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THE

LONDON QUARTERLY REVIEW.

JULY, 1879.

ART. I.—*Clark's Foreign Theological Library.* Edinburgh.

More than twenty years ago the opening volumes of this series were noticed in our columns. It is not too much to say that the promise of the commencement has been more than fulfilled since. Year after year has brought to the subscribers a succession of Biblical expositions and illustrations, many of which will take their place among the classics of the exegete and preacher. The series has steadily improved, both in the solid value of the works translated, and in the merits of the translation. We know of no other series of works in recent days which has rendered more effective service to students of the sacred volume, or exerted a deeper influence on British theological thought. An intimation given some time ago that there was some probability of the series coming to an end, awakened in a wide circle equal surprise and regret; surprise, because as yet only specimens from a rich mine have been given; regret, because a gap would be left which there is nothing else to fill up. The wide domain of German theological literature, so long the carefully-guarded preserve of the professor and leisured student, has been thrown open to the busy pastor and preacher. It is true that a knowledge of German is becoming a more common acquisition; but the form of German writers on theology is often as repulsive as their matter is good, and this circumstance alone will always act as a bar to extensive study of the originals. Most even of those who possess a competent acquaintance with the mysteries of a peculiar terminology will prefer a translation, where it can be had. The present series

satisfies every reasonable expectation. Judgment by comparison is not unfair, and this mode of judgment is available in the present instance. An attempt is being made to naturalise on English soil the leading works of the rationalist school. Although the Edinburgh series is not mentioned by name, it is the one meant when the prospectus of the new series claims for itself that it is "of a more independent character, and less biassed by dogmatical prepossessions." We question the claim altogether. The anti-dogmatical prepossessions, at least, are as pronounced as possible. But putting out of view the difference in the matter, no one who compares the two series in outward respects, will say that the new is better. The price is higher, the amount of matter given far less, the typography inferior, and the translation certainly not better. As to the first point, a recent critic in the *Spectator* says of the Edinburgh series, "It is really surprising that books which must often present a very difficult task to the translator, should be put within the reach of students of theology at so very reasonable a price." We would add that the introduction of so much that is deleterious renders a continuous supply of the antidote all the more necessary.

A special excellence of German Biblical exegesis is that it occupies itself so much with the Old Testament, which in England, as formerly in Germany, had fallen into the background. The work done by Ezra of old for the law has been repeated for the whole of the ancient covenant during the last generation. The change brought about almost amounts to a new revelation. Into every nook and corner of Jewish history and faith floods of light have been thrown. The mutual interpenetration of the two parts of Holy Writ is understood as it never was before. The New is seen to be rooted in the Old, the Old to come to perfect flower and fruit in the New. A thorough knowledge of the Old carries with it inevitably a better knowledge of the New Testament. Another point of excellence is that German exegetes of the highest class everywhere expound the original text. The study of Hebrew, and of Oriental languages generally, has long occupied a foremost place in German universities. Ewald, Gesenius, Fürst, are simply the highest names in a numerous school. The student of their works insensibly acquires the habit of referring his thoughts and judgments to the original text.

It is also acknowledged on all hands in Germany that

investigation of the original text and subject-matter of Scripture, under all aspects, lies at the very basis of exposition of Scripture. To that in the last resort every question is brought back. This is true of the most extreme of the destructive critics. Even these, however arbitrary and fanciful the principles upon which they proceed, profess to make grammar and history their guides. Indeed, the only permanent service which rationalism has rendered to the cause of truth, is the thoroughness of its grammatical and historical criticism. We may observe, by the way, that scholars of the orthodox school have always done more justice to their opponents than they themselves have received. Hengstenberg and Delitzsch often acknowledge the merits of Ewald, Hupfeld, Hitzig, in terms which it is impossible to imagine the latter using of Hengstenberg and Delitzsch. However, the prerogative of the original text is maintained as earnestly by orthodox as by rationalist. The Hebrew scholarship of men like Hävernick, Hengstenberg, Keil, Delitzsch, is beyond cavil. On this field they hold their own with the best. The difference between our modern expositors and the English expositors of two centuries ago is, that the former deal with the letter, the latter with the spirit of Scripture. As spiritual, edifying expositors, the writers of the Puritan period are unrivalled, but few of them take the original text as the basis of their comments. Lightfoot, whose works are far from being obsolete, is almost the only one who anticipates the peculiar merit of modern exposition. He would have been thoroughly at home among the Ewalds, Keils, and Hengstenbergs of to-day. This could be said of very few of Lightfoot's contemporaries.

In illustration of the prominence given to the Old Testament we wish especially to refer to the commentary upon it by Keil and Delitzsch, just completed in twenty-five volumes. It is characteristic of German exhaustiveness that this voluminous exposition is styled in the original an Exegetical *Handbook*. Although written as a reply to the rationalist Handbook of Hitzig and others, the amount of polemical matter in it is inconsiderable, Keil's *Exposition of Chronicles*, in which this element was most prominent, having been replaced by a work of Bertheau's. Dr. Keil is a typical German commentator, eminent for learning, sobriety, and sound judgment. To these qualifications Dr. Delitzsch adds special acquaintance with the lore of

the Talmud and Jewish commentators, a feature which gives a specially Jewish flavour to his expository writings. The abundant illustrations he is able to bring on questions of lexical interpretation from Arabic and other languages cognate to the Hebrew are of the greatest value. His Hebrew translation of the New Testament has just appeared in a second edition. By habitual conversance with Hebrew writers he has become thoroughly saturated with their spirit, and his pages are often touched with the richness of Oriental fancy. The division of labour is admirably suited to the respective gifts of the expositors. Dr. Keil takes as his field the historical and prophetical books, Dr. Delitzsch the poetical books. The only exception is that the latter also expounds Isaiah, who is a poet in substance if not in form.

Descending to particulars, we may refer, in the first place, to the Commentary on Job. For Dr. Delitzsch this book is an inspired drama of the age of Solomon, dealing with that old problem—the meaning and design of the afflictions of the righteous. On this view, it would have to be classed with Proverbs and Ecclesiastes. We cannot say that the author has dealt satisfactorily with the arguments against the dramatic and for the historical character of the book. There is here no question of inspiration or revelation. On these points Professor Delitzsch is thoroughly sound. The arguments for the historical view are well stated in the article on Job in Smith's Dictionary, and we have never seen any adequate reply to them. If the writer had lived in the days of the fully-developed Jewish law and ritual, it is difficult to believe that this fact would not have betrayed itself in incidental allusion or phrase, as is the case in Ecclesiastes. We could not, indeed, considering the subject of the book, expect any direct reference, but indirectly at least the individuality of the writer must have looked through his work. The reply is that the writer threw himself back, by sheer force of imagination, into the pre-legal period. If it were so, the book would form an exception to the rest of Scripture. There is nothing more certainly established by modern criticism than that in the writers of Scripture, alongside the Divine, the human is allowed full play. Apart from this point, the exposition has every element of excellence. The main problem of the book is seen to receive a many-sided solution. The sufferings of the righteous are disciplinary and preparatory to a

higher state of prosperity. But above all in the history of Job is rehearsed the world-wide and world-long conflict between good and evil, which culminated in the cross of Calvary. In this relation the appearance of the personal Tempter at the opening of the book is very significant. Our thoughts are inevitably carried forward to another conflict and another triumph. The book of Job is thus an earlier Gospel, the ancient sufferer is a type of the Divine Sufferer, the issue is a prophecy of a wider issue to be realised in the fulness of time. Delitzsch says well: "The Church has always recognised in the passion of Job a type of the passion of Jesus Christ. James (v. 11) even compares the patience of Job and the issue of the Lord's sufferings. And according to this indication, it was the custom, after the second century, to read the Book of Job in the churches during Passion-week. The final solution of the problem which this marvellous book sets forth is then this: the suffering of the righteous in its deepest cause is the conflict of the seed of the woman with the seed of the serpent, which ends in the head of the serpent being trampled under foot; it is the type or copy of the suffering of Christ, the Holy God, who has Himself borne our sins, and in the constancy of His reconciling love has withstood, even to the final overthrow, the assault of wrath, and of the angel of wrath. The real contents of the book of Job is the mystery of the cross; the cross on Golgotha is the solution of the enigma of every cross; and the book of Job is a prophecy of this final solution."

The three volumes on the Psalms represent an immense advance upon Hengstenberg, and along with Perowne's excellent commentary supply all that an English expositor needs. Professor Delitzsch is thoroughly at home in his exposition of the structure of Hebrew poetry, and the whole work has evidently been a labour of love. The Introduction treats of such subjects as the History of Psalm Composition, the Strophe System of the Psalms, Temple Music and Psalmody, History of the Exposition, Preliminary Theological Considerations. The history of the exposition of the Psalms is traced with particular care. At the head of all expositors stands the Lord Himself who, "both before and after His resurrection, unfolded the meaning of the Psalms from His own life and its vicissitudes." After the Lord the Apostles, and after the Apostles the Fathers, among whom Augustine and Chrysostom shine pre-eminent.

The mediæval Church produced nothing of special mark on the Psalms. "When, however, a new light dawned upon the Church through the Reformation—the light of a grammatical and deeply spiritual understanding of Scripture, represented in Germany by Reuchlin, and in France by Vatablus—then the rose-garden of the Psalter began to breathe forth its perfumes as with the renewed freshness of a May day; and, born again from the Psalter, German hymns resounded from the shores of the Baltic to the foot of the Alps with all the fervour of a newly quickened first-love." Among the most modern expositors Hupfeld is commended for his "grammatical thoroughness;" Hitzig for "stimulating originality;" Ewald for "a special gift for perceiving the emotions and throbbings of the heart, and entering into the changes of feeling."

"The much-abused commentary of Hengstenberg opened a new track, inasmuch as it primarily set the exposition of Psalms in its right relation to the Church once more, and was not confined to the historico-grammatical function of exposition." In any history of exposition written by Delitzsch the Jewish interpreters are sure to receive their due. Rashi of Troyes († 1105), Aben-Ezra of Toledo († 1167), Kimchi of Narbonne († 1250), are fitly commemorated,—the second "independent and genial," the latter "less original of the two, but gifted with a keener appreciation of that which is simple and natural, and of all the Jewish expositors he is the pre-eminently grammatico-historical interpreter." Dr. Delitzsch does not overlook the parallel between the five-fold division of the Psalms and that of the law. In one we have a Pentateuch of devotion, in the other of founding and legislation. The principle of division is shown to be that of homogeneity of matter. Profoundly interesting is the discussion of the relation of the Psalms to Messianic prophecy, legal sacrifices, New Testament doctrine and morality. In the section on temple music we are told that "antiphonal song ought to alternate, not according to the verses, as at the present day in the Romish and English Church, but according to the two members of the verse."

Equally thorough and serviceable is the exposition of Isaiah. Delitzsch's remarks on the spirit of the destructive criticism are severe but just. "Wilful contempt of external testimony and frivolity in the treatment of historical data, have been from the very first the fundamental evils apparent in the manner in which modern critics have

handled the questions relating to Isaiah. These critics approach everything that is traditional with the presumption that it is false; and whoever would make a scientific impression upon them must first of all declare right fearlessly his absolute superiority to the authority of tradition." The vindication of the unity of the book, in opposition to those who trace a new hand from ch. xl., is full and conclusive, although the author refers to a still fuller vindication in the elaborate commentary of Drechsler. The latter is a work of considerable eminence in Germany. Delitzsch, who helped to complete it, characterises it thus: "Its peculiar excellency is not to be found in the exposition of single sentences, which is unsatisfactory, on account of the comminating, glossatorial style of its exegesis, and, although diligent and thorough enough, is unequal and by no means productive, more especially from a grammatical point of view; but in the spiritual and spirited grasp of the whole, the deep insight which it exhibits into the character and ideas of the prophet and of prophecy, its vigorous penetration into the very heart of the plan and substance of the whole book." However, Delitzsch's own work, no doubt, contains the pith of Drechsler's without its defects. Every high-class commentary has its culminating point. In the present work this is to be found in the expositor of ch. liii.—that "golden *passional* of the Old Testament evangelist." Here the prophet and his expositor alike reach their highest level. Thought and language rise with the grandeur of the theme. Which of the innumerable passion-sermons in existence will compare for a moment with Isaiah's? It is an epistle to the Hebrews in epitome. "It looks as if it had been written beneath the cross upon Golgotha. It is the unravelling of Ps. xxii. and Ps. cx. It forms the outer centre of this wonderful book of consolation (ch. xl.—lxvi.), and is the most central, the deepest, and the loftiest thing that the Old Testament prophecy, outstripping itself, has achieved."

Of the volumes contributed by Professor Keil to this Old Testament handbook it will be enough to notice those on Ezekiel and Daniel, both of which are masterly monographs. The former should be compared with the commentaries of Fairbairn and Hengstenberg on the same mysterious book. Keil founds himself more completely on the original text than Fairbairn, although the latter gives as a substitute a new translation with notes. The difference in point of com-

pleteness is indicated by the fact that the exposition of the grand temple-vision in chs. xl.—xlviii. fills two-thirds of Keil's second volume, while in Fairbairn's it is limited to seventy pages: here Keil is at his best. Both oppose the millenarian interpretation. On some points, Fairbairn's exposition seems preferable to Keil's. Thus, the latter regards the cherubim in the first chapter as representing living realities in the angelic world, while the former looks upon them as "ideal combinations," a far more likely supposition. Keil is right in contending against the rationalist critics that Ezekiel's imagery is borrowed, not from Assyria and Babylon, but from the Jewish temple. The fact that Ezekiel was a priest, and therefore familiar with temple symbols, confirms this view. There are decisive differences between Ezekiel's figures and those pictured in Assyrian and Babylonian remains, while the features in common might just as well be borrowed from the Jewish ritual. On the cherubim Hengstenberg's essay in his commentary should be compared.

The Commentary on Ezekiel has a worthy companion in that on Daniel. Keil is less minutely polemical than Pusey, and therefore more useful to the ordinary student. The Introduction supplies an adequate answer to the objections against the genuineness of the book drawn from its position in the Canon, from the supposed silence respecting the book in the other writings, and from alleged internal anachronisms, improbabilities and errors. The argument on the first two points is thus summed up: "Its place in the Canon among the *Kethubim* corresponds with the place which Daniel occupied in the kingdom of God under the Old Testament; the alleged want of references to the book and its prophecies in Zechariah and in the Book of Jesus Sirach is, when closely examined, not really the case: not only Jesus Sirach and Zechariah knew and understood the prophecies of Daniel, but even Ezekiel names Daniel as a bright pattern of righteousness and wisdom." On the latter point, the author is not content with repelling attacks, but carries the war into the enemy's camp. The whole argument is very able. The language and contents of the book are shown to be totally inconsistent with the theory of its origin in the Maccabean period. We are compelled to break a lance with the translator, who in general has done his work excellently. He says in his preface, "The severely critical

and exegetical nature of the work precludes any attempt at elegance of style. The translator's aim has simply been to introduce the English student to Dr. Keil's own modes of thought and forms of expression." We have no fault to find with such an aim, though it is not the highest. But even such a canon requires a translator to be intelligible. On p. 48 we read of prophecies "covering themselves" (*decken sich*) with the historical facts. We doubt whether any one, ignorant of German, will discover the meaning of so un-English an idiom.

Even with the *Speaker's Commentary* in view, we should still in preference recommend Keil and Delitzsch to the student. Along with Keil's admirable *Introduction to the Old Testament*, it forms a complete exposition of the letter of the Old Covenant, and does the highest honour to its authors. Keil and Delitzsch on the Old Testament, and Meyer on the New, together form a commentary on the Bible which, for the purposes of the preacher and expositor, it will be hard to surpass. The series on the Old Testament is offered by the publishers at subscription price.

We pass from Biblical comment to the kindred field of Biblical theology, which is represented by two noble works, Schmid's *New Testament Theology*, and Oehler's *Theology of the Old Testament*. First, as to the translation. The translation of Schmid is admirable in every respect. Not so that of Oehler. The second volume is rendered fairly, but the style of the first is bald and clumsy to the last degree. "Churchly dogmatic" (p. 33) is a barbarism. "The creation and *maintenance* of the world" is at least an unusual phrase. The following is a fine specimen of the barely literal: "Then time, which with the Godhead founded Rome, mixed fortune and virtue, that, taking from both what was their own, it might set up for all men a holy hearth, an abiding stay and foundation, an anchor for things driven about midst storm and waves. Thus in the Roman Empire the weightiest matters have found stability and security, everything is in order, and has entered on an immovable orbit of government." This instance is clear in comparison with many that might be quoted. Oehler deserved as good a translator as Schmid was fortunate enough to find. His work is truly a masterpiece, and here and there displays an insight which borders upon genius. The field is a wide one, the details to be mastered are intricate, but he grasps and handles the whole with the utmost ease. The work embraces

two parts, Mosaism and Prophetism, which, as is well known, represent two stages of Jewish doctrine, partly successive and partly contemporaneous: contemporaneous, inasmuch as the germs of Prophetism were embedded in the Mosaic law, and the Mosaic law continued in the age of the prophets; successive, inasmuch as Prophetism in its full development and flower is subsequent to the establishment of the Mosaic system. It is impossible to give an adequate idea of the wealth of thought and matter contained in the author's investigations into early Jewish beliefs respecting God, the world, man, sin, sacrifice, worship. The fact of gradual development in revelation is here strikingly illustrated. We are able to trace every doctrine, from its lowest root to its topmost branch. In his interpretation of the ritual of sacrifice, Professor Oehler rejects the notion of *vicaria pœna*. But here the emphasis, we imagine, is to be laid on *pœna*. We do not gather that Oehler rejects the idea of substitution. He says (i. 417), "God has put the soul of the clean and guiltless animal which is presented to Him in the blood of the offering, in the place of the impure and sinful soul of the offerer, and this pure soul, coming between the offerer and the Holy God, lets Him see at His altar a pure life, through which the impure life of the offerer is covered." The author lays stress on the idea of the soul offered "covering" the soul-offering. But this is a simple adherence to the etymology of the original word, which, though it may be the basis, cannot be the final expression of a doctrinal idea. Professor Oehler also very justly points out that the Mosaic law provided no sacrifice for wilful, presumptuous sins. "He who has malevolently committed trespass against the covenant God and His laws falls without mercy under the Divine punitive justice; but on this account there is no more sacrifice for him. The Mosaic cultus is a Divine ordinance of grace for the congregation, which, though it does indeed sin in its weakness, yet seeks the Divine countenance." All the expiatory sacrifices were for sins of ignorance and infirmity alone. If it were any use to find fault with the form of a book, which in the case of a posthumous work like this is unalterable, we should be disposed to criticise the form of the present work. Professor Oehler adopted the practice—which is such a favourite with German authors, but which does not commend itself to English minds—of throwing the bulk of the matter into numerous long notes, which are

appended to a brief text. The fusion of the two elements would have been a great improvement. Enough references to German literature would still have been left to form a body of valuable notes. *Sed aliter diis visum est.* After every deduction on points of form, Oehler's work remains one of the best in the entire series.

Schmid's treatise is unexceptionable. The fascinating subject of which it treats has scarcely received any notice in England. The aim of Biblical Theology is to draw out the doctrinal teaching of Scripture in systematic form, apart from all dogmatic developments. It lays bare the fundamental strata of revealed truth previous to all human accretions. We get back to the original substance of truth, to which all creeds and churches profess ultimately to appeal. It is obvious that the danger to which the Biblical theologian is exposed is that of reading later ideas into the original record, and perhaps it is impossible for any one entirely to avoid this error. We believe that Dr. Schmid succeeds in this respect as well as any one is ever likely to do. His work consists of two parts—the first dealing with the teaching of Jesus, the other with that of the Apostles; to each part is prefixed a brief account of the historical circumstances of the period treated of. Then follows a description of the doctrinal teaching under the head of each doctrine or subject. The order followed in the second part is most natural. The first form of Apostolic teaching, as standing nearest to Judaism, is that of James and Peter. The second form, in which the development of New Testament doctrine, and indeed Old Testament as well, reaches its crown, is that of Paul and John. The discussion supplies a demonstration not only of the process of development within the circle of revelation, but also of the essential unity of revelation in all its parts. All the discrepancies which have ever been alleged against Scripture are superficial, while the unity is in its very essence and substance. The Pauline theology, as it has been called, is already contained in germ in the teaching of Christ, while the teaching of Christ desiderates the exposition of Paul, just as the Old Testament does the New. "I have many things to say unto you;" and Christ did say them by the pen of His Apostles.

In Winer's *Confessions of Christendom*, with its precise definitions and rigid formulæ, we have a perfect contrast to the simplicity of Biblical Theology. Symbolism, or the

History of Creeds, has a considerable literature in Germany. Winer's treatise is the most suitable text-book, because of the judicial impartiality by which it is marked. It is as free from the passion of controversy as a digest of laws. The judgment of the student is thus less likely to be deflected from the straight line by bias, either to the right hand or left. At the same time, Winer does not cover the entire field. The great creeds of the early Church are not noticed. The sole object is to set in clear relief the doctrinal differences of modern Christendom, and this is done in a most thorough way. Whether as a text-book for college teaching or private study, we can conceive no better manual than this. Whoever will master its contents, and especially follow out the suggestions in the Introduction, will become no mean proficient in comparative theology. To complete the survey, a work like Hahn's *Bibliothek der Symbole und Glaubenslehren der alten Kirche*, which has recently appeared in a second edition, is necessary. The various introductory labours of the editor will be found to add greatly to the value of Winer's treatise. He observes as follows:—"To set forth in order, and with absolute impartiality, the endless variations of Christian thought, through the entire process of the *loci communes* of theology, in all their dogmatic comprehensiveness and subtlety, is a task for which very few men could be found competent. Many have taken it in hand; but, before proceeding far, have been overpowered by their honest prepossessions, and surrendered themselves to the *genius loci* of their own confession. But Winer has held the scales with an even and untremulous hand. He has done justice to every side of every question; the copious extracts from the standards are left to speak for themselves; while innumerable points of less importance, both in dogma and its history, are thrown into the notes and observations." It was a clever move on the part of the Roman Catholics to translate Möhler's specious volume on *Symbolism*. The editor of Winer says that the work is "a subtle though clear apology for Tridentine doctrine. What Bossuet attempts in an oratorical and unsatisfactory, because unreal, manner, in his *Variations of Protestantism*, Möhler essays to establish in a calm and scientific manner." We might demur to the latter part of the description, but perhaps the manner is as calm and scientific as is usual in this particular controversy. The editor speaks afterwards of Möhler's fallacies.

However, the translation no doubt answered its purpose, and it is a pity that no translation has appeared of such replies as those of Hase and Baur.

The important department of Dogmatic Theology is represented in the series by a single work, Martensen's *Dogmatics*. Shedd's *History of Doctrines* is published by the Messrs. Clark outside the series, and is an original work of the author. Martensen's volume is rather a general discussion of the main doctrines than a minute survey of the entire field. The extreme originality and independence of view, which constitutes its excellence for the student, prevents its serving as a map of the entire domain of dogmatics. The defect, no doubt, of German works on the subject is the polemical tone which prevails in them; but this is an element which we must accept and make the best of. We might go through the alphabet in an enumeration of the authors in this field—Baumgarten-Crusius, Beck, Ebrard, Gass, Hase, Kahnis, Lipsius (whose handbook has just appeared in a second edition), and so on. Hagenbach's treatise is promised in the Edinburgh series. It was published by the Messrs. Clark, in 1846; but the new edition is to be taken from a recent edition of the original, and to contain "large additions from various sources." German treatises, such as Harnack's and Zezschwitz's, on Practical Theology, inclusive of the theory of preaching and pastoral work, are very full. This interesting field is still untouched by translation, as is, also, formal Apologetics.

The department of ethics is represented by two works, Martensen's *Christian Ethics* and Harless's *System of Christian Ethics*. To name the author of the first work is to characterise it as full of original, stimulating thought. Originality and vigour seem indeed to belong to the fibre of the Danish mind, if we are to judge by Martensen and another author to whom Martensen refers—Kierkegaard, who appears to be a sort of theological Carlyle. Martensen's volume merely represents the first part of the original, the part dealing with the general principles and ideas of ethics. It is true that in this respect Harless forms a supplement to Martensen, discussing as he does in detail the several departments of the subject. But in reality no author can be regarded as a supplement to another. Though the material is the same, it takes different shapes in different hands. The outline which Martensen at the close of his

volume sketches for the second part, is identical in the main with the divisions of Harless. The former says: "Special ethics remains, then, to be treated under these principal divisions: 1. Life under the law and sin; 2. Life in imitation of Christ; 3. The moral life of society and the kingdom of God." Harless's divisions are—1. The blessing of salvation, including the natural state of man and life under the law; 2. The possession of salvation; 3. The preservation of salvation. But full and able as Harless's mode of treatment is, Martensen's has a value of its own. The form adopted by Harless is the same as in Oehler, a brief text and long notes.

Hengstenberg's is a name that often occurs in the series, but not oftener than is due to the merit of his works. As the leader in the revival of orthodox faith, Hengstenberg was the mark of boundless abuse; but he never shrank or quailed in contending "earnestly for the faith once delivered to the saints." The wonderful success which crowned his lifelong struggle is no doubt the true cause of the bitter disparagement and scorn still heaped upon his name in some quarters. Abuse in such a cause and from such persons is the highest honour. To the defenders of saving truth, if to any, Christ's words apply in all their force: "Blessed are ye when men shall revile you . . . for My sake." Oehler, quite as competent a judge as any on the other side, speaks in a very different tone. "Hengstenberg retains the merit of having been the first to revive in Germany a strong religious and theological interest in the Old Testament." To say that some of his works need now to be supplemented is only to say that the world has not stood still. Canon Perowne speaks of the "laboured dulness" of his Commentary on the Psalms, but here the author suffers for the "dulness" of the translator. We ask our readers to judge of Hengstenberg, not by this work, but by his *Christology of the Old Testament*—a worthy supplement to Pye Smith's *Scripture Testimony to the Messiah*—and his monographs on Ezekiel, Ecclesiastes, and St. John. The special feature of the last work is the care with which it traces the threads of connection between the Gospel and the Old Testament. The idea may be pushed a little too far in certain details, but it is a true one, and is worked out by Hengstenberg as by no one else. A very full and just estimate of Hengstenberg's character and influence may be found in the Introduction to the

second volume of his posthumous work, *The Kingdom of God under the Old Testament.*

A very different, and in many respects contrasted, character is that of Tholuck, whose Commentaries on St. John and the Sermon on the Mount have a place in the series. Tholuck occupied an altogether different standpoint from that of Hengstenberg. The former essayed to strike out a middle course between dogma and lax belief, while the latter was ever a sturdy Lutheran. The charm of Tholuck's genial, mystic temperament was resistless, and his power over the young immense. His best works have all run through edition upon edition in Germany, and no one who reads them can wonder at their influence. A learning as solid and multifarious as Hengstenberg's is blended with the grace of poetry. The ineffaceable stamp of genius is visible everywhere. Philippi is somewhat harsh when he describes Tholuck as a "misty, vacillating mediation-divine," though the charge may be substantially true. It was not in Tholuck to be a dogmatic theologian. Sharply cut precision was alien to his nature. We would fain believe that his chief influence has been exerted in producing faith, though perhaps imperfect, where it did not exist, than in disturbing faith where it was strong. The two works of Tholuck in the Edinburgh series are worthy of the author's fame and the subject, and at the same time free from all doubtful elements.

The present age is an age of monographs, and Germany is their favoured home. There they originated, and there they have come to perfection. Every great character or epoch or institution has its monograph or monographs containing an exhaustive study of the subject. The application of this system, which is only another form of the division of labour, to the interpretation of Scripture has had the best results. The time is long since past when we were content to receive a Commentary on the whole of Scripture from a single hand. There is not a Commentary of this class which has not its weak and strong parts. If Dr. Clark is at his best in the Gospels, in the Prophets he is at his weakest, and no wonder, when his memoirs tell us that the exposition of Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel was written in six weeks. Even if this statement only applies to the simple writing after careful preparation, the time is short enough. By division of labour, when properly carried out, we obtain equal strength in all the parts.

All our best modern Commentaries are of this composite character,—The Speaker's, Jamieson, Brown, and Faussett's, the *Critical Commentary* on the New Testament by Blackley and Hawes, Schaff's, Ellicott's. The last name reminds us that Bishop Ellicott was the first to introduce expository monographs into England, by his peerless Commentaries on the Epistles, never, alas, to be completed. Lightfoot followed in the same track. Will he follow also in the last respect and from the same cause? Eadie, in a somewhat different line, deserves respectful mention. The present series of translations contains four noble monographs—Delitzsch, on the Hebrews; Godet, on Luke; Godet, on John; Luthardt, on John. Of the first we only need say that it is quite equal to the other works of the author, which we have already sufficiently characterised. Dr. Delitzsch's, minute acquaintance with everything Jewish admirably qualifies him to expound the great Jewish epistle. To German thoroughness and learning Godet adds the French facility of clear and graceful exposition. His Commentaries are an almost perfect example of the continuous, as opposed to what Delitzsch calls the "glossatorial" style of exposition, so that they are books to read as well as consult. Mark the unity which Godet traces through the Gospel. First, the Narratives of the Infancy, in seven parts (i. 5—ii. 52); secondly, the Advent of the Messiah, in four narratives (iii. 1—iv. 13); thirdly, the Ministry of Jesus in Galilee, in four cycles (iv. 14—ix. 50); fourthly, the Journey from Galilee to Jerusalem, in three cycles (ix. 51—xix. 27); fifthly, the Sojourn at Jerusalem (xix. 28—xxi. 38); sixthly, the Passion, in three cycles (xxii. and xxiii.); seventhly, the Resurrection and Ascension (xxiv.). This exposition, so firmly knit together, is embedded between an introduction, which discusses fully the usual questions, and ample dissertations on the general characteristics and composition of the Gospel, its sources and relations to the Synoptics, and the beginning of the Christian Church. The advantage of this division of the matter usually included in Prolegomena is that the conclusions advocated in the *Postlegomena* are supported by the whole weight of the intermediate exposition. The discussion in the latter part, on the relations and origin of the Synoptics, is particularly interesting. After criticising the most recent theories of Weizsäcker, Holtzmann and Weiss, Professor Godet proposes his own,

which is substantially that of Alford, but put with French grace and vivacity. We seem to see the Gospels gradually crystallising round certain fixed points. The independence and distinctiveness of the Evangelists are well brought out. But Godet's masterpiece is his Commentary on St. John's Gospel in three volumes, which has been translated into German as well. The only fault, if any, is that the author seems to have aimed at saying everything that can be said. Notes like those on pp. 137, 140, and 295 of vol. i., are unworthy of a place in such a commentary on such a Gospel. But these are mere spots in the sun. The grammatical criticism, theological exposition, and discussions of critical problems are all of the highest order. In addition, there is the flowing diction which is so seldom present in similar works on the other side of the Rhine. Of all the great commentaries on this glorious Gospel, we doubt whether there is one superior to Godet's. To all who are compelled to confine themselves to a single exposition we should confidently recommend it. Take the following as a specimen of argument and style. Professor Godet is replying to the objection that the character of Christ's teaching in the Synoptics is altogether different from that given in St. John. The dilemma put is: "A choice must be made: if Jesus has spoken as Matthew represents, He cannot have spoken as John describes." "Now," says M. Renan, "between these two authorities no critic has hesitated, nor will hesitate." After dwelling on numerous points of coincidence, Professor Godet continues: "Criticism has so frequently made use of the comparison between the discrepancy which we are considering, and that which the Socrates of Xenophon and of Plato present, that we cannot refrain from likewise devoting some lines to that interesting subject. The analogy between the two facts is very remarkable. It is from Xenophon's narrative that we become acquainted with the varied, practical, and popular side of the teaching of Socrates; it is by means of Plato that we get a glimpse of the lofty speculative background which constitutes the basis, unknown to the common herd, of those dialogues full of animation and originality which Xenophon has preserved to us. Without the theory of ideas, concerning which the latter is silent, Socrates would never have attained to that firm attitude, that sovereign deportment, which Xenophon himself makes us admire in his master. And if the history of philosophy

first flowed to the side of the Socrates of Xenophon, and regarded that of Plato as a speaking-trumpet, selected by the latter to set forth his favourite theory, it has changed its mind at the present day. Schleiermacher, Brandis, Ritter, recognise that the close connection which unites the school of Plato with the philosophy of Socrates would be inexplicable if the teaching of the latter had not comprised profounder speculative elements than anything which Xenophon has transmitted to us. It is in like manner, on this condition only, that we can account for the complete revolution wrought by Socrates on the progress of Greek thought. Thus science comprehends that the two pictures are equally legitimate, and seeks for a synthesis which will reunite them, and reproduce the image of the true and complete Socrates. Who would not be struck by the analogy between that historical phenomenon and the one which we are considering? As we have seen, the Jesus of the Synoptics is likewise an insoluble enigma if we do not admit, as lying at the foundation of Christ's consciousness, that sublime background of the feeling of an eternal existence, of a Divine pre-existence, which, from the period of His baptism, became the basis of His earthly activity, and which has been clearly disclosed to us only by John. The influence of Christ on the religious life of mankind is only intelligible on such a condition. If there was in the Greek sage the wherewithal to furnish two such different portraits, and yet one and both of them relatively true, how should it surprise us to see a similar result produced with respect to Him who possessed an infinitely superior richness of life and thought, and who, if He had lived in the Greek world, could have said: 'Here is a greater than Socrates!'" A pithy saying is quoted from Wolff: "In John, Jesus is *constantly* that which in the Synoptics He is only during some remarkable hours."

With Godet's Commentary should be compared Luthardt's, also in three volumes. The Introduction, of course, goes over the same ground as Godet's, but it is not without excellent features of its own. We may refer to the exceedingly minute and elaborate discussion of the language and style of the Gospel. The peculiarities of construction and idiom are well illustrated. These are such as—a fondness for repeating words and phrases; brief, abrupt sentences in the Hebrew rather than the Greek style; abundance of

antithesis and contrast. Still more interesting is the illustration of the Evangelist's fondness for sketching typical characters, which stand out from the canvas in life-like outline and colour—Thomas, Nathanael, Philip, Andrew, Peter, the beloved disciple, the mother of Jesus, Mary Magdalene, the two sisters at Bethany, the Samaritan woman, Nicodemus, Caiaphas, Pilate, Judas. All the preliminary matter is discussed with even greater thoroughness in the author's excellent volume, *St. John, the Author of the First Gospel*, issued independently of the series. The Bibliography at the close of the latter volume of the works published on the origin of the fourth Gospel fills eighty pages. It is compiled by the translator, Dr. Gregory, a few of whose comments are not in the best taste. Indeed, the flavour of the translation is rather American than English, though we do not impute this as a fault. Both Godet and Luthardt regard chap. xxi. as an appendix added by John subsequently, holding chap. xx. 30, 31, to be the real close of the book. We may add that the printing of the final ς as σ throughout Luthardt's volumes has far from a pleasing effect to English eyes.

Other works, like Bleek's *Introduction to the New Testament*, we must pass by. Stier's volumes, and Christlieb's *Modern Doubt*, are too well known to need description. Among the new announcements is Kriebeg on the *Atonement, considered in the Light of Christian Consciousness*—a work which in opposition to Ritschl has made a deep impression in Germany. There is every promise that the series will continue to deserve the high place which it has won in theological literature. Every minister who uses it will find his range of thought sensibly enlarged. No richer mine of material for pulpit exposition and teaching exists.

Every one who considers the subject must be struck by the contrast between English and Continental theological literature. It would be impossible in this country to find a market for such works as are constantly pouring from the press in Germany and even in France. No one there who has anything which he considers worth publishing has any hesitation in sending it forth. Of course a great deal of the literature is ephemeral, but a fair proportion lives. He would be a daring publisher who in this country should adventure such a thesaurus as Herzog's Encyclopædia, which is now appearing in a second edition. In France it is not uncommon to find not only modern reprints of the Fathers,

but also modern translations of the Fathers *in extenso*. It is evident that the theology-reading public is far greater on the Continent than with us. The ministers alone form a considerable constituency, and these have undergone a far more thorough and systematic training in theology than is common in this country. Theology occupies a very subordinate place in the curriculum of universities among us, compared with its position in Germany. There it is much more on a level with the other branches of academical training. The field is regularly mapped out, and professors are assigned to the several departments. The chairs of theology and its related subjects rank with those of classics and science. Oriental philology is thoroughly taught.

All this points to the much more complete training of the ministry in Germany. Scotland is the only part of Great Britain which approaches Germany in this respect. All honour to the national tradition which has always reckoned scholarship and learning among the essential requisites of the Christian teacher. No question is more important in its bearing on the future of Christianity than that of the training of the ministry. If no one would be allowed to practise in medicine or law without the credentials of adequate qualifications, far less should this be possible in the cure of souls. If it is lawful to learn from an enemy, we may be admonished by the practice of the Romish Church. However narrow and exclusive the training of its priests, they are, at least, well versed in the technicalities of their calling. Until lately, the English Church was the most backward in this respect. Well drilled in the classics or mathematics, its ministers were left to pick up theological knowledge as best they could. Strenuous efforts are now being made by the establishment of colleges like King's, Highbury, Litchfield, Chichester, Cuddesdon, and Lampeter to supply the deficiency. Nonconformists have excelled the English Church on this point. Their deficiency, owing to scanty means, has rather been in breadth and depth of general knowledge. Nonconformist candidates for the pulpit have always been trained, more or less completely, in the outlines of theology. Let the churches perfect their systems of ministerial training. Nothing will repay culture more generously than this field.

Still, let it never be forgotten that all that colleges can do is to supply the instruments, sketch the outline, indicate the methods of theological study. The programme given

in these preliminary years must be worked out and filled up by assiduous, lifelong research and study. The student, when he leaves college, has mastered the grammar of his special science. He has next to apply the rules put into his hands to one department after another. He is in the position of the art or science student, whose course of training in studio and laboratory is completed. His next business is to do work of his own. It would be a good sign if English theology were constantly producing works like those given in the series now under notice, many of which issue, not from professors' studies, but from quiet parsonages. More exhaustive and elaborate works still are perforce left untranslated. We do not of course forget or undervalue what is done in Great Britain in this field. The different lectureships and individual scholars are rendering good service. But the total outcome is not large in comparison. The great lack is a public interested in theological questions, and nothing will tend to create this more effectually than a thorough training of ministerial candidates in Biblical and theological science. To all these purposes the series of German translations has made—may it long continue to make—no insignificant contribution.

ART. II.—1. *Voyage dans la Basse et la Haute Egypte pendant les Campagnes du Général Bonaparte.* Par VIVANT DENON. A Paris: Didot, AUX. 1802.

2. *Monuments de l'Egypte et de la Nubie, d'après les dessins exécutés sur les lieux sous la direction de* CHAMPOLLION, *le jeune, et les descriptions autographes qu'il en a rédigées, publiées sous les auspices de* M. GUIZOT *et de* M. THIERS, *Ministres de l'Instruction publique et de l'Intérieur, par une Commission spéciale.* À Paris: Firmin Didot. 1845.

3. *Egypt's Place in Universal History.* An Historical Investigation. In Five Books. By CHRISTIAN C. J. BUNSEN. Translated by Charles Cotterell. London: 1859.

4. *Voyages de M. de Thevenot, tant en Europe qu'en Asie et en Afrique.* À Paris: chez CHAS. ANGOT, au Lyon d'or. 1689.

5. *Up the Nile and Home Again.* A Handbook for Travellers and a Travel Book for the Library. By F. W. FAIRHOLT, F.S.A. With One Hundred Illustrations from Original Sketches by the Author. London: Chapman and Hall. 1862.

6. *A Thousand Miles up the Nile.* By AMELIA B. EDWARDS, Author of "Barbara's History," &c. Upwards of Seventy Wood Engravings by G. Pearson, after Finished Drawings on the spot by the Author. Longmans. 1877.

7. *Album du Musée de Boulaq, comprenant quarante planches, photographiées par* MM. DÉLIÉ *et* BÉCHARD. *Avec un Texte explicatif rédigé* AUGUSTE MARIETTE-BEY. Le Caire. Mourès et C^ie^. 1871.

8. *Voyage dans la Haute-Egypte. Explication de quatre-vingts-trois Vues photographiées d'après les monuments antiques compris entre Caire et la première Cataracte.* Par AUGUSTE MARIETTE-BEY. Tome 1^er^. Caire: Mourès. Paris: Goupil. 1878.

9. *Egypt from the Earliest Times to B.C.* 300. Christian Knowledge Society. 1876.

10. *Egypt and the Pentateuch.* An Address to the Members of the Open-Air Mission, by W. R. COOPER, F.R.S.A.,

&c., Assistant-Secretary of the Society of Biblical Archæology. Bagster. 1875.

11. *The Manners and Customs of the Ancient Egyptians.* By Sir Gardner Wilkinson, D.C.L., &c. A New Edition, Revised and Corrected by Samuel Birch, LL.D., D.C.L., Keeper of the Egyptian and Oriental Antiquities in the British Museum. Murray. 1878.

The subject which we have undertaken is far too vast to be treated of in all its bearings in a single paper. The interpretation of hieroglyphics alone, and the latest results obtained in this way in the field of history and mythology, are enough to fill our whole space. Much must be wholly left out, much more can only be glanced at. We shall aim at being suggestive—at pointing out lines of research for those who may care to investigate a subject which follows naturally from that of Cyprus, so lately treated of in these pages. The interest of Egypt is manifold. To the traveller its ruins will always come with the freshness of a revelation. Every one who has been there assures us of this; no previous getting-up of the subject detracts from the delight of seeing the things themselves. You may study every print, from the coloured plates in Denon to the newest autotype; but none the less will what you see at Ghizeh, and Edfoe, and Abou-Sembal (Belzoni's Ipsambul) strike you with awe when you really get there. This is not so with man's works elsewhere; it is not so even in Switzerland, where we sometimes think we have seen a view before, so often has it been brought before us in picture or engraving. No pictures could ever make you fancy you had seen the Sphinx or the colossal Rameses before.

To the English politician Egypt is, perhaps, what he cares most about in the Eastern question. Even if Constantinople was in the hands of a hostile Power, we need care but little provided Egypt, the high road to India, remained open. We have lately been told that India does not pay; that it is not only bankrupt itself, but is ruining us by forcing us to keep up an army and navy far beyond our means; but be this as it may, we are not likely to think of giving India up, inasmuch as to do so would at once consign us to the position of a third-rate Power. We cannot vie in Europe with the masters of colossal armies; if we give up India we shall have to confess ourselves no match for them, not in Europe only but in the world. Egypt, too,

has a peculiar political interest from the way in which France and England are there drawn together. Our joint ownership of the canal, and the co-operation of Mr. Goschen and M. Joubert in managing the Khedive's finances, are a pledge of that friendship which is the best hope for the future of Europe. That England and France should heartily co-operate in managing Egypt on just and honest principles is something to delight the philanthropist. A war like that in Zululand is always matter of intense regret for those who think most seriously of England's honour. In such a case we never go to war with clean hands; we are always urged on by colonists eager for "a little blood-letting," anxious "to read the restless savage a severe lesson," or we are drawn into hostilities through some wretched frontier squabble; while in a peaceful struggle with the combined greed and wastefulness of the rulers, the knavery and insolence of the low Europeans, the chicane of the consular courts, the degradation of the *fellaheen*, and all the other evils so graphically pictured by M. About in *Ahmed Le Fellah*, we should have the whole world with us and our consciences to boot. Troublesome freebooters though they are, the Zulus are undoubtedly patriots, and Cetewayo is a patriot king, and his wish to prevent our spreading further in South Africa is intelligible enough; he fears for his people the fate of the Bushmen. But were we or the French to annex Egypt to-morrow, we should offend no patriotism. The little Turkish colony would go, and the rest of the inhabitants would simply acquiesce in another of those changes of masters which have been their lot for ages. Egyptian patriotism died when Psammetichus the Second was crushed by the power of Darius Ochus; or, if revived under Alexander the Great, it was finally stifled during the long life in death of the later Ptolemies. Cleopatra, the last Egyptian patriot, made patriotism thenceforth impossible for her countrymen.

The religious interest of Egypt is fully as great as the political. If the land is the link between Europe and the East, the religion is the link between heathenism and that religion whence our own is derived. To trace analogies between the Jewish cult and the Egyptian, to speculate on the influence of the Egyptians on the Jewish mind in matters of religion, has been, for some critics, a labour of love. They have had to confess that the connection is rather in the way of contrast than of resemblance. On the face of

it the Egyptian religion says more than any other about the after life and the condition of the soul therein. The Pentateuch says so little on the subject that its silence favours the argument of Bishop Warburton's *Divine legation of Moses*. This silence (says one school of Egyptologists) was a reaction against the excessive "other-worldliness" of the Egyptians. It was not that the Jews knew nothing about an after state; they deliberately put aside theories which they had found compatible with lust, and cruelty, and oppression.

However this may be, the connection between the two religions offers matter for deep thought. Dr. Watts, long ago, pointed out that the shape of the cherubim had some resemblance to that of the god Apis. Solomon's temple, too, in its general plan, was not unlike an Egyptian temple; its holy of holies, at the back of the several courts, answering to the position of the Egyptian sanctuary. *The Tale of Two Brothers*, again, translated by Mr. Le Page Renouf, in the second volume of *Records of the Past*, when stripped of its mythological additions and adornments, strikingly reminds us of that of Joseph. To this subject, however, we will return by-and-by; one word more about another of the deeply interesting aspects of Egyptology. Who were the Egyptians? We have a more minute record of their daily lives than any other ancient nation has left. Where we can but doubtfully guess about the ways and doings of Greeks and Romans, how the Egyptians passed their lives is as clear to us as vivid painting could make it. Yet who they were who thus lived and acted, of whose modes of worship, of treating their dead, of tilling their land, of working handicrafts, of taking their pleasure, we know every detail, is a mystery. Certainly they were not negroes; yet the shape of the foot and of the calf of the leg, as well as the fulness of the lips, bespeak negro affinities. The strange mixture, too, of the solemn and the ludicrous, of the grandest symbolism and the most grovelling fetishism, leads to the conclusion that there was in them a strong tinge of negro, to which this lower element is due. The colour need be no difficulty; not all so-called negroes are black; the "Amaxulu," figured in Pritchard, has just the Egyptian tint as given in the monuments. But what was the other race which, while impressing its culture on the primitive inhabitants of the Nile valley, yielded, as superior races have so often done, to the

debasing influence of the primitive religion? The onions and cats and crocodiles are the fetishes or totems of the primitive nomes, and these lived on to the last, side by side with the grand myth of Osiris-Horus, or the conflict of good and evil. They live on still in the quaint superstitions which cling to Egyptian Mohammedanism, the serpent of Sheik Hareede, for instance, just as the tinge of negro still survives in and gives individuality to the comely Copt. Who were these incomers? Children of Ham, kinsmen of the Canaanites, the genealogy in Genesis says; but then there is the doubt whether that genealogy was meant to be ethnical or confined to certain families. Some have traced affinities between the Egyptian civilisation and that of the old Hindoos with its castes, and have thought the matter settled because a few ignorant sepoys, brought in to help in dislodging the French, "did *poojah*" to a sculptured cow at Denderah. Others have compared the pyramids of the Nile valley with those of Mexico, forgetting that the former were undoubtedly tombs and nothing else, while the latter were plateaus on which sacrifices were performed. From this supposed connection they have been led to imagine a primitive reddish-brown race, whose chief seat was the submerged continent where now rolls the Pacific Ocean. The island groups scattered over that ocean were its mountain tops; Easter Island, with its quaint, colossal idols, one of its mountain shrines; the Polynesians the poor remnant of its least cultured inhabitants. Dreams of this kind, however, are as unprofitable as the speculations of Dr. Piazzi Smith, who has found in the great pyramid a compendium of weights and measures and astronomical facts enshrined there by the antediluvians for the teaching of all after time. Wherever the old civilisers of Egypt came from, undoubtedly Egypt held the same position with regard to the rest of Africa that Mexico did to North and Peru to South America, and that China holds to the vast and wide-spread Tartar family. In each we see the highest development of one particular race with or without foreign admixture. Miss Edwards talks of the strikingly un-Egyptian features of the colossal Rameses at Abou-Sembal; but the gods with whom in the frescoes that mighty conqueror is associated have, when they are human-headed, the usual round-faced, full-lipped type. We believe that in all these cases of exceptional culture there was a mixture; everywhere the mixed races have done most in the world; even

in our country it has been noticed that the borderland of Celt and Englishman, from Devon and Somerset up to the Tay, has produced far more than its share of famous names.

Into the bearing of all that has been discovered about early Egypt on the question of the antiquity of man we will not attempt to enter. Mr. Wallace, in a very remarkable essay on the subject, asserts that there seems no progress in Egyptian art; the earliest work is the best; the great pyramid, in which the constructive power of this wonderful people culminates, belongs to almost the remotest period of which we have any sculptured records. On this assumption, the correctness of which we think is disputed by most Egyptologists, some of whom even find a flint age in Egypt, he bases his theory of successive ebbs and flows of civilisation; the great pyramid marked the full tide of Egyptian culture, the ebb began soon after. Old Egyptian chronology will probably never be more than approximately settled. The old Egyptians wrote no history; what history we have is evolved from incidental notices in sepulchral inscriptions, in records of treaties, of conquests, &c., collated with the very conflicting lists of Herodotus and Manetho. But much has been done; how much may be judged by comparing with Mr. Stuart Poole's papers in the *Contemporary* a jaunty article in the *Edinburgh Review* (July, 1862), which, under cover of a notice of Sir G. C. Lewis's *Astronomy of the Ancients*, pokes a good deal of clumsy fun at Baron Bunsen's great book. We may at once admit that Bunsen was, like Niebuhr, given to rash speculation. His convenient way of explaining successive dynasties as contemporaneous in different parts of the country has been discredited; and few will now support his wild statement that the Egyptians emigrated into the Nile valley 13,000 years ago, more than 2,000 years after "that formation and deposit of Sinism in which we discern the earliest polarisation of religious consciousness, which issued in the formation of pure agglutinative speech." Bunsen holds that before the first glacial period with its accompanying deluge Egypt had been peopled; hence in her traditions there is no record of a flood. He thinks that Osirism began with the earliest settlement of the land, while animal worship was not introduced till Menes, in 3624 B.C.,*

* The uncertainty of Menes' date follows from the absence of certain time-notes in all the monuments. "He was only eight centuries before the earliest dated monuments," say some; but to provisionally fix these dates even the

united all the nomes into one government. But Bunsen's mistakes were the result of building a vast superstructure on a very insufficient foundation. The whole subject is now much better understood. Champollion has been justified in regarding the modern Coptic as in the main the same language as the old Egyptian; and, despite the sneers which only sixteen years ago were levelled at the Egyptologists, Dr. Birch's new edition of Sir Gardner Wilkinson and Mr. Stuart Poole's essays, and the whole series of books in Messrs. Bagster's list, show that a good deal of certainty has been attained.

Our summary of early Egyptian history shall be very brief. Menes every one assumes to be an historical character, the founder of Memphis, the first merely human king (says Herodotus) of a land that had long been ruled by gods and demigods.

The date of Menes is uncertain; but we form a notion of it when we remember that he was the first king of the first dynasty, the Pharaoh who made Joseph his prime minister having been the last of the seventeenth. The pyramids of Ghizeh were built by kings of the fourth dynasty; of the fifth we learn from the hieroglyphics that conquests were carried on in Nubia and mines worked in Sinai. Then, from the sixth to the end of the tenth dynasty Egyptian history is a blank. It would seem as if the Delta had been all this time under a foreign yoke, for we find the eleventh dynasty reigning not at Abydos or Memphis, but at Thebes and far up to the southward at Elephantine. Abraham came to Egypt during the thirteenth dynasty. The seventeenth was that of the famous Hyksos, or shepherd kings, the silence of Herodotus concerning whom has caused so much controversy. Who were they, and what was their relation to the Jews? Kalmucks say some, connected with those Scythians of whose early invasions of Syria Herodotus speaks. Shemites say others; and the favour accorded to Joseph by one of them is a confirmation of this view. While they ruled the Delta a native dynasty was reigning at Thebes, which by-and-by became powerful enough to dispossess the foreigners. Then began that oppression of the Jews which in the Bible is connected with the arising of another king "who knew not Joseph." The kings of this eighteenth dynasty raised Egypt to a

average lives of the Apis-bulls buried at Memphis have to be reckoned. Boeckh dates Menes, B.C. 5702; Bunsen, B.C. 3624.

wonderful pitch of glory, which was continued under the nineteenth, during which come Moses and the Exodus. And it is a remarkable confirmation of Scripture that Pithom and Rameses, built by Rameses II., are stated in the inscriptions to have been largely built by Jewish labour.

With the twenty-second dynasty we get the first really certain date in Egyptian history—the taking of Jerusalem by the first king of that dynasty, called Shishak in the Scripture, B.C. 970. Necho, of the twenty-sixth dynasty, is famous amongst other things for having sent an expedition round the Cape of Good Hope; the very reason which Herodotus gives for his disbelieving the account—that at midday they saw the sun to the north instead of to the south of them—proving that at least they got below the Line. Before this dynasty was over, Egypt was conquered by Cambyses; but native dynasties still held out in corners of the land, till at last Nectanebo II. was driven off beyond the first Cataract, and the thirtieth dynasty came to an end. By-and-by with the Ptolemies began a new national life; and it was then that those temples were built which have been most fruitful in explanations of the Egyptian creed. Denderah, begun by Cleopatra, finished by Tiberius: the inscription on its portico says that it was built for the welfare of the new Augustus, son of "the god Augustus;" Philae, whose inscriptions tell mostly of Ptolemy Physcon, or the fat; Edfou, buried almost to the roof in drifted sand when Roberts and Bartlett made their sketches, but since cleared not only of sand, but of the Arab huts and rubbish which had gathered round it—it is in such places that the Egyptologist learns most about the religious thought of the old dwellers by the Nile. The earliest tomb- and temple-pictures are almost wholly scenes from everyday life; very little about the after world in them. The solemnity comes out later, just as the beautiful myths are posterior to the dry interminable ritual, like that of which the *Book of the Dead* consists. Students, then, are now being recommended to study these later temples, if they would grasp the spirit of old Egyptian mythology. We suppose there is no fear lest Greek, or at any rate some form of Aryan or Semitic thought might by that time have modified Egyptian ideas. Edfou, for instance, which is one of the grandest of the Nile temples, dates only from Ptolemy Philometor (about 170 B.C.), considerably before whose time the Septuagint

had been translated. Nothing in history is more curious than this Ptolemaic revival. At Denderah is an authentic likeness of Cleopatra wearing the head-dress of Hathor, the Egyptian Venus, the plumed and winged globe.* That it is a portrait may be judged from the fact that Cæsarion, her son by Cæsar, who is also figured on the temple wall, "has an unmistakable Roman nose." Everywhere the Ptolemies seem to have entered thoroughly into the feelings of their subjects; and it is sad to think that a dynasty which began so well and lasted so long should have ended in disgraceful decrepitude.

Those who have studied the wonderful collection of Egyptian remains in our Museum must have noticed the change in the decoration of the mummy-wrappings which is seen in those belonging to the Græco-Egyptian period. Instead of the mere hard colouring, which does not attempt to disguise the fact that life is gone, these more modern mummies sometimes have faces painted with what we call artistic feeling; now and then the artist is not satisfied to lay his colours on the bandagings, he paints a portrait on a little wooden panel. The change is remarkable, and may lead us to suspect that where Greek art had made way Greek thought and Greek allegorising would not have failed to penetrate.

The Romans despised the Egyptians, while, at the same time, the need of keeping Egypt, their great granary, at peace led them to be very tender of their feelings. Meanwhile Christianity, introduced (tradition says) by Simon Zelotes, spread in two ways, becoming at Alexandria a great intellectual power and itself being profoundly modified by the neo-Platonism with which it there came into collision, and also filling the Thebaïd with that vast army of ascetics of whose austerities we have a record in the life of St. Anthony.† Those interested in Alexandrian theology will in Kingsley's *Hypatia* find a lively, if somewhat idealised, picture of the state of things in that city. More than two centuries intervened between the official annihilation

* She is figured in Mr. Fairholt's book, p.243, by no means a perfect Grecian, still less an Egyptian beauty. He says "the face is infinitely superior to that upon her coins, which is absolutely ugly."

† The old hermits won reverence by their mode of life. It is sadly otherwise with their modern representatives, the Coptic monks. Curzon (*Monasteries of the Levant*) speaks of their "swimming like Newfoundland dogs after the tourists' boat," and boarding it stark naked, to the disgust of the Arabs, "whose previous contempt (adds Mr. Fairholt) is heightened by this cynical indecency."

of the old religion by Theodosius and the establishment by Phocas of the supremacy of the Roman Pontiff in opposition to the claims of Antioch and Alexandria to independence and equality.

A generation after this (A.D. 640) followed the Saracen conquest. This was largely helped by sectarian treason. The Monophysites, or Jacobite Church—they who "confounded (says the Athanasian Creed) the persons"—hastened to pay tribute to the caliph, repaired roads and bridges, supplied provisions and intelligence to the invaders. Memphis was taken; Alexandria, open to the sea, and continually succoured by Heraclius, held out for fourteen months. At last it fell, and Caliph Omar's general, Amrou, was able to announce that he had captured "the great city of the West, with its 4,000 palaces, 4,000 baths, 400 theatres, 12,000 food-shops, and 40,000 tributary Jews."

Of the destruction of the great library every schoolboy has heard; but few reflect that what was destroyed by the Mussulman fanatic was by no means the same collection which had been begun by Ptolemy Philadelphus and enriched with the books amassed by the kings of Pergamus. More than half the original library was burnt during the attack on Julius Cæsar; the rest was destroyed along with the Serapeum, in which the books had been stored, by bishop Theophilus, uncle of Cyril, when Theodosius was suppressing heathenism. Orosius, twenty years after, saw the shelves empty—(quoted by Gibbon, chap. xxviii., nos vidimus armaria librorum quibus direptis exinanita ea a nostris hominibus nostris temporibus memorant). It may be presumed, therefore, that this act of bigotry, which may be compared with the destruction by the Crusaders of the library of Tripoli and the burning by Cardinal Ximenes in the great square of Grenada of 80,000 Arabic MSS., did not inflict on posterity so great a loss as many have imagined. We shall not attempt to follow the disputes of Abaissdes and Ommiades, or the way in which Egypt became an independent Mussulman state in 868, and how Memphis was totally destroyed, and the new city, Cairo, *el Kahireh*, the victorious, made the seat of a caliphate. For a brief space Mostansir reunited Cairo and Bagdad, the two caliphates; but they were speedily sundered, and the Egyptian caliphs lasted on till, in 1171, Saladin again put an end to the independence of Egypt.

Then came the Ayoubite sultans, the last of whom,

Almohadan, was put to death by his Mameluke militia at the very time (1250) when St. Louis was a prisoner in the hands of the Mohammedans. Thus began the line of Mameluke sultans, one of whom, Bibars, drove out the Moguls who had conquered Bagdad, and in 1263 completed the destruction of the Christian power in the Levant.

The Mameluke militia, that strangely-selected body into which born Jews and Mohammedans were inadmissible, went on choosing sultans from among themselves, till in 1517 the Grand Turk Selim conquered Egypt, and hung the last Mameluke prince on one of the gates of Cairo. Thenceforth Egypt was covered with the pall of Turkish oppression, and fell into that state of living death which has long been the fate of so many of the fairest and richest parts of the old world.

Not that the connection which completed the ruin of Egypt did the Porte much good; the allegiance was little more than nominal, the Mamelukes ruling pretty much as they pleased, no matter what the Pasha might wish. Here, however, as elsewhere, Turkish rule effectually put the country out of the commonwealth of nations. More even than other Turkish provinces, Egypt at the beginning of the century was an unknown land. We—most of whom have welcomed friends back from a trip up to the first Cataract, or at any rate have heard all about Cairo and the pyramids from sons or brothers or sisters who stopped on their way to or from India—can hardly realise that to the grandfathers of all of us, and the fathers of many of us, Egypt was a sealed country. People went to the Holy Land, they went to Greece, a very few even went to Lesser Asia; but the kingdom of the Pharaohs was out of their range.

Of course a few eccentric travellers made their way into it, like Sandys, early in the seventeenth century, and Thomas Coryate, a few years earlier still. Coryate was an oddity who, when he got back from his first wanderings, hung up his shoes in the church of his native village of Odcombe. His Eastern Travels—they extended through Persia as far as Surat, where he died—we have not been able to come upon. If they are as curious as the *Crudities Hastily Gobbled Up in Five Months' Travels in Europe*, or as *Coryate's Crank*, or his *Colewort Twice Sodden*, they are well worth reading. Sandys' book, published in 1615, can more readily be got at. He was a poet—translated *Ovid's Metamorphoses*, and paraphrased the Psalms; but the gap which sunders

him from the modern world becomes manifest when we remember that he was son of that Cambridge vice-chancellor, afterwards Archbishop of York, who was imprisoned in Mary's reign for having preached a sermon in favour of Lady Jane Grey. His style may be judged of from the following account of Pompey's Pillar. After speaking of "Pharaoh's Needle" (as he calls it), and another lying by, and, like it, half buried in "rubbidge," he says, "They tell a fable how that one of the Ptolemies erected the same in the farthest extent of the haven, to defend the citie from naval incursions; having placed a magical glasse of steele on the top, of virtue, if uncovered, to set on fire such ships as sailed by. But, subverted by enemies, the glasse lost that power, who in this place erected the column."*

In contrast with the wonder-loving Sandys is the matter-of-fact Thevenot (he who brought coffee into France), who visited Egypt in 1655, but got no further than Cairo, turning aside across the desert to Suez and Sinai. Thevenot notes the grandeur of the walls of Alexandria, rebuilt since Amrou levelled them, and the number of porphyry and granite pillars which are scattered about the town, and the ruins of Cleopatra's palace, and the multitudes of what he calls "charms," or medals, of cornelian, agate, emerald, &c., beautifully engraved all over, which are found among the ruins after a shower of rain. "These the Moors sell to the Franks for a mere trifle; at least they did so till lately, but now the Franks, bidding against each other, have somewhat raised the price." But what puzzles him is the engraving; it is so good that he can scarcely help believing the ancients had some secret for softening the stones so as to render them more manageable with the graver. Neither can he imagine how a stone like Pompey's Pillar could ever have been raised into its place; he is almost disposed to give in to the opinion that it was, like scagliola, manufactured on the spot. As for all these great blocks having been brought from far up the river, that seems to him quite out of the question. He finds Egypt wonderfully cheap—it is now one of the dearest countries in the world,—and the food he pronounces excellent. The Nile was infested with corsairs (as he calls them), to drive off whom he kept a light burn-

* Sandys, quoted by Fairholt. Now that the Needle adorns our Thames Embankment, it is curious to read Fairholt's estimate: "Neither of them would be worth the trouble of removal to England: the expense might better be incurred on some antique elsewhere."

ing all night in his boat; indeed, his general estimate of the natives is not flattering: "L'on peut dire assurément que l'Egypte est un paradis terrestre, mais qu'il est habité par les diables, tant parceque les Habitans sont fort basanez, que parcequ'ils sont fort vicieux et gens à tuer en homme pour un sou." At Cairo he rides round (the Egyptian donkeys were an institution in his day), and also walks, putting a bean in his pocket every hundred paces, his grand object being to prove that this "grande ville remplie de canaille" is not so big as Paris. He notes the multitude of mosques,—23,000 said the legend, and the vastness of the castle, a city in itself, but falling to ruin "because the Turks never repair anything;" and then he goes to the pyramids, taking measurements and comparing them with those of Father Elzear the Capuchin, who visited them in 1652, and getting a strong man to throw from the top of the biggest pyramid a stone which falls on the twelfth step, whence he concludes that it is impossible to throw beyond the base. The inside passages he finds almost choked with sand, so that he has to crawl on all four; but when he comes again a few days after the sand is nearly all gone, "for the Bacha had sent some people to see what it was that (pouvoit obliger) could induce the Franks to go in, for no one but a Frank ever thinks of going in." In spite of stifling air, to which (unlike Belzoni), he finds he gets used after a while, he pushes on to the chamber containing the empty sarcophagus, "the stone of which is very beautiful when polished, that is why many people break bits off it to be made into seals, but you must have a good arm and a good hammer to get even a chip from it." The well of which Belzoni makes so much seems to our Frenchman too dangerous a place for him to go down. "Father Elzear went down; he was probably the first who ever made the descent; and he says there is nothing to see. So as I saw there was a good deal of risk I stayed at the top. A Scotch gentleman who was with me had himself let down, and *was* nearly killed in coming up by the fall of a loose stone which missed his head, but knocked the candle out of his hand."

