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GORDON S. WAKEFIELD, M.A., B.LITT.

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EDITORIAL

RECENT THEOLOGICAL disputes have had repercussions far beyond Protestant Christianity or agnostic humanism. The essentialist-existentialist debate could oust the venerable Catholic-Protestant conflict as the controversy of the future. This, admittedly, is speculation; what is certain is that Romans and Orthodox have more than marginal comments to make on the *affaire Robinson.*

One of the fascinations of it all is that while Bultmann, Bonhoeffer, Tillich, and even Wren-Lewis and Robinson himself are inexplicable apart from Protestantism and *sola fide*, some of their conclusions find more ready accommodation in Catholic theology, which has always been more hospitable to immanentism. What Robinson says about God is less shocking to Romans and Orthodox than to many of those whose avowed theological source-book has been the Bible only, with its transcendent God at once personal, and 'wholly other'. To the charge that the Bishop did not distinguish between God and the Universe a very able Roman replied that in the metaphysics of relationship there was less 'distance' between finite and infinite than between two finite beings. Several of us have observed that language about 'the ground of being' is familiar in mysticism, and in his little book, *A Two-Way Religion*, published in 1957, V. A. Demant says that religion has always been at its strongest when men have not only look outward and upward but 'downward and inward through the depths of their own being'.

This is not to say that these theologians regard *Honest to God* as an adequate reconstruction of belief; but they are not stampeded into unbalanced judgements. There is a severely critical, though immaculately courteous, review by Herbert McCabe, O.P., reprinted from *Blackfriars* in the *Honest to God Debate* (pages 166-180). The learned Dominican has no difficulty in showing that much of what appears most radical may be paralleled in traditional theology. The conclusion may be crudely summarized as 'what is true isn't new and what is new isn't true'!

At the Patristics Conference in Oxford in September 1963, Vladimir Rodzianko, Protopriest of the Serbian Church of St Sava, Chiswick, gave an Orthodox critique of Robinson's book—*'Honest to God' under the Fathers' Judgement.* This has been published in *Theology* for February 1964. Like McCabe, Rodzianko maintains that there is much that is not new; he finds parallels to much of the Bishop's argument in the Eastern Fathers, e.g. John of Damascus: 'God does not belong to the class of existing things: not that he has no existence, but that he is above existing things, nay even above existence itself': and Gregory of Nyssa, who maintains that God is not revealed by any names or images, not even 'Father'.

Similarities are, however, more apparent than real, since Robinson's is the affirmative (cataphatic) way of Western theology, whereas the Fathers' is the apophatic or negative way. For *Honest to God* 'the intellectual search will condition everything'; for the Fathers, the liturgical and mystical life

alone leads to God through 'final ignorance which transcends into vision'. *Honest to God* is the fruit of a corrupt Western tree. Father Rodzianko would not burn the fruit as rotten; he would first dig about and dung the tree!

All this suggests that catholic theologians (as distinct from seminarian priests) may be at an advantage in assessing modern developments because of their long training and philosophic background. The Bishop of Woolwich himself would not claim to be more than a theological amateur. In the Free Churches there are plenty of Biblical scholars and Church historians, but *has there arisen one creative systematic theologian since the war*?

That English Romans are not complacent about the study of theology is clear from the latest Downside Symposium, *Theology and the University; an ecumenical investigation* (Darton, Longman & Todd, paperback 15*s*.; hardbound 30*s*.). A distinguished team met at Downside, preponderantly Roman Catholic but reinforced by Rupert Davies and Kenneth Grayston as well as J. K. S. Reid, David Jenkins, Alan Richardson, L. C. Knights, and Colin James of the B.B.C. The Roman papers show a great humility, the readiness to learn from Protestants and the desire to break out of the seminary. Living theology, so it is claimed, has need of three things: 'a university setting, lay participation and the ecumenical dialogue.'

The third we will not pause to illustrate directly. On the first, David Jenkins, the Anglican, and one of our own contributors this quarter, speaks with that intensity which makes him so influential in his own University of Oxford. The passing of the privilege which Pusey claimed means that while the department of Theology is 'open', the teachers must be more than ever committed to the service of truth.

> Our approach must not be that of the Master-Theologian providing the theological glue essential to any synthesis of the 'fragmented university' or the 'theological depth' which will give 'ontolological reality' to the souls lost in the relativity of other studies. Our own subject, as we practise it, is likewise fragmented by modern pressures; and . . . we too are perplexed by relativities. . . . We enter into the dialogue, therefore, not with the form of the master but with that of the servant . . .
>
> . . . all this means that Theology must be done *with* the layman and is necessary *for* the layman. . . . Otherwise theology is deprived of a prime means of her life —living and effective contact with what God is doing in the world outside the Church . . . (pp. 160-1).

And so the Symposium includes some exercises in open dialogue between theology and literature, theology and philosophy. The latter show how vital it is that theologians and philosophers should talk together; the former, with a characteristically elegant contribution from Professor L. C. Knights, make plain that the insights of literature are needed to deliver theology from its often unrealistic, superficial and bloodless categories.

All this is brought home in the most moving of the contributions—that of Simon Clements, a Catholic teacher of English in a non-Catholic comprehensive school. This is a harbinger of what we may hope for from the new-type Catholic layman, liberal, articulate, 'involved'.

It ought to be read by all teachers, and all ministers of religion, and it

deserves wider circulation than its place in this learned and specialist volume may give it. The key to its argument is in Mr Clements' discovery 'that Christ was met quite simply in the children I taught'. This is the true Christian existentialism, and it is valuable that in the master-paper of the series Father Charles Davis defines this 'vogue word that has not gained in clarity by its popularity':

> By 'existential' I mean what concerns or involves human existence in the concrete. I call a truth 'existential' when I cannot assent to it as a mere spectator or disinterested thinker but only by committing my whole existence.

The Conversations debate is making us re-examine our catchwords and favourite presuppositions. In the March *Proceedings of the Wesley Historical Society*, John C. Bowmer exposes the fallacy that the 'Open Table' is part of Methodism's title-deeds. Wesley's position was in reality no different from that of historic Christianity, Catholic and Reformed, Anglican and Presbyterian. 'Attendance at the Lord's Table is inseparably linked with "... the duties and privileges" of membership in the Body of Christ'. The 'Open Table'...'is a peculiar development of late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century Methodism. In essence it is neither Anglican fish, nor Presbyterian fowl, nor good old Methodist red-herring. We suspect it belongs to a Methodism which had become unsure of itself and its doctrines in which former disciplines were breaking down, and where there was developing an anxiety to get people in "with no strings attached".'

Another dubious popular assumption is that the Conservative Evangelicals—that important minority in the Church of England—are the spiritual descendants of Wesley. This may be the result of our inveterate tendency to regard the Methodist Revival and the Evangelical Revival as one and the same. In spite of its global influence, in the context of English Christianity, Methodism was but a part of the latter. Methodists were those evangelicals who followed John Wesley, were Arminian in theology, and ultimately became separate from the Church of England. Other evangelicals remained within the national Church, and while some of these had been influenced by Wesley, many had not, and as Stephen Neill wrote: 'on the whole they spent a great deal more of their time in criticizing the great man than in agreeing with him' (*Anglicanism* (1958), p. 190). They were Calvinists, and it was against them that some of Wesley's bitterest invective was directed. This does not mean that their descendants have not much to teach us now, and a vital place in 'the great Church'. But historical kinship is not as close as many of us are tempted to think.

Last quarter we announced that the main subject for October 1965 will be 'Myth and History'. For this we invite articles. They may be on any aspect of the subject, but should not exceed 3,500 words in length, and must be received in the office not later than *1st June, 1965*. Decision to publish will be taken by the Editor and a small group of experts. We hope that the result will be yet one more contribution to ecumenical dialogue.

GORDON S. WAKEFIELD

PROTESTANT LIBERALISM AND THE DOCTRINE OF GOD

John Kent

IN THE OPENING pages of *Honest to God* the Bishop of Woolwich takes it for granted that we no longer think literally (if anyone ever did) of a three-decker universe whose God can be thought of as 'up in Heaven'. In its place, he says, there has been substituted the idea of a God who is no longer spatially but spiritually and metaphysically 'out there'. Dr. Robinson is concerned to criticize this second conception of God, on the ground that 'the signs are that we are reaching the point at which the whole conception of a God "out there", which has served us so well since the collapse of the three-decker universe, is itself becoming more of a hindrance than a help'. Dr Robinson is not entirely convincing here: his suggestion, for instance, that 'a super-Being "out there" is really only a sophisticated version of the Old Man in the Sky' seems to me to make too much of the spatial metaphor involved—'out there', in so far as language of this kind was ever used, presumably pointed to the assumed 'otherness' of God, to the view of God as existing somehow over against us, calling, judging, even rejecting us. Such language seems to evoke personal, not spatial, relations.

When the Bishop of Woolwich gave this chapter the title 'Reluctant Revolution', however, he meant to compare this second view of God, as spiritually and metaphysically 'out there', with the kind of language used by a theologian like Tillich, whom he quotes as describing God as 'the depth and ground of all being'. Tillich's own explanation of this phrase is that the reader may translate it in terms of his own life, of the source of his own being, of his ultimate concern, of whatever he takes seriously without any reservation. Even the atheist and the unbeliever, Tillich says, can give this sort of meaning to the word 'God', and in that sense has to surrender the word 'atheist' as meaningless. In some such terms, therefore, the Bishop of Woolwich wants us to abandon the view of God as spiritually and metaphysically 'out there'; he would like to call this abandonment a 'revolution'. All that I propose to do in this short essay is to ask how far one can speak of a revolution in the Liberal Protestant doctrine of God over the past century or so; and if I limit myself to Liberal Protestantism it is because this seems to be the tradition in which the Bishop stands.

One has to say first of all, of course, that the Liberal Protestants of the nineteenth century were people who were profoundly influenced by the development of philosophy and science. There are many Protestants who

will say that they ought not to have been so influenced, and that they ought not to have modified their doctrine of God in terms of, for instance, Kant, Darwin and Freud. Such Protestants would say that Christianity possesses in the Bible a revelation which removes the need for philosophical misgivings; that the theologian's business is to work out the Biblical doctrine of God; different theologians may differ a little about what the Bible says of God, but they proceed with safety as long as they confine themselves to the known paths of revelation. Twentieth-century 'Biblical Theology' was a sophisticated version of this approach; its exponents asserted again and again that they were the only Protestants faithful to the true Reformation principle which recognizes in God alone the power to reveal Himself; nineteenth-century Liberal Protestants, on the other hand, had been accustomed to argue that the Reformation was grounded on freedom of enquiry and the religious supremacy of the individual conscience. For the Biblical theologian the materials for the doctrine of God had been given once and for all in the Scriptures by God Himself; for the extreme Liberal the problem might be summed up in van Buren's recent statement that 'the empiricist in us finds the heart of the difficulty not in what is said about God, but in the very talking about God at all. We do not know "what" God is, and we cannot understand how the word "God" is being used.... The problem of the Gospel in a secular age is the problem of its apparently meaningless language.'[1]

This division in the Protestant mind involves two different doctrines of God. The God of classical Protestantism presented His people with an objective revelation of Himself in Christ and in the Scriptures; theologically, even faith in God was stirred up by God Himself in the Holy Spirit and so was objectively given: the subjective element in revelation so to speak was God Himself taking over our human faculties. For the Liberal Protestant the situation is more difficult to define: it would be untrue to say of Schleiermacher, for instance, that for him the content of the idea of God was nothing more than subjective impression. As Jacques de Sénarclens, himself no admirer of Schleiermacher's theology, has said recently:

> For him, God and man are conjoined in religious consciousness, which is primary only to the degree to which God influences it and is present in it. The object of faith is thus outside, and instead of speaking of integral subjectivism we should rather find Schleiermacher's starting-point in a kind of synthesis between God and man which is achieved in the domain of consciousness where the encounter takes place. All the elements of religious life contain the sense of absolute dependence, or, in other words, all self-consciousness contains consciousness of God. The totality of things and the world, or the world, does not place us in absolute dependence. God alone gives us this sense. In the bosom of consciousness it is the only true encounter between God and myself. Thus the subjectivism of Schleiermacher does not imply suppression of the divine object. It consists in emphasizing the subject which apprehends the truth rather than the word of truth itself....[2]

In much more recent times, F. R. Tennant was accustomed to protest against the suggestion that Liberal Protestants somehow cared less about God than did their classical critics, that their position entailed resistance to grace.

Obviously the real problem which this division reveals is why the Liberal

Protestant should have become steadily more nervous about asserting what might be called the objective content of the doctrine of God; more concerned to argue that it is almost impossible to speak with *certainty* of objective knowlege of God.[3] He was, that is, neither a disguised nor an unconscious sceptic, nor was he always suffering, as was frequently suggested, from an overdose of intellectual pride. His God had not died the death of a thousand qualifications: the Liberal Protestant simply gave full value to the difficulties which one encountered when one attempted to set out a doctrine of God.[4] He felt, what the classical Protestant did not feel, that the materials available for a doctrine of God had been drastically reduced in the course of the nineteenth century.

The sources of this reduction were perhaps fourfold. One was certainly the moral criticism, stemming from the Enlightenment, of the traditional Protestant theological scheme. The picture of God, for instance, as the Master of Hell and the underwriter of eternal damnation, was clear enough: the Liberal Protestant, however, responded to the moral criticism of this picture and was bound to ask himself whether the subtle modifications of the original doctrine which he was often offered in extenuation by the classical theologians were not themselves more a product of this moral attack than of the Scriptures from which they were said to be drawn.[5] I am not here concerned with the moral issues raised, but with the effect which the controversy had on the clarity of the Liberals' doctrine of God; further uncertainty about how God acted arose from similar moral criticisms of the substitutionary theories of the Atonement popular in nineteenth-century Protestantism.

The second major source of the attenuation of the classical doctrine was the development of science. For the Liberal Protestant it was science rather than philosophy which shattered the idea of contemporary miracle: this again affected the clarity of his conception of God: God was no longer thought of easily as intervening magisterially in the affairs of this world. A good example of this attitude may be found in the writings of Jean Réville, a prominent French Liberal Protestant at the turn of the century:

> The truth is that today belief in miracles is only a survival of the erroneous notions which people entertained about nature, prior to the results of modern science. Outside religious tradition, still thoroughly imbued with the spirit of the past, miracles are now no longer credited anywhere. Among Protestants, even the most ardent defenders of the supernatural no longer allow that miracles play any part whatever in their own life, and when it comes to explaining the miracles of the past, they invoke the action of laws as yet unknown which are supposed to have modified the course of laws we at present know; that is, in order to save the fact they deny the principle....[6]

Most later nineteenth-century Protestants absorbed some version of Darwin's theory of evolution into their doctrine of God as creator; the problem of miracles, contemporary or New Testament, proved much more refractory. There was an important point in the nineteenth century at which Christian apologists recognized that the miracles of Jesus recorded in the New Testament had ceased for most people to be positive evidence of His divine mission and had become events which had to be defended: for many people

Christianity might be said to be true in spite of the New Testament miracles rather than because of them. The Bishop of Woolwich sees the difficulties of what he calls 'supranaturalism'; some of the obscurity of his own book arises because he does not want to react in the manner of a Liberal Protestant like Jean Réville, who cheerfully dismissed the supranatural altogether. On the contrary, the Bishop says, 'the task is to validate the idea of transcendence for modern man.... For, as Professor Gregor Smith has said, "The old doctrine of transcendence is nothing more than an assertion of an outmoded view of the world." Our concern is in no way to change the Christian doctrine of God but precisely to see that it does not disappear with this outmoded view' (*Honest to God*, p. 44).[7] I am not concerned here with the possibility of such a programme but with the fact that under scientific as under moral criticism the Liberal doctrine of God lost the firm outline of the classical position: neither Réville nor perhaps the Bishop of Woolwich was far removed from Matthew Arnold's suggestion that all that we can say about God is that He is 'the eternal not ourselves that makes for righteousness'.[8]

A third source of reduction was Biblical Criticism: 'Hélas, on ne fait pas impunément de l'exégèse,'[9] as Edmond Schérer said. He was a distinguished French writer whose reluctant withdrawal from French Evangelicalism was one of the symbolic stories of the nineteenth century. He summed up, about 1860, the kind of pressure which compelled the Liberal, as distinct from the classical Protestant, to surrender himself into the hands of the critical attitude:

> One fact is evident nowadays: the antagonism between faith and criticism. We cannot give up our faith without also giving up what seems the very truth of life itself; but we cannot give up criticism without falling into superstition. If we lose our faith, we lose our souls; if we ignore knowledge we surrender our dignity as reasoning beings. Yet knowledge tends to dissolve faith, and faith maintains itself only by forgetting or despising knowledge. And so we are reduced, like Jacobi, to being Christians emotionally and pagans intellectually. We have reached a point at which society is divided into two camps: a minority of fervent Christians with closed minds and a majority of open-minded unbelievers; on the one hand the materialism of modern science, on the other the religion of the immaculate conception...[10]

At first Liberal Protestants in particular welcomed Biblical criticism: they persevered in the hope that either a consensus or an inspired critic would emerge from the discussion; that thus the Biblical problems would be resolved. In the present century Liberal Protestants have had to face the fact that for them the 'authority' of the Scriptures is as much a problem as the status of metaphysics: they may recognize various doctrines of God in the Bible, but can no longer be certain how far these doctrines represent more than the state of mind of a particular group of people at a particular point of time in the past. Talk of 'progressive revelation' only describes this problem, it doesn't solve it. And once the verses of Scripture are subjected to linguistic analysis, the Liberal is again in search of a clarity which eludes him.

All these were public sources of bewilderment; in the background, slowly

but effectively working, was the philosophical criticism which had been consolidated by Kant, who put what has looked like becoming an ineradicable question-mark against the status of metaphysics, and in doing so seemed to have cut men off from any doctrine of God whatsoever. Once again the Liberal Protestant was simply the person who was (perhaps unduly) sensitive to the difficulty of saying anything meaningful about 'God' at all; who understood why Schopenhauer, for instance, mocked the German theological professors who behaved as though Kant had never existed, and poured forth 'volume after volume upon God and the soul, as if these were familiar personalities with whom they were especially intimately acquainted'.[11]

From this fourfold reduction of the material available for a doctrine of God the Liberal Protestant emerged with perhaps three conclusions: that dogma, in the classical sense, was of dubious value; that he must not confuse the difficulty of stating beliefs with difficulty in holding beliefs; that apologetic was bound to shift on to a subjective, experiential level: and he was aware of the weaknesses of this last method.

In terms of all this it is not easy to speak of a recent revolution in the Liberal Protestant doctrine of God. When Dr Robinson suggests that we have worn out the conception of a God spiritually and metaphysically 'out there' one feels that he is simply recognizing the force of Kant's criticisms of the classical doctrine. When the Bishop appeals to Tillich's definition of God as one's personal ultimate concern and so forth, one feels that both men are following a track marked out by Kant when he tried to re-establish some kind of contact with the absolute through an analysis of the inner nature of man's moral experience: one doesn't have to agree with the way in which Kant tried to do this to see that he had anticipated the essential shift in direction. One might go even further. The Bishop of Woolwich also appeals to Dietrich Bonhoeffer, who, in his last writings, suggested that man did not have a 'religious instinct', and talked about 'religionless Christianity'. It is not, I think, entirely fanciful to suggest that here again the modern writers are moving into territory which Kant entered in *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*; Kant's distinction between pure religious faith and ecclesiastical faith, with the consequences he draws from it, makes the best commentary on what Bonhoeffer may be supposed to have meant. *Honest to God* is less a sign of revolution than of reaction: reaction against the long, futile Barthian effort to exorcise with rhetoric the problems raised for Christian theology in the last two hundred years. It has often proved easy to ridicule Liberal Protestant solutions to these problems; but a rejection of the Liberal solutions does not add up to a solution of the problems. One can only add, in conclusion, that Christ will be the salvation of the Church, not the Church the salvation of Christ.

[1] van Buren, *The Secular Meaning of the Gospel*, 1963, p. 84.

[2] J. de Sénarclens, *Heirs of the Reformation*, 1963, p. 40. Sénarclens is largely paraphrasing Schleiermacher himself: the links with the Tillich-Robinson position are obvious: the modern writers, however, are much less anxious to attempt to define the kind of consciousness to which they appeal; they would hesitate to speak so universally of a sense of 'dependence', or for that matter of the 'numinous', or the 'holy'.

[3] Cf. R. B. Braithwaite, *An Empiricist's View of the Nature of Religious Belief*, 1955: 'The only facts that can be known directly by observation are that the things observed have

certain observable properties or stand in certain observable relations to one another. If it is maintained that the *existence* of God is known by observation, for example, in the "self-authenticating" experience of "meeting God", the term "God" is being used merely as part of the description of that particular experience. Any interesting theological proposition, e.g. that God is personal, will attribute a property to God which is not an observable one and so cannot be known by direct observation. Comparison with our knowledge of other people is an unreal comparison. I can get to know things about an intimate friend at a glance, but this knowledge is not self-authenticating; it is based upon a great deal of previous knowledge....' pp. 4-5.

[4] I am not concerned, of course, with the vulgar, semi-political Protestant Liberalism which one associates with Harnack, etc., at the turn of the century.

[5] The full consequences of this line of criticism may be seen in J. S. Bezzant's contribution to *Objections to Christian Belief*, pp. 82-4. But with the destruction, for the Liberal Protestant, of the clear classical 'plan of salvation', there also vanished, for him at any rate, the clear picture of what God was like, how he regarded men, and so forth. Dr A. R. Vidler has ruefully noted (in *The Church in an Age of Revolution*) that the main motive of nineteenth-century missions was to rescue as many heathen as possible from everlasting damnation, 'a more powerful motive, it seems, than any that derives from a more liberal theology about God's dealings with non-Christians' (p. 252).

[6] Jean Réville, *Liberal Christianity*, 1903, pp. 179-80. Réville added that 'in support of the supernatural, some invoke God's intervention in answer to prayer, but their contention is based on a false notion of prayer. In practice, with the exception of a very small number of fanatics, the traditionalists of every school resort to the means furnished by experience and science in order to ward off the dangers which menace them or to obtain the gratification of their wants. They do not rely on miracle. In theory, the conception of magical prayer, considered as a means of provoking miracles, is not only contrary to experience and observation; it is, further, scarcely reverent, and opposed to the spirit of the Gospel' (*op. cit.*, p. 179). The failure of tone here was not uncommon in late nineteenth-century Liberalism; there was a similar failure in what became the Fundamentalist camp. Réville was an extreme example: he openly regarded the doctrines of the Trinity and the Divinity of Christ as incompatible with the rejection of the supernatural indicated in these passages.

[7] Our concern, the Bishop says at this point, will not be simply to substitute an immanent for a transcendent Deity.

[8] It is perhaps worth adding that Arnold didn't say this without having Christ in mind as well. He had said earlier, for instance, in the same passage, that 'no other religion with an unsound foundation of miracles has succeeded like Christianity, because no other religion had, in close conjunction with its unsound belief in miracles, such an element of soundness as the personality and word of Jesus...', *God and the Bible*, 1875, p. xxxvii. If nineteenth-century theologians had taken Arnold seriously, instead of dismissing him as a layman who wrote too well to be academically significant, they might have anticipated many of our present troubles.

[9] O. Gréard, *Edmond Schérer*, 1890, p. 150.

[10] *Mélanges de Critique Religieuse*, Ed. Schérer, Paris, 1860, pp. 183-4. The passage comes from a dialogue called 'Montaigu et le Surnaturel'. I have used French sources to some extent in this essay to underline the general nature of the problem.

[11] It is worth bearing in mind at this point that as late as 1893 Leo XIII had issued an encyclical, *Providentissimus Deus*, which denied the possibility of a real conflict between religion and science and affirmed the inerrancy of the whole Bible; the *Revue Thomiste* was started in the same year, a consequence of Leo's earlier encyclical, *Aeternae Patris*, 1879, which followed up the lesser known decree of the first Vatican Council which stated that God could be recognized with certainty by the use of reason and that Thomism was the natural form of Catholic philosophical theology.

SYMBOLISM AND THE DOCTRINE OF GOD

Anthony Hanson

O. FIELDING CLARKE, in his reply to *Honest to God* called *For Christ's Sake*, makes one effective point on page 40. 'It is a complete confusion of thought,' he writes, 'to argue . . . that our image of God must be scrapped. I repeat, the Image cannot be scrapped if we are to remain Christians, for that Image is Christ Himself.' Here surely is a startling argument, vitally affecting the very heart of the controversy aroused by the Bishop of Woolwich's book. But, most surprisingly, the author of *For Christ's Sake* makes no attempt to develop it or even explain it. He goes on with his page-to-page refutation, leaving this remarkable thought wholly undeveloped. My aim in this article is to take up that thought, and so show, if I can, that it has great relevance to the question, and may even hold the clue, or part of the clue, to a solution of the problem posed by the modern urge to modify, or even abolish, the traditional Christian image of God.

By the time that the New Testament was written, Judaism was already wrestling with the problem of the inexpressibility of God. The reluctance to use the divine Name was no doubt partly motivated by extreme reverence and even by an apprehension of the remoteness and transcendence of God. But there must also have been a more philosophical reason: once the Hebrews came to realize that this God was not one among many, but was the only God, the need for a distinguishing name was no longer felt. On the contrary, it was rightly held that God should not be given a name. A name is necessary for objects belonging to the same class, in order to distinguish one from another. But God is the only one of his class. To give him a name, therefore, is to degrade him. Those reverential periphrases which we meet in the Targums and Rabbinical literature were not purely products of poetry or piety, they were partly efforts to circumvent the older and more naïve representations of God as only too easily expressible. The *Sh'kinah* of the Lord was one way of indicating that God was not to be too easily localized: where the Scriptures described God as being visibly present, it eased the strain to paraphrase this as the *Sh'kinah*, the Tabernacle of the Glory, usually rendered in Greek simply as *doxa*. The *Memra'* made the audibility of God a little easier to understand: it was God's utterance who had spoken visibly, not quite God himself. It may be that the Wisdom to some extent played the same role, though I think that many references to the *Sophia* in the Book of Wisdom are more poetical and rhetorical than philosophical or theological. But later writers could understand it in a more philosophical sense. Philo, of course, who was willing to concede much more to contemporary Greek philosophy than were the Rabbis, is absolutely explicit about how impossible it is to express God fully. For example, in *De Praemiis et Poenis VII*, 46, he describes Jacob as follows: 'In Hebrew he is called "Israel", in Greek "the man who sees God", sees him, that is, not as he really is (for that, as I have explained, is impossible), but sees that he is.' Thus the intellectual heritage

enjoyed by the writers of the New Testament gave them no excuse for being naïve about the difficulty of representing God.

Nor were they. In all the three great Christological traditions in the New Testament, Paul, Hebrews and John, we find the thought of Christ as the final expression of God. In all three Christ as the Image means not just *an* image but *the* Image. In all three, as I hope to show, there is evidence that Christ is in some sense thought of as the expressibility of God, or, to put it more succinctly, Christ as God's visibility.

We begin with the latest, because here it is clearest, and work our way towards the earliest. One obvious passage to prove our thesis as far as John is concerned is John 1^{18}: 'No one has seen God at any time, the only Son (or equally likely "God only-begotten"), who is in the bosom of the Father, he has made him known.' Commentators on the whole seem to have missed the point of this verse. 'No one has seen God at any time' is no mere *obiter dictum* of the evangelist. He repeats it at 5^{37}, where Jesus says that the Jews have never heard God's voice or seen his form; and the Jews here stand for Israel throughout Old Testament history. And he repeats the same assertion about no man seeing God in 6^{46}. Editors usually compare with these passages the incidents in the Old Testament where it is said that to see God is to die. But this is not what John says: seeing God is not just a fatal experience, it is an impossibility.

The clue to John's meaning is to be found in 12^{37-41}. Here John cites two passages from Isaiah, the second from the famous sixth chapter where Isaiah has his great vision of the Lord of Hosts in the Temple. John's comment is as follows: 'Isaiah said this because he saw his glory and spoke of him.' There can be no reasonable doubt what this means: Isaiah saw Christ, the pre-existent Word in the Temple. That was the glory (*doxa* = *Sh*^{e}*kinah*) which Isaiah saw. Here is a man in the Old Testament who is certainly described as seeing God. But no one has ever seen God, says John: and here he draws the conclusion for us: Isaiah saw Christ.

