
A table of contents for the *London Quarterly Review* can be found here:

https://biblicalstudies.org.uk/articles_london-quarterly-and-holborn-review_01.php

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WESLEY THE MYSTIC

TO those who believe that Christian mysticism has a message of incalculable value to our bustling age and our Martha-like Christianity, the unfavourable judgement of Wesley comes as a cold shower. Let me give a few of his words.

'We went to Stanton-Harcourt, to Mr. Gambold, and found my old friend recovered from his mystic delusion, and convinced that Paul was a better writer than either Tauler or Jacob Behmen' (*Works*, the 14 vol. ed., i. 85). 'You [Moravians at Herrnhut] receive not the ancient but the modern mystics as the best interpreters of Scripture, and, in conformity with these, you mix much of man's wisdom with the wisdom of God. You greatly refine the plain religion taught by Holy Writ, and philosophize on every part of it to accommodate it to the mystic theory. Hence you talk much in a manner unsupported by Scripture, against mixing nature with grace, against imagination, and concerning animal spirits, mimicking the power of the Holy Ghost. Hence your brethren zealously caution us against animal joy, against mixing nature with grace, against natural love for one another, and against selfish love of God, against all which there is no one caution in all the Bible. In conformity to the mystics, you likewise greatly check joy in the Holy Ghost, by such cautions against sensible comforts, as have no tittle of Scripture to support them. Your brethren here [in England] damp the zeal of babes in Christ, talking much of false zeal, forbidding them to declare what God hath

done for their souls. You also undervalue good works (especially works of mercy), never publicly insisting on the necessity of them, nor declaring their weight and excellency' (1740, i. 330). 'One odd hindrance to brotherly love I found creeping in upon us, which had already occasioned much evil: namely, a fancy that we must not justify ourselves. (Some of the spawn of mystic divinity.) Just contrary to the scriptural injunction, Be ready to give a reason for the hope that is in you' (1747, ii. 52).

Wesley wrote *A Letter to the Reverend Mr. Law* (1756, ix. 498–509) in answer to one of Law's books, in which that author popularises some of the views of Bohme, which Wesley dislikes. The latter inveighs against the mixture of philosophy with religion, and quotes with hearty approval an earlier word of Law, to the effect that there can be 'no such thing as a philosophical religion, for religion is the most plain, simple thing in the world. It is only, "We love Him because He first loved us." So far as you add philosophy to religion, just so far you spoil it.' The chief objections of Wesley to Law's book are: a number of speculative and strange theories about creation and related matters; theosophical views on relation of spirit and matter; views on angels, fall, sin, marriage, God's omnipotence, absence of righteous wrath or vindictive justice in God—'nothing is more frequently or expressly declared in Scripture than God's anger at sin,' says Wesley, 'and His punishing it, both temporally and eternally, and every assertion of this kind [that is, to the contrary by Law] strikes directly at the credit of the whole revelation. For if there be one falsehood in the Bible [on weighty matters like this], there may be a thousand, neither can it proceed from a God of truth' (p. 481); justification of a person is simply making that person like Christ; regeneration, the whole of man's salvation; redemption, only the life of God in the soul; Christ's work as redeemer is to raise into life the smothered spark of heaven in us; atonement of divine justice and extinguishing sin

in us the same (Wesley quotes at length from Anna Maria Schurmann, in favour of the ordinary doctrine of propitiation or atonement); regeneration, the making alive the heavenly body and spirit extinguished when man fell; Lord's Supper, necessary for regaining our first heavenly body; the fall, a fall of soul from heavenly body and spirit into a bestial body and spirit; salvation, not by faith nor by works, heaven and Christ in every soul; sincere wish for Christian virtue, the perfection of faith, all virtues by the mere turning of the mind, stopping all self-activity and passively attentive to the inner light, seeking no help from men or books but leaving oneself to God, looking upon Christ as temple, church, Supper, the inner worship whereby we live unto God above time and place; hell, no penalty by God, but only operation of self, 'the damnation springing up within us,' &c.

All these ideas Wesley rejects, and exhorts Law at the close (p. 509) to go to Paul instead of Tauler, cast out 'that vain philosophy,' speak nothing higher than the oracles of God, 'abhor all the high-flown bombast and unintelligible jargon of the mystics,' and come back to the 'plain religion of the Bible, "We love Him because He first loved us."' 'The doctrine of pure love (the loving God chiefly, if not solely, for His inherent perfections) I once firmly espoused. But I was at length unwillingly convinced that I must give it up or give up the Bible, which teaches no other love than "We love Him because He first loved us." And I desire no higher love of God till my spirit returns to Him (1758, xii. 212). The mystic scheme asserts the efficacy of physical to cure moral evil, and the necessity of sufferings to purify lapsed beings, neither of which I can find in the Bible (p. 214). A certain author turns the whole redemption of man by the blood of Christ into a mere metaphor. I doubt whether Jacob Behmen does not do the same. I am sure he does, if Mr. Law understands him right.' (Inge says that Law is the best expounder of Boehme.) 'The Divinity is unsusceptible of anger.' I take this to be the [illegible] of all the

mystics (p. 214). 'The immediate, essential, necessary means of reuniting men to God are prayer, mortification, and self-denial.' 'No, the means are living faith and that alone; prayer, mortification, and self-denial are the fruits of faith and the means of continuing and increasing it' (p. 215). In 1739, the year after his conversion, Wesley published *Hymns and Sacred Poems*, by himself and especially by his brother Charles. In the preface he objects to the 'scheme of the mystic divines' which he 'once had in great veneration,' (1) because these divines teach that 'we are to be accepted for our virtuous habits or tempers,' whereas we are accepted and justified solely for the righteousness and death of Christ; (2) because they teach seclusion or solitude, 'in order to purify the soul,' whereas Scripture teaches union and communion with each other; (3) because they do not emphasize good works, but rather resignation and contemplation, whereas the gospel knows no religion and no holiness but social, and continual external activity for God and man (xiv. 319–21).

It will be noticed from these quotations that Wesley's objection to mysticism is to that unevangelical, inactive, philosophical kind, which is more intent on meditation and metaphysicizing on abstruse questions, thinks more of speculation than of Scripture, more of the inner light and the vision of God than of doing His will here and now. It was his concern for the simplicity that was in Christ, for the way of salvation through Him by faith, to keep his people—the most of whom were not the learned and the 'wise and prudent' of this world—from the perplexities of philosophizings and the 'stillness' of a do-nothing Christianity; this it was which was behind his earnest efforts, in the early years after his conversion, to save English Christianity from a subtle and dangerous substitute for the gospel. That Wesley was always fair to mysticism, or understood it, and did not exaggerate its dangers, I would not say; but there is no doubt that he did well in keeping Methodism at all hazards

near to the New Testament in those testing years. He was determined that his converts should not float away on fog banks, but keep their feet on the solid ground of experimental religion with the Bible in their hand. In fact, it was Wesley's tremendous emphasis on the Bible, his overmastering passion for God's Word and Testimony, that was one of the springs of his reaction on this matter. Then Wesley inherited high regard for the means of grace—sacraments, public worship, prayer, &c.—and it was his true instinct that the salvation which had come to his people would be lost if they forsook the assembling of themselves together. These means are God-ordained, he thought, and, in any case, are essential for the nourishing of the Christian life. Besides, there was an Antinomian strain in contemporary religious movements, and Wesley, who was the incarnation of conscience as to the moral law, was exceedingly sensitive as to any effect on his societies in the direction of confusing their ethical distinctions in their religious enjoyments. An eminent authority, the Rev. Dr. Herbert B. Workman, puts the matter thus :

'There were many features in the mysticism of the times which will account for Wesley's dislike. The extravagances of Molther's doctrine of stillness—that the single duty of a man wanting faith, or to serve God perfectly, was "to be still" and do nothing, thus reducing prayer, the means of grace and good works, into hindrances to salvation, not to say sins—naturally disgusted his logical common sense and his energetic spirit. Then, much of the current mysticism lent itself to Antinomianism. Now Wesley abhorred Antinomianism, the iron of which, through an incident in his family history, had entered into his soul. [He refers to the remarkable case of Wesley's brother-in-law, Westley Hall, full particulars of which you will find in Tyerman, *The Oxford Methodists*, 1873, 386–411.] Antinomianism had ruined the influence of his early friends, the Moravians, and, but for his strong control, would have gained a footing in his societies. In addition to these two chief causes for his dread of

mysticism, we gather, from his many references to the subject in his *Journal* and letters, other reasons, some of which were scarcely just. He believed that mysticism advocated a doctrine of union with God, which would rob man of his personality. He dreaded the mystic's exclusion of reason, as he deemed it, for the appeal to feeling. He hated the fondling, amorous, irreverent language and symbolism which characterized some of its utterances. Nor would he allow that it was the uniform duty of the Christian "to choose the most disagreeable things, whether they came from God or the world." In much of this dislike to mysticism, Wesley, no doubt, was the child of his age, which vehemently suspected anything savouring of "inner light." The genius of Locke was in the ascendant, and that was fatal to all forms of transcendental or mystical thought' (*New History of Methodism*, 1909, i. 54–5).

With Wesley's training and practical bent, the wonder is, not that he reacted against extreme mysticism, but that, for all his life, he remained as favourable to it as he did. Now a few facts to show that he did thus remain.

That wonderful mystical classic, Thomas à Kempis's *Imitation of Christ*, he published himself in 1735 (in his mystical days, you say; yes, but it was republished in 1750), with introduction, directions, and a revised translation. Wesley boasted that his translation was the closest to the original of any that had appeared; and it is divided like the Latin into distinct sentences. (The *Imitation* was originally written in rhythmical cadences or a kind of metre, and the first translation—it was anonymous—which preserved that form, was published with a preface by Canon Liddon in 1890.) 'He was dissatisfied with Dean Stanhope's translation,' says his friend Moore, 'and determined to give a full view of the self-denying purity of his favourite guide' (*Life of Wesley*, ii. 401, Eng. ed.). In Wesley's *Life of Fletcher*, he says that he would sometimes slip into Fletcher's study and rarely 'saw any book before him besides the Bible and Christian

Pattern [*Imitation*].' In 1741 he published another edition of the *Imitation*, much abridged. The first had 319 pages, this 180, and other editions of the smaller were put out in 1744, 1746, 1759, 1777, 1780, and 1788 (and one in 1800, after his death). 'The societies,' says Wesley in 1768, 'are not half supplied with books, not even with "Kempis," which ought to be in every house' (*Large Minutes*, 1768, p. 23). Of this handbook of mysticism, Wesley says in his preface: 'The scope of this treatise is that perfection which every Christian is bound to aspire to. Now, although the whole essence of this consists in love, which unites the soul to God, yet, because perfect love implies (1) entire humility, (2) absolute self-renunciation, (3) unreserved resignation, (4) such a union of our will with the divine, as makes the Christian one spirit with God, a great part of it describes these tempers, whereby, he that loves God is made partaker of the divine nature.'

In 1741, Wesley published *An Extract of the Life of Monsieur de Renty, a late Nobleman in France*, who was also a true mystic. Wesley sometimes refers to him in his sermons, and quotes, more than once, his remarkable testimony: 'I bear about with me an experimental verity and a plenitude of the presence of the ever-blessed Trinity' (xiii. 77), and he even asks his sister Hetty whether she ever experienced 'something similar.' He says that while de Renty was serving the poor, or in other duties, he was in constant communion with God (xii. 44). If ever there was a man of utmost faith, piety, and mystical devotion it was de Renty, whose piety would have been anathema to Ritschl, but was a sweet savour unto God for Wesley (not his superstitions, as these were cut out in the abridgement of his *Life*).

In 1749 he published the Homilies of the Egyptian mystic Macarius, who held that the 'Christian's mind is the throne of God, like the chariot seat in Ezekiel's vision, and the heavenly Charioteer hath seated Himself upon thee, and thy soul has become all over a spiritual eye.'

The celebrated Cambridge mystic and Platonist, John Smith, was also included by Wesley in the *Christian Library* (1752, in vol. xix.), with this preface: 'I am sensible some parts of the following discourses are scarce intelligible to unlearned readers. But I could not prevail with myself on that account, to rob those who can understand them, of so great a treasure.'

In 1775, Wesley put out *A Collection of Forms of Prayer for Every Day in the Week*, in the preface of which he gives at least two elements of the mystic path.

'By a constant exercise of self-denial, the true follower of Christ continually advances in mortification. He is more dead to the world and the things of the world, till at length he can say with that perfect disciple of his Lord, Marquis de Renty, "I desire nothing but God," or with St. Paul, "I am crucified unto the world; I am dead with Christ; I live not, but Christ liveth in me."

'Christ liveth in me. This is the fulfilling of the law, the last staged Christian holiness: this maketh the man of God perfect. He being dead to the world is alive to God; the desire of whose soul is unto His name; who has given Him his whole heart; who delights in Him and in nothing else but what tends to Him; who for His sake burns with love to all mankind; who neither thinks, speaks, nor acts, but to fulfil His will, is on the last round of the ladder to heaven. Grace hath had its full work upon his soul. The next step he takes is into glory' (xiv. 271–2).

In a letter to Miss Bishop he says, 'there are excellent things in most of the mystic writers. As almost all of them lived in the Romish Church, they were lights whom the gracious providence of God raised up to shine in a dark place. But they did not give a clear, a steady, or a uniform light. That wise and good man, Professor Francke [the eminent Pietist, professor and founder in Halle], used to say of them, "They do not describe our common Christianity, but every one has a religion of his own." It is very true. . . .

Each one of them makes his own experience the standard of religion' (xiii. 25).

This was followed the next year by an abridged *Life of Madame Guyon*, with an interesting preface. Madame Guyon had great vogue in England. She was an enthusiastic mystic, and Wesley often had to warn his members against a too trustful following of that marvellous saint. She was altogether too high-flown for Wesley's plain, practical Bible sense. He calls her a 'fine writer, but very far from judicious. Her writings will lead any one who is fond of them into unscriptural Quietism. They strike at the root, and tend to make us contented without either faith or works' (xiii. 25). Still, with such warnings as these, Wesley wanted the best things in her life and books made known to the people of England. So he omitted the objectionable, and gave out over 280 pages. He says that she was not only 'a good woman, but good in an eminent degree; deeply devoted to God, and often favoured with uncommon communication of His Spirit. But she was far from infallible. . . . It is true that the anointing of the Holy One taught her all things which were necessary for her salvation.' He protests against her idea that God never can purify a soul, except by inward and outward suffering, which led her to the 'unscriptural practice of bringing suffering upon herself.' But 'how much of pure gold! What a depth of religion did she enjoy! Of the mind that was in Christ Jesus! What heights of righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost! How few such instances do we find of exalted love to God and our neighbour, of genuine humility, of invincible meekness, and unbounded resignation! So that, upon the whole, I know not whether we may not search many centuries to find another woman who was such a pattern of true holiness' (xiv. 276–8). Nor did Wesley omit all the mystical parts. In his preface to his *Ecclesiastical History* (1781), he fears that Mosheim was not 'much acquainted with inward religion. Perhaps it is owing to

this that he condemns all the mystic writers in a lump' (p. 298).

It was in vain that I looked up Gregory Lopez, in by far the best and most extensive collection of religious biographies in our language, McClintock and Strong, *Cyclopaedia*. Though Wesley published his Life in the *Christian Library* in 1755 (vol. i.) and in the *Arminian Magazine* in 1780, and though there are over half a dozen references to him in Wesley's *Works*, I doubt if you will find anywhere a single article on this eminent saint and mystic. I cannot give this Spanish devotee's life here, but only an extract from Wesley's abridgement, to show how he taught mysticism to the Methodists of England.

'He settled at St. Foy, Mexico, on May 22, 1589, and passed the rest of his life there in contemplation and prayer, without ever going out of it but twice, to a church which is a small half league from St. Foy. Before he communicated there, he fell on his knees before Father Vincent Calba, and, striking his breast, said, "Through the mercy of God I do not remember to have offended in any thing. Give me, if you please, the most holy sacrament." The raptures and ecstasies which he desired to have in this life were only to unite him to God, and to confirm him more and more in His holy will that he might obey Him in all things. . . . "I do not dispute, neither do I know anything but that God teaches me." . . . His soul appeared to be disengaged from all things else, by a pure union with God. Him he always enjoyed in the essence of his soul, where the supreme majesty delights to dwell. . . . No created thing was capable of interrupting or abating his continual love of God and his neighbour. So far from drawing back in this, his union with God, he advanced in it continually, referring to God by this simple act of pure love all the graces which He was pleased to give him, without assuming anything. This union was the source of all his knowledge, and God Himself was his teacher. . . . "Perfection does not consist in visions,

revelations, ravishments, ecstasies, though God often favours His servants therewith, because He acts toward every one according to his capacity, need, and disposition. But souls accustomed to acts of pure love, do not need the suspension of their senses in order to have deep communion with God, because these do not hinder them therein." His senses were perfectly spiritualized, entirely subject to his reason, and conformable to the will of God. . . . The union between God he compared to the union between light and air. "How much closer is the union between the pure essence of the soul and Him who is an infinitely pure Spirit" ' (*Christian Library*, vol. l., pp. 364, 386, 391–3).

No; Wesley was not at all averse to considerable concessions to mysticism, in spite of protests against unsound manifestations. For instance, in volume xxxviii. of the *Christian Library* (1754) we have *Letters Concerning and from B. Lawrence*, and also *Conversations with B. Lawrence*. Brother Lawrence was a mediaeval monk of Lorraine, whose *Practice of the Presence of God* attracted Professor William James, and has, in recent times, been republished in numerous cheap editions. It was this which was given forth under another name by Wesley. The brother speaks of his sins and penitence, and says: 'This King [God] full of mercy and goodness, very far from chastising me, embraces me with love, makes me eat at His table, serves me with His own hands, gives me the key of His treasures, converses and delights Himself with me incessantly in a thousand ways, and treats me in all respects as His favourite. It is thus that I consider myself from time to time in His holy presence.

'My most usual method is this simple attention and such a general passionate regard to God; to whom I find myself oftener attached with greater sweetness and delight than that of an infant at the mother's breast; so that, if I dare use the expression, I should call this state the Breasts of God, for the inexpressible sweetness which I taste and experience

there. If sometimes my thoughts wander by necessity or infirmity, I am presently recalled by inward motions so charming and delicious that I am ashamed to mention them' (*Christian Library*, vol. xxxviii., p. 17). 'I persevere in His holy presence, by simple attention and a general loving regard to God, which I call an actual presence of God; or, to speak better, an habitual, silent, and secret conversation with God, which often causes joys and raptures inwardly, and, sometimes, also outwardly, so great that I am forced to use means to prevent their appearance to others' (p. 16). 'How sweet is it to suffer with God! However great the sufferings may be, receive them with love. It is paradise to suffer and be with Him. If in this life we would enjoy the peace of paradise we must accustom ourselves to a familiar, humble, affectionate conversation with Him' (p. 21).

I cannot go into the tragic life of Molinos, that is, his persecutions by the Inquisition under the lead of the Jesuits. John Bigelow has made us familiar with them (*Molinos the Quietist*, New York, 1882). Suffice it to say, that Wesley published the *Spiritual Guide* of this famous and holy mystic, and I can give only one quotation.

'The soul which is entered into the heaven of peace [while in this life] acknowledges itself full of God and His supernatural gifts, because it lives grounded in a pure love, receiving equal pleasure in light and darkness, in night and day, in affliction and consolation. Through this holy and heavenly indifference [the Jesuits did not like this: it was too lofty for their worldly-wise methods] it never loses its peace in adversity, nor its tranquillity in tribulation, but feels itself full of unspeakable enjoyments. And although the prince of darkness makes all the assaults of hell against it with horrible temptations, yet it makes head against them and stands like a strong pillar; no more happening to it by them than happens to a high mountain in the time of storm and tempest. Though the valley is darkened with

clouds, hail, thunder, lightning, and hailstones, the lofty mountain [of the soul] glitters by the bright beams of the sun in quietness and serenity, continuing clear like heaven, immovable, full of light. . . . The soul becomes clear, peaceable, resplendent, quiet, serene, being a mere ocean of joy; so great, indeed, that a glimmering of God redounds even to the outside of it.

'Because in the throne of quiet are manifest the perfections of spiritual beauty, here the true light of the secret and divine mystics of our holy faith, here perfect humility, even to the amplest resignation, chastity, poverty of spirit, the sincerity and innocency of the dove, modesty, purity of heart, forgetfulness of every created thing, joyful simplicity, heavenly indifferency, continual prayer, and perfect disinterestedness, a most wise contemplation, a conversation in heaven, and, lastly, the most perfect and serene peace within, of which this happy soul may say what the wise man said of wisdom, that all other graces come with her' (*Christian Library*, vol. xxxviii., pp. 291–8).

Wesley also republished some of the sermons of the Cambridge Platonist and mystic, Henry More, but I have not space to quote—*Christian Library*, vol. xxxix., pp. 5–98. It was the opinion of Wesley's able friend, Alexander Knox, that his divinity contained the 'very spirit of Macarius and Chrysostom, of Smith and Cudworth, of de Sales and Fénelon, simplified, systematized, rationalized, evangelized.'

Dr. H. B. Workman well calls attention to the innate similarity of mysticism and Methodism. 'Many of the primary ideas of Methodism must be regarded as mystical.' Both 'build on the foundation, not of argument or observation, but of conscious spiritual experience.' They have felt and known divine realities, and they testify to what they have seen. This in general Christian experience, as well as in the witness of the Spirit or the so-called Doctrine of Assurance. 'With our inner ears,' said old Ruysbroeck,

'we shall hear the inborn Word of the Father, and in this Word we shall receive all knowledge and all truth.' The absolute certainty of salvation and blessedness, which rings so clearly in the mystics, is also the note of Methodism. It has caused her some reproach, but it is her glory. That means also that there are other avenues to the soul besides reason. You all know Wesley's fine vindication of reason, but that does not mean that he closed up the other sources of religious knowledge. Intuition, spiritual faculties, faith, hope, love, the open mind to the Heavenly Teacher—these were emphasized by the early Methodists. They did not condemn learning, but they knew that the humble soul could be taught of God. Finally, I have often been struck with the wonderful similarity of the Methodist and mystic doctrine of perfection, of salvation from all sin, of conformity with the will of God, of union with Christ or God, of the depth and height of the love of God in us which passeth knowledge, those higher and deeper things of the spirit in Christ and Paul and Tauler and Ruysbroeck and the Pietists and Wesley which were so offensive to Ritschl. This was the reason why Wesley published so many testimonies to this complete and regnant Christianity in his *Christian Library* and in separate books. If he found some Roman Catholic or Protestant saint, say Fénelon, Madame Guyon, Philip Henry, whose words and life gave eminent testimony to the fullness of salvation and a nobly satisfying and conquering piety, he would publish his or her writings or Life, and without being at all careful to leave out everything which a more matter-of-fact Christianity might object to. In this, Wesley did not mean, of course, that a less buoyant and assured experience was not genuine and Christian. He only meant that John's words were true: 'Of His fullness have all we received, and grace upon grace.' Wesley was one of the most catholic spirits of his time. Presbyterian, Baptist, Roman Catholic, Friend, Lutheran, Reformed—all knew the heavenly vision, and, wherever a true heart had given out

anything fine and rich for the Christian life, Wesley appropriated it for his people.

In preparing this article, I felt that the hymns of the Wesleys were of special value as to the mystical bent of Methodism, and I have marked many more to quote than I shall have space for. One of the most common ('Author of faith, eternal Word') is really one of the most mystical:

> Faith lends its realising light,
> The clouds disperse, the shadows fly;
> The Invisible appears in sight,
> And God is seen by mortal eye.

No mystic's experience went higher than this:

> I rode on the sky,
> (Freely justified I!)
> Nor envied Elijah his seat;
> My soul mounted higher
> In a chariot of fire,
> And the moon was under my feet.

Or this ('Fountain of life, to all below'):

> We soon shall reach the boundless sea;
> Into Thy fullness fall;
> Be lost and swallowed up in Thee,
> Our God, our all in all.

In reading the mystics, I have often been reminded of these words of Johann A. Rothe, translated by Wesley:

> With faith I plunge me in this sea.

Zinzendorf's great hymn, 'I thirst, Thou wounded Lamb of God,' translated by Wesley, is full of the mystic spirit, as penetrated by Christianity. Brother Lawrence could not breathe forth anything deeper than

> My soul and all its powers
> Thine, wholly Thine, shall be.

Or this, in 'Come, Holy Ghost, all quickening fire':

My will be swallowed up in Thee;
Light in Thy light still may I see,
Beholding Thee with open face;
Called the full power of faith to prove,
Let all Thy hallowed heart be love,
And all my spotless life be praise.

There is a side of the German evangelical mysticism in Charles Wesley's lines which strike a note not congenial to our atmosphere:

Jesus, cast a pitying eye;
Humbled at Thy feet I lie,
Fain within Thy arms would rest,
Fain would lean upon Thy breast;
Thrust my hand into Thy side,
Always in the cleft abide,
Never from Thy wounds depart,
Never leave Thy bleeding heart.
(In hymn, 'Saviour of the sin-sick soul.')

So energetic and valiant a soldier of Jesus Christ as Charles Wesley could not mean, perhaps, the 'stillness' of the old mystics, at least not Quietism, in his fine lines in his great hymn, 'O Love divine, how sweet Thou art.' It echoes the longings of many a devout soul. And his description of the land of perfect salvation, to which God introduces His own in this life, would find a hearty response in the soul of many a Tauler in 'O Glorious hope of perfect love!'

Methodism combined the restfulness of the mystic with the activity of the soldier, and so, like early Christianity, she found a place for many a quiet saint like Hester Ann Roe Rogers, and for the valiant preacher, Captain Webb, or for many who combined in one both sides of Christianity, like Fletcher.

J. A. Faulkner.

SOME TENDENCIES AMONG INDIAN STUDENTS TO-DAY

STUDENTS always tend to be extremists in all countries and in all ages. Especially is this so in times of controversy and of excitement. They are at an age when they quickly respond to emotional appeals; they have not yet felt the restraining influence of vested interests or rigid conventions; their life together tends to develop a strong corporate mind, and to create a 'herd-instinct' which is intolerant of anything that hinders its headlong path. As a result, you will find students to-day among the most extreme adherents of nationalistic movements, such as Fascism in Italy, Bolshevism in Russia, Imperialism in Japan.

Those in authority often try to meet the dangers of such student extravagance by measures of repression. But history has shown that such a policy is usually quite ineffective. Often, indeed, it acts as a direct stimulus to extremist tendencies. Moreover, a Government which persistently antagonizes the mind of its student community finds that the ranks of the younger generation of political leaders tend to become more and more hostile and intransigent.

In India to-day, it is well known that the students as a whole are in sympathy with the extreme left of political radicalism, and are a constant source of embarrassment to the Government. This situation is by no means peculiar to India. It will be found in substantially the same form in other countries, such as Korea, the Philippines, and parts of eastern Europe, where a similar political situation exists, under a Government that is foreign to the people of the country. But in India there are additional and special reasons for it. The whole of educated India to-day is under the influence of an immense surge of nationalistic feeling. This feeling is emotional rather than rational. It is easy to discredit it as unbalanced. But the feeling remains.

Indian students are in no mood to weigh dispassionately the advantages and disadvantages of foreign rule. They know that India is not a nation as the other peoples of the world are 'nations.' They know, for instance, that if they, as Indians, find themselves in an international gathering of students, all their friends, be they Chinese, or Norwegian, or Bolivian, or New Zealander, will have a national flag as a sign of their nationhood. The Indian alone has no such flag—unless it be the unofficial flag of the Swaraj party, which is more a symbol of revolt than of a genuine national heritage. They know, too, that, in almost every department of their national life, the ultimate direction of policy lies in the hands of men who are not of their own race or religion; who rarely show, or desire to show, any real insight into the Indian mind; and who, under the cover of an entirely correct social politeness, are unable altogether to conceal their fundamental conviction of their own national superiority, and of the incapacity of the Indian for the higher ranges of responsibility and initiative.

Moreover, Indian education at school and college starts with the assumption that the really important facts of life are connected with the history, science, and culture of the West. The heritage of India was for many years entirely and deliberately ignored. Even now, it is only receiving tardy and reluctant recognition. The student finds that the change from the culture of his home-life to that imposed by Government upon Indian schools and colleges is immense. The knowledge which he receives at school or college seems entirely disconnected from the knowledge which he received from home; and generally no attempt is made to weave the two together into a harmonious unity, or to show how Indian thought and culture can find the fulfilment of some of their best ideals in the expanding realms of modern knowledge, which is ultimately neither Western nor Eastern, but the heritage of humanity as a whole.

The new knowledge has to some extent entered into him,

in spite of himself; for much of it is true and indisputable, and he cannot refuse it. But, deeper down in his heart, the old emotions and feelings of home and of Indian religion lie in most cases untouched. Here and there, the new knowledge roots out the old, and the young man becomes (as Macaulay hoped he would become) Western in thought, but without the Western springs of religion in his heart; 'denationalized,' and knowing that he is no longer a true 'son of India.' Very rarely has he learnt how to blend the newer Western knowledge with the old culture of his motherland. There is perhaps the gravest evil inherent in any system of government that is controlled by those who do not share the culture of the people they seek to educate.

For seventy years past (indeed, ever since Queen Victoria's Proclamation at the close of the Indian Mutiny), the official manifestoes issued by the Government of India, in the name of the Queen-Empress or King-Emperor, have been generally and increasingly sympathetic and progressive in tone. But, unfortunately, the Indian student knows only too well that these Royal Proclamations have seldom expressed the *real* opinion of those who have administered the Government of India on the spot. The Proclamations have been put forward by the Home Government, frequently in the teeth of the public opinion of the majority of British residents in India—including the officials of the Government itself; and the British Press in India has not hesitated to criticize and condemn these Proclamations with uncompromising vigour.

