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THE

LONDON QUARTERLY REVIEW.

OCTOBER, 1872.

ART. I.—*Fraser's Magazine* for October, 1857. London.

IT has been wisely observed that the reason why discussions upon art are so difficult is that we do not remark in art the ascensional phases evident in the development of science,—that the definition applicable to scientific progress cannot be applied to progress in art, which latter we are fain to describe as developing itself when, from age to age, it changes its aspects and nature, without ever departing from consonance with beauty. This view of things, doubtless a right view, would seem, at first sight, to afford but a dismal outlook to the lovers of systematic art-philosophy; and yet we held it to be a right view, as firmly as we do now, when we recorded, some years ago, our belief in an ordered classification of the fine arts.* After taking occasion to discredit a classification proposed by the acute and learned M. Taine, we wrote as follows:—"It would have been extraordinary if the encyclopædic mind, which propounded a classification of the sciences, had not also furnished one of the arts; and, accordingly, we find Comte, after objecting to the very division now advanced by M. Taine, delivering his own classification on the principle applied to the sciences—that of decreasing generality and increasing intensity, involving, in the case of the arts, increasing technicality. The order thus established is: poetry, music, painting, sculpture, architecture—an order which corresponds with that of historical growth, and which is so fully demonstrated in the work cited, that the question of its propriety and utility need not be entered upon."

The "work cited" was the *Discours sur l'Ensemble du Positivisme* (Paris, 1848), with the greater portion of which,

* See *London Quarterly Review* for October, 1868. Article: "Art-Philosophy and Art-Criticism."

relating to social and political questions, we had not then, and have not now, any concern. The section on æsthetics, however, embodying a large array of sane and deep art-philosophy, we held sufficient to excuse us from going over the arguments in support of the classification of the arts; nor do we now propose to bring those arguments forward *seriatim*, although, as far as they may chance to occur in support of what we have to say about the relative positions and respective functions of poetry and music, we shall not scruple to make use of them.

The whole question of classifying the arts might, at a hasty glance, be deemed trivial, but reflection cannot fail to leave in the mind conviction of numerous ways wherein any undue glorification or depression of any one of the arts, when sanctioned by philosophic authority or popular opinion, cannot but lead to evil results; and a part of our present task will be to strike a balance between philosophic over-valuation and popular under-valuation. But before we get to that part of our subject, it behoves us to admit the great difficulty that there must always be in working out systematic views of art, and to face without wonder the differences of opinion shown by even philosophic minds, of close relationship one to another, concerning art questions; for, as regards this very matter of classifying, it is quite true that, although the abstract sciences may each be traced out with logical clearness, from their known or assumed origin to their perfection (or advanced stage, if still incomplete), yet, in the case of the arts, essentially less rigid and logical than the sciences, in the same degree that the emotions are less rigid and logical than the intellect, no regular and unbroken pedigree can be traced.

In the domain of science, man has before him the universe, which it is his essential duty to understand, so far as it lies within the scope of his intellectual powers to do so; and he must, of necessity, begin to wrestle with the lowest and most simple phenomena before his powers can well be exercised analytically and synthetically on the higher and more complex. But in art he is not so much an explorer as he is a creator by means of his emotional nature; and thus national or individual idiosyncrasy may have almost any weight in determining whether one or another of known arts shall be warmly persisted in and perfected; whereas, of the abstract sciences, no one can be thoroughly understood if any of greater simplicity be neglected or ignored. Hence it is that, while the history of science is comparatively compact and consequent,

an historical survey of art discovers innumerable *lacunæ* and apparent anomalies.

Not the least striking of these historical peculiarities, at a first glance, is the long period between the unknown birth of music and the splendid modern culmination of that art in the hands of the great German masters. But, notwithstanding the fact that poetry had produced some half-dozen literatures of the first order before music had come to one great period, and that, meantime, painting, sculpture, and architecture had all fulfilled themselves with the highest magnificence in different countries and epochs, there is not, as far as we can judge from the historical materials accessible to us, any reasonable doubt that the genesis of the arts has taken place in the order already noted, that of music being next to that of poetry.

The more we search the records made by travellers concerning their observations of the habits and manners of primitive peoples, the more cause we see to believe in the existence of this natural order of birth. It is true that the most primitive specimens of humanity ever observed by travellers have not been so low in the scale that a still lower ancestry could not be conceived; but, in the lowest states we *know*, we are able to discern the germs of all art in energetic fragments of speech of a semi-poetic character. Indeed, it seems merely rational that the first form of art to make its appearance should be that which demands no machinery, no implements of any kind, not even the faculty of chronicling itself, and which, in this its elementary state, is mere spontaneous utterance—human, but *savagely* human—of some passionate phases of feeling that will find vent. Looking a step higher than this, at the dance-chants of savages, we find the fragmentary poetic utterances have reached a monorhythmic intonation, constituting the first element of music, and passing, naturally enough, into chants accompanied on such rude instruments as can be devised by people with no glimmering of industry properly so-called. How fast a race possessed of these two beginnings of art developes itself to the need and possibility of other arts must depend on many intricate combinations of circumstance; but it is tolerably clear that these must come first, as a very decided step in the manufacturing or industrial direction must be made before painting in its most barbarous form can exist, a further step being needful before sculpture can arise, and a still further one before architecture can come into being as an art.

But beside the evidence of barbarous dance-chants in this

connection, we have the evidence furnished by the existence of similarly monotonous chants among boatmen and others in the East, and the history of the Greeks gives us still further evidence; the early poems of that race—sacred legends embodied in the rhythmic and metaphorical language of strong feeling—appear to have been chanted, not recited; and the cadences and tones became musical under the same influences that made the words poetic; but this chanting is believed by historic investigators to have been rather *recitative* than singing properly so-called, and a *recitative* much simpler than ours, judging from the fact that the early Greek lyre, played in unison with the voice, had but four strings, and thus confined the voice to four notes.* We have thus historic evidence of an early form of music, advanced as compared with the dance-chants, but far less removed from ordinary speech than the *recitative* that is the simplest part of our own music: this is a valuable addition to the *rationale* of the matter as connected with industrial development; and in addition to this historic evidence there is other, of a class still observable, that *recitative*, the simplest form of civilised music, has been the natural outcome of strong feelings, similar to those that developed the dance-chants out of primitive poetic utterance. When a Quaker preacher addresses a meeting, which he only does under the influence of strong religious feeling, he usually speaks in tones quite different from ordinary speech, indeed, in a kind of subdued monotonous chant; and the intoning to be heard in many churches doubtless represents the same mental state, and came into use on account of its fitness to represent contrition, supplication, or reverence, although, in the present day, its connection with those feelings may be thought rather historical than actual.

Had we proposed to ourselves the great labour of discussing exhaustively the origin and respective functions of all the fine arts, we should have taken upon us a composite task to which there is good need that some competent hand should be set, and of which each division might well occupy a considerable essay. It would, in that event, have been needful to analyse the co-existence of sculpture in its noblest and most prolific epoch with the highly imaginative polytheism which the Greeks had developed, or had had developed for them by the

* The music of the Greeks seems to have been mainly accessory to their poetry, and the superb perfection of their poetry fully accords with their inferiority to some other ancient nations in the matter of music.

primitive Aryan stock, out of mere fetishism. It would have been also necessary to discuss the equally notable co-existence of the most exquisite epoch of architecture with Mediæval Catholicism, and to trace how the decadence of the same Mediæval Catholicism became involved with that Renaissance wherein painting rose to its highest known eminence, to an eminence, indeed, which no other age of painting approached, with the isolated exception of the present age as represented by the single name of Turner (and that order of landscape art, which Turner emphatically is, cannot fairly be placed behind any order of art, be it what it may, in respect either of exaltation or of triumph over materials). The correlativity of the various great poetic or literary epochs with various states and phases of social existence would, in such a wide subject, be the widest division, and, at the same time, the most straightforward, because the same spontaneous connection with the emotional nature that brings this supreme art first into existence, maintains poetry of all arts in the first position as regards expression of national character, and, at an early stage of civilisation, is aided by the adaptability of poetry to the purposes of a high language of ideas, so that every great epoch must produce a great literature, whether posterity be or be not fortunate enough to inherit such product. But this correlativity, also, is of less importance to us just now than the formation of modern music in an age of restless energy and social embroilment, and among a people who are *the* speculative and solidly thoughtful nation *par excellence*,—a phenomenon which we shall presently inspect more closely.

Concerning the absolute or remotest origin of poetry and music, no one can, of course, predicate much with certainty: only it is perfectly clear that as poetry is merely speech perfected, and comes to a recognisable state through the necessity of saying or uttering as perfectly as possible certain definite emotions that manifest themselves in the primitive brain, so, some of the vaguer emotional manifestations, for which mere speech seems inadequate, strive to utter themselves in the vaguer sounds that are the essence of music. And, inasmuch as the more definite emotions, and such states of mind as are the subject of ready intercommunication, demand emphatic expression sooner and more urgently than those vaguer emotions whereof a man is but half-conscious, we need not be surprised at barbarous poetry coming into existence earlier than barbarous music. But the extreme lateness of the highest and most complex form of music might well astonish

anyone who had only thought a little on the subject; while to us it seems, after considering the subject from time to time during several years, that the explanation is plain enough.

It would be impossible to conceive the great instrumental music of Germany taking its birth, for instance, among such institutions as existed without dispute in France under Louis XIV. The national life in France then, though compact and articulate, was not one of universal aspiration and brotherhood, but one in which the king and the nobility ruled absolutely as a matter of course, while the peasants and burgesses, equally as a matter of course, accepted the supremacy of the Court, and aspired to nothing beyond their birthrights (as birthrights were then conceived). To such a society the sense of fusion produced by powerful music on large bodies of people, and the soaring, unbounded aspirations that are expressed in the combinations and sequences of vague exquisite sounds, could have but little meaning or *raison d'être*; and this kind of society, the natural outcome and finale of the Feudal-Catholic *régime*, existed, not in France alone, but throughout Europe, taking its tone always more or less from France. But France, who had set, and still sets, so many fashions for the rest of the civilised world to follow, had in store a tremendous example in an opposite kind to that of the Louis XIV. order of things; and as we find a strict correspondence between that pre-revolutionary era and the courtly dramatic and other literatures that were its most articulate artistic outcome, so we trace a correspondence equally certain, if more vague, between the ideas and sentiments disseminated throughout Europe since the Revolution and the great development of music.

M. Taine has shown, with admirable vividness and vigour, in his *Philosophie de l'Art*, how the aristocratic order of things, so entirely unfit for the social medium of a great musical development, became transformed into the most fitting medium for such a development—how these absolute governments, perfect in their own way, became their own executioners, and broke up through simple definite achievement. We English, always less prone to complete *bouleversements* than our Latin neighbours, had readjusted the monarchic system to our requirements, when no longer disposed to tolerate the absolute monarchy that ended virtually at the execution of Charles I.; and before the French Revolution we had had time to settle into a tolerably definite social system more or less feudal and classified; but in France the final struggle of Absolutism came when there was so much more intellectual

advance among the burghers—a so much more "long-accrued retribution" to be executed by oppressed and suddenly liberated savage natures, that France simultaneously rose and sank to a far more frightful and universal instruction, as to the power of the people, and their possibilities, than it had been the lot of England to give to the nations of Europe. The Government before the Revolution, being absolute, lapsed into negligence and tyranny; and the brilliant society of the Court, which it had long been the part of the people to admire simply, became the sole recipients of the good things dispensed by the Government. "This," as M. Taine observes with *naïveté*, "appeared unjust to the burgesses and the people," who, having largely developed in enlightenment, numbers, and wealth, found their power increasing in proportion with their discontent, until they "made the French Revolution," and, after ten years of unparalleled anarchy and sufferings, established a democratic and levelling *régime*, under which all employments are open to all persons, subject only to the qualifications of the individual and to fixed rules of advancement.

The wars of the First Empire, aided by the force of example, gradually carried this order of things past the frontiers of France; and it is clear enough that, notwithstanding local differences and temporary delays, the whole of Europe in the present day steadily inclines to the new arrangement of society, which, together with the rapid invention of industrial machines and a considerable amelioration of manners and customs, has changed the average condition of men, and, consequently, their general character. Freed from arbitrary rule, and protected by efficient police, their material anxieties are lessened; and an enormously increased production of matters conducive to comfort and convenience puts within the reach of the poor many things that were formerly luxuries to the rich. However low a man's birth, almost any career is open to him; while the rigour of State control has relaxed, a parallel relaxation has taken place in family control; and, as the citizen has tended towards equality with the nobleman, the father has become the comrade of his children instead of the distant ruler of old times. The weight of oppression and unhappiness in the visible relations of life has, in short, been very perceptibly lightened. On the other hand, ambition and covetousness have increased frightfully in area: people experiencing more and more comfort, and seeing happiness more and more nearly within their reach, get to look upon comfort and happiness—nay, wealth and position—as rights: the more they have the

more they want; their pretensions outrun their acquisitions. At the same time, the immense development of positive science, and the spread of education, have not taken place without opening the door for bold inroads of free thought; and men are getting more and more apt to throw off the traditions that heretofore ruled their beliefs, and to strive, by the force of individual intellect alone, to attain to absolute truth. They have called in question to a startling extent the recognised formulas of religion, morality, and politics, and for nearly sixty years there has been an ever-growing tendency to try the various roads, proclaimed by various minds, as leading to complete happiness—the various social and "religious" systems offered for man's approval.

Such a state of things is not without the very gravest effects on the general mind, in modifying the currency of ideas: the ruling personage of such a drama, the person to whom the spectators accord most interest and sympathy, is the dreamy, melancholy man of inordinate ambition, whom we see embodied in Réné, in Faust, in Werther, in Manfred—the man of vague longing and incurable sadness. His incurable sadness arises partly from an inordinate sensibility, causing him to fret over small ills, to crave too eagerly sweet and delicious sensations. He is too much accustomed to comfort; he has not had the rough education of our ancestors, half-feudal, half-rustic; he has not been cuffed by his father, flogged at school, kept in respectful silence among great people, checked in his mental development by domestic discipline; he has not been used, as his ancestors were, to depend on his hands and his sword, to make journeys on horseback, or to lie uncomfortably; and in the sultry atmosphere of modern luxury and sedentary habits he has become delicate, nervous, excitable, and but little able to accommodate himself to any life exacting effort and imposing pain. Intellectually he is disposed more or less to scepticism: in the inrush of new doctrines and new views, shaking society from top to bottom, a precocious independence of judgment often sends him adrift in his youth, far away from the beaten track that his fathers habitually followed under the guidance of tradition and authority. His curiosity and his ambition, abnormally exacting, goad him forth on the search for absolute truth and infinite happiness: love, glory, science, power, as they exist in the world, will not satisfy him; and the intemperance of his desires, irritated by the insufficiency of his conquests and the emptiness of his enjoyments, leaves him dejected over the ruins of himself, while his imagination, overwrought, oppressed and powerless, can-

not represent to him the *something beyond* that he covets and cannot obtain.

Such is the typical personage who was the direct and indirect outcome of the French Revolution, and whom M. Taine described so finely seven years ago in the Ecole des Beaux Arts, reminding his audience that the ills of this ruling character had been called the *maladie du siècle*—a malady that existed in its greatest strength nearly fifty years ago, and one that has not yet been extinguished by the encroachments of the positive spirit, with all its apparent coldness and gloomy impassibility. The traces of this "malady" are to be seen in the large development of philosophic, lyrical and sad-toned poetry in England, France and Germany, in large alteration and enrichment of the languages, in the invention of new characters and new orders of composition, in the style and sentiments of all the great modern writers, from Chateaubriand to Balzac, from Goethe to Heine, from Cowper to Byron, from Alfieri to Leopardi. In the arts of design you may see analogous symptoms—a style that is feverish, without repose, or laboriously archæological, a striving after dramatic effect, psychological expression, or local exactness: one notes, too, how often artistic procedure is ruined by confusion of methods; how an infinite amount of talent, played upon by new emotions, has opened up new paths; and how, in the midst of all this, a profound sentiment for out-of-door nature has sustained an original and complete landscape art, as a kind of reaction following sedentary habits.

It was not, however, in poetry, philosophic, dramatic, or lyric, nor in painting or sculpture, that the most extraordinary development took place, but in music, and that with an almost unparalleled vigour and rapidity. That development is one of the most noteworthy features of our age, and connects itself intimately with the modern spirit that we have referred to above.

Modern music, as might be well expected, took its rise in the two countries where people sing naturally, Italy and Germany. In Italy, it was hatching, so to speak, during a century and a half, from Palestrina to Pergolesi, discovering its procedures, and groping after its resources: then, all of a sudden, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, at the very time when Italian painting ended, the nestling of 150 years spread its wings, and Scarlatti, Marcello, and Handel arose, and furnished in their operas those innumerable sentimental tendernesses and trills for the delectation of the degenerate and voluptuous society of the day. It was then

that grave and ponderous Germany, arriving later at the consciousness of herself, manifested the grandeur and severity of her religious sentiment, the depth of her science, and the vague melancholy of her instincts, in the ecclesiastical music of her Sebastian Bach;—and this before she attained to the evangelical epic of her Klopstock. Whether in Italy or in Germany, it was then that began the reign of *expression of sentiment;* and between the two, half German and half Italian, Austria struck a balance of the diverse spirits in the production of Haydn, Gluck, and Mozart. And music became cosmopolitan and universal at the approach of that great tempestuous spiritual struggle that underlay the French Revolution, just as painting had done before under the shock of that wide mental renovation which we call the Renaissance. There is nothing surprising in this apparition of modern music, for it corresponds with the apparition of a new genius, —that of the reigning character in the contemporary drama already described, that ardent, restless soul painted so vividly by M. Taine. It was to that soul that Beethoven, Mendelssohn, and Weber spoke; for him that Meyerbeer, Berlioz, and Verdi tried to write later on; and it is to his extreme and refined sensibility, his measureless and indeterminate aspirations, that music addresses itself,—an office for which music is eminently fit, and which no other art could so completely fill. For, on the one hand, music is founded more or less remotely on the imitation of the human cry, the complete natural expression of passion, claiming our involuntary sympathy; and thus the quivering delicacy of the whole nervous system finds in music its excitation, its echo, and its occupation: while on the other hand, the *technique* of music resting on relations of sound that imitate no living thing, and which seem, especially in instrumental music, like the dreams of an incorporate soul,—this art is better fitted than any other for the expression of floating thoughts, formless visions, aimless and limitless desires, and all the gigantic trouble of a restless heart that aspires universally and attaches itself to nothing.

This is why, simultaneously with the agitations, hopes, and dissatisfactions of modern democracy, music has passed the bounds of its native lands to spread its marvellous influence throughout Europe and America. This is why the most complicated symphonies attract crowds in that France whose national music has scarcely yet passed beyond the standard of songs and ballads,—although M. Gounod and other French musicians have made exquisite contributions to the German school of music; and this is why the opera and other

musical entertainments have become a distinctly national feature in the life of the practical democrats of America; while we English also, in our degree, and with our accustomed slowness, are getting more and more disposed to find music a necessary institution, and an immense boon and benefit.

To those who are familiar with M. Taine's brilliant and fascinating books, it will be evident that we have been adopting some of his views and illustrations. There are, however, things in connection with the slow development of music which it was not in M. Taine's programme to touch upon at all; and we are bound to state that he is in no way responsible for what we have to say in further explanation on this subject. We have seen that music, born almost as soon as poetry, has been for ages arrested in its development: we have examined the nature of the social medium in which it spread its wings for sudden and soaring flight; and a little further examination will suffice to show us why things *could not* have been otherwise with the growth of this glorious art. As we have already noted, the most elementary forms of music and poetry come into being, as no other arts do, without any extraneous apparatus whatever; and in order to see why the later-born arts attained their highest perfections long before music did, we must examine the relationship of the various arts to the *agents* between artist and public.

The initial oral poetry and vocal music are equally free from the need of any medial agency whatever,—as they are independent of any instruments unprovided by nature. Indeed, as regards poetry, it is in its very nature oral, and we know one distinguished poet who holds to this day that the printing system is a mistake, and professes that he can always utter poetry better than he can write it. There is a great deal of truth (partial truth) in this view; and it is likely that oral poetry might have reached a far greater development than it actually did (great as that was), and that much idiomatic simplicity would have been more strictly preserved, had not writing, and afterwards printing, come upon the scene. But it may be fairly doubted whether poetry, remaining oral, could ever have followed any subtle course involving close thought, in the absence of its industrial agent, printing; and it is difficult to imagine an unwritten dramatic literature so composite and splendid as the Elizabethan. Similarly, music, so long as it confined itself to vocal operations, might have attained a high excellence without extraneous aid; but it is not possible to conceive even a distant approach to modern music, until civilisation had enabled nature to call

in the assistance of manufacturing ingenuity for the production of instruments. Thus a highly developed form of music cannot dispense with agents; and the brain that originates the composition cannot effectually address the public except through agents of two classes,—industrial for the manufacture of instruments, and artistic for the performance of works.

Now such a dependence upon medial agency is not to be observed in connection with any other art. It is true that in the drama, perhaps the highest form that poetry has reached, an analogous artistic agency to that needed by music has taken an important position; but the *importance* of acting, as an adjunct and interpreter of the dramatic poet's art, is but a feeble parallel to the *necessity* of performance as an interpreter of the composer's production. It cannot be doubted that Shakespeare exercises a far greater influence, now that performances of his works are witnessed by comparatively few, than he did when the stage was his staple medium of public appeal. Admitting, therefore, that the glory of poetry culminated in the drama, in Shakespeare's hands, we are still free to think that it might equally have done so without the stage; for, while the essence of musical influence and enjoyment lies in the hearing of performances, and not in the highly technical feat of reading scores, the essence of the great dramatic influence lies in contact with human actions, passions, and emotions, and the apprehension of wise and noble utterances; and it is far easier to construct in imagination the entire dramatic spectacle, than it is to imagine a symphony from the score. The mere fact that the symbols of caligraphy and typography are infinitely freer from technicality than the symbols of written or printed music,—that the one set of symbols represent words that are the common property and currency of a nation, while the other set of symbols stand for sounds that have no *definite* meaning whatever, however much they play upon the emotions and delight the whole soul,—the mere fact that such is the case constitutes an enormous difference between the relationship of a printed play to an acted one, on the one hand, and of a score to a performed symphony on the other. To take up a play and, while reading it, see in the mind's eye all the actions and variations of expressions, hear with the mind's hearing all the changes of voice and gradations of tone, is simply a matter for which the ordinary imagination may be qualified without *special* education; whereas to take up a score, and hear the symphony with the mind's hearing, is only the result of a very high degree

of technical education. We do not, moreover, conceive that, even in an ideal general education of the most Utopian character, the reading of complex scores could be fairly included among the qualifications aimed at; and it seems to us that modern music must ever remain, in its very nature, more dependent on medial agency than dramatic or any other poetry.

This radical dependence is, at all events, sufficient explanation for the extremely slow growth of music as compared with poetry, without going into the nature of the respective agents required by those two arts. But when we come to consider the rapid growth of the later arts—painting, sculpture, and architecture, the question becomes more complex, and more strictly sociological than æsthetic. Certainly, as we have seen, the initial barbarisms of painting must have demanded some slight industrial civilisation, to say nothing of the immense industrial advance implied in any high order of painting: a further growth of industry would be needed before sculpture could either begin or become great; and, ere the arts could absorb into their composite fabric, under the head of architecture, the shelter-building instincts common to man and many of the lower animals, industry must be enormously spread in area, and highly organised.

But let us note the *sort* of agency on which painting, sculpture, and architecture have depended, and still depend.

Painting must at a very early stage have become dependent on the producers of its materials; and now painters have the misfortune to be more or less dependent on the medium of dealers and exhibition authorities; the former men of no artistic reputation; the latter, men who may or may not be qualified for their posts. On this medium, sculptors also depend more or less; and the industrial connections of sculpture are more complicated than those of painting, inasmuch as for sculptors to quarry and transport (for example) their own marble, and to manufacture their own tools, would be too flagrant a waste of good labour for any organised society. Architecture is still further dependent on commerce and industry, for it implies either capitalists or wealthy governments, and very extensive organised and supervised labour; so that it is by far the least independent of all the arts.

Now, though music is in its start infinitely less dependent than architecture is, it is easy to see how, in the race of development, the more dependent and material art overtook and outstripped the more ethereal and independent,—simply through the difference in the *sort* of agency on which each depended. Beside the fact that, in the high civilisations of

the Old World, architectural works were imperatively demanded by religion and by the need that the great should be fitly housed, it must be borne in mind that, to execute a design in architecture on the most magnificent scale, a potentate such as were the early patrons of the arts could command the necessary labour; for even slaves could build as directed;—whereas, to afford the public an appreciation of any of the great modern musical compositions, you want a troop of men, who are not dejected slaves, but every one of whom must have attained his power under conditions of perfect freedom,—for each must be more or less an artist. Autocratic governments may compel men into the performance of menial or mechanical functions; but the elasticity of combined musical operations could not exist unless each performer were as free as each listener to indulge his own caprices, and to play or not play according to his own requirements and inclinations.

Thus we see that the requisite performers of great musical compositions *could* only be produced in a society free from any taint of slavery,—wherein each man is at liberty to develop his talents as they seem to lead him. Moreover, with the exception already noted with regard to the stage drama, the necessary medial agents between artist and public are, in the case of every art but music, persons who enjoy no share whatever of any popular enthusiasm that may be called forth by a work of art; while in the case of music, the performing agents themselves, being an indispensable class of artists, merit and receive a large share of the popular gratitude and enthusiasm attending the production of a work; and even the manufacturers of instruments have often taken a high position as artists,—as witness the esteem in which violins by Guarnarius, Stradivarius and others, organs by Father Schmidt, and many other instruments, are held by connoisseurs,—who often regard them as works of art irrespective of their efficiency for playing upon. A great instrument-maker remains dear to connoisseurs for centuries, because the material product of his talent remains to speak for him; and a great performer, without this advantage, has a wider, though shorter, life after his death: both live long in the minds of men, though neither can attain to that wide and absolute *subjective immortality* that is the heritage of a great composer; but what printer, compositor, picture-dealer, artists'-colour-man, marble-quarrier, builder, bricklayer, or stone-sawyer, ever gained even an ephemeral reputation *as an artist?* We presume that even the bibliomaniacs who pay

fabulous prices for books printed by William Caxton do not regard that worthy man as an artist, or the antiquarian treasures of his press as works of art! As, however, the highest form of music is dependent, as we have seen, upon agents who are themselves objects of æsthetic adulation, to be which is the birthright of none but free men, this highest order of music was of necessity deferred until the arrival of the present age of perfect freedom; for, as the adequate provisions for the performance of such music as that in question did not exist, and could not exist, in the old times, the idea of modern music in its composite illimitable expansion could not have formed a part of the wildest dream of the greatest lost genius of the art as practised in the antique world.

In England, the absence of a great national music, and the slowness to adopt exotic music as a vital institution, are explicable on various grounds. First, English people do not *sing naturally*, as the Germans and Italians do; secondly, England had arrived at the consciousness of herself,—of her modern self, that is to say,—earlier than Germany and France had; so that the great wave of the French Revolution affected us less rapidly than it did some of our neighbours of Europe: thirdly, we are less alive than more southerly natures are to the voice of all arts but poetry; we have thought so much of our poetic literature and of our old national drama (and justly much), that we have deemed them all-sufficient: and, fourthly, the English nature is less responsive than that of other civilised nations to any appeal that is not direct and concrete. Moreover, our popular notions in æsthetics are particularly crude and limited; and we certainly have not the intense susceptibility to quick and vivid emotion that many less practical nations have. Thus poetry, with its direct intelligibleness and easy adaptation to current manners, questions, and national movements, has been our one great individual national art.

We have been less slow to adopt and encourage the arts of painting and sculpture than that of music; and this fact corresponds with our preference for the concrete and tangible, and with our commercial character: doubtless the greater number of the scattered wealthy public on whom the function of art-patrons has devolved since the mediæval centralisation of patronage ceased, experience a certain relish in the essentially mercantile process whereby they cater for their æsthetic appetites, when painting and sculpture are the arts patronised; and the fact that we so dearly like to have something to show for our money gives painters and sculptors as

a body a great advantage over musicians and composers. Much of the money devoted to music goes to the purchase of pianos and the education of household amateurs, and benefits high musical art but little. But most of the money spent on painting goes directly or indirectly to the painter: the wealthy gentleman forms by purchase a collection of pictures, and has a substantial equivalent to show to his friends and leave to his heirs; but if the money thus spent were devoted to any really useful patronage of music,

> "What record, or what relic of my lord
> Should be to after time, but empty breath
> And rumours of a doubt?"

When we patronise painting by buying a costly picture we have something ponderable to gratify the love of possession; but to provide for one's self and one's friends a high musical entertainment of the same monetary cost would imply in the patron a love of distributing wealth of a kind that is not very common.

In the times when noble social entertainments bore among us a larger proportion to commercial pursuits and the acquisition of property, it was not music, but the elder art of poetry that got the benefit; for our great men were the liberal patrons of that national drama that is our most cherished artistic produce, and so vividly records the manners and sentiments of a parent age; but since the utter degradation of the stage, which has taken place notwithstanding the powerful struggle made by some few earnest legitimate dramatists thirty years back, we have seen a marked growth in the importance, and improvement in the quality, of those essentially socialising and ennobling gatherings that it is in the very nature of high musical entertainments to be.

Thus far we have been considering the present subject, especially music's origin, from a sociological point of view; but before we come to the question of functions we must consider music from a physiological point of view, that is to say, in its discernible connections with the individual living organism. This branch of the subject was fully discussed, under the light afforded by facts that are common scientific property, in an article by Mr. Herbert Spencer, printed fifteen years ago in *Fraser's Magazine*, and reprinted in the author's collected essays. But it is precisely because, in treating of the *origin* of music, Mr. Spencer showed that same penetration of scientific insight that he has displayed in other fields, and because his deductions concerning the *function* of music are

made from facts shown in seeking that origin, and made in a solidly scientific method, that we wish to question those deductions so far as they may affect the position of poetry among the fine arts,—just as we should decidedly question most of Mr. Spencer's wider philosophical deductions, while admitting the admirable qualities of his method of discussion, and his almost unique powers of rigid and absolute adherence to the thread of scientific argument.

The essay to which we have referred opens, deep down in the foundations of the subject, with an excellently full analysis of the relations between muscular action and emotions and sensations, pleasurable or painful: it is pointed out how, among animals for example, pleasure and pain are manifested by various motions, more or less violent according as the excitement of the nerves of sensation is more or less violent; while in human beings, distinguished from lower animals by feelings alike more powerful and more varied, parallel facts are more conspicuous and more numerous. Mr. Spencer then proceeds to show how emotions and sensations, pleasurable and painful, all tend to produce active demonstration in proportion to their intensity. Concerning the sensations of the human subject, Mr. Spencer writes as follows:—

"In children, and even in adults who are not restrained by regard for appearances, a highly agreeable taste is followed by a smacking of the lips. An infant will laugh and bound in its nurse's arms at the sight of a brilliant colour or the hearing of a new sound. People are apt to beat time with head or feet to music which particularly pleases them. In a sensitive person an agreeable perfume will produce a smile; and smiles will be seen on the faces of a crowd gazing at some splendid burst of fireworks. Even the pleasant sensation of warmth, on getting to the fireside out of a winter's storm, will similarly express itself in the face.

"Painful sensations, being mostly far more intense than pleasurable ones, cause muscular actions of a much more decided kind. A sudden twinge produces a convulsive start of the whole body. A pain less violent, but continuous, is accompanied by a knitting of the brows, a setting of the teeth or biting of the lips, and a contraction of the features generally. Under a persistent pain of a severer kind, other muscular actions are added; the body is swayed to and fro; the hands clench anything they can lay hold of; and, should the agony rise still higher, the sufferer rolls about on the floor almost convulsed."

Thus far of sensations and their muscular manifestations: the author then proceeds still more fully to note down the emotions and their muscular manifestations thus:—

"Though more varied, the natural language of the pleasurable emotions comes within the same generalisation. A smile, which is the commonest expression of gratified feeling, is a contraction of certain facial muscles; and when the smile broadens into a laugh, we see a more violent and more general muscular excitement produced by an intenser gratification. Rubbing together of the hands, and that other motion which Dickens* somewhere describes as 'washing with impalpable soap in invisible water,' have like implications. Children may often be seen to 'jump for joy.' Even in adults of excitable temperament an action approaching to it is sometimes witnessed. And dancing has, all the world through, been regarded as natural to an elevated state of mind. Many of the special emotions show themselves in special muscular actions. The gratification resulting from success raises the head and gives firmness to the gait. A hearty grasp of the hand is currently taken as indicative of friendship. Under a gush of affection the mother clasps her child to her breast, feeling as though she could squeeze it to death. And so in sundry other cases. Even in that brightening of the eye with which good news is received we may trace the same truth; for this appearance of greater brilliancy is due to an extra contraction of the muscle which raises the eyelid, and so allows more light to fall upon, and be reflected from, the wet surface of the eyeball.

"The bodily indications of painful emotion are equally numerous, and still more vehement. Discontent is shown by raised eyebrows and wrinkled forehead; disgust by a curl of the lip; offence by a pout. The impatient man beats a tattoo with his fingers on the table, swings his pendent leg with increasing rapidity, gives needless pokings to the fire, and presently paces with hasty strides about the room. In great grief there is wringing of the hands, and even tearing of the hair. An angry child stamps, or rolls on its back and kicks its heels in the air; and in manhood, anger, first showing itself in frowns, in distended nostrils, in compressed lips, goes on to produce grinding of the teeth, clenching of the fingers, blows of the fist on the table, and perhaps ends in a violent attack on the offending person, or in throwing about and breaking the furniture. From that pursing of the mouth indicative of slight displeasure, up to the frantic struggles of the maniac, we shall find that mental irritation tends to vent itself in bodily activity."

It is thus clear that all feelings, whether sensations or emotions, pleasurable or painful, are muscular stimuli; and

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* We do not remember the expression in Dickens: it is impossible to *prove* a negative, where a man's works are so voluminous; but if Dickens does say so, he probably stole the thought from Tom Hood, who, in *Miss Kilmansegg*, describes Sir Jacob the Father, at the baptism of his "heiress and daughter," as a man who,

> "In the fulness of joy and hope,
> Seemed washing his hands with invisible soap,
> In imperceptible water."

it is a general law that, alike in men and animals, there is a direct connection between feeling and motion; the last growing more vehement as the first grows more intense. Mental excitement of all kinds ends in excitement of the muscles; and the two preserve a more or less constant ratio to each other.

As regards the connection of these physiological facts with the origin and function of music, Mr. Spencer points out that all music is originally vocal, that all vocal sounds are produced by the agency of certain muscles, that these muscles, in common with those of the body at large, are excited to contraction by pleasurable and painful feelings, and that, therefore, feelings demonstrate themselves in sounds as well as in movements. A dog barks as well as leaps when he is let out; a cat purrs as well as erects her tail; and a canary chirps as well as flutters, when pleased; an angry lion roars while he lashes his sides, and a dog growls while he retracts his lip. A maimed animal not only struggles, but howls; and in human beings, bodily suffering expresses itself not only in contortions, but in shrieks and groans. In anger, fear, and grief, the gesticulations are accompanied by shouts and screams; delightful sensations are followed by exclamations; and we hear screams of joy and shouts of exultation.

In these facts it is clear, as Mr. Spencer says, that we have "a principle underlying all vocal phenomena, including those of vocal music, and by consequence those of music in general. The muscles that move the chest, larynx, and vocal chords, contracting like other muscles in proportion to the intensity of the feelings, every different contraction of these muscles involving, as it does, a different adjustment of the vocal organs, every different adjustment of the vocal organs causing a change in the sound emitted, it follows that variations of voice are the physiological results of variations of feeling; it follows that each inflection or modulation is the natural outcome of some passing emotion or sensation; and it follows that the explanation of all kinds of vocal expression, must be sought in this general relation between mental and muscular excitements."

The natural sequel to these considerations is an examination of the chief peculiarities in the utterance of the feelings,—grouping these peculiarities under the heads of loudness, quality or *timbre*, pitch, intervals, and rate of variation.

In regard to *loudness*, it is hardly necessary to say that loud vocal sounds are commonly the result of strong feelings,

inasmuch as the loudness of a vocal sound increases with the strength of the blast from the lungs, which blast is effected by some of the muscles of the chest and abdomen, while the force of the muscular contraction is in proportion to the intensity of feeling. Moderate pain is borne silently, extreme pain causes an outcry. Slight vexation makes a child fret and fume; a grave vexation, inducing passion, makes the same child cry loudly and sharply. Loud applause means high approval; uproarious merriment, high enjoyment; and anger, surprise, or joy, give rise to increased loudness of the voice. From the silence of apathy to the shriek of agony or shout of joy, the utterances grow louder with the increasing strength of the emotions or sensations.

In the matter of *quality* or *timbre*, it will be found that the quality of voice varies with the mental state: the tones are more sonorous than usual under excitement: the sounds of strong feeling have much more resonance than those of mere conversation: the voice has a metallic ring under the influence of rising ill-temper, and the habitual speech of a scold gets from habit a piercing quality quite opposite to the softness that indicates placidity. A ringing laugh shows a joyous temperament: the tones of grief approach in *timbre* to those of chanting; and the voice of an eloquent speaker becomes more than usually vibratory in pathetic passages. Now this resonance of vocal sounds is produced by a muscular effort beyond that needed for quiet conversation. To cease speaking and *sing* a single word, the vocal organs must be readjusted by muscular action; and we have here another set of instances of the connection between mental and muscular excitement.

The phenomena of *pitch* give the same result. The pitch of the voice varies with the action of the vocal muscles, and that action varies with the mental state. The middle notes of ordinary conversation are produced without much effort while very high or low notes require a good deal of effort; and while the middle tones are used in states of calmness or indifference, high or low ones are used under excitement,—higher and higher, or lower and lower, as the excitement increases. The habitual sufferer complains in tones far above the natural key; and agony gives rise to shrieks (very high notes), or groans (very low notes). Anger is expressed in high wrathful tones, or, perhaps, low muttered imprecations. There are groans of horror, remorse, and disapproval, and shrill cries of extreme joy and fear.

Again, as regards *intervals*, the monotony of common speech contrasts with the wide intervals, such as fifths, octaves, &c., that distinguish emotion. Two friends meeting daily utter their greetings in notes that have only moderate intervals; but two friends meeting suddenly after long separation greet each other in tones of much stronger contrast; and a person calling to another who does not answer as expected, uses (unless very patient) tones that get more and more widely contrasted with each call, as patience decreases. And here, again, we have muscular action in proportion to emotion; for to speak in large intervals requires more muscular action than to speak in small ones. Moreover, the direction as well as the extent of vocal intervals derives from the relation between nervous and muscular excitement; and a departure from the middle notes in either direction shows increasing emotion, while a return towards the middle notes shows decreasing emotion.

Lastly, *variability of pitch* gives a similar result, as may be seen from the following instances:—When an eagerly-expected visitor arrives among his friends, all the voices undergo changes of pitch both greater and more numerous than usual. "If a speaker at a public meeting is interrupted by some squabble among those he is addressing, his comparatively level tones will be in marked contrast with the rapidly changing ones of the disputants. . . . During a scene of complaint and recrimination between two excitable little girls, the voices may be heard to run up and down the gamut several times in each sentence." In such cases as these, muscular excitement is shown "not only in strength of contraction, but also in the rapidity with which different muscular adjustments succeed each other."

It seems, then, that the chief phenomena of vocal sounds are manifestations of the general law that feeling is a stimulus to muscular action,—a law that lies deep in the nature of animal organisation, inasmuch as it holds good with all sensitive creatures, and is not confined in its operation to man. The expressiveness of these various modifications of voice is, as the scientific investigator tells us, innate. "Each of us, from babyhood upwards, has been spontaneously making them, when under the various sensations and emotions by which they are produced. Having been conscious of each feeling at the same time that we heard ourselves make the consequent sound, we have acquired an established association of ideas between such sound and the feeling which caused it. When the like sound is made by

another, we ascribe the like feeling to him; and by a further consequence we not only ascribe to him that feeling, but have a certain degree of it aroused in ourselves; for to become conscious of the feeling which another is experiencing, is to have that feeling awakened in our own consciousness, which is the same thing as experiencing the feeling. Thus these various modifications of voice become not only a language through which we understand the emotions of others, but also the means of exciting our sympathy with such emotions."

When we pass from the phenomena of speech to those of song, we find that the peculiarities which indicate excited feeling are precisely those that distinguish song from ordinary speech. Of the changes of voice that correspond with passionate, vivacious, deprecatory, or exalted utterance, whether we consider loudness, *timbre*, pitch, intervals, or rate of variation, we find that each one is carried to an extreme in vocal music, far higher than it reaches as the ordinary physiological result of pleasure or pain. So that song "employs and exaggerates," in a systematic combination, the "natural language of the emotions," just as poetry employs and exaggerates the natural language, not only of ideas, but also of such emotions and passions as are not too vague to pass into speech.

The same absolute correspondence with physiological phenomena exists in many of the minor peculiarities of song. The trembling of anger, fear, hope, joy, the effect of the relaxation of muscles resulting from an *extremity* of emotion,—a trembling that works upon the voice through the vocal muscles,—is idealised in that tremulousness frequently employed by singers in pathetic passages. The action of the vocal muscles which gives us *staccato* passages, expressing exhilaration, confidence, resolution, corresponds with the musculations productive of sharp, decisive, energetic movements of the frame, indicative of those states of mind. "Conversely, slurred intervals are expressive of gentler and less active feelings, and are so, because they imply the smaller muscular vivacity due to a lower mental energy." There are numerous other analogies that will be obvious without specification; and even the *rhythm* that distinguishes song from speech, and also distinguishes poetry from ordinary speech, seems to correspond with dancing and the various rhythmic motions of the body in pain, grief, or agitation. The more facts examined in this connection, the more clear it becomes that vocal music (upon which all

music is founded) is "an idealisation of the natural language of passion."

We have already noticed* the gradual manner in which music doubtless diverged from speech, as indicated in the dance-chants of savages and other analogous phenomena, such as the recitative of the early Greeks. It is now needful to remark how, in all those qualities discussed in connection with emotional and musical utterance, musical *recitative* stands midway between speech and song. "Its average effects are not so *loud* as those of song. Its tones are less sonorous in *timbre* than those of song. Commonly it . . . . uses notes neither so high nor so low in *pitch*. The *intervals* habitual to it are neither so wide nor so varied. Its *rate of variation* is not so rapid. . . . . Its primary *rhythm* is less decided," and it has none of that "secondary rhythm produced by recurrence of the same or parallel musical phrases, which is one of the marked characteristics of song."

And if *recitative* arose from emotional speech, as it doubtless did, there is no more doubt that song arose out of *recitative*.† Of this transition there is evidence in the leading gradations of an opera; for "between the comparatively level recitative of ordinary dialogue, the more varied recitative with wider intervals and higher tones used in exciting scenes, the still more musical recitative which preludes an air, and the air itself, the successive steps are but small."

To the influences which induced this development, an index must be sought in the dispositions of those individuals who were *personally* instrumental in the development, as distinguished from the radically modified *society*, already described at some length, wherein the development has taken place; and we have abundant evidences that among the members of that society, whose average sensitiveness and susceptibility have been so developed by social and political movements, musical composers have, as a rule, been pre-eminently susceptible, sensitive, of active affections. Intenser feeling producing intenser manifestations in these natures, will "generate just those exaggerations which we have found to distinguish the lower vocal music from emotional speech, and the higher vocal music from the lower; and thus we may under-

* See page 3.

† Grétry's principle that song is derived from speech through the intermediate stage of declamation, harmonises with this view, inasmuch as declamation is only a simpler, less exalted recitative,—or, if one prefers to express it otherwise, recitative is but an idealised declamation.

stand how the vast variety and complexity of musical expression arose.

For that passionate, enthusiastic temperament which "naturally leads the musical composer to express," as Mr. Spencer says, "the feelings possessed by others as well as himself, in extremer intervals and more marked cadences than they would use, also leads him to give musical utterance to feelings which they either do not experience, or experience in but slight degrees. In virtue of this general susceptibility which distinguishes him, he regards with emotion, events, scenes, conduct, character, which produce upon most men no appreciable effect. The emotions so generated, compounded as they are of the simpler emotions, are not expressible by intervals and cadences natural to these, but by combinations of such intervals and cadences: whence arise more involved musical phrases, conveying more complex, subtle, and unusual feelings. And thus we may in some measure understand how it happens that music not only so strongly excites our more familiar feelings, but also produces feelings we never had before, arouses dormant sentiments of which we had not conceived the possibility, and do not know the meaning; or, as Richter says, tells us of things we have not seen, and shall not see."

The development of song from mere recitative, through the agency of the stronger passions, corresponds perfectly with the development of lyrical from epic poetry through the same agency. Each development constitutes a further idealisation of the natural language of emotion, for lyric verse is more metaphorical, hyperbolical, and elliptical than epic verse, and has a rhythm of lines added to the rhythm of feet, while singing proper is more sonorous, louder, and more extreme in its intervals than recitative, and has a rhythm of phrases as well as a rhythm of bars. And as poetry rose to express still higher and subtler complexities of emotion in the magnificently-constructed dramas of the Greeks and of the Elizabethan era, likewise adapting itself to lofty didactic themes, so music has risen in these later times to a splendour and complexity of *expression* that seems almost infinite.

We now come to the question of *function*. Of course there are functions common to music, poetry, and the rest of the fine arts, that hardly need enumerating, such as the yielding of high and noble pleasures as distinguished from low and grovelling pleasures, or the power of importuning us with more or less definite influences for good. These influences of the arts are usually rather *less* definite than *more*, and

operate chiefly by occupying the sentient being with high thoughts, feelings, and aspirations, to the expulsion of much vileness that might otherwise find room; and the importunity of music is particularly vague, subtle, and indirect. That music is beautiful, no one denies; that it derives its beauty from its correspondence with emotional vocal phenomena, however widely it has diverged in its ramifications from exact likeness to those phenomena, no one who reads the foregoing pages need have much doubt; and that high music produces in the listener a kind of mental consonance with ideal beauty, just as the other arts do, only less apparently, is indisputable. It is thus a tremendous humanising agent in its possibilities; and the fact that it can be abused as frightfully as other humanising agents can, adds importance to this function. Just as the miscellaneous pseudo-artistic literature of our times, which is the lineal descendant of the grandest poetic literatures of all the earth, has taken upon itself a noxious, demoralising function that has grown hideously of late, so music is capable of low appeals, and makes them but too frequently. There is music with a low general tone, just as there is literature with a low general tone; and while low literature is more *definite* in its bad effects, low music is more *violent*.

But beside this general and more obvious art-function, of which Mr. Spencer does not treat, there is a function special to music, which it is the main object of his essay to make clear. We refer to the effect of music on speech in aiding the latter to develop that great variety of emotional utterance that civilised languages have, as compared with the languages of barbarous people. Mr. Spencer puts this effect forward as a hypothesis; but any reader who follows the theme with us to the end, will doubtless admit our position, that the effect may fairly be regarded as a fact. On this part of the subject we must leave Mr. Spencer to speak for himself. He says:—

"All speech is compounded of two elements, the words and the tones in which they are uttered,—the signs of ideas, and the signs of feelings. While certain articulations express the thought, certain vocal sounds express the more or less of pain or pleasure which the thought gives. Using the word *cadence* in an unusually extended sense, as comprehending all modifications of voice, we may say that *cadence is the commentary of the emotions upon the propositions of the intellect*. This duality of spoken language, though not formally recognised, is recognised in practice by every one; and every one knows that very often more weight attaches to the tones than to the words.

Daily experience supplies cases in which the same sentence of disapproval will be understood as meaning little or meaning much, according to the inflections of voice which accompany it; and daily experience supplies still more striking cases in which words and tones are in direct contradiction;—the first expressing consent, while the last express reluctance; and the last being believed rather than the first.

"These two distinct but interwoven elements of speech have been undergoing simultaneous development. We know that in the course of civilisation words have been multiplied, new parts of speech have been introduced, sentences have grown more varied and complex; and we may fairly infer that during the same time new modifications of voice have come into use, fresh intervals have been adopted, and cadences have become more elaborate. For while, on the one hand, it is absurd to suppose, that, along with the undeveloped verbal forms of barbarism, there existed a developed system of vocal inflections, it is, on the other hand, necessary to suppose that, along with the higher and more numerous verbal forms needed to convey the multiplied and complicated ideas of civilised life, there have grown up those more involved changes of voice which express the feelings proper to such ideas. If intellectual language is a growth, so also, without doubt, is emotional language a growth.

"Now the hypothesis which we have hinted above, is, that, beyond the direct pleasure which it gives, music has the indirect effect of developing this language of the emotions. Having its root, as we have endeavoured to show, in those tones, intervals, and cadences of speech which express feeling, arising by the combination and intensifying of these, and coming finally to have an embodiment of its own, music has all along been reacting upon speech, and increasing its power of rendering emotion. The use in recitative and song of inflections more expressive than ordinary ones, must from the beginning have tended to develope the ordinary ones. Familiarity with the more varied combinations of tones that occur in vocal music, can scarcely have failed to give greater variety of combination to the tones in which we utter our impressions and desires. The complex musical phrases by which composers have conveyed complex emotions, may rationally be supposed to have influenced us in making those involved cadences of conversation by which we convey our subtler thoughts and feelings. That the cultivation of music has no effect on the mind, few will be absurd enough to contend. And if it has an effect, what more natural effect is there than this of developing our perception of the meanings of inflections, qualities, and modulations of voice; and giving us a correspondingly increased power of using them? . . . . Music having its root in emotional language, and gradually evolved from it, has ever been reacting upon and further advancing it."

Now if this indirect effect of music on language is a matter of fact, it is a function not very easy to overrate; and that it

is a matter of fact there seems to be scarcely any reason for doubting. Indeed, admitting (as we do) that the use in recitative and song of inflections more expressive than ordinary ones *must*, as Mr. Spencer says, have tended to develope the ordinary ones, admitting this, one admits the existence of the function claimed for music, and further proof of its existence becomes almost superfluous. In the absence of direct and absolute evidence in support of this conclusion, attention is called to such facts as that the Italians, among whom modern music was earliest cultivated, and who have more especially practised and excelled in melody, speak in more varied and expressive inflections and cadences than any other people, and that the Scotch, accustomed to the limited range of musical expression shown in their national airs, are particularly monotonous in the intervals and modulations of their speech; that among the higher classes, with whom music as well as other agents of culture is more largely at work than amongst the lower, there is a strong contrast in regard to variety of intonation; that the gentleman speaks in more varied cadences than the clown does, and that the conversation of the servant-girl is not marked by those delicate and complex changes of voice that are used by the refined and accomplished lady. In summing up the importance of this function claimed for music, Mr. Spencer writes as follows:—

"In its bearings upon human happiness, we believe that this emotional language which musical culture developes and refines, is only second in importance to the language of the intellect, perhaps not even second to it. For these modifications of voice produced by feelings, are the means of exciting like feelings in others. Joined with gestures and expressions of face, they give life to the otherwise dead words in which the intellect utters its ideas; and so enable the hearer not only to *understand* the state of mind they accompany, but to partake of that state. In short, they are the chief media of sympathy. And if we consider how much both our general welfare and our immediate pleasures depend upon sympathy, we shall recognise the importance of whatever makes this sympathy greater. If we bear in mind that by their fellow-feeling men are led to behave justly, kindly, and considerately to each other—that the difference between the cruelty of the barbarous and the humanity of the civilised results from the increase of fellow-feeling; if we bear in mind that this faculty which makes us sharers in the joys and sorrows of others, is the basis of all the higher affections—that in friendship, love, and all domestic pleasures, it is an essential element; if we bear in mind how much our direct gratifications are intensified by sympathy,—how, at the

theatre, the concert, the picture gallery, we lose half our enjoyment if we have no one to enjoy with us; if, in short, we bear in mind that for all happiness beyond what the unfriended recluse can have, we are indebted to this same sympathy;—we shall see that the agencies which communicate it can scarcely be overrated in value. The tendency of civilisation is more and more to repress the antagonistic elements of our characters and to develope the social ones—to curb our purely selfish desires and exercise our unselfish ones—to replace private gratifications by gratifications resulting from, or involving, the happiness of others. And while, by this adaptation to the social state, the sympathetic side of our nature is being unfolded, there is simultaneously growing up a language of sympathetic intercourse—a language through which we communicate to others the happiness we feel, and are made sharers in their happiness. This double process, of which the effects are already sufficiently appreciable, must go on to an extent of which we can as yet have no adequate conception. The habitual concealment of our feelings diminishing, as it must, in proportion as our feelings become such as do not demand concealment, we may conclude that the exhibition of them will become much more vivid than we now dare allow it to be; and this implies a more expressive emotional language. At the same time, feelings of a higher and more complex kind, as yet experienced only by the cultivated few, will become general; and there will be a corresponding development of the emotional language into more involved forms. Just as there has silently grown up a language of ideas, which, rude as it at first was, now enables us to convey with precision the most subtle and complicated thoughts; so, there is still silently growing up a language of feelings, which, notwithstanding its present imperfection, we may expect will ultimately enable men vividly and completely to impress on each other all the emotions which they experience from moment to moment."

. Now, had the essay ended here, we should scarcely have found in it anything to dissent from, beyond the single line in which it is stated that the modifications of the voice are the *chief* means of sympathy—which is altogether too absolute a conclusion of the whole matter, in these days of widely-sown literature, electric telegraphs, and other influences, enabling millions of men to have one thought and one feeling in common, all over the world if need be. But the essay does not end there: it ends thus—

"Thus if, as we have endeavoured to show, it is the function of music to facilitate the development of this emotional language, we may regard music as an aid to the achievement of that higher happiness which it indistinctly shadows forth. Those vague feelings of unexperienced felicity which music arouses, those indefinite impressions of an unknown ideal life which it calls up, may be considered as a prophecy, to the fulfilment of which music is itself partly instrumental.

The strange capacity which we have for being so affected by melody and harmony, may be taken to imply both that it is within the possibilities of our nature to realise those intenser delights they dimly suggest, and that they are in some way concerned in the realisation of them. On this supposition the power and the meaning of music become comprehensible; but otherwise they are a mystery.

"We will only add, that if the probability of these corollaries be admitted, then music must take rank as the highest of the fine arts; as the one which, more than any other, ministers to human welfare. And thus, even leaving out of view the immediate gratifications it is hourly giving, we cannot too much applaud that progress of musical culture which is becoming one of the characteristics of our age."

The terms in which we have already spoken of music will sufficiently guard us from any imputation of thinking meanly of it, either as an art of pure beauty and enjoyment, or as a humanising agent;—so that we need not fear to discuss in an adverse sense the position Mr. Spencer has claimed for it in the "hierarchy of the arts," as a natural and obvious consequence from the admission of his theory of its origin and function: his theory and its corollaries we do admit, with the exception already stated; but this final deduction we do not,—and that for numerous reasons.

Supposing this golden and glorious dream of perfected emotional utterance to be fully realised,—as who shall say it may not be, and as who can do aught but earnestly wish it may?—supposing man to be in full exercise of an emotional language, adequate to the needs of his most exquisite susceptibilities, his most rapturous and intense emotions, a language whereby men might "vividly and completely impress on each other *all the emotions* which they experience from moment to moment,"—and supposing music to be, as it will if the dream be realised, largely instrumental in perfecting that language,—we must still bear in mind the fact that music will neither *be* that language nor constitute the *sole* artistic agency in its development.

Confining ourselves to the region of pure hypothesis, it is legitimate to assume that in the growth of such an ideal emotional language, poetry will take a part at least as important as that taken by music,—while as regards the component elements of the language, *poetic material must surely be assumed to preponderate over musical material.* Hitherto, as man has developed subtleties and complexities of emotion, his language has grown towards the fulfilment of his requirements in the transmutation of those subtleties and complexities into words; and in the hands of the best lyric poets we have lan-

guage shaped into forms that are hardly more dependent on formal ideas, for the effect they produce upon us, than music is. The rapturous transmutations of speech that we see in the poems of Shelley had a large effect in pushing on the development of our language; and in the matter of weaving speech into forms of almost mystic beauty, we can imagine that Mr. Swinburne, if endowed with the exquisite beneficence that softened and overflowed the negative aspect of Shelley's mind, might have carried the English language to a more superb variety of noble form than has yet been seen. As it is, he has made our tongue do things it has never done before; and it is to be for ever regretted that certain evident characteristics of his nature have curtailed his influence on English (merely regarded as language). However, Shelley's works we have; and it is beyond question that they are an advance on pre-existent English in regard to *emotional expression:* in the most characteristic poems, the rapturous fluency, the impetuous gush of lovely utterance, produce in us feelings quite apart from the conventional meaning of the words; and the power of these combinations of words must rest in the transfusion of significant sound into the fabric of those symbols of ideas which it is the primary function of words to be,—a transfusion of sound that has a subtle correspondence with those physiological facts of our being, shown to bear so intimate a relationship to music: this occult correspondence between combinations of words and phases of feeling seems to us to be quite independent of the phenomena of vocal music; and we can certainly recall passages of poetry that it has given us, in boyhood, an inexpressible delight to repeat *below the breath*, or to *read*, although the *ideas* conveyed by the words were altogether vague, and indeed, in some cases, not within our boyish comprehension. We would urge, therefore, as a primary reason for still considering poetry the first of the fine arts, even in the event of Mr. Spencer's ideal emotional language being developed with immense assistance from music, the fact that such a language, beside being more allied to poetry than to music, and shaped more directly by poets than by musicians, must consist of ideas interfused with some such element of emotion as in the most exalted poetry, rather than of those vaguer forms of expressed emotion that correspond with the very nature of music. Setting aside extraneous influence, language must surely be expected to ascend towards the needs of those who use it, and become more and more able to reduce to a currency of ideas the increasing subtleties and complexities of emotion; and the

fact that men require swift communication on matters affecting the intellect, as well as those that concern the affections and emotions, points to poetry, and not to music, as the principal agent in that increase of happiness that a perfected language would imply.

For while music, as received by the vast majority of people, deals with the feelings almost exclusively, poetry always deals largely with the intelligence also: it is already the glory of poetry that it affords men the means of ready sympathy in that exalted region of their mental being where matters of the intelligence are intimately blended with those of the feelings; and any sympathy that combines in its area the regions of the intellect and the affections must come strictly within the province of poetry and its various literary developments. The currency of precise ideas is more far-reaching than the currency of vague emotions; and while a language of such marvellously varied inflection and intonation as Mr. Spencer seems to point at could only operate on the happiness of people at large through the medium of personal communication, a language of ideas with exquisitely significant combination of words, indefinitely extended in power and beauty in the direction practically indicated by Shelley, would be a means of communication altogether independent of the distribution of individuals, and a medium of more independent communication, between one generation and another, than music can ever be. That an idea is *precise* does not by any means argue that it belongs exclusively to the logical domain of intellect; for many precise ideas are—to invert an expression of Mr. Spencer's—the comment of the intellect upon some noble aspiration or emotion, and a comment embodying that aspiration or emotion with such completeness of expression as the intellect can help the affections to.

Quitting the region of hypothesis, and the subject of what music and poetry may, in their respective spheres, accomplish, let us enter the region of pure fact, and look at what they have accomplished and do accomplish, and also at what they *are*.