Now we can apply this to 1^{18}. Why does John say there that no one has ever seen God? He does so in connection with a reference to the giving of the Law through Moses. We look for a place where the Law was given in connection with a vision of God, and we find it in Exodus 33-34. There, in 33^{12-17}, Moses asks for a vision of God; he wants to see God's 'ways' and to be given a sight of God's 'glory'. God promises to grant this wish. Then in 34^{1-4} Moses comes up the mountain with the two new tables in his hands, intended for the writing of the Law; and God descends and passes before Moses and proclaims: 'The Lord, the Lord, a God merciful and gracious, slow to anger, and *abounding in steadfast love and graciousness*.' Here is the original of that tremendous verse, John 1^{14}: 'the Word became flesh and dwelt among us, *full of grace of truth*: and we beheld his glory.' And this explains the relevance of verses 17-18. According to John, wherever God is described as making himself visible or audible in the Old Testament, it was in fact the pre-existent Word. Christ is the visibility and audibility of God. This is how John represents Christ as the image of God.

At first sight it does not seem likely that we will find in Hebrews a doctrine of Christ as the visibility or the audibility of God, since in the very first verse

of the Epistle we learn that God spoke of old to the fathers. But two verses later Christ is called the reflection of God's glory: this word *apaugasma* is used of Wisdom in Wisdom 7^{26}, and also by Philo of his Logos. It seems an exact counterpart to the Pauline *eikōn*. Then later on the conviction begins to grow on us that the pre-existent Son is being identified with the Voice of God. The argument is cumulative and it requires a very careful reading of Hebrews chapters 3-4 in order to follow it; we hear repeatedly the warning of Psalm 95: 'Today if you will hear my Voice . . .', and we are unexpectedly told in 4^{2} that we Christians have received the Gospel just as much as Israel of old (not vice versa). There is much talk about the belief and unbelief of Israel of old, and we are warned not to imitate their unbelief, just as Paul warns his Corinthians in I Corinthians 10^{1-13} (and Paul certainly found the pre-existent Christ in the wilderness history). I would also point to Hebrews 12^{24-27}, where the significance of a very complicated reference to Old Testament history seems to be that it was Christ who spoke on Sïnai. But I think Christ as the visibility of God certainly lies behind the reference to Moses in 11^{24-28}. One must compare it with Acts 7^{23-35}, a closely related passage, where the reference to the burning bush is explicit. In Hebrews 11^{25} Moses chooses 'to share ill-treatment with the people of God', a situation which in the next verse is described as 'abuse suffered for Christ'. In Exodus 3^{7} God, appearing in the burning bush, says he has seen the 'affliction of his people' (the same root in Greek as 'ill-treatment' above). Then in Hebrews 11^{27} Moses is described as leaving Egypt. This must refer to his flight to Midian, and not to the Exodus, for verse 28 describes his keeping the first Passover, which took place before the Exodus. In verse 27 comes the beautiful phrase 'he endured seeing him who is invisible'. The conclusion is surely plain that this is a reference to Moses' vision of God in the burning bush. Christ had come down to relieve the affliction of his people. Moses chose to share that affliction. Thus it seems that in Hebrews also Christ is both the visibility and audibility of God.

Though it is Paul, and not John or Hebrews, who explicitly calls Christ the Image of God, one cannot be so certain that he thought of Christ as the visibility of God. This is partly no doubt because he wrote nearer to the event and was not so much concerned to present a speculative Christology as were the other two. However, most of the elements which we have found in John and Hebrews are present in Paul. He certainly believes in the pre-existent activity of Christ in Old Testament history (I Corinthians 10^{4}). What we miss is the implication that God cannot speak or appear except through Christ. However, in II Corinthians 4^{4} Paul speaks of 'the glory (*doxa*) of Christ, who is the likeness (*eikōn*) of God'. In two other places also these two words *doxa* and *eikōn* are associated, Romans 1^{23} and I Corinthians 11^{7}. In the first the *doxa* of God is changed to the *eikōn* of man, the suggestion being that the glory of man is substituted for the glory of God. In the second man is called the *eikōn* and *doxa* of God. It seems, therefore, very likely indeed that when Paul calls Christ the *eikōn* of God in II Corinthians 4^{4}, he is identifying Christ with the *Shᵉkinah*. If so, there can be little doubt that Paul would have attributed all Old Testament theophanies to Christ, since contemporary Rabbis held that the *Shᵉkinah* appeared on these occasions. In

Colossians 1^{15} Paul comes a step closer to Hebrews and John: he calls Christ the *eikōn* of the invisible God. This does seem to suggest that Christ is the visibility of the invisible God. Those who hold that Colossians is deutero-Pauline will look on this passage as representing a transition from Paul to Hebrews and John. Kittel in his article on *eikōn* in the *Theologisches Wörterbuch z. N.T.* emphasizes quite rightly that *eikōn* in both II Corinthians 4^4 and Colossians 1^{15} implies absolute equality between God and Christ. It looks, therefore, as if Paul was at least moving in the direction of Hebrews and John on this question.

It seems, then, that the New Testament writers, in presenting Christ as the Image of God, means us to think of him as being, in one aspect at least, the expressibility of God, God's visibility and audibility. Now an effective symbol is surely just this, a means whereby something or someone is expressed and made apprehensible. In this sense Christ is the supreme symbol of God. He is more than that also, but here we are concerned with questions of meaning and revelation. According to the New Testament writers, through Christ God expressed himself, so that he became understood by us. No one has ever seen God; but God only-begotten, Jesus Christ, has expressed him—to paraphrase John. This means, of course, that the whole incarnation is the symbol. Thus that appellation, 'the Image of God', is not merely an indication that Christ takes his place in a pre-arranged philosophical system, as if Paul or John had said: 'I want you to understand that I accept the whole of Philo's philosophy, but where he reads "the Logos" I read "Christ".' The New Testament writers were not merely playing with concepts. The whole career of Christ was for them what expressed God; and, as we have seen, they saw this career as extending backwards right into Old Testament history, though supremely concentrated on the thirty years of the incarnate life. It would, therefore, seem unnecessary to attempt to demythologize the concept of Christ as the Image of God. Presumably one can only demythologize a myth, a related series of concepts belonging to a particular period in the intellectual history of mankind. But Christ as the Image of God hardly fits into this category; though we can discern the *Shᵉkinah* and perhaps the inter-testamental *Sophia* behind the *eikōn* and the *doxa*, they are not determinative of the meaning. What determines the meaning is the earthly career of Jesus, and to some extent, the character of God as presented in Old Testament history. The word 'image' is used because it was a process of making visible and audible. God was in Christ making himself known.

There is, it is true, a danger attached to the presentation of Christ as the visible Image of God. It is quite possible so to over-emphasize the inexpressibility of God as to suggest that a visible version of God is bound to be inferior. This is certainly present in Philo: his Logos was the means that God used for communicating with the world, but Philo says quite clearly that the Logos is very far from being of the same substance as God. On the contrary, Philo's Logos is neither really God nor really a creature, very like the Arian Christ in fact. This danger was not completely avoided by Christian Theology in the post-canonical period. Both Justin Martyr (*Dialogue* 127^{1-4}) and Theophilos of Antioch (*Ad Autolycum* 22) maintain that God by his very nature cannot do many of the things that are attributed

to him in the Old Testament: coming down, speaking, becoming visible, etc. A 'second God' is therefore needed to do all these things which the supreme God by reason of his divine nature cannot do. This 'second God' is Christ, and already we begin to suspect that he is a God of the second rank. Tertullian goes so far as to say (*Adv. Marcionem*, Bk. II, Chap. 27) that if you want a philosopher's God you can take God the Father; but the God who establishes contact with man is Jesus Christ. This led straight to Arianism, and this is why Augustine, writing after the traumatic experience of the Arian controversy, will have nothing to do with any suggestion that it was the Son alone who appeared in the Old Testament theophanies. If you emphasize too much the fact that God is beyond expressibility, you end by finding yourself with an Arian Christ.

I am not quite sure that the Bishop of Woolwich altogether avoids this danger in *Honest to God*. His suggestion that we may not only have to scrap our present image of God, but also all the images of God whatever, appears to point in this direction. The imageless God is certainly not the God whose Image we encounter in the New Testament; he is more like the God of Philo and Arius; the God of the Pseudo-Dionysius; and in modern times the God of Radhakrishnan, and the Advaita School of Hindu thought. Two other small indications suggest that the Bishop of Woolwich had leanings in this direction, at least when he wrote *Honest to God*. One is his unwillingness to apply the word 'God' to Christ, and his desire to represent the New Testament writers as also evincing this unwillingness. I believe he is mistaken in this: if Paul and Hebrews were unwilling to apply the name 'God' to Christ, it was not because they had doubts as to his con-substantiality with the Father, but because they did not wish to confound the Persons—to use completely anachronistic language. The other indication is the Bishop's preference for the modern figure of 'window' instead of the biblical one of 'image' or 'reflection'. An image, at least in the New Testament sense of the word, is a three-dimensional object with a past and a future. A window has only two dimensions and is meant to be looked through, not looked at. But it is possible that the movement towards the concept of an ineffable, imageless God which we find in *Honest to God* was only a tentative one. In the Bishop of Woolwich's essay in *The Honest to God Debate* there is no more talk about doing without images altogether.

If, therefore, we suggest that the concept of Christ as the Image of God should answer the Bishop of Woolwich's quest for a demythologized image of God, we are still left with the question: why did he not accept it? Why does he still go searching for an image of God 'in the depths', and why is he chary of a Christology of pre-existence? No doubt part of the answer to this last question is that the concept of the pre-existent Christ active in Old Testament history itself needs demythologizing. This we may readily grant, though such a process should not be difficult. We have learned from Barth to meet the God of grace and faith in the Old Testament as well as the New. I would suggest that one reason, unconscious perhaps, for the Bishop's avoidance of the concept of Christ as the Image of God is the increasing scepticism about our knowledge of the historical Jesus which has been emanating from Bultmann and his school during the last twenty years. It is all very well to

say that what determines the Image is the career of thirty years, but if you are constantly being told that you really cannot know anything certain about that career, you find yourself ultimately left with nothing on which to build an image of God. There is nothing about this in *Honest to God*; but there is much about Bultmann, and it is difficult not to harbour this suspicion.

The other reason for the absence of this concept from *Honest to God* is undoubtedly the Bishop of Woolwich's determination to avoid all metaphysics whatever. The New Testament writers do not supply us with a philosophy as well as a theology, but they do not hesitate to use terms in their Christology which inevitably imply some sort of philosophical presuppositions; *eikōn*, *logos*, *plērōma*, and so on. They had no hesitation in treating the Image as a hypostasis. John's Logos doctrine was the necessary result of this process. The Bishop of Woolwich in his essay in *The Honest to God Debate* shows himself more determined than ever to avoid any metaphysical entanglements. But is this really consistent with a determined search for an adequate Image of God? Above all, can you really embrace Tillich's doctrine of God as the ground of our being without also accepting his doctrine of the Logos? This is what the Bishop of Woolwich is attempting to do, and it certainly seems a desperate enterprise.

What is not so easy is to suggest what could be done to remedy these difficulties. As far as historical scepticism is concerned, it seems unlikely that Form Criticism can go very much farther without turning Christianity into a non-historical mystery religion. A very careful re-examination of the basic assumptions of the Form Critics seems to be called for. As for the relation of Christian theology to philosophy, this is not the sort of thing that can be solved by a simple formula. We may have to wait till Western Philosophy recovers from its present pre-occupation with technology, keeping in touch with it as far as possible meanwhile. But history seems to show that the Christian doctrine of God cannot get on very long without some relation to metaphysics, much though the nature of the metaphysics has varied down the ages.

THE TRANSCENDENCE OF GOD

J. Heywood Thomas

AT A TIME when both philosophers and theologians have taught us that the most significant aspect of religious language is its reference to a transcendent, it is ironical that what has won popular acclaim of late has been a frankly immanentist theology. It is true that one can never be sure whether Dr Robinson set out to replace the doctrine of transcendence by some doctrine of immanence or rather to suggest a new way of appreciating what we mean when we talk of transcendence by referring to those aspects of experience which we describe as manifestations of God's immanence. If the latter was indeed his aim, then it has far more to commend it than has been admitted by his supporters, let alone his critics; for 'immanence' and 'transcendence' are polar terms. But too often he seems to be advocating that this is a new way of talking of God's transcendence.[1] 'Out there' or 'in depth' are then two quite legitimate ways of saying what we mean when we talk of transcendence, because—like Tillich—Dr Robinson would say that both these are symbolic expressions. But it seems to me that if we say this then we do not realize that the idea of transcendence itself is a symbol. To talk then as if both height and depth would be useful ways of symbolizing transcendence is like saying that either a photograph or an oil-painting would be useful symbols of the Red Dragon. What makes us forget that transcendence itself is a symbol is the fact that we cannot get away from this symbol. This is the justification of our having recourse to symbols in talking of God. It is because we cannot use empirical language of God without modifying its meaning that we say that our language is here used symbolically. So in order to justify any religious language at all we must be able to justify the use of this word 'transcendent'.

I have referred to the modern appreciation of God's transcendence. This began with Kierkegaard who, despite his tremendous insistence on the primacy of what he called 'subjectivity', realized that religious knowledge was in some sense an activity of the known rather than of the knower.[2] It was he who gave Barth his early 'system'—'the infinite qualitative difference between God and man'.[3] But the greatest single contribution to the modern understanding of God's transcendance was, without doubt, Otto's *Idea of the Holy*. Otto's great achievement as a philosopher of religion was that he showed how the word 'holy' (and its synonyms) marked off in actual practice the area of religion from other areas of language. He did this by showing the various strands of meaning which can be uncovered in the use of the word 'holy'; and one of the most important of these is that the religious object is somehow felt to be Wholly Other. Even in mysticism with its characteristic emphasis on the nearness of the divine and on absorption into the divine as the goal of religion there is still a massive emphasis on the fact that the divine is beyond the world—it is *trans*cendent or *super*natural. In these words 'supernatural' and 'transcendent' we have, of course, the very picture

with which we are concerned, and Otto does well to point out that their feeling-content has a quite different character from that of their relational significance.

> These terms 'supernatural' and 'transcendent'... on the side of conceptual thought... are merely negative and exclusive attributes with reference to 'nature' and the 'world' or cosmos respectively. But on the side of the feeling-content it is otherwise; that *is* in very truth positive in the highest degree.... It is through this positive feeling-content that the concepts of the 'transcendent' and 'supernatural' become forthwith designations for a unique 'wholly other' reality and quality, something of whose special character we can *feel* without being able to give it clear conceptual expression.[4]

This is a most important point about our use of the word 'transcendent' and one which seems to be ignored by most theologians. Not only does the word have the negative function of separating the divine object from the world of empirical reality, but it also serves to describe—though perforce inadequately—the special character of the divine. If we now turn to an examination of this negative relation, this picture of how God is related to the world, we shall, I think, the better understand not only what we mean when we talk of God's transcendence but also why we must talk thus.

The picture is quite simply a spatial one, the representation of spatial relations. Now in the case of two spatial objects we can say that the one is beyond the other—the table-surface stretching beyond my paper—because we can see both of them. God is not seen, and this may be thought to invalidate the picture altogether. However, part of what we mean by saying that God is invisible is that He is holy, and even where the holy object belongs to the empirical world its holiness puts it apart. So the particular kind of beyond-ness with which we are concerned is the situation where one thing is hidden from something else. A mass of money sufficient to keep them in luxury was what lay beyond the mail-van door for the mail-train robbers. So God is beyond this world as something which is not part of the world and is indeed hidden by the world. As Newman puts it in his sermon on 'The Invisible World':

> ...The world we do not see is on the whole a much higher world than that which we do see. For, first of all, He is there who is above all beings, who has created all, before whom they all are as nothing, and with whom nothing can be compared.[5]

It is precisely this sense that God is somehow hidden by the world of things that we see which is involved in the picture of transcendence. The biblical idea of the world is that it is something which reveals God's glory. Thus Stauffer says that what is revealed in creation is 'God's divinity. It is the quality by reason of which he, and he alone, is called God: his glory.'[6] But the corollary of this is that the world is not identical with God and indeed that God is that which we see *through* the world.

One important aspect of this idea of transcendence is that it contains a monistic metaphysics. This is where the picture may be thought inadequate. Possibly this was what the Bishop of Woolwich had in mind. The way in

which God is beyond the world, is hidden by the world we see, is different from the way in which the photographer is hidden by the dark cloth because the world is real only because God is real. But one thing is quite clear—the transcendence of God does not imply the antiquated cosmology of a three-part universe, as the Bishop seems to think.[7] Rather the picture of the universe is that of one world beyond which lies the one mystery. In this connection it is most instructive to look at St Thomas' Five Ways. St Thomas chose these arguments as being common-sense ways of talking of God, and the significant point for us is that he talks of God as the maker of heaven and earth in this attempt at a causal demonstration of His existence. This means that for St Thomas the heavens and the earth constitute *one* effect.[8] Prof. Ninian Smart has said very well that 'the essence of the Argument from Design is not its exhibition of teleology in the universe but its æsthetic appraisal of the world as a single mysterious work'.[9] For the moment the most important point is the singleness of this work. Hume saw that this was indeed the difficulty of the Argument from Design if it presented itself as an analogical argument[10]—that it presupposed the posibility of comparison where by definition comparison was impossible. There is but one world and God is beyond that. We may go so far as to say that a necessary condition of believing in God is that we believe that there is one world. The similarity between the Antimony and the Cosmological Argument in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*[11] shows how closely we approach to theology when we engage in this kind of metaphysical thinking.

The difference between such metaphysics and theology could be described by saying that theology is much more like an æsthetic assessment. In æsthetic appreciation we are not concerned to argue to the existence of the artist, but are concerned with the particular piece of art as exhibiting his artistic power and making our admiration of him appropriate. So in theology we start with the idea of God and our problem is that of seeing how the world shows His glory. But to return to the Argument from Design, one of the most interesting features of this argument is the way in which its earliest expositions make no reference to those aspects of the world which, because they serve human ends, are now commonly regarded as *the* evidence of teleology. Cicero, quoting Aristotle's version of this argument, puts it thus:

> Suppose that there were a people living underground, but in splendid domiciles, filled with statues and pictures and all that constitutes happiness in men's minds—suppose, too, that though secluded in their subterranean abode, they had heard of some strange power on the part of some unknown supernatural beings that were named 'gods'—suppose then that the earth should open to these people, and that they should come forth from their darkness to the light of day—then assuredly we must suppose, when all of a sudden they saw the earth and the sea and the sky, and the great cloud-musters moving in the air and the mighty sun in the glory and beneficence of his all-pervading brightness—or when again, it was night and they saw the bespangled stars and the moon that wanes and waxes in her gentleness, and all those movements immutable in their appointed courses from eternity—then assuredly, as we must suppose, they would think that there were gods whose handiwork all these wonders are.[12]

Other examples of this kind of æsthetic appreciation would be the various

ways in which the holy is seen in nature which are listed by Harvey in the appendices to his translation of Otto's great work—F. W. Robertson's sermon, Addison's hymn and Blake's poem.[13]

The monistic character of the metaphysical outlook which the idea of transcendence involves is seen more clearly when we say that not only is there one world but the mystery which is beyond this world is also one. That is, the whole scheme of things in some sense can be summed up in the assertion 'There is a living God' because it is He 'who has made all things'. Prof. H. D. Lewis has pointed out how the pantheon of gods of some of the ancient civilizations lived on because of some social or artistic significance even though they had ceased to be 'symbols of a transcendent reality'. But, he remarks, they 'would only remain features of a living religion because the worship of them in some way referred beyond itself to a more mysterious and absolute reality which found symbolical expression in them'.[14] Whether or not we are to regard even polytheism as a symbolical expression of the awareness of the one transcendent mystery does not alter the fact that precisely such awareness is what is expressed in our picture. Once again let us refer to St Thomas. Because he held that the term 'God' was a general term rather than a Proper Name he did not see anything contradictory in the assertions that there are many Gods. But in fact the arguments reach conclusions about the truth of a proposition, and the subject of each conclusion will be *called* or *understood* to be divine or 'God'. However, if we regard the term 'God' as a Proper Name the assertion of a plurality of Gods becomes contradictory. It seems to me that the way in which the term 'God' is used in Christian discourse is—at least most often—as a Proper Name.[15] This is surely why all accounts of religious faith such as Schleiermacher's sense of dependence or creature-feeling, despite their correctness as phenomenological accounts, are so hopelessly inadequate. We need to be told how this particular intuition of the world is an intuition of what is expressed by the Creator. It is much more a sense of a presence than an intuition of the world, and because this presence is holy it must be something beyond the world. The Platonist Macrobius commends Cicero for calling the world the *temple* of God. Cicero wanted to show that the universe God was the Invisible Being for whom the whole visible universe was only the temple.[16] This is echoed by several of the Christian Fathers.[17]

We have tried to unpack what is conveyed in this spatial picture which is contained in the very etymology of the word transcendence. But the word 'transcendence' is used not only as it were to describe God's location but also to describe God's very character. This dual function of the word is not often appreciated perhaps because we forget that the picture is what Prof. Ramsey has recently called a 'disclosure-model' rather than a picturing model.[18] 'The theological model', he says, 'works more like the fitting of a boot or shoe than like the "yes" or "no" of a roll call.'[19] It was surely because the model was regarded as a picturing model that the model of transcendence seemed to the Bishop of Woolwich to be a superstitious myth. If it were this kind of model, then there would be no point in asking whether this is the best model we can provide, but in fact this is the only model that fits in the sense that the very use of models is necessitated by what we are here saying.

It follows then that this adjectival use of the word is not merely honorific. Its connection with worship has been already stressed, but it has some kind of descriptive function as well. In saying that God is transcendent I am not only expressing my worshipping attitude but also asserting that God is worthy of worship. We must now try to indicate the kind of thing we mean to say about God in this way.

First, it serves to indicate the formal character of all that we can say of God as being by the nature of the case inadequate. God is beyond description not only because language is always found to be wanting when we push it beyond its day-to-day empirical use but also because no words could ever be good enough. In the same way we feel that though we can analyse the various levels of meaning in any great work of art we are only confused if we are asked 'What is *the* meaning of this work?' We can say what it means better by our attitude towards it than by any description—and this is partly because the attempt to describe is self-defeating. For this reason Christian mystics have been led to call God the Nothing.[20] Thus to call God transcendent is to say that He is too majestic for words. Therefore, worship is never to be confused with the description of God. The confession of our inability to describe is meant to express our adoration of that which is alone worthy of adoration (Isaiah $11^{12ff.}$, Psalms 63^{5}, 145^{3}). Even in this limited sense of performative, then, worship is performative. But clearly we must see a wider sense in which worship is a matter of deeds not words. The main message of the eighth-century prophets of Israel was just this, and we are told by the Apostle that to say that we love God when we do not love our neighbour is to lie (I John 4^{20}). However misleading an absolute identification of work and worship may be, there can be no doubt that the separation of the two is thus erroneous.

In conclusion, as God in His person is transcendent so His relation to man is transcendent. God's authority over man is transcendent in two ways: (a) it is unlimited, and (b) it is real whether I acknowledge it or not. First, God's unlimited authority is the corollary of the attitude of humble submission which is the appropriate attitude for man. For the believer God's authority is not to be questioned. Confronted with the Holy One I must abase myself and confess that 'I am a man of unclean lips' (Isaiah 6^{5}). To my utter abasement of myself corresponds the limitless authority of God over me. Kierkegaard's 'teleological suspension of the ethical' is not, as some interpreters have been led to think, the rejection of any principles in ethics, but quite simply the recognition that as against God's authority I have no rights. The paradoxical superiority of the individual to the universal which he saw in Abraham's case derived from the fact that God's dealings are with the individual. The examples of reluctant disciples in the New Testament tell the same story. If a man put his hand to the plough and looks back he is not worthy of the kingdom of heaven (Luke 9^{62}). Another disciple is told to let the dead bury the dead (Matthew 8^{22}). It is clear that in the New Testament the call of Christ is regarded as possessing an absolute authority.[21] In this respect the mystery of God can be elucidated by using such models of authority as 'king', but we shall have to make clear that such models do nothing towards elucidating the transcendent character of God's authority.

Only such words as 'absolute' or 'infinite' can indicate the peculiar character of this authority which is related to all life and to all time. Secondly, the authority of God does not depend on my acknowledging that He has authority. All the references to God's transcendence that we have mentioned would have this point in common. It is not I who give God His authority. Nor is the truth of this assertion affected by our conceding, as we must, that there is a sense in which to say that God does now have authority over me does indeed depend on my acknowledging His authority. For the position we concede is the trivial assertion that if to have authority over X is to be recognized by X as having such authority, then God's having authority over me does depend on me. This is trivial in a religious as well as a logical sense in that it says something about me and not God. What has been said of submission to God could, *mutatis mutandis*, also be said of the glorification which is appropriate for us. Even the greatest glorification of which we are capable is not enough; for God surpasses even that (Ecclus. 43^{28-30}). Similarly with regard to God's faithfulness and power. Nor is this all that we can say about God as transcendent; for the claim that Jesus is divine means that what we have said of God in relation to the world and man by means of this picture or model of transcendence has been revealed here. To the question What is transcendence? we can answer with St Paul (1 Cor. 2^{16}) 'We have the mind of Christ'.

[1] Vide *Honest to God*, pp. 13, 18 *et passim*.
[2] Cf. *Philosophical Fragments*, pp. 38 ff.
[3] Barth, *Romans*, p. 10.
[4] Otto, *Idea of the Holy*, p. 30.
[5] L. F. Barman (ed.), *Newman at St Mary's*, p. 138. Cf. *Sermons on Subjects of the Day*, pp. 12-13.
[6] E. Stauffer, *New Testament Theology*, p. 88.
[7] Vide *Honest to God*, p. 44.
[8] Vide *Summa Theologiae*, I, ii, 3, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, I, c. 13. Father Edward Sillem has argued that in the first Way, as it is given in the latter Summa, St Thomas does claim to prove that there is only one Unmoved Mover, but only because he follows Aristotle in admitting 'the existence of the heavenly spheres and therefore the idea of the one outermost sphere which is moved by the one Unmoved Mover' (*Ways of Talking of God*, p. 78). It seems to me that this is highly doubtful, and that St Thomas does not claim any more for the conclusion of c. 13 than for that of art. 3.
[9] N. Smart, *Reasons and Faiths*, p. 40.
[10] Hume, *Enquiry*, p. 148.
[11] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 536, 612.
[12] Cicero, *De Natura Deorum* II, 37. The reference to Aristotle would be to *De Philosophia* (Fr. 1476, a.34-b.11).
[13] Otto, *op. cit.*, Appendices X and XI. In this connection we can appreciate the significance of Prof. H. D. Lewis's remark that not only does artistic wonder come close to religious wonder but may merge almost imperceptibly into properly religious experiences (*Our Experience of God*, p. 106).
[14] H. D. Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 98.
[15] I have discussed this somewhat more fully in my *Subjectivity and Paradox*, pp. 84 ff.
[16] Comm. in Somn. Scip. i, 14.2, quoted by E. Bevan, *Symbolism and Belief*, p. 39 (Fontana Library).
[17] For example, Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* 7.5. Vide Prestige, *God in Patristic Thought*.
[18] I. T. Ramsey, *Models and Mystery*, pp. 2-10.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 17.
[20] E.g., John Scotus Erigena says: 'Dum vero (divina bonitas) incomprehensibilis intelligitur, per excellentiam non immerito nihilum vocatur' (quoted by Bevan, *op. cit.*, p. 22 n).
[21] Cf. Brunner, *The Divine-Human Encounter*.

MYSTICISM

H. D. Lewis

THE WORD 'MYSTICISM' is a rather ambiguous one, and, like the word 'religion', it is often used very loosely. Some are apt to describe any form of spiritual experience as a mystical one. This is a grave mistake. 'Mysticism', in its serious usage, has a fairly precise meaning. It is derived from a word, *muo*, which has affinity with our words mute and mum, and reflects the silence of the worshipper before the incomprehensible mystery of God. More strictly it stands today for union with God. But not all union with God is a mystical one. What characterizes mystical experience is the alleged directness or immediacy of our union with God, and it is the claim to realize this union which characterizes mystical experience and the disciplines which are thought to make it possible. In one of its major forms this claim is thought to involve the annulment of our finite status; there is nothing between us and God because we are (or become) strictly one with God in a way which makes all separation and division unreal. As it is sometimes put, there is not 'a many' but only 'the One', the Eternal which is all-pervasive.