In most cases, Government officers have carried out their duties along the lines of the official policy with integrity and honesty. But only in a few cases has there been any genuine approval of the measures inaugurated by the Home Government; and, in the private talk of the European clubs, the real feeling of the Government community in India has found open expression. Through many channels, this has found its way to Indian ears. Moreover, a Government officer, however conscientious he may be in administering a

policy which has been entrusted to him by his superior authority, is not able to conceal, in his personal dealings with Indian colleagues or subordinates, the real significance of his feelings. The more honest a man he is, the more will these become apparent.

The effect of all this upon Indian opinion has been exceedingly serious; it has created the impression that the official Proclamations issued by the Government of India in the name of the Sovereign are mere 'camouflage,' and do not represent an honest intention to carry out the policy therein indicated. 'Profession' and 'practice' in these matters seem to the Indian to be far apart in the Government of India; and this, perhaps more than anything else, has fatally undermined the belief (which undoubtedly was widely prevalent in India a few decades ago) that, whatever might be the failures of British administration, it could at least be trusted to stand by its word. To-day, any reference to 'British honour' in India provokes only a scornful smile of contempt among educated Indians.

No one can read the Indian Press without noticing what a large space is given to incidents which are alleged to express discourtesy or insult from Europeans to Indians. To read these columns, one might suppose that the European of to-day had surpassed all his predecessors in rudeness and violence. As a matter of fact, the reverse is probably true. Europeans as a whole to-day are generally more careful than at any time in the previous history of India to avoid acts which would aggravate an already embittered situation. Occasional acts of rudeness do occur; but they tend to occur less and less frequently, and they generally are deprecated by the bulk of Europeans themselves. Nevertheless, the situation has not improved in this matter of personal relations between Indians and Europeans.

The last fifty years have seen a change in the outlook of educated Indians (a change which is largely the direct result of the Government's policy of higher education) which has

been far more rapid and drastic than any corresponding change in the attitude of the British community towards the Indian. The latter has undoubtedly improved on the whole; but the movement towards greater courtesy and consideration has been comparatively slow; while, on the Indian side, the demand for equality in every department in life has advanced with far greater rapidity. The result has been increasing misunderstanding and bitterness.

Twenty, or even ten, years ago, the Government officer in a country district found that, if his attitude towards the people was one of kindly paternalism, they were more than satisfied, and met his benevolent attitude with grateful smiles. To-day, if he adopts the same attitude, or even if he adds to it an element of greater kindness, he finds himself met with scowls and criticism on the part of educated Indian young men in every town and village, who detect in his attitude a note of 'superiority,' which their fathers accepted as a matter of course, but which they bitterly resent; and their attitude in turn leads the Government officer to regard them as ungrateful and insolent, and to lament the old days when there was sincere good will between the sahib and the Indian people.

These tendencies have been in progress for many years past, and are familiar to all students of the Indian situation. But at the present time certain new features have entered the situation.

First, there is the atmosphere of *disillusionment*, in sharp contrast to the buoyant hopes and expectations of the Non-Co-operation movement of 1921–2. To those outside India, that movement generally appeared so extravagant in its programme, so fantastic in its methods, that it is hardly realized how completely it gained the confidence of the great mass of younger Indians, particularly of the students. Most of these sincerely believed that the goal of Indian self-government was almost within their reach. Mahatma Gandhi had assured them that it was within their power to

bring the Government of India to its knees within a few months; and, in the excitement of high hopes, they hardly paused to notice the *conditions* which he had firmly laid down—conditions which involved a spirit of absolute self-sacrifice for the national cause, and of sustained devotion through long periods of persecution.

Weeks passed, and months, and years; and still the foreign Government remained, outwardly at least, as secure as ever. And the young enthusiasts who had leapt to greet the millennium began to relapse into disappointment and gloom, and to realize that their goal was a good deal farther away than they had thought. Many of them began to wonder whether that goal would be reached at all within their own lifetime.

So a characteristic of student life and thought in 1930 is the note of disillusionment and disappointment, sometimes verging into bitterness and pessimism. It is an atmosphere which, though quieter than the storms of 1921 and 1922, is perhaps even more dangerous. The student strikes and fervid agitations of the Non-Co-operation period left the agitators exhausted and depressed. But there has been no rebuilding of mutual confidence or restoring of mutual good will. The situation is still charged with suspicion and mistrust.

Meanwhile, there has been a widespread rejection of the ideal of *non-violence*, which was proclaimed so fervidly by Mahatma Gandhi in 1921, and acclaimed enthusiastically by the whole body of his supporters. When non-violent Non-Co-operation failed to bring immediate Home Rule, a large number of those who had professed themselves devoted followers of Gandhi began to express doubts and questions, and to suggest that the use of force was the only lesson which the materialistic West really understood, and the only weapon by which subject-nations had ever gained their freedom.

To-day, although Mr. Gandhi's gospel of non-violence

still holds the allegiance of a large part of India (including probably most of its finest thinkers and men of character), nevertheless a large number of the rank and file have exchanged that gospel for the worship of force. To-day, that worship finds open and popular expression in all Nationalist circles. This is an important characteristic of student life in 1930 which distinguishes it from the student life of five or six years earlier.

Finally, there is the controversy over the *Simon Commission*, and more recently over the Viceroy's Pronouncement. These controversies are so recent, and events are moving so rapidly at the moment, that it is scarcely possible to forecast the immediate future. It is fairly safe to predict, however, that Indian student opinion, now as at all times, will sympathize with the most advanced and uncompromising demands, and will be inclined to denounce as traitors to the National cause all who show willingness to meet the 'powers that be' half way.

Is it, then, any use to try and understand an attitude so extravagant and unreasonable? Is there any prospect that any change of policy would conciliate student opinion? What do they really want? Do they know themselves what they want, and are they prepared under any circumstances to modify their intransigent attitude?

In the mind of the Indian student, questions of honour (*Izzat*) loom much larger than questions of profit. To many Britons, the ultimate justification for British rule in India rests upon the solid material benefits which that rule has brought to the people of India, as well as to the people of England. The Indian student is inclined to question whether these national benefits to India have been as great as her rulers think. In any case, he insists that, however great these benefits may have been, they do not counterbalance the disregard of personal self-respect, of national honour, which is inherent in any foreign system of government. He broods continually upon the fact that the Indian is not

the master of the destinies of India; that the control of the future of the land is in hands alien to the soil; that he himself, though compelled to remain a subject of the British Empire, is not allowed freedom of travel nor full rights of citizenship in large areas of that Empire; that he is subject to petty annoyances in his own country and in his own personal affairs, against which he has no redress, because the ultimate power rests in the hands of those who believe that the interests of their own people should have first consideration. All this breeds in his mind a deep-rooted sense of grievance; and this grievance is not outweighed by any material benefits whatever, real or imaginary.

To many young Indians, for example, the essential question in regard to 'Dominion Status' or 'Complete Independence' is not whether India will, or will not, ultimately remain within the British Empire, but whether India is, or is not, to have the right of deciding, as a self-governing nation, whether she wishes to remain 'within' or 'without.' Once that right to decide were granted to India, a large number of Indians, even of the most extreme type, would be prepared to agree that, under present conditions, it would be to the advantage of India, as well as of the Empire, that India should remain as part of the Empire. But they stress the fact that the other Dominions, such as Canada and Australia, are, in effect, free nations voluntarily electing to remain associated with other free nations in a Commonwealth or Federation which bears the name of Empire, but which is, in fact, far removed from the 'Empires' of old, ruled by a central despotic power.

To the average Britisher, on the other hand, the necessity for India to remain within the British Empire is an axiom, which he is not prepared to see brought into question. On that basis alone is he willing to negotiate. It is this very pre-condition which seems to the Indian to violate India's national honour; while to the Englishman any questioning of it violates the honour of Britain. It is tragic that, while

there is such a large measure of agreement between the best men on both sides regarding both the ultimate goal and the main lines of a satisfactory final settlement, there is always this apparently unsurmountable barrier.

Is there anything that can be done, then, to transform the present atmosphere of suspicion, misunderstanding, and misrepresentation into a more wholesome atmosphere of mutual confidence and hope? Perhaps the deepest need is for a *quicker imagination* and insight which will bring a truer understanding of those whose background of life is different from our own. A policy of social separation from the people has generally prevented the officers of the Government in India from attempting or even desiring to enter into any real personal friendships with the people of India. Yet it is through such friendship alone that persons of different cultures are able to see a little into each other's hearts.

A second urgent need is for a policy on the part of the Government of India which is *consistent and fearless*. The story of the last fifty years in India gives only too much credit to the suggestion that that policy has consisted of long series of surrenders to popular Nationalist clamour, not from genuine conviction or generosity, but from weariness or even weakness. The concessions made have been immense; enormous strides have already been taken in the direction of Indian self-government. But these concessions have so rarely been made with any real generosity, have so often been so much spoilt by the note of grudging surrender, that they have not produced that good will which might reasonably have been hoped for; and have encouraged the Indian to think that nothing pays so well in India as agitation. If the British Government could make India believe that they had laid down a policy dictated by regard for the highest interests of India, and that from that policy they would not be deflected either by threats or cajolements, great service would be rendered to the cause of understanding and mutual respect.

There is also great need for the restoration of the atmosphere of *honesty*. Professions of good will towards India are made in abundance in the columns of the British Press in India, and on the occasions of public dinners, by those who represent European interests. But these professions often have a ring of insincerity about them. The real trend of opinion is reflected in the after-dinner talk at the European clubs or in the atmosphere of the business office or the railway station. And the Indian student is quick to notice the contrast between practice and profession. It would be a gain to good relations between the two peoples if either professions of generosity could be a little abated or good will shown a little more in act as well as in word.

In short, the crux of the present situation is the restoration of better personal relations, especially between leading members of both communities. Without this, political changes will have little more effect than the shuffling of a pack of cards from which all 'honours' have been removed. You may change the system of government; but a background of suspicion and mistrust will render any system ineffective. On the other hand, given a measure of mutual confidence and respect, even an inadequate system of government is capable of steady improvement and evolution; particularly among a people such as the Indians, who are unusually quick to respond to any gesture of friendship.

For the future welfare of India, therefore, the personalities of those who guide and lead her destiny are more important than their political labels or theories. The past ten years have seen instances of statesmen and rulers in India whose theories have been liberal and progressive, but whose personalities have been marked by a frigidity and a note of superiority which has debarred them from winning the affection of the Indian people. Others there have been (among them, the present Viceroy) whose political traditions are such that they might have been expected to be less sympathetic to Indian aspirations, but who, by virtue of

qualities of sympathy and grace, have created an atmosphere of confidence and friendship. On such foundations alone can England and India build securely together for the days that lie ahead.

E. C. DEWICK.

DIPLOMACY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

Studies in Eighteenth-Century Diplomacy, 1740-1748. By Sir Richard Lodge. (John Murray. 12*s.* 6*d.*) As Professor of History in the University of Edinburgh and Ford Lecturer at Oxford, this subject has long occupied Sir Richard Lodge's attention. His experience as a teacher has convinced him that the darkest period in the history of Europe in the eighteenth century is that of the War of the Austrian Succession. After the Great War he set himself to work out the activities of Carteret at Hanau and Worms in the one year of his greatness, 1743, and then turned to the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. That he found could not be understood without investigating the activities of the fourth Earl of Sandwich at Breda and the Hague, and the earlier relations of the Marquis d'Argensen with Sardinia and the Dutch. Diplomacy was carried on under great difficulties where dispatches were often held up for days or weeks by adverse winds, and were exposed to the risk of capture by an enemy ship or a privateer, which capture might betray the secret of a cipher or even of a policy. Carteret was ousted from office in order to burke discussion in Parliament; Sandwich was hampered sorely by the Duke of Newcastle in arranging the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. Newcastle's egotism was nauseating. He 'clamoured for the fullest recognition of his services to the State, and whimpered like a spoiled child if the allowance of praise fell short of his expectations.' 'I am determined,' he wrote, 'never to have any Minister in my department who tells me he is wiser than I am.' 'He would have come down to history,' says Sir Richard, 'as the architect of his country's ruin if he had not found what he had so long dreaded—a masterful colleague in William Pitt.' Light is thrown on the tangled diplomacy of the period and on the character and aims of the leading English and Continental politicians by Sir Richard Lodge's prolonged studies in the State papers and other first-hand sources.

THE LAW OF LOVE[1]

AS a Jew writing for Jews the evangelist Matthew presents Jesus in contrast to Moses as the new lawgiver, and the Sermon on the Mount as the counterpart of the law of Sinai. The main theme of the Sermon is the contrast between the new life and the old law. Pharisaic piety as well as scribal interpretations are condemned. Jesus fulfils the law, not by imposing more outward commands, but by giving the already given commands a more inward content. Anger and contempt for others are condemned, and not murder only. The lustful look is forbidden, as well as the adulterous deed. The casuistic distinction in oaths is censured as well as their violation; and the practice of speaking truth, abolishing the need of oaths, is enjoined. Here Jesus moves from the outward obedience to the inward disposition; respect for others, restraint of temper, purity of desire, sincerity of mind, are what the new life will produce as the fruit of the Spirit.

Two of the illustrations of this contrast of old law and new life may in this article receive separate treatment, for two reasons: (1) they are illustrations, not of individual commandments, as against murder, adultery, and perjury, but of fundamental characteristics of the old law, namely the principle of retaliation, the *lex talionis*, the basis of ancient justice, and the restriction of the scope of moral obligation, the mark of Jewish exclusiveness. (2) To both of them is opposed what Jesus on another occasion declared to be the supreme principle of morality, love for all men, enemies as well as friends. Not confining myself to these two illustrations, but placing them in the wider context of Jesus's teaching generally, I shall treat the whole subject of Christian Love.

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[1] Matthew v. 38–48.

I

(i.) We must first of all attempt to discover the content of love by an analysis of its psychic factors. While emotion is the prominent and dominant feature in love, as the term is usually understood, it seems necessary to insist that emotion cannot be detached from thought, or from action, and that love is an exercise of the whole personality. Christian love involves (to put the matter summarily) a judgement of value, a sentiment of interest, and a purpose of good.

(1) Although it is tempting with Moffatt to read 'the second and third clauses of verse 22 as a rabbinic comment upon the closing words of verse 21,' restoring the text as follows: 'Whosoever murders must come up for sentence; whosoever maligns his brother must come before the Sanhedrin; whosoever curses his brother must go to the fire of Gehenna,' yet, even in this case, Jesus may be regarded as endorsing the censure of contempt for the mental capacity or moral character of another. His teaching about the value to God of the individual soul in the parables of the Lost Sheep and the Lost Coin justifies the assumption that the love He enjoins involves a recognition of the *worth* of another as the child of the heavenly Father. Kant's insistence on the recognition of humanity in another as the basis of moral obligation is akin to this. Such a recognition of worth does not, however, exclude a sense of the *unworthiness* of another as sinful. Indeed, it is the *ideal worth* which must be the measure of the *actual unworthiness*. But even then the recognition of worth will forbid rash and harsh judgement, reckless and cruel censure. A Christian will shrink from thinking the worst, and strive to think the best possible of others.

(2) Where there is the judgement of value, there will also be the sentiment of interest. We must be interested in those whom we value. But we must give the word interest the full meaning which its origin, Latin *inter est*, allows. It means that we have a common life with those we love, that

we rejoice with them in their joys, and mourn with them in their griefs, in so far as these are in accord with their worth, and do not spring out of their unworthiness. For the judgement of value must control the sentiment of interest. Sinful pleasures or pains we cannot share, except in compassion for the objects of our affection, that such are their joys or griefs. When conscience forbids that we should feel *with* them, affection allows that we should feel *for* them. In any case, indifference is impossible; some sentiment of joy or sorrow there must be.

(3) In the normal psychic process, expression completes impression and affect. Thought and feeling issue in action. Even when the circumstances forbid the action, there is the purpose of good. Where love is, the good of another is always willed, even when it cannot at once be done. While lesser and lower goods are not excluded, the purpose of good must be the realization of the *worth* of the personality loved, and the recovery from the *unworthiness*. Christian love means that as children of God we desire and endeavour to win others for the same relation to God.

(ii.) This conception of love seems to me to remove two difficulties.

(1) How can there be a *law of love*, how can love be enjoined? If love were only a spontaneous emotion, an individual attraction, no command could enforce it. But we can direct our attention, and we can control our volition. Let it be frankly admitted that between persons there seem to be natural affinities and natural repulsions. Some people we cannot help liking, and others we cannot avoid disliking; and we cannot simply force these inclinations towards, or away from, others. But love is not merely liking. We may direct our attention to the *worth* of another as the object of God's love, to his *unworthiness* as evoking the grace of God in forgiveness; and if we practise, as we may, such thinking about others, we shall reach that judgement of value which is the first element in love; and that judgement will modify

the feeling of like or dislike, enhancing the one, and restraining the other. Still more, if we form the habit of willing the good of others, and of doing them good as we have opportunity, there will be a reaction on our sentiments towards them. Even if emotion does not follow expression, as some psychologists hold, namely, that we are sad because we cry or sob, and glad because we laugh, there is no doubt that volition and action do affect emotion. We come to feel kindly to those of whom we think justly and to whom we act rightly. It is not honesty, as some men boast, to say and to do to others just as we think of them or feel towards them. It is not hypocrisy to treat others in word and deed better than our thoughts about them or feeling towards them would prompt; for, by acting rightly, we discipline ourselves to think truly and feel kindly.

(2) What does loving our neighbour as ourselves mean? Does it mean that we wish him to be as selfish as in our worst moments we might wish ourselves to be? This love to self and neighbour must be determined by, and subordinate to, our love for God with all our mind and soul and strength. The self to be loved is the self that thus seeks and strives to live for God; and love to others means that we do not hinder, but help them all we can so to live for God. As the greater includes the less, it does not exclude care for the bodily needs of others, for we desire our own needs met; but it primarily includes concern for the Kingdom of God present and dominant in them as in us. It does not involve quantitative equality, but recognizes qualitative differences in vocation, function, position within the society. A husband's love for his wife or a wife's love for her husband does not involve the same duties, but complementary; so is it of teacher and scholar, ruler and subject. What love does require is that mutual duties, whatever they be, shall be done as thoroughly and fully as would be desired, were the positions reversed. What the Golden Rule means is that I shall do, as far as I can, for another, in view of his vocation,

function, and relations, what I should desire to have done to me, in view of my position. Love thus involves, not identity of action, but such a variety as shall promote unity within the society.

II

Having defined the nature of Christian love, we must next seek to determine its range. (1) This is indicated in the second of the two passages under consideration. Jesus opposes Himself to *Jewish exclusiveness*. He condemns the saying, which, if not as regards the second part expressly recorded, yet gives the restrictive sense in which the Jews generally accepted their moral obligations. 'You must love your neighbour and hate your enemy.' The Jew understood by neighbour a fellow countryman; and, in the parable of the Good Samaritan, Jesus overthrows this barrier. The enemy for the Jew in the time of Christ was every Gentile, especially the Roman oppressor. As addressing His disciples especially, Jesus had in view their persecutors for the gospel's sake (verses 10–12). But we must not limit the range of the love required of Christian disciples to this particular instance. As God's beneficence in nature is universal, without even being restrained by distinction of character in men, so must Christian love be impartial. While Jesus, as Jewish Messiah, and fulfilling God's promises to the covenant nation as such, confined His brief ministry to the lost sheep of the house of Israel, His attitude to Gentiles and Samaritans, in His occasional contacts with them, showed that His love was not so confined. The restriction was due to temporary expediency, and not to permanent principle; His rejection by the Jews would have been more complete had He approached the Gentiles or the Samaritans. St. Paul had the mind of Christ in the universalism he so often proclaimed. In Christ the differences among men that caused divisions had been transcended in a common life in Him as God's children. The barriers had fallen between Jew and Gentile,

Greek and barbarian, bond and free, learned and unlearned, male and female. If Christian love must extend to the enemy, it must surely embrace all men. To-day social, national, and racial differences threaten the divisions which Christian love must bridge so as to secure the unity of all mankind in Christ.

(2) The affirmation of this Christian universalism must be guarded against a misconception. Verses 46 and 47—'For if you love only those who love you, what reward do you get for that? do not the taxgatherers do as much? And if you only salute your friends, what is special about that? do not the very pagans do as much?' (Moffatt's Translation) —may seem a depreciation of natural affection and the ordinary social relations. Jesus does not condemn this restricted interest as bad; it is good, but His disciples are expected to exceed the righteousness of scribes and Pharisees even (verse 20). It is true that Jesus does not deal in such detail as does Confucius with the varying relations in human society, husband and wife, parent and child, brother and brother, friend and friend, ruler and subject. But when occasion arose, He recognized the existence of such relations, and enforced their corresponding obligations. The reference to the unclean look and to divorce, in the Sermon as well as elsewhere, show what His view of marriage was as a divinely constituted union which it is sinful for man to dissolve. His enforcement of the duty of children to parents in condemnation of scribal casuistry is a recognition of the obligations of this relationship. When a brother sought His intervention in a family dispute, He rebuked the motive of the request. Among His disciples were three, James, John, and Peter, whom He drew to Himself in closer intimacy. The home of Bethany was dear to Him, and Mary especially had chosen the good part of sympathy with Him in His passion. I do not identify 'the disciple whom Jesus loved' with John, the son of Zebedee, and thus another may be included in the circle of His intimates. His patriotism

appears in His lament over Jerusalem; His acceptance of the claims of the State in His teaching on tribute to Caesar; His filial affection in His committal of His mother, even on the cross, to the guardianship of His beloved disciple. Christian love does not exclude, but purifies and enhances, the natural affections and the ordinary social relations. Some social distinctions, such as slavery involves, it has abolished, as irreconcilable with the Christian estimate of the value, the liberty, and the dignity of every man. It does not appear, however, to be likely that national peculiarities will be all merged in a neutral cosmopolitanism, but it is more probable that they may be preserved in a varied internationalism. One thing Christian love must do; it must condemn and destroy all differences among men that breed suspicion and hostility, that make men enemies of one another; for in Christ all enemies must be reconciled.

(3) There are, however, two limitations on the claim of these natural affections and ordinary social relationships which the teaching of Jesus imposes. (*a*) ***Firstly***, all these must be subordinated to the higher claim of the Kingdom of God. In His answer to His mother at Cana He affirmed that in the fulfilment of His vocation she must not use her mother's authority, or claim her Son's obedience. He called His disciples to forsake home and kindred to follow Him; and, in comparison with their devotion to Him, to hate father and mother. While in monasticism this submission may have assumed a form not always in accord with the will of Christ, to His inexorable demand for such surrender, when necessary for His sake and cause, there can be no challenge. (*b*) ***Secondly***, as the claim of the Kingdom is higher, so those who acknowledge that Kingdom are brought into a more intimate relation to one another. Jesus, rejecting the interference with His ministry by His mother and brethren, declared that these relationships must yield to the relationship constituted by the one purpose of obedience to God. Hence we may, from His words, justify the distinction

recognized in the primitive community between *philadelphia* and *philanthropia*, love of the brethren and love of men. The love which is to be diffused among all mankind may, as it were, be focused with greater intensity within the Christian fellowship. We have not preserved the word *philanthropia* as we have the word *philadelphia*, and in a great measure the absence of the word is an indication of the absence of the idea. Christian fellowship within the Church to-day does not represent a more intense and intimate affection than the relationship in the world outside. The Church is thus less vitally and effectively the body of Christ, the organ of His love towards mankind. A renewed *philadelphia* would be an attractive pattern and persuasive motive of a renewed *philanthropia*. In the Church, Christian love should be at its fullest and freest. Natural affections and social relations may be sublimated into spiritual devotions by love. But beyond these love must reach out to all men, not limited by any barrier, not even the barriers hostility may raise. For this love returns good for evil, and triumphs over hate in enduring the evils which it may inflict. It returns a blessing for a curse, and prayer for persecution. It is as impartial in its beneficence as is God in giving sunshine and shower to evil and good, just and unjust.

III

It is from this broad standpoint of the supreme principle of religion and morality, the equal love of self and neighbour, that we must subject to closer scrutiny the teaching of Jesus about non-resistance to evil, about the meaning of which there is so widespread difference of judgement in the Christian Church.

(1) Between the general principle and this particular instance of the conduct required of a Christian there is a bridge, over which we must, as it were, pass. An application of Christian love to which Jesus allows no exception is the duty of *forgiveness*. Man's need of the divine forgiveness is

universal; Jesus expressly enjoins as a condition of that forgiveness the duty of human forgiveness; and the absolute demand is nowhere qualified. 'If you forgive men their trespasses, then your heavenly Father will forgive you; but if you do not forgive men, your Father will not forgive your trespasses either' (Matt., verses 14, 15, Moffatt).

This teaching presents such difficulties to our thought that we must examine it very closely and carefully. (*a*) *First* of all what do we mean by forgiveness? Although common usage does not make the distinction between the two words, it is useful to distinguish pardon and forgiveness. This distinction has been fully and clearly put by a writer on Christian ethics, Dr. F. A. M. Spencer, in his book, *The Theory of Christ's Ethics*, p. 186. 'There are two words in English with allied but distinguishable meanings; pardon and forgiveness. The former term is perhaps the more dignified term; the latter suggests greater intimacy and tenderness. A king pardons a subject; a parent forgives a child. When a king pardons a criminal he remits the penalty to which the latter has rendered himself liable. When a father forgives his child, he receives him back into loving intimacy. God is to men both King and Father, and, at least, if we believe that He punishes, we may think of Him as both pardoning and forgiving in the senses defined. If He punishes and then restores to intimacy, He may be said to have refused pardon but to have forgiven. In any case, refusal to pardon by no means prevents subsequent restoration to the affectionate intercourse which characterizes the relation of parent and child.'

(*b*) The Christian's duty as a child of God is to forgive, and if forgiveness demands pardon, also to pardon; but in some cases love may require that the consequences of sin should be endured; but the assurance of forgiveness will make them not merely penal, but remedial. This distinction is important for dealing with the passage before us. Forgiveness may not always demand non-resistance of wrong; it

may even impose the duty of restraint, reproach, and penalty.

(*c*) The description of forgiveness as receiving back into loving intimacy raises a further question. Such intimacy is a mutual relation between the forgiving and the forgiven. It cannot be secured until there is repentance, the confession of sin, and the plea for forgiveness by him who has done the wrong. Must love then wait for this change of heart? No, for we may distinguish the will to forgive, which should at once be the response to the wrong done, and the full realization of that loving purpose when the forgiveness sought can be received. Nay, love, even, will lose no opportunity and use all the means at its command to evoke penitence. God did not wait for the world's repentance to send its Saviour, but that sacrifice saves in evoking the penitence as well as conveying the pardon. Love may allow the loved to suffer in forgiving; but love also suffers with the loved so that forgiveness may be fully received.

(2) These considerations will show how mistaken is the method of isolating these particular instances of non-retaliation as if they were an absolute decree to be literally obeyed in all circumstances. In dealing with this passage we must consider the historical situation to which it applies, the conditions which confront us in life of which it does not take account, and the validity of the claim for general application which many pacificists, if not all, make for it.

(*a*) Jesus is here contrasting the new life of the Christian disciple with the old law, the *lex talionis*, retribution, the infliction of penalty, commensurate with offence. While the first instance He gives refers to the violent action, probably in anger, of one person towards another, the second deals with litigation, and the third with forced labour, the compulsion on civilians to carry burdens, exercised as a right by Roman soldiers on the march. The last does not seem to belong to this context at all, unless we assume that the beggar or borrower would exercise some coercion, which

might be resisted. It is a counsel addressed to the people generally to submit to the oppression of the Romans, or to the disciples in particular to accept the persecution which might fall on them for their faith. The policy of the Zealots, one of whom became a disciple, is here as elsewhere rejected. His cause Jesus would not sustain by any use of force, but He expected its triumph by endurance and sacrifice. The disastrous result of the Jewish rebellion against Rome in A.D. 70 on the one hand, and the triumph of the martyrs over the hostility of the Roman Empire on the other hand, prove the wise foresight of Jesus. But can we generalize this counsel as to be followed in all circumstances? Were the Protestants of Holland wrong in their struggle for, and achievement of, political independence and religious liberty? Many Christians will hesitate in giving a confident affirmative answer.

(*b*) But the passage does not put before us all the conditions which must be brought into account. Jesus is not here referring to the responsibility of one man for the good of another. Even if in certain circumstances it might be my duty to suffer hurt by submitting to violence myself, can it always be my duty to stand aside and let another, wife or child, suffer hurt? May not resistance for the sake of the transgressor himself, to turn him from his evil ways, be a duty, if love's plea has proved unavailing? Have not citizens a responsibility for the suppression of vice and crime, and the maintenance of law and order? Is anarchy the inevitable conclusion from this teaching of Jesus? If a Government is responsible for the restraint of violence within its own borders, has it no responsibility to the people it governs for resistance of violence from another nation? I should answer all these questions affirmatively. I cannot accept the extension of the principle of love and forgiveness so far as to exclude all restraint or resistance of wrong-doing within a nation or between nations.

(*c*) Dr. F. A. M. Spencer puts the case against pacificism

in a concrete illustration. 'If I were taking my child on a journey through a lawless country, would it not be right for me to protect his or her person from brutal outrage, just by letting people see that I have a revolver? Or if I am travelling alone, ought I not similiarly to safeguard my own person for the sake of my children at home? The moral interests of those who might be tempted to murder or to outrage me or my child would appear to demand this measure.'[1] As regards war, not only the Christian conscience, but the moral judgement of the most cultured and civilized nations, has reached, or is so far on the way to, the conclusion that to use war as an instrument of policy, or to refuse any available means of the peaceful settlement of differences, is an international crime. I am myself convinced that a Christian citizen would not only be entitled, but under obligation, to refuse any kind of support or service to a Government guilty of such a crime. The only problem which now remains for Christian casuistry in the good sense is this: if a country is invaded, or even if its vital interests are so assailed as to imperil the people's welfare, must the Christian citizen refuse to fight, or to help his country in any way? I should not dare to condemn as wrong him who so refused; but I should, as now advised, be moved to approve as right him who obeyed his people's call. But I must add: it seems to be a lamentable error of judgement to be pressing this question always to the front as some pacificists are always doing, and so dividing the Church, instead of seeking to unite the Church in support of the practical policy, now possible in the present political situation, for preventing war, and promoting peace, so that the situation will never arise when the Christian citizen will be required to solve this problem of individual duty.

