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THE

LONDON QUARTERLY REVIEW.

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ART. I.—1. *National Association for the Promotion of Social Science, with which is united the Society for Promoting the Amendment of the Law. A Manual for the Congress, with a Narrative of Past Labours and Results.* By J. L. CLIFFORD-SMITH, Secretary of the Association. Published at the Office of the Association, 1, Adam Street, Adelphi, W.C. 1882.

2. *The Nottingham Daily "Express," "Guardian," and "Journal," September 21st to 28th,* 1882.

THE National Association for the Promotion of Social Science held its autumnal congress at Nottingham. Efforts had been made to awaken special interest by directing attention to the fact, that at such congress the Association would complete the twenty-fifth year of its history. It was hoped that thereby fresh vigour would be infused into an organisation that was showing some signs of decline, and that it would so far recover itself as to give reasonable promise of endurance for at least another quarter of a century. That such hopes were fully realised, can hardly be said. Nor can any sufficient cause of their partial disappointment be found elsewhere than in the Association itself, and in the multitude of rival societies that have of late years been formed. A programme so wide and generous as to include bankruptcy and bi-metallism, dress-reform and Chinese sewerage, the charities of Italy and the spread of tuberculosis, will undoubtedly have attractions for people of plentiful leisure, but will with equal certainty repel those who are too busy to afford to be

diffuse. In the years, moreover, since the Association was founded, so many smaller societies have sprung up, less ambitious in their aim and less omnivorous in their digestion, but appealing more directly to personal crotchets and convictions, that now congresses are so abundant that they overlap one another, and the most inveterate talker must needs withhold his favours from some. A specialist who has the choice between a society which is wholly devoted to his own purpose, and a larger one which refers him to some department, or section of a department, will not be unlikely to carry his theories and projects to the former. And if this Association, which has survived both flattery and ridicule, is not to succumb before indifference and neglect, it will probably have so to fence its platform as to show that it has some serious purpose in view, and, instead of weakening itself by undue distribution, to concentrate its efforts, year after year, upon some one, not necessarily always the same, department in which there is, for the time being, necessary work to be done. It will thereby lose a few of its supporters, whose support has, however, been chiefly a weakness to it heretofore. But it will gain in their stead general respect and a position in the esteem of men that would largely increase its practical usefulness, and make it a more efficient means of reform, alike in jurisprudence and in social and commercial economy, than it has ever yet been.

But handicapped as it has been, and doubtful as is its present outlook, it can point to much wise legislation and useful information that has been effected or gathered by means of its influence during the past twenty-five years. To no man does it probably owe so much as to the gentleman who was fitly elected to preside over the last congress, G. W. Hastings, Esq., M.P. for East Worcestershire; and certainly to no man does it owe more. Since 1868 Mr. Hastings has filled the office of president of the council, and up to that date, from the very commencement of the organisation, he acted as its general secretary. But he has not only watched over its fortunes and tended it carefully, sparing no pains to promote its success; he may be said to have begotten the Association, and has nursed it with ceaseless vigilance from the beginning. It may have been, as we are told in the *Transactions* for 1858, "set on foot by an almost spontaneous effort of the social reformers scattered through the whole country." There must, indeed,

have been some such general desire for its establishment, or there would not have been so hearty a welcome accorded to it. But had not Mr. Hastings, taking advantage of current sentiments, skilfully guided them to a practical issue, the Association would hardly have come to its birth when it did, and would not now be celebrating its twenty-fifth anniversary. But there is another name connected, not so deservedly, but more conspicuously, with the earlier years of the Association. It was first formed at a time when Lord Brougham had ceased to figure as an important factor in government and in political agitation. And it provided him with a sphere peculiarly appropriate to a man of his faculty and habit, and enabled him to exhibit upon its platform the same cyclopædic pretension at which the world had wondered before. On July 29, 1857, a private meeting was held at his house in Grafton Street, at the suggestion of Mr. Hastings; and the Association was then established with the promised support of various men of mark or position. Its object was stated to be "to afford those engaged in efforts for the improvement of the people an opportunity of considering social economics as a great whole." And since then, with occasional fluctuations of interest, it has never failed to hold its annual meeting, or to attract a certain moderate amount of attention on the part of educated men.

The constitution of the Association has undergone but little change from the beginning. Five departments were then made, devoted respectively to jurisprudence and amendment of the law, to education, to punishment and reformation, to public health, and to social economy. But inasmuch as the original idea of the Association was that of a body dealing with the science of society as a whole, it was soon felt, and ought, indeed, to have been perceived at first, that such a classification was anything but scientific. If any exact meaning was attached to the term "social economy," the classification was vicious in at least two particulars. It left out much that had as good a claim to consideration as anything that it included. And the sections overlapped one another to such a degree that the secretaries must have often been sorely puzzled to which any given subject should be referred. In 1864, accordingly, the departments were re-formed in the arrangement that has subsisted since, the number remaining the same, but several changes occurring in their names. The subjects of

punishment and reformation were naturally relegated to other sections. Social economy was expanded into the more intelligible title of economy and trade. And a fifth department was devoted to art, or "the æsthetic recreative life of the people," although no work seems to have been attempted in it until seven years ago. This alteration in the constitution of departments was coincident with what has proved perhaps the most important change in the relation of the Association to kindred societies. Twenty years before a society for the amendment of the law had been founded by certain zealous reformers, and in its brief career had successfully promoted several measures of great value, and checked several attempts at legislation that were wrong in principle, or likely to prove hurtful to the people. But in 1864, it united itself to the younger association, and brought apparently such a tribute of knowledge and ability to the department of jurisprudence that its discussions have been more fruitful than those of any other department.

The most unfortunate mistake the Association made in its constitution was the assumption of a title too ambitious, and calculated to awaken expectations which no serious attempt has been made to meet. Even when its valuable practical work is not overlooked, it is only reasonable to require that a society which exists ostensibly for the promotion of social science should promote it. And yet it is questionable whether all the thick volumes of its *Transactions* have contributed, or will hereafter contribute, at all to its promotion. They contain much curious information, statistics that may serve for the verification or illustration of social principles after they have been established, and suggestions of almost every degree of wisdom and of uselessness; but they do not contain any science. And the web of social existence is no less tangled than if the doors of Lord Brougham's house had never opened to Mr. Hastings. Such a consequence has not resulted from any intentional avoidance by the Association of the intellectual problems which social science has to solve. Its very founder is a frequent witness to the contrary. In the first Introduction he wrote for its annual volumes, he does not omit to say, "It is desirable that a certain number of papers should be contributed, containing deductions from generalised facts, and dealing with the more abstract philosophy of social science." And in his presidential

address he describes the function of the Association as "to elucidate the economical and moral principles on which the constitution of society should be based, and to influence by the light of those principles the course of future legislation." Undoubtedly, that ought to be the function of an association with such a name as the one in question. And it is equally certain that no such function has been discharged, or hardly even attempted by this Association from its origin. It has performed the useful office of directing attention to many wrongs and many neglected duties, and has succeeded in righting and enforcing some of them. But it has done nothing directly, and very little indirectly, towards reducing the denseness of the obscurity that clothes the great principles which either knit men together in social relationships, or ought to regulate the relations that are thus constituted.

It seems, indeed, that the whole method of investigation, as pursued by this Association, whilst it may lead to tentative remedial measures, cannot lead to any systematised science. The Association tries to deal directly with the most complex phenomena, and to discover, by a course of experimentation, the causes that lie behind, and hopes thus to acquire such a knowledge of the laws of social life as will enable its further development to be watched and unerringly modified. Whereas it has become now a matter of almost universal assent, that the complicated phenomena of society cannot be disentangled by any such process; and that process has proved of so little use during the many years it has been followed, that there is a widespread suspicion that the generalisations which profess to relate to society are often due to quackery or worse. Two circumstances alone render every effort to arrive at the ultimate laws of human society by any method of induction, and especially by the method of simple enumeration, necessarily vain and fruitless. The one is the plurality and the other the conflict of the causes that produce the effects upon which examination is directed. "Take, for instance," writes perhaps our greatest living logician, "such questions as the influence of any particular form of government upon the welfare of the people among whom it is established, the effects of religion, or of any particular form of religion upon morals, the social and political conditions most favourable to the development of art, or literature, or science, or commerce. Here, if it be required to discover

the cause of a given effect, our materials are a set of consequents constantly varying in their character and intensity, and a set of antecedents, often very numerous, any one of which may have an appreciable influence in the production of the effect in question; and it is obvious that to detect the precise degree in which the effect is due to any one of these antecedents, even supposing the task to be possible, will require the utmost skill, patience, and dispassionateness in the selection and comparison of instances. Nor, if it be required to discover the effect of a given cause, will the task be much simplified; for, though it may be possible to fix the precise time at which a new cause—say a new form of religion, a new form of government, or a new commercial tariff—was introduced, yet, before it can be argued that any novel event, which may appear to have resulted from it, is really due to it as an effect to a cause, the inquirer is bound to satisfy himself that the introduction of the new cause was not accompanied by other causes which may have wholly or partially produced the supposed effect, and that the new cause and the supposed effect are not joint effects of some common cause which he may have overlooked." As long, therefore, as the Association continues to pursue exclusively its present method, it must not be expected to contribute anything to any exact science of society. Guesses that are more or less random, and local statistics and uniformities may still continue to encumber or enrich its papers. It may put on record much individual experience that may hereafter be turned to use. But it will construct no theoretical system, and disclose to its members none of the general principles which together constitute the philosophy of human society.

But if the Association errs in the attitude it maintains towards speculation and the theoretical side of the matters with which it is concerned, it has taken a position in relation to religion which is altogether wise. With few exceptions, each annual congress has been preceded by a sermon, preached professedly before its members, and actually to a few of them. Any further recognition of the close connection between religion and society would perhaps be impossible in an organisation in which so many varieties of faith and practice are represented. But just as there is no more general cause of the defects which the Association seeks to remedy than irreligion or godlessness, so the social reformer has no more serviceable ally than Christianity,

and much of his work can only be done with the aid of Christian influences and sentiments. And whatever may be the private views of its members, it is evident that the platform of the Association is distinctly and persistently Christian. Its president, with a glow which twenty-five years have not quenched, describes its aim as "to imbue the mind of all classes alike with a sound social creed, at the bottom of which lie faith in Providence, goodwill to men, an inflexible morality, and sympathy for freedom." And the opening sermon, which this year was preached by the Rev. J. M. Wilson, M.A., the head-master of Clifton College, earnestly enforced the necessity of co-operation between the Church and social reformers, if the former is rightly to carry on its work, and if the latter do not want to find their work fruitless of the best results. Upon utilitarianism there can never be based any very vigorous or permanent efforts at social improvement, for not only do the schemes that it devises fail to make men's interests coincide, but the very motive to which it appeals often acts as a bar to the conduct which it recommends; and consequently its efforts hitherto have only touched the fringe of the evil from which the community is suffering. Social science, as a philosophy, teaches no distincter lesson than that the surest way to improve the relationships of men is by awakening that which in the nature of each is divine, and encouraging it to action. For if the spiritual element in man be not recognised, and no appeal be made to it, attempts at social amelioration may issue in a little temporary surface-refinement, but they cannot issue in the adoption by the community of a higher standard of morality, or consequently in the disappearance of those evils which are due above all to the prevalence of a low standard. "To make the conditions of life for every member of a community such that he may arrive at the best of which he is capable," cannot be effected without enlisting the highest and most influential part of his nature, and therefore without bringing into play religious sanctions and aspirations. It is true, indeed, as the history of the Church bears only too conclusive testimony, that the duty of promoting improvements in the condition of society has sometimes been forgotten, and sometimes even stigmatised and shunned. But it would be well now if, forgetting all the faults and discords of the past, the Church, on the one hand, braced herself to more diligent labour to secure for

every man the best possible conditions of life, adopting all the methods that social science recommends; and if, on the other, philanthropists and reformers of every kind prosecuted their efforts, with not less zeal, but with due conviction of the truth that their ultimate success will be in proportion to their use of Christian motives and aims. Many subordinate consequences of great importance would follow. Sectarian differences would probably disappear by degrees in the enthusiasm of a common work. There would be no apparent divergence between the lines upon which faith and philosophy respectively advance. The democratic spirit and the sociological forces of the age would be guided to a worthy issue, and saved alike from undue exuberance and from the perils of reaction. But, best of all, the apostolic ideal of religion would be more nearly approached, and social evils and degradations would be assailed by a power against which they could not long stand. The true spirit of social science and the spirit of Christian brotherhood are one and the same; and their close and continued alliance would be to the advantage of both the Church and the community.

The *Manual*, prepared by Mr. Clifford-Smith, enables us to trace the work that the Association professes to have done during the last quarter of a century. It does not, indeed, claim the sole credit of the various improvements that have been advocated in its congresses and committees. The president spoke distinctly in his opening address of the variety of other forces that are at work—"an active press, much interchange of thought, patient inquiry by many thinkers, continuous discussion and ventilation of grievances in Parliament"—which all combine in their own measure for the promotion of social and legislative changes. But omitting the influence which the Association has exerted upon local opinion, and the information it has gathered for use by men who were not its members, there have been many modifications in the law of the land of the highest practical value, to the need of which attention was first called in its meetings, or to the enactment of which its agencies materially contributed.

If the departments are taken in their present order, the first, in its two sections of Jurisprudence and of the Repression of Crime, contains the longest list of services that have been rendered to the community by legislative changes, of the advantage of which little doubt can be entertained.

The Endowed Charities Act of 1860, the Legitimacy Declaration Act of 1858, the Supreme Court of Judicature Act of 1873, and a clause in the County Courts Act of 1875, permitting appeal from the decision of a county-court judge, are some among many instances of the way in which the Association has directly affected legislation. International relations have not been overlooked, for the "York and Antwerp Rules," applying to maritime adventures, which have been adopted as the basis for the settlement of questions relating to general average almost throughout the commercial world, and have been recognised in our own country in the Court of Appeal, were the result of an inquiry that was instituted by this Association in 1860. Amongst minuter amendments of the law, not the least valuable to merchants has proved the clause which enables loans of money to be made to a trader on condition of the lender's receiving a share of the profits without being exposed to the liabilities of a partnership, and which was successfully urged by the Council in 1865. And of the legislation that is still pending, delayed by the grievous block in the House of Commons, no small part has been brought forward under the auspices of this Association. It is striving to secure the codification of international law and of English case-law, the greater efficiency of the system of trial by jury, the settlement of the question of copyright, and certain modifications in the office and position of coroner, which are rendered necessary by the antiquity and inconveniences of the present regulations. And if the Association could point to nothing more in the record of its twenty-five years' career than the work it has done and is doing in this single section, that alone would be sufficient justification of its existence.

But the other section of this department, dealing with matters less abstract in their nature, and the decision of which is followed more quickly by results, has generally appealed with more success to the interest of the desultory frequenters of the congresses. Its action in connection with the law of evidence may be referred to more appropriately when the proceedings of its last meeting are narrated. But its advocacy of the appointment of a public prosecutor, and the position it has constantly maintained in relation to prison discipline, are greatly to its honour. The first question to claim its attention was the disposal of convicts. In 1852, all the colonies except Western

Australia had refused any longer to receive them; and since that colony could take only a small number annually, and our home prisons were filled with nearly 7,000 men under sentence of transportation, the due administration of criminal justice threatened to become impossible. Nor did the Penal Servitude Act of 1853 greatly reduce the difficulty. Its principles were fair enough, but its administration was so feeble and irresponsible, that failure and a state of feeling in the country little short of panic quickly followed. Convicts, according to its regulations, who could not be sent to Western Australia, were to be liberated in this country after short periods of imprisonment with "tickets-of-leave." A similar arrangement at a later period was found to answer the purpose in view. But at first the conditions of the ticket-of-leave were not merely not enforced, but were openly disregarded. The police stated before a committee appointed to inquire into the operation of the Act, that they knew and did not interfere with ticket-of-leave men whose occupation was that of training thieves. And a remark made by the head of the metropolitan police was still more surprising. He said, "he did not think he had ever seen a ticket-of-leave, or had ever received notice of the conditions endorsed on it." Meanwhile in Ireland the same Act had been strictly administered, and with the most beneficial results. The conditions were stringently enforced, and "intermediate prisons" were provided, to which the convicts were sent before liberation to test in a state of partial, their fitness for complete, freedom. For fifteen years the Association discussed, and agitated, and devoted much of its time to secure the adoption in England of the method of administration which had succeeded so well in Ireland; and in the Prevention of Crime Act of 1871, reform was effected in the three respects of the classification of prisoners, the extension of the mark system, and an efficient police supervision. Sir R. Cross's bill, too, for the transfer to the State of county and borough gaols must be ascribed to the efforts of the Association. For it was in response to the request of one of its deputations, who pleaded the want of uniformity in the discipline of prisons, and the possibility of introducing industrial labour into them, that the Royal Commission was appointed, in pursuance of whose recommendations the above bill was introduced into Parliament.

A single remark of Mr. Clifford-Smith's, that more than

four hundred papers have been presented in the department of education, each followed probably by discussion, is a sufficient witness to its activity. And yet this multitude of words seem to have been mostly useless, as far as any practical result is concerned. The Schools' Inquiry Commission, out of whose report grew the Endowed Schools' Bill, was indeed the direct effect of the representations of a deputation which Mr. Nassau Senior persuaded the Association to send to Lord Palmerston. And, moreover, it early arrayed itself upon the side of the movement to provide facilities for the higher education of girls and women, and has of late carefully watched the dangers to health which are apt to attend educational pressure in primary schools for girls. And of course the great movement in national education, which will probably hereafter be quoted as the most important legislative action of the past quarter of a century, numbered this Association amongst its supporters. At its first meeting a strong protest was made in favour of some system of general education, though it was made with little hope of speedy success. And from that date there was kept up such a flow of memorials into the offices of the Government, as without doubt affected and hastened the efforts which bore fruit in Mr. Forster's bill. But otherwise the work of this department has not been generally satisfactory. It has suffered from the strong tendency on the part of many men to regard their own views on various aspects of the question of education as worth ventilating, whatever their obviousness; and themes have been too frequently introduced, the admission of which cannot readily be explained upon any other ground than the necessity of providing the department with something to talk about.

No department, on the other hand, during the present, or in all likelihood during most of the preceding congresses, has attracted so much interest, or been concerned with questions of so much pressing importance, as that devoted to the consideration of sanitary matters. The first step taken by the Association was to make the temporary Public Health Act of 1858 perpetual, and few years have been allowed to pass since without some suggested revision or amendment of that law. The adulteration of food, the abatement of the nuisance of smoke, the registration of births and of lodging-houses, the management of hospitals and of provident dispensaries, the pollution of rivers, the health

of merchant seamen, and many similar subjects, have in turn engaged the attention of the Association, which has in most cases succeeded in checking the mischief it had discovered, either by new legislation, or by arousing public indignation. It is indeed in this domain of social amelioration that the Association has found its best field of operation. It arose at a time when there was practically no earnest effort to check the evils that were caused by the massing of the population in towns and centres of trade, and when there was but little recognition of the existence of those evils. And it has been favoured by researches into the causes of disease and of the spread of infection that have proceeded almost contemporaneously with its own discussions, and that have exercised upon many a fascination exceeding that of nearly every other study. In philosophy writers of great genius and charm have made the possibility of formulating the laws that affect human life an attraction to all thoughtful or educated minds. And, on the other hand, the problems of sanitation have been only second in interest to those of politics to an ever-increasing number of practical men, whose ingenuity has been devoted, sometimes as an amusement, often in the course of business, to the invention of valves and ventilators, or to schemes for the material improvement of the conditions of life. But if the very atmosphere in which this department has worked has been thus favourable to its vigour and fruitfulness, there is none the less great gratitude due to it for discerning the evils that needed to be put right, and for the skill and persistency with which those evils have been assailed. A theory, which is not without its representatives in the inner circle of the Association itself, would, if it behaved reasonably, claim all the credit for these tendencies and sentiments that were afloat everywhere. A more just philosophy will be thankful for the tendencies and sentiments, but will not forget the men who had eyes to discern their opportunity and wisdom to use it.

The final department, for in this review of the past that of Art is too young and barren of definite results to be in the reckoning, is concerned with trade and economy, but has not any long list of completed work to point to. The best mode of levying taxes so as to press least on the industrial resources of the country has been twice discussed in committee. Energetic steps have been taken to suppress the gambling farms that used to be so great a scandal

at Hong Kong, and to protect merchant sailors against the temptations to which they were exposed by their method of payment. And the licensing laws have of necessity been considered on various occasions by this department. But its best work will be found in two other quarters. A paper, read by Sir C. W. Sikes before the Bradford congress, is said by Mr. Clifford-Smith to have been the distinct origin of post-office savings banks. And in the matter of strikes and trade unions, the Association has steadily wielded an influence that has tended to justice and tranquillity between masters and workmen. Soon after its first formation, it summoned a committee composed impartially of employers of labour, representatives of working men, and men of repute in economical science, to gather and diffuse information as to the relations between capital and labour. A similar but better organised attempt was made nine years later, in connection with which certain resolutions urging amendments of the law were widely circulated and brought under the direct notice of the Government, which adopted several of them in its Trades' Union Bill. And the same committee, by persuading the trades concerned to accept a system of arbitration, greatly aided in putting an end to the strike of engineers at Newcastle in 1871, to that of masons in London in 1872, and to that of the power-loom weavers at Barnsley in the following year. Bearing in mind the slow pace at which changes in popular opinions and habits or in legislation are effected, and the mass of indifference that has to be quickened into interest, it must be acknowledged that in all four departments, though in different degrees in each, the Association can plead, in rebuke of the neglect with which the public is beginning to treat it, a career of much practical usefulness which has only been reduced in quantity by its frequent alliance with trifling and vapidity.

Turning next to the proceedings of the recent congress, it is impossible even to enumerate the various subjects upon which papers were read. Nor could any good purpose be served by doing so. Several of them must have been selected through causes which related more to the gratification of individuals, or the abhorrence of a departmental vacuum, than to the attainment of any worthy results. In a few instances, on the other hand, the themes proposed for discussion were not novel, but of very great importance to the community, and such as are withheld

from settlement by a considerable conflict of opinion. The majority of these will be noticed in due course in connection with the section to which they appertain. But the president's opening address not only ought, but in this case certainly does, form the best of all introductions to the more detailed work of the congress. It commenced with a passing reference to the losses which had been sustained through death in the twelve months, in which due tribute was paid alike to the high ability of Lord Frederick Cavendish, and of Professor Stanley Jevons, and to the promise of a yet more distinguished career which the untimely end of each had eclipsed. But the bulk of Mr. Hastings' speech consisted of an enthusiastic account of two statutes, the Settled Land Act and the Married Women's Property Act, which Parliament, in spite of the general domestic unfruitfulness of its last session, succeeded in passing. So high is his opinion of the former, that he passes upon it the warm eulogium, "it may be doubted whether any greater revolution, legal or social, has been accomplished in this country." That it is a great step in the direction of land-law reform cannot be questioned. Its nearest parallel in importance has to be sought in the restoration of the old Saxon tenure by free socage and the abolition of knight-service under Charles II., or in the establishment of the principle of free transfer under Edward I. It removes almost the last of the evil consequences of that subinfeudation of the land, which the policy of the Norman dynasty substituted for the system of alienation at pleasure that prevailed before the Conquest. It makes land saleable, and in that respect gives the tenant for life as complete control over his property as if he held it in fee simple. But at the same time it is not marked by any character of finality. One radical defect in it is that, while it grants a landowner permission to sell, it withdraws almost every adequate motive for selling, by insisting that the purchase money must be invested in approved securities for the benefit of the reversioner. The mansion-house upon an estate moreover must not be sold without the leave of the High Court of Justice; and by that single exception the selling value of the estates which it is most desirable to bring into the market would be so seriously diminished, that few owners would be disposed to avail themselves of the benefit of the Act. The reform of the land-laws will be im rfect until there is given to the landlord such complete

possession of his property that he can do what in his opinion is the best with it, and until the transfer of land is made both easy and inexpensive. Much difficult legislation will be needed before that end can be secured. And the Settled Land Act must be followed by the abolition of entail and of the objectionable incidents of copyhold tenure, by some compulsory system of registration, and by a few other changes of less moment, before the section for the amendment of the law will be able to erase the subject of the sale of land from its programme.

In a similar tone of exultation, though at much less length, Mr. Hastings spoke of the Married Women's Property Act. The Association, almost from its foundation, has persisted in calling attention to the injustice of the regulation by which a woman's property passed upon her marriage into the absolute possession of her husband. The ancient law, however unfair to wives in respect of their rights, was fair enough in respect of their property. It seemed to them inalienably their dower. And if it transferred the management of their lands to their husbands, it transferred also the military service, but did not delegate any power to sell or bequeath. But under the modern custom, while rich women have been able with much complication and expense to protect themselves, the poor have had to suffer without appeal the confiscation of their scanty savings. For years their advocates were met generally by indifference, rarely by anything more earnest than ridicule. But their persistence has succeeded at length in procuring the enactment of a statute, which makes a wife liable upon her own contracts, and able to sue and to be sued, and to acquire, hold, and dispose of both real and personal property. To call that statute "a landmark to future generations of the rise of justice and true statesmanship in the reign of Queen Victoria," is to speak with a roundness and glow that are pardonable in those whose fatherly interest has been tested by long delay. But few will refuse to acknowledge that the principle of such legislation is in itself right and just, and that its adoption is likely to put the relationship of husband to wife among all classes upon a basis of greater forbearance and consideration. It is one of the most hopeful features of the age, that grave social and political questions, which not long ago were discussed almost solely by a supposed governing class, now attract general attention. And it may reasonably be concluded

that the other evils, which still affect society, and hinder its tranquil progress, will gradually be recognised and remedied by the twin agency of intelligence, inspired by Christian conceptions and motives. And so long as the Association continues to direct its energies to the removal of such barriers to free trade as dictated the Settled Land Act, and of such hindrances to fair social life as dictated the Married Women's Property Act, it will not be through the lack of beneficent purposes if it does not command prosperity.

The president of the jurisprudence department was H. F. Bristowe, Esq., Q.C., Vice-Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. His official address consisted of a recapitulation of the changes that have been effected in social, personal, and criminal legislation during the past quarter of a century, and of an enumeration of the matters that call for immediate attention. Taking international law first, he urged the propriety of all civilised states coming to some definite understanding upon the following points, viz., the circumstances under which extradition of criminals may be demanded, the section of the Declaration of Paris which abolishes privateering, the exemption of commercial cities and vessels from attack or capture during war, the reference to arbitration of questions that arise out of the construction of treaties, the enactment of some uniform marriage-law, and the provision of some system of copyright, and of effectual protection against the piracy of trademarks. The list of the principal questions in domestic jurisprudence that demand speedy settlement is longer still. No time has been more favourable than the present for attempting something like a codification of existing law, the great cost of which would be more than counterbalanced by the benefits that would accrue. There is in the statute-book no thoroughly effective Rivers' Pollution Prevention Act, and no satisfactory method of dealing with cases of bankruptcy. The system of trial by jury has disclosed several defects which should be remedied, and steps might be taken which would in most instances ensure accused persons a fairer and fuller trial than is possible under the present law of evidence. The Statute of Mortmain needs to be so modified as to apply to personal as well as real estate, and the incorporation in it of the suggestions of the late Lord Hatherley would be in every way a boon to the community. The sale of next presentations ought to be

prohibited, and some tribunal constituted where questions affecting the doctrine and ritual of the Church of England, as by law established, might be adjudicated to the satisfaction of all parties concerned. These, and a few other difficulties, such as the devolution of realty in cases of intestacy, and the extension of the jurisdiction of local courts, indicate the direction which the legislation of the next few years must take, if the teaching of the science of jurisprudence concerning the future welfare of the country is to be followed.

Several of the matters thus cursorily alluded to by Mr. Bristowe were discussed at large in the daily meetings of the department. But it is impossible within our limits to do more than record the conclusion to which the discussions tended. The law of primogeniture was opposed on the triple ground of the difficulty experienced by laymen in distinguishing real from personal estate, of the natural obligation cast upon every man to support all his children, and of the maxim *cessante causâ, cessat ipsa lex*, the neglect of which could only be excused on strong grounds of public policy. It was, however, argued by some that exception should be made in the case of peers, in order that the independence of their Chamber might be kept up by ensuring its members a competent amount of property. But the day for class legislation has passed, because the need of it has ceased. And such amendments of the law of intestacy are inevitable as shall cause the distribution of the whole of an intestate's property according to the dictates of natural justice and the principles that are supposed to be best for the country.

Another of the special questions submitted to this department will awaken wrath on the part of some that such a matter should be discussed at all, and will not be permitted by any to issue in practical change without vigilant care for the maintenance of our liberties. It was worded thus: "Is it desirable to abolish trial by jury, and, if so, in what cases? And, where trial by jury is retained, is it expedient to require a unanimous verdict?" The jury system has existed for some six hundred years; and at certain periods of our history, notably during the reigns of two of the Georges, when the Crown was too powerful and the Houses of Parliament too corrupt, the jury was the best representative of public opinion, and the only refuge of its champions. It is not, therefore, to be wondered

at that so great a charm and glamour have invested the system, that to touch it seems to many little short of sacrilege. And yet if it be remembered that the system has already undergone several adaptations, there can be no reasonable objection to such further modification as shall restore to it its old efficiency in an advanced state of civilisation. At one time jurymen were witnesses as well as judges, whereas now the challenge of a juryman on the ground that he is wanted in the witness-box is fatal. The verdict of twelve out of twenty-three used to be accepted, but now in most cases the number of the jury is limited to twelve, and the verdict must be unanimous. For many years after the adoption of the system, a false verdict exposed a jury to severe punishments under a writ of attaint, and before the year 1670, a verdict contrary to the direction of the judge was frequently followed by the penalty of a fine: now no penal liability or legal responsibility whatever attaches to a jury for any verdict it may please them to give. That the system still needs revision, its complete failure of late in Ireland has made sufficiently obvious, for the same causes that enabled it to be used as a means for the defeat of justice there, may cause its breakdown elsewhere in a time of similar excitement and agitation. There are, moreover, certain radical faults in it which render it, even when well administered, and in a period of quietness, a doubtful means of detection of wrong. Most juries labour under such a complete want of experience as disqualifies them for dealing with civil causes of any complexity. No right of challenge, in the necessary absence of full information concerning the previous lives and the predilections of men whose names may never have been heard before, can be so exercised as always to secure impartiality in the jury-box. On the one hand, the want of adequate payment to jurymen leads sometimes to undue haste in the disposal of difficult cases; whilst, on the other, their want of due intelligence and their amenability to the craft of counsel lead more often still to a great waste of time, and constitute probably the principal cause of the frequent block of business in the courts. But there is no likelihood that the public, however willing they may be for the bulk of civil cases to be settled before a judge alone, or before a judge with skilled assessors, will consent to abolish trial by jury in criminal cases, or to accept any verdict, in the more serious charges, as final, which is not

unanimous. Upon the lines of some such distinction as this, the reform of the system may be expected quickly to proceed. It would probably be a saving of both expense and time, if, in patent cases and cases of debt or contract and actions for trespass or accident, either the judge were unhampered by a jury, or the number of the jury were reduced, and their special fitness for their work considered; of which courses the balance is in favour of the former. But any change that would place a man's liberty or life at the disposal of a single judge, or of a majority of a small jury, would be sturdily resisted by public opinion, and would not be favourable either to justice or to general confidence in the administration of justice. And history has its pages too full of teaching to permit questions of political rights, such as the liberty of the press, or of public discussion, to be determined by any tribunal in which the decision of the jury does not give its tone to the voice of the judge.

Two other matters were brought before the notice of this department upon which it is necessary to be even more concise. The one was the state of the law respecting bankruptcy, and the other the expediency of extending the jurisdiction of local courts. The first step recommended in the latter case, and certainly a step for which many weighty reasons might be pleaded, was the abolition of all local courts of civil jurisdiction except county courts, to be followed by the reorganisation of the latter on a basis which would integrally connect them with the High Court of Justice, and extend their cognisance to actions in which claims of £200 were involved. In the discussion on bankruptcy, one novel suggestion was made. The existing law in itself is without doubt unfair in its operation, and in need of much amendment. But there is great force in the statement that its failure is due more to the neglect of the creditors than to its own inherent feebleness. There are stringent enough provisions in its clauses to prevent the escape of a fraudulent debtor, but because it is not always worth the creditor's while to enforce them, or within his power to meet the astuteness of the opposing lawyer, the trustee, who is often simply the nominee of the bankrupt, is left to do as he pleases, and all the checks and safeguards of the law become virtually inoperative. And the formation of a general creditors' association is well calculated to prevent these abuses. In all probability it would not be an additional burden, for several modes might be devised

whereby it would pay its way. And not the least important of its functions might be made the collection of information concerning the law and practice of bankruptcy, which would be of equal use to judges in the preparation of their "general orders," and to the legislature in its occasional revision of the statute-book.

In the Repression of Crime section, the opening address was delivered by Sir John Pope Hennessy, K.C.M.G., and his theme was, in his own words, "State-created crime," by which he meant, crime that is encouraged by the excessive severity of the measures that are taken for its repression. In the development of his theme, he confined himself to illustrations which his own experience in the colonies provided. In Hong Kong he found that the system of first branding and then deporting criminals to the Chinese provinces on the mainland led to a distinct increase of crime, the indelible brand hindering every attempt on the part of the prisoner to obtain an honest livelihood in his own country, and compelling him to return to prey upon the colony. The reform of the penal system in 1872 was soon followed by a distinct decrease of crime, so marked that merchants have been able to dispense with the armed retinue that was previously necessary to protect their goods upon transit from robbery. But no part of the chairman's address will be more welcome to those who are interested in the maintenance of righteous relations between Great Britain and her dependencies and allies, than the paragraph in which he described his personal knowledge of the effects of opium upon the smoker's mind and character. Many men of at least equal experience with that of Sir John Hennessy will complain that his account is too moderate, and by no means an adequate representation of these effects. But its very moderation betokens the care that was taken to avoid exaggeration, and commends his narrative as erring, if at all, only on the better side of repression. And certainly his uncoloured statements are quite enough to show that, alike in the interest of morality and in that of the unselfish consideration which a strong State owes a weak one, and a Christian State a pagan one, it is high time that Great Britain ceased to have any official connection whatever with the traffic in opium. No diplomat should ever hereafter find reason to speak as Sir John Hennessy does. "British China," he said, "is the focus of the opium trade. In the little colony under my govern-

ment, one million sterling changes hands every month in the article of opium. But with commercial activity and trade profits there comes an increase of crime from opium, from its consumption, and from its smuggling. Hong Kong wages a chronic opium war on a small scale with China. A desperate class of men, the opium smugglers, make the colony the base of their operations; they purchase cannon and ammunition there, they fit out heavily-armed junks, and engage within sight of the island in naval battles with the revenue cruisers of the Emperor of China. . . . All this gives rise to a class of crime difficult for the governor to repress, difficult on account of the influence of those who profit by it, whether they are local traders or the financiers of a viceroy. But the crime created within the colony by opium is as nothing compared with that which it is creating in China. For the last few years I have had opportunities of meeting some of the leading statesmen of China. Their great complaint against the opium traffic is that it causes immorality and crime, that it injures the intellect and impairs the moral character. Such is the objection that the Grand Secretary, Li Hung Chang, the virtual prime minister of China, over and over again repeated to me. During the nine years that I have been responsible to the Queen for the good order of her colonies in the China seas, I have constantly observed that whilst opium-smoking may not injure the physique of some individuals, it invariably deteriorates the moral character and increases crime. The responsibility of creating and spreading such crime in a nation of three hundred millions against the earnestly expressed wishes of the Empress Regent and her ministers, and indeed the wishes of the whole literati of China, is a responsibility that I trust England may soon be able to shake off."

In the same section, two papers, describing the organisation and urging the support of Prisoners' Aid societies, met with a good reception. And the chaplain of Clerkenwell gaol introduced the kindred subject of the best method of legal treatment of inebriates. By leave of the Home Office, he had submitted certain questions to the governors and chaplains of all English local prisons, and their answers, when tabulated, showed a strong consensus of opinion in behalf of several modifications. Fifty-six out of seventy-three advised prolonged imprisonment for repeated offences, on the ground that the ordinary sentence does not act as a deterrent upon habitual drunkards; and

almost all agreed that no adequate opportunity was given for physical improvement under the present system. All, with few exceptions, concluded that to allow a fine after a limited number of convictions was to punish the poor disproportionately to the rich, and often to cause the main penalty to fall on innocent shoulders.

But the most valuable contributions of this section related to proposed changes in the law of evidence, and to the various methods of dealing with vagrancy. The question in the former instance was whether it was desirable that defendants in criminal cases should be competent to give evidence, and strong advocates were heard in support of each side of the contention. But about the time the congress closed, appeared the annual report of the Director of Criminal Investigations, one of whose recommendations is the introduction into criminal procedure, with suitable regulations and guarantees against abuse, of the interrogation of prisoners. Great weight must attach to the source from which that suggestion comes. And when it is considered, further, how favourable to justice has proved the recent admission to the witness-box of defendants in actions for breach of promise and respondents in suits in the Divorce Court, and how satisfactorily the system recommended by Mr. Howard Vincent has worked in the United States, prejudice in favour of the present practice ought not to prevent patient examination into the merits of the proposal. The object of all criminal procedure is to discover the exact truth, and to act accordingly, to protect the innocent whilst convicting the guilty. And there have been one or two instances of late where that object has been defeated mainly because of the silence that is imposed upon the defendant. And yet such is often the nervousness and agitation of an innocent prisoner, that any severe cross-examination would involve him in a confusion that would prove more damaging in the eyes of many juries than any evidence that could be brought against him. Nevertheless, as a rule, it is probable that to subject the prisoner to questioning would further reduce the small chance of miscarriage of justice that exists under the present system. The innocent would be more likely to escape and the guilty to be detected. And with such restrictions upon the natural partisanship of the plaintiff's counsel as would hinder him from torturing a helpless prisoner, and due vigilance on the part of the judge, the

suggested change might with advantage be gradually introduced, the various details being amended from time to time as experience dictated.

The paper on Vagrancy was chiefly a description of the so-called "Berkshire" system. The peculiarity of that system is its rigid enforcement of the principle that no able-bodied tramp shall receive any kind of relief or shelter without some adequate return in the shape either of labour or of travel. Every vagrant who applied to a workhouse without a way-ticket would have one offered him, on which would be stated the places from and to which he professed to come and to be going. He would then be received, and have eight ounces of bread, his bed, and eight ounces more in the morning, with such a task of work as would meet the cost of his night's keep. His way-ticket would inform him of a police-station on the road to his destination, where he could obtain a midday meal, and of a workhouse at the distance of a fair day's walk where he would be received for the night. By constantly insisting upon the production of this ticket, travelling labourers could be readily distinguished from professional vagrants, and such a difference be made in their treatment as would discourage the latter, while placing no unnecessary hindrance in the way of the former. The failure of the provisions of the present Vagrancy Act, which, if it be strictly enforced, enlists the sympathy of the people on the side of the vagrant by giving him a grievance, has made it absolutely necessary that some other method should be devised, if the profit of idle strolling is to be destroyed. And the Berkshire system appears exactly to meet the difficulty. It is not unduly severe upon any who from any cause apply for a night's shelter. It facilitates the efforts of honest workmen to transfer themselves to a locality where their labour is needed. And the only thing required to ensure its general efficiency is its universal adoption through the different counties and unions, or else the result will be that vagrancy will be stamped out in some districts to flourish the more in others.

Passing next to the Health Department, the presidential address was delivered by Sir Rutherford Alcock, K.C.B., who hesitatingly defined health as "that condition of the body which allows full play to all its organs and component parts in due subordination and harmonious action." Opponents of sanitary legislation, proceeded the speaker, with

the exception of the "Peculiar People," and of anti-vaccinators, base their objections on one of two grounds—that of distrust in the power to effect any material change in the average mortality, which is supposed to be subject to conditions beyond the reach of human intelligence; or that of the doctrine, that compulsory legislation is an undue interference with personal liberty. To the latter objection, Blackstone's dictum is, for the present, a sufficient reply: "The law which restrains a man from doing mischief to others is really one which increases the civil liberty of mankind." The refutation of the former is found in the well-sustained fact, that sanitary science has already succeeded in reducing the average mortality. It has not yet learnt how to prevent altogether the advent of infectious diseases, but it is thoroughly competent to limit their area, and thus to diminish the evils they are apt to inflict. The report of the Local Government Board for 1881 shows that the death-rate of England and Wales has fallen during the last decade by nearly four and a half per cent. "More than three-quarters of this reduction of deaths," so says the registrar, "comes under the head of the seven zymotic diseases, that is to say, of the diseases which are the most influenced by sanitary improvements." The army returns bear exactly similar testimony, and prove that there was a saving by improved sanitation in a single decade of 40,000 lives, "or twice as many as were killed in battle in our twenty-two years' war, including Waterloo and Trafalgar." With such records of success in the past, it has still to be remembered that from one-fifth to one-sixth of the total annual mortality is due to diseases of a preventible kind, and that hitherto no adequate measures have been taken to prevent them. Legislative regulations have not only been either tentative and permissive or purely local, but they have also as a rule been rendered useless by direct opposition in some cases, and in others by indifference or passive resistance on the part of municipalities, or of the public. And therefore, the chairman concluded, it was the duty of sanitary reformers, and of all who are interested in the health and well-being of the nation, to insist upon the fundamental truth that every year there is a needless waste of human life, and a needless amount of human suffering, and to procure the enactment and sure execution of measures, by which the life may be saved and the misery disappear.

The first step which Sir Rutherford recommended was

the compulsory notification of infectious diseases and isolation of the infected. And the warmest and most interesting debate of the whole congress took place the same morning upon that subject. There was no question as to the necessity of isolation, and, on the other hand, no disposition to insist on the removal of all infected patients to special hospitals, when the arrangement of their own houses permitted complete isolation. But the attempt to impose the duty of notification upon the doctors was sturdily resisted by a little band, who regarded the interests of their profession as at stake. It was urged in favour of the proposal, that thereby the state of public health would be accurately known each morning, and anything that threatened it might be promptly dealt with; that light would be thrown upon the nature and origin of diseases of which at present but little is known; and that schools and lodging-houses could be easily supervised, and their freedom from risk of infection guaranteed. The beneficial results of the system were proved by a comparison between some of the statistics of disease before and after its adoption in such towns as Edinburgh and Nottingham. Such objections as that the proposal was one of a number of attempts to bring us under the domination of the medical practitioner and of the policeman, and that it would involve an invasion of the sanctity of the hearth and of the delicate and confident relation of the doctor to the patient, were met by the statement that in practice the system had not been disadvantageous to the profession, or productive of much inconvenience to the public. Whilst it was alleged by one that the fear of the results of notification would tend to the concealment of disease, it was replied by others that such concealment was generally impossible for long, and that experience did not disclose any considerable tendency to it. And the conclusion to which the department came by a vote of almost three to one, was that "it is highly desirable in the public interest that the legislature should, at the earliest possible opportunity, pass a general enactment for the compulsory notification of infectious diseases on the principles of the Bill introduced into the House of Commons in the present year by Mr. Hastings." Those principles have, indeed, already been sanctioned by a Select Committee of the House. It is, however, still doubtful whether the notification should be made incumbent upon the doctor, as the above Bill suggests, upon the

patient, or upon the householder. A large proportion of the profession are avowedly and strongly opposed to any effort to throw the duty upon them, and are sustained in that opposition by the action of the Royal Colleges of Physicians and of Surgeons. The difficulty will no doubt be removed after a little delay, when time has permitted the proper consideration of all aspects of the question; and probably the conclusion, which points to the medical attendant as the most suitable notifier, will shortly be accepted. For the more direct, quick, and complete the notification can be made, the more useful it is likely to prove. And if some fit system be devised of compensating for the private losses that will occasionally be caused by compliance with this new public requirement, it may well be welcomed, as fair and just in itself, and as carrying with it a reasonable promise of a further reduction in the death-rate from zymotic diseases, and of the speedier expulsion of those scourges from the country altogether.

At an earlier session of this department, another question that has of late commanded much public attention was debated at length; whether any, and, if so, what restrictions should be placed upon the employment of mothers in mills and manufactures? The opinions of most of the speakers were decidedly adverse to any further legislative interference with the employment of women; but no progress was made towards the settlement of the point in dispute. The establishment of a fund in factories to allow of the temporary absence of mothers, the circulation of information as to the feeding and nursing of infants, and the organisation of day nurseries in connection with places of work, were in turn advocated. By other speakers it was held, that the employment of mothers in mills did not injuriously affect the rate of infant mortality any more than their employment in other ways, or than the dissolute habits of some of the unemployed. And the wise decision was arrived at, to recommend the collection of fuller information on the subject, before any restrictive action was proposed by the Association.

Of the other matters discussed in this department little need be said. The spread of tuberculosis, the superior protective power of animal lymph as compared with humanised, and the necessity of pressing some judicious system of revaccination, formed the subjects of papers to the reading of which a small audience listened. Mr. George

Smith, of Coalville, discoursed once more with his usual energy on the condition of gipsies and of the canal-boat population. The former he described as "leading the lives of vagabonds, demoralising all they have been brought in contact with by their lying, dirty, cheating, and crafty habits;" and added a sentence of terrible import: "We have at this day over 30,000 gipsy children of school age, growing up as vagabonds, and not two per cent. of the whole able to read or write a sentence." As a remedy he urged, amongst other things, the registration and proper supervision of all moveable habitations, the adoption of strenuous measures to bring the children under educational influences, and the allotment of waste lands to gipsies upon long leases at nominal rents. In the Canal Boats Act of 1877 he enumerated various defects, and eagerly supported the Bill now before Parliament to amend that Act and remove the permissive character of its provisions. It is needless to add that Mr. Smith's views received the hearty countenance of the department.

But the most complicated of all the subjects reviewed during the congress was probably that relating to needed reforms in the administration of hospitals. The subject is so beset with difficulties, arising from the diversity in origin, aim, and management of the institutions concerned, that it is mere tinkering to confine oneself to the reform of any separate department. What is wanted is a full and impartial inquiry into the endowment, accommodation, management, and relations with one another, and with schools of medicine, of the different hospitals and kindred institutions; and that can be most effectually done by means of a Royal Commission. There is a growing suspicion of the wisdom and expediency of many of the arrangements of the present administration, and an almost unquestioned certainty that those arrangements do not tend to the greatest efficiency. And it would be to the advantage both of medicine as a science and of the people themselves, if the Government could be persuaded to issue a Commission with a view of obtaining full and reliable data upon which reforms of the whole system might be based.

The departments which remain to be noticed were concerned mainly with questions either of little importance, or too abstruse in character to be of general interest. There was indeed some profitable discussion about technical education; but in that instance, as in too many others,

little was said that was fresh or in need of repetition, and little practical result is likely to follow. The presidents' addresses are all that need further be referred to, in order to complete this summary view of the work of the Association, and of the matters to which the attention of social reformers is at present being directed. Professor Bonamy Price presided over the department of economics, and in a masterly address defended free trade from the assaults that have recently been made upon it, and depicted the struggle which bi-metallists are waging with the character of the money with which the commerce of this country is carried on. It would be difficult for any one to exceed the clearness and vigour with which the Professor exposed the radical vice of the bi-metallic scheme of currency, and the injustice and confusion that would follow its adoption. Neither in theory nor in practice can it be right to legalise a fictitious ratio of value between silver and gold, and to give any article a higher price at the mint than it would fetch in the market. And if need should ever arise through the increase of the population and the scarcity of gold for the introduction of a second legal tender, its market value in relation to gold must be ascertained from time to time, and a corresponding rate of exchange fixed.

In the Education Department, W. Woodall, Esq., M.P., was selected as president, and discoursed upon past advances in education, and the expediency of grading schools for the purpose of technical instruction and of extending the system of inspection to intermediate schools. One provision of the New Code was specially commended. It will have been obvious to most observers that many young people, who have not long passed the school age, are apt to display many faults in conduct and manners which suggest that, however good the present system may be as a system of instruction, it is almost destitute of any ethical or refining influence. And the new arrangement for classifying schools and awarding grants according to the excellency of their moral discipline, affords good reason for expecting that a perceptible improvement will quickly be effected in the habits and apparent character of the young.

The president of the Art Department was George Aitchison, Esq., A.R.A., who maintained that the progress of the fine arts has been hindered by asceticism, by the development of the applied arts, and by the marvellous discoveries in natural science. "How can the sense of

beauty," he asked, with artistic exaggeration, "be cultivated, when each new wondrous machine is more hideous than the last?" As the best means of improving the fine arts, he would have every man cultivate his own taste, public buildings permanently adorned with frescoes and historic mosaics, and free museums and galleries to stimulate and inform the higher faculties of the poorest. The fault of the address was the natural one of unduly eulogising pursuits for which the speaker has a special liking. "Nature silently points out that the contemplation of beauty in form, colour, and sound is the true recreation of man," was his keynote. But so long as man himself, his passions and deeds, awaken more interest than the most beautiful still-life, though the contemplation of beauty will not cease to be a recreation, it can have no claim to be regarded as the sole or best recreation of man.

It must not be supposed that this review of the past work of the Association, either during the quarter of a century that has elapsed since its foundation, or during its latest congress, pretends to anything like completeness. The bulky volumes of the *Transactions* are capable of no such condensation. But it does profess to represent fairly the contribution which the Association has made to such questions of primary importance as have been before it, and the various practical matters relating to social improvement that need and are receiving immediate attention. And if on the whole the Association cannot be said to have quite redeemed the promise with which it started, it can point to a career of much usefulness and to several tasks satisfactorily done. It has remedied great evils, and placed some wise provisions upon the statute-book. And to-day it is as full of zeal in its officials and as full of work as ever. Some of the themes which are now before its committees are not less important than those which it has already settled, and have a direct bearing upon the prosperity and health of the community. And it will be to the discredit of those who profess a wise interest in the welfare of their fellows, if the Association is allowed to languish and become crippled through their neglect. We congratulate its president upon the success of the organisation which he principally founded; and hope that, should his days be prolonged to the measure of those of its first president, he will have the satisfaction of joining in the celebration of its jubilee.

ART. II.—1. *Emanuele Kant.* Per CARLO CANTONI, Professore di Filosophia all' Universita di Pavia. Volume Primo. La Filosophia Teoretica. Milano: Gaetano Brigola e Comp. 1879.

2. *Text-Book to Kant. The Critique of Pure Reason: Æsthetic, Categories, Schematism. Translation, Reproduction, Commentary, Index. With Biographical Sketch.* By J. HUTCHISON STIRLING, LL.D. Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd. London: Simpkin, Marshall and Co. 1881.

3. *Kant and his English Critics. A Comparison of Critical and Empirical Philosophy.* By JOHN WATSON, M.A., LL.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in Queen's University, Kingston, Canada. Glasgow: James Maclehose. London: Hamilton, Adams, and Co. 1881.

THERE is nothing with which her detractors are more apt to taunt Philosophy than the schisms and inconsistencies of her disciples, nor is the reproach an altogether baseless one. It must be frankly admitted that the exponents of metaphysics do not hold one language, and that their various utterances are far from being consistent with one another. The thought of Aristotle is not merely other than that of Plato; it is in many respects fundamentally at issue with it. Spinoza, Descartes' sole spiritual successor, destroyed Cartesianism; the followers of Locke have reduced his system to a chaos, and are now attempting to erect a new edifice in place of it upon a plan which their master would never have approved. Hegel is never more brilliant than when he is exposing the errors of Kant. Nay more, it is impossible to read any great philosopher attentively—the small men are usually much more consistent—without finding him tacitly or explicitly denying in one part of his work what he has affirmed in another. No coherent system can be educed from the Platonic dialogues: the *De Anima* of Aristotle, in some respects his most important work, is a tissue of incompatible theories; Locke's views on the "external" world, and its relation to the perceptive faculties, differ in different parts of his

treatise, and are mutually irreconcilable; the idealism of Berkeley's dialogues, and of the *Principles of Human Knowledge*, is of another complexion from that which is partially developed in the *Siris*; Hume's argument against miracles logically involves a totally different theory of physical law from that to which "the experimental method of reasoning" brought him, and by which the uniformity of nature is resolved into a tendency to "expect for the future a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the past;" * and lastly, as we hope to show at some detail in the course of the present article, the views which Kant in the latter part of his greatest metaphysical work propounds and elaborates concerning the nature of "things in themselves," and the possibility of their cognition by the human mind, are radically inconsistent with the critical analysis of experience which precedes them, and on which they are supposed by him to be based. Consistency, however, is no test of a philosopher's greatness. Every great philosopher, every philosopher who can be truly described as epoch-making, sums up in himself a mode of thinking which he is destined to render obsolete, while he pushes forward into new realms of speculation, "voyaging through strange seas of thought alone." And thus it is not surprising that there should often be more in his thoughts than he is himself aware of. The old manner of thinking is with him still, and will not give place all at once to his new methods; he cannot sustain himself always at the higher levels of his speculation, and from time to time, like a bird that has but lately learned to soar, he sinks to the common level of less adventurous thinkers. Such, and not any vice inherent in philosophy itself, is the explanation of the inconsistencies and confusions of thought which disfigure the greatest works even of the greatest philosophers. In an article published in the 111th number† of this REVIEW, we endeavoured to expound what we take to be the gist of Kant's theory of experience, and the conclusions we then arrived at may be briefly stated as follows:

1. All experience implies the consciousness of a relation between subject and object.

2. Time and space, and the uniformity of nature, are wholly relative to consciousness, but nevertheless not

* *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, Part I. s. 7.
† For April, 1882.

derived from experience. They are *a priori* forms of thought, and conditions of all possible experience.

3. There exists a real universe independent of the human mind, but not independent of consciousness: and the knowledge of the existence of such an universe is an *a priori* condition of the knowledge of one's own existence.

The object of the present article is to show that the development of the principles just enunciated leads to conclusions which do not accord with those at which Kant himself arrives in that portion of the *Critique* which is entitled the *Dialectic of Pure Reason;* but, in order to do so, it will be necessary first of all to state as concisely as possible what the peculiar scope or purpose of the *Dialectic of Pure Reason* is, as distinguished from that of the *Analytic*. The *Dialectic of Pure Reason*, then, is, properly speaking, a critique of philosophy in general. As the problem of the *Analytic* was, in effect, "How is knowledge, popular and scientific, possible?" so the problem of the *Dialectic* is, How, or how far, is philosophy possible as a theory of the world and of the soul? At a time when German philosophy was less studied in England than it is at present, those who sought to introduce Kant to the English public were wont to lay much stress upon the distinction between *Reason* and *Understanding*, between *Vernunft* and *Verstand*. We are not sure that they rightly apprehended the distinction, for they seemed to present it as one of faculties, which it really is not; but the distinction itself is of some importance towards a clear apprehension of the purpose of the *Dialectic*. By *Verstand* Kant means the reason as exercised in perception, and in objective science, as, *e.g.*, mathematics and physics: by *Vernunft* he understands the reason as employed in philosophy; and it is with *Vernunft* the philosophic or speculative reason that he is occupied in the *Dialectic*. Now as all knowledge implies the relation of subject and object, philosophy, as the theory of reality, naturally divides itself into (1) A theory of the reality of the subject; (2) A theory of the reality of the object; or into a theory of the soul, and a theory of the world.

The question then which Kant is concerned with in the *Dialectic* is a twofold question: (1) How far is a philosophy of the soul possible? (2) How far is a philosophy of the world possible? We will take these in order, and see what answer he renders to them. Now, in the first place,

it must be borne in mind that Kant was educated in the school of Wolf, and that he regarded the Wolfian system as the type of constructive philosophy. Accordingly, his critique of philosophy amounts to nothing more nor less than a critique of the Wolfian system. Now Wolf was a follower of Leibnitz, and the Leibnitzian system was little more than the development and universal application of a single idea, that of the monad. The monad itself is merely the time-honoured notion of substance; and therefore, in treating the soul as a monad, and nature as a system of monads, Leibnitz is only reproducing under a new name a mode of thinking which is almost as old as philosophy itself. Further, the conception of substance is really no more than the bare notion of permanent connection in the context of experience. When I designate a given metal (as, *e.g.*, iron) a substance, all that I thereby connote is a certain aggregate of qualities. If I think away the qualities one by one, there at last remains nothing; no substance or substratum underlying them can be discovered. As Kant puts it, substance is a category having reference only to experience. Accordingly it must not be used to transcend experience. This, however, is precisely what Wolf, following Leibnitz, does, or tries to do. In teaching that the soul is a simple, self-identical substance, immaterial and incorruptible, related definitely to objects in space, yet imperishable, Wolf is not thinking of the soul as it is known to us, but of a mysterious somewhat which we never know or can know, but which underlies all our experience. Now to this "thinking thing," if it exists, we certainly cannot ascribe the various qualities which Wolf ascribes to it. We cannot say whether it be material or immaterial, simple or complex, destructible or indestructible, for we know nothing in the world about it, and its very existence is problematical. Such, in brief, is Kant's criticism of Wolf's theory of the soul; nor is there, of course, anything new in such criticism. Substantially it is identical with that which Hume had already applied to the psychology of Berkeley. Hume, indeed, goes a little farther than Kant by declaring the thinking substance to be a mere fiction. But for practical purposes it matters very little whether we hold a thing to be non-existent, or confess ourselves unable to determine whether it exist or no. Now, inasmuch as Kant has no conception of the possibility of any other sort of constructive philosophy than this dogmatic method,

as he calls it, of Wolf, it follows that in pronouncing the dogmatic method futile, he is in fact affirming the impossibility of a speculative theory of the soul. In other words, there is no such science as pure psychology. Such is a brief and necessarily a very condensed, but we trust not on that account obscure, analysis of Kant's critique of pure, or rational, psychology (*psychologia rationalis*). As against Wolf, we take it to be unanswerable. It is idle to seek a philosophy of the soul in the realm of metaphysical abstractions. We shall certainly never learn to know ourselves by feigning that we are something the nature of which we can never know, and whose very existence is, to say the least, a problem.

Does it, however, on that account follow that no rational doctrine of the soul is possible? Because Wolf, following Leibnitz, fell into the slough or black Serbonian bog in which many a better thinker had sunk before him, are we to conclude that the bog is at the end of every road? Wolf's method was wrong; but is there no other method? The answer is plain. Kant himself, though he knew it not, has furnished us with one. It is a mere fallacy of abstraction to suppose that the soul is something other than experience, than that same unity of consciousness, the laws of whose constitution Kant expounds in the *Analytic*. The principles of the possibility of experience in general are in fact the first principles of pure psychology. That Kant should have been so ignorant of the true significance of his own work as to pronounce the very science which he had himself reconstituted a futility and a dream, is just one signal instance—we shall note others in due course—of that remarkable schism which divides the thinking of the *Analytic* from that of the *Dialectic*. In the *Analytic* Kant was occupied throughout with Hume; in the *Dialectic* he is busy with Leibnitz and Wolf. Hume had not, after all, so thoroughly aroused him from his dogmatic slumber, as that the influence of his first teachers could be entirely shaken off; and their philosophy still remains for Kant the type of what philosophy should be, if philosophy were possible. But it may be asked, what do we gain after all by accepting the results of the criticism of experience as the basis of pure psychology? Are we thereby in a better position as regards the solution of those problems which alone give mankind at large an interest in the science,

the problems (that is to say) of freedom and immortality? Are we not shut up wholly in the region of phenomena, ourselves mere phenomena? And how can freedom and immortality be ascribed to a phenomenon? Now, in the first place we must enter our protest against the strange assumption—an assumption which Kant has done as much as any other thinker to popularise—that knowledge is of phenomena merely. It has come to be taken for granted by the most diverse schools of thinkers that the mere fact of a thing being known necessarily constitutes it a phenomenon, and that it is the characteristic of the *noumenon* that it should be unknown or unknowable. It is as if philosophers were enamoured of the *lucus a non lucendo* principle of etymology, and were determined to have its counterpart in their own science; for not until intelligible and unintelligible are equivalent terms, can *noumenon* signify the unknowable. It is true indeed that the *noumenon* is invested by Plato with no small degree of mystery. A peculiar faculty and a special training are necessary to the acquisition of even the poorest measure of the knowledge of intelligible reality. But the reality is intelligible, and intelligible to man. If we dared allow ourselves such a luxury, we might quote passage upon passage of Plato's "grave Hellenic speech" in support of this statement. But to what end? There are some facts even in the history of philosophy which may be taken for granted, and that Plato conceived the world of absolute reality to be penetrable by the speculative reason is one of these. The attitude of Aristotle towards the Platonic theory of ideas furnishes matter for an interesting, if difficult inquiry, upon which of course we cannot enter here; but we venture to affirm that no passage can be quoted from Aristotle's writings which so much as hints that the region of absolute truth may be outside the range of the human faculties. It was not for these high priests of reason to set limits to the power of reason. With high hope they launched European thought upon its course. That hope has been shattered a thousand times since Plato lay in Academe, or Aristotle paced the walks of the Lyceum. Yet Sisyphus is still rolling the stone, and eventually he will securely fix it upon the mountain top. Meanwhile, however, reiterated failures and disappointments have left indelible traces upon language, of which not the least striking is this monstrous perversion by which the very word which to the ancient Greek meant that

which is apprehended by the highest of human faculties, has come to signify to the modern European that which is absolutely inscrutable, and of which the bare existence is, and must remain, an insoluble problem. We hold that it is time philosophers mended their ways in this respect, that the only proper sense of the term *noumenon* is "intelligible," in the strict metaphysical acceptation of that term. In other words, we hold that whatever is known conforming to *a priori* laws is, in virtue of being so known, a *noumenon*, and that the term phenomenon should be restricted so as to cover only such facts of experience as have not yet been brought within the circle of *a priori* demonstration. The distinction as thus drawn is, it may be remarked in passing, a merely modal one, importing no essential difference in the objects themselves. That which is a mere phenomenon to-day, may be a *noumenon* to-morrow; and if we saw all things *sub quadam specie æternitatis*, as Spinoza says, we should recognise no such distinction. If, then, we ask whether the soul is a phenomenon or a *noumenon*, the answer presents itself immediately: the soul is a *noumenon*, and Kant has proved it to be so. For the outcome of the Kantian analysis is to show that the soul is not merely one among other intelligible realities, but for us the source and fountain of all those intelligible laws which, as forming one system, are comprehensively denoted by the terms nature, world, or universe; and, being of so high a dignity, the soul might perhaps not inappropriately be designated the *noumenon* of *noumena*.

Let us then see if the principles with which Kant has furnished us cannot be made to yield some measure of speculative truth concerning the soul, the world, and God. Now the first principle is,—Consciousness of an object implies consciousness of a subject. And this principle is the proper and indeed the only ground on which the doctrine of personal identity may rest. It is idle to seek any further assurance of personal identity than the immediate consciousness which we have of it, that immediate consciousness of self which is in fact the condition of our consciousness of everything else. Personal identity is precisely this consciousness. I am the same person to-day as last week or last year, just because and just in so far as I am conscious of myself as being such. And, if it be urged that this is to make personal identity a thing of degree, a variable quantity varying with tenacity of memory, some

people having more of it than others, and each individual having more of it at one time and less of it at another in proportion as his memory grows or declines in power, we cannot deny that this is so. The man of civilisation is in a truer sense of the term a person than the savage who can scarcely count, and who speaks of himself in the third person: and the man of powerful and disciplined intellect, strongly marked character, and resolute will, is more really a person, or as we sometimes say, a personality, than the half-developed, characterless piece of humanity who takes rank with him as a member of the same genus. But, however this may be, the assumption of a noumenal substance corresponding to, but distinct from, the self-conscious subject which is revealed in experience, cannot place personal identity upon any firmer basis; for it is not the substance but the subject which is required to be self-identical. The substance, even if it existed, would be (as we have seen) nothing for us. It is only in so far as we are conscious of ourselves that we are ourselves. If personal identity is not given in consciousness, it does not exist at all. The question then is one of pure introspection. Various attempts have been made from time to time by philosophers of the empirical school to explain away self-consciousness, to reduce it to the level of merely sublimated sensation. All such attempts have, however, a difficulty to meet, which, so far as we are aware, they have hitherto conspicuously failed in meeting. Either the sensation which is to yield self-consciousness does or does not contain it. If it does not, then it has yet to be shown how the perception of successive moments of purely sensitive life can transmute itself into that unique consciousness which looks over the present backward to its past, and forward into the future, and knows itself as that which was, and is, and shall be. On the other hand, if sensation already contains self-consciousness, it is obvious that the question becomes merely one of the right use of terms. In the nature of things there is no reason why we should not employ the term sensation, or feeling, to designate self-consciousness. But words have their accepted significations, and it is indicative of a loose and unscholarly habit of mind to use a term of vague and indeterminate import rather than one whose value is precisely determined. Until it has been clearly demonstrated that a consciousness of not-self can differentiate itself into a consciousness of

self, we shall continue to regard self-consciousness as a primordial fact in psychology; and, until some good reason is shown for discarding the term which most aptly describes it, in favour of some expression of less certain import, we shall continue to give it its accustomed designation. We hold, then, that personal identity is given, and given immediately, in consciousness. It may be said, however, that this is not enough, and that, if personal identity is placed in consciousness, it is insecurely placed, inasmuch as we are not always conscious. How can I be considered the same person to-day as yesterday, when in the meanwhile my consciousness has been suspended for several hours during sleep? Is not sleep a constantly recurring "solution of continuity," and do I not therefore put on a new personality with my clothes every morning of the week?—to say nothing of the phenomena of insanity, sleep-walking, trances, and the like? These questions, like most others in metaphysics, are by no means new. They were familiar enough to Locke, as the chapter on "Identity and Diversity," in the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, testifies. It cannot, however, be pretended that they are unimportant, or that they can be solved by mere common sense. Can they be answered by the aid of the principles which we have deduced from Kant? We think they can. We think that the Kantian doctrine of time furnishes a satisfactory solution of them.

That doctrine, we must remind our readers, has two sides, a negative and a positive side. On the positive side Kant holds that time is an *a priori* form of thought; on the negative side he holds that it is a mere form of thought, in other words, that it is relative to consciousness. On its negative side the doctrine is not peculiar to Kant, having been held by Berkeley and his followers. And it is with this negative side of the doctrine that we are now concerned. We shall, however, speak of it, for convenience' sake, as the Kantian doctrine of time. That time is relative to consciousness, *i.e.*, that it has no existence apart from consciousness, is a thesis which carries with it the correlative proposition—consciousness is not conditioned in time. That to which time is relative cannot itself exist as an event, or a chain of events, in time. In fact, the supposition of a genesis of consciousness in time inevitably carries us into a vicious circle, since the time in which the genesis is to take place itself, presupposes the existence

which is to come into being during it. To begin to be conscious means in effect to be conscious of oneself as so beginning; which implies that one is already conscious. And the like argument holds with equal cogency of the idea of a cessation of consciousness. *Genesis* and *phthora*, becoming and ceasing to be, are alike relative to consciousness; consciousness itself is, in the proper sense of the term, eternal. Its absolute continuity suffers no breach; and if the phenomena of sleep and waking, and of the fainting fit, seem to militate against this view, it is only because imperfect memory furnishes but a broken record of the thoughts with which the brain is busy during sleep, and what in popular speech is termed suspended consciousness. Berkeley in this respect, as in some others, saw farther and more clearly than Kant, and his remarks will still bear quoting.

"For my own part, whenever I attempt to form a simple idea of time abstracted from the succession of ideas in the mind, which flows uniformly and is participated by all beings, I am lost and imbrangled in inextricable difficulties. I have no notion of it at all, only I hear others say it is infinitely divisible, and speak of it in such manner as leads me to harbour odd thoughts of my existence; since that doctrine lays one under the absurd necessity of thinking either that he passes away innumerable ages without a thought, or else that he is annihilated every moment of his life; both of which seem equally absurd. Time therefore being nothing abstracted from the succession of ideas in our minds, it follows that the duration of any finite spirit must be estimated by the number of ideas or actions succeeding each other in that same spirit or mind. Hence it is a plain consequence that the soul always thinks, and in truth whoever shall go about to divide in his thoughts or abstract the existence of a spirit from its cogitation will, I believe, find it no easy task."—*Principles of Human Knowledge*, section 98.

This is clear, logical, luminous thinking, and shows that though elsewhere Berkeley unfortunately describes the soul as "thinking substance," and his doctrine of spirit is, on the whole, the most valuable part of his system, yet in this passage, at any rate, he had reached a truer, because more concrete, conception of the nature of spirit than Kant ever arrived at, or indeed, so far as we are aware, any other thinker before Hegel. There is an irony in the history of philosophy, as well as in tragedy and fate. Berkeley was no Cartesian; but an ardent disciple of Locke, *i.e.*, of the

thinker who, in his polemic against Cartesianism, at once so trenchant, original, and crude, had enounced, with unhesitating confidence, "The soul thinks not always." It is only by a twofold hypostasis that we can represent to ourselves consciousness as beginning or as ceasing to exist, viz., by first hypostasising time as an absolute self-existent entity, and then hypostasising the soul, as another self-existent entity, separate from consciousness, stable during the changes of consciousness, and related to consciousness as substance to accident. Unconsciously we do perform this twofold process of hypostasis in all our ordinary thinking, precisely as common sense habitually abstracts space from its relation to consciousness, and regards it as a thing in itself, as common sense operates a thousand such hypostases. No wonder, then, if even the philosopher finds it hard at first to realise all that is meant by the relativity of time to consciousness, no wonder that even Kant failed to perceive the full significance of the doctrine! Had it been otherwise, his philosophy would assuredly have assumed a very different complexion from that which it wears in the *Dialectic*.*

It need hardly be said that this doctrine is radically inconsistent with that theory, termed in theological language Traducianism, which represents the soul as the product and resultant of forces operating analogously to those which generate the physical organism, with which it is associated—a theory of which the popular modern form is the evolution hypothesis. Of course, we have no intention to run counter to the established facts of heredity, or to blink their importance. All that we desire to insist upon is, that no theory which is incompatible with the established truths of metaphysics can derive any support from them. An innate idea remains at the present day as inconceivable as it proved to Locke in the seventeenth

* In criticising Moses Mendelssohn's proof of the immortality of the soul (see *Transcendental Dialectic*, Book II., cap. 1), which deduced the indestructibility of the soul from the simplicity of its substance, Kant remarks that the argument proceeds on the assumption that the destruction of a substance is possible only in one way, viz., by resolution into its component parts; whereas, even granting the substance of the soul to be a simple one, and therefore insusceptible of such resolution, it may yet be possible for the soul to perish as it were by elanguescence, *i.e.* by a gradual fading away into non-entity. As a reply to Mendelssohn this criticism is of course pertinent enough, but both the argument and its refutation belong to a plane of thinking, above which it is the boast of transcendental idealism to have elevated philosophy.

century. Nor do we make matters any better by substituting the term "connate" for innate. Ideas cannot be born either in, or with, the physical organism; they cannot be transmitted, or inherited, in any precise sense which it is possible to assign to the expressions. And what we say of ideas is equally true of tendencies and habits. The evolution philosophy has indeed destroyed the older empiricism; for it has shown that the mind itself cannot be accounted for on the basis of complete derivation from experience. At the same time, by treating the soul as no more than a resultant of the play of physical forces it exposes itself to a powerful attack from the metaphysical quarter. A neo-empiricist—if we may be permitted to coin the term—like Mr. Herbert Spencer assumes that such "forms of thought" as space, and time, and self-consciousness have been generated and established as "forms of thought" in the course of many ages of evolution by the "experience of the race," so as to be *a priori* for the individual, *a posteriori* for the race. Thus Mr. Spencer endeavours to reconcile science with empiricism, and both with transcendentalism. As a matter of fact, however, he only succeeds in compromising empiricism, while his own scientific doctrine lands him in antinomies from which there is no escape. It was, no doubt, a distressing sense of the difficulties of his own position which inspired that vehement tirade against metaphysics and metaphysicians to which Mr. Spencer devotes no less than four chapters of the second volume of his *Psychology*. He is naturally anxious to discredit those whom he instinctively feels to be formidable antagonists, and whom with undiscriminating catholicity he classes together as metaphysicians, viz., such ornaments of the empirical school as Berkeley and Hume, a follower of Reid like Sir W. Hamilton, and a Transcendentalist like Kant. In effect, Mr. Spencer is in a cruel dilemma, and the "metaphysicians" are in part responsible for his being there. The dilemma, which is twofold, may be thus stated: evolution, as understood by Mr. Spencer, is a process which takes place in space and time, and the metaphysicians, one and all,* hold that space and time are relative to consciousness; on this one point empiricism being in accord with transcendentalism; moreover, Mr. Spencer himself in applying the doctrine of

* In this particular Sir W. Hamilton did not follow Reid.

evolution to consciousness has tried to explain how space and time develope themselves in consciousness: such being the state of the case, how is the subjectivity of space and time which empiricism teaches, consistent with their objectivity, as demanded by the evolution hypothesis; or, in other words, supposing space and time to be independent entities, how can they also be conceptions gradually developed in consciousness; and, finally, is it not sheer nonsense to speak of the development of time in consciousness, since that very process of development must of necessity occupy, and therefore presuppose, the existence of time? Now that space and time are perceptions we may take for granted, thankful that in philosophy anything may be taken for granted. The logical principle of identity will do the rest. The neophyte in logic assents readily enough to the proposition, A is A and not not-A. That a perception is a perception, and not something totally different, is a proposition hardly less clear, one would think. And if this proposition be true, it follows that space and time cannot be, on the one hand, two entities—we use the term in default of a better—independent of consciousness; and, on the other hand, two generalised conceptions evolved, "registered," and transmitted as forms of intuition during the indefinitely protracted "experience of the race."

Furthermore, the hypothesis of the evolution of time in consciousness presupposes the existence of time in which the process takes place, involves (that is to say) the absurd notion of the genesis of time in time.

Nor do we mend matters by distinguishing between space and time as forms of "things in themselves," and space and time as forms of thought. For if space in itself is something different from space as a form of thought, it is something of the nature of which we know nothing, and to which accordingly it is misleading to apply a term which stands for something of which we have a definite conception. It is obvious that the same considerations apply equally to time. Mr. Spencer, indeed, professes to be able to conceive space and time as existing independently of consciousness. The slightest study, however, of his chapter on "Transfigured Realism" teaches that the space and time which he thinks of as properties of the *noumenon* are things of a totally different kind from the space and time which we know. Indeed, if we knew so

much of the *noumenon* as is involved in attributing space and time, in our sense of the terms, to it as properties, we could not logically declare it, as Mr. Spencer does, to be absolutely unknowable.

So much then for modern Traducianism, and the difficulties in which it lands us. Before quitting this branch of our subject we must again caution our readers against supposing that we wish to shut our eyes to what are known as the facts of heredity. But whatever may be the true import of these facts, it cannot, we think, be successfully maintained that any satisfactory explanation of them is afforded by crude metaphorical expressions, such as transmission and inheritance, connate ideas, instincts, or aptitudes, and the like, and they can never give the slightest support to that which is intrinsically inconceivable, viz., the genesis of self-conscious intelligence in time.*

Like every other category by which intelligence construes the intelligible world, evolution exists only in and for intelligence, and can, therefore, furnish no explanation of the origin of intelligence. Its proper use is to co-ordinate and systematise; but if hypostatised as a process operating independently of consciousness, it becomes a mischievous abstraction, no better than the one substance of Zeno or the restless flux of Heraclitus.

But it may be suggested, is not the notion of the eternity of consciousness incompatible with what theology teaches concerning the creation of the soul by God? We think the answer must be in the negative. It is true that upon this theory it is necessary to regard creation as taking place in eternity- a position which may possibly appear to some minds as novel or even startling. But this is at least in logical consistency with what many eminent theologians have held concerning the immanence of God in the universe.

It follows from this doctrine that the soul is not an

* The distinction between connate and innate ideas (which is really a distinction without a difference) is merely a mask to conceal the fact that the line occupied by Locke and the old-fashioned empiricists have been abandoned by their *soi-disant* followers, who have really gone over to the opposite camp. So also the substitution of the experience of the race for experience is merely a transparent device to facilitate the identification of the new theory with the old. The race, properly speaking, has no experience. Experience means, if it means anything, experience of the individual. A connate idea is simply one which is not derived from experience. Heredity is merely a metaphor drawn from law, and no explanation.

effect; for every effect is an event, and the soul is not an event. It may, however, be suggested that if it be true that the soul is not an effect, so likewise is it true that it is not a cause; and that particular psychical phenomena which are termed volitions are effects of an external cause or causes. The will, it may be said, is merely an abstract term connoting many particular acts of volition; every volition is an event and must therefore be an effect, and, as a matter of fact, all volitions are the effects of certain well-known causes, which are designated motives. Such, so far as we have been able to apprehend it, is the sum and substance of what is known as the necessitarian theory of the will. For the most part, the exponents of this theory seem to consider their case made out when they have shown—what no reasonable person will dispute—that the will is determined by the strongest motive. There was a time, doubtless, when certain thinkers across the Tweed sought to save free will by inventing some mysterious power of suspending or controlling the operation of motives, so as to give a preference to the weaker one. If such a theory still lingers anywhere, we are heartily sorry; it can only have the effect of compromising the cause which it is intended to serve. It is not in any case for us to drag it from its lurking place, in order to show how perverse may be the logic with which good intentions seek to support the best of causes.

The whole question, as between freedom and necessity, really rests in the determination of the meaning of the term motive. Do we mean by motive a force separate and distinct from the will, or merely a function of the will? If we mean the former, then, of course, the will is determined *ab extra;* if the latter, it is self-determining. Now if we analyse volition, we find that it has four *momenta*:—(1) A certain conceived object; (2) a desire attracted towards that object; (3) suspense and deliberation, more or less prolonged, concerning action; (4) the complete act of volition. Where, then, in this process are we to look for the motive? Clearly the bare object conceived will not do, since without the corresponding desire it could not affect the will at all. The motive, accordingly, must consist of the object *plus* the desire. This being so, however, in what sense is the motive separate and distinct from the will? Will, we know, is but a common name signifying, in the abstract, what volition means in the concrete; and desire

is incipient volition, that which is merely desire before deliberation becoming volition after it. In short, if by the will being determined by motive no more is meant than that desire always precedes volition, it is hard to see how such determination by motive differs from self-determination. Thus when Mill, authoritatively expounding the necessitarian theory, informs us that, "correctly conceived, the doctrine of philosophical necessity is simply this, that given motives which are present to an individual's mind, and given likewise the character and disposition of the individual, the manner in which he will act may be unerringly inferred; that, if we knew the person thoroughly, and knew all the inducements which are acting upon him, we could foretell his conduct with as much certainty as we can predict any physical event"—apart from the ambiguous and, we venture to think, unphilosophical use of the term motive,* there is nothing in the doctrine as thus stated which a rational supporter of the doctrine of free will might not endorse. A doctrine, however, is seldom so well stated as when it is stated for controversial purposes; and as Mill, having constituted himself the champion of sensationalistic philosophy, had occasion in his polemic against Hamilton and Mansel to deal afresh with the necessitarian theory, it would manifestly be at once unfair and unwise on our part if we neglected to consider, with all due care and attention, what he there has to say upon the subject. The passage to which we wish to direct our readers' attention, because it seems to us to be the strongest statement of the necessitarian doctrine yet extant, is to be found towards the close of the chapter on the "Freedom of the Will" in the *Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy*. It is as follows:

"But the argument on which Mr. Mansel lays most stress (it is also one of Reid's) is the following. Necessitarians say that the will is governed by the strongest motive: but I only know the strength of motives in relation to the will by the test of ultimate prevalence; so that this means no more than that the prevailing motive prevails. . . . . Sir W. Hamilton was not the man to neglect an argument like this, had there been no flaw in it. The fact is that there are two. First, those who say

* See *Logic*, Book VI. cap. 2. It is obvious that without a knowledge of the character and disposition of the man we could not possibly have any knowledge of his motives.

that the will follows the strongest motive, do not mean the motive which is strongest in relation to the will, or in other words, that the will follows what it does follow. They mean the motive which is strongest in relation to pain and pleasure; since a motive, being a desire or averaion, is proportional to the pleasantness as conceived by us, of the thing desired, or the painfulness, of the thing shunned. And when what was at first a direct impulse towards pleasure, or recoil from pain, has passed into a habit or fixed purpose, then the strength of the motive means the completeness and promptitude of the association which has been formed between an idea and an outward act. This is the first answer to Mr. Mansel. The second is, that even supposing there were no test of the strength of motives but their effect on the will, the proposition that the will follows the strongest motive could not, as Mr. Mansel supposes, be identical and unmeaning. We say, without absurdity, that if two weights are placed in opposite scales the heavier will lift the other up; yet we mean nothing by the heavier except the weight which will lift the other up. The proposition nevertheless is not unmeaning, for it signifies that in many or most cases there *is* a heavier, and that this is always the same and not one or the other as it may happen. In like manner even if the strongest motive meant only the motive which *prevails*, yet if there is a prevailing motive—if, all other antecedents being the same, the motive which prevails to-day will prevail to-morrow, and every subsequent day—Sir W. Hamilton was acute enough to see that the free-will theory is not saved. I regret that I cannot, in this instance, credit Mr. Mansel with the same acuteness."

We regret that we cannot, in this instance, credit Mill with an accurate conception of the meaning of the term, heavy. The term, "the heavier," in Mill's example unquestionably denotes what Mill says it does, viz., that the one weight which will lift the other up; but it connotes a great deal more, it connotes that the one weight bears an ascertainable quantitative relation to the other; and just in virtue of that connotation it is that the proposition in question is an instructive and not a frivolous or identical one. But when we are gravely informed that the proposition,—The will follows what it does follow, or,—The prevailing motive prevails—is an instructive proposition, and indeed fatal to the free-will theory, though Mansel was not acute enough to see how it could be so; we fear we must own ourselves to be no less wanting in acuteness. That, all other things being equal, the same cause will always

produce the same effect, is a proposition which applies as much to the phenomena of volition as to other phenomena: we fail entirely to understand what bearing so harmless a truism can have upon the question of human freedom. We have dealt first with the second answer to Mansel's argument, because it is cognate to that form of the necessitarian theory which we have hitherto been discussing. We will now deal with the first answer. This consists, it will be observed, in a new definition of the epithet strongest, as applied to motive. Strongest motive (it appears) does not mean what one would naturally suppose it did mean, the motive which is most powerful or energetic to move the will; on the contrary, it means the motive which is strongest in relation to pain and pleasure, *i.e.* (so far as we can guess), the motive which is richest in anticipated pleasure or apprehended pain. Whether this is so or not, whether any writer before used the term in this sense, we do not know, nor hardly care to inquire. At any rate the expression "strongest motive" has never been commonly so understood, and the controversy was never (so far as we are aware) presented in this particular form by any thinker of the necessitarian school anterior to Mill. But, however this may be, it is important to observe that this doctrine standing alone would really be tantamount to a surrender of the necessitarian theory, as commonly held and understood, in favour of a totally new theory; for it would then be tacitly confessed that the mere fact of the strongest motive always prevailing is not enough to constitute necessity, it being at the same time contended that one particular sort of motive always is the strongest, and that it is in the fact of the will always obeying motives of this special class that its subjection to necessity consists. In other words, man is under the dominion of two masters —pleasure and pain. This is a very different doctrine from that contained in the passage which we cited from the *Logic*. But is it true? We believe that, so far from being true, it is founded on an all but puerile confusion of thought. Because pleasure is the concomitant of the healthy exercise of the faculties, it is inferred that the anticipation of pleasure from their exercise is the motive which calls the faculties into play. The argument, however, is of the kind which logicians term circular—a form much affected by philosophers of the empirical school; for *ex hypothesi* without the healthy exercise of the faculties

there can be no pleasure, and therefore pleasure cannot be the sole motive to such exercise. No doubt the faculties, to a large extent, exercise themselves spontaneously (*e.g.*, those of sense and memory, and in case of the more highly gifted members of the species, the imagination); nevertheless, for the performance of the more complicated processes, whether of physical or mental exercise, it is necessary that the attention should be closely and strenuously concentrated, and attention is a voluntary act. Now in order to find action of a given kind pleasant, or the reverse, I must first act in that way, and I cannot be determined so to act by the anticipation of an experience which I have never had. Hence the higher forms of activity, whether physical or mental, cannot be initiated by the anticipation of pleasure to be derived from them. And if we confine our attention to the intellectual and spiritual spheres, we shall find the victorious energy of reason, and the invincible endurance of faith, alike inexplicable, except upon the theory that human desires and yearnings spontaneously go forth towards objects, dimly conceived it may be, yet conceived as in themselves worthy to be sought after even with pain. So far from men's actions being determined solely by desire for pleasure or fear of pain, there exist in human nature such motives—not to mention distinctively religious ones—as, *e.g.*, pure respect for law apart from any apprehension of evil consequences to ensue from law-breaking, active enthusiasm for the intrinsically right and just, for abstract truth, for ideal beauty, which is something entirely distinct from the mere gratification of taste; the desire to maintain a graceful and courteous demeanour in dealing with men; unselfish, passionate devotion to country or the wider interests of mankind; and last, and not the least powerful, that ideal of pure and noble conduct based upon self-respect, which it is the special glory of chivalry to have developed, and which is associated with the term honour. All these motives are possible only for a self-conscious, intelligent being, and in so far as they, and not desire for mere sensuous gratification, determine his conduct, in so far is he free: on the other hand, in so far as the merely sensuous motives—desire for pleasure, aversion from pain—predominate to the exclusion of the higher or rational motives, just in so far does he become the slave of his passions or lusts. The hedonistic theory is not even true of the

animals, for even they have instincts which determine their activities irrespectively of pleasure and pain, and as applied to man it is inconsistent with the facts of heredity, which establish the existence in man of tendencies towards certain modes of action which, as they cannot be accounted for as habits acquired during experience, may fitly be termed instinctive, and which furnish him with objects of desire and ambition which themselves predetermine, to an incalculable degree, his very susceptibilities to pleasure and pain.

It must not be supposed that the theory of free will which we have endeavoured to expound in the foregoing pages is to be found in Kant. It followed from his view of the subject as necessarily a phenomenon so far as revealed in consciousness, that he was unable to conceive of freedom except as a problematical attribute of the problematical *ego noumenon*. Accordingly the freedom of the will, like personal identity and immortality, was to him an insoluble problem. In these three problems of personal identity, immortality, and freedom, is comprised the whole subject-matter of pure psychology. If the solutions which we have propounded are satisfactory, they contain at least the outline of the first department of constructive philosophy. Accordingly we pass on to consider the relation of the principles of the Kantian philosophy of experience to the second branch of our subject, viz., the philosophy of nature, or, as Kant terms it, the cosmological problem. In other words, how does Kantianism, properly understood, teach us to regard the universe? Before attempting, however, to answer this question, we musta dvert to certain logical puzzles which, according to Kant, confront the human mind on the threshold of the inquiry, and which he has made famous under the name of the Antinomies of Pure Reason. These antinomies are not, Kant holds, creatures of the dialectical subtlety of philosophers; they are, on the contrary, sophisms invented by pure reason itself, and as such, deserve the most respectful attention. It is important, then, that we should endeavour at least to understand precisely what these antinomies are, and what their interest for reason.

An antinomy of pure reason, then, consists of a pair of contradictory propositions, termed by Kant thesis and antithesis, each of which is demonstrable *a priori*. Of these Kant enumerates four pairs, two of which correspond to

the "pure forms" of space and time, and two to the category of cause.*

Thus: the world is either (1) indefinitely extended, or (2) definitely limited in space, and either (1) had, or (2) had not, a beginning in time. Now we can neither conceive an absolute limit to the world as extended in space, nor can we conceive the world as having had an absolute beginning in time; and, on the other hand, we find it impossible to conceive that space is absolutely limitless, and that the world is a series of events which never had a beginning. For if we try to conceive space as limited, then it must be limited by something, and we can conceive nothing whereby to limit it except space itself; and in like manner an absolutely first event is inconceivable, because every event must of necessity supervene upon some prior event, and an absolutely first event would have nothing to supervene upon; on the other hand, limitless space is a contradiction in terms; for space is precisely that which contains or limits, and, if limitless itself it could not contain or limit anything; and the like is true of a time which never began to be, for a stream of events flowing from nowhere is absolutely inconceivable.

And again, space consists either of a finite, or of an infinite, number of parts. Now if the number of its parts is finite, then there must be a *minimum quantitatis*. But this *minimum quantitatis* must be itself a quantity, and every quantity is a whole of parts. Therefore the *minimum quantitatis* is itself made up of parts, which is absurd.

On the other hand, suppose space to consist of an infinite number of parts. Then each divided part of space is itself made up of an infinity of parts. But that which contains an infinite number of parts must be itself infinite. Therefore every least portion of space is itself infinite, which is absurd.

Or once more, either there does, or there does not, exist a first cause of the series of natural phenomena. Assume the negative. Now every event presupposes a cause, and every cause being an event it follows that every cause is itself a mere effect. And there being no first cause there are no causes at all, but only effects. But inasmuch as

* The wording of the several proofs of the antinomies given in the Critique and of the glosses thereupon is clumsy and obscure. We do not profess to have attempted in the text an exact, or even a close, reproduction of the original.

effect presupposes cause, and there are no causes, there are also no effects, which is absurd.

And, on the other hand, assume that a first cause exists. Such first cause cannot be an event; otherwise it would be itself an effect, and therefore no first cause. But in order to initiate a series of events the first cause must at some definite time begin to operate. But this beginning to operate is an event, of which there must be a cause, which is inconsistent with the hypothesis.

Finally, the series of phenomena is either necessary or fortuitous. That it is necessary is clear, since every event has a cause. But wherein consists its necessity? Two suppositions alone are possible; either the series is necessary in virtue of the existence of a first cause, or, being without beginning in time, the series itself is necessary, as it were, in its own right. The first assumption lands us in the difficulties we have just discussed. The second is on the face of it absurd, since that of which every constituent part is fortuitous cannot be necessary in the whole.

Such, then, are the famous antinomies of pure reason, and it is clear that so long as they remain unsolved it is idle to talk of a philosophy of nature. They in effect suggest the question, Is nature conceivable at all? They imperatively demand a solution, and, if reason cannot furnish one, it must own itself powerless to render an intelligible account of what nature really is. Does, then, idealism help us to a solution?

Now of these four antinomies it will be observed that the two first and the two last belong together—the two first constituting what may be comprehensively called the antinomy of space and time, the two last the antinomy of cause and effect. The antinomy of space and time rests upon the twofold assumption—(1) that space and time exist independently of consciousness, (2) that the universe exists in space and time.

As we have seen, idealism teaches that time and space are *a priori* forms or modes of consciousness, a doctrine from which it follows that there is no limit to either of them but such as thought imposes. Space is not made up of spaces, nor time of events. Suppose them to be so, and you have no escape from the self-contradictory notions of a first event in time, a final limit in space, and a *minimum quantitatis*. But space and time being wholly relative to thought, space is not indeed indefinitely

extended, nor indefinitely divided; nor is time a dateless succession of events; but space is indefinitely extendible, and divisible, and the beginning of time is where thought dates it.

The second assumption implied by the antinomy of space and time is that the universe exists in space and time. Now, even supposing for the nonce that space and time are substantive entities, it is clear that the universe cannot in any intelligible sense be said to exist in them. For by the universe we mean the totality of things, and accordingly it must include space and time within itself. They cannot exist outside the universe so as to contain it. Moreover, when we talk of the universe as existing in space and time, we do not mean that one part or division of it exists in space, and another in time; but that the whole universe exists at once in space and in time. But this is impossible. A series of events in time cannot also be an aggregate of parts in space.

The universe, then, does not exist in space and time, and consequently the antinomy of space and time, even if otherwise valid (which as we have seen it is not), could not apply to it.*

The antinomy of cause and effect arises out of an erroneous conception of the nature of cause, a conception with which readers of popular English philosophy are familiar enough, but which is radically inconsistent with the Kantian theory of cause as an *a priori* category. Throughout the demonstrations and expositions of this antinomy Kant in fact identifies cause with uniform antecedent in a manner that would have done credit to Hume. The truth is that cause does not antecede effect, nor effect ensue upon cause. A cause is not an event, but the uniform conceived relation between two events or groups of events, whereby one of them always precedes, and one always succeeds, the other. Cause is thus definable as uniformity of relationship as subsisting between events, or, briefly, as the law of an event. Thus understanding cause, we are able to find a meaning in the expression, first cause, very different from the self-

* We are of course left by this doctrine at liberty to use such an expression as the world in space as an equivalent for the "external world," no more meaning thereby that the world actually exists in space, than when we employ the latter expression we mean that the world is external to consciousness.

destructive notion of a first event. Science and philosophy alike cherish the ideal of a perfectly harmonious conception of the cosmos. The reality which corresponds to that ideal is the first cause, which is at the same time the *ultima ratio* of the universe, as the *prima philosophia* of the ancients was always regarded as the crowning effort of reason.

In fine we may say that the antinomy of cause is the *reductio ad absurdum* of the popular idea of cause, while the antinomy of space and time is the *reductio ad absurdum* of the materialistic conception of the universe. For common-sense realism is in fact materialism, and it is only to the world as construed by common sense that the latter antinomy has any application. Thus these famous enigmas, themselves hoary with antiquity, which Kant was the first to collect and marshal side by side in grim array, turn out to be only so much further evidence (were any needed) of the fundamental doctrine of idealism, the absolute relativity of things to thought, or (as it is sometimes expressed) the identity of being and knowing.

But, it may be said, does not this doctrine land us in a dilemma quite as serious as those from which it has relieved us? For if we suppose the universe to exist, it can on this theory only exist for an eternal and universal consciousness; and, if we suppose such a consciousness to exist, we are bound to ask ourselves how we are to conceive it, whether as similar to our own in all essential particulars or not; and as space and time are necessary forms of our consciousness, and we can conceive of no consciousness of which they are not necessary forms, it follows that we must either give up all attempts to conceive the universe, or conceive it, not indeed as in space and time, yet as existing for a consciousness of which space and time are necessary forms; in other words, we must either suppose that space and time are forms of the consciousness of God, or the universe must remain for us a conception absolutely empty of content.

Such are without question the alternatives, of which Kant chose, and, as we think, wrongly chose, the first. According to the doctrine developed in the *Dialectic* the universe is a noumenon, or thing in itself, and by consequence we can never be certain whether it exists or no. The noumenon of Kant is not indeed identical, at least when Kant is at his best, with the bare conception of sub-

stance, like the matter of which Berkeley disposed so unceremoniously. What Kant means by it when he really endeavours to think out what he does mean, is very clearly expressed in the following passage from the chapter on Phenomena and Noumena, which is interposed between the conclusion of the *Analytic* and the beginning of the *Dialectic*. The passage is rather freely rendered, but we think it accurately expresses the sense of the original.

"That a noumenon should represent for me a real object distinguishable from all others, it is not enough that I should disengage my thought from all conditions of sensuous perception. I must further have reason to assume the existence of another kind of perception, in which such an object might be given; otherwise my thought is not indeed inconsistent with itself; it is void. We have indeed not been able to prove that sensuous perception is the only possible one, though we have shown that it is the only possible one *for us;* on the other hand, we were not able to show that any other kind of perception is possible, and although our thought is able to make abstraction of all conditions of sensuous perception, yet there remains over the question whether the noumenon be not a merely formal conception, and whether after such abstraction any object whatever is left behind."

From this doctrine it clearly follows (1) that the universe as a thing in itself is a conception, as to which we must always remain in doubt, whether any corresponding object exists; and (2) that, if the universe have any existence at all, it can only be as object of a consciousness, the nature of which is inscrutable.

We answer in the first place that it is impossible to doubt of the existence of the universe, and that Kant himself has shown that it is so in his *Refutation of Idealism*, and in the second place that the consciousness which includes the universe as its object cannot be wholly inscrutable to us. Such a consciousness must, *e.g.*, be a consciousness of self; and, attributing self-consciousness to God, we must likewise regard time and space as modes of His consciousness. For self-consciousness means consciousness of self-identity throughout change, which implies consciousness of time, and, as Kant (again in the *Refutation of Idealism*, and elsewhere) has shown, consciousness of time presupposes consciousness of space.

Nor does this doctrine really place any limitation upon

the infinity and eternity of God's consciousness. By infinity as ascribed to God we mean not that His intelligence and power are unlimited, but that they are limited only by their own perfectness; and as space and time are merely modes of the Divine consciousness, they cannot be any limitation upon its perfectness; and we have seen that we must regard even the finite human spirit as self-determining. By God we mean an intelligence in all essential respects like to our own, but infinitely powerful and all-comprehensive. At the same time it must not be supposed that we wish to make unto ourselves a God in our own likeness. We do not forget that the height and depth and majesty of the Divine Mind transcend human conception. Yet it is necessary that we should know what we believe; and we cannot avoid a certain measure of anthropomorphism, if we attribute personality to God at all.

It remains to consider the second division of the *Dialectic*, which deals with philosophical theology, and consists, in fact, of an examination of three famous arguments for the being of God termed by Kant respectively the ontological, the cosmological, and the physico-theological argument. Of these the first is associated with the name of Descartes, the second with that of Leibnitz, while the third is the well-known teleological or design argument. Together they constitute for Kant the sum total of pure or speculative theology. The Cartesian argument is concise if not conclusive. We are in possession of the idea of a being necessary, eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, and perfect; therefore such a being exists.* Of course Kant's comment upon this argument is simply—Non sequitur. We cannot conclude merely from the having a certain idea that its counterpart exists *in rerum natura;* otherwise I might pay my debts by the simple process of conceiving them as paid. Such is the gist of Kant's criticism; and it does scant justice to Descartes. The thought of the founder of modern philosophy cannot have been merely nugatory, however imperfectly it may have been expressed. In effect the Cartesian argument conceals an enthymeme or suppressed premiss, which is that experience is not a mere illusion. Descartes was never wanting in hardihood. We know that he began his philosophical career by welcoming doubt, that he pushed

* *Principes*, 1ère *Partie*, 14 & 15; *Discours de la Méthode*, 4ième *Partie*; *Méditation*, 3ième.

his doubts to extremes. His sane Gallic intellect, however, saw clearly that a halt must be made somewhere, that absolute universal doubt, like "vaulting ambition," "o'erleaps itself and falls on the other." In other words, Descartes grasped, though he did not formulate, the principle upon which, in fact, all human reasoning rests, viz., that which is required or postulated by the existence of experience as such is true. Now the existence of an absolute or necessary being, in scholastic phraseology an *ens realissimum*, is unquestionably postulated by experience. We try to re-think Descartes' thought somewhat in this fashion. Suppose the whole content of immediate experience to be an illusion (excepting only self-consciousness, of the reality of which there can be no possible doubt); yet even an illusion requires explanation, *i.e.*, implies the existence of a reality; and, even supposing I were myself the source of my own illusion, yet the existence of myself is an elementary fact which needs to be explained. Thus the argument tends to assume the form, particularly in the third Meditation, of what might perhaps be described as an *argumentum a contingentia animae*. And if it be said that this argument will only yield at best the bare conception of "the absolute," we answer that thinkers of high speculative quality like Descartes do not deal in the absolute, and that, if it be once admitted that an absolute being exists, an analysis of the meaning of existence will show that it is predicable only of an intelligent subject, or of an object embraced within the consciousness of such a subject.

But—we think we hear some Positivist interpreter of Kant observing—your postulate after all does not put the ontological argument on any better footing than it had before. Granted that we must conceive an absolute being as existing, a necessity of thought is after all but a necessity of thought, and therefore only relatively true, only true *for us*. We cannot be sure that anything objective corresponds to it. The existence of God is absolutely unverifiable.

We answer—All demonstration rests upon necessities of thought which are absolutely unverifiable. How is the axiom, two straight lines cannot enclose a space verifiable *a posteriori*? Who ever saw two lines absolutely straight *in rerum natura*? And the conclusions reached by *a priori* reasoning are no less unverifiable than the premisses.

That the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal is a proposition which it is impossible to make more certain by empirical verification, because an isosceles triangle which shall be really isosceles cannot be constructed. What we do find by experience is that the more accurately the figure is constructed the more nearly does it approach to ideal truth. That the premisses and conclusions of geometry are purely ideal was recognised by both Locke* and Hume,† though the latter boldly denied their validity. Again, what is the ground of the conviction we have of the existence of Nature? We cannot verify Nature *a posteriori*. We cannot, properly speaking, observe Nature. *A posteriori* we are conscious only of various objects and events—it is these, and these alone, which we observe—which we connect together and conceive as constituent parts of a larger whole which we designate Nature, but that larger whole is absolutely unverifiable. Why then is it that no reasonable person doubts of the existence of Nature? We are driven back upon our *a priori* principle once more. Nature is a necessity of thought for us. Our experience would be unintelligible, nay, self-contradictory, without it.

Further, we suppose that no sane man has any doubt of the existence of other beings besides himself. Yet no one of us can verify the existence of his fellow man. The forms and features which we see, the words which we hear spoken, are all part and parcel of our own consciousness, and have no existence apart from it. It is by a mere figure of speech that we talk of the communication of ideas by language, for it is impossible that the thoughts of one man should pass over and enter into the mind of another. We instinctively assume the existence of other creatures like ourselves by way of accounting for the facts of experience, but such assumption is not arbitrary, since it is based upon our *a priori* principle—that which is required by the existence of experience as such is true. Any other hypothesis would involve the consequence that experience is illusory, and that is inconceivable. And when philosophers debate—as philosophers of the empirical school sometimes do—whether empirical verifiability, or the inconceivability of the negative of a given proposition,

* *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, Book II. cap. xxxi. § 3.
† *Treatise on Human Nature*, Part II. § 4.

be the more conclusive test of truth,* it is no wonder that the conflict should be both protracted and indecisive (neither side having any very clear notion of what they are fighting about), since it is not mere inconceivability of the negative of a proposition that assures us of its absolute truth, but such inconceivability alone as is deducible from our *a priori* postulate. The mere abortiveness of the effort to conceive the negation of a proposition—to employ Mr. Spencer's picturesque mode of speech—is no conclusive warranty of its truth: that may be due simply to the weakness of the analytic faculty or force of habit: but a proposition which, on examination, turns out to be inconsistent with the reality of experience, is necessarily inconceivable and false, and its negation necessarily true. In short, consistency or inconsistency with the reality of experience is the ultimate criterion of truth.

We are now in a position to recast the ontological argument for the being of God. We have learned from Kant that Nature, or the universe, is an *a priori* idea; we know also that the non-existence of the universe is inconceivable. But Kant's analysis of experience (if it has taught us anything) has taught us that the universe is a relative existence, an existence for intelligence merely; whence it follows that in the existence of the universe is postulated the existence of an eternal intelligent subject, in and for whose all-comprehensive intelligence the universe exists. This is metaphysics, certainly, but it is reason also. Idealism has constructed a ladder every round of which is securely riveted, and which, resting its foot upon the lowly earth of common experience, is radiant at the further end with the Divine glory.

The second or cosmological argument for the existence of God may be stated thus: the universe is a contingent existence; the contingent involves the necessary; therefore a necessary being exists. Without following in detail Kant's elaborate criticism of this argument, it is enough for our purposes to point out that at the most it gives us, as it stands, the bare idea of a necessary being. The identification of this necessary being with the universal consciousness, the omnipresent Spirit of God, it cannot accomplish, and therefore, as Kant truly says, it is an *ignoratio elenchi*. The truth is that this so-called argu-

* See Spencer, *Psychology*, Vol. II. Pt. VII. cap. II. The Universal Postulate.

ment *a contingentia mundi* is not an independent substantive argument at all. It is simply the minor premiss of the ontological argument. The contingency, *i.e.*, the relativity of the universe, is, as we have seen, an essential moment in that argument; but, in the absence of an idealism profounder than any Leibnitz dreamt of, it may indeed carry us to an abstract Pantheism which is no better than materialism: it can never show us the living God which religion demands.

As the cosmological argument presupposes the ontological, so the physico-theological argument turns out upon analysis to rest upon the cosmological. It assumes that the physical universe is not a self-subsisting, self-ordering universe, and that the order and harmony which we observe in it are due to some agency other than that of the physical forces. It assumes that this is so, *i.e.*, it assumes that the universe is contingent. And, proceeding upon this assumption, it infers that the power which is the source of law and order is of a kind with the intelligence which apprehends and admires that law and order.

The physico-theological argument is in effect an attempt to articulate the bare conception of a necessary being, at which the cosmological argument stops short, into the idea of a Divine Maker and Ruler of the universe. As commonly presented, however, it is open to the reproach of materialism. It assumes the existence of matter which the Divine Workman is supposed to mould and fashion into the perfect fitness and harmony of the cosmos. Idealism, however, has destroyed matter, and with it the demiurge or world-architect (Weltbaumeister) form of the teleological theory, even if the facts upon which the evolutionists base their hypothesis were not inconsistent with such a conception. We cannot rightly compare a universe which lives and grows to a watch constructed to go when it is wound up for a certain number of hours, and then run down.* Not that we give up the teleological argument. By no means. The law which exists in the universe is evidence of the existence of God; for law exists only for intelligence, and an universe of law apart from an universal mind is inconceivable; but in saying this we are merely repeating what we have already said in

* The kind of Theism or Deism prevalent in the last century banished God from the universe, placing Him in the position of a constitutional

discussing the ontological argument, of which the teleological argument is only a special form.

That intelligence alone is capable of adjusting means to ends is true, but it is a truth which is included in the larger one of the identity of being and thought. If thought is everything, and everything is thought, it need hardly be stated that it is thought and thought alone which adapts means to ends. Thus the importance of the teleological argument is somewhat diminished by idealism, at the same time that the materials of the argument have been immensely augmented by science. The whole physical cosmos, so far as explored by man, is now seen to be an organic living whole, and idealism interpreting science finds in this all-pervading life the witness of the eternal self-revealing Spirit of God.

We have now reached a point in our examination of the Critique at which it becomes useless to pursue the inquiry further. The chapters, which under the head of the Transcendental Doctrine of Method conclude the Critique, contain merely a system of rules for the conduct of the understanding in view of the stern limitations to which, as we have seen, Kant supposes it to be subject; and as we do not accept the results of the *Dialectic*, advice based upon them, however reasonable it may be, can have no possible interest for us. It is enough on this point to observe that Kant recommends the maintenance of an attitude of evenly-balanced suspense towards the insoluble problems (as he holds them to be) of philosophy and

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monarch, who reigns but does not govern, with Nature for His prime minister. Science has done good service to the best interests of theology and religion by exposing the incompatibility of such a theory with the phenomena of organic life. Compare the profound and expressive lines of Goethe:

> Was wär' ein Gott, der nur von aussen stiesse,
> Im Kreis das All am Finger laufen liesse,
> Ihm ziemt's, die Welt im Innern zu bewegen,
> Natur in Sich, Sich in Natur zu hegen,
> So dass, was in Ihm lebt und webt und ist,
> Nie Seine Kraft nie Seinen Geist vermisst.

Of which for the benefit of such of our readers as are not acquainted with German we subjoin the following imperfect paraphrase:

> What God were He, that, sitting there outside,
> Let the world, circling, round His finger slide?
> The universe He from within upholdeth,
> Nature in Him, Himself in Nature foldeth,
> That so what in Him lives and moves and is
> Never His power, never His Spirit miss.

theology, and the assumption of the ideas of pure reason for the purposes of giving unity and systematic arrangement to our scientific knowledge, and moral dignity to our lives.

Before, however, we finally part company with Kant, we wish to honour the great and noble qualities of the man. We have had occasion, in the course of this article, to insist often, and strongly, upon his errors and inconsistencies as a thinker. It was his evil fortune to sit in darkness; but his eyes were ever towards the light, though it was but a glimmer that greeted them. Never was spirit more loyal to reason and the highest instincts of the soul. At once reverent and fearless, sober and uncompromising, he would see all sides of every question and do them equal justice. Thus it is that, in spite of the negative results of his philosophy, the influence of Kant has been and still is so potent in Europe for good, making more than any other for the spread of a temperate and catholic manner of thinking, in which alone lies the hope of effecting a final and satisfactory adjustment of the claims of reason and faith.

ART. III.—*Die christliche Liebesthätigkeit in der alten Kirche.* Von G. UHLHORN, D.D. Zweite Auflage. Stuttgart, 1882. ["Christian Beneficence in the Ancient Church." By G. UHLHORN, D.D. Second Edition.]

THAT modern charity is the creation of Christianity has long been a commonplace of Christian teaching. The transformation in this respect is marvellous and hard to realise. "Old things have passed away, all things have become new." But the significance of the change can only be understood when the difference between the ancient and modern world is drawn out in detail. This is done by Dr. Uhlhorn, in the above-named work, with a completeness never attempted before. Dr. Uhlhorn is already favourably known by his kindred work, *The Conflict of Christianity with Heathenism.** The subject of the present work is still more attractive, and is handled in a very broad, masterly manner. An outline of the argument will not be without profit.

The ancient world of heathenism forms the dark background against which the beneficence of Christianity shows in strong relief. "A World without Love" is Dr. Uhlhorn's terrible but true description of it. The old world was not without liberality, the idea and reality of mutual help were not quite unknown, overwhelming calamities called forth practical sympathy; but all phenomena of this kind do little towards disproving the truth of the above description. The forms which liberality took were such as entertainments and gifts to friends, the erection of baths, theatres, aqueducts, statues, and the like. The poor and needy, it is evident, were not thought of in such acts. It can scarcely be thought uncharitable to say that selfishness, rather than disinterestedness, underlay them. One's own reputation, or the reputation of one's friends and native city, was the motive in view.

At first sight there might seem to be considerable resem-

* See this REVIEW, No. CVIII. p. 422.

blance between Christian charity and the monthly distributions to poor Roman citizens which were so marked a feature in the life of the old imperial city. Every citizen resident in Rome had a right to receive five bushels of wheat monthly, to which gifts of oil, salt, meat, and clothing were occasionally added. No condition was required beyond a declaration of Roman citizenship and residence in Rome. The question of need never arose. The institution grew to enormous dimensions. Its administration employed many officials. Cæsar found 320,000 recipients, and reduced them to 150,000, which was made the maximum; but the tendency was constantly towards an increase of numbers. Septimius Severus added a dole of oil. Aurelian would have given pork and wine, if he had not been deterred by the remark of a prefect, that the people would soon expect cooked fowls. To the monthly distributions must be added the special largesses on such occasions as a coronation, an imperial birthday, triumph, &c. The amount varied from £2 to £50. At Cæsar's triumph the feast covered 22,000 tables, and wine flowed in streams. But this whole system was one rather of waste and bribery than charity. It was meant to avert the discontent which is the mother of revolution. As long as the people were kept in good humour, despotism was safe. The provinces were plundered that the Roman citizen might live in idleness. No greater premium on idleness or discouragement to work could be devised. Pauperism never took a more demoralising form than in ancient Rome. Much of the blame of the decline and fall of the empire must be laid at the door of this system.

A closer resemblance to some modern phenomena is seen in the *Collegia*, which were trade guilds and benefit societies. Such associations were found in all classes and trades. The members paid a monthly contribution. While provision for burial was a principal object, other objects were not wanting. There were club-feasts then as now. But of course the *Collegia* had as little of a charitable character as their modern representatives.

The nearest resemblance to Christian charity is to be found in the practice in the early days of Athens of giving two obols daily to the necessitous. Orphans of slain soldiers also were brought up at the cost of the State, and their property was exempted from taxation. In times of scarcity corn was distributed. These customs belonged to

the earlier and better days of Athenian history. Afterwards a wholesale bribery of the people, as mischievous as that at Rome, came into practice.

In the later days of the Roman empire we meet with some noble educational foundations, which breathe a truly humane spirit. Several of these were in honour of and named after wives of the emperors. One was for 245 boys and 34 girls, another for 300 boys and 200 girls. Still, such institutions are few, and it is impossible to say whether they were or were not partly due to Christian influence. However this may be, we rejoice in every indication of a gentler spirit amid the prevailing hardness and cruelty of the old world.

A still more obvious preparation for Christianity is to be seen in the Stoic doctrine of a common humanity and brotherhood. Such teaching was a great advance on previous ideas. Plato's Utopia has no room for beggars or beneficence. Beggars are to be simply excluded. If they are too weak to live, and therefore too weak to benefit the commonweal, let them die. The State, not the individual, is supreme. Aristotle's doctrine of liberality and friendship is not without selfish features. The liberal man gives because it is agreeable to do so. The Stoics, on the other hand, spoke of a common nature, which forms the ground of a certain equality. But they never succeeded in shaking off the pride and hardness by which they are known. Seneca, who wrote seven books on "Benefits," and said much about gratitude and ingratitude, condemns sympathy as weakness. "Old women sympathise, the wise man not. The latter helps the weeper, but weeps not with him." There is more of pride than love in his giving.

Thus the ancient world remains "A World without Love." There are no hospitals, except for slaves and soldiers; no houses for the poor and aged, the widow and orphan. There is nothing approaching to an organised system of charity, precisely because the idea of the worth of the individual soul and of the unity which springs from religious faith is wanting. Boeckh says, "Mercy is no Hellenic virtue." Lactantius says, "Mercy and humanity are virtues peculiar to the righteous and to worshippers of God. Philosophy knows nothing of them." "Even in giving it was not the individual who was considered, but the State, the city, the body of citizens. But in helping the State, one is really helping one's own interests, because

we need the State. Each individual is worth as much as he can aid in realising the State-idea. Hence, the poor are nothing, really they are a burden to the State. Hence also the little interest taken in children."

The true preparation for Christian charity is to be found in Judaism. We wish it were possible for us to linger on the milder spirit breathing in the laws and institutions of the Mosaic economy, in such striking contrast with the rest of the world in this particular. If Christianity represents the noontide of love, Judaism was the dawn, as heathenism was the midnight. Charity is no mere incident in the history of Christianity, but its most characteristic feature, its abiding law. And this character it owes to the words and work of its Founder. The Christian love, with sympathies wide and deep as human need, which has for ages been pouring itself out in acts of self-sacrifice such as the world never before saw, is simply the outflow of Christ's life. While the command, "Love thy neighbour," was no new one on Christ's lips, the position assigned to it was new. To co-ordinate it with love to God, and thus to incorporate morality in its highest form with religion, was to give it the highest possible sanction and impulse. Who can estimate the stimulus given to humanity in all ages by the parable of the Good Samaritan? Whether Christ meant in that parable to portray Himself or not, the Church has always seen the Good Samaritan in Him. The truest Christian philanthropists have consciously followed in His steps. "It is no play of fancy when we call Christian institutions by Bible names — a Deaconesses' House 'Bethany,' a deaf and dumb institute 'Ephphatha,' an asylum for the fallen 'Magdalen.' We mean by this to describe our work as a continuation of the Lord's work. He first healed the sick, the blind, the lepers, the deaf and dumb; He led back the fallen one to a good life, fed the hungry in the wilderness with bread; and each one of these works of His has become a seed-corn bringing forth fruit a thousandfold in the course of centuries. By doing all this in presence of the disciples, He educated them in charity. Even the drawing of woman into the work of charity—a thing of so great significance for the future of the Church —was prefigured. The Lord is surrounded by a circle of ministering women—the type of the deaconesses and other charitable women, in whom the history of the Church is so rich." Nor are there wanting deeper reasons which con-

nect Christian charity directly with the teaching of Christ. The central truth of Christ's teaching is the new Kingdom of God, which He founded upon earth, and which His followers are to extend. That Kingdom is meant to embrace all mankind. Every human being is designed for membership in it. Whatever prevents or disqualifies for this blessed consummation is to be removed. In this doctrine is laid the deepest, strongest basis of universal charity. Every one is made his brother's keeper. Selfishness is branded as unchristian. Only by the exercise of charity of the most comprehensive kind can Christ's declared purpose be carried into effect. All artificial distinctions vanish before this equality of blessing and privilege in the Kingdom of God. The Church is God's realised Kingdom, but the whole world is His Kingdom potentially.

Passing over the Apostolic Church of the New Testament, we have briefly to notice two stages in the history of early Christian charity—that before and that after the triumph of Christianity under Constantine. The first period is well described as the period of first love, a love characterised by its freshness, spontaneity, and energy. Exhortations to the duty were not needed, and they are not found. No reference to merit or reward, or to the effect on the giver, appears. The Church was yet small enough to retain the family feeling, at least during the early part of this period. The consciousness of weakness and the stern reality of persecution helped still further to confirm the unity and deepen the mutual sympathy of believers. At first there was no need of separate houses for the sick and orphans, "when every Christian house offered shelter to Christian travellers, and every Christian was ready to succour those in need." The sound views taught by Christianity as to labour and wealth had an important effect on charity. The healthy teaching of the New Testament on these subjects was repeated and emphasised by Christian teachers. If labour was not exactly represented as a Divine vocation, it was held to be honourable and necessary. The Apostles themselves were held up as examples. Wealth was not condemned in itself. Its moral dangers only, especially in times of persecution, were pointed out. Riches and poverty neither qualified nor disqualified for a place among Christians. They were simply indifferent.

The means for the support of the poor were drawn from

two sources—monthly, and afterwards weekly, contributions by the church members, and the oblations or offerings at the Eucharist. The name given to the former by Tertullian is *stips*, in allusion to the monthly contributions in the old *Collegia*. The church-box for the reception of the gifts he calls *arca*, with a similar allusion. Instead of *arca*, Cyprian uses *corbona*, with a Jewish reference. These regular contributions were acknowledgments of the society character of the Church, and have their analogies still. But undoubtedly it was the Eucharistic oblations which had the greatest influence. Never before were poverty and the poor brought into such sacred relations. Of course the support of the poor was only one of the purposes to which these gifts were applied. The funds for the support of the Church generally came from this source. Still it was one purpose. We may remark incidentally that the time for the celebration of the Lord's Supper in the earliest period was the evening, in connection with the Agape, as is intimated in 1 Cor. xi. Only in the second century was the Supper, for fear of abuse, separated from the Agape, and transferred to the morning.* The old liturgies preserve the prayers offered on such occasions. Thus, "Receive, O Lord, the offerings of those who now bring an offering. As Thou didst receive the offering of righteous Abel, the offering of our father Abraham, the incense of Zacharias, the alms of Cornelius, and the two mites of the widow, so receive their offering, giving them back the eternal for the temporal, the heavenly for the earthly." And again, "Remember, O Lord, those who offer Thee these gifts, and those for whom and for whose benefit they offer them. Remember, O Lord, those who bear fruit and do good works in Thy holy Church, and who remember the poor. Reward them with Thy riches and heavenly gifts. Give them the heavenly for the earthly, the eternal for the temporal, the imperishable for the perishable." By such association with the most solemn act of worship the last vestige of disgrace was swept away from the condition of the poor. The rich man gave to God, the poor man received from God. It is important to notice that in these earliest days the gifts formed the sacrifice, not the consecrated elements. It was not long indeed before the idea was transferred to

* This by way of reply to Ritualists, who speak of evening celebrations as something akin to sacrilege.

the latter, but this was an innovation. Nor did the Primitive Church fail to pray "for those who give secretly and those who give publicly, for those who give much and those who give little, and also for those who would give and cannot." When the ordinary means were insufficient, or special need arose, collections were made. Cyprian made a collection for the imprisoned Christians in Numidia, amounting to nearly nine hundred pounds, and sends with the money a list of the contributors, "in order that you may remember in your prayers the brethren and sisters who have so gladly and quickly co-operated in such a good work, and a recompense may be given them." The same fact throws some light on the amount of the charity of the early Church. The Carthaginian Church cannot well have exceeded four thousand souls, and these included many poor. That a Church of this size should raise so much in a short time for a special need in another Church, says much for its liberality. According to a notice in Eusebius, 1,500 widows and needy persons were supported by the Church in Rome. Reckoning by the old scale of five bushels of wheat monthly, this implies a yearly expenditure of £3,750.

The distribution took place through the deacons as the organs first of the Presbyters, and afterwards of the Bishops. The deacons had no independent position in this matter, but acted as at once the eye and ear and hand of the bishop, who was responsible only to God. They reported cases of need to the bishop, who then decided on the help to be given. In the third century we read of sub-deacons. Dr. Uhlhorn thinks that there were no deaconesses at first, the recognised widows doing the work afterwards assigned to deaconesses. Up to the end of the third century deaconesses are only mentioned once, namely, in Pliny's letter to Trajan. Neither the Apostolic Fathers, nor Tertullian, nor Cyprian, refer to them. But widows are constantly mentioned. The reference in 1 Tim. v. is plainly to widows in some recognised position. Ignatius greets them, placing them immediately after the deacons. Clement of Alexandria puts them among the Church officials, while Tertullian describes their position at length. They are aged widows, of exemplary life, who have decided to remain unmarried. They take a certain oversight of the women and children of the Church, and are supported by the Church. Towards the end of the third and the beginning

of the fourth century they are everywhere replaced by deaconesses. The reasons of the change cannot be indicated with certainty. One reason undoubtedly was the growing honour paid to the unmarried state. The ascetic spirit began to show itself very early, and gained ground rapidly. A curious indication of the change is seen in the difference on this point between the genuine and the interpolated Ignatian epistles. Whereas in the former the widows follow the deacons immediately, in the latter the deacons are followed by the subordinate clergy, these by the deaconesses, these again by the virgins, and last of all come the widows. Other reasons leading to the same change were the growth of the priestly idea, and the increasing pomp and ceremony of worship. At first the widows were a sort of Presbyters to the women. But when the Presbyter became a priest, the widow lost in dignity because unable to offer sacrifice. Her functions then became subordinate. For some cause or other, deaconesses were much more common in the East than in the West. A form of ordination was observed in their appointment. Their duties corresponded to those of deacons; they were doorkeepers in the churches, and distributed alms to the poor.

The Agapæ still continue, gradually changing in character. They become less and less feasts of the whole Church, more and more meals for the poor members. The disorders to which the institution seemed peculiarly liable, and which are noticed even in 1 Cor. xi., led to many special regulations, and eventually to the disuse of the custom. According to Clement of Alexandria the feasts took place on Sunday evening. After the deacon has lighted the lamp, the bishop prays for the poor and the host who has invited them. No one begins to eat before the Presbyter. All eat quietly; nothing is said unless the Bishop or Presbyter asks a question. Psalms are sung, and the guests quietly depart. All this is different from the earliest Agapæ, and is yet a remnant of those gatherings.

The care of the widow and orphan was always regarded as a sacred duty by the Church. It seems likely that as early as the second century there were separate homes for widows. Only widows of 60 years of age, of good character, who promised to remain unmarried, were entered on the list. Others received help in case of need. The orphans were the special charge of the Bishop or Presbyter, who

had to arrange for the training and marriage of the girls, and for the boys being taught a trade. Origen was adopted by a Christian woman on his father's martyrdom. The infant of the martyr Felicitas also found a second mother. Tertullian is fond of contrasting the cruelty of heathenism in the exposure of children with the new spirit of Christianity which branded as murder, not merely such exposure, but the neglect to provide for children so exposed. In times of pestilence and famine the courage and humanity of the Christians formed a bright contrast to the fear and selfishness of the heathen at such times. Both Cyprian and Eusebius tell us that many Christians lost their lives through waiting on the plague-stricken and dying. After describing the conduct of the Christians in Alexandria, Eusebius says: "With the heathen all was different. Those who began to be sick they forsook: they fled from their dearest friends; the half-dead they cast into the streets from fear of infection, which yet they could not escape; they left the dead unburied." The burial of the dead also was looked on as a work of mercy. "We cannot endure," says Lactantius, "that the image and creature of God should be thrown a prey to wild beasts and birds, but return it to the earth, whence it was taken."

Mindful of the Lord's words, "I was in prison and ye came unto me," Christians were assiduous in visiting prisoners of all kinds—criminals, debtors, war-captives, slaves.

The action of Christianity on slavery was indirect, rather than direct. Slavery was not condemned as sinful in itself. The master and his slave might both be Christians, like Philemon and Onesimus. But the spirit of the relation was changed on both sides. "The slave served differently and the master ruled differently from what they did before." Emancipation became more and more common, but it was voluntary, not authoritatively enforced. Clement of Alexandria says, "Slaves are not to be treated like beasts, but the Christian master is to treat his Christian slave like a son or a brother because of their community of faith." Callistus rose from being a slave to be Bishop of Rome. Slaves who died a martyr's death were honoured like other martyrs. The spiritual equality thus created was very real, and the equality of condition followed in due time.

Times of persecution made new demands on charity. Christians condemned to imprisonment, exile, fine, con-

fiscation, and the mines, had to be succoured. Those condemned to the mines were most to be pitied. The majority soon succumbed to the hardship and outrage which were their lot. Among Cyprian's letters are several from Christians in the mines, expressing thanks for sympathy and help. Many a brave confessor must have been consoled by the knowledge that his family was cared for by the Church. At the close of one letter a slave sends special greeting to his master.

New scope and meaning were given to hospitality. It was no longer shown to illustrious guests merely, but to Christian brethren. Of a bishop it was required that he should be "given to hospitality." To guard against deceit notes of recommendation, signed by the bishop, were used.

It would be wrong to overlook the shadows which began to creep over the Church, even in these early days. Then were sown the germs which afterwards bore evil fruit. The exaggerated notions of the merit of celibacy and voluntary poverty do not concern us here. We only need notice the errors bearing on charity. On this as on other points Cyprian is the chief offender. No wonder that he is such a favourite with Romish and High-Church divines. Even if Origen and Tertullian scarcely understood the full meaning of some of their casual expressions, this can scarcely be said of the elaborate teaching of the African bishop and martyr. According to him, while all sin previous to baptism is washed away in baptism, all sin afterwards needs other means of removal, and these are prayer and alms. Prayer borrows its efficacy from almsgiving. "He who on the Day of Judgment will reward works and alms, will even now favourably hear prayer which is conjoined with alms." "Good is a prayer accompanied by fasting and alms." Cyprian's chief appeal is to the Apocrypha. His ideas on this subject are Jewish rather than Christian. He makes Luke xi. 41 mean that the heart is cleansed by means of alms. His teaching was taken up by other writers, handed on to the Middle Ages, and there elaborated into a great system of salvation by works. The temptation to postpone baptism as long as possible contained in such a doctrine was largely yielded to. Charity was poisoned in its very springs. The motive was no longer the benefit of the receiver, but the benefit of the giver. The giver sought in this way to atone for his sins and secure heaven. Not

all the vastness and splendour of a beneficence based on such grounds should blind us to its essentially selfish and pernicious character.

In passing to the second period, beginning with the days of Constantine, we must note the general character of the period. It is a pitiable scene which lies before us, nothing less than a world in dissolution. The process took centuries. That great empire of iron died hard. We see the paralysis which precedes death invading part after part. If anything can make the scene more pitiable, it is the unconsciousness of the chief actors in the drama. They do not dream that they are standing by the deathbed of the old world with its literature and heroisms. Great Christian teachers, like Ambrose and Augustine, are confident that Christianity will be able to renew the youth of the vast organism. But the old world was too deeply saturated with heathenism for its renovation to be possible even to the Divine forces of the Gospel. Every part of its life—literary, social, political, religious—was penetrated with evil. It had to perish as completely as the older world in the Deluge. Well that Christianity was present to smooth its passage to the grave, to ease the transition from the old to the new order of things, and to delay the end until the nations who were to be the progenitors of the modern world were fitted by Christian training to do their part. The new wine was poured into old bottles, and burst them. But it was also poured into new bottles, which with the wine were preserved. In one respect indeed Christianity helped the process of decay. In former days religion and the State were one. But union between Christianity and a heathen State was impossible. A Christian's citizenship was in heaven. The Church gradually became a State within a State. The young life and energy, withdrawn from one, were given to the other. "Thus, the Church increases, whilst the State decreases. One may even say, the Church absorbs the State. A glance at the age shows that the real life is on the side of the Church; the State growing old, the Church in the freshness of youth; on the side of the State increasing torpor, on the side of the Church multiplying energy and influence; there a slavish race crushed by despotism, here a sense of freedom." "It is a dying world which we have before us. Everywhere dissolution. There is the greyness of age in the physiognomy of the times. Population decreases in numbers and strength.

Industry, trade, art, science—all is in decay. Financial perplexities increase, the burdens which the people have to bear grow more and more intolerable. What is worst, morality sinks deeper and deeper. Unchastity, even unnatural lusts, rise to a higher pitch. A half-barbaric luxury squanders the property still left."

There can scarcely be a clearer proof of the decay of the native forces of the empire than the fact that the real work of defending it and carrying on its work fell more and more into the hands of the barbarians. The ranks of the legions were filled, not with home-born Romans, but with those strangers who might have said, as Tertullian said in the name of the Christians of his day, "We are but of yesterday, and we are found everywhere." A thoughtful observer must also have been struck by the contrast of extravagant wealth and hopeless poverty. The Court and nobility revelled in more than Oriental pomp and luxury, while the masses were ground down by ever-increasing taxation. The Court was surrounded by an army of officials, the governors of provinces and their satellites ruled like the worst of modern pashas, the people sank deeper and deeper in wretchedness. The Emperor Julian himself says that a Court barber was dressed like a privy councillor. A senator, Symmachus, spent £400,000 on a feast to celebrate the prætorship of his son. Another called Maximus spent £800,000 on a similar occasion. As to the taxation, while it amounted in Vespasian's days to six or seven shillings a head throughout the empire, in later times the land-tax alone in Gaul amounted to about fifty shillings per head. Officials were constantly inventing new methods of raising money. Torture and imprisonment were common. Many fled or committed suicide in order to escape the burden. Others gave up house and home in despair, and betook themselves to beggary, or sold themselves into practical slavery. Laws were made to bind people to their place and business. Farmers, who could not run away so easily, were the worst off. In Campania one-eighth of the whole cultivable land lay waste. The simple phrase *glebae adscripti* tells a sad tale.

It was in such circumstances that the Church had to carry on its work of beneficence. The Church was the only power which attempted to relieve the prevailing misery. In this period Christian charity assumes altogether a new character. In some respects such a change was inevitable.

The vast dimensions to which the work grew entailed corresponding changes in mode and organisation. The simple arrangements of earlier times could no longer cope with increasing needs. The Agapæ, which had long been declining, entirely disappeared. They had formerly been held in the churches. This was now forbidden, and they soon drop out of sight. In a large mixed community it was no longer possible to continue the family feeling. The charity was now administered on a wholesale scale, and required corresponding arrangements. Individual care was impossible.

There are many indications of the immense needs pressing upon the Church. Chrysostom speaks of 10,000 Christians in a constituency of 100,000 who needed help. Among these 10,000 were 3,000 widows and virgins. In the days of John the Almoner the list of poor at Alexandria held 7,500 names. At Rome it formed a large volume. This only included the poor in the Church. In addition there was the vast mass of suffering outside. Chrysostom tells of the crowds of beggars he met on his way to church. Gregory of Nyssa speaks of their gathering in troops and trying to excite sympathy, one stretching out his crippled hand, another pointing to his emaciated stomach, a third to his cancerous limb. Justinian limited the number of deacons at the church of St. Sophia, Constantinople, to 100, and of deaconesses to 40.

New sources of supply had to be opened up. One of these was found in legacies. The ancient laws which permitted bequests to certain gods and temples were transferred to the Church. Just as formerly it was a custom to leave bequests to friends, to eminent men, and above all to the Emperor, so now it became a custom to leave something to the Church. In old Rome it was almost regarded as high treason to forget the Emperor in a will. The same feeling now existed in reference to the Church. Other motives were freely applied. As we shall presently see, the dying were urged on the most selfish grounds to make liberal bequests to the Church. We do not care, with Dr. Uhlhorn, to quote Salvian's exhortations on this subject. Dr. Uhlhorn truly says that Salvian paints in strong colours, and is therefore scarcely a fair representative of the teaching of his time. But there can be little doubt that much of the revenue of the Church came from such legacies, and that the motive very often was to make satisfaction for sin.

Valentinian I. was obliged to make a law fixing the limits of such bequests.

In this and other ways the property of the Church grew apace. Bishops proved themselves to be efficient administrators. Modern complaints about the secular business falling on Christian ministers remind us of similar complaints in earlier days. Gregory the Great tells of the worry he has in the administration and letting of property, the purchase and sale of goods. He advises that the rearing of horses should be limited, as the horsekeepers cost so much, and the gain is so little, not forgetting to say what is to be done with the harness in possession. In the fifth century the Church was the largest landed proprietor. In Gregory's time the Church at Rome had extensive property, not only in Italy and Sicily, but also in Gaul and the East. The Churches at Milan and Alexandria were exceedingly wealthy. In reply to the exhortations which Damasus addressed to the præfect Praetextatus to become a Christian, the latter said, "Make me Bishop of Rome, and I will become a Christian at once." On the other hand, it would be most mistaken and unjust to suppose that the property was used for any other than right purposes. It was not merely the poor, but the whole work of the Church, which had to be supported out of the means thus obtained. And many thought, as many no doubt think still, that the great officers of the Church should vie with the great officers of State in the rank and external appearance which so greatly impress the multitude. The honour of religion was supposed to be involved in the matter. Unworthy bishops formed the exception in the early days of which we are now speaking. Alienation of Church property was strictly forbidden. Ambrose, Basil, Epiphanius, Paulinus, gave their private property to the Church for the poor. This indeed was the rule with bishops. Chrysostom and Augustine lived themselves in the simplest, even barest, way. Taunted by a Roman noble with the wealth of the bishops, Ambrose replied, "They who talk to us in this way, why do they not spend their incomes like us? The Church possesses nothing but the poor. Its only possession is the support of the poor. Let them point to the prisoners whom their temples have ransomed, to the poor whom they nourish, to those plunged in misery whom they support. And because that which would otherwise go to the priests is applied to the public weal, therefore, say they,

public calamities come." The bishop was the chief dispenser of alms. Dr. Uhlhorn says, "It is a strange spectacle to see a bishop in the midst of the hungry giving alms every day with open hand, every one looking for help from him, and receiving as much as possible—the poor Roman driven by the barbarians from house and home, the German also, for the first time touched by the mild breath of Christian love, and visited with surmisings of the Divine compassion therein reflected; a bishop with whom the stranger finds an asylum, and the sick succour, who sells the church vessels, the silver and gold vessels of the Eucharist, in order to ransom prisoners, and himself lives a poor man's life in his own house in order to teach the poor that the Church's property belongs only to them—a Basil, who himself tends the sick and lepers; a Chrysostom, who, living simply and modestly amid Byzantine luxury, feeds 7,000 poor daily; an Ambrose, who, a proud Roman and withal a humble Christian, resists an Emperor and condescends to every poor man; an Augustine, who desires no other clothing than what he can give to any brother; a Gregory, who carries on his heart all the need of the age, and yet grieves when an individual dies in Rome of hunger."

Another consequence of the changed condition of the times was the decline of the Diaconate. The place of the deacons as dispensers of the Church's alms was taken by a series of other officers, at the head of whom stood the bishop's oeconomus, or steward. The work of the deacons was so limited to the minor services of worship, that the very consciousness of their ancient functions was lost in the Church.

Notwithstanding all these provisions, the clamorous need of the age was far from being fully met. The appeals to Christians to exercise private charity, in addition to what the Church does, are continuous and urgent. Every Christian preacher has something to say on the subject. Motives of humanity, justice, gratitude are appealed to; excuses of all kinds are refuted. Augustine says, "Give, then, to the poor, I beseech you, I exhort you, I command you. For I will not conceal why I thought it necessary to preach this sermon. In coming to church and going away, the poor call on me and pray me to ask you to give. They press me to speak to you, and when they see that they receive nothing from you, they suppose that my labour with you is in vain. They expect something from you. I

give all I have, all I can; but am I able to meet their need? Because I am unable to satisfy their need, I am their ambassador to you. You have heard the Gospel, you have said, 'God be praised;' you have received the seed, you have repeated the words. Your praises oppress me; I bear them and tremble under them. But, my brethren, your praises are mere leaves, fruit is asked of you." Perhaps no more than rhetoric is meant when Augustine makes God say, "Thou hast Me as a giver, now make Me thy debtor. Thou givest Me little, I will give thee back much. Thou givest Me the earthly, I will requite thee with the heavenly. Thou givest Me the temporal, I will return thee the eternal. I will give thee thyself in giving thee back to Myself." "Lay up thy gold above, trust it not to thy servant, but to thy God." Chrysostom is constantly preaching on charity. "Every day, it is said to me, you are talking of alms. Yes, verily, and I will not cease speaking of them. Were you as well taught as I wish, I would still speak of them, in order to preserve you from growing slack. But when you are still only half way, whose is the fault? Is an untaught scholar to complain of his master's repetitions?" Nazianzen cries, "If you will hear me, ye servants of Christ, brethren and fellow-heirs, let us, while there is time, care for Christ, nourish Christ, clothe Christ, receive Christ, honour Christ." Basil, Ambrose, Gregory, use similar language.

We have now to notice that the errors, which began to appear in the former period, are further developed. The development, indeed, was not complete until the Middle Ages, but little more remained to be added. Much that is quoted from Chrysostom, Leo, Gregory, and even Salvian, in praise of the merit of almsgiving may be set down as heedless rhetoric. But after every allowance has been made, enough of deadly error is left. The intrinsic connection between faith and good works seems to have been utterly forgotten by the Church. The nature of faith itself was misunderstood. It was reduced to a mere intellectual assent, love supplying the emotional element. Faith and love were treated as independent co-ordinate powers. We have here also to note the gradual nature of the progress in error. Augustine divided sin into three kinds, very heavy, heavy, and light. Forgiveness for the first must be obtained by Church penance, the second by brotherly admonition, the third by prayer and almsgiving. The latter

class includes sins of infirmity, like harsh words or immoderate laughter. Such satisfactions only avail for believers who are endeavouring to live a Christian life. Augustine's threefold division soon gave way to a twofold division, mortal and venial. It was strenuously maintained, as the Romish Church teaches still, that God remits the guilt, but not the penalty. The latter must still be borne or expiated. It was also constantly held that the virtue was not in the gift, but in the disposition from which the gift springs. Thus Gregory the Great says, "Although in this work all gifts are not the same, the love must be the same. For the liberality of believers is not estimated by the weight of the gifts, but by the greatness of the love of goodwill. The wealthy may be richer in his gift, but the poor is not behind him in love. For although a greater harvest is expected from a greater sowing, yet rich fruit of righteousness may spring from a scanty sowing." Augustine says, "In Matt. xxv. Christ means only those who give to hungry Christians as Christians, who give to Christ Himself." But these and many other cautions and qualifications could not neutralise the error taught as to the efficacy of almsgiving. Ambrose says, "Alms are, so to speak, a second bath of the soul, so that, when a man has sinned after baptism through weakness, this means remains to him to cleanse himself by alms." Gregory specifies prayers, fasting, almsgiving, as good works. "Fasting is good, but almsgiving is better. If any one can do both, both are good; but if he cannot do both, almsgiving is best. If it is impossible to fast, almsgiving is enough. Fasting with almsgiving is doubly good." We might quote much more to the same effect. All that was necessary to complete the circle of error was to extend the efficacy of good works into the next life by the doctrine of purgatory; and this was done. To tell people that they could secure eternal life for themselves and their friends by charity, was to urge indeed the most powerful motive possible, but the mischief was enormous. It was to preach "another Gospel" with a vengeance. The corruption of the Middle Ages was the result. Our author well says, "Alms have entirely changed their character. They are no longer a moral duty, but a religious; alms are given, not in reference to our neighbour, to serve and help him in love, but in reference to oneself, in order thereby to influence our own relation to God, and to obtain reward." But we gladly turn to more pleasing themes.

Even the deep shadows just pointed out must not be allowed to hide from us the great services of the Church during these ages. Dr. Uhlhorn justly says, "Nothing is farther from me than the wish to depreciate the charity of that age. On the contrary, I stand amazed before the lofty forms it produced; before these bishops who daily open their hands to feed the hungry and clothe the naked, living simply and meagrely themselves; before these men who give away millions and themselves choose poverty; before this circle of noble women, whose whole life was one series of doing good. It would be to do them the greatest injustice not to acknowledge that what lived in them was really genuine Christian love streaming from the Cross into their hearts. Nor did they stop at giving away their means; personal service was added. But we do them no injustice in measuring them by the standard of the Gospel, which was itself the source and strength of their life, and then with all our astonishment we must concede that their charity is no longer sound."

Let us take a few living examples. First in the East. Macrina, the sister of Basil, was betrothed, but her betrothed dying, she devoted herself to a life of religion and charity. Collecting others likeminded around her, some from higher, some from lower, circles of society, she spent her fortune in doing good. Especially during a time of scarcity was she a blessing to many. Olympia, the faithful friend of Chrysostom, rich, clever, beautiful, much admired and sought after, preferred, on the death of her husband, the præfect of Constantinople, although but eighteen years old, to remain a widow and live for God and her brethren. The Emperor Theodosius would fain have married her, and tried to force her consent by assuming the management of her property. On her thanking him for the relief, he restored the property. Chrysostom was the guide of her beneficence, and when the archbishop was exiled, Olympia still remained his friend. She was one of the most natural characters of the age. Charity was not with her a mere amusement. Nonna, the mother of Gregory of Nazianzum gave her all to feed the poor, and, if it had been possible, would have sold herself and children for the same purpose. Nor was this without the love of which St. Paul speaks, for she died while praying at the altar. Her daughter, Gregoria, inherited her spirit. She was a plain citizen's wife in Iconium. Gregory says of her, "She was eyes to

the blind, feet to the lame, a mother to the orphan. Her house was a common inn for all sufferers."

Let us also take a few examples from the West. Nothing is more surprising in the last quarter of the fourth century than the number of the descendants of old Roman families who gave themselves to lives of self-denial and charity. The Marcelli, Scipios, Gracchi, Julii, Fabii, figure among Christian names. The ascetic tinge is strong indeed, but this was almost inevitable in those days. Perhaps it is also partly explained by the fact that Jerome's influence was powerful with this circle of Roman Christians. The most prominent figure in this circle was Paula, related to the Scipios, Gracchi, and Julii. Her charity to the poor certainly bordered on, if it did not fall into, extravagance. When remonstrated with for her profusion, she replied that she only wished to die a beggar, and be buried in a pauper-shroud. Accompanied by her daughter Eustochia she went to the Holy Land, and settled in Bethlehem, to live and die near the cradle of the Lord. There she built a house for pilgrims, and a cloister. Another daughter, Paulina, married to the senator Pammachius, followed in her mother's steps. After his wife's death, Pammachius devoted himself and his wealth to the cause of the poor. Fabiola, married to a rich spendthrift, got a divorce from him. Then, smitten with sorrow for her sin, she did public penance, and resolved to live for the poor and wretched. She built the first house for the sick in Rome, often herself carrying them into the house, washing and binding up their wounds, and refreshing them with food. Paulinus of Nola is a famous name. Immensely rich, highly cultured, consul in the year 378, he decided, on the death of his only son, to withdraw from the world along with his wife, Theresia. He settled finally at Nola, which became the centre of attraction, not only for crowds of sufferers from all quarters, but also for many others who heard of and admired his good deeds. Once, it is said, in an attack of Vandals, after all his means were exhausted in ransoming captives, he himself took the place of a widow's son, and was carried away to Africa. He was engaged in correspondence with all the great men of his day. His devotion to relics and saints was part of the growing superstition of the age.

One of the most interesting memorials of early days is to be found in the inscriptions on tombs. They bring

before us, not merely the great and famous, but simple, ordinary Christians. The earliest inscriptions are the simplest. "The name, the age, the day of burial, at most a brief expression of Christian hope—a symbol, the fish, the dove, a palm-branch—this is all." After the fourth century there is less simplicity. The virtues of the deceased are commemorated. A few inscriptions bear on the present subject. A certain Junianus is called a "lover of the poor," and his wife Virginia "a lover of the poor, and zealous in well-doing." We read of a Christian man: "The orphan and widow had in him a father;" and of a Christian woman: "Noble in birth, rich in possessions, she was the mother of the poor." "Gentle to the poor" is a frequently occurring phrase; and it is said of a merchant, "He was a shelter to the wretched, and a haven to the poor." Of Bishop Namatius of Vienna, who died in 522, it is said, "The poor man went away from him rejoicing, the naked left him clothed, the prisoner rejoiced in being made free." On the grave of another we read, "Giving away everything to the stranger, the widow, the prisoner, he went, enriched by sacred poverty, to the stars." Other inscriptions are: "He conquered avarice, which usually conquers all," "He sent his treasures beforehand to heaven," "He sent what he had over and above to heaven." The errors already noticed are also reflected in the inscriptions.

The two great institutions, the founding of which belongs to the present period, are hospitals and monasteries. The only hospitals in heathen antiquity were for slaves and soldiers, and perhaps for gladiators. The rise of hospitals is wrapped in obscurity. No doubt the motive causes were two, the great increase of distress and suffering due to the character of the age, and at the same time the strong tendency to organisation in every line. Every trade had its organisation. It is also pretty certain that hospitals arose by differentiation out of the early homes for travellers and the poor. Indeed, it was only by degrees that the division and classification were carried out. For a long time poverty and sickness were provided for by the same means. The institution came from the East, as the earliest names indicate: Xenodochia (houses for strangers), Nosocomia (houses for the sick), Cherotrophia (houses for widows), Orphanotrophia (houses for orphans), Brephotrophia (houses for infants), Gerontocomia (houses for old men), Ptochotrophia (poor houses), Pandochia (houses for

pilgrims). The names were transferred to the West with the things. The words hospitia and hospitals afterwards replaced these foreign titles. About A.D. 370 Basilius founded the famous hospital of Cæsarea, called Basilias, after him. It assumed the form, and almost the dimensions, of a town. A church stood in the centre, and around it were houses arranged in the form of streets for the poor and sick, for the different officials and servants, and also for workshops. We read of similar institutions about the same time in Cappadocia and Pontus, in Edessa, Antioch, Ephesus, Alexandria, and Constantinople. Du Cange mentions 35 hospitals of all kinds in the latter city. The first hospitals in the West were those founded by Fabiola in Rome and Pammachius in Portus. Jerome calls this "a transplanting of a twig of the terebinth of Abraham to the Ausonian shore." There were no Xenodochia in Milan in Ambrose's days. Augustine speaks of them as new things. He had one built in a garden belonging to him. Pope Symmachus (498–514) built three in Rome. Belisarius built and endowed a large one in Rome. In the sixth century there was a very large one in Lyons.

The means of support were drawn largely from the Church revenues. There were also large private subscriptions and special collections. The State also contributed. Many hospitals were privately endowed. As the Church was the largest supporter, it was natural that the management should fall to the Church and the bishops. All hospitals, whatever their origin, were under the bishop's jurisdiction. He appointed the officers, received the reports, and directed the management. We imagine that those among us who are most jealous of ecclesiastical control in the present day would allow that no other course was possible in those days. The letters of Gregory the Great enable us to see how the bishops fulfilled their trust. "In Sardinia a Xenodochium has fallen into decay. He orders its restoration. In Naples a certain Isidorus has left a legacy for the erection of a Xenodochium. The 'Defensor' is to see that the will is carried out. If the legacy is insufficient for the purpose, it is to be applied to the existing Xenodochium of St. Theodore. In Cagliari the accounts of the different Xenodochia are no longer submitted to the bishops as formerly. The bishop is to see that this is done, and to take care that trustworthy officials are appointed." An inscription found in Africa, which probably stood over

a Xenodochium, runs, "The door of this house is open to the poor and strangers." Two ruins of ancient Pandochia have recently been discovered in Central Syria. One is in Deir Sem'an, consecrated, according to an inscription over the portal, on July 22, 479. This is the place where Simeon Stylites performed his singular exploit of living for years on a pillar. A still finer building of the same kind is in Turmanin. It is a stately building, in direct connection with a church, surrounded on three sides by a colonnade, and contains a large hall in two stories.

Among the hospital servants in the East were the Parabolani, whose proper duty was to carry the sick to the hospital and wait on them there. But from some cause or other the Parabolani were notorious as leaders of riot and turbulence. They seem to have been the "rowdies" of church-synods, using their fists as arguments. Perhaps they suggested the modern reference to those who "prove their doctrine orthodox by apostolic blows and knocks." Let us hope that the Parabolani were not fair representatives of an ancient hospital-staff. We are told that Placilla, the wife of Theodosius the Great, herself not only visited the hospitals, but waited on the inmates.

Monasteries were not only schools of industry, but also homes of charity. Like hospitals, they came from the East. The chief cause of their institution undoubtedly was the failure of the Church to leaven the old heathen world with Christianity. Heathenism penetrated into the Church. Much of the common Christian life of the day was a compound of both systems. Heathen customs were perpetuated in Christian forms—a fact which Dean Stanley was fond of illustrating, perhaps with some exaggeration. Christian mothers used amulets, merely substituting a piece of a Bible or Gospel. None lamented this state of things more than the great Church-teachers. We can thus easily understand how the notion arose that no one could live a perfect Christian life without withdrawing from the world. The world was practically given over to the power of evil. That such a doctrine was false, and such a course mistaken, every Protestant at least would allow. We have only here to note how the mistake was overruled for good. We do not need to dwell on the secondary causes indicated by Dr. Uhlhorn, such as the influence of ancient ideas respecting the incompatibility of an ideal and practical life, although it is interesting to note that an ascetic life was at first

often called a "philosophic" life. At first the ascetic life was preferred as affording scope for "contemplation," but this feature soon gave way to another. Labour in some form or other became the note of the monkish life. The monasteries were really the arks in which the civilisation of the ancient world was saved from perishing with that world. The Christianity which had failed to leaven the ancient world of heathenism was to issue from these retreats and leaven the new world reared on the ruins of the old. By labour the monks obtained means for dispensing charity. Both in the East and West the monasteries are generally scenes of industry. Jerome said, "A working monk is tormented by one evil spirit, an idle one by countless evil spirits." We find the Eastern monks engaged in weaving, basket making, cultivating fields and gardens. Monastic labour, however, never reached the dimensions in the East which it did in the West. Here it had a long and fruitful, we may even say glorious, history. Augustine's teaching was decisive on this subject as on many others. He ridicules monkish idleness in biting words, and applies the apostolic law of working and eating to the monks in full force. According to the Benedictine rule, meditation and labour receive each due attention. Seven times a day the brethren assemble in the church at the canonical hours. The rest of the day is given to meditation and toil. The day begins with four hours' toil, then follow two hours devoted to reading the Scripture or good books. After the midday meal there is a time of rest, then again work till the evening meal, and again a brief period of work till bedtime. Cultivation of the land formed a large part of monkish labour in the West. "The cloisters are everywhere the advanced posts of cultivation; they make roads and build bridges; and from the monks the Franks and the other German races learnt cultivation of the soil, manufactures, and art."

After providing for the support of the monastery, the revenue was applied to the relief of need of all kinds. In the West this was done by fixed rule. According to the rule of Benedict the steward of the monastery is to look after the children, the sick, the strangers, and poor. The doorkeeper is to greet every beggar and stranger with "God be praised." Poor and strangers are to be received with respect and carefully provided for, because Christ is received in them. The prior is to eat with them, and even to break

fast for their sakes, except on great fast days. "For near and far the cloister was a source of blessing. In times of scarcity, of barbarian invasion, it was the cloisters which saved the sad remnant of the people from starvation, protected them, and gave them new heart. Benedict himself did not hesitate, in a famine in Campania, to divide all the stores of the cloister of Monte Casino among the poor, trusting God to replenish them. An abbot, Suranus, did the same in Upper Italy on an incursion of Longobards. And when the floods of the national migrations had settled down, the cloisters became the centres of a new civilisation, and the monks the teachers of the young nations." We must also bear in mind the connection between the monastery and hospital. Their histories are interwoven. They were both worked together, often in the same place, and by the same persons. Both at first were dependent on the bishop, and both gradually acquired independence of episcopal jurisdiction.

There are several subordinate ways in which the Church exercised its beneficence. It is no mean glory that through all these ages Christianity was found on the side of the oppressed. No doubt there were instances of priestly arrogance, but these were exceptions. In days when whole nations lay at the mercy of irresponsible despotisms, the Church was the only refuge to which the weak and oppressed could look. In the course of time, indeed, the Church itself became a tyrant; but this was long after the days now under consideration. The Church was the only power of which emperors and governors stood in awe. The Gregories, Basils, Chrysostoms, Augustines, Ambroses, exerted their matchless eloquence on the side of clemency. Bishops were always the friends of the oppressed. The conduct of Ambrose in forbidding Theodosius to enter the Church until he had done penance for the massacres at Thessalonica is typical. When all Antioch was trembling before the Emperor's wrath, the Bishop Flavian went to Constantinople to intercede; Chrysostom comforted the people in his "Pillar Orations," and a monk seized the reins of the judge in the streets with the words, "Say to the Emperor: You are not the sole Emperor; you are only a man, and reign over equals. Human nature has been made after God's image; therefore, let not God's image be effaced with such cruel barbarity."

However subject to abuse afterwards, the right of asylum

attached to churches was no mean protection in those days. It was never meant to shelter gross crimes, but simply to check hasty vengeance, and afford time for negotiations. The right first attached only to the altar, but was afterwards extended to a circle of thirty steps round the church. The attitude of the Church to slavery was not one of absolute hostility. Churches, monasteries, bishops, possessed slaves. What the Church did was, by teaching and discipline, to enforce the right treatment of slaves. Chrysostom allows that slaves have faults, but reminds that there are better means of improving them than the stick. "They are inclined to drunkenness: take from them the opportunity to get drunk. They are inclined to impurity; marry them. This slave is thy sister in Christ. Has she not an immortal soul like thee? Has she not been honoured by the Lord Himself? Does she not sit with thee at one table of the Lord?" The emancipation of slaves was also commended. This was one of the many forms of good works by which men were taught to earn salvation. Many slaves acquired their freedom by becoming monks. And the mild treatment of slaves in the service of monasteries must have had a great influence in the way of example. The Church often used its office of intercession with the authorities on behalf of those ground down by heavy taxation, while all its strength was exerted against the crying evil of usury. In those days usury was rampant, the system of commercial interest was unknown. Men only borrowed under the pressure of need, and were taken advantage of without mercy. Assistance was freely given by the Church in rescuing the victim from the usurer's grasp. Augustine made a collection to reimburse himself for a sum paid on behalf of one Fascius.

The gentle spirit of Christianity was still more powerfully manifested in its concern for the lot of prisoners and captives. An imperial edict of the year 409 made it the bishop's duty to visit the prisons and satisfy himself that none were imprisoned unjustly, or treated cruelly. A canon of the Synod of Orleans, 549, ordains that the archdeacon of the church shall visit the prisons every Sunday to ascertain their condition. A still wider field of beneficence lay before the Church in the ransoming of captives of war. The Roman Empire was a hunting-ground for the barbarians. Goths, Vandals, Lombards, in quick succession, swept multitudes into captivity. "It must have

been a piteous spectacle to see the former masters of the world carried off in the waggons of the barbarian hordes—bound hand and foot, covered with dust and blood." Many succumbed to pain and hunger. Many, if the ransom was not forthcoming at once, were ruthlessly butchered. Many returned with crippled limbs, with noses and ears cut off. One of the most striking testimonies to the extent of the suffering is the petition common in the Liturgies of the day, "O Lord, remember the believers who groan in chains, and grant them again to see their native land." The Church did what it could to mitigate the evil. Ambrose says, "It is the highest liberality to ransom prisoners, and save them from the hands of their foes, to snatch husbands from death and wives from shame, to restore parents to children, and citizens to their native land." Chrysostom in his banishment used some of the money sent by Olympia from Constantinople in buying back prisoners from the wild Isaurians. Gregory the Great's letters contain many references to the subject. Great sums were spent in this cause. For a cleric, who was taken captive, £70 was paid. The ransoming of two Sicilian bishops cost £9,000. For about the same sum Candidus, Bishop of Sergiopolis, ransomed 12,000 prisoners at once. Private persons exercised their beneficence in this way. No scruples were felt at using church treasures and vessels in this service. Ambrose defends the practice thus: "Far more useful is it to preserve souls for the Lord than to preserve gold, for He who sent forth the Apostles without gold also gathered the Church without gold. The Church possesses gold, not to keep but to spend, and therewith help the needy. Would not the Lord demand of us, 'Why didst thou let so many poor die of hunger; why are so many prisoners carried off and not released; why so many slain by the enemy? Better that thou hadst preserved living than metal vessels.' What wilt thou answer? Perhaps: 'I feared lest God's temple might lack the needful ornament.' Would He not reply: 'The sacraments need no gold; their acceptance depends not on gold, for they were not bought with gold'? The beauty of the sacraments is the ransoming of prisoners. How glorious, looking at the prisoners redeemed by the Church, to be able to say: 'These has Christ redeemed. Behold gold of real value, useful gold, the gold of Jesus Christ, which saves from death, ransoms modesty, pre-

serves chastity. I would rather restore thee these prisoners than preserve gold.' The long list of ransomed is nobler than all the glory of gold."

The Church thus presided over the transition from the old world to the new. Our author well says: "Let us suppose that the Roman Empire had fallen into the hands of the Germans earlier, *e.g.*, when Marcus Aurelius only restrained with difficulty the pressure of the Marcomanni on the Donau. They would have blotted out the civilisation of the old world and Christianity, and left not a vestige. Hence the delay, the reprieve afforded to the empire by Constantine's act. The Germans were first to be so far educated as to be equal to the discharge of their high calling. Not as heathens, but as Christians, they are to seize the empire. How differently a Marcomannian leader would have treated Rome from the Goth Alaric!" As the Church stood beside the deathbed of the old world, so it stood beside the cradle of the new. The modern world is as Christian in its whole spirit and texture as the ancient world was heathen. Its poetry, its art, its social and political institutions, are essentially Christian. Only such a convulsion as overwhelmed the old world could dechristianise the new. The extreme forms of atheistic socialism thoroughly recognise this truth. Hence their creed contains but one article, annihilation to everything existing. This also explains the fact that their bitterest hate is reserved for Christianity, churches, and religion in any form. This policy springs from an instinctive recognition of the truth that Christianity and modern civilisation are so interwoven that one cannot be destroyed without the other.

This review of the earliest Christian charity suggests a comparison with modern. We do not think for a moment that the latter shows unfavourably in comparison. On the contrary, we believe that it is immeasurably greater in amount as it is infinitely more diversified in form. The great defect of modern beneficence, undoubtedly, is the want of unity and economy of organisation. The waste on the mere machinery is very great. The channels absorb much of that which should fertilise the land. Whether greater economy and efficiency will be secured, is one of the problems of the future. That Christianity has much to say respecting the great questions of the present—capital and labour, property and co-operation—is certain. We

do not see what other power there is to act the part of mediator and prevent fearful catastrophes. As to the spirit in which these questions should be approached, the Church of the present has much to learn from the past. If history teaches us anything, it is that the sympathy of the Church, in its purest and most glorious days, has been on the side of the needy and suffering. Christianity holds no brief on either side. It teaches that all classes alike have duties as well as rights. It is identified with the selfishness of no order or class, but seeks only the true interests of all. At the same time its highest glory in the future, as in the past, must lie in healing the wrongs, elevating the condition, enriching the lives of the millions of mankind. In proportion as it does this it will be true to its best traditions and to its own motto, "Glory to God in the highest, on earth peace, goodwill towards men."

ART. IV.—1. *The Works of the Rev. William Law, M.A.* Nine Vols. London. 1762.

2. *A Short Account of the Life and Writings of the late Rev. W. Law.* By RICHARD TIGHE. London. 1813.

3. *Notes and Materials for an Adequate Biography of the Celebrated Divine and Theosopher William Law.* Printed for Private Circulation. 1854.

4. *William Law, Nonjuror and Mystic. A Sketch of his Life, Character, and Opinions.* By J. H. OVERTON, M.A. London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1881.

THE *Serious Call* and its companion the *Christian Perfection* have long ceased to be generally read, and of their author little was known by the present generation beyond the facts that he contributed somewhat to the religious revival of the last century, and that he afterwards became a believer in the mystical doctrines of Jacob Behmen. To very few the name of William Law suggested the saintly recluse, the masterly controversialist, the able champion of Anglican theology, and one of the best writers of the golden age of English prose. This ignorance Mr. Overton's timely and interesting biography will do much to dissipate; although it is, perhaps, too much to expect that this hurrying and irreverent age will spare much of its attention for one in whose life and opinions there is so much to rebuke some of its worst tendencies, and to point it to a "more excellent way." Mr. Overton's work would scarcely have satisfied that devoted disciple of Law, the late Mr. Chr. Walton.* It is not exhaustive or profound, but it is accurate and appreciative, sufficiently full for ordinary readers, and exhibits that fairness, ability, and knowledge of the period which we might expect from the joint author of *The History of the English Church in the Eighteenth Century.*

That for so many years no other account of Law's life and opinions had appeared than Tighe's scanty record was, no doubt, greatly owing to the mysticism which so largely tinged all his later views and writings. And hence, too,

* Vide *Notes and Materials, &c.*, pp. xx.—xxv.

in part at least, the oblivion which has overtaken even his most valuable works. But Law was a great power in his day. Courtly and prosperous Latitudinarianism must have felt uncomfortable under his withering exposure of its inconsistencies and mischievous tendencies. His keen and practised logic pierced straight to the central fallacy of fashionable and self-complaisant Deism. He faithfully rebuked the shallow formalism which, with multitudes, did duty for religion, and set forth the nature and claims of real Christianity with a clearness and force never exceeded. The mark to which he pointed others, he conscientiously aimed at himself. He lived what he taught. He recalled to an age, daily drifting further from both, the doctrine and practice of the primitive Church. He was one of the few lights left to illumine what was, perhaps, the darkest period which had ever overtaken morals and religion in this country; and to him many weary souls turned for direction and comfort. People in all parts consulted him in their spiritual difficulties. His *Serious Call* and *Christian Perfection* were in the hands of all the devout and earnest. With John Wesley, during the earlier part of his career, he was "a kind of oracle." He and his brother Charles used to walk twice a year from London to Putney for the benefit of his conversation and counsels. It is hardly too much to say that the great Evangelical reaction, of which Methodism is the most considerable product, received from him its most decided impulse; although beyond that first impulse there is little else of his influence traceable in it than the severe unworldliness which marked its earlier adherents. Far more clearly is the influence of William Law discernible in the great Oxford movement of forty years ago. To the men who originated that movement his lofty spirituality, and his bold recurrence to primitive doctrine and usage as the best exponents of apostolic teaching, were a source of inspiration and strength in their endeavour to arouse the Church of this country to a lively sense of its true origin and functions, and arm it against the menacing advance of a destructive liberalism. The extreme forms and arrogant spirit, however, which mark the later developments of the movement were as far from his spirit as they would have been from his sympathy.

The interest attaching to William Law belongs rather to himself than his history. The lives of few eminent men have been so uneventful. He was born in the year 1686

at King's Cliffe, in Northamptonshire. In 1705 he was entered as a sizar at Emmanuel College, Cambridge, where he graduated in 1708. He was elected Fellow of his college in 1711, and in the same year received holy orders.

After gaining his Fellowship, he continued at Cambridge, and took pupils. For a while the current of his life flowed smoothly on, but in 1713 an event occurred which filled it with trouble, and changed its course. High Church and Tory principles had been outraged by the form which the Revolution had taken, but their partisans had been held down in murmuring helplessness all through the vigorous Whig ascendency of William's reign. From the time of Queen Anne's accession, however, they had been recovering strength and hope, and were now, with dangerous force, assailing the very foundations on which the Revolution settlement rested. The election returns, the attitude of the Lower House of Convocation, the Sacheverell episode, and the tone of the pamphlets ceaselessly pouring from the press, all indicated what sort of spirit was abroad. Whiggism was strongly entrenched in the large towns, in the House of Lords, and on the Episcopal bench; but from the country clergy and gentry, from the younger members of the Universities, and from the Court itself, a tide of opposition had set in which soon assumed the most threatening proportions. It was inevitable that the young Cambridge tutor should be reached and affected by the prevailing agitation. A mind so logical and ardent as that of William Law would not be long in coming to a decision, and could hardly refrain from entering into the strife. He took the opportunity of a tripos speech to play off a little Jacobite sentiment, which so alarmed the heads of houses that they inflicted upon him the severe penalty of degradation. Shortly afterwards he refused to take the oaths of allegiance and adjuration required on the accession of George the First. He was too clear-headed not to see through the fallacies by which multitudes endeavoured to reconcile their convictions with their interests, and far too conscientious to sacrifice duty at the shrine of worldly advantage. As a nonjuror he was obliged to resign his Fellowship, and with it vanished all hope of Church preferment.

Some uncertainty rests on his movements during the next ten years. He seems to have resided in London, and, at one time at least, to have been in somewhat straitened circumstances; but it was during this period that he wrote

some of his ablest and best known works. The first of these, the *Three Letters to the Bishop of Bangor*, appeared in 1717. Few of our readers would care to venture into the bewildering labyrinths of the famous Bangorian controversy. It may suffice to remind them that it was first provoked by Benjamin Hoadley, then Bishop of Bangor, who, in 1716, published a pamphlet entitled *A Preservative Against the Principles and Practices of the Nonjurors*, and in March of the following year preached a sermon before the king on John xviii. 36, which was printed by royal command. In the former he vigorously assails the positions which the nonjurors took up in their denial of the right of Parliament to alter the succession, and of the State to deprive the bishops. In the latter he infers from the text, "My kingdom is not of this world," that Christ's Kingdom or Church is wholly spiritual and invisible, and consists of all who are truly sincere in their religious beliefs. He maintains that Christ is the sole King, Lawgiver, and Judge in His Kingdom, and that the Church has no judicial authority in matters of faith. But, in his anxiety to upset his opponents, he not only pours out his wrath and contempt on principles which Churchmen have held sacred from the beginning, but advocates others utterly subversive of the grounds on which the Church has ever been considered to rest. The circumstances which Churchmen had always regarded as essential to the validity of Christian ordinances are mere "niceties and trifles." Authoritative benedictions and absolutions (which he strangely supposes are unconditional, and imply infallible knowledge) are "vain words."* Even our Lord's claim to forgive sins is only a declaration of His supernatural knowledge of God's will.

The principles which Bishop Hoadley laid down in these publications were, as Dr. Stoughton justly remarks, "so similar to those adopted by Nonconformists, and led so directly to either disestablishment or a thorough alteration in the Church, that it is difficult to understand how he could reconcile his teaching with his position."†

The bishop's assault caused no small stir in the Tory and High-Church camp. The Lower House of Convocation drew up a report on these works, denouncing them as tending to the destruction alike of the royal supremacy and

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* Bp. Hoadley's *Works*, Vol. I. p. 595.
† *Religion in England*, Vol. V. p. 412.

of all discipline and government in the Church itself. The presentation of this report to the Upper House would have been the signal for a renewal, in a fiercer and more dangerous form than ever, of the strife which had long raged between the two Houses. But before it could be presented, Convocation was prorogued by royal mandate, not to assemble again, except for the transaction of merely formal business, till the year 1852. But though Convocation was silenced, the controversy raged. Fifty authors entered the lists; seventy pamphlets appeared in a single month; and it is said that, at one period, the excitement grew so intense that business was suspended on 'Change, and many shops were closed.

William Law was no politician. He took no part in any of the political schemes in which many of the nonjurors were involved; nor did anything but some danger threatening the interests of true religion ever tempt him into the arena of literary conflict. He was, especially at this period, exceedingly jealous for the preservation of those principles on which alone he was convinced the Church, as a Divine institution, could safely rest. Clearly seeing that Bishop Hoadley's argument, pushed to its true conclusions, was fatal to those principles, he at once stood up for their defence. He points out how the bishop's reasoning recoils with destructive effect against the very idea of the Church as a spiritual society, denying authority to its ministers, efficacy to its sacraments, and even nullifying the Christian covenant itself. Well might the free-thinkers claim the bishop as their ally. "Your lordship is ours," Law says, "as you fill a bishopric; but we are at a loss to discover what other interest we have in your lordship." The bishop asserted that benedictions, absolutions, and excommunications were mere "niceties and trifles," "having nothing to do with the favour of God;" and that "to expect the grace of God from any hands but His own is to affront Him." Clearly this implies, as Law shows, that every institution of the Church in which grace is supposed to be conferred through human hands, or by the ministry of the clergy, is "trifling, useless, and affronting to God." Law refers to the forms for Confirmation, Ordination, and the consecration of the Lord's Supper, and asks the bishop how he could administer those offices while he held that to expect any special grace in connection with them was to affront God; and then, adverting to the practice of the

Apostles in laying on of hands, he further inquires "whether we do not plainly want new Scriptures. Must we not give up the Apostles as furious High-Church prelates who aspired to presumptuous claims, and talked of conferring the graces of God by their own hands? Was not this doctrine as strange and unaccountable then as at present? Was it not as inconsistent with the attributes and sovereignty of God at that time to have His graces pass through other hands than His own, as in any succeeding age?" He then proceeds to show that the bishop's objections to authoritative benedictions lay equally against the prayers of Abraham for Abimelech, of Job for his three friends, and the blessing of the people by the priests, the sons of Aaron. As to objecting to the authoritative ministrations of the clergy because they were only men, Naaman might as well object that the water of Jordan was only water. Most of the positive institutions of Christianity must be given up if the natural weakness of men makes them incapable of communicating grace to their brethren. He then argues that the order of the clergy derives its authority from the Holy Ghost, just as do the Sacraments and the Scriptures, and for that reason is no more to be altered or set aside than they are; while their power is conditional, just as that of every other means of grace is. Law then points out the absurdity of the bishop's suggestion that the famous text on the Power of the Keys might refer merely to the power to inflict or cure diseases, and animadverts severely upon the Socinian cast of his interpretation of our Lord's claim to have power on earth to forgive sins.

In reply to the representation of the Committee of Convocation, the bishop had explained that all he had said about the Church of Christ referred not to *a* church, but to *the invisible* Church. In his third letter, Law humorously exposes the hollowness of this explanation. "To call the number of men and women who believe in Christ and observe His institutions the invisible Church, is as false and groundless as to call them the order of angels or the church of the seraphim." The profession of Christians is as visible as any other profession, and as much declared by visible acts. All our Lord's references to His Church imply that it is a visible external society. The bishop's assertion, that his description of the Church as an invisible body was the only true one, was a contradiction of the 19th

Article of the Church of England. The tendency of his teaching was to make visible churches and external ordinances alike indifferent. The words of our Lord, "My Kingdom is not of this world," do not describe what His Kingdom *is*, but what it is *not*; and the elaborate inferences which the bishop drew from them have about as much relation to them as if they had been deduced from the first verse of the Book of Genesis. Law further goes on to argue that the bishop's objections to Church authority would be equally applicable to all authority; that excommunication is something more than the common right which all have to avoid the company of those whom they dislike; that we are as much obliged by Divine authority to external communion with the Church of Christ, as we are to be just and honest in all our dealings; that sincerity, as such, cannot be the sole condition of God's favour; and that the doctrines of Church authority and communion condemned by the bishop are perfectly consistent with the principles of the Reformation.

If any one wishes to see one of the very ablest defences of Anglican Church principles, he should read these brilliant letters. Whatever he may think of the soundness of the positions maintained by Law, he cannot, at least, help admiring the grave courtesy, fine irony, and logical acumen with which he assails those of his adversary. As against a Churchman, and especially a bishop, the argument of the *Three Letters* is irresistible. Hoadley never replied to them, and Sherlock was probably not far from the mark when he said, that he could think of only one reason why he did not do so.

In 1723, Law published his *Remarks on the Fable of the Bees*, in reply to Dr. Bernard Mandeville's *Fable of the Bees, or Private Vices, Public Benefits*—a short doggerel poem, with rather lengthy notes. The moral of the fable is, that pride, luxury, and vice are essential to the prosperity of society, and that the general practice of what is called virtue would lead to national ruin. Man is a mere animal, and "the moral virtues are the political offspring which flattery begot upon pride." The doctrine taught is that of the lowest expediency—utilitarianism without the decent garments it usually borrows from Christianity. The grand jury of Middlesex presented the book as dangerous to religion and order. In itself it was not worthy of a serious reply; but as indicating the practical tendency of

the sceptical development of Locke's philosophy, and symptomatic of a widely-spread diseased state of moral feeling, it called for the gravest consideration. Bishop Berkeley attempted to refute it by elaborate calculations; but Law took far higher ground. He opens his attack by showing, with admirable satire, that the author's way of accounting for the origin of moral virtue would just as rationally account for the origin of man's erect posture and his use of speech. He then proceeds to point out the true origin of moral virtue. Regarded as the rule or law of intelligent beings, "it is as much without beginning as truth and goodness, which are in their natures as eternal as God;" but, considered as the object of man's knowledge, "it began with the first man, and was as natural to him as it is natural to man to think or perceive, or feel the difference between pleasure and pain." "The reasonableness and fitness of actions themselves is a law to rational beings," and even to the Divine Nature itself. "God is necessarily just and good, not from any external force, but from the excellence of justice and goodness," and it is the will of God that makes moral virtue our law. The whole work, though one of his smallest, is in Law's best style, and well deserves the high praise bestowed on it by John Sterling, in a letter quoted by Maurice, in his "Introduction" to a reprint of it. "I have never seen," he says, "in our language, the elementary grounds of a rational, ideal philosophy, as opposed to empiricism, stated with nearly the same clearness, simplicity, and force."

Law next wrote a tract entitled, *The Absolute Unlawfulness of Stage Entertainments fully Demonstrated*, which he afterwards incorporated in his *Christian Perfection*. In this tract he condemns the stage as being contrary to the whole nature and temper of Christianity, and because it cannot but grieve the Holy Spirit for Christians to hire persons to regale their ears with wicked, vain, and impure discourse. The play-house "is as certainly the house of the devil, as the church is the house of God." "You must consider that all the laughter there is not only vain and foolish, but that it is a laughter amongst devils, that you are upon profane ground, and hearing music in the very porch of hell." "The stage never has one innocent play." "The business of the player is not a more Christian employment than that of robbers!" These are comparatively mild specimens of his language on the subject. His

denunciation becomes at times almost violent, and is too sweeping and unmeasured to be always quite just. We cannot, however, agree with Mr. Overton in his stern condemnation of Law's pamphlet. Even admitting the truth of all that is advanced in favour of the theatre, we think Law's arguments against professing Christians attending it are unanswerable. And it must be remembered what the English stage was in his day. John Wesley speaks of it as "the sink of all profaneness and debauchery." David Hume refers to its "scandalous licentiousness." Leslie Stephen, in his *History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century*, says, "To confess the truth, I must say that, in spite of all ingenious defences, it seems to me that pruriency and cynicism are the best qualifications for a thorough enjoyment of the Congreve school of comedy."* Things are certainly better now. Public decency is respected. It is, no doubt, possible for players to be of blameless reputation. But when one remembers how many modern plays are mere adaptations from the French, —steeped in the atmosphere of passion and intrigue— when we bear in mind the temptations to which the life of actors and actresses exposes them, and when we add to this the sacrifice of time and money involved in habitual play-going, together with the late hours, the excitement, the facilities afforded young men for commencing a fast and gay life by the sensual attractions which gather in the immediate neighbourhood of theatres,—it is strange that any who profess to be real, earnest Christians can be found to patronise them, and still more strange that they should be encouraged in it by even episcopal defence and sanction. The marked increase of theatre-going among Evangelical Nonconformists is but one of many indications how far the type has degenerated from the strict unworldliness which formerly distinguished it.

In same year, 1726, Law published his *Practical Treatise upon Christian Perfection*. His was a nature extremely sensitive to logic and conscience. Shams, pretexts, compromises, were as abhorrent to his heart, as fallacies to his reason. When such a nature finds itself face to face with Christianity as taught by its Author and exemplified by His Apostles and the primitive Christians, the result cannot fail to be a revolt from the conventional piety of

the day, and an earnest protest against it. The startling and painful sense of the want of agreement between the two has led, in the past, to the founding of new religious orders, and in more recent times, to the formation of religious societies. In Law's case it resulted in a life-long endeavour to act out, both in letter and spirit, the high precepts of our Lord, and called forth the *Christian Perfection*, and its great successor the *Serious Call*, which seem to stand in the midst of a worldly Church, uttering their solemn protests, like the two Witnesses of the Apocalypse.

By Christian Perfection Law does not mean Entire Sanctification or Perfect Love. He defines it as "the right and full performance of those duties which are necessary for all Christians, and common to all states of life." "What can it be," he asks, "but a living in such holy tempers, and acting with such dispositions as Christianity requires? Now, if this be perfection, who can exceed it? And yet what state, or circumstances of life, can allow any people to fall short of it?"* He lays it down, to start with, that the sole end of Christianity is to deliver us from the misery and disorder of this present state, and to raise us to a blissful enjoyment of the Divine Nature. His description of this present world is drawn in colours somewhat too gloomy and unrelieved. It is "the remains of a drowned world, full of marks of God's displeasure, and the sin of its inhabitants:" "it is a mere wilderness, a state of darkness, a vale of misery, where vice and madness, dreams and shadows, variously please, agitate, and torment the short, miserable lives of men." He takes no account of the beauty and good and joy which God has permitted to linger here for our comfort and hope. He loses sight of love and friendship and knowledge, of the flower, the landscape, the sunset, the song of birds, and the happy laughter of children.

The Christian state to which the Gospel raises us is "an invisible life in the Spirit of God, which ranks us in a certain order among heavenly beings in Christ Jesus;" so that nothing concerns us but what concerns an immortal spirit going to God; no enjoyments are worth a thought but such as will help to increase our fitness for heaven. It is not any number of moral virtues, nor modes of worship, nor articles of faith, that makes us true Christians,

* Law's *Works*, Vol. III. p. 3.

but a new principle of life, an entire change of temper. Christianity requires us to renounce the world's cares as well as the world's pleasures: no degree of piety is to be neglected for business; even the necessaries of life are to be sought with a kind of indifference. Whatever degree of holiness was required of the first Christians is required now, and for the same reasons.

Several chapters are devoted to the duty of renunciation of the world and all worldly tempers. Taking his stand on the words of our Lord, his teaching on this point is of the severest and most uncompromising type, and yet one cannot say that the doctrine is not fairly drawn from the text. Our Lord's direction to the rich young man to sell all that he had and give to the poor, is the rule for all rich men; but they sufficiently sell all who part with the self-enjoyment of it, and use it for the support of those who need it. There is no more necessity for entering a cloister in order to renunciation of the world, and the cultivation of those degrees of holiness and those Divine tempers which Christianity requires, than for giving up clothes in order to avoid vanity. "They renounce the world as they ought who live in it without worldly tempers, and take their part in the offices of life without complying with the spirit that reigns in the world."

Law then deals with self-denial and mortification as a necessary part of Christian duty. Christianity is a *doctrine of the Cross*. We ought to conform ourselves to the sufferings of Christ just as to His holiness. We cannot suppose that He suffered for us that we might live in pleasure. The self-denial and taking up of the cross required by our Lord of all who would follow Him, imply something more than resistance of temptation, or doing good at the cost of our own ease. This self-denial is only the fitting expression of that state of repentance and sorrow for sin to which we are called. "It is suited to such as have forsaken all to follow Christ; it is suited to such as are to be dead and crucified to the world, to such as are to be meek and lowly as Christ; it is suited to such as are commanded to love and do all good to their most violent enemies, and who are to love their neighbours as themselves." The doctrines of self-denial are as much laws to all Christians as the Ten Commandments are. He then shows the reasonableness of self-denial. The call to holiness is necessarily a call to deny ourselves of all that corrupts our minds,

supports our vanity, or nourishes sensuality: and "if there are any denials or mortifications that purify and enlighten the soul, that lessen the power of bodily passions, that raise us to a heavenly affection, and make us taste and relish the things that be of God; these are as necessary to be practised, as it is necessary to believe in Jesus Christ." The reasonableness of self-denial is further founded on our need of Divine grace. As our true life is from the Holy Spirit, and we are only God's children as we are led by His Spirit, we are bound to practise all that self-denial which will both keep us from grieving Him, and make our hearts quick and responsive to His movements. The false satisfactions and trifles of life just as really prevent people from living in the Spirit of God as the debaucheries of intemperance. Law here illustrates his point by some of those character sketches which so frequently appear in his subsequent writings. They show the hand of a master; every touch tells; all is nature and truth; and now and then gleams of grave humour play over the picture. *Titius* is so great a mathematician that he does not know when Sunday comes: *Philo* is a virtuoso, and the truths of religion seem small things in his eyes, for his soul is extended to all the curiosities of the world; *Patronus* is an enemy to the Dissenters, and loves the Church of England because of the stateliness and beauty of its buildings; he never comes to the sacrament, but he will go forty miles to see a fine altar-piece: *Publius* goes to church sometimes, but knows nothing of all he hears or prays there, his head is so full of politics; and "he dies with little or no religion through a constant fear of Popery." *Siccus* "might have been a religious man, but that he thought building was the chief happiness of a rational creature. He is all the week amongst dirt and mortar, and stays at home on Sundays to view his contrivances. He will die more contentedly if his death does not happen whilst some wall is in building."

Law devotes a chapter to the condemnation of vain and impertinent books; and when we remember the character of the fashionable light literature of his day, we cannot wonder at the strength of his language. He fails, however, to say a word in favour of those books which, although not directly and confessedly religious, are at least both interesting and improving. Surely the same God who has brightened this outer world with many a gleam of beauty and gladness, and is the author of poetic

imagination and artistic skill, has provided both the one and the other to aid in softening humanity's hard lot and beguiling its pilgrim way.

He then dwells very beautifully on that constant state of prayer and devotion to which Christians are called. The following passage on devotion as a state and temper of the heart may serve as a specimen: "Friendship does not require us to be always waiting upon our friends in external services; these offices have their times and seasons of intermission; it is only the service of the heart, the friendship of the mind, that is never to intermit; it is not to begin and end as external services do; but it is to persevere in a constancy like the motion of our heart, or the beating of our pulse. It is just so in devotion; prayers have their hours, their beginning and ending; but that turn of mind, that disposition of the heart towards God, which is the life and spirit of prayer, is to be as constant and lasting as our own life and spirit." * Shortness in prayer is no excellence: frequent and continuous prayer is enjoined upon us by our Lord and His Apostles, and will react most blessedly on our own hearts in rightly disposing them towards God.

He concludes his treatise with an earnest exhortation to labour after this perfection. Not only has the world nothing to offer that is comparable to it, but our faithful endeavour to attain it is necessary to our salvation; for "though our imperfections will not prevent the Divine mercy, yet it cannot be proved that God has any terms of favour for those who do not labour to be as perfect as they can."

The *Christian Perfection* has been charged with presenting the Gospel under a somewhat gloomy aspect, and with making too little reference to Christ's work and God's mercy. We can well understand that one who has been trained in the religion-made-easy doctrines of much of the present-day evangelism, would feel a sort of unpleasant shock as he turns over these pages, and finds himself confronted by an ideal of Christian perfection such as he had never dreamt of. Commands of the Lord Jesus which he has read a thousand times with the vaguest of impressions, and which, probably, he has never heard preached from, shine out before him with an awful and penetrating light, a meaning that cannot be missed, and

* *Works*, Vol. III. p. 368.

a force not to be evaded. The fact is, the treatise presents us with an aspect of Christianity familiar enough to the early Church, but strange indeed to those whose religion, while it enables them to talk freely of assured salvation, is of a sort that interferes as little with their habitual tempers as with their business or their comforts. The charge of dwelling too little on the redeeming work of Christ, and on God's covenanted mercy to believers, is altogether impertinent. Law's purpose did not require him to treat definitely of these points; but there are not wanting indications that a firm belief in the doctrine of the atonement, and of justification by faith, lies at the foundation of this treatise, and of its companion, the *Serious Call.*

Of Law's life during his ten years' residence in London, very little is known; but in 1727 we find him at Putney, in the family of Mr. Gibbon, grandfather of the historian, in the capacity of tutor to his only son, Edward. Law remained there twelve years, "the much-honoured friend and spiritual director of the whole family."* The best information concerning Law's life at Putney is contained in the amusing journal of the quaint, gentle John Byrom, who was first drawn to him, as were many others, by reading the *Serious Call.* Byrom paid his first visit to Law in 1729, and from that time these two men, so entirely unlike each other, became intimate friends. Byrom regarded Law with great veneration and affection, and looked up to him as his master and guide.

His description of his various interviews with Law is simple, fragmentary, full of detail, and abounding in those graphic touches which reveal the characters of both master and disciple, and also give us interesting little glimpses into the social life of the period.

We cannot forbear inserting here, in illustration, part of a passage, the whole of which is given by Mr. Overton (*Life and Opinions, &c.*, p. 69).

After telling how, having put on his boots and coat and trunk-hose, and duly shaved and powdered, he went to the King's Arms in Fulham, and regaled himself with four Brentford rolls and half a pint of cider, Byrom proceeds thus (under date, June 7, 1735):—"I went to Putney afoot, and walked past the house and into a field, and about

* Gibbon's *Memoirs and Letters*, p. 22.

three inquired for Mr. Law, and Miss Gibbon came to me and went with me into the garden, and brought me to him, walking by the green grass by a canal. He asked if I had dined? I said 'Yes;' and after salutation and a turn or two: 'Well, what do you say?' to which I answered that 'I had a great many things to say, but I dare not.' It was not long before Mrs. Bourignon became the subject of his discourse,* and he said much about her and against her; seemed to think that she had great assistance from the Spirit of God, but questioned much if she did not mix her own as Luther did; said that he had locked her up that Miss Gibbon might not find her among his books, that he had not met with anybody fit to read her, and mentioned her saying that there were no Christians but herself; and, above all, her rendering the necessity of Christ's death needless, which was the very foundation of all Christianity; and that she would puzzle any man what to do, and that she thought the world would be at an end. He mentioned Mr. John Walker some time in the afternoon, that he had left his father because he could not comply, and yet he heard since that he went to assemblies, which was impossible for a true Christian to be persuaded to do; mentioned one that came to ask about some indifferent matter his advice, and he heard that since he was going to join holy orders and matrimony together; I suppose he meant Houghton. Upon my asking if Rusbrochius† was the first of those writers,‡ he said, 'You ask an absurd question. Excuse me,' says he, 'for being so free;' that there never was an age since Christianity but there had been of those writers. . . . He said that the bottom of all was that this world was a prison into which we were fallen, that we had nothing to do but to get out of it, that we had no misery but what was in it. . . . He said that there was a necessity for every one to feel the torment of sin; that it was necessary for them to die in this manner and descend into hell with Christ, and so to rise again with Him; that every one must pass through this fiery trial in this world or another. . . . That the preachers durst not speak upon the subject of the

* Byrom had been much taken with her mystical writings.

† John Ruysbroek, prior of the convent of Grunthal, a celebrated mystic of the fourteenth century. His works were in Law's library, evidently much read.

‡ The mystics.

cross; that we do not know what our Lord suffered, that the sacrifice of His human body was the least thing in it. There were two men drawing the rolling-stone, and he said how fine it would be if they would learn piety, but they would not be taught; that Mr. Gibbon's other daughter was married; that it was such an absurdity to come to the Communion with patches or paint, which no Christian would have done formerly." Odd and confused as this account is, it correctly represents Law's well-known opinions on certain points, and gives us a good impression of the force and fulness of his conversation.

During the early part of his residence at Putney, Law published his greatest, or at least, his best-known work, *A Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life, adapted to the State and Condition of all Orders of Christians.* Admirably does this fine treatise justify its title. While quite as serious and closely reasoned as the *Christian Perfection*, its style is much brighter. The author dwells more largely on the happier side of Christian experience, and makes more use of the plan of introducing sketches of imaginary characters, which he had commenced in the former work. He starts from the principle that Christians are called to a life devoted to God; he exposes the folly of those who strictly attend public worship and yet live worldly lives, and in the sketches of *Leo* and *Eusebius* shows that the difference between some who are regarded as pious Christians and those who ignore religion altogether is *nil*. The former only add Christian devotion to a heathen life. The cause of this inconsistency is the lack of that intention to please God in all the actions of life in which Christianity really consists. The only way to please God in any state or employment is to live therein to His glory. He dwells largely on the right use of wealth, and insists that there is no other measure of our doing good than our power of doing it. The effects on character of a wrong or right use of wealth are then illustrated in two of his most finished sketches, those of *Flavia* and *Miranda*.

He puts in striking contrast the real happiness of a life devoted to God and the misery and folly of one given up to self-indulgence, and shows that even the most regular life, not governed by the spirit of devotion, is really foolish and vain. The remainder of the book is taken up with the subject of private devotions. He

recommends the observance of the canonical hours, and the practice of daily singing the Psalms. He dwells much on the cultivation of a spirit of humility, and shows how the difficulty of doing so is greatly increased by the false methods of education in vogue. Every point is illustrated by one or more character portraits, drawn with wonderful insight, and sometimes with fine humour.

The *Serious Call* was popular from the first, and soon ran through many editions. Its influence was immense. Mr. Overton says that "next to the Bible it contributed more than any other book to the rise and spread of the great Evangelical revival of the eighteenth century." That this is correct, few of those acquainted with the facts will doubt. The *Christian Perfection* had largely prepared the way. No appeal to Scripture so powerfully reasoned, so aptly and forcibly illustrated, had ever been made to the heart and conscience of the nation. And there was deep need of such an appeal. Locke's empirical philosophy had done great service in supplying principles for the justification and defence of the Revolution; but it had exercised an unhappy influence on the religious life of the nation. It strengthened the reigning dynasty, but undermined a powerful Church. Denying to man the faculty of directly recognising that which is Divine, and making sense the ultimate source of knowledge, and reason the sole test of truth, it at once lowered the tone of religious sentiment and the level of religious argument. It furnished the opponents of Christianity with their keenest weapons of attack, and deprived its friends of their most effective means of defence. Falling in with the political aims of the many, flattering the pride of human reason, and lessening the restraints of spiritual mysteries, it was widely welcomed, and soon spread its spirit through every department of mental activity, materially aiding the triumph of Whiggism in politics, latitudinarianism in religion, and Philistinism everywhere. The Church was still engaged in its weary strife with Deists and Nonjurors, defending itself against the former by long lines of evidences, and attacking the latter with principles which, while sapping the enemy's position, also undermined its own. Mitres rewarded distinguished services to the reigning policy. Crowds of unprincipled flatterers choked every avenue to preferment. A cold, formal, worldly spirit crept down like a mountain mist from the high places

of the Church, and spread itself everywhere. Loyalty lost its veneration, and religion its zeal and devotion. Advanced intelligence, both among Churchmen and Dissenters, had become tainted with Socinianism, while the great mass of Christian professors were content with a dead and decent orthodoxy. Scepticism and profligacy pervaded the upper classes; the lower were becoming more and more brutal and wretched.

Yet things were not so bad as to be past remedy. There were thousands "who had not bowed the knee to Baal." Here and there, among tradesmen and farmers, and in many a cottage, and hall, and country vicarage, might be found some faintly glowing embers of the ancient piety. Upon these the solemn and stirring appeal of Law's two great treatises came like the breath of the Spirit, and they burst at once into flame, and thus was commenced that great Revival which took its most extensive and permanent form under the preaching of the Wesleys. Of the *Serious Call* John Wesley speaks as "a treatise which will hardly be excelled, if it be equalled, in the English tongue, either for beauty of expression, or for justness and depth of thought."* Again, we find him saying, "All the Methodists carefully read these books and were greatly profited thereby." † The power of the *Serious Call* was acknowledged by others besides Methodists. Dr. Johnson says that his reading it while at Oxford was the first occasion of his thinking earnestly about religion. Gibbon, the historian, refers to it thus: "If he finds a spark of piety in his reader's mind he will soon kindle it to a flame; and a philosopher must allow that he exposes, with equal severity and truth, the strange contradiction between the faith and practice of the Christian world." ‡ Even Leslie Stephen, far enough from holding Law's views, is yet impelled to say of it: "The power can only be adequately felt by readers who can study it on their knees; and those to whom a difference of faith renders that attitude impossible, doubt whether they are not in a position somewhat resembling that of Mephistopheles in the cathedral." §

It has been strongly urged against the *Serious Call*, that its teaching is lacking in the *Gospel* element. This must be admitted; but it must be borne in mind that it

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* Sermon CXVIII. † Sermon CVII. ‡ *Memoirs, &c.*, p. 21.
§ *History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century*, Vol. II. p. 394.

was intended, not to set forth a complete system of theology, nor to serve as a book of devotion, but simply to arouse professing Christians to a sense of their "high calling," and to stimulate them to a serious endeavour to live up to it. It presupposes Christian faith; it is what its title indicates, a *Serious Call* to Christian duty. Its spirit and aim are those of the Sermon on the Mount, and of the Epistle of St. James. We know of no reading better adapted to deepen and intensify religious conviction, or to quicken and guide religious activity. It has been of immense service in awakening the consciences of those "dead in trespasses and sins;" but its greatest use is in stimulating the earnestness and devotion of those in whose souls the living fire of Gospel faith and love has been already kindled.

About the year 1732, Law published a small volume entitled *The Case of Reason, or Natural Religion Fairly and Fully Stated, &c.* This is a reply to Matthew Tindal's book, *Christianity as Old as the Creation.* In this ably-written work, which made a great sensation at the time of its appearance, Tindal maintained that morality does not depend on the mere will of God, but on the eternal fitness of things, which is the sole rule of God's actions; and that this eternal fitness of things is discernible by human reason. Law was willing to grant the former proposition, but he denied the latter, arguing that if God's nature be absolutely perfect, the rule of His actions must be above human comprehension, and that therefore reason cannot discover the eternal fitness of things. Tindal further taught that that cannot be true, nor of Divine obligation, which is not discoverable and demonstrable by reason; that there is neither light nor law beyond nature; and that there is nothing really mysterious in revelation; that what appears so is the invention of priests. Law clearly shows that as natural religion is as full of mysteries as revealed, Tindal's reasoning is as valid against the former as the latter: that in fact it leads directly to Atheism, and thus to the overthrow of the Deist's own position. He points out the inability of Deists to produce any proof whatever of that perfect reliability and all-sufficiency of reason which they so confidently assert, and urges against their assumption the testimony of six thousand years of human history. In fact, he demonstrates the hollowness of the whole *Case of Reason* as against revealed religion. The treatise itself is

a marvel of keen and powerful logic, clothed in a style the most forcible and elegant. It will always repay careful perusal as one of the ablest replies to a class of objections against Revelation which under various forms is ever being arrayed against it.

In 1731-2, Law wrote three admirable letters to a lady who was inclined to enter the communion of the Church of Rome. This lady, who was probably the daughter of the learned Henry Dodwell, was drawn to the Roman communion as the shortest way to get rid of the difficulties with which she was confronted. If God approved the Church of England, she argued, surely more benefit would attend its services. Law replied that the same might be said of the Church of Rome and of the Church of ancient Israel. Besides, how could she certainly know who were receiving good? Referring to some animadversions on the method of the Reformation, he justly remarks that the bare history of it is satire enough, but the history of the Popes is quite as scandalous. The sins of both Reformers and Papists were purely personal, and do not affect the question between them. The means of salvation, he goes on to say, are fully preserved both in the English and Roman communion, for all who are disposed to make a right use of them. He regards the members of the Church of Rome as just as much his brethren in Christ as any Protestants, and thankfully refers to the benefit which he received from the works of many of their writers. At the same time he plainly tells his correspondent that her desire to enter that Church was merely the result of a restless, inquisitive, and self-seeking temper, for which resignation to God's will is the best cure.

Law's attitude towards the Church of Rome, as indicated in these letters, and in the *Appeal to All that Doubt, &c.*, written several years later, was that maintained by the Non-jurors generally, and by many Churchmen of a former generation. While he abhorred her superstitions, and strongly denounced her persecuting spirit, he could not join in a blind and wholesale condemnation; nor could he forbear expressing his thanks to God that, despite the corruptions and hindrances to piety which prevail in that Church, "so many eminent spirits, great saints, have appeared in it, whom we should thankfully behold as so many great lights hung out by God to show the true way to heaven; as so many joyful proofs that Christ is still

present in that Church, as well as in other Churches, and that the gates of hell have not prevailed, or quite overcome it."

Before the publication of his next work, which took place in 1737, Law had adopted the views set forth in the writings of the German mystic, Jacob Behmen. These views he maintained till his death in 1761, and with them all his later works are more or less pervaded. The English mind has not proved a very congenial soil for mysticism. William Law is almost its only considerable product, but it must be admitted that he is a magnificent specimen of that genus, and would be remarkable even where mysticism has flourished most.

It must not be supposed that when Law became a mystic he threw away all his previous theological beliefs. On the contrary, he tenaciously clung to all those doctrines which, as a strictly conscientious Churchman, he had held from the commencement of his course, and to which as a clergyman he believed himself bound by his vows. His mysticism seemed, so to speak, to pervade and envelope his theology, without destroying or even disarranging the least portion of it. It was to him the apprehension of that grand and eternal system of things, of which the creed of the Church and the appearances of nature are but the partial and formal presentation. To him it seemed as if the mist had lifted: it was no longer a tower or pinnacle shining out here and there that he saw; but the whole city of God stood revealed in all its wonderful and harmonious perfection.

Mysticism has too often been judged by its exaggerated forms, or by those wild growths which, from time to time, have attached themselves to it. All true mysticism starts from the profound conviction that God is in every man, and that man can only be what he ought to be, only find true life and light and rest, when he enters into communion with Him. To find Him, he must turn away from the world without, abandon all thought of self, and be content to see and know nothing but God. Thus seeking Him by faith and love and with entire humility, in the sanctuary of his own spirit, he will find Him, to his inexpressible comfort and peace. To this the Christian mystic adds as necessary his recognition of the work of the Mediator and of the help of the Holy Spirit. The more completely he realises this oneness with God, the more clearly he

sees Him in all things, and all things in Him. The outer world begins to give up its secret in the type of the inner and spiritual world, and Holy Scripture opens out a wealth of heavenly suggestion, even in its least promising portions, such as was never suspected to lie within it.

Law was well read in the writings of all the Christian mystics, commencing with the Egyptian Macarius and the pseudo-Dionysius, down to "the great Fénélon" and "the illuminated Guyon"; but he seems to have been most attracted by the great German mystics of the fourteenth century. He admired and studied the works of Ruysbrück, the prior of Grünthal, but most of all those of Tauler, the saintly Dominican of Strasbourg, of whom Luther said "he was a teacher such as had been none since the time of the Apostles." He used and recommended the *Theologia Germanica*, and was familiar with the *Imitatio Christi*. He was never much in love with the Quietists, although there is not a little in their writings which strictly harmonised with his own most cherished opinions. It was to Father Malebranche that he owed his first impulse towards mysticism. Accidentally taking up a copy of one of his works during his undergraduate days at Cambridge, he felt, as he told Byrom at their first interview, "as if all other books were trifles to this." Malebranche was a man after Law's own heart,—powerful and refined in intellect, and leading a life devoted to piety and charity; and the mystic element so closely inwoven with his idealistic philosophy made him one of Law's most favourite authors. Thus for many years Christian mysticism, in its purest and best forms, had been taking root in his mind. It was probably about the year 1734 that Law met with the writings of Jacob Behmen. At first he felt repelled by their apparent wildness, but as he continued to study them their true meaning became clear, and when at length he fairly grasped the system as a whole, he entirely gave himself up to its sway. Behmen stands at the head of the theosophic mystics,—of those who believed that not only might the sincere and humble soul, turning its steadfast gaze within, find God Himself there, but might also, in some degree, have "opened up" within it a perception of the real natures and relations of all things in heaven and earth. Behmen was regarded by his disciples as singularly privileged in this respect. He was poor and uneducated,

but deeply pious, humble, and gentle, and possessed of a strongly poetic imagination. Praying and meditating, with scarce any other light than that afforded by the Scriptures themselves, he evolved from his own consciousness, or as he believed, there was divinely opened within him the whole, real, secret system of the universe, —the true account of its nature, origin, and destiny. By this illumination he could explain the true meaning of a Bible text, or the real nature of a flower or a stone. The wild, uncouth jargon in which for the most part Behmen set forth his views, was quite enough to account for the chorus of condemnation with which they were greeted in our own country, where ignorance of mystical doctrines is so general. Scarcely any one thought it worth while to examine if there might not be some "method" in all this "madness." In Law, however, Behmenism found a soil prepared to receive it. His long and thorough acquaintance with mysticism, and deep sympathy with those truths which lie at the heart of all its various forms, enabled him to grasp Behmen's ideas and get at the very core of his system. And now in the outpourings of this, as he believed, divinely illumined shoemaker of Gorlitz, he found himself face to face with what seemed to him that grand, eternal reality which underlies all the facts of nature and all the doctrines of revelation; and thus the longing of his mind for the logical completeness of its knowledge and faith was entirely set at rest. He had found that centre from which he could behold the whole mighty universe existing in God, and moving on through all its destined cycles in obedience to the laws of Eternal Nature.

In all Law's later works we meet with Behmen's doctrines, but in a very different form from that in which their author first sent them out into the world. Behmenism, after it has passed through the refining crucible of Law's powerful mind, and been baptised with his devout and earnest spirit, and found expression in his luminous and impressive style, presents a by no means unattractive appearance. Any attempt to give even an outline of Behmen's theosophy would more than absorb all our remaining space. A brief notice of some of Law's later works, however, may afford our readers some little insight into this boldest, most elaborate, and most complete of all theosophic systems.

For three years Law had been engaged in the devout

study of Behmen's writings, when the appearance of a book entitled *A Plain Account of the Nature and End of the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper* impelled him again to take up his pen. Although published anonymously, the authorship of this book is universally attributed to Hoadley, then Bishop of Winchester—Law's old antagonist. The position assumed is, that all that can be known about the nature, end, and effects of that Sacrament is contained in the words of Christ in its institution, interpreted according to "the common rules of speaking in like cases." Law asks whether the world affords any like case, either as to the person speaking, or the thing spoken of. The words of the institution must have conveyed to the Apostles, as they first heard them, a very narrow and inadequate meaning, as compared with that which they were afterwards seen to bear when beheld in the light of a full knowledge of our Lord's Person and mission, and a full apprehension of the articles of our Christian faith.

His own views as to this Sacrament were those of a High Churchman; but the influence of Behmen is plainly evident in the mode in which he maintained those views. "As all things come from God, and all things have something of God and goodness in them, so all things have magnetical effects and instincts both towards God and one another." This is the life, the force, the power, the nature of everything. Hoadley contended against the possibility of any good coming to us through the Sacraments, except by way of our reason. Law argues that no good whatever, natural or spiritual, can come to men through their reason, but only through the sensibility of their nature, "while reason can only view through its own glass what is done." Hoadley sums up the whole working creed of the reason-worshipping latitudinarian party to which he belonged, from Tillotson downwards, when he places our highest good in "the uniform practice of morality, chosen by ourselves, as our happiness here and our unspeakable reward hereafter;" and Law has no difficulty in convicting him of rejecting the whole method of salvation by Jesus Christ.

Law's next publication was a short treatise, called *The Ground and Reason of Christian Regeneration.* This little work contains the first full exposition of his views as a mystic after they had become modified, and, as we may add, sadly marred, by his Behmenism. What we find here, and throughout his later writings, is a theology in the

main sound and Scriptural, presented in what might well be taken for strangely exaggerated figurative language, but which the author intends for exactly real description. Law's mind was strong in logical power, but weak in imagination and sympathy: he was a born reasoner: but such minds miss much truth, and often embrace serious error, for want of that delicacy of perception which discerns, or rather feels, relations beyond the grasp of logic, and thus exerts a modifying influence on the judgment. Such, however, was Law's profound belief in all the great articles of the Christian faith, and such his reverence for the Scriptures, his intense earnestness, his devoutness of spirit, his deep acquaintance with the workings of the human heart, and the wealth of spiritual thought, clothed in the purest forms of language, that lies scattered throughout his writings, that the careful and discerning Christian may, despite his Behmenism, read him with no small profit. In this work, *The Ground of Reason, &c.*, Law argues that as the indwelling of the Son of God and of the Holy Spirit constituted man's original light and life, and his Fall resulted in their withdrawal from him, so his recovery can only be by the restoration of this Divine indwelling,—a New Birth within him of the Son and the Holy Ghost. The primal germ of this new birth was, however, hidden in our nature immediately after the Fall. Christ, "the seed of the woman," who is to "bruise the serpent's head," is "the Light that lighteneth every man that cometh into the world," and the source of that general and preventing grace of God in which lies the possibility and beginning of our personal salvation. In perfect consistency with his High-Church theology Law maintains that the Divinely appointed means whereby this latent seed of life is quickened into a real New Birth of God in the soul is the sacrament of Baptism.

In the early part of 1740 Law published *An Earnest and Serious Answer to Dr. Trapp's Discourse of the Folly, Sin, and Danger of being Righteous Overmuch.* Dr. Trapp was a fair representative of the easy-going clergy of that evil time, baptised with the very spirit of the age, whom the evangelical revival, and especially the rise of Methodism, made very uncomfortable. Dr. Trapp, with a good deal of truth, traced this great movement to Law's two practical treatises,—*The Perfection* and *The Call*,—concerning which, he says, he "had prophesied that they would do harm,

and so it had happened, for shortly afterwards up sprung the Methodists." Law's reply to Trapp's violent assault is remarkable for its self-restraint, its tender earnestness, and the solemn and crushing weight of its rebuke of the unspiritual tone and mischievous tendency of the doctor's work. The passages in which he addresses the clergy are full of powerful reasoning, and breathe a spirit of most sincere and affectionate interest: they may profitably be pondered by all who are engaged in this holy calling.

Closely following his answer to Dr. Trapp, appeared one of Law's most mystical writings, *An Appeal to all that Doubt or Disbelieve the Truths of the Gospel, &c.* In reading this, and others of his works, one cannot but notice how the most striking and peculiar parts of his mystical system are evolved from the literal sense of passages of Scripture which are generally understood in a sense purely figurative. Law commences by arguing from the words in Genesis which tell us how God breathed into man's nostrils the breath of life and thus man "became a living soul," that the soul of man is not created out of nothing, but is an effluence or breath of God,—a something "of the Divine nature, become creaturely existing, or breathed forth from God, to stand before Him in the form of a creature?" This is the true ground and reason of man's immortality, of his relation to God and of his obligation to love and obey Him. The created soul is a creature of time; but the essences of the soul "had been in God from all eternity, or they could not have been breathed forth from God into the form of a living creature." Human thought and will are free; for what "thinks and wills in the soul is that very same unbeginning breath which thought and willed in God before it was breathed into the form of a human soul."

He then goes on to insist that as God cannot create evil, either natural or moral, He cannot be the author of the world in its present state; that the evils of nature, and the diseases of our bodies have the same cause. The present condition of the world is "only the remains or ruins, first, of a heaven spoiled by the fall of angels, and then of a paradise lost by the sin of man." The creation of the world is not out of nothing, but out of "the invisible things of God." "All that is on earth is only a change or alteration of something that was in heaven; and heaven itself is nothing else but the first glorious outbirth, the majestic manifestation, the beatific visibility, of

the one God in Trinity." The last fires will turn this gross, temporal nature back into its first heavenly state. "There is no goodness in any creature, from the highest to the lowest, but in its continuing to be such a union of qualities and powers as God has brought together in its creation; . . . on the other hand, there is no evil, no guilt, no deformity in any creature, but in its dividing and separating itself from something which God had given to be in union with it. This, and this alone, is the whole nature of all good and all evil in the creature, both in the moral and natural world." Hence mankind and fallen angels are what they are through having turned away their desire from God, and lost the light and love which would have kept them in their first estate; the image of the Triune God was broken: the Three Persons of the ever-blessed Trinity no longer dwelt in them in their mutual relations, "in a creaturely manner" as before.

As the doctrine of an eternal nature is one of the cardinal points of Law's system, it may be as well to quote a passage from another of his works, which contains, perhaps, the completest statement of it:

"The first manifestation of the invisible God is that which is called, and is, Eternal Nature; which is the eternity of all possible powers and qualities of life, the first source of every natural power that can be in any creature. All these qualities of life, in their eternal birth, and rising from one another by the eternal will of God, are the outbirth or outward glory of God, in which He manifests His triune invisible Deity in a threefold life of fire, light, and spirit; which are the ground of all the qualities of life, sensibility, power, and spirit, that ever were or can be found in any creature. Every thing that exists, or thinks, or moves, or finds itself in any kind or degree of sensibility, is from and out of, this *glassy sea* of these united powers of life. And this whole manifestation of all the possible powers and perfections of life and glory, is called that kingdom of heaven in which God dwelleth: and is, as it were, His Divine work-house, out of which He is perpetually giving forth new works and forms of wonder."—*The Way to Divine Knowledge.* Law's Works, Vol. VII. p. 146.

Temporary nature is only so much of this eternal nature become gross, finite, measurable, divisible, and transitory. The angels who fell involved in their ruin their whole kingdom of outward nature, which was the place of this present world: but God took their spoiled part of heaven,

and created it into a temporary state of good and evil, capable of final restoration, and placed man therein.

Our space will not permit us to follow Law any further in the exposition of this mystical system. Enough has been said to indicate its general character. For further information we must refer our readers to Mr. Overton's excellent sketch of it in chapter xiv. of his *Life and Opinions of William Law*. Law seems to have regarded the logical completeness of this system and its harmony with the literal sense of certain passages of Scripture as sufficient proof of its truth. Nor is this surprising in one of whom Mr. Leslie Stephen well says, that "his sensitiveness to logic was only equalled by his sensitiveness to conscience."

Law's later mysticism intensified rather than lowered those high views of the ministerial office, and of the nature and end of the sacraments, which are expressed in his earlier works. The sacramental theory of nature, too,—the belief that its various manifestations symbolically express the "invisible things of God" which underlie and determine them—this belief, so dear to all true mystics, forms one essential part of his system.

In his three following works, *The Spirit of Prayer*, *The Way to Divine Knowledge*, and *The Spirit of Love*, Law elaborates particular parts of his mystical teaching. These treatises take for the most part the form of dialogues. In the course of them Law renews his attack upon all mere book-learning as one of the greatest hindrances to the apprehensions of Divine truth. In this he follows Malebranche; but both these great men were learned, and owed much of their ability as thinkers and writers to the very learning which they treated with such contempt. In the dialogues Rusticus readily grasps the doctrines of religion, even in their strange Behmenish dress, while poor Academus, trammelled with his learning, finds himself beset with difficulties.

At the close of the year 1740 we find Law retired to his native village, King's Cliffe, where his brother George still lived, and where he himself owned a house. Here he was soon after joined by Miss Hester Gibbon and Mrs. Hutcheson, the latter being the widow of a gentlemen whom Law had visited in his last illness. The joint income of these ladies amounted to nearly £3,000 a year, which they agreed, after providing for their own necessities, should be spent in

relieving the poor. This intention they carried out. They regarded Law as their spiritual director, and the whole establishment was conducted according to the principles laid down in the *Serious Call*. Schools and almshouses were founded, and daily supplies of food and clothing dealt out to the numerous beggars whom the fame of such benefactors soon drew to the village. Law used to begin the business of each day by himself distributing the milk of four cows to the poor of the neighbourhood. However busy, he never refused to listen to the tale of distress, nor failed to inquire into the needs of every applicant for alms. He would always eat off a wooden platter, and made a practice of himself first wearing the coarse linen shirts which he had made for the poor, and which were afterwards washed and given away. Besides being the special adviser and friend of the two devout ladies who resided with him, he was the counsellor of many who sought his aid in the affairs of their spiritual life. His published correspondence shows with what care, insight, and fidelity he dealt with such cases.

The most reliable accounts of Law's appearance and manners show him to have had little of the austerity, and none of the moroseness, with which in some quarters he has been so liberally credited. He was serious and dignified, but always cheerful, conversed freely with his numerous visitors, and was exceedingly fond of little children. Law's mysticism drew down upon him much opposition. Among his opponents were men like Dr. Trapp and Bishop Warburton, men to whom his intense, practical, religious earnestness was as distasteful as his Behmenism; there were others like Bishop Horne and John Wesley whose admiration for Law's character and piety made it painful for them to have to disagree with him on account of his mysticism. John Wesley was for some years among the most devoted of Law's disciples, and used frequently to visit him during his residence at Putney—always on foot, however, that he might save money for the poor. Their friendship lasted till Wesley's conversion in the year 1738. Ten days before that event he addressed to Law a letter, which, notwithstanding Mr. Overton's kindly palliations, we must agree with Mr. Tyerman in regarding as "an uncalled for, rough, morose attack." * The letter charges him with having been silent through all their intercourse on the subject of justi-

* *Life and Times of John Wesley*, Vol. I. p. 186.

fication by faith in the blood of Christ, and peremptorily demands the reason why he had not pressed upon him the same advice which Peter Böhler had now given him. After mentioning some possible reasons, only to tear them to pieces at once, he puts it to him whether the true reason was not that he himself did not possess this faith. Law's reply was exceedingly temperate, but severely keen. He reminds him that he had never been with him for half an hour without his mentioning this very doctrine; that the second time they had met he put into his hands the *Theologia Germanica*, with a strong recommendation to read it, and if that book did not plainly lead him to possess Christ he was content to know as little of Christianity as he might please to believe. He concludes by advising him not to be too hasty in believing that because he had changed his language he had changed his faith. "The head can as easily amuse itself with a living and justifying faith in the blood of Jesus as with any other notion; and the heart which you suppose to be a place of security, as being the seat of self-love, is more deceitful than the head." Further correspondence followed, and the breach between these two friends was completed. A year and a half afterwards Wesley records in his journal the following rather harsh judgment on Law's book on the New Birth: "Philosophical, speculative, precarious; Behmenish, void and vain! 'O what a fall is there!'" One would hardly expect, after this, to find him publishing an extract from Law's *Serious Answer to Dr. Trapp*, in which he sets forth his mystical views respecting the kingdom and fall of Satan and his angels. He appends a note, however, to the effect that though this theory of Jacob Behmen's is not supported by Scripture it is, notwithstanding, probable. For seventeen years Law and Wesley went their several ways; but, in 1756, the latter published a pamphlet entitled, *A Letter to the Rev. W. Law, occasioned by some of his late Writings*. In this Wesley vehemently attacks the whole system of Behmen as expounded by Law, and concludes by exhorting him "to renounce, despise, abhor all the high-flown bombast, all the unintelligible jargon of the mystics, and come back to the plain religion of the Bible." It is obvious, as Mr. Overton points out, that Wesley's acquaintance with Behmenism was very imperfect, and he lay open to a heavy retort, had Law been disposed to take the opportunity: but Law was silent.

His last work is entitled *An Humble, Earnest, and Affectionate Address to the Clergy.* It is a faithful and vigorous exposition of the essentials of true personal Christianity, and an earnest exhortation to realise it. Before, however, the work could be published, the writer had gone to his rest. A sudden cold brought on inflammation, and after a few days of suffering, he breathed his last on the morning of April 9, 1761, in the seventy-fifth year of his age. The story of his last hours, as told by Miss Gibbon, in a few touching words, is what one might expect as the sequel of such a life: "The gracious words that proceeded out of his mouth," she writes, "were all love, all joy, and all Divine transport. After taking leave of everybody in the most affecting manner, and declaring the opening of the Spirit of Love in the soul to be all in all, he expired in Divine raptures." And so passed away one of whom it has been well said, "he might stand for a primitive Christian, come to revisit a strangely altered world."

ART. V.—*Rapport sur le Progrès des Études Historiques en France.* Par MESSIEURS GEFFROY, ZELLER, et THIENOT. Publication faite sous les auspices du Ministère de l'Instruction publique. 4°. Paris. 1867. Imprimerie impériale.

WHATEVER may be the outcome of French literature during the last half century, there is little doubt that historical researches have never been prosecuted with so much ardour and with so much success, and that original works in that special branch of study have been more than usually remarkable. The names of Guizot, Thiers, Michelet, Mignet, De Barante, Villemain, the two Thierrys, occur at once to our memory as the most conspicuous; and the European reputation which these distinguished writers have achieved, makes us almost forget that next to them a band of scholars exists equally deserving the gratitude of posterity. Our object, on the present occasion, is to give, as completely as we can within the limits of a necessarily short article, an account of the progress made by our neighbours in historical literature since the Restoration period, and to show under what philosophical influences the laws, the social, religious, and political institutions of the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and modern times have been discussed.

If, in the first place, we endeavour to connect the intellectual movement, which began about the year 1815, with the traditions of the past, we find ourselves baffled at once. Between the closing decade of the eighteenth century and the accession of Louis XVIII. to the throne of France, there is a complete abyss, corresponding to the Revolution and the reign of Napoleon I. No link, however small, joins the one epoch to the other, and history is conceived and written now from a point of view which the Benedictines, Lacurne de Sainte-Palaye, Villaret, Ducange, and Mably had no idea of. The blind hatred of the Revolutionists against everything which savoured of the *ancien régime*, and the unintelligent despotism of Napoleon I. were equally unfavourable to the development of historical literature. The maniacs who sent Lavoisier to the guillotine under

the pretext that *la République n'a pas besoin de chimistes*, acted as if the annals of the French nation began with the taking of the Bastille: all the splendid publications commenced by the Benedictines were suspended: the *Histoire Littéraire de la France*, the *Gallia Christiana*, the *Recueil des Historiens*, Laurière's *Recueil des Ordonnances*; Bréquigny's *Diplômes*, Mademoiselle de la Lézardière's *Histoire des Lois Françaises*, and many other works of equal merit could not be published. The influence of the Imperial Government was more disastrous still: as the representative and the embodiment of the Revolution, Napoleon could not allow any rehabilitation of the *ancien régime*, and as the firm champion of the principle of authority he was equally determined upon not having it ill spoken of.*

When a period of constitutional liberty and of peace began for France, in 1814, a corresponding literary revival took place, and an effort was made in the sphere of historical studies, both to take up the work where the scholars of the previous century had left it, and to discover successors worthy of following in the footsteps of the Mabillons, the Montfaucons, the Bouquets, and the D'Acherys. Our business is now to see what results crowned those endeavours, and according to what tendency a fresh impulse was given to researches connected with history. It will be better, perhaps, to consider, first the work accomplished by erudition, properly so called, and to see how the materials were brought together, so to say, for the use of those whose aim it was to write over again the history of their country.

The religious congregations had been scattered by the revolutionary tempest, and although a few isolated members had survived, and resumed their habits of work as soon as order was re-established, yet the Benedictines, as a body, no longer existed; the law would not have tolerated them. On the other hand, the academies were there still, the *Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres*, in particular; and their first care was to revive the traditions of intellectual vigour which twenty years of civil and foreign war had so lamentably interrupted. Dom Bouquet's gigantic *Recueil des Historiens*, the *Gallia Christiana*, the collection of Diplomas and Chartularies, the *Histoire Littéraire de la*

* See *Revue Historique*, Vol. I., M. Gabriel Monod's article on "The Progress of Historical Studies."

France were immediately continued, a fresh series of publications, namely, that of the *Historians of the Crusades* was begun, and numerous prizes were instituted for the encouragement of historical studies. With that early period of literary revival to which we are now alluding are closely connected the names of M. Daunou and M. Brial; the latter a quondam Benedictine, whose erudition and enlightened taste did so much to further the study of history in France. We have said just now that the congregation of Saint Maur, together with all the other religious orders, had been compelled to disperse. When, after the Revolution of 1848, a more liberal and tolerant system of administration was introduced, the French Benedictines endeavoured to perpetuate in the monastery of Solesmes the ancient reputation which that society enjoyed for scholarship. The *Spicilegium Solesmense*, published by the Father Abbot Dom Pitra (1852-60) in five volumes octavo, is a monument of erudition quite comparable to that of D'Achery, and showed what might be expected from the successors of Mabillon and Montfaucon. But the existence of Solesmes has been of only short duration, and the legislators of 1881 have refused to tolerate what the Republicans of 1848 had thought perfectly consistent with democratic institutions.

We must not forget the *École des Chartes*, created in 1820 for the express purpose of training librarians and paleographers. This is unquestionably one of the most useful establishments for which we are indebted to the Government of the Restoration. It has contributed in the highest degree to diffuse a taste both for the history of the country and for that of the Middle Ages in general; and, thanks to its teaching, France has been able to maintain its proud position as foremost in the science of palæography and diplomatics. The pupils who attend the lectures delivered at the *École des Chartes* are required to compose an essay on some point of history or archæology before they can obtain a diploma; and some of these essays, subsequently published with additions and corrections, have proved works of great and lasting merit. The *Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes* issued every alternate month by old members of the school, is a treasury of valuable information on mediæval history and literature. As, in connexion with the *Académie des Inscriptions*, we have mentioned the names of MM. Daunou and Brial, so we should not leave unnoticed the most striking at least amongst the representatives of the

training school for palæographers, MM. Guérard, Natalis de Wailly, Quicherat and Léopold Delisle. The first-named of these *savants*, who held during several years the post of director, took as the special subject of his researches the condition and tenure of landed property in France during the Middle Ages. The chartularies and registers (*Polyptiques*) of the various abbeys and monasteries abound in materials on this question, and M. Guérard edited some of them (*Polyptique de l'Abbé Irminon*, 3 vols. 4°, *Polyptique de l'Abbaye de Saint Rémi à Reims*, 4°).

The former of these works belongs to the ninth century, and refers to the famous abbey of Saint Germain des Prés in Paris; the latter is of somewhat less importance. The author's views are stated at considerable length in the prolegomena to the Irminon document, and the final conclusions to which he arrived were embodied in an article of the *Bibliothèque*, under the title of *De la Formation de l'Etat Social, Politique, et Administratif de la France*. M. Jules Quicherat, like M. Guérard, was one of the most illustrious members of the *Ecole des Chartes;* and since the death of his eminent *confrère*, he had been universally regarded as the scholar whose knowledge of the history of the Middle Ages was most accurate and complete. His special researches were connected with the fifteenth century, and with Joan of Arc in particular; he had studied thoroughly all the documents relating to her life, and he edited for the *Société de l'Histoire de France* the accounts and *pièces justificatives* of the two judgments passed upon her, namely her condemnation and her rehabilitation. M. Quicherat was the founder of the club or society destined to serve as a bond of union between the old pupils of the *École des Chartes*, and he contributed a number of articles to the *Bibliothèque* which we have already mentioned. The teaching of palæography is one of the chief objects aimed at by the founders of the school; now in 1820, the only work on the subject available to students was Dom Mabillon's *De Re Diplomatica*, an excellent treatise for the age in which it appeared, but now become obsolete. The science of diplomatics has made rapid progress during the last two centuries; and if we consider merely the pictorial side of the question, it is quite clear that the fac-similes of charters and other monuments given by the learned Benefictiore and his coadjutors, notwithstanding all the care bestowed upon them, were not sufficiently accu-

rate. In the year 1838, M. Natalis de Wailly published in two splendid quarto volumes, copiously illustrated, *Les Éléments de Paléographie*, bringing that science down to its latest results; the work has long been out of print, and a new edition of it is very much wanted. Meanwhile, the comparatively recent resources of photography and heliography have enabled scholars to improve even upon the carefully engraved plates which add so much to the value of M. de Wailly's volumes, and in emulation of the publications of our own palæographical society, the *École des Chartes* is now issuing a series of photographic facsimiles for the use of students. We must not take leave of M. Natalis de Wailly without noticing his excellent editions of Joinville and Villehardouin. Let us add, also, that M. Victor Palmé, who has contributed so much to the progress of historical literature by his reprints of the *Gallia Christiana*, Dom Bouquet and the Bollandist *Acta Sanctorum*, has announced for some time an edition of the *De Re Diplomatica*, revised and enlarged: all the original documents quoted in it are to be photographed.

There is, finally, another and most important point connected with the accumulation, selection and classification of materials destined to form the substratum of historical works: we mean the aid given by calendars, indices and catalogues. In this special province we have to name more particularly the learned Director of the Paris National Library, M. Léopold Delisle, who has deserved the deepest gratitude of all persons interested in historical researches by his description of the MS. collections of the splendid establishment over which he presides. M. Ulysse Robert, assistant-keeper of MSS. at the National Library, has also helped very much towards an acquaintance with the treasures still hidden in the dust of public libraries, by his *Cabinet Historique*, a review issued every alternate month, and containing, besides the text of original documents, a calendar of the principal libraries and record-offices in France and abroad. This publication, started in 1855 by M. Louis Paris, has been continued without interruption ever since, and is full of the most interesting information. We must observe, however, that the *Cabinet Historique*, as well as M. Léopold Delisle's descriptive catalogue alluded to above, refers to MS. documents; whereas the *Catalogues de la Bibliothèque Nationale* published by order of the Government, contain exclusively printed books and

pamphlets. The portion treating of history is to consist of thirteen volumes, eleven of which are now on sale.

In the particular sphere of literature with which we are now immediately concerned, as well as in all others, the impulse, we need hardly say, is given from Paris, where so many resources exist for students; it would be unjust, at the same time, not to notice the efforts made by local societies and antiquarian clubs. Some of these provincial academies are of long standing, for instance, the *Société des Antiquaires de Normandie*, the *Société des Antiquaires de Picardie*, and the *Société Archéologique du Midi de la France*, each of which has largely contributed to the progress of historical knowledge by the publication of memoirs, essays, disquisitions, &c. The *Société Bibliographique* should not be left without a mention here, although its object is not exclusively history. Founded in 1868, for the express purpose of Roman Catholic propagandism, it could not neglect so important a branch of intellectual culture as history. Its originators applied themselves consequently to the twofold task of publishing, first, cheap but correct editions of French memoirs and chronicles; and, secondly, a quarterly review entitled *Revue des Questions Historiques*, designed to counteract the influence of liberal opinions, and to elucidate the problems of history, both sacred and profane. The tone of this periodical is always very courteous, but the *rédacteurs* who contribute to it state their Ultramontanist views with the utmost frankness. It was inevitable, therefore, that a rival publication should be started; and just as the success of the *Edinburgh* resulted in the appearance of the *Quarterly*, so the *Revue des Questions Historiques* produced indirectly the *Revue Historique*. It is issued six times a year, with the motto from Cicero, *Ne quid falsi audeat, ne quid veri non audeat historia*. Between these two magazines the great difference (besides that of the spirit in which they are written) is that the more recent one allows a considerable space to original documents. Thus the reader cannot fail to notice a very interesting series of letters written by the historian Sismondi during his residence in Paris at the time of the "hundred days." We may also mention Napoleon's correspondence with his brothers Joseph and Louis, published by Baron Ducasse, &c., &c.

The French Protestants, too, have their *Bulletin*, which was begun in 1853, and their *France Protestante*, an excel-

lent biographical dictionary compiled originally by MM. Emile and Eugène Haag, but a new and very much improved edition of which is now appearing at irregular intervals by the care of M. Henri Bordier, author of several well-known historical works.

One of the most noteworthy measures inaugurated by the illustrious statesman M. Guizot, during his tenure of office as minister of public instruction, was the publication of a series of quarto volumes, known as the *Collection des Documents Inédits*; the suggestive report he presented to King Louis Philippe on that subject in 1834 will be found amongst the pieces quoted in the appendix to the third volume of his memoirs: it states very fully the importance of such an undertaking, the ground it was to cover, and the plan according to which it was to be carried on; the several Governments which have succeeded each other in France during the last half-century have deemed it an honour to continue the work started by M. Guizot, and the *Collection des Documents Inédits* now comprises upwards of one hundred and sixty volumes, illustrating the political history of France, the history of French mediæval literature, and archæology. It is obvious that when a large number of *collaborateurs* are engaged, all publications cannot be of equal merit; but if M. Didron's *Archéologie Chrétienne* and M. Eugène Sue's annotated edition of *Escoubleau de Sourdis* are not what they ought to be, on the other hand Count Beugnot's collection of the *Olims*, M. Avenel's edition of Cardinal Richelieu's correspondence, and M. Chéruel's journal of Lèfevre d'Ormesson are masterpieces of their kind; we have already mentioned M. de Wailly's *Eléments de Paléographie*. One of the reasons which M. Guizot puts forth in support of his scheme was that the State alone could defray the expenses it would naturally entail; and he alluded to the *Société de l'Histoire de France* as a proof that private enterprise must be, by the force of circumstances, limited in its resources and in the scope of its publications. That society, which has now been in existence since the year 1834, owes its origin chiefly to M. Guizot's influence. The small subscription of thirty francs, paid yearly by the members, entitles them to four octavo volumes, besides a copy of the *Annuaire-Bulletin*, which contains, together with an account of the society's transactions, bibliographical reviews and historical catalogues, a number of interesting documents, too small to

make up a separate volume, but demanding to be rescued from oblivion. Amongst the works issued by the *Société de l'Histoire de France* we must mention Le Nain de Tillemont's *Histoire de Saint Louis*, Mademoiselle Dupont's *Philippe de Commines*, M. Siméon Luce's *Froissart*, and M. Ludovic Lalanne's *Brantôme*.

The Government of Napoleon III. was ambitious to show that, whilst doing its utmost for the material prosperity of France, it aimed also at contributing its share to the progress of historical literature. A great part of the old Paris buildings having been swept away under the direction of the then Prefect of the Seine, Baron Haussmann, it was thought that an excellent opportunity was thus afforded of publishing a series of handsome and scholarly works on the history and antiquities of the metropolis. Dulaure's *Histoire de Paris* had become useless, and Corrozet and Sauval still more so, while a new and improved edition of Lebœuf's *Histoire de la Ville et de tout le Diocèse de Paris*, prepared by M. Cocheris, remained unfinished. The enterprising and destructive Prefect came to the conclusion that he was bound to preserve some memorial of the edifices which he had levelled with the ground, and the *Histoire Générale de Paris* was accordingly commenced. It comprises already several folio volumes, most of which are splendidly illustrated with chromo-lithographs, fac-similes, &c. To the list of periodicals issued by the various societies previously noticed, we must add the *Revue Archéologique*, the *Journal des Savants*, and the *Mémoires de l'Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques*; the first-mentioned of these journals deals particularly with mediæval subjects; the two last treat chiefly of modern questions, and some of the most remarkable articles of the late M. Victor Cousin (*Les Carnets de Mazarin, le Connétable de Luynes*) enriched originally the pages of the *Journal des Savants*.

The members of the *Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres* have undertaken to continue Dom Bouquet's *Recueil des Historiens*; but independently of this gigantic publication, six other series of memoirs deserve to be noticed, which may be regarded as forming a sequel, not only to Dom Bouquet, but to Duchesne's *Historiae Francorum Scriptores*. The first is M. Guizot's collection of documents beginning with the origin of the monarchy, and ending with the thirteenth century; it forms thirty-one volumes octavo. M. Buchon edited collection of chronicles (eleventh to sixteenth

centuries), forty-seven volumes; MM. Petitot and Monmerqué on the one hand, and MM. Michaud and Poujoulat on the other, published the memoirs of public characters from the reign of Philip Augustus to that of Louis XVI. MM. Berville and Barrière took up the Revolutionary period, and after devoting to it forty-six volumes, left still more to be accomplished. Finally MM. Cimber and Danjou collected together under the title *Archives Curieuses de l'Histoire de France* a large number of documents illustrating in twenty-seven octavo volumes many obscure points of general and local history from the reign of Louis XI. to that of Louis XIV. If we take no notice of duplicates, we have thus a formidable sum total of nearly 300 volumes, which students are bound to make themselves acquainted with, if they would know something about the history of France; and the reader will note that we have mentioned neither M. Jannet's *Bibliothèque Elzévirienne*, nor M. Ravaisson's *Archives de la Bastille*, nor yet the memoirs of Saint Simon, those of the Duc de Luynes, &c. A complete list would be quite out of the question here.

Before taking leave of the part of our subject which treats of original documents and *pièces justificatives*, we must say a few words about the French Foreign Record Office (*Archives des Affaires étrangères*) and its administration. Up to a recent time (within the last ten years) all access to the treasures contained in that establishment was surrounded with the most absurd and the most extraordinary difficulties. A visitor might read a MS.; but as for transcribing it, or making extracts from it, that was absolutely out of the question; nor did it matter whether the paper in question referred to the Peace of Utrecht or to the Conferences of Erfurth. The *archives* were transformed into a kind of Garden of the Hesperides, under the *surveillance* of keepers and clerks who looked at all scholars as intruders, and who in the most courteous manner possible informed them that they had no business there. M. Armand Baschet relates to us (*Le Duc de Saint Simon, son Cabinet, et l'Histoire de ses Manuscrits*) the annoyance which General de Saint Simon had to put up with when he endeavoured, by virtue of the express permission of King Louis XVIII., to publish some of his illustrious ancestor's papers. It will hardly be credited that documents which could affect neither present political interests nor the character of any living person were still kept under lock and key, and that

permission was absolutely and uniformly refused to print any document whatever which had found its way to that repository of historical information. In one of his lectures delivered at the Sorbonne upwards of fifty years ago, M. Villemain said, "The archives of our Foreign Office cannot always retain their treasures. Censorship is never good, and it is particularly useless when applied to the past. After the interval of half a century, marked by a great social revolution, indiscretion and gossip have no longer any danger, and they often contain a portion of truth which is instructive without being scandalous."

It has often been remarked that, despite their revolutionary proclivities, our Gallican neighbours are in many respects blindly and unintelligently conservative. Not very long ago they still followed the educational system and adopted the school-books introduced by the Jesuits. Similarly, the traditions held sacred at the Foreign Office about the undesirableness of giving to the public any document of a political character were considered to be without appeal; and it is only the example set by the English Government in the administration of the Record Office, and the printing of calendars of State papers, which has, at last, led in France to a corresponding measure. Henceforth there will be no difficulty put in the way of students, and the first result of this timely decision has already appeared in the publication of the Saint-Simon papers under the editorship of M. Prosper Faugère, who, strange to say, had been the foremost in opposing the very change of which he is now taking advantage.

But leaving the part of our subject which treats of what might be called, strictly speaking, *helps to original historical composition*, let us see what progress has been made during the last sixty years in the method of writing history, and how the views of historians have been affected by the political events we have been called upon to witness. Whatever may be the *régime* under which we have to live, the collecting and editing of charters, memoirs, and correspondences, must always, to a great extent, be very much the same. We cannot suppose that Baluze or Ducange, if they had been our contemporaries, would have performed their task as scholars and antiquarians otherwise than as they did, *Ludovico magno regnante;* and similarly M. Léopold Delisle, or M. Siméon Luce, if we fancy them transformed into Benedictines of the congregation of Saint Maur, would

have followed in the footsteps of Mabillon and Montfaucon. It is in the way of interpreting documents that the difference is apparent, and the change of tendency manifest.

At the time which we have taken as the starting-point of our investigations, that is to say, in 1814, the school of Voltaire was triumphant, and history was studied from the sceptical point of view. To the influence of Bossuet's *Discours sur l'Histoire Universelle* had succeeded that of the brilliant but pre-eminently false *Essais sur l'Esprit et les Mœurs des Nations;* and where the "eagle of Meaux" saw the directing hand of Providence and the constant interposition of God in the march of events, the "Ferney philosopher" could discover nothing but blind chance and the action of secondary causes. No wonder that under such teaching the history of the Middle Ages should have been thoroughly misunderstood. It may be said, perhaps, that the documentary evidence was not abundant enough to ensure an accurate appreciation of that part of French history extending from the invasion of the Barbarians to the sixteenth century. What was especially and deplorably lacking, however, was the spirit of strict impartiality. The school of Voltaire could not possibly judge fairly an epoch in the history of the world when the destinies of political communities were closely bound up with those of the Papacy, and when the Church, with its array of regular and secular clergy, its abbeys, convents, monasteries, and schools, was the great, if not the only, guardian of civilisation.

Accordingly, as soon as the conservative reaction against the so-called liberal theories in historical literature took place, the very first symptom was an almost universal and not unfrequently blind enthusiasm for mediæval civilisation in all its various forms and manifestations. The impulse had been given as early as the Consulate by M. de Châteaubriand in his *Génie du Christianisme*, a work which, notwithstanding many glaring defects, abounds in real beauties of a high order. At a later period of his life the *Études Historiques* did much likewise to spread a knowledge of the subject. There is no doubt that political animosity had a great share in this movement. For a great many the anxiety to establish the principles of monarchical government beyond a doubt suggested the researches which were taking place on all sides, with reference to the origin of the French monarchy in particular. These investigations

had the excellent result of directing the attention of earnest scholars to the study of archæology, feudal law, mediæval literature, and Church history. For a short time mediævalism became a positive mania. To the first ten years of the Bourbon restoration, accordingly, belong the works of M. de Marchangy (*La Gaule Poétique, Tristan le Voyageur*), and a number of tales, essays, pamphlets, and disquisitions, all designed to glorify what certain enthusiasts designated as *le bon vieux temps*. Next to M. de Châteaubriand a galaxy of writers appears, whose names have now become household words, and who have left behind them a reputation which time will only serve to confirm more and more. What could we say which has not already been said over and over again about the philosophic insight of M. Guizot, (*Histoire de la Civilisation en France*), the picturesqueness of M. Augustin Thierry (*Lettres sur l'Histoire de France, Récits des Temps Mérovingiens*), the brilliant genius of M. Michelet (*Histoire de France*, vols. i.-vi.), and the dramatic talent of M. de Barante (*Histoire des Ducs de Bourgogne de la Maison de Valois*)? These four men may be regarded as the founders of the new historical school in France, and they are all open to criticism on some point. M. Michelet, for instance, allows too much to fancy, and often builds up the wildest theories on the flimsiest foundations. M. Augustin Thierry exaggerates the influence of races. M. de Barante, in his wish to be impartial, reduces history to a mere narrative void of all criticism, a series of pictures artistically sketched, no doubt, but destitute of the philosophical summing up which constitutes the difference between history, properly so called, and mere chronicles. M. Guizot's *Lectures on the History of France* deal too much perhaps with generalities, and have none of the qualities which make the writings of MM. Thierry and Michelet so attractive. They appeal to our reason, not to our imaginative faculties.

The mediæval mania, if we may so say, lasted for some years, and necessarily had its influence upon the popular works of the day. M. Victor Hugo's *Notre Dame de Paris*, for instance, was one of the most celebrated novels which it produced. But a period of reaction set in at last, or it would perhaps be fairer to say that political excitement drew ardent minds into another direction, and led them to concentrate their attention upon the principles of government and the problems of legislation. The comparatively

few students who remained faithful to their early sympathies examined the Middle Ages no longer through the medium of their own imagination, but from the standpoint of erudition; and instead of endeavouring to grasp the whole subject, they preferred taking up special episodes, separate personages. Hence it is that French literature boasts of no general history of the Middle Ages; only attempts have been made which it would be ungracious to mention here because of their decided inferiority.

We must bear in mind that our review professes to deal exclusively with works referring to the history of France, and therefore if we are justified in mentioning here the *Histoire des Gaulois* of M. Amédée Thierry, we cannot do more. The dying convulsions of the Roman Empire, the corruptions of the Byzantine Court, the struggles of the early Church, are subjects of a too general character to fall within the scope of this sketch, and we have to reserve our notices for works which treat exclusively of France and French civilisation. The origins of mediæval society show us the Church in the foremost rank, the guardian of peace, of progress, of security. Art, science, literature, war, legislation, are all leavened by ecclesiastical sympathies; and it is not too much to say that the history of the Middle Ages throughout Europe is to all intents and purposes the history of the Church. The very titles which Gregorius Turonensis and the Venerable Bede gave to the works which have made their reputation are full of significance in support of this assertion (*Historia Ecclesiastica Francorum*, *Ecclesiastica Historia Gentis Anglorum*), and from the moment when the Franks of Gaul saved the Church and the relics of ancient society under Clovis and Charlemagne, to the time when Philip the Fair struck the first blow at the Papacy, it would be impossible to separate in the history of France the secular from the religious element. The late M. Fr. Ozanam's book, *Le Christianisme chez les Francs et la Civilisation au Cinquième Siècle*, may be appropriately named here. Like the writer's other works, it is composed under the influence of the strongest Roman Catholic convictions. And although some of the conclusions arrived at are exaggerated by prejudice, yet M. Ozanam's erudition is wonderful, and the sympathy with which he describes characters and sketches events gives to his volumes a glow perfectly in accordance with the character of the times.

We trust that M. Fustel de Coulanges will soon find

leisure to continue and complete his *Histoire des Institutions Politiques de l'Ancienne France*, although it covers nearly the same ground as the late M. Lehuerou's *Institutions Mérovingiennes et Carlovingiennes*. These two last-named works have never been reprinted; they are still excellent contributions towards the history of an epoch which is veiled with much obscurity, and they might be profitably studied simultaneously with the edition of Gregorius Turonensis, published for the *Société de l'Histoire de France*, and with the geographical essays of M. Jacobs (*Géographie de Grégoire de Tours, Des Fleuves et Rivières de la Gaule au Moyen Age, Géographie de Fredegaire et de ses Continuateurs, Géographie des Diplômes Mérovingiens, &c.*)

As we have thus been led to allude to works on geography, we may observe that the remarkable impulse given to that branch of science by the splendid publications of M. Elisée Reclus has produced great results so far as the history of France is concerned. Let us quote for instance M. Desjardins' *Géographie de la Gaule Romaine*, and M. Auguste Longnon's *Géographie de la Gaule au VI^e^ Siècle*. The latter work is especially important for the history of the Merovingian dynasty, that obscurest part in the annals of France. The time may come—ought to come—when a complete account of the two first French families of French kings will be written. We have already enumerated a few sources. To these let us add the essays or disquisitions of M. Rabanis (*Les Mérovingiens d'Aquitaine*), of M. Huguenin (*Histoire du Royaume Mérovingien d'Austrasie*), and of M. Digod (*Histoire du Royaume d'Austrasie*). M. Fauriel had already earned a seat in the *Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres* by an exhaustive history of Southern Gaul under the Teutonic conquest, and taken the district of Languedoc as the special subject of his researches. Each of the independent or quasi-independent states which were afterwards to form the kingdom of France had thus its historian; and in addition to these monographs, another scholar, M. Goguet, has at last succeeded in throwing considerable light upon a question closely connected with the decay of the Merovingian rule. Who were the mayors of the palace? What was the origin and nature of their power? Who were the personages that like Ebroin, Saint Leodegarius, Pepin of Herstal, really wielded the sceptre during the interregnum which separates the first dynasty from the second?

It is no exaggeration to say that the splendour of the Carlovingian rule began with Charles Martel and ended with Charlemagne. The great emperor of the West not only fills the pages of history, but occupies a conspicuous place in mediæval fiction. M. Gaston Paris tells us in his *Histoire Poétique de Charlemagne* how he has been celebrated by Troubadours and Trouvères, how the episode of Roncevaux has engaged the notice both of Spanish minstrels and of Italian songsters, how a cluster of *chansons de geste* has gathered round the terrible conqueror of the Saxons, how, by the strangest of anachronisms, he has been associated with the feudal system and the Crusades. On the history of the Carlovingian dynasty we have no recent work deserving mention written by a Frenchman. Gaillard's four duodecimo volumes, exactly one hundred years old, good enough at the time when they appeared, are incomplete now, and we have only a few special sketches to mention, M. Monnier's life of Alcuin, Charlemagne's "intellectual minister," as he calls him, and M. Himly's biography of Wala, the emperor's grandson, a clergyman and politician, who was closely mixed up with all the public transactions of his age.

The ecclesiastical character of mediæval legislation is deeply stamped upon all the imperial capitularies, whether issued by Charlemagne or his successors, and the identification of temporal and spiritual matters appears in the very title of M. Monnier's carefully written work, *Histoire des Luttes Politiques et Religieuses dans les Temps Carlovingiens*, which may be almost considered as a sequel to M. Poinsignon's *Histoire de l'Église Franque au Temps des Mérovingiens*. Representing the old civilisation and the new religion, serving as mediator between the Latin world and the Teutonic invaders, the clergy, both regular and secular, had a difficult part to perform. We must study the history of the national councils of Gaul to appreciate equitably their humanising influence. But if we wish to see more particularly the work they did as scholars, philosophers and intellectual guides, we should become familiar with the life of one of the convents or monasteries where the *trivium* and the *quadrivium* were taught, and where the Holy Scriptures and the then known monuments of classical literature divided the attention of the recluses. M. Alliez has supplied us with materials for these studies in his *Histoire du Monastère de Lérins*, one of the earliest

ecclesiastical communities established in the West, founded by Saint Honorat about the year 400.

With the downfall of the Carlovingian dynasty we enter upon a distinctly new phase in mediæval history. The wonderful structure of feudalism rises from the ground; the age of chivalry has arrived, and the Crusades bring into close contact the civilisation of the Eastern world and the rough, unpolished, semi-barbarous barons of the West. The Church is at the height of its power. Count de Montalembert makes us understand its influence in his eloquent history of the monks of the West. M. de Rémusat describes an important episode in the intercourse between the temporal power and the Papacy, when relating the life of Anselm of Canterbury. More than ever the interposition of a peaceful principle is necessary in the midst of the permanent state of warfare which seems to prevail from one end of Europe to the other—lords pitted against lords, laymen against ecclesiastics, the inhabitants of towns, the villeins and the serfs against the barons. The panic connected with the supposed end of the world in 1000 tended for a brief space of time to introduce a quieter state of things, and the Church profited by this reaction to proclaim the peace or truce of God, an institution which was of too short a duration, and the history of which has suggested to M. Semichon an interesting volume. On the Crusades we are still reduced to the classical, but now very insufficient, work of Michaud. M. Leroy takes chivalry as his special subject (*Histoire de la Chevalerie*), and M. de Maslatrie gives us an excellent *Histoire de l'Ile de Chypre sous le Règne des Princes de la Maison de Lusignan.*

The French monarch whose name is chiefly associated with the Crusades is Saint Louis, and we are fortunate in having Joinville's touching narrative to guide us to a true appreciation of his character. M. Natalis de Wailly, who had previously given us a magnificent edition of Villehardouin's *Chronique de Constantinople*, followed up this undertaking by an equally valuable reprint of the Sénéschal de Champagne's *Histoire de Saint Louis*. The *Société de l'Histoire de France* has edited Lenain de Tillemont's *Vie de Saint Louis*, and begun the publication of the code of laws which, under the name of *Etablissements*, remains as one of the most curious monuments of mediæval legislation. The biographies composed by MM. Faure and Wallon should not be forgotten; and before taking leave of

that epoch, we must mention the Abbé Georges' *Histoire du Pope Urbain IV. et de son Temps*, that French pope who invited over to Italy Charles d'Anjou, brother of Saint Louis, for the purpose of rescuing the kingdom of Naples from the power of the German prince Manfred.

With Philip the Fair we come to the most unattractive portion of mediæval history. The spirit of chivalry has entirely departed, and to the age of manliness, honesty and religion has succeeded the triumph of cunning and deceit; the *roman de Renart* has taken the place of the *chanson de Roland;* lawyers rule at court, and the intellectual predecessors of Rabelais make their appearance. On that epoch several important works deserve to be named. M. Boutaric's *La France sous Philippe le Bel* is a little deficient in unity, and it may be looked upon more as a history of administration and government during the Middle Ages than as a monograph of the reign of Philip the Fair. Still, it has the merit of being derived from the best authorities; and the portion referring to the struggles between the king and Pope Boniface VIII. throws considerable light upon the state of the Papacy at the end of the thirteenth century and the beginning of the fourteenth. M. Pierre Clément's memoir on Enguerrand de Marigny brings also into strong relief the unscrupulous character and ingratitude of Philip the Fair; and the collection of documents published by M. Michelet for the *Société de l'Histoire de France*, on the trial of the Knights Templar, shows to what measures a despot can have recourse when greed of money is there to prompt him. We are obliged, by want of space, to confine our enumeration to the principal works, but we believe that we have left unmentioned three publications referring to the reign of Louis VII. and of Philip Augustus, which deserve to be studied. One is the edition of Suger's writings, edited by M. Lecoy de la Marche, Abbé of St. Denis. Suger was the favourite minister of the former of these monarchs, and regent of France during his absence at the Crusade. The life of the distinguished statesman has been written by MM. Combe and Huguenin. The history of Philip Augustus, composed by M. Capefigue, half a century ago, is the best production of a voluminous author who has sacrificed too much to the love of popularity, and who in his subsequent works has shown an utter want of critical judgment.

We must hasten over the last period of mediæval history. It is for France a disastrous epoch, and contains the record of civil disturbances and foreign warfare under the reigns of Charles VI. and Charles VII. M. Siméon Luce's account of the Jacquerie, and the monograph which M. Perrens has devoted to Etienne Marcel, supply the faithful record of revolutionary movements; whilst M. Henri Wallon's *Jeanne d'Arc*, M. Vallet de Viriville's *Charles VII., Roi de France, et son Époque*, and M. Siméon Luce's *Histoire de Bertrand Duguesclin*, give us animated sketches of the efforts made by France to recover her national independence. M. Quicherat, in his *Rodrigue de Villandrando*, delineates the portrait of one of those *condottieri* or adventurers who played so conspicuous a part in that movement, and whose best known representatives are Dunois, Lahire, and Xaintrailles. The name of Charles VII. naturally suggests to us that of Jacques Cœur, his *argentier* or treasurer, about whom so many legends have long passed current, and whose biography M. Pierre Clément has written. M. de Beaucourt, the learned editor of the *Revue des Questions Historiques*, has also published the first two volumes of a history of Charles VII. When we come to Louis XI., we have to deal with Philippe de Commines, and here we can connect M. de Chantelauze's splendid edition, published by MM. Didot. The history of King René, Duke of Anjou, and Count of Provence, belongs also to the epoch: it has been very well related by M. Lecoy de la Marche.

The downfall of feudalism and the steady growth of the kingship in France was the joint work of several statesmen and politicians, who, unconsciously perhaps, but none the less successfully, contributed to that wonderful organisation, destined to reach its full growth under the reign of Louis XIV. For an interesting description of this movement we cannot do better than recommend M. Louis de Carné's *Les Fondateurs de l'Unité Française*, which is really a collection of portraits, containing personages we have already had to notice; Suger, Saint Louis, &c., together with others belonging more properly to modern history; the part, we mean, which begins with the reign of Francis I.

It will be perhaps better if, before proceeding any further, we glance for a few minutes at the general histories which have been published since the great work of Sismondi.

Napoleon said once that the history of France should be written in one hundred volumes or in four. M. Henri Martin and M. Michelet are the two authors who have adopted the former alternative. They have not gone quite so far as the limit suggested by the emperor, but the sixteen octavo volumes of the one, and the twenty-four of the other are formidable enough in point of dimensions to merit the title of detailed histories. M. Michelet has placed himself successively at two points of view diametrically opposed to each other. His first six volumes, comprising the period of the Middle Ages, were written under the influence of religious ideas, with a tone of dignity and gravity which precluded neither enthusiasm nor brilliancy of style. The last portion of the work shows us M. Michelet transformed into a thorough revolutionist, discarding Christianity, *slanging* the monarchical principle, giving us caricatures instead of portraits, repudiating the most glorious traditions of his country, and revelling in *naturalist* details which would gladden the heart of M. Zola, and which make his work utterly unfit to be used for educational purposes. M. Henri Martin has neither the genius nor the fascinating manner of the historian we have just named, and his defects are all the more conspicuous. He judges characters and events from the standpoint of a narrow liberalism; for it is a curious fact that some French liberals are as exclusive and intolerant as the politicians of the opposite camp. Whether he describes the administration of Charlemagne, the character of Louis XI., or the despotism of the Grand Monarque, his style never varies; and in addition to a goodly number of historical blunders arising from his prejudices, he lacks that philosophical spirit which is so characteristic of M. Mignet and M. Guizot. M. Michelet provokes and irritates us by his democratic frenzy, but he keeps us under the spell. M. Henri Martin is deplorably dull.

Amongst the numerous *résumés* or less copious histories which have been published during the last quarter of a century, we may name those of M. Dareste, M. Trognon, M. Th. Lavallée, M. Duruy, MM. Bordier and Charton, and M. Laurentie. All these works are valuable contributions to historical literature, the two last especially. M. Laurentie does not conceal his legitimist opinions, and the fervour of his political creed imparts to his style an animation which makes us sometimes almost overlook the unsoundness of

many of his theories. The work composed jointly by MM. Bordier and Charton is essentially liberal in its tendencies, but its liberalism is wise and discriminating, and it has the merit of giving extensive quotations from original sources. Next to general histories, we must mention a few important works which treat of administrative, legislative, and social questions. M. George Picot's voluminous *Histoire des États Généraux* is an admirable work. It gives a full account of those celebrated assemblies which, to a certain extent, an imperfect one we grant, endeavoured to realise for France what the Parliament was in England. M. Picot takes us from the meeting of the States General in 1355, during the reign of King John, to the year 1614, when for the last time before 1789 the deputies of the three estates of the realm assembled for the purpose of presenting their grievances to the Crown. The work we are now noticing should be read side by side with M. Augustin Thierry's learned introduction to the *Monuments de l'Histoire du Tiers État:* it reminds us that history is not merely a record of battles and sieges. Details of administration have also their importance (*Histoire de l'Administration en France*, by M. Dareste and M. Clément). The condition of the working classes is frequently the result of the political events which tell upon the prosperity of the country (*Histoire des Classes Agricoles*, by M. Dareste; *Histoire des Classes Rurales*, by M. Doniol; *Histoire des Classes Ouvrières*, by M. Levasseur; *Histoire des Classes Laborieuses*, by M. du Cellier). Finally, if we do not master thoroughly the history of taxation (*Histoire de l'Impôt en France*, by M. Clamageran), we run the risk of passing erroneous judgments upon the fiscal measures of certain kings, and the causes of dissatisfaction amongst the people at certain epochs.

The expression *unity of the monarchy* should make us remember that France was gradually formed by the aggregation of provinces, sometimes differing from each other in a remarkable degree in respect of legislation, coinage, manner and language. It is not too much to say that the points of opposition between Brittany and Burgundy, for instance, are far greater than those which separate Burgundy from Switzerland. Most of these provinces have had their historians; Dom Planché's *Histoire de Bourgogne* fills no less than four volumes folio, and Dom Lobineau's *Histoire de Bretagne* is complete in two. Modern local histories are also numerous, and, generally speaking, very

noteworthy. We have space only to mention, for provinces, M. Beaurepaire's *États de Normandie sous la Domination Anglaise*, M. d'Arbois de Jubainville's *Histoire des Ducs et Comtes de Champagne*, and M. Chalmel's *Histoire de Touraine*; for cities, the *Histoire de Chartres*, by M. de L'Epinois, M. Germain's *Histoire de Montpellier*, and M. de Beauville's *Histoire de la Ville de Montdidier*.

With Francis I. modern history really begins. Not only has feudalism breathed its last, but the Papacy seems to be tottering on its foundation. Whilst the scholastic philosophy finds its last representatives in Gabriel Biel and Nicolas de Clémenges, the free-thinking movement breaks forth in the writings of Dolet, Rabelais and Bonaventure Despériers, and the Protestant Reformation asserts itself through the teaching of Calvin, Farel, Viret and Gérard Roussel. The chief works on that epoch are of course M. Merle d'Aubigné's *Histoire de la Réforme au Temps de Calvin*, M. Herminjard's *Correspondance des Réformateurs de Langue Française*, and, for the merely political part, M. Mignet's *Histoire de la Rivalité de Charles Quint et de François Premier*, originally contributed to the *Revue des Deux Mondes*. The wars of religion have commenced, and France is once more transformed into a huge battle-field. No student can complain of a want of elucidatory documents on this important epoch. The collection of memoirs published by Petitot, Michaud and Buchon abound in the most interesting autobiographies, correspondences and memoirs. Castelnau, Vieilleville, Mergey, Tavannes, more or less mixed up with those *plus quam civilia bella*, where, according to Castelnau's own expression, *les Français n'avaient d'ennemis qu'eux mêmes*—have left faithful impressions of the struggles between Ultramontanism, subsidised by the Court of Madrid, and the Huguenot party. Amongst the numerous historical figures which stand out prominently on the canvas of the sixteenth century, we must name Catherine de' Medici, the Guise family, and Admiral Coligny. On the policy of the clever but unprincipled Italian princess we should consult M. Chéruel's *Marie Stuart et Catherine de Médicis*, M. Teulet's *Relations Politiques de la France avec l'Écosse et avec l'Espagne au Seizième Siècle*, M. Armand Baschet's *La Diplomatie Vénitienne*, and M. Forneron's *Histoire de Philippe II.* These various books will assist materially the student in forming an adequate idea of the strenuous efforts which

Catherine made to crush Protestantism and to restore the power of the Church. The Venetian ambassadors, in particular Morosini and his colleagues, have left a collection of journals and despatches abounding in the most curious and interesting details. Extremely clearsighted and active, always on the look-out for information, they were, besides, comparatively unbiassed, and that impartiality gave them an advantage which we of the nineteenth century can appreciate.

It is difficult to determine whether Catherine de' Medici or the Guises were the bitterest and most fanatical champions of Roman Catholicism. The Lorraine princes, at any rate, had the merit of being identified with a thoroughly *national* system of policy; and if it be objected that their ambition was boundless, we may answer that the worthless character of the three last Valois monarchs sufficiently explains and even justifies the lofty designs of the Guises. The hero of Calais, Guines, and Thionville, whatever may be said of the other members of his family, is a soldier whose memory is not likely ever to be forgotten in France; and M. Forneron, whom we have already named, has written his biography *con amore* (*Histoire des Ducs de Guise*). Count Delaborde's *Gaspard de Coligny, Amiral de France*, is a monograph worth consulting on the Huguenot side of the question; and M. Pingaud's *Les Saulx-Tavannes* furnishes us with curious information respecting a family which played a conspicuous part in the events of the sixteenth century.

One of the points most warmly discussed and controverted in connexion with the wars of religion is the origin of the massacre of the Huguenots on Saint Bartholomew's day. Was it or was it not premeditated? Had the Catholic party matured the plot for a long time, or was the massacre forced upon the Court by the pressure of the mob? A perfect deluge of pamphlets, newspaper articles and reviews has overwhelmed us on this subject, the most recent being an article by M. Jules Loiseleur, which forms part of the interesting volume he has published under the title *Trois Enigmes Historiques*. This gentleman does not believe in the theory of a preconceived plan. The Catholics, he says, undoubtedly wished to get rid of their adversaries, and they would gladly have done so had an opportunity offered, but the evidence of history proves that the idea of a plot

conceived and matured a long time before the fatal twenty-fourth of August must be discarded.

Colonel de la Barre Duparcq has recently published a history of Henry III., which does not aim at increasing, nor does it indeed increase, our respect for the weak and dissolute fanatic who perished at Saint Cloud by the dagger of Jacques Clément. For details on that monarch's reign and on the latter half of the French sixteenth century, it is better to consult the chatty *Registres Journaux* of Pierre de l'Estoile, a new edition of which is now in course of publication by MM. Paul Lacroix, Charles Read, Bourquelot, and others.

We have thus reached the reign of Henry IV., and the accession of the Bourbon dynasty. Political animosity, which makes use of every means in its power, and seeks for arguments in the quarters where we should least expect to find them, has been especially busy with the character of the *Béarnais*. Two legends have long passed current on the subject. The one, set afloat by the historian Péréfixe, represents Henry IV. as the model of kings; brave and clever at the same time, generous to a fault, honest and sincere in his dealings, anxious, above all, for the welfare of his subjects, and whose ambition is that the meanest peasant in France should be able to have a boiled chicken for his dinner every Sunday. To these merits he adds those of a hard drinker and a *vert galant*. This view of the first Bourbon king was widely circulated in 1814 and 1815 by the *émigrés*, who wished really to sketch out the *programme* of what the restored monarchy ought to be. Students who were acquainted with history, those especially who had read it from the republican point of view, had no difficulty in showing that the pattern king we have just been describing, the kind of French Haroun-al-Raschid, was a perfect myth. But then, rushing into a diametrically opposite direction, they made him out to be a mere impudent braggart, deceiving all parties, trifling with his conscience, and having no respect for that of others, the most selfish and ungrateful mortal that ever existed. As for his boasted courage, they scarcely brought themselves to acknowledge it. They would fain have made us believe that he was a thorough coward, who assumed a semblance of determination only under the fixed pressure of necessity, and by a kind of calculation. Twice a traitor, to his friends and to his faith, Henry IV. deserved that

D'Aubigné should say to him after Jean Châtel's attempt at assassination, "You have renounced God only with the lips, and He has accordingly struck you only upon the lips: when your heart shall have renounced Him, He will strike you at the heart." The great merit of M. Poirson's *Histoire du Règne de Henri IV.* is that it has destroyed both legends, and given us, for the first time, a complete description of the reign from every point of view. War, home administration, finances, religion, art, science, and literature—nothing has been neglected. If the style of the work is somewhat dull, this slight defect is more than compensated by the amount of information which M. Poirson has so industriously and so conscientiously brought together. By way of supplementary works on certain parts or episodes of the reign, let us name M. Mercier de Lacombe's *Henri IV. et sa Politique*, M. Jung's volumes, and M. Rott's *Henri IV., les Suisses, et la Haute Italie.*

Coming between two individualities so strongly marked as Henry IV. and Louis XIV., the character of Louis XIII. appears more insignificant than it really is. We may almost say that the king stands forth only as a subordinate figure in the history of his favourites. Constable de Luynes is the most noteworthy of those who preceded Richelieu. His reputation, which had been either completely depreciated or set aside altogether, was in the first instance rehabilitated by the late Victor Cousin, and quite recently fully vindicated in a monograph for which we are indebted to M. Zeller. It seems hard indeed that the greatness of Richelieu's government should make us unfair towards others. A careful study of original documents will show that even Louis XIII. was not what M. Victor Hugo in his *Marion Delorme* and Count Alfred de Vigny in his *Cinq-Mars* would represent him to be—the helpless victim of the terrible Cardinal. We have just named M. Cousin: no one has done more than that gentleman to make us familiar with the events of the early seventeenth century. His monographs of Mesdames de Chevreuse and de Hautefort are extremely valuable on Richelieu's administration. Let us also quote M. Bonneau-Avenant's life of Madame d'Aiguillon, the Abbé Houssaye's three excellent volumes on Cardinal de Bérulle, and M. Henri Corne's *Histoire du Ministère du Cardinal de Richelieu.* This work has entirely superseded M. Antoine Jay's biography, which was brought out in 1816. It ought

to be read in the light of the Cardinal's voluminous correspondence edited by M. Avenel, which in its turn forms the natural sequel to the series of Henry the Fourth's letters. M. Berger de Xivrey, the editor of this last work, has also taken an active part in the controversy which originated some years ago with the supposed discovery of the heart of Saint Louis under the pavement of the Sainte-Chapelle at Paris. MM. Antoine Jay and Corné had, of course, devoted portions of their respective works to an account of Richelieu's administration. But this interesting subject has been more fully discussed in M. Caillet's *De l'Administration en France sous le Ministère du Cardinal de Richelieu.*

After the death of the stern minister, followed at a short interval by that of Louis XIII., the nobility, crushed for a time, thought that they might take advantage of the minority of the young king to renew their claims. The civil war of the Fronde has engaged the notice of several eminent writers. M. Cousin's publications on Madame de Longueville and Mazarin are brilliant sketches which seem written with all the enthusiasm of a contemporary. M. Amédée Renée's *Nièces de Mazarin*, although more sober in tone, is a work full of genuine interest. But of this early part of the reign of Louis XIV. the most important account recently published is undoubtedly M. Chéruel's *Histoire de France pendant la Minorité de Louis XIV. et sous le Ministère du Cardinal de Mazarin.* Richelieu's favourite pupil and successor could not, of course, rival his master in point of genius. But his dexterity and cleverness were equalled only by his utter want of scruple. At his death he left political factions crushed, prosperity at home, foreign enemies subdued, and a band of distinguished statesmen and diplomatists perfectly qualified to assist Louis XIV. in the government of France. Even the arch-conspirator, Cardinal de Retz, the French Catiline, as he is often called, felt himself obliged to submit. After having done his best to upset Mazarin, and to bring about a revolution which had really no *raison d'être* except the inordinate ambition of the aristocracy, he accepted the position of an unofficial diplomatic agent of the Court of Saint Germain at the Vatican. M. de Sainte-Aulaire's *Histoire de la Fronde* had already contributed in no small degree to place the character of Cardinal de Retz in its proper light. We may also name on the same subject, M. de Chantelauze's

two volumes treating, respectively, of the Coadjutor's missions abroad, and of the negotiations which ended in his promotion to the Cardinalate; and especially the new and very much improved edition of the memoirs published by this gentleman for MM. Hachette's *Collection des Grands Écrivains.*

The war of the Fronde should not be studied merely as a political event. It reflects, to a considerable extent, the state of society during the first twenty years of the reign of Louis XIV., and the energetic, resolute, and impulsive personages which sided with Mazarin or with the *Frondeurs*, used to meet on equal terms at Mademoiselle de Scudéry's house, in Madame de Sablé's drawing-room, or in the *salon bleu* of Madame de Rambouillet. This circumstance gives a decidedly historical interest to M. Cousin's *Histoire de la Société Française au Dix-septième Siècle*, and to his biography of Madame de Sablé. All these works show us the bright side of French life. The dark one has been delineated by M. Alphonse Feillet in his *La Misère au Temps de la Fronde et Saint Vincent de Paul.* There we see the melancholy picture of a nation ground down by the rapacity of some, the selfishness of others, the cruelty of all. When we rise from the perusal of that suggestive volume, we feel that neither La Rochefoucauld nor Madame de Longueville are so attractive as we fancied. Both Condé and Turenne lose a good deal of their prestige, and we come to the conclusion that, Italian as he was by nationality, Cardinal Mazarin was at heart far more really a Frenchman than all his adversaries put together.

The enumeration of the distinguished ministers, generals, and politicians who shed so much lustre over the reign of Louis XIV. is associated in our mind with a gallery of highly-finished portraits, or rather a series of talented works, drawn from original sources, and which are most creditable to the historians of the nineteenth century. The notorious Foucquet, with all his cleverness, was no doubt a rogue pure and simple; but the duplicity to which Louis XIV. and Colbert had recourse in their wish to destroy him drew round him a large quantity of devoted friends (*Mémoires sur Foucquet, par A. Chéruel*). Colbert, who was the administrative successor of Foucquet, if we may so say, differed from him in temper, in appearance, in disposition, as much as it is possible to imagine. Whilst the *surinten-*

dant fascinated all who approached him by the suavity of his manners, his liberal temper, his intellectual and artistic tastes, Colbert, who hated courtiers and despised popularity, was universally dreaded and detested. Louis XIV. alone had discrimination enough to appreciate his transcendent abilities. The unpopularity of Colbert is a standing disgrace, not only to Madame de Sevigné, and to that snappish, snarling little pamphleteer, Guy Patin, but to the whole of the French nation under the reign of Louis XIV. But for him as for many others, the day of justice has come, and he has found in M. Clément (*Histoire de la Vie et de l'Administration de Colbert; Lettres, Instructions et Mémoires de Colbert*) and M. Ch. Gouraud (*Histoire de la Politique Commerciale en France*) painstaking and appreciative historians. The former writer, let us add, places himself at the free-trade, and the latter at the protectionist, point of view. Next to Colbert, Louvois deserves to be named. His life and administration have been well described by Camille Rousset, whose sole defect is perhaps that he is too severe upon Louis XIV. Not that we would for an instant wish to extenuate the faults of that monarch, or to endorse his views of government; but there were certainly great points in his character, and the last fifteen years of his reign brought out those points in a manner which commanded the admiration even of his enemies. History has long been unfair both towards Louis XIV. and towards Louvois, but a reaction is now setting in, and the attentive study of original documents shows us that here, as in so many similar cases, the best course to follow is to stand midway between the blind admiration of panegyrists and the indiscriminate abuse of determined enemies. M. Valfey has done ample justice to another French statesman of the seventeenth century (*Les Ambassades de Hugues de Lyonne en Italie*); M. Caron has given us an insight into the war administration (*Letellier, Intendant d'Armée*); and quite recently the courage, the skill, and the lofty character of Marshal Fabert, too long obscured by the more brilliant reputations of Turenne, Condé, and Villars, have been brought to light by M. Bourelly.

The war of the Spanish succession is undoubtedly one of the chief events in the reign of Louis XIV., both for its political consequences and also on account of the illustrious generals who fought on the side of the allies. The

negotiations connected with it were an opportunity, moreover, for the display of the talents of the Princess des Ursins, an accomplished but intriguing lady, whose life has been written by M. Combe, while M. Geffroy has published her hitherto unedited correspondence. The diplomatic history of the question is one of M. Mignet's most justly celebrated works, and General Pelet is responsible for the military narrative.

The influence which the king's mistresses unfortunately exercised upon the course of affairs obliges us to mention a few amongst the numerous publications lately devoted to them. Madame de la Vallière (*Louise de la Vallière et la Jeunesse de Louis XIV.* by M. Lair) is certainly the most interesting of the group. She had, at any rate, no ambition beyond that of winning and retaining the heart of Louis XIV., and her want of intellectual power made her fall an easy prey to the unscrupulous Madame de Montespan. The character of this lady is all the more despicable because of her consummate talent (*Histoire de Madame de Montespan, par P. Clément*); but even the *esprit des Mortemart* cannot atone for shameful profligacy, and there is not, to our mind, one redeeming point in the whole course of her life. The biography of Madame de Maintenon has been written both by the Duc de Noailles and by M. Th. Lavallée, who have satisfactorily explained certain circumstances in her eventful career which had been either imperfectly understood, or purposely distorted. For instance, it is absurd to represent her as a second Catherine de' Medici, plotting long beforehand the destruction of the Huguenots, and wishing to obtain an equivocal position on the steps of the throne at the price of the blood of her old fellow-religionists. It is a painful thing to say, but when he persecuted the religious minority, and finally signed the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, Louis XIV. was backed by almost all his Roman Catholic subjects. Madame de Maintenon was uniformly, together with the Dauphin, on the side of gentleness and conciliatory measures as against the atrocities which Louis XIV. sanctioned, misled as he was by the designedly false reports sent to him on all sides. The melancholy results of the Revocation have been admirably described by M. Weiss. The other interesting victims of the king's religious prejudices, we mean the solitaries of Port Royal, cannot be named without recalling immediately to our mind M. Sainte-Beuve's work, begun

under the influence of Christian principles, but the last volumes of which, unfortunately, reflect the withering scepticism which marked the concluding years of the talented author.

If ever the leavening power of Christianity was needed, it was about the middle of the seventeenth century, when an outward appearance of refinement, politeness, and intellectual culture served only to disguise corruption and vice of the most extraordinary kind. In proof of what we say, we need only refer our readers to M. Loiseleur's volume, already mentioned, and to the account he gives us of the scandals which led to the institution of *la Chambre des Poisons*. The highest persons at the Court of Versailles, were implicated in these horrible cases, and M. F. Ravaisson's *Archives de la Bastille* furnish abundant details which confirm M. Loiseleur's narrative. The legend of the Man with the Iron Mask is another of those mysterious points belonging to the reign of Louis XIV. Hypotheses without number have been put forth about it, and whether the prisoner confined successively at Pignerol, in the island of Sainte Marguerite, and at the Bastille, was a son of Anne of Austria by Cardinal Mazarin, the Duc de Beaufort, the Duke of Monmouth, a twin brother of Louis XIV., or Count Mathioli, will probably never be known. It is a French parallel to the authorship of *Junius*.

We have taken the end of the reign of Louis XIV. as the limit of our review; not that new and most interesting books do not abound in the subsequent period, quite the reverse; but the bare list of them would swell this article to about double its size without conveying to the reader any definite and satisfactory impression. The regency of the Duc d'Orléans marks the beginning of the reign of public opinion. Both the days of the *ancien régime* and the era of absolute monarchy are at an end, and a political state of things, prepared, strange to say, by Louis XIV. himself, is approaching. By levelling all classes of society, destroying the influence of the nobility, and concentrating the power in his own hands, the king has virtually laid the foundation of the utopian scheme of equality, which is as false as it is dangerous. The *Mémoires de Louis XIV.*, published by M. Dreyss, are, from that point of view, full of the deepest interest. They show how sincerely the king believed in the whole programme of despotic authority, and

how conscientiously he abhorred the slightest approach to freedom. Whether he actually uttered the famous expression *L'état c'est moi*, or only thought it, does not much signify: the corresponding motto, *Le roi gouverne par lui-même*, is even now to be seen on the ceiling of one of the drawing-rooms at Versailles, and it expresses, in substance, the same idea.

The ultra-republicans of the present day would be astonished, perhaps, to hear that *le Grand Monarque* is their political progenitor, but the fact is true nevertheless. When, in a state, the balance of power has been destroyed, there must be a perpetual oscillation between the despotism of the mob and the despotism of a dictator, and it is of very little consequence whether the dictator's name is Louis XIV., Napoleon I., or General Cavaignac.

ART. VI. 1.—*Conversations and Journals in Egypt and Malta.* By the late NASSAU WILLIAM SENIOR, Master in Chancery, Professor of Political Economy, Membre Correspondant de "l'Institut de France," &c., &c. Author of "A Treatise of Political Economy," "Biographical Sketches," &c., &c., &c. Edited by his Daughter, M. C. M. SIMPSON. Two Volumes. Sampson Low and Co.

2. *Egypt: Native Rulers and Foreign Interference.* By BARON DE MALORTIE, Author of "Mr. Gladstone and the Greek Question," &c., &c. Ridgway, Piccadilly.

"IN publishing my father's Conversations, I have always endeavoured to seize the moment when the countries whose politics and habits they record were objects of especial interest." With these words Mrs. Simpson begins the preface to a work inferior, indeed, in what may be called prophetic value to that which gave us so wonderful an insight into the workings of French politics and the personal feelings of French statesmen under the Empire, but possessing for us this additional interest that we for fully half a century have taken an active part in the affairs of the country of which it mainly treats.

"Surely there will never be a more opportune occasion than the present for the appearance of these journals." When those referring to Turkey and Greece were brought out, much valuable matter had to be omitted, and the names of nearly all the speakers suppressed. Mr. Senior was in Egypt from mid-November, 1855, to mid-March in the following year; and, therefore, the lapse of time has relieved his daughter of the need of writing either names, facts, or opinions. In Mr. Senior's own words, "the East does not change," and, as his interlocutors so often remark, one despot has been pretty much like another, allowance being made for personal peculiarities; while as for the Joint Control and the way in which Sultans, Viceroys and European Powers have successively striven each to play off his opponents against one another, a parallel may be sought for all this as far back as the days of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, when satraps were plotting

against the great king, and Persian gold was lavished by both sides to buy the help, or to secure the non-interference, of this or that Greek state.

Of direct prophecy (of which the conversations with notable Frenchmen, in and out of office, contained so much) these volumes contain very little. Mr. Senior could not foresee Arabi; he could not foresee that "European interests" would be furthered by urging Ismail to heap up that load of debt which made the dual control a necessity; but he had repeated evidence that the Cavala family "has no root whatever in the country; a mere street row in Cairo or Alexandria might turn them out."

Their rise is one of those phenomena so common in the East as to have passed into a proverb. A Macedonian peasant, born about 1769, was in due time pressed into the Turkish army. He rose to the command of a troop of irregular horse, and distinguished himself in suppressing some disorders at Cavala and Drama. This led to his being sent to Egypt, and employed against the Mamelukes. Before long he was on the Mameluke side, and, seizing the Turkish pasha, deposed him. His next step was to reinstate the pasha, and to help him against the Mamelukes; but no sooner did an opportunity offer itself than he made himself pasha by Mameluke help, which he rewarded by massacring all of them whom he could lay hands on, just as Sultan Mahmoud massacred the Janissaries. Mehemet was so anxious during the massacre that he contracted a little nervous laugh which he never lost. No doubt he was a man of genius; he drilled negroes into admirable soldiers; he spent hours in teaching his Turkish officers—whose insolence was too much even for the patience of a fellah recruit—that the secret of managing a regiment is to love it and to treat the men with firm kindness. But to say, as Barthélemy de St. Hilaire says, that "he would be as worthy as Frederick the Great of the title of father of his country had Egypt been able to understand the value of that phrase," is absurd. His sole aim was self-aggrandisement; and this he secured by forming a regular army and drawing a large revenue. We think of him as the modern counterpart of those Dacian or Illyrian peasants who became first popular generals, then emperors. Indeed, the comparison to the first Napoleon is most apposite. Both had in view the greatness of their adopted countries only as a means to their own glorification; both were utterly

unscrupulous in their mode of setting forward this greatness. In his last wars Napoleon selfishly sacrificed France to his insane longing for universal empire; Mehemet Ali throughout "cared as little whether the means he used for obtaining power did good or harm to Egypt as a postmaster cares whether his horse be fat or thin, so that it does his work. The work which Egypt had to do was to keep him and his family pashas, by supplying them with soldiers and money: that alone gave to the country any interest in his eyes. He never identified himself with the Egyptians, he never learned their language, he never employed one of them in any office for which he could get a Turk; he used Egypt, as his son Said is fond of saying, as a *moyen*. As for his successors, they have been cruel, selfish sensualists, who have looked on their viceroyalty as a property held only for life, out of which as much as possible is to be squeezed for their children. So little does Said feel as an Egyptian—as a man to whom the welfare of his country is entrusted, and to whom that welfare ought to be the principal object—that he threatens if his caprices are interfered with he will turn Egypt into a desert. Who can feel loyalty, or affection, or respect for such a family; for a family which has so usurped its power, and has so employed it; for a family which not merely violates, but absolutely ignores the responsibilities of sovereignty, and treats its dominions as you have treated Sebastopol: as a conquest to be turned to account while it can be kept, and to be destroyed if it must be abandoned? It is only by an effort—only by reflecting on the harm which they have done to me and mine, and are doing to me and mine—that I can bring myself to think of them seriously. My first impulse is always to treat them as actors, and actors who do not know their parts, as a set of uneducated *bourgeois gentilshommes*, aping what they suppose to be the manners and the language and the prodigalities and the vices of kings, without being conscious of the duties, or even of the decencies, which the rank to which they pretend imposes."

We quote the words of Hekekyan Bey, on the whole the best informed and most sensible of those whom Mr. Senior talked with, not excepting the English or any of the French, except M. de Lesseps. Hekekyan had been employed by Mehemet Ali to search for coal in the desert between the Upper Nile and the Red Sea. Being a man

of education, he assured the Viceroy that the nature of the strata made it impossible there should be any coal, but he would have the district explored; and "those nine months," said Hekekyan, "were the happiest I ever passed. . . . I soon lost all reckoning of time, and the effect was remarkable. It seemed as if a weight had been removed from me, or, rather, as if the last string that tied me to civilised life—to duties and to obligations—had been cut. For the first and last time in my life I felt absolutely free."

This man looked on the Turkish rule as the prolongation of "the second recorded invasion of the Hyksos, which has already lasted 2,300 years; but what is that in Egyptian chronology?" His one hope was in European intervention leading to eventual autonomy. Abbas turned him out of office for undertaking some surveys for our Royal Geological Society. These involved going round to the villages and asking a number of questions; and "the man who asks all these questions," said Abbas, "can't mean well." His estimate of Abbas and Said is, that while Abbas liked Turks and never, if he could help it, employed any one of another race, Said liked Europeans. "There the principal distinction ends," he said, in reply to Mr. Senior's complaint that on no subject did he hear such diversity of opinion as on the characters of these two men.

Of Artim Bey, for many years Mehemet Ali's Prime Minister, we should like to know whether he was a native Egyptian. One would fancy so from the scorn with which he speaks of the Turkish Government, or rather no Government, at Constantinople. He, too, was eager for foreign intervention. "You must interfere; you must insist on there being some security for property and life. You see here large commercial and industrial establishments. Did you ever hear of a native house of business or of a native manufactory? No person who does not enjoy foreign protection has any credit. No one would trust an unprotected Egyptian, however large his capital, since that capital might be destroyed or confiscated in a day, or indeed in an hour."

It is this absolute want of security for life or goods which led Sumner to say to the minister whom he had noticed on such charmingly easy terms with Mehemet Ali, but who confessed that the Viceroy might at any instant bastinado or behead him: "Well, we Americans think we are a brave people, but you are infinitely braver." Of course, every

subordinate claimed the same absolute power over those below him which the Viceroy exercised over his ministers. To act as he pleased towards his inferiors was his way of indemnifying himself for being tyrannised over by those above him. The fellah, at the bottom of the scale, is in a worse case than the mythical Irish tenant: he cannot venture to appear possessed of anything. To do so would expose him to be robbed and beaten by a hierarchy of oppressors, beginning with the Sheykh-el-Beled, and ending with the Pasha. As for the Capitulations, though they are sometimes abused (and of the abuse Mr. Senior's book, like About's *Ahmed le Fellah*, gives some typical instances), the best Egyptians assured Mr. Senior that they are the only hope of the country. "We don't want labour or capital," says one, "we want foreign aid, because in a country governed by Mussulmans, foreigners alone, and those who are protected by foreigners, enjoy security. . . . "We don't want from Europe its Germans, or its Spaniards, or its Maltese; we want only its protection." It is, of course, hard that a Greek should hire a house from an Egyptian, and that when, not paying, he is sued in the Greek Consul's court, his creditor should find that he has transferred the house to an Armenian, and that, therefore, the suit has to be begun over again, with fresh costs, in the Russian Consul's court. M. About gives a story of a poor landlord who was taken from court to court, and is probably still kept at the same game, if he has money left to pay any more fees. Mr. Senior tells the tale of one Iscouros, a Greek, who went over to America, bought a bit of land, and, coming back, flourished in the Viceroy's eyes the protection of the United States' Consul to shield him from the consequences of what by Mahomedan law was a fraud. This is very deplorable; and patriotic Egyptians confess: "It is only the system of protection which, by keeping alive some small embers of liberty, industry and activity, has prevented Turkey and Egypt from being as bad as the interior of Morocco." One of them would even wish the Consuls to return to their old practice and sell their protection, "and sell it cheaply. The demand would be immense. The first and most eager purchasers would be Mehemet Ali's descendants. A real aristocracy would be created in Egypt. The pipe-cleaner of the American Vice-Consul, protected by the Stars and Stripes, is really an aristocrat. He belongs to the privileged class; he stands between the Pasha

and the people. He has rights; the Prime Minister or the heir to the throne has none." The way in which judges are appointed is (as one of the English speakers expresses it) the key to a great deal of this. The Kadi, the fountain of justice, is a Turk, sent from Constantinople, not knowing a word of Arabic. He has bought the place and thinks only of repaying himself. He signs without having even looked at the evidence or had it translated to him. Nothing is got without bribes; and these are thrown into a common fund which is shared amongst the members of the Divan, the Kadi getting the largest share. Everybody is bribed; the officer appointed at, say, £50 a year to superintend the cleansing of ditches, makes £200 to £300 to report work done which was never even taken in hand. He thrives; but the cultivation of the country is seriously damaged. One never knows what to believe. We used to be told that 313,000 labourers were employed on the Mahmoodecyeh Canal, and that they suffered terribly from overcrowding. At least a third of them were pretty certainly fictitious, for the system was this: a village was required to send, say, 100 labourers; it contained 300, of whom 250 could bribe the Sheykh. Only fifty, therefore, were sent. But the Sheykh gives part of his spoil to the officer charged with supplying men and feeding, and he reports that 100 have been sent, and draws rations for 100.

Mr. Rushton, engineer of the Alexandria and Cairo railways, had the greatest difficulty in getting supplies, and found always that, after he got an order for men, camels, horses, &c., he received about half. When he threatened to tell, he found he was making himself unpopular with all the hierarchy of officials, and so gave up the attempt to alter the habits of a whole people, protecting himself by asking thrice as much of everything as he really wanted. Of course, being there, we are bound to alter this disgraceful state of things, but this will be a work of time.

We have brought together a good deal of what is said in Mr. Senior's pages about Mehemet Ali; and it is interesting to contrast the views of Orientals like Hekekyan and Artim Beys, of Englishmen like Mr. Rushton and Sir F. Bruce, of Frenchmen like De Lesseps, with the views of the distinguished writers quoted in M. de Malortie's book. In the latter there is an almost unvarying chorus of praise. Mehemet is superior to Napoleon, because he had to create as he went along the materials wherewith to do his work.

Prince Pückler Moskau says: "Education was his hobby; it is difficult to believe the good that has been done in so short a time; he has frequently taken on himself the appearance of brutal selfishness in order thus to become the benefactor of his people for centuries to come; indeed, he has done more in this direction for Egypt than any of its rulers since Saladin; posterity will do justice to his mighty influence on the commencing regeneration of the East" (*Aus Mehemet Ali's Reich*). H. Stephan (*Das Heutige Egypt*) and E. de Regny (*Statistique de l'Egypte*) show that the vast improvement which he wrought in the revenue was managed without increased taxation, mainly indeed by enlarging the cultivated area. Count Prokesch Orten points to the reforms which he began in Syria, and reminds us how different would have been the state of Turkey had he not been crushed down by the European Powers. But of all these panegyrists the most uncompromising is M. de Lesseps, who told Mr. Senior that if Mehemet had been allowed to conquer Syria, Turkey would by this step have been not weakened, but much the reverse. "He made the country secure within and formidable without. He gave it improved agriculture and industry. .... When I returned after seventeen years' absence, I was astonished at its progress. Egypt had passed from barbarism to civilisation." The most important testimony to his efficiency in making travelling secure is that given by M. Batissier, the French Consul at Suez: "At the beginning of his reign the only communication between Cairo and Suez was by caravans of 3,000 or 4,000 men, which travelled twice a year. It was a dangerous journey. Several caravans have been attacked and very many men killed at this spot" (Mr. Senior was travelling in the desert in view of Mt. Sinai with the Commissioners appointed to report on the feasibility of the Suez Canal), "where the hills give shelter for an ambush. The Bedouins used to come over from Idumea, a distance of perhaps 500 miles, which good dromedaries will travel in five or six days. Now no one ever thinks of an escort." In his indifference to human life he was wholly Oriental. "The European cares little for brute life; he destroys the lower animals without scruple for his convenience, his whim, his pleasures; he shoots his favourite horse or dog when they become too old for service. The Oriental solicitously preserves the lives of the lower animals..... The beggar does not venture to destroy his

vermin; he puts them tenderly on the ground. There are hospitals at Cairo where superannuated cats are fed at the public cost." Yet when Abbas, a mere boy, had his pastry-cook bastinadoed to death, Mehemet mildly reproved him for it, as we should reprove a child for killing a butterfly. Such things, he said to his little grandson, ought not to be done without a motive. He did not interfere when his daughter Nasli Hanem burnt her slave to death for giving her cold coffee; and, though Mr. Senior does not mention the shoeing with red hot irons of some unfortunate servant, he tells a story about drowning a messenger who brought a letter, which in itself is enough to stamp the perpetrator's character.

But whatever might have happened if Mehemet had been unchecked by Europe and had passed his authority on direct to the heir whom he had pointed out, there is no question that under Abbas, son of his second son Toussoun, much of his work was undone. Abbas was a stupid tyrant. He cut down all the public establishments, especially the public schools (those which he spared being afterwards suppressed by Said). He allowed the canals to get silted up, so that large tracts of land went out of cultivation. He wasted his income in childish expenses—keeping a thousand saddle horses, though he was too timid ever to mount one, and would not show them for fear of the evil eye; and building palaces, clumsy, ill-contrived structures, which he was always pulling down and altering, and the furniture of one of which cost £200,000. Of the private foulness of Abbas's life Mr. Senior heard a good deal. All that is ever said of Turks was true of him. As Mougil Bey said: "His name was hateful to all except to some military men whose favour he had bought by unworthy means." Cahil Effendi, a Syrian Christian, American Vice-Consul, had the very worst opinion of him. It is of Abbas that the edifying story is told how somebody saw blood on his fingers, and asked what it was: "Oh, I've only been sewing up the mouth of a girl who would smoke in the harem." There seems no doubt this was done, the breaker of rules being left to die of hunger. Abbas, whose nature was more suspicious than even that of the rest of his house, disliked Europeans. How he could have got so deeply into debt is a mystery, for "he stole the materials of his palaces, and did not pay those who put them together." Of Said the accounts are most conflicting. M. de Lesseps, whose

pupil in a great measure he was, naturally praises the ruler who fell in so easily with his grand scheme of the Canal. Very sociable, especially fond of the society of foreigners, he found that society an expensive luxury. Nobody (says Mr. Senior) goes to Egypt except to make money; and one result of Said's European *entourage* was that he left debts to the amount of ten millions, after having won the doubtful honour of being the first to burden Egypt with a public debt. "He left to Ismail" (said Mr. M'Coan) "a rotten administration, great disorder, and the Canal Concession with all its ruinous obligations." Yet he meant well; his favourite phrase was: "Those who went before me did nothing but milk the cow; *moi, je prétends la nourrir.*" Like all the dynasty, he was a thorough Turk; De Lesseps tells how once, in the desert, he found him in his tent in an agony of tears. "I was retiring, but he called me back. 'I will not hide myself from you,' he said; 'I am horrified and humiliated that Constantinople is in the hands of the Christians, and that it has escaped Russia only to fall under England and France.'"*

The threat to turn Egypt into a desert is authentic. Mr. Senior heard it himself in the course of an interesting conversation, or rather monologue, in which the Viceroy told how he had increased his army by 16,000 men, without taking away one labourer (*sans enlever à l'agriculture une seule pioche*), by simply insisting that the sons of sheykhs should enter the army. "When one of them amused himself the other day with abusing me and the service to his comrades, I said if he thought a fellah's life better than a soldier's, he should enjoy it. So I put on him a fellah's dress, walked him up and down before the regiment for an hour, and then sent him to a village to work for a month. This alarmed him much more than a bastinado would have done." Then, having detailed his plans for keeping the Bedouins in check, and enlarged on his dislike for his successor, and the need of making a purse for his one child during his life, he burst out: "Je suis bon enfant; on peut tout avec moi par de bons procédés. Mais si l'on me traite avec orgueil, ils verront de quoi je suis capable. (I will turn Egypt into a desert or a jungle; I will throw

* This feeling was so strong in Mehemet, that when a foreign visitor congratulated him on his Egyptians having beaten the Turks at Nezib, he looked very sad and explained that all his officers were Turks.

the barrage and the temples and the towns and the villages into the Nile. If they want a Nile they shall have to dig a new one. I will fill the canals and tear up the dykes. It shall take three hundred years to make Egypt again habitable." No wonder Mr. Warne, who had been in the country twenty years, rated such a sham Napoleon—spoiled by the flattery of foreigners, undoing everything, and himself working less than two hours a day—very low indeed. Nor had Abdullah Bey a higher opinion of him. Some of his stories are characteristic. The under zábit (police magistrate) of Alexandria, laughed when Said came back from his European tour two days after he had started. Said ordered him five hundred blows, a punishment almost sure to be fatal. The Bedouin sheykhs he treated much as his father did the Mamelukes, invited them to a conference, and then fired artillery on them. His Bedouin prisoners he blew from guns, or set them up tied two and two as targets for his negro riflemen to shoot at. His chief general, Houssein Pasha, he dismissed the service, because he let 450 Bedouins go who had surrendered on promise of quarter, but whom Said ordered him to put to death. Like Abbas, he began early; his tutor, Curling, left him, being afraid to stay after he saw him shoot a ferryman who kept him waiting. He had, too, the unfairness of his race; when he succeeded Abbas, large arrears were due to almost every public servant; these he confiscated by a mere order, and, finding himself in consequence worried with petitions, he announced that every one who petitioned against the order should be dismissed. That was the time, thought both Artim and Hekekyan, for the four Christian powers to have interfered; for this was a clear violation of the Hatti-Sheriff, granted under their dictation, by which the rights of property are declared inviolable. Perhaps his most senseless act was the destruction of the medical school, at the head of which was Clot Bey. He had 150 pupils, who studied five years, and therefore added (allowing for failures) twenty-five per year to the medical men of Egypt. Said drafted all the students into the army—as brutal an act as any that his family have been guilty of. They were picked youths, chosen for their intelligence, zealous for their calling. Clot Bey said: "That one day destroyed my life's labours." This Clot Bey Mr. Senior calls "the father of Egyptian medicine;" and his remarks about the climate, the plague, &c., are very interesting.

Abdullah Bey was an Englishman named Rickards, who managed the transit service for Abbas, with whom he was a great favourite. His story is romantic; Mr. Senior vouches for its truth. He got attached to the daughter of a sheykh at Minieh. The intrigue was discovered; and to save her from being sewn up in a sack and flung into the Nile, he married her. But as an infidel cannot marry a Mahomedan, he "turned Turk." She made him an excellent wife.

In estimating Said's character, it is fair to remember that he was apparently in earnest in his edict for abolishing slavery; and, not to speak of the partial M. de Lesseps, Mr. Bruce, Lord Elgin's brother (afterwards Sir Frederick), thought Egypt had gone on improving all through the Cavala dynasty, never more than during Said's reign. Semi-barbarous Governments, he said, must be tested by general results; the details will never bear European criticism; and, of course, on the same principle, objects and not means must be looked at. Mr. Bruce thought it a very good thing that Egypt was not independent of Constantinople: "With all his frankness, his *bonhommie*, his commercial liberality, Said is as impatient of control as Napoleon. But as a Turk he has a traditionary veneration for the Sultan; and I should be sorry to lose that hold on him, such as it is." Bruce thought Said's dismissing his ministers and determining to manage everything himself, from raising an army to fixing the hour for a train to start, was a good thing. "We foreigners, at any rate, have no right to complain. In all matters affecting *us* he is far more liberal and indeed far more sensible than any ministers or counsellors are likely to be. He is as good a free trader as we are. And we escape the horrible corruption which is the pest of all Oriental negotiations; we have not to bribe, and we are not opposed by bribes. We escape, too, the dreadful delays of the East." He admitted that in matters as to which Said's theories or information happened to be wrong, and still more in those as to which his passions might bias him, he must make dangerous mistakes.

Russmayer, too, the Dutch Consul-General, thought highly of Said: "In a year and a half he has done more for the improvement of the country than was ever done during a similar period by any sovereign. He has abolished slavery and the *octrois*, he has reduced the interior customs from twelve to three per cent., he has insisted that all

taxes shall be paid in money, thereby stopping an immense amount of extortion and oppression. He has extended military service to all classes—a proper and beneficial step, however harshly carried out. He is in treaty for the purchase of all the judges' appointments—a grand thing, for the corruption and ignorance of the Turkish kadis is inconceivable. He means the Kadi of Alexandria to be appointed by universal suffrage and ballot." In answer to the question, "Why does he dislike Europeans?" Russmayer replied, it was because his love of justice is shocked by mixing with the detestable European population that swarms in Egypt." This strong disgust at the Europeans was loudly echoed by Clot Bey. He placed the Turks in the lowest place of infamy, then the European population, then the Copts, the Egyptian Mussulmans being the best of all.

For Said's successors we have, of course, to look to M. de Malortie. Ismail, second son of Ibrahim, succeeded, owing to the death of his brother Achmed, of whom Mr. Senior gives many anecdotes. Of Ismail, who kept much in the background, he does not, we think, say one word. He reigned for seventeen years, and during that time was industriously piling up the enormous debt which indirectly caused the bombardment of Alexandria and the late war. The whole history shows the all-powerfulness of money and the unscrupulous way in which the lords of finance deal with their helpless prey. "Scandalous," says M. About, "is the history of European financing in Egypt under Ismail. The fellah has to complain more of the lender than of the borrower. It has been an organised spoliation. Viceroy, country, fellahs, all suffer alike under loans, advances, treasury bonds, exactions of all kinds for the good of the Europeans." Thanks to immense bribery, Ismail was able to gain from the Sultan the power of making loans without consulting his suzerain. This seemed a saving, inasmuch as on every loan a heavy commission had to be paid to the great officers of the Porte. In reality it helped on the financial ruin of the country, for it made borrowing so much easier that loan upon loan became the regular system as long as there was anything to borrow upon. To obtain his other object, the altering of the succession, cost him another visit to Constantinople and a sum of some three millions, of which £900,000 in cash is said to have been laid at the Sultan's feet. Further, he made Egypt nominally independent and autonomous,

though in reality she only exchanged the very light yoke of the Porte for slavery to the bondholders. Ismail's one grand work was education, especially female education, of which he set an excellent example in his own family. Perhaps no human being was ever swindled on such a gigantic scale. Adventurers flocked round him. Mehemet Ali had been similarly beset; but he had sense enough to distinguish between scamps and true men. Ismail signed concessions right and left without inquiring into the antecedents of the contractors. One of these instances of wholesale plunder was exposed by Mr. Mulhall in the *Contemporary* for last October. Messrs. Greenfield and Sir G. Elliott undertook the harbour works at Alexandria for £2,542,000—raised by interest to very nearly three millions. This was Ismail's boon to England to keep the balance straight, seeing that France had been entrusted with the Canal. Sir Rivers Wilson calculated that at most the value of the work should have been £1,420,000.

There was great fear among the contractors lest Sir Rivers should cancel such an outrageous contract. But no; the payment was allowed; it was but one more case of spoiling the Egyptians. Of the ways in which smaller men fleeced him About gives some amusing instances. Inventors used with him the plan which is common at Christmas among purveyors of wine and vendors of Christmas cards; they would send him their machines and then demand payment. Ismail, always dreading lest a refusal to pay might bring down on him some consul or another, paid, and the machines were left in their packing cases to fall to pieces on the shore by Alexandria. No doubt some of the money was usefully spent. He purchased and regulated the post office, which had before been in foreign hands; he brought gas and water into his two cities; at M. Mariette's instance he started the Boulak Museum. With all his waste it is unfair to say that he "borrowed ninety millions and left nothing to show for it but a few lath and plaster palaces." It is worth while to read Mr. J. Seymour Keay's *Spoiling the Egyptians* in order to form an adequate notion of the disgraceful conduct of European financiers. "All the usurers of the Continent flung themselves on Egypt as an easy prey. His Ministers' anterooms were crowded with bankers eager to lend him millions at a percentage prohibited by penal laws in their own countries. To the last they continued to push him to take their gold, and to mortgage

Egypt, greedily renewing his bonds till they found it more advantageous to liquidate the estate." It is the case of the Hindoo money-lender on a colossal scale; and M. de Malortie's comment is that, had his case been that of an ordinary mortal, a court of law would have reduced the outrageous claims to fair proportions. "But he was a sovereign, and his creditors the kings of Jews, or rather the Jews of kings, and powerful enough to bring to bear the authority and pressure of their respective Governments to enforce their claims by every means available." The facts are undoubted. Mr. Cave's report shows that out of a nominal one hundred millions Ismail only received forty-five, of which, so long ago as 1876, thirty-one had been repaid in interest and principal. The crying scandal was that, while Europe, because Egypt was a poor weak state, took up the case of the foreign creditors, she wholly declined to put the native creditors on the same footing as the rest. She forced Ismail to pay the bond-holders, while his own officials, the army, &c., were not paid. It is well to note this, for the bitter feeling which such injustice must have aroused is one great cause of the unhappy events which led up to the late war. M. de Malortie thinks that the great cause of Ismail's bankruptcy and of Egypt's ruin was the Canal, which has verified the old oracle that frightened Pharaoh Necho from completing it: "You are only working for the foreigner." The canal has brought loss of traffic, a great public debt, and foreign intervention. Of Tewfik we need say nothing; he was only the organ of the dual control, and (as our aim is to be strictly non-political) we shall wholly abstain from any reference to still more recent events.

Such, then, is a sketch of the Cavala dynasty, mainly gleaned from opinions by Mr. Senior. It is one more instance of Eastern self-development hopelessly checked by Western interference. Mehemet Ali would have made Egypt a strong state, closely allied with the Porte (for his reverence for the head of Islam would have kept him from aiming at independence). He was thwarted and crushed, and both Egypt and Turkey were weakened past remedy, owing to the jealousy of England and France, played upon by the malevolent selfishness of Russia. Under his successors Egypt gradually sank more and more into the toils of the European adventurer. Turkey has suffered in this way a good deal; but in Egypt, where

the Viceroy had fewer advisers, the adventurer had it all his own way. Each member of the family outdid the other in fatuous extravagance and obstinate mismanagement. Each was stained with gross cruelty, betraying the untamed barbarian under the varnish of culture. At last the end came; and we know what that has been.

It is an unpleasant story; for the part which Europe, the pioneer of the world's thought, the bringer of healthier influences into the unwholesome air of Eastern despotisms, has taken in all this is simply humiliating. Her influence has been distinctly bad. Each European nation has sacrificed her own honour, and the welfare of Egypt, to the maintenance of her own influence, and the keeping out of rivals; while individual Europeans have cynically pursued a course which, if less brutally violent, has not been less ruinous to the country in which they settled than the behaviour of the Spaniards in South America.

And now we will conclude with a more pleasing task—that of rapidly following Mr. Senior's journal and gleaning a few facts from its very instructive and amusing pages.

The moment he lands in Alexandria he is in the thick of the Canal agitation. M. de Lesseps, whose father had also been Consul-General, opened out his scheme and gained his firman a few months after Said's accession, less than a year, *i.e.*, before Mr. Senior's visit. Said had not gained that position of unhappy independence represented by the title of khedive, which his nephew Ismail was by-and-by prompted by his creditors to insist on. The firman was therefore submitted for confirmation to the Sultan; English interest, then paramount at Constantinople, was strongly used against it; Lord Palmerston lost his temper, not so much owing to Gallophobia, as to that personal spite against French ministers which so often affected his policy; the *Times* and the whole English Press sneered down the enterprise as a contravention of the laws of nature; said everything, in fact, except (what might have done some good) to state calmly and clearly the possible disadvantage to Egypt of diverting the traffic which was so gainfully conveyed along the old overland route. It brings us strangely into a past which is wholly past though yet so near the present, to find the English objections and M. de Lesseps's answers set down in full in Mr. Senior's opening pages. The event has certainly proved that the Frenchman was right when he said the Canal would do nothing but good to England.

With more than three-quarters of the India trade to Europe in her hands, she could not dread a commercial rival on the Continent. Over the only rival whom she need fear, America, the Canal would give her an immense advantage.

In June, 1855, M. de Lesseps came to London, to try to overcome English opposition; and, bringing from M. Thiers an introduction to Mr. Senior, he invited him to accompany the international commission of celebrated engineers which the Viceroy had just appointed to report on the scheme. Of the three Englishmen chosen, Mr. Maclean was the only one who actually joined the expedition. Of the others, Nigrelli of Austria, and Paleocapo of Sardinia, are the most famous names. In such company the indefatigable journal-writer found himself at Alexandria, among miserable hovels, masked women, naked children, dirt, dogs, donkey-boys, camels, palm-trees, flies, and, above all, dust and sand. No sooner was he landed than he began to learn from Mougil Bey something of the jobbery which was perhaps not greater in Egypt under Said than in France under the second empire. He found, too, that "the treatment of the Israelites was a fair sample of the administration which now prevails in Egypt." He found governors like Abderahman Bey, of Charkieh, who was known to have put unhappy fellahs between planks, and had them sawn in sunder.* He was worried for *bakshecsh:* "You suffer," explained Mougil, "because you are too lavish. A man begs, and instead of a para, and a cut of your whip if he is importunate, you give him a piastre. 'Ah,' he says, 'see what God has done for me. He has sent me this Christian to give me a piastre. Perhaps it is His will that the Christian shall give me another, or even more than another.' To avoid the sin of rejecting the favours of Providence, he will persecute you indefinitely. Turn on him with your whip, and he is satisfied. He has done his best; he has ascertained that God does not mean him to get another piastre from you, and he submits." We never saw the principle of fatalism which underlies all Oriental life more neatly explained.

* Abderahman cynically confessed this. When Mougil Bey, one of Mehemet's Armenians, high in office at the time of Mr. Senior's visit, questioned him, he coolly replied: "I've tried it; but it did not answer."

Another contrast to Europe is the impossibility of getting at facts. The census in 1845 gave the population at five and a half millions. Mougil said this was too little; the village sheykhs were anxious to give in the smallest possible numbers so as to diminish taxation and conscription. But, on the other hand, Linant Bey (another of Mehemet's Armenians) and Kœnig Bey, a Frenchman, Said's secretary and old tutor, said the census, which at first was under three millions, reached that total, because Mehemet was anxious to exaggerate the importance of Egypt and ordered the numbers to be raised.

Among the commissioners, Mr. Senior and M. Barthélemy de St. Hilaire and one or two others were received by the Viceroy with the greatest possible honour. He made his army defile before them, and as they sat by his side he begged them to put on their hats. "Mais Votre Altesse traite ces messieurs comme des têtes couronnées," said de Lesseps. "Et ils sont," was the reply, "les têtes couronnées de la Science."

The horses of the cavalry and their very rapid evolutions delighted Mr. Senior, who remarks that the Viceroy's horse, of no great size, galloped with him (over twenty stone) as if he had been a man of ordinary weight. Some of the weight was laid on the running footman, on whose head he rested his hand. A little incident after dinner shows that he had real goodness of heart. "Kœnig Bey, who hitherto had been the greatest man we had seen, was now thrown back among the other courtiers. The Viceroy thought we might undervalue him, and said: 'Kœnig Bey was my tutor; now he is my friend. We weren't always good friends during our early acquaintance, when he used to put me on bread and water for idleness. The punishment (he added, looking at his stomach) failed as respects the physique.'"

The history of the barrage exemplifies the way in which Egyptian money was squandered when it was not spent on palaces and private pleasures. It was one of Mehemet's splendid failures, the attempt being to dam up the Nile, both the Rosetta and Damietta branches, so as to afford perpetual irrigation. Mehemet was so eager about it that he very nearly pulled down the great pyramid to get stone with—would have done so, had it not been proved that stone could be got cheaper from a neighbouring quarry.

Mr. Senior did not go up the pyramid, but he got

Mr. Maclean to estimate its cubic extent and the cost of building such a stone mountain in England. The "tombs of the kings" at Luxor answer to the Ghizeh pyramids. At the latter place they reared a hill, not having one provided by nature. The journey up to the first cataract was rather hurried, the Commissioners being anxious to begin their survey. Off Philoe, in an interesting *tête-à-tête*, De Lesseps asked: "What motives can England have which would bear to be exposed before Europe? Could she venture to say that Europe shall not get the shortest road to India and China because she is afraid the Mediterranean States will thereby obtain a larger share of the commerce of Asia? or because India will become more accessible to an enemy? Such selfish motives could not safely be brought forward, even in the English Chamber." At each successive interview the Viceroy was more affable. On one occasion he confessed his half-belief in astrology. "Abbas," he said, "used to have full faith in it. I have one of his astrologers, sent him by the Sultan of Borneo; as soon as his last prediction about me is run out, I shall give him a flogging and send him home."

Achmed Pasha, heir presumptive, Ismail's elder brother, the richest man in Egypt, was no less open to conversation. He explained to our author that the Nile fertilises chiefly by breaking up the hard soil, not by depositing mud, else the surface would be much more rapidly raised. Lands far away from river or canals get moist by filtration. The best manure (there being very little stock) is got from the remains of ancient towns. This Achmed was a distinguished pupil at the Paris Polytechnic school; he was killed by an accident a little before Said died.

A remarkable instance of the third Napoleon's fealty to England came out in a conversation about the railway. "How came Abbas to make it, when he, brought up in the harem till he was too old to do any good, hated Europeans and their works?" "You English forced him. You threatened and bribed; but while Louis Philippe reigned nothing was done. He opposed it as an English scheme, just as you oppose the Canal as a French scheme. During the *entente cordiale*, your foreign policy, like ours, was simple; you instructed your diplomatists always to oppose ours, we instructed ours always to oppose yours. The only real friend of England was Thiers, and him you turned out." So said De Lesseps; and Mougil added: "In

1651 Abbas sent me to Paris to offer them *carte blanche* if they would support him, as Guizot had done, in refusing the railway. Baroche, Minister for Foreign Affairs, flatly refused. 'We believe,' he said, 'that the railway will be useful to Egypt, and we are certain it will be useful to the world.'"

Times correspondents in Egypt seem to have done much mischief, if we may trust the accounts given of them in this book. Mougil instanced one to whom Abbas gave £1,000 a year. Said withdrew his pension, and Mr. I——, a man with the old anti-French prejudices, gave them free scope in regard to the Canal, and to Egyptian matters generally.

At Suez Mr. Maclean went into raptures over the harbour: "Only one such exists in England, Milford Haven. The log of the English corvette shows that for three years she has not shifted anchor, or lost communication with the shore."

Here is a striking picture of the desert from one not particularly prone to go into raptures over scenery:

"No European prospect resembles this. What comes nearest to it is a downy country—Salisbury Plain, for instance—covered with snow and lighted up by a red sunset. All the colours to which we are accustomed—green, blue, purple and black—were absent; all the objects to which we are accustomed—trees, buildings, and cultivation—were absent; nothing was to be seen but naked plain, hill, and mountain, all white, yellow, or red. There were no contrasts; the different colours melted into one another, the white passing into yellow and the yellow into red insensibly. I have compared the prospect to an illuminated snowy landscape. I know of no better comparison, but in fact there is little real resemblance. The colouring is more varied; red and yellow predominate over white, and what white there is, being reflected from sand, is a yellower white than that of snow. Another peculiarity is the form of the mountains and hills. The Gebel Attakah presents a varied outline, but to the east two parallel chains—one perhaps 3,000 or 4,000 feet high, the other 500 or 600—as far as the eye can follow them, rise in precipitous walls from the plains at their feet and end in table lands. This want of variety of outline and of relief, added to the vast extent of the prospect and to the haziness produced by a powerful sun and an unclouded sky, makes the distance indistinct. The whole effect is gorgeous and strange, unlike anything else, and therefore, in fact, incapable of description."

The following shows the disadvantages of personal government, on the advantages of which Mr. Gisborne, of the Telegraph Company, had insisted:—

"A railway depends on punctuality and on arrangement, and the Turks have no idea of either. Yesterday Sabbatier, the French Consul, persuaded the Viceroy, without consulting anybody, to issue an order that no train should leave Alexandria before eleven in the morning. That delay may enable him three or four times in a month to get his letters on the day that the packet enters, and for this petty convenience the trade between Alexandria and Cairo is deranged, and the passengers reach Cairo in the dark. On Saturday orders came to Tantah that all the passengers should be turned out of their seats, and left on the road, in order to take in 340 sheykhs' sons, the Pasha's recruits, whom he wished to send to Cairo. There were thirty or forty Englishmen and Americans in the train. I wish that the officials had persisted, and had tried to force them out of the carriages; it would have tested their power. Any day, just as the train is starting, some 300 or 400 soldiers or Turks are sent to me, or come to me without having been sent, and require to be forwarded. I have sent word to the Pasha that if he will merely tell me on one day what he will want on the next I will provide for him. But he is a child with a new plaything, and wishes to have it always in his hand. It is useless to remonstrate with a Turk; he cannot reason, and therefore does not understand you, and supposes that you are making difficulties for some purpose of your own."

On the question of slavery there is a great deal to be learnt from Mr. Senior's book. It shows us that there are worse things at home than slavery as it is in Egypt. It was the free fellahs whom Abderahman Bey used to saw asunder. "Our slavery," said Hekekyan, "does not resemble that of America or the West Indies. It is not degrading. For centuries Egypt has been ruled by slaves. Almost all its nobles and great men have been slaves or the sons of slaves. Said's mother was a slave; so was Abbas's; so was Hakim's; so were almost everybody's. . . Sabbatier, the French Consul, has a young slave whom he bought in Nubia. The boy looks down on the hired servants. 'You are paid,' he says; '*moi, je suis de la maison.* You may be turned away; I cannot be!'" As a health resort, Mr. Senior sets Algiers before Cairo. The Algiers climate is far more agreeable, and, though damper, he thought it more wholesome. "The food is bad in both places; but not

quite so bad in Algiers as it is here. In Algiers the milk and butter are good, and I think I remember having once or twice tasted eatable meat there." The strange thing was to find every one complaining of cold in January, and Mr. and Mrs. Senior both down with bronchitis. "The variations from sun to shade, from a southern room to a northern one are greater than I ever felt except perhaps at Munich." It is even stranger to find excess of water, and not the want of it, a general complaint. As to child mortality, one of the bugbears of the European sojourner, it seems certain that "the children of the rich die, not those of the poor. Shut up in harems without air or exercise, coddled and fed on sweets and trash, exhausted when mere boys with all sorts of excesses, how can they survive? The Turks are right in not attempting to have an hereditary aristocracy; those who survived would become hereditary idiots. Mehemet's posterity will die out or degenerate into imbecility in a few generations. A certain pasha in the Soudan had 280 children; six of them are alive," so said Dr. Bourguières, a notable French physician.

Hekekyan Bey was, we said, by far the most interesting of all with whom Mr. Senior came in contact. His estimate of Mehemet is singularly fair. He admitted his industry, forethought, love of knowledge, decision, and other eminently un-Turkish qualities; yet, he added, "the more I judged him by the morality I had learned in Europe, the more angry I sometimes got at owing everything to such a man." He was very Eastern in his fear lest his ministers should get too friendly; he was always trying to make them suspicious of one another, so that they might eventually act as spies. He could not bear criticism; he had been told an "*École d'Administration* was a good thing; but after he had founded one, and saw the professors' questions about the incidence of taxation and the theory of government, he shut up the school at once."

Hekekyan's only hope for Egypt was in European control. He may have exaggerated the hopelessness of getting any permanent good out of a Turkish ruler (he was an Armenian), but his picture of Said, with no intimates save his barber, cook, bather, pipe-bearer, slipper-carrier, seems very truthful. These are the only people with whom he exchanges thoughts in full freedom; with foreigners he is constrained; in his ministers of state he never has full

confidence; the people are of course of no account, "they are not fellow creatures. . . . Still less are the foreigners so; for every Mussulman believes that the man who dies in his unbelief is doomed to endless punishment, though some few, in order to reconcile this doctrine with God's mercy, hold that no man dies an unbeliever; that at the instant of death every one is converted."

One thing must have struck everybody who knows anything of the history of the Cavala family, that a set so masterful, passionate, reckless when offended, should have kept so clear of those family murders which are matters of course in purely Oriental society. Abbas is believed to have been strangled, but not by his relatives—by two Mamelukes who feared he meant to put them to death. What held the hands of men like Abbas and Said? The fear of European public opinion. "Abbas," said Mr. Bruce, "was always planning the destruction of Said, and of all who stood before Il-Hámi. Had he not feared Europe and perhaps Constantinople, they would have disappeared in time."

Said, by the way, must have been a great exception to Oriental rulers in his frankness, and the way in which he encouraged frank speaking from others. When he was detailing to Mougil the good he had done by forcing the sheykhs' sons into the army, and how in a year or two they would be educated and civilised instead of squatting before their village gates in the sun in winter, and in the shade in summer, Mougil replied, "Your Highness has treated them with justice, but it was justice *à la Turque*." "Was not that a bold speech?" asks Senior. "Not to Said, il est bon enfant, and is not easily offended when he suspects no wish to offend. Perhaps he took it as a compliment." All these varying accounts show us at once the weakness and the strength of Mr. Senior's system of gaining information. He got a number of different opinions, but in almost every case allowance has to be made for the personal prepossessions of the speaker, and very few readers have the patience to collate these different opinions. Most are satisfied to get some general notion of what men in general thought on this point or that. We hope Mr. Bruce's estimate of the Copts, for instance, given when he is explaining to Mr. Senior the unwillingness of the Patriarch to send in a petition to protect his people from being forced to turn Mussulmans, is unduly low. "Not one of them," he said,

"has any backbone; they are all creepers clinging to foreign support, and if you once let them lean on you they can't stand alone."

As to the Turks there seem scarcely two opinions. Captain Jénisée, Instructor of the Engineers, complained bitterly of his officers. His colonel, a handsome boy, whom, for his good looks, Abbas had raised at one step from a corporal, knew nothing, and desired to know nothing. He would make the fellahs into officers. "The Turk is good while he is a private. The instant you make him an officer he becomes debauched and insolent; and, as he has no feelings of honour, he loses even his courage." The sum total, too, of opinion is, "you cannot improve Egypt through Turkey;" so that Mr. Senior must have been pleased when the vassalage was pretty nearly got rid of, and the Viceroy transformed into a Khedive.

Said saw deeper into European character than Ismail. He was delighted when the Bank of Egypt was set up: "Such banks will take me and my subjects out of the hands of these grasping Jews and Greeks and French. It is best for you Europeans to deal with one another. Les loups ne mangent pas les loups. Je suis un pauvre petit agneau, et je sais bien que chacun de vous voudrait me croquer."

For a Turk, Mehemet Ali seems to have had a wonderful amount of literary taste. He enjoyed the *Esprit des Lois*, and had every book he could hear of about Napoleon translated to him. He began Machiavelli; but after the third reading he said: "I see I've got nothing to learn from him. I know many more tricks than he knew. No more of him, please."

Startling incongruities met Mr. Senior at every turn. The fellahs at forced labour, under the lash, venting their feelings in impromptu verses:

> "The pasha has us beaten,
> The pasha has us beaten,
> But there's One above will punish him."

And

> "No work on Fridays,
> You must not work on Fridays,"

when they were kept at it on the Mahometan Sabbath; the recruits whom the Viceroy, on horseback, was drilling, their instructors also having whips and sticks which they freely used, and, close by, Said's son, of two years old, with his

English nurse, whose management of him frightened the harem, for in defiance of Egyptian habits she exposed him to the evil eye, clean and well dressed.

Mr. Senior soon got tired of the life. "The more I see of Cairo the more I am inclined to hate all its living inhabitants except my own friends and acquaintances. . . . I hate everything in and about it except the climate, the Nile, the desert, the scenery, the Citadel, and the Pyramids." Rather a wide margin of exceptions. The air of the desert delighted him as it does every one; and, as we read him, we think of the time when the deserts will be the world's parks, the only ones available, if man multiplies all the world over as he is multiplying in our Indian Empire.

What Mr. Senior tells us about the Cairo mosques makes us glad that that city did not share the fate of Alexandria. About the latter he made this confident prophecy: "Alexandria will never be attacked," *à propos* of Linant's objection formed to the draining of the Birket Mareout, when the English cut the natural dyke in the Bay of Aboukir, "because it is a military protection to Alexandria." His own ideas are summarised in a remark to Mr. Bruce: "I should be inclined to neutralise all Egypt; to put it under the protection of the Powers and to make any attempt to appropriate it by a single Power a breach of the public law of Europe." He would make it, in fact, what it has often been called, the Belgium of the East. Here is another bit of his own mind:—"I carried to Egypt strong prejudices against Mahometanism and despotism; four months' experience has convinced me that I undervalued the mischief of both." It must be wearying to live in a land where everything is fictitious.

But we must close. Mr. Senior's two volumes will, we need not say, repay careful reading, while M. de Malortie deserves great praise for having marshalled such an array of authorities. He is a sort of Senior of books, culling divers opinions from them, as the Englishman did from living speakers. Mr. Senior illustrates *en passant* a number of minor questions—on the origin of the pointed arch, for instance, which must be Eastern, for it is found in the oldest Cairene mosque built in the ninth century, while it did not appear in Europe till the twelfth. Another curious fact is that Hekekyan Bey is found advocating the use of Indian troops. "If I were Sovereign of England (he said), the instant I heard of disturbances in Egypt I would

order the Governor-General of India to send 10,000 men to Kosseir and 10,000 to Suez. They should be good Mahometans, saying their prayers five times a day. About the time of their arrival my emissaries should cut the telegraph wires, and with light india-rubber water carts they should converge suddenly and silently on Cairo."

This is a remarkable bit of "prophecy." One thing we miss, which, if we remember aright, was not wanting in the volumes about France, a full, compendious index. In the present work this is a great want. The very object of recording such conversations is that the reader may by comparing various opinions form his own judgment of the persons talked about. But, though there is a good table of contents, it is impossible, where a dozen different people give their views about Said or Abbas, rapidly to collate what they all say. And thus, for occasional reference, the book is deprived of a great part of its value; which is all the more vexatious, since it is just one of those books which we like to take up during a spare ten minutes. We open at some remarks of Linant Bey, but we have a firm conviction that Hekekyan, or Mr. Rushton, or M. de Lesseps, took quite a different view. Unluckily, our memory does not extend to the pages in which these other views were given; hence we are driven to hunt up and down the contents, our spare moments meantime running away apace. We hope in her second edition (for of such a valuable contribution to Egyptian politics a second edition will surely be called for) Mrs. Simpson will supply this omission.

ART. VII.—*The Science of Ethics.* By Leslie Stephen. London: Smith, Elder and Co. 1882.

THE author of this work is already well known, both by his charming critical essays, *Hours in a Library*, and by his two elaborate volumes on the *History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century*, as well as by his editorship of the *Cornhill Magazine*. The present is a more serious undertaking than any of its predecessors. Its aim is to survey the whole domain of ethics, and to show how old theories may be modified so as to "bring them into harmony with the scientific principles" which have of late commanded the assent of so many minds. The principles specially concerned are those connected with the doctrine of evolution. The reconstruction of ethics was an obvious necessity from the moment that the closer affinity of man with the brute began to be suspected; and the task, it is needless to say, is not here attempted for the first time. A sort of unconscious preparation for the work seems to have been going on in a certain school of philosophy from the days of Hobbes downwards—not to remount to Epicurus and Democritus—and it must have rejoiced the hearts of the labourers in the field of physical science to find their efforts so warmly seconded by their psychological brethren. As in the one department, however, so in the other, there is not perfect unanimity either in the methods of working or in the attained results. Not every one who traces our physical genesis to some modification of the simian type does the like with our mental and moral nature.

There are almost as many varieties in the doctrine of evolution as there are expounders of it. And for this if for no other reason there must be corresponding varieties in the forms of ethical reconciliation. When any writer sets himself to harmonise ethics with evolution, it is fair to ask at the outset, what evolution? Is it the evolution of Darwin himself, or that of his interpreters, Huxley and Tyndall; and, if the former, is it the evolution of the *Origin of Species*, or that of the *Descent of Man*? In other words, what is the attitude taken by the moralist, we

will not say towards Christianity, but towards those primitive beliefs which connect the origin of man, both in his inward essence and in his outward investiture with the operations of a personal God? Does he confess that man is God's creature, and that, through whatever complexity of mediate workings we may have to thread our way, we must at last find ourselves in presence of a great first cause, or does he deny all such necessity, or does he declare this problem insoluble?

One would think that these three alternatives were exhaustive of all the possibilities of the case; but it is not so. Mr. Stephen—for it is with him we have to deal—has found a way of escape from the horns of this trilemma by ignoring the question altogether. His defence will probably be that he is justified in ignoring it; that in his first chapter he has openly declared his purpose to postpone all metaphysical problems, among which theological ones, though not mentioned, might be presumed to be included, as ranking among the abstrusest; that he has given himself wholly to the examination of facts, and not to the invention of hypotheses. Such a defence, we think, hardly meets the case. We might dispute whether he has really succeeded in avoiding metaphysics, but on this point our readers will be able to judge for themselves before they reach the end of this article. Or we might ask whether the notion of a God, as distinguished from arguments for His existence, is not as clear to the veriest babe as that of its own personality; and whether it might not have been better for the author to state the value he attaches to that notion before proceeding to write eighty pages on the form and contents of the moral law, and ninety more on merit and conscience, since these notions are in most men's minds almost inextricably interwoven with the other. But on this point he must take his own course; he is elaborating a moral system from the facts that lie before him, and if he wishes to avoid any wider generalisation than the facts will warrant, he is philosophically justified in doing so. To the doctrine of evolution he stands in a somewhat different relation. Here he is not a teacher, but a learner; he puts himself into leading-strings, and humbly follows his guides. They produce facts, and he believes them; they frame hypotheses, and he accepts these too. After journeying in this way a little while, the road forks, and his guides part company; some take the direction of a

thoroughgoing materialism, and some that of a Divine and supernatural operation. Is it not a little disappointing not to be told by our author which of these leaders he follows? Or, if he resolve to proceed no further than the point of their divergence, might not the public have been duly apprised of the danger of following these blind guides any farther than our author went with them? His reticence stands in strong contrast with their garrulity, and would be highly commendable if caution were the only or principal qualification of the moralist, whose business it is to teach men how to live and how to die.

The author can hardly blame us if, from such reticence on such a subject, and from the ill-concealed contemptuousness of his flings at religious belief and conviction, we draw less favourable inferences than we should like to have done concerning the son of Sir James Stephen. We are obliged to assume that the form of the evolutionary hypothesis which Mr. Stephen would sanction, is not the theistic, and we will not pretend to choose for him between the remaining alternatives, the atheistic, which denies the existence of a God, or the agnostic, which seeks to escape, on the plea of ignorance, both the odium of denying, and the responsibility of confessing one. Mr. Stephen's business lies with the facts of our moral life, and his object is to show that the highest developments of the latter may have been evolved by social pressure out of the primitive instincts of the savage, in the same manner as the savage himself has been evolved out of his humble progenitor, the brute. In contemplating such an object, he rightly resolved to "begin at the beginning." One would suppose that the beginning would be with the brute, and that the first step would be to show how, in the countless ages that are at the command of the evolutionist, the instinct of the animal may have been transformed into the reason of the savage. This is manifestly the first problem of evolutionary ethics. We will suppose the identity of the physical structure in man and the brute placed beyond the possibility of doubt; the identity between the mind of man and the mind of the brute still requires to be argued. This Mr. Stephen has nowhere done. He has started with the savage, and therefore has not begun at the beginning.

Of course, historical proof there can be none. The brute we know and the savage we know, but the connecting links have disappeared, and have left no traces of their

existence. But upon another point, of no less importance than this, the voice of history should be heard, if it utters any. It is assumed throughout this volume that man first existed in the savage state. This is, indeed, a necessary correlate of the doctrine of evolution in its atheistic or agnostic form. But not a shadow of proof is forthcoming, and history, if appealed to, would not furnish it. The opinion that the savage is the degenerate offspring of the civilised man has as much to be said for it as the opinion that the civilised man is the improved descendant of the savage. The traditions of all nations point back to a golden age, of great simplicity indeed, but also of great purity and dignity of life; and the rubbish heaps of Europe, equally with the mounds of Asia, would be searched in vain for evidence to the contrary. This is another objection, *in limine*, to the scheme of morals set forth in this book. Two fundamental facts have yet to be established before the ethical theory based on them can even be discussed; and here we might lay down our pen, and contentedly await their discovery. But we will accord to our author these initial premises. Our contention is that even so his foundations will not sustain the edifice he rears upon them. We must confine ourselves to a few salient points: it is obviously impossible within the limits of an article to deal fully with a volume of 460 closely printed pages.

In the first chapter, after stating some of the difficulties of moral science and showing the irrelevancy of metaphysical questions and the insufficiency of statistical methods, the author reaffirms the old truth that "society is not a mere aggregate, but an organic growth," adding, however, a statement by no means deducible from this, viz., "that it forms a whole, the laws of whose growth can be studied apart from those of the individual atom." This statement is one of sufficient importance to challenge scrutiny. It announces a leading principle of the present inquiry, viz., that man may be studied in the mass before or without being studied in the individual. This principle is laid down in opposition to another said to have been sometimes acted upon, viz., that of studying the individual without reference to the mass. It appears to us that both these methods are wrong, as running into opposite extremes; and that the golden mean is preferable. Our rule would be, never study the mass without considering the properties of the individuals composing it, and never study

the individuals without remembering that they form parts of an organic whole.

Moreover, it would not be very difficult to retort the author's weapon upon himself. He complains that philosophers have not made enough of the relations that men hold to one another, and of the moulding effect of his fellows' action on each man's mind. We would add, if one set of relations must be taken into the account, so must another. There are relations that men hold with God quite as palpable to those that hold them as any they maintain with one another. It will not do to ignore these, or to relegate them to the shadowy realm of metaphysics. They belong to the region of facts. The author may have his own explanation, as that they are all mere subjective impressions, the offspring of delusion, or what not. But in any case he is placed between the horns of a dilemma from which there is no escape. If he omit to take notice of the moral phenomena connected with religion, he is neglecting a very important class of moral facts, and facts that many believe bear witness to supernatural relations. If he accept the facts, but deny the supernatural inference, he at once puts on the metaphysical character which he said he would not assume. The horn on which he chooses to impale himself is generally the former: the moral elevation of man from the savage state to his present position is assigned to a process of natural development, and the moral system thus unfolded is one that has no need of God. At times, however, religious beliefs are alluded to without being accounted for, but in such a way as to show that the second horn of the dilemma is then preferred as an easier resting-place than the first.

We do not dispute the validity of our author's postulate that it is desirable to study man as a social being, though we hold strongly to the opinion of his first master, John Stuart Mill, that "human beings in society have no properties but those which are derived from, and may be resolved into, the laws of nature of individual man." Mill surely in this respect is a safer authority than Comte. The importance of our author's views on this subject will be seen from the fact that it is in this connection he first refers to the theory of evolution. His doctrine appears to him to set forth the spiritual correlate and continuation of the process by which man was developed from the brute. "For the theory of evolution brings out the fact that

every organism, whether social or individual, represents the product of an indefinite series of adjustments between the organism and its environment. In other words, that every being or collection of beings which forms a race or society is part of a larger system; that it is a product of the continuous play of a number of forces constantly shifting and rearranging themselves in the effort to maintain the general equilibrium, and that, consequently, every permanent property represents not an accidental similarity, but a correspondence between the organism and some permanent conditions of life." Of the important part which "forces" play in the moral as well as the material world, we entertain no doubt, yet we cannot but think that too much is asserted as to their transforming operation and too little proved as to their power to effect the change; while as to the origin and nature of these forces and the laws that govern them nothing is said at all. The parallel between the doctrine of evolution and the author's moral system is well drawn out, but both conceal the same weaknesses under the same thin gauze of easy and specious assumption. John Locke is a name that will have weight with the reasoners in both fields of thought. His doctrine of active and passive power—not his absolutely, but a doctrine sanctioned by him—should teach his would-be followers caution. "Fire," he says, "has a power to melt gold, that is, to destroy the consistency of its insensible parts, and consequently its hardness, and make it fluid, and gold has a power to be melted: the sun has a power to blanch wax, and wax a power to be blanched by the sun, whereby the yellowness is destroyed, and whiteness made to exist in its room. . . . Power, thus considered, is twofold, viz., as able to make, or able to receive, any change: the one may be called active and the other passive power." The crudeness of his description of these physical changes does not detract from the correctness of his analysis of them. A power to be acted upon is as essential to their taking place as a power to act. Fire does not melt asbestos, and the sun does not blanch charcoal. So it is with all the "forces" of the moral and material worlds, whether they effect evolution or not. To say that an organism is the "product of an indefinite series of adjustments between it and its environment" is only to ascribe an enormous effect to an exceedingly meagre cause. The constitution of the organism itself must be taken into the account as well, and

when that is found, its cause also must be sought in something adequate to produce it, that is, in something greater, not less, than itself.

Having thus shown us the clue which is to guide him in the course of his researches, the author next states the problem. It is "to discover the scientific form of morality, or, in other words, to discover what is the general characteristic, so far as science can grasp it, of the moral sentiments." The first fact he encounters is the "variation in moral beliefs," or "partial views of the truth which have commended themselves to persons under different conditions," and side by side herewith "an ideal code." "That there is, upon any theory, a great difference between actual and ideal morality, I take to be an admitted fact." Of these two it is the former, not the latter, that Mr. Stephen proposes to discuss. The relation between them he postpones to a future stage of the inquiry, but we cannot find any subsequent reference to it. Now, the existence of an ideal code cannot be thus summarily dismissed. Given the ape-evolved savage and his environment—the one the clay and the other the potter—and we can easily understand moral variations. An ideal code wrought out on such conditions is not so intelligible, and still less an ideal and perfect code at the back of all actual and imperfect ones. The improved savage may well be supposed to transcend his discarded conceptions, but how does he transcend his cherished ones? If it be said he only knows the existence of an ideal code because he sees the imperfections of the actual one, the question meets us, How can he content himself with a code known to be imperfect?

The admission, by the author, that such a perfect code must exist, whether discoverable or not to human reason, is a fact of grave import. He makes it his business in this book to inquire "what is the cause of these" different and irreconcilable "opinions." Why does he not also ask what is the cause of the unanimity that is so much more wonderful than the disagreement, and what the source of the one standard which is so far superior to the many? Surely the imperfections of the actual standard, though they may suggest, do not create, an ideal one. The one immutable, eternal law, of which all others are but dim and unworthy reflections, bespeaks for itself an Author, who must also be the Author of the existences that are subject to it. And when He is found, we shall need no longer to resort to a

circuitous and impossible process by which that is brought out of a being which was never contained in it, but we shall find our greatest mystery solved by the old confession, "There is a spirit in man, and the breath of the Almighty hath given him understanding."

It is, however, with actual, not ideal, morality that the author has to do. In seeking to determine its scientific form, he proceeds, in his second chapter, to consider the theory of motives. The sense in which conduct is swayed by emotions is first investigated, and then the sense in which it is governed by reason. In the course of this investigation we meet with some observations on an old and very perplexed question. He maintains, hardly we think with success, that in every case the will follows the lead of the feelings, in opposition to those who say that reason is, or may be, called in to assert its intrinsic superiority to them. The only way in which reason can control one set of feelings is to play off another against it. This statement is of course far from new, nor can it be said to have been overlooked in this connection. But he goes farther than this. A fault in the very analysis of choice is pointed out with good effect.

"The true proposition that conduct is determined by the feelings, has been constantly confounded with the erroneous proposition that it is determined by the agent's judgment of his happiness. This is expressed in the form that the will is determined by a kind of syllogism. The major premise is invariably —I will adopt the course of conduct which will produce the greatest balance of happiness. I am unable to admit the accuracy of this statement, although I do not deny that in many cases it is an approximate statement of the case. . . . The feeling which determines conduct is not a judgment at all, though it is inseparably bound up with serious judgments. It is a simple unanalysable fact. If we would, not define, but describe the feeling in other words, we should rather call it a psychical force."

We have quoted this passage in full, because it has an important bearing on the position of the author in reference to some of the most serious questions in the whole domain of morals. It is a distinct departure from the utilitarian tenets in which he was a firm believer at the outset of his ethical inquiries. At the same time, it is not intended as a concession to intuitionalism, about which he would seem not to have made up his mind, as he steers

clear of it all through this volume. But as it regards another momentous problem, that of the freedom of the will, the statement, taken with what precedes it, is a distinct choosing of sides. It is a manifesto on the side of necessity: Mr. Stephen, by the full consent of his will or else because he cannot help himself—we do not know which is the right form of speech—is a determinist. For our own part, we cannot see that he was compelled by anything he has said just here to come to this conclusion. That is forced upon him by the general defect in his system to which we have already alluded. That "unanalysable fact," the "psychical force" that determines judgment, is not quite beyond the reach of scrutiny, after all. It is possible to ask whence it comes, from without or from within, and who or what fostered it, the man or his environment. And if only it could be admitted that each mind has its own constitution, partly original, partly inherited, and partly modified by its own action, it would be easy to hold that man follows the lead of his strongest feelings, and yet to escape the determinist inference, seeing that in so yielding man does but obey the actings of a psychical force in part at least of his own creating. But our readers will see that this explanation would have run directly counter to any ethical theory that avowedly builds on evolution. For it is a necessity to every such theory to make as little as possible of reason, that divinest gift of God to man, and still more to deny anything like an original moral constitution to the human mind.

So far as reason is concerned, this necessity comes out still more clearly in the section devoted to its relations with feeling. It is of importance to minimise the action of reason as much as possible, in order to show up man as the plaything of forces, physical and psychical alike. But this is a principle that may be pushed too far, as the following will show. "No theory can be tenable which virtually asserts reason and feeling to be two separate and independent faculties, one of which can properly be said to govern the other. The reason is not superinduced upon the emotions as something entirely new. There is no absolute gap between the lower and the higher organisms. The animal instinct may be regarded as implicit reason, or the reason as a highly developed instinct. Instinct is reason limited to the immediate, and incapable of reflecting upon its own operations; and reason an extended instinct,

apprehending the distant and becoming conscious of its own modes of action." But it is just here that the author begs the whole question. His evolution of reason out of instinct is akin to the conjuring trick which professes to bring eggs, crockery, and apple-dumplings out of an empty hat. Common sense joins with philosophy in scouting the very idea. If instinct is "incapable of reflecting on its own operations," and reason is "conscious of its own modes of action," no mere difference in the wording of these clauses will hinder a sane man from saying that reason and instinct are separated by an impassable gulf. That capacity can be developed out of incapacity we shall believe when we have seen a genius educated out of a blockhead, or a gem carved out of a cairngorm.

The weakness of the argument betrays itself at every point throughout this paragraph. "The development of the whole nature implies a development both of the intellectual and the emotional nature. The growth of new sensibilities implies a power of detecting new qualities and new relations between phenomena; and the growth of mechanical power implies the capacity of bringing things into fresh combinations and so developing new sentiments. The increased range of thought due to the power of forming abstract conceptions and reasoning by symbols is associated with an equal growth in the complexity and variety of the corresponding emotions." "Associated," yes: "implies," undoubtedly. But association is not a cause, nor implication a creative force. These are still to seek. If the author had not been so explicit, we might have supposed that the emotions generated the intellect, or the intellect the emotions. But he so states the case as to lead us to draw our own inference, that while each implies the other, both are produced by something else.

The explanation of the influence of reason upon the feelings is as unsatisfactory as that of its genesis. Let the following be weighed. "The intellect and the emotion are in reality related as form and substance, and cannot be really divided. To judge of pleasures is to feel the pleasures themselves, or to feel representative pleasures." Here two questions arise. Are the representative pleasures identical with the pleasures they represent: if not, are not these last "really divided" from the intellect that judges of them? Again, are the representative pleasures equally strong—neither more nor less—with those they represent:

if not, the intellect will err in judging of them. Moreover, the relation of intellect to feeling is not that of form to substance. The logic without the feeling would not necessarily be "a mere blank nonentity." There are cases in which the absence of feeling is a condition of correct judgment, and the ideal representation of feeling, which is not feeling, is all that is needed for the process. This is, in fact, virtually admitted by the author a little further on. He speaks of a low desire being "instantly quenched by the bare thought, say, of duty, or of the injury to the family." True, he says that this cannot be done except by one who possesses "a strong fund of emotion capable of being called into vigorous operation." But up to the moment of its being so called, which is the strongest feeling, the low desire that is clamouring for gratification or the "latent force" not yet converted into the "active form?" The desire has to be resisted while the effort is being put forth to summon up the thought of duty and of home, and both the resistance and the effort are alike painful. Yet the man masters the unworthy passion, not by the superior force of a better passion at the same moment felt, but by a stern resolve of the will to keep the idea of duty or of home steadily before the mind. That the opposite view cannot be consistently maintained is manifest from statements that seem to us to contradict it, such as the following: "In spite of the connection between the two faculties, it is possible to consider them separately. The intellectual, for example, may vary, whilst the emotional remain constant." How does this comport with the mutual implication of intellect and emotion, and their relation as form and substance? So, again, "emotional activity is, in particular cases, unfavourable to certain forms of intellectual activity." An undeniable fact; but what countenance does it give to the function of reason as calling in one feeling to overpower another?

All this, however, is only preliminary to the inquiry how far the existence of reason in man, and its use according to the above-mentioned rule, will help to determine "the nature of reasoned conduct." This brings us to the ancient problem of the *summum bonum*, "that chief good which it was conceived must be desired by every one in virtue of his being reasonable." The answer given by the author is short and summary—there is no such thing. On the hypothesis he has adopted as to the nature and use of

reason, this is the only answer he could give. For the office of reason is purely formal, its action merely to decide between rival passions originating in primitive instincts. To affirm then an unity in all moral ends would be to affirm an unity in all initial impulses, or to maintain that "all the feelings by which we are prompted may be regarded as modifications of some single instinct." And this would be manifestly absurd. Nevertheless, though a simple unity cannot be discovered in the complex of our emotional nature, a harmony may be established among its varied impulses, a sort of federation, of whose manifold interests reason is the umpire and mediator. In different minds the balance will be differently struck according to their different constitutions, though how these are attained does not yet appear. Thus "we start with a certain balance of feeling, with certain fixed relations between them; and however these may change afterwards, our character is so far determined from the start." There is some difficulty in seeing what is meant by "the start." We might suppose it to mean that point in the history of the brute at which it manifests distinctly human characteristics. But this will hardly do. A long interval must elapse between the first dawn of reason in the brute, and the attainment of the full-blown consciousness even of the savage. From what point of time through these long ages—while the human nature was maturing, and its ultimate triumph over its former self yet hung in the balance—are we to date "the start," and the possession of an original constitution?

This is a weak place in the theory, and one that claims attention, the more so as on it is founded the doctrine of various types in man, each having its own end, which may determine for it a persistent and harmonious line of action. The genesis of these types is to our minds altogether illegitimate; indeed, so far from owning any lawful genealogy, they seem to have been spirited into being without one. But granting them "the start," we have next to consider how they are gradually elaborated to greater and greater distinctness, and how they stand related to the moral problem.

Their gradual elaboration is illustrated by various comparisons drawn from nature and art, such as typical sheep and typical bows, which represent the maximum of efficiency or utility that all actual sheep or bows approximate to without being able to reach. Here, however, we must

tread warily. "We can say what is the typical sheep from the point of view of the butcher, or again from the point of view of the wool merchant; but what is the typical sheep considered absolutely?" The criterion is "the sum total of the sheep's relations to the external world." When we ask then which is the best sheep, the answer must be given not from any one of the standpoints of individuals differently interested in the problem, but from one which will take account of the interests of all. So it is with man; and the action of evolution works out the problem for him. The mode of operation is as follows: "We learn from the theory of evolution that as the individual organism is composed of mutually dependent parts, and its existence involves the maintenance of a certain equilibrium, so each organism supports itself as a part in a more general equilibrium, and that its constitution depends at every moment upon a process of adaptation to the whole system of the world. And this may be expressed by saying that every animal represents the solution of a problem as well as a set of data for a new problem. As the bow is felt out, so the animal is always feeling itself out. The problem which it solves is how to hold its own against the surrounding pressure and the active competition of innumerable rivals." It might savour of hypercriticism to comment on mere faults of phraseology, otherwise it would be easy to remark on the strange description of "an animal feeling itself out." To object to "the maintenance of a certain equilibrium" as a misrepresentation of the facts supposed in evolution is not, however, to carp at language, but to point out a flaw in the reasoning itself. It is unfair to speak of the maintenance of equilibrium as the aim of an organism, when the parts that compose it are by the very hypothesis engaged in an internecine struggle for existence, and when the organism is confessedly nothing but the sum of the individual parts. If it be said that the mutual disturbances of equilibrium thus produced result in a general equilibrium, the question arises, how that is assured? It can only be assured by ascribing to the organism as a whole a life and unity altogether distinct from those of its components—a phenomenon surely requiring to be accounted for.

In the next paragraph the phrase "maintenance of equilibrium" is dropped, and in the place of it "development" is employed to describe the result of the struggle. We might suppose then that the earlier phrase was only

another example of pardonable inadvertence, like that just now referred to. But if we attempt to replace it by "development" in the above quotation, we shall see that it will not do. It may be easy to read "development" for "equilibrium" when some individual organism is in question, but how when we are speaking of the "general equilibrium" of the whole system of the world? How if we apply development to this? Would not this be a contradiction in terms?

However, supposing the types elaborated, a question previously raised recurs in another form. Instead of "which is the best type of sheep?" it is "which is the best type of man?" And here a curious admission is made, viz., that there is no absolutely best type of man. Why there should be a highest type for the lower organism and not for the higher seems inconceivable. The law of evolution seems almost as capable of receiving modifications itself as of effecting them in its subjects. Perhaps the reason why the many human types admit of no generalisation into unity, as is the case with sheep, lies in the greater complexity of our nature—and so the law grows elastic with the substance it operates upon. But this is not hinted by our author. He only says, in answer to the question, "What is the relative value of different kinds of efficiency?" that "a complete answer might bring out the fact, which seems on other grounds probable, that it is an advantage to a race to include a great variety of different types." But this is a very different thing from the answer itself. As a matter of fact, none is vouchsafed except the disappointing statement, "It is enough, however, to say here, that by speaking of a type I do not mean to assert that there is one special constitution, conformity to which by any individual of a race is a condition of efficiency." Nevertheless, we cannot but remember that, at the outset of the inquiry, the author said that behind all the varying codes of actual morality there was one ideal code in which all men everywhere believed. We are aware that the reasonings we have just been examining belong to the infra-moral sphere—morality not having yet emerged into view. Yet it does seem something of a contradiction to say that in that higher sphere in which human thought and effort find their noblest consummation there is one absolute ideal, conceivable if not attainable by all, but that in the lower sphere of the natural energies and capacities

which furnish the means and instruments for the higher, an absolute ideal is nowhere to be found.

The relation of the doctrine of types to the moral problem may now be touched upon. The way in which our author approaches the subject is by comparing the doctrine of types with the previously established doctrine of pleasure and pain. It is true in general, he says, that conduct is determined by considerations of pleasure and pain, so that that course will be chosen by the agent which will secure to him the maximum of pleasure. But how comes it that the said course produces pleasure? That depends upon the character of the agent, and that again on the conditions of his existence. This attempted harmony of the doctrine of pleasure and pain with that of varying types slowly elaborated through long ages, is the very pivot on which our author's system turns. Of such importance is it that we cannot but quote a few sentences which will bring the subject clearly before our readers' minds:

"Given a certain character, the agent does what gives him pleasure. But if we ask how he comes to have that character, the only mode of answering is by referring to the conditions of existence. His character must be such as to fit him for the struggle of life. The reason of conduct is always its quality in terms of pain or pleasure. The cause of its being painful or pleasurable is the constitution of the agent; and for this constitution we can only account, so far as we can account for it at all, by considering it as a variable, dependent upon the conditions of life. Only in this way does the problem from which we started become determinate. If we take character as fixed, the development of reason can only imply a harmony, an adaptation of means to ends, and so forth, leaving the end or the dominating instinct in itself a positive or arbitrary datum. As character varies, so will the ends vary; and from the simple consideration of consistency, or of pain and pleasure, we cannot by any ingenuity determine what will be the general law of conduct. . . . We may regard conduct either as painful and pleasurable, or as conducive or not conducive to the permanent existence of the agent. And hence we have the consideration that there must be a correlation between painful and pernicious actions on the one hand, and pleasurable and beneficial on the other. A man will do what pleases him, and, if he is to live, must do what is good for him, or at least what is not destructive. The 'useful,' in the sense of pleasure-giving, must approximately coincide with the 'useful' in the sense of life-preserving. This is a fundamental doctrine from the evolutionist point of view."

The bearing of all this will be more fully seen as we proceed. We may, however, state some general objections to this teaching, apart from its connection with the origin of particular moral virtues. We say at once that, if all were granted which this paragraph contends for, it would prove a great deal too much. Given such conditions as are here supposed working through the innumerable ages the evolutionist has to disport himself in, vice and misery ought to have vanished from the scene. Pernicious pleasures should long since have wrought their destructive effects. The varying moral types should by this time have adjusted themselves to each other and to their environment, eliminating all such as refuse to contribute to the welfare of the organism. It should have been as easy to-day to point out the highest type of man and the best embodiment of it as to determine the typical sheep or the typical bow.

But if the paragraph proves too much, is it not because too much has been assumed? Do pleasure and pain depend so exclusively upon the constitution of the agent as is here supposed? Take the accumulation of money as an example. The pleasures of hoarding, which would revolt the heart of the generous man, are very real and intense to the miser. Were his character other than it is, he could not feel them. But how about the anxiety and fearfulness with which he contemplates the possible loss of his wealth? Has the character determined these? The man has shaped his own pleasures: why did he not at the same time modify his pains? Again, character and constitution are treated as one and the same thing. But is there no such thing as a constitution underlying character, the one fixed and the other variable; the one independent of the man and the other the resultant of the many forces that he suffers to influence it for good or evil? If the constitution varies with the character, what is there to hinder there being as many types and as many standards as there are men, each of whom would then become a law unto himself, and justify his deeds by his temperament, that is, by his fostered inclinations? And, finally, supposing constitution fixed and character variable, if the complexion of the character be attributed solely to the conditions of life, in what sense can it be said to be invested with responsibility?

The intent of the passage we have been commenting on is apparently to preserve the author's theory from appear-

ing to favour a wholly selfish view of life and morals. How to avoid that imputation is, indeed, the crux of the whole business; and in the third chapter the author expands the hints thrown out in the second. Man may seek only personal pleasures, but his nature defines their limit and direction, and his nature is determined by his conditions, *i.e.*, among other things, by social pressure. Therefore, though he would be selfish if isolated, as a matter of fact he is not so, because the action of other minds on his own imparts a benevolent bias to its activities. The purely selfish man, if he ever existed, has been eliminated; and only types that admit at least a tincture of benevolence have survived. This is the sum of the doctrine, and it must be admitted to be a curiously subtle method of transmuting dross into gold. We must inquire a little further into the process, in order to make quite sure that all the gold brought out of the fining-pot has not been surreptitiously cast in after the experiment has begun. A good deal is made of the fact—not doubted by anybody—that society is not a mechanical aggregate, but an organic living structure. Man is a product of society, and, therefore, a social creature to begin with. How much meaning is to be put into the terms "social" and "society" might seem doubtful, since in our search for the explanation of them we come upon such a sentence as this:—"Man means a being born of woman, and perhaps ultimately descended from a monkey. It would, therefore, be sheer nonsense to speak of a man as if he either might or might not be in some respects independent of society." The fact is, however, that the author is not as yet talking of society in the sense we intend when we speak of it as affording some standard of virtue. It is not virtue at all that he is speaking of here, but instinct. Hence he is not far wrong when he says that "the distinction drawn between the social and the self-regarding qualities, or, again, between qualities as useful to the race and useful to the individual cannot possibly be ultimate," and that "every man is both an individual and a social product, and every instinct both social and self-regarding." But the moral or immoral use of the instincts, their selfish or benevolent direction by reason, must not be lost sight of, even at this stage of the inquiry. It seems to have been overlooked in this chapter. In brutes the social instinct may work unconsciously for the good of the species. But in man even instincts pre-

eminently social may by the abuse of reason be converted into instruments of mischief to society no less than to the individual, and certainly the self-regarding ones may be so too. That it may be so in certain cases the author himself admits, but we do not see that he says anything to prove that it might not be so universally. His solution of the difficulty seems to us an evasion of it. He says that while the race is only the sum of the individuals, the interests of an individual may be incompatible with those of the race. "The existence of such incompatibility is of course only too familiar a fact. The prosperity of a Napoleon may involve the degradation of his country. But when I speak of 'the individual' as being worse or better adapted to his circumstances, I am not speaking of any particular person, but of the average person. A Napoleon may conceivably thrive by possessing qualities which are injurious to his fellows. But it would be something very like a contradiction to suppose that the average man might be improved by conferring upon him such qualities prejudicial to the rest."

If we take reason into the account, the question is not what the interests of an individual may be, but what he thinks them to be. The average man may make a mistake here as well as a Napoleon. And if he does, his action is to be condemned, whether he "thrive" like Napoleon or not. It seems to be taken for granted that the average man must thrive. But where is the necessity for this? Might he not deteriorate? The reply may be that the average man stands for mankind at large, and that to suppose him to degenerate, and even to perish, is to suppose that one day a like fate might overtake society. And what is there impossible in this? Does evolution assume that, while individuals may degenerate, the race must improve? If so, the theory does something more than contradict the facts of history: it contradicts itself. What happens to one individual may happen to all, since society is only the sum of its units. It will be said, those that have the healthier instincts will survive. But it is not a question of instincts, so much as of the use of instincts. If one may pervert them, so may another. The selfish will give place to the benevolent, it is said. But where are the benevolent to come from? Selfishness in one man does not beget benevolence in all the rest, unless that be a sort of mutual benevolence which prompts them to band together

against him—a doubtful supposition, since their hostile union may be as selfish as his hostile isolation.

There are further reflections awakened by this view of man's relation to society. "A man not dependent upon a race," says our author, "is as meaningless a phrase as an apple that does not grow upon a tree." To what extent is man dependent on the race? For existence, of course, in the first place, but, as the context shows, for much more than that. It is properties that are being investigated. "I cannot say that an apple owes certain qualities to the fact of its growing upon a tree, for it owes all its qualities to that fact." What is true of the whole assemblage of qualities is true of them individually. There is none that is not due to the race relationships of the apple. Similarly with man. Now the theory of evolution familiarises us with the appearance in individuals of qualities not manifested by the rest of society. To what then are these due? They are forced out by social pressure. But, by the hypothesis, those who exert the pressure do not as yet exhibit them. The social pressure then originates nothing: it only elicits a quality previously dormant. Thus all the qualities of a Homer or a Newton are to be traced back to the savage, then to the brute, the vegetable, the inorganic compounds, and lastly, by a consistent application of the theory, to the individual atoms in their sixty or seventy categories which go to make up the globe. With such an array of qualities investing each particle of his physical frame, the original endowments of each man appear something truly astonishing, and worthy to have been insisted on with at least as much persistency as the mere development of them through contact with his fellows. And as this complement of original qualities must be as equally distributed, or nearly so, as the atoms which make up the man, it follows that there is more hope for humanity than our pessimists willingly allow. In the atoms that compose him each man has an infinite store of potential being. There are no developments either of animated nature or mental idiosyncrasy, which the future of the race may not witness. Mankind may become the progenitors of a species as much superior to themselves as they are to the monkey, or as the monkey to the nuts on which it feeds.

But here we are checked in our furious driving, and it is the author himself who rebukes our excess of zeal. We courteously heed his admonition. He plied the whip, now

let us see how he pulls the rein. "An unreasoning animal can only adapt itself to new circumstances, except within a very narrow range, by acquiring a new organisation, or, in other words, by becoming a different animal. Its habits and instincts may therefore remain fixed through countless generations. But man, by accumulating experiences, can virtually alter both his faculties and his surroundings without altering his organisation." That is, some animals have not developed into men, while others have through adapting themselves to new circumstances. But men can adapt themselves to new circumstances without altering their organisation. In other words, the pressure of its environment transmutes the brute form into the human, and the brute instinct into reason; but, when once that capital acquisition has been made, not all the pressure of environment, even with the added element of social pressure, will work any further organic change. And the reason is, that there is no need. There are no possible emergencies that reason will not cope with. In order to see whether this argument is sound, we must compare the needs of the brute and the needs of man, and the pressure they are respectively subject to. As to the former, is it not a fact that intelligence brings with it needs of its own? We will not speak of the physical changes that have accompanied intelligence, some of which, such as the loss of the natural covering, add very considerably to the needs of man. But consider all that is necessary to fit any human being for a place in the humblest ranks of society. Compare the struggle for existence among men, fierce in proportion to their rise in the scale of intelligence, with the same struggle going on among brutes. Will anybody in his senses say that the needs of the ape are greater than the needs of a man? The necessities originating in the one gift of speech are in the exact ratio of its advantages. The restlessness of man forms a startling contrast with the dumb passive resignation to its fate that we frequently see in the brute. Instinct is soon satisfied, but reason is insatiable. Yet we are told the brute may erect itself into a man, but man must aspire no further.

There is another vice in this hypothesis. The obstacle to further evolution is, it is said, reason, itself the product of evolution. Let that be granted. Still it can only apply where reason has received some culture. There are said to have been savage tribes who, on the hypothesis, have

been evolved, like civilised men, out of brutes, but have never yet made full use of their powers. Reason in them has been comparatively dormant. How is it, then, that in them the changes in organisation have apparently come to an end? The pressure of the environment has transformed the quondam brutes into men: how is it that the same pressure does not continue to produce similar effects, and generate a race of beings as much superior to other men physically as these would be to them mentally?

If we accept the author's reasonings we are shut up for the present to the improvement of our faculties. But here, surely, we may hope for a progressive development, and, once begun, the process will always go on. Not so. "Many races, perhaps the numerical majority of all races, are in a stationary state," and "there may be a period, though for many reasons it would seem to be indefinitely distant, at which everything has been made out of the given materials which is possible, and at which further progress is therefore possible only on the hypothesis of an organic change." So even reason has its limits. The time may come when she will have exhausted her materials, and, if any further developments are to be witnessed they must spring, not from the intelligence that has worn out its materials, but from the worn-out materials themselves. In other words, reason will first ransack nature, explore all its recesses, lay under contribution all its energies both mental and physical, and then when she begins to stoop under her burdens and has grown decrepit with the lapse of ages, she will leave to nature, whom she has harassed and impoverished by her extortions, to fill the earth with new types of existence nobler than those of its palmiest days.

Supposing, however, the dependence of each man on his race to be as absolute as the author would have us believe, there arise two questions which must be settled before the form and contents of the moral law can be debated at all. They are, first, what is the unit of the social organism? and secondly, what is its relation to the organism as a whole?

As to the first, it is clear that it will not do, on the author's hypothesis, to treat the individual as the unit, because this might lead us to overlook the social direction of the larger part of his instincts. We must therefore study man in such groups as appear to be the most per-

manent and necessary to his welfare. Having passed in review other relationships, such as the military and political, the author shows that none are so deeply founded in the very constitution of man as the family. The family is therefore regarded as the unit in the social organisation, involving instincts that are prior to all others both in existence and strength, and that might conceivably survive the destruction of all others without entailing the destruc- of the fabric as a whole. "If, then, we look at society as a whole, we see that the division into families does not properly represent a mode of organisation co-ordinate with the other social organs. It represents, on the contrary, the immediate and primitive relation which holds men together. The family affections are the bonds which hold individuals together, and the primitive cohesions in virtue of which society becomes possible, the molecular forces which form the separate cells into a continuous tissue, the elementary property in virtue of which society is woven together, to be afterwards formed into different groups." If this had been said in praise of God's grand institution of marriage, we should have had nothing but approval for its eloquent testimony to the wisdom and goodness of the Divine appointment. But when we discover that the terms "family affections" and "primitive cohesions" are employed to include such unnatural and monstrous combinations as those of polyandry, our admiration changes to disgust. Putting feeling aside, however, we may ask what sort of an unit that is which runs through every change from the most casual and indiscriminate commerce of the sexes up to monogamy itself? Or how can the instincts underlying such a relationship be for one moment regarded as fundamental to society, apart from the form of their indulgence? Notwithstanding all that is argued here, the unit seems to us to be the individual still: otherwise the very foundations of law and government which make each man responsible for his own deeds, are out of course.

The other question remains. Supposing the family to be the unit of social organisation, what is its relation to the whole? The answer is surprising. It is not that of an organ to an organism after all. The organic unity so industriously built up in the preceding sections here crumbles under the author's own hands. "To use the word 'organism' is to suggest that the whole body is

capable of combining its efforts in order to bring about some common end; as we may say (with certain reservations) that a whole nation may combine to carry on a war, or a single society to build a house. We cannot in this sense predicate unity of the so-called organism. It is continuous, but has not this unity. Its limits are fixed, not by its internal constitution but by external circumstances." After all, if the author's hypothesis be admitted, this is a logical deduction from it. It would be a wonder indeed if there were anything worth the name of an unity in the mass of being whose units were only fashioned by "feeling themselves out." The wonder is that there should be so much resemblance among the units themselves. Here, in fact, lies the inconsistency, a fatal flaw in the whole system. The brute creatures are the sport of circumstances, yet they originate rational beings whose variations are as nothing compared with their affinities. These rational beings combine, but with the utmost effort of their rationality they cannot unite for a common end. If there be no such end, reason itself would seem to say there ought to be one. But the author has his appeal. He will appeal from reason to fact, from *a priori* probabilities to the demonstrations of experience. We are not afraid to meet him on his own ground. True, most of the attempts to combine the human race into one whole, even into a merely external political whole, have failed. From the days of Nimrod downward this form of ambition has overleaped itself. As little success attended the effort made in the Middle Ages to enforce an unity of another kind, an ecclesiastical unity, in which thought, not action, eternity, not time, were the limits of the proposed dominion. But these efforts were all of merely human origin, and tainted by base earthly motives. There is yet another unity struggling for expression, another universal organism gradually winning its way to the ascendency, capable of harmonising the most varied types of human character and of combining all its energies in the accomplishment of one great end, viz., its own establishment and recognition as the kingdom of God upon earth. Through many shocks and reverses, this unity of all good men has maintained itself from age to age, the kingdom not of this world has proved its power to subdue the world unto itself. Its universal law of love is that ideal standard which even the author admits to form the dim background of all actual codes. The power

of the Lawgiver is the source of authority to its precepts, and of life to its subjects. The law written on the heart is the impress of His finger: the law written in the word the reflection of His mind. Here is the solution of the problem that the unassisted reason fails to comprehend—God with man and in man, man by God and to God for ever.

We have just brought our readers over the threshold of the subject: space forbids our proceeding any further. From our examination of the bases on which the structure rests, they may easily form their own idea of the structure itself. We have no doubt it will be hailed in some quarters as a grand contribution to the ethical literature of the day. We can only regard it as the abortive product of vast but misapplied labour, as every work must be which attempts to find any other foundation for morals than specifically human intelligence governed by an infinitely holy God.*

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* The following list of errata may be of some use to the reader :—

Page vi., line 5, *for* "intrusionists" *read* "intuitionists."
„ xvii., „ 1, *for* "morality is natural" *read* "morality as internal."
„ 2, „ 4 from bottom, *for* "tessellations" *read* "tesselations."
„ 3, „ 14 from top, *for* "have agitated" *read* "have been agitated."
„ 15, „ 16 from top, *for* "what felt hunger" *read* "what part hunger."
„ 53, „ 12 from top, *for* "included" *read* "excluded."
„ 78, „ 27 from top, *for* "either than another" *read* "better than another."
„ 83, „ 6 from top, *for* "pleasurable and temporal" *read* "pleasurable and beneficial."
„ 105, „ 10 from top, *for* "more then" *read* "more than."
„ 139, „ 25 from top, *for* "singificance" *read* "significance."
„ 171, „ 4 from bottom, *for* "germs" *read* "genus."
„ 171, „ 3, and 2 from bottom, *for* "these germs" *read* "this genus."
„ 186, „ 5 from top, *for* "the approved of courage" *read* "the approval of courage."
„ 252, „ 6 from top, *for* "dependent" *read* "independent."
„ 409, „ 16 from top, *for* "billious" *read* "bilious."

ART. VIII. 1.—*The Doctrine of the Holy Spirit.* The Ninth Series of the Cunningham Lectures. By GEORGE SMEATON, D.D., Professor of Exegetical Theology, New College, Edinburgh. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 38, George Street. 1882.

2. *A Popular Commentary on the New Testament.* By English and American Scholars of Various Evangelical Denominations. With Illustrations and Maps. Edited by PHILIP SCHAFF, D.D., LL.D., Baldwin Professor of Sacred Literature in the Union Theological Seminary, New York. In Four Volumes. Vol. III., "The Epistles of St. Paul." Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 38, George Street. 1882.

3. *A Commentary on St. Paul's Epistles to the Corinthians.* By JOSEPH AGAR BEET. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 27, Paternoster Row. 1882.

WE have endeavoured in occasional articles of this Journal to trace the development of the doctrine concerning the Holy Spirit through some of the epistles of the New Testament: in a fragmentary way, but with reference to a complete view of which the essays already published are only specimens. The epistles to the Corinthians of course claim special attention in this design. They present more of the characteristic or salient points in that development than any other. What these are, and what their relation to the other types of doctrine, will be the subject of the following hints. It may be premised that they were prepared without allusion to any particular books on the subject; but the works placed at the head of this article having lately appeared, and being exceedingly full in their exposition of this particular doctrine, we have thrown our observations into the form of what is to a certain extent a review of these books: to a certain extent only; for our particular topic, the distinctive elements of the doctrine in these epistles, will be kept mainly in view throughout. Meanwhile, the importance of these recent contributions demands that they should be formally introduced.

Dr. Smeaton's volume takes precedence, as being especially devoted to the doctrine of the Holy Ghost. Its appearance is

one more evidence of the fact, to which attention has been called again and again in these pages, that the relation of the Spirit to the economy of redemption and the Christian life is more and more occupying the minds of theologians. The number of larger and smaller works on the subject that have appeared during the last twenty years is very noteworthy and full of promise. This volume contains the Ninth Series of the Cunningham Lectures—an institution of great theological value—with the addition of an "Historical survey of the discussions connected with the doctrine:" this last point distinguishing this volume above others of the same class, and introducing almost a new feature in the treatment. Dr. Smeaton's work is marked by the same characteristics which were observed in his treatise on the Atonement: it is clear, concise, complete, and, where the theology differs from our own, we have not a single word to complain of as dictated by narrowness of spirit. We have read the volume with great pleasure, and commend it with confidence. Its only fault is an unavoidable one: the necessary scantiness of the discussion; the scantiness however being by no means synonymous with superficiality.

Dr. Brown is the contributor of the Corinthian exposition in the "Popular Commentary," which is in course of publication under the auspices of Dr. Schaff. This commentary on the New Testament is of high value; and the present volume shows that it ought to take rank with the best of the many claimants of the same class. But we have now to do only with our two epistles, and with these only as they bear on our subject. No living theologian is more competent to deal with the Gospel as administered by the Spirit, or to show how this affects the glory of the true character of the Christian dispensation. We have studied with much admiration every word bearing on the question; and find nothing to complain of but that Dr. Brown's reverence and humility of mind restrain him from interposing where perhaps his high authority would have weight among contending expositors. But he writes for a "Popular Commentary;" and, bearing that in mind, we may retract the complaint. When the truth is given with simplicity and true expository discernment, we may well dispense with the polemics of exegesis.

Mr. Beet's volume we place last, as being in relation to our theme more full and more stimulating than the others. It is indeed so pervaded by the right expository sentiment as to the place of the Holy Spirit in the epistles that we wonder

the Dissertations accompanying the volume do not contain one on this express subject. The volume as a whole cannot be reviewed without a more thorough reading: at present we have studied it as we have studied the others, with one particular subject in view. But even this partial review enables us to do justice to the thoroughness, laboriousness, and conscientiousness that stamp the whole. The historical dissertations and comparisons with the other epistles of St. Paul, and the literature that surrounds the New Testament without being part of it, give the book a special value as a contribution to Biblical Theology as such. Mr. Beet sets out, however, with the honest and laudable ambition of making his commentary "a contribution to Systematic Theology" also. And the reader who marks his treatment of the Church and the Sacraments —especially the sacrament of the Eucharist—in this volume, will find the claim sustained. We are not quite so sure as to the "systematic" view of the atonement and its application; but the author's labours on the Galatians and St. Paul's epistles of the imprisonment will, we hope, round off the edges of those doctrines in his exhibition of them. Meanwhile, a few points on the discussion of the Holy Spirit will show where we come into friendly collision with our expositor.

But now to enter on our subject. One thing is observable at the outset: that in every document of the New Testament, written after the day of Pentecost, or rather written for the Church as established on the day of Pentecost, the references to the Holy Ghost allude to His person and operation as part and parcel of the fabric of Christianity itself. The Spirit assumes His as it were natural and constitutional place: not to be accounted for, not to be vindicated, not to be proved, scarcely to be explained, but as everywhere and by all taken for granted. His name is as familiar as that of the Father or as that of the Son. If, with this thought in his mind, the reader opens any of the epistles, or these two in particular, he cannot fail to be struck with the force and importance of this truth. But he will be the more sensible of it if he takes into account a certain threefold progression in the New-Testament development: the germ in the gospels ready to be revealed; the actual springing into life before our eyes in the Acts; and the full luxuriant development in the apostolical writings. The two former points have occupied our attention before: that is, the wonderful way in which every promise and prophecy of the Holy Spirit is sure to have its exact fulfilment and

accomplishment in the progress of the gospel through the Acts. And the juncture—if we may so speak—of the Epistles with the Acts is equally remarkable. There is no longer specific mention of the descent of the Holy Ghost, in His Pentecostal or minor-Pentecost effusions. He is a Presence in the churches, spoken of and appealed to as such. We open, for instance, these Corinthian epistles; and we read of the Father of Whom we are, and of Jesus Christ His Son in Whom we are, without any reference to the Spirit, even in the most indirect manner: or if at all, in a manner very indirect, even when we are waiting to hear His name and feel that He must be at hand. But suddenly the unseen Presence is revealed; and in the most natural way possible, as if it could no longer be hid, the influence and demonstration of the Spirit is introduced, and from that moment through both epistles the name of the Third Person is never long absent. But there is no one word throughout that recalls to the Corinthians the fact of a new and final revelation of the Godhead: that the name of God, as known to the ancients, had been now exchanged for or glorified into the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost. The final revelation of the Spirit is taken for granted in a sense hardly applicable to the Gospels or the Acts. He appears as the administrator of a finished Christianity. And that is the point from which we must set out.

In the two epistles taken together there are five leading characteristics of the administration of the Holy Ghost which are so prominent in them as to be almost their distinctive peculiarity. They are, first, the Spirit's office in the revelation of Christian truth to the Church and to every member of it; secondly, His indwelling as constituting the πνευματικός or spiritual individual man, and the source of the spiritual gifts of the common body; thirdly, as following from this, the pre-eminence of the Spirit in the Christian economy as the new covenant contradistinguished from the old; fourthly, the manifestation of the Spirit in the special endowments or charismata of the congregation; and fifthly, the subordination of the Spirit in the most holy Trinity as administrator. Now it would be ill-advised to say that any one of these five is wanting elsewhere. But it would be quite within the limits of propriety to say that no one of them is expressed elsewhere with anything like the same precision. Were they absolutely confined to these epistles, that would involve a suspicion of the unity of doctrine in the New Testament generally. And

this point is of such vital importance that it may arrest our attention for a few moments.

It is of great moment, for instance, to find if we can the germs of them all in the Lord's own words. Generally speaking, there is nothing in the apostolical streams that may not be traced up to the well-head in the Gospels. And there is nothing subsequently taught as to the Holy Spirit that may not be discerned in the promises of Him who sends the Spirit to be His other self. As to the first, He promised the Holy Ghost to be the guide and leader of His disciples into the truth. His office was to be the ὁδηγεῖν into Himself and in Himself the ὁδός. As to the second, St. John gives us his Master's doctrine that "the law came by Moses, but grace and truth by Jesus Christ:" our Lord Himself calls the Spirit "the Spirit of the truth," of *that* truth; and we learn from the epistle to the Hebrews that He is "the Spirit of grace," of *that* grace. As to the third, our Lord promised that His disciples should receive and exercise miraculous powers surpassing those which He Himself had shown: "greater works than these shall he do, because I go unto the Father." Whatever other meaning these words may have, when compared with the special predictions and promises of the latter part of St. Mark's Gospel, they certainly had their fulfilment in the spiritual gifts bestowed on the Church through the outpouring of the Holy Ghost. As to the fourth, so faithful is the doctrine of these epistles to the teaching of our Lord that it may be regarded as simply its expansion. The entire testimony of the final discourses reveals to us a Third Person through whom the Father and the Son visit and inhabit the souls of believers; whose agency however is that of the administrator of a will not primarily and only His own. The text in the Gospel of St. John and the commentary in the Corinthian epistles are so faithful to each other that either may take the place of the other, whether as text or commentary. But the same cannot be said of any other portion of the New Testament this side the day of Pentecost. And the last of our five points admits of an equally clear illustration. Between our Lord's first cardinal sentence, "that which is born of the Spirit is spirit," and the Corinthian doctrine of the "spiritual" man, there is an exact correspondence: a correspondence which is not so full and express in any other part of the New Testament; not indeed in the epistle to the Romans, where the "spiritual" man is scarcely introduced as such.

We would not go too far in this direction, and make the Corinthian epistles the only expansion of our Lord's great germinal hints. It is enough to say that in these epistles only are these five points fully expounded. Not one of them is altogether wanting in other writings of the apostles, and of the apostle Paul in particular. But only here are they as it were expresaly treated.

For instance—to begin with the first—the revealing office of the Spirit is the secret light which makes glad the entire body of apostolical literature; but it is not often expressly referred to. In the epistle to the Ephesians the mystery of Christ is said to be "revealed unto the holy apostles and prophets in the Spirit;" and, in a more indirect manner, the Spirit may be spoken of as giving "the spirit of wisdom and understanding." And in St. John's first epistle the Spirit is "the truth" and "the witness" of the truth, and the "anointing" by which Christians know all things. It may be also said that in many places the older Scriptures are said to have been given by His inspiration; and new Scriptures through Him spoken as in the Apocalypse. But let the reader gather together all that is elsewhere said about the Spirit's most blessed function of demonstrating to the mind and writing on the heart and making the will subserve the truths of revelation already given—which is the point here concerned—and he will find that a few sentences will be the fruit of his labour. Then let him take these two epistles, especially the first, gathering together all that is there written in them, and he will find that he has a very great treasure of things new as well as old.

To enumerate the mere elements of the doctrine is enough for us: the commentators must be resorted to for their fuller exhibition. And what are these elements? In one chapter, the second of the former epistle, we have the Spirit's authority and functions as a Revealer sublimely set before us in unique strokes of the Apostle's pen which it is hard to describe save in his own words. He is the very consciousness, so to speak, of God: the Godhead as knowing Himself. This, however, wonderful to say, is spoken of to impress on our minds how much, not how little, we may know. The deep things of God concern mankind, or rather believing mankind; in the very depths of the Divine nature the interests of men are hidden; yet not hidden, for the Spirit searcheth them as if to find them for us. And these mysterious wonders of grace, which are freely given to us of God, are now and are to be still more

fully hereafter "made known to us by the Spirit." The things of God knoweth only the Spirit of God. But He makes them our things by fulfilling the Saviour's promise and showing them to us; so that the clause "the things of God knoweth no man" is doubly wrong; wrong as not being in the Greek, and wrong as being contrary to the fact of Christian experience or at least of apostolic experience. A more wonderful saying does not invite the reverent study of the student of Scripture. But there the apostle does not end. The world has its spirit also: its consciousness of its own poor shallow secrets. It knows its own wisdom; and a wisdom which has come down to us in some most beautiful and attractive forms: in forms, indeed, so beautiful and attractive that only the apostle's authority could induce us to brand it as folly. Nor does he brand it as folly save as it never itself knew, and could not accept when made known, the wisdom of God in "Jesus crucified." The world has its spirit. This, says the apostle with joy, he and the teachers of Christianity had not received: they had received that other Spirit whose office it is to reveal, not mysteries to be painfully sought out by philosophy, but "things freely given." But the things are simply Christ's things as in the Lord's final discourse; and Christ's things are Himself; and Christ Himself is here and elsewhere the "mystery of God;" and that mystery was foreordained before the world "unto our glory"—one of the most remarkable sayings in the Bible; and of that mystery the hierophant or interpreter is the Holy Spirit given to the apostles. But not given to them for themselves: they have to make known to all what was "freely given." The revelation of the apostles, their sub-revelation as it were, does not supersede the primary revelation of the Spirit. He is still Master of the Christian school, and that in two ways: His demonstration is the secret of the apostle's power in preaching, so that the truth is proved to those who hear it; and those who do not reject what is demonstrated to them, become spiritual men to whom then, thus prepared of the Spirit, the apostles can expound all their higher and richer doctrines "interpreting spiritual things to spiritual men."

At this point the apostle introduces what we have ventured to call one of the characteristics of these epistles, the term "spiritual" as the note of the Spirit's peculiar relation to the revelations themselves, to the new nature of the individual, who receives them for himself, and to the gifts through which he imparts them to others. But we cannot dwell on either of

the applications of the term at any length. Our expositors interpret it only the words "given by the Spirit;" and lay much stress on this. Dr. Brown says:

"That the *style* as well as the *matter* of spiritual things should have been Divinely provided for is most noteworthy. What, then, we naturally ask, is its character and mould? We see it in the apostle's own style, and in that generally of the New Testament; and this we find to be just that of the ancient oracles, only purified, enriched, and informed with a new and higher life. Thus the things of the Spirit are married indissolubly to a phraseology united to the things themselves; and what God hath joined let no man put asunder. There are those who think they can now couch 'the things of the Spirit of God' to far better effect by slipping off the husks of the Biblical phraseology as that of a past age, and using those modern forms of speech to which we are accustomed in secular affairs. But those who listen to them find that the things themselves, in their life and efficacy, have to a large extent evaporated in the process, while the Biblical language is as music to their ears."

It is music to our ears also. And doubtless there were spiritual words given to the apostles, as also given to the speakers in the Church who had the charisma of tongues. But we can hardly think that such an important truth as "spiritual words" given would have been announced by the apostle without the term "words" itself, if he had intended to lay on it so much stress. But our expositors do not examine the rendering we have given, and we have no time to defend it here. It is an omission in the Cunningham Lecture that the entire question is left out. But Dr. Smeaton thus forcibly speaks of the "natural man" who is the antithesis of the "spiritual."

"They cannot know them. I shall not efface the angles of this expression to make it less emphatic, nor apologise for the expression being used; for I am only an interpreter, and with that my duty ends. The *natural* man is he who is not occupied by the supernatural powers of the Spirit. The phrase '*to receive the things*' of the Spirit of God, as applied to the word of truth, is a common New-Testament expression,—meaning that through grace the word is not only viewed as true, but assented to as good. That word the natural man does not receive; but when it is added, 'neither can he know them,' expositors and divines in general, of the modern type, transmute the words into *will* not *know them*. . . . Why the natural man neither receives nor knows the things of the Spirit of God is next subjoined. The way of

salvation by the cross, described by 'the things of the Spirit of God,' appears to him absurd; for they are foolishness to him. Though the propositions as such, in which the doctrines are expressed, can be sufficiently apprehended by the natural understanding, he receives them not, neither can he know them without a supernatural discernment, taste, or relish for them imparted by the Spirit of God. The apostle makes no concealment of the malady, and draws a broad distinction between one who has the Spirit and one who has not the Spirit."

Hence the unique name of the Holy Ghost, "the Spirit of faith," which Dr. Brown fails to make emphatic, but Mr. Beet rightly marks, though he would lay stress on the energy of faith as subsequent to the original revelation of the Spirit: "The Holy Spirit moving men to believe the promises of God, especially the promise of resurrection and life with Christ. Although faith is the condition on which we receive the Spirit, yet when received, by revealing to us the love of God, He works in us a firmer and broader confidence in God. The assurance which enabled Paul to pursue his apostolic path, he felt to be a work of the Spirit. *The same* Holy *Spirit.*" Although these last words are true, the name here given to the author of faith is best explained by the former part of the passage. No truth is more earnestly insisted on throughout the New Testament than that the Holy Ghost alone can reveal the mysteries of Christ, and give the full confidence in the Gospel which utters with confidence (*παῤῥησία*) what it believes with assurance (*πληροφορία*). The cardinal text is sometimes sought in the twelfth chapter: "No one can say, Jesus is Lord, but in the Holy Spirit." We hesitate, however, to make a general application of what is obviously limited to the public utterances of the inspired in the Church. Mr. Beet seems to combine the two expositions: "Inward spiritual life is always in harmony with historic Christianity, *i.e.*, the Spirit of God, who is the animating principle of all devotion to God, ever leads men to recognise the claims of the carpenter of Nazareth; and without the inward presence of the Spirit none can recognise rightly these claims. This latter principle implies that every one who looks up to Jesus and from the heart calls Him Master, possesses the inward presence of the Spirit, and therefore possesses a measure of capacity for Christian work. Upon this broad basis rests the whole teaching of ch. xii." Dr. Brown takes a totally different view: His "principle" is that "Recognition of 'Jesus as the Lord' is an unfailing test

of the reality of spiritual gifts. . . . . It is not of ordinary utterances that this is said, or could be; for many that have not the Spirit of Christ, and are none of His, are ready enough to call Jesus Lord, while some who in their inmost souls adore Him may, like Peter, in a moment of temptation, come near to cursing Him. It is of Divinely *inspired utterances* that this is said." It appears to us that this last sentence hits the truth. The earlier part of the epistle shows us that there are "babes in Christ" who are, as it were, in a midway position as between the "spiritual" and the "carnal," and who are addressed "as" the latter and not "as" the former. These might own the Master of Nazareth, the "historical" Christ,—as Mr. Beet rightly says, though we cannot recognise or admit any "carpenter of Nazareth" as such—and call him "Lord": this however being much more than our expositor's "Master." He aptly speaks of them, as not "altogether destitute of the Spirit, but as men whose spiritual life is as yet undeveloped."

The passage in the twelfth chapter, therefore, does not exclude these semi-carnal men from being Christians; and it appears to us that their position in relation to the Spirit's office as the revealer of the mystery of Christ is of great importance. Mr. Beet evidently sees this, but his "undeveloped" hardly expresses all that seems here to be hinted at of a midway position in which the eyes have received the first touch, but the second is wanting. These men of the intermediate state have not the full light which the "spiritual" have; but they have a measure of knowledge and are among the disciples of Jesus. Then only are they truly "spiritual" when the Holy Spirit reveals Christ within them as their new life. All our expositors deal well with the "carnal," or, as Mr. Beet quaintly calls them, "the men-of-flesh," and the "spiritual;" but they have not given their due place to the carnal-spiritual men who have the beginnings of the Spirit's revelation, but not the full disclosure which would make them "men of the Spirit," or "men in Christ," and give them the full possession of the privileges of the Christian estate. These seem to have been, if not the majority, yet very numerous in Corinth, and they are very numerous now.

We must not pass on without an observation on Mr. Beet's view of the "demonstration of the Spirit." This is one that we cannot accept on any terms, though it is ingenious enough: it seems to take the nerve out of the apostle's

testimony to the Spirit's office in approving to every mind the "wisdom of God." These are the words of the expositor:

"What was the proof afforded by the Spirit and power of God? Not the effect of the Gospel in the heart and life; for this can be appreciated only by those who experience it, *i.e.*, by those who have already accepted the Gospel. It therefore cannot be the ground of their first acceptance of it. The effect of the Gospel in earlier converts may influence us (cf. ix. 2). But this would not affect the founding of a Church like that of Corinth. In Rom. xv. 19, Paul speaks of the power of signs and wonders, 'power of the Spirit of God,' with which Christ wrought through his agency for the obedience of Gentiles. In 2 Cor. xii. 12, he speaks of 'signs and wonders and powers' wrought among the Corinthians as signs of his apostleship; and the *proof* appealed to here can be no other than the miracles wrought by the *power* of God, through the agency of the Holy *Spirit*, in proof that Paul's *proclamation* is true. Fresh proof would, as his words imply, supersede all persuasion."

But if St. Paul had meant this, he would have said it, and not have left so important a truth to implication or inference. He would have appealed to his miracles as the proof that Christ was the wisdom of God; and to the lustre of his own signs and wonders as outdazzling the rhetoric of Greek philosophy. But this he never does, here or elsewhere. When the question is of his own credentials as an apostle he appeals to the "signs of an apostle;" but not as if they were "the signs of the Gospel" too. These are very different things. The messengers of the Gospel were approved by wonders, even as their Master was: for He also appealed to what we may call "the signs of the Christ." But the Gospel itself was never so approved. On the contrary, we read that it pleased God "by means of the foolishness of the preaching to save them that believe." And the close of the sentence that now occupies us runs, "that your faith should not be in the wisdom of men but in the power of God."

But we turn to the second distinguishing feature of the Corinthian doctrine. In the unity of the Most Holy Trinity the Father is Spirit, the Son is Spirit, and the Holy Ghost is Spirit. The one name belongs not to the third Person alone. It is His, in a sense unfathomable to us, eternally. But in the economy of redemption there is a mysterious interchange and intercommunion of the term between the second and third Persons which must be understood by the sound expositor; and these epistles give the keynote for the right apprehension

of it. The third chapter of the second epistle expounds the relation of the new covenant to the old, especially as it respects the ministration of the Holy Spirit; the process of the argument shows that this very Spirit is the Incarnate Lord revealed by Him; and it closes by making them one. In the first, the Holy Spirit is before us in all His distinctness. Here Mr. Beet differs honourably, without telling us that he does so, from the commentary suggested in the very type of the Revised Version, and from many other commentaries, in marking this both in his type and in his exposition. The "spirit" is not distinguished from the "letter" as being an ideal conception of whatever kind. "To bring men under condemnation to death was a specific and immediate aim of the law:" this, by the way, is a sentence we do not like. "Paul was an agent through whom his readers received *the Spirit, i.e.*, the Holy Spirit, whose presence in the heart *gives life*, and is a pledge of life eternal.... And that the Old Covenant was preparatory to, and receives its entire value from, the New, which gives life at once to all who accept it, proves the infinite superiority of the latter." There was, indeed, some life under the old covenant—indeed "life" is a word that often occurs among its promises—and where the new is only a letter it also may occasion death; but still it is true that *the ministry of the Spirit* is the ministry of the Gospel, which conveys the Spirit to those who believe. When, secondly, the apostle makes the illumination of unbelieving Israel dependent on their turning to the Lord—to Jesus, but emphatically as the Lord—he introduces a sudden transition, not happily expressed by "moreover." "That Lord is that Spirit" expresses the meaning, though inadmissible in translation. Mr. Beet forcibly and well gives it thus: though the term "Master," very often employed by him, seems incongruous; and we would ask the expositor to consider whether after Pentecost the term is not lost in the higher glory of "Lord," especially in such a connection as this, where "Master" seems altogether out of place: "The coming and the presence of the Spirit is spoken of as the coming and presence of Christ. This intimate and essential relation between the Son and the Spirit, amounting to practical identity of these two Divine Persons, Paul asserts by the strong words, *the Lord is the Spirit*... In virtue of this essential relation of the Son and the Spirit, the Holy Spirit, sent by Christ and the bearer of Christ's presence, is called *the Spirit of the Lord*; and Christ is, in ver. 18, 'the Lord of the

Spirit.'" This is excellent, till we come to the last words, where we halt. There would be something very striking in the bold antithesis, "Spirit of the Lord" and "the Lord of the Spirit;" but the latter would be out of harmony with Scriptural phraseology. The Authorised Version felt this and clung to the former, repeating it; the Revisers have wisely compromised by giving "the Lord the Spirit." This completes the trilogy we ventured to hint at above: the Spirit, the Lord is the Spirit, the Lord the Spirit. Mr. Beet well says that "the identity asserted in ver. 17 is administrative and not personal." But not so well that "in virtue of this identity both is Christ *Lord of the Spirit* and the Holy Spirit is *the Spirit of the Lord*." What becomes of our expositor's fidelity to the Father's *Principatus*? If he will not allow that the Christ who came of the Jews after the flesh is "God over all" and not of Jews only after the Spirit, he surely will not plead that Christ is Lord of the Spirit: none is—in the sense he loves to insist upon—Lord but One. For the rest, and by way of parenthesis, we must give the admirable note on the cardinal mirror-word:

"*Beholding reflected in a mirror*: i.e., in the Gospel, where the words and works of Christ are recorded. So in 1 Cor. xiii. 12, where the Gospel mirror is contrasted unfavourably with direct vision in the world to come. And in this glass we behold, not mere abstract moral grandeur, but moral grandeur combined into an *image*, into a picture of a living man, even Jesus. The early disciples saw Him face to face, and as they heard His words and watched His works they (John i. 14) beheld His glory. But we can do so only by pondering the Gospel. We thus see His image and behold His glory. . . . *The image* reflected in the Gospel mirror reproduces itself in those who gaze upon it. This change is inward and spiritual, resulting from inward and spiritual vision of Christ. Soon we shall see Him face to face; and so wonderful will be the effect of that vision, that even our bodies (Phil. iii. 21, cf. 1 John iii. 2) will be changed and made glorious like His."

Here, again, the close suggests the only ground of demur. Surely it is not our contemplation that will change our bodies in the former of the passages quoted; and in the latter we shall be like Him before we can see Him as He is. Bnt Mr. Beet does well to impress the great truth that "this verse reveals the infinite value of persevering Christian contemplation. As we continue looking into the Gospel mirror there rises before us with increasing clearness an Image in

which are combined all the elements of moral grandeur in their highest degree, the Image of the God-man. As we contemplate it we feel its power: (for it is a living and life-giving image of the Lord of the Spirit:) and ourselves are changed, in a matter corresponding with Christ's gift of the Spirit, into a likeness of Him at whom we gaze." It is very grateful to find the contemplation of our Lord's Person in the Gospel made prominent. Mr. Beet does not argue against the "reflecting" of the Revision; and indeed his passing illustration from photography might seem to indicate a slight sympathy with it. But the whole strain of his exposition is faithful to the right thought: so faithful indeed that we wonder he does not refer the "liberty" rather to the Son who makes us "free indeed" than to the Spirit who is "absolutely *free*, *i.e.*, unrestrained by any will or force external to Himself." He whose eye of faith is fixed for ever on the Lord Whose glory, as that of an only-begotten, we behold in the Gospel, will be free indeed from the veil which will lift of itself. From His glory ours comes; and yet it is of the Holy Ghost, for Him we see only through the Spirit. What follows then but that it is from One who is at once IN US, both the Lord and the Spirit. Hence another turn should be given to the parenthesis in the passage quoted above, which evidently gives the expositor some trouble: "For it is a living and life-giving image of the Lord the Spirit: of the Lord, for it is His glory irradiating our own human nature and living before us still; of the Spirit, for it is only the Holy Ghost within us after all that is the life-giver. Then we are changed into one and the same image of the common glory by the Spirit. All is from Him who under one aspect is the Lord, under the other the Spirit: from both, from each. Regarding the One Image of glory, it is 'from the Lord;' regarding the image multiplied in us, it is 'from the Spirit.' But the Lord is the Spirit." So should we read it.

Remembering that the glory radiating from the Lord Christ is the supreme thought throughout, we read on to chapter iv. 6, and find there that it is the Deity of the Son and of the Spirit which explains the passage: "Seeing it is God that said, Let light shine out of darkness, who shined in our hearts to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ." The Lord is gone and the Spirit is gone, and God remains alone in the face of Jesus Christ. In fact the words cannot be understood unless the Trinity is introduced. The Revealer, the revelation, the glory revealed,

are all of God. And here, it may be added in passing, Mr. Beet is rather hard on the Revisers, whom he sometimes almost satirises where they are right, and silently winks at where they are wrong. "In 2 Cor. iv. 6, a mere schoolboy, following the order of the Greek words, would have avoided the Revisers' vapid rendering, and have reproduced the exact force of Paul's picturesque words, *Out of darkness light shall shine.*" The schoolboy perhaps might think that the first word must have the emphasis, but theologians like the Revisers saw plainly that the emphasis lies everywhere in this page on the light and the revelation of that wonderful image in many hearts. And this suggests another example. "In a few cases I am compelled to believe that there are changes for the worse. Of these the worst cases are 1 Cor. iii. 16, vi. 19, 2 Cor. vi. 16, where the new rendering *a temple* implies gross and unpardonable theological error. See notes." But there is nothing in the notes that justifies a change in the rendering of the plain Greek; and Mr. Beet's calm judgment will perhaps come to see that God has other temples besides the human heart. Each of us is *a* temple, but not *the* temple; and the Revisers are not so very wrong.

The "living and life-giving" in our quotation is a happy expression; and suggests the other instance of the Divine unity or identity between the Lord and His Spirit: that, namely, in the resurrection chapter. We have a conviction that there is a close analogy between the two passages, or the two classes of teaching. In the second epistle the Lord is the Spirit who writes the epistle on the fleshy tables of the heart, and transforms the spirit of the believer into the image of the Lord of glory. In the first epistle, and in the resurrection chapter, the Lord is the Spirit who, in His very last ministration as the administrator of the Gospel covenant, will give life to the bodies of the saints till then sleeping in the dust. That there are difficulties in this interpretation may be freely conceded: there are difficulties in every interpretation. On the other theories of exposition they abound: if not issuing in absolute contradictions, yet they leave a vague sense of dissatisfaction as if the apostle had not intended to say anything definite and clear. The analogy between the interpretation of spirit in 2 Cor. iii. and 1 Cor. xv. extends to the opposite methods of interpretation also. The prevalent idea of "spirit" in the former, sanctioned by the Revised Version, is that it represents the spiritual character of the covenant as opposed to the mere letter of the law:

though what that ethereal idea really expresses no one knows, and no one would undertake to put it into a formula. So in the resurrection chapter, the idea is generally regarded as something opposite to the bodily life in the flesh. As the first Adam was a living soul, and we are like him, so the second Adam is a spiritual energy diffusing in some ethereal way a spiritual kind of existence. Dr. Brown says: "*A spiritual body:* not meaning a body simply of finer material than the present (the contrast does not lie in that), but a body whose animating principle is 'the spirit,' or rational nature in its entirely purified and perfected condition; a body all whose organs and properties will be adapted to the inner and higher nature whose handmaid it is to be. (To be sober and safe on such a subject, one needs to keep strictly within the lines of these definitions.)" And again, as to the natural and spiritual body, we read: "the one no less certain than the other—and simply an advance from the lower to the higher." So it is generally said; but we cannot see that the apostle is laying down any such general law. Mr. Beet follows in this good company; and whatever may be said for the interpretation, he well says. But the best is not very satisfactory: "Our future bodies will be entirely permeated and controlled by our spirits, the seat of our intelligence. Consequently, the resurrection body, instead of limiting the spirit, will be a perfect manifestation of its nature and a passive instrument of its will." But the text says that the body is to be spiritual, and not merely the instrument of spirit. However, as we have only to do with the "life-giving Spirit," we will quote some sentences from Mr. Beet, who always succeeds in putting with extreme terseness every interpretation, wrong or right. Whether right or wrong in this case, the reader must judge. But he must be reminded beforehand, that our quotation will necessarily be in some measure unfair to the expositor, since we are obliged to select and compress:

"By God personally inbreathing the principle of life into a lifeless but organised body, *the man*, who before was only a lifeless body, *became a living soul.* The *soul* was a result of the entrance of the principle of life into a mortal body. That the word *soul* is used in Gen. ii. 7 to designate the entire man who thus sprang into being, implies that of man thus created the soul, *i.e.*, the animal life, was the distinctive, name-giving element. This designation, therefore, proves that the body of man, as first created, was a soul-governed body."

We go to Genesis and find that man was created in the image of God, and cannot doubt that his spirit was, as a direct effluence from God, the great controller of his soul and body. Whatever St. Paul's allusion meant, it cannot have meant all that this exposition reads into it. Surely the Creator did not create a lifeless body and then breathe life into it: we cannot imagine a body without a soul; though we can suppose—which however is perfectly needless—the further inbreathing of the breath of lives which made Adam all that his high estate declares that he was. The tendency of this kind of exposition is to give us what we may call an Apollinarian Adam. But, it will be said, how can the difficulty of St. Paul's quotation be got over? By considering two things: first, that the argument is altogether confined to the resurrection of the body; which therefore, secondly, demands that the whole be interpreted of the fallen Adam, whatever difficulty this may throw around St. Paul's allusion to his original creation; as, indeed, thirdly, the very fact that the last Adam is introduced demonstrates: there would be no Lifegiving Lord from heaven, the Spirit, if there were no fallen Adam. Here, however, we frankly confess that we have started a topic which we cannot now pursue: not that we have any scruple or fear, but that our space is gone. In fact, this theme cannot be expatiated on in the style which alone suits a popular essay.

We pass now to another great characteristic of these epistles; their distinct references to the Holy Spirit in His sacred τάξις or place in the Holy Trinity. Nowhere is the baptismal formula—the authoritative deliverance to the Church of the absolute and redemptional Trinity—so clearly reflected as here. Not that it is absent anywhere. There is hardly a page in the apostolical writings, certainly there is not a whole epistle, which does not show the triple or triune glory of the Godhead. But the wonderful sentences in our epistles approach nearer to the idea of a formula than any found even in the Epistle to the Romans, the eighth chapter of which may be said to be the Pauline version of our Saviour's final discourse on the Paraclete. We say "comes nearer;" for still it remains true that there is but one sanctified, authoritative, and absolute formula, that of our Lord Himself. In it the Trinity is disclosed, without any reference to subordination of Persons and administration of offices. In every other instance—not excepting that in the opening of the Apocalypse—the Trinity

is introduced with reference to relations sustained by the Several Persons. But among these the passages that occur in the Corinthians shine out conspicuously.

It may be admissible to quote that very striking variation on the usual phrase of the New Testament: "But ye were sanctified, but ye were justified, in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, and in the Spirit of our God." Here in a subordinate sentence, as it were, the whole sum of the Christian estate is brought into relation with the Trinity; and that in a manner unique. "The Spirit of our God" seems to carry a very deep significance; a little fluctuation in the expression that suggests a volume of meaning. "One God" is one Triune God, Whose name is in Jesus, Whose Spirit unfolds the virtue of that name. It does not require much subtlety to discern in "ye were washed" the baptismal dedication which begins religion: the "washing" or "washing yourselves" is the term used simply because the apostle's mind lingers on the impurities from which the converts had passed; but the thing meant is the great transition of which baptism was the sign: not the washing from guilt or from defilement so much as the entrance on the new life and the inheritance just before referred to. "He saved us by means of the laver of regeneration," as Mr. Beet aptly quotes, though he takes the more limited view of the word: "To this life of purity, Baptism, as a public confession of Christ and formal union with His people, was the Divinely appointed outward entrance; only thus, in ordinary cases, could men obtain salvation (Mark xvi. 16, Acts ii. 38). And the use of water set forth in outward symbol the inward purity which God requires, and is ready to give." Then follow in the apostle's words the two great blessings which the Spirit administers in the name of Jesus, sanctification and righteousness. These are two co-ordinate blessings, and embrace the whole sum of the Christian privilege; just as unrighteousness and impurity stamped the general character of the converts before they were admitted to the inheritance of the kingdom of God's children. The fact that sanctification here precedes has given rise to much needless controversy. It is not enough to say that defilement was the leading thought in the preceding picture of sin; unrighteousness is at least equally prominent in it.

We should be content to fall back upon the principle that the two blessings are, as has been said, co-ordinate: it

matters not which takes the lead: even as they run through the Scripture without disputation for priority: "in righteousness and holiness" and "in holiness and righteousness" before God being interchangeable phrases. Mr. Beet's argument is that "Paul is here dealing with practical unrighteousness; and with him the justification of pardon always precedes (*e.g.*, i. 30) sanctification. But we have the opposite order here, because practical conformity with the law is an outflow and consequence of devotion to God. Therefore by claiming us for His own, and by breathing into us the devotion He claims, God makes us righteous." It is undoubtedly true that practical conformity with the law is intended here; but we fail to see that it is the outflow and consequence of devotion to God. By parity of reasoning it might be said that in 1 Cor. i. 30 sanctification is an outflow and consequence of righteousness: as indeed it is made by most of Mr. Beet's fellow-expositors of the Romans. But, in fact, neither in that passage nor in this are the two parts of righteousness dissevered; nor in either of them is one blessing made a consequence of the other: "both righteousness and sanctification," as our expositor rightly translates, suggests the contrary; and our expositor does not forget to give the true meaning of the latter term when he says, "the impartation of objective and subjective holiness:" he should, however, always remember his own words "impartation" and "objective." But we are digressing from our immediate subject; and must add only one word. The passage we now consider, like 1 Cor. i. 30, seems to give out its full meaning when we view it in the light of one of St. Paul's peculiarities, that of going beyond and forgetting for the moment his context: rising out of it, as it were, to a broad and comprehensive statement which must be expounded in its own grandeur, isolation and integrity.

"Our God" becomes "God" in the next great Trinitarian passage. "Now there are diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit. And there are diversities of ministration, and the same Lord. And there are diversities of working, but the same God, who worketh all in all." Here is the Holy Trinity introduced with special reference to the Spirit, who throughout this paragraph has the pre-eminence. He is the administrator of the Godhead within the Church; replenishing with spiritual endowments those who have ministries to discharge in the service of the One Lord of

the Church; and in the operations which these ministries require there is One God who is the source of all energy. Now this is another illustration of the principle just hinted at, that St. Paul takes occasion at almost all points to rise out of his immediate subject to impress some broad and fundamental truth that underlies it. Here his immediate subject is the charismata or special gifts of which we have already spoken; and these more directly in their relation to One Lord and His Spirit. All spiritual gifts—this is his axiom—have it for their token, that they honour Jesus the Lord; and this is his application of it, that none need be troubled about the manifold utterances of the inspired. The one common Spirit of this inspiration never will permit Jesus to be pronounced Anathema; nor can the mystic utterances proclaim Him Lord but under His influence. The spirits of the prophets will not merely be subject to the prophets, but subject to the Holy Spirit Himself; and, whether the language of the tongues be unintelligible or otherwise, whether the utterances be exalted or in the ordinary style, dishonour to the name of Jesus would be a mark of their evil origin, and confession of His Lordship a sure mark of their origination from the Spirit. These words are not, however, to be too literally applied. The apostle did not suppose that in the Christian assembly there might be a furious outburst of malignity—"Jesus Anathema," as in some assemblies has always been heard. It is his own glowing expression of a fundamental law: that the Holy Spirit honours Jesus the Lord. And then the thought of this unity leads him to pause for a moment, and rise to a still higher unity. These and all other manifestations of the Spirit's presence are not only tokens that "the Spirit and the Son are One," but tokens also that in all these manifestations the Spirit and the Son are One in the unity—not of the Father, that would be said only of the Son, but—of God.

And it is not so much the distinction of the Persons, or their subordination, as their equal supremacy that is emphasised. Of course, the subordination, rightly understood, is here and everywhere indicated as an underlying truth; the emphasis, however, is not on that, but rather on the fact that each Person is God, and that no one of the three is pre-eminent. If we may say so, the whole Deity is in each: the charisma, the ministry, the working are all and equally Divine. There is no subordination in

this sentence. And, in token of this, the paragraph returns very soon to the remarkable close, which, as it were, purposely gives to the Spirit the very term which had just before been given to God, in distinction or distinctively: "all these WORKETH the one and the same Spirit, dividing to each one severally EVEN AS HE WILL." Therefore we do not quite like such a note as this in Meyer: "The Divine Trinity is here indicated in *an ascending climax*, in such a way that we pass from the Spirit who bestows the gifts to the Lord who is served by means of them, and finally to God, who, as the absolute First Cause and Possessor of all Christian powers, works the entire sum of charismatic deeds in all who are gifted. This passage has always been rightly adduced in opposition to anti-Trinitarian error; but it is to be observed that with all the equality of nature and inseparable unity (2 Cor. xiii. 13) of the Three, no dogmatic canon can do away with the relation of subordination which is also manifest." Would Meyer have forced the ascending climax on the apostolic benediction also when the grace of the Lord comes first? Mr. Beet is more cautious, and does not take up the strain. He is, as we shall see, in the advanced ranks of subordinationist theologians, but he does not force on this text what it will not receive. His words are:

"That *the Spirit* has a *will*, and is yet (in ver. 4 *ff.*) distinguished from, and placed side by side of, the Father and the Son, implies clearly that He is a Person distinct from Them, and that the words Spirit of God, are not a mere description of the Father as animating men. For to have a *will* is the essence of personality. Still more clearly is this implied in the words of Christ, recorded in John xvi. 13: 'He will not speak prompted by Himself; but as many things as He may hear He will speak.' For he who can listen to the Father must be a person distinct from Him. Again, since the Spirit possesses the entire knowledge of God, as our spirits know all that we know (xi. 10), He must be infinite, and therefore Divine; for the finite cannot comprehend the infinite."

This is a good doctrine. But if the possession of a will is indeed the essence of personality, why does our translator so obviously incline to the *It*? He has the right instinct when he puts "*As He* pleases;" though neither "pleases" nor "likes"—this last must have slipped accidentally into the notes—expresses the mind of the Spirit with the shade of meaning that the verb in the original

seems to have. "*As He likes:* asserts emphatically that the distribution of the gifts springs simply and only from the sovereign choice of the Spirit." A careful examination of certain synonyms might show that these terms are all too strong; and that some other must be found, mediating between counsel and sovereign choice, that would better suit the sequel. Our expositor explains excellently at the end of the chapter why the Spirit divides severally His gifts in the wise purpose of His will, and does not scruple to say that "these gifts of God's grace were to be obtained by human effort," and "by earnest desire to obtain and develop this fitness, men might be *emulous for the greater gifts.*" But to return: we cannot with all our heart accept the dictum, in its full breadth, that "to have a will is the essence of personality." In our Lord the human nature has a will, though His human nature has no personality. We have never known our own personality without a will "exercised to discover good and evil;" but, perhaps, the first Adam knew not that his will was of his essence. However, the vindication of the Personality of the Spirit is too precious to allow of subtilties in dealing with it.

The interpolation of "Father" in the passage quoted above—whereas the text expounded avoids that term—suggests the very remarkable passage in an earlier chapter where that term is used in striking relation to the Son as Lord. It is true that our own word, "the Spirit," does not occur there. But the general subject of the subordination, which necessarily involves the Holy Third Person, finds there one of its classical texts, as Mr. Beet rightly perceives. The name Father has all its infinite meaning in that connection; but we humbly think that it is never introduced after the baptismal formula, save in relation to the Son: being lost as it were in the term God when the Three Persons are formally introduced: the Ephesian Prayer being hardly an exception. Premising, therefore, that the sentence, "*The Father* is the constant designation of the *One God,*" will not bear to be inverted, we quote one of the most thorough and outspoken expositions that we have lately seen of the doctrine of subordination in the Holy Trinity.

"Notice that, even as compared with the Son, the Father is the *One God*, and that everywhere Paul uses the term *God* as the distinctive title of the Father (cf. iii. 23, xii. 3, xv. 28, John xx. 17).

But this does not contradict John i. 1 (v. 18 probably), xx. 28, where the Son is expressly called 'God,' any more than the special title *One Lord* denies that the Father is also our Master. But it does imply that the title *God* is specially appropriate to the Father, even as distinguished from the Son, and the title *Lord* to the Son, even as distinguished from the Father. In the thought of His contemporary followers, Jesus was distinguished from the Father as He cannot be in our thought; for the chief element of their spiritual life was loyalty and obedience, and service to One from whose human lips commands had been given. To Him, therefore, the title *Lord*, by which He was accosted on earth (Matt. vii. 21, viii. 2, 6, 8, &c.), was specially appropriate; and, to the Father, as being first of the mysterious Three, the Eternal Source, essentially and historically, of the Eternal, and in their days Incarnate Son (John v. 26, vi. 57, Col. i. 19), and of the Spirit (John xv. 26), whom the Son and Spirit ever obey (John v. 30, xvi. 13), thus furnishing an eternal pattern of devotion; to Him, even as compared with the Divine Son and Spirit, the supreme title *One God* is specially appropriate. For this reason, in presence of prevalent polytheism and of jealous Jewish monotheism, Paul never speaks of the Son as God (see note, Rom. ix. 5); and even John uses (cf. John xvii. 3) the word God as the distinctive name of the Father. Paul left others to make the correct inference embodied in the august title, God the Son. Oversight of this has given rise to unitarian arguments based on the monotheistic language of Paul."

We have no desire to quarrel with Mr. Beet's general vindication of the truth that the doctrine of the Holy Trinity can be held with perfect confidence only by those who accept the ancient catholic statements of the eternal subordination of the Son and the Spirit. On the contrary, we think he does good service by losing no opportunity given him as an expositor of the sacred text for impressing the importance of this truth. The doctrine of the Eternal Sonship, for which none have contended more resolutely than the divines of Mr. Beet's own communion, hangs upon this; and the reconciliation of the Trinity in Unity is perhaps only on this principle possible. But some of the sentences here quoted seem to be unguarded, and, in a commentary which rightly aims to keep dogmatic theology in view, to be regretted. Three things seem very plain to the reverent reader of the New Testament. First, it is clear that there are one or two or three passages which undeniably reveal an interior order of being in the Triune Essence, for instance, the Only-begotten Son; the Proceeding Spirit; and perhaps the Gift of Life in

Himself. Secondly, that the express language of subordination, habitually used, is in every instance—it is well to speak boldly—applied in reference to the history of the economies of creation, providence and redemption. Thirdly, that there are very many passages in which the Two Persons are called God without reserve: remembering always that there are other terms besides God which, at least equally with God, express the idea of essential Divinity. As it respects the first of these, the only reflection that arises is that we ought to imitate the sublime reserve of our only guide, the word of revelation; and therefore abstain from carrying up the ideas of "obedience" and "devotion" to the "eternal" tranquillity of the Divine nature. Then as to the second, it will be seen by close examination, that the mediatorial subordination of the two Persons—of the One by becoming incarnate and of the Other by becoming the Spirit of Christ as the Administrator—lies at the root of all the passages that are adduced on this subject. "Christ is God's;" but we exceedingly shrink from the dictum that "the Eternal Son receives His being from (Jno. v. 26), and therefore belongs to, and bows to, the Eternal Father, and exists to work out the Father's purposes." Is it well to say that the reason of the being of the Eternal Son is that He may fulfil the Father's purpose? Does not the very word "purpose" here perilously suggest that *βουλήσει* of the Arians which the Homoousian conflict suppressed? We are limited in our subject here, or it might be shown that the final subjection of the Son comes under the same law. He will give up "the kingdom to the God and Father;" but the phrase changes, "the Son will be made subject to Him who made all things subject to Him: that God may be all things in all:" not, as Mr. Beet says, "that thus the Father may be everything in the eyes and thoughts of all His servants." He with a sound instinct introduces his remarks by saying: "In view of the mysterious words of vers. 24, 28, touching the relation of the Eternal Son to the Eternal Father, rather than speak, the expositor would prefer to bow in silent adoration. But what God has spoken we cannot forbear to re-echo. These verses teach the absolute and eternal submission of the Son to the Father." The adjective "eternal" is here imported into the exposition. We read on in the chapter and find that this "Son" is the Last Adam, and understand that the Incarnate Son will be made subject—"a suitable expression; for the Son's submission, though embraced willingly and cordially by Him, does

not originate in His will as the Incarnate: it is obedience to the law of the Eternal Trinity, or God, which as Incarnate He accepted, and which,—the will of the one God, the Father, and the Son of the Spirit,—being accomplished, the Incarnate Son with His glorified human nature is subject for ever to God, all in all." Thus we have ventured to change the flow of Mr. Beet's sentence; but, we are afraid, without his leave. As to the third point, it is not our present concern to show that the Son is called God, the God over all, the Great God and our Saviour: though believing firmly that in the gradual development of New-Testament doctrine His dignity reaches these terms. We have only to do with the Spirit, who is in our epistles Divine, by many proofs: as Mr. Beet nobly helps us to prove. To his guidance on this subject we must now commend our readers. Our own remarks we must suspend, solely because our space is gone. But the general subject will be continued in relation to other writings of the New Testament.

[We gladly give insertion to the following letter from the pen of the Rev. W. Arthur, M.A., on some points referred to in our October issue.]

The last number of THE LONDON QUARTERLY REVIEW contains an article on the *Revised Form of Baptism*, some portions of which seem to me calculated to convey impressions that are not quite correct, so much so that, with profound respect, I venture to solicit from the Editor permission to offer a few words of explanation.

The fact that the proportion of votes in a certain division was as two thirds to one third is so stated that an ordinary reader might suppose that as many as one third voted against the preamble adopted. Such was not the case. The only division in which the proportions were two thirds to one third was not taken as between two proposed forms, but as between yea and nay on the proposal to drop any attempt at revision. When that point had been decided, there remained open four courses:—1. To adopt the body of the revised formulas, retaining the old preamble. 2. To adopt the preamble proposed by the committee. 3. To adopt the old preamble, omitting certain words. 4. To adopt the preamble in the revised form for adult baptism, as having been agreed to by all the committee, and use it also in infant

baptism, changing such words as required change. The first two proposals were virtually withdrawn. The testing division was taken between the last two. The number that voted in the minority in this case was much less than that which voted in the minority in the other case.

On subsequent divisions on points of detail the minority was often an exceedingly small fraction. But it would not be correct to take these as being the whole of those who thought with the minority. Some might say that, the battle having been fought in the division between form and form, it was not desirable to prolong the struggle. Yet, for my own part, I know that, in the only case in which I cared to vote on one of those points of detail against the recommendation of the committee, I did so vote. That was on the question of omitting or retaining among the prefatory sentences from Holy Scripture the words of John iii. 5.

The next statement I would notice is this:—"A neutral and colourless substitute was extemporised for the emergency." The preamble substituted by the Conference was not extemporised. It was a form already agreed upon by the committee, and by it recommended to the Conference as the preamble to the service for the baptism of adults—that baptism about which there has never been a question in the Church. The difficulty had not arisen on this; but on infant baptism, as to which there has been much question. It was then suggested that the form which had by common accord been recommended for that baptism which in the Primitive Church was the normal baptism, was not less suitable to what in the later Church has become more frequent, infant baptism. What made the suggestion acceptable was precisely the fact that the form was not extemporised, but was beforehand known as the well-considered recommendation of a laborious committee.

Another point is this:—"It is greatly to be feared that there will be now two, if not more, formularies in use, perhaps in the same congregation." The evil to spring from such a diversity is said to be such that every one must see it. A stranger might easily infer that among Methodists diversity had been unknown, and that two formularies had never concurrently existed. But diversity is not new. It is as old as my earliest recollections, and older far. It remains to be seen whether the diversity will practically be greater in the future than in the past. I expect that it will be less. But God forbid that I should try to put it down by any attempt to magnify the evils of diversity. If old Methodist charity and catholicity abide, the evil will not be great, and the diversities will gradually lessen. And it is hard to say how far the formation and growth of that charity and catholicity have been due to the existence of diversity. How-

ever strongly one may feel in favour of diversity, one must feel, with the writer of the article, that it has often been pushed too far, in a manner tending to that loose method of administering infant baptism which he justly condemns. But I am persuaded that the promoters of the revised formula were not led by any desire to encourage the faults condemned, but by a desire to encourage the earnest and impressive administration of the sacrament, which is properly recommended. For that end they believed that the revised formula would be not only almost, but altogether, as good an instrument in the hands of a faithful minister as the former was, and one more likely to win general adoption.

I shall note only one other point. It is said in the article that if in deference to the wishes of the minority the old preamble, omitting certain words, had been retained, "the Conference would have been of one mind." This I cannot understand. The writer admits that there were minds that needed relief. Those proved to be a large majority. He speaks of those who formed the minority as "those who needed no relief." Yet if a majority needing relief had submitted to a minority not needing relief, all would have been of one mind. Not so. The majority declined to adopt a form of preamble to which the minority had expressed strong objections. It took the form for the baptism of adults to which no objections had been heard, and this it did not make compulsory. Yet even then all are not of one mind. In the article, the effect of what has been done is stated thus, "it gives relief to many minds, while those who needed no relief are left where they were." Is not that coming as near to one mind as frail men may reasonably expect? And when a majority, desiring relief for itself, takes care, in providing it, to lay no new burden upon a minority, but shows itself content and more than content to leave them "where they were," is not its action, when charitably viewed, calculated rather to confirm brotherly confidence and brotherly love than to strain them?

I purposely abstain from touching upon the rather numerous questions raised in the article as affecting shades of theological opinion.

WM. ARTHUR.

LITERARY NOTICES.

I. THEOLOGICAL.

The Fernley Lecture for 1882.

The Witness of the Spirit. A Discourse, delivered in St. Peter's Chapel, Leeds, July 31st, 1882, in connection with the assembling of the Wesleyan-Methodist Conference, and as the Twelth Lecture on the Foundation of the late John Fernley, Esq. By the Rev. Robert Newton Young. London: Published for the Proprietors by the Wesleyan-Methodist Book-Room, 2, Castle Street, City Road, and 66, Paternoster Row, E.C. 1882.

We cannot be wrong in predicting that this lecture will be more widely read among the Methodist people than any of its predecessors. It goes straight to the heart of a community concerning which the lecturer says "that the public preaching and profession of this doctrine is an essential element of the mission of Methodism." Mr. Young was well advised to take this ground at the outset. It has often been asserted, but never more impressively or beautifully, than in these words: "The organisation of Methodism, however masterly in its conception and felicitous in its adaptation, cannot justly be credited with its persistent vitality and its unparalleled success. That which appealed to the eager thousands who gathered round Mr. Wesley and his preachers was the exhibition of a religious life that rested, not on undefined anticipations, or fallible and uncertain inferences, but on a present and conscious sense of the forgiving grace of the Father. The doctrine of the *Witness of the Spirit* opened out to them a heaven, not in the distant future only, but in the very heart of their daily life." After this keynote we know what strain to expect. The theme might have been handled philosophically, or in relation to the evidences of Christianity, or with direct reference to the oppositions of controversy, or even as an exegetical discussion of Scriptural phraseology. None of these aspects are omitted; but the drift of the whole sets towards the strong and deep feeling of the Methodist heart, to which it will not appeal in vain.

Our lecture however is not, on this account, narrow in its range. It is the exact opposite of this. Limited as the space is, we find an ample or at least a sufficient discussion of the work of the Holy Spirit generally, of His administration in all the economies, of His presence and operation in the Old Testament, and even of His catholic outgoings in all the world. On this point we are constrained to quote a few admirable sentences: "The witness of the Spirit to Christ has a yet wider range. There is a light 'which lighteth every man that cometh into the world.' It played among the ancient faiths, lending to them here and there a more than human lustre. In no age of the world's history, in no tribe of the human family, has God left Himself 'without witness.' A yearning after God, after some revelation from heaven, after the forfeited fellowship of Eden, may be traced among all faiths and forms of worship. There is perhaps no human heart which has not its altar, though it be inscribed 'To an unknown God.' The universal unrest of the world in all ages is far deeper than political, or intellectual, or social. 'The whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain,' waiting 'for the manifestation of the sons of God.' By mysterious processes the world is being educated to receive the truth, 'as the truth is in Jesus;' and, though it may be impossible for us, as yet, to know how, or how far, it is equally impossible to cast away the hope that outside all churches, beyond the range of holy enterprise, save so far as the prayers of the Church pervade all human life, some testimony of the Spirit is borne to the grace and sympathy and tender mercy of Him who is 'the desire of all nations.' It is not too much to suppose that our Lord contemplated no narrower range of spiritual attestation than the vast circle of human need, when He said of the promised Paraclete: 'He shall testify of Me.'" The lecturer is right in not stopping to defend the quotations which enrich this passage; and he is wise in leaving the subject where he leaves it; but he was faithful to his theme in not omitting it.

He has a happy topic also when he opens the "indirect evidence —if indeed it may be called indirect—which Holy Scripture furnishes in the favour of this assumption:" namely, that the Holy Ghost "is discharging no new function when he certifies to the heart of the believer his personal interest in the Redeemer's victorious work." Here we should lay stress on Mr. Young's parenthesis, and ask if indeed his evidences addressed from Scripture can in any sense be called indirect. They are so in relation to the mere title of his theme, *The Witness of the Spirit.* But as to the theme itself the passages he adduces are to our mind the very thing he means. Perhaps the all-pervasive character of the Spirit's revelation to the soul of "the things freely given" in the whole estate of grace is not sufficiently dwelt upon in the lecture:

not that the passages are wanting; but a deeper impression of the largeness and breadth of this Christian blessing might have been left on the mind, as against a certain narrowness of conception which tends in some minds to limit it to the attestation of adoption. But we are arrested by a passage which carries our heart with it and disarms criticism: "What if . . . . what even . . . . would any one of these revelations, would all of them put together, compare for one moment with the revelation to his own inner heart of God's love to *him*? 'Tell me,' cried Jacob to his antagonist, as he strove with him till the breaking of the day, 'Tell *me*, I pray thee, thy name'" "In that impassioned demand for a personal revelation of God to his soul, he represented the intensest yearning of the human heart, and anticipated the promise which the Mediator of the better covenant made to His followers, and which in the gift of the Holy Spirit He has gloriously fulfilled."

The three leading terms of the phraseology of the doctrine are Witness, Witness with, and Assurance. With the first Mr. Young really begins and ends, as it is the final testimony of St. John; the cardinal passage of the New Testament. "He that believeth on the Son of God hath the witness in himself" is the first passage, as it were unconsciously quoted as such; after a while the "reflective interpretation" is briefly but well vindicated; and towards the close the words are again brought in with remarkable effect. But the next edition must have a note on this most important text: one which to us appears to be itself the final and sealing testimony of Scripture to the nature of all spiritual testimony, evidence, assurance, and certitude. As to the "witness with," we think the lecturer has not left that question in the same clear light as he throws round most other questions. He has indeed laid us under obligation by the catena of expository notes. But his conclusion does not make strong enough the connection between adoption and regeneration in relation to this subject. We are not quite sure that the difference between what is commonly called the inferential witness of our own spirit is sufficiently distinguished from that witness of our regenerate spirit *as* regenerate to which St. Paul seems to refer. "There can be little question as to the antecedency of the Divine Witness or the witness of our spirit." This is certainly true as to the inferential evidence of the fruits of the Spirit to which Mr. Wesley alludes when he says: "We must be holy in heart and life before we can be conscious that we are so; before we can have the testimony of our spirit that we are inwardly and outwardly holy." But the question is whether the new life of regeneration does not bear its own witness to its own life. We think it does; and that with *this* witness the Spirit of adoption conspires and concurs. The inferential evidences—of which conscience reinstated is the arbiter

—seems to us an altogether different matter. But this must be left to our lecturer. As to the testimony of adoption producing the regenerate life, we must fall back on Mr. Young's honest doubt: "This statement is not, perhaps, entirely free from objection," omitting the "perhaps."

The question of assurance is of course very prominent. The lecturer uses the word everywhere, so that we are not to suppose that he is really opposed to it in his heart; though he may adopt Mr. Wesley's language spoken "for the present distress" when pressed by Calvinistic perversion. We cannot enter on the subject here, but must be content with one observation: that while the verb holds its ground in the New Testament with the meaning "being fully persuaded," the noun is safe enough with the meaning "assurance." That is to say, where the blessings of salvation are in question, and especially where faith is concerned. Abraham was "fully assured," and his faith had its "full assurance:" the only "full accomplishment" or "fulness" of faith is its being fully persuaded. We may contend about the assurance "of hope" or "of understanding;" but the verb is a sufficient protection for "faith." However, we leave this to the lecturer's consideration, feeling some degree of confidence that he will hold the evidence with a still more partial hand than he shows even now.

But we must leave the lecture to our readers, feeling sure that they, with us, will be deeply thankful to Mr. Young for this reverent, dignified, almost exhaustive, and altogether edifying contribution to our literature.

The Completion of Meyer's Commentaries.

Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament. By Heinrich August Wilhelm Meyer, Th.D., Oberconsistorialrath, Hanover. From the German, with the sanction of the Author. The Epistle to the Hebrews. By Dr. Gottlieb Lünemann. The Epistles of James and John. By Dr. J. E. Huther. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 38, George Street. 1882.

With these two volumes the series of the Meyer Commentaries closes. The volumes themselves are an important addition to our exegetical literature, as the Epistle to the Hebrews and the Epistle of St. James are precisely the parts of the New Testament which our own expositors have left comparatively untouched. Dr. Lünemann's volume is one of great value, especially as he has himself corrected it up to the highest point, and brought it to the level of the most recent literature on the subject. The work of Dr. Huther on St. James will be found exceedingly interesting, not only as an admirable piece of exegetical skill, but as exhi-

biting most clearly the relation of Lutheran dogmatics to the epistle. We have seldom opened and read volumes more stimulating and attractive. To this effect the translators have largely contributed.

To one at least of these commentaries we shall return, and deal with it at more length. Meanwhile, we are bound to pay our final tribute to the series as a whole. In doing this we can only repeat what has been said again and again. No other commentary known to us renders Meyer's superfluous. There are some points on which the reader must be on his guard—points which have been noted before as affecting the doctrine of a plenary inspiration and authority in every part of the canonical New Testament. As to the fundamentals of the faith delivered in the New Testament—more particularly the objective and subjective Reconciliation—Meyer is a safer guide than most of his fellows, whether in Germany or in England. Where this great master, in fact, appears to greatest advantage is precisely in those parts of the New Testament where soundness of exposition is most vital. On the doctrine of the atonement and justification, as of sin and its penalty, and salvation present and future, there is no expositor who leads his reader with a firmer hand. The student who is sufficiently well grounded to appreciate and profit by Meyer's philological and grammatical learning will have in his volumes a great treasure; he will find in his pages almost all the advantage of a living master in New-Testament Greek. It is with sincere gratitude to Messrs. Clark that we congratulate them on their perseverance and the reward of it. Their "reward," we say; for it is to them a reward that they have been able to give the public this most important work. Another kind of reward we trust they have had, and will have, in the extensive patronage of their enterprise. The close of the undertaking will test the gratitude of the theological world. Those who have had the former volumes will of course finish their set; but we hope that the entire series will be secured by very many who have held aloof during its progress. Doubtless Messrs. Clark will do their best to place the entire work within the reach of all kinds of students. We can honestly tell those students that their expository library will not be complete without it; and will repeat what was said above, that no other exposition of the New Testament, and no collection of monographs—which is saying a great deal—will render Meyer needless or superfluous.

The Parallel New Testaments.

In every variety of form we have the two versions laid before us side by side. It would be superfluous either to praise the University presses or to dilate on the value of the book to the

student. Surely no student will be without such an assistance in reading the Scripture, and we believe the time will come when the Parallel New Testaments will be the familiar companions of the people at large, whether in their private reading or in the house of God. Especially, however, would we remind the student of the immense advantage he will find in the volume offered to him containing the new text of the Greek Testament on one side and the two versions on the other. These we have seen only in one size; but we hope, for the sake of many, that somehow or other the beautiful larger Greek Testament, published at the Clarendon Press, will be sent out with the English versions appended. If it required two volumes, we are sure the public would show their appreciation and indemnify the publishers. The Clarendon Press especially has been most vigorous in its efforts to consult the public convenience. We are deeply thankful to its Syndicate and Mr. Frowde.

Dale's Epistle to the Ephesians.

The Epistle to the Ephesians: Its Doctrine and its Ethics. By R. W. Dale, M.A. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1882.

This volume is a most welcome illustration of that "intellectual interest in the Christian revelation," the decline of which during the last century and a half Mr. Dale regards as an explanation in part of the present languor of the religious life of the Church, and of the lack "of audacity and of vehemence" in Christian enterprise. The actual state of the Church of the nineteenth century is not perhaps so unsatisfactory as Mr. Dale assumes it to be. In no age have the Sacred Scriptures, and more particularly the New Testament documents, attracted more scholarly interest and been the subjects of a closer critical investigation. It is true that "critical questions and questions of apologetics lie on the extreme edge of the territory of Christian thought," and that the subsidiary aids which scholarship has furnished to the illustration of the New Testament narratives render "very little service in apprehending the substance of the Christian revelation." But the labours of the past fifty years have not by any means been confined to subjects remote from "the central and inspiring elements of the Christian Gospel." The "vivid intellectual interest" which Paul exhibited in regard to the truth which he preached is not faintly reflected in the theological masters of to-day. And not the least hopeful of the signs of the times is the fact that, in one of the busiest and most utilitarian centres of English life a congregation can be found which listens with unabated interest, from Sunday to Sunday, to such lectures on doctrine and ethics as the volume before us contains.

The Epistle to the Ephesians, of which Coleridge speaks as "the divinest composition of man," has somewhat of an encyclical character, which gives it a more general interest than any other of St. Paul's Epistles. Approaching to no particular section of the Church, and protesting against no specific heresy, it sets forth the doctrines of Christian faith and practice as a whole. No Epistle of St. Paul offers so wide and so varied a field of sacred study. In selecting this Epistle as the basis of exposition Mr. Dale has had the advantage of being able to deal with all the main doctrines of the faith.

These lectures, as the preface reminds us, were delivered to a popular audience. They do not, therefore, profess to touch those grammatical and logical difficulties with which the Epistle abounds. Mr. Dale rarely ventures on textual criticism. He treats rather the fundamental doctrines and the practical morality of the Epistle with a freshness and vigour which prove that his audience must be accustomed to "strong meat" as well as to "the sincere milk of the word." Some passages, he tells us, "suggested by the obligation of the pastor rather than of the expositor," have been omitted—an omission to be regretted—yet there is throughout the lectures an undercurrent of suggestion and appeal to the conscience and to the convictions of the thoughtful which cannot fail to tell.

The table of contents would lead to the assumption that the lecturer was a pronounced and devoted Arminian. In truth, Calvinism meets with little mercy at his hands. To him the predestinarian theory of the Westminster divines "is not the theory of St. Paul." The Calvinistic creed, "so hard, so severe, so intolerable," involves "the gravest slanders both on the Divine justice and on the Divine love." All are "among the non-elect" until they are elect in Christ. Yet, repudiating all sympathy with their creed, his estimate of the Calvinists is as true and philosophical as it is generous. "Their most extravagant and daring and appalling statements concerning the Divine predestination of the lost to dishonour, wrath, and everlasting death were but the endeavour of devout men, who were filled with immeasurable wonder and thankfulness by their own salvation, to translate into a theological system their professed conviction that they had no stronger claim on the mercy of God than any of those who had been condemned to eternal destruction, and that their salvation was to be ascribed, and ascribed without reserve, to the unsearchable riches of God's grace." Again: "Of the two extremes—the suppression of man, which was the offence of Calvinism, and the suppression of God, which was the offence against which Calvinism so fiercely protested—the fault and error of Calvinism was the nobler and grander."

In dealing with purely doctrinal topics Mr. Dale is as happy as

he is clear and forcible. Affirming, for instance, his conviction, "without venturing into the lofty and perhaps perilous inquiries suggested by the Athanasian Creed—that the Sonship of the earthly Christ has its foundation and root in relations eternally existing in the Godhead," he proceeds to say that "though the eternal relationship between Christ and the Father cannot belong to us . . . all who are one with Christ share the blessedness, the security, and the honour of that relationship; and the life of Christ, which has its eternal foundations in the life of God, is theirs." On the doctrine of Regeneration and the Witness of the Spirit, Mr. Dale's teaching gives no "uncertain sound." "The simplest and most obvious account of regeneration is the truest. When a man is regenerated he receives a new life and receives it from God. In itself, regeneration is not a change in his old life, but the beginning of a new life, which is conferred by the immediate and supernatural act of the Holy Spirit." "The soul is conscious of a Divine freedom." "By giving them the Holy Spirit God has set His seal upon them, and given them the assurance that they were His." In a profoundly beautiful and thoughtful lecture on "Redemption through His blood," Mr. Dale thus summarises the doctrine of the Atonement:—"The death of Christ was an act of submission on behalf of mankind to the justice of the penalties of violating the eternal law of righteousness, an act in which our own submission not only received a transcendent expression but was really and virtually included; it was an act which secured the destruction of sin in all who through faith are restored to union with Christ; it was an act in which there was a revelation of the righteousness of God which must otherwise have been revealed in the infliction of the penalty of sin on the human race." At the close of the lecture, as though confessing the precariousness of human definitions and the possible incorrectness of his own conclusions, he adds:—"Although no theory of the relation between the death of Christ and the forgiveness of sin may afford us intellectual satisfaction, and though there are times and moods in the life of most of us when the greatness and sacredness of the mystery seem to forbid as irreverent and profane all attempts to speculate on the manner in which His death accomplished its great redemptive purposes, we may still receive with awe and wonder, with faith and hope and immeasurable joy, the blessed assurance that He 'suffered for sins once, the righteous for the unrighteous, that He might bring us to God,' and that 'we have our redemption through His blood, the forgiveness of our trespasses, according to the riches of (God's) grace.'"

The purely doctrinal sections of these lectures do not monopolise all that is original or beautiful in them. There are many striking passages, which cannot but arrest the reader. Such, for instance,

is the passage in which Mr. Dale defines a saint:—"A saint, a consecrated man, according to the Apostolic conception, is one whom God has set apart for Himself. The act of consecration is God's act, not ours. Our part is subordinate and secondary. . . . The common conception is precisely the reverse of this, and precisely the reverse of the truth. It begins with a human volition instead of a Divine volition. It makes the act of consecration a human act instead of a Divine act. . . . The Apostolic idea was far more profound. . . . The theology of this Epistle obliged him to rest the idea of sanctity, not on the shifting sands of human volition, but on the eternal foundations of the Divine love." Another passage, which, if not conveying a new idea, enshrines an old one in a beautiful form, may be quoted as a timely contribution to the teaching which these days demand. "The power of benediction, which belongs to the commonalty of the Church, and not to Church officers only, is a beautiful illustration of the true ideal of the Christian life. We dwell in Christ and Christ in us. It is a superstitious and most ruinous falsehood to tell men to reverence the real presence of Christ in the consecrated wafer with the lamp burning before it in the silent church. His real presence, according to His own teaching, is to be found in the common life and activity of every Christian man. His real presence is to be found in the Christian tradesman at his counter, the Christian clerk at his desk, the Christian mechanic at his bench, the Christian mother among her children. Christ is really present in the Christian physician going through the wards of a hospital, in the Christian barrister pleading in court, in the Christian statesman contending in Parliament for justice and peace. When we pity human suffering our pity is made more tender by Christ's compassion; when we struggle against injustice and tyranny the fires of our indignation are kindled and made more vehement by Christ's infinite hatred of unrighteousness." A passage on hereditary vice will probably convey to some minds a new and consolatory thought:—"By a beneficent law it seems as if this awful accumulation of hereditary vice is soon arrested. The race grossly infected with hereditary corruption soon dies out. Experience verifies the truth of the ancient words that the iniquities of the fathers may be visited on their children to the third and even to the fourth generation, but there the entail ceases, the race perishes; but the entail of manly virtue, of sobriety, of industry, of piety, is not cut off; the mercy descends through thousands of generations of them that love God and keep His commandments."

We had marked several other passages for quotation, notably one on controversy "as one of the highest and fairest expressions of charity," and one of special vigour on the ignoble and fatal policy of dwelling "on the external and incidental benefits which

follow the acceptance of the Christian gospel" as an inspiration to evangelical enterprise. And we should have been glad if the space at our disposal had allowed us to cite in full a passage worthy of very grave study in these days of abnormal religious demonstration, a passage affirming the principle that "the real force and depth of every religious movement" may be measured by "the greatness of its conception of God." Irreverence is the natural issue of a low conception of God, and the next step is Infidelity.

It seems almost ungracious to hint that a volume which has given us so much pleasure and satisfaction has some deficiencies. We cannot, of course, accept Mr. Dale's eschatological views, though they are kept in the background. To us it seems questionable, too, that "a man who has been accustomed to lie through cowardice does not at once (on his conversion) become courageous enough to be always perfectly truthful." And we cannot but regret that the grand subject of the Fatherhood of God has not received the treatment which in a course of lectures on the Epistle to the Ephesians we should have expected. The theme of the Epistle is adoption in Christ, as predetermined by God from all eternity. Of him every family or fatherhood (πατρία) in Heaven and earth is named. Everywhere, throughout the Epistle, the origin and foundation of the Church is assigned to the will of the Father. The teaching of the Epistle is summarised by the Apostle in words which give to the Father the pre-eminence:—"One body, one Spirit, one hope, one Lord, one faith, one God and Father of all, who is over all, and through all, and in all." But on the whole Mr. Dale's work is strong, healthy, and most timely. It is characterised by great vigour of thought, originality, and beauty. It is a most valuable contribution to the theological literature of the day, and no man can read it without forming a purer, broader, and more Catholic conception of the Christian Faith.

Bruce's Parabolic Teaching of Christ.

The Parabolic Teaching of Christ. A Systematic and Critical Study of the Parables of our Lord. By Alexander Balmain Bruce, D.D., Professor of Apologetics and New Testament Exegesis, Free Church College, Glasgow. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1882.

Of recent English contributions to the literature of the Parables, the greater part consists of works of a devotional or homiletical character. And there has long been wanted an elaborate and systematic study of the subject, embracing the conclusions of advanced textual scholarship, and pursued in adherence to some

other than the allegorical method of exegesis. That want Dr. Bruce may fairly claim to have met. He constructs the texts of the various parables by use of his own critical acumen, and, wherever different readings are adopted from those of the Revised Version, defends his choice by the addition of generally valuable notes. His predecessors in the same field, and the best of modern commentators, are steadily kept in view, but there is no disposition either to parade authorities, or to encumber his pages by quoting opinions for the sole purpose of assailing them. The drapery and background of a parable are never brought into undue prominence, and are never left without due attention to whatsoever matters of interest or difficulty may be connected with them. The habit, indulged in of late to excess by not a few writers, of seeking illustration or amusement in the Rabbinical comments is followed when any real good can thereby be served, but otherwise avoided. The style of the writing is graphic and spirited, and the tone consistently reverent and devout. And the book ought to be in the library of every student of the New Testament as an inseparable companion of Trench—the one as the best allegorical treatment of the subject in English, and the other as the best historical and apologetic treatment.

Into the merits of the various methods of interpreting the parables that have been adopted by different expositors it is needless to enter. Each system will have its special adherents, and probably no system can be of such solitary excellence as to deserve to be followed to the neglect of the others. There is, however, much truth in Dr. Bruce's position, that the primary meaning of a parable cannot, except casually, disclose itself to one who regards it from any other than the historical point of view. The spiritualising method is always open to the double charge of fancifulness and of frigidity, whilst the endeavour to transform all the details of a parable into their theological equivalents under the didactic method can be carried out with little certainty, and often results in the emphasis of truths that were not designed to be prominent. The best course for a student of the parables to take is probably, in the first place, to confine himself strictly to the incidents of each little story in their connection one with another, and to the circumstances which provoked its utterance, and only afterwards to concern himself with the dogmatic and mystic interpretations to which it yields. In the latter part of his work some other guide than Dr. Bruce must be engaged, but in the former a better guide can hardly be desired.

Another feature of this book is the classification of the parables under general heads. Most expositors, deterred it may be from such an attempt by Greswell's signal failure, have taken the parables in the order in which they occur in the several Gospels. Dr. Bruce justly complains of the casual character of that arrange-

ment, and finds what he considers to be a key to their right classification in the triple division of Christ's teaching ministry. "Christ was a Master or Rabbi, with disciples whom He made it His business to instruct; He was an Evangelist, going about doing good among the common people, and preaching the gospel of the kingdom to the poor; and He was a Prophet, not merely or chiefly in the predictive sense of the word, but specially in the sense that He was one who proclaimed in the hearing of His contemporaries the great truth of the moral government of God over the world at large, and over Israel in particular, and the sure doom of the impenitent under that righteous government." Accordingly the parables may be conveniently and usefully distributed into three groups, styled respectively theoretic, evangelic, and prophetic. Those of the first group enunciate general truths concerning the kingdom of God, whilst those of the second emphasise Divine grace as the source of salvation and the law of Christian life, and in the remaining group the righteousness of God, as the Supreme Ruler and Judge, rewarding according to works, becomes most conspicuous. A somewhat similar classification is recommended by Lange and Plumptre, and, though not without faults, is to be preferred above such others as have heretofore been suggested. One fault, which Dr. Bruce does not fail to notice, is the difficulty of deciding under which of two categories a parable which partakes of the nature of both should be ranged. That of the Great Supper, for instance, is both an evangelic and a prophetic parable, and cannot be rigorously considered under one aspect without the loss of much of its primary meaning. And there are one or two parables, such as that of the Rich Fool, which cannot well be brought at all within such a scheme of distribution. To say, as Dr. Bruce does, that they are "of no independent didactic importance," but simply moral commonplaces in a concrete and lively form, is not a valid reason for excluding them from a systematic treatise on the parabolical teaching of Christ, but rather an indication of some deficiency in the system. And consequently the proposed classification must be placed alongside some of our recent scientific hypotheses, as good for working purposes, but as neither altogether satisfactory nor final. In some further respects also this book is worthy of all admiration. The distinction, so often overlooked, between the teaching of a parable and what Dr. Bruce well calls its felicity, is carefully and constantly kept in view. No difficulties of interpretation are avoided, or arbitrarily settled in the absence of sufficient information for decision. But Dr. Bruce's wise custom under such circumstances is to represent the various opinions in their strength and weakness, and after indicating the conclusion, if there be one, to which the balance of opinion points, to pass on. It is not to be expected that all his amendments of the text or

expositions of the narrative will equally commend themselves to his readers. There are, for example, few things in the volume more beautiful or of higher spiritual tone than the interpretation of the Blade, the Ear, and the Full Corn; but the principle of the parable is confined chiefly in its application to religious experience, whereas its bearing upon Christian service is even more direct. That there was no consciousness of justification in the case of the publican is rendered very unlikely by the word "exalted" in our Saviour's exhibition of the moral of the parable, whilst on the other hand it is questionable whether it is possible for a hypocrite to be wholly unconscious of his hypocrisy. The exposition of the Unjust Steward again seems to imply the commendation of a purely selfish motive, as though the moral were, "Spend your wealth upon the poor simply in order that they may repay you by welcoming you into the everlasting tents," which is directly against other advice of Christ's. And in the parable of Dives and Lazarus, Dr. Bruce appears to regard the passage across "the great gulf" as difficult, but not as impossible, which sense is not clearly and obviously contained in the words. But when allowance is made for these and a few other matters, concerning which Dr. Bruce's views do not command immediate assent, the very high excellence of his work must still be acknowledged. It is probably on the whole the best book upon the Parables that has yet appeared.

Hanna's Our Lord's Life on Earth.

Our Lord's Life on Earth. By the Rev. William Hanna, D.D., LL.D. London: The Religious Tract Society.

This volume contains the matter of the six volumes by Dr. Hanna, which have had so large a sale in their separate form. As there is no mention of abridgment, we take it that there has been none. We are told in the prefatory note, "It may interest the readers of this volume to know that its publication, in its present shape, was the last literary work which occupied Dr. Hanna's attention. Only a few days before his death he expressed, to the officers of the Religious Tract Society, his earnest desire that the volume might be issued in such a form and at such a price as to be within the reach of the largest possible number of readers." But apart from the interest of such a circumstance, the volume deserves the warmest welcome for its own sake. The public has here in a handy form, and at a moderate price, spiritual reading of the highest possible type, alike in matter and style. All controversy and criticism are most rigidly excluded. The inimitable story is told with perfect simplicity, and yet the simplicity is evidently that of a scholar. Not a sentence or a word is trite or commonplace. The writer had evidently not merely read but

lived himself into the theme; and the calm, the dignity, the sacredness brooding over the pages seem to come less from the writer than the theme, perhaps we should rather say from both. Those who are tired of Lives of the Life, in which that most holy ground is made the battle-field of rival theories and schools, will turn with pleasure to a writer who takes as his model (none would acknowledge more sincerely than himself, an unapproachable model) the Evangelists themselves. The most unlettered Christian will understand and appreciate everything that is here said. The scholarly Christian will not fail to detect everywhere the touches of a master. The republication in the present form of such a work is indeed a happy thought and a priceless boon.

Leathes' Foundations of Morality.

The Foundations of Morality: being Discourses on the Ten Commandments, with Special Reference to their Origin and Authority. By the Rev. Stanley Leathes, D.D., Prebendary of St. Paul's, &c. Hodder and Stoughton. 1882.

This is no mere volume of sermons on the Decalogue. A series of sermons it undoubtedly is, and the texts are chiefly taken from Exodus xx., some few being added from the New Testament. The expository and hortatory elements, too, are not wanting, some of the appeals which the discourses contain being very direct and searching to the conscience. Nevertheless, these are not the main features of the volume, and it would be unfair to the author to view his work chiefly from this point of view, and find, as we should be compelled to do, much lacking upon this side of his subject. Readers need not seek in this volume minute and thorough ethical analysis, or copious application of the principles of the Ten Commandments to the sins and needs of to-day. This work they may find much better done elsewhere.

But the author has addressed himself, as his title and preface show, to one special problem, and has subordinated other considerations to one special aim. He considers the Ten Commandments "with special reference to their origin and authority." These Commandments being accepted as the basis of moral and social life in the most civilised nations of the world, he asks, Why is this? "Why do their enactments and prohibitions receive the common consent and acquiescence of mankind? Is there any reason why they should not be repudiated? Can we be sure that this common acquiescence will not be withheld after a time? And if not, why not?" And, upon the fact of this common consent and acquiescence, he seeks to build an argument—first for their Divine authority, then for the supernatural cha-

racter of the revelation made to Israel of old, and in its time of the Christian religion. The chief aim of the book, then, is evidential, and Dr. Leathes' previous work in this important field prepares us to find, as we do find, a thoughtful, fair, and carefully reasoned contribution to the Apologetics of the day, from the side of morality. Almost simultaneously with the publishing of this book, Dr. Leathes read a paper at the Church Congress, bearing the title, "The Dependence of Morality upon Revelation," the scope of which was similar to the outlined argument of this volume. The subject is therefore one which he evidently considers, and rightly in our judgment, to be one of great importance just now: "The practical testing of these principles is virtually the problem of the day," as he himself says. The following is a brief sketch of his position, phrased, for the most part, in his own words, as gathered here and there from these discourses.

The Ten Commandments, it is generally admitted, are in such accord with the constitution and requirements of society, that the attempt to reject them would be fatal to society itself. Here is, therefore, a very significant indication that these precepts have a binding force which can only arise from their proceeding from the same origin as society itself, *i.e.*, one responsible for the constitution of society. If the constitution of society is moral in its basis, the moral law is a witness to a Mind and Will enunciating it, a moral Will and Governor. Hence this law is based upon the self-revelation of a Person, is indeed itself so far a self-revelation of a Person, and the commandments which have reference to the constitution of society are preceded by commandments which have exclusive reference to Him who has a right to say, Thou shalt not. Hence the claims of morality form a valid basis for the ultimate foundation of the evidences of religion. The phenomena which attended the delivery and subsequent history of the moral law shut us up to the acknowledgment of the presence and operation of the supernatural. The answer to the question, Why is right, right? is, Because it is in accordance with God's will, and His will must be right. It is not right because He has arbitrarily declared it, but He has declared it because it is right, and right is that which corresponds to His nature.

For example, in dealing with the Seventh Commandment, which the author says forms a better illustration than the Sixth or Eighth, because society may more easily arrive at fixed principles in the matter of human life and personal property than in regard to family arrangements, Dr. Leathes frames his appeal thus:—If we repudiate the restrictions of this commandment as *Divine*, and do not borrow from the sanctions of the Christian religion, can we maintain morality at this elevation? So far as experience has gone, we might predict total failure to any such

experiment. If God has not prescribed a right and wrong in such matters, who has? The prescription of society is historically variable, and worth nothing. Can we find a standard in ourselves? Who is it that makes right and wrong? And if it does not vary with the individual, how can there be any common authoritative standard which does not point to a person? "We are led, therefore, as before, to discern in the 'Thou shalt not' a witness to the presence of a Person who not only commands, but has also authority to do so; and it is this conception which alone seems adequate to account for the general witness there is in humanity to the consciousness of a right and a wrong, however vague and undecided it may be, while it alone supplies the definite standard of authority and direction which the nature and constitution of society so imperatively demand. It is God and God only who has laid the foundations of the family deep and broad, and made the restrictions incidental to it the safeguard and preservation of society" (p. 175).

A similar line of argument, though naturally loftier in its tone as it is loftier in its subject-matter, is pursued as the author passes from Moses to Christ, from Sinai to Calvary. If the requirements of the law are perfect love, the very renunciation of those requirements, if Divine, contains the promise of their fulfilment. None but the Lawgiver could fulfil them, and He who most unfolded the spiritual requirements of the law gave the most perfect exhibition of their fulfilment. "The cross must ever challenge to itself the right to be regarded as a superhuman and Divine exhibition of love. All interpretation of it is inadequate which pronounces it to be merely human. But if the merit of the cross is Divine, what is the essential character of that law which it vindicates, confirms, establishes, and illustrates? Can it be other than Divine? . . . . Thus not only does the cross of Christ exhibit in itself a Divine act, but it shows also how profound, how sacred, how Divine is the origin, and therefore how absolute and universal is the authority of the law which it illustrates and fulfils. And as the cross of Christ is the triumph, symbol, and exponent of religion, its very essence, root, and kernel, its foundation and its crown, so that in beholding the cross of Christ we behold the evidence and demonstration of the truth of religion, the depth and stability of its foundation as a Divine gift to man, so in the cross of Christ we see as we can see nowhere else, that the foundation of religion is the foundation also of morality, that the moral law is based on nothing else than that foundation on which religion also rests, so that if there be no morality there can be no religion; and likewise, if there be no Divine evidence of, no Divine truth in, religion, there can also be no Divine authority in, no Divine sanction for, the moral law; but the one common foundation on which both alike rest

is overthrown, and universal moral ruin is the inevitable result" (pp. 229-231).

With the main argument of this book we need hardly say we are thoroughly in accord, and are thankful for so clear and able an exposition of the vital connection between morality and religion. It is a lesson which a generation much needs which accounts Herbert Spencer's *Data of Ethics* its guide, and produces Mr. Leslie Stephen's *Science of Ethics* as a consummate fruit of its meditations upon these matters. It is a lesson which we devoutly trust will not have to be learned by bitter experience, that morality apart from religion loses its only *adequate* explanation, its main authority, its most powerful motives, and its most awful sanctions. Men must, indeed, learn that they cannot separate the ethics of Christianity from its doctrine, or idly suppose that a generation which has been taught to scorn the theology of the Bible will, with vigour and tenacity, maintain the standard of its inviolable purity. A man in theological perplexity does well to hold fast by morality, at least till he gains more light; but he must beware of being satisfied, as too many try to persuade themselves they are, with what is but a plank to hold by in a welter-ing sea, till he can gain shipboard. And all who show, as Dr. Leathes has here done, and Professor Wace even more fully in his *Boyle Lectures*, the essentially *personal* character of true morality, how it necessarily implies, and is based upon, relation to a Personal Being, are doing good service indeed.

We should hesitate, however, to adopt our author's broadest conclusions. We italicised the word "adequate" above, believing, as we do, that the moral law written upon the conscience cannot be rightly, fully, thoroughly understood, without our acknowledging a Divine Lawgiver. But we should hesitate to say, as Professor Leathes does, "Take away the personal authority of the law, and you take away the law itself; for it becomes no longer a law but an induction, a creation of the mind and subject to the mind creating it." The full authority of the law is indeed impaired, its claim fails to be fully understood, but its demands remain still, the constitution of our nature remains, and more than an "induction" remains, which has undoubtedly a *binding* force, such as is neither the creation of our minds nor subject to our minds. Why weaken the *obligations* of morality in itself, because we think these logically and legitimately lead to religion? "Destroy the foundations of religion," we read again, "and you have destroyed that which is the basis also of morality, and it will be as impossible for morality to last as it will be for a tree to live of which the tap-root is cut" (Pref., p. viii.). The latter part of this sentence is a prophecy with which we may probably agree, but the figure implied in the former part should not lead us to imagine that belief in a personal God is the only foundation of morality.

God has fixed its bonds in the very constitution of our nature, has there "not left Himself without witness." In nature as well as in the supernatural is His impress, and we must not, in our zeal for religion, our perfect conviction of its necessity, if even the lower requirements of morality are to be *adequately* met, remove any of those bonds with which God has bound us, remove any of those foundations which He has established. There is a light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world, as well as a God who spoke amid the lightnings of Sinai, and a Light of the World incarnate. In vindicating the claims of the supernatural we are wise not to depreciate the obligations, authority, and just demands of the natural. Professor Leathes follows Butler in "using the word nature in a very high and sacred sense, as the very root or foundation principle upon which our moral being is constituted." The vindication of this, even apart from the direct acknowledgment of an Author of Nature, is valuable, and to enforce the *obligation* thus entailed, independently of the personal obligations of religion, is not to cast morality adrift from its true moorings, but to fasten it by another cable, independently of that which religious men think the strongest and best.

In all this we feel sure our author would agree, but the strength of some of his expressions, and the manifestation of a tendency never long quite absent from apologetics, made us judge a caveat necessary. We heartily thank the author of this interesting volume for one more valuable contribution to the Evidences of Religion.

Fitzgerald's Self-Consciousness.

An Essay on the Philosophy of Self-Consciousness, containing an Analysis of Reason and the Rationale of Love. By P. F. Fitzgerald. Trübner. 1882.

The purport of this book may be thus stated in the author's own words. "What I profess to have done, therefore, is to have been the first to show that intelligence or understanding is of the Ego, or self-conscious subject, and that from this understanding of Being, *per se*, which is directly known to us, from the feeling of our relation to other beings, we have the idea of relativity, and that from the feeling of power and the ability to resolve, or tendency, or self-determination for the good for Being, we have the idea of action being for the good for Being, and also the idea of Being itself; for all concepts are of persons or of things, of Being or Existence in its modifications through relativity and tendency." The titles of the three parts into which the book is divided are—Part I. An Analysis of Reason; Being the Source of Conception. Part II. Rationale of Love; Relativity of Being the Source of

Love or Attraction. Part III. Tendency or Desire for the Good for Being the Source of Morality, or the Desire for the Universally Good. The writer takes, as the basis of his remarks rather than arguments, what he calls the "triformity of thought," thus defined (p. 11). "Thought is a process comprising three distinct acts of the mind: perception, apprehension, and comprehension, which, taken together, constitute the idea, Begsipp, intelligence. These three acts proceed from three great principles or sources of action. Our own being is such, we are so constituted that we are forced to conceive or mentally represent a Sufficient, Efficient, and Final Cause for every event and for every thing, by reason of our being conscious of such causation in our own being." Based upon this, we have the following remarkable classification of the sciences:—First, the Physical, those which have their source in the Principle of Efficient Causation; secondly, the moral sciences, in the Principle of Final Cause; thirdly, "Ontology, zoology, and botany have their source in the Principle of Sufficient Cause, because these sciences have Being itself, spiritual Being or material existence, for their subject-matter!" This section contains, however, curiously intermixed with extracts from different authors, some apt and pointed remarks on the reigning Associational School of Psychologists, and thoughts which would well repay clearer statement and fuller development than they here receive. "We are conscious of ourselves as powers, or causes, intelligent, emotional, and moral, or as powers existing, related and acting naturally for the good for Being, or for the maintenance of the integrity of spiritual Being. And as in reflection, or introspection, or retrospective analysis of the Ego in the categorisation of its manifestations in feeling, thought, and will, or self-determination for the good for Being, the subject or Ego becomes *to us* an object of consideration like any other object, a Sufficient, Efficient, and Final Cause is necessarily and equally to be inferred and assumed for the existence or being of the Ego, as for that of any other object, a Creator, Preserver, and ever-to-be depended upon Benefactor, as the necessarily or reasonably assumed source of a powerful, related, and benevolent being" (p. 37).

The second part is a curious mixture of rhapsody with half-worked-out thoughts awkwardly expressed. Whole pages are occupied with quotations on the subject of Love. The idea of so using quotations is borrowed, we are told, from Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy*, and is certainly marred in the borrowing. Shakespeare (printed as prose) and Apuleius, Canon Liddon and "Persian Poet," French riddles, Arthur Sullivan, and the Song of Solomon strangely confront one another in these pages without connecting word, the object of such miscellaneous heaping together of sentences and parts of sentences being "to show that the subjective sense of completeness or fulness of Being corresponds with

the objective ideal of perfection of Being." After which the author proceeds to "contradict a popular fallacy on the subject of conjugal love."

We gather that the form and arrangement of the book are not the author's own, and that a friend has largely supplemented the written matter in his hands from *viva voce* utterances. We presume that the following is an example of a "*viva voce* utterance" (the sentences before and after it having not the slightest connection with it in meaning), "Being recognises Being." "*Homo mensura* (of conception) *Protagoras.* Relatively of conception to individual Being." We trust our readers are edified by this extract copied carefully from page 176.

We need say no more. The aim of the book is good; some thoughts, especially in the first part, are sound, and if clearly stated and worked out in opposition to current materialistic beliefs would be valuable; but the ideas are often crudely conceived, awkwardly expressed, and the book is so cumbered with heaps of ill-digested thoughts of other people as to be anything but pleasant or profitable reading. We only add, that we have noted a large number of printer's errors in a volume of less than 200 pages.

Gostwick's German Culture and Christianity.

German Culture and Christianity: their Controversy in the Time 1770-1880. By Joseph Gostwick. London: Frederic Norgate.

The present volume embraces the whole history of German Rationalism from its apparently insignificant rise, through its portentous development, to its culmination in Strauss. There are some periods and movements which possess an exhaustless fascination for the reader. It is thus with the French Revolution. However often and variously treated, it always presents itself under new aspects, and suggests new lessons. Similar interest will attach hereafter to the great religious and philosophical movement described in this volume. As yet it has scarcely begun to be estimated as a whole. Men have been busy discussing single phases, and refuting single errors. The filiation of the several parts, and the bearing of the whole have scarcely been thought of. One merit of Mr. Gostwick's performance is, that he brings into view this natural succession. The blending of philosophy and religion is also a remarkable feature in the history of German thought. One might wonder what business names like Lessing and Goethe have in a work of this kind. Englishmen are accustomed to draw a sharp line of distinction between the two fields. Perhaps the German instinct is nearer

to the truth. No difficulty, no error has ever emerged in one field, which has not its counterpart in the other. While the two spheres are not co-extensive, they have much in common. Hence the necessity for their contemporaneous cultivation. Lessing, Jacobi, Goethe, Schiller, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, while properly philosophers, had a most potent influence on religious thought. Another attraction in the subject is the thought that the cycle of error is past. We see speculation after speculation, dream after dream, rise and disappear. It is in the highest degree improbable that the same theories can be propounded again. What new theories may spring from the boundless ingenuity of the human intellect, it is impossible to say. At all events the world has done with the theories whose history is recorded here. They have been tried and found wanting. Our satisfaction in the review is akin to the feeling of comfort with which a mother recounts the story of her children's ills, conscious as she is that there is no danger of a return. In Strauss scepticism has run to earth, touched its lowest point. Every movement now must be upward.

Mr. Gostwick does well to call attention to the fact, that the whole system of German Rationalism took its rise in the English Deism of the last century. The incipient Rationalism of the English school was swamped by the rising tide of religious faith initiated by the Evangelical revival. Transplanted to France and Germany, it met with no counteractive force, and there bore its baleful fruit to perfection. Much of the responsibility of the French Revolution, and still more of the responsibility of German Rationalism, lies at the door of English Deism. Of Baumgarten (1706-1757) it is significantly said, "His library contained an almost complete series of English deistic books." Sack also was a diligent reader of Toland, Collins, and Morgan. What was true of Baumgarten and Sack was true of all. At the same time, as Mr. Gostwick truly remarks, this importation from without was rather the occasion than the cause of the mischief. The real cause was the decay of faith and life in the German Churches. That internal decay laid them open to foreign attack. It would almost seem as if Germany in our own days were repaying us the harm we did it a century ago. We sent them the seeds of unbelief, they are sending us back the ripened fruit. The evil we did is returning home. The full-blown Rationalism which is showing its face in certain quarters in England and Scotland is the lineal descendant of the teachings of Toland, Collins, Woolston, Morgan, Chubb, Paine, Tindal, Shaftesbury, Bolingbroke, Hume, *et hoc genus omne*. Truly, the evil which men do lives after them. In a bad as well as good sense bread cast on the waters is seen after many days.

The prominent names of German thought are duly emphasised

by our author. Lessing stands at the head of the critical movement. His was essentially a rationalistic nature, destitute of all affinity for the supernatural. More recently we have heard in England of his *Education of Mankind*. Jacobi is really the German Coleridge, with the same dreamy, discursive, and yet suggestive style of thought. Of right, Kant figures largely in Mr. Gostwick's picture. Much has been said of Kant, and the last word has not been said. He carried Berkeley's and Hume's doctrines to their logical results. His influence again on Hamilton and Mansel was great. The doctrine of "regulative" knowledge is thoroughly Kantian. A chapter on Carlyle exhibits him as a disciple of Fichte. The notices of Goethe and Schiller are well done. Schelling, Hegel, Schleiermacher, Strauss, and Baur close the cycle. Hegel's influence is far from being exhausted. Avowed by several writers of our own country, it is silently felt in others. A certain Philosophy of Religion, delivered in lectures on a recent foundation, is nothing more or less than Hegelianism in an English dress. In the case of Hegel, and a few others, it might perhaps have been better if Mr. Gostwick had given rather the one or two central ideas instead of attempting a *résumé* of all their works. Such a synopsis, necessarily very compressed, fails to give clear impressions to the uninitiated. Hegel's Pantheism scarcely comes out with sufficient distinctness. In relation to the subject of Mr. Gostwick's work this doctrine, which comes out so plainly in Hegel's *Philosophy of Religion*, deserves greater prominence.

In a final chapter our author sketches an argument on Christian evidence, which is an anticipation of Mr. Row's excellent volumes.

Despite a few defects of style, the work is a valuable one. In no other English book will the reader find so much information on the subject brought together. The biographical portions add greatly to the interest.

Molesworth's History of the Church of England.

History of the Church of England from 1660. By William Nassau Molesworth, M.A., Honorary Canon of Manchester, Author of "History of the Reform Bill," "History of England from the Year 1830," &c., &c. London: Kegan Paul, Trench and Co.

The fact that a volume of moderate size professes to review the whole history of the English Church from 1660 to the present day, shows that it does not claim to be a complete history. Nothing more than a broad outline is attempted. Minute details are avoided; no references are given. The explanations given of common events, and the description of well-known characters,

show also that the work is not meant for the student, but for the general public. Canon Molesworth, in fact, expounds his views respecting the development of his Church. His other works will at once indicate the spirit in which this is done. He writes from the standpoint, not of the ecclesiastic, but of the historian. His simple aim is to be fair. His opinions as to the mistakes of his own Church are very plainly expressed. We need scarcely say that ecclesiastical histories by ecclesiastics, written in such a spirit, are very rare. Generally they are the expositions of a school or party, so that if you know the school to which the writer belongs, you know the opinions that will be expressed on every critical question. Church histories, written like other histories, we repeat, are extremely rare. The present work belongs to this class. Whether the general reader agrees with all the views or not, he will at least be able to understand them. The writer has done well to concentrate attention on the leaders who chiefly determined the course of events—Sheldon, Sancroft, Tenison. The judgments expressed on the first two of these are excellent specimens of his desire to be impartial. While expressing the strongest disapprobation of Sheldon's harsh, intolerant spirit, he does not forget to mention a few redeeming virtues. Sancroft receives all the praise due to consistency and conscientiousness. The narrowness and impracticableness of the nonjurors might have been more strongly emphasised.

The story of James II.'s fanatical obstinacy is told again with great spirit and ability. It seems almost incredible that any one could be so infatuated as to wear out the slavish loyalty of the supporters of the royal party, and convert preachers of passive obedience into rebels. The feat might have appeared impossible, but James accomplished it. James's policy and Charles II.'s moral character are described in very plain language.

The history includes the most recent events—the Oxford tracts, the Hampden case, Gorham case, Papal aggression, Ritualism, Colenso controversies, Broad Church, the pew system, the Education Act, tithes and church rates, which are all clearly and succinctly reviewed. The Anglican Revival witnessed in the present century is in strange contrast with the torpor into which the Church had sunk in the last century. Mr. Molesworth says, "Never, perhaps, had any religious communion sunk so low as had the Church of England at this conjuncture." Bishops and dignitaries non-resident, promotion regulated by bribes and favour, revenues abused, education neglected, fill up the picture. "Who cares now to know what Archbishops Herring, Hutton, or Moore thought, said, or did? I have searched carefully the seven volumes of Lord Mahon's history for the names of these prelates, but have not succeeded in meeting with any of them." The Evangelical movement banished this torpor and saved the Church. We may

agree or not with some of the forms which the new activity of the Church has taken, but the fact is certain.

On page 16 Mr. Molesworth assigns the wearisome extempore effusions of the Puritan preachers as one of the causes of the reaction in favour of the Church and the Stuarts. But we think he has overcharged the picture. He seems to assign the opinions of a few to the whole party. After saying, "They regarded any sort of preparation for their pulpit addresses as involving a sinful want of faith on the part of those who had recourse to such carnal aids," in the context (p. 18) he includes Howe, Baxter, Owen, Calamy in the accusation. Such a charge should be supported by references, but none are given. We doubt whether any could be given. A party is not represented by the views and practices of fanatical adherents.

We are greatly surprised to find several instances of careless writing or printing. On p. 78 the first sentence in the last paragraph is incomplete. On p. 92 the sentence beginning "What could be more natural" has no conclusion. In the long sentence ending at the top of p. 198, we have been unable to find the nominative to "had put an end." But perhaps this clause should read, "had not put an end." On p. 208 the involved sentence beginning, "For his party in the country," is left unfinished. What is meant by the following clause, p. 239, "Owing to the loss of influence and consideration which the Convocation had suffered since the revolution of 1688 had been taken from it"?

Maclaren's Secret of Power, &c.

The Secret of Power, and other Sermons. By Alexander Maclaren, D.D. London: Macmillan and Co. 1882.

No lover of sermons will hesitate as to the kind of welcome he should give to a new volume by Dr. Maclaren. Few preachers of the day combine so many useful qualities or maintain a higher general level of excellence. The style is never pretentious or turgid, and yet the modern pulpit hardly contains a greater master of symbolism and figure. Of the outward characteristics of his work there is probably not one that strikes and charms a reader or a listener so soon as does this well-regulated faculty of driving home important truth by the use of condensed and vivid imagery. Not a word is wasted, and not a word is introduced unless it will serve, not merely to grace a sentence, but to increase its force and effect. This combination of the richest imagery with a most unusual parsimony of words is perhaps the most prominent feature of the English which Dr. Maclaren writes and speaks. But the value of these sermons arises from the presence of other qualities as

well. They are marked by careful and minute exposition of Scripture, and thorough appropriateness to modern difficulties and perplexities. No man's hold of the verities of the Faith could be much firmer, and no man can, when there is need, track more remorselessly the vanity of current and popular objections. At times the preacher's voice grows sad over the sins and woes of humanity, but it never fails to point to the unchangeable God, or to stimulate to effort and amendment. And there are one or two truths which Dr. Maclaren is particularly fond of urging, and which are not omitted in this last volume of his. His emphasis of the Person of Christ, and of cleaving to Him as the sum and substance of all religion and the remedy of all evil, is as marked here as before. Nor do we miss that healthy mysticism, which sings the praises of meditation and has many wise things to say concerning the necessity and blessedness of abiding in Christ. And the indomitable faith in Christianity, which has before now strengthened many feeble knees, is as conspicuous and clear-tongued in these sermons as in any that have preceded them. There is perhaps no more interesting preacher in the North of England to-day than Dr. Maclaren, no one who is better able to quicken the religious thought of a congregation already devout, or to stir all the evangelical sentiments in the spirit of a reader who already bows before Christ.

Of the twenty sermons in this volume, several, as we are told in a preliminary note, have appeared before in less permanent forms. The first five are those preached respectively before the London, Wesleyan, and Baptist Missionary Societies, the National Bible Society of Scotland, and the Congregational Union of England and Wales. Then follow several dealing with various aspects of Christian life and service, with a triad for three festivals placed in their midst, and leading up to a most pathetic and touching discourse on "I am now ready to be offered," which fitly completes the series. Not one of these sermons is dull or unprofitable; two at least are of surpassing interest and force. And in one respect only is the series as a whole inferior to the three that have already been published. A careful reader of those will sometimes meet in this with figures and special uses of a given truth, that Dr. Maclaren has already made him familiar with. From a moral point of view, such a circumstance might easily be defended; but as a literary characteristic, it leads in some measure to the absence of that valuable property of freshness. But none the less would we advise all who are in quest of the best methods of presenting Christian truth, and all who are fond of strong, masculine, stirring sermons, to secure this volume without delay.

Dr. Punshon's Lectures.

Lectures. By the Rev. W. Morley Punshon, LL.D. London: T. Woolmer, 2, Castle Street, City Road.

Any attempt to commemorate Dr. Punshon's public labours which did not give a place of honour to his lectures would be an injustice and a failure. Whatever Dr. Punshon was in the other relations of his life, as a lecturer he was unique. It has rarely fallen to the lot of one man to combine in himself the highest success in the pulpit with the greatest popularity on the platform. To this double distinction Dr. Punshon attained.

One conviction will, we believe, come to all who read this volume, viz., that the speaker never glorified himself at the expense of doing good. He always puts truth foremost, and only uses his brilliant powers to assert her supremacy and to support her claims. No lecture but enforces justice, freedom, and righteousness.

These pages reveal the fertility of the author's mental resource, and the charming variety of his knowledge. History, literature, criticism, are all pressed into service; science is marshalled in the array; while frequent and pointed classic allusions show familiarity with the best authors. Here is nothing mean or bare. No stringing of high-sounding words which captivate an audience in public, but which dismay a student in private. Here is wealth, yea, affluence of knowledge and imagination, and both in perfect agreement. Most of these lectures were prepared originally for delivery before young men, and admirably are they adapted to their purpose. If a combination of sturdy common sense, a strong and manly spirit, a sympathy with the struggling, a hatred of shams and puerility, a thorough grip of the subject, and beyond all, an eloquence which is neither forced nor borrowed, but is the essential outcome of intense sincerity—if such a combination be likely to commend itself to young men, and we think it will—then these lectures are in the foremost rank of the Exeter Hall series.

As we close this volume, we feel not only that we have here specimens of eloquence as pure and classic as any which brighten the pages of modern literature, but also that a grand purpose has been kept in view throughout,—the purpose of promoting a healthier religion, a higher morality, and a more perfect consecration to the service of Christ through "the truth which maketh free."

Memorial of Dr. G. Smith.

Gervase Smith, D.D.: Memorial Volume: Lectures, Speeches, Sermons, &c. London: T. Woolmer, 2, Castle Street, City Road.

It is fitting that amongst those whose memorials are preserved in

Methodism Gervase Smith should have an honoured place, and we welcome the volume now before us as a worthy witness of a worthy life. Unlike many memoirs, personal history occupies but a small part of the volume; the greater part being devoted to selections from the pulpit and platform utterances of Dr. Smith.

After a modest and discreet introduction by the editor—a son of the subject of the memorial—we have two sketches of the life and character of Dr. Smith, each differing greatly from the other, yet both worthy of the occasion. The "Personal Recollections," from the pen of the Rev. Benjamin Gregory, are peculiarly interesting, going back, as they do, to the days of boyhood, and revealing the existence, even then, of those noble traits of character which distinguished later life.

The literary portion of the volume is taken up with lectures, speeches, and sermons. The lectures—four in number—are all on kindred subjects. Protestantism is their theme, and a defence of Protestantism is their aim. It is very evident that the lecturer is at home with his subject. The task has not been undertaken simply to figure in a programme, or to pass a pleasant hour. It is rather that the speaker has something on his conscience, and he cannot rest until he tells it out. He is so impressed with the burden and importance of his message that he does not always stop to do—what he has well the power to do—embellish his style or polish his periods. Conscious that some around him, by argument or artifice, would fain bring England back again under the Papal yoke, every power of his nature is roused, and he enters the lists, himself a combatant, to rouse others to the combat, and in this he thoroughly succeeds.

Passing over the years which followed the production of the lectures, we are introduced, by the volume, to another and a very different specimen of Dr. Smith's utterances, viz., the charge to the newly-ordained ministers at the Conference of 1876. We think this one of the most useful ordination charges given to Methodism for many years past. It contains teaching, warning, exhortation, and encouragement. It includes every subject which is of vital interest to a minister's life and duty. Its style is nowhere complex or abstruse, but is marked by directness and simplicity. The defence of the validity of Presbyterian orders is timely and valuable, while the exposure of the hollowness and unreality of so-called "apostolical succession" is complete and convincing.

The remainder of the volume contains a selection from the sermons which Dr. Smith preached. This is, perhaps, to many readers the most valuable part of the book. The author had always a high appreciation of the claims and responsibilities of the pulpit. While the six selected sermons show great variety

in subject, they uniformly testify to the greatest care in preparation. Throughout there is staunch fidelity to Evangelical truth. Here vice and meanness meet with unflinching opposition: fraud and hypocrisy are scathed and scorched; while truth and honour and sincerity, and indeed all things which form the Christian character, are set forth in attractive light, and commended with tender solicitude. While the sermons on "Truth" and the "Lips under Guard" are fine specimens of forceful moral teaching, that on "The Joy of Jesus in Prospect of the Cross" is a good illustration of homiletical analysis. In some of these sermons the preacher rises to a forceful and captivating eloquence. We would instance the paragraph commencing at the bottom of page 288, on "the gift of Pentecost." We wish we had room to quote it. This is an admirable memorial of one who combined in his life sound judgment with generous impulse; intellectual force with gentle simplicity; varied endowments with intense labour; and the results of all these will be traced in this volume, which we sincerely recommend.

Bowman's Hebrew Course, Part II.

A New, Easy, and Complete Hebrew Course: containing a Hebrew Grammar, with copious Hebrew and English Exercises, strictly graduated; also a Hebrew-English and English-Hebrew Lexicon. By the late Rev. T. Bowman, M.A., Clifton, Bristol. Part II. Irregular Verbs, &c. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1882.

In the number of this Quarterly for April, 1881, we expressed our high appreciation of the former Part of the work here named. The second and concluding Part, now published, is built upon the same plan as the first, and possesses the like qualities of perspicuity, accuracy, and completeness. The admirably constructed series of progressive exercises, included in the present portion of the volume, relate to the Irregular Verb and Verb Suffixes, the Noun and Noun Suffixes, and the Particles. The Tables of Forms, as presented by Mr. Bowman, are singularly clear and full; and, what is always of great service in books of this description, the work is supplied with several copious and easily intelligible indexes. We regret to observe that the second Part is posthumous. At the same time we cannot but congratulate the Hebrew learning of our days, upon the circumstance that the pious duty discharged by Mr. Bowman's son, the Rev. A. H. Bowman, B.A., of Birkenhead, in editing a publication of it, has fallen into so entirely competent hands. It should be added, that the Hebrew Index and Lexicons are the production of the editor.

II. MISCELLANEOUS.

Some Recent Books of Verse.

Thirty Years; Being Poems New and Old. By the Author of "John Halifax, Gentleman," &c. London: Macmillan and Co. 1881.

Children's Poetry. By the Author of "John Halifax, Gentleman." London: Macmillan and Co. 1881.

Cædmon's Vision, and other Poems. By Sarson C. J. Ingham, Author of "The White Cross and Dove of Pearls," "Selina's Story," "Laura Linwood," &c. London: Kegan Paul, Trench and Co. 1882.

If, peradventure, there were found some one to assert that the verse-impulse of the "Author of John Halifax, Gentleman," the motive that induces her to express her thoughts in rhyme, is moral rather than distinctly poetical, we wonder whether she would regard the statement as a compliment.

For morals are so all-important, "conduct," according to Mr. Matthew Arnold's graceful teaching, occupies so large a part of life, that one could not be surprised if a writer whose tone of mind is very distinctly ethical and religious were systematically to disregard the art side even of an art she was practising, and dwell almost exclusively upon the lessons which that art might enable her to drive home. And to have it recognised that we succeed in what we try to accomplish, what pleasure can be greater than that? Still, it is possible that the "Author of John Halifax" might not regard the view of our supposed critic as complimentary. The "Last Minstrel," if we remember aright, though he loved his harp well, did not like to hear it praised at the expense of his flowing verse. And so few poets, and indeed few persons, are partial to such a selection among their gifts as implies disparagement or negation of other gifts. Any comparative analysis of the kind must be very friendly to be at all pleasant.

Let us therefore forbear to pursue this line of inquiry further; and as it is quite clear that the two volumes before us, entitled respectively *Thirty Years* and *Children's Poetry*, have a very distinctly moral and religious aspect, and that whether or not the author regarded that aspect as alone important, she certainly regarded it as very important, let us dwell upon it too, and enjoy praise-pleasure to the full. For here there is no room for cavil.

The moral tone of the pieces composing these volumes is distinctly, proudly high. Right stands here for what it is, and beautiful; wrong for what it is, and foul. The banner of religion is borne unfurled, and with no faltering hand. Heaven, again and yet again, is shown with its glory of dawn light after the gloom of life and the night of death.

Take as a sample the poem, "Philip, my King," which fitly opens the first of these volumes—a poem we well remember in the first collected edition of the author's verse, published now many years ago. Thus it runs:

"Look at me with thy large brown eyes,
Philip my king.
Round whom the enshadowing purple lies
Of babyhood's royal dignities:
Lay on my neck thy tiny hand
With love's inviaible sceptre laden;
I am thine Esther to command
Till thou shalt find a queen-handmaiden,
Philip my king.

"O the day when thou goest a-wooing,
Philip my king!
When those beautiful lips are suing,
And some gentle heart's bars undoing
Thou dost enter, love-crowned, and there
Sittest love glorified. Rule kindly
Tenderly, over thy kingdom fair
For we that love, ah! we love so blindly
Philip my king.

"Up from thy sweet mouth,—unto thy brow,
Philip my king!
The spirit that there lies sleeping now
May rise like a giant and make men bow
As to one heaven-chosen amongst his peers:
My Saul, than thy brethren taller and fairer
Let me behold thee in future years;—
Yet thy head needeth a circlet rarer,
Philip my king.

"A wreath not of gold, but palm. One day,
Philip my king,
Thou too must tread, as we trod, a way,
Thorny and cruel and cold and grey:
Rebels within thee and foes without
Will snatch at thy crown. But march on, glorious,
Martyr, yet monarch: till angels shout
As thou sitt'st at the feet of God victorious,
'Philip the king!'"

Here we have reflected, as in a mirror, the ideas that fill the rest of the two volumes before us: family affection, hallowed love, duty as paramount over life ruling in all private or public relations, death advancing slow or swift, but resistless ever, and then, after all, the crowning in the "far spiritual city." Such are

the themes on which are built, with due variations, poems like "Four Years," "The Wind at Night," "Until Her Death," "A Dream-Child," "In the June Twilight," "The Golden Gate," "Into Mary's Bosom," and—but why catalogue? we should have to reproduce most of the index.

As to the *Children's Poetry*, it is, as is but natural, more mainly narrative than the poetry of the companion volume. There's The Story of the 'Birkenhead,' and Sir Richard Whittington, and a tale of Waterloo Day, and a sad account of the evils of disobediently going into a boat in Swanage Bay, and there are tales fabulous and allegorical. But besides these there are many exhortations to all that is good, and pure, and true, and brave, and unselfish. For such evidences of noble, moral purpose, having its root in strong religious faith, one has never far to seek in the works of the "Author of John Halifax." And so we bid farewell to these volumes, merely adding, by way of postscript—for a Parthian shaft must be allowed us—that we have rather puzzled ourselves in wondering what induced the author to publish such a poem as "The Great Loch Lomond Scheme." Rattled out as an impromptu during a blithe rain-splashed expedition among the hills, such verses may have had their ephemeral value, and made the merry time pass more merrily. But afterwards?

Somewhat akin to the inspiration of the "Author of John Halifax," is that of Miss Sarson C. J. Ingham, for we gather, perhaps wrongly, that the writer of *Cædmon's Vision and Other Poems* is a lady.

She too, even in that portion of her volume which does not contain professedly "Religious Poems," turns familiarly, lovingly to devotional thoughts. She too shows the high ethical feeling for what is pure, unselfish, and noble.

Might one desiderate here and there a little more technical completeness? We have grown so fastidious in such matters. Our modern masters, even though they may often lack any vital poetic genius, may have indeed not very much to say, yet so say their little as to avoid forms of expression too trivialised by daily use. Poetry, alas, must be made of gems, and yet the gems must look as if they owed nothing to the lapidary's art—"*hic labor, hoc opus est.*" "Why did you not ask them to explain?" inquires a "youth" with "haughty Spanish brow" of his "lady-love," who has been telling him how she has been slandered by a rival beauty.

> "And yet there's comfort even in the fact
> Of waking up,"

we are told in the opening of a rather formless sonnet on God's sudden revelations to our souls. Moreover, such rhymes as "orchestra" and "are" are quite inadmissible. Nor are

there wanting expressions which the rhyme has too obviously dictated, as where we are shown the poet's

> "Unconscious brow serene,
> O'er which there wandered sympathy's blue vein."

Is it harsh to fancy that these peculiarities of the brow would have remained unnoticed, save for the necessity of finding rhymes—found, alas, too easily—for the "queen" and her "train"?

But enough. Let us go back to the material of which the volume is woven. That material is greatly historical. We have, in ballad metre, the story of the vision that came to the cowherd Cædmon, at Whitby Abbey, and led him to sing of the "Origin of all things;" we have the story, a little worn perhaps by this time, of the "Wise Man of Northumbria," who pictured our life as a sparrow's flitting between the portals of birth and death; the "Last Days of St. Columbra," the "Death of Cratesiclæa." Then there are many "occasional poems," poems on public events: the wreck of the *Princess Alice*, on which City voices descant in various tones; the murder of Lord Frederick Cavendish; the accident on the Great Western Railway which saddened the Christmas of 1874; the flight of the Empress, the "beautiful Eugénie," from Paris, in 1870; the death of Longfellow; poems on incidents or experiences that have struck the writer's fancy; "On Hearing Jenny Lind's 'Good Night' Sung in the Street;" on a hospital experience, a police-court scene; on hearing the "Bells of Malines." Then there are several memorial verses, and, as we have intimated, a goodly number of religious poems, and so, finally, poems which defy any very strict attempt at classification, and may be defined as miscellaneous.

It is to these latter, if the truth must be told, to poems like "The Lady and the Sweetbriar," that we look with most pleasure in going back through the volume—it is these that, in our opinion, have most *future*. Let us, to conclude, quote from the "Harp and the Singer" the lines wherein the poet sings as follows of the spring-tide of her verse:

> "O sweet, sweet pain! If flowers know such,
> 'Tis 'neath the Spring's first quickening touch;
> 'Tis when the bud and leaf prick forth
> Their verdure through the travailing earth.
> The stream may know it, bursting free,
> Whence the stern glaciers hold the key,
> Like Lazarus from the sepulchre,
> Troubled to meet the atmosphere.
>
> It was the pain of growth, of life;
> The rarer air, the soul's first strife
> To loose her fetters and spread wing
> Where the lark's song falls echoing.

And, cleaving rosy clouds, mount higher,
To snatch one spark of sacred fire
From heavenly altars, and retreat
With rapture from the daring feat."

Such the spring-tide; here is the conclusion:

"Oh, to float outward on that sea,
From the great world's attraction free!
To learn a note from angel lyres,
To snatch a spark from heavenly fires!
To feel the bitterness dissolve;
Harsh discords to sweet sounds resolve!
Oh, Thou who knowest my heart takes part
Against the agony and smart
Of riper knowledge, change my book;
Let me on Thy perfections look,
Till, lost in wonder evermore,
These strings, so near to break, adore."

Old French Sonnets.

Sonnets des Vieux Maistres François. 1520-1670. Paris: E. Plon and Cie. 1882.

A DAINTY volume, dainty in general appearance—for all the foreign paper cover that so soon shows dishevelled; dainty too in type; and dainty, more than all, in the general character of the contents.

Shall we say, indeed, that these last incline somewhat to over-daintiness? Artificiality is the bane of the sonnet. The intricacy of the rhyme-sequence, save where the poetic impulse is strong and most vital, tends to deaden spontaneity. The rigid limit of fourteen lines checks the free outgrowth of passion or robust thought. How many are there who in so "scanty a plot of ground" can do more than cultivate, with more or less of success, some pretty garden flower or exotic,—who have the courage to plant a tree from the world's great open forests, to grow in perennial power and beauty? And so it comes to pass that the sonnets that are also great poems are less numerous than the countless number of existent sonnets might lead one to hope.

No; if a sonnet is to have *life*, it must be more than perfect in form and mechanism. It must be interesting. The poet must have something to say. And these old French masters, who wrote in the century and a half beginning in 1520, did not always bear in mind so simple a truth. They give us in abundance, in super-abundance, the well-worn conceits of love-poetry. Cupid, to hear them, is ever ready with his darts. They suffer ceaselessly from flames. They are often in chains. Their wounds are mostly incurable. Is their mistress at the point of death, it is because the heavens are envious that the earth should possess aught so

fair. Does she issue from her palace in the morning, the sun forthwith pales before her superior beams. Doubtless all this was fresher when it was first written than it seems now. But it can never have been very fresh. It is the property of great art not to grow really old-fashioned.

No, as we have already said, what the pieces contained in this volume lack for the most part is substance, the evidence of their having been the product of something more than a desire to tack together fourteen lines with skill and taste. Throw in among them a sonnet by Shakespeare or Milton, and how few but will seem tawdry, and as tinsel by the side of gold.

Not all, of course. And those which will stand the ordeal best are unquestionably those of Ronsard. The chief of the *Pleiade* was a genuine poet. His sonnet to Hélène may take its place unabashed by the side of any sonnet in any language. It is the well-known sonnet in which he seems to see his love in the far future spinning among her women, and singing his verse as she spins, and suddenly filled with wonder at the dead past, and crying, "Ronsard sang my praise in the days when I was fair." Yes, lady, concludes the poet, and shall then be lying beneath the sod, and you will be an old woman cowering before the hearth. Now life and love are vouchsafed to us. Were it not better, then, to gather the roses of life while yet there is time?

Here we have the ring of a genuine feeling. And the form also is perfect. There are at least two lines in this sonnet, the fourth and fourteenth, which are of supreme beauty. Nor are Ronsard's other sonnets here quoted greatly inferior. But when we pass beyond his work, we fall at once almost exclusively among *vers de société*; and for *vers de société* what very genuine lover of poetry cares very greatly?

Hood's Oliver Cromwell.

Oliver Cromwell: His Life, Times, Battlefields, and Contemporaries. By Paxton Hood, Author of "Christmas Evans," &c. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1882.

A SINGLE sentence in the preface describes Mr. Hood's intention in compiling this book, and may serve as a specimen of the inexact and hasty manner in which he writes. "Of these" (the Lives of Cromwell), he says, "I believe I have seen the greater number; but I have not seen one which answers the end proposed by this volume: that is, to set forth in a compendious manner, accessible to any person not possessed of too much time for wading through many or large volumes, the great Protector's claims." The book is meant to be a handy popular biography of Cromwell, his career being rendered more intelligible by the

introduction of short accounts of some of his more eminent contemporaries. Sir John Eliot, Pym, Hampden, Prince Rupert, and Sir Harry Vane are thus caused to figure in unequal prominence upon the pages, and, indeed, the delineation of the last of these men is about the best thing in the book.

Mr. Hood commences his volume with a brief examination of the various theories of Cromwell's character that have of late years been propounded. He proclaims himself, in this respect, a disciple of Carlyle, and even goes beyond his master in admiration and praise of the Protector. It would have been more satisfactory to his readers, and certainly more just to the circumstances of the case, had the eulogy been less rhapsodical and more discriminating. Cromwell himself would have been the first to protest against such a shadeless portraiture of himself. And when our author writes, "Around his name so distinct an aureole of light gathers, that we shall refuse to see the justice of the comparison with even the greatest statesmen of antiquity," or in a still more fulsome tone ascribes to the Protector "prescience beyond the lot of mortals," it is obvious that, whatever else he is, he is not a judicious biographer. And in the sentences he passes upon the men whose opinions differ from his own, or with whose conduct he is disposed to find fault, there is exhibited the same tendency to unlimited exaggeration. James I. is "a miserable piece of loathsome corruption," and Laud is "that ridiculous old archprelatical absurdity."

That much of the writing is vigorous and picturesque is but another way of saying that the writer is Mr. Hood; and the publishers have so produced the book as to make it in every way a pleasure to handle it. But its faults of style and method are such as unfit it for recommendation as a popular narrative of Cromwell's life and work.

Stoughton's William Penn.

William Penn, the Founder of Pennsylvania. By John Stoughton, D.D. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1882.

Dr. Stoughton's study of the history of religion in England from the opening of the Long Parliament to the end of the eighteenth century, renders him eminently qualified to write the life of William Penn. In the "Advertisement" prefixed to this volume, Dr. Stoughton tells us that the work has been undertaken at the request of his publishers, as "the Bicentenary of William Penn's arrival in America naturally calls attention to the story of his life." But he has not been content to compile a readable biography, a task a man of literary habits and aptitude may accomplish with easy success. He has examined sources of

information not readily accessible, and has been fortunate enough to secure the perusal of "unpublished correspondence."

The life of a man who died almost two hundred years ago is sure to present unanswerable questions. Dr. Stoughton cannot decide whether the Penn family were of Welsh or of West-country extraction. He is able to show that William Penn did not enter the University of Oxford till after the Restoration, a matter that has hitherto lain in some doubt. He evidently disbelieves the common stories of his University career—*e.g.*, his violent attack upon the surpliced undergraduates, and even his expulsion from Oxford for Quakerism. The silence of Anthony Wood on the subject furnishes the chief reason for doubting the latter tradition. Wood asserts that Penn was addicted to athletic sports and other un-Quakerlike pursuits. Dr. Stoughton expresses natural surprise at the statement, though he appears to accept it. Certain it is that William Penn left Oxford without taking his degree, and to his father's intense displeasure. This fact, and the high intrinsic probability of the story, will not permit us to reject the substantial accuracy of the asserted expulsion. Possibly the young man may have been "sent down" without the formality of a recorded sentence, and thus Anthony Wood's ignorance be accounted for. At any rate Penn left Oxford thoroughly imbued with Friends' principles.

William Penn's fame connects itself closely with his religion, and no biographer can do him justice who does not sympathise with and understand his religious emotions and experiences. On this score there is nothing to complain of in his present biographer. The progress of the Divine work in his soul is traced from the remarkable vision of his boyhood to his conscious conversion in Ireland. Dr. Stoughton is careful to point out that "that conversion must not be regarded simply as a change of opinion. . . . It penetrated his moral nature; it made him a new man." Dr. Stoughton expounds Penn's theological views with a nice discrimination, free at once from captiousness and from advocacy. On the vexed question of the "inward light" and its relation to the Scriptures, we may endorse the cautious and appreciative judgment: "The affirmation of an internal knowledge and experience of the work and will of God, as essential to true religion, is most important, and will be accepted and maintained by every spiritually-minded Christian; and it was this testimony, in the face of formalism of all kinds, that made Quakerism a blessing to England and the world in the seventeenth century. But to speak of the inward light as the *final* test of truth and righteousness, without *one word* of reference to Holy Scripture as the rule of faith and practice, is highly objectionable, and opens a door to immense self-delusion." Penn did not deny that the Bible is a rule of faith and practice, but he would not acknow-

ledge it as *the* rule, and he claimed to interpret it according to the dictates of a species of personal inspiration. To say that "there was a great want of caution in this mode of expressing his spiritual ideas" is assuredly as mild a censure as can in justice be pronounced. On the other hand, we must remember that these tenets never lead their holder into the faintest approach to external antinomianism.

Like impartiality is maintained in dealing with the multitudinous controversies in which William Penn was engaged. Dr. Stoughton can perceive at the same time harshness of manner and strength of argument, and he can recognise an excellent spirit while he exposes defective logic. His pages convey a fair idea of the number and scope of Penn's works, and of the character of his correspondence. Several letters are taken from a beautiful volume published some years ago—*The Penns and the Penningtons*—which has not attained the circulation it deserves. If the polemics exhibit Penn's natural impetuosity, the letters prove him to have been a most loving and lovable man, and both manifest resolute faithfulness to his convictions of right and duty.

It is to be regretted that, in studying the life of one of the noblest men Quakerism, or even England, has ever produced, we cannot confine our attention to his religious experience and activities, and his statesmanlike and philanthropic achievements. Time and thought must be spent in scrutiny of conduct of questionable colour, and in vindication of his integrity. Two matters especially demand trial and verdict. Lord Macaulay is mainly responsible for the charge brought against Penn that he trafficked in pardons, and was concerned in the notorious affair of the "Maids of Taunton." Shortly after the issue of the volume of Macaulay's *History* containing the accusation, Mr. W. E. Forster published a pamphlet, *William Penn and T. B. Macaulay*, in defence of the calumniated Friend. His pleas are adopted substantially by Mr. Hepworth Dixon and Dr. Stoughton. The sole evidence against William Penn is a haughty letter from the Earl of Sunderland to "Mr. Penne" about the maids' ransom. The letter demonstrates that the "Mr. Penne" who received it had an intimate connection with the disgraceful business. His Christian name is not given. But there hung about the Court a man of dishonourable repute, named George Penne, who was perpetually mixed up with the buying and selling of pardons. The style of Sunderland's note exactly suits a person of George Penne's position; it is utterly unlike the communication of one gentleman to another, or of a courtier to a royal favourite. Common sense draws the immediate inference that the "Mr. Penne" of the letter is *George* not *William* Penn. It is difficult to see how anything but deliberate determination to blacken a good man's character can come to

a contrary conclusion. Dr. Stoughton, we think, attaches scarcely sufficient weight to the excessive unlikelihood that a personage of William Penn's rank and profession would be chosen as middleman in so discreditable a transaction. Besides, whatever had William Penn to do with Taunton?

The relations of William Penn and James II. present a more perplexing problem. The friendship between the arbitrary monarch and his liberty-loving subject may be accounted for. James, when Duke of York, had become attached to Admiral Penn, and for his sake had shown many favours to his son after his decease. It was not in that son's nature to forget kindnesses. He formed, too, a high estimate of the king's character, partially founded upon his conduct toward himself. People often speak of Penn's affection for his sovereign, as though James were destitute of good qualities. However foolish and obstinate, James possessed qualities which might have won for him comfort and respect in private life. Penn honestly endeavoured to exercise his influence with the king in behalf of his persecuted co-religionists. Multitudes of them languished in prison, and multitudes more were amerced in ruinous fines. Almost their only hope of relief rested upon the petitions he addressed to the sovereign. He actually procured the release of upwards of thirteen hundred of them. His support of the Declaration of Indulgence has been condemned as sycophantism, but his censors overlook the fact that his views on the subject of toleration were immensely in advance of his age. He stood well-nigh alone in advocating perfect liberty of conscience for every man—Churchman or Dissenter, Catholic or Protestant. Dr. Stoughton's excusable dislike of James, and his admiration of the Independent and Baptist leaders, tempt him to treat Penn with something less than justice. Surely it should not be imputed to him as a fault that he anticipated Catholic emancipation by a couple of centuries. Whether the course he pursued was wise is a question totally distinct from whether it was adopted and followed from honest conviction. Nor does blame attach to him on account of his conduct towards the dethroned king. On the contrary, we cannot but admire the fidelity with which he confessed and maintained the private friendship, and the loyalty with which he adhered to his principle of the right of the people to choose their own rulers, and make their own laws. Nevertheless, the spectacle of a Quaker at Court is incongruous, and there are a few faint but unmistakable indications that his continued and close intercourse with the king and his nobles was other than beneficial to him. Dr. Stoughton sums up his own judgment as follows: "I cannot but think that it was a good thing for William Penn when King James abdicated the throne, and retired from England. Though in one respect the favour of the sovereign

helped him to serve the Quakers, the influence of the sovereign could not be favourable either to his political or his religious character. It tended to warp his judgment in some points, and to impair the beauty of his life in others. He must have been more than man if his exposure to the temptations of a Court like that of James II. left him perfectly untarnished and entirely untouched. It would hardly fail to rub off the fresh bloom of his early piety. It certainly has had a detrimental effect on his historical fame. All the most serious charges against him spring from *this one source*. Those charges are, when fully examined, found to be unsustained. Yet occasion and colour were given to them by the unfortunate circumstances in which patronage, such as that of the Popish prince, placed this excellent person over and over again. Some of the reports circulated respecting him might have been silenced at once but for his uncommon intimacy with the monarch, and the means he adopted to maintain and increase it." This summary may pass without objection; only it should be noted that, while the actual charges were unfounded, the fault now found rests upon speculations as to what must have been the effect of life at Court. And the phrase, "the means he adopted to maintain and increase it," has a suspicious sound which is not warranted by the facts, and which, probably, it was not intended to convey. The troubles that befell Penn, directly or indirectly, through his connection with James II. remind one of Kingsley's saying about Sir Walter Raleigh—that God loved him so well that He always punished his sins in this life.

The story of the founding of Pennsylvania, the impolitic and ungrateful treatment Penn received from the colonists, his family distresses, and his closing years, is told in clear outline. Now and again the reader wishes for fuller details, but generally these could not possibly have been procured. One of Dr. Stoughton's remarks helps to solve the mysteries of Penn's course—he was essentially a "sanguine" man. Had he trusted others less, he might have enjoyed greater external prosperity. His last years were spent with partially beclouded faculties. The present biography points with unusual delicacy of touch to the suggestive fact that his religious emotions continued vigorous to the end.

We congratulate Dr. Stoughton upon a work worthy of his literary reputation, and the public upon the possession of a readable, handy, and trustworthy memoir of William Penn. The unique portrait prefixed to the book gives it additional value.

English Men of Letters.

English Men of Letters. "Sterne," by H. D. Traill. "Swift," by Leslie Stephen. "Dickens," by A. W. Ward. London: Macmillan and Co. 1882.

Little is known of Sterne's life apart from his works, and what

little there is does not increase our respect for him. That such a writer should have been a clergyman throws a sad light on the state of the English Church of the last century. Mr. Traill wisely gives his chief attention to a criticism of Sterne's works. His criticism seems to us eminently discriminating and just. The grossness, the plagiarisms, the affectations of the great novelist are condemned without attempt at excuse or palliation. In acting thus Mr. Traill pursues a wise course. He evidently feels that his subject will allow these deductions. Sterne's fame rests on grounds which are independent of these admitted facts. Indeed, it may be said that the mere fact of his fame surviving such glaring defects is no mean tribute to his power. Such defects would have been fatal to an ordinary writer. We imagine that the extent of Sterne's borrowings from writers like Burton and Bishop Hall, to say nothing of French writers, will be a discovery to ordinary readers. Mr. Traill's discussion of Sterne's single great quality—his humour—is excellent. In illustrating its "purity and delicacy," he has to premise that he uses these terms in a rigidly literary sense, for he has just said, "There can be no denying that Sterne is of all writers the most permeated and penetrated with impurity of thought and suggestion." The remarks on Sterne's "creative and dramatic power" also are well put. Mr. Traill justly observes that the creation of one new character like that of Uncle Toby is title enough to immortality. It is only from a Shakespeare that we can expect a whole gallery of new creations. "As a rule we see the worthy Captain only as he appeared to his creator's keen dramatic eye, and as he is set before us in a thousand exquisite touches of dialogue—the man of simple mind and soul, profoundly unimaginative and unphilosophical, but lacking not in a certain shrewd common sense, exquisitely *naïf*, and delightfully *mal-à-propos* in his observations, but always pardonably, never foolishly, so; inexhaustibly amiable, but with no weak amiability; homely in his ways, but a perfect gentleman withal; in a word, the most winning and lovable personality that is to be met with, surely, in the whole range of fiction."

The study of Swift is excellently done. The life and works are treated together, each work being described and characterised in the order of its appearance. Even to a greater extent than usual Swift's writings are the embodiment and expression of the man. We doubt whether there was more vigour, more common sense, more cynicism, more power of scathing satire in the man than there is in his writings. This is saying a great deal, for if ever qualities of this order were impersonated in a single character, they were so impersonated in Swift. He was acknowledged to be a terrible enemy, and perhaps no man ever made so many enemies, or cared so little for the good opinion of the world as Swift. His independence amounted to a monomania. Still, even

Swift had a gentle side. His boundless ambition, so bitterly disappointed, was not the ambition of personal avarice. His charity to the needy was constant. "He had a whole 'seraglio' of distressed old women in Dublin; there was scarcely a lane in the whole city where he had not such a 'mistress.' He saluted them kindly, inquired into their affairs, bought trifles from them, and gave them such titles as Pullagowns, Stumpa-Nympha, and so forth." "He scorned to receive money for his writings; he abandoned the profit to his printers in consideration of the risks they ran, or gave it to his friends. In later years he lived on a third of his income, gave away a third, and saved the remaining third for his posthumous charity." The £12,000 which he left went towards founding St. Patrick's Hospital in 1757. Amid the mingled admiration and disgust awakened by the more prominent features of his character, let not this gentle aspect be overlooked. Mr. Stephen does not attempt to solve the many problems presented in Swift's life. Space forbids this, but he expresses an opinion which always evidently rests on good grounds. It is little likely that any more evidence will be forthcoming on these hotly disputed points. Many strange tales attach themselves to the Dean's name. His congregation consisting on one occasion of himself and his clerk, Swift began the service, "Dearly beloved Roger, the Scripture moveth you and me." Faulkner, the Dublin printer, was dining with Swift, and on asking for a second supply of asparagus, was told by the Dean to finish what he had on his plate. "What, sir, eat my stalks?" "Ay, sir; King William always ate his stalks." "And were you blockhead to obey him?" asked the hearer. "Yes," said Faulkner; "and if you had dined with Dean Swift *tête-à-tête*, you would have been obliged to eat your stalks, too." Once a great crowd collected in Dublin to see an eclipse. Swift sent round the bellman to give notice that the eclipse had been postponed by the Dean's orders, and the crowd dispersed. On his visits to London Swift sometimes stayed in Chelsea. It is curious now to read of his bathing in the river on hot nights, while his Irish servant, Patrick, warned off passing boats.

Professor Ward's criticism of Dickens is evidently based upon thorough familiarity with his works. While full of sincere admiration, it is far from undiscriminating. The faults, as well as the merits, of each work are pointed out. The former arose partly from rapidity of production. Dickens wrote too much and too rapidly to write perfectly. True, the exaggeration and sensationalism which are the drawbacks of his writings had their roots in his life and character, but they might have been overcome by due culture. For this Dickens had not time, or thought he had not; and he died of premature exhaustion induced by working at the highest possible pressure. The series of public readings,

described in Professor Ward's sixth chapter, seems stark madness. Without any call of necessity, and in the teeth of repeated warnings, he persisted in course after course of reading before exciting assemblies which would have tried herculean strength. Every one must rejoice that the influence of Dickens's writings has been so healthy. He proved that the ordinary novel, adapted, unlike Scott's, for general readers, need not be immoral in order to be interesting. The provision of good reading of this type for millions is one merit of Dickens, but by no means the only one. The purpose and the effect of nearly all his writings is to create sympathy with the struggling and unfortunate. No one can measure the impulse given by his writings to the cause of charity. The objection that his range of description is limited, that he draws his material only from one sphere of life, applies to other writers with just the same force, to Scott, Thackeray, George Eliot. Enough that he worked the vein which he knew best so well. The incidents of his own life, and the results of his own observation, enter largely into his novels. Not the least interesting feature of Professor Ward's book is that it points out the originals of so many of the familiar characters and scenes. Only Dickens himself could have furnished a complete key. One of the chief faults we have to find with Dickens is that he so often made his religious characters hypocrites. This fault also arose from the limitations of his experience. Mr. Ward says, "Of Puritanism in its modern forms he was an uncompromising, and no doubt a conscientious, opponent, and though, with perfect sincerity, he repelled the charge that his attacks upon cant were attacks upon religion, yet their *animus* is such as to make the misinterpretation intelligible. His dissenting ministers are of the *Bartholomew Fair* species, and though, in his later books, a good clergyman here and there makes his modest appearance, the balance can hardly be said to be satisfactorily redressed." We should naturally put the case much more strongly. The accounts of Dickens's personal habits—his love of neatness and method, punctuality, early rising, fondness for walking—are interesting. Professor Ward writes out of fulness of knowledge, and of course with almost perfect taste. But we confess that the word "banalities" (p. 46) is above us.

Autobiography of James Burn.

James Burn, the "Beggar Boy." An Autobiography, relating the numerous Trials, Struggles, and Vicissitudes of a strangely chequered Life, with Glimpses of English Social, Commercial and Political History, during Eighty Years, 1802-1882. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

The contents and purpose of this work are pretty clearly indicated

or suggested in the title. Mr. Burn hopes that the story of his changeful life may prove interesting and instructive to others. We have no doubt that this will be the case, although the lessons suggested to the reader may not always be those designed by the writer. Mr. Burn leaves us in doubt as to his nationality. He was born in Ireland, but whether his parents, who were not married, were Scotch or Irish is not stated. His deceived mother removed, with her infant, to Dumfries, where she married a drunken discharged soldier, called Mac Namee. The whole of his early life was spent in vagrant begging and peddling, the tramping being confined, for the most part, to Northumberland and Southern Scotland, but sometimes extending farther. It is quite evident that but for Mac Namee's drunkenness the party might have lived a tolerably comfortable life, and one effect of the Autobiography will certainly be to evince still more clearly the unwisdom of charity to tramps. Gradually the "Beggar Boy" worked himself into independence of his early surroundings, but it was only to show how difficult, nay impossible, it was for him to shake off the restlessness induced by early habits. The list of situations he filled, trades he attempted, and masters he served, is of appalling length. He is no sooner in a situation than he loses it again. Either his health fails or his master is unfortunate. Hat-making, herding, harvesting, mining, tea-dealing, a faint attempt at smuggling, tavern-keeping, hawking, spirit-selling, book-hawking, directory-making, commercial travelling, newspaper editing, clerk in salmon fisheries, railway servant—he is all these by turns, and nothing long. As Mr. Burn writes especially for the instruction of the young, it is obvious to remark that his fondness for change is rather for warning than imitation. The reflection forces itself on the reader of such a story of incessant change that the cause must have lain chiefly in the subject of the Autobiography. The possession or exercise of ordinary prudence would have averted most of the misfortunes. Indeed, Mr. Burn remarks several times, that he was pursued by an evil genius. He is always taking the wrong turn. When he is in a good situation an unaccountable impulse prompts him to give it up; and when he is in a poor situation, of course he must change. It is quite evident that the evil genius is nothing more or less than the restlessness surviving from his early years. We do not wonder that, as we gather from the book, doubts have been expressed as to the genuineness of the story. We neither cherish nor wonder at the doubts. The air of truthfulness is too patent, the sequence of events too natural, the familiarity with a great variety of places too minute, to allow of doubt. On the other hand, we cannot wonder that many doubt the probability of so many strange coincidences happening in one life. By all the laws of probability the "Beggar Boy" should have died many times over, of starva-

tion, ill-treatment, drowning, stabbing, despair. But something always turned up. A good Samaritan always appeared in the nick of time. Perhaps it is another consequence of the deficiencies of the writer's early life, that there are no references to a controlling Providence. To many readers the thought will often suggest itself. We should have supposed that when the writer mentions especially the fact of his being kept at so many critical points from a course of crime, the idea would have lain near at hand. But in relation even to the most general religious sentiment the book is singularly deficient.

Mr. Burn's work naturally suggests comparison with Mr. Smiles's *Biographies of Scotchmen in humble life*. It would have been well if Mr. Burn had imitated the brevity of Mr. Smiles. The life itself, occupying the first four hundred pages of the book, is constantly interrupted by moralising reflections and comments on passing events. The descriptions of places are not without interest, although they might often be abridged. The last two hundred pages are devoted to a review of the general progress of the country during the last half-century. We are far from questioning the interest and ability of these general reflections. We only fear that the size of the work, which is a consequence of entering into these general questions, may be a hindrance to its success. It would have been better if this secondary element had been kept within stricter limits, or omitted altogether. The composition affords much matter for criticism, if criticism were fair in the circumstances. For example, "In the year 1838, I again bound myself in the hymeneal noose," is a curious introduction to the account of a really fortunate and happy marriage (p. 174). "*Hob-nobbing* hymeneally" is a singular combination of slang and fine language (p. 339). On p. 157 the same sentence relates the coronation of William IV., and the death of a prize-fighter, called Sandy McKay. It is unfortunate, too, that the language of the brief Dedication should be limping and ambiguous. The first sentence defies construing, and the last one speaks of "a man independent of the 'guinea stamp.'" But, considering that the writer never had any education proper, the composition of the book, on the whole, is astonishingly correct. When, however, in the preface the writer describes his purpose as that of stimulating "young men to overcome obstacles and difficulties," we must remark that it does not appear that the writer ever did overcome the obstacles and difficulties in his path. To the last he is no sooner out of one than he is into another. The utmost that can be learnt by the reader in the way of moral is, not to lose heart and cheerfulness in the face of an endless succession of difficulties. An interesting account of a strange life would have been still more interesting without the faults we have indicated.

Autobiography of Dr. Mahan.

Autobiography, Intellectual, Moral and Spiritual. By Rev. Asa Mahan, D.D., LL.D. London: T. Woolmer.

An Autobiography appealing to a different audience, as it is altogether different in contents and style, from the foregoing. Sixty-five of Dr. Mahan's eighty-two years have been spent in Christ's service. During the first eighteen years he was entangled in the perplexities of Calvinism, and in extreme old age he sits down to describe the means by which he was led out of these into a brighter faith. The discovery of the truth came with the suddenness of intuition. He passed from darkness to light in a moment. We have no doubt that his experience is a typical one, but its several stages have never been set forth with such clearness and vigour as here. A wonderful freshness breathes through the pages. There is none of the commonplace or wearisome iteration often associated with old age. The "intellectual" vigour displayed is as conspicuous as the "moral and spiritual." Dr. Mahan describes to the life the natural effects of Calvinism on Christian experience. At that time the feeling of personal obligation and responsibility was utterly annihilated. He saw that such a feeling was inconsistent with his creed, and he put it away. Salvation was with him an entirely passive, joyless process. Arminianism changed all this. Creed and feeling were now at one. The account of the difference of the two experiences is full of interest. As is well known, Dr. Mahan is an earnest advocate of Christian Perfection and the Baptism of the Holy Ghost in order to spiritual power. To these doctrines he again bears effective witness in this most edifying volume. Students and Professors will find much that is suggestive in the chapters on "Seminary Life" and "Experience and Reflections as President of Colleges." Charged with Scripture truth, eminently practical and spiritual, Dr. Mahan's last book is his best in every respect.

Life of Anne Lutton.

Memorials of a Consecrated Life. Compiled from the Autobiography, Letters, and Diary of Anne Lutton. London: T. Woolmer. 1882.

Biographies, especially of Christian men and women, are so numerous that one is inclined to scrutinise closely the *raison d'être* of every addition to the number. Not every person of deep piety ought to have his or her life written, and certainly not in a

volume printed for general circulation. The subject of a memoir offered to the public should possess qualifications of character or achievement, or both, markedly distinguishing it from the rest of the world, and presenting an example worthy of wide imitation or unusually stimulative to holy living and dying. Judged severely by this standard the *Life of Miss Lutton* could well maintain its right to exist and to be read. Miss Lutton was a woman of no ordinary capabilities. She outlived her fame as one of the most effective and modest female preachers Methodism or even the kingdom could boast, but to the day of her death she retained her remarkable powers of personal influence and spiritual counsel. Brought into contact with various sorts and conditions of society, she showed herself the faithful Christian lady and attracted many people of diversified characteristics to herself and to her Saviour. She was an accomplished linguist, an earnest student, a poetess of some skill, a diligent, wise, and successful class-leader and sick-visitor.

This book, however, can scarcely be called a biography in the common sense of the term. By far the larger portion of it consists of Miss Lutton's letters and the autobiography of her earlier years. The letters are divided chronologically into periods. Each period is prefaced by a condensed narrative just sufficient to make allusions in the letters intelligible. A few personal reminiscences, and a sketch of Miss Lutton's life after the blindness that afflicted her old age had deprived her of the ability to write, complete the volume. The letters abound with advice on various matters of experimental religion, as sagacious as it is kindly, as profound as it is sincere. They express a close and constant communion with God, a whole-hearted devotion, a holy trust and joy, which irresistibly remind us of *Rutherford's Letters*. Perhaps they lack the emotional glow of Rutherford, but they have a compensating precision and firmness of tone. Miss Lutton's correspondence manifests the same gentle yet resolute thoroughness—*downrightness*—that was apparent in her acts and speech. Possibly some may pronounce her views as to amusements, fiction, &c., narrow and old-fashioned, but that is quite a different thing from proving them unsound. At any rate, her precepts and her arguments deserve careful weighing.

Evidently the connective memoir proceeds from the pen of a greatly admiring and very intimate friend. Nevertheless, it never sins against good taste in its eulogies, and scrupulously abstains from exaggeration in its portraiture. If fault must be found, greater care might have been taken to avoid repetition in a few of the letters, and the anecdote on page 400 would be better omitted. But we do not care to take such exceptions to an admirable *Life* of a truly noble woman.

Some interest attaches to the fact that Miss Lutton was one of

the last representatives of a class now nearly extinct—Wesleyan Methodists holding themselves members of the Established Church and receiving the Lord's Supper from her clergy. Miss Lutton was compelled to abandon her position, though she clung to the theory after she had ceased the practice. She seems to have changed her opinion, however, before her death, as she wrote a very forceful epistle to a member of her class, urging her to give herself wholly to Methodism, and displaying its advantages over the establishment.

Examples are rare of such a combination of gifts and graces as is presented here, especially in an age in which, as some think, culture and piety tend more and more to part company. This book affords one more demonstration of the fallacy underlying this opinion, and as such deserves, and we hope will obtain, a wide circle of readers.

Harwood's Coming Democracy.

The Coming Democracy. By G. Harwood, Author of "Disestablishment." London: Macmillan and Co. 1882.

This is a very able book, written in a calm and philosophic spirit; and though the author's party bias is evident, there is no manifestation of political rancour; so that those who differ from him most widely may read patiently the honest expression of his views. His standpoint seems to be that of the conservative working man, and his ideal a State in which Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy are curiously blended—the latter contributing the chief motive power. He has large sympathy with all of these; but his attachment to the powerful middle class, which, after all, is the backbone of the nation, is less pronounced. He hardly gives it full credit for its many virtues, and rather emphasises its little failings. In the last chapter—on Democracy and Religion—we think we discover the cause of this coolness in the sturdy nonconformity of the class in question, as he is a staunch supporter of the connexion between Church and State. The Established Church is, in his view, national in the broadest sense, whilst all other denominations are merely sects. Perhaps we may find room for a few remarks upon this point before we close. The book is, on the whole, reassuring, and those who have most feared that we are on the eve of sweeping changes, amounting almost to revolution, will rise from its perusal with greater confidence in the stability of our political institutions. If the estimate of the mental and moral characteristics and political tendencies of the industrial classes be correct—and it cannot be denied that there is a strong conservative element

amongst our working men—our Constitution is safe, though some of the impending changes may be repugnant to our tastes.

Mr. Harwood's style is pithy and sententious, and we are often reminded of the homely wisdom of "John Ploughman's Talk," though there is a total absence of its racy humour. The analysis is keen and the reasoning generally sound; and even when any subject is not treated exhaustively, the thoughts are exceedingly suggestive. The terse and pointed illustrations, drawn from classical, historical, and other sources, are little gems well set: we have seldom read a more instructive political treatise, though we are very far from adopting all its conclusions. If we were reviewing the book at greater length, we should have to point out some inconsistencies and apparent contradictions. For instance, there is some looseness in the use of the word democracy, which, above any other in the book, should have been correctly defined, and the adopted meaning rigidly adhered to. In most places it plainly means government by the masses, as distinguished from the upper and middle classes; whilst elsewhere it is rightly interpreted as signifying government by *the people*, including all classes of the community. The former meaning fits in best with the general scope of the author's arguments, however; and his style is too clear to leave room for serious misapprehension. In one sense, he says, the democracy has come already, as the last Reform Act has given a preponderance of power to the working classes. Up to the year 1832 the country was virtually ruled by the aristocracy. For the last fifty years it has been governed by the middle classes, and now these in turn must give place to the masses of the people. In another sense the democracy has still to come, because "our new masters" have not yet learned how to appreciate and use their newly-acquired power; and because still further reforms are impending, such as the extension of the franchise to the agricultural population, and the redistribution of political power by the division of the country into more equal electoral districts. Perhaps manhood suffrage will follow; but Mr. Harwood does not think that the right to vote will ever be conceded to women.

The volume is divided into three books, in the first of which he treats of democracy in its relation to foreign politics. He believes that the lower classes are keenly alive to the greatness and dignity of our vast empire, and will make many sacrifices to maintain them; and that, whilst they will never be carried away by the desire for extended power and military glory, nor by the doctrine of "the Manchester School," whose aim is wealth and its motive selfishness, their object will be to promote the general well-being of mankind, and their motive duty. He thinks that our destiny as a nation is to promote the civilisation and regeneration of the world. This is a high ideal and a noble purpose,

and if the people can be brought to see it and to carry it out by proper and lawful means, the British Empire will be far greater in the future than it has ever been in the past. To christianise the heathen, to civilise the savage, and to colonise the uninhabited but habitable portions of the globe, is the "manifest destiny" of the Anglo-Saxon race; but it seems to us that our author would commit the Government to a system of political and religious propagandism. It may make wise arrangements for colonisation; but the conversion of mankind to Christianity, and its resulting civilisation, must be accomplished by the zeal and enterprise of the Church of Christ. All that we can expect of the Government is that it shall never hinder, and that it shall protect the rights of those who are engaged in the work. The "active Foreign Policy" which he advocates, and which, he admits, carries with it the idea of aggressive wars, would soon embroil us with half the world. The leading nations of Europe, with their vast armies, would not stand quietly by whilst we absorbed whole continents under the pretext of civilising them and converting them to Christianity. They also have their schemes of territorial extension, and would be quite as ready to help themselves as our coming democracy. No doubt our empire will grow, by the annexation and absorption of bordering states; but our true policy is "to make haste slowly," and only to seize when stern necessity compels.

The second book—on Democracy and Home Politics—is divided into two parts, namely, 1, Constitutional Politics, and 2, Social Politics; and each of these again into an introduction and three chapters. The three chapters of the first deal with the democracy as it is likely to affect the Crown, the House of Lords, and the House of Commons. In the first chapter the author discusses the comparative merits of an elected and an hereditary head of the State, and concludes that the people will adhere to the latter as, on the whole, the cheapest and the best. He believes that their attachment to the monarchical form of government, and to our present Royal Family, is so deep that the sovereign and the masses would be more likely to combine and crush all that stands between them, than that the lower orders should unite with those above them in an attempt to overturn the Throne. In like manner, after showing that in all forms of constitutional government a second chamber has been found necessary, he weighs the relative advantages of an elected and an hereditary Upper House, and concludes that the democracy will retain the present House of Lords. He believes that the sympathy between the nobility and the working classes is stronger than that between either of them and the middle classes. This view is probably correct, for the aristocracy regard with some jealousy the prosperous plebeians who rival them in wealth and contend with them for Parlia-

mentary honours; whilst the labouring classes look with envy and dislike upon successful tradesmen who are perhaps not superior to them in ability or education, but who rise far above them in wealth and social position. In the case of the nobility and the working classes, "'tis distance lends enchantment to the view." Their relative positions have never been changed; there is no rivalry between them; and the services rendered by the latter to the former are for the most part liberally rewarded. Mr. Harwood contends that the democracy will not curtail the prerogatives either of the Sovereign or the House of Peers, for the simple reason that they have already been reduced to a minimum, so that further reduction would amount to virtual extinction.

Paradoxical as it may seem at first sight, our author thinks that the growing power of the democracy is more likely to lessen the power of the House of Commons than to increase it. The "mob," he says, are proverbially impatient of talking assemblies, and are much more in favour of decisive action than of slow deliberation, so that it is not unlikely that in some great national crisis it may set aside the Lower House and put up a dictator in its place. He probably has in his mind a state of things which might have arisen if the last general election had endorsed the policy of the late administration, or rather of its chief. The Lower House, he thinks, has a formidable and growing rival in the Press. "Hence it seems certain that the newspapers will more and more mould that public opinion which Parliament is bound to obey; and thus, as in the past the chief function of the House of Lords has been considered to be that of registering the decrees of the Commons; so, in the future, it may happen that the chief function of the House of Commons will be that of obeying a public opinion extraneously framed" (p. 102). He also expects great changes in the *personnel* of the Lower House, including an increase in the number of working men, so large as to give a distinct tone to the Assembly; and this of course would render necessary a great reduction in the cost of elections. The ballot he regards as a serious evil, increasing the temptations to corruption and diminishing the means of detection: and he hopes that the democracy will eventually abolish it. But as long as candidates are unprincipled enough to offer bribes and electors are base enough to accept them, no system of recording votes will secure purity of election; and our only remedy is wholesome severity in the punishment of offenders. As a result of the larger number of working men in Parliament, he thinks that the honour of membership will be less sought after by those who have hitherto aspired to it as a high social distinction, and that the money value of the letters M.P. must fall because they may belong equally to a stonemason, a collier, or a millionaire. He believes, therefore, that fewer of

the trading classes will offer themselves as candidates, and that their places will be supplied either by working or professional men. He foresees danger, however, in the fact that members from the working classes may be open to bribes, and that votes may hereafter be bought and sold in the House, as they have hitherto been at elections. It is to be hoped that the democracy will guard against this evil by continuing to choose as their representatives men who are wealthy and above suspicion. He is of opinion that the younger branches of the aristocracy will maintain their ground as representatives, as they possess the inestimable advantages of leisure, culture, and independence.

We cannot notice in detail the three chapters of the second part,—on the upper, middle, and lower classes,—but must glance at some of the author's views as to the future course of social legislation. Some of the changes which he anticipates are the redistribution of taxation; the burdens on land and all kinds of property being largely increased, and a corresponding reduction being made in the duties on commodities extensively used by the industrial classes, such as spirits and tobacco; the abolition of the laws of entail and primogeniture, and considerable alterations in all the laws affecting the tenure and transfer of land, though he does not apprehend any attempts at spoliation. He is not a believer in free trade, and would like to see our home industries protected by imposts on foreign goods, after the fashion of the United States and Canada. He does not believe that the democracy will ever adopt the principle of local option, because it treats the working man as a child who needs to be taken care of, whereas he thinks that he is quite able to take care of himself. A large development of trades' unionism and of co-operative societies, with great improvements in the dwellings of working men, and other social changes, more or less desirable, or the reverse, are also on the author's programme. It may be a matter of opinion how far he has faithfully reflected the views of the labouring classes, and how far "the wish has been father to the thought;" but we would advise our readers to examine the book and judge for themselves.

We have left ourselves little space for comment on the last chapter, which treats of democracy and religion. It contains much sound reasoning and many noble sentiments; but we are occasionally startled by what appears to be glaring fallacies. For instance, he says, "The principles of the Reformation have never become powerful except where they were allied with the civil power!" (p. 349). But do we not find the fullest development of these principles in the nonconformist churches at home and abroad? Again, he says, "Under no form of government have the Church and the State been able to get permanently away from each other" (p. 351). We thought that they had been able

to do this in the United States, and it seems certain that, in the great nations which will arise out of our colonies, the Church will have no connection with the State. His ideal of a national Church is that it should be an organisation without doctrinal tests, offering the ministrations of religion freely to all, and throwing upon the people the responsibility of accepting or rejecting them (p. 382). When a Church is national, he says, it is self-governed when the nation governs it! (*ibid.*). The Church and State are thus identical, and each member of the body politic is *ipso facto* a member of the Church. Of course, these views are not new; but are they true? Is such a Church, embracing, as it must, Romanists, Socinians, and Atheists, the Church of Christ? As pictured by him, it is without theological or moral tests, and without power to exclude from its most solemn rite those who choose to accept its invitation "all ye that truly and heartily repent," &c. Will any Church consent to be the tool of the democracy on these terms? And further, as the democracy will have to rule a vast empire, its Church should be imperial also, and, overleaping all narrow sectarian bounds, should embrace Mahomedans, Hindus, and Buddhists in its "undistinguishing regard." What right would it have to demand from a Buddhist belief in the existence of God, if it gave up its right to demand from its communicants at home belief in the divinity and atonement of Christ? Our author, by stripping the Christian Church of its doctrinal and moral tests and disciplinary power, would hunt it down to death.

Christmas Books, &c.

Besides the annual volumes of the *Leisure Hour* and *Sunday at Home*, which fully maintain their character as repertories of sage counsel, lively narrative, and interesting information, pervaded by a Christian tone that makes them delectable family reading, the Religious Tract Society issues a splendid illustrated volume, entitled *Sea Pictures, Drawn with Pen and Pencil*, compiled by Dr. James Macaulay, the editor of the first-named periodical. The poetry of the sea, its physical geography, its harvest of wealth, and its historical associations, are in turn illustrated with a variety and profusion which will make the possession of this volume an object of keen rivalry in the distribution of Christmas and New Year's gifts. Those who have worked hard all the year at some of these subjects, and at times wished them a little less tedious, will find a reward for their pains in the charm with which those subjects are here invested. And the love of the sea, so natural to children, will be fostered and refined by this volume, and, what is more, connected with those wide and generous human sympathies which it is so desirable to cherish side by side with a passion for nature. Both the engravings and the letterpress are well worth the attention of children of a larger growth. Mr. Richard Heath's *Historic Landmarks in the Christian Centuries* is somewhat less discursive, pre-

senting us with a series of sketches of the most striking and notable scenes in the eighteen Christian centuries. The plan is of course somewhat similar to that of Mr. White's well-known book on the same subject, but the treatment is different, the aim being evidently picturesque representation of events rather than continuous narration or philosophic explanation. The style is easy and attractive, and the illustrations good, though not so gorgeous as those of *Sea Pictures*.

The Wesleyan Conference Office issues a number of useful and entertaining books. In *Simon Jasper*, Mr. M. G. Pearse, in his own inimitable style, tells the story of another hero in humble life, likely to be almost as great a favourite as our old friend Daniel Quorm, whose story has been told to a wide audience, if each of the 86,000 copies already printed count but for one instead of a dozen or more. The success of such works as those of Mr. Pearse—we have only mentioned two of the many—places them almost beyond the reach of criticism, as it certainly does place them beyond the need of laudation. And their popularity speaks well for the public, no less than for the author. For their interest is far deeper and healthier than that of the common religious, or semi-religious novel. A high-toned spirituality is stamped on the principal characters, and while all the resources of keen wit, vivid imagination, and sympathetic nature-painting are employed in their illustration, the dominant idea and motive of the artist are never for a moment lost sight of. A more cheerful view of religion in common life was never presented than in *Simon Jasper*—an antidote to all pessimism. Mr. Marrat's *Our Sea-Girt Isle* rivals the best of the publications of its class in the fulness and variety of its information, and of its accompanying sketches of the natural beauties, monumental grandeurs, and historic names of our native land. Another chord is touched, but one that cannot fail to vibrate in harmony with all genuine Christmas sentiments, in the *Great Army of the London Poor*, which will awaken in many breasts a species of sympathy with the homeless and destitute, far more practical and disinterested than used to be excited by the Christmas carols of Charles Dickens. *Leaves from my Log*, by T. C. Garland, furnishes interesting details of effective missionary work in the East-end of London, and shows how accessible to Gospel influence are even the most hardened and ignorant when approached with tact and in the spirit of Christian charity.

Hardly to be placed in the same category are *Memorials of the Rev. J. H. Anderson* and *Led by the Spirit*. The former narrates the career of a young minister of high promise, too soon, alas! cut off, and adds samples of his vigorous pulpit and platform utterances, remarkable for their freedom from conventionalism, and their direct and forceful appeals. In the latter, Mr. Robinson enshrines the memory of a life distinguished by its devotedness to the highest ends, and remarkable for the early trials through which that spirit of devotedness was tested and made strong.

Miss Yonge's *Unknown to History*, published by Macmillan and Co., is an historical tale, which weighs in an even balance the character of Mary, Queen of Scots, and shrinks not from a portrayal

of the dark intrigues of which she was the mainspring, as well as of the misfortunes and political exigencies of which she was the victim. This work will also help to turn the dry places of the school curriculum into fat pastures for the youthful mind.

The White Cross and Dove of Pearls, by the authoress of *Selina's Story* (published by Messrs. Hodder and Stoughton), is a religious novel of the better sort. It narrates the fortunes of a gipsy foundling, who turns out to be a lord's daughter, and depicts with equal ease the two extreme grades of society. It has already passed through five editions.

END OF VOL. LIX.

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