Not all the views which identify finite beings with God are, however, of the mystical variety. Consider, for example, nineteenth-century idealism. This is undoubtedly a form of monism, that is of the view that there is only one Reality and that all else is a part of it. But, on the usual forms of this idealism, finite things do have their place as phases or elements of the being of God. Their reality is not wholly impugned, but only their distinctness; they have their place in the one system of being, although much in the form they take for us is 'mere appearance'. But there are forms of monism which deal more harshly with finite being. They annul it and claim that there is, in the last analysis, only the one undifferentiated whole of being. It is this form of the claim to strict identification with God that is usually thought of as a mystical one. Some forms of recent idealism, and especially the work of the greatest figure this movement produced, namely F. H. Bradley, tend towards mysticism. Indeed, the so-called 'supra-rational' features of Bradley's thought are a form of mysticism—and an impressive one. Bradley's very famous *Appearance and Reality* could be not improperly described as a sustained philosophy of mysticism.

It is in Hindu religion that we find the most consistent affirmation of our literal union with God. But Hinduism is a very diversified religion and has had a long and colourful history. In some of its forms it approximates more to the sort of monism we find in recent idealism. But the more typical form of Hinduism, especially in its sophisticated expressions, is the more severe kind of monism in which diversity, and the world of change and of 'the many', is in some way annulled or superseded in the undifferentiated unity of the Whole. In between these varieties of monism, in Hindu religion and writings, there are many intermediate positions which accord varying prestige and status to finite reality. In many forms of Buddhism also the aim is to

pass altogether beyond the imperfect reality of our present existence, but in this case the 'passing hence', although incomprehensible to finite thought, is not so explicitly an identification with some One Ultimate Reality. In practice, I believe, the 'goal' of the Buddhist is closer to the union with transcendent reality than has commonly been thought.[1]

A particularly interesting and significant form of the alleged identity with God is that which we find in Sufi mysticism. This is a development of Islamic religion, and the movement of thought which leads from traditional or orthodox Muslim religion to the ideas and practices of the Sufis is extremely revealing. In its normal and original form Islam is much closer to Hebrew and Christian traditions than to Indian religions, and it centres upon the absolute distinction between man as a created being (and all other creatures of course) and his transcendent Creator. Nowhere does 'the gulf' between man and God receive greater stress than in orthodox Islam. One of the main reasons for the tension between Islam and Christianity has been that the Muslim could not find any doctrine of incarnation compatible with the majesty and transcendent power of God; it has seemed to him an inescapably idolatrous doctrine. Human and divine reality are altogether different, and nothing must be done to question the transcendent glory of God. God is absolute Lord and we are dependent in every way upon Him. But unless we are extremely careful this emphasis can only too easily lead to the view that all we ourselves are and do is directly encompassed by God Himself. If there is nothing that is not expressly encompassed by God, if my dependence on God is such that I only breathe and move through Him, then we come very close to saying that my own actions are the actions of God Himself in me. This is one of the main sources of the doctrine of predestination in Christianity as well as in Islam, and it also took the form in Islam of severe fatalism, that is of irresistible external determination. But once this step is taken we have almost made God all in all in all our own actions. There appears to be no room for freedom and we can easily come in this way to the view that all we are and do ourselves is an extension or manifestation of the activity of God; and at this point the emphasis on the transcendence of God and the difference between Him and His creatures tends to pass, by one of the most curious and instructive paradoxes, to the very opposite affirmation of an identity of man and God.

There are other aspects of Sufi mysticism, including the scope it offered for the more emotional and individualistic features of religious life—and the debasement of this in some distortions of the ecstatic excitation of the feelings and the senses, a common danger for all religions when the emotional side is strong. But my concern now is with the ease of transition from the emphasis on God's transcendence and otherness, if this is not very carefully handled, to the opposite extreme of the identification of all finite reality with God.

Orthodox Islam set its face firmly against this development. When one of the most notable and influential of Islamic mystics, namely Hallaj, taught that man was God incarnate he was denounced and eventually put to death. At his execution he uttered words of prayer very reminiscent of the words of Jesus on the cross. Earlier he had written in verse the words:

If thou seest me, thou seest Him,
And if thou seest Him, thou seest us both.

This is not, however, the only form of mysticism. There is also the mysticism which claims not that we are strictly identified with God, but that, without becoming God, we have direct or immediate contact with Him. This is not the same as the intuition of the being of God. It is immediate contact with the reality of God. Those who claim this experience naturally find it impossible to describe it properly. They speak in metaphors or 'slantwise' as Evelyn Underhill put it. The experience itself is incommunicable. But the metaphors which are meant to give us some impression of it stress the direct unmediated character of the experience. Some mystics speak of 'touching' God, even 'tasting' Him.

There is no reason why an experience should not be incommunicable. Some experiences are certainly very difficult to communicate; and we almost certainly have some experiences which we cannot properly communicate to others. Nor are these all of a religious nature. A person born totally blind could not be made to understand properly what we mean by colour. He could take it from us that it is pleasant to see colours, and he could learn which of the many objects he handles have this or that colour. But we could not tell him properly what colour itself was. He would have to see it. Nor could we tell anyone what physical pain was if he should be some fortunate creature who had never experienced any. It is probable that some of the paranormal experiences which are being widely studied today are of so radically different a nature from ordinary experience that many of us can have no conception at all what they are like in themselves.

This naturally makes us cautious, and we need some strong independent evidence before we allow that it is likely that some experiences are as different from normal experiences as is sometimes alleged. But caution is one thing, out-and-out scepticism another. I shall not go now into the sort of independent evidence which would impress us here.[2] But there could be evidence good enough to warrant a strong presumption, and, on the other hand, we could certainly not rule out on principle the possibility of an experience not directly communicable to others. That would be sheer dogmatism.

When, therefore, a claim is made to have a direct experience of God we cannot rule this out just because we do not have this experience ourselves and can form little conception of what it would be like. If we did so we would, moreover, be putting ourselves in an odd position *vis-à-vis* those who say they have no sort of religious awareness. But there could be other reasons for disallowing the claim. It might be found to be an inherently impossible claim, and this objection could not be ruled out on the grounds that we can pass no sort of judgment on an experience we have not had in any way ourselves. It will not do to say: 'Who are you to question what the mystic alleges, you have had no mystical experience yourself?' If anyone told me that he had found a square-circle in my garden I would deny this straight away. I might be curious enough to see what sort of object, if any, could have been described in these preposterous terms. But I certainly would

not step into the garden on the off-chance that, as I had not seen this object myself, it might after all, for all I knew, turn out to be a square-circle. I know at once that it cannot be, just because there cannot be such an object.

This holds, it seems to me, of the claim to have an immediate contact with God. It is not just that there is strong evidence against this, that the prophets, for example, usually declare that the God they have come to know is also a God who 'hides himself', it is not that we have not had this sort of experience ourselves and need to be cautious in admitting the likelihood of a very remarkable claim. We know from the outset that there could be no immediate contact with God. For this would surely imply that we knew expressly what it was like to be God. We would be aware of God as He is—in His essence. But one of the things we need to stress most about God is that He is transcendent in a way which precludes this. The way we recognize His existence involves His being a Reality of that kind. To claim to know God directly, in the strict sense, is like claiming to have found a square-circle.

Does that mean that the claim the mystic makes here is altogether bogus? By no means. It certainly does not follow that mystics are insincere or fraudulent persons who are seeking to impose on us. There are no doubt poseurs and imposters who call themselves mystics, and in a field which goes so far beyond normal experience, and where we often find much eccentricity, the imposition may not always be easy to detect and expose. We may have to give the benefit of the doubt when we would normally withhold it. But it would be very hard to doubt the sincerity of the more famous mystics. Many of them were notably saintly persons, modest in their claims and outlook and very little anxious to make any display of their own attainments, sometimes according them a quite subordinate place. But to be sincere is one thing, to be sound another; and while I would not wish to deny that the mystics had remarkable experiences of some sort, I would not agree that they have described them correctly when they claim to have known God directly, to have 'touched' and 'tasted' the Divine nature in this sense.

This does not mean that there cannot be extremely intimate experiences of God. I certainly think that there can be, but I also hold that they must be indirect. Their importance is not, in my view, in the least impaired in that way. After all, our experience of one another is also mediated. We do not know the mind of another as we do our own, but we can have a richly intimate fellowship all the same. My impression is that the great mystics did have a peculiarly close relation to God and that, in their concern and enthusiasm, they misdescribed this as an unmediated contact with God. This would be more likely to happen if, as seems probable, they had modes of awareness and further accompaniments of their experience which went beyond the sort of experience we normally have.

In some of its forms the claim put forward by the mystics involves a repudiation of the distinction between subject and object. If this were a merely striking way of saying how completely we may forget ourselves in the absorption of our attention in some object that holds it, there could be no objection to it. If the actors at the theatre know their business and have a fascinating play to perform, we soon forget our own role of spectators, we identify our-

selves with the actors. But however absorbing the performance and however oblivious of ourselves we may become, we never strictly cease to be spectators. There remains a valid and basic distinction to be drawn between the onlooker and that which he contemplates. I do not see how this distinction can be superseded; it is true that God cannot be one finite thing among others, but He is a Reality other than ourselves of which we claim in religion to be aware, and however we may become lost to ourselves and the world in such an experience we are nonetheless having an experience of a Reality which is not ourselves.

We are reminded in this context of much that has been written today about the idea of encounter with God, and the alleged I-Thou relation. Prophetic mystical writers, Martin Buber in particular, claim that the subject-object relation is superseded in all forms of the I-Thou relation. This is thought possible because of a relation which involves no sort of 'knowledge about'. But this submission, whether advanced by Buber or by more 'existentialist' writers, is quite bewildering to me. I have no notion what sort of contentless experience this could be. We do find, however, in recent allusions to mysticism and in appraisals of it, frequent recourse to the perplexing notion of a relationship with other persons which involves no knowledge about them—or which goes altogether beyond such knowledge. It seems to me plain that in any experience, other than experience of our own states, the distinction of subject and object is unavoidable, however unobtrusive it may also be.

This brings me back to the first form of mysticism noted above, that which claims not direct contact with God but identification with Him or absorption in some way into His Reality. This does not give us a contentless relation, for there is here no relation between us and God—we are God. But there are other objections to this supposition, and they seem to me overwhelming. A finite creature could be eliminated or annulled, but it is hard to see what it could mean for it to become literally part of God. It would have ceased to be as a finite being, and what, in that case, is our affirmation *about*? There are in any case very grave difficulties in the notion of a merging of persons at any level. It seems to me that persons, although destructible, have an indivisible nature which precludes any strict absorption of one in another. And how, if I were absorbed in the being of God, would I be benefited or redeemed or saved in any other way? I would just cease to be; there would only be God. My neighbour would cease to be also; there could be no Kingdom of Heaven.

It does not follow that there is nothing to be extracted from the affirmations, mainly in Oriental religions, that we eventually become one with the being of God. For here again there is much misdescription of genuine and profound experience and a remarkable testimony to the sense of the ultimate and absolute nature of God. There are also many accompaniments, some more and some less incidental, of this sort of mystical religion which are of great worth and interest. It has provided a corrective to crass wordliness and an incentive to living a deeply spiritual life. There are also many dangers involved, the dangers of escapism and neglect of our responsibilities here and now, the sort of other-worldliness which has been thought, often

with justification, to make religious people very poor citizens of this world. There is also the danger of unhealthy preoccupation with 'inner' experience and personal sanctity which makes some forms of mysticism a perversion of genuine religion. It is on these grounds that Sri Aurobindo and others have sought to modify Hindu religion.

In Christian countries mysticism has usually been highly regarded, and some of the most notable Christian saints were eminent mystics. But in the Christian religion the mystic rarely claimed strict identification with God. The emphasis was usually on direct *contact with* God. Even the more extreme type of Christian mystic, like Meister Eckhart, would be found insisting that, even in the most intense mystical experience, 'soul is soul and God is God'. Orthodox Christianity would certainly require this, and so do all religions which involve a deep understanding of the notion of 'Creation'.

A further feature of mysticism has considerable interest. It is the disciplines by which mystical experience is usually attained. These have sometimes involved much asceticism and mortification of the body, and this raises many problems, including ethical ones. The more specifically mental and spiritual disciplines are of great interest, and there is probably much to be learned from them for other forms of religion. Connected with this are the various stages through which the mystic passes before the ultimate union with Supreme Being is thought to be attained. There is a remarkable similarity in the forms these have taken in different cultures at times when these could have influenced one another very little, if at all. Another problem of considerable interest today is the relevance of paranormal psychology, and of states of mind induced by drugs like mescalin, to mysticism and to the ecstatic states which it sometimes involves—and to the accompaniments of these. But these are matters which I cannot effectively discuss in the space at my disposal now.

I must refer, however, to one recent attempt to provide a philosophical justification of the more extreme type of mysticism. This is found in a notable and much admired book by Professor W. T. Stace, entitled *Mysticism and Philosophy*. Stace is a well-known philosopher and a very lucid writer, whether he is dealing with the more severely technical problems of philosophy or with questions of more general concern. In this book he has done the subject of mysticism the very great service of raising sharply the more distinctly philosophical questions it presents. No one has done this so effectively before, most writers on the subject being content to describe it in rather general terms. Professor Stace's own position does not seem to me, however, one that can be sustained.

He rejects the sort of mysticism which simply identifies God and the world—a view that would perhaps be better described as pantheism. This seems to Stace to be just a 'silly view' and he takes Professor Hampshire to task for ascribing it to Spinoza. We must maintain instead the curiously paradoxical position that

(a) The world is identical with God

and

(b) The world is not identical with God

This gives Professor Stace the opportunity to come to terms with common sense and avoid denying that there is any sense in which 'the many' are real. But his success depends on its being possible to say two quite opposite things. The many are real, they are also not real. There is not, for Stace, to be any mitigation of this paradox. He is very firm on that point. The paradox is not a rhetorical one designed to make us stop and think. It is not just a literary device. Nor is it a case of misdescription of their experience by the mystics themselves. Nor are we to say that reality is in one respect many, one in the other, the 'double location' theory. Nor is the claim meant to be ambiguous. 'There is no ambiguity', we are told, 'in the claim that I cease to be this individual, and yet I remain this individual.' We have to take the contradiction in its most downright and literal sense. We must be quite bold about it.

But what is wrong with contradiction? Everything, we would be inclined to say. A downright contradiction is not even false, it is meaningless. If I say that my book is blue and also, in respect of the same part of its surface, not the shade of blue alleged for it, then I have just not said anything. I cannot mean this contradiction; I am uttering words but not entertaining a thought.

This is what Stace questions, and, for so gifted and shrewd a thinker, the arguments by which he seems to justify so odd a theory are exceptionally strained. He proceeds thus, for example, in one place: 'If "A is B" is a meaningful statement and if "A is not B" is also meaningful, it is impossible that the connective "and" placed between them should render the conjunction of the two meaningful statements meaningless.' But surely everything turns here on the connective. The meaning of the statement is in the whole of it. As a whole it is nonsense even if parts, by themselves, are quite meaningful.

Stace also seeks to fortify his position by a 'delimitation of the areas of logic and non-logic'. Logic applies to 'any world in which there exists multiplicity', but while 'the many is the sphere of logic, the One (is) not so'. This seems to me dangerous doctrine. If we give up the anchor sheet of logic there is no telling where we may drift. We must, however, say that in some sense God is beyond the world as we find it and that there must therefore be some Reality which goes beyond the categories of our thought and reason. But to say that God is 'beyond' or 'above' is one thing. It leaves it a mystery how God exists and what is His relation to the world. It does not require us to identify God with the world or to call logic as such into question at all— as if reality could be, though it happens not to be, illogical. 'Supra-rational' and 'supra-logical' are very open notions. The trouble with Stace's position is that he does not reckon with this; he is very sensitive to the mystery and transcendence of God but he also wants to 'scale' this down 'to the logical plane of the intellect'; and this is what we cannot do without the highly questionable and dangerous doctrine that 'the logic and the illogic occupy different territories of experience'. We must not commit ourselves to that doctrine but rather disclaim the attempt to make sense of what is alleged to go beyond the way we make sense of things. If God is truly transcendent we do not know how He is related to other things, that must

remain an unfathomable mystery to us; and this is what the doctrine of Creation preserves and accentuates for us. But if we try to rationalize the mystery our presumption recoils upon us in the form of questionable paradox and dangerous impugning of logic, to say nothing of being committed to saying that there is at least one sense, and that the most radical, in which finite things are not real. That they are real seems to me beyond question, and the plurality of them is real. We need not impugn this if we also say that they are rooted in some Reality which is altogether different—provided we are content not to say more and do not slide off the very narrow edge along which we must walk when we speak of the transcendent. That, I fear, is what Professor Stace, with all his sense of the mystery of God and his familiarity with mystical writings, has been apt to do at crucial points in his own thesis.

It should be noted that Professor Stace also claims that the Western mystics, who usually reject the notions of strict identification with God in favour of some kind of dualism, were largely under pressure from established authorities, like the Church or orthodox Islam. There seems to be in fact very little, if any, evidence for this. My own view is that the dualistic mystics were offering a better account than others of experiences of an exceptionally close relation to God which they shared in many ways, but not in all ways, with Eastern mystics. In neither case is the description offered altogether adequate. Why should it be? We do not expect that of the day-to-day accounts we give of normal experience.

There is in fact much further work to be done on the problems presented by mysticism. We shall be much helped in this by recent studies in paranormal psychology and by investigations of the role of symbol and image in literature and experience. Such distinctions as that between 'introvert' and 'extrovert' types of mysticism, as this is drawn by Professor Stace, should also much advance the subject. I cannot, however, pursue these issues further here and must be content to observe, in leaving this subject, that whatever the judgement we finally pass on the claims made by the mystics themselves, there is undoubtedly, in the reports of their experiences, a very rich mine to be quarried by those who would seek a profound understanding of religion.

[1] Cf. my 'Buddha and God', *The Monist*.
[2] I have discussed this question in chapters XIV and XV of my *Our Experience of God*.

WHITHER THE DOCTRINE OF GOD NOW?

David Jenkins

THIS PAPER does not get nearly far enough. But I do not believe we have yet gone deep enough in diagnosing the situation with regard to the doctrine of God. Until this is done we cannot see anything clearly about where the doctrine of God should go. Hence this paper is intended as a contribution to the future development of the doctrine of God by being an attempt to diagnose the present situation more clearly.

The question has been raised as to whether we are or ought to be in sight of the end of theism. Theism would come to an end if one of two mutually exclusive sets of conditions obtained. The first possibility is that there is no God and that everyone comes to realize this. Theism is thus known to be void, ceases to exercise any hold and fades completely away. The second possibility is that the Christian symbol of the Last Day stands for that which will be realized in the eventual experience of all men. In that 'event' men would 'in the End' see God with an immediacy which is best described as 'face to face' and theism would be shattered not because it was voided but because it was fulfilled. The point is that theism does not exist in its own right. It is either totally superstition or a body of belief, understanding and practice which in some form or other is required by the intermediate and interim nature of our situation and our experience. Theism is either mistaken about reality or else properly expectant about reality. In neither case is it completely and straightforwardly descriptive of reality.

Our present debate, however, is immediately occasioned by some who, while intending to remain Christians, wish to deny the continuing validity of some clear and exhaustive distinction between the positions of theism and atheism as just touched on. In raising the question 'The end of Theism?', Bishop Robinson clearly did not think he was pointing to either of the possibilities referred to above. Rather he was suggesting that the symbol of a transcendent and personal God which was the essence of theism had indeed now turned out to be superstitious. That is, this symbol not only did not correspond in any understandable or life-enhancing way with reality, but was positively misleading and mythological about reality. Thus, if modern 'believers' are to continue to keep hold of those features about reality for which the symbols of theism had once stood and if others are to be helped to come to grips with those aspects it is necessary to recognize the end of theism. We must face the possibility of abandoning the symbols of theism associated with and focussed upon that of the personal and transcendent God and find other ways of talking and organizing our experience. None the less, this is not a programme for atheism. It is aiming at some third thing which would rescue theism from superstition and atheism from unbelief. Reluctant believers and enthusiastic unbelievers, however, tend to refuse to accept this and hold that the programme does look, logically, like a programme for atheism.

For reasons which will, I hope, appear, I agree with this diagnosis. For theism to come to an end in this world would only leave everyone as atheists. But it will merely encourage everyone to become or remain atheists if theistic believers do not face up to the reasons which prompted that sort of an attempt to find a third way (between theism and atheism) of which Robinson has given us an example. In this connection there are two sets of considerations, the first to do with the climate of thought in which theism is to be entertained as a live option and the second to do with the manner in which a theistic position has in fact been occupied and maintained over a very large range of recent and general Christian thought and practice.

With regard to the climate of thought, I wish to focus on what seems to me to be the crucial point for the development of theology by talking of 'Post-Copernican Man'. I choose this symbol from Kant's preface to the second edition of his *Critique of Pure Reason* and I do so because I believe that Kant rightly perceived the inwardness and the implications of the revolution in thought which modern man was producing and which was producing modern man.

Kant was concerned 'to introduce a complete revolution in the procedure of metaphysics, after the example of the Geometricians and the Natural Philosophers'. He proposed 'to do just what Copernicus did in attempting to explain the celestial movements. When he found that he could make no progress by assuming that all the heavenly bodies revolved around the spectator he reversed the process and tried the experiment of assuming that the spectator revolved while the stars remained at rest.' In this Copernicus was typical of the various experimentalists who had 'learned that reason only perceives that which it produces after its own design, that it must not be content to follow, as it were, in the leading-strings of nature but must ... compel nature to reply to its questions'. Kant saw that this revolution in thought about the world (the replacement of the objective knower with his divine gift of reason by the subjective observer with the human capacity for experiment) required a revolution in thought about thought. Men did not gain their knowledge by the pure and *a priori* use of a reason which had the intrinsic capacity of penetrating through the appearances of phenomena to the ultimate realities. It was no longer one's understanding of reality which determined one's articulation and assessment of the observed appearances. Rather one's observation and articulation of the appearances was on the way to becoming that which determined one's understanding of reality.

It is necessary to say 'on the way to becoming' when we are at Kant's stage and part in the revolution because, as is well known, Kant himself held that while the speculative reason could not go beyond its own categories and the phenomena, practical reason took one validly into the sphere of reality in which talk about God, Free Will and Goodness was proper, necessary and truthful. Here Kant remains a believer in transcendental reality, to the knowledge of which he held that the practical reason could build a rational bridge.

Post-Copernican Man in his maturity has not allowed Kant's revolution in philosophy to stem the whole revolution and preserve the transcendent realities in the manner Kant himself intended. He has carried through the

revolution in thinking about the world and in thinking about thought to the completion of a revolution in the understanding of understanding itself and of knowledge. The result is that the first question which must be faced in any serious and relevant attempt to maintain, develop, re-state or even re-establish a doctrine of God is not 'Is there a God?' or 'What is meant by "God"?' but 'What is it to know?'. For the answer to that question implies and presupposes an answer to the question 'What can be known?', i.e. 'What can, with reasonable confidence, be held to be real?' or, even, 'What is real and how is it real?'. The spirit in which Post-Copernican Man explicitly or implicitly answers such questions is well reflected, for example, in the definition which Professor D. R. Newth gives (in his contribution to *Science in its Context*, ed. J. Brierley) of science as 'the process by which men create knowledge in which they can place a high and often measurable degree of confidence'. Knowledge is that which is produced by the use of the experimental method when men 'compel nature to reply to . . . questions' (*vide* Kant cit. *supra*). Such knowledge is firm and can be confidently used, although it is never 'final' in more than a strictly limited sense. As Heisenberg says (*The Physicist's Conception of Nature*, p. 27f.): 'In the exact sciences the word "final" obviously means that there are always self-contained, mathematically representable, systems of concepts and laws applicable to certain realms of experience, in which realms they are always valid. . . . Obviously, however, we cannot expect these concepts and laws to be suitable for the subsequent description of new realms of experience.' A little later he remarks: 'The exact sciences also start from the assumption that in the end it will always be possible to understand nature, even in every new field of experience, but that we may make no *a priori* assumptions about the meaning of the word "understand".'

Knowledge is a strictly human achievement which is strictly limited and relative, but which is none the less extremely potent within its limits, not least because these limits are precisely known. For Post-Copernican Man knowledge is the articulated understanding of observable and measurable realities so far achieved. There is more to know by the same and developed techniques. As such knowledge is gained it will change our understanding of what has hitherto been known. Truth is relative and it becomes truth as it is discovered, established, put to the test, articulated and used as the basis for further discovery, further relative but relevant truth. You cannot 'go beyond' the knowledge you have save by building on what you have got in strict continuity with it. Experience, experiment and techniques for testing by application in understanding and action are the tests of knowledge and thereby of reality.

The symbol 'Post-Copernican Man' as representing the attitude to knowledge and reality not very precisely indicated above is, I believe, a more useful representation for our purpose in considering theism than the vaguer 'modern man', for the symbolism draws attention to the fact that the crisis for belief is, at its centre, epistemological—to do with knowing and what is knowable. Further, anyone who embodies or expresses the qualities and approach symbolized by Post-Copernican Man has today an unquestioned authority, an authority which is believed to be self-evident. Any

other approach will not be heeded unless it can give a very good account of itself in terms which at least overlap those of the Post-Copernican Man and which can establish their own claim to relevant meaningfulness. This is why Robinson attempted a version of what I have called the third way. Theism (belief in and talk about a transcendent and personal God) goes beyond the knowable facts. Theism is therefore not knowledge concerned with reality. Once it was symbolism referring mythologically to features of reality but now, on Post-Copernican principles, it is seen to be superstition and must therefore come to an end. The features of reality the symbols of theism used to refer to must be found now more firmly located in 'real' reality, i.e. that which is now known and judged to be knowable. Hence the programme to re-express theism in terms of depth, concern, encounter and relationships.

But, understandable as such a programme is, it is not really a programme to replace outmoded symbols. The trouble about symbols is only symptomatic of the real trouble which is that about knowledge and reality. For the programme is an attempt to come to terms with Post-Copernican Man on his terms and these do not envisage the possibility of there being a reality which can only, and must always, be pointed to by symbols. That which is real is that which is known and that which is known is that which has been described. There is always more to know but we shall know this when we are able to describe more. Knowledge and reality remain relative terms. Hence if theism is to become acceptable to Post-Copernican Man it must become atheism, i.e. it must surrender to him for he has no terms for anything other than relative reality and relative truth. Whatever the symbols of theism stood for, they stood for something that was in logic (and, the theist contends, in reality) different from anything which falls within the logical possibilities of Post-Copernican Man's terms. For the theist, the significance of God's presence, immanence, availability is always derived from his otherness and his absoluteness. This is a matter not of mythology, but of logic. Part of the confusion in *Honest to God* and in much of the current debate is the failure to recognize this. Anyone concerned with the future of the Doctrine of God must face up to the starkness of the clash involved here. Concentrating on symbols can simply disguise the fact that the full development of the approach of Post-Copernican Man to the world is literally godless. Symbolism is certainly a question for the doctrine of God but only after, or at least as part of, the answer to the question as to how a Doctrine of God is to be maintained and commended in a world where the acceptedly authoritative man is godless.

I have spent half of this article seeking to define more clearly what seems to me to be the essential nature of the challenge now presented to theism and to make clear how stark and definite a challenge it is because I am myself sure that the future of theism, the direction for the development of the doctrine of God, is to be found in facing up with accuracy and rigour to the challenge of the situation. This is a theological conclusion derived from my present understanding of the doctrine of God and it is reached as follows.

Any doctrine of God which is in continuity with the theism of the Bible and of Christian tradition must be clear about at least the following. *First*,

the word 'God' refers to, or, better, names (a) reality who/which is other than the sum total of the realities which constitute the observable (or theoretically observable) universe.

The being named 'God' is not simply different *from* other beings or realities. He is different *in* being and reality. That is the logical point indicated by the caution which has to be used in referring to him as *a* being. That is also why he can be referred to only in symbols, analogies, etc. To use the name 'God' and to believe that one is using it meaningfully is to assert that the reality of the world is not exhausted by the realities in the world and that symbols of the type 'out there', 'beyond this', 'on another level' or the like (logically like, that is) are inescapable if we are to attempt to do justice to the reality in which we are involved. It is also why the conflict between Post-Copernican Man and the theist is logical with the certainty that one position or other in its ultimate conclusion about the world is false, rather than mythological with the hope that a third way would resolve the conflict. The debate is not about talk but about the way things really are. Thus the radical otherness of God (in a logical, ontological and existential sense) is a theistic axiom.