(*d*) Whether restraint or resistance is legitimate must be decided on the broader issue. What in the given circumstances will advance the best interests, not only of individuals

[1] *The Theory of Christ's Ethics*, p. 84.

but also of communities, indeed, of all mankind? Would submission to wrong always advance those interests? While sacrificial love is, in Christ, God's method of reconciling and redeeming mankind, and should ever be the inspiration of all Christian effort, the question remains, can grace at once and always supersede law? Must forgiveness, the desire for and effort to restore the relations of love, always include pardon (to revert to the distinction already made)? We cannot here, in my judgement, indulge in absolute universal judgements. We must, in each situation, discover what will effect the purpose of love.

IV

(1) The motive and the pattern of Christian love is the love of God, as revealed and realized in Jesus Christ as Saviour and Lord. Jesus assumes that it is the aspiration of the child of God to be like God the Father; the perfection which in this passage is set before the Christian disciple as his pattern is the impartial love of God as shown in nature. The Father in heaven 'makes His sun rise on the evil and the good, and sends rain on the just and unjust' (verse 45). In the following chapter (verses 26 and 28) Jesus appeals, as proofs of God's goodness, to the feeding of the wild birds and the clothing of the lilies of the field. For Him, as Son knowing the Father, nature was not 'red in tooth and claw,' the scene of a struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest only, it was the home of a Father caring for all in a goodness reaching to the lowliest of His creatures, and even disregarding the moral differences of men. Can we doubt which of the interpretations is nearest the heart of reality? A morality of love and forgiveness, according to Jesus's witness, is not contrary to the nature of things, a challenge of reality, but in accordance with the ultimate cause and final purpose of the Universe, the loving heavenly Father. In the Epistles this appeal is not to God's goodness in nature, but His grace in redemption. The imitators of God, 'as beloved

children, are kind one to another, tender-hearted, forgiving each other, even as God also in Christ forgave' (Eph. iv. 32, v. 1).

(2) Not only is God the pattern of love, He is also the source. God's generous love evokes man's grateful love, and that grateful love not only returns to God, but expands in a generous love to fellow men. We not only love God because He first loved us, but the love of God in Christ constrains us, that is directs and controls the currents of our sentiment and action into the Christlike love, forgiveness, and service towards men.

(*a*) Between this absolute love to God and the equal love to self and neighbour there is no rivalry or opposition, as a one-sided piety has often imagined. Pascal, to give one illustration, great as he was, fails to reproduce the piety of the New Testament. 'God has made man with two loves—one for God, the other for self—with this law, however, that our love for God should be infinite—that is, without any end but God Himself—but our self-love finite, and leading beyond ourselves to God.' He also regards the love of our neighbour as to be swallowed up in God. Von Hügel, in contrast, recognizes two levels at which life may be lived, one among men with our natural affections, and one in which all such affections are renounced, and the life is entirely devoted to the cultivation of the love of God. In my judgement even this is a mistaken view.

(*b*) If God is the universal Father, if He not only desires the love of all His children for Himself, but also that in common life with Him by His Spirit they should grow in likeness to Him, in an impartial goodness such as He shows in nature, in a sacrificial grace, such as is revealed in Jesus Christ, then it seems to me to follow inevitably that a man will not increase his love for God by contracting his interest in and effort for man. Love for God can be best cultivated, not in isolation, but in society, in the doing of the daily duty towards others, in the growth of the human affections, in the

service which furthers the fulfilment of God's purpose on earth. There is an individual relation between the Father of all and each of these children; but this relation will be impoverished if it is separated from, or opposed to, the relation of the children to one another. The Lord's Prayer has always 'our,' never 'my.' Men loving one another should pray together, should feel their common bodily needs, and should have a sense of the sin and the temptation which all share. In this ideal of love, forgiving and serving, we are at the very core of Christian religion and morality; if it were realized, mankind would indeed be a new creation, the old things passed away and all things become new; God the Father would become the whole life of all men.

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

Some Exponents of Mystical Religion. By Rufus M. Jones. (Epworth Press. 6*s*.) To Professor Jones the mystic is one who insists on a wider range of first-hand acquaintance with direct experience than that confined to the operation of the five senses. Buddha 'had lived his way down below the surface-life, and seems to speak out of eternity, as all supreme prophets and spiritual creators do.' The entire life of Christ was marked by first-hand experience of God. St. Paul was primarily a mystic rather than a theologian. The mystical strain was fundamental to his nature, and not derived from outside sources. The experience of God which surges into the mystic's consciousness seems to him its own evidence of God. 'It carries with it the same *sense of reality* that attends the perception of mountains or the sound of oncoming trains of cars.' After this exposition of mystical experience we have studies of great mystics. Few men have shaped the thought and coloured the spiritual experience of the Western world as Plotinus has done. Eckhart is the towering figure in the unique procession of mystical geniuses in the fourteenth century. In Luther the mystical and forensic types of religion blended. Browning's poetry shows a deep and vital experience of God; Walt Whitman's life and writings reveal his absolute certainty of an inner spiritual world of Life and Love which overbrims the world of atoms and molecules. The studies of these great exponents of spiritual religion is followed by a sketch of 'Mystical Life and Thought in America.' 'There is a strong spiritual strain in our composite blood, we rise naturally to the call of duty. We quickly feel the appeal to help to build a better world for unborn generations. We are like Jacob of old; we can see where lies our main chance for good returns, and yet on occasion we too can see angels, as he did, and feel them tugging at us, to pull our better self free.'

HEALTH AND RELIGION

IT is not always recognized that disease and ill health are the enemies of healthy religion. Maximum spiritual efficiency cannot be reached apart from maximum physical efficiency. Or, in more popular language, you cannot be as good as you might be unless you are as physically fit as you can be.

Already in the minds of some readers this will be challenged. They will point to the suffering saints and argue that it is their suffering which has been the cause of their saintliness. Or they will point out those many heroic illustrations of men and women who day by day manifest a fine Christian spirit and yet who are battling against some crippling disability in their body.

A little careful thinking, however, will prove to us that the saints have become what they are, not through suffering, but in spite of it. Suffering has no automatic power to make us good. You may test this for yourself the next time you stand on the dentist's doorstep. The normal result of suffering is resentment, bitterness, and depression. Men have become saints, not through suffering, but through their attitude to suffering. In other words, suffering has awakened their spiritual forces and mobilized them into activity where previously these forces were dormant. It is impossible to suggest that Jesus would have been finer in character if He had been diabetic or lame, or that in curing physical disability He removed what was a spur to spiritual development. Given the spirit is fully awakened, spiritual health is much more complete and radiant when the spirit functions through a sound body than when it functions through an imperfect and diseased body. And concerning the suffering saints, while their suffering calls for our highest admiration, it still remains true to say that, had their spirit been

awakened as completely by some other means, their personality, regarded as a religious force, might have been an even greater thing if the physical body through which it expressed itself had been a more perfect medium. The case of our Lord's spiritual life shows that physical well-being and good health need not necessarily mean that the spirit is not functioning at its highest. 'So-and-so would never have been the saint he is,' writes a correspondent to me, 'if he had always had blue skies above him.' As far as 'blue skies' mean physical health, the case of Jesus would seem to disprove this, and the spiritual life of Jesus was not more perfect when the body through which it was manifested was tortured on the cross than when, in the full prime and vigour of His perfect physical manhood, He arose, newly baptized, from the waters of Jordan ready to begin that strenuous work to which God had called Him. The days of the necessary association between weakness and piety, of the pale young curate type who tried to dislike his meals, sat up until the early hours burning 'midnight oil,' despising athletic exercise and regarding his physical organism as a 'vile body,' have gone for ever.

Much has been said in recent psychology of the tremendous effect of the mind over the body. The limits of this influence have not yet been found, and I should be the last to disparage them. I have seen wonderful results in this realm, and shall return to some of them later in this article. The mind is capable of altering the temperature of the body, the speed of the heart-beat, and the quantity of the secretions. It can build up tissues, and in abnormal states can make the touch of the finger burn like the touch of a red-hot iron, and can make the touch of a red-hot iron painless. We have probably all noticed that one sentence of bad news, or, if you like, one idea received into the mind, can make the tear glands function, the sweat glands exude perspiration, the heart race, the temperature fall, the respiration alter, the hair to stand up on the head, and in intense agony of mind

can even make blood exude through the pores of the skin.

What I want to point out now is that to give full recognition to the power of the mind over the body must not mean that we overlook the tremendous effect of the body over the mind. The alteration of the proportion of glandular secretions, even the fact that a person is not drinking enough water or is suffering from constipation, or, notoriously, from some liver complaint, may mean pessimism, doubt, depression, until his very faith in God is damaged. If the windows of the body are dirty or smoked over, the light of heaven cannot make radiant the rooms of life. Any one, for instance, who has known a patient under treatment with thyroid or insulin will know that he develops symptoms which an unskilled observer would regard as psychogenic, that is, being entirely due to the state of the mind. But while with diseases suitably treated by thyroid and insulin there may be psychogenic factors as concomitants, the real origin of the apparently psychical symptoms is in the disturbance of the balance of the secretions due to the physiological treatment—that is, the cause of the symptoms is in the body, and not in the mind.

Let us think of an illustration which will make this clear. Think of the human personality made up of the mind and the body (for the moment I include 'soul' in the word 'mind') as a man playing a violin. The player is represented by the mind, or non-physical constituents, and the body is represented by the violin, through which the player expresses himself. The influence of the mind over the body is apparent. If the player is incompetent or diseased or crippled, then the music (that is the value of his personality to the community) will suffer accordingly. In this illustration it is clearly obvious that if the violin is damaged, if it is cracked, if the strings are too tight or too loose, thickened or frayed, then, however ably played (however whole the mind), the music will suffer. The highest music is only possible when both player and violin are at their best, when mind and body are

both at their maximum efficiency.[1] The fact that the physical body if diseased hinders the perfect functioning of the spirit has some support from delinquency statistics. Mr. Cyril Burt, in *The Young Delinquent*, says: 'Most repeated offenders are far from robust, they are frail, sickly, and infirm. Indeed, so regularly is chronic mind disorder associated with chronic physical disorder that many have contended that crime is a disease, or at least a symptom of a disease, needing the doctor more than the magistrate, physician rather than the whip. The frequency among juvenile delinquents of bodily weakness and ill health has been remarked by almost every recent writer. In my own series of cases nearly seventy per cent. were suffering from such defects, and nearly fifty per cent. were in urgent need of medical treatment.'[2] May we not, then, regard it as an axiom that to be at one's best spiritually one must be at one's best physically. If I ask myself when I feel most like praying, I find that the answer is that I feel like praying most, not when my body is tired or diseased, but after, say, eighteen holes of golf, or three or four sets of tennis, or a good swim, when every nerve and muscle of the body is

[1] Perhaps it may be added that the illustration leaves the way open for a belief in immortality. Sir Arthur Keith used the illustration of a candle-flame and candle as an illustration of the mind and body from which it would appear that when the candle was exhausted the flame would go out, and that the death of the body meant the quenching of the soul. We must not take the illustration as though it were an argument, particularly the illustration of a scientist who is dealing with a philosophical speculation outside the province of science. The illustration of the man and the violin representing the mind and body is, at any rate, in harmony with the findings of philosophers from Socrates onwards. The man may fling the violin away and smash it to atoms, but he himself remains free, and may, if he likes, take up some other instrument with which to express his personality. In other words, when the physical body is rotting in the grave the real essential ego is free, and may manifest itself through what St. Paul called the spiritual body; through another instrument fitted for the further life.

[2] p. 248.

tingling with the glow of physical health. Then there falls upon one that real desire to pray, which, to the great bewilderment of many Christians, rarely visits them, partly because, in the crowded, stuffy days, especially in winter, their bodies are nearly always functioning below normal efficiency and vitality.

I want to state now the antithesis of this point, and to say that to be at your best physically you must be at your best spiritually. It is perfectly true to say that maximum physical efficiency cannot be reached without maximum spiritual efficiency. Or, again in more popular language, if you want to be as fit as you might be, you must be as good as you can be. Sin works the very devil in the physical system. Most of us, meditating over that sentence, will think at once of venereal disease, but this is only a gross illustration of the way in which sin incurs disease. Any sin, even in the world of thought, is physically bad for us. It upsets secretions, pulse rate, 'nerves'; it upsets, in more technical phrase, the neuro-somatic balance. Many will remember the illustration of this that occurs in Scott's novel, *The Talisman*. The physician is about to administer a drug to Richard Coeur de Lion. The king is a little suspicious, and, reaching out his hand, he feels his own physician's pulse, and then says, 'This is no poisoner of princes, or his own pulse would not beat so quietly.' And when we remember how we have flushed in telling a lie, trembled before we did some evil thing, when the heart beat against the ribs as if it would burst, then we have some faint indication that, even if sin gets no further than the realms of the mind, it is upsetting the normal functioning of the body. 'How did he behave when you taxed him with it?' said some one to a woman whose little boy had done wrong. 'Oh, he denied it as usual,' said the mother, 'but when I washed his face I saw he was as white as a sheet.'

As a matter of fact, no week passes but I have evidence, which is entirely convincing, that many physical disabilities,

especially those which the physician finds it hard accurately to diagnose and completely account for (such as influenza, sleepy sickness, paralysis, rheumatism, 'nerves'), can be traced back to some secret sin, or false emotion like fear and worry, which the cleansing of the spirit by the grace, power, and forgiveness of God would entirely remove. Here is an extreme illustration to show what I mean. On an evening set aside for interviewing those people who have no definite appointment, a man presents himself at my door. He is in such a state of discontrol that one of my helpers is hesitant whether to let him in or not. He jerks his head from side to side in a horrible way, his limbs suddenly lash out without any control, and when he has entered my room he stalks up and down until one wonders whether one is in the presence of a dangerous lunatic. Gradually he is persuaded to lie on a couch and relax his muscles, but he finds it almost impossible to control them. After most patient questioning, his story comes out. He has for his 'boss' a fine Christian man in a neighbouring city. He has defrauded him, is still defrauding him, and pretending that the relationship between them is everything that it should be. Every kindness that his boss shows him in this apparent illness makes the illness worse, because it makes the conflict in his mind more intolerable still.

Let me explain in untechnical language what is the matter with him. It is established, of course, that the mind runs the body, that an involuntary process like the action of the limbs or even the beat of the heart would be impossible without the activity of the unconscious mind. Many things we learnt to do by the conscious direction of our mind are now carried through by the unconscious mind. For instance, a little child is taught to walk and its walking demands the use of its conscious mind, but the mechanism of habit means that gradually walking becomes an unconscious procedure. The unconscious directs it and carries it out, leaving the conscious mind more free for the demands made upon it.

This is one of the economies of nature. To form a habit means that an action is carried out with the use of the minimum amount of mental energy. Conscious direction applied to all the things a man does before he goes to business would mean fatigue before the day began.

Now here is my patient, who up to a certain time was healthy, whose unconscious mind carries out perfectly its physical functions. Then he sins, and to use picturesque, but not inaccurate, language, he puts this sin in a box deep down in the depths of his being, shuts the lid, and is desperately anxious that the lid should be kept shut. Now, think of the forces of the mind as a platoon of men whose business it is to control the bodily functions. My patient is so eager to keep that lid shut—the task of which becomes more and more difficult—that he calls man after man from his post to come and help hold down the lid of the box, until there are not enough men in the platoon left to do their usual duty, namely to run the body and control its movements and processes. Then the bodily functions of which they are supposed to be in charge are neglected and go astray. In other words, he is using so much mental force in his repression that there is not enough mental energy left over to run the machinery of his body.

Of course, the cure is simple and direct. We must get into touch with his employer, we must put the whole situation before him. The matter must be straightened out. The patient may in some way have to be punished, but his repression will cease and the forces within him will return to their right tasks, and his cure will probably be brief if the diagnosis be correct.

It should be remembered that this is an extreme case, but there are thousands of people suffering for the same reason, who complain of weariness, sleeplessness, lack of appetite, flaccidity, that tired feeling, and so on. Perhaps they have refused to forgive some one or have nursed an injury for years, or perhaps they have done something years

ago which has never been opened to the cleansing winds of God's forgiving spirit. What they must do, with or without the help of some doctor of souls whom they can trust, is to bare the whole thing, so that the energies of the mind are not engaged in bottling up a guilty secret or worrying fear. A point of interest is to be noticed here, to which Dr. H. P. Newsholme has drawn attention in his book, which may truly be described as epoch making, *Health, Disease, and Integration*. He points out that again and again for a slight injury—as slight, for example, as a blow on the head—some people develop symptoms which can hardily be accounted for by the injury, which seem serious and out of all proportion to the injury. The reason is, that if there is repression and the forces of the mind have no reserves, then when they are called upon to deal with a shock caused by an injury, some other task within the organism is either not being done at all or being done imperfectly; and the cure will probably have to involve the setting free of the mental energy used up by the repression. It cannot be said too often that the right thing is always the healthy thing, and the healthy thing is the right thing.

The last point I have to make in regard to healthy religion is another way of showing that sin is bad for one. Let me start with an illustration drawn from Dr. Newsholme's book, and then make a deduction from it. 'There is a well-known instance on record of absolutely sudden death carrying off a baby which, although previously in perfect health, sank dead on its mother's bosom immediately after a meal. Previously to suckling her infant the mother had experienced a terrible mental shock occasioned by a fight between her husband and a soldier who happened to be billeted in the house. The mother, trembling with fear and terror, threw herself furiously between the combatants, wrested a sword from the soldier's hand, broke it in pieces, and threw it away. Following on this violent excitement the mother nursed her infant, with the result recorded.'

Dr. Newsholme goes on to say, 'There is no essential difference in the mechanism between the secretion of milk by the breast glands and the secretion of saliva by the salivary glands, and of mucus by the mucous glands: so that emotion, if sufficiently intense, may conceivably produce a toxic change in the saliva, or in the mucus of the naso-pharynx.' This is indeed an eloquent comment on the power of the mind over the body. Our argument then runs as follows. Wrong thoughts and disturbing emotions, such as fear, worry, hate, are capable of making toxic poisoning in the body. This poison can only be eliminated by dealing with the causes; the causes are false ideas and emotions. These can only be removed by introducing healthy ideas and emotions, and there are no ideas and emotions in the world so powerful in their effects as those of religion. Sir Maurice Craig, the famous Harley Street specialist, puts the matter in an amusing way: 'A bitter word, a quarrel, bad temper, and the very pepsin of your stomach loses its power. A forgiving spirit, a cheery word, a radiant happiness, and you can eat ice-cream and pickles, crab and ginger-beer, without a thought of to-morrow.' It is very interesting to feel that Paul's words, that we are to keep on thinking of whatever is pure, holy, and of good report, have support from a consideration of physical health. For by so thinking we can prevent the manufacture of, and drive out (if there be any), those toxic substances which poison the very blood and secretions. Another argument is arrived at supporting the former contention: that you cannot reach maximum physical efficiency unless you are as good as you can be.

We thus reach this conclusion: that the health of the body will make for the health of the mind and spirit, and will mean greater fullness of expression. Here is an argument which applies, not only to ourselves, but to others. If we are content to allow to continue dirt, bad housing, drunkenness, sweating, and the thousand evils that lower the vitality of the body, we are defeating our end because we are asking

for spiritual efficiency and yet taking no pains, or few pains, to maintain physical efficiency. The one cannot be reached without the other. You cannot expect the best music from a violin strained to cracking-point.

Also, we may remember that the maximum health of the body cannot itself be reached if the mind still persists in what we call sin. Unworthy and unwholesome fears and worries, secret sins, evil imaginations induce toxic substances which poison the blood-stream, reduce the vitality, threaten the sanity, and depress the spirit. Further, we may note that repression is using up the energies of the mind which are needed to run the personality. Health, therefore, can be maintained only by living in a world of healthy ideas, and the word of Jesus, 'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, soul, and strength, and thy neighbour as thyself,' is a word potent for the health of the body as well as the health of the spirit. So with all our drill, bathing, golf, and tennis, there must be a uniting of the soul with God. A body as fit as we can make it. A soul as completely in harmony with God as an echo to a song, a flower to the sunlight, a quiet mountain tarn that mirrors the cloudless blue above it. The breathing exercises which so many people do regularly every morning might well become a symbol of the opening of the whole being to God as of one who says, 'I throw open my whole personality to the inflowing power and purpose of God.' Let physical exercises and cold baths be symbols of the lifting of the sluice gate by which the tides of the spirit may sweep in through muddy back-waters, cleansing, refreshing, and renewing all the secret channels of the soul. Or, to change the figure, let there be the opening of the windows of the house of life till the breath of God blows away all the hot stuffiness and fetid poison of sin, replacing them with the wine-like mountain air in which the spirit truly lives and thrives.

LESLIE D. WEATHERHEAD.

POST-WAR RUSSIA

THE Bolshevik rule in Russia is the greatest experiment in State Socialism since the French Revolution, and as such merits a careful study. It presents many difficulties to the foreign observer, however, because it is almost impossible to obtain an unprejudiced and uncensored statement of the present condition of Russia. As, ultimately, the value of an experiment is judged by its results, it becomes absurd to pass judgement at this stage upon the experiment; but one may at least have some appreciation of the case by a study of such facts as are available.

To understand the situation it is necessary to have a realization of certain fundamental factors in Russian history. In the first place, the Russians are racially and historically of Eastern, and not Western, origin. Their philosophy of life, their religion, their traditional form of government, their social habits previous to the nineteenth century, were all coloured by the East, rather than by the West. Petrograd—or Leningrad, as one should now call it—was more Western in tone than any other city; but Moscow represents the typical cultural Russia, which is Eastern. The second great factor lies in the immensity of Russia itself. It is a land of great extremes—of extremes of climate, of resources, of wealth and poverty, of town life and country isolation. These differences are further emphasized by great lack of communications. Vast tracts of land are untouched by railways of any sort: the roads are few and bad. In this great region, communities live isolated one from the other. The civilization, the centralization, and the standardization of life throughout such a country is therefore a task of great difficulty. The third important factor is the peasant population. Russia is mainly agricultural. It has been estimated that 75 per cent. of its population are peasants; sturdy but illiterate, dragging out a dreary existence, working hard,

but mostly for the benefit of the landlord. A worker *on* the land, but not a possessor *of* it, despite the Bill of 1861, the interest of the peasant lies almost entirely in the question of land tenure. He has had no experience in the art of government or administration. Even in the local governing body, the Zemstvo, the representation was so arranged that the peasant class, though represented, had no power. This was lodged in the land-owning class. A corollary to the numerical predominance of the peasants is the smallness of the middle or bourgeois class. Trade was largely in the hands of foreigners and Jews, the middle-class Russians consisting mainly of the professional people and the intellectuals, or intelligentsia. They had no actual political power, but by reason of their anti-autocratic propaganda, and demagogic ability, at times had great influence over the peasants, and created much stir in the country. The rich land-holding class was even smaller, but was the all-powerful element among the people. They monopolized all authority and administrative power—whether local or central—which was not directly attached to the Crown. The fourth factor to be considered was the position and authority of the Tsar. He was head, not only of the State, but of the Church. He was the 'Little Father' of his people. In the Church, however, his authority was tempered by that of the Patriarch: but in the State his power was unlimited. All the State officials were appointed by him, and were directly responsible to him. The first National Assembly did not meet in Russia until as late as 1905! and even then in actual experience it proved to be nothing more than an advisory council, whose advice need not necessarily be followed. The Zemstvos (local councils) had organized national meetings. This was a most promising and healthy sign in the national political life—but the Great War broke out before they had really begun upon their work. This mediaeval form of despotic government was an anachronism in modern European life, which was bound to disappear sooner or later: its incongruity was

further emphasized by its utter inefficiency, and intelligent Russia was demanding a more representative type of government. Under the impetus of fear, the Tsars now and again temporarily yielded a little to this demand—but otherwise their general retort to all criticism and suggestions of modification of royal power, however loyally proposed, was fierce repression, exile, and death. The natural reaction was the foundation of all sorts of secret societies—Socialist and Anarchist—all fiercely working by underground methods for the propagation of their views. Every exile, every political persecution, whether individual or collective, but fanned the zeal of these secret societies; and, by the time of the outbreak of the Great War, Russia was absolutely riddled with them. The devastating experiences of the war, combined with the vacillating character and mediocre ability of the late Tsar, only hastened a revolution, the inevitability of which was generally recognized.

In few countries did the war bring more suffering in its train than in Russia. The machinery of State was corrupt, and in ordinary circumstances inadequate for national needs. Under the stress of war, it soon broke down completely. Hundreds of thousands of men were called up to meet the danger on the German frontier. Hundreds of thousands more were drafted in centres behind the lines and in Petrograd awaiting a move to the Front. Russia's own resources in munitions and equipment were soon exhausted: land-locked by Germany and Turkey, she was unable to receive supplies from the Allies. It was not for a considerable time that Archangel was opened up for traffic, when it proved to be less useful than was anticipated. Meanwhile the army was daily increasing. It consisted largely of illiterate peasants, who had no understanding of the cause for which they were fighting, and who had been dragged away from their work on the land. Owing to lack of equipment, the majority, ill-fed and ill-kempt, were hanging idle around these training centres. The effects of bad management were

apparent everywhere: the soldiers returning from the Front added to the general discontent by their tales of horror. They were, in fact, very promising material for any revolutionary propaganda.

Nor was this lacking; revolutionary activities increased everywhere—especially in the towns amongst the industrial populations, where the food problem was acute. This was particularly true of Petrograd, where the ordinary population had been much increased by war-workers and soldiers. The Petrograd Soviet (or Union of Workmen and Soldiers)—by far the most important—was founded February 27, 1917. It took its formal title by March 2. At first it was 'a huge, shouting mob demanding reform in the Duma,' (or National Assembly), but it soon became a rather militant organization to suppress the old order of things. Such soviets soon sprang up in the towns all over the country, and on March 28 was summoned an All-Russian Assembly of Soviets, representing 138 local soviets. Events were moving rapidly. Early in 1917 the leading members of the Duma, or National Assembly, demanded from the Tsar a responsible Ministry to direct affairs. In February, 100,000 workmen in Petrograd went on strike, and 25,000 in Moscow: upon whom the soldiers refused to fire. This was significant. On March 11, the Tsar dissolved the Duma: they, however, refused to be dissolved, whereupon there was much street fighting. The Revolution was in full swing: the Duma now effected a *coup d'état*, and proclaimed a Provisional Government. The Tsar was requested to abdicate. This he did on March 15, in favour of his brother, the Grand Duke Michael. He, however, was wise enough to leave the decision to the Government, which represented all parties—the Conservatives, the Constitutional Democrats (the Cadets), and the Social Democrats (the Mensheviki and the Bolsheviki). The Conservatives were supporters of the old régime—but run on more efficient lines. The Constitutional Democrats (Cadets) were the only recognized opposition party in the

old Duma, and might be called a Liberal Reform party. The Socialist parties had never had any political recognition in the Duma, and, because of persecution, were rather restricted to underground organization in the towns. The Mensheviki had taken the German Labour movement as their ideal, and were really little adapted for underground methods. They desired openly to educate the proletariat in Socialist views. They believed that the intermediate stage between an Imperialist Russia and a Communist proletariat was a bourgeois republic. The Bolsheviki, on the other hand, thought that an immediate Proletarian Communistic Government was possible. They were prepared to appeal to force immediately, and to *impose* their views upon the majority at once. Lenin, although in exile, was the leader of this party. It was quite insignificant as a party in early 1917, took no part in the Revolution or the formation of the Provisional Government, and at first had no clear policy in the Duma itself.

The first Provisional Government, under the premiership of Prince Lvov, and under the direction of the Cadet party, was thrust into an impossible position. Loyalty to the Allies demanded a continuation of the war on more efficient and energetic lines, and this could only be accomplished by gathering all the resources of Russia for war purposes: on the other hand, the Revolution presupposed drastic constitutional changes and domestic reforms, which would in themselves absorb all the energies of the Government. Prince Lvov and his colleagues threw their energies immediately into the question of war, and proceeded much more slowly with constitutional reforms. The Socialists, backed by the soviets of workmen, soldiers, and sailors, demanded a new Government, which would deal more effectively with domestic reforms, and the Provisional Government had to give way to the Coalition Government, whose moving spirit was Kerenski, the leader of the Menshevik party. This Government realized the enormity of their task, and with

a grave sense of responsibility assumed office, July 22, 1917. They did much to stop the rot that had set in in the army, and were slowly but surely producing order and government in the provinces. They were greatly hindered by the inability of the Allies to realize the seriousness of the situation in Russia; by the Separatist demands in Finland, Latvia, Esthonia, Poland, and the Ukraine; and, most important of all, by the Petrograd Soviet, in which the Communist Bolsheviki had seized the chief power. The passions of the mob of Petrograd had been inflamed by Bolshevik propaganda and catchy slogans. Lenin had organized by this time a secret and effective system, which kept account of all the places of moment in the city, the numbers and types of troops, and all stores, &c. They rose against the Government in July 1917; this was unsuccessful, but they had secured the support of the Petrograd mob. They now prepared openly for the November revolt. Such a violent outbreak was regarded as inevitable by everybody, and the Bolsheviki were determined that this outbreak should serve their purposes. Lenin openly declared that 'The State is an organ or machine for the domination of one class over the others.' This was so under the autocratic Tsars; it should be so again under the Communist Bolsheviki. He believed that, given the indifference of the masses, it was possible for a small party such as the Bolsheviki (which in late 1917 only totalled 240,000), not only to seize power, but to maintain it. The Separatist provinces were to be quieted by the promise of autonomy; the peasants were to be appeased by the promise of land; all opposition was to be ruthlessly crushed. In a situation of absolute chaos and incoherence, they, almost alone, were perfectly definite in their aims and policy and ruthless in their action; and, late in October 1917, they seized power from the Coalition Government; subsequently turned out, on its first day of meeting, the new representative Assembly; and inaugurated the Bolshevik rule in November 1917.

Incredible though it sounds, this revolution has been effected and maintained not only by a minority class, but by a minority of that one class. It has been accomplished by sheer terrorization, at first absolutely uncontrolled, though deliberately encouraged. This was almost immediately succeeded (December 1917) by an ordered, centralized system of terrorization under Lenin, working through the Cheka, or secret police of the Bolsheviki.

The new Government was soon faced with the problem of maintaining itself. It was from the first strongly supported in Petrograd: it had excited no great interest anywhere else: the peasant majority were satisfied by being allowed to seize the lands around them: the declaration of the Bolsheviki that they stood for peace pleased everybody. But few were prepared for foreign peace at the price of national humiliation, and for domestic peace at the price of slavish subscription to all the Bolshevik tenets. In spite of great opposition, even within his own party, Lenin forced through the peace of Brest-Litovsk, December 1917. All the Separatist provinces became independent. Russia lost a population of about 65,000,000 people, a territory of about a half-million square miles, and had, in addition, to pay a large war indemnity. Gorky, the Russian novelist, has estimated that this treaty robbed Russia of 87 per cent. of her manufacturing industries, 75 per cent. of her coal, and 73 per cent. of her iron. In exchange for all this, the Government had freed itself from foreign complications, had secured German officers for the new Red Army, and could concentrate on home affairs. This humiliating treaty, in conjunction with the terrorization which was everywhere apparent, aroused bitter opposition. Three opposition White Armies were formed, which operated in the north, south, and east respectively. They had at first considerable success, which might have become permanent, had they not made the fatal mistake of being too anti-revolutionary. In their horror of the Bolshevik form of socialism, they

began to idealize the old régime. This frightened the peasants, who were determined not to give up their newly acquired lands, and offended the average bourgeois, who stood by the first Revolution, which overthrew the Tsarist Government. The attitude of the peasants decided the issue. Amidst these disintegrating forces, the solidarity of the Bolsheviki was bound to control the situation. By fair means and foul they crushed all opposition—first in the city, and then in the country. The aristocrats fled; the bourgeois remained, until the vindictiveness of the Bolsheviki against their class forced them to disappear also. During the first six months of 1918 fighting was proceeding everywhere—but by the end of that time the Red Army and system of soviets was completely triumphant. In July 1918, the New Constitution was proclaimed, the official title of the Government being the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic. The Federation consisted of sixty-six Governments in European and Asiatic Russia under the direct control of the Moscow Administration (Moscow being now the official capital), eleven autonomous regions and communes (only distinguishable in name from the previous sixty-six), and ten autonomous republics which are apparently independent units, but in actual practice have remarkably little authority. Not even the Bolsheviki had originally intended the soviets to assume the administration of State, and all awaited the calling of a National Assembly. But, in the war, anarchy, and confusion of 1918, the local soviets had assumed local power and administration, while Lenin and his fellow Commissars had assumed Central Authority; and out of the necessities of the times the new system of Russian National Administration had grown. This federation of soviets has since been increased by the inclusion of the Soviet Republics of Ukraine, White Russia, and the Transcaucasian Federation. These had experienced a period of complete independence since 1917, but pressure had been brought to bear upon them, either by direct war or

by organized Communist risings, until in January 1924 the Assembly included them in the Federation. The official title of the Russian Federation now became the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (the U.S.S.R.), and the constitution was somewhat revised. In 1925, two more republics in Middle Asia entered the Union—Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan—so there are now six republics in the U.S.S.R. There are over a hundred nationalities in the Soviet Union; and more than twenty autonomous areas and republics are inhabited by Oriental races, with a population of over thirty million.

The constitution is a very complicated, intricate one, which, while providing for a certain amount of autonomy in the members of the Federation, at the same time allows the Central Authority of the State to exercise an almost complete control. 'Foreign trade, military and naval affairs, railways and communications, are directly under the control of the Soviet Union itself, which also reserves special directing and planning functions, such as industry, finance, home trade, worker-peasant inspection, and the regulation of labour questions. Such subjects as people's education, public health, social insurance, jurisdiction, agriculture, and internal administration (People's Commissariat for Home Affairs) remain under the direct control of the respective republics' (Professor Cheliabov). But even here there is strong central control, because the People's Commissariats in any given republic are not only subordinate to the Government of their respective republics, but also to the General Union of People's Commissariats. There is a National Assembly representative of all the soviets of the Union, and a Central Executive Committee of the Union. These have certain functions more or less definitely specified, but any executive function they exercise is strictly limited by the instructions of the Praesidium, 'a permanent institution voicing the wishes of the Central Authority, and in the position to get them carried into effect.' Nominally a

federation of republics, in actual practice Russia is a highly centralized State. The whole constitution is quite frankly non-democratic—the rule of a small minority. It is organized for the sole benefit of the *industrial* working class. As far as civil rights are concerned, neither the aristocratic nor bourgeois class exist, and the existence of the agricultural worker is only recognized as far as he is able to contribute to the needs of the industrial worker. No person has the right to vote or be elected who (*a*) employs others for the sake of profit, or (*b*) lives on an income not arising from his own work. This deprives of any participation in the Government all the upper and middle classes, including professional people, merchants, tradesmen, or any working person who employ's anybody else's labour as well as his own. This at once disqualifies any peasant who has to employ another peasant on his farm. But the constitution bears still more unfairly on the peasant than even this implies. In the Soviet Assembly a representative is given for every 25,000 industrial workmen—but it takes 125,000 peasants to secure one representative! This fact of minority rule is still more marked when one remembers that at least 75 per cent. of the Russian population consists of peasants. This vital underlying principle of government vitiates whatever may be good in the Soviet rule. Whatever social, educational, and political progress has been made—and much has been done—still, it is only for a small minority of the peoples of the Russian Union.

In theory the Bolsheviki believe in complete and direct State control of all industry and agriculture for the sole benefit of the worker. In Russia, owing to the circumstances of the time, this means the industrial rather than the agricultural worker. Industrially, their theories were put into complete operation between 1918 and 1921. Agriculturally, they were unable to do so. In order to attain power, they had at first allowed the principle of private ownership in land, and when they proceeded, later, to

nationalize the produce of the land, they met with the bitter and obstinate opposition of the peasants—an opposition which finally caused the Government in 1921 to revise their whole industrial and agricultural policy.

In November 1917, the workers were everywhere encouraged to seize and control factories. This was done amidst scenes of great disorder and rioting. The 'capitalist' was driven out 'lock, stock, and barrel': the most absurd and ludicrous situations arose. Workers formed councils to organize trade: many of them had no experience of commercial life, no knowledge of the rudiments of international finance. Foreign capital fled the country. Trade, already disorganized by war and revolution, now became thoroughly demoralized. The State, hoping to remedy the situation, declared the wholesale nationalization of all banking trading, and industrial organizations. This was extended to include every business that employed more than five people. All speculation, private enterprise, and foreign competition were swept away. One Supreme Economic Council was formed which controlled the buying of raw material, production within the country, and markets for manufactured goods. The Bolshevik Government hoped thus to produce a trade revival—but the exact reverse was the result. There followed a collapse of all trade. Workers were drifting back again into the country; factories were closing down. The net result seems to have been a horde of officials amounting (so it has been computed) to two-thirds the total number of workers in the basic industries. It is difficult to obtain in figures a true standard of comparison between these years and pre-war times, because the territory of Russia at these two periods differs so greatly in extent. The greatest proof of the failure of this policy, however, was Lenin's announcement to the Assembly on March 15, 1921, of a new economic policy which recognized private trade. It is possible that the Soviet might have won through to a modified nationalization, had it not been for the attitude of

the peasants, who resented any sort of nationalization which touched agriculture. These, in their struggle with the Government, simply refused to cultivate the land, and so brought famine to the towns—and want now, as often, determined the direction of State policy. The attempt at nationalization was even more unsuccessful in agriculture than in industry. The Bolsheviki, in order to obtain the acquiescence of the peasants in the Revolution, had tacitly recognized private ownership in land, and the conversion from the large manor to the small privately owned peasant holding and small farm had been accomplished both rapidly and quietly. The peasants were everywhere settling down in the enjoyment and development of their newly acquired lands. The urgency of affairs in town and State, together with the difficulty of communication in the country, all helped the peasants in their quiet development. This, however, was not to last long. Private ownership of any sort was fundamentally contrary to Bolshevik principles, while famine prices and want in the towns were making the agricultural problem a matter of great urgency. At first the Government tried to deal with this by establishing Communist centres in the country, importing from the towns for this purpose Communist workers and labourers. This policy of permeation proved futile. In the meantime, the food problem became acute, and the Government endeavoured to meet the difficulty by nationalizing the produce of the peasant, over and above his individual need. They arranged for the collection and distribution of the surplus, as also for the distribution of agricultural implements and seeds. This policy was bitterly opposed by the peasants, whereupon 'Food Armies' were sent throughout the agricultural districts to make forcible collections. The peasants retaliated by refusing to sow seed except sufficient for their own needs, and 1920 and 1921 were years of great famine, which particularly hit the industrial areas. Hunger led to riots, and when, in March 1921, the Kronstadt garrison broke out in open revolt,

it was evident that a change of economic policy was an absolute necessity, and Lenin was obliged to announce to the Soviet Congress, 1921, the failure of the policy of complete communistic nationalization.

The Government, however, did not abolish the principle of State control. It compromised by a modified system of State control and private enterprise. Under certain conditions and in all small businesses, private enterprise was now encouraged. As an offset to this return to the old 'capitalism,' all big businesses and industries were either run on co-operative lines, or as trusts under State direction. These trusts are largely district, including many kinds of business. They have many State monopolies, subsidies, and privileges, and private enterprise is heavily taxed. Notwithstanding this fact, however, private business is extending, and it is becoming increasingly evident, as money becomes more difficult to obtain, that the salvation of Russian trade, and the consequent maintenance of Soviet rule, lie in the further encouragement of private enterprise and the admission of foreign capital and trade. A further impetus was given in this direction in 1925; since then figures for home production have shown a small but steady increase. The following figures are interesting (*all figures in millions of kilograms*):

Year	Coal	Oil	Iron Ore
1920	7,642	8,880	164
1925	17,707	6,960	2,217
1926	26,488	8,220	3,898
1927	32,112	10,180	4,960

Much, however, remains to be done. A comparison of figures shows that production is still considerably short of pre-war figures, and that Russia compares badly with other European countries, not only as to actual production, but also as to facilities for trade. In Great Britain and Ireland, for instance, there are 8.7 kilometres of railway for every 10,000 inhabitants; in Russia only 5 kilometres per 10,000 (1925 figures). In Great Britain there are 873,732 motor-cars

and 274,651 lorries, while in Russia there are only 11,700 motor-cars and 9,408 lorries (1927 figures).

The famine of 1921 completed the rout of the Government by the peasant. It was no longer possible for the Bolsheviki to attempt to follow a policy of nationalization either with respect to the land or its produce. In 1922, they were obliged to give *legal* recognition to the peasants' individual inalienable right to the land they had acquired. The immediate result of this security of tenure was a great increase both in the actual acreage under cultivation and in the quantity of produce. In 1927, Russia produced: wheat, 20.400 million kilograms; rye, 24.600; barley, 4.700; oats, 18.000; potatoes, 54.681; sugar beet, 9.900; maize, 8.800. In cattle for the same period were reared: horses, 31.8 millions; cattle, 67.8; pigs, 20.0; sheep and goats, 184.8. The area under cultivation of flax and hemp—two crops which almost became non-existent during the early years of Communism—rose in 1927 to considerably more than the pre-war area (1913). In the case of flax it was an increase of 80 per cent.; in that of hemp 50 per cent. There is no doubt that the peasantry is becoming once again the dominant factor in the economic life of Russia. This is of great significance, not only for the present, but for the future.

A. M. EVANS.

(*To be continued in our next number.*)

Be of Good Cheer. By Rev. W. P. G. McCormick. (Longmans. 2*s*. 6*d*.) The Lenten book for the London diocese could not have fallen into better hands, nor could it have had a more inspiriting subject than joy. Of that it is full. The first requisite is 'a right view of God' that brings joy in God's will to the seeker and the worker. The joy of communion is beautifully described, and the things that destroy joy are pointed out. Then we see the joy of discipline, of the Church, of Sunday. It is beautifully clear, its illustrations are happy, and its quotations of poetry are apt, and, above all, it comes straight from the heart. We feel all through that is the real thing that the world needs.

THE NECESSITY OF THEOLOGY

TO those who believe in the necessity of religious apologetic, and doctrinal formulation, the present widespread indifference to what is known as theology must give rise to all kinds of arresting and challenging considerations. That there ever was a time when this study was regarded as *scientia scientiarum* is exceedingly difficult for most moderns even to conceive, and this difficulty reveals, more clearly than a thousand facts, the width of the gulf which separates our modern from those mediaeval days when all sciences paid homage to theology as to their 'Queen.' Those familiar only with our modern universities do not find it easy to appreciate that our universities began, as Carlyle put it, 'with their grand aim directed on theology.' While there are not wanting signs that this indifference is becoming less self-assured and self-satisfied, in large measure it still remains. My object is to estimate the significance of certain aspects of this indifference, to confront some of the challenges which arise, and to conclude on the positive note that humanity can no more dispense with a theology than it can with reason.

In speaking of modern indifference to theology I do not refer to the fact that people in general do not concern themselves with difficult doctrinal formulation and unification. For, to adapt the famous answer made with regard to *Punch's* humour, they never did. Nor have I chiefly in mind the antagonisms of some of those frequently regarded as our *intelligentsia*. I do not doubt that the assured cynicisms of these have their part to play in the theological awakening whose day, as I venture to hope and to believe, draweth nigh. I think, rather, of an attitude manifested by many of the religious people of our day. It is not unusual to hear ministers of religion disparaging theological study:

such adjectives as cloudy, abstract, barren, &c., are frequently used to designate it. Many of the fine young Christian idealists of our time do not disguise a quick impatience with respect to an investigation, which, as they tell us, has little or no place in the Gospels.

To discover the reasons for this openly-avowed indifference, this thinly-veiled antagonism, would take us, I believe, a considerable step on the road to a better day for theology. If reasons there are, let us look at them calmly and dispassionately. Let us seek to estimate both their partial validity and their partial invalidity, sympathizing frankly with the former, but as frankly repudiating the latter.

And, firstly, the age in which we are living has witnessed an uprising of the spirit of man against the temporal evils and misfortunes endured by humanity, or by sections of humanity, through the ages. I do not know that any past age has witnessed so fierce a resentment against such, so stubborn a refusal to acquiesce in their permanence, so determined an endeavour to remove them. The significance of this uprising for our present theme lies partly here. A practical emphasis does not easily cohere with a speculative or theoretical emphasis. We have, I think, to recognize that the religious idealism of successive ages is concentrated upon different tasks. The theologian, while ungrudgingly rejoicing in the *practically* idealistic endeavours and concerns of our age, may helpfully give the reminder—'these things ought ye to have done and not to leave the others undone.' And this apart from the more fundamental consideration, that a practical task always comes back to the theoretical ideas in which, whether it knows it or not, it had its birth.

Associated with this engrossment with the practical implications of Christian truth there is the widespread belief that theology in the past has been indifferent, if not hostile, to such tasks of the Kingdom. The Christian 'Doctrine of Salvation,' as so frequently taught, it is held, concentrated

the thought of past generations upon the necessity of a mere mental or emotional acceptance of a statement of dogma. To yield a credal assent to a theological statement of the 'saving efficacy' of a historic fact, was regarded as more important than to reveal or validate this efficacy in life. The arresting suggestion was made by Colani in the mid-nineteenth century that the salvation taught by orthodoxy was a 'salvation by magic,' which, were it true, would remind Protestants that there can be a magical soteriology as well as a magical sacramental theory. Luther, it must be remembered, has not been the only Protestant without love for epistles of straw. A credally formulated way to 'salvation' becomes more important than the salvation itself. If it is essential to hold that salvation is for our *acceptance*, it is of importance to note that we don't *accept* it by *saying* so. If, to counter this emphasis, it be pointed out that the primacy in salvation of the 'grace' of God must be secured, I would venture to suggest that there is no reason for supposing that this primacy will be surrendered by an emphasis which declares that any salvation, to be believed in by an inductive age, must be manifest in human personalities. All religion is of God: He is the *fons et origo* of every manifestation of goodness, of beauty, and of truth; but His grace is seen *in* these, and not in the formal statement, or acceptance, of a doctrine which proclaims it. Salvation is no abstraction, but the manifestation within the confines of terrestrial existence of the ultimate values in which God is least inadequately conceived and most truly 'revealed.' The 'grace' of God was supremely manifest, as Christians believe, in a life, and not in words, in Jesus of Nazareth, and not in a formula which seeks, however necessarily, to explain Him.

> And so the Word had breath, and wrought
> With human hands the creed of creeds
> In loveliness of perfect deeds,
> More strong than all poetic thought.

'More strong' also, I would add, than all dogmatic or philosophic thought.

The idealistic impatience with the idea that it is a more heinous offence to 'doubt' Christianity than not to practise it is understandable. Samuel Butler in *The Way of All Flesh* spoke of certain early nineteenth-century Christians who 'would have been equally horrified at hearing the Christian religion doubted and at seeing it practised.' The present theological situation is partly the result of this inadequate emphasis. Christian idealism demands a theology which involves a warfare, and not a theology which inculcates a facile acquiescence. To disparage, without seeking to understand, this idealistic concentration upon practical tasks, will not lead us far. *Inadequate* it may be, but *false* it is not. I cannot, therefore, wholly sympathize with the criticism made by a distinguished theologian, to the effect that there were certain young preachers who were concerning themselves with social and economic questions because they had no gospel to preach. For myself I have sufficient respect for the views of those who refuse to acquiesce in the evils which afflict us to be willing to seek another, and from the theological point of view a less facile, explanation for this concentration. My suggestion would be that, if the criticism of inadequacy has to be attributed to any one, it cannot be withheld from those by whom the revealed ethic of the gospel was relegated to the subsidiary, the secondary, the peripheral. Not thus will theology receive its necessary reinstatement. Not by making light of modern ethical insights and endeavours can we hope for any sympathetic appreciation of the theologian's task.

The trouble, I fear, is that those of us who would wish to regard ourselves as theologians are very prone to develop our discursive powers at the expense of our ethical. We achieve skill in avoiding the point of opposing arguments and facts, we become dubiously subtle, we acquire a capacity for clouding retractions in such a way that the impression is

conveyed to all but the elect that the boot is on the other foot. A frank avowal of the inacceptability of past apologetic constructions still inspires a pugnacious resentment in the minds of a certain type of theological thinker. Hence such assertions as the following—so difficult for the historian to rebut: 'Where there is most theology there is often least religion.' Hence the familiar byword of history: the '*odium theologicum*.' When Erasmus was urged to go to Louvain he refused, giving as his reason the presence of the theologians there. 'I regret to say,' he declared, 'I do not love those gentry.' Melancthon, who spent his life in the service of theology, and who himself was not wholly a stranger to the vice of resentful intolerance, confessed that among the reasons why he did not fear death was that he should be set free from the rage of the theologians. If he conceived the separation as a *permanent* one, we have interesting implications suggested.

I cannot, however, refer to this past partial divorce of theology from religion and ethics, without referring to the progress we have made. No crimes would to-day, at least in Protestant countries, be justified as in the interests of such theological opinions as have been approved by the majority. The '*odium theologicum*' is being less and less frequently manifested: when it operates at all it does so in secret. The number of 'expiatory monuments' to be erected by future ages will become, I believe, progressively fewer. There is less likelihood, for example, of future generations being called upon to make such 'reparation to the memory' of progressive theological thinkers as has recently been sought by King's College, on behalf of the memory of F. D. Maurice. The cynic may be expected at this point, I fear, to declare that these 'reparations' are seldom *de cœur*; and are but the means of exploiting the theological liberalism of our times. I would myself prefer a worthier reading of the situation.

Among other reasons which might be instanced to explain

the present lowly position in which theological study is held by the age, mention should be made of a certain refined hairsplitting on questions where dogmatism is to-day felt to be out of place. A reverent agnosticism is the only fitting attitude to many of the questions with which theology has to deal. It is here doubtless exceedingly difficult for us moderns to be strictly just in estimating past theological systematizations. The historical imagination enables us to appreciate that in the days when our doctrinal confessions were achieved, serious and critical issues to our fathers were involved. Yet with our different presuppositions to-day, it is difficult not to marvel at the type of question which engrossed their thought. Some of the terms with which the student of dogmatics becomes familiar—for example the *communicatio idiomatum* of Lutheran dogmatics, supralapsarianism, and sublapsarianism of Calvinistic dogmatics, &c.—remind us of controversies that once meant much. Men fought with a determination begotten of the conviction that vital issues were at stake. Nevertheless, we cannot but feel that the passion for dogmatic system has led to immodest excesses which demand no apologia from us moderns. We ought indeed, if we have adequate faith, to give thanks to God that in every age there have not been wanting those of sceptical mind who resisted, often at great cost to themselves, the imposition of the dogmatic systems of bygone days. Such resistances have compelled theological thinkers—and how often they have found it difficult not to kick against the pricks—to consider their systems again and again.

Karl Barth, in an address delivered in 1923 on 'The Doctrinal Task of the Reformed Churches,' indulges in some caustic speaking on the aim of a Church conference to escape '*fruitless* theological discussion.' All who, with him, believe in the necessity of the Church getting down to this essential task of theological thinking will welcome the endeavours of those who feel its importance. Even so, we must be willing to accept the reproach suggested by the epithet 'fruitless,'

if we are to achieve anything in the nature of a theological revival. For myself, it is vain to suggest, whether by implication or by general emphasis, that the adjective is unjustified, and as vain to suppose that any kind of Calvinistic theological construction will win the assent of minds dominated by the teaching of Jesus about God. There is, to my own mind at least, no incompatibility between the frankest recognition of 'unfruitfulness' and the unswerving conviction that theological statement is essential to religion.

In times when faith and hope burn low, we are tempted to wish for a return of days long past, when men believed sufficiently tenaciously to fight about their beliefs; when they refused with scorn any such suggestion as that 'it will all come out right in the end.' Nevertheless, such a wish is begotten less of faith than of despair, which two, in spite of some, are not to be equated. For the plain, the inescapable, fact is that, however serious the problems of the past seemed to the theologians of the past, they are not our problems. It is not indifference to the virtues of the theological combatants of the past which forbids us finding inspiration for our militant zeal in the echoes of 'old, unhappy, far-off things.' We are called by God to deal with the problems which He has thought fit to entrust to us, and not with the problems entrusted to the past. A theology that is alive must meet the perplexities of its own age, not the doubts of a past age. The trouble is the presence of so many timid ecclesiastical leaders who prefer to ignore the existence of modern questionings, and who resent the theological endeavours of those who know that real issues are raised.

No call for a revival of theological endeavour will awaken a response, unless it comes from those who are willing to accept the truths revealed to our own age. Deep calleth unto deep, and by some mystic, deep-seated intuition, an age *knows* when its thinkers and preachers are speaking from the depths of present common needs, present common urgencies, present common insights. We do not require to

be told if a man has stood where we have stood. Whatever ecclesiastical labels we wear, we always recognize those who are our brothers.

The most obvious fact of the whole situation, at least to my own mind, is that our theological confessions, our Prayer Books, our systems of theology, all date from eras either prior to, or in the infancy of, our modern world. Roughly speaking, we may describe the pre-modern age as the *pre-scientific age*. The last few centuries have witnessed the greatest revolution in human thought humanity has yet known; the last few generations have seen the intensive application of the scientific principles which the era introduced. The *malaise* of the modern religious mind is caused by the fact that two divergent series of principles and presuppositions are implicit, on the one hand in his theology, and on the other in his science. He is not always *conscious* of this diversity, hence so often a *malaise* instead of an antagonism, or a rebellion. Diversity, however, there is. Such systems, for example, as those of Aquinas and Calvin, are based upon what I would call a pre-scientific view of Holy Scripture. It is idle, in this connexion, to point out the closely woven rational texture of each of these systems. The trouble with such rationalizations is not with the superstructure so much as with the assumptions on which the super-structure is reared. They rationalize at the same time too freely and too niggardly. When the age demands reason they give authority, and it is no compensation for this gift to receive reasons on matters where a certain modesty of restraint is felt instinctively to be desirable. The fact is that past theological systems are involved, to a far greater extent than is often acknowledged, with a view of Scripture which is now held only in obscurantist circles. Let me illustrate from the *Summa* of Thomas Aquinas. He postulates what I would call a non-scientific, or non-historical, or non-evolutionary, conception of the divine revelation in the Bible. A 'text' from any part of Scripture will do to

clinch an argument. 'Sacred doctrine,' says Aquinas, 'uses the authority of the canonical Scriptures as an incontrovertible proof' (I., Q. 1, Art. 8). And he uses 'texts' to settle the most astonishing (to the modern mind, that is) questions. Let a modern reader peruse, for example, his section on *The Week of Six Days* (I., Q. 65–74) and he will perceive the depth and the width of the gulf separating us from scholastic theology. Both the nature of the questions he here raises and the answers he gives to these questions reveal an attitude to Scripture impossible to those acquainted with the findings of history and of science. No modern theologian would even dream of asking the questions Aquinas raised in all solemnity (e.g. 'Whether the firmament was made on the second day,' 'Whether the firmament divides waters from waters,' &c.), and this for the simple reason that we now look to modern science for our cosmogony, and not to a book written before cosmogonic science was born. Associated with this conception of the Bible there is the further pre-supposition of Aquinas, which I would express by the phrase, *the modal duality of knowledge*. There is, first, 'a knowledge revealed by God,' and, second, 'philosophic science built up by human reason' (I., Q. 1). This distinction has prevailed also in Protestantism until recent years, and much of the theologico-philosophic endeavour of our times is to transcend this dualism in a larger synthetic view. It involves greater difficulties than it solves. *Discovery* is regarded as modally distinct from *revelation*: the human intellect is adequate for the first, but inadequate for the second. And, as the obverse of this, the divine direction and purpose are unnecessary for the first, but necessary for the second. As a consequence of this duality the present age, which finds that all its increase of knowledge comes by the strivings and intuitions of the human mind, is debarred from claiming any of its achievements and insights as 'revelation,' and is called upon by the protagonists of this traditionalist view to look backwards in time to a specific

date and to specific circumstances when 'revelation' was given, unknown and for ever unknowable to ourselves. The 'Catholic,' in order to avoid the awkward intellectual situation which then results—a situation which is tantamount to atheism, since a God who does nothing might as well not exist—has created the still more curious, though entirely coherent and logical in its setting, notion that revelation has now been entrusted to an institution, or to the heads thereof, whose *ex cathedra* utterances have the same quality of 'revelation' as has belonged to the 'revelations' given of old. The Roman Catholic thus out-fundamentalizes the fundamentalist, and the true home of the latter is, I have always thought, with the former. The 'Catholic' escape, however, tends merely to perpetuate a form of atheism among the increasing number who find truth elsewhere than in the utterances of 'Infallibility.' They are called to look for infallible revelations to statements which they themselves are unable to recognize as such. It is obvious, I think, that such an apologetic seeks to confine those who cannot accept it to a negation of theism. Integrally connected with these two pre-suppositions of Aquinas there is this third, namely, a dichotomy of divine activity in the universe of natural phenomena. Restrictions of space compel me to say but two things about this apologetic: this duality of divine activity can neither be scientifically discerned nor religiously perceived.

From all this it will be seen that we cannot expect any adequate rehabilitation of theology until we build upon assumptions that are generally acceptable. An intellectual edifice, whatever the foundations, may command the interest and admiration of the age: but it will only serve as a *home* provided the age is convinced that its foundations are sound.

The trend of this paper may seem to some readers to be more critical and less positive than the title would suggest, 'The Necessity of Theology'—under such a heading what comfortable and comforting paragraphs might not be

written! I do not, however, wish to perpetuate misunderstandings. If we declare for the 'necessity' of theology, it is rather important that we state what kind of theology we conceive to be necessary. And so, to elucidate my theme, I would emphasize one further consideration which is both positive and critical.

Theology, while it is necessary to religion, is not *religion*. Here, it is obvious, the question of the meaning and precise relation of these two is at once raised. Once again one of the central issues of modern religious thought is at stake. We have our theological thinkers who are at pains to set forth their conviction that the claim to have an immediate awareness of God is 'nonsense.' This is, as I understand it, the position of Dr. Tennant in *Philosophical Theology*. Barth likewise is scornful when he speaks of 'religious experience'; God is the 'Wholly Other'; 'God in us' implies arrogance. Most of the religious seers of the past will, then, have to be convicted of this 'arrogance,' not excluding our Lord.

If religion does not stand for an immediate communion with God, for myself I do not see any convincing reason for perpetuating the term. Its content is covered by other terms already in use. Let us, then, hasten, in the interests of our theological dialectic, to direct our energies into decrying the essence of the mystical claim in every age. Let us extirpate from the religious records of the past everything suggestive of this claim to *knowledge* of God, union with God. Let us banish these pathological experiences as 'pietistic and methodistic illusions.' I know not in what line of the prophets this emphasis will place us, but I am certain it will not be in the line of Jesus of Nazareth.

No plea for the re-instatement of theology is to my own mind so nugatory and vain as that which is dominated by an emphasis hostile to religious experience, or to the claim to 'communion with God.' 'Spirit to spirit Thou dost speak.' If this be not so, it will nothing avail us to have

erected a dialectic edifice in which a 'Wholly Other' transcendent Deity is enshrined for the intimidation of humanity. If the human soul is not immediately open to divine influence, then religion as such is illusion, and theology is the rationalization of illusion. And when I use the word 'immediately,' I do not suggest the absence of personal and environmental factors, as if, again, religious experience involved the 'supernatural dictation' of the old deistic inspiration theory. I use it to proclaim my belief that in and through these mediating *data* there is given to us awareness *of God*; and that in and through the historical *devenir* there is revealed 'the increasing purpose' of God.

I say these things in order to make clear that what I mean by the 'necessity' of theology is not what some others mean. I personally do not believe there is any necessity for a theology which has, as one of its fundamental presuppositions, the idea that religion receives whatever validity it has from theology. Religion I regard as the living tree, and theology as one of its fruits.

Nevertheless, having said this, I would stress that theology *is* a necessary fruition of religion. It is when religious man reflects, that theology is born. Religion existed before theology, and is indeed the life-giving principle of theology. But that no more means that theology is unnecessary than the fact that the babe precedes the man argues for the in-necessity of self-conscious and directive intelligence. It would be a highly curious situation if an age in which the average level of reflective intelligence is higher than it ever has been were to be led away by the notion that its intelligence need not be devoted to the data of religion. I have already suggested in the former part of this paper that the historical *justification* for this mistaken attitude (though it is not a justification; it is rather a *psychological explanation*) lies in the felt inadequacy of past theological explications. Nevertheless, this felt inadequacy should lead us, not to argue that we can do without theology, but to set about the

task of a worthier doctrinal explication and unification. As long as man retains his reflective intelligence he will need, and will seek, a theology. Only a universal religious and intellectual decadence could kill within humanity the felt necessity of coherent theological formulation and statement. The introduction, therefore, of emotional or practical fervour, to eke out the inadequacies of intellectual discussion of religious questions, will always be resisted by an age that reflects on its religion.

. . . . . .

I would sum up, in closing, the positive suggestions of this paper.

The theology of the future will have to be more ethical. Woven into its texture will be the highest ethical insights of its age. No theology which does not accord with the deepest moral consciousness will endure. Soteriological and eschatological formulation, in especial, will have to remember this. *Vice versa*, the ethical idealisms of the age will have to seek, and find, a basis and rationale in theological statement. And if in Jesus Christ we have the revelation, not only of the nature of God, *but also of His will for humanity*, have we not the foundation stone of that statement?

The theology of the future will have to be at once more rational and more religious. More rational, in the sense that the scrutiny of reason must not be forbidden the domain of the presuppositions. More religious, in the sense that religious insight and experience must be both the foundation and the inspiration of theology. More rational—that stands for the recognition that truth is not *imposed*, it is *seen*; that theology is, like every other branch of human thought, an *inquiry*, and not authoritarian and infallible dogmatic assertion; that the thought of the past should be a stimulus, and not a paralysis, of the thought of the present and of the future; that the question and the problem that 'stabs our spirit broad awake' is not an enticement of the legions of hell, but a call from the Spirit of Truth. More religious—

that stands for the insight of a St. Ambrose: 'Non in dialectica complacuit Deo salvum facere populum suum.'

The theology of the future will have to be *significant* to the problems of its own era. Every living theology has upon it the stamp of the mental and spiritual environment of its age, and speaks to the needs of that age. Such theologies are theologies of personal insight, and not merely compendious systematizations of the insights of the past. In a true sense, a man's theology (and an age's theology) is his own, or he has none.

The theology of the future will have to be more simple. This does not mean less profound; it means less complex and more central. One of the basal thoughts of the theology that is to be will be the distinction between cardinal truths without which theology could not exist at all, and some detailed theories, monuments of the past, which sought to systematize those truths. There will always be a measure of religious sympathy for such a cry as that of Erasmus, to whom I may be permitted to refer again. 'The sum of religion is peace, which can only be when definitions are as few as possible, and opinion is left free on many questions. Our present problems,' he went on to add, 'are said to be waiting for the next Oecumenical Council. Better let them wait till the veil is removed and we see God face to face.' Like Milton's 'grand infernal peers,' we reason high on lofty issues, but find no end 'in wandering mazes lost.' The day will come when our partial insights, our finite formulations, will bow their heads in shame that they ever pretended to be 'last words.' Even so, the patient enduring for that day presupposes certain truths of religion which are not subject to the shock and change of new knowledge, of new categories of thought, of fresh and urgent necessities of life. And this presupposition will, in certain other moments which visit most of us, give us more sympathy than Erasmus always showed for those who fought the doctrinal battles of their times.

The cardinal articles of the Christian faith are few. God,

Incarnation, Eternal Life—the substance of the Christian affirmation is here. Each of these truths, however, demands explication and coherent statement. Each involves and presupposes the others. Our conception of God will include both our conception of the Person of Jesus Christ, of the *ultimate* meaning of His life and death, and our conception of human life, its purpose and goal. So also our mode of formulating a doctrine of the Incarnation will rest upon a prior conception of God, and of His relation to nature and to humanity. And so I might go on. It will thus be seen that, few and simple as are the cardinal Christian truths, they unfold a universe of theological inquiry.

C. J. WRIGHT.

PRECURSORS OF THE LAMBETH CONFERENCE

LONGMANS & Co. publish a set of books which are precursors of the Lambeth Conference. *The Church of England and the Church of Christ*, by Archdeacon Rawlinson, 5*s*., is an expansion of lectures at Sion College. He explains why he believes in the Church of England and its future. The first lecture shows that there is no hope of Church Unity in any sectarian solution. The problem is as wide as the problem of Christendom. The English Church in the eighteenth century had many abuses, much laxity, and a general atmosphere of indifference. 'The Evangelical Revival was in its essence a revival of spiritual and personal religion in an age of spiritual torpor.' In *Before We Meet at the Lambeth Conference* (2*s*.) Dr. Neville Talbot finds that the heart of the Church of England's catholic and sacramental life is a beautiful and authentic manifestation of the unsearchable riches of Christ. 'The whole Church needs the whole Christ and His whole Body. And the Church therefore needs the reassembling of the whole of its divine resources.' *Lausanne, Lambeth, and South India* (2*s*. 6*d*.), by N. P. Williams, D.D., is a set of 'Notes on the Present Position of the Reunion Movement' by the Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity at Oxford. It was begun as a Memorandum on the Report of the Lausanne Conference. He discusses the views of Canon Streeter and the Bishop of Gloucester as to the transmission of Orders, and thinks that they cannot claim to be historically tenable. *White and Black in Africa* (2*s*.) is a critical examination of the Rhodes Lectures of General Smuts by J. H. Oldham. They furnish no little stimulus, suggestion, and guidance. As to East Africa he has no more exciting suggestion to make than that the history of South Africa, shorn of its abuses, should be repeated under conditions a hundred times more unfavourable to the success of the experiment.

ARISTOTLE THE HEIR OF PLATONISM

IT is well recognized to-day that the work of no great thinker can be adequately appraised without some study of his intellectual history and the influences that contributed to his development. In the case of Aristotle, a large proportion of contemporary research is being directed to the investigation of the chronological order of his writings and of the extent of his dependence upon his predecessor Plato.[1] The results of this research will inevitably lead to a fuller and more precise understanding of Aristotle's philosophical system. The object of the present paper is to focus attention on some of those aspects of his thought which are most clearly reminiscent of his early contact with Platonism.

About 387 B.C., according to tradition, when Plato had returned from his travels abroad, he bought a house and garden to the north-west of the city of Athens, where he set up a religious brotherhood, or school, dedicated to the Muses. From its situation in the grove of the hero Academus, this school came to be known as the Academy. To the Academy, as to a modern university, there repaired the young men of the Hellenic world who were desirous of advanced training in science and philosophy. Aristotle, a native of the Ionian colony of Stagira, in Chalcidice, entered the Academy at the age of eighteen, and remained there for twenty years, participating to the full in the programme of study and research which was followed there. The curriculum, framed doubtless on the lines of the education of the Guardians as outlined in *Republic* vi., comprised mathematics, in its branches of arithmetic, geometry, and stereometry, astronomy, harmonics, and dialectic, the crowning science of the Good. Biology, too, one may conclude, was not ignored in the researches of the school, judging from the

[1] See Jaeger's *Aristoteles* (1923); W. D. Ross, *Aristotle* (1923).

proficiency displayed in that direction by Plato's nephew Speusippus, as well as from the stress which Plato himself laid on the logical division of genera and species in the *Sophist* and *Politicus*.[1] At any rate, it is certain that this branch of study, as well as ethics and politics, had claimed a large share of Aristotle's attention during his long sojourn in Plato's school.

Apart from the mere subjects studied, the whole tone and atmosphere of the Academy must have provided a powerful stimulus to the moral and intellectual development of its students. In a previous article, attention has been drawn to the dual aspect of Plato's philosophy, and it was suggested that his religious temperament led him to a belief in the immortality of the soul and the existence of God, whereas his thirst for knowledge caused him to build upon these religious data the famous theory of Forms and the science of dialectic, whereby all the truths of the subordinate sciences, through a continuous testing of hypotheses, should culminate eventually in the knowledge of the Good, that great end for which the whole universe strives and lives. There is sufficient evidence, both from the fragmentary remains of Aristotle's early works and from references in his *Ethics* and *Metaphysics*,[2] that these fundamental assumptions, however they may have been modified or re-interpreted, remained a paramount influence as long as Plato was the head of the Academy. That Aristotle was profoundly affected by his master's views, and was at first a faithful adherent of Platonism, has recently been demonstrated very convincingly by Professor W. Jaeger in the work already indicated.[3] Among the earliest known works of Aristotle is a dialogue styled *Eudemus, or the Soul*, which treats of the subject of Plato's *Phaedo* in a truly religious spirit, affirming the doctrine of Immortality and that of Learning by Reminiscence

[1] Cf. Epicrates, fragment 5.

[2] Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.*, A, vi.; *Metaphysics*, Z, vi. 1031*a–b*.

[3] Jaeger, *Aristoteles*, c. ii., pp. 28-36.

of the Forms seen in a previous life. He wrote, further, a work called *The Protrepticus* as a kind of prospectus for the Academy, proclaiming the Platonic way of life, and expressing a desire for greater exactitude in the principles of ethics and politics, after the fashion of Plato's *Republic*. In his very early works, then, Aristotle apparently elaborated the religious doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul, as well as the epistemological theory of the Forms and of the Good, which served both as an ethical and a scientific end. According to the theory of Forms, the whole field of transitory phenomena, of which the visible universe consists, is but a shadow, an image of true existence, and, wherever a group of particulars is called by the same name, there exists an eternal, immutable Form, which is the true reality, and which imparts to the particulars such existence as they have. The climax of true existence is reached in the Form of the Good, which, to quote the *Republic*, 'every soul pursues, and for whose sake performs all things, divining its existence, although it be unable adequately to comprehend it.'[1]

After Plato's death in 347 B.C., when Aristotle had departed from Athens to King Hermeias in the Troad, signs of an independent tendency appeared. There was a desire to modify and re-interpret the doctrine of Forms. It would seem as if the mystical language in which that doctrine had been expressed began to awaken doubts in the mind of Aristotle. He had come of Ionian stock, of the race that had brought natural science to birth in eastern Greece, and his early education, owing to his father's connexion with medicine, had familiarized him with scientific method. In the Troad, too, he probably spent a good deal of time in observing animal life, and he may have written some of his biological treatises there.[2] At all events, the background of his earlier life gradually re-asserted itself, now that the

[1] Plato, *Republic*, 505 E.

[2] See Burnet's *Aristotle*, p. 12 (British Academy Lecture, 1924).

mystical and religious influence of the master was withdrawn. In the work *Concerning Philosophy* exception was taken to the peculiarly poetical and imaginative phraseology which Plato had used to explain the Forms and their relation to the things of sense. The criticism applied especially to the difficulty of explaining how any eternal, immutable realities, which exist apart, could be the cause of eternally changing phenomena, which are quite distinct from them. How can a sensible thing participate in an ideal Form? The Platonists, he thought, simply set up a second class of existences over against the first, and were obliged to explain two things instead of one. Further, how did the sensible thing come into being at all? What was the cause of motion and change?[1]

This criticism of the Forms seems to have made the first breach between the teaching of Plato and that of his 'most genuine disciple.'[2] When Aristotle had completed his sojourn at the Macedonian Court as tutor of Alexander, and had founded his own school in Athens (335 B.C.), the breach gradually widened. The difference indicated, perhaps, not so much a fundamental difference of doctrine as a difference in temperament and in his general reaction to life. The more one reflects on the essential features of Aristotelian theory, the greater becomes the conviction that it was in essence the same as Plato's, being, in reality, a peculiar interpretation and expansion of the latter. I now propose to consider some of the chief doctrines of orthodox Platonism (excluding the later mathematical developments in the Academy), and to compare them with their counterparts in Aristotle, as we know them from the notes of lectures delivered in the Lyceum, which form the bulk of the present Aristotelian corpus.

Orthodox Platonism, as we have seen, postulated a world of ideal truth, immutable and eternal, which exists, and a

[1] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, A, vi. 987*b* 4; ix. 991*b* seq.

[2] Diogenes Laertius, v. 1.

world of sense, which never is, but always becomes; and the exact relationship in which these two worlds stand to each other was never adequately explained. Aristotle, when he came to the formulation of his mature philosophy, had decided that the world of sense and change deserved more recognition than it had received from Plato, and that the immutable Forms offered no explanation of it. His researches in logic led him to the conclusion that being, or reality, belonged not to general notions or universals, but only to a concrete thing—the subject, but never the predicate, of a proposition. Further, all concrete things could be resolved into two constituents, form and matter. To take an example from *Metaphysics*, Z, a statue consists of stone, which is its matter, and the shape imposed upon the stone, which is its form. The stone in its turn may be regarded as having two constituents—its material elements and the formula of their combination. These elements themselves, in their turn, may be analysed into form and matter. Even the four so-called first elements, air, earth, fire, and water, may be resolved, in the last resort, into a grouping of contraries, e.g. the warm and the moist, or the cold and the dry, together with a matter which is pure substrate, the mere possibility or potentiality of being. Thus the whole universe, from this empty substrate upwards, is to be regarded as an elaborate system of successive superpositions of form upon matter. A thing is known only by its form, and, from the scientific point of view, the world is to be considered as consisting of a very large number of interrelated genera and species.[1] The study of the individual cannot be separated from that of the species to which it belongs; and the form of the individual thing and of the species alike consists in that differentia which marks it off scientifically from other species belonging to the same genus, or larger class. The matter of such an individual

[1] Cf. Plato's Division of Genera, *Phaedrus*, 265 E; *Philebus*, 16 B–C.

thing or species is the genus. It is from this analysis of the world that he arrives at the conception of a definition as consisting of the genus and the difference (*per genus et differentiam*).

As one reads this description of the world of things, one recognizes it as being practically identical with the world one envisages from the Platonic dialogues, especially from the *Timaeus*. The chief difference lies in Aristotle's insistence that this world is the real world, whereas Plato regards it as being at best only half real. In the *Timaeus*, when he has to deal with the 'probable account' of the generation of phenomena, Plato declares that, besides the two classes of Forms and Sensibles, which he had hitherto postulated, he must now mention a third, the Substrate of Becoming. It is a nature that is vague and hard to explain. 'It ever receives all things into it, and has nowhere any form like to aught of the shapes that enter into it. For it is as the substance wherein all things are naturally moulded, being stirred and informed by the entering shapes. . . . But the shapes which pass in and out are likenesses of the eternal existences, being copied from them in a fashion wondrous and hard to declare.'[1] Here, too, then, we see concrete individual things coming into existence within a receptacle or substrate, which is really mathematical space, attained by a process of abstraction from the actual world of sense. But whereas Plato calls the things that come and go merely 'likenesses of the eternal existences,' of the forms which are apart from the substrate, Aristotle regards the form as well as the matter as being inherent in the things. He favours Immanence, as opposed to Transcendence.

In his exposition of the relationship of form and matter, Aristotle not only failed to improve upon Plato, but involved himself in some inconsistency. In the first place, his form, or essence, is not immanent in the concrete thing in any

[1] Plato, *Timaeus*, 50 C, tr. Archer-Hind.

material sense; it is a principle of structure or function that can be grasped only by the mind. Secondly, the Aristotelian treatment of the term existence, or reality, is confusing, so far as its use in the *Metaphysics* is concerned. As a logician he assigns existence primarily only to the concrete thing, composed of form and matter; yet in his more metaphysical discussions he implies that the substantial element in things, the only element that can be known, is their form, or essence.[1] This appears to be a lapse from his own common-sense point of view to a position very like that of Plato.

Let us next consider the attitude of the two philosophers to the problem of motion and change. Aristotle asserts in the *Metaphysics* that the Forms of Plato do not provide an Efficient Cause, and that Plato did not furnish any explanation as to why the world is moved this way or that.[2] Since he evidently considered his own account of motion superior, it will be more convenient to consider his view first, and Plato's afterwards. Motion, according to Aristotle, is a passage from potentiality to actuality. For example, the bricks and mortar which go to the making of a house are the house potentially, and motion is called into being by the process of actualization at the hands of the builder. In the case of art, therefore, the starting-point of movement is outside of the thing that is moved. In Nature, however, there is a power of movement in the thing itself; and the nature of a thing is its form, its innate mode or structure, and it is this which causes the thing to grow and change, and to stop growth when it has reached the culmination of its form. Matter is ever aspiring to form, and form, by its mere existence, calls forth motion. Hence Formal, Final, and Efficient Cause coalesce into one. This conception of an immaterial entity, such as the plan in the mind of the craftsman, or a desire felt by an animal, as calling forth movement within the appropriate matter, is carried out on

[1] *Metaphysics*, Z, xvii.

[2] *Metaphysics*, A, 991*b* 5; L, 1071*b* 33.

a much more extensive scale in his consideration of the heavens and the movement of the universe taken as a whole. Since it is part of his general theory of Motion that the agent which causes motion must exist in actuality before the motion to which it gives rise—e.g. the idea of the artist comes before the picture, the oak-tree is prior to the acorn—so there must exist somewhere pure, uncaused movement which is prior to all other movement. This source of movement will be also the Final Cause of all things, as well as pure Form, untrammelled by matter of any kind. Such a source he finds in the movement of the First Heaven. This First Heaven is the outermost sphere of the universe, containing the fixed stars, and the universe consists of a series of such spheres, all concentric, with the earth at rest in the centre. The rotatory movement of the First Heaven is due, he affirms, to the activity of pure thought, which he calls the Prime Unmoved Mover, and also God. He therefore assigns a physical motion to an entirely immaterial cause. Each of the concentric spheres is moved by a similar Unmoved Mover. Aristotle's description of the process is: 'It moves as the object of Desire'; i.e. it does not purpose or will movement, but calls it forth merely by its existence. The universe is moved by sheer attraction. 'On this principle, then, depend the heavens and Nature. God's life is like ours at its short best. Such is His life always (which ours cannot be); for His activity is also pleasure. And while thought varies in perfection with its object, it is at its best and most divine when it is in such direct contact with its object that it and its object may be said to be identical. This best and most perfect contemplation it is that God enjoys. If, then, with God it is always well, as with us sometimes, this is wonderful; and if even better, it is more wonderful still. And this is the fact. Life, too, is His; for the actuality of mind is life, and He is that actuality, an actuality which essentially is perfect and eternal life. We say, then, that God is a living being, eternal and perfect, and

that continuous and eternal life and being are His. For He is this.'[1]

Is there anything similar to this in Plato? There is certainly no explicit doctrine of Potentiality and Actuality, of Material and Formal Cause, and of Mind as Pure Form, systematically applied to the whole realm of nature. There are, however, traces in the dialogues of something analogous to Aristotle's views. As regards the innate power of Form to evoke a response in matter, even the early utterances of Plato occasionally refer to the object as 'aiming at' being the Form, but 'falling short' of it[2]; and the notion that the whole process of nature is an unconscious striving after an End or Form which it never perfectly attains finds its counterpart in the *Republic*, where the idea of Good is described as that which every soul pursues, that towards which all action tends, and for which all lesser things are sacrificed.[3] Further, the notions of Potentiality and Actuality are latent in that passage in the *Sophist*, where, in order to meet the wishes of materialists and idealists together, Being is defined tentatively as the 'power or potentiality of acting or being acted upon.'[4] Similarly, the doctrine of the Prime Unmoved Mover takes us back to Plato's utterances concerning soul. His belief in the soul and its immortality was probably a datum of the religious consciousness. It endowed life with a purpose, and at the same time provided an explanation of the unceasing change of the physical universe. In the *Phaedrus*, soul is defined as the self-mover, which is without beginning, and therefore immortal.[5] In the *Sophist*, the Eleatic stranger revolts from the thought that motion and life and soul and mind should not be attributes of absolute Being.[6] In the *Timaeus*, the divine artificer is represented as fashioning the world by placing mind in soul and soul in body, and soul is moved from within

[1] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, L, vii. 1072*b* 18, tr. Professor J. L. Stocks.
[2] Plato, *Phaedo*, 74 D. [3] *Republic*, 505 E. [4] *Sophist*, 247 E.
[5] *Phaedrus*, 245 C. [6] *Sophist*, 249 A.

and is the cause of motion in all other things.[1] In the *Philebus*, Protarchus says: 'To hold that reason orders all things is what the very aspect of the universe, the sun, the moon, the stars, and the whole circumference of the heavens, requires us to believe.'[2] Finally, in the *Laws* the highest and best form of motion is that which moves both itself and others, and is identified with soul, the oldest of all things. All the revolutions of the heavens, and of the bodies in the heavens, are akin to the movements of soul, and are the reflections of the will, the deliberation, the opinion of the souls that reside within.[3] The orderly revolutions of the stars prove the regularity and precision of the soul-movements which they reflect. These souls or soul are God: and God pays heed to human affairs, observing whether men do justice or injustice, and is not to be propitiated by offerings and gifts. Plato, therefore, had a vision of the physical universe as moved and controlled by Reason, as consisting of a body and soul together. He calls the universe God, and the stars and planets are gods of the second rank, perfect bodies whose orderly movements are produced by a good and wise soul.

There is a difference, however, between this and Aristotle's adaptation of it. With Plato the universe is a union of soul and body, and physical motion is but a reflection of the motion of reason, as seen through the medium of sense. For Aristotle the two are distinct. The heavenly spheres in their revolutions exist separately from the Unmoved Movers which cause their movement. Moreover, Aristotle's God takes no thought for the universe, but is ever engaged in thinking upon thought. Such a God does not satisfy the religious consciousness. Here we note Aristotle's impersonal, objective view of the world. Yet, even in his description of pure Intellect, there are one or two reminiscences of Plato's *Laws*. For instance, Plato suggests that the gods might be

[1] *Timaeus*, 34 A, 46 E. [2] *Philebus*, 28 D–E, tr. H. F. Carlill.
[3] *Laws*, 896 D, E, seq.

compared to the generals of armies.[1] The nature of the universe, says Aristotle, contains the good both separately and in the order of its parts, as an army does: 'for the good is found both in the order and in the leader, and more in the latter—for he does not depend on the order, but it depends on him.'[2]

How does the doctrine of immortality fare with Aristotle? Most interpreters agree that Plato believed in immortality for the individual, and not merely for the universal, soul. To understand Aristotle's position here, one must consider to some extent his general view of the relation of soul and body. Whereas for Plato the soul is a divine essence, which for a time is imprisoned within a body, 'like an oyster in its shell,'[3] with Aristotle the term comprises all the activities of a living body through all the grades of animal existence. The soul of man, therefore, includes all the functions of his bodily organs—growth and nutrition, movement, sensation, perception, desire, intellect. He applies to it his usual metaphysical terminology, and says briefly: 'The soul is the form, the body is the matter, of the living thing.' Many of these faculties of the soul are connected with a specific bodily organ or organs, and hence would have no meaning apart from the body. When he comes to the discussion of mind, or intellect, however, Aristotle is led, by his ignorance of the physical correlate of thought, to suppose that the reason of man—that which distinguishes him from the lower animals—is incorporeal, entering mysteriously from without. Hence the reason in man may be immortal, but soul, in so far as it comprises the lower faculties, which are inevitably connected with body, is not immortal. The Soul Doctrine of Aristotle, therefore, contains both a criticism of, and a reversion to, Platonism. Dissatisfied with Plato's classification of the soul's activities into reason, passion, and appetite,[4] he extends the analysis by adding nutrition and sensation, and insists on the inevitable correlation of soul and body, but

[1] *Laws*, 905 E. [2] *Metaphysics*, L, 1075*a* 11 seq., tr. W. D. Ross.
[3] *Phaedrus*, 250 C. [4] *Republic*, 435 E seq.

in the end he admits that the essential part of man's soul, the Creative Mind, exists apart from body, and is pure activity—form without matter. Some commentators have held that the Creative Mind alluded to in this part of Aristotle's psychology is nothing less than the Divine Mind which inspires the universe. In spite of this decided lapse into Platonism, Aristotle appears to have no place in his scheme for individual immortality—only for the endless generation of the species.

But it is in ethics and the study of conduct that we see Aristotle diverging most conspicuously from the Platonic doctrine. In ethics, as in physics, Plato's attitude was determined by strong religious beliefs. In the *Phaedo* and in the *Theaetetus* he expressed his assurance that the world is under the governance of good and wise gods, that the soul is immortal, and that the best life for man is the imitation of God, a preparation for death or for a fuller life hereafter.[1] Man's life is therefore a perpetual quest; his moral history consists in a struggle between the conflicting tendencies within him—the appetitive, the passionate, and the rational elements of the soul. The allegorical description of this struggle as that of a charioteer driving two horses of different breed and temper is well known. Right action ensues when the rational element rules and disciplines the other elements. Departure from the rule of the rational means failure and sin. In order to facilitate the rule of the rational in man's life, the State, according to the *Republic* and the *Laws*, must be so organized that education, from the first, should be directed towards the formation of the best character in the citizens, and that the government should be in the hands of the men who possess the highest intellectual and moral excellence. This is the meaning of the famous sentence that an ideal State will become possible only when philosophers are kings or kings become philosophers.[2] The philosophers are

[1] *Phaedo*, 62 E seq.; *Theaetetus*, 176 seq. [2] *Republic*, 473 C.

those who spend the greater part of their lives in study and in contemplation of the Good, returning to practical life only when the State needs their services as governors.

Aristotle, in his ethics, ignores the religious assumptions upon which Plato's ethical views rest. The doctrine of personal immortality and of the transmigration of souls had to be discarded when he defined soul as 'the first actualization of a natural body possessing the capacity of life' (*De Anima*, 412*a*, 27). Further, God, as conceived by Aristotle, is engaged in contemplation alone, and cannot be called just or temperate or brave or liberal, or by any of the moral terms suitable to human beings.[1] Hence it would be inappropriate to call the moral life of man 'an imitation of God.' He therefore leaves God and the religious life out of account in his ethics, and concentrates upon the subject as an objective science, making common-sense generalizations about conduct from the point of view of a sane and careful observer. Two of these generalizations stand out pre-eminently. One is that a good or bad character is the result of habits, and that the man who aims at a good character must, therefore, be disciplined in good habits, so that his will may support his tendency to virtue. So long as a man's soul is the scene of a struggle between conflicting impulses, the fixed state of virtue has not been attained. Hence Plato would acclaim as a temperate act any single victory of a good will over an impulse to self-indulgence; Aristotle, on the other hand, would call the agent in such a case continent, but not temperate, reserving the latter term for the man who is habitually virtuous in this respect. Conversely, he would call the man who succumbs sometimes, but not always, to temptation, incontinent, whereas the habitual drunkard would be intemperate. The virtuous man, in short, is one in whom right action has become a habit, a habit of deliberate choice.[2] The second characteristic which

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[1] *Eth. Nic.*, x. 1178*b* 10 seq., [2] *Eth. Nic.*, ii. 1106*b* 36.

Aristotle stresses is that virtuous action must consist in a mean between two extremes—those of excess and defect. Thus, in regard to giving money, the mean would be liberality, the excess prodigality, the defect niggardliness.[1] Lest the doctrine be interpreted on a merely quantitative basis, Aristotle goes on to say that the mean is purely relative to the person concerned, and that the final judge of the mean in any particular case is the 'wise man'—one who understands human nature and the character that is desirable for the citizens of a good State.

In his study of moral virtue, then, Aristotle proceeds on somewhat different lines from Plato; but his indebtedness becomes clear again in his view of the human good and in his final estimate of human well-being. In a late dialogue, the *Philebus*, Plato had discussed the criteria with which the human good must comply. It must be adequate, complete, and desirable in itself.[2] Following this notion, Aristotle, in his *Ethics*, requires that the human good shall be final and self-sufficient, concluding that it is to be identified with well-being, or happiness.[3] This happiness he proceeds to equate with activity, the activity which constitutes the particular function of man as distinguished from the animal world—that is, a life directed by moral discipline. His final definition of happiness is 'an activity of the soul, conditioned by virtue; and, if the virtues are more than one, by that virtue which is the best and most perfect; further, for happiness a complete lifetime is required.'[4] This last clause is added to show that some external advantages are necessary for real happiness—a reasonable length of life for the exercise of man's activity—and, later, other material goods are mentioned, such as good birth, good looks, and friends. Under some conditions even the wise man could not be styled happy. This analysis reminds one of the 'mixed life' of reason and pleasure described in the *Philebus*; neither

[1] *Eth. Nic.*, ii. 1107*a* 28 seq.
[2] *Philebus*, 22 A seq.
[3] *Eth. Nic.*, i. 1097*a* 28 seq.
[4] *Eth. Nic.*, i. 1098*a* 17.

reason nor pleasure in isolation is the human good, for by itself each lacks self-sufficiency and the property of adequacy and completeness.

At the end of the *Ethics* there is a characteristically Aristotelian modification of a Platonic point of view. Influenced, no doubt, by the scheme of life outlined for the Guardians of Plato's State, in accordance with which they pass the greater portion of their lives in the contemplation of the Good, Aristotle proclaims finally that the most perfect happiness of all is the activity which calls forth the highest virtue, and the highest virtue is that of the divine part of man, namely, the intellect.[1] Such activity has no end beyond itself, and is least dependent on external advantages for its fulfilment. It is that activity which is most like the activity of God, and in exercising it man comes nearest to the achievement of immortality. Such a life is only for those who are philosophically inclined, and it is entirely divorced from the practical life of government, which was one of the intermittent activities of Plato's Guardians. It is in these utterances that Aristotle comes nearest to anything like religious fervour, but his religion and his God are coldly intellectual, and aloof from the world of human interests and the struggles of ordinary men.

The treatise on *Ethics* was followed or accompanied by one on *Politics*, of which ethics, in the eyes of Aristotle, was but a part. The debt of the *Politics* to the dialogues of Plato is continuously manifest. Although Aristotle passes many strictures on the organization of the ideal commonwealth, particularly on the so-called communistic doctrines in the *Republic*, he lays the same stress on the necessity of sound laws and good education as did Plato in his last book, the *Laws*; and in his classification of possible constitutions he is following in the main the similar classification in

[1] *Eth. Nic.*, x. 1177*a* 12.

Plato's *Politicus*. It would take us too far afield to deal, even in a cursory manner, with the wealth of material in Aristotle's *Politics*. One striking contrast between the two philosophers may, however, be noted. Whereas in the *Republic* the Guardians devote themselves to the good of the whole State from religious principles, studying the Good because by so doing they may enable mankind as a whole to lead a noble life, in Aristotle the State exists for the philosophers alone, for the few who are fitted by nature to exercise the highest human activity, and the whole machinery of government, with its system of slavery and disenfranchised labour, is but an instrument to this end.

In conclusion, it will be well to reiterate that aspect of their thought which marks both philosophers as belonging to one and the same school, however differently they may express their views. Both look for reality, whether in physics, ethics, politics, science, or metaphysics, in the end or purpose rather than in the matter or the process through which that end is attained. Both find fault with Anaxagoras because he introduced a Reason into the explanation of the world, but failed to endow that Reason with any other function than that of a moving cause.[1] Plato identified this Reason with a Divine Mind, whose providence has ordained that things should arise in the best way and for the best. Aristotle concluded that the purpose is inherent, not in God, but in nature itself, which unconsciously and unceasingly inspires each part of the universe to achieve its own appropriate end or form. Such difference as there is between the two positions is due surely to temperament and point of view. In Plato's system there has always seemed to be a gap between the religious postulates and the theory of knowledge. Aristotle, by ignoring the religious data, appears to bridge the gap and to work out a harmonious system. It is merely an appearance, however, for his conceptions of a Purposive

[1] *Phaedo*, 98 B; *Metaphysics*, A, 985*a* 17.

Nature and of a Prime Unmoved Mover are no more capable of scientific demonstration than Plato's Divine Mind.

The present study of Aristotle, from its very nature, can give only a very partial view of his achievement. In singling out those features of his teaching which are to be attributed to his Platonic inheritance, one must of necessity ignore a great deal of subsidiary material in which his native genius found expression, and one can make no attempt to estimate the amazing industry and versatility which enabled him to systematize and weld into a coherent whole the results of his investigations in so many different realms of knowledge. Whatever he took over from Plato was passed through the crucible of his own mind, and impressed by his own stamp. The relation between the two has been compared by Professor Stocks to that between Philip and Alexander of Macedon.[1] The one conceived the ideal and furnished the instruments for the great search after truth; the other re-interpreted the ideal, re-fashioned the instruments, and brought into being an all-embracing, compact, and self-sufficient scheme of knowledge.

MARIE V. WILLIAMS.

The Open Door and the Mandates System. By Benjamin Gerig. (10s.) *The Private Citizen in Public Social Work.* By Hilda Jennings. (Allen & Unwin.) Mr. Gerig gives a clear and full account of economic equality before and since the establishment of the Mandates System. Such a survey has been made possible by the administrative machinery now established at Geneva. When compared with a century ago, there can be no doubt that the direction of commercial policy is towards liberalism. A surprising measure of control is effectively exercised by the Permanent Mandates Commission, and customs regulations are carefully observed. In fact, the Mandates System is undoubtedly the most effective instrument yet devised to make the Open Door effective.

Miss Jennings shows that during the past century the private individual has acted consistently as the pioneer in social reform until, in 1909, the London Education Authority decided to extend the Voluntary Care Committee System to all its schools. She gives striking instances of the benefit to children and parents, shows how the system works, and brings out the need for voluntary workers.

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[1] *Aristotelianism*, Professor J. L. Stocks, p. 38.

ST. VINCENT DE PAUL: FIRST PHASE[1]

PROBABLY no Roman Catholic saint makes a stronger appeal to the modern world than St. Vincent de Paul, whose humanitarian zeal ranks him with such Protestant saints as John Howard, Elizabeth Fry, and the Earl of Shaftesbury. The sixteenth and the twentieth centuries seem to be brought closer together in the person of this Gascon prison-chaplain and reformer than by any other servant of God, Protestant or Romanist, of the times of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation. He seems to be the very embodiment of Christian love in action, not a whit behind St. Francis in his practical compassion for the unfortunate and degraded, loving the moral leper with a fervour akin to that of the Little Poor Man of Assisi for the physical outcasts of society.

St. Vincent was born in 1581, five years later than the date accepted by most of his biographers. The error is serious, because it involves a question, not only as to the date of his ordination, but also, as we shall see, as to his youthful character and reputation for sanctity. If the usually accepted date of his birth (1576) be incorrect, then Vincent de Paul, contrary to the prescriptions, then very recent, of the Council of Trent, was ordained priest five years too soon, at the age of nineteen. The date of his ordination, September 23, 1600, has been recorded in documents of an indisputable authenticity. If he had in 1600 attained to the requisite age of twenty-four years, then 1576 must be correct. But between 1921 and 1925 M. Pierre Coste published in forty volumes the correspondence of Vincent de Paul and other authentic documents relating to

[1] *Saint Vincent de Paul*, Correspondence, Entretiens, Documents. Edition publiée et annotée par Pierre Coste, prêtre de la Mission. Paris: Gabalda. Quatorze volumes in-4°, 1921–5.

his life, the whole work evincing on every page a jealous solicitude for truth and a scrupulous critical sense. From this monumental work we gather that the saint was born at Pouy, near Dax in Gascony, in the month of April 1581. St. Vincent has written his age a dozen times in his letters, and there is no contradiction between one letter and another. He says himself in 1660: 'I have been a priest sixty years,' and he gives his age then as seventy-nine. M. Antoine Redier says: 'He was capable of doing a simple subtraction. In taking away from seventy-nine those sixty years consecrated to God, he left only nineteen before the great day on which he was made priest. But he knows something else: that on that great day he was nineteen and no more. He would have been shocked, when making himself out to be seventy-nine years old in 1660, to discover—because it is impossible that he should not have perceived it—that that made him priest at nineteen, if it had not been the truth.'[1]

St. Vincent's parents were very poor Gascon peasants, living in a little cottage with a barn and stables adjoining. 'In the country to which I belong,' says Vincent, 'the people are nourished on a tiny grain called millet, which they boil in a pot; at meal-times it is poured into a vessel, and the members of the household gather round, take their meal, and afterwards go to work.' Jean de Paul, the father of St. Vincent, was not of noble origin, as his name might lead one to think. The other peasants of his village all bore, like himself, the preposition, because it was the common usage to designate themselves by the place of their birth or of their habitation. One finds to-day at Pouy a house and a stream called Paul. A family who lived near that stream or occupied that house became the family of Paul. Vincent always signed 'Depaul,' in a single word. His mother was named Bertrande de Moras. No more noble than her husband, 'she had never,' says her son, 'had a servant, having been a servant herself.' The good people

[1] *La Vraie Vie de Saint Vincent de Paul*, p. 10.

had six children born to them—four boys, Jean, Bernard, Gayon, and Vincent, and two girls, both of whom were called Marie. All the children, when they grew old enough, helped their father on the farm. We do not know in what order the children came into the world, but one biographer, Louis Abelly, says that Vincent was the third child.

The village of Pouy, where the family lived, is no longer to be found on the map of France or in the list of the communes. Since 1828 it has figured under the name of Saint-Vincent-de-Paul, and the little railway station which serves it, the last before Dax when travelling to Bordeaux, is called Berceau-de-Saint-Vincent-de-Paul. It was there that the child kept his father's sheep and pigs. All that is related of his boyhood is charming, but uncertain. There are anecdotes which witness to the charity and precocious piety of the little swineherd. It is known from his own testimony that he had been 'a poor swineherd from birth.' All the rest is fantasy. It was his custom, we are assured, to pray night and morning under an old oak beside a little ruined chapel near to his home. It is affecting to find that the oak is still there, and that to-day pilgrims venerate it in memory of St. Vincent; but nothing compels us to believe that the piety of the child was remarkable; we do not know. We are told that one day he gave all he had, thirty sous, which he had saved up to buy something he wanted for himself, to a poor beggar. It is quite possible. But it is better to admire Vincent de Paul for what he really did than for the edifying fables invented by his devotees. All we know is that, with a stick in his hand, he wandered to and fro across the cheerless, wind-swept pastures, the poorest in France. That region north of Acqs, as it was formerly called, or Dax, as it is now written, was then very dreary, the ungrateful soil affording little nourishment for man or beast.

They tell us without proof that young Vincent was a little saint. I think that he was rather a little prodigy, and that in the favourable solitude his keen brain worked. He

who was to become an incomparable man of action had, in the dawn of his life, precious leisure hours which he was never to find again. He did not devote them all to prayer, but doubtless used them to exercise, by observation and meditation, his intelligence and nourish his ambitions.

There was in France at that time, as in Ireland to-day, one short cut, for an enterprising lad, from poverty and obscurity to power and influence. No political advancement offered itself, and the learned professions of law and medicine were beyond the reach of a peasant boy; but the Church gave Vincent an opportunity of which he was not slow to avail himself. It seems certain that, by the age of fifteen, Vincent had passed at least four years at Dax, either in the Franciscan College or in the home of M. de Comet, a barrister of some position in that town and magistrate of the village of Pouy. Probably M. Comet had noticed the lad and persuaded the father to confide him to his care. Whether the child was for a time a pensioner at the college and later on a tutor in the home of the lawyer, who had two sons, or whether he only lodged at the house of his benefactor and attended classes at the college, we shall never know. This is certain: that we see a young gallant already very far removed from his first estate of swineherd. 'When I was a little boy,' he said one day, 'as my father took me with him into the town, I was ashamed to go with him and to acknowledge my father, because he was badly dressed and slightly lame.' And one of his biographers assures us that he once made to Madame de Lamoignon this confession: 'I remember that at the college where I was studying, some one came to tell me that my father, who was a poor peasant, was asking for me. I refused to go and speak to him, by which I committed a great sin.'

In 1596, at the age of fifteen, he went to receive, in conditions, circumstances, and dispositions without doubt edifying, the tonsure. We only know the bare fact. He proceeded to Toulouse, to pursue his theological studies at the university.

How did he provide for his needs there? We have no precise information till 1598. In the summer of that year he bestirred himself to obtain a tutorship in a family, as the students do to-day during vacations. He found it at the Château of Buzet-en-Comdomois, five leagues from Toulouse. The lord of the place was evidently satisfied with the services of the young cleric, for he decided, on his return, to send his two sons to Toulouse, where Vincent lived with them, and supervised, in his hours of leisure, their studies. During the same vacation, on September 19, 1598, Vincent returned in haste to Tarbes to be made a sub-deacon. He was seventeen years old. Three months afterwards, on December 19, he betook himself, as a matter of course, to the same town of Tarbes, where the bishop, Monsignor Diharse, ordained him deacon. During these intervals other youths were added to those from the Château de Buzet to work under the supervision of the enterprising tutor, who set up a sort of institution or *pension de famille*, which venture we should expect to be told was prosperous if we had not the correspondence of the Principal himself, who, at the time he was at Toulouse, was head over ears in debt. But he continued to make haste. Although there was an archbishop at Toulouse, where he lived, and a bishop at Dax, the diocese from which he came, he went on September 23, 1600, taking advantage of another vacation, to receive the priesthood at nineteen years of age from the hands of a blind and decrepit prelate, François de Bourdille, Bishop of Périgueux, who ordained him in the private chapel of his château of Saint-Julien.

In 1658, two years before the death of St. Vincent, his familiar friends were ignorant that he had entered in that hasty fashion into the service of the Church. Brother Ducournau wrote, in the month of August of that year, a long letter to Jean de Saint-Martin, Canon of Dax, demanding of him expressly at what time and place the man of God was ordained priest. The good brother received no reply,

but, on the same day that his superior died, September 27, 1660, he found in the bureau of the deceased saint, among his secret papers, documents establishing the date, place, and conditions of the ordination. He discovered then a secret fault in the life of his superior. Probably he thought for a moment that the saint had deceived himself as to the date of his birth. It was apparent that he was made sub-deacon and then deacon within three months, and the further hasty ordination in Périgord was difficult to reconcile with that which was known otherwise of the life of such a man. The brethren then decided that at least they would avoid any scandal; and, in the absence of any official certificate of his birth, they fixed it as having occurred on Easter Tuesday, April 24, 1576.

We have no such reason to cover up the truth, and to make him out to be at twenty years of age the saint which he was not. It is better to show him as he was, a man loaded with chains like ourselves, who one day, by the grace of God, succeeded in breaking them.

All his biographers, copying one from another, relate the same edifying anecdote regarding his first mass. 'It is said,' writes Abelly, 'that he had such an apprehension of the majesty of that entirely divine action, that he trembled at it; and that, not having the courage to celebrate publicly, he chose rather to say mass in a remote and little-visited chapel, assisted only by a priest and a server.' Unhappily, in spite of the word of the pious Abelly, nothing obliges us to accept as true so touching a story. There are even material reasons which discredit it, and above all a moral reason. Vincent was preoccupied then with making his way in life, rather than with abasing himself before God.

In a famous letter of which we have the whole text, dated July 24, 1697, he speaks of a powerful prelate at the Court of Rome, and writes to his correspondent, M. de Comet: 'Mon dit seigneur m'a commandé d'envoyer quérir les lettres de mes ordres, m'assurant de me faire du bien et

très bien pourvoir de bénéfice.' A little later, having insisted on the attachment which he has for the same prelate, he adds: 'Cette sienne affection et bienveillance donc me fait promettre, comme il me l'a promis aussi, le moyen de faire une retirade honorable, me faisant avoir à ces fins quelque honnête bénéfice en France.' An honourable retirement at twenty-seven! Later still, in 1610, he is possessed with the same idea. 'J'espère tant en la grâce de Dieu,' he writes to his mother, 'qu'il bénira mon labeur et qu'il me donnera bientôt le moyen de faire une honnête retraite pour employer le reste de mes forces auprès de vous.' On this M. Redier comments: 'Those who enter the Church in order to extricate their parents from misery find in Vincent, all through his career, an implacable critic, and sometimes his hardness shocks one.' Rev. Francis Goldie, S.J., says: 'When he had become the almsgiver of kings, and streams of money flowed through his hands, he never could be induced even to say a word for those whom he had left behind.' In a conference on May 2, 1659, on mortification, Vincent said: 'The rule says again one thing which seems harsh; nevertheless it is necessary to bow to it; the Son of God has said it plainly, that, in order to renounce all for His sake, it is necessary to hate one's parents.' M. Redier also quotes St. Vincent as saying: 'Parents are obstacles to our perfection'; and he says: 'There is nothing about the family in his instructions except imprecations. That astonishes and repels us. That error of the great saint, the only one perhaps of all his extraordinary apostolate, probably had its source in the displeasure which he felt at recalling to mind his own weakness as a young priest, as his ardour in reforming the clergy certainly had its origin in the lifelong reproaches of his own conscience for the scandal of his premature ordination. When he speaks in a letter of January 24, 1642, to Bernard Codoing of Annecy "of the abominations of his past life," he is doubtless animated by the emotion of excessive humility, but he puts himself also

in all sincerity in the lowest rank of sinners, calling to mind very forcibly that at twenty or twenty-five years of age holiness was not his first care.'

Vincent, made priest on September 28, 1600, returned forthwith to Toulouse and resumed his studies. Although he frequently repeats in the course of his life that he was a poor, ignorant youth and a backward pupil, it is certain that he received at the University of Toulouse the degree of Bachelor of Divinity. He lived on the profits of the little institution which he directed. Among his pupils we find two young relatives of the Duc d'Epernon, who, greatly esteeming the young priest, exerted themselves to obtain for him some important preferment. Vincent resorted on that account to Bordeaux, and he admitted in a letter written a little later to M. de Comet, that he had then a great need of money to pay his debts, having incurred great expense in the pursuit of a matter which his rashness, he said, did not permit him to name. Shortly before or after that journey to Bordeaux and those tentative advances to obtain rapid preferment, but during the lifetime of Pope Clement VIII, who died in 1605, he found the means to go to Rome. He himself says, in fact, five or six times in his letters and conversations, that he has seen with his own eyes the supreme Pontiff. Beyond this we should know nothing more of him till 1607, when we find him again at Rome, if the pious persons who surrounded the saint in his last years had not indiscreetly preserved for us a singular letter which he had begged them to destroy. In his eightieth year, within six months of his death, he writes to Canon Jean de Saint-Martin of Dax: 'Monsieur, I conjure you, by all the grace which it has pleased God to bestow on you, to do me the favour to send me that miserable letter which makes mention of Turkey; I refer to that which M. d'Ages has found among his father's papers. I beg you earnestly in the bowels of Jesus Christ our Lord to do me at once the favour which I ask of you.' The worthy canon

did not reply, and for a good reason. The letter had for two years lain in a safe place, at Saint-Lazare.

The letter is full of picturesque details of which a great show has been made in the edifying selections of the hagiographers. Vincent speaks of a marvellous adventure which occupied two years of his life, but of which we have no corroborative testimony. Without that document, which he himself described as 'miserable,' we know nothing, either from himself or from others, which contributes the least shadow of confirmation of what he related to M. Comet in terms of which the least that we can say is that falsehood is evidently mixed with truth. Only one person could enlighten us. He died without having divulged a secret which he believed to be well kept.

From the letter we learn that some business had taken Vincent to Marseilles. The weather was fine, and he accepted the invitation of a friend to return by boat on the Mediterranean as far as Narbonne. Suddenly three Turkish corsairs appeared. They bore down upon the French vessel, and, though passengers and crew fought bravely, two or three of them were killed, all the rest were wounded, and the ship had to yield to the enemy. Vincent was severely wounded by an arrow, seized as a prisoner, and carried off to be sold as a slave in some place vaguely indicated. There, loaded with chains, he and the other prisoners were led through the streets, and then brought back to the ship, where 'the slave merchants came to see who could eat heartily and who could not, and to examine if our wounds were mortal. When that was over they led us back to the great square, and the merchants looked at us just as you do at a horse or an ox when you are going to buy one, making us open our mouths to see our teeth, feeling our sides, probing our wounds, forcing us to show our paces, to trot and run, to lift weights and also to wrestle to test our strength, and a thousand other brutalities.' Vincent was bought by a fisherman; but, as he was no sailor, he was resold to an

old alchemist, who treated him kindly. His work was to keep alight five great furnaces in which the alchemist heated his metals. After a year the old man was carried off by order of the Sultan to work for the Grand Turk, and his nephew sold Vincent to a renegade Savoyard. As Vincent was working in the fields and singing as he worked, the Turkish wife of his new master begged him to sing to her. With tears in his eyes he intoned the 137th Psalm, 'Super flumina Babylonis,' and then sang the Salve Regina and other hymns. So moved was she that she told her husband he had done wrong in leaving a religion which seemed to her so holy. Her words struck deep into the man's soul, and he told Vincent next day that he would get away with him to Europe as soon as he had the chance. Ten months, however, went by before the two were able to escape to France in a small boat. Later, Vincent accompanied his deliverer, who had been received back into the Church, to seek for him a place of penance in Rome, where he desired of his own accord to expiate his sins; and there the penitent entered the austere order of St. John of God.

The whole letter is included in M. Pierre Coste's edition of the saint's correspondence. He there appears as one of the most rugged and splendid characters of history, an earthen vessel who was to become a vessel unto honour, meet for the Master's use.

W. G. HANSON.

Bulletin of the John Rylands Library (January).—Special tribute is paid to Dr. Peake and Professor Tout, who rendered conspicuous service to the Rylands Library. Professor Burkitt's 'Twenty-five Years of Theological Study' is a valuable sketch of some of the main movements in that field since the Theological Faculty of the University of Manchester was formed. The Bishop of Middleton writes on the origin and history of the Faculty, and Sir Alfred Hopkinson shows how co-operation between the library and the university aided in overcoming many initial difficulties. The devoted and untiring work of the librarian is fitly recognized. Important papers on 'Indigenous Rule in India' and other subjects are included in this number.

THE TURKISH REVIVAL[1]

CAPTAIN ARMSTRONG'S *Turkey in Travail* was recognized as an arresting account of the breaking up of the Ottoman Empire in the years that followed the Armistice of 1918. It was an inside study by one who was in intimate contact with the chief personalities in Turkey between 1918 and 1923. For the next four years he was forced to live in Europe, but in January 1927 his appointment as one of the Commission for Assessment of War Damage sent him back to the old scenes. 'My soul leapt at the thought of sun, of the taste in the nostrils of stale dust newly sprinkled by the water-carriers in Eastern alley-ways, of all the confusion and bustle as the caravans swung out of dark gateways on to roads coming grey in the false dawn. The thrill and drive of vagabondage pulsed hot through my blood once more. Moreover, my duties would put me in touch both with the rulers and officials and with the ordinary townsmen and villagers. I had a unique opportunity of seeing how these countries, where I had worked and dreamed my dreams when it seemed as if the whole world had been reborn, had developed in their new life.'

His new volume represents the months of travel that followed, and helps a reader to estimate the present position of public and social life in the new republic, especially in its seat of government at Ancona. He steamed into the grimy little harbour of Bayreuth at dawn. From the sea the red-roofed houses, topped by a church or two, the minarets of a mosque, and some graceful palms, stood out against a background of Lebanon mountains capped with snow. The harbour was crowded with Arab sailing-craft, amid which

[1] *Turkey and Syria Reborn: A Record of Two Years of Travel.* By Harold Armstrong. With twenty-one illustrations and a sketch map. (John Lane, 1930.)

were two French destroyers hung with the week's washing. The mongrel seaport had no beauty or attraction. The town itself seemed without a soul, and Captain Armstrong stayed not one minute longer than was necessary in a climate which robbed him of will-power and energy. His Syrian chauffeur rushed through the streets hooting and cursing at the crowd of Arabs for daring to be in the way. They were soon climbing the zigzag road up the cliff on their way to the country of the Druses.

The Druses had been stubborn and resentful enemies of the French, who had only overcome their two years' resistance by the use of 50,000 troops. They treated Captain Armstrong with much hospitality, and had a sense of humour and kindliness which made them pleasant people for an Englishman to visit. Their hatred of France was damped down for the moment 'under the cover of defeat, but glowed hotter than ever, fed by the memory of their burnt villages and the loosing of Senegalese and irregular troops among their women. I saw that spirit flame out—the unbroken, resentful, unforgiving fighting spirit of these people, beaten but not crushed; and the women were as stout-hearted as the men.' One old sheikh, whose hospitality Captain Armstrong enjoyed for a few days, burst into a passionate denunciation of the outrages they had endured at the hands of mercenary troops: 'The Turks were soft-hearted compared with these black-hearted French.'

Spring had come. 'All the flowers and trees raced into blossom together, so that they might bear fruit and fulfil themselves before the summer heat blasted them. Roses and daffodils, peach, cherry, and oranges, and the Judas-trees with the flowers oozing from the bark like drops of blood, red flax and purple flags—all bloomed in riot together, and the corn was hastening to the harvest.'

A few hours in Damascus dissolved many dreams of its romance and glamour. It is perhaps the oldest living town in the world, and was 'kept alive only by the great rivers

that ran through it and fed its protecting oasis. The renowned Mosque of Omar was a disappointment. At one end, behind a black cloth, were the relics of Saladin and the head of the martyr Husein. Its fourteen hundred square feet of floor were covered with cheap carpets, and there were prayer niches for each sect. Pilgrims from all central Asia were resting in the courtyard of the mosque before taking rail for Mecca. A great studded gateway led into the native bazaar. Women in coarse black clothes and thick veils were buying at the booth shops, and, if none of their men were watching, lifted their veils to look at the Englishman. The Maidan, the best quarter of Damascus, had been blown to pieces by the French during the Druse revolt of 1925, and still lay in ruins. General Serail, the French High Commissioner, had handled a difficult situation roughly and without tact, but his successor, M. Poïnsot, was making friends with the Nationalists.

Captain Armstrong found the officials in Damascus suspicious, and was followed by spies wherever he went. It was even worse when he wanted to leave, but at last he was on his way to Baalbek, which was 'staggering in its immensity; in the majesty of its buildings, in its tall colonnades, and the great sweep of its terraces of steps, that ran from mighty doorways far up into dim temples, where stone altars still waited for the worshippers. To build this, there must have been some great driving force, some faith, some belief. Every block of stone was a square that a man might span with arms outstretched, and the biggest blocks would have taken a regiment to move, and yet the whole was balanced and moulded into a beautiful symmetry.'

Aleppo, where the caravans met and the merchants of the East once did their business, is dying, strangled by the new frontiers on its very side. The governor was capable and energetic, but, like all the French in Syria, gave the impression of being unsure and uncomfortable. They realized that they could only hold Syria by force, and ruled sourly over

peoples who were in sullen surrender. At Antioch, Captain Armstrong stood amazed. 'It was incredible that this should have once been the capital of the Roman Empire, where the Emperor Theodosius had held his splendid Court and indulged in the "wildest debaucheries the world has seen"; where in the huge amphitheatre the Christians were thrown to the lions; where they were first called Christians . . . and where, a thousand years later, the Crusaders marched in, singing hymns, and then, in a drunken fury, murdered ten thousand Moslems. There were no signs of the twelve miles of fortified walls nor of the great palaces and the massive buildings.' In the narrow cobbled alleys and streets of poverty-stricken shops the air was stifling.

At Mersina, Captain Armstrong got his first impressions of the New Turkey. It was a characteristic Anatolian town, a jumble of twisting cobbled streets of diminutive shops, where the tradesman sat cross-legged on the counter smoking and dealing casually with a customer. The Governor received him courteously, and allowed him to travel freely within a limited area. Tarsus was a village of hovels, scorched and burnt under the terrific sun. The Cydnus was almost dry. Yet this was St. Paul's 'no mean city,' whose university rivalled Athens and Rome for learning, and where the worship of Mithra had its centre and for three centuries vied with Christianity for supremacy.

Captain Armstrong worked for some weeks on the claims of Allied subjects for damages suffered in the war. One shopkeeper claimed £60,000 for loss in rope and sacking. Eventually he got £50. He was angry, because he said he ought to have had £60. The Commissioner said, 'But you asked for £60,000.' 'That is nothing,' he replied, with a shrug of his shoulders. 'My lawyer just added a few noughts.' The villagers around Adana had shown themselves brave and patriotic in the war, but had none of the plodding spirit needed to succeed in days of peace. 'They gave me a sense of desolation and hopelessness, as they sat in

their broken villages. Centuries of maladministration had impoverished them, continuous wars had decimated them, and finally the last fierce fighting between themselves and the French for possession of their houses had left them ruined.'

Kaesarea was an old-world town grouped round a turreted Seljuk castle, with narrow, twisting streets full of jostling hawkers and peasants, who only gave way when a loaded pony or donkey shouldered its way forward under the blows of its driver. Trades were grouped together in streets of shoemakers or rope-makers. All work was done in the open. The people had the fierce, brutal, hard outlook of the Middle Ages, and were uncompromisingly religious. They were courteous, dignified, and placid. Captain Armstrong got every assistance from the capable and energetic Governor, who was driven almost to frenzy by the procrastination and inefficiency of his junior officials and the general sloth and backwardness of the mass of the people. He was typical of the small body of rulers—not more than one in 50,000—grouped round the mental, moral, and physical dictatorship of Kemal Pasha. 'They were capable, energetic, fighting against great difficulties to cultivate a new, virile country, but forced to destroy almost down to the roots before they could cultivate any new growth. They had to tear up the social, religious, and political life of the Ottoman Empire; to root out fiercely the dearest ideas, conventions, and ways of thought of a people naturally slow and immensely conservative, who had for centuries been trodden down and ruined by misrule.' The Government offices in Angora are 'well-built, modern affairs, that give a sense of stability. The ten acres in which they stood gave me more hope for the future than all the rest of Turkey together. They contained the small piece of leaven that might raise the whole nation.' Mustapha Kemal was supreme ruler, and his prestige was immense. He had great power to inspire, and had organizing ability. 'He knew his own mind. His orders were always exact, and he enforced them. Publicly and privately he was

utterly ruthless, without one piece of sentiment or pity in his composition to weaken his will.' Suspicion and fear had got hold of him. A triple line of sentries guarded his house, and, when he rode out, the routes were guarded by troops and police and secret agents, who watched the crowds. His old friend, Ismet Pasha, the Prime Minister, had kept his confidence, and was a steadying influence behind Kemal. All the Government energies were concentrated on the schools, where the future generation was being trained for citizenship. 'As yet Turkey was just born, a babe in swaddling clothes and without distinctive characteristics, and no one could prophesy into what sort of man the child would grow.'

One chapter is headed 'The Death of Islam.' The mosques at Angora were empty, and children played marbles, shouted, and quarrelled on their unswept steps. The people, save the old men and women who went still to the mosques, had gladly shed their religion. When Captain Armstrong reached Stambul, he found that few came to the mosque. A priest complained that the Government had starved the officials and chased away the religious orders. The people, he said, wanted to come and pray, but were afraid. He says, 'I filled my eyes with the beauty of Stambul, the majesty of its setting on its hills, with the Golden Horn curving at its feet and the Marmora stretching away to the Islands of the Princes, and beyond them the Mountain of Olympus towering to the sky. Once again I feasted myself on the beauty of its mosques and its wide vistas, followed its broad roadways between trees, and then dived into its twisting alleys, where the squalor of its life and the clammy weight of its atmosphere made my soul writhe. Once again, unresisting, content to be dragged down, I let the city twine her insidious fingers round my heart.'

The people of Constantinople had opposed the transfer of the capital to Angora, and the present rulers had set out to ruin the great port, though its ruin meant the bankruptcy of

all Turkey. But the old city cannot be killed, though for a while tied down and gagged. Long after the Turkish Republic has disappeared it will still sit here majestically on its hills, a Pearl of Beauty, a Royal City, with the sea round its feet, and the wealth of all the countries filling its harbours. At the moment its spirit is damped down, and it lies helpless and desolate.

From Constantinople, Captain Armstrong sailed to Smyrna, where, save for a flimsy office or two, the burnt-out quarter still lay untouched six years after the fire. The mosque had few worshippers. It was so also at Adalia. Islam had failed to hold the men, and would not hold the women as soon as they gained a little liberty. 'The young men and women had no more faith in it; a few old men held defiantly by its dead body.'

In the café at Adalia, Captain Armstrong picked up a Turkish newspaper, and found there a portrait of himself. His *Turkey in Travail* was appearing in the columns. That opened many doors to him in the last days of his wanderings. He had learned to love Turkey and its people, and his book will arouse in many minds new interest in a land that needs above all things the truth and grace of the gospel.

JOHN TELFORD.

MYSTICISM

An Introduction to the Study of Mysticism. By Margaret Smith, M.A., Ph.D. (S.P.C.K. 4*s*.) A compact history of mysticism and its exponents in many centuries, and both East and West, was really needed, and Dr. Smith has met the need in an entirely satisfactory way. She adopts Evelyn Underhill's definition that 'to be a mystic is simply to participate here and now in real and eternal life, in the fullest, deepest sense which is possible to man.' Then she traces mysticism in the Old and New Testaments, in Classical Times, in the Early Christian Church, in the Orient, the Middle Ages, in England, Germany and Flanders, Italy and Spain, and closes with a chapter on Modern Mysticism, which shows the position of William Law, Blake, Wordsworth, and Browning. It is a valuable handbook to the whole subject.

Notes and Discussions

SOUTHEY AND THOMAS TELFORD

It is strange that Southey's *Journal of a Tour in Scotland in* 1819, just published by Mr. Murray, should have lain unused for more than a century. The MS. was bought from Southey's son in 1864 by Sir Robert Rawlinson, who presented it to the Institution of Civil Engineers in 1885. Attention was drawn to it in June 1928, at the Centenary of a Royal Charter granted to the Institution largely through the influence of Thomas Telford, its first president. Southey describes a delightful tour, from August 17 to October 1, which he made with the great engineer, John Rickman and his wife and their two children, and Miss Emma Piggott, 'a young lady of prepossessing appearance and agreeable manners.' Rickman was Clerk Assistant of the House of Commons and Secretary to the Commissioners for the Caledonian Canal, and the tour was evidently one of inspection. It is of peculiar interest as a description, not only of that engineering masterpiece, but of the harbours which Telford was constructing on the north-east coast of Scotland, and of the plans which he adopted for constructing his piers and his famous roads. More interesting still is the account which it gives of Telford himself; 'a man more heartily to be liked, more worthy to be esteemed and admired, I have never fallen in with.' When he joined the party in Edinburgh, Southey found 'so much intelligence in his countenance, so much frankness, kindness, and hilarity about him, flowing from the never-failing well-spring of a happy nature, that I was upon cordial terms with him in five minutes.' As they moved northwards he realized that 'Telford's is a happy life: everywhere making roads, building bridges, forming canals, and creating harbours—works of sure, solid, permanent utility; everywhere employing a great number of persons, and putting them forward in the world, in his own way.' He had two assistants on whom he relied—Gibb, whom he called his Tartar, from his cast of countenance and the fact that he travelled on horseback 6,000 miles a year as overseer of the roads; and John Mitchell, his general superintendent, who had begun life as a working mason like Telford himself, and whose activity, firm, steady character, tact, and inflexible integrity made him invaluable as inspector of all the Highland roads. 'No fear or favour in the course of fifteen years have ever made him swerve from the fair performance of his duty, tho' the lairds with whom he has to deal have omitted no means to make him enter into their views, and do things, or leave things undone, as might suit their humour, or interest. They have attempted

to cajole and to intimidate him, equally in vain. They have repeatedly preferred complaints against him in the hope of getting him removed from his office, and a more flexible person appointed in his stead; and they have not unfrequently threatened him with personal violence. Even his life has been threatened. But Mitchell holds right on.' When Telford discovered him he could scarcely read or write, but in time he became a good accountant and an able correspondent. He travelled every year not less than 8,800 miles, and in 1819 was the same temperate, industrious, modest, unassuming man as when Telford discovered him.

Southey's notes on Scottish towns a century ago are often of great interest. The High Street in Edinburgh was alive when he stepped out of the coach from Carlisle at a quarter past five in the morning, for everything in the busy greens-market had to be cleared away before eight. Blackwood gave the Poet Laureate *Peter's Letters to his Kinsfolk*, which he had just published, and Southey had to check himself when beginning to speak with indignation about them in the presence of James Wilson, brother of 'Christopher North.' It is amusing to read about the smoke-scape from the windows of their hotel. 'Well may Edinburgh be called Auld Reekie! . . . You might smoke bacon by hanging it out of the window.' The portraits of Mary, Queen of Scots, at Holyrood are 'not beautiful, or only so by comparison in Scotland; anywhere else such a countenance would only be called good-looking, and that rather by courtesy than by right.' Southey takes notes, and writes up his *Journal* at quiet moments. He tells us much of inns and their landlords and landladies. He lives up to his Continental reputation as the 'Wolf' and enjoys his salmon, his Findon haddocks, and, above all, his herrings. 'This year of my life might be designated as the great Herring year.' He had eaten 'this incomparable fish' at breakfast, at dinner, at supper, wherever they were to be had, from Dundee to Inverary.

There are many quaint stories, notably one of Neil Gow, the fiddler, who complained of Telford's broad roads, for 'when I'se gat a wee droppy at Perth, I'se just as lang in getting hame by the new road as by the auld one.' His zig-zag route has to be remembered. The desolation wrought at Arbroath Abbey makes Southey quote Wesley's exclamation over the ruins: 'God deliver us from reforming mobs!' 'The Scotch now exceed us as gardeners,' he writes, though 'Wesley says that when he was first in that country, they had only one sort of flesh-meat even at a nobleman's table, and no vegetables of any kind.' The comparison between English and Scottish scenery is a pleasant feature of the *Journal*. Southey came from Keswick. 'Our own Lakes will appear to advantage over the Scotch, just as they appear to a disadvantage after the Swiss and Italian, being as much superior in their accompaniments of fertility and beauty to the former, as they are inferior to the latter.' There is a happy touch in the entry for September 22. 'When Mr. Telford paid the bill, he gave the poor girl who had been waiter, chambermaid, and probably cook-in-chief also, a twenty-shillings bill. I shall never

forget the sudden expression of her countenance and her eyes when she understood that it was for herself. It instantly brought Wordsworth's lines to my mind:

> I have heard of hearts unkind, kind deeds
> With coldness still returning;
> Alas, the gratitude of man
> Has oftener left me mourning.'

In closing this living record of a century ago, we must not forget the valuable Introduction and Notes by Professor Herford, which bring out its chief features so effectively; nor the fine portraits of Southey and Telford.

EDITOR.

THE CHURCH AND THE CHURCHES

IT would help greatly to a clearer understanding of all that is involved in the various movements towards Church Union at home and abroad, and a clearer recognition of the real issues at stake, if those who are interested in the matter would agree to distinguish between things that differ, and would agree to express that difference by the consistent use of certain terms with a definite connotation. I refer to the terms 'the Church of Christ,' 'the Christian Church,' and 'the Christian Churches.' If we could agree to use these terms, giving to the first the meaning of the ideal universal Church which is His Body; to the second, the Church as an organized institution, at one time catholic in the liberal sense of the word, but now split up into many and various denominations; and applying the third to these denominations and the local expressions thereof, we might see better where we are going and what we are driving at.

The Church which is His Body, the ideal and therefore the real Church of Christ, consists of all those whose acknowledgement of His lordship is real, the great company of the redeemed on earth and in heaven, a multitude which no man can number. It is the whole body of true believers in Jesus Christ. Being, in this vital and spiritual sense, His Body, it is and always has been one, but its unity consists not in outward organization, or uniformity of worship, or even identity of formal doctrinal belief, but of spiritual union with Christ, its living Head. It has only one roll of membership, the Lamb's Book of Life. It is not identical, and never has been, with any one organized Church, nor with the existing aggregate of all the Churches. It is the living Church of the living Christ, which through all the centuries has been truly apostolic, catholic, and holy. Both in Reformation and pre-Reformation times the Church in this sense has been termed 'invisible,' a term which Dr. W. B. Pope (does any one read his *Compendium* in these modern days?) takes up, when he says: 'The Church is, as the Redeemer's mystical body, animated

by His Spirit, essentially invisible. In its deepest and most comprehensive sense it is a spiritual and unseen reality; and therefore an ideal and mystical fellowship.' But since the only part of the Church of Christ of which we can have any cognizance consists of living men and women, the 'part of the host that are crossing the flood,' the term invisible is obviously inappropriate. 'In its manifestation upon earth,' says Dr. Pope, 'it is none other than the invisible Church taking visible form.' As Dr. Carnegie Simpson puts the matter, the Church of Christ must in the nature of things be visible, but its visibility is indefinite like that of a cloud, rather than definite like that of a house, with its four walls and roof, where it is perfectly easy to determine whether any one is inside or out. But if we use the term 'Church of Christ' with this ideal connotation, then we need some other to designate the Church as an organized institution, or as the aggregate of all the organized institutions into which the visible fellowship is now divided. For this purpose the second term, 'the Christian Church,' will serve as marking a distinction with a difference. That the ideal Church of Christ cannot be identified with the Church as an organized institution will be admitted by all, outside Rome. This is not to decry organization and institutionalism, for these were inevitable from the very beginning, in however simple a form. Roughly speaking, we may say that the appointment of the Seven in Acts vi. marks the beginning of organization, and the emergence of the Christian Church as distinct from the Church of Christ. It is not too much to assume that the Seven in the discharge of their duties compiled lists of members, with notes of those entitled to relief, and possibly of those able to contribute. Then began the peril from which the Christian Church has never since been able to escape, the peril of nominal membership. Experience in the mission field suggests that there would be some, however few, who would come into and hang on to the Church for sake of what they could get out of the daily ministration. Acts itself is evidence of the existence, even at that early stage, of the cardinal sin of nominal members of a less indigent character 'keeping back part of the price.'

Church history down the centuries is the history of the Christian Church rather than of the Church of Christ; the society of believers as an organized institution rather than as a spiritual organism. The two need not, and indeed cannot, be set over against each other as distinct and separate entities. There has never been a time when there was not some measure of identity, but there has never been a time, unless at Pentecost and the years that immediately followed, when there was absolute identity between the two. Each has included men and things which the other excluded. The Ideal Church has always been the living soul, seeking ever to express itself through an appropriate visible life form. It has been often more perfectly incarnated in little groups of simple-hearted loyal followers of Jesus, than in the larger and more elaborately organized corporate institutions that have laid claim to the title of 'the Church.' But, until the time of the Great Schism, the essential unity of the Church

of Christ was not obscured by the disunity of the Christian Church. Even then, for hundreds of years, the disunion was geographical rather than denominational, and ordinary folk in western Europe were probably no more conscious of the existence of the orthodox Church than the Baptists of Burma of the existence of the Syrian Christians of Travancore. With the Reformation, however, the Christian Church was rent in twain, and Western Christianity became Catholic and Protestant, and a divisive process made itself evident amongst the Protestants at once and has been going on ever since. As against the boasted unity of Rome, finally stood the *Whitaker's Almanack* list of hundreds of sects, each claiming with regard to some detail of doctrine or polity or practice to be a more perfect embodiment of the ideal Church than the rest. Now with regard to the primal disruption of the sixteenth century and many of the greater schisms that have cleft Protestantism again and again since then—the Methodist break-away, for example—when all allowance has been made for human pride and passion, the play of political intrigue, and ecclesiastical narrowness and stubbornness on all sides, the fundamental fact remains that these divisions were an evidence of the activity of the life of the Church of Christ, which was being cramped or corrupted by the evil customs, worldly ambitions, disregard of and open disloyalty to truth, on the part of the Christian Church. The divisions were a proof of the vitality of the Church of Christ, as against the deadness and decay of the Christian Church, but inevitably they obscured, as it had never been obscured before, its essential unity. The emergence of national and denominational Churches shattered the outward unity of the Christian Church, and made it almost impossible for men to realize that the Church which is His Body is one and indivisible. Moreover, the ideal Church was no more identical with the aggregate of the separated Churches than it had been with the undivided Church; still less was it identical with any one of them. There was some measure of identity with each one of them and each conserved some elements of real value, expressed and emphasized some aspect of truth, gave some partial expression to the glory which belonged to the whole body. The white light was split up by the prism of denominationalism.

> Each sees one colour of Thy rainbow light,
> Each looks upon one tint and calls it heaven;
> Thou art the fullness of our partial sight;
> We are not perfect till we find the seven;
> Gather us in.

Rome, of course, claims that she is still the one and undivided expression of the Body of Christ, and that the various 'sects' cut off from the parent stock have therefore ceased to share in its divine life. Some Anglicans hold similar views with regard to what they call the 'Catholic Church,' many repudiate such an unspiritual view of Church unity; others are perplexed and wistful. Said an Anglican bishop to me in India, 'What puzzles me is, when does a schism

become a Church?' By way of reply I pointed to an avenue of trees growing in my compound, and to another avenue of what looked like bare stakes. These latter had all been cut off from the parent trees in the main avenue, and stuck in the ground. Some remained stakes to the end of the chapter, and became a prey to white ants, which grow fat on *dead* wood, but others began to show signs of life, and in due time grew up into trees as strong and far-spreading as the lordly trunks from which they had been severed. Life and growth are the ultimate proofs that a schism 'has become a Church.' Lest this illustration should be used as an argument for the perpetuation of the denominational *status quo*, it should be remembered that Paul suggests the possibility of branches being grafted into, as well as being severed from, a parent stock.

Now as far as Christian re-union is concerned, it will be granted, I think, that every Church is to some extent an expression and embodiment of the one universal Church of Christ. Although we cannot admit an absolute identity of the Church which is His Body either with any one denomination or with the sum total of them all, we may gladly recognize that every Christian Church is part of the Church of Christ, and that it is the business alike of the ministers and members of each one to work together to make each denomination more and more perfectly a revelation of the Ideal Church. But is a perfect revelation of the Church of Christ in its essential holiness, spirituality, unity, and catholicity, possible in and by any one section of the Christian Church? If each has some element of reality and truth and life, which belongs to the Ideal Church, however much these may have been mixed with unreality and error and formalism, then the richness and variety and fullness of power of the whole Body of Christ can only be perfectly manifested in the gradual working out of corporate union amongst the now separated Churches. Only a growing fellowship which embodies the ideal of variety in unity, 'not compromise for the sake of peace, but comprehension for the sake of truth,' can fully manifest the manifold richness of the life derived from Him who is the divine Head of the Church, and which is meant to be available for all the severed communities which claim a place in the one catholic fellowship. Roman and Reformed, Orthodox and Lutheran, Anglican and Nonconformist, Salvationist and Quaker, they all have a place in the Church of Christ; each is an expression, however imperfect, of the Church which is His Body, the fullness of Him who filleth all in all. 'Re-union,' if it means anything at all worth while, means that the different sections of the Christian Church, realizing their essential unity in Christ, are seeking here and there, in England and in India, to enter into a union that shall transcend all their differences by a synthesis of fellowship in Christ that shall include them, and thus help on towards the realization in ever fuller measure of the Church Visible, now so rent and sundered, with the Ideal Church which Christ is ever seeking to present to Himself, as a glorious Church, not having spot or wrinkle or any such thing, holy and without blemish. In face of all the

barriers to union we need to remember that He *is* able to do exceeding abundantly above all that we ask or think, according to the power that worketh in us; for, in the realization of our ideal and fulfilment of our hopes, there shall be manifest to all the world glory unto Him in the Church, and in Christ Jesus unto all generations for ever and ever.

W. E. GARMAN.

THE THEATRE OF AESCHYLUS AND SHAKESPEARE

To compare an English miracle-play of the late fifteenth century with a Greek dramatic performance of a hundred years before Aeschylus is to feel that the intervening two thousand years have not brought much of change. Indeed, the theatre of Aeschylus himself can find strangely familiar features in that of Shakespeare. The English 'apron' stage, with its few shrubs to represent a forest, its clumsy machinery, and often conventional dresses, seems not far removed from the proscenium at Athens, where actors, dressed as for the festival of Dionysus, declaimed before a stately colonnaded temple, and where scene-painting was crude, and the reverberations of the 'thunder-machine' were more effective than convincing. But, when we examine the mental attitudes of the two audiences, we find them to be widely different. If in the early stages of their dramatic art the races will bear easy comparison, a century of change and growth emphasizes their distinctive lines. Different forces played upon Hellas in the fifth century B.C. and upon the England of our own sixteenth, and national temperaments of different inheritance reacted to them.

The Greek temperament was religious—*δεισιδαιμονέστερος* was one observer's judgement—and an important side of this religion was the sense of the 'fitness of things.' This was only one expression of the national love of all things beautiful, and of the desire, not only to find beauty, but to impart it to all that they did. Deep as was their reverence for the traditional gods of the Acropolis or of every fountain and grove—although by this period an increasing scepticism was abroad—it was not more real than their love of that which was fitting, not only in form, but in character and conduct. Hence they shrank from an outrage to the gods, but not less from *any* violation of the principle of *μηδὲν ἄγαν*, of 'nothing too much.' Their keen sense of the beautiful demanded always proportion, whether in physical dimensions or in moral qualities. Sculpture must be faithful but never exaggerated, architecture perfect in symmetry, not flamboyant and aspiring, but low-browed, complete, satisfying; Socrates will seek the difficult way of Truth in unprejudiced inquiry, and in due time Aristotle will enunciate the Golden Mean. Excess was always reprehensible, not to be tolerated. Hence, however excellent might be the virtues of a hero, his valour must not be magnified into disdainful flouting of the gods—that *ὕβρις* which was the undoing of Ajax; nor his zeal for

justice become so unbalanced as to be a tyranny (cf. the *Antigone*). These two notions, of the majesty of the gods and of the obligation of fitness, went far to create the mental atmosphere in which Greek plays were performed. The great dramatic festivals were national religious gatherings, and there was therefore no question of producing a play of such quality as to ensure an audience. For although the performances were competitive, and the spectators expressed freely their admiration or disapproval, the primary religious character of the occasion was preserved.

With the Elizabethan audience the case was different. It was indeed not long since English drama had been wholly religious in conception and execution, had been, in fact, the monopoly of the Church; but among the many broadening effects of the Renaissance had come the emancipation of the drama. The times were stirring, and, after 'the long sleep of the Middle Ages,' men's minds were awaking to a world fuller of possibilities than they had ever dreamed. But the religious atmosphere of the play had been dispelled; if people still gathered to see dramatic representations, it was with other thoughts than to draw a moral from such an exhibition as Langland's *Harrowing of Hell*. Also, the first reaction of the Great Awakening to classical models was stayed for a moment, though men returned to it more than once, and Shakespeare was finding his subjects, not only there, but in English history, Continental literature, and the common life of his time. In his age the world was elastic, and needed only a push strong enough in any direction to press back its boundaries indefinitely. A revolution had turned people's minds away from the old fixed standards in natural science and in religion, and they stood wide-eyed and open-mouthed, ready to accept any new wonder which might be offered. Here was a profound contrast to the great volatile concourse in the tiers of stone benches below the Acropolis. These looked and listened in critical awe as the well-known incidents from their ancient folk-lore were repeated before them by statuesque actors in costume which defied rapid movement, and assisted by a majestic chorus which executed dignified paces about the altar. It was of the essence of the play that its subject should be thoroughly familiar; the author's art consisted in presenting it in such a way as to illustrate from the conduct of his characters, either by affirmation or by contrast, those qualities which were implied in the Hellenic ideal of life. It was for this that his audience watched.

But the London theatre audience must have movement and life. It had no restrictions of religion or convention to impose—at least, none so conscious or direct. It was not horrified though the stage ran red with slaughter, a sight never admitted by an Athenian audience. Marlowe was not considered to have exceeded the bounds of propriety when he introduced twenty murders in one play (*Tamburlaine*), nor was *Hamlet* rejected because the four principals fall dead on the stage before the final peal of ordnance is shot off. Shakespeare's listeners were in no way shocked by the coarsest language, and indeed

they seem to have regarded no presentation as out of taste, so long as they were allowed to follow situations of high tension working successively to a climax where their craving for excitement might be amply answered.

If we seek, then, to compare the standards of things 'not done' on the stage of Aeschylus and of Shakespeare, we seem to find that in the earlier case the dramatist was limited by a convention which bound also the whole of his audience. That is to say that he would no more think of presenting a flagrant and unpunished outrage to the gods than his audience would think of allowing it. If Shakespeare, on the other hand, was fettered by any conventional ideas, they seem to be his own, and not dictated by the common heritage of outlook shared by all his contemporaries. His plays must be so written as to ensure an audience, since people came only for the play and not from any religious motive, and they desired a mental stimulant in an age of great events. The Greek fifth century was also big with events momentous for the nation, but until the period of definite decline (after the death of Pericles in 429), when disaster and pestilence had ruined the moral tone of the people, the old ideas of reverence and beauty served as the ultimate standards; and it would seem that in the very stillness and statue-like quality of their drama they found a welcome retreat from the current excitement, whereas the Elizabethans sought a similar escape by enhancing this excitement, a tendency to be noted at the present day. The Greek temper is thus seen to be restrained, seeking diversion in well-balanced moderation of speech and action; the modern temper (for with the Renaissance we gain the threshold of modern times) is impetuous, passionate, passing all restraint in the quest for variety of sensation. The natural outcome of each appears before long: the aim of retaining balance even at the risk of sterilizing progress inevitably degenerated when subjected to less noble influences, and Greek drama thereafter declined. The extravagant quest of the early seventeenth century led in due course to satiety, and by reaction to the Puritan disgust at dramatic art altogether. The elements of the contrast seem to be that the limits placed on Greek drama arose from the rather rigid scheme of Hellenic thought; while in England the corresponding mediaeval fabric had already been shattered, but from the fragments there had not as yet emerged the characteristic code which should be at once the expression and the normal standard of the new age.

L. H. Bunn.

Recent Literature

THEOLOGY AND APOLOGETICS

The Principles of Theology: An Introduction to the Thirty-Nine Articles. By the late W. H. Griffith Thomas, D.D. (Longmans & Co. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

This book represents the work of forty years. It owes much, the author says in his Preface, to Dr. Barry and Dr. Wace, under whom he studied at King's College, London, and 'keeps as closely as possible to the Articles as the truest expression of, and best guide to, Anglican Theology.' His friends found the MS. completed when they looked over it after his death. It needed only a few verbal alterations, and his former colleagues and other friends feel that its exhaustive and penetrating treatment, its fidelity to the Bible, and its exact historical scholarship will secure it a welcome from all who wish to know the basis of Christian doctrine in general and of the Anglican Church in particular. The history of the Articles is given in the Introduction, where they are viewed as part of a large number of Confessions issued about the same time. Each Article is then considered in detail, with the English and Latin form prefixed. The exposition shows how much wide reading has been brought to bear on the work. It is always lucid and evangelical, and gives a real insight into the whole range of theology. Article III. brings up the subject of the descent into hell. The history of that doctrine is given in some detail, and the explanations are discussed. After the Articles have been dealt with, their relation to the Prayer Book, and to Rome, and the Ethics of Subscription, are considered. The Appendix contains valuable notes on the Personality and Fatherhood of God, Bible Difficulties, Infant Salvation, the word Catholic, Prayers for the Dead, Eschatology, and other subjects. The work will add distinctly to the reputation of a man who was eminently useful and honoured both in this country and in Canada.

The Resurrection of Man, and Other Sermons. By the Ven. R. H. Charles, D.D., D.Litt. (T. & T. Clark. 7*s.* net.)

This is a really brilliant book. There is no volume in the Scholar as Preacher Series which has an ampler scholarship, or which treats of the greatest themes with a nobler seriousness. The spirit of the book is adventurous, but it is always profoundly reverent; and it explores the deepest things fearlessly, as of one who would know the truth at whatever cost. The earlier part of the book is more of the nature of a treatise, than of sermons addressed to a promiscuous congregation, in which Dr. Charles makes an examination of the doctrine of the

Resurrection of Man, and traces the development of the teaching through the Old Testament, in the teaching of St. Paul, and in that of our Lord, and closes with four sermons on arguments against and for a blessed future life. The work is consummately done. But not all will be able to accept all that he says; the Christian conscience of many will feel a sense of violation, when they read of 'the gross conception of the empty tomb,' and again of 'the legend of the empty tomb.' There are five really great sermons on Jeremiah, which so present that fine prophet as to enamour the soul of the reader, and to lay upon him a strange charm. These are sermons which have hardly been equalled in our time, and surely have not been surpassed. There are also three lectures on John Wyclif which are full of understanding and interpretation and impulse. Four other sermons complete the book. No one who has the least familiarity with modern sermons but will set this volume in the first rank. However we may differ with some of the teaching, we are bound to confess that here we are brought into contact with a very serious mind inspired with a passionate love of truth, and determined to follow it at all cost; who has not the least fear in declaring what he believes, and who has devoted great powers of mind and heart to search out the deepest things of life. Dr. Charles does not always carry his scholarship lightly, but it is evident on every page; and the literary expression sets him among the masters of our tongue. Here is a vigorous mind grappling with the age-long problems that few dare to probe so deeply, and doing it in a way which must win the homage of all who are followers of Him who is the Truth, and who bade us pursue it with an ardour that must know no abatement.

The Atonement in History and in Life. (S.P.C.K. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

This volume of essays has been edited by the Rev. L. W. Grensted, Fellow and Chaplain of University College, Oxford, to whom the Bishop of Chelmsford, who had planned the work and enlisted helpers, passed over the task when he was called to Chelmsford. The essays range from Sacrifice in the Old Testament, the Contribution of the Prophets, Atonement in Jewish Literature, Atonement in the Synoptic Gospels, to the Teaching in St. Paul and in the Johannine Writings, the Atonement in Patristic Writings, in Anselm's Doctrine, in Reformation Theology and Post-Reformation Writers. The Atonement and the Problem of Evil; in Personal Experience; in Modern Thought, are also considered with scholarly insight by men whose names will carry weight with students. Principal Chavasse contributes the closing essay on the preaching of the Cross. The Atonement is a subject that has exercised the minds of religious thinkers in all generations, and such a complete and careful survey as this volume gives makes a wide appeal, and will repay close study. The theories are conflicting and baffling, but, as Mr. Chavasse says, the Cross itself preaches—'it first arrests attention and then declares its own gospel.'

The Christian Family. By George W. Fiske. (Abingdon Press. $1.25.)

Professor Fiske feels that religion must have a home basis, and sees that the modern family is in danger. Divorce is a serious symptom in America, where it has risen to one case in every seven marriages. In religious families it is probably less than one in fifty. An experienced judge in Ohio has never had a divorce case in which the two parties were members of the same Christian Church. Some incidents are given which show the dangers to which young people in America are exposed, and prove the need for such a wise and frank discussion as this.

L'Unité Chrétienne: Schismes et Rapprochements. Par André Paul. (Paris: Rieder. 18 francs.)

The first part of this survey reviews the schisms in the Church from the first centuries and the time of Nestorius down to the Vatican Council of 1869–70, which led to the Old Catholic separation. The second part deals with the Antinomies; Authority and Liberty; The Church and the Individual; The Objects of Faith; The Moral Life; Salvation; Ceremony; and the Essential Conflict of Attitude between the chief Religious Confessions. The third part is devoted to signs of rapprochement between various Churches. The subject of reunion is the order of the day from America to India, and the National Committee of Social and Political Studies has been considering it in the Cour de Cassation, and it is an ideal which is cherished with growing hope among Christians. This book throws light on many phases of the subject both in the past and in the present, and is itself a welcome sign of the times.

The Stone, or Married to Another, by Lucy G. Mason (Marshall, Morgan & Scott, 2*s.* 6*d.*), traces the promise of Christ, 'the Living Stone,' through the Old Testament and into the New, with many pleasant references to personal experiences in Palestine. The writer's faith in the Bible is 'full of holy inspiration from beginning to end'; and her glimpses of everyday life in the Holy Land throw light on many Bible scenes.—Mr. Wales has now given us his revised translation of *The Psalms. Book III.* (H. Milford. 1*s.*) It is careful work, which keeps close to the original, but has many felicitous touches that are impressive and suggest much.—*Jesus and our Pressing Problems.* (Abingdon Press. $1.50.) Professor Rollin H. Walker first describes the religious inheritance of Jesus in the Hebrew Bible, which He knew and loved, and to which He gave new and wider meaning. His challenge to faith, His teaching as to earthly goods, the family, our enemies, self-sacrifice, and the Holy Spirit are impressively expounded and applied. It is a deeply spiritual and also intensely practical survey of problems which concern all thoughtful men and women.

HISTORY, BIOGRAPHY, TRAVEL

The Cambridge Mediaeval History. Edited by J. R. Tanner, Litt.D., C. W. Previté-Orton, Litt.D., F.B.A., and Z. N. Brooke, M.A. Vol. VI. Victory of the Papacy. (Cambridge University Press. 50*s*.)

This great undertaking has sustained a severe loss by the death of Dr. Bury, Regius Professor of Modern History, who was 'its architect.' His plan for the work had long ago been completed, and vol. vii. will deal with the 'Decline of the Empire and the Papacy,' and vol. viii. with the 'Growth of the Western Kingdom.' But the three Editors will greatly miss his ready help in difficulties, and the wise counsel which was so freely at their disposal. Three of the contributors to vol. vi. died before it appeared: M. Louis Leger, who wrote on Hungary, Dean Rashdall, who contributed the chapter on Mediaeval Universities, and Miss Weston, whose subject was Legendary Cycles of the Middle Ages. The work is divided into twenty-five chapters. Dr. Previté-Orton writes the Introduction and the chapter on Italy; Professor Jacob on Innocent III and England—Henry III; Mr. Lane Poole contributes chapters on Philip of Swabia and Otto IV, Germany in the Reign of Frederick II, and the Interregnum in Germany. Professor Powicke's subjects are England: Richard I and John, and the Reigns of Philip Augustus and Louis VIII of France. The work extends to nearly 1,100 pages, and deals chiefly with the thirteenth century, though the chapters on Trade and Commerce, Warfare and Architecture, Religion and Learning cannot be limited to that period. The peoples of western Europe had been slowly refashioning—or, rather, remaking—their civilization and their institutions, the whole fabric of their thought and life, almost from the dissolution of the Roman Empire in the West, certainly from the dissolution of Charlemagne's Empire in the ninth century. The age of which this volume treats had in its germs symptoms of the decay of its most impressive embodiments, yet as a whole it was 'not an age of dissolution of an old order, but of the old order's full perfection.' Whether its peoples acted or dreamed, the faculty of living growth was in them. They moulded their heritage from Roman and Teuton into a multitude of original forms and devices, all instinct with life and the power to change and grow. That is impressively brought out in the Introduction, and illustrated in all the spheres and leaders described in the following chapters. The writers are experts in their subjects and never fail to present them in an interesting way. Dean Rashdall's 'Mediaeval Universities' throws light on the growth of the schools in Paris and Oxford, and Professor Powicke's account of the reigns of Richard I and John makes a special appeal to students of English history. The chapters on St. Louis, the development of Ecclesiastical

Organization, and its financial basis, on Heresies and the Inquisition, the Mendicant Orders, Ecclesiastical and Military Architecture, the Art of War, Chivalry and Legendary Cycles help a reader to form a real picture of the times. There are ample bibliographies, both general and for each chapter. There is a full chronological table, a valuable set of maps in a separate portfolio, and a really adequate index. The interest and importance of the volume cannot easily be exaggerated.

Byways: Leaves from an Architect's Notebook. By Sir Reginald Blomfield, R.A. (John Murray. 15*s*.)

The old towns in the South of France have a fascination of their own, and Sir Reginald Blomfield's expert descriptions help English readers to form some real conception of their chief architectural features. He found the architecture of Avignon disappointing. The Papal Palace is huge, uncouth, sinister. It has a fine chapel, and a very interesting room in the Tour de la Garde-robe, decorated with frescoes of scenes from country life, but the ashlar walls run sheer up from the rock, with scarcely a break in their height of more than a hundred feet. The place suggests unknown iniquities of Papal days. It is much more of a fortress than a palace, with its enormous walls and its secret passages and stairways for escape from within as well as for access from without. The redeeming feature of Avignon is the Jardin du Rocher des Doms, which stands on the summit of the rock, the lower slope of which is occupied by the Cathedral and the Papal Palace. The north end of the wall that encloses the garden forms a semicircular bay from which there is a magnificent view, with the Rhone at one's feet. The crowded houses and narrow streets are bad both for health and morals, and tourists are constantly coming and going. Sir Reginald's most recent impression is one of never-ceasing noise and bustle, and of the incessant shrieks and blares of motor-horns. Across the river lies Villeneuve, with two art treasures—the Virgin of St. Pons carved in ivory and the 'Coronation of the Virgin' by Charonton. French carvers at the end of the thirteenth or beginning of the fourteenth century were unsurpassed, and this figure in St. Pons 'cheers one along; it suggests a different conception of life, now and hereafter, and of the relation of man to his Maker. It anticipates the idea of God's immanence in the universe.'

Avignon is an excellent centre for expeditions. Twenty miles to the north is Orange, with its triumphal arch and the splendid ruin of its theatre, which shows the Roman of the Empire at his best. The town was founded about 46 B.C. as a colony of the Second Legion, and within two hundred years had its circus, its triumphal arch, and its theatre, on a scale larger than any modern theatre, and, according to a local historian, it had also its amphitheatre, baths, and aqueduct. Maurice of Nassau fortified the town in 1622, but Louis XIV demolished his castle, and Orange steadily sank into decrepitude

after 1713, when it was annexed to France by the Treaty of Utrecht. In 1794 the revolutionary commission in Orange sentenced 332 persons to death in 47 days. 'A callous, hysterical cruelty is never far below the surface in the Provençal.' The Pont du Gard, the remnant of an aqueduct probably built in the reign of Augustus, is perhaps the most impressive of all the vast Roman undertakings; and Sir Reginald's drawing, reproduced in collotype, gives a very clear impression of its beauty. He found Arles, once a great and busy place, depressing and tourist-ridden, with little life of its own. The west front of St. Trophimus, with that of St. Gilles, seems to be the finest example of Romanesque sculpture in existence. Air proved delightfully restful after the bustle and strident atmosphere of Avignon and the motor-cars of Arles. Vauvenargues, a few miles to the east, was the birthplace of the gentle and kindly philosopher of that name, who died in 1747. The amphitheatre at Nîmes is a little smaller than that of Arles, but it seems to be treated as the town dust-pan and worse. A graphic account is given of the Camisards and their terrible struggle for religious liberty. Munich and Vienna and the South German towns are described with much skilled knowledge. Würzburg is full of interesting buildings, and an air of quiet orderliness pervades the place. The effigies of the earlier bishops are striking. The account of baroque architecture in Austria and Germany is important, but after the art of the alcove Sir Reginald found a visit to Stockholm like getting into fresh air. Good modern work is being done in Vienna, but the men in the van are the architects of Sweden and Denmark, and of our own country. Sir Reginald admires the Swedish architects because they are moving forward on a track that stretches far back into the past. There, he believes, lies the future of architecture. Many beautiful illustrations in half-tone and collotype add to the charm of this fine volume of studies.

Letters of Sir Joshua Reynolds. Collected and edited by Frederick Whiley Hilles, Ph.D. (Cambridge University Press. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

This is another book we owe to America, and it is a treasure. Dr. Hilles is Instructor in English at Yale University. It was not till fifty years after the painter's death that a biographer seriously attempted to collect his correspondence, and since that time twice as many letters have come to light. Even now the correspondence is small, for Sir Joshua wrote sparingly. He was absorbed in his profession, and says, 'I am forced to write in a great hurry, and have little time for polishing my style.' Some of the fragments are illuminating. He tells his father: 'While I am doing this [i.e. painting] I am the happiest creature alive.' In 1769 he writes to James Barry, who was studying in Rome, 'Whoever is resolved to excel in painting, or indeed any other art, must bring all his mind to bear upon that one object, from the moment he rises till he goes to bed; the effect of

every object that meets a painter's eye may give him a lesson, provided his mind is calm, unembarrassed with other subjects, and open to instruction.' His appreciation of his brother artists is a pleasing feature of the letters. He offers Lord Ossory Gainsborough's 'Girl and Pigs' in exchange for a copy by Titian, and describes it as 'by far the best picture he ever painted, or perhaps ever will.' When he bought it, Sir Joshua sent a flattering note to his rival, who replied: It could not fail to afford him the highest satisfaction that he had 'brought his pigs to so fine a market.' Light is thrown on many famous pictures bought by the Duke of Rutland and others. The Duke of Portland gets his famous vase for nine hundred guineas. He was resolved to have it at any price. The Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishop of London object in 1778 to 'our scheme of ornamenting St. Paul's with pictures.' Fanny Burney greatly charmed him. He had begun to despair of seeing her, 'and little expected to find the author correspond to our romantic imaginations. She seems to be herself the *great sublime she draws*.' Johnson and Burke often appear in the letters, and he expresses the highest opinion of the abilities of Burke's son. Alderman Boydel wants him to do eight pictures for his illustrated Shakespeare, 'by which all the painters and engravers find engagements for eight or ten years. He has insisted on my taking earnest money, and, to my great surprise, left upon my table five hundred pounds—to have as much more as I shall demand.' Lady Ossory sends him a tambour-worked waistcoat which she had herself embroidered. Sir Joshua thinks it too good to wear, but adds, 'I will promise this at least, that when I do wear it I will not take a pinch of snuff that day—I mean, after I have it on. Such a rough beast with such a delicate waistcoat!' Rogers once saw Sir Joshua at an Academy dinner when his waistcoat was absolutely powdered with snuff.

The Solitary Warrior: New Letters by Ruskin. Edited by J. Howard Whitehouse. (Allen & Unwin. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

Some of the most interesting letters in this volume are to the Rev. A. J. Scott, a Manchester minister, and members of his family. Ruskin's friendship with them began in 1859, and his letters describe his journeys abroad, and show how generous and affectionate he was in all his relations to these friends. There are some touching references to his love for Rose la Touche. In 1859 he is fighting with many thoughts. 'The fact that all good people are being taken from us and that wicked men live for ever prosperously makes one feel as if one had to fight with all nature against one for an enemy, instead of sorrowing by a friend's grave.' In 1880 he tells Mrs. Scott, 'Most men at my age, I observe, still think life infinite. I have long since counted its remnants and trust that my dearest friends will earliest forgive my husbandry or even miserliness of them.' The letters to Canon Barnard and his wife have many points of interest. He writes

to her from Coniston in 1878, when Rose is 'in a physician's house—under care.' Many fairest things are round him, 'but they are most of them dead to me, the third *Fors* has given me everything that ought to make a man happy, except the one thing I asked for. And the wonder is to me, and evil—that I don't know if I was wrong in worshipping too much—or not enough. Whether I ought to have surrendered hope before—or fought on, in neglect of all other hope.' The letters are a welcome addition to our knowledge of Ruskin as a true friend and a man of many noble thoughts and purposes. The portrait by Samuel Lawrence and Ruskin's own pencil sketches are a great enrichment of the volume.

Odds and Ends of My Life. By Ann Estella, Countess Cave. (John Murray. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

Lady Cave has woven odds and ends into a book of real charm. She begins with her own childhood, and strings together a delightful set of children's sayings and doings; then she moves among her servants, a kindly, thoughtful mistress who has found a happy response to her own trust in those who have served her and been true friends. Her dogs are not the least interesting figures in her domestic circle. Little Wu, the Pekingese pet, is 'very small and as beautifully coloured as an autumn leaf; his eyes are about four times the size of his nose; when pleased, he will stretch out a golden paw and stroke you down and really talk, but he is just as likely to puff out his cheeks and show a quivering tongue between his tiny teeth and swear gently. If you continue to annoy his sacred person, the swearing grows more pronounced, and larger teeth appear for business purposes.' The chapters on dress and on colour, and the too brief account of experiences and finds as a collector, are not merely entertaining, but have many wise hints which ladies will prize. Most interesting of all are the glimpses of Lord Cave and her own ambition for a husband on the Woolsack. She had a full share in the toils and triumphs of his election for Kingston-on-Thames, and knew that he would mean much to his party, 'for he never could do less than his best for anything and everything he ever undertook.' She soon realized that, 'unless you are of a hopeful disposition and have a certain sense of humour, politics might be a deadly thing to cope with, for it can take more out of you than almost anything I know, and between whiles things are very dull. Personally, I grew to love elections and the excitement of them—the canvassing, the meetings, the friends you make and the enemies you meet—it was all such fun.' The final chapter, on Success in Life, is a stirring call to the cultivation of character, ability, self-discipline, and will-power, 'so that when some big plum comes along you are ready to take it and thoroughly digest it.'

The Life-Story of John Wesley, by John Telford, B.A. (Epworth Press, 1*s.*, 2*s.*), gives a view of the Making of Wesley and the Making of Methodism which may be recommended as an introduction to the

study of one of whom the *Spectator* wrote: 'England, as a whole, is as truly interested in Wesley as in Shakespeare; and it may well be doubted whether in the long course of her history any one person has ever influenced life in so direct, palpable, and powerful a way as John Wesley.' Certainly he was never more honoured and more powerful in the life of the world than he is to-day.

Economic Causes of the Reformation in England. By Oscar A. Marti, Ph.D. (Macmillan & Co. 10*s.* 6*d.*) Professor Marti sees that the sources of the revolt against Rome in this country 'go deeper than the dynastic hopes of the monarchy and disputes about the supremacy. The roots of the Reformation reached deep down into a subsoil of money-matters and of fundamental economic changes that were taking place. It is only in the added light that such facts furnish that the Reformation in England may be clearly understood.' The clergy are computed to have held one third of the wealth of England. The hired personal staff of the monasteries gives some indication of their riches. Buttley was not a large religious house, but it had eighty-four persons on its staff. Boniface, who became Archbishop of Canterbury in 1240, sold the woods on the lands of the see, levied heavy taxes on the people, and thus raised 15,000 marks to help his brother to carry on a private war in Provence. Grosseteste strenuously opposed the practice of papal provisions, and every form of papal abuse and levy. The constant demand made by Rome for ever-increasing sums of money led to the Acts of Mortmain, Premunire, of Provisors, and the statutes that effected the ultimate breach with Rome in the sixteenth century. Wyclif taught that to deprive the priesthood of their temporal possessions would be a national boon. How happy England would be if every parish church had its own rector, with his family, and every estate in the land its just lord. There would then be no scarcity of corn and cattle, and abundance of servants, farm labourers, and artisans. The final clash was inevitable. The continuance of ecclesiastical institutions existing largely for non-producing monks and pilgrims, for the distribution of alms, and for an outworn feudal system of tenantry, was challenged by men who had made their way to a place of importance under the newer economic régime. 'The Church ran athwart the new spirit of progress, which proved its undoing.' Dr. Marti supports his view by contemporary evidence which throws a flood of light on the economic conditions of the Reformation period.

GENERAL

Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology. By A. N. Whitehead. Gifford Lectures, 1927–8. (Cambridge University Press. 18*s.* net.)

PROFESSOR WHITEHEAD, who has been temporarily, at least, captured from London University by Harvard, is the greatest living exponent of philosophy from the mathematical and physical sides. He has reached the production stage of his career, and since the war has issued a number of brilliant writings, all of which have been converging towards the point attained in this big volume, which is a systematic exposition of his position, which he calls the philosophy of organism. He claims that this position is a modern rendering of the phase of philosophic thought which began with Descartes and ended with Hume. Its other affiliations are with modern realism, pragmatism, and the emergence philosophy, whilst, of course, the change of outlook which has followed the doctrine of relativity is marked here as in all Professor Whitehead's work. If the higher critics of two thousand years hence discover this book they will no doubt prove that Professor Whitehead had not heard of Einstein, since, curiously enough, his name is not mentioned!

Adequately to give an account of Professor Whitehead's position would demand a small volume, not a brief review, and would need to presuppose acquaintance with the author's other work. His style is not easy, and he coins a number of new terms, such as 'concrescence,' 'vector prehension,' and in a very definite manner he labels and describes eight categories of existence, twenty-seven categories of explanation, and nine categorical obligations. The ultimate reality, or rather realities, of Professor Whitehead's philosophy, however, are 'actual entities,' or 'actual occasions' which are different 'drops of experience, complex and interdependent.' God is an actual entity, so is 'the most trivial puff of existence in far-off empty space.' The business of philosophy is entirely misconceived if it be taken to be that of starting from universals, and deriving from them concrete particulars. Its business is to explain the emergence of abstract things from the raw, concrete entities, which for Professor Whitehead make up the real world. No subject experiences twice. Time is, in Locke's phrase, a 'perpetual perishing.' It is form, not substance, which is permanent. Forms undergo changing relations, whilst actual entities perish perpetually subjectively, yet in perishing acquire objectivity whilst losing their subjective immediacy, and so are objectively immortal. Those who are acquainted with Professor Whitehead's earlier treatment of the way in which 'events' become 'objects' will grasp the meaning of this.

God is a conception of prime importance in Professor Whitehead's

scheme, but it is a very metaphysical God, with a primordial infinite conceptual nature, and a consequent conscious nature derived from the temporal world which is taken up into the immediacy of his own life, a process which the author speaks of as saving the world, with 'a tenderness which loses nothing that can be saved.' He does not create the world, He saves it, He is 'the Poet of the world, with tender patience leading it by His vision of truth, beauty, and goodness.'

This, of course, is to pass from purely metaphysical reasoning, and shares the necessary weakness of every attempt to proceed from fact to value. If any one cares to accept Professor Whitehead's metaphysical God, he is in no way bound to accept the religious and moral predicates which are attached thereto. This is a matter of interpretation, as Professor Whitehead is careful to indicate, and, whilst one is glad that he humanizes a rather abstract philosophical scheme with this religious interpretation, one cannot agree that a metaphysically conceived God can satisfy the requirements of the religious consciousness. Moreover, Professor Whitehead's treatment of the problem of evil has as many limitations from the moral, as, I think, it has from the metaphysical, point of view.

Professor Whitehead ignores rather than answers the challenge of idealistic philosophy, and, whilst he deals extensively, though not as destructively as he imagines, with Bradley's philosophy, he leaves Bosanquet wholly aside. Yet in the end, as he admits, his philosophy comes very near to being the transformation of some of the chief doctrines of absolute idealism on a realistic basis. None the less, it is difficult to see how realism is strengthened by Professor Whitehead. Such criticisms as these, however, are prompted by differences of standpoint. All must agree that *Process and Reality* is a book of first-rate importance, in many respects the most important contribution to philosophy since Bradley published *Appearance and Reality*, and, whether or no it is destined to a like influence, it is a monumental expression of the profoundest thought of one of the deepest thinkers of the day.

Sick Society. By A. J. I. Krauss, Ph.D. (Cambridge University Press. 9*s*.)

This is an English version of two German manuscripts dealing with the alleviation of social conditions. Dr. Krauss has found the basic concepts of society lacking in present-day social philosophy. 'Around the sick society lies a great obscurity, which threatens to extinguish every spark of thought that flickers in its gloom.' The diseased portions of society become dependent on the healthy portions. Dr. Krauss seeks to make clear the proper place of remedial measures within the total complex of a social life. The ethical and economic principles which co-exist in social amelioration are considered, and the zones of power. No law is so elastic or so amenable that it can at once adapt itself to every new social mutation, or fit itself to every minute difference in a complex social life. Benevolence can relieve

isolated cases before social amelioration has had time to interfere. The confines of this social amelioration stretch far beyond the confines of the economic world-order. 'The sick society receives the necessities of life through social amelioration, which thus spans the abysses that separate man and man and become a world-compelling, cultural factor.' The sections devoted to human efficiency deal carefully with division of labour, and show how every field of labour 'forms a graded series of tasks, many of which can be performed by the members of the sick society.' The whole discussion is timely and fruitful in practical suggestion.

Regency Windows, by David Emerson (Sampson Low, 7*s.* 6*d.*), is a novel of the early years of the nineteenth century. There are some striking descriptions of the Waterloo era and the doings of Orator Hunt. The notorious poet Faulconbridge, with his meteoric popularity, is evidently a study of Lord Byron. Morals and religion are at a discount in this society, though Richard Langley is a fine exception, and is evidently destined for political power. Meanwhile he has his hands full with his clever and attractive wife, who sadly needs bit and bridle. He is learning to manage her when the curtain falls. The great lady of the story is Richard's mother, Lady Mauldeth, whose beauty, ambition, and will-power make an impressive study. Her death-bed, with the family gathered round, is a dramatic scene without a touch of religious feeling.—*For Prince Charlie.* By Kate Whitehead. (Epworth Press. 8*s.* 6*d.*) The story opens with the prince's birth in Rome, and centres round the march into England in 1745. The perils and escapes that followed Culloden are vividly described, and the man who is regarded as a traitor turns out to be a strong and resourceful friend who brings Alexander safely through many dangers. It is a spirited story, with some fine characters, in whose fortunes we become keenly interested.—*Reminders for Company Secretaries.* By H. W. Thomas. (Jordan & Sons. 2*s.* 6*d.*) This is a fifteenth edition, thoroughly revised in accordance with the Companies Act, 1928, and indispensable for all directors and secretaries.

Field and Fair: Travels with a Donkey in Ireland. Translated from the Irish of Padraic O'Connaire by Cormac Breathnach. (Dublin: Talbot Press. 8*s.* 6*d.*) The writer of these sketches was born in Galway in 1881, worked in the London Civil Service from 1899 to 1914, and died in a Dublin hospital on October 6, 1928, with an ounce or two of tobacco, his pipe, and an apple. The sketches have real charm, and the little black donkey soon becomes a friend. Life in the woods, in his little tent made out of an old sail, the old Irish widow, who lived over her early visit to the market with her lover and the forest feast they enjoyed together—it is work with a heart in it, the work of one who loved nature and made friends with the little denizens of the wood. The translation is excellent, and Michael MacLlammoir adds to one's pleasure by a set of illustrations that have really caught the spirit of the book.

Periodical Literature

BRITISH

Hibbert Journal (January).—Dr. Matthews's Drew Lecture on 'The Destiny of the Soul' is very able and important. The Christian religion is incurably other-worldly. The Kingdom of God is not an earthly Utopia. It urgently needs to be shown that the destiny of the soul lies in the unseen. 'If man has his origin in the transcendent order, and can pursue ideal ends which point beyond the present world for their complete fulfilment; if he has the potentiality of an eternal destiny, let us proclaim that truth. For in the light of it our values are transformed, and our estimate of good becomes quite different.' The Jewish Christian Symposium has an article by Mr. Montefiore on 'Jewish Conceptions of Christianity,' and by Professor Burkitt on 'What Christians Think of Jews.' Major Darwin's reply to the Bishop of Exeter on *Darwinism* deserves attention, and Sir Francis Younghusband thinks 'The Faith of the Future' will be faith that the world is governed for good. His last sentence sets one thinking: 'Faith that the holiest our highest have ever conceived is but as the dawn to noon in telling what that Power is like which governs the world.'

Journal of Theological Studies (October).—Dr. Souter offers a new edition of another MS. of 'Fides Isatis ex Judaeo,' of which he obtained rotagraphs from Zürich. Chapters in the History of Latin MSS. of Canons, by Professor C. H. Turner, deal with the version called Prisca. A. J. Smith gives the result of his study of 'Pelagius and Augustine.' Dean Robinson has an interesting note on Byrhtferth, the learned monk of Ramsey at the beginning of the eleventh century, to whom Mr. Crawford thinks we owe the *Anonymous Life of St. Oswald*.

Expository Times (December).—The Rev. James Reid expounds the first word from the Cross: 'There is no picture in which we can more fully catch the glory of Jesus than this.' 'They know not what they do' is a rather startling addition to the plea for forgiveness. The warmth and hope of that forgiving love awoke the prayer of the penitent robber. Professor Robertson discusses Glover's *Jesus of History*. It spoke in a new language to multitudes, with its living and moving picture of the human Jesus, but it did not show Christ 'pursuing the line of His supreme purpose, except to an inadequate extent in his chapter on "The Choice of the Cross," and was weak in its Christology.'—(January.)—Dr. Macgregor expounds the story of 'The Penitent Thief.' The actual reply of Jesus has had a certain dogmatic and almost geographical fixity given to it, but 'here is a

desperate creature who has never had a life in thought, on whom anything evasive or subtle must be thrown away, and to him Jesus is bound to speak in the language he can understand.' The exposition is not very convincing or helpful. Mr. Morrison of Aberdeen deals with 'Natural Law and Miracles.' The miracles of Jesus are not to be explained away, but to be gloried in as a revelation of God's mighty power to save, and a pledge of what man may be and do when restored to spiritual fellowship with God. Professor Gunkel's paper on 'Elisha' and Mr. H. G. Wood's discussion of the 'Mind of Christ as to Socialism' will be read with interest.

Church Quarterly Review (January).—Canon Jenkins, writing on 'Bishop Creighton's View of History,' describes the Life by his wife as, 'from a literary point of view, one of the greatest biographies of the nineteenth century.' The estimate of his critical work is of special interest and value. Miss Doyle's article on 'Church and State and the Jure Divino Theory of Episcopacy in the English Church' deals with a problem which is being raised to-day with great intensity. The Archdeacon of Worcester considers the Report of the Commission on Religious Education, and Dr. Hitchcock discusses 'The Charges against the Christians in Tacitus.'

Congregational Quarterly (January).—The Editor's Notes on proposals for reunion in South India are a strong protest against a mechanical conception of the Church. The Rev. A. Gordon James writes on what some describe as 'The Church's Failure.' 'The way for the Church to make good her right to existence is to stick to her principles, maintaining her work at the highest degree of spiritual efficiency, and allowing nothing in her forms of worship to be ill done or badly expressed.' 'Education—the New Situation' and 'England's Indebtedness to Nonconformity Musically' are prominent features of a good number.

Holborn Review (January).—Editorial Notes on Church Union in Scotland and South India and on the Methodist Church Congress are followed by *in memoriam* tributes to Dr. Peake, which show him in his class-room and in his Oxford days. The Bishop of Middleton describes their work together as editors of the British edition of the *Outline of Christianity*, and Professor Howard brings out his extraordinary kindness to younger students, and his brilliant fireside talks. Dr. Lidgett says, 'To unreserved consecration, high courage, and loyalty to truth, he added serenity of spirit, sympathetic insight, and untiring patience.' Professor Burkitt's 'Twenty-five Years of Theological Study' is an impressive plea for adequate theological training. If ministers of religion are to guide public opinion, they need 'more intensive, more extended, more intelligent and courageous study, so that they may apply to the present the well-digested lessons of the past.'

Science Progress (January).—Recent advances in science form an impressive section of this number. In 'Darwinism versus

Lamarckism,' Mr. Pycraft sees no escape from the introduction of a large leaven of Neo-Lamarckism into the Darwinian theory of Natural Selection. The various organs of the body are moulded by the stimuli to which they have been subjected, rather than being solely due to the 'selection' of fortuitous variations in this or that direction. The account of Sir Humphry Davy is of special interest.

British Journal of Inebriety (January).—Sir Josiah Stamp gave the thirteenth Norman Kerr Lecture on 'Alcohol as an Economic Factor.' We may learn from the United States that Prohibition has drawn certain specific evils in its train, but none of the manufacturers whom he questioned in 1920 desired the *status quo ante* for their workers. They put the increased efficiency at 10 to 20 per cent. The lecture will repay study.

AMERICAN

Anglican Theological Review (October).—'Contrasted Philosophies of Christianity,' by C. L. Dibble, insists that if we are to keep any religion at all we must 'get back the age-old sense of the numinous that we have almost lost, the belief in a Reality wholly other to this present world, and in a God who really counts.' A dogma must be regarded as a résumé of the facts of religious experience. The lines on which the restatement of religious philosophies is proceeding are stated and expounded in this important article. Other articles are on 'Coptic Gnostic Writings,' and on Father Thornton's outstanding work—*The Incarnate Lord*. A reading course on 'History of Christian Thought' will be prized by students.

Journal of Religion (Chicago: January).—Mr. Lawton writes a valuable study of 'Spiritualism—A Contemporary American Religion,' showing how it appeals to a certain clientele. Other articles deal with 'Missionary Activity in Non-Christian Religions,' 'The Supernatural in Early Christianity,' 'Popular Competitors of Early Christianity,' 'Through All to God.'

The Princeton Theological Review.—The editors of this review announce that its publication ceased with the issue of July 1929. In that number the article of most general interest was contributed by Professor J. A. Faulkner, of Drew Theological Seminary. Writing on 'Temporal Power,' by an illuminating historical survey he sets the subject in its true perspective. It was the so-called Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals (850) that 'greatly aided the Popes in making good their temporal sovereignty.' But the Christian world had to wait seven hundred years 'before the *pseudo* was proved *pseudo* in the modern title of the Decretals' by Lutheran theologians. After giving instances of Papal maladministration, Dr. Faulkner points out that 'the rule again in Italy of Canon Law' is the most important of the terms of the Restoration of 1929. 'It means the banishment of all heretical or infidel teaching in the schools, colleges,

or universities of Italy,' according to the well-known French journalist, Pertinax. Though Mussolini has definitely promised no interference with toleration, Dr. Faulkner thinks that 'the treaty of 1929 has dark possibilities to Protestant minorities.'

Harvard Theological Review.—An enlarged issue (October 1929) contains a comprehensive article (108 pp.) by Dr. Luigi Salvatorelli entitled 'From Locke to Heitzenstein: the Historical Investigation of the Origins of Christianity.' The survey begins with the Deists, and comprises detailed studies of Schleiermacher, Strauss, the Tübingen school, Renan, the Religionsgeschichtliche Schule and Formgeschichte. The author's elaborate researches have not included the work of modern British scholars, but for New Testament students he has provided valuable material not otherwise easily accessible.

Methodist Review (January—February).—Dr. Cheney, of Wesleyan University, writes on 'The Holy Spirit—the Dynamite of Christianity'; the Rev. E. E. Turner on 'John Wesley and Mysticism.' 'Saint Courageous and Saint Frances' is a warm appreciation of Frances Willard and her courageous mother, who, amid every condition, displayed the graces of a noble Christian character. 'Never, in times ancient or modern, has there lived a nobler Christian Crusader than Frances E. Willard.'

FOREIGN

The United Church Review (December).—The Official Organ of the United Church of Northern India gives an interesting account of 'Adventuring in Kohat,' where a native missionary, supported by two English ladies who were trained nurses, has taught the little group of poor Christians new standards of giving, and has brought to light an encouraging amount of Indian initiative—'a rare and precious quality for whose appearance there is a great need and longing.' Mr. Ogden writes on 'Personal Evangelism—the Life of the Church.' It is a powerful call for lay testimony in making Christ known to their fellows.—(January.)—This number has useful articles on 'Organising a Church School in India,' 'The Indian Village Church of To-morrow,' and 'Working from Within,' a record of evangelistic work, with a plea for the exercise of an adventurous faith.

The Moslem World (January).—A map of the Mohammedan world and an article on its 'Political Geography' are features of this number. 'Mohammedanism does not concern itself merely with religion, but takes, as one of its cardinal principles, war against the non-Moslem world and the extension of Moslem authority. If we add that its populations are in some cases fanatical, that the spread of its influence is immensely rapid, and that no people once Mohammedan has ever been converted to the Christian religion, we may gain some idea of the seriousness of the political problems which it calls into being.'