The remarkable thing is that Thevenot, in sight of such wonders, never rises above his matter-of-fact. The love of the marvellous was certainly developed in his day; it had not to wait, like the fondness for wild scenery, for the dawn of a new era; but the men of the Middle Ages (and Thevenot's

spirit is in this quite mediæval) marvelled in a different style from what we do; a juggler's trick struck them more than the pylones of Luxor or the mighty pyramids themselves. Enthusiastic description, too, had not yet been invented; prose was prose, and not the unmetred poetry in which "Eothen," or Dean Stanley, or a crowd of meaner writers, depict such scenes. Thevenot holds it for certain that the big pyramid was made for that Pharach who was drowned in the Red Sea; and he sums up with the very commonplace remark, "Verily, these pyramids are wonders of those Egyptian kings, who were in building the foremost men of their day, and without offence to any one I may say that there is no prince on the earth who could raise buildings like them."

The Sphinx* has generally roused the enthusiasm of travellers. Who does not remember Kinglake's glorious piece of writing:—"Laugh and mock as you will at the worship of stone idols, but mark ye this, ye breakers of images, that in one regard the stone idol bears awful semblance of Deity, unchangefulness in the midst of change, the same seeming will and intent for ever and ever inexorable. Upon ancient dynasties of Ethiopian and Egyptian kings, upon Greek and Roman, upon Arab and Ottoman conquerors, upon Napoleon dreaming of an Eastern Empire, upon battle and pestilence, upon the ceaseless misery of the Egyptian race, upon keen-eyed travellers—Herodotus yesterday and Warburton to-day—upon all and more, this unworldly Sphinx has watched like a Providence." But all Thevenot's anxiety is to know whether there is or is not a hole in its head. He tries to throw grappling-irons over it, but fails. Some Venetians, however, who managed to work themselves up, told him that there was a hole, growing narrower and narrower, and reaching the level of the breast. Into this he supposes a man got over night, with the help of a ladder, when the Sphinx was to give out its oracles; and so the monster which so impresses even the wild Arabs that they call it "the father of fear," becomes for him part of the machinery of a puppet-show.

Very possibly, however, Thevenot in this comes nearer than do our modern gushing writers to the old Egyptian spirit. Every one has noticed the strange juxtaposition in Egypt of the sublime and the ridiculous. The Egyptians

* Most of us know that the Sphinx is older than the Ghizeh pyramids. It was repaired by Cheops, and is named on his tablet.

lived merry lives; Herodotus tells of their revels on the river; the wonderfully perfect wooden statue now in the Boulaq Museum (figured in Mariette) has its fat face full of fun; yet in their worship they so strangely mix sublimity and childishness, so unhesitatingly place the solemn form of Osiris close to the colossal cats of Bubastis, that it is quite possible the Sphinx may have been used in some religious conjuring comparable with what went on at our own Rood of Bexley.

At Sakkara Thevenot goes down a mummy-pit, and grumbles very much because "the master of the mummies" broke his word and took him down a pit that had been opened before. "Beware of these Moors (he says); "comme ils croient que les Francs sont toujours bien fournis, quand ils tiennent quelqu'un ils en tirent tout ce qu'ils peuvent." "So visit the pits well armed and with a good party, and have a good resolute Janissary; but still, don't go so far as to strike them; if you do you'll have the whole village about you." The reason why the Moors will never open a fresh pit except they are alone, is that they are sure of finding idols and such like, and "lorsque ces canailles trouvent quelque chose ils le gardent pour le venir vendre à la ville aux Francs." The picture of the pit with the Frenchman unwrapping a leg broken off from one of the mummies, another unbroken mummy lying at their feet, gives an excellent idea of the scene, and is, we imagine, the earliest pictorial attempt of the kind. Matter-of-fact here also, Thevenot is chiefly struck with the splendid bandaging—"over 1,000 ells, and so cleverly arranged that several surgeons have confessed to me that nobody nowadays could come near it." The sand, he thinks, has helped to keep the bodies so perfect, just as in the desert dogs and camels are dried up and preserved. "However, the *mummy* which is brought over to Christendom to be used in medicine is not the dried carcases of the desert, but the produce of the Egyptian pits." He takes care to bring away with him some hands, and he tells us that he elsewhere obtained two whole mummies and a whole lot of idols and other curios. Some people have tried to persuade him that these things are not real antiques, but are manufactured by the Moors, just as our "flint-jack" made to order the implements of the palæolithic age; but that could not be, says triumphant matter-of-fact, for, let alone their being far too idle, they sell them for less than what

they're made of would cost. One thing strikes him; all the old Egyptian burying-places are outside their towns; "it's only the Christians who seem to have no dread of contagion, and bury their dead in the midst of the living."

The insect pests of Egypt, now one of the severest drawbacks on the pleasure of travelling there, were in full force in Thevenot's day. Speaking of the monastery of St. George, in old Cairo, he says:—"Il est tellement plein de puces que d'abord qu'on y a mis un pié il en est tout couvert, et comme elles sont fort maigres, elles ne tardent guère à monter plus haut."

Unable to understand the grandeur of the monuments, he is naturally on the look-out for puerile legends, such as that which asserts that the sycamore near the so-called spring of the Virgin opened when she and her Son were passing by. The holy family went inside, and thus found a refuge from enemies who were closely pursuing them. When the danger was over, the tree reopened and the cavity remained in the same state till 1656, when half the tree was broken away. His strangest story is that on Wednesday, Thursday and Friday in Holy Week, Greek style, the dead rise in the graveyard outside Cairo, "not," as he explains, "that they walk about the burial-place, but that their bones come out of the ground during those three days and then go down again." Turks and Moors, he says, believe this, just as firmly as Copts and Greeks; indeed the bones of a Turkish sheik are amongst those which rise. "I went (says he) and saw several skulls and other bones lying about, which everybody assured me had just come out. I wanted to see them come out before my eyes, but found that the proper plan was to look another way; and then, when you have turned back you see bones where no bones were before. I tried to explain that it was clear the bones were scattered overnight by the santons; but I had to leave off for fear of being maltreated. They were determined to believe in their own fashion."

He visits the Nilometer, of which he gives a fancy sketch with a Corinthian capital and a vase on the top, and notes how on St. Peter's Eve criers, who take their cue from a man specially appointed by the Bacha, go through all Cairo proclaiming how high the river has risen. Of wells he is sure the whole land contains only two, that of the Virgin Mary aforesaid, and a very deep well, which by means of an endless chain of buckets supplies the citadel of Cairo

This he calls Joseph's well, and says that it is supposed to communicate in one direction with the great pyramid, in the other with Suez and the Red Sea! Egg-hatching has gone on in Egypt from time immemorial; he happens to be there at the right season for seeing the whole process. "Some tell us (he says) that it can only be done in Egypt, but the Grand Duke of Florence brought over some men from Cairo who succeeded just as well as if they had been at home. They tell me it has also been done in Poland; indeed I think it can be done anywhere if an even temperature is carefully kept up." Here is a remark which shows that matter-of-fact and common sense go together: "Some very dainty folks say that the chickens are not so good as those hatched under a hen, but there is very little difference, or rather none at all, except in imagination; and, anyhow, it is a great thing to come so close in imitating nature."

So far Thevenot, who without going further than Cairo joins a caravan and travels across to Suez and Sinai, seeing the usual wonders of the desert, *e.g.* hot sand-winds which fill his mouth, and ruin two pasties which were wrapped in a napkin at the bottom of his trunk, hunting ostriches, and above all, keeping on excellent terms with his fellow-travellers. The following might be taken to heart by many a traveller in modern times: "Durant tout ce voiage nous fûmes toujours fort gais, et je prenois grand plaisir à entendre les Arabes qui nous contoient leur vie, les mettant de tems en tems en humeur par des interrogations que je leur faisois."

The modern way of looking at Egypt, as a land of mystery where may perchance be found the solution of some of life's problems, dates from Volney. He writes of it as an old Greek might, for the old Greek feeling in regard to these things was much more akin to our own than that of the Middle Ages. Volney, of course, tries to strike at Christianity through the mythology of Egypt. For him Isis and Horus are the Virgin and Child, and Osiris the god who, in his contest with evil, dies and comes to life again, is the original of our Christ. Nay, the resemblance is carried further; for, just as St. Paul says, "We are changed into His likeness from glory to glory," so the soul, in the engraved and pictured lore of the sepulchres, becomes Osiris himself when it has got freed from all earthly taint.

To us, however, Volney's political influence is more important than his attacks on our religion; for to him, we

believe, was mainly owing the French expedition of 1798.* In 1787 Volney had published his Travels in Egypt and Syria; and in 1794 he was made a professor in the new University of France. No doubt Bonaparte counted on the old connection between France and Egypt—how the foremost of French crusaders, saint as well as king, had looked on it as the key of the whole East, but Volney was just the kind of writer to take hold of Bonaparte's mind. His grandiose style, his crude, startling ideas, harmonised exactly with the First Consul's tone of thought. He would go to Egypt; and, more successful than St. Louis, he would make that his basis for driving the English out of India. He would cut through the Isthmus of Suez, and turn the course of trade into its old channel. Like another Cæsar he would astonish the *pékins* of Paris with "commentaries" from an unknown world, and then, like that same Cæsar, he would use the fame and power that he had won in Egypt in subduing his own country.

That Napoleon's expedition got safely to Alexandria is one of history's marvels. Lanfrey points out that, heavily laden as it was with men and stores, ten English ships would have sufficed to destroy it. However, it did land, and Bonaparte's order of the day impressed on his men the duty of being "as tolerant to mosques as they had been to convents and synagogues. "The Roman legions," he reminded them, "protected all religions." He himself professed to be half a Mohammedan, and one of his generals, Menou, turned Mohammedan altogether. He had come (he said) to deliver Egypt from the tyranny of the Mamelukes; and this tyranny was so grinding that in any other country he would have been hailed with delight; but the Egyptians had been bond-slaves too long to think of striking a blow for freedom; they simply looked on, and the Turks saw through his clumsy attempts to play the Mussulman. His success in the field was wonderfully rapid. "In five days," he says, in the despatch which tries to explain away the disaster of Aboukir, "I was master of Egypt; and it was only when Fortune saw that all her favours were useless that she gave our fleet to its fate." Bonaparte failed to hold Egypt; but he had opened it up to the modern world. His *savants* were employed not only in finding out all about modern Egypt and its resources—how

* Leibnitz had tried to induce Louis XIV. to seize Egypt and make peace in Europe. But it is certain Bonaparte had never seen Leibnitz's pamphlet.

to grow the vine, what to use instead of hops in making the beer for which, like Zululand, the country was once famous, but in studying its geology, and, above all, its ancient monuments. Bonaparte's expedition gave the impulse to Champollion, the father of Egyptology; and of this expedition the scientific historian is Vaillant Denon.

It is delightful to look into such a book as Denon's Travels. The enthusiasm of the man, the grandiose style, the way in which in his dedication he compares Bonaparte to Sesostris and Mendes, take us back to that wonderful time when so much seemed possible to the combined army of warlike philosophers and philosophic warriors. We can understand how men like Denon must have gnashed their teeth at what he calls "the fatal mistake of Aboukir." Had the French admiral kept out of the way of the English fleet, Egypt would, he thinks, have certainly become a French colony, a counterpoise to the excessive amount of territory monopolised by one selfish nation. The beauty of the two volumes adds immensely to the pleasure of reading them. The French have always excelled other nations in their *éditions de luxe;* and Denon is a splendid example of the best style of French work; type, paper, illustrations, all are good. The illustrations, by the way, belong to modern as well as to ancient Egypt. Their omissions are a measure of the increase of our knowledge about the country. Denderah (Tintyra Denon calls it, as he calls Anubis Chenubis, &c.) is there, looking much as it does in the latest book of travels; so is Luxor (Louqsor), so is the Sphinx. All that he saw, Denon describes accurately enough; but he could not describe what was not yet discovered, and his mistakes are often ludicrous. Thus the Great Zodiac at Denderah is used to prove the vast antiquity of man, and therefore the falsehood of the Bible records. To the French *savants* this Denderah zodiac appeared to be almost as old as the pyramids; we now know that the whole temple is among the most modern in Egypt.

The French have the credit, however, of opening up Egypt to modern research (Bruce, Burckhardt, and Belzoni followed Denon); and they have always managed to keep foremost among Egyptologists. If their first *savants* did foolish things in Egypt, they certainly were outdone by Lepsius, who actually engraved on the great pyramid eleven lines of hieroglyphics in honour of King William of Prussia and Queen Victoria of England—an anachronism as

ridiculous (says Lord Nugent) "as if one added a line to the *Iliad* in commemoration of Waterloo." And here we will add a word of advice in case this should be read by any intending visitor to Egypt: "Don't imitate the disgraceful custom of scrawling or cutting your name on the monuments." It is strange that what in Europe is considered a mark of the lowest vulgar is in Egypt indulged in by those who, from the fact of their travelling there, must be people of some wealth and station. They have not the excuse of belonging to the poor and ignorant classes, and besides, the mischief they often do is irreparable. Mr. Fairholt says "they have done more injury to these ancient monuments within the last thirty years than has been done to them by the action of time or the ignorance of Arab and Turk during three thousand." Educated Europeans surely ought not to need to be taught respect for monuments which are "a sacred bequest from the past."

The French books on Egypt certainly show that they have spared no pains nor expense in the work. Without attempting to settle the relative merits of Dr. Young and Champollion, and Gliddon,* we must remember that Young has left no successor comparable with M. de Rougé, and that, great as is the industry and care shown in the old edition of Wilkinson, his work, and even the folio of Roberts, looks almost insignificant beside the really grand French volumes named in our list of books. To these we may add—*Description de l'Egypte, ou Recueil des Observations et des Recherches qui ont été faites en Egypte pendant l'Expedition de l'armée française: publié par les ordres de S. M. l'Empereur Napoleon le grand*, 1809. Of course no one would go to this work for instruction in Egyptology; the student will get more out of Dr. Birch's little book than out of all these splendid volumes. We call attention to it both as a literary curiosity and also to show how persistent the French have been in justifying their claim to be the foremost Egyptologists. The preface to the volumes on antiquities is in the magnificent style of the First Empire. It tells us how the great man at whose bidding this work was put together had brought "peace and prosperity to France and

* Gliddon was an American, self-taught. His *Chapters on Early Egyptian History* are curious. His hieroglyph for America is as follows: "An asp, a mace, an eagle, a ram, an infant, a consecrated head (typifying a civilised region), and the tau, or *crux ansata*, signifying eternity." We may well be thankful that the old Egyptians adopted a less complex system.

confusion to her foes, and put an end to civil discord," and it is careful to note how *La Fortune la derobe aux flottes ennemies*. The work is a grand sample of line engraving and hand colouring. One is amused at the get-up of the French *savants*, as unlike that of the "Mossoo" of nowadays. A curly-headed gentleman with whiskers and big trousers and a sabre by his side is seated sketching the Sphinx.

The book which stands second on our list stands of course on a different footing; it is the patient work of a scholar with fuller lights and more facilities for working than were possible for Bonaparte's *savants*. To the Denderah zodiac aforesaid Champollion assigns its right chronological place. It is figured in vol. iv. The Beni Hassan tomb-pictures are reproduced, with their complete picture of everyday life—the wrestlers, male and female, the girls at ball-play, the soldiers, the inhabitants of the farmyard, the monkeys and other wild creatures in the woods, the Nile boats carrying long-haired singers, the women gathering flowers from plants trained on trellis-work. Well may Dean Stanley (*Sinai and Palestine*) remark of these tomb-pictures: "It is curious how gay and agile these ancient people could be who in their architecture and graver sculptures appear so solemn, and immovable. Except a doubtful figure of Osiris in one, and a mummy on a barge in another, there is nothing of death or judgment or sorrow." These paintings belong to the twelfth dynasty, *i.e.*, they date from nearly 3000 years B.C. They stand in a fine position, hollowed out of the hardest stratum of the limestone cliff. Their name is that of a plundering Arab tribe which once lived close by, but was exterminated by Ibrahim Pasha. It is so strange to find here the so-called Doric column in that perfect proportion in which it appears afterwards used in the Parthenon. These Doric pillars are coloured to imitate red granite. The roof of the finest tomb, painted in panel, has an exceedingly modern look. In every chamber are wells leading to "mummy pits;" for, as M. Mariette points out, there are three parts to every Egyptian tomb—the building above ground (here replaced by a cave-chamber); the well or *conduit en pente douce*, containing nothing and filled in as soon as the burial was over, and leading to the real tomb, which in the oldest examples contains absolutely nothing

* The granite, which the Egyptians thought imperishable, and brought from such a distance, has borne the weather far worse than their other building materials.

but the mummy. The life, thus vividly and minutely figured seems* to Mr. Grant Duff (whose lecture on Egypt reprinted in the recent volume of his Essays, gives as much information as many large volumes) to have been curiously like that of China. He notices the exquisite view from these mountain-tombs over "the narrow ribbon of green which makes the whole land of Egypt." It is curious that, though the tombs were visited by early travellers, *e.g.*, Norden and, we think, Pococke, they say not a word about the marvellous paintings, but are interested in them solely because they had been "grottoes of holy hermits."

Of course Champollion's book figures the victories of Rameses, all the great battles, the reproduction of which on the walls of one of the British Museum rooms is, next to the entire reproduction of an underground cave-chamber in the Berlin Museum, the most successful attempt to put Egypt before the eyes of the masses. We note the two rows of royal figures at Thebes those on one side with the mitre, those on the other with the corn-measure, showing that he was king both of Upper and Lower Egypt. This repetition of the same colossal figure is supposed to denote the omnipresence of the person represented. Dean Stanley is worth quoting on this point (*Sinai and Palestine*, Introd. p. l.):—"Kehama, victorious over gods and men, is the image which most nearly answers to these colossal kings; and this multiplication of the same statue, not one Rameses but four, not one Amenophis but eighteen, is exactly Kehama entering the eight gates of Padalon by eight roads at once."

While looking through Champollion, the student should, if possible, compare it with the great Italian work—*I Monumenti dell' Egitto e dela Nubia, designati dalla spedizione scientifico-litteraria toscana in Egitto dal dottore Ippolito Rossellini*, published at Pisa in the first quarter of the present century. While the elder Champollion was working at his grammar, Rossellini was compiling a dictionary and making the drawings and "squeezes" here so beautifully reproduced. Lepsius, too, should be looked into. It is a very voluminous work in many folios, *Denkmaehler aus Egypten und Æthiopien*, collected by the expedition

* Of the fulness of detail in these tomb-pictures, a notion may be formed from the fact that Brugsch-Bey (*On the Geography of Egypt*) has constructed *from the processions of offerings sent from the subject provinces* a sort of map of Canaan 250 years before Moses.

sent out in 1842-5 by Frederick William IV. Lepsius, in his first volume, like Denon and our own Roberts, gives a number of coloured landscapes. His twelfth volume he devotes to demotic Greek and parian inscriptions. Roberts's book should also be taken up by those who wish to see what England has done artistically for ancient Egypt. It is of very different calibre from Champollion or the others, with which (except in size) Wilkinson should rather be put in comparison. And we fancy that Louis Philippe, to whom it is dedicated, must have felt that he whose people had just put forth Champollion might have been spared the infliction of an inferior work. The dedication speaks of "that enlightened country of which you, Sire, are the patriot-king," and then, with questionable taste, the prefatory history sneers at "the affected enthusiasm with which Denon's *savants* clapped their hands at Carnac before they had time to see the details of it." One statement in this preface we leave to our readers: "Zenobia held Egypt for a time, as a Ptolemy." The title is: "*Egypt and Nubia, from Drawings made on the spot by D. Roberts, R.A., with descriptions by W. Brockledon, F.R.S. Lithographed by Louis Haghe.* Moon, 1846."

If in these works of a past generation the French stand undoubtedly first (Champollion is far grander than Wilkinson—he is for the public library, the latter for the study), they even more certainly hold the pre-eminence now that photography has given us new means of copying and the more scientific study of the old language assures us of greater certainty in interpreting the old monuments. M. Mariette—Mariette-Bey, as he is styled, since through love of Egyptian art and a desire to understand and to explain it he became a naturalised Egyptian—has undoubtedly done more for Egyptian antiquities than any living man. We have able Germans working in the same field. Brugsch-Bey, of whose *History of Egypt under the Pharaohs* a translation was published last year, is a valuable and trustworthy writer. Duemichen, not content with the old and often inaccurate copies, is painfully transcribing all the inscriptions, and has already published since 1867 a whole series of *Altägyptische Tempelinschriften.* Then we have among ourselves Dr. Birch, Mr. Sayce, Mr. C. W. Goodwin, Mr. Stuart Poole, and, above all, Professors Chabas and Maspero, whose history is perhaps on the whole the best we can recommend to those who only want a summary.

But what makes M. Mariette's books so specially interesting is his enthusiasm. He never despairs of his adopted country; above all, he determines that Egyptian antiquities shall henceforth belong to Egypt. Of course he does not wholly succeed: white men will break the law in dealing with Egyptians as with Turks; they consider this the privilege of their superior civilisation. Miss Edwards found that in one winter one agent in Alexandria had (illegally) passed through the custom-house fifteen mummies; and she gives an instance of the reckless waste still going on: "M. bought a mummy and a papyrus, and was fairly cheated. A week after he drowned the mummy because the smell was unpleasant."

No doubt there are mummies enough to supply the world. When we think of the contents of the crocodile-caves of Manfaloot—seven or eight miles of cave already explored, all crammed with mummied crocodiles, varying from a few inches to twenty feet long, we feel that there is no fear of the supply becoming exhausted. At the same time, unique monuments, like the Rosetta stone in our Museum and the Paris stone from the great hall at Carnac, ought to be in the country to which they belong. Our own feeling is that, of statues like those brought over by Belzoni, which make the Egyptian rooms of the British Museum the richest in the world, it is better for foreign nations to have merely casts. How effective these may be is seen at Berlin, and was shown on a larger scale in the Egyptian court of the Crystal Palace. It seems unnatural that the Boulaq Museum should have no colossal figures "because all those which could readily be removed have been carried off to foreign countries." Nor has this plundering been always unaccompanied with cruel defacement of what is left behind. Lepsius's company above all have earned the unenviable title of a "crowbar brigade." In the tombs of the kings at Thebes their ravages are specially apparent. Mr. Fairholt speaks of some of the finest bas-reliefs in a tomb near the Memnonium, the work in which is perhaps the most delicate and full of feeling of any yet discovered, as splintered into fragments in the vain attempt to carry away a portion of them." Again, while a silly Frenchman has desecrated the so-called "Harper's Tomb" (well described by Bruce) by scribbling on the musician's harp that "La musique embellit la vie et dissipe l'ennui," in the tomb called Belzoni's, where Sethi, father of Rameses, was

buried,* Lepsius followed Champollion and surpassed him in cutting away and breaking off decorations. In order to get away the upper portico, he broke in pieces the lower, and then found after all that what he wanted was too large to pass through the door, though to try to make a passage he had one of the beautiful pillars supporting the roof roughly broken down.

The Boulaq Museum, says Mariette, "est sorti de l'excès même du mal qu'il est appelé à guerir. Pillés ravagés dispersés anéantis dans l'ancien temps, les monuments n'ont pas moins souffert jusqu'à l'époque actuelle. . . . Within the last fifty years Egypt has had the garniture of half a dozen Egyptian museums torn from her bowels. *Savants* have demolished a temple to get a statue, a tomb to get a sarcophagus. Therefore it is that the Service de Conservation des Antiquités was created."

In the Album M. Mariette groups all the Osiris figures together; Apis, he says, is Osiris made flesh. A great difficulty in the Pantheon is caused, he remarks, by one deity being transmuted into another. Thus Hathor, the pure Aphrodite, becomes Sethos, the goddess of Sirius, and at Denderah becomes "le Beau," the goddess of the general harmony of nature. He inclines to the old view, that for the initiated there was a God eternal, invisible, without name or form, beginning or end, while for the masses Cyprian's phrase was true: *Ægyptia portenta non numina.*

The stepped pyramid of Sakkara he assigns to the first dynasty—its only monument, and (if correctly dated) the oldest monumental relic of old Egypt. The old empire, which closed with the end of the eleventh dynasty, left no temples, only tombs. He lays much stress on the usurpation of the high priests, which brought about both the fall of the twentieth dynasty (that of Rameses III.) and a decay which lasted till Psammetichus of the twenty-sixth, the priests reigning at Thebes, the kings at Tanis in the Delta (San, the Zoan of the Bible). The gap in works of art between Psammetichus and Alexander he accounts for by the destruction of Sais (where were the porticoes that Herodotus so much admired) and Mendes and Sebynnetus, Philæ (that mass of masonry with cloisters, walls, propylea, and an obelisk), which Mr. Grant Duff hopes to see converted into a garden, "the Isola bella of Egypt,"—and

* His sarcophagus was brought over by Belzoni, and placed in the Soane Museum.

the Ptolemaic work in general he calls *la voix de la vieille Egypt agonisante*. He marks the decay in art—a young Ptolemy in the Boulaq Museum is stiff and *guindé*, while Thothmes III., despite the quaint hair and beard, is well-proportioned and vigorous. The best that the race could do, when they gave to granite the suppleness of life, was done from the twelfth to the twentieth dynasty. There was, he says, an undoubted development. The earliest sculpture, the wooden panels from Hosi's tomb at Sakkara (Album, pl. 12), are harsh-featured. Chephren (pl. 26), early in the fourth dynasty, a figure found in the well of the Sphinx temple at Ghizeh, is good, despite the conventional style. Very remarkable is the standing wooden statue from Sakkara (pl. 18, 19), which M. Mariette assigns to the first half of the fourth dynasty. It is a grand face, with an air of command and an expression of (so to speak) contemptuous goodness. Excellence in wood, then, seems to have been attained much earlier than in stone. In stone the earliest work is heavy—the massive style M. Mariette thinks due to prehistoric earthquakes. It grew lighter, and then degenerated into stiffness.

Some of M. Mariette's symbolisms are fanciful. The "scarabæus self-generator" may be a symbol of the resurrection, as the *crux ansata* is of immortality; but when in Plate 6 we have Phtah (Vulcan) as an embryo, "the visible germ of the world of which he is at once cause and effect, the Divine creative wisdom, the crocodile beneath whose feet betokens his conquest over darkness," we are forced to take breath and ask, May not this quaint figure be either a talisman or a plaything like the tongue-lolling Typhons on the same plate?

Phtah, by the way, was more or less a local deity—the god of Memphis, as Ammon was of Thebes, Hathor of Denderah, &c., Osiris alone being the god of the whole land, symbolising the strife of good against evil, truth against falsehood. He is beaten by his brother Set (physical evil), but Horus, his solar son, beats Set by the aid of Thoth (wisdom). Herein Mr. Stuart Poole sees the story of human life, its temporary fall, death, and the resurrection.*

* When Ra (the Sun) as Osiris is depicted in conflict with the great serpent Apep (Typhon), we have a remarkable definition and dating of the myth. For Horus, avenging his father, and being thereby justified and therefore able to justify his worshippers, becomes Horhut driving out Apophis, the shepherd-king, in the 363rd year after the invasion. (See Naville, *Mythe d'Horus*.)

As we said, M. Mariette finds in the Ptolemaic temples more about the Egyptian belief than in those of earlier date. "Under the Pharaohs the doctrine is veiled, there is no guiding thread. Karnak, for instance, despite the thousand texts, full of vague titles, keeps the secret of its dedication. The Ptolemaic temples tell all." Yet reward and punishment, though kept out of sight in the earliest tombs, comes out strikingly at Thebes, where the trial of the soul, with gods for assessors, is as plain to the eye as it is described in words (borrowed perhaps from his Egyptian reminiscences) in Plato's *Gorgias*. Here, too, is seen a difference between the earlier and the later bas-reliefs; in tombs of the old and middle empire (to the end, *i.e.*, of the seventeenth dynasty) it is the dead man himself, with friends and servants about him, who is figured, *and never Osiris;* in those of the new empire, of which there are fine examples at Bab-el-Molouk and El Kab, the dead man actually becomes Osiris.

Was this one permanent change, the sole change apparently in Egyptian cult, due to foreign influence? asks Mr. Stuart Poole, in one of his valuable papers in the *Contemporary Review*. As to the lower element, he decides contrary to the great mass of symbolisers, who have always believed that under fetish signs was to be found "the wisdom of the Egyptians," that in these lower forms of worship there is no philosophic meaning, *they are simply what they seem to be*. M. de Rougé thinks he has discovered, from the great book of Ritual, that the old Egyptians had an idea of one God, unnamed at first, but afterwards identified with Ra (the Sun). In this he is at one with M. Mariette; but when the latter sums up the Egyptian creed in the following eloquent passage, we must remember he refers not to the earliest times but to those which came after the mysterious change that we have referred to:

"Si l'âme a trop péché sur la terre, si Osiris ne réussit pas à la faire sortir victorieuse des épreuves qui lui sont imposées, elle subira le châtiment suprême, ce châtiment terrible qui est l'anéantissement. Si elle a mérité par ses bonnes œuvres, par ses vertus la récompense promise aux âmes justes, elle entrera dans le sein d'Osiris pour s'y confondre, elle deviendra Osiris lui-même, elle ira en tous les lieux et sous toutes les formes qui il lui plait, contempler l'infini spectacle de ce qui est, elle vivra d'une seconde vie qui ne connaîtra ni la douleur ni la mort."

Mr. Poole, on the whole, agrees with this in a very striking

passage in one of his recent Essays. According to this view (and we who are no Egyptologists have no right to impugn the views of the ablest students of the hieroglyphics) the main feature of the Egyptian creed at the time of the Exodus was intense "other-worldliness," a dry formal weighing of good and evil deeds, almost like that to which the Roman Church has sometimes tended. Naturally such a creed was, especially in a nation of castes, compatible with great hardness, with class standards of morality, with a cruelty that, but for the judicial blindness which in such cases always supervenes, must have made the whole seem unreal. Hence the absence of any reference to an after state of rewards and punishments in the Pentateuch. Bishop Warburton (as we remarked above) long ago enlarged on this in his *Divine Legation*, and it was undoubtedly in one sense a reaction from the wrong and excessive use of the doctrine by those who had cruelly oppressed the children of Israel.

Mr. Cooper shows, from Egyptian literature, the rottenness of Egyptian morals; he decides that the *pallakides* (women kept for temple-service)—whose bad character, Wilkinson imagines, existed only in the prurient minds of the Greek travellers—could not have been otherwise than impure, subject as they were to the desires of a king who was looked on as God manifest in the flesh, and of priests who from the highest to the lowest were supposed to share the Divine character.

To return to M. Mariette. The books which we have named represent a very small portion of his labours. Under his direction, for more than ten years, splendid autotypes have been made of the chief temples. The description of Abydos was published in 1869; that of Denderah, in five volumes, occupied from 1870 to 1874; next came Karnak; and the books "set forth under the auspices of his Highness Ismail Pacha," were published simultaneously at Cairo, Paris, and Leipzig.

Edfou, a gorgeous Ptolemaic temple, has been taken in hand by Edward Naville, the Swiss, a pupil of Lepsius. He tells us, in the introduction to his *Textes Relatifs au Mythe d'Horus Recueillis dans le Temple d'Edfou* (Génève et Bâle, 1870), that Mariette recommended Edfou to him. He staid there seventeen days; and then, when he revisited Egypt at the opening of the Suez Canal, and went up the Nile with a great company of *savants*, he spent a day at Edfou, and collated his plates with the inscriptions. He,

like Mariette, thinks that these later temples which time has but little touched best repay research: "*Les temples ptolemaïques sont maintenant ceux que les Egyptologues étudient le plus volontiers.* . . . Here, instead of bare ritual, we get the history of the gods, and an explanation is found for the mystical allusions of the formulas of adoration therein. It is a radical change from the meagreness of the ritualistic inscriptions of the Pharaohs, varied with records of battles and conquests, to their rich mythologies, so full of detail, just as if those who set them up were anxious to keep the old faith from oblivion."

We have already hinted our doubt as to these Ptolemaic myths being wholly home-grown, and we are strengthened therein by a remark in Dr. Birch's *Rede Lecture* about "the mingling of Greek philosophy with the faith of the Nile." Mr. Stuart Poole, however (who from his kinship with Mr. Lane has an hereditary right to speak with authority), and the great mass of Egyptologists, hold the other view, that, though the fashions changed, the main doctrines of the religion remained the same for twenty centuries. At any rate, whether wholly home-grown or not, the cult of the Ptolemies was very different from what it came to be under the Romans. This is seen in the architecture. The Roman work is coldly imitative—*decrepitude* is the word M. Mariette uses of the samples of it which are found at Sakkara close to some of the very earliest work of all.

Dr. Birch's name is sufficient warrant for the excellence of his books. Besides that named on our list, we recommend his *Rede Lecture* for 1876, *The Monumental History of Egypt*, as even more succinct. Here Dr. Birch just touches on the interpretation of hieroglyphics, pointing out how Young, in 1821, working at the Rosetta stone, "by a process of his own, partly mechanical, made out five letters, but never advanced further, proving that the hieroglyphs in the name of Ptolemy were fuller forms of the demotic signs used for the same name, and that, as the demotic was an alphabetic system, the hieroglyphic must be of the same nature." Champollion did much more; he proved the mixed nature of the language—that the signs are partly ideographs, partly phonetic (£50, and the dubious phrase, fifty pounds, furnish an example of each). This, however, led to nothing but the working out of hosts of proper names, and the doubtful signs of a few abstract ideas. It was only when Coptic was brought in as a help that the inter-

pretation really progressed. Coptic, which is written in Greek with extra letters for the sounds that have no existence in the latter language, was spoken till the sixteenth century, and has left a large literature, chiefly ecclesiastical. Its narrow range is a hindrance to its use in interpreting, inasmuch as the Copts deemed their own theological terms idolatrous, and everywhere replaced them by Greek words. However, Coptic enabled students gradually to grapple with the grammatical forms and structure of the language of the Pharaohs (at first they could only construe: not translate, knowing the root meaning, but ignorant of its secondary sense), and to get a daily increasing vocabulary. Dr. Birch says (quoting Benfey) that the Egyptian was a Semitic tongue. Others point to the negro character of the roots. We must not forget the view of Mr. Palgrave (who has seen the Arab under all circumstances) that Arab and therefore Jew shows a very appreciable negro strain. Anyhow, Dr. Birch admits "the Egyptian type was produced by a fusion of races," though he differs from Sir J. Lubbock in thinking there is no indication of a stone age or of aborigines reduced to servitude; the mixture of grandeur and pettiness which marks the worship does not strike him (as it does Mr. Poole and others) as evidencing a dual origin.

Undoubtedly, however, the race became mixed as time went on. Waves of invasion swept over the land. Cushites from the south, Semites from the north-east, fair blue-eyed Libyans from the north-west, all left their mark. The Delta was several times held by foreigners. Of the great Rameses II., whose name, popularised by the Egyptians into Sesu or Setesura, which in less melodious Greek becomes Sesostris, Dr. Birch says, speaking of "his personal beauty of the Asiatic type, there is some reason to believe that the blood of the Hyksos flowed in his veins." On the other hand, "the mother of Amenophis III. belonged to the black races." Egyptian, by the way, Mr. Cooper says is far easier to learn than Sanscrit or Arabic, the grammar is so simple; and, though there are 960 characters, only 150 of them are in common use, and no two can be mistaken for one another. We have but little hope that Messrs. Sayce and Renouf's free Egyptian classes at the rooms of the Society of Biblical Archæology will do much towards Egyptology as a science; but we feel sure that even a few of such lectures, or a little time given to Mr.

Renouf's grammar, will enable a visitor to the Museum to feel intelligent delight instead of vague wonder at the square yards of imperishable record there brought under his eye. "The task of interpreting has been (says Dr. Birch) aided by the peculiar construction of the hieroglyphs, where every word not perfectly abstract in meaning, consists of two portions—hieroglyphs to represent its sound, followed by hieroglyphs expressing its general or specific meaning;" or in Mr. Cooper's words: "The sentences abound with determinatives, designed to give at a glance, as by a picture, the nature of the words they accompany." All this, complex enough in description, would be at once cleared up in a lecture; and we trust the time will come when a short course of Egyptology will be as much a part of a liberal education as a little knowledge of Greek. It is a case in which a little learning is not dangerous, for the amateur will never go far enough to be able to give up the hand of his guides.

Of Egyptian civilisation Dr. Birch says: "It stands alone, the oldest and that African, finally superseded by Asiatic and European progress. Yet still the oldest, first in arts, sciences, and organisation, an enlightened despotism supported by a territorial aristocracy trained under a sacerdotal culture,* animated with the love of literature [we have a medical treatise by Cheops!], the thirst for immortality, the conviction of a glorious future." He notes that the monuments which to us seem such a waste of national power have attained their aim; they have lasted, while all the world's contemporary work is scattered to the winds. Egypt was wise in jealously shutting out foreigners: "none of her conquerors improved her internal condition; all either arrested or degraded its development." Will it be so, we cannot help asking, with the somewhat similar civilisations of Japan and China? At any rate, the Chinaman as a colonist has a power of adaptability which climate and physique denied to the Egyptian.

Mr. Cooper's motto: "After the doings of the land of Egypt shall ye not do?" explains the object of his lecture.

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* We have spoken more than once of Egyptian castes; their existence is denied by several Egyptologists. Sir Gardner Wilkinson says that whether there were castes or not, those men who showed talent were drafted into the higher orders, and so on into the priesthood. This accounts for the long duration of the system.

He shows that the influence of Egyptian literature was negative rather than positive. The Pentateuch says nothing about the Trinity lest the Jews, saturated with Egyptian ideas, should have confounded it with one of the many Egyptian triads. It is intensely anthropomorphic in its description of God, lest He might be mistaken for the incomprehensible Amun Ra, who was a divine principle acting through lower deities, not a divine entity entering closely into relationship with mankind. So, again, because in "Horus the holy child, the Lord of life, the beloved son of his Father, the justifier of the righteous," the Egyptian found redemption, therefore a personal Redeemer is very indistinctly shadowed forth in the Pentateuch. The Jews, too, were long kept without a king, because gradually in Egypt the kingly power had grown till the king was not only absolute but infallible, a very God upon earth. Mr. Cooper's striking lecture is worth careful reading: we do not profess to agree with all that he advances; but the following remark, "it is absurd to illustrate or prove a doctrine in Genesis by a passage in Isaiah, or demonstrate a practice in Numbers by a quotation from Ezra," is not without pertinence. The importance of Mr. Cooper's subject speaks for itself, for (as Dean Stanley well says) "Egypt is the background of the whole history of the Israelites"—this is its special interest to all Christians.

That no notice of the most prominent fact in the relation between the two, viz., the Exodus, is found on any monument or in any yet examined papyrus will surprise no one who considers the Egyptian character. It was the exaggeration of what we find in modern China, where, when the allies were in Pekin and had burnt the Summer Palace, the bulletins issued in the neighbourhood represented them as suffered to exist solely by the Emperor's forbearance. As Dr. Birch says: "The dark and mysterious annals of Egypt are chiefly found on sacred monuments, full of the pomp of conquest, but reticent of disaster." It is as if we should try to determine the moral character of an old family from their epitaphs. "Virtues not vices were incised for public consideration, and to the scribe was left the task of recording the private history of the throne or the trials held before royal commissioners."

But we feel that very much of what we had planned is excluded by the limits of this paper. Lady Duff Gordon's

Letters we do hope no one who cares about the subject will omit to read. Our notice of them may well be brief, for they do not belong to the class of books of which one learns enough from a review; they should be read from beginning to end. Two points they chiefly impress on us; first, the tyranny of the Government and its pitiable results —only sons blinding themselves that they may not be torn away to war or forced labour from the families that depend on them for support; a waste of life as great as in the days of the Mahmoodeyeh canal: "We are Muslims, but we should thank God to send Europeans to govern us"—and the distrust bred of tyranny. When a father is asked why not send for the doctor to his sick son, he replies: "God knows what a Government doctor might do to the boy." The next point is the very kindly, noble nature of both Arabs and Copts, and the coarse way in which travellers too often treat "the native." Omar praying outside Lady Gordon's door: "O God, make her better," "Oh, may God let her sleep," is well matched by the same Omar resisting an Italian valet's tempting offer of far higher wages; he preferred ragged clothes and kindness with the lady. Lady Gordon nurses a poor sick *reis* (boat captain) in his last illness. The gratitude of the people is unbounded: "I often feel quite hurt at the way they thank me for what the poor at home would turn up their noses at. Hardly a dragoman has been up the river since Er-Rasheedee died but has come to thank me as warmly as if I had done himself some great service, and many to give me a present—eggs, pigeons, even a turkey; and food is worth money, with butter at three shillings a pound. I am weary of hearing: 'Of all the Frangee I never saw one like thee!' Was no one ever at all humane before? For, remember, I give no money, only a little physic and civility." We may well be thankful that there has been one at least such European visitor to Egypt, and that she was an Englishwoman.

Of the picturesque traveller, whose name is legion, we have chosen two—Mr. Fairholt, who went out with Lord Londesborough, and Miss Edwards.

Miss Edwards was specially taken with the temple at Abou-Sembal, the four colossi at the entrance to which form her frontispiece. There she stayed for eighteen days, sleeping in front of the giant faces, "more unearthly in the grey dawn than by moonlight." She speaks of their

"fixed, fatal, appalling look," and notes how "they flushed into life as the sky warmed; for a moment there was the flush of life; then in the steady daylight they became mere colossi, serene and strong." She is eloquent about "the daily miracle of these awful brethren," and she discusses with zest the vexed question as to their type of face —"more negro than the usual Egyptian face, say some; Mongolian, say others; Semitic, says the Viscount de Rougé; he and Sethi were Hyksos." (We cannot contradict this statement, but we take leave to doubt it. De Rougé would scarcely say that Rameses, the oppressor of the Jews, was a Hyksos.) She herself thinks it a portrait of "the handsomest of men, the most perfect Egyptian face." We can judge for ourselves, for besides his fallen colossus at the Ramaseum at Thebes (out of the face of which the Arabs have cut mill-stones), we have the head in the British Museum (called the Memnon),* of his removal of which, in spite of intrigues and jealousies, and the opposition of officials, Belzoni gives such a triumphant account. The fellahs, finding themselves, for a wonder, paid for their work, fancied that the stone so precious in the eyes of the Franks must be full of gold; this notion got carried to the local authorities, and orders at once came to stop work. "I was just then very ill" (says Belzoni), "but I took my janissary with me and crossed the water to Luxor. I there found the Caimakan, who would give no reason for his proceeding but saucy answers, and the more I attempted to bring him into good-humour, the more insolent he became." A violent scene followed; the Turk drew his sword, but Belzoni seized and disarmed him, gave him a good shaking, and said he would report him to the Pasha, and send the sword and pistols to show how his Excellency's orders were respected.

To return to Miss Edwards. Rameses at Abou-Sembal, she points out, is hard to get a good view of; from below he is too much foreshortened; you must climb the sand-slope to the level of the beards (for two are buried to the throat, one has lost his head, only the southernmost sits uninjured and wholly free from sand). "There they sit, sixty-six

* The French broke up the statue, intending to carry off the head. The huge fallen colossus was overthrown either by an earthquake or by Cambyses, "the Cromwell of Egypt." It is of stone so hard, that the Luxor forgers of scarabs use splinters of it as we do graving diamonds. Well may it be asked, "How was such a vast mass brought from Assouan?"

feet high, without the platform below their feet" (higher, reader, than the towers of most village churches), "the width across the chest is twenty-five feet four inches. The hands are too small, if Charles Blanc's canon is correct that the middle finger should be a nineteenth of the total height. The faces are finished like portraits; the lower parts are only indicated. Verily these old sculptors took a mountain and fell on it like Titans. Without clay models or other helps, they carved and hollowed it as if it was a cherry-stone." Abou-Sembal seems the most striking of all the Egyptian temples. The scenery adds to the effect; the mountains close in upon the stream, so that the sculptured rock overhangs the water. Opposite is a narrow strip of that Nubia which "exists only by the grace of the desert or the persistence of the Nile in well-doing:" beside the water, a shadoof, with its ox-power, a group of palms, and a few naked Nubians, who certainly do not look like Rameses' kinsmen. Of these Rameses figures, says an American writer (Curtis, *Nile Notes of an Howadji*): "in their faces is a godlike grandeur and beauty which the Greeks never reached. They are not only colossal blocks, but the mind cannot escape the feeling that they were conceived by colossal minds. Such only cherish the idea of repose so profound, for there is no standard in nature for works like these, except the comparative character of the real expression of real heroes and more than heroes. If a poet should enter in dreams the sacred groves of the grandest mythology, these are the faces he would expect to see, breathing grandeur and godly grace. They sit as if necessarily expectant of the world's homage. There is a sweetness beyond smiling in the rounded, placid mouth. . . The Greek gods are human, even their Jove, albeit so grand and terrible; but these elder figures are above humanity; they dwell serenely in abstract perfection." Dean Stanley is equally eloquent.* "Here you get the most distinct conception of the great Rameses. Sculptures of his life you can see elsewhere. But here alone, as you sit on the deep

* For rugged terse suggestiveness, Browning has, as usual, no equal in his lines about an Egyptian city:

> "But he looked upon the city, every side
> Far and wide,—
> All the mountains topped with temples,
> All the glades of colonnades,
> All the causeys, bridges, aqueducts; and then
> All the men."

pure sand, you can look at his features, magnified tenfold, till every line of them sinks into you with the weight of a mountain. And remember that the face which looks out from the top of that gigantic statue is the face of the greatest man of that old world that preceded the birth of Greece and Rome—the first conqueror recorded in history, the glory of Egypt, the terror of Africa and Asia, whose monuments still remain in Syria and Asia Minor, the second founder of Thebes, which must have been to the world then as Rome was in the days of its empire. It is certainly an individual likeness. I notice, besides the profound repose and tranquillity, united perhaps with something of scorn, the length of the face, compared with that of most of the sculptures, the curl of the tip of the nose, the overlapping and fall of the under lip." But Dean Stanley cannot help noticing what must strike every one no less forcibly than the rapid transitions from the sublime to the ridiculous in the mythology, viz., the horrible savageness which underlies this stereotyped serenity: "Rameses, with his placid smile, grasping the shrieking captives by the hair; and Amun, with smile no less placid, giving him the falchion to smite them." The whole impression is that gods and men alike belong to an age and world entirely passed away, when men were slow to move and slow to think; but when they did move or think, their work was done with the force and violence of giants.*

No wonder Miss Edwards is disgusted when a fleet of dahabiehs is moored close by Abou-Sembal, and their occupants give an evening *fete*, "drumming and singing under the very noses of the colossi." It was like the champagne luncheon amid the sphinxes and avenues of Thebes that Miss Martineau (*Eastern Travel*) complains of.

Further south, Miss Edwards's party discover a tomb

* The collective effort and the absorption of all individuality in the one great purpose, remind us of what is said of the Zulu way of *swarming* across a river in flood. It is like the work of a mass of insects. Was such work done with enthusiasm? Or is Herodotus right as to the disaffection caused by pyramid building? He is clearly wrong about Cheops shutting up the temples, for Cheops is named as the builder of new and the restorer of manifold ones. Moreover, every king began a pyramid as soon as he came to the throne. We are accustomed to think of three or four at Ghizeh, and a few elsewhere. At Ghizeh there are nine, standing in a necropolis of Memphis, which had been abandoned before the Ptolemies. There are more than sixty other pyramids, all mostly tombs, all standing in burying places. Unlike the Chinese, who waste so much good land on burying-places, the careful Egyptians buried in sand beyond the reach of the fertilising river.

for themselves. They "work like tigers" at getting out the sand, with no tools but a fire shovel, a broom, and two coal baskets, and twenty pair of hands. By-and-by they get two broken oars and more baskets, and then comes the reward in the shape of gorgeous paintings kept by the sand as fresh as the day when they were finished. Of course they take wet paper "squeezes" which destroy the colour, especially of the blue-faced Amun; but "when science leads the way in such defacement, is it wonderful ignorance should follow?"

Miss Edwards is delighted that in Egyptian the same word (*Ma*) expresses truth and justice, and the same (*Nefer*) good and beautiful; and she cannot, despite the cruelty of the conquering kings, think evil of a people among whom a woman's name was "Worth-her-weight-in-gold." We cannot linger with her in the more than half-buried Ptolemaic temple of Kom Omboo; nor in Cairo, when she sees the sheik of the dervishes "ride over a human causeway." "Despite the assertion that his horse's tread is harmless, I saw at least one man in strong convulsions as if he would never walk again (he had not said the prayer which acts as a talisman, was the explanation"); nor in Boulaq Museum, "which, founded only thirteen years, is richer far than the Pompeii Museum at Naples." Here she principally notes the figures with white quartz eyes and metal pupils, coloured to the life, of prince Ra-hotep and queen Nefer-t, contemporaries of Snefru, the builder of the unopened pyramid of Meydoon. Their strong chins, she thinks, mark a difference in race between them and the Upper Egyptians who came a few years later.

She, like others, notes the contrast between the genial jovial scenes depicted at Beni-Hassan (twelfth dynasty) and the solemn after-world, with its courts of justice and awards of weal or woe, which form most of the subjects in the tombs of the kings at Thebes (eighteenth dynasty). She explains it, not, like everybody else, by a difference of date—the realistic scenes being earlier far than these glimpses of the spirit world—but by an epigram: "It was an epicurean aristocracy ruled by Puritan kings. The tombs of the subjects are anacreontics, those of the sovereigns are penitential psalms." Shall we say that the earlier Egyptians had not yet developed the idea of an after-state, or only that they were unwilling to refer to it in their

pictures? Anyhow, in the whole mummy system seems to be realised the mediæval idea that the actual body which dies must rise, or else that the after-life of the soul is in vain. The old Egyptian had not realised that "corruption cannot inherit incorruption;" and so everything was put ready for the day of waking, when the soul, like a human-headed hawk, should re-enter the undecayed corpse. Perhaps the strangest thing of all, in reference to this subject, is what Dr. Birch tells us in his notes to Wilkinson. Besides the soul, *ba*, man had a shade, *khebi*, a spirit or intelligence, *khu*, and an existence, *ka*, besides the life, *ankh*. There is a curious analogy between all this and the belief of some red Indian tribes, who not only distinguish between the soul and the life, but gift man with several souls.

At Thebes, Miss Edwards sees Lady Duff Gordon's rooms—"bare, comfortless, till you look from the west window and see the view." She meets Lady Gordon's "little Ahmed," Mustapha Aga's young son, "who in the morning looks like a prince in the Arabian Nights; in the evening, has the dress and the *élancé* step of a Belgravian youth."

We are thankful to her for quoting from Leigh Hunt two lines, which show that a third-rate poet sometimes has a happy inspiration:

> "It flows through old hushed Egypt and its sands
> Like some grave mighty thought threading a dream."

And now for one brief closing word about politics. The present state and future prospects of Egypt may well afford a whole paper to themselves. We must omit Mr. M'Conn's *Egypt as It Is*, just as we have omitted Bonwick's *Egyptian Belief and Modern Thought*. We can only just name M. About's *Ahmed le Fellah*, just as we can do little more than name the new edition of Wilkinson. Every one who studies ancient Egypt is, however, pretty sure to take up Wilkinson, which, by the way, was so wholly based on the wholly erroneous chronologies and idle tales of Herodotus and Diodorus that Dr. Birch's task must have been a difficult one. And every one interested in the matter is sure to read what Mr. Dicey on the one hand, and the Khedive's friends on the other, have to say about the state of the people and the character of the government. Before this paper is published the Khedive may have abdicated in

favour of his son, and we shall have learnt whether the attack on Mr. Rivers-Wilson was due to the unforecasting revenge of an exasperated ex-despot. The state of things during Nubar Pasha's prime ministry was that the Khedive had allowed Mr. Goschen and M. Joubert to nominate respectively a controller of receipts and of expenditure. Of these the Englishman soon found out that the Khedive had, like Ananias of old, concealed a part of his property. This he had to give up—hence the spite against Mr. Rivers-Wilson. The vast family estates at Dairu and elsewhere were surrendered, and the Egyptian customs were taken in hand. It is a great comfort that in all this England and France have gone hand in hand. The French liked our buying the Suez shares, for they thought (see Valbert in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, Jan. 1st, 1876) that this was a pledge that we should also act in concert with them on the Balkans. We failed to do this; but in Egypt, at any rate, our interests and theirs are much the same, and happily what here suits "British interests" must tend to the world's good. Said Pasha was a barbarian, but he only got four millions into debt; Ismail is an enlightened ruler who is said to have reclaimed a million and a half acres, but he has added eighty millions to the debt since 1863. Mr. Dicey says that in this time one hundred millions more have been spent than are accounted for; but this discrepancy may probably be to a great extent explained by the ruinous system of borrowing; out of forty-three millions of loan, thirty-four millions, we are told, were swallowed up in interest and sinking fund! No wonder that the most violent opponents of reform are not the Khedive and his family, but the European and the Levantine usurers of Alexandria and their hangers-on, the bloodsuckers who fatten on Ismail's extravagance. Of this set, wholly lawless till the recent change in consular courts, M. About tells some stories that would be farcical, but that they are unhappily true samples of the way in which rascality has trodden down those poor workers who, from the Pharaohs' days, have been set to make bricks without straw. For instance, a Greek hired an Arab's house, and when the time came refused to pay any rent. The Arab sued him, not in the native court, to which as a foreigner he was not amenable, but in his own consul's court. Before the case came on the Greek had transferred his interest in the house to an Italian, and the poor Arab had to begin again with

the Italian consul. The transfer was then made to an Armenian (Russian subject), then to a German, and so on; and in that way for years the man was kept out both of house and money. *O l'étrange racaille!* is M. About's well-merited comment.

We are told (Dr. Birch loudly echoes the sentiment) that nations do not revive. Those who hope great things from Greece, who think that Greece has already done great things in three-quarters of a century of freedom following ages of servitude, will not believe this. We hold that no race can die out without the world losing something; and, if the fellah is the descendant of the old Egyptian, that skill which is shown in so many strange ways in the monuments must still be latent in him. And if this art often seems to us futile, if efforts such as filled the crocodile-caves of Manfaloot strike us as a degrading waste of time, let us reflect that "it is childish, instead of trying to ascertain the ideas, to revile or ridicule the manifestation which was never meant to meet our conceptions, and can never be interpreted by them. There were, we know, reasons which made it a very different thing with them to cherish sacred animals from what it would be in us" (Martineau). Not only in glyptic art but in engineering were the old Egyptians great: they dyked the Nile, and dug lake Maris to regulate its inundations; they have a continent at their back which it will take all man's best energies to subdue. May they so rise as to be able to help in the work! May future generations see a race of peaceful conquerors sally forth from that Nile valley to turn Africa's swamps into wholesome cornlands and to fertilise its deserts. We trust M. Mariette is not too hopeful when he says:

"L'Egypte traverse une époque de recomposition et de restaurationqui à peine commencée depuis un demi-siècle est déjà féconde. Rien n'excite la sympathique curiosité du voyageur comme le spectacle de ce pays qui vient à peine de s'éveiller à la vraie civilisation et qui déjà d'effort en effort est parvenu à une hauteur qu'aucun autre peuple de l'orient n'a pu jusqu'à présent atteindre."*

A word about the physical geography of Egypt, and we have done. It has long been remarked that no argument for or against development can be drawn from the persistence of the types in Egypt. The cat of the earliest monuments is

* We trust M. Mariette's promised work on Nubia will soon appear.

the cat of to-day; so is the ibis, so is the crocodile. But types change only when their surroundings change, and the character of Egypt has from the first been fixedness in climate as in most things. All that the evolutionist claims is that development goes on till the point of comfort has been reached, so far as the circumstances admit. No wonder, then, that the early paintings present the very types which we meet with nowadays. The negro is there with his monkeys and cameleopards, because the dense African forests then, as now, suited, and therefore produced the negro type. Egypt itself as naturally developed a rapidly civilised people, as the conditions of life in several parts of Africa have tended to keep man in barbarism. The first thing a well-fed people, who have not too severe a struggle for existence, and who have a pretty settled Government, desire to do, is to leave some record of themselves for later times. Now (as Mr. Stuart Poole well expresses it), "in no country is life easier, or the acquisition of wealth from the land more rapid, than in Egypt." We are tempted to doubt this when we think of the abject misery of the fellaheen; but a moment's reflection convinces us that the remark is true. "Egypt is a table-land of rock, through which the Nile has cut a passage, which, by its annual overflow, it has gradually fertilised." What none who have not been there can realise, is the exceeding narrowness of the greater part of this Nile Valley. Readers of Miss Martineau's *Eastern Travel* will remember her astonishment at being able to "see across from one side of Egypt to the other," almost until it widens out into the Delta. On this surface the deposit of soil is very small, "not more than four and a half inches in a century for the last 3,000 years," says Mr. Poole. Yet it bears a rich crop year after year, and, if artificial irrigation is used, two or three crops a year may be grown without exhausting it. No wonder the old Egyptians were successful farmers.

Then what a climate it is for preserving monumental records; and this would be sure to encourage the multiplication of them. Stone, too, lay close at hand, both easily-worked limestones and sandstones, and also the syenite of the first cataract. And as there was abundance, so also was there variety of food. Fish was plentiful in the river, wild fowl swarmed in the northern marshes,—no need to go far afield for any of the necessaries of life, and there-

fore abundant leisure to turn the mind to suprasensual matters. How the yearly miracle of the cornfield, the death of the seed corn, and its rising again in a new and glorified form came to take such hold on the Egyptian mind, who can tell? They who believe that much of what we wonder at in the early civilisations is due to primitive tradition, fragments of which were preserved, some here some there, though their origin was forgotten, will see in this a prefiguring of the appointed Divine Sacrifice. "Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it remaineth alone," says our Lord; and His use of this figure makes it not improbable that the Truth was under it foreshadowed to the earliest men. Hence the Osiris myth, and hence, too, that strong belief in immortality, in a resurrection of the body, which led to almost all the later developments of Egyptian art. For developments we have seen there are,* in spite of the dominating permanence. And the crowning wonder is that of all this wondrous system the mystery is gradually being unravelled in lands which, when Egypt was in her glory, were tenanted by the cave-bear and the reindeer and the palæolithic man. There are "the kings in their glory, each in his own house;" and here are the Egyptologists comparing signs, making vocabularies, unfolding to all of us the *records of the past*, finding in every fresh discovery new testimony to the truth of Him whose word abideth "for ever in heaven."

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* Compare the dry and unattractive nature of the Ritual or (Book of the Dead), even in M. de Rougé's elegant translation, with the glowing description in Mr. Cooper, of the judgment of the soul, the heaven and hell, the *work in heaven*, as helps in which work the little statuettes of Osiris were placed on every mummy's breast, the metempsychosis, &c. It is like coming to a Psalm or a chapter of Isaiah, after a page of the Talmud. Read also, in Naville, the strange passage about the wrath of Ra, and the deluge of human blood.

ART. III.—1. *Modern Physical Fatalism.* By T. R. BIRKS, M.A. London: Macmillan and Co. 1876.

2. *The Supernatural in Nature.* London: C. Kegan Paul and Co.

THESE works have their origin in the many recent attempts which have been made to explain the universe without God. The weapons by which science is said to have expelled from the human mind belief in miracle, and therefore in the Author of miracle, and to have given back to man a freedom which is in reality but license in disguise, are here taken up and used after a masterly manner in defence of truth.

Modern Physical Fatalism is an able examination of the groundwork of H. Spencer's *Negative Philosophy* from a mathematical and physical standpoint. Though dealing with abstruse problems it is characterised throughout by unusual perspicuity of thought and logical acumen. Mr. Birks displays much skill in demonstrating the numerous contradictions and startling paradoxes which underlie the verbose definitions and imperfect reasoning of the "First Principles" of this philosophy, a philosophy which would reconcile religion and science by extinguishing the former and placing blind fate on the throne of the universe. As we shall show hereafter, he conclusively proves that the whole system is based on false assumption, and established by more than doubtful logic. We rejoice that the university which gave birth to this doctrine of physical fatalism has also sent forth so able and complete a refutation of it.

The author of *The Supernatural in Nature* has produced a work of real merit. No extracts or mere epitome can do justice to the freshness of thought and extensive scientific knowledge which it displays. The centre-piece of the book is a scholarly examination of the early narrative of Genesis in the light of modern science. We have nowhere met with a more reasonable explanation of the text or a more judicious application to it of the certainties of science. The attempt to reconcile the revelation of nature with the revelation of the Word is a work worthy of the highest intellect, and must in time yield substantial fruit to the unbiassed labourer. The Bible, if

true, is true for all time. Science, on the other hand, is essentially progressive; each age in its turn laughs at the simplicity and ignorance of that which has supplied the germ of its own discoveries. It is therefore unreasonable to expect a full accord between the two revelations till the fundamental truths of nature come more perfectly within the grasp of science. Mysteries, no doubt, there will be to the end of time, but much light has been thrown upon the subject by the wonderful scientific advances of the last half-century. Many interesting problems, bearing on theological truth, have been raised and settled; these the reader will find clearly stated and rationally applied in *The Supernatural in Nature*. Although the primary end of the Bible is not to teach science, used in its limited sense, and the phraseology adopted in its illustrations drawn from nature is, as is becoming in a book intended for universal perusal, simple and popular; nevertheless revelations are there made concerning the mysteries of existence which no criticism, worthy of the name, can resolve into mere myth or symbol. Though originally given to enlighten man's ignorance on topics beyond his reach, such statements serve in our day another purpose. When verified by the latest dicta of science they yield undoubted proof of their Divine origin. "How could a Jew, whom some call 'semi-barbarous,' and his cosmogony an 'incubus'; a Jew, without a shred of modern science (whatever shrewd guesses he may have acquired from the 'wisdom of the Egyptians') as to astronomy, or geometry, or geology, or physiology, or chemistry; a Jew who, speaking out of his own thoughts, would probably say that the earth was flat, and the centre of the system, stars and sun moving round, write a correct, or even an approximately correct account of creation? How, indeed, unless God taught him!"* Had the Bible reflected in detail the imperfect teaching of past centuries its record would rightly be rejected by the science of the present day. But when its simple suggestive statements open out with almost prophetic expansion under the ever-growing revelation of nature's mysteries, we behold in them the signature of their Divine Author.

The scientific mind will find in this work no strained coincidences, and none of that empty declamation against scientific men which is unfortunately so common, and withal so

* *Supernatural in Nature*, p. 43.

pernicious in its effect. It will repel no one who loves and seeks the truth. As correctives to the form of scepticism rife in these days the above works are invaluable. When some of the leaders of thought in this country declare Spencer's fatalistic philosophy to be a system for all time, and confer upon him the high-sounding title of apostle of the understanding, averring that evolution will account for all things, and that man, ever the victim of circumstances, is the necessary result of inert matter and force, it is important for the sake of those who are not able to form an independent opinion on these subjects, that such statements should receive a decided scientific denial.

One of the most fruitful sources of the errors of the philosophy which discards miracle, together with other "crude beliefs" of our forefathers, is the unnatural or multiple meaning attached to the words used in logical processes. On the one hand, instead of being the exponents of facts, they are in reality the exponents of theories; and, on the other hand, in the place of one definite connotation, their signification is constantly changing, not only in the same volume, but even in the same paragraph. Definitions, however carefully made, if not in accordance with usage, are always apt to mislead both writer and reader. Fortunately the word natural, through the adoption of Butler's definition by Darwin, in his *Origin of Species*, has a determinate connotation attached to it. "The only distinct meaning of the word natural is, stated, fixed, or settled," says the Bishop, in his *Analogy*. A natural law is a uniformity of nature, as far as our observation has extended. This last limitation is of great importance. Mechanicians state that a machine can be made which, after displaying for ages one stated law of action, will make a single change, and then return to its former law for ages to come. Any one observing this operation, century after century, would predict with increasing probability the future of that machine; but being out of sight of the mechanism, and not in the secret of the designer, would after all make one wrong prediction. "No finite number of instances," says Professor Jevons, in his *Principles of Science*,* "can warrant us in expecting *with certainty* that the next will be of like nature." There is no necessity in natural law. "There is nothing whatsoever

* Second Edition, p. 738.

incompatible with logic in the discovery of objects which should prove exceptions to any law of nature."* Thus expounded we entirely accept Butler's definition of the word natural; but must strongly protest against any further addition to its significance, and especially condemn the innovation of those who would include the idea of necessity, and so exclude the continuation of Butler's exposition. "What is natural as much requires and presupposes an intelligent mind to render it so, that is to effect it continually or at stated times, as what is supernatural or miraculous does to effect it for once." By such men natural law is regarded as necessary law, requiring no originator, and brooking no alteration or suspension. Adequate reasons for rejecting this doctrine will be given hereafter.

The term supernatural is less easily defined, because more vaguely used. It is often employed as synonymous with miraculous. Hence some, discarding miracle as false or susceptible of natural interpretation, boldly affirm that belief in "The Supernatural," the Author of miracle, is negatived by science, and is only fit for the childhood of our race. Underlying this reasoning are three assumptions: that "supernatural" is applicable to Divine action alone; that miracle is the only manifestation of Deity; that what is natural is self-existent or self-created. By others the term has been applied to the origination, and to any change in the collocations, of matter and law accomplished by free agency, whether Divine, angelic, or human. Others, again, restrict its application to the Divine action in primary creation, to an exhibition of "power independent of the use of means, as distinguished from power dependent on knowledge—even infinite knowledge—of the means proper to be employed." "We must conceive of the Creator as first giving existence to the means, and then using them for the accomplishment of ends."† Very definite lines are here drawn between the origination and use of matter and law. It is evident that, in most cases, the definition of this word varies with the special doctrine of second causes held by the writer. In all, Divine action is the prominent idea; therefore we take supernatural, not in its limited sense as synonymous with miraculous, but as applicable to

* *Principles of Science*, Second Edition, p. 737.
† Argyll, *Reign of Law*, chap. I.

all direct manifestations of the One above nature. The danger of the present day is to multiply the natural at the expense of the supernatural, to attribute all things to secondary causes. It is only by transcending the thoughts suggested or modified by our dependence and limited sphere of action that we can rise to the conception of God as the author and preserver of the universe, and say with Mr. Cook, "Natural law is habitual, miracle unusual Divine action; the one is a prolonged and so unnoticed supernatural." We may scientifically regard the natural and the miraculous both alike as manifestations of the supernatural. Thomas Carlyle truly writes: "Innumerable are the illusions and legerdemain tricks of custom; but of all these perhaps the cleverest is her knack of persuading us that the miraculous by simple repetition ceases to be miraculous. True it is by this means we live; for man must work as well as wonder; and herein is custom so far a kind nurse, guiding him to his true benefit. But she is a false, foolish nurse, or rather we are false foolish nurslings, when, in our resting and reflecting hours, we prolong the same deception."* Whether miracles result from the suspension of natural law by the direct Divine volition, or the introduction and use of higher laws unknown to us, it is impossible to say. A perfect knowledge of all natural laws would be necessary before an event could logically be proclaimed *contra naturam*. The essence of a miracle, however, does not consist in an exhibition of power and wisdom more wonderful than that displayed in a natural event, but in the accomplishment of something unusual and superhuman for a definite purpose revealed to man. "The works that I do they testify of Me." "They were performed to assist faith, and not to confound reason."† Their "how" is practically immaterial to those who regard law not as a master, but as a servant whose very existence depends upon the will of the Almighty self-existent God.

There are those who allege, with great show of proof, that "the deepest, widest, and most certain of all facts is this, that the power which the universe manifests to us is utterly inscrutable."‡ If true, knowledge is coextensive with physics, theology a myth, the future to each individual a blank, and his hopes or fears of a life beyond the product

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* *Sartor Resartus.* † Argyll.
‡ Spencer's *First Principles.*

of a hyper-excited brain;—if Spencer's *First Principles* be our Bible, nature, instead of being a revelation of the existence and attributes of God, must be regarded as a huge machine, surrounded by "a mystery ever pressing for interpretation," a mystery which, notwithstanding, Nihilism absolutely forbids us to attempt to solve.

Atheism, Pantheism, and Theism are alike discarded by Spencer on the common ground that they postulate self-existence somewhere, and this assumption, "whether made nakedly or under a disguise, is 'equally vicious, equally unthinkable.' Yet he admits, in the same sentence, that the assumption is one 'which it is impossible to avoid making.' The common fault, then, for which the three rival doctrines are condemned, is that they do what no one can help doing, or believe in 'self-existence somewhere.' The peculiar excellence of the doctrine of the Unknowable is, that it does what its own author declares no one can do, admits self-existence nowhere. A strange foundation, indeed, for a new and improved philosophy!"* If there be existence, there must be self-existence. "An infinite series of links receding for ever is an effect without a cause." †

To call God the Unknowable, and theology nescience, is basing pretended knowledge on total ignorance, or else in some sense postulating what is denied. God may be incomprehensible in His essence and attributes, but between the extremes of nescience and perfect comprehension there is such a thing as partial knowledge. To Hamilton's reasoning, adopted by Dean Mansel in his *Bampton Lectures*, from which Spencer quotes so largely in favour of his doctrine of the Unknowable, Mill aptly replies: "Our author goes on to repeat his argument, used in his reply to Cousin, that infinite space is inconceivable, because all the conception we are able to form of it is negative, and a negative conception is the same as no conception. The Infinite is conceived only by thinking away every character by which the finite is conceived. To this I oppose my former reply. Instead of thinking away every character of the finite we think away only the idea of an end or boundary." Infinite goodness, differing from finite goodness, not in kind but degree, having the additional negative attribute of absence of limit, is knowable as goodness, though incomprehensible as infinite. It does not posit nescience but

* Birks' *Modern Physical Fatalism*, pp. 9, 10. † Cook's *Monday Lectures.*

knowledge capable of infinite expansion. The infinity of the attributes of God thus becomes a stimulus, not a bar to knowledge.

To assert that this term, applied to Deity, necessarily involves not only absence of limitation in each attribute, but also the possession of all attributes, good and bad, is as illogical as it is irreverent. True theology often tries faith by mystery, never by asking belief in self-evident contradiction. Good and evil apply to the actions, or rather motives prompting to action, of free agents, and apart from them have no meaning. Their existence is not, however, dependent on contrast. Goodness does not need evil as a foil. Though perfect in kind and immeasurably remote, even in their smallest manifestations, each admits of degrees. The first created intelligences, pure and holy, required no evil to make known to them the surpassing goodness of their Maker. The contrast of finite with infinite goodness affords scope not for a passing discrimination merely, but for an eternal contemplation, each increase of knowledge forming a basis for a further apprehension of that which no finite knowledge can compass. The existence of evil in created beings is as certain as it is mysterious, but to argue that this is incompatible with God's omnipotence is beside the mark. God can do whatever He will, and in His wisdom He has seen fit to entrust man with this tremendous responsibility, that within limits of space, time, power, and the other restrictions involved in humanity, he also can do whatever he will, using and increasing, or gradually extinguishing the light "which lighteth every man that cometh into the world." Evil is a possibility, though not a necessity, where free will and conscience are entrusted to finite beings. We cannot agree with the author of *The Supernatural in Nature*, that the time will ever come when "we shall begin to know that the mystery of iniquity is a necessary mystery."* It is inconsistent with our knowledge of Him who hates iniquity. The key to this suggestion is found in the following statements, which we believe to be erroneous. "Are not onward movements essential to the happiness of finite beings; and can we form any idea of life, growth, progress without conflict, *i.e.*, without evil?" † Are we not to "grow in grace, and in the knowledge and love of our Lord Jesus Christ" in heaven, where conflict is over

* Page 293. † *Ibid.*, p. 107.

and evil for ever excluded? "If we set before us the essential contrast of light and darkness, of good and evil; that good becomes a higher good by trial, and evil a greater evil by refusal of good; that truth must be manifested as separate from a lie, and righteousness must be displayed as opposed to unrighteousness."* Truth will be manifested as separate from a lie, and righteousness as opposed to unrighteousness, but the latter are in nowise necessary for the display of the former. The contrast between infinite and finite goodness affords scope for an unlimited revelation and unbounded knowledge. The existence of evil ever testifies to the transcendent importance of the gift of choice, and the acceptableness of the service of perfect freedom.

Again, to say God is absolute, and then base on one special connotation of this word the doctrine that He is unknowable is reversing the logical order of things. The definition of a word must precede its use and determine its applicability. If absolute signifies the incapacity to exist in relation to anything else, and as such can be applied to any being, that being is truly unknowable. But if, on the other hand, it connotes existence "out of one set of relations, that is out of all relations of dependence,"† capacity to exist out of all relations, but not incapacity to exist in relation to anything else, then theology calls God absolute. As such He can be known as personal, and has been mysteriously revealed in His Son. Being and personality are positive realities possessed by us with manifold limitations: He is the self-existent, independent Being, before whom limitations vanish, and with whom, in the words of Carlyle, "As it is a universal Here, so it is an everlasting Now." But are we not anthropomorphic? Those who would thus stigmatise all notions of God derived from human attributes, fail to appreciate man's eminence. Instead of viewing God in the light of man, man must be viewed in the light of God. "Let us make man in our own image," the finite the image of the Infinite! Man before the fall, man after the rise to true manhood, through the sacrificial offering of Christ, is the image of God. May we not, then, rather call the Divine attributes displayed in redeemed man theomorphic, than characterise our imperfect ideas of the infinite attributes of God as anthropomorphic? Those who complain of anthropomorphism, instead of attempting to

* *The Supernatural in Nature*, pp. 294, 295. † *Monday Lectures.*

rise to the conception of God through the conscious being and purest attributes of the acknowledged Head of creation; either offer us nothing in their place, or, laying aside the higher and nobler, deify law and matter: instead of viewing God from the loftiest pinnacle of creation, they confound Him with His lowest handiwork.

So far from theology's being the equivalent of nescience and physics of science, both have their truths, and alike lead on to the infinite and incomprehensible. Physics falls with theology, if the doctrine of the unknowable be true. Even in this brilliant age, when science annihilates time and space, circling the globe with her electric wires, and revealing by the spectroscope the secrets of the stars, matter itself is an unsolved mystery. Infinite number, space, and time are incomprehensible; nevertheless we have useful sciences of number, space, and time in arithmetic, geometry, and algebra. "There is no object, though finite, of which all the relations, either within itself or to other objects, can be exhaustively known by any finite mind. The number two is one of the simplest objects of thought. But to know perfectly either its square root or its common logaritbm in their ratio to unity, since the number of decimals in either is infinite, must be beyond the reach of any finite understanding."* Few would venture to define life, yet biology has its truths as well as its mysteries. If mystery accompanies the knowledge of physics, knowledge can be the logical accompaniment of the mysteries of theology.

As the science of the first great cause, theology completes the otherwise baseless temple of knowledge, and throws its light, though as yet it be but the twilight of dawn, over the "how" and "why" of the universe. Whether we contemplate the infinities of the stellar and atom worlds in physics, the mysteries of life, mind, and spirit in man, or the higher and more profound mysteries of theology, we are led to regard God, in His essence, attributes, and works, as furnishing an adorable object of study throughout eternity.

If, then, God be knowable, and the author of all things, it is reasonable to expect nature to bear witness not only to His existence but also to His attributes.

Only, however, when the works are viewed in the light of the revelation of the Word can the glory and beauty of

* Birks' *Modern Physical Fatalism*, p. 17.

that testimony be discerned. The intellectual apprehension of the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient God, based on the logic of nature, is but one step in the process of that supreme knowledge which must enter man by other avenues before it can form a complete and firm foundation on which to build that which eternity itself cannot complete. Our subject, the Supernatural in Nature, can be treated positively or negatively. Adopting, with Mr. Birks, almost entirely the latter method, we proceed to determine, by a free use of the works before us, whether the physical fatalism of the present day will satisfactorily account for the origin and existence of the universe as we find it. Space will not allow the discussion of many topics, but we hope to show that scientific facts not only strongly suggest but demand the recognition of the Supernatural, that without it no cosmogony is tenable. The knowable things of physics, matter, energy, and natural law, will explain much that we find around us, but they cannot explain all things, they fail even to explain themselves.

Our present knowledge concerning matter does not warrant the assumption that it is a necessary existence. Although some regard it as questionable whether the Bible explicitly affirms the primary creation of matter, science, so far from negativing such an opinion, strongly suggests it as the most plausible solution of an evident difficulty.

Mr. Spencer, who maintains that matter is unknowable as regards the noumenon, knowable only as regards the phenomenon, upholds the doctrine that it is necessarily indestructible. "The plain fact is just the reverse, for this phenomenal matter perishes and is renewed daily before our eyes. Thus, by the theory, of matter the noumenon we know nothing, and therefore cannot know that it is indestructible. Of matter the phenomenon we may know much, and one main thing we know of it, proved by hourly experience, is that it both may be and continually is destroyed. For an appearance is destroyed and perishes when it ceases to appear."*

"On the other hand, the permanence of matter, the truth revealed by science, depends on these four axioms: that matter is not phenomenal, but the cause on which the phenomena depend; that while phenomena vary from moment to moment, the cause abides and endures; that this cause is knowable, and consists of position and force

* Birks '*Modern Physical Fatalism* p. 136.

joined in one; and that while the sensible effects which result from the coherent relations of its atoms to each other vary immensely, causing appearances, disappearances, and reappearances, the total amount of matter as tested by weight remains unaltered. In short noumenon matter, though not indestructible, is permanent and indestructible by man. But while this is a truth known *a posteriori* by a long and ever-growing induction, the theory is doubly false which calls it an *a priori* truth, and affirms also that the matter of which it is true is wholly unknowable. . . . The first step then of advancing physics must be over the grave of this doctrine of the unknowable."*

The indestructibility or conservation of matter is a generalisation from large but limited experience. It can have, as Jevons logically asserts, no universal or necessary character. The conclusion is justly drawn that the probabilities against the creation or annihilation of any portion of matter by man are very great; but the assertion that there is no power in the universe equal to the task is not warranted by the premises. Another extract from Mr. Birks will show the kind of reasoning on which this nihilistic system rests. "The annihilation of matter, we are told, 'is unthinkable for the same reason that the creation of matter is inconceivable;' it contradicts the very nature of thought. 'It is impossible to think of something becoming nothing or nothing becoming something, for the same reason, namely, that nothing cannot become an object of consciousness.' Here, then, it is pronounced to be a contradiction of the laws of thought that anything should either begin or cease to be. Theism is first coupled with pantheism and atheism, and condemned to death and burial as a deceiver of mankind, because it affirms self-existence somewhere, whilst self-existence is inconceivable. And next we are taught that self-existence is the only kind of existence conceivable. Whatever exists now must always have existed and must exist for ever; since it is forbidden by the very nature of thought to think of anything whatever as either beginning or ceasing to be."† The assertion here made by Mr. Spencer with regard to matter, is afterwards predicated of motion, and involves a similar paradox. Nihilism first consigns all real knowledge to the grave, and then presides at the

* Birks' *Modern Physical Fatalism*, pp. 136, 137. † *Ibid.*, pp. 153, 154.

resurrection of as much as pertains to physics, and by implication of more than the system can recognise if it is to exist at all. Matter, then, as real is knowable, and by man indestructible. It must either be self-existent and eternal, or have been created in time. If it were originally simple and homogeneous the present variety is inexplicable. How to produce an unlimited number of substances having quite distinct physical properties from one and the same basis—by addition of like to like—is a problem which requires for its solution more than ordinary imagination and logic. If there be several simple kinds of matter, as chemical and spectroscopic analysis suggest, necessity cannot account for their existence and relative proportions. Whatever theory of matter be adopted no mechanical hypothesis can satisfactorily explain its origin. But to this point we shall return when discussing the conservation of energy.

Before endeavouring to ascertain what bonds law lays on nature, it may be reasonably asked if physical fatalism can account for the existence of these laws. Natural law has no origin in necessity. Every law of nature is one of many possibilities. Our mental constitution does not negative the conception of other laws as substituted for those actually in existence, nor hinder us from making any substitute the basis of logical deduction. This is verified in the history of every scientific advance. Theory after theory, each possible and thinkable, rises and falls, as observation and experiment supply new data, before the real law is ascertained. Thus, that grandest of all physical laws, the law of gravitation, according to which every particle of matter attracts every other particle and is attracted by it with a force which varies inversely as the square of the mutual distance, is no *a priori* truth but a generalisation following a patient and thoughtful study of individual instances. It is easy to conceive of matter unaffected by gravitation or the subject of a repulsive force, or imagine, with Newton, that the attractive force varies inversely as any power of the mutual distance other than the second, and build up a solar system on the assumption. A notable change has taken place in Mr. Spencer's opinions with regard to this law. In the first and second editions of the *First Principles* it was stated that physicists were obliged to assume the law because it resulted from the necessary conditions of geometrical space that other laws were unthinkable. These statements are withdrawn in the third

edition and replaced by the opposite assertion "that action at a distance, by any rule of variation whatever, is 'positively unthinkable,' and that action equal in amount, whether the intervening space is empty or occupied, is equally incomprehensible and inconceivable. He gives no word to explain this abrupt transition by which that is an inconceivable absurdity to-day which yesterday was proclaimed a necessary and *a priori* truth."* If natural law has a necessary origin, Professor Tait's maxim, "Nothing can be learned as to the physical world save by observation and experiment, or by mathematical deductions from data so obtained,"† must be discarded, and physicists retire into their studies to deduce the laws which, in fatalistic phraseology, govern the universe. Again, if necessary, these laws should at once appeal to our minds as true, needing no confirmation in nature. No repetition of instances is required to convince us that two straight lines inclose a space, that the whole is greater than its part; to apprehend is to believe. They are necessary truths. Do natural laws thus present themselves to the understanding? Certainly not. We may apprehend the meaning of the law of gravitation, and yet logically doubt its existence, until interrogation of nature or the testimony of competent observers convinces us that our disbelief is ill-founded.

Natural laws, or sequences, based on a number of observations, finite as to extent both in time and space, can only be applied to like instances in the future with increasing probability. No number of observations can render the sequence necessary; why after the five-thousandth rather than the first? As in the machine of human device previously mentioned, what surprises in the shape of alteration or suspension of any law the future may reveal cannot be ascertained. We do not regard the universe as a machine; but even if it were, miracles, in the sense of suspension or alteration of natural law, are logically as possible as the one change in the said machine, if the originator anticipated the need of such variation. Natural law is not necessary as to extent in time or space. There may have been times when the law of gravitation was not; there may be worlds where attraction follows another rule of variation; our mental constituton forbids the concep-

* Birks' *Modern Physical Fatalism*, pp. 222, 223.
† *Recent Advances in Physical Science*, p. 342.

tion of time or space, when and where the part is greater than the whole, or two straight lines include a space.

Law in nature is, however, more than the registration of sequence. The "what" naturally leads on to the "how" and the "why." Laws cannot govern. The universe may be governed according to law, but not by law:* law is the expression of power. In the words of Tyndall: "The scientific mind can find no repose in the mere registration of sequence in nature. The further question intrudes with resistless might, Whence comes the sequence? What is it that binds the consequent with the antecedent in nature? The truly scientific intellect never can attain rest, until it reaches the *forces* by which the observed sequence is produced." But whence comes this transcendently superhuman force so intelligently applied? To that question necessity can give no reply. Our ideas of force arise from its personal exercise; it is associated with mind and will. It is then eminently scientific to attribute the force displayed in nature to an omnipotent free agent. Why should the present laws exist instead of some of the numberless other possible laws? Here again necessitarian philosophy, when logical, is silent. We find the "why," applied to their origin, reflected back to their use. They are means to an end, and as such postulate a Being who has chosen them as the ministers of His service. The most scientific explanation of the laws of nature is to regard them, not as self-existent, but the expression of will on the part of an Almighty Lawgiver, chosen, with definite ends in view, out of many possible modes of action, and upheld by Him as long as they shall accomplish His purpose in the government of the universe. What marvellous changes may be rung, in the future, on other modes of action, and elements and elemental combinations yet unknown, imagination cannot even suggest. When such wonders are wrought by so few of the numberless possible collocations of the things that now are, what may not the future have in store!

One of the latest weapons of materialism, in its evolutionary garb, is the doctrine of the conservation of energy. This is said to circle the universe with the bonds of necessity to an extent never anticipated before. We hope to show that this allegation is utterly false. Space forbids reference to the numerous contradictions and complete

* Carpenter.

confusion of ideas in Mr. Spencer's chapters on continuity of motion and persistence of force. The reader will find in Mr. Birks' volume a key to this labyrinth, and an able exposition of the truth contained in the facts thus misinterpreted. As the subject is a difficult one we make no apology for endeavouring to explain, in a concise manner, the doctrine itself, before attempting to trace its bearing on the subject in hand.

The law of the conservation of energy is based on the fact that all force exhibited in the physical world, as far as our imperfect knowledge goes, is entirely a function of mutual distance. Each particle of matter attracts every other particle with a force varying inversely as the square of the mutual distance, whatever be the velocity of the particles at any moment, and whether the intervening space be void or occupied. With such an attractive force, and two particles at a distance from each other, the integral or sum of the force which would be exerted in the passage of the particles from their first positions to contact, measured by half the square of the final velocity, is termed the potential energy of the system. Suppose the particles be at any finite distance apart and at rest: then if motion take place, and the particles approach each other, the possibility of the future exertion of force, or the energy of position, is diminished, but an equivalent of motion is produced, this being the result of the action of the attractive force. This motion measured by half the square of the final velocity, or the summation of all velocities from rest up to the actual velocity, is termed the kinetic energy of the system, or *vis viva*. The law of conservation of energy states that the sum of the potential energy, or energy of position, and kinetic energy, or energy of motion, is invariable. The misinterpretation of this statement arises chiefly from the confusion of cause and effect, the assumption that "potential and kinetic energy are the very same thing, attribute, or substance, its form alone having varied. For the formula in dynamics does not assert the constancy of either, taken separately, but only of their sum. The one is an integral of force, the other of velocity or motion. But force and motion are not the same. One is the cause, the other the effect. The whole process of continual change depends on this contrast. So also does the whole theory of dynamics. The first law of motion, the starting point of Newton's *Principia*, assumes it. There may be balanced

forces, or pressures, without motion. There may be uniform rectilinear motion, without force. The whole reasoning of dynamical science depends on the clear, sharp contrast between speed or velocity, of which the effect is a uniform change of distance or place, and force, of which the effect is a change in the velocity or speed, or the direction of motion. Thus potential and kinetic energy cannot be the same thing. The integrals of two different things must be different also. Motion is produced by force, and force produces motion. But motion cannot transform itself into force, and force cannot transform itself into motion. The connection indeed is so close, and the relations are so definite, that in loose and popular speech the expressions may be allowed. But in the view of strict science they are always inaccurate."* If energy be one thing the constant change from the kinetic form to the potential, and *vice versâ*, is inexplicable. "Why should energy, which is indifferently force or motion, cease to be force and exist as motion, or cease to be motion and exist as force? The confusion of thought which mingles cause and effect under one ambiguous name, applied in turn to either or both, leaves the whole series of changes without any possible reason or explanation. What other power compels this blind Titan to occupy a whole eternity with ceaseless and purposeless transmigrations? It is only when force is seen clearly to be distinct from motion, and its cause, that any key to the countless phenomena of the universe can be found. This, accordingly, was the very first step taken by Newton in those laws or definitions which form the prelude to his immortal discoveries. The first step of the new philosophy is to obliterate this clear line of contrast."†

Attractive forces are not, however, the only ones which are met with in nature; repulsive forces also exist, though physicists are not agreed as to their exact location and laws. As far as known they vary inversely as a higher power of the distance than the second, and are supposed by some high authorities to be inherent in the particles, or monads, of a substance other than matter termed ether. In a purely repulsive system the energy of position is greatest at contact, and zero at an infinite distance, whilst the energy of motion increases with the distance. If an attractive and repulsive force, such as the above, be com-

* Birks' *Modern Physical Fatalism*, pp. 188, 189. † *Ibid.*, pp. 192, 193.

bined at one point there will be a neutral limit within which the attraction and without which the repulsive force will be in the ascendant.

According to the nebular hypothesis, and in consonance with the evident excess of attractive force, the universe existed in ages long past as a diffused mist, which, by reason of the attraction, has since condensed into its present form. In this diffused state the energy of position is at a maximum, and that of motion at a minimum. Pursuing the hypothesis to its extreme limit we should expect to find a condition of perfect rest. "A probable view of the atomic forces in actual operation is that they are either self-repulsive, as in the action of ether on ether, or mixed with a neutral limit, as in the action of matter on matter or on ether. In this case, assuming a system, finite however immense, where even the nearest particles have a distance greater than that of neutrality, and an original state of rest, the later change will be one of condensation, but not indefinite or without limit, with a constant substitution of *vis viva* or kinetic energy, for the attractive potential energy of the first position, and since compression within the neutral distance will be followed by reversed or expansive action, the tendency will be to a growing amount of rotatory motion."* Thus the formation of suns, with their relative motions and circling planets, is accounted for. Numerous facts show that the condensation is as yet far from complete, that the primary attractive potential energy is by no means exhausted. The progression is still from the potential to the kinetic with integration of matter. Science, however, does not point to an ever-circling change from the diffused through the integrated to the diffused, but marks out a beginning and an end, one finite course, without any explanation as to origin or progress from necessitarian philosophy. Mr. Birks proceeds: "There will be, on the whole, no reverse tendency to a later diffusion, but a steady progress from a condition of wider diffusion and absolute rest to one of greater condensation and permanent steady motion. This agrees with the general conception of the nebular theory. But it is wholly opposed to the doctrine of a fixed amount either of potential energy or of collective motion, and to the singular hypothesis of a series of alternate evolutions and

* Birks' *Modern Physical Fatalism*, pp. 195, 196.

dissolutions reaching onward through all eternity." To assert that the same forces which produce condensation will reproduce dissipation in a finite system is against sound logic, and negatives the very doctrine on which it apparently rests. The origin of the mistake is evident. The process of condensation, termed evolution, is thus defined by Mr. Spencer: "A change from incoherent homogeneity to coherent heterogeneity accompanying the dissipation of motion and integration of matter." This statement contains more than one cardinal error. For present purposes it is sufficient to note that it completely reverses the law of conservation of energy. Integration of matter with dissipation of motion is in other words diminution of energy of position, with mutually attractive forces, and at the same time decrease of kinetic energy! Dissolution, the antithesis of evolution, in Mr. Spencer's vocabulary, is "absorption of motion and the concomitant disintegration of matter," or simultaneous increase of both kinetic and potential energy! A system built on such a definition cannot be received as a true explanation of the universe.

Before applying the above statements a few words must be said on the dissipation, or rather degradation, of energy, as explained by Professor Tait in his *Recent Advances in Physical Science*. Where attractive and repulsive forces both exist, the tendency, in a finite system, will be to uniform condensation within limits regulated by the repulsive forces, with uniform distribution of motion. Light, sound, heat, &c., are all forms of kinetic energy, the corresponding varied sensations arising from differences in the character and rapidity of the vibrations, which affect organs specially suited for their reception. All these varieties of motion tend to be resolved into that which reveals itself to us by the sensation of heat. Higher forms can be completely changed into lower, but the most perfect machine cannot convert even one-fourth of the heat supplied into useful motion, the rest passing off as heat of lower intensity. In the words of Professor Tait: "The energy of the universe is getting lower and lower in the scale. . . . Its ultimate form must be that of heat, so diffused as to give all bodies the same temperature. Whether it be a high temperature or a low temperature does not matter, because when heat is so diffused as to produce uniformity of temperature it is in a condition from which it cannot raise itself again,"*

* *Recent Advances in Physical Science*, p. 146.

or be raised by any process known to man. This doctrine also negatives the idea of ceaseless evolutions and dissolutions.

The conservation of energy, with its attendant truths, when rightly interpreted, points to a beginning and an end. If the integration of matter and degradation of energy be not complete, the universe must have originated in time: had it existed from eternity it would long since have "burnt out." The force required for integration is inherent in matter. If matter be eternal, either it must have existed for ages apart from this force, or its particles must have been so situate that the system was at rest. If the former, how did matter ever gain the force? If the latter, none but an independent power could disturb the equilibrium. The act of One above nature can alone logically meet these difficulties. The supernatural origin of matter, as well as of force, is the most simple, tenable, and therefore scientific theory to explain its existence.

It may be truly urged that this is answering difficulty by mystery, but we hold the counter theories much more unlikely and quite as mysterious. Matter itself is a mystery. Till science can tell us what it is we venture no more definite statements as to its origin. It is, however, very significant that force, one of the manifestations of mind, is obtruding itself into the latest definitions, as displayed in the "force centres," the "dynamised space," of Birks, and the vortex theory of Thomson. What if the idea of creation out of nothing is unnecessary, and an outflow of Divine force alone be indicated! The self-creation of matter is indeed a "pseud-idea." It involves potential existence preceding actual existence! How and why did the change take place? The atoms, moreover, before their actual existence, must choose what kind of atoms they will be, and what laws they will obey. Look at them, when in existence, from the standpoint of the law of gravitation. "The laws they fulfil without deviating need little short of omniscience to satisfy them for a single moment. Each atom must either be able to divine, each instant, the place and distance of every other atom in the universe, to effect an almost infinite summation of these various tendencies to be obeyed, and that without a moment's cessation or pause, or else be guided passively by the hand and secret wisdom of the Almighty Creator."* What, indeed, must

* Birks' *Modern Physical Fatalism*, pp. 259, 260.

the problem be when physicists state that in hydrogen, under ordinary conditions, each atom has its direction entirely altered by collision with other atoms seventeen hundred million times per second! Well may we in amazement ask who is sufficient for these things.

Assuming the fundamental facts of the conservation of energy, no theory which does not allow a beginning for force and matter will account for the present state of the universe. The hypothesis of La Place requires the start. Moreover, it assumes, in addition to matter and force, a definite relative position of the atoms which could not occur a second time.

The existing collocations of the material world are as important as the laws which the objects obey. "Mere laws without collocations would have afforded no security against a turbid and disorderly chaos." "An unlimited number of atoms can be placed in an unlimited space in an unlimited number of modes of distribution. But of infinitely infinite choices which were open to the Creator that one choice must have been made which has yielded the universe as it now exists."* Law, so far from binding nature fast in fate, entirely fails to explain why the atoms have their actual velocities and positions at any one moment. It can only remove that part of the indeterminateness which is due to lapse of time, "so that the amount of variability removed is to that which is still retained, and which no law of force can remove, in the ratio of unity to three times the number of atoms in the whole universe."† Even this partial removal of indeterminateness is not warranted by the law of the conservation of energy, unless "we make the very large and groundless assumption that no laws of action exist anywhere in the universe but the law of gravitation, and a few others of the same class, in which the force exerted by one unit on or towards another is a function of their distance alone."‡ The necessitarian philosophy cannot account for the existence, variety, and relations of the very things by which it would explain the universe. A theory which overcomes the greatest difficulties of physical fatalism, and gives a rational explanation of the present state and past history of the universe, must be considered thoroughly scientific. As

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* Jevons. † Birks' *Modern Physical Fatalism*, p. 236.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 237.

such the doctrine of an Almighty Creator and Governor demands more than the sneers of those who regard science as their peculiar property, and the reception of their philosophy as the test of a well-balanced mind.

Physical fatalism is equally unfortunate in its attempt to solve the mysteries of life by means of matter and mechanical force. Proceeding with confidence where others fear to tread, it openly courts criticism. Although some of the first principles of biology are still *sub judice*, we think there is abundant evidence, without surpassing the limits of knowledge, to show that the postulates of physics are utterly inadequate to explain the marvels of animal and vegetable life, much less the free agency and spiritual gifts of man. One of the most important biological discoveries of modern times is the unity of the physical basis of life. In man, as in the lowest plant, life exists in connection with a transparent, colourless, structureless, viscid substance termed protoplasm, or bioplasm. All living creatures, at one period of their existence, consist of an apparently homogeneous particle of this protoplasm. Through it the organs are constructed, all their functions performed, and the continuation of the species effected. Materialism regards it as a molecular machine, resulting from the interaction of matter and mechanical force, whose combined properties, called life, are entirely explained by its physical constituents. In our opinion protoplasm is the product and instrument of life; and we hold that materialistic theories fail to account for protoplasm as completely as protoplasm fails to account for life.

Granting the gradual formation of the universe, there is abundant proof that the earth was once in such a condition as to preclude the possible existence of living protoplasm. Science recognises no other physical basis of life. Haeckel, the arch-defender of materialistic evolution, making the denial of the supernatural a premise, announces that "spontaneous generation" must undoubtedly have occurred. "It is a necessary hypothesis which cannot be ruined either by *a priori* arguments, or by laboratory experiments." Here spontaneous generation evidently signifies the production of living protoplasm from the chance concurrence of atoms under the influence of mechanical force. Those who reject materialistic evolution do not doubt that God made use of these agents in creation; but they also boldly affirm that, were living protoplasm now seen to spring

from its chemical elements, that circumstance would not lessen in any degree the force of the arguments against materialism. An adequate cause for that result would still be required. The spontaneous origin of living protoplasm has, however, never been observed, though some of the first intellects and most skilful experimentalists of the day have long been engaged in the attempt to establish the doctrine on a scientific basis. The most recent researches on the life-history of the lowest organisms confirm the well-established truth that living protoplasm always arises from living protoplasm. Haeckel would elevate this unproved hypothesis to the dignity of an ascertained fact. If we find no presumptive evidence in its favour the philosophy which requires it and the teaching it orignates must alike be regarded with suspicion.

It is a suggestive fact that, compared with the products of life, the chemical compounds of inanimate nature are exceedingly simple. Matter and mechanical force working respectively with and without life produce very different results. The elements contained in protoplasm exist in nature, apart from that substance or its products, either free or in such simple combinations as water, ammonia, and carbonic acid. No compounds are found which in the slightest degree hint at the natural production of protoplasm. We ask those who talk of the formation of this substance by the fortuitous concourse of atoms to point out in nature some steps of the process. Where are the missing links? The atoms of carbon, hydrogen, and the other elements in protoplasm do not run together and form a complex whole under the blind guidance of mechanical force. Let life leave protoplasm, and physical forces, so far from sustaining, resolve it into its simple constituents. The formation of protoplasm involves forces of which pure chemistry knows nothing. Man possesses a power of modifying conditions which can never be attributed to *Force*, therefore there is a strange logical inconsistency in expecting unaided physical forces to accomplish that which completely baffles human ingenuity. Years of careful research fail to reveal the chemical constitution, much less methods of synthesis, of albumen, one of the primary products of the decomposition of dead protoplasm: and yet we are asked to believe that the fortuitous concourse of atoms has "evolved" not this comparatively simple substance, albumen, but living protoplasm with its marvellous poten-

tialities! Each unsuccessful attempt at the natural synthesis of living protoplasm increases the improbability of the materialistic hypothesis, and declares the need of a supernatural element in the process. We have constant failure when the theory demands success! If protoplasm ever orginated through the interaction of matter and mechanical force the uniformity of nature authorises a constant repetition of the process. The "conditions in a cooling planet" can have no magic vitalising power capable of producing a substance which a moderate temperature resolves into the simplest chemical compounds. Experimentalists have at command matter kinetic energy in all its forms more intense than is compatible with life, and in addition the power of varying their collocations. What more can be wanted by the materialist? The conditions under which protoplasm evolves protoplasm are remarkably simple, the process requires no great intensity of mechanical force. Professor Huxley says "yeast will increase indefinitely when grown in the dark in water containing only tartrate of ammonia, a small percentage of mineral salts and sugar," and manufacture nitrogenous protoplasm "in any quantity."

If it be granted that the chance collision of atoms might have produced a particle of protoplasm, from whence are its properties derived? No other chemical compound is known which can so select and influence the crude elements in its immediate vicinity that they combine and form matter like itself. No mechancal force will inspire life into dead protoplasm. Life has no physical correlative. The assimilative powers, varied movements, and cyclical changes of protoplasm are inexplicable on any theory of complex molecules.

Mr. Spencer would explain life as a "definite combination of heterogeneous changes, both simultaneous and successive, in correspondence with external coexistences and sequences." We cannot enter in detail into Mr. Birks' examination of this definition, but will select his most important remarks. "First, life is a combination of changes. It is not the cause or source of changes, but those changes themselves." Changes of what we are not informed. Observation limits those changes to one substance, protoplasm. "Again, if life is a combination of various changes, who or what is to combine them? The theory excludes any reference to a Creator. . . . Not the

living plant or animal. The definition recognises no such existence, but seems purposely framed to exclude it. Do these changes, then, combine themselves? Do successive changes all exist before they combine or combine before they exist? Either alternative is unthinkable."* "Life is a definite combination of changes. But by whom and what is this combination defined? What is there to sever these changes from the millions on millions of others, adjacent to them in place, and coexisting with them in time, which it is meant to exclude?"* Then, "external and internal relations are named in contrast to each other." "These epithets external and internal, introduce by stealth and in secret that idea of a living unit, with a defined limit to the range of its powers which the theory refuses openly to recognise because it would be fatal to the whole course and tenor of its reasoning."* A good definition should be clear in its verbiage and reflect fact rather than theory. Mr. Spencer's definition is not recommended either by its perspicuity or applicability to the thing defined. It is an application of his theory to life, and assumes in its terms the very distinction it is intended to supersede. Mr. Birks adopts as a provisional definition of life "that force or power of some living individual existence, whether man, animal, plant, or germ, by which it can attract into union suitable material and repel or reject the unsuitable, in agreement with some plan of living structure or external life-work peculiar to each specific form and type of life."† In substance we accept this statement, though objection may be taken to the introduction of the words 'life' and 'living' into a definition of life. Moreover, as it is intended to apply solely to life as manifested in physical organisms, the fact that this "force or power" acts only through one substance, protoplasm, should have been duly registered. The essential elements of life, according to Mr. Birks', are individuality, vital force, and a definite plan, to which science adds a definite physical instrument, protoplasm. The fatalistic philosophy cannot satisfactorily account for any of these things.

There is undoubtedly something which individualises living organisms, separating them from the purely physical changes taking place around them and in them. The

* Birks' *Modern Physical Fatalism*, p. 275. † *Ibid.*, p. 278.

atoms of matter composing every organism are, in almost all stages of the developmental cycle, in a state of perpetual change, yet identity is preserved. This individuality may be associated with conscious personality, simple sensibility, or total absence of all feeling. Mere change of form and internal structure combined with the constant flux of atoms is no bar to identity. The caterpillar, chrysalis, and butterfly, are not regarded by the biologist as distinct creatures, but one individual. There may be no internal consciousness of identity but there is evidently a bond of union, and that in all its potentialities is contained in the protoplasm of the egg of the butterfly. Our ignorance of the lowest forms of life has in times past afforded a fine field for materialistic speculation. Now, after overcoming almost insuperable difficulties, science talks of the life-history, or individuality, of the lowest organisms, and discards Bathybius as having no counterpart in nature. The Bathybian diffusion of protoplasm, suggested by Huxley, and its imaginary division into plastidules by Haeckel, will never dispose of the individuality of living organisms, or make the gap between the living and not-living a whit the narrower. Even Mr. Spencer, as Mr. Birks indicates, admits again and again in effect that each animal is a living individual. There cannot be individuality, in spite of atomic variation, without some adequate cause: physical fatalism cannot consistently allow that cause, and without it the living organism is inexplicable. Though separable in thought the three essentials of life are one in fact. There is a force or power working out a definite plan, which individualises the organism from the surrounding physical changes. In what substratum this force inheres we do not know. The idea of a vital force is irresistibly suggested by a study even of the simplest organisms. The minute structureless masses of protoplasm forming some of the lowest marine invertebrates build up most complicated and geometrically perfect calcareous and siliceous shells. Materialism, however closely the protoplasm be examined, can give no reason why one mass should select carbonate of lime and another silica from water rich in other salts; or why, in the human body, of masses of protoplasm arising from division of the selfsame germ one should produce bone, another muscle, and a third transform itself into digestive ferments. The assimilative powers and spontaneous movement of a single

bioplast are a conclusive answer to all mechanical theories of life. We are far from saying mechanical force plays no part in the movements and other properties of protoplasm: we only affirm it comes in as a servant not a master, it works in subjection to a higher power. If the Selective powers of homogeneous protoplasm be acknowledged there is a force which does not vary entirely with the distance; therefore the assumption made as the basis of the conservation of energy, like the doctrine itself, is not of universal application.*

The wonderful powers exhibited by protoplasm completely eclipse all human jugglery. Will matter and mechanical force explain the mystery that minute particles of structureless organless protoplasm, a substance in which the microscope can detect no promise and potency of marvels to come, and from the examination of which not the most imaginative would predict a glorious future, produce, by the assimilation in each case of like elements, now a fungus, now a frog, now a bird, and now a man! Professor Huxley allows that life is the cause of organisation and not organisation the cause of life. There exists behind the mere atoms of all germs a far-seeing co-ordinating power, of which pure physical science knows nothing. In the words of Sir L. Beale, "Bioplasm prepares for far-off events." This power must be present in every germ, not in part but in its full completeness, for the very first steps in the constructive process presuppose those which follow. In the development of man, as in the formation of the giant cups of the southern seas, the numberless bioplasts resulting from the division of the primary germ work in great measure independently of each other, every bioplast having its own small area of influence, yet for one common though complex end. Maudsley assumes that, as force is not self-genetory, the transforming power of an organism must grow in proportion to its bulk, and therefore argues that, as this increment of power must come from the transformation of mechanical force, it is not "extravagant to suppose that a similar transformation might at some period have commenced the process, and may ever be doing so." Mr. Cook aptly urges that we have no evidence to show that the co-ordinating power, contained in the original germ, is increased by the growth of the individual. "Very evidently that power is not changed, for the plan of

* Birks' *Modern Physical Fatalism.*

an organism is the same from first to last, through its whole growth." The total absence of any such co-ordinating power in inanimate nature is acknowledged by Mr. Spencer, therefore we must suppose chemical units combine so as to form infinitely more complex units, which in some unknown manner gain the powers of life. This pure assumption, besides having no presumptive evidence in its favour, involves several untenable hypotheses.

The production of the complex living units is only possible on the assumption that life is a form or combination of mechanical forces, a supposition discountenanced by fact. Whatever comes out in the compound must go in with the elements. Again, whatever the plan behind the germs, their protoplasm exhibits no corresponding chemical or structural differences. Nothing but homogeneity is found to account for the most elaborate heterogeneity! This doctrine of complex molecular units, like Mr. Darwin's theory of pangenesis, deals with variations which ordinary science cannot approach. They do not admit of direct proof, but we are expected to treat them as facts though all indirect evidence is against them.

This complex union, moreover, must be effected, and the peculiar succession of collocations held together, by chance. Mechanical force has no power of self-direction. Any one who seriously talked of nature turning out a finely finished locomotive, or chance publishing Birks' *Modern Physical Fatalism*, would rightly be regarded as ignorant of nature or altogether devoid of logical power. What, we ask, is the hypothesis of the formation of all the varied animal and vegetable organisms by mechanical force from matter, but such a wild fancy magnified a hundredfold? We have not only to account for the formation of the engine and the book, but the corresponding existence of rails and readers. Even Tyndall says inadvertently, with curious self-contradiction, that a living organism is "woven by a something not itself," and to this all nature bears witness. Modern speculation cannot by any division of the process, however fine, dispose of the difficulty.

The argument from design in nature has lost none of its original force, though so loudly decried of late by those who would attribute all things to mechanical causes. We believe mechanical evolution is destined to an early grave. Already we hear Darwin admitting, in his *Descent of Man*, that "in the earlier editions of my *Origin of Species* I pro-

bably attributed too much to the action of natural selection or the survival of the fittest. I had not formerly sufficiently considered the existence of many structures which appear to be, as far as we can judge, neither beneficial nor injurious, and this I believe to be one of the greatest oversights as yet detected in my works."* And again: "In the greater number of cases we can only say that the cause of each slight variation, and of each monstrosity, lies much more in the nature and constitution of the organism than in the nature of the surrounding conditions, though new and changed conditions certainly play an important part in exciting organic changes of all kinds."† The more closely the theory is examined the more threadbare does it appear, and we commend the closing chapter of Mr. Birks' volume to those who regard "natural selection" as the magic phrase which is to expel the wisdom of the Almighty Creator from the internal and external adaptations found in connection with living organisms. We believe with Argyll that at every step the scientific inquirer "finds himself face to face with facts which he cannot describe intelligibly, either to himself or others, except by referring them to that function and power of mind which we know as purpose and design."

Having no scientific ground whatever for the origin of life from the chance reaction of matter and mechanical force, but the very strongest evidence against the possibility of such an occurrence, we think belief in the interference of a supernatural power most reasonable. It is almost past credence that the miracles of wisdom, which biology is ever revealing but never exhausts, should be attributed to blind chance, when we consider that the highest human intellect may spend a lifetime in the study of one living organism, and yet have to confess at the close that the revelation of ignorance has kept pace with the attainment of knowledge. Nature displays the beneficent action of an Omniscient Creator. With the author of *The Supernatural in Nature* we believe the Biblical account of the origin of the earth and its living occupants to be substantially true: it is not inconsistent with any of the certainties of science. "We wonder that, in relating the primal illumination of the earth, he (Moses) tells us first of the light, and after that of the luminous body, the sun."‡ Was Moses acquainted with the nebular theory, or the fact that light is a form of

* Vol. I., p. 152. † Vol. II., p. 388. ‡ *Supernatural in Nature*, p. 144.

motion? But it is impossible to condense into a few lines the intelligent exposition of three hundred pages, which has already been commended to the reader's notice. One question, however, cannot be altogether ignored. What are the bearings of the Mosaic account on the evolution theories of the day? One thing is certain, Faith must never quail before Science, for the Bible and the universe bear the stamp of the same Divine Author.

Theories are ever changing, and even the very facts of science are encircled by mysteries, the removal of which may any day give them an entirely new interpretation. In the study of nature, patience, which should be at a premium, is too often at a discount. At a time when every fact must have its explanation, and extravagant theories are too often advanced as undoubted truths, the protest of a Virchow is most cheering to those lovers of science who also respect the higher revelation. The term creation, applied to the origin of living beings, signifies the re-arrangement of the matter and forces already in existence through the introduction, by Divine fiat, of new forces or powers acting according to new laws. As usually understood it postulates a distinct origin for each species.

Evolution, on the other hand, essentially connotes the derivative origin of species: in other words, life, not only in the individual but also in the species, springs from pre-existing life. Though the all-absorbing question with many naturalists at the present day is, How has this been accomplished? we must not forget that the still more important question, Has derivation occurred? is still unanswered. All materialistic theories, involving spontaneous generation, we reject as unscientific. Creation must precede evolution. But in contradistinction to the special creation of each species, or direct evolution of the species by Divine power from matter and mechanical force, it is not unreasonable to suppose that God may have used the first created beings in the origination of the rest. Geology shows a general progression from the lowest up to the highest forms of life. We read in the Bible of a similar progression; far from being one act, creation consisted of a succession of acts extending over a long period of time. There is nothing whatever in the text to negative the derivative origin of species. The *exact* method by which the varied forms of life were introduced

on our globe has not been revealed to us. It has been left as a problem for man by his study of the Divine works to attempt to solve. However accomplished, the origin of species was of God.

One of the most striking points in the Divine narrative, grand in its simplicity, is the special record of the creation and pre-eminence of man.

This is in perfect agreement with our present knowledge of his powers and history. Science bears no testimony to his bestial origin. It is true Professor Haeckel traces man's pedigree without difficulty from inanimate matter upwards, but all are not gifted with the imagination that finds in every atom a soul, and sees all things as "equally living." Reversing his dictum, that "where faith begins science ends," he makes faith the basis of science, instead of a castaway whom she refuses to recognise. His cosmogony is founded not on the facts which ordinary senses reveal, but on assumptions which ordinary faith fails to grasp. Haeckel is obliged to concede that it is by deduction, not induction, that the brute origin of man is established. In other words, having demonstrated the truth of materialistic evolution in the case of the lower animals, no other theory from his atheistic standpoint being possible, man must have come from the missing links. His genealogical tree presents some striking peculiarities. Before we arrive at the vertebrates there are at least four purely hypothetical classes of animals, which, for embryological reasons, must have existed! By reversing the laws of embryology the gulf between the invertebrates and the vertebrates is bridged. Man himself comes from the unknown extinct apes of the miocene through the dumb apemen, another purely imaginary species. Truly evolution can work wonders on paper. Giving up the comparatively glorious possibility of descent from monkeys, some would now create a common ancestor for man and monkey, closely related to the sheep. Whatever our progenitors *may* have been, we ask for a few of the links to aid our faith. Evolution, let us ever bear in mind, takes no leaps. After many years' diligent search none have been found! Darwin himself says their absence is amazing; and Dana truly observes, "If the links ever existed, their annihilation without trace is so extremely improbable that it may be pronounced impossible: until some are found, science cannot assert that they ever existed." This sudden fall

from man to the ape level is made specially prominent, in that there are all possible gradations from the lowest man to the highest.* We find abundant variation, but no suggestion of mutation of the species. Adding to this the fact that the cranial capacity of man is double that of the highest ape, we may truly say there is not the slightest direct evidence in favour of the derivative origin of man; and each year renders it less likely that geology will supply the necessary proof. We have, however, positive testimony in favour of his independence. The very oldest human remains exhibit no approach to the ape type. Our geological knowledge of man now extends to the quaternary age, yet the fossils, neither in erectness nor in cranial capacity, yield precedence to their representatives of to-day. "We can decidedly pronounce that there are among living men a much greater number of individuals who show a relatively inferior type than there are among the fossils known up to this time."† When we also consider that the lowest existing races are evidently the degraded descendants of more worthy sires, and not apes struggling after manhood, it is not surprising that our thoughts should revert to the time when man, in the perfection of manhood, is said to have come from the hands of his Maker.

Evolution cannot account for man as an animal; but even if the possibility of physical descent from the apes were allowed its real difficulties then begin. This Professor Huxley recognises in his *Evidence as to Man's Place in Nature*. "His structure, wonderful as it is, does not even approximately represent his essential nature. With a certain difference in structure between the lower apes and the gorilla, we find a moderate and measurable difference of nature; but, with a less marked difference of structure between the gorilla and man, we have an immeasurable and practically infinite divergence of nature."‡

Man's physical structure will in no wise account for his essential nature. By the possession of conscious personality, of mental power such that he can rise above matter, and in abstract proposition discourse on its marvels, of "a perception of right and wrong in motives, and a feeling that the right ought and the wrong ought not to be chosen," and of a free will by which that choice becomes possible, man is raised infinitely above all other animals.

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* Dana. † Virchow. ‡ *Supernatural in Nature*, p. 300.

No community with these in bodily descent could ever account for his powers or lessen his pre-eminence.

We are asked, in the much-abused name of science, to believe that matter and mechanical force will account for all this! Man is but a series of changes. The dust of the earth, as devoid of life, sensation, and choice of position, as mechanical force is of self-direction, assumes the form of man, lives, moves, thinks, loves, acknowledges in reverent worship a power above, and then falls back into the dust again. Soul and spirit are results, not causes, and vanish with physical dissolution! But every sane man is conscious of his own personal identity, and time does not efface that consciousness. If matter, with its inherent mechanical forces, be the cause of the unity, that unity should be broken. Matter comes, and matter goes, but we go on for ever. Our surest knowledge is not the knowledge of matter but of mind. The certainty, without which all other certainties were impossible, is that I, a feeling, thinking being, exist. The real existence of matter is an after-thought, an inference based on states of consciousness. If matter is real, mind must be real, and distinct from matter. The attributes of the two, extension and absence of extension, inertia and absence of inertia, cannot co-inhere in the same substratum without direct reversal of axiomatic truth. The two sides of Tyndall's hypothetical atoms must part company, for a thing cannot be and not be in the same sense at the same time.* But we cannot here examine the materialistic views as to the higher nature of man. Physical fatalism has insuperable difficulties to surmount before it can logically approach mind or spirit. Until it can give a more rational account of the origin of matter, force, law, and life, and bring forward some slight direct evidence in favour of the brute origin of man, we need not seriously trouble ourselves about its higher flights.

If involution and evolution are an eternal equation, then "for the development of man, gifted with high reason and will, and thus made a power above nature, there was required, as Wallace has urged, a special act of a Being above nature, whose supreme will is not only the source of natural law, but the working force of nature itself."† On the principle that every effect must have an adequate cause, we maintain, with Mr. Cook, that, as a consciously dependent

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* Cook's *Monday Lectures.* † Dana.

person, man is an unanswerable argument for the existence of an Independent Person. Granting the existence of an Almighty Omniscient God—and the whole universe in its grandeur, as in its details, bears unceasing witness to the fact—the difficulties of materialistic evolution vanish. There is as little need to endue matter with the potency of life, mind, and spirit, as to create a scientifically unknown ancestry for man.

We cannot refrain from one thought more. Man, viewed from the standpoint of materialistic evolution, is an automaton, and therefore irresponsible for his actions. Freedom of will becomes nonsense, and conscience a chimera; virtue and vice are empty words; antipathy is irrational, and love deprived of its noblest motive: all is necessity, inevitable fate. The Euclids of philosophy here chime in, and pronounce a palpable *reductio ad absurdum*.

It is sometimes well to bring speculation to the test of common sense. If we read Shakespeare, and all our noblest writers, in the light—or rather darkness—of the necessitarian philosophy, their grand utterances, reflecting the history and problems of man's higher nature, are meaningless and unscientific, for they regard him not as the outcome of inert matter, but as the image, distorted though it be, of One above, and as influenced by the hope or fear of a life beyond. Physical fatalism, in laying down its very premises, rejects the whole teaching of the Bible, and reduces to mere verbiage most of the finest literature extant. The readiness with which some materialistic cosmogonists not only discard a system that has survived the adverse criticism of centuries, and holds to-day a firmer grasp upon the world than ever, but even employ the unwarranted denial in bridging over the otherwise impassable gulfs of nature, displays a dogmatism unsurpassed in all the records of theology. Such theories we leave to time and science. So long as man has a conscience the sublime truths of Christianity, abounding in blessings for this life, and unspeakably rich in hope for the life to come, will never wane before the cheerless dogmas of a Fatalism whose genealogy of causes has its root in the Unknown.

ART. IV.—1. *The Christian Doctrine of Sin.* By DR. JULIUS MUELLER.

2. *The Problem of Evil.* By PROFESSOR NAVILLE.

3. *Lectures on Systematic Theology.* By REV. CHAS. G. FINNEY.

4. *A Theodicy or Vindication of the Divine Glory.* By ALBERT TAYLOR BLEDSOE, LL.D.

5. *Theological Institutes, &c.* By REV. RICHARD WATSON.

6. *The Congregational Lecture on the Doctrine of Original Sin.* By GEORGE PAYNE, LL.D.

MUELLER, in defining sin as "that which ought not to be," has furnished a formula of much philosophical value—one whose soundness and comprehensiveness are sufficiently evident. At first sight this definition may look too general and simple; the more, however, it is reflected upon, the more undoubted is its worth, as it obviously sets itself in opposition to all false theories whatever. We may bear it with us round the whole circle of moral speculation, and find it to be capable of universal and efficient application. In fact, it is so comprehensive as to answer every purpose for which it was framed, and so manifestly just as not to be gainsaid.

Descending, however, from this abstract view to one somewhat more concrete, the scientific method of treating moral evil generally resolves it into a principle of selfishness, of which the endless forms of moral evil are only so many modifications. The agreement among authors on this point is striking. It is almost startling to find Pascal and Rousseau, Jonathan Edwards and Jeremy Bentham, Finney, Comte, and J. S. Mill, Müller, Hegel, and Schiller apparently blended in one common sentiment. This agreement is, however, more in appearance than in reality. Bentham, Comte, and Mill understand selfishness in a widely different sense from Pascal, Edwards, Müller, and Finney. For while the former confine it merely to evils which disturb the economy of human society, the latter make it to be a trespass against the claims of God and against the moral order of the universe.

It is highly significant, however, that the Political Economist and Sociologist is compelled to admit the necessity of a moral basis for the thrift and well-being of society, and to find in the Divine precept, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," the remedy for all social evils. Indeed all communistic theories, in a perverted form, pay a blind homage to the Christian doctrine of universal benevolence. The thing to be regretted is, that by divorcing the precept already cited from its greater companion, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart," it renders obedience to the former impossible. When heaven is ignored, earth cannot be blessed.

It is needful to observe that selfishness, in the philosophic use of the term, bears not the narrow meaning commonly attached to it: being understood to signify the gratification of self at the expense of universal order, and enforced by Divine authority. It is therefore a private principle at war with the general good, fraught with enmity against all interests and authority which thwart its aims. It is thus enmity against God, trampling on all claims the holiest and highest; and, if allowed to spread unchecked among all orders of moral beings, would involve the universe itself in anarchy and misery. In the wide sense thus assigned to the term selfishness the unity of moral evil is seen. Rousseau's words are here worthy of citation: "The good man arranges himself with reference to the whole, while the bad man arranges the whole with reference to himself. The latter makes himself the centre of all things—the other measures his radius, and keeps at the circumference. Then he is in his right place with respect to the common centre, which is God, and with respect to the concentric circles, which are the creatures." Selfishness is thus seen to be a principle that displaces God and deifies self; that would subordinate God to the creature instead of the creature to God. Pascal's words are: "We are born unrighteous, for every one is self-seeking. This is against all order; we ought to seek the general good; and this selfish tendency is the beginning of all disorder." Stephen Charnock's resolution of the matter agrees with this. "As grace," says he, "is a rising from self to centre in God, so is sin a shrinking from God into the mire of carnal selfishness. And therefore all sins are well said to be branches or modifications of this fundamental passion." With Jonathan Edwards this view of sin was a corollary of his benevolence theory. Julius Müller affirms

sin to be "a principle of inborn selfishness." Luthardt says: "It is the special merit of Müller to have asserted the fact that selfishness constitutes the essence of sin." Kant's account of man's fall is that the alternatives before the soul were the moral law and self-love, and it chose the latter. "Man no longer desired the good of all, but the good of himself; he no longer sought for the happiness of mankind, but for the gratification of his own passions." Hegel teaches that "the life of nature is a life of selfishness," and that "evil is making self the ruling principle of universal good." "Good," say Naville, "is charity, love, the opposite of selfishness—the consecration of the individual will to the general good." Luthardt remarks, "Wherein consists the essence of sin, is a question which has at all times been discussed. No more correct answer can be given than that it consists in selfishness." Finney, in his systematic theology, reasons the matter up from the ultimate ground of obligation to all kinds of moral and theological issues. And this view of the subject has received at his hands exhaustive treatment. He takes up the various forms of evil, and shows that they are all so many manifestations of selfishness. But Finney's theory of benevolence is not to be identified with Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism, nor with any later improvement of it. Finney, indeed, offers a strenuous opposition to utilitarianism. "Utilitarianism," remarks Dr. Calderwood, "is in the very singular position of professing itself a theory of universal benevolence, and yet laying its foundations on the ground that personal happiness is the sole end of life." The difference, however, between the two theories is thus sufficiently obvious; as the ultimate aim of the one is personal happiness, the other the good of universal being.

This view, however, is not to be held apart from other important truths, as will be seen in the following deductions.

If sin is selfishness, benevolence, its moral antithesis, must needs comprehend all good: a view not without the sanction of Scripture, to which indeed our Lord seems to set His seal in His synoptical presentation of the moral law. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart." To this first and great commandment He adds the second, which is "like unto it," the same in principle with it, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," and asserts that "on these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets"—all revealed religion. Hence this law of love is "the royal law:" whose principle underlies and embraces every other law,

or branch of law, which is of Divine authority. In the love thus enjoined we have the central, all-comprising principle of good; so that, as the various forms of sin are so many modifications of selfishness, the manifold virtues and moral excellences are so many modifications of benevolence. Kant said, "There are many virtues, but one virtuous determination," and that determination is the consecration of the individual to the interests of universal being: the submission of the will to the law of love. Love, however, in such a system, must be discriminated from all forms of mere feeling; or, as Finney would say, modifications of the sensibility. Love so understood becomes a phenomenon of the will; the reigning settled attitude of the will in relation to the glory of God and the welfare of His creatures: in other words, good will, or willing good, to God and all other beings capable of good.

Another deduction is that sin is not the offspring of the intelligence, understanding thereby the reason in relation to moral truth; for the intelligence must ever approve of the law of universal benevolence, which "commends itself to every man's conscience in the sight of God." The origin of sin must be rather sought in some other and lower element of our nature. Its immediate seat is the sensibility: this, however, not as limited to mere sensuousness demanding an alliance of the soul with a material body, but as shared by men with beings "whose dwelling is not with flesh." Sensibility being thus understood to mean the faculty which forms the basis of self-enjoyment in all beings capable of happiness, any difficulty connected with this subject ceases. A further inference, scarcely to be distinguished from this, is that the intelligence, representing duty, obligation, God, is ever in opposition to sin. Thus, there is in us that which pleads for God and righteousness, rendering man redeemable as it brings him within the reach of the moral influence of the Gospel.

Another deduction drawn from the proposition which resolves all sin into selfishness is, that sin, as such, is not the object of immediate choice; and, when committed, is not committed *because* it is sin, but *notwithstanding* it is sin: in other words, for the sake of the gratification it yields to a creature governed by a selfish disposition. In regard to this matter Bledsoe says: "Sin is committed not for its own sake, but for the pleasure which attends it. If sin did not gratify the appetites, or the passions, or the desires of men, it would not be committed at all: there would be no temptation to it.

. . . . The direct object of our choice is not disobedience; not sin, but the forbidden thing; the prohibited gratification. We do not love disobedience, but the thing which leads us to disobey." Charnock, indeed, goes so far as to maintain that "To will sin as sin, or purely evil, is not in the capacity of a creature, neither man nor devil. The will of a rational creature cannot will anything, but under the appearance of good in the sin itself, or some good in the issue of it." By "good" Charnock means self-gratification, as he shows in another passage: "No sin is committed as sin, but as it pretends to a self-satisfaction." This seems a fair inference from the proposition we have before us. For if sin is committed for its own sake, its commission would seem to be in obedience to a dictate of the intelligence, which, we have seen, cannot be the case. While, however, this view appears in harmony with our consciousness, it should be supplemented by another, that the consciousness of freedom carries in itself a certain temptation to an abuse of it. And, moreover, the very restraints and prohibitions of moral law, in their effect upon a depraved being, may tend to disobedience: "the motions of sin which are by the law," in the Apostle's words, may bear such a meaning. Even Finney, who so strongly rejects the notion that sin is committed for its own sake, admits that there may be cases of exceptional wickedness in which sin is committed simply for the gratification which disobedience of God *per se* affords. And then the self-satisfaction mentioned by Charnock would consist in the very fact of disobedience.

The nature of sin, however, involves another question of much moment—namely, the ground of moral obligation. Finney defines this to be "that reason or consideration intrinsic in the object of ultimate choice, which necessitates the affirmation of obligation to choose it for its own sake."

On this question there is a wide diversity of opinion, even among those whose views are generally orthodox. The sovereign will of God; the theory of Paley (which is selfish in essence, though religious in form); the utilitarian scheme; the theory which makes right to be the ground of obligation; moral order, duty, the nature and relations of moral beings; the eternal fitness of things; and, lastly, the theory which accepts universal happiness as the ground of moral obligation, have respectively their advocates among thinkers. The last of these theories, as we have seen, is not to be confounded with utilitarianism. In the discussion of this question it is

needful to be on our guard against sliding into the common error of mistaking the conditions of moral obligation for the ultimate ground of moral obligation. That the will of God, for example, is a condition of moral obligation, as the standard of conduct is cordially admitted by those who reject it as the ultimate ground of obligation. The same remark might be made of utility, order, duty, &c., &c., all of which are conditions of obligation. It is evident that the final ground of moral obligation must be an absolute as distinguished from a relative good: meaning by relative good that which is good because of its necessary relation to something beyond itself. And, according to Finney, the preceding theories have all this error in common, that they assign as the ultimate ground of obligation a relative instead of an absolute good. On the contrary, happiness, or the well-being of the universe, he maintains, is such a good—a good in itself, without reference to anything ulterior to justify it—so that no reason can, or need be, assigned for its worth: its value being immediately, necessarily, and universally recognised by every sane mind, which is, as the abettors of this theory hold, more than can be affirmed of any other theory of moral obligation. Thus, if right be held to be the ground of obligation, right is at once perceived to be a term of relative import, and not one which terminates absolutely in itself. It looks to something beyond itself, and derives its rectitude from its relation to that. Moreover, if sin be resolved into selfishness, universal happiness, as the ground of moral obligation, becomes a necessary complement of that proposition. For if selfishness and sin be identical, then benevolence, the opposite of selfishness, obviously becomes the summary of all moral good. In which case, what can the ultimate reason of virtue be but the happiness of the universe? Always bearing in mind, however, before and above all things, the glory of God as included in this.

Hence the value of order, as it is a condition of universal happiness; and hence the reason of the moral law, as the means of securing universal order among moral beings. For it is evident that order, on the part of moral intelligences, can only be secured by their conformity to the law of love. Every departure from this law is, therefore, an aberration from order, and a trespass against the well-being of the universe. Thus, the moral law is seen to be no creation of mere arbitrary authority, but the offspring of universal benevolence under the control of infallible intelligence, and

rendered binding by the authority of the supreme will. A claim to virtue, therefore, demands an unconditional surrender of the will to this law. We are virtuous as we conform to the law of disinterested benevolence, and sinful as we depart from it. Sin and holiness thus become one with the end to which an intelligent being devotes himself, and the essence of moral action resolves itself into motive; so that, the ground of moral obligation being the good of universal being, that must become the ultimate object of pursuit with all who would be virtuous. And between this worthy end and the unworthy and unlawful end of seeking supremely our own gratification, there is no alternative.

It must not, however, be thought that Christianity forbids a due regard to our own interests and happiness; an exaggeration with which Herbert Spencer charges it. This charge is dispelled by the very words of the law: "Thou shalt love thy neighbour *as thyself*." For they plainly recognise, if they do not enjoin, such a regard to our own happiness—making that regard the measure of what is due from us to our neighbour. To rise above self-love, which is inseparable from our nature, is impossible. Christianity, however, enjoins no impossibility. The law of God comes in not to forbid but to regulate self-love, and to save it from degenerating into selfishness. Self-love is consistent with the highest devotion to God and to the welfare of our fellow-creatures. What the law of universal benevolence enjoins is, that when self-gratification comes into competition with the moral order of the universe, on which rest the highest interests of being, the smaller must give way to the greater; self-gratification must be sacrificed to the claims of God and of our fellows. Love must rule and self be denied. And in this, as in other respects, Christianity has the approval of reason and conscience.

It is open to question whether the idea intended by Finney in the phrase "the ultimate ground of moral obligation" should not rather be denominated "the ultimate reason of moral distinctions." Obligation seems to demand an authority which makes duty to be binding on the ground of responsibility. In harmony with Monsell's remark: "All men are conscious that they never feel under obligation towards things but towards persons; a fact which plainly argues that the source of all obligation exists in a person having right to supreme legislation." As Kant says, "We cannot have the intuition of obligation without thinking at the same time of

another—namely, God and His will." Thus, while moral government still rests on the intrinsic value of happiness, the Supreme Governor and His will are held to be the fountain and foundation of obligation.

Müller remarks "that a diabolical hatred of God seeks to dissolve or pervert this connection between the law of God and man's sense of obligation. It discerns," he adds, "nothing in the Divine law beyond the arbitrary will of God as a lawgiver demanding the submission of man; accordingly it refuses to discern any moral obligation to obey His command." To what extent Kant's *Autonomy of the Will* may be responsible for the feeling thus so strongly condemned by Müller we will not undertake to say. Kant's teaching makes virtue to be incompatible with obedience to external authority. And if the will of God could be severed from His intelligence as the source of law, according to the fantastic notion of Duns Scotus, there might be some foundation for Kant's teaching on this point. For on such a view the Divine will becomes a matter of mere arbitrariness resting on no reason. But who thinks of harbouring such an impossible notion concerning the law of God? Kant's objection, however, falls to the ground when it is remembered that human intelligence gives its readiest assent to the law of God, which is the law of universal benevolence. Thus, we see that there is a wise autonomy of the will: not certainly in the sense that the will governs itself, which is an absurdity, but in the sense that in every instance of virtue the will submits to the law of reason and conscience. For if in any sense we are "a law unto ourselves," we are so in virtue of the conscience, which though *in* us is not altogether *of* us, but is God's witness and viceroy, holding a sceptre under Him. For no theory of conscience can be held without God. The grand correlative of conscience is God. Kant, in fighting the battle against rationalistic deism, did good service; but it is impossible to read his exposition of morality without deploring its slender recognition of God. That Kant was an atheist we do not with De Quincey believe, but that much of his teaching is "without God" is only too obvious. Every view of autonomy, unless guarded by sufficient explanations, is fallacious. Autonomy may be allowed in the sense that as God reveals Himself and His will to man through the human intelligence, we are under obligation to obey its dictates. If, however, our aim, even in this, be simply to bring about the unity of our nature by doing away with the discord between

our propensities and our intelligence without reference to the Divine will, we come altogether short of the Christian notion of obedience and holiness.

Kant's notion of autonomy in another and better form is realised in the highest state of Christian experience when the soul "joined unto the Lord is one spirit" with Him. Obedience then becomes less a matter of regard to the letter of the law than an inward, living spring of spontaneous action. This, however, implies no disparagement to the law, nor does it regard its external authority as incompatible with the highest form of virtue. The "yoke" and the "burden" are still there; but the one is become "easy" and the other "light." The soul now thoroughly pervaded with love, the great principle of the law is become assimilated to the latter, since the opposition offered to it by our selfishness disappears.

No proper theory of sin can be held which does not distinctly recognise the Deity. Sin, whenever felt as personal guilt, is discerned to be against God. "Against Thee, Thee only, have I sinned and done evil in Thy sight." Hence sin is presented to us in the Scriptures as "transgression" and "disobedience" as well as "wickedness" and "iniquity." And while all the terms which are employed in Scripture to describe moral evil suppose wilful departure from an authoritative standard of conduct, they appear nevertheless to possess distinctive shades of meaning. "Sin" seems to be a generic term for all moral evil. "Wickedness," again, while vying with the word sin in the width of its meaning, suggests somewhat more distinctively the wilfulness of the evil-doer, and the contradiction of his conduct to his own conviction of right and obligation. "Iniquity" is expressive of a violation of just claims. "Transgression" a trespass against the law that would keep men within the limits consistent with the welfare of universal being; and "disobedience" suggests the idea of opposition to a personal will and authority.

With all theories grounded on materialism or pantheism sin is obviously incompatible, for the evident reason that they exclude freedom, with its implied responsibility—the point of departure in all moral teaching—without which we cannot proceed at all; an unchallengeable condition of moral action, whose denial involves the annihilation of moral law and government. It is one of Müller's enlightened remarks, "It would be quite impossible for us to define moral law, even in its broadest outlines, as distinguished from the law of nature, without specifying its exclusive reference to beings

possessed of a will." According to materialistic theories of being, we have only matter and molecular force. Hence the necessitated character of all activity: self-determination there is none; nor even a self to determine in any higher sense than the individuality which belongs to the mere animal. Law is everywhere and everything, and free agency has no existence. "In natural science, law is the expression of what *is*. In moral science, law is what *ought to be*." Pantheism is in the same position with Materialism. Excluding the liberty of the creature, it renders man incapable of being placed under moral rule. On pantheistic grounds God is everything, and man is virtually annihilated: annihilated in respect of all that constitutes him a personal being. The manifold phenomena of the world—mental as well as material—are manifestations of the one central will. Hence all schemes which by over-magnifying the Divine will so as to make it overshadow and absorb the human will—even when not in form—are in reality pantheistic. And it is in our consciousness of guilt and blameworthiness that pantheistic forms of teaching meet their sturdiest resistance. Richard Holt Hutton says: "Here is the eternal protest against pantheism, God not *in* man but *against* him; telling us of a life separated from ours, as far as the east is from the west."

On the hypothesis of evolution, sin is simply a remnant of the lower animal not yet eliminated. Until, however, the hypothesis receives its demonstration its consideration may be justly postponed. It is obvious that such a view of sin as is yielded to us by this hypothesis is not to be reconciled with the definition of evil as "that which ought not to be." For evil in that case would be only a natural and inevitable feature of humanity in its progress towards a higher form of existence. A *vitium* there might be, but no *culpa*; a fault of nature, but no blameworthiness and guilt; as there would be no abuse of freedom, nor trespass against recognised holy authority.

The question of evil has been perplexed by misconceptions of its nature. The confusion of the *more* and *higher* with *good*, and of the *less* and *lower* with *evil*, furnishes an example of this kind. Archbishop King, in dividing evil into (1) imperfection, (2) natural evil, (3) moral evil, appears to have fallen into this error. Exception might be taken to this division on the ground that what is here meant by "imperfection"—being a feature pertaining to the nature of a created being—is not to be logically discriminated from

"natural evil." But we take stronger ground than this for our objection. The division implies that the necessary limitation of a finite nature is in itself an evil; as also the inferiority of one thing to another in the system of being called "comparative imperfection." We are forbidden, however, by our definition to rank anything in the category of evil on either of these grounds. It is obvious that, on the supposition of creation, the former of these things must be. For how exalted soever the creature, it cannot but be limited in nature. And as it regards the gradation of being, implied in the other thought, it is unwarrantable to say it "ought not to be," as its absence would be an obvious loss to the beauty and interest of the universe. We therefore submit that the phrase comparative perfection is, in this case, more correct than comparative imperfection. For everything which answers its purpose in the universal economy, however humble its place and design, is perfect in its kind. Are we to designate the daisy an evil because it is not a rose, or a dog an evil because it is not a horse, or man in his primal innocence because "he was made a little lower than the angels?" Whither would reasoning so vain lead us? Not such was the verdict of "the only wise God," who declared the creation as a whole, and everything in it to be "very good."

Dr. John Clarke, Boyle Lecturer in 1720, has some able remarks on the foregoing and kindred topics. Replying to Bayle, who grievously harassed the theologians of that day, he says: "Animal creatures compared with men may, in this sense, be styled bad or evil. And so may man himself with regard to angels. And angels with respect to still superior intelligences. There is no end of such comparisons; and it is the Supreme Being alone concerning whom absolutely and universally goodness can be affirmed: according to that saying of our Saviour, Matt. xix. 17, 'There is none good but One: that is God.'" Naville's remarks on this point are in the same strain. "Good," he says, "consists not in the *quantity* of power, but in its *direction*. Everything may be good, and perfectly good in its own place, without ever leaving its own order. Evil can never be good —it is disorder, and disorder has no legitimate place."

Leibnitz wrote his *Theodicée* to meet the assaults of Bayle, who, while too philosophical to receive Christianity, could accept the absurdity of Manicheism: a striking example of the perverting influence of unbelief on the intellect. A similar instance we have in the case of James Mill, respecting

whom his son, in his *Autobiography*, gives us to understand that, though entirely hostile to Christianity, and not accepting even the being of God, he "would not have equally condemned the Sabean or Manichean theory of a good and evil principle struggling against each other for the government of the universe, and he expressed surprise that no one revived it in our time."

Bayle's objection to the rule of One Supreme Being is drawn from the evil existing in the world. The form of his argument, briefly stated, is, that the Creator of this world cannot be both omnipotent and virtuous. The existence of so much manifest evil in the world forbids us to ascribe such a combination of attributes to one God. If He is omnipotent, then He is not virtuous; for if He were, He would not have made a world into which evil could enter. If, on the other hand, He is virtuous, He is not omnipotent; for, in that case, His virtue would have led Him to use His Almighty power in preventing the intrusion of evil. Whatever value may pertain to this reasoning, it has not the interest of novelty; for it is that of the ancient Stoics and Epicureans. To vindicate God's omnipotence and goodness in the face of existing evil, Leibnitz wrote his *Theodicée*—a work marked by the lofty genius of its author, but which we are compelled to regard as falling short of its design. Plato, between whom and Leibnitz there are not wanting points of resemblance, attempted the same task, and with a similar result. To account for this failure of Leibnitz, it must be remembered that he was the disciple of Des Cartes, whose teaching, by the excessive form in which it presents the all-controlling power of God, excludes all real freedom, and leads, by logical sequence, to Pantheism—a result actually reached by Spinoza, another of Des Cartes' disciples. Leibnitz entering upon his task, thus embarrassed by the necessitarian notions inherited from his master, fails, as we think, to refute the objections of Bayle and to vindicate God. Conceding to Bayle his leading fallacy, namely, that it is within the sphere of Omnipotence to produce virtue at will, Leibnitz was compelled to adopt an optimist basis for his theory. And Leibnitz's *Theodicée* may be regarded as a splendid attempt to justify the existence of an evil world on optimist principles. The world is as the will of God would have it, and is therefore, with all its evils, the best of all possible worlds. Evil is the necessary result of the limitation of the creature, and is justified by the good arising from it to the universe re-

garded as a whole. This view of Leibnitz contains, in principle, the teaching of Shaftesbury, though it may not wear the same dangerous form which was reduced to poetry by Pope:

> "Respecting man, whatever wrong we call
> May, must be right, as relative to all."

Thus evil has assigned to it an important function, and subserves high useful ends in the economy of the universe. To describe sin, therefore, as evil, is a libel, and the moral abominations of mankind find their justification as necessary to the perfection of being regarded as one great whole. This, however, is the talk of men only while they fill the philosophical chair. When they descend to occupy common ground, they straightway learn to speak as other men in condemnation of the moral evils that desolate society, and especially of those which trespass against themselves. Naville shrewdly remarks that there is at any rate one evil among men, and that is the opposition offered to optimist teaching; or why is it so strongly resented?

Renouncing optimism, in order to maintain the reality of evil, we equally disclaim Schopenhauer's pessimism, which is the outpouring of a diseased mind. Our world is not the best of all possible worlds, for sin has entered to mar it. But neither is it also the worst of all possible worlds, for it is not a world abandoned to the reign of evil. It is neither the scene of utter darkness nor of perfect light, but one in which the two elements are commingled; exactly answerable to the Scriptural representation of a world where God is working out his redeeming purpose in the restoration of fallen beings, and overruling even the natural evils of the world to discipline the restored for a higher state of existence.

It is well, in considering such a theory as that of Leibnitz, to recall one or two obvious truths underlying the question of moral evil. We cannot assign to evil a legitimate function in the world; for then it is evil only in name, but good in reality. The Christian notion of sin can be maintained only by abiding faithful to our definition of evil, as "that which ought not to be"—a disorder and trespass forbidden and condemned by God's holy law. We cannot make evil the offspring of necessity; for freedom is a stern postulate of evil, as "that which ought not to be." "The denial of liberty forecloses the question of evil." The application of obvious truths like these invalidates the foundation of Leibnitz's *Theodicée*. If Leibnitz's best of all possible worlds meant no

more than that to the eye of God it seemed best that there should be a universe in which various races of intelligent beings, governed by moral motive, should find place, we see not what sound objection could be raised against such a view. Or if by the best of all possible worlds were meant simply that God is making the very best that can be made of a bad state of things, no opposition need be offered. We cannot, however, save Leibnitz on either of these grounds, for he maintains that God can cause virtue to be in the world without mixture of vice, and even that He may easily cause it to be so. And here, we think, lies his leading fallacy. But, as a necessitarian, he was bound to say as much. Or, further, if by evil Leibnitz could be understood to mean the possibility of evil—peccability, not sin—his basis in this amended form would be defensible; for it is a sound remark of Wesley that all finite beings appear to be fallible. Fallibility, however, implies freedom. The limitation of the created nature is not in itself evil, nor does it in creatures capable of moral rule necessarily lead to evil. To solve the origin of evil thus on a metaphysical instead of a moral basis—a limitation of nature instead of an abuse of freedom—can never satisfy earnest inquiry. It is liable to many formidable objections. It strips evil of its moral character, reducing it into a natural phenomenon. It also renders escape from evil impossible, save by an exit from existence. And assuming the truth of the Scriptural account of the fall of angels, it leaves inexplicable how a portion of them remained faithful, while others fell, since they were all alike limited in capacity. Moreover, it denies His freedom from evil "who was manifested to take away our sins," and "in whom is no sin."

Bayle held that between his Manicheism and Pantheism there was no alternative. His words are, "According to the idea we have of a created being we cannot comprehend it to be a principle of action—that it can move itself." Thus, according to Bayle, if humanity be the production of Omnipotence, we are but puppets of Divine power, whose movements may be interesting to watch, but which nevertheless are strictly mechanical. No wonder that when persons come to adopt such views they should be able, with M. Taine, to treat historic personages with an impassive indifference to their moral character. Here again Leibnitz, by the metaphysical form in which he maintains a *concursus* of Divine power, along with every volition of the human will, was able to oppose to Bayle's notion but a feeble resistence. Leibnitz's

position is, that the positive part of the human volition comes from God, but the pravity of it from the necessary imperfection of the creature. This question requires the closest attention, as false views thereon lead to pantheistic conclusions. The main error of Schleiermacher consists in an exaggerated view of the creature's dependence on the Divine Omnipotence. Müller's teaching gives full satisfaction. "The fact," says he, "that man in his sin is still encompassed by the sustaining providence of God does not in the least detract from his guilt [nor, we may add, in the least implicate God in his guilt]: man derives his power to act, to decide, to desire, from God every moment of his life; but he desires, or resolves upon, or does evil himself." "We live, and move, and have our being" in God, "by whom, and through whom, and to whom are all things." This is the true Pantheism; and while it asserts the dependence of the creature upon God, it clearly marks the personal distinction between them. So that the Divine agency is not made necessarily to exclude the fact of human freedom. God's sovereign rule and universal efficiency are maintained along with the free, responsible agency of man. And to hold that the two facts are incompatible is to impose restriction upon the absolute power of God, presenting Him as unable to constitute beings capable of moral rule. God's upholding and all-controlling power leaves room for the origination of human action. And it is a solemn aggravation of sin that the very power by which God sustains the creature in existence, and enables it to act at all, is by an abuse of freedom employed in contradiction to His will: "I have nourished and brought up children, and they have rebelled against Me."

Bayle, however, goes so far as to assert that the possibility of sin—the faculty which renders man capable of sin—is evil. His reasoning is, "It cannot be conceived that the first man could receive from a good Principle the faculty of doing ill. The faculty is vicious, and everything that can produce evil is bad, since evil cannot proceed but from a bad cause." We thus see that the origin of evil, in its bearing on the Divine character, limits itself solely to the question, Whether it is consistent with the wisdom, goodness, and power of God that there should be a *moral* universe at all? Is the existence of moral agents a reflection on God's character? Is the existence of a Supreme Being incompatible with any other than a mechanical universe in which freedom can find no place? "A creation necessarily good is a contradiction" (Naville):

a short, pregnant sentence before which the sophistry of Bayle vanishes. Bayle's, and kindred teaching, is to be overcome only by holding the obvious truth that virtue is not to be produced by the direct exertion of mere power, as it must be the offspring of motive operating upon the intelligence of a free agent. Hunt, in his *History of Religious Thought*, says: "The Christian no less than the optimist philosopher is unable to understand why evil should be permitted at all." Bledsoe firmly withstands the notion that evil is "permitted at all." It exists not by the "permission," but in spite of the Divine Will. And taking permission to mean acquiescence or approval, Bledsoe is right. Müller, however, who is favourable to the phrase "the permission of evil," explains that by "permission" is not meant "to allow," *i.e.*, with consent, but "to suffer" it to be. Archbishop King gives three ways in which the entrance of evil into the world might have been prevented. "(1.) If God had created no free being at all. (2.) If His omnipotence interpose, and occasionally restrain the will, which is naturally free, from any wrong elections. (3.) If He should change the present state of things, and translate man into another, where the occasions to error and incitements to evil being cut off, he should meet with nothing that could tempt him to choose amiss." On these several ways of preventing evil Dr. Calderwood remarks: "Of these the first must be discarded as involving a claim for restriction upon the absolute; the second, as implying a breach on the nature of the creature; and the third, as inconsistent with the conditions of moral life."

In referring to the origin of evil, Dr. Calderwood wisely discriminates between the provinces of philosophy and revelation. Philosophy is competent, by an analysis of consciousness, to detect the present abnormal condition of men, but incompetent to account for this fact. And as the origin of evil in man is not a psychological but an historical fact, any information we have on this subject must be obtained from "a direct revelation." In harmony with this view Naville also says, that "the Christian dogma of the fall of humanity contains the philosophic doctrine which most reasonably accounts for the facts of experience, which give rise to the problem of evil." Our attention is thus led to the Mosaic narrative of the Fall. And we are immediately met by the inquiry, Is the record to be accepted as sober fact, or instructive allegory? All rationalistic and transcendental teaching adheres to the latter view. Tholuck, even, compromises the

matter by admitting that while the Fall itself is an historic fact the narrative is but a figurative representation of that fact. The adoption of the allegorical view is attended with the serious difficulty, that it not only invalidates the authority of the Mosaic record, but, moreover, clashes with its corroboration by our Lord and His apostles. It is undeniable that the case of Adam's probation and fall in Eden, as given in the Scriptures, presents all the features of a perfect moral trial. For the temptation appealed not only to "the desires of the flesh," but also "of the mind;" while the real agent in the seduction concealed himself under the guise of his humble animal instrument. It is conceivable, however,—with what force our readers are left to judge for themselves,—that this very feature of the case may be urged against the orthodox view as forming too complete a case to be accepted as a concrete fact. But what is our gain on the rejection of the literal sense of the narrative, and the adoption of the allegorical interpretation? We rid the case, it may be said, of its miraculous and supernatural elements. If, however, the presence of these elements is held to be fatal to the authenticity of the record, the question of "a direct revelation" is manifestly foreclosed. That the narrative is characterised by the language of symbol in the Divine address to the serpent is admitted; this fact, however, by no means denies the strictly historic nature of the event.

In regard to the primitive moral state of man, Dr. Payne holds that the knowledge and love of God possessed by Adam before he sinned—though acquired as soon as his faculties came to be exercised in the contemplation of God and of His works—were not concreated with him. Bledsoe holds a similar view. And Müller, while not so explicit on the point, seems to lean in the same direction. The reason for this view appears to be the assumed impossibility of creating a moral character by immediate power. Accordingly, all that can be ascribed to man at the very beginning of his earthly existence is an innocence implying the absence of positive evil. This view, however, could be admitted only along with the qualification that at the earliest period of his being man was predisposed to obedience and holiness; and, further, we should be warranted in calling for some explanation of "the image and likeness of God in which he was *created*."

That the prohibitory command and sanction were thoroughly understood by the probationers, and had duly impressed their minds, is apparent from the exactitude with which the woman

when tempted was able to reproduce the words in which God had conveyed to them His command and threatening. The test to which the new-formed creatures were subjected imposed no harsh or difficult task: involving only abstinence from the gratification of the lower principles of their nature at the expense of the higher, in obedience to Divine authority.

In this transaction is found a *bona fide* probation of a moral being. Uninfluenced by fate, predestinating decree, or the limited capacity of the creature, he was "sufficient to have stood, though free to fall." Necessity there was none. Sovereign of his own choice, he was competent to obey, equally so to disobey. The decision was his own: his own notwithstanding the temptation. For while that was the occasion, he himself was the cause of his fall. Uninfluenced by motive, constituted a moral agent as he was, it was impossible he should be. But uncompelled to obey wrong motive he certainly was.

Strange to say, Schiller, Hegel, and others have lauded this act of disobedience as imparting to the first man the consciousness of his personality, and enabling him to lay the foundation of a moral existence. By the voice of God forbidding man to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, Schiller understands the instinct which drew him back from the tree; by disregarding which he rose above the level of a mere animal existence, and became a man. So he and we are to be congratulated on this act of disobedience to instinct! It is much easier to understand how instinct should draw man to the tree than hold him from it. Well has Luthardt described the words in which these views are conveyed as "proud words:" may we not add "foolish words?" And how the above is to be regarded as an account of the fall of man, we can scarcely understand in any other light than that of a burlesque. To call that a fall which was necessary to assert and secure the dignity of our nature, looks much like an abuse of language and confusion of thought. Evil, however, with this school is not "that which ought not to be." But rather that without which no good could or can be. For good is the conquest of evil; and therefore, according to this school, good is conditional on the existence of evil, and not simply on its possibility. As if a nature free from evil could not be good. And that thus, as the evil tendency of any nature became reduced, the personal goodness decreased in like ratio. It is hard to see how anything but the high names of the authors and sponsors of these views could pro-

cure for them a serious hearing. Another baseless notion emanating from the same source is, that evil is necessary to the self-consciousness of a moral being. Implying that the love of God, with its attendant delight, is not sufficient as a basis of self-consciousness. What, then, of Him who knew no sin? For surely His "sorrows" are not to be confounded with moral evil.

In conceiving how a creature holy and upright, possessing the image and likeness of God, might be accessible to evil, it may assist us to remember that, while man was possessed of an intelligence—mirroring the image of God, and steadily upholding the idea of obligation before him—he was also furnished with a sensibility marked by appetencies and propensities capable of being variously gratified. And in this feature of human nature, even in its uncorrupted state, we have a possible inlet for the entrance of evil into the heart. This is substantially Bishop Butler's elucidation of the case, and he is among the safest of guides on such a subject. Along with this view should also be recalled what has been already advanced in regard to the temptation to evil which must necessarily inhere in the consciousness of freedom. And in the light of this combined view, we may be enabled to understand how even a creature in possession of uncorrupted holiness and uprightness might fall from his integrity.

According to the tenor of orthodox teaching, the immediate result of disobedience was a liability on the part of the transgressor to the full penalty of all implied in the dark word death; a threefold evil including the departure of the Holy Spirit, and the consequent loss of the moral image of God, usually denominated spiritual death; the bodily change by which the material frame became mortal and doomed to dissolution; the consignment of the soul to an everlasting separation from God, which may be regarded as the perpetuation of the spiritual death already noticed. Not the spirit's annihilation, which by no means answers to the counter-Scriptural idea of "eternal life;" but its alienation from the glory and blessedness of the Divine presence. This penalty, in unmitigated form, would have passed with instant execution upon the guilty but for its arrest by a governmental provision, the fruit of God's mercy in Christ devised in anticipation of man's offence. In this case the race would have met its extinction in the death of the original pair.

Pelagius, however, maintained that death is not due to sin, but that man is naturally mortal apart from any act of

disobedience. Jeremy Taylor shares in this view. "Death," says he, "which at first was the condition of nature, became a *punishment* on account of sin; just as it was to the serpent to creep upon his belly, and the woman to be subject to her husband. These things were so before, and would have been so; but they would not have been a curse if any of them had been hindered by grace and favour, but by God's anger they were now left to fall to the condition of their nature." From this view the mass of Christian divines dissent; inferring from the Apostle's words (Rom. v., 1 Cor. xv.) that the dissolution of the frame is the penal result of disobedience. How men, in the event of no such catastrophe as the Fall, would have been disposed of, no one ventures dogmatically to affirm. Knapp holds the singular notion that the bodily immortality of man was maintained by "the fruit of the tree of life," but that the fruit of the forbidden tree gave rise to inordinate desires in the soul, while it empoisoned and killed the body. Bledsoe, without directly impugning the notion that temporal death is the legal fruit of sin, seems, nevertheless, to reason in opposition to that view, maintaining that there may be, and is, in the case of animals and infants, both suffering and death under an administration of infinite goodness and wisdom, where there is no sin. And that the contrary teaching goes to strengthen atheism.

This subject connects itself with the question of original sin—a doctrine of dogmatic theology which has given rise to a wide variance of opinion, and no little theological warfare. The phrase "original sin," as used by theologians, is not to be understood of the first sin of "the first man," but the effect of the first offence upon mankind. Jeremy Taylor, however, defines the subject in the former of these senses. We are reminded by Dr. Pope that Adam's sin was not *the* original sin; the first instance of the abuse of freedom occurring elsewhere in the universe, and among a super-human class of beings: a fact made known to us in Holy Scripture with the reserve befitting a communication whose design it is not to minister to curiosity, but to lead a lapsed race back to the favour of God. By one class of divines original sin is held to include the imputation of Adam's guilt to his posterity, as well as the depravity naturally derived from him. By another class, however, the idea of guilt is excluded, and original sin is expressive simply of the depravity which marks our nature. The diversity of opinion thus indicated rests very much upon whether Adam is to be regarded as the federal head and representative of

the race, or merely as its natural head? For, on the former view, original sin embraces the element of guilt as well as of depravity. Augustine's teaching, always strong, and often excessive, goes to blend Adam and his posterity apparently in one organic whole, as a tree, though distinguishable into roots, and trunk, and branches, is one. This notion taken literally would destroy our personal identity and make us responsible for Adam's sin as it is our own, since we are an integral portion of that humanity, which is one both in its head and members. We may thus be held liable for the sins of all other men and they for ours. Moses Stuart justly describes this as "a fictitious unity;" while Richard Watson says of it: "It is so little agreeable to that distinct agency which enters into the very notion of an accountable being that it cannot be maintained, and it destroys the sound distinction between original and actual sin." And yet, notwithstanding the absurdity of this view, it has been espoused by great names—Jonathan Edwards among others. Nor was it unusual for New England divines of Edwards' day to inculcate as necessary to a sound and complete Christian experience the conviction and confession of identity with Adam in the guilty transaction of the garden, and bitterly to reproach oneself for it. Naville, indeed, unless we misapprehend him, comes dangerously near this exaggeration of Augustine when he says: "Two things are to be distinguished in the individual—(1) His personal will responsible for its acts and consents to natural inclination; (2) the human nature that is in him, for his share of which he is responsible, not as an individual, but in his character as a man:" words which we find easier to read than to understand. The nearest notion to these views which we can deem at all admissible is that in Adam the human will was on its trial.

The federal relation of Adam to mankind supposes, as the term implies, a covenant into which God entered with him, as the representative of the race, called by the older divines "the covenant of works." Pictet explains this covenant to mean the dispensation under which Adam was placed, so that on the performance of a certain act or acts the blessings he possessed should be enjoyed by his descendants. Respecting such a covenant, however, the Mosaic record is silent. Much indeed of what has figured on this and kindred topics in the reasoning of divines can be regarded in no other light than bare assumption. As, for example, when Dr. Payne, to show the enormous gravity of Adam's offence, enhances it by the

fact that the momentous consequences to his posterity, dependent upon his conduct, was known to him. "Nothing is said concerning the degree of knowledge imparted to Adam and Eve, as to the nature, terms, and limits of their probationary state." How rare is the wisdom which is willing to keep silent where God has not spoken.

Augustine's view of original sin,—with whom, it may be remarked, the phrase originated,—we have seen. Pelagius, Augustine's great opponent, rejects the notion of original sin altogether. Man, according to Pelagius, as has been already observed, was created mortal; nor did his sin go beyond himself. Bad example, wrong education, and other external causes account for the prevalence of sin. With these views Socinians ally themselves: an explanation wholly insufficient in the face of the acknowledged universality of evil. From the strict Pelagians, however, we have to discriminate the semi-Pelagians, who have modified in several essential forms the views of the former. The semi-Pelagians admit death to be the effect of sin, and represent the power of the will in the direction of good to be greatly reduced by the Fall; and while an ability to take the initial steps in the process of salvation is claimed for man, the necessity of Divine grace in order to its consummation is admitted. In neither form of Pelagianism, however, is there a recognition of the imputation of Adam's guilt to his posterity. And even in the formularies of the Reformed Churches the element of depravity is the only one that clearly appears; the guilt of man being made to arise out of his depravity rather than the depravity from the guilt.

Dr. Payne, in his *Lectures on Original Sin*, elaborated a theory which is, in some of its features, peculiarly his own, and therefore demands more than passing notice. According to this theory, man created in the outfield of the world was led within the enclosure of the garden to be subjected to a moral testing affecting his relation to mankind as their federal head and representative of his posterity. In virtue of the constitution under which Adam was thus called to act, he was the beneficiary of the future race in respect of certain "chartered blessings"—namely, the indwelling of the Holy Spirit and immunity from bodily death, called "chartered," as they are the gifts of God's sovereign goodness and bounty, and could not be claimed in equity. These "chartered blessings," in the event of his incorruptible loyalty under trial, would descend to Adam's seed, but on the alternative

of disobedience would be lost both to him and them. The trial of Adam in his federal relation, however, was confined to the one single command, "Thou shalt not eat of it." So that no other violation of the Divine will, whatever its effect upon his own personal relation to the Supreme Ruler, would be able to intercept the transmission of these "chartered blessings" to mankind.

The theory further affirms that, to render the trial fair and sufficient, man must meet the exigency of the case in the exercise of his own powers, unaided by the Divine Spirit. Man thus left to himself fell, and, according to Dr. Payne, one of the lessons to be learned from the defection of Adam is, that man, devoid of God's Spirit, is unequal to the demands of God's moral government. And now original sin, in its guilt, is the loss of the aforesaid "chartered blessings," and does not imply the imputation of blameworthiness to mankind on account of Adam's offence, any more than the blameworthiness of a nobleman who has been guilty of treason is imputed to his children, though they be involved in its legal consequences of confiscation of title and estate. "Adam," to cite this writer's words, "was guilty in committing the act; his guilt does not attach to us, yet it involves us in all the consequences of the act as if it had been our own." On this view of the case we see no reason why Dr. Payne retained the phrase "imputed guilt," which nevertheless he did: this, on his showing, is original sin in its guilt. In its depravity it is the inevitable ascendency of the lower principles of our nature arising from the loss of the Holy Spirit. Such in substance, we think, is Dr. Payne's theory of original sin.

In some of its features it is neither new nor objectionable; in those very features, however, which are distinctive of the theory, it discredits itself. Its unsupported assumptions, so far as we can see, serve rather to aggravate any difficulties which may be supposed to pertain to the doctrine of original sin than to remove them. We fail to see any reason for introducing into the case the assumption that the trial of man's faithfulness should be limited to one specific command of God. With Richard Watson we prefer to regard the prohibition in Eden as designed to test man in respect of his submission to the law of supreme love to God, of which the various features of the moral law are but modifications, and that had the law of love been transgressed in any other form the same guilt would have ensued, and therefore, presumably, the same sad consequences would have been entailed upon

both the offender and his posterity. It is further supposed possible by this theory that man might have been obedient in relation to this one command, and yet have been disobedient in other respects; in which case Adam, having proved obedient in his representative capacity, would have transmitted the "chartered blessings" to his posterity when he himself had become an object of the Divine displeasure—a result so full of embarrassing incongruity as to forbid our acceptance of any notion which affirms its possibility. The theory is open again to the objection that, by depriving man while under trial of the Holy Spirit, he is visited with the penalty before the offence is committed. And then, looking at another feature of the theory, if the moral inadequacy of man, apart from the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, is a lesson we are to draw from Adam's delinquency, must we not conclude—notwithstanding any natural ability which Dr. Payne attributes to man—that his fall was ensured by the withdrawal of the Divine Spirit from him? And is it conceivable that God would have withdrawn His Spirit from man when, by continuing His presence, the fall of man, with all the mighty sum of moral and natural evil involved therein, would have been averted; for it looks to us to be a fair deduction from this theory that the "chartered blessings" descending to all future generations of men from a federal head, faithful in regard to one particular instance of Divine authority, this world would never have seen either sin or death, nor become, on any fair construction of the case, the scene of moral probation to the race. It requires, finally, no great insight to see that the scheme is vitiated by the assumption that God could, if He would, have prevented the entrance of moral evil into the world. This notion shatters our definition of evil as "that which ought not to be"—a definition in whose security alone we are safe.

Methodist theology includes both the element of imputed guilt and of hereditary depravity. In the words of Dr. Hannah's definition, original sin "is the transmission of the hereditary guilt and depravity of the first sinning pair to their posterity." Dr. Pope somewhat qualifies this definition when he says: "The guilt of the first transgression is reckoned in its consequences upon all the race represented by the first transgressor. But not apart from their own sin, all are not only regarded as sinners, but made sinners also through the inheritance of a nature of itself inclined only to evil." In this view Dr. Pope agrees with Goodwin, as

quoted in Watson's *Institutes*. Thus, while the depravity is made to be partly the effect of guilt imputed, it is to a certain extent also the ground of that imputation; which modification of Dr. Hannah's definition appears to bring the notion of original sin nearer to the Methodist teaching of an earlier period. For in those of Welsey's *Sermons*, which touch on original sin, the view is confined to the natural effect on mankind of the first transgression,—in harmony with the well-known definition of the Ninth Article of the Established Church. Mr. Watson, also in his *Biblical and Theological Dictionary*, says: "Original sin is that whereby our whole nature is corrupted, and rendered contrary to the nature and law of God, or according to the Ninth Article of the Church of England, &c., &c.;" adding, "This imputation of the sin of Adam to his posterity is also what divines call, with some latitude of expression, original sin." His adoption of this latter view, however, is not declared. In his *Institutes*, Mr. Watson, it is true, employs words which, in their severest construction, might be understood to carry in them the notion of guilt in original sin. It is, nevertheless, to the moral effects naturally arising from the Fall that he, in the remarks which immediately follow, confines our attention. He denies "a direct corruption of human nature by a sort of *judicial* act"—and with this view we quite coincide—but it needs some subtilty to save him from a certain inconsistency when he makes the spiritual death of mankind to be part of "the full *penalty*" of Adam's sin. The definition of original sin, as contained in the *Conference Catechism*, also omits the element of imputed guilt. And it might be thought more consistent with the Methodist scheme of doctrine to hold that as our recovery to God is due to the merit of Christ without the direct imputation of His righteousness, so is our fall from God due to the fault of Adam without the direct imputation of his offence. Both are imputed only in their effects. The imputation of Adam's guilt to mankind, in any sense, is a doctrine that rests mainly on the teaching of St. Paul, as found in the Fifth of his Epistle to the Romans—where the Apostle draws a parallel between Adam and Christ in the result to the race of their obedience and disobedience respectively. Not only does the Apostle assert that "by one man's disobedience many were made (constituted) sinners," ver. 19; but, moreover, that "by the offence of one (one offence) judgment came upon all men unto condemnation." And that this condemnation is not due solely to the personal

sinfulness of mankind, is apparent from the fact that the Apostle makes death to be the fruit of sin. But as multitudes fall a prey to death in infancy, it is clear that their death cannot be the result of personal transgression, and must be owing to the condemnation which has befallen universal humanity, as the consequence of the first act of sin, which stands at the head of all human evil. On a Methodist construction of the case, however, it stands thus in theory only. For, the universal atonement of Christ, together with the universal grace of the Spirit—the fruit of the Father's universal love—have, from the very introduction of evil into the world, came in to ameliorate the case. The salvation of all who die in infancy is, by this means, secured—and, indeed, no man is condemned to eternal death for Adam's offence. Every man is placed in a position to work out his salvation, for God's grace comes unbidden, as heaven's own light—"working in us to will and to do of His good pleasure." That this has been traversed by contrary teaching, need not be said. Müller and others understand by those "who have not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgressions," not infants incapable of personal transgression, but those who had not transgressed a positive and express law. Bledsoe strongly reprehends the notion that the guilt of Adam should be reckoned to those whose innocence is guaranteed by their helplessness; and treats the whole as a baseless fiction.

The new school of American theology—as it was once called—seems to have largely identified itself with Knapp in his view of original sin. In regard to the relation existing between Adam's offence and the sinfulness of mankind, Knapp, while admitting that the Scriptures assert such a relation, denies that they reveal any *quo modo* of the fact. This is Butler's view in regard to the doctrine of the atonement; the Scriptures reveal the fact, but no theory. That our information respecting the relation of Adam's sin to his posterity is by no means so full and ample as that imparted to us in regard to our recovery through "the Second Man, the Lord from heaven," must be admitted. And the reason of this is obvious. The universality of sin is manifest and undeniable, and it is of far higher moment to us to learn how to escape an evil in which we are confessedly involved than to learn how we fell into it. Finney adopts Knapp's foregoing view. Of Finney it might be remarked that, as a theologian, he is *sui generis*, and not to be ranked with any particular school, having formed a

system of theology peculiarly his own. On most of the points at issue between the new school and its older rival, he fraternises with the former. The new school holds the universal depravity of mankind, but rejects wholly the notion of the imputed guilt of Adam's transgression. Finney, in his treatment of the question of depravity, remarks that the word literally and primarily means "very crooked:" not in the sense of original or constitutional crookedness, but in the sense of having become crooked. The term "does not," he says, "imply original malformation, but lapsed, fallen, departed from right or straight. It always implies deterioration, or fall from a former state of moral or physical perfection." That man is become the subject of such depravity is admitted almost on all hands. In regard, however, to the nature and extent of the depravity, in its hereditary form, opinion varies. Augustine depictures unregenerate man in terms so dark as to lead us to ask—what of man is left under this mass of evil and helplessness? Allowing his indignation to master him in his vehement desire to beat down human pride, "he seems to annihilate both man and his pride together in the presence of God and of His sovereign grace." Much of this is probably owing to the life Augustine led before his conversion, and the Manichean errors in which he was then entangled. Augustine's conversion was a marvellous triumph of God's grace, and issued in piety of the highest order. "He was a burning and a shining light," yet his teaching is by no means to be regarded as a pure gain to the world. In the diabolical form in which it presents man in his unrestored state, together with his almost fatalistic predestinarianism, Augustine's teaching empoisoned, to a large extent, both the philosophy and theology of the Church; and as perpetuated in various forms since his day has, we fear, not promoted the progress of God's "glad tidings" through the world. Augustine's view of human depravity, in slightly softened garb, reappears in the *Formula Concordiæ* of the Lutheran Church—a document which, while marked by the keenest acumen, is nevertheless excessive in its description of human depravity. According to this formulary man is, in things spiritual, like a stock or stone, and differing from them only as he is rebellious and an enemy to the Divine will. He is able neither to understand, believe, embrace, think, will, originate, perform, nor even co-operate within the strictly spiritual sphere. How the personal guilt of the unregenerate is to be maintained on such a view it is impossible to see. In the face of such

teaching the groundwork of religion, personal responsibility, takes its departure, and moral government disappears along with it. Well has Müller remarked, "These affirmations concerning the depth of human depravity lead to inferences obviously sanctioning the doctrine of unconditional predestination." Such extreme views are ever doomed to the penalty of self-contradiction when those dangerous inferences, logically arising from them, come to be guarded against. And the fate of these misstatements is, that in the end they come to minister to the very errors they were meant to withstand. But truth is far-reaching in her vindicatory power. On these Augustinian and kindred views of unregenerate men, it is hard to discover where the transition from a state of sin to one of grace can exist; upon what the truth and power of God may work; to what the Divine voice may appeal; or on what the Divine hand lay hold. The Holy Spirit "coming" to such a nature has nothing in it; no moral basis on which to operate. To be rendered amenable to any restorative process, man must be divested of one set of faculties and attired in another. Regeneration, instead of being a moral, becomes a physical change, and must precede conversion, regarded as the return of man to God. "Repentance toward God, and faith toward our Lord Jesus Christ," cease to be prerequisites of salvation, since they are as impossible to unregenerate man as any imaginable physical impossibility, if, as these views set forth, he can neither think, believe, nor co-operate in regard to his personal restoration to God. Human salvation is thus denuded of all conditions, and man reduced to a mass of passivity, to be operated upon by the sovereign and resistless power of God. The adaptation of the Gospel, as a means, ceases. Divine truth, as an instrument of renewal, retains no function; and all the mighty motives by which Christianity appeals to unregenerate men are bereft of their force and meaning. It has been said that Mr. Wesley, in his *Sermon on Original Sin*, has allowed certain passages to escape him which are scarcely reconcilable with the anti-Calvinistic genius of his general teaching; and in particular with the views he holds on the subject of conscience. For, though Mr. Wesley holds that what is called "natural conscience" is the light of God in the soul, nevertheless the soul must, on that supposition, have a capacity to receive and respond to that light. It must not, however, be forgotten that whatever Wesley takes from man with one hand he, in his system of universal grace, restores to him

with the other. It is one of Müller's pregnant remarks, "Man has *need*, or else where is the wisdom of redemption? And man has *susceptibility*, otherwise redemption would be of no avail." The most serious objection to this excessive teaching on the subject of human depravity, which we are now discussing, is that by virtually stripping man of the elements of a moral nature, they place him out of all relation with redemption; for redemption has relation only to a creature who, however deeply fallen, retains a capacity for action. It is an admirable suggestion of Monsell's that the moral employment of the word "help," which is of so frequent occurrence in Scripture, while it denotes the necessity of Divine grace implies no less the co-operation of man. Much of the error entertained on the subject of human depravity probably arises from the want of distinguishing clearly between the moral character and the moral nature of man. The depravity of the former, in the case of every unregenerate man, is, and must be, entire; for so long as he is committed to a sinful end of being, the character—meaning by that, with Müller, "the formed will"—must be devoid of all that is holy. The heart—that is, the heart of the soul, the reigning attitude of the will—"is evil, and only evil continually."

The moral nature of man, however, includes faculties which, under Divine light, can perceive the claims of God and righteousness, and sympathise with them. It is thus, that while man yields a base submission to the dictates of mere propensity in opposition to the high claims of duty and obligation, he is rebuked by his enlightened reason and conscience. And herein is the very essence of his guilt,—that the enlightened intelligence, animated by a conviction of obligation, eloquently urges submission to Divine authority; he, in the abuse of his freedom, hardens his neck and refuses. Hence the bitter strife between good and evil which rends the soul. And if there were nothing left in man by his fall from God to sympathise with the holy and the good, no account could be given of this moral distraction. The Fall must not be made to dehumanise man. Pascal intimates that man in his fallen condition is "a discrowned monarch." Robbed of the moral image of God, the natural image is not wholly lost. In becoming a sinner Adam ceased not to be a man. And hence his intrinsic worth, justifying the wondrous means of his redemption. And by unduly depressing and depreciating man, even in his moral prostration, we strike

at the root of his restoration by Christ. Nor is it by indulging in exaggerated views of the degeneracy of human nature that we obtain a correct impression of man's real degradation. Such an impression is obtained only when, with exalted conceptions of the nature, we dwell on the voluntary surrender of that nature to sin. We discover then, even in fallen man, that on which the hand of mercy may seize in the work of restoration to God. Luthardt, speaking of the conscience, says, "This is the point at which God begins the work of deliverance in man; but here, too, is that place of inward torture which can become a hell." It is ever thus, "the same fountain may send forth both bitter waters and sweet." The privilege abused becomes a curse. The feature in our moral nature which makes our restoration to God a possibility, also renders it possible we should be lost to God.

Dr. Payne, as we have seen, reproduces Jonathan Edwards' view of depravity, as the predominance of the lower principles of our nature, resulting from the forfeiture of the Holy Spirit—which differs not from Richard Watson's "deprivation," leading, by necessary consequence, to "depravation;" and is John Howe's "living temple" falling into moral disrepair and desolation on the departure of the Holy One. And all in substantial agreement with the dogma of the schoolmen—"In Adam the person corrupted the nature. In us the nature corrupts the person."

Finney's explanation of our depravity is but a reproduction of Knapp's views, and is to the effect that in the earliest years of human existence the intelligence is necessarily dormant while the sensibility is growing and developing; so that when man comes to take possession of himself in the exercise of his reason and conscience the sensibility is already master of the situation, and sways an ascendant power over the soul. And in this abnormal development of the sensibility in relation to the intelligence consists the natural depravity of man. Man is thus led at the commencement of his responsible being to commit himself to a wrong, a selfish end of life: so that his first step is false. This, though not necessarily, is nevertheless uniformly the case; and every one between the beginning of his responsible age and his conversion to God "walks after the flesh," under the dominion of the sensibility in opposition to the intelligence. The natural depravity thus issues in moral depravity or sin. Under the influence of depraved sensibility the will settles

into an habitual, carnal, selfish state, "fittingly described," remarks Finney, "as indwelling sin."

According to Finney, the sensibility in the unrenewed acquires frightful relative proportions leading to an utter depravity of character. Moreover, very much of the depravity of the nature is maintained to be, owing to the effect of sin upon the body especially, upon the nervous system, and is transmitted by way of natural generation. Finney intimates that such is the effect of sin upon the race that no example of a sound mind in a sound body is to be met with in the whole range of mankind. The relation of this state of things to Adam's sin is, as already stated, according to Knapp and Finney, said to be unrevealed. That there is such a relation is admitted, but what it is there is no attempt to explain. We are barely able, however, to see that this foregoing account of human depravity requires to have any connection with Adam's sin assigned to it; as the explanation may be in its essential point maintained without any reference to the first offence. But the important feature in Finney's teaching on this subject is the distinction already hinted at which he makes between *physical* and *moral* depravity. Assuming the position that nothing "back of the will" is to be called moral, he denies the moral character of anything purely natural and involuntary. The nature, therefore, cannot be said to be sinful. On Finney's principles, sin is a voluntary act—the wrong choice of a voluntary agent—and can be predicated of no kind of substance whether of mind or body. The depravity we naturally inherit, or which in any way characterises our bodily or mental constitution, is physical, and becomes moral only when its impulses and tendencies are obeyed. The natural depravity, until it be taken up by the will—embraced by the heart—is more correctly described as temptation than sin. Accordingly, it is so described by Finney, and natural depravity is said to be a source of "fierce temptation"—"leading," as we have seen, uniformly but not necessarily to sin. In harmony, as he holds with St. James's teaching, "Lust when it hath conceived bringeth forth sin, and sin when it is finished bringeth forth death." Lust becomes "sin" only when the will is surrendered to its tendency. Then it brings forth sin, its deadly offspring. The physical thus becomes moral depravity—temptation issues in sin, whose consummation is death. Much stress is consequently laid by Finney on St. John's definition, "Sin is the trans-

gression of the law"—lawlessness a voluntary practical disregard of the law of love which enjoins upon every moral being the consecration of himself to the interests of universal being. It is not uninteresting to observe the agreement between this view of Finney and that of the Council of Trent. "This concupiscence," say the Council, "which the Apostle sometimes denominates sin, the holy synod declares the Catholic Church never understood to be called sin, because it is really and truly sin in the regenerate, but as it is from sin, and inclines to sin." In denying the sinfulness of the nature, Finney sets himself in opposition to Protestant standards of doctrine generally; and therefore has been deemed heretical on this point.

The distinction between natural and moral ability, as having been mixed up with the question of sin, claims some notice. In falling from God, man was not reduced to the condition of a "necessary agent." By the disobedient act he fell under the dominion of supreme selfishness, but he retained his freedom. This is man's inalienable heritage, which, though he may merge in moral servitude, nevertheless clings to the very foundations of his being. Thus, on the theory of natural ability, man is able to obey God, but lacks the disposition. In fact, *moral* inability is nothing else than this "want of disposition." Man has all the faculties requisite to obedience. He needs no additional attribute of nature; but while the attitude of the heart is supremely selfish, he is resisting and disobedient. Natural ability to fulfil a duty thus becomes tautological, if not an absurdity and a contradiction in itself; for the obvious reason that our ability and obligation must be conterminous. What exceeds our ability is beyond the sphere of duty. Dr. Payne, in accordance with his view that none of the faculties are in themselves evil, remarks, "Our dependence is upon the Holy Spirit for disposition rather than power." The Spirit's influence is, however, an acknowledged *sine quâ non* in regard to the disposition to return to God.

The question of ability is vitally related to that of freedom. If the former be denied, the latter cannot be maintained. Whatever infringes upon ability, touches freedom in the same degree. And how are both to be held in the face of universal depravity? Adopt what theory of human depravity you will, modify your statements as you please, still you have on your hands the fact of what must be admitted to be, through some peculiarity of nature, the deflection of the whole race

from the right way, and the true aim of life. "We have turned every one to his own way." And this fact has to be reconciled with the responsible freedom of every one, and with the unfeigned condemnation of every sin, even to the very first act of deliberate wrong-doing. For if any one act of sin may be justified, so then may every other. We have thus reached, what appears to us, the most difficult problem within the domain of theological science, and one which has driven Müller, and some others, to find a solution in an "extra-temporal" or pre-existent state of probation. We enter upon life enthralled with a predisposition to evil, while we are, nevertheless, the subjects of self-blame and of conscious guilt. There is thus an apparent necessity to do evil with the self-accusation which supposes freedom. The logical conclusion with Müller, therefore, is that we have sinned before our birth in time; we underwent a *bona fide* probation, and, falling under that trial, are in our present depravity suffering the consequence of that defection. But few, however, have been found willing to embrace so extravagant a notion; still the problem craves some solution at our hands. It would be difficult to find one adequate to the whole necessity of the case. The only one we have to offer is neither novel nor recondite, and is founded upon the fact of the universal grace of the Holy Spirit, admitted by all who allow universal atonement; admitted, moreover, to be contemporaneous with the entrance of man upon a moral and accountable state. And here, upon the very threshold of responsible life, when planting his first step upon that solemn territory where an everlasting destiny has to be achieved, God meets man with unsought light and grace sufficient, if embraced and obeyed, to preserve him from the rebellion of self-will, and the error of fatal choice. We admit, with Finney, that there is a uniform departure of men from a holy aim of life; but, with him, we maintain also that there is no necessity for such a deflection. The idea of necessity must be carefully excluded from the case, for once admitted, the reality of sin is thereby denied. The question as to whether any may be supposed to yield to "prevenient grace" at the moment of emergence into responsible being, is one we can neither affirm nor deny. Nor would the affirmation or denial lead to any material modification of our foregoing statements and reasoning, for the broad fact of universal defection still remains.

Many topics lying within the range of the subject of this article must, for want of space, be altogether omitted, whilst

to others we shall be able to direct but a too scanty attention. Amongst the latter is the impossibility of self-redemption. The sinfulness of man is a fact which renders him wholly dependent upon means beyond himself for his redemption. For while his "own wickedness" in its injurious effects is fitted to "correct" him, and his backslidings to "reprove" him, sin, as "that which ought not to be," excludes every element of self-redemption from the case—whether viewed objectively in its relation to transgressed law, or subjectively in relation to personal depravity. The insulted authority of the law demands an expiatory compensation far beyond the culprit's ability to furnish; and the estrangement of heart from God, "the shy distrust" consequent upon the consciousness of guilt, together with the hereditary bias to evil which marks unregenerate man, places self-redemption beyond all claim to consideration. And no truth is more manifest than that our salvation, both in its objective and subjective aspect, is of the Lord. "Not by works of righteousness which we have done, but according to His mercy He saved us." Nor is it impossible to regard this subject as connecting itself with the condition of humanity beyond this life. For as our Lord's words, "If ye believe not that I am He, ye shall die in your sins," and kindred texts suggests that at death the reign of mediatorial mercy terminates, then the "wicked, driven away in his wickedness," becomes evermore its hopeless captive, held in the bonds of his own sin beyond all power of release. There is a superficial and unphilosophical way of dealing with the eternity of evil, on the ground of sentiment rather than intelligence. It is obvious, however, that questions affecting the moral government of God, or indeed any government of moral agents, is not to be settled by an appeal to the sensibility, but to the reason and conscience. Government is not the offspring of the sensibility, which is ever impatient of the restraints and sanctions of moral law, but of the intelligence, whence law derives its existence. And it is at the stern dictate of the intelligence we maintain—(1) That so long as the moral constitution of the universe is upheld, must there be the possibility of evil; and (2) so long as there shall be infinite intelligence united to infinite benevolence in the character of the Supreme Governor to administer law over creatures gifted with freedom, where there is sin must there be misery along with it. Nor let this view be thought to thwart the Divine glory and blessedness. For such a con-

struction of the case there is no warrantable foundation. The glory and blessedness of God have coexisted with sin, and its attendant misery, for untold ages, and therefore may continue to do so for evermore.

May it not, however, be supposed that in the deteriorating and destructive effect of sin itself upon the soul we find the means by which it shall eventually escape its doom, by the simple ruin of its very existence? Notions of this kind, we suspect, are owing to an unconscious descent from a spiritual to a material sphere of thought. Nothing is more easy and natural than such a perversion and error, as every word we employ is necessarily stamped with a material idea. False analogies, however, of this kind must be discarded when a question of this nature is under scientific treatment. Simple and direct apprehensions of what, for want of a better term, we must call the substance of the soul, perhaps are beyond our present ability. Hence our speech on such a subject becomes negative, defining not so much what the soul is as what it is not. When, however, we say of the soul that it is *im*material, we are warned against the error of reasoning on grounds of strict analogy from the body to the soul. To avoid such an error entirely, however, is scarcely possible—at any rate, not without effort and care. Evil always presents itself to us along with some material image, some substance coming within the range of our senses, which it necessarily deteriorates and goes to destroy. When, therefore, we figure to ourselves evil as a characteristic of a spiritual being, we become the unwitting victims of the delusion which makes a moral evil to be of the very substance of the soul. We are reminded by Dr. Pope that "whatever sin is, it is the accident of a nature not in itself changed." "Accident" is here used in its metaphysical sense as something "come to" or "added to" the nature which it characterises, but not an essential element of that nature. Physical disease, in the very consummation of its deteriorating power, is provided with the means of delivering from suffering, by the extinction of life and feeling. But, then, physical disease is of the fibre and substance of the body; and as moral evil is not, and cannot be, so far as we are able to see, of the substance of the soul, all analogical reasoning is thereby estopped. The ravages of moral evil are not related to the soul's substance, but to its principles, motives, aims, spirit and temper; these it utterly corrupts and desolates, while it leaves the substance of the spiritual being untouched.

It might, however, be thought that, though there is nothing in the natural action of moral evil to extinguish the soul's existence, there may be such a tendency in the penalty of sin, on the supposition that the penalty of sin is something apart from the natural effect of sin upon the soul. Our reply is, that we dare not say that "the only wise God" could not establish such a relation between the soul's penalty and its very being, so that the one should operate to destroy the other, and when the proof of this is produced, we shall be prepared to consider it on its merits. Our conclusion of the matter, for the present, is that neither in the natural operation of evil, nor in any form of penalty attaching to it, is there aught which goes necessarily to obliterate the existence of the human soul.

When, however, we come to speak of future retribution as marked with different degrees of penalty, we feel ourselves to be on firmer ground: ground which we may pronounce to be doubly sure, as Revealed Truth asserts not only a variety in the amount of woe which will befall the lost in another world, but, moreover, ascribes to sin in this world different degrees of guilt and heinousness corresponding to the future calamity. Thus, while in "the world to come" we have "the greater condemnation," "the sorer punishment," the less "tolerable doom," we have also in the present life "the secret fault," "the presumptuous sin," "the great transgression," the "all manner of sin and blasphemy" which comes within the reach of forgiving mercy, with the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost which hath never forgiveness, on account either of the objective turpitude of the crime, or of the disastrous subjective effect it produces on the heart, as we may feel inclined to regard it. And while an Apostle declares that "the blood of Jesus Christ His Son cleanseth us from all sin," he nevertheless says, "There is a sin unto death: I do not say that he shall pray for it." It is therefore clear that while all sin "is exceeding sinful," it admits of a gradation of guilt and ill desert.

Müller remarks that while sins of a more sensual form have associated with them a larger amount of shame and humiliation, evil exists in an intenser and profounder form in the "spiritual wickedness" of pride, arrogance, and a direct hatred of God and of His authority. For while in the former class of sins man approaches the animal, in the latter he resembles the originator of all evil.

We are warned, however, that we have reached the limit

of our article. When the supreme and far-reaching moment of the question of evil is reflected upon, together with its central and vital relation to all moral and theological truth, no wonder will be felt that so much, at various periods, has been written on it, and that the greatest intellects have been attracted to its discussion. Moreover, when the manifold perplexities and mysteries of the subject are apprehended the wide variance of opinion entertained upon it can excite no astonishment. Sin when viewed on the one hand in the possibility of its universal spread, like a moral gangrene, involving all in its ruin ("the *fruit* of evil-doing")—or on the other in the surpassing expensiveness of the means employed to withstand and suppress its ravages, must be deemed an evil whose magnitude is beyond human comprehension. And in the light of those astounding means to which Almighty love and wisdom have had recourse to preserve the universe from the desolations of sin, will the character of God appear in its richest glory. "O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are His judgments, and His ways past finding out!"

ART. V.—*Selection from the Correspondence of the late Macvey Napier, Esq.* Edited by his Son, MACVEY NAPIER. London: Macmillan and Co. 1879.

HERE are some four or five hundred letters written to the Editor of the *Edinburgh Review* by its leading contributors during one of the most eventful periods of modern times 1829-1846. The interest of this correspondence is far more varied than might be supposed to attach to communications ordinarily passing between an editor and his staff. These, we apprehend, are as a rule prosaic enough. Suggestions of topics and outlines of articles to be written on them, deliveries of copy or apologies for its non-appearance, deprecations of criticism, and, in return, the compliments which such modesty tends to call forth, notifications of the success of this or that production or of the reasons which delayed its appearance, these, together with brief observations on the health of the parties, the state of the weather, and the course of public affairs, would, we presume, sum the contents of the post-bags of our literary hacks. But it is otherwise when the portfolio of so responsible a personage as the manager-in-chief of a great political organ is open to inspection, and the confidential correspondence of such men as Brougham, Jeffrey, Macaulay, Carlyle, and a dozen more, is exposed to view. The generation for which they catered has departed, but a still more inquisitive one has arisen in its stead. The word inquisitive suggests our chief objection—and it is not a slight one—to a book of this kind. An indiscriminate publication of all the petty jealousies and foibles which such a correspondence generally reveals seems but a poor tribute to be paid by the living representatives of an editor to the abilities and excellences that gave importance to his office. A certain measure of rough justice may perhaps be dealt out by this means to men whose business it has been to sit in judgment on the performances of other people. Out of their own mouths they are convicted of being "men of like passions" with those whom they had summoned to a self-constituted tribunal, and lynched or let go according to their pleasure. At all events, this book adds an exceedingly interesting chapter to the history of one section of modern literature; and the general effect is not to diminish in our

eyes the mental stature of those who figure in it, nor very largely to modify existing impressions concerning them. If anything, it will serve to deepen those impressions. As we read, we seem to be present at an editorial council whose sessions never break up, with the advantage that each man's sentiments are expressed at full length, and not as condensed in the minutes of a secretary, and are poured forth with a freedom and familiarity, both with regard to his own productions and those of his fellows, which no actual council-chamber could admit. The result is a series of life-like self-delineations beyond the art of any biographer to rival.

Before introducing our readers to some specimens of this unconscious self-portraiture, we must refer to the perhaps not quite unconscious collector of them. Not quite unconscious, we say, for it is obvious that the editor of such a journal—sitting, so to speak, at the centre of the whirlpool which his issues were constantly creating in the political ocean—must have been fully aware of the high places his collaborateurs were destined to attain in the national literature. Hence his careful preservation of these their most fugitive effusions. His son after him has preserved them with equal care, and now after the lapse of forty years, during which all the most notable contributors (except Thomas Carlyle) have passed away, at the instance of many friends on both sides of the Atlantic they are given to the world.

The son's references to the father are few, and intended merely to point out the successive steps which led to his appointment as editor. Born in 1776, and educated at the Universities of Glasgow and Edinburgh, Macvey Napier became, in 1799, "a member of the Society of Writers to the Signet." In 1805 he was appointed their librarian. In the same year he wrote his first article for the *Edinburgh Review*, then in the third year of its existence, receiving as remuneration from the editor Jeffrey the "booksellers' allowance" of five pounds. Among his first communications from Jeffrey was a letter of recommendation to "Mr. Brougham," with whom he was afterwards to enter into such close relations. The letter sufficiently indicates that even at this early period Brougham had proved himself a somewhat intractable yoke-fellow, for Napier is charged not to reveal to him his occasional connection with the *Review*. In 1811, a review of Stewart's *Philosophical Essays* for the *Quarterly*—then just two years old—brought Napier hearty encomiums both from Gifford the editor and Stewart the subject. Three

years later we find him engaged on the Supplement to a new edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, and in 1816 appointed Lecturer on Conveyancing to the writers to the signet. In 1820 he was proposed by Dugald Stewart as a candidate for the chair of Moral Philosophy, vacant through the death of Dr. Thomas Brown, but, being a Whig, he declined to compete. His connection with Constable ceased on the completion of the Supplement to the *Encyclopaedia* in 1824, but a new edition of the whole work being projected shortly afterwards, Napier was chosen to conduct this important undertaking. The year 1829 terminated Jeffrey's brilliant reign of six-and-twenty years as chief of the *Edinburgh Review*, and saw Macvey Napier on his recommendation installed in his stead. In a preface to his collated reviews, published in 1844, Jeffrey thus refers to this event. "I wrote the first article in the first number of the *Review* in October, 1802, and sent my last contribution in October, 1840. I was sole editor from 1803 till late in 1829. In that last year, I received the great honour of being elected, by my brethren of the Bar, to the office of Dean of the Faculty of Advocates, when it immediately occurred to me that it was not quite fitting that the official head of a great Law Corporation should continue to be the conductor of what might be fairly enough represented as a Party Journal, and I consequently at once and altogether withdrew from the management, which has ever since been in such hands, as can have left those who take an interest in its success no cause to regret my retirement." The following racy epistle, written during his journey South that summer, shows in what high glee Jeffrey threw up the editorial reins. It refers to the backward state of preparation of the July number, and would almost seem to imply that he had left his successor sadly in the lurch.

"I have just come in, and find your letter. Alas for our sins and miseries! You may depend upon Empson, for he has my orders as well as yours, and dares not fail now in the very heat of the battle. I do not understand what is come over Brougham. I have heard nothing of him, and my last act in leaving Scotland was to urge him to despatch. In his extremity I am sorry you did not apply to our ancient friend Colonel Browne, who, I rather think, has an article about finished, on the Affinities of Greek and Sanscrit. It irks me to give you so much trouble, but it will be a stormy entry on a smooth voyage, *et olim meminisse*. You must give out everywhere that my health absolutely required my retreat

from the severe duties of the editorship—nay, that I was bent upon dying at my post, and would infallibly have perished at midnight over a proof-sheet, had not my friends forcibly pushed me into a post-chaise, and sent me off screaming violently for the printer, one of the most generous taking the whole responsibility of this perilous desertion on himself. This at least must be the outline of your fable, but I trust for the details, and even colouring, to yourself. With great gratitude and commiseration."

And so he makes his bow, betaking himself with great gusto to the "fresh fields and pastures new" of the sunny South, while his poor substitute is vainly raising the hue and cry among dilatory contributors for articles wherewith to make his own first bow to the public.

A new editor would naturally endeavour not only to assure himself of the continued interest of old contributors, but also to obtain the assistance of fresh ones. It is curious that the list of correspondents is headed by the name of Dr. Chalmers, who had the year before been transferred from the Chair of Moral Philosophy at St. Andrew's to that of Divinity at Edinburgh. His first communication is, however, unfortunately his last. One mental characteristic is adverted to in it which was in him a conspicuous feature, and would of itself have caused his contributions to the *Review*—if they had been forthcoming—to stand in strong contrast with the versatility of some others. So Barrow, another mathematical divine, speaks of his "imperfection, not to be able to draw his thoughts easily from one thing to another."

"*July* 25, 1829. My dear Sir,—It gives me very sincere regret that I cannot comply with a proposal, the honour and kindness of which I am alive to. I feel the utmost pain in turning from one kind of severe labour to another, and this infirmity, I fear, has been growing upon me of late. At present, I am wholly engrossed with my preparations for the Chair, and do most honestly assure you that I have no remaining time or strength for anything else. I can truly say that there is no individual connected with the periodical literature of our land whom I would have more readily obliged, had it been possible. You now occupy the highest station in this literature, and may you be the instrument of extensive and abiding usefulness."

The next letter the new editor receives is the first of more than one hundred and twenty from a contributor who did more than any other man to sustain the character of the *Edinburgh Review* and, we may add, to mould the taste of the British nation, Thomas Babington Macaulay. It has

reference to the last of his three essays on James Mill's *Utilitarianism*. These essays were not inserted by the author in the collection published in 1843, not because he was disposed to retract the doctrines they contained, but because they did not do justice to the character and abilities of his antagonist. The letter shows us Macaulay in all the heat and glow of the early conflict.

"*London, October* 8, 1829. Dear Sir,—The *Westminster Review* has put forth another attack on us, and both Empson and I think that, as the controversy has certainly attracted much notice in London, and as this new article of the Benthamites is more absurd than anything they have yet published, one more paper ought to appear on our side. I hope and trust that this will be the last blow."

It may have been the last blow given: it was certainly not the last needed. But Macaulay's genius did not lie in the direction of abstract ethics.

As Mill had been one of Napier's coadjutors in the seventh edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, it must have been hard for him to edit papers which held his friends' opinions up to ridicule. To M'Culloch, who served in both departments and who sympathised with the Utilitarians, he apologises "for inserting another blow" at them, and speaks of having "softened its severity."

Jeffrey behaved much more handsomely than might have been expected from the unceremonious manner in which he quitted his post. He confessed that he "ought not to have run away before the end of the battle like a schoolboy on the eve of vacation, or Lord Hermand the last day of a session," and offered a peace-offering, in the shape of two articles, which appeared in the number for January, 1830, one on the Lady Fanshawe and the other on Felicia Hemans. Another letter from Jeffrey about this time contains his opinion on the first number for which Napier alone was responsible. It is otherwise remarkable for his critique on Sir William Hamilton's first contribution to the *Review*. It shows how even the trained eye of such a critic as Jeffrey might fail to discern the marks of superior genius. Indeed, one of his weak points seems to have been that, even in his own department of *belles lettres*, he was unmerciful if not unjust to new candidates for fame. How much more likely was he to be at fault in attempting to gauge the intellectual proportions of a philosopher like Hamilton. Hamilton was far

from being unknown to him. They were both members of the Scottish Bar, and Jeffrey had lent him his support in his unsuccessful candidature for the Edinburgh Chair of Moral Philosophy in 1820. But the two do not seem to have been intimate, and of course the authorship of the article on Cousin was as yet a secret known to Napier alone. The latter had, it appears, great difficulty in persuading Sir William to write: it was only by representing the difficulties of his new position and the importance of giving philosophy a more prominent place in the *Review* than it had yet occupied, that he succeeded in overcoming Hamilton's disinclination to literary effort. Had he not succeeded, one of our deepest thinkers and the founder of an important school of philosophy might never have emerged from the obscurity in which from youth to middle age he was contented to remain. Jeffrey's letter is as follows:

"*November* 23, 1829. My dear N.,—I have run hastily over the No. [October, 1829], and say privately to you that I think it does you great credit, and is clearly above the average of late numbers. Macaulay ['Utilitarian Theory of Government'] I think admirable. The beginning is too merely controversial, and as it were personal, but after he enters on the matter, he is excellent. It is out of sight the cleverest and most striking thing in the number. Your American reviewer [Hazlitt, article on Dr. Channing] is not a first-rate man—a clever writer enough, but not deep or judicious, or even very fair. I have no notion who he is. If he is young [Hazlitt was now fifty-one, only five years younger than Jeffrey himself] he may come to good, but he should be trained to a more modest opinion of himself, and to take a little more pains, and go more patiently and thoroughly into his subject. Cousin [by Sir William Hamilton] I pronounce, beyond all doubt, the most unreadable thing that ever appeared in the *Review*. The only chance is, that gentle readers may take it to be very profound, and conclude that the fault is in their want of understanding. But I am not disposed to agree with them. It is ten times more *mystical* than anything my friend Carlyle ever wrote, and not half so agreeably written. It is nothing to the purpose that he does not agree with the worst part of the mysticism, for he affects to understand it, and to explain it, and to think it very ingenious and respectable, and it is mere gibberish. He may possibly be a clever man. There are even some indications of that in his paper, but he is not a *very* clever man, nor of much power; and beyond all question he is not a good writer on such subjects. If you ever admit such a disquisition again, order your operator to instance and illustrate all his propositions by cases or examples, and to reason and explain with reference to these. This is a sure test of sheer nonsense, and

moreover an infinite resource for the explication of obscure truth, if there be any such thing. The Chemistry is more shallow than I expected, and omits in a great measure the great topics of Heat and Galvanism. But it is clear, direct, and, for its compass, very concise. I like Brougham's. They are not brilliant, but they are strong, straightforward, and, to my taste, not tiresome, even the Useful Knowledge. Now, there is my word on the whole thing, and I have only to add *Imprimatur* and *macte virtute*. Ever yours."

It was doubtless some comfort to the new editor to have his first issue stamped with the *imprimatur* of the old one. But we cannot help thinking he must have preferred his own standard to the one he had displaced, and to which this letter so patronisingly invites him to conform. In matters of taste Jeffrey was undoubtedly strong: of philosophy he had not the slightest tincture. The clever was evidently with him the highest style of writing. The first three articles are judged by this canon, and have assigned to them three degrees of comparison. Macaulay is marked "cleverest," Hazlitt "clever enough," Hamilton "possibly, but not very clever." Brougham is let off with a dubious verdict, and while condemned as "not brilliant" is excused as "not tiresome." Everything is sacrificed to mere readableness, a quality important enough in the lighter forms of literature, but by no means worthy to rank as the dominant idea of the *Edinburgh Review*. The critic utters his own strongest condemnation when he pronounces Cousin's philosophy "gibberish." If that were so, the article on Cousin was something worse than "mystical," and the writer of it could not have been even "possibly clever." Had Jeffrey lived to our own day, he would have seen not only quarterlies but monthlies well sustained by the public, which are considered lacking in stamina if they do not contain one or more pieces of the "unreadable" sort. Metaphysics has in fact become quite a popular study: its fundamental connection with every question both of natural and moral science is acknowledged. But it must be said in justice to Jeffrey that he only shared an ignorance at that time common to the whole literary world. When in 1836 Hamilton became a candidate for the Chair of Logic and Metaphysics in the University, his supposed obscurity of style was made an objection. The philosopher whom he had criticised bore testimony that he had "not even the slightest appearance of obscurity." And Sir William himself met the allegation in the following

characteristic manner. "There are, I may be allowed to say, two kinds of obscurity; one the fault of the writer—the other, of the reader. If the reader, from want of preparation, be not competent to a subject, that subject, though treated as lucidly as is possible, will to him be dark or unintelligible. This is the case of the two articles in question. The first, that on the 'Philosophy of the Absolute,' in relation to M. Cousin's 'Cours de Philosophie,' is on the subject of all others the most difficult and abstruse—a subject which, whilst it forms the cardinal point of the recent Continental philosophy, was one with which no British metaphysician had yet ventured to grapple; and to the discussion of which, accordingly, even the philosophical language of this country is wholly inadequate. . . . . A journal like the *Edinburgh Review* is not the place for elementary expatiation. Its philosophical articles are addressed not to learners but to adepts." Jeffrey —now Lord Jeffrey—and Macvey Napier were among those who aided in securing Sir William's election.

The same number of the *Review* called forth some observations from Macaulay in reference, not to the articles of others, but to the editorial supervision of his own. It is not to the editorial prerogative itself that he offers objection, but simply to the manner of its exercise. "The passages omitted were the most pointed and ornamental sentences in the *Review*. Now for high and grave works—a history, for example, or a system of political or moral phliosophy—Dr. Johnson's rule, that every sentence which the writer thinks fine ought to be struck out, is excellent. But periodical works like ours, which, unless they strike at the first reading, are not likely to strike at all, whose life is a month or two, may, I think, be allowed to be sometimes even viciously florid. Probably in estimating the real value of any tinsel which I may put upon my articles, you and I should not materially differ. But it is not by his own taste, but by the taste of the fish, that the angler is determined in his choice of bait." However the editor and the contributor may have agreed as to the value of tinsel, we cannot but think that the former had the advantage over the latter in his judgment as to its place in his pages. The piscatory argument is worth very little, and is altogether unworthy of Macaulay. Fishing is, we presume, pursued for the good of the fisher, not at all for the good of the fish. To adopt this maxim of his in literature would be to justify far worse abominations than floridness of style. Had Macaulay foreseen the lasting

popularity his essays were destined to attain, he would himself, no doubt, have pruned their luxuriance with even greater severity than that of which he complains. In his preface to the whole collection he speaks of them as "overloaded with gaudy and ungraceful ornament," and declares himself "so sensible of their defects that he has repeatedly refused to let them appear in a form which might seem to indicate that he thought them worthy of a permanent place in English literature."

If Macaulay's solicitude for the purity of the public taste is not very strongly marked in these references to his own study of it, it comes out conspicuously enough in a letter of the same period, in which he proposes one of his most famous articles. "I have been thinking of a subject," he writes, March 22, 1830, "light and trifling enough, but perhaps not the worse for our purpose on that account. We seldom want a sufficient quantity of heavy matter. There is a wretched poetaster, of the name of Robert Montgomery, who has written some volumes of detestable verses on religious subjects, which, by mere puffing in magazines and newspapers, have had an immense sale, and some of which are now in their tenth or twelfth editions. I have for some time past thought that the trick of puffing, as it is now practised both by authors and publishers, is likely to degrade the literary character, and to deprave the public taste in a frightful degree. I really think we ought to try what effect satire will have upon this nuisance, and I doubt whether we can ever find a better opportunity."

By our placing these quotations in juxtaposition we must not be misunderstood to mean that the redundancy of Macaulay's style is a fault to be compared for one moment with the outrages on common sense which disfigure the pages of his victim. The sentences in his own writings which Macaulay pronounces "gaudy and ungraceful," are of classical purity in comparison with any that are quoted by him, or that could be quoted by anybody, from this now deservedly forgotten poet. There is a sense in which it is quite true that the taste of the reader must be consulted as well as that of the writer, and Macaulay would not have done so much to raise the standard of English composition, if he had not condescended a little to the appetite he sought to refine. And he did the public a great service when, in this scathing article, he opened its eyes to the real character of the trash it had been content to swallow. Yet he fails to explain

Robert Montgomery's temporary success. He admits that puffing can never "raise any scribbler to the rank of a classic," and that "some of the well-puffed fashionable novels of 1829 hold the pastry of 1830." And we do not think the power of unlimited puffing is proved by saying that "the author and the publisher are interested in crying up the book, and nobody has any very strong interest in crying it down." Mere advertisement could not carry a book through twelve editions. There must have been some points of affinity between the poet and the public for the latter to have endured him at all. There were, we think, three such points in the present case. His verse was smooth; his imagination, or rather his language, was wild; his theme was religious. There was at that time a circle of readers whom the great awakening of the previous half-century had deeply imbued with the religious sentiment, but whose literary culture had not kept pace with their spiritual enlightenment. Whatever sympathies with poetry they possessed had been fed on Young and Cowper, in whom, notwithstanding the occasional tameness of the one and turgidity of the other, we must acknowledge real poetic worth. With the present century came Kirke White and James Montgomery, the last of these falsifying by his long popularity the evil omens of this same *Edinburgh Review*. Then came Pollok, with his weird description of the fortunes of the race, aiming to be a second Milton. These had ministered to the intellectual taste of the religious world without very greatly purifying it. And when close on the heels of Pollok followed Robert Montgomery, treating the same class of subjects in a still more daring manner, and combining, as it seemed, the smoothness of Pope with the splendour of Byron, the vulgar enthusiasm knew no bounds. Criticism for the time was forgotten, and it required the sarcasm of Macaulay to demolish claims which, without religious fervour to back them, could never have been put forward at all. The reaction was complete. In Keble's *Christian Year* the public was already provided with a purer model, and in due time Tennyson's *In Memoriam* completed a revolution in poetry on its moral side, which, in its more general aspects, had been long fostered by Wordsworth and Coleridge. The soberer tone of feeling has communicated itself also to religious literature generally, without detriment, as far as we can see, to its practical earnestness; and sensationalism is left, for the most part, to the fleshly and godless school to which,

if to any, it naturally belongs—a school whose existence is one of the disgraces of modern society.

One more quotation on the advertising business we must leave our readers to interpret. They must not view it too seriously: it goes to establish a proposition we laid down at the outside, one which many forget though few would deny, viz., that critics are but men. "We have had quite enough," says Macaulay, "of puffing and flattering each other in the *Edinburgh Review*. It is in vile taste for men united in one literary undertaking to exchange these favours." So even the *Edinburgh Review* could upon occasion play the part of a Mutual Admiration Society, and use its great influence for the purposes of puffing, with this advantage over other adepts in the art, that its anonymous character concealed the relation of puffers and puffed. Surely it was time for some of the virtuous indignation poured on other transgressors to return in the form of repentance into the bosoms of those who gave it birth. One thing we are sure of, that—whatever may be said of his predecessor—Napier's hatred of such tricks was as sincere as that of his clever correspondent. Every letter of his bears the stamp of an honest soul. There was another person more deeply implicated in the puffing business than either of them.

Brougham's connection with the *Review* is most amusingly illustrated throughout the course of this correspondence. Brougham claimed a right to put in and put out what he pleased, grounding his claim on his early and constant services. There is not a doubt that his contributions were literally voluminous. He stated that he had written a fifth of the whole. As a sample, his articles for October, 1829, were four in number. Those for October, 1830, were as many. But as to the date at which he joined the "literary Fronde," as it has been called, he and Jeffrey are in direct collision. He says in his Autobiography that he contributed several articles to the first number. Jeffrey says, "he did not come in till after the third number, and our assured success." One outbreak of imperiousness occurs in a letter dated September 8, 1830, in which he promises an article on the second French Revolution. It is as follows:

"My dear Professor,—I have no objection to do J. Allen, and send it you on Monday, if my brother brings it with him from Edinburgh. But I must beg, and indeed, make a point of giving you my thoughts on the Revolution, and, therefore, pray send off your countermand to Macaulay. The reason is this: all our move-

ments next Session turn on that pivot, and I can trust no one but myself with it, either in or out of Parliament. Jeffrey always used to arrange it so upon delicate questions, and the reason is obvious. Were it possible (which it plainly is not) to disconnect me and the party from the *E. R.*, I should care little how such questions might be treated there; but as it is, I and the party I lead are really committed. I have already begun my article, and it is of great importance that it should stand at the head. I have direct and constant communication with the leaders of the Revolution, having been their first ally in England in and out of Parliament, where I predicted the event 30th June last in plain terms."

To exclude politics from a political journal at such a crisis would, of course, have been suicide, but why Brougham alone must indite the politics does not so easily appear. His "I and the party I lead" was perhaps a more appropriate collocation of terms than Wolsey's "*Ego et rex meus.*" But why could not the captain of the Reform regiment be content to let another blow the bugle, particularly when that other was Macaulay? If Brougham was a wire-puller behind the scenes, Macaulay, then at Paris, was a spectator in front of them. If the one was followed as a political leader, the other was trusted as a political thinker. His article on Hallam had accomplished that. But the battle in this instance was to the strong. Macaulay's lucubrations, already prepared for the *Review*, found their way into Lardner's *Cabinet Cyclopaedia*. And though he did not secede from the *Review*, nor threaten it with such a disaster, he was hugely mortified and affronted, not with Napier but with Brougham, for what he calls his "unjustifiable dictation."

A letter from our old Chelsea sage, now in his eighty-fifth year, is characteristic enough. It reveals something both of his strength and his weakness. He despised Byron's pretensions to greatness: Napoleon's quite carried him away. Noteworthy also are his remarks on "literary conscience."

"*Craigenputtoch, Dumfries, November* 28, 1830. My dear Sir,—I am much obliged by your favourable reception of the proposition touching my brother, and no less so by your wish that I should write something for you in the *Edinburgh Review*. I have already written in that *Review*, and should be very happy to write in it again; as indeed there can be no more respectable vehicle for any British man's speculations than it is and has always been. My respected friend your predecessor had some difficulty with me in adjusting the respective prerogatives of author and editor, for though not, as I hope, insensible to fair reason, I used sometimes to rebel against what I reckoned mere authority, and this partly

perhaps as a matter of literary conscience; being wont to write nothing without studying it if possible to the bottom, and writing always with an almost painful feeling of scrupulosity, that light editorial hacking and hewing to right and left was in general nowise to my mind.

"In what degree the like difficulties might occur between you and me I cannot pretend to guess; however, if you are willing, then I also am willing to try. Occasionally of late I have been meditating an essay on Byron, which, on appearance of Mr. Moore's second volume, now soon expected, I should have no objection to attempt for you. Of Mr. Moore himself I should say little, or rather, perhaps, as he may be a favourite of yours, nothing; neither would my opinion of Byron prove very heterodox; my chief aim would be to *see* him and show him, not, as is too often the way (if I could help it), to write merely about him and about him. For the rest, though no Whig in the strict sense, I have no disposition to run amuck against any set of men or of opinions; but only to put forth certain truths that I feel in me, with all sincerity, for some of which this Byron, if you liked it, were a fit enough channel. Dilettantism and mere toying with truth is, on the whole, a thing which I cannot practise; nevertheless real love, real belief, is not inconsistent with tolerance of its opposite; nay, is the only thing consistent therewith—for your elegant *indifferente* is at heart only *idle*, selfish and quite *in*tolerant. At all events, one can and should ever *speak quietly;* loud hysterical vehemence, foaming, and hissing, least of all beseems him that is convinced, and not only *supposes*, but *knows*.

"So much to cast some faint light for you on my plan of procedure, and what you have to look for in employing me. Let me only further request that if you, for whatever reason, do not like this proposal, you will without shadow of scruple tell me so. Frankness is best met by frankness; the practice presupposes the approval.

"I have been thinking sometimes, likewise, of a paper on Napoleon, a man whom, though handled to the extreme of triteness, it will be long years before we understand. Hitherto in the English tongue, there is next to nothing that betokens insight into him, or even sincere belief of such, on the part of the writer. I should like to study the man with what heartiness I could, and form to myself some intelligible picture of him, both as a biographical and as a historical figure, in both of which senses he is our chief contemporary wonder, and in some sort the epitome of his age. This, however, were a task of far more difficulty than Byron, and perhaps not so promising at present.

"Have the goodness to let me know by your first convenience what you think of this; not hesitating to say *Fiat* or *Ne fiat;* and believe me always faithfully yours, "THOMAS CARLYLE."

With the lapse of time Carlyle's ideas about Napoleon appear to have become more sober as well as intelligible, if we may judge from the portrait he draws of him at the conclusion of his *Hero-Worship*. He makes but a sorry finish to a race that begins with demigods and culminates with Luther and John Knox. If still "our chief contemporary wonder," he is no longer regarded as "the epitome of his age." He is ranked far below Cromwell.

The proposed essay on "the grand Napoleon of the realms of rhyme," as Byron called himself, fell through. The subject had already, in fact, been dealt with by Macaulay. A little later Carlyle was again solicited by Napier to write a notice of the poet for the *Encyclopaedia Britannica;* but, though he gives his consent, he seems to have had himself excused, the notice that actually appeared being attributed to T. H. Lister. The following shows how far he was from condoning Byron's moral obliquities on account of his mental powers:

"*Craigenputtock, Dumfries, April* 28, 1832. My dear Sir,—If it can gratify any wish of yours, I shall very readily undertake that little piece on *Byron;* but it will be *tacente Minervâ*, without inward call; nor, indeed, am I sure that you have fixed on the right man for your object.

"In my mind Byron has been sinking at an accelerated rate, for the last ten years, and has now reached a very low level: I should say *too* low, were there not a *Hibernianism* involved in the expression. His fame has been very great, but I see not how it is to endure; neither does that make *him* great. No genuine productive thought was ever revealed by him to mankind; indeed, no clear undistorted vision into anything, or picture of anything; but all had a certain falsehood, a brawling, theatrical, insincere character. The man's moral nature, too, was bad; his demeanour, as a man, was bad. What was he, in short, but a huge, *sulky dandy;* of giant dimensions, to be sure, yet still a dandy; who sulked, as poor Mrs. Hunt expressed it, 'like a schoolboy that had got a plain bun given him instead of a plum one'? His bun was nevertheless God's universe, with what tasks are there; and it had served better men than he. I love him not; I owe him nothing; only pity and forgiveness; he taught me nothing that I had not again to forget. . . .

"You will find the literary world of London, and, indeed, all the worlds of it, in a very wonderful condition; too like what Ephraim Jenkinson described long ago: 'The world, my dear sir, *is* in its *dotage*.' Heaven send it a speedy recovery, or quiet death."

Equally striking is his sketch of Bentham. How we should like to have had from the author of *Hero-Worship* a full-length portrait of the great Utilitarian! The following is a bare outline, so far as we know, never filled up. "A far finer essay," he says, referring to another subject, "were a faithful, loving, and yet critical, and in part condemnatory, delineation of Jeremy Bentham, and his place and working in this section of the world's history. Bentham will not be put down by logic, and should not be put down, for we need him greatly as a backwoodsman; neither can reconciliation be effected till one party understands and is just to the other. Bentham is a denier; he denies with a loud and universally convincing voice; his fault is that he can *affirm* nothing, except that money is pleasant in the purse and food in the stomach, and that by this simplest of all beliefs he can reorganise society. He can shatter it in pieces—no thanks to him, for its old fastenings are quite rotten—but he cannot reorganise it; this is work for quite others than he. Such an essay on Bentham, however, were a great task for any one; for me a very great one, and perhaps rather out of my road."

Volcanic heavings are here distinctly perceptible; after nine years' internal working—*nonum prematur in annum*—they find relief in the following explosion, in the lecture on "The Hero as Prophet," contrasting Bentham with—Mahomet:

"But there is another thing to be said about the Mohammedan Heaven and Hell. This namely, that, however gross and material they may be, they are an emblem of an everlasting truth, not always so well remembered elsewhere. That gross sensual Paradise of his; that horrible flaming Hell; the great enormous Day of Judgment he perpetually insists on: what is all this but a rude shadow in the rude Bedouin imagination, of that grand spiritual Fact, and Beginning of Facts, which it is ill for us, too, if we do not all know and feel: the Infinite Nature of Duty? That man's actions here are of *infinite* moment to him, and never die or end at all; that man, with his little life, reaches upwards high as Heaven, downwards low as Hell, and in his threescore years of Time holds an Eternity fearfully and wonderfully hidden: all this had burnt itself, as in flame-characters, into the wild Arab soul. As in flame and lightning, it stands written there; awful, unspeakable, ever present to him. With bursting earnestness, with a fierce, savage sincerity, half-articulating, not able to articulate, he strives to speak it, bodies it forth in that Heaven and that Hell. Bodied forth in what you will, it is the first of all truths.

It is venerable under all embodiments. What is the chief end of man here below? Mohammed has answered this question in a way that might put some of *us* to shame! He does not, like a Bentham, a Paley, take Right and Wrong, and calculate the profit and loss, ultimate pleasure of the one and of the other; and summing all up by addition and subtraction into a net result, ask you, Whether on the whole the Right does not preponderate considerably? No; it is not *better* to do the one than the other; the one is to the other as life is to death,—as Heaven is to Hell. The one must in nowise be done, the other in nowise left undone. You shall not measure them; they are incommensurable: the one is death eternal to a man, the other is life eternal. Benthamee Utility, virtue by Profit and Loss; reducing this God's-world to a dead brute steam-engine, the infinite celestial Soul of Man to a kind of Hay-balance for weighing hay and thistles on, pleasures and pains on. If you ask me which gives, Mohammed or they, the beggarlier and falser view of Man and his Destinies in this Universe, I will answer, It is not Mohammed!"

Carlyle himself was a denier, or at all events denouncer, of a much fiercer sort than Bentham. And his assertions are as stout as his negations. But they lack definiteness. Force of character is admirable, when employed to propagate the right and the true and the good. But what authority is there to define to us these abstractions, and what means of acquiring force of character in case we do not possess it? Kant's "categorical imperative," making duty the revealer of God, and not God the revealer of duty, is responsible for this. Yet Carlyle must be counted as a power for good. His researches into German philosophy did not emasculate his native vigour. His task seems to have been to brace the moral fibre of the British nation, as it was Hamilton's to brace the intellectual. And, like Hamilton, he was at first misunderstood. Even Macaulay speaks unfavourably of him. An article of his, entitled "Characteristics," which now stands first among the *Miscellaneous Essays*, appeared in January, 1832. Of it Carlyle says, while in the ardour of composition, "I am in the aphoristic style, and need an incessant watchfulness to keep from being abstruse." Macaulay's comment on the piece is, "As to Carlyle, he might as well write in Irving's unknown tongue at once. The *Sun* newspaper, with delicious absurdity, attributes his article to Lord Brougham." Jeffrey, of course, follows suit. "I fear Carlyle will not do, that is, if you do not take the liberties and the pains with him that I did, by striking out freely, and writing in occasionally. The misfortune is that

he is very obstinate, and, I am afraid, conceited, and unluckily in a place like this, he finds people enough to abet and applaud him, to intercept the operation of the otherwise infallible remedy of general avoidance and neglect. It is a great pity, for he is a man of genius and industry, and with the capacity of being an elegant and impressive writer." Carlyle patched with fragments of Jeffrey must have made a mosaic of very curious pattern. The "capacity for elegance" has never been developed, but whose now is the "general avoidance and neglect"? The fact is, Jeffrey and, for that matter, Macaulay, were but philosophers of taste: Carlyle is a philosopher of life. The general strain of the latter's correspondence may be compared with the general strain of the former's, by the two following quotations. Macaulay says: "I am glad to hear that my articles are liked at Edinburgh. I have been laid up for a fortnight, and, therefore, know little of what is said here. But what I have learned is favourable." Three sentences on one's own reputation is an egotism pardonable enough in a private letter. But we may search the whole correspondence in vain for anything indicating such a sense of responsibility as is thus betrayed by the "obstinate and conceited" Carlyle:—"A mighty work lies before the writers of this time. I have a great faith and a great hope that the *Edinburgh Review* will not be wanting on its part, but stand forth in the van, where it has some right to be." We cannot help tracing the same difference a little farther in their respective references to a bereavement suffered at this time by Macvey Napier. "The hand of Death," says Carlyle, "has been busy in my circle, as it has been in yours; painfully reminding us that 'here we have no continuing city.' The venerated Friend that bade me farewell, cannot welcome me when I come back. I have no Father in this land of shadows." "During the last few months," says Macaulay, "I myself, for the first time in my life, felt the pain of such separations, and I have learned how little consolation can do, and how certain is the healing operation of time." The sage of Chelsea recognises facts: the son of Zachary Macaulay recommends us to forget them. The former tells us in his "Characteristics," just referred to, that "literature is a branch of religion." The latter would perhaps hardly admit religion to be so much as a branch of literature.

References to politics are plentiful in this volume. Among the rest are notices of the great Reform agitation of 1832.

Nobody cares to discuss the merits of a change which everybody has for a generation submitted to. This, however, we may say without wounding the most delicate susceptibilities. Extreme views as to the issue of this measure have been falsified by the event. Prophets of ruin and prophets of peace have been alike disappointed. Pandemonium is not yet builded, neither is Paradise yet restored. But the balance of good is in favour of the new order of things. The following from a foremost leader in the strife seems instinct with all the fury of it. As we read it, we seem to stand at the parting of the ways. The nation's destiny trembles in the balance. The Lower House, just elected for the purpose, has declared in favour of the Bill. The Upper House, jealous of its prerogative, yet hoists the flag of "No Surrender." The leader of the people—true patriot in some men's eyes, false demagogue in others'—rallies his forces to the assault. The northern organ, champion of freedom, must not now utter an uncertain sound. A decisive blow must be struck for liberty. All this we see in Brougham's letter. His injunction of secrecy must be explained by his sense of what was due to his position as Lord Chancellor. But if that tied his tongue, it did not sheathe his pen.

"*London, September* 14, 1831. My dear Professor,—I shall certainly send you something on the present truly alarming state of things as regards the Bill and the peace of the country. Meanwhile not a moment is to be lost if the people of Scotland have any desire for Reform. They must show it peacefully and calmly, but steadily. The enemy of reform and peace is at work, declaring that all feeling of Reform is at rest, and that the people no longer care for it! A grosser delusion never was heard of. But it is sure to throw out the Bill; and if Scotland announces meetings everywhere to petition the Lords, the peace of the country will be preserved and the constitution perpetuated. If not, I really tremble for the consequences. My having written to you must on no account be known. I am quite ready to avow that I strongly desire the people's sentiments to be declared in vindication of their own consistency, and to frustrate the intrigues of those who, some from fair and honest though mistaken views, others for factious and interested reasons, are really the worst enemies of both the King and constitution. But if it were known that I wrote to you upon the subject, much absurd misrepresentation would be attempted. Therefore you must act entirely from yourself."

A good deal more of reference to political matters occurs in Brougham's letters, but the interest of them is mainly personal. The success of Reform, even in the partial degree

already achieved, had brought him a place and a peerage, the "solid pudding" as well as the "empty praise." But though the peerage continued, the place was soon forfeited by the impracticableness of its occupant. Four years he retained the chancellorship. When the Whigs fell, he fell, but on their return to power soon after, they put the seal in commission, and ultimately bestowed it on Lord Cottenham. Brougham's mortification was extreme. He never recovered the blow, but remained through life a disappointed man, siding with no party, but, as occasion served, assailing both. Reform brought no elysium to him, unless it were the elysium of Cannes. The following was written shortly before the return of the Whigs to power, and while he was yet buoyed up with the hope of returning with them.

"*House of Lords, April* 3, 1835. My dear Professor,—What you say of any *alienation* between us here is almost all groundless. The underlings of the party had been persuaded by such lies as the papers circulate, that the King and Court turned them out of their places because I was too strong a Reformer, and I believe those underlings would throw their own fathers and mothers overboard to get back to their mess of pottage. If they had known my extreme aversion to office, and my all but irrevocable determination never again to hamper myself with it, and thereby and by party connection to tie up my right arm, and prevent me from working my own appointed work,—these gentlefolks might have saved themselves the trouble of wishing to get rid of me as an obstacle to their restoration. But Lord Althorp's fixed and immovable resolution to remain out, shakes mine; for, in truth, I hardly see how a Government (a Liberal one) can show itself with nobody in it whom the people care or even know anything about. However, all this is not to be talked of. *Those underlings* have kept in, and are keeping in, the Tories.—Yours ever, H. B."

Five days later Peel and Wellington resigned, and Lord Melbourne resumed office. But Brougham was excluded. "What," asks Earl Russell, in his *Recollections and Suggestions*, "was the nature of the objections which prevented Lord Melbourne from offering to return the Great Seal into the hands of Lord Brougham? The objections came first from Lord Melbourne, and were frankly communicated by him to Lord Brougham. His faults were a recklessness of judgment, which hurried him beyond the bounds of prudence, an omnivorous appetite for praise, a perpetual interference in matters with which he had no direct concern, and, above all, a disregard of truth. His vast powers of mind were

neutralised by a want of judgment, which prevented any party from placing entire confidence in him, and by a frequent forgetfulness of what he himself had done or said but a short time before. It was for these reasons that, many weeks before the change of Government, Lord Melbourne resolved not to offer the Great Seal to Lord Brougham. He told me of his fixed resolution on this head many weeks before the dissolution of Sir Robert Peel's ministry. Observing, as I did, the characters of the two men, I thought Lord Melbourne justified in his decision, and I willingly stood by him in his difficulties."

It was almost inevitable that some of the spleen stirred up by this disappointment should be poured out on the head of the manager of the *Review*. Napier had from motives of prudence withheld articles designed by Brougham for the January number. The silence of the *Review* at this crisis he ascribed, and said other people ascribed, to "the worst motives of trimming, and waiting to see how the cat jumped." But the non-appearance of the articles in question he accounted for in another way. It was not Napier's policy that was to blame, but other people's craft. "You would, I know, have printed those articles had you got them. But they were intercepted." One of them appeared in April, and with it five more from the same pen. Here is the list of them: "The British Constitution—Recent Political Occurrences;" "Thoughts upon the Aristocracy;" "Newspaper Tax;" "Memoirs of Mirabeau;" "French Parties and Politics;" "State of Parties." Channels enough these surely through which to vent his political gall. But the catalogue forms a curious comment on the complaints heaped on the head of the poor editor in the following communication, which we must quote, before passing on, as a sample of the author's spirit:

"*London, June* 9, 1835. My dear Sir,—I wish to know whether or not Mr. Allen has undertaken to give the character of Bolingbroke's style, eloquence, &c., or only the *political* and *factious* portion of the subject, because if he is possessed of both parts, I shall beg leave to decline interfering with him. I hope you may take in good part what I must now in fairness to you, and in common justice to myself, add.

"Ever since you succeeded to the management of the *Edinburgh Review*, I have found that my assistance was reckoned, justly God knows, a very secondary object, and that one of the earliest friends of the Journal, and who had (Jeffrey will inform you) enabled it

to struggle through its first difficulties as much as any one or even two of the contributors, was now next thing to laid upon the shelf. This is the common lot of those who, in any concern, outlive their contemporaries; and no one, I must say it for myself, in this world has less of personal punctilio about him, or cares less for such trifles when in pursuit of a great object. But, at the same time, I really do feel that I ought not to be merely made a hack of, and 'offered' such and such books; that is, whatever nobody else likes to do. Yet it does so happen that of late years this is my position. Dr. Southey, I assure you, is considered in a very different way by the *Quarterly Review*. However, let that pass. My resolution now is, that I shall review such things as suit my taste and my views on subjects and on public affairs, and if there is any kind of objection *in any quarter* (which I am well aware in these times of intrigue and jobbery is very possible), I cannot help it, and I shall interpose no obstacle to the conductors and contributors of the Journal, and should be very sorry to stand in the way of any other arrangements or connections. Ex-ministers are always in the wrong, I know full well. However, if the base and truly jobbing plan of some *would-be ministers* and their adherents (in London) had taken effect, and you had, 'for fear of giving offence,' kept all politics out of the last, as you had done out of the Number before, my belief is that the *Review* would have died in the course of the Spring. I am sure the political character of the last Number did it much service and no harm, except disappointing the *good-for-littles* I allude to."

It is plain that Lord Brougham would still have considered himself "next thing to laid on the shelf" unless permitted at least an occasional repetition of the feat ascribed to him by Lord Cockburn in his *Life of Jeffrey*,—that of having written the whole of one number of the *Review*, including an article on lithotomy and another on the music of the Chinese. Napier's reply is not preserved, but it must have been in a conciliatory tone, for within a week Brougham wrote another letter which comes as near to the *amende honorable* as anything could be which proceeded from his pen. It was only too servile.

About this time several interesting letters passed between Napier and Macaulay on the subject of the latter's Indian appointment. But these we must not refer to further than to mention Macaulay's generosity. Being now raised to affluence, he wished to forego money payments, and only to receive in recognition of his services any new books that Napier might think it worth while to send. This proposal the latter would not consent to. Indeed, it was a rule in

the *Edinburgh Review* not to accept gratuitous help. The first article Macaulay sent from Calcutta was the famous one on Lord Bacon, composed during his voyage out. The different opinions entertained as to its merits by his compeers at home is well illustrated in the following quotations from our editor's correspondence. Jeffrey was, as usual, lavish in his praise of Macaulay's latest production. The length of it had been an objection, and the ex-editor writes:—"What mortal could ever dream of cutting out the least particle of this precious work, to make it fit better into your *Review?* It would be worse than paring down the Pitt diamond to fit the old setting of a dowager's ring. It is altogether magnificent—*et prope divinium.* Since Bacon himself, I do not know that there has been anything so fine. I have read it not only with delight, but with emotion—with throbbings of the heart, and tears in the eye."

Bulwer thinks Macaulay has not read Bacon's character aright, and exposes his weakness as to Bacon's philosophy.

"Macaulay's paper is triking and brilliant, as is all that comes from his vigorous mind and brilliant fancy. But I think, though Bacon was quite as bad a public man as he represents, that his vices were not the consequences of a weak and servile temperament, but of the same profound and subtle mind that he evinced in his letters. He chose his means according as they could bring success to his ends. And it is remarkable (and this Macaulay overlooks) that his worst and meanest acts *invariably succeeded* in their object,—nay, that they were the only means by which his objects *could* have been gained. Thus his ingratitude to Essex was his great stepping-stone to his after distinctions, and his cowardly submission on the detection of his corruption not only saved his head, but restored him to liberty, wealth, and rank. I could show, too, from Bacon's letters that Macaulay is mistaken as to his religious sincerity. As Bacon himself says, he wrapped up his physic in sweets for the priests to swallow. In fact, he was not a weak, irresolute actor in politics, but a consummate and masterly hypocrite, trained in the rules of Italian statesmanship. The biographical part is, however, the best of Macaulay's article. The view of Bacon's philosophy seems to me merely brilliant declamation. All detail, all definition of the exact things Bacon did and omitted to do, are thrown overboard. The comparison with Plato, as a fair illustration of ancient and modern philosophy, is mere rhetoric. And the illustration would have ruined his own position if he had substituted Aristotle for Bacon. Aristotle was a *useful* philosopher as well as Bacon, and it was in combating Aristotle that Bacon learned the use of his own limbs and weapons.

Enough of these criticisms on Criticism. I may differ with Macaulay, but his genius in this article, as in all else, is of a prodigious and gigantic character. He is formed to be the man of his age."

Stephen's comments are mostly laudatory, or intended to be so.

"In the paper on Lord Bacon, he shows powers of a far higher order than in any other of his writings. It is the most considerable performance of its kind which has appeared in my day, and would have conferred a lasting place in English literature on him, had he written nothing else. His scorn for the mystical, and his honest determination to write nothing which he does not fully understand, and which he cannot make intelligible to his readers, seem to me to have injured his estimate of Bacon's character. He leaves out all mention of the *gaseous* part of it, which Coleridge and his disciples would have employed themselves in an attempt to fix, by combinations of words conveying no meaning to the many, and but half a meaning to the few. But in his contempt for this kind of pretension, Macaulay has, I think, made the great Philosopher too much into a mere promoter of inventions for improving the condition of mankind in what relates to their lower faculties. His Bacon, or rather his Baconian system, is (in the pet phrase of Coleridge and Co.) rather too sensuous. It is, however, a noble paper, and the more so as the glare of his earlier style is so much subdued, without the loss of any of its vivacity, or even of its learning, which is now to be detected through a decorous veil instead of challenging the admiration of his readers."

Brougham was irreconcilable.

"The *Bacon* is, as you say, very striking, and no doubt the work of an extremely clever man. It is so very long that I think you might have cut it in two, there being an obvious division. But (not to trouble you with the superfluous enumeration of its good qualities) it has two grievous defects,—a redundancy, an overcrowding of every one thing that is touched upon, that almost turns one's head; for it is out of one digression into another, and each thought in each is illustrated by twenty different cases and anecdotes, all of which follow from the first without any effort. This is a sad defect in Macaulay, and it really seems to get worse instead of better. I need not say that it is the defect of a very clever person—it is indeed exuberance. But it is a defect also that old age is liable to. The other fault you have alluded to, but I will expose it after Macaulay's own manner of writing. 'You might as well say that all men balance themselves in order to walk and, therefore, there is no science of mechanics, or that every child learns to suck, and, therefore, the Torricellian experiment was of no use to science, or that the dullest of human beings goes to his

point by one straight line and not by the other two sides of a triangle, and, therefore, there is no Geometry, or that the most ordinary workman, be he mason building an arch, or cooper making a cask, forms a curve by joining straight lines short in proportion to the whole length, and, therefore, the fluxional calculus was no discovery;' through two or three pages as easy to fill with such trash as it would be unprofitable. In fact, this way of treating a subject is somewhat mistaking garrulity for copiousness, but I am now complaining much more of the matter than the manner. Greater blunder never was committed than the one Macaulay has made on the Inductive Philosophy. He is quite ignorant of the subject. He may garnish his pages as he pleases with references: it only shows he has read Bacon for the *flowers* and not the *fruit*, and this is indeed the fact. He has no science at all, and cannot reason. His contemporaries at Cambridge always said he had not the conception of what an argument was; and surely it was not right for a person who never had heard of Gilbert's treatise, to discuss Bacon's originality, nay, to descant on Bacon at all, who seems never to have read the *Sylva Sylvarum* (for see p. 83 about ointments for broken bones); and who goes through the whole of his speculation (or whatever you choose to term it) without making any allusion to Bacon's notorious failure when he came to put his own rules in practice, and without seeming to be at all aware that Sir I. Newton was an experimental philosopher."

Macaulay in his turn, being made acquainted with these last unfavourable criticisms, thinks he can defend his doctrine as to what Bacon did for inductive philosophy, and imagines that "Lord Brougham's objections arise from an utter misconception of the whole argument, and every part of it." In this instance posterity will probably believe that, notwithstanding the splendour of Macaulay's style, the truth on these various points lies with his candid friends. Both he and they appear to have overlooked the extent to which this famous essay championed that very Utilitarianism which a few years before Macaulay himself had taken such pains to demolish.

There is much more of correspondence between Napier and Macaulay, and between Napier and Brougham, but we cannot enlarge upon it. The following specimens will illustrate the manner in which each rival for public favour unbosomed his sentiments concerning the other to their mutual friend. "I have no heart to say one word on any subject of the last number [that for January, 1840] but one—I mean, one which absorbs all others—Macaulay's most profligate political morality. In my eyes, his defence of Clive,

and the audacious ground of it, merit execration." This is the introduction to a long tirade, in the course of which the noble correspondent mourns the failure of his efforts to restore, by means of the *Review*, "a better, a purer, a higher standard of morals." The second correspondent—all unconscious of the opinions expressed about him—thus retorts upon the first. "He is not a malignant or bad-hearted man, but he is an unscrupulous one, and where his passions are concerned or his vanity irritated, there is no excess or dereliction of principle of which he is not capable." We must put down much of this vilification to temporary feeling. But Macaulay was perhaps often in danger of being a little blinded by the glorious achievements of Britain's heroes to the character of the means by which they were accomplished. As for Brougham, he never in the heat of his passion bears false witness against his neighbour, without at the same time bearing witness that is not false against himself.

The miserable ruse by which, in the Autumn of 1839, he sought to win back a portion of his lost popularity, is well known. He thought it at the time a wonderful success, though, of course, he disclaimed the responsibility. He says, "My relations with the Government are less hostile by a great deal. They were I find quite stunned to find the sensation caused by my departure from this lower world. Their silly vanity, and the flattery of their sycophants, and the noise of their vile newspapers, had really made them fancy that I was utterly gone into oblivion. They have now found a marvellous difference, for they are obliged to admit that they, and all their people, might have died, and been quietly buried, compared with my decease." But all this feeling was, so to speak, conditional. And, as Jeffrey says, on the failure of the condition, the British public was entitled to a *jus retractus*, or a *restitutio in integra*, "like the worthy man who was persuaded to tender his forgiveness to an ancient foe who was said to be dying, and turned round after he had shaken hands, and said, "Remember, though, that *if you recover*, I retract my forgiveness." Our references to Brougham may well conclude here, as the book stops short by twenty years of his real death in 1868 in his ninetieth year. In justice to so great a name we will quote a sentence from the edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* now in course of publication. "His indomitable energy, his vehement eloquence, his enthusiastic attachment to the cause of freedom, progress and humanity, to which he rendered so

many signal services, caused him to be justly regarded as one of the most extraordinary and illustrious men of his age and of his country."

Another contributor, not so renowned as those last named, must not be passed over in silence: we mean Sir James Stephen. At the outset of its career, and long afterward, the *Review* steadily ignored religion, or treated with contempt the only form of it that was worth the name. And it thereby forfeited an influence for good that might have been a great strength to it and an incalculable benefit to the British nation. But this task it disdained. It left to others the glory of infusing into the thought of the country that moral earnestness which now characterises it. The narrowness and formality at that period of Scottish ecclesiasticism may have partly accounted for this. But much of the responsibility attaches to the founders themselves. Witness the following remarks from Jeffrey to his great coadjutor so early as 1804. "You are very much mistaken if you suppose I countenance Wilberforce or his principles. I have much respect for his talents and great veneration for his character. I shall read his book [the *Practical View*, published 1797] at a convenient season, but scarcely expect to get the length of W— or King Agrippa. In the meantime I am very much flattered by the favourable opinion of such men, and should be sincerely sorry to do anything to scandalise them." Scandalise them he did, however, by the publication of Sydney Smith's scurrilous and ignorant brochure on the Methodists, the reception of which by the public warned the editor that, whether he held with the hare or not, it was not quite safe to run with the hounds. With the accession of Napier a different feeling prevailed, and articles on religious subjects were occasionally admitted, which did not shrink from acknowledging religion to be a potent and beneficial element in the life of the nation. Among the writers who followed this line none was more conspicuous than Sir James Stephen, whose contributions were afterwards published under the title of *Essays in Ecclesiastical Biography*. Curiously enough, his first article (April number, 1838) was on that very member of the Clapham sect whose principles Jeffrey had once so zealously forsworn. This was followed by others. In July appeared "Lives of Whitefield and Froude;" in January, 1839, "Luther and the Reformation;" in October of the same year, "Baxter;" in April, 1840, "Works of the Author of Natural History of Enthusiasm," &c.

About the last but one the following testimonies were borne. Empson, Jeffrey's brother-in-law, said, "Baxter has been generally put down to Macaulay, who admires it, but not quite as much, I think, as Jeffrey and I do. I told him that Whishaw said, 'I hear there is a canting article on Baxter by Macaulay.' Denman, too, took it for his. The tone might be cant in Macaulay, but it is sincere in Stephen." The flippant Jeffrey is even more eloquent. "Are you prepared to hear that my favourite article is that on old Baxter? I think it very touching, eloquent, and amiable; and you may depend upon it that such papers are of inestimable value to the *Review*, not merely for the pleasure and edification they minister to pious persons like me, but from their taking away from you the reproach (or suspicion) of infidelity or indifference at least to religion, and thus giving tenfold weight to your Liberal opinions upon other subjects, with the best and steadiest friends of liberality. It is so sweetly, and candidly, and humanely written, that all good people, I think, must love and reverence the author, and I hope you will try to get as much out of him as possible." The simplicity of this confession is quite charming. The value of religion is precisely the amount of credit it will bring to Liberal politics and the amount of profit it will by consequence bring to the *Review*. But we must not suppose that Jeffrey was a mere cynic, who utterly lacked feeling. The above bears witness to the contrary, and however harsh his treatment of Wordsworth and Keats, his sympathy with those he took to be true poets is seen in one of the letters published with his "Life," in which he says he could get down into the dust and weep to think of the "arrangements" which thwarted the normal growth of such a man as Burns. As a parting tribute, let us cite Lord Cockburn's summary. "The peculiar charm of his character lay in the junction of intellectual power with moral worth. His honour was superior to every temptation by which the world could assail it. The pleasures of the heart were necessary for his existence, and were preferred by him to every other gratification except the pleasures of conscience. Passing much of his time in literary and political contention, he was never once chilled by an unkind feeling even towards those he was trying to overcome." The "pleasures of conscience" seem almost to open to us a new domain of human felicity. By Jeffrey they were perhaps enjoyed as the necessary accompaniments of "natural religion."

The last number of the *Review* that Macvey Napier edited was that for January, 1847. He died in February. From a sketch which appeared in the *Scotsman* shortly after his death, we cull the following tribute, which we believe to have been honestly earned.

"In the conduct of that brilliant publication it is well known that he was preceded by men of the finest genius, as well as of the purest, firmest, and most consistent principles; and it is no light praise to say that this leading organ of constitutional and liberal doctrines, and of manly and enlightened criticism, suffered no decay under his steady and unflinching management. In these respects the absolute and unassailable purity of his character as a public man had the natural consequence of bringing him into close and confidential intercourse with many of the highest and most influential men of the age; and nothing can reflect brighter honour on his character than the strict fidelity, and truthfulness, and independence, with which that intercourse was invariably maintained. Within the circle of his private acquaintance—more remarkable, perhaps, for its intimacy than for its extent—his memory will be always cherished as that of a most intelligent, kindly, and pleasing companion—a zealous, disinterested, and devoted friend."

One quotation more, *apropos* of the whole subject, we must make, not from this volume, but from Carlyle's *Characteristics*, referred to above.

"Nay, is not the diseased self-conscious state of Literature disclosed in this one fact, which lies so near us here, the prevalence of Reviewing! Sterne's wish for a reader 'that would give up the reins of his imagination into his author's hands, and be pleased he knew not why, and cared not wherefore,' might lead him a long journey now. Indeed, for our best class of readers, the chief pleasure, a very stinted one, is this same knowing of the Why; which many a Kames and Bossu has been, ineffectually enough, endeavouring to teach us: till at least these also have laid down their trade; and now your Reviewer is a mere *taster:* who tastes, and says, by the evidence of such palate, such tongue, as he has got, It is good, It is bad. Was it thus that the French carried out certain inferior creatures on their Algerine Expedition, to taste the wells for them, and try whether they were poisoned? Far be it from us to disparage our own craft, whereby we have our living! Only we must note these things: That Reviewing spreads with strange vigour; that such a man as Byron reckons the Reviewer and the Poet equal; that at the last Leipzig fair, there was advertised a Review of reviews. By-and-by it will be found that all Literature has become one boundless self-devouring Review; and, as in London routs, we have to *do* nothing, but only to *see* others

do nothing. Thus does Literature also, like a sick thing, superabundantly 'listen to itself.'"

This would seem to condemn the whole art and mystery of reviewing. But, we may ask, does the critical faculty stand in any necessary antagonism to the intuitive? We think not. The star-gazer does not enjoy the heavens less, but more, for being able to tell the constellations. Analysis should lead to a more perfect synthesis than was possible without it. The evil is not in making the analysis, but in stopping short at it. And if the state of literature be one of diseased self-consciousness, this shows that the analysis is still imperfect, or at least that men, rightfully or wrongfully, are not satisfied with it. After all, society is only the sum of the units that compose it. One man, or set of men, may think the main problems settled. Another man, or set of men, may not yet have been able to solve them, or may have solved them in a different way. With a good deal of what is chaotic, we think the tendency of the age, its serial literature included, is at least toward clear definition, if not satisfactory solution, of the problems of existence. In Church and State, in Art, Literature, and Science, parties and principles are more and more clearly marked off. And it only needs that each party should be faithful to its own principles for victory ultimately to crown the right. For no principles can be true in theory which will not stand the test of practice. If recent tendencies, for instance, in the direction of superstitious symbolism on the one hand, or of scientific scepticism on the other, are what they profess to be, discoveries of new truth or rediscoveries of old truth, they will exalt the intelligence and purify the morals of those who embrace them. If not, the opposite results will follow. And though mischief, great and irretrievable, may in the meantime be done, yet in the end it will work its own cure. So those must believe who believe in a plan of the universe.

In this present article we have gone a step beyond the merchant of Leipzig fair. He only proposed to review Reviews: we have been reviewing Reviewers of reviews. Our consolation is that no one can criticise us without carrying on the process to the fourth degree.

ART. VI.—1. *Forty Years in New Zealand.* By REV. W. J. BULLER, Wesleyan Minister. Hodder and Stoughton. 1879. With Illustrations.

2. *Reminiscences of the War in New Zealand.* By THOMAS W. GUDGEON, Lieutenant and Quartermaster Colonial Forces No. 3. With Twelve Portraits. London: Sampson Lowe. Auckland: E. Wayte. 1879.

3. *Travels in New Zealand; with Contributions to the Geography, Geology, Botany, and Natural History of that Country.* By ERNEST DIEFFENBACH, M.D., Naturalist of the New Zealand Emigration Society. Two Volumes, Plates. Longmans. 1843.

AN ominous paragraph has lately been going the round of the papers:—"The Maori King will not agree to the recommendations of the Colonial Government touching the sale of land; but it is believed that, nevertheless, Rewi and his tribe will sell and lease their lands." We trust this does not mean another Maori war, in addition to the rest. We trust, too, that it does not mean that dying out of the Maori race which we hoped timely measures had averted. No doubt our people will have elbow-room, and emigration to New Zealand has so increased that a cry for more land is very plausible. But the system of fixing a certain limit for native reserves, and then continually trenching upon it, is doubly disastrous as well as dishonourable. Its effect on the whites can only be to make them wholly regardless of any right but that of the stronger—to lower the whole standard of political and social morality. To the natives it is simply ruinous. With what heart can a Maori till land, make improvements, go in for culture and progress, when he feels that, by-and-by, his civilised and Christian neighbours will "desire his land" (to use the expressive Old Testament word), and, by getting together an illusory meeting of the ne'er-do-weels and drunkards of his tribe—the men who have learnt from civilisation only its vices—will manage to secure possession of it and to shunt him off to fresh ground, of which he may again be dispossessed as soon as more allotments are wanted for other colonists? The example of the United States of America is a very instructive one. Certain fragments of Indian tribes—Creeks,

Cherokees, &c.— had started on the high road of settled civilised life. They cultivated and exported cotton, and published newspapers written in their own language and printed in characters invented by one of their nation. The Government of Washington moved them off westward, and settled them in the basin of the Arkansas. The Americans, in spite of their theories about liberty and equality, could not bear the sight of Indian reserves in the midst of populous States. Two or three such transplantings have, not unnaturally, been enough to justify the reiterated assertion that the Red men are incapable of civilisation; they have proved incapable of it under conditions which would turn even a Norfolk farmer into a shiftless hand-to-mouth sloven.

To deal in a like way with the remnant of the Maoris is to act altogether unworthily both of the religion which we profess and of the position which we claim among the nations of the earth. In the old time Christian philanthropy was almost unknown; the savage, unless he could be profitably enslaved, was a nuisance to be got rid of. Romanists, believing in the inevitable doom of all the unbaptised, baptised the natives by hordes, and taught them some sort of travesty of Christianity. Till lately, Protestants did not even do as much as this. In Tasmania, in Australia, in North America, everywhere, that the native should disappear before the white man was looked on as a law of nature, "the survival of the fittest." A truer sense of what Christianity means is making us think otherwise. Christianity we believe to be God's great instrument for modifying the law of survival, which would else often come to be a survival of the unfittest—the coarsest and strongest—and for preserving for the future advantage of the human family much that would else be crushed out in the struggle for existence. In this way the gentle, the good, the kind and sweet-natured have, here at home, an advantage which, without Christianity, they would not have over the rough, the overbearing, the selfish and hard. It must be the same in our dealings with other races, unless our sharing Christianity with them is a sham. If the Maori is our brother in Christ, we must treat him as such, and must give him additional consideration to make up for the relative disadvantages with which God has seen fit to surround him. He belongs to that great class, "the weak," whose infirmities we are to bear. The practical working of this should be that the native reserves in New Zealand should be as sacred as the most strictly entailed property at home. When the colonists,

who already hold such a very large share of the islands, are really pressed for room (which they certainly are not yet), let them go elsewhere—seek land in the unoccupied parts of Australia or of New Guinea, if they prefer doing so to working on the second-best land at home. If, because there is in the colony a dearth of thoroughly eligible plots, we are therefore to tell the Maoris to "move on," we had better at once all attempt to be their spiritual guides. A policy which should combine the offer of heaven with gradual but inevitable extinction upon earth would be nothing but a monstrous hypocrisy.

We write strongly; but those who read Mr. Gudgeon's book will feel that we do not write too strongly. The whole of the sad story of the original land war of 1860-64, followed by the Hau-hau war, which resolved itself into a long and exciting chase after Te-Kooti, shows how entirely our eagerness for land has been the cause of bloodshed and extermination. The Maoris, who where much in the social condition of the Scotch Highlanders of a century and a half ago, and (except in the matter of cannibalism) not far behind them in civilisation, had no notion of personal property in land. Mr. Buller tells us how Colonel Wakefield, prospecting for the Emigration Company, purchased (as he thought) large tracts from natives who were on the steamer with him, and who looked on the whole transaction as a profitable joke—a joke which gave them blankets and guns and ammunition, but a joke nevertheless.

We need scarcely say that Lieutenant Gudgeon's view of the land question is not ours. He seems to think Government was right in "making some of the earlier settlers disgorge what they had got for a keg of spirits or a few knives, and buy again at a fair price." He does not see that, by Maori law, as definite on the subject as our own, it was impossible for a single native to alienate any part of his tribe's territory. He could no more do so than any one of the Campbell clan could have sold away a part of the clan's land, which (under our modern arrangements) forms the inheritance of the ducal house of Argyle. It was just the same in Ireland; the "undertakers" who went over always found some disaffected clansman ready to part with his allotment of the tribal land; and this, when acquired, the new comers claimed to hold in full ownership, not caring that by the Brehon law there was no such thing as ownership without regard to tribal rights. Even in England we have our survivals of

tribal usage in Lammas lands and commons, &c.; and in Epping Forest the old system has lately won a victory over that which has been only too successfully carried out in New Zealand.

Mr. Gudgeon, with whose sneers about "the noble savage," and whose general tone about the Maoris we have not the slightest sympathy, says that "when the natives saw the Pakehas (whites) improving land and selling it at very advanced prices among themselves, they not only got ideas of perpetual property in land, but became very sharp in their dealings. Some blocks were given back to them, because the titles were manifestly bad. They then marked out the best bits as reserves, and put into the concessions lots of nearly useless land, *so cunning had they become.*" We might ask who taught them to be thus cunning in self-defence; but we prefer to join issue with Mr. Gudgeon as to the Waitara block, the cause of the war of 1860. Our author says it had been *already purchased twice over;* the point at issue is were the purchases legal? On this point many of the best men in New Zealand held with the natives; even Sir G. Grey was far from being convinced, though he thought (as is too often thought under the like circumstances) that it would never do for England to back out. So far from rushing into war with savage recklessness, the Maoris tried negotiations for ten years. At last the Taranaki natives declared war by building a *pah* on land which Governor Gore-Brown had told them he was going to take possession of. This war was mostly carried on on our side by Government troops. At one time there were ten British regiments in Taranaki and Auckland, to which districts the fighting was confined till 1865, when the hostile natives left Waitara and joined the Wanganuia. Some of us may remember the astonishment, not unmixed with rage, which was felt because the Maoris stood so well on their defence, actually giving us lessons in the use of rifle-pits. It was even proposed that the Sikhs should be taken over to help us. How daring the Maories were may be judged from what happened soon after the outbreak. General Cameron had given orders for his camp to be pitched. An officer, who knew the natives well, hinted that they were much too near the bush. "Do you imagine, Major Witchell," was the reply, "that any body of natives will dare to attack 2,000 of Her Majesty's troops?" Very soon a volley was fired, which killed an adjutant-general and fifteen men, and, had not Major Witchell told his troop to keep their horses saddled, the casualties would have been many more.

As it was, one native was cut down only twenty yards from the General's tent.

Our sympathies with the natives are lessened by what are styled "murders." We forget that, for a Maori, all was fair in war; not to cut off a straggler or to kill a white who happened to come in the way, would have been considered mere folly. We taught the Maoris one thing—to give up cannibalism—and all through the long twenty-five years' struggle, never, save once during the very wildest outbreak of Hauhau fanaticism, was there any attempt to return to it. But we could not teach them that their way of fighting was inhuman. Our Maori allies were fully as bad in this respect as our enemies. Of this Mr. Gudgeon gives many instances. It must certainly be hard to persuade a native that for you to shell his village and kill his people in incomprehensible ways with Gatlings and Martini Henry rifles without giving them a chance of coming to close quarters is fair and honourable, while for him to cut down, *more majorum*, a white who falls into his power is the reverse.* Instead of thinking our way all fair, their way murderously unfair, we should try to put ourselves in their place, though they are "only niggers;" and this, by bravery and endurance rarely paralleled, the Maoris forced us to do.

One thing all through Mr. Gudgeon's book has caused us much pain. We did not realise the extent to which native help was used, when "the self-reliant policy of Messrs. Weld and Stafford" had gradually got rid of the Imperial troops. The settlers, when trained to bush-fighting, made admirable troops, and were much more dreaded by the natives than the regulars—"*they had something to avenge*," says our author. But as if this was not importing enough blood-thirstiness into the conflict, tribal jealousies and old hatred were played upon to make some tribes willing agents in subduing their fellows. The Arawas joined us, "having a great desire to get guns, and a still greater wish to shoot some one with them." Lieutenant Gudgeon would have liked the Maoris very well "if we could have had them without their chiefs." They

* Here is Mr. Gudgeon's view of the case:—"The Maoris of 1860 were not Han-hans, and though, like all savages, they held peculiar notions as to what constituted a murder, still they respected non-combatants." Before the Waireka fight, the leading chiefs had *tapued* Rev. W. Brown's house, affixing a notice forbidding any one to interfere with him or his neighbours. And, after the battle, lest some of the young men might seek revenge for their heavy losses, Rapata, the great chief of the Taranaki tribe, took the inmates all under his protection.

served us remarkably well. Major Kepa, Ensign Poma, &c., often saved the volunteers from annihilation in the days when, unused to bush-fighting, they were subject to panics and given to pack together. But this was dearly purchased at the cost of arousing feelings and encouraging conduct wholly inconsistent with the Christianity which we had so long been inculcating. It was for their own ends, and not for love of us, that some of the tribes joined us; and Mr. Gudgeon hints that they were never to be wholly relied on. The true relation between Englishmen and friendly natives is seen from the following:—"Do you trust me?" asked Katene of an officer. "I do." The Maori sat looking at the fire, and then, laying his hand on his friend's knee, replied, "You are right, and you are wrong; you are right to trust me now, for I mean you well; but never trust a Maori. Some day I may remember that I have lost my land, and that the power and influence (*mana*) of my tribe are gone, and that you are the cause; at that moment I shall be your enemy." By-and-by Katene—whom M'Donnell considered so valuable that he once let him out of prison, where he had been put for stealing, in the hope of getting information from him—saw a relative of his who had been killed in some skirmish with "friendlies." A few nights after he went away, and probably joined in the war against us.

What came of using friendly Maoris—selfishly interesting, *i.e.*, all the latent savagery and evil passions of their nature in our cause, is shown over and over again in Mr. Gudgeon's book. Here is a case which happened at the very outset. At Te Matata, in 1864, Toi, the chief of the Arawas, who had just joined us, was killed. Among the prisoners was a Whakatohea chief, for whose safety, when he surrendered, Captain M'Donnell became personally responsible. Toi's wife, however, persuaded a man to lend her a loaded rifle, and, walking up to the prisoner, blew his brains out.

After this the following sinks into insignificance:—"One of the Hau-haus was shot; and little Winiata (one of the contingent, a very hero in Mr. Gudgeon's eyes), to square things in accordance with Maori ideas of right and justice, dealt him the same number of tomahawk cuts that Haggarty had received, and formed a very low opinion of the Pakehas because they rebuked him."

Here is another unedifying scene:—Katene and his brother (both of them Kupapas, *i.e.*, contingent men) went to a half-friendly pah, in order to draw a great fighting man, Te Waka,

into an ambush laid for him by M'Donnell. Te Waka began to reproach Katene for fighting against his own people. "Pish!" said he; "the Pakehas are fools, and I have more brains than you. In one month I shall steal more ammunition than I can use in two years; then I shall return to you. If you disbelieve me, come, and I'll show you a thousand caps I've stolen already." Te Waka, greedy for ammunition, fell into the trap. When they were ten yards from the ambush, Katene seized his gun, the brother laid hold of his tomahawk, and as he prepared to escape by leaping down a cliff, the men in ambush shot him dead. "Why did you take the gun and not the man, as I told you?" asked M'Donnell. "Because you would have saved him, *and I wanted him killed, for he had done me an injury.*" No wonder men of unblunted military honour were disgusted at taking a share in a war conducted in such a way.

In 1864 the war assumed a new shape. At first a quarrel between ourselves and a single tribe, it had spread, owing to the patriotism of the most intelligent chiefs. A Maori king had been chosen, and an endeavour made to combine, as the only way of saving themselves from being driven out in detail by the encroaching Pakeha.

But patriotism was not enough to overcome old tribal feuds. Religion was brought in, either advisedly, by able unscrupulous men, who only made use of the fanaticism of their fellows, or (more probably) the fanaticism developed amid the despair of what seemed a hopeless struggle, and was (as is too often the case) a mixture of half-unconscious imposture with real belief. This is the way in which Hau-hauism is said to have begun. Te Ua, a man of little account, assaulted a woman of his tribe, and was caught by her husband. The man tied him up and left him. While he was lying bound the Angel Gabriel came to him and bade him burst his bonds. He did so; and when the husband chained him up the angel enabled him to break the chain. Thenceforward the tribe looked on him as some great one, and his spiritual intercourse became constant, not only with Gabriel, but with Michael the Archangel, and with a host of minor spirits, "who landed from the *Lord Worsley* (a steamer lately wrecked on Taranaki coast. Mark the strange notion that spirits, like Pakehas, come in winged canoes). He began to have visions. Gabriel showed him all the tribes of the earth; and, while he was gazing, a voice said, "Rise, Te Ua, and kill thy son." He took the boy, broke his legs, and was about to carry out the command, when Gabriel said,

"Not so; wash him with water." He obeyed, and his son became whole as before. The Hau-hau ritual consisted chiefly in dancing round a pole, called Niu, and singing a *waiata* (hymn) about the Trinity. The dancers got into an ecstatic state, and were then believed to have the gift of tongues. The Hau-haus called themselves *pai-marire* (good and perfect), and Te Ua strictly forbade any violence till they should have made the round of all the tribes, converting as they went. "Then," he said, "the angels will come and annihilate the Pakehas, and will teach you all their arts. You will only have to sit still and see the salvation of the Lord." Attacked by Captain Lloyd and a detachment, they were thoroughly successful. Captain Lloyd was killed, and the Hau-haus cut off his head and carried it about with them, believing that it gave forth prophecies. Had Te Ua's programme been carried out, Lieutenant Gudgeon knows not how serious might have been the result; but Hepanaia and other sub-prophets could not wait. They attacked a redoubt, called Sentry Hill, some twenty miles north of Mount Egmont, and rushing on under the idea that if they cried Hau-hau and held up the left hand, they would be invulnerable, they were driven off with great loss. Their four front ranks went down to a man under a withering fire. Explaining this as due to the lack of faith of those who fell, their prophet led them on again, only to fall as before. Then followed the murders of Mr. Völckner, a Lutheran in Anglican orders, and of Fulloon, a half-caste interpreter. Another missionary, Mr. Grace, was rescued by Captain Levy, the Jewish master of a coasting vessel. The Hau-haus looked on themselves as the modern chosen people, and therefore had a special regard for those who had held that place of old. Hence Captain Levy was unharmed, and was able to save others. Against Völckner the charge was that he kept a light in his window at night as a beacon to guide the coasters between Auckland and Opotiki. There was also some dispute between him and one of the Roman Catholic priests, of the trouble caused by whom Mr. Buller gives more than one instance.

We can well understand, however, why missionaries should be special objects of attack. The Maoris would, of course, suspect them of betraying their secrets; and not without reason, for the field map used during most of the Hau-hau war was drawn chiefly by Father Pézant, who, having gone much among the natives, knew the position of every *pah*.

Then came the taking of the Wereroa *pah*, a strong position, which General Cameron declined to attack without 2000 men; and yet 500 Wanganuis, with a few volunteers under Captain M'Donnell (Mr. Gudgeon's hero), surprised it early one frosty morning, "although the Hau-haus talked gibberish (their miraculous tongues being Maori, pronounced with a ridiculous English accent) to bewitch us." "Grey dawn" seems to have been the best time for attacking those whom Mr. Gudgeon unaccountably calls "our sable foes." The Maoris, immigrants from a warmer climate, and with no animals to furnish them with skins, feel the weather, and are not much on the alert while the frost is on the ground. The suffering of the native contingent during some of the cold rains must have sickened them of helping the Pakeha. The treatment of prisoners may be judged of from the following:—Enter Sergeant Duff, with a native boy, part of whose brains are protruding, thrown across his horse. "Boy's very bad," says an officer. "He's only wounded, Sir. I've brought him in to give information." Many were killed as accessories to Völckner's murder on the word of private enemies who wished to be rid of them. Captain Biggs (p. 80) shot a prisoner in cold blood because an enemy denounced him. It is but fair to say that not all the sub-prophets (there were twelve, after the number of the apostles) were as ferocious as Kereopa, the murderer of Völckner. Patara, another prophet, exclaimed against him, and thereby saved Bishop Williams and his family.

The origin of Hau-hauism we take to have been political; Mr. Gudgeon thinks otherwise. It is not our business in this paper to enter into religious disputes; we shall content ourselves with quoting Mr. Gudgeon's statement of the case. "An agreement (he says, p. 23) was entered into that the Church of England Missionary Society should occupy and evangelise the upper half of North Island, and the Wesleyan the lower; and this agreement was strictly adhered to for some years, in fact, until a Bishop of New Zealand was appointed, who carried the doctrines of his own Church through the whole island, invading the Wesleyan territories, and preached their condemnation, telling the Maoris that they (the Wesleyans) had no authority even to baptise, but were the grievous wolves spoken of in Scripture." Mr. Gudgeon then refers to the Rev. Hanson Turton's correspondence with Bishop Selwyn (see Brown's *New Zealand*), in the course of which the question was asked and not

answered: "Who gave the bishop this authority that he denied to others?" Other sects came in, each condemning the rest, and each eager for converts; and to the scandal of their rivalry Mr. Gudgeon attributes the rise of Hau-hauism. We think the desire to preserve their land, on which their existence depended, from the greed of speculating Pakehas, so worked on the excitable feelings of the Maoris as to rouse them to religious frenzy. No wonder they rejected our religion, while they saw us acting so contrary to its precepts. It is remarkable that while rejecting Christianity they went (as the Taepings are also said to have done) to the Bible as the source of their new faith.

Bishop Williams's work had been round Poverty Bay, which, at the time of the outbreak, Mr. Gudgeon says was "one vast orchard, all the fruit even now exported being from trees planted by Maoris." It was then rich in wheat crops and cattle and horses, and was peopled by three tribes who were progressing rapidly in wealth and civilisation. To them came Kereopa, and in spite of all the bishop's efforts, persuaded them to join the Hau-hau sect, and to hoist the flag of the war-god.

We cannot follow Mr. Gudgeon through details trifling enough, but showing a most lamentable state of things. His hero M'Donnell, who, he says, "had no fear of Exeter Hall before his eyes," was accused by Messrs. Graham and Parris of needless violence and cruelty at Pokaikai, which was surprised one intensely cold night, and the *whares* (huts) burned, and those who were escaping from them fired upon. Mr. Gudgeon thinks them wholly unworthy of credit. Of one he says: "As for Mr. Parris, the force had the same opinion of him as Captain Chute in 1866 when he requested him to clear out of the camp on short notice." There certainly seems to have been some firing on surrendered prisoners; and the Government defence minister checked the eagerness of the volunteers by an edict that no operation was to be undertaken without Government orders except for self-defence. M'Donnell's early morning surprises so disgusted his enemies that they called him "a rat that moves only by night."

The East coast was soon reduced, mainly by the help of Kopu, a Wairoa chief whose tribe went two ways. The help was invaluable; but it is sickening to read that "the friendlies having been successful in the killing line, alarmed our camp by a terrific war-dance." The dense bu h round Mount Egmont, with a *terai* (to use an Indian word) of scrub, flax,

and fern, was a far harder fighting-ground; and General Chute's expedition from Manutahi, east of New Plymouth, near Sentry Hill, across to the Waimata landing, was beset with difficulties.

How general was the feeling against us is shown by the conduct of the Hawke's Bay tribes. They had not sold their land, but had leased it at a high rent to private Pakehas; their well-cleared country was not suitable for the war of ambushes in which the Maori delights. Yet at last they rose, only to get a crushing defeat, our numbers being at least four times theirs.* In spite of this there now began for us a tide of ill-success, connected with the appearance of Te Kooti, the most remarkable man who came to the front on the native side. He had been our friend, but had been collared by one of the "friendly" chiefs and accused of intercourse with the enemy. Another accusation was made against him by some settlers (falsely, Mr. Gudgeon thinks); for the men with whom he was said to have had dealings were a hundred miles off. However, he was sent prisoner to the Chatham Isles, and there organised a wonderful escape for himself and his fellow prisoners. They overpowered the whites; held possession of the islands for several days, hurting no one, save one man who would insist on attacking them, treating our women and children with chivalrous tenderness. It may be doubted (confesses Mr. Gudgeon) whether Europeans would have behaved more moderately in like circumstances. They then seized a schooner and forced the crew to navigate it to Poverty Bay. The wind was contrary; they cast lots, and threw an old man overboard, like another Jonah, and at last got safely to their chosen landing place.

By Te Kooti's advice the Maoris left off endeavouring to defend their *pahs* and took to bush-fighting. Our reverses then began. In a skirmish with the Te-Ngutus in the bush west of Waihi, Von Tempsky, a soldier of fortune who had been the soul of the volunteer horse, was killed, along with a fifth of the whole force engaged. By-and-by Major Hunter, serving under Colonel Whitmore, was killed, and a quarter of those engaged were killed or wounded.

Te Kooti stained the successes, some of which he inspired, in others of which he shared, by massacring thirty-three settlers and thirty-seven "friendlies" at Poverty Bay. The

* The numbers of the Maoris were always surprisingly small. General Cameron never had (we are told) more than 700; nor had Chute more than 400 in arms against him.

tide then turned; he was defeated with great loss. "Surrender," said Major Biggs. "No; God has given us arms and liberty, and I am but an instrument in His hands carrying out His instructions." Then followed the lamentable murders of Lieutenant and Mrs. Gascoigne and their three children, and of the Rev. W. Whiteley, of whom Mr. Gudgeon says: "He was not one of those missionaries who think it necessary to abuse their own country-people, and therefore he was respected by the natives."

Te Kooti was driven to great straits; but he took advantage of a storm on Lake Moana, round which there was much fighting, to re-establish his authority as a prophet of God. The fighting against him now gradually dropped into the hands of the Kupapa (native contingent), and his hair-breadth escapes were marvellous. They often came upon his warm trail. Once he was left with eight men; once his wife was captured while cooking his supper. The hunt went on "through the black-birch forest where hardly a rat can live, and where the traveller will rarely see a bird or an insect." The chief hunter was Rapata, with that half of the Ngatiporou tribe (near East Cape) which had sided with us. The story is not edifying. We cannot patiently read (p. 319) of a girl-prisoner killed in cold blood, or of a "friendly" flourishing about with a prisoner's head. We can conceive no system better suited to degrade the friendly natives and prepare them for certain extinction. Mr. Gudgeon lets us into the secret when he says that after Von Tempsky's death "the liquor had to be stopped;" Dieffenbach notes that the Maoris are remarkable among savages for their strong dislike to alcoholic drinks: "it takes a long apprenticeship to make them endure the taste." How sad to think that, through the agency of Christian civilisers, they were, in less than twenty-five years, so changed that spirit-drinking was one of the bribes to keep them on our side.

Te Kooti finally got off; in August, 1871, he and Kereopa were together; the prophet was captured, but the chief slipped through Captain Porter's hands into "the king's country," the still independent part of Maori-land.

To show the character of the pursuit and of the men engaged in it we cannot forbear giving a short extract from Rapata's journal of the hunt after Te Kooti. "Perhaps we shall all die from cold and snow brought by south wind. No: we will not die from the cold; if we were the descendants of Ruaimoko we might do so, but we are the offspring of Tongia,

who thought only of wearing rough warm clothing. Ruaimoko was lazy and cared only for fine clothes, so that the women might take a fancy to his party. When he got near Hikurangi mountain he was pursued by Tongia, who found the whole party frozen to death. Their bones lie there to this day. It is from thinking of our ancestor that I make these remarks. His thoughtfulness has descended to us who now carry tents and warm clothing, by means of which alone we could carry out this great work. Perhaps some of our friends think it is only the ordinary work of a campaign. Can this be decided by those who live in comfortable houses? No; the magnitude of the work can only be ascertained by treading it with the feet."

Mr. Gudgeon's closing paragraph echoes the words of Sir Donald M'Lean, the Defence Minister: "Wait; no more war yet." He writes that Sir George Grey has settled out there, and that in February, 1878, he had an interview with the king, Tawhiao. Persuasion, he thinks, is best, along with a simpler way of buying lands—though what way he would suggest he does not tell us.

We have left ourselves little room for the other books on our list. We call special attention to that of Mr. Dieffenbach, because he saw the country when immigration was only beginning, and because, as an outsider, he was able to give a disinterested opinion of the native character. Things would have been very different had colonists imitated him in scrupulous care for native feelings. Mr. Buller's book there is less need that we should notice, because it is likely to be in the hands of many of our readers; it is a plain, unvarnished account of a life's labour in the cause of God. We do not go along with the writer in his low estimate of the natives—though even he allows that in many instances they showed wonderful self-sacrifice. Sensuality and cruelty are, alas, in human nature and therefore are sure to come out—not more in Maoris than in other heathens. Mr. Buller's hearty appreciation of the labours of other denominations does him great credit, as does the way in which he avoids unpleasant reference to the disputes with the Church of England. His illustrations of New Zealand scenery are very interesting.

To return to Mr. Gudgeon, we find, among other strange assertions, the following most amusing instance of a *non-sequitur*: "The natives, finding that the more they demanded the more they obtained, the chiefs being mostly native assessors with good salaries, finished by entering into a league, proclaimed

a king, and declined to sell any more land." We marvel to find Mr. Gudgeon giving it as an instance of Maori shrewdness that just when their chiefs were drawing large salaries and their land was bringing more than it was worth, they should throw up the whole affair and put a sudden end to their gains. The fact is that, in spite of those gains, the far-sighted among them began to discern that as things were going on their own extinction was but a question of time, and so they tried the only possible remedy, seeing that the fair-spoken Government arrangements had proved delusive. Whether it will prove an effectual remedy or not must depend partly on the Christian temper of the settlers, partly on the action of the Government. If Government insists on peace between white man and Maori, and when the pinch comes and settlers are anxious to swarm over the yet unoccupied lands, distinctly forbids extension, then the Maoris may be preserved, educated in European culture, and eventually absorbed in a peaceful way. But if continuous colonisation is permitted on the plea that the reserves are needlessly large and that the wants of the immigrants are pressing, we shall have the same farce repeated in New Zealand which has so often sickened the Christian world in North America. The native will be told to give up a part of what he still retains; and then, by-and-by, to give up yet more; till at last, after a war of extermination, if indeed he still retains spirit enough to fight, what yet remains will be wrested from him, and the Chatham Isles will become the Maori Flinder's Island, the pitiable dying-out-ground of a race worthy of better things. This will be a sad end indeed to all that has been done by devoted Christian effort in an island where it was at one time sincerely hoped that the problem had been successfully solved of Christianising and civilising the native race without exterminating it.

A few words more upon the land question. Those who think that the Maori tribal system was nothing but the childish whim of savages, should read M. Laveleye or Sir H. S. Maine on early village communities. They will then learn that the tribal system, as opposed to individual proprietorship, has been, nay is, the rule over the greater part of the world.

"But the Maoris had a great deal more than they could use; and, therefore, we were justified in taking some from them." This needs qualification. No tribe occupied at one time all its land; but when Lieut. Gudgeon saysthe uncultivated

lands of New Zealand were nothing but barren fern wastes and bush, which the natives offered in miles to the first settlers for a blanket or a gun, he leaves out several needful qualifications. First, the fern wastes were by no means barren; every farmer knows that land must be rich to carry fern. And though, as he remarks, the Maoris had no hunting grounds, there being no wild animals except the rat, and no eatable birds since the moa was killed out save the parrot and the pigeon, and they did not care to till more than their garden patches, their system of tillage nevertheless involved the possession of a large surface of good ground. Their plan was to exhaust the soil close to the pah, and then to shift their quarters, building another pah and breaking up fresh ground, and so on, till having gone through all the best land belonging to the tribe they would find the original patch in good heart after a long fallow. Next as to selling land. It is not likely that men who were accustomed to the system just described would barter away their land recklessly: and further it is highly improbable that when the first settlers came among them the Maoris could form any notion of alienating land by absolute sale. A drunken Maori might, after rubbing noses with his white tempter, profess to sell him what the other so much coveted; but, even if the drunken man knew what he was about, he was doing what he had no right to do, for land among the New Zealanders was as much a tribal possession as it was among our Aryan forefathers.

This is a point that can never be too often insisted on. The modern English ideas about land are very modern as well as very limited in their acceptance. Among the Jews, as we see from the case of the daughters of Zelophehad, individual ownership was not allowed to stand against tribal right. The old Celts and Germans looked on all land as the property of the tribe, managed by the chief in the interest of all. In later times the king took the chief's place; and English law long recognised the king as paramount owner of all the soil in England, in trust, of course, for the nation. Hence, the whole system of fiefs, all land being held as a benefice in consideration for certain services.

Among the Maoris tribal ownership had not yet been modified even by feudalism; and to talk of a man selling (as we understand selling) land for a blanket or a gun betrays an ignorance as dense as that of Colonel Wakefield, alluded to above.

Hence many of the early treaties made by our Government were based on a mistake. No doubt we meant well for the Maoris, while we were certainly not indifferent to our own interests. It is something that in one instance at least a Christian nation, as a nation, imitated the policy of the Quakers in Pennsylvania. We did not assume that the whole island belonged to us by right of our inborn superiority, and (in Mr. Gudgeon's words), "then deal out the benefits of civilisation as they could comprehend and enjoy them." What these benefits are to aborigines, the Maoris might learn from the case of Tasmania. "We made a treaty acknowledging them as lords of the soil, and they agreed to sell their land as the Government required it for immigration purposes." In making such a treaty the Maoris could have no clear idea of what they were doing; they knew nothing of England, its resources, its teeming population; as to immigration, at most they would expect a few settlers such as were their own forefathers when, not so many generations before they had come into the island. Such a settlement they would have welcomed, for it would have brought them the arts of life without crushing them out by pressure of numbers. But, when they saw the scale on which the immigration was going on, when they saw the land around Auckland and the other towns wholly Europeanised and felt themselves being edged out in all directions, they would feel that though the treaty was being kept in word, it was broken in spirit—was interpreted by the Pakehas as something very different from what they had intended. Hence, looking at the matter from a Maori point of view, we see that land disputes and land wars were inevitable, unless the immigration had been (as we hold it ought to have been) strictly limited in numbers. Either these people were or they were not put by God into our hands to be first Christianised and then raised to a higher level of civilisation, and made (as they are fully capable of being) our equals in the world's work. If not, there was no need for treaties. "Supply and demand" should have been left to do their work. There was the supply of land, and the demand for it was strong enough among those who had no hope of finding a living at home. But, if we felt ourselves to be God's stewards in dealing with these His less favoured children, we should have taken care to make our stewardship a reality and not a sham. As it is, the Maoris had to teach us, during a grievous war of nearly fifteen years—a war which did very much to upset all the

missionary work,—that they were not going to be got rid of with impunity. For this very reason, no doubt, they have been far better treated than any other aborigines. Government honestly meant in most instances to give them a fair price for their land; but no price could be fair under such conditions, for to sell their land would be to give up the future of their race. Even to lease it must be a somewhat dangerous experiment. A tribe that had advantageously leased their land would be sorely tempted to live on their rents, in idleness and debauchery, instead of devoting themselves to industry of some kind. Uncivilised races are relatively mere children, and must be dealt with paternally. The one way to save the remnant of the Maoris (and it is certainly not to our credit that they are only a remnant) is to protect them as well against themselves and the consequences of their own folly as against the too rapid influx of whites. By-and-by they will be able to bear this influx—able to hold their own in the competition which the presence of whites among them will bring. By-and-by, too, the race of half-castes, of which Dr. Dieffenbach speaks in such high terms, will, we hope, have multiplied. But at present, surely, our duty is to insist on the Maori kingdom being not further circumscribed. This is our duty as Christians; and, further, it is for us a matter of national honour. Our self-complacency would be rudely shaken could we hear how French and Germans contrast our loud professions of Christianity with the actual results in Tasmania and through all the South Pacific. We have only to see what a calm philosopher, M. de Quatrefages, says about us in his recent book on *The Human Species*.

It will be no use pleading, when the Maoris are extinct, that they were unimprovable, and we could not help their destruction; for they are improvable, and we can help it if we will. If not, we must admit that our Christianity is useless in regulating our relations with other races.

ART. VII.—*Il Buddha, Confucio e Lao-Tse: notizie e Studii intorno alle Religione dell' Asia Orientale.* Di CARLO PUINI. Firenze: Sansom. 1878.

2. *Chips from a German Workshop.* By MAX MULLER, M.A. Volume I. *Essays on the Science of Religion.* Longmans.

3. *Buddhism: Being a Sketch of the Life and Teachings of Gautama, the Buddha.* By T. W. RHYS DAVIDS. of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-Law, and late of the Ceylon Civil Service. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge.

FROM the earliest times when the doctrines and dogmas of the religion of Sakyamuni began to be studied it has been disputed, and the dispute is not yet at an end, what the Buddhists mean by their Nirvana, the name they give to the final destiny reserved for man. Some interpret the word as the total extinction of every kind of existence; others, on the contrary, desirous to defend Buddhism, so deeply compromised as an atheistic system, from the monstrous doctrine of those who make the death of the body the death of the soul, would make the word signify a certain form of existence possible only after death: an existence that is of absolute rest from the turmoil of changeful and passionate being. Some learned students of comparative religion deny that the founder of Buddhism ever taught the dogma of annihilation, and assert that this was afterwards introduced by a modern school; others, equally learned, invert the hypothesis, insisting that Sakyamuni taught the absolute extinction of being, and that the modern schools of thought which sprang up from contact with various races introduced the innovation of an eternal Nirvana of untroubled existence. It certainly is admitted by all who have authority on this subject, that the founder, in his preaching, omitted the Uncreated and Eternal Being, and that his system may be called atheistic; but they admit also that later schools of the system (reverting back to Brahmanism) introduced the idea of a supreme intelligence, the Creator of the universe.

Down to the first century of the Christian era the doctrines taught by Gautama had been, according to

tradition, transmitted orally for more than four hundred years, and faithfully preserved in this secret teaching. Buddhism had already established itself in a great part of Northern India, in Cashmire, in some parts of Central Asia, and in Ceylon, when it was thought the fitting time to give a written form to the teachings of this philosopher. The Buddhists of the north—that is, those of India and Cashmire—and the Buddhists of the south, or of Ceylon, undertook the compilation of the sacred Scriptures; but independently of each other. In Ceylon that compilation was made under the reign of the Vartagamani (88—76 B.C.), and the Singhalese vernacular was probably adopted for it, from which, in the fifth century of an era, it was translated into Pali, the sacred language of the Buddhists of the south. In the north the undertaking began later, and took effect in the time of the synod convoked by the king Kanishka, who reigned in Cashmire 10—40 A.D., using in the compilation the Sanscrit tongue. The primitive Buddhism maintained its original form distinct from all other systems, during the first two centuries of its existence. From that time, it separated into various schools, springing from the philosophical speculations of the many Brahmans who espoused the new doctrine; and this was in part the reason that some of these schools were confused, as to their metaphysical teachings, with others of India. This might easily be foreseen, when we consider the tendency there was in the proselytes of Sakyamuni, not contented with the simple truth announced by him, to elaborate new theories which should adapt themselves to Buddhism and wear its appearance. In the sequel, when Buddhism, having gone beyond India, established its dominion in Thibet, in China, in Mongolia, in Japan, it found itself in the midst of new beliefs; and its tolerant nature led it to accept modifications by no means indifferent, which took from it much of its primitive character. The place where it underwent fewest alterations through internal influences, and where it consequently maintained itself in most purity, was Ceylon, whence it was introduced into Burmah and Siam. There, beyond any other region, we may find true accounts of the original Buddhist doctrine: preserved by a body of clergy which Childers calls "one of the most enlightened, generous, and liberal-minded in the world." But the Buddhism professed by the northern nations, besides being impregnated at the outset

with many Brahmanical ideas, appropriated a vast number of popular superstitions and beliefs.

Hence, Buddhism may be divided into three periods: first, the primitive form it assumed in the preaching of Sakyamuni; secondly, the period when it began to elaborate philosophical doctrines, which made it approximate to Brahmanism; and, thirdly, the later period when, besides the Brahmanical symbolism, it incorporated endless superstitions which reigned in the regions to which it had been carried. The Buddhist system which bears the name of Hinayana corresponds pretty nearly to the first period; that is, to the period of the undiluted teaching of Gautama. The elements of that teaching are given in the volume of Signor Puini, with great fulness; and, as our present subject cannot be understood without placing it in relation to Buddha and Buddhism generally, we shall condense our author's sketch mostly in his own words freely translated:

"Buddhism is at this day professed by a third part of the human race; and under its beneficial influence the ferocious nomads of Central Asia became civilised and social. Many peoples owe to it all their culture, civil and moral. India owes to it that great reformation by means of which, resisting all the persecutions of the most arrogant clergy in the world, was proclaimed the perfect equality of men, and the utter abolition of caste. However strange and absurd may seem some of its dogmas to us in the West, we ought to make ourselves acquainted with a system which has played so long so prominent a part in the moral and civil history of Asiatic peoples. Buddhism, says a modern writer, is the vastest religious system of the world; and it embraces all those branches of science which Western nations have been accustomed to regard as summing up human knowledge. It is indubitable that Buddhism, exploring the free mystery of nature, brought to light many truths which Western science discovered much later. As to the plurality of worlds, and their formation, it anticipated by two thousand years the nebular hypothesis, and in its researches into the cosmic life of this earth it intuitively perceived not a few of the results of modern astronomy and geology.

"But the question may be asked if the doctrines of Sakyamuni and their development constitute a religion or a philosophy. If we consider Buddhism as it is in the countries which it now pervades, if we look at its temples, convents, idols, altars, priests, if we cast our eyes on the worship of the superstitious and ignorant crowds, it must appear to be a religion. But, although behind the dogmas, ceremonies, and absurd beliefs of the present

Buddhist system, we may still perceive, in more or less corrupt forms, the fundamental forms of the Buddhas original doctrine, yet it is plain that the Buddhism which is professed by four hundred millions of men in the present day, is very far from being that which issued from the mind of Sakya Muni."

Hence the importance of studying the system in the earliest written documents, and of separating them from the enormous mass of its subsequent literature. And in studying them it must appear to the thoughtful mind that it was a philosophy which aimed to conduct men to a state of purity and ideal perfection. Viewed as a religion it is the most grotesque religious system the world has ever known. It knows no divinity, admits no creator, denies a soul capable of proper and eternal existence, regards life as the sum of all misery, and exhibits as its supreme good, and the only reward of men who are counted worthy of it, an eternal rest, whence the aliment of life is banished, and where all the energies of body and soul are for ever suppressed. Whatever that ultimate goal may have been in the mind of the founder of this system, it included no personal active existence either before a personal god or within His essence; and in every variety of form it taught the suppression of conscious activity and enjoyment. Such a system must needs be one of the greatest wonders to men generally, and a perpetual enigma to the philosophic student: a doctrine that places Nothing at the end of many successive existences, nevertheless subdued the hearts of some of the fiercest tribes of Asia, set multitudes of men on the severest pursuit of virtue, and some centuries before Christ inculcated the brotherhood of mankind and the perfect love of the neighbour.

"The Buddhist faith sprang from the sorrow and despair of life. The ancient and general lamentation sent up by man showed that he did not count himself the most perfect of beings. But, among all those who have sent up this profound lamentation, among all those who have bewailed the distresses of men, no man conceived of sorrow in a way so grand as Sakya Muni; no one equalled him in the deep feeling of human infelicity. Like the elegiac psalmody of a whole race immersed in thick melancholy, Buddhism bewailed the miseries of life, the fleeting nature of joy, the vain hopes which recede further and further, and leave the human soul in bitter and cruel disenchantment. It aimed to calm, to destroy, to annul the misery inherent in human nature, under whatever form life may manifest itself; its ambi-

tion was to liberate humanity on the largest scale. The Buddha consecrated himself supremely to this. The means which he adopted to attain this end, Nirvana, or the extinction of being, may seem to many a monstrous and frightful theory, incompatible with the ideas of our race, contrary to those aspirations which our psychology has not hesitated to call a universal sentiment of mankind, but it was not on that account less really the true, only, and inevitable consequence of its system. As to the Buddha himself, we are bound to confess that, notwithstanding the errors into which he fell, there never was a man in the world, save Jesus, who so much loved mankind as he did; so much sympathised with its sorrows, and so entirely gave himself up first to ameliorate and then to end its troubles. 'Reading the details of the life of Sakya Muni,' says Bigaudet, vicar apostolic of Ava and Pegu, 'it it is impossible not to be reminded of many of the actions of the life of our Saviour. The Christian system and the Buddhist have an extraordinary resemblance, in spite of the abyss that separates them; and the assertion ought not to be held inconsiderate, that many of the moral truths which adorn the Gospel are found in the Buddhist Scriptures."

Our object is not to treat of Buddhism in general as a system of metaphysics or theology, nor to examine the history whether of its founder or of its subsequent sects. But a few words may be spent upon both by way of necessary introduction, and we cannot do better than borrow from Professor Max Müller a few sentences, which we shall take the liberty of selecting and combining into one paragraph.

"Buddha, or more correctly the Buddha—for Buddha is an appellative meaning enlightened—was born at Kapilavastu, the capital of a kingdom of the same name, situated at the foot of the mountains of Nepal, north of the present Oude. His father, the King of Kapilavastu, was of the family of the Sakyas, and belonged to the clan of the Gautamas. The name of Buddha, or the Buddha, dates from a later period of his life, and so probably does the name Siddharta (he whose deeds have been accomplished), though we are told that it was given him in his childhood. . . . . The child grew up a most beautiful and most accomplished boy, who soon knew more than his master could teach him. He refused to take part in the games of his playmates, and never felt so happy as when he could sit alone, lost in meditation in the deep shadows of the forest. It was there that his father found him when he had thought him lost; and, in order to prevent the young prince from becoming a dreamer, the king determined to marry him at once. When the subject was mentioned by the aged ministers to the future heir to the throne,

he demanded seven days for reflection, and, convinced at last that not even marriage could disturb the calm of his mind, he allowed the ministers to look out for a princess. Their marriage proved one of the happiest, but the prince remained, as he had been before, absorbed in meditation in the problems of life and death. 'Nothing is stable on earth, he used to say;' 'nothing is real, life is like the spark produced by wood. It is lighted, and is extinguished: we know not whence it came and whither it goes. There must be some supreme intelligence where we could find rest. If I attained it, I could bring light to man; if I were free myself, I could deliver the world.'"

Here is the germ of his whole doctrine. Multitudes of legends embellish the account of his final determination to forsake the world and betake himself to contemplation and the separation of his soul from all phenomenal things.

"Making every possible allowance for the accumulation of fiction which is sure to gather round the life of the founder of every great religion, we may be satisfied that Buddhism, which changed the aspect not only of India, but of nearly the whole of Asia, had a real founder; that he was not a Brahman by birth, but belonged to the second or royal caste; that, being of a meditative turn of mind, and deeply impressed with the frailty of all created things, he became a recluse, and sought for light and comfort in the different systems of Brahman philosophy and theology. Dissatisfied with the artificial systems of their priests and philosophers, convinced of the uselessness, nay of the pernicious influence, of their ceremonial practices and bodily penances, shocked, too, by their worldliness and pharisaical conceit, which made the priesthood the exclusive property of one caste, and rendered every approach of man to his Creator impossible without their intervention, Buddha must have produced at once a powerful impression on the people at large, when, breaking through all the established rules of caste, he assumed the privileges of a Brahman, and, throwing away the splendour of his royal position, travelled about as a beggar, not shrinking from the defiling contact of publicans and sinners. Though, when we now speak of Buddhism, we think chiefly of its doctrines, the reform of Buddha had originally much more of a social than of a religious character. Buddha swept away the web with which the Brahmans had encircled the whole of India. Beginning as the destroyer of an old he became the founder of a new religion. . . . . The most important element of the Buddhist reform has always been its social and moral code, not its metaphysical theories. That moral code, taken by itself, is one of the most perfect which the world has ever known. On this point all testimonies, from hostile and from friendly quarters agree, and hence Hardy, a Wesleyan missionary,

speaking of the Dhamma Padan, or the 'Footsteps of the Law,' admits that a collection might be made from the precepts of this work which in the purity of its ethics could hardly be equalled from any other heathen author. M. Laboulaye remarks: 'It is difficult to comprehend how men not assisted by revelation could have soared so high, and approached so near the truth.' Besides the five great commandments not to kill, not to commit adultery, not to lie, not to get drunk, every shade of vice, hypocrisy, anger, pride, suspicion, greediness, gossiping, cruelty to animals, is guarded against by special precepts. Among the virtues recommended we find not only reverence of parents, care for children, submission to authority, gratitude, moderation in time of prosperity, submission in time of trial, equanimity at all times, but virtues unknown in any heathen system of morality, such as the duty of forgiving insults, and not rewarding evil with evil. All virtues, we are told, spring from Maitri, and this Maitri can only be translated by charity and love. 'I do not hesitate,' says Burnouf, 'to translate by charity the word Maitri; it does not express friendship or the feeling of particular affection which man has for one or more of his fellow-creatures, but that universal feeling which inspires us with goodwill towards all men and constant willingness to help them.' We add one more testimony from the work of M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire: 'I do not hesitate to add that, save Christ alone, there is none among the founders of religion that presents a figure more pure and more touching than that of Buddha. His life has no stain. His constant heroism equals his conviction; and, if the theory he preaches is false, the personal examples he gives are irreproachable. He is the finished model of all the virtues he proclaims; his abnegation, his charity, his unalterable sweetness, are not belied a single moment. He abandons at nineteen the court of the king his father to become a religious and a mendicant, he silently prepares his doctrine during six years of retreat and meditation; he propagates it by the sole power of word and persuasion during more than half a century; and, when he dies in the arms of his disciples, it is with the serenity of a sage who has practised piety all his life, and is assured of having found the truth."

To this we shall return. Meanwhile it is desirable to consider the relation of Gautama to the state of things by which he was surrounded. India presented at the time of Gautama Buddha a state of things very much like that of Greece in the time of Socrates and Plato, when rival schools and philosophers everywhere encountered each other. Celebrated Brahmans gathered around them numerous disciples. Not a few sages, in order to reach perfection in science and morals, lived in hermitages, far from

the impure converse of society, dedicating themselves to meditation and the contemplation of nature; men of the Brahmin caste were distinguished as priests or sacrificers, and wise men or philosophers. The former conducted all religious functions, had wives, and were heads of families. The philosophers lived for the most part in celibacy, removed far from the world in woods and hermitages. Their religion was of a different stamp from that of the priests; it took the form of a secret doctrine imparted mysteriously to disciples carefully chosen. Three fundamental dogmas lay at the foundation of this religion: The creation of the world, the existence of one supreme spirit pervading the universe, and the transmigration of souls. The one end to which these Indian philosophers directed their aims was to purify their spirit by delivering it from human passions, by rendering it superior to pleasures and pains, indifferent to everything that moves the human heart, and worthy to be at last received into the unspeakable and imperishable joys which await the pure in the bosom of the supreme spirit who penetrates and glorifies every place in the universe. In order to this they lived temperate and chaste lives, mortifying the flesh and living on vegetables which themselves gathered, or on the alms which their neighbours might bring them. Such were the Brahmans of the time of Gautama and Alexander the Great.

In the Punjaub and in the Valley of the Ganges there was a great number of these philosophers and anchorites. The most eminent of these attracted disciples, who placed themselves under discipline, while many of them went into the populous cities to seek proselytes and expound their doctrine. Hence arose the many schools in which were elaborated those systems of philosophy for which India has been famous from hoar antiquity. Siddharta, the son of a king, or Gautama, afterwards the Buddha, was himself one of them; and his whole system was a new school which aimed at the reformation of Brahmanism. He first retired into privacy, and then spent his life in wandering as a missionary of his own doctrine. With his life and history we have not here to do. Suffice that he won great success, saw kings and Brahmans converted, and was recognised by the poor and afflicted as their saviour. He made no pretence to supernatural aid, nor did he declare himself clothed with Divine authority. His desire was to be a sage and not a God; and the people

called him Buddha, or the Wise, because they reputed him the most instructed of men. "The Buddha," says Koepen, "is a man, and nothing more than a man; not the incarnation of any celestial being. His wisdom was not revealed to him from above, nor revealed to him by any god, but was the fruit of his own meditative nature." So Burnouf writes: "He lived, and taught, and died as a philosopher; and his humanity was a fact so incontestably acknowledged by all, that the legendists, to whom miracles were so easy, had no idea of making him a god after his death. There are few faiths that repose on so small a number of dogmas and impose fewer sacrifices on common sense. I speak here particularly of the Buddhism that seems to me the most ancient of the human Buddhism, if I may venture so to term it, which consists almost entirely of some very simple rules of morality.

But, in proportion as Sakyamuni himself receded into the distance, the doctrine concerning him assumed other proportions, lost its human simplicity, and elevated him above mortals in the eyes of his adorers. The Buddha of the Hinayana, that is of Buddhism primitive, is no other than the only man who, until then, had been able to liberate himself from the sufferings of existence, which the Buddhists call Sansara, or, as we should say, the world; the only man who had been able to effect the annihilation of himself; to deliver himself from transmigration, and from the penalty of any future birth. He was not the sovereign of the universe, nor did he become so after death and Nirvana. But the Buddha of the Mahayana is a very different personage. He is in communion with all worlds of which the Buddhist universe is composed, and did not lose his own personality, not even after death. Moreover, the new Buddhism peoples its universe with an infinite multitude of Buddhas. It admits, contrary to the primitive doctrine, that an Arrhat, or eminent saint, after being immersed in Nirvana, remains still in the world for the instruction of men; to excite their imitation, and to unfold to them the deep mysteries of the Buddhist law. Yet these diverse Buddhas are not themselves, even in that system, creators or governors of the universe.

Returning, however, to the original Gautama on his way to Buddhaship, we find him adopting the great principles that had always regulated Indian philosophy, but giving them an altogether new direction. To liberate the soul from

sense, and the dominion of the unreal world of illusion, and to cut off the entail of transmigration, had been long the scope of Indian thought, whether in the Vedanta or in the Samkhya. Signor Puini gives us the following vivid sketch of the first dawn of Buddhism in the mind of the Buddha:

"We have now reached that crisis in the life of Siddharta at which the legends invest him with the quality of Buddha, placing him finally in possession of the longed-for science that he had been seeking for seven years. It was under the shade of the gigantic *Ficus religiosa*, the ornament of the forests of India, that, according to the canonical scriptures, the Prince of Kapilavastu was transformed into the Buddha, or the Sage of sages, in possession of the true doctrine which alone could 'deliver human souls from the ocean of transmigration, and conduct them to a state of eternal repose and quiet.' The legend preserves the words which he pronounced on the act of becoming Buddha, and he felt the truth revealed to him, 'I have gone through infinite existences, seeking the architect of this receptacle of concupiscence which is called man, and in sorrow have always been born again. At last I see thee and know thee, O maker of life! and thou shalt no more make for me the tabernacle of passions and appetites. I will lay aside thy ornaments, I will destroy thy stones. My mind reposes for ever; every desire is stilled in my heart.' For seven days the Buddha remained in this place in continual meditation, reasoning out in himself the principal points of the doctrine and the few principles which run through the Bhuddist writings. He asked himself first, "What is the cause of all the miseries and sorrows which afflict man? It is no other than existence. And the cause of existence? Love. And love springs from desire and concupiscence in the senses which are moved and disturbed by that which is in the world. But if that which is in the world begets in the senses concupiscence, love, life, grief, it is because man looks at the world with an infirm mind and a false judgment. Ignorance, therefore, is the cause of the evils that afflict mankind; *from ignorance springs the world and all that it contains.* The knowledge that has dissipated in me every illusion, as light dissipates darkness, has shown me all things in their reality, and I have seen the vanity of all that surrounds me. Meanwhile, there is nothing in the universe but affliction and sorrow. All beings, miserably held in the vortex of life, are driven hither and thither by the disorderly waves of concupiscence, attracted by fallacious appearances towards objects which never satisfy their desires. Knowledge alone can save humanity. The knowledge to which the Buddha ascribed so much value and power has its foundation in the *Four Noble Truths* so familiar in Buddhism: (1) Sorrow as the inheritance of all beings, in whatever condition

of life they may be found (gods, man, animals, and demons); (2) the infinite number of desires and passions which fill the heart of the living is the cause of sorrow; (3) the destruction of passions and desires is the sole means of salvation; (4) the destruction of the passions and desires is found in Nirvana, or in the destruction of being. Such was the result reached by his long study and meditation. This was the basis on which was built the hinge on which revolved the whole Buddhist system. The tree under which Siddharta meditated and formulated the fundamental truths of his doctrine was called *The Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil*, as its Indian name was translated by P. Georgi, *The Tree of Bodhi*. It is supposed to exist still, and is the object of great devotion."

It has been seen that the fourth of the noble truths prescribes the way in which to reach Nirvana. The moral way consisted in eight things, which give the main principles of Buddhist morality. But the physical way—if it may be so called—was the series of existences through which the soul must pass in order to its final detachment from all things sensible and material, which final detachment is the indispensable condition of attaining the final state. It is necessary, therefore, to consider what our Buddhist doctrine of transmigration meant.

Metempsychosis, or rather transmigration, is one of the fundamental dogmas of all Buddhism. And this must be rightly understood if we would rightly understand the system generally, and its Nirvana. It is common in its principle to Buddhism and Brahmanism. But there is a remarkable difference between the metempsychosis of the latter and what may be called the metamorphosis of the former. In the Brahminical system the soul of existence, which is only a part of the universal soul, clothes different bodies in successive states of being, until, purged through successive transmigrations through all the forms of creation, it is led back to the supreme essence from which it was taken. In this the individual being is confounded as a drop of water which falls into the ocean; it loses its individuality and forms part of the divine substance of Brahm. The Buddhist metempsychosis is not the transmigration of the soul or spirit through various bodies, as the Brahmins and the Pythagoreans taught. Buddhism affirms, on the contrary, that after death the spirit perishes with the body; but that out of the complete dissolution of the individual there is born another being which will be animal, or man, or deva, according to its merits; that is, according to the

actions it had done in the life past. In the language of the Buddhists, transmigration is occasioned or regulated by the efficacy of merits or demerits, to which the name Karma is given; but this efficacy is of such a nature that a being which has reached the term of life does not transmit anything of its own entity to the individual immediately reproduced by the quality of its action. This last is a totally distinct entity, independent of the former; created, it is true, by the influence of the merits or demerits of the former, but yet having nothing in common with it. The Karma, or influence of merits and demerits, produces the creature, like a moral fate, just as the fruits, which may be good or evil, produce trees totally distinct the one from the other. This is a marvellous doctrine, and one which requires to the Western mind almost a new metaphysical sense to understand it. Its originator, the Buddha himself, thus illustrates it by figures: "One lamp may be kindled by means of another. Being kindled, the two are quite distinct; but the second has its light from the first, and without it could not have been kindled. The tree produces the fruit, and from that fruit another tree grows, and so forth. The last tree is not, however, the same tree, while it is a consequence of the former. If that had not been, this had not been. Man is the tree; his actions are its fruit, and the vital force of the fruit is desire. Good and bad actions give their quality to the fruit, so that existence, springing from them, will be happy or unhappy; and the quality of the fruit has its effect on the plant which grows from it." Thus, on this strange theory, the souls of the living had not really an existence in other organised forms; but a being, under the influence of passion and desire, performed good or bad actions, in consequence of which, after his death, a new being is produced in a new body and a new soul. That which migrates or transmigrates is not, in fact, the spirit, the soul, the I, but as it were the conduct and the character of the man. The living universe is created by the works of its occupants: it is simply the effect of these.

But what does Buddhism say about the cause of these laborious transmigrations? Why are all creatures condemned to this inevitable law? The reply in its sacred writings is that all beings are impure and full of sin. But whence came their sin? Man, they say, from the time he appeared on this earth has given himself up to the guidance

of his desires, and run after pleasure; whence have arisen bad passions, lusts, hatred, avarice, and has fallen into all kinds of sensuality. But, once more, how was this possible? How could men thus fall into sensuality and sin unless they were so biassed from the beginning? The only reply is, that all creatures have this inclination, which comes from the sin which they have in themselves, not yet extinct, bringing it with them into the world when they are born. Sin in the present world is the consequence of the continuation of sin which came from a former world, and so on to infinity. Of the ultimate origin of this the Buddhist scriptures say absolutely nothing. They know no God whose law was broken at the outset of human history. They know no spirit independent of the body, which therefore could carry its individual guilt into another form of existence. The soul or spirit or mind, the *manas*, is only a sixth sense or element of existence, residing in the heart: it is only a resultant or consequence of the animal organism, and disappears when this disappears. Hence the same obscurity that rests upon the past rests upon the future. No man knows the future of his destiny: no man can read his own Karma. However good he may have endeavoured to be, he knows not what sins of the past, not yet expiated, await expiation in the ages to come. The Buddhist must die without hope. But he knows that there is no eternity for him, either of pleasure or of pain; since nothing is eternal but Nothing and the law of eternal mutability. On this point, however, there is great confusion in the writings. The issue of all would seem to be that the difference between the good and the evil, the wise and the unwise, is simply that the former never reach the annihilation of being. Here we may quote a Burmese account given in Bigandet, which is very suggestive:

"It is written in the Scriptures that a Brahmin went to consult Gautama on some points of knowledge as to which he was in great perplexity, and said to him: 'I am agitated by many doubts touching the past, the present, and the future. I ask myself, Have I lived in other generations? and, if so, what was my condition during these existences? The reply I make to myself is that I know nothing about anything. What was my condition before I came into this world? I know not. And is it a truth that I now exist? or is my existence nothing but a dream? Shall I live again or not? What are these beings that I see around me? Are they only illusions which delude me with the appear-

ance of reality? I know nothing about it, literally nothing. And the future is for me full of the most cruel uncertainty. What will be my condition during the existences that are to come? A dense veil hides from my eyes all that is prepared for me in the future. How may I carry a little light into the midst of so great a darkness?' And the Buddha said: 'Consider in the first place this fundamental point: that what we are wont to call our person, our I, is no other than *name* and *form*; that is to say, is only a composite of four elements, which are subject to a perpetual transformation, under the power and influence of Karma. Persuaded of this truth, you have only to know the reason that produces the *name* and the *form*. As soon as you direct your thought to what I say every doubt will pass from your mind. What a difference with the followers of other doctrines which take not the trouble to search into the nature of beings, nor the occasion of their existence! They are tenacious of their beliefs; and die saying that what the ignorant, ruled by illusion, call an animal, a king, a subject, a stone, a hand, are really animals, kings, subjects, stones. These are truly full of error; whence it comes that they follow various paths; and we reckon among them more than sixty schools are different, but all united in rejecting with equal obstinacy the true doctrine of the Buddha. These are condemned to wander unceasingly in the circle of infinite existences. How different is the condition of the true believers, our disciples! They know that the living beings which inhabit the world have a cause; but they see the folly of seeking to penetrate the origin and the first cause, which is beyond the capacity of the loftiest intelligences. To them it is evident, for example, that the seeds of a tree contain in themselves the principle of reproduction; but no one presumes to know what this principle is. Our disciples know well that what the vulgar call man, woman, animal, horse, insect, are only illusory distinctions which vanish before the eyes of the wise, who sees only in what is around him *name* and *form*, or what is produced by Karma and Avidya, or ignorance. These are not the man or the woman, but the efficient causes of them. What I say as to the man and woman may be said of all other beings. They are all the result of Karma and Avidya, and are distinct from these two agents as the effect is from the cause. Our disciples know that the five Skanda which compose the human body pass from generation to generation through the whole series of rebirths to which that is condemned; but that they pass in such a manner that the second generation holds no memory of the Skanda of the first. Only the occasions which produce them, that is Karma and Avidya, never change.'"

When it is said that these two words are the cause of all the modes of being, Avidya is objective, Karma subjective. Avidya or ignorance gives birth in the mind of the

individual to a multitude of illusions, which he regards as real forms appearing in the inhabitants of the world. Thus the things which surround him have their origin for him through himself: their true nature is revealed to him by the science of Buddha. On the other hand, if he wants to know whence he himself comes, his origin must be sought in Karma, or actions performed in another existence: thus he comes to know the reason of the condition and manner of his present being. All beings are only a composite of four elements—earth, water, air, and fire. Intellectual operations are produced by the heart, where resides the manas, as vision resides in the eye. All existence is doomed to perpetual transformation through the action of Karma. But the parts which on transmigration make up a new being have no relation to the being which was before. Only the merit or quality goes on; and with endless processes of purification, total extinction is finally reached for him, while the series goes on eternally in the universe.

We are now prepared for the consideration of the great word that has exercised the thought of all students of Buddhism from the beginning. The question is as to what conception was entertained of Nirvana by the primitive doctrine, preserved in its most ancient canonical scriptures, and only a little altered by the more recent speculations of the philosophers.

On this point, as has been observed, much difference of opinion exists. The majority of the students of Buddhism, including Burnouf, Spence Hardy, Gogerley, hold that Nirvana meant absolute nullity; while very many, including Colebrook, Max Müller, Beal, Bunsen, Neander, deny, or at least much modify, this assertion. Our author classifies the objections urged by the latter to the notion that Nirvana was originally "a total extinction of every species of existence" under three heads: the impossibility that man would ever have accepted the Buddhist doctrine, if it had really pronounced nothing but absolute extinction as its *summum bonum;* the fact that in the Sutra-pitaka and Vinaya-pitaka, the two parts of the Buddhist canon containing its most ancient scriptures, the word Nirvana is never used in the sense of total "annihilation" but of that of "quiet," "immortality" "felicity" "wellbeing;" and, finally, the records of the Buddha's reappearance, after entering the state of Nirvana, to teach his disciples. These objections are examined in detail, in order to their

refutation. The argumentation is deeply interesting, and the reader must judge for himself what value it has.

The first argument against the extreme view of the original doctrine of Nirvana is the simple one that it is inconsistent with the moral teaching and vast practical influence of Buddhism as it sprang from its founder. It taught the highest virtue and disciplined men to perfect superiority over the world of sense, and yet is supposed to have offered no reward but extinction. Such a doctrine would not be accepted by half the world with the eagerness that welcomed the teaching of Buddha. To this it is replied that this teacher did not propound his doctrine as one likely to be acceptable. "My doctrine," he said, "is profound, difficult, and hard to be understood; it is sublime, and worthy to be known only of the wise;" and again, "very few men will attain to the Nirvana; the greatest part will continue their course among the pleasures of existence." His one end was to teach that existence as such was nothing but an infinite congeries of miseries, and to point out in the Nirvana the only means of liberation; and this was the necessary and inevitable consequence of his whole system. Moreover, he did not forget that men demand reward, and will not undertake the severities of virtue without hope of some good result. He taught that every good work will have its recompense, and every evil work its punishment. These retributions were, on his system, reserved for the future life, and connected with his doctrine of transmigration. Now these future births in new existence will be very numerous, or rather infinite; good actions may be of such a kind as to secure a state less unhappy, indeed, but still under the bondage of existence. Now Gautama undoubtedly taught that existence is essentially and as such miserable; but if men loved it, he would not take it away from them; all he would say was that they must be as virtuous as possible, that their existence might be hereafter less and less miserable. He whose high ambition spurned this attenuated misery and yearned to rest for ever from all the ills of being, had before him the Nirvana. But how awfully difficult its attainment! What manifold forms of being must be passed through, what many forms through how many ages of incarnation before every sin was purged away, and that perfect virtue or that perfect science reached which would make the man himself a Buddha! Nirvana was for the

saints alone, but men might become good without being such saints. Thus that most wonderful system, which has held captive more human minds than any other, did really stimulate the hope of reward; in the illimitable distance there was total extinction of sin and life together, but in the intermediate perspective transmigration after transmigration through a long series of improvements in the quality of existence.

Still the question arises, Was this final repose of the wearied spirit regarded as absolute extinction, and not rather as the return of the soul to the original source of being whence it came, or, if not that, at least a continuance in eternal repose without thought and feeling and energy?

It could not be the former in the original system of Buddhism, which in nothing more than in this differed from the Brahmanism which it aimed to reform. It had no place for a great first cause and final end of being. Among the Brahmans the soul, part of the universal soul, is invested with a variety of bodies through a succession of existences, until, purged by innumerable transmigrations through all created forms, it is conducted to the supreme essence whence it was taken. It falls like a drop into the ocean, loses its individuality, and is one with the Divine substance of the Brahm. Buddhism affirms, on the contrary, that at death the spirit dies with the body; but that, at death, there is born from the complete dissolution of the individual another being which will be animal, man, or deva, according to its merits or demerits; yet not the same spirit, or soul, or personality, but only its personified character or Karma. The person, in fact, dies in every transmigration, and dies finally and for ever after the last. As in Brahmanism the I is lost in Brahm, in Buddhism it is lost in Nirvana.

It would appear, then, that Nirvana is the goal of all created things, is literal annihilation, because Buddhism denied the existence of an eternal and supreme cause of all. Yet it seems hardly necessary to assume that because the system was without a God, therefore it was without immortality. The word itself certainly does not furnish decisive evidence; it deserves careful study.

"Nirvana is not a term of Buddhist origin. It had been already adopted in Brahminical literature to indicate that eternal recompense which all the Indian systems promised to their followers,

whether absolute nothing, eternal repose, absorption into divinity, or the enjoyment of beatitude in the celestial spheres. Hence it was synonymous with Moksha, Nirvitti, Apavarga, or liberation, cessation of existence, deep repose, or *summum bonum*. It is composed of the elements *nir* and *va: nir* being a negative or privative particle, and *va* a root which signifies wind or movement. The whole word therefore signifies 'cessation of movement,' or 'extinguished by a breath,' like the flame of a candle. According to Gogerley its etymology is *ni-vana*, from *vana* desire; and he defines it 'total cessation of existence' through 'total emancipation from desires.' With this accords the Buddhist meaning, which is usually expressed thus: 'destruction of the action of the Karma,' or the secret cause which demands the circulation of the being in the series of transmigrations; and 'total destruction of all the elements or aggregates, the factors of existence.' In the individual it is supposed that the five *Skandha*, which form the human nature, are destroyed; that is, the form, sensation, perception, discernment, knowledge."

Hence it will be evident that the word itself does not necessarily mean extinction of being. That was not its original signification. The restless desires or perturbations of life may cease while life itself goes on; the component elements of personality, as in the phenomenal world, may be dissolved, and yet the personality itself continue. But the whole system of Buddhist thought is supposed to require that the word was adopted in the sense of final annihilation. That system regarded life as a continued succession of pains, in which animals, men, and the deva appeared as transitory phenomena. From the eternal restlessness of the ocean of existence death is as deliverance, because the Karma, the character stamped on the individual by good or evil actions, constrains it to live on through an endless series of incarnations. All kinds of existence—not only animals and men, but demons and the gods who inhabit the blessed regions—are under the dominion of transmigration. According to the fundamental dogma of Buddhism life, in whatsoever manifestation, is only sorrow and misery, which is the fatal inheritance of men and gods alike. Hence Gautama admitted no solace but that of bursting the iron bonds of the prisonhouse, not of life events, but of existence; the extirpation of the cause which constrains every creature to live again. These are some of his words: "O religious man, from the destruction of passions comes the destruction of love to life; from destruction of love to life results the destruction of exis-

tence; and from the destruction of existence follows the destruction of birth, old age, death, grief, sorrow, anguish." Felicity is found only in the state beyond transmigration, where there is no movement nor life; that is, in Nirvana. It is certain that this, in the Buddhist system, could not be absorption into Brahm or any other divinity, since the Buddhists accept no uncreated Being, nor any form of spiritual life emerging from transmigration, since—according to Gautama—every operation of the spirit is the occasion of sorrow, and perfect calm could result only from the annihilation of the spirit itself as the personal centre of restlessness and change. Brahmanism and Buddhism have this in common, therefore, that Nirvana is rest from the dreary process of the transmigrations of life. But, in the latter, the conception of Nirvana is more abstract. The Sansara, or phenomenal existence, must be transcended by the absolute annihilation of the I of personality by its moral elevation above all personal thought, feeling, and wish; above all personal interest and cares. Brahmanism makes the end an absorption into Brahm; Buddhism an absorption into a Nirvana, which has no definition, save the negative one that all movement and activity are lost in a dreamless sleep of existence. And when we consider that the Buddhist system regarded a perfectly absorbed and abstracted state of mind, as both the preparation for the Nirvana and the pledge of it, it is natural to suppose that the profound meaning of the word was originally no other than that of perfect rest in unchanging life. But this brings us to the second argument considered by our author.

"Max Müller does not admit the interpretation of the word Nirvana which we have given above, because, says the illustrious philologist, in no passage of the Vinaya-pitaka, or of the Sutri, which contain the discourses of the Buddha, do we find it used with the meaning of 'perfect annihilation,' such as we find in the Abhidharma, or the part of the metaphysical writings which are the most modern in the Buddhist canon. He affirms that in the Saitra its synonyms are 'rest,' 'supreme felicity,' 'wellbeing derived from the cessation of all passions and desires,' and even 'immortality,' expressions which are far from consistent with the idea of Nolling. Hence Max Müller maintains that the conception formed by Buddha and his disciples was that which is still preserved among the faithful, in opposition to that which is derived from the philosophical writings: that is, the word expressed the state of the spirit wrapped in a profound quiet, the

subjection of every concupiscence of the heart, indifference to joy and sorrow, to good or evil, and the absorption of the human soul into a soul universal. We have seen that such a mode of apprehending the final destiny of living creatures does not harmonise with the teachings of Sakyamuni, and belongs rather, as we shall soon see, to the state of *incomplete Nirvana*, which precedes the annihilation of being. But is his affirmation strictly true? It is allowed that in the Abhidharma, which contain all the speculations of the various schools, there are found more ample discussions of the annihilationist doctrine of Nirvana; and that these are wanting in Sutra, which record, for the most part, the simple sayings or preachings of the Buddha. In them the idea is presented as the term of the evils of existence, as victory over desire, sin, and ignorance, as the contrary of the mutable and transitory in the process of transmigration: whence the words rest, quietness, felicity, immortality. The signification of those expressions, taken literally, has led to a false conception with reference to this fundamental point of Buddhist teaching. Hence it has come to pass that too much love of the latter has found in their writings a Creator which the system does not admit, a human soul capable of living beyond its material prison, and made Nirvana equivalent to immortality, or the state of peace."

Of this instances are adduced. In the Dhammapada, one of the Sutra translated by Max Müller, we read: "Reflection is the path which leads to immortality (or Nirvana), thoughtlessness is the path of death. Those who reflect die not; those who do not think are as if they were already dead." The translator deduces from this an allusion to Nirvana as a state of eternal existence, quite different from absolute annihilation. The question is as to the meaning of the Pali word *amata*, which undoubtedly signifies a state of perpetual existence. But d'Alwys, followed by the author, argues that, as the Buddhist scriptures everywhere affirm that "everything is transitory," and that "there is nothing immortal," the term *amata* was used in the primitive sense it bore previous to its later signification of "immortal or eternal." From the negative *a* and *mata*, death, it means "not death, without death, free from death," with the emphatic opposition only to death. Hence d'Alwys translates less literally, it is thought, but more justly in the Buddhist sense: "Reflection leads to the lot which is devoid of death, and thoughtlessness to that which is (ever susceptible of) death. Those who reflect do not (enter the condition liable to) die; but those who are thoughtless are the same as those who

are already dead." We cannot help thinking this argumentation forced, as is also that of another passage: "Those who meditate profoundly on the origin and destruction of existence (or the five *Skandka*) will have an idea of the felicity of him who has reached the knowledge of what *amata* is." It is assured that the destruction of the five elements renders impossible any sort of existence; and that *amata* must mean, like the primitive Nirvana, a condition where there is no death, because there is no existence that can die. But the thought irresistibly returns that the deep meaning of these original contemplations was that of a being without the five elements of life necessary to the phenomenal world.

In the same book Max Müller translates one of the synonyms of Nirvana, "the quiet place." "The religious who acts well and practises joyfully the teaching of Buddha, will reach this quiet place, this condition of repose, which springs from the dissolution of the elements of existence or Sankharia." It is argued that the latter clause destroys the inference of the former; and that the dissolution of the elements of existence implies that the quiet place of Nirvana is annihilation. But existence in the composite form of earthly life is not being proper: "the sages who do injury to none, and always do right actions, will attain Nirvana, entering into which they suffer no more." There is much to support the notion that Buddhism placed its highest felicity in deliverance from the burden of being, and this is the prevalent notion formed of its Nirvana. Undoubtedly, the master's doctrine was philosophised upon in this sense, as we find in the following words: "In Nirvana there is no water, nor earth, nor fire, nor air (the four elements constituting all bodies); there is nothing that can be called great, little, short, or long, good, or evil. In it both the *nama* (mind and its faculties) and *rupa* (body) are extinct; and with the destruction of consciousness existence itself is annihilated."

Another objection, in appearance important but not really so strong as the former, is this, that Buddha, after having entered into Nirvana, appeared again to his disciples and continued his preaching. This objection is dealt with in an interesting manner; and here we shall again condense our author's arguments. In order to understand how this may be made to agree with what has been said above about Nirvana, it is necessary to say a

few words about the two modes or rather states of Nirvana itself. The word is used in two diverse significations. The principal is that of annihilation of existence; the other is applied to designate that particular state of the spirit which is a species of preparation, consisting in a general wellbeing, the result of release from passions and desires; a state which the devotee enjoys in the state which immediately precedes extinction of existence. This last stage of being, incomplete Nirvana, is more accurately described as *Kleca Nirvana*, "annihilation of human passions"—a "Nirvana in which remain the elements of existence; while the finished Nirvana is called *Skandha Nirvana*, "annihilation of the elements of being," or a "state devoid of every trace of existence." When it is said in the old writings that a devotee having reached a certain stage of sanctity through victory over his senses and passions, had entered Nirvana, we must understand the word only in the former of these senses. In that state he still lives on a pure life, endowed with supernatural power, delighting in the unspeakable assurance that the great enemy of man, existence, has been finally discomfited and vanquished. When he is dead, he no more is born again into the circle of transmigration, because he has been found able to destroy the germ of life; the lamp of existence, as they say, has ceased to burn and is extinct. Then he finally reaches the true and proper Nirvana. Now in those passages of the scriptures where Buddha is represented as appearing, after entrance in Nirvana, in the midst of his disciples to teach them, and where Nirvana is spoken of as a state in which "the spirit rejoices in its true purity," allusion is always to the incomplete Nirvana. The acquisition of *Bodhi* or the old wisdom was necessary for the final salvation of man; because the world was regarded as in some sense the product of the mind weakened and obscured by ignorance, and there was no remedy but in the coming of supreme wisdom to illuminate the human mind and teach it the vanity, insufficiency, and unreality of the whole universe. The Bodhisattva attains to this elect science; and as such Buddha preached to his hearers, that is, in the incomplete Nirvana. But it is denied that any book represents him as having appeared after the perfected Nirvana received him. On the contrary, it is said in one of them: "As long as the body of Buddha, separated from the turmoil of existence, remains in the

world as the fruit and the flower separated from the stalk, gods and men may see him; but when his life reached its end, and his body was destroyed, neither gods nor men could see him any more."

The conclusion to which Puini comes as the result of much investigation may be thus summarised.

Nirvana, as conceived by the Buddha and his immediate disciples, is no other than the perfect extinction of every kind of existence, the destruction of all active faculties, whether of the spirit or soul or of the body; in fact, the absolute annihilation of the personal being. This truth must needs emerge as the natural and necessary consequence of the essential doctrine taught by Sakyamuni, and of the more ancient canonical scriptures which transmit to us his teachings. But, secondly, the word Nirvana has been adopted in the Buddhist books to indicate not only the state of annihilation, or the annulling of all being, but also the state of the human spirit in the period which precedes that annihilation. To this condition of the soul must be referred all those passages of these scriptures in which, when speaking of Nirvana, allusion is made to some sort of existence as nevertheless supposed. Thirdly, in a more recent period, when in the bosom of Buddhism various schools of philosophy had their development, and when the metaphysical side of the system of Sakyamuni approximated to Brahmanism, the word Nirvana lost, at least in some sects, its primitive value or signification. It passed into the definition of that idea which many insist upon finding in the word as its general and sole meaning, which expresses namely an existence of beatitude and repose, eternally translated into the bosom of a universal and divine essence.

We have reserved to the close the view of our subject taken by Mr. Rhys Davids, in the interesting little volume he has published on Buddhism. It is rather different from any already referred to, and will be best seen in his own words. After describing the Four Noble Truths, and the Eight Paths that lead to perfection, and the Ten Fetters that are gradually broken off—the first being the Delusion of Self and the last Ignorance—he then goes on:

"One might fill pages with the awestruck and ecstatic praise which is lavished in Buddhist writings on this condition of mind, the Fruit of the fourth Path, the state of an Arahat, of a man made perfect according to the Buddhist faith. But all that could

be said can be included in one pregnant phrase—THIS IS NIRVANA. 'They who, by steadfast mind have become exempt from evil desire, and well trained in the teachings of Gautama, they, having obtained the fruit of the fourth Path, and immersed themselves in that ambrosia, have received without price and are in the enjoyment of Nirvana. Their old Karma is exhausted, no new Karma is being produced; their hearts are free from the longing after future life; the cause of their existence being destroyed, and no new yearnings springing up within them, they, the wise, are extinguished like this lamp." What then is Nirvana, which simply means extinction—it being quite clear, from what has gone before, that this cannot be the extinction of a soul? *It is the extinction of that sinful, grasping condition of mind and heart which would otherwise, according to the great mystery of Karma, be the cause of renewed individual existence* . . . . . Nirvana is therefore the same thing as a *sinless, calm state of mind;* and, if translated at all, may best perhaps be rendered 'holiness'—holiness, that is, in the Buddhist sense, perfect *peace, goodness, and wisdom.*"

This last qualification is necessary. Holiness is a Christian term; and the essential idea inherent in it, separation from sin as the condition of fellowship with God, must needs be absent from Buddhism. As Mr. Davids says:

"Our word holiness would often suggest the ideas of love to and awe in the felt presence of a personal Creator—ideas inconsistent with Buddhist holiness. On the other hand, Nirvana implies the ideas of intellectual energy, and of the cessation of individual existence, of which the former is not essential to, and the latter is quite unconnected with, our notion of holiness."

"It is better, therefore, to retain the word Nirvana as the name of the Buddhist *summum bonum*, which is a blissful holy state, a moral condition, a modification of personal character; and we should allow the word to remind us, as it did the early Buddhists, both of the 'Path' which leads to the extinction of sin, and also of the break in the transfer of Karma which the extinction of sin will bring about. That this must be the effect of Nirvana is plain; for that state of mind which in Nirvana is extinct (upadana, klesa, trisha) is precisely that which will, according to the great mystery of Buddhism, lead at death to the formation of a new individual, to whom the Karma of the dissolved or dead one will be transferred."

When a Buddhist has become an arahat, when he has reached Nirvana, he has extinguished upadana, the grasping, and klesa, sin, but he is still alive; the upadi, the Skandhas, his body with all its powers, that is to say the fruit of his former sin, remain. When these last are dis-

solved there can be no new individual, and the arahat or perfect man will be no longer existent in any sense. "Stars, long ago extinct, may be still visible to us by the light they emitted before they ceased to burn; but the rapidly vanishing effect of a no longer active cause will soon cease to strike upon our senses; and where the light was, will be darkness. So the living, moving body of the perfect man is visible still, though its cause has ceased to act; but it will soon decay, and die, and pass away; and, as no new body will be formed, where life was will be nothing." Mr. Richards sums up all in one sentence: "Death, utter death, with no new life to follow, is then a result of, but it is not, Nirvana. The Buddhist heaven is not death, and it is not in death but in a virtuous life here and now that the Pitahas lavish those terms of ecstatic description which they apply to Nirvana, as the fruit of the fourth Path, or Arahatship."

Here we might seem to have reached the conclusion of the whole matter; and in such a way as to harmonise the discordant elements presented in the canonical writings of Buddhism. Nirvana is the perfect state of the soul, prepared as a finished sacrifice for its final immolation to nothingness. It seems a necessary qualification of the strong sentences penned by M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, on which Max Müller comments as we shall afterwards see:

"Buddhism has no god; it has not even the confused and vague notion of a Universal Spirit in which the human soul, according to the orthodox doctrine of Brahmanism, and the Sankhya philosophy, may be absorbed. Nor does it admit nature, in the proper sense of the word; and it ignores that profound division between spirit and matter which forms the system and glory of Kapila. It confounds man with all that surrounds him, all the while preaching to him the laws of virtue. Buddhism, therefore, cannot unite the human soul, which it does not even mention, with a God whom it ignores; nor with nature, which it does not know any better. Nothing remained but to annihilate the soul; and in order to be quite sure that the soul may not reappear under some new form in this world, which has been cursed as the abode of illusion and misery, Buddhism destroys its very elements, and never wearies of glorying in this achievement. What more is wanted? If this is not the absolute nothing, what is Nirvana?"

To this Professor Müller vaguely replies by a very poor defence:

"Such religion, we should say, was made for a madhouse. But Buddhism was an advance, if compared with Brahmanism; it has stood its ground for centuries, and, if truth could be decided by majorities, the show of hands, even at the present day, would be in favour of Buddha. The metaphysics of Buddhism, like the metaphysics of most religions, not excluding our own Gnosticism and Mysticism, were beyond the reach of all except a few hardened philosophers or ecstatic dreamers. Human nature could not be changed. Out of the very nothing it made a new paradise; and he who had left no place in the whole universe for a Divine Being was deified by the multitudes who wanted a person whom they could worship, a king whose help they might invoke, a friend before whom they might pour out their most secret griefs. And there remained the code of a pure morality, proclaimed by Buddha. There remained the spirit of charity, kindness, and universal pity with which he had inspired his disciples. There remained the simplicity of the ceremonial he had taught, the equality of all men which he had declared, the religious toleration which he had preached from the beginning. There remained much, therefore, to account for the rapid strides which his doctrine made from the mountain peaks of Ceylon to the Tundras of the Samoyedes; and we shall see in the simple story of the life of Hiouen-thsang that Buddhism, with all its defects, has had its heroes, its martyrs, and its saints."

The pith of all this seems to be that the followers of Buddha were wiser than their master and better than their creed; that they revolted against the atheism of the Buddhist metaphysics; and represented that human nature which in its irrepressible instincts cries out for a living God. But if Buddha reformed Brahmanism by removing the grand faith of that system in a supreme Cause of all things, it is hard to see how it was an advance upon Brahmanism; but it is easy to see how it came to pass that in the course of generations the reforms in this supposed reformation brought back again the great Supreme, as manifested in Buddha. However, Max Müller is not content with this defence, and in another essay takes up the subject again in a rather different style:

"Whether the belief in this kind of Nirvana, that is, in a total extinction of being, personality, and consciousness, was at any time shared by the large masses of the people, is difficult either to assert or deny. We know nothing in ancient times of the religious convictions of the millions. We only know what a few leading spirits believed, or professed to believe. That certain individuals should have spoken and written of total extinction as

the highest aim of man is intelligible. Job cursed the day on which he was born, and Solomon praised 'the dead which are already dead, more than the living which are yet alive.' Voltaire said in his own flippant way, 'On aime la vie, mais le néant ne laisse pas d'avoir du bon;' and a modern German philosopher, who has found much favour with those who profess to despise Kant, Schelling, and Hegel, writes: 'Considered in its objective value, it is more than doubtful that life is preferable to Nothing. I should say even, that if experience and reflection could lift up their voices they would recommend to us the Nothing. We are what we ought not to be, and we shall therefore cease to be.' Under peculiar circumstances, in the agonies of despair, or under the gathering clouds of madness, such language is intelligible; but to believe, as we are asked to believe, that one half of manhood had yearned for total annihilation, would be tantamount to a belief that there is a difference of kind between man and man. Buddhist philosophers, no doubt held this doctrine, and it cannot be denied that it found a place in the Buddhist canon. But even among the different schools of Buddhist philosophers, very different views are adopted as to the true meaning of Nirvana. . . . We do not find fault with M. Sainte-Hilaire for having so emphatically pressed the charge of nihilism against Buddha himself. In one portion of the Buddhist canon the most extreme views of nihilism are put in his mouth. All we can say is that that canon is later than Buddha; and that in the same canon the founder of Buddhism, after having entered on Nirvana, is still spoken of as living, nay, as showing himself to those who believe in him. Buddha, who denied the existence, or at least the divine nature, of the gods worshipped by the Brahmans, was raised himself to the rank of a deity by some of his followers, and we need not wonder therefore if his Nirvana too was gradually changed into an Elysian field. And, finally, if we may argue from human nature, such as we find it at all times and in all countries, we confess that we cannot bring ourselves to believe that the reformer of India, the teacher of so perfect a code of morality, the young prince who gave up all that he had in order to help those whom he saw afflicted in mind, body, or estate, should have cared much about speculations which he knew would either be misunderstood, or not understood at all, by those whom he wished to benefit; that he would have thrown away one of the most powerful weapons in the hands of every religious teacher, the belief in a future life, and should not have seen that if this life was sooner or later to end in nothing, it was hardly worth the trouble which he took himself, or the sacrifices which he imposed on his disciples."

But if this style of argument is to have any force, it should extend its suggestive apology to the doctrine of the

Buddha concerning God. It is vain to hint that Buddha must have left room for an eternal existence of the purified spirit, if it is absolutely certain that he exterminated God from his system. What is all being without its eternal and substantial basis? What eternity can phenomena have without an eternal reality behind them? The fact remains, after a thousand special pleadings, that Buddhism is the most astounding system of incongruous elements the world has ever known. It is the most perplexing mystery that comparative religion has to present; and in two respects, especially, that mystery knows no approximation even towards human relation. Both these involve a certain remarkable resemblance to Christianity; one being its peaceful missionary propagation and widespread influence; the other the supremacy of its social ethics. The Christian, who believes in one absolute Revealer of one absolute religion has his own method of accounting for both. To him every religion of heathenism is only a particular form of a universal yearning for the Redeemer of mankind; and every one is doomed to exhibit in its own special way the hopelessness of the pursuit of truth without the direct guidance of revelation from heaven. Some of them exhibit the strangest paradoxes: Buddhism the strangest of all. Its beautiful morality is vitiated by the absence of two truths on which all true morality must hang: a Deity and a future life. Its ascetic description purifies only to destroy. Its duties of the second table are nothing worth, for they are not linked with or "like unto" the duties of the first table. All its graces and virtues are dead while they live, for they have not in them the hope of eternity. However much they resemble the Christian—and the resemblance is undeniable—their essential principles are diametrically opposed to those of the religion of Jesus. Meanwhile, the Buddhist self-renunciation and disinterested devotion to the good of all men is the glory of its ethics. They are the glory of Christian ethics also. But in Christianity they are bound up with consecration to God in Christ and the hope of eternal life. Alas, the fact that the wrong system is more generally honoured and acted up to by its adherents than the right system is, remains the standing opprobrium of Christendom. If the followers of the self-renouncing Redeemer of mankind served Him and followed His precepts on their way to eternal life as faithfully as the followers of Buddha walk in his four paths on

their way to annihilation, Buddhism would have accomplished its destiny and soon be absorbed in the true doctrine which it now caricatures and perverts.

We are tempted here to show in how many other respects Buddhism has its fundamental errors reflected in the present day; but space fails, and we must content ourselves with transcribing a suggestive passage which Max Müller quotes from M. Saint-Hilaire:

"This book may offer one other advantage," he writes, "and I regret to say that at present it may seem to come opportunely. It is the misfortune of our times that the same doctrines which form the foundation of Buddhism meet at the hands of some of our philosophers with a favour which they ill deserve. For some years we have seen systems arising in which metempsychosis and transmigration are highly spoken of, and attempts are made to explain the world and man without either a God or a Providence, exactly as Buddha did. A future life is refused to the yearnings of mankind, and the immortality of the soul is replaced by the immortality of works. God is dethroned, and in His place they substitute man, the only being, we are told, in which the Infinite becomes conscious of itself. These theories are recommended to us sometimes in the name of science, or of history, or philology, or even of metaphysics; and though they are neither new nor very original, yet they can do much injury to feeble hearts. This is not the place to examine these theories, and their authors are both too learned and too sincere to deserve to be condemned summarily and without discussion. But it is well that they should know by the example, too little known, of Bhuddhism, what becomes of man if he depends on himself alone, and if his meditations, misled by a guide of which he is hardly conscious, bring him to the precipice where Buddha was lost. I am well aware of all the differences, and I am not going to insult our contemporary philosophers by confounding them indiscriminately with Buddha, although addressing to both the same reproof. I acknowledge willingly all their additional merits, which are considerable. But systems of philosophy must always be judged by the conclusions to which they lead, whatever road they may follow in reaching them; and their conclusions, though obtained by different means, are not therefore less objectionable. Buddha arrived at his conclusions 2,400 years ago. He proclaimed and practised them with an energy which is not likely to be surpassed, even if it be equalled. He displayed a childlike intrepidity which no one can exceed, nor can it be supposed that any system in our days could again acquire so powerful an ascendency over the souls of men. It would be useful, however, if the authors of these modern systems would just cast a glance at the theories and destinies of

Buddhism. It is not the philosophy in sense in which we understand this great name, nor is it religion in the sense of ancient paganism, of Christianity, or of Mohammedanism; but it contains elements of all worked up into a perfectly independent doctrine which acknowledges nothing in the universe but man, and obstinately refuses to recognise anything else, though confounding man with nature in the midst of which he lives. Hence all those aberrations of Buddhism which ought to be a warning to others. Unfortunately, if people rarely profit by their own faults, they profit yet more rarely by the faults of others."

In conclusion, we recommend those of our readers who are interested in the study of the science of religions to spend much time on Buddhism. The two works from Italian and English pens which are at the head of this paper will be found of great value. But it must not be forgotten that the three works on the subject published by the lamented Spence Hardy still remain the classical standards in our language. They are highly prized all over Europe, and ought to be better known than they are among ourselves.

LITERARY NOTICES.

I. THEOLOGICAL.

Max Muller's Hibbert Lectures.

Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion, as Illustrated by the Religions of India. By F. Max Müller, M.A. The Hibbert Lectures. Second Edition. London: Longmans. 1878.

The relations between the science of language and the science of religion are very close. To discover the origin and trace the growth of men's ideas on religious subjects, there is no better way than to analyse the words in which those ideas are expressed. The spoken word of the lips answers naturally and of necessity to the unspoken word of the heart. We do not wonder, therefore, that an acknowledged master in the field of comparative philology should now push his researches into the neighbouring field of religion. His preliminary essay was the *Lectures on the Science of Religion*, which dealt mainly with the general pre-suppositions of the question, and seemed to many readers simply to formulate truths which nobody thought of disputing. The charm of Professor Müller's style is such that nothing he says can ever appear commonplace. The present volume is of a higher order altogether, more after the fashion of his invaluable works on language. He never wrote with more force and brilliance, and at the same time, instead of confining himself to vague generalities, discusses a definite subject. That subject is nothing less than the development of religious ideas in a literature of which he is a perfect master. In doing this, he is faithful to his calling as a philologist. The witnesses to whom he appeals, and whom he cross-examines in a searching way, are words and phrases as symbols of ideas and beliefs. Many of his discussions of single words, as of *religio*, p. 11, are interesting in the highest degree. In the following quotation it is the enthusiastic philologist who speaks:

"I like to quote one instance, to show the intimate relationship between Vedic Sanskrit and Greek. We know that the Greek Ζεύς is the same word as the Sanskrit Dyaus, the sky. Dyaus, however, occurs in the later Sanskrit as a feminine only. It is in

the Veda that it was discovered, not only as a masculine, but in that very combination in which it became the name of the supreme deity in Greek and Latin. Corresponding to Jupiter, and Ζεὺς πατήρ, we find in the Veda Dyaush pitar. But more than that, Ζεύς in Greek has in the nominative the acute, in the vocative the circumflex. Dyaus in the Veda has in the nominative the acute, in the vocative the circumflex. And while Greek grammarians can give us no explanation of that change, it is a change which in Sanskrit has been shown to rest on the general principles of accentuation. Now I conceive that such a vocative as Dyaus, having the circumflex instead of the acute, is to my mind a perfect gem, of the most precious material and the most exquisite workmanship. Who has not wondered lately at those curious relics of pre-Hellenic art, brought to light at Hissarlik and Mykenæ by the indefatigable labours of Dr. Schliemann? I am the last man to depreciate their real value, as opening to us a new world on the classical soil of Greece. But what is a polished or perforated stone, what is a drinking vessel, or a shield, or a helmet, or even a gold diadem, compared with this vocative of Dyaus? In the one case we have mute metal, rude art, and little thought; in the other, a work of art of the most perfect finish and harmony, and wrought of a material more precious than gold—human thought. If it took thousands, or hundreds of thousands of men to build a pyramid, or to carve an obeliak, it took millions of men to finish that single word *Dyaus*, or Ζεύς, or *Jupiter*, originally meaning the illuminator, but gradually elaborated into a name of God! And, remember, the Veda is full of such pyramids, the ground is strewn with such gems."

The first and second lectures are introductory; and, although not in form yet in reality, contain a powerful argument against the theories of modern positivism. Some of the discussions in these and the following lectures are not perhaps relevant in the strictest sense to the main subject, but they are all valuable. Even Professor Müller's "chips" are most precious. We may instance the discussion of fetishism, both name and thing, in the second lecture, which is set in a very fresh and original light. The lecturer deals a heavy blow at one of the fundamental parts of the Positivist position—*i.e.*, at the notion that all religion necessarily begins in fetishism. We may add that there is no trace of fetishism in the early history of India. In the first lecture the author argues just as powerfully against another fundamental of the Positivist creed—*i.e.*, that the infinite is unknown and unknowable; that all human knowledge is imprisoned within the bounds of the finite. On the contrary, he maintains that the two are given in inseparable connection, that each implies and involves the other. "What I hold is that with every finite perception there is a concomitant perception, or, if that word should

seem too strong, a concomitant sentiment or presentiment of the infinite; that from the very first act of touch, or hearing, or sight, we are brought in contact not only with a visible, but also at the same time with an invisible universe. Those, therefore, who deny the possibility or the legitimacy of the idea of the infinite in our human consciousness, must meet us here on their own ground. All our knowledge, they say, must begin with the senses. Yes, we say, and it is the senses which give us the first intimation of the infinite. What grows afterwards out of this intimation supplies materials both to the psychologist and to the historian of religion, and to both of them this indispensable sentiment of the infinite is the first pre-historic impulse to all religion. I do not say that in the first dark pressure of the infinite upon us, we have all at once the full and lucid consciousness of that highest of all concepts: I mean the very opposite. I simply say we have in it a germ, and a living germ; we have in it that without which no religion would have been possible, we have in that perception of the infinite the root of the whole historical development of human faith." This principle is very strikingly illustrated in relation to time and space, sound and colour.

It is very far from Professor Müller's intention to represent the course of religious development in India as typical of all cases. He repeatedly disclaims this. All that he professes to do is to describe the development in one particular case. Thus understood, we quite agree with his exclusion of the notion of a primitive revelation. We believe that in India we have an example of the development of natural religion by man's unaided powers. Let us note the steps. The Vedic deities are classed as consisting in tangible, semi-tangible, and intangible objects. Evidently it was chiefly in connection with the second and third classes that the idea of a higher power first arose. The growth of that idea is then traced in concrete instances—in relation to fire, the sun, the dawn, thunder, wind. One of the most deeply interesting portions of the volume is the fifth lecture, in which it is shown that the ideas of infinity and law are actually present in the most ancient Hindu documents. *Aditi* is the exact equivalent of infinite; *diti* being = finite, and *a* the negative particle. *Rita* again expresses what is orderly, fixed, regular. It was applied in the first instance to the orderly movements of the heavenly bodies, and then transferred to the moral world. "Think only what it was to believe in a *Rita*, in an order of the world, though it be no more at first than a belief that the sun will never overstep his bounds." When we reach the sixth lecture, we have serious fault to find with the Professor. The lecture is entitled "Henotheism, Polytheism, Monotheism, Atheism," and the suggestion is that these are different stages in the way the Hindus trod. But the Monotheism in the title does not appear in the text at all.

All that we find there is a "tendency towards monotheism"—a tendency which never comes to anything. This exactly corresponds with the state of the case. Hinduism perhaps ought to have led to monotheism, but it did not. Monotheism, which, as Professor Müller says, means the worship of one God to the exclusion of every other, never did exist as a creed in India. What then is meant by inserting the name in the title? We do not suggest for a moment that the Professor intended to conceal the gap which meets us in Hindûism, but he does not emphasise it as he ought. We look upon India as a crucial test of the ability of man by the powers of unaided reason to "find out God." The achievements of the Hindus in philosophy leave the efforts of the ancient Greeks far behind in many respects. Yet they never discovered the simplest article of the Christian creed. Indeed in one point they were less advanced than the Greeks. Professor Müller dwells with emphasis on the fact that there is nothing in the Indian pantheon to correspond with the single supremacy of Jupiter in the Greek and Roman. No Hindu deity figures as sovereign of all the rest. Such a notion might conceivably have formed a point of transition to monotheism, but it never emerged above the horizon of Hindu faith. We believe that the various stages of the religious development of India would be more correctly marked as Henothenism, Polytheism, Pantheism. The countless gods of polytheism came to be regarded as manifestations of a single higher power. The subjective self and objective self, about which Professor Müller, founding on the philosophy of the Upanishads, discourses so eloquently, were identified. The jîvâtman is simply the reflection of the paramâtman, as the shadow in the water is of the substance.

By Henotheism, which is Professor Müller's substitute for fetishism, is meant the worship of single gods without reference to others. In the Vedas we are met by this phenomenon, that we find invocations of different deities, each of whom for the moment seems to be supreme. "This is the peculiar character of the ancient Vedic religion which I have tried to characterise as *Henotheism* or *Kathenotheism*, a successive belief in single supreme gods, in order to keep it distinct from that phase of religious thought which we call polytheism, in which the many gods are already subordinated to one supreme god, and by which, therefore, the craving after the one without a second has been more fully satisfied. In the Veda one god after another is invoked. For the time being, all that can be said of a divine being is ascribed to him. The poet, while addressing him, seems hardly to know of any other gods. But in the same collection of hymns, sometimes even in the same hymn, other gods are mentioned, and they also are truly divine, truly independent, or, it may be, supreme."

The lectures abound in matter for quotation, comment, and sometimes protest. For example, the drift of much that the Professor says is that the differences between one religion and another are inconsiderable, at least in the eyes of God, and that this ought to be the case among men. This indeed is not said in so many words, but it is the meaning. The less acceptance such teaching finds the better. But the solid merits of the work as a whole are very great. Commenting on the requirement of *faith* in India, Professor Müller says: "The word here used for the first time for faith, shraddhâ, is the very same word which meets us again in the Latin *credo*, and still lives in our *creed*. Where the Romans said *credidi*, the Brahmans said shraddadhan; where the Romans said *creditum*, the Brahmans said shraddhitam. That word and that thought, therefore, must have existed before the Aryan family broke up, before Sanskrit was Sanskrit, and before Latin was Latin. Even at that early time people believed what neither their senses could apprehend nor their reason comprehend. They believed; and they did not only believe, as a fact, but they had formed a word for belief, that is, they were conscious of what they were doing in thus believing, and they consecrated that mental function by calling it *shrad-dhâ*."

The number of typographical errors is greater than ought to occur in a second edition printed at the Oxford University Press, *e.g.*, "precept" for "percept" on p. 210. The sign of interrogation is persistently omitted, of which the last sentence in the volume is an example. Professor Müller refers more than once to his *History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature*, published in 1859, Such a work ought not to be allowed to remain out of print so long as this has been. We have no doubt that the publisher would report many inquiries for it.

Murphy's Habit and Intelligence.

Habit and Intelligence: A Series of Essays on the Laws of Life and Mind. By Joseph John Murphy. Second Edition, Illustrated. London: Macmillan and Co. 1879.

Although Mr. Murphy calls this book a second edition of one that was published about ten years ago, it is practically a new work. In some instances his old materials reappear, but rarely without some improvement upon the mode in which they were arranged before. Various chapters, of little use in the development of the theory which binds together the otherwise discordant subjects of which he treats, have been omitted. And long sections, dealing with such matters as the fixation of characters, the anticipation of function by structure, and automatism, appear

now for the first time in print. The result is a work, very bulky, containing still far too many details that are easily accessible elsewhere, and that are introduced here occasionally for the sake of their interest rather than for that of their relevancy, but withal in some measure original, and not without vigour and utility.

The professed purpose of the book is to "investigate the special and characteristic principles of both unconscious and conscious life," and chiefly "those vital principles which belong to the inner domain of life itself, as distinguished from the principles" (*e.g.*, laws of nutrition and respiration) "which belong to the border-land where life comes into contact with inorganic matter and force." That investigation leads Mr. Murphy to a twofold conclusion—that life with the power of forming and transmitting habits is distinct from all merely chemical and physical forces, and that intelligence, whilst co-extensive with all life, is distinct from the power of forming and transmitting habits. According to him, there are two and only two principles peculiar to living organisms. The one he calls Habit, which he defines as "that law in virtue of which all the actions and the characters of living beings tend to repeat and to perpetuate themselves, not only in the individual but in its offspring." The other he calls Intelligence, embracing under that term alike "the organising intelligence which adapts every part of an organism for its work," and "the conscious intelligence of the mind," both of which he maintains are simply separate manifestations of the same power. It will be seen that Mr. Murphy is in agreement with no dominant school, biological or psychological, of the present day. One after another, the distinguishing tenets of every one of them are exposed to his assault. Natural selection is dethroned, and its action confined within very narrow borders. Association of ideas is rejected as the sole solution of mental nature, and subordinated to a higher and controlling intelligent agency. And the popular belief that formative and mental intelligence are distinct—the former being Divine—is opposed by the theory, which is asserted and re-asserted all through this book, and is indeed its *raison d'être*, that "the unconscious intelligence which directs the formation of the organic structures is the same which becomes conscious in mental action." Notwithstanding, Mr. Murphy leaves no doubt as to his own philosophical position, but describes it with unusual clearness. "I am (he says) a Realist, because I believe, as a truth at once of science and of faith, that we live in a world of realities and not of phantoms; and that the function of philosophy is to interpret and thereby to justify the spontaneous dicta of consciousness. And I am a Natural Realist, because the facts of organic and mental science teach that intelligence acts spontaneously." And

when, as is inevitable in any thorough treatment of his subject, he is brought face to face with such difficulties as the nature and ground of the moral sense, he does not fail to confess that he has reached the limits of the sphere within which his own theory is held to be an adequate explanation. He describes holiness very incorrectly as the "preferring a higher aim to a lower one; as, for instance, preferring the performance of a duty which is certain to be unrewarded to pleasure;" but he adds, "I believe this sense of holiness is incapable of being referred to any principle belonging to either matter, life, or sensation, and can only be explained as a case not of vital but of spiritual intelligence." The closing sentences of the book exhibit his view still more fully. "No physical science (he writes) can elucidate the relation of the spirit to the brain; but the fact that man's brain has no superiority to that of the highest apes from which his spiritual superiority could possibly be guessed, so far from giving support to a materialistic view of our spiritual nature, rather tends to cut away the ground from under any materialistic argument. The question, what point in the development, either of the individual or of the race, is that where the spiritual nature has come in, cannot be answered, but is not an important one to answer. It is, however, in accordance with all the analogies of creation, if the same Creative Power, which at the beginning created matter and afterwards gave it life, finally, when the action of that life had developed the bodily frame and the instinctive mental powers of man, completed the work by breathing into man a breath of higher and spiritual life."

In several respects this contribution of Mr. Murphy's to the settlement of one of the most perplexing questions of the day is admirable. He has not, however, succeeded in preventing the presence of that feature which is perhaps the most general feature of all such books. The urgency of his assault far exceeds the strength of his defence. With unusual and more than once with irresistible skill, he marshals his forces against some point he is attacking. Nothing more, for example, need be said against Darwin's hypothesis of sexual selection as the principal factor in the perpetuation of ornamental colouring and structures than is said here. For when it has been shown, as Mr. Murphy shows with many illustrations and obvious familiarity with his subject, that that hypothesis depends upon assumptions as to the mental nature of animals that are not verifiable, and does not explain facts as well (say) as Wallace's theory of the increased intensity of life at pairing season, and is fundamentally opposed to the phenomenon of the fixation of ornament, and supposes endless variation in the numerical proportion of the sexes, and overlooks alike the reversal of sexual characters in man and the beauty of shells which is certainly not utilitarian: the necessary logical

conclusion is that the hypothesis of sexual selection is not merely improbable, but impossible. Similarly with the wider matter of the origin of species, the operation of natural selections amongst spontaneous variations is demonstrated to be so far limited that the necessity of some other or additional agency is readily yielded. Or if we turn to the later section of the book, in a chapter which would be almost the gem of the whole, were it not for an earlier one entitled "Structure in Anticipation of Function," Mr. Murphy summarises the arguments against automatism in a masterly manner, which leaves little to be desired. Indeed no objection need be made to that part of the book which is devoted to the exposure of the insufficiency of the current theories, except that occasionally, as in the chapter upon "Metamorphosis," where Mr. Murphy founds his conclusions upon the metamorphoses of three out of five groups, and "leaves out of consideration" those of the remaining two groups, there is traceable a tendency to compromise and not to push his arguments against natural selection quite as far as phenomena would warrant him in doing.

But when Mr. Murphy proceeds to vindicate his own theory, he does not succeed so uniformly in carrying his reader with him. It will have been observed already that, as he confesses, he uses the word habit "in an unusually wide sense," and takes for granted in its definition much which is, to say the least, doubtful. But, to omit all matters of definition which are rarely altogether satisfactory, and all minute details, Mr. Murphy's theory itself will not bear examination. Many objections could be raised against it, of which we can refer to but a few. According to him, the organising intelligence is, like the conscious intelligence of men, internal to the organism, and presides over and controls those vital functions and organic forms in which the relation of means and purpose is more evident than that of cause and effect. In other words, every indication of adaptation in an organism is the indication also of the presence of an "unconscious organising intelligence," the seat of which is also within. Even if the inappropriateness of such a word as intelligence in such a context be overlooked, it cannot be allowed that the so-called organising intelligence is identical in kind with the conscious intelligence of man. Mr. Murphy's proof amounts to nothing more than the elaboration of such analogies as that, just as the organism is constructed out of food by the organising intelligence, so mind is constructed out of impressions of sense by the mental intelligence—analogies which obviously prove nothing. And yet they form the basis of chapter after chapter. One compares the development of an organism out of a simple germ with the development of mind out of the germ of sensation. Another contains a parallel, after the manner of Hobbes or of Herbert Spencer,

between the processes of development in the individual and in the social organism. Another traces certain similarities between political progress and mental education. But it does not appear to have struck Mr. Murphy that he was merely illustrating the great law of progress in different spheres of thought or life, but by no means demonstrating that "organising intelligence" and mental intelligence were one and the same.

There are two recommendations of the author's theory upon which he lays some stress. "The view of direct creation," he writes, "cannot be reconciled with the imperfections of the organic world, and its slow and interrupted progress towards relative perfection," or with the existence of parasitic worms and immoral instincts. To which it might be replied, either that the existence of parasitic worms is a greater difficulty in the case of the theory of an internal organising intelligence than in the case of any other theory; or that the view of direct creation is not accompanied by forgetfulness of the facts that organised beings exist only on condition of being co-ordinated with certain media in nature, and that nature is not bound to accommodate itself in everything to the private convenience of organised beings. Mr. Murphy gives but one instance of an imperfection in nature—viz., that "the human eye, even when healthy and normal, is asserted by Helmholtz to be very imperfect in comparison with the best optical instruments that human skill can produce." But Helmholtz not merely makes that assertion; he also explains the optical defect just as an advocate of direct creation would explain it, in words which our author seems to have overlooked: "The appropriateness of the eye to its end exists in the most perfect manner, and is revealed even in the limit given to its defects. A reasonable man will not take a razor to cleave blocks; in like manner, every useless refinement in the optical use of the eye would have rendered that organ more delicate and slower in its application" (Helmholtz, *Revue des Cours scientifiques*, 1re série, t. vi., p. 219).

Nor does instinct become less mysterious under the treatment which Mr. Murphy applies to it. On the one hand, he hardly frames the argument as strongly as he might have done against the theory of the transmission of instincts by hereditary habit, for such cases as those of the necrophores and the pompilia are neglected. On the other hand, the definition of instinct as "unconscious motor intelligence" is very misleading. For intelligence implies power of foresight and judgment and choice: whereas the distinguishing character of instinctive actions is that they are executed apparently without any foresight or determination whatever. Certainly they cannot be explained by the individual experience of the animal; and to attribute them to an unconscious organising intelligence is so far from removing the

difficulties in which, according to any view, they are involved, that it deepens them, and leads us from the obscure into the more obscure.

Though Mr. Murphy in our opinion fails to commend the theory for the sake of which he wrote, his book has much in it, especially in its side-issues, that is well worth reading. His style is not altogether free from awkwardness, but his method of prefixing its subject to each paragraph adds greatly to his intelligibility. Evidently he has read much and thoughtfully, and this product of his reading and thought is not without value.

Wallon's Jesus et les Jesuites.

Jésus et les Jésuites. Moïse, Jésus, Loyola. Les Jésuites dans l'Histoire. Paris: Charpentier. 1879.

Nearly a generation ago we had a Jesuit scare. Half the footmen in London, with a good percentage of the butlers, were believed to be Jesuits in disguise, their object in assuming that disguise being supposed to be the conversion of our nobility and gentry. We have now grown so used to the sight of titled perverts that perhaps we have gone into the other extreme, and have ceased to be as watchful as the ceaseless aggressiveness of the Society of Jesus demands that we should be.

In France they cannot venture to be so quiescent; for there Jesuit influence permeates the whole of political and social life, making it, for instance, "bad form" to be a republican. It has, moreover, during the long pontificate of Pius IX. profoundly modified the character of the French priesthood and its relations to the Papal See. This change began much earlier, with the unhappy Concordat of the first Napoleon. That most self-seeking of men, for the sake of securing his recognition by the Pope and of being consecrated by him in Notre Dame, gave up the clergy, bound hand and foot, to the tender mercies of Rome. It was a cruel change, for many of the priests, some even of the bishops, who had accepted the Constitution, were married; the communion was celebrated in both kinds; the old Gallican liberties were fully insisted on. All this was crushed out by the Emperor. But, says M. Wallon, the political maxim enunciated in 1845, *l'état n'est pas théologien*, gave fuller play to Jesuit influence, and therefore left the clergy more completely unprotected. Since then the priests have been absolutely under the thumb of the bishops, while these have almost universally been inspired by the *Gésu*. Here comes out at once the difficulty of the French liberal's position. His principles forbid him to refuse free action to any sect; but the Jesuits no sooner have scope for teaching than they begin to plot against the Government which has permitted them to teach.

Separation of Church and State is the panacea in the eyes of most French liberals. M. Wallon easily shows that in France it will be insufficient. It is all very well, he says, to affirm that *la politique n'aura plus rien à faire avec la religion;* but how can you provide that men shall act regardless of that which for nine-tenths of mankind is the chief end and aim of action? His method is rather problematical, "to conquer the Jesuits by means of liberty." According to him, the great power of the body is mainly due to its being unfairly protected. "Under the Second Empire, you need only be a Jesuit to get everything you wanted. Let mammas see that the good Fathers have not the entire control of all the best appointments, that they can't succeed as they once did in making eligible matches for their pupils, and they'll soon care less about sending their children to Jesuit schools." France must also take up what she has let slip, the higher theological training. The State gives theological degrees (p. 161); let it then watch over the instruction and make the different degrees compulsory. In this way, if Rome has her doctors, France will have hers also. But how if the head of the Government is an unbeliever? M. Wallon foresees this difficulty, but fails to meet it, except by vague phrases. He admits that an unbeliever would be more dangerous than even a Jesuit, because he would, in his Gallio-like indifference, be so easily hoodwinked. He talks of councils, general, cantonal, and communal, to which (he says) the Concordat, which he had before anathematised, gives the right of choosing clergy and electing bishops; and he believes a Council of State would help and support the Government. Of course he foresees trouble with Rome; Louis XIV. found he could not make bishops of his own will. The thing will be to get your educated clergy; and then, when there is a sufficient number of vacant bishoprics, Rome will make a compromise. The lower clergy would undoubtedly rejoice at being emancipated. Their feeling now is that "monkery is stifling them; and this monkery keeps up a vast staff of Jesuits to organise these monastic hordes into an army." It appears that in France there are more than half a million monks—a monstrous percentage on the full-grown population of the country; and M. Wallon is eloquent on the mischiefs which this brings about, on the unfair position in which it places France with regard to other nations. But we cannot find that he is able to name any definite remedy. Things have come to such a pass, he says, that nothing but the nation can save itself; we can't go on for ever in this unwholesome state, the clergy preaching disobedience to the laws, and submitting the national decrees to the Roman *curia*. But then the Jesuits must be beaten *par la liberté*; and how this is to be done we are certainly not told.

That they must be kept in check if France is to hold her place in Europe, is plain enough. Already, says our author, they have

created three parties, and by making them neutralise one another they manage to secure a large share of power. If they succeed in making a fourth and a fifth, they will turn France into another Poland or Spain, and will lead it in like manner along the high road to ruin. Poland is, says M. Wallon, a terrible warning for France; no doubt Poland fell through divisions fostered by the Jesuits; and the fierceness of French parties, the brutal language used against the Commune even by a sober statesman like M. Thiers, show that, were it not for the restraining hand of Government, French parties would be ready enough to fly at each other's throats and tear their country to pieces.

M. Wallon is much more satisfactory as a historian than when he proposes measures for the future. His proposals are—Don't admit a pupil of the Jesuits into any Government school; open free Catholic churches, and guarantee the pay of those curés who reject the *Syllabus;* insist that the clergy shall not be removable except for misconduct; do away with surplice-fees in poor parishes; and, above all, keep the Jesuits out of all Government employments. It will, we fear, be difficult to bring about all these measures; but it is not difficult to show that the Jesuits have inverted almost every point of Scripture teaching. They are against the Law and against the Gospel alike. Self-sacrifice is the mainspring of Christianity; sacrificing others to yourself is the principle of Jesuitism. Self is made predominant; your advancement, in this world or in the next, is to be your sole aim.

In proof of this M. Wallon gives us an abstract of Loyola's teaching. "I don't reproach them with their doctrine (he says), for they have no doctrine—in all their spiritual works there is not a word of theology. I shall say nothing of their politics; they boast of working solely for themselves under every form of government. The world has criticised their morality; they have no such thing. Their rule is to choose in all things the opinions which are most widespread and best received."

Then taking Father Ravignan's *Exercises* as his basis, he proves the cynical selfishness of the system, and how it makes salvation a difficult science, beyond the reach of all save the rich or idle classes. These exercises and the meditations which form a part of them will be new to most of our readers. They are meant for that *time of retreat* which is so strongly recommended by the Jesuits, and during which those who are attending to their soul's health are to sit in darkened rooms and in an almost Trappist silence.

Next follows an able and interesting summary of the history of the Jesuit body, especially at Rome and in France, and then an account of their origin and constitution.

Perhaps the affair of Father Theiner, whom Pius IX. in his more liberal days commissioned to print at the secret press of the Vatican the unabridged records of the Council of Trent, and who

was so persecuted by the Jesuits in 1870 because of his opposition "to that sham Council which was really a den of robbers," was never more clearly set forth than in these pages. M. Wallon gives in full Theiner's letters to his friend Friedrich, most interesting in their bearing on the growth of the Old Catholic body.

The striking feature of M. Wallon's book is its calmness. Most books on the subject deal in such violent tirades that weak minds have sometimes been led by a mistaken sense of fairness to give up the truth. Our author, on the contrary, is content with letting facts and documents speak for themselves. He shows unanswerably how the Jesuits falsify history, how they have two sets of books (a false and an authentic) adroitly mixed (p. 353), how they give in their adhesion to every Government, and pursue their own ends alike under each. All this is pointed out with the least possible amount of angry comment. The maxim "No faith with modern society; it is all based on liberalism," is strangely at variance with the submissiveness which in 1796 said: "He who is not a good republican is a bad Christian." Nowadays, on the other hand, we find the Archbishop of Aix asserting that "the decrees of the republic *violent l'honnêteté !*"

To those, then, who wish a sober statement of what Jesuitism is and of the dangers with which it threatens modern society, we recommend M. Wallon's book. Happily we are not quite in the same position as the French; but the state of Ireland, and the continual cropping up of questions like this Irish University, show that for us too Jesuitism is a power which it will tax all our best statesmanship to cope with.

Bowen's Modern Philosophy.

Modern Philosophy, from Descartes to Schopenhauer and Hartmann. By Francis Bowen, A.M., Professor of Moral Philosophy in Harvard College, America. London: Sampson Low.

Professor Bowen has for many years held a high position in America as a writer on metaphysical subjects, and the volume before us is in every sense worthy of its author. We consider the title a little misleading. "Studies in Modern Philosophy" would have been a truer description of the contents of the book. The author in his preface says it is not his purpose to write a complete history of Modern Philosophy: his purpose is rather to present an analysis and criticism of those works which have permanently influenced the course of modern European thought, paying most attention to the earlier French and later German philosophers, with whom comparatively few English readers are at all familiar.

Hence he says little of such writers as Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Reid, and Hamilton, as these works are accessible to all English

readers. "But the great names of Descartes, Spinoza, Malebranche, of Leibnitz, Kant, and Hegel, are little more than names to most English students."

He believes that Kant, Hegel, and Schopenhauer have not been fairly appreciated by English students, because they have not been thoroughly understood. Professor Bowen's object, therefore, has been to furnish an exposition of their systems which should be intelligible and comprehensive enough to enable the student to estimate their merits and defects. He has particularly endeavoured to give a complete analysis of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, as he considers that book to contain a key to German metaphysics. It is refreshing to find in this book how thoroughly its author combines the earnest Christian with the cultured philosopher. As an illustration of this we quote the following:—

"No man can be an earnest student of philosophy without arriving at definite convictions respecting the fundamental truths of theology. In my own case nearly forty years of diligent inquiry and reflection concerning these truths have served only to enlarge and confirm the convictions with which I began, and which are inculcated in this book. I have studied faithfully most of what the philosophy of these modern times and the science of our own day assume to teach, and the result is, I am now more firmly convinced than ever that what has been justly called the 'dirt philosophy' of materialism and fatalism is baseless and false. I accept with unhesitating conviction and belief the doctrine of one personal God, the Creator and Governor of the world, and one Lord Jesus Christ, in whom dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily, and in the literature of modern infidelity I have found nothing which, in my mind, casts even the slightest doubt upon that belief." He also adds that "the civilisation which is not based upon Christianity is big with the elements of its own destruction."

In the introductory chapter we have a history of philosophy in the seventeenth century. In contrasting the sixteenth with the seventeenth century philosophy he observes, "The leading philosophers of the sixteenth were great scholars, rather than great thinkers. They hunted out and collated all manuscripts; with indefatigable zeal and industry they translated, annotated, and lectured on Plato and Aristotle." But of the seventeenth he says, "They no longer deigned to controvert ancient philosophy or mediæval metaphysics, but passed them by as obsolete, perhaps with silent contempt, and busied themselves with an attempt to reconstruct the philosophical edifice from its foundations. They accepted nothing upon authority; they borrowed not a stick nor stone from those that went before them." The most comprehensive analyses in the book are those upon Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Hartmann.

We would call the special attention of the English student to the chapters in which the works of the two last-mentioned authors are treated. We think he will find there the most accurate and comprehensive exposition of modern German pessimism to be found in the English language. In speaking of the pessimism of Hartmann, Professor Bowen says, "The Philosophy of the Unconscious is a great improvement upon the doctrine of Schopenhauer, though it is built in the main on the same foundations, and often seems to arrive at similar results. But the qualifications of his predecessor's opinions are numerous and important, and are generally such as to take away much of their offensive character, and to prepare them, perhaps after further modification, for general acceptance. Thus, he is nominally a pessimist; but he also fully accepts and defends the doctrine of Leibnitz, that this is the best of all possible worlds, making this qualification, however, that though it is the best possible, it is still so bad that it would be better for us all if it did not exist at all."

But Leibnitz also teaches the inevitable character of what he calls "metaphysical evil," which even omnipotence could no more obviate than it could create two mountains without a valley between them. At the worst, then, Hartmann only exaggerates the amount of this "metaphysical evil;" and therefore I cannot see why he has not as good a right to be called an optimist as either Leibnitz or Pope. In fact, his pessimism appears rather speculative and theoretical in character than earnest and profound. It is only his rhetorical presentation of the old difficulty, which all theologians feel the weight of, respecting the origin of evil. He is *not* a misanthrope, he has not a suspicious and gloomy temperament, and his experience of life has not been so unhappy as was that of Schopenhauer. Hence, if he should be entirely cured of the malady which has so long crippled him, and if his family should increase in number and contentment, his admirers may well hope to learn that he has abjured pessimism as bravely as he has already renounced his inclination to dabble in poetry and the fine arts.

To all who take an interest in the history of philosophy we cordially recommend this book.

Bryce's Ancient British Church.

The Ancient British Church. An Historical Essay. By John Pryce, M.A., Vicar of Bangor. London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1878.

The preface sufficiently explains the origin of this book, and prepares us for its defects and excellences. "The following essay," writes the author, "having been adjudged to be the best on *The Ancient British Church* of the essays submitted for

competition at the National Eisteddfod of 1876, I have not felt myself at liberty to introduce alterations except in the way of phrase and illustration, together with the addition of some of the notes and the latter part of Chapter V. The necessity of keeping closely in my treatment of the subject to the lines marked out by the committee in their programme, is my apology for the disproportionate length at which I have discussed some points, and for the consequent want of symmetry which I feel pervades the whole essay." The result of adhering to such a plan is that the quality of the book is about as unequal as it could well be. Some topics are discussed with great erudition and skill; others are hurried over, to the dissatisfaction of the reader, who finds that, instead of having lighted upon a synopsis of all that is known concerning the early British Church, he must read much that he would fain not read, and turn elsewhere for much that he was justified in expecting to meet with here. And certainly the additions in Chapter V. to the Essay, as it originally stood, are the weakest part of the book. By no ingenuity can the existence of the ancient British Church be prolonged beyond the year 1188, when Baldwin, Archbishop of Canterbury, preached the crusade through Wales, and received in every Welsh diocese due recognition of his supremacy; and Mr. Pryce would have done better had he closed his history at that date, or, indeed, four centuries earlier. A sketch of the origin of Welsh Calvinistic Methodism, in the course of which Mr. Charles is defended from the charge that he bitterly repented his share in the formation of the Association in 1811, and at the same time strangely accused of "outrunning the will of God:" an attempt to urge re-union amongst Welsh Christians, which starts with such a grotesque position as "that while among the Welsh dissenting bodies piety is degenerating into a series of short-lived emotions, which, stirred up for a moment, under the influence of stirring appeals to the feelings, die away amidst the duties and trials of life, there is, on the other hand, in the Church a deepening of the spiritual life," it was surely not wisdom upon the part of Mr. Pryce to waste his own time and to irritate his reader by additions of this character, especially when as his admirable notes show, he was capable of much better things.

If we omit all matters which do not belong to Mr. Pryce's subject, and which, it is but fair to add, occupy relatively only a small part of his book, we have much to say in its favour. Evidently no pains have been spared in research; and the facts thereby discovered are narrated with precision and distinctness, and often with much grace. The most interesting question connected with the ancient British Church is undoubtedly—when and by whom was that Church founded? Unfortunately that question is one which cannot be answered with any confidence.

We have reliable testimony to the existence of Christianity in Britain in the latter part of the second century in Tertullian's extant words, that "places in Britain not yet visited by the Romans had been subjugated to Christ." (These words occur in Tertullian, *Adv. Judæos*, which Mr. Pryce, following Haddan, dates A.D. 208, but which, according to perhaps better authorities, might be dated seven years earlier.) It is almost certain, too, that Christianity was introduced into Britain from Gaul. Whether by missionaries from Lyons, shortly before the outbreak of persecution in that city in A.D. 177, as Mr. Pryce supposes, or, as seems more likely, by the irregular efforts of Christians in the Roman legions, and of civilians who visited Britain for purposes of trade, it is impossible to say. But there are indications that for several generations Christianity took but feeble hold of the people of the land, and was confined mainly to Roman residents and such of the natives as were brought into closest contact with Romanising influences. Mr. Pryce probably overrates what he calls "the providential preparation of the Britons for the reception of the Gospel," their national characteristics disposing them, as he argues, speedily to accept Christianity, which would be further recommended to them by its affinity with their previous national creed. If the Galatians were members of the Cymric branch of the Celtic race—and probabilities largely favour that view—we ought to expect to find Christianity after its introduction into Britain passing through much the same stages as marked its early history among the Galatians, impulse playing a larger part in the process than conviction, and passionate attachment to the cruel creed of their forefathers retarding the advance of the gentler Gospel.

Although after the opening of the fourth century the dearth of information about the British Church ceases to be almost total, there are but a few incidents, separated frequently by an interval of several generations, that can be disentangled from the legends that obscure them. The martyrdom of St. Alban, if divested of all the romance and marvel wherewith subsequent veneration draped it, is the earliest event that can with any confidence be regarded as historical. Three British bishops were present at the Council of Arles, and more than three at the Council of Ariminium. Then follow St. Ninian's mission to Galloway, the replanting of the faith in Ireland by St. Gildas, the visit of Germanus and Lupus, and their successful opposition to a spreading Pelagianism, the hallelujah victory, the local synods of Llanddewi-Brefi and Caerleon-on-Usk, and the foundation of a few monasteries; and hardly anything more is known of the external history of the British Church until it appears in conflict with Augustine at the Conference of Austcliffe. Mr. Pryce not only describes these events about as fully as they can be described

without a free use of the imagination, but he gathers from different sources much information as to the organisation of the Church, its ritual and its peculiar usages. The foundation, ever-varying boundaries, and early history of the different Welsh sees receive as much attention as even at an Eisteddfod they deserve. Monasticism is traced in its spread through Wales, and in its influences upon the ferocity that surrounded it and upon the future, though it may well be doubted whether the link between practical Christian heroism and the monkish suppression of affection is as close as Mr. Pryce supposes. A few clear paragraphs contain an outline of the history of the relationships between the Welsh and the English Churches, until, all differences in observance having disappeared, in about the ninth century the two Churches became one. That the supremacy of Canterbury over Wales has been marked occasionally by imprudence, by nepotism, and by several other faults, no one can reasonably doubt; nor can any one reasonably fear that the errors of the past will be repeated generally in the future.

Memorials of Samuel Clark.

Memorials of the Life and Letters of the Rev. Samuel Clark, late Principal of Battersea Training College, Rector of Eaton Bishop. Edited by his Wife. Macmillan. 1879.

If the late Frederick Denison Maurice had been rewarded in proportion to the influence which he exercised on Church of England thought, he ought at least to have been made Archbishop of Canterbury. Bishop Colenso, in the preface to a little volume of sermons preached at Forncett St. Mary's, long before the famous Zulu began his disquieting inquiries, speaks of Maurice as the father of his mind. Mr. Llewellyn Davies and Mr. Harry Jones are both Mauricians. Men like Mr. Haweis and Mr. Stopford Brooke owe him much more than perhaps they themselves imagine. We should like to see a careful study of the relation between Dean Stanley and the late Cambridge moral philosophy professor; we feel sure that even here the influence of Maurice has been great.

And this influence is due not only to the force of an intellect which was rather subtle than commanding, but also to two quite distinct causes. First, the character of the man was so lovely and so loveable that it irresistibly drew to him those with whom he came in contact. His father, the subject of this memoir testifies, was the most unselfish of men; and his son inherited this fascinating trait. Next, Maurice was intellectually not subtle only, but hazy. To outsiders he seemed always in a fog; and though his own footing was firm, though he made his own way steadily enough, and held to the last a well-defined position, he

did not always succeed in securing this position for his followers. Hence he was naturally a rallying point for restless minds. Men who in the last or the earlier part of the present century would have seceded, held their ground because Maurice, with whom they felt they had something in common, declared himself a steady well-satisfied Churchman. A generation ago, the current phrases among advanced thinkers were: "Maurice has made Christianity possible for me." "I'm a Churchman, as Maurice is."

The subject of this memoir, however, was very different from the lax unsettled theorists who once formed the rank and file of the Maurice school, and many of whom have, ere now, probably gone in for Tyndalism or something like it. He felt that his mission was to work and not to theorise, and he deemed not only that it was impossible for him to work unattached, but that, as a Christian, he must attach himself to a body which had on its side the prestige of antiquity and organisation. The way in which the young Quaker is led first to join (if not to set going) the party of reform in his own body; and then, feeling the want in the Society of Friends of many things inseparably connected with the true idea of a church, to go over to the Church of England, is traced in the early part of these *Memorials* in a very interesting way. One of Mr. Clark's pupils, Mr. Evan Davies, in a long and delightful letter, printed in the Introdnction, speaks of him as a sound Churchman, somewhat of the old school. No doubt he became so, but there is at the outset no sign of any very fervent Church feeling. It was his surroundings which determined his future. Falling in with the Maurices, and being plied with the arguments which were afterwards reproduced in that first of F. D. Maurice's works, *The Kingdom of Christ*, he became a member of the Established Church. Had he come under other influences, he might have become a Romanist, a Methodist, a Presbyterian. All we can find in him at the time when the change was beginning, is a deep dissatisfaction with the deadness and formality of the system in which he had been brought up, above all, with the compatibility of so much talk about special spiritual influences with thorough worldliness, and at the same time a longing, inevitable in such a mind, for such an organisation as the Society of Friends has not.

Maurice proved to the young Quaker that the Anglican Church had all that he longed for—the sacraments, which his own body kept in the background, the breadth which contrasted with their exclusiveness, the spirituality which he found wanting in what claimed to be an especially spiritual body. To understand at all the working of young Mr. Clark's mind, one must read *The Kingdom of Christ* along with these *Memorials*; but, as we said, the conclusion we have come to is that the special form of

Christianity which he adopted was due to the influence under which he was placed. Held spell-bound by the Maurices, he did not pause to consider the claims of other Christian churches, into which drifted (he tells us) some of his young friends, disappointed, like he was, at the failure of this attempt to reform Quakerism from within.

Of Mr. Clark's life there is not much to tell. Born in Southampton, in 1810, the youngest of a Quaker family of ten children, he early showed signs of what was to be his strong point as a man. Some of the elder children had taught him the rudiments of astronomy, whereupon he read more of the subject, and constructed transparencies of the planets out of old bandboxes, and gave a lecture which his audience thought worthy an embryo Newton. At thirteen he was taken into his father's business. His mother begged he might have a little more schooling, and he went down on his knees to support the petition. But "thou knowest quite enough for what I want of thee," was his father's reply. In those days business hours were long, and holidays very rare. He had always kept a book in his desk to fill up the minutes of leisure; and in this way he read a surprising amount of classics and general literature—surprising, until we note in the extracts from his diaries the very stringent rules by which he bound himself to a certain amount of work every week. He was not wholly unaided; there was a doctor brushing up his rusty Latin and Greek, who read with him and helped him much; there was also a German with whom he read, and to whose rhapsodies on the grandeur of Æschylus and the glories of the Acropolis he would listen with delight. It is characteristic that he introduces the story with the remark, "I was young and inexperienced, and he was unscrupulous, so we read on Sunday." The same feeling leads him later in life elaborately to justify the plan which he had adopted of writing letters on Sunday.

When he was about seventeen the Maurices came to Southampton. James Maurice, the father, was struck with the intellectual deadness of the place, and soon strove to give life to the Mechanics' Institute, the Literary Institution, &c. In this work he met young Clark, and at once took in hand to guide his reading and advise him as to his future. By-and-by, but not before he had thoroughly passed under Maurice's influence, Mr. S. Clark went as partner into Darton's book-shop on Holborn Hill, and soon after he had settled in London was baptised by F. D. Maurice, in St. Saviour's, Southwark. But having joined the Anglican Church, he seems very soon to have felt that longing to do something for which, till quite lately, that Church made no other provision than taking orders. One who wanted to work must get ordained; and, as Mr. S. Clark wanted to work, he determined

to get ordained. This he accomplished in a manner which at once marks the energy of the man and how he was helped by circumstances. He was able to arrange with the authorities of Magdalen Hall (now Hertford College), Oxford, on the one hand, and with Messrs. Darton on the other, for an irregular residence at the University, broken by turns at business, and in this way (including a longish spell of foreign travel) protracted through seven years. While keeping terms, he employed his evenings in writing to help to pay his expenses. He early showed ability in map-drawing; several of the best sets of maps published by the National Society were drawn by him, and the geographical numbers of *Peter Parley's* series are from his pen. His mode of residence, of course, precluded him from going in for honours; but he read hard, and went to whatever University lectures were going on. His notes on Oxford men and things are amusing. Sewell seems to have struck him, though he began by abusing his favourite Carlyle; and when, in a later lecture, Sewell actually finds in Carlyle a complete scheme of Church government, he becomes quite enthusiastic in his praise. Clearly an apostolic manner, positive and yet vague, still had a charm for the ex-Quaker. The companion of his travels was Mr., now Sir Edward, Strachey, who continued his friend and correspondent through life. Among other places they went to Greece; and Mr. Clark earned the Oxford *sobriquet* of "Athenian Clark" through buying a fish in the Piræus in the very words of Aristophanes. His letters from abroad are very lively; indeed all those describing his various tours are well worth reading.

Finally, severing the connection with Messrs. Darton, he was ordained to a curacy, but only held it a few weeks, being appointed Vice-Principal of St. Mark's Training College, under the Rev. Derwent Coleridge. Here his talents as a lecturer soon became apparent, and some years after he was made Principal of Battersea College, which he soon raised to a very high degree of efficiency.

Ill-health, his enemy through life, made him at length resign, and accept the living of Bradwardine, in Herefordshire, from which he was a few years before his death duly promoted to the neighbouring living of Eaton Bishop. He devoted the comparative leisure of his parochial charge to writing various parts of the so-called Speaker's Commentary.

The book abounds with evidence of his kindliness of nature and readiness to sympathise with men of various views; it is throughout the record of a busy, uneventful, very useful life, but for most readers we think the chief interest will be in the earlier part—that which shows how the young Quaker was, thanks to Maurice and Oxford, transformed into a firm Churchman. Mr. Clark never went with F. D. Maurice in his social theories; there

is a letter to Mr. Ludlow disavowing "Christian socialism" altogether. At the same time, he points out that "thee" and "thou" was in Fox's day a proper protest against class distinctions. People thee'd and thou'd their dependents and the poor; and, but for the Quaker protest, the usage might have become stereotyped, as it has abroad.

Rainy's The Bible and Criticism.

The Bible and Criticism. Four Lectures by Robert Rainy, D.D. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

The design running through these lectures is to show the compatibility of Biblical criticism with the strictest faith. The author evidently wishes to disarm the suspicions and fears which ordinary Christians are apt to entertain towards anything which even appears to call in question the accuracy of any detail in Scripture, and to vindicate the rights and functions of a reverent, well-guarded criticism. Thus in the first introductory lecture we read: "Those who love the Bible are apt to be impatient at the substance and the manner of the questions raised. Criticism comes in with assertions based on microscopic points that have no apparent connection with edification; it takes liberties with things that the Christian heart delights to reverence. To be obliged to think whether something is true about a minute point in the Bible, which is difficult to harmonise with Christian faith and devoutness, is discomposing, even if the difficulty is successfully solved. Why torment us with it? Or, if unbelievers will make work of that kind, why should those who are not unbelievers help them? If the Bible be the Bible, let us have the comfort of using it for our daily necessities without disturbance. However these things may be, one thing must be said. It would be a great mistake to look upon criticism as only a source of troubles and difficulties for people who read their Bibles. Criticism has performed, and continues to perform, the most essential service to the Christian faith. It both enables us to construct our historical evidences, and it throws light in a thousand ways upon the Bible and its teaching. There may be those who do not want to be troubled with it, and who would willingly part with its aid if they could, at the same time, get rid of its embarrassments. These are not wise Christians. And there may be others who may be very willing to take the aid of criticism, if only they may be allowed to shut their eyes when its aspect becomes less helpful. Those are not honest Christians. Either way, there is no help for it. This is one of the things we must reckon with, and the more deliberately and calmly the better."

Every one knows the sensitiveness and jealousy of Scotch orthodoxy—a fact in every respect honourable to the Scotch

character. It must be extremely difficult with such an audience to gain a hearing for a study which professes to criticise the records of Divine revelation. Dr. Rainy's object is to show that, setting aside the absurd lengths to which criticism has been pushed, it is still capable of being turned to good account in the service of faith. Thus, his work is rather apologetic for sound criticism as against morbid fear than apologetic for sound faith against rationalistic criticism. The latter is ruled out of court altogether. The lecturer argues only with believers, on the ground and within the lines of faith. This is the point of view announced in the first introductory lecture and maintained throughout. In the same lecture a very happy illustration, too long for quotation, is given of the nature, methods, and results of criticism from a supposed case of family letters, whose date, order, and authenticity are to be settled by internal and external evidence. In all the lectures in the same way the discussion of abstract principles is enlivened by interesting cases in point. Criticism is defined as "the science of the means by which a book has its character and place in history determined." It takes account of the date of a book, "its authorship; the relations in which its statements, its style, its thinking, stand to the modes of statement, and forms of style, and currents of thought of the past; the sources on which it draws; the effects it has produced; the notices of it that have occurred since its appearance, also the discrimination of its various parts, if perhaps different parts of it have to be ascribed to different sources and different periods, and have afterwards come together." It is pointed out that criticism is by no means limited to the field of Scripture, but is applicable to the entire domain of literature. The Bible comes within its sphere as a literary product. Faith in the divinity of Scripture upon higher grounds does not make the work of criticism superfluous. "Sometimes this study yields results that promote the full understanding and right use of Scripture teaching. Sometimes, again, the result for the interpretation of the Scriptures, or for edification, may seem to be little or none. But in either case it is part of our duty to knowledge, to investigate whatever can be investigated; and it is part of our duty to the Bible to know all about every aspect of it that can be known."

We have noticed only a few points in the first lecture, which is not the most interesting of the series. The whole volume is marked by great vigour and clearness both of thought and style. Dr. Rainy advocates a candid, fearless faith. He holds it to be an attribute of strong faith in the divinity of Christianity that it need not fear the results of the most searching inquiry and can afford to be generous to opponents. "I wish there were a more general recognition, in some quarters, of the peculiar kind of en-

thusiasm which animates many workers on this line. It is the enthusiasm of an intense faith in the truth of Christianity, in Divine supernatural revelation. It is a burning confidence in this, that the strictest and most thorough historical investigation, if quite strict and thorough, will exhibit the track of a revealing God, moving down through history, in a manner that will prove irresistible, and will rise over against all the scientific certainties so as to command the assent of men no less cogently than they do. This enthusiasm may be sanguine, like other enthusiasms. It may not always be wise. It may play into the hands of the enemy by concessions which do not represent what is due to truth, but rather what is suggested by a too eager confidence. Some of those to whom I ascribe it belong to schools of theology from which I am far removed; some of them deem it honest, and according to the facts, to take up positions on critical questions which I, endeavouring to put together the various lines of evidence, cannot share and must oppose, which I regard as neither sound nor safe. But all that does not hinder me from recognising this enthusiasm as a thoroughly believing one, and honouring accordingly those whom it inspires."

The Mystery of Miracles.

The Mystery of Miracles. By the Author of "The Supernatural in Nature." London: C. Kegan Paul and Co. 1879.

The anonymous author undertakes to show the harmony of science and faith, of the natural and supernatural. The prime requisite for such a task—mastery of the facts and principles of science—he possesses in abundant measure. On this field he must command, or at least deserves, the respect of professed scientists. His work, while somewhat peculiar in form and style, is really remarkable for thoughtfulness and genuine eloquence. In this respect a high key-note is struck and uniformly sustained. The volume is suggestive and stimulating in the highest degree. A certain unity of subject binds together the brief essays or chapters, which are somewhat eccentrically headed "Thought I., Thought II.," &c. We have perhaps no right to say that greater simplicity of style might be desirable, for this would be to erect our own taste into a standard for others. All that we can require of a writer is that his style shall be free from defect and affectation, and this the style of the present volume is. The richness of poetical expression is evidently "to the manner born." The titles of some of the twenty-seven "Thoughts" will indicate the line of argument and discussion pursued: "Inner Impulse to the Miraculous, Cosmical and Mental Analogies, The Universe a Complement of Intellect, Symbols, Spiritual Insight, Action of

Spirit on Matter, Mechanical View of the World." Other Thoughts deal with topics like the denial of miracles unscientific, miracles probable, reasonable, natural, credible, and capable of proof. These subjects are illustrated with great wealth of analogy and proof.

The author has a poet's eye for detecting analogies and resemblances. He loves to trace in nature presentiments and prophecies of the supernatural. The miraculous thus becomes the natural. A favourite thought with him is the gradation which binds together all existences, from the lowest to the highest, into one grand unity. "There is no rock-barrier between the natural and supernatural. If the finger of God touch the trigger marvellous things are done: done softly, done blessedly, done without observation; yet they hold back the wind, send rain, bring prosperity, renewal of life; and, sometimes, so grandly that nations are amazed." "One grand system of life and intelligence occupies the world. Every living creature proceeds from a germ, which has power to build up the organism with all its members and faculties. There is no great difference between the process by which is born the wild ass's colt and that by which man is brought forth. The advance from low to high degree is by an immense number of grades, contemporary or successive, from the undifferentiated particle to the sublime human organism. The plant grows from a germ, first in the dark, then through sunshine and rain, producing stem, leaves, flowers, and fruit. From zoophytic life up to the mammalia is another vast ascending scale; not only in bodily perfection, but in animating principle—whatever that may be—lifting up dull, sluggish automatism, hovering on border of the insensate, to the speechless reason of the elephant and dog; thence to human intellect and language. To every seed, to every kind, belong its own powers of growth, or of automatism, or of sensation, or of sensibility, or of all of them, in the ranks from lowest dulness to the fullest splendour of intelligence. Throughout all this range and curious variety, from the glimmer of the glow-worm to the genius that blazes in the human countenance, there is that unity of power and plan which shows that the whole comes from one and the same universal and eternal source."

A proposition of Spinoza's is thus commented on:—"The statement 'Miracles are impossible' cannot be maintained; it is a pure negative extending over all time, space, circumstance; and, except by an omniscient being, is incapable of scientific verification. The assertion, 'There is no transcendental beginning,' can only be maintained on the assumption that nature is, and ever was, in itself organically and eternally complete; for want of completion in any of its parts would render the whole to that extent imperfect. That which has no beginning cannot grow in

beauty and power, otherwise every act of growth would be a partial beginning. It cannot, at any time, occupy a new place; must remain eternally the same, or move in a series of recurring cycles, in which is neither first nor last, beginning nor end. . . . In contrast with such boastful statements concerning God and the world, and in proof that even a small part of that world cannot be fully searched out, remember that no one can tell the secret of atomic obedience in the familiar changes from ice to steam; nor tell the acting law of the pressures and resistances which a flying bird encounters all around from the atmosphere; nor are the forces at work in our finger-nail, or in our hairs, or in the hair of a nettle, scientifically understood. Think of the entomologist, Pierre Lyonnet, devoting many years to the study of one insect, *Phalæna cossus*—a caterpillar which infects the willow tree. The book describing and figuring it is a quarto-volume of more than 600 pages, adorned with eighteen plates. The number of muscles alone, all described and figured, is 4,041. The labour, nevertheless, did not acquire all the knowledge; nor does the book narrate all that is to be narrated; nor do the plates, nor the muscles described and figured, reveal more than a small part of the mystery and the wonder contained in that one insect."

Grimm's New Testament Lexicon.

Lexicon Græco-Latinum in Libros Novi Testamenti, auctore C. L. W. Grimm. Leipsic, 1879. London: Williams and Norgate.

This work is a complete dictionary, in Latin, of the Greek of the New Testament, and gives in alphabetical order all the words there used, and all their inflexions. A special feature is that it contains all the forms brought to light by the textual researches of Lachmann, Tischendorf, and Tregelles, and adopted in their critical editions of the Greek Testament. Another feature is that, with the exception of very common words, every passage is noted in which each word is found; and this is indicated by an asterisk. This is done even for such words as δικαιοσύνη, πίστις, πιστεύω, χάρις. The work is, therefore, practically a concordance as well as a lexicon. The use of each word by the classic writers, by Philo and Josephus, and by the Christian Fathers, is carefully noted, and apposite quotations from all these sources are given. The references to the Septuagint are specially valuable. And there are quotations from the best modern grammarians and commentators.

We are not sure that the work before us can claim to have contributed much original matter to New Testament philology. But as a collection of facts, gathered with great care and toil

from all sources and arranged in a very convenient form, it is invaluable.

In the April number of this journal a review was given of another New Testament lexicon, that of Dr. Cremer. This work differs from that of Dr. Grimm as being not so much grammatical as theological. And, while Dr. Grimm gives every word in the New Testament, Dr. Cremer discusses only those words of which the meaning has been moulded and developed by Christianity; and discusses them at much greater length, as expressions of the new life breathed into human thought and speech by the voice of Christ. Dr. Grimm's book is specially designed for those beginning the study of the Greek Testament; Dr. Cremer's work is rather for those who have made some entrance into its outer grammatical form, and are seeking its inner significance. We do not hesitate to say that Dr. Cremer's lexicon deserves a place on every minister's bookshelf. But Dr. Grimm's book is even more indispensable. It meets the need of the youngest student, and is of undiminished value to the advanced scholar. It is about a sixth larger than Cremer's lexicon, and can be had in this country, well bound, for about fifteen shillings, and the money cannot be more profitably spent. We cordially recommend it to our readers.

Wycliffe to Wesley.

Wycliffe to Wesley. Heroes and Martyrs of the Church in Britain. One Volume. Wesleyan Conference Office. 1879.

This is a most attractive volume of biography, and one which we especially commend to the authorities of Sunday-school libraries. It contains within the compass of 250 pages short accounts of the lives of the most eminent leaders in the religious life of this country during the stirring times which elapsed from the fourteenth to the eighteenth century. Wycliffe, Tyndale, Knox, Latimer, Baxter, Bunyan, Howe, Watts, and Wesley, not to name others mentioned in the twenty-one sketches of this volume, are among the noblest names in our national history, and every effort to make them more widely known and their memory more fervently cherished in our day is as commendable as it is necessary.

The sketches in this volume are necessarily short, often far too short for anything like a fair presentation of the life under review; but they are full of interest, and are rich in lessons of courage, fidelity, and all nobility of character.

We regret, however, that each of the notices is so detached from all else in the volume; had they been linked so as to show the continuity of the work of God committed in turn to these

"Heroes and Martyrs of the Church," both interest and information would have been added to the volume. This omission is especially noticeable in the first part: Wycliffe prepared the way for Tyndale, Tyndale and Coverdale were united in the work of Biblical translation, and they were together the means of the conversion of John Rogers. Rogers, in his turn, carried on the task by his edition of *The Matthew Bible*, in which, by his notes, he furnished the first general English commentary. All this is the history of one work carried on by many workers, and we think it would have been wise to point out links of connection; a few dates and notes of contemporary English history were all that was needed. The history of the Church is one, and, in volumes similar to the one before us, it seems to us necessary to point out the proofs of God in history, fulfilling Himself and perfecting His work in many ways. Here is the true doctrine of Development.

We must refer to the general appearance of the book. It is clearly printed, largely and admirably illustrated: some of the woodcuts, notably that of Archbishop Usher on p. 118, in clearness, depth, and strength of outline are excellent specimens of the engraver's art.

Haggard's Creation as a Divine Synthesis.

Creation as a Divine Synthesis. A Contemplative Treatise concerning the Inter-Relations between Deity and His Creation, as Discoverable by and to the Human Understanding. By Wm. N. Haggard. London: J. Ridsdale, 27, Ivy Lane, Paternoster Row. 1878. All Rights Reserved.

The author proposes to furnish "to the scientific and philosophic mind a theology which is intelligible to the human understanding," and then proceeds to expatiate through one hundred and fifty pages on "concretive universes, creation, or the totiety of concretive universes," on "sentionalising, sensito-emotionalising, mentalising," and still more unintelligible things. In order to make the new theology intelligible to us, he even translates the Prologue of St. John and the Nicene Creed into this jargon. But it is all of no use. Probably because ours are not "scientific and philosophic" minds, though we believe our understandings are "human," the author seems to us to be somewhere in the clouds. Mr. Haggard, to judge from the quotations, is very fond of Swedenborg, but we hope that even Swedenborg would not adopt such nonsense. J. S. Mill spoke of worlds in which two and two might make five. In such worlds Mr. Haggard's book might possibly be understood. Almost the only sentence that we agree with or understand we are happy to quote, italics and all: "No doubt the Darwinian theory is true, *so far as it legitimately goes.*"

Argyll's Eastern Question.

The Eastern Question, from the Treaty of Paris, 1856, to the Treaty of Berlin, 1878, and to the Second Afghan War. By the Duke of Argyll. Two Volumes. London: Strahan and Co.

Two bulky volumes on the everlasting Eastern Question, the first volume and two-fifths of the second dealing with the Turkish branch of the subject, the remainder with the difficulties which have sprung up in Afghanistan. The history of the work is this. The noble author was prevented by indisposition from taking his place in the late Parliamentary discussions, and employed his time in drawing up a connected history of the question on all sides. Thus we have the substance of many speeches. In one respect the Duke's illness was not unfortunate. His history will have a permanent value, such as could not attach to speeches which are forthwith buried in the pages of Hansard. No such exhaustive treatment of the subject has previously appeared. To those for whom political questions have a perennial charm no more instructive study could be recommended than the present work. Many of those who dissent from its conclusions will refer to it as a repertory of facts and dates. These it is always possible to separate from the criticisms. The author says in the Preface: "I have endeavoured throughout to make it quite clear as to what is stated as fact, what is direct quotation, what is my own representation of the effect of documents not quoted *in extenso*, what is inference, and what is comment. I cannot hope that among materials extending over several thousand pages I have made no mistakes, but at least I can say that I have taken pains to be accurate." Every one who knows the style of the author will know that he is pre-eminent for clearness and vigour both of thought and statement, and there is abundant evidence of these qualities in the volumes before us. The clearness is almost judicial. Many of the chapters might have been read from the bench. The desire to be fair is just as conspicuous. The criticism, while trenchant enough, never passes into invective and

declamation. The reasons are always set forth at length, so that every one can judge how far they sustain the inferences. Considering the connections of the author, his utter fearlessness and honesty are altogether admirable, and still more his burning sympathy with the downtrodden and oppressed. These are the qualities which are the very salt of the public life of England.

There is no more prevalent delusion than that respecting the independence of Turkey, and, accordingly, in his first chapter the Duke sets himself to discuss the question in the light of the treaties of 1856. All parties alike must allow that the independence belonging to Turkey is, and has long been, of a very modified kind. What sort of independence is that which it needed the arms of two foreign Powers to defend in 1854, and which became the subject of treaties between the several European States? It is quite true that by the Treaty of Paris "the Sublime Porte is admitted to participate in the advantages of the public law and system of Europe." From the circumstances of the case this did not and could not mean that Turkey was placed on an equal footing with the other Powers. It simply meant that a government which previously had been outside the European family, an outlaw, at the mercy of Russia or any other Power, should now have a place in the family. A general European protectorate was substituted for an exclusively Russian protectorate. If Turkey could not stand alone before the war, still less could it do so after the war. The treaties did not bar the right of other Powers to interfere, as previously, on just cause shown. They only laid down the principle that the interference should be exercised under the supervision of Europe, instead of by each Power separately. Here is a crucial proof. By the famous "Capitulations" Europeans resident in Turkey are withdrawn from Turkish jurisdiction and subjected to European jurisdiction. "There is no part of the law of nations more thoroughly understood and more universally recognised than the principle that within its own territory every Government has supreme jurisdiction over all persons. If men choose to live in countries other than their own, they must submit to the laws of the State in which they live. There is not one of the civilised States of Europe which would not resent it as an intolerable pretension on the part of any foreigner that he should claim any exemption from its laws or from the jurisdiction of its Courts. Yet this is precisely the pretension which all the European Powers not only make but insist upon on behalf of their own subjects as against the Government of Turkey." Lord Russell said in 1862: "The Capitulations rest on the principle that Turkish rule and Turkish justice are so barbarous that exceptional privileges are required. No one would think of separate tribunals for Englishmen in France or for Frenchmen in England; but so

long as law in Turkey is undefined, so long as pashas are allowed to sell justice and protection, so long will the privileges of the consular tribunals be necessary." The Prince Consort defined the object of the treaties of 1856 as "the cancelling of all previous Russian treaties, and the substitution of an European for a Russian protectorate of the Christians, or rather of European protection for a Russian protectorate." And again Lord Derby said in 1876: "As to the obligations imposed on us by treaty to do what in us lies to protect the subject-races of Turkey from misgovernment, the obligation to intervene for the protection of the empire from external attack implies a corresponding duty of control." It may be convenient to describe a State in such a condition as independent, but "dependent" would be more in accordance with facts.

Two very full and able chapters deal with the condition of Turkey, and the conduct to it of the European Powers, between 1856 and 1875. The evidence adduced as to the unchanged character of the Government, despite promises and firmans, is unanimous; and it is the evidence of British consuls like Taylor and Zohrab in Asiatic, and Holmes, Stuart, and Longworth in European Turkey. Present events show only too clearly the backwardness of Russian civilisation. But in this world things go by comparison. The question is a choice, not between Russia and England, but between Russia and Turkey. Who are so well qualified to judge on this question as the Christians who are actually subjects of Turkey? What is the explanation of the constant emigration that went on from Turkish to Russian ground, both on the Asiatic and European side? Consul Taylor in 1869 reports that in one district "750 families have within the last six years emigrated to Russia, whilst 500 more have sent this year representatives to Erivan to negotiate a similar step." We need not quote from the consular reports accounts of the fearful outrages to which Christian families were subjected. The wholesale emigration into Austrian territory is matter of public notoriety, and has formed the subject of diplomatic negotiations. The suggestion that the emigration was stimulated by foreign agencies is wholly without evidence and is contradicted by every probability. We know the burden which has thus been imposed on Austria. With respect to the general charge that the insurrections and disturbances of the Christians were instigated from without, we may observe that the charge was made just as much against Austria, with which England has acted throughout in cordial alliance, as against Russia. In a despatch of March 24, 1873, Consul Holmes classes Austria and Russia together in this respect (p. 80). Probably there was as much foundation for the charge in one case as in the other. On the subject of foreign interference the Duke of Argyll says: "On October 8, 1876, Mr.

Baring felt constrained to make a most important explanation in respect to one passage of his report on the Bulgarian massacres. He had ascribed the revolt to the work of 'foreign' agitators and emissaries. He desired now to explain that the principal men concerned were all Bulgarians by birth, but had lived many years in Roumania and Servia: it was true they came from abroad, but as regarded Bulgaria they should not be called foreigners. He had never intended to convey the impression that *bonâ fide* foreigners took an active part in the revolt." The Duke then proceeds: "Considering that the liberties of England were secured by the help of foreigners, and that 'intrigues' with them formed a principal part of the work done by the patriots who brought about the Revolution, it does not seem very intelligible why it should be thought a fatal condemnation of insurrections against the Turks that they have been aided and abetted by foreigners. English officials in Turkey like Consul Holmes are never weary of repeating this charge. It is satisfactory, therefore, that as regards the rising in Bulgaria, Mr. Baring puts the facts in their true light. The 'foreigners' were natives who had become accustomed to liberty in lands free from the Turks; and they were the natural leaders of their countrymen in their attempts to throw off the Moslem yoke."

We can only quote a few sentences from the evidence given by our consuls. When Consul Holmes, certainly no prejudiced witness against the Turks, was challenged in 1871 by Sir H. Elliot to substantiate some strong statements about Government officials, he replied: "They are all corrupt. I do not hesitate to say that of all cases of justice, whether between Mussulmans alone or Turks and Christians, ninety out of a hundred are settled by bribery alone." Positive proof is impossible, because "there is a common bond of interest among all classes of Turkish *employés*, which causes them to unite in stifling evidence and preventing exposure." Consul Stuart, in Epirus, says, in 1873: "Notwithstanding the alleged reforms about which so much has been said and written, the inequality between Christian and Mussulman before the law was never more strikingly and openly illustrated than it is at present in the daily practice of the so-called courts of justice. The rights of Christians, when opposed to the claims of Mussulmans, are, in contempt of all law and equity, utterly ignored. . . . . In the matter of taxes, the last farthing is wrung from the Christian; time and indulgence are granted to the Mussulman. The Christian defaulter is handed over to the rigour of the law; the Mussulman is mildly dealt with and easily let off." In the same year Sir H. Elliot sums up the condition of the whole Turkish Empire thus: "Almost all Her Majesty's consuls concurred in reporting that the nominal equality of Mussulmans and Christians before the law, which had never thoroughly existed in

practice, was now in most provinces more illusory than it had been a few years ago."

What were the European Governments doing all this time? Why did they not exert the power of intervention given them by the treaties of 1856? These are questions often asked. It is often said that if former English Ministries had done their duty, no such crisis as that of 1876 would have arisen. Our author shows that the period between 1856 and 1876 was one continuous story of interference up to the full measure allowed by the treaties. The other Governments had been most careful to provide that the promised reforms should be carried out by the Turkish Government itself, and that all appearance of foreign dictation should be avoided. It was for this purpose that the pledges were embodied in a firman issued in the Sultan's name, apparently *proprio motu*, and taken note of as such by the Powers. To have gone beyond strong remonstrance and persuasion would have been to do what Russia did in April, 1877. "Turkey was to be entrusted with the fulfilment of her own promises, and the European Powers did not, as indeed they could not, make themselves responsible for Turkish administration. Yet this, and nothing short of this, would have been the result of any formal and authoritative right of interference in that administration." In May, 1857, by Lord Clarendon's directions, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe remonstrated with the Grand Vizier on the prodigal expenditure on the marriage of the Sultan's daughters. In 1859 Lord Russell writes to our ambassador urging concert between the different ambassadors in pressing reforms on the Government. In 1860 came the massacres in Lebanon, and the direct interference of England and France. In a despatch, dated January, 1861, Lord Russell says: "The Ottoman Ambassador called upon me yesterday, and said he supposed that at the end of the three months Her Majesty's Government would ask at Constantinople for an account of what the Grand Vizier intended to do. I said, an account not of what he intended to do, but of what he had done. The time is past when mere vague promises, little known at Constantinople, and neither known nor regarded in the provinces, can satisfy the European Powers." In 1867 occurred the terrible massacre in Crete, when Lord Stanley absolutely interdicted British men-of-war from carrying away helpless fugitives. In 1870, when the defeat of France showed that one of the old supports of Turkish power was no longer available, England again urged upon Turkey the necessity of strengthening itself and conciliating European regard by internal reforms. What could be clearer than the following warning in a despatch of Lord Granville's in 1870? "Although I am willing to place confidence in the explanations which have been given to Sir. A. Buchanan as to any design being entertained by the

Cabinet of St. Petersburg of a hostile character to Turkey, and although I believe that Russia is not now prepared for war, it is impossible to rely permanently on this state of things. No one can doubt that it is a universal wish in Russia to modify, or even abrogate, the conditions of the treaty of 1856, even if she has no ulterior object of ambition. The last fourteen years have been prosperous to Russia. The material resources of the country have been developed by the emancipation of the serfs, by the extension of commerce and manufactures, by a great development of the railway and telegraphic system, and by an increase of political liberty. Russia believes she is as strong as she ever was. The continuance of the war, or even the conclusion of peace, would favour diplomatic action on her part, and even more decided measures. Her Majesty's Government desires carefully to consider what position it would become this country to take in such a contingency. England made great sacrifices of blood and money during the Crimean war for an object which was deemed to be of great importance both to itself and the rest of Europe. The nation would be loth to see all the results sacrificed which had been thus obtained. But would it be wise, would it be compatible with ordinary prudence, for Great Britain, single-handed, to throw itself into such another struggle? How far could Turkey defend itself even with such assistance as England could afford? Is it fair to Turkey to encourage her in the belief that she may rely on the support of Europe, and with absolute certainty on that of Great Britain? I have already told the Turkish ambassador that I could not give assurances as to future contingencies." Turkey is reminded that "her real safety will depend upon the spirit and feelings of the populations over which she rules," and that "the feelings of the Christian subjects of the Porte will be in favour of the Porte or of Russia, exactly in proportion to the amount of liberty, prosperity, and order which they enjoy under the one, or are likely to obtain under the other." There were remonstrances "in 1871 as regarded Bosnia, in 1872 as regarded Crete, in 1873 as regarded Bosnia again. As regarded Syria in the same year, Lord Granville had to warn and to rebuke." In 1875 Lord Derby wrote to Sir H. Elliot: "I approve your Excellency having communicated a copy of Mr. Brophy's despatch to the Porte respecting the outrages committed on the Bulgarians by Circassians under the guidance of Turkish zaptiehs, and it would be well that you should urge that such atrocities deserve the severest punishment of all concerned." In the presence of such facts, how can it be said that former Governments in England neglected their duty?

The subsequent events—the Berlin Memorandum, the Conference, the political issues of the war, the Congress—are all fully discussed. With respect to the Conference two points are

sharply criticised—first, the discourtesy of settling the affairs of Turkey in its own capital, while the Turkish representative was excluded; and secondly, the refusal of England to enforce the conclusions arrived at by anything stronger than persuasion. It was scarcely worth while for the plenipotentiaries of all Europe to go to Constantinople to do nothing more than make recommendations. Europe had been doing nothing else but making recommendations for twenty years. When Turkey knew that she had nothing to fear from refusal, her decision was quickly taken. The proposals were pared down again and again. The "irreducible minimum" was reduced till scarcely anything was left, only to meet with the same absolute negative. It is indeed impossible to say that the mere threat of compulsion would have been enough to ensure compliance; but the Duke of Argyll gives an instructive illustration of the effect of firmness. It respects the demand of an armistice for Servia. "On October 31, 1876, the Russian Government ordered General Ignatieff to demand from the Porte the acceptance within forty-eight hours of an armistice for six weeks. Should the Porte not accept, the Russian ambassador was to leave Constantinople, and all diplomatic relations were to be broken off. The result is best described in the two following telegraphic despatches from Sir H. Elliot, both dated on November 1—the one at 11.40 A.M., and the second at 7 P.M. The first was, 'Russian ultimatum was sent in last night.' The second was, 'Porte will consent to the demands of the Russian ultimatum, and orders are already sent to the military commanders to suspend all operations. An answer in this sense will be sent to General Ignatieff this evening.'"

Through recent events the Eastern Question has taken large strides towards a just settlement. Time, the laws of God, the best sympathies of human nature fight against wrong and for right. The silent, invisible forces of nature will prove too strong for artificial barriers. The ultimate victory is with the progressive, not with the stationary, races of the world. That justice may be done all round, that the Turkish Government may receive its due, and the Christian peoples, who form the vast majority, may also receive their due, is a wish in which all may join.

Godkin's Life of Victor Emmanuel.

Life of Victor Emmanuel II., First King of Italy. By G. S. Godkin. In Two Volumes. London: Macmillan and Co. 1879.

A CONCISE, unbiassed memoir of King Victor Emmanuel, written for English readers, has hitherto been a desideratum. The want, so far as the conciseness of the record is concerned, is

here supplied; nor is it too much to say that, though writing with an ardent admiration for his subject, our author has, with suppressed emotion, confined himself to a faithful recital of facts. Those facts are the best portrayal of the character of Italy's first King. Victor Emmanuel was eminently a man of action, not a man of ideas. He did not lack sentiments; but they were such as found expression in deeds. There was nothing hidden: there was no wide diversity between his convictions and his conduct that needed harmonising by the skill of a biographer. The King's faults are known: we neither apologise for them nor parade them. The character may have been imperfect: we may detect the absence of some features we would fain have seen, and we could earnestly wish some features absent which are all too obvious; but what was there was consistent with itself. Frank and outspoken, true to his word, faithful to his conception of the duties of his high office, he earned, as a due testimony to his honour and as the descriptive title of his character, the distinction of the honest King—*Il Re galantuomo*—his claim to which title is well told in these volumes. The incident of its first application is thus related:—

One day Massimo D'Azeglio, talking alone with his sovereign, said:

"'There have been so few honest kings in the world, that it would be a grand thing to begin the series.'

"And Victor, looking at him with a smile, asked—

"'Have I to play the part of honest King?'

"'Your Majesty has sworn to the *Statuto*, and has thought of all Italy, and not of Piedmont only. Let us continue in this path, and hold always that a king, as well as an obscure individual, has one word only, and by that he must stand.'

"'Well, in that case,' replied the monarch, 'the profession seems easy to me.'

"'And the *Re galantuomo*, we have him,' concluded the Minister.

"His Majesty was pleased with the title and proud of it. When the register of the census of Turin was brought, and he was asked to sign his name, he wrote, under the head 'Profession,' '*Re galantuomo*.'"

The life of Victor Emmanuel could only be written in a detail of stirring national events—events of so great moment to the history of Italy and of all Europe, and stretching in their influence to the limits of Christendom—events the effect of which must continue to be felt for many generations to come. The special value of the volumes before us lies in their clear recital of these events in as far as Victor Emmanuel was a central figure and an active mover; so that the reader has not so much a private view of the King's life which might gratify a morbid

curiosity, as a view of him as he moved amongst men, and as he influenced the destinies of his nation—those features of his life which distinguished him from the multitude of men around him.

It was needful to precede the memoir by a general view of the condition of Italian society; and a sketch, in the form of introduction, is designed to do this. It is brief, and somewhat limited in its range: otherwise it is suitable to prepare the mind of the reader for the stirring account which follows. A mere glimpse is taken of the state of affairs in the several States; but it is sufficient to show the imperative need for reformation—a reformation which meant revolution.

The entire story explains how so great a reformation was effected with so little bloodshed; how, while on the one hand the peoples groaned for liberty, and the national sentiment so long suppressed by priestly domination burst forth at length into definite expression, on the other hand sagacity, patience, bravery, and heroic patriotism contended against faction within and strong forces without; and how, throughout the whole, those singular combinations of favourable circumstances occurred which, at particular junctures in national history, disclose the working of a hidden power in the sphere of human affairs, and illustrate that doctrine of a Divine supervision which is expressed by the one word providence.

The interesting story begins with Charles Albert, of whom sufficient is said to show the precise conditions under which his son, Victor Emmanuel, began his reign. The star of hope first caught the eye of the Italian patriot in the cold grey of that morning when Massimo D'Azeglio, after a rapid tour throughout the country, testing the condition of the national feeling and sowing the seeds of national life, returned to the King, and, with distrustful heart, explained his errand. He spoke of the disturbed state of the country, the causes and effects of the rebellions, the danger of a great revolution in the event of the Pope's death, of the desire of the more prudent and better-advised to secure the desires of the nation by moderate means, and of the general confidence in Piedmont as the only suitable leader in the national cause. Then, having assured the King that he had never been a member of a secret society, he told him of his dealings with the Liberal party, begging his Majesty to say whether he approved or disapproved of what he had done.

"He paused for a reply, and, according to his preconceived idea of Charles Albert's doubleness, expected an evasive one. Instead of that the King, without a moment's hesitation, fixed his eyes frankly on those of Azeglio, and said in a calm, resolute tone: 'Let those gentlemen know that for the present they must remain quiet; but, when the time comes, let them be certain my

life, the lives of my sons, my arms, my treasures—all shall be freely spent in the Italian cause!'

"Azeglio, whose loyalty till now had been of the coldest, was touched by the King's heroic sentiments, and thanked him with emotion for his confidence. When they both rose to their feet, Charles Albert laid his hands on Azeglio's shoulders, and touched first one cheek and then the other with his own. There was something so solemn, almost funereal, in this embrace, that it somewhat chilled Azeglio's enthusiasm. In after years he said he could never see without a thrill those green silk chairs in the bay window where they sat while the King offered, through him, to his country, all he possessed—even his life."

With this incident the history fairly begins. Victor Emmanuel, as Prince Carignano, speedily appears in view, and on his war-charger, as was most meet, first at Santa Lucia, where, in his first taste of war, he behaved so nobly that a silver medal was awarded to him for his valour; again at Goito, where he received the double honour of a gold medal, and, what to him was a greater honour still, a wound—for by it he shed his blood for Italy; and once again on the fatal field of Novara. Nor do we lose sight of him until the day when the nation, weeping around the mausoleum of its first King, paid its utmost tribute to the faithful citizen and the victorious soldier, up to whom it had learned to look as "IL PADRE DELLA PATRIA."

The chequered course of the history is traced almost too briefly, but through all the record Victor Emmanuel is present. Neither the excitement of scenes of the deepest interest, nor the attraction of persons of the highest eminence, beguiles the biographer from the one life he had undertaken to portray.

Thus the history ends:—"Victor Emmanuel was now at the zenith of his glory; his utmost ambition was attained. He had found Italy oppressed by a host of petty tyrants, dominated by Austria, torn by lawless combinations, misjudged and condemned by the other countries of Europe. She was now a free, united nation, tranquil and law-abiding, respected everywhere. At peace with all the world, beloved and honoured by his people, what was left for him to desire? He might say, with the poet—

'I have touched the highest point of my greatness.'

But he was not happy; and, during the last few months, he had been subject to unaccountable fits of melancholy. That this gloom had its origin in a feeling of dissatisfaction with himself is very probable. Notwithstanding his long and resolute struggle against clerical pretensions, Victor Emmanuel had preserved a simple child-like faith in the religion he had been taught at his mother's knee; and, through all the stormy passions of his fitful career, he had preserved sacred the image of his pure young wife, whose

memory he revered as that of a saint. In Turin, where he passed the autumn of this year, having gone there to inaugurate a monument to his brother, the Duke of Genoa, he was heard to say more than once, 'I am not a good man, but I cannot die a bad death; she who is in heaven would not permit it.'

"On the last day of the year 1877 Victor Emmanuel received all the Foreign Ministers who waited on him to exchange the compliments of the season in the name of their respective sovereigns. The following day he gave audience to deputations from both Houses of Parliament, and others who presented congratulatory addresses. The King spoke cheerfully and hopefully of the future, and bade his Ministers trust always in the Star of Italy.

"'The Star of Italy is your Majesty,' replied Signor Depretis, at which the King smiled sadly.

"They did not dream that it was his last New Year's Day; but he was even then feeling indisposed, and in nine days after he was dead."

Our space will not permit us even to glance at the great events in the midst of which the life of King Victor Emmanuel was passed—events which have so recently become history, enacted, indeed, before our eyes. Nor can we dwell on the part which Victor Emmanuel played in them. We must refer our readers to Mr. Godkin's handy volumes, which, if too small to satisfy all curiosity, are sufficiently large to place in its true light the life of its illustrious subject. It is scant praise to say the story is well told. It thrills one as a romance, but with no mere undertone of truth. The facts are patent, and the stirring statements of the narrative are constantly backed up by reference to official documents and well-attested records. These volumes contain a plain and truthful account unencumbered by needless reflections. The life of Italy's brave King speaks for itself, and no more requires the dress of sentiment to give it vigour than a marble bust dug up from the Campagna needs a name to give it worth.

Cunynghame's My Command in South Africa.

My Command in South Africa in 1874—1878. *Comprising Experiences of Travel in the Colonies of South Africa and the Independent States.* By General Sir Arthur Thurlow Cunynghame, G.C.B., the Lieutenant-Governor and Commander of the Forces in South Africa. With Maps. Second Thousand. Macmillan. 1879.

The value of a book like this just now is that it throws light on the causes of the unhappy struggle in which we are engaged, and helps us to some extent to judge how far such a war was, sooner or later, inevitable.

General Cunynghame's range is a wide one. He begins with Capetown, treating of ostrich-farming, about which he gives details invaluable to any who think of going in for it; of wine-growing, of the descendants of the Dutch settlers and their ways, and of federation and its prospects. He then crosses into Kafferaria (*sic*) and Natal, getting from the Komgha, the artillery station of the frontier army, in Gaikaland, near the Kei, right on to the now so famous Tugela. In his chapter on this river our author says a good deal about "Mr. John Dunn, in whom Cetewayo appears to have great confidence." He also remarks on the dangerous extent to which the natives are being armed, not only with the old smooth-bore guns but with excellent modern rifles. "For what purpose is this insatiable craving for arms? It is to possess the all-powerful weapon with which the white men conquered and brought them into subjection, but which they hope to employ in their turn against their conquerors. Then, of course, the British soldier will be implored to come to the help of the colony. Generous old England will be asked once more to pay the bill. And the colonists will be ready to send waggons and teams of oxen, with supplies at fabulous prices, and to undertake all the necessary contracts for the supply of the troops." These words, though things have not turned out precisely in this way, come as near the fact as most prophecies do. Every native who earned a little money at the diamond-fields laid it out in buying a gun; and free trade in guns and ammunition has been the rule with colonial traders and merchants, despite the not unreasonable protests both of the Boers and of our own frontier farmers.

While in Kaffraria our author sees and hears a good deal about witchcraft. Every thinking man who has been in the country wonders, he says, that something has not been done to suppress it. "How loudly Englishmen talk of the evils of slavery; yet here is a greater evil than slavery, for it is manslaughter and murder, the result of a false and lying priestcraft, practised in countries where the chiefs are paid out of the Government revenue." Of the fearful horrors of the system, several instances are given. Thus: "A rein is lost from a span; recourse is had to a diviner. He says, 'So-and-so's *baboon* (familiar spirit—note the likeness to the early Italian satyrs) took it, and So-and-so and another have the rein between them.' They are caught and horribly tortured, and finally roasted alive or strangled for this imaginary fault, their property plundered, their families scattered." Surely something should be done to put down a system far more destructive than Indian suttee.

General Cunynghame's next inspection tour was to the diamond-fields, Griqualand West; and next he went to the Transvaal, then just annexed. His last chapter contains an account of the

sixth Kaffir war—that against Kreli; the book thus ending as it began, for the first incident in his landing at Capetown is his being told of Langalebalele's rising.

It is needless to note how very much of present interest the book contains. We cannot do more than dwell for a brief space on one or two points.

The Bushmen's talent for drawing we had never before realised. On the rocks are portrayed hunting-scenes, showing how the lion, eland, gnu, &c., were killed or taken, all sketched with wonderful vigour and in colours so permanent that one might fancy they were done yesterday. Can it be that a strain of Bushman blood gave their artistic talent to the old Egyptians? The modern fellah, we believe, never tries to imitate his ancestors, if indeed they were his ancestors. These Bushmen General Cunynghame summarily dismisses as unimprovable. Certainly the only way Dutch and English have discovered of improving them is to improve them off the face of the earth. The last poor remnant of them was destroyed in the glens of the Drakenberg in 1871 by a set of Basuto ruffians, whom our author dignifies as an "expeditionary force," under one of the sons of our friend Mosheah.

The profit of ostrich-farming, in his chapter on which our author tells a good deal about emu-breeding in England, must vary much. In 1875 a pair of birds cost as much as £500. Even then they may have been a profitable investment, especially as feathers were selling at from £30 to £40 the pound. Ten pages further on we are told that in 1868 the price had sunk to £2 and £3 a pound. In 1874 it was £5 or even £8 at Natal. The figures hardly seem reconcilable; and there is some doubt whether a full-grown bird yields a pound of first-class feathers or not. It is worthy of note that the ostrich feather differs from all others—the quill is in the middle of the plume. Hence the old Egyptians made it the symbol of justice.

Of Bloemfontein General Cunynghame speaks very highly as a health-resort in cases of consumption. The only drawback is the cost of living: eggs 6d. each, butter 5s. a pound, cabbage 2s. 6d. each, and so on. They must get some Chinese gardeners out there, to do what they have done in Queensland, provide cheap vegetables.

The cruelties which led to the annexation of the Transvaal are given in detail in chap. xxiii. Here is one case: "A Kaffir with flag of truce was shot. The other three ran off, but a few days after gave themselves up. They were shot in a most brutal way, for if they had got into Leydenburg they would have told the English about shooting at them when going in with the white flag." The Hollander is like the wicked man in the Psalms; his tender mercies are cruel. On principle he treats the native as if he was a brute beast.

In the war against Kreli there were some episodes which might have ended like Isandula. "Our communications are cut off. We are surrounded on all sides by Kaffirs, who are destroying everything. I do not see any way of relieving Fort Linsingen at present. Spencer's camp was attacked last night," &c. So ran a letter in cypher received from Captain Wardell.

Kreli and his Kaffirs, however, had small chance against the telegraph, of which much use was made in the campaign; and the Martini-Henri rifle, "then for the first time fairly used by British soldiers," which killed the astonished natives at 1,000 and even at 1,800 yards.

General Cunynghame is not half severe enough upon the spirit trade which is demoralising the natives, and even threatening them with extinction. "On Sandilli's border there were five canteens in thirty-five miles of road; the aggregate sale amounted to 250 gallons a week, and each took at least £2,000 a year over the counter." Some chiefs forbid canteens in their territories, and, as we know, have petitioned earnestly to have them prohibited on their borders and in other parts. "The answer of authority has always been that the natives should place a moral restraint upon themselves and not drink too much, and that trade cannot be impeded simply because it may engender evil consequences among the natives." The fearful hypocrisy of such language, or else the judicial blindness of those who can use it, is unparalleled even in the history of other colonial dealings. "Cape smoke," our missionaries have found, has been the worst enemy to the Gospel. Unhappily this miserable war will give a great impulse to the sale of it. The soldiers drink; and the friendly natives learn to drink harder than ever. And for a native to drink "Cape smoke" is a very different thing from indulging in harmless native beer.

English Men of Letters: Goldsmith, Burns, Spenser, Hume.

English Men of Letters. Goldsmith, by William Black; Burns, by Professor Shairp; Spenser, by Dean Church; Hume, by Professor Huxley. London: Macmillan.

Goldsmith's life usually serves as a text for a sermon upon the world's ingratitude and neglect of its greatest men. This was the key-note struck by Forster's otherwise excellent biography, and it has been taken up by most other biographers. Mr. Black, on the other hand, takes the part of the world, and we think with success. Without enlarging unnecessarily on the defects of Goldsmith's character, he insists that, during his latest years at least, the poet's troubles were his own fault. During the earlier period of course

he had given no proof of genius; the work he did was paid for as all work of the same class was paid for. But when once his position was established as a man of genius, he had no reason to complain of neglect. During the last seven years of his life he received what should have been an ample fortune for a bachelor of simple tastes. But Goldsmith's habits were far from simple. On the contrary, he was a typical specimen of improvidence and extravagance. No amount of money would have kept him out of debt. The £400 received for one play were at once spent in the purchase of sumptuous chambers, and this is a fair illustration of what he was always doing. "If Goldsmith had received ten times as much money as the booksellers gave him, he would still have died in debt." As Mr. Black insists, Goldsmith went in for excitement at its highest, and he paid the inevitable penalty.

The incidents of Goldsmith's life are few and well known. The same may be said of his best works. They are few in number. Their value depends not on bulk, but quality. A very moderate-sized volume contains them all. And no English classic is better known or more popular. While Mr. Black has nothing new to tell, his biography and criticisms are fresh and interesting.

"To a degree" (p. 115) is a Scotticism which Goldsmith would have avoided, and which we hope will never be naturalised in English. "Happy-go-lucky" very aptly describes Goldsmith's temperament, but it recurs somewhat too frequently in the biography. Mr. Black also speaks of "cut-throats," metaphorical of course, more frequently than is pleasant. He gives interesting illustrations of the care with which Goldsmith corrected and revised his writings. "Goldsmith put an anxious finish into all his better work; perhaps that is the secret of the graceful ease that is now apparent in every line." But scarcely enough is made of the element of natural genius undoubtedly present in Goldsmith's case. Sometimes indeed the very existence of genius is questioned or denied. It is defined or explained away as "the faculty for taking pains." Thousands have taken far more pains than Goldsmith, without attaining the charming ease and grace of his style. Of education he had comparatively little. He only took to literature, after failing to get a livelihood in any other way. And yet he reached the front rank in prose and poetry alike.

The force of genius is still more conspicuous in the case of Burns. What else is there to explain the bursting forth of that bright fountain of song in so lowly a place and amid such ungenial conditions? His parents did not rise intellectually above the average of Scotch peasants. Burns's independence is just as clearly marked, in a painful way, in moral respects. His character was in utter contrast with that of his parents, who represented the best type of Scotch peasant piety. With all his invectives against cant and hypocrisy, the poet always reverenced the religious

character of his parents. His inimitable *Cotter's Saturday Night* was intended as a picture of his own early home. Burns's life is as painful, as his poems are delightful, reading. There is little or no relief in the picture. The cloud, instead of lifting, darkens as time goes on. The tyranny of appetite and passion became more and more inveterate. Burns's last days were the unhappiest. One by one, friends had been obliged to hold aloof, and he stood almost alone. Professor Shairp well says: "How often has one been tempted to wish that we had known as little of the actual career of Burns as we do of the life of Shakespeare, or even of Homer, and had been left to read his mind and character only by the light of his works!" It can never be an easy task for a Scotchman to be impartial in judging the character of Scotland's truest poet. We believe that Professor Shairp is thoroughly impartial. His volume is altogether an admirable one, alike in its clear narrative, moral judgments, and poetical criticism. While giving no more of painful details than is necessary, he does not allow enthusiastic admiration of genius to blind him to serious shortcomings. The passage from which we most strongly dissent is one on p. 188, in which the author seems to represent the poet's character as altogether the work of circumstances. The substance of the passage is, "Given such natural tendencies and outward conditions, and no other result was possible." True, but other things were given—Christian example and training, clear perceptions and strong convictions of truth—which are not enumerated in the catalogue. These, if we are to believe in human responsibility, were strong enough to counteract, and ought to have counteracted, the unfavourable circumstances.

Professor Shairp dwells with much force on the poet's services in fostering a national spirit among his countrymen. "When he appeared, the spirit of Scotland was at a low ebb. The fatigue that followed a century of religious strife, the extinction of her Parliament, the stern suppression of the Jacobite risings, the removal of all symbols of her royalty and nationality, had all but quenched the ancient spirit. . . . . Though he accomplished but a small part of what he once hoped to do, yet we owe it to him first of all that the 'old kingdom' has not wholly sunk into a province. If Scotchmen to-day love and cherish their country with a pride unknown to their ancestors of the last century, if strangers of all countries look on Scotland as a land of romance, this we owe in great measure to Burns, who first turned the tide, which Scott afterwards carried to full flood."

It is a pleasant surprise to us to hear Burns commended for the purity of his writings. But as all things go by comparison, and the comparison is here with preceding writers, the praise is no doubt just. "He was emphatically the purifier of Scottish song. There are some poems he has left, there are also a few among his

songs, which we could wish that he had never written. But we who inherit Scottish song as he left it, can hardly imagine how much he did to purify and elevate our national melodies. To see what he has done in this way, we have but to compare Burns's songs with the collection of Scottish songs published by David Herd, in 1769, a few years before Burns appeared."

Spenser is very far from being the popular poet that Burns is. Just as there are preachers for preachers, so Spenser is rather a poet for poets than for the people; and we believe that not a few of the latter have often wondered at the reverence and enthusiasm of poets for *The Faery Queen* and its author. "Our greatest poets have loved him and delighted in him. He had Shakespeare's praise. Cowley was made a poet by reading him. Dryden calls Milton 'the poetical son of Spenser;' 'Milton,' he writes, 'has acknowledged to me that Spenser was his original.' Dryden's own homage to him is frequent and generous. Pope found as much pleasure in the *Faery Queen* in his later years as he had found in reading it when he was twelve years old; and what Milton, Dryden, and Pope admired, Wordsworth too found full of nobleness, purity, and sweetness." The reason of the popular indifference is easy to find. It is the allegorical form in which Spenser's masterpiece is cast. The allegory, as Dean Church shows us, was in keeping with the stateliness of the Elizabethan age, but is altogether remote from ours. We have little patience with an ideal world of shepherds and knights, virtues and vices. We soon grow tired of a long poem, every line of which needs a key to explain it. On the other hand, we leave too much out of sight Spenser's originality in his day. "Spenser had but one really great English model behind him; and Chaucer, honoured as he was, had become in Elizabeth's time, if not obsolete, yet in his diction very far removed from the living language of the day. Even Milton, in his boyish compositions, wrote after Spenser and Shakespeare, with their contemporaries, had created modern English poetry. Whatever there was in Spenser's early verses of grace and music was of his own finding: no one of his own time, except in occasional and fitful snatches, like stanzas of Sackville's, had shown him the way."

Dr. Church had a harder task than most of his co-labourers in the series. As Spenser's life has not been a favourite theme of biographers, the materials are not all ready to hand. What Dr. Church has done is to give us not merely the poet's life, but its general surroundings. The political, social, and literary characteristics of the age, so far as these touch the poet's sphere, are ably sketched. We get a vivid glimpse into the miserable condition of Ireland, where most of Spenser's mature life was spent, and which was then, as now, England's difficulty. The turbulence, treachery, confiscations, bloodshed, mistakes, make a sad picture. The

English believed but in one means of government—force; the Irish but in one means of redress—rebellion. "Ireland had the name and the framework of a Christian realm. It had its hierarchy of officers in Church and State, its Parliament, its representative of the Crown. It had its great earls and lords, with noble and romantic titles, its courts and councils and administration; the Queen's laws were there, and where they were acknowledged, which was not however everywhere, the English speech was current. But underneath this name and outside all was coarse, and obstinately set against civilised order. There was nothing but the wreck and clashing of disintegrated customs; the lawlessness of fierce and disintegrated barbarians, whose own laws had been destroyed, and who would recognise no other; the blood-feuds of rival septs; the ambitions and deadly treacheries of rival nobles, oppressing all weaker than themselves, and maintaining in waste and idleness their crowds of brutal retainers. In one thing only was there agreement, though not even in this was there union; and that was in deep, implacable hate of their English masters. And with these English masters, too, amid their own jealousies and backbitings and mischief-making, their own bitter antipathies and chronic despair, there was only one point of agreement, and that was their deep scorn and loathing of the Irish." Spenser himself, who was a servant of Government, thoroughly endorsed the English policy. "Men of great wisdom," he writes, "have often wished that all that land were a sea-pool." Spenser also says: "They say, it is the fatal destiny of that land, that no purposes, whatsoever are meant for her good, will prosper or take good effect, which, whether it proceed from the very genius of the soil, or influence of the stars, or that Almighty God hath not yet appointed the time of her reformation, or that He reserveth her in this unquiet state still for some secret scourge, which by her shall come unto England, it is hard to be known, but yet much to be feared." Spenser himself was driven by the rebels from the estate he had received as a grant from Government, his house burnt; he himself a wretched, beggared fugitive to England, where he soon died prematurely with his great work but half finished.

One-fourth of the volume is occupied by a very full and eloquent analysis and criticism of *The Faery Queen*, which we hope may do much to explain, if not to popularise, Spenser's great poem. Its faults and merits are all carefully set forth. As to the latter, the spell of the poem is to be found mainly in three things. (1) "In the quaint stateliness of Spenser's imaginary world and its representatives; (2) in the beauty and melody of his numbers, the abundance and grace of his poetic ornaments, in the recurring and haunting rhythm of numberless passages, in which thought and imagery and language and melody are interwoven in one perfect and satisfying harmony; and (3) in the

intrinsic nobleness of his general aim, his conception of human life, at once so exacting and so indulgent, his high ethical principles and ideals, his unfeigned honour of all that is pure and brave and unselfish and tender, his generous estimate of what is due from man to man of service, affection, and fidelity. His fictions embodied truths of character which, with all their shadowy incompleteness, were too real and too beautiful to lose their charm with time."

It seems a curious arrangement to assign the life of a purely mental philosopher like Hume to a purely physical scientist like Professor Huxley. The result is what might be expected. Professor Huxley gives, as he could not but give, an exceedingly clear and often lively analysis of Hume's teaching, but of the relations of that teaching to the work of other mental philosophers both before and after, *i.e.*, of Hume's position in the order of philosophical development, nothing is said. Yet it is evident that, without such comparison and contrast, Hume's theories can only be half understood. Professor Huxley has evidently made a long and loving study of Hume's works, takes him as his master in psychological research, adopts all his conclusions and more, and ably epitomises and discourses all that is to be found within the four corners of Hume's philosophy. But this is not enough. An expositor of one part of a vast system must be master of the whole system, and Professor Huxley's work has been in another field than that of psychology. Would the editor of this series assign the discussion of the work of a great natural philosopher like Herschel or Faraday to a pure metaphysician? The arrangement seems the more remarkable as there are many eminent psychologists to whose hands the work might have been fitly entrusted. As a simple presentation of Hume's theories in themselves, Professor Huxley's volume is unobjectionable; but, as it seems to us, the whole subject needed to be handled in an altogether different method. For all that we are told here, Hume might almost have been the first and the last philosopher who ever discussed psychological questions or attempted to analyse mental faculties and operations. Mr. Green's introduction to Hume's works suggests the right method of treatment.

Hume's life occupies one-fourth of the volume. There was not much to tell, and less that was worth telling. The different points of Hume's teaching are then discussed in order. As might be expected, Professor Huxley is strongest in dealing with "The Mental Phenomena of Animals," where his special knowledge as a physiologist serves him in good stead. He does his best to shade away the barrier between mind in man and in animals. To all the other positions of Hume, especially those of a sceptical cast he endeavours to add new buttresses. We cannot reconcile al Professor Huxley's opinions. If there is any fundamental point

in philosophy, it is the distinction between mind and matter. But after enumerating the different theories held, Professor Huxley professes himself an Agnostic as to the "substance" of either matter or spirit (p. 166). How is this consistent with the bald materialism of passages like the following? "What we call the operations of the mind are functions of the brain, and the materials of consciousness are products of cerebral activity." He also endorses the substance of the dictum of Cabanis, that the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile. It seems to us that one who holds such definite views is no Agnostic—he does know, or professes to know, the nature both of matter and mind. In presence of such conflicting statements, we might well confess ourselves Agnostics as to what Professor Huxley's views are. He might indeed take refuge in the distinction between substratum and phenomena, just as in his *Lay Sermons* he argues that he is no materialist, because he does not believe in any substratum of matter apart from its properties; as if a materialist had ever been defined as one who does so believe. The defence is worthy of Dr. Newman's subtlety. If Professor Huxley had given us an account of Bacon and his writings, he would probably have rendered better service than he has done by the present volume.

Wiesener's Youth of Queen Elizabeth.

The Youth of Queen Elizabeth, 1533—1558. By Louis Wiesener. Edited, from the French, by Charlotte M. Yonge. Two Volumes. Hurst and Blackett.

When *Sneer*, in "The Critic," expressed the hope that there was "no scandal about Queen Elizabeth" in Ruff's play, the "scandal" only existed in flying rumours or spiteful stories. Cobbett was the first English historian systematically to degrade "Gloriana" into "old Betsy;" and though his view of her was, like most of his dicta, pushed to extremes and "hedged round with wilful prejudice," it has been strongly supported by investigations made since his time. All students may not be prepared, indeed, to hurl at Shakespeare's "fair vestal throned in the West," the coarse epithet employed by Walter Savage Landor; but few can doubt that Elizabeth had something of the hero in her composition; she was not of the stuff which makes martyrs. Her support of the doctrines of the Reformation was, like her father's overthrow of monastic orders, dictated by personal ambition and political expediency, rather than by conscience and conviction, as is shown by her rigorous treatment of the Puritan party. M. Wiesener is no panegyrist of Elizabeth, though he feels the true biographer's interest in his subject; he does not attempt to disprove the craft and cruelty which made her just as small as a woman as she was great as a queen. But he shows that no other

result could have been reasonably expected from the peculiar trials and temptations of her youth. Nature combined in her the levity and ready wit of her mother with the pride and turbulence of her father. For twenty-five years circumstances compelled her to be a hypocrite in order to save her life; and when she became absolute mistress of her actions she did not throw aside the habit of disguising her motives. The outline of her story is so familiar that there is no necessity for recapitulating it here, especially as M. Wiesener, though consulting every known authority on the epoch to which he confines himself, and referring to original documents in England and France, has not discovered any fact of material importance, nor thrown any new light on those already known. In alluding to the labours of his predecessors he cordially acknowledges Agnes Strickland's general accuracy—testifying to her usefulness, indeed, by paraphrasing many passages of her narrative—but Froude he calls "perhaps the least reliable of all living historians;" a dictum certainly not justified by the very trifling inaccuracies he points out. Great stress is laid by both author and editor on the prominence given by Wiesener to the *Bedingfield Papers*, Miss Yonge stating in her Preface that they are "here for the first time brought forward;" while Wiesener, admitting that Miss Strickland put him "on the track" of them, claims that he has "drawn much more largely upon this source than the English author;" whereas there is only one extract from the *Bedingfield Papers* in Wiesener, which the later editions of Miss Strickland's *Lives of Mary and Elizabeth Tudor* do not contain, while she has taken many anecdotes from them not to be found in Wiesener. Two chapters are devoted by M. Wiesener to the studies of Elizabeth, especially while under the care of the learned and pious Roger Ascham, whose treatise, *The Scholemaster*, throws light on the method he pursued with his Royal pupil. In his account of Mary Tudor's entry of the Tower after her accession, M. Wiesener has fallen into a curious error. Among the State prisoners kneeling on the grass were, he says, "Edward Courtenay, and his father the Marquis of Exeter, *who had been decapitated* in 1539, without trial or crime" (vol. i., p. 125). The amazing statement that the headless father joined his son in welcoming the new queen may be due to some confusion of the translator's. But M. Wiesener seems to be unaware that the Marquis of Exeter and Lord Montacute were sentenced to death in 1538 for "treasonable adherence to Cardinal Pole, and treasonable discourses." The *Baga de Secretis*, parch. xi., contains the minutes of their trial. In the original M. Wiesener's work will no doubt be acceptable to French students, as presenting in a consecutive narrative incidents hitherto scattered over old chronicles and bulky histories; but English readers will be deterred on the threshold by the incompetence of the translator, who more frequently confuses the reader than

interprets the author. Speaking of the rigid composure with which Elizabeth heard of the execution of Thomas Seymour, we are told: "However, that the heart whose self-control borders so closely upon the hardest dryness, had throbbed for the handsome cavalier, this is certain;" and, "There was an absolute need of occupation worthy for the mind as well as moral power against these days of trial." (Vol. i., pp. 75—93.) Here the sense, though obscured, is not lost entirely. But the following sentence, supposed to be complete, has absolutely no meaning: "Notwithstanding all their efforts, all the talk, and all the influence that were visible on the opposite side from patriotic aversion to the foreigner and distrust of Austrian ambition" (p. 202). Equally perplexing, but too long for quotation, are the opening sentences of chapters v. and vi., vol. i. As an instance of a genuine Irish bull, almost unique in the work of a Frenchman, we may quote two lines from vol. i., p. 186, where, after saying that neither Mary nor Renard understood the bearing of their conversation, but the attendants present understood them both, it is added —"Their secret, though in real truth it no longer existed, was penetrated and divulged." Of singular metaphors we need only cite three: In vol. ii., p. 48, it is said of Noailles, that "in his heart he was champing the bit." In vol. i., p. 271, we are told that Elizabeth "fortified her house at Ashbridge and filled it with soldiers—no doubt without any direct idea of using them against her sister, for she was not one to burn her ships." And in vol. ii., p. 131, after quoting Heywood's description of Elizabeth, as she wandered among the groves and gardens of Woodstock, comparing the "strait and extending trees" to the nobility and the briars and bushes to "the meanest of the people," we are informed that "the germs of Elizabeth's plan of government are to be found in these meditations, and that, when queen, "she cuts openings among these oaks, where they are *so consequential* as to absorb the light and dew of heaven" (vol. ii., p. 132). It is unfortunate for M. Wiesener that the interest his book possesses as a narrative should be so impaired by its clumsy English dress. We expected better things from a book bearing the editorial *imprimatur* of so accomplished a writer as Miss Yonge. Many Gallicisms in these volumes suggest the idea that the translator may be a Frenchman, which would excuse much that we have objected to in style and construction. But in that case careful editorial supervision was yet more imperatively called for.

STOKES'S EARLY CHRISTIAN ARCHITECTURE IN IRELAND.

Early Christian Architecture in Ireland. By Margaret Stokes. Illustrated with Woodcuts. London: George Bell. 1878.

In her dedication to "Edith Chenevix Trench," Miss Stokes

quotes from *Piers Plowman's Vision*, how that a certain company asking the Ploughman the road to Truth, gets for answer that he cannot "the way teche" until he has sown his half-acre. Whereupon a veiled lady among them replies—

> "This were a long lettyng.
> What sholde we wommen
> Wercke the while?"

Her woman's work Miss Stokes finds in the book before us. Still adapting the passage from the *Vision*, she says, "No country stands more in need of clothing, of honour, and of that food by which the soul is fed than does our own beloved Ireland;" and, therefore, by opening up to the reading public the treasures of early Irish architecture, she trusts she is "the helper not the hinderer of such men as have striven and still do strive to work worthily in her cause." The book is indeed well fitted to do good service if only readers can be found to take it in hand. There is and always has been this grand difficulty in regard to Irish matters. To a few English people it comes as a sacred duty to learn all they can about the past as well as about the present of a country which has suffered so much from its connection with England. By them everything that concerns Ireland is studied with enthusiasm; but they are few, and the masses care more about the habits of an obscure African tribe than about the records of those to whose labours their forefathers owed their Christianity. Of this small company of sympathetic students we trust that Miss Stokes's book may increase the number. It is full of information conveyed in such a pleasant way that few who begin the work will be able to lay it aside unread. It is, of course, wonderfully accurate,—to those who know anything of Irish literature, Miss Stokes's character for scrupulous conscientiousness in detail is warrant for this. Its price, moreover, puts it within everybody's reach. It is otherwise in regard to those two grand volumes mainly made up of the late Lord Dunraven's Autotypes and Drawings, of which this book is in some sort an abridgment. They are so costly that the general reader has to content himself with such a glimpse of them as he can get during a hasty visit to London or Oxford. We trust the time may come when culture will be so widely spread that no free or public library will be without such a work as Lord Dunraven's. But, meanwhile, Miss Stokes has met the present want by giving us, in a cheap form, a series of illustrated essays on Pagan Forts, Early Christian Monasteries, Churches without Cement, Ecclesiastical Towers, the Northmen in Ireland, Irish Romanesque, and the other subjects on which she had already given us her views in another form in Lord Dunraven's magnificent volumes.

We do trust that every one who feels the least interest in what manner of men were St. Patrick, and St. Colman, and Columbkille,

and Columbanus, will not fail to read Miss Stokes's account of the stone records which they have left of themselves. Their interest in the men whose work as missionaries only the densest ignorance can nowadays ignore, will surely be strengthened by what they read.

The special interest attaching to early Irish ecclesiastical architecture is not its beauty (though this is great), nor an antiquity too often exaggerated, but the fact that it is home-grown. Whatever Briton or Saxon built has almost wholly disappeared. Two little churches in West Cornwall, Gwithian and Perran-in-the-Sands, strongly resembling some of the cell-churches in Ireland, are perhaps the sole remains of British Christian architecture. A few towers, like Barnack in Northamptonshire, with their "long and short work," are claimed as Saxon. All else is gone. Whereas in Ireland there is a whole series of monuments, "untouched by the hand either of the restorer or of the destroyer," from the sixth to the thirteenth century, in which we may trace a gradual development from the consecrated enclosure (cashel) with its unecemented boundary wall and rude beehive huts, scarcely distinguishable from the Pagan fort which served as its model, to the stately Irish Romanesque of Cormac's Chapel.

Pagan forts and Christian *cashels* are alike almost confined to the wildest parts of the country; elsewhere, tillage or rebuilding has done away with them. Steague Fort, in Kerry, and Dun Ængus are good instances of the former; the monastery of St. Michael on the Skellig is the best example of the latter.

In the next period cement is gradually introduced; a chancel with its arch is added to the hitherto unecemented cell; and, though the doors still have horizontal lintel and sloping sides, ornament and mouldings begin to be used—some of them such as are elsewhere held to mark a late period in architecture. This is very important; and we recommend those who wish to understand the complete difference in this respect between England and Ireland, and the impossibility of arguing from one to the other, to study Miss Stokes's remarks on the continuance in Ireland of that school of Celtic decorative art which in England died out during the Roman occupation.

We have in a former number of this Review spoken of Miss Stokes's theory about round towers—that they date mostly from the tenth century, and were set up as shelter-places against the Norsemen. This is the view of M. Viollet le Duc in regard to church towers generally. Why the Irish round tower so often stands alone is because "Irish churches before the Cistercian period were invariably low and small, while the Continental buildings reach nearly to the height of the tower beside which they stand." Irish churches, too, were no doubt often built of perishable materials. The absurd theories about the antiquity of

these towers are in part due to the not unnatural desire of the Irish to find a golden age of culture far back across the centuries, a quiet time anterior to the trouble which has scarcely ever in historic times been calmed, but partly also to the malignity which, having barbarised the Irish Celt, denies that he was ever anything but a barbarian. "The native Irish never understood the use of hewn stone; therefore, as these buildings are clearly pre-English, they must be pre-Irish also." That was the strange argument led by which some attributed the round towers to Cuthites or Phœnicians, while soberer writers thought them the work of the Danes. We forget if Mr. J. H. Parker, who is at much pains to prove that the Irish never used any more durable material than willow-wood, adopts the Danish theory.

All this nonsense, both of foolish glorifiers and more foolish detractors, is conclusively answered by the Annals, some of which (*e.g.*, the *Chronicum Scotorum*) have been published by the Irish Rolls Commissioners. These give the dates of the building of several of the *cloichteachs* (round towers): that at Tomgraney, in Clare, for instance, was built in 965, and a good many belong to the great revival of church architecture, when the victories of Brian Boroihme had secured a temporary respite from Danish incursions. Next to the round towers, the most distinctive feature of Irish church architecture is the vaulted stone roofs, several of them double. Some of these belong to the pointed arch period; but some are undoubtedly very early, and Miss Stokes thinks that in them can be traced in a regular series *the striving after and final achievement of the pointed arch*. This is a matter (as she says) of the deepest interest; and we recommend architectural readers to carefully study the four churches which she gives as typical instances—Gallarus, Friars' Island near Killaloe, St. Columba's house at Kells, and Cormac's Chapel at Cashel. "Had the Irish been allowed to persevere in the elaboration of their own style they would probably have applied this expedient (the double vault) to the roofing of larger buildings" (Fergusson's *History of Architecture*, vol. ii., p. 110), "and we should then have seen whether the Irish double vault is a better constructive form than the single Roman arch. It was certainly an improvement on the wooden roof of the true Gothic style." On Irish Romanesque, so very different from that other form of Romanesque which we call Norman, Miss Stokes remarks: "It was a native style, springing from a people possessed of original power and mind, lowly in aspect when placed beside the grand monuments of Norman art in England, lowly, but not therefore unloveable."

One great feature of this book, as of all that Miss Stokes has written, is its judicial calmness; thus, in speaking of domed beehive huts (p. 27), she confesses: "The dome formed by the projection of one stone beyond another till the walls meet in one flag

at the apex is a form universally adopted by early races in all periods of the history of man, and in various portions of the globe, before the knowledge of the principle of the arch had reached them." Nowhere does she show a trace of the desire, too common among Irish writers, to claim certain forms as exclusively Irish, and as proving that Ireland in prehistoric times was a land of exceptional culture.

Of Irish Romanesque perhaps the most typical instances are the arcades at Ardmore (p. 121-2), though the west door at Freshford (plate 93) is beautiful and characteristic.

We should say that among the appendices there is a valuable essay "On the preservation of national monuments." It appears that the ladies of Alexandra College Archæological Society are drawing out lists and descriptive catalogues of such monuments. We wish something of the same kind was being done in our own country; it would greatly strengthen Sir John Lubbock's hands.

Richardson's Total Abstinence.

Total Abstinence. A Course of Addresses. By Benjamin Ward Richardson, M.D., F.R.S., &c. London: Macmillan and Co. 1878.

This well-argued protest against alcohol as a food by a scientific physician, who has had his own prejudices to overcome, and whose advocacy is a work of supererogation, deserves thoughtful attention. Dr. Richardson theorises little; he appeals to actual facts, including an interesting though fragmentary account of his own experience when conscientiously putting the opinions forced upon him by experiment to personal test. From a scientific as well as a social point of view he shows that total abstinence from alcohol in health is a right and reasonable practice. It would be an injustice to both sides to assert that small quantities of the drug have a perceptibly injurious action on the system: experiment, however, proves that the dose of alcohol that can be imbibed without perverting the normal functions of the body is so small that it would not produce the desired effect, if taken for the sake of its stimulating properties. Occasional drinkers must therefore regard the pleasure derived from indulgence in alcohol as bought at the expense of temporary perversion of function. That the regular ingestion of this liquid causes organic in addition to functional disease none can deny; and Dr. Murchison, in his now classical work on diseases of the liver, does not fail to notice the surprise and even indignation aroused in so-called moderate drinkers when their maladies were attributed to the use, or rather abuse, of alcohol. Those, therefore, who advocate and practise regular moderation should bear in mind that serious disease

may be induced, and life shortened, without the production of intoxication.

In this, as in his other works, Dr. Richardson is clear, at times racy, and always readable. He treats ably of the difficulties in the way of total abstinence, pointing out both their source and remedy; and even those who do not agree with him cannot but admire his conscientious earnestness and generous spirit.

Arnold's Johnson's Lives.

The Six Chief Lives from Johnson's "Lives of the Poets," with Macaulay's "Life of Johnson." Edited, with a Preface, by Matthew Arnold. London: Macmillan and Co. 1878.

This is a most admirable piece of book-making. Mr. Arnold's preface, which is a very pleasant and brilliant essay, sketches graphically the birth and development of the modern prose of English literature as distinguished from the old style. This great change occurred during the century and a half covered by the lives of Milton, Dryden, Swift, Addison, Pope, and Gray; and Johnson, whose biographies of these six men are among the imperishable treasures of literature, had himself a large share in the perfecting of the modern prose. Thus these six chief lives form a series of very unequal merit and interest, taken in connection with that splendid biography of Johnson which Macaulay contributed to the *Encyclopædia Britannica;* form a book eminently fitted for helping in the cultivation of a rising generation but little likely to find time to wade through the whole of Johnson's *Lives of the Poets*, or equipment to discriminate between what is just and what is unjust in those lives. In the matter of discrimination as regards these six chief lives, Mr. Arnold is an ideal guide; he seldom errs in matters of literary criticism, has but little faculty for erring in such matters; and his own style and method, while forming as pointed a contrast with that of Macaulay as Macaulay's does with that of Johnson, may be fearlessly pronounced not inferior to either; indeed, the setting of three such prose styles before the young student as are brought together in this book is of itself a lesson not easy to overrate, quite apart from the excellent coherence of the whole subject-matter as here arranged. The book should be as popular as it is readable, instructive, and well planned.

PRINTED BY BEVERIDGE AND CO., FULLWOOD'S RENTS, HOLBORN.

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