The close constitutional bonds between Orthodoxy and the Greek state are revealed in many ways. Religious and national feasts often coincide. On the Feast of the Annunciation the uprising of 1821 against Ottoman domination is also commemorated. This uprising, which was supported by the local clergy, led to the birth of a Greek state. On 28 October, the day of the Greek 'no' to the Italian ultimatum in 1940, which brought Greece into the Second World War, the feast of Mary's Protecting Veil is also celebrated. Traditionally Orthodox churches celebrate this feast on 1 October, but in Greece the date was changed so that it would coincide with the 'day of no'. On 15 August both the Dormition of the Mother of God and Mary's patronage of the Greek military forces are celebrated. Government ministers have to be sworn in by the archbishop of Athens on the assumption of their duties; an Orthodox bishop can accede to office only after being presented to the Greek president. The salaries of Orthodox clergy are paid by civil authorities; in exchange, the church turns over one third of its income to the state. Bishops, theology professors and politicians often define the relationship between church and state as *sunallelia* ('being together').³⁵ Nevertheless, there has often also been tension between the ecclesiastical hierarchy and those in parliamentary and government circles, especially during the first eight years of the administration of the socialist party (Pasok) (1981–89).

From its origin as an independent state during the first half of the nineteenth century until the beginning of the twentieth century Greece was dominated by the 'Great Idea' (*Megale Idea*): the vision of uniting within one state all territories where Greeks lived and of reviving the Byzantine Empire with Constantinople as its capital

and Orthodoxy as its state religion.³⁶ (In the same period both Russia and Bulgaria nurtured the ambition of acquiring Constantinople as well.) Initially these aspirations led to enormous territorial expansion, but they failed dramatically with the defeat of the Greek army in Asia Minor and the subsequent forced 'exchange of populations' in 1922–23. This exchange meant that – with some exceptions, such as the Greeks in Constantinople and the Muslims in West Thrace – the Greek Orthodox had to leave Turkey and the Muslims Greece. The criterion used was religion.

How do ecclesiastical professionals – by this somewhat profane term I mean in particular bishops, priests, deacons, theologians, monks and nuns – nowadays view the link between church, state and the Greek people? There is frequent reference in their writings to an indissoluble bond between Greek people (*ethnos, genos, laos*) all over the world, 'Greekness' as such (*hellenismos, romiosune*) and Orthodoxy. They like to point out that the New Testament was written in Greek; that the great Church Fathers and the Ecumenical Councils also used that language; that the Eastern Roman Empire was perfectly Christian; that Orthodoxy preserved the Greek people's identity under Ottoman rule; and that the church played a decisive role in the uprisings against the Turks. It often looks as if people, Greekness and Orthodoxy are three hypostases of one and the same being; that the true Greek is Orthodox and, conversely, the true Orthodox is Greek.

This triune nature was made particularly explicit during the recent Macedonian crisis, especially between 1991 and 1995. All over Greece there were protests against the so-called Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia for allegedly misusing the old Greek name and making claims to all the historical territory of Macedonia. There was widespread fear among Greeks that the supposed claims of the new republic, which was usually called the 'pseudo-republic of Skopje' in the Greek press, would revive the claims and disputes of the turn of the century, when Bulgarians, Greeks and Serbs were fighting not only against the Ottoman Empire but also against each other. At that time the greater part of Macedonia fell to Greece; smaller parts of it were allocated to Serbia and Bulgaria. The leadership of the diocese of Thessalonica played an important role in the recent crisis. The bishop of this Greek 'co-capital'³⁷ of Greece, Panteleemon, acted as if he were an ethnarch; so did several other metropolitans of northern Greece, such as Bishop Timotheos of Kerkyra (Corfu) and Bishop Augoustinos of Florina. In their addresses on this issue the Gospel and politics seemed to melt into one another as they adduced historical and geographical arguments in support of the idea that Macedonia belonged to the Greek nation.³⁸

When Yugoslavia fell apart into separate countries which were subsequently recognised as independent states by Germany, other members of the European Union and the Vatican, and when open violence began, many Greek ecclesiastical professionals had great sympathy with Serbia. A common Orthodox religion and united combat against the Ottoman Empire were mentioned as the most important motives here. During the ethnic cleansing and other atrocities in Bosnia it was the Serbian victims in particular who received attention in Greek Orthodox circles. Relief action was organised for them and goods such as blankets, clothing and food were taken to the afflicted areas.³⁹ Bosnian-Serbian children came to Greece to recuperate, their expenses paid by Greek dioceses. The leader of the Bosnian Serbs, Radovan Karadžić, was hailed as a hero during his visits to Greece. Several Greek bishops said that they were very proud of him. As the war went on there was an increasing tendency within the Greek Church to regard it as a religious war between Catholics, Muslims and the Orthodox.⁴⁰ The occasional coalitions between the Croats and the Bosnian government in Sarajevo were considered to be conspiracies against