First of all, let us examine this very adaptability to express intense emotions, on which so much is founded in the case of music; and one of the chief things that strike us is the over-excitement of the whole nervous system that the very noblest and most glorious music effects on persons of no extraordinary susceptibility. The direct appeal of music to the emotional nature, as distinct from the intelligence, calling that nature into unusual activity, is, if long persisted in, exhausting; and

educated men of average refinement and intelligence often come from the musical entertainment jaded and ravenously hungry. Doubtless they have been experiencing an enjoyment that is in the main noble; and an increased conformity of their higher being with ideal beauty is doubtless a result of each such entertainment; but we may admit all this, and yet hold, without inconsistency, that this nobility of enjoyment and this adjustment in the direction of ideal beauty are accompanied by a certain excitation of the animal nature, which, however small, must invalidate seriously any claim made for music to rank higher than poetry as a fine art.

The region of emotions and sensations from which music derives physiologically, and to which it returns with an indescribable, thrilling effect, can hardly be held to constitute the higher nature of man until it passes under the selecting and regulating power of the intelligence. Now, the animal instincts of man—even those that are most violent and difficult to repress—are respectable so long as they are under due control; and there is not the slightest reason for ignoring or maligning those instincts in art; but to excite them definitely or indefinitely cannot be held to be a high function of art, although it may not be in the nature of some arts to avoid altogether the possibility of doing this, in many by no means ignoble natures. It has always been understood that those who have done most for music have been men of peculiarly strong emotional nature—men whose passions were remarkably energetic; and in "passions" the most sensuous of our instincts are obviously included: on the other hand, that men who are cultured and refined, and under perfect control, become under the influence of some music of the highest class, involuntarily conscious of a certain voluptuousness, is not a hypothesis but a fact beyond all dispute. It is also a natural deduction from the physiological origin of music.

It will be readily understood how difficult it is to obtain anything approaching to trustworthy statistics on such a subject; but we are able to adduce one curious enough public confirmation of what we have just stated. Walt Whitman, who, we believe, understands both the psychical needs of the modern man and the whole range of his animal nature in an exceptional degree—who also, with certain definite aims, is the reverse of reticent in a manner quite startling in this nineteenth century—Walt Whitman, who "*believes* in the flesh and the appetites" and delights to sing "man's physiology complete from top to toe"—gives us, in connection with the

subject of music, what we believe to be an absolute truth, but cannot quote entire, even for purely scientific* purposes. Treating of sounds, in his chief poem, he says:—

"I hear the violoncello, or man's heart's complaint;
I hear the keyed cornet—it glides quickly in through my ears,
It shakes mad-sweet pangs . . . . . .
The orchestra wrenches such ardours from me, I did not know I possessed them,
It throbs me to gulps of the furthest-down horror . . . .
Leaves of Grass, Ed. 1860—61, p. 60.

In the lines which we have omitted, there is a more direct confirmation of what we have stated. We believe that passage depicts an extreme case of a phenomenon by no means uncommon in a less violent form; and, indeed, it can hardly be doubted that the origin and nature of music make it a matter of course that it should appeal to the *whole range* of the emotional and sensational being.

Such being the case, we can the more readily understand why many phases of animalism in man are largely and definitely worked upon by classes of music that cultivated people agree in condemning as low: this low music appeals too exclusively to the *lower* range of the emotions, leaving out of its programme altogether the almost devotional aspiration that the higher music blends, more or less as a matter of course, with its less exalted characteristics; and the fact that when these glorious harmonies and cadences sweep through the inmost recesses of our nature, and stir every fibre of our nervous organisation, the lower feelings are in due subordination to the higher (just as they are in a well-regulated life), suffices to keep music above all assault that could be made with the view of proving it to be other than a noble and ennobling art. The direct effect on the lower nature must in almost all cases be extremely small as compared with the direct effect on the higher nature, and cannot be condemned so long as this entire subordination subsists; but the existence of the lower effect in ever so small a degree, and more especially its existence without possible blame, serves as an almost unanswerable argument in favour of the view we espouse concerning the relative importance of music and

* We may be allowed to note in passing what seems to have been hitherto ignored—that it is from the scientific point of view, and not from the point of view of propriety or form, that the unblushing "announcements" of Walt Whitman are to be dealt with by criticism.

poetry as fine arts, as gauged by the loftiness of those attributes of our nature with which each art at its best connects itself. No great poetry stirs that part of our nature that we have been discussing: anything in literature that does so is at once, and on all hands where authority exists, condemned as low, whatever be the power brought to the creation of the work, or the technical beauties of the work itself.

These facts bear out and illustrate the æsthetic scale we referred to at the opening of the present article,—the scale of decreasing generality and increasing technicality,—that holds relation with our higher attributes in proportion to its generality and untechnicality. Poetry, at one end of the scale, is more intimately related with religion, science, and philosophy than any other art; architecture, at the other end of the scale, excels correspondingly in the intimacy of its relations with industry. Art, standing midway between philosophy and practical life, "never becomes disconnected from human interests;" but in its descent from that most general method of expression wherein it makes common cause with religion, science, and philosophy—in its ascent towards the extreme technicality wherein it makes common cause with industry—it claims relationship with attributes of our nature that are less and less high; and in the same progression it gets more and more dependent upon inorganic nature.

To give high enjoyment, to beautify, to humanise, and to soften—to thrill men with a sense of the glorious and imperishable freedom of their manhood, and to call into vivid and intensified action all the higher emotions and aspirations, are lofty parts for an art to play; but they are parts not confined to music: poetry also does all this, and adds to its *rôle* the bearing about of articulate evangels, the setting of the best thoughts in the best words: and while it has power—

> "Not only to keep down the base in man,
> But teach high thought, and amiable words
> And courtliness, and the desire of fame,
> And love of truth, *and all that makes a man*"—

it owns the supreme faculty of setting up immortal types of perfect manhood and perfect womanhood to be made the living companions of our life: in a word, it is more nobly and articulately *creative* than music is.

We do not ignore the fact that the truly modern music gave up in the hands of Beethoven, once and for all, the old tradi-

tion of sound for sound's sake, and took on that great accession of true creativeness that is implied in the existence of organic *ideas* underlying all his great works; but this development, however highly it be followed out with music isolated from poetry, can only be lyric and didactic (so to speak), and cannot come to be dramatic in the high creative kind in which poetry is dramatic. Moreover, the very fact of this development of music gives an additional proof of the supremacy of poetry; for it is poetry which supplies the ideal basis whereon this higher music is founded.

We do not intend to enter upon any discussion concerning what is known as "the music of the future;" but we may note that Richard Wagner, the prophet and practitioner of that music, abandons definitely the position of absolute independence that was practically and theoretically claimed for music until far into its modern period. The departure of music from its position of bondage to poetry was followed, in course of time, by a strange anomaly; and instead of music being used simply to heighten the effect of the drama,—as it did with the Greeks, who used their meagre music in connection with their divine choruses,—we find a later civilisation subordinating poetry altogether before the arrogant pretensions of composers who, it is true, practised an art which had already a grand development whereon to found pretensions. The Italian opera at the commencement of modern music was based upon poems (*libretti*) of the most dull and feeble order,—and this because they were written for the mere sake of adaptability to the display of sounds: this state of things had its origin in that degraded society that we referred to further back,—a society for whom the musician had but to display such an amount of technical skill as would satisfy the *virtuosi*, and create such a class of sounds as would satisfy and inflame a vapid sentimentality. That such a society was unfit for a musical drama with a real poetic basis, is evident from the one notorious fact that it had fallen to that degraded state of æsthetic cruelty which permitted of the maintenance of a class of soprano voices obtained solely by the culture of emasculated male singers;—a monstrous subordination of morals to technical art, such as must ever be the index of a rotten society, incapable of any approach to the highest æsthetic creation. As a matter of fact, the "poet" wrote for the musician, the musician often enough for the *castrato*; and the result, from a high æsthetic point of view, was as unsatisfactory as in reason it should have been; but in the development of the opera, successive masters strove more and

more against this anomaly: Glück declared uncompromisingly, that the function of the musician was to give full expression to the words of his opera; and in the present day Wagner endeavours to reconcile, more fully than any other artist has done, the two arts of poetry and music, by producing operas that are strictly dramatic in action, and founded upon a real and distinct poetic basis. We need hardly say that here the music is guided and regulated by the poetry; and, supposing an ideally perfect opera to be the highest form of music, the movement of which Wagner's is at present the fullest development is an emphatic and final restoration of the supreme position of poetry in any joint product of the two arts. If the noblest form of music is the musical drama, it is simply because of the poetic element in what is not absolute music at all. We have not space to discuss here the question between the musical drama and the symphony; but the fact that the highest representatives of modern music have seen the utter untenableness of the position assumed in the Italian opera (the principal means by which music and poetry were brought into actual collision), is another argument in favour of the parent art maintaining the first position.

Although poetry produces a less intense impression than music does, the same may be said of it as compared with the other three arts; and indeed the three arts of form, appealing to the sense of sight, produce a still more intense impression than music does, "because things seen are mightier than things heard." And, on the other hand, the impressions produced by poetry are more varied, have a grander range, than those that result from any other art; for poetry embraces every side of our existence, individual, domestic, and social; and while it, like the other arts, is more nearly related with actions and impulses than it is with thoughts, it is not excluded from treating the most abstract conceptions, to the inner beauty of which it may readily add, while improving the language wherein they are expressed. More popular, more comprehensive, more spontaneous than the other arts, it also excels in the principal distinctive characteristic of art —ideality; and idealisation must always be regarded as a higher function of art than mere expression, in the intensity of which the other arts, as we said, exceed poetry.

The superiority of music over the arts of form is a natural consequence from the supremacy of poetry; for it has a nearer kinship with the parent art than any of the others have, and approaches poetry more nearly in popularity, in comprehensiveness, in spontaneity. Science furnishes an

additional argument for its superiority, in the classification of the senses which biologists adopt: the senses arrange themselves on the principle of relative sociability; and, of the only two senses that are æsthetic, hearing, to which music appeals, thus stands higher than sight, to which painting, sculpture, and architecture appeal. More general and less technical than the arts of form, music is more intimately related with our higher attributes than they are; it depicts a less material kind of beauty than they depict, and exercises a higher influence on our moral nature.

The amount of discredit attaching to indifference to the arts, among educated people, also confirms the view we have taken of their relative importance. Shakespeare's immortal utterance on indifference to music may be applied in varying degrees to indifference concerning the other arts:—

> "The man that hath no music in himself,
> Nor is not moved with concord of sweet sounds,
> Is fit for treasons, stratagems, and spoils;
> The motions of his spirit are dull as night,
> And his affections dark as Erebus:
> Let no such man be trusted."

This is one of the most precious of the household words of the great bard,—one of the words which, dramatically and vicariously spoken, as all his words are, we can yet associate, with an extreme degree of probability, with the large personality of Shakespeare; and,

> "If music and sweet poetry agree,
> As they needs must, the sister and the brother,"—

how much more true is this relentless brand when applied to the man that hath no *poetry* in himself! Literally speaking, such a man cannot exist, because every child born inherits some of the elements of poetry; and no man who is not a villainous travesty of humanity can be unmoved by the *external* influence of poetry in some form or another, whether epic, lyric, dramatic, or in the kindred form of oratory (for it is poetry that moves us in an oration: the effect is strictly æsthetic). Shakespeare has made it an articulate reproach to a man to be obtuse in regard to music: few cultivated people care to be thought indifferent to painting; and taste, real or reputed, for sculpture and architecture are pretty widely coveted. And here we find, as a matter of course, that the discredit attaching to imperviousness to the influences of the various arts is in proportion to their generality

and untechnicality. A man has no possible excuse for disregarding the appeals of poetry, which come before him at all points of his existence, in some shape or another: disregard for music is nearly as inexcusable, because all of us are more or less within the range of its influence involuntarily. We may shut our eyes to the arts of form, but we cannot close our ears to the art of sound; and the difficulties in appreciating the arts of form increase with the amount of technical knowledge to be mastered,—the trouble of bringing oneself under the influence of the work increasing at the same time. To hear a musical composition, you *must listen*, and may have to go from one place to another; but that is all. To see a painting, you have, when brought before it, to bring the will to bear on all the muscles connected with seeing, and also to shift your position in front of it: for a statue, you have to do all this, and more, for you must go round about it: and for architecture, the same process in a much extended degree is needed.

It is true that the enjoyment of music may be much enhanced by a technical acquaintance with the processes of the art, such as gives the intellect a relish in the matter; but the major part of the enjoyment must always be independent of the higher intellectual functions; and the moral effect—the effect on the emotions—will not be at all heightened by special technical intelligence, though it will by general culture and vivacity of appreciation. In poetry, the intellectual enjoyment of technique is still less; and the chief part of the technique, prosody, is so simple that the intellect can master it, and put it in practice in a few days. This technical simplicity is the main reason why the individual can carry about so much more of a poem than he can of any other work of art: in fact, he can reproduce it all without extraneous aid, if he once knows it; and this he cannot do with any other work of art except a song, which he may sing if he have the skill.

Looking at the importance of the functions performed by music, as indicated in the foregoing pages, we ought to note that notwithstanding the immense increase, of late years, in the attention given by the public to musical entertainments, the influence of the art is particularly ill-organised. People *enjoy* music more and more every year, no doubt; and yet it does not receive its due of critical, official, or general attention. While we have a chartered Royal Academy for painting, &c., the Royal Academy of Music is without a charter, and proportionably without organisation and influence. While

the Privy Council takes cognisance of the arts of form in its Science and Art Department, it almost ignores music. Again, the rewards for the arts of form are much more justly distributed by society than are the rewards for musical composition, a good painter getting better paid than a good composer; and lastly, criticism, which is of great importance in these days, is far worse represented in the matter of music than in the matter of the arts of form. "Art criticism" consists mainly of the criticism of painting and sculpture, and this is fairly well done on the whole; but we have literally no good popular criticism of music, which seems to be quite forgotten when people talk about "art"—presumably because Mr. Mill's stricture on the popular idea of art is true: he says people mostly regard the arts as "a kind of elegant upholstery," which music clearly is too intangible to be included in. It is unfortunate that music should not be definitely included in the æsthetic programme, and especially as regards criticism, because sensationalism in music is nearly as rife and as baneful as sensationalism in literature; and a powerful and judicious criticism might do invaluable service here. The moral responsibilities of composers and musicians seem scarcely recognised, while those of other artists clearly are; and this inconsistency is absolutely indefensible.

The importance of poetry, and indeed of literature generally, is fully recognised by criticism in England: we have really an abundance of high critical literature that cannot be obscured or discredited by the still greater abundance of mere saleable "copy" that passes as critical with the reading public. Literary criticism is certainly doing much good work; but at the same time excellent productions of this class are frequently wasted on mediocre or worthless works that should, in a perfect literary economy, sink by their own weight out of sight. The critic's duties, however, will grow more absolute and be better defined when æsthetic literature itself becomes nobler and more coherent than it can possibly be in the present shaken state of society. At present, men and women at large are deplorably wanting in fixed notions of life—individual, domestic, and social: and but little art of the highest order can spring from a race deprived of such notions. More than all, the absence of a universal religion makes a universal literature impossible; and until we get accorded on this vitally important point, we may have splendid *littérateurs*, but we shall have no supreme bards, inhaling and exhaling the national life and sentiment. The *elements* of modern life are by no means incompatible with the existence of such

bards, but the want of integration is absolutely incompatible: when religion again asserts its proper sway (effects the *re-binding* that its etymology implies), we shall have grand bards again; and a superb literature will serve to carry upwards, indefinitely, all the lower arts of expression.

It will hardly be supposed that the high place we have claimed for poetry is claimed for any poets in particular, much less for the poets of the present day. We have been referring to poetry in the abstract, and as represented by the greatest poets of all ages and nations. The poets of our own day have idealised doubt, and analysis, and the critical aspect so characteristic of the present time: they have gone back upon the past and done good service in historic and romantic idealisation; and they have fetched home, from the highest places of foreign art and intellect, fine material to embody in our elegant literature: they have given dexterous piecemeal expression to many of the minor phases of modern life and thought; but when we say that *Aurora Leigh*, with its fervour of conviction and feeling, its masculine force and feminine beauty, and its serious lack of adaptability to modern requirements as a whole, is by far the nearest approach we have to a real contemporary epic poem, we indicate how far the poetry of the day is from that synergic impulse that characterises the greatest literatures. Our poets *represent* our age very well; for the age does not know its own mind, is not more accorded on fundamentals than the poets are; and, in a partially disintegrated age, each poet gets impressed with some special element of it instead of becoming powerfully imbued with the spirit of *ensemble*. When the *ensemble* again coheres and is articulate, the yearly-increasing æsthetic proclivities of modern society will provide the requisite giant-personalities to breathe forth the breath of the age's life; and perhaps our posterity may have to find some other name than poets for these men of the future.

The literatus of the reintegrated age, the man who shall speak ideally of and for a modern society, knowing its own mind, and fully accorded on matters of religion, polity, morality, practical life, must understand the meaning of his age, be familiar with its details, know its place in history, and above all, feel enthusiastically its most salient emotions and aspirations: he must be able to convey outward, in an idealised and synthesised form, without refraction of eccentric personality, this intelligence, this familiarity, this knowledge, this feeling, and vividly impress the result on the

general mind of his fellow men. To do this, he must combine great tenderness and great energy with a philosophic intellect and a poetic enthusiasm; and, just as he will be the product of an age that is already vast in its expansions and extensions, in its conquests and explorations, so the doings of his individual mind will come at length to have again what has characterised the minds of the greatest poets of foregone times—a certain correspondence with the "broad-cast doings of the day and night."

ART. II.—*William Tyndale: a Biography. A Contribution to the Early History of the English Bible.* By the Rev. R. DEMAUS, M.A. London: The Religious Tract Society.

THE English Bible has been the most important and influential book in all literature. Even its literary influence can hardly be overstated, for, more than any other book—perhaps more than all other books beside—it has contributed to the perpetuation of the strength and beauty of the English tongue among all the different offshoots of the race. The identity of the language spoken throughout the North American Continent with that which we speak at home, though doubtless maintained in part by constant commercial intercourse, is largely due to a common familiarity with the words of Scripture. Men of our own lineage, separated from the mother country by the breadth of oceans, and united in social intercourse and in political relationships with representatives of every European nationality, can nevertheless compare favourably with home-born Englishmen in the purity with which they speak and write the English tongue; and the reason is that as children they read, and that they still continue to read, the same Holy Book as we, and that their earliest and deepest impressions of the beauty and fitness of words arise unconsciously from the unequalled diction of the English Bible.

Of still greater historic importance is the political influence of the same book. It has been from the beginning the instructor of the English people in their duties and in their rights. The dissemination of the first rude version of Wycliffe awakened the movement called *Lollardie*—a movement which was crushed by the strong hand of the Lancastrian kings, only to reappear in new form and increased intensity under the Tudor and the Stuart reigns. Cromwell's stout Ironsides rode to battle with the "Souldier's Pocket Bible," a small and portable collection of extracts of Holy Scripture, "buttoned between the coat and the vest, next to the heart;" and, through all the gloomy period which preceded the Revolution of 1688, the men who fought the battle of civil and religious liberty were men who loved the Bible, and who found in it precepts for this life as well as promises of another.

And, to come to more recent times, that spirit of temperate liberty which has in these days appeared almost peculiar to our own countrymen, which has conducted us through the greatest political changes without social disturbance or danger, which cherishes the supremacy of law as jealously as it maintains the freedom of the individual, we trace confidently to the quiet influence of scriptural principles of human duties and human rights in which successive generations of Englishmen have been trained from childhood.

Of the religious influence of the English Bible this is scarcely the place to speak. "Its sound has gone forth into all lands, and its words to the end of the world;" it has pleaded with the careless, and guided the penitent to his Saviour, and strengthened the wavering in the battle of life; it has been the first teacher of little children in all things true and pure and kindly, and it has been the companion of Christian men and women in all kinds of duty and danger, and its blessed words have been their last earthly consolation on the bed of death. More widely scattered in our own day than the wildest imagination could have anticipated, accepted as the inspired Word of God by all denominations of English Christians and by all branches of the English race, it has been the greatest power for religious good the world has ever seen.

There is a sense in which the days of this hitherto unequalled version of Holy Scripture are drawing towards a close. Step by step the learned and impartial committees which represent the Biblical scholarship of England are proceeding in the great and responsible task which has been assigned them, the revision of the English Bible. The fulness of time has evidently come, and the revision now being conducted with the assistance of a greatly improved text, and with far more critical acquaintance with the languages of the original Scriptures, may perhaps give us an English Bible that shall endure as long as the language itself. But those who have felt most strongly the necessity of revision, to make the English Bible what it ought to be, and what it might fairly claim to be regarded when it was first "appointed to be read in churches," namely, the most accurate representation of the original that English scholarship could produce, have felt also how important it is to retain as far as possible the words to which we have been accustomed from childhood. Not literary taste alone, and reverence for antiquity, but an honest regard for the best interests of all Churches, and for all English-speaking families and nations, would suggest that there should be no great gulf, but an easy and natural transition, between

the Bible of King James and that which will, we trust, be given to the world under the auspices of Queen Victoria.

Everybody knows that the present version of Holy Scripture was prepared by a Commission of Divines appointed by King James I., and that, as the title-page informs us, it was "with former translations diligently compared and revised;" but everybody does not know how greatly the present version was indebted to those "former translations," and above all to one of them, the translation of *William Tyndale*. The age had been prolific in translations, or rather editions, of Holy Scripture; the King's Instructions to the Translators, while directing that the Bishops' Bible of Queen Elizabeth should be followed, and as little altered as the original would permit, mentioned no less than five others which were to be consulted; but Tyndale's version, the first of the five in order of time, the first English translation from the original tongues, had infused its spirit into the rest. As Mr. Froude eloquently says, recording the appearance of Tyndale's Bible as one of the memorable events in the history of England: "Of the translation itself, though since that time it has been many times revised and altered, we may say that it is substantially the Bible with which we are all familiar. The peculiar genius—if such a word may be permitted—which breathes through it, the mingled tenderness and majesty, the Saxon simplicity, the preternatural grandeur, unequalled, unapproached, in the attempted improvements of modern scholars, all are true, and bear the impress of the mind of one man—William Tyndale."

The story of the man who conferred so great a boon upon the English race is well worthy of preservation; and Mr. Demaus has executed his task with the fidelity, the minute and careful accuracy, and the literary taste and skill which were to be expected from the accomplished biographer of Hugh Latimer. The materials at his disposal were indeed comparatively scanty; the greater part of Tyndale's work was done in seclusion on the Continent, while the English authorities sought for him, persecuted him "unto strange cities," and burned his books as they longed to burn their author. Such a life, known in detail to few of his contemporaries, was not likely to leave materials for a perfect biography; but what has been left is sufficient to give an outline portrait of a true hero, as well as a glance into English life during the most stirring and momentous period of English history.

It appears impossible to fix with certainty either the place

or the time of William Tyndale's birth. The martyrologist Foxe, who could probably have given ample information, was satisfied to say, "He was born about the borders of Wales." Tradition has given the honour of his nativity to the county of Gloucester, which answers sufficiently to the vague description, as Monmouth was then considered to belong to Wales. A lofty monument to his memory was erected some years ago on Nibley Knott, one of the most conspicuous and beautiful of the Cotswold Hills. Mr. Demaus, however, has shown that, although Tyndale must have been born within no great distance from this spot, it was not at the place usually pointed out, the manor-house of Hunt's Court, in the village of North Nibley, but more probably in the parish of Stymbridge, near the Severn. The date, which no contemporary record has preserved, was somewhere between 1480 and 1490. About that time and place, in a quiet farmhouse in the midst of an agricultural neighbourhood, a child was born whose life and work were destined to do more than was done by any other agency without exception, in directing the progress of the English Reformation, and in forming the future character of the English people.

Although we know little of the precise circumstances of Tyndale's childhood, we have ample information of the state of things in the country and the world. His birth took place within a few years of the great battle of Bosworth Field, in which the long Wars of the Roses were ended, and the last blow was given to England's old feudal aristocracy. Perhaps ten years before, William Caxton had set up the first printing press in the Almonry of Westminster, bringing into England the infant invention which was to grow into such a gigantic power for good and evil, and which was to co-operate with other agencies of Divine Providence in causing the work of Tyndale to abide and triumph, where that of Wycliffe had almost passed away. Within the same decade the feet of Columbus stood first on the shores of the New World; and those great discoveries were begun which gave new scenes to commercial enterprise, new domains to science, and new empires to kings. The influence of these great events, however, had not reached the quiet village by the Severn shore where Tyndale spent his childhood. No part of England was more completely under the control of the clergy than that remote corner of Gloucestershire; and nowhere was there a more blind and ignorant superstition. The clergy had learned nothing from Wycliffe, and were eager to repress everywhere the spirit of inquiry which his teaching had evoked; they did

not read the Scriptures themselves, and they visited those who dared to read them with the severest penalties; but they sanctioned and directed those miserable mummeries which were degrading the ancient faith into a Fetish worship. The people kissed their thumbnails before engaging in prayer; they flung holy water at the devil; they bowed before the blood of Hailes, the sight of which was sufficient to insure eternal salvation. Being a bucolic people, whose great dependence was upon the produce of the dairy, they had a special saint to watch over churns, cream, and dairy-maids. He or she, for the sex is doubtful, was called St. White, and was propitiated by the offering of a large cheese. All these things Tyndale witnessed from his childhood; and, as his intellect gathered strength, he must have seen them with growing disgust and repugnance.

At an early age, the date again uncertain, William Tyndale was sent to Oxford, and entered in Magdalen Hall. The registers of the University unfortunately do not extend so far back as Tyndale's day, so that Oxford retains no memorial of one of her greatest sons, excepting a portrait with a laudatory inscription in the refectory of Magdalen Hall. The sole positive record of his University career is in the words of Foxe:—"At Oxford, he, by long continuance, grew and increased as well in the knowledge of tongues and other liberal arts, as specially in the knowledge of the Scriptures, whereunto his mind was singularly addicted, insomuch that he, lying there in Magdalen Hall, read privily to certain students and fellows of Magdalen College some parcel of divinity, instructing them in the knowledge and truth of the Scriptures. Whose manners, also, and conversation, being correspondent to the same, were such that all they that knew him respected and esteemed him to be a man of most virtuous disposition, and of life unspotted. Thus he, in the University of Oxford, increasing more and more in learning, and *proceeding in degrees of the schools*, spying his time, removed from thence to the University of Cambridge, where, after he had likewise made his abode a certain space, being now farther ripened in the knowledge of God's Word, leaving this University also, he resorted to one Master Walsh, a knight of Gloucestershire, and was there schoolmaster to his children, and in good favour with his master."

At Oxford Tyndale found himself in an entirely different atmosphere of religion and intellectual life. There the strife had begun. A few bold innovators had brought from the Continent, where the revival of letters was dawning, the

knowledge of the Greek language and of the Latin classical authors. Up to this time, the University had provided for its students nothing better than the barbarous jargon which fitly enshrined the subtilties of scholastic divinity, and the new teaching provoked a storm of opposition. Tyndale himself has described the contest in characteristic language:—"Remember ye not how within this thirty years and far less, and yet dureth to this day, the old barking curs, Dun's disciples [followers of Duns Scotus], and like draff called Scotists, children of darkness, raged in every pulpit against Greek, Latin, and Hebrew; and what sorrow the schoolmasters that taught the true Latin tongue had with them? Some beating the pulpit with their fists for madness, and roaring out with open and foaming mouth, that if there were but one Terence or Virgil in the world, and that same in their sleeves, and a fire before them, they would burn them therein, though it should cost them their lives, affirming that all good learning decayed and was utterly lost, since men gave them unto the Latin tongue."* There was at least equal hostility to the intelligent study of Holy Scripture as to Virgil and Terence. Indeed it may be strongly suspected that classical literature was chiefly dreaded as a step towards that Biblical research which would be fatal to ecclesiastical pretensions. The Vulgate had long been in the hands of the scholastic divines, but had not been so studied as to bring forth the truth it might have taught them. They had surrounded its plainest statements with allegorical interpretations; they had sought for expressions which might decide questions in metaphysical science, and had absolutely failed to understand its real revelation of man's sin and man's Saviour. Duns Scotus and Thomas Aquinas were more to them than Paul and John; and the quaintest and most profitless intellectual puzzle interested them more deeply than the solemn question,—"How can man be just with God?"

Now, however, the waters were troubled. The Hebrew and Greek Scriptures were in the hands of young and eager students, and Colet, afterwards Dean of St. Paul's, had been lecturing on the Pauline Epistles, reading the Apostle's words in the original, and endeavouring to discover and bring out, not a conventional interpretation, but the real meaning of the words. To us, perhaps to Romanists in our age and country, such a course of lectures would seem a very natural and ordinary incident in a Christian university, but the

* *Works*, Vol. III. p. 75.

impression produced at Oxford was extraordinary. The lecturer was young, accomplished, and eloquent. Such men as Thomas More and Erasmus delighted to hear him, and by their agency and that of others only less illustrious the fruit of Colet's expositions was scattered widely. Like his most renowned disciple, he was better qualified to point out to others the weak points of the great fortress of error, than to lead the forlorn hope to its capture; but such men as he laid the foundation of the glorious work which was afterwards accomplished by braver, and, perhaps, better men.

Such was the condition of the great University when Tyndale was entered at Magdalen Hall, and it was not long doubtful what part he was to take. He had great natural gifts for the study of other languages, as well as for the strong and graceful employment of his own. He became a master of the Greek, and, so far as his opportunities allowed, of the Hebrew also; nor did he hesitate in applying the sacred languages to their best and most important use, the study of the Original Scriptures. And after reading Scripture for himself, he was resolved to communicate to others what he had found there. We find him surrounded by a little company, not of undergraduates only, but of men of position in the University, "privily reading to certain students and fellows in Magdalen College some parcel of divinity, instructing them in the knowledge and truth of the Scriptures." The incident so graphically described suggests many thoughts. What Methodist can read of those students and fellows, without thinking of that other little company at Oxford, when John Wesley was Fellow of Lincoln, and Charles was student of Christ Church, that met and discussed the same questions out of the Scriptures, and without acknowledging the many obligations which our country owes to her ancient Universities?

From Oxford Tyndale removed to Cambridge; perhaps to be near Erasmus, who had already removed thither, and was lecturing on Greek and in the theology of the New Testament. The influence of that illustrious scholar was at this time thrown unreservedly into the scale of the Reformation. He appears to have regarded the conflict around him as simply an intellectual conflict, in which the truth must eventually triumph; he did not foresee how soon human passions would be dragged into the strife, and how the truths which he vindicated with scholarly eloquence would be vindicated by others in the agony of the martyr, until the flames in which good men died, rather than the sparks of his wit

and wisdom, should kindle a fire in England and in the world which never shall be extinguished. For the present it was a strife of words, and there the accomplished Dutchman had no rival in Europe; but the men that heard his Cambridge Lectures, such men as Bilney, and Cranmer, and Latimer, and Tyndale, were destined to act and suffer, as well as to write, and were preparing to lead the van in the great work of the Reformation in England.

Tyndale remained at Cambridge until about the year 1521, perfecting his knowledge of languages, studying more profoundly the text of Holy Scripture, and probably associating with many whose sympathy afterwards followed him in exile. The University must have been an attractive place of residence to one who was so well qualified to appreciate its literary and social advantages; but whether he found a continued residence likely to involve him in personal danger as a holder and setter-forth of heretical doctrine, or whether he was anxious to convey the truth which he had learned into some wider circle of influence, he left without seeking any preferment such as his brilliant abilities and devoted industry might have been expected to secure. M. Demaus has shown that the commonly received idea of Tyndale's having taken the vows as a Franciscan monk is founded upon misapprehension. The pupil of Erasmus had left that form of the religious life far behind him. He had read in one of the books he prized next to Scripture, that "Monkery is not piety; it is merely a manner of life which may be useful or useless, according to the temperament of body and mind of the man who adopts it; piety consists neither in food nor in dress, nor in any outward observance."* Tyndale, therefore, took no monastic vows; he entered the ranks of the secular clergy, and was ordained deacon and priest according to the ancient usage of the Church in England. Still, however, he did not undertake any cure of souls, and so place himself under direct ecclesiastical control. He returned to his own neighbourhood, and accepted the comparatively humble office of tutor and chaplain in a gentleman's household, that of Sir John Walsh, of the Manor House, Little Sodbury. Here his life might have been expected to be secure and quiet; his views of doctrine, however widely at variance with those of the clergy and laity around, might have remained unnoticed, but Tyndale's love of truth would not permit him to shrink from the avowal and defence of his opinions. At the plenti-

* Erasmus' *Enchiridion.*

ful table of the Manor House he met a constant succession of guests, and none more frequently than the beneficed clergy of the neighbourhood. The narrative of what took place on such occasions is told with great graphic power in the first edition of Foxe.

"The said Tyndale being schoolmaster to the said Master Walsh's children, and being in good favour with his master, eat most commonly at his own table, which kept a good ordinary, having resort to him many times divers great beneficed men, as abbots, deans, archdeacons, and other divers doctors and learned men. Amongst whom commonly was talk of learning, as well of Luther and Erasmus Roterodamus, as of opinions in the Scripture. The said Master Tyndale being learned, and which had been a student of divinity in Cambridge, and had therein taken degree of school, did many times therein show his mind and learning. Wherein as those men and Master Tyndale did vary in opinions and judgments, then Master Tyndale would show them on the book the places by open and manifest Scripture; the which continued for a certain season divers and sundry times, until in the continuance thereof, those great beneficed doctors waxed weary, and bore a secret grudge in their hearts against Master Tyndale."

Who can help pitying the great beneficed doctors, worried at dinner-time by this impertinent Master Tyndale?

"So, upon a time, some of those beneficed doctors had Master Walsh and the lady, his wife, at a supper or banquet, there having among them talk at will without any gainsaying; and the supper or banquet being done, and Master Walsh and the lady his wife come home, they called for Master Tyndale, and talked with him of such communication as had been where they came fro, and of their opinions. Master Tyndale thereunto made answer according to the truth of God's Word, and in reproving of their false opinions. The Lady Walsh being a stout woman, and as Tyndale did report her to be wise, being there no more but they three, Master Walsh, his wife, and Master Tyndale, 'Well,' said she, 'there was such a doctor, he may dispend two hundred pound by the year, another one hundred pound, and another three hundred pound; and what think ye, were it reason that we should believe you before them so great, learned, and beneficed men?' Master Tyndale, hearing her, gave her no answer; nor after that had but small arguments against such, for he perceived it would not help, in effect to the contrary."

There is something exceedingly quaint in the humour with which the martyrologist tells this tale of human nature three hundred and fifty years ago. The issue, however, was Tyndale's translation of Erasmus' *Enchiridion Militis Christiani* (Handbook of a Christian Soldier). Under the authority

of the famous scholar, the favourite of courts and kings, the tutor screened his own pecuniary insignificance from the contempt of Sir John and Lady Walsh, and the result was that Tyndale triumphed, and the prelates came to the Manor House no more.

Still greater offence appears to have been given by Tyndale's preaching. The children whom he was engaged to teach were still very young, and needed but little instruction from him. His leisure time was spent in preaching in the adjacent villages; he reached even the city of Bristol, then the second city in the kingdom, and preached to crowds on College-green, in the front of the old cathedral. Those who might not have cared to inquire too closely into the opinions of an able and fearless man, as long as they were held in private, or discussed with dignitaries of the Church at the table of a county magnate, were aroused to action when he began to preach them publicly. The character of Tyndale's mind, the outspoken plainness of his style in later years, will enable us easily to imagine how Tyndale preached. Though the stern sarcasm of some of his notes on the Scriptures, and the fearless denunciations of the "Practice of Prelates," belonged to a later period of his history, we cannot doubt that he was already prepared to speak in the clearest terms that the English tongue could furnish, of the abuses of priestcraft, the dishonesty of the current quotations of Scripture, and of the only way of salvation through faith in the Lord Jesus. The immediate result was a general outcry against the Reformer from the clergy of the neighbourhood, and shortly afterwards his citation before the Chancellor of the Diocese. He escaped for that time without retractation, and without punishment or formal censure, but he had received a warning which it would have been folly to disregard, and he saw that his residence in Gloucestershire must soon come to an end.

During this portion of his history, he was meditating seriously on the great work which he afterwards accomplished. By his frank intercourse with both clergy and laity he had been led to despair of establishing the truth against sophistry and tradition, and, above all, against dishonest applications of Scripture language, without placing in the hands of the people the Books of Scripture themselves, where they might study what he calls "the process, order, and meaning of the text." He brooded over his design, and saw more and more clearly how important its accomplishment would be to the work of Reformation in England. Once, as it is recorded,

the design burst from him in characteristic language. "Communing and disputing with a certain learned man, in whose company he happened to be, he drove him to that issue, that the learned man said, 'We were better to be without God's laws than the Pope's.' Master Tyndale, hearing that, answered him, 'I defy the Pope and all his laws,' and said, '*If God spare my life, ere many years, I will cause a boy that driveth the plough shall know more of the Scriptures than thou doest.*'"*

The words were in more respects than one characteristic of Tyndale; but they are peculiarly interesting also as showing the influence which a great and commanding intellect unconsciously exercises over others. Probably Tyndale, in the heat of discussion, was not thinking of Erasmus, but he was echoing in a sterner key the very language of that calmer and gentler spirit. "I would wish even all women to read the Gospel and the Epistles of St. Paul. And I wish they were translated into all languages of all people, that they might be read and known, not merely by the Scotch and the Irish, but even by the Turks and the Saracens. *I wish that the husbandman may sing parts of them at his plough*, that the weaver may warble them at his shuttle, that the traveller may, with their narratives, beguile the weariness of the way."† Erasmus' wish was father to Tyndale's thought, and when he read the New Testament in his study at Little Sodbury, it was in an edition which Erasmus had published, and which was the only one accessible at that time in Europe. Tyndale compared the Greek text with the beautiful Latin version given in connection with it, and meditated the possibility of sending forth an English translation which should open the treasury of evangelical truth to every Englishman. Ages were to pass away, and agencies which he could not anticipate were to be created and employed, before the ultimate object of Tyndale's resolution should be attained. The toil of Reformers and the deaths of martyrs, the preaching of the Puritans, the missionary work of Methodism, the gathering of children in Sunday-schools, all these were to be the agents of Divine Providence to accomplish Erasmus' gentle wish, and Tyndale's sterner purpose, to bring the Bible home to him that follows the plough.

So bold a design, so fearlessly announced, produced a still deeper impression upon the neighbouring clergy, who were prepared to take advantage of the first opportunity to deal

* *Foxe.* Edition of 1563. † Erasmus' *Paraclesis* (*Works*, Vol. IV. p. 141).

with their antagonist more effectually than on a former occasion. Tyndale received intimation of this, and was aware that he must not rely on the protection of his master, or on the influence of his own connections, against the terrible charge of heresy, if deliberately brought against him. Probably, also, he perceived that the quiet vale of Berkeley, and the stagnant life of an agricultural population, did not furnish the most suitable scene for the accomplishment of such a task as his. He needed books, and the society of educated men, and he foresaw that, as his work approached completion, he would require to be where it could be printed under his own oversight. He therefore bid farewell to Sir John and Lady Walsh, and to the Cotswold Hills and the Severn shore, and all the scenes of his childhood and youth, and like many a literary adventurer, taking with him his last literary work—a translation of an oration of Isocrates—but with a holier ambition than a mere literary adventurer ever imagined, he set out for London, where he arrived about July or August 1523.

Tyndale's hope in coming to London was to secure the patronage of Tunstal, then Bishop of London, whom he knew only as an accomplished scholar, the friend of Erasmus and Sir Thomas More. Under his protection, perhaps under his very roof, he hoped to be permitted to carry on his long meditated work. He had a letter of introduction from his master to Sir Harry Guildford, controller of the household, through whom he obtained, in due time, an interview with the prelate. As might have been expected, however, by any one better acquainted with the world than Tyndale, his reception was by no means enthusiastic; probably the Bishop of London even then found it difficult to provide as he would have wished for all the deserving men in his diocese, and felt it a little unreasonable that he should be expected to take into his house, and enrol among his chaplains, a stranger from a remote county, strongly suspected of heresy, and avowedly full of the design of translating the Scriptures into the vernacular. Renowned as he was for courtliness and hospitality, Tunstal could say nothing to Tyndale but that he had already as many priests in his household as he could entertain, and that he might easily find employment in London; and, much to Tyndale's innocent indignation, he said it in a needlessly cold and distant manner. It was not in the episcopal palace that Tyndale's translation was to be made; it was not to be introduced to the English people "by His Majesty's special command." If it had been so made and published, the his-

tory of the English Reformation might have taken another, and probably not a better course.

Disappointed of episcopal patronage, Tyndale found a friend in a London merchant—Humphrey Monmouth—then residing in the parish of Allhallows, Barking. While Tyndale was waiting for the promised interview with the Bishop, he had the opportunity of preaching several times at St. Dunstan's, then called St. Dunstan's-in-the-West; that is to say, in Fleet-street, close to Temple Bar. There Humphrey Monmouth heard him preach, and being a man of large sympathies with merit of all kinds, and especially interested in the new doctrines, he took the opportunity of conversing with him in reference to his position; inquiring, in fact, "what living he had." Tyndale acknowledged himself to be unprovided, and to be applying for the position of one of the Bishop's chaplains; and when his hopes were disappointed, he went to Monmouth again, probably by previous arrangement, and became an inmate of the merchant's house. The story is best told in Monmouth's own words, in a petition addressed to Wolsey, when he was charged with abetting the dissemination of heresy:—

"The priest came to me again and besought me to help him, and so I took him into my house half a year, and there he lived like a good priest as methought. He studied most part of the day and of the night at his book, and he would eat but sodden meat by his good will, and drink but small single beer. I never saw him wear linen about him in the space he was with me. I did promise him ten pounds sterling, to pray for my father and mother their souls, and all Christian souls. I did pay it him when he made his exchange to Hamburg, and afterwards he got of some other men ten pounds sterling more, the which he left with me. The foresaid Sir William left me an English book called *Enchiridion*, the which book the Abbess of Denneye desired it of me, and I lent it to her. . . . . When I heard My Lord of London preach at Paul's Cross that Sir William Tyndale had translated the New Testament into English, and [that it] was naughtily translated, that was the first time that ever I knew or suspected any evil by him. And shortly after, all the letters and treatises that he sent me, with divers copies of books that my servant did write, and the sermons that the priests did make at St. Dunstan's, I did burn them in my house. He that did write them did see it. I did burn them for fear of the translator more than for any ill that I knew by them."

There are one or two points in the narrative of much interest. "Sir William," to use the quaint old clerical title which reminds us so forcibly of one "Sir Hugh Evans, a Welsh parson," still delighted in the *Enchiridion* of Erasmus, and

had manuscript copies of his translation at the service of his friends. His emancipation from the superstitions of the past was not complete, for he was to receive from Monmouth 10*l.* sterling, "to pray for his father and mother their souls, and for all Christian souls." His future usefulness is suggested by his unwearied industry, and the almost ascetic purity of life which appeared conspicuously in the plentiful household of the wealthy merchant. And it is pleasant to see that Monmouth's testimony to Tyndale's blameless character is confirmed by Sir Thomas More, his most bitter and determined assailant, who admits that "before he went over the sea he was well known for a man of right good living, studious and well learned in Scripture, and looked and preached holily."

The stay of Tyndale in London was probably somewhat under a year, and the time was not ill spent. In Monmouth's house, and in association with those who resorted there, he became acquainted with the great work which had been going forward in Germany under the guidance of Luther. His books were prohibited in England; the King himself, coming forward as the champion of the Papacy, had received as his recompense the title of "Defender of the Faith," and the clergy throughout the kingdom had been induced to denounce doctrines which few of them cared to understand, as "detestable and damnable heresies." In London, however, the constant commercial intercourse with the Continent rendered it impossible to exclude the prohibited books, and in the houses of men like Monmouth they were carefully treasured and diligently read; thither, also, came men from the scene of conflict, full of the story of Luther's triumphant audacity, and as Tyndale associated with them, he was drawn more and more towards the true leader of the great Protestant movement; at the same time he was acquiring that knowledge of the secret history of his times which afterwards appeared in the *Practice of Prelates*, and he was forming friendships of the most intimate character with some who, in later days, assisted him in his work.

That great work, however, it became evident, could not be accomplished in England, for there was no prospect of obtaining episcopal patronage, or even the formal permission without which no printer dare publish it, no tradesman sell, no private person read it. The authorities of the Roman Catholic Church were fully aware that a great conflict was impending, and, according to their universal policy, they resolved to do their utmost to shut out the Books of Holy

Scripture, and to compel the laity to receive from the priests alone such statements of their teaching as they might see fit to give. But there were presses in Germany which were at least comparatively free; there were printers who would work for any employer, and merchants who would undertake to introduce into England any kind of contraband goods; and it soon appeared that the Continent was the best place, if not the only possible place, for printing the English Bible. The needful funds were provided in part by Monmouth and in part by other friends, one of the many paradoxes of the history being the fact, that Tyndale expended in the translation of the New Testament the money which he received for praying for souls in purgatory; and about the month of May 1524, having left his native country for ever, he landed at Hamburg.

Hamburg was then, as it has been since, a great and busy commercial city; but it was by no means a centre of intellectual activity, as may be gathered from the statement, that at this time the city did not possess a single printing press. It seems highly probable, therefore, that Tyndale did not long remain there, but that, according to the testimony of his contemporaries, which has been called in question without any just ground, he went forward to Wittemberg to visit Luther, and there prepared his first edition of the New Testament. If there was any place which should present peculiar attractions to Tyndale, it was the place where the Reformation had begun, and where the Gospel was now preached in its purity; and if any man on earth was worthy that the translator of the Bible into English should seek his friendship and rely on his courage and fidelity, it was the great-hearted Martin Luther.

At the same time, the influence of Luther in Tyndale's work cannot have been great. Tyndale was certainly as well acquainted with the Greek language as Luther, and none of the German divines knew anything of English; the translation, therefore, must have been his own work. The labour was severe, for grammars and lexicons were scarce and costly, and Tyndale had no superabundance of means. One difficulty he escaped, which is among the greatest in the revision now proceeding; he had only one text before him, for he had access to no manuscripts, and translated simply from the third edition of Erasmus's Greek Testament. He had before him at least two Latin versions, the Vulgate and that of Erasmus; he had also Luther's German Testament; and these appear to have been all. He engaged an amanuensis

called William Roye, who gave him some help and much annoyance; and during the lapse of a single year he accomplished the most important work of his life—he translated the New Testament.

The next undertaking was to have the translation printed, and sent into England for sale. About April 1525, Tyndale returned to Hamburg, where he received a remittance of ten pounds from Humphrey Monmouth; and from Hamburg to Cologne, where he hoped to find a printer. The place was not ill chosen, for the Book could not be printed at Hamburg, and it would have been difficult to circulate it in England with the imprint of Wittemberg. Cologne was a Catholic city, while at the same time there were printers there who knew that no books sold so well, or brought so much profit, as those prohibited by ecclesiastical authority. In Cologne, therefore, the printing of the New Testament began, and was proceeding rapidly, when the work was cut short by the interposition of the magistrates, at the suggestion of a man known as Cochlæus, Dean of the Church of the Blessed Virgin, at Frankfort. Checked, but not discouraged, Tyndale and Roye escaped from the city, carrying with them the sheets already printed, and found refuge in the Protestant city of Worms; where, at length, the work was completed, and two editions, a quarto with notes, and an octavo without note or comment, amounting together to six thousand copies of the New Testament Scriptures, were gradually smuggled over into England.

Of all these six thousand copies, not three perfect copies are known to exist. Of the three thousand quarto, all that remains is a fragment of the Gospel of St. Matthew, preserved in the Grenville Library of the British Museum; of the octavo, an imperfect copy is in the library of St. Paul's Cathedral, and a perfect one, lacking only the title-page, in that of the Baptist College at Bristol. Of course, this utter destruction is not the work of time alone; the book was proscribed, and as one copy after another fell into the hands of the priests, or was in danger of doing so, almost the whole edition eventually perished by fire. But that first edition formed the basis of the English New Testament, and its publication was an era in the history of England. Mr. Demaus enters at length into the discussion of its literary value, proving, what any person qualified to compare it with the original feels instinctively, that it cannot have been taken from the Vulgate, or from the German of Luther, but was a direct translation from the Greek; he brings overwhelming evidence of Tyndale's scholarship; and he shows how the

statement that Tyndale's version was taken from Luther's must have originated, by comparing Tyndale's quarto, printed in 1525, with Luther's folio, printed in 1522. "Tyndale's New Testament is Luther's in miniature; the general appearance of the page is the same; the arrangement of the text is the same; and the appropriation of the margins, the inner one for parallel passages, and the outer for glosses, is the same." The marginal notes, or glosses, are in large measure similar to those of Luther, and in some cases identical with them; in fact, the work was formed on the model of Luther's Testament, but the translation, while bearing marks of the care with which other versions were consulted, is emphatically Tyndale's own.

Indeed no translation of a translation, or photograph taken from a previous photograph, would have maintained its place as Tyndale's version has done. Mr. Demaus says, with as much truth as eloquence, "The English Bible has been subjected to repeated revisions; the scholarship of generations, better provided than Tyndale was with critical apparatus, has been brought to bear upon it; writers, by no means over-friendly to the original translator, have had it in their power to disparage and displace his work; yet, in spite of all these influences, the Book to which all Englishmen turn as the source, and the guide, and the stay of their spiritual life, is still substantially the translation of Tyndale." And most emphatically may it be said of those passages of the New Testament which are most intimately associated with our deepest religious emotions, that it is the actual unchanged words of the original translator which are treasured up in our hearts and are so potent in impressing the soul."

Perhaps no portions of the New Testament are more familiar, or more impressive, than the Sermon on the Mount, and the Parable of the Prodigal Son. We subjoin them as Tyndale gave them in his first edition:—

"St. Matthew vii. 7—20.

7. Ask and it shall be given you, seek and ye shall find; knock and it shall be opened unto you:

8. For whosoever asketh receiveth; and he that seeketh findeth; and to him that knocketh it shall be opened.

9. Is there any man among you which would proffer his son a stone if he asked him bread?

10. Or if he asked fish would he proffer him a serpent?

11. If ye then which are evil, can give to your children good gifts, how much more shall your Father which is in heaven give good things to them that ask of him?

12. Therefore whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, even so do ye to them; this is the law and the prophets.

13. Enter in at the strait gate, for wide is the gate and broad is the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there be which go in thereat.

14. For strait is the gate, and narrow is the way which leadeth unto life, and few there be that find it.

15. Beware of false prophets which come to you in sheep's clothing, but inwardly they are ravening wolves.

16. Ye shall know them by their fruits. Do men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of briars?

17. Even so every good tree bringeth forth good fruit; but a corrupt tree bringeth forth evil fruit.

18. A good tree cannot bring forth bad fruit, nor yet a bad tree can bring forth good fruit.

19. Every tree that bringeth not forth good fruit shall be hewn down, and cast into the fire.

20. Wherefore by their fruits ye shall know them."

"St. Luke xv. 11—24.

11. A certain man had two sons.

12. And the younger of them said to his father, Father, give me my part of the goods that to me belongeth. And he divided unto them his substance.

13. And not long after, the younger son gathered all that he had together, and took his journey into a far country, and there he wasted his goods with riotous living.

14. And when he had spent all that he had, there rose a great dearth throughout all that same land; and he began to lack.

15. And he went and clave to a citizen of that same country, which sent him to the field to keep his swine.

16. And he would fain have filled his belly with the cods that the swine ate; and no man gave him.

17. Then he remembered himself and said, How many hired servants of my father's have bread enough, and I die for hunger.

18. I will arise and go to my father, and will say unto him, Father, I have sinned against heaven and before thee.

19. Nor am I worthy to be called thy son, make me as one of thy hired servants.

20. And he arose and came to his father. When he was yet a great way off, his father saw him, and had compassion on him, and ran unto him, and fell on his neck and kissed him.

21. And the son said unto him, Father, I have sinned against heaven and in thy sight, neither am I worthy henceforth to be called thy son.

22. Then said the father to his servants, Bring forth that best garment and put it on him; and put a ring on his hand and shoes on his feet.

23. And bring hither that fatted calf, and kill him, and let us eat and be merry:
24. For this my son was dead and is alive again; he was lost and is now found."

In reading these beautiful verses, it must be remembered that the English language was in its infancy when they were written; the age of Shakespeare and Sydney, and Hooker and Raleigh, was yet to come; the capacities of the language in a literary view were unknown, until this evidence of them appeared. And yet it is not difficult to see why the language of Tyndale differs so little from the English we speak; the reason evidently is the conscientious simplicity, the absence of egotism, of pedantry, of affectation, which became the man who desired to place the true text of Holy Scripture before the English people. Tyndale's language is true English, not only in words and in grammatical structure, but in spirit; so that, though any one who strives to imitate him will find the truth of the French proverb that "there is nothing so difficult as simplicity," yet there is hardly a word or a construction which appears in the present day unnatural. If we compare his style with that of any of his contemporaries, or immediate successors, excepting, perhaps, Hugh Latimer, we find that we are studying a different language; they write English as if they thought in Latin, and as if they could not escape the inversions and involutions of a Latin style. Tyndale thinks in English, and writes as if he were addressing a congregation of Gloucestershire peasantry at Little Sodbury, and intended them all to understand him. Nor may we doubt, what our author reverently suggests, that he was indebted, and we in him, to Divine assistance. In a work so great in itself and in its bearing upon the future history of the Church of Christ in England, undertaken on the highest motives by an earnest and godly man, we may be assured that the help of the Holy Spirit was constantly implored, and that it was graciously and abundantly bestowed.

That Tyndale did not himself regard his work as perfect and infallible, he has given evidence in his addresses to the reader, both in the quarto and octavo editions. At the close of the octavo he promised that, by Divine help, he would in time to come revise the whole; that he would put out "if aught be added superfluously," and add to "if aught be overseen through negligence, and enforce to bring to compendiousness that which is now translated at the length, and to give light where it is required, . . . and will endeavour ourselves as

it were to seethe it better, and to make it more apt for the weak stomachs." The Prologue to the quarto deserves quotation, as the grave and religious address of the translator of the English Bible to all Biblical students, and to those especially who are at the present time engaged in the work he so earnestly commends to them:—

"I have here translated, brethren and sisters, most dear and tenderly beloved in Christ, the New Testament for your spiritual edifying, consolation, and solace; exhorting instantly and beseeching those that are better seen in the tongues than I, and that have higher gifts of grace to interpret the sense of the Scripture and meaning of the Spirit than I, to consider and ponder my labour, and that with the spirit of meekness. And if they perceive in any places that I have not attained the very sense of the tongue, or meaning of the Scriptures, or have not given the right English word, that they put to their hands to amend it, remembering that so is their duty to do, for we have not received the gifts of God for ourselves only, or for to hide them; but for to bestow them unto the honouring of God and Christ, and edifying of the congregation, which is the body of Christ."

Tyndale employed the gifts which had been entrusted to him, and did his work faithfully; it is the work of the scholars of this generation, with equal devotedness and fidelity to the truth, to do theirs.

The introduction of the English New Testament could not long be kept secret from the bishops and clergy; complaints were made to Wolsey, and although the great Cardinal was at first inclined to pass the matter over, saying, in the words of Pilate, "I find no fault therein," he was induced by Tunstal and others to adopt the most rigorous methods of repression. It was ordered that the books should be burned wherever they could be found; Tunstal was directed to preach at Paul's Cross, to denounce the translation as wilfully incorrect and heretical, and to burn a copy before the assembled citizens at the close of the service. Shortly afterwards an injunction was issued, first by Tunstal, and afterwards by Warham, Archbishop of Canterbury, commanding all persons in their respective dioceses to deliver up their English Testaments under pain of excommunication. Notwithstanding, such was the desire to possess the prohibited books, that they found free sale at prices which must have been at least remunerative. We read of one copy as having cost three shillings and twopence, and another, four shillings, and this at a time when the value of money was probably eight or ten times what it is in our own days. An Antwerp printer, apparently without communication with Tyndale, prepared an edition of over

2,000 copies, as a mercantile speculation; some three hundred were seized and burned through the representations of the English Ambassador, but many more escaped and found their way to London. A temporary check was sustained by the seizure of a large number of prohibited books, including many of Tyndale's Testaments, at Oxford and elsewhere, and by the apprehension of several persons guilty of dealing in them, or of having them in their possession; but, as was certain in the nature of things, the demand increased, and the influence of the book was extended by the means employed for its repression.

Up to this time Tyndale had escaped any attempt on his personal liberty, and he might probably have been left undisturbed much longer, but for the conduct of his old associate, William Roye. Tyndale had availed himself of his assistance in passing his translation through the press, both at Cologne and at Worms: but he had been compelled to part with him by his recklessness and his propensity to satire. Little was known in England, excepting by secret friends, of the men themselves, or of the connection between them; and when the secret of the authorship of the English Version of the New Testament was discovered, it was naturally concluded that the two persons who had combined in this work were united in all other literary enterprises. In opposition to the advice of Tyndale, who said "it becometh not the Lord's servant to use railing rhymes, but God's Word, which is the right weapon to slay sin, vice, and all iniquity," Roye had brought out a coarse and offensive satire on Cardinal Wolsey. The circulation of this aroused the indignation of Wolsey far more effectually than the translation of the Scriptures, or than any attack on the usages of the Church; and the powerful minister employed various agents to discover the residence of Tyndale and Roye, in order that he might induce the German authorities to hand them over to him. The search, however, was not carried on with sufficient secresy for success, and Tyndale had no difficulty in leaving Worms, and finding a refuge where Wolsey could not reach him, at Marburg, in the dominions of Philip, Landgrave of Hesse Cassel. It is probable that during Tyndale's residence at Worms he was diligently studying Hebrew. Comparatively inadequate means for the acquisition of this language had been within his reach before he left England; at Wittemberg, however, he would find both books and teachers, and at Worms a colony of Jews, with a synagogue of almost immemorial antiquity; and it would not be difficult for him to

acquire a complete mastery of the original language of the Old Testament. These studies he continued in Marburg, availing himself of any assistance which might be attainable in the university recently established; and meanwhile he wrote and published one of the most famous of his works, *The Parable of the Wicked Mammon.* The work is really a treatise on the great doctrine of the Reformation, Justification by Faith, with an examination of all the texts usually quoted as inconsistent with that doctrine. There are in the preface these bold and memorable words, in which we seem to see the very heart of the writer:—

"Some men will ask, peradventure, why I take the labour to make this work, inasmuch as they will burn it, seeing they burnt the Gospel? I answer, in burning the New Testament they did none other thing than that I looked for; *no more shall they do, if they burn me also, if it be God's will it shall so be.* Nevertheless, in translating the New Testament I did my duty, and so do I now, and will do as much more as God hath ordained me to do. And as I offered that to all men, to correct it, whosoever could, even so I do this. Whosoever, therefore, readeth this, compare it unto the Scripture. If God's Word bear record unto it, and thou also feelest in thine heart that it is so, be of good comfort, and give God thanks. If God's Word condemn it, then hold it accursed, and so do all other doctrines; as Paul counselleth his Galatians, 'Believe not every spirit suddenly, but judge them by the Word of God, which is the trial of all doctrine, and lasteth for ever. Amen.'"