Secondly, however, the theist in the Biblical and Christian tradition holds that this is no absolute bar to the knowledge of God because God relates himself to the world and to man. The symbols which refer to this relationship are primarily 'Creation' and 'Revelation'. The symbol of Creation stands for the assertion of the fact as a fact that the existence of realities other than God is ultimately dependent upon God. Therefore, it is conceivably in the nature of things that these other realities in their own reality may reflect God or be usable as a means of communication about God or even of God. The symbol of Revelation stands for the assertion of the fact that God so relates himself to the world that he evokes knowledge of himself in and in connection with particular persons and events.

Now this belief in and assertion about God as reality who is both other and at the same time related as Creator and Revealer seems to have been almost completely thrown on the defensive by a full and open confrontation with Post-Copernican Man. In this defensiveness theism is false to its own premises and experience. This brings us to the second set of considerations related to the future of the Doctrine of God—those to do with the manner in which Christian theism has very largely been practised and doctrine of God taught as men have moved into the Post-Copernican era. There has been a widespread failure either to teach sufficiently radically about, or take practical notice of, the fact that theism does not exist in its own right. It has been unconsciously assumed that on the basis of a taken-for-granted authority of the Bible and/or the Church talk about God would remain both meaningful and relevant in its own right. But religious symbols which are taken for granted and left to have force in their own right and by their own weight become idols. The very name of God is only too easily taken in vain and the repeated sin of religious men is to rely on their religion (their concepts and their rules) rather than on the God to whom the symbols pointed and with whom the religion was validly concerned. Symbols are inescapably necessary in theism. But they operate only as stultifying idols

unless they are used in a manner which is not self-contained but open. God is radically other. Therefore, the truth about Him or the reality of Him cannot be contained in or be equivalent to any particular set of symbols, symbolic acts or significant encounters. All such may be means of knowing God but are not to be equated with God.

But God is related and present as Creator and Revealer. Hence the Universe is always furnished with potential symbols, and the possibilities of symbolic acts and opportunities for encounter which can kindle and have kindled the knowledge of God. Hence when theism is threatened and much (or even all) of the symbolism seems to be going dead the believer in the God with whom the theistic tradition has to do will look for a renewal of theism. (He knows that, as there is God, theism cannot either fade away or be done without.) This renewal he will look for by seeking a greater openness to God. And *this* he will seek by a greater openness to the real (and not the supposed, muted or turned aside) challenge of the situation. For the God who is other is known in the intermediate and interim manner of theism through His presence and relatedness. And because God is real and is concerned with reality He is not to be found in our illusions about the situation, but He is to be found as we seek to come to the closest grips we can with the objective reality of the situation.

It is here that the true concern of the theist meets up with the maturity of Post-Copernican Man. For Post-Copernican Man is determined to put everything to the test of experience and experiment and to proceed inductively from the knowledge he has to the building up of further knowledge. In fact, he is taking the givenness of what the theist would call the created universe absolutely seriously and in its own right. His ideal is to be open to observed and verified facts and thereby to dispel illusion and unclarity and to work in the light thus gained. This ideal represents an absolute commitment to pursuing the truth of the matter which is wholly proper to the givenness of a created universe, the data of which demand the respect which rejects all *a priori* treatment. The theist who believes that 'created' is a proper adjective to apply to the Universe must not and cannot go back on this achievement of Post-Copernican Man in which he is more mature than theists have generally shown themselves to be.

What the theist knows is that there is also God to be known and that ultimately it is this knowledge which is both primary (God is the proper context of everything) and ultimate (God is the proper fulfilment of everything). He cannot, however, blame Post-Copernican Man for refusing to allow that he (the theist) has anything that can be called knowledge about 'God' if he neither behaves as if he has knowledge (i.e., does not approach given reality on the basis of a real—because competent and practical—understanding of something real) nor can give any reasonably plausible account of the source or bearing of his knowledge. The questions which post-Copernican Man puts to the theist are 'How do you know God?' and 'How would you suggest to me that "knowledge of God" is knowledge?'. These questions require answers based on experience (How was the body of knowledge built up and how is it passed on?) and related to possibilities of experimental living.

In facing this challenge of the situation, I would suggest, we are required to work our way towards a post-Copernican Natural Theology, an account of revealed truth which is always sensitive to origins on the one hand and practical relevance on the other, and the development of a spiritual discipline and discipleship which is clearly an experimental attempt to make sense of our modern life in the light of our theistic understanding and to make sense of our theistic understanding in the light of our modern life. In other words, there is no way forward in the doctrine of God save on the broadest of fronts and by combining a number of enterprises.

It may be thought that on my usage 'post-Copernican Natural Theology' is a contradiction in terms, but I do not believe this is so. As a theist, I maintain the view that the universe is rightly characterized as 'created'. The experimental and inductive approach of Post-Copernican Man is the mature approach to the givenness of the created universe. If the theistic approach is in accord with the reality of things, then careful, sensitive and prolonged investigation of the methods, results and presuppositions of the post-Copernican approach must yield material for a natural theology. It must be possible to find material to make a case for the 'theistic hypothesis', although it will never be possible to establish it finally. (This is where the other two aspects of the enterprise mentioned above come in.)

Among the areas for search may be included: epistemology itself (Logical Positivism is by no means as complete or satisfactory as some of its first proponents supposed or as some *avant-garde* but possibly behind the times theologians now suppose. Also pure existentialism may perhaps without much difficulty be shown to lead to 'the Absurd'); freedom and morality (particularly the former where it may fairly speedily become evident that man cannot be established or maintained as human on strictly post-Copernican principles. But in either field the insight of Kant that here lies a bridge to the transcendent needs to be vigorously explored); psychology and sociology (The more we know about individual and group features which affect and produce persons and personality, the more we may be able to see features in which self-contained descriptive and reductionist accounts of what personality is or what persons may be or may become are self-evidently unsatisfactory and incomplete). There is also the need to investigate and re-assess those ranges of human experience which Post-Copernican Man tries to undervalue or ignore in relation to knowledge and which have their revenge in producing a modern literature which is largely pessimistic, uncertain and unclear in contrast to Post-Copernican Man's certainty, clarity and optimism. But this again must be investigated in its own right and not be prostituted and distorted by being prematurely forced into ready-made theological categories (re guilt, sin and the like). The natural theology must be built up from what is observed in the natural as it is given to us.

But this search for a post-Copernican Natural Theology would never be undertaken nor would it have any hope of success if it were not the case that there existed a reliable tradition of revealed knowledge of God and a constant community of current experience recognizably continuous with the experience of those who were the means of producing the tradition. God is to be known in and through the realities of the situation, but God is not

the same thing as the situation, the otherness remains a reality. Natural Theology can aim at showing that there is a possibility of God in the situation. But to look for a possibility of God one must have some idea of what 'God' could mean and this comes from a sensitive and lively confrontation with the tradition in which one begins to separate the symbols from the logic, and the mythology from the experience. It is to this end that the tradition, whether in the Bible or in doctrinal formulations or in the worshipping and praying practice of Christians, is to be studied and sifted with particular regard to origins (the situations which gave rise to the Tradition) and relevance (the way situations were held to be affected by that which was formulated into Tradition). (Here particular attention will have to be given to the data of and about the historical Jesus. I would venture the prophecy that more can reasonably be known in this field than the present prevailing fashions in exegesis will allow, overwhelmed as they are by a probably unsound existentialist epistemology. There may well be sufficient facts of a 'hard' [by post-Copernican standards] sort about Jesus to go quite a long way in legitimately raising the question as to whether the reality of the world is contained in and exhausted by the realities in the world.)

But that which convinces the theist that there is a God and that the challenge of Post-Copernican Man is a challenge to learn more of God and not a summons to fight a rearguard action on God's (doubtful) behalf are the occasions, whether individual or corporate, whether vivid or faintly and evasively remembered, when the challenge of the situation and the givenness of the Tradition are kindled into an awareness which makes practical, comforting and illuminating sense of both by giving what must be described as the knowledge of a Presence and a Power. Hence it is that no doctrine of God can go forward unless it is clearly related to a spiritual discipline and discipleship which is experiential and experimental in relation both to the Tradition and to the current situation.

Thus the future of the development of the doctrine of God must lie in sustained attempts to give an account of the ways in which confrontation of the situation, exploration of the Tradition and personal discipleship yield knowledge of God and what the content and bearing of this knowledge is. Such attempts must emerge from and be backed up by a Christian community which is plainly living experimentally and openly. The challenge of Post-Copernican Man has decisively reminded us that Christian theology and Christian living must be conducted together.

Prolegomena to a New Methodist Service Book: Three papers read at the High Leigh Conference of the Book of Offices Revision Committees

THE RATIONALE OF PUBLIC WORSHIP

Gordon S. Wakefield

'CHRISTIAN WORSHIP was intensely corporate, but it was not public,' wrote Gregory Dix of the apostolic and primitive church.[1] Like others of his judgements, this cannot go completely unchallenged. Who was the ἰδιώτης of I Corinthians 14 verse 23 ff.? St Paul hopes that he will acknowledge the Divine presence because the power of corporate prophecy has laid bare the secrets of his heart. He was clearly a visitor, a 'stranger', a non-believer, who had entered out of curiosity and might remain to pray.

For the most part, however, Christian worship in the early centuries was the private activity of the initiated. From this sprang the notorious distrust of Christian morals, and the proliferation of scurrilous rumours. Many of the apologists of the second century did little to dispel pagan suspicions since they did not wish to reveal secrets known only to the faithful. Justin Martyr is the great early exception, as was Tertullian later. Worship contained no scandalous mysteries and was probably a simple union of Word and Sacrament, but it was for committed, baptized and instructed believers, and was distinguished from evangelism and propaganda, prayer being almost excluded from these latter. This was one reason why Christianity did not require special buildings for worship even after it became increasingly tolerated.

That 'christian worship was intensely corporate' is indisputable. This is attested on every other page of the New Testament, and is one of the distinguishing marks of Christianity. The theological warrant for it is Paul's doctrine of the Church as the Body of Christ, which springs directly from a discussion of worship and the reform of corybantic abuses. I Corinthians 12 and 13 should be treated as a Directory of Worship. They prohibit the display of individual virtuosity in any form, and would condemn much of our singing, our prayer, our preaching and our critical frame, as well as our disorder.

The corporate nature of Christian worship is so often asserted these days that it would seem superfluous to linger over it. Worship for the Christian is *not* the 'flight of the alone to the alone', neither is religion entirely, in Whitehead's great phrase, 'what the individual does with his own solitariness'.[2] When Aldous Huxley took mescalin and believed himself to have attained the beatific vision he looked at a flower arrangement of a rose, a carnation and an iris, and saw 'what Adam had seen on the morning of first creation'. The legs of his chair had 'a miraculous tubularity, a supernatural polished smoothness', the very folds of his grey flannel

trousers were charged with 'is-ness', but his wife and his great friend 'both belonged to the world from which for the moment mescalin had delivered me—the world of selves, of time, of moral judgements and utilitarian considerations . . .'.[3] That is profoundly unchristian. Contrast the importance, in all our early sources for Christian worship, of the offering for the poor.

Worship, then, was corporate from the beginning, but it became truly public after the establishment under Constantine. This had some paradoxical consequences. The resulting corruptions led to that remarkable withdrawal from public life of those who wished to revive primitive heroic Christianity. At first, as hermits, they withdrew from corporate worship too, though this was soon redressed.

The worship the desert fathers left behind became more and more a public spectacle. In the official and recognized worship of the Roman Church, as in the Imperial Court, Eastern influences became powerful; Byzantinism, as it is called, predominated. Gregory the Great was accused of introducing Byzantine customs into the liturgy, which he vigorously denied. Perhaps one of his obscurer successors, Vitalian, was responsible.[4] Be that as it may, ceremonial and magnificence increased especially around the person of the supreme pontiff. The Carolingian concept of the two kingdoms carried this further, since it was maintained that the Pope must have equal pomp with the Emperor—although there was often sackcloth beneath the gorgeous vestments of splendour (*sic transit gloria mundi*). This undermined corporate worship; by the seventh century and throughout the Middle Ages, the liturgy was a spectacle for many to behold rather than an act for Christians to share.

The great reformed confessions took for granted that worship should be public, though the English sects believed in fencing the Lord's Table. But the Reformation depended on the 'godly prince', who was the representative of his people, and his churchmanship was vicarious. This was in no way vitiated by the ethical failings to which the pressures of high office subjected him. The Reformation perpetuated the belief that to attend worship is a mark of the good citizen, and that the absentee is the 'outsider', the alien.

The Reformers revived corporate worship, and in this they were helped by use of the vernacular, by congregational singing—'an almost new phenomenon which modern worship owes to Luther and Calvin'[5]—and by the restoration of preaching to its place in worship. There was plenty of preaching in the Middle Ages; it was both public and popular; unfortunately, it was fanciful in its exegesis and divorced from worship. Zwingli seems to have held that the Sermon at the Lord's Supper effected the transubstantiation of the people, so that they were no longer fragments of sinful humanity but the Body of Christ. Thus in reformed worship the Sacrifice of the Mass becomes the Communion of the Lord's Supper.[6] As J. S. Whale wrote:

> The sense of the numinous, a non-rational awe before the sacred mystery, gives place to the clear light of understanding which knows what it is doing while it prays, and so relates the sense of the holy to the world of moral realities, and makes reverence rational. Calvin puts in a nutshell what might well serve as a shrewd criticism of Rudolf Otto's work on The Holy: *'de dire que nous puissons avoir dévotion, soit à prière, soit à cérémonie, sans y rien entendre, c'est une grande moquerie'*.[7]

The Methodist attitude to public worship derives directly from the peculiar circumstances of our origin. Wesley believed that public worship should be provided by the Parish Churches, and he hoped that specifically Methodist Services would consist largely of an evangelical exposition without anything more than the shortest prayers. The parallel he adduced was that of University Sermons, but he might have cited the early Church for his virtual distinction between worship and propaganda. After his death, as throughout his life, the drift to separation from the Church of England was reluctant and half-hearted, though this must not make us minimize the differences which made the rupture inevitable. The consequence is that ours has never been a Confessional Church with strong independent principles of worship which says solemnly 'No' to the Establishment as did the 1662 Dissenters. That Wesley's Eucharistic revival was not continued may well be due to our fathers' loyalty to the Mother Church. The Plan of Pacification stated that 'the sacrament shall never be administered on those Sundays on which it is administered in the Parish Church', and thus, as J. C. Bowmer has it, 'the glorious Sunday morning celebrations of the early days died out'.[8]

Methodism has always loved crowds—we may recall Charles Wesley's fondness for the expression 'myriads'—and has never paused to question that worship should be public. As many people as possible must be brought to the sound of the Gospel word. But this, together with the fact that apart from 'our hymns' and the Covenant Service, we have never had any forms of our own, has led to confusion between worship and the revival meeting or mass evangelistic rally. It would be blasphemous to deny that the latter are true worship when the angels tune their harps to welcome the prodigal, and

> All heaven is ready to resound
> The dead's alive, the lost is found![9]

The Primitive Methodists on Mow Cop were indeed at worship as they sang of the flowing river of Grace, and—even more significantly—'Thou Shepherd of Israel and Mine'. But, as St Paul knew so well, there are obvious dangers if worship is conceived of solely as revivalism. No responsible Methodist of any of our sections has so misunderstood it. Primitive Methodism had a strong sacramental strain; Samuel Chadwick loved to keep Lent. But we must admit that the fire of the Holy Spirit descends at the appointment of God and not at our feverish contrivance. We may these days be deficient in the faith which looks for apostolic miracles of grace to be repeated, but this expectation needs to be sustained and disciplined by a patient service of God in ways faithful to the Gospel. This saves revival from delirium, and is partly the secret of Wesley. He was both evangelist and churchman, whose conversion to extempore prayer in no way diminished his love for the Prayer Book and his belief that this was more appropriate in 'the great congregation'. Adam Clarke was convinced that there would have been no revival apart from the Liturgy of the English Church, while, in the Caribbean, the paroxysms and emotional storms of conversion were contained by ordered, scriptural worship.[10]

Yet it is not altogether inaccurate or unfair to maintain that there lingers

in Methodism the sense that worship is primarily to convert sinners, and a failure to discern that it has a *raison d'être* of its own. This means we have had little to sustain us in an age when the social climate makes 'revival' unlikely, and the concepts of conversion and religion are both under serious review. It means, too, that our services are often highly sacerdotal, the preacher 'over against' the people, whose corporate participation may seem to be confined to the hymns.

In our day worship has lost its popular appeal. On any statistical judgement, it is those who attend Church who are the outsiders. The slow-dawning realization of this, coupled with a quickened sense of the futility of much churchmanship, has provoked some extreme reactions. John Robinson, while anxious that worship should be made to appear relevant by liturgical reform, declares that its test is the extent to which 'it makes us *more sensitive* to the "beyond in our midst" to Christ in the hungry, the naked, the homeless and the prisoner'. He goes on to quote John Wren-Lewis's 'hard saying' that if you go to Church to find God and enter into a relationship with Him which is not possible apart from specific acts of worship, you would do better to stay away.[11] Martin Thornton has an equal scorn for public worship as it has evolved since the Reformation, but he is all for regular Mass and daily offices, which are the discipline of the committed, and do not exist either to be 'relevant' or comforting.[12]

Statistical judgements may, however, mislead, and while both Robinson and Thornton ought not to be dismissed complacently, we would be foolish to lust for the catacombs, or despise the opportunities still left for organized religion in these islands. There must be a greater humility, a readiness to learn from 'those without', an end of superior patronizing from positions of social or political privilege, a new discovery that God is not confined to 'steeple-houses'. But though He is Sovereign Lord, and we must not presume to think that He is wholly at our disposal, there is a sense in which, in Christ, He has put Himself into our hands, and called us to be His Mediators to men. That is the proper meaning of 'the Priesthood of All Believers'. And so, through our corporate life and praise, something of the supernatural may penetrate our drab subtopias, and God's love in Christ reach those not temperamentally devout or churchgoing. We must probably reconcile ourselves to the fact that worshippers will remain, as always, a minority. (Sociology has demolished the fiction that in the nineteenth century everyone went to Church.)[13] But this does not exempt us from that service which is at once for God's glory, and for the life of mankind; or from the task of devising such forms as in our age will bear the burden of the prayers of those who may never pray for themselves.

I conclude, therefore, with some guiding considerations both of practice and of principle.

(1) We must be prepared to give to our preachers and people far more help in the understanding of Christian worship, its constituent parts and their proper order. There could well be an Introduction to the new Book of Offices, which seeks to do this, not only for the Communion Service and the 'occasional offices', but for the Service of the Word, which, though not a set form, ought to have its various essential parts fitly framed together.

This is urgent now that Family Services are so rightly on the increase. It is then that all principle may be abandoned in the interests of brightness and brevity.

(2) We may well need to re-learn from the early Church that there is a Christian mystery which the unbelieving world may not instinctively comprehend. Certainly all is not made plain because to the sophisticated Christian the bread and wine of the Sacrament seem so redolent of the common life. Indeed, we may presume to doubt whether they have such relevance in our civilization. Is it not better to keep them for what Christendom throughout the centuries has taken them to symbolize, the most grievous passion, and gracious compassion of our Saviour Christ?

(3) Congregational participation is all-important, but we may be beguiled by the Liturgical Movement and the fashions of our age into forgetting that it may be at its most intense when the worshippers are seemingly passive. Modern man can sit for hours in intense absorption before a television set without any urge to influence what is happening on the screen, though he may well be sharing in it to the limit of his powers. We should not underestimate the willingness of worshippers to listen to a twenty-minute sermon, submitting, to what, please God, is the proclamation of His Word, without any itch to turn it into a discussion, or to go parading in procession round the Church. They may be most completely involved in heart and mind when they are not outwardly active.

But this again brings us back to the need for instruction. The place of preaching in worship should be explained, and a section on How to Listen to Sermons included in the Church Membership Preparation Class.

(4) There is long precedent for maintaining that a Christian congregation is not constituted until there has been some reading from the Word of God. This rebukes our shallow scamping of the lessons, and the slovenly concession whereby we deprive the children of Holy Scripture for the sake of an address to amuse the adults. It does, however, raise the problem of language. The rest of service—apart from the sermon—ought to be in a language which conforms to the version of the Bible used. It should be possible to strike a proper balance between the natural and the numinous without blurring the uniqueness of our relation to God by recourse to the second person plural!

(5) We must devise some means of linking public with private prayer. It is possible that many people simply do not understand how one feeds the other. The new Book of Offices ought to be a manual of private devotion, just as any revised hymn-book must, in accordance with good Methodist custom, make provision for 'the secret place'.

(6) Finally, worship is not utilitarian or subjective. It is concerned with God's glory and the end to which the whole creation moves. 'The glory of God' may be a cant phrase of religiosity. Was it not this very word 'glory' which provoked Humpty-Dumpty's comment 'When I use a word it means just what I want it to mean, neither more nor less'. He had wanted 'glory' to mean a 'nice knock-down argument', which is just how Christian preachers sometimes use it, as one of those undefined concepts which conclude the sermon to their satisfaction and orthodox delight but which mean

precisely nothing. From these may Paul Tillich deliver us!

Perhaps the paraphrase for glory which is most faithful to the rich Biblical meaning is the word *distinction*.[14] To say that our worship is for the glory of God is to say that it must celebrate His distinction, that which evokes His unique esteem, and also that it must—if this does not sound blasphemous—bring distinction to Him in the loving tribute of His creatures, and the making plain of His hidden ways. But let the finest Free Church devotional writer of my lifetime express it in incomparable words: No Christian objects to saying the *Gloria*, for we are all accustomed to sing it at the end of the Old Testament Psalms, but for many it has become a mere formula, lifeless and theological. It has become like a tarnished coin. It must be restored to its first brightness and radiancy for us, for there is no other short way in which to declare in a phrase the ineffable glory and wonder of God. Almighty God, our Creator and the Creator of all the ends of the earth, Source of all Goodness, Truth and Beauty, is Himself also our Redeemer, for he was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself by the mystery of His life and Passion; and he it is, too, he the Creator and Redeemer who has given himself to our hearts whereby our love answers to his immeasurable love. He is God the eternal source of life; he is one with his co-eternal Son, the Word, his uttered thought; the Holy Ghost is the eternal life of God, being the love of the Father for the Son and the Son for the Father; three 'Persons', yet one, only everlasting, ever-glorious God. To him was glory in the beginning on Creation's dawn, when the morning stars sang together and all the sons of God shouted for joy; to him is glory now from the Church triumphant in heaven and from the Church militant, straitened, persecuted, yet believing on earth, and from all Creation, for the heavens declare his glory and the cattle praise him upon a thousand hills. His Kingdom is an everlasting Kingdom, and to all eternity everything in his house shall cry 'Glory'. The *Gloria* is not a formula; it is the triumph-song of the reedemed.[15]

[1] Gregory Dix, *The Shape of the Liturgy*, 1945, p. 16.
[2] A. N. Whitehead, *Religion in the Making*, 1927, p. 6.
[3] A. Huxley, *The Doors of Perception*, London, 1954, p. 25 ff.
[4] For this I am indebted to a paper, unpublished as far as I know and circulated at the 1963 Oxford Patristics Conference, by S. P. J. van Dijk, O. F. M., *Recent Developments in the Study of the Old-Roman Rite.*
[5] J. S. Whale in *Christian Worship* (ed. N. Micklem), London, 1936, pp. 163-4.
[6] The Book of Common Prayer heads its liturgy *The Order of the Administration of the Lord's Supper or Holy Communion*, while it is well known that it is only within this service that provision is specifically made for preaching.
[7] J. S. Whale, *op. cit.*, p. 163.
[8] J. C. Bowmer, *The Lord's Supper in Methodism, 1791-1960*, London, 1961, p. 22.
[9] *MHB* 326.
[10] Cf. *The Gospel Day*, Methodist Missionary Society Report, 1960, p. 28.
[11] John Robinson, *Honest to God*, London, 1963, p. 90.
[12] Martin Thornton, *Pastoral Theology: a Re-orientation*, London, 1956, p. 215.
[13] Cf. K. S. Inglis, *Churches and the Working Classes in Victorian England*, London, 1963.
[14] I am indebted for much of this paragraph to W. A. Whitehouse, *Order, Goodness and Glory*, London, 1960, p. 73 ff.
[15] Nathaniel Micklem, *Prayers and Praises*, 2nd edn., 1954, pp. 18-19.

THE FUNCTION OF THE BOOK OF OFFICES

Kenneth Grayston

The Book of Offices exists to provide historical continuity, authoritative direction and forms of worship

I

METHODISM WHICH STEMS from the tradition of the Wesleys has had a book of services from the earliest days. This was either the *Book of Common Prayer* or the *Sunday Service of the Methodists.*[1] The 1792 edition of this book was authorized by article 10 of the Plant of Pacification in 1795. From that time onwards, freelance changes produced a growing divergence from the original (with a drastic but unofficial revision of the Baptismal Office in 1846); so that Conference took hold of the book and produced an official revised version in 1864. At that time members of a congregation could possess as many as a dozen different Methodist service books, as well as the *Book of Common Prayer* which apparently was more frequently used than the Sunday Service.[2] In 1874 a memorial from the London (Islington) Circuit requested that 'a revised and safe liturgy should be prepared and used instead of the Book of Common Prayer'. Conference therefore appointed a commission 'to consider the subject of revising the Liturgy and Book of Offices, especially with a view to the removal of all expressions which are susceptible of a sense contrary to the principles of our evangelical Protestantism'. Its outcome was 'The Book of Public Prayers and Services for the use of the People Called Methodists' adopted by the Conference of 1882.

Other sections of Methodism also were provided with service books in due course.[3] The Annual Assembly of the United Methodist Free Churches in 1867 directed its Book Room to prepare a book for optional use, because there are 'certain special and solemn occasions in our church life which ought not to be left entirely to the discretion of the minister or other presiding brethren'. The Primitive Methodist Church published a service book some time after 1880, and in 1899 the Methodist New Connexion issued a handbook compiled by W. J. Townsend by order of the Conference. In 1903 the Bible Christians produced, by order of the Conference, a new edition of their Book of Services and said that they 'expected that it will be used in many cases as a Guide to the kind of service required rather than slavishly followed. In this way a certain degree of freedom and variety will be secured, without, it is hoped, running any risk that the *decorum and solemnity befitting such occasions* should be violated'.[4] The United Methodist Church issued its *Book of Services* in 1913.

From this historical information it follows that the *Book of Offices* should provide continuity with our own Methodist past. It is true that we have

little that is liturgically distinctive. Our Covenant Service has been widely welcomed in recent ecumenical exchanges as the peculiarly Methodist contribution to the worship of the Great Church, and it has been adopted in a much improved form in *The Book of Common Worship* of the Church of South India.[5] Its present shape, however, is quite different from the Covenant Service which was printed in the book of 1882, and there is only a slender relation between the two. At this point the historical continuity of Methodist liturgy is wearing thin. Moreover, the old tradition of using the Order of Morning Prayer (from the book of Common Prayer) has almost ceased in English Methodism. Perhaps it should be omitted from a future Book of Offices which needs to be a working manual, not a section of our archives.[6] It may be enough that we should have a Book of Offices that contains the traditional range of services, familiar *patterns* of worship, and familiar prayers. Continuity with our distinctively Methodist past is better preserved in our hymn-book, except that the most characteristically Methodist features of a hymn-book are now in disuse. The old arrangement of hymns according to the spiritual scheme devised by Wesley[7] has been abandoned, and the hymns of Charles Wesley, which express our doctrines, are sung less than others.

In these circumstances, it is even more important that the Book of Offices should provide continuity with the universal Church. This has been widely recognized. Thus the Bible Christians, in their Book of Services,[8] did 'not aim at originality' but used 'formularies which have been reverentially regarded by successive generations of Christian men'. The present *Book of Offices* states that 'The wealth of liturgical devotion which is the noble heritage of the universal Church has been largely used, and forms of worship belonging to the East and the West, to ancient times and to more modern days, have all been explored to enrich these pages.' These statements suggest that the sentimental *cliché* is inseparable from the subject; but in fact there is a better justification than nostalgia for trying to preserve historical continuity with the universal Church. It is the business of a Book of Offices to ensure that Christian worship is as complete, as varied, and as orthodox as fidelity to tradition can make it. Otherwise worship can become maimed, stereotyped and peripheral.

Finally, it is important that we should maintain continuity with Churches joined to us by a common ethos and some common history, notably the Methodist Churches in the West Indies and in West Africa. If these Churches become independent and join in unions (like the Church of South India), we may yet hope for a recognizable liturgical link with their new form. In turn, their liturgies may influence ours, as is already happening with the worship of the Church of South India. But even when these Churches become autonomous Conferences, they should be informed and consulted about any revisions of the Book of Offices. At the right stage their representations should be taken into account.

II

Service Books are authoritative in various ways. The *Book of Common Prayer* is annexed to an Act of Parliament, with deviations permitted by

Parliament or Convocation. In principle, it is binding on ministers of the Church of England, not only in the services actually prescribed, but also in prohibiting any forms of service not prescribed unless occasionally authorized. Not much less rigid was the *Directory of Public Worship* put out by the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland and approved by Act of Parliament in 1645.[9] It was 'to be carefully and uniformly observed and practised by all the ministers and others within this Kingdom'. Ministers were indeed urged to 'put forth themselves to exercise the gift of prayer, with which our Lord Jesus Christ pleaseth to furnish all his servants whom he calls to that office'; but worship was to be according to this pattern and none other. The present *Book of Common Order* is more liberal. It is put out by the General Assembly 'for the guidance of ministers in the worship of the reunited Church of Scotland'. The Assembly states that 'the provision of such forms implies no desire to supersede free prayer. Liberty in the conduct of worship is a possession which the Church of Scotland will not surrender. But a service book is necessary "to express the mind of the Church with regard to its offices of worship, in orders and forms which, while not fettering the individual judgement in particular, will set down the norm for the orderly and reverent conduct of the various public services in which ministers have to lead their people".' This liberty is again emphasized by the provision of an 'abundant variety of material with which, at his own discretion, [the Minister] may enrich the services without altering their general character'.

Other Service Books have the lesser authority of a growing demand among ministers. These include *A Book of Public Worship* compiled for use of Congregationalists by Huxtable, Marsh, Micklem and Todd (1948), with its notable preface justifying the book on Congregational and Reformed principles. Among Baptists, books have been sponsored by Secretaries of the Baptist Union: a *Manual for Ministers* by M. E. Aubrey, and *Orders and Prayers for Church Worship* by Payne and Winward, 1960.

Our own *Book of Offices* is authoritative because authorized for use in the Methodist Church by Conference in 1936. By contrast *Divine Worship* was simply 'approved by the Conference for optional use in Methodist Churches'. Therefore, the *Book of Offices* is not optional. Nor is it exactly obligatory, for no one would legally take a minister to task if he departed from any order, or invented his own. Yet these are the forms of worship authorized by Conference. A Methodist minister is expected to follow them, and is perhaps under an obligation to follow them if the Steward or Trustees so request. Therefore, it becomes important to ask whether these forms of worship are intended to provide a *norm* and to permit variations. What variations are permissible, and what desirable? Ought a minister to be free to adapt, omit, rearrange and supplement various parts of the service? What judgements should guide him in making alterations—that he thinks the service too long or the wording archaic? That his theology differs from that expressed in the order of worship? That he is against read prayers, or likes to bring in a personal touch? These questions need discussion, and we must have a clear guidance about a future *Book of Offices*. Does the book set out to provide services to be used as they stand, with certain variable and free elements; or does it provide a firm *pattern* of worship, to be filled out from

material provided and with free prayer?

This is not only a question about liturgy. The *Book of Offices* is authoritative in declaring our doctrine. It is our public face, and observers can read our doctrine from it. To take an example from the past, the *Sunday Service of the Methodists* changed the service of Infant Baptism to avoid baptismal regeneration, and gave American Methodists the threefold order of bishops, elders and deacons. The Conference of 1882 sat on the fence, and said 'in thus adopting a revised form of the Baptismal Service the Conference does not prohibit[10] the use of any forms which have hitherto been approved by the Conference'. Our present Service for the Baptism of Infants demonstrates the kind of understanding of baptism characteristic of the nineteen-thirties. Another example may be found in the doctrine of ministry and ordination. In the Bible Christian book of 1903 there is a 'Service for the Public Reception of Ministers into Full Connexion'. It includes the prayer, 'grant unto these thy servants in fullest measure all necessary gifts and graces for the faithful discharge of the ministry to which we believe thou hast called them'. The candidates were asked whether they were resolved to devote themselves to God and the work of the ministry, whether they would pray daily for the extension of the Redeemer's Kingdom, whether they would endure hardship, labour diligently to bring souls to knowledge of the truth, and to build up believers in their most holy faith. Then they were asked: 'Do you feel so united to our Connexion, and do you so firmly believe its doctrines, that you can cordially unite with your brethren and is it your intention to remain in our ministry as long as you are able to continue in the work?' By a show of hands the congregation ratified the decision of Conference to receive the brethren into Full Connexion, and copies of the Holy Bible and Hymn Book were presented to each brother. To judge by this order alone, here is no laying on of hands, no making of ministers. By the normal tests, this is not ordination. If in so judging, I mistake the Bible Christian doctrine (and I am quite prepared to believe that I do), it is the fault of their *Book of Services.*

A *Book of Offices*, authorized by Conference, must be an authoritative declaration of our doctrines as expressed in worship.

III

The most obvious and practical function of a *Book of Offices* is to provide forms of worship. But here it is easier to raise questions for discussion than to suggest answers.

Should a *Book of Offices* provide forms for the worship which is our main liturgical activity, namely the one or two Sunday services; or should it, like the present book, provide main forms of worship excluding our common worship? If it provides forms or guidance for our common worship (and who will deny that this is where renewal is most needed?), should it provide one form or several? And what is our common worship, and how is it related to other services? For instance, is our common worship the hymn and preaching service to which Holy Communion is occasionally added; or is our common worship the Holy Communion or some derivative from it?

Ought the *Book of Offices* to provide forms for the main services only, or

for the occasional services as well? Should it provide not only forms, but also rubrics, i.e., instructions for carrying them out? Ought it to be primarily a handbook for ministers, and what of the needs of local-preachers, 'supplies' and visitors? If it is primarily a handbook for ministers, should there be a reduced form for congregations and for other preachers; or should it be more widely a handbook of worship and devotion? Would it be possible to provide the book in two forms: a comprehensive *Book of Offices* for ministers, and a *Book of Worship and Prayer* for congregations and others which would include only those orders which are frequent, together with devotional aids (preparation for Holy Communion, prayers for use during Communion, prayers on entering Church, and so on)?

The function of a *Book of Offices* should be to make it possible for every Methodist service to be adequate and orthodox, though certainly not unvarying; for the special services to proclaim our doctrine, not narrowly but inclusively; for every Methodist minister to know what is expected of him in worship, both as regards fidelity to our tradition and to the gifts of his calling. Should it also make it possible for all Methodist churches to have something in common every Sunday, such as collects or lectionary? We do it for special Sundays and great festivals; why should we not do it every Sunday?

[1] See articles by W. F. Swift in *Proc. Wes. Hist. Soc.*, xxvii, 33-41, Methodism and the Book of Common Prayer; xxix, 12-20, 'The Sunday Service of the Methodists'; xxxi, 112-118, 133-143, 'The Sunday Service of the Methodists', A Study of Nineteenth-century Liturgy; xxxii, 99-101, a reply to J. Hamby Barton, 'The Sunday Service of the Methodists'.

[2] W. F. Swift, *Proc. Wes. Hist. Soc.*, xxvii, 38-9; xxxi, 142-3, where the reference to the previous treatment is given incorrectly.

[3] See J. C. Bowmer, *Proc. Wes. Hist. Soc.*, xxxii, 145-52, Some Non-Wesleyan Service Books; xxxiii, 1-3 The Bible Christian Service Book.

[4] My italics. This phrase suggests that the compilers were moved by social rather than liturgical propriety.

[5] Oxford 1963. Only a very small alteration is made to the Covenant itself; but a better conclusion to the service is provided, three readings are introduced before the Covenant, the preparatory prayers of Adoration, Thanksgiving and Confession are shortened, and the introductory exhortation is partly reworded. The effect is to throw more weight on God's part in the Covenant, and to remove some of the more effusive expressions of devotion.

[6] Principal A. R. George has drawn my attention to the fact that the Order of Morning Prayer is not properly part of the Book of Offices; see the title page and its reverse.

[7] In *A Collection of Hymns for the Use of People called Methodists*, 1780. In the Preface, reprinted in the 1933 Hymn-book, he said: 'The Hymns are not carelessly jumbled together, but carefully ranged under proper heads, according to the experience of real Christians.' The proper heads were retained in the *Collection of Hymns*, 1877; fragments remained in the *Hymn-Book* of 1904, but all disappeared in 1933.

[8] Quotations here and later are from a copy in Didsbury College Library (New Edition, 1903).

[9] It replaced Knox's Liturgy which had been in general use until this time. See W. D. Maxwell, *An Outline of Christian Worship*, 120-136.

[10] Prohibit, indeed! The new order was carried by a 2:1 vote; hence the indecision.

THE EUCHARIST IN RELATION TO THE TOTAL WORSHIP OF THE CHURCH

A. Raymond George

I BEGIN WITH TWO preliminary points. First, the term 'Liturgical Movement' does not mean what many people fear. It does not mean that services should be read from books according to rigidly prescribed forms, but that worship should be regarded as the corporate act of the whole people of God, and through its stress on the participation of the entire congregation it breathes a spirit which is almost the opposite of what many people associate with the word 'liturgy'. As a subject of study, worship has a vast literature and its own technical terms, and we need some people who will master these; but the end-product at which we aim should be simple and untechnical. Secondly, there is no need to fear that a radical revision of our *Book of Offices* will offend the other Free Churches by being too Anglican or offend the Anglicans by reducing our existing links with the *Book of Common Prayer*. The fact is that all the churches are now tending in the same general direction. If we do nothing, we shall be left behind; if we move steadily along the general lines of the Liturgical Movement, we shall be in step.

I do not propose to consider the deeper theological issues, but the practical questions about the actual form and style of our worship.

I

I begin with the *history* of the subject. There are parallels in the Old Testament to our problem; there is the whole question of the relation of the Temple to the Synagogue. But we will start with the New Testament. Preaching was essential: if the gospel had not been preached, no one would have known it. 'In the beginning was the Word' (John 1^{1}); this sentence has secondary meanings. All is based on Peter's speech (Acts 2). To this proclamation the people responded with services (Acts 2^{42}), including Holy Communion. In these services there was a good deal of informality (I Cor. 14). We know that the word was publicly proclaimed outside these services, e.g. in the open air. It is not so clear what form the word took *in* these services. The word 'preach' (*kerusso*) is never clearly used of what went on in the Christian assemblies. But we know that there was an element of discourse, the most obvious example being that discourse of Paul during which Eutychus fell out of the window (Acts 20^{9}). And, though the theology of the Word of God was not fully developed as it was later at the time of the Reformation, it seems likely that these discourses, even if primarily ethical instruction or exhortation, must have contained a good deal of that gospel on which it was all based. The distinction between *kerygma, didache* and *paraklesis* is useful, but sometimes drawn too sharply.

We move to the second century. In Justin's account (*Apology*, I, lxvii)

on an ordinary Sunday we have readings and sermon; then prayers and Holy Communion. And in the early church generally we get this twofold arrangement: the first part is for the catechumens as well as for the faithful and contains instruction based on the gospel; the second part is the Lord's Supper for the faithful, i.e. for the baptized if they are not under discipline. It is a full service with two peaks or climaxes. (I leave out the complicated question in which part the intercessions fall.) If on the Communion Sunday most of our people stay, then our service has the same form.

In the Middle Ages preaching decayed, both in the East and in the West, though friars often preached outside the churches. In the West, not in the East, there was a multiplication of masses. In both East and West the general communion of the people became rare. The priests received the communion constantly, but the people usually only at Easter. The service thus became a kind of spectacle in which there was no active participation. Thus the two climaxes, the sermon and the general communion, were both lost.

At the Reformation Zwingli prescribed for most Sundays a non-eucharistic preaching-service, but Luther, Calvin and the *Book of Common Prayer* all wanted a full service with preaching and general communion, which would restore the practice of the early centuries. But this arrangement either was disallowed, as by the magistrates at Geneva, or broke down, because the people, retaining their medieval attitude, were unwilling to receive the communion more frequently. Hence in Lutheranism the service was on most Sundays abbreviated, so that it consisted simply of the service of the Word, or Ante-Communion. In Scandinavian countries this is still given a name which means 'High Mass'. British travellers are often misled by the occurrence of the Apostles' Creed in these services (the use of which at the Eucharist is a peculiarity of Lutherans and Calvinists) into supposing that they are present at a form of Mattins, whereas in fact the service is derived from the Eucharist as can be seen from many of its features, such as the use of an Epistle and Gospel, often the same as those prescribed for that day in Anglican and Methodist churches. Some maintain that Presbyterian services also are based on Ante-Communion, but this is in some dispute; the question can be studied in such books as W. D. Maxwell, *An Outline of Christian Worship*, and Howard G. Hageman, *Pulpit and Table*.

But in the Church of England an odd thing happened, a growth in the importance of Mattins or Morning Prayer. This service, together with Evensong, had its origin in the custom of praying at certain hours each day (e.g., Acts 10^{9}); these prayers, first private, later became corporate, and were developed in monasteries into that elaborate system of daily prayers known as the Divine Office, because it is the duty (*officium*) of monks and indeed of priests to say it, as in the Roman Catholic and Eastern churches they still do. The logical modern equivalent of this is the daily prayers of a family or college. But Cranmer, who rearranged the seven or eight daily offices into two great pieces, Morning and Evening Prayer, so simplified and improved them that in the Church of England, alone of the great churches, they became popular services, on Sundays, but not on weekdays. Thus their Sunday morning service came to be Morning Prayer, Litany and Holy Communion, and this soon became, on most Sundays, Morning Prayer, Litany and Ante-

Communion, the Sermon coming in the prescribed place after the Creed in the Communion or Ante-Communion. But when the custom arose of having the Communion at 8 a.m., then in many churches the service in the middle of the morning became simply Morning Prayer and Sermon. This is a reversal of the traditional order, and its awkwardness is seen on a day such as Palm Sunday, when in such churches the greater part of Matthew 27 is read at 8 a.m. as the Gospel, and then later in the morning Matthew 26 is read as the Second Lesson. Thus a form of Word-service, other than Ante-Communion, was blown up with hymns and sermon to bear a weight which it was not intended to bear. The sermon is not integral to it, though, strictly speaking, catechizing should be inserted into Evening Prayer. This familiar service has become a well-loved vehicle of devotion for countless multitudes of English people for over four centuries; but it has rather too much penitence, and too little adoration, thanksgiving and dedication.

Methodism in one sense made no great change. Wesley probably read Morning Prayer, Litany and Holy Communion; the main difference was that he had frequent communions, so that the service would not be reduced to Ante-Communion. The Methodist services at 5 a.m. and 5 p.m. were supplementary. Our own service, say the Minutes of 1766, 'pre-supposes public prayer, like the sermons at the university'. Methodism really began evening services, which were facilitated by the invention of gas-lighting. The older custom was to have the second service in the afternoon; cathedrals still have Evensong at that time, and I have heard of an Inghamite church which still follows the older custom. Evening services are still largely confined to the English-speaking world.

But by the time Methodism had begun to pursue its independent course, the emphasis was on preaching-services often held at the normal hour of the Church-service, at least in the morning. Some churches retained Morning Prayer (I wonder how long they also said Ante-Communion), either from the *Book of Common Prayer* or from 'our venerable father's Abridgement (i.e. *The Sunday Service of the Methodists*); otherwise, if the service was in Church-hours, the Plan of Pacification required the reading of at least the appointed two lessons. Morning Prayer is still common in our overseas churches; it is (I believe) the normal usage of three of our four principal churches in the centre of London; it still constitutes our official Conference Service, much to the surprise of some who attend it. But most of our churches, including those not in the Wesleyan tradition, have followed the form of a simple preaching-service and have thus become assimilated to the general Dissenting tradition, though indeed that has itself been in a state of flux. Yet the widespread, though not universal, use of two lessons, one from each Testament, contains an echo of the Morning Prayer tradition, just as the custom of making the 'long' prayer intercessory echoes the intercessions after the third collect at Morning Prayer.

The relation of the Holy Communion to this has always been a matter of some difficulty. When Wesley sent *The Sunday Service of the Methodists* to North America in 1784, he sent with it a letter (*Letters*, VII, 239), in which he said: 'I also advise the elders to administer the Supper of the Lord on every Lord's Day.' But for various reasons Methodist chapels never acquired

Wesley's own custom of frequent communion. When there was a Communion, it was not felt that it could stand by itself as the Public Service, and the relation of the Communion Service to the preaching-service was somewhat uneasy as we see from the frequent omission from many editions of *The Sunday Service* of the rubric about saying the Collect, Epistle and Gospel.

The outstanding feature of our own day is that the Liturgical Movement has revived the emphasis on Holy Communion with Sermon and general communion. For Rome this means fewer masses, more preaching and more frequent communion. For Anglicans it means 'the Parish Communion' at 9 or 9.30 a.m.; for Lutherans, what they call 'the full service'. We already have it, but only once a month, for the most part, and sometimes with a sense of anticlimax. We have to face the question whether we want it more often.

II

What, then, are the *possibilities now open to us*?

Some desire a full service with Sermon and general Communion each Sunday; they point to the fact that weekly communion was not felt to be excessive in the early Church, by the great Reformers, or by Wesley. But others do not wish for this, even as a distant goal, and all agree that we are hardly within sight of attaining it.

Some adopt a half-way position; they have Holy Communion each Sunday at 8 or at 10 a.m., but only once a month does it constitute the principal service at 11 a.m.

But by far the commonest practice is to have Holy Communion only once a month (once a quarter in villages) in conjunction with either the morning or the evening service. The other services are straightforward preaching-services. It may seem an artificial and unnecessary question to ask whether they are or should be based on Morning (or Evening) Prayer or on Ante-Communion, whether they are derived from the Divine Office or the Eucharist. Their actual history, as we have seen, is somewhat complex. Would it not be better to acknowledge the preaching-service as an independent form, with rights of its own, rather than to seek to conform it to some alien norm? In fact, however, any attempt to elaborate it almost inevitably, though often unconsciously, shows signs of following some model. Thus the fairly common custom of chanting a Psalm in place of the second hymn, before the first lesson, is a reminiscence of the place of the Psalms at Morning and Evening Prayer. If the Holy Communion had been in mind, the position would have been different. But indeed, quite apart from elaboration, the need for continuity poses this problem. If worship is to continue Sunday by Sunday in a systematic way, it is desirable to follow some scheme of readings from the Bible. If we follow the Lectionary, we read a Lesson from each Testament; this is strongly reminiscent of Morning and Evening Prayer, and, as we saw, was mentioned in the Plan of Pacification as a kind of minimum substitute for Morning Prayer. If we had the Holy Communion in mind, we should read the Epistle and Gospel. Many of us do this on the Communion Sunday even when we are not during the first part of the service

using the printed order; but this of course disrupts the series of Old Testament and New Testament lessons.

These difficulties could be avoided if one service each Sunday (let us say for the moment the morning service) were derived from Holy Communion, even when there is no actual communion; such is the Lutheran practice. The Report of the Committee on Christian Worship to the Conference of 1960, in dealing with this problem, said:

> We are all agreed that all our Sunday services, whether or not they are Communion services, should emphasize, as both the Communion service and evangelical preaching clearly do, the remembrance of Christ's death for our sins, communion with the crucified and risen Christ, and the offering of our souls and bodies in response to Him. The structure of the service of Holy Communion and the structure of the service where there is no Communion bear a certain relation to each other.

Thus the first order of service there recommended, based on an article by Dr Alan Kay in *The Preacher's Quarterly*, was capable of standing alone as a preaching-service or of serving as an Ante-Communion.

It is not desirable that the first part of the present Communion Service should be said on the Sundays when there is no Communion or even necessarily on the Sundays when there is, but simply that the service each Sunday should be in some form which will suit either type of occasion. The most immediate reform would be to amalgamate the morning lectionary with the Epistle and Gospel series. Thus we should have three lessons, two of them quite short; and the inclusion of an Old Testament lesson would rebut the criticism that to have the Holy Communion or some derivate of the Holy Communion each Sunday would eliminate the Old Testament. If the Collect for the Day were to be said, it would precede these readings. Before this there would be short introductory material, probably penitential, rather like the present opening hymn and first prayer. The readings would lead to the sermon, which would be preceded or followed by the Creed. Afterwards would come the Intercessions, corresponding to the Prayer for the Church Militant rather than to the Prayers after the Third Collect, but better put in the form of a Litany or even of a Prayer Meeting.

The big problem is how to finish on the Sundays when it does not go on to Communion. Some would even argue that it should be given a deliberate air of incompleteness to show that the Communion is lacking. Some would say that in the absence of the Communion the sermon covers the same ground, and should stand at the end as the climax, but that would destroy the essence of this structure. I would rather say, following earlier suggestions of the Church of South India, which were subsequently slightly modified, that the officiant should take the offering and say a prayer of thanksgiving for creation and redemption; and this would be reminiscent of the first two of the eucharistic actions: He took, He gave thanks. This Great Prayer would end with the Lord's Prayer, which would in this case serve as a climax, as with the Lutherans; and the blessing.

We have assumed that this would be the morning service, but in practice there must be some provision for communion in the evening also, or vice versa. But in general if we had this rather full type of service once each

Sunday, then the other gathering might be of a very different kind, with the emphasis, for instance, on a discussion or a lecture, were it not for the danger that people might come only to that gathering when they ought to be receiving also the full diet of worship.

These questions do not closely affect the proposed revision of the *Book of Offices*, except in one or two respects. Morning Prayer, which at present is rather something printed with the *Book of Offices* than strictly a part of it, may well be retained, but it should not be in any way represented as *the* correct order of morning worship. Nor should the present first Order of Holy Communion, which should also be retained, be regarded as the sole form. I assume that the present alternative order will disappear. There should be a new order, a new simple structure, such as I have outlined for 'The Sunday Service', to use the historic Methodist title. Old Testament Lesson, Epistle, Gospel and Sermon would be at its heart. Sample prayers could be written into it, but other prayers, particularly to allow for seasonal variation, or extempore prayers, could be substituted. A way of rounding it off in the absence of Communion would be provided, and would have equal status with the other possible conclusion, which would be an order for Communion. Careful typography would secure this equality of status, and would also provide that on the Communion Sundays the service would appear to be a whole and yet a Minister who turned to the book after the departure of the non-communicants would not appear to be starting in the middle, as we now often appear to do.

We might also consider producing an office for daily use; Taizé, the Renewal Group, and the Joint Liturgical Group have all worked at this.

III

Certain *other services* traditionally stand in a relationship to the Eucharist. Thus Baptism and Confirmation originally preceded the Eucharist of Easter; marriage and the churching of women preceded the Eucharist; a rubric at the end of our marriage service alludes to this. Ordinations take place during it; in the Anglican use deacons are ordained before the Gospel (which one of them then reads), priests after it, and bishops after the Creed and Sermon. Our ordination service has some trace of the Collect, Epistle and Gospel structure (those in the American Methodist *Ritual* more so); then we turn to the Communion service at the Prayer of Humble Access. We start at that point in certain other services also. The Church of South India has shown us a better way of integrating the Covenant Service into Holy Communion, and there are other possibilities. But some of these customs cannot easily be restored. The awkwardness of the semi-private communions at marriage and at ordination could be avoided if these were connected with the Sunday Eucharist; but this is not very practicable, at least as concerns marriage.

Yet for most of these services the simple structure which I have already outlined would be the appropriate setting, and we could eliminate such phrases as 'at the close of a shortened service on the Lord's Day', which occurs in a rubric of the Public Reception of New Members. To use the common structure would save space in printing, but each occasion would

have its proper Collect and Old Testament lesson, Epistle, and Gospel, or two of these, followed by Sermon or charge. Then would come the particular act in question, Covenant, dedication of a Local Preacher, Confirmation, Ordination, or the like; then, perhaps with a brief intercession, we should proceed to Communion, starting with Offertory, and then 'Lift up your hearts'. Some streamlining would be necessary, but such a service would not be excessively long. Most of these acts would lead naturally to Communion, but some might be done without a Communion, e.g., the baptism of an infant; this would simply follow the sermon, as indeed it usually does, and be followed by the non-eucharistic ending.

Thus the Church, the Christian family, having received from the Bible and Sermon the message that constitutes its being and authorizes it to perform these particular acts, proceeds to transact the family business just before it gathers at the table for the Family Meal.

IV

In *conclusion* we might argue, as, for instance, William Nicholls did in *Jacob's Ladder*, that the Word Service is primarily proclamation and the Eucharist primarily response, so that each needs the other. Indeed, we should all agree that they complement each other. Some say that they do this so well that they should do it every Sunday; others think not. For the sake of the latter, and indeed in any case, we should not distinguish them too sharply. Each should contain elements of both proclamation and response. The Word-service and the Eucharist are two parts of one whole, yet in a sense each part contains the whole. The Word-service can best do this, not by modelling itself on an office, but by having some regard to its double role. We may use it as the first part of a service with a double climax, or we may use it (whether this role be temporary or permanent) as an independent service; and we must have a certain freedom to adapt it for both these purposes.

JOHN BAILLIE AND CHRISTIAN EPISTEMOLOGY

A. P. F. Sell

AS PROFESSOR JOHN McIntyre has so well said, 'There could scarcely be a finer conclusion to a life of such academic brilliance, theological literary achievement and profound Christian devotion' than the late John Baillie's Gifford Lectures, *The Sense of the Presence of God*.[1] Now great books raise great questions, and we shall not genuinely revere the beloved Professor if we allow his work to fossilize by failing to ask these questions. The debate goes on, and if we draw attention to certain matters arising from *S.P.G.* it is in the hope of fostering further discussion. We are especially concerned with such epistemological considerations as certitude, faith and proof, and experience and verification.

I

Our first query is as to whether Professor Baillie does justice to the paradoxical nature of the Christian's certitude. What is the Christian claiming when he claims to have certain knowledge of God? He can only mean that he has such knowledge by acquaintance if he can show clearly how he interprets that acquaintance, for despite evangelistic phraseology that suggests the contrary, the Christian cannot literally introduce God to his friend as he might introduce his wife to his friend, so that his friend became acquainted with her. Again, the Christian cannot give a description of God as he could of a table if someone asked him if he knew what a table was. Or if he tried to give a description of God the Christian would in all probability soon find himself using such words as 'omnipotent', 'omniscient' and 'omnipresent' which, whatever else they revealed, would reveal beyond all reasonable doubt that in highly important ways God is unlike any other describable person or object. The Christian could now change his tactics and say that 'to know Him is to know His benefits', but this appears to be a dangerously subjective substitute for that objective certainty that knowledge is generally believed to entail. We do not suggest that the fact that our customary ideas of knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description fail the Christian implies that his case is necessarily indefensible, but it can hardly be denied that there are puzzles here that merit attention.

The Christian's certitude is paradoxical in that the Christian is absolutely certain of the absolutely uncertain. Consider first the latter pole of the paradox. The warning against the objectification of God has frequently been sounded on the ground that He can be known only in the intimacy of an I-Thou relationship. That is to say, the Christian cannot look at God from a detached position, as though He were 'out there'. But this warning must never be taken as the excuse for reclining upon the marshy bed of feeling only; it simply means that if God is not known as a personal reality

He is not known at all. He is object only in the sense that the Christian does not manufacture Him out of his own emotions—and on that 'only' the entire Christian revelation depends. It is not that feelings are to be ruled out of account altogether, for whilst a purely subjective faith is insecure and readily deflatable by any psychologist, and whilst a false homiletical emotionalism is always to be shunned as blasphemous, it must always be remembered that the Christian can hardly say, for example, 'Christ is my Saviour' without *feeling* something. We may thus borrow Kierkegaard's term and say that faith is a 'second immediacy' in which the feeling element is undergirded by knowledge. Faith is not co-terminous with knowledge, but is included in it. Faith is the positive response of the whole person to One who has made Himself *known*. Apart from faith there is no way of knowing God, and in the matter of faith there is no room for the calculation of probabilities. The chasm has to be leaped before the Christian knows whether there is anything on the other side. It is as risky as that. But the leap brings certitude in its train, for there *is* another side.

From that pole of the paradox that recognizes the fact that God is no ordinary object of knowledge it would seem that we may agree with Professor Baillie's comment on Tennyson's lines,

> We have but faith, we cannot know;
> For knowledge is of things we see,[2]

and say that the Christian truly has but faith, but that he *does* know. But when we turn to that pole of the paradox that relates to the Christian's certitude Professor Baillie is not so helpful, and perhaps George Meredith, who said,

> Ah, what a dusty answer gets the soul
> When hot for certainties in this our life[3]

was nearer the mark than we are led to suppose. It is arguable that in seeking certainties in the matter of God's existence the Christian does not find even dusty answers; he finds no answers at all. For he is certain of the uncertain. Now in daily life, if John claims to know George there are numerous ways of ascertaining whether he does in fact know him or not, and whether therefore his certitude is justified. We might arrange for John and George to be in the same room at the same time, ensuring that neither is in disguise, and that neither is smitten by temporary blindness. All things being equal, they will recognize each other at once if they do know each other, and our test will have succeeded. But when the subject of investigation is the Christian's certitude of God, these tests do not apply. The Christan cannot provide us with a set of proofs to justify his certitude. The problem is thus not on all fours with the linguistically similar problem that arises in ordinary discourse if Tom says: 'I know Pythagoras's theorem but I can't prove it.' In this case the 'can't' implies an inability which with practice or revision of the textbook may well be overcome. But if Tom says 'I know that my Redeemer liveth but I can't prove it', his 'can't' is a *logical* 'can't', the nature of which is determined by the object of knowledge in question and by the manner in which He is known. The fact is that the Christian's knowledge of God is no more probable or certain one day than it is the next. As

Kierkegaard saw, all the Christian has is 'objective uncertainty held fast in infinite passion'.[4] He is called to walk by faith, and he has to. The full realization of this fact gives rise to numerous practical implications, of which we give one example. In his article 'God and the Bible',[5] Professor L. Hodgson quotes his Gifford Lectures and says:

'We walk by faith, not by sight.' False theories of revelation spring from a refusal to be content with our creaturely status, an insistence that the only revelation worth having is one which gives us the kind of knowledge open only to a spectator of all time and all existence.

There would seem to be room for a fuller recognition and exposition of the paradoxical nature of Christian certitude than we find in *S.P.G.*

II

It is perhaps because of his failure to deal adequately with the paradoxical nature of Christian certitude that Professor Baillie is led to embark upon the quest of the verification of religious judgements. He maintains that such judgements are verifiable, not indeed in the way that ordinary empirical judgements are, that is, by observation, experiment and so on, but by appeal to *religious* experience. In other words, Professor Baillie contends that the area of verifiability must be appropriate to the judgement in question. It is as much a mistake to treat religious assertions as if they were scientific as it is to try to weigh 'duty'. We agree that the two kinds of assertion are dissimilar, and we hold that the Christian's judgements, whilst born out of an experience of God in Christ, are nevertheless dynamically related to what is outside that experience. Otherwise God's very existence would seem to depend upon the presence of responsive human beings. That Professor Baillie would endorse this is clear when he says: 'Faith *is* experience but, like all veridical experience, it is determined for us and produced in us by something not ourselves.'[6] But Professor Baillie evades the corollary of this, which is that faith can be verified only by reference to that 'something not ourselves'. To seek to verify religious judgements by reference only to one's experience may all too easily be to remove those sanctions that ensure the *Christian* nature of the revelation, to endanger faith by minimizing its knowledge content, and to impede works by reducing the objectivity of God's commandments. The Christian *does* know, worship, and serve God, and this is not merely because he has a certain experience, but because there is a God who may be known, worshipped and served. Important though the Christian's experience certainly is, its elevation into a criterion of verification, far from having the desired result, merely serves to militate against that objectivity upon which the Christian revelation depends. Professor Baillie, however, states his view as follows:

... our ethico-religious judgements ... are verifiable, but in their own kind and on their own level. They are verified by appeal to our ethico-religious experience and to that alone; and certainly not by appeal to our sensible experience of the corporeal world. The proper name of religious experience is faith ... we must not say that faith is *based* on religious experience [because] religious experience, if it is authentic, already *contains* faith.[7]

This appears to be circular. The Christian, we are told, makes his judge-

ments on the basis of his faith (or religious experience) and he verifies them by reference to his faith (or religious experience). We shall later note the problem posed by this circularity to the theology of encounter, but meanwhile we must draw attention in passing to the terminological issue raised here. There seems to be the ambiguous use of the term 'faith' in the above quotation. In the first half of the quotation Professor Baillie appears to make faith synonymous with religious experience. In the second half of the quotation faith seems to become *a priori*.

Professor Baillie next turns to Professor Flew's question: 'what would have to occur or to have occurred to constitute for you a disproof of the love of, or of the existence of, God?'[8] He begins by reiterating his belief that a body of doctrine not derived from the empirical observation of the corporeal world cannot find its verification or falsification in a return to such observation. He shortly points out that Flew's question 'is thus formally parallel, not to the question as to what would lead me to the reversal of a particular judgement of sense perception or a particular scientific conclusion, but to the question as to what would lead me to distrust my sense perception as a whole and consequently to surrender my belief in the objectivity of the corporeal world'.[9] But if there comes a point at which it is nonsensical to expect a person to falsify his basic presuppositions, there also comes a point at which to press him to verify these presuppositions is to invite him to embark upon an equally nonsensical quest. A person takes his stand, and there is no more to be said.[10] What is required here, therefore, is the recognition of the fact that whilst the verification principle has its use as a criterion of the meaning of particular assertions, it is inept as a test of the reliability of those basic presuppositions that are the foundation of discourse. It would seem that by playing into the hands of the verificationists, Professor Baillie not only weakens his own case, but misses an opportunity to administer a salutary rebuke to those who give the impression that the verification principle is an omnicompetent maid of all work.[11]

III

Clearly the scientific model lies behind much of the discussion of verification in *S.P.G.*, and this same model seems to lead Professor Baillie astray when he suggests that Christian faith in God is a plausible hypothesis. He refers to Professor Wisdom's celebrated parable of the gardener whose inaccessibility to observation caused one friend to deny that there was a gardener at all, and the other friend to insist that there was an invisible gardener. Professor Baillie says that there are certain facts that cannot be accounted for without hypothesizing the divine, and that these facts include the religious life of mankind.[12] But is God an hypothesis? Is the religious quest merely a quest for this kind of plausibility? Since the terms involved here are so obviously those of the physical sciences it may be profitable to observe how the scientist employs them. In a recent television discussion[13] of the creation of the universe the opposing views of the supporters of the 'steady-state theory' and the 'big-bang theory' were considered, and Professor Hermann Bondi explained the role of hypothesis in the physical sciences in some such way as this: the scientist has a 'hunch'; he then

'sticks his neck out' and puts his hypothesis to the test. Empirical investigation and experiment are brought to bear, and if the hunch is justified the hypothesis is *provisionally* accepted. Many more tests may be made, and the hypothesis may stand up to them, but absolute certainty is never claimed. Further discoveries may necessitate the framing of a new hypothesis; *it* will then be tested, and so on.[14] Enough has been said to show that the Christian surely cannot wish to regard his belief in God as an hypothesis. Could things count against God to the extent that the Christian would abandon Him? Christians themselves say that those who lose faith did not *really* have it in the first place. Again, the Christian does not hold that his experience of God is something to be accepted provisionally, nor does he entertain the thought that he may one day have to leave God behind in favour of a more adequate 'hypothesis'. The Christian does not use God as a means of explaining certain phenomena; he does not 'conjure up' God out of certain evidence, nor use God to account for any evidence. Plausibility is not his goal; certitude is. But as we have seen, certitude comes not by experimenting but by leaping. Now he *knows* in the only way he ever could know. Science neither gave him his faith, nor can it deprive him of it. We cannot help but feel that to the extent that Professor Baillie yields to science at this point, he weakens his case.

IV

By far the most crucial concept in Professor Baillie's book is that which gives the book its name. It is indeed the plank upon which his entire theology rests. In his own words:

> Nearly all contemporary philosophers profess to be empiricists, and to be an empiricist is to believe that all our veridical knowledge derives from our experience and can be checked by reference to it. But the *empeiria* or experience many of them have in mind is our experience of the corporeal world as revealed to us by our bodily senses, and these assume that this is the only experience, and consequently the only knowledge, we possess of trans-subjective reality.... My contention will indeed be that we have even what can properly be called *sense* experience of other things than these.[15]

It is unfortunate that Professor Baillie does not really *contend* for his position, he merely states it and reiterates it, offering as justification only the fact that he is not alone in his belief, realizing that whilst a measure of agreement is not a test of truth, it is 'normally a necessary condition of the security of individual judgement'.[16] The inherent difficulties in the notion of a religious 'sense' are not discussed, however. This is unfortunate in itself, and also because it could be interpreted by unfriendly critics as a failure to meet with objections lodged since *Our Knowledge of God* was written over twenty years ago. Encounter theology has been much discussed, and rightly so, and even if Professor Baillie did not feel it necessary to meet his opponents by name, we should nevertheless have been greatly helped if he had shown us how he would consolidate his position against unfavourable onslaughts.

There is in the first place the terminological issue. Professor Baillie fails

to compare and contrast his religious sense adequately with the other five, and wriggles out of the situation by saying: 'But we need not here do battle about words, though I propose to abide by my own, my concern being only that these other awarenesses should be recognized as so far analogous to the corporeal senses as to enable us to perceive something not otherwise perceptible.'[17] But there *is* a battle about words, and having defined something that many feel to be non-existent Professor Baillie excludes comment. It is true that if one hunts through his book one can gather the notion that Professor Baillie would be prepared to make certain concessions, as, for example, where he says that the *sense* of the presence of God, like the sense of duty and the sense of humour, is 'not on all fours with the senses by means of which we apprehend the external world'.[18] But in spite of all his concessions Professor Baillie still speaks as if there were a religious *sense* like the other senses. Secondly, there is the charge of psychologism that has been lodged against the Professor. Can the Christian communicate at all if he relies upon such a sense as it here posited? (The 'can' in this question is a logical 'can'.) For is the Christian not in danger of making assertions about his feelings only, and not about what is, in fact, the case? To say that one feels a sense of the presence of God is to say nothing about God, it is not to give a reason for one's faith, it is merely to say something about one's state of mind. Is this all the Christian wishes to do? Professor Baillie is aware of the charges, but instead of showing that they are out of place, or shoring up his position against them, he resorts to *argumentum ad hominem*: 'if the purely psychological explanation is the true one, then the whole sum of them [i.e. the outwardly observed facts] reduces to meaningless nonsense such as merits at best our amused or pitying indulgence, and at worst our contempt'.[19] Next there is the question of illusion. May not the Christian be under an illusion, at least on some occasions? How will he discover whether he is or not? If his experience is self-authenticating, can he *never* be mistaken? If we are sometimes mistaken as to the true attitude and character of persons whom we have seen, how can we be sure that we are never mistaken concerning God whom we have not seen? As Dr Frederick Ferré has said:

> The logic of encounter, by ruling out any . . . independent tests (which would be impossible to conceive, it would seem, even if they were desired), has effectively blocked any means of distinguishing between 'genuine' encounter with God and the illusory products of supercharged emotions.[20]

Professor Baillie evades any such challenge as this; nor does he provide an adequate account of the logic of self-authentication. He ought to provide this, for, be it noted, it is an *experience* and not an assertion that he claims is self-authenticating: 'If the trust we repose in it [i.e., in the primary mode of apprehension] be not self-authenticating, there is no other apparent way of authenticating it.[21] We appear to be back to incommunicable subjectivism. There is finally the question of the position of the sceptic. Is he like a man blind from birth? That is, is he an unbeliever because he lacks this special sense? If so, is there any hope for him, and if so, how? It cannot be said, on Professor Baillie's view that the sceptic has

this sense but that it is dormant, for it is a self-authenticating experience and this surely implies knowledge of its presence. There would seem to be room for further discussion before we may finally rest content with encounter theology.

V

That *S.P.G.* is a challenging and valuable book no one would deny. If we have fastened upon only a few matters arising from it this is because we are especially concerned that the discussion of these shall proceed. We are aware that our treatment has been analytic only, that is, we have noted some of the things Professor Baillie says, and have taken account of some of the positions he adopts, and have sought to examine the logic involved, using 'logic' in an informal rather than a formal sense. We do not deny that to gain a reasonably complete impression of what a man believes one has not only to listen to what he says, but to see what he does. We do not deny that there are *uses* of encounter language, for example, to foster a sense of communion with God and to encourage the desire to worship, that we have not considered at all. So long as we do not claim exhaustiveness, however, no harm is done. Followers of Professor Baillie could do a great service to their cause, and could advance that most necessary dialogue between theologians and philosophers, if they would take up the work where their master left it. This would entail the honest facing of the objections that have been lodged against encounter theology, the reconsideration of the bearing of the scientific model upon that theology, and the appraisal of the paradoxical nature of Christian certitude. There could be no more fitting a tribute to John Baillie than that his theology should be vindicated, or else that a modified way of preserving his deep and noble insights should be found.

[1] Vide *The Sense of the Presence of God* (hereinafter referred to as *S.P.G.*), 'Foreword', p. vii.
[2] *S.P.G.*, p. 4.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 8.
[4] *Postscript*, p. 182.
[5] An article originally published in the *Church Quarterly Review* and the *Bulletin* of the Berkeley Divinity School. Reprinted in *On the Authority of the Bible* (an S.P.C.K. symposium), pp. 1 ff.
[6] *S.P.G.*, p. 65
[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 64-5.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 69, quoting A. G. N. Flew, 'Theology and Falsification', *New Essays in Philosophical Theology*, p. 99.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 72.
[10] In other words, faith is the answer to a limiting question. For an illuminating account of this idea, vide J. Heywood Thomas, *Subjectivity and Paradox*, pp. 151 ff.
[11] It would have been interesting to have had Professor Baillie's reactions to the discussions of the question of verification in *New Essays*, pp. 96 ff. B. Mitchell says that the Christian will not allow anything to count *decisively* against his belief; R. M. Hare holds that religious statements are not properly to be described as assertions at all; and I. M. Crombie maintains that they are assertions which can in principle, though not in practice, be verified. For a recent discussion of these points and of the limits of verificational analysis, vide F. Ferré, *Language, Logic and God*, ch. 4.
[12] *S.P.G.*, pp. 126-7.
[13] 'The Cosmologists', B.B.C. T.V., 12th March, 1963.
[14] That Professor Baillie is conversant with such procedures is clear. Cf., e.g., *S.P.G.*, pp. 8-9, 28 and 62.
[15] *S.P.G.*, p. 52. Ch. 8 of F. Ferré's *Language, Logic and God* is a useful account of 'The Logic of Encounter'. The idea of Encounter has also been discussed by C. B. Martin in

New Essays, pp. 76-95, and by R. W. Hepburn in *Christianity and Paradox*. We resume some of their points here because we feel that they require more adequate treatment from the Christian side than they have so far received if there is to be a genuine and lively dialogue here. John Hick has paved the way in his article on Professor Hepburn's book, 'A Philosopher criticises Theology,' *The London Quarterly and Holborn Review*, April 1962, pp. 103-110.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 57.
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 53.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 89.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 129.
[20] F. Ferré, *Language, Logic and God*, p. 104.
[21] *S.P.G.*, p. 73.

SCIENCE, STATISTICS AND STYLE

Trevor T. Rowe

IN 1851 DE MORGAN, a professor of mathematics, in a letter to the Rev. W. Heald, wrote: 'I should expect to find that one man writing on two different subjects agrees more nearly with himself than two different men writing on the same subject.' He suggested that the authorship of the Epistle to the Hebrews might be settled by comparing the length of words used in the Epistle with that of other letters attributed to St Paul. 'If scholars knew the law of averages as well as mathematicians, it would be easy to raise a few hundred pounds to try this experiment on a grand scale.... Some of these days spurious writings will be detected by this test. Mind, I told you so.'[1] The reverend gentleman did not live to see the professor's words to some extent confirmed. The actual test proposed has not proved a useful tool, but de Morgan's basic assumption that a man's literary style has characteristics that do not change has been vindicated by recent work. Since his day 'the law of averages' has blossomed out into the involved field of mathematical statistics and it has been found that some mathematical techniques can be applied to the problems associated with 'spurious writings'. This article is an attempt to give a progress report upon the developments in this, to many people, fearsome field.

An outline of the history of modern literary statistics is given by A. Q. Morton in the introductory chapter to *The Structure of the Fourth Gospel*. de Morgan's suggestion that authors could be distinguished from each other by the average number of letters in the words they used was taken up by

T. C. Mendenhall in 1887 and 1901.[2] C. B. Williams confesses that he tried letters-per-word as a test of authorship without success in 1935.[3] A more useful test was developed by U. Yule in 1939[4] which involved the frequency distribution of sentence lengths in different authors. This test was applied to Greek prose with good success by W. C. Wake in 1957.[5] It has been used by A. Q. Morton in a wide field of Greek prose, including the New Testament. Further tests have been used by Morton; he finds that not only is sentence length a characteristic of authorship, but also the frequency and position in the sentence of some common words: ho/he/to, kai, de, autos, en and the parts of einai. When these tests are applied to the Pauline corpus it is found that there is a significant distinction between Romans, 1 and 2 Corinthians, Galatians and the rest of the epistles attributed to St Paul (Philemon has to be left out because of its short length). J. Watt has applied similar tests to the disputed problem of the authorship of the works attributed to Leontius of Byzantium. Work is now beginning to see if similar tests can be applied with profit to Latin prose. Some tentative work is being done to apply the techniques of 'quality control' to literary texts. The principle involved here is to regard the sequence of sentences in a document as a production line of articles to be tested to see when their characteristics depart from a specified limit of tolerance. Techniques of this sort are commonly applied in industry and it seems likely that it will become possible to write, perhaps graphically, a running commentary upon the style of a document and this will make it possible to detect lack of integrity, etc.

Apart from the unhappy feeling of being lost and unable to understand whether the mathematical concepts are valid or not, two chief objections are raised against literary statistics. These are that a man's style changes with his subject, and over the period of his lifetime. The fact is that when you analyse a man's style statistically you find that these common-sense judgements do not apply in some important respects, e.g., sentence length and frequency of common words. However, it is no more unreasonable that a man has word-prints on his brain than finger-prints on his fingers, or a recognizable smile or characteristic walk and that they remain constant through his lifetime. A good deal of research on the mechanism of the brain helps us to understand how these observed facts, analysed by literary statistics, arise.

I shall now give a simplified account of a statistical test. The problem to be considered is whether Epistle 211 of St Augustine, the so-called Rule of St Augustine, comes from the pen of the Bishop of Hippo. This is a question that has proved intractable to normal literary critical methods.[6] The letter contains 146 sentences. We take samples of 146 consecutive sentences from three other works of St Augustine, the authenticity of which has never been questioned. We have now four documents: Ep. 211 and documents we shall call A, B and C. First, we must define the length of a sentence as the number of words from the beginning of the sentence to a full stop, question mark, semi-colon, colon or dash. We then count the lengths of sentences in the four documents and arrange the results in the following table.

Class divisions	*Sentence length frequencies*				*Average*
	Ep. 211	A	B	C	*frequency*
(a) 1-10 words	37	34	42	41	38
(b) 11-15	28	37	36	35	34
(c) 16-20	25	23	31	40	30
(d) 21-25	22	19	14	12	17
(e) 26-30	12	14	11	11	12
(f) 31 and over	22	19	12	7	15

We now wish to test whether these documents all belong to the same family or population. We would not expect that a writer would write four passages like this with an identical sentence-length distribution. Do the differences between the results differ because they are not by the same author, or by the pure chances of sampling? This we can test by applying what is called the X^2 test. We do this by first assuming that we might expect St Augustine to write in sentence lengths that were an average of the four documents. The expected frequency distribution is, therefore, that shown in the final column. X^2 is now computed by adding together for each column the squares of the difference between the frequency we observe and that we would expect, divided by the expected frequency for each class division. This can be expressed mathematically (if O is the number in the sentence-length column and E the average frequency):

$$X^2 = \sum_{f}^{a} \frac{(O-E)^2}{E}$$

We then add together the computations of X^2 for each column and obtain the figure 24·15. When we look up mathematical tables we find that X^2 (for 15 degrees of freedom) at the 5% level is 25·0. Leaving a good deal, I realize, unexplained, we can say that the computed figure for X^2 is so close to that of the tables that no decision can be taken on the basis of these figures concerning the authorship of Ep. 211. We must study more carefully the samples of text to be considered as the differences between B and C, on the one hand, and Ep. 211 and A, on the other, are noticeable. Other tests must be applied, and even more important the reliability of all these tests for Latin prose writing would need to be vindicated by their application to a wide and varied range of Latin prose. The example I have introduced solely for purposes of illustration. It shows an early stage in the research necessary for dealing with this problem. In other words, I have given a page from a research note-book, not a thesis.

Many of the calculations I have described can be done these days more accurately and quickly by the electronic computer. The technique employed is to print the text to be tested in code upon a punched tape—the holes in the tape being a coded form of the letters typed on the printer. This tape is then fed into the 'store' of a computer where the information is held in an electric code 'written' on two-state electronic devices. A series of instructions (a programme) can then be given to the computer to examine

the information in the store and count various characteristics of it. These operations the machine can perform with fantastic speed and then print the answers in coded form upon punched tape. This tape can then be translated into numbers by a machine. Having had the counting done for him the researcher can use a calculating machine (like those used in commerce) to do most of his other arithmetic for him.

At this point it may be useful to mention two further applications of the computer to literary studies. The first is the preparation of word-lists and concordances. Up to now this has had to be done by some filing system method and has involved colossal labour. Now the technique can be to write the texts upon punched tape, feed the coded text into the store of a computer, and instruct the computer to sort out the words used into alphabetical order and print them out with either their frequency or page/line references. The labour involved in typing the text is but a fraction of that required by the older method and the time correspondingly small. The second application has to do with small fragments of a text. Perhaps we have some papyrus fragments of a biblical text and want to find out the place in the text where the words on it occur. The biblical text can be placed in the computer store and an instruction given to survey the text until the place where the words on the fragment is found. The answer will emerge in a very short time indeed.

Statisticians can render service to literary studies in a number of other ways. Morton has described some of these in the chapter of *The Structure of the Fourth Gospel* to which I have referred. The whole of that book and an article in *Science News 43* use statistical methods to throw light upon the way in which the New Testament books were written. Udny Yule in *The Statistical Study of Literary Vocabulary* and G. Herdan in *Language as Chance and Choice* give examples of applications over a wide field.[7] A paper by Yule in 1946[8] shows how statistical methods may lead to a revision of a number of the rules commonly used in textual criticism. The field has been pioneered, as a hobby, by a few professional mathematicians with literary interests. We now need men with detailed knowledge of literary problems, who are prepared to do their mathematical homework, to develop and apply these techniques to problems that are suitable for statistical treatment in their own fields.

There are a number of lessons we can learn from these developments. The first is that literary men, including theologians, can learn from scientists how to work in a team. The largest part of scientific research brings little personal kudos. Non-scientific scholars seem to find it difficult to accept anonymity in the pursuit of knowledge. There is a tendency to feel that a scholar must do all great work on his own. This was illustrated for me in discussion with an American scholar who was asking about how a computer could help him produce a concordance of the works of Tertullian. He wanted to know how he would have to programme the computer after he had got the works of Tertullian coded on punched tape. He seemed to find it difficult to accept that he would need the aid of an expert programming technician to do that part of the work for him. Scientific methods, beside being efficient, may also stimulate humility.

The second adjustment non-scientific scholars may have to make is to think

on a new time scale. A piece of research that at one time may reasonably have occupied a Ph.D. student fully for three years may now be possible in a few months. This could cause universities some embarrassment. It might also cause large-scale redundancy in the scholarly world. Men have spent a lifetime on projects that may now be done very easily and quickly. I suppose it would be wildly optimistic to hope that in the world of theological scholarship those released from literary work would take up some of the pressing theological tasks.

The third and supreme lesson to be learnt from the methods I have described is the whole mood of scientific research. In literary statistics tools have been used, and if they do not work they are improved or discarded. It is the results that matter. Apart from the truth of these results, nothing else is important. This spirit springs from the fact that the few people working in the field have some scientific background and are working in collaboration with scientists. We have talked much about the scientific nature of theology and justified these pretensions with learned books, and yet missed the quality that keeps scientific research alive and exciting—the readiness to discard inadequate views. The mood of scientific and theological argument is very different, but this is not recognized for, unfortunately, few have a foot in both camps. Theologians so often seem to be defending their position and not extending their command of truth. Their argument is fundamentally proud, in spite of their usual kindliness, and lacks the humility to which they are called. There is a sense in which the integrity of theological scholarship is called in question by developments in literary statistics. Are theologians going to dismiss the results just before they cannot understand how they are obtained? Or are they prepared to change a number of the 'established results' of literary criticism in the face of new evidence? This is a serious issue. It must be treated seriously.

[1] Quoted R. D. Lord, *Biometrika*, XLV, 1958, p. 282.
[2] C. B. Williams, *Biometrika*, XLIII, 1958, p. 284f.
[3] *Biometrika*, XXXI, 1940, p. 356f.
[4] *Biometrika*, XXX, 1939, p. 363f.
[5] *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, CXX, Pt. III, 1957.
[6] The problem is stated conveniently in G. Bonner, *St Augustine: Life and Controversies*, Appendix B (London, 1963).
[7] Cf. also A. Ellegard, *Who was Junius?* (Uppsala, 1962); A. Ellegard, *A Statistical Method for Determining Authorship.* The *Junius* Letters 1769-1772 (Göterborg, 1962); F. Mosteller and D. L. Wallace, 'Inference in an Authorship Problem', *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, June 1963, Vol. 58, pp 275-309.
[8] *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, CIX, 1946, p. 44f.

THEOLOGICAL DIVERSITY AND OUR UNION IN CHRIST

Frederic Greeves

A Sermon preached at the University of Cambridge on Sunday, 19th January, 1964

> To Him who has power to make your standing sure according to the Gospel I brought you and the proclamation of Jesus Christ, according to the revelation of that divine secret kept in silence for long ages but now disclosed, and through prophetic scriptures by God's eternal command made known to all nations, to bring them to faith and obedience —to God who alone is wise, through Jesus Christ, be glory for endless ages. (*Romans 16, 25 ff.*)

THROUGHOUT CHRISTENDOM today separated denominations, each of which trusts that God makes its standing sure according to the proclamation of Jesus Christ and the revelation of the divine secret, are beginning to converse with each other and to seek unity. If we are neither to withdraw, through fear or weariness, from the long road ahead, nor to rush carelessly into foolish actions, two conditions are necessary.

First, we must be agreed that the ultimate goal is the replacement of denominations as we know them, by a Church which will be *one* in a way that we do not yet know, and can only dimly foresee. There are, of course, those who cherish the belief that organizational separation is an essential characteristic of the Church's earthly existence. With that primary question this address is not concerned. Those of us who have long believed that full, organic and indeed organizational unity is part of the 'divine secret' of which our text speaks, must recognize that for many Christians the denominational nature of the Church is part of their understanding of the Church. Moreover, few of us can expect quickly and easily to escape from this centuries-long point of view.

It is, secondly, important that we should attempt to distinguish primary problems from those which are secondary. An obvious example of a secondary problem is one which, very naturally, looms large in much of our thinking: What will happen to our particular Church-building and to our denominational-organization? Among the primary problems is the one with which this address is concerned. *How far is theological agreement essential before unification of now separated Church can take place?*

There are four answers to that question which I believe to be mistaken. We shall consider each in turn.

1. It may be said that *agreement about doctrine is of minor importance compared with unity in action*; it is what we do rather than what we believe that matters.

No thoughtful Christian would completely divorce belief from action, but this point of view may be expressed in one of two ways.

(a) On the one hand, emphasis may be laid upon faith as personal commitment rather than correct belief. Theological statements, it may be claimed, are descriptions of attitudes of mind (including emotion and will) rather than propositional statements. Valuable, and congenial to contemporary thought, as is this description of Christian faith, it is inadequate. It is impossible to isolate belief *in* God from belief *about* Him. Commitment necessarily involves ideas about that to which we are committed and about what such commitment means. Moreover, Christian faith is not to be centred upon what we do, but upon what God does—and it is about this that doctrines differ.

(b) Alternatively, escape from theological problems may be sought by emphasis upon unity through liturgical and especially sacramental actions. Those who do the same things are united (it is claimed), however differently they may regard what they do. There is more to be said for this point of view than some Christians readily admit. We are made one by God's action and not by our own, and it is, indeed, by sharing together in worship and in the acceptance of the means of grace that we may hope to become more of like-mind. But the problem of intention remains, and the problem of intention includes that of diversity in doctrine. To put an extreme case, would anyone claim that an adult candidate for Baptism who held exclusively atheistic beliefs could be truly baptized?

2. In direct opposition to such attempts to escape from the theological problem is the view of those who hold that *only on a basis of complete doctrinal agreement can unification of denominations take place.* I believe this answer to be both impracticable and undesirable. That it is *impracticable* is suggested by the whole history of the Church. Even in the undivided, earlier years there was not complete doctrinal agreement. We owe much to recent scholarship which has uncovered the unity in New Testament writings and the unity between the two Testaments, but only by a method of selection and omission can it be claimed that the Church of the beginnings was based upon total theological agreement. Again, it is highly important for us to recognize that no existing denomination is characterized by theological unanimity. It would be well to recognize that if, for example, we could imagine either the Church of England or the Methodist Church disintegrating over-night, it would be impossible to re-create either denomination on the basis of complete theological concord.

That prior doctrinal unanimity is *undesirable* is suggested both by the fact that most doctrinal differences now run across denominational boundaries and by a growing realization, within many denominations, that all of us need to share much that other Christians value. Our contemporary doctrines do not in fact separate us into our existing groups; in many instances, it is precisely separation which impoverishes the theological thinking of each separated communion.

3. There is a third attitude towards this question about doctrinal agreement which is more varied in the forms it takes and more difficult to mention briefly. It is the view that *Scripture alone provides a basis for full doctrinal agreement* as a prelude to unification of Churches.

Discussion about this claim is wrapped up with, and often befogged by, discussion about tradition. This is partly, though by no means wholly, due to ambiguity in the word 'tradition' itself. If by 'tradition' is meant a deposit of revealed truth in the form of concepts and statements, alleged to exist from the beginning of Christendom and independent of written Scripture, then, I believe, we are faced with a belief which appears to be in conflict with the doctrine that many of us hold. How far this conflict in fact exists is one of the major questions before Christendom today.

But 'tradition' is also used to describe the varied interpretations of Christian truth which have been held among those who have sought to base all their doctrine upon the Revelation recorded in holy scripture. I believe that if the appeal to 'Scripture alone' seeks to minimize the importance of tradition in this sense, it is one that should be rejected.

In the minority statement included in the *Report on Anglican-Methodist Conversations*, we are reminded that 'whilst all Churches have traditions, they must continually be sifted and tested by Scripture'. This I take to be a statement of basic importance. But the writers continue: '... tradition represents the worldliness of the Church, Scripture points to its supernatural origin and basis.'

I find it impossible to understand how Methodists could make this statement. The Deed of Union (which declares our doctrinal standards), in expressing the claim by the Methodist Church to 'take its place in the Holy Catholic Church', states that that Church 'rejoices in the Apostolic Faith and loyally accepts the fundamental principles of the historic creeds and of the Protestant Reformation'. It proceeds to draw attention to 'doctrines of the evangelical faith' and, in reference to these doctrines, it sets up certain writings by John Wesley as standards of preaching and belief to which the preachers of the Church are pledged. If these are not 'traditions', what are traditions? Of course, they are all affirmed to be founded upon Scripture, which alone is 'the supreme rule of faith and practice'. But so are a great many 'principles' and 'doctrines' which other Christians hold to be true and important.

The appeal to 'scripture alone' can easily be used to conceal the fact that no Christians and no groups of Christians read the Bible with minds that are free from influence by traditions of previous study by other Christians. May it not be precisely because we seek to understand the scriptures from the point of view of particular traditions, of previous study by other Christians, that we are hindered in understanding them? However that may be, nothing in Christian history gives us cause for hope that 'scripture alone' is a slogan that will hasten complete theological agreement among Christians. Rather one may venture the opinion that as Christians in many denominations turn with fresh conviction to search the scriptures, our theological differences will become more acute, because they will be centred upon more important themes than have often occupied our attention. A closer study of Scripture normally involves reformation of doctrine.

4. This leads us to another type of solution, which has had a long history. It is the attempt to *separate doctrines of crucial significance from others*. A. P. Paterson's book, *The Rule of Faith*, though published in 1912, still

provides a valuable survey of attempts to do this. I fear that these attempts break down for two reasons. First, Christian belief cannot be divided into separable doctrines; as though it were a seamless robe, it tends to be destroyed when part is removed. Second, it is precisely doctrines which appear secondary to one generation which become important for another. This is exemplified by an appendix to Paterson's book. He gave a list of doctrines which he claimed provided 'a concensus of modern protestant theology' (though he added significantly, and somewhat naïvely, 'subject to differences of theological interpretation'). This list makes no reference to the Ministry, the Sacraments, or the nature and structure of the Church—the very doctrines which now most seriously divide.

This lengthy rejection of alleged solutions, if it is trustworthy, leaves us with only two alternatives. Either we must envisage a continuance of denominations based upon doctrinal diversities—and if so, have we any ground for expecting that the number of them will not greatly increase? Or we must envisage a Church in which there is far greater variety of doctrine than any denomination has yet experienced. I believe that we must choose this alternative.

If we do, two necessities appear to follow.

1. We must learn to apply a test which is based not upon a list of doctrines, but upon a realization of what theology is for. We must rid our minds of the notion that theology unites. It is Christ who unites. 'He has been made our wisdom and our righteousness.' The theological responsibility of the Church is a continuing one; it is the task of testing and setting forth the Gospel that is proclaimed by God's command to all nations.

But it is not possible for this task to be carried out afresh in each generation without the Church's own understanding of its faith being modified.

That there are theological beliefs which hinder men from receiving the Gospel and from living *en Christo* we cannot doubt. We may, perhaps, learn much about this, both by example and warning, from the Christological controversies of the first centuries. But denominations, like individuals, must realize that pride, even though it be in 'our doctrines', is sin. A Roman Catholic speaker at the last meeting of the Vatican Council commented upon the 'great diversity . . . of theological doctrines' in his own Church. In reply to an anticipated objection that ecumenism would lead to doctrinal relativism, he replied: 'Ecumenism, as understood in a firm evangelical faith, can perhaps lead to a certain relativism of expression and of personal opinions, but in no way to relativism in faith in Divine revelation and in the holy Truth which everlastingly transcends the efforts of human minds.'

2. Secondly, therefore, we must venture more fearlessly on the belief that unity between Christians is the fruit of their participation in God through Jesus Christ by the Holy Spirit. How can we hope more fully to share together the mind of Christ if we do not share in the means of Grace?

The belief that organizational separation is the inevitable result of theological diversity makes our beliefs the ground of our salvation. To seek to 'make our standing sure' by the adequacy of our theological opinions is to

forget Him who alone has power to do this. There is heresy that leads men away from Christ; there is also rigid orthodoxy which keeps them from Him. Must we not be prepared to take risks? If sinners may and must meet each other within the Church, why should we be afraid that theological eccentricities must cut us off from each other? Of course, as we so often say, 'we must set limits'; but do we not need to think afresh, perhaps with our eyes on those who first called Jesus 'Lord', what limits God would have us set?

Most of all, we must fix our attention upon the vast majority of our fellow human beings who have not received the 'divine secret which, by God's eternal command, has been made known to all nations to bring them to faith and obedience'. For their sakes, more than for our own, we must become a Church which trusts not its own orthodoxy, but God. 'To God who alone is wise, through Jesus Christ, be glory for endless ages.'

RECENT LITERATURE

Edited by John T. Wilkinson

I and II Kings, by John Gray. (S.C.M., 75*s*.)

Only thirteen years have passed since the appearance of the *International Critical Commentary* on *Kings*; but the need for a new commentary is amply demonstrated by John Gray's *I and II Kings* in S.C.M. Old Testament Library (75*s*.). His mastery of the archæological information is reflected in textual notes, topographical comment, and an ever-full appreciation of the historical situation both within Israel and in her external relationships. In a most valuable introduction, he argues for a pre-exilic Deuteronomic compiler as well as a post-exilic Deuteronomic redactor, and discusses in detail the sources at their disposal, with the theological conceptions involved. He regards J and E in Kings as limited to a general literary influence, and considers that Nathan may be the author of the great succession narrative. Chronology is well and fully treated (with the obvious slip of giving the name Zechariah to the last king of Judah on p. 62). The commentary itself is given to an elucidation of the text and an unfolding of the political, social and religious history of Israel. All this is excellent and illuminating, although here and there one may disagree—as, for instance, with his interpretation of the proportions of the Temple, and one may feel that in some cases recent literature bearing upon the subject has been overlooked. The commentary is definitely for the Hebrew student: comments frequently assume that the reader has the Hebrew text before him; the Hebrew verse enumeration is followed, without even a parenthetic note of the English verse numbers where they happen to be different; Ugaritic is quoted without translation on p. 450. Needless to say, Greek is also required (see note on I K.8, 12-13, etc.). It is therefore very regrettable that the transliterated Hebrew is full of errors. These are far too numerous to note in a review, since almost every page with Hebrew has errors. The English text is a mixture of modern idiomatic English and archaisms. This again suffers from numerous errors. Verses are omitted completely: E.g. I, 3, 23 (p. 124, where the verse marked 23 is in fact 22), I, II, 20b (p. 263), I, 11, 26 (p. 269), I, 12, 3 (p. 280 confuses vv. 1-3), I, 18, 8 (p. 345). In many instances verses are wrongly numbered or not numbered. The translated text is also occasionally amended without explanation (I, 11, 36; 12, 21; 17, 1; II, 23, 1; 23, 17). The footnotes to the text are confused on pp. 104-5, and occasionally show minor errors. (For instance, should not 'with' be inserted before 'MT' in p. 573 Nj? P. 338 N a has Gk support, as has also p. 398 N a.) It is good to know that the publishers are already seeking a means of correcting these errors—particularly those in the Hebrew. When this is done, this volume should prove a most valuable commentary.

H. Cook

The History of the Synoptic Tradition, by Rudoph Bultmann, translated by John Marsh. (Blackwell, 50*s*.)

This book, originally published in German in 1921, is one of the outstandingly important contributions to the modern study of the Synoptic Gospels, and it is difficult to understand why it has had to wait for over forty years before being translated into English. The Principal of Mansfield College, Oxford, has placed

all British students in his debt by repairing this serious breach at long last. No longer will students who lack a knowledge of German have to depend on second-hand accounts of the views of this great scholar whose work helped to lay the foundations of the form-critical study of the Gospels. It is to be hoped that many will avail themselves of this opportunity of discovering Bultmann the Form Critic at first hand—including those to whom his well-known scepticism about the historicity of the Gospel tradition is anathema. They will realize how much they can learn from one with whose conclusions they may violently disagree. The translation is based on the third German edition of 1958, which includes a Supplement of seventy-five pages, taking into account the vast literature produced in the field of Form Criticism since the appearance of the first edition.

OWEN E. EVANS

Studies in Biblical Theology (S.C.M. Press): No. 38. *On Paul and John*, by T. W. Manson. (13*s.* 6*d.*) No. 39. *Christ in the Wilderness*, by Ulrich W. Mauser (12*s.* 6*d.*) No. 40 *Moses in the Fourth Gospel*, by T. F. Glasson (9*s.* 6*d.*)

These three additions to a most valuable series have been published simultaneously. The volume by the late Professor T. W. Manson consists of a shortened version of two series of his class lectures, delivered, over a number of years, to theological students in the University of Manchester. Many who were privileged to hear these lectures delivered have long cherished the hope that they would one day be published. Such men will rejoice at the appearance of this book, which will enable them to re-live the inspiring hours they spent sitting at the feet of a great and beloved teacher. Others, familiar only with Manson's work on the Synoptic Gospels, will discover that he was no less at home in the Pauline and Johannine fields. This volume is marked throughout by all the qualities of scholarship, insight, wit and balanced judgement that we have learned to associate with the name of its distinguished author. Warmest thanks are due to Principal Matthew Black for editing the work. Dr Ulrich Mauser is a young German scholar now working in the U.S.A. His book is a study, in the words of its sub-title, of 'the Wilderness Theme in the Second Gospel and its Basis in the Biblical Tradition'. The book is a good example of the growing tendency to regard the Evangelists as not merely collectors of traditional material but theologians in their own right. Dr Mauser uses the theme of the wilderness as a guide in tracing some of the distinctive characteristics of Mark's theology. Not all readers will be convinced that Mark's references to the wilderness are as significant as the author contends, but they cannot but be grateful for the very useful survey the book contains of the treatment of the theme, not only in Mark but in the biblical and inter-testamental literature as a whole. Dr Glasson's study has something in common with that of Dr Mauser, both in method and subject-matter. He is impressed by the prevalence, in the New Testament and in Christian tradition, of the idea of Israel's wilderness wanderings as a type of Christian life, and by the fact that in recent years increasing attention has been paid to the importance of seeing the Messianic hope in terms of a new Exodus and of recognizing the Messiah as a second Moses. Dr Glasson's aim is to show that this approach is one of the keys (though not the only one) to the understanding of the Fourth Gospel. The amount of evidence which he is able to produce is impressive, even when allowance is made for the fact that many of the alleged connexions are tenuous and unconvincing. Whether or not one agrees with Dr Glasson on their significance for Johannine thought, one cannot but be grateful to him for the learned and interesting presentation of these parallels between Christ and Moses.

OWEN E. EVANS

Historical Tradition in the Fourth Gospel, by C. H. Dodd. (Cambridge University Press, 55*s*.)

When Professor C. H. Dodd published in 1953 his big book on *The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel*, he added an appendix dealing with 'Some considerations upon the Historical Aspect of the Fourth Gospel'. This raised hopes that he might himself be planning to make this the subject of a full book, and this hope has now been fulfilled. The Bishop of Woolwich has hazarded the opinion that this book may prove to be 'the greatest of the long line of Dr Dodd's publications'. That seems a very high hope for an author who already has to his credit such epoch-making books as *The Apostolic Preaching* and *The Parables of the Kingdom*, but there is little doubt that this new book will rank as one of the most significant contributions to New Testament studies in this generation. In his earlier book on the Fourth Gospel it was becoming clear that Dr Dodd had become convinced that this Gospel had been written in complete independence of the other three Gospels. His careful studies in this new book add further confirmation of the rightness of that conclusion. This means that historical material which the Fourth Gospel has in common with the others, so far from being valueless for historical investigation, since it was merely borrowed from them, now stands out as derived from an independent tradition, and so is confirmation of the validity of that material. Four main sections of the Fourth Gospel are in turn subjected to most careful scrutiny, with a view to determining what in them may be regarded as historical. First, there is the Passion Narrative, both the material shared with the Synoptics, and the material peculiar to John. Then there come various aspects of the Ministry, including the healing miracles, three of the other miracles, and short notices of topographical interest. Thirdly the passages relating to John the Baptist are examined, and found to be a rich source of historically valuable material. Finally, many of the Sayings of Jesus are studied. Several, which have parallels in the other Gospels, are shown to have reached John via an independent tradition, and other sayings, including some 'parabolic' material, are shown to bear the stamp of genuineness. Among the traditions peculiar to this Gospel, Dr Dodd stakes a claim to historicity for the story of the feet-washing, the visit of Mary Magdalene to the tomb, the statement that Jesus baptized disciples concurrently with John the Baptist's ministry, Thomas's 'odd but entirely convincing combination of pessimism and impulsiveness', and a number of others. The predictions of Jesus about His return are regarded as genuine. In the Synoptics they are commonly understood to refer to the Parousia, but in John to the Resurrection. In Dr Dodd's opinion the Fourth evangelist derives his understanding of them from 'a tradition which appears to reach back to a stage distinctly more primitive than that represented in the other Gospels'. The book is a masterpiece of insight and discernment. The argument proceeds with inexhaustible patience and exemplary lucidity. No detail is missed. His conclusions are made to appear inevitable. No longer will it be possible to regard the Fourth Gospel as theologically important but historically valueless. Indeed, as Dr Dodd hopes, his studies of it have made it certain that for any future reconstruction of a historically reliable portrait of Jesus—'the great end of our studies'—the Fourth Gospel will make its own significant contribution.

C. LESLIE MITTON

The Secular Meaning of the Gospel, by P. van Buren. (S.C.M. Press, 25*s*.)

The author, of the Episcopal Theological Seminary, Austin, Texas, undertakes to show how believers who are secular in the sense of being not only in but of the present-day world (he includes himself among them), sharing its this-worldly out-

look and concerns, may express their faith in terms that satisfy their scruples. The book, written for theological readers, is thus an outline of how theology can be secularized. It assumes as by now needing neither exposition nor defence that (a) only little in the Synoptic Gospels can survive historical criticism, (b) beliefs can be tested by whether or no they make a difference to one's character and conduct, and (c) the linguistic analysts are right in leaving all questions of fact to the sciences, in referring all other questions to the right or natural use of language, and in dismissing everything metaphysical as meaningless. On the third assumption, 'God', being a name for an alleged entity never encountered and neither imaginable nor conceivable, should be dropped. 'Jesus', however, is the name of an empirically evidenced man. Theology is thus to be changed into a Christology without God. God is not to be denied but left out as unknowable: 'He who has seen me has seen the Father' says that the only meaning of 'Father' is what we can observe in Jesus of Nazareth and that we must look no further. Faith, neither true nor false but a strong comprehensive conviction, is a 'perspective' on the *knowable* world of things and men, with a consequent way of life; Christian faith is such a perspective or orientation based on contemplation of the historical Jesus and of the Easter sense of 'liberation' which came to the original disciples, a 'discernment situation' (a term borrowed from I. T. Ramsey) which we can share, and which is 'objective' in the sense that it is felt to come from the man Jesus, i.e. is felt as a response, not, existentially, as a free personal decision. The way of life required is that of love for others, which is the only empirical meaning that can be given to the phrase 'love for God'; and such practical loving is enough, is to be left to its causal consequences, there being no need to tell others of our reason for it or to evangelize. Christian faith is to be cut down to its 'historical and ethical dimension'. Professor van Buren assures us that 'nothing essential' is thereby omitted. The first half of the book, especially the account (in which 'impassibility' is regularly misspelt) of the steps that led to the Chalcedonian Christology, is clear, concise and interesting. The rest, interpreting that Christology in the light of the above thesis, is tediously repetitive. The residual perspectival and moral meaning left to such religious terms as revelation, providence, divine, incarnation, worship and prayer makes me wonder why these terms need be retained at all, and, if they were frankly dropped as *too* Pickwickian for the secular, what could be put in their place not only of our creeds and theologies but also of our liturgies and hymns. T. E. JESSOP

The Day of His Coming: The Man in the Gospels, by G. Gloege. (S.C.M., 16*s*.) Professor Gloege (now of Bonn University) some years ago wrote an important volume on the Kingdom of God and the Church in the New Testament. His present work touches on the same theme at a number of points; but his main subject is the work and ministry of our Lord, and the book is in part inspired by the 'new quest of the historical Jesus'. It has no footnotes and does not engage in direct debate with other scholars, but it is the fruit of profound thought and wide reading, and is intended for all who are interested in Christian origins and are asking what Jesus means for the world of today. The book in its English form appears as a large paper-back in the series of S.C.M. Greenbacks. Its German title is *Aller Tage Tag*. The writer points out that the Hebrew day began with evening; the dawn came later. So it was with the Day of God, that day for which men had longed through the centuries. The teaching and death of Jesus belong to the evening; but with Easter the full light of the day dawned. This idea provides the framework of the whole discussion. The background of Jewish and Gentile history is dealt with in the first hundred pages, and then the

mission and teaching of Jesus are expounded—without any attempt at a chronological sequence of events. The eschatological horizon is given a central place. (By the way, there was no year 0, as is wrongly stated on p. 78; the year A.D. 1 is reckoned as following 1 B.C.). It is claimed that Jesus combined the conceptions of the Son of man and the Servant. This point is, of course, widely held. But in the main the writer does not merely repeat what has been said many times before, but he has an original approach and an incisive way of putting things. Few readers could fail to be stirred and challenged by these stimulating pages. In a sequel, Professor Gloege is to deal with St Paul and the early Church; no doubt this will clarify his Christology. For some years Gerhard Gloege was in Communist East Germany; and earlier still he belonged to the anti-Nazi Confessional Church. The style and intensity of his writing owe much to these strenuous and testing experiences. One is forced to listen to such a man when he seeks to relate the Christian message to the present era. In the Epilogue he refers to Camus's treatment of modern man as a Sisyphus rolling his stone and sustained by the frank acknowledgement of his absurd position. Gloege adds to the parable that when the stone was rolled away from the tomb of Jesus it meant that Sisyphus was rescued from *his* stone with its vain repetitions. 'Men begin to live historically as soon as they meet this historical Jesus, whom God has raised from death to life.'

T. FRANCIS GLASSON

Consecration of the Layman, by Max Thurian. (Helicon, 16*s*.)

This study of confirmation by the Sub-Prior of Taizé was originally published in French in 1957. It is a sign of ecumenical progress that it now appears in English from an Irish publisher with a Roman Catholic foreword. The gist of the argument is that Christian initiation has two aspects—baptism by water and baptism by the Holy Spirit. In the early centuries baptism by the Spirit was called the seal and had the form of anointing or the laying-on of hands. Water baptism signifies death and resurrection with Christ; Spirit baptism signifies Pentecost, the gift of the Holy Spirit. These two should neither be confused nor separated. Once they are performed Christian initiation is complete and so there is no need for a later 'confirmation'. Undoubtedly mediæval episcopal confirmation and, consequently, Anglican practice have been understood in this latter way: confirmation is a completion of baptism. Max Thurian is on good ground when he insists on the unity of the act of initiation. There should be no question that those who have been baptized are members of the family of the church. Confirmation, episcopal or otherwise, is not a ticket of admission to communion, though Anglican ecumenical policy has implied it to be. In suggesting that water baptism is to be distinguished from spirit baptism the author is dealing with a highly contentious subject and his treatment of the New Testament and patristic evidence is not really convincing. For example, is there anything to suggest that St Paul 'had in mind the liturgical action of imposition of hands when he spoke of his seal' (p. 33)? In short, he follows the line of Dix against Lampe. Brother Max argues that confirmation today should be practised as a sacrament of consecration to service in the world and in the church. In fact, he goes back on himself by writing (p. 90): 'baptism in the Spirit is . . . ordination to the kingly priesthood of the Church in the world; confirmation is a second ordination of laics to the service of the church'. He then introduces ideas like 'rungs in the ecclesiastical hierarchy' and suggests 'limited catechetical functions' and being 'put in charge of a liturgical office on weekdays' as suitable functions for those confirmed. This is a lame conclusion to an interesting book which could

certainly introduce Methodists who are beginning to study Christian initiation seriously to the variety and subtlety of the tradition regarding confirmation.

ROBIN SHARP

The Primitive Church, by Maurice Goguel. (George Allen & Unwin, 63*s*.)

Here at last we have in English the third volume of Goguel's great trilogy, *Jesus and the Origins of Christianity*. The first volume, *The Life of Jesus*, was available in English as long ago as 1933. *The Birth of Christianity* in 1953, and this final instalment was published in French in 1947. The work has established itself as a classic and Mr H. C. Snape, who was also the translator of *The Birth of Christianity*, has done a valuable service in making the whole of it now available for English readers. In this volume, which is closely linked to the preceding one, Goguel examines the relationship between the Church as an historical fact and the doctrine concerning the Church. In the first part he discusses the various doctrines of the Church revealed in the New Testament and the Apostolic fathers, and in the second he traces the development of the Church's organization and worship and its ethical teaching. As Professor Simon says in the introduction: 'One of Goguel's merits is that he brought to light the extreme diversity of doctrinal tendencies and ecclesiastical institutions in apostolic and post-apostolic Christianity.' He rejects both the Roman Catholic and traditional Protestant theories of the origins of the Church with their rival interpretations of the *Tu es Petrus* text, which he shows to have played no part in the rise of the Roman primacy. 'Jesus neither desired nor foresaw the Church and yet it took its birth from his activity and provided a form for his work without which it would have completely miscarried.' The Church's birth and growth were 'sociological facts which obey the laws governing the birth, life and death of all societies'. Every religion has a tendency 'to dissolve from a kind of internal necessity. This dissolution can take on three forms which most often are linked together: rationalization, moralization . . ., and ecclesiasticism.' In the primitive Church these three tendencies are all seen to be at work: rationalization, as theology becomes an end in itself detached from the spiritual experience which gave it birth; moralization, as salvation becomes a reward and ceases to be a pure gift of God; ecclesiasticism, as the Church becomes an institution through which salvation is guaranteed. Yet because Christianity never quite loses contact with its source in the personality of Christ it is kept from dissolution by that quality of 'spontaneous creativeness' which it derives from Him. We may today be constrained at times to differ from Goguel, but this immensely stimulating book, the mature fruit of a life devoted to its subject, remains indispensable for a study of the Church in the first and second centuries.

G. ERNEST LONG

The Humanity of the Saviour, by Harry Johnson. (Epworth Press, 35*s*.)

It is hardly surprising, considering the preponderant tendency throughout the history of Christology to neglect the humanity of Christ, that a theory which boldly states that the Son of God assumed fallen human nature should have received but scant attention. Apart from a handful of protagonists, it has been traditionally judged (usually very summarily) as unavoidably impairing the sinlessness of Jesus, and therefore rejected as heretical. Of late, however, the doctrine has been revived and has acquired in certain quarters some formidable advocates, notably Karl Barth. It is opportune, therefore, that a book should now appear which offers a comprehensive investigation into the doctrine. Dr Johnson's book, however, is more than an investigation: it is a rationale of this whole Christologi-

cal position, which makes clear not only the importance and value of the theory for a satisfactory doctrine of the Incarnation, but also argues its necessity for an adequate and convincing doctrine of the Atonement. Necessarily, in view of the controversial nature of the theory and the history of its treatment, the first part of the book is devoted to the crucial task of definition. This is undertaken in the context of a discussion of the doctrines of the Fall and of Original Sin. Dr Johnson does not shun the problems which arise when one tries to integrate the concepts of responsibility, guilt and the 'inevitability' of sin into a satisfying definition of fallen human nature; nor does he baulk the greater difficulties of relating these questions to the person of Jesus, whom, it is categorically asserted, remained sinless. If it might appear that the whole position is in danger of becoming too paradoxical, it can be argued that it is the author's explicit purpose to show that the Paradox of the Incarnation is only adequately presented when the fundamental paradox that Christ assumed fallen human nature is granted. Part II is a review of the New Testament evidence, with the conclusion that the theory is suggested in the Gospels, integral to the Pauline conception of the Person and Work of Christ, and an important part of the thought of the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews. Part III is a valuable historical summary of the exponents of the position, from Gregory of Nyssa to the present day, concluding with an account of the principles which unite them; and Part IV explores the reasons for the theory's comparative neglect. The conclusion of the book draws out what has been implicit in the previous sections: the powerful soteriological motivations of the theory. It is here that its true value and significance can be estimated. This is an important book which will have to be reckoned with. It treats of a large theme at a high level of argument, and will necessitate further attention being given to the status and acceptability of this strangely neglected doctrine. ROBERT C. SHAW

The Birth of the Christian Faith, by James McLeman. (Oliver & Boyd, 12*s.* 6*d.*)
The author examines the New Testament evidence in order to answer such questions as 'Where did the Resurrection appearances occur'? and 'Did conviction arise from physical awareness'? He insists that if we maintain the historicity of the Resurrection appearances we must allow them to be subject to historical enquiry and decides that it was in Galilee that the disciples became convinced that Jesus was alive and that they returned to Jerusalem to proclaim publicly their conviction. The fact that among those present at the appearance of Jesus were some who did not believe is said to be so embarrassing to the later tradition that it must be authentic, and, together with the fact that some who disbelieved were later convinced, is regarded as proof that the Resurrection faith began not with an event but with a conviction. It is, however, unfortunate for the hypothesis as so stated that the sources which the author recognizes as early make no mention of the disbelief and that there is no evidence that the later sources found it an embarrassment! Perhaps the unbelief was introduced to emphasize the extraordinary nature of the event or, more simply, because the disciples disbelieved for joy. Mr McLeman states that the first person to be convinced that Jesus was alive was Peter and that this incident has been transferred in the Gospels to the period before the passion and located at Caesarea Philippi. He shows how well the major issues of Caesarea Philippi fit a time immediately after the death of Jesus but attempts no explanation of Mark's giving them not only a different time but also a different place when he could so easily have accommodated them in Galilee. The book raises some important questions and will repay study.

VINCENT PARKIN

Kerygma and Myth, Vol. II, edited by H. W. Bartsch. (S.P.C.K., 30*s*.)
R. H. Fuller has selected and translated selections from three volumes of the series entitled *Kerygma und Mythos* which have been published since 1953. (A selection from the two earlier volumes was published in English in that year.) All deal with Rudolf Bultmann. The present volume contains a long and somewhat tedious summary of 'the present state of the debate'—i.e., up to 1954, written by the editor himself. Bartsch writes very much on the defensive, and his article involves much repetition as he cites critics of Bultmann in several countries. The most interesting parts of this book, at least to the English reader, will be Karl Barth's article and the debate between Jaspers and Bultmann. The latter never approach understanding of each other. Barth somewhat mischievously entitles his contribution 'Rudolf Bultmann—an Attempt to Understand Him'. Whether Barth's humorous, seemingly regretful criticism or Jaspers' sharp attack is the more severe is a matter of opinion. There is also a very lengthy paper by Gustav Brondsted and two shorter contributions by others. There is much that is valuable in this collection of essays. It becomes once again clear that Bultmann is frequently misunderstood and that he must bear much of the blame for this. But the tone of the debate, whilst it may amuse some readers, is hardly worthy of the great themes that are discussed. Must theological discussion be so centred upon personalities? Is the reputation of Bultmann the matter about which he himself cares? Surely not. Too much of this discussion reads like the childish bickering in some senior common rooms. When it escapes from this, the conversation deals with great topics—the nature and the presentation of the Gospel. The patient reader will find much to think about. FREDERIC GREEVES

Grace and Reason: A Study in the Theology of Luther, by B. A. Gerrish. (Clarendon Press: Oxford University Press, 30*s*.)
This author joins the growing army of exegetes who seek to explain what Luther's 'intractable spirit' really meant. The Reformer's attitude towards Reason is the subject of this academic dissertation. He sets himself a threefold task: to elucidate 'Luther's actual utterances on the worth (or worthlessness) of reason', 'to counterbalance the picture of Luther as an irresponsible creature of instinct'; and to examine 'Luther's relation to Occamism'. The author denies any attempt to 'defend or recommend Luther's opinions', but the reader is left in no doubt that he regards Luther as sadly misunderstood by those who labelled him 'irrationalist'. The essay is divided into three parts entitled 'Reason and Philosophy', 'Reason and Religion' and 'Reason and Scholarship' respectively. In the first part the author shows that Luther recognized natural reason as praiseworthy in its proper place, 'the Earthly Kingdom', but when it invades 'the Heavenly Kingdom' it is an arrogant trespasser until it is regenerated, when it may become the handmaid of faith. The second is the longest and most important part of the dissertation. Luther's *Commentary on Galatians* is chosen as the basic text. It is admitted that Luther started from the epistemological position of his Nominalist tutors. But his thought is so completely dominated by the soteriological tenet of justification by faith with its correlative *sola fide* and *sola gratia* that he became the opponent of the *via moderna*. The final part of the essay shows that while Luther recognized the value of the Humanists' philological and grammatical studies he also knew that, without the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, they were unable to provide an accurate interpretation of the Word of God. This is a timely and finely produced book. It systematically presents the Reformer's pronouncements on reason. At a higher level it shows that beneath the blustering and often vulgar ebullience of Luther there was a mind wrestling with problems that only today are coming

into prominence. Much here is relevant to the modern debate between the Christian and the logical positivist, to the debate between the Christian and the apologists of other great religions and to the debate within the Church between the Fundamenalist and the disciple of Bultmann. Finer points of technical argument are relegated to footnotes to the advantage of the less advanced student. The bibliography and indexes are adequate and accurate. H. PARKIN

Word and Spirit: Calvin's Doctrine of Biblical Authority, by H. Jackson Forstman. (Stanford University Press, Stanford, California; London, Oxford University Press, 38*s*.)

After the great resurgence of Luther-scholarship in the last two or three decades, we are now in the middle of a similar resurgence of the study of Calvin. The books on Calvin have not turned to be quite so exciting, either in style or in discovery, as those on Luther were; but this may be due to the very different characters and theological methods of the great men under discussion. Mr Forstman's book deserves a high place among recent studies. It begins with a convenient summary of the main approaches made to Calvin's theology by modern writers, and renounces (rightly, in the opinion of this reviewer) the persistent but fruitless quest for a 'key principle' in his thought, in the light of which all his theology should be interpreted. He shows that Calvin's only aim is to expound Holy Scripture in coherent form—a point which ought to have been clearly seen a long time ago. But this, of course, raises at once the problem of Calvin's conception of the authority of the Bible. Mr Morstman's basic solution of this problem is that Calvin's principle of authority is the 'correlation of Word and Spirit'. Armed with this solution, he proceeds to tackle the much-debated question whether Calvin was a literalist; on this issue powerful teams could be ranged on either side. Mr Forstman works out the notion of the 'correlation of Word and Spirit' on the basis of two kinds of knowledge that the Spirit imparts: the 'knowledge of faith', which is knowledge through Christ of God's gratuitous mercy, received through the heart, and personal through and through; and the 'wider knowledge' of many things relating to the world and God, received by sheer submission to God's Word, and quite impersonal. In the case of the 'knowledge of faith', he argues, Calvin does not require a literal acceptance of the words of Scripture, but the response of faith; in the case of the other, absolute literalism is imposed. The argument is impressive, but not, perhaps, quite conclusive, especially as Mr Forstman admits that the distinction between the two kinds of knowledge is implicit rather than explicit. But even those who are not convinced by the argument will enjoy the book, and not least the examples given of Calvin's Biblical exegesis.

RUPERT E. DAVIES

The Biblical View of Sex and Marriage, by Otto Piper. (James Nisbet & Co. Ltd., 17*s*. 6*d*.)

When twenty-one years ago Professor Otto Piper of Princeton, New Jersey, wrote *The Christian Interpretation of Sex*, he made a most valuable contribution to a new phase in the study of the subject. It would be true to say that remarkably little fresh ground had been broken in the Christian consideration of sexual relationship since the Protestant Reformation. Then the major forward move was that initiated by the break which the Great Reformers made with the tradition of clerical celibacy. In more recent times a great deal of rethinking of our traditional positions has been forced upon us by many factors in the modern world which have made earlier beliefs untenable or at least have demonstrated their inadequacy. Although many of those factors have been of the kind usually described

as 'secular', such as, for example, the impact of science and the pressures of the population explosion, the new emphasis on the significance of Biblical insights has played a very considerable part. *The Biblical View of Sex and Marriage* is a complete rewriting of Professor Piper's earlier work. In it he sustains the emphasis which is part of his original treatment of the subject, namely that the ethical treatment of sex should start not from the institution of marriage but from the nature of sex itself. The book spreads itself over twenty-one chapters and it is not always easy to see the wood for the trees. Some of the author's arguments are based upon a severely conservative interpretation of Biblical texts and it is not always clear that the pressure of God's Spirit through so-called secular movements is fully recognized. Many readers will wish to contest the view that we are bound to accept the doctrine of male superiority as the only proper basis of sexual order. But the book is full of excellent material and is the result of a lifetime of concentrated thinking on a most important theme. It will well repay careful study.

KENNETH G. GREET

The Saints' Everlasting Rest, by Richard Baxter. Edited with an Introduction by John T. Wilkinson. (Epworth Press, 18*s.* 6*d.*)

Once again Mr Wilkinson has turned his skill as an editor and his precision as a scholar to Richard Baxter. This time he has given us an edition of the great seventeenth-century Puritan's devotional treatise, *The Saints' Everlasting Rest*. It is not likely that many people today would find their way through the 800,000 words of Baxter's original, even if they could come by it. Indeed, almost without exception the work has been issued in an abridged form since the end of the eighteenth century. As we are told in the excellent Introductory Essay, before Baxter died in 1691 the book had passed through twelve editions, although the intervals between these increased considerably in the days following the Restoration and the rise of deistic philosophy. Between 1690 and 1754 there was little trace of the work, but then the influence of the Methodist movement began to make itself felt, and round about the middle of the century John Wesley published an abridged version as one volume of *The Christian Library*. A few years later another abridgement appeared, made by Benjamin Fawcett, and it is in this form that Baxter's work has for the most part been published since. During three centuries the book has been constantly re-issued in one form or another, an obvious recognition of its vitality. In this edition Mr Wilkinson has made no changes in Baxter's text, which he has merely abbreviated by making omissions and made more readable by modernizing the spelling. As a result we have Baxter's own book in a form suited to our own time and circumstances. The subject, of course, is not of ephemeral interest. Here is something which, if superficially not suited to the temper of our day, is in fact part of that enduring treasury of Christian conviction and devotion which in the last resort is always what we need to know. Baxter wrote the book after an unhappy period as an army chaplain in the Civil War. If it can be said that he turned to such a subject because of melancholy caused by the sight of men fighting, by the quarrels between England and Scotland, and because of his own physical weakness, yet what he gives is not to be regarded merely as compensation for an unhappy world but rather as the fulfilment which alone gives meaning to a world necessarily incomplete in itself. Baxter wrote of the rest which remains to the people of God: the rest of grace in this life and the rest of glory beyond it. Many readers will be grateful to Mr Wilkinson for introducing them to a devotional classic which bears comparison with that other product of Puritanism, *The Pilgrim's Progress*. Through his labour they will catch something of the spirit of a

very great Christian, and they will perhaps be surprised to find how fresh Baxter's words often are and how directly they speak to their own enduring needs. Many examples of this could be quoted. But if only because it is so like John Wesley's third direction for singing the Methodist hymns, and so much in line with the advice of the spiritual masters of every age, one example must suffice. It concerns the practice of prayer and meditation. 'If thy heart draw back, force it to the work: if it loiter, spur it on; if it step aside command it in again: if it would slip away and leave the work, use thine authority; keep it close to the business, till thou have obtained thine end. Stir not away, if it may be, till thy love do flame, till thy joy be raised. . . .'

NORMAN P. GOLDHAWK

John Wesley's English: A Study of his Literary Style, by George Lawton. (George Allen & Unwin. 30*s*.)

This is a book primarily for the philologist and if he is also an admirer of John Wesley it will have a correspondingly greater interest for him. The reader cannot fail to be impressed by the immense amount of reading and research which the writing of the book has entailed. Apparently the author has studied with meticulous care every item in the vast volume of Wesley's surviving writings: Journal, Sermons, Letters, Treatises, etc. This reading has not been primarily for the subject matter, but for the form and vocabulary through which it is expressed. The work is divided into twelve chapters, each with an explanatory heading and numerous subdivisions which greatly assist the reader and stimulate his interest, as, for example, Choice of Words: Wesley's Theory and Practice; Wesley's Use of Adjectives; Scripture Idiom. Mr Lawton shows how Wesley was familiar with the terminology peculiar to the various classes of society; with nautical and military terms; with those peculiar to the Church, the Law, Medicine, Philosophy and the various Sciences, down to the everyday speech of the common people, even including slang. All, of course, appear in an appropriate context when they are found in Wesley's works. The author appears to be almost as familiar with the *Oxford English Dictionary* as with Wesley's writings. He shows, for example, how frequently Wesley's use of some word or phrase ante-dates the earliest reference to its use cited by the *Dictionary*. He also urges that the *Dictionary* could profitably make a more extensive use of Wesley's writings than it does. A specially interesting section of the book deals with Wesley and the language of the Bible, and the writer shows how he was 'no slave to the letter of Scripture', but nevertheless his extensive use of Biblical phraseology 'invest his prose with a certain dignity' which is yet consonant with 'intensity of feeling and conviction'. Space forbids reference to other features of this book which are mainly factual, but there are occasional discussions of such controversial matters as the relation between Wesley's sermons as published and as preached. There are numerous quotations from the *Works* to support the author's many contentions and the usefulness of his book is enhanced by an index of about one thousand words which are referred to in the text.

W. L. DOUGHTY

Fathers of the Victorians: The Age of Wilberforce, by Ford K. Brown. (Cambridge University Press, 55*s*.)

The thesis of this book is that 'the unmistakable improvement in manners and morals of early nineteenth-century England that has generally been ascribed to the Methodists can be credited to them only in the most indirect way'. That change was primarily the work of Wilberforce and the Anglican Evangelicals, who succeeded where Wesley failed because they drew into the movement many of the leaders of the ruling class. The Evangelicals were concerned only with the conver-

sion of England to Evangelical Christianity, not with the reform of the social and political evils of the time. John Newton urged a priest to use the talents that God had given him 'in pointing out *sin* as the great cause and source of every existing evil, and to engage those who love and fear him, instead of losing time in political speculation'. Even the campaign for the abolition of slavery was merely incidental and subordinate to this main aim. In fact, in political matters they stoutly upheld the *status quo* as a children's hymn indicates:

Not more than others I deserve,
Yet God hath given me more;
For I have food while others starve,
Or beg from door to door.

The chief agencies of this revolution were the innumerable societies which the Evangelicals formed. This is a strange book. It provides us with long lists of the Evangelical societies covering several pages. It goes into considerable detail in describing their patrons. It quotes Hannah More and other Evangelical writers at considerable length. In great detail it tells the story of the Blagdon controversy, and the means by which the auxiliary of the Bible society was established in Cambridge. Yet Mr Brown's book seems to have no plan, and it never mentions several important studies on the subject. Maurice Quinlan's *Victorian Prelude* (1941) and Muriel Jaeger's *Before Victoria* (1956) are but two of the notable omissions. Mr Brown shows a complete lack of sympathy for the Evangelicals, who are constantly the targets for his ingenious criticisms and often rather vulgar witticisms. The reader who wishes to study the impact of Evangelicalism upon the early nineteenth century will gain little from this book. He would be well advised to avoid it and turn to *Victorian Prelude* which, in spite of Mr Brown's book of 550 pages, still remains definitive. ALAN B. WILKINSON

Britain 1984, by Ronald Brech. (Darton, Longman & Todd, 15*s.*)
Our Crowded Planet, ed. by Fairfield Osborn. (George Allen & Unwin, 21*s.*)
British Government Observed, by Brian Chapman. (George Allen & Unwin, 12*s.* 6*d.*)

Mr Ronald Brech, of Unilever's Economics and Statistics Department, was asked in 1959 to talk to post-graduate medical students in Dundee about probable developments in medicine during the next twenty-five years. Out of it grew this calculated assessment of the probable economic development of Britain. The end date was fortuitous, but the result provides a startling contrast to George Orwell's famous prediction. The basic thesis is simple. By 1984 we shall have reached the general standard now prevalent in the United States, so our kitchens and shopping centres and purchasing patterns then will be as theirs are now. But the detail is fascinating. One unexpected sidelight is that leisure time is tending to decrease rather than to expand. Ministers and circuit stewards in tough areas might like to note the comment that, as by 1984 60 per cent of the population will be comfortable middle class, and as the middle class is more addicted to church-going, church attendance will increase. All of it, of course, is intelligent guesswork—but it foreshadowed the Beeching Plan and the Buchanan Report. We have the advantage in Britain that we start from a comparatively high standard. Most of the nations of the world are not so fortunate, and their outlook is not so bright. For they are the areas of rapid population increase, and population growth vitiates every effort to raise living standards. Twenty-two experts contribute brief but pointed essays to *Our Crowded Planet*, covering every aspect of the global problem of population pressures. Two contributors deal specifically with Roman Catholic and Protestant attitudes. The dominant concern is summed up by Julian Huxley.

'Overpopulation is a world problem so serious as to override all other world problems, such as soil erosion, poverty, malnutrition, raw material shortages, illiteracy, even disarmament. The future of the whole human species is at stake.' It is a grim book, but a needed one. Mr Chapman has his doubts even about Britain; a nation that is slipping backwards because in the preparation and implementation of policy it prefers the amateur to the trained professional. There is, he urges, need to reform and modernize our Legal, Parliamentary and Civil Service systems. His criticisms are justified. Unfortunately, he also thinks that they order these things better in France. When he was writing, the French economy was progressing and ours stagnating. When his book appeared, ours was displaying remarkable recovery and the French was in trouble. All the same, this is a lively little book that is provocative in the right way.

EDWARD ROGERS

Science and Religion, by Harold K. Schilling. (George Allen & Unwin, 25*s*.)
The sub-title of this book is 'An Interpretation of Two Communities'. In it the author, himself a professional American university physicist, and also a Christian, explores the parallel nature of these two apparently distinct communities of knowledge and belief. This is not a book about the content of either field, nor therefore about any of the age-old conflicts which arose from an apparent difference of opinion on matters such as miracles and the age of the earth, which seemed to belong to both. It is a book about the methods of science and religion. The author re-states very clearly the position now almost universally accepted by scientists (other than the social scientists). This is that science begins with observation and experiment; the results of these observations are next fitted into a pattern by the use of concepts, invented by us for this very purpose; and finally these concepts are used for whatever project we desire. The position is neo-Kantian, for things-in-themselves are never known to us, and truth means essentially 'fitting into a self-consistent and fruitful pattern'. Dr Schilling asserts that the same methodology applies also to religion. There are experiences—personal ones of love and hate and fear and forgiveness, and historical ones of the Old and New Testaments. These are co-ordinated by concepts (e.g. the Trinity, grace, conversion), and are subsequently fruitful in all good works. The parallel is worked out skilfully and with many excellent illustrations from both fields. But certain fundamental difficulties still remain. To mention just two: first, if science and religion are two parallel communities, on much the same level, why can we never speak of science as a religious activity, and why do we claim that although a man may live without knowledge of science, he will scarcely live meaningfully without some experience of religion? Is religion optional? Second, science has many different concepts, and none dominates the rest. But in religion God so dominates everything that we can understand St Augustine's 'love God and do what you like'. The difference is fundamental. It is only fair to say that Professor Schilling recognizes these difficulties, and he makes some very interesting suggestions for dealing with them. In short, this is a highly sensible and very honest book, completely sound scientifically, and of a tolerant Liberal-Protestant-Modernist theological flavour. It would do our theological students a lot of good to have to read it; and it would do their teachers a lot of good to have to show why, in certain respects, they differ from it!

C. A. COULSON

The Royal Priesthood of the Faithful: An Investigation of the Doctrine from Biblical Times to the Reformation, by Cyril Eastwood. (Epworth Press, 30*s*.)
Dr Eastwood has performed a great service for these times in his two volumes on

the doctrine of the Priesthood of All Believers, and, in some ways, this second book, first in order of history though second in publication, which deals with the doctrine in pre-Reformation times, is the more important of the two. The doctrine is clearly biblical, firmly held by the early church, and maintained by several writers in the centuries prior to the Reformation when it received its classic restatement. It is thus not to be slighted as an exaggeration of the Reformers. The blame for the eclipse of the doctrine in Catholic thought is bluntly laid at the door of Cyprian, a verdict which concurs with that of an article in the current *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* suggesting the need for a thorough reappraisal of the influence of Cyprian on ecclesiastical doctrine, and one of considerable importance in modern debate. It is high time, for example, that certain interpretations of the office and function of the priesthood should be re-examined in the light of this doctrine which has been part of the Faith from the beginning. On page 64, line 12, 'the' should read 'be'; H. M. Smith is referred to throughout as H. H. Smith; on page 176, line 15, 'Wycliff's' is mis-spelt; on page 181, line 14, there is a misprint in the quotation from Kramer. But these minor defects do not detract from the importance of a most timely book. To quote Dr Eastwood's concluding sentences: 'A final and decisive argument in favour of reviving and understanding the doctrine of the priesthood of all believers is that in the sixteenth century is brought new life and strength and reformation to the Christian Church. In fresh circumstances, and in a different though not less needy world, its message, believed and applied, may yet do the same again.'

H. MORLEY RATTENBURY

NOTE

In the review of the late Dr Flew's Jesus and His Way (January 1964, p. 77) the price was wrongly given as 22*s.* instead of 21*s.*, and it was not made plain that the book had been edited by the Rev. Benjamin Drewery.

NOTABLE ARTICLES IN PERIODICALS

The Eastern Churches Quarterly, Vol. XVI, No. 1, 1964.
Pope John XXIII: An Appreciation, by Henry St John, O.P.
The Fathers and Christian Unity, by Jean Danielou, S.J.
The Orthodox Church and Christian Unity, by Chrysostomos Konstantinidis.
An Anglican View of Teilhard de Chardin: Ecumenical Reflections, by Lucien Morren.
An Ecumenical Study-Circle: An Account by an Evangelical Theologian of Common Study between Evangelicals and Catholics, by Edmund Schlink.
Iconography and Ecumenism, by François Schmuck.

The Expository Times, January 1964.
Theologians of our Time: XII. C. H. Dodd, by Bp. J. A. T. Robinson.
Second Thoughts: III. Present Issues in New Testament Theology, by Canon Alan Richardson.
Important Moral Issues: III. Gambling, by Edward Rogers.

The Expository Times, February 1964.
Important Moral Issues: IV. Management and Men in Industrial Relations, by M. J. Jackson.
C. H. Dodd's *Historical Tradition in the Fourth Gospel*, by A. M. Hunter.
The Worldliness of Christianity, by W. Lillie.

The Expository Times, March 1964.
Theologians of our Time: XII. Vincent Taylor, by Owen E. Evans.
Second Thoughts: IV. Books of Testimonies, by Fr. Barnabas Lindars, S.S.F.
The Courage of Christ, by H. H. Farmer.
Healing, by A. W. Sloan, M.D.

The Harvard Theological Review, January 1964.
Aphrodite as Guardian of Greek Magistrates, by F. Sokolowski.
Milton's Conception of Time in *The Christian Doctrine*, by L. Stapleton.
Christian and Un-Christian Etymologies, by Henry Kahane and Renee Kahane.
On the Origin of the Rotas-Sator Square, by Duncan Fishwick.

International Review of Missions, January 1964.
A Survey of the Year, 1962-3, by the Editor.
Roman Catholic Missions in the Light of the Second Vatican Council (1962-3), by J. Beckmann, S.M.B.

Interpretation, January 1964.
Grace and Truth: An Old Testament Description of God and its Use in the Johannine Gospel, by L. J. Kuyper.
Betrayed by Friends: An Expository Study of Psalm 22, by L. R. Fisher.
Basic Issues: A Study of Recent Gospel Research, by H. K. McArthur.
Interpretation in Contemporary Theology: I: A New 'New Barth', by Robert T. Osborn.

Studies in Philology. January 1964.
Linguistic and Psychological Couplings in the Lays of Marie de France, by J. A. Frey.
Gentilesse in Chaucer's *Troilus*, by A. T. Gaylord.
Erasmus' *In Principii Erat Sermo*: A Controversial Translation, by C. A. L. Jarrott.
Erasmus and the Tradition of Paradox, by Sister M. Geraldine, C.S.J.
The Order of Stanzas in Cowley and Crashaw's 'On Hope', by C. H. Miller.
Pierre Bayle's Sincerity in his verses on Faith and Reason, by K. C. Sandberg.

Scottish Journal of Theology, March 1964.
The Fourth World Conference on Faith and Order, by P. C. Rodger.
'Non-Metaphysical' Christian Philosophy and Linguistic Philosophy, by J. W. Woelfel.
'The United Church', by Fr. Gabriel Herbert.
Worship in the Church of South India, by J. R. Macphail.
St Paul and the Law, by C. E. B. Cranfield.

BOOKS RECEIVED

ALLEN & UNWIN: A. D. Galloway (ed.), *Basic Readings in Theology*, pp. 316. 45s.
Bradford Smith, *Meditation the New Art*, pp. 224, 21s.

AQUIN PRESS (The Aquinas Society of London: Aquin Papers): No. 38, D. F. Pears and J. F. Thomson, *Is Existence a Predicate?*, pp. 12, 2s. No. 39, Kenelm Foster, O.P., *Courtly Love and Christianity*, pp. 24, 2s. 6d. No. 40, G. Buchdahl, *Induction and Necessity in the Philosophy of Aristotle*, pp. 38, 3s. 6d.

ARNOLD: P. Gardner-Smith, *The Roads Converge*: A Contribution to the Question of *Christian Reunion*, pp. 253, 30s.

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS: C. E. B. Cranfield, *The Gospel according to St Mark: An Introduction and Commentary*, pp. 491, 17s. 6d.

CLARK, T. & T.: H. H. Rowley (ed.), *A Companion to the Bible* (New Edition), pp. xii + 628 + maps. (Original ed. by T. W. Manson, 1945.)

COLLINS: J. M. Creed, *The Divinity of Jesus Christ: A Study in the History of Christian Doctrine since Kant*, pp. 144, 6s. (Fontana Library).
DARTON, LONGMAN & TODD: Louis Bouyer, *Introduction to Spirituality*, Second Printing, pp. 321, 15s.
EPWORTH PRESS: F. Baker, *Charles Wesley's Verse: An Introduction*, pp. 110, 12s. 6d. A. Colquhoun, *John Brown's Soul goes Marching*, pp. 121, 7s. 6d. R. E. Davies, *Honesty, God and Christianity*, pp. 9, 1s. (Foundery Pamphlets No. 18). W. H. Kyle (ed.), *Healing Through Counselling*, pp. x + 194, 21s. C. S. Rodd (Epworth Preachers' Commentaries), Vol. I.
Psalms 1-72, pp viii + 136, 12s. 6d., Vol. II, *Psalms 73-150*, pp. 134, 12s. 6d. N. Snaith, *The Seven Psalms*, pp. 109, 5s. J. J. Vincent, *Christian Nuclear Perspective*, pp. 64, 3s. 6d.
EYRE & SPOTTISWOODE: P. Munz, *Relationship and Solitude*, pp. xi + 236, 30s.
FABER & FABER: D. M. Baillie, *The Theology of the Sacraments*, paper covers, 9s. 6d.
FELLOWSHIP OF RECONCILIATION: R. J. Billington, *The Basis of Christian Pacifist Conviction*, pp. 16, 1s.
INDEPENDENT PRESS: T. E. Jessop, *Church and Society: Social Service and Social Challenge*, pp. 16, 1s. (Malcolm Spencer Lectureship.)
INTER-VARSITY FELLOWSHIP: Leon Morris, *Ministers of God*, pp. 128, 4s.
NELSON, THOMAS, & SONS: *The Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman*, C. S. Dessain and V. F. Blehl, S.J. (ed.), pp. xviii + 555, 70s.
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS: *City of Oxford: Handbook of Religious Education*, pp. x + 149, 17s. 6d. Ian T. Ramsay, *Models and Mystery* (Whidden Lecture, 1963), pp. ix + 74, 9s. 6d. Eric C. Rust, *Towards a Christian Understanding of History*, pp. xi + 292, 42s.
S.C.M. PRESS: J. Jeremias, *The Parables of Jesus*, pp. 248, 30s. C. Michalson, *The Rationality of Faith*, pp. 160, 18s. Alan Richardson, *History Sacred and Profane* (Bampton Lectures, 1962), pp. 328, 35s. Ninian Smart, *Philosophers and Religious Truth*, pp. 200, 6s. (paperback). Vittorio Subilia, *The Problem of Catholicism*, pp. 190, 30s.
S.P.C.K.: W. D. Davies, *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism: Some Rabbinic Elements in Pauline Theology*, pp. 392, 18s. 6d. (First published 1948: paperback ed. 1963.) Martin Thornton *English Spirituality*, pp. 330, 27s. 6d.
TYNDALE PRESS: I. H. Marshall, *Eschatology and the Parables*, pp. 48, 2s. (The Tyndale New Testament Lecture, 1963.)
UNITED CHURCH PRESS, PHILADELPHIA (Distributed by Independent Press): Robert S. Paul (ed.), *An Apologeticall Narration* (facsimile of 1643 edition, with Introduction), 15s.
UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO PRESS: E. W. Tetlock, Jr., *D. H. Lawrence, Artist and Rebel*, $5. Norton B. Crowell, *The Troubled Soul: Browning's Theory of Knowledge*, $5.50.

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

JOHN KENT	Tutor in Church History at Hartley-Victoria College, Manchester.
ANTHONY HANSON	Professor of Theology, University of Hull.
J. HEYWOOD THOMAS	Lecturer in the Philosophy of Religion, Manchester University.
HYWEL D. LEWIS	Professor of the History and Philosophy of Religion, London University.
DAVID JENKINS	Fellow and Chaplain of the Queen's College, Oxford, and Bampton Lecturer for 1966.
KENNETH GRAYSTON	New Testament Tutor at Didsbury College, Bristol, and Deputy Head, Special School of Theology, University of Bristol.
A. RAYMOND GEORGE	Principal of Wesley College, Headingley, Leeds.
A. P. F. SELL	Minister of Sedbergh and Dent Congregational Churches.
FREDERIC GREEVES	President of the Methodist Conference, 1963-4; Principal of Didsbury College, Bristol.
TREVOR T. ROWE	Methodist Minister in Ainsdale, Southport.

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