Orthodoxy. The Greek Orthodox press charged the Western European press with an anti-Serbian and pro-Islamic and pro-Croatian bias. Hard words were spoken against the Roman Catholic Church, which was accused of imperialism and of exploiting the difficult position of Orthodoxy in general for its own interests. The revival of the Uniate churches in Eastern Europe was regarded as part of a Vatican strategy for the subjection of Orthodoxy.⁴¹ The Bosnian Muslims were often taken by Greeks to be accomplices of their 'hereditary enemy', Turkey. A few Greek ecclesiastical and political leaders feared that Greece would be cornered and finally devoured by the numerically superior Turkey with its 'allies', the Muslims in Albania, Kosovo, Bosnia, Bulgaria and Greek Thrace. They were also afraid that the western international community would in the end abandon Greece, having hardly intervened in Turkish-occupied Cyprus during the past 20 years. It was pointed out that Papism and Ottoman Islam had made an alliance for a common assault in order to subject the Orthodox Balkans, and the necessity was stressed of setting up an Orthodox axis against this, in the form of a federation of Orthodox states, especially Serbia, Greece and Russia.⁴²

There were other voices to be heard, however. Several priests and theologians pointed out that Orthodoxy was a matter of the heart, that it was concerned with the spiritual way of purification, illumination and 'deification' and not with fighting for national interests, with abstinence and asceticism and not with passion for transitory national borders. Theological periodicals concerned with renewal, such as *Sunaxe* and *Kath' Hodon*, published special issues with critical articles on nationalism within Orthodoxy.⁴³ According to the editors of *Sunaxe* nationalism, 'vigilant national thought' or a 'nation-orientated ecclesiastical consciousness' distort the Gospel and are located on the level of transitory flesh and blood, not on that of the true spiritual life.⁴⁴ Professors at the Society of Ecumenical Studies and Interorthodox Information in Thessalonica retained an open mind towards the ecumenical movement and also sought dialogue with the Muslims in Western Thrace. In spite of episcopal disapproval several Orthodox priests and theologians continued to participate in rare ecumenical services with Catholics and Protestants. In May 1995 the Athenian theologian Sabbas Agourides sent an open letter to the Roman Catholic archbishop in Athens in which he expressed his sorrow and anger about the attacks against the Roman Catholic Church in Greece at that time and his hope that 'this scourge of nationalism and xenophobia in our country will soon pass'. Many lay persons, both intellectuals and non-intellectuals, contended that Orthodox and Catholics shared the same faith and that the resolution of historical disputes was an urgent matter.

With regard to the Macedonian question and the important role played in it by the Greek hierarchy a few critical Greek theologians expressed their fears that the episcopate was trying to enhance the Church's influence in a time of secularisation and that it was a willing horse for right-wing politicians.⁴⁵ They also pointed out that whenever the Greek church press dealt with relations with Serbia it spoke of 'Orthodox brothers', but that whenever it dealt with relations with the Slavic Macedonians a common faith was not mentioned at all, even though most of the latter were also Orthodox. These theologians conceded that a role here was certainly played by the fact that most Orthodox peoples, including the Greeks and Serbs, considered the Macedonian Orthodox Church, after its secession from the Serbian patriarchate in 1967, to be schismatic. However, they stated that they could not avoid the impression that the Greek land and people were more important arguments than 'international' common faith.

Any discussion of Greek Orthodoxy must take due account of the great changes

which have taken place in Greek society over the past few decades. The Second World War and subsequent Civil War did a great deal to undermine moral values in society. There has been large-scale urbanisation and emigration from the countryside, which has emptied rural Greece and weakened many traditional community bonds. Rapidly increasing western influences, by way of the European Union, American and Western European industry and mass tourism have radically changed traditional Greek culture, economy and customs. A greatly extended educational system has introduced widespread study of western scientific methods and expertise, particularly in the social, medical and physical sciences. All these developments have led to an identity crisis. Questions which Greeks often ask themselves are: Who are we Greeks? What is our role between East and West? What is the meaning of Orthodoxy in a united Europe? It is remarkable that a theologian like Chrestos Giannaras (Yannaras), who works towards renewal, keeps returning to a consideration of the potential of 'Greekness' (*hellenismos*) as helping to establish an identity for contemporary Christianity.⁴⁶

Serbia

The Patriarchate of Serbia comprises not only the Serbian Orthodox faithful in Serbia and Montenegro, but also those in Croatia, Bosnia and the western world. It numbers about eight million members.

For reasons of space I shall not deal here with the Kosovo question, although it is most important because of continuing repression and violence and because the Serbs consider Kosovo to be the cradle of their ecclesiastical and national self-consciousness and the Albanians refer to the fact that they have been living there for centuries. Nor shall I discuss the Montenegro issue, which is relevant, as large sections of the Orthodox Church in Montenegro seek autocephaly, in spite of Serbian resistance.

Many writings by members of the Serbian Orthodox hierarchy are imbued with the conviction that being a Serb and being Orthodox essentially go together. The Serbian people were shaped by Orthodoxy, runs the argument, and Orthodoxy presents its best image in the Serbian tradition. 'Serbness' and Orthodoxy are two hypostases of the same being. It was the Orthodox faith which preserved Serbian identity throughout the centuries, especially under Turkish oppression. The Serbian people have always suffered and were continually persecuted, both by Turkish Muslims and by western Catholics.⁴⁷ Catholicism is frequently identified with the Croatian people. The vocation of the Serbian people consists in enduring severe suffering on Earth; eternal life will be the reward. The influential Serbian theologian and bishop Nikolaj Velimirović (1880–1956) even states that the Serbian people have suffered more than Christ, because they were crucified for five centuries whereas Christ stayed on Golgotha for only one day. In Serbian Orthodox tradition a central role is attributed to the activities of St Sava (1176–1235), Serbia's national saint. According to Velimirović *Svetosavlje* ('Saint-Savanness') includes all the positive values of medieval Orthodox Serbia, to which contemporary Serbia should return. *Svetosavlje* is at odds with western culture, Roman Catholicism and Protestantism, which, since the Enlightenment, have all become unchristian.⁴⁸ His views are supported by another important theologian, the priest-monk and 'spiritual father' Justin Popović (1894–1979).

This stress on suffering reappears in a declaration issued by the Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church in 1995 – in the middle of the recent Balkan war – on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the end of the Second World War:

During these May days, while the world commemorates the victory over Nazi-fascism 50 years ago, in Jasenovac and surroundings, where, during the Second World War, more than 700,000 Orthodox Serbs were killed before the eyes of the whole world, the last Serbs in West Slavonia who survived those camps are being persecuted and annihilated ...⁴⁹.

In a message entitled *Christian Appeal for Justice and Peace* published in Belgrade in the autumn of 1995 a comparison is made with the sufferings of the Jewish people:

We see a direct parallel between the persecution and murder of the Jewish people by Nazi Germany and the atrocities which were committed on the Serbs both then and now. ... We call on you, the international Christian community, to come to us and look at the pogroms inflicted on our people.⁵⁰

This appeal also claims that the Serbian people are the victim of mass murders, particularly because of their Orthodox Christian faith. The memory of this suffering is linked with the pursuit of the so-called 'Greater Serbia' idea, namely the aspiration to unite all Serbs in one Serbian state. The idea of 'Greater Serbia' played an important role in the nineteenth-century Serbian state: according to the 'Great Plan', *Načertanje*, all Serbs, indeed all Southern Slavs, were to be united in one empire. The idea has subsequently been cultivated and promoted by many Serbian ecclesiastical professionals. Characteristic is the communiqué of the Serbian bishops issued in January 1997. The occasion was the political unrest in Serbia following the refusal of the socialist regime to recognise the election victory of the opposition parties. The communiqué condemns, among other things, the socialist regime, because it has tramped on Serbia's 'glorious and centuries-long misery-laden history', its honour and dignity and its spiritual and national values, and has 'betrayed the Western Serbian territories'.⁵¹ Serbian theologians and bishops stress the fact that during the Second World War hundreds of thousands of Serbs were killed, including many priests, and that numerous churches were devastated or heavily damaged. The Dutch Roman Catholic theologian Geert van Dartel asserts that 'the war became fixed in collective memory as the genocide of the Serbian people, for which the Croatian people and the Roman Catholic Church were held just as responsible as the regime of Ante Pavelić [the Croatian *Ustaša* regime during the Second World War]'.⁵²

At the same time it should be noted that during the recent Balkan war Serbian bishops, notably Patriarch Pavle, also made urgent appeals for peace and justice.⁵³ In February 1996 an 'Ecumenical Dialogue on Reconciliation' was organised by the Serbian Orthodox Theological Faculty in Belgrade and the Conference of European Churches (CEC); it looked at the theological, pastoral and socio-political aspects of reconciliation. The final statement from the meeting described the difficult road to real dialogue and referred to the Holy Trinity as the source of community. It stressed the importance of repentance, forgiveness and concrete actions, such as 'promoting multi-cultural education (including religious curricula)'.⁵⁴ The Orthodox 'Association of Serbian Nurses' in Zagreb provided humanitarian aid to any war casualty, regardless of nationality or religion.⁵⁵ In June 1997 the Serbian bishops, horrified by the terrible consequences of the civil war for all parties involved, emphasised reconciliation and peace and argued in favour of the return of all refugees and freedom for all pastors of religious communities.⁵⁶

A few individuals in Serbia, such as the theologian Mirko Đorđević and the ecumenical group of Orthodox lay people in Belgrade to which he belongs, maintain

that Greater Serbian thought is national madness and also claim that the recent war and the leaders Milošević, Karadžić and Mladić were supported by the Serbian bishops. These dissident voices criticise the nationalist and anticumenical attitude of the hierarchy and the lack of dialogue in Serbia. They argue that the demons of the past must be banished and the Serbian soul rediscovered.⁵⁷ The theologian Radovan Bigović from Belgrade denounces the elevation of the nation to the status of a new religion and advocates openness and the breaking down of enemy images.⁵⁸

Various non-Orthodox scholars outside Serbia take the view that both the Roman Catholic Church in Croatia and the Serbian Orthodox Church have shown too little openness to one another and that they were therefore unable to prevent war. They point out that there is also a strong nationalist movement in Croatia and its Roman Catholic Church and they argue that both the Catholic periodical *Glas Koncila* and the Orthodox *Pravoslavlje* are biased, tending to report favourably about their own side and negatively about the other. They say that although there have been frequent meetings of church leaders and beautiful and peace-loving declarations made these have been unable to influence the development of the war. They also contend that differences in interpretation of Balkan history by the Croatian Roman Catholic, the Serbian Orthodox and the Bosnian and Albanian Islamic religious professionals have made no contribution at all to interreligious and interconfessional harmony in the Balkans, and that a common approach to historiography is urgently needed.⁵⁹

The Patriarchate of Constantinople

For centuries in the Byzantine and the Ottoman Empires the influence and jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople developed strongly. However, the autocephaly movements in the Balkans during the nineteenth century, which led to the emergence of the independent churches of Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Albania, meant that the Patriarchate lost a significant part of its jurisdiction there. As the Ottoman Empire shrank and the Balkan states extended their territories, the Patriarchate's geographical jurisdiction decreased even further. After the war between Turkey and Greece and the so-called 'exchange of populations' between these two states in 1923, and after subsequent attacks and discrimination against the Greek population of Istanbul during the 1950s and 1960s, almost all Greeks – and this means almost all the Eastern Orthodox – disappeared from Turkey. Nowadays the central territory of the Patriarchate in the former imperial city comprises only a few thousand faithful. Because of the tensions between Turkey and Greece relations with the Turkish authorities are delicate, although the Patriarch is a Turkish citizen. Islamic extremists periodically try to oust the Patriarchate from Turkey by force.

Outside Turkey the Patriarchate's geographical jurisdiction encompasses parts of Greece, notably Crete, the Dodecanese and Mount Athos, and the Greeks and several other Orthodox groups in the so-called 'diaspora', that is North and South America, Western Europe and Australia. All Orthodox Churches concede primacy of honour to the Patriarch of Constantinople – not a juridical primacy, as in the Roman Catholic Church. However, the recent tensions with the Moscow Patriarchate as to the canonical status of Orthodoxy in Estonia and the troubles in America regarding the status of the Greek Archdiocese in 1995–96 show that there are differences of opinion within world-wide Orthodoxy about the scope of Constantinople's jurisdiction and about the interpretation of its primacy of honour.

Constantinople's self-consciousness is that it is the highest see (*protothronos*) within universal Orthodoxy; that it is supranational; that it creates unity, coordinates,

takes initiatives and tries to mediate in any problems. What role has the Patriarchate played in the nationalist strife in the Balkans?

In March 1992 a *synaxis* of Orthodox church leaders was organised by the Patriarchate at the Phanar in Istanbul. The term *synaxis* means both meeting and liturgical assembly. In their final message the primates declared that they were saddened by the 'fraternal confrontations' between Serbs and Croats and that both they and the leaders of the Roman Catholic Church would need to exercise attention and wisdom in order to avoid the exploitation of religious sentiment for political and national purposes.⁶⁰ During the *synaxis* the Orthodox Churches' participation in the ecumenical movement and contacts with the Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches were under dispute. Many Orthodox bishops and theologians reproached the western churches with intense proselytising and abusing the weakness of Eastern Orthodox churches after decades of persecution. Proselytising circles in western churches, including the Uniate churches, were denounced, but it was decided to continue Orthodox participation in the ecumenical movement.

During his visit to Serbia in August 1993 Patriarch Bartholomaios emphasised the necessity for peaceful coexistence with non-Christians and for solidarity and mutual support for the benefit of common good.⁶¹ In several official letters he wrote that he supported peaceful solutions. He stated that Islamic religious leaders too were pursuing peace in a sincere and altruistic way and that he was baffled by the madness and hatred in former Yugoslavia.⁶²

In February 1994 the Patriarchate organised an international conference in Istanbul on peace and religious tolerance with participants from Christianity, Islam and Judaism. The conference aimed to show that the three monotheistic religions could cooperate for the preservation of peace and tolerance in a world of nationalist conflicts and that the religious factor could bring about unity and peace and should not be used for the creation of hatred and war. One of the results of this conference was the so-called *Bosphorus Manifesto*. It stated that a crime in the name of religion was actually a crime against religion and that '... the war in former Yugoslavia is not a religious war and that appealing to religious symbols and their exploitation for promotion of aggressive nationalism betrays the universality of religious faith'. There was an exhortation for support for the refugees, especially for children. War, murder, rape and ethnic cleansing were condemned.⁶³

In November 1994, during the Sixth Assembly of the World Conference on Religion and Peace at Riva in Italy, Patriarch Bartholomaios accentuated the need for spiritual leaders to leave their cloisters, to take action against, among other things, nationalism and religious terrorism, and to teach peace. He turned vehemently against racism and nationalism and argued in favour of unity and universal cooperation.⁶⁴

On the occasion of the feast of St Peter and St Paul Patriarch Bartholomaios and Pope John Paul II met in Rome at the end of June 1995. In their final communiqué they declared that a more active collaboration would facilitate the Church's influence in promoting peace and justice in situations of political or ethnic conflict; they condemned discrimination on the grounds of race, language or religion.⁶⁵

A second *synaxis* of the Orthodox primates took place in September 1995 on the patriarchal island of Patmos. In their message they appealed to all Christians and all people of good will to pursue peace, fraternisation, justice and truth. They took this opportunity to react to western criticism that the close link between church and people in Orthodox countries had contributed to a large extent to the Balkan war, and they contended that while the Orthodox ecclesiastical concept of 'nation' emphasised

the particularity of each people and their right to cultivate the richness of their traditions it did not sanction aggression and conflict between peoples. The primates condemned any nationalist fanaticism which might lead to hatred between people and to extinction of the cultural and religious characteristics of other peoples on earth.⁶⁶

On many occasions the Patriarchate has tried to act as mediator, as in the initiatives for reconciliation undertaken by the Conference of European Churches.⁶⁷ The Patriarchate has also supported the production by scholars of various Balkan nations of a common historiography for the Balkans, and the endeavour to provide more comprehensive multireligious education. These are urgent but ponderous tasks. In this context an important problem is the hesitant and frequently negative disposition in many Orthodox circles in the Balkans towards ecumenical contacts and their reproaches to the Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches that they are exploiting the weakness of Orthodoxy. The Patriarchate of Constantinople makes a great effort to keep all Orthodox Churches involved in the ecumenical movement; but the Holy Synod of the Church of Greece, for example, sees no point in continuing theological dialogue with the Roman Catholic Church at the present time.

There have also been initiatives by individual theologians. In November 1991 several well known French Orthodox theologians appealed to the Serbian bishops not to contribute to Serbian hatred for the Croats by constantly recalling the atrocities committed against the Serbian people during the Second World War.⁶⁸ In July 1995 Orthodox theologians from Western Europe and North America appealed to the Serbian Holy Synod to declare that any Orthodox who committed war crimes would not be permitted to receive communion.⁶⁹

Epilogue

The American political scientist Samuel Huntington asserts that the fact that the Orthodox countries declared their solidarity with Serbia during the recent Balkan war ought to have come as no surprise, since all of them belonged to the same Orthodox civilisation.⁷⁰ Although his observation is broadly correct, the facts I have recounted in this article show that the detailed picture of Orthodox reaction to the Balkan war is more differentiated than he would allow for.

Roughly speaking, we can discover three tendencies in Orthodoxy. The first is the tendency to stress the close links between church, homeland and people. The second is the tendency to emphasise the inner way of the heart and the eternal spiritual dimension and to reject nationalism because of its exclusiveness. The third is the tendency to attempt to be objective in describing the facts in the hope of arriving at realistic solutions. As we have seen, all three tendencies are to be found in the Orthodox reaction to the Balkan war. It is impossible to say that one or another of these tendencies is typically Orthodox and that the others are not.

Notes and references

- ¹ The author would like to thank Mr Leo van Leijsen for his comments on an earlier version of this article and Mrs Ania Lentz-Michaelis for her help in revising the English text.
- ² Because of limited space I do not deal here with the Biblical notions of 'promised land' and 'lost land', the meaning of Israel/Palestine and Jerusalem, or other relevant New Testament texts such as Matt. 23: 37–39 and John 4: 20–23.
- ³ Original Greek texts in K. Aland *et al.* (eds), *The Greek New Testament*, 3rd corrected edn (Stuttgart, 1984).

- ⁴ See for example B. Altaner and A. Stuiber, *Patrologie: Leben, Schriften und Lehre der Kirchenväter*, 8th edn (Freiburg/Basel/Vienna, 1978), pp. 77–78; 556–57.
- ⁵ H. Marrou (ed.), *À Diognète: Introduction, édition critique, traduction et commentaire* (Sources Chrétiennes no. 33 (2nd edn), Paris, 1965), pp. 62, 64.
- ⁶ More detailed studies include: E. Suttner, *Kirche und Nationen: Beiträge zur Frage nach dem Verhältnis der Kirche zu den Völkern und der Völker zur Religion* (Das östliche Christentum, N.F. 46, nos. 1–2, Würzburg, 1997); E. Bryner, *Die Ostkirchen vom 18. bis zum 20. Jahrhundert* (Kirchengeschichte in Einzeldarstellungen III/10, Leipzig, 1996); P. Ramet (ed.), *Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twentieth Century* (Christianity under Stress I, Durham/London, 1988). See also A. van der Aalst, 'Ex Oriente lux et umbra', *Lezingen over het Oosters Christendom* (Nijmegen), no. 1, 1995, pp. 5–30 (here pp. 19–24).
- ⁷ P. Coleman-Norton, *Roman State and Christian Church: A Collection of Legal Documents to A.D. 535* (London, 1966), vol. 1, pp. 30–35. See also C. Andresen and A. Ritter, *Geschichte des Christentums I/1: Altertum* (Theologische Wissenschaft VI/1, Stuttgart/Berlin/ Cologne, 1993), pp. 62–64.
- ⁸ Coleman-Norton, *op. cit.*, pp. 353–56. See also J. Roldanus, 'Ontwikkeling van het christendom in het oostelijk Middellandse Zeegebied tot aan het Concilie van Chalcedon', in H. Teule and A. Wessels (eds), *Oosterse Christenen binnen de Wereld van de Islam* (Kampen, 1997), pp. 3–16 (here p. 10).
- ⁹ See D. Geanakoplos, 'Religion and nationalism in the Byzantine Empire and after: conformity or pluralism', *The Greek Orthodox Theological Review [GOTR]*, vol. 22, 1977, pp. 98–116.
- ¹⁰ See A. van der Aalst, 'Het oosterse Christusbeeld: De byzantijnse kerk', *Tijdschrift voor Theologie*, vol. 15, 1975, pp. 237–54 (here pp. 237–44, 245, 247).
- ¹¹ E. Beurlier, 'Adoration', *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, vol. I, 1903, pp. 437–42 (here p. 440).
- ¹² See P. van der Aalst, *Christus Basileus bij Johannes Chrysostomus* (Nijmegen/Utrecht, 1966), pp. 37–53.
- ¹³ J. Meyendorff, *The Orthodox Church: Its Past and its Role in the World Today*, 4th rev. edn (Crestwood, New York, 1996), pp. 20–23. Meyendorff also mentions the 'increased emphasis on ecclesiastical formality', such as the role of the sanctuary in the church building and the stress on the 'terrifying mystery' of God's presence in the church.
- ¹⁴ See P. van der Aalst, 'Nationalisme in de oosterse kerken', *Het Christelijk Oosten [CO]*, vol. 20, 1968, pp. 262–86 (here pp. 265–68).
- ¹⁵ G. Ostrogorsky, *Geschichte des byzantinischen Staates*, 3rd edn (Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft XII, I, II, Munich, 1963), pp. 236–47.
- ¹⁶ See Geanakoplos, *op. cit.*, p. 100: '... in general, Orthodoxy and the sense of nationhood became more closely intertwined the more serious the crises, external and sometimes internal or both, that threatened the existence of the state'.
- ¹⁷ See A. de Groot, 'Christenen in het Osmaanse Rijk (1300–1914)', in *Oosterse Christenen binnen de Wereld van de Islam*, pp. 83–98; E. Suttner, 'Kirche und nationale Identität in Europa zur Zeit der Osmanenherrschaft über Südosteuropa', in *id.*, *Kirche und Nationen*, pp. 97–107, originally published in *Ostkirchliche Studien*, vol. 43, 1994, pp. 41–53.
- ¹⁸ From the large number of studies on nationalism I would select: L. Greenfield and D. Chirot, 'Nationalism and aggression', *Theory and Society*, vol. 23, 1994, pp. 79–130; C.-H. Grenholm, 'Nationalismus', *Theologische Realenzyklopädie*, vol. XXIV, 1994, pp. 21–34; S. Cordellier and É. Poisson (eds), *Nations et nationalismes* (Paris, 1995); J. de Valk (ed.), *Nationale identiteit in Europees perspectief* (Annalen van het Thijmgenootschap 81, 3, Baarn, 1993).
- ¹⁹ 'Autocephalous', 'having its own head', means administratively entirely independent.
- ²⁰ J. Mansi, *Sacrorum Conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio*, vol. XLV (Paris, 1911; reprint Graz, 1961), pp. 417–546; Maxime, Métropolitte de Sardes, *Le Patriarcat Oecuménique dans l'Église orthodoxe: Étude historique et canonique* (Théologie

- historique 32, Paris, 1975), pp. 374–87; F. Thual, *Géopolitique de l'Orthodoxie*, 2nd edn (Paris, 1994), pp. 79–84.
- ²¹ J. Karmires, *Ta dogmatika kai sumbolika mnemeia tes orthodoxou katholikes ekklesias*, vol. 2, 2nd edn (Graz, 1968), pp. [1039–44].
- ²² Meyendorff, *The Orthodox Church*, pp. 152–53.
- ²³ T. Ware, *The Orthodox Church*, 3rd edn (Harmondsworth, 1993), p. 77; see also pp. 89, 174–75, 191.
- ²⁴ Meyendorff, *The Orthodox Church*, pp. 73, 81, 131–32.
- ²⁵ J. Meyendorff, *The Byzantine Legacy in the Orthodox Church* (Crestwood, New York, 1982), pp. 225–29, 251–53.
- ²⁶ See A. Schmemmann, 'A meaningful storm: some reflections on autocephaly, tradition and ecclesiology', *St Vladimir's Theological Quarterly*, vol. 15, 1971, pp. 3–27. In his book *The Historical Road of Eastern Orthodoxy* (New York/Chicago/San Francisco, 1963), pp. 276–81, 289–91, Schmemmann traces Greek Orthodox nationalism back to the late Byzantine and Ottoman periods and vehemently denounces this nationalism as just as harmful as the influence of western nationalism on the nineteenth- and twentieth-century Balkan states.
- ²⁷ See G. Florovsky, *Aspects of Church History (The Collected Works of Georges Florovsky)*, vol. IV, Belmont, MA, 1975), pp. 191–99.
- ²⁸ See I. Karmires, 'Nationalism in the Orthodox Church', *GOTR*, vol. 26, 1981, pp. 171–84.
- ²⁹ See his address on this issue in *Episkepsis* (French edition), no. 484, 31 October 1992, pp. 17–22.
- ³⁰ See D. Papandreou, 'Orthodoxie et Balkans', *Episkepsis*, no. 489, 28 February 1993, pp. 8–12. *Episkepsis*, no. 510, 31 October 1994, pp. 14–21, reports on a theological seminar on 'nationalism and European unity'.
- ³¹ Thual, *op. cit.*, pp. 17–18, 69, 125–32.
- ³² *ibid.*, *passim*.
- ³³ *Katholike*, 30 May 1995, pp. 2–3; *Ratsismos, antisemitismos, xenofobia kai misallodoxia sten hellenike koine gnome* (report from Greek Helsinki Watch and the Greek Group for Minority Rights; sent as a fax to various Greek newspapers and periodicals in June 1995).
- ³⁴ See also: Ware, *op. cit.*, pp. 136–44; A. Angelopoulos, 'Griechenland', *Theologische Realenzyklopädie*, vol. XIV, 1985, pp. 213–28; Thual, *op. cit.*, pp. 12–14; B. Groen, 'Griekenland', *CO*, no. 47, 1995, pp. 279–308; *id.*, 'Ter genezing van ziel en lichaam': *De viering van het oliesel in de Grieks-Orthodoxe Kerk* (Theologie & Empirie 11, Kampen/Weinheim, 1990), pp. 220–25.
- ³⁵ A. Wittig, *Die orthodoxe Kirche in Griechenland: Ihre Beziehung zum Staat gemäß der Theorie und der Entwicklung von 1821–1977* (Das östliche Christentum, N.F. 37, Würzburg, 1987), *passim*.
- ³⁶ See R. Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 47–99; I. Kallis, 'Die "Megali Idea": Schicksal einer politischen Vision', in A. Kallis and Bishop Eumenios (Tamiolakis) of Lefka (eds), *Orthodoxie in Begegnung und Dialog: Festgabe für Metropolit Augoustinos* (Münster, 1998), pp. 125–44; Thual, *op. cit.*, pp. 53–60.
- ³⁷ In Greek *sumproteuousa*, an epithet of Thessalonica.
- ³⁸ *Gregorios ho Palamas*, vol. 75, 1992, pp. 7–13; vol. 76, 1993, pp. 559–60; *Ekklesia*, vol. 72, 1995, pp. 115–16, 149–51, 229–31.
- ³⁹ See *To Bema*, 18 June 1995, p. 16.
- ⁴⁰ See for example G. Zerbos, 'Threskeutikos polemos kata tes Balkanikes Orthodoxias', *Balkania kai Orthodoxya* (Athens, 1993), pp. 54–63.
- ⁴¹ G. Metallenos, 'Ounia (Prosopo kai prosopeio)', *He Ounia chthes kai semera* (Athens, 1992), pp. 11–49; T. Zeses, *Ounia: He katadike tes* (Thessalonica, 1993); Timotheos (Bishop of Kerkyra), 'Ho eidikos rolos tes Ekklesias tes Hellados eis ten Balkanike Chersoneso, eis ten Anatolike Europe kai eis ten Huperkaukasia hupo ten prooptike ton semerinon exelixon' (report to the Holy Synod), *Ekklesia*, vol. 72, 1995, pp. 444–46, 484–86, 537–40; *Anaplasis*, no. 341, March–April 1992, p. 38; D. Lebantes, 'Katholike

- Ekklesia kai Athenaïkos Tupos', *Sugchrona Bemata*, vol. 24, 1993, pp. 3–23. More literature in: B. Groen, 'Greek Orthodox reactions to the 400th anniversary of the Union of Brest', *Exchange*, vol. 25, 1996, pp. 232–42; *id.*, 'The Trojan Horse and a Grecian gift: Present-day Greek Orthodox reactions to the Union of Brest', in W. van den Bercken and B. Groen (eds), *Four Hundred Years Church Union of Brest (1596–1996): A Critical Reevaluation* (Louvain, 1998 (in print)).
- ⁴² See for example K. Kotsiopoulos, 'Ounia kai Batikano: Sugchrones ekklesiastikes exelixeis', *Gregorios ho Palamas*, vol. 76, 1993, pp. 357–72.
- ⁴³ *Kath' Hodon*, vol. 1, no. 2, 1992; *Sunaxe*, no. 48, October–December 1993.
- ⁴⁴ *Sunaxe*, no. 48, October–December 1993, p. 3.
- ⁴⁵ See also the critical comments made by S. Agourides, 'Sugkalupse adunamion e pragmatikos kindunos? (To problema tes Ounias kai ho schetikos thorubos)', *Kath' Hodon*, vol. 1, no. 2, 1992, pp. 34–44.
- ⁴⁶ See C. Giannaras, 'Ethnos, Laos, Ekklesia', *Sunaxe*, no. 48, October–December 1993, pp. 17–20. See also: A. Kallis, 'Griechische Identität und Orthodoxie', in A. Kallis (ed.), *Dienst am Volk Gottes: Leben und Wirken der Griechisch-Orthodoxen Metropolie von Deutschland, Exarchat von Zentraleuropa* (Herten, 1992), pp. 77–95; Florovsky, *op. cit.*
- ⁴⁷ See G. van Dartel, 'Servië: Kroniek', *CO*, vol. 48, 1996, pp. 99–109, here p. 109.
- ⁴⁸ T. Bremer, *Ekklesiale Struktur und Ekklesiologie in der Serbischen Orthodoxen Kirche im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Das östliche Christentum, N.F. 41, Würzburg, 1992), pp. 112–60; see also pp. 253–58.
- ⁴⁹ *Glaube in der 2. Welt [G2W]*, vol. 23, no. 6, 1995, p. 11.
- ⁵⁰ *G2W*, vol. 23, no. 6, 1995, pp. 24–25.
- ⁵¹ *G2W*, vol. 25, no. 1, 1997, pp. 5–6, 14.
- ⁵² See G. van Dartel, 'De servisch-orthodoxe kerk in Joegoslavië (1918–1991)', in *Oosterse Christenen binnen de Wereld van de Islam*, pp. 272–84, here p. 279; and a similar statement in his 'Nationalisme en lijden: De herdenking van de slag op de vlakte van Kosovo (1389–1989)', *CO*, vol. 41, 1989, pp. 77–93, here p. 84.
- ⁵³ See for example G. Tsetses, 'He Ekklesia paragon sumfilioseos kai eirenes (Skepseis me aforme ten Serbokroatike dienexe)', *Kath' Hodon*, vol. 1, no. 2, 1992, pp. 7–17. See also Ware, *The Orthodox Church*, p. 169: 'But, to its credit, the Serbian hierarchy ... has condemned the atrocities committed by the invading Serbian armies and the Serbian irregulars in Croatia and Bosnia.' There is a similar statement in Meyendorff, *The Orthodox Church*, pp. 231–32.
- ⁵⁴ *Ecumenical Dialogue on Reconciliation: Belgrade, 19–22 February 1996: Conference of European Churches; Theological Faculty, Serbian Orthodox Church* (Geneva, 1996), pp. 77–80, here p. 79.
- ⁵⁵ *ibid.*, p. 48.
- ⁵⁶ *Una Sancta*, vol. 52, 1997, pp. 118–19; *Service Orthodoxe de Presse*, no. 220 (July–August 1997), pp. 6–7.
- ⁵⁷ *G2W*, vol. 23, no. 1, 1995, p. 9; vol. 25, no. 3, 1997, pp. 24–25.
- ⁵⁸ *Service Orthodoxe de Presse*, no. 165, February 1992, pp. 18–23.
- ⁵⁹ See for example the German Roman Catholic theologian Thomas Bremer in his article 'Der Krieg im früheren Jugoslawien: Das Versagen der Kirchen', *CO*, vol. 48, 1996, pp. 245–55.
- ⁶⁰ *Ecumenical Trends*, vol. 21, 1992, pp. 57–60, here p. 59. See also *Orthodoxia*, 2nd period, vol. 1, 1994, pp. 71–88, here p. 87; *Kleronomia*, vol. 21, 1989, pp. 345–58; vol. 22, 1990, pp. 291–94; *Kath' Hodon*, vol. 1, no. 2, 1992, pp. 89–125; *Irénikon*, vol. 65, 1992, pp. 65–77; *CO*, vol. 44, 1992, pp. 167–84.
- ⁶¹ *Orthodoxia*, vol. 1, 1994, pp. 126–30, here p. 127.
- ⁶² *ibid.*, pp. 212–13.
- ⁶³ *ibid.*, pp. 331–47.
- ⁶⁴ *ibid.*, pp. 745–54.
- ⁶⁵ *Catholic International*, vol. 6, 1995, pp. 412–13, here p. 413. See also: *Orthodoxia*, vol. 2,

1995, pp. 225–36; *Episkepsis*, no. 520, 31 July 1995, pp. 2–22; *Service d'Information: Conseil Pontifical pour la Promotion de l'Unité des Chrétiens*, no. 90, 1995, pp. 113–25.

⁶⁶ *Orthodoxia*, vol. 2, 1995, pp. 366–74, here p. 367. See also: *Istina*, vol. 41, 1996, pp. 171–80; *Oekumenisches Forum*, vol. 19, 1996, pp. 289–96; *CO*, vol. 48, 1996 pp. 109–16.

⁶⁷ J. Taylor, 'Vermittlungsbemühungen der Konferenz Europäischer Kirchen (KEK), in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Rat der Europäischen Bischofskonferenzen (CCEE), dem Ökumenischen Kirchenrat (ÖRK) und dem Lutherischen Weltbund (LWB)', in T. Bremer (ed.), *Religion und Nation im Krieg auf dem Balkan: Beiträge des Treffens deutscher, kroatischer und serbischer Wissenschaftler vom 05.–09. April 1995 in Freising* (Wissenschaftliche Arbeitsgruppe für weltkirchliche Aufgaben der deutschen Bischofskonferenz: Projekte, vol. 2, Bonn, 1996), pp. 205–13. See also: *Konferenz Europäischer Kirchen: II. Vollversammlung, Graz 1997: Gemeinsam mit Christus (vgl. 2 Kor. 6, 1)* (Geneva, 1997), pp. 56–64; and *Episkepsis*, no. 501, 31 January 1994, p. 16, which reports on an inter-religious conference on peaceful coexistence in former Yugoslavia and on aid to the casualties of war.

⁶⁸ *Balkania kai Orthodoxia*, pp. 207–11.

⁶⁹ Appeal issued by the Orthodox Peace Fellowship, Alkmaar, The Netherlands; *G2W*, vol. 23, no. 10, 1995, p. 7.

⁷⁰ See S. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York, 1996), pp. 28, 38.