The doctrine which he teaches and vindicates can hardly be expressed more clearly and eloquently than in such words as the following:—

"This is plain, and a sure conclusion, not to be doubted of, that there must be first in the heart of a man, before he do any good work, a greater and a preciouser thing than all the good works in the world, to reconcile him to God, to bring the love and favour of God to him, to make him love God again, to make him righteous and good in the sight of God, to do away his sin, to deliver him and loose him out of that captivity wherein he was conceived and born, in which he could neither love God, nor the will of God. Or else, how can he work any good work that should please God, if there were not some supernatural goodness in him, given of God freely, whereof the good work must spring? even as a sick man must first be healed, or made whole, ere he can do the deeds of a whole man; and as the blind man must first have sight given him, ere he can see; and he that hath his feet in fetters, gyves, or stocks, must first be loosed, ere he can go, walk, or run; and even as they which thou readest of in the Gospel, that they were possessed of the devils, could not laud God till the devils were cast out.

"That precious thing which must be in the heart, ere a man can work any good work, is the Word of God, which in the Gospel preacheth, proffereth, and bringeth unto all that repent and believe, the favour of God in Christ. Whosoever heareth the Word and believeth it, the same is thereby righteous, and thereby is given him the Spirit of God, which leadeth him unto all that is the will of God, and [he] is loosed from the captivity and bondage of the devil, and his heart is free to love God, and hath lust to do the will of God. Therefore it is called the word of life, the word of grace, the word of health, the word of redemption, the word of forgiveness, and the word of peace; he that heareth it not, or believeth it not, can by no means be made righteous before God. This confirmeth Peter in the fifteenth of the Acts, saying, 'that God through faith doth purify the hearts.' For of what nature soever the Word of God is, of the same nature must the hearts be which believe thereon, and cleave thereunto. Now is the Word living, pure, righteous, and true; and even so maketh it the hearts of them that believe thereon."

This is noble theology, and equally noble are some of the exhortations to practical obedience to the Divine law of Charity. He speaks with stern plainness of the unrighteous Mammon, as including not only what is wrongfully acquired, but what is wrongfully withheld from the necessity of others. But again we may allow him to speak for himself:—

"The order of love and charity, which some dream, the Gospel of Christ knoweth not of; that a man should begin at himself, and serve himself first, and then descend, I wot not by what steps. Love seeketh not her own profit (1 Cor. xiii.), but maketh a man to forget himself, and to turn his profit to another man; as Christ sought not Himself, nor His own profit, but ours. This term, myself, is not in the Gospel; neither yet father, mother, sister, brother, kinsman, that one should be preferred in love above another. But Christ is all in all things. Every Christian man to another is Christ Himself; and thy neighbour's need hath as good right in thy goods as hath Christ Himself, which is Heir and Lord over all. And look what thou owest to Christ, that thou owest to thy neighbour's need. To thy neighbour owest thou thine heart, thyself, and all that thou hast and canst do. The love that springeth out of Christ excludeth no man, neither putteth difference between one and another. In Christ we are all of one degree, without respect of persons. Notwithstanding, though a Christian's heart be open to all men, and receiveth all men, yet because that his ability of goods extendeth not so far, this provision is made, that every man shall care for his own household, as father and mother, and thine elders that have holpen thee, wife, children, and servants. If thou shouldest not care and provide for thine household, then wert thou an infidel, seeing thou hast taken on thee so to do, and forasmuch as that is thy part committed to thee of the congregation. When thou hast done thy duty to thine household, and yet hast further abun-

dance of the blessing of God, that owest thou to the poor that cannot labour, or would labour and can get no work, and are destitute of friends; to the poor, I mean, which thou knowest, to them of thine own parish. For that provision ought to be had in the congregation, that every parish care for their poor. If thy neighbours which thou knowest be served, and thou yet have superfluity, and hearest necessity to be among the brethren a thousand miles off, to them art thou debtor. Yea, to the very infidels we be debtors, if they need, as far forth as we maintain them not against Christ, or to blaspheme Christ. Thus is every man that needeth thy help thy father, mother, sister, and brother in Christ; even as every man that doth the will of the Father is father, mother, sister, and brother unto Christ.

"Moreover, if any be an infidel and a false Christian, and forsake his household, his wife, children, and such as cannot help themselves, then art thou bound, and thou have wherewith, even as much as to thine own household. And they have as good right in thy goods as thou thyself; and if thou withdraw mercy from them, and hast wherewith to help them, then art thou a thief. If thou show mercy, so dost thou thy duty, and art a faithful minister in the household of Christ; and of Christ shalt thou have thy reward and thanks. If the whole world were thine, yet hath every brother his right in thy goods; and is heir with thee, as we are all heirs with Christ."

Teachings like these must have sprung from a deep conviction of duty, and it is pleasant to find that Tyndale practised the charity which he taught. Foxe has recorded, that when in Antwerp he reserved two days in the week as days of pastime, and that on the one it was his habit to visit all English refugees in the city, and relieve their wants, and on the other to walk round about the town, "seeking out every corner and hole where he suspected any poor person to dwell, and where he found any to be well occupied and yet overburdened with children, or else aged or weak, those also he plentifully relieved; and thus he spent his two days of pastime."

Next in order appeared Tyndale's greatest and most elaborate work, *The Obedience of a Christian Man*. The Preface was evidently written after hearing of the opposition which had been shown to the circulation of the English New Testament, and of the sufferings through which some had passed for its sake. Like a faithful minister of Christ, he comforts those who were persecuted, and he argues with irresistible force on the right and duty of presenting the words of Scripture in the language of the common people. But the book itself has a peculiar interest; its design was to defend the Reformers against those who charged them with instigating sedition and rebellion against constituted authorities in the

State. Such charges had arisen from various quarters, and in some cases not without apparent cause; but Tyndale was evidently clear, not only of sedition, but of what in our own day would be regarded as the mere principles of political liberty. It inculcates absolute obedience, even to evil rulers, assuring us that "whatever is done to us by them, that doth God, whether it be good or bad." No Tudor monarch could desire a more sincere and earnest advocate of passive obedience. Then he advances another step in the argument, and shows that not the Reformers, but the Pope and the clergy, instigated men to refuse obedience to the civil power. Kings had been excommunicated by them, and whole nations laid under interdict; even now they refused to submit to the jurisdiction of the secular courts themselves, and claimed the privilege of opening sanctuaries where the most daring criminals might find refuge; and while excluding the State from interference with them, they had secured for themselves the highest offices in the State. In fact, the Papacy was a great political power, ruling with direct and absolute authority the largest, wealthiest, and most influential class in every kingdom in Europe, and by their means exercising a predominant influence on the policy of every monarch, and on the private fortunes of every individual.

"Is it not a shame," says Tyndale, "above all shames, and a monstrous thing, that no man should be found able to govern a worldly kingdom, save bishops and prelates, that have forsaken the world, and are taken out of the world, and appointed to preach the kingdom of God? To preach God's Word is too much for half a man, and to minister a temporal kingdom is too much for half a man also. Either other requireth a whole man. One, therefore, cannot well do both. He that avengeth himself in every trifle, is not meet to preach the patience of Christ, how that a man ought to forgive and to suffer all things. He that is overwhelmed with all manner of riches, and doth but seek more daily, is not meet to preach poverty. He that will obey no man, is not meet to preach how we ought to obey all men. . . . . Paul saith, 'Woe is me if I preach not.' A terrible saying, verily, for popes, cardinals, and bishops! If he had said, 'Woe be unto me if I fight not, and move princes unto war, or if I increase not St. Peter's patrimony,' as they call it, it had been a more easy saying for them."

Tyndale's subject led him to denounce the grasping ambition and covetousness of the clergy in a strain of keen invective:—

"Not given to filthy lucre, but abhorring covetousness; and as Peter saith, Taking the oversight of them, not as though ye were compelled

thereunto, but willingly; not for desire of filthy lucre, but of a good mind; not as though ye were lords over the parishes; over the parishes, quoth he! O Peter, Peter, thou wast too long a fisher; thou wast never brought up at the arches; neither wast Master of the Rolls; nor yet Chancellor of England. They are not content to reign over king and emperor, and the whole earth, but challenge authority also in heaven and in hell. It is not enough for them to reign over all that are quick, but have created them a purgatory, to reign also over the dead, and to have one kingdom more than God Himself hath. But that ye be an example to the flock, saith Peter, and when the Chief Shepherd shall appear ye shall receive an incorruptible crown of glory. This abhorring of covetousness is signified, as I suppose, by shaving and shearing of the hair, that they have no superfluity. But is not this also a false sign? Yea, verily, it is to them a remembrance to shear, and shave, to heap benefice upon benefice, promotion upon promotion, dignity upon dignity, bishopric upon bishopric, with pluralities, unions, and tot quots.

"First, by the authority of the Gospel, they that preach the Word of God in every parish, and other necessary ministers, have right to challenge an honest living like unto one of the brethren, and therewith ought to be content. Bishops and priests that preach not, or that preach aught save God's Word, are none of Christ's, nor of His anointing; but servants of the beast, whose mark they bear, whose word they preach, whose law they maintain clean against God's law, and with their false sophistry give him greater power than God ever gave to His Son Christ.

"But they, as insatiable beasts, not unmindful why they were shaven and shorn, because they will stand at no man's grace, or be in any man's danger, have gotten into their own hands, first, the tithe or tenth of all the realm; and then, I suppose, within a little, or altogether, the third foot of all the temporal lands.

"Mark well how many parsonages or vicarages are there in the realm, which, at the least, have a plowland apiece; then note the lands of bishops, abbots, priors, nuns, knights of St. John, cathedral churches, colleges, chauntries, and free chapels. For though the house fall in decay, and the ordinance of the founder be lost, yet will not they lose the lands. What cometh once in, may never move out. They make a free chapel of it; so that he which enjoyeth it shall do nought therefore. Besides all this, how many chaplains do gentlemen find at their own cost, in their houses? How many sing for souls by testaments? Then the proving of testaments, the prizing of goods, the Bishop of Canterbury's prerogative, is that not much through the realm in a year? Four offering days, and privy tithes. There is no servant, but that he shall pay somewhat of his wages. None shall receive the body of Christ at Easter, be he never so poor a beggar, or never so young a lad or maid, but they must pay somewhat for it. Then mortuaries for forgotten tithes (say they). And yet what parson or vicar is there that will forget to have a pigeon-house, to peck up some-

what both at sowing time and harvest, when corn is ripe. They will forget nothing. No man shall die in their debt, or if any man do, he shall pay it when he is dead. They will lose nothing. Why? It is God's; it is not theirs. It is St. Hubert's rents, St. Alban's lands, St. Edmond's right, St. Peter's patrimony, say they, and none of ours. Item, if a man die in another man's parish, besides that he must pay at home a mortuary for forgotten tithes, he must there pay also the best he there hath. Whether it be a horse of twenty pounds, or how good soever he be; either a chain of gold of an hundred marks, or five hundred pounds, if it so chance. Then bead-rolls. Items—Chrysomes, churchings, banns, weddings, offering at weddings, offering at buryings, offering to images, offering of wax and lights, which come to their vantage; besides the superstitious waste of wax in torches and tapers throughout the land. Then brotherhoods and pardoners. What get they also by confessions? Yea, and many enjoin penance, to give a certain sum for to have so many masses said, and desire to provide a chaplain themselves; soul masses, dirges, month minds, year minds, All Souls'-day, and trentals. The Mother Church, and the high altar, must have somewhat in every testament. Offerings at priests' first masses. Item, no man is professed of whatsoever religion it be, but he must bring somewhat. The hallowing, or rather conjuring of churches, chapels, altars, super-altars, chalice, vestments, and bells. Then book, bell, candlestick, organs, chalice, vestments, copes, altar-cloths, surplices, towels, basins, ewers, stoup, censer, and all manner ornament, must be found them freely; they will not give a mite thereunto. Last of all, what swarms of begging friars are there! The parson sheareth, the vicar shaveth, the parish priest polleth, the friar scrapeth, and the pardoner pareth; we lack but a butcher to pull off the skin.

"Let the kings put down some of their tyranny, and turn some unto a commonwealth. If the tenth part of such tyranny were given the king yearly, and laid up in the shire-towns, against the realm had need, what would it grow to in certain years? Moreover, one king, one law, is God's ordinance in every realm. Therefore ought not the king to suffer them to have a several law by themselves, and to draw his subjects thither. It is not meet, will they say, that a spiritual man should be judged of a worldly or temporal man. O abomination, see how they divide and separate themselves; if the layman be of the world, so is he not of God! If he believe in Christ, then is he a member of Christ, Christ's brother, Christ's flesh, Christ's blood, Christ's spouse, co-heir with Christ, and hath His Spirit in earnest, and is also spiritual. If they would rob us of the Spirit of God, why should they fear to rob us of worldly goods? Because thou art put in office to preach God's Word, art thou therefore no more one of the brethren? Is the Mayor of London no more one of the city, because he is the chief officer? Is the king no more of the realm because he is head thereof? The king is in the room of God, and his law is God's law, and nothing but the law of nature and natural equity, which God graved in the hearts of men. Yet, Antichrist is too good to be judged

by the law of God, he must have a new law, of his own making. It were meet, verily, that they went to no law at all. No more needed they, if they would study to preach God's Word truly, and be contented with sufficient, and to be like one of their brethren. If any question arose about the faith of the Scriptures, then let them judge by the manifest and open Scriptures, not excluding the laymen, for there are many found among the laymen which are as wise as the officers. Or else, when the officer dieth, how could we put another in his room. Wilt thou so teach twenty, thirty, forty, or fifty years, that no man shall have knowledge or judgment in God's Word save thou only? Is it not a shame that we Christians come so oft to church in vain, when he of fourscore years old knoweth no more than he that was born yesterday?"

And the book is not only an elaborate exposure and powerful denunciation of the great secular system called the Catholic Church; it is also a clear exposition of the truth before which that system must fall. It asserted the supreme authority of Scripture in the Church, the monarch in the State. It was eminently a book for the times, certain to arouse the clergy to the most terrible anger, and to expose its author to their utmost vengeance, if he should fall into their hands, and certain also to go far and wide among the laity, and to assist them to think definitely on the great political and religious problems of the age. It expressed the vague dissatisfaction of many generations, and indicated the only adequate remedy; it published and vindicated the thoughts over which others had secretly brooded. How widely the influence of this masterly book extended, we may gather from an incident quoted from Strype's *Ecclesiastical Memorials.*

"Upon the Lady Anne (Boleyn) waited a fair young gentlewoman named Mrs. Gaynsford; and in her service was also retained Mr. George Zouch, father to Sir John Zouch. This gentleman, of a comely sweet person, a Zouch indeed (Zouch—douce—sweet), was a suitor in way of marriage to the said young lady; and among other love tricks, once he plucked from her a book in English, called Tyndale's *Obedience*, which the Lady Anne had lent her to read. About which time the Cardinal had given commandment to the prelates, and especially to Dr. Sampson, Dean of the King's Chapel, that they should have a vigilant eye over all people for such books that they came not abroad; that so, as much as might be, they might not come to the King's reading. But this which he most feared fell out upon this occasion. 'For Mr. Zouch,' I use the words of the MS., 'was so ravished with the Spirit of God, speaking now as well in the heart of the reader as first it did in the heart of the maker of the book, that he was never well but when he was reading of that book. Mrs. Gaynsford wept, because she could not get the book from her wooer, and he was as ready to weep to

deliver it. But see the Providence of God: Mr. G. Zouch, standing in the chapel before Dr. Sampson, ever reading upon this book, and the Dean never having his eyes off the book in the gentleman's hand, called him to him, and then snatched the book out of his hand, asked his name, and whose man he was. And the book he delivered to the Cardinal. In the meantime the Lady Anne asketh her woman for the book, she on her knees told all the circumstances. The Lady Anne showed herself not sorry nor angry with either of the two. But said she, 'Well, it shall be the dearest book that ever the Dean or Cardinal took away.' The noble woman goes to the King, and upon her knees she desireth the King's help for her book. Upon the King's token (the royal signet probably), the book was restored. And now bringing the book to him, she besought his grace most tenderly to read it. The King did so, and delighted in the book; for, saith he, *This book is for me and all kings to read.* And in a little time the King, by the help of this virtuous lady, by the means aforesaid, had his eyes opened to the truth, to search the truth, to advance God's religion and Glory, to abhor the Pope's doctrine, his lies, his pomp, and pride, to deliver his subjects out of the Egyptian darkness, the Babylonian bonds, that the Pope had brought him and his subjects under."—Strype's *Ecclesiastical Memorials*, Vol. I. pp. 172, &c.

This singular story is sufficiently corroborated in its essential particulars by the narrative of George Wyatt, to render it certain that King Henry VIII. read the *Obedience*, and that he uttered some such royal and appreciative criticism. In fact, the book was certain to please him; the unquestioning loyalty it inculcated to the person of the monarch, would appear to him perfectly consistent with the revolt of monarch and subjects against the intolerable oppressions of the Papacy. It would be too much to imagine that the perusal had any direct influence on the monarch's future policy; the times themselves were changing; the Providence of God was leading the nation by a way which neither they nor their sovereign knew, and this book of Tyndale's was one intimation of the new spirit which was abroad. But we have still more remarkable evidence of the great influence the same book exercised, in reviving and encouraging the spirit of Protestantism in England. In the persecution which arose on the first discovery of Tyndale's New Testament, some who had been distinguished advocates of the truth had been induced to purchase a shameful safety by recantation. One of these was Bilney, of whom Latimer relates that, when he was released, he returned to Cambridge in a state of agony little short of despair; so that for two years his friends dared not leave him alone day or night. "They comforted him as they could, but no comfort would serve; and as for the comfortable places

of Scripture, to bring them to him was as though a man should run him through the heart with a sword." At length Bilney understood the only way in which that peace of conscience, which is better than life, might be restored to him. Pathetically saying to his friends that he must now "go up to Jerusalem," he set out towards London, preaching and distributing the English Testament as he went; and when he was seized and martyred, the books found in his possession were Tyndale's *Testament* and *The Obedience of a Christian Man*. Almost identical is the history of Bainham, who had also recanted, and had also been filled with the agonies of remorse, and had determined to return to the Saviour whom he had forsaken; he came the next day to St. Austin's with the New Testament in his hand, in English, and *The Obedience of a Christian Man* in his bosom; and stood up there before the people in his pew, declaring openly, with weeping tears, that he had denied God; and prayed all the people to forgive him, and to beware of his weakness, and not to do as he had done. "After this," adds the Martyrologist, "he was strengthened, and bore the cruel death by fire with remarkable courage.

Ever since Tyndale's arrival on the Continent, he had been diligently prosecuting his Hebrew studies, and his next work was the translation of the Pentateuch. The literary portion of the work was accomplished at Marburg, with the assistance of an early friend, Fryth, who had already witnessed as a confessor, and was destined not long afterwards to die as a martyr. Funds for the enterprise were provided in part by the strangely shortsighted policy of the bishops of the English Church. On a former occasion, considerable sums had been expended in buying up copies of the New Testament, with the view of stopping the supplies in England; Tunstal had long had the credit of the transaction, but Froude has shown that he was only the principal agent in carrying out a plan for which others were equally responsible, and has quoted a letter from the Bishop of Norwich to Warham, Archbishop of Canterbury, commending the design, and offering ten marks as his contribution towards the expense. It was, however, now considered necessary to obtain a large number of copies of the same book, in order that they might be burned at a great public ceremonial at Paul's Cross, in accordance with a royal proclamation recently issued. Tunstal, who had been on the Continent negotiating a treaty between England and the Emperor, returned by way of Antwerp with the view of making an extensive purchase. It

was the month of August 1529, and Tyndale, who was probably making arrangements for transmitting the "Pentateuch" to England, was in Antwerp also. It does not seem probable that any direct intercourse can have taken place between the powerful prelate—the envoy of England—and the poor priest whom he had dismissed with scanty courtesy six years before; or, indeed, that the one had any suspicion that the other was again so near him; yet a transaction took place between them by which both were gratified, though the advantage was all on the side of Tyndale:—

"Here it is to be remembered, that at this present time William Tyndale had newly translated and imprinted the New Testament in English, and the Bishop of London, not pleased with the translation thereof, debated with himself how he might compass and devise to destroy that false and erroneous translation (as he said); and so it happened that one Augustine Vackington, a merchant and mercer of London, and of a great honesty, the same time was in Antwerp, where the bishop then was, and this Vackington was a man that highly favoured Tyndale, but to the bishop, desirous to have his purpose brought to pass, communed of the New Testaments, and how gladly he would buy them; Vackington, then, hearing that [what] he wished for, said unto the bishop, 'My lord, if it be your pleasure, I can in this matter do more, I dare say, than most of the merchants of England that are here, for I know the Dutchmen and strangers that have bought them of Tyndale, and have them here to sell; so that if it be your lordship's pleasure to pay for them (for otherwise I cannot come by them, but I must disburse money for them), I will then assure you to have every book of them that is imprinted and is here unsold.' The bishop, thinking he had God by the toe, when indeed he had, as after he thought, the devil by the fist, said, 'Gentle Mr. Vackington, do your diligence and get them, and with all my heart I will pay for them whatsoever they cost you, for the books are erroneous and naught, and I intend surely to destroy them all, and to burn them at Paul's Cross.' Augustine Vackington *came to William Tyndale*, and said, 'William, I know thou art a poor man, and hast a heap of New Testaments and books by thee, for the which thou hast both endangered thy friends and beggared thyself; and I have now gotten thee a merchant, which with ready money shall despatch thee of all that thou hast, if you think it so profitable for yourself.' 'Who is the merchant?' said Tyndale. 'The Bishop of London,' said Vackington. 'Oh, that is because he will burn them,' said Tyndale. 'Yea, marry,' quoth Vackington. 'I am the gladder,' said Tyndale, 'for these two benefits shall come thereof: I shall get money to bring myself out of debt, and the whole world will cry out against the burning of God's Word; and the overplus of the money that shall remain to me, shall make me more studious to correct the said New Testament, and so newly to imprint the same once again, and I trust the second will much better like you

than ever did the first.' And so forward went the bargain; the bishop had the books, Vackington had the thanks, and Tyndale had the money."—*Hall's Chronicle* (Foxe, Vol. IV., pp. 670, &c.).

Our author has shown that there must be exaggeration and embellishment in this narrative; that Tyndale cannot have had many copies of the New Testament at that time in his possession; that there were various editions, which Antwerp printers had brought out as trading speculations, and which would equally satisfy Tunstal; and that Tyndale, as a matter of history, did not revise and reprint the New Testament until five years afterwards. But the story has undoubtedly a basis of truth; by the sale of Testaments or of other publications to Tunstal, Tyndale was provided with additional funds, and returned to Marburg to press forward his new enterprise. On the 17th of January, 1530, the translation of the Pentateuch appeared.

The work was evidently performed on the same principles and in the same spirit as the New Testament. The original language had been carefully studied, and from the original text the English version was produced; not from the German, and still less from the Latin, which, as Tyndale has showed, is far less fitted to represent the simplicity of the Hebrew than our own tongue. At the same time, careful attention has been paid to all the versions which were accessible—probably the Septuagint, and certainly the Vulgate and Luther's—and the result was eminently satisfactory. We may present one or two specimens, which will serve to show that the influence of Tyndale upon the present version of the Old Testament is as strongly marked as upon the New.

"GENESIS XXII. 4—18.

4. The third day Abraham lifted up his eyes, and saw the place afar off.

5. And said unto his young men, Bide here with the ass; I and the lad will go yonder and worship, and come again unto you.

6. And Abraham took the wood of the sacrifice, and laid it upon Isaac his son, and took fire in his hand, and a knife; and they went both of them together.

7. Then spake Isaac unto Abraham his father, and said, My father; and he answered, Here am I, my son. And he said, See, here is fire and wood, but where is the sheep for sacrifice?

8. And Abraham said, My son, God will provide him a sheep for sacrifice: so went they both together.

9. And when they came unto the place which God shewed him,

Abraham made an altar there, and dressed the wood, and bound Isaac his son, and laid him on the altar above upon the wood.

10. And Abraham stretched forth his hand, and took the knife to have killed his son.

11. Then the angel of the Lord called unto him from heaven, saying, Abraham, Abraham; and he answered, Here am I.

12. And he said, Lay not thine hands upon the child, neither do any thing at all unto him; for now I know that thou fearest God, in that thou hast not kept thine only son from me.

13. And Abraham lifted up his eyes, and looked about; and behold there was a ram caught by the horns in a thicket: and he went and took the ram, and offered him up for a sacrifice in the stead of his son."

"NUMBERS XXIV. 3—9.

3. And he took up his parable and said: Balaam the son of Beor hath said; and the man whose eye is open hath said:

4. He hath said which heareth the words of God and seeth the visions of the Almighty, which falleth down and his eyes are opened.

5. How goodly are the tents of Jacob and thine habitations, Israel,

6. Even as the broad valleys and as gardens by the river-side: as the tents which the Lord hath pitched, and as cypress-trees upon the water.

7. The water shall flow out of his bucket, and his seed shall be many waters, and his king shall be higher than Agag; and his kingdom shall be exalted.

8. God that brought him out of Egypt is as the strength of an unicorn unto him; and he shall eat the nations that are his enemies, and break their bones, and pierce them through with his arrows.

9. He coucheth himself and lay down as a lion, and as a lioness: who shall stir him up? Blessed is he that blesseth thee, and cursed is he that curseth thee."

The Pentateuch, like the quarto New Testament, was published with ample marginal notes. In the New Testament, as has been already noted, these were very largely adapted from Luther; in the Pentateuch, on the other hand, while there is much of Luther's style and spirit, there is no traceable quotation of his words. The notes are in many cases keenly, if not bitterly, sarcastic in their allusions to the claims and practices of the Romish clergy. Tyndale seems not to miss a point on which an allusion can be fixed. The note on Genesis xxiv. 60, "They blessed Rebekah," is, "To bless a man's neighbour is to pray for him and to wish him good, and not *to wag two fingers over him;*" on Exodus xxxiv. 20, "None shall appear before me empty," he says, "That is a good text for the Pope;" on Exodus xxxvi. 6, "The people were restrained from bringing," he asks, "When will the Pope

say 'Hoo' [hold], and forbid to offer for the building of St. Peter's Church? and when will our spiritualty say 'Hoo,' and forbid to give them more land, and to make more foundations? Never, verily, until they have all." Balaam asks, "How can I curse whom God hath not cursed?" and Tyndale answers in the margin, "The Pope can tell how."

Notes like these seem strangely out of place on the margin of the Holy Scriptures, and the work of Tyndale would have produced greater religious results if he had never shown this resentful spirit, for it was true then as always that "the wrath of man worketh not the righteousness of God." But those who have most closely studied the spirit of the times, who have realised what that great Mystery of Iniquity was in those days of desperate conflict with her undiminished power, who have tracked Tyndale in his life of exile, and have sympathised with him in the imprisonment, the torture, and the death of his dearest friends, will feel that it is not for them to criticise too severely the men whose heroic endurance made it possible for us to discuss these questions so calmly now.

In the course of the same year which witnessed the publication of the Pentateuch, Tyndale issued *The Practice of Prelates*. The scope of the work was chiefly political, and he has not escaped the fate of those who criticise public events from a distance, and with partial information. Wolsey had fallen; the Great Seal was in the hands of Sir Thomas More; Parliament had assembled, and had declared against the undue claims of the clergy; the Universities had been compelled to pronounce in favour of the royal divorce; in fact, the great movement had begun for which Tyndale longed and prayed. But important political changes are seldom understood while they are in progress; and Tyndale, living in Germany, without newspapers, which were an invention of the next century, and without direct intercourse with well-informed Englishmen, was not in a position to appreciate the magnitude of the coming revolution, or the earnestness of the men who were engaged in it. It appeared to him that the disgrace of Wolsey and the reform of prominent abuses were mere "Practice of Prelates," and that when certain objects had been accomplished the great Cardinal would return from York to London, that More would yield to him the Chancellorship, and all would be as it had been before. It is needless to say here how completely he was mistaken. This subject, however, led him to discuss the *practice*, that is, the cunning or artifice by which the clergy had risen to the state of gran-

dour and predominance they occupied in his day; and this was ground with which he was thoroughly familiar. With what force and fierceness he wrote, how his words would ring through England, the anger of the still powerful clergy, the wonder and expectation of the great classes that were slowly becoming Protestant, may in part be understood from the following fragment:—

"A Proper Similitude to Describe Our Holy Father.—And to see how our Holy Father came up, mark the ensample of an ivy tree. First it springeth out of the earth, and then awhile creepeth along by the ground till it find a great tree. Then it joineth itself beneath alow (below) unto the body of the tree, and creepeth up a little and a little, fair and softly. And at the beginning while it is yet thin and small, (so) that the burden is not perceived, it seemeth glorious to garnish the tree in the winter, and to bear off the tempests of the weather. But in the mean season it thrusteth roots into the bark of the tree, to hold fast withal; and ceaseth not to climb up, till it be at the top and above all. And then it sendeth his branches along by the branches of the tree, and overgroweth all, and waxeth great, heavy, and thick; and sucketh the moisture so sore out of the tree and his branches, that it choaketh and stifleth them. And then the foul, stinking ivy waxeth mighty in the stump of the tree, and becometh a seat and a nest for all unclean birds, and for blind owls, which hawk in the dark, and dare not come at the light.

"Even so the Bishop of Rome, now called Pope, at the beginning crope along upon the earth; and every man trod upon him in this world. But as soon as there came a Christian emperor, he joined himself unto his feet, and kissed them, and crope up a little with begging now this privilege, now that: now this city, now that: to find poor people withal, and the necessary ministers of God's Word. And he entitled the emperor with choosing the Pope and other bishops; and promoted in the spiritualty, not whom virtue and learning, but whom the favour of great men commended; to flatter, to get friends, and defenders withal. And the alms of the congregation, which was the food and patrimony of the poor and necessary preachers, that he called St. Peter's patrimony, St. Peter's rent, St. Peter's lands, St. Peter's right; to cast a vain fear and a heathenish superstitiousness into the hearts of men, that no man should dare meddle with whatsoever came once into their hands for fear of St. Peter, though they ministered it never so evil; and that they which should think none alms to give them any more, because they had too much already, should yet give St. Peter somewhat, as Nabuchdonesser gave his god Beel (Bel), to purchase an advocate and an intercessor of St. Peter, and that St. Peter should at the first knock let them in. And thus, with flattering and feigning, and vain superstition, under the name of St. Peter, he crept up and fastened his roots in the heart of the emperor, and with his sword clamb up above all his fellow-bishops, and brought them under

his feet. And as he subdued them with the emperor's sword, even so by subtility and help of them (after that they were sworn faithfull), he clamb above the emperor, and subdued him also, and made him stoop unto his feet, and kiss them another while. Yea, Pope Cœlestinus crowned the Emperor Henry the Fifth (Sixth), holding the crown between his feet; and when he had put the crown on he smote it off with his feet again, saying, that he had might to make emperors, and to put them down again.

"And as the Pope played with the emperor, so did his branches and his members, the bishops, play in every kingdom, dukedom, and lordship; insomuch that the very heirs of them by whom they came up, hold now their lands of them, and take them for their chief lords. And as the emperor is sworn to the Pope, even so every king is sworn to the bishops and prelates of his realm: and they are the chiefest in all parliaments; yea, they and their money, and they that be sworn to them, and come up by them, rule altogether. . . . The ivy tree, the Pope, hath under his roots throughout all Christendom, in every village, holes for foxes, and nests for unclean birds in all his branches, and promiseth unto his disciples all the promotions of the world.

"The nearer unto Christ a man cometh, the lower he must descend, and the poorer he must wax. But the nearer unto the Pope ye come, the higher ye must climb, and the more riches ye must gather, whencesoever ye can get them, to pay for your bulls, and to purchase a glorious name, and license to wear a mitre, and a cross, and a pall, and goodly ornaments."

The avowed object of the *Practice of Prelates* is to denounce the project for the divorce of the king. On this question Tyndale was at variance with many of the English Reformers, and perhaps any other man might have been induced to suppress an opinion which tended to alienate his friends, as well as to exasperate one who might prove his most formidable enemy. But if he had been capable of silence, when he believed that duty called upon him to speak plainly and aloud, William Tyndale would not have accomplished the work he did for his country.

At this point of the history it will be necessary to retrace our steps a little way. When the Prelates found that their efforts to exclude the Scriptures had been unsuccessful, and that various books advocating the principles of the Reformation were scattered in great numbers over the country, they determined to employ in the defence of the Church that powerful engine which had proved so formidable in assailing it; and they called on Sir Thomas More to take up the pen as the Champion of Romanism. He had high qualifications for the task; in literary ability and in forensic skill he had no rival in England; and from his early connection with

Colet and Erasmus he might be supposed fully acquainted with the strength of the enemy. In June 1529, while Tyndale was busy with the Pentateuch, Sir Thomas More published his celebrated *Dialogue*, in which Tyndale was assailed by name in connection with Luther, as founders of "the pestilent sect, by the tone [one] begun in Saxony, and by the tother laboured to be brought into England." The book was worthy of the reputation of its author; it was sparkling, interesting, and ingenious; it presented the stock arguments of the Papacy in the newest and most attractive forms. Of course, Tyndale had no alternative but to reply; he alluded to the book and its author in the *Practice of Prelates*, and early in 1531 he committed to the press his *Answer to Sir Thomas More*. There was no comparison between the two books; if the vivacity, the wit, the dialectic subtlety, were on one side, the strength of direct and irrefragable argument was on the other. On that other side, unfortunately, there was also considerable bitterness of personal feeling, which it was not in Tyndale's nature to suppress. He believed that More had been one of the most active agents in checking the circulation of the Word of God; he had been led to believe also that he was hired by the bishops, as Balaam was by Balak, to plead their cause in opposition to his own convictions. In the former particular Tyndale was probably right, in the latter he was certainly wrong; modern principles of controversy would have excluded all considerations of personal character as foreign to the question at issue, but such was not the practice in those days; and indeed, on many occasions, long afterwards, it has proved difficult to discuss a theological question without a personal quarrel.

Whether by force of argument or invective, Tyndale's answer was successful enough to compel More to resume his pen. He was now Lord Chancellor of England, and might have been excused from the arena of theology; but neither his own credit nor the interests of the Church would permit him to allow the controversy to rest where it was. The first part of his *Confutation* appeared early in 1532, and it was continued afterwards until it filled five hundred folio pages. In argument it is weaker than the *Dialogue*, while in personal invective it is far more violent. Upon the whole the gainer in the controversy was Tyndale, or rather Tyndale's cause; More's great literary reputation raised the character of the man who had proved not unworthy to cope with him, and tended to the establishment of doctrines which even he had not been able to overthrow. We cannot bid farewell without

sorrow to the name of Sir Thomas More, a man of acute and ready intellect, of profound learning, and of spotless integrity; a man who, misled by what he regarded as religious duty, descended to the most unworthy artifices of controversy, and persecuted to the death the witnesses for the truth; a man who died like a hero in support of a falling delusion. His monument is in Chelsea Old Church, but his epitaph is also in the page of Froude, who says "he was born to show what the Roman Catholic Religion would make of an honest man who sincerely believed it."

During the year 1531 an attempt had been made to induce Tyndale to return to England. The agent was Vaughan, a political adherent of Cromwell, who was high in the royal favour, and who must have acted in concurrence with the King. Probably the reason for this attempt was the desire to secure the assistance of his powerful advocacy in the controversies which followed the downfall of Wolsey, and which ultimately resulted in the emancipation of the country from the Papal power. The policy which had been avowed by Tyndale, in the *Obedience of a Christian Man*, was in a great measure the policy of Cromwell; and it might have been equally serviceable to the government and pleasant to Tyndale, if his long exile had been ended by his safe and honourable return. But the negotiations were broken, probably by the displeasure of the monarch at some of Tyndale's writings, the *Practice of Prelates* in particular, which had only just reached him, and they were never resumed. The persecution of the Reformers burst forth again with renewed violence; sentence was pronounced against William Tracy, guilty of promulgating heretical opinions in his will, that his body should be exhumed and cast out of consecrated ground; it was at this time also that Bilney, previously alluded to, was apprehended and burnt at Norwich; and Bayfield, found in possession of a whole cargo of Lutheran books, and known as a relapsed heretic, was also burnt. These were not times for Tyndale to return to England without some evident call of duty, and he remained upon the Continent and went on with his work, publishing in the course of the year his translation of the Book of Jonah, with a characteristic Prologue.

This was the last considerable portion of Scripture which was published by Tyndale himself, although during the brief remainder of his life he was constantly engaged upon it, and doubtless much of his work was incorporated in later editions. He brought out in rapid succession Expositions of the three Epistles of St. John and of the Sermon on the Mount. The

tone of the whole was controversial rather than exegetical; and whatever may have been the immediate impression produced, they have added nothing to Tyndale's permanent fame. There is much, however, to be said in apology for the Reformer, if he sometimes himself forgot the precept which he quoted to check the extravagance of an associate, "The servant of the Lord must not strive;" the pen was his only weapon against an antagonist who employed all the terrors of the civil power against his friends and him. While Tyndale was writing at Antwerp, the persecution was raging in England; even the hardy Cranmer had been compelled to recant; Bainham was burned in Smithfield; Tyndale's own dearest friend and fellow-labourer, John Fryth, having ventured across the Channel, was apprehended and imprisoned, and, after witnessing a good confession, died the same glorious death. To him Tyndale wrote the following letter, beautiful in its manly and Christian sympathy, and invested with peculiar interest by the fact the writer himself was so soon to pass through the same conflict in which he endeavoured to encourage his friend.

"The grace and peace of God our Father, and of Jesus Christ our Lord, be with you. Amen. Dearly beloved brother John, I have heard say that the hypocrites, now they have overcome that great business which letted them [i.e. the royal divorce], or that now they have at the least way brought it at a stay, they return to their old nature again. The will of God be fulfilled, and that [what] He hath ordained to be ere the world was made, that come, and His glory reign over all.

"Dearly beloved, howsoever the matter be, commit yourself wholly and only unto your most loving Father and most kind Lord, and fear not men that threat, nor trust men that speak fair: but trust Him that is true of promise, and able to make His word good. Your cause is Christ's Gospel, a light that must be fed with the blood of faith. The lamp must be dressed and snuffed daily, and that oil poured in every evening and morning, that the light go not out. Though we be sinners, yet is the cause right. If when we be buffeted for well-doing, we suffer patiently and endure, that is thankful with God; for to that end we are called. *For Christ also suffered for us, leaving us an example that we should follow His steps, who did no sin. Hereby have we perceived love, that He laid down His life for us: therefore we ought also to lay down our lives for the brethren. Rejoice and be glad, for great is your reward in heaven. For we suffer with Him, that we may also be glorified with Him, who shall change our vile body, that it may be fashioned like unto His glorious body. According to the working whereby He is able even to subject all things unto Him.*

"Dearly beloved, be of good courage, and comfort your soul with the

hope of this high reward, and bear the Image of Christ in your mortal body, that it may at His coming be made like to His, immortal: and follow the example of all your other dear brethren, which chose to suffer in hope of a better resurrection. Keep your conscience pure and undefiled, and say against that nothing. Stick at [*i.e.* resolutely maintain] necessary things, and remember the blasphemies of the enemies of Christ, 'they find none but that will abjure rather than suffer the extremity.' Moreover, the death of them that come again [*i.e.* repent] after they have once denied, though it be accepted with God and all that believe, yet is it not glorious; for the hypocrites say, 'He must needs die, denying helpeth not: but might it have holpen, they would have denied five hundred times: but seeing it would not help them, therefore of pure pride, and mere malice together, they speak with their mouths that [*i.e.* what] their conscience knoweth false.' If you give yourself, cast yourself, yield yourself, commit yourself wholly and only to your loving Father; then shall His power be in you and make you strong, and that so strong, that you shall feel no pain, and [in?] that shall be to another present death: and His Spirit shall speak in you, and teach you what to answer, according to His promise. He shall set out His truth by you wonderfully, and work for you above all that your heart can imagine. Yea, and you are not yet dead; though the hypocrites all, with all they can make, have sworn your death. *Una salus victis nullam sperare salutem.* To look for no man's help bringeth the help of God to them that seem to be overcome in the eyes of the hypocrites: yea, it shall make God to carry you through thick and thin for His truth's sake, in spite of all the enemies of His truth. There falleth not a hair till His hour be come: and when His hour is come, necessity carrieth us hence, though we be not willing. But if we be willing, then have we a reward and thanks.

"Fear not threatening, therefore, neither be overcome of sweet words; with which twain the hypocrites shall assail you. Neither let the persuasions of worldly wisdom bear rule in your heart; no, though they be your friends that counsel. Let Bilney be a warning to you. Let not their vizor beguile your eyes. Let not your body faint. He that endureth to the end shall be saved. If the pain be above your strength, remember, 'Whatsoever ye shall ask in My name, I will give it to you.' And pray to your Father in that name, and He will cease your pain, or shorten it. The Lord of peace, of hope, and of faith, be with you. Amen. WILLIAM TYNDALE.

"Two have suffered in Antwerp, *in die Sanctæ Crucis* [September 14], unto the great glory of the Gospel: four at Riselles, in Flanders: and at Luke hath there one at the least suffered all that same day. At Roan [*i.e.* Rouen] in France they persecute; and at Paris are five Doctors taken for the Gospel. See, you are not alone. Be cheerful: and remember that among the hard-hearted in England, there is a number reserved by grace: for whose sakes, if need be, you must be ready to suffer. Sir, if you may write, how short [soever] it be, for-

get it not; that we may know how it goeth with you, for our hearts' ease. The Lord be yet again with you, with all His plenteousness, and fill you that you flow over. Amen.

"If, when you have read this, you may send it to Adrian [or John Byrte], do, I pray you, that he may know how that our heart is with you.

"George Joy, at Candlemas, being at Barrow, printed two leaves of Genesis in a great form, and sent one copy to the King, and another to the new Queen [Anne Boleyn], with a letter to N., for to deliver them; and to purchase licence, that he might so go through all the Bible. Out of that is sprung the noise of the New Bible [report that there was to be a new translation]; and out of that is the great seeking for English books at all printers and bookbinders in Antwerp, and for an English priest that should print [*i.e.* that intended to print].

"This chanced the 9th day of May.

"Sir, your wife is well content with the will of God, and would not, for her sake, have the glory of God hindered.

WILLIAM TYNDALE." *

Tyndale himself, escaping various attempts made to seize him, and to bring him over to England to answer for his heresy, continued his residence at Antwerp. By the kindness of Thomas Poyntz, an English merchant settled there, he was furnished with a lodging in the English House—a large mansion which had been granted as a home to the English traders—where he was at least in comparative safety. Foxe has given a beautiful description of his Antwerp life, recording his two days of "pastime" in every week, which were spent, as already narrated, in active and self-denying charity, his four days of earnest literary "travail," and his Sabbath spent in reading and expounding Scripture in the merchant's chambers, the fittest Sabbath employment for one who regarded the mass as an idolatry. There he re-issued the Pentateuch, and in the year 1534 he brought out a carefully revised edition of the New Testament. The latter work had been long promised, and too long delayed; the great demand for Tyndale's Testament in England had led to its being reprinted several times by persons on the Continent entirely unconnected with him; and Dutch printers, without an English eye to correct the press, had made such a strange travesty of Tyndale's beautiful diction, that the simple reader "might ofttimes be tarried and stick;" and at last an Englishman, a former associate of Tyndale's, had given his services to an Antwerp printer, and had brought out an

* Foxe, Vol. V. pp. 15, &c.

edition with certain alterations, favouring views of his own at variance with those of the original translator. At length Tyndale's revision appeared, and presented marked improvement upon his own great work; he had introduced many thousand corrections, bringing his version in every instance nearer to the original text, and in most cases to the present version also; in other places, by careful consideration of the force of words, he had increased the perspicuity, the energy, or even the melody of the language, and entering upon the task of revision in the same spirit as that in which he worked at first, he had preserved the unity of the whole. Prologues were furnished to all the books excepting the Acts and the Apocalypse, and marginal notes, now not fiercely controversial, but expository and profitable, accompanied the text. The entire version is Tyndale's noblest monument. There is a copy now in the British Museum, beautifully printed upon vellum, with illuminations, and on the richly gilt and tooled edges may still be read, "Anna Angliæ Regina." It is evidently a presentation copy, printed for Queen Anne Boleyn, and offered to her in acknowledgment of her avowed sympathy with the Reformers.

In fact, the tide was turning in England; the time had come when it was almost equally perilous to be known as a stubborn adherent of the Papacy or as an ardent Reformer. Sir Thomas More, Tyndale's ancient antagonist, and Fisher, Bishop of Rochester, refusing to take the oath of allegiance to the King as supreme head of the Church, were imprisoned in the Tower, whence they were only to come forth to die. Cranmer, the new Archbishop of Canterbury, was known to lean towards the Reformation, and was even meditating a version of the Scriptures, to be prepared by the authorities of the Church, and to be circulated throughout the country under the sanction of the King. The great conflict between truth and error had reached a point at which it was not difficult to anticipate the ultimate issue, and Tyndale may well have hoped that his own long exile might soon come to an end, and that he might be permitted to return to finish his glorious work, and to see the triumph of his principles in his native land.

But Providence had otherwise determined, and at the very time when Tyndale's troubles and dangers seemed light in comparison with those to which he had been exposed for many years, his career was brought to a sudden close. A plan for his destruction was formed in England; an agent was sent out to denounce him as a heretic before the authorities of

Brabant; he was treacherously decoyed from his asylum in the English House, and imprisoned in the Castle of Vilvorde. It is pleasant to find evidence that the English government had no part in the transaction; the laws against heresy had evidently been broken by Tyndale, and it was only necessary for some bigoted Papist to bring the accusation, and to place the offender within their grasp; the interposition of Cromwell was absolutely in vain. In the Castle of Vilvorde he languished for sixteen months. An original letter to the governor of the castle, the only document in Tyndale's handwriting known to exist, has recently been discovered in the archives of the Council of Brabant. The illustrious prisoner requests that, if he is to remain there during the winter, he may be supplied with warmer clothing from that which had been seized with his other property at his apprehension, that he may have a candle in the evening, and, above all, that he may be permitted to have his Hebrew Bible, Hebrew Grammar, and Hebrew Dictionary. It is a letter worthy of Tyndale; pathetic in its unconscious and heroic manliness, and justifies Mr. Demaus' eloquent comparison with the letter of the aged Apostle of the Gentiles, "sending for his cloak and his books, but especially the parchments, to defend him against the damp and the tedium of his gloomy Mamertine dungeon."

So, with his Hebrew Bible, Hebrew Grammar, and Hebrew Dictionary, Tyndale, face to face with death, worked at the task to which he had devoted his life, until the sentence he had looked for so long was pronounced and executed. Bound to the stake, with faggots piled around him, but with the merciful cord around his neck, he cried with a loud voice his last prayer for his country, "Lord, open the King of England's eyes!" then the cord was tightened, and Tyndale's heroic spirit was dismissed; immediately the faggots were kindled, and the ashes of the worn and feeble body were soon mingled with the embers of the funeral pile, unrecognised save by Him who shall raise it up at the last day.

It was little more than twelve years since Tyndale left his native land, not seeking wealth or pleasure, nor avoiding persecution and danger, but determined to undertake a work for which there was no place in England. In exile and poverty, and often in hunger and cold, he had devoted his life to the production of the English Bible. His other works, powerful as they were in their influence upon his contemporaries, have passed away, but the work for which he had unequalled qualification, and doubtless a special vocation

from God, is yet mighty among the nation that he loved. The truth itself, in all its grace and power, we owe to God the Holy Ghost; the form we owe to Evangelists and Apostles, who wrote as they were moved by Him; but no mean office was entrusted to him who constructed that clear, crystalline medium, through which the light and truth have reached the English race.

As was said at the outset of this article, it is not possible to write a perfect biography of William Tyndale. The history of his daily life, his domestic habits, his intercourse with Continental Protestants, and his correspondence with England, has almost entirely disappeared. But the book before us presents the most complete and the most trustworthy record which is now attainable. It embodies the results of careful and conscientious research, and of rare critical discrimination; it rectifies the errors and misapprehensions of other biographers, with the uniform result of placing the subject of the narrative at a still higher eminence among his fellow-labourers in the Reformation in England; and it affords a most valuable contribution to the history of the English Bible.

ART. III.—*The Higher Ministry of Nature, viewed in the Light of Modern Science, and as an Aid to Advanced Christian Philosophy.* By JOHN R. LEIFCHILD, A.M. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1872.

EVERY thoughtful mind, instructed in the aspects of modern scientific speculation, and solicitous for the safety of moral and religious truth, must desire the spread of sound scientific knowledge. The recent achievements of science are so fascinating, nay, romantic, that they must needs become matters of popular interest. Their poetry, their cosmical catholicity, their almost superhuman results, invest them with a perpetual charm for all who think. But it is undeniable that a clear knowledge of the principles of science, and a consequent appreciation of the true relations of current discovery, is not possessed generally by even the most cultured classes. Hence a bare statement of formula or fact, although expressing the sublimest discovery, would, to the masses, have neither beauty nor force. To have meaning for them, it must be correlated to theory, strung upon hypothesis. This work, of necessity, fell into the hands of the speculatists in science; and thence have arisen the complexities of prevailing thought. We by no means imply dishonesty of purpose, we have strong reason to believe in the sincerity of these teachers; but we nevertheless urge that the manner in which hypothesis is made to wed fact, can be received only by those to whom, in their integrity, the data of modern science are unknown. The surest correction of these heretical speculations is a rigid knowledge of the facts; for it is not what science discloses, but the philosophy of its votaries, that threatens the foundation of religious belief.

Science proper is the exact interpretation of phenomena. It has no concern for the harmony or discord of these with the canons of either metaphysics or theology, much less with efforts to prove harmony impossible. Its work is to grasp and accumulate the facts of the universe until they axiomatically group themselves into inevitable "laws." Nature thus discloses her own meaning, and mind perceives, does not

invent, the correlations of phenomena. But profound and eager students of Nature, not content with interpreting to us the latest utterance of their great instructor, *interpolate*, tell us what they think the following sentences will be. Doubtless this has been done at times with a splendid penetration that has reflected the utmost glory upon the human intellect. Nay, there are limits within which it is invaluable. But to the audience outside themselves, which scientific men seek to reach, the interpolation and the text should be distinguished. Their separate values should be frankly given, and the suppositions should relate to sequence, not to phenomena—to laws, not to facts. But this is too much lost sight of in the brilliant speculations of our day. Data real and data hypothetical are placed side by side. There is no attempt at distinction, and the whole are marshalled at the dictates of a philosophy by means of which science negatives the possibility of all but itself! It becomes, therefore, the duty of the Christian philosopher to separate the known from the hypothetical, the real from the ideal; to disarm the ruthless theoriser, by enabling the thoughtful and truth-seeking to distinguish between what Nature has disclosed and what is merely the invention of imaginative minds; to front fearlessly the latest triumphs of research, prepared to show that these disclose profounder lessons than the highest science can reach; that Nature has a "higher ministry," without which, even after science has drawn from it its latest truth, it would be devoid of its noblest meaning. This is the object of the book before us. A timely, and, in many senses, a rich contribution to the mental necessities of our times, it is the work of a mind comprehensive in its grasp, deep in its sympathy with nature, and strong in its love of truth. Its scope is broad, embracing the physical, the metaphysical, and the metaphysiological, in their most advanced and completed forms, comprising, on the one hand, the largest questions possible to thought, and, on the other, the minutest details of the latest research. The reasoning is clear and strong; and the style, although occasionally florid, is in the main graceful and pure.

The author takes up his position under circumstances that entitle him to a fair and impartial hearing on either side. He is known to science as a writer on geological subjects whose contributions deserve the highest respect, while his right to be heard by theologians is manifest in the conservative, yet purely philosophical, spirit in which theology is treated.

With the earlier chapters we are not so immediately concerned. They conduct us naturally to the essence of the theme, reminding us of the fleeting nature of human life and experience in comparison with the enduring nature of the universe. Hence the importance of learning to the utmost what Nature has the power to teach. It is urged that Nature's ministry is twofold,—a lower and a higher, a utilitarian and an ethical. By the one she "subserves our present individual and collective interests, makes highly civilised man what he now is, and promises to make him more than he now is, and place him on the highest eminence of physical attainments."* By the other, "She serves us as a handmaid to religion, and becomes our servant in showing herself to be the servant of God." † It is confessed that they are intimately linked, but we prefer to consider that Nature has no ministry *but* the higher; that in her affluent response to man's personal needs, and in her aids to his physical elevation, as well as in her appeals to his highest mental nature, her ministry is one. It is selfishness that has broken the rhythm and unity of her teaching. Man has luxuriated in her boundless beneficence *to him*, until his mind's eye has become dull to the gentler breathings, which, through his intellect, were meant to link him with the Mind from whence all being sprang.

To those who are eager to exclude the Deity from the universe because He eludes their method, because they cannot find Him as they find an absorption-band in a stellar spectrum, of course Nature has no ministry but what is brute, no beauty that is real. But this is not philosophy, for it ignores the mental characteristics of the philosopher! It generalises with some of the largest facts omitted. It is content wholly to omit the consciousness of humanity, and to treat with contempt the necessary laws of thought. Mind everywhere is conscious of the ethical in Nature, otherwise the largest proportion of its meaning is lost. To what end the sublimity, the majesty, the glory of nature? Whence the unuttered perfection of its minutiæ, and the boundless magnificence of its whole? If Nature makes no appeal to mind, why are the purest displays of her beauty within its reach, yet defiantly and for ever beyond the grasp of unaided human vision? Why has the invisible crystal such entrancing grace of form? To what end the chasing on a diatom which it requires our highest optical aids to discover? Why

* Page 9. † Page 24.

have some of the minutest animals in nature a sculptured beauty which the most artistic conception cannot surpass? Is it not Infinite Intelligence appealing to its finite kindred? Matter is the thoughts and activities of the Unbounded Mind taking visible form. Like poetry, music, sculpture, it is a language; and to understand it a like intelligence was formed. We may engender a deafness to it, we may become specialists, we may suffer an unequal development of our nature. In studying the mere framework of creation, we may blind ourselves to its soul, as an organ may be analysed or constructed by those who have no faculty to evoke its music. But it need not be thus. Some of the most accomplished experimentalists and investigators in every department of science are not only devout students of nature, but simple and confiding Christians. We speak of what we know. Then, is not our voluntary or tolerated indifference culpable? Are we not responsible for a gift so large as that which Nature offers? This is a question to which Mr. Leifchild carefully replies:—

"The term ignorance, if strictly used, can only be applied with reference to that which may be known, for the term nescience properly expresses that which is beyond the possibility of knowledge. In truth, there can really be an ignorance only of that of which there can be a knowledge. 'The ignorance,' says Ferrier, 'which is a defect, must not be confounded with the nescience of the opposites of the necessary truth of reason; in other words, with a nescience of that which it would contradict the nature of all intelligence to know. Such nescience is no defect or imperfection—it is only the very strength or perfection of reason.'

"Ignorance which is remediable is morally culpable, and more or less culpable in proportion to the importance of the object of knowledge. Of many things we may continue ignorant which it would be of some advantage to know; of other things we may be ignorant which are of the highest moment, and if we remain voluntarily ignorant of them to the end, such ignorance is culpable in proportion to the importance of its objects.

"Now in this light ignorance of what may be learned of the Divine Being and His designs in the world around us appears to be voluntary and culpable; voluntary in proportion to the amount of light and knowledge capable of being discovered in the natural world; and culpable in proportion to the value and elevating influence of such knowledge on the mind in relation to God. Moreover, this culpableness increases in proportion to the bearing which all such knowledge has on our condition in a future state; and if we extend our ignorance voluntarily to what belongs to the state of the soul in the next life, then we become responsible for all that we may there have to endure."—Pp. 28, 29, 30.

This opens to us the whole question of knowledge—what it is possible to know, and what is "unknowable." And here, considering the importance of the question as it bears upon modern scepticism, we discover a serious defect in this treatise. The author declines to discuss it: he launches from phenomena to faith; and, in a book designed to display the reasonableness of faith in the light of modern science, we think this a deficiency. The subtilest scepticism of the age proceeds on the assumption that the reality, the absolute existence of things, is unknowable; that we can never know more than the relations subsisting between things unknown. We neither do nor can know anything but phenomena, and these but relatively. They are observed to occur unwaveringly in the same order, and our knowledge of this furnishes their "laws;" but this is all. Things, realities, we never reach. Hence the existence of mind or matter, God or self, cause final or cause efficient, lies defiantly beyond us: it can never be known. But the major difficulties which this subtle system brings with it arise from confounding the knowledge of the nature of a thing with the knowledge of its existence. We may know that a thing is without knowing what it is. To suppose that mind can confine itself to a mere succession of phenomena evinces the utmost weakness. Its fallacy is shown by the reasonings and hypotheses of the Positivists themselves. "Positive knowledge," says Herbert Spencer, "does not, never can, fill the whole region of possible thought. At the uttermost reach of discovery there arises, there must ever arise, the question, 'What lies beyond?' As it is impossible to think of a limit to space, so as to exclude the idea of space lying outside that limit, so we cannot conceive of any explanation profound enough to exclude the question, 'What is the explanation of that explanation?' Throughout all future time, as now, the human mind may occupy itself, not only with ascertained phenomena and their relations, but also with that unascertained something which phenomena and their relations imply."* Huxley admits that the term positive, when used to signify a system of thought which knows of nothing beyond observed facts, "never did exist and never will."† Thus this philosophy sets out with canons which it is compelled to admit that the common consciousness of man repudiates. Thought will not be contracted within the limits of material phenomena. As to mind:—

> "Stone walls do not a prison make,
> Nor iron bars a cage."

* *First Principles*, 16, 17. † *Lay Sermons*, 178, note.

Neither do material phenomena erect a barrier beyond which, within proper limits, it may not legitimately range. A reflection implies something reflected, and it is an immanent act of mind to refer phenomena to something. Appearance implies something appearing, and from this implied somewhat, as separately existent, the new philosophy cannot free itself. Professor Helmholtz has recently endeavoured to prove the relativity of knowledge; to show that what is axiomatic with us may be false in another sphere. We live in space of three dimensions, but we can conceive, he says, intelligent beings living and moving on the surface of a solid body, able to perceive nothing but what is on its surface, and insensible to all beyond it. Theirs would be space of two dimensions. If their surface were a plane, the axioms of Euclid would hold; if a sphere, they would not hold. The axiom that there is only one shortest line between two points would fail, for between two points diametrically opposite an infinite number of shortest lines, all of equal length, might be drawn. On an ellipsoid two triangles having their three sides equal each to each drawn on different parts of their space would not have equal angles, and so forth.* But is it not clear that this very reasoning appeals to more than the phenomena? It calls in inference, experience; something underlying the facts, and to which the facts are such. The impalpable beings on an ellipsoid must infer relations in space and number. It must be so in every walk of science. The profoundest and most exact sciences depend for their exactness, not on phenomena, but on inference—something that eludes discovery. There would never have been a geometrical demonstration to this hour, had it depended on phenomenal truth. A straight line is impossible as a fact. A circle has no existence as a phenomenon. The whole science of mechanics rests upon that on which no eye has ever looked, uniform force and rectilineal motion. Mathematics and mechanics are built up by inference—*i.e.*, by an agency denied by the modern philosophy to all knowledge! Lord Brougham affirms, "of the two existences, that of mind, as independent of matter, is more certain than that of matter apart from mind."† At least it is clear that if mind and matter be alike unknow-

* The fallacy of this reasoning Professor Jevons has clearly shown. It proves only that conditions can be conceived in which our geometry would not apply—not that the axiom and demonstrations of Euclid are false: they are true eternally, although they may not correspond to all conditions. Applicability and falsity are essentially different.

† *Nat. Theol.* 57.

able, the certitude of the one is equivalent to that of the other.

To confound me with *life* is weakness. I *possess* life; it is mine. To tell me that thought is existence, and existence thought,* is simply to contravene my consciousness. There is something beyond thought, *to* which thought is, and in which it inheres. It is *I*, myself, who am thinking. I realise myself as distinct from all within and around me; a recipient and voluntary *ego*. Thought changes, emotion changes, that which environs me changes; but my conscious self changes never. Every operation of mind proves it immutable. When reason operates, it is *to me;* when judgment is exercised, I am conscious of it as *my* judgment. They cannot be severed from the conscious self. It defies my comprehension, but I know it is there. No subtilty of reasoning can annul it. Even if it were admitted that all the activities of mind are phenomena of *matter*, they must be phenomena *to* something. They cannot be manifestations to themselves; what discovers them? If thought be mere physical impression, it is impression perceived. Otherwise, Labyrinthodon foot-prints on the Triassic rocks would be consciousness. But if thought be impression cognised, there must be something that can cognise. Chemical affinity, heat, electricity *are* these, and nothing more. They may be capable of refinements which we have not yet approached; but they can only be refinements along the line of their own nature. For ever they must affect a percipient agent to be perceived. This remains true even in the grossest materialism. If "thoughts result from the movements of matter,"† there must be that *to* which thoughts are, and *by* which they are perceived. If "thought bears the same relation to the brain as bile to the liver,"‡ the very statement involves the separate existence of the conscious *ego*. The liver is unconscious of its secretion. There is no ultimate consciousness *to* which bile is secreted, and by which it is perceived. But however mental phenomena are produced, they are to, for, and under the control of my conscious self. Indeed, we not only perceive, we create mental acts. They are subject to our volition. If thought *be* molecular change, it is under my control, and can be played upon as an instrument. So that when Professor Huxley says, "strictly speaking, the existence of a 'self' and of a 'not-self' are hypotheses by which we *account* for the facts of consciousness,"§ he makes a statement wholly

* *Lay Serm.* Huxley, 356. † Moleschott. ‡ Vogt.
§ *Lay Serm.* 359.

adverse to the experience of mankind. It carries him beyond Descartes; for him the dictum "I think, therefore I am," sufficed. Hence Huxley seeks to invest it with a new meaning. "In the first place, the 'therefore' has no business there. The 'I am' is assumed in the 'I think,' which is simply another way of saying, 'I am thinking.'"* This is neither what Descartes said nor what he meant. "Thought is—*to me*—therefore I am." "Thought is—is recognised, apprehended—therefore that which knows it, and which we call 'self,' exists;" this was his meaning. The difference between a name and an affirmation the Professor wholly neglects. Thought is a mere name. "Thought exists" is something affirmed. To suppose an affirmation with nothing to make it, is equal to supposing penetrable impenetrability. You cannot name thought until you have made an affirmation concerning it; and, therefore, the very name of thought implies the thinker. To know, is not to be knowledge, but to have it. Huxley admits the absolute existence of thought; "it cannot be doubted, for the very doubt is an existent thought." Equally certain are we that thought is *realised*. The thought is: the I perceives it; therefore both *ego* and thought are certainties. Even Mr. Mills' subtile definition of the agent cannot elude this. It is "a series of feelings, with a background of possibilities of feeling."† But we can have no series of feelings apart from that which, being distinct from the feelings, feels; any more than we can have a series of motions apart from that which moves. To describe light as a series of vibrations, simply, would be absurd. There must be *something*, the great desideratum of modern science—ether. Possibilities of feeling must be possible to somewhat. And this is not altered by changing it into a "series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future."‡ A series of magnetic currents adds nothing but number to the first of the series taken by itself. If the "series" be known as such that which is "aware" of them must be itself other than they are, and equally existent. And when Herbert Spencer seeks to invalidate this position by asking if thought must be *to* something which, perceiving it, necessarily exists; *to* what does that something exist?"§ we answer, *to itself*. Thought and consciousness are wholly different; consciousness is not such if it be not *self*-conscious.

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* *Lay Serm.* 330.
‡ *Ibid.*
† *Exam. Sir W. Hamilton's Philos.* Chap. XI.
§ *First Princip.* p. 65.

Then, is it not clear that at the very outset we have a certitude of the existence of self? Then from this we may rise to the certitude of things beyond us. I act from within outward: I am re-acted upon from without inward. We know absolutely the difference between acting and being acted on; and we know that it is to be found, not in the changes wrought, but in the *cause* of them. The certainty that my action is the result of an entity—self—leads me to an equal certainty that that which re-acts on me must exist. They are both real, the inward and the outward. When, therefore, we are told that we are conscious of phenomena, and nothing else, it is simply a sophism, and not a truth. It has not been, and cannot be, proved that they are not the appearances of the actual and the real. True, we only apprehend this reality, we do not comprehend it; but this is no negation of verity. Whence we are assured of two things—our own existence, and the existence of reality beyond us. Wherefore, so far as these things are capable of teaching us the Divine, if we do not learn it we are culpable. Our responsibility in this direction is as real as that higher responsibility pertaining to the spirit. It applies, not only to men of science who wilfully ignore it, but to Christians, who too often neglect, or even despise, the sublime revelations of Nature. As if there were conflict between the intellectual and moral features of the Godhead, they suppose themselves concerned only with the latter. But all nature is a manifestation of Deity, and, if it be good to find Him at all, it must be better to find Him to the utmost. The purest and most absolute devotion—devotion the broadest and fullest in its meaning—springs from the heart in unison at once with Nature and with Nature's God.

We are thus brought face to face with the all-important question of the existence in the universe of purpose, design, prospective harmony. Is this an entity? or is it something merely reflected *into* Nature by the mind of man? Mr. Leifchild's chapters on this subject are clear, eloquent, and well-reasoned; but they scarcely reach the limit of difficulty which the question in its modern phase presents. It is undoubtedly a truth from which we can never escape—one of the foundations of our intellectual nature—that when we see matter not only disposed in a certain order, but having perfect adaptation to the accomplishment of a clearly discoverable end, it is simply impossible to elude the conception of a designer. This is a common intuition of humanity. But the phenomenal philosophy prefers to exclude all *but*

phenomena, and therefore this immanent inference of mind is refused. But why it should be, any more than the admission of the axiom that the whole is equal to all its parts, is by no means clear. These philosophers claim that the unvarying sequence of phenomena establishes a law. But they dare not import the idea of *stability* or *necessary* sequence into it. Their philosophy affords no grounds for expecting the combining proportions of sulphate of zinc to be the same to-morrow as they are to-day. Yet they vilify their own logic; they deal with them as stable. They are constantly betrayed, both in reasoning and practice, into the assumption of something more than sequence in their conception of law. This is simply inference; the very thing objected to in relation to "design." How completely the adaptation of means to ends fastens itself upon the mind, may be seen in Mr. Darwin's own record of his exquisite studies. In spite of all efforts and all theory he finds it impossible, to avoid such expressions as "contrivance," "beautiful contrivance," &c. He is constantly abutting against arrangements that were made "purposely" and "in order to" some ulterior end.* What right, then, has science to refuse to mind its normal action? What justifies him in confining attention to mere succession, and refusing all the essential inferences of intellect? He would tell us that an adapted instrument in Nature was not intended *for* the end it answers, but that the accomplishment of that end is merely the *consequence* of its existence. But we see more than the accomplishment of the end; we perceive adaptation for this object. We cannot suppress the mental consequence of this any more than we can bring ourselves to believe that two atoms can occupy the same space at the same time.

We are told that we have no knowledge of the mind of the Infinite Designer; it lies defiantly beyond us, and therefore we cannot infer design. Then it inevitably follows that I can infer design in no being in the universe save myself! I *know* no other mind. I can only *infer* the aims of my fellow-man by his doings. All nature is a blank as to purpose; the beaver builds a dam, the bird builds a nest; beaver mind and bird mind are for ever beyond me. I have no right whatever to infer that what they have done they meant to do. Geologists find flint chips rude and polished in the drift. These show design, and it is claimed that they have had an intelligent origin, and

* Duke of Argyll's *Reign of Law.*

prove the antiquity of man. But if the teachings of current biological philosophy were true, it would be rendered possible that they might have been the product of a brute on his biological way to manhood. We know nothing of the *mind* of such a being: then, according to the positive philosophy, we have no right to attribute purpose. Will Sir J. Lubbock and Mr. Taylor close the whole question of palæolithic man because they cannot argue design? No. It is enough for them that *there is evidence of purpose;* and although they can give no proof of mind in the producer but such as that which it has produced exhibits—they see adaptation and they argue an adapter. And why not in Nature? We do not need to know the mind; we judge only from its works. Mr. Lewes says that the potentiality involved in design does not exist. There is no idea until it is accomplished! He admits that the plan of the human architect must precede the building, "because the materials have no spontaneous tendency to group themselves into houses."* But this "organic materials" have; wherefore no design is needed! But does the possession of a spontaneous tendency to group themselves explain that tendency? It is a simple *petitio principii.* What are "organic materials?" The very organism is part of the plan; the means by which the end is accomplished. He lays great stress on the fact that if the ovum of an animal is to produce a normal form, the "requisite conditions" must be observed. If not, abnormality is the issue—*i.e.* the plan is not observed; and therefore there could have been none! But would any different issue follow if the human builder did not observe the conditions imposed by the plan? The plan could never have been formed had not the designer known the conditions of existence and foreseen every modifying cause. These are parts of the plan: if you alter them you interrupt, *not the design,* but merely the circumstances which made it possible. This undoubtedly involves us in "cause;" but we need not shrink from a mental necessity, nor seek to explain it away. It is an ultimate fact. But it does not involve us of necessity in "final cause." *To us* there need be no final cause in the whole realm of nature." Put "prospective harmony" in its place, and some of the largest difficulties of modern thought would be met. With the knowledge we possess we have no right to infer *final* purpose; but we cannot avoid perceiving present adaptation. But we may interpret this falsely. Thirty years ago the sole method of

* *Hist. Philos.* Vol. I. lxxxv. Fourth Ed.

argument, inference, and generalisation in zoology was the comparison of adult forms with each other in gradational series. From this, fundamental arguments of structure were supposed to be seen, and teleological inductions were made. But the study of embryology has shown the greater part of these to be false. What was claimed as the ultimate end of an organ is shown not to be so; and because of this the whole argument of design is treated with contempt. But in reality all that is needed is to go further back with the argument, as the anatomist has gone further back for his facts. One of the profoundest embryologists living is W. K. Parker, F.R.S. His recent labours enrich the records of the Royal Society, and are a monument to the powers of mind. We are not concerned with his theory—he believes that creation was progressive and developmental—we are concerned alone with his facts. He says:—"As far as we know at present, the life of each individual of a high type is a repetition of the evolutional progress in the ascent and modification of the vertebrate forms from the beginning."* And, after a laborious examination of the skull of the common fowl *down* through each successive stage to the very earliest, he says, "I seemed to myself to have been endeavouring to decipher a *palimpsest:* and one not erased and written upon again just once, but five or six times over."

"Having erased, as it were, the characters of the culminating type—those of the gaudy Indian bird—I seemed to be amongst the sombre grouse; and then towards incubation the characters of the sand-grouse and hemipod stood out before me. Rubbing these away in my *downward* work, the form of the tinamou looked me in the face; then the aberrant ostrich seemed to be described in large archaic characters; a little while and these faded into what could just be read off as pertaining to the sea-turtle; while underlying the whole, the fish in its simplest myxinoid† form could be traced in morphological hieroglyphics."‡ But is there no teleology in this region? After speaking of the wonderful adaptation of one of the facial arches§ in humming birds and woodpeckers, he says, "we will study *form* free from all final purpose, bias and preconception; but a new and delightful phase of teleology will set in when the laws of form have been mastered;"‖

* *Monthly Microscopical Journal*, Vol. VII. p. 97.
† *Hagfish.* ‡ *Philos. Trans.* 1870, pp. 803, 804.
§ Arches in the embryo head out of which the skull, face, jaws and hyoid are formed. ‖ *Monthly Jour. R.M.S.* Vol. VI. p. 213.

and, remarking on the way in which these embryonic arches are "gently specialised for life function," he says, "it was the first pair that most struck me with the beautiful prospective harmony between morphology and final purpose."† Now let Mr. Lewes speak, whose determined opposition to revealed religion is as constant as it is fierce. He says: "What rational interpretation (on the supposition of a creative plan) can be given to the succession of phases each embryo is forced to pass through? [The reader] will observe that none of these phases have *any adaptation* to the future state of the animal, but are in positive contradiction to it; or are simply purposeless. Many of these have no adaptation even to the embryonic state."‡ Such utterances are to be reprobated in the strongest manner; they are false. There is not a shred of science in them. The most accomplished living embryologist shall attest. "The highest type—the human—passes through every stage of morphological structure seen in the series beneath: it does not stop at these stages; it does not utilise, so to say, the incipient structures that are ready to be used, but runs rapidly along its own line, *choosing, as it were, and refusing,* until at length the perfect man is attained. Yet this perfection of parts, this production of a creature who in his lowest attributes is the 'paragon of animals,' is not brought about irrelatively to the rest of the creation; it is merely an *elective consummation* of all that is *highest and best* in morphological structure. Does this exclude teleology, or the fitness of every part to other parts, and to the rest of the world? I think not.§" Precisely so: an elective consummation of all that is highest and best. Whether you accept development or direct creation, you cannot strike design out of this. You push it further back; you make it more profound. Nor does it involve man's evolution from a lower form. We refuse on logical grounds to admit that the ape was our progenitor. What was valuable in the ape and in all below him was "elected" by the Great Creator in the structure of our frame. The reason why there is a graduated similarity of structure in all vertebrates, is that they have similar work to perform. The law of "least action"—that of accomplishing the desired end by the most perfect means, is *the* law of nature. So far as the *same end* was to be answered in any vertebrate, it would be accomplished by the same means.

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* *Monthly Jour.* R.M.S., Vol. VI. p. 213.
† Mr. Darwin's Hypothesis, *Fortnightly Review*, 1868.
‡ *Microscopical Journal*, Vol. V. p. 204.

Hence there must be uniformity of skeletal structure. The skeleton of an ape is pre-eminently adapted to its work. So is that of man. What is common to both is essential, for it does work in common. There is no reason for the inference, that, because the cranial bones of a monkey bear a morphological resemblance to those of man, therefore the one gave birth to the other. But we do see that modern embryology finds itself anticipated in the song of the Psalmist:—

> "Thine eyes did see my substance *yet being imperfect*,
> And in thy book *all my members were written*,
> Which in *continuance* were fashioned,
> When as yet there was *none of them*."*

When none of my members as a human being were formed, they were in the Divine Mind—fashioned in continuance of preceding forms—"Elective Consummation," leading us to perceive that the exquisite adaptation in our whole being proves us "fearfully and wonderfully *made*."

We have been led to this course of reasoning, because it involves the subtilest questions which modern biology presents; and those least understood. And it is a phase of the argument not discussed by Mr. Leifchild. But we earnestly recommend our readers to make themselves acquainted with the masterly and eloquent pages which he has written on this subject. So far as they reach, they prove that purpose and prevision are everywhere visible in nature. Wherefore, reaching from effect to cause, we arrive, at length, at a First Cause. Arguing from phenomena to the realities they enfold, we come to the boundless Power that gave them being. Passing up through the forces of the universe, we are led at last to the Omnipotent *will-force* that directs them all. While inferring, from the infinite harmonies of the Cosmos, the perfect adjustment of its parts to their purpose, and the agreement of each with the whole, we perceive that that from whence it was all derived must have been One Infinite Mind; and all this affords us the ennobling promise of an ever-widening grasp of His Boundless Nature.

But at the very threshold Philosophy meets us, and declares the Godhead inscrutable to the human mind. If there be a God, we cannot know Him. The Infinite, the Absolute, are concepts that bristle with contradictions and become impossible to thought. Mr. Leifchild challenges the reasoning on which this inference is based, and disputes, chiefly with the acknowledged weapons of others, the entire question. It is shown

* Ps. cxxxix. 16.

that the high reputation of Sir W. Hamilton gave wide currency to this view, and that its adoption and specific expansion by Dr. Mansel, although nobly meant, was ill-founded.

One of the devices of Philosophy most to be dreaded is the assertion of ignorance with the assumption of knowledge. This may always be premised when it is asserted that we must necessarily employ words of whose meaning we know *nothing*; for this is purely an assumption. They are positive concepts, or their constant employment would be impossible. In spite of affirmed ignorance the most complete, both Hamilton and Mansel define both "Absolute" and "Infinite." "By Absolute is meant that which exists in and by itself, having no necessary relation to any other being." It is "that which is aloof from relation, comparison, limitation, condition, dependence, &c." Now to suppose such a conception knowable in its fulness, would be absurd. We know not in what it inheres. It is a concept merely, not an entity. Whoever distinguishes the universe from God; whoever separates the vast concatenation of matter from its Creator, must submit that by the very production of being other than His own, He has chosen to condition Himself:—to place Himself in relation. For this reason *The* Infinite, *The* Absolute cannot be conceived by us. That which our minds embrace is an Absolute and Infinite *Being*. Because I exist and *know* that I am not God, therefore the Creator is conditioned. He is beyond my comprehension, but I must know *something* of Him, or the conception of His existence would never have arisen within me. It could have had no place in my mind. To assert that we cannot know Him is to know something concerning Him.

If by The Absolute we mean The All,—the ideal everything that is or may be,—of course we cannot approach it: it teems with contradictions to us. Even consciousness could not attach to it, for this would condition it. But, we repeat, this is a mere abstraction, not the perception of an objective existence. It is utterly unlike what *must* be our concept of the Infinite *God*. We attach a perfect meaning to the word infinite; although it is an idea which it is impossible to complete. We do not merely mean by it the unknown; and the something we do mean profoundly interests us. Indeed, we can *only* mean by it that which extends beyond all we know or can think of, and then still further. The limit can always be made to recede before us, but only by a succession of mental shapes. If it be objected, that this confounds the

indefinite with the infinite, the answer is, that the indefinite is something of which we cannot affirm whether it extends beyond some conceivable limit or not: the infinite is that of which we can say it extends beyond all conceivable limits. Thus the idea infinite, is distinguished from all other conceptions, and the Infinite God becomes a definite object of knowledge. It must ever be limited, but it is clear. We cannot explain; we can conceive. We do not comprehend; we apprehend.

Thus, then, the Infinite Source of the universe is accessible to the mind. But can He be a Person? Infinitude and Personality are declared contradictory and unthinkable. It is said the one is conditioned, the other not. "Yet, as distinct Creator, he must of necessity be a separate personality. If we refuse personality to Him, we relapse into Pantheism; if we doubt His infinity, He ceases to be the Creator, in not being co-extensive with creation."* "What love can we cherish for an impersonal, universal substance? Before we can feel human love for God, we must surely apprehend Him as love personified."† Nevertheless, our author has no logical support for this claim. He implies that personality is an attribute of a being having mind and body. "If we affirm that God is incorporeal, we seem at the same time to affirm that He is impersonal! ... We know that the Infinite Mind transcends the limits of any finite personality;"‡ and he seeks simply to apologise for the doctrine by an appeal to "a refined and elevated consciousness." Yet he admits that "it may be wholly indescribable in human language, without being inconceivable by human thought."§ We affirm, that there is nothing more inconceivable in a Personal Infinite than in an Infinite alone. Omnipresence does not nullify personality. Space is no *necessary* concomitant of our conception of presence. We can conceive ourselves a thousand times as large as now; if so, why not a million times? Why not any size we please? Size is a mere accident to personality. A body as large as the universe involves no negation of it. At what point will it become incongruous between this and infinity? Again, what is personality or personal presence in ourselves? Is it in every part of the body, or limited to a region? Is its "position" a mathematical point in the brain, or a certain cubic space? The very question shows, that what we mean by personality is not position, limitation —but immediate control over the contents of any space. If

* P. 131. † P. 140. ‡ P. 145. § P. 141.

I could separate the metals from the earths in Jupiter, or work machinery by the water-courses in Mars, although my body remained on the earth, I should be as personally present there as here. Position is a secondary matter, involving the whole question of space and time. Personality destroys The Absolute, The All; but the same may be said of wisdom or truth. But our concept of the Infinite God is no more destructive of personality than it is of purity or power. He is the Great Will of the Universe, and the only idea of will we *can* have is, that it is the will of a person. Thus reason heralds faith, and faith opens to our higher nature the supremest object of its love.

Having reached this point, intellectual schemes explanatory of the universe and its cause are considered; and the Mathematical Pantheism of Spinoza is placed beside the Monadology of Leibnitz. The former presents us with a God who is the Infinite Substance of which bodies and souls are merely the modes. God and the universe are one. Separation between them is an abstract effort. Material forms are not His manifestation, they are His life, His very self. Everything is the substance of God. He is extended, yet incorporeal; thinks, but without understanding; is free, without will; an unique substance, but without personality; ever known, yet unknowable; infinite, yet finite; the author of nothing but good, yet it co-exists with evil; at once His infinite self, and His creature. He "sleeps in the mineral, dreams in the animal, and wakens into consciousness in the man." Thus the very framework of Pantheism is contradiction. It is the Absolute, constrained by law! Substance is the *cause*, yet there is that outside and above it by which it is compelled! Law subserves substance, yet substance has no intelligence to produce law!

Leibnitz sought, by a method which he purposed to be equally rigorous, to refute this, and give to the individual its philosophy in relation to The All. The elements of the universe were monads—simple unextended forces—in which the idea of substance rests. Some have no perception, and form the material world; others have mere vitality, as in the brute; but others yet are the self-conscious souls of men, bearing in themselves the fountains of necessary truth. But there must be a sufficient reason for the existence of all these, and that is, the One Supreme Infinite, the *Monas Monadum*, the cause and explanation of all that is. Every monad was launched into being with a determinate eternal history. "From the given state of any monad at any time, the Eternal

Geometer can find the state of the Universe past, present, and to come." There is no interaction between soul and body, but simply pre-arranged harmony; and the end of the scheme is the disclosure of Divine Perfection. Thus, in striving to give a place to the individual, the theory virtually destroys an external world, and robs us of our moral nature. Neither system meets the necessities of mind; while between the Pantheism of Spinoza and Atheism there is but a verbal difference.

In spite of this, Pantheism is the fountain that pours out the streams of current sceptical thought. Its subtilties repeat themselves in a thousand forms: but substance and modes, subject and attributes, include all that can be, while causality is utterly excluded. Evolution, natural selection, physico-chemical theories of life, and the molecular origin of thought, are all the outcome of its fascinations. It is an intense effort to unify every agent and activity. Creation is treated with scorn; and "evolution" is set up in its place. The chapters on this and cognate subjects are the most brilliant and masterly in this book. They expose triumphantly the tissue of subtilties by which hypotheses are deified and Deity ignored. Diverging somewhat from Mr. Leifchild's path, we will discuss it. What is the meaning of nature? What was its source? Did it spring from a self-developing power inherent in matter? or is it the product of an infinite and intelligent mind? Our prejudices apart, can *law* construct the universe? What is law? "It is the invariable relation between two distinct phenomena according to which one depends on another."* Clearly, then, it is not a power. It is neither intelligent nor volitional. It is neither self-originating nor self-sustaining. It is purely "a method of intelligent agency."† To us laws are nothing but formulæ. They express, of necessity, the modes of action of an actor behind them. They are not that which rules nature, but the method by which it is ruled. "Creation by law" can have no meaning unless as the expression of what we are able to observe as to the methods by which the Omnipotent created. Shift the ground by declaring that it is an activity impressed upon matter; still it exists *outside* matter and is dependent upon Divine energy. To attempt, therefore, to use the expression as equivalent to creation without God, is sophistry. The taunt that God's government in person involves "incessant interference," and is unworthy of His nature, is meaningless. It originates with the opponent; it has no place in our conception. The Omni-

* Lewes, *Hist. Phil.* II. 701. † P. 243.

potent can never "come between the sequences which He Himself has pre-ordained; never can there be any necessity for interference—less still for incessant interference—when the Omnipotent is executing by law His own designs, and accomplishing His ulterior purposes."* To God there is no distinction between the natural and the supernatural. The creation of the first oak, however accomplished, was no more *supernatural* than the operation of the laws by which our forests grow. He acted by law then; He acts by law now. This, of course, involves a *self*-existent Creator: but which is easier of conception, a self-existent Creator or a self-existent universe? Then, if He created at all, He created all things. "Special creations" of successive types is a mere complication. God created all things by method: and the repetition of this method would be no more beneath the dignity of Deity than the first act. Admit the Creator, and His plan you cannot question: and in spite of the supremest subtilty—the veriest witchcraft in language—no system yet devised can elude Him. Evolution is the doctrine on which modern scepticism is building. But what is its foundation? Our author shows triumphantly that it involves an evolver; although he does not analyse its logical claims. What is evolution? "A change," says its chief exponent, "from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity, to a definite, coherent heterogeneity, through continuous differentiations and integrations."† This, mark, is the God that is to produce the universe. Let us seek to grasp it. The homogeneous has no differences of parts. If its ultimates be atoms, they will be alike, their distances uniform, and their states of rest and motion coincident. Its parts neither attract nor repel—they are inert, and therefore no portion of the mass can possess function not possessed by another and equal portion, and no shape but that of the ultimate atoms. This is the absence of all development; it is chaos. But if some portion begin in any sense *to differ* from the rest, this is the first step in evolution. If it continue, the homogeneous will cease, and the heterogeneous will ensue, and diversity of form, quality, and function will result. This is evolution; all its products being inter-locked by one vast law of unity. Now, granting that all nature sprang from a gigantic uniformity, does this explain it? Is it not infinitely more difficult to believe that its heterogenesis was causeless, than that it arose from the volition of an Infinite Mind? At what point did the inert mass feel the

* P. 247. † Herbert Spencer, § 57. 1863.

grand pulsations that moved it into glorious forms? And whence came they? If all is granted, have we explained anything by a mere record of physical change?

Again. Is the universe infinite in extent? If so, who shall say that the evolution of one part is not correlated to the devolution of another? Have the serial changes to which matter has been exposed been eternal? or had they a beginning? If they began, they must have had a cause. If they have been eternal, there can be no evolution, for that *begins* in the homogeneous. For evolution to have the most initial logical status, it must enunciate a "law," which either accounts for the beginning or needs none. In the absence of this it is a transparent fallacy.*

But even if it were possible as a theory, do the facts of science justify its claims? Every year facts are produced narrowing the possibility of the theoretical cosmical "fire-mist." There are nebulæ still that are not only not stars, but are proved to be gaseous; but that they bear any relation to the material of which worlds are made is wholly denied by the evidence of the spectroscope. On the other hand, geologists are constantly more assured in the conviction of the absence of Plutonic action in the earliest rocks. But granted the possibility; can evolution construct the universe? Let us suppose it has produced the inanimate world; how does it bridge the chasm between the living and the dead? Let the highest science produce a single fact that makes the distance between organic and inorganic less than infinite. Place the mineral and the organism side by side. The former increases *only* by the addition of like particles from without; its boundaries are plane surfaces and right lines. Minerals originate within themselves no motion or change. Internally they are absolutely at rest. A crystal of quartz, freed from all external influences, would remain unchanged for ever. But in organised bodies internal spontaneous activity and change are absolutely essential. They increase by internal assimilation. The molecules of which they are formed are never at one stay—the old are borne off, and new laid down; so that there is a constant passage through spontaneous and cyclical changes. The most industrious efforts of modern chemistry and physics fail to alter this. Strips of palladium galvanised in water, so as to be enabled to absorb the liberated hydrogen, have been made to

* A paper of great value on this subject (by Mr. J. Mott), will appear in the Liverpool *Literary and Philos. Trans.* 1873.

contort and creep like worms, until great molecular change has superinduced inaction; but this was not vital; the activity was from without, not from within. It has been asserted that the cavities of some crystals are filled with a moving fluid: but it lacks proof. The gulf is impassable: keeping only to physical *facts*, how shall evolution bridge it? And if it could, the distinction between the animal and the vegetable is nearly as broad. In the lowest forms of life the fact is not that there are no differences between them, but that they are unknown. There are many points in common; but the divergences are always sharp when the life history is clear. However difficult it may be to define, in the present state of our knowledge, yet every naturalist perceives an absolute void between them; and therefore, taken logically and according to facts, evolution becomes a monstrous impossibility.

But, even if every claim were granted, as Mr. Leifchild proves, an Intelligent Cause becomes an absolute necessity of mind. Self-evolution, leading to the sublimest order, the truest beauty and the highest good, is, must ever be, repugnant to thought. It is true, evolution "may be Theistic, Atheistic, or Pantheistic, in accordance with the mood of the framer's mind."* But the march of true science—the interpretation of the facts of Nature in harmony with the laws of mind—leads inevitably, irresistibly, to GOD.

It is a fact, nevertheless, that evolution has taken a powerful hold upon the scientific mind. Doubtless this arises chiefly from the grand unification it seems to offer, and from the absence of large and clear reasoning powers amongst specialists. The hypothesis of natural selection springs wholly from it; and, although it evades some of its largest anterior issues by the assumption of the *creation* of one or more primordial germs, it is nevertheless not God, but law, that evolves. It is an inherent potentiality in matter, which by the aid of unmeasured time transmutes the mollusc into a fish, the fish into a mammal, the mammal into a man. It starts with a great truth; and this is the secret of its power. It enunciates the unquestionable fact that there is mutation in every living form. Species change. The offspring is never exactly like its parent. This alone distinguishes individuals. But Mr. Darwin claims that this variation is indefinite, constant, and in all directions; and natural selection comes in, conserving useful change and extinguishing the useless, and thus producing species. It is

* P. 274.

as though we should say that the combination of metals, by which the balance of a chronometer is made *self*-regulating, proves that it evolved itself. *The self-adjustment applies only within certain limits;* and is the clearest proof of purpose. It is so with organic forms; every species is elastic *within certain limits.* This elasticity is for the good—the preservation—of the species. But this self-adjustment no more proves that the formation of the species depended on it, than the self-regulating "governor" of a steam engine explains its production.

Mr. Leifchild has given a most careful critique of this remarkable hypothesis; its exposition is faultless, and its reasoning indisputable. Without following his direct line of thought, we may seek by a few propositions to show that the hypothesis is untenable.

1. *Natural* selection is an assumption which nature does not justify. So far as Mr. Darwin's writings are concerned, the facts they deal with refer only to the origin of varieties—not of species. A species is an organic form permanent in itself, and retaining that permanence amid changing circumstances by a certain adaptive elasticity. This power of adjustment varies in different species. The goose, the peacock, the cat, the ass, have but the most limited range of variation. The pigeon, the dog, the horse, the ox, have a far wider range. Man can seize on this power and make for *himself* improvements; but they are never "improvements" for *the animal.* They are monstrous varieties—neither presenting nor indicating the remotest specific mutation. All that marks the species remains intact. The skeletal modifications produced by "breeding" are no greater than always exist. The mummied cats and dogs from Memphis are like those that live beside us. Huxley admits "that a group of animals having all the characters exhibited by species in nature has never been originated by selection, whether artificial or natural."* The varieties are purely abnormalities, "selected" by art, solely for man's good or caprice. Hence they are unfixed; they go back to the normal condition as soon as the strain of "selection" is taken off. The horse or the ox never so highly bred, will, if left to Nature, simply revert to the original condition; and every variety of pigeon will, on acquiring freedom, go back to the form of its simplest ancestor—and this often with great rapidity. What is the issue of this? Simply that art selects,

* *Lay Sermons*, 323.

not Nature. Nature refuses to accept the selection art has made, and remodels after her antique form. Yet the whole theory of Darwin depends on the changes art has produced, to infer the entire production by Nature of all organic forms! Further; the distinction between the species of Nature and the varieties of the breeder is clear; the former will freely interbreed and continue to be fertile. The interbreeding of species is infertile. M. Flourens, after prolonged experiment, declares, "If two distinct species, such as the dog and the jackal, wolf and dog, ram and goat, horse and ass, are united, they will produce offspring which is infertile, so that no durable intermediate species can be established."* Darwin evidently feels almost bound to admit this; he can produce no instance. "I do not know of any" authenticated case, is changed in the sixth edition to "I know of hardly any;"† but nothing is gained, for facts are wanting; and all recent experiment proves the sterility of hybrids. Therefore, species and varieties are distinct, and natural selection of the former is in nature unknown.

II. The demands made on *time* by this hypothesis cannot be granted; they are inadmissible by the facts of other sciences. Mr. Darwin demands a period of more than 300,000,000 years for the latter part of the secondary geological epoch alone! What then must have been the gigantic interval between the Oolitic system, down through the carboniferous, to the Cambrian! And yet he says, "if the theory be true, it is indisputable that before the *lowest Cambrian stratum* was deposited long periods elapsed, as long as or probably longer than the *whole interval* from the Cambrian age to the present day."‡ Now it is well known that, with the exception of the small Laurentian group, all below the Silurian is without a trace of life. While the Laurentian itself only yields the "Eozoon Canadense," a form which to this hour many Palæontologists declare inorganic. Why, then, if there has been so gigantic a period, and such incalculable hosts of beings evolved, have we not the shadow of a trace of them? Mr. Darwin replies, "I can give no satisfactory answer!"§ And yet his whole theory is based on the assumption!

But Physics is equally a foe. Calculations on the probable age of the sun's heat, constantly becoming more accurate, repudiate the possibility of Darwin's demands. Professor Thompson and Mr. Croll could not yield him a hundredth

* *Examen du Livre de M. Darwin sur l'Origine des Espèces.*
† Compare p. 305 of Fifth Edit. with p. 240 of Sixth Edit. *Orig. of Spec.*
‡ *Origin of Spec.* p. 286. Sixth Edition. § *Ibid.*

part of his claims. But the most recent and elaborate researches are by Dr. Gould, and he says the limit given by Thompson must have immense reduction. To this the French Academy has in effect given its adhesion. On the most extreme supposition, Dr. Gould affirms, "we could not assert so long a period as 80,000,000 years for the past duration of the sun's heat."* Such incongruities are absolutely fatal to the theory.

III. The record of the rocks wholly fails to support the hypothesis. Geology gives no instance of a single specific transition; and the order in which some geologists affirm that genera are superimposed is transparently open to question. Professor W. Thompson states: "In successive geological formations, although new species are constantly appearing, and there is abundant evidence of progressive change, no single case has yet been observed of one species passing through a series of inappreciable modifications into another."† It is true the "imperfection of the geological record" is constantly urged upon us; but, granting this in the main, there are cases in which it *is* perfect. There are many perfect transitions between the Cambrian and Silurian; but no gradation of species; and the eyes of the earliest trilobites are the most perfect! But more, if all the claims of evolutional palæontology could be granted, they would stand at best on negative grounds. It is admitted on all hands that the absence of certain fossils in a given strata is no necessary proof that they did not exist during its formation, provided that *traces of life have been found at all.* But the theory of evolutional superimposition of organic forms depends as much on their absence as their presence. "Any geological epoch, so far as we know, could have sustained the existence of any known form; and every known fossil belongs to some one or other of the existing classes; . . . the organic remains of the most ancient fossiliferous strata do not indicate . . . that any earlier and different group of beings remains to be discovered.‡" The result is that the dogmatic statements that certain fossils could only be found in certain strata have had to be constantly corrected.§ Since 1818 fishes have been passed down from the Carboniferous to the Silurian epoch; reptiles from the Permian to the Carboniferous; birds from the Eocene to the Trias; insects as lately as 1865 were re-

* *Nature*, May 12th, 1870.
† *Ibid.* Nov. 9th, 1871. ‡ Owen's *Palæontology*, i. 18.
§ This is well shown by J. Mott, in the paper before alluded to.

moved from the Carboniferous to the Devonian. Who shall say that subsequent research will not find the higher vertebrates in the Silurian? The chances of finding the bones of land mammals in comparison with those of marine molluscs and cetaceans are, in every way, enormously against the latter.* The dredging expedition of the *Porcupine* proves this. In a region where whales and porpoises abounded, other marine fauna were copiously found, but not a trace of a cetacean skeleton was dredged! Hence there is not a shred of evidence that the absence of vertebrate fossils proves their non-existence. Yet upon this and the gradational character of the species displayed by the rocks depends the whole hypothesis! The geological gap between the anthropoid apes and man is alone destructive of the whole theory. Apes have been discovered in Greece, but they are *only* apes. And remains of man have been found for which immense antiquity is claimed, but they are remains of *man* and nothing less. We would, therefore, ask in all simplicity how far this hypothesis coincides with the canons of the phenomenal philosophy out of which it professes to have grown? Finally—

IV. The series of animals extant gives no sanction to the theory. We are traced back by Mr. Darwin to the Ascidian larva. This depends on the observations of Kowalevsky and Küpffer on the larva of *Phallusia Mammilatica* and *Ascidia intestinalis*. They profess to detect the *chorda dorsalis:* the first differentiation of any moment in the vertebrate embryo, and peculiar to it, being, indeed, the track of the spinal chord. This is said to develope in the tail of the larva, which, nevertheless, is finally aborted. Dr. Donitz—a most accurate microscopist—wholly disputes the facts, and asserts that the affinities revealed are absolutely in another line. But if they were true, what is gained? The gap between the lowest vertebrate and the Ascidian larva is immeasurably vast; how shall it be bridged? Only by the most unbridled imagination. If we come to the earliest vertebrate, what do we discover as to its relation to the order next above it? The lancelet, although a vertebrate, has no vertebræ, they are indicated by a mere gelatinous notochord. It has no ribs, no skull, no brain, no jaws, no hyoid arch, no ears, and probably no sense of smell. Between this and the lampreys —next in order—"there is a gap the extent of which has never been imagined."† Every distinguishing feature of the

* See Mr. Mott's paper.

† W. K. Parker, F.R.S. *Philos. Trans.* p. 202. 1871.

higher vertebrates is either absent or in its crudest form. If we pass from these to the sharks and rays, territories are vacant larger than any now occupied by family after family; and it is only when we reach the Teleostian, or bony fishes, that the vertebrate skull is perfect. What an abyss lies between this and the lowliest reptile, lepidosiren included! and thence to the bird, the mammal, and the man! All this Mr. Darwin is bound to perceive; and yet he would have us believe that every form, by variation and progressive change, has been produced by those which preceded! And the whole issues in the production of consciousness, emotion, and thought. An "inherent power in nature" is its cause; an unconscious, impersonal, soulless abstraction produces the conception of Deity, ideas of right and wrong, ennobled purpose, vast intellectual powers, ability to subserve the laws by which this unvital something acts, and educes language, music, poetry, and all the powers of modern civilised man! Is it not easier to accept what the evolutionist brands as "Hebrew myths," avouched as they are by the history of hoary centuries, than, on the sole authority of modern imagination, to accept this?

But suppose all were granted, what follows? If infinite modifications in an anthropoid ape evolved man's progenitor, still it leaves him *man*. The problem of mind becomes even more stupendous than before. Mental and moral phenomena are facts differing from all other in the universe. Their origin *cannot* affect their nature. They admit of *no* comparison with their source. If, in spite of all the true teaching of science, we are told they arose out of bestial sensations, we retort fearlessly they are *not* bestial sensations *now*. They have their own inalienable domain. Are we to ignore their true characteristics because of their source? When the artist makes the canvass instinct with beauty and truth, do we simply call it "pigments and canvass?" These are employed in its production, but are *they* the picture? Do they make it? No! the realised ideal is something infinitely different from that out of which it is formed. Whatever the source of mind, it *is* mind. It differs wholly from its evolutionary factors; it is neither the thing that produced it, nor the sum of them. It is a new entity, and by every analogy it can never cease to exist.

But here a new subtilty arrests us: it is the omnipotence of Force. Its manifestations are "modes of motion;" and mind is one of them! With great conciseness and ability our author expounds the doctrine of the equivalence and con-

servation of energy, and frankly accepts it. The weight of evidence is overpowering; "a corporation of physicists," whose weight and authority it would be vain to ignore, have produced *facts* before which theoretical opposition must retire. "But," says Mr. Leifchild, "it will be seen that we are by no means bound on this account to accept the *conclusions* which sceptical materialists draw from it."* And this must be the future position of the Christian philosopher. The doctrine "that the sum of the actual and potential energies in the universe is unchangeable,"† is the noblest outcome of science since gravitation was discovered. From the position of the physicist, we accept Mayer's definition: "Force‡ is that which is expended in the production of motion; and this which is expended is, as cause of the effect, equal to the motion produced." It may develope itself as heat-force, light-force, electric-force, &c., each of these being varying modes of motion produced in the ultimate atoms by ethereal vibrations: they can be changed into each other; their equivalents being unalterable, and in some instances known. Force may be potential or actual; stored up and expended. My muscles have potential energy; I throw a stone in the air; the potential energy of my arm is converted into *actual* energy in the stone. This becomes potential when the stone has reached its highest point; it is transmitted into actual energy as it descends, and, striking the earth, is transformed into heat. Some of the subtilest difficulties which this great doctrine presents arise from laxity of language and want of definition. "Force" is used in a sense often impossible, and motion is confounded with it; while energy is used for both, and *property* is distinguished from neither. But the great abstract difficulty is, that the *manifestations* of force are taken for the force itself. Force is a constant; its manifestations are modes of motion; these are inter-transmutable. But motion cannot be the cause of motion. Motion is not a *thing*. Here are two points in space: a body is in one of them, in the next moment it is in the other. This fact is called motion. Now, motion can apparently only be communicated by impact. But *how* is it that the impact of a moving body and a still one causes the latter to move? "Because," say the greatest authorities, "pressure begins to act between them to prevent any parts of them from *jointly occupying the same space*."§ That is, to

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* P. 531. † Rankine. *Philos. Mag.* § iv. Vol. V. p. 106.
‡ These words are unfortunately interchanged at present. *Vide infra.*
§ Thompson and Tait, § 294, *Force and Energy.*

prevent them from doing the impossible! They *cannot* jointly occupy the same space. Matter is impenetrable; and this explanation is simply futile. A billiard ball in rapid motion strikes one at rest; the latter instantly moves. But there is no proof of *actual* impact. The atoms of the ivory are not touching, for with equivalent pressure the ball can be compressed into a smaller space. When could we say we had so compressed an india-rubber ball as to cause its ultimate atoms to touch, and that because of their impenetrability they could be compressed no more? Then, if no amount of impact or pressure gives evidence of contact of atoms *within* the ball, what right have we to affirm that when two balls meet their particles touch? When iron is vaporised, its atoms are not in contact, neither are they when it is at a white heat, nor yet when it is cold, for it can even now be compressed; so it can be when it has been beaten for hours with the hugest steam hammer. Then, who may assert that the atoms of a cannon ball *touch* the atoms of a stricken target? Yet this is precisely what is assumed; and, therefore, motion has a physical cause! But the fact is, that the atoms of bodies never touch: motion, according to all phenomena, takes place without atomic contact. Then, motion must result from a power—a mover—a will. Force is the mover, motion is its mode; contact is no factor, for it does not exist. I am conscious of power to move this weight. From this consciousness comes my *idea* of power. I can have no other. Force is will. It operates with unalterable rigidity, and we can formulate its modes: but it is barbarous to confound the mode with the cause. To say that a raised weight has potential energy of position, is not to explain what it is that pushes masses of matter together; it only tabulates the phenomena that occur when they are pushed. The physicist can never free himself from the metaphysical force; that force can be conceived of only as will.

Then, give the name energy to the power of doing work throughout the universe, and remember that the power to do that work depends on a great will-force behind it, and the facts of modern physics are sublime. Not free from difficulty doubtless; neither is its elder brother, the theory of gravitation. There are some phenomena which we know *only* as motion; as light, or heat. There are others, as gravitation, or chemical affinity, which at first appear inconceivable as states of motion. How can they be interchanged?—how can there be resting motion? A difficulty is not of necessity a contradiction. The facts declare it, if we cannot explain.

Conceive a piston in a closed cylinder kept in the centre by an equal volume of air on each side. Theoretically this would be explained by the constant and equal impact of air molecules on either side. Take out some of the air on one side, and *the same impact* of molecules on the other side produces an upward motion. The impact that before displayed itself in heat now produces motion; and the amount of heat lost accounts for the work. Here, then, we have potential energy, actual energy and movement, all the result of molecular motion.* As to gravitation, it is not of the same *class* of phenomena as light or electricity, although interchangeable with them. It arises not from the motions of matter within, but from motion beyond them. Challis and Maxwell have shown mathematically that ethereal pressures and waves will explain every phenomenon of gravity. To suppose it a property of matter is without warrant in fact. A property can neither change nor be lost. A particle of gold would be the same, though it experienced incalculable vicissitudes, and traversed the entire creation; but a body weighing five hundred pounds on the earth, if carried to the distance of the moon, would weigh but two and a half ounces, and at a calculable distance beyond it would be *without* weight: thus destroying the root-thought of the word property.

But our space is failing us, and important questions still invite our scrutiny. Biologists have been fascinated with the discovery of physicists; and they argue, if heat be a "mode of motion," why should not thought be also? It is the old principle, unify phenomena at all costs. In a chapter on "Life, Protoplasm, and Vital Force," Mr. Leifchild treats this question with excellent grasp and great candour. The Chemico-Physical theory of vitality we do not hesitate to say is one of the most vicious blunders that ever distorted scientific thought. With what we know of the chemistry and physics of the laboratory, to predicate the building up of a living, conscious, volitional, thinking organism, is equal to predicating music from the laws of gravity. Take one of the most constant attributes of life, irritability—stimulus, and let either chemistry or physics, or both, explain it. A mere mechanical irritant of almost imperceptible magnitude falls into the eye, or attaches itself to the mucous surface of a bronchial tube, or finds its way to the tissues of the brain. Its weight is nothing; no chemical change ensues in it; yet it may excite such inflammatory action as to cause the death

* *Vide* J. Drysdale's *Life and the Equivalence of Force.*

of the part, or even of the whole body. What force has been given equalling such an effect? When an imperceptible drop of Tsetse poison strikes down the strongest animal to death, what chemical change can be shown that in the most shadowy way resembles it? When an organism does work, it is amenable *so far* to the laws of correlation—so much work, so much expenditure—it is a mechanical act subject to physical law. But this does not explain the organism itself. You may correlate the heat expended in lifting a hundred-weight a foot; but what of the consciousness that realised the fact, and the volition that decided to do it? Prove that so much chemical affinity may be changed into so much consciousness, or so much thought, and the case will wear another aspect. To believe it at present involves immeasurably more credulity than to believe in Nature's horror of a vacuum. Indeed, if every claim of Materialistic Biology were made out, it could only prove that life was a *property* of organisation with which under unknown conditions—conditions wholly outside the reach of the known forces—the Creator has endowed it. Life could never have come from what was not life. Organisation endowed with such a property must have been created; and no matter can ever live but what is transmitted from, or transmuted by this. With the existence of a soul in man, we are not bound to a "vital principle" to explain the phenomena of simple vitality, although it is incomparably the more philosophical. Property is inalienable. We can only know things by their properties. The living organism possesses these, and they are such as to distinguish it from all else. In the same organism dead, every trace of these properties is gone. It follows, therefore, that none of the so-called proximate principles found in the organism when *dead* existed in it when living; but that in their place there is a peculiar combination isometric with the sum of these; and that the resolution of this into the "proximate principles" is the act of death. You cannot analyse life; the very act of analysis resolves it into death. It eludes the most subtile processes; and, because we cannot find it, to say that it is simply a series of molecular changes in the elements we find in death, is to step outside the pale of Philosophy.

That life differs wholly from any possible effect of physical force finds a beautiful phenomenal confirmation in the labours of Dr. Beale, whose work is evidently appreciated by Mr. Leifchild. As a microscopist he is second to none in the world, and he has made the study of vital phenomena the special duty of his life. He distinctly affirms that matter

living and matter dead are always and wholly dissimilar. He says, and by his preparations proves, "that between the living state of matter and its non-living state there is an absolute and irreconcilable difference; that so far from our being able to demonstrate that the non-living passes by gradations into . . . the living, the transition is sudden and abrupt; . . . that while in all living things chemical and physical action occur, there are *other actions*, as essential as they are peculiar to life, which . . . are opposed to and are capable of overcoming physical and chemical attractions."* Then to suppose *life*—to say nothing of consciousness and thought—a correlate of physical force, cannot be more than equalled by some of the most ignorant blunders of the Middle Ages. All the materialist *could* make it, if *all* his premises were granted, we repeat, would be a distinctive *property* of matter. But matter never so marvellously endowed could not produce consciousness, thought, volition. The very endeavour to think that it can, forces us, with Professor Huxley, into pure idealism. There is no stronger evidence of the unthinkableness of the attributes of mind flowing from the qualities of matter than Huxley's retreat into the negation of matter when to his own satisfaction he had but just slain the last argument that would render the existence of anything but matter possible.† Mind is an entity wholly unlike matter—and life is wholly separate from physical force. If it be urged that such reasoning involves a certain degree of mind in brutes, and consequent immortality, we reply, be it so. There can be no proof on either side. The problem is beyond us; but our own immortality is irrefragable.

The same reasoning makes the assumption of a physical basis of life impossible. The glairy compound everywhere associated with life is no explanation of the life it phenomenalises. The chemist analyses what?—not the life in the plasm, but the plasm *when the life has left it*, and life defies him as triumphantly as before. To have found that life everywhere inheres in a proteine compound, which on analysis after death yields certain elements, is not to have found *life*. And to talk of *dead* protoplasm is equal to saying that twice seven are ten!

The fallacies of spontaneous generation are equally patent. We write after years of careful investigation; decomposing matter is *never* recomposed into organic forms. The last

* *Medical Times and Gazette*, Nov. 7th, 1868, p. 523.
† *Lay Sermon*, 374.

struggle of Dr. Bastian to prove it, is a transparent failure.* It tells us more of the development of lowly forms, but it does *not* prove their invital origin. The remaining chapters of this valuable book are chiefly constructive, and abound with most pregnant contemplations. They consider man as an intellectual being, with a momentous past, and a glorious future. The philosophy of death, the question of resurrection, the certainty of immortality, the future continuity of our knowledge of God in His works, and the consequent heaven of mind, are all considered with the reverence of a Christian and the calmness of a man of science. The author seizes with exquisite aptitude the latest discoveries and hypotheses of science, and by analogical reasoning marshals them in support and elucidation of the highest claims of religious thought. Rising from a contemplation of the most brilliant speculations of modern science, we see that they point with a skeletal grimness, grimmer than death, and more terrible than the grave, to a Universe without God, and humanity without a soul. But, closing Mr. Leifchild's book, we rejoice to have seen *everything that science can claim as fact* ranging itself on the side of our nature, and marked by kinship with revelation. It is a false philosophy which constructs a science of Nature, and ignores a science of man. He is part of Nature: but he is immeasurably above it. But there can be no science of man which does not include *faith* as a normal element of his being; for it is only reason in its loftiest attitude. We can never believe until we know *why* we believe, and to do this is to reason. Faith carries us across the flood, to the edge of which reason has brought it, and is compelled to leave it; and unless faith bear us over by its naked strength, the infinite mystery beyond becomes a Tantalus-like nightmare to mind. Professor Tyndall seeks to evade this by making "imagination" take its place. But it is a fallacy; at once a scandal to science, and a disparagement of the normal attributes of man. Revelation lays no interdict upon research; it deliberately passes phenomena over to reason: but it authoritatively declares to faith that which no searching can discover.

* *Proc. Royal Society*, March 21st, 1872.

ART. IV.—1. *Encyclopædia of American Literature, embracing Personal and Critical Notices of Authors, and Selections from their Writings, &c.* By EVERT A. DUYCKINCK and GEO. L. DUYCKINCK. Two Vols. New York.

2. *Memoir of Rev. Michael Wigglesworth, Author of the "Day of Doom."* By JOHN WARD DEAN. Second Edition. Albany, N. Y.: Joel Munsel. 1871.

IT was on the 20th of September, 1620, that the *Mayflower*, with a hundred and two souls on board, left Plymouth harbour, to carry into a land as yet but lightly touched by the hand of civilisation, a stock of moral and mental energy such as not often in the world's history has been collected on board one frail bark and transported to lay in far countries the foundations of a new order of existence. How those resolute souls fared on and after their voyage, and for what cause of conscience they left the shores of Old England to return no more, are matters of history with which every child, whether in Old England or in New England, is more or less familiar. Suffice it to recall, that it is now over two hundred and fifty years since, after a two months' voyage, the *Mayflower* rode at anchor under that terrible "coast fringed with ice—dreary forests, interspersed with sandy tracts, filling the background," from which point the three memorable expeditions, in search of a final place of settlement, were sent out, to result at last in that landing on Clark's Island so big with import for the future centuries.

It was in the cabin of the *Mayflower*, on the 21st of November, 1620, that the earliest "original compact" of self-government recorded authentically in the history of mankind was framed and signed; and this act of solemn covenanting on the part of the Pilgrim Fathers was not more characteristic of the spirit that was to animate the coming settlement than was that simple and touching act of the third exploring party who, having found the place at which the landing was to be made, and having spent Saturday, the 19th of December, in "exploring the island," gave up all considerations of further procedure in the most urgent circumstances, and *rested on the Sabbath Day*.

The intense fervour and uncompromising earnestness of that simple act of resting is not to be overrated. As an

orator, himself descended from a Pilgrim Father, has said, "it was no mere physical rest. The day before had sufficed for that. But alone, upon a desert island, in the depth of a stormy winter; well-nigh without food, wholly without shelter; after a week of such experiences, such exposure and hardship and suffering, that the bare recital at this hour almost freezes our blood; without an idea that the morrow should be other or better than the day before; with every conceivable motive, on their own account, and on account of those whom they had left in the ship, to lose not an instant of time, but to hasten and hurry forward to the completion of the work of exploration which they had undertaken—they still 'remembered the Sabbath Day to keep it holy;'" and asserted practically, in the most emphatic manner, the religious origin of that permanent settlement of America by a civilised race, which mere ordinary secular motives had failed to effect. What was waiting for these men to do while they were observing the Sabbath is recorded in the words of one of their number, who tells us that "on Monday we sounded the harbour, and found it a very good harbour for our shipping; we marched also into the land, and found divers cornfields and little running brooks, a place very good for situation; so we returned to our ship again with good news to the rest of our people, which did much comfort their hearts."

To seek a greatly artistic literature as the offspring of such a temper as the temper of these men would be somewhat like looking for roses on an oak-tree; but that the needs of their being found a certain literary expression and left a record of permanent interest and value, many able and laborious men of the present day have been at pains to show. Carrying with them many gifts, both good and evil, as a spiritual heritage from the Old World,—carrying among other things the language of Shakespeare and Milton,—these earnest religionists passed into a sphere where it was not specifically their part to found a new literature, but where they had to provide, first of all, for their material wants, and, these being provided for, to devote themselves to the foundation of a new social and political order, and the fusion, in due time, of certain nationalities into one new nationality; and if the literature which they and their descendants yet found time to produce was for a long time chiefly of a theological and controversial kind, that fact was the natural outcome of the antecedent fact of the New World having been sought out by the Puritans from religious motives. Indeed, to them any rhetorical delicacy

must in the nature of things have stood in the light of worldly adornment to be eschewed; and yet within thirty years of the sailing of the *Mayflower* we find a New England literature sprung up, and of very considerable dimensions, both of prose and of verse.

Of this mixed literature, the prose preponderates in importance, as showing most distinctly that notable historic fact, that these men had not learnt the lesson of tolerance which the history of the origin of their colony might well have taught them. Rancour and bitterness and bigotry abound in the curious records of the spiritual state of the times; and religious persecution was a tradition that they had not seen fit to leave to the Old World as an uncontested heritage. Roger Williams put the tolerance of the colony to the proof very soon after its foundation; for he emigrated to Massachusetts as early as 1631, and, settling at Salem, became the beloved and admired of a numerous flock. He sought, as others had sought, that spiritual liberty not to be got in the Old World; but he soon learnt the lesson that, if he wished to be free to worship God in his own way, he must adjust his views to those of his fellow colonists at large. Summoned before the General Court at Boston, to answer for certain of his views, he was formally tried, and ordered to leave the colony, and this with the approval of all the ministers of the Court but one. He went with some followers to Rhode Island, founded the colony of Providence, and set up in it the first example of complete tolerance which the Christian world had seen. It was to this tendency of his to tolerate all religious sects that he owed his expulsion from Massachusetts; and, of course, the principles that guided his new colony were a mark for prophecies of evil; and yet, as Gervinus says, in his *Introduction to the History of the Nineteenth Century*, "these institutions have not only maintained themselves here, but have spread over the whole Union. They have superseded the aristocratic commencements of Carolina and of New York, the High Church party in Virginia, the theocracy in Massachusetts, and the monarchy throughout America; they have given laws to one quarter of the globe, and, dreaded for their moral influence, they stand in the background of every democratic struggle in Europe." The same principle of tolerance that Williams set a-going in Providence, Lord Baltimore and the other Catholics, who founded Maryland, adopted there; but while the literature of the Williams Controversy is considerable, the free act of the Maryland Catholics gave rise to no literature.

Pitted against Williams, who has been described as "an apostle of civil and religious liberty," was the Rev. John Cotton, described in Mr. Carlyle's *Cromwell* as "a painful preacher, oracular of high gospels to New England; who in his day was well seen to be connected with the supreme powers of the universe;" and who, zealous and honest, was as much an apostle of bigotry as Williams was of the reverse. Williams embarked in 1643 for England (writing, by-the-bye, on his voyage, a curious volume concerning the Naragansett dialect, and called *A Key into the Language of America*); and while he was in England there appeared *A Letter of Mr. John Cotton's, Father of the Church in Boston, in New England, to Mr. Williams, a Preacher there.* In reply, Williams published a pamphlet called *Mr. Cotton's Letter lately Printed, Examined and Answered*, and a more important work under the title of *Bloody Tenent of Persecution for Cause of Conscience, in a Conference between Truth and Peace.* The fierceness of the contest that raged before the principles of toleration were fairly established, is fitly typified in the titles of the next two works in this series. On the side of persecution we have Cotton's *Bloody Tenent of Persecution made White in the Blood of the Lamb;* and on the side of tolerance Williams's rejoinder, *The Bloody Tenent, yet more Bloody by Mr. Cotton's Endeavour to Wash it White in the Blood of the Lamb!*

In the meantime, John Winthrop, founder of Boston, and first Governor of Massachusetts, who had come to Salem in 1630, had been diligently preserving a less warlike record, in his MS. Journal of the affairs of the colony, which was eventually published as a *History of New England from* 1630 *to* 1649; and Nathaniel Ward, the author of *The Simple Cobbler of Agawam*, a book treating of toleration, had prepared his *Body of Liberties*—a code of laws adopted in 1641 as the earliest statutes of New England. While history and jurisprudence were thus represented, a place was also being found in this literature for philology, psalmody, and mission work. John Eliot, founder of Natick, translated, in the course of his missionary labours among the Aborigines, the whole of the Bible into the Indian language, and, with Richard Mather and Welde as *collaborateurs*, prepared the *Old Bay Psalm Book*, published in 1640—the earliest American book of the kind, and long a standard work in New England.

The earliest collection of original poetry published in New England was from the pen of Mrs. Anne Bradstreet, daughter of Thomas Dudley; and, in the young days of the colony, the productions of this lady were matter of no small pride to

her fellow-colonists,— presumably by reason of the great dearth of productions in verse belonging to that time and place. It must have been no easy matter for the vanity of writing verse to have found a pardon among those stern and realistic Puritans; and for a long time verse was but little in use among them, except for the purpose of psalmody, and the quasi-religious purpose of elegy writing. Indeed, the fact that Mrs. Bradstreet was so early able to attain to a considerable popularity speaks volumes as to the innate love of poetry, or at all events rhythmic utterance, in the human species. Her earliest work was called *The Tenth Muse lately sprung up in America*,—a somewhat ambitious and not very highly poetic title,—and was published in 1650. She affected subjects in zoology and natural science generally, so far as they came within her ken, and was wont to set them forth in a simple, unaffected manner, and with much circumstance of detail. Without soaring into high latitudes for which her powers were unfitted, she managed to display a fair amount of genuine poetic enthusiasm, and showed that she really loved the external universe for its own sake. The following little piece of description would not discredit a more ambitious muse than this "Tenth sprung up in America," in the middle of the seventeenth century:—

> "The primrose pale and azure violet
> Among the verduous grass hath nature set,
> And when the sun (on's love) the earth doth shine,
> These might, as love, set on her garments fine.
> The fearful bird its little house now builds,
> In trees and walls, in cities and in fields;
> The outside strong, the inside warm and neat,
> A natural artificer complete."

It is not to be supposed that her verses have any high poetic character; but they have certain honest, common-sense, healthy qualities, expressive of her real life,—that of a sensible, conscientious wife and mother, who did not let her everyday duties suffer from her cultivation of letters.

Still more popular, as a wielder of the lyric pen, was the Rev. Michael Wigglesworth, the author of *The Day of Doom* and *Meat out of the Eater*. Indeed it is doubtful whether any volume produced by the New England colony up to the date of the appearance of *The Day of Doom* was as widely read as that was; and it is partly because the popularity of that curious book is eminently characteristic of the puritanic intolerance then still triumphant in the new

colony, partly because the man's life was as eminently characteristic in its earnestness, that we have selected him specially for the purposes of the present sketch. We might indeed have found a more notable subject in the life and writings of Cotton Mather, who is comparatively well known to English readers; but an additional reason for choosing the Rev. Michael Wigglesworth exists in the fact that, notwithstanding the extensive popularity of his books up to a century back, he is at present quite unknown to the reading public in England,—while his books are not familiar even by their exterior to more than a few of the most miscellaneously informed of bibliographical adepts.

Wigglesworth has been made the subject of a handsome monograph, whereof fifty copies were recently issued by subscription in the United States; but a glance at the list of subscribers shows that only one of them is in England, and suggests a probability that barely more than one copy can have found its way across the Atlantic; but *one* more certainly has, and of that one we shall proceed to avail ourselves.

Michael Wigglesworth was born on the 18th of October, 1631: his father was Edward Wigglesworth; but the place of his birth is not ascertained. In an autobiographic sketch in his own handwriting, still preserved, he calls it an ungodly place, and states that most people there rather derided than imitated the piety of his parents. This, however, is altogether indistinctive, and probably means that the Puritans were a minority in that place. Cotton Mather says the parents of Wigglesworth had been "great sufferers for that which was then the cause of God and of New England;" and Wigglesworth says that they "feared the Lord greatly from their youth," but were opposed and persecuted "because they went from their own parish church to hear the Word and receive the Lord's Supper," insomuch that they determined to "pluck up their stakes and remove themselves to New England." And, accordingly, they did so, leaving dear relations, friends, and acquaintance; a new-built house, a flourishing trade; to expose themselves to the hazard of the seas, and to the distressing difficulties of a howling wilderness, that they might enjoy liberty of conscience and Christ in His ordinances. They arrived at Charlestown in August or September, 1638, Michael being then in his seventh year; and in October they left to settle in New Haven. In the following year Michael was sent to the school of Master Ezekiel Cheever, where he studied a year or two, and "began

to make Latin and to get forward apace;" but, his father falling lame, he was taken from school to assist him in his work. He was sent to school again in his fourteenth year, soon overcame the difficulties incident to his four years' relaxation of study, and in two years and three-quarters was pronounced fit to enter college. He accordingly proceeded to Cambridge, to which college the Rev. John Harvard had left a bequest the year the Wigglesworths reached Charlestown. The following account of the father's difficulties and rewards in sending the son to college is interesting and in every way characteristic:—

"It was an act of great self-denial in my father, that notwithstanding his own lameness and great weakness of body, which required the service and helpfulness of a son, and having but one son to be the staff of his age and supporter of his weakness, he would yet, for my good, be content to deny himself that comfort and assistance I might have lent him. It was also an evident proof of a strong faith in him, in that he durst adventure to send me to the college, though his estate was but small, and little enough to maintain himself and his small family left at home. And God let him live to see how acceptable to himself this service was in giving up his only son to the Lord and bringing him up to learning; especially the lively actings of his faith and self-denial herein. For first, notwithstanding his great weakness of body, yet he lived till I was so far brought up as that I was called to be a Fellow of the college, and improved in public service there, and until I had preached several times; yea and more than so, he lived to see and hear what God had done for my soul in turning me from darkness unto light, and from the power of Satan unto God, which filled his heart full of joy and thankfulness beyond what can be expressed. And for his outward estate, that was so far from being sunk by what he had spent from year to year upon my education, that in six years time it was plainly doubled, which himself took great notice of, and spake of it to myself and others, to the praise of God, with admiration and thankfulness."

In the autobiographic sketch from which the foregoing is taken, and of which we have not seen it necessary to preserve the antiquated orthography, he tells us that he had enjoyed the benefit of religious and strict education, and that God, "in His mercy and pity," kept him from "scandalous sins," both before and after coming to college.

"But alas," says he, "I had a naughty vile heart, and was acted by corrupt nature, and therefore could propound no right and noble ends to myself, but acted from self and for self. I was indeed studious, and strove to outdo my compeers; but it was for honour, and applause, and preferment, and such poor beggarly ends. Thus I had my ends,

and God had His ends, far differing from mine; yet it pleased Him to bless my studies, and to make me to grow in knowledge both in the tongues and inferior arts, and also in Divinity. But when I had been there about three years and a half, God, in His love and pity to my soul, wrought a great change in me, both in heart and life, and from that time forward I learnt to study with God and for God. And whereas before that I had thoughts of applying myself to the study and practice of physick, I wholly laid aside those thoughts, and did choose to serve Christ in the work of the ministry, if He would please to fit me for it, and to accept of my service in that great work."

His "call" to be a Fellow of the college took place not long after he was graduated; and he appears to have acted as tutor there, as did most of the early Fellows of the college. Cotton Mather says that he adorned the station with "a rare faithfulness," and had such a "flaming zeal," that he sometimes feared lest his care for the training of his pupils "should so drink up his very spirit as to steal away his heart from God." Increase Mather, Cotton's father, who was a pupil of Wigglesworth, says he had "on that account reason to honour his memory." During the period of his tutorship, he appears to have delivered at the college two orations, still preserved in his Common-place Book, the one entitled, *The Prayse of True Eloquence*, the other, *Concerning True Eloquence, and How to Attain It.* These are composed in a fine earnest style, and show considerable enthusiasm of a secular kind, which may be regarded as a step in the direction of composing in verse.

Meantime, he was preparing himself for the ministry, and, as we have already seen, had preached several times before the death of his father, in 1653. The first call he is known to have received was in 1654, from the town of Malden, where he supplied the pulpit a year and a half, "being much troubled to decide what his duty might be, before he was fully inducted into the pastoral office,"—which was probably soon after the 25th of August, 1656; for on that date he received what was the necessary preliminary among the Puritans of New England, a letter of dismission from the Church at Cambridge, which, in itself an interesting relic, and thoroughly expressive of the temper of the time and place, is as follows:—

"To the Church of Christ at Malden, grace and peace from God our Father, and from the Lord Jesus Christ.

"Whereas, the good hand of Divine Providence hath so disposed that our beloved and highly esteemed brother, Mr. Wigglesworth, hath his residence and is employed in the good work of the Lord amongst you, and hath seen cause to desire of us Letters Dismissive to your

Church, in order to his joining as a member with you. We, therefore, of the Church of Christ at Cambridge, have consented to his desires herein, and if you shall accordingly proceed to receive him, we do hereby resign and dismiss him to your holy fellowship, withall certifying that as he was formerly admitted among us with much approbation, so during his abode with us his conversation was such as did become the Gospel, not doubting but that, through the grace of Christ, it hath been and will be no otherwise amongst you; and that he will be enabled to approve himself to you in the Lord as becometh saints.

"Further desiring of the Father of mercies that he may become a chosen and special blessing to you, and you also again unto him through Christ Jesus,

"We commit him and you all, with ourselves, to Him who is our Lord and yours,

"In whom we are,

"Your Loving brethren,

"JONATHAN MITCHELL
"RICHARD CHAMPNEY,
"EDMUND FROST.

"With the consent of the brethren of the Church at Cambridge.
"Cambridge, 25 of ye 6th m. 1656."

In the meantime, Wigglesworth seems to have married his first wife, Mary Reyner:—we say "seems," because the precise date of this marriage is not positively ascertained, though there is but little doubt it took place before August 1656; neither is there any doubt that the union was a happy one, so long as it endured. As regards the aspiration in the letter of dismission, that Wigglesworth might become a "*special* blessing" to the Church at Malden, we may say that, certain drawbacks notwithstanding, it was substantially realised. The chief drawback was his health, which, after his marriage and call to Malden, was very bad; and by the summer of 1659 it was so impaired that he thought seriously of resigning his ministerial office. This, however, he did not do; but the entries made in his Common-place Book show that his malady was of a most distressing character. On the 21st of December, 1659, he had a crueller grief than his bodily ailments to contend with; for on that day his wife died, after a very brief married life, leaving a daughter under four years old. On the subject of his great loss he writes as follows:—

"Oh, it is a heart-cutting and astonishing stroke in itself. Lord help me to bear it patiently and to profit by it. Help me to honour Thee now in the fires, by maintaining good thoughts of Thee, and speaking good and submissive words concerning Thee. And, oh,

teach me to die every day. Fit me for that sweet society she is gone unto, where solitariness shall no more affright or afflict me. Oh, Lord, make up in Thyself what is gone in the creature. I believe Thou canst and wilt do it; but oh, help my unbelief."

About a year later he wrote as follows in his Common-place Book:—

"The Brethren are now below considering and consulting about a future supply and constant help in the ministry; as also whether I am called to lay down my place or not. Father, I leave myself and all my concernments with Thee. I have neither way of substance nor house to put my head in if turned out here. But, Lord, I desire to be at Thy disposing. Let Thy fatherly care appear towards me in these my straits, as hitherto it hath done, O my God; for other friend or helper beside Thee I have none. Lord, I believe; help my unbelief."

The Brethren decided that the disabled teacher was not called on to resign, and found him colleagues to perform that part of the ministry for which he was disqualified; but although prevented from officiating in the pulpit regularly, if at all, he was by no means idle; and it was doubtless to the fact of his active ministry being thus restricted, that he owed that wider influence which he ultimately, and for long after his death, exercised through the channel of literature. *The Day of Doom*, his chief work, and the first work in verse by him of which we have any record, must have been in hand very soon after the decision of the Brethren; for in January 1662 he was preparing it for the press, and making one of those profoundly simple and earnest entries in his Common-place Book that serve so well to set the man before us even now.

"I desire with all my heart and might to serve my Lord Christ (who is my best and only friend and supporter) in finishing this work which I am preparing for the press, acknowledging that the Lord hath dealt abundantly better with me than I deserve, if He shall please to accept such a poor piece of service at my hands, and give me leisure to finish it. I delight in His service and glory, and the good of poor souls, though my endeavours this way should rather occasion loss than outward advantage to myself. Lord, let me find grace in Thy sight. And who can tell but this work may be my last; for the world seem now to account me a burden (I mean divers of our chief ones), whatever their words pretend to the contrary. Lord, be Thou my habitation and hiding place, for other I have none. . . "

On the next page he records the result of his labours thus:

"It pleased the Lord to carry me through the difficulty of the forementioned work, both in respect of bodily strength and estate, and

to give vent for my books, and greater acceptance than I could have expected, so that of 1,600 there were scarce any unsold (or but few) at the year's end; so that I was a gainer by them and not a loser. Moreover I have since heard of some success of those my poor labours. For all which mercies I am bound to bless the Lord."

This very respectable literary success, implied in the sale of eighteen hundred copies within a year, was by no means of an ephemeral character, inasmuch as the popularity then established went on growing till within the last hundred years or so, and the book became, as we have seen, one of the most popular works of New England, if not *the* most popular. Mr. Francis Jenks, writing in the *Christian Examiner*, as recently as the year 1828, affirmed that he was even then acquainted with many aged persons who could still repeat the poem, though they might not have met with a copy "since they were in leading strings;" and this tenacity with which the work clung to the Puritan mind of New England, for generation after generation, was the inevitable result of complete and genuine adoption in the first instance. Taught to the New Englanders of the latter part of the seventeenth century with their catechism, published in one large edition after another, and even hawked about the colony printed on large sheets ballad-fashion, the work was one which Mather might well think, from the contemporary point of view, likely to "*find* the children" of that generation down a long succession of centuries, and indeed, as he himself quaintly expressed it, until the arrival of that day which gives a name to the poem.

As regards Wigglesworth's assurance that he had heard of "some success" having been vouchsafed to his "poor labours," we must note that there must have been an abundant foundation for that assurance. The grim terrorism that held so prominent a part in the severe and sombre religion of the seventeenth century Puritans gave rise to *The Day of Doom*, and received in that poem its most complete expression; and the fact that New England received the work so promptly, and retained it so long, is evidence enough that it fell into fertile ground, and succeeded (for it is, of course, *spiritual* success that the author records) in turning many persons towards the religion whereof it expressed and depicted one portion only. To assume that the utility of the book was simply and absolutely measured by the amount of pleasure it afforded to readers, would be, in such a case as the present, altogether too harsh a judgment; that it had a utility, served a purpose, and served it well, the length and

breadth of its popularity attest; and that that utility was such as the author intended, namely the service of religion, is the only fair conclusion.

The year 1662, in the course of which *The Day of Doom* came out, was a dreadful time for Puritans, whether in England or in America: in that year the "Act of Uniformity" was passed, and the newly restored Stuart dynasty was "breathing out threatenings and slaughters" against all Nonconformists. The Colonial Charters and liberties of New England were in the utmost peril, and the Puritans there were in dread of losing all they had found and made in the land of their choice. They were also afflicted with epidemic and a great drought; and it is not unlikely that these considerations, added to the personal sickness of Wigglesworth, helped to determine him in the selection and elaboration of his grim subject; for in this poem "Justice, with the terrors of her law, fearfully overshadows mercy." In the same year the author produced another shorter poem, which is not forthcoming at present, but which was seen by Dr. McClure when he compiled the *Bi-Centennial Book of Malden:* it was entitled *God's Controversy with New England.*

After the sale of the first edition of *The Day of Doom*, the poet of justice triumphant made a voyage to Bermuda, in the interest of his health, and returned within a few months. How his time was occupied after his return to Malden, we are not fully informed; but he must clearly have done some preaching and teaching; and about seven years after the issue of *The Day of Doom* he completed a new poem,—*Meat out of the Eater; or, Meditations concerning the Necessity, End, and Usefulness of Afflictions unto God's Children; All tending to prepare them for and comfort them under the Cross.* This subject was the natural complement of the subject of his other chief poem, and it was nearly as successful. The references made in the Common-place Book to this second work are particularly characteristic:—

Sept. 17, 1669.—I have been long employed in a great work composing Poems about the Cross. I have already found exceeding much help and assistance from Heaven, even to admiration, so that in three weeks' time I have transcribed three sheets fair, and made between whiles a hundred staves of verses besides. Some days the Lord hath so assisted me that I have made near or above twenty staves. For which His great mercy I bless His name from my soul, desiring still to make Him my α and ω in this great work. Lord, assist me now this day. Tu mihi principium, tu mihi finis eris: a deo et ad deum: τα παντα. . . . . Sept. 29.—The Lord did assist me much this day, so

that I wrote five sides fair and made out eleven or twelve staves more, though the day was cold and I wrought with some difficulty .... And now through Thy rich grace and daily assistance I have done composing. Laus deo. Amen. October 18.—My birthday, and it was the birthday of this book, it being finished (i.e. fully composed) this morning."

At this time ten years had passed since the death of his wife, and he seems to have remained a widower another ten; but in 1679 he married one Martha Mudge, aged eighteen. His friends and relatives disapproved of the marriage; but he himself expresses the opinion that, under God, she was a means of his recovering a better state of health, and he does not seem to have regretted the match. She died after about eleven years, leaving him a son and five daughters.

In 1684 Increase Mather wrote to offer him some weighty post at Harvard College, probably the presidency, which he declined; and by about 1686 his health was so far restored as to admit of his re-entering on the active duties of his ministry: as Cotton Mather says, "It pleased God, when the distresses of the Church in Malden did extremely call for it, wondrously to restore His faithful servant. He that had been for near twenty years almost buried alive, comes abroad again." And his ability as a preacher was put in requisition in May 1686, at no less important a matter than the annual election, at which he preached the customary sermon before the General Court of the Colony. On this occasion certain functionaries of the Court were ordered to "Give the Rev. Mr. Michael Wigglesworth the thanks of this Court for his sermon on Wednesday last, and to desire him speedily to prepare the same for the press, adding thereto what he had not time to deliver, the Court judging that the printing of it will be for the public benefit:" whether this was done, does not appear.

In 1691 or 1692 he married a third wife, Mrs. Sybil Avery, a widow, who survived him. The year 1692, whether the year of his marriage or the year after, is memorable for the fearful delusion concerning witchcraft which led to so much bloodshed and persecution in New England; but there is no evidence that he took an active part on either side,—though he certainly helped in the work of allaying the troubles occasioned by the delusion, after its subsidence.

In 1698 he had a severe illness, which so much alarmed his flock, that they "came together with agony, prayed, fasted, and wept before the Lord, with supplications for his life;" and on his recovery, they voted him a short respite from his

labours: but in June 1705 the respite granted from death expired; he was attacked in that month by a fever, which ended fatally on the 5th. It will be seen he was in his seventy-fourth year, notwithstanding the ill-health he had suffered from a great part of his life.

We have chosen to make a brief abstract of Wigglesworth's life, rather than to devote the same space to the criticism of his works, feeling that the course adopted affords a better explanation and illustration of the influences acting on New England Puritan literature than could have been got by extracts from and critical remarks on these extremely local poems. Nor do we propose to end this sketch with any detailed examination of *The Day of Doom* and *Meat out of the Eater*,—which works are in our own days far more interesting as *facts* than as *poems*. It must not, however, be understood that they are without literary merit: on the contrary, they are written in good vigorous English, and with a very fair measure of rhythmic and rhetorical excellence. *The Day of Doom* has also, amid its terrors, many truths of general import, as good for the men of to-day as for the men of the author's own time and land; and it is full of that unmistakable genuine piety shown in the Autobiography and Common-place Book. But the small element of *general* interest in it would not have sufficed for that popularity which began with its publication and lasted for some generations. The fact is, that in these pages the Puritans of New England saw honestly and strongly expressed the theology in which they believed; and they read in overwhelming language of the terrors of the Day of Judgment, the awful wrath of offended Deity. The mature man, accustomed to the sombre side of life, turned also instinctively to the sombre side of death and eternity; and the "imaginative youth devoured with avidity the horrors" of *The Day of Doom*, "and shuddered at its fierce denunciations. In the darkness of the night he saw its frightful forms arise to threaten him with retribution, till he was driven to seek the ark of safety from the wrath of Jehovah." Perhaps there were some who experienced a morbid satisfaction in gazing on Wigglesworth's grim pictures, convinced of immunity, on their own individual parts, from the terrors of the day of doom; but this special complacency in respect of the just punishment of sinners is an element in the Puritan religion that has almost passed out of existence, and can well be spared. Would that the earnestness of those noble though imperfect men were, in other respects, more diligently studied and emulated.

ART. V.—*Christenthum und Lutherthum* [Christianity and Lutheranism]. Von Dr. KARL FRIED. AUG. KAHNIS, Prof. der Theologie, Leipzig. Leipzig: Dörffling and Franke. 1871.

OUR readers have been furnished from time to time with general notices of the progress and tendency of theological thought on the Continent, especially in Germany. To many this has proved a valuable enlargement of the scope of their knowledge, and tended to promote in their minds that catholicity of sentiment which in our days is so specially desirable. It is well to mark how the Spirit of Truth is guiding other evangelical inquirers, subserving His own ends by the labours of earnest men in all communions and widely separated on subordinate points. The following pages will give a brief analysis and running criticism of one of the most striking works that have lately appeared in Germany. It is a selection of essays, dealing with some of the most important topics that are made prominent in modern Lutheran theology.

Dr. Kahnis is one of the ablest representatives of what may be called the Lutheran Confessional theology. He belongs to a class of divines who strive to combine scientific precision and progress with resolute adherence to the old standards of the German Reformation: the standards, that is, of the Augsburg Confession, as illustrated by other formularies of the sixteenth century and the great dogmatic divines who vindicated them. They have set before themselves an exceedingly difficult task, but they have for the last thirty years accomplished their task nobly. Although some of them have diverged, on the one hand, towards a doctrine that savours too much of Romanism, and some, on the other hand, have conceded too much to the spirit of liberalism, the best of the school have remained faithful, and we owe to them some of the noblest theological labours of the century. Dr. Kahnis has laboured long as Professor of Theology in Breslau and Leipzig: his chief works have been an unfinished description of the doctrine of the Holy Ghost, and an elaborate treatise on the Eucharist. The present volume contains an expansion of lectures delivered at various times on the Confessional subjects that now engage the attention of Germany; but its real value is its presentation of the system of doctrine that

may be said to be distinctively Lutheran, as opposed to the Reformed doctrine in all its shades. Believing most firmly that Lutheranism stands or falls with the conviction that the substance of the Augsburg Confession is founded on the Word of God, Dr. Kahnis strives hard to bring back the reviving faith of his country to the old standards, not, indeed, in the way of a simple "repristination"—the spirit of the age and the spirit of Christianity would not tolerate that—but in that of a pure reproduction of the doctrines so earnestly contended for by the Lutheran Fathers, as they are based on Scripture, and essential to the integrity and the defence of the Faith in the present age.

We heartily sympathise with our author's vindication of the necessity of a sound confession of faith. The most obvious proof of this necessity lies before us in the history of free thought in religion during the last century. The tendency which in philosophy and moral life vainly called itself Illuminism, is in the Church and in theology Rationalism. The same tendency which displaced positive legal enactments in favour of the vague generalities of natural right, and the historical forms of political life in favour of the *Rights of Man*, found the sum of Christianity in the doctrines concerning God, duty and immortality, and reduced everything positive in the Christian faith to the level of mere supports which Providence had appointed for that more rational and simpler edifice of all religions. Jesus Christ, the centre and substance of faith, was made simply and only the teacher and the pattern of virtue. Through many phases this error passed into a strictly cognate form; that of Schleiermacher, who made religion matter only of sentiment and of life. Its most subtle and most beautiful shape was assumed in the feeling of young evangelical Germany, that Christ was a present influence descending into the heart of everyone who cried to Him in faith—"My Lord and my God!" This warm sentiment, in itself, and as based on a sound theology, so noble, was misleading as it respects the Church, however fruitful and full of salvation to individuals. "We have found the Lord!" was the sole confession of this first love of reviving Germany. But this was not enough for the establishment, defence, and spread of the Christian cause. However dear to the Saviour this individual confession of the soul, His wise foresight did not entrust to it alone the diffusion of His kingdom. And the history of Pietism in Germany, as of other similar forms of religion in England, shows, as clearly as Rationalism itself, that something more is wanting than a

personal relation of love to the Lord. Whatever place may be given to the heart's feeling of individual trust—whether it comes after knowledge or leads to it—certain it is that there is no religion, no permanent and world-compelling religion, without a clear knowledge of God and His truth, and without a corporate fellowship of those who rejoice in it. The knowledge of God, in His triune relation to the world's destiny, is certainly not, as Schleiermacher would have it, a conclusion from the internal consciousness: the Word of Revelation is always appealed to by God, and there is a "Faith delivered to the saints," the alpha and the omega of which is Jesus Christ. Now, whilst everyone who receives Christ has in his own heart the key to the understanding of the Scripture concerning Him, it cannot be said that our Lord has left it to every individual believer to extract from that Scripture the articles of his belief. The same Christian community that has handed down the Scripture has also handed down a Confession. And in every age of restoration and revival it is the task, the difficult task, of the Church to present that Confession in such simplicity as to make it perfectly accordant with the Word of God.

Wearied by the vain endeavours of the Mediationists to pare down both Scripture and Confession within such limits as to give sanction to a new Creed, adapted to the free spirit of the times, such men as Kahnis, and the strong party of those whom Kahnis represents, went straight back to the original confession of Lutheranism, and seek to show its accordance with the Scriptures, or rather with those plain passages of the acknowledged Scriptures which contain matter of faith. In spite of the clamours of enemies on every hand, who have urged against them the cry of retrograde tendency, exclusiveness, and unevangelical strictness, they have held on their way, and given the Augsburg Confession a dignity that it has never had since the seventeenth century closed. Defending himself against these several attacks, Dr. Kahnis gives his views severally of Christianity, Protestantism, and Lutheranism in relation to this question.

In the essay on Christianity, Dr. Kahnis makes his keynote the unity of this trinity: faith in God, fellowship with God, and the communion of those who hold this faith and enjoy this fellowship. "Faith is the root, fellowship with God the stem, the fellowship in religion the crown:" this sentence, of course, must be accepted, if accepted at all, with some reservation; but, rightly understood, it is undeniable that the perfection of religion is the eternal communion of

the saints in the unity of the Father and the Son through the Spirit. Positive religion demands revelation, not only the ordinary revelation of His works, but the extraordinary revelation of His prophets. The fact that all religions have appealed to such revelation, shows that God has implanted a craving and a necessity in the heart of man which it is His will to satisfy. No form of religion has continued, save as professing to rest upon express Divine revelation. But, as the knowledge of God must rest upon the authority of God, so it is fellowship with God which faith demands. The consciousness of sin, universal, and, by man's own endeavours, ineradicable sin, demands of God the revelation of its reason and its cure. And the fellowship of religion, with its doctrine, constitution, organisation, and worship, equally demand an express revelation: there can be nothing positive, absolute, and permanent in religious communion, without the Divine authority. Hence, the fact that all positive religions appeal to revelation is grounded on the very nature of religion itself.

Applying these three ideas to the Church of the present times, Dr. Kahnis shows that the different Confessions give different answers to the question, as to the essentials of Christianity. The orthodox Church of the East would say that Christianity is a sound faith in the truth concerning the Triune God: it is the religion simply of sound doctrine. Protestants would admit this; but they would insist that the essence of that sound doctrine is individual fellowship with God through Christ: whether based, with the Lutheran, on justification by faith, or, with the Reformed, on the predestination of the Divine counsel. The Roman Catholic divines would assert that the true doctrine, and personal salvation through that true doctrine, are given only in the Church, which is, therefore, the fundamental thing in Christianity. They would plead, that what Jesus Christ founded upon earth was not an institute of doctrine, nor an economy of personal salvation, but a kingdom which is to find its fulfilment in the coming kingdom of God: but that kingdom of God upon earth is the Church. Dr. Kahnis shows, and with great force, that these three elements of religion have been each unduly magnified by the several Confessions, and that their errors have resulted from this. But here we will translate his own words:—

"Judging these Confessional definitions of Christianity by the first impression which they produce, we are compelled to ascribe to each a portion of the truth. If Jesus Christ commanded His Apostles to make

all nations His disciples by baptism into the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, faith in the Holy Trinity must be essential to Christianity. But, it must further be said, God has revealed Himself in Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit, not to announce that He is Three-One, but to redeem us, to deliver us, to reconcile us, to bring us to salvation. The truth which Christianity reveals is the salvation of the individual, and thus Protestants are right in their cry: Seek the one thing needful in Christianity in the salvation of your own soul. Certainly its saving purpose is essential to Christianity. But Protestants have always admitted that no man can have God as his Father who has not the Church for his mother, understanding by the Church, not its outward organisation, but the kingdom of the Spirit established by Christ, which calls men to salvation by Word and Sacrament; nor can they forget that those who receive salvation are, as believers and saints, members of the body of Christ, which is the Church of our Lord. And thus the Catholics are not altogether wrong, when they lay the stress of Christianity on the Church. . . . .

"Christianity is the covenant which God has ratified with mankind, through Jesus Christ, the only Mediator between God and men. This is, in its most comprehensive definition, the essence of Christianity. Religion is the relation of men to God: its three elements, faith, fellowship with God, and religious communion, demand a revelation. This revelation, as pursued through the Old and the New Covenant, exhibits the characteristics of revealed religion in the particular form which those three elements receive in Christianity. . . . .

"Christianity, the fulfilment of the Old Covenant, is the covenant of believing men with God through Jesus Christ in the Holy Ghost, the three forms of which are faith in the Three-one God, secondly, the fellowship of the saved individual with God, and thirdly, the Church. Neither of these three can be wanting where there is true Christianity. Where a Church has the true faith in the Triune God, but not the life of faith, there may be orthodoxy but not true believing. It is acknowledged that this is the peril of the Oriental Church, which terms itself the Orthodox. Where individuals are in living faith, but neglect the faith of the Church as founded on the Word of God, and have no sentiment of true community life, pietism and mysticism are the result. Where, finally, the entire weight of Christianity is thrown upon membership in the external Church, where authorities, forms, and laws are regarded as in themselves saving, there is false Catholicism, which, as is well known, must be sought not only in Romanism. Certain as it is that these three elements mutually require each other, it may yet be said that the centre of Christianity is the second, in the fellowship of salvation. The Gospel is pre-eminently the covenant of a believing heart with God, the power of God to save men, the word of reconciliation. Christianity is the kingdom of God which had for its presupposition the kingdom of revelation from Adam to Christ, and its fulfilment in the kingdom of eternal life coming with the return of Christ. In this interval between the ascension and the return of the

Redeemer from heaven, the kingdom of God upon earth has this function to discharge, given it by the Lord at His departure, to gather from the nations disciples who shall abide when the Lord returns to judge the living and the dead."

After a noble assertion, and defence of the assertion, that the religious life of man finds its truth in Jesus, that the Christ of faith is the Christ of history, and that in Him is personal salvation, the author proceeds to the discussion of Protestantism and Lutheranism in relation to the three elements of religion above laid down. Protestantism is defined as "the tendency running through all ages of the Church, but culminating in the Reformation, to apply the standard of the Gospel to the faith and life of the Church." The Confessions are to the Protestant true, not because the Church has defined and maintained them, but because and so far as they are conformable to the Gospel, that is, to the Scripture. The decisive authority is not the Church, but the Word of God. That is the Protestant principle as to *doctrine*. Again, while all agree that salvation is in Christ alone, and Protestantism does not deny that the Church through Word and Sacrament brings men to faith and binds believers to a faithful profession, salvation is not made dependent on adhesion to the internal Church, but on a living faith in Jesus Christ. That is the Protestant principle as to *personal salvation*. Finally, Catholicism makes the Church an organised union of sound believers in one external whole, while Protestantism makes the Church's unity consist, not in uniformity of forms, but in its Divine foundation, in the fellowship of believers, which is produced by Father, Son and Spirit through Word and Sacraments. That is the Protestant principle as to the *Church*. But it must be remembered that Protestantism is not a mere protest against error. The canon of Scripture is a rule for construction, and not for destruction only. The doctrine of personal salvation through faith is not doctrine only, as opposed to Romish salvation by works, but must be the Scriptural expression of a reality sealed on the heart by the Spirit. The principle of the invisible Church, as supreme, is an airy abstraction, unless it goes hand in hand with the endeavour to construct the true Church as sketched in the New Testament Scriptures. A mere Protestantism of principles, which has no Confession, no established state of grace, and no Church, is as bad, in another sense, as that against which it protests.

Protestantism, whether as negative or positive, has always

been a tendency within Christendom. Before the Reformation, it had not power enough either to reform the Church or to set up a rival polity. In the ancient and mediæval times, it assumed two forms, as it was either bound up with Catholicism or opposed to it. Our author cites Augustine, as blending in himself two opposite tendencies: uniting dependence on the authority of the Catholic Church with the principle of the supremacy of Scripture; the necessity of belonging to the external Church in order to salvation with the doctrine of the predestination of individuals; the highest Church ideas, as to its mighty internal organisation, with the doctrine that, in the proper sense of the term, only the saints belong to the Church. A stronger protest than his was raised by such men as Jovinian, who bore witness against legal righteousness; Vigilantius, who was zealous against the influx of heathenism into the Church. The necessity of a strong hand to keep down the German hordes rendered comparatively powerless the Protestantism of Claudius, Agobard, Berengarius. From the eleventh to the thirteenth century the mediæval Church was the greatest power of the world, and brooked no opposition either from without or from within. Then began a multitude of forces to pave the way for the Reformation; but only to pave the way. The method of cure to which all looked was the legitimate ordinance of General Councils. But in vain. The Popes, who, as Italian princes, had learned the secrets of all statecraft, were able to dissipate the uniting forces of reform. The old way of secular and ecclesiastical progress was too broad, worldly, internal and undecided, and, above all, too unevangelical, to effect a reformation in the head and members. Then arose the reforming bodies and the great precursors of Luther. The Waldenses started from the priestly rights of the individual Christian, Wycliffe from the supremacy of Scripture, Huss from the internality and sanctity of the Church. But they only sowed in tears what the next century reaped in joy. Luther started not from any of these principles, but from the principle of personal salvation through faith in our Lord Jesus Christ.

Lutheranism stands or falls with the Augsburg Confession; that is to say, a Lutheran Protestant acknowledges that Confession to be essentially in accordance with Scripture, and makes it the standard of his belief and public instruction. The Reformed Communions have no such universally accepted formulary; they have national symbols only. Lutheranism finds its second fundamental principle in the doctrine of personal salvation. The Reformed Church rests rather upon the

Pauline doctrine of predestination; the Lutheran, on his doctrine of justification. Christianity makes its second great principle the fellowship of man with God in salvation through Jesus Christ: Protestantism finds this in the salvation of the individual by faith, without the necessary mediation of the external Church; Lutheranism first rests upon the fundamental conviction that in the salvation of the individual lies the eternal centre of the Gospel; secondly, makes that salvation result from justifying faith; and, thirdly, constitutes the doctrine of justification the material test of all doctrines. Lutheranism, finally, has a strict and rigid Church organisation: one which makes the Confession rule all functions of worship; which gives a special prominence to Word and Sacraments, as the instruments of the Holy Spirit; which assigns to a special ministerial order all the offices of instruction, worship, edification, administration; which accepts synodical union and union with the State as necessities of its origin and continuance till now, though not necessary concomitants of its future; which makes large and free use of ancient forms of service, so far as they can be purified; and, lastly, which lays a specific stress upon the Eucharist, administered only after confession and absolution. As the Confession of Faith is placed in the office of the Eucharist, and holds the Eucharist to be the highest expression of unity, so the administration and reception of the Supper presupposes adhesion to the Lutheran Church. Hence the Lutheran Church has, in its ecclesiastical organisation, principles which it cannot give up without changing its individuality. But these principles leave more or less free space for variety and development. To this point we shall hereafter return.

Dr. Kahnis is led in the next essay to consider the most important subject of the present day—Scripture and Confession. He is in evident straits between three parties: those who, like Hengstenberg, make all scientific inquiry bow to faith; those who, like the Tübingen school, sacrifice the demands of faith to science; and, lastly, those who try to mediate on the ground of mutual concession, like Bleek. This is his conclusion:—

"All acknowledge that we have on the whole, though not in detail, the text as it was written. The theory that the Holy Scriptures are absolutely wanting in genuineness, credibility and integrity, has never been held, and, if it were set up, would be of little import. But the deductions made by destructive criticism in the name of science are so important that the Divine authority of Scripture cannot consist with them. If in the New Testament only four Pauline epistles and the

Apocalypse are accepted, but the life of Jesus regarded as made up of myths and legends, that is, as in its substance unhistorical, the New Testament may indeed be the object, but not the regulator, of theological science. That theology alone is true which unites in itself true faith and true science. To faith, in the sense in which the Church has always demanded it, negative criticism makes no pretence. But it thinks it has in this freedom from faith the charter of true science. Yet it is most certain that this freedom from faith is the fruit of a negative spirit which is quite as unscientific as that which holds fast results before the process of inquiry. The Tübingen school set out from a view of the origin of Christianity which must first make the history whose result it professes to be; a circular process which is so palpably unhistorical that we cannot but wonder at its having so long obtruded itself as scientific. The faith rejected by these proud builders is in fact the condition to the right understanding of the sacred history. The theologians of faith have most victoriously established the genuineness and authenticity of the Holy Writings in all essential points."

This last point is one of very great importance. Is the authority of Scripture absolute and unexceptionable in all its parts, or does that authority admit of abatement and extend only to its general integrity as a whole? Dr. Kahnis appeals to history, and proves that the Lutheran Church, like the Early Church, fell very far short of that unconditional acceptance of the Scripture which modern orthodoxy aims to enforce. As during the first four centuries several of the books of the New Testament were contested, so was it also in the early times of the Reformation. The noble old Lutheran dogmatics reckoned those same books among canonical Scriptures of the second degree: following in this the unconcealed judgment of Luther himself. Both Luther and Calvin, it is well known, acknowledged that in the historical books minor inaccuracies were to be found. And, accordingly, Dr. Kahnis does not hesitate to say that "it cannot be maintained in the bosom of Lutheranism that the true Lutheran view of the genuineness and authenticity of the Scripture is that of the absolute and unconditional kind," of which, for instance, Hengstenberg was the representative. He concedes very much to modern criticism, so far as concerns the fringes of the vesture of truth, the details of minor inaccuracy, which, as he thinks, high orthodoxy vainly defends, and the subordinate character of some of the canonical books. Declining to accept the theory of a strict verbal inspiration and necessary preservation of the very letter of Scripture, he falls back upon the principles of the Church when in a state of indecision: that is, of the Early Church before the canon was

completed, and of the Early Reformation before the later dogmatists defined the doctrine. The following extract will give some idea of his own principle:—

"The older theology was right when it made a careful distinction between revelation and the inspiration of the Spirit. The prophets and the Apostles drew their teaching from revelation. The prophets received from God by the Holy Ghost the Word which they were to announce. But to the Apostles there was revealed, by the Holy Ghost, the meaning of the facts of salvation which they had announced. But what prophets and Apostles knew by revelation they must present in clear thought and word. We speak of a Pauline, a Petrine, a Johannæan system of doctrine. No man can doubt that each of these apostles stamped upon the revelation committed to him the mark of his own gift of teaching. We must therefore distinguish between revelation and doctrinal statement: inasmuch as in the latter we add to the substance of the revelation an element of individual thought which is based upon the personal mental characteristics of each individual Apostle. One thing is the Word of God, another thing is the mental conception of it, which undeniably has a human side. But we must also distinguish between the intellectual conception and the presentation in word and writing. For the presentation of that which God revealed to him, an Apostle needed a special assistance of the Holy Spirit. As the Second Epistle of Peter says of the prophets, 'Holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost,' so St. Paul says of himself and the other Apostles, 'Now we have received, not the spirit of the world, but the spirit which is of God; that we might know the things that are freely given us of God, which things also we speak, not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth.'" (1 Cor. ii. 12, 13.)

Even an Apostle who came into a city to preach the Word could not know whether it might be given him to give to God's Word the true utterance. For this he needed the special aid of the Spirit. With fear and trembling St. Paul came to the Corinthians (1 Cor. ii. 3). When an Apostle spake he spake in the manner peculiar to himself. No man will believe that the Holy Ghost, who inspired him while speaking, poured into him his language word for word. Everyone must so conceive of the Spirit's help as that it should so penetrate the powers of the Apostles' souls with heavenly life, that they were raised to their highest activity, that they were preserved from human disturbances, while the manner of speech peculiar to these holy men corresponded to the sacred substance and the sacred design. Now it is hard to doubt that the writers of Scripture wrote in the same style in which they spoke. The speeches of St. Paul in the Acts are in strict keeping as to substance and form with his

Epistles. And if we must needs interpret the Apostle's style of teaching according to his own characteristics when his instruction is oral, it cannot be supposed that the manner of teaching and the verbal style belong immediately to the Holy Ghost when he writes. The old dogmatists had recourse to the expedient that the Spirit in dictating adapted Himself to the peculiarity of each sacred writer; but that is inadmissible. It cannot for a moment be doubted that the help which the Holy Ghost afforded in oral discourse corresponded with that which He afforded in the written discourse. As the Apostles spoke, so they also wrote, in the Holy Ghost. The Spirit of God moved, inspired, guarded, consecrated them, so that they wrote worthily of the heavenly matter. But this assistance of the Spirit was not imparted in a purely supernatural manner, but allied itself to what the Apostles spoke out of their Christian personality and in their office. The doctrine of the old dogmatic that God Himself, more specifically the Holy Ghost, is the proper author of the Scripture, is impossible. St. Paul and not the Holy Ghost wrote to the Romans. What urged the Apostle to write to them was his official duty, and what he wrote was the substance of his Apostolical doctrine in his own style of exhibiting it. But that which moved him and what he wrote was all in the Holy Ghost. St. Paul was the proper author of this epistle, and the Holy Ghost only that which He is called, the Helper or Paraclete.

In all this there is a certain undeniable basis of truth. But at the same time it is an exceedingly perilous principle in its adaptation. It leads directly and of necessity to the theory that makes the Spirit in the individual Christian the test and arbiter of the degree of inspiration in the several parts of Scripture. He who lives in the Spirit of God discerns in the Scripture and feels in all its teaching a power which is discerned and felt in no other book. But this being absolutely certain, it is not absolutely certain that he can distinguish "between Isaiah and Daniel, between Paul and James." According to Dr. Kahnis, and his theory of inspiration, "the old orthodoxy which held all the books contained in the Canon as therefore equally authenticated products of inspiration had its foundation in a great lack of experience in the Holy Ghost and of spiritual power of discernment." Hence a distinction is made between the inspiration of the Old Testament and that of the New; between that of the writings uncontested and that of those which were held in doubt, between that of the Apostles them-

selves and that of those who, like St. Luke, wrote at second hand. There is a great fallacy in all this. Without entering into elaborate arguments to show that there is a specific difference in inspiration, which distinguishes it from every other influence of the Holy Spirit, it is enough to allude to the following facts. The Scripture itself makes no such distinction: it speaks of the Holy Ghost as speaking and writing by the holy men of the Old Testament. As if of set purpose to obviate this future theory, it speaks of itself as one organic whole which cannot be broken. The writers of the New Testament were to be led into all truth. Again, it is precisely in those books which are said to be of the "second degree" that the doctrine of inspiration has its fullest statement, as notably in the Second Epistle of St. Peter and the Apocalypse. Nor is it a matter of slight moment that the full weight of Gospel testimony rests upon the evidence of some of those writers who belong to that class. Take St. Luke, for instance. It would not be too much to say that there is no writer of the New Testament, no author in Scripture, upon whom more depends than upon him. The profoundest mystery of the incarnation is in his Gospel; it contains such an exhibition of the character, and teaching, and work, and kingdom of Christ as has no strict counterpart elsewhere. It alone continues the history of Christ into His heavenly state; and its sequel, the book of Acts, bears the whole weight of revelation as to the establishment and spread of the Christian Church. It is, to say the least, exceedingly dangerous to apply this distinction. The spirit of Christ in the Church, to which this theory makes appeal, does not sanction it. Will anyone undertake to say that the testing spirit in the Christian has ever failed to discern in St. Luke's Gospel, in the Acts, in St. Peter's precious Second Epistle, and in the opening of the Apocalypse, the very highest, deepest, and most commanding, revelations of Divine truth? The same may be said of St. James's much maligned Epistle. They who compare it, or rather contrast it, with St. Paul's writings, forget that there is another class of Scripture to which it may be likened,—that is, the Saviour's own teaching in the Gospels, especially the Sermon on the Mount. There is no vital difference between St. James's doctrine and St. Paul's on justification. To those who assert that there is, St. James may say "I appeal unto Cæsar." The Saviour gives every word he has written His final sanction; and in the Lord's words St. Paul and St. James find their reconciliation, their unity, and their peace.

When Dr. Kahnis enters upon the question of the Church's Confession, he is on ground more firm, and his teaching is most valuable. God has been pleased to commit the Scriptures to the Church, that the Church may in her Confession define the fundamental teachings of that Scripture, and conduct her theological teaching on the basis of that Confession, as proved by the holy oracles. Scripture, Confession, and Theology must work together in the perfect theory of the Church's life. A Church without a Confession, direct or indirect, expressed in one formulary or diffused among many, is a contradiction. The Scriptures themselves are, of course, the Supreme Confession. But there never has existed a Christian community which has not expressed its common consciousness or apprehension of the essential doctrines of the Scripture in its own way. Dr. Kahnis applies three tests to the Confession of the Church. It must be *legitimated:* externally, as appointed by the Church's organs, and acknowledged as the expression of the Church's faith; internally, as coinciding strictly with that faith. It must be in *harmony with Scripture:* not simply as being a theological development, but as vouching its every statement by clear utterances of the Word of God. It must be *regulative:* that is, it must govern the instruction, the preaching, the theological science, the worship, the official functions, the common activities, of the Church that holds it.

There have been two great periods of the construction of Confessions: that of the Primitive Church, and that of the Reformation age. Three Confessions, which may be called general or œcumenical, were formed in early times, and have been transmitted to succeeding ages with more or less universal acceptance. These were the Apostles' Creed; the Niceno-Constantinopolitan, commonly called the Nicene Creed; and the Athanasian.

Applying the three tests to the first of these, the Apostolical, it is authoritative, Scriptural, and regulative. It was the Saviour's own formula expanded so as to embrace the facts of Apostolical testimony concerning the Father as the source of all; the Son in His conception, birth, passion, death, descent, resurrection, and return; the Spirit as governing in the Church, administering the forgiveness of sins, and as He will effect the resurrection and bestow eternal life. It cannot be contested that it expresses the truth of Scripture, and it has stamped its regulative impress upon the worship and teaching of the universal Church. In that Creed Scripture and tradition were one; but in it tradition spent itself. The

second Creed, the Nicene, which was perfected at Constantinople, went back through tradition to Scripture for its definition of points that were contested by heresy; that is, of the Son's consubstantiality in eternal Sonship with the Father, and of the Holy Spirit's relation to both. In this Creed, which the universal Church, East and West, old and new, has accepted, the Confession became more theological; and the Church, fresh from the contest with heresy, taught her children the meaning of the older Confession. This element of teaching appeared yet more strongly in the third, the Athanasian, which, on the basis of the others, constructed a definite doctrine of the relations of the Holy Trinity and of the Person of Christ in the unity and distinctness of His two natures. This Creed has not the legitimation of the former; its origin is unknown, though its relation to the Augustinian school of teaching is undoubted; its Scripturalness is proved only by a keen theological exposition of the words of Holy Writ; and its severity is alien from the spirit of its predecessors. In it the Confession has almost become theology. In fact, it is a perfect exhibition of the transitional period, when the Church began no longer to be contented with the plain facts and doctrines of the common salvation, but required of all her members a consent to the truth of the more interior mysteries of the faith. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that this Creed has received a sanction with which it did not set out, that it is generally faithful to the Scriptures, and that it has impressed its teaching, more than is generally acknowledged, upon the entire theology, teaching, and worship of the greater part of the Evangelical Church.

When we come down to the modern Confessions of the Christian Church, there is one thing that immediately strikes the mind. They bring into prominence the work of Christ, the doctrines of grace, the conditions, character, and issues of salvation, in a manner of which there is scarcely any trace in the older Creeds. This, of course, was a necessity caused by the corruptions of the mediæval Church. But it may be questioned whether those corruptions themselves were not to a great extent the fruit of the comparative neglect of the "things that accompany salvation" in those ancient Creeds. The eternal verities, to whose importance those Creeds bear witness, they kept in safety. The perversions of ages never affected them. The doctrines of the Trinity and of the Person of Christ were preserved inviolate through the darkest ages. But it was far otherwise with those doctrines which the Creeds passed by. Had the Nicene and the Athanasian laid down clear definitions

as to the mediatorial work of Christ, as to the Spirit's offices, as to the connection between sin and redemption, as to the terms of acceptance with God, and the character and the consummation of the Christian life, the current of ecclesiastical history might, humanly speaking, have been very different. The Œcumenical Creeds do full justice to God, but they do not full justice to the relations between God and man. Hence the vast difference between them and formularies of the Reformation age.

Into the history of those formularies we cannot enter. Nor, indeed, does our author lead us in that direction. He is a strict Lutheran, and pleads for the Augsburg Confession, pure and simple, as the basis and standard and regulator of Lutheranism. But his is not a blind and undiscriminating devotion; he takes great care not to merge the Christian, or even the Protestant, in the Lutheran. The following sentences are weighty, and deserve translation :—

"As to the Augsburg Confession, the *Formula Concordiæ* says:—'We accept it not because it was laid down by our theologians, but because it was taken from the Word of God, and is firmly grounded in that Word.' The norm of all time is the course of the earth round the sun, which defines day and night, and months and years. This final norm of time, however, for common life uses the medium of calendar and hours. So also the final norm of all truth, the Holy Scriptures, must for the Church's life use the medium of a summary of faith, according to which, in the course of life, all must be judged and ordered. Scripture, said the ancients, is the rule ruling (norma normans), confession is the rule ruled (norma normata). Not the Scripture to be interpreted, but the interpreted Scripture, is the rule of the Church's life. But, as the calendar and the hours must be defined according to the sun, so the confession has its regulator not in itself, but in the Scripture. While the Romish Church says that its doctrines are true, because the Church has by its authorities established them, the Lutheran Church calls the Augsburg Confession true, not because Lutheran theologians have established it, but because it is founded on the Word of God. Accordingly the estimation of the Confession in the Lutheran Church is always a *conditional* one; only *so far as* it is grounded in God's Word is it true. As soon as Lutheranism makes the estimation of the Confession absolute, it forsakes the domain of Protestantism. Having subjected the Creeds of the ancient Church to the Word of God, it cannot withdraw its own testimony from the same text. . . . Again, the truth of the Confession does not depend on the truth of every individual statement. Melanchthon was mending the original down to the last, and afterwards changed much, which must be regarded as improvement, though only the original has absolute authority. But that a blind adherence to individual clauses may lead to error, that of the *Apology*

(Art. XIII.) shows, which teaches three sacraments, Baptism, Eucharist, Absolution. Further, it is not the *theological form*, but the substance of the faith, that a man embraces in the Confession."

Here follows a series of points, in which the substance of the doctrine and its theological form differ: the holder of the Creed being permitted to differ from its first constructors. It may be asked whether, with such deductions as these, it might not be possible to hold almost any creed that has any evangelical basis at all. Dr. Kahnis's free principles are necessary for him, as an apologist of the Augsburg Confession. He does not himself abuse his liberty, at least to any great extent; but the same license in other hands has not been so discreetly enjoyed, as numberless theological works show. But, after making these reservations, the author proceeds to show that his Augsburg Confession, as the sole standard of Lutheranism, will sustain the three tests of legitimacy, Scripturalness, and regulative force. "It was the true objective result, in which were united the two lines of development in the Reformation—that of doctrine and that of organisation. The Confession was, on the 25th of June, 1530, read before the Emperor and the Estates; in spite of all defections from the faith, it has been to this day in all Lutheran lands the fundamental formulary of our Church." How far it is a Scriptural confession, an examination of the distinctive doctrines of Lutheranism must decide. It required a theological defence in the *Apology*, and strove to adapt itself to the various shades of Reformation belief in the *Formula Concordiæ*. As to its regulative character, as moulding the offices of Word and Sacrament, it has never been wanting, though the efforts to promote a union between the Lutheran and the Reformed Churches have introduced much confusion into the subject, and shaken its authority very considerably.

This leads to the main question of the present volume; a question of vital interest in Protestant Germany, and one which touches at many points of deep interest the religious state of England. Dr. Kahnis occupies a few chapters of high theological value with the exhibition of certain fundamental principles of the Lutheran faith, which will not blend with any other system, and give Lutheranism a unique and exclusive character. Let us glance at them in his order, which, however, does not seem to us the best.

First, we have a discussion of the doctrine concerning the personal appropriation of saving grace. As all confessions, in some sense, regard the true Christian as one who is in saving

communion with God through Christ, so Protestantism makes that salvation to be the result of faith in Christ independently of the Church, and Lutheranism is characterised by the earnestness with which it insists upon this justification by faith as the central element of salvation. The author establishes the truth, that acceptance, or justification, on the ground of the merit of Christ, is the regulative principle of evangelical theology, but sums up in the following statement, which gives the strength and weakness of Lutheranism :—

"God, who sent His own Son to obtain our salvation, imparts the salvation provided in Christ through the Holy Spirit to man. He foreknew those who would embrace that salvation and persevere unto the end, and those who would not; and ordained to salvation those who should persevere. But those whom He foreordained He called through Word and Sacrament, placing them in a condition in which they should be able to come to salvation. Many, however, are called; few chosen. The call must, in order to issue in salvation, lead through regeneration to saving faith. Regeneration, connected with the Sacrament of Baptism, is the work of the Holy Ghost, who changes from children of the flesh into children of the Spirit. But those who are children of God are justified also by faith: they receive forgiveness of sins, have access to God, are reconciled to Him, and have a title to eternal life. But the judicial union of men with God includes the mystical indwelling of the Triune God. He who stands in justifying faith has actual communion with the Father through the Son in the Holy Ghost. But, if the Spirit of God rules in believers, He, at the same time, produces, through the regenerate will of man, sanctification, that is, the renewal of man into the image of God, which was lost by the Fall."

It is obvious to remark upon this modern interpretation of Lutheranism, that it gives a very diluted edition of the great Protestant principle. If justifying faith is preceded by Regeneration, and Regeneration is absolutely imparted in Baptism, and in no other way, how is it possible to evade the natural suggestion that, after all, the fundamental matter in Christianity is the sovereign impartation of a gift that cannot be resisted,—the gift of the new creating Spirit of Christ? Either Regeneration must lose the grand and glorious meaning which it has in the New Testament, or, retaining that meaning, and placed before acceptance with God for Christ's sake, Justification ceases to be the central doctrine that Lutheranism has always boasted of having made it. We believe that many modern Lutherans, and many Sacramentalists who are not Lutherans, adopt the former part of the alternative. They reduce the Regeneration, which they suppose to be the

baptismal gift, to a mere susceptibility of future grace. But they have no warrant in Scripture for such a meaning of the term. Never once, from our Saviour's first reference to it down to St. John's sublime description of the regenerate life, is the term lowered to this level. There is, indeed, a preparatory blessing which is pledged and sealed in baptism to the children of believers, but that is not termed Regeneration.

Those who adopt the other side of the alternative, and make the baptismal gift Regeneration in the fullest sense of the term, do really, however unconsciously, remove the cardinal doctrine of Protestantism from its central place. In this one point the Lutherans and the Reformed often agree. The believer who, through the exercise of faith, is accepted of God for the sake of Christ, whose atoning merits he appropriates, is necessarily already well-pleasing to God, by reason of the new heart that is capable of the exercise of faith. He cannot but be an object of complacency, because of the heavenly grace wrought in Him by the Holy Ghost. But the Lutheran is the most inconsistent of all who hold this doctrine. The Romanist can maintain it with perfect consistency: his doctrine of justification is the good work wrought in man and accepted as such. The Reformed or Calvinist is, in a sense, consistent also, because he ascribes all to the predestinating grace of God, who, independently of sacraments, forms Christ within the heart of all whom He has already accepted. The Justification of believers is a pretemporal justification, an acceptance from eternity; and it is matter of little consequence whether it be called Regeneration or Justification, since it is simply the righteousness of Christ imputed in either case. But the Lutheran, who holds firmly to the principles that guided the great Reformer at the outset of his career, and who maintains the Augsburg Confession as explained by other formularies, ought to be careful to avoid the phraseology adopted by Dr. Kahnis and others of his school. Certainly, if the Christian Regeneration precedes the Justification of a sinner before God, then Justification by faith loses the character that it had when its publication renewed the face of the Christian world.

The two great divisions of Protestantism in Germany differ in their Confessions on this as on other subjects. But the difference is not here so vital, because of their essential unity in regard to the merits of Christ as the sole ground of personal acceptance. Lutheranism early renounced the Augustinian doctrine of Predestination; the Reformed Creeds retained it. But this difference has been softened down, both in theology

and practice, by many expedients and by many influences which it is not necessary now to dwell upon. In all ages it has been found that the Spirit of Christianity as a Gospel for the world has been too strong for the restraints of a faith in absolute decrees preappointing the destiny of every individual; and it would not be too much to say that, practically, all communities in the Protestant world proclaim salvation everywhere and to all men. In systematic theology the case is otherwise. There the free spirit does not reign; and no union can ever be effected in this department. The essential and permanent difference is stamped upon the whole theory of Christian doctrine; but nowhere is it more evident than in the exposition of the doctrine of the Means of Grace, to which Dr. Kahnis next passes.

Here Lutheranism has an ineffaceable character of its own. The Means of Grace are Word and Sacrament. The Word is made in this system a kind of sacrament, as being the channel of imparting the grace which it proclaims and signifies; and the Sacrament is a visible word, which, through the power of the Holy Ghost, imparts to faith that of which it is the sign. Calvin and the Reformed Confessions differ from the Lutheran, however, in this, that they subordinate the Sacrament to the Word, and make it simply the symbol and the pledge of a grace which it does not necessarily impart—which, indeed, cannot be said to be imparted in it at all. The Reformed symbols teach positively that the baptismal rite is not Regeneration, nor the administration of the Sacrament the impartation of the body and blood of Christ. It may be said, that what distinguishes the Protestant doctrine from the Romish—the renunciation of the *opus operatum*, and the making all depend on the faith of the recipient—really reconciles the internal Protestant variations. But this is not strictly true. Zwingle, as the exponent of the freer Sacramental doctrine, regarded the virtue of the Sacrament as simply what faith brought to it; and did not essentially differ from Calvin, who regarded the reception of the body and blood of Christ as entirely dependent on the faith of the recipient. But the Lutheran Confessions, especially as now expounded by modern Lutherans, strictly connect the bestowment of Regeneration and the nourishment of Christ's body and blood with the Sacramental symbols, through which they are necessarily conveyed, though their saving effect is dependent on faith. Here there are two things in the Lutheran doctrine which demand separate notice, for which, however, only a few words are necessary in this present general discussion.

First, as to the necessity of faith for the enjoyment of the Sacramental blessing. The more deeply this is pondered, the more clear will the immense difference between the Confessions appear, and the more evident the advantage on the side of the Reformed. What can be the Sacramental blessing which is bestowed and yet not accepted? We can understand that blessings may be promised, symbolised, pledged, proffered, and brought to the very lips of the sinner, which he may reject, and thereby incur the frightful condemnation attached to the rejection. But we cannot understand a new birth bestowed for condemnation; or, in other words, a birth which is a deeper death, a union with Christ which makes the soul more a child of Satan than before. We cannot understand a bestowment of the very Christ Himself which is given, though not accepted, and becomes the poison of the soul. The rejection of Christ makes His Gospel a savour of death unto death, but not Himself. The refusal to receive Him incurs the condemnation, but He does not enter and incorporate Himself with the nature of man that He may turn it to corruption. In the maintenance of this doctrine, which modern Lutherans press far beyond the limits marked out by their wiser forefathers, there is an approximation to the mediæval Church, or rather, a refusal to recede from it, which is and will ever be fatal to the influence of their theology on the world. The clear-sighted Calvin carefully avoided that error; and it is avoided by all the Reformed Confessions, not excepting the Anglican. Many of them admit, with Calvin, that the benefit of Christ's very body and blood are imparted, in a spiritual manner, to the worthy communicant; but they do not, in our judgment, declare a positive impartation of the body and blood of Christ to the unbelieving soul. Any phrases that may seem to bear this meaning are simply figurative, and refer only to the rejection of the Word that accompanies the Sacrament. In the case of the baptism of infants it may seem to be otherwise; but, candidly considered, their doctrine will be found to be that a new life is imparted to the unconscious soul, which is a real principle that has to struggle with another, and may be lost. This is very different from the bestowment of an impossible grace on a reluctant soul, whose very reluctance makes the gift impossible.

This leads to the other aspect of the same question; the necessary connection of the blessings of grace with the Sacraments as means of grace. Here Lutheranism lags behind the truth as it is taught by the Reformed. No clearer or

fuller statement of its doctrine can be had than the following extract contains:—

"As it respects the design of the Sacraments, it is expressed in their signification as Means of Grace. Jesus Christ, Who, through the Word of the Holy Ghost, works, not only knowledge, but also believing acceptance of salvation, instituted the Sacraments that they might be media through which the Holy Spirit imparts to worthy recipients Regeneration and fellowship with Christ. The Sacrament of Baptism begets children of God, the Sacrament of the Supper nourishes the children of God with the body of Christ. The Sacrament of Baptism makes individuals the members of the Church, the Sacrament of the Supper unites the individual members through the body of Christ in one body. Since, then, the Church of Christ upon earth has this for its object, to beget believers and to unite believers in one, the Sacraments are the necessary organs through which the Church attains its object. Baptism and the Eucharist, the fulfilments of Old Testament ordinances which testified of the future in Christ, are accordingly testimonies that Christ is come, through which He is ever coming. As the life of Christ was once sealed in baptism and death, so He still ever comes by water and by blood (1 John v. 6, 8). Circumcision and the Passover, the typical Old Testament Sacraments, were partly signs of grace which was declared to man, and partly signs of faith which was confessed to God. The New Testament Sacraments are, as Means of Grace and organs of the purposes of the Church and as witnesses of Christ, *signs of grace*. But since man does not merely contemplate these signs of grace, but receives them, he makes his confession to grace in Christ. The Sacraments are Christians' *signs of profession*. As soldiers by their *parole*, as the initiated by mystical tokens, so are Christians known by Baptism and the Supper. But that by which they know themselves is that by which also the world knows them: chiefly, however, are they the tokens by which they confess themselves to God and His Son. Baptism is the pledge of a good conscience to God (1 Pet. iii. 21). But he who in bread and wine receives the body and blood of Christ, who gave Himself to death for the forgiveness of our sins, confesses to the death of Christ until He comes (1 Cor. xi. 26). But, not only the individual as an individual, the Church also as a Church, must confess to God through Christ by the Holy Ghost in worship. Worship, the union of the Church with God, is, on the one hand, a sacrifice which the Church brings to God (Rom. xii. 1), but, on the other hand, an act of the self-communication of God. God gives Himself to the Church which brings to Him the sacrifice of prayer and song, by the Holy Ghost who fills the worshippers with holy emotions; He imparts to the Church, which builds itself on its most holy faith, His word; finally, He imparts to the Church, which offers to Him in the Eucharist the commemoration of the death of Christ, the body and blood of Christ. The Supper is at once Sacrifice and Sacrament. Sacraments are the Divinely appointed foundations of the Divine worship. Baptism is the

Sacramental door, the Eucharist the Sacramental holiest of Christian worship."

The Reformed Confessions deny that the Sacraments are strictly in this sense the means of grace. The only means of grace they acknowledge is the effectual Word of God; and the Sacraments only exhibit and pledge what the Word of God is to accomplish alone on certain conditions. Both parties appeal to Scripture. The Lutherans lay great stress, as we have just read, upon the typical Sacraments of the Old Covenant, fulfilled and transfigured in Christ. But we submit they are fulfilled and transfigured only as signs—signs still, and no more, in their Christian accomplishment. Signs of grace in the Old Covenant are responded to by better and more important signs of grace in the New. Circumcision was a sign and seal, which in itself did not give what it signified; Baptism is a sign and seal of the death of a true believer with Christ, and of the resurrection in Christ of his new nature (Col. ii. 11). Signs and seals in the New Testament answer to signs and seals in the Old; signs and seals still, though exhibiting and pledging incomparably greater and more manifest blessings. No matter how closely connected in time and place the bestowment may be with the pledge, the one is not the other. In every Sacramental blessing it is the Word that is the instrument of the blessing.

As it respects the Eucharist in particular, the Lutheran doctrine is in glaring contradiction with the Reformed, and, as we think, with Scriptural teaching. It never has thoroughly and entirely purged itself from the infection of the doctrine of the Middle Ages. The Lutheran formularies deny transubstantiation only to the extent that the substance of the bread and wine remain; but they maintain that, under the form of bread and wine, the true body and blood of Christ are present. It is true that they protest against the withdrawal of the cup, and specially against the sacrifice of the mass; spending upon the latter their utmost severity, as it were in compromise for their tenderness to transubstantiation. In their interminable controversies with the Zwinglian and Swiss divines, the Lutherans have always done their cause and their doctrine great injury by undervaluing the undeniable symbolical value of the Eucharist. Luther himself seemed never able to discern what is written in every eucharistical sentence of the New Testament, that the sacred transaction is, whatever else it may be, a glorious symbolical act, expressing by simple signs the most precious mystery of the

Christian faith. But Calvin and his doctrine has given them most trouble; nor has the controversy ever failed to leave them in the utmost embarrassment. Calvin taught that the elements of the Supper are pledges that God will give us what they signify, the body and blood of Christ His Son. In the words of institution there is a metonymy: this a sign of very body, of very blood. The elements cannot have in them or be the instrument of communicating that body and blood; to suppose so, is contrary to Scripture and superstitious. On the other hand, he asserted that to make the bread and wine merely memorial signs of the death of Christ was profanity. When God promises that He will give us the body and the blood of His Son, He must keep His pledge. But how can it be kept? He cannot give us the body and blood of Christ Himself. They are in heaven and cannot enter into us upon earth. But there may be imparted to us the energies, the life, the spirit of the glorified body of Christ. These are communicated to the believing communicant by the Holy Ghost. As these energies are infused into us by the Spirit's mediation, faith rises into heaven where Christ's body is at the right hand of God. But this communication of the saving powers of the glorified body by the Holy Ghost is not bound to the reception of the elements. This doctrine of Calvin was a great improvement on the Lutheran in many respects, even as it was a great improvement on the Zwinglian. It gave its true prominence to the glorious symbol. It recognised the pledge of Divine grace in the Sacrament. It retained the body of Christ in heaven, with its necessary limitations. It exchanged for the corporeity of Christ the energy of Christ's life generally. And it assigned to the Holy Ghost His supreme place in the whole economy of the Sacrament. But the doctrine underwent the fate of most avowed mediations. It adhered too closely to the promise of the body and blood of Christ to satisfy the Zwinglian party, and it roused the animosity of the Lutherans by denying the literal integrity of the body of Christ. The *Formula Concordiæ* itself most peremptorily rejected the Calvinistic doctrine.

The question brought before us in this book is that of the union of the Confessions in Germany. We have not, therefore, to do with the truth of these separate Confessions in themselves; but a few remarks may be made on passing. The Lutheran doctrine cannot be regarded as sound by those who remember first the unity of our Lord's Person in the perfect distinctness of His two natures, and, secondly, the relation of the Holy Ghost to the One Mediator as the Repre-

sentative and Dispenser of the whole Christ. The union with Divinity cannot give to the body and blood of Jesus the virtue of an universal presence on all the altars of Christendom; nor can the corporeity of Christ be separated either from His human spirit, or His Divinity, or the Spirit whom He sends forth to represent Himself. Calvin's resolution of the body and blood into the spiritual virtue of His life comes near the truth; but it adheres too literally to the corporeal idea and the corporeal words. The Eucharist is a solemn and occasional pledge of a constant bestowment on Christians of the Spirit of Him whose body is the whole company of those thus united to Him. Their spirit is filled with His Spirit; their bodies and souls have the pledge of a union in the resurrection, when the body shall be fashioned after His glorious body; fashioned according to its similitude, but not penetrated by His corporeity.

As to the union of the Confessions—the few leading and important distinctions of which have been indicated—Dr. Kahnis has his deep convictions, which shall be faithfully exhibited in the few pages that remain to us.

Dr. Kahnis's views of the unity of the Church are very broad. As the Church is the fellowship of all Christians, so it is the combination of all congregations. All the communities, Eastern, Romish, Lutheran, Reformed, in which the Holy Ghost by Word and Sacrament produces, nourishes, and unites faith, are portions of the Church. The unity of the Church cannot consist in the things that divide, but in the things which unite the Churches. What unites them St. Paul tells us in three pairs of three (Eph. iv. 5): one body, *one Spirit*, and one hope of the calling; *one Lord*, one faith, one baptism; one *God and* Father above and through and in us all. The unity of the Church is in the Divine foundation, not in the human organisation or doctrine, constitution and worship. It is Apostolic, as built and perpetuated on the apostolic Word; it is holy in its sacred end and sanctifying discipline; it is the exclusive source of salvation, as possessing, though not as one corporate body, the Means of Grace. It is Catholic, as forming a unity of all called Christians and Christian communities, with a promise for all nations, Catholic in the Divine design. The Protestant differs from the Romish theory of the Church, in making unity depend, not on the human organisation, but on the Divine foundation.

The two great Confessions of the sixteenth century—the Lutheran and the Reformed—cannot be briefly distinguished except by general principles. The Lutheran has more affinity

with antiquity; the Reformed with pure Scripture. The Lutheran is more allied with the State, more worldly; the Reformed more independent and more spiritual. The Lutheran is more systematic in its divinity; while the Reformed is more devoted to Biblical theology and exposition. The Lutheran has been more tolerant, more human, more familiar with man's affections; the Reformed has been overshadowed by its doctrine of the Absolute Sovereignty of God, which has stamped its impress upon all its views of doctrine. The differences between the two types were early seen and proved ineffaceable; so that when, after many years of controversy, from 1530—1580, the Romish doctrine was stereotyped at Trent, the Lutheran took its final form in the *Formula Concordiæ*, and the Reformed in the national Confessions governed by Calvin. Efforts have never been wanting to bring about union in Germany; but without effect until the War of Independence ceased. From 1817, the tercentenary of the Reformation, down to the present time, the blending of the two Confessions in one common Evangelical Church has been steadily going on.

Dr. Kahnis is an opponent of the Union. He argues that the unity of the Church does not demand unity of Confessions.

"The defenders of the Union must admit that on a great scale the accomplishment of it is impossible. Only a fanatical Unionist will believe that the English State Church, which with so emphatic sense of its dignity opposes the Dissenters, will enter into a union with the Lutherans, with whom it comes so little into contact. The same holds good, more or less, of the two Scottish Churches, of the Netherlands, of the Zwinglian and Calvinistic Churches of Switzerland, of the Reformed in France, of the Episcopalians, Congregationalists, Puritans in America. On the other hand, the Unionists who have any knowledge of the condition of the Lutheran national Churches, cannot conceal from themselves that in Scandinavia, and in the Lutheran provinces of America, the accomplishment of the Union is impossible, and in Saxony and Bavaria by no means probable."

But he also thinks that the union among the Protestant Churches would be as perilous to the interests of the Reformation, as would union with the Oriental and Romish Churches. He delights in going back into the past for his arguments, and shows that semi-Arianism and semi-Pelagianism were compromises that wrought no good, but availed only to negative opposite doctrines without substituting anything better. Hence he springs to the conclusion, that evangelical truth would be sacrificed were the union carried out as ex-

tensively and thoroughly as it is sought to carry it out. But we cannot help thinking that his historical analogies are fallacious. The systems that mediate between opposite errors, obviously such, can never know permanent prosperity. But, in the case of the Lutheran and the Reformed communities, the essential verities of the Gospel are retained; and surely this ought to make a great difference. Dismissing these, however, the other arguments of Dr. Kahnis are, undoubtedly, sound. He may well point to the fact that Christianity exists without this Confessional union. He may also reasonably appeal to the well-known truth that these differences of parties tend to the furtherance and catholicity of Christian theology; and that they co-operate largely to the defence of the truth, over which opposite parties watch. Moreover, it is a fair plea to urge that Lutherans and Reformed have, for a very long time, tolerated each other, as members of the body of Christ and Evangelical brethren, agreeing heartily in the fundamentals of Protestantism, while differing in minor matters. They have united in all parts of Germany for the diffusion of Scripture, for the propagation of the Gospel by missions, and for all the various schemes of benevolence that the present century has produced.

But the secret of Dr. Kahnis's objection is, really, his intense devotion to his peculiar Lutheran doctrines; and every man who holds certain definite truths earnestly, and values them much, must sympathise with him. "As a Church which cannot tolerate a theology that is labouring after truth is impotent, so is a theology without ground and true life if it is not devoted to the Confession of its Church. But we have seen that no theological progress has availed to set aside the doctrinal peculiarities of Lutheranism." Lutheran Protestantism is much to be pitied, in that it is, to so large an extent, a restless pursuit of the truth. But this is an accident of its career; and its earnest children and theologians are to be respected when they deprecate such influences of the State as may tend to render the land indifferent to the truths they are labouring to establish. Dr. Kahnis is one of a large and increasing class, who think that the future of Germany, and they may be pardoned if they silently add of Christendom, is bound up with the maintenance of Lutheran doctrine on the Trinity, the Person and Work of Christ, and the Sacraments of the Church. We do not agree with them in this. We think that it would be better for the Christian world if some of the peculiarities of Lutheranism and the Reformed were effaced, and a creed accepted by Germany

which should omit the harsh and incomprehensible elements of both Creeds. But that does not affect our cordial appreciation of the energy with which those who hold them fight for their preservation. If we were Lutherans, like Dr. Kahnis, we should perfectly agree with him; being what we are, we cannot but rejoice that he is unsuccessful, and that there is such a thing in Germany as a Union theology, a body of Union theologians, and a tendency to Union abroad.

Not, however, that the union of the Churches in Germany has as yet been a success on the whole. Our author gives us a vigorous, but rather one-sided sketch of the Union in Prussia, where it was introduced by an enthusiast, King Frederick William III., who partook of the first Union sacrament in his Church at Potsdam, in 1817, and issued a Book of Services which attempted to reconcile the two Confessions at the Eucharist. Since 1830 it appears that a reaction has set in: it was found that the Confessions had begun to lose their just estimation. Cabinet orders followed in succession, but in vain. Our author is very severe upon the indefiniteness of the Union in Prussia, where it has established an Evangelical Church which is neither Lutheran, nor Reformed, nor a composite of the two. "This is the hardship in the case of the Prussian National Church, that neither the Union nor the Confession has its rights." He gives his advice that, where the Union is an accomplished fact, it should be tolerated as a form of Protestantism; but that the advancing spirit of unionism should be stoutly resisted. "The Union is not the People's Church, but the State Church. The State which introduced it, is its only prop." He thinks that a genuine German Church, national in the sense of embracing all the branches of the German stem under one organisation of doctrine, constitution, and worship, is a thing impossible. Only the Lutheran Church, and the Augsburg Confession, is adapted to this object; but the author despairs of that fair ideal. Meanwhile, year after year convinces him, as it must convince everyone who knows anything of the progress of German thought, that the current of speculation and belief, even among the best circles, sets in towards a system of Confession more and more lax. Regarding this as one of the fruits of the Union, it is not wonderful that he should dread it so much. But he will have found out before long that there is nothing in the rigid Lutheranism he pleads for that can resist effectually this spirit of license.

Dr. Kahnis's final words deserve careful attention on this side of the Channel. He is a true lover of unity in the Church:

he must needs be such, as one of the most learned, and pious, and experienced of modern divines. He acknowledges the profound truth at the heart of all the efforts that have been put forth, as in Christendom generally, so especially in Lutheranism. Some of the noblest intellects and warmest hearts, from Melanchthon and Leibnitz down to the Pietists and Prussian rulers, have longed for and hastened towards the ideal unity which the Christian instinct yearns for. But he is honest enough, and bold enough, to decline any Union save in these three respects, and with these three reservations.

First: the Church of Christ, by a historical necessity which God has not prevented, exists only in Confessional Churches. The evil of the divisions cannot be done away. Believing in one holy Apostolic and Catholic Church, the lover of his creed must look beyond his own Confession while he lives by it. "Christianity has not its standard in Lutheranism, but Lutheranism in Christianity. He who so thinks will in all who have put on Christ in baptism recognise members of the body of Christ." Secondly: while holding firmly the great principles of the Augsburg Confession, and recognising Lutheranism as the guardian of evangelical truth, the Confession should be held fast under the condition of loyalty to the Scripture, and with perfect readiness to admit every modification that the Holy Spirit may introduce through the testimony of other Churches. "We must protest against the unity to which truth is sacrificed. We dare not say that there is room for opposite convictions on such and such points. We cannot say yea and nay at one and the same time. We must have no compromise in truth. But, while thus firm, we must look gently around us upon others. We must be mindful of the cross which the Lord has placed upon us. Distinguished by our doctrinal views, which are to us important, yet, in a time when unbelief has so frightful a power, we must rejoice in every measure of accordance with the Reformed and the Evangelical among the Unionists. We must learn from the theology of all Confessions, and be glad that there is a unity in the theological science that labours after truth, if not in doctrine itself." Thirdly: the best expressions of their unity is found by Lutheran and the Reformed in free combinations for common Protestant ends. "Among these may be classed the Bible Societies, the Tract Societies, and the Gustav-Adolf-Verein, in which Lutherans, and Reformed, and United, are combined to assist and uphold the scattered and exhausted congregations of their several faiths." The author does not put much confidence in the

common labours of the several communions for Home Missions. These have never been found successful. There are, however, enterprises enough in which the Christian communions can show that they are one in devotion to the common Head of the Church. But woe to those who throw a stumbling-block in the way of the common communion of Christians at the Table of the Lord. Thus, to sum up all in words which are almost as applicable in England as in Germany:—"The growth of union lies, first, in the sentiment which springs from true Christianity, and sees, in all members and Churches of all Confessions, members and parts of the one Church of Christ; secondly, in a doctrinal position which, while faithful to the Confession, is also always progressive in its struggle after truth, and therefore believes and hopes in the common efforts of others in the same direction; and, thirdly, in free confederations for the common prosecution of the common interests of the Kingdom of Christ."

It would be wrong to lay down this clear and interesting volume without adverting to its high value as an exhibition of Lutheran doctrine. Dr. Kahnis is a lineal descendant, and a worthy one, of the Lutheran dogmatists who, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, carried systematic theology to a point never surpassed. We do not hold many of his views, as these pages have shown; but we admire his treatment of some very important branches of theological science, not excepting the well-known exhibition of the internal relations of the Holy Trinity. There is no book that gives in the same compass so full and luminous a view of the fundamentals of Lutheranism. These we have not touched upon now, having eliminated from the volume all that did not bear upon the question of the union of the Protestant Churches in Germany.

One word in conclusion. We have lately given a sketch of another kind of union: the combination of all Protestants in Germany to resist Confessions and creeds and positive faiths of every kind. Those who read that paper will find an interest in this one. And it will, doubtless, occur to them, as it occurs to us, that it were far better to promote the true Union of the Confessions somewhat more directly than Dr. Kahnis contents himself with doing. It were better to make many sacrifices, rather than perpetuate a really needless division of creeds and communions. In the interest of the Church of Christ in Germany—which is of profound importance for the world—we cannot but close by wishing God's blessing on the true Protestant Union in the consolidated Empire.

ART. VI.—1. *London: its Celebrated Characters and Remarkable Places.* By J. H. JESSE. Three Vols. 8vo. London. 1871.

2. *London and Westminster, City and Suburb: Strange Events, Characteristics and Changes of Metropolitan Life.* By JOHN TIMBS. Two Vols. 8vo. London. 1868.

3. *Curiosities of London.* By JOHN TIMBS. London. 1869.

4. *Ancient Meeting Houses; or, Memorial Pictures of Nonconformity in Old London.* By G. H. PIKE. London. 1870.

5. *Commentaries on the History, Constitution, and Chartered Franchises of the City of London.* By GEORGE NORTON. Third Edition. London. 1869.

6. *Report of the Select Committee on the Municipal Government of the Metropolis.* London. 1867.

7. *Report of the Commission on the Municipal Government of the City of New York.* New York. 1867.

8. *Further Report as to the Condition of the Industrial Classes, and the Purchase Power of Money in Foreign Countries.* London. 1871.

WE have always thought it strange that, while writers of literary eminence and fame have taken pleasure in describing the architectural grandeur and dazzling beauty of modern Paris, the gradual development of her manufacturing industry, and her progress in the realms of art and science, the history of the City of London should have yet to be written. Every schoolboy knows who founded the City of the Seven Hills, who built the temples and walls of Athens, and who restored Carthage; but we doubt whether one in fifty could give an intelligible sketch of the early history of our great metropolis, or could specify the causes of its unprecedented prosperity and unparalleled growth. The fault lies at the door of the historians, who have possessed the ability, but lacked the will to accomplish the work. Hence the history of London has fallen into the hands of tedious antiquarians and dry topographers; and, it is almost needless to say, has suffered in consequence. Mr. Timbs's books are fair specimens of the extraordinary faculty which the civic antiquarians appear to possess of portraying and blending events trivial

and important, grave and gay, ancient and modern, mythical and true, without the slightest regard for the harmony of facts, or the faintest notion of the laws of historical perspective. Photographic sketches, popular stories, romantic legends, disjointed fragments collected together without any appearance of chronological order, do not constitute a history. Several writers have, it is true, attempted to traverse the bridge connecting the present with the past history of the City, and two or three have for a time kept up a kind of hobbling march; but, like the crowd, whom Mirza, in his vision on the heights of Bagdad, saw thronging the bridge which crossed the valley below, they have one after another fallen, being "quite tired and spent with so long a walk." Let us hope that, as in Addison's famous narrative, there appeared to the prophet a genius who bade him look no more on man in the first stage of his existence, so the Muse of History may ere long discover to us one of her sons endowed with the vigour, and power, and style, which so great a subject, of right, demands. We should be doing Mr. Norton an injustice were we not at once to except him from either of the unenviable categories to which we have made reference above. His work is neither tedious nor dull; indeed, as far as we are aware, it is the only intelligent exposition of recent date of the polity, the chartered franchises, and the privileges of the City of London. Mr. Norton does not deserve, however, an altogether unqualified praise. The field of inquiry is far too extensive to be satisfactorily surveyed from so limited a point of view; and, passing from the form to the substance of the work, we have noticed two or three passages which would become rather the lips of a special pleader than the pen of one who claims the position of a constitutional historian.

It is not our intention to attempt to supply the deficiencies to which we have called attention, or even to enter upon a task which it would require several bulky volumes successfully to achieve. To describe and discuss the progress of events which found the City of London successively a British trading post, a Roman fortress, the headquarters of the Anglo-Saxon court, the centre of Norman feudalism, and in an age of mediæval darkness and superstition the champion of religious truth and the nursery of political freedom; to tell the illustrious roll of citizens—statesmen, soldiers, merchants, poets, painters, and philanthropists—who made the City what it is, and were nurtured within its walls; to describe the regal magnificence of the civic magistrates, the splendour of the civic companies, and the constitution of the

ancient civic army; to refer to the style of the more aristocratic and public buildings, or to dwell upon the homes and habits of the common people, their moral victories, their political defeats—all this would take up more space than a reviewer is able to afford. Nor shall we linger to portray the successive revolutions which these events necessarily created in the social and moral condition of the people. It would be a difficult task to speak in truthful, yet temperate language of the morality of the citizens of London towards the close of the seventeenth century. For half a century freedom had been degenerating into license; the apparent straightlacedness of the *salons* of good society stood forth in striking contrast to the reckless frivolity out of doors; the distinctions between innocence and vice were being rapidly lost sight of; ordinary conversation too often took a rough and licentious turn; there was something fundamentally odious in the vacillating and double-dealing character of the great statesmen of the age; to a large multitude life was nothing more than a pageant, and they themselves merely the company of maskers. Dark as the picture seems, it had a bright side. There was a bold and independent section of the community who still cherished the stern tenets of the Protector. They were actuated by a strong and earnest feeling of religion, and were as yet unsullied by the miserable hypocrisy of fashionably society. Rough and illiterate they doubtless were; but their thoughts were fashioned after one standard, their minds were formed by one system of discipline, and they possessed the advantage which men of one book will invariably enjoy. Their headquarters were close to the seat of civic government, and it is no exaggeration to say that often in the hour of need they found the Corporation of the City their friend, patron, and mainstay.

Commercially the capital was making steady progress. The energy and bustling activity of her citizens had enabled her to advance with rapid strides; the trade of Hamburg, Amsterdam, and Antwerp was slowly passing to the Thames; every home and foreign rival was being outstripped, so that, on the accession of George the Third, the City of London was in a position to control the European markets. A century before, Antwerp was the great commercial city of the West. The annual exportation of English cloth was valued at more than a million sterling, and no less than four-fifths of the entire trade of the port was done in English produce. The insignificant position which London had hitherto occupied as a commercial centre was in no small

measure due to the monopoly of our foreign trade enjoyed for nearly three centuries by the great trading fraternities, known as the Hanseatic Merchants of the Steelyard, the Merchants of the Staple, and the Company of Merchant Adventurers. The continuous accession of foreigners not merely excited, as was natural that it should, the animosity of private traders —against such opposition the trading companies were well able to hold their own—but it aroused the jealousy of the civic authorities, who possessed exclusive trading privileges of a far more ancient date than the oldest of the foreign chartered companies. In answer to a petition from the Common Council of the City, Elizabeth thoroughly extinguished the German monopoly by the stringent regulations which she in 1582 imposed on the export trade.

"The supremacy of London," says Mr. Capper, "as a commercial city, is of comparatively recent date. At all periods of her history London has been indeed a place of trade, but that trade has not all times been in her own hands, nor has it until a recent period borne any proportion to the trade of the world at large. It has been a fashion to say that until the reign of Elizabeth England possessed no trade. This is scarcely correct, although no doubt it was not until, or even after, the reign of Elizabeth that English commerce began to acquire importance."

Although there can be little doubt that the foreign policy of Lord Burleigh gave a vigorous impulse to commercial activity, we should be rather disposed to date the steady growth of English commerce from a period some sixty or seventy years later on. How rapidly our commerce increased, when the tide of prosperity had set fairly in, is apparent from the following curious summary, by an anonymous Levant trader, of our Continental trade in 1690.

"We trade to Naples, Genoa, Leghorn, Marseilles, Malaga, &c., with only 20 ships, chiefly herrings, and 30 sail more laden with pipe staves from Ireland.

"To Portugal and Andalusia we send 20 ships for wines, sugar, fruit, and West Indian drugs.

"To Bordeaux we send 60 ships and barks for wines.

"To Hamburgh and Middleburgh 35 ships are sent by our Merchant Adventurers' Company.

"To Dantzic, Koningsburg, &c., we send yearly about 30 ships, viz., 6 from London, 6 from Ipswich, and the rest from Hull, Lynn, and Newcastle, but the Dutch many more.

"To Norway we send not above 5 ships, and the Dutch above 40, and great ships too."—*Capper*, p. 84.

For many generations the foreign trade of London was far in advance of that of any of our native ports. In the year 1701 London, Bristol, and Yarmouth, were our three largest seaports. Strange to say, Exeter ranked next, while Hull and Liverpool occupied respectively the third and fourth places. Five hundred and sixty ships entered the port of London, while Liverpool mustered about one hundred. We fear that we should lay ourselves open to the charge we have already brought against Mr. Timbs, were we to attempt to refer to the extraordinary development of London commerce since the commencement of this century. Sixty years ago there was only one steamship in the United Kingdom. During the same period five large docks, covering a space of 300 acres, have been constructed; and at the present moment the shipping trade of London supplies direct employment for nearly half-a-million souls. At the outset of his book, Mr. Capper endeavours, in two or three concise and pointed sentences, to specify the several peculiar and distinctive commercial advantages which the Metropolis enjoys over every other European city. In geographical position, and in the means of external and internal communication, the city is without a rival; from day to day she has to supply a large, wealthy, and increasing population with the necessaries and luxuries of life; her merchants inherit a reputation for acuteness and integrity; her citizens are industrious, and have at the same time abundant means of producing sufficient to pay for that which they will consume; and lastly, London is the recognised centre of monetary transactions, the seat of Government, and the representative of the power and wealth of the United Kingdom.

The rapid extension of the boundaries was a necessary consequence of the increased trade. Elizabeth and her immediate successors viewed the growth of the City with alarm, and vainly endeavoured by frequent and stringent proclamations to prevent it. The population of the capital at this epoch of civic history was about 360,000. Its general aspect was mean and unsightly. The streets were narrow and dirty. Courts and alleys abounded in every direction. Private houses were for the most part built of wood, and the only means of distinguishing one from another were the sign-boards, which a charter granted by James I. permitted the citizens to fasten above their doors. Country houses and villa residences were unsought for by the leading citizens. The gates were shut at dusk. About ten o'clock at night the bells of Bow Church were rung, and no one was allowed to

walk about the streets after dark. The trade of the City was in comparatively few hands. Shopkeepers were almost unknown. From Temple Bar to St. Paul's there was, in the reign of Edward VI., scarcely such a thing as a shop to be seen. A hundred years hence the City presented a different appearance. The political disturbances of the seventeenth century, the great fire, and the subsequent rebuilding of the City, the new impulse imparted by Sir Christopher Wren to ecclesiastical architecture, and the fitful efforts of the municipalities to cleanse, light, and improve the streets—all contributed to change the aspect of the Metropolis; but still only the nucleus of modern London existed. In 1610 Holloway, Kingsland, and Hackney, were isolated villages; a generation later Clerkenwell and Shoreditch were in the suburbs; in 1733 the villages of Hoxton, Marylebone, and Bethnal Green, stood in the midst of green fields; while Belgravia, Mayfair, and Tyburnia had literally no existence. There are men still living who can recollect the time when the Angel at Islington was the last halting place on the road to London, and when from that point to John Wesley's Chapel in the City Road, there was scarcely a house to be seen. At the revolution of '88 the capital covered 600 acres; it now stretches over 250 square miles; the population was then 500,000, it is now three millions and a half; London was then little larger than Paris, it now out-numbers its foreign rival by something like 1,450,000 souls. At the same period the population of Berlin was about 55,000, of Rome 160,000, and of New York 4,500.

For half a century after the accession of George II. the City of London "exercised almost as great an influence on the politics of England as Paris has in our time exercised on the politics of France." The Londoner was not, it is true, gifted with that superior political capacity and intelligence over the clodhoppers of Somerset, or the Yorkshire weavers, which Frenchmen are so fond of ascribing to the citizens of Paris over the ignorant and misguided rurals of France, and yet for many generations the ascendency of the central administration had been supreme. At the period of which we speak municipal institutions locally chosen were almost unknown. The provinces were in a state of political infancy and tutelage; London, and London alone, directed the national affairs; the country people were, politically speaking, rapidly losing their energy, activity, and mental life. The State patronage was enormous. There was hardly a county, borough, or even a parish, where the Government had not

some favour to give or to withhold. The provinces were swarming with place-seekers. The State meddled in everything, and, as a natural consequence, every local miscarriage was laid at the door of the Government of the day. It was not long before the reaction came, and that the aversion to a central board took a definite shape. Local authorities claimed to be invested with appropriate powers of subordinate legislation and administration. It did not follow, however, that because the central *ought not*, that therefore the local authority *ought* to be supreme and absolute. By adopting the cautious maxim *medio tutissimus ibis*, and grafting the two systems, a condition of mutual and harmonious control was happily attained. The actual management of local affairs by a central board now began to develope itself in a new form, and, owing to the defective state of the general law, there arose the necessity for the modern system of legislation by means of Private and Local Acts.

Some twenty years ago the Metropolis suffered in no ordinary degree from this wholesale system of indiscriminate legislation. Of the whole of London, the confined portion known as the City Proper was the only section that possessed a municipal corporation; the rest of the Metropolis, comprising seventeen-eighteenths of the population, and ninety-nine one-hundredths of the area, was without any form of internal or self-government. Outside the civic boundaries everything was subject to the uncertain operation of the general law, and such provisions as that law failed to contain, and their name was legion, became the subject of Private Bills. In the spring of 1855 there were no less than seven hundred special Acts in force for lighting, paving, cleansing, and other objects of a similar nature in the Metropolis. There can be no doubt that the new system of local legislation has had a beneficial influence on the country at large. A practical knowledge of the art of government has been diffused, and a habit of caring for the national weal engendered; the public business of England has become the private business of every Englishman; and, lastly, in fulfilling the duties of vestryman, juryman, or justice of the peace, he has become an active member of the administration of his country. Such was the effect of the new system in the rural districts. In London its influence has been completely neutralised by the revolution which the habits of the citizens have undergone. To adopt the forcible and expressive language of Lord Macaulay:—"The chiefs of the mercantile interest are no longer citizens. They avoid, they almost contemn, municipal

honours and duties. Those honours and duties are abandoned to men who, though useful and highly respectable, seldom belong to the princely commercial houses of which the names are renowned throughout the world."

Yet the history of the municipality of London is one of which no Londoner need be ashamed. The Court of Common Council dates from 1262, and is older in its constitution than the House of Commons. As early as the time of Athelstan two aldermen were at the head of the judiciary of London. The first mayor, Henry Fitz Elwyn, was elected in 1189, and long prior to that date the chief magistrate, under the title of Portreve, governed the city independently of the reigning king. It was in the Guildhall that the presumption and arrogance of Richard of Gloucester received their first check; it was the City of London that first evinced a thorough determination to resist the illegal demands of Henry VIII., and protested effectually against the unconstitutional stretch of the royal prerogative known to students of history as the Benevolence; it was the attachment of the citizens to the proud and haughty Virgin Queen, whose ancestor, Geoffry Boleyn, had been Lord Mayor in 1457, that induced them to furnish 15,000 men, and fit out and man 58 ships, on the first intelligence of the projected Spanish Invasion; they were the dames of the city who sold their jewellery to fill Cromwell's military chest, and their husbands and their sons who proved the bravest and staunchest soldiers of the Parliamentary army; it was in the Court of Aldermen, in the memorable year 1688, that the Lords of Parliament assembled, and solemnly declaring in favour of William of Orange, promised him a cordial reception in the City; it was to the Common Council that Wilberforce, Clarkson, Buxton, and their coadjutors looked as their most powerful ally in the cause of negro emancipation; it was the Common Council who clamoured for the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts long before Parliament consented to hearken to the public voice; and, finally, it was owing, in no small measure, to the constant and powerful advocacy of the Corporation that the battle of Parliamentary Reform was successfully sustained and finally won. We do not mean, however, for a moment, to assert that the municipal body has not its faults, or to deny that often they have fought, step by step, and with a dogged obstinacy, against the removal of glaring and patent abuses. The history of the Council does not fail to furnish examples of two faults from which, unhappily, few corporate bodies are free—the one is a lavish expenditure of public money, the other is a tendency

to perpetuate salaried but useless offices. The Corporation of London has often been compared to the British Constitution. According to Lord Brougham the comparison was an utterly fallacious one. As to the reason or otherwise of this opinion, our readers will be able to judge from the following very brief and concise sketch of the civic constitution contained in the Report of the Select Committee on Metropolitan Local Government:—

"The City of London is a county of itself. Its governing bodies are the Court of Aldermen, the Court of Common Council, and the Court of Common Hall. The Court of Aldermen consists of 26 aldermen including the Lord Mayor, and of whom thirteen form a quorum. The Court of Common Council consists of the Lord Mayor, the aldermen, and 206 common councilmen, of whom the Lord Mayor, at least two other aldermen, and a sufficient number of common councilmen to make up forty are requisite to constitute a court. The Court of Common Hall consists of the Lord Mayor, or his *locum tenens*, four aldermen at least, and such of the liverymen of the city companies as are freemen of the City of London. The City is also divided into wards for certain purposes of local government. The freemen, occupying premises of the annual value of £10 in each ward, elect a number of councilmen annually and one alderman for life. The alderman and common councilmen are the governing body of the ward. The Lord Mayor is selected annually by the Court of Aldermen from two aldermen elected by the livery in Common Hall. The functions of the Court of Aldermen are both judicial and executive. In its judicial capacity it is a Court of Record, and decides disputes respecting the validity of the elections of certain functionaries of the City and of the wards. The Court also appoints the Recorder and some other officers, admits brokers and certain officers, and exercises a jurisdiction over them in hearing and adjudicating upon complaints of misconduct. In its executive capacity it possesses a concurrent power with the Common Council of ordering payments out of the City's cash; it superintends the prisons, and exercises several powers under Acts of Parliament. The most important affairs of the Corporation are regulated by the Court of Common Council. Its business, however, is chiefly transacted by the agency of its committees. Some are standing committees, others are appointed for special purposes. Their organisation is nearly of a uniform character, upon the general principle of distributing authority as equally as possible amongst the members representing the several wards."

The mummeries and festive enjoyments, which form so important an element in the municipal and ward life of London, have had the natural effect of drawing away public attention from the services which the civic authorities render,

and fastening it on the less dignified features of their life. This result is the more to be deplored because their duties are of an arduous and intricate character. Take, for instance, the office of Lord Mayor, and it would be almost impossible to find a more laborious or responsible post. He is the representative of the Crown in the civil government of the City; he is the official president in the Courts of Aldermen, Common Council, and Common Hall; he sits daily in the justice room at the Mansion House; he is a judge of the Central Criminal Court, a conservator of the Thames, a justice of the peace, and a member of many of the committees of the municipal body. He has a multitude of other duties of a more general character—such as to communicate with the Government in matters which concern the City's welfare, to preside at public meetings, to assist in organising public charities, and to entertain distinguished foreigners. In one of his chapters on England, M. de Montalembert remarks—"Elle ne permet pas à des esprits chimériques, violents et absolus, de l'égarer par leur déductions et de l'opprimer par leur conclusions." Narrowing the scope of Montalembert's words we may apply them with equal force to the City of London. Distinguished foreigners may doubtless regard the municipality with disdain; in their servile admiration for imperial institutions, they may compare its civic constitution with that of Petersburg or Berlin, and pronounce it ponderous and cumbersome in the extreme; but, whatever may be its faults, it is English to the very core. It still preserves a representative character; it has the reputation of being a hard-working body; it seldom lends itself to political and economic absurdities; and it has never been a creature of the State under the guise of municipal authority. What the motives may be which induce citizens to aspire to civic honours, we are at a loss to know. Whether a sense of duty, inherent ambition, love of authority, or a partiality for the good things of this life move them, we cannot tell. Common councilmen, perchance, have lived like many more of us to learn that—

> "Not a man for being simply man
> Hath any honour; but honour for those honours
> That are without him, as place, riches, favour,
> Prizes of accident as oft as merit."

Once cross the Channel, and we are confronted by a municipal system of more recent origin, and of a very different character, a system so utterly repugnant to all principles of self-government, as fully to justify Mr. Disraeli's recent emphatic protest

against the introduction of Continental modes of legislation. We have already taken occasion, in the course of this paper, to refer to the reaction which followed the bureaucratical policy of English statesmen in the early part of the present century. In France (says M. de Tocqueville) the system of administrative centralisation was in full vigour for a century prior to the Revolution of 1789. The governors of provinces, the mayors of the towns, and the syndics of the villages were chosen from time to time, as the day of election came round; but their power had long since departed. The skeleton was there, but the flesh, the blood, the sinews, and the motive force, were gone. Thirty Intendants, acting under a central council in Paris, governed the provinces. They assessed and levied the taxes, arranged the conscription for the army, controlled all roads and public works, organised a special body of military police, undertook the instruction of the peasantry in agricultural pursuits, placed such restrictions as they chose on the manufacturing industry of the nation, and reversed at pleasure the decisions of the superior courts of law. An opportunity, however, soon offered for Frenchmen to display their traditional acuteness in discovering the faults rather than the merits of their institutions. The Revolution of 1789 shook to its very foundation the structure of French society. Since then revolution has succeeded revolution, constitution after constitution—monarchical, imperialist, republican—has come and gone, there has been mismanagement, turmoil, convulsion, agitation, anarchy, and blunders without end; but the old administrative organisation is materially unchanged. The truth seems to be that a system of local management, self-government, and self-control, is entirely out of harmony with the French mind, and would be unpopular under any form of government. In nine cases out of ten, a Frenchman, who troubles himself to consider this subject, argues thus with himself:—"If I take part in public affairs, I shall increase my toil. To be a member of half-a-dozen committees, to prepare or listen to reports, to hear speech after speech for a fortnight on the same subject, to digest statistics, and make investigations—all these are wearisome occupations. Life is short. I must enjoy it while I can. I will therefore concern myself with none of these things. I will hand over such matters to the government. If the State is a despot, is it not also a servant? If it trammels me in some respects, does it not also save me from much worry? I will take it as my steward; I will invest it with full power; I will openly criticise its doings; and, should it

become intolerable, have I not always the option of turning it out of doors?" This sentiment is really a national characteristic, and crops up perpetually in the history of France. The recent trial of the late Prefect of the Eure, furnishes a striking illustration of the abuses to which the French people will expose themselves, rather than undertake the duties of official life. "L'état," says M. de Pressensé, a high authority on such questions, "est le *deus ex machinâ* de tous les parties."

Paris, like London and New York, is a county in itself. For municipal purposes it is divided into twenty arrondissements, each presided over by a Maire. An arrondissement is a municipality of itself, and is divided into quartiers, each of which has its local judicature and commissary of police. The arrondissements of the city and suburbs elect a Council General of the departments, over which the Préfet of the Seine presides. Although the constitution of the municipality of Paris is not of such a nature as to encourage self-government, it certainly possesses several important advantages which London, with all its historical experience, does not enjoy. In Paris there is a uniform system throughout the city, here municipal government varies in different portions of the Metropolis; in Paris the social position of the suburban officials is not of an inferior character to that of the officers of the more ancient parts of the city, here, on the other hand, the chief ruler of the City proper is a petty king, while the dignitaries of the suburban parishes are mere nobodies; in Paris there is a uniform system of rating, in London aristocratic Mayfair pays a poor-rate of something like sixpence in the pound, while there are several poverty-stricken districts, at the other end of the town, where the rate is nearly five times that amount; and lastly, while in Paris the power of combined action for sanitary, police, and other precautionary measures is almost perfect, in London it has on more than one occasion proved itself to be nil. It would have been surprising had none of our politicians endeavoured to accomplish for our Metropolis an equally desirable result. The Bill which Mr. Hughes submitted to Parliament two or three years ago borrowed the most salient features of the Parisian system, features which had been practically adopted at a much earlier date by Mr. J. S. Mill. Mr. Mill proposed to divide the Metropolis (exclusively of the City proper) into municipal boroughs, corresponding in extent with the Parliamentary boroughs; to grant to each borough so formed a corporate body by virtue of the Reform Act of 1835; to give

to each borough a distinct commission of the peace, with a salaried police magistrate, and a separate police-court division; to invest the municipal councils with the powers of the vestries and district boards under the Metropolitan Local Management Acts; and lastly to devise means of united action between the suburban councils and the Corporation of the City of London. Certain matters of general interest, such as the organisation of the police, the regulation of the gas and water companies, the control of public traffic, and sanitary precautions, as, for instance, against cholera, can only be effectively managed by a central board, invested with some such powers as those possessed by the Council General of the Seine. "It hath been an opinion," says Lord Bacon, "that the French are wiser than they seem;" upon the truth or otherwise of Lord Bacon's charitable supposition, we do not mean, of course, to pronounce. The fact remains that, while Frenchmen are peculiarly destitute of that special political education which a system of local government can alone bestow, they have many advantages arising from a central administration which we do not at present enjoy.

From the civic constitution of New York we have nothing to learn but a lesson of warning. Were M. de Tocqueville still alive, he would probably point to "the gem of the Western World" as a striking illustration of his favourite theory, that there may be a democratic state of society without a democratic government. Americans are said to have an instinctive faculty for self-government. The great mass of the people are politically educated. The expedition of Lamartine, who only took five minutes to decide whether the future *régime* in France was to be a Republic or a Constitutional Monarchy, is more than outrivalled by the extraordinary aptitude of some of the modern cities of the Union for extemporising municipal administrations. Structures hastily run up and loosely jointed together must, sooner or later, fall. It is only seven or eight years since one of the most popular and talented preachers in New York declared from his pulpit, that the government of the city was doing more moral injury to the citizens than all the Churches were doing good. The legislature of the City of New York consists of two bodies, the Board of Aldermen (seventeen in number), and the Board of Councilmen (twenty-four in number). The aldermen and councilmen of London work gratuitously; in New York each of these dignitaries receives about 2,000 dollars per annum. The Council Chamber in the Guildhall at London is rather a dingy-looking room, and the accommodation barely sufficient;

the Council Hall in New York is furnished in a style of sumptuous elegance. Each councillor is provided with a comfortable armchair and solid mahogany desk, the president's canopy is the acme of magnificence, the chandeliers are of the most ornate structure and elaborate design, the ceiling is frescoed in the highest style of art, and contiguous to this gorgeous chamber, there are handsome rooms for the use of the members' clerks.

"The twenty-four councilmen who have provided themselves with such ample assistance and costly accommodation are mostly young men, the majority appear to be under thirty. Does the reader remember the pleasant description given by Mr. Hawthorne of the sprightly young bar-keeper who rainbows the glittering drink from one tumbler to another? That sprightly young bar-keeper might stand as the type of the young men composing this board. There are respectable men in the body. There are six who have never knowingly cast an improper vote. There is one respectable physician, three lawyers, ten mechanics, and only four who acknowledge to be dealers in liquors. But there is a certain air about most of these young councilmen which, in the eyes of a New Yorker, stamps them as belonging to what has been styled of late years 'our ruling class.' Butcher boys who have got into politics, bar-keepers who have taken a leading part in primary-ward meetings, and going fellows who hang about engine houses and billiard rooms. A stranger would naturally expect to find in such a board men who have shown ability and acquired distinction in private business. We say again there are honest and estimable men in the body, but we also assert that there is not an individual in it who has attained any considerable rank in the vocation that he professes."—*North American Review*, Vol. 103, p. 419.

We shall not dwell longer on the civic affairs of New York. The passage which we have quoted, and fifty more which it would be possible for us to quote to the like purport, are sufficient to show, firstly, that civic corruption and municipal misrule are not at all at variance with a democratic form of government; and secondly, that serious mischief must necessarily arise, if the ablest and most virtuous citizens, men of subtle understanding, comprehensive genius, sound education, and sterling character, abjure the duties of public life.

We have already referred incidentally to the important part played by the great companies in the ancient history of the Metropolis. As far as the trading fraternities are concerned, we are rather disposed to dissent from the antiquarian tendency of the times to trace all our old institutions to British sources. The companies are of a hybrid origin. Introduced in their more developed form by the Normans, they were, at

the same time, the legitimate outgrowth of the territorial guilds of Saxon times. We shall not discuss the early history of the companies, or the circumstances which occasioned their several incorporation. It is sufficiently clear that they were nothing more nor less than trade combinations for the purpose of regulating or, to the best of their ability, monopolising the various branches of industry, and that the establishment and preservation of their exclusive privileges were not only the natural tendency, but the definite result and explicit end contemplated by the respective charters. In the reign of Edward II. we find the first authentic reference to the mercantile character of the municipal corporation of the City. It was provided by an early charter of this reign, "that no stranger be admitted into the freedom of the City at the hustings court. That inhabitants to be admitted shall be of some mystery or trade, six members of which shall be sureties to indemnify the City in respect of them."

"By the ancient law," says Mr. Pearson, in his celebrated speech on Corporation Reform, "no man was permitted to tarry in the City unless taken into frank-pledge and admitted a member of the great social family within its precincts. If a person in a state of villainage could escape from his lord and take refuge within the City, and if being permitted to remain for a year and a day he paid his scot and bore his lot, he acquired the rights of a freeman, and was admitted and sworn upon payment of a small fee without any fine. When a person of this description came over London Bridge, or presented himself at the gates of the City, and asked admittance, giving assurance that he was industrious and skilful in some mechanical art, the warder blew his horn and delivered the new comer over to the authorities of the ward to examine. What is your name? John. John! John what? I am St. Pierre's villain, and have no other name but John. Don't tell us anything about your Norman jargon; we are freeborn citizens and will have none but freemen here. Tell us what are you? what can you do? I am a tailor. Well, then, you shall be John le Taileur; go amongst the company of Tailors, and if they certify you, you may stay. What is your name? Richard. What are you? A smith. Well, Richard Smith, you may go and work at the smithies in Smithfield. So shoemakers were sent to cordwainers' ward, and other workmen to other districts in which similar workmen wrought. If it turned out that any of them had got into the City laying claim to a knowledge of arts which they did not possess, the citizens soon gave them the cold shoulder; they would have no drones or unskilful workmen in the hive."

Edward III. had the foresight to perceive that the trading fraternities were the mainstay of the commerce of the king-

dom. He stimulated their energy by enrolling himself in the Linen Armourers' Company, and, what was of far greater importance, bestowed upon the guilds more extensive privileges; among others, the right of nominating the members of the Common Council, a power formerly vested in the wards. Of the eighty-four civic companies still in existence, half have been incorporated since the accession of James I. The Weavers' Company claims to be the oldest, dating from 1164. Twelve, viz. the Clothworkers, Drapers, Fishmongers, Goldsmiths, Grocers, Haberdashers, Ironmongers, Mercers, Merchant Taylors, Salters, Skinners, and Vintners, are styled by pre-eminence the Great Companies. The Stationers, Apothecaries and Goldsmiths are the only companies still retaining some slight degree of control over their respective trades. As originally constituted the companies actually consisted of persons practising the trade from which they took their name, but the custom has long ago died out.

"Long before the reign of George I. not only the municipal authorities of the City had ceased to interfere much in regulating the companies, but the companies had also ceased to interfere in regulating the mode of trading within the City. The companies admitted to the freedom of such associations, and eventually to the rank of a liveryman, whomever they thought fit, without regard to his being either a tradesman or a householder, either within the City or elsewhere. The consequence was that a large bulk of the freemen and liverymen of the companies no longer represented the true citizens and householders within the City paying scot and bearing lot, or often even as traders. In the mere capacity of liverymen of a company and freemen of the City without being householders, or occupying as traders, they had no more real connection with the City of London than with that of Liverpool or any other city."—*Norton*, p. 247.

It is not, however, because the London companies are wealthy corporations, because the names of kings and other potentates are written on their rolls, because they have played an all-important part in the history of the City, or even because their archives shed light upon the religion, the habits, and the customs of a bygone age, that we have glanced, even as rapidly as we have done, at the origin and constitution of the civic guilds; but because we entertain a firm conviction that, by doing comparatively little to improve those branches of industry, the furtherance of whose interests was the primary cause of their incorporation, the companies have ceased to act in conformity with the spirit of their

charters. Free trade and international intercourse have made it impossible for the London companies, or trades' unions in any shape or form, no matter how stringent their written or unwritten laws or how significant their threats, to subject the labour market to their dominion or exert a general and active control over the industrial classes. We are, unhappily, too familiar with the disastrous effects of the trades' unions in this country during the last half-century, in curtailing productive power, checking manual skill, and stamping out moral industry, to suggest a return to the old protective system; neither do we, for a moment, imagine that anything could be gained by reinvesting the companies with their former powers, or adopting the modern system of Continental guilds. On the Continent of Europe the guilds have for many generations exerted a powerful influence on the people. The introduction of steam power, the extension of the factory system, and the increased trade in coals are, however, now doing much to undermine the basis upon which they are built. In Saxony, for instance, until ten years ago, there was not a man of any craft, with the exception of country masons, carpenters, sweeps, and bakers of rye bread, who did not necessarily belong to a guild. In 1861 the guilds were abolished, and the effect was immediately apparent. The number of masters at once diminished, that of the journeymen increased; trades became subdivided, that of carpenters for example into building carpenters, cabinet makers, makers of flooring, of window sashes, and the like; labour was drawn from the cottage to the factory; and the status of the working classes became entirely changed. In Egypt the system of *esnafs* or guilds has for centuries been established. It is probably maintained from the facilities it affords in the collection of the capitation and other personal taxes, as well as for the guarantee it is made to offer for the due execution of works ordered by the Government. Every esnaf is presided over by a sheikh, or warden appointed by the Government. The sheikh is actually the ruler of his guild, admitting members, directing the manner in which contracts shall be carried out, fixing the wages of the craftsmen, selecting workmen to carry out the various works, collecting all taxes from his guild, and he is moreover responsible to the Government in all matters connected therewith. The members of a guild are furnished on admission with certificates, stating their proficiency, and the rate of wages they are entitled to receive. As a rule, when they have once turned their attention to a particular craft, and

entered a guild, they are not allowed to change to any other trade.

The work, which we should like to see the chartered civic companies of London undertake, is that of technical and scientific education. The ignorance of the English artisan as to the most elementary scientific principles of his art or trade is telling with alarming rapidity upon our manufacturing and commercial progress. France, Prussia, Austria, Belgium, and Switzerland, all possess sound and efficient systems of industrial education for the masters and managers of workshops and factories. Commercially, these countries have grown almost in proportion to the extent and excellence of the educational training supplied to their manufacturing population. "I am of opinion," says Mr. Mundella, "that Englishmen possess more energy, enterprise, and inventiveness than any other European nation. The best machines in my trade now at work in France and Germany are the inventions of Englishmen, and in most cases of uneducated workmen; but these machines of English invention are constructed and improved by men who have had the advantage of a superior industrial education." The testimony of Mr. Young, the largest chemical manufacturer in the United Kingdom, is to the same effect. "Originally," he says, "I was a working man, but have succeeded in increasing the range of manufacturing industry. The foundation of my success consisted in my having been fortunately attached to the laboratory of the Andersonian University in Glasgow, where I learned chemistry under Graham, and natural philosophy and other subjects under the respective professors. This knowledge gave me the power of improving the chemical manufactures into which I afterwards passed as a servant, and ultimately led to my being the founder of a new branch of industry, and owner of the largest manufacturing works of the kingdom." The principal manufacturing towns on the Continent are fully awake to the importance of this question. In Paris there are several large and flourishing institutions devoted exclusively to industrial tuition. In the Ecole Turgot there are 800 pupils, in the Collége Chaptal 950, in the Ecole Centrale des Arts et Manufactures 500, and more than twice that number of applicants on its books; and lastly, there is the celebrated Ecole Polytechnique. Now how does London stand, when compared in this respect with her foreign rival? We believe that we are not understating the fact when we say that there are only two institutions in London where a youth can obtain an education approximating in the slightest

degree to that given in each of the large Parisian schools that we have ntioned. We are not aware of any other institutions in... lon than the Department of Applied Sciences at King's College and the classes at the Jermyn Street Museum, where students—of course we refer to other than art students—can obtain the necessary aid of practical study; and even here the education is to a very large extent of a purely theoretical character. Nor is this eagerness of the mercantile classes abroad confined to the large cities of the Continent. Take, for instance, the little town of Nienburg in Hanover, and we find there a model school, specially intended for workmen in the building trade. The school is open only during the winter months; it is attended by about 200 pupils, of whom eighty-nine are masons, eighty-seven joiners, nine millwrights, and seven locksmiths. The municipality of Brussels established as an experiment some few years ago several Ateliers d'Apprentissage, or industrial schools with workshops attached, and so successful and useful have they proved that they are now largely aided by Government grants. In Lombardy and Piedmont no less than 13,329 children receive annually a technical education in the 154 Government schools. In Rome the fine institution of San Michele, which has for twenty years been used as a political prison, is under a happier and wiser dispensation already being restored to its original educational design. In this noble building from five to six thousand students used to be instructed by the best professors that Rome could furnish in every art, science, profession, and trade, at the low rate of four shillings per month.

We can hardly expect the Educational Department to enter upon this comparatively new field. What is done must be done by private enterprise, and there is surely nothing extravagant in the suggestion that the London companies are pre-eminently fitted to break up the fallow ground and supply a want long and painfully felt by the more energetic and hard-working youths of the City. Most of the larger companies have extensive landed estates, which are increasing in value and also in bulk year by year. The magnificent and commodious halls scattered over the City, and at present used merely for an occasional banquet or ball, could without much difficulty be utilised for the purpose of delivering lectures on the various trades. The vested interests in the corporate funds, except for charitable purposes, are small, and the Courts of Assistants, or governing bodies of the companies, are, with a few notorious exceptions, composed of

intelligent and liberal-minded men. The Merchant Tailors certainly possess one of the most efficient schools in the metropolis; but as far as the majority of the other companies are concerned, when we have said that they support a large array of pensioners, maintain and control a considerable number of suburban almshouses, regulate a few provincial schools in their respective gifts, occasionally offer scholarships at Oxford or Cambridge to sons of the liverymen, and offer prizes now and then for excellent workmanship in their several branches of trade, we have, we believe, mentioned all that the companies are doing to improve the moral, social, and intellectual condition of the citizens of London. We should like to see the Stationers' Company establishing some such institution as that at Mullhouse, where printing in all its branches and bearings is scientifically studied. The Haberdashers' and Drapers' Halls stand in the very centre of the City. What an incalculable advantage it would be to thousands of young men engaged in the large Manchester houses to be able on two or three evenings of the week to resort to either of these halls, and find there a library stocked with the literature of their trade, a reading-room furnished with the most recent designs and records of the newest inventions, and to have the further opportunity of attending lectures bearing upon the commercial or manufacturing aspects of their daily pursuits, such as the fluctuations of prices, the foreign centres of trade, the law of textile tissues, the use of chemical dyes, the relation and harmony of colours, the adaptation of machinery, and a thousand other points to which a thorough business man must sooner or later turn his attention. We do not doubt that such institutions would soon be self-supporting. Were this, however, not the case, what inconsistency would there be in diverting, with the approbation of the requisite legal authorities, a portion of the wealth so frequently and absurdly lavished on a corps of hereditary pensioners for the accomplishment of so desirable an end. Benevolence that furnishes means of subsistence to those who are capable of self-support is no benevolence at all. It is on this account that we are disposed to regard with grave suspicion the disposition of trust funds for the purpose of gratuitously distributing year by year small pecuniary gifts. There is a vast and increasing multitude of pensioners on the great companies and charities of London, who are actually being taught year by year to distrust their own energies, and rely upon external aid for that which they can and ought to achieve. Surely the cup of

charity has been wisely compared to the horn which the giant in Utgard handed to Thor to test his drinking powers—the end was sunk in the ocean and the flagon was only to be emptied by draining the sea.

Setting aside the social, intellectual, and moral consideration of this question of technical instruction, and looking at it solely from a commercial point of view, nothing more will be necessary than to trace the history of the manufactory at Creuzot and the Messageries Impériales Steam Navigation Company at La Ciôtat, in order to perceive at once that masters may derive a large pecuniary profit by actually rearing in primary, secondary, and higher schools, a skilled body of workmen, engineers, and accountants. Interesting as the subject of technical education must in these times necessarily be, we should not have ventured to devote so large a portion of our space to it were we not firmly convinced that it involves not only the manufacturing pre-eminence of our country, but the moral and social well-being of the industrial classes. This is particularly the case in London. There is an old Jewish proverb which says, that the man who does not teach his son a trade teaches him to be a thief. The proverb has lost none of its significance. Before many years have passed away, the man who refuses to his child an education will condemn him to a life of poverty, and, not improbably, of crime. Knowledge, so Lord Bacon tells us, is power; we trust that then it will be wealth also. If our working people of London wish to stamp out that system of hereditary pauperism that is again beginning to gnaw at the vitals of the State, if they wish to be something better than hewers of wood and drawers of water, if they would root out the diseased and rotten portions of the social fabric, if they would turn the vicious and destitute children swarming in their streets into sober and honest citizens, they must be ready, and even anxious, to give to those children, though it be at some personal sacrifice, an industrial and also a godly training, and they must be willing to believe, that the curse pronounced on themselves and all their forefathers—that if man would eat bread he must eat it in the sweat of his brow—was in appearance only a curse, that in reality it was a blessing. It is utterly puerile for working men to gather round the ale-house table and attempt to devise secret and arbitrary measures for the purpose of outwitting their masters and evading the law, to dream of a recurrence to mediæval errors and again surrounding labour with its old artificial environments, and to labour under the delusion that, by congregating on

Clerkenwell Green or Trafalgar Square, and drinking in a quantity of silly nonsense, they are preparing the way for the advent of an imaginary republic, where everyone will be equal, and where misery and crime cannot, by the sheerest possibility, exist. Intelligent, persevering, unfettered, and conscientious labour is the only panacea for such evils.

We have no intention, at this late stage of our paper, to enter upon the wide field of social science, or to suggest a solution of any of those perplexing enigmas connected with what is known pre-eminently as the social life of our large manufacturing towns. We are the less disposed to do so, for, were we desirous of discussing such questions as the intercourse between rich and poor, the relations of capital and labour, the growth of pauperism and crime, or the extent and nature of charitable aid, we should have nothing more to do than refer to page after page in recent numbers of this Journal. We shall, therefore, do nothing more than indicate two or three of the agencies of evil which appear to demand thorough and stringent legislative action, and in London make all schemes of social amelioration so difficult and uncertain of success. It is impossible to walk through the streets of the metropolis, and see the "gallows literature" circulating by the thousand among the boys and girls engaged in the factories, without awarding to the low journals and serial magazines one of the foremost places among the corrupting and demoralising agencies of the day. Robbers, banditti, murderers, and malefactors of every hue, are described in glowing and attractive language. These serials are, without a doubt, the text-books of the juvenile delinquents of London. Not a few graduates in crime have learnt the first principles of iniquity from the *Newgate Calendar* and publications of a more modern character but similar type. Nothing can be more patent than that the interests of the community imperatively demand that the sources should be at once ascertained, and, when ascertained, removed, whence these children who are preying on society and living in hostility to its laws receive their instruction in crime. Every accession to the ranks of the juvenile offenders means an additional demand on the public revenue and a heavier burden in the shape of taxation on the shoulders of every honest man. We think that it was Montesquieu who said that there would be periods in the history of every people when a veil would have to be thrown over the statue of liberty. It is high time, as far as these serials are concerned, that the liberty of the press should be curtailed. Surely the literature which stimu-

lates, trains, and hardens the criminal, furnishes an annual contingent to the ranks of delinquency, and tends materially to augment the public burdens, is unworthy of John Milton's eloquent plea and a fit subject for legislative control.

The rapid increase of theatres and music halls is another serious phase of London life. We have already spoken of the exclusive character of the citizens of London a couple of centuries ago. They lived almost entirely within the City walls, they were governed and guided by their own laws, their manners and customs were essentially civic; but nothing distinguished so clearly the City from the Court as the persistent refusal of the municipality to permit theatrical representations within their precincts. Now there are no less than thirteen or fourteen theatres within a radius of a mile from Charing Cross, many of them devoted to comedy and burlesque of the lowest type. Two hundred thousand persons, or in other words the entire population of Wilts, Salop, or the east riding of Yorkshire, could be comfortably accommodated in the Metropolitan places of amusement of this character. The working of the pawnbroking system is a question which is rapidly coming to the front, and one with which social reformers will shortly have to do battle. The subject is too wide a one for hasty consideration. It has already been placed upon the Parliamentary programme, and must ere long force itself on the attention of the country. Sandy Mackaye was not far wrong when he compared one of the miserable alleys of St. Giles's to "the mouth o' hell, and the twa pillars thereof at the entry, the pawnbroker's shop o' one side, and the gin palace at the other—twa monstrous deevils eating up men, women, and bairns, body and soul."

One of the many advantages possessed by foreign working men over their English competitors is that, owing to the education they have received, they are able to find in a variety of rational pastimes that necessary relaxation from labour which is so essential to their moral and physical well-being. Much has been done during the last twenty years to improve the condition of the working classes of London. Modern improvements have rooted out many of the plague-spots of the city; stringent, though often unavailing, measures have been adopted to prevent overcrowding in confined garrets and unhealthy cellars; a large proportion of the worst-conditioned houses of the metropolis have been effectually drained; precautionary measures have been successfully devised for arresting the progress of pestilence, and officers

of health appointed whose duty it is to subject the sanitary arrangements of their several districts to a strict scrutiny. Much still remains to be done; but, as far as the homes of the working classes are concerned, London will bear favourable comparison with the majority of Continental towns. In Naples, for example, the lodgings called "*bassi*," inhabited by the working men, are damp, overcrowded, unventilated, and filthy. A large number of the artisan and labouring classes of Naples consequently live outside the octroi limits, and many of them as far as eight or ten miles from the city. In Antwerp an effort has recently been made by the municipality to remedy a similar state of things by the erection of model lodging houses for artisans and their families at the Stuivenberg. At Constantinople matters are, as might be expected, in a worse condition. A working man's house there costs on an average about £12 or £13 to construct. It consists of two rooms, the walls are of lath and rubble, the windows are small, open in summer, in winter stuffed with rags, and all sanitary considerations are, of course, ignored.

Admitting, and lamenting as we do, that the condition of the working classes is far from the ideal which it is possible to form, we still affirm that it is improving with a rapidity that justifies the most sanguine expectations. "In the youth of a State," says Lord Bacon, "arms do flourish, in the middle age of a State learning, and then both of them together for a time, in the declining age of a State mechanical arts and merchandise." London is a mercantile city, but there are no signs of decrepitude or decay. The City's credit is unshaken, sedition and political agitation are well-nigh unknown, and at no period of the civic history has there been a greater disposition to encourage the friendly intercourse of class with class. The history of the City of London furnishes abundant proof that our forefathers were not indulging in a golden dream when they maintained that advancement in civilisation and improvement in morals went hand in hand, and it supplies yet another illustration of M. Prevost Paradol's maxim:—"On oublie trop de nos jours lorsqu'on parle de la grandeur ou de la décadence des peuples que les causes de ces grands événements sont purement morales."

ART. VII.—*Dissent in its Relation to the Church of England. Eight Lectures preached before the University of Oxford, in the Year* 1871, *on the Foundation of the late Rev. John Bampton, M.A.* By GEORGE HENRY CURTEIS, M.A., late Fellow and Sub-Rector of Exeter College, Principal of the Lichfield Theological College, and Prebendary of Lichfield Cathedral. London: Macmillan and Co. 1872.

THE last year's Bampton lecturer undertook one of the greatest topics that could just now engage the English mind: the study of all the forms of Nonconformity in Great Britain in relation to the English Church. For the accomplishment of such a task, a number of qualifications were necessary that rarely meet in one man. Mr. Curteis unites in himself many of them, but not all; and, unhappily, the absent ones are precisely those most indispensable for the endeavour to conciliate into unity such a wide variety of conflicting parties and interests. The public censor of Dissent should be learned in the history of the development of the denominations; he should take a philosophical view of the great principles of which each has been the exponent, and be able to give them their due honour without stint; he should be capable of a generous enthusiasm in his estimates of the deeds and efforts of men from whom he widely differs; he should be evidently animated by a loyal zeal in the service of Christianity, while tactily defending one form of it in exclusion of the rest; he should have the graces of scholarship, eloquence, and of a vigorous style, that a subject perpetually handled by others may recommend itself by some advantages of style. All these requisites for the prosecution of his object Mr. Curteis brought to his lectures. He is learned beyond most men in the lore of our English ecclesiastical history; he is profoundly touched by all that is noble and true in what he condemns; he is a scholar and writer of pure and classical English, knowing well how to sprinkle over his pages such felicities as only extensive reading, under the guidance of an elegant taste, can place at a writer's disposal. But there are two things that he lacks: the first is the power of looking at the systems which he discusses as wholes—a

deficiency which gives a distorted view, for instance, of Unitarianism and Methodism, and, indeed, more or less of all the systems, while faithful enough to their leading peculiarities; and the second is a want of practical wisdom in dealing with the infinite complications of modern English ecclesiastical life.

It is an important element in the appreciation of this work, that its object be kept in view: that object being, not so much the rebuke and condemnation of systems that the lecturer disapproves, as the furtherance of some ulterior scheme of union, such as the organising of Teutonic Christendom into a form capable of combination with the Latin and Slavonian races. The Church of the Teutonic race is said, with much truth, to be the one only power which is capable of maintaining the world in equilibrium between the violent and enormous extremes of Lamaism in modern Rome, and sceptical materialism in modern Paris. The destiny of this race, therefore, having such vast issues committed to its loyalty and courage, is one of the most momentous questions of the day. This volume is a contribution to the practical solution of that question.

Practical, however, we can hardly call it. From beginning to end there is no evidence that the great difficulties of the question are duly appreciated; nor is there any suggestion of any method by which one step could be taken for the accomplishment of the object desired. What avails it to speak of "Englishmen, Americans, and Germans laying out their ecclesiastical plans, with reference to the eventual combination and reunion with the Latin and Slavonic races and their fixed type of Episcopal Church organisation?" The question is not one of mere Church organisation or otherwise. It goes in many cases to the very foundations of Christian faith. And, if it were, the great communities of Christendom, in East and West, and further West, are not engaged in laying out ecclesiastical plans. It belongs to no generation to do that. The ancient constitutions of Churches cannot be changed at will; they are the growth of ages; they have been consolidated through a long series of former generations, by the skill of men, both with and without the direction of the Holy Spirit, and they are bound up with associations, and prepossessions, and habits of religious life, that place them beyond the reach of change—at least of any change that has not for its author the direct omnipotent action of God Himself. Union between Rome and the East has been the despair of nearly a millennium. Supposing them united,

union between them and Teutonic Christianity, as such, is a thing utterly impracticable by any human efforts; for first must the divisions of Teutonic Christendom be removed. But what plan can be suggested, even by the fondest enthusiast, which shall unite in ecclesiastical organisation the German and the English speaking Christians? It has been the fruitless labour of more than fifty years to blend even the Lutheran and the Reformed Churches of Germany, one as they are in the glorious traditions of the sixteenth century; and as to the combination of the English and American denominations among themselves, no comment upon the hopelessness of any such attempt can be more convincing than the pages of this volume.

Nor is this way of putting it a begging of the question. We are not now speaking of an effusion of the mighty influences of the Divine Spirit healing the breaches of Christendom, first revealing and then commending and then imposing the one true organisation for the Christian world. Nothing is impossible to the Head of the Christian Church. But He has long taught us what are His methods; what we are to expect and what not to expect from His sovereign grace. We have the past for our guidance, and that past teaches us that He overrules and directs the free tendencies and efforts of His people. We are speaking, with this book, of the "laying out of our ecclesiastical plans," and it must be repeated that there is a grievous unreality, and more than mere unreality, in referring to our "reckless and unintelligent confusions" as under our own control. We are the children of our fathers, have entered into the heritage bequeathed us from our several ancestry; and, for the great renovations idealised and pictured upon our imaginations, we have but little power and but little responsibility.

Limiting his view to the organising of Teutonic Christendom—without a word of suggestion touching the broader question—Mr. Curteis discusses the two schemes presented to our choice. These are the scheme of "The Evangelical Alliance," and the scheme of "The Old Catholic Church."

The former can hardly be said to be fairly presented in the sketch given in this Preface. The Evangelical Alliance, which has been before the Christian world for many years, does not profess to organise Teutonic Christendom. It simply exhibits the union that really exists among Christian communities which are otherwise divided, and literally know not how to abolish their subordinate distinctions, being bound to them by forces beyond all human control. It assumes that it is

the will of God, made known in fact and history, that the Gospel should be diffused over the world from a multitude of centres, instead of from one; with a thousand types of internal organisation instead of one; and by a number of Apostles not necessarily "entering into other men's labours," instead of by emissaries sent from one central source of authority. The Evangelical Alliance deserves a kinder characterisation than it has here; the following is a rather unreal picture:—

"These objections seem of themselves conclusive against the 'Evangelical Alliance' scheme. But they are strengthened a hundredfold by the consideration that hereby would be sanctioned and consecrated, as if in full accordance with the mind of Christ, a scheme for the continuance and extension of His kingdom, involving such waste of power, such mutual obstruction, such a reticulated and mutually-contradictory aspect 'toward them that are without'—as to render Christendom (far more than it is at present) a scandal and an object of ridicule to the heathen. It would make Missionary success in future absolutely hopeless; and all such conception of 'the Church and Family of Jesus Christ' as might enkindle men's imagination and engage their love, once and for ever out of the question.

"And, again, what can be said of a scheme which proposes to break up, in front of the deep and serried phalanx of Rome, the whole opposing army into a mere cloud of skirmishers; to abandon interior discipline and subordination, just at the moment when the enemy has concentrated his power into one man's hand, to create a multitude of independent and infinitesimal commands, with endless chances of misunderstandings, of cross purposes, of jealousies, bickerings, and loss of all 'solidarity,' precisely at the hour when the whole vast Roman communion has surrendered itself, '*perinde ac cadaver*,' to the guidance of the general of the Jesuits, and has become travestied from a Church into a military 'company,' who march (it almost seems as if they cared not whither) at the word of Papal command. This were indeed to throw away victory out of our hand, and to abandon those very 'spiritual weapons of our warfare'—obedience, self-control, and unanimity—by which alone the strongholds of darkness can be overcome."—Page xvi.

We have read these sentences again and again, to find their practical application. But we can find none. They would be forcible enough if we were now setting out upon the world's conversion with a new Christianity revealed, authenticated, and committed to us from heaven. Even then it would be a question, without specific Divine command settling the point, whether it would not be better to allow every race, or every nation, or every province, receiving its own Christianity, to publish it throughout the world. It is not so certain to us that one common visible centre would or could be retained for

the one common invisible sphere. But we are dealing with the great irresistible facts of the Christian world. We are all addressed by our monitor as if we were going out on a fresh enterprise against Rome and Infidelity, and could arrange our plans accordingly. "See that ye fall not out by the way" is good advice when the journey is before a single company. But when the company has from the very beginning been separated into a variety of tribes, it may be exceedingly important to give this counsel as to the conduct of mutual enterprises, and the suppression of needless discords, but the counsel has no force as it respects the blending into one company again. The "Evangelical Alliance scheme" has nothing to do with the aggressive work of the several communions. It leaves the Churches to maintain their confessions, cultivate their spheres of labour, uphold their own organisations, and rejoice in their own worship. Not interfering with these, it seeks to give all an opportunity of showing that there is a broad Christianity in which they should agree, and that they can from time to time unite to proclaim that they have one Master, and love one another.

But what is the rival "scheme," that of the Old Catholic Church? It is simply the restoration of the Christian world to something like its condition before the usurpation of one despotic power. There is to all our hearts a charm in the term "Catholic," so mighty a word in the beginning, so much perverted since. But it is hard to understand what it means. If the term Evangelical "opens a question which no man can close, what is it precisely to be 'Evangelical'? who are thereby excluded, and by what authority?" surely the same may be said of the term "Catholic," and especially of the term "Old Catholic." We have lately been made familiar enough with the word. "Old Catholic," in Germany just now, and in France, signifies a return to Tridentine theology and Tridentine decrees for order and worship. Our author has a very different idea of "Old Catholic;" but he cannot surely pretend that in these days the true "Old Catholic" idea can be reproduced. It is true that there is much in the constitution and polity of the Church of England that is more nearly conformed to early ages than anything found among her separated daughter communities or rivals. But it is equally certain that some of those rivals retain or have recovered much that the Church of England has lost; as also that the greater portion of the Anglican students of antiquity are utterly discontented with the Catholicity they find in her, and are spending their strength in the endeavour to restore

their own type of Catholic antiquity. Here is Mr. Curteis's view:—

"Happily, however, another alternative presents itself, from which almost all these fatal conditions of failure are absent, and that is the Old Catholic system of the Church. Here the watchword is not 'independence,' but 'unity.' Here each man and each congregation are called upon to sacrifice some portion of their private liberty for the common benefit. The one normal type, both of organisation and of ritual, is loyally maintained; but, at the same time, free play is allowed for local preferences and national characteristics. Power, energy, and momentum are engendered—by clerical synods and by mixed congresses, conventions and conferences—among the lower orders of the Christian 'polity;' and edge, efficiency, and concentration are supplied by a graduated hierarchy, of which the uppermost ranks (archbishops and patriarchs) form centres and guarantees of unity, but are not invested with any considerable power; while the lower (bishops, rectors, &c.) are intrusted with practical and executive authority. According to this theory, as the Bishop of Rome is the patriarch of the Latin Church (De Marca, *de Concord.* i. 2, 7), and the Bishop of Constantinople is the patriarch of the Eastern Church, so the Archbishop of Canterbury is the patriarch of (at least) the English-speaking Churches—if he may not fairly claim the presidency of the whole Teutonic Church, which owes its foundation mainly to English missions."—P. xvii.

Dividing this paragraph into two portions, the earlier part of it is very much more true as a picture of what the Evangelical Alliance theory aims at than as an exhibition of the temper of what may be called the Old Catholic movement: almost every sentence applies to the laudable efforts of the friends of Evangelical Unity among the Protestant Churches. The latter part is the reading off into good English of a strange dream that has no English common sense in it. When will the Pope be content with the Patriarchate of the West? When will the East submit to the Patriarchate of Constantinople? And by what strange combination of events will the Archbishop of Canterbury find himself the head of the Presbyterian communities of America, Germany, and Switzerland? Surely, the Christian communities must be on their guard against diverting their energies from the conversion of the world while such gigantic revolutions are waited for among themselves.

The fact is that the true theory of Christendom, that in which a solution of any difficulty would be found, combines these two. The Old Catholic Church was strictly an Evangelical Alliance among Churches that were, to a great extent, independent of each other in a far larger multitude of parti-

culars than is generally supposed. The provincial and more general synods were not more homogeneous in their construction than an occasional gathering of Christians. During the first ages there were blended in some of these Councils quite as wide a variety of sentiments, cultus, and even doctrine, as will be found in the Assembly at New York next September. When it ceased to be so, and one all-embracing despotism began to rule the Christian world, and the Bishop of Rome became the Cæsar of universal appeal, then, indeed, both the Old Catholic and the Evangelical Alliance systems faded from the world, and the Church no longer answered to the New Testament ideal. Our lecturer abhors the mediæval unity as much as we do; and, indeed, leaves us behind in the strength and intensity of his language concerning it. Now, if he would dispassionately consider the question, and study ancient Church history for the purpose of trying to find some warranty for the present state of things, he would, perhaps, come or be driven to the conclusion that during the first five centuries there was not more real cohesion, combination, and unity among the Christian communities of Asia Minor, North Africa, and Spain, than exist now upon the face of our much condemned ecclesiastical England. Mr. Curteis' fragmentary list of heresies—which is shielded from criticism by his frank admission of its imperfection—will not shake our position. With one or two exceptions his ancient heretics and schismatics were such as the Evangelical Alliance would shake off, and has shaken off, at any cost: indeed, such as the Alliance has never consented to accept as Christians at all. Gnostics, Ebionites, Montanists (if not Donatists), Arians, Sabellians, Pelagians, Fatalists, are an array of names which Mr. Curteis makes representations of ancient dissent. Such dissent from the "prevailing and authorised methods, both of doctrine and discipline," we should most of us regard just as he regards it. The modern Church, even on the "Alliance" theory, is as resolute as the Old Catholic was at its best in suppressing or protesting against all such errors as these words represent. Were our lecturer heartily disposed to find among our sects the elements of Catholic, Old Catholic, truth, he would find them in much more abundance than he seems now disposed to believe. We say nothing of a certain Montanism in our Quaker friends, and at present of a certain Donatism in some others of us—the Ebionite Unitarians we leave out at present for other reasons—and confine ourselves to the Christian communities which we broadly call Evangelical. Viewing these in a pure catholic spirit, and making allowance for a

nomenclature occasionally different, we make bold to say that Catholic truth and Catholic discipline is far better represented by the great Christendom represented in the Evangelical Alliance than by some of those ideals of Christendom which called themselves Old Catholics.

And our lecturer ought, after all, to be desirous of admitting this truth: not to appeal to the charitable feeling that should hope all things, it is enough to refer to the logic of facts. Surely it should go for something in our argument, that the estate of Christendom is what it is—is what the Head of the Church has permitted it to be. *Permitted* it is saying but little. Unless ten thousand evidences, drawn from a vast induction of facts mutually confirming each other, deceive us, He has done much more than merely suffer it to be so. He has given His undeniable and unmistakable blessing to the Church of England in its Dissent; to the Church of England which, in modern times, is the mother and mistress of all Dissenters, the most effective Dissent the modern world has known. He has given His sanction to the Lutheran and Calvinistic forms of Dissent from Rome. He has most abundantly blessed the Puritan and Methodistic Dissent; and the Dissenting element in Christendom is so firmly established—yes, established—in the modern world, that the very supposition of its absence suggests the idea of a revolution which the mind cannot well grasp. What would the cause of Christ be at this moment, if the agencies and results of what is here called Dissent were eliminated? The grace and loveliness of unity has as much fascination for our judgment and heart as for the lecturer's; but we are compelled to accept what we have seen and known. There seems to us a time when theories must submit to the modification of facts. And there are some noble thoughts in this volume which come to our help. Take, for instance, the following, which refers to the Saviour's design in establishing His Church:—

"Thirdly, that this purpose was simply and purely an *educational* one. The society was, above all other things, not to be exclusive and selfish, as if for enjoyment. It was to be a self-forgetting, a self-hazarding agent of His own vast and expansive charity, and therefore, like Himself, it was not to stop and ask if this man were a publican or that man a Samaritan, but to gather up its armfuls of the strayed, the lost, the weak, the young—the victims of nature, of man, of their own passions or folly—and to 'set them among the princes,' by giving them a home, with love and training in it, and all that makes men human, cheerful, healthful, and, in the best and highest sense, natural.

"Fourthly, that the ultimate object of all this machinery was, not

to create, in any sense whatever, a privileged class; not to maintain a hierarchy or an endowed establishment for their own sakes (God forbid), but simply the pure and Christian purpose of *saving souls;* of sealing down upon them, when the wax is hot, the impression of Christianity; stamping it down in sacraments, and rituals, and lessons, and sermons, and setting before them a visible example of the peace, and joy, and health that dwells in His household, and are the natural inheritance of His children."—Page 16.

It is true that the lecturer follows up this by some eloquent and forcible pages on the sad opposite, which is presented by modern Christendom in the face of the wondering and mocking world. But he ascribes to the existence of Dissent more of the evil that he so feelingly describes than can fairly be chargeable upon it. At any rate, some of the separated communities faithfully respond in their character to the noble picture he draws of the Church of Christ. They cling to their order with tenacity, very often at the sacrifice of sentiment and taste. They think much more of the great business given them to do, in the invitation of Christ, than of fair ideals which might distract them from it. They accustom themselves to regard the Church as a vast "educational institute," preparing in rough exterior synagogues those whom they transmit in due time to the interior and perfect sanctuary not yet revealed, being "hid with Christ in God." They exist to "save souls," and are not behindhand, to say the least, in self-hazarding labour at home and abroad for the multitudes of the heathen dispersion. They have learned to be "filled" with this work, and to postpone for another sphere the realisation of an ideal which is common to the inmost hearts of Churchmen and Dissenters alike, the perfection of Christ's people in all things in one.

In another part of the volume, when writing of the Unitarians, the lecturer says as follows:—

"And so we learn to recognise that God's method is *compromise*, not directness; that safety lies, not in one force, but in a revolution of forces; and that—eagerly as people of one idea are always craving for simplicity, unity, and logical completeness—their ways are not God's ways, and are sure to lead to some ruinous and (ultimately) illogical result.

"I need not, surely, spend time in applying this parable of nature to the subject before us. Unitarianism, on the one side, with its entire abrogation of all creeds, and Romanism, on the other, with its now completed centralisation of authority, are each of them compact and perfect logical systems, while the true system of the Catholic Church seems incomplete, illogical; a mere resolution of irreconcilable

forces; a 'compromise.' Yet this, there is every reason to think, is God's way after all."—Page 306.

We heartily agree with this, and claim the benefit of it. Pleading for our many independent communities, we would fain place them among these seemingly "irreconcilable" forces which the Supreme Hand knows well how to harmonise, bringing their innumerable perturbations and oscillations to a perfect adjustment in the great cyclical system. We thank the lecturer for the word, and desire no more. We desire no more, that is, as things are. Simplicity, unity, and logical completeness are three terms that kindle our deep admiration and desire. But in this militant Church we despair of these. We must bear this cross among others. And we must be content to enter into the great "compromise." Again we thank the lecturer for the word.

But our space is short for so large a subject; and some remarks of a more particular kind press upon us. The individual studies of the several forms of English Dissent would each repay a careful study of our own. We must leave them to those more immediately concerned, and occupy a few pages with some remarks upon the study of the Wesleyan system. Before doing so, however, we are arrested by the formidable essay on Romanism. It is startling to find "the Romanists" introduced as "the second great secession which rent the unity and disturbed the peace of the Church of England subsequently to the Reformation," and as "following the evil example set them by the Brownists and Independents shortly before," and as having "seceded on a point of internal organisation, only in an opposite direction" from that of the Independents. The question as between the Romish and the Anglican Churches is here treated entirely on the ground that the former is one of the forms of Dissent. We have no space for extracts which would illustrate the luminous and thorough style in which the Bampton lecturer traces the growth, ascendency, corruption and decline of the Papacy. We must content ourselves with two passages, which will go far to prove that, after all, the Church of England, on the lecturer's theory of the Church, was no other than a noble form of Dissent from a Church the existence of which is acknowledged.

"From that time forwards the Papacy has been essentially a question for the Latin nations. The men of the Teutonic and Saxon nations have found, or are finding, other methods for securing combination and unity, than a Dictatorship founded on fraud. And the

Church of England, in particular, when she saw herself forced, in the sixteenth century—if she would be loyal, not to the Pope, but to the Pope's Sovereign and hers, Jesus Christ—to take some measures towards a *pro tempore* self-reform, simply purge away all absolutely intolerable abuses and superstitions; and so patiently abide, until such time as her sister Churches also (with or without the Pope) should take heart to reform. The attitude of our Church at the Reformation cannot indeed be too frequently or too clearly called to mind. It was not a breach or a schism that was intended. It was simply a 'protest.' Now a protest,—whether in a club, a Church, or any other society,—of course signifies that the protesting party does *not* withdraw, does *not* wash its hands of the society. Else, why take the trouble to protest? When the managers of a society, for the time being, do something distinctly wrong, there are always two courses open,—either 'protest' or 'secession:' one of the two. But the choice of the one alternative necessarily includes the other.

"The former of these two courses was chosen by the Church of England in the sixteenth century: the latter by the Anabaptists and other sectaries. She is therefore, more truly than any other Christian community in this kingdom, a Protestant Church. And her 'protest' was raised, be it remembered, in the most orderly and effective way that was then possible. It was not the act of the State. It was not the act of the King. It was the act of the Church herself in her regular convocation, and by the mouth of her then existing, unreformed Bishops,—men who were using everyday the Sarum missal; were firmly holding transubstantiation, the seven sacraments, and auricular confession; and many of them afterwards stiffly refused any further changes. It was by these men, in the Convocation of 1531, that the Church of England cast off from her neck the fatal incubus of the Papal supremacy. Regretfully and hesitatingly the important step was taken. But, once taken, it was firmly persevered in; in hope not to stand aloof for ever from her Continental sisters; but that, a fair example once set of such local reforms as were safe and possible, a future General Council might impartially review all that had been done, and either retrench or extend it, as might seem best for the whole family of National Churches."—Page 189.

The difference between "protest" and "dissent" can hardly be maintained in the case of a separation from what was then the predominant form of Christianity in Europe. It might, perhaps, be sustained if it could be proved that the controversy between England and Rome had reference only or mainly to the Papal supremacy. But the controversy included other and, we cannot but think, even more fundamental issues. The resistance was directed against the universal doctrine of the Church of antiquity as to its unity, discipline, and sacraments. The Church of England was one of those parties which, as the lecturer told us at the outset,

"have always arisen in opposition to the prevailing and authorised methods, both of doctrine and discipline." Admitting the Church of Rome to be a veritable Church of Christ, the National Church of England dissented in this country, and in Romish lands still dissents, from her doctrine and polity, and sets up by her side a rival communion. "Dissent" is defined in the same opening lecture as "the ripened or chronic form of a thing which in itself is both natural and right, viz. dissatisfaction with the existing doctrines or practices of the Church. If doctrines were mainly in question, it was usual in past times to call this kind of dissent by the name of 'heresy.' If discipline and practical order were mainly in question, another title was employed, viz., 'schism.' But the two things are, essentially and at the bottom, the same." Hence the Roman Catholic Church has condemned the Church of England as heretical and schismatic at once: Protestantism, in her sense, always including both. We, of course, exonerate the Mother Church of these lands from both charges; we thank God for her fidelity in the nineteenth century; but we cannot doubt that she set the example, and in many ways has been setting it ever since, to her sister and daughter Churches of a Dissent that opposed the "prevailing methods," and that must at last appeal to the Supreme for its justification. Mr. Curteis's appeal we must needs transcribe: it shows that the dissenting feeling is strong in him; in fact, that his sentiment towards Rome is very much that which many enforced separatists from the Church of England entertain towards the mother community whose hardness, and injustice, and want of sympathy have made them what they are:—

"To the judgment of the great Lord and real Head of the Christian Church we may safely appeal in such a quarrel as this. If in His eyes a merely *mechanical unity*,—guaranteed by the simple arrangement that His Church shall in all ages consist of those who consent to deny and affirm as one man shall direct; if this sort of unity is of such paramount importance in His sight, as to supersede every other consideration, Divine or human, moral, intellectual, or spiritual, then before men and angels it will, no doubt, one day appear that Christian England has utterly misread His Gospel and misunderstood His will. But if otherwise, it may perchance be made manifest, when all things are known, that the Church of our race has, with all its faults, weaknesses, and sins, borne a noble and consistent testimony on behalf of freedom, veracity, and manly simplicity. Her steadfast protest against a system based on forgeries, and cemented by the grossest superstitions, will appear not to have been in vain; and, honouring to the utmost,

and herself upholding, the principles of unity; maintaining in her cruel isolation the Catholic faith whole and undefiled, and the ancient discipline unbroken; striving amid the endless perplexities and difficulties of modern life (as no other Church in Christendom has striven) to reconcile the ancient faith with modern science; yet all the while steadily proclaiming the temporary character of all her arrangements, her longing for reunion, her readiness to be employed in God's hand as a means thereto, and her willingness to report all she has done, and to revise it (if necessary) at a *bonâ fide* General Council (whenever it may please God that such a council shall be assembled);—she may, at last, receive the praise, and not the anathema, of the Lord whom she has thus honestly tried to serve; and be given no unhonoured place among the galaxy of Churches that shall form His heavenly crown."—Page 200.

We have heard much about this future General Council; but hold it to be, on the principles of this volume, a great unreality, which, like most other unrealities that absorb attention and awaken aimless longings, must do more evil than good to the minds of those who speculate about it. Where will it meet? Who will summon it and preside in it? Of what members will it be composed? Will it include the Presbyterian and Independent Protestant bodies? What subjects will it take cognisance of? To effect any good in this world, taking the world as it now stands, it must after all be a gigantic Evangelical Alliance; and be possible only after East and West have renounced their corruptions, and such a "compromise" has been agreed upon as our lecturer can hardly include in his theory, and probably would consider a subversal of Christianity to the foundation.

The Unitarians and the Wesleyans represent to the lecturer the controversies of the eighteenth century, and the two principal secessions in which these controversies terminated. The first pair of Dissenting bodies were the Independents and the Romanists: this singular collocation exhibiting the two opposite poles of divergence on Church polity. The next two were the Baptists and the Quakers: the former representing a refinement on the sacramental media, the latter their entire rejection. In the eighteenth century the last pair came on: the Unitarians, going off in pursuit of unlimited intellectual freedom, dealing with the Church's system of doctrine; the Methodists, interested in the lowest strata of society, and handling "with an almost sublime self-confidence the tremendous spell of an appeal to the mere *feelings* of half-taught and half-civilised men." In the style of the lecturer's dealing with these two bodies we mark the defect which was spoken

of in the commencement: one or two salient points are raised and exhibited in such a manner as to betray a very serious inconsistency in their characterisation as wholes.

Unitarianism is too highly honoured, when it is made the representative of intellectual freedom as dissenting from the Church's doctrine of the Trinity. Mr. Curteis's method of conciliating its respect by his own metaphysical vindication of the Triune essence, we shall not pause to criticise now. But he seems to forget that their monotheistic principle is but one element of their difference from the faith of Christians. "Say what men will," avows Mr. Curteis, "it is impossible for any observant man to believe that the separation of the Unitarians from the Church is a fundamental or a permanent one. Let us take, for instance, their own especial subject of dispute, viz. (what they call)—the Church's 'metaphysical' conception of the Trinity." The lecturer takes it then; and deals with nothing else—asserting in some of the least pondered pages of his volume the Church's care to be Unitarian in the good sense. But there is not a word about a very different matter, the Unitarians' hypothesis of the simple and pure manhood of the Redeemer of mankind, which renounces much of the dignity that the old Socinianism gave Him. Nothing is said about the atonement for human sin; and their denial, indeed, of human sin as such,—that is, as the sin of the race,—and their necessary abandonment of the whole round of the doctrines "that accompany salvation." Their separation from the Church is not "fundamental or permanent!" Permanent it must be whilst they hold their doctrines, which are, as we think, as fundamentally different from what we think the doctrines of the Church of England as they can well be. Is it possible, after all, that we, who are outside the Anglican Church, so called, are better children of that Church than her own sons? Is it so that we hold more thoroughly and soundly the great central doctrines for which the Reformers suffered, than such advocates as Mr. Curteis? At any rate, there is no other of the denominations, brought to the bar of criticism in these lectures, which would or could use such language as this concerning the Unitarians. But, to return to the Wesleyans:—

"We seem at the present moment to be threatened with the growth of a 'Wesleyan Legend;' and John Wesley is credited with both an originality of invention and a completeness of plan, which did not in reality belong to him. Still, he was (without doubt) the greatest religious reformer of the eighteenth century. And though we cannot exclaim, with his latest exulting biographer, 'Methodism is the greatest

fact in the history of the Church of Christ,' we are able to allow that it is, at least, the greatest fact in the religious history of the eighteenth century; and that it justly deserves a patient and scrutinising study."

Such a study has, of course, been devoted to the history of the rise of Methodism; but it is very obvious that the lecturer is not familiar with the present position of the community, in regard either to its theology, or to its work in the world. We shall say a few words, mainly upon this subject. The other topics to which the lecture on "the Wesleyans" directs attention have been of late exhaustively treated in our pages. We cannot doubt the general truth of the lecturer's position, on the views of Mr. Wesley concerning his revival. But it cannot be too steadily kept in view that in Methodism there was a Greater than Wesley, who shaped his rough-hewn ends. If this is forgotten for a moment, if this does not enter into every conclusion on the subject, we are landed in inextricable confusion. Leaving, however, this matter where we have lately left it, we may consider, to use the lecturer's own words, his "exaggerated and ill-balanced statements of that which Methodism has always taught." From the Moravians, we are told, Mr. Wesley "learnt the fatal error (which he afterwards modified) that, not for *some* men, but for *all* men, there was a swift and royal road, by which the highest spiritual things could be reached at a bound. He here learnt (in short) the two peculiar lessons of subsequent Wesleyanism, viz.—(1) Instantaneous and sensible conversion; (2) The doctrine of perfection, i.e. of a Christian maturity, on attaining which, he that is (in the Wesleyan sense) 'born again,' 'born of God,' sinneth not."

This charge is not very carefully or skilfully drawn up. There are, really, three points in question between the censor of Methodist teaching and its adherents: the relation of the preparatory grace of Christian baptism to regeneration; the individual sealing or assurance of acceptance; and the perfection to which the religious life in this world may attain. On these three subjects, belonging respectively to the outer court, the sanctuary, and the holiest, of personal salvation, it is certain that the theology of Wesleyan Methodism speaks clearly and, it may be, with a peculiar and distinctive type of teaching. On these subjects it is quite able to defend itself, but it is difficult to conduct the controversy with opponents who so entirely misconceive their doctrine as Mr. Curteis seems to do.

It might appear to a cursory reader of this lecture, that the

"peculiar lessons" of modern Methodism were instantaneous convulsionary conversion, and the sudden attainment of a sinless state. These doctrines of course belong to that department of theology which deals with the personal appropriation of the Gospel salvation. We must remind the lecturer of what he must needs know, though he takes no pains to show that he is aware of it, that Methodism, while faithful to its peculiar lessons, claims to be a faithful teacher of the whole compass of theological science. It teaches its ministers, and through them its people, the "truth as it is in Jesus," without the omission of any one element of that truth. It strives also to exhibit Christian doctrine in its integrity and in its "proportion," as it is contained in the Holy Scriptures. The faith delivered to the saints has lost nothing in its keeping. It has its system of theology complete in all its parts: basing its existence, and its work in the world, not upon any one or two specific doctrines, but upon one broad foundation of Christian truth. The secession from the Church of England which this book deplores, has not involved a separation from the Catholic faith of the Church of England, which, in all fundamentals concerning the doctrines of the Holy Trinity, sin, redemption, justification, holiness of inward experience and outward practice, the Church and sacraments, the future with its issues, and the Holy Scriptures, which are the infallible depository and standard of all these doctrines, is held by the Methodists with a unanimity, tenacity, and resistance to innovation that affords an example to the Mother Church herself. As to the entire body of strictly evangelical truth, and setting aside certain points of order and discipline, Methodism is, as a whole, far more faithful than the Church of England to the teaching of the fathers and founders of the Anglican Church.

In this fact we cannot but rejoice; if our protest seems to savour of self-gratification and boasting, we are compelled to it by the studied silences of such essays as those of the Bampton Lecturer. We will be bold and say yet more. There cannot be found in Christendom a community which, by the grace of God, is more faithful to that summary of truth which is universally acknowledged to contain the principles of the regeneration and life of the world. Methodism, whether in England, or in the universal dominions of England, or in America, has never given birth to a heresy: some few faint appearances of a tendency to unsettle the foundations of doctrine as to the person of Christ, have been instantly and thoroughly repressed; and with regard to

points of less importance, than that the sensitiveness of the community has been so vigilant, that the originators of views out of harmony with the common faith have been compelled to retire. It is needless here to discuss the nature of the doctrinal tests that have been so rigorously employed; nor is it necessary to inquire into the grounds of this steadfast uniformity of doctrine. The fact is evident, and it is a most remarkable one. Year after year, hundreds of young men are sent out into the ministry at home and abroad, the soundness of whose faith may, generally speaking, be relied on. The annual Conferences of Methodism in various parts of the world exhibit the spectacle of some thousands of pastors who are of one accord, and of one mind, as to the fundamental doctrines of Christianity: so perfectly of one mind, that any serious variation from the truth on the part of any one of these thousands would surely lead to his separation from the teaching ministry. This is a fact that perhaps has no strict parallel in the Christendom of the present day. And it ought to be known, and taken into account, by any writer who makes the doctrinal relations of Methodism to the Church of England, or to the Church universal, his study.

But to return to the vexed question of the "peculiar lessons" of modern Methodism. Slightly correcting the Bampton Lecturer's statement, it may be allowed that, in respect to the appropriation of the work of our Saviour, the theological system of Methodism maintains some peculiarities of doctrine, as to preliminary grace, the personal experience of salvation, and the issue and consummation of it in the present life. When we call these "peculiarities," however, it is with some qualification that we use the word. These doctrines have not been originated by Methodism. They are contained in Scripture, they have been held by some of the best writers of Christian antiquity, and in some form or other each and all of them are avowed by other Christian communities than the Methodist. It is true that they have been brought into the forefront by Methodist teaching; that they have been made in many cases unduly and disproportionately prominent; that the reaction against former neglect has taken the form of all extreme reactions. It is true, also, that in their integrity, that is, in their combination into a compact system containing them all, they may be said to be the distinctive possession of Methodism. We have no hesitation in saying that the Providential design in the rise and progress of this community has included this among other objects. Methodism has been as much a revival of Christian

theology as of Christian life. Its value as one of the instruments of the Holy Ghost is as marked in the one respect as in the other; and its prosperity in the accomplishment of its peculiar function, according to the allotment of the Divine will, depends very much upon its keeping both equally in view. The peculiarities of Methodist doctrine, such as they are, will not be examined at length in these fragmentary pages; but a few remarks may be made of a defensive character, as suggested by the observations of the lecturer.

The first point above referred to Mr. Curteis introduces thus:—

"For this is, in one word, the question between Catholicism and Puritanism. Is the outward organised Church, with its visible mechanism, its regularly-commissioned officers, its code of laws (ritual, disciplinary, and doctrinal), and its exterior means of grace, nought? or is it, on the contrary, the special organ of the Holy Ghost, the vehicle and instrument and 'sacrament' (as it were) of His inward operations, in renewing and redeeming mankind? In this question lies the whole controversy between the Church of England and 'Dissent.' And the controversy is gathered into a point on the (at first sight) irrelevant doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration. For, if a convulsive crisis in a man's inner being first *makes* him (as is too often affirmed) a 'Christian,' then the Church of Christ, no doubt, ought to be composed of such 'converted' persons alone. It consequently becomes a purely *spiritual* society. It is an unorganised, invisible, and abstract thing. It has (as the earliest heretics affirmed concerning our Lord) no true body at all; it is all spirit."—Page 364.

The majority of denominations which are challenged by the lecturer would utterly deny that they undervalue the organised visible Church as the instrument of the Holy Ghost in preserving and diffusing the means of grace in the world. They agree with him that the Church is both visible and invisible; and if they maintain firmly the principle that the invisible Church is the more important, that the visible only exists for it, and that visible and invisible will finally be one, the lecturer, as a Protestant, cannot be supposed to differ from them. Nearly all Evangelical communities hold the Church to be the depository of the means of grace. But we have to do with Methodism. Mr. Curteis fairly quotes the words of John Wesley: "By baptism we are admitted into the Church; and consequently made members of Christ, the Head. . . . . They are mystically united to Christ, and made one with Him. . . . From which spiritual, vital union with Him, proceeds the influence of His grace on those that are baptized,—as from our union with the Church a share in all its

privileges, and in all the promises Christ has made to it." "Later Wesleyanism," as the lecturer terms it, has never deviated from Mr. Wesley's doctrine, taking it, as all teaching should be taken, as a whole, and with all its guards and qualifications. There has never been an accepted teacher of the community who has denied that baptism is the sign and seal of a grace that flows from Christ, according to the preparation and the capacity of the recipient. If the lecturer will read the "Methodist Offices," including the Covenant Service (with its Puritan origin), and the writings of its divines from the beginning, he will find ample evidence on the subject. And, returning to Mr. Wesley, it is surely unworthy to plead against his constant testimony the fact that he regarded himself as having "never been a Christian till within the last five days." A dispassionate judgment on such words as these would at once remove from them every shade of inconsistency. In the full and perfect sense of the term he became a Christian when he found the precious secret of the Christian experience. As well might St. Paul be challenged for saying that a Jew is not a Jew "who is one outwardly;" the Apostle did not deny the circumcised Jew his full measure of prerogative as such. John Wesley did not, if we take his words, however "seriously," think that the change "had been nothing less than a transition from heathenism to Christianity." How could the man who wrote the words above quoted mean such an offence as this? How could he mean that "his baptism had been a mere formality, and an unmeaning superstition?" Such reckless charges as these do great injury.

The lecturer may scarcely expect to hear that, on his theory of Regeneration, Methodism and, it may be said, most other "forms of Dissent" would find no difficulty in agreeing with all he says. Deficiency of space forbids our doing full justice to his views, which must be represented by a partial extract:—

"No one can have mixed much with the labouring or the trading classes without finding out that, in their conceptions, the Church teaches, by 'Baptismal Regeneration,' certain crude and preposterous heresies, which, of course, she never has taught, but would be the first to repudiate. Who, then, is responsible for her having *seemed* to teach them? Is it not we, the clergy of the Church, who have never taken sufficient pains to point out that the word 'regeneration' is a *technical* expression; that it does not mean the same thing in theology as it does in the columns of a modern newspaper; that the 'regeneration' of a country, or the regeneration of society is one thing, but the 'regeneration' of an individual in the waters of baptism is quite

another; that it is, in short, nothing less than a second birth, not new into the world, but into the family and household of Jesus Christ; there to be educated, there to come under,—at once and by right as sons,—all the healthful elevating influences of His family; and there to grow up by slow and (it may be) sadly interrupted degrees, to 'the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ.'"—P. 233.

This passage occurs in the lecture on "The Baptists," and we leave to them their peculiar relation to the controversy which is altogether different from ours. In the lecture on "Wesleyanism" the writer supplements his teaching by declaring that the New Testament "*never once* calls upon a baptized person to become 'regenerate' (as modern Wesleyans do); but only bids them to become 'renewed.'" Putting the whole together we arrive at the lecturer's views, which are consistent enough in themselves, but unfortunate as a basis of attack upon others. He holds the term "regeneration" to mean only an outward change, what in stricter theological language would be expressed by the term "adoption," which is the external and relative view of that Christian sonship, the internal and absolute characteristic of which is the new birth. Such being his technical and conventional use of the word, he would doubtless assign the same technical meaning to many of the strong expressions used in the Prayer Book and its Baptismal Office, regarding the supplications that the child might be "born again," as referring to the future influences of grace descending through the family privileges of Christ's household. Whether this theological teaching will be accounted faithful in an Anglican divinity tutor, is not a question for us. But, taking it as it stands, and apart from the use of terms, there is nothing in the doctrine that Methodism has not always taught. All children baptized are certainly adopted into the family of God. They partake of the preparatory influences of the Holy Spirit; they are the subjects of Divine grace, visiting them through the nurture and admonition of the Lord, and leading them to a conscious renewal of heart and consecration of life. As to the lecturer's distinction, however, between regeneration and renewal, we must demur. It is vain to say that the New Testament never calls upon a baptized person to be "regenerate:" it would be equally true to say that the New Testament never calls upon any one, from beginning to end, to be "regenerate." It makes the new birth, or renewal of human nature, the forming of the new man within, the prerogative of the Holy Ghost alone. With this baptism is intimately connected: the *seal*

of acceptance into the family of God, of the adoption of sonship, of entrance into the Christian household; the *pledge* of all the future grace that leads to the regeneration and renewal of the soul.

But this opens up the wider question of the relation of Methodist doctrine to the general preliminaries of grace. Here there is a peculiarity in which its theology has always been marked and explicit: a peculiarity, however, which is best described by its points of difference from other systems. It looks upon the redeemed world as under the influences of the Holy Spirit restored to mankind; bringing all men into an outer court of the great temple, which is no longer "the court of the Gentiles," but the court of the Holy Spirit's preparations for Christ. In this it agrees with the purest doctrine—that which may be called in the best sense of the term the Arminian doctrine of the Church of England. But it differs from three other types of doctrine in that Church. It does not bind the Divine influences to the sacramental channels so rigorously as to make, for instance, baptism the one sole appointed conductor of that grace. It does not, with the Latitudinarians, elevate that outer court to a level with the interior sphere of saving grace and privilege where Christ is fully known. Nor does it, with the Calvinist, leave it in total darkness until an absolute grace, dependent on an absolute decree, sends the spark of light to kindle life and draw the soul to Christ within. Methodism has its own clear and generous teaching upon the preparatory grace that has visited the world through Christ's redemption, who is the "light that enlighteneth every man." But that teaching defends the rights of the baptismal seal of the Christian covenant, on the one hand, while, on the other, it carefully distinguishes between all that precedes the enjoyment of Christian privileges in Christ and those privileges themselves.

The lecturer is very severe and very onesided in his references to the second branch of what he thinks the "peculiar lessons of subsequent Wesleyanism,"—"instantaneous and sensible conversion." At the outset, it may be remarked that this has not been, in any sense, the lesson of "subsequent" Methodism. The innumerable sudden awakenings and effectual conversions which laid the foundation of Methodism have never been rivalled since. Nor can it be said that the wonderful facts of earlier times have been reduced to "lessons" in later times. In fact, the many pages devoted to this subject in the lecture literally mean nothing as a charge against Methodism. The amusing theory of "French

fanaticism," and the elaborate disquisition upon it in these pages, should be omitted in any subsequent edition of the book. For no man knows better than the lecturer that in every age of the Church, and among all communions East and West, the revival of God's work in times of spiritual torpor has been marked by sudden conversions, and marvellous signs accompanying and following them. They have not been the monopoly of Methodism. Some of the most striking exhibitions of them have been found in the history of Roman Catholic Missions, home and foreign. The history of the Quakers, both in England and America, will furnish examples which Methodism cannot surpass either in number or in startling effects. The Church of England has known them, as well in more modern as in more ancient times; and knows them now, both in the Ritualist and in the Evangelical schools. In all the painful remarks upon the subject made in this work, there are two silent errors. First, Methodism has never taught that there must be a convulsionary and violent change in order to the assurance of salvation. It teaches no such doctrine in any form; nor has it ever taught it. Among the tens of thousands who are fostered under her care in the religious life, a large proportion are found who have been brought to religious decision and an entire change of life as gently as Lydia was brought to open her heart to the teaching concerning Christ. Secondly, not a word is said about the distress of soul that it is the Holy Spirit's office to produce; the effects of which, as recorded in the New Testament, are as precisely as they can be the antitypes of what is often, though not often enough, witnessed among the Methodists. It is hard to speak tolerantly of the negative argument in this volume. Surely a writer who can appreciate so justly the good points of every system which he attacks, should have had some generous paragraphs for the wonderful spiritual effects of the Methodist preaching of repentance.

The lecturer misses altogether—as if he had never included this branch of theology in his prelections—the real peculiarity, the true "peculiar lesson," of Methodism: its incessant and universal inculcation of the privilege of all who are accepted of God to know that they are His children. Not that this is a peculiarity of Methodist doctrine; it has been the doctrine of all the purest teachers of the Christian Church. But Methodism has given it prominence: not so much by preaching it and bidding men expect it from God, as by distinguishing and guarding it from unsounder teaching on the subject. The "assurance" taught by Methodism is not the

confidence inspired by absolution in the so-called sacrament of penance; though there is no reason why it should not concur with the ministerial declaration of the Divine forgiveness. It is not the assurance to which the aspirant after perfection may aspire, of which Hooker speaks: "the strongest in faith that liveth on the earth, hath always need to labour and strive and pray that his *assurance* concerning heavenly and spiritual things may grow, increase, and be augmented." This is the general faith in things unseen, which, as one of the fruits of the Spirit, continually may grow. Nor is it the Calvinistic assurance which, once imparted, includes the past, the present, and the future, and releases the elect from all anxiety for ever. It is different from all these. It is the New Testament "witness of the Spirit" with the spirit of the believer that he is accepted; it is the "sealing with the Holy Ghost," which is said to accompany and follow faith in the Gospel; it is the Divine absolution spoken to all who believe in Jesus, "thy sins be forgiven thee." Now, all religious systems may be said to teach this doctrine in some form. Methodism teaches it in the form in which it appears in the New Testament: as the common inheritance of Christianity, as the privilege of every Christian, as directly imparted by the Holy Ghost, as generally enjoyed by the believer, although by no means absolutely necessary to his Christian character. Now, this "witness of the Spirit" has literally been the glory of all Evangelical theology. The Bampton Lecturer ought to know this; and he should be very careful not to seem to join the infidel in the use of language like the following:—

"The doctrine of the new birth is nothing else than the theory that a person is not made a Christian by being christened; but, rather, when he passes through a certain convulsive crisis of the inner life, from out of which he issues with a strong *feeling* of serenity and acceptance with God. The 'feeling' is construed as 'the witness of the Spirit with our spirit. And the person is supposed to be, then for the first time, justified, converted, made a 'Christian.' Hence, the main efforts of Methodist preachers are (naturally) directed towards producing this crisis; and revivals, camp meetings, and terrifying appeals to the imagination, become in coarser hands the means of bringing it to pass. The Church, on the other hand, positively refuses to regard immature persons as outside the Christian pale; and teaches that the normal growth in grace is—not this attainment of a high religious consciousness *per saltum*, but—'first the blade, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear.' At the same time she fully admits those—very numerous but still exceptional—cases where (the Holy Spirit having been long grieved and resisted) God's mercy puts a man to whole-

some shame, by treating him as a relapsed heathen, and sending him 'a conversion.' On this subject, however, as on all others, every Wesleyan minister may be compelled, by the Court of Final Appeal, to preach in accordance with 'certain notes on the New Testament, and the first four volumes of sermons published by the late Rev. John Wesley.'"—P. 390.

Would anyone believe that the writer of these sentences could be a diligent student of the Scriptures of the New Testament? or that he could be animated by the spirit of love, which rejoices in the evidences of regeneration wherever they are found? How much more true and reasonable are the words which he is obliged to quote from John Wesley: "But whatever be the case with the infants, it is sure all of riper years who are baptized are not at the same time born again. The tree is known by its fruits." "I ask not whether you *was* born of water and of the Spirit, but are you *now* the temple of the Holy Ghost, which dwelleth in you? . . . For ye are now dead in trespasses and sins. To say, then, that ye cannot be born again—that there is no 'new birth' but in baptism—is to seal you all under damnation. . . . . Who denies that ye were then made children of God, and heirs of the kingdom of heaven? But, notwithstanding this, ye are now children of the devil. Therefore ye must be born again." This is irrefragable both in theology and in logic. Mr. Curteis threatens the Methodist preachers with the authority of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, but we think he himself will be constrained to allow, that the decision, as to "what is contrary to the doctrine contained" in the Methodist standards, would very probably leave the faith which he condemns untouched. For, if in one sentence Mr. Wesley preaches strongly a baptismal grace, his Connexion generally would agree with him; and when, in another sentence, he declares that those who are unconverted need to be born of God, they, of course, agree with him still. The Bampton lecturer knows well enough how generous is the doctrinal interpretation put upon theological formularies by the Judicial Committee. The Methodist teachers of the present day are not likely to be inhibited because they fail to teach the doctrine of baptismal regeneration.

But to return. It is melancholy to hear the witness of the Holy Spirit treated in so perfunctory a manner. Nothing, in short, in the whole volume, has grated so harshly on our ears. Alas! that the spirit of exclusiveness, and bigoted adherence to the notion of the Old Catholic Church, should blind the mind of a thoughtful student to the evidence fur-

nished by every page of the later New Testament, that there is a Church within the Church; that, while the called are many, the chosen and sealed are few; and that the direct attestation of the spirit of adoption is the internal voice of God, corresponding with His external Word in the Scripture. But here we may be in danger of misleading the reader as to the precise sentiment of the lecturer. It cannot be that he is ignorant of the peculiar bearings of the doctrine of the Spirit's witness; it is rather that he shuts his eyes and his heart against innumerable proofs of the operation of the Holy Ghost, producing in the Methodist community, as well as in others that come under his censure, such manifest tokens of spiritual life, energy, and sanctity, as should constrain him, beyond the possibility of resistance, to revise his theory of the terms of communion in our Lord's one Catholic Church; or, supposing this too harsh a judgment, it cannot be denied that the lecturer at least fails to exhibit any kind of sympathy with the deep religious feeling that exists outside his own communion. He writes like a man who not only has never joined in exercises of Christian fellowship with other communities, but who has never taken pains to acquaint himself with the internal movements of their religious life, and has allowed himself to be the passive victim of a prejudice against what he deems the unregulated impulses of mere enthusiasm or fanatical zeal. This seems to be the tone only too prevalent in the Lecture on Wesleyanism.

This lack of appreciation is still more painfully manifest in the few notices devoted to the Methodist doctrine of Perfection, the third of the specific peculiarities which we have mentioned. This doctrine the lecturer joins with "instantaneous conversion" as completing the "peculiar lessons of modern Wesleyanism." We must once more demur to such a statement as this, that "The second leading doctrine of Wesleyanism is that of Perfection," and that on several grounds. In the sense in which the term "leading" is here used, Methodist theology has no leading doctrines. In this matter, as in everything else that concerns its mission, Methodism aims precisely to reflect the New Testament exhibition of the Gospel. It has no other proportion of faith than that of the Scriptures themselves. It embraces in its definition of theology all the revealed truths that declare the relations of God with His creatures. It teaches what the Apostles taught, and according to the gradation of emphasis which they lay upon the several doctrines which they an-

nounce. It is a mistake that hardly ought to need correcting, to suppose that Methodist preachers have accepted from the tradition of their fathers one or two salient topics on which they ring the monotonous variations of their teaching. No Christian Church could be built upon any selection from the common faith. Again, it is not true that "Perfection" as such is a Wesleyan doctrine. If the lecturer would enrich his library with the goodly array of works written on this subject, beginning with Mr. Wesley's, and read them carefully, he would find that in no point are they so careful to spend their strength as on the definitions, guards, qualifications, and special characteristics of what Christian theology must needs call "Christian perfection." The word "perfection" is a beautiful one, and cannot well be spoiled; but it requires its right adjective to show its perfect beauty.

It is true that Methodist theology has for more than a century laboured to give this glorious truth its due tribute. Perhaps it would not be a reprehensible boast to say that the Holy Ghost has condescended to use its instrumentality for the revival and enforcement of this almost forgotten element of Christian truth. As Methodist theology has given new prominence to the light that enlighteneth every man in the outer court of the Christian temple; and as it has done much to define and exalt the privileges that belong to all who are in Christ and sealed by His Spirit in the sanctuary of the Church; so it has uttered a clear, distinct and unfaltering testimony to the perfected love that reigns in the Holiest of all. But its doctrine has little affinity with the distorted representation given of it in this lecture. Mr. Curteis evidently knows nothing on the subject but what has floated to his ears as an evil tradition. "The doctrine of Perfection," he says, "that is, of a Christian maturity on attaining which he that is (in the Wesleyan sense) 'born again,' 'born of God,' sinneth not." It hardly needs to be pointed out that there is no meaning in this sentence, as it stands. Let us then turn to the more formal statement given in the Appendix, where of course the rhetoric will yield to precision. But there we read:—

"*The second leading doctrine of Wesleyanism is Perfection*,—in other words, the theory that a person, on being (in the Wesleyan sense) 'born again,' is *at once* translated from darkness to light; that he attains *at once* the maturity *(teleiotes)* which the Churchman—with his 'sacraments' and careful self-culture—painfully and often unsuccessfully gropes after; and that such a person can take the words of St. John upon his lips, 'He that is born of God sinneth not.' This is,

again, nothing else than an unguarded statement of the Church's doctrine of 'assurance;' a privilege which she holds out as attainable, *in ever increasing* (*or abating*) *degree*, in proportion as a man faithfully 'fights the good fight of faith,' and becomes 'established, strengthened, settled,' by the long indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the heart."—Page 391.

Here it is observable that the writer confounds the new birth or entrance upon the renewed life with the state of maturity; and charges it upon the Methodists that they teach that the soul born of God at once passes into the perfection of the religious life. There have been many in Germany and in America who perhaps have so taught. But it is not to them that the lecturer refers. His error is one of artless confusion, the result of unfamiliarity with the doctrines which he assails. This is evident from a quotation that follows: the only passage of Wesleyan theology that is brought forward to illustrate its doctrine of Perfection, and one that does not directly or indirectly approach the subject. The passage quoted gives Mr. Wesley's exposition of the regenerate state, and contains a very temperate comment on St. John's declaration, that "he that is born of God cannot commit sin:" "Now one who is so born of God . . . not only doth not commit sin, while he thus keepeth himself, but, so long as this seed remaineth in him, he cannot sin; because he is born of God." Whereupon the easily-satisfied lecturer cries: "In other words, the great '*privilege of those that are born of God*' amounts to this: they cannot commit sin until they begin to commit sin. And, if this be all, the Church's more guarded doctrine of assurance appears preferable; especially as it avoids the error of supposing that God's eye cannot see, in many a case of 'sancta simplicitas,' the germs of a very high potential spirituality." But this is *not* all; in fact, this is nothing, so far as the doctrine of entire sanctification is concerned. That doctrine was not in Mr. Wesley's thoughts when he wrote the sermon referred to. Many sermons and treatises might have been consulted which would have enabled the critic to have spoken more intelligently. They would have taught him that the Methodist doctrine of "Perfection" does not affect that word, save as qualified by "Christian" or "Evangelical," and distinctly repudiates as suspicious the expression "sinless perfection," as involving the danger to which the enemies of the doctrine are never weary of referring. They would have shown him that the very essence and heart of the 'privilege' is the perfect and

unobstructed effusion of the love of God within the soul, abolishing the indwelling sin of man's nature, and so filling the spirit with the energies of Divine consecration that there remains nothing contrary to the love of God and the love of man. They would have shown him that the Methodists teach the way of perfection just as the Scriptures teach it, in the three-one way of devotion to God, charity to man, and obedience to the law, which St. John in his First Epistle indicates. They would, indeed, have given him some warranty for affirming that the perfect consecration of the soul, and its elevation to a tranquil ascendency of love, is set forth by Methodist teaching as held out to the aspiration of earnest prayer and mighty faith, and as an attainment which in its final issue may be instantaneous. But no student of Scripture and of the experiences of the saints can well doubt that there must be a point when the full completeness of the Christian character may be stamped upon the soul, and the sanctified spirit, having reached one perfection, may go on towards another, that will recede before it, throughout eternity. Indeed, there are too many declarations of Scripture concerning the power of God's Spirit, and the prerogative of believing prayer, to allow this doctrine to be successfully combated; it is fenced round by a phalanx of "great and precious promises." Lastly, these writings would have taught him that there is literally no connection between the Methodist "Perfection" and that doctrine of "Assurance," about which he speaks so much. The lecturer confounds things that are perfectly distinct. The "assurance of faith" belongs, in the theology he opposes, to every state of the true Christian, and so does the "assurance of hope." But of a kind of assurance that screens from the possibility of sin, guarantees the final salvation of the soul, and thus forecloses the contingencies of probation, the Methodist doctrine at least knows nothing. On the entire subject, however, the Bampton lecturer is less informed than he ought to be; more ignorant, in fact, than we should have expected to find one who in so many other respects shows the fruits of great and varied reading.

As to the internal economy of Methodism, the work says but little. Strange to say, it does not comment on the "class meeting" system, though at the time when he was preparing his sermon the question engaged much thought in the Christian world. One remark, however, we find in a note which requires correction. The lecturer exaggerates the importance of the discussion that has lately taken place; naturally enough, however, as the public prints have almost

universally misled him. "At the present moment," he says, "a serious discussion is growing, on the subject of *retaining class-meetings as a test of membership*, and Mr. Hughes—a minister who published a book on this subject in 1869—has been reduced to the rank of a 'supernumerary' by the Conference at Manchester, in 1871." The writer carefully avoids giving the meaning of his own note, or his own opinion on the subject. We have nothing, therefore, to say but this, that no difference of opinion exists among Methodists—(1) as to the necessity and importance of retaining the class-meeting membership in the Methodist society—perhaps that is what is meant by "class-meetings as a test of membership;" and (2), as to their repudiation of the charge, that they make membership in the class the condition of membership in the Christian Church. As to Mr. Hughes, he is still a minister among the Methodists, although not for the present deemed a competent and trustworthy administrator of the peculiar pastoral functions of the society.

In conclusion, we cannot but express our surprise that nothing is said about the measures by which the breach between Methodism and the Church of England ought to be healed. This is a subject which engrosses the thoughts of many good men on both sides. In a certain sense, it is the deep desire of all Methodists; that is to say, they would be on terms of mutual Christian regard and brotherly love; they cordially wish that every offence and every provocation of bitterness may be removed. Methodism is not likely to cease from its "secession" in the way that Mr. Curteis seems to indicate, or rather to sketch before his own imagination. But, on the other hand, it is not so entirely gone over to "Dissent"—using the word with the "technical" meaning that he assigns to it—as he seems to fear. Earnest, conscientious, and thorough Dissenters there have always been, and always will be, in the Methodist community, but there is every guarantee that the heart of Methodism will always remember whence it came, the amount of its obligation to the Mother Church, and the sacred duty of doing nothing to widen a breach already wide enough. It is much to be desired, however, at this time especially, that whatever is said by the one party concerning the other polemically, or in the way of controversy, should be said prudently, charitably, and with large knowledge. We are sorry to be obliged to mourn over the Methodist portion, especially, of these Bampton Lectures, as wanting in a broad, comprehensive, and Catholic view of the religious system on which it pronounces sentence.

LITERARY NOTICES.

I. THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.

Catholicism and the Vatican. With a Narrative of the Old Catholic Congress at Munich. By J. Lowry Whittle, A.M., Trinity College, Dublin. London: Henry S. King and Co. 1872.

In our last number we drew attention to the "Old Catholic" movement from a French point of view, taking for our guidance the work of the Abbé Michaud. Of the other countries of Europe each will have its own point of observation and its own grounds of accord with the Vatican decrees and assumptions, or of dissent from them. Austria, Italy, Spain, and Germany, not to omit England and even Ireland, are each differently affected by the position assumed by the Roman Bishop. In each country are adherents to *Romanism;* but in each, on special grounds, are adherents also to *Catholicism* and opponents to Curialistic pretensions. The relation of Catholics to Ultramontanism differs according to national institutions, to the training and character of the priesthood, and to the general culture of the laity. The jealousy with which the Italian hierarchy and their predominance in the Cardinalate are viewed by the priesthood and laity in other countries, is not inoperative in widening the breach between the Jesuits and their opponents. A clear view of the attitude of the Irish and German Churches in relation to this subject is presented in the volume before us.

That the condition of that portion of the Catholic communities which does not sympathise with Ultramontanism has been very seriously affected of late, needs no demonstration. The labours of the Ultramontanes during the past few years are now beginning to bear their fruit. The fatal Syllabus, written in the blind expectation of gaining an unwarrantable supremacy over the culture of modern society, brought into prominence the opposition of German theolo-

gians, and tended to strengthen and intensify that opposition. Let it be admitted that it was honestly written in the supposed interests of truth and virtue. But in how grievous a misapprehension of those interests! It demanded for its complement the doctrine of the infallibility; for by no other means could the assumptions of the Curia be maintained. A few keen-sighted Catholics watched with anxiety the growing power and pretensions of Ultramontanism, but the many were either indifferent, or held themselves to be fatally committed to them. And it was only when the Vatican Council was projected, and its purpose fairly avowed, that, as from a long continued stupor, they were aroused to an acknowledgment of the danger that was imminent. It was no longer possible to misinterpret either the spirit or the aim of the party; nor was it possible to conceal the danger to Catholic truth. This is plainly avowed in the book before us. "Eminent Catholics, whilst repudiating Ultramontane opinions for themselves, affected to consider them as only the idiosyncrasies of individual ecclesiastics, or of some amateur theologians. Their ancient origin in the Italian Church, the consistency with which they had been pursued, and the vigour with which they have been pressed for the last half-century all over the Catholic world—these signs of danger to Catholic truth were continually overlooked or disregarded. An eminent Irish member delighted his Catholic supporters some time since by bidding men who talked about Ultramontanism talk about Mesopotamia, one term was as much to the purpose as the other, the fluent orator contended. This sort of language only echoed the general sentiment of Catholic society." Now, as Mr. Whittle truly says, interpreting the convictions of many of his brethren in faith, "it is no longer possible for Catholics to shut their eyes to the existence or to the designs of the Ultramontane party." And again, "it is very plain that, for those who care about Catholic truth, Ultramontanism is a very pressing matter." For many sufficient reasons, interest centres in the struggle of the German Churches. A cultured clergy, many of whom are distinguished by special literary attainments, by bold and fearless character, by piety, and by liberality of sentiment; and an educated people, who, while attached to their Church institutions, are lacking neither in loyalty nor love of liberty, fit them to be leaders in the sacred strife. The Roman Court has assumed a position from which it cannot retire. It must abide by all the responsibilities and consequences of the acts of July 1870. Equally has the "Old Catholic" party assumed a position directly antagonistic to the former, from which it cannot without dishonour and contradiction retreat. It must abide by the declarations of September 1871. The Roman Catholic Church is the arena of a strife which has not been equalled in solemn importance since the days of the Reformation. It is a strife for the highest pretensions. What at first was only a faint murmur has now grown to be a clear and strong voice of dissent. If anything were needed to show this, it is furnished in these pages; in the clear view given of the rising sentiment in

Germany previous to the Council; of the excitement created by the fatal Decrees; and of the growing opposition, onward from its first expression at the Nuremberg meeting, when "the universal jurisdiction and infallibility of the Pope" were rejected as "novelties, and therefore as no doctrines of the Church; as destructive of the rights of the episcopate; as dangerous to society; since all those pretensions made by Popes from time to time to exercise authority over the State, and to interfere with toleration, become matters of doctrine;" and when, in consequence, an appeal was made "to the bishops of the opposition to assemble a Council on this side of the Alps."

The precise position assigned to the Pope by the Council is stated in the concluding paragraphs of the third and fourth chapters of the Vatican Decree, the Bull *Pastor Eternus;* the one declaring him to be Universal Bishop, the other declaring him to be the infallible teacher.

It is not easy at once to trace the operation of these dogmas, especially the former, from which attention has been drawn by the overshadowing importance of the latter. It is an entire subversion of the episcopacy. It places the Pope in direct relation, and that the relation of supremacy, with every priest and every layman. It gives him full and supreme, ordinary and immediate power, alike in matters of faith and morals, of discipline and government, over all and every Church, over all and every pastor and believer, in every region of the earth. Mr. Whittle judges, rightly as we think, the practical effect of this dogma to be greater than that of its more celebrated companion. He says:—"The sweeping away with the consent of the episcopacy of the whole constitution of the Latin Church, is one of the most remarkable facts the modern historian could record. All the rights and privileges of separate orders in the Church are abolished. All the customs of local or national Churches, the relations of the parish priest to his flock, to his bishop, of the bishops to each other, of the various national Churches to the Papacy; the whole canon law which elaborately regulated all these relations; all these institutions of the Church have only a significance so far as the Pope may permit in each particular case."

The error of the pretended infallibility is stated in no measured terms; e.g., "The second dogma has naturally attracted more immediate attention amongst the laity, for its operation affects at once every member of the Church. It proposes to the acceptance of every Catholic one of the most wonderful miracles that has ever been presented to the human mind. According to this decree, ever since the time of St. Peter we have had in the world an actual living oracle of God. This inspired man has no guarantee for his virtue or his knowledge, but, being elected to the chair of St. Peter, he cannot make a declaration of faith to the whole Church that is wrong. It is admitted that his own opinion in theology may be totally wrong; only on this supposition could the supporters of infallibility get over the instances of erroneous opinions held by former Popes. The declarations of

Honorius on Monothelitism were wrong, it is admitted; for they were solemnly condemned by subsequent Popes. As to the condemnation, there is no question that it was *ex Cathedrâ*, but the original declarations were not, it is said, *ex Cathedrâ*; they were only the private opinions of each Pope as to the doctrines in question." Again: "Once this power is recognised, it is plainly impossible to set any limits to it. Let the reader conceive layman, priest, or bishop being asked to examine critically whether an utterance of the same voice that was often the voice of God, was really uttered by the voice of God on this particular occasion. What a marvellously finely-balanced mind the listener must have, who, knowing that the voice he hears is probably the voice of his Creator, hesitates to obey it until he has determined whether it bears the proper notes of an *ex Cathedrâ* declaration. And the bishop knows that in any case this is the voice of one who has appointed him to his office in the Church, and absolutely controls his discharge of that office."

The interest of the book culminates in the account of the Old Catholic Congress, held in Munich, in September of last year. The assembly numbered about four hundred, comprising men of every class, most of them advanced in life:—"Men of rank (like Barons Von Stauffenberg and Von Wulffen), peasants, proprietors, country shopkeepers, priests, university professors, members of the chambers and professional men. Many from Bavaria were the burgomasters of the country towns, and it was remarkable that of those men, collected from almost every class in Germany, nearly every one had given some time to study at one of the German universities, so generally is university education diffused in that country. This difference of academic culture gives a greater importance to a movement in which university men take the leading position. Besides the delegates from the Old Catholic clubs in Germany, there came delegates from societies in other countries, as Herr Keller of Aarau, from Switzerland, others from Austria and Hungary. There were three priests from Holland, as a deputation from the Church of Utrecht; and Professor Ossinin, Professor of Theology in the Greek Church at St. Petersburg. From France, Spain, and America, came some invited guests, distinguished amongst whom was Father Hyacinthe."

A general confession of faith was adopted, the draft declaration of which had been prepared by a committee appointed at Heidelberg. It is too long to transfer entire into these brief notes. It affirms the fidelity of the members to the Old Catholic creed and worship; repudiates the dogmas of infallibility and supreme episcopal and immediate jurisdiction; aims at reforms in the Church in harmony with canon law and national necessities; declares the Church at Utrecht free from the charge of Jansenism; expresses the desire for a re-union with the Greco-Oriental and Russian Churches, also the hope that "whilst pursuing desired reforms in the path of science and a progressive Christian culture, gradually to bring about a good understanding with the Protestant and Episcopal Churches;" it

declares scientific study to be necessary for the training of the clergy; promises to support the national constitutions and to stand by the Governments in their struggle with "that Ultramontanism which assumes the form of dogma in the Syllabus;" and, as "manifestly the present miserable confusion in the Church has been occasioned by the Society called that of Jesus," it declares the conviction "that peace and prosperity, unity in the Church, and just relations between her and civil society, will only be possible when the pernicious activity of this order is put an end to;" and, finally, it lays claim to the legal rights and property of the Church.

The report of the Congress is very interesting. In addition to the terms of the declaration, but growing out of them, were two questions of the highest moment. One was the attitude of the Church at Utrecht, so long the fearless antagonist of Jesuitism, which is able to render such signal aid to the movement in the very grave difficulty of episcopal succession. The other related to the course of action to be taken in the future. Some difference of opinion on this point was known to exist. Ultimately the following was agreed upon: the establishment of an organised directory and of local societies on the basis of the declaration; also the formation of separate congregations and a regular cure of souls, where a necessity existed and priests could be obtained; and, when the right moment came, the establishment of a regular episcopal jurisdiction.

Von Schulte, of Prague, vacated the chair in order to lead the debate on these questions. Döllinger, desiring to avoid schism, strenuously opposed a special organisation being proclaimed by the Congress; though the necessity for it was strongly stated, though for three hours earnest appeals were made to him to withdraw his objections, and though "delegate after delegate arose, and declared that without some distinct pledge of future action, his constituents would consider the whole meeting waste of time—would lose all heart in the possibility of the work they were engaged in." The resolutions of Von Schulte were finally adopted by a large majority.

We must refer our readers to the luminous pages of Mr. Whittle's little book for a statement of the attitude of the Irish Churches towards Ultramontanism, and for some far-seeing remarks on many topics relating to the future of this movement. They will find many sentences suggestive of careful and profound thought on the grave questions involved in it: a movement entirely and purely Catholic, but a movement in that direction which we think most hopeful for the Catholic Churches, and which we trust will, under the guidance of the Divine Spirit, prove beneficial to all the Churches of Christendom. Romanism has weighted herself with a glory which even her strong pillars cannot upbear. An old book says, "Pride goeth before destruction and a haughty spirit before a fall." There is a Catholic unity for which we hope, and pray, and wait, and work.

Physiology of the Soul and Instinct, as distinguished from Materialism. With Supplementary Demonstrations of the Divine Communication of the Narratives of Creation and the Flood. By Martyn Paine, A.M., M.D., LL.D. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1872.

Unquestionably this is an able work, displaying both range of learning and power of thought. Though published in America, it deals with questions which will for some time to come in our own country attract a large share of attention. We most heartily thank Dr. Paine for this very seasonable contribution towards the solution of what really are the problems of the day.

The starting-point and aim of our author will be best indicated by quoting a few of his own words.

"In the spiritual essence of man we meet with a subject upon which nothing has been yet said in proof of its existence but what revelation and metaphysics teach, nothing of its *physiological evidences*, while materialism has occupied the whole physiological ground, with the advantage of dedicating its labours to the senses and to the indolence of mankind."—P. 18.

"It must be allowed a misfortune that the subject of mind, as distinguished from matter, has been in the keeping of metaphysicians. Learned, and able, and devoted as they may have been to the prerogatives of reason, and with all the lustre they have shed upon mind, they have considered the spiritual part of man *too abstractedly from his organisation*. This has contributed to the reaction which now assumes the form of undisguised materialism."—P. 25.

"The author has been actuated by the belief that no subject can offer greater interest to the whole human family; and from its intricacies and entire want of demonstration at the hands of physiologists, and more especially on account of the prevalence of materialism, he has supposed that a service might be rendered to every contemplative mind, to the materialist himself, by affording reliable evidence of the existence of the soul as an independent, self-acting, immortal, and spiritual essence. . . . But more than all, the author has supposed that if the doctrine of materialism can be shown to be erroneous, and a perfect conviction of the existence of the soul as an independent, self-acting agent can be established, it would hardly fail to enlarge and strengthen our conceptions of creative power, of our dependence upon that power; and of our moral and religious responsibilities. Such a conviction, arising from demonstrative proof, *which appeals to the senses as well as to the understanding*, it appears to the writer, has been wanted by the human family, however they may be disposed, in the main, to accede to revelation, or to listen to the natural suggestions of reason."—*Preface.*

The want above referred to Dr. Paine seeks to meet, and in Chapter II. furnishes us with a demonstration, based upon physiological premises, of the "substantive existence and self-acting nature

of the soul." Of the contents of this long chapter it would be impossible in a short notice like the present to furnish any adequate account, and we therefore commend it to the careful perusal of our readers as well worthy of their attention.

But whilst thoroughly sympathising with the aim of our author, we cannot but think that he has attempted too much. Granted that he has discovered certain physiological facts for which no material cause can be assigned, but which at the same time we cannot think as uncaused, yet with regard to the absolute nature of their cause physiology enables him to predicate nothing. He may be right in saying that it is non-material, but as a physiologist he cannot declare it to be mental. Consciousness alone reveals to us the world of mind of which, apart from its testimony, we know nothing. The senses may make us acquainted with facts which, for their explanation, demand other than material causes; but any knowledge of these realities we may possess must, in the nature of things, come through other channels. Hence, therefore, we think that any attempt to contemplate our mental experience from its physiological side only is a fatal mistake. The facts of physiology are all realities presented to external observation, whilst, on the other hand, the validity of our judgments regarding spiritual phenomena can be certified by consciousness only. The two orders of facts, though variously related, are perfectly distinct. The physiologist may perhaps throw some light on the material and vital conditions of the existence of acts and states of mind, but he can tell us absolutely nothing of the characteristics of the mental phenomena themselves. To consciousness alone can we appeal, and what consciousness gives must be accepted. To assume the mendacity of consciousness is, in the language of Hamilton, "to suppose that God is a deceiver and the root of our nature a lie." Such a supposition would necessarily be suicidal. If, in the pursuit of truth, our faculties are not trustworthy guides, our labour is vain. It would then be impossible to show why one opinion or theory is to be preferred to any other. In fact we should have no power to discriminate in any instance between truth and error.

Now, it is a fact of mental science that consciousness gives the most unequivocal testimony against the materialistic theory. We are conscious of the existence of a *self* as the subject of certain classes of mental phenomena. If we know anything, we surely know that *we* are not our *thoughts*, nor our *feelings*, nor our *volitions*. When conscious of a given thought, we do not thereupon infer the existence of an unknown or unrevealed self as the basis of that thought. The thought and the self that thinks, together constitute the complex object of a single act of consciousness. Further, we are conscious not merely of a personal self, but of an abiding and unchangeable self. Our thoughts, feelings, and purposes pass away, but self continues and is ever the same. Physiologists, on the other hand, tell us that the particles of the body are continually changing. Consequently, if there is no self-personality distinct from

the material organism, we cannot be the same persons for a day, or for even two successive moments. For obvious reasons materialists never deal with this argument against their fundamental dogma. They pretend not even to understand it.

We notice that our author too often forgets the principle that language strictly applicable to the realities and facts of physiology, loses all significance when employed to describe mental realities. The practical disregard of this truth has been the source of much error and confusion in modern speculation. The physicists sin most grossly in this respect. To take but one illustration. What intelligible meaning can any man possibly attach to Professor Tyndall's statement, that our different sensations are so many modes of the molecular motion of the particles of the brain? The very supposition that we are to distinguish one feeling from another by a comparison of the various modes of molecular movement is nonsensical. It would be just as rational to attempt to classify our thoughts by reference to their various shapes.

A large portion of this treatise is taken up with the statement and examination of various scientific doctrines "conflicting with the revealed existence of the soul, a future state of being, and the existence of a Personal Creator." Dr. Paine experiences little difficulty in demolishing that form of the materialistic hypothesis which has been based upon the assumption of the transformation of forces. We have elsewhere shown that forces, though often correlated, are never convertible. The theory of Spontaneous Generation hardly deserves the refutation our author gives it. In failing to clearly distinguish between life and a living organism, its advocates are at the outset guilty of an oversight which invalidates all their reasonings. The life exists before the organism. *Life is in order that the organism may be.* Without one jot or tittle of evidence, the believers in spontaneous generation assume that vital powers are nothing but material forces. They tell us that the life itself is destroyed in the destruction of the organism! We shall next be told that when the human body is destroyed by fire, the soul ceases to exist. This, it seems to us, must be accepted by those who maintain that mental and vital powers are but the transformed forces of inorganic matter. We have this conviction, in common with our author, that materialism and scepticism cannot reach a lower depth! Any movement now must be in the right direction.

Considering the aim and purpose of the treatise, we think Dr. Paine should not have embraced in it so many topics. There is a lack of unity in the discussion. The style, too, would have been much better had the author allowed his materials to steep longer in his mind. Far be it, however, from us to appear to depreciate this really valuable book, which we cordially commend to the notice of our readers.

Systematic Theology. By Charles Hodge, D.D. London and Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons.

THE second volume of this noble work has reached us, bringing down the systematic exhibition of Christian doctrine to the end of

the Doctrines of Redemption, and to the threshold of that branch of theology which deals with the appropriation and enjoyment of salvation. We reserve a more full examination of the work till the appearance of the third volume, which may almost immediately be expected. Suffice now to say, that it is most certainly the best work on Systematic Divinity at present in the English language constructed on Calvinistic principles. That it is so intensely and uncompromisingly Calvinistic is to us no slight drawback. It is also, in our estimation, a fault that the work so pertinaciously deals with modern theories and objections. These belong to Historical and Controversial Theology, and cannot be thoroughly discussed in the space given to them here. A work written on this principle must needs become, in a few years, comparatively obsolete. We want some manual, or some large work, of Systematic Theology, that shall lay down the doctrine with as little reference as possible to current opinions. To the majority of our readers doubtless this very fact will be a recommendation. What we count a drawback, they will count a great advantage. To them, if they are votaries of the Westminster Confession especially, the volumes of the venerable doctor leave hardly anything to be desired.

The term "venerable" reminds us that Dr. Hodge has just been receiving a most honourable tribute, in what the American papers call a "semi-centennial celebration." The Princeton University has recognised the extraordinary worth and most valuable labours of their Professor by the creation of a Theological Professorship, with an endowment of 50,000 dollars, and by the presentation to the veteran Professor of 15,000 dollars. The American Presbyterians have done well. The object of their benevolence, however, has deserved all and more than all that they have done. May the close of his life be a lengthened one, and filled with benediction!

Messrs. Nelson deserve the warmest thanks of the English Churches for this transplantation from the American soil.

Devotional Works.

Christian Counsels. Selected from the Devotional Works of Fénelon, Archbishop of Cambrai. Translated by A. M. James. London: Longmans. 1872.

Christ the Consoler. A Book of Comfort for the Sick. With a Preface by the Right Reverend the Lord Bishop of Carlisle. London: Longmans. 1872.

These are devotional works of considerable merit. Every book of real value in this department deserves grateful mention, seeing that so many manuals of devotion are published which are either vitiated by erroneous teaching, or are weak, sentimental, and sapless. We should very much like to have the opinions of a number of devout and intelligent people on the whole question of devotional reading. How it may best contribute to Christian life, what books have most approved them-

selves as helpful, and to what class of readers,—these are questions upon which the experience of our friends, if we could collect their suffrages, would throw much light. Meanwhile, between one friend and another, a better service can scarcely be rendered than the recommending of a book which has wrought with wholesome power on the reader. It may easily happen that what was well timed and helpful to one will fail really to come at the heart of another; still, friends know something of each other, and need not be quite in the dark as to what is and is not appropriate.

The *Christian Counsels* of Fénelon, it is almost unnecessary to say, are those of an elevated and saintly spirit. The deficiency which they have in common with the works of many of the best Roman Catholic writers is, however, a serious one. The analysis of sin is close and unsparing, and the lines of Christian character are drawn with delicate skill, but the justification of the sinner through faith in Jesus Christ is only obscurely and imperfectly taught. It may be answered that such a fundamental doctrine is presupposed, and that a "Christian Counsellor" offers guidance only to those who are possessed of the great initiatory truth. We allow so much force to this reply as to admit that works of this class may prove valuable to those who have found in our Lord Jesus Christ "the full, perfect, and sufficient sacrifice, oblation, and satisfaction for the sins of the whole world;" but experience protests against a perilous taking for granted of a fundamental truth, which is not merely all-important up to a particular time, but continues to be essential in the whole scheme of Christian teaching, as it is in the whole experience of Christian life.

The second of the books above named we commend with hearty and grateful approval. It is the very best book of its kind we have met with for a long time, and we are quite sure it has become dear to many of those for whom it is specially designed. Its plan is that of conversations between a suffering disciple and the Lord. The confessions, prayers, inquiries of the servant, are partly in the writer's own language and partly taken from Scripture and the best religious authors, while the replies of the Lord to the voice of the disciple are never in the words of the writer, but almost exclusively in the language of Holy Scripture, the only exception being certain passages from the *De Imitatione Christi*. This plan is carried out with skill and tact, and much real spiritual insight.

The Treasury of David. Containing an Original Exposition of the Book of Psalms; a Collection of Illustrative Extracts from the whole range of Literature; a Series of Homiletical Hints upon almost every Verse; and Lists of Writers upon each Psalm. By C. H. Spurgeon. Vol. III. Psalm liii. to lxviii. London: Passmore and Alabaster. 1872.

We give a very cordial welcome to the third volume of Mr.

Spurgeon's great work on the Psalms. It deserves to be so called. It is generally known that Mr. Spurgeon's expositions of Scripture in the pulpit are as striking in their way as his sermons, and these written expositions are fully worthy of his reputation. He possesses quite sufficient scholarship for practical purposes, a strong, racy, human common sense, and a marvellous grasp of spiritual truth in almost every key. We could select passages whose shrewd thought and quaint expression recall the liveliest of Puritan preachers, and others of sustained and lofty eloquence worthy of any pulpit of any age. But beyond doubt Mr. Spurgeon's great power is the spiritual power, which is a preacher's greatest glory. The illustrative extracts are well selected from a very wide range of authors, and by themselves would form an interesting Commentary. For general readers, reading for purposes of devotion and religious instruction, we know of no work on the Psalms to be compared with this, and we sincerely trust the author's life may be spared to finish his laborious and very useful undertaking. The following extract, taken almost at random, will perhaps illustrate the writer's plain and vigorous style:—

"*Evening, and morning, and at noon, will I pray.* Often but none too often. Seasons of great need call for frequent seasons of devotion. The three periods chosen are most fitting; to begin, continue, and end the day with God is supreme wisdom. Where time has naturally set up a boundary, there let us set up an altar-stone. The Psalmist means that he will always pray; he will run a line of prayer right along the day, and track the sun with his petitions. Day and night he saw his enemies busy, and therefore he would meet their activity by continuous prayer. *And cry aloud.* He would give a tongue to his complaint; he would be very earnest in his pleas with heaven. Some cry aloud who never say a word. It is the bell of the heart that rings loudest in heaven. Some read it, 'I will muse and murmur;' deep heart thoughts should be attended with inarticulate but vehement utterances of grief. Blessed be God, moaning is translatable in heaven. A father's heart reads a child's heart. 'And He shall hear my voice.' He is confident that he will prevail; he speaks as if already he were answered. When our window is opened towards heaven, the windows of heaven are open to us. Have but a pleading heart and God will have a plenteous hand."

Nassau Senior and Alexis de Tocqueville.

Correspondence and Conversations of Alexis de Tocqueville with Nassau William Senior from 1834 *to* 1859. Edited by M. C. M. Simpson. Two Vols. London: Henry S. King and Co. 1872.

The *Journals kept in France and Italy*, by Nassau William Senior, published a few months ago, are now followed by two interesting volumes of his *Correspondence and Conversations* with Alexis de Tocqueville. The friendship of which they are the memorial began singularly enough. One day, in the year 1833, while Mr. Senior was sitting at work in his chambers, a knock was heard at the door, and a young man entered, who announced himself in these words: *Je suis Alexis de Tocqueville, et je viens faire votre connaissance.* At that time Senior was the better known man of the two; for the work on America, which at once gave De Tocqueville reputation, had not yet appeared. But De Tocqueville's instinct in seeking Mr. Senior's acquaintance was a true one. They became firm friends, frequently visited each other, shared their intellectual pursuits, and together watched with keen intelligent interest the course of events from 1848, the *annus mirabilis* of modern Europe, to 1859, the year of De Tocqueville's premature death. It is sufficient that M. de Tocqueville's reputation should rest on his principal work, *De la Démocratie en Amérique;* but the volumes before us give no unworthy proof of his learning, eloquence, insight, and general capacity for the investigation of social and political questions. He was one of a class of Frenchmen to whom France, during the last thirty years at least, could not be a kindly mother. Belonging both by birth and by sentiment to the *ancien régime*, yet singularly free from a narrow spirit of class; a monarchist by the tradition of his family, and by personal conviction; a friend of order, yet full of contempt for the *bourgeois* theory that makes commercial prosperity the one measure of a nation's greatness; admiring the capacity of the lower orders, though deploring their ignorance, and the prevalence among them of false ideas; loving his country with chivalrous devotion, and ashamed of her moral and political bondage; how could he be otherwise than restless and unhappy in the France of Louis Philippe and Napoleon the Third? There are times of national misfortune in which the spirits of the best men are strung to the highest pitch for effort or for suffering, and these are by no means the worst periods of a nation's history; but when the sting of humiliation is added, when events are only tragic in their consequences, and run continually into burlesque in the character and conduct of the actors, then honourable

and sensitive men have a bitter time of it, and it may be, through sheer despondency, do less for their country than they might. De Tocqueville writes thus of the downfall of Louis Philippe :—

"The great and real cause of the Revolution was the detestable spirit which animated the Government during this long reign; a spirit of trickery, of baseness, and of bribery, which has enervated and degraded the middle classes, destroyed their public spirit, and filled them with a selfishness so blind as to induce them to separate their interests entirely from those of the lower classes whence they sprang, which, consequently, have been abandoned to the counsels of men who, under pretence of serving the lower orders, have filled their heads with false ideas. This is the root of the matter, all the rest were accidents, strange and violent in themselves, I confess, but still insufficient to produce alone such an effect. Consider, on the one hand, the causes which I have pointed out, and, on the other, our system of centralisation, which makes the fate of France depend on a single blow struck in Paris, and you will have the explanation of the Revolution of 1848." Later on, he said in conversation with Mr. Senior: "Louis Philippe had so thoroughly corrupted the Chamber, that he had no parliamentary opposition to fear. He had so thoroughly corrupted the 200,000 electors, that he had nothing to fear from an electoral opposition. With his 200,000, or rather 400,000 places, all the middle classes, on whom his Government rested, were his tools. But, by abusing for these purposes the gigantic means conferred by our system of centralisation, he had rendered those middle classes, on whom his throne was built, unfit to sustain its weight. His monarchy was constructed with great skill and solidity, but its foundation was a quicksand. He made the middle classes objects of hatred and contempt, and the people trampled them and him under foot."

The evils of centralisation are often referred to by De Tocqueville, and the illustrations afforded by the history of the last few years will readily occur to the reader. It has not merely prevented the growth of an intelligent public opinion in the provinces—a thing which most French Governments have expressly desired—but, by withholding the means of practical training in municipal and national politics, has led to this result, that among the most quick-witted people in Europe there is, perhaps, a smaller proportion of men capable of taking part in the transaction of public affairs than in any other civilised country. The French love of organisation, and the curious aptitude for discipline, which is as indisputable as some opposite qualities more generally ascribed to them, form very hopeful elements of national character; but Government after Government has discouraged the true political education of the people, and so, to her own grievous loss, France has been denied the benefit of the national genius when it was needed in the highest department of national affairs. It is quite compatible with this state of things that offices under the Government are very much more numerous in

France than, for instance, in England. The excessive multiplication of public functionaries generally marks an undeveloped or abridged measure of public liberty. A trifling post under Government, or the prospect of getting one, goes a long way towards reconciling a man to the very scanty political rights which a paternal Government allows, and the free distribution of such offices has been found wonderfully effective in appeasing the public appetite for reforms, and converting previously independent members of the community into officials.

One important difference between French society and English is noticed:—"We talked of the careers open in France to a gentleman. From many of those which naturally suggest themselves to us, he is almost excluded by the low estimation in which they are held. Such are the Church, the Bar, and Medicine. Unless under peculiar circumstances, a gentleman would not select one of these professions for his son. France has not the Indian and Colonial Empire, in which the cadets of the English aristocracy find place. None but the sons of men engaged in banking, trade, or manufactures follow these pursuits. The great outlet is public employment, military or civil." Concerning the French clergy generally De Tocqueville's testimony is favourable. "In general the priest is the son of a rich peasant; he is not a polished man, but has manners that do not offend, and considerable information. His worst fault is pride. His morals are always pure. A dissolute priest would be hunted out of the country; but whatever his personality, his profession entitles him to be treated as an equal. When you come to Tocqueville," he added, "you will find the curé dining frequently with me, and once a year Madame de Tocqueville and I dine with him. The brother of the predecessor of the present curé was my servant; the curé has dined with me whilst his brother waited, and neither of them perceived in this the least *inconvenance*." De Tocqueville's friend, M. Anisson, was less favourable in his estimate of the clergy. "He thinks very ill of their information, and not well, at least not universally well, of their morals. There are none whom he could invite to his house. He agrees with De Tocqueville as to the great increase of religious feeling since the revolution of 1789, and his experience is long." Leaving on one side the religious aspect of the question, Mr. Senior points out, in rather a striking manner, one of the evils resulting to a nation from having a celibate clergy. "Have you ever," I said, "considered the loss which the world would have sustained if the Protestant clergy were unmarried? A third, perhaps a half, of our most distinguished men in England and Scotland have been the sons of clergymen. A clergyman has almost always a family; he always gives them a liberal education; he has generally something beyond his life income, but not enough for his sons to live on. They uniformly refuse to be tradesmen, and are therefore forced into literature and the professions, and succeed in them better than any other class."

Nothing in these volumes is more interesting than De Tocqueville's

criticism of Napoleon the Third. The analysis of his character seems to us, on the whole, wonderfully accurate, and while he did not prophesy, many of his hypotheses respecting the future, now that we read them in the light of accomplished events, show him to have had real insight into the condition of France, and the nature of her chief public men. The following sentence was written at the very beginning of the Empire:—"What I fear is, that when this man feels the ground crumbling under him, he will try the resource of war. It will be a most dangerous experiment. Defeat, or even the alternation of success or failure, which is the ordinary course of war, would be fatal to him; but brilliant success might, as I have said before, establish him. It would be playing double or quits. He is by nature a gambler. His self-confidence, his reliance, not only on himself, but on his fortune, exceeds even that of his uncle. He believes himself to have a great military genius. He certainly planned war a year ago. I do not believe that he has abandoned it now, though the general feeling of the country forces him to suspend it. That feeling, however, he might overcome; *he might so contrive as to appear to be forced into hostilities;* and such is the intoxicating effect of military glory, that the government which would give us *that* would be pardoned, whatever were its defects or its crimes." We believe this estimate to have been very fully confirmed. The Crimean War and the Italian War were successful, and gave strength to his throne. The attempt in Mexico was a failure, and, though the extent of the failure was carefully concealed, the spell of success was broken, and the Emperor's prestige suffered accordingly. Then came the last great venture, when he played "double or quits," and—the end of the Empire. It is not very pleasant for an English reader, though we think it may not be unwholesome for him, to know what was thought in France of the eager cordiality with which we accepted the Second Empire, and rushed into the arms of our new ally. The friends of political liberty in France could not understand the way in which the English people, so tenacious of their own liberty, could make a friend of one who suppressed the liberty of a neighbouring people. We think that the moral feeling of this country showed itself very lax with regard to the *coup d'état*. It succeeded, and the successful man promised fair to be a very useful kind of neighbour, and, the fact is, we shirked the question of right and wrong in a way not particularly creditable to a nation with a high standard of political virtue. "While he was useful to you," said De Tocqueville, "you steadily refused to admit that he was a tyrant, or even an usurper. You chose to disbelieve in the 8,000 men, women, and children massacred on the Boulevards of Paris; in the 20,000 poisoned by jungle fever in Cayenne; in the 25,000 who have died of malaria, exposure, and bad food, working in gangs on the roads and in the marshes of the Metidja and Lambressa." To this Mr. Senior replied that the English people were ignorant. "*I* knew all these facts, because I walked along the Boulevards on the 20th of December, 1851, and saw the

walls of every house, from the Bastille to the Madeleine, covered with the marks of musket balls; because I heard in every society of the thousands who had been massacred, and of the tens of thousands who had been *déportés*. But the untravelled English knew nothing of all this. They accepted his election as the will of the nation; and though they might wonder at your choice, did not presume to blame it." This is about as good an answer to the charge as could be given; but De Tocqueville's reply again has point. "The time at which light broke in upon you is suspicious. Up to the 14th of January, 1858 (the date of the memorable threats towards this country, to which the 'Volunteer Movement' was our main reply), the oppression under which thirty-four millions of people lay within twenty-four miles of your coast, with whom you are in constant intercourse, was unknown to you. Their ruler insults you, and you instantly discover that he is an usurper and a tyrant. This looks as if the insult, and the insult alone, opened your eyes." De Tocqueville describes the effect upon public opinion of the English mismanagement and misfortunes during the first year of the Crimean War. We believe, however, that they were greatly exaggerated, and the corresponding difficulties of the French army carefully concealed; all that was calculated to depreciate the ally, and by consequence raise the importance of the French in their own eyes was industriously repeated; on which subject we refer our readers to Mr. Kinglake's *History of the War*. "The English ought to know that what has passed in the Crimea, and is passing there (January, 1855), has sensibly diminished their moral force in Europe. It is an unpleasant truth, but I ought not to conceal it from you. I see proofs of it every day, and I have been struck by it peculiarly in a late visit to Paris, where I saw persons of every rank and of every shade of political opinion. The heroic courage of your soldiers was everywhere and unreservedly praised; but I found also a general belief that the importance of England as a military power had been greatly exaggerated; that she is utterly devoid of military talent, which is shown as much in administration as in fighting; and that even in the most pressing circumstances she cannot raise a large army. Since I was a child I never heard such language. You are believed to be absolutely dependent on us; and in the midst of our intimacy I see rising up a friendly contempt for you, which, if our Governments quarrel, will make a war with you much easier than it has been since the fall of Napoleon. . . . I confess that I saw with great grief the sudden change in the expressions of the majority of the English, a year ago, respecting our Government. It was then ill-consolidated, and in want of the splendid alliance which you offered to it. It was unnecessary that you should praise it in order to keep it your friend. By doing so you sacrificed honourable opinions and tastes without a motive. Now things are changed. After you have lost your only army, and our master has made an alliance with Austria, which suits his feelings much better than yours did, he does not depend on you; you, to a certain extent,

depend on him. Such being now the case, I can understand the English thinking it their duty to their country to say nothing that can offend the master of France. I can understand even their praising him; I reproach them only for having done so too soon, before it was necessary." Our last extract is from a remarkable conversation that took place in Paris, between M. de Tocqueville and Mr. Senior, on the 23rd of December, 1851, three weeks, that is to say, after the *coup d'état*. "How long," I asked, "will this tyranny last?" "It will last," he answered, "until it is unpopular with the mass of the people. At present the disapprobation is confined to the educated classes. We cannot bear to be deprived of the power of speaking or writing. We cannot bear that the fate of France should depend on the selfishness, or the vanity, or the fears, or the caprice of one man, a foreigner by race and by education; and of a set of military ruffians and infamous civilians, fit only to have formed the staff and the privy council of Catiline. We cannot bear that the people which carried the torch of liberty through Europe should now be employed in quenching all its lights. . . . Thirty-seven years of liberty have made a free press and free parliamentary discussion necessaries to us. *If Louis Napoleon refuses them, he will be execrated as a tyrant. If he grants them, they must destroy him.* We always criticise our rulers severely—often unjustly. It is impossible that so rash and wrong-headed a man, surrounded, and always wishing to be surrounded, by men whose infamous character is their recommendation to him, should not commit blunders and follies without end. They will be exposed, perhaps exaggerated, by the press and by the tribune. As soon as he is discredited, the army will turn against him. It will never support an unpopular despot. I have no fears, therefore, for the ultimate destinies of my country. It seems to me that the Revolution of the 2nd of December is more dangerous to the rest of Europe than to us. That it ought to alarm England much more than France. *We* shall get rid of Louis Napoleon in a few years, perhaps in a few months; but there is no saying how much mischief he may do in those years, or even in those months, to his neighbours." Certainly M. de Tocqueville did not give the Empire credit by anticipation for an existence of twenty years; but the end he foresaw has arrived. Though political questions occupy the chief place in De Tocqueville's letters and conversations, there is much beside, on literature and general topics, that is extremely interesting.

Lord Lytton's Horace.

The Odes and Epodes of Horace. A Metrical Translation into English, with Introduction and Commentaries. By Lord Lytton. With Latin Text. New Edition. London: Longmans. 1872.

As scholar and poet, Lord Lytton takes high place amongst recent translators of Horace, who form, it need scarcely be said, a very

goodly company of literary craftsmen. Though it is doubtless true, in a certain sense, that poetry cannot be translated, such versions as those of the late Mr. Conington, of Mr. Theodore Martin, and of Lord Lytton, will enable the English reader to gain some real insight into the qualities of the best Latin verse. As for Horace, one can hardly say more for his wonderful vitality than that, after all these years, and versions well nigh numberless, it is not labour lost to translate him. He is still the most popular of lyric poets, the friend and favourite not merely of students, but of men of average general culture everywhere, and possesses, if not a throne among the "dii majores," an unchallenged seat among the companions of the library and the fireside. His genius and exquisite skill could not have failed to give high permanent reputation to his writings, but it is the personal qualities of the man, everywhere looking out upon us from his work, that cause the reader to feel something as much like personal affection for him as is possible in the case of one who lived nearly two thousand years ago. And this personal popularity is not difficult to account for. Horace is thoroughly and genially human, and by his frankness seems to say, like Montaigne, "*C'est icy un livre de bonne foy, lecteur.*" Assuredly he is "not too bright or good for human nature's daily food;" but he is full of humour, life, and friendliness. His aspirations are not towards the unattainable, and his likes and dislikes are of the good-natured sensible sort that most people agree with. Still, though essentially good-natured, there is in him a reserve force of indignation; he can be angry when needs be in a key quite beyond men of merely shallow nature, and though claiming often enough to be little better than a trifler, "the idle singer of an empty day," he will now and again, amidst the flow of somewhat average moralising, give utterance to things more spiritual and penetrating than were expected. We know Horace as we know very few authors, ancient or modern, and whom we know so well we cannot help but like. It may be that our friend is not the greatest nor the best of men, but he is at least—our friend; and in literature, as in life, that goes for a good deal.

The difficulties of translation, and they are greater and more numerous than those who have not looked into the subject will suppose, reach their height in the case of lyric poetry. Here imperfection of form is fatal. Nothing that may be urged respecting the beauty of the idea will compensate for rough or inferior workmanship. Skill is as requisite as imagination, and the rigorous conditions of style cannot be relaxed. Of Horace it may be said that his style and his inspiration are worthy of each other, if indeed it be a true analysis that distinguishes between them. The qualities of his style are at once the delight and the despair of translators, and make success impossible to any but the most skilled and patient hands. How hard is it, for instance, to do justice to the exquisite felicity of language shown both in the selection and order of words; to avoid amplifying, and so weakening, the terse compactness which only an artist's hand

can give to an artist's work; to reproduce in English the elegance or the energy of the Latin; and generally to give, not only the author's meaning, but to give it in the author's way, so as to convey the original impressions to the ear, the taste, and the imagination! And if to all other difficulties that of a shy and subtle metre be added, then indeed must the translator go—

> "All in quantity, careful of his motion,
> Like the skater on ice that hardly bears him,
> Lest he fall unawares before the people,
> Waking laughter in indolent reviewers . . . .
> Hard, hard, hard is it only not to tumble,
> So fantastical is the dainty metre."

The peculiarity of Lord Lytton's version is the employment of rhymeless metres. "No reasonings, and certainly no examples, in favour of rhymed verse can alter my opinion, formed after long and careful deliberation, that while for the purposes of imitation or paraphrase rhyme may advantageously be employed in selected specimens of the Odes, it is utterly antagonistic to a faithful translation of them, taken as a whole, whether in substance or in spirit." The only rhymeless metre with which English readers generally are acquainted is the familiar "blank verse," and hence disappointment may be felt by those who fail to accommodate their ear to subtle and unfamiliar metres, such as Lord Lytton uses. A second reading, however, and if it be aloud so much the better, will generally give the reader the metrical key, and put him in a position to judge in some degree of the nature of the experiment. The classical scholar knows how much of musical charm and variety of rhythm may exist without rhyme. The question is, can this be attained in English? Is there any hope of our successfully employing the metres common in Greek and Latin poetry, with such modifications as the genius of our language may demand? Experiments in this direction have been made from time to time with varying success. Amongst the best known is the Ode to Pyrrha, translated by Milton:—

> "What slender youth, bedewed with liquid odours,
> Courts thee on roses in some pleasant cave,
> Pyrrha? for whom bind'st thou
> In wreaths thy golden hair?"

Most readers of Cowper will have felt the metrical power of those dreadful Sapphics beginning—

> "Hatred and vengeance—my eternal portion—
> Scarce can endure delay of execution—
> Wait with impatient readiness to seize my
> Soul in a moment."

And again, there is a tender, plaintive music in Charles Lamb's poem:—

> "I have had playmates, I have had companions
> In my days of childhood, in my joyful school-days;
> All, all are gone, the old familiar faces."

Other examples might be recalled, but these are sufficient to remind the reader that Lord Lytton's attempt is not a new one, though perhaps no one else has given it so exhaustive a trial. What are the prospects of really naturalising this kind of verse among us? Our own opinion is, that the classical metres are not likely, in the full sense of the term, to be naturalised in English literature, yet they may be happily employed upon occasion, more especially in compositions intended for those who have some acquaintance with classical literature. Of the English hexameter, for instance, we generally feel compelled to say, as Jeffrey said of the *Excursion*, "this will never do;" and yet Mr. Kingsley in his *Andromeda*, and Mr. Clough in the *Bothie of Tober-na-Voilich*, have justified the experiment by succeeding. The precise task which Lord Lytton set before himself he has admirably accomplished. His metres are not, of course, reproduction foot by foot of the Horatian metres; they are, so to speak, renderings of them in thoroughly sympathetic manner, according to the capabilities of the English language. Here are two specimens of Alcaics, which we quote as illustrations of metre, at the same time inviting attention to the closeness and felicity of translation.

The first is the Ninth Ode of the First Book :—

"Vides, ut alta stet nive candidum
Soracte, nec jam sustineant onus
Silvæ laborantes, geluque
Flumina constiterint acuto," &c.

"See how white in the deep-fallen snow stands Soracte!
Labouring forests no longer can bear up their burden;
And the rush of the rivers is locked,
Halting mute in the gripe of the frost.

"Thaw the cold; more and more on the hearth heap the fagots—
More and more bringing bounteously out, Thaliarchus,
The good wine that has mellowed four years
In the great Sabine two-handled jar.

"Leave the rest to the gods, who can strike into quiet
Angry winds in their war with the turbulent waters,
Till the cypress stand calm in the sky—
Till there stir not a leaf on the ash.

"Shun to seek what is hid in the womb of the morrow;
Count the lot of each day as clear gain in life's ledger;
Spurn not thou, who art young, dulcet loves;
Spurn not, thou, choral dances and song,

"While the hoar-frost morose keeps aloof from thy verdure.
Thine the sports of the Campus, the gay public gardens;
Thine at twilight the words whispered low;
Each in turn has its own happy hour:

"Now for thee the sweet laugh of the girl, which betrays her
Hiding slyly within the dim nook of the threshold,
And the love-token snatched from the wrist,
Or the finger's not obstinate hold."

The second is the Thirty-fifth Ode of the First Book—

"O Diva, gratum quæ regis Antium," &c.

where the same metre is thus differently rendered:—

"Goddess, who o'er thine own loved Antium reignest,
Potent alike to raise aloft the mortal
From life's last mean degree,
Or change his haughtiest triumphs into graves;—

"To thee the earth's poor tiller prays imploring—
To thee, Queen-lady of the deeps, whoever
Cuts with Bithynian keel
A passing furrow in Carpathian seas.

"Thee Dacian rude—thee Scythia's vagrant nomad—
Thee states and races—thee Rome's haughty children—
Thee purple tyrants dread,
And the pale mothers of Barbarian Kings," &c.

Did space permit we should like to quote further examples of Lord Lytton's metrical skill. He will not persuade all his readers that he has the truth, and the whole truth on his side, but most will admit that his unrhymed verse has a delicate charm for the ear, and retains a characteristic of the original which rhymed verse surrenders. The book is one of the very pleasantest that we have met with, and we advise any lover of literature desirous of a genial introduction to Horace to take Lord Lytton for his guide.

Recent Poetry.

Delhi, and other Poems. By Charles Arthur Kelly, M.A. London: Longmans. 1871.

Eros Agonistes. By E. B. D. London: Henry S. King and Co. 1872.

Cæsar in Britain: a Poem in Five Cantos. By Thomas Kentish. London: Pickering.

The Legends of Saint Patrick. By Aubrey de Vere. London: Henry S. King and Co. 1872.

The Knight of Intercession, and other Poems. By S. J. Stone, M.A. Rivingtons: London, Oxford, Cambridge. 1872.

Songs from the Woodlands, and other Poems By Benjamin Gough. London: S. W. Partridge and Co.

From the crowd of minor poets claiming notice, we select a few who do not seem, either by their merit or demerit, to demand any very lengthened criticism. If an association could be formed, with reasonable chance of success, for the suppression of all but the best poetry, we would gladly join it; but there are causes at work to make such an undertaking hopeless. The economic law of demand

and supply prevails here in an inverted order; the supply creates the demand. There is no falling off in the number of persons who can write what will fairly pass for verse, so that if poetry be not very plentiful, at least good imitation abounds. Whether or not, the majority of these writers believe in their own originality, we cannot say; but it is certain that the greater portion of the numerous verse put forth betrays its origin in the most innocent manner. We can tell at once whether we are indebted to Mr. Tennyson or Mr. Browning, and even find a melancholy pleasure in tracing the minutiæ of unconscious imitation. The first volume above-named, that of Mr. Kelly, is a fair specimen of a book of poems owing its origin to literary, as distinguished from poetic, feeling. He writes like a well-read man, with considerable power of appreciation; but his literary models absolutely tyrannise over him. In his principal poem, *Delhi*, he uses the heroic couplet to the precise eighteenth century tune,—the same smooth monotony of versification, and familiar balance of phrase and epithet.

> "Then the stern Saxon from a stranger land,
> Fire in his eyes, and conquest in his hand.
> Weep for the glorious dead by whom were wrought
> Those feats of war, those master-works of thought.
> Mourn for the men of might—how few survive
> Who rule like Hastings, or who fight like Clive!"

In another poem, *Marathon*, our recollection of Macaulay's *Lays* is most unwisely challenged thus:—

> "At break of day, the people
> Have met in stern debate,
> Short space had they for counsel,
> For war was at the gate.
> And they have marshalled forth their host,
> And chosen generals ten,
> All skilled to sway on the battle-day
> The rush of armèd men."

The martial vigour, which is the very life-breath of such a poem is now and again sadly let down by a feeble line like the following:—

> "Callimachus the Archon
> Was chieftain of the ten,
> And he hath called his colleagues,
> *Those great and earnest men.*"

We give a verse or two of Mr. Kelly in his Tennysonian vein, from a poem in memory of Sir James Outram:—

> "O day of darkness and of light,
> O throbbing chords of joy and pain!
> The bridal of a fair-haired Dane,
> The death-hour of a noble Knight.

" When blushing Love, in holy trust,
On happy hearts her signet placed,
Not far away Death's finger traced
'Ashes to ashes, dust to dust.'

" When the rich-robed processions sweep
In solemn state up Windsor's aisle,
And rolling organs shake the pile,
Our Indian Bayard falls asleep.
* * * *
" So Death and Love their arms entwine,
And chant one grand funereal song,
'Uphold the right, war down the wrong,
And make the mortal more divine.' "

Eros Agonistes not merely reminds us of Tennyson, but plainly owes its form and general mode of treatment, if not its very origin, to *In Memoriam*. A lost love supplies the place of the dead friend, and then, precisely after the manner of the great model, the author leads his grief along the various stages of a soul's pilgrimage, through doubt and bitterness, to submissive trust. The comparison invited proves disastrous. There is much graceful, tender thought, and better than average quality of verse, but the reader is haunted by echoes of another poem, and—that is fatal. It cannot be otherwise; witness the following:—

" Once more the sacred season draweth near
When first we met. The day that of all days
And anniversaries which the circling year
Presents, most piercing memories shall raise.
* * * *
" Ah, yet again, as once in that old hall,
On wild gray mornings when the wind is loud,
And weary music, in its rise and fall,
Awakes the past, I see those cedars bowed.
And, 'mid the fierce gusts' distant gathering roar,
That light footfall upon the creaking stair
Makes my heart leap.

Cæsar in Britain, though a poem in five cantos, may safely be dismissed in about five lines, and they shall be the author's own:—

" However, if I rightly guess,
Doubt need not long the mind possess;
But little lapse of time will show,
And we the certainty shall know.
For, hearken to the approaching tramp
Of hurrying steeds, with heavy stamp!
And louder still, and still more near!
And, see! look yonder southward! where
The hill, in rapid slope, descends,
And with the plain its verdure blends.
They come! they come! distinct in sight,
One after one; I count them; five
In number; which will first arrive?"

The freest use of notes of exclamation cannot give life to lines so utterly prosaic and dead.

The next volume on our list is of a higher order than any yet mentioned. Mr. de Vere has struck into that early circle of legends clustering round the great name of St. Patrick, which has been trodden by few except the most ardent explorers of the poetic antiquities of Ireland. "The early legends of St. Patrick are at once the more authentic and the nobler. Not a few have a character of the sublime; many are pathetic; some have a profound meaning under a strange disguise; but their predominant character is their brightness and gladsomeness. A large tract of Irish history is dark: but the time of St. Patrick, and the three centuries which succeeded it, were her time of joy." There is, so far as we have observed, a certain monotony in these legends of the Saints (compare, for example, Bede's *Lives of St. Cuthbert and St. Felix* with the *Legends of St. Patrick*); but no sturdiness of Protestant principles shall lead us to deny to them both poetic and religious charm. To the author, we can plainly see that these idylls of the Saint have been a labour of love. We feel inclined to suggest that, perhaps a rougher, more archaic verse would have better suited the subject and spirit of the legends. Once or twice a ballad-metre is effectively employed; for the rest, it is smooth, melodious blank verse.

The Knight of Intercession, &c., is the work of Mr. Stone, Vicar of St. Paul's, Haggerston, the author of the *Thanksgiving Hymn* lately sung at St. Paul's, and of one or two of the best hymns in the Appendix to *Hymns, Ancient and Modern*. This will, perhaps, sufficiently indicate the school to which Mr. Stone belongs. It is the school which has for some time past led the way in the earnest and enterprising use of religious song, a matter deserving the attention of Churches too much inclined to rest upon their traditions. The majority of the pieces included in this volume are directly religious in their subject; all are thoroughly so in their spirit. There is just the tinge of distinctive High Church doctrine that we might expect; but it would be a grudging and unworthy criticism that could see in Mr. Stone's poems nothing but the mannerism of a school. There is much more,—chaste and graceful, if not vigorous, imagination, and keen sensibility to what is beautiful in nature, and in the character and deeds of men. Let us confess that it is pleasant to us to read thoughtful and tender poems that derive a main charm from their most devout and reverent regard for our Lord. This is not so common but that we may thus acknowledge it. The following is one of a short series of Easter sonnets:—

> "He said unto her, 'Mary.' With one cry,
> And in one moment, she was at His feet.
> Oh, to her desolate thirsting soul how sweet
> The calling! as to those in days gone by
> His voice on the dark waters, 'It is I.'
> O, great good Shepherd! so He came to meet

The sheep that cried to find Him—so to greet
Her for whose need He was unseen so nigh.
He knows His sheep, and calls them all by name;
They hear not others, but His voice they know:
She heard and knew the calling sweet and low,
And to His feet in reverent rapture came.
O, my great Master! thus and evermore
Thee would I seek and find, love and adore."

Of Mr. Gough's *Songs from the Woodlands*, we can speak favourably as regards both their poetical and their religious tone, but any other praise we hardly know how to give, unless accompanied and qualified by something very much the reverse. They are the production of a man of genial, kindly nature, rejoicing much in the open-air mercies of life, and ready to break into verse upon—let us say—the slightest provocation. The majority of the songs have not theme enough. The thought does not progress. No sentiment or reflection is developed, and after a few stanzas of fluent, tripping, graceful verse, we leave off exactly where we began. A noticeable peculiarity is the number of verses that are short of predicate; with much preparation nothing is said; *e.g.*—

"Down in the coppice,
When the woodlark sings,
Rising and descending
With half-opened wings;
Cheery as the sunshine,
Flying to and fro,
Warbling forth wild notes
With a joyous glow."

Mr. Gough evidently has great facility in composition of this kind, but its luxuriance needs to be pruned and brought into stricter subjection to grammatical and logical rules. What, for instance, does this mean?—

"Comes Spring's coronation
In her crown of flowers?"

How does a coronation come in a crