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THE
LONDON QUARTERLY REVIEW.

OCTOBER, 1876.

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THE advance of human knowledge, during the past quarter of a century, has been nowhere so remarkable as in the regions of biology and physics. This has been due in both sciences to the rapid and almost complete perfection to which special instruments of research have been brought. In physics the spectroscope has suddenly wrought a revolution, and almost endowed physical and chemical research with a new sense. Science is only beginning to discover the immense possibilities which this instrument opens up.

Already it has, with unerring precision of analysis, discovered the constituent elements of sun and stars; estimated approximately their molecular condition; given evidence of the diverse thermal intensities of stellar bodies; furnished proof of the existence of suns in such a state of heat that compounds have not yet been able to form, of others cooler but still in a state of inconceivable thermal intensity, and of others distinctly cooling. It has been employed, too, to detect what no other means could discover, the actual advance towards or recession from us of great stellar bodies and groups, and to indicate their speed. In the elements that lie around us on our own globe, it has been used to discover new metals which must have eluded all other processes; and to demonstrate the presence of chemical substances in quantities so minute as to be practically non-existent to the ordinary analyses of the chemist.

Scarcely less remarkable have been the rapid perfection and wonderful revelations of the Microscope. It is now probably the most perfect physical embodiment of exact abstract science existing. It certainly is the rival, if not the peer, of the telescope in this sense. It almost absolutely *realises* theoretical optics, and a certain group of mathematicians and physicists, at least, strongly incline to the opinion, which they believe they can approximately demonstrate, that we have reached the limits of power possible by this means: that, in fact, the vibrations of the luminiferous ether are too coarse to reveal minuter objects than those at present reached by our most powerful and refined lenses. Even if this be so—which, from practical evidence, put into contrast with calculations based upon hypotheses, we are inclined to doubt—the resources placed at the disposal of science by this instrument have a value and importance the limit of which no sagacity or penetration is competent to measure. Indeed, at the present time, the finest English and American lenses are greatly in advance of the skill and competence of the majority of microscopists and specialists who employ the microscope. Our text-books are almost silent on the subject of the employment of lenses exceeding in magnifying power a thousand diameters. Yet we do not hesitate to say that at least one English house furnishes an instrument, with almost perfect corrections, which magnifies ten times this amount; but an instrument like this, just as it involves incomparably higher

skill in its device and manufacture, so it demands patience, perseverance, and suitable culture, in a far more than ordinary degree, to employ it as a real aid to vision. It cannot be doubted that remarkable results have been attained in the past, in all suitable departments of science, by the use of what are known as "low powers." But these results, which now often astonish the possessors of far more powerful instruments, depended upon the fact that the investigators who used them did, by incessant labour, make themselves masters of their instruments. It too frequently happens, now, that the purchaser of a good microscope supposes himself forthwith competent to make manifest its utmost powers. But the truth is that there are thousands of "microscopists," possessed of costly instruments, who obtain a reputation as good "exhibitors," but who pass their fine instruments on to their heirs without ever having discovered the full powers of even their moderate lenses. Instead of employing them in original research, and thus discovering their capacities, and devising means, which practice and patient labour are always suggesting, for utilizing them in the most efficient manner, they are content to exhibit brilliantly what may dazzle but fails to instruct, and the qualities of the lens, which only the cunning of practice develops, is undiscovered. But if the users of microscopes, both for amusement and for scientific purposes, do not exhaustively master the use of moderate and moderately high lenses, how can they successfully manipulate and make the best of such instruments as Powell and Lealand's lenses, capable of magnifying from three to twenty thousand diameters? The men who, as true scientific workers, can employ the "one-fiftieth" of an inch lens, or even higher powers, with the same ease as they can a "one-eighth" of an inch, or a "one-twelfth" of an inch, are extremely few in England, fewer still in America, and scarcely to be found at all on the Continent. All this arises from a repugnance to enter upon the laborious apprenticeship which their successful employment involves, and without this even the benefit of their employment cannot be seen. Hence amongst the most skilful and competent histologists there is a constant advocacy of "moderate powers," with occasional reminders that the best of work has been done by their employment. Without doubt they have done much, and there remain generations of work for them yet to do. But they have

their limits; and that the highest powers now made can, in the hands of practised experts, go immeasurably beyond them, we need only the records of recent microscopical research to demonstrate.

To Dr. Carpenter we are indebted for a concise and thoroughly able summary of these. His *Microscope and its Revelations* is undoubtedly the most complete and trustworthy book which has yet appeared on the whole subject in any language. We question whether that part of the work which details and discusses the results of microscopical work could possibly, in the space allotted, be better done. The matter cannot fail to be interesting to any reader, and it certainly has not suffered in its mode of presentation. But with this testimony of thoroughly deserved commendation, we cannot withhold an expression of regret that this—the best book on the subject—should be silent on the method and advantages of using the highest powers which our opticians can produce. It is only from such a treatise as this that we can hope that the skilful and ardent student, who has mastered the use of lenses magnifying six or eight hundred diameters, will be induced to attempt the use of the highest lenses the optician can provide. But the difficulties must be shown, and, as far as they can be, met in a practical manner; and if this were fairly done, and some of the advantages of high-power research simply illustrated, as they might be, from recent labours in several departments of science, there can be little question that the utmost benefit would accrue, especially in biological inquiries. We would not be understood to imply that Dr. Carpenter should himself have mastered all the detail; the matter for surprise is that he is practically acquainted with so much; but if this part of the book had been put into thoroughly practical hands—been given to men who had specialised themselves as workers with high powers—as the theory and general practice of microscopy has been, it would have given the book a freshness and a real value which, excellent as it is, it does not now possess. It may be added that Dr. Carpenter's beautiful series of illustrations of the "revelations" of the microscope will of themselves not only indicate, but in several instances show clearly the vast fields of research, and the rich harvest of facts, which are open only to the highest and best combination of lenses which the first English opticians can produce.

The extremely interesting lecture of Professor Huxley,

delivered at the Royal Institution so recently, is an illustration in point. He gathers up and summarises, in his own clear and concise manner, all that is now known of the border territory between the animal and vegetable series. The question is rich in interest from any aspect. What is an animal, what a vegetable? Is there a sharp partition between them, or do they insensibly graduate into each other until they meet, and their continuity is seen? There can be little doubt that such continuity exists throughout organic nature, and it may exist beyond; but before this can be scientifically announced it must have received irresistible proof. To ordinary observation there is an apparent demarcation of the strongest kind between animal and vegetable organisms. The oak, the fern, and the fungus appear to have nothing in common with the ox, the swallow, and the cheese mite. "But in the fourth and fifth decades of this century the greatest and most rapid revolution which biological science has ever undergone was effected by the application of the modern microscope to the investigation of organic structure; by the introduction of exact and easily-manageable methods of conducting the chemical analysis of organic compounds; and finally by the employment of instruments of precision for the measurement of the physical forces which are at work in the living economy."* And the result is that, speaking scientifically, the difference between an animal and a plant "is one of degree rather than of kind; and the problem whether in a given case an organism is an animal or a plant may be essentially insoluble."

The truth is that there is not a single feature belonging to either series of organic forms which is not in some measure shared by some representative of the other.

There are animals, with which every zoologist is familiar, definitely understood to be such, which are so low in the scale of being that they possess no definite form, and reveal to our most refined scrutiny only the feeblest traces of organisation; they move, but without framework or muscles, they creep without limbs, they feel without discoverable nerves, they eat without mouths, they digest without stomachs: in short, they have all the properties of life, but without a trace of organised structure.

* "On the Border Territory between the Animal and Vegetable Kingdom." *Macmillan's Magazine*, February, 1876, p. 374.

Because such a creature is ranked as an "animal" we are prone to associate with it a measure at least of consciousness and volition. But, on the other hand, there are plants of the highest and most complex structure, in which delicacy of organisation, refinement of mechanical contrivance, and exquisite adaptation of means to ends, are combined with majesty and grace, form and elegance, and even splendour of product; and yet, because they are labelled "plants," or "vegetables," we assume that they are without consciousness, and wholly devoid of will. Do the facts of nature justify such an inference? We venture to think that they go a long way towards making such an inference void.

Let us consider carefully some of the facts. Cuvier relied on motion—volitional change of place—as a feature by which the animal might be clearly distinguished from the vegetable. But the distinction is not true of all animals. The sponge and the corals are made up of colonies of animals as incapable of change of place as the cedar or the sycamore; while the modern microscope has revealed to us a realm of vegetable organisation of which individual motion is as essentially an attribute as it is of the eagle or the swallow. The earliest forms of true vegetable life—minute single cells of protoplasm—spend a large proportion of their little lives in intense activity. But when we leave the simple cell, and look upon it as grouped into complex forms, the life-history of such forms is one of unceasing activity. The well-known *Volvox globator* is one of an assemblage of minute plants—common inhabitants of the pond—whose minuteness and beauty of form vie only with its inexpressible grace and power of motion. It is a minute sphere, elegantly reticulated and covered with fine vibratile hairs, or "cilia," and by their united and harmonious action its motion is effected. At times it whirls like a top upon a rigid axis; again it rolls forward with the combined motions of a planet in space, or darts with almost lightning rapidity across the field. Nothing can surpass the ease and beauty of its movements, and the joyous sense of freedom it suggests. Yet it is a plant of the lowest structure, and millions of them would find an ample ocean in a wineglass.

Not less wonderful and even more beautiful are the still minuter *Desmids*. These are the commonest and most persistent dwellers in our ponds and streams of all their

invisible inhabitants. They are a rich green in colour, and of every conceivable form: the crescent, the cross, the sphere, the triangle, the straight line, the curve, and every possible combination of them, is to be found in the symmetrical forms of these invisible atoms of beauty. All these delicate plants *can* move; and many of them do so habitually with apparent purpose, and a grace that cannot be surpassed.

But even these are exceeded in minuteness and delicacy of structure by the closely allied *Diatomacea*. These differ from the *Desmids* in the possession of an imperishable siliceous skeleton; and although some forms are so minute that twenty thousand of them, if placed between the finger and the thumb, would be invisible to the eye and impalpable to the most delicate touch, yet they have lived for such a vast period in the history of the earth that the myriads of successive generations have laid their imperishable skeletons down and actually built up solid rocks. They are found now in every quarter of the globe, in our oceans and rivers, and ponds and ditches, and moist places, from the arctic to the antarctic pole. And these little vegetables—chased and engraved as many of them are with a delicacy which surpasses the analytical power of even the modern microscope—are in many cases free to move, and do so with the utmost elegance and ease.

How such minute atoms of matter effect their unerring and evidently controlled movements, the utmost power of research yet brought to bear upon them has failed to discover. But two recent observers* of the minutest living forms at all amenable to even the great powers of our modern lenses, have demonstrated that these minutest organisms—the *Bacteria*, rod-like bodies present in putrefaction—effect their movements, which are intensely rapid, by means of a pair of motile filaments or “flagella,” one at either end of their rod-shaped bodies. Professor Huxley says that “as to the vegetable nature of these there is now no doubt;” and therefore it is extremely probable that some such organs of locomotion might, with sufficient power, be found to belong to the *Desmid* and the *Diatom*. Be that as it may, voluntary motion is as clearly, although not as universally, an attribute of the vegetable as of the animal kingdom.

* *Monthly Microscopical Journal*, vol. xiv., p. 106.

Nor is it only in minute vegetable forms that this is seen. The exquisite researches of Mr. Charles Darwin upon the habits of the climbing plants have made manifest something nearly akin to "instinct" in their deportment and motion. When a climbing plant first springs from the ground, the extremity of the shoot performs slow gyrations in the air, as if searching for a support, a motion clearly voluntary. The climbing plant twines round its support either with or against the sun. The object is to expose as large a surface as possible to the sun and air, but how the motion is accomplished cannot be determined; yet it is impossible to study the deportment of the whole group of "creepers" without becoming assured of their possession of some almost sentient controlling power. The tendrils of some of these plants coil, others are sensitive to a touch and bend, while others yet secrete a glutinous fluid which attaches it to its support. The tendrils of a *Bignonia*, for example, are sensitive; hence in growing and revolving amid the branched twigs of some supporting tree the tendrils wanting supports soon get touched, and at once they clasp the twig like a bird when perched. The tendrils of another species were seen to slowly travel over the surface of a piece of wood, and when the apex of one of them came to a hole or fissure it inserted itself; the same tendril frequently withdrew itself from one hole to insert itself into another, as if seeking for what exactly pleased it; and Mr. Darwin has seen a tendril withdrawn from a hole after having chosen it and remained fixed there for thirty-six hours. And this apparent selective power is carried still farther in some climbing plants of tropical forests, which will travel on, prolonging their growth indefinitely, and avoiding all other supports that present themselves, until they reach the tree which they peculiarly affect, and then they will at once attach themselves. It is not too much to say that the same behaviour in a definite animal would be taken as an evidence of "instinct."

But even commoner instances of locomotion amongst plants present themselves. In the deep ponds and water-courses of England the common Bladderwort is often found. This plant is usually at the bottom of the pond, its roots immersed in the mud. But it cannot expand its flowers and be fertilised in this position. At the right time, therefore, it rises to the surface of the water, opens its flowers, the pollen is shed upon the pistil, and once more it sinks to its former position.

Yet more remarkable are the habits of the *Vallisneria spiralis*, a plant common in the rivers of the South of France. The female, or seed-bearing parts, and the male, or pollen-bearing parts, grow on separate plants. The female flowers grow on spiral stems, so that if the stream in which they grow should receive an accession of water and rise, by a simple lengthening or pulling out of the corkscrew stem they rise with it; if the water diminishes, by simply compressing the spiral stem they sink with it. Thus they are always on the surface of the water. But the male flowers of the plant grow on short stalks in the water. How, then, is fertilisation effected? When the pistils are ripe to receive the pollen, the male flowers absolutely break off, rise to the surface, and, floating round the female flowers, shed their pollen and fertilise the seed. Clearly then motion, and even motion directed to a distinct object, is not absolutely a monopoly of the animal kingdom, and in no way serves to distinguish it from the vegetable.

Not less remarkable is the fact that *sensitiveness* and reflex movement is as strikingly possessed by the vegetable as by the animal world. It has long been known that certain plants exhibit intense susceptibility to external influences. The *Mimosa pudica*, or "sensitive plant," is one of these. Not only do the leaflets fold their upper surfaces together, the branches of the leaf-stalks bend to each other, and the whole leaf-stalk falls, instantly, when touched; but if the leaves are only breathed upon, if one of them is touched with a speck of acid, or sunlight focussed upon it by a lens, the same results ensue. Nay, it has been affirmed by Dr. Masters that in the savannahs of tropical America, where this beautiful plant abounds, the vibrations caused by the hoofs of an approaching horse will cause all the *Mimosas* instantly to contract; and, just as in the animal organism a cessation of sensation supervenes, and "numbness" results, from a diminution of temperature, so if this plant be placed in an atmosphere below 15 deg. Centigrade all sensibility is gone.

Now, we must no longer suppose that this plant is singular, or in any very remarkable sense an exception. The researches of Charles Darwin and others now prove irresistibly that sensation, or what is a remarkable approach to it, is very widely distributed in vegetable organisms. Nothing can be more remarkable than the sensitiveness or irritability displayed by some plants as a means employed

to secure fertilisation.* In the common Barberry, for example, the stamens lie down upon the petals, and the nectar which the insect seeks is produced by six pairs of honey glands at the bases of the petals; but the stamens are at their bases highly sensitive or irritable, the consequence being that when the insect touches them they spring forward and throw their pollen upon the intruder, to be carried to another flower. Still more striking is the sensitiveness of a group of Orchids, of the genus *Catasetum*. In these plants the pollinia, or pollen-caskets, and the stigmata—the surfaces prepared for the reception of the fertilising pollen—are in different flowers. Of necessity, then, the pollen must be carried by some active agent to the stigma. This is done by insects, but the adaptations are remarkable in a high degree. The flower containing the pollinia, which is highly elastic, carries it under considerable tension in a part which the insect visiting the flower for nectar never approaches; but in obtaining the nectar the insect comes into contact with a delicate spur, which is so sensitive that the excitement of the touch is carried along the tissues of the plant until it reaches the extremely thin membrane which confines the pollen mass; the membrane is instantly ruptured, the pollinia, with a force that will carry it three feet from the flower, flies out, and, being armed with a gummy disc, it sticks to the insect, which carries it to the next flower, and thus eventually fertilises the female flower.

In other genera of plants the same means conserve another end. The *Dionaea muscipula* (Venus' Fly-trap), for example, is one of the plants which affects bogs and swamps, and derives but small nourishment, little else than water, from its roots, and is therefore dependent on some other source for pabulum. This is secured by the sensitiveness of the leaf. This organ is bi-lobed; it is capable of being closed like a book. On each lobe there are three delicate spikes, which are exquisitely sensitive. If one of these be touched with a cotton fibre, or even a hair, the lobes snap together like the sudden closing of a book, the act being instantaneous. The object of this is the securing of animal food in the shape of insects, for the digestion of which the closed leaf or sensitive trap is specially endowed.

* "Fertilisation of Flowers by Insects." Lubbock.

Nor can there be any very remarkable difference in such an organised action in the plant and the animal; for Dr. Burden Sanderson has shown that the same electrical changes ensue in the substance of the plant on contraction, as ensue when the muscle of an animal is similarly affected.

But all this is surpassed by the almost inconceivable susceptibility which the investigations of Darwin have shown to be possessed by the common Sun-dew. This elegant little plant is dependent upon animal food. Its root contributes but little to its support; but the leaf is a beautiful organ for entrapping and digesting food. The insects on which it preys are not secured as in the *Dionæa* by a sudden mechanical action, but by means of a viscid fluid, to which, on the slightest contact, it adheres. The leaf itself is nearly round, and is armed with tentacles crowned with glands, on the top of which the clear colourless viscid fluid rests. There may be as many as two hundred tentacles upon a leaf, and each of these is intensely sensitive, and has a power of reflex motion. As soon as an insect alights upon the glands, the irritation is conveyed from tentacle to tentacle, until they have all curved over and directed their glands with their viscid secretion upon the prey, and digestion ensues.

If an insect alight upon only a few of the glands of the exterior tentacles, the results are the same; they become inflected or bent, and carry it with a rolling motion to the centre of the leaf. And this action will be excited by the presence of the minutest insect; nay, by the presence of particles both the size and weight of which are too minute for appreciation. A piece of soft thread, the one-fiftieth of an inch in length, weighing the eight thousand one hundred and ninety-seventh of a grain, and a particle of human hair, the eight-thousandth of an inch in length, weighing less than the seventy-eight thousandth of a grain, have been proved sufficient to excite a tentacle to action, and cause it to bend or arch over one hundred and eighty degrees. Yet it must be remembered that the minute pressure thus so remarkably perceived does not directly affect the gland; but it has to come through the cushion of viscid fluid which crowns it, and on which the particles rest. In fact, therefore, the pressure exerted by the smallest of these bodies does not exceed the millionth of a grain!

But, if so large a particle as the one-fiftieth of an inch of human hair be placed upon the human tongue or in the eye, it is actually unperceived. In sensitiveness, then, the vegetable actually surpasses the most complex and refined animal! But this is by no means the limit of susceptibility in the Sun-dew. Drops of water containing the minutest quantities of organic compounds or ammoniacal salts placed on the leaves, or the leaves immersed in them, produce still more wonderful results. The most remarkable may suffice for illustration. A quantity of phosphate of ammonia in solution not more than the *thirty millionth* of a grain suffices not only to incurve the whole of the tentacles, but to cause a bending of the entire leaf itself. This is a fact which repeated experiments by the present writer have fully corroborated.

At present the mechanism by which this wonderful susceptibility and reaction are effected is not known. It is one of the problems which await solution with the highest powers of the microscope, and we have reason to believe that it is already fairly attacked. But, in the meantime, it is abundantly clear that if there be a distinction between animals and vegetables, it must be sought outside of the phenomena of sensitiveness or irritability.

Even sleep, apparently so peculiarly a feature of animal organisation, is almost as characteristic of the vegetable. The phenomena are caused by the organs which produce spontaneous movement, and the nocturnal position or position in sleep is generally the opposite of that taken in waking. This is specially clear in the *Leguminosæ*. The great water-lily of the Amazons, when it slumbers, closes its gorgeous corolla, and sinks into the water. Almost every flower of the field has its hour for slumber; and in virgin forests, or vast savannahs, the difference of aspect between the sleeping and the wakeful state is not only unmistakable but impressive.

A remarkably characteristic feature of the vegetable kingdom is the power which the organisms constituting it possess of being propagated by artificial division. A "slip" cut from a healthy plant it is well known will "strike" root in suitable soil, and become a distinct individual. But even this has its counterpart in the animal series. The common *Hydra* of our ponds may be cut into twenty or even forty pieces, and each will become a distinct and perfect individual: if the body be cut into two

lengthwise, the parts will become re-soldered, and form a perfect Hydra; while, if the dissevered parts be kept asunder, each half will become complete. The same is true of another and better known order of the class. Writing of the *Medusida*, or "jelly fishes," Haeckel says, "In several species of the family *Laodicei*, I could divide the umbrella into more than a hundred pieces, and from each piece, provided it only contained a portion of the margin of the umbrella, grew in a few days a complete small medusa." The present writer has grafted the body of a *Hydra vulgaris* on to the mouth and tentacles of a *Hydra viridis*, and the blending was perfect, the two creatures becoming one, just as a graft of *Gloire de Dijon* will retain its distinctive vitality soldered to a wild rose stem. Indeed, the records of vivisection, and even surgery, give evidence of "budding" and "grafting" that proves even these to be no distinctive attribute of plants.

Respiration and circulation are both simulated in a striking way by vegetables. The circulation so clearly seen in the web of a frog's foot with a moderate power of the microscope, is a remarkable sight to those who first behold it. But the circulation of protoplasm with its contained chlorophyl granules in the cells of *Vallisneria spiralis* or *Nitella* is as clear, and certainly as striking. On the other hand, there are animals, such as the *Foraminifera*, the *Radiolaria*, or the *Paramæcia*, in which there is either no circulation at all, or the most shadowy semblance of it.

Plants, like animals, may be rendered unconscious by anæsthetics, intoxicated by narcotics, and killed by electricity. Indeed, although a nervous system proper has not been yet found as belonging to any distinctive vegetable, yet there are many unmistakable animals in precisely the same condition. But "the results of recent inquiries into the structure of the nervous system of animals converge towards the conclusion that the nerve fibres, which we have hitherto regarded as ultimate elements of nervous tissue, are not such, but are simply the visible aggregations of vastly more attenuated filaments, the diameter of which dwindles down to the limits of our present microscopic vision, greatly as these have been extended by modern improvements of the microscope, and that a nerve is, in its existence, nothing but a linear tract of specially modified protoplasm between two points of an organism—

one of which is able to affect the other by means of the communication so established. Hence it is conceivable that even the simplest living being may possess a nervous system." * Thus, the sensibility of plants, like that of animals, which to our present instruments of research are "without a nervous system," may, in fact, be the result of delicate tracts of nerve substance distributed over the entire organism. Nor does the physical basis of the vitality of the vegetable differ in the least from that of the animal. The protoplasm of both is the same. It was long firmly held that plants were made up of *ternary compounds*; cellulose, dextrine, starch, and so forth. In animals these were said to be subordinate, the body being mainly composed of albumen, fibrin, gelatine, &c. But it is now well known that starch and sugar are always present in the higher animals, whether normal or morbid; while chlorophyl—so distinctively vegetable—has been found in the bodies of the *Stentor* and the green *Hydra*,—which are without question animal—and cellulose, the product of vegetables, has been found in the testa of *Ascidians*.

It is clear, then, that no discoverable distinction, which will include the whole of the animal and the whole of the vegetable series, has yet been found; and only one other test remains. It is the nature of the materials assimilated by both classes of organisms. Are they distinct? Must they be of one kind for the animal, and of another kind for the vegetable?

It is here that Professor Huxley finds the "Borderland." As a broad generalisation it is undoubtedly true that animals depend directly upon plants for the materials of their bodies; that is, either they are herbivorous, or they eat other animals which are herbivorous. On the other hand, plants can work up mineral matters into complex organic compounds. But broad as the basis of this distinction is, it does not cover all the facts. All the higher animals assimilate salt—a mineral—while plants, such as the mistletoe, can only exist on the organic juices provided by the trees on which they are parasitic. But besides this it has now been demonstrated beyond dispute, that vegetable organisms entrap and assimilate animal food; that it is indeed essential to their existence. For fifty

* "The Border Territory between the Animal and Vegetable Kingdom," *Millman's Magazine*, Feb., 1876, p. 376.

years neglected observations have been on record concerning the carnivorous habits of a genus of plants known as *Sarracenia*. There are only eight species, and they are all natives of the eastern states of North America. Like most of the carnivorous plants they affect bogs, and even land covered with shallow water. Their leaves are modified into inverted trumpets or ewers. The flower is solitary. In some of these plants the ewer-shaped leaves are furnished with a protecting lid or cover; in other species, although the lid is there, its position is such that it cannot protect the contents of the leaf. Speaking generally, there is placed at the bottom of these hollow leaves a mucilaginous and somewhat astringent fluid. This has been satisfactorily ascertained by Dr. Mellichamp, from observations upon native specimens in their natural state; though it is rarely true of cultivated specimens in this country. But these tubes are veritable traps for insects. The flying prey are attracted to the leaf, in several instances, by the fact that the cover of the ewer-shaped leaf is coloured like the flower. Now the flower contains nectar, which the insect seeks. This is peculiarly the case in an allied form known as *Darlingtonia Californica*. In this plant the cover of the leaf serves as such, and is developed into a long and brilliantly coloured flap, marked just like the flower. Further than this, the only openings into the hollow leaf are shaped like the openings into the nectar-bearing parts of the flower. Thus, doubtless, many an unwary fly takes the leaf for the flower; and so far as the object of its search is concerned it suffers no disappointment, for the whole of the cover of the leaf and the rim for some distance down into the tube is richly smeared with honey, secreted by glands specially designed to this end. Once in this rich feasting ground, the animal is lured farther down. But having reached a certain point the tube becomes delicately enamelled, consisting of glassy cells. No insect can retain a foothold here, so that it inevitably glides down. But the tube narrows rapidly now—wings are useless from want of space—and the body of the insect becomes pressed all round by the narrow neck of the trumpet, which is thickly set with stiff needle-like hairs, all pointing downwards, so that every struggle to be free simply drives the animal down, until, in the cases where it is provided, reaching the fluid which is said to be anæsthetic in its effects, it speedily succumbs. The

enormous number of insects thus entrapped is almost incredible. We have carefully watched one of them named *S. flava*, and are convinced that it is a most successful lure. An old leaf cut open will always show the shells and remains of insects, as well as their eggs and chrysalides, pressed closely together for several inches up the tube. We cut recently twenty old leaves from a *S. flava* that had been in the same place for seven years, and had thus become thoroughly "at home," and certainly the number of flies in a recognisable condition, in all the leaves, could not have been less than four thousand; while for some distance at the base of the tubes was a black unrecognisable *débris*. As a rule, in their native state these plants, in consequence of the animal matter in decay which they thus contain, emit a strongly noxious odour; and there can be no question that the leaves, thus heavily laden with rich manure, fall to the ground and provide the plant with the sustenance which, from the nature of the soil, it would not otherwise obtain. In order to attract wingless insects into these tubes they are furnished almost to the root with a honeyed tract, up which animals such as the ant are lured until they too reach the fatal snare and perish in its depths.

This, it will be seen, is not an instance of the actual *digestion* and assimilation of animal food, although it closely approximates to it. Cases, however, are now well known and carefully attested, in which not only the organ for securing the prey is complete, but the function of digestion is added, so that the plant, like the animal, is supported by animal food. The *Nepenthis*, or true "pitcher plants," are an instance in point. These are climbing shrubs growing freely in the region of the tropics. They produce the "pitchers" or vase-like appendages, at the ends of their leaves; and these are provided with tendril-like stalks, by means of which the plant can climb. Some of the "pitchers" are very large and strong, and might even entrap small birds. The rim of the pitcher is richly smeared with honey, and is often attractive in colour. The honey glands are continued a small distance into the vase, and then the surface becomes exquisitely glazed, so that the insect, attracted in by the nectar, glides down its sides until it reaches an acid fluid contained in the bottom of the vase, into which it falls and is killed.

The glands for secreting this fluid are enormous in number: in one species not less than a million are found

in every "pitcher," and, in fact, they are nothing less than stomachs. As is well known, the digestion of albuminous compounds by animals is effected by a ferment called pepsin, which is the active agent, together with weak hydrochloric and lactic acids. And both are essential to the act of digestion. The fluid in these "pitchers" is a weak acid; and as soon as an organic body is put into the "pitcher" pepsin is poured out in addition, and digestion proper takes place. If an *inorganic* substance be dropped in, *no effect is produced*—the pepsin is not poured out; but if a fragment of beef or mutton, or an insect, be placed in the fluid, precisely the same changes take place as occur when the same substances are put into the stomach of a dog or a man. Nor can digestion be effected by the fluid alone when withdrawn from the "pitcher," because then we have the acid only, and the pepsin, which the "pitcher" would be stimulated to pour out, is wanting.

Darwin has shown the same to be the case with Venus' Fly-trap. When the leaf has closed upon its prey, pepsin and acid are poured out in such quantity as actually to fall off the leaf in drops. In this way the toughest insects are digested, and the digested matter is thus transformed into the protoplasm of the plant.

But the same careful observer has shown that even a more striking instance is presented to us in the common Sun-dew. It is not only furnished with a beautiful apparatus for entrapping its prey, and a perfect digestive apparatus for the digestion and assimilation of the same to its own support; but it possesses to some extent at least a discriminative power, and can distinguish between what is nutritive and what is not. A piece of beef or mutton, or an insect, placed upon the tentacles leads to their speedy action, and the tentacles do not relax until digestion is complete. But if a piece of cinder, or cork, or glass, or other non-nutritious substance be put upon the leaf, it is probable that no action at all will take place in the tentacles; or if they should move towards and close upon it, they are speedily withdrawn. Mrs. Treat, of America, who has experimented upon them, affirms that not only the tentacles but the leaf will move a minute distance upwards *after* a fly, which is fixed in a position very near to it, but not in contact with it.

In this case, too, the components of the digestive fluid have been most carefully analysed, and are found to consist

of pepsin and acid; and Mr. Darwin has proved it capable of digesting not only raw and roast meats, but cartilage, bone, and even enamel. But digestion may be completely stopped if the acid in the fluid be neutralised by an alkali, or the alkali be rendered neutral by an acid. Thus the analogy is complete.

Hence it will be seen that although it is generally true that plants are characterised by their power of working up mere mineral matters into complex organic compounds, it is yet not true without exceptions, and some of these are significant in a very high degree. But on the other hand, it is simply impossible in the present state of science to prove that in the comparatively unknown "Borderland" there are not animals which, with equal facility, manufacture *only* inorganic elements into the life-stuff of which they consist.

During the past four years some carefully digested observations of an exhaustive character have been made upon the extremely minute living forms that people almost the outmost fringe of the area over which our optical aids, as at present provided, extend. The importance of exact knowledge of the whole life cycle of even a few of these excessively minute organisms is extremely great. Dr. Carpenter tells us that "such a study has recently been very carefully prosecuted, with really important results, by Messrs. Dallinger and Drysdale, who have worked not only with the highest powers, but with appliances specially devised to keep the same drop of water under continuous view."* And Professor Huxley has carefully, and with his usual penetration, applied the information thus afforded to a most critical analysis of the points, if any, in which in this region of minuteness—the last refuge—the animal may differ from the vegetable. His attention was specially drawn to it by the fact that Professor Tyndall some months before asked him to examine a drop of hay infusion placed under an excellent and powerful microscope, and to tell him what some organisms visible in it were. Besides Bacteria—the special organism present in putrefactive processes—there were other organisms attaining "the comparatively gigantic dimensions of $\frac{1}{500}$ th of an inch." Each of these had a pear-shaped body with the small end slightly incurved, and produced into a long filament of

* *The Microscope*, p. 494.

extreme tenuity; and behind this another filament, equally fine, trailed. By lashing the front flagellum, motion was effected, and sometimes it was anchored by the hinder one. These tiny creatures carefully avoided collision when in full career towards each other, and often collected in crowds and jostled one another "with as much semblance of individual effort as a spectator on the Grand Mulets might observe with a telescope among the specks representing men in the valley of Chamounix." Professor Huxley continues: "The spectacle, though always surprising, was not new to me. So my reply to the question put to me was that these organisms were what biologists call *monads*, and though they might be animals, it was also possible that they might, like the *Bacteria*, be plants." To any but the close and critical student of such vital forms, this reply would appear almost absurd; we believe it would have done so to many a well-read biologist a very short time since. We are not surprised, therefore, to find that Professor Tyndall "received this verdict with an expression which showed a sad want of respect for authority." For "he would as soon believe that a sheep was a plant." This led Dr. Huxley carefully to reconsider the subject; and he is obliged to adhere to his former view that it is impossible to determine whether the monad is an animal or a plant.

Professor Huxley was not, however, able to afford the weeks or months required to work out the life-history of this form; but he regrets this the less as the "remarkable observations, recently published by Messrs. Dallinger and Drysdale on certain monads, relate in part to a form so similar . . . that the history of the one may be used to illustrate that of the other." That history is briefly this:—At first the normal, almost oval form divides into two, even to the exquisitely delicate cilium. This was accomplished in six or seven minutes. "At this rate a single form would give rise to a thousand like itself in the course of an hour, to about a million in two hours, and to a number greater than the generally assumed number of human beings now living in the world in three hours. . . . The apparent suddenness of the appearance of multitudes of such organisms as these in any nutritive fluid to which one obtains access is thus easily explained." This method of multiplication by division has, however, been long known as characteristic of such organisms, although the details of the method were never before explained. But

a still more remarkable fact is the discovery by these observers, in this and the five other monad forms they so persistently worked out, of a true sexual method of increase. Two of the monads meet, come into contact, and coalesce: the whole of each flowing into the other. The result of the fusion is a triangular body, at first retaining the activity of the component bodies, but at length falling into a state of rest. Eventually the apices of the triangle open, and give exit to a dense yellowish glairy fluid, filled with inconceivably minute granules. These were watched, and seen to develop into the parent-form, commence self-division, and once more indeed repeat the cycle.

Professor Huxley says that the form shown him by Dr. Tyndall "very closely resembled" this one, but he is not certain that it is the same. First, because the nucleus or "central particle" described by Messrs. Dallinger and Drysdale could not clearly be made out; and second, because nothing is said by these observers of the existence of "a contractile vacuole" in this particular monad, "though they describe it in another."

We are, however, inclined to think that the form seen by Professors Huxley and Tyndall is identical with that described by those observers. The presence or absence of the "central particle," we gather, can only be determined by very continuous observation at times, and may, perhaps, be dismissed. But on referring to the paper in the Proceedings of the Royal Microscopical Society, we find that they do describe "a contractile vacuole" in this organism, but not by that designation. It is thus pointed out:—"A large disc is constantly present in this stage, and exhibits an opening and shutting motion like that of the eyelid, opening at either hand from a median line, and *snapping* with great force."* This is evidently the description of a contractile vesicle or vacuole having, as in the *Amæba*, some remote relation to circulation or its equivalent; but not being described as usual, might readily escape notice.

This being so, it would appear that Professor Huxley's monad is identical with the one he aptly uses to illustrate its nature.

Now the question is, Does this group of minute organ-

* *Monthly Microscopical Journal*, Vol. X. p. 248.

isms, of which we now have some accurate information, throw any light upon the question of what an animal is, as contradistinguished from a vegetable?

When Professor Huxley wrote his paper in *Macmillan's Magazine*, he had only seen *four* out of the seven papers which we now find Messrs. Dallinger and Drysdale have contributed on this subject. Hence he says: "I am not aware that the investigators from whom I have borrowed this history have endeavoured to ascertain whether their monads take solid nutriment or not; so that, though they help us very much to fill up the blanks in the history of my *Heteromita*," their observations throw no light on the problem we are trying to solve: Is it an animal or is it a plant?" But in the last paper contributed by these gentlemen, we find an extremely instructive passage:—

"We do not profess," they write, "to decide what is the true nature of the monads we have studied—that is, to decide whether they be animal or vegetable. We nevertheless strongly believe in their animal nature. But if this be so, they afford another illustration of the inefficiency of the distinction between the animal and vegetable kingdoms, which assumes that animals can only assimilate organic compounds, while vegetables can elaborate their protoplasm from those that are inorganic. We made a series of experiments on the transplantation of known forms to Cohn's 'nutritive fluid,' which contains *no albuminous matter*, but *only* mineral salts and tartarate of ammonia. The result was that we found that not only the Bacteria but the flagellate monads lived, thrived, and multiplied in it, although supplied with no other pabulum. If it be affirmed that this is a proof of their vegetable nature, we can only say that the same must be said of the *Kerona* of Ehrenberg and Dujardin; which flourish side by side with the monads, with this nutritive fluid as the sole source of pabulum. And both alike lived and multiplied in the dark."†

Now Professor Huxley shows clearly, that, as to their mode of development, these minute creatures are simulated by definite plants; and there is no reason why they may not be such, save the very cogent one that there is also no reason why they should not be animals. But by the above quotation another fact is presented. A definite animal, the *Kerona*, lives in a purely inorganic fluid with

* This is the name Professor Huxley uses in preference to *monad*.

† *Monthly Microscopical Journal*, Vol. XIII. p. 190.

the monads, and, therefore, whether the monads be animal or not, it is now clear that animals *can* assimilate purely inorganic nutriment. Thus the last distinction of a scientific nature is gone; and we are obliged to look upon the entire region of biology—the whole realm of vital existences—as without absolute distinction. The continuity is complete; and organically considered, the difference between animal and plant is “one of degree rather than of kind.”

This is a generalisation to which all the investigations of recent years have pointed. The chemistry of the ultimate substance in which life inheres in both plant and animal is alike; this gives them the same physical basis. It might, therefore, be anticipated that similarity of function would display itself in an almost infinite diversity of manifestation.

But in *Evolution and the Origin of Life* Dr. Bastian would lead us to conclude that because an organic continuity can be scientifically shown to exist, that continuity must be continued from the organic to the inorganic, and that *he has found the link*. He affirms that the minute organisms present in decaying matters originate *de novo*; and that even inorganic, that is mineral, matter suitably combined will give rise to them. Now it is unfortunate that Dr. Bastian is obliged to make the testing ground of his hypothesis a region of organic forms so minute that our most powerful lenses cannot fully reach them; and concerning the life-history of which nothing of real value for generalisation is known; while, on the other hand, the hypothesis itself is directly adverse to *all* the facts furnished by experimental biology. We apprehend that there is no man of science and no lover of truth living, who would either reject or wish to refute the spontaneous origin of living things from things non-living, if the facts of nature warranted. But it is too large a question to be lightly treated, and involves too much to allow of unjustified generalisation. Nothing can be clearer than the fact that Herbert Spencer, Darwin, and Huxley, for example, would, as believers in the doctrine of evolution, gain much by the *proof* that there was a demonstrable continuity—a visible point of junction—between the now sharply separated organic and inorganic realms. But it is a clear proof of their proverbial honesty that they will not admit the hypothesis upon doubtful data. Dr. Bastian

crosses from the organic to the inorganic world, not by the aid of facts, but upon the most transparently fallacious assumptions. There are scores of prominent biologists willing enough to cross from the inorganic to the organic—from the non-living to the living—under the leadership of facts; but it is a fatal feature that, with all Dr. Bastian's almost passionate enforcement of his so-called facts, there is not an English biologist of note who accepts his doctrine.

In the last published volume (the third) of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*,* there is a fine article by Huxley and Thistleton Dyer on "Biology." It is there distinctly stated that "the biological sciences are sharply marked off from the abiological, or those which treat of the phenomena manifested by not-living matter, in so far as the properties of living matter distinguish it absolutely from all other kinds of things, and as the present state of knowledge furnishes us with no link between the living and the not-living."† This, of itself, is enough; it is not a statement of opinion, but of fact. But we have statements of this fact in detail in all the recent writings of competent biologists. And this has greatly exercised Dr. Bastian. He pleads with them as if it were a matter to be determined by their own will. He asks why they should dare to take up a position so adverse to his "facts."‡ As if the consensus of the finest intellects in Europe specially devoted to the phenomena of life, and knowing all that Dr. Bastian can know, were not an answer that makes the very question absurd!

Dr. Bastian evidently prefers what to his mind would be the coherence of the doctrine of Evolution to a patient discovery of Nature's own methods. To make Evolution a satisfactory means by which the inorganic and the organic realms are alike developed, there must be to his mind a visible pathway. So he chooses the Bacteria-organisms, as we have said, quite unknown, and almost inaccessible to us; and from some undigested and conflicting "facts" obtained by dubious methods, he tells us that the chasm is crossed. The Bacteria originate spontaneously, originate without parents, in dead matter—and, therefore, Evolution is established! In other words, as a recent writer has indicated,§ Evolution requires sponta-

* Ninth edition.

† P. 679.

‡ *Evolution*, pp. 18—16.

§ *Popular Science Review*, May, 1876, p. 115.

neous generation, and therefore spontaneous generation must be true!

The evidence on which Dr. Bastian relies for his hypothesis is in itself utterly incompetent, even if it were trustworthy. In conspicuous living forms it is not difficult to discover what the mode of origin really is. But in more obscure and less accessible organisms imagination has free scope. There was a time when water-birds were believed to originate in trees! But without any knowledge of such minute and puzzling organisms as *Bacteria*, manifestly peopling in some form air and water, and deposited on every solid, it might be supposed that a scientific biologist would interpret their mode of origin by the mode of origin of all other living things, down to the limit of man's present knowledge, and not attempt to infer from questionable experiments that "spontaneity" of origin which research has gradually exploded and narrowed down amongst organised beings until it can now be assumed concerning no other form *than* the *Bacteria*. Yet Dr. Bastian relies for the truth of his hypothesis simply on thermal experiments on these minute creatures, of whose development we are ignorant. Certain flasks containing them are boiled and sealed while boiling: no air—nothing, indeed, containing *Bacteria* or their germs—can now come into contact with the fluid. The organisms are said to be killed at a much lower temperature than the boiling point, so that now if they reappear in the flask they must have originated in dead matter. Now the fact is, that the most careful and precise experiments agree in proving that these specks of organised matter do not survive the boiling point if the infusion be filtered, carefully boiled, and the vessel carefully closed. But a few very exceptional instances are on record, in which, although the boiling has been continued for some minutes, yet, on the opening of the flasks after the lapse of a suitable time, *Bacteria* have appeared. And it is *only* on the evidence of these "facts" that Dr. Bastian requires that the biological world receive the doctrine of "spontaneous generation"!

Two assumptions lurk in every instance presented to the world by this writer. The first is that a given heat destroys every form or condition of *Bacterial* life: this he has never either proved or taken means to prove. The second is, that in the given instance he had raised every part of a given infusion to this required temperature: a

matter needing the utmost caution in a fluid charged with solid matter.

A striking instance of the looseness of the method has recently been presented to us.* Dr. Bastian put an infusion of cress with some of the leaves and stalks of the plants into a flask, and while it was boiling hermetically sealed it, and then raised it to a temperature of 270 to 275 degrees Fahr. It was not opened for nine weeks; but when it was opened the experimenter found "more than a dozen very active monads." He took these and heated them, and found that he could kill them absolutely at a temperature of 140 degrees Fahr. So he triumphantly concludes that they must have originated in dead matter.† Indeed he declares any other conclusion to be in effect absurd, and advises his opponents that their only refuge is to "doubt the facts."

Now, we have seen above, that the monads have recently been most fully and carefully examined, and typical life-histories completely made out. In all the forms studied, after a most rapid and curious series of metamorphoses, evidently all conserving the great end of rapid multiplication, they all, without a single exception, were found to produce myriads of spore or eggs. These were submitted to thermal tests to discover the amount of heat they could bear, and yet develop into perfect monads. It was well established that the creatures themselves were killed at 140 degrees Fahr. or thereabout. But now it was demonstrated that two out of six of the monads produced spore, which developed *under observation*, after exposure to 300 degrees Fahr., and that the average heat-resistance possessed by the spore was nearly double that of the adult.

Now, Dr. Bastian drew, measured, and described his monad—the triumphant product of spontaneous generation—and it has since been absolutely identified as one of the forms whose life-history is now so completely known. It is no other than one of the two forms whose spore were proved to be able to resist 300 degrees Fahr. But since Dr. Bastian only raised his infusion up to 275 degrees Fahr., 25 degrees less than this, it is obvious that his conclusion as to its "spontaneous" origin—so triumphantly and even defiantly flourished before his scientific opponents—is a delusion and a snare. The

* *Popular Science Review*, April, 1876.

† *Evolution*, pp. 175—180.

monads were not parentless waifs, but the natural products of the heat-resisting spore.

But having established the existence of genetic products—eggs—in the monads, the series next in order to the Bacteria themselves, and having shown what fallacies may arise from want of knowledge of this fact, we are the more fully prepared to perceive the weakness of Dr. Bastian's method and his inferences. But this is what *he* wholly fails to do; and the same kind of reasoning as was employed to transform a naturally begotten monad into a "spontaneous" product, is now employed—though certainly, whether Dr. Bastian knows it or not, with diminished effect—upon the Bacteria.

The most speedy way in which to render futile any further efforts to establish the hypothesis of the transition of not-living into living matter by way of the Bacteria would be to demonstrate the germs through which they ultimately multiply. We say ultimately, because they increase at an enormous rate by self-division. But the discovery by the microscope of even the germs of the *monads* evidently taxed the utmost powers of the finest modern microscopes, worked in the most delicate way. It is manifest, therefore, that, since these are comparatively giants to the Bacteria, the germs of the latter must be ultra-microscopic. Hence, although they have been indicated distinctly by all the best and most careful experimenters, yet they have never been seen. But their existence was made almost absolutely certain when it was shown that the organisms nearest them in form, size, and deportment produced and emitted germs, out of which the perfect form developed.

The matter must have rested here, so far as our present optical appliances were concerned, but for the fact that Dr. Tyndall devised another method of solving the important problem. It is well known that the passage of a powerful beam of light through a dark room is made strikingly manifest by the presence of dancing motes. The beam is more or less manifest in proportion to their size and multitude. But if the air of any chamber be allowed sufficient time, these motes will deposit themselves upon the lowest surfaces of the chamber, leaving the air clear; so that the intensest beam of light is absolutely invisible in its passage across a chamber in such a condition, while the most inconceivably minute particles

are capable if they still remain in the air of being made manifest by light condensed and sent in a beam across it.* Dr. Tyndall immediately saw that this might be applied to the discovery of the presence or absence of Bacterial germs. To put it into practice air-tight chambers were prepared, in which filtered infusions of every kind might be boiled, when, by the passage of a beam from the electric light, it was shown that the air in the chamber was moteless. The result was that such infusions, however long exposed, produced no Bacteria. What Bacteria and germs they had contained had been destroyed by the boiling temperature; and the surrounding air being deprived of germs or particles of matter carrying them, the infusions were sterile to the end, proving clearly that it was by the presence of germs the putrefactive organism originated; for no sooner were these same infusions exposed to the open air—to the extent of six hundred cases—than they were “infallibly smitten,” while in the air freed of its motes there was absolute immunity—the infusions were free to the last.

Clearly then the motes are a determining cause of the presence of Bacteria, and it is amongst the least and most densely packed of these particles—immensely beyond the reach of any lens—that Dr. Tyndall discovers the essential precursors of these organisms. Now, the question is, What are they? To suppose they are inorganic is in itself absurd; but it is rendered more so by the fact that calcined air, however much charged with motes, is as powerless as optically pure air to determine the presence of the putrefactive organisms. And, therefore, if what is *known* of the monads as to their ultimate origin in germs be taken beside what is here given, the fact that the germs of Bacteria have been reached, approaches much nearer to certainty than many things which even science unhesitatingly accepts.

But even this certainty has been strengthened by an investigation into the deportment of the germs of the monads treated in precisely the same way. This investigation has been conducted by Mr. Dallinger.† The decaying animal matter in which the monads thrive after being in a putrescent state for a year or more may be

* *Nature*, Jan. 27th, 1876, p. 252.

† *Popular Science Review*, April, 1876. *Monthly Microscopic Journal*, Vol. XII., p. 263.

dried, and becomes then, it appears, a porous flaky mass, friable in many parts, and specifically very light. Now the presence of two well-known monads was demonstrated in a putrescent mass of this kind, and it was seen by careful observation that they were actively depositing germs or spore. The mass was then dried, and heated up to a temperature of ten degrees higher than that required to kill the adult forms, but much lower than was needed to destroy the germs. The fine light powder resulting from the breaking up of the baked mass was then distributed through a chamber, such as Dr. Tyndall used, and an *inorganic fluid*—the “Cohn’s” nutritive fluid referred to on p. 21—which had been shown to be capable of sustaining the monads was inserted, when the beam of light showed that the air in the chamber was full of motes. The whole was then left for five days. After that time had elapsed, the fluids were taken out and examined. The two monads were found to be copiously present in all the cups of fluid. But the air in the chamber was now *moteless*; it had deposited all its particles—this the “beam” demonstrated—so more fluid, perfectly clean, was inserted. At the expiration of five days this was examined, and not a trace of monads was to be found. More dust from the baked mass was now diffused through the chamber, and these sterile cups of fluid again inserted. At the expiration of five days more each of the cups swarmed with monads.

Nothing can be more decisive than this. The germ—known to be such—acted in the production of monads precisely as the motes—*believed* to be germs—acted in the production of Bacteria. The inference is irresistible. The lowest organisms known to science are the product of anterior life, and the line of continuity connecting the living and the non-living—spite of Dr. Bastian’s hypothesis—has, on the evidence of the most accomplished biologists in the world, yet to be discovered.

This is an important fact. In living matter as such, whether animal or vegetable, there is no sharp line of demarcation. But when we reach the outmost border of the “living,” we find no demonstrable connection with the inorganic. That there are lines of continuity from the non-living to the living is in one sense certain, for both states inhere in matter. The living state of matter differs from the dead state in only one essential—the *property* of vitality, a property which by its very nature cannot

be destroyed. This property is not found in the proximate principles or constituents of an organised body when dead. So that the property of matter called life results from no known or even conceivable combination of these, but is an entirely new, peculiar, and unknown combination isometric with the sum of them. When this combination breaks up into what are known as the organic elements, that is the act of death. However this property was acquired, it is only matter possessing it that can endow other matter with the same property. Hence, philosophically we might have anticipated what experiment demonstrates—the non-living and the vital present us with no visible link. The one cannot become the other by any combination or adjustment of atoms, except under the control of matter endowed with the vital property, any more than lead could become gold by any process of the alchemist.

That matter at some remote period in the past history of this globe was endowed with this property is certain. But palpably it was endowed with it once and for all. By whatever process the Great Creator wrought out the universe, there was a period when dead matter had to receive a new property—*sui generis*—and, once given, it could no more repeat itself without the same original power acting—whether a “first” or a “second” cause—than inorganic elements can now become organic without the intervention of a living thing. This is true whatever theory of the universe be maintained. It is as true of evolution as it is of the doctrine of distinct and separate creations. There can be no question about this fact. So that when the eager advocate of spontaneous generation urges upon Evolutionists that they are bound to believe it if they would be consistent, Professor Huxley properly answers, “if it were so, it would be so much the worse for the doctrine of evolution.”* But the truth is that no conceivable mode of origin of the present universe—whether it be projected upon the assumption of either a direct or indirect action of the First Great Cause—requires to postulate spontaneous generation if it be in any sense logical. There was a period when all conditions and forces, however directed, converged to the endowment of matter with a new—the highest—property, life: and life was the pro-

* *Encyclopædia Britannica*, Vol. III., p. 689, ninth edition.

duct—the “work” done by the forces expended. It was not an indefinite power given to non-living matter to become *vital* when it chose. The conception is absurd. It is no more to be looked for, than that a crystal of quartz should have the power to become a diamond, or a molecule of water to become a molecule of sulphuric acid.

It is clear then that the hypothesis of Dr. Bastian is without foundation, alike in philosophy and in fact. Nature is not capricious; and by whatever means evolution may, under Dr. Bastian's consciousness of necessity, be spurred across the chasm which divides the not-living from the living, he must henceforth abandon the “spontaneous” origin of Bacteria.

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ART. II.—*Commentar über den Brief Pauli an die Ephesier.*
Von G. C. A. von Harless. 1858.

THREE important Epistles of St. Paul, written during the same Roman imprisonment, may be compared with singular interest as to their several doctrines of the Holy Spirit. The comparison would form an important chapter of Biblical theology, properly so called. In the Colossian Epistle there is one and one only allusion, "your love in the Spirit" (ch. i. 8): this being clearly incidental, and not itself incontestable. When it is remembered how close is the affinity between this and the Ephesian Epistle in other respects—that affinity running into long parallel passages,—this is obviously strange: "the Spirit bloweth where He listeth." The Philippians hear four times of the Holy Ghost: "the supply of the Spirit of Jesus Christ" (ch. i. 19); "stand fast in one Spirit" (ch. i. 27); "if there be any fellowship of the Spirit" (ch. ii. 1); "who worship God in the Spirit" (ch. iii. 3), besides which and after which He occurs no more. But in that to the Ephesians He is a Divine presence, in name and influence, everywhere: forming the very theological tissue of the whole discussion. This Epistle is, to adopt its own language, "filled with the Spirit." In comparison with all and each of the other Apostolical documents it is more abundant. It has the superiority over them in the number and variety of allusions in proportion to its length: this holding good even when the comparison is with the two Corinthian letters, rich as they are in the doctrine. Again, it compares to advantage—*sit venis verbo*—in the diffusion of its reference throughout its substance, from beginning to end: for instance, however glorious on this subject the Epistle to the Romans is, it is only in the heart and centre of it that this glory appears. In the Ephesians it is everywhere. Moreover, it is distinguished from all others by the variety of its teaching: embracing all or nearly all the elements of other Scriptures, and superadding not a few of its own. Again, it is remarkable as stamping a certain

peculiarity of form upon most of its exhibitions of the subject: when the individual phrase is not unique, there is invariably something in the application or combination of phrase that marks it out from all others. And, finally, it alone, in the later New Testament, combines as it were into one treatise the doctrine of the Holy Ghost as taught by our Lord and St. John with reference to the Trinity; as taught in the Acts and Corinthians with reference to the Church; and as taught by St. Paul elsewhere especially in reference to the individual believer. St. Paul's question to certain Ephesian believers was, "Did ye receive the Holy Ghost when ye believed?" It seemed his mission to that Church to unfold among them the doctrine the absence of which so moved his soul. Postponing, however, the specific reason for this singular "benefit" to them, we will let the Epistle itself make good our assertion.

First, as to the Holy Spirit's relation to the God of redemption. The impress of the economical or mediatorial or redemptional Trinity is stamped upon the entire volume of revelation, especially upon the New Testament, and most especially upon the Apostolical Epistles. In the Old Testament three, and only three, Persons appear as manifestations of God: appearing, however, not absolutely as Divine Persons, but as having each a specific part in the conduct of the economy of Providence and Grace. In the New Testament these Three Persons have their parts more distinctly assigned to them: the Son is the Incarnate Son, declaring Himself sent by the Father and yet co-equal with Him, and Himself promises another Self, a Self who is yet Another, the Holy Ghost. After the baptismal formula has been laid down, the redemptional Trinity is literally everywhere in the New Testament. There is a triple or threefold or three-one glory of the Godhead discernible throughout: sometimes more faintly; sometimes more clearly; sometimes with invisible demonstration; but always with reference to the origination, the accomplishment, and the administration of the redeeming work by the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost respectively. Of this all-pervading exhibition of the Trinity the Epistle before us is the most complete and perfect example in the New Testament. A general glance at its doctrine of the Spirit will make it plain; only however by way of suggestion, and without such minute exposition as would amount to a commentary on the whole Epistle.

It begins with a Trinitarian doxology, "Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath blessed us with all Spiritual blessings in heavenly places in Christ." The word "spiritual" connected here with "blessings" as certainly refers to the Spirit as if He were mentioned by name. Every other interpretation of the adjective is cold and inappropriate: for instance, that which makes it refer to the more spiritual character of the Gospel in comparison with the Law. They are blessings "in heavenly places," and are supposed to be in the keeping of the Holy Ghost, who is the Supreme Steward of the mysteries of Christ: moreover, they are but one great blessing, that blessing which in the Galatians is said to be "the promise of the Spirit through faith" (Gal. iii.). This is "the heavenly gift" of Heb. vi. 4. It may be said to be a critical instance and fair example at the outset of the manner in which the doctrine of the economical Trinity pervades this Epistle and the New Testament generally. The Divine Spirit shares in that heavenly community of blessings of which the Saviour spoke: "All Thine are Mine and Mine are Thine." The heavenly gift is that of the Father through and in the Son by and in the Spirit. Such language assumes the doctrine of the Eternal Trinity, introducing the mediatorial subordination. It is adapted to that doctrine and to no other; and it argues both in the writer and in the reader a state of mind in which the Supreme Being is habitually regarded as Three-One.

As we proceed we find that these blessings of the Spirit decreed in the heavens in Christ Jesus are translated to earth. They are obtained by those who believe in Christ, and are therefore sealed by the Spirit of promise, the earnest of the Christian inheritance unto the day when the eternal purpose having been accomplished in time shall flow back to eternity again. Thus the "spiritual" of verse 8 is suspended through the intervening verses until it becomes personal in the Holy Spirit of verse 19.

Praise turns immediately to prayer; and the prayer still more distinctly includes the Three Persons. "The God of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Father of glory," is invoked as the Head of the Trinity in redemption, even as Christ is the Head of the Church. As such He is the God of our Lord Jesus Christ, that God whom the Son reveals as His own Father and the Father of that "glory of grace which

is revealed in the Beloved." The Son He hath "made to be Head over all to the Church;" but that Church is "His Body, the fulness of Him which filleth all in all" with His own fulness, "the fulness of God." And the Spirit is prayed for as "the Spirit of wisdom and revelation in the knowledge of Him," that is, as the Revealer of the Triune God. As the Spirit of wisdom He is the guide of the soul into the full knowledge of God through the medium of the Word and the means of grace, through the doctrines of redemption as apprehended by the understanding. As the Spirit of revelation He directly pours into the soul the illumination of grace, manifesting the Lord to the spirit of the believer by a secret disclosure to the intuitional consciousness. But in both He stands in relation to the God of redemption as the Interpreter and Expositor of what without Him would be eternally unknown. Whereas in the preceding doxology He was the sum of all heavenly gifts, in this prayer He is the Revealer of all heavenly truth, which is no other than the knowledge of God in His Son, of the Father of glory in the glory of the Only-begotten.

Here we must needs anticipate the still more finished Trinitarian prayer of the heart of the Epistle. The long preface to that prayer is as it were an echo of the former. "The mystery of Christ" is revealed unto His holy apostles and prophets "by the Spirit" and "by revelation," especially to the Apostle Paul, as displaying "the manifold wisdom of God." The mediatorial Trinity cannot be hid. But the great intercession that follows unfolds the relations of the Three Persons to human salvation still more expressly: indeed in such a way as to make it the classical text on the subject. The Spirit is the Agent of the Divine power, searching the inmost principles of the inner man: penetrating ever more and more surely and deeply into the inmost mysteries of man's motives and springs of action, known only to Himself; and strengthening each faculty and all in their unity unto all holiness and duty. If the doctrine of the Trinity were not vital to Christianity that would have been enough. But once more we find a Divine blessing taking three forms, not in addition to the strengthening of the Spirit, but as the same thing in another form. The Christ is regarded as dwelling in the believing heart, in the inner heart of that inner man; to dwell there being the prerogative of God alone. That this

is true is sealed to us by what follows: "That ye may be filled up unto all the fulness of God." No marvel that a prayer which is to end in that way should begin by invoking the might of the Spirit. God only can make the soul strong to bear His own indwelling.

The latter part of the second chapter introduces the Spirit in two relations to the Triune God of redemption. First comes the economy of reconciliation, in which God is the Father to whom all are to be reconciled, through Him who is "our Peace," whose stonement on the cross is applied by the Spirit. "For through Him we both have access in one Spirit to the Father." Here the conditions of return to God are the subject: the reconciliation "in the heavenly places in Christ"—not yet Christ save in purpose—has become a reality on earth in Christ our Peace; but that reconciliation in God must have effect on man only through the appropriation of it by the Spirit. Then, secondly, those who have access, or admission—for that is the force of the term—have become a temple in which the Triune God dwells: His "household," His "building," His "temple." In the wonderful combination of thought and language which this mystery requires, we find that the Father of the household has become the God of the temple, having admitted sinners to His presence through forgiveness and purification. We find also, that Christ Jesus our Peace has become the chief cornerstone of the temple; that that very temple is "in Him the Lord;" and that the living stones of that temple are those who were predestinated to "adoption through Jesus Christ unto Him" the Father. Further, we find that the Holy Spirit who sealed the right of access through pardon, who witnessed the adoption of sons, is now the element and sphere of the sanctification of those who are "builded together for an habitation of God in the Spirit." Thus those who were "strangers to the covenant of the promise" (verse 12)—of "the Holy Spirit of Promise," that is—are by the reception of the Spirit brought into the fellowship of the Triune God. And, finally, let it be observed that that mystical preposition "in," which belongs only to God and our relations to Him, is here emphatically applied both to the Son and the Spirit: we are a temple "in the Lord;" a habitation of God "in the Spirit." This is a most impressive fact, and is full of suggestion. It is an answer to those who decline to admit the personality of the Holy Ghost in this and

similar passages: as "in the Lord" is consistent with the personality of the Redeemer, so "in the Spirit" is consistent with the personality of the Holy Ghost, whose name Spirit has all the privileges and grammatical peculiarities of a proper name. On the other hand, there is good reason for the difference of prepositions here: unto the Father, through the Son, in the Spirit. The emphasis is on the middle term; the mediation of the Personal Son, who gives not access but introduction to the Father. The Spirit is not so directly the personal Introducer; His intercession is not in heaven, but on earth. It is in the common participation of His influence "in the Spirit" that we draw near. The Apostle thought of all men as Jews and Gentiles; that distinction has dropped, but the universality remains. When the occasion does not require such precise shading of terms he says: "but now in Christ Jesus ye who sometimes were far off are made nigh by the blood of Christ." These interchangeable prepositions show that the personality of the Spirit is not affected by them.

Once more, we must go back to the earlier part of the third chapter, where the Apostle introduces that same "mystery of Christ" which he had once before spoken of in the Epistle to the Colossians. In that Epistle, however, he had not connected it with the Spirit; now he supplies, as it were, that omission, being led to do so by his present purpose, which is to speak of the revelation of the mystery, the unspeakable glory of which in the former Epistle he had been making matter of prayer. The mystery itself is something much deeper than the union of Jews and Gentiles in Christ. That, indeed, was a mystery of former ages, now made plain in the Gospel; but this is a mystery of the ages before the ages, yea, of eternity before the ages were, "hid in God who created all things;" the adorable mystery of Christ as the Son in the eternal essence of the Deity. "By revelation" the Apostle received it; or, as he afterwards says, "it hath now been revealed unto His holy apostles and prophets by the Spirit." In the former he doubtless refers to the secret illumination in which God "revealed His Son in him;" and as given to him, whether as a man or as a preacher, it found him and it left him "less than the least of all saints:" words which have been turned against the apostolical authorship of the Epistle by men whom that very circumstance shows to

ack the first elements of true exposition. When, however, he speaks more generally of the influence of the inspiring Spirit, and of Christ's mystery "which in other generations was not made known unto the sons of men, as it hath now been revealed unto His holy apostles and prophets in the Spirit," he changes his style as we see. Including himself, of course, but only as a member, and the lowest of the "holy" company, he speaks of them as the special organs of the Holy Ghost, sanctified to know, and to preach, and to write the mystery of eternity born in time. But here we have to do with the mystery of the Trinity as well as with the mystery of Christ: the two being in fact one. It was "hid in God;" the eternal "mystery of Christ;" revealed to men "by the Spirit." This is clear enough to the eyes that have once beheld the Triune glory of the New-Testament dispensation, and are prepared to behold its rays everywhere. Some would go further, and find in the "fellow-heirs" a reference to the Father "in whom we have been made an inheritance," in "of the same body" a reference to the Incarnate Son, and in "partakers of the promise," a reference to the "Holy Spirit of promise." Let this be in the vision also, for those who will have it. But none ought to fail to see the glorious harmony of the whole chapter as setting forth the mystery of the Godhead as revealed through the Son by the Spirit. To speak boldly, we regard this as the passage which beyond any other touches the awful subject of the revelation to man of the supreme mystery of all mysteries, the absolute and the mediatorial Trinity. Here we have that one thing which was yet wanting in the Epistle to the Colossians.

When we reach the fourth chapter we have the same mediatorial relations of the three Persons; but now with more direct reference to the organic Church upon earth. In the former chapters the Spirit was the revealer of the Trinity in redemption: now He is the representative of the Trinity in the organisation of the Church. Here also we find a very complete exhibition of the offices of the Holy Ghost, containing some peculiar elements of its own, and giving the rudiments of what had been more fully expanded to the Corinthians.

The temple of the Church now becomes the body, a term which had been hinted in passing before but is now made prominent. The order is still the Spirit, the Lord, the God

and Father of all. And it is observable that in the first paragraph the unity of the Church is the leading theme ; while in the long sequel the ministries are enlarged upon which tend to that consummate unity. In the former the Spirit is the chief theme, though not without the Son ; in the latter the Son of God is supreme, though not without the Spirit. Only once is the God and Father of all mentioned, whose tribute is that "He is over all, and through all, and in all." Let us take each part of the chapter separately, and with special reference to our present subject, the Holy Spirit in the Church.

Here, as often, the Apostle rises from a particular introduction to a general principle. "Endeavouring to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace" follows the injunction to "walk worthy of the vocation wherewith ye were called." This is echoed again in "ye were called in one hope of your calling ;" but the general announcement of the Trinitarian unity of the body absorbs all else. "There is one body and one Spirit." The mystical, regenerate and spiritual fellowship of believers is the body, and it is moulded and animated by the Holy Ghost : He is to it what the soul is to the human organisation, forming and informing what He Himself creates. As a building it "groweth unto an holy temple in the Lord ;" or "an habitation of God in the Spirit." As a body it groweth "unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ," in love increasing "into Him in all things, which is the Head, even Christ." Hence the only "unity of the Spirit" is the "bond of peace" in the common reconciliation ; not external uniformity of any kind, however desirable that may be ; but in that which is not corruptible, and incapable of change or passing away, the common possession of the "hope of our calling." Then comes the passing tribute to the "one Lord : " unity in Him being no other than the common exercise of "one faith" or living personal appropriation, sealed in the world, and in time, and before men by "one baptism," the symbol of corporate unity. Then follows, and for no other reason than to complete the homage to the Trinity, the tribute to the "one God and Father of all." He is the Father in the Triune economy ; but as such represents the God "who is over all," the Supreme Author of redemption in all its processes in heaven and earth, "and through all," pervading the whole mediatorial work of His Son Incarnate, exercising

the Divine Government through Christ's kingly office, "and in all," resting in and filling with His tranquil influence the body of the Church through the Spirit.

In the latter long paragraph it is not the Spirit but the Son of God who is supreme. The framing and compacting Spirit is not mentioned by name, whilst Christ "from whom the whole body being fitly framed and knit together by means of every joint of *THE SUPPLY*" maketh increase. But that "supply" is no other than the Holy Ghost, "the supply of the Spirit of Jesus Christ" (Phil. i. 19). "Every joint" in the ministry is kept in vigour and health by Him; and His energy is "in every part," including every member of the great organic whole down to the least. If any reinforcement of this argument is necessary it is found in the Corinthian Epistle: "Now there are diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit; and there are differences of administration, but the same Lord; and there are diversities of operations, but it is the same God which worketh all in all. But the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man to profit withal" (1 Cor. xii. 4, 5). The Triune glory of God is everywhere in the New-Testament doctrine of the Church.

Before closing these references to the Spirit in the Church, mention must be made of two other passages. "The mystery of Christ and the Church" cannot be understood without the introduction of the Holy Ghost. "We are members of His body, of His flesh, and of His bones:" that is, the derivation of Eve from Adam was not more actual and complete than our spiritual existence is from Christ. The idea of the Head here gives place to one more tender and, if possible, more vital. As He became partaker of our nature, we also became partakers of His. Even our humanity is sanctified, preserved, and will be glorified, even to its flesh and bones, in union with Him. Of this the Eucharist is the symbol and pledge. But we must not forget that the emphasis lies upon the former clause: the latter may be said to be hinted, and vanish with the allusion to the original sanctification of marriage. "But I speak," the Apostle emphatically adds, "of Christ and the Church." "There is one body and one Spirit;" and the body of which the Spirit is the life "hath not flesh and bones." We may say of St. Paul what St. John said of his Master: "This spake He of the Spirit which they that believe on Him should receive." The nature of

the spiritual body must be in harmony with its living soul, its quickening spirit. "The first man Adam was made a living soul:" a soul animating a physical organisation. "The last Adam was made a quickening Spirit:" the humanity derived from Him is a spiritual body in every sense of the term; it is a spiritual whole, and its individual members have mortal bodies which will be quickened "because of the Spirit dwelling in us;" which will be "fashioned like unto His glorious body," but not explicitly derived from His human body. Moreover, we must bear in mind that most wonderful word which the Apostle has given us in relation to this very subject. Speaking to the Corinthians of the desecration of the body, in the violation of the mystery of marriage, he says: "Know ye not that your bodies are the members of Christ? Shall I then take the members of Christ, and make them the members of an harlot? God forbid. What? know ye not that he which is joined to an harlot is one body? for two, saith He, shall be one flesh. But he that is joined to the Lord is one Spirit" (1 Cor. vi. 15—17). Our bodies *are* the members of Christ, not formed from Him. And the person of the believer, body and soul, is joined to the Person of Christ, so as to be not one flesh, but one Spirit. This is a sufficient illustration of the Ephesian passage. But, passing away from any argument on the subject, what an amazing privilege does this importation from the Corinthian Epistle set before us! To be joined with Christ so as to become one Spirit with Him! This is not an occasional hint, like that we have been considering, but the bold expression of a truth that pervades the New Testament, "Not I live, but Christ liveth in me." And every believer may say, if his heart is with St. Paul, that the Holy Ghost is common to his Lord and to himself. "If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of His." Inverting this, he that is Christ's not merely has the Spirit of Christ ruling him, leading him, guiding him, sanctifying him, preparing him body and soul for glorification; but has Him also as the new animating Soul of his soul, Spirit of his spirit, repeating in himself the mystery of the union of two natures in one personality.

The link of "submitting one to another" connects this passage with one that precedes, in which the Holy Ghost is the inspiring energy of the Church's joy. "Be not drunk with wine, wherein is excess, but be filled with

the Spirit." Here we discern a faint allusion to the Day of Pentecost, and the first misinterpretation of the ecstasy of the new Christian assembly. The new wine of the Holy Ghost in the Church renders needless, and casts out, and is the perfect opposite of every other and merely sensual excitement. It is the inspiration of joy and thanksgiving. The Spirit pours His new meaning into the ancient Psalms, giving voice in the Church to their silent testimonies of Christ and making them sing more plainly what they sang behind a veil. He inspires afresh the canticles of Scripture, the hymns to the glory of God. And He forms, and dictates, and employs the spiritual songs which express from age to age every variety of Christian experience. But here again the Trinity cannot be hid. The personal melody of every individual heart is to the Lord; and all goes up in universal thanksgiving "unto God and the Father, in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ."

We must not—for the present at least—trace the Holy Spirit farther back in the chapter. As we read our English Bible we find the God of forgiveness, whose kingdom is the "kingdom of Christ and of God," from the fellowship of which are excluded all who bring forth "the unfruitful works of darkness," the "fruit of the Spirit being in all goodness, and righteousness, and truth." But we are instructed to read, "the fruit of the light." The reading that crept in, however, was a very venial error of transcription. The light is the missing Third Person: giving Him a name as surely as if Himself were mentioned. And every word shapes that way: it is He who "reproves" and "makes manifest." Nor is the striking verse an exception, "for whatsoever is made manifest is light:" the Divine Spirit, and He alone—certainly not the light of human reproof—turns into light that which He shines upon. In whichever of two senses we take it this is true: He causes the darkness of sin to become light in the Lord; and He—which is more to the point—alone can condemn secret sin to declare its own iniquity. That which is made manifest by His light declares its own shame. And in the new form which St. Paul gives to an old Scripture, putting into it the name of Christ and thus making it arise and shine, we have what is evidently to our mind the gift of the Holy Ghost: "Wherefore He saith, Up! thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead, and Christ shall give thee light." Above when the prophet said, "Arise, shine, for thy light

is come; and the glory of the Lord is risen upon thee" (Isa. lx. 1), he was predicting that day of the Lord of which the next chapter speaks when Christ declared that the "Spirit of the Lord was upon Him," through Him to be given to all who, dead in their sleep, though only asleep in their death, should hear His voice and live.

At this point, and by way of transition to the doctrine of the Spirit in relation to the believer, it may be well to note the circumstance that the Apostle is never careful to distinguish between the presence of the Spirit in the Church and His influences in the individual members of the Church. This Epistle gives many striking illustrations of what we mean. As Christ is the "Head of the Church," and "the Head of every man is Christ;" "as the Father is He of "whom every race in heaven and earth is named," and also the Father of every adopted son; so the Spirit is the life of the Body and the strength of the inner man of every regenerate soul. Reading the Apostle's high testimonies in prayer and otherwise, we might be disposed to think some of his words too strong for individual privilege and endowment. But in every such case we find something to suggest to every one of us that we have a personal interest in what he says. When, for instance, he prays for "the Spirit of wisdom and revelation in the knowledge of Him," we might be tempted to think that such a gift must belong to the universal, collective body, and find its expression in the mind of the Church or in the Scriptures of truth. But it is not so: he would have each of us to be blessed with an inward revelation of Christ, and of His infinite varieties of grace, every man for himself. It is hardly too much to say the same of our "being filled unto all the fulness of God." So when he speaks of the increase of the body unto a "perfect man, in the full stature of Christ," it is less than presumption to give his words at least a personal secondary application. So, also, when he bids us "be filled with the Spirit," and so everywhere. It is the glory of Christianity that it both sinks the individual in the whole, making the personal "I" as nothing in the great whole of Christ's mystical body, and gives that same individual as much interest in the economy of grace as if he and his Lord were alone in redemption. The most glorious things spoken of the Church are transferred to every member of it. Witness the words "temple" and "body," and above all, that deepest word

which the New Testament contains, "He that is joined to the Lord is one Spirit."

We now pass to the rich series of passages which define the Spirit's relation to the individual Christian. These are so full and comprehensive as almost to exhaust the subject: in fact, there are very few aspects of the office of the Holy Ghost in personal salvation which are not, directly or indirectly, exhibited in this Epistle. And the remark already made holds good that almost every presentation of it assumes here a unique character. Moreover, by a slight rearrangement of the material, we may make it the basis of a systematic construction of the order of the work of the Third Person in the administration of personal redemption.

In doing this, however, we are struck by what seems to be a deficiency which is common to this, with most others of the Apostolical Epistles—that of the preliminary agency of the convincing Spirit. The first introduction of His name declares Him to be the gift that seals the entrance into the Christian life; nor is there any hint that He had prepared His own way into the hearts that He sealed. Were this silence peculiar to our Epistle it would be enough to say that the Ephesians are addressed as Christians in the full enjoyment of the privileges of the Christian temple, and that the influences of the Holy Ghost in the outer court are therefore not distinctly dwelt upon. But the same comparative silence as to His prevenient operations may be marked in all the writings of the later New Testament, even in those which describe the process of conversion. Nor is the Book of the Acts altogether an exception. There the name of the great Convincer is generally kept back, until as the Comforter He reigns in the hearts of those who believe. It may be said generally that there is not to be found so clear and distinct a reference to the preparatory work of the Holy Ghost as our Lord's words might lead us to expect. But a close examination of this Epistle will explain what seems to be a deficiency.

First, it may be said that the prevenient office of the Spirit is included in the words already studied: "For through Him we both have access to the Father by one Spirit." Here the term "access" means literally the introduction or right and power of approach to God, not only as the privilege of the believer in the temple, but as

the gracious influence that draws the seeker of salvation to its gates. The way to the Father is through the mediatorial Son, and the way to the Son is the way of penitential sorrow inspired by the Spirit. It must not be forgotten that this is taught by the context of the passage just quoted. "Having slain the enmity," our Reconciler "came and preached peace to you which were afar off, and to them that were nigh. For through Him we both have access by one Spirit." Before we become "the habitation of God in the Spirit" we are brought individually to the temple "by the Spirit." Here is all the doctrine of the drawing of the Father by the Holy Ghost to the Son. But, secondly, we are provided with another explanation in the fact that the preliminary influences of the "Spirit of revelation" are thrown into comparative shade by the surpassing glory of His internal work as the indwelling power of regenerating life. That is His supreme "demonstration," as it is termed to the Thessalonians. All that precedes is merged in His final act. He calls through the Word, convicts of sin, and righteousness, and judgment, inspires the energy of faith, glorifying belief into trust, and reveals the Saviour to the soul that trusts Him; but all these influences of the Spirit in the outer court are summed up in the general words, "by grace ye are saved." His name is, so to speak, kept back until He shines forth in the full glory of "that Holy Spirit of promise." As the Saviour, long unrevealed as the "light that enlighteneth every man," is not named until He bears His name of Jesus, so the Holy Ghost, working mysteriously in the human spirit in its way to the Redeemer, is not named until He bears His name as "the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus." Here is the sufficient solution of the apparent suppression of the distinct offices of the Giver of "repentance unto life." And this will trace the way to the striking testimony given here to the common bestowment of the Seal and the Earnest in believers.

There is no passage which marks more clearly the process of conversion than that which introduces the Holy Ghost in the first chapter. The order is the hearing of the word of truth, the Gospel of salvation; the belief of the testimony; the sealing of that testimony in the heart by the Spirit; and the preservation of the soul that receives it until the day of redemption. Before considering the office of the Holy Ghost more particularly, it is

necessary to speak of this order. Theological dogma deals with it under various prepossessions; all agree that there is a succession; but some mark it too emphatically. The sacramental theory finds it necessary to interpolate baptism, faith, and the Holy Ghost, and lays an emphasis on the "*after* that we believed," which the Greek does not bear. Certain advocates of the "higher life" make the "*after*" refer to a subsequent consecration of the Spirit which supplements the common faith of ordinary Christians. It is remarkable that both these parties refer to the passage in which the same Apostle Paul asks certain other Ephesian disciples, "Have ye received the Holy Ghost *since* ye believed?" It is enough to say that the passage in the Acts, like that which we now consider, refers to a reception of the Spirit supposed to be divided from the act of believing by no interval of time. Neither an intervening baptism of water nor an intervening baptism of the Spirit is contemplated; at any rate as subsequent to the crisis of true faith. As we understand the passage, there is a succession of counterpart terms in it. The word of truth is also the Gospel of salvation; the hearing is also the believing; the sealing Spirit is also the earnest of the inheritance. Whatever refinements may be introduced into the order of thinking, the order of fact is here plain enough. All belongs to the sacred transition into Christ: "In whom, on your believing." Circumstantial are omitted: only the great reality is dwelt upon. Between the hearing and the believing there may have been doubts, and arguments, and exhortations; but here the hearing and the trusting are one in the history of conversion. Between the acceptance of the testimony with the heart and the Apostolical imposition of hands conveying the extraordinary gifts of the Spirit, there may have sometimes occurred an interval, just as there was sometimes an interval between that special effusion and the baptism of those who were "only baptised in the name of the Lord Jesus;" but here the trusting and the sealing are regarded as in experience one. The Apostle's words rise to a high level of generality; the earthly order is lost in the heavenly; and the whole passage describes the one great transition from the world without to the fellowship of saints "in Christ." Undoubtedly baptism is a seal of acceptance on the part of God: an earthly, though also a heavenly seal. Undoubtedly, also, the faith that trusts in

Christ must precede the impartation of the Spirit to the believer—precede it in the economy of conditions in the administration of grace. But of these things the Apostle is not here thinking. He is altogether in the region of pure spiritual experience.

This first and common gift is most solemnly introduced as "that Holy Spirit of promise," the more emphatic form of saying "the promised Holy Spirit." This recalls the Saviour's words, "the promise of the Father;" the connecting link between the whole sum of Old-Testament prediction and New-Testament fulfilment concerning the Third Person of the Trinity. Our Lord made the Father's promise His own; and the promise of the Father and the Son was fulfilled on the Day of Pentecost. The Incarnate Son and the Holy Spirit were alike and together, though not equally, the burden of ancient prediction and hope. The predictions concerning both travelled together through the prophets. But they were separated at the fulness of time. First came the incarnation and finished work of the Son; then the outpouring of the Spirit as its perfect result and seal; and after that the two promises again blend into one: the promise of the Father is the Spirit of His Son. The designation of the great gift is here very high and very solemn. It stands alone in the Epistles. Once before had St. Paul spoken of the Gentiles as receiving "the promise of the Spirit through faith" (Gal. iii. 14). But here he gives the Comforter a name which makes Him the common inheritance and privilege of all who believe. He is in Himself and in His gifts the supreme promise and property of every one who receives and trusts in Christ. He is the sum of all promise: receiving Him we receive all. Thus, we find the Apostle afterwards mentioning the Holy Ghost as the promise without giving His name, as if the term was sufficient of itself to signify His work and influence: "That the Gentiles should be fellow-heirs, and of the same body, and partakers of His promise in Christ by the Gospel (ch. iii. 6). Here Christ ceases to be the promise, He being the sphere in which they already live; the residuary, abiding, and inexhaustible promise is "in Him," the Holy Ghost, named without a name.

The Spirit thus given is a Seal and an Earnest: two words the relation of which requires careful investigation. It is generally said that the sealing is the internal

confirmation of the soul in the assurance of acceptance; and the earnest the pledge of all the future blessings to which that acceptance leads. Doubtless the gift includes all this. But it may be suggested that there is a double inheritance alluded to: that the Holy Ghost is given to the believer as God's seal that he is His possession, and as his earnest of his own inheritance in God. The Christian is God's purchased possession, and sealed as such. God is the Christian's inheritance, and His Spirit is the internal pledge and earnest of it. The whole passage is easily dissolved—without any violence—into a clear illustration of this twofold truth.

As to the former, it cannot be denied that the current Scriptural use of the symbol or figure is that of appropriation to the person who impresses the seal; in the case of a Divine setting apart it is consecration, as in His temple. Thus, the mediatorial Son was consecrated to His work: "Him hath God the Father sealed," which is afterwards, "I sanctify Myself." Thus, one of the seals of the foundation is, "The Lord knoweth them that are His." Thus, the elect in the Apocalypse are finally sealed. In our passage "the redemption of the purchased possession" is the final assumption to Himself of all that is His own through the redeeming ministry of Christ, who is made unto us redemption in the final sense: the redemption, that is, of all that needs deliverance after the work of grace in time is finished. As we "wait for the adoption, to wit, the redemption of the body," so also God, who has made us His own, waits for that final emancipation of all that is His. He will gather into one the perfected bodies, souls, and spirits of all His purchased possession. Until that day, and for that day, He gives His Spirit to believers, as the seal of His possession and rights, the Spirit of consecration in their spirits, and the pledge of resurrection for their bodies. As it is written, He shall also "quicken your mortal bodies, because of His Spirit that dwelleth in you" (Rom. viii. 11). Undeniably, that seal is also an internal assurance to the believer that he is accepted; but it is that subordinately. Undeniably, that seal imprints the image of God on the soul; but that also subordinately. Its supreme purpose is to make the soul and seal it the Lord's: the element and the strength and the secret of an entire consecration to Him. That we know ourselves His is a less matter, blessed in itself, and fully ensured by

the subsequent "earnest." The supreme blessedness is that we are His, and that we belong to the new Israel, of whom He says, "The Lord's portion is His people; Judah is the lot of His inheritance." And this looks back to a former verse, rightly translated, "In Whom also we have become an inheritance" (ch. i. 11); and to a subsequent verse, "That ye may know what is the hope of His calling, and what the riches of the glory of His inheritance in the saints" (ch. i. 18). It is true, finally, that the term inheritance is not here used in reference to God. But the variation on it, so carefully chosen by the Apostle, contains the full idea. "The purchased possession" has its full explanation in 2 Peter ii. 9, "A peculiar people . . . which in time past were not a people, but are now the people of God," as also in St. Paul's own words, Titus ii. 14, "Who gave Himself for us, that He might redeem us from all iniquity, and purify unto Himself a peculiar people." God has a property or propriety in them above all others. They and they only are His own, and His through the testament of Christ's purifying blood. But in the present passage alone is the inheritance of God in the saints made to include their whole being, in its final risen integrity.

The earnest needs no vindication, nor does it need to be expounded, save so far as the antithesis between the two inheritances may require. It is of the nature of a pledge—of this pledge at least—that it be of the same kind as the consummate possession. Now, the final and perfect and indeed the only inheritance of the spirit of man is his God; not His gifts, nor the blessings that lead to Him, nor the surroundings of His presence in the kingdom of grace and of glory, but Himself. Therefore, it is said of nothing in the whole circle of the economy of Gospel privileges that it is the earnest of our inheritance, but of God the Holy Spirit only. Again and again He is so called, and in such a sense that He—the Spirit namely—is the firstfruits of His future Self, more abundantly imparted. "We who have received the firstfruits of the Spirit" (Rom. viii. 23). Now, the indwelling Spirit as an earnest of our inheritance is all that the soul can need or desire as testimony. He is the "Spirit of adoption," assuring those who are heirs of their present sonship, with all its future promise. He is the Witness of pardon to those who "through the Spirit wait for the hope of righteous-

ness by faith" (Gal. v. 5), who, having the present righteousness of faith, wait for its hope in the final acceptance. All this, and with it everything that is necessary to the present assurance of faith, He is as the "Earnest of our inheritance," until the time when our inheritance and God's possession of us shall be alike perfect and made one.

This collocation of the two inheritances—of the Christian as God's and of God as the Christian's, the Spirit being common to the two—once more stamps a peculiar impress upon the doctrine of the Holy Ghost in this Epistle. The seal individually and the earnest individually we have elsewhere. They are united only in this passage and in another to the Corinthians, 2 Cor. i. 21. In this latter passage the unction of the Holy One is added: "He which hath anointed us is God, who hath also sealed us, and given us the earnest of the Spirit in our hearts." Here the anointing is the general effusion of the Spirit, as in the only parallel of St. John, "Ye have an unction from the Holy One." And that "anointing"—representing to the Corinthians the "promise" of our present passage—is sub-divided into its two branches: the sealing of believers by God for Himself, and the earnest of their possession of Him. Elsewhere we find not the same combination. But, though it is found so seldom, it is the pith and marrow of all Christian privilege. The present Christian life cannot be more fully, more blessedly summed up than in these terms: the universal anointing of those who are in Christ by the bestowment on them of the Spirit of promise; their consecration to God as His in every faculty of their nature and in all the tenour of their life, and their secret and sacred possession of all the beginnings of grace in the earnest of their inheritance of God.

Once again does the Apostle in the most emphatic manner introduce in our Epistle the sealing Comforter. But now the Holy Spirit of promise becomes "the Holy Spirit of God:" this high formula being used only in a few elect instances in the New Testament, and strictly speaking in this its full form used only here. There ought to be no doubt that the Divine personality of the Spirit is made emphatic in both passages. Grammatical refinement may explain away "by whom" in the former, and make it "by which." But the Saviour has taught us that

the neuter word "spirit" must be connected with the personal pronoun "He;" and there is no need, certainly no absolute necessity, to soften it away. But the "by whom" of that passage becomes here "in whom," and gives us the first example, to be followed by several others as we proceed, of the form of phraseology which makes the Holy Ghost the sphere in which Christians live. "In Him we live and move and have our being:" as of God the Father, and of the Son Incarnate, so also of the Holy Ghost, the phrase is used; signifying that union and fellowship with the Divine Persons which is the highest consummation of religion. The usual interpretation is here "by whom ye were sealed;" but it is not the teaching of St. Paul that the Spirit seals, rather "He that hath anointed us is God, who hath also sealed us and given us the earnest of the Spirit." The Holy Ghost may say, like the Son, "I in you and ye in Me." We are exhorted not to grieve Him as the indwelling God in whom also we live.

This passage is decisive against the overstrained doctrines which make the sealing of the Spirit, on the one hand, a higher consecration of the mature Christian life, and on the other an irreversible guarantee of final salvation.

Nothing is more certain than that the Holy Ghost as an internal seal is here regarded as the possession of all who believe: not the special endowment of such as were favoured with supernatural gifts, nor the high prerogative of the entirely sanctified. He is God indwelling in the regenerate, who may be grieved by every sin of thought, and word, and act into which the regenerate may fall. The injunction is connected both with what precedes and with what follows. The sins which grieve the Spirit—which excite His displeasure, but the displeasure of His tenderness; not as vexing Him, nor as resisting Him, but as causing Him to mourn—run through the whole range of the offences of the thought and word and work, from the mood of anger through corrupt and savourless words up to the gross sensuality which excludes from the inheritance. Now, although it is perfectly true that the entirely consecrated soul may lapse into all these, it is obvious that this kind of exhortation is more appropriate to the lowest than to the highest stages of the Christian life. Moreover, we have seen that the early doctrine of the Epistle does not distinguish between two classes of believers. Those who

trusted in Christ were at once sealed with the Spirit: anointed or baptised with Him once for all. Their richer consecration depended simply on their submission to the sanctifying discipline of a power already within them; their failure in entire devotion was simply their neglect of an influence already imparted; and their full baptism of the Spirit was simply their yielding up their whole nature to the influence of the Holy Ghost already poured out upon them. As the theory of religion supposes one regeneration issuing in the full renewal of the inner man, so it supposes "one baptism" of the Spirit. To pray for additional and continuous baptisms of the Holy Ghost is not scriptural language, however allowable in itself. The Holy Ghost, like the kingdom of God, is "within us." But to make a sharp and clear line of distinction between the believer in the name of Jesus and the same believer baptised with the Spirit is without any authority at all. It is admissible only on the assumption that the faith is intellectual only and not regenerating; or that it is like that of the Ephesian relicts of John's baptism, faith only in a preparatory institute; or like that of those who—in vast numbers—are only in the Christian outer court of preliminary grace.

But we must not so soften down the gentle word "grieve" as to make it signify that peculiar kind of offence against the Spirit which is alone compatible with His inalienable indwelling; as if the meaning were: "Though ye cannot drive Him from you, yet grieve Him not while He remains." There is nothing in text or context which asserts the doctrine of a necessary final perseverance on the part of the elect or a necessary final redemption on the part of God who seals them. The seal is not affirmed to be inviolable. "For the day of redemption" is all that is said: scarcely "until," though even that would allow an indeterminate sense. The sealing does not bear, as we have seen, the meaning of an internal assurance of eternal salvation. This will be still more plain if we paraphrase the words. "Grieve not the Holy Spirit of God by whom ye were assured and are assured of your eternal redemption," must be compared with "Grieve not the Holy Spirit of God by whom ye were set apart and consecrated to God for His eternal possession." The specific sin is not against our assurance but against our God. And it must not be forgotten that the warning expressly includes those extreme sins of carnality which

exclude from "inheritance in the kingdom of Christ and of God." That the Apostle supposes the possibility of the exclusion of those to whom he writes is evident from his most solemn close: "Let no man deceive you with vain words." However hard it may seem, we must number amongst those "vain words" all the arguments which would make this sealing absolutely inviolable. For the rest, and with this reservation, it is well to admit what force there is in that exposition. Much grief may the gentle Spirit of God endure before He leaves the soul. As He "hateth putting away" the obdurate who resist Him, so He hateth going away from the careless saints who sadden Him. He still remains as the Convincer of indwelling sin even when He is constrained to cease to be the Comforter. The emphasis of the exhortation is found in this. Sin in the sanctified is now especially sin against the interior monitor who keeps the soul for God and for redemption. That is its peculiar aggravation: the "sin against the Holy Ghost" which is not unpardonable. As the sin of the unregenerate world is specifically that "they believe not on Me," a sin of which the Spirit convinces the world, so the sin of the regenerate is specifically their offence against the sealing Spirit of holiness. It is the failure to be "led of the Spirit" in thought and word and action. It is the indulgence of the "lusting of the flesh against the Spirit." It is the impure breath of internal sin dimming the image that it does not destroy, obscuring the seal which it does not yet break. But only a persistent offence against the sealing Spirit will make Him remove His earnest. Only through many phases of slow departure does the regenerate lapse into that final condition which is at the other extreme of the Pentecostal fulness: "sensual, having not the Spirit" (Jude 19).

We may here collate three passages already referred to in another connection, which are, each and together, unique as describing the operation of the Spirit in the formation and growth of the new man. The first invokes Him in prayer, or rather prays for His bestowment, as "the Spirit of wisdom and revelation in the perfect knowledge of Christ, having the eyes of your heart enlightened" (ch. ii. 17, 18); the second asks that we may "be strengthened with might by His Spirit in the inner man;" and the third is that which bids the Ephesians to "become renewed by the Spirit of your mind." It is obvious that these may be classed

together as having one element in common : the relation of the Holy Ghost to the interior personality of the man in Christ. To these might be added the injunction to "be filled with the Spirit," but that will be reserved for the close. In these passages the heart, the inner man, and the mind respectively are the spheres or the sphere of the Divine Spirit's operation. These three are one ; yet there is a certain distinction between them.

The central one of these three gives the solitary instance of the Spirit and the "inner man." The expression is chosen with great precision. The strength of the Divine influences is not invoked to rest in, but to be exerted towards, the inner man ; finding out and strengthening the interior principles of action as opposed to the outward and visible life. In the new man—whether new in relation to a former state *νέος*, or new as changed from an unregenerate state, *καινός*—the Spirit already dwelt by the very terms of regeneration. But the personality of the "inner man" was yet infected with weakness, especially in respect to aim and motive, and needed still to be constantly strengthened and confirmed. The two other passages refer to the same "inner man," viewed severally as the "heart" which has eyes opened actively to behold, and as the "mind" which is the passive sphere in which the Spirit accomplishes His transforming work. When St. Paul speaks of "the eyes of your heart being enlightened," he means by "heart" the very "inner man" of the other prayer. St. Peter gives the connecting link for the expositor: "The hidden man of the heart." Doubtless the word connotes the affection of the central personality : the understanding warmed by the passion set upon the supreme object of knowledge.

But it is the last phrase which is the most unique and explicit. The inner man of the Gentiles was "darkened in the understanding," and they "walked in the vanity of their mind," in the "blindness or hardness of their heart." They had not the Spirit ; and their best part was only "mind," as in Romans vii., but not yet under conviction of sin and filled with longing for the unattainable righteousness of the law : in fact, they lived in "the vanity of their mind." But the Ephesians had undergone the change which brought the Spirit into the mind of the inner man. Hence they were undergoing the "renewing of their mind," as in Rom. xii. 2 ; and are exhorted to co-operate with and

further and submit to that renewing by actively putting off the "old man" still remaining and putting on the "new man," or cultivating all the principles of the regenerate life. And this new man is not Christ; but the life imparted according to the new image of holiness in Christ after the pattern of which the Christian is regenerated in the new creation. He was regenerated once, and the inner man became the new man; his constant renewal is the disavowing and putting off what remains of the old man; but this only as the yielding himself up to the discipline of the Holy Ghost. "By the Spirit of your mind:" by the Holy Spirit, who has taken possession of your "mind," your higher nature, and makes it "spirit" or the sphere of His spiritual presence and operation. No other interpretation is tenable. St. Paul does not mean "in the spirit," which is your mind:" this has no support from the general style of his vigorous phraseology. Nor "in the tendency of your mind:" this also is a phrase he never uses. "The spirit that now worketh in the children of disobedience" is a personal spirit, "The prince of the power of the air:" the anti-Spirit, corresponding with the future anti-Christ. The deep meaning of the passage is that the Holy Spirit has found His rightful place in man's higher nature; that for which in Rom. vii. He is struggling; and also that the mind of the regenerate man has also found its rightful occupant and controller. The mind was not made for vanity, but for the Holy Ghost. He takes possession of what was once His own; and His work of perfect sanctification is only a "renewal," though a renewal which, on account of its immeasurable importance, and because of its connection with the new humanity in Christ, is called a creation also. Hence it may be observed that an interpretation might be adopted which would make the spirit equivalent to the mind as the higher nature of man now invested with its original rights as "spirit." It is undoubtedly true that human nature unregenerate is regarded as "psychical," and as having no more than soul as the centre of the personality, and the seat of the will, and affections, and mind, while the regenerate man is "spiritual," and his higher nature is "spirit." Nor can it be doubted that in many passages it is hard to distinguish between the human spirit and the Divine Spirit. But this is a question into which our present subject—the doctrine of the Holy Ghost in the Epistle to the Ephesians—does not lead us. Suffice to say

that the Apostle, had this been his meaning here, would have said so by using the expression "spiritual mind." And it must be emphatically repeated that what he does say is, "The Spirit inhabiting your mind, or belonging to it as it to Him."

These three are followed by another threefold series, which connect the Spirit with the process of the Christian life: its fruits, "for the fruit of the Spirit is in all goodness, and righteousness, and truth;" its victorious warfare, "the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God;" and "praying always in the Spirit."

We have already conceded to strong evidence that the true reading is "the fruit of light;" but with the reservation that the Apostle was thinking and meaning when he wrote, "the fruit of the Spirit:" in fact, that he remembered his former words to the Galatians, the echoes of which we find here. There the one "fruit" is opposed not to fruits, but to the manifold "works" of evil; there "of the flesh," here of "darkness." There it is said that, "they which do such things shall not inherit the kingdom of God;" here precisely the same thing is said of the children of disobedience. There we have, "If we live in the Spirit, let us also walk in the Spirit;" here, "Now are ye light in the Lord, walk as children of light." The catalogues of the evil produce of the flesh are generally the same in both. The one fruit also is generally the same. But the threefold summary of the fruit of the light, or of the Spirit, is here very striking. The whole of Christian morality is summed up under its three main principles: the good, the right, and the true. It is the Apostle's manner in every Epistle to give some ethical summary or summaries, varying according to the character of his readers; and this one, the solitary instance in the Ephesian Epistle, is in close accordance with the tenour of his doctrine as to the nature of Christian renewal into the image of God, which is "righteousness and the holiness of truth." Finally, the "proving what is acceptable to the Lord" is, as in Rom. xii. 2, in strict keeping with the "renewal by the Spirit of the mind," who teaches the believer to know what is the hope of his calling, and to discern by sure tests what is and what is not well-pleasing to God.

The Christian warfare is set forth at the close with more fulness and emphasis than anywhere else in St. Paul's

writings. It has a character here which is in strict harmony with the more abundant revelations of the higher spiritual world generally which this Epistle contains. We are told in the Acts that the Ephesians on their conversion made a grand renunciation of a traffic with demons which was peculiar to them. They brought their books of "curious arts" and burned them at a great cost (Acts xix. 17). Hence St. Paul's ministry among them had much to do with their relation to the unholy world of spirits. There were the "vagabond Jews, exorcists," and that evil spirit who confessed his fear of Him and His servant Paul. It was there that the Apostle was endowed with a peculiar power of "special miracles," which through "handkerchiefs or aprons" he exercised, so that "evil spirits went out of them." All this helps to illustrate his first inquiry among "certain disciples." "Did ye receive the Holy Ghost when ye believed?" And it sheds some light upon the grandeur and peculiar amplitude of the revelation given in this Epistle concerning the spiritual world, as it may be traced from the very beginning to the end. The compensation for their holocaust of their unsanctified library was this little book of their Apostle, giving them the richest revelation of Scripture concerning the world they had renounced at so great a cost. It has been seen that in an earlier chapter we have the solitary instance of the name of "spirit" being given to Satan as opposed to the true "Prince of this world" and His Holy Spirit. And now, at the close, St. Paul very emphatically introduces that "spirit," by his name "the devil," as at the head of all the principalities of evil, and confronts him with "the Spirit" as the source of the Christian's defensive and offensive strength.

"The whole armour of God" is, or rather includes, the "sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God," the weapon which He puts into their hands and helps them to use, and the habit of ceaseless prayer "in the Spirit," by which their internal strength is sustained. But the form of the sentence shows that these are only two aspects of one common principle of spiritual energy, viewed as within the soul: on the one hand, repelling by the application of the Divine word, not of promise only, but of truth generally, every spiritual attack, and on the other deriving habitual strength for the warfare by habitual communion with God in the inner man. The reference to the Holy

Ghost is in each case unique as to the application, though other Scriptures are found which illustrate both forms of expression.

The Spirit does not save the Christian militant by His mighty vicarious defence; without our own energies He accomplishes nothing in us, either for our sanctification or our defence. Nor does He defend us by strengthening the spiritual resources of our renewed nature; He gives us as our sword the saying, or truth, or word of God, as adapted to the special emergency. We are by the very terms employed carried up to the wilderness where our Representative was tempted "in all points like as we are," so far as He could be "without sin," without the sinful affinity with sin which gives Satan his power over us. He might have begun as He ended with, "Get thee behind Me, Satan." But He used the words of God, and taught us how to use them. Not, as some say, the Gospel as the power of God unto salvation; but "every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God;" the Spirit suggests the appropriate word, which He accompanies, and makes living and mighty, so that a single clear saying of God, used in the steadfast energy of a simple faith, and thrust into the very face of the temptation to unbelief or to sin, makes Satan flee and puts to flight also all the armies of the aliens. But he who thus has "in his mouth and his heart the omnipotence of the Holy Ghost is he who prays in the Spirit:" in whom, that is, the Spirit habitually prays, "making intercession for us with groanings that cannot be uttered," and who constantly holds communion with God in the sphere of the Spirit. This is that "praying in the Holy Ghost" of which St. Jude speaks as the secret of "keeping ourselves in the love of God" (Jude 20). Collating all these passages we are led to observe upon the remarkable double or reciprocal use of the particle "in;" the Spirit praying in us, and we praying in the Spirit. It cannot be too firmly fixed in the mind that this is a kind of expression used only of our relation to God. Of Him alone can it be said that He is in us while we are in Him; any other application will be found, if attempted, to convict itself of folly. Of the three Persons of the Godhead this is predicated, but of no other, "God dwelleth in Him and He in God" (1 John iv. 15). But this indwelling is of the Father, "we also shall continue in the Son and in the Father" (1 John ii. 24); "Abide in me and I in you"

(John xv. 4). Of the Spirit the Lord said, "He dwelleth with you, and shall be in you" (John xiv. 17); the "in you" is added, as it were, expressly to show that He Whom, as the Comforter, the Spirit of truth would send, should not be an influence among the disciples, but a personal God within them. These two final words of our Epistle, thus illustrated from elsewhere, are the most absolute assurance of the Divine Personality of the Spirit. A sword is not wielded but by a person: though the Christian uses the word of defence, the Personal Spirit makes it effectual. It is his word, but it is the word of God. It is his sword, but it is the sword of the Spirit. So his prayer is his own, but it is the prayer of the Divinity within him; interceding for him but only blending His own prayer; "knowing the mind of God," with the praying spirit of him for whom, and with whom, and through whom, He makes personal intercession.

The crown of all these allusions is that glowing exhortation which carries the doctrine to its highest point; "but be filled with the Spirit." This injunction is once more unique. Elsewhere we read of the disciples as "filled with the Holy Ghost" on the Day of Pentecost; and of individual believers who were effectually and personally "full of the Holy Ghost;" but nowhere else do we find the command, or the "commandment with promise"—to borrow the words of our Epistle—"to be filled with the Spirit."

The manner of its appearance in the text is remarkable. "But be filled" refers to the preceding caution, "be not drunk with wine:" thus introducing this most wonderful of all exhortations with a "but," that places it in antithesis to the degrading stimulants of sensual excess; the Holy Spirit's influence being the perfect opposite and the perfect cure of every carnal excitement. And the sequel seems to carry on the same idea. The effect of the fulness of the Spirit is exhibited as the hilarity of common joy in public worship; they would speak to each other in ancient psalms, and hymns, or canticles of praise to God, and spiritual songs setting religious truth and experience in general to music. It would also express itself in all the gracious melody of private meditation and devotion. Whether in private or in public it would go back to God in a tide of thanksgiving, which would make "all things," whether pleasant or grievous, matter of gratitude through Jesus

Christ. And, withal, that exultant and enthusiastic internal influence of the Holy Ghost would produce profound humility. Not only would it be consistent with lowliness, it would produce it: "submitting one to another in the fear of God." Thus the Divine excitement of the Spirit produces the highest elevation towards God, and the deepest humility towards man; a combination which is the sure criterion of the genuineness of every mighty work of grace in the soul. It at once exalts and makes low the soul which it visits.

The words, therefore, belong to the context. But the injunction they convey is one of a large class in the apostolical writings which were evidently intended to bear more meaning than their context gives them. Very often does St. Paul rise from a very special and common application to a high, universal, and transcendent principle. "He that is joined to the Lord is one Spirit:" to quote an instance that cannot be too often quoted, "None of us liveth to himself, and no man dieth to himself." "Whether, therefore, we eat or drink, or whatever we do, do all to the glory of God." So here: "Be filled with the Spirit," is something grander than the opposite of sensual excitement, or the mere outpourings of joy, whether public or private. It is the high note of the highest form of Christianity. It is a "commandment with promise."

As a promise it must be applied to every other doctrine of the Spirit's influence throughout the Epistle. It is as if the Apostle should say: "Be filled to the utmost limit of the capacity of the soul while in time and probation, with that Holy Spirit of whom I have been speaking." The Spirit fills the temple of God with His presence, and every living worshipper in that temple may be filled with the spirit of devotion. He animates the body of Christ, and every member of that body may be full of His life. The Holy Spirit seals the soul for God; and every faculty of mind, every feeling of the heart, every energy of the will, may bear the consecrating impress. He is the earnest of that inheritance which is God, and the believer may be so "filled with the company" of his God as to find literally no other satisfaction save in Him. As God may have full possession of His own, reserving their very bodies for the day of redemption, so His own may have full possession of God, saving these same bonds of tabernacled in the veil of the flesh. The promise is not indeed made of none

effect, but deeply dishonoured, if it is made to limit our aspiration to anything short of a full mutual possession of the Christian by his God and of his God by the Christian.

Something must be said of the commandment. It is one of those which take the form of an injunction to let that be which is ordained to be, and will be if unhindered. "Let your light shine," "Be ye reconciled to God." It is not addressed to a reluctant will, as some think: it rather animates the purpose of attainment by declaring what is the design of the Spirit if not impeded. It is the will of the Spirit to fill the being; let him not be limited by doubt, by sensuality, by the unwisdom which does not "walk circumspectly," not "understanding what the will of the Lord is," and not "redeeming the time." A very slight obstacle may hinder His filling the soul; and, on the other hand, the removal of a very slight impediment may cause Him to open the windows of heaven, and open too the inmost recesses of the nature for a blessing which, if He did not take order to enlarge the heart, "there would not be room to contain." What the precise effect of this fulness of the Spirit would be or is in the restoration of the perfect image of God, is more than hinted at in a previous passage. As to its destruction of sin actual and original, its perfect effusion of the love which is the "fulfilling of the law," its stilling of the last pulsation of fear, and its entire sanctification of the whole nature in these outer courts of the eternal temple, the Apostle does not speak more particularly. We, therefore, though not without reluctance, abstain.

ART. III.—*Nature; The Utility of Religion; and Theism.*
By JOHN STUART MILL. London: Longmans, Green,
Reader and Dyer. 1874.

THE great fact of this globe is MAN. It teems with human beings. They are born, they live, they grow up to maturity; they transmit their personal life to others who become their successors; they toil, acquire, possess, and enjoy; they suffer; and, at last, they must submit to hard necessity and die. This is the course which is run, and the goal which is reached, age after age, by such multitudes that imagination itself staggers in the attempt to realise them. Every successive day witnesses the introduction into the world, and the exit from it, of thousands, most of whom have either already passed through an exciting personal history, or are about to enter upon it.

But what is the meaning of all this? For it is hard to imagine that it is without meaning. Every individual of all these multitudes who attains to maturity is conscious of an aim and a striving. He is in pursuit of something, whether he clearly apprehends what it is or not. He has a purpose, an object to be secured, and is using means, wisely or unwisely, for its attainment. But in the development of his being, the evolution of his character, and the direction of those influences, both in the moral and physical world, which necessitate such development, and, at least, prescribe the limits of the evolution, there are manifested aims and purposes which as far transcend his as the heavens do the earth. It was not of his purpose, nor of that of any of his progenitors, that he was so mysteriously constituted; a complex combination of physical and spiritual elements—a thinking, feeling, willing unity, composed of such a variety of structures, organs, and members. It was not of his purpose that the world without and around him came to be so exactly adjusted to the requirements of the living, conscious, craving world that is within, adapted at once to meet its wants, and to stimulate its thought and activity, and thus promote its perfection and its bliss. And it was not of his purpose that the necessities of this strangely constituted organism

should compel him to thought and appropriation, resulting in growth, maturity, decay, and death.

And yet there are thought and purpose manifestly underlying all. Merely aimless force could never work in such orderly fashion, for the production of such results. In respect to this, it really does not matter how the human race was first originated; whether, according to the Biblical account, by an act of special creation, or, according to a modern theory, by a process of evolution from a vital monad, through a marine ascidian, up to a Chimpanzee monkey, and, last of all, to man. Even supposing this latter should be admitted as the true theory—which, nevertheless, we by no means admit—it does not explain, but rather involves in incalculably greater doubt and perplexity the meaning of the mystery. We are amazed that such a reasoner as Mr. Mill should have been so completely mystified by the doctrine of evolution, and the survival of the fittest, as to imagine that an eye, for instance, produced by the action of these laws, would cease to present any proof of intelligent design, though, apart from the action of such laws, it would!* The result, in any case, is that of the action of vital force, under properly adjusted conditions. Not eyes only, but all the complicated structures of animals and men have resulted (according to the theory) from the action of the same force. Whence came that force? How came it to be possessed of all this wealth of possible evolution? The result, as well as every step by which the road to that result has been travelled, is in proof that there were aim and purpose from the beginning. There, in that first vital monad, was deposited *the life*, with all its tendencies, aspirations, and laws, which was adapted to work out the pre-determined result. Whence came that life? Surely it must have come from a living, intelligent, and forecasting mind. For it is obvious that, in the whole process of past creation or evolution, one purpose has been steadily kept in view, and one process of preparation has been pushed forward continually, till at length fitting provision had been made for the appearance of MAN. And this is true, not only of the evolution of living organisms—supposing them to be the result of evolution—but of the formation of the earth itself, through all the geo-genetic

* *Theism*, pp. 170—172.

periods, and through those also of its adjustment in relationship to the solar and astral systems. One consistent purpose has clearly ruled the whole, and that purpose, so far as yet disclosed, has caused all its separate lines of action, through all the ages, to bend towards one point, and that the production and reign of MAN. His existence on the earth expounds the meaning of all that has gone before.

But what is the meaning of *his* existence? Regard him as only an inhabitant of earth, and what an astonishing amount of planning and patient energy for the production of such an inadequate and disappointing result! Naturally the most helpless, unprovided, and unprotected of all terrestrial animals, his life, from the very first, is one restless conflict with at least apparently adverse powers. Other creatures, from the hour of birth, are supplied with needful clothing, and find stores of appropriate food provided to their ready instinct. But he, whose constitution is most susceptible of injury from varying temperature and atmospheric conditions, is destitute of any natural protection against such injury; and he, whose organs of nutrition are most delicate, and require specially prepared aliment, has no such food provided to his hands. True it is that in process of time his intellect gives him the advantage against and above all others; that he is able successfully to assert his lordship over this lower world, and to win for himself a position of comparative security and comfort. But he strives in vain to conquer his own ideal. To whatever position he rises, he is still the prey of unsatisfied longings, of unfulfilled desires, and of cravings which mount upwards towards the possession of satisfying, but unattained, if not unattainable, good. And even within the limits of the possible, how he is baffled and beaten back, disappointed, defeated, and oftentimes crushed or overwhelmed by opposing forces! No doubt he is evermore gaining increased mastery over nature, extending his domain, and successfully asserting his right of lordship. But at what a tremendous cost of thought, and energy, and life! And how suddenly are the fruits of long years of combined skill and industry swept away by floods, or consumed by fire, or blown to atoms by some explosive substance! Besides which, disease and suffering, both physical and mental, track him everywhere, so that his history comes to be but too faithfully represented

by the prophet's scroll, which was "full of lamentation, and mourning, and woe." "Nature," writes Mr. Mill, "impales men, breaks them as if on the wheel, casts them to be devoured by wild beasts; burns them to death, crushes them with stones like the first Christian Martyr, starves them with hunger, freezes them with cold, poisons them by the quick or slow venom of her exhalations, and has hundreds of other hideous deaths in reserve, such as the ingenious cruelty of a Nero or a Domitian never surpassed."* So that one might be ready to ask: Has, then, man been called into existence in order that, by his baffled aims, his broken hopes, his many-mannered sufferings, and his tragic end, he might furnish exciting sport to Titanic and malignant powers?

Yet, dark as the reality is, that is a solution of the problem which cannot for a moment be entertained. There are too many and conclusive proofs of beneficence in the purposes and plans of nature to admit of any such conclusion. It is not only that an incalculable amount of real happiness is diffused amongst men, nor only that they might be much more happy if they would, but also that the obvious aim of all those contrivances, through which even pain and suffering come, was not to provide avenues of torment, but instruments of good. "The world abounds with contrivances," says Paley, but "we never discover a train of contrivance to bring about an evil purpose." "Evil no doubt exists, but it is never, that we can perceive, the object of contrivance. Teeth were contrived to eat, not to ache; their aching now and then is incidental to the contrivance, perhaps inseparable from it; or even, if you will, let it be called a defect in the contrivance, but it is not the object of it."† "There is a preponderance of evidence," says Mill, "that the Creator desired the pleasure of His creatures. This is indicated by the fact that pleasure of one description or another is afforded by almost everything, the mere play of the faculties, physical and mental, being a never-ending source of pleasure, and even painful things giving pleasure by the satisfaction of curiosity and the agreeable sense of acquiring knowledge; and also that pleasure, when experienced, seems to result from the normal working of the machinery, while pain usually arises from some external interference with it, and

* *Nature*, p. 29.

† *Natural Theology*, chap. xxvi.

resembles in each particular case the result of an accident. Even in cases when pain results, like pleasure, from the machinery itself, the appearances do not indicate that contrivance was brought into play purposely to produce pain."*

The fact is that pleasure and pain are most intimately related; and provision for the one would seem of necessity to expose to the other. All the nerves of sensation were evidently intended to minister to the safety and happiness of their possessor; but the very fact that they are sensitive, and adapted to become the instruments of pleasurable feelings, would seem to carry along with it the necessity of being liable, through over-stimulus, to become the mediums of that which is unpleasant or painful. Thus, a certain degree of warmth is most agreeable and exhilarating; but let the warmth be increased to intense heat, or diminished into freezing cold, and the exhilarating sensation is transmitted into intolerable pain. The pleasant because not over-stimulated sensation indicates a state of surrounding conditions which is, usually, favourable to the organism, while the painful gives warning of those which are injurious, and need to be avoided or changed. But things could not have been ordered thus if the sole purpose had been to gratify malignity.

Are we, then, shut up to the conclusion that the Creator's purposes were good, but that His power was not equal to His desire? "The only admissible moral theory of creation," says Mill, "is that the Principle of Good *cannot* at once and altogether subdue the powers of evil, either physical or moral; could not place mankind in a world free from the necessity of an incessant struggle with the maleficent powers."† "The evidences of Natural Theology distinctly imply that the Author of the Kosmos worked under limitations; that He was obliged to adapt Himself to conditions independent of His will, and to attain His ends by such arrangements as those conditions admitted of."‡ The evidences of order, purpose, and intelligent aim are everywhere so manifest in nature as that they cannot but produce their effect upon every candid mind, and they had their effect upon his. It was obvious also to him that not malignity but goodness was the characteristic of the all-pervading aim. But the presence of evil

* *Theism*, p. 191.

† *Nature*, p. 38.

‡ *Theism*, p. 177.

staggered his faith. There must have been defectiveness in the Creator's goodness, or wisdom, or power — or, perhaps, in all. Hence he speaks of the impossibility of "ascribing absolute perfection to the Author and Ruler of so clumsily-made and capriciously-governed a creation as this planet and the life of its inhabitants;"* affirms that "not even on the most distorted and contracted theory of good which ever was framed by religious or philosophical fanaticism can the government of nature be made to resemble the work of a Being at once good and omnipotent;"† and directly or by implication declares that it must have been an easy matter for an almighty Being to have created a world in which only happiness should dwell.‡

But is happiness itself, apart from its conditions and causes, to be regarded as the supreme good? Surely not. For if so, then the animal, the insect, the reptile, might be equal to the man. For though its enjoyments may not be of either so intense or so elevated a character, yet they are enjoyments, and that, too, unabated by any fear of failure. And why more elevated, but that something besides happiness comes into the conception? Man's enjoyments are modified by intellect, by anticipation, and memory, and, above all, by their relationship to goodness, truth, and righteousness, and his own moral sentiments. With him the supreme question is not how he may become happy, but how he may become righteously happy. For he is taken up into fellowship with his Maker in the work of completing his own creation. As to the external conditions of his existence, the Creator has done less for him than for any other terrestrial creature. But as to internal equipment He has done infinitely more for him. Not only in the moral adjustment and disposition which were first bestowed upon him, but in his imperishable, rational, and moral nature, he was created in the image of God. To him is given the capacity to perceive and understand the thoughts of God as they are wrapped up in material forms all around him. His it is to trace, more and more completely, the plan, and to unfold the purpose of the great creative mind, and to set up lines of creative action for his own benefit after the example which has been furnished.

* *Utility of Religion*, p. 112.

† *Nature*, p. 38.

‡ *Nature*, p. 37. *Theism*, p. 176, &c.

It is not indeed given to him to originate that which is absolutely new ; to project his original thought by a word into substantive existence ; to call things that are not as though they were, and secure their answering response ; nor to create either worlds or atoms out of non-appearing things. But it is given to him so to master Nature, so to apprehend her elements, understand her forces, perceive her laws, observe her modes of operation, and discover her inter-related affinities, attractions, and repulsions, as that he can, by new combinations and adjustments, originate new forms of being and fresh lines of productive action. He has been thus endowed, and has been placed in a world where he may find ample scope for the exercise of his powers, and in which, indeed, he must use them for his own preservation and perfection, not because the Creator "could not place him in a world in which he should be free from the necessity of an incessant struggle with maleficent powers," nor that he might "stand forward as a not ineffectual auxiliary to a Being of perfect beneficence," but limited power, who could not make the world more perfect than it is without man's assistance ; but rather that through this medium he might be raised into happy fellowship with his Maker both in thought and work, and might be working out for himself a perfect moral character, and a consequent perfect blessedness. And no one needs to be told how much more precious must be a happiness so won, than one which should have come to him without any thought or effort of his own.

But supposing it possible that an omnipotent Being could have created a world in which nothing but happiness should dwell, is it conceivable that He could have made a progressive and consciously self-improving creature, the conditions of whose existence should have been such as that he should have been liable, on the one hand, to no error of judgment, or prejudicial preference, or perversion of character and will, or, on the other hand, to no pain or inconvenience from the neglect of self-culture, or the violation of moral or physical law ? To us it seems to be, in the nature of things, impossible. We know what will be the retort—viz., that this same "nature of things," in which the impossibility resides, is the work of the Creator. But it is the work of the Creator providing appropriate conditions for the existence of such a creature. And the question is, Could these be provided

without any such necessities and risks? Even almighty power can have respect only to things which are the proper objects of power. Whatever may be imagined or suggested to the contrary, even omnipotence cannot make unity and multiplicity to be identical; cannot make fiction to be fact, falsehood truth, or wrong right. These are things which are no more possible to the most unlimited power than they are to the most limited. They are things to which power has no relation whatever. Neither is it possible for an almighty Being to create a finite creature with infinite attributes; nor to create a moral being which shall of necessity be good, or free from liability to lapse. The very supposition is absurd; and if such things must be possible to any Being who shall be properly called Almighty, then it may be safely affirmed that no man does or ever did believe in the existence of such a Being.

Equally impossible does it seem that a finite moral being should be produced to whom should be supplied all the avenues of pleasure without any liability to pain; all the powers and facilities for exploring the widely-extended and vastly-varied fields and mines of truth without any exposure to the seductions of error, and all the resources requisite to conquer for himself the joys of a good conscience without the possibility of having, through failure, to suffer the torment of an evil one. Stability of moral principle and perfection of moral character in the creature must be the result, not of power from without, for that they can never be, but of holy disposition from within, consolidated by a course of wise, holy, and successive action. It seems, indeed, to be of the very essence of the idea of man that to him is given the power and assigned the duty of solving the problem of his own perfected being, and that this of necessity carries along with it the double possibility of success and failure. Otherwise there could be no room for the praise, and honour, and blessedness of virtue. For whatever the intellectual powers, the physical or spiritual energies, the possibilities of stupendous achievements, there could be no more of virtue (in its moral sense) nor of the merit or joy of virtue in such a creature, than there is in the doings of a gnat or an elephant.

Then, also, it would seem that provision for the access of pleasurable sensations must involve the possibility of painful ones. Both the one and the other are intended to stimulate to thought and activity. Whether such a con-

stitution be absolutely needful or not, in order to arouse the moral creature from its unconscious torpor into a state of triumphant activity, it is quite obvious that in man the intimate connection of soul and body, and the provision thereby made for the intercommunion of the thinking subject and the stimulating object, has provided most effectually for the accomplishment of this result. The stimuli which work through the bodily appetites and sensibilities are, no doubt, in their normal state, and when promptly obeyed, sources only of pleasure ; but their very existence seems to involve the liability to become sources of painful inconvenience by excess. At any rate, there can be no question as to the facts of human experience. Both the pleasure and the pain have combined, through the same avenues, to produce the same result. But for the pressure of hunger, where would have been all the arts and sciences connected with husbandry ? But for the susceptibility of inconvenience and pain from exposure to excessive heat or cold, and changing seasons, where would have been our architecture and all our marvellous manufactures, with all the scientific knowledge ranging over both the animal and vegetable kingdoms, and throughout the whole earth, to which they have furnished the occasion ? But for the difficulty of transport on account of mountains, valleys, rivers, and oceans, where would have been all our engineering, mining, road-constructing, locomotive-building, or navigation, and the astronomical and other sciences involved in the successful prosecution of the great carrying facilities ? And finally, but for the fact of accident and disease, where would have been the sciences of anatomy, physiology, biology, and pathology, and all that pertains to the study or practice of medicine and surgery ? The fact is, that the unprovided and exposed state of man, as he comes into the world, the necessities, the dangers, the sufferings of which he becomes the subject, are the very things which arouse him into action, provoke him to make earnest use of the powers bestowed upon him, and to conquer and replenish the earth, and subdue it, and to have dominion. Whether all the results which have been or may yet be achieved, might not have been achieved without the tremendous cost of suffering and life which have been involved, is a question to which mere nature cannot supply a conclusive reply, and on which we, apart from revelation, are hardly competent to judge.

But surely we may be allowed to judge as to whether the result justifies the cost; and we have little hesitation in saying that if the whole result is to be summed up in the small addition made to man's comforts here, if there are to accrue no advantages beyond these, then the cost of attainment seems to be altogether too great. That man's existence has been so conditioned as to compel him to the use and culture of his vast intellectual powers is sufficiently evident. That those powers are now principally employed in providing for the support and comfort of the present short, perishable life, is also equally obvious. But that this sets forth the final purpose for which his powers were imparted and thus conditioned, is hard to be believed. What! Such vast cosmical preparations through the bygone ages, such endowments of intellect and will, such provision of provoking *stimuli* to excite him to the utmost use of his powers, and all to provide a creature who could light a fire, cook a dinner, weave a coat, build a house, and then rejoice for a few short hours in the great achievements of his skill and industry! And to what more does the result of all the skilled and unskilled toil of man amount, if this life only is concerned? Tell us, further, of intellectual and moral culture; of the pleasures of memory; of imagination, of hope, and of moral sentiment; of the comforts accruing from the interchanges of civil and social life, and of the joys of progressive art, science, and discovery. Precious things, truly, if the subjects who profit by them have anything like scope enough in time and space for their acquisition, enjoyment, and use; but poor and miserable comforters all, if all the derived advantage is to terminate with our present dream-like life.

But we shall be told by a certain class of philosophers that though hitherto, both in respect to the individual and the race, the results have been altogether inadequate to justify the process, there is still a progress of humanity towards completeness and perfection, which shall yet attain its goal, and in which the vindication shall be complete. "The human faculties (by process of necessary law) must be moulded into complete fitness for the social state; the things that we call evil and immorality must disappear, and man must become perfect."^{*} The real is to

^{*} Herbert Spencer, *Social Science*.

be evermore approximating the ideal, till at length they become blended into one. Man is to attain such perfect knowledge of himself and nature, and such complete dominion over both, as to make life a universal triumph and perpetual joy. We are not told whether the happy men, whose lot shall fall upon those golden days, shall still be liable to death, nor whether all their repugnance to death shall be done away, nor whether death itself shall have become a thing of joy. But however that may be, and without attempting to determine whether the human race is likely to exist long enough to ever reach that goal at the present rate of travel, or whether "the present constitution of things" will or will not "remain" as it now is, till the laurel-crowned champion comes in, or whether then there may be accorded to him (individually, or as a successive social body) such a lease of existence as shall obliterate the memory of the weary way by which, through infinite pain and loss, the dear-bought reward shall have been won, we ask, What of all those countless myriads who have thought, and toiled, and suffered, and died to promote the final result? We know that in respect to many if not most matters of terrestrial good, it is manifestly true that "one soweth and another reapeth," and that many are sent "to reap that on which they bestowed no labour." But we know also that it is according to the first principles of morality that "he who plougheth should plough in hope," and that "he who thresheth in hope should be partaker of his hope." But how are these to reap the fruit of their labour? or to participate in that which was the object of their hope?

We are told that "the essence of religion is the strong and earnest direction of the emotions and desires towards an ideal object, recognised as of the highest excellence, and as rightfully paramount over all selfish objects of desire;" that "the religion of Humanity" (unselfish devotion to the worship and perfection of the race) is a religion which answers to this description, and that it is better adapted to fulfil the functions of religion than any of the so-called supernatural religions.* We are assured that "if the Religion of Humanity were as sedulously cultivated as the supernatural religions are, all who have received the customary amount of moral cultivation would,

* Mill's *Utility of Religion*, pp. 102, 110.

up to the hour of death, live ideally in the life of those who are to follow them ;" that as a virtuous Roman could not have hesitated for a moment "to sacrifice life, reputation, family, everything valuable to him, for the good of his country," so those who become devoted disciples of the Religion of Humanity (as we are led to infer that all ought to become), will not hesitate to offer themselves up in a similar spirit for the good of the race ; and that this religion is superior to all others because it expects such service without any hope of reward but the present pleasure of doing good, and the ideal approbation of all those, dead or living, whom we admire or venerate.* And yet these are the men who sneer at vicarious suffering and the idea of salvation through the Christian Atonement ! If Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures, He has also been raised again to deathless life on account of our justification. If Christianity requires of us, out of devoted love to our adorable Saviour, to be ready to live and even to lay down our lives for the brethren, and to promote the ideal perfection of the redeemed race, it assures us also of a final participation in the glory and blessedness which are to be thus wrought out. There is no shadow of such hope held out by the Religion of Humanity ; and whatever may be said by amiable sentimentality to the contrary, to impose upon men or expect from them such service and such suffering as a duty which involves no corresponding claim is to do violence to the very first principles of our moral nature.

The fact is that from Nature alone, as apart from Revelation, the attempt to solve the problem of human existence must end in failure. From whatever point the philosopher may start in his inquiries—whatever premises he may assume as those from which his arguments shall advance—so long as he confines himself to work by the light and help of Nature, he must be involved in hopeless contradictions and insoluble mysteries. Let him eliminate the thought of an intelligent Creator from the universe, and maintain that all has been the result of chance, caprice, or blind fatuity, and his very attempt to prove the position is self-convicted of absurdity. For in such a world—if such a world could be—it would be impossible either to anticipate or to prove anything. Let him

* *Utility of Religion*, pp. 104—106.

assume that all things—even human actions themselves, equally with all physical phenomena—are the result of stern necessity and inexorable law, and thereupon proceed to prove that things could not possibly be other than they are, and his own consciousness, in common with that of every other human being, would contradict the conclusion. Let him maintain that the perfection of the race is to be wrought out at the expense of the individual, and that the toil of brain and hand, and the sacrifice of feeling and of life must be offered up in stupendous hecatombs, age after age, in order to ensure the ultimate result, and the sentiment of universal man will cry shame upon the frightful injustice. Or let him tell us that the world has been produced by a well-disposed, but feeble or blundering artificer, and we demand, Whence that artificer himself? Who gave him power and authority to try his hand at making such a world? And have we, the suffering creatures of his incompetence, no claim nor right of appeal to any superior power against his injurious bungling? We may ask these questions, and feel that we have the right to ask them, but we shall look in vain to nature for any satisfactory response.

But now let us meditate the subject under the glow of the light shed upon it by the Christian revelation, and judge whether we are not then presented with a solution of the problem which is at once clear, consistent, and adequate. First of all we find that man is here dealt with and appealed to as an immortal being, and that, not with vague reference to the continuity of the species, but individually, and as one who is now in training for a higher and more perfect state. Here, at last, we have one fact, assuming it to be such, which dissolves and dissipates many an obstinate difficulty. The thought, the toil, the suffering, when wisely and righteously directed, have not been in vain, even in respect to the individual. Of incalculable benefit to others they may have been, both in respect to this world and the next, but they have been of immeasurably more importance to himself. Even though he may have had small reward or satisfaction in his labour here, he cannot fail to reap the harvest yonder. And, supposing that he has secured a good degree of wealth, or of the means of earthly happiness, as the result of his present thought and effort, he will have the satisfaction of knowing that this perishable treasure is not the only, nor

even the chief reward of his righteous toil, but that, even when he has to leave all these things behind him, he will still keep and carry over with him into the other world the far more precious possessions of a well-trained mind and a holy character, and thus be the better prepared to enter upon and enjoy the blessedness and lordship of the more enduring state.

"If man had not the power," says the sceptical philosopher, "by the exercise of his own energies for the improvement both of himself and his outward circumstances to do for himself and other creatures vastly more than God had in the first instance done, the Being who called him into existence would deserve something very different from thanks at his hands."* But, passing by the unworthy sneer which that sentence involves, we maintain that, according to Biblical teaching, man was endued with the power to improve both himself and his circumstances, that those powers were bestowed upon him by a beneficent Creator, and that his life was so conditioned, and he had such opportunities afforded, as that he could have used his powers so effectually as to prevent the misery to which he has become subject, and to win for himself both the right and the ability for a more perfect dominion in a higher state. To him, as sufficiently furnished for his life task, was given the commandment, "Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it, and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth" (Gen. i. 28). It was in the fulfilment of the duties of that right of lordship that his intellectual and physical energies were to be developed and matured, his moral character to be built up and consolidated, and his present and everlasting bliss to be ensured. According to that teaching, his mental, moral, and physical constitution was faultless at the moment of creation, and therefore, at that point, very good. But his nature was not so perfect as to need no self-development and discipline. These were the very things which it did need, and the accomplishment of which required all his thought, care, and diligence in a life of fellowship with God. The Bible gives no intimation that he was not liable to faultiness and failure, whether of judgment or

* *Thomson*, pp. 122, 123.

will, in the prosecution of his task. But it maintains that he was so furnished and provided as to make any failure on his part to be manifestly his own fault. "To suppose that God could not, in the first instance, create anything better than a Bosjesman or an Andaman islander," is to assume, without vestige of proof, and in the very teeth of Biblical testimony, that the first human pair were really of a similar type.

The testimony of the Bible is that "God made man upright,"—"made him a little lower than the angels," and "crowned him with glory and honour," setting "him to have dominion over the works of His hands," but that he, being in a state of honour, abode not therein. He sinned, and the crown of righteous and effective dominion fell from his brow. Yet was he not stripped of all power and authority, but graciously furnished with opportunity to recover his forfeited position. Now, however the fact of the fall may be accounted for, whether according to the literal record given in the Book of Genesis, or in some other way, or whether a fall be altogether denied, it cannot be denied that the present state of mankind agrees with the results which the Scriptures describe as a fall. "If the motive of the Deity for creating sentient beings was the happiness of the beings He created, His purpose, in our corner of the universe, at least, must be pronounced, taking past ages and all countries and races into account, to have been thus far an ignominious failure."* And again, "If the Creator of mankind willed that they should all be virtuous, His designs are as completely baffled as if He had willed that they should all be happy."† The facts as to the actual moral state and physical condition of men are clearly identical. The Bible charges the guilt of that state upon the perverse and sinning sons of men; the philosopher throws it back upon the Creator, putting in, however, this poor apology, that He did the best He could. But to deal with the facts, and the Biblical mode of accounting for them, it is obvious that the fatal error of the individual and the race, of the first human pair and of all their successors, has been the persistent eating of forbidden fruit, the striving after happiness by unlawful means, or by the excess and abuse of lawful ones.‡ Or,

* *Theism*, p. 192.

† *Nature*, p. 87.

‡ This does not touch the question as to whether there was not also a literal eating of real fruit in Eden.

to put the matter in another form, the essence of the offence has been the use of that as end, as the chief good, which was only intended to be a means to that end. The offender has become completely absorbed in the pursuit and enjoyment of merely earthly and physical good, as though that were the only end of his being, to the neglect of his moral and spiritual nature, and the perfection and joy of that in fellowship with God, to the attainment of which the former was but intended to be introductory and subservient. Hence all his ungodliness, unrighteousness, and intemperance. Instead of preparing himself with all diligence for the glory and honour of immortality, he has suffered himself to become debased into a mere intellectual animal, and has consequently become "earthly, sensual, devilish."

And having so missed the mark morally, is it to be wondered at that he should have become a prey to disappointment, defeat, discontentment, accidents, sufferings, and death? We cannot bring ourselves to believe in the theology of *Paradise Lost*, or to rest in the conclusion, so long prevalent in the Church, that *all death*, even in the animal, and we suppose also in the vegetable, world, was the result of Adam's sin. Nor can we affect any sympathy for those who, disabused of that mistaken assumption on geological evidence, hazard the opinion that angels or some other kind of moral beings were, long ages ago, placed on this earth as probationers and failed, and who seek thus to account for the fact that death had reigned triumphantly, through vast geological periods, long enough before Adam was created. It seems obvious to us that, where living organisms are maintained by successive procreative existence, by the appropriation and assimilation of food, and, in short, by birth, growth, and development to maturity, there must, in the very nature of things, be liability to decay and death. Indeed, all organic life above that of the vegetable is sustained by death. The vegetable loses its life to sustain that of the animal, and the animal again loses its life to sustain that of some other, and all lose their lives in succession to restore the means of life to the perpetually succeeding generations in both kingdoms. To all such creatures, therefore, there must be the natural liability to death, and the Bible affirms nothing to the contrary.

But the Bible does affirm by implication that man,

abiding innocent and good, should have been exempted from this doom of death. By nature, that is according to the laws of his physical constitution, he must have been as liable thereto as any other animal. But in case of his fidelity and obedience, exemption from death, and of course from all those injuries, accidents, and diseases which lead to and end in death, was virtually assured to him so long as his probation continued, of which the fruit of the tree of life in the midst of the Paradise of Eden was at once the symbol and the sacrament. When the probation of each would have terminated, and how they would have been taken up to the permanent dominion of the heavenly world, are secrets which have not been disclosed, and which are of no practical interest.

But it was supremely important that the original purpose of man's creation should not be defeated, therefore a great redeeming and new-creating work was projected and disclosed. The first man had failed, and involved himself and all his posterity in moral and physical ruin, therefore a "second man," even "the Lord from heaven," must appear, and, according to the Scriptures, did appear, to retrieve the race and to lift us up to a still more glorious dominion. Jehovah had blessed the first human pair and crowned them with a lordly dominion which they had forfeited. Nevertheless David, long ages after the Fall, had sung, "What is man, that Thou art mindful of him? and the son of man, that Thou visitest him? For Thou hast made him a little lower than the angels, and hast crowned him with glory and honour. Thou madest him to have dominion over the works of Thy hands; Thou hast put all things under His feet." (Psalm viii. 4—6.) Yet it must have been clear to him then, as it was to the Apostle afterwards, and as it is to us now, that, so far as man in this present life is concerned, the dominion is far more in the ideal than in the reality. Nevertheless it is and is to be **REAL**, for the world to come has not been put into subjection to angels but to men. The Word shall be made good: all things shall be put under His feet. True, we see faint tokens of this absolute dominion as yet on earth; but we see Jesus, **THE SON OF MAN**, who was made a little lower than the angels for the suffering of death, crowned with glory and honour. All power has been given to Him in heaven and on earth. He is Lord of all. And He reigns not alone; but as the great Captain of salvation, made

perfect through sufferings, He is bringing many sons to share His glory, of whom it is said that He is not ashamed to call them brethren. These He cheers onward and upward by the assurance that "to him that overcometh will I give to sit with Me in My throne, even as I also overcame, and am set down with My Father in His throne." Hence the rapture of gratitude with which St. Paul gives thanks to God, even the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, for that He has "made known to us the mystery of His will, according to His good pleasure which He hath purposed in Himself, that in the dispensation of the fulness of the times He might gather together in one all things in Christ, both which are in heaven and which are on earth, even in Him." (Eph. i. 8—10.) Thenceforth the dominion shall be complete and unassailable.

But forasmuch as that lordship is not to be solitary but social, not such as that everyone shall have perfect dominion by and in himself alone, but in association with all the rest of the redeemed and with Him who is the Head and Lord of all; and forasmuch as this is not a new and superinduced idea, but one which governed the purpose of the original, as it does also now of the new, creation; therefore the training to which men are here subjected, has of necessity to assume the social character. Therefore it is that society is founded in the family; that the human breast is so mightily moved by the family and social affections, and that those who desire to participate in "the glory of the liberty of the sons of God" are now required first, to present themselves to God as living sacrifices, to be holy and acceptable, in rational religious service; secondly, to live, not in a state of conformity to this world, as though their chief good were to be sought and found here, but to be transformed by the renewing of their minds, that they may prove the will of God, even that which is good, acceptable, and perfect; and thirdly, to combine together, under the Headship of the Lord Jesus, for mutual ministry, in promoting the full accomplishment of that holy will, both in respect to each separate individual and the entire social body; and thus to secure the consequent perfect preparation for the eternal inheritance.

Of the state of blessedness and glory in that world, the specific character of the lordship, and in what manner it

is to be exercised or administered, we have but little positive information; and this, we apprehend, of necessity, seeing that we are not yet able to receive the revelation. But thus much is manifest, that it shall not be limited and annoyed by resisting and destructive forces, whether because the nature subjected to the lordship shall be exempted from the action of all such forces, or because the rulers shall have perfect aptitude to forecast, direct, evade, or neutralise them, that no pain, distress, sorrow, or death shall find any place therein; that every one shall be blessed up to the measure of his capacity; and that the measure of that capacity, and the resulting power and blessedness, will bear strict proportion to the moral and intellectual improvement made, and the holy service rendered, during the present state of probation. For it surely cannot be imagined that while moral and spiritual excellence must have greatest influence in the work of preparation for that world, the intellectual should be of no account. It seems to us that the well-practised, the skilled and sharpened aptitude to discover and turn to account the thoughts of God which are wrapped up for us in these material forms, and the experience gained of exercising effective control over the forces of nature, must place those at a great advantage in the heavenly world who have by godly diligence gained distinction here.

But altogether apart from any matters of doubtful disputation, and taking the disclosures of the Christian revelation in respect to the future life as they must be understood by all, we fearlessly make our appeal to every intelligent man as to whether we have not here a solution of the problem of human existence with all its mysteries, such as is not to be approached by any other? As to the ideal perfection of the race, towards which we are assured that society is advancing by the force of necessary law, there can be no scientific certainty that the present conditions of existence will continue long enough to ensure the result, nor that they will abide for any definite period after the state has been attained, while there is scientific certainty that the whole of the present cosmical adjustments must sooner or later come to an end. There is, therefore, no assurance that a good in any sense whatever commensurate with the terrible cost will ever be attained by any, while there is the mournful assumption that all

the countless myriads who have thought, and toiled, and suffered, and died, during the process of working towards the result, must perish without a glimpse of the glory, and almost without a hope that anyone else will behold it. But take the statements of Christianity, and admit the truth of these hopes, and there is no further room for reproachful disquisitions on the blunders or cruelty of nature, the misery of man, or the supposed deficiency of power or goodness in the Creator. But put them out of view, discredit or deny them, and then what a tremendous and impotent blunder the very existence of the human race becomes! And the man who, having no hope beyond this life, no prospect of a heritage of good for himself or others beyond the grave, does not become profoundly melancholy, must be profoundly insensible.

We may be reminded that there are great difficulties involved even in the Biblical solution of the problem. We know there are, and that they have been felt by every real Christian thinker, however firm his faith. Space will not permit us to estimate their force. We will only now add: first, that they are small indeed as compared with those of any other attempted solution; secondly, that they affect rather questions of sympathy and sentiment than those of justice and equity; and thirdly, that those who believe in Him who spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all, can calmly and confidently wait till He works out their complete practical solution.

- ART. IV.—1. *Miscellaneous Essays.* By H. T. COLEBROOKE. Edited by E. B. COWELL, Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Cambridge. Two Vols. London: Trübner and Co. 1873.
2. *Indian Wisdom: Examples of the Religious, Philosophical, and Ethical Doctrines of the Hindus.* By MONIER WILLIAMS, M.A., Boden Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Oxford. London: Allen and Co. 1875.
3. *Laws of Thought.* By W. THOMSON, D.D. *Appendix on Indian Logic.* By MAX MÜLLER. London: Longmans. 1860.

THE most obvious comparison on the subject of early Indian philosophy is with the philosophy of ancient Greece. It is a remarkable fact that the two schools were contemporaneous. It is true that the date of ancient Indian writers cannot be fixed as exactly as that of Western writers, but every probability and general opinion assign Indian philosophies to (speaking roundly) the fifth or sixth century B.C. Kapila, Gotama, Vyāsa, were thus contemporaneous with the pre-Socratic thinkers of Greece, and indeed with Zoroaster in Persia and Confucius in China. History presents few more remarkable conjunctions than this. One great impulse of inquiry and reflection seems to have moved East and West at once. The existence of some outward connection between the different movements is naturally suggested, but no proof or trace of such connection is forthcoming. In the scantiness of our records of those ages the absence of historical proof would scarcely surprise us. What weighs most and indeed decisively against the supposition of any relation of dependence or borrowing is the internal dissimilarity of the systems themselves. If one had learnt from the other, there must have been elements in common; but no such common features exist. Both in outline and detail the differences are as great and the resemblances as few and slight as was possible where the inquirer was the same human mind, and the subjects of inquiry were sub-

stantially the same. Of the independence of the systems there can be no doubt.

One advantage which India possesses over Greece is that its various theories are much more systematic, more rigidly defined, and restricted within fixed lines. Instead of a number of separate writers, who speculate without reference to each other, and whose works (as far as the pre-Socratic schools are concerned) have come down to us in fragmentary sentences, we have in India three distinct schools, in whose wake all subsequent thought has followed. Indian philosophic speculation seemed at once to discover its congenial grooves, which it never left, and to which it never added. Three powerful minds, one mainly metaphysical, one mainly logical, one mainly spiritual or theological, struck out three roads to absolute truth, and in those roads the Indian mind has submissively travelled. We have also abundant means of knowing these schools. We are not reduced to make guesses at the meaning of disjointed sentences. Of text books and commentaries there is a plentiful supply.

With respect to the extent of the practical influence of the Greek and Indian philosophies there is little or no difference. If Plato and Aristotle reigned over the Western world for centuries, and now, if they no longer reign, exert no inconsiderable power, the Indian mind for as many centuries has been formed under the Indian schools. The Indian teachers directly or indirectly can count as many disciples as their Western compeers. On this account alone they must be an interesting object to the student of history. They can never be any more than this. Their day is waning even in their native East, and from their very nature they can never be of practical service to us. They are all built on the old lines of *a priori* speculation and deduction, not from verified but assumed premises. Of induction, verification, experiment, of the necessity of a basis of facts internal or external, they are wholly unconscious. From first to last the systems are evolved from the depths of the thinker's consciousness. Perhaps this is the attraction which Oriental systems have for some modern German transcendentalists. One of these at least gloried in being called a Western Buddhist. Probably Indian writers would have spoken with as bitter contempt of what passes in England for science and philosophy as some German thinkers; and we

may add, that to English minds Kapila and Gotama and Vyāsa are not more unintelligible on many points than the Schellings, Hegels, and Schopenhauers.

Beside many tenets which all the Indian schools have in common, such as the eternity of soul and matter, they are all alike in having a religious purpose. This is a distinctive feature of Indian teachers in contrast with Greek. The object of all alike is to show the way in which man can secure emancipation from the fetters of his nature, and complete absorption in the divine or universal. Whoever is the guide, whatever the starting-point, whatever the road traversed, this is the goal. This is what Kapila proposes to show by his atheistic metaphysics, Gotama and Kanāda by their logic, Vyāsa by his pantheism. What each prides himself upon is that his method is the shortest path to absorption of the individual life. This must never be forgotten by the student of Oriental philosophies. The presence of this religious purpose makes each system, in fact, a theosophy. A Hindu's interest in the theories is purely religious. To us they are simply logical or metaphysical theories, to him they are something higher.

The Hindu schools are generally regarded as six in number, called the Six Demonstrations, *Shat-Darśhanas*. Really they are three, each assuming a twofold form, or composed of two parts, the Sāṅkhya system by Kapila with the Yoga by Patanjali as a supplement, the Nyāya system by Gotama with the *Vaiśeṣika* by Kanāda as a supplement, and Vēdāntism in the two forms of the Former and Latter (*Pūrva* and *Uttara*) *Mimāṃsa*, the first by Jaimini, the other by Vyāsa. In the case of the first the supplement is of little importance; in the second and third the chief interest centres in the supplement.

In examining first the Sāṅkhya system of Kapila we will mention some of the native works on the subject by way of illustrating the remark made before upon the ample means of information we have of Indian teaching.

Kapila's *Sūtras* or *Aphorisms*, 526 in six books, known as the *Sāṅkhya-Pravachana*.

Commentaries on ditto, chief of which is the one by *Vijñāna-bhikṣu*. Kapila's *Tattwa-Samāsa*, *Compendium of Principles*, translated by Dr. Ballantyne.

Sāṅkhya-Kārikā, a useful compendium in 72 verses, translated both by Wilson and Colebrooke. Other similar

works and commentaries are named by Colebrooke. The greatest commentator of all is Shankarāchārya, 7th century, A.D., whose works are almost innumerable.

From the circumstance that Sāṅkhya has number for one of its meanings, some have imagined a resemblance to the Pythagorean system of numbers and harmony; but the resemblance goes no farther. Numbers and their multiples play no part in the Indian theory. The title is doubtless chosen from its secondary sense of "judgment, deliberation, and exact discrimination." The theory is purely synthetic and deductive. It assumes two original, independent, uncreated, eternal principles, Nature and Soul.* Even Nature, Prakriti, in its original state is not simple in essence, but marked by three qualities or properties—goodness, passion or activity, darkness or ignorance (sattwa, téjas, rajas). Indeed Nature is described as the equilibrium of these properties (guna). In all other cases one or other preponderates; in the gods, goodness; in man, passion; in animals, ignorance. By some the members of the Hindu triad—Brahma, Vishnu, and Shiva—are instanced as personifications of the same. Man rises higher or sinks lower in the scale of virtue as one or the other of these qualities predominates. In contrast with Nature, Soul or Purusha is devoid of these qualities (nirguna), and only acquires them on union with Nature. Nature is called also by the expressive names of "Rootless root" (amūla-mūlam), and "chief or first one"

* Principle = tattwa. Nature = prakriti. Soul = purusha. It is not easy to represent these words by a single word in English, and any word chosen may be objected to. All we can do is to define the word we use. "Tattwa" is curious in composition. Tat = that, twam = thou. This combined with asmi = thou art, etc., is the favourite formula of the Advaita sect, those who recognise but one universal substance. "Thou art that," i.e. subject and object, matter and spirit, are one. Hence its secondary sense, according to this theory, of "truth, reality, existence." Of this, "principle" may serve as the equivalent. "Prakriti" means "that which makes before," the source of all existences except soul. If we describe this by "nature," we do not mean nature as the sum of the universe in its present form, but rather as the universe in its germ or undeveloped condition. "Matter" might be put for it, and seems suggested by antithesis to the next term, but that it includes intelligence and other immaterial objects. Yet we are not at all sure that the Sāṅkhya does not regard these as material in some sense; and if so, "matter" would be better than "nature." "Purusha" has not "soul" among its secondary meanings. Its ordinary meaning is "male." But it is usually taken here to stand for the individual being or soul. Mythology, unable to enter into these speculations, boldly converted purusha and prakriti respectively into the male and female progenitors of creation.—See note in Williams, p. 90.

(*pradhānam*), and is described as "eternal matter, undiscrete ; undistinguishable, as destitute of parts ; inferrible, from its effects ; productive, but no production." Soul, on the other hand, is "neither produced nor productive. It is multitudinous, individual, sensitive, eternal, unalterable, immaterial." Of course, if not produced, it is eternal like Nature ; and if not productive, there is a multitude of separate souls, each one eternal in itself.

In the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth verses of the *Kārikā* we have the proof of the existence of these two original principles. These and Colebrooke's expansion will serve as a specimen of the arguments which satisfy Hindus.

"XV., XVI. Since specific objects are finite, since there is homogeneousness, since effects exist through energy, since there is an issue of effects from cause, and a reunion of the universe, there is a general cause which is undiscrete."

Colebrooke from native authorities comments thus :—

"Specific objects are finite ; they are multitudinous and not universal : there must then be a single, all-pervading cause. 'Homogeneousness indicates a cause ;' an earthen jar implies a lump of clay of which it is made : a coronet of gold presumes a mass of gold of which it is fabricated : seeing a rigidly abstemious novice, we readily conclude that his parents are of the sacerdotal tribe : there must then be a cause bearing affinity to effects which are seen. 'Existence of effects through energy :' there must be a cause adequate to the effects. A potter is capable of making pottery : he makes a pot, not a car or a piece of cloth. But the main argument is 'the issuing of effects from cause and the re-union of the universe.' A type of this is the tortoise, which puts forth its limbs and retracts them. So at the general consummation of all things, the elements constituting the three worlds are withdrawn in the inverse order of their coming out, returning to the first cause—the chief and undistinguishable one—Nature."

"XVII. Since the assemblage of sensible objects is for another's use, since the converse of that which has the three qualities, with other properties, must exist, since there must be superintendence, since there must be one to enjoy, since there is a tendency to abstraction, therefore soul is."

"The assemblage of sensible objects is for another's use : as a bed for a sleeper, a chair for a sitter : that other who uses it must be a sensitive being, and the sensitive being is soul. The

converse of sensible objects endued with the three qualities must exist; that is soul. 'There must be superintendence:' as a charioteer for a car: the superintendent of matter is soul. 'There must be one to enjoy' what is formed for enjoyment; a spectator, a witness; that spectator is soul. 'There is a tendency to abstraction:' wise and unwise alike desire a termination of vicissitude: holy writ and mighty sages tend to that consummation, the final and absolute extinction of every sort of pain: there must then be a being capable of abstraction, essentially unconnected with pleasure, pain, and illusion; and that being is soul."

To proceed in our exposition. Soul is simple in essence, not so Nature. Beside the three properties mentioned it is the source of twenty-three other Principles, *Tattwas*. First of these is Intelligence, *Buddhi* or *Mahat*, the last meaning "great one." From Intelligence comes Egoism, individuality, the notion of self—*Ahankāra*. *Ahankāra* again is the parent of a brood of Principles: first, five subtle rudimentary elements—*Tanmātras*, which, too fine for our grosser senses, themselves produce the five sensible elements, earth, water, fire, air, space.* Secondly, eleven instruments of sense and action—viz., five instruments of sensation: eye, ear, nose, tongue, skin; and five of action: voice, hands, feet, with the organs of excretion and generation; the eleventh instrument, the mind, being internal. From this will be seen the important place which Egoism fills in the scheme. It is the parent of twenty-one of the twenty-three derived principles. Hence the aspirant after the beatitude of final emancipation must bend all his effort to the destruction of this principle of Egoism, the sense of individuality. This illusion removed, little will intervene between the soul and absorption. The third verse of the *Kārikā* says very clearly—"Nature, the root, is no production. Seven principles (Intelligence, Egoism, and the five rudimentary elements) are productions and productive. Sixteen are productions (only). Soul is neither a production nor productive." In this feature of intense individualism some see a point of resemblance with Berkeley's theory.

These two principles being postulated, their union is

* Space has the property of audibleness; air the properties of audibleness and tangibility; fire of audibleness, tangibility, and colour; water audibleness, tangibility, colour, and savour; earth audibleness, tangibility, colour, savour, and odour.

creation. We must suppose that the union takes place under the influence of a natural affinity or attraction. These separate souls, countless in number, are constantly blending with Nature, and forming sometimes gods, sometimes men, sometimes animals. The combination is compared to the lame carrying the blind. Nature becomes conscious and able to know and observe itself by the aid of Soul. Then the process is reversed, and soul returns to its original distinctiveness. In the process of creation the soul first assumes what is called a subtile body, *linga-sharira*, a body invisible and atomic in size, composed of all the Principles mentioned above, except the five gross elements. It is this subtile body which is both a body to the original soul, and a soul to the gross body which is composed of the five gross elements. The notion of a subtile body, Colebrooke well remarks, "seems a compromise between the refined dogma of an immaterial soul, and the difficulty which a gross understanding finds in grasping the notion of individual existence, unattached to matter." It is this subtile body, not pure soul, which is subject to transmigration. It is only the gross body which is visible and subject to decay and death. Final emancipation means casting off the subtile body.

We think it will be evident by this time that if we were to substitute matter and spirit, or even matter and force, for nature and soul, we could not be charged with reading modern speculations into ancient systems. To us it seems that Kapila's theory is the modern one which recognises only matter and force, neither more nor less. The resemblance is still closer in the absence or positive exclusion of a Creator or personal God. Kapila denies and argues against this. Indeed, in his system, there is no room for God. Everything is provided for. Matter is the source of evil, thus anticipating Manichæism. Charged with atheism, Kapila admits and justifies it. He simply asserts that the existence of God is unproved by sense, or reason, or revelation. "Detached from nature, unaffected, therefore, by consciousness and the rest of nature's trammels, he could have no inducement to creation: fettered by nature, he would be incapable of creation."* He does, indeed, admit the existence of a god, but it is a finite one, who comes into existence and passes away with the universe. So again

* In Colebrooke, I. 264. Colebrooke says, p. 286, "Prakriti abstracted from modifications is no other than matter."

the idea of evolution and the old principle "*Ex nihilo nihil fit*" are expressly asserted. "There cannot be the production of something out of nothing: that which is not cannot be developed into that which is. The production of what does not already exist is impossible, like a horn on a man; because there must of necessity be a material out of which a product is developed; and because everything cannot occur everywhere at all times; and because anything possible must be produced from something competent to produce it.' Thus, remarks a commentator, curds come from milk, not water: a potter produces a jar from clay, not from cloth. Production is only manifestation of what previously existed. Aphorism 121 adds, 'Destruction is a resolution of anything into its cause.'"^{*} So in the *Kārikā* we read, IX., "Effect subsists (antecedently to the operation of cause); for what exists not can by no operation of cause be brought into existence. Materials too are selected which are fit for the purpose: everything is not by every means possible: what is capable does that to which it is competent; and like is produced from like."[†]

In the creation brought about by the union of Nature and Soul, the *Sāṅkhya* distinguishes between the corporeal creation and the intellectual. The first consists of fourteen orders of beings, eight superior, five inferior and man, distributed into three worlds, each world being marked by a predominance of one of the three qualities. The intellectual includes all mental powers and affections, which are minutely distinguished and classified as means of obstructing, disabling, contenting, or perfecting the understanding. Into these minutiae we need not enter.

The sole purpose of this elaborate theorising is to furnish a path by which man may obtain release from the trammels of separate existence. The only means, we are told, by which this can be secured is right knowledge. Other means are proposed in the *Vēdas* and elsewhere; but these are imperfect, inadequate, and in some cases of doubtful morality. Man must clearly discriminate between Nature, the imperceptible principle, the derived perceptible ones, and the Soul. Nothing short of this will suffice. By sacrifices man becomes one of the gods, but even the gods, Indra and the rest, are subject to change and pain

^{*} Kapila's *Sātra*, in Williams, p. 89.

[†] Colebrooke, I. 273.

like man. For them, as for mortals, the only means of deliverance is the intuition of absolute truth, the truth which the Sāṅkhya expounds. Again, the means by which this knowledge is attained are three, Perception, Inference, and Right Affirmation (*Drishta*, *Anumāna*, *Apta-vachana*), the last including the Vēdas and oral teaching. "Sensible objects become known by perception. By inference or reasoning acquaintance with things transcending the senses is attained : and a truth which is neither to be directly perceived nor to be inferred by reasoning is deduced from revelation."* By the insertion of the Vēda among the sources of knowledge Kapila avoids the appearance of atheism, but it is only the appearance which he avoids. By the right use of these three methods man may reach entire deliverance from mortal existence with its pains and ills. A curious simile is used to express this deliverance. "As a dancer, having exhibited herself to the spectators, desists from the dance, so does Nature desist, having manifested herself to the Soul. He desists because he has seen her ; she does so because she has been seen." In India the Sāṅkhya system, though not much studied, is in high repute. There is a saying in the *Mahā-Bhārata* : *Nāsti Sāṅkhya-samam jñānam, nāsti Yoga-samam balam*, There is no knowledge like the Sāṅkhya, there is no power like the Yoga.

The Yoga supplement demands no special notice. One of its purposes is to show the method of acquiring miraculous powers. It is the source of the extravagant austerities and penances for which Indian devotees are famous. Unlike the Sāṅkhya it acknowledges God.

The next system is the more popular and better known one, the Nyāya of Gotama (not Gotama the founder of Buddhism). The *Vaishēshika* of Kanāda is the Nyāya enlarged and improved, and, unlike its predecessor, includes physical inquiries as well as metaphysical. Nyāya means "examination," and denotes the analytical spirit of the system. *Vaishēshika* is from *vishēsha*, "particular, individual," and is doubtless derived from Kanāda's peculiar method in dealing with particular objects, instead of being satisfied with generalities. The two systems differ in arrangement, and the last is much the fuller. They include all the subjects usually discussed in logical

treatises. Logic is the subject which Hindus, so fond of dispute and litigation, revel in. We do not, therefore, wonder at the innumerable treatises and commentaries which exist. Colebrooke mentions a considerable number of the principal, and leaves still more unmentioned. We subjoin a few.

Nyāya-sūtra-vritti, in five books, with commentary of Vishwanātha-bhatta, the first four books translated by Ballantyne, Calcutta, 1828, and Benares, 1850.

Tarka-Sangraha, Manual of Logic, by Annam-bhatta.

Bhāsha-Paricchēda, with commentary called Siddhānta-muktāvali, edited and translated by Dr. Rœr.

Vaishēshika-Sūtras, 10 books, edited and translated by A. E. Gough, Benares, "in Pandit," 1869-72.

Nyāya-Lilāvati, by Vallabhāchārya, in 2,700 verses.

Tarka-Bhāshā, by Kēshava-Mishra, and many others equally excellent and famous.

Gotama's work deals with the whole subject under sixteen topics. These are:—1. Proof; 2. Things to be proved; 3. Doubt; 4. Motive; 5. Example; 6. Demonstrated Truth; 7. Members of Syllogism; 8. Refutation; 9. Determination; 10. Controversy; 11. Disputation, Wrangling; 12. Cavilling; 13. Fallacious Reason; 14. Perversion; 15. Futility; 16. Defeat.* We can only refer to a few as specimens of the minute thoroughness with which all are treated.

Under the first topic four means of Proof are described, Perception, Inference, Comparison, Authority. It will be seen that Comparison is added to the three of the Sāṅkhya. On this subject the various Hindu sects divide. The Vaishēshika rejects Authority, or tradition, leaving Perception and Inference only. Some Mimāṃsakas add Presumption and Privation. The materialists (chārvākas) allow Perception only. Gotama defines Proof as "the efficient or special cause of actual knowledge, and cause (kāraṇa) as that which is efficacious, necessarily preceding an effect (kārya) that cannot else be." Of the three kinds of causes enumerated, two, the inherent and instrumental, correspond with Aristotle's material and efficient causes. Aristotle's final cause is virtually contained in Topic IV. His formal cause scarcely corresponds with Gotama's

* 1. Pramāṇa; 2. Pramēya; 3. Samahaya; 4. Prayōjana; 5. Driṣṭānta; 6. Siddhānta; 7. Avayava; 8. Tarka; 9. Nirṇaya; 10. Vāda; 11. Jalpa; 12. Vitanda; 13. Hētwābbāsa; 14. Chhala; 15. Jāti; 16. Nigraha-sṭhana.

remaining case, *i.e.* non-inherent, as putting together threads in making cloth. Inference is said to be of three kinds, from cause to effect, from effect to cause, from other relations than that of cause, as the colour of a flower from the scent perceived.

The most important topic is the second, where Gotama discusses the twelve objects of proof. 1. Soul; 2. Body; 3. Organs of Sense; 4. Objects of Sense; 5. Intelligence; 6. Mind; 7. Activity; 8. Faults; 9. Transmigration; 10. Retribution; 11. Pain; 12. Emancipation. The existence of Soul is proved thus. Knowledge, desire, aversion, volition, pain and pleasure exist as facts. They are not universal attributes of substance, as number, quantity, &c., but peculiar, apprehended by a single organ. They do not belong to apparent substances, as the earth. They therefore require a distinct, special substratum, of which they are the qualities. The individual is distinguished from the supreme soul (*jivâtma* and *paramâtma*). Still one as well as the other is described as infinite and eternal. The soul is said to be ubiquitous, in fact, omnipresent, though only consciously active in connection with the body. This seems to be the only point of difference between the individual and supreme soul. This limitation is done away in final emancipation, when the soul becomes conscious of its latent omnipresence and omniscience: in a word, merges in Deity. The account given of the organs of sense is worth noticing. The five organs, smell, taste, sight, touch, hearing, are "not modifications of consciousness (as with the *Sāṅkhyas*) but material, constituted of the elements, earth, water, light, air, ether, respectively." Further, "The organ of sight is a ray of light, proceeding from the pupil of the eye towards the object viewed; and ether contained in the cavity of the ear, and communicating by intermediate ether with the object heard, is the organ of hearing. That ray of light is not ordinarily visible, just as the effulgence of a torch is unseen in meridian sunshine. But under some circumstances a glimpse of it is obtained. For instance, in the dark the eye of a cat at night. The site of the visual organ is the pupil of the eye; of the auditory organ, the orifice of the ear; of the olfactory organ, the nostril; of the taste, the tip of the tongue; of feelings, the skin." "The existence of organs of sense is proved by inference, from the fact of the apprehension of those objects: for apprehension

implies an instrument to effect it, since it is an act, just as cutting implies an instrument." On the same ground he argues for the existence of Mind, the internal organ of sense, and sixth in the list given above. For pain and pleasure, and like emotions, require an instrument other than the senses, since they are experienced in the absence of the senses. Its union with the senses is necessary to knowledge. "Various sensations do not arise at one time to the same soul. They only seem to do so when occurring rapidly, though successively; as a firebrand, whirled with velocity, seems a ring of fire." "Mind is single: for each soul, one; not as many minds as senses. It is eternal, distinct from soul as well as from body, with which it is merely conjoined." The fifth object is Intelligence in two forms, notion and remembrance. Seventh in order is Activity, which is the cause of virtue and vice, merit and demerit. It is oral, mental, or bodily. From acts spring faults. Transmigration is the passage of the eternal soul from body to body, and never ceases till complete Emancipation takes place, the means of which are pointed out under the twelfth head. Retribution is the fruit (phala) of faults.

Under the seventh topic the syllogism is dealt with. As stated in its full form it contains five members, thus:—

1. The Proposition (pratijñā). The hill is fiery.
2. The Reason (hētu). For it smokes.
3. The Example (udâharana or nidarshana). What smokes is fiery, as a culinary hearth.
4. The Application (upanaya). The hill smokes.
5. The Conclusion (nigamana). Therefore it is fiery.

It will be seen that the first and second members are superfluous, and these cut off we have the Aristotelian syllogism. The clumsy addition at least proves the independence of the Indian logician. But a reason is assigned for the addition. The short form is enough for ourselves, the longer form is useful in an argument addressed to others. Max Müller quotes the following from a native source: "Inference is twofold, intended either for ourselves or for others. The former has been explained. As to the latter, it is to be accomplished by argument. An argument consists of several members; and real members there are only three—assertion, reason, proposition; or proposition, assumption, and deduction. Not

five; for three are sufficient to exhibit the pervading rule and its two members; the other two can therefore be dispensed with."* The phrase which occurs here "pervading rule" calls for further notice. It refers to the doctrine of "invariable pervasion or concomitance" (*vyāpti*), which fills a prominent place in Indian logic. It includes a pervading attribute (*vyāpaka*), and a pervaded object (*vyāpya*). In the proposition, "Wherever there is humanity there is mortality," mortality is the pervader, humanity the pervaded. After drawing several minute distinctions, a *Sūtra* defines "invariable concomitance" as "invariable co-inherence of the predicate." In the *Muktāvali* mentioned above, we are told that the *vyāpti* or universal proposition is reached by affirmative and negative induction, which "correspond to the methods of Agreement and Difference in Mill's *Logic*, Vol. I., p. 454, the great object being to discover, if possible, the relation of cause and effect between the two phenomena. This is well illustrated in the commentary on *Sāṅkhya Sūtra* I., 40, 'The two suggestions of the relation of cause and effect are—(1) This concomitance of affirmatives—that whenever the product exists, the material cause exists, and (2) this concomitance of negatives—that whenever the material cause no longer exists, the product no longer exists.' "†

The eighth Topic, Refutation (*Tarka*), is a technical term for the *reductio ad absurdum*, showing that premises must be wrong because they lead to conclusions at variance with proved or admitted facts. No fewer than twelve different forms are enumerated by different writers.

Fallacy (13) is distinguished into five kinds with other sub-divisions. Perversion (14) is either misconstruing what is ambiguous, understanding metaphor literally, or making general what is particular. Under Futility (15) twenty-four sorts of self-confuting replies are described. Under the last head of Defeat or Failure twenty-two distinctions are drawn.

Gotama's theory, thus briefly summarised, is embodied in the *Vaiśeṣika* of Kanāda. We must yet notice what is peculiar to the latter. The striking feature of the system is the seven Categories (*padārtha*):—"1. Substance;

* *Laws of Thought*, p. 297.

† Colebrooke, I., 314, note.

2. Quality; 3. Action; 4. Genus; 5. Individuality; 6. Co-inherence; 7. Non-existence."* The seventh is not Kanāda's, but was added afterwards as implied by the rest. This list may be compared with Aristotle's ten categories, which are specified and criticised in Mill's *Logic*, I., 50. The existence of substance is attacked and defended by the same arguments in India as among us. A Hindu materialist says, "I see water. I see no substance of water apart from water. I see only particular objects. I see nothing of the universal you speak of." A Vaishēshika replies, "True; you see only Qualities and Actions; but Qualities and Actions imply a subject." Substance thus is that in which Qualities exist and Action takes place. Co-inherence expresses an inseparable relation, such as that obtaining between cause and effect, substance and quality, a whole and parts. Non-existence is of four kinds: things which are—1. Not yet, but may be afterwards; 2. Not now, but have been; 3. Not, and never will be; 4. Not what something else is, i.e. which differ. Some writers insert Kanāda's Categories under Objects of Sense, the fourth subdivision under Gotama's second Topic.

Kanāda's Substances are nine: Earth, Water, Light, Air, Ether, Time, Space, Soul, Mind. These have occurred before in Gotama in a different connection, and the argument and exposition proceed in much the same order as there. Soul, of course, is an immaterial substance, and of material substances the first four in the series and Mind are atomic. The primary atoms are described as imperceptible, indivisible, different in essence, and eternal. Because of the comparison with Western theories, we quote Colebrooke's account:—

"The mote seen in a sunbeam is the smallest perceptible quantity. Being a substance and an effect, it must be composed of what is less than itself; and this likewise is a substance and effect, for the component part of a substance that has magnitude must be an effect. This, again, must be composed of what is smaller, and that smaller thing is an atom (anu). It is simple and uncomposed, else the series would be endless; and, were it pursued indefinitely, there would be no difference of magnitude between a mustard-seed and a mountain, a gnat and an elephant,

* 1. Dravya; 2. Guṇa; 3. Kārman; 4. Sāmānya; 5. Viśeṣa; 6. Samavāya; 7. Abhāva.

each alike containing an infinity of particles. The ultimate atom then is simple. The first compound consists of two atoms; for one does not enter into composition, and there is no argument to prove that more than two must for introduction be united. The next consists of three double atoms; for if only two were conjoined, magnitude would hardly ensue, since it must be produced either by size or number of particles; it cannot be their size, and therefore it must be their number. Nor is there any reason for assuming the union of four double atoms, since three suffice to originate magnitude. The atom then is reckoned to be the sixth part of a mote visible in a sunbeam. Two earthy atoms, concurring by an unseen peculiar virtue (*adrishta*), the creative will of God, or time, or other competent cause, constitute a double atom of earth; and by concourse of three binary atoms a tertiary atom is produced, and by concourse of four triple atoms a quaternary atom, and so on to a gross mass of earth: thus great earth is produced, and, in like manner, great water from aqueous atoms, &c. The qualities belonging to the effect are those which appertained to the primary particle, as its material cause; and conversely the qualities which belong to the cause are found in the effect.*

This is the full-blown atomic theory with which we are familiar in the early Greek schools, and later in the sounding hexameters of Lucretius. Compare the account given by Ueberweg in his *History of Philosophy* of the atomic theory of Leucippus and Democritus. Democritus described the primary atoms as infinite in number, indivisible (whence the name), different in shape, order, position and size, invisible and eternal. By their motions and combinations he explained the formation of the universe, making even the soul, unlike Kanāda, atomic in composition.† We mentioned before the Hindu notion of the similarity in nature of the perceiving organ and object perceived. With this compare a saying of Empedocles: "By the earthy element we perceive earth; by the watery, water; by the aerial, air; by fire, fire."‡

A very important Category is that of Quality. Kanāda's definition is, "That which has substance as its substratum, is without qualities, is not a cause of conjunction or disjunction as independent of them." With subsequent additions twenty-four are enumerated—fifteen material, eight intellectual, and one ambiguous. The fifteen properties of material substances are Colour, Savour, Odour,

* I., 298. † *History of Philosophy*, I., 69. ‡ Williams, p. 84, note.

Tangibility, Number, Dimension, Distinction, Conjunction, Disjunction, Priority, Posteriority, Weight, Fluidity, Viscidity, Sound. The qualities inherent in soul are Intelligence, Pleasure and Pain, Desire and Aversion, Volition, Virtue and Vice. The last is Faculty, which is said to belong partly to the material, partly to the spiritual, as velocity and elasticity to the former, as imagination to the latter. The relations of Substance and Quality are pursued to the last technicality. A doctrine is laid down and vindicated from all seeming exceptions. For example, Odour is said to be peculiar to the substance Earth. But you say, Is there not Odour in water and air? True, but there it is adventitious, and exists only in conjunction with earthy particles which are present. The exposition of the nature of Sound is not without interest. It is peculiar to the substance Ether and is apprehended by the hearing. "To account for sound originating in one place being heard in another, it is said that sound is propagated by undulation, wave after wave, radiating in every direction from a centre, like the blossoms of a Nauclea. It is not the first nor the intermediate wave that is the sound heard, but the last which moves in contact with the organ of hearing, and therefore it is not quite correct to say that a drum has been heard."* Many guesses at truth as shrewd as this might be quoted. The schools differ as to the eternity of Sound, the Mimamsakas affirming, the Naiyāyikas denying. The latter say that if eternal it could not be apprehended by human organs of sense. Number, Dimension, Distinction, Conjunction, Disjunction are universal. Number, Distinction, Priority and Posteriority spring from comparison. Among intellectual Qualities we may instance Volition, effort (*yatna*). Its occasion is desire or aversion, its reason perception. It seeks the pleasant, shuns the unpleasant. Another kind, imperceptible to sense, is inferred from the analogy of spontaneous acts, and comprises animal functions, having, for a cause, the vital unseen force. Virtue and Vice, or merit and demerit, are the result of Volition, and the cause of Pleasure and Pain. They are imperceptible, but inferred from reasoning. Faculty in the form of Imagination is "a peculiar quality of the soul, and is the cause of memory. It is the result of motion or recollection, and,

* Colebrooke, I., 305.

being excited, produces remembrance. The exciting cause is the recurrence of an association—that is, of the sight or other perception of a like object."

The fourth Category is Genus, and closely corresponds with our Genus and Species. It is described as "the cause of the perception of resemblance," eternal, one, yet concerning more than one thing. It applies to substances, qualities and actions. It exists in two degrees, higher and lower. The highest generality of all is existence, which can be predicated of everything. There is an Indian sect which denies all abstractions of this kind, maintaining that individuals only exist. The Vaishēshika does not think of genus as an abstraction or notion of the mind created for our convenience, but as something really existing, as real as the objects in which it inheres, though of course imperceptible to sense. We need not remind the reader of the exact likeness of these conceptions to conceptions familiar in controversies at home.

The fifth category, Individuality, is "the cause of the perception of exclusion." It pertains to particular and single objects only, rejecting the idea of community in every form. For this reason it is said to inhere in eternal substances only, not as genus in qualities and actions as well. The eternal substances in their imperceptible form only are absolutely individual, namely, mind, soul, time, place, ether, and the atoms of earth, water, light and air.

These specimens will serve to give an idea of Hindu methods of inquiry and reasoning. The difference between the Nyāya and Vaishēshika is mainly one of arrangement. The substance of both is the same, while the latter is an extension of the former. Thus the account of perception and the syllogism which comes under Gotama's second and seventh topics are discussed by Kanāda in his second category under the head of Intelligence. It will be apparent also that the system, while in great part treating of logic, includes also matters of psychology and physical science. The system in fact is intended to include the whole circle of philosophical knowledge (*omne scibile*). The distinctions and divisions are worthy of the days of scholasticism. And considering the period when the theories were elaborated and the methods pursued, we must wonder not only at the immense ingenuity and

ability manifested, but also at the amount of truth discovered.

What as to the final purpose of all this intricate and recondite speculation? In the Nyāya just as much as in the Sāṅkhya that purpose is religious. The student is to master these endless complications, these analyses and distinctions which seem to recede farther and farther back as you approach, in order that he may attain that which is the supreme desire of every Hindu soul, and the Indian equivalent of our "eternal life,"—the beatitude of final emancipation from separate existence, in short extinction or annihilation. The only way to this is right knowledge of the nature of the world and soul, and of this knowledge the Nyāya is the sum. The Indian philosopher laughs at the material means of worship and sacrifice proposed in Vēdas and Purānas. Even if by such steps the worshipper should rise to the highest place in the highest heaven, the throne of Brahma himself, he would still be as subject to the never-ending vicissitudes of transmigration as now. Only the firm grasp of absolute truth, to be attained by resolute application and intense study, will avail to raise the soul above the region of change to that identity with the absolute where birth and death, pain and pleasure, creation and destruction, and consciousness are not. We must prove this. Gotama treats of Emancipation under his second topic, Objects of Sense. He says, "Misery, birth, activity, fault, false notions : on the removal of these in turn (beginning with the last) there is the removal also of that which precedes it; then ensues final emancipation."* That is, being interpreted, false notions lead to faults of desire and aversion, these to activity, activity to virtue and vice, virtue and vice require successive births to expiate them, in these births virtue and vice are ever accumulating, of which misery is the consequence. Destroy false notions, and all these come to an end, the illusion in which man lives vanishes. A Naiyāyika commentator, Vātsyāyana, is quoted to the following effect:—"From false notion proceed partiality and prejudice; thence come the faults of detraction, envy, delusion, intoxication, pride, avarice. Acting with a body a person commits injury, theft, and unlawful sensualities, becomes harsh, false, and slanderous. This vicious activity produces demerit. To

* Williams, p. 75.

do acts of charity, &c., to be truthful, given to repetition of the Vêda, kind, disinterested, reverential, produces merit. This activity is the cause of vile and honourable births. Attendant on this is pain, comprising distress, trouble, disease, and sorrow. Emancipation is the cessation of all these."* Colebrooke's exposition is similar. He points out that truth, reality (*tattwa*), the essence of things, is only to be known through science, which must be acquired by assiduous thought and meditation. This then is the highest kind and way of salvation known to Hindus. On such a plan how few would be the saved! Salvation is only for philosophers, for perfect logicians and metaphysicians. For the rest there is no escape from the weary cycle of transmigration. And the nature of the salvation is such as to strip it of all charm or attraction for the multitude. We repeat that to overlook this special purpose of Indian philosophies would be a fatal error. To us they are only logical or psychological, to the Hindu they are more.

We showed that the Sâṅkhya theory was avowedly atheistic in its conception of the world. The Nyâya is not much better. It is true that Gotama postulates the Supreme as well as individual soul, and allows the Vêdas as an authoritative source of knowledge. But having done this he makes no use of the admission, and it is hard to see the purpose for which it is introduced, except to avert the charge of atheism. His theory goes on independently, and, indeed, leaves no room for creation. Both he and Kanâda speak on the subject in such a way as to leave commentators in doubt. Just as Kapila evolves everything from eternal matter and spirit, so Gotama and Kanâda make the primary atoms on one side and souls on the other eternal. The office of the Supreme soul seems to be to bring these together as well as to combine the original material atoms, though others ascribe this to *Adrishta*, Fate, Force. But disciples of the latter school are earnest in maintaining its theistic character. One of these, Udayanâchârya, wrote an interesting treatise called *Kusumânjali*, to prove the Divine existence on *Vaishêshika* principles. The work has been edited and translated by Professor Cowell, Calcutta, 1864. A brief extract is given by Professor Williams, and other extracts are contained in

* Williams, I. 311.

the Appendix to Dr. Muir's Sanskrit Texts, Part III. The form of the arguments and many of the objections and arguments themselves are peculiarly adapted to the Hindu mind. It is often, therefore, difficult for us to see their relevancy and bearing; but this may be said with equal truth of German transcendentalists. The explanation which a Hindu would give, like that which the Germans give, might not be flattering to us. But some of the arguments are those with which we have been long familiar. "An omniscient and indestructible Being is to be proved from the existence of effects, from the combination of atoms, from the support of the earth in the sky, from traditional arts, from belief in revelation, from the Vêda, from its sentences, from particular numbers. Comment: The earth must have had a maker, because it is an effect like a jar. Combination is an action, and therefore the action implied in the junction of two atoms at the beginning of a creation must be from the volition of an intelligent being. The world depends upon some being who wills to hinder it from falling, like a stick supported by a bird in the air. The traditional arts now current, as that of cloth-making, must have proceeded from an intelligent being. The knowledge derived from the Vêda is derived from a virtue residing in its cause, because it is true knowledge."* From Dr. Muir's extracts we epitomise an argument which might have force for one who receives the whole Hindu cosmogony. It is objected that there is no proof of God, because emancipation may be gained independently by following the instructions of the Vêda. But, it is replied, the Vêda itself must have come from an intelligent being who understood its meaning, and not as some say from some unconscious breathing. True, but this may have been a created being, and its only authority that which arises from its reception by competent persons. But, the answer is, there have been successive creations and dissolutions, and at each creation the Vêda arose possessed of plenary authority, which it could have derived from no existing persons. Besides, only an omniscient being can be an object of perfect confidence.

In connection, however, with the bearing of this work

* Williams, p. 87.

on the theistic character of the Nyāya theory, it must be remembered that the author is a later follower, and can only give us his version of Gotama's original teaching. What is certain is that the system is essentially dualistic, positing two eternal substances apart from God. Pantheism comes out in explicit and complete development in the third system, Védantism, the consideration of which must be reserved for a future opportunity.

ART. V.—*The Prose Works of William Wordsworth*. For the first time Collected, with Additions from unpublished Manuscripts. Edited, with Preface, Notes, and Illustrations, by the Rev. ALEXANDER B. GROSBART, St. George's, Blackburn, Lancashire. In Three Volumes. London: Edward Moxon, Son and Co., 1, Amen Corner, Paternoster Row. 1876.

Who has not heard it debated whether William Wordsworth was or was not the original of Robert Browning's fine dramatic lyric *The Lost Leader*? If there be such an one, be it now known to him that the question has been asked over and over again, answered in the affirmative, answered in the negative, and, up to the present time, or rather up to the time of the issue of the three volumes now before us, left in doubt. Now, however, there is no longer any doubt, for Browning has spoken once for all; and Wordsworth *was* the "lost leader." Of what? Presumably of the infinitesimally small minority who, at the beginning of this century, stood in the forefront and led the forlorn hope in the struggle for "universal brotherhood,"—the band which lost its last great leader when Shelley's boat went down in the Gulf of Spezzia, leaving Wordsworth the one Englishman who might have gone on with the work.

"Just for a handful of silver he left us,
Just for a riband to stick in his coat,"—

says Browning's spokesman, an impersonation or representative man speaking for that band which numbers the great ones of modern civilization :

"Shakespeare was of us, Milton was for us,
Burns, Shelley, were with us,—they watch from their graves!
He alone breaks from the van and the freemen,
He alone sinks to the rear and the slaves!"

What! Wordsworth sink to the rear and the slaves?
Well, so it is written. Let us first hear the living poet's

avowal and qualification, and then examine the facts of the case. Mr. Grosart, the Editor of Wordsworth's Prose Works, seems to have written to headquarters for a solution of this point; and the following is the reply:—

"19, Warwick Crescent, W., Feb. 24, 1875.

"DEAR MR. GROSART,

"I have been asked the question you now address me with, and as duly answered it, I can't remember how many times: there is no sort of objection to one more assurance, or rather confession, on my part, that I *did* in my hasty youth presume to use the great and venerated personality of Wordsworth as a sort of painter's model: one from which this or the other particular feature may be selected and turned to account: had I intended more, above all such a boldness as portraying the entire man, I should not have talked about 'handfuls of silver and bits of riband.' These never influenced the change of politics in the great poet; whose defection, nevertheless, accompanied as it was by a regular face-about of his special party, was, to my juvenile apprehension, and even mature consideration, an event to deplore. But just as in the tapestry on my wall I can recognize figures which have *struck out* a fancy, on occasion, that though truly enough thus derived, yet would be preposterous as a copy, so, though I dare not deny the original of my little poem, I altogether refuse to have it considered as the 'very effigies' of such a moral and intellectual superiority.

"Faithfully yours,

"ROBERT BROWNING."

It is not strange that Browning, always an ardent lover of Shelley, the child and fullest spiritual embodiment in England of the French Revolution, should, forty years ago, have regarded Wordsworth's defection as a grave calamity to what he deemed the cause of spiritual and political emancipation in this country, and should still, in his mature age, think of that defection as a thing to be deplored; but how great was the breach between the Wordsworth of 1793 and the Wordsworth of half a century later we have never been in so good a position as now to estimate.

It is well known that the future poet laureate went over to Paris to watch personally the workings of the uprising in the mind of man which had centralized itself there, and which eventually gave place to those terrible scenes that have served to throw horror on the whole movement; but

it is only now, after the lapse of eighty-three years, that the public can judge how wholly the young man's splendid intellect and fine moral nature had felt the intense significance of the Revolution, and how imperturbably his great humane spirit was able to stand amid the atrocious concomitants of the movement, and survey the central questions at issue in their true bearings. It seems that Bishop Watson, in publishing a sober sermon, affixed thereto an appendix specially aimed against republicanism, and intended to keep people generally in their places; and in the year 1793 William Wordsworth addressed a letter to his Lordship,—a long letter evidently meant to be published as a tract,—but which has remained in manuscript until now. The title written on the fly-leaf of this manuscript, by the author himself, is "A Letter to the Bishop of Llandaff on the Extraordinary Avowal of his Political Principles, contained in the Appendix to his late Sermon: by a Republican."

In this letter, placed at the beginning of the series of Wordsworth's prose works, the principles of republicanism are defended in the broadest and most unshrinking manner; and the action taken by the Bishop of Llandaff, which aimed to exalt to a high pitch the British Constitution, and to make the people satisfied with their own position and privileges, is censured in a vein of austere denunciation most remarkable in an enthusiastic republican of twenty-three years. It is not strange that the author should have consented to hold unpublished a letter which it would certainly have been dangerous at that time of day to issue authenticated with his signature, and which would have done no great good to the cause espoused had it appeared simply as the work of "A Republican." A tract attacking hereditary authority, espousing manhood suffrage, stigmatizing the law of primogeniture, disallowing titles and pageants, pronouncing government "at best but a necessary evil," and accusing a high dignitary of a State church of aiming at a "detestable object" by means "criminal," "dangerous," and "insidious,"—such a tract would have afforded ample grounds for personal persecution; and it was discreet enough in our young republican to keep from the press such homely rhetoric as that in which he accuses the Bishop of duplicity: "In some parts of England," he writes, "it is quaintly said, when a drunken

man is seen reeling towards his home, that he has business on both sides of the road. Observing your Lordship's tortuous path, the spectators will be far from insinuating that you have partaken of Mr. Burke's intoxicating bowl; they will content themselves, shaking their heads as you stagger along, with remarking that you have business on both sides of the road."

Browning's letter to Mr. Grosart shows pretty clearly that he had no intention of accusing Wordsworth of having "business on both sides of the road;" and we should gather no such intention from the sonnet addressed to Wordsworth aged forty-five, by Shelley at the age of twenty-three, and published in that little volume which first gave the world unmistakeable evidence that a great poet was among us in the person of an ardent young republican,—*Alastor and Other Poems*. Shelley's sonnet, addressing Wordsworth as "Poet of Nature," is solemn and earnest in its tone, and expresses a heartfelt grief at the loss sustained by the cause so dear to the young poet, but conveys no imputation as to the genuineness of the elder poet's motives; and we presume no one would be so bold as to insinuate that the "handful of silver" gained by allegiance to the established form of government had any weight in determining the course of "such a moral and intellectual superiority" as Wordsworth unquestionably was, whether espousing the republican or any other cause. No writer can help his political opinions, and no man can honestly desist from acting on any change which the years may work in such opinions; and when we record our belief that Wordsworth changed his, there is no longer any necessity to say that we hold him wholly justified in the defection deplored by Shelley as the representative of certain opinions, and dramatized by Browning in *The Lost Leader*. Of course Wordsworth acted, as he wrote, from conviction; and conviction with him was no mere matter of an hour or two's deliberation, no impulsive rush of new sentiment determined by internal and incalculable causes, but the result of deep continuous meditation, intensified by face-to-face contact with nature, and sustained by a mental equipment of the first order.

The next work which Mr. Grosart has placed in the "political and ethical" division of these volumes is a reprint of the celebrated essay generally known as the

"Convention of Cintra," of which the whole title runs thus:—"Concerning the Relations of Great Britain, Spain, and Portugal to each other and the Common Enemy, at this Crisis; and Specifically as Affected by the Convention of Cintra: the whole brought to the Test of those Principles by which alone Independence and Freedom of Nations can be Preserved or Recovered." This treatise, published in 1809, has long become difficult to meet with; but Bishop Wordsworth was quite mistaken when he said, in the *Memoirs* of the poet, "There is scarcely any volume published in this country which is so difficult to be met with as the tract on the Convention of Cintra." We have ourselves seen several copies of it, and can by no means regard it as a fresh book coming up for judgment, "with the unimpaired freshness of a new work." However, the "tract" is a splendid work, and ought to be read with profound interest and high enjoyment by a fresh generation of readers.

The Letter to Major-General Pasley on his *Military Policy and Institutions of Great Britain* is another reprint, derived from Bishop Wordsworth's *Memoirs*, and already well known; but Mr. Grosart has been enabled to add an interesting letter of some two-and-a-half pages, enclosing the other to some friend unspecified.

The Two Addresses to the Freeholders of Westmoreland, which follow the last-named letters, were printed at Kendal, in 1818, and have become extremely scarce; but even this pamphlet was by no means unknown to students of Wordsworth, and cannot be regarded as a new candidate for public favour. How much Wordsworth's Addresses may have weighed in the three defeats which Lord Brougham (then *Mr. Brougham*) sustained in contesting the representation of Westmoreland, it were bootless to attempt to estimate; but no doubt the powerful invective and strong argumentative eloquence of the poet turned local politician had a considerable effect on the minds of the constituency, both through the medium of the local newspaper, in which portions of the tract first appeared, and through the less ephemeral pages of the tract itself.

The letter of 1829, on the Catholic Relief Bill, addressed to the Bishop of London, and now printed for the first time, is altogether a less notable thing than either of the compositions preceding it: it opposes a cold, hard, calculating resistance to the measure then before the nation,

and shows Wordsworth in a very different view from that of either of the other essays. Even in argument it is less remarkable than the letter on the French Revolution, and it wants altogether the fine poetic indignation of that of the tract on the Convention of Cintra, and of the Addresses to the Westmoreland Freeholders. But it is still a clear and well-argued essay, however little it may add to the lustre of Wordsworth's fame. Indeed this opposition to a measure so necessary to the cause of Freedom of Conscience will go far to shake the confidence of the Liberal school in a really noble poet and thinker, whose works cannot but be beneficial to every class of readers before whom they are brought. It seems preposterous that a man of such wealth of intellect, and with such antecedents as Wordsworth had to own to in 1829, should have opposed such a granite front to the admission of persons of any creed whatsoever to participation in civil rights of any kind; and while he might without reproach "trust" that it was "the intention of Providence that the Church of Rome should in due time disappear," it must surely be a reproach to him that he could not see how the cause of freedom, once so wholly dear to him, was to benefit by the removal of all civil disabilities attaching to any creed. For this reason it might have been better for this letter to have been withheld; but probably the poet's legal representatives and the editor of his prose works see no reproach in it. It is somewhat strange, however, that he should himself have retained in manuscript two such diametrically opposite compositions as the letters to the Bishop of Llandaff and the Bishop of London,—likely to discount him with two opposite and vast sections of society,—and that he should not have cared to destroy either of them.

Mr. Grosart's "Ethical" division consists entirely of reprints, mostly on the subject of education. Perhaps the best (and best-known) of this division of essays is the piece which the editor vaguely describes as an Appendix to the Poems published in 1835, and which he prints under the title "Of Legislation for the Poor, the Working Classes, and the Clergy." And here, be it duly set down, though well known, that Wordsworth was one of the earliest pioneers of the essentially modern movement known as the co-operative movement; in this very Appendix he

pointed to it as the remedy for the standing differences between capital and labour; and we must not be so ungenerous as to doubt whether he would so warmly have espoused this popular cause if he could have foreseen the grave alteration of the social face of things which it has already effected, and the final results threatened to the higher civilization of the age by the eventual transfer of an enormous power into the hands of the uneducated and half-educated masses of the community. We should be interested to know whether Mr. Grosart has Wordsworth's authority for the title under which he now disguises this essay, or whether he took upon himself to rechristen it as he did the letter to the Bishop of Llandaff. The essay is, in fact, the "Postscript" to *Yarrow Revisited, and Other Poems*; and why that fact should have been ignored or slurred over with the vague statement that it was an Appendix to Poems published in 1835, we cannot guess. In these matters, however, Mr. Grosart is either very careless or wilfully and provokingly secretive, for again in giving us in this same "ethical" group Wordsworth's speech on laying the foundation stone of a new school in the village of Bowness, a ceremony performed in 1836, our editor tells us at page xxiii. that the speech is reprinted from a Kendal newspaper, and then says at page xxix. that all the pieces marked with a star, *of which this is one*, are published in this collection for the first time.

The second volume of the three now before us, described by the editor as "æsthetical and literary," contains extremely little that is new; but the admirable essay upon Epitaphs, originally printed in Coleridge's *Friend*, is supplemented by two no less admirable from the author's manuscripts, essays also intended for the *Friend*, but said to be now published for the first time. One is headed "The Country Church-yard, and Critical Examination of Ancient Epitaphs," the other, "Celebrated Epitaphs Considered." These two papers, like the other, are full of a sweet contemplativeness and simple beauty of diction that make them a really poetic addition to Wordsworth's works. We read, for instance, towards the close of the second of these new essays, the following passage suggestive of the immortal Ode on Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood:—

"In an obscure corner of a country church-yard I once espied,

half overgrown with hemlock and nettles, a very small stone laid upon the ground, bearing nothing more than the name of the deceased, with date of birth and death, importing that it was an infant which had been born one day and died the following. I know not how far the reader may be in sympathy with me; but more awful thoughts of rights conferred, of hopes awakened, of remembrances stealing away or vanishing, were imparted to my mind by that inscription there before my eyes than by any other that it has ever been my lot to meet with upon a tombstone."—Vol. II. pp. 72, 73.

Among the "Essays, Letters, and Notes Elucidatory and Confirmatory of the Poems," which form a considerable part of this "æsthetical and literary" volume appear the celebrated letters to Sir George Beaumont, given in the Wordsworth Memoirs; and here again the editor has been at some pains to leave the public in a fog as to the amount of new matter published: this whole section of letters is marked with a star to "designate publication herein for the first time," and then the following footnote is given:—

"The Beaumont Letters are given from the originals, and in many cases, as elsewhere, contain important additions and corrections."

Here are two different statements: the fact is the footnote is to some extent true, though the importance of the additions may be questioned; while the star, which is said to indicate first publication, is simply false, as regards the mass of these letters. Tricks like this, to give an appearance of novelty to reprinted matter, and hoodwink the unreasoning readers who hate reprints, are an insult to the memory of a great truth-loving and truth-speaking spirit like Wordsworth; and it is strange that Mr. Grosart had not learnt better than this before he set about his task.

Beside what we have already mentioned, the second volume contains the *Guide to the Lakes*, and the letters from the *Morning Post* concerning the proposed Kendal and Windermere Railway,—letters taking just such a view of the question of railway extension in the Lake District as Mr. Ruskin has of late so vigorously put forward. These republications call for no special remark; and we may pass to the consideration of the third volume, which, as far as regards new matter, is the most important of the

three for lovers of Wordsworth's verse; and after all it must ever be as a poet and not as a prose-writer that he will hold his own amongst the great men of this century, his prose being more valuable as complementary to his poetry than from any other point of view.

The notes and illustrations of the poems, occupying the first 216 pages of the third volume, are of the greatest interest and importance. Beside the notes collected from the first and successive editions to the poems, we have here at last the whole of the "I. F. MSS." These MSS., written down by Miss Fenwick from Wordsworth's dictation, have been used in a fragmentary way in the Memoirs; but we now have them, if we may take literally what the editor says, "completely and in integrity;" and although the whole collection of notes should, properly speaking, be distributed over a worthy edition of Wordsworth's *poetical* works, all students of this great poet will be but too glad to get them in any shape whatever, and even if they come "in such a questionable form," or rather with such questionable accompaniments, as to throw upon the student the needless labour of finding out for himself what are the proportions borne by the mass of the old notes to the present mass as enlarged by the issue of the I. F. MSS. "completely and in integrity." One would have supposed that such a labour was not very arduous: nor would it be, if the person performing it happened to know by heart the whole two bulky volumes of the Memoirs, wherein Bishop Wordsworth had already drawn upon the I. F. MSS. for highly interesting and valuable material, or even if one happened to have ascertained already with precision how much had been added in those volumes to Wordsworth's own previously published notes. But, as a matter of fact, the work of checking Mr. Grosart in his curious statements as to novelty is so serious as not to be worth the while of anyone but an editor engaged upon a final edition of Wordsworth's poetry, to embody all notes by Wordsworth that could be raked together from all sources, and who might wish to specify properly the printed source of every note. For here, again, we have Mr. Grosart's asterisks doing twofold and barely reconcileable duties: at the head of the Contents of Vol. III. (p. v.) he says, "A star [*] designates publication herein *for the first time*;" but in a note facing page 3, he says concerning the "Notes and Illustrations of the Poems," that "the star [*] marks those

that belong to the I. F. MSS." It follows that, as portions of the I. F. MSS. have appeared in the *Memoirs*, either the star does not always designate notes that belong to those MSS., or does not designate publication for the first time. We leave Mr. Grosart and the more critical readers whom his editing is so well framed to mystify, to pursue the discussion of these points, trivial in themselves, but so significant in their issue of honesty or the reverse, while we content ourselves with culling a few noble passages bestarred in this collection without any curious scrutiny which of the two contradictory meanings may be attached to the asterisk, or even whether it be altogether delusive.

All will remember those beautiful lines which stand at the front of Wordsworth's collected poems—

"If thou indeed derive thy light from heaven," etc.,

the imagery of which is derived from the contemplation of the stars differing from one another in glory, and the moral of which is that the poet should shine in his place "and be content." Perhaps no man of gifts comparable to Wordsworth's ever strove so earnestly to shine as he thought it his duty to shine, and no otherwise, in that place which he conceived to be his. A gifted lady who knew him when alive, and who, by-the-by, is mentioned in these very "I. F." notes, observed to us once that Wordsworth did try very hard not to be a poet; and truly we think he did not always rightly judge the place to shine in, and was sometimes too easily satisfied with a certain quality of shining,—what Mr. Lowell might call a "middling shini-ness,"—that was uncommonly like an attempt to suppress the higher poetic element in him. But he shone so lustroously on so many occasions, and irradiated with the light of his great intellect so many dismal places, that these particular lines must ever remain peculiarly dear, and anything he has left concerning their genesis must have a wider interest than will attach to the general run of even the I. F. MSS. "in their integrity." It is, therefore, with great pleasure that we read the following note:—

"These verses were written some time after we had become resident at Rydal Mount; and I will take occasion from them to observe upon the beauty of that situation, as being backed and

flanked by lofty falls, which bring the heavenly bodies to touch, as it were, the earth upon the mountain-tops, while the prospect in front lies open to a length of level valley, the extended lake, and a terminating ridge of low hills; so that it gives an opportunity to the inhabitants of the place of noticing the stars in both the positions here alluded to, namely, on the tops of the mountains, and as winter-lamps at a distance among the leafless trees."—Vol. III. p. 3.

There are numerous gems of poetic prose such as this got together in this third volume of Wordsworth's Prose Works, and doubtless many of them really appear here and nowhere else, notwithstanding the pains Mr. Grosart has been at to shake our faith in his method of distinguishing what is new from what is old and to be found elsewhere. It is delightful to learn from the poet himself who Barbara Lewthwaite was, how beautiful her mother and sister looked in the single coffin wherein they travelled "the dark road," how Barbara was not really the little girl whom the poet overheard "as engaged in the poem" of *The Pet Lamb*, and how vain Barbara became on finding her name in the poem, which, to the mortification of the poet, found its way into Grasmere school, in a book compiled by Lindley Murray. The small sermon which Wordsworth appends to these particulars (Vol. III. p. 21) against the use of names of persons still alive, for purposes similar to that for which he used Barbara Lewthwaite's name, is less delightful than the particulars themselves,—and, we may add, less likely to be efficacious in rebuking human frailty than the method chosen for that purpose in some of the other notes. For example, it is a pity that the late Samuel Rogers is not here to see the note at p. 171 on the *Lines suggested by a Portrait from the Pencil of F. Stone*. Wordsworth states positively that the anecdote in those lines of the monk saying in sight of Titian's picture of the Last Supper, in the Escorial,—

"I not seldom gaze
Upon this solemn company unmoved
By shock of circumstance or lapse of years,
Until I cannot but believe that they—
They are in truth the substance, we the shadows,"

was told in his house by Wilkie, and that Southey trans-

ferred the story to the Doctor; "but," he adds, "it is not easy to explain how my friend Mr. Rogers, in a note subsequently added to his *Italy*, was led to speak of the same remarkable words having many years before been spoken in his hearing by a monk or priest in front of a picture placed over a refectory-table in a convent at Padua."

One of the most interesting notes in this collection is that upon the beautiful poem *We are Seven*, and includes particulars as to the genesis of that masterpiece of high art, Coleridge's *Ancient Mariner*. The little girl who figures in *We are Seven* was met, it seems, by Wordsworth "within the area of Goderich Castle, in the year 1798;" but the poem was not written till the spring of 1798, when Wordsworth and Coleridge were together at Alfoxden on that memorable tour, concerning which a most graphic record has been printed, but not published, by the Rev. W. L. Nichols,* of Woodlands, near Bridgwater.

"In reference to this poem," says Wordsworth, "I will here mention one of the most remarkable facts in my own poetic history, and that of Mr. Coleridge. In the spring of the year 1798, he, my sister, and myself, started from Alfoxden pretty late in the afternoon, with a view to visit Linton, and the Valley of Stones near to it; and as our united funds were very small, we agreed to defray the expense of the tour by writing a poem, to be sent to the *New Monthly Magazine*, set up by Phillips, the bookseller, and edited by Dr. Aikin. Accordingly we set off, and proceeded along the Quantock Hills, towards Watchet; and in the course of this walk was planned the poem of the *Ancient Mariner*, founded on a dream, as Mr. Coleridge said, of his friend Mr. Cruikshank. Much the greatest part of the story was Mr. Coleridge's invention; but certain parts I myself suggested; for example, some crime was to be committed which would bring upon the Old Navigator, as Coleridge afterwards delighted to call him, the spectral persecution, as a consequence of that crime and his own wanderings. I had been reading in Shelvocke's *Voyages*, a day or two before, that, while doubling Cape Horn, they frequently saw albatrosses in that latitude, the largest sort of sea-fowl, some extending their wings twelve or thirteen feet. 'Suppose,' said I, 'you represent him as having killed one of these birds on entering the South Sea, and that the tutelary spirits of these regions take upon them to avenge the crime.' The incident

* "The Quantocks and their Associations." A paper read before the Bath Literary Club on the 11th December, 1871. By the Rev. W. L. Nichols, M.A., F.S.A., Bath. Printed for private circulation. 1873.

was thought fit for the purpose, and adopted accordingly. I also suggested the navigation of the ship by the dead men, but do not recollect that I had anything more to do with the scheme of the poem. The gloss with which it was subsequently accompanied was not thought of by either of us at the time, at least not a hint of it was given to me, and I have no doubt it was a gratuitous after-thought. We began the composition together, on that, to me, memorable evening: I furnished two or three lines at the beginning of the poem, in particular—

'And listen'd like a three years' child;
The Mariner had his will.'—Vol. III. pp. 16, 17.

The two points in the scheme of the poem claimed by Wordsworth as his suggestions are very important contributions from the point of view of imagination; and we are not surprised at his wishing to put on record the fact that he was instrumental in adding to that wonderful composition something more than the two fine lines,—

"And thou art long, and lank, and brown,
As is the ribbed sea sand,"—

for which Coleridge gave him credit as long ago as 1817, in a note stating that the poem was "planned, and in part composed," on a walk "from Nether Stowey to Dulverton, with him and his sister, in the autumn of 1797." What may have been lost by the abandonment of the partnership in composition, it is bootless to guess; and we can but admire the modesty with which Wordsworth says, "As we endeavoured to proceed conjointly (I speak of the same evening), our respective manners proved so widely different, that it would have been quite presumptuous in me to do anything but separate from an undertaking upon which I could only have been a clog." It certainly would have been very curious, had Wordsworth, or anyone else, found it possible to preserve a mind in harmony with his who was engaged on the production of a work so wholly unique as *The Ancient Mariner*; and while it doubtless benefited from the suggestions for the scheme, and from the few lines adopted by Coleridge from his sometime coadjutor, it must also have gained in harmony of tone from that modesty which induced the author of *We are Seven* and *The Idiot Boy* to withdraw his co-operation. Wordsworth continues his account of the transaction thus:—

"The 'Ancient Mariner' grew and grew till it became too important for our first object, which was limited to our expecta-

tion of five pounds; and we began to talk of a volume which was to consist, as Mr. Coleridge has told the world, of poems chiefly on natural subjects, taken from common life, but looked at, as much as might be, through an imaginative medium. Accordingly I wrote 'The Idiot Boy,' 'Her Eyes are Wild,' &c., and 'We are Seven,' 'The Thorn,' and some others. To return to 'We are Seven,' the piece that called forth this note:—I composed it while walking in the Grove of Alfoxden. My friends will not deem it too trifling to relate, that while walking to and fro, I composed the last stanza first, having begun with the last line.* When it was all but finished, I came in and recited it to Mr. Coleridge and my sister, and said, 'A prefatory stanza must be added, and I should sit down to our little tea-meal with greater pleasure if my task was finished.' I mentioned in substance what I wished to be expressed, and Coleridge immediately threw off the stanza, thus:

'A little child, dear brother Jem.'

I objected to the rhyme, 'dear brother Jem,' as being ludicrous; but we all enjoyed the joke of hitching in our friend James Tobin's name, who was familiarly called Jem."—*Ibid.*, pp. 17, 18.

Whether Coleridge was poking fun at his friend covertly, as well as enjoying the overt joke with him, is too wild a question even to be entertained; but it seems to be quite certain that "Jem" himself apprehended the most serious consequences from the publication of *We are Seven*; and, as regards the stormy reception which the *Lyrical Ballads* got at the hands of the British press, his forebodings were by no means ill-founded. It seems he warned Wordsworth on the subject; and the conclusion of this autobiographic note is very characteristic:—

"The said Jem got a sight of the 'Lyrical Ballads' as it was going through the press at Bristol, during which time I was residing in that city. One evening he came to me with a grave face, and said, 'Wordsworth, I have seen the volume that Coleridge and you are about to publish. There is one poem in it which I earnestly entreat you will cancel, for, if published, it will make you everlastingly ridiculous.' I answered, that I felt much obliged by the interest he took in my good name as a writer, and begged to know what was the unfortunate piece he alluded to. He said, 'It is called "We are Seven."' 'Nay,' said I, 'that shall take its chance, however;' and he left me in despair."—*Ibid.*, p. 18.

* Not, perhaps, too "trifling," but almost too funny to receive with the gravity befitting the occasion.

We should probably not be far wrong in assuming that either Jem, or any other man, who might have been interested to persuade Wordsworth to cancel any poem he had sent to the press, would have had to leave him, in like manner, in despair; for, right or wrong, he was never wanting in "the courage of his opinions."

These notes are often more curiously and provocatively realistic than those passages in Wordsworth's poetry that lay him most open to the charge of being bathetic; and the besetting sin of his verse, that laudable desire to set everything right by recounting his own experiences and impressions, and basing small lectures on the same, is still more notably the besetting sin of these notes. For instance, we turn to a new note (at least to a note marked by Mr. Grosart with an asterisk "denoting publication herein for the first time") on *The White Doe of Rylstone*, and are interested to learn where and on what occasion that fine poem was composed. Also we find something beautiful in the apology to Mrs. Wordsworth, solemnly recorded, for having often made her uncomfortable by keeping the dinner waiting when "on a visit to her eldest brother," at Stockton-upon-Tees, where the poem had birth. "I here beg her pardon," says the poet, "for this and similar transgressions, during the whole course of our wedded life. To my beloved sister the same apology is due." This was uttered when Wordsworth was over seventy-two years old; and the unkindly disposed might think that he ought to have found out that an apology was due at least a quarter of a century earlier, so as to avoid at all events twenty-five years' arrears of apologies so near the end. But probably the right assumption will be that Mrs. and Miss Wordsworth concealed, in the most exemplary way, their annoyance at the free exercise of the husband's and brother's right of overturning domestic arrangements, and sacrificing the *minutiae* of household law on the shrine of Poesy and Nature. For our own part we must think he exaggerated the extent of his delinquency in this regard; but perhaps the solemn apology is intended as a warning to other poets who fear the Muse, and have little terror of keeping the dinner waiting. At all events there can be no question as to the didactic tendency of the passage immediately following the apology, in the same note on *The White Doe* :—

"It may be worth while to note as a caution to others who

may cast their eyes on these memoranda, that the skin having been rubbed off my heel by my wearing too tight a shoe, though I desisted from walking, I found that the irritation of the wounded part was kept up by the act of composition, to a degree that made it necessary to give my constitution a holiday. A rapid cure was the consequence.

"Poetic excitement, when accompanied by protracted labour in composition, has throughout my life brought on more or less bodily derangement. Nevertheless I am at the close of my seventy-third year, in what may be called excellent health. So that intellectual labour is not necessarily unfavourable to longevity. But perhaps I ought here to add, that mine has been generally carried on out of doors."—*Ibid.*, p. 123.

No one will dispute the soundness of the advice given or implied in these two paragraphs; and indeed the tone of Wordsworth's writings throughout, whether in verse or in prose, is always, of course, innocuous, in general actively wholesome, while his work is frequently beautiful to a high degree, and sometimes sublime. But we doubt whether these passages and scraps, exhibiting him merely as a harmless egotist, will contribute to the lustre of that fame which should be for ever the fame of such a poet as left no one to fill any sphere approaching in magnitude that which he had filled since the beginning of the century. When the old laureate passed away, and left it possible for the new laureate to take—

"The laurel greener from the head
Of him who uttered nothing base,"

those words meant much: there is solid gold in all that Wordsworth ever did, we firmly believe; but, at the same time, a little gold was sometimes made to go a long way with him; and, though there was never any counterfeiting of any other kind of goods than what he offered, still there were times when the refiner's fire and the goldsmith's hammer might have come into use with great advantage. Unquestionably he carried English song some steps along on its glorious way, and showed us, as Shelley and Keats and Coleridge showed us, new possibilities of beautiful form and new achievements of perfect work: unquestionably he helped most valiantly in the development of English thought, and specially of English philanthropy; and unquestionably he preached to some solid result, even in the matter of remodelling institutions that needed such

help badly enough. In these three volumes lying before us, we have, gathered up for the first time, the record of his doings in a walk very different from that wherein he is best known,—wherein he will always be best known. But we have here also much that adds nothing to his fame,—much that is barely, if at all, worth preserving; and when a man can sweep the strings of the lyre, and sound the depths of thought and feeling to such splendid result as Wordsworth did, it does him but scant honour to put together all the shreds and patches Mr. Grosart has cobbled in with the nobler and more characteristic relics it has been given him to add to the recognised works of this truly great poet and intellectual giant.

- ART. VI.—1. *The Doctrine of Retribution.*** Eight Lectures Preached before the University of Oxford, in the Year 1875, on the Foundation of the late John Bampton, M.A., Canon of Salisbury. By WILLIAM JACKSON, M.A., F.S.A. (formerly Fellow of Worcester College), Author of "*The Philosophy of Natural Theology*," "*Positivism*," "*Right and Wrong*," &c. London: Hodder and Stoughton, Paternoster Row.
- 2. *Life in Christ: a Study of the Scripture Doctrine on the Nature of Man, the Object of the Incarnation, and the Conditions of Human Immortality.*** By EDWARD WHITE, Author of "*The Mystery of Growth*," &c. London: Elliot Stock, 62, Paternoster Row.

THESE two works are placed side by side at the head of this paper on the principle that the bane and the antidote should go together. Not that either of them was written with the other in view. They appeared almost simultaneously as the productions of men working in entire independence of each other and on very different lines. In the latter the doctrine of man's natural immortality is formally assailed, and, in the author's opinion at least, successfully dislodged from whatever defences it may have found either in philosophy or theology. Immortality is regarded as a gracious boon only conferred on Christian believers, and all who are not evangelised on earth or in Hades await, in accordance with the Destructionist theory, the final extinction of their being. In the former the subject is viewed in the light of reason alone: a futurity affording a sufficient sphere for the bestowal of rewards and punishments, is sought to be demonstrated from the constitution and course of human nature; and although endlessness is not asserted to be an indispensable feature, yet the impression left upon the mind is that without it futurity would fail to furnish scope for issues so tremendous as must hang on the possession of the prerogatives of moral being. The views propounded in the latter volume, whatever else they may entail, compel us to abridge enormously the original endowments of mankind. It is true that in compensation for that loss a stupendous

achievement is assigned to the supernal influences revealed by Christianity, nothing less in fact than the addition of an eternity of being as well as blessedness to creatures previously mortal. And it is hoped that the excision from the Christian creed of a doctrine so repugnant to human sympathies as that of eternal punishment will go far to reconcile men to the acceptance of the rest. But we very much fear that the sacrifice of the important dogma of our natural immortality will scarcely tend to prepare the mind for the vast demands of those who make immortality the gift of Christ. The perpetuity of bliss which is bliss indeed, was our original birthright. To give up that is to lay Natural Theology in ruins, and vain is the hope that its disjointed materials will serve to construct a grander edifice of Revealed Theology.

While the aggrandisement of Christianity is thus by one of these two authors vainly sought in the destruction of all Natural Religion, its real glory does not by any means suffer at the hands of the other by comparison with that lesser light to which he points his readers. Natural Religion is with him the handmaid, not the rival, of Revealed: it is the porch which partakes of the dignity and prepares for the service of the temple, without pretending to serve as its substitute or to trench on its claims. He holds that our nature of itself bears witness for God, and notwithstanding its lapse from a state of innocence and purity, contains a revelation of God that can never be blotted out. The Scriptures themselves not only admit but proclaim the same truth. They everywhere assume a moral accountability in those to whom they are addressed, and with that a sphere for the realisation of its issues. It may be that the Scriptures also undertake to explain the fact of the continued maintenance of moral accountability and probation, of moral government in fact, in spite of the deterioration of the race. They do explain how such a thing is possible, on the ground that what appears to be the light of nature is in reality the common grace which by the Spirit of God is everywhere diffused, even where the truths of Redemption are not known. They also explain how the upholding of God's moral government in such circumstances is to be justified, inasmuch as the whole race participates in the economy of Redemption, and is subject to the mediatorial sway of Christ. But these are explanations that do not at all interfere with the proper

business of the natural theologian. He takes human nature as he finds it everywhere and collects its common characteristics, whether exhibited within or beyond the range of the Church's institutions and influences. The facts he discovers prove the race as a race to be capable of relations with its Maker, and, whether satisfactorily or not, to be actually sustaining relations to Him. How this state of things has been brought about and how it continues to subsist is a wholly different question, and one with which the theist, in his argument with the sceptic, need not concern himself. When the government of God is once demonstrated, apart from the peculiar evidences of Christianity, it will be time enough to inquire how it is that the moral condition of the race is neither so good as to exhibit an obvious fulfilment of the Divine purpose, nor yet so bad as to cut it off from the hopes and responsibilities of probation. If the sceptic be not satisfied with the explanation afforded by the Scriptures, he will at least have been rescued from the gulf of Atheism. But most minds will at once be guided by a logical and moral necessity to the acceptance of the revealed doctrines of a Fall and a Redemption. In short, the origin of our convictions as to God and a future state—whether to be sought in the continued presence with us of the Spirit who fashioned us at the first, or in a second bestowment of the same Spirit who, forfeited by Adam's sin, is restored through Christ's grace and strives in consequence with every human heart—this it is not the province of the natural theologian to determine; and even though for the purpose of his argument he may accept the former solution, he in doing so only adopts an hypothesis which may satisfy the mind of a doubter until that fuller light shall rise upon him which shows God in Christ to be all in all. Let us not therefore fear that any discredit will be done to revealed religion when its advocates, like Moses in the history of Job, and Solomon in the confessions of Ecclesiastes, and St. Paul in the pleadings of the Areopagus, laying aside the weapons of the heavenly armoury and descending into the arena girded only with those of human reason, on its own ground win from our nature an acknowledgment of its fealty to the sovereign Lord of all.

As the doctrine of a conditional immortality, together with other theories of the end of evil, has been recently dealt with in the pages of this journal, we cannot devote

much space to the consideration of Mr. White's elaborate treatise on the subject. His arguments, however well presented and systematically arranged, contain little that has not been advanced and refuted before. Our purpose is to sketch in brief outline the course of thought pursued by the Bampton Lecturer of last year, who in the present volume makes a contribution towards the philosophy of Natural Religion which worthily fulfils the promise held out in the companion volume on the philosophy of Natural Theology, reviewed by us eighteen months ago. The title given to the whole series shows the line of argument adopted in these Lectures. The nature which gives the highest revelation of God is not the merely animate or inanimate creation : it is in human nature and human life that we find the clearest and fullest exhibitions of a Creator, as it is here only that He puts on the character of a Moral Governor as well. It is instructive, doubtless, to class man with the other works of the Divine Hand : it is more instructive to contrast him with them. The following passage sets forth the ground intended to be occupied in these lectures. We may say, however, before quoting it, that we do not see why the name Natural Religion should be applied to the teachings of man's moral nature, and that of Natural Theology to the teachings of nature commonly so called. Man and the creation form two departments of the same great science : there is a doctrine and a practice, a theology and a religion grounded on it, taught by each. Waiving this peculiarity of nomenclature, let us allow the author to speak for himself.

" Here, however, we must carefully observe that Natural Religion is by no means identical with Natural Theology. 'There was never miracle,' says Bacon, 'wrought by God to convert an Atheist, because the light of Nature might have led him to confess a God.' To record the truths discerned by this light is the business of the Natural Theologian. He registers them with the object of leading Man to the confession of a God. Yet for this light to shine, it is necessary that man should (in Baconian phrase) consider himself as Nature's '*minister et interpres*;' he should wait upon Nature with a loving eye, and translate her meaning into human thoughts. To succeed in his translation, Man must take with him the fact that he is not only Nature's interpreter, but Nature's *interpretation*—her 'word-book.' The rule of knowledge, as well as of Being, appears absolute,—that every higher thought, every higher existence, must explain lower

thoughts and lower existences. This rule would seem to be *the* truth involved in the Positive Philosophy of Comte—the vital germ in his systematising. How far that growing point has been fairly developed by Positivism, is a different question and foreign to our inquiry. Whatever may be thought on this subject, none will doubt that Man is visibly this world's highest fact. In him, therefore, and by correlating him with the world he inhabits, we shall find its most certain explanation. Linked in a thousand ways to the world, yet differing manifestly from it—in the world, yet not truly of the world—Man is (so to speak) the great supranatural element discoverable in Nature. In this spirit, Job turns his human eye upon the starry heavens, and infers from their glory and beauty the invisible things of God. In this same spirit, the Preacher examines human nature itself, and concludes, 'Fear God and keep His commandments: for this is the Whole of Man.' St. Paul unites both preacher and patriarch. He maintains that what may be known of God is manifest both in and unto mankind. His invisible things are shown us visibly. We may ourselves feel after and find the Lord. Such, then, is the utterance of Natural Theology, and upon such grounds it speaks.

"Natural Religion, as strictly defined and distinguished from Natural Theology, does not need to ask the previous question, 'Is there, indeed, a God?' In reasoning out its principles, we may proceed along very separate paths. One is to assume the conclusions of Natural Theology, and argue from them to the relations which they determine, the duties they impose, and the feelings they excite, when Man is viewed as standing in the presence of his God. This is the easiest way of conducting the discussion; but it is not to all minds a method the most satisfactory. Another path sets out from the truth of Moral Distinctions, and leads to the establishment and definition of the doctrine of Retributive Justice, as well as of the law of its ultimate development. You will not fail to observe that, if the truth of Retribution be thus established, Natural Theology gains a fresh and confirmatory evidence. And such a result is too valuable to be neglected in planning the method of these Lectures.

"On the whole it appears advisable to adopt a line of reasoning which unites in itself the advantages of the two paths just indicated. It will be my endeavour to rest the conclusions of Natural Religion—and above all, its main and most essential doctrine—upon the truths of Pure Morality. But from time to time, and at various landing-places of the argument, it will be wise to compare them with the positions which a Theist must needs occupy in regard of the questions at issue."

As will be seen from the above extract, the author is a champion of Independent Morality. No other position

is tenable for one who intends from *human* nature alone to establish anything worth the name of either theology or religion. If man is only influenced by a regard to temporal happiness, either his own or that of his kind, he is but a higher sort of animal. The contrast with the brutes fades away, and retribution, and the necessity of a sphere sufficient for its exercise, disappear. True, man is a sentient being, and needs no teacher but his own instincts to tell him that pleasure is a good and pain an evil. He is also a social being, and has always condemned in the individual what would be unsafe for society at large. But if duty be bounded by a regard to individual and social happiness, it will require in many cases a subtle casuistry to determine how in the long run these will be best promoted. A comprehensive training in a political economy higher than the world has yet seen becomes a necessary equipment for the humblest member of the commonwealth; and more than that, there will be needed a fine critical acumen to decide between rival schools. That morality is something more than a prudential code accumulated through the course of ages is proved by a comparison of modern with ancient, professedly Christian with heathen, moralists.

"Anyone acquainted with the language of Hume, Paley, and Jeremy Bentham, may feel at once satisfied of the superior purity and refinement of moral character stamped upon the *Ethics* of twenty-one hundred years ago. We meet with a similar phenomenon in Cicero, who exacts, as obvious duty, rules of commercial honesty and truth which are utterly alien from the age we live in; and which, if enforced from a pulpit, would stamp the preacher as an enthusiast or Utopian visionary. Such plain facts raise a presumption against all theories which make Morality a sort of social development. No one will accuse the Gospel of having introduced into *Ethics* pleasurable enjoyment, self-indulgence, or self-interest, as principles of Christian activity. Neither can we say that society has regressed since the era of Alexander or the last days of Roman oligarchy. We must therefore maintain (as, indeed, seems to be the truth) that those lower motives advocated in our eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are the utterance of a voice never quite silenced in human creatures: the natural language of that side of our being on which we approach animality. Thus viewed the older and more noble maxims which we have cited are not expressions indigenous to pleasure-loving Greece or to brutally luxurious Rome. They are the reactions of higher natures against the degraded tones of their times. *O si*

sic omnia! Would that it were always so with both Pagan and Christian Philosophies!"

Even when the higher and nobler of two courses is pointed out, what obligation is there to embrace it? What is to be said of the man who prefers the easier and more ignoble, and what comparison is to be drawn between him and the man who braces himself to some disinterested self-sacrifice? If the latter be praiseworthy because he has chosen a greater good, is the former to be counted praiseworthy too, only in a degree less in proportion as the good aimed at by him is less than the good aimed at by the other? The matter is brought by our author to a crucial test. The case is supposed, not of some ordinary difficulty occurring among the small economies of life, but of all that life affords of happiness and honour being staked on the answer to a single question, without the remotest prospect of any good accruing to mankind from the sacrifice of the lower instincts to the demands of truth and righteousness. The case is that, in fact, of a victim of the Holy Inquisition brought forth to undergo examination. After quoting from one of the greatest of recent prose-writers a vivid description of the horrors of such a tribunal, the Lecturer proceeds:—

"Place yourself, in imagination, each or any of you, beneath the vault of yonder rugged room. Picture the scene at least two or three times, and each time put to your own heart a problem. Begin by-laying aside the thought of friends from whom, when once a prisoner, you are severed. Not a soul of them will ever see you again. No one can even conjecture where you are. You have been trapped, it may be, in a lonely street, and brought hither under cover of night. Fix your attention entirely upon yourself. In another ten minutes you must undergo the Question: what answer will you give? Will you confess to these men, according to the example of St. Paul, 'After the way which they call heresy, so worship I the God of my fathers, believing all things which are written in the Law and in the Prophets?' Or will you deny your own convictions, and return to a creed you have quitted in obedience to Scripture and the Church primitive—that Church which was most pure and incorrupt? To do this would be to obtain, at the very least, easy death; probably no more than a short penance; possibly, seclusion in a well-known monastery. To denounce your friends, and enter the service of your tormentors as a spy, would be to gain life and much that makes life luxurious, if not splendid. Of these last basenesses

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you pronounce yourself incapable; but as to the former, think quickly, for you have not much time to think. What profit shall there be in your blood when you go down into the pit? You shall go down in silence. No protest of yours—no word, nor deed, will ever be known: neither the fact of your death, if you die; nor yet your existence should you continue to live in any other vocation than the abhorred one of being a spy upon your friends. Such is the policy of this tribunal.

"In this situation, if Right and Wrong be thought to depend on utility or non-utility, Right and Wrong are *at an end*."

We should like to pursue to the close this fine illustration of the reality of the distinction between Right and Wrong. Enough has been quoted, however, to show what line the author is compelled to take. The supposed case cannot be regarded as exceptional or extravagant. It is one which in a thousand-fold variety of form is occurring every day, and, to the credit of humanity be it spoken, is almost continually in these diverse forms demonstrating anew the hold which convictions of duty possess upon the well-instructed heart. A multiplicity of instances is, however, unnecessary to the establishment of the conclusion. One case of genuine self-sacrifice is enough for the purposes of our induction. The supremacy of moral motives which determines the action of the martyr is authoritative for the whole race. The same *amount* of self-sacrifice may seldom be required, but the principles which govern the heroes among men must be accepted as the basis of all morality, or else selfishness in some more refined or more disgusting shape will usurp the throne vacated by a good conscience.

It is impossible to contemplate such a case as that described above, without asking whether the belief in the reality of moral distinctions, which inspires the self-sacrifice, is not invariably accompanied by that of a Supreme Ruler who will in another world take cognisance of human actions. Has not the struggle for right always implied in those who have maintained it a conviction of its ultimate triumph? Without some such hope would not the odds appear too overwhelming, and would not despair of the final issues of right and wrong tend to subvert men's faith in their reality, and the practical contradictions of the world of things introduce confusion and anarchy into the world of thought? Is it not, in fact, the idea of Retribution which redeems self-sacrifice from the reproach of madness, and renders the loftiest disinterestedness a shining exhibition of the

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practical wisdom which finds out worthy means to worthy ends? Of course, questions like these raise another, viz. whether the admission, say to the mind of a martyr, of any thought even of the ultimate triumph of his cause, and much more of his participation in it, would not vitiate the purity of his actuating impulses, and reduce them to a level with the sordid aims of the utilitarian. Undoubtedly, the mere transfer of rewards and punishments from the present to a future state is not attended by any ennobling influence. The sanguinary struggles of Islam did not derive any lustre from the promise of houris in Paradise which sustained the spirits of those engaged in them. And if in general the hopes of a future state were similar in kind to those which prompt men to run the race for earthly riches, we do not see that there would be much to choose between them. The supposed permanency of the former might well be set aside in favour of the pressing urgency of the latter, and the self-regarding nature of the motive would be as patent in the one case as in the other. But neither in that religion which alone we can consent to call Revealed, nor in that which alone in our view deserves to be called Natural, does this assimilation of the heavenly to the earthly, of the spiritual to the sensuous, and of the eternal to the temporal, take place. The prophecy of our inner consciousness, like the predictions of an external revelation, points chiefly to the perfection of our being as likely to be consummated only by steadfast adhesion to that which is lawful and right: it does not clearly indicate the circumstances in which that being shall continue to subsist. Such an expectation and belief must be placed at the farthest remove from those of the most enlightened and far-sighted utilitarianism. The very dimness of the light shed by our nature upon a future state,—the fact that it is only a conviction forced upon us by what we know of this state and not founded on any experience of that,—itself separates by a wide interval between conduct governed by a reference to futurity and conduct shaped in accordance with the calculations of time and sense. Self-love is not necessarily selfish: the love of the right is a principle wholly distinct from the love of the happy, and both in God and in man if the two are at any time incompatible, the lesser must give place to the greater. The problem that has sometimes been propounded, of the soul being called upon to obey the voice of duty even though that duty should involve the forfeiture of eternal happiness,

is a puzzle belonging to an unreal world, and only fitted to exercise the wits of the schoolmen and the consciences of the mystics among whom it first arose. It may be asked, however, whether any example can be found of the perfect disinterestedness which does the right without regard to the good effects, the personal advantages, that are sure to follow,—whether such a pitch of virtue is not as worthy to be classed among the unrealities as that which we have just pronounced to be so. Our answer must be that the world we live in is not a perfect world; that its discipline is designed for the restoration of fallen beings, not for the probation of those already upright; that the substitution of higher motives for lower ones appears to be the only mode by which it is possible for the fallen to be raised; and that the substitution of the love of the right for the love of the happy is the assimilation of the human to the Divine, an ideal to be continually striven for, whether perfectly realised in this life or not.

Having indicated his belief in the reality of Moral Distinctions, the author proceeds to consider the objections that have been made thereto. These objections are of many and various kinds, but they all have their root in a denial or doubt of "man's power of attaining transcendental truth." Their parentage is traced to Hume. The following passage shows the connection between his sceptical philosophy and the subject under consideration:—

"In our day Hume's progeny is chiefly Materialistic, in the immoral and irreligious sense of that ambiguous word. His great recommendations for our purpose are two. One, that he is *thorough* in his Scepticism: with him the world is all an optical shadow. The other that he is a distinctly *modern* Sceptic. Ancient Scepticism, we may remark, is of a totally different cast. As has been observed, the Greek assailed feeling and sensation first of all,—whereas Hume assumes their veracity, and proceeds to attack universal truths, because not contained in the empirical circle—the circle of sensuous perception. The issue is universal Doubt. 'We have, therefore,' 'he says, 'no choice left but betwixt a false reason and none at all. For my part, I know not what ought to be done in the present case.' And again, 'The intense view of these manifold contradictions and imperfections in human reason has so wrought upon me, and heated my brain, that I am ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more probable or likely than another. Where am I, or what? From what causes do I derive my existence, and

to what condition shall I return ? . . . In all the incidents of life we ought still to preserve our scepticism. If we believe that fire warms, or water refreshes, 'tis only because it costs us too much pains to think otherwise.' Every honest thinker must be glad of Hume's surprising outspokenness. It is still more surprising in a person educated by French Jesuits, and used to see economies of speech, reticences of all sorts, valued and practised every day. Under any circumstances, such cool, half-bantering, sceptical talk seems a phenomenon to be accounted for in a young man of seven-and-twenty. How easily does the rogue laugh actualities out of court, till nobody can tell the difference between a lake and a mirage ! Common-sense people were used to speak with some confidence of the little fact that fire warms. Our young sage sets it down among disputable topics. Yet a man may keep this and other pet beliefs, *animi voluptatisque causâ*, as Cæsar says of British hares,—if, that is, he happens to fancy them ! They are not worth the labour of extinguishing ! Reality is thus vaporised into Credulity. And when we pass from the outer to the inner world, Ideas appear with Hume no safer than Realities. They are the relics of impressions, once made through the senses and since fallen dim. Hence the idea of a mathematical point is simply impossible. That which has neither length, breadth, nor thickness, never impressed itself upon any sense. Exact Equality and Inequality, a Right line, the Infinitude of geometricians, are no ideas proper to our poor human mind. As a matter of fact, Infinity of all kinds is inconceivable ; and with the Inconceivable, we, who are the slaves of 'every school-boy's' intelligence, can have nothing whatever to do. The universals which people have called primary truths must either be refracted palpabilities, or they must be accounted Nothings. Henceforth let no man look in the face such reasons as he may suppose himself to possess for any fact, natural law, moral distinction, or metaphysical first-ground. He who asks for Truth does so on pain of being driven to reject, with our young sage, and with a great many school-boys, all belief, all reasoning, all first principles, and to consider no one opinion more likely or more probable than another. And what now has become of our Moral Realities !

It is obvious that if the world of which we form a part can boast no real existence, small reliance is to be placed on any mental reasonings whatsoever. The destruction of our commonest of all beliefs, that which asserts the reality of an external world, carries with it into the same gulf the validity of every mental act and the reality of the mind performing it. Berkeley thought he could find safe footing on the precipice, and maintain and even magnify the

powers of a mind conscious only of modifications of itself. But the common-sense of mankind has refused to stake its all on the success of so daring an experiment. It has accepted neither the pernicious scepticism of the godless doubter nor the presumptuous confidence of the pious divine. It has neither been depressed by the abuse nor elated by the compliments which have been showered upon it from either side. But we must let our author show in how subtle a manner the arch-heretic carried on his insidious advances against the dearest beliefs of human nature, and sought to employ his philosophy to sap the foundations of religion.

"Hume, like others of the Illumination, had (I fear) a criminal intent upon Morality. He approached the object aimed at, first through abstract argument, secondly by analysing, that is, dissolving away, an elementary factor of Human Nature. The effect of both assaults was to make Morality conventional. We will (as I said) examine the abstraction first. I allude, of course, to Hume's celebrated theory of Customary Association.

"At a glance we may perceive what a power is here for easy philosophy to handle. Habit is second nature. We are all the creatures of Habit. Why should not Habit account for modern prejudice, and old-fashioned principle also? Why should it not make us think as we do think, on universal truths and on universal interests,—on our sociology, polity, Morality? If it can be shown that we survey the inanimate world,—Matter, Force, Law,—through glasses fitted to our mind's eyes by Habituation, is it certain that we do not also survey the intelligent and moral world by aid of similar optics? At all events, Reason cannot—does not—govern Moral Choice. Justice being some kind of Utility, property is no more than a customary arrangement: respect for human rights—perchance for human life (either our own or other people's)—or, again, for human truth, rectitude, purity, may well be neither more nor less than convenient fashions of feeling. As customs, we may deal with them all; as customs, we cannot say that any one of them holds good in any life but this. Yet if we cannot affirm a vitality in Moral maxims apart from our habituations,—if there is no essential distinction between Right and Wrong, indelible, and pertaining to the eternal Then,—surely there can be no cause why we should act upon it *Now*. Farewell, a long farewell, to the hopes of good and the terrors of wicked men! Farewell to moral certitudes and moral restraints; above all to the Belief in a just Retribution!"

Such is the abstract sceptical argument advanced from

the side of metaphysics. There are no such things in nature as causes and effects: at least, we can never know them to be such. All that we perceive is mere succession of phenomena: we know nothing of any tie, save as we ourselves frame one for convenience of recognition. If there be no such thing as causation, there can be no such thing as production, and no such thing as intention. Thus all distinctions of right and wrong lose their meaning. But the void thus created is not confined to our intellectual faculties. A grievous blow is dealt also at the constitution of our moral nature. We have not only to contemplate the world we live in, but to act in reference to it. It is difficult enough to act upon the world when only its external phenomena are deprived of causal connection, but how when the power of decision itself turns out to be no power at all, when moral causation is found to possess no more reality than natural, and our consciousness of free agency sinks to the level of our belief in the uniformity of nature? Here we find the solvent that eats away the strength of all morality and all religion.

"It will not, I think, escape you that the more Motive resembles (as in some modern theories) an *efficient* or producing cause, and the farther it recedes from the Aristotelian idea of a *final* cause, or object of pursuit, the more absolute appears the subjection of Man to *mechanical* Law. His actions are enchained; his Will is determined by the 'must be.' And the chain becomes doubled in strength when individual character is looked upon as a fragment of universal character, and men are supposed to be like each other, as pebbles in a brook are like each other. The possibility of a powerful religious influence upon character was a thought foreign to Hume's mind; feeble, too (as it would seem), were his ideas of self-formation and self-reformation. Yet, without these last-named endowments, all that is Man-like in Humanity has vanished. For the crown and glory of our Human Nature, and its loftiest distinction from mere brute nature, is that we can elevate ourselves, improve our best faculties, enhance their vigour, form increasingly noble habits, and by the exercise of self-discipline, mount high above our original selves.

"Such, and nothing less, is the hope of self-change, never relinquished by any human being, except an incurable trifter, a madman, or a vice-besotted wretch. Yet it is *the* element of our nature which Hume is bent on dissolving away. Contrast this undying hope with his survey and estimate of Mankind, as described by his best biographer. It runs thus:—'How very clearly we find these principles practically illustrated in his

history! A disinclination to believe in the narratives of great and remarkable deeds proceeding from peculiar impulses; a propensity, when the evidence adduced in their favour cannot be rebutted, to treat these peculiarities rather as diseases of the mind than as the operation of noble aspirations: a levelling disposition to find all men pretty much upon a par, and none in a marked manner better or worse than their neighbours; an inclination to doubt all authorities which tended to prove that the British people had any fundamental liberties not possessed by the French and other European nations.' Mr. Burton concludes by saying, 'Such are the practical fruits of this Necessitarian philosophy.'

And, like everything else that can in any way influence practice, it is by its fruits that this philosophy must be judged. Even on individual men, even on those individual men who have espoused it, and who, therefore, had the best reasons for desiring to set it off, its influence has been baneful. The above quotation from Hume's biographer is in proof of this, and such testimony, founded on an examination of his whole career, is not to be set aside by his own profession that in ordinary life he did not think so differently from his fellow-men as might be supposed. As a contrast to the indifferentism of Hume, our author sketches the lineaments of his great antagonist, Kant, and shows how a sound philosophy reacted on the sturdy nature of the Scoto-Tenton and developed its best qualities, just as frivolity was the natural outcome of the "parlour-fire philosophy" of the Franco-Scot. But it is not in individuals that the effects of a wide-spread and popular system are to be chiefly traced. "Cause and effect, when written large, are more conspicuous and less mistakeable." The Logic of Events has confuted the scepticism of Hume. Everybody knows that it was in France that his philosophy was most heartily welcomed, and that it gave its own impulse to the progress of the French Illumination to which it owed its being. And what was the issue of this philosophy of universal doubt? The horrors of the French Revolution. Consequences the farthest from these teachers' thoughts were those which, with a sounder philosophy, they themselves would have foreseen to be inevitable.

"The free-thinking philosophers of that period were no wiser than the educated circles of ladies and gentlemen for whom they lived and wrote. We, looking back now-a-days, are apt to

wonder how they could so perilously sport with the world's received maxims and modes of thinking. The truth is, these people were supported by *their* world's sympathy; the mistake they made was to forget that there were in Europe—and notably, in France—other worlds, with other ways of life and feeling quite outside the *exclusive* pale of their own.

"Unmindful of this social fact—yet, perhaps, not more unmindful than the French Court, the French Church, and the French Noblesse—a clever circle, pervaded by Scepticism of every kind and degree, was bent on illuminating the French people. Inflamed with zeal for the emancipation of mankind from evils indescribably gross, they kindled their new Illumination where the shadows of despotism and superstition lay deepest. We may figure to ourselves a tall Lighthouse, with its lantern bright but colourless upon one side,—on the other fiery red. In the former direction it stands like a benevolent giant overlooking heights beneath which the waters sleep in security. In the reverse direction, it flashes an ensanguined glow across sunken shoals, jagged reefs, and currents raging tempestuously. Just so, this illuminative wisdom of free thought blazed out between the two contrasted classes of the French nation: the class which enjoyed life without care, and the class which toiled self-like and hopeless. Beheld amongst the calms of aristocratic conventionalism, what could appear better adapted to the idle, *disillusionised* men and women of that hollow and frivolous upper world! Its quiet clearness seemed like the enlightenment of an ironical Koran, preaching *libertine freedom*. There is always an incessant craving for strong sensations when life appears short and tedious, and when the ghastly skull cannot be wholly hidden by rosebuds garlanded before they be withered. To such hearts and heads, Easy Philosophy brings certain alleviations; its tranquil brilliancy, though cold and pale, is soothing. Its promise seems to be security in wicked pleasure,—under all circumstances,—Security.

"But what was the other side of the Lantern like! It gleamed blood-red and fiery over the sons and daughters of civilised servitude,—the part-educated, half-famished, whole-desperate dwellers in the dark places of society. They, too, craved strong sensations. Concerning such, we may take up our parable and say, 'Over them was spread an heavy night, an image of that darkness which should afterwards receive them: but yet were they unto themselves more grievous than the darkness.'* Unto themselves first; next to their cynical Lords and Ladies; to the French race; and to all Europe! Of any pure and spiritual teaching they would have asked, 'Wherefore

* *Wisdom of Solomon*, xvii. 21.

is light given to him that is in misery?' To the misery-maddened no light was or could be so welcome, as that lurid blaze of unbelieving philosophy, which burned away their fears of a future Retribution, and *by consequence* set their passions and their vengeance free.

"Had there existed prophetic insight among the reasoners of polished France, the visible fact that their philosophy shone out over such terrific shadows would have been a danger-signal of the coming wreck. But no warning voice was heard, till the flame of atheistic selfishness was *answered* by the furnace fires of that Terror which consumed all human ties. Do *we* in these days, wonder that no warning was heeded *then*? Would any similar warning be more effectual *now*? Fatalism and Atheism are preached constantly amidst the plaudits of ignorant Englishmen. How many highly-bred politicians deem the matter a thing of the slightest consequence?"

But a better answer to scepticism even than its practical, is to be found in its speculative, destructiveness. Scepticism is "worse than a crime,—a blunder." The mind that doubts the validity of mind's operations, doubts its own doubt. And again, the mind that has no sufficient ground for believing has no sufficient ground for acting, and for such a mind action becomes as irrational as thought. In fact no man ever did maintain an universal scepticism, and yet no man can consistently stop short of that issue who once begins to question the reality of our primary beliefs. He has no right to pick and choose among them: they are all equally authoritative, as they are all equally undemonstrable.

Since, therefore, primary beliefs must be admitted, the next step is to investigate them. This our author accordingly proceeds to do, and without pretending to make the list exhaustive, he mentions four axioms which form the groundwork respectively of our Mathematical, our Logical, our Scientific, and our Moral reasonings. The first is the fundamental principle which determines all relations of Quantity and Number: it is purely formal, though constantly verified by application to the material world, and capable of representation by diagram before the bodily eye. The second is the axiom of Deductive logic, that of Contradiction, or rather Non-contradiction, by virtue of which alone it is possible to perform any operations of mediate or immediate inference. Like the first, it is purely formal, but unlike it, is incapable of being aided by visible representation,

since it is not to things simply, but to the relations of things, that it applies. The third differs *toto cælo* from the former two: it is the Inductive Principle which introduces us at once to the powers and processes of nature, and assists us in the endeavour to classify its uniformities. And the fourth takes us into the sphere of moral action, and declares that here as everywhere else there is a *must be*. For these four axioms it is claimed that they are all equally imperative and all equally universal in their sway over the mind of man. And while each gains confirmation—if such a thing be needed—from its own verifications in the subject-matter to which it appertains, each also by the fact of its own existence and verification lends confirmation to the rest. For if in one sphere we require a resting-place in something transcendental, then in another likewise it is reasonable to apprehend a like necessity. And whereas the procedure of scepticism is destructive, and derogatory alike to our intellectual, social, and moral well-being, the beliefs of reason are essentially constructive, harmonising with our best instincts, and tending to the exaltation of our race. Who can contemplate recent discoveries of science which identify the distant nebula in constitution with the earth on which we tread, without recognising the fact that these discoveries owe their meaning, truth, and value to the principles which we have named? And who that recognises this would not wish those principles to be true which have given such extension to the range of human thought?

The difference in the sphere and application of the moral maxim from those of the other three is described in the following passage, which we the more readily quote as it illustrates also the sturdy Protestant feeling of the Lecturer:—

“Precisely in the same manner, we both say and believe that, throughout the Moral zone, even as throughout the physical zone of the world, a Law embodying an immutable ‘*must be*’ is, to the eye of our Reason, universal. The different operation of the *Must* (a fact which we also perceive and assert) is consequent upon the difference of subject-matter controlled by the Supreme formal Law. In the sphere of physics, where Things as they exist can neither originate nor terminate Motion, the Law is necessarily mechanical. In the sphere of Volition, Persons not Things are the subjects of Law. They are able to commence actions, and to hinder them. The necessity, therefore, becomes Moral,—the ‘*Must be*’ is transformed into an ‘*ought to do*.’ How-

ever people may argue or refine upon such topics, this again is a persuasion which no arguments can eradicate from the human mind: 'I know I ought not to have done it' will always be the utterance of multitudes whose sin has found them out. . . . And consider how often, when all seemed against it, before the eyes of all Oxford men the 'I ought' has been victoriously maintained. Here, for example, in this very church, within these four walls, Anglican prelates, lawfully anointed, were brought to bay by their persecutors and required to affirm a falsehood. Although the penalties were loss of earthly substance and position, imprisonment, cruel mockings, and death by fire, the 'I ought' prevailed. It prevailed here; it prevailed in sight of the old grey walls of Balliol, and the Saxon tower of St. Michael's. There the sacrifice of Duty was consummated. There one Bishop said to his companion in torture, 'Be of good comfort and play the Man. We shall this day light such a candle, by God's grace, in England, as I trust shall never be put out.' These words *still* stand true. True for England,—true for Oxford! We Oxonians have often been censured for clinging too fondly to the records and customs of the Past; and false prophets were not wanting more than two centuries ago, who foretold the approaching Romanism of our whole University. Yet what was the answer pronounced at Magdalen, and repeated through Oxford, when James the Second tried that question out? And if it were tried again, what would be our answer now? There are in this church, men who, like myself, have reason to mourn the loss of friends remaining in the same land, but no longer walking to the same House of God. Yet, for many here, as for me, the '*I ought*' remains the same. That old Bishop's words are not dead, but living. We would rather ourselves die in the slow-consuming flame, than yield allegiance to the proud false Dogma which has torn by its perplexities the breasts of some among our lost friends, and of others, our fellow-countrymen. We would resist, not only in theory, but also in practice, the schism-causing pretensions of Papal Rome. So long as the power of Resistance shall remain to us, and to leaders of men likeminded with our humbler selves, the resolve (long ago spoken) will be echoed and re-echoed,

'That no Italian Priest
Shall tithe or toll in these dominions,'"

Under the title of "The Prerogative of Humanity" the author devotes one Lecture to a comparison between the moral axiom and its three compeers, with the design of showing its likeness to, distinctness from, and superiority over them. They are all alike genetic: they all alike, in order to the evolution of their legitimate results, demand an apparatus of postulates wherewith to work: they all alike

proceed according to a certain Method. But the postulates and the method of any one do not resemble those of the remainder. Each keeps its own province and follows its own laws. Thus there are the postulates of geometry and the categories of logic. These cannot be compared, because they pertain severally to matter and mind, objects which have nothing in common. And the methods of these two sciences in like manner differ, because their aims are different. "Mathematics are founded on magnitude and number. They measure the material universe; and it matters not to them whether the All is Finite or Infinite. Yet they cannot gauge Thought. Arithmetic cannot time Thought; Geometry cannot circumscribe it." The author, indeed, regards "impenetrability" as applicable both to mind and matter, and asks, "Can one Soul be thrust inside another?" But the question has no meaning. That which has not extension can neither possess nor lack impenetrability. The impenetrability he speaks of turns out to be incognisability, and indicates the impossibility of our reading each other's thoughts. Between the third and fourth axioms there may be drawn a similar contrast in regard to scope as between the first and second. Nature places its own bounds, both of time and space, to the reasonings of the inductive philosopher. His results are only true within the limits of the material universe. It is otherwise with the metaphysician, unless thought be identified with matter. To establish such identity is, as we know, the aim of the materialist, but he has only been able to prove material modifications an uniform concomitant, not an universal and indispensable condition, of thought in our present state of existence. In this respect the sphere of the second and fourth axioms immeasurably transcends that of the first and third. Thought and Morality assert their empire conjointly and indestructibly over all conceivable thinking substances. If the logical axiom be not true for all worlds, it is not absolutely true for us, and so of moral distinctions.

Coming now to the question which of these four axioms should have the pre-eminence,—or, for that is the same thing,—which is the most distinctively human, the Lecturer has no difficulty in assigning this position to the axiom of Morality. All four, indeed, in one sense stand or fall together. We cannot occupy a point of view external to humanity even when surveying humanity's most abstract

operations. It is still the human eye that watches, and the human mind that thinks. But of all human manifestations it is in those we characterise as right or wrong that we feel ourselves placed at the farthest distance from all else we see in animate and inanimate nature. Admitting the familiar argument of the likeness in many points between man and the brutes, the author shows that in morals there is no approach to likeness, but what would be, if we were not so accustomed to it, the most startling contrast. There are to be found in them observation and memory, a kind of logic even, and a rudimentary induction.

"But in bar of all approaches towards Humanity, there has always been a fatal limit. What unreasoning creature, however highly developed, is educable in the sense that a human *baby* is educable? The teaching of an infant-school is removed by an utter *disparateness* (if I may use a word not in Richardson), by which I mean, not only a disparity, but an ineffaceably disparate character, from the powers of the whole animal kingdom. Self-education seems more hopelessly remote still. Throughout the ages during which animals have lived, suffered, and sickened, they have never attempted to cure a disease, or alleviate the pains of an injury. Man is the only physician and sick-nurse of organised creatures. But all other liminary contrasts fall short of the Moral interval. No creature void of Reason has ever been known to sit in self-condemning judgment on its own life. None can exercise the faculties, and act upon the primary insights underlying remorse, repentance, and self-reformation. . . . We watch with pleasure, in our dog or horse, such manifestations of hope, fear, and grateful attachment as our own training and culture have called forth. The being of the creature seems nerved by a striving to meet its master's wishes, and gain approval from his eye. This is perhaps the highest state ever attainable in animal existence. It is simply one of impulse, strengthened by custom; and we like to trace in it some resemblance to our impulsive feelings or habituations. Yet the law of Morality, deep down in Man's nature, removes the likeness to an *infinite* distance. When a man *loves*, the tide of affection turns back upon its source, to sun itself beneath the light of Reason; to gain strength from the inevitable self-scrutiny which reigns supreme over emotion and sentiment, as well as over purpose and action. What was feeling becomes Will—high resolve, tintured with duty and devotion; an affection, which, to be eradicated from the Man, must tear away his heart-strings:—

'They sin who tell us Love can die!'

Man's real Love will never die, if Man himself is immortal! The

same Moral Law vindicates itself throughout all social ties. For Society is not gregariousness. A herd of men would not be a nation. That very idea is an absurd misnomer, except when human ties have been relaxed by some disruption in the history of a people. True human society is Moral Sociality; and the best patriotism, a truly human education. Train yourselves in strict moralities, and you will be true to your own interests, the interests of your country, and to the aim and Ideal of Humanity."

The instinctive yearning after a more perfect and immortal state of being counts for something. The argument from the universal expectation of mankind is not to be put to silence by the cynical retort that worlds no more than fortunes may be had for wishing. But the hope of a future state rests on a firmer foundation than is afforded by our impulses, noble and ineradicable though they be. It is a necessity forced upon our rational intelligence by the facts of our moral life. The Method by which this conclusion is reached is one that compares favourably with that relied on for its processes by Natural Science. Natural Science is, in fact, transcendental in the same sense and to the same degree as Moral Philosophy. The writers of the experience school have been accustomed to laud the Science method as the most perfect specimen of a system which rigorously confines itself to the facts of observation and experiment, and admits no term into its conclusion which has not been previously admitted into the premisses. Moral philosophers have been recommended to follow the fair example, and have been assured that one result of their doing so will be the abandonment as a mere Utopia of the regions of an unseen universe, and another the consequent rise in value of our actual visible possessions. To speak plainly, the interests of this present life would, it is thought, be more truly estimated and its duties more worthily performed, if both were not dwarfed by constant comparison with others, vast in their apparent dimensions but shadowy and unsubstantial in their nature, which loom upon us from an unknown world. Yet what is the real state of the case? Why, that if moral science begs the question, natural science does the same. Or rather, if the one performs an induction of which the conclusion is wider than the premisses, the other does so too, and is equally justified in the procedure.

"Men speak of Natural Science as pre-eminently experience.

Its validity, we are told a thousand times over, rests, first, on facts experienced,—next, on experimental verification. Are these statements *absolutely* true? We know they are open to very damaging questions. And from the answer to these questions we derive a different account of the matter. So different, as to necessitate another speculative basis for physical science, and another confirmation for conclusions.

“We may be quite sure that all sciences will endeavour to become philosophies. It is well if they do not pretend to rank as *the* Philosophy. To this general rule, Natural Science is no exception; it has been, and still is, striving after some hidden Unity, some living principle, to explain and lend form and movement to the whole. This attempt has modified its scientific grounding and procedure, as you will perceive from the following examples.

“Writing upon the newest department of biological science—Anthropogeny—Mr. Huxley defines its position and the position of several other scientific conceptions in these words:—‘It need hardly be said, that in dealing with such a problem as this, science rapidly passes beyond the bounds of positively verifiable fact, and enters those of more or less justifiable speculation. But there are very few scientific problems, even of those which have been, and are being most successfully solved—which have been or can be approached in any other way. Our views respecting the nature of the planets, of the sun and stars, are speculations which are not and cannot be directly verified; that great instrument of research, the atomic hypothesis, is a speculation which cannot be directly verified; the statement that an extinct animal, of which we know only the skeleton, and never can know any more, had a heart and lungs, and gave birth to young which were developed in such and such a fashion, may be one which admits of no reasonable doubt, but it is an unverifiable hypothesis.’

“Now, does Natural Science require verification before it demands our belief for its statements, or does it not? Mr. Huxley goes on to say, that ‘unverified, and even unverifiable hypotheses may be great aids to the progress of knowledge—may have a right to be believed with a high degree of assurance.’ Why, then, may not *other* transcendent assertions, if credibly grounded, have a right to be believed?”

In this demand on behalf of Science for the exercise of lawful speculation, the Biologist is sustained by the Physicist, and Professor Huxley kept in countenance by Dr. Tyndall. For its eternal sanctions Morality rests upon a theory as urgently demanded by facts as those of light, heat, magnetism and electricity. That a race of beings should be endowed with a sense of right and wrong, and

with the conviction that right should be rewarded and wrong punished, and yet that the history of the race should never satisfy this sense, and never realise this conviction, as plainly contradicts our common sense as that a single bone should exist without having formed at one time or another a part of some complete skeleton. The verification lacking to the issues of Morality is, however, accorded to the reality of its distinctions, and in so far its certainty surpasses that of any unverified theory.

But a more curious contrast remains behind, and in this the advantage is all on the side of the Independent Moralist. Those who say that experience is everything find some difficulty in applying the principle to the most recent results of science. Our belief in the uniformity of nature arises, say they, from an observation of its unvarying succession. The expectation that to-morrow's sun will rise is founded on long-continued acquaintance with a similar phenomenon. There is no universality or necessity about this. We are always open to the doubt whether our experience has been wide enough to justify the prediction. Now astronomy has recently shown us worlds in process of formation, and natural philosophy has demonstrated that the universe must die. What becomes then of our expectation of the constancy of nature? We can only say nature is practically constant for us: it is not really so: a period will arrive when the wondrous equilibrium will fail to be maintained. We need not wait for the final catastrophe in order to infer that Nature cannot be explained from herself. Uniformities of limited range and duration do not explain themselves: they are not ultimate and necessary facts. They have a beginning, and they have an end: they therefore demand for their explanation a Cause external to themselves. Something outside nature must be admitted, something unaffected by its changes and untrammelled by its laws. Such a something has been found by the Moralist in Will-force, of which the best known example is the free agency of man. Nature is an insoluble enigma apart from the transcendental hypothesis, and yields up its secret only to him who beholds alike in its uniformities and variations the workings of intelligent Mind. In a word, the experience theory, for this too is a theory, will not interpret nature even, much less man; whereas its rival, rightly understood, interprets both.

But this true interpretation of both nature and mankind

is not to be attained by carrying the Law which governs the latter into the domain of the former, and making the practically uniform operation of physical forces amenable to the judgment of Morality. We must not treat nature as a Person, because it is the creation of a personal God. To make man in this sense the measure of nature would be as great an error in the one extreme as to make nature the measure of man would be in the other. The real distance between man and nature and between moral and mechanical forces and laws may be more clearly apprehended from the attempts which have been made to bridge the gulf between them. No one has uttered more dreary platitudes — and withal more sentimental ones — over what he calls the immoralities of nature than the unsentimental John Stuart Mill. "Nearly all things," he says, "which men are hanged or imprisoned for doing one to another, are Nature's every-day performances." And "the order of Nature is constructed with even less regard to the requirements of justice than to those of benevolence." But who attaches moral blame to the earthquake or the flood that has bereaved him, any more than moral praise to the mine or the corn-fields which have sustained and enriched him? It is true that the blow seemingly levelled at nature is really aimed at nature's God. But it is forgotten that the Author of nature stands in a different position to men from that which they occupy toward one another. He is their Maker and Owner, and possesses rights over them which none else share. And the admission of such an Author of nature as our own moral being declares Him to be, reconciles us at once to the inconveniences and imperfections of the world we live in. The necessities of moral probation may require that our lot should be just such as we see it ordained. Our conflict with physical evil tries and develops us no less than our conflict with the moral evil we encounter within and without. And to a Being whose survey of His creatures' destiny embraces an eternity of recompense in addition to the finite measure of our earthly ills, there may appear to be so overwhelming a balance of good as will ultimately justify the ways of God to men. In fact, Retribution alone, while it keeps the province of our moral action distinct from that of our natural life, sufficiently explains the anomalies of their connection.

We cannot but quote from our author a paragraph which

shows that it is just as impossible to assimilate man to nature as nature to man.

"Another unfounded hypothesis receives a similar death-blow. What possible pretence can remain for assuming that Man, from the contemplation of Nature, will create a Science yielding an exact account of her and her ways,—discover a law that rigorously directs her disorders, injustices, cruelties,—and *when* this is done, arrive at the further discovery that he has in doing this created the only true science of HIMSELF! Nay,—more monstrous still: that what he has always conceived, and does still conceive, to be the *true* science and law of his own nature and his own world, must be set aside by reason of his incapacity to read himself aright. He has (it seems) a correct eye for the Natural world—that Thing with which he is in polar antipathy; he has none for the only Being known to him by Sympathy, the inner Being presented hourly to his own introverted consciousness. Yet, such are the assumptions of men who, having spelt Force into the letters of a language adapted to stocks and stones, would persuade us that this is the only Force known or knowable—the one Force supreme over a machine-made universe of men!

"The truth is, that such systematisers write and discourse in one groove, till speech dominates over thought. They mistake a form of expression for a reality of Being. As Mr. Herbert Spencer truly says,*—'The interpretation of all phenomena in terms of Matter, Motion, and Force, is nothing more than the reduction of our complex symbols of thought to the simplest symbols; and when the question has been brought to its lowest terms the symbols remain symbols still.' 'But,' writes Professor Huxley,† as if with a designed comment on Spencer,—'the man of science, who, forgetting the limits of philosophical inquiry, slides from these formulæ and symbols into what is commonly understood by Materialism, seems to me to place himself on a level with the mathematician, who should mistake the *x*'s and *y*'s with which he works his problem for real entities; and with this further disadvantage, as compared with the mathematician, that the blunders of the latter are of no practical consequence, while the errors of systematic Materialism may paralyse the energies, and destroy the beauty of a life.'‡ Happily for Humanity, our nature revolts against becoming a kneaded clod. To use Bacon's words, 'A sparkle of our Creation-light, whereby men acknowledge a Deity, burneth still within.'"

In his Seventh Lecture, entitled "Growth, Trial and Triumph," the author shows conclusively that no system of morals presents an adequate incentive to the observance of

* *First Principles*, Sect. 194.

† *Lay Sermons*, pp. 160, 161.

its precepts but that which derives its sanctions from a world to come. In fact, none but such a system can either venture to raise a lofty standard for men to aim at or effectually exhort them to press after its attainment. Virtue never becomes Holiness except as associated with Immortality. But in the morality that is enjoined by an enlightened conscience under the inspiration of an anticipated futurity both the standard and its sanctions are invested with a solemnity which demands profoundest reverence and dread. The responsibilities of being assume an importance which no appeal to mundane interests can create, and time itself borrows a transcendent worth from eternity. The Utilitarian does not so much as pretend to furnish his disciples with motives always powerful enough, if weighed, to counterbalance the promptings of their lower nature. He can only recommend them to prefer the greater to the lesser good, and, if they do not heed him, inform them that they have subtracted something from the possible sum-total of human happiness. There is no external, not to say supernatural, authority to command and enforce obedience. Without a clear and sharp definition of the boundaries of right and wrong as eternally antagonistic contradictories, there can be no infallible prediction of their eternally divergent consequences. All the similes that have been drawn from the seedtime and harvest of the natural world become absolutely inappropriate, or else are perverted to quite another use and meaning with the free agency of the sower omitted. If there is to be a system of ethics always and universally binding upon mankind, it must come from something which has an objective as well as a subjective reality and power. And this is provided in that which is therefore truly called the Independent system of morals.

“Morality, *objectively* supreme, constitutes the asserted claim and essential meaning of Retribution. This law of Justice consists neither in a gift unworthily bestowed, nor yet in a penalty arbitrarily inflicted. The law of Habit realised is perhaps our nearest example of its Retributive operation in this life; and gives us a very clear idea and illustration of the *modus operandi*. Its final accomplishment is the normal and legitimate *out-growth* of the Moral Law, which, subjectively active during years of change, becomes, when events grow ripe, objectively manifested. Could it be otherwise? The very idea of a Moral Law would, even now, be subverted. Duty might (that is to say) remain a

Moral persuasive,—a belief which (like one of Hume's physical beliefs) we might keep if we liked. But it would not be a moral LAW,—a rule to be obeyed through all losses, toils, sufferings, sorrows, and self-abnegations. A rule to be disobeyed at the proper peril of each evil-doer; not without warning in the very moment of disobedience, that he thereby insures his Soul-degradation. The operative nature of such a Law is that it exists as a moving, working principle. If left to its proper energies, it quickens and ennobles;—if tampered with and sophisticated, it enfeebles and kills. And this is what those writers really mean who describe Morality as founded in the Nature of Things. To be Morality at all, it must be naturally supreme over man's practical destinies, just as the laws of Truth are naturally supreme over each possible development of his speculative Reason. In both cases the ultimate outcomes may be inconceivably immense; but, in both, they must be the normal and necessary issues of our present germ-state. Otherwise, speculative truth could not now be true, and Moral distinctions would be unpractical; and therefore *un-Moral*.

"The Moral Law is thus, in its operation, a pledge and earnest—in its own essential nature, a transcendent prophecy, of its own finality. As a living movement or germ, it *foretells* the beautiful flower and blessed fruit of perfection to be borne by every righteous man: for every wicked one, the out-grown freezing shadow, the poisonous life-destroying produce. And this twofold energy of Law corresponds in its consummation with the twofold judgment of God,—'Who,' as the Apostle tells us, 'will render to every man according to his deeds: to them who by patient continuance in well-doing seek for glory and honour and immortality, eternal life; but unto them that are contentious and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness, indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish, upon every soul of man that doeth evil.'"

The "why" of such Morality itself teaches the "how:" the sanction shapes the rule. This is because its basis is a living and growing principle, and as it is founded upon an indestructible and ever-deepening moral consciousness so it continually leads to clearer and stronger judgments upon particular courses of conduct. This is its operation upon those who follow the dictates of conscience: every additional experiment of obedience on the part of the will brings new verification and certainty to the judgment, till the steps that were at first tentative, faltering and slow, become habitual, confident and rapid, and "the path of the just, like the shining light, shineth more and more

unto the perfect day." It is otherwise with those who disobey: their "way is as darkness: they know not at what they stumble." Yet ever and anon, from the inward consciousness whose light they strive to quench, come lurid gleams, too terribly prophetic of the fate they tempt. Even "slothfulness" in the discharge of duty "casteth into a deep sleep," but it is sleep on the edge of a volcano, continually disturbed by its upheavings, and certain to be terminated by the outburst of its pent-up fires.

But the views just presented of the practical working of the Law of Morals must not be accepted in the sense of exempting those who acknowledge it from the necessity of supernatural help and deliverance. We will leave it to our author, in the last quotation our limits permit, to trace the connection between Natural Religion and Revealed.

"In all that has gone before, I have placed this doctrine before you as a human truth,—a something belonging to our own higher nature, as contrasted with inferior, sensual, and animal natures. Retribution has been viewed both as a Reality, truly Rational, truly Moral; and as a fulfilment of that *prophecy* which has written itself on our Being. To borrow a similitude from St. Paul, that prophecy is like a foundation-stone bearing two inscribed Seals. On the human side it tells us men that we may reasonably hope for a nobler development, a more excellent perfection, if only we are faithful to the law written on the table of our human hearts. On the Divine side it tells us, as believers in God, that the Law of Retribution is a Law of *Infinite Love*. It exists for the advancement of Good, the debasement of Evil, the triumph of Purity and of Peace; and our own consciences acknowledge that Peace is unattainable without the attainment of purity.

"The instant this latter thought is realised, he who strives most earnestly after purity will be the very first to say, as the Prophet said, 'Woe is me! for I am undone, because I am a man of unclean lips;' or to cry out with the Apostle, 'Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord.' And the question at once arises, Is there anything in the Doctrine of Retribution itself,—anything in the code of Natural Religion immediately founded upon it,—which can soften a difficulty confessedly superhuman: superhuman, and altogether impracticable to man? For, who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean? . . . The Doctrine of Retribution itself, viewed as we have viewed it, points us firmly and freely to the 'larger hope.' Yet could there not possibly exist some means for purifying the impure,—could there be nothing to bestow true Heart's Ease upon the foreboding spirit,

a living Amaranth on frail and mortal creatures,—then surely the Law of Retribution must cease to be a Law of Purity and of Love. No human soul could find, or even reasonably seek, Moral Freedom, Perfection, Peace. The Present would remain what it is—a struggle. The Future never could become what we have hoped—a Repose.

“The more truthful answer is this. As in the world of mechanical nature, fixed and determinate, there subsists a world of Moral Nature, aspiring, capable of reformation and self-formation: as, amidst the sphere of things insensate, or simply instinctive—the low and the limited—there exists a Being upon whom are inscribed certain lineaments of the Infinite; so that, by virtue of his existence, the purely Natural carries within it the *Supra-natural*: precisely in the same manner does there dwell within Natural Religion the moving life-power of supernatural Belief. The Law of Retribution, revealed in us, anticipates a Spiritual Law bringing Freedom from a Sphere by nature above us—a Spiritual Law, endowed with such Divine Life as can make us Spiritually Free.”

The characteristics even of the Spiritual Law may, the author goes on to show, by the same analogy be distantly but distinctly observed—prescribing a moral element in every mode of religious purification, and suggesting as a mediating Personality, not a Man-god, one of our weak selves glorified, but a God-man, a Son of Glory descending to share our sorrows.

It need scarcely be said that a conditional immortality is nowhere found written in the volume of our common human nature. The prophecy it contains of good to the righteous stands for ever correlated with one of evil to the wicked. It is not a prophecy of existence to the well-doer, and of non-existence to the evil-doer. The “fearful looking for” which, as the accompaniment of sin, must be one of the first experiences of fallen man, and the first stepping-stone to “repentance unto life,” ought, on the Destructionist theory, to be everywhere derided and explained away. It has no objective foundation—it is a subjective illusion, a traditional heirloom handed down from Greek philosophers and Jewish Pharisees, an interim belief fit only for the horn-book period of the Divine dispensations, a strange survival of heathenish superstition that should henceforth be relegated with gods of wood and stone to the museum of some half-crazy antiquary. But against such trifling with our deepest religious convictions the solemn protest of the human conscience will ever make

itself heard, affirming the righteousness of the sentence that attaches an endless penalty to moral evil. Annihilation, no matter by what tremendous catastrophe preceded, cuts off the consequences of transgression, and makes the ways of the Lord unequal, who indeed "trieth the righteous," but does not "plentifully reward the proud doer." Against this insidious doctrine, which, by destroying one of the two eternal sanctions of an eternal law, dulls the edge of remorse, weakens the sense of guilt, and postpones the necessity of repentance, the work we have been surveying raises up an impregnable bulwark. It does not pander to the enfeebling positive philosophy of the day, but exposes its weaknesses and shows the hollowness and untenableness of every form of scepticism, even of that scepticism which is satisfied with dislodging but one of the cornerstones of our unchangeable creed. We trust the Bampton Lecturer of 1875 will long be spared to bless the Church and the age with the ripe fruits of his consecrated philosophy and scholarship.

ART. VII.—*America in the Centennial Year.*

THERE is no country in regard to which Englishmen are so liable to come to conclusions equally confident and mistaken as America. We presume ourselves to be entitled to judge American institutions and affairs on analogies drawn from our own country. The people of the two countries are largely of the same blood, either Anglo-Saxon or, at any rate, Teutonic or Keltic, or a mixture of Teutonic and Keltic; they speak the same language; their minds are saturated with the same literature. How natural to conclude that they live under similar social and educational conditions, and that, if we meet with the like causes, we may expect the like effects; if we find the like effects, they must be traceable to the like causes. Nevertheless in so concluding we shall inevitably fall into serious error.

The people at large—they number twice the population of England—read the best English authors far more extensively than the English people, yet the newspapers which they read every day are, with very rare exceptions, in style, in matter, and above all in spirit and tone, a sorry, not seldom a shameful, contrast to the high-toned and well-written newspaper press of England. Well read again as they are in the literature of their own tongue—probably no people so well read—and well informed though they are beyond all other nations as to modern facts, yet the people of no leading nation have been so irregularly, or, on the whole, so scantily schooled, in no great country is the range of studies in the public schools so low in proportion to age, and in none are culture and taste, and all that belongs to the higher and more finished discipline of a truly liberal education, so feebly developed in proportion to the amount of general intelligence and the diffusion of competency and comfort. They are, in short, a slightly schooled and a meagrely accomplished, but a largely self-educated people—a people well read in English authors.

In our own country again the ballot, whilst it has afforded protection to the voter, has not, as yet, proved unfriendly to the freest individuality and even caprice of voting; but, on the contrary, has rather afforded cover for

such caprice; whereas, in America, the operation of the ballot over the wide areas of election, and in the intensity of party strife, which are special features in the political conditions of the country, has been to render caucuses necessary engines of party politics, and implicit submission to the decisions of the caucuses—in other words the extinction of all individuality of choice or judgment in voting—an inexorable necessity of party organisation. Politics have thus become a matter of scientific arrangement and complex calculation which only experts can work or understand, and these experts—called in America “politicians,” and constituting in that country a special professional class—are the necessary wire-pullers of their respective parties, rule in the caucuses and virtually govern the politics of the country. They are mostly adventurers, are proverbially unscrupulous, are paid for their services, expect to obtain lucrative offices and heavy perquisites, and diffuse an odour of chicanery and corruption through the whole political organisation of the country. The fact that every office changes hands with every presidential change, and that the “spoils of office” are divided among the politicians, down even to village postmasterships and the smallest registrarships, adds to the intensity of the evil we have described. Such are some of the circumstances which make a thrifty, hard-working, middle-class country to be at this moment a spectacle of political corruption such as old monarchies in their worst days of tyranny and personal rule have seldom equalled.

An aggravating circumstance, moreover, is found in a political arrangement which at first sight might well appear likely to contribute directly towards good and wise government. In order that every citizen of free America may have his way open to take a full share in government, and to rise to any office he may be competent to fill, all representatives elected to attend a legislative chamber, whether in one of the States or at Washington, and whether in Senate or in the Lower House, are paid for their services. The pay is very moderate, barely sufficient for the wants of the thriftiest and most unpretending of representatives, conceived on a scale of what might naturally be spoken of as republican political virtue and domestic economy. Beforehand, we imagine that nearly everyone would have regarded such an arrangement as obviously good and right, especially in the case of a republic, many

of whose founders retained a strong savour of Puritan simplicity and virtue. Indeed, it would seem to have been a matter of necessity in the early years of the Union. Yet, in fact, this arrangement has worked disastrously. The pay, coupled with public office, strongly tempts the adventurer, the "politician," while it rather repels than attracts the industrious and well-to-do men of business. If such a citizen is to give up his independence and accept the position of a public servant, liable to be treated as a hireling and a placeman, open to all the imputations which attach to such a position, he ought at least to receive something like adequate compensation. To accept poverty and place, giving up for this his business competency and prospects, as well as his personal independence, is more than can be expected of an American citizen. But to an adventurer, a "politician," who has no competency, no business, no prospects, except such as are dependent on his own ingenuity and political adaptability, the pay annexed to public employment is a substantial inducement, and the fact that office in America is nearly always, and may always be, associated with gifts, with *douceurs*, with perquisites, of various sorts, makes the total value of a place in the Legislature to be very great indeed—great, if it be only in the State Legislature, much greater, if the way opens into Congress. Of these "politicians" a large proportion acquire some smattering of the law—an easy acquisition in the States. They thus become nominally members of a profession, and improve somewhat their social status. At other times they have some military titles, such titles being the commonest of social baubles in the States. A few of these military politicians may have been for awhile in the army; but the great majority have "graduated" in the local militia only. In reality, however, the whole class we are now describing belong strictly and truly to but one profession, that of "politician." They climb from grade to grade in this line of public service until at length they obtain their ambition in Congress, possibly even in some diplomatic post or some considerable administrative appointment.

Of course there are men, not a few in the aggregate, who are thrust into office by the public opinion of the community among whom they have risen, without ambition, to a conspicuous and influential place. In moments of emergency, at a time of public need, or after some public

scandal, such men are obliged to come forward and take a public part; manifest duty utters its call to them, and their influence and authority are recognised by their neighbours. And it is possible that, having been thus compelled to accept public position and responsibility, such men may rise to commanding eminence and may afterwards permanently hold office. Such cases, however, whether in a municipality, in a state, or in the national Congress, would appear to be quite the exception—the exception which emphasizes the rule.

One other anomaly—at first sight most strange to an English observer—remains to be pointed out. This is that public corruption has unquestionably increased, and the character of American statesmen and politicians fallen much lower, since slavery was abolished. We should have anticipated a very different result. Slavery was, beyond doubt, a most contaminating and demoralising institution. It barbarised the masters and mistresses and corrupted the whole tone of society; all classes alike and both sexes were inevitably degraded and demoralised. And yet what we have intimated is true; indirectly one result of emancipation has been to increase public corruption, at least as presented at Washington. The “Southern aristocracy” of former days, whilst by the influence of slavery it was, in certain respects, barbarised in grain, had yet some qualities—qualities naturally found in an educated, wealthy, leisurely, ruling caste—which fitted them for public office; they were superior to mercenary corruption; they possessed hereditary culture; they looked to the public service as their natural sphere of employment; they brought to such service habits, traditions, maxims of personal honour, family connections, which all tended to fit them for its honourable discharge. The North conceded to the South the lead in national politics and government; they expected the posts of honour at Washington, from the Presidency downwards, and diplomatic offices abroad, to be filled by Southern men, or by New England men, sustained by Southern support and alliances. Nor can it be denied that from the South arose a succession of statesmen and public servants of whom many combined high personal honour with great abilities and accomplishments. Antipathy to a hateful and ruinous system must not blind us to the merits of not a few of the slave-owning class. Indeed, the late slave war itself showed how superior were many of the men

reared in the South, notwithstanding the cause with which it was their fate to be associated. Of the integrity and piety of General Jackson, of the singularly elevated character of General Lee, of the high character, as well as the genius and accomplishments, of Commodore Maury, no one can doubt.

But the effect of the war has been not merely to alienate, but, for the most part, to break up and destroy the planter families of the South. They are a ruined race; and, to a large extent, they have disappeared. To them no Republican party could look for service, even if they still flourished; but, so far as we can learn, they are not likely in future, as a rule, to furnish, in any large proportion, statesmen or diplomatists again for either party, for the Democrats any more than for the Republicans. The consequence has been that the high offices of the State have been largely filled by such adventurers as we have described. Hence the corruption—the sale of offices, the unblushing bribery, which has fixed an indelible stigma upon the administration of General Grant. The President himself, indeed, seems to have been little, if at all, implicated personally. The worst thing that can be fairly alleged against him is that he has not always been superior to the reception of presents or financial favours. But still of direct or distinct corruption, or misprision of corruption, on his part, his assiduous enemies have been able to find no proof. He has, however, been surrounded by profligate administrators. Among these some of his former military friends, in particular the notorious General Belknap, have been unenviably conspicuous.

Probably General Grant's own deficiencies—his want of culture, of social status and connections, of honourable antecedents previous to the war—the general mediocrity, in short, of the man, notwithstanding his undeniable common sense and his unflinching courage—have placed the Republican party at a disadvantage since his election to the Presidency. Many of the chief and choice of the party, it is well known, held altogether aloof from him. Charles Sumner's bitter animosity may, in large part, have been stimulated by personal considerations; but Sumner led and represented, in his marked estrangement, a wing of the Republican party which, if not large, was influential. Certain it is, that the highest circles of Republican character and influence have been very scantily repre-

sented in General Grant's administrations during his two terms of office ; and, that during the last twelve months, until the nomination of Hayes for the Presidency gave a new and unimpeachable head to the Republican party, there had appeared to be a great probability of a fusion being effected between a considerable section of the high-class Republicans, especially in Massachusetts, and the Tilden party. Even now, indeed, it appears that the great influence of Charles Francis Adams and his family is pledged to the support of Tilden.*

One of the first steps towards the effectual reform of American institutions will, in our judgment, be the creation of a class of high-bred public men, who combine education, social position, competent financial independence, and official traditions and training ; from out of whose ranks, not exclusively, indeed, but largely, the chief officers of the State, including the President and the leading diplomatists of the country, may be chosen. The country, especially the Northern States, cannot be said to be destitute of such men, or such-like men. There are the families now which should furnish such functionaries, and there are also at least some men who, if they had but the opportunity, would fill with credit the highest positions in the State, several of them having already served in public posts of greater or less importance. But the fault of these men is that they are too independent, of too select a social standing, too quasi-aristocratic. Hence they are ostracised from high office. In the South aristocracy was admitted as a social institution, and the North, partly, perhaps, under political fear and compulsion, allowed the Southern aristocrats to hold office—we should say rather, allowed them to regard office as their natural inheritance and appropriate sphere. But, for reasons which we have no space here to explain, the American people will not have a Northern class of hereditary public families, no matter what may have been the fame or the worth of the heads of such families in earlier generations. Hence such families as the Adams' and the Winthrops now contribute no statesmen for the public service. The dread of an "oligarchy" produces such effects in the United States.

And yet, as we have intimated, until there exists for the

* Since the text was sent to press, Mr. Adams has been nominated by the Democratic Convention of Massachusetts as their candidate for the governorship of that State.

public service an adequate succession of men to fill the foremost posts who are, both from education and personal character, and also from financial and social position, superior to the suspicion of being governed by mercenary aims, or mean ambitions, or ignoble passions, we do not see how the character of the public service is to be redeemed, or the machinery of administration to be rescued from the invading and insatiable swarm of professional "politicians." The first requirement is to have, in the highest places, men above fear and above reproach. Then, by degrees, reform may be expected to extend downwards; after awhile the "civil service" may come to be rendered pure and efficient; and, instead of a term of office for civil servants lasting only while the administration lasts, it may come to be a life-service, to which only men of proved character and competency can be admitted.

Such is a slight sketch of the actual results of administrative working in the great American Republic during its first century of existence. Results more contradictory to the expectations and predictions of the founders and early panegyrists of the United States could hardly be imagined.

But, in truth, one source of miscalculation and of contradictory result has been that the founders of the republic constructed its polity and built up its constitutional laws and arrangements on analogies derived largely from the experience of the colonies in their early days of simplicity and economy, and whilst as yet the scale on which election and administration were organised was very limited. A polity which might have worked very well for a cluster of small, frugal, and virtuous States on the eastern seaboard, when the spirit of Cincinnatus prevailed among public men, when the issues raised were few and simple, may well be altogether unsuitable to the conditions of a commonwealth which well-nigh covers a continent and includes classes and populations of every character and almost every race, in which the public service constitutes a vast lottery of prizes, great and small; in which greed and ambition grow up rankly everywhere; and in which no one question, no single man, no special set of principles, can well exercise, under ordinary circumstances, any paramount influence over public convictions.

As to one thing only is there reason, at this centennial epoch, for the United States to indulge in high self-congratulation, so far as its internal political and social

condition is concerned, and that is its deliverance from the ulcer and incubus of slavery. There is, at any rate, an end of that monster evil with all its complications. Twenty years ago slavery threatened worse mischief by far to America than all the evils of to-day. But that has gone; gone sooner far than any could have anticipated—gone by a way of sacrifice, of suffering, of heroism, of triumph, which none could have imagined. In a terrible tragedy the terrible tangle of sin and wretchedness, of oppression and immorality, was rent to pieces and done away. And now, sooner than could have been hoped, we are beginning to see the promise of settled progress and improvement for what were formerly the Slave States. The crop of cotton is now larger than it was before the war. That fact speaks volumes. The cotton estates are broken up. The soil is now owned and farmed, in part, by Northern men, and, in part also, by coloured men, who have been able to purchase, at a low price, small portions for themselves. The result abundantly proves that the owning and farming, under the new conditions, is, on the whole, a great success. Education, also, under whatever drawbacks and difficulties, is making progress among the coloured people. Doubtless the anomalies, the scandals, the confusions, in the Southern States are still, and will long continue to be, most discouraging and perplexing. But another generation will show a miraculous change. In some parts of the South, indeed, as in Florida, Northern capital and enterprise are developing new kinds of culture with remarkable success. The oranges of Florida are of surpassing quality, as well as of a noble growth, and will ere long be known and sought after according to their merits. Probably there are none equal to them in any country.

Anyhow, the States are rid of slavery; and that deliverance was worth any sacrifice. "One woe is past." There can be no worse to come. There may, indeed, be other struggles and sore troubles yet in the future. But if the first century of American history, whatever problems and perplexities may, during its course, have grown up into threatening forms and complications, has yet seen the country not only wax vast and mighty beyond all expectation or forecast, but also delivered from the intestine misery and curse of slavery, America will not be daunted by the difficulties of the present hour. It will confidently trust that less than another century will behold the end of

such constitutional ailments and derangements as we have described.

With slavery would seem also to have been done away the old grounds of party distinction in the United States, while no other permanent grounds of such distinction have emerged to serve as a substitute. The war has made a final end of the points of controversy which defined the essential principles of the Democratic party. That party looked back to Jefferson as its great original, and adopted from him the principles of French democracy as its cardinal convictions. These were, especially, two—the civil and political equality of every man, and the paramount rights of majorities in every community. These are still the main principles of Continental republicanism. The second of these principles is interpreted by French republicans of the pronounced type to-day as giving to each organised community a right, so far as it sees fit, to govern itself independently. On this principle the Parisian commune acted in 1870; in Lyons and Marseilles this right of self-government is held as a sacred principle by the *outriers*. In America the form which this principle assumed was that of claiming for each state, acting through its majorities, the right of sovereignty, and, if it should so please, of separation from the rest—of “secession.” This, accordingly, had for several generations been recognised as one of the “planks” of the Democratic “platform,” up to the time of the late civil war, itself essentially a war of “secession,” an armed attempt on the part of the Southern or Slave States to carry into effect the Democratic claim for liberty to secede and separate. That claim, however, has now been finally settled and disallowed by the terrible and decisive arbitrament of war; has been crushed down into silence and impotence by the iron heel of conquest. Nay, more, the constitution has been so modified as to leave no liberty of raising the claim again in future. Thus an end has been made of one of the two essential principles of the Democratic party in the States.

The other principle of the Democratic party affirmed, as we have said, the civil and political equality of all men, as such. This principle, strangely enough, found special acceptance in the Southern States. It went along with the other of which we have spoken; it was part and parcel of the French philosophy and culture which found so much favour among the cosmopolitan gentlemen of the South;

it was recommended by the great authority of Jefferson ; it had the merit of being anti-English and quintessentially Democratic. It could not, indeed, be denied without giving up at the same time the principle of the sacred and paramount rights of majorities, and the sovereignty of the several States. The men of the South, accordingly, were obliged to hold fast by it. It was, indeed, accepted, with or without the principle of State sovereignty, by a large proportion of the men of the North. But, as held and applied in the Slave States, it brought with it a special consequence the pinch and pressure of which would not have been felt in a country where slavery was unknown. It placed the Slave States in this dilemma, that either the equal and true humanity of the coloured race must be denied or slavery must be abolished, and the slaves themselves placed on a full level, in matters civil and political, with their masters. The latter alternative seemed to the Southerner not only revolting but impossible. Hence it became a necessary tenet among Southern politicians, and it passed into an article of the Democratic political creed, that the coloured race were not men in the same sense as the white races; that they belonged to a different species; that they were inferior animals, for whom slavery was the fit, and right, and providentially destined position. The Confederate Vice-President, Stephens, said that this doctrine was the corner-stone of the Confederation. It was so, because it had for generations been the corner-stone of Southern policy and statesmanship.

But by the results of the civil war, an end has also been made of the controversy that raged around this question. All coloured men have now actually been placed on the same level, as to civil and political rights and franchises, at least nominally,* with all other American citizens. So that, in respect to this, as to the other "plank" of the proper "Democratic platform," there is now no room whatever for further party conflict. The Democrats

* We say, "at least nominally," because still throughout the South, as indeed even in the Northern States is generally the case, the coloured child is not allowed to attend the free public school, the "common school," together with the white children. If there is not a "coloured school" he is left without education. In New York itself coloured children attend none but coloured schools, of which there are only five or six for the whole city, so that the great distances to be travelled interfere very seriously with the attendance of the children.

of to-day are consequently left without any distinctive principles whatever.

Of course the like is true of the Republican party. This party held to national federalism as a paramount and supreme principle of the constitution. That principle is now placed above the range of party controversy. They held that slavery was intrinsically contrary to American liberty and the governing principles of the constitution, and that, if it could not at once be done away, it ought to be strictly restrained from spreading through the Union, or advancing beyond the lines which divided, according to statute and covenant, the free North from the slave-holding South. Their political theory did not compel them to recognise the absolute and necessary civil and political equality of all men, or to deny the proper humanity of the coloured race for the sake of democratic consistency and thoroughness. But they can have no occasion now and hereafter for maintaining any controversy on such questions; the logic of the war has inexorably settled all.

From all which considerations it follows that the present party contest between Republicans and Democrats in America is little else than a personal controversy. No principles are really involved in it. Of course the old Republicans form a set and cling together. Of course, also, those who in former days held Democratic principles retain their personal bias, dislike at least in political sense the set of men who vanquished them, and would like to see their own personal friends in power. There are two sets of officials, and two sets of political connections; of these one set has been in office now for many years, and the other has been out. But, apart from past history, past friendships and animosities, past political connections or official associations, there are no grounds,—in respect of practical political questions or principles, there are no assignable grounds whatever—for keeping up the former party distinctions. There is scarcely a point of practical statesmanship of any importance as to which the opinions of Mr. Hayes, the Republican, are known to differ from those of Mr. Tilden, the Democratic candidate for the Presidency. In May last the "independent" party in the States—including such adherents as Carl Schurz, William Cullen Bryant, Mr. Bryant's son-in-law, the well-known journalist, Mr. Parkes, Charles Francis Adams, and R. C. Winthrop—all men of the highest character and influence, and all

formerly belonging to the Republican party—declared that, unless Mr. Bristow were adopted as the Republican candidate, they, as leagued together on behalf of political character and purity, should combine to support Mr. Tilden as the candidate for the Presidency. At the time they were dreading the probable nomination of Mr. Blaine, in whose character they had no confidence. The nomination of Mr. Hayes, who appears to be a man of modesty and integrity, has conciliated, as we gather, some of this independent party, even although their particular favourite, Mr. Bristow, was not accepted as the Republican nominee, but Mr. Adams, at any rate, has shown himself to be as good as his word by declaring publicly his adhesion to Mr. Tilden. Mr. Bristow, we may remark in passing, appears to have lost the nomination chiefly because he had sprung into office and into eminence without any aid from the professional "politicians" of his party.

Some time ago it seemed as if the question of "hard money" or "soft money" might have furnished a working line of party separation. But that is now impossible. Mr. Tilden is an abler and more influential supporter of a metallic basis and a strictly convertible paper currency than Mr. Hayes. It is true that Mr. Hendricks, the vice-president designate of the Democratic party, is personally favourable to the absurd and mischievous principle of an inconvertible paper currency; and, so far, his candidature perplexes and weakens his party. But yet the Democratic platform, as settled at St. Louis last summer, is a distinctly "hard money" platform; and if Mr. Hendricks is unsound on finance, it is to be feared that there are not wanting Republicans of some standing in their party who are similarly unsound. Mr. Tilden will be troubled and injured by his connection with Mr. Hendricks, but is not likely, if chosen President, to allow any weakness to be shown on that side. His antecedents, his business relations, and his intellectual superiority, may be taken to guarantee him as to this point.

The question of Free Trade comes nearer to the character of a test question than that of the currency. Doubtless the policy of the Republicans, hitherto, has been a policy of Protection, while the Democratic party at St. Louis adopted a manifesto which seems to look decidedly in the direction of Free Trade. But yet it cannot certainly be affirmed that the Republican party is absolutely committed to the uncon-

ditional maintenance of Protection, or that the Democratic party has pledged itself to the lightening of protective duties. The fact is rather that Republican principles have hitherto found their chief supporters in those Northern and Eastern States where manufacturing industry is most developed, and has thriven under the shelter and encouragement of protective duties, while those Southern and Western States in which the Democratic party has chiefly found supporters are, for the most part, occupied with the growth of crops which seek a market in Europe, and are exchanged to the best advantage with the products of European manufacturing industry. Free Trade, accordingly, can hardly be made a test-question between the two parties, and, if it were, it is evident that some new party nomenclature would have to be adopted. The epithets *Democratic* and *Republican* respectively would not avail to indicate the two contrary commercial policies of Free Trade and Protection. We may, however, regard it as very probable that American political parties of the future will, under some new names which will have to be discovered, concern themselves increasingly with commercial questions and controversies. At the same time, we have no expectation that the policy of Protection will be suddenly abandoned, whatever party may be in office. Free Trade in the United States can only, as we believe, win its way gradually to general acceptance. More than a few years will probably elapse before the commercial policy of England will find its counterpart in the United States.

Once more, the question of subsidising denominational schools has been sometimes spoken of during the last year or two, as if that would furnish the necessary distinction between the two parties. But that distinction, it is now evident, cannot be maintained, at least as yet. The Democrats altogether disclaim and repudiate the idea of their favouring what have been looked upon as the "Catholic claims" as to this question. No thoughtful person, indeed, would be surprised if, at some not distant period, an organised agitation were to arise upon this subject. Across the Canadian border the Roman Catholics see their co-religionists maintaining their own schools out of taxes contributed by themselves, and relieved, to a corresponding extent, from contributing to the general school taxation of the locality in which they live. It is likely enough that, when the favourable time comes, they may demand no less

consideration throughout the States of the Union. But at present they make no such demand. Their highest ecclesiastical authorities find it necessary at present to declare that it is far from their thought to do any such thing.

Here, then, is another special feature which marks the opening of the second century of the history of the American Union. There is really no question of principle between the parties which are contending,—on the old lines of organisation, for the most part,—for the victory in the coming presidential campaign. It is a contest of persons and personal preferences or antipathies rather than of principles. Already the “independent” party has furnished evidence that new party lines must before long be chosen. Old party memories die sooner in America than in this country; party organisation is less tenacious of official traditions and customary associations; parties know little or nothing of family solidarity or hereditary ties of unity. In the States each President reconstructs his party, while in England parties are independent of the Crown, live as energetically and with as close an organisation in opposition as in office, and are maintained for long years together by the energy and authority of a well-knit band of leaders. Hence, in the United States, under present circumstances, we may expect before long an entire reconstruction of parties, on lines entirely irrespective of the controversies which have divided the country during the years that are gone. We hardly venture to hope that the reform of the civil service will be one of the professed objects of any great party in the near future. Such an object would at once array the army of placemen and “politicians” against the party which brought it prominently forward. Not the less will all parties, we anticipate, find themselves, by a constantly increasing pressure of public opinion, compelled to contribute something towards satisfying this cardinal necessity. To the Press the country must chiefly look as the power to bring this about. And, among many discouraging features in the present aspect of American affairs, it is matter of no small encouragement to find that, faulty and inferior as it still is, the American Press is every way superior at the present time to what it was thirty years ago, and that it appears to be steadily, if slowly, improving from year to year.

The reform and reconstruction of the civil service would open the way for a course of gradual reform and recon-

struction in other respects, both within the several States and in the national government and administration. At present complications, difficulties, abuses furnish pasture ground for the "politicians," whose interests are opposed to all radical reforms. No people are naturally more open-eyed and candid in the admission of their national defects or abuses than the Americans, or more anxious for their removal, but at present an organised army of interested political agents and public servants, swarming everywhere, and holding in their hands all official experience, and influence, and patronage, are leagued together to prevent any such thing as honest and thorough dealing with existing evils.

The first legislative work of reform to be accomplished is, undoubtedly, the reform of the public service; and this, as we have said, is to be brought about by the power of the Press. But, also, as we remarked on an earlier page, in order to begin to move towards taking this primary step in the way of all consecutive improvement, it is necessary that the high offices of the State should be held by men who neither themselves belong to the class of professional "politicians," nor have been indebted for their promotion and their posts to the influence of such politicians. Unless the President and his Cabinet are men of independent and of high personal position, the first movement cannot be made in the way of improvement. We come back to what we said before: the most pressing present necessity of America would seem to be a class of "consular" men, and of families from which such men may be expected to come forward; never to the exclusion, in the least degree, of such men of distinction as may have emerged from obscurity, yet so as to furnish, even if such new men of mark should not appear, an ordinary and steadfast supply for a need that must in the nature of things be constant; for a demand that must be permanent.

It is vain to speculate as to the changes which another century may have wrought in the vast and inconceivably opulent aggregate of territories which are now the United States of America. Although, for reasons, some of which are associated with lamentable moral and social evils, while others connect themselves with physical conditions, and perhaps also with habits of life, tending to bodily degeneracy, there is, in some of the Eastern States, little, if any, natural increase of population; yet, looking at the country

as a whole, at the vast territories still unoccupied, the sparse population in most of the States, and all the influences which tend to encourage immigration and increase of population, we cannot but conclude that another hundred years will probably have seen the present number of inhabitants increased fourfold, and not much less than two hundred millions of people occupying the continental space between the Gulf and the Dominion of Canada. Will all that territory, will all those millions, be at that time under one government, represented in one national legislature, regulated by laws emanating, year by year, from that Legislature, distributed among a hundred States, but aggregated into one strict bond of federation? Such questions as these arise spontaneously, as we think of the future, but they not only defy our power to answer, they defy speculation even to frame probable surmises.

No one, however, who was present at Philadelphia on the 10th of May last, when the Centennial Exhibition was opened, who witnessed the pride and excitement, without tumult, of the immense concourse, the national pomp and circumstance of the opening, the gathering of President and Cabinet, and foreign diplomatists, of military force, of civil leaders, of wealth and beauty, of overflowing crowds, the banners and the pageantry, the exultation, the ecstasy, —who heard the splendid music, giving out in succession the national airs of every great country in the world, and the admirable orchestra rendering Whittier's centennial hymn, as set to a most chaste and effective measure, a sort of chorale, with a precision, a sweetness, and withal a force, never to be forgotten by those who heard it, the whole scene being bounded, line beyond line, but with peopled spaces between, by the vast crystal palaces in which the Exhibition, in its various departments, was set forth; no one who witnessed all this last May, and afterwards went through the Exhibition itself, can have any doubt that America is destined to develop resources, forms of industry, wealth of products, in every kind, compared with which all that it has hitherto done is but a faint outline and a trivial instalment.

We have referred already to the question of Free Trade as one of the coming questions of American politics. But we have also intimated that the system of Protection is not likely to be soon or easily abandoned in the States. It will, we apprehend, be gradually done away, but very

gradually. We English, having thirty years ago become converts to the principles of Free Trade, are virtuously indignant with those who, in this matter, are a generation or more behind us. Nevertheless, the experience of America can hardly be said to prove that Protection, on the whole, has been an error in that country thus far. To Captain Galton—as is evident from recent letters of his in the *Times*—it has rather suggested the contrary. He has visited the Centennial Exhibition, and seen there how American manufactures have been developed during the last thirty years; he has visited certain seats of manufacturing industry; and he bears witness that American manufactures have, under Protection, gained such a rooting and such a growth as have not only secured for them a permanent establishment in their own country, but enabled them to enter into competition with foreign countries. But he intimates, further, that, having obtained such a position, it will become necessary before long, in order to their further adequate development, that Protection shall be exchanged for Free Trade. There is no contradiction or paradox in this twofold view, although at first it might seem so. And some obvious considerations would seem to confirm Captain Galton's ideas.

It would seem as if, in the initial stage, Protection may wisely be applied to certain industries in a country, but not to others. These are such as would naturally spring up in the country, if it were not for the competition of similar industries long established in other countries; and such as, if they were once established, the country would have special advantages in carrying on. A country, for example, which abounds beyond other countries in the useful metals, and also in coal of every description, and in which the metals and the coal are placed in convenient proximity to each other, would seem to be one in which the metals ought to be worked, and in which, if once the industry was established, the result would be permanent emolument and success. Now, America is just such a country; its natural supplies of iron, copper, and coal are unrivalled. Still, without Protection, large industries in iron and copper manufactures would hardly have been established. The first outlay in the establishment of manufactures is very great, and the cost of working afterwards is also, in the United States, exceedingly heavy. All first outlays in such cases are heavy; all such enterprises in any country

involve more or less of risk—the risk is often great ; but in a country where manufacturing labour is so scarce and so costly as in the States, such outlays and such risks could not but be disproportionately formidable. Besides which, in America capital is comparatively scarce, very much scarcer than in England, while interest and customary returns upon capital are much larger than in this country. Under such circumstances, it was the more improbable that capital would be sunk in enterprises which, however sure they might be to open up wealth and large returns for the distant future, were still more sure to involve heavy loss for the present and for an indefinite period to follow.

Protection alone could assure the American capitalist of returns adequate to compensate him for his outlay in founding and starting manufacturing industries. This protection has been given ; the foreign competitor has been either barred from the field, or only allowed to enter on such conditions as left a large margin of profit to the American manufacturers who sold at the foreigner's terms, or undersold him. This protection has been continued now for many years. The consequence has been a perfectly marvellous development of iron and copper manufactures, and, in particular, of iron. America can now supply its own wants in this respect, and, indeed, is beginning to threaten Europe with its competition. Its command of labour, also, for its work has greatly increased. Americans themselves never do mining work or heavy manufacturing work ; indeed, as a rule the artisans of the States are all of foreign extraction, if not of foreign birth. But Germans and Irish, together with the Africans and the Chinese in certain departments, are to them as the Gibeonites were to the ancient Israelites ; not, indeed, literally hewers of wood and drawers of water, but subordinate industrial helpers who do the rough and mean work of the nation's advance.

Another branch of industry in which, during the last thirty years, America has made wonderful advances, is that of cotton manufacture. The goods made will often compete with the very best made in England, and they have, during the last few years, been sold at low prices. In Canada American cottons have supplanted English. Indeed, American goods have been offered in England during the last twelve months at lower prices than they could be made for in this country. That, however, is no doubt owing to the desperate straits to

which all American manufacturers, and especially the textile manufacturers, have been driven during the last two or three years. In machinery our cousins are peculiarly ingenious and inventive; cotton is a product of their own country, and Irish labour largely feeds the factories of New England.

From the letters of Captain Galton, in the *Times*, to which we lately referred, we make the following extracts, in illustration of the remarks we have now made:—

“Without discussing the wisdom of the protective policy, or how far it has been instrumental in aggravating the present stagnation of trade, it is certain that it has led to the erection of a large number of factories and of numerous iron and steel works, and to a rapid development of manufacturing industry, as evidenced by the great increase in late years of the amount of coal raised. Thus, while the total amount of coal raised in the United States in 1870 was about 32,000,000 tons, as compared with 113,000,000 raised in Great Britain, the coal raised in the United States in 1874 was 50,000,000 tons, as compared with 125,000,000 raised in Great Britain. Of the coal thus raised in 1874 only about 500,000 tons was exported from the United States, of which about 400,000 tons was exported to the Dominion of Canada. The coal-fields of the United States cover an area of 196,000 miles; the coal is, in most cases, easily accessible; iron ore is abundant, both near the coal-fields and elsewhere.” “Although there is not so large an amount of new railway in construction as was the case in 1872 and 1873, many lines are substituting steel for iron rails. The rails now used in the United States are almost all being manufactured in that country, and it is not probable that England will be called upon much longer to supply rails for the United States. The development which the manufacturers of the United States have attained, and the energy with which they work, make it manifest that, not only can we no longer expect to obtain a market for our manufactured goods in the United States, but that we must be prepared to find the manufacturers of that country competing with us in every market to which we and they have access for all our principal manufactures, such as iron, cotton goods, &c. It is most important that England should thoroughly appreciate its true position in this matter.” “It is not Protection alone that has developed American industries; the development is due to a combination of circumstances; but Protection induced the investment in workshops and factories of those large sums of money which were thrown upon the country by Government

contracts during the war. Coal and ironstone exist in comparatively unlimited quantities and in positions very favourable for working in close proximity to an inexhaustible supply of food. The American nation has been formed from the more energetic members of the principal northern European nations, for to be an emigrant requires energy. These works and factories, being thus in existence side by side with many favourable conditions for working, will naturally struggle for work and for a market, and in seeking foreign markets must necessarily disregard protective prices. I saw various articles in metal, such as gratings, ventilating louvres, and such like, better made and cheaper than similar articles in England. There are many branches of industry which the protective system has not developed largely, and in which our imports to America show no decrease. Pottery is, I believe, one of these. There are other branches which, possibly, might not survive the loss of protection; for instance, I visited a factory of morocco leather, in which the skins came, *via* Liverpool, from Calcutta, and the material used for tanning was imported from Sicily.

"My former letter had reference chiefly to the manufacture of iron, of machinery, and of cotton goods. I cannot but think that the enormous development of manufactories for these in the United States will lead to an early introduction of such American manufactures into foreign markets. There can, however, be no question but that when this occurs to any great extent it will be followed by the removal of the protective duties, and the adoption of a tariff framed for revenue rather than for protective purposes."*

These quotations not only illustrate what we have said as to the application of Protection in certain cases. They also give instances to show the folly of attempting by Protection to nurse into development what are really exotic and unsuitable industries. In these cases Protection is mere robbery of the general public for the benefit of a favoured set of craftsmen who profess and cultivate an alien industry. But Captain Galton also intimates that a general policy of Protection cannot permanently be maintained in America, even in the interests of manufacturers themselves. No apology can be offered for it under any circumstances except as a shelter and encouragement to a natural industry during its early stages of development, serving as the fence which surrounds the young tree, or as the glass which shelters the valuable but tender garden plant in its infancy. Protection, adopted as a standing rule, means arbitrarily

* *Times*, August 26th.

imposed and regulated taxation levied upon the general public for the sake of a number of industries which the Government has thought fit to patronise—means a congeries of monopolies. If an industry is suitable to a country, it will, after it is once established, maintain itself against natural rivalry. If it is not suitable, its protection involves the most unfair and indefensible of monopolies. Industries which have once obtained a footing, are afterwards naturally regulated and best developed under the laws and tests of free competition. Protection is an arrangement by which ignorance, sluggishness, and old blind custom, are maintained at the cost of the country against superior enterprise and enlightenment in other countries. It is true that America is a vast region, and that there must always be competition among American manufacturers themselves in their struggles to supply the demand of their own home population. But it is equally true that European competition is necessary to develop the utmost capabilities of American manufacturing industry; and necessary also to supply adequately, and at sufficiently low prices, the wants of the great and rapidly-increasing American population. Immense as the country is, and unrivalled as are its resources and capabilities, America cannot be to itself a self-sufficing world, shut off from the other human world without. The wonderful crops of America seeking export to Europe can only find the market they require when America is freely opened to European manufactures. Nay, the very manufactures of America, especially her metal and her cotton manufactures, need a European market which can only be furnished by such reciprocity of commercial relations as will open America in return to the textile and the metal manufactures of the world. How much protective taxation may fairly be justified on the grounds partly of revenue which must be raised, partly of the comparative infancy of certain manufactures, is of course an intricate and precarious problem to solve, even approximately, but there can be no doubt that the enormously high prices of all articles of clothing and upholstery in the States, the terrible rent-charges, and the excessive price of labour, are all owing in no inconsiderable degree to the system of Protection as now maintained. This system has, accordingly, greatly aggravated and prolonged that stagnation of all business which for three years past has weighed so oppressively on the States, and which

has had so much to do in either causing or greatly increasing the general business depression of this country and of Europe.

The remarks we have now made have naturally arisen out of our reference to the Centennial Exhibition at Philadelphia. England, indeed, stood paramount in that Exhibition as a manufacturing exhibitor. No Englishman could be otherwise than proud of his country's appearance in that world-fair. Many Americans were not a little surprised to see the British pre-eminence. Nevertheless America showed well, and the exhibition she made was most important as being but the promise of results far larger and more impressive which are to come forth during the next generation. In machinery, also, of which there was a very great display, America showed wonders—not only in the way of promise for the future, but of actual achievement.

America as yet is behind in art, in systematic education, of every grade, and generally in what is described as culture. But the frankness with which American officials and professional men admit their backwardness in these respects is the best pledge of future progress. The Bureau of Education at Washington has done its duty well in continually keeping before the mind of teachers and educational officials the need of systematic training for the teachers, of regular attendance in the schools, and of such thoroughness and such a range in public education as have not hitherto been known. High American authorities never pretend that public education in the States is comparable for general excellence, for completeness, or for organisation with the public education of England, whether in primary, secondary, or high class education. The most emphatic recent instance of the frankness of which we have spoken was in the case of the Massachusetts educational "exhibit" at Philadelphia. The gentleman in charge directed our attention to a number of specimens of drawing sent from Boston, and while lamenting the general backwardness of America—even of Massachusetts—in all matters of art culture, spoke with enthusiasm of the influence of South Kensington in the development of art, not only in England but in America, and in the handsomest manner gave the credit of the recent very marked progress made in art studies in Boston to Mr. Walter Smith, whom Boston had brought over from South Kensington, and to

whom the educationists of Boston had had the good sense to give *carte blanche* in all matters connected with his vocation.

As to education generally, we may remark in passing, there was very little to be learnt at the Centennial. Indeed, as, in the matter of education, methods cannot be exhibited, nor principles expounded, nor results shown in an exhibition, as the school-books of one country are seldom suitable for another, and after all, the true work of education in any grade has very little to do with what are called school-books, as, again, school-rooms, if really useful and adequate, must be everywhere pretty much alike, and all countries conceive to themselves very much the same sort of model arrangements, while in practice they all in general vary not a little from those arrangements, falling often, especially in Germany, greatly below them; for these and other such reasons an educational exhibition is a very empty sort of show. Canada, undoubtedly, made the best show at Philadelphia, especially with its maps, its books, and its instruments. Switzerland and Holland were represented in force, each nation contributing a complete summary of its educational system, and Holland furnishing a history, in English, of its educational progress and legislation. Germany sent nothing, neither did England. The educational system and methods of both countries include too much, both as to extent and variety, to admit of any attempt at exhibition.

The general want of refined culture, as distinguished from hard-headed intelligence and general reading, in the States seems to a visitor to be strikingly symbolised by the general deficiency of flower-culture. There are many professional florists, and vast sums are lavished on bouquets. But whereas in England the culture of flowers is universal; while every English farmstead has its flower-beds, as well as its kitchen garden; every village cot its flower border, and if possible its flowering creeper to adorn the cottage wall, and almost every house, large or small, in the towns, at least its window plants, if no scrap of garden is possible;—in America, speaking generally, flower gardens are scarcely known in towns throughout most of the States, and are very rare even where the farmsteads have for some time been well and comfortably settled. It is strange to travel through rich Illinois for nearly 800 miles, passing by many homesteads, and scarcely to see anything like a

flower garden ; strange to look through the suburbs of the great city of St. Louis, with so rich a soil, and so cordial a climate, and find indeed many noble houses, but scarcely anywhere a garden. In New York the appalling price of building land might account for the want of gardens within the city precincts ; but such an explanation does not, of course, apply generally in the United States. What seems to emphasize the general lesson taught by the fact of which we are speaking is, that in New England, with nearly the harshest climate and the hardest soil in the States, we find flower culture to be more common than anywhere else in the country, except perhaps some of the older settlements in New York State. It is most refreshing to an English eye to feast on the suburban gardens of Boston, with their flowers and their shrubberies. The explanation would appear to be that there is more of Old England in New England than anywhere else in the States, and, in particular, that there is more of taste, refinement, and general culture there than elsewhere. Philadelphia may be disposed to dispute this ; but, nevertheless, we believe it to be true. And we count it as a confirmation of our judgment in this respect that, even in Philadelphia, so much farther south, and with a soil as well as climate so much more congenial, there is much less of flowering beauty and fragrance among the streets and about the houses than in Boston.

Indeed, amid many brilliant features of success at Philadelphia, the Horticultural House was a marked failure. It was a beautiful crystal house, but the shrubs and plants made no good show. In fact they did not appear healthy ; and the men did not seem to know how to manage them. A striking contrast to this failure was presented not many yards away by an English nurseryman's rhododendrons. He had brought them all the way from Knap Hill, Surrey, and had placed them in a large glass-house of his own apart. There were between one and two hundred sorts, all in perfection. Though the rhododendron is a native of the country, it is but little known in America generally. That exhibition, however, made a very great sensation ; and we have no doubt that our enterprising Surrey nurseryman, costly as his venture must have been, has made a very good speculation of his visit to the American Centennial.

All, however, that belongs to domestic attractiveness and refinement will in time be brought to perfection in the States. Already, in domestic architecture, the best cities

of the States take the lead of the world. No doubt among the highest classes of Englishmen, such as those with whom Mr. Ticknor was intimate, and of whose houses, town and country, and domestic *ménage*, he has given such interesting and vivid descriptions in his letters, all that belongs to home comfort, refinement, and luxury, is found in a degree and of a kind not to be rivalled in the States. But, regarding the American people as essentially a middle-class people, and comparing the domestic architecture of rank with rank, class with class, there can be no doubt that America, in its great cities, much excels England. Each city seems to have its special cast and style of architecture. St. Louis is Southern; the style of Southern Europe modifies the Anglo-American style. Baltimore is Southern, too, but more purely American, whilst retaining, at the same time, especially in the older shops and houses, very much of the South-country English style. Chicago is square, monotonous, American, brand-new, but very spacious and commodious, and full of modern conveniences. Philadelphia is neat, regular, utilitarian—its inferior houses altogether deficient in architectural style and finish, although well built; its superior houses handsome, but not, like many Boston houses, picturesque, and not so sumptuous as those of New York. Boston is, to the taste of many English visitors, the most attractive city in the States. The houses are elegant; gardens are much made of, and are often charming in the season; all is done that can be done in such a climate for the growth of shrubs and ornamental trees. The older parts of the city remind one both of superior old English town quarters and of pleasant streets in the better parts of French or Belgian towns. The modern suburbs are full of beautiful villas, situated in trim little gardens, or what in the States are called “parks,” miniature enclosures with a grass plot and borders. But New York undoubtedly possesses the most solid and, at the same time, sumptuous domestic architecture in the States, and, we presume, in the world. The houses are built in excellent taste, of the best material, the rich brown stone of Connecticut being more common than any other, but white marble being sometimes used, as in the late Mr. Stuart’s house, or the beautiful and perfect bricks which are so peculiarly American, and which are not less valuable or handsome than the choicest stone, such as those which may be seen in the splendid Windsor Hotel. The internal

fittings of the houses are as solid, handsome, and well-finished as can well be imagined ; while the arrangements, both for luxury and convenience, are admirable. The scarcity of servants in the States has led to many labour-saving contrivances within the house of remarkable ingenuity and convenience. Of these some are being introduced into England, and more no doubt soon will be.

The general reason for the excellence of American town-houses is that, as a rule, the house of each resident of at all superior position is his own property. If Englishmen lived in their own houses—houses to be occupied for life, and to descend to their family afterwards—our English houses would be very different and very differently built from what is generally the case at present. The price, moreover, of building ground in the chief cities, and most of all in New York, is so high—in New York the price is probably higher, on an average, than in London, owing to the strait natural limits of the “island territory,”—that poor houses built on such costly sites would be absurd. A citizen of moderate fortune will expend sixty thousand dollars on his house. If his annual expenditure is ten thousand dollars, not a large amount in New York, he will expect to pay scarcely less than four thousand dollars in rent, if he hires his house. So it has been for a dozen years past. It is said, however, that just now, owing to the long and deep depression of trade, rents are falling rapidly. In Chicago the rent of a large house, of which the ground floor is a book store in a good business street, and some of the rooms above are occupied as offices, is fifteen thousand dollars. This is moderate compared with New York ; but it furnishes evidence as to the standard of rent charges in America. Chicago, however, is a dearer place than St. Louis or Baltimore ; and Philadelphia, in comparison of either New York or Chicago, is a place of moderate rentals. Brooklyn, again, although only divided from New York by an estuary, is much lower in its rental. It is the capital of Long Island, where there is much land still unoccupied.

Having referred to the general deficiency of American cities in suburban horticulture, we should not omit to say that in the neighbourhood of New York, especially up the Hudson and on Long Island, many beautiful homes, embosomed in charming grounds, are to be found. The New York Central Park was admirably laid out by an accom-

plished landscape gardener, who, for many years before coming to the States, had been in the employment of the Emperor of Austria. There is no stint of flowers, or of flowering shrubs—in which the American flora is very rich—or of ornamental trees. Every year the park shows new beauties, and, in a short time, it will take high rank among city parks. This park has given a great impulse to landscape gardening in the villas round about New York; and the gentleman who laid it out was, so long as he lived, employed extensively in laying out lawns, and shrubberies, and pleasure grounds in the country retreats of the opulent gentlemen of New York. The State of New York, through which the Hudson river flows, ranks next to New England, as we have intimated, for its garden culture. The Dutch were the early colonists and masters of this State; and Dutchmen could hardly settle anywhere without carrying with them the love of flowers. All the way up the Hudson there is much evidence of this traditionary taste. The pretty little towns between New York and Albany are made very pleasant by it, and Albany itself is inferior to few American cities in its taste for horticulture. In this respect, notwithstanding the splendid Fairmount Park, which is perhaps unequalled in extent and natural situation, occupying as it does for many miles the space between the Susquehannah and the Schuylkill rivers, Philadelphia disappoints the visitor, although there are not wanting beautiful villas, with lovely garden surroundings, scattered here and there along the streets and avenues of Philadelphia, showing what is capable of being done in such a soil and climate, even within the boundaries—wide, indeed, and large they are—of the city.

We have already intimated that the artisans of the States are seldom native Americans. We have heard it said that no native American strips to his day's work; except when he works on his own soil or homestead, should perhaps be added; but, if so qualified, the saying is probably not far from the truth. We observed lately in the foreign correspondence of the *Times* that one of the delegates sent by the artisans of Paris to the Philadelphia Exhibition told his fellows very distinctly how the matter stands as to artisans in the United States. His words are thus reported:—

“There are strictly speaking, no American artisans. All the

artisans of America are the expatriated of other countries, who have carried their industry thither. In that great American Republic, so much vaunted by our politicians, we found what is seen everywhere at home, the same economical position for the workman, capital being there as much the master as in France. In America workmen have every possible liberty, and there are more schools than with us, but if negro slavery has been abolished that does not prevent white slavery from existing in all its rigour. In spite of all the methods of teaching, schools, libraries, and universities to be found in America, the workman is ignorant. He has every liberty, but he does not make use of it. The reason is that he is forced to work fifteen hours a day in order to live miserably."—*Times*, August 2nd.

The language here used is rather strong, but it serves very well to illustrate the point we are explaining. The Americans are what we have called them, a middle-class nation; they are masters, not servants; Americans are not "working men." Americans are professional men, merchants, storekeepers, manufacturers, managers, above all, yeomen living and working on their own land. But the miner, the forgerman, the worker in metal, the mason, the artisan in general, the navvy, the railway pointsman, the professed gardener, the factory operative, the serving man or serving woman, the day labourer of whatever class, all such wage earners are, as a rule, foreigners—English, Scotch, Irish, German, Scandinavian, African, Chinese, as the case may be. Of these foreigners many are not naturalised, and very few, except the Irish, have attained to any direct connection with the active political classes. Scarcely any of them ever become members of a State Legislature, much less of Congress. Hence it follows that the laws regulating labour are made by Americans, while the labourers themselves are foreigners. Moreover, the divisions of race and the diversities of language among these labouring classes render them far less able—and, indeed, far less disposed—to combine for any trade union or political purpose than the working classes of European countries. Herein is probably found the explanation of the fact that American masters find themselves very much less troubled by strikes, and very much stronger in dealing with strikes, than English masters.

The fact that Americans proper are a people made up of masters, a middle and not a working class people, has an important bearing on many questions both social and religious. There is no American pauper class—no semi-

pauper class, except in a few of the largest towns where the dregs of the foreign emigrant labouring classes hang about. Neither pauperism nor semi-pauperism is a national institution. There are no village poor in the States. Of all parts and places in America the villages and the country townships are the most absolutely free from any such thing as pauperism. That one fact signalises, perhaps, the most fundamental and influential of all the differences between America and the mother country. Hence it is that while in England a thoroughly effective elementary school, and the strictest regularity in school-going for years together, are indispensable means in order to raise the village child above the level of hereditary semi-pauperism, in the United States the boy or girl from village or lonely farmstead attends a makeshift school for a few years only, during three or four winter months in the year, and yet is in no danger of sinking into pauperism, but, on the contrary, commonly so makes the most of a little schooling as to become an intelligent as well as competent and comfortable citizen.

So, again, as respects matters ecclesiastical. An established and endowed Church is not only congenial to the aristocracy of England, it is also congenial, and in various ways conveniently adapted, to a village commonalty of poor day labourers. On the other hand, a free and informal voluntarism seems naturally adapted to a thriving middle-class nation like the Americans. As American society knows no such thing as a national pauperism, so the American churches know nothing, in general, of an inferior population, who have lived below the range of religious conviction and profession. The one condition, like the other, is the result of the nation's antecedents and historical conditions: the American immunity from pauper inferiority is to it the gift of Providence, not the result of its national polity or institutions; the English pauperism and semi-pauperism have descended to the present age as an inheritance from mediæval times and conditions. Still, the contrast is as we have stated it; and it affects the whole complexion and temperature of ecclesiastical thought and organisation in America. The Anglo-American churches have not, on any wide, much less any national, scale, a mission to the American poor, as our English Churches have to our English poor.

There are, indeed, poor labourers in the States, although

there is no hereditary pauperism or semi-pauperism ; but these poor labourers are foreigners, and are the natural charge of their own foreign Churches. The Irish poor are the charge of the Roman Catholic Church ; American Protestant Churches have next to nothing to do with them. The German Churches care for the German labourers, or are supposed to be responsible for so doing. The English skilled labourers, scattered through the country, melt easily into the American community, and generally take a superior and responsible position. The facts we have stated affect every ecclesiastical community in the States, and differentiate the condition of the American Churches from that of the corresponding Churches in England. In not a few instances the Anglo-American Churches are reproduced in foreign forms adapted to the case of the streams of emigrant population which pour from European shores. Thus, in particular, there are German and Scandinavian Methodist Churches, Methodism being the dominant Communion of the States. These foreign Churches repose, as their basis, mainly on the agricultural settlers of the respective nationalities. German farmers form the stable element in the German Methodist Churches. To these the German artisan of the towns often unites himself ; although, as a general rule, we believe that the German town settler, if he joins a Church at all, is more often a Catholic than otherwise, the reason being, perhaps, that the German town settler is often an emigrant from South Germany, while the agricultural settler comes more often from North and East Germany. But of the ecclesiastical aspect and conditions of America and Americans we hope to be able to speak in another article. In the paper we now close we have endeavoured to afford such a general view of the political and social conditions of the United States as could best be given within the limits at our disposal, dwelling especially on points as to which misconception has largely prevailed.

LITERARY NOTICES.

REUSS ON THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS.

Histoire Evangelique : Synopse des Trois Premiers Evangelies. Par Edouard Reuss. Paris. 1876.

WE have already bespoken attention to the ponderous, learned, and almost unique work of which this is another instalment. It will be a monument of zeal and devotion to the Scriptures, such as scarcely any other living writer will have reared. But it is the work of one who leans too much to destructive criticism, and is labouring in comparative darkness as to the true doctrine of inspiration. The peculiarity of the work generally, and of this portion of it in particular, is that it combines dissertation on the text with commentary. The latter portion is almost unexceptionable in general; and the former abounds with rich suggestion. It furnishes a very interesting contribution to the question of the construction of the three Gospels. Into this subject we do not now enter; but shall offer a few suggestions on some points of interest in the general review which closes the introductory dissertation.

"Before entering on the narrative of facts, the historian is bound to give account of the value of the sources whence he draws them: through neglecting this duty in regard to the most important fact in the annals of humanity, many books, otherwise worthy of regard on account of the sentiment that inspired them, belong rather to the class of works of edification than to that of those which satisfy a want less subjective. We must then ask leave to close this long introduction by some general considerations on the synoptical Gospels considered as *historical sources*.

"It would be easy to prove that they are not absolutely complete, as our legitimate curiosity might deem. We have only to compare them with each other to find that each of the three discloses chasms in the rest; whence we easily draw the conclusion that if we possessed a greater number of like narratives dating from the same epoch we should be acquainted with a much larger number of details. But without hazarding conjectures we have the avowal of the authors themselves that they only made a selection from among the materials which were at their disposal.

Nevertheless we are convinced that a greater abundance of details would not change the general character or the spirit of this history, as it is presented in a more narrow view. Some additional miracles, even many more than those which are related, would not give it a different colouring, and would not impress on us, as to the Passion of Jesus, a conception different from that which the recitals now existing are calculated to produce.

"These chasms might appear more to be regretted so far as the teachings of the Master are concerned. Without doubt, during the course of His ministry, however short we regard it, Jesus spoke—whether to the more intimate disciples or to the crowds who pressed on His steps—much oftener than our texts report. We may also admit that His teaching on incidental occasions or in the set preachings of the synagogue was not circumscribed within the limits which now define them to us. But we need not be troubled by this. Jesus did not teach according to an arranged plan or in a dialectic method, so that the omission or transposition of any particular element would throw the reader out of the right point of view, or disorganise a theory artistically elaborated, or even render it inexact. What He preached were general principles, simple in their form, striking in their truth, ratified at once by the consciences of His hearers, capable of giving a new impulse to the whole of life, rich above all in lending themselves to the most varied applications, so that in fact, in spite of the developments which social life has undergone during so many ages, their power, far from becoming weakened, is revealed with ever-increasing and sensible effects. The depth of the ideas, which is discovered by study and yet more by practice, redeems the defect of amplitude in the fragments which have reached us : a defect which we may regret, but ought not to exaggerate. We think that these Gospels fully suffice to represent to us what we might call the portrait of Jesus, painted with the same colours under which He appeared to His contemporaries, and such as they were to present to their immediate successors. Nevertheless a portrait is not a history ; and in our days we want, above all things, history : that is to say, we want to arrive at an understanding of facts by a study of their causes distant or near, of their evolution gradual and regular. Do our Gospels suffice, in this sense, for the construction of the history of the Founder of Christianity ? A great number of writers belonging to the most diverse schools have thought so, otherwise they would not have attempted this arduous task, in regard to which, after so many attempts, the chances of failure are always preponderant. We will leave out of question the capital difficulty of the profound divergence between the three Evangelists and the fourth, and shall confine ourselves to the subject before us, pointing out some things which must make us pause before

adopting the hasty conclusion that we can construct a perfect history."

Then follows a fair representation of the chronological difficulty. And we are given to understand that the reduction of the accounts current among men of the works and words of Christ have rendered history proper impossible by their loose collocation. Modern historians have given a needless value to such insignificant and monotonous formulas as "then," "afterwards," "and," "it came to pass." "It is pure illusion not to see that they are there precisely to mark or to hide the absolute impossibility, in which they were found, of arranging them more precisely." Thus it is alleged that the number of years during which our Lord wrought is undefinable. "The three Synoptics mention only a single journey of Jesus to Jerusalem, that which led Him to Calvary, whilst the fourth mentions and especially describes a series of others. There are means of discovering in the three themselves some faint traces of the Saviour's appearances in the capital. It is the business of criticism to combine, if it may be, these Divine data. Still it is plain that there was not in the three first redactors any positive and precise remembrance of this presumed plurality of journeys." To this we need only reply that criticism has no right to detach the fourth Evangelist from the body of the writers: he is their complement as plainly as if the fact were asserted in his text. And a good harmony will show that, without any violence, the four accounts may be made to harmonise and agree on the longer stretch of our Lord's public work which the facts of His influence and the preparations for His death demand.

There is something important in the next point:—"It is hard to arrive at a clear and precise idea of the habitual relations which the Twelve bore to their Master, and of His own private life with its material conditions. The traditional opinion which makes them appear always travelling might seem to be established by many a formal passage; but when we remember that we have to do probably, not with young disciples, but with adult men who had to provide for their families, we find ourselves in the face of difficulties which do not appear to have existed in reality, but which are not dissipated by the mere letter of the text in itself." No one has failed, some time or other, to have been struck by this thought. The fact alluded to is one of many which go together to establish the position that the life of Jesus as such was not intended to be written. It was not in the design of the Holy Spirit that the secret history of our Lord, or His public history otherwise than as Messianic, should ever occupy the biographer.

The manner in which the Gospels refer to the Pharisees is thus stated:—"Looking at these narratives we should say that

they were a class of people apart, a sort of agents of ecclesiastical police, or functionaries assimilated to the scribes and priests, but occupying a particular position by the side of these—in fact, a special caste. Such a conception, however, would be very strange, and in any case little in harmony with historical reality. The portrait of the Pharisees sketched by the Evangelists is living and true only so far as it characterises the religious and moral tendencies of the party; or rather, we learn from them the true state of things only in regard to the elements which are pointed to by the authentic words of Jesus Himself. The writers, placed already at some distance from the facts, and not having themselves lived the life of scholastic Judaism, had a sure hand only when they were faithfully reproducing the judgments formulated by their Master. All beyond is sketched in a very confused and vague manner.” As to this, the same principle applies. The readers are supposed to be acquainted with the sects and parties of Judæa, and not a word is given that aims directly at giving instruction as to the internal state of things in the fading religion. All parties, and individuals of all parties, come on the scene for the sake of the Master’s teaching, and for no other purpose. Had any members of the Essenian confraternity crossed the Redeemer’s path and given Him a text, it might have been narrated. But so sublime is the indifference of the Gospel to the parties of the expiring religion that their name is never once mentioned. It is the fashion to make Christianity a great plagiarism from the Essenes, and tacitly to brand its Founder with concealment of His obligation. But the admitted scantiness of the references to Pharisaism and Sadduceeism suggests the explanation of the silence of the Gospels. The Essenes were not enemies of Christianity, they never confronted it. They watched it from a distance, and probably sent their disciples into its bosom without any specific reference to the source whence they came. But another point of interest here arises, and we shall with pleasure translate a paragraph.

“Let us pause at a *hiatus* more important, the existence of which itself renders impossible the reconstruction of any true life of Jesus—that is, of any such biography as modern science demands, and as traditional theology has ever conceived the idea of giving. Here we have to do with the fact that we know nothing at all of the first thirty years of our Lord. He appears on the scene at an age when among men generally the character is formed and the direction taken; when the principles are fixed, the end determined, and the activity engaged in the career which is not to be lightly changed. At the moment when He presented Himself as Prophet and Doctor before the nation He was in full possession of all the truths which composed the programme of His lessons; He proclaimed from the beginning His

most elevated principles, His most fruitful and most absolute truths—or, rather, what He preached and what He did was already the application and concrete form of a conception perfectly ripe, sure of itself and of its power and of its future. But we do not learn by what way He reached them, how His ideas were formed, how His plan was conceived, what means of study and of education were at His disposal—or, rather, the beginnings of His history, such as two Evangelists relate them, and such as a third implicitly elevates to the rank of a dogmatic theory, interdict our even investigating the antecedents of apprenticeship such as we might wish to suppose in His case. And yet a solitary line of one of these (Luke ii. 52), but a line, which, in face of all we have just said, creates an insurmountable difficulty, would permit us to assimilate the march of the intellectual and moral development of this peculiar individuality to what we see elsewhere. But if Jesus is God it is a thing at once superfluous and unbecoming to speak of education and development. Hence the traditional theology has placed itself frankly at the opposite point of view. The unique scene which marks the long interval between the birth and the baptism is only one enigma the more for him who would fill up the gap by psychological combinations. This gap is all the more grievous because the greater part of men who have marked history have revealed their genius and their special aptitudes long before the thirtieth year; whilst here we should have a personality specifically superior to the general level who arrived much later at maturity, or at least at the resolution of making it serve the world; and we cannot perceive any cause that should have retarded the moment. None of the numerous essays which in our days have been made to write the life of Jesus have succeeded in resolving this problem, and very few have discussed it at all. From all this we conclude that if our Evangelists suffice amply to give us the portrait of Jesus, true, grand, and admirable, such as it was presented to the elect of His age, and as it will remain in history, they leave much to be desired when we ask them for more, and would learn from them not only what He was, but how He became what He was. Evidently this point of view, quite rational and quite modern, was not that of our authors."

Here we entirely agree with Professor Reuss. But we wonder that he does not learn from the Synoptists themselves the true reason why a plan of His work, and a secret discipline for it, ought never to be elements in the biography of our Lord. They unite with St. John in declaring that the Father was the supreme Teacher through the Holy Ghost of His incarnate Son; that the school in which He was taught was one into which human curiosity may not penetrate. Moreover the testimony of St. Luke

on the brief narrative above referred to, which lifts the veil from the long period of obscurity and concealment, gives all that we need to know as to this subject. The Lord was in "His Father's" house and business and teaching from the first dawn of His human intelligence. In His discipline for His work, as in His introductory temptation, there are secrets for ever reserved. And, for a higher reason than our author's, we also deprecate the attempt to write the life of Jesus, regarding that department of theological literature as open to grave suspicion and much distrust.

A very important subject next follows: the doctrine of Jesus the Teacher:—"With what the primitive tradition has retained of the teaching of Jesus, and what the ancient Gospels have preserved for us, we are incontestably on the solid ground of history. Doubt has rested, indeed, on many things which form the frame of this history; but as to the authenticity of the didactic element, it is just the contrary. Not only has it never been seriously contested, it is affirmed and recognised with an energy all the greater because study is emancipating itself from the methods of traditional prejudice in order to cling closely to the texts which are its faith. Apart from some obscurities which only serve to show the distance which separated between the conception of the Master and the intelligence of His disciples, all is here invested with a clear luminousness which is surpassed only by the unfathomable depth of the riches of the religious thought which is revealed by the lips of Jesus. Long has it been said that it is not thus writers invent. It is, then, always on this platform that apologetics ought to stand, when it is dealing with the value of Christian convictions; from this point we must start if we would reconcile reason with what, taken in isolation, no longer exercises on the age the victorious ascendancy which was its strength heretofore. The defenders of Christianity may easily show that philosophy, while imagining itself independent of it, has never gone really beyond the primitive and authentic teaching of the Gospel, and that the scholasticism of doctors and councils has only put a disguise upon it. To speak truly, it needs only that this be allowed to speak for itself; it needs not the aid of the dialectics and eloquence of men. It is not likely to find arguments more convincing than that which Jesus Himself indicated when, with a sublime assurance, He appealed to the ages to verify by practice the Divine origin of the rule which He dictated."

But it is exceedingly difficult to make the distinction between the moral influence of our Lord's teaching and the direct and incidental confirmation it gives to the universal inspiration of the Scriptures, as we now hold them, as well as to the plenary authority of the records which His servants have left for our

faith and guidance. Surely the grandeur of His teaching reflects its glory on the frame in which it is set. If the sacred record is carefully studied it will be found that the doctrines and the facts are so interwoven that they cannot be separated. What God hath joined let no man put asunder. The current of our Professor's argument ought to lead him to an unreserved acceptance of the whole record. This will more plainly appear in what follows: a luminous defence of the miraculous element in the Gospel narrative as it is spread before the Christian Church of all ages.

"And first of all we will say that if there had been nothing in the acts of Jesus which went beyond the experience of every day, His history would only become all the more incomprehensible. Had His moral discourses been, if that were possible, ten times more sublime and penetrating than they are, they would not certainly have produced of themselves alone so extraordinary a movement in a population so little prepared to be penetrated by them, so little adapted to appreciate them at their just value, so incapable, above all, of measuring their issues. There was necessary for these masses some other thing which should raise them, which should draw them, which should not leave them at the risk of vanishing, in their undisciplined minds, when an unexpected catastrophe seemed to provoke a fatal and definitive reaction. Unless we say that all which our Gospels record of the enthusiasm of the people, their judgments, their political tendencies, in relation to the person of the Prophet of Nazareth are only fable and falsehood, there must have been another element, a perfectly new spring and a palpable force, to have given the impulse in a sphere where the power of ideas is not generally the greatest. Who does not think here at once of the numerous miracles which form, by the side of the didactic part, the true history of Jesus? Would anyone dare to say that He could, by giving Himself thaumaturgic airs, audaciously abuse the credulity of His followers? For such poor and unworthy means His end was too grand and too pure. . . . There are in psychical life, and in its relations with the organism, mysteries which still elude the control of exact science. Moreover the texts which assign to Jesus in regard to His healings certain declarations which are indisputably authentic, make Him, as it were, responsible for the interpretation they give of them. Let us add that the miracles which are attributed to Him were not those which would be expected, that all were not satisfied with them, that they were always asking of Him something more, that He declared Himself, in presence of certain moral dispositions, powerless to act. All this proves, it seems to us, that the records of the acts which He did perform, according to His historians, were not precisely according to the current theory of Messianic beliefs."

This is a valuable testimony from one whose whole literary life has been spent in endeavouring to accommodate the Christian faith to the demands of human reason, from one who has in doctrinal questions done much to unsettle the faith of many of his readers. M. Reuss doubts still on the very points which he is labouring to rescue from doubt: his faith needs constantly to be saved from its unbelief. The mythical hypothesis of the construction of the Gospels he utterly rejects. He is firmly assured that the Evangelists record only what was already the steady faith of the times in which they wrote. They did not invent any of the facts which they relate. They did not take the initiative of the faith and tradition of the Church, that existed before their writings, and existed as the result of faith in these facts. Now an institution like the Church cannot have a simple illusion for its basis. Our Gospels in these first sketches are too near the epoch of Jesus to allow margin for an entirely fabulous and mythical transformation of His history. Even if we possessed books more ancient still, and still nearer to the events, it is not probable that these would present them under another aspect. Whatever doubts may exist as to the internal character of these facts, and though our modern conceptions cannot class them like those which are passing under our eyes, that will not hinder us from acknowledging that the writers who have preserved their memory, and to whose narrative we have only to oppose purely theoretical arguments, were not only faithful interpreters of the convictions of their contemporaries, but cannot be suspected of having displaced more sober testimonies by such as flattered the tendency of the times.

If our author had a clearer idea of the relation of the fourth Gospel to the complete history of our Lord, he would be saved from all his embarrassments. Then he would learn the secret of all that troubles him and others like him. That Gospel gives the plain solution of every difficulty. Before our Lord departed He committed His mysterious life and sayings and finished work to the care of the Holy Spirit, under whose superintendency the earthly memorial of His mission was to be preserved for all ages.

M. MARTIN ON THE FUTURE LIFE.

La Vie Future, suivant la Foi et suivant la Raison. PAR Th. Henri Martin. Troisième Edition. Paris: Delagrave and Co.

THIS is the work of a Roman Catholic layman, sanctioned by due authority, on one of the grave questions of the day: the relation of time to eternity, and the destinies of the human spirit. It is a very learned, comprehensive, and exhaustive

treatise, and—with the exception of certain errors naturally to be expected—may be recommended to every theological student. First we have a rapid sketch of the state of opinion, as to a future life, among nations not Christian, then a full exhibition of the religious traditions of antiquity, with especial reference to Greece and Rome, the insufficiency of natural light being amply shown. The Hebrews are distinctly considered, and it is established that the belief in the immortality of the soul existed under special forms in the Mosaic religion; that it was derived from an anterior tradition; that it was invariable as to substance, variable only in the form first only mysterious, then more and more clear, under which it was presented; that it differs profoundly from each of the other philosophical beliefs of antiquity, and is very superior to them all. It is elaborately shown how that faith passed into Christianity, without change but with clearer demonstration, with new developments, and as the basis of sublime doctrines which explain it, which defend it from dangerous errors, and give it its amazing power on human life and hope and practice. Then it is traced through the history of the Church, and its contests with heresy of every kind. Then follows a full discussion of the limits of philosophic thought—apart from revelation though profiting by it—in relation to the question of immortality. And it is shown that right reason accords with Divine revelation. Objections are then considered: as urged against original sin, against the eternity of rewards and punishments, and against the resurrection of the dead.

In travelling through this vast field our author may generally be followed with confidence, always with deep interest: an interest which is kept up through seven hundred pages; and is through the last two hundred stimulated by a series of supplementary notes ranging over a great variety of related topics. A specimen of the author's manner may be taken from his essay on the "Eternity of Rewards and Punishments."

"We have already said that no Father—save, perhaps, Irenæus in a solitary passage—accepted the opinion of certain heretics of the second century, that the penalties of the lost would terminate by the annihilation of their souls. From the beginning of the third century the eternity of penalties, and at the same time the eternity of rewards, were contested more seriously by Origen and his followers, whose errors as to the future life troubled the Church for a long time. Origen thought that all intelligent substances are absolutely *incorporeal*, but that in the present state of things God alone is *without body*, and that created intelligences are all united, whether to gross bodies like ours, or to more subtile bodies like those who have passed from terrestrial life, or to bodies more subtile still, like those of the angels. According

to Origen, especially in his earlier writings, this imprisonment of thinking and simple substances in bodies is the result of a fall more or less profound which they underwent through having sinned in an anterior existence apart from matter, and out of which they may be raised by degrees in a series of trials or probations. The soul of Jesus Christ was created without body from the commencement of all things, like all other souls; but His alone, by an excellent use of liberty in the pre-existent state, merited to be indissolubly united to the Divine Word; and by a free surrender of self was united with the Word for human salvation. Thus, according to Origen, with the exception of the soul of Jesus Christ, every human soul sinned in a former state, and must undergo after the present life other probations in other bodies more or less subtle or gross, until the resurrection of the dead and the final judgment, after which God will exercise in a more marked manner His justice, both for reward and for punishment. For this judgment the guilty will rise with miserable and dark bodies; the just with bodies glorious, of a spherical form, disembarrassed of members henceforth useless; the condemned, and with them the fallen angels, will be given up to *eternal fire*: that is, to remorse which cannot end, he says, *while sin furnishes its aliment*. But the chastisements of the damned, and even those of the demons, will issue finally in the conversion of the guilty; and all souls, clothed in subtle and glorious bodies, will rise by successive degrees to the condition of the different orders of angels. Finally, all angelic intelligences will reach a life separated from all commerce with matter, which, then useless, will be annihilated by the Creator. Then, in their common union with the Divine Word, all souls will be equally perfect and equally happy. Nevertheless, keeping still their liberty of will, these souls will be capable of redescending from their sublime condition, and, according to Origen, will even necessarily descend, in a course of ages, to an inferior condition, in human bodies, into a visible world which God will have created for that end. But they will rise again to fall again, and for them God will create and annihilate by turns an indefinite number of worlds.

"These errors, which Origen derived from Greek philosophy and Oriental superstitions, evidently implied the negation of eternal punishments and rewards. Among the Fathers whom the Church honours there is not one who has not affirmed these two verities: whether by simply quoting the holy texts which establish them, or by developing the thought of these texts and expressly denying that individual punishment and reward can ever end, universally condemning in this way Origen and his followers. Nevertheless among these same Fathers there are three or four who appear, in a small number of passages, to have

expressed as to the eternity of punishments some doubts inspired by Origenism, but afterwards retracted in other passages of their works. According to the remark of St. Basil the sacred texts which guarantee the eternity of rewards are one with those which affirm the eternity of punishments ; so that by robbing the latter of their strength by forced interpretations we deprive the former of the support of Scripture. Origen saw this and spared neither."

On the freedom of the will and the moral responsibility of man it is interesting to see in what clear terms our author states the difficulty and meets it :—"Free will is recognised by all men simple and wise ; for this knowledge is part of the common consciousness we all have of our own existence. But free will may seem hard to reconcile with certain other truths, such as the influence of organisation, or health, or disease, of education, external circumstances, on morality ; or the dominion of reasonable motives and passions on the will, or the absolute prescience and omnipotence of God, and His creating and preserving influence on all substances ; or, finally, the special and supernatural action of His grace. Again, man cannot recognise himself to be free without recognising his responsibility before Divine justice, and without feeling himself tormented by importunate fears. Hence the doctrine of free will has found in all ages, especially in our own, numerous opponents. . . . As to the philosophers and theologians who deny free will because of the difficulty of explaining it, some are Materialists, who, silencing their reason and conscience that they may believe only their sight, their hearing, their smell, their taste, and their touch, will acknowledge in man only a physical organisation, and subject the will to an external necessity, and the blind empire of matter. These do not perceive that the physical and the moral influence in man are reciprocal ; and that all influence, like all relation, supposes the reality of the two terms between which it exists : one of these terms, the soul, they deny. Others are idealist Pantheists, according to whom everything is God, even moral evil, which is only, they say, the absence of a greater good ; and the individual existence of souls is only a passing phenomenon of the Divine essence into which they are absorbed and disappear in death. On the other hand, certain theologians attribute moral good to a necessitating and efficacious grace without human co-operation, and moral evil to the absence of a grace without which good is impossible to man. They admit that God, by a decree absolute and logically anterior to the prevision of demerits, predestined invincibly the greater part of men to sin and eternal damnation."

We need not follow the author in his refutation successively of Materialism, Pantheism, and theological Necessitarianism, but shall add another extract, which is perhaps still more interesting.

"There are other adversaries to combat: certain philosophers, who are neither Pantheists nor Materialists, subject the will either to an interior necessity, or to an irresistible action of God. They believe in a future state, where the lot of the good will be better than that of the wicked; but they efface from the other life the notion of a *penalty* inflicted by *justice*, and make predominant the notion of a *correction* applied as *moral medicine*. In fact, they will see in all the guilty only ignorant and diseased souls; consequently they attribute both to the Sovereign Judge and to judges terrestrial only the duty of *instructing* and *healing* in virtue of *compassion*, the example of the remedy profiting as the same time those who might be tempted to expose themselves to the same necessity. But, in order to give the moral medicine its efficacy, as also to arrest by intimidation the souls inclined to evil, there is necessary precisely that which these philosophers refused to God and the civil power: there is necessarily the right to *punish* in virtue of *justice*, and the recognition of this right by the public conscience and by the individual conscience. The justice which punishes, being perverted into anger which takes vengeance, is confounded with vengeance simple, and as such reprobated. In fact, according to these systems, God could have only the right to correct and not to punish. Having posited in each soul the assemblage of determining causes of all their volitions, causes irresistible to every man at any moment being what he is, the infinitely just and good Being could impose on souls suffering only for the sake of bringing them to happiness. Let us add that, on this same hypothesis, God must have assured eternal salvation to all immortal souls whom He created without free will; or, if He could leave some of them in an irremediable depravity, He must at least take away from them for eternity, with the faculty of sinning, the faculty of thinking and of suffering also. . . .

"It is not permitted to the philosopher to doubt the possibility and the reality of a certain interior action of God on the soul, to enlighten and lead to good. But there are some Determinists who degrade this action of God, exaggerating it into an always irresistible and necessitating action. They say that God alone does everything in the universe; and His prescience is only the knowledge which He has of the immutable decree by which He determines in an absolute manner all that will take place, even free actions. According to them, God acts all in us, even moral evil. This evil, they say, is only the absence of a greater good, and is evil only in relation to the individual in whom it is produced. The *Determinists*, these Jansenists in philosophy, substitute for free will in man, which they retain only in name, a natural and irresistible action of God; just as the Jansenists, these Determinists in theology, substitute for free will the super-

natural action of a necessitating grace, without which, they say, fallen man can do only evil. Both alike forget that they suppress the moral responsibility of every man, and that thus they outrage the testimony of conscience; they do not see that no being can incur any responsibility whatever for an act which it was out of his power not to do at the moment of its performance, and that the responsibility would go back entirely to God if every human act resulted necessarily from certain dispositions implanted by God Himself in the man."

But we cannot pursue this subject. M. Martin makes us acquainted with a great number of authors whose names we had not heard; and of theories, half philosophical, half Christian, peculiar to the French atmosphere, some of them reproducing in a marvellous way the ancient speculations of Origen, both of a pre-existence before this earthly probation and of a succession of probations beyond this life. Passing by all this, we shall give the substance of two forcible notes upon the later Greek and Roman opinions touching the future. Speaking of the incredulity and contempt with which the later philosophers regarded the doctrine of eternal rewards and punishments, M. Martin says:—

"Cicero and Seneca expressly called it folly to entertain fear of the Divine justice, whether in this life or in the next: that is to say, they were without even the *beginning of wisdom*. Cicero, doubtless forgetting Socrates and Plato while he thought only of their unworthy successors, attributed this same sentiment to *all philosophers*. In the denial of penalties in another state the Stoics were at one with the Epicureans and the Sceptics. It would be useless to cite here Epicurus, Lucretius, Sextus Empiricus, Lucian. But we may refer to a multitude of wiser men, who were smitten with this blindness, such as Isocrates, Chrysippus, Cicero, Virgil, Horace, Propertius, Seneca, Epictetus, Pliny the Elder, Juvenal, Plutarch, and Marcus Aurelius. To passages cited below might be added many from other despisers of Divine justice. How much wiser than these was Plato! In him philosophic pride had not rendered the spirit deaf to the cry of conscience and the voices of religious tradition, which, in the midst of the errors of Polytheism, had preserved the notion of the penalties and rewards of another life." Another kindred subject is the decay of the doctrine of the immortality of the soul among the same Greeks and Romans.

"In Athens, at the time of Pericles, not only the immortality of the soul was rejected by the Sophists, enemies of all faith, and by their numerous disciples, but Thucydides and Plato teach us that the thought of another life was absent from the funeral orations. The philosophical poet Euripides, disciple of Anaxagoras and Socrates, in a chorus which in its sentiment and poetry

demanded the expression of the hopes of another life, scarcely dares to suppose that there can be for virtue as much justice in the other state as in this. It demands for the generous Alcestis, who devoted herself to death for her husband, an honourable place near to Proserpine, 'if there is below any advantage for the good.' In the *Hippolytus* the same poet says that what inspires man with a mad attachment to this life with all its miseries, is his ignorance as to what is to follow. The poet cannot dissipate this ignorance, which he regards as invincible; for, in the same piece, to console the young hero who dies the victim of his virtue, the chaste goddess who protects him finds nothing to promise but sterile honours for his tomb. Again, he makes the virtuous Andromache, envying the lot of Polyxena, say that the dead suffer no more, but that they are deprived of all sentiment, and have the advantage of being as if they had never existed. The same thought is found in *Æschylus*. Such was the teaching of tragedy in the religious festivals of pious Athens in the days of Pericles, where, nevertheless, a better faith had some interpreters. At Rome, Sallust, contemporary and friend of Julius Cæsar, shows him to us counselling the Roman senate not to condemn to death the accomplices of Catiline, giving for his reason that death is the end of all penalties, and that after death there is neither joy nor care. The greatest and best of Roman philosophers, Cicero, who rejects the penalties of another world, likes to believe that all souls, vicious or virtuous, will be happy immediately after death, and for ever. This hope of a future life pleases him, but it appears uncertain, and he holds it cheaply: 'Let us renounce the hope of immortality.' In fact, what basis was there for the expectation of another life, when he has effaced the notion of a justice Divine exercising its rights on the soul after death? It is not astonishing that Cicero often accepts the supposition that souls would be annihilated, and all feeling and thought end with life. The Stoic Panætius had made this supposition into a doctrine, so did Cornutus the Stoic; Pliny and the poet Lucan followed their example. For Epictetus death is the dissolution of the soul as of the body. Seneca, who sometimes admits the immortality of the soul, yet oftener doubts it, sometimes expressly denies that the soul survives the body. Marcus Aurelius Antoninus leaves the decision free between the affirmative and the negative, but inclines to the negative; and, like the ancient Stoics, declares that, if souls survive bodies, it is not for ever. Tacitus asks himself if great and pious souls endure after death; as to the common run of souls it does not even occur to the great historian that they can be immortal. According to those of the ancient Stoics who denied not absolutely immortality, souls survived a longer or shorter time after death: the stronger and the

wiser alone might remain until the destruction of the world by fire, but not beyond that catastrophe, in which indeed all the gods were also to perish, with the exception of Jupiter, that is to say, the universal soul, the fiery principle, which then was to consume the universe, to make it rise again at a later period."

Among the multitude of books, English and foreign, which deal with the destiny of the soul after death, we reckon this one of the most interesting. Its errors as to Purgatory are venial in comparison of the immense amount of honest truth and sober argument and sound learning which it has accumulated for the devout reader.

THE OLD TESTAMENT.

Theology of the Old Testament. By Dr. G. F. Oehler. Translated by E. D. Smith and S. Taylor. Two Vols. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.

Biblical Commentary on the Proverbs of Solomon. By F. Delitzsch, D.D. Translated from the German by M. G. Easton, D.D. Two Vols. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.

Messianic Prophecy: Its Origin, Historical Character, and Relation to New Testament Fulfilment. By Dr. Edward Riehm, Halle. Translated from the German by the Rev. John Jefferson. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.

IN our judgment the translations from German, published by Messrs. Clark, are increasing in value with every issue; not only because of the intrinsic value of the works themselves, but because they are the antidotes of another and pernicious German theology which has lately been introduced to the English public. The "Foreign Theological Library" has steadily added to our stores books almost indispensable to the student. They are more necessary than ever now, when rival publishers are striving to naturalise among us authors of the negative and destructive type. For some time past the Edinburgh series has been peculiarly rich in its Old-Testament department. Taken as a whole, there are no commentaries equal to these which are fast running through all the books of the older Scripture. Latterly, ground has been broken in Old-Testament theology proper. Of this class, Kurtz, Hengstenberg and Oehler are good representatives. The two volumes of Oehler, in particular, cannot be too highly praised as exhibiting what may be called the true relation between the perfect teaching of the New Testament and its preliminary germs

and preparations in the Old. Of the style and spirit of this book, and of the importance of its subject, the following extracts from its Introduction will give a favourable idea. In them the author speaks, we may say, in behalf of a large and increasing number of orthodox German theologians who, differing on some minor points, agree in challenging more earnest attention to the ancient oracles of God.

"In the course of recent years it has often been said, especially in ecclesiastical assemblies, that a special need of the age is a better recognition of the Old Testament for religious knowledge and life; that the treasures of this book, so little known, especially to persons of culture, be more fully laid open to the body of the Church. To this end, the first requisition is—that theologians shall form a more thorough acquaintance with the Old Testament, especially that they become more familiar with it as a whole. It is true of every intellectual product, that it cannot be rightly esteemed by those who concern themselves only with its outer features, or with individual fragments of it; and of the Bible this is peculiarly true. What is here unfolded is one economy of salvation—*unum continuum systema*, as Bengel puts it—an organism of Divine deeds and testimonies which, beginning in Genesis with the creation, advances progressively to its completion in the Person and work of Christ, and shall find its close in the new heaven and earth predicted in the Apocalypse; and only in connection with the whole can details be rightly estimated. He who cannot apprehend the Old Testament in its great historical context may produce in detail much that is valuable and worth knowing, but he lacks the right key to its meaning, and therefore true joy in the study of it; then he easily stops short at the puzzles which lie everywhere on the surface of the Old Testament, and from them he condemns the whole. Now, to introduce to organic historical knowledge of the Old Testament is the very business of the discipline to which these lectures are devoted."

Hence in these volumes the history, institutions and theology of the Old Testament are blended. We have a clear account of the development of the ancient people, of the symbolism of their worship, and of the doctrine that was gradually unfolded. But the Biblical theology of the Old Testament, as distinguished from the New, is everywhere predominant. Here we perceive two opposite errors continually guarded against; on the one hand, that of ignoring the progress of doctrine, confusing the two Testaments, and finding Christ and Christian doctrine everywhere; on the other, that of sundering the Old Testament from the New, and placing it on a line with other pre-Christian religions which also were in their way a preparation for Christianity. We cannot have the redeeming God of the new covenant without

the Creator and covenant God of the Old. No New Testament idea is already fully set forth in the Old Testament, but the genesis of all the ideas of New-Testament salvation lies in the Old Testament. The divisions of the work are—first, MOSAISM, the patriarchal covenant of promise, and the Mosaic covenant of the law, on the basis whereof the theocracy is founded—these two being one; secondly, PROPHECY, as the development of God's kingdom and its theology; thirdly, WISDOM or CHOCHMA, rooted like prophecy in the law, the meditation of sages under the influence of revelation on the general aspects of the ethical life. But we fail to see here an improvement on the old and sacred division of Law, Prophets and Hagiographa.

We cannot analyse the result; nor is it necessary, as most of our readers will be able to do that for themselves. We advise every theological student to give the work a careful study as a text-book. But there are some points on which it will be necessary to exercise caution. As to the future destiny of the ancient people of God we cannot agree with the author generally, though it is hard to understand precisely what his views are. On this point there is obscurity and a certain vacillation. The same may be said as to another subject—one of very great interest in relation to the theology of the first covenant—the Old-Testament experience of salvation. We must condense the chapter on this subject. "How far did this appointed way of salvation, that man laying hold by faith on the grace of God should find forgiveness, hold good during the Old-Testament dispensation? Are we to say that the just man not only walked in the faith of a future fulfilment of the promise and a future redemption, but also rejoiced in the present possession of salvation, and had an assurance that his sins were pardoned? In other words, *Was there already in Old-Testament times the experience of justification and adoption in the New-Testament sense of these terms?* This difficult question was especially discussed in the Cocceian disputations, Cocceius maintaining that the old covenant furnished only a *paresis*, a *prætermisio*, a *dissimulatio* of sin, according to which, although satisfaction has not been made for sin, God does not punish it; but not an *aphesis* or forgiveness of sins, or proper *remissio*. In this matter the question is whether, besides the pardon which was obtained for *sins of infirmity* by confession and sacrifice, there was also pardon for presumptuous sins, which could not be atoned for by sacrifice, and therefore a justification of the whole man. To this we reply as follows: the Old Testament certainly teaches by word and fact—by the latter in the history of the nation as well as in the history of godly individuals—that Divine forgiveness is imparted to the sinner who turns in penitence and faith to God; and that this is not a mere ignoring of sin, a silence on the part of God with respect to it, such as He

might for a season observe also in the case of the ungodly, but, as Nathan declares to the repentant David, a causing of the guilt to pass away, or removing it to a distance, or, as it is expressed in Job xxxiii. 26, He restores unto man his righteousness. It is a replacing the sinner in a state in which, as conforming to the Divine will, he is accepted by God, and becomes an object of the Divine complacency. 'There is forgiveness with Thee that Thou mayest be feared,' that Thou mayest be in Thy forgiving mercy an object of veneration. Forgiveness of sins is an act which God performs for His name's sake. Hence we find not only assumptions of praise for the future atonement, like Micah vii. 18, but also thanksgivings for pardon received, like Ps. ciii. *This experience of salvation, however, still remains but relative, and decidedly differs from that of the New Testament.* In the first place, it does indeed afford peace of mind concerning individual sins—nay, for the moment, concerning the whole standing of the sinful subject before God; but, not resting on an objective and permanent atonement obtained for the Church, it does not establish *any permanent state of reconciliation.* That which applies to the Church as a whole with respect to the insufficiency of the ministry of Gospel reconciliation established in it—viz., that it was to the future that it must look for a perfect atonement and pardon, 'O Israel, wait for the Lord; He will redeem Israel from all her sins'—applies also, notwithstanding the inward nature of the expiation (Ps. li. 19), to the individual also. Not such atoning grace and justification were imparted to him as to enable him to say with the Apostle, 'Old things are passed away; behold, all things are become new.' He was pacified concerning the past, but only to begin again seeking to be henceforth just through the works of the law. . . . But, in the second place, there was not in him, until the *spiritual man* appeared in Christ, *an indwelling of the Spirit*, in virtue of which a subversion of the old foundations of his life was effected, and the seed of a new and spiritual personality, of a spiritual man, implanted in him. . . . In the third place, because the Divine Spirit did not make in the Old-Testament saints a new foundation of life—did not as yet work outwards from within, as the transforming principle of the whole man—that the *conquest of death and everlasting life were not effected.* The individual might indeed be for the moment raised above death and the grave, but then death was only concealed under a veil. . . . Hence the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews declares, ch. xi. 40, that before the redemption of the New Testament the fathers of the old covenant were not partakers of the *teleiosis*. From what has been advanced, it may be seen how much was wanting under the Old-Testament dispensation to the full restoration of a filial relation towards God. The notion of *Divine sonship*, as conferred

upon the nation in general, and then upon the theocratic king—nay, as affirmed in a special sense of the godly, Pa. lxxiii. 15, was still but a notion to be fully realised only in the future. The highest relation of intercourse between God and man, instituted by prophecy, does not attain to the eminence of that filial state inaugurated by the New Testament; for which reason Christ declares the greatest of the prophets to be less than the least in His kingdom, Matt. xi. 11."

All this is true; but it does not bring out the whole truth. On these subjects the reader will do well to consult, and indeed study profoundly, the suggestive little book of Dr. Riehm, on "Messianic Prophecy." We say study, for a single reading here will not suffice, and the book deserves to be pondered from beginning to end. Apart from a few indications of undue freedom as to the Old-Testament canon, the learned author has done real service in showing that a severe historical exposition of Old-Testament prophecy, and the maintenance of the principle that much Messianic prediction was only brought out as such by the fulfilment, tends to impress "the glory of the educating wisdom of God" in the Old Covenant. In opposition to those who think that they find everywhere in the old sacred writings the truths of salvation in their complete New-Testament form, Dr. Riehm demonstrates that the prophets recognised only "individual phases of the Divine purposes without being able to place them in the connection in which, during the course of fulfilment, they become one united whole. What the Apostle says of the New-Testament prophets, 'We prophesy in part,' applies more fully to those of the Old Testament, and still more prominently we find in Messianic prophecy the 'sundry times and divers manners,' of which he speaks to the Hebrews." He has strikingly shown how far the ancient predictions fell short of the glory of the fulfilment. But the applications of this we shall show by a more extended reference to this valuable book.

The Old-Testament wisdom or Chochma is the philosophy of the Hebrews, comprising three of the canonical books of the Old Testament—viz., Job, Proverbs and Ecclesiastes, with many of the Psalms. The discussion of this branch of Old-Testament ethical theology is very interesting, and will serve as a good introduction to Dr. Delitzsch's work on "Proverbs," the first volume of which has appeared and will soon be followed by another. The place given to these Chochma writings in Old-Testament theology is important. They are quite distinct from the Law and the Prophets; they prepare the way more distinctly than the others for a human literature uninspired, forming as it were the transition to it. It is well known that the Apocrypha includes some further developments of this class. Dr. Delitzsch thus sums up the general bearing of them: "And how was the

Chochma conditioned! To what was it directed! To denote its condition and aims in one word, it was universalistic or humanistic. Emanating from the religion of Jahve, but seeking to comprehend the spirit in the letter, the essence in the forms of natural life, its effort was directed towards the general truth affecting manhood as such. While prophecy, which is recognised by the Chochma as a spiritual power indispensable to a healthy development of a people (ch. xxix. 18), is of service to the historical process into which Divine truths enter to work out its results in Israel, and from thence outward among mankind, the Chochma seeks to look into the very essence of this truth through the robe of its historical and national manifestation, and then to comprehend those general ideas, in which could already be discovered the fitness of the religion of Jahve for becoming the world-religion. From this aim towards the ideal in the historical, towards the everlasting same amidst changes, the human in the Israelitish, the universal religion in the Jahve-religion, and the universal morality in the law, all the peculiarities in the Book of Proverbs are explained, as well as of the long, broad stream of the literature of the Chochma, beginning with Solomon, which, when the Palestinian Judaism assumed the rugged, exclusive, proud national character of Pharisaism, developed itself in Alexandrianism. . . . In vain do we look for the name *Israel* in the Proverbs; even the name *Thorah* has a much more flexible idea attached to it than that of the law written at Sinai; prayer and good works are placed above sacrifice; practical obedience to the teachings of wisdom above all. The Proverbs refer with special interest to Gen. i. and ii., the beginnings of the world and of the human race before nations took their origin. On this primitive record in the Book of Genesis the figure of the tree of life (perhaps also of the fountain of life), found nowhere else in the Old Testament, leans; on it also many other expressions, such as 'the spirit of man,' in ch. xx. 27. This also, as Stier observes, accounts for the fact that *Adam* occurs most frequently in the Book of Job and in the Solomonic writings. All these phenomena are explained by the general universal aim of the Chochma."

The Book of Proverbs has been too much neglected by preachers. But we think that the diligent use of this admirable commentary, with its generally clear and good new translation of the text, will open the eyes of Christian pastors to the inestimable treasures of instruction which the book contains. Those students who are in the habit of carefully studying the Hebrew original of their texts from the Old Testament will find the philological and critical learning, and the Rabbinical illustration, which abound in this and all the volumes of the series of great value to them.

We are reminded by the advertisement of the publishers that the present year will complete the translations of the Keil and Delitzsch commentary on the Old Testament. The subscribers to the Foreign Theological Library are to be congratulated on this fact. They will have what may be pronounced—taken as a whole—the best exposition of the ancient Scriptures which our language contains. For purposes of reference there is none to be compared with them; and their introductions and occasional dissertations are of peculiar value. They are sometimes tedious, and sometimes obscure. Often they may seem too intent on discussing and overturning the expositions of other exegetes of whom the English reader knows nothing. But they are always faithful to the analogy of the faith, and exhibit in every page the earnest and devout determination at all costs to obey the Saviour's command and *search the Scriptures* to find in them Him of whom they testify.

DR. HEFELE ON THE COUNCILS.

A History of the Christian Councils, from the Original Documents, to the Close of the Council of Nicæa, A.D. 325. By C. J. Hefele, D.D. Vol. I. Translated from the German by the Rev. W. R. Clark, M.A.

A History of the Councils of the Church, from the Original Documents. By the Right Rev. C. J. Hefele, D.D. Vol. II. A.D. 326 to A.D. 429. Translated from the German by H. N. Oxenham, M.A. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.

THESE two volumes may be said, generally, to comprise the History of the Christian Church and of Christian Doctrine and Discipline especially, during its first three centuries after the Apostles. But that history is exhibited in the light of the early Synods and Councils; and this invests it with a peculiar interest, giving us, as it were, much of the secret history of Christianity which could not otherwise be penetrated. Attempts have been made to present the development of the Christian faith in connection with the lives of its most distinguished representatives. And the result has been a vivid presentation of the leading epochs. But here we have the Church as one organic body studied in connection with the most critical epochs of its organic life. The individual men are there; but the Church is also there in its representative life. Bishop Hefele tells us that he here presents "the period of the fullest and most eventful dogmatic development of the faith in the history of the Church." He adds: "I trust I may have contributed some help towards a

clearer insight into this great process. I have therefore given my first and best attention to the Synods of that period which handled dogma; but the many others, with their numerous and often very important ordinances concerning ecclesiastical discipline, worship and morals, canon law and judicial procedure, have also received due consideration. Every lover of the history of the Church and of civilisation will here find abundant materials for study."

These two volumes, strictly speaking, are the history of the Arian controversy, with its results in the interval which preceded the final settlement of the doctrine as to the Person of Christ in His two natures; with the equally important decisions affecting the doctrine of the Holy Spirit in the second Council at Constantinople, as well as the definition of the human spirit of our Lord as against the heresy of Apollinaria. Theological students are accustomed to regard these two Councils, with the two that followed them, simply in their dogmatic bearing upon the fundamentals of the Trinity and the Person of Christ. But this work will show what an enormous mass of other work these Councils achieved, and at what expense of feeling and strife the decisions were arrived at. In fact, it is not too much to say that they bring out as nothing else can what we have just called the secret history of the establishment of the Christian faith and worship.

Mr. Oxenham, the translator of the second volume, thus speaks of the issues involved: "It must be added that the Arian controversy, over and above its historical importance, has a special interest of a practical kind at the present day, when there is so strong a tendency among a class of religionists, not openly professing infidel opinions, to treat all doctrinal questions as 'disputes about an iota.' It would argue mere ignorance or incapacity to doubt now, with the reflex light of history cast upon it, that what Gibbon calls 'the difference of a single diphthong' involved in the fourth century—like the modern assault on the Athanasian Creed—no less a question than the fundamental tenet of the entire Christian Revelation, the Divinity of the Son of God. And it is not uninteresting to notice, as we follow Bishop Hefele through the successive phases of the long struggle, how the Arian and Semi-Arian leaders are constantly betraying those characteristics of indifference, worldliness, profanity, Court intrigue, shuffling, profanity and fierceness against definite belief which still too often mark the prophets of that much-coveted but impossible abstraction, an 'undogmatic Christianity.'"

It must be remembered that we have before us the work of a Romanist theologian: one who has since distinguished himself by his fearless integrity and loyalty to what he holds to be truth; but a Romanist nevertheless. The Protestant reader must therefore be on his guard. But he need not be suspicious. It will be

serviceable to his own theological faith to read what this sincere champion of Romanism has to say about the relation of early Councils to the Pope, and the interminable struggles which have at last issued in a strange settlement at the Vatican. As to the Presidency of Councils we read as follows: "As the presidency of a diocesan Synod belongs to the bishop, of a provincial Synod to the metropolitan, of a national to the primate or patriarch, so, in the nature of the case, the presidency of an œcumenical Council belongs to the supreme ruler of the whole Church—to the Pope; and this is so clear, that the most violent partisans of the episcopal system, who assign to the Pope only a primacy of honour, yet do not in the least impugn his right to preside at œcumenical Synods. The Pope may, however, exercise this presidency in person, or he may be represented, as has frequently been the case, by his legates. Against this papal right of presidency at œcumenical Synods the Reformers brought forward the objection that the history of the Church showed clearly that the emperors had presided at some of the first eight Councils." Hefele has to answer this, and his answer we shall summarise for ourselves, dwelling only on the earlier general Councils in the backward order which he has adopted. The Council of Chalcedon, 451, acknowledged Pope Leo as its head: "Thou, by thy representatives, hast taken the lead." But this is indefinite: it does not assert that the Pope had the pre-eminence as matter of course. The imperial commissioners had the place of honour before the altar; they are the first named in the minutes; they took the votes, arranged the order of business, closed the sessions, and thus discharged the functions proper to the president. This is explained in the same letter to the Pope, "Faithful emperors have used the presidency for better order." They conducted the externals of the Synod, but gave no vote on matters of faith. So Constantine the Great said: "And I am a bishop. You are bishops for the *interior* business of the Church; I am the bishop chosen of God to conduct the *exterior* business of the Church." In the Third Council, at Ephesus, 431, the Emperor Theodosius "sent a lay president as *comes sacrorum domesticorum*; but he is not to take part in discussions of doctrine, since it is not allowable to anyone, unless enrolled among the most holy bishops, to intermeddle in ecclesiastical discussions." But this lay president, after all, had a good deal to do that marred the theory of Papal authority. "He was to send away the laity and the monks, if they repaired in too great numbers, to Ephesus; he was to provide for the tranquillity of the Synod and the safety of the Synod; he was to take care that differences of opinion arising among the members of the Synod should not degenerate into passionate controversies, but that each might express his opinion without fear or hindrance, in order that, whether after quiet or noisy

discussions upon each point, the bishops might arrive at a unanimous decision. Finally, he was to prevent anyone from leaving the Synod without cause, and also to see that no other theological discussion should be entered into than that which had occasioned the assembling of the Synod, or that no private business should be brought up or discussed." Cyril headed the clerical subscription at the council, "taking the place," as he said, "of Celestine, the most holy Archbishop of Rome;" in what sense, however, may be inferred from the documents of later councils which refer to Celestine and Cyril indiscriminately as presidents of the third Œcumenical Council. At the second Council—one of the most important assemblies of the Christian Church—neither the Bishop of Rome, Damasus, nor his legate, was even present. The first Council, that of Nicæa in 325, certainly had no Bishop of Rome; but it is constantly asserted that his legate was there in the person of Hosius. Certainly the emperor was a very important personage, had the seat of honour, and delivered the introductory discourse. He then, according to Eusebius, "made way for the presidents of the Synod;" not the president, however. "Hosius, Bishop of Cordova, was the representative of the Bishop of Rome; and he was present at the Council of Nicæa, with the two Roman priests Vitus and Vincentius." There is absolutely nothing to prove that Hosius was the one president at Nicæa, or that he was such in the name of the absent Bishop of Rome. We read of presidents, and not of one; nor does any one of the numerous authorities quoted say that Hosius signed first as president or as representative of the absent head of the Church.

As to the confirmation of the decrees, it is undeniable that the emperors solemnly and officially confirmed the decrees of all the first Councils. There is no evidence that the Popes, so called, did so. Dr. Hefele suggests that the signatures of the Pope's legates before that of the other bishops must be regarded as a sanction of the see of Rome. To us it seems to imply something very different. Had the Bishop of Rome been then what he afterwards became, a simple priority of subscription would not have been enough to give his sanction. The history of the relation between the Pope and the second Council is very important. At first the Western bishops disapproved of the acts of that Council; afterwards Pope Damasus gave his sanction in part; his successor Leo rejected its canons, and, still more explicitly, Gregory the Great. The Popes accepted, however, the creed of the second Council, and some of them, including Gregory, declared it œcumenical, while refusing to sanction its canons. All this is hardly consistent with the claim set up in modern times. As to the third Council, of Ephesus, it is undeniable that a later Pope, Sixtus III., sanctioned it in private letters; but that says nothing for the necessity of Papal confirmation. The fourth

Council, that of Chalcedon, did indeed send its acts for confirmation and approval to Rome. But when that approval came, with reservations, the fact that the exception had no weight shows that the authority of the Council was not absolutely dependent on Papal authority. After that, we are at sea in an ocean of controversy. The relation of the Pope to general Councils of a later period must be studied at great length to be understood. On it hangs much of the history of the great perversion of Christendom.

We have spoken of the emperor and his commissioners as having great weight in the earliest Councils. They were not, however, the only laymen present: they brought their secretaries with them, who listened, but had no vote. In many of the more limited diocesan Synods, especially in Africa, laymen were allowed to be present. We will quote our author here:—

"Towards the middle of the third century we find a departure from this ancient practice of having only bishops as members of Synods, first in Africa, when Cyprian assembled at those Synods, which he held with reference to the restoration of the *lapsæd*, besides the bishops of his province and his clergy, *confessores et laicos stantes*, i.e. those laymen who were under no ecclesiastical censure. So there were present at the Synod held by Cyprian on the subject of baptism by heretics, besides eighty-seven bishops, very many priests and deacons, and *maxima pars plebis*. And the Roman clergy, in their letter to Cyprian on the subject, request that the bishops will take counsel in Synods, in common with the priests, deacons, and *laicis stantibus*. It must not be overlooked, however, that Cyprian makes a difference between the membership of the bishops and that of others. It is *præsentis etiam stantium plebs*, the faithful laity being also present. In other places, Cyprian speaks only of the bishops as members of the Synod; and it comes out also that the bishops had at these Synods taken the advice and opinion of the laity as well as of the clergy. It is never, however, in the least degree indicated that either the clergy or the laity had a *votum decisivum*; only bishops were voters."

From this it appears that these early Synods were occasionally summoned in defence of doctrine, or for the detection of error, or for the settlement of disputed questions; and that, in some places at least, the laity were summoned or permitted to attend. This practice was exceedingly wholesome. It was continued for some centuries. An archbishop of Lyons, in 517, says: "We permit the laity to be present, that the people may know those things which are ordained by the priests alone." This, being put into more orthodox language, means that things which the Holy Ghost reserved for the Christian pastorate, and for which they are responsible, might be discussed and settled in the pre-

sence and even with the counsel of instructed laity, who have a consultative voice, but not a decisive vote. The fourth Synod of Toledo, in 633, goes so far as to say expressly that laymen should be invited to the Synoda.

But we must break off, though the infinite variety of interest in these volumes might well carry us on to any length.

LIGHTFOOT ON THE COLOSSIANS.

St. Paul's Epistles to the Colossians and to Philemon. A Revised Text with Introductions, Notes, and Dissertations. By J. B. Lightfoot, D.D., Canon of St. Paul's. London: Macmillan. 1875.

AGAIN and again have we paid our tribute to the excellence of Dr. Lightfoot's commentaries. The present volume must receive generally the same kind of praise which has been bestowed on its predecessors. But we have to hint that it exhibits the same tendency to sacrifice exposition to dissertation which detracts from the perfection of the series. If the theological exegesis were on the same scale of thoroughness as that which marks the treatment of the criticism, introduction, and concomitants generally, there would be nothing to rival these works, at home or abroad. The Judaistic and Gnostic heresies which gave occasion to the Epistle, or at least have shaped its character, are discussed more fully than in any other English work. The characteristic feature of Essenism being a Gnostic tendency specially alluded to by St. Paul, the author gives an exhaustive account of the Essenes. To those who feel the fascination of this subject generally, and are acquainted with the place modern theory assigns to Essenism in the origination of Christianity, this essay will be profoundly interesting. Again, there is nothing finer in our literature than the dissertation on the term *Pleroma*. There are a few discursive notes also—on the salient difficulties of the Epistle—which are models of discussion. Those on ch. ii. 14, *seq.* 23, are among the number: in both these we are carried with the author irresistibly in spite of some preliminary reluctance. Generally speaking, the grace and dignity with which Dr. Lightfoot teaches those who read his works are such as none but those who study him can understand. It is impossible to resist it.

This makes it all the more matter of regret that the theological exposition should be sometimes scanty. On some points—speaking for ourselves—we should call it defective and one-sided: that is, the supreme principles of the Christian faith are sometimes taken for granted where they perhaps ought to be enlarged upon; and the Gnostic allusions are discussed when perhaps they were little in the Apostle's mind. For instance, the Atonement has a

wonderful exhibition in this Epistle, quite distinct from the peculiar aspect of it as confronting the false philosophy troubling the Colossians. But it is not unjust to say that there is here no note on the grand doctrine itself, scarcely an allusion to it, apart from the face it presents to the supposed Gnostic error. In the Introduction we read: "When, lastly, he dwells on the work of reconciliation, as wrought through the blood of Christ's cross, in the body of His flesh through death, we may perhaps infer that he already discerned a disposition to put aside Christ's passion as a stumbling-block in the way of philosophical religion. Thus regarded, the Apostle's language gains force and point; though no stress can be laid on explanations which are so largely conjectural." That the author has no exaggerated views of the Apostle's polemic against Gnosticism is evident: "Guarding ourselves at the same time against misunderstanding with the twofold caution, that we here employ the term to express the simplest and most elementary conceptions of this tendency of thought, and that we do not postulate its use as a distinct designation of any sect or sects at this early date. Thus limited, the view that the writer of this Epistle is combating a Gnostic heresy seems free from all objections, while it appears necessary to explain his language." Now we complain that, notwithstanding this, the exposition is, on certain points inestimably precious, too sedulous in explaining the Gnostic allusion, and passes by the profound thought to which that allusion gives no more than a transient colouring. We should be most thankful—and this is the only complaint we have to make against one whose learning, exhaustive research, and evangelical dignity, make him worthy to take the lead of modern expositors—if the objective and subjective atonement of Christ in this Epistle had been more amply treated, in their distinction and mutual relations.

We shall quote a few sentences which seem to us to point to a partial estimate of the reconciliation or atonement. "The reconciliation is always represented as made to the Father. The reconciler is sometimes the Father, sometimes the Son." "The active rather than the passive sense of *ἐξομότης* is required by the context, which (as commonly in the New Testament) speaks of the sinner as reconciled to God, not of God as reconciled to the sinner. It is the mind of man, not the mind of God, which must undergo a change, that a reunion may be effected." The time will come, we hope, when Dr. Lightfoot will give us a dissertation, in another Commentary, on the terms "Propitiation" and "Reconciliation" as they meet in the modern term "Atonement." Then we shall have our revenge; for we cannot doubt that such an essay would bring out the truth. Meanwhile, it is disappointing that the two or three sentences quoted above should be all that the Commentary has on the subject of Reconciliation. We

turn from the English to the German expositor. Meyer, in Clark's Translation, says on the same words: "*Enemies* in the passive sense (comp. on Rom. v. 10; xi. 28): *invisos Deo*, as is required by the idea of having become reconciled, through which God's enmity against sinful men, who were *by nature children of wrath* (Eph. ii. 3), was changed into mercy towards them. This applies in opposition to the usual *active* interpretation, which Hofmann also justly rejects, hostile *towards* God (Rom. viii. 7; Jas. iv. 4), which must not be *combined with* the passive sense (Calvin). *In your mind* and *by wicked works* belong to *both* the preceding elements; the former as dative of the *cause*: *on account of their disposition of mind* they were once alienated from God and hateful to Him; the latter as specification of the event, *actual sphere of life, in which* they had been so. The view which takes in *τῇ διαvoίᾳ* as dative of the *respect*—as *respects disposition*—would no doubt suit the erroneous *active* explanation of '*enemies*,' but would furnish only a *superfluous* definition to it, as it is self-evident that the enmity towards God resides in the disposition." Meyer's footnote at this point may be profitably studied: "See Fritzsche, who aptly explains *καταλλάσσειν τινι*: *in alicujus favorem venire, qui antea successuerit*. The reconciliation of men takes place when God, instead of being angry at them, has become gracious towards them,—when consequently *He Himself* is *reconciled*. Comp. Lu. xviii. 13; 2 Cor. v. 19. So long as the wrath is not changed, and consequently He is not reconciled, men remain unreconciled. 2 Macc. vii. 33, 'He is reconciled to His servants,' comp. viii. 29; i. 5; v. 20; Clem. Cor. i. 48. In Constt. Apost. viii. 12, 14, it is said of Christ that 'He reconciled God to the world,' and of God that 'He is reconciled to believers.'"

As to the reconciliation on the part of God, Meyer is very explicit. We shall collect a few passages in which he expounds ver. 20. They lose by being taken out of their context, but are of great importance in themselves. "God is the *subject* whose *hostility* is removed by the reconciliation (Rom. v. 10): *all things* is the *object* which was affected by this hostility grounded of necessity on the holiness and righteousness of God. If the hostile disposition of men towards God, which had become removed by the reconciliation, were meant, the universal '*all things*' would not be suitable; because the whole universe might, indeed, be affected by the hostility of God against sin, but could not itself be hostilely disposed towards Him." "The only correct sense is therefore *that the entire universe has been reconciled with God through Christ*. But how far! . . . The original harmony which in the state of innocence subsisted between God and the whole creation was annulled by sin, which first obtained mastery over a portion of the angels, and in consequence of this (2 Cor. xi. 3), by means

of the transgression of Adam, over all mankind (Rom. v. 12). Not only had sinful mankind now become alienated from God by sin and brought upon themselves His hostility (ver. 21), but also the whole of the non-rational creation (Rom. viii. 19) was affected by this relation, and given up by God to 'vanity' and 'subjection to corruption.' Indeed, even the world of heavenly spirits had lost its harmony with God as it originally existed, until a portion of the angels formed the kingdom of the devil in antagonism to God, and became forfeited to the wrath of God for the everlasting punishment which is prepared for the devil and his angels. But in Christ by means of His 'propitiation,' through which God 'made peace,' the reconciliation of the whole has taken place, in virtue of the blotting out thereby effected of the curse of sin. Thus not only has the *fact* effecting the reconciliation as its *causa meritoria* taken place, but the realisation of the *universal reconciliation itself* is also *entered upon*, although it is not yet completed. Down to the time of the Parousia unreconciled believers are not yet separated; the non-intelligent creation still remains in its state of corruption occasioned by sin; even the angelic world sees the kingdom of the devil, though already the object of Divine triumph (ch. ii. 15), not yet annulled in its energy against the Christian Church. But through the Parousia the reconciliation of the whole which has been effected in Christ will reach its consummation. . . . This collective reconciliation is justly marked by the *aorist* infinitive ἀποκαλλάζειν, because to the telic conception of God it was present as *one moment in conception*. The angels also are necessarily included. Of angels not fallen the New Testament never speaks of a reconciliation; but it is to be observed that the angels are to be conceived *according to category*, in so far, namely, as the hostile relation of God towards the fallen angels affected the angelic world viewed as a whole. The original normal relation between God and the higher order of spirits is no longer existing, so long as the kingdom of demons in antagonism to God still subsists—which has had its powers broken no doubt already by the death of Christ (ch. ii. 14; Heb. ii. 14), but will undergo at length utter separation. The idea of reconciliation is therefore in conformity with the manner of popular discourse, and according to the variety of the objects included in 'all things,' meant partly in an immediate sense (in reference to mankind), partly in a mediate sense (in reference to the creature and the angelic world). The idea of the reconciliation is of an *elastic kind*."

Dr. Lightfoot's notes take another ground. They seem to be governed by the idea of a subjective reconciliation, though the objective is not wholly omitted. The latter is again and again hinted at. The summary of the paragraph is thus given. "The false teachers aimed at effecting a partial reconciliation between

God and man through the interposition of angelic mediators. The Apostle speaks of an absolute and complete reconciliation of universal nature to God, effected through the mediation of the Incarnate Word. These mediators were ineffective, because they were neither human nor Divine. The true Mediator must be both human and Divine. It was necessary that in Him all the plenitude of the Godhead should dwell. It was necessary also that He should be born into the world and should suffer as a man." What is meant by "absolute and complete reconciliation" we are not told. On this subject the Commentary is almost too restrained and temperate. "The whole universe of things, material as well as spiritual, shall be restored to harmony with God. How far this restoration of universal nature may be subjective, as involved in the changed perceptions of man thus brought into harmony with God, and how far it may have an objective and independent existence, it were vain to speculate." "Making peace through the blood of His cross," "Things in earth or things in heaven," are phrases passed over almost without comment. This is the more surprising because the preceding summary tends to excite expectation. "And this absolute supremacy is His, because it was the Father's good pleasure that in Him all the plenitude of Deity should have its home; because He willed through Him to reconcile the universe once more to Himself. It was God's purpose to effect peace and harmony through the blood of Christ's cross, and so to restore all things, whatsoever and wheresoever they be, whether on the earth or in the heavens." "But now, in Christ's body, in Christ's flesh which died on the cross for your atonement, ye are reconciled to Him again." The relation here of "atonement" to "reconciliation," and the connection of "the death on the cross" with both, are nowhere discussed.

Another characteristic of the exposition which does not carry with it our full consent is the too exclusive limitation of the "Mystery" to the free admission of the Gentiles into the fellowship of the Gospel. That the vocation of all men is included as one of the accessories of the great mystery of Christ committed to St. Paul's preaching is obvious: but our expositor everywhere makes it the "leading idea." This seems to us out of harmony with the grandeur of the Apostle's statements. The following is Dr. Lightfoot's principal note, which, as usual, goes to the root of the matter:—

"This is not the only term borrowed from the ancient mysteries, which St. Paul employs to describe the teaching of the Gospel. The word *ῥύσις* just below, ver. 28, seems to be an extension of the same metaphor. In Phil. iv. 12 again, we have the word *μυήματα*; and in Eph. i. 14 *σφραγίζεσθαι* is perhaps an image derived from the same source. . . . There is this difference,

however ; that, whereas the heathen mysteries were strictly confined to a narrow circle, the Christian mysteries are freely communicated to all. There is therefore an intentional paradox in the employment of the image by St. Paul. See the notes on 'every man perfect' below.

"Thus the idea of *secrecy* or *reserve* disappears when *μυστήριον* is adopted into the Christian vocabulary by St. Paul : and the word signifies simply 'a truth which was once hidden but now is revealed,' 'a truth which without special revelation would have been unknown.' Of the nature of the truth itself the word says nothing. It may be transcendental, incomprehensible, mystical, mysterious, in the modern sense of the term (1 Cor. xv. 51 ; Eph. v. 32) ; but this idea is quite accidental, and must be gathered from the special circumstances of the case, for it cannot be inferred from the word itself. Hence it is almost universally found in connection with words denoting revelation or publication. But the one special 'mystery' which absorbs St. Paul's thoughts in the Epistles to the Colossians and Ephesians is the free admission of the Gentiles on equal terms to the privileges of the covenant. For this he is a prisoner ; this he is bound to proclaim fearlessly (iv. 3 ; Eph. vi. 19) ; in this had God most signally displayed the lavish wealth of His goodness (ver. 27 ; ii. 3 ; Eph. i. 6 ; iii. 8). In one passage only throughout these two epistles is *μυστήριον* applied to anything else, Eph. v. 32. The same idea appears very prominently also in the thanksgiving (added apparently later than the rest of the letter) at the end of the Epistle to the Romans, xvi. 25."

We need not go to heathen phraseology for the derivation of terms the use of which lie much nearer home. As to the "sealing," St. Paul in Rom. iv. seems to tell us whence he derived that. And our Lord's parabolic teaching had made the Christian world familiar with "the mystery of the kingdom of God," "the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven." We would fain plead the same sacred authority for the term "perfect." Our Lord used it in a moral application with reference both to the beginning and the end of the Christian life, not as a discipline of knowledge, but as a discipline of practice : "if thou wilt be perfect" as to the conditions of His discipleship, "be ye therefore perfect" as to the end and aim of it. Hence St. James and St. John make frequent use of the word in its highest moral meaning as including the entire new nature of the Christian. Moreover, Epaphras, at the close of this Epistle, is represented as sharing the Apostle's agony on behalf of the Colossians that they might be "perfect ;" and he cannot be supposed to have derived the idea from the phraseology of the Gnostics. When, therefore, we read here that "the language descriptive of the heathen mysteries is transferred by him to the Christian dispensation, that he may thus more effectively

contrast the things signified," and that "in Christ every believer is *τέλειος*, for he has been admitted as *ἐκκλῆσια* of its most profound, most awful secrets," we feel that enough is not said, and that this great word has not full justice done it. Whatever may be said as to the parallel passage, 1 Cor. ii. 6, our present context demands much more. By all kinds of wise instruction and discipline the Apostles sought, and our Apostle laboured, that they might present every man morally perfect in Christ.

As to the supreme mystery itself we venture to suggest that its "leading idea" is the Christ of God, the mystery of eternity, revealed, and yet not revealed in the Gospel; or, in Dr. Lightfoot's striking words, "God's mystery, which is nothing else than Christ—Christ containing in Himself all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge hidden away." Whatever may be said as to the Gentiles' participation being one special mystery the Apostle was commissioned to reveal, it seems plain that the central mystery was the purpose of redemption in Christ, which was until the Gospel was preached hidden from Jews and Gentiles alike. Hence the doxology at the end of the Epistle to the Romans declares that the Gospel is a "revelation of the mystery which was kept secret since the world began, but now is made manifest . . . to all nations for the obedience of faith:" to all nations, Jews and Gentiles alike. In Christ the Mystery revealed—the One Mystery of heaven and earth, time and eternity—are hid all the hidden treasures of wisdom and knowledge: obviously, therefore, the proclamation to the Gentiles revealed only to them what was the heritage of all mankind. The "riches of the glory of this mystery" must be interpreted of the manifestation of God in Christ to the human race: that this manifestation in Jesus was concurrent with its exhibition to the Gentiles was a demonstration of the manifold wisdom of God; but we cannot think that "it was just here that this 'mystery,' this dispensation of grace, achieved its greatest triumphs, and displayed its transcendent glory." It is true that to the Ephesians St. Paul makes the calling of the Gentiles an important element of the revealed mystery. But, if the passage is carefully examined, it will be found that this mystery is only a subordinate part of a grander mystery which the Apostle received by revelation, "the mystery of Christ" absolutely. Of his "knowledge" in this he speaks in a style which shows that he is thinking of more than his Gentile commission. It was a grace given to him to preach among the Gentiles, and "to make all men see what is the economy of the mystery which from the beginning of the world hath been hid in God:" not "the fellowship" of the mystery, but the character and issues of the mystery itself, and the "manifold wisdom" which it displayed. In the Ephesian Epistle the hid treasures—*ἀκρυβηταί* is another echo from the Gospels—are rather the un-

speakable blessings of the covenant of grace, in the Colossian they are rather the unspeakable wonders of the Redeemer's person. St. Paul did indeed glory in being an apostle to the Gentiles; but infinitely more in being an apostle of Christ. Granted that he was "the prisoner of Jesus Christ for you Gentiles," the emphasis lay upon the Master's name; and we think that he would not have altogether sanctioned this comment on his own word "whereunto I also labour:" "'that I may initiate all mankind in the fulness of this mystery,' 'that I may preach the Gospel to all without reserve.' If St. Paul had been content to preach an exclusive gospel, he might have saved himself from more than half the troubles of his life."

But we must refrain from enlargement: in fact we have been drawn on in this style almost unconsciously. A few more theological notes in another edition would make Canon Lightfoot's the most perfect exegetical monograph in our language. We shall now betake ourselves to another reading of its two leading essays—on the Essenes and on Pleroma—and others of alight character: advising our readers to do the same. There could be no more profitable task for a young divine than to devote a few weeks to the careful simultaneous study of Meyer and Lightfoot on the Colossians. We have indicated where the German seems to supplement the English divine. We might show, on the other hand, how much Meyer's view of our life in unison with Christ falls short of our expositor's. But the student will find out that, and many other points of superiority, for himself.

RELIGION AND SCIENCE.

Religion and Science, Their Relations to Each Other at the Present Day. Three Essays on the Grounds of Religious Belief. By Stanley T. Gibson, B.D., Rector of Sandon, in Essex. London: Longmans. 1875.

THE essays are long, the subjects of infinite importance—the Divine Existence, Miracles, the Gospels and the Moral Faculty. We wish that the book were one which could be recommended to the class it professes to address, thoughtful, educated seekers of religious truth. There is great need of works by competent hands adapted to remove the doubts of this class; but this is not to be done in the way here proposed. Sympathy with honest doubt is right, but doubt is not to be removed by simply stating its grounds without attempting to deal with them. Take the first essay. The old design argument is in great part abandoned, for reasons partly speculative, partly scientific, and both classes of reason slight enough. For example, cases are adduced in which

design seems wanting, such as the case of apparently useless organs in animals. Might not the writer have remembered what believers are often reminded of by sceptics, that our ignorance of the explanation does not prove that there is no explanation? We never read the Design argument to mean that we must be able to explain the purpose in every minute particle of the universe. Surely we know too little to be expected to do this. It is enough that the overwhelming balance of probability points to design, and this is not denied, much less disproved. All the instances which are brought against the vast body of proofs are too insignificant to mention, and certainly altogether insufficient to outweigh the other facts. We have no heart to recapitulate the writer's other arguments, in which doubts and difficulties are made much more prominent than replies to them. We are glad to see the conclusion which the author announces. There was need to announce it. The whole tenor of the discussion suggests "Not proven," and the premisses, as stated here, would go no farther. We are therefore surprised and pleased to read: "Singly none of our arguments suffice, but combined they give an evidence which is sufficient for the practical purposes of religion, if not for proving all the definitions of theology. In the first place, the Design argument does give evidence for one intelligent Ruler of the world whose general purposes, at all events, we can apprehend and approve: next, the moral argument on the assumption of this result bears witness to the perfect goodness of this Being."

The second essay, on Christian Miracles, is still more unsatisfactory. We should be sorry to misrepresent the writer, but the impression made on us is that he feels this element to be a weakness and burden, and regards it as the vulnerable point in the armour of the faith. The same course is followed as in the former essay. Every objection which has ever been stated or imagined is brought forward, to be either admitted or receive the feeblest replies. It is a strange inconsistency that a writer who, in the former essay, summarily rejects all *à priori* arguments for the faith, in this essay elaborately endorses *à priori* objections to the faith (pp. 126 to 139). He examines at length Paley's eleven criteria of genuine miracles, and then apparently argues that many of the Gospel miracles fail to fulfil the conditions, and that many non-Gospel miracles, such as those at the tomb of the Abbé Paris, and other reported cases in modern times, do fulfil the conditions. It seems to us another inconsistency that a writer who would have no difficulty in receiving the latter sees so many difficulties in receiving the former. The objections adduced to weaken the evidence for the authorship of the Gospels and the Resurrection of Christ are slight in the extreme. Against the latter the only real evidence alleged is the discovery of apparent discrepancies in the accounts of the first announcement of the fact, and the sub-

sequent appearances of Christ. It is extraordinary that in a Christian minister the apparent bias should be against, not in favour of, received Christian doctrine. We could understand neutrality or judicial impartiality, though this might seem strange in one whose position could only be justified by positive faith. But there is something more than this. The adverse bias is apparent in the raking up of every conceivable objection, however trifling. For example: "A question has been raised whether Christ died upon the cross at all. He was not long enough by any means upon the cross to bring about death from that cause in a natural way. And hence it has been conjectured that He did not die in the manner usually supposed, but that He may only have sunk into a swoon. If so, the subsequent interviews with His disciples which gave rise to the traditions in the Gospels, may have had nothing really supernatural about them. But this view has many serious difficulties. It requires the supposition of confederates unknown to us. The young men spoken of in the accounts of the resurrection have been taken for such. But this idea of a prolonged life with secret friends is altogether at variance with these accounts. Who could these friends be, or how can we think that they, or still more Christ, deceived the disciples?" True, this is only mentioned as *conjecture*, but is it worth the paper and printing! And what can be the only effect of such stale conjectures collected and drawn out at length! The writer would seem in this section as elsewhere to have gone for his Scriptural criticism to Strauss's *Life of Christ*, "Supernatural Religion," and Davidson's *Introductions*, and to be ignorant of any replies to them. Nothing can be more inadequate as a statement of the case or more melancholy than the writer's summary on this "stronghold" of the miracle-argument. "We are now in a position to judge of the evidence of Christ's resurrection. If we set it aside we must accept two hypotheses—1, the removal of the body unknown to the disciples; 2, that the alleged appearances of Christ and the angels were really only subjective visions. . . . To me it seems that each is difficult to be received, and it must be remembered that both have to be received if the resurrection is denied." The "upshot" is that we have such probability as "would decide the conduct of any fair-judging man," but no more. "My conclusion is that the argument from the miracles cannot in these days be relied upon as the foundation for Christian belief. . . . It is not miracles, not even in the strictest sense of the word, which I call in question, but the evidential argument founded upon them. That argument has not lost all its value, but it has lost some. It may claim a place, but not the first place in Christian evidences. It is auxiliary rather than fundamental, fitted as matters stand rather to confirm the believer than to convince the sceptic."

Every other argument failing, we are to find refuge at last in the moral argument, the witness of conscience to Christian doctrine and morality. Here at least we might expect our defender, after giving up so many outworks, to make a firm stand, but the result is grievous disappointment. The mode of defence is to surrender almost everything against which a word can be said. When we come to inquire what the Christianity includes to which conscience bears testimony, we find little more than natural religion. Atonement is maintained indeed, but it is in a form which the author declines to state. What is certain is that he is most anxious to repudiate all the elements usually included in it. As to the doctrine of everlasting punishment, he is eager to lead the assault upon it. It is sufficient to produce a specimen of the weapons employed against it. Speaking of the passage, Matt. xxv. 46, he says, "Its supposed conclusiveness arises from the same epithet, *αἰώνιον*, being here distinctly applied to the punishment of the wicked, and also to the reward of the righteous. The latter, it is thought, all will say, is everlasting. I venture to put forward the following conjecture. May not the verse mean only that in the next æon the righteous will be happy and the wicked miserable, that the next stage of man's existence will be one of *ἀπορία* or judgment? It does not prove that this æon will be everlasting, or not succeed by others in which both may be happy. The idea of successive æons is certainly to be found in the discourses of Christ Himself. We hear from Him of 'this æon' and 'the æon to come.' And again of 'the end of this æon.' St. Paul has the plural form æons. With him, as in the Apocalypse, we find the phrase 'æons of æons.' To assert that *αἰώνιος*, in Matt. xxv. 46, means everlasting, is to beg the whole question as to the meaning of the word. There is nothing in this text more than in some others to necessitate that meaning." We are as clear as possible that the begging of the question is on the other side. The arguments against the doctrine are worthy of the above exposition. And yet a critic and expositor of this calibre undertakes in the interest of unbelief to reply to Butler's Analogy. The heading on four of his pages is "Answer to his Analogy." Ah, modesty, whither hast thou fled!

Whoever takes up this book, as we did, expecting to find a defence of Christian truth, will be sadly disappointed. We think the expectation a natural one, looking at the title and the position of the author. As to the result, we refrain from using stronger language, though others will not. We will only describe it as extraordinary and melancholy. The author has evidently been reading all on one side, and somehow thinks it his duty to inflict on the public his hazy theories and half-formed conclusions. That he should undertake to guide the doubting and unsettled is inexplicable. We look for light and see only thicker darkness; we

ask for bread and receive a stone. The author repeats the old and just warning, which he would have done well to act upon, against *a priori* expectations of the course of Divine government. This is just, where the conditions are evidently unequal. But there are cases where the conditions are equal, and the data therefore within our capacity to grasp. For example, when a book is published with such a title as this, and professing to reconcile Religion and Science, a book written by a Christian minister and beneficed clergyman of the National Establishment, we should expect a strong and earnest vindication of religion, and not a surrender on demand to any and every paltry assailant.

LORRAINE'S RITUALISM IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND.

The Church and Liberties of England. The True Character and Public Danger of the Present Extreme Movement in the National Church; with Dedication and Appendices. By Nevison Loraine, Vicar of Grove Park West, London, Author of "The Voice of the Prayer Book," &c. Introduction by the Very Rev. the Dean of Chester. Second Edition. London: Smith, Elder and Co. 1876.

THIS little volume, a thoughtful and vigorous public lecture on the causes of danger to the National Church, reveals the fact that slowly, by sure but certain steps, the ritualism of the English Church is passing on to its final stage—a stage beyond which it cannot go and continue to be of the Church of England. That a "distinctly counter-reformation" movement has now for some time been silently working within the Church needs little proof; it has long been seen by many, and believed by others who have not been brought into direct contact with it. Yet we venture to think the readers of this book will be startled to find how unblushingly this is avowed, and by what stealthy, secret means it is being effected.

Mr. Loraine has spoken and written with the view of awakening serious attention to these insidious but determined attacks upon the Church and the Protestantism of the land; and to show that a distinctively Romish teaching is being covertly diffused. This he effectually exposes by large quotations from works issued, openly or secretly, by the ultra-Ritualistic party.

When the Primate of England can say—"No one can take up a newspaper or novel in a railway carriage without being confronted with the fact that the laity of England are alarmed by seeing that there are some of the clergy who are bent on restoring the Mass and the distinctively Roman doctrines which this

country rejected at the Reformation ;" when nearly every bishop joins in an allocution which declares—"We also observe with increasing anxiety and alarm the dissemination of doctrines and encouragement of practices repugnant to the teaching of Holy Scripture and to the principles of the Church, as derived from Apostolic times and as authoritatively set forth at the Reformation ;" it is obvious that the question is one of very serious import. When "customs and costumes" are introduced quite at variance with the spirit and practice of the English Church for the last 300 years, when rich symbols, emblematic of occult truths or open errors, are employed, turning the simplicity of worship into spectacular exhibitions rivalling those of a play-house, silence becomes sinful.

The highest aim, the most daring and most dangerous, is the assumption of mystic power and sacrificial priestly function by the clergy. "The priest is the divinely-appointed channel through which the Omnipotent power of the Sinless High Priest in heaven is conveyed by the ordinances of the Church." "The priest at the altar is virtually Christ Himself." But a priest without a sacrifice is an anomaly ; and the bread and the wine come to be "a constantly repeated sacrifice for the living and the dead." The Eucharist is a propitiatory sacrifice. In one work quoted the following appears :—"At the words, THIS IS MY BODY, THIS IS MY BLOOD, you must believe that the bread and wine become the Real Body and Blood, with the Soul and Godhead of JESUS CHRIST ; bow down your heart and body in deepest adoration when the priest says these Awful Words, and worship your Saviour then verily and indeed present on His altar ; then say, Hail, True Body ! born of Mary, spotless virgin's virgin birth," &c. The *Directorium Anglicanum* speaks of "the transubstantiation and consecration of the Sacrament." Yet Article XXVIII remains. Does the investiture with the clerical habit exempt from those principles of truth and honesty which in commercial and common life are held sacred by the lay mind ?

Mr. Loraine gives a number of extracts from various works in which the most unrestrained contradictions of Church of England doctrines are proclaimed, and the most miserable manipulations are required. Solitary celebrations and fasting communions are enjoined ; evening communion being a "deadly sin." It is inconceivable that the following could be taken from a work designed to be a directory to Anglican Clergymen :—"If a fly or spider or any such thing should fall into the chalice . . . after the consecration the fly or spider or such like thing should be warily taken, oftentimes diligently washed between the fingers, and should then be burnt, and with the ablution, together with the burnt ashes, must be put in the piscina." "If the Eucharist hath fallen to the

ground, the place where it lay must be scraped, and fire kindled thereon, and the ashes reserved beside the altar. Also, if by negligence any of the blood be spilled upon a table fixed to the floor, the priest must take up the drop with his tongue, and the place, if the table, must be scraped, and the shavings burnt with fire, and the ashes reserved with the relics (!) beside the altar; and he to whom this has befallen must do penance forty days." The adoration of the elements; confession and judicial absolution follow: what would not follow!

Concerning a work published without name, and circulated privately—its sale being *confined to the clergy*, Mr. Loraine says:—"I cannot, in this one case, continue the method of telling Ritualists to speak for themselves, for there are parts of this book that are not fit for your ears. I give you my word they are disgusting and disgraceful." "The second part of this Ritualist hand-book, 'The Priest in Absolution,' directs to similar courses of inquiry, and suggests questions to be whispered in the ears of young women and married women by clergymen of the English Church, which, if proclaimed on the house-top, would heat to boiling point the blood of the English people." It is but too true that "around this Ritualist party there falls the shadow of some potent and honoured names; and if they fail to denounce it, they too must be held responsible for this disgraceful book."

Next in order comes "The Exaltation and Adoration of the Blessed Virgin Mary as Mediatrix, and the Saints as Co-intercessors." In a work published by the Church Press Company, "Mariolatry is taught in the fullest and plainest terms." Masses, prayers for the dead, the seven sacraments, the veneration and procession of relics, the celibacy of the priesthood, are all enforced with as much confidence as if they were commanded and not condemned by the Articles. How unlike the pure, old, vigorous teaching of Barrow and Hooker, of Jewel and Pearson, is the following:—"After the *Te Deum* the officiant and his ministers should proceed to the chancel gates, and there hold the inner relic-case to be kissed by the faithful, wiping the glass after each osculation with a piece of cotton wool." It is enough to make Churchmen weep tears of blood. Well may the writer protest that a party who teach "doctrines of such character, and with such results, are disloyal to the constitution, and dangerous to the most sacred interests of the Anglican Church." Mr. Loraine speaks and feels as a true Protestant. But pray, what is Protestantism? Let clergymen of the great Protestant Church declare. In their view it is an "ulcerous cancer"—"a cold, miserable, unloving, Godless figment:" the leading English and Scotch reformers are "a set of miscreants." One renowned Ritualist clergyman speaketh thus—"I say anathema to the principles of Protestantism, and to all its forms, and sects, and denominations."

All is summed up, and the whole spirit and aim exhibited in one line from the Ritualist organ—"What, we should like to know, has the Church of England to do with the spirit and principles of the Reformers, except to get rid of them as soon as possible!" Yet these saintly men eat the bread of the Protestant Church of England! And is there no remedy? Every day's delay in expurgating the Church of England from this foul, festering sore makes the Church less lovely in the eyes of her friends, and more vulnerable to the attacks of her foes. It is a dream to suppose that a church in which such teaching is possible can long continue to be the Established Church of this country, or that it can ever be again the Church of the English people. The awaking will come. What is needed is a plain, honest, outspoken repudiation of these dangerous deceits, and a faithful avoidance of any complicity with them. This repudiation ought to spring from the highest authority. Where is the readiness, "with all faithful diligence, to banish and drive away all erroneous and strange doctrine contrary to God's Word; and both privately and openly to call upon and encourage others to do the same!" And in what other Church would "the people" sit still and allow the foundations of their faith to be thus undermined? This is a timely though a sad book, as every cry of danger is a sad cry. But it behoves all who value the liberties of England and love the doctrines of her grand old Church, to seek by might and main to stem the torrent of this dangerous course.

MOZLEY'S UNIVERSITY SERMONS.

Sermons Preached before the University of Oxford and on Various Occasions. By J. B. Mozley, D.D., Regius Professor of Divinity, Oxford, and Canon of Christ Church. Rivingtons, London, Oxford, and Cambridge. 1876.

THESE sermons are worthy of the Bampton lecturer of 1865. They breathe throughout the spirit of true Christian philosophy; show very considerable power of analysis—especially in the description of character—and maintain a faithful accordance with the primitive doctrines of Christianity. The style is as good as the matter. Dignified and philosophical—but not bold nor austere—the author seldom puts a point before his readers without having fully illustrated it; and yet never wearies his hearers by mere verbose repetition. We have no doubt that a far more numerous circle of readers will pronounce a like favourable judgment on these sermons with those who listened to them. The first seven were preached before the University of Oxford; the

next eight at the cathedrals of Christ Church or Worcester ; and the remaining three at Lancing College. The first of the university sermons was delivered on the eve of the assembling of the Ecumenical Council, and protests, by anticipation, against its two great objects—the decree of Papal infallibility and the ratification of the Syllabus. The right of persecution involved in the latter is justly regarded as not a mere historical or philosophical, but a moral question, dependent on another, viz., whether the Church and the State are one society or two. The position taken by the Church of England is that of a contract between two societies : the position taken by the Church of Rome is that of their identification. We should be disposed rather to say the subjection of the one to the other. A distinction between the several provinces has always been admitted by the Papacy, even in the very language it employs in handing over heretics to the secular arm. It has confessed sincerely its own inability to employ force ; and, in the recommendation to shed no blood, has confessed also hypocritically the unworldly and merciful spirit by which it ought, as a spiritual economy, to be actuated. It has never, we believe, confounded the secular power with the spiritual ; but by a much more dangerous policy has sought to make it its tool, thereby securing all the benefit without the responsibility of power. Dr. Mozley's comment on the position of the Roman hierarchy in this country is worth noting. He regards them as "standing in a somewhat eccentric attitude before this country in insisting on the moral right of persecution ;" and bestows a measure of pity on their "yearning after unjust and obsolete governments," which he pronounces "the most disinterested of conceivable championship—the championship of the theory of persecution without the advantage of the fact, which is now no longer possible."

The second sermon, on the Pharisees, is very effective. He insists a little too strongly, perhaps, on the newness in the days of our Saviour of this type of moral evil ; but not at all too strongly on its vitality and persistency. The contrast between the Pagan conscience and the Pharisaic is very striking ; and so also that between the different attitudes assumed by the Gospel toward natural frailty and false goodness. How admonitory is the following passage both to individual Christians and ecclesiastical communities—the evangelical portion of the Church—for instance, whether within or without the Establishment :—"The real virtues of one age become the spurious ones of the next. When, in the progress of the human race, any new ground is gained—whether in truth or morals—the original gainers of that ground are great moral minds—they are minds which are penetrated by true perceptions and by an inward sacred light—and they fought with the society ; they therefore stand high in the scale of goodness. But it is totally different when, the new ground being once made,

a succeeding generation has to use it. The use of it then is no guarantee of moral rank. There is a starting power in true goodness, by a struggle, to get itself accepted as a standard—accepted even by the very society which is in heart opposed to it. This is that peculiar homage which is paid to goodness, that it extorts a public support, even from those who individually reject it. Otherwise there never would be any rise in the standard of society at all, which is in heart always at the time hostile to it; but this principle provides one. The new virtues are then started; they are erected as a standard; they are established, received, and taken into the system. But *then*, inferior men can practise them; and more than this, selfish men can practise them. The selfish principle does not require vice as its instrument; so long as it can get behind the last erected class of virtues, can command the situation, and dictate the motive, it is enough. It retreats then behind the last ground gained—whether of truth or morals—and uses the latest virtues as its fulcrum and leverage. A standard once raised by the convulsive efforts of a fervent minority, a mass of lower character is equal to the adoption of it; but the originators of the standard are separated by an immeasurable interval from their successors. The belief of the Pharisees, the religious practice of the Pharisees, was an improvement upon the life of the sensual and idolatrous Jews whom the prophets denounced. But those who used both the doctrine and moral improvements as the fulcrum of a selfish power and earthly rank were the same men, after all, as their fathers, only accommodated to a new age, though this indeed was just what they denied. They said, on the contrary, *we* build the prophets' sepulchres, whereas our *fathers* killed them, and exposed themselves to our Lord's irony, that the builder of the sepulchre was a very fitting successor to the killer."

The third sermon, on "Eternal Life," is addressed to a different class of minds—those in whom "the unbelieving counterpart to conversion" has taken place—the awakening not to the reality, but, as they suppose, to the nonentity of the invisible world. The ease with which in many minds the belief in a world to come is dissipated or, if not dissipated, so weakened as to become a practical nullity, is a phenomenon in the explanation of which it will help us to remember the lineaments of the character described in the previous sermon. To Pharisaism we must too frequently look for the genesis of infidelity. The moral principles which are accepted only in their external seeming, and for their external advantages, are sure to become repulsive to the minds that submit to their yoke, which, accordingly, it becomes desirable to cast off as quickly, and yet as decently as possible. So the moral perversion, like the moral illumination, precedes and assists the mental, and a godless philosophy is hailed as a saviour from irksome

superstition. What has facilitated the process in many cases has undoubtedly been the jealous fear of many Christians to call to their aid the weapons of a true philosophy, the unfounded apprehension lest in so doing they should substitute reason for faith. But it is overlooked that religion, like scepticism, spiritual science, like secular, must have some philosophical foundation: the faith that decries philosophy does so for reasons, good or bad, that are drawn from the region of philosophy. A true philosophy finds in all the intuitions of the human mind so many exercises of the same faith, as a primary action of our intelligence, which receives its noblest expansion in embracing the revelation of a world to come. And for sceptics, at least, philosophy must be met by philosophy. A good specimen of this kind of reasoning is afforded by this sermon.

Of the rest, we may mention those on Nature—which is really on the modern love of nature—on the Work of the Spirit in the Natural Man, on the Strength of Wish, and on the Unspoken Judgment of Mankind, as good samples from which we should like to give some quotations did space permit. In the sermon on the Atonement there occurs a passage which, if its meaning had been fully attended to by the author himself, would have led him to omit some of the analogies by which he seeks to illustrate the subject. He says—"It must be remembered that the supernaturalness of the sphere in which the doctrine of the Atonement is placed affects the agency concerned in the work of the Atonement." So affects the whole work itself, we may add, that the case of an earthly judge having "the element of mercy drawn out of him by the mediating suffering of another person for the guilty one," does not strike us as a suitable parallel to that of which it is said—"The Father sent the Son to be the Saviour of the world."

Zoology of the Bible. By Harland Coultas. Wesleyan Conference Office. London. 1876.

WE can heartily recommend this interesting little volume, which supplies, on the whole admirably, a chasm in our popular Scriptural literature. Mr. Coultas is well fitted for the task he has undertaken; having the happy art of pleasant description, and knowing well what to exclude from a work of this kind. It is an advantage to the design that it is not slavishly limited to the Biblical relations of the classes of creatures described, but gives a fair general account of them as the basis on which the sacred zoology is constructed. We have the sufficient guarantee of Dr. Moulton that the peculiar difficulties that beset some parts of the subject are not forgotten, and that they are fairly met. How fairly, we may gather from the following extract, which opens

with a glimpse into a topic much disputed about. Instead of the frank and explicit admission here made, a hundred artifices have been resorted to. There are only two expedients for release from a difficulty. It may be said that Moses only decided "which animal was, for the interpretation of the law and *in jure*, to be considered as chewing the cud, or as having divided hoofs, without any reference to the convictions of naturalists." This seems plausible enough: the legislator decided that the hare, at least on account of the structure of its feet and perhaps other reasons in the nature of the animal, was not one of the clean animals. This, perhaps, should suffice, especially for young readers. But the other expedient is adopted—that of admitting an indifference to exactitude in the classification.

"By the law of Moses the hare was forbidden to the Jews as food. All animals were prohibited then as food, excepting those ruminants which chewed the cud and divided the hoof. Thus the ox, goat, sheep, and antelope, fulfilling both of these conditions, were allowed; whilst the hare, camel, coney, and pig were forbidden because they did not fulfil them. (See Lev. xi. 3—7 and Deut. xiv. 7.) Here we find that, by the Levitical law, the camel, hare, and coney were not allowed as food because, although they chewed the cud, they divided not the hoof; and also that the pig was forbidden to be eaten because, although he fulfilled the latter, he did not the former of these conditions of the code. But every zoologist knows that none of the above animals mentioned as chewing the cud do so, excepting the camel, which is a ruminant. The hare is a rodent or gnawing animal; and it is utterly impossible from the structure of its teeth and stomach that it should do such a thing."

Now, to a non-scientific observer, the hare really does seem as if she were chewing the cud. The curved incisor teeth of the upper and lower jaw of this animal, in common with those of every other rodent, are never shed, but continue to grow throughout its whole life. Hence it is that, whenever at rest, the hare is continually sharpening the chiselled edges of its incisor teeth, the loss of matter by this process being constantly replaced by continual deposition of new dental material at their bases. A peculiar movement resembling that of rumination is thus given to the mouth: and Cowper, the poet, who kept hares for several years, was deceived by their mumbling into believing them to be ruminants, and thus writes about his favourite hare, "Puss"—"Finding him exceedingly tractable, I made it my custom to carry him always after breakfast into the garden, where he hid himself generally under the leaves of the cucumber vine, sleeping or chewing the cud till evening."

The truth is, that the Bible was never intended to be a text-book either to natural or physical science, or to chemistry. The

Mosaic law and the other parts of Scripture subsequently revealed were evidently given in accordance with the knowledge on scientific subjects which prevailed at the time, and both are simply intended to be (2 Peter i. 19) "a more sure word of prophecy, whereunto ye do well that ye take heed as unto a light that shineth in a dark place until the day dawn, and the day-star arise in your hearts;" and the object of that "word of prophecy" is to bring "life and immortality to light through the Gospel" (2 Tim. i. 10); "to give light to them that sit in darkness and in the shadow of death, to guide our feet into the way of peace" (Luke i. 19); such researches into God's Works it is the duty of man to make, in accordance with the command given from the commencement (Gen. i. 28), "subdue the earth and have dominion;" and that God who gave the command has given him the ability for that purpose. It is our duty to interpret God's Word on such subjects by His works, which are only another revelation of His eternal power and Godhead, and thus obtain correct views of Scripture, and grander and more enlarged ideas as to its meaning. And *correct views of God's works*, obtained by the study of them, cannot but be acceptable to Him, and give us *correct views of His Word*.

II. MISCELLANEOUS.

TREVELYAN'S LIFE OF LORD MACAULAY.

The Life and Letters of Lord Macaulay. By his Nephew, George Otto Trevelyan, M.P. Two Vols. London: Longmans and Co. 1876.

ALTHOUGH Mr. Trevelyan's Life of Lord Macaulay has, in one or two quarters, encountered a fretful and ungenial criticism, its reception, on the whole, has been that of unmistakable welcome. The high expectations awakened beforehand have not been disappointed.

In recent times there have been few better subjects for biography than Macaulay. He belonged both to literature and to politics. On the one side of his career he ranks with historians and essayists, and on the other with statesmen and orators. He was associated throughout his life with the most distinguished men of letters, the most influential politicians, and the most conspicuous members of society. His renown at Westminster was only surpassed by his fame in Paternoster-Row. He was at the same time all but unrivalled in the abilities which make a man eminent in refined and cultivated society, and in the literary powers that command world-wide popularity. In addition to these aspects of his life, Macaulay's personal and domestic history reveals elements of character that found little or no expression either in his writings or in his public career. Though his intimate friends were few, his friendships were lasting and deep. For his sisters he showed a tender affection that has seldom been surpassed; from boyhood to the close of life they were the confidants of all his hopes and feelings, and the objects of a more than brotherly devotion. His letters to them, written without reserve, overflowing with humour, full of news and gossip, his lighter and his graver thoughts, give the real portrait of the man, drawn by himself, unconsciously but with absolute truthfulness, from year to year. Mr. Trevelyan's almost filial relation to Lord Macaulay, together with the ample materials at his command, and the assistance of surviving relatives and friends afforded all the conditions favourable to successful biography; and to these he has brought the needful qualities of good sense and judgment, along with a grateful and affectionate regard for his uncle, that give warmth and feeling to his work without detracting from its historic trustworthiness. It is hardly too much to say, that in Mr. Trevelyan, Macaulay finds a biographer worthy of the honourable and responsible office committed to him.

The main outlines of Macaulay's career were already well known. Stories of his precocious childhood and brilliant youth, of his early fame as a reviewer and of his successes in the House of Commons, of his marvellous memory and universal reading, have been widely told for many years. But the character of his youthful precocity is worth noticing. Its peculiarity was that it gave exact promise of his maturer age. From the first it took the direction of bookishness. In imagination and sensibility he doubtless exceeded ordinary children, but his love of reading and his powers of memory were his far more striking and characteristic qualities. "From the time that he was three years old he read incessantly, for the most part lying on the rug before the fire, with his book on the ground, and a piece of bread-and-butter in his hand. A very clever woman who then lived in the house as parlour-maid told how he used to sit in his nankeen frock, perched on the table by her as she was cleaning the plate, and expounding to her out of a volume as big as himself." His appetite for books was insatiable, and nothing came amiss to him in the way of theology, politics, history, or fiction. At thirteen he was reading for his own recreation *Plutarch's Lives*, Milner's *Ecclesiastical History*, Fénelon's *Dialogues of the Dead*, and Madame de Genlis's *Petits Romans*. At fifteen his letters contain comments and criticisms on Boccaccio and Chaucer, Dryden and Le Sage, Byron and Southey. Not only in the love for books but in his marvellous power of remembering what he read, was the "child the father of the man." "He seemed to read through the skin," said one who had often watched the operation. "He read books faster than other people skimmed them, and skimmed them as fast as anyone else could turn the leaves." It will be seen that the powers by which, in later life, he was to achieve such great results were distinctly marked in him from the first. So strikingly is this the case, that it may be affirmed that on the whole there was no change worth speaking of in the qualities of his mind from first to last. With regard to the limitations of Macaulay's powers, they also may be seen from the beginning, indicating as clearly what he would not do in after life, as his early developed abilities indicated what he would do. All that his youth promised was amply fulfilled in his career, but we doubt whether he ever did anything that his youth had not promised, or, in other words, whether any power or quality ever showed itself in him in addition to those already manifest while he was yet a school-boy.

This consideration, if it be correct, as we believe it to be, does in one sense increase the marvel of his precocity. To find the tastes and talents of a man like Macaulay, his love of literature, and his power of rapid mastery and perfect recollection, together with the general character of his intellectual powers, not only indicated, but actually formed in a mere child, is certainly very

wonderful. But the subtle, undefinable difference between cleverness and genius is suggested by the brilliant performance of Macaulay's childhood, as it is by the great productions of his after life. The movements of his mind owed all their main impulses to literature. His childish imaginings, his precocious ballads, epics, essays, and what not, were struck out of his quick and ready mind by contact with books. Of self-originated speculations, of

"Those obstinate questionings
Of sense and outward things,"

to which some children turn by the necessity of a speculative or poetic nature, there is little trace. Let the reader compare young Macaulay's grave bookishness and sober beginnings of authorship, with young Hartley Coleridge's early difficulties concerning the subject and the object, and the agony of thought in which, at five years of age, he strove to master the relation of the potential to the actual, saying "If a thing is to be, it is." The mention of Hartley Coleridge's name in this context, and the remembrance of others who might be named, children

"Whose fancies from afar were brought,"

may well suggest the reflection that talent in a child is less liable to miscarry than genius, far more likely to redeem its promises and walk through life in peace, skirting the edge of storms which break upon the more impassioned, sensitive, and high-wrought spirits, often to their utter ruin. Macaulay's whole course of life, "his joyous and shining pilgrimage through the world," as his nephew calls it, was one continuous development and expansion of his youth. Without check or digression, he grew at an even rapid rate, till he became, as a man amongst men, what he had been as a child amongst children, a prodigy of erudition, the possessor to an unrivalled degree of the powers by which knowledge is acquired and retained.

Macaulay went into residence at Trinity College, Cambridge, at the age of eighteen. Though his success, so far as University honours were concerned, was sufficient to inspire him at the time, and to give him abiding pleasure in the retrospect, it was in no way remarkable for a man of his abilities. He twice gained the Chancellor's medal for English verse, and in 1821 established his classical repute by gaining a Craven University Scholarship. For mathematics, and for scientific subjects generally, he had the strongest dislike, and would not and did not set himself to master them. Nor was his classical scholarship precisely of the kind that secures highest University honours. "Macaulay detested the labour of manufacturing Greek and Latin verse in cold blood as an exercise, and his hexameters were never up to

the best Etonian work, nor his iambics to the highest standard of Shrewsbury. He defined a scholar as one who reads Plato with his feet on the fender." Of that scholarship which consists in a thorough acquaintance with the whole range of classical literature, and finds constant recreation and delight in the great Greek and Latin writers, Macaulay possessed abundance. Perhaps no one ever carried in his memory a richer store of the best thoughts and noblest language of antiquity. Having in youth made friends of the poets and historians of Greece and Rome, he turned to them throughout his whole life with an enthusiasm mellowed but not lessened by time, and found in their society amusement, consolation, or stimulus, as his need might be.

To "anyone who is wise enough to have kept up his classics, or young enough for it to be still his happy duty to read them," to use Mr. Trevelyan's words, "the extracts given in these volumes from notes pencilled, from time to time, in Macaulay's Greek and Latin books will be full of interest." In one of his letters, written towards the close of life, when health and spirits were failing, he says, "I have pretty nearly learned all that I like best in Catullus. He grows on me with intimacy. One thing he has,—I do not know whether it belongs to him or to something in myself,—but there are some chords of my mind which he touches as nobody else does. The first lines of '*Miser Catulle*;' the lines to Cornificius, written evidently from a sick bed; and part of the poem beginning '*Si qua recordanti*,' affect me more than I can explain. They always move me to tears."

The history of Macaulay's connection with the *Edinburgh Review* is well known. His article on Milton appeared in the August number of 1825. The effect on the author's reputation, then in his twenty-sixth year, was instantaneous and decisive. He had become famous in a day. It is said that of the whirl of compliments that poured in upon him from every side, the one he valued most, the only one he was ever known to repeat, even in the innermost circle of home, was the sentence with which Jeffrey acknowledged the receipt of his manuscript,—"*The more I think the less I can conceive where you picked up that style.*"

By his first brilliant success as a reviewer Macaulay had decided the direction of his literary labours for the next twenty years.

The conditions of reviewing suited him exactly. It could be carried on in such intervals of time as were at his disposal as a public man better than more sustained and formal undertakings. He was at liberty to choose his own subjects and to treat them in his own way. He was able to combine, with the best results, an extensive knowledge of history and an ardent love of literature with a strong interest in current questions and contemporary movements. He could give himself to criticism proper, to political

discussion, or to finished and careful composition in history and biography, as he pleased. As a periodical writer he had immediate access to the public through the most powerful organ of the day, while his literary individuality was so fully recognised from the first that he enjoyed all the advantages of separate authorship. The *Essays*, nearly forty in number, which he contributed to the *Edinburgh Review* between 1825 and 1844 have taken their place amongst the classics of the language. Their immediate popularity was something altogether new in this class of literature, and, so far from having passed away, has steadily increased to the present time. It may well be asked, what are the causes of this popularity, to what qualities of thought and style is it to be attributed?

In answering this question we are wishful, first of all, to point out the hollowness of the criticism that affects to consider great popularity a proof presumptive of intellectual inferiority. That many writers of the highest excellence have found their "fit audience" in the "few" no one can deny, and writers of doubtful merit will long continue to find consolation in the fact; but to affirm the converse, that if an author be popular he is in all probability commonplace or comparatively worthless, is to go very much astray. The history of literature is wholly against such an assumption. Though it has its instances of unrequited labour, of genius and devotion spending their strength for nought, and its examples, on the other hand, of success entirely unmerited, of popular approval bestowed, for a time at least, on works that were bad in art and false in philosophy and morals, yet the great weight of its testimony is in another direction. It establishes the fact, cheering alike to authors and to readers, that a wide and lasting popularity may be confidently relied on as a test of merit. Where a writer's productions are of the kind to which popularity is possible, addressed, that is, to people generally and not to any particular class, the people themselves are the ultimate and only judges whether he has succeeded with them or not, and their verdict is given in a way that cannot be gainsaid, by the attention and delight of an ever-widening circle of readers.

In Macaulay's case, the grounds of an unexampled popularity are not hard to discover; they correspond very closely with the qualities and attainments for which he was distinguished.

By the whole structure of his mind Macaulay was a practical man. For abstract speculation he was wholly disinclined: he expected little from it, and he looked with suspicion upon its processes and results, especially when it was sought to substitute them for more practical rules of human conduct. In this we are not prepared to follow him to all lengths. We set metaphysics at a higher value than he did. But Macaulay was constitutionally impatient of the abstract. If he spoke of the laws of the human mind, it was not in relation to systems of psychology, but

to the conduct and motives of men everywhere revealed and illustrated in their history. In discussing political rules he refused to refer them to such abstract origin as the "greatest happiness principle," or to any other, incapable of demonstration, but capable of covering any amount of fallacy. He had little interest in theories respecting the origin of ideas or the ground of moral distinctions; but few writers have had a stronger hold upon the facts of human life, of the motives that govern conduct, and of the varied forces and interests that compose society. All his tastes and accomplishments as a student of letters rested on a strong basis of good sense and right feeling. His sentiments respecting liberty, justice, morality, &c., were neither of the showy, philosophic sort, nor yet of the kind that ardent religious feeling will inspire, but they were broad and generous, never running into eccentricities or extremes, but keeping at the high level of a humane and upright nature. Macaulay's judgments of men and things may disappoint us by the absence of any fine spiritual insight, but his practical love of right, his humanity, and strong common sense, together with his great experience of actual life, give a general soundness to his judgments, which, in an historian at least, may well atone for the absence of speculative or philosophic subtlety.

It belongs alike to Macaulay's thought and to his style to be readily understood. He never needs an interpreter. Of the kind of disciples who live by explaining the obscurities of their master, and divide into different schools over rival theories of hidden meanings, he has and can have none. He has nothing to say which would suggest a lecture-room as the best place, and a few students as the proper audience for it. He has confidence in the understanding of the people. He is their superior in learning, in breadth of view, in rapidity and vigour of intellectual movement, but there is no great difference in kind between him and them. In his political and ethical judgments, in his sympathies and antipathies, in the range and character of his imagination and passion he is never difficult to follow. We may be pleased or displeased in particular instances, but we are never perplexed; we know what he means. Whether he narrates or criticises, whether he portrays character or discusses principles, whether gathering and combining minute historic details, or pouring forth his richest and most impassioned eloquence, he still holds his audience,—they understand what he says, and for the most part feel as he feels. We speak of Macaulay's readers as his audience, for that is perhaps their best designation. He is, from first to last, an orator; and the instincts and powers of an orator go far, in our judgment, to account for his extraordinary popularity. The arts which give success to public speaking are applied with consummate skill throughout his written works. He banishes inattention by

the way he addresses the spectator and considers him in the whole management of his discourse. He helps him over difficult places by patient explanations and by illustrations of every kind, drawn from his vast stores of knowledge. If the subject be in itself obscure, he will try to bring it within view by analogies and comparisons that help the understanding without overtaxing it on the one hand, or insulting it on the other. In the art of narration, the main requirement of a writer of history, Macaulay is hardly to be surpassed. As none of the laborious processes of road-making are allowed to appear, the reader who is borne along the firm smooth course of the narrative may easily overlook the skill employed in its construction. But a candid estimate of Macaulay's powers will recognise his extraordinary merits in this particular. Their best proof is the fascination of interest felt by tens of thousands of readers—readers of every class and condition—in the pages that tell of the rise of the English power in India under Clive and Hastings, or of the Revolution that gave the throne of the Stuarts to William of Orange.

The quality of Macaulay's imagination should also be noted. It is the imagination of an orator as distinguished from that of a poet. It does not create or invent, but it warms and kindles readily to any suggestion. It moves freely among distant scenes and past events. If it had no airy offspring of its own, it was peopled by the living forms of those who, to most of us, are but a name or the shadow of a name. A characteristic instance of this is reported by his sister Margaret. "Tom has just left me, after a very interesting conversation. He spoke of his extreme idleness. . . . I said that I was surprised at the great accuracy of his information, considering how desultory his reading had been. 'My accuracy as to facts,' he said, 'I owe to a cause which many men would not confess. It is due to my love of castle-building. The past is, in my mind, soon constructed into a romance.' He then went on to describe the way in which from childhood his imagination had been filled by the study of history. 'With a person of my turn,' he said, 'the minute touches are of as great interest, and perhaps greater, than the most important events. Spending so much time as I do in solitude, my mind would have rusted by gazing vacantly at the shop windows. As it is, I am no sooner in the streets than I am in Greece, in Rome, in the midst of the French Revolution. Precision in dates, the day or hour in which a man was born, or died, becomes absolutely necessary. A slight fact, a sentence, a word, are of importance in my romance. *Pepys's Diary* formed almost inexhaustible food for my fancy. I seem to know every inch of Whitehall. I go in at Hans Holbein's gate, and come out through the matted gallery. The conversations which I compose between great people of the time are long, and sufficiently animated, in the style, if not with

the merits of Sir Walter Scott's. The old parts of London, which you are sometimes surprised at my knowing so well, those old gates and houses down by the river, have all played their part in my stories.'"

We do not claim for an imagination of this order the very highest rank, but it is only affectation or ignorance that will despise it. In Macaulay's case it was, if not the cause of his popularity, the quality of his mind which directed and sustained the rest, and, in close alliance with strong practical sense, made his great stores of knowledge available for the instruction of more readers than historian or essayist ever had before.

Of the beneficial character of the influence exercised by his writings we have but a word to say. In their general healthiness of tone they are worthy of the author's sound and manly mind. His judgments on men and things are conscientious, not often warped by prejudice, and always marked by strong good sense. One returns again and again to the mention of this latter quality in Macaulay, because it was not only the source of so much of his strength both in politics and literature, but it marks the limit of his powers. So far as a strong understanding, a sound and vigorous judgment, the possession of ample learning, together with perfect mastery of all his resources are concerned, Macaulay has had few superiors in any country at any time. But the notable deficiency of his nature lies on its spiritual side. He did not seek for the foundations of things, nor for their highest relations. He is never troubled as to the limits or value of knowledge, or haunted by the problems that lie beyond. His analysis neither goes very far back nor reaches very far forward. All the operations of his powerful intellect are carried on upon ground that is absolutely clear and sure; his horizon is well defined, and he seems to have no curiosity as to what may lie beyond it.

It is not in any spirit of censoriousness or illiberality, but with the warmest admiration for Macaulay's character as well as for his powers, that we regret the marked absence throughout these memories of any indication of religious thought and earnestness. The opportunities for calling them forth are there, but they are not forthcoming. When confronted by the dark mysteries of heathenism in India, when mourning with filial or paternal tenderness the death of those he loved best, when touched to sadness by the loss of friends and companions in life, and when, in 'premature old age, he drew near the end of his course, we miss the expression of Christian faith and hope. We do not judge Macaulay. There may have been,—let us go further, and say there surely was, a Christian foundation for the many excellences and virtues of his character, but if so it was hidden away beneath a consistency of reserve that we may be pardoned for regretting. The question as to his

religion, which Macaulay resented as an impertinence when it was once put to him during a parliamentary election, may have been out of place; but it is not so when it rises in the mind of the reader as he lays down these volumes. It is the question that must needs be asked by all who believe that religion furnishes the key to the great problems of life and death, and is the ultimate and highest aspect in which human character and conduct must be regarded. We repeat it that we are not judging Macaulay in this matter; possibly the means of forming a judgment have not been supplied by his biographer; but it is allowable to wish that the great powers of his mind and the noble qualities of his character had been seen more clearly associated with a hearty faith in Christ.

In closing this brief notice we would suggest once more the immense service rendered by Macaulay to readers of the English tongue. To refer to the *Essays* alone, we are persuaded that, apart from other service whose value might possibly be estimated, they have now for more than a generation done the altogether inestimable service of awakening countless minds to a love of literature. Let anyone who read them for the first time in his youth ask himself how much his after life is indebted to the early charm and stimulus of Macaulay's *Essays*, devoured with an appetite that turned away from the counter-attractions of the novel and the playground. Such are the present writer's earliest recollections of them. He remembers threading his way through the crowds of Holborn and Fleet-street, book in hand, avoiding collisions by a kind of instinct, now quickening his pace through sheer excitement, his pulse beating to the measure of some stirring narrative or brilliant declamation, and again loitering in a side street or beneath an archway to read a second time of Milton "sitting at the old organ beneath the faded green hangings," or of Chatham "pressing his hand on his breast," as he sank down and was carried dying from the House of Lords.

Our last paragraph shall be that with which these volumes close:—"Macaulay rests with his peers in Poets' Corner, near the west wall of the south transept. There, amidst the tombs of Johnson, and Garrick, and Handel, and Goldsmith, and Gay, stands conspicuous the statue of Addison, and, at the feet of Addison, lies the stone which bears this inscription:—

"THOMAS BABINGTON, LORD MACAULAY,
BORN AT ROTHLEY TEMPLE, LEICESTERSHIRE,
OCTOBER 25, 1800,
DIED AT HOLLY LODGE, CAMPDEN HILL,
DECEMBER 28, 1859.

'His body is buried in peace,
But his name liveth for evermore.'"

FORSTER'S LIFE OF SWIFT.

The Life of Jonathan Swift. By John Forster. Volume the First. 1667—1711. London: John Murray, Albemarle-street. 1875.

THE first volume of the late Mr. John Forster's *Life of Swift* is not only a most entertaining book, but one full of evidence of the peculiar faculty of its author for biographical research. The subject of Swift's Life having been many years in his mind, he had devoted much time and labour to the collection of materials; and the success which attended his efforts in that behalf is remarkable. He appears to have had the opportunity, over and over again, of acquiring documents of a most valuable character, and the result has been that we have an infinity of corrections authoritatively made in the received versions of the great Dean's diaries, &c., &c., and a great number of letters and other documents hitherto unpublished. At the close of his preface, Mr. Forster had to express his regret at the death of one who had been much interested in this work, and who rendered the biographer all the assistance in his power, Mr. Edward Wilmot Chetwode, a man of rare talents and enthusiasm; and it was with a very widely-felt regret that the news of the subsequent death of Mr. Forster himself, at no very advanced age, was received. There are, we believe, those among the great writers of England still living among us, who, not wholly sympathising with the biographical doings of Mr. Forster, indulged the hope that they might be permitted to outlive their friend, lest he might write their lives also; but this hope was of course one of long life for themselves, not of short life for him; and probably the desire to escape from his biographical manipulation was at once forgotten, wherever it may have existed, in the grief naturally ensuing on the demise of one who has moved so many years among circles so distinguished for genius, talent, and ability of all classes, as those in which the late Mr. Forster was wont to move. That the strangely prying and partial hero-worship exhibited in the *Life of Dickens*, and which failed to make a hero after all of that curious combination of the genius and the common-place man, should have inspired in certain minds some such dread as we have adverted to above, is not to be marvelled at; but in the case of a man gone out of the living world so long as Swift has been gone, and one so traduced, and of a life so wholly in need of elaborate investigation, Mr. Forster was the man of all men to take upon him the task of biographer. He has well said that "few men who have been talked about so much are known so little;" and it is perfectly true that "his writings and his life are connected

so closely, that to judge of either fairly with an imperfect knowledge of the other is not possible; and only thus can be excused what Jeffrey hardily said, and many have too readily believed, that he was an apostate in politics, infidel or indifferent in religion, a defamer of humanity, the slanderer of statesmen who had served him, and destroyer of the women who loved him." Such were the kind of charges which Mr. Forster had to meet and dispose of; and we do not think he goes too far, when he says that "belief in this, or any part of it, may be pardonable where the life is known insufficiently, and the writings not at all; but to a competent acquaintance with either or both, it is monstrous as well as incredible."

If such a string of calumnies were not monstrous and incredible, it would surely be questionable whether Jonathan Swift, even as the author of the immortal *Gulliver's Travels*, were a worthy subject for a biography on such a scale, and involving so much research and labour, as Mr. Forster's. But certainly, as far as we have Mr. Forster's labours before us, the assumption is that there was no sufficient evidence to justify the eminent calumniator. The present biographer's main difficulty has of course been with the earlier part of Swift's life: the latter part was already, as Mr. Forster says, "broadly and intelligibly written; but to the work of dealing with his earlier life, no one has given till now the requisite patience, or brought the special kind of ability needed. Those who have been regarded as authorities on the life of Swift will not stand the test of careful and exacting scrutiny; and even such men as Johnson and Scott, who might have done almost what they would, do not seem to have done what they could,—Johnson from want of sympathy and admiration, and Scott mainly, it would seem, from over-occupation with other matters,—for the great fictionist of the nineteenth century was by no means wanting in admiration or sympathy for his predecessor the great satirist, fictionist, and man of multiform doings in literature and life.

It is to this unsatisfactoriness of previous lives, as regards the early career of Swift, that we owe the piling up of detail in this first volume of Mr. Forster's work; and this piling up of detail, documentary and narrative, not unfrequently becomes dry enough, and detracts from the entertaining character of the book at large. That it was necessary, however, no one acquainted with Swift literature will doubt; and no true lover of "the immortal Dean" will fail in gratitude to Mr. Forster for the mass of information he has got together. Of the merits, however, of the whole work, it is obviously impossible to form a trustworthy opinion from this instalment; and even this volume itself cannot be fairly judged in all respects in the absence of the succeeding portions of the biography, which are, as the author hints, to justify this very

great minuteness of detail in the account of the earlier years of Swift.

Of the new materials obtained by the biographer an account is given in the present volume, though of course a great part of them are not herein used. It appears that no less than one hundred and fifty unpublished letters by this great master of English letter-writing have been sought out and placed at Mr. Forster's disposal, nearly fifty of them being addressed to Archdeacon Walls after Swift had become Dean of St. Patrick's. Then we are promised great results from the collation which Mr. Forster has been enabled to make of the later portions of the *Journal to Stella*, with the original manuscript. "To later passages of the life," he says, "their contribution will be extremely important. Some special blanks in the printed journal, on which Scott remarks, are filled by them." Again, some additions are made "to the fragment of autobiography first printed by Mr. Dean Swift; and questions raised by that fragment in connection with Swift's university career, are settled by one of the Rolls of Trinity College," which fell accidentally into Mr. Forster's hands—so that he has been lucky as well as laborious. When Mr. Monck Mason's library was dispersed, Mr. Forster acquired Swift's note-books, books of account, letters of ordination, a large number of unpublished pieces in prose and verse interchanged between Swift and Sheridan, unpublished letters, and a series of contemporary printed tracts for illustration of Swift's life in Ireland. These last he was subsequently enabled to complete by the addition of all the very scarce Wood Broadsides. At the sale of Mr. Mitford's books, &c., the biographer obtained a copy of Hawkesworth's *Life of Swift*, with MS. Notes by Dr. Lyon who attended the Dean in his last illness; and these notes were only partially used by Nichols and Malone. The papers given by Mrs. Whiteway to Mr. Dean Swift, of great interest, comprising several of Swift's important writings in his own MS., and a copy of the *Directions to Servants*, with humorous additions, fell also into Mr. Forster's hands; and he likewise acquired an unpublished journal in Swift's autograph, "written on his way back to Dublin, amid grave anxiety for Esther Johnson, then dangerously ill:" and, finally, Mr. Forster was fortunate enough to procure the large paper copy of *Gulliver*, which belonged to Ford, the friend of Swift, who carried the MS. "with so much mystery to Benjamin Motte, the publisher." This copy is "interleaved for alterations and additions by the author," and contains, beside published changes, several interesting passages, mostly in the *Laputa* division of the work, never yet given to the world. We are not prepared to say, at this moment, that Mr. Forster's labours have produced a result as good as could possibly have been produced from the remarkably rich materials at his command: such a

verdict would be premature with but one volume before us ; but we may safely pronounce that one volume one of the richest and most interesting of recent additions to English biography.

PICCIOTTO'S ANGLO-JEWISH HISTORY.

Sketches of Anglo-Jewish History. By James Picciotto.
London : Trübner & Co., Ludgate-hill.

THERE is probably no important section of the community of Great Britain concerning which the rest of the community is so ludicrously misinformed as the Jewish section. There are numerous reasons why this should be the case—reasons into which it is not necessary to enter at present ; but the cause with which we are mainly concerned at present is the absence, hitherto, of a Hebrew demonstrator, able and willing to lay bare the inner life of the Jews, and to place it before English readers at large in a connected, unprejudiced, and exhaustive manner. The proverbial exclusiveness of the Israelites has operated to enhance the difficulties in the way of getting correct information on the details of domestic and other history within the Jewish community ; and Mr. James Picciotto has done a real service to English Christians as well as to English Jews in making strenuous exertions to obtain access to facts, and in embodying those facts in a book available alike to the Jewish and to the Christian student of manners and minute history. The Jews themselves in Great Britain are, it seems, extraordinarily ignorant about their own history ; while the records possessed by the community are of a quite exceptionally complete and interesting character. Mr. Picciotto points out that no chronicler has narrated the earlier struggles of the Jews, which took place on their return to Britain after prolonged banishment, and that no writer has attempted to depict their rise and progress in London. “The archives of the older Synagogues,” he says, “which are treasures of curious information, remained until the present time buried in obscurity, their very existence being scarcely known. Some few of the elder officials had a glimmering of their contents, but to the vast majority of even the Jews themselves these books were as hidden and impenetrable as the Vêdas or the Zend Avesta. In addition to being jealously guarded, they were written in the Spanish and Portuguese languages, or in the Jewish-German dialect, which rendered them thus necessarily understood but by few.” To the study of these valuable registers, Mr. Picciotto has been permitted to devote months of careful application ; and, concurrently with this labour, he has been extending his researches in every direction where he thought his toil was likely to be rewarded. The result has been that, with a keen eye for facts and a quick intel-

ligence for record, he has produced a book which is not a mere compilation, but a series of well-written and highly-readable sketches, full of information, and constantly breaking entirely new ground. A great many new details are disclosed concerning prominent members of the Jewish community, such as Isaac D'Israeli, Baron d'Aguilar, Mordecai Lopez, Samuel Mendoza, and Nathan Meyer Rothschild; and altogether the book is one which in a singular degree fulfils the conditions laid down for himself by the author. It puts both parties, Jewish and Christian, right on numerous points, and embodies a mass of information and interesting detail such as will make it, or should make it, circulate far and wide in England.

Although Mr. Picciotto's book is modestly put forward without any claim to being a regular history of the Jews in England, and although it cannot be said to be in any sense a systematic history, it yet goes far to exhaust the subject taken in hand. Strictly speaking, it is what it professes to be, a series of sketches; but these are so various and so well arranged that they do not leave very much for the future historian of the Jews in England to do. Mr. Picciotto has begun at the time when a mere handful of his co-religionists immigrated into England in fear and trembling, which fear and trembling were anything but groundless; and has followed their fortunes up to the point at which they have become "a peaceful, wealthy, and important community of nearly fifty thousand souls, enjoying the rights and privileges of British-born subjects, and having their full share of public honours and influence." In 1663 a few Jews were wont to assemble in King-street to pray, in a single room; and the successors of these men now find "a dozen synagogues insufficient." London boasts of several handsome buildings erected for the places of worship of this community; and yet, we are told by their historian, their cry is for "more synagogue accommodation." In civil progress the result is more remarkable still; for, whereas, at the beginning of the period dealt with by Mr. Picciotto, a Jew was debarred from opening a shop in the City of London, the latter years have witnessed the highest municipal dignity occupied, with honour and credit, by a Jew; while it is safe to say that even the most important national affairs could scarcely be carried on but for the thrift and consequent wealth of this once feeble and despised community. The details of many parts of Mr. Picciotto's book read more like romance than mere dry record; and yet there is no doubt whatever of their authenticity. When we read of Manasseh Ben Israel arguing the cause of the Jews before Oliver Cromwell, of Sir Solomon de Medina, the financier, making army contracts with John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, and paying his Grace a pension of £6,000 a-year, of Sampson Gideon, in his threadbare garments, "negotiating a loan with Walpole, becoming

a millionaire, living like a Christian, and dying like a Jew—a man who wished to be a Christian on earth, and a Jew in heaven ;” when we read of Joseph Salvador, the loan-contractor, whose career was full of romantic details ; of Abraham Goldamid, “entertaining Royalty, and dying rather than the slightest speck should rest upon his honour ;” of Nathan Meyer Rothschild finding funds for the leading powers of Europe ; we are almost under the illusion that this is a work of fiction rather than one of sober history. Yet, as we have already said, we believe the whole of Mr. Picciotto’s statements, beside those which are notoriously true, to be of unimpeachable authenticity.

Making all possible allowance for national bias on the part of the historian, there remains enough here to convince those least disposed in favour of the Hebrew community, that countless prejudices which have been entertained are wholly baseless ; and that our fellow-countrymen of the Jewish faith are, as a body, a highly meritorious set of people, whom we might do well to emulate in many important details of life. Mr. Picciotto’s book ought certainly to be added to every library aiming at anything like completeness.

SOME RECENT BOOKS OF VERSE.

The Human Tragedy. By Alfred Austin. Edinburgh and London : William Blackwood and Sons. 1876.

The Dramatic and Poetical Works of Westland Marston. In Two Volumes. Collective Edition. London : Chatto and Windus, Piccadilly. 1876.

Elfinella ; or, Home from Fairyland. Lord and Lady Russell. By Ross Neil, Author of “Lady Jane Grey,” “Inez,” “The Cid,” &c. London : Ellis and White, 29, New Bond Street. 1876.

Cæsar in Egypt, Costanza, and other Poems. By Joseph Ellis. London : Basil Montague Pickering. 1876.

Exotics. A Translation of the Spiritual Songs of Novalis, the Hymn-Book of Luther, and other Poems, from the German and Italian. By George MacDonald. London : Strahan and Co., 34, Paternoster-row. 1876.

London Lyrics. By Frederick Locker. A New Edition, Enlarged and Finally Revised. By S. King and Co., London. 1876.

Greenwood’s Farewell, and other Poems. By the Earl of Southesk. Strahan and Co., Publishers, 34, Paternoster Row, London. 1876.

The Hunting of the Shark, an Agony in Eight Fits. By Lewis Carroll. With Nine Illustrations by Henry Holiday. London: Macmillan and Co. 1876.

IN our number for July, 1873, we had occasion to notice Mr. Alfred Austin's little volume of octave stanzas of the Byronic order separately published under the title of *Madonna's Child*, and announced as being only an excerpt from one of the four cantos of *The Human Tragedy*, concerning which nascent work the author had, from time to time, kindly reported progress to a much uninterested public. *Madonna's Child*, however, *did* interest the public more or less; and it interested us so far as to induce us to devote some space to a short abstract of Mr. Austin's doings and pretensions, which were, in brief, the production of certain satires, the writing of a book attempting to dispose summarily of the claims of all our contemporary poets to be considered as great poets, and the setting up of a claim on his own account to be none the less so regarded. We hinted then that we should be happy to revise our judgment of him in the light of his completed *magnum opus*, whenever he might be disposed to lay that before the public; and we have now at length before us *The Human Tragedy* in its "fourfold aspect and development—the Religious, the Romantic, the Ethnical, and the Humanitarian." It is certainly an interesting work, one rather of labour than of inspiration, but abounding in good passages, and deficient only in harmony of workmanship and power to deal with a subject so vast. We have read it with some care, and not without much pleasure; but we confess that it barely fulfils the promise of *Madonna's Child*, while that part of the second canto which actually is *Madonna's Child* is very much improved in detail in the process of incorporation. The characters of this story, for it is a tale in *ottava rima*, or "Whistlecraft metre," as it is sometimes called, and not a tragedy at all, are all typical persons, and yet with a strong human interest. They are—(1) Godfrid, a young English gentleman of no fortune, much pride, and independent humanitarian opinions; (2) Olive, a young lady, heiress to a large estate in England, enamoured of Godfrid, who is only doubtfully reciprocative; (3) Sir Gilbert, an English gentleman of fortune, sporting and conservative, enamoured of Olive, and afterwards her husband; (4) Olympia, *Madonna's Child*, an enthusiastic Italian Catholic maiden, beloved of Godfrid and loving him, but prevented by religious scruples from marrying him, and subsequently taking the veil; (5) Miriam, a patriotic southern Italian, the second wife of Sir Gilbert, but not until Rome is free.

This list of persons gives some notion of the outline of *The Human Tragedy*; for the rest we may say that Olive marries Sir Gilbert at the wish of her parents, and because she thinks Godfrid

has been trifling with her, whereas he is quite prepared to fall in love with her, but does not more than half do so. Of course she never cares for Sir Gilbert, and she dies of what is termed a broken heart, at Florence. Sir Gilbert finds out that she has really loved Godfrid ; and he gets changed by the influence of the latter from a conservative Englishman to a flaming patriot in the Italian struggle for liberty : he then finds a really fitting companion in Miriam ; and they two betake themselves, after the accomplishment of Italian unity, to Paria, where they are at the time of the Commune. Godfrid and Olympia come there together afterwards, to succour the wounded ; and at the terrific *finale* Godfrid finds out his two friends in the thick of the slaughter carried on by the bloodthirsty old man who was at the helm of France for that brief period : he sends Sir Gilbert and Miriam off under the protection of his badge of ambulance, and remains amid the slaughter with Olympia. They are both shot by the victorious besiegers, and die in a final embrace which only death could sanctify. The complexities of antagonistic motive in this story are well imagined ; and some of the workings of human passion and emotion are delineated with great delicacy and intelligence. The hapless Olive is very well drawn ; and Olympia is charming in her pure self-abnegation at the shrine of her faith. Miriam, in whom love and patriotism are at conflict, is at once robust and feminine ; and Godfrid, who suffers through all the four motives of the tragic tale (love, religion, patriotism, and humanitarianism), is natural and loveable. Sir Gilbert is rather fantastically conceived. Broken into episodes, the book is naturalistic : in its entirety, it is as artificial as ambitious ; and, while it is full of interest and of real enthusiasm for the cause of Italy, it is too long, too dreary in places, and too little worked into shape to be a great work, or even, on the whole, an excellent work, plentiful as are its beauties.

Dr. Westland Marston's published and unpublished dramatic works were certainly well worthy of preservation in a permanent form ; and although, on the whole, they are, as was doubtless the author's intention, better adapted for the stage than for the study, there will be many students of English drama who will be glad to give them a place in their libraries, and who will enjoy becoming acquainted with the eminent playwright in the character of dramatic poet. Although three of the plays collected in these volumes have never before been printed, they are well known to playgoers, and, through dramatic critics, to the reading public also ; but of course not adequately known ; and even those which have been previously printed are now considerably revised.

As regards Dr. Westland Marston's earliest work, *The Patrician's Daughter*, the author has done well to administer a corrective for the various misapprehensions to which the intentions of the play

have been subjected. He tells us that his aim in that very popular drama was to exhibit impartially "the conflict between the pride of Aristocracy and that of Democracy, with the evils resulting from their collision;" and it is no bad compliment to the success of the artist in this respect, that while some critics endeavoured to identify him with his radical hero, others accused him of "Tory bias." It was, of course, a vulgar error to attempt an identification of a dramatist with any of his characters or vicarious sentiments; but the fact that the play yielded a *novum* for the advocates of each hypothesis speaks volumes for the impartial administration of patrician and democratic sentiment. Dr. Marston not unfairly claims to have it considered that the retribution with which the democrat Mordaunt is visited closes the way against any charge of approval of that hero's conduct; and he discriminates very properly between belief in the doctrine that claims derived from human qualities outweigh those of accident and convention, and approval of the specific retaliative means whereby Mordaunt seeks to assert that doctrine. Dr. Marston points out that Mordaunt is represented as a man "deluded by the sophistry of wounded pride," and unconsciously indulging a passion "in the belief that he was vindicating a principle;" but that at all events the charge of avenging himself on his betrothed is unfounded, it being clear that he meant to avenge himself on the family of Mabel, and thought he was "freeing her from a hateful tie by rejecting her alliance." This will certainly be admitted by any careful reader of the play. The two volumes are full of good reading; and we can recommend with equal confidence, *Anne Blake*, the serious drama of *Life for Life*, not before printed, and the bright, pleasant comedies, *The Favourite of Fortune* and *Donna Diana*; but all of these, though good reading for the chamber or the study, are specially suitable for the stage; and, in the excellence of their stage technique, defy full appreciation, until the reader has also seen them acted.

Of the dramatic fragments and poems, "Montezuma," "A Lost Life," and "A Dream-Journey," appear for the first time; and so do about half of the sonnets; but it would be scarcely fair to judge the veteran dramatist by these works, which, after all, have not, we should say, been put forward with the view of serious competition for poetic honours as distinguished from dramatic. Some of these minor pieces are above the average of their class; but their interest derives rather from their parentage than from their intrinsic qualities.

Lovers of the unacted drama will be glad to see "Ross Neil" coming to the front with a third volume of plays,—*Elfinella*, or *Home from Fairyland*, and *Lord and Lady Russell*. We can scarcely say that the author has made progress in this volume as compared

with his last, for that was so thoroughly excellent, both for the study and for the stage, that progress was hardly to be expected. Throughout the volume now before us, there is the same admirable intelligence of the ways and means of the legitimate drama, the same entire freedom from anything like maretricious effect, the same fine, pure, wholesome English, and the same excellence of metric quality, that we have had occasion to commend first in *Lady Jane Grey* and *Inez*, and more lately in *The Cid*, *The King and the Angel*, and *Duke for a Day*. Who "Ross Neil" may be, we are more than ever curious to know; for such sustained excellence as he has shown in a series of now seven plays is striking enough. It is, however, useless to hazard any conjectures; and we presume there is no alternative but to await the voluntary unveiling of this notable unknown,—if, indeed, one whose qualities are so solid and self-contained may be expected ever to gratify the public and his own self-love by avowing the authorship of works whom no living dramatist need be ashamed of.

The story of *Elfinella* turns, as might be more than half divined from the name, upon the poetic mediæval superstition of infant changelings: *Elfinella*, who under a certain astral combination available in that behalf, has been taken away by the fairies, with the option of immortality and ceaseless elfin joy, finally elects to return to her human kin, and give up all for the sake of human love. The subject is most gracefully wound through the four Acts of the Drama; and the conclusion is eminently satisfactory. *Lord and Lady Russell*, in the present volume, though painful as any drama on such a subject must be, is full of genuine pathos, and strong in human interest throughout. The subject is perhaps finer than the other theme chosen by "Ross Neil" from English history, *Lady Jane Grey*, and not wholly unlike that, and the treatment is certainly not inferior to that of any one of the plays which have preceded it from the same hand. For our own part, we find *The Cid* more strongly poetic than either this or *Lady Jane Grey*; but more dramatic it certainly is not; and we can imagine that many would select *Lord and Lady Russell* as "Ross Neil's" masterpiece.

Mr. Joseph Ellis's *Cæsar in Egypt* is a manly and conscientious volume of poems. We say "conscientious" emphatically, as from first to last, whether in elaborate historical researches of most careful minuteness, or in working out special views of individual thought and emotion, the author obviously bestows an amount of labour and care that should command the respect of every critic. The latter qualities, indeed, are often too apparent; but as Wordsworth quite prides himself in one of his prefaces on having written a long and "laborious poem," we ought to be guarded in any objections we may offer on that score.

It is very remarkable how little the brilliant episode in the magnificent career of Julius Cæsar, which comprises not only the Alexandrian War, but his amours with the beautiful "serpent of old Nile," is known to the great majority of readers. It may be said that the splendour of Shakespeare's *Antony and Cleopatra* throws into shade, and almost into oblivion, what took place previously in Egypt; yet if historical students only are conversant with Cæsar's warfare in Egypt, and his travels through that region of then unvisited wonders, how comes it that the lovers of the romantic are, for the most part, so little aware of the place that Julius Cæsar once held in the affections of Queen Cleopatra, and that the fruit of it was a son—to wit, Cæsarion, who was left sleeping in the cradle when the hero departed? Howbeit, all this is progressively as well as glowingly worked out by Mr. Joseph Ellia. We think the finest passage in the poem is the closing scene:—

"Stooping then
To kiss her lips,—she, quickened by this token,
Sprang from the couch dishevelled, passionate,
Embraced, and wordless fell. Cæsarion slept,
Still as primeval stillness:—

Cæsar stood,
Rigid, with sudden'd eye; then moved away,
Intoning low—"Good-bye, dear Cleopatra!
Twice—thrice good-bye—the world's work must be done."
In-breathing, sighing, he the curtains closed,—
While she 'mid rose and lotus prostrate lay."

The next poem in the volume is entitled *Costanza*. It is quite a love poem of the romantic mediæval school; the subject being of a kind that Keats would have delighted in, though we are pretty sure he would not have adopted a stately blank verse for the medium. It opens with all the pomp of a mythological epic. But our author seems rather fond of courting difficulties. The superabundance of proper names occurring, of necessity almost, in *Cæsar in Egypt*, were scarcely practicable in poetry, and the careful adherence to history rendered an occasional prolixity, as well as roughness, almost inevitable. Even in *Costanza*, where the poet could have done "as he liked," there appears the same conscientious following of the story, the occasional over-dwelling upon details being compensated for, here and there, by an abruptness, and a "cutting the matter short" which almost takes the reader's breath away. The next poem, *A Flight in Space*, is also rife, as a matter of course, with all imaginable difficulties, but it is a master-piece. The astronomical "reading" for it is forgotten and lost in the earnestness of the imagination, and the poetry of the whole. The author, in this case, has very properly laid his reading aside (if he had kept it at his elbow it would

have been the ruin of him), and having his space, and his planets, spreading, spinning, and shining clear in his "mind's eye," he has recorded his impressions in as clear and palpable a form as a subject fraught with so many sublime mysteries was capable of being conveyed in. The volume contains a number of other poems, some of which deserve very special notice, but our limits do not at present enable us to deal with them. The ruling characteristic, however, of them all is that of manliness; there is not a "lady's hand" or even a feminine touch in any one of them; and they all bear the unmistakable impress of an earnest, bright-minded, warm-hearted man, thinking independently, and setting down his own thoughts and feelings with unmingled truthfulness.

Some of the minor poems may be passed over as mere records of private amenities or passing events; some may be read again and again with pleasure; but three or four of the Sonnets are master-pieces of sterling thought and genuine emotion,—particularly "Sleep," "Silentium Noctis,"—and, yet more, the one on "Silence." The sonnet "On the South Downs," though by no means an imitation, would not have been unworthy of Wordsworth.

Mr. Macdonald, in his volume of *Exotics*, has made a real contribution to our sacred poetry, in transplanting from the German tongue into the English the spiritual songs of Novalis, and the Hymn-Book of Martin Luther; and it is good that these well-known German sacred classics should have found so scrupulous a translator as well as one with so much talent for verse-making. There is very little in the volume that can be said to come up to the highest standard of excellence in poetic translation; but a thing may be very good without being of the first order; and some of the Novalis songs are extremely good. So, for that matter, are many of the Luther Hymns,—much less finished in the German than the songs of Novalis,—and accordingly represented by Mr. Macdonald. The principles of rendering laid down, and for the most part observed (at all events in intention) by the translator are sound on the whole:—first, to give the spirit of the original; second, to keep the poet's individual meanings; third, to preserve "his peculiar mode, the aroma of his style;" fourth, rigorously to respect his rhyme and rhythm; fifth, to be as literal as possible under the other four conditions; and sixth, to do all this in good English. The only amendment we have to propose is, that the whole of these conditions should be made to accommodate each other, lest, for instance, a too rigorous respect for any particular element in the original should sacrifice some other element, where less rigour on one side would admit of adequate respect on both. We give the following transcript of No. LX. in the *Heimkehr* of Heine,

as a somewhat unfavourable result of Mr. Macdonald's principles :—

“ They have company this evening,
And the house is full of light ;
Up there at the shining window
Moves a shadowy form in white.

“ Thou seest me not—in the darkness
I stand here below, apart ;
Yet lo! Ah ! lo! thou seest
Into my gloomy heart.

“ My gloomy heart it loves thee,
It loves thee in every spot ;
It breaks, it bleeds, it shudders—
But thou seest it not.”

The last line is simply dreadful.

Mr. Frederick Locker, notwithstanding the “ bells and jingle ” for which, in a well-known composition, he asks pardon of his graver brethren of “ Homer’s craft,” may be safely pronounced one of the wisest living members of that craft. His wisdom consists, first, in a precise intelligence of the limits of his own peculiar walk in letters, and secondly in a shrewd knowledge of the length to which it is well to go in placing before the public examples of a class of composition very decidedly popular. Perhaps the highest perfection attained in modern England in the department of *vers de société* is to be found in the works of Winthrop Mackworth Praed ; and the claim to that most gifted writer’s mantle was, until recently, divisible between Mr. Locker and Mr. Mortimer Collins : the premature death of the last-named gentleman leaves Mr. Locker indisputably the best claimant to the said mantle, or perhaps it would be more in keeping with the subject to say, not the mantle, but the frock coat and silk hat of Praed. A younger claimant, Mr. Austin Dobson, begins to tread close upon the heels of Mr. Locker ; but at present he can hardly be said to contest seriously the position we assign to Mr. Locker as chief of a class of writers whose compositions are as difficult of execution as they are pleasant and amusing when executed. How high a standard of workmanship Mr. Locker sets himself, we may take to be fairly indicated by the half sad conclusion of one of his most charming pieces of light fanciful delineation—*The Unrealised Ideal*. The muse he courts displays in her flight before him a modern garb, and distinctly West End habitudes ; but the pathos is still undeniable in the avowal that, even after all these years of careful elaboration, extending over several editions of *London Lyrics*, the fastidious poet has not yet seen her face—

"She foots it ever fair and young,
Her locks are tied in haste,
And one is o'er her shoulder flung
And hangs below her waist.

"She ran before me in the meads ;
And down this world-worn track
She leads me on ; but while she leads
She never gazes back.

"And yet her voice is in my dreams,
To witch me more and more ;
That wooing voice ! Ah me, it seems
Less near me than of yore.

"Lightly I sped when hope was high,
And youth beguiled the chase,—
I follow, follow still ; but I
Shall never see her face."—Pp. 173, 174.

And he who takes the trouble to compare this final edition of *London Lyrics* with its predecessors will find ample proof of the pains taken by one who is no mean lyric craftsman to bring his work up to his own standard of completeness rather than go on piling volume on volume. For the rest, Mr. Locker's verse, though professedly light, has nearly always something in it showing thought as well as ear for rhythm and verbal effect ; and the impression his poetry leaves on the mind beside that of artistic work, is generally worth having and thinking about. Those who have looked upon the author of *London Lyrics* as a personal friend, by virtue of the tender and healthful undercurrent of suggestions which his light-winged verse leaves in its path, will be pleased to find in this edition a vigorous and graphic portrait from the etching-point of Mr. Millais,—a refined, keen, and amiable-looking denizen of culture, represented by means of what is a very notable small work of art.

We might almost dismiss the Earl of Southesk's new volume, *Greenwood's Farewell*, &c., with the verdict that it is in all essential particulars the opposite of Mr. Locker's ; but it is perhaps safer to enlarge upon this verdict to the extent of explaining that it is pretentious in theme where his is unpretentious ; slovenly in workmanship where his is finished and admirable ; easily mistakable for the inferior work of Mr. Buchanan, where Mr. Locker's is absolutely unmistakable for anything so vulgar ; and, in a word, bad where Mr. Locker's is good. The attempt to deal with social and spiritual problems which is so openly made by his lordship, demands the powers of a master ; and his lordship is not even a skilful student. He has no poetic gift whatever, and the best lesson he could learn would be—silence.

Nonsense is all very well in its way ; and there is such a thing

as clever nonsense,—even, though paradoxical, sensible nonsense; and of this paradoxical kind Lewis Carroll has produced the best that has been issued in modern England, and the most widely accepted. It is not well, however, to ask the lyric muse to submit to a wholesale invasion of her precincts by this spirit of nonsense, however sensible. Lewis Carroll's two popular volumes, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*, and *Through the Looking-glass*, being mainly in prose, and full of originality not devoid of teaching, did not encroach unduly on places that should be sacred from the intrusion of fun, the few passages in verse being excellent of their kind, and carrying their own justification with them. But in *The Hunting of the Snark* we have a whole volume of nonsense by no means comparable to the Walrus and Carpenter ballad, or the song of the Jabberwock, and entirely in verse,—cleverly turned verse enough, but too vague in its significance to be reckoned among works first-rate even in that secondary or tertiary class. Indeed, *The Hunting of the Snark* baffles criticism altogether. What a "Snark" is, and how its being a "boojum" should have caused the tragic disappearance of one of the strange crew who set forth to "seek it with thimbles," and "pursue it with forks and hope," we must leave it for time to discover, if time will be concerned with such questions: for our part, in justice to the book, we will say that it is, after all, readable, though not generally intelligible, that the illustrations are charming, and that the inscription "To a Dear Child" is worth extracting:—

"Girt with a boyish garb for boyish task,
Eager she wields her spade: yet loves as well
Rest on a friendly knee, intent to ask
The tale he loves to tell.

"Rude spirits of the seething outer strife,
Unmeet to read her pure and simple spright,
Deem, if you list, such hours a waste of life,
Empty of all delight.

"Chat on, sweet maid, and rescue from annoy
Hearts that by wiser talk are unbeguiled:
Ah, happy he who owns that tenderest joy,
The heart love of a child!

"Away, foul thoughts, and vex my soul no more!
Work claims my wakeful nights, my busy days;
Albeit bright memories of that sunlight shore
Yet haunt my dreaming gaze!"

We hope "the dear child" is not as much bewildered with *The Hunting of the Snark* as we are.

SYMONDS' GREEK POETS.

Studies of the Greek Poets. Second Series. By John Addington Symonds, M.A., Author of "Sketches in Italy and Greece," "Renaissance in Italy," &c. Smith and Elder. 1876.

AGAIN we welcome from Mr. Symonds a valuable contribution to a class of literature which is increasing because it meets a manifest want.

The success of *Ancient Classics for English Readers* shows how many there are who, without claiming to be scholars, would fain take an intelligent interest in the works which till lately have been the almost exclusive possession of scholars. This is a remarkable change connected with that social evolution which is going on so rapidly. Not many years ago, the old smattering (a very slight one) of classical lore which was a tradition of the days when nearly everyone who was educated at all, was educated at a "grammar school," had almost wholly died away. The immense development of manufactures and the arts and sciences therewith connected, the growth of non-classical schools, the influence of men of modern tone, like Lord Brougham, had well-nigh killed out the old fashion under which, when there was little else to learn, future shopkeepers and farmers had learned their outlines of mythology like embryo parsons and lawyers. Mythology gave place to chemistry and applied mechanics.

But people soon began to weary of merely useful knowledge; it was felt that to dabble in chemistry and understand all the systems of pulleys does not give culture. At the same time modern life had become so full and busy that a return to the old gerund-grinding was for many wholly out of the question. Hence a longing for some means of getting at the old master-pieces without plodding along the old road of accident and syntax. And hence a whole crop of books like Mr. Lucas Collins's series, to which Mr. Symonds' volumes form an excellent sequel. When we remember what the "magazines" used to be—Tait, Colburn, and the like—how light and frothy was the great mass of their articles, we feel that for essays like these to have appeared in such a popular periodical as the *Cornhill* is indeed a sign of the times.

But not only does classical literature now interest thousands who have "little Latin and no Greek," classics themselves are taught in a very different way. Of old, it was "the dull drill'd lesson" which made Byron cry out, "farewell Horace whom I hated so." To learn grammar and to make verses was all that boys had to do, and all that ninety-nine out of a hundred of them did. For one who gained, rather in spite of than by the help of his teachers, an intelligent insight into Greek and Roman lite-

ture, there were ninety-nine whose minds remained as untilled as if they had been engaged in learning tables of logarithms by heart. Even when Donaldson first published his *Theatre of the Greeks* and Lord Lytton his *Athens*, the "fit audience" for such books was very few. There were always elegant as well as ripe scholars at our Universities; but they formed no school, their influence was only that of the individual. The change of feeling outside, which we have just described, no doubt did much to temper the Castalian spring at its source. Then came German influence—so much more powerful than French in this direction; witness the fact that Schlegel is still a high authority on the relative merits of the three great Greek tragedians (even Mr. Symonds follows his lead) while *The Travels of Anacharsis*, in its day a most valuable work, never produced any appreciable effect in England. Then followed a series of writers, Colonel Mure (*Literature of Greece*), Grote in chapters which he devotes to literature, Sellar (*Poets of the Republic*, &c.), the forerunners of Mr. Symonds and his compeers; and then came that University reform, which at Oxford at least has given such an impulse to the modern way of studying classics.

Hence a twofold call for books like that before us. Mr. Symonds' work is alike valuable to either class. To the cultivated man or woman who is ignorant of the original it gives translations, such as translations should be, of the passages whereby the genius and special character of the writers are illustrated, it analyses plots, brings modern poetry to bear out that of old times, and leaves nothing undone to place before the mind's eye, not the mere dry bones of the great classics, but the men themselves as they lived and thought. To the classical student it is as good as a private tutor—far better, indeed, than most, so full is it not only of suggestion but of the latest results of criticism. Even the fancies in which Mr. Symonds now and then indulges have their value, for dulness has far more than unchecked imagination been the bane of English scholarship. To understand the place of such a poet as *Æschylus* among the world's poets needs as much depth of thought as to master the relative value of the various readings in a chorus of the *Agamemnon*, nor is there the least reason why the former kind of scholarship should be a whit more superficial than the latter.

But we must hasten to give some slight account of the book itself, not at all with the view of superseding a careful study of it on the part of our readers. Mythology, Achilles, the women of Homer, Hesiod, Parmenides and Greek philosophic poetry, Hero and Leander and the contrast between classic and romantic art, and a concluding chapter on the plastic character of Greek genius, and the subordination in Greek art of Pain and Discord to Harmony—these are the minor essays in this volume; they all (especially the

last) show the deep influence which German thought from the time of Winckelmann and Goethe onwards has had on English scholarship. They remind us, too, that Mr. Symonds is, like Mr. Pater, one of the prophets of the modern renaissance, "that outburst of the old heathen spirit" as Professor Mivart calls it, which surely may be turned to better account than to rouse a reaction which shall make Roman Catholicism triumphant. But the most important part of the present volume is the five chapters which deal with the Greek dramatists. Here the ground has been almost unoccupied since Schlegel's day. Mr. Symonds, too, goes further afield than the great German, and his essays on the fragments of the three great tragedians, and on the fragments of the lost tragic and comic poets, are masterly and exhaustive. The way in which he reproduces Cæcilius and his family, poets also to the third generation, from a few fragments in Stobæus, coupled with the satirical allusions in Aristophanes, is a model of sober ingenuity. We are glad that in these chapters he does full justice to the labours of the brothers Didot, whose splendid *Scriptorum Græcorum Bibliotheca* gave him, in its twenty-fifth volume, the necessary basis for his essay. We specially commend his chapter on Æschylus. It shows how thoroughly he enters into the spirit of the Greek drama. The way in which he brings out the surprising grandeur of that often decried play the *Persæ*, and shows that from a Greek point of view it is perfect, is most remarkable. Sophocles he follows Schlegel in placing at the head of the illustrious three. The French have always given the preference to Euripides, whom Aristotle styled "of tragic poets the most tragic."

Those who refer to our remarks last January on Mr. Mahaffy's *Social Life in Greece* will find reason to think that the English and German estimate of Euripides is far too low. If no extant play of Euripides can compare with *Edipus the King* in skill of plot and subtle play of intense feeling and careful leading up through every single line to the great climax, neither has the younger poet left us anything so poor as the *Trachiniae*, the only play of which Sophocles makes love the main motive. This was a region in which Euripides was destined to achieve his chief triumphs; and even our author freely confesses (p. 233) that the *Hippolytus* and the *Medea* take rank above Sophocles' "dull handling of a theme in which he seemingly took but a slight interest." Æschylus, despite the bombast which had come to be laughed at even in Aristophanes' day, Mr. Symonds, rightly we think, characterises as Shakespearean in concentration of phrase and in the bold use of massive imagery (p. 210). "When he chooses to be simple, he combines majesty with grace, strength with beauty, speed with volume, in a style which soars higher and reaches farther than the polished perfection of Sophocles or the artistic elegance of Euripides." His difficulty (not reckoning that which depends on a ruined text) is

shown to be less insidious than that of Sophocles, whom you may think you understand when you do not, so apt is he to convey his meaning in a subtle, many-sided, pregnant, and yet smooth style. *Æschylus* is hard because of the remote and mystic nature of the ideas which he is seeking for the first time to express in language. "When even simple prose could scarcely convey his meaning, he presents a cloud of highly poetic figures to our mind." Our author's closing words on *Æschylus* are worth quoting, inasmuch as they clearly set forth the want in all such criticism—"We forget the vital moral faith which the Greeks held as securely at least as we do. There are few nations whose fine literature combines so much æsthetic splendour with direct sound moral doctrine; and this not because their poets strove to preach, but because their minds were healthily imbued with human wisdom." He then contrasts Milton with *Æschylus* to the disadvantage of the former, "who vitiated his moral theory with the dross of dogmatism, while the latter infers the law intuitively from the facts of spiritual life." There is a want, we say, in this; it wholly fails to account for the moral decay of this people "so healthily imbued with human wisdom;" but who, "by wisdom, knew not God, and found the preaching of Jesus Christ foolishness." While, therefore, we fully hold with Mr. Symonds that "Physical Science does not exclude her elder sisters, Philosophy and Religion" (p. 399); while we believe with him that "the men of the future will look back with wonder on the ages in which religion, philosophy and the science of nature were supposed to be at war," we must warn those who take up the book that they must themselves supply what is lacking throughout, painfully so in the concluding chapter, viz., that Christian spirit which perhaps the writer may have thought the subject required him to leave out.

We would fain have had time to follow Mr. Symonds through his common-sense protest in Chapter I. against Prof. Max Müller's quaint paradox that "mythology is a disease of language," and also against the exclusive use of "nature-myths" which the same professor offers us as an alternative.

We should like to analyse his Achilles, and to compare him with the Diarmuid of the great Gaelic epic. Helen, too, whom our author traces through the Homeric poems and the tragedians from *Æschylus* and Euripides down to Marlowe and Shakespeare and Goethe, is an enticing subject. So are the Hesiodic Ethics and Hesiod's myth of the Fall (p. 115) compared with *Æschylus'* treatment of the Prometheus story. We dissent wholly, however, from Mr. Symonds' idea (p. 188) that had we the entire trilogy we should see that Prometheus had been really and gravely in the wrong—"was a responsible co-agent in man's sin against God." We rather hold that Prometheus is the asserter of the *Æschylean* primal justice against the sceptred injustice of Zeus.

In *Hero and Leander* we wonder our author did not mention Hood as well as Marlowe and Leigh Hunt. As far as it goes, the essay is delightful. A few lines from it, showing Mr. Symonds' style—lines worthy to be compared with Ruskin at his best—may fittingly close our too-inadequate notice of a delightful and instructive book—"Musæus's little poem of 360 lines is both an epic and an idyll. While maintaining the old heroic style, it recalls the sweetness of Theocritus. Like some engraved gems, the latest product of the glyptic art, it adjusts the breadth of the grand manner to the small scale required by jewellery, treating a full subject in a narrow space, and in return endowing slight motives with dignity and nobleness of handling. Calm mornings of sunshine visit us at times in early November, appearing like glimpses of departed spring amid the wilderness of wet and windy days that lead to winter. It is pleasant, when these interludes of silvery light occur, to ride into the woods and see how wonderful are all the colours of decay. Overhead the elms and chestnuts hang their wealth of golden leaves, while the beeches darken with russet tones, and the wild cherry glows like blood-red wine. In the hedges crimson haws and scarlet hips are wreathed with hoary clematis or necklaces of coral briony berries. The brambles burn with many-coloured flames; the dogwood is bronzed to purple; and here and there the spindle-wood puts forth its fruit like knots of rosy buds on delicate frail twigs. Underneath are fallen leaves, and the brown brake rises knee-deep. Everything is beautiful with beauty born of over-ripeness and decay. Green summer comes no more this year, at any rate. In front are death, and bareness, and the winter's frost. Such a day of sunlight in the November of Greek poetry is granted to us by *Hero and Leander*." With this exquisite passage we leave Mr. Symonds in our readers' hands.

WALTON AND HERBERT.

The Complete Angler; or, The Contemplative Man's Recreation. By Izaak Walton. Being a Facsimile Reprint of the First Edition published in 1658. London: Elliot Stock, 62, Paternoster Row, E.C. 1876.

The Temple. Sacred Poems and Private Ejaculations. By George Herbert. Being a Facsimile Reprint of the First Edition. With an Introduction by the Rev. Alexander B. Grosart, Editor of "Herbert's Complete Works in Verse and Prose" and the Aldine Edition of "Herbert's Poems," &c., &c. London: Elliot Stock, 62, Paternoster Row. 1876.

THE two latest additions to Mr. Elliot Stock's valuable series of facsimile reprints form, in many respects, the most desirable

companion volumes. *The Complete Angler* of delightful Izaak Walton is wholly worthy of companionship with *The Temple* of "divine" George Herbert; for different as is the subject-matter of the two books and the method of treatment, both men are at once so manly and earnest, so quaint in expression, and so whole in heart and soul, that the artificial barriers between verse and prose break down and leave the men essentially of the same community. These volumes are perhaps hardly so wide in their appeal as the marvellous allegory of John Bunyan, with which Mr. Stock started his series of reprints: but what book is of the same standing as *The Pilgrim's Progress*? The class to whom *The Complete Angler* and *The Temple* are acceptable is nevertheless of considerable extent; and the interest attaching to the first form in which those books came up for the verdict of the reading public is commensurate with the difficulty with which copies of the first editions can be obtained. In reproducing these two books, Mr. Stock has adhered to the principle of absolute facsimile which, in his first issue of *The Pilgrim's Progress*, was compromised by the introduction of a very essential piece of dialogue wanting in the first edition, and of the curious and characteristic cuts which were also borrowed from a later edition. This departure from the principle has now, we understand, been remedied by the removal of the extraneous portions; so that the noble old Pilgrim will be in a position to stand beside the Angler and the devout Singer, and also beside a greater than all three whose work it is designed to bring into the series. A facsimile of the first edition of the *Paradise Lost* will indeed be a treasure for the student of English verse; and we are glad to learn that that glorious book is about to be added to the series at present under notice. Many of our readers are doubtless aware that, as it first appeared, our great epic showed, among other variations from later copies, a difference of division—being in ten books instead of twelve—and, though it has been recently reprinted in that form, there has not as yet, curiously enough, been any attempt, as far as we are aware, to reproduce it in facsimile. Considering the magnitude of the work and the relative unimportance of many that have been facsimile'd, this is remarkable; and we congratulate Mr. Stock on this part of his project.

Of the two volumes specially under mention, we have no derogatory word to say. The rough yet artistic style of typography is admirably preserved in both of them; and even the paper and binding are imitated with great care, so that the reader can readily bring himself into the pleasing illusion that he holds in his hand *The Complete Angler* and *The Temple* in the very form in which Walton and Herbert first offered those immortal books to the reading public. As might readily be expected, the type in

which these books were printed has long ago fallen out of use ; and though the matrix of much of it is still in existence, there are many letters, figures, &c., that have altogether disappeared. These, together with the beautiful title-pages and vigorous little cuts of fish, have been reproduced by a photographic process which the learned pronounce to be infallible, and which certainly has not failed here ; and no mechanical means would seem to have been left unused to secure a perfect reproduction.

The noble poet, Elizabeth Barrett Browning, says—

“The world of books is still the living world.”

If that be so, the *vera effigies* of a world-renowned book has an importance only differing in degree from that of the author's own portraiture ; and the movement which Mr. Stock's volumes represent is not to be characterised as antiquarianism or bibliomania. For our own part, we have considerable sympathy with the movement : the reproduction, with all peculiarities, of early editions of great works, vastly enlarges the means at the command of textual students ; and on that ground alone any facsimile of a fine work justifies itself.

Artistes Anciens et Modernes. Par Charles Clément. Paris : Didier et Cie. 1876.

It is a curious subject of speculation what is the degree or kind of excellence that justifies the republication of articles originally written for a newspaper, magazine, or review. The volume before us consists of such articles, which have appeared from time to time in one of the first—if not indeed the very first—of French newspapers, the *Journal des Débats* ; and lest our opening sentence should suggest too strong a doubt whether in our opinion they possess a permanent value apart from the occasion that called them forth, we hasten to say that M. Clément is a perfectly competent art-critic, and that all he writes shows knowledge, discrimination, and a very equitable judgment.

The more modern part of the volume, we confess, has interested us most. It is not that M. Clément has not much that is judicious to say respecting the Venuses of Milo and Falerone, the art of the Catacombs—by-the-by, he disputes the extreme antiquity claimed by M. de Rossi and other Roman Catholic writers for certain of the paintings—the Earlier Years of Michael Angelo, Raphael, Early German Art, Velasquez, and one or two other similar topics. But these are subjects on which a good deal has been said—and well said—already. To anyone possessing an ordinary knowledge of art, this is fairly familiar ground. It is not till we reach the papers devoted to the more modern masters—to the French artists of yesterday and the

day before—that we altogether lose the feeling that we are being introduced to personages whose acquaintance we have partly made on former occasions. For, as regards these modern men, M. Clément has much to tell us, especially if we live on this side of the Channel, and enjoy only fitful opportunities of studying the works of the contemporary French school. Gleyre, for instance, the painter of the “*Illusions Perdue*,” so beautiful in its conception, so dry in the quality of the execution, exists for us little more than as a name; and even in France his persistent refusal to send any of his pictures for public exhibition must have made it difficult to appreciate the quality of his work. M. Clément’s notice of him is full and valuable. So again we confess to having been ignorant that M. Edouard Bertin, somewhat chief editor of the *Journal des Débats*, was an artist of originality and power. And, indeed, if anyone wishes to know what is thought by a judicious and enlightened French critic of the powers of Joseph and Horace Vernet, of Hippolyte Flandrin, of Troyon, Ingres, Gustave Ricard, Corot, Carpeaux, de Triqueti—whose memorial work, executed by command of the Queen in honour of the Prince Consort, may be seen at Windsor—he cannot do better than refer to M. Clément, and he will moreover obtain a good deal of pleasant information by the way.

GILL’S LIFE IN THE SOUTHERN ISLES.

Life in the Southern Isles; or, Scenes and Incidents in the South Pacific and New Guinea. By the Rev. William Wyatt Gill, B.A. London: The Religious Tract Society.

IN our last number, we called attention to Mr. Gill’s *Myths and Songs from the South Pacific*, as full of interest for the general reader, and valuable to students of comparative mythology. The volume before us is of greater general interest, and on the whole, we think, more valuable than its predecessor. It contains in a revised and extended form the notes of a missionary who has spent more than twenty years in the Pacific, with every opportunity of becoming acquainted with its populations, and those qualities of accurate and sympathetic observation without which opportunities are nothing in themselves. Mr. Gill’s notes on the natural history of the Hervey Group would do credit to a professed naturalist, while his account of a visit to Torres Straits and New Guinea, the substance of which was read before the Royal Geographical Society in 1873, is an important contribution to the present stock of knowledge respecting that almost unknown land. But one of the finest characteristics of Mr. Gill’s writings is, in our judgment, the genuine Christian humanity exhibited

throughout. It shows itself not only in the religious spirit proper to the missionary, but in the genial, hearty interest with which he regards the whole life of his people, their language, their customs, and traditions, together with their social qualities, and mental and moral characteristics. A wide and intelligent sympathy with men of another race is not common even amongst the best of men. It is never found in narrow natures, however excellent in their way, and is the result of a happy combination of heart and intellect only realised now and again. Where it exists, whether in statesman, traveller, or missionary, it is invaluable. To the lack of it, as towards inferior or subject races particularly, many evils must be ascribed—certainly a large proportion of the failures and disappointments in connection with Christian Missions.

The Hervey Group of Islands, so named by Cook, who discovered them in 1773, is one of the smaller groups of the South Pacific. It consists of seven islets, of which Rarotonga, the largest, is thirty miles in circumference. Mr. Gill speaks enthusiastically of its beauty: "From one to two miles of rich alluvial soil extends everywhere from the base of the mountains to the sea. The whole island is clad with rich tropical verdure. It is difficult to exaggerate the strange forms of beauty which everywhere meet the eye,—gigantic and fantastic columns of rock draped with vines; deep valleys lying in the shadow of overhanging mountains; primeval forest, with its many shades of green; immense chestnut trees, laden with fragrant blossoms, marking off the actual domain of man; miles of breadfruit groves, intermingled with cocoa-nut palms, shading plantations of coffee. Nearer the beach are plantains, bananas, sweet potatoes, and, lastly, growing to the water's edge, are graceful iron-wood trees, with hair-like leaves hanging down like tresses."

The population of the group is a little under 9,000. Mr. Gill dissents from the theory advanced by Mr. Wallace in his work on *The Malay Archipelago* that the Polynesians are descended from a race which once overspread a great submerged southern continent. For various reasons he is of opinion that they are of Malay origin, and his impression is that the progenitors of the present race entered the Pacific from the south-eastern fork of New Guinea, but were driven to the eastward by the fierce Negrito race. The Hervey Islands appear to have been peopled comparatively lately, not more, in Mr. Gill's judgment, than five or six centuries ago.

The Malay race is very widely scattered, as may be seen from a glance at the map. A language, which is essentially one, though its dialects are almost numberless, is spoken from New Zealand to the Sandwich Islands, and from Fortuna to Easter Island, that is, a distance of four thousand three hundred miles

in one direction, and three thousand five hundred in another. Many illustrations are given by Mr. Gill of the imaginative and poetic modes of speech with which these dialects abound. Violent death is "eternal deafness," natural death is to "follow in the track of the setting sun." A childless wife calls herself and is designated by her friends, "a food-waster." "Tanu" is to bury or plant, conveying a certain glimmering of the idea of resurrection. Birds are named from their note. All quadrupeds, except rats, are called "pigs," some distinctive epithet being added. Horses are "pigs that run over the ground," or, "pigs that carry men;" goats are "horned pigs;" dogs, "howling pigs;" cats, "pigs that mew."

Christianity was introduced into Mangaia—the second island of the group in size and importance—by native evangelists from Tahiti in 1824. An interesting account is preserved of the first religious conversation between the heathens and their new teachers. After several months two warriors came to have their long hair cut off in token of their having renounced their ancient worship; and shortly afterwards a Christian village was formed. In 1834 the first church was formed, consisting of twelve members: on the 1st of January, 1872, the three churches of Mangaia had a total of 745 members. The writer's own labours in Mangaia began in 1852.

The records of Christian life and experience amongst the natives will probably be passed over by some readers of this volume as being of a hackneyed and stereotyped kind. To our own mind they are full of pathos, often of a strange dignity. Mr. Gill writes: "Our converts do not seem to be troubled with the doubts and fears which affect the highly-cultured European. May not this be owing to the childlike nature of their faith—just taking God at His word? Amongst the excellent men whose deathbeds it has been my privilege to visit, I would refer to Rakoa, chief of Tamarua, who died in September, 1865, nearly eighty years of age. He was emphatically a good man, ready for every good word and work. During the last two years of his life he became childish; yet I could nearly always fix his attention for a few minutes by referring to the interests of his soul. The last words I heard from his lips a few days before his death were—'I am dying; but I am in God's hands. Jesus alone is the Way, the Truth, and the Life.'"

Mr. Gill devotes a chapter to reminiscences of native preachers; and it is not the least interesting in the book. Those who take a mere conventional interest in Christian Missions, and still more those who wholly despise them, have little notion of the way in which whole populations have been elevated and benefited by religion, and what noble characters have been formed under its transforming power. Let those who echo the criticisms of others

as to the small results and enormous expenditure connected with Mission work take care to know what those results are. "Sixty-five years ago the whole of the Pacific was heathen ; now upwards of 300 islands are Christianised. When Missions were commenced in the Pacific, commerce did not exist. The commerce of the Pacific is now estimated at £3,000,000. Idolatry, in the greater portion of the Pacific, is a thing of the past. Education is advancing ; 500,000 natives are under instruction ; 60,000 are, we hope, "disciples indeed." Wherever a Christian community is ministered to by a native pastor, he is sustained, not by contributions drawn from Europe or America, but by the free-will offerings of his own people. All this has, under God, been done by various Protestant Missionary Societies at little more than the total cost of the Alexandra Palace—less than a million sterling." Some of the results of Christian teaching are of a kind to appeal to the most worldly and cynical of spectators. The abolition of human sacrifices, war, cannibalism, polygamy, idolatry, and a crushing despotism, are due to Christianity. While, however, the natives of the Hervey Group, in common with other Polynesians, have received inestimable benefits from their intercourse with white men, they have also received, it should be borne in mind, some very grievous wrongs, both from the abominable practice of kidnapping and from the vices and diseases introduced by foreigners. There is a peculiar susceptibility in the native constitution to imported diseases ; and, as was lamentably shown in the late destructive epidemic of measles in Fiji, complaints which Europeans regard as comparatively harmless affect the natives in the deadliest manner. It is said that vessels from colder latitudes, as New Zealand, rarely touch at the Hervey Islands without leaving influenza behind them. When a native is unwell he will say *Kua paf au*, "I am shippy"—that is, "I am suffering from sickness brought by some ship." It must be confessed that the prospect of these races permanently surviving their introduction to the world of Europe and America is very doubtful. It will indeed be a pathetic chapter in human history should it have to be recorded that these secluded races, after their long night of ignorance and cruelty, received the Gospel only as a sort of death-bed blessing, giving them the joyful hope of another life just as they passed out of this world.

Of the native preachers referred to, one of the finest examples is *Mamae*, a native of *Mangaia*. His portrait is that of an intelligent and thoroughly comely man. "He is well versed in Scripture, which he expounds with great originality and power, bringing his illustrations, not from books or commentaries, but from nature and from events familiar to those whom he is addressing. He has much wit and humour, as well as true pathos ; and, best of all, he is a devout and humble follower of Jesus Christ. For above

twenty-eight years he has preached the Gospel to his own countrymen. I have known him for twenty-five of these years; and the more I have known him the more I have cause to esteem and love him for his own as well as for his work's sake. I regard him as a fine example of the transforming power of the Gospel. For the first half of his life he was an untaught heathen, a worshipper of idols. The very idol which he and his tribe worshipped—a rude carved human figure, made of iron-wood, named *Motoro*—is in the museum of the London Missionary Society." Then follow some specimens of the racy and characteristic illustrations with which he enlivens his discourses. We regret that we cannot find space for them. We must close this short notice of a deeply interesting book with an ancient story still repeated in *Mangaia*. "*Kotu and Koā* were brothers who dearly loved each other, and, as they lived on opposite sides of the island, they were constantly exchanging visits. One evening *Kotu* left his home with the intention of visiting his younger brother, *Koā*. About the same time *Koā* left his home in order to pay a visit to his elder brother. Their road lay across *Rangimotia*, the central and highest hill in *Mangaia*. By the time they had arrived at this spot, which was exactly half way, it was perfectly dark. A drizzling shower had set in.

"It was the practice in those times, when walking at night, to wrap up the head and face in native cloth, so as to conceal the features. The brothers met, without recognising each other, at the narrowest part on the summit of the hill. The pathway through the fern admitted only of one person passing at the time. Under the branches of a tree they met, and stood for a long while face to face, without uttering a word, each hoping to tire out the other's patience. It was a point of honour not to step out of the narrow pathway to oblige another; to do so would be an admission of inferiority.

"At last they hustled each other. As neither gave way, they prepared for a deadly conflict. The head covering having fallen on the shoulders, each contrived to get hold of the other's long, twisted hair, after the approved murderous fashion of these Islanders, and endeavoured to break his neck. As they wrestled and fought, they unconsciously approached one side of the hill, and rolled over and over until they reached the moist spongy bottom. *Kotu*, the elder, happened to be uppermost, and was not much the worse, but *Koā* had suffered considerably, and his strength was nearly exhausted. By a sudden movement *Kotu* succeeded in disengaging his own head. Firmly planting his knees on the back of his prostrate and exhausted foe, he gathered up all his strength in order to break his neck. The poor fellow underneath, in the agony of death, gasped out the name of their father, or, as some have it, the name of his beloved elder

brother,—‘Alas, Kotu, I perish!’ That cry, uttered at the last extremity, saved his life. The arms of Kotu fall powerless; and the brothers wept with shame and grief. When they had rested, Kotu took his brother with him to his home in Veitatei, and told the strange tale to their aged father, Oeve.”

A traditional song preserves the memory of this incident. It runs thus:—

“ ‘Twas I that wearily ascended
The long hill-range at Karanga,
‘Twas I, Koa, that well-nigh perished.
Through the drizzling rain,
Kotu climbed the southern side.
We met, and angrily faced each other.
Alas, Oeve! we angrily faced each other.
Murderously we fought through the night,
Until daylight appeared.”

VAUGHAN'S HULSEAN LECTURES.

Some Reasons of our Christian Hope: being the Hulsean Lectures for 1875. By Edward T. Vaughan, M.A., Rector of Harpenden, Honorary Canon of Peterborough, and formerly Fellow of Christ's College, Cambridge. London: Macmillan and Co. 1876.

THESE Lectures run rapidly over a very wide field, and discuss a great variety of topics. While we cannot claim for them any profundity of philosophic thought or extraordinary display of learning, they are evidently the product of one who, despite his own disclaimer, is both a philosopher and a scholar. No one could have produced this volume who had not thoroughly studied the difficulties which have recently been raised against our common Christianity. It is addressed, however, rather to the many whose views have become unsettled, they hardly know why, and who would gladly become established again if they only knew how, than to the few whose culture and leisure make it possible for them exhaustively to investigate the whole line of attack and defence. And both in style and spirit these lectures are admirably adapted to the class of readers for whom they are designed. There is nothing about them that savours of the repellent and hard-featured handbook, or of the stiff and elaborate essay, and yet they are far from degenerating into mere table-talk. The book is likely to be read through by those who once sit down to it, and will probably in many create or sharpen the relish for theological discussions which sterner treatises sometimes fail to provoke. A deep conviction of the importance of the subject and a tender sympathy both with perplexed believers and the living Object of their faith, pervades every paragraph. One token of this may be seen in the substitution in the title of the warmer

word "hope" for the more common "faith" or "belief." The general plan of the lectures is thus sketched by the author in the preface: "I have endeavoured first to define the nature of our Christian hope, and to show that it is adapted to certain real and deep wants of human nature (Lecture I.). I have recognised, secondly, the history of our Lord's earthly life, His death and resurrection as the only basis on which that hope can be rested; and have sought to show further that some such history is required to account for the origin of the Christian Church, and for the admitted facts of Christian life, as these have been experienced, in the largest possible variety of circumstances, during the last eighteen centuries (Lecture II.). I have sought, thirdly, to determine, by strict examination, the real value of the *direct* evidence of the truth of the Christian history, afforded by the various books included in the Canon of the New Testament (Lecture III.). I have then gone back to the Scriptures of the Old Testament, and have sought to show that they afford convincing proof of a Divinely guided preparation for the coming of the Son of God (Lecture IV.). I have sought, finally, to consider carefully certain difficulties which are very generally felt to be involved in those conceptions of Revelation and Inspiration which, in *some* shape, seem to be necessarily implied in our Christian faith (Lecture V.)."

We cordially commend this unpretentious work to our inquiring youth as a good introduction to the science of Christian Apologetics.

ANCIENT CLASSICS FOR ENGLISH READERS.

Ovid. By the Rev. Alfred Church, M.A.

Livy. By the Rev. W. Lucas Collins, M.A. Edinburgh and London: W. Blackwood and Sons.

THERE seemed to be no good reason why the series of Ancient Classics for English Readers, which had met with such marked success, should be brought to a close before it had included some of the greatest names in Greek and Latin literature. It was manifestly incomplete while omitting Aristotle, Thucydides, and Demosthenes on the one hand, and Livy, Lucretius, and Ovid on the other. We are glad to see that a supplementary series will meet this deficiency, and that eight or ten additional volumes are to give something like completeness to the whole.

It was impossible to pass by Ovid in any survey of the classic authors, and yet it is not an easy task to introduce him to general readers. That Ovid is witty, clever, possessing boundless facility of easy graceful verse, hardly needs to be affirmed, but his sins against decency are beyond all excuse. There is no need to

try him by any Christian standard of morality, a jury of respectable Pagans might safely be trusted to pronounce a verdict on his writings; for in all but the very worst days of heathen antiquity there was a sufficient recognition of propriety to secure condemnation for such topics and methods of treatment as those adopted by Ovid. Mr. Church has done his best to illustrate Ovid's genius, and to give selections from his writings, while keeping clear of the filth with which his poems abound. The poet has made this difficult by the extent to which his poems are charged with utterly repulsive matter. The best that can be said of certain of his works is as follows: "The passion which inspires the verse is coarser and more brutal than that of his rival poets, even when this shows itself in its worst phases. It has nothing of the fervour of Propertius, the tenderness of Tibullus. It does not spring from any depth of feeling. It is real, but its reality is of the basest, most literal sort. . . But then, again, he shows an incomparable skill in expression; he invests even the lowest things with a certain grace. His wit and fancy 'sparkle on the sty.' If he lets us get away for a moment from the mire—if, with the delicate fancy that never fails him, he tells us some legend that 'boys and virgins' need not blush to read—he is charming. There never was a more subtle and ingenious master of language, and it is a grievous pity that he should so often have used it so ill."

We do not care to inquire in what proportions Ovid's great popularity has been due to his better and his worse qualities. That it is not the result of either exclusively there is little doubt. After a frank acknowledgment of the immorality of much of his writings, it is a little perplexing to find Mr. Church offering something very like an apology in the following sentence: "Yet if it is anything in favour of a culprit that he is not alone in his guilt, it may be urged in arrest of judgment that one of the greatest of English poets translated with much approval of his own generation the very worst of these writings, and not only translated them, but contrived to make them more offensive in their new dress than they are in the old."

It is unfortunately true that Dryden seems to have selected for translation the most objectionable passages, not only from Ovid but from Juvenal and Lucretius, and that what was licentious in the original lost nothing in his version; but in him also the offence is inexcusable. Ovid can give no excuse for him, nor he for Ovid. In Dryden's case the sin is almost unaccountable. He was too good a man for such dirty work. His private character appears to have been free from the impurity displayed in his writings, and it is grievous in the last degree that such a man should have provided obscene literature for readers whom, in his heart, he despised. Many utterances of his better mind on the

subject are known, and they should have prevented Mr. Church from using Dryden's example in ever so faint apology for Ovid. In his preface to the tales from Chaucer he writes with regard to Collier's attack upon the immorality and profaneness of the stage: "I shall say the less of Mr. Collier, because in many things he has taxed me justly; and I have pleaded guilty to all thoughts and expressions of mine which can be truly argued of obscenity, profaneness, or immorality, and retract them. If he be my enemy, let him triumph; if he be my friend, as I have given him no personal occasion to be otherwise, he will be glad of my repentance." In a letter, written not very long before his death, he says: "I confess I am the last man who ought, in justice, to arraign her, who have been myself too much a libertine in most of my poems, which I should be well contented had I time either to purge or to see them fairly burned." Those who will be at a little pains to look for them may find, scattered through our literature, such confessions and regrets of poets for the licentiousness of their writings as afford a pathetic comment on this great evil.

In presenting *Livy* to English readers Mr. Collins has had no such difficulty to deal with as that referred to in the case of Ovid. He has completed his task with the ability and success that characterised his contributions to the earlier series. Both Mr. Church and Mr. Collins quote the judgment of Lord Macaulay on their respective authors. As far as *Livy* is concerned that judgment is well known, and Mr. Collins adopts it on the whole, as may be seen from his closing sentences: "For an artist *Livy* is, when all has been said, far more than an historian. The word historian means, in its very derivation, a patient inquirer into facts and circumstances, and that *Livy* was not. It was the powers of the poet, the novelist, the dramatist, which he possessed in such a large measure, and these have given to his pages a lasting interest, undiminished even when his story is no longer accepted in all cases as trustworthy. Above all, he carries his readers with him by his great gift of oratory—the gift which perhaps the Romans, like the Athenians, in their pride of civilisation, valued beyond all others, and which has by no means lost its position amongst ourselves."

TINLING'S OPIUM POLICY OF GREAT BRITAIN.

The Poppy-Plague, and England's Crime. By J. F. B. Tinling, B.A. London: Elliot Stock. 1876.

THE question of the British opium policy is one of those which a small but earnest minority, acquainted with the real facts of the case, has determined to discuss until the general apathy shall be stirred, and the nation induced either to alter its policy, or to assume its responsibility, knowing what it is. It is still a

reproach to us that the interest taken in Indian affairs, both in Parliament and out of it, is unworthy of the nation to which Providence has committed them; and it is a still deeper reproach that such attention as is given to Indian questions is given almost exclusively to material as distinguished from moral interests. One of the evils of our complicated social state is that myriads of persons may be unconsciously, but none the less effectively, helping to sustain a state of things which they would repudiate with indignation if they were properly aware of it. We have no doubt whatever that if Englishmen generally knew the history of our opium trade with China, and the results that it is still producing, no consideration of supposed interest or conventional policy would prevent its speedy abolition. It may be said, however, that there is no public opinion on the subject. Most people do not know enough respecting it to have so much as an opinion, and while that is the case it is useless, in the present stage of political morality, to expect the governing caste, either at home or abroad, to do anything towards relieving us from a great national sin. Our hope is in the diffusion of knowledge, together with that quickening process by which God arouses nations as well as individuals from their self-complacency. Worldly indifference to righteousness, the only law for communities as for individuals, is perhaps the worst feature of our political life, but there are signs of its being disturbed; and we may hope that the "enlightened" selfishness that has been accepted as the highest form of political wisdom will soon be exchanged for principles more worthy of a Christian people. If not,—we write it with sorrow and anxiety,—trouble will surely come of it.

We have, in the last two numbers of this *Review*, discussed the whole question at considerable length. In addition to the various works then referred to, we have much pleasure in recommending Mr. Tinling's Essay. It is clearly and intelligibly written, and gives in moderate compass the history of our opium policy in the East, and its connection with Government, finance, and morals. A considerable measure of enthusiasm is required in any man who pleads a righteous cause against overwhelming ignorance and apathy. Mr. Tinling is not deficient in this moral requisite, and it is combined with adequate knowledge, as well as with candour and general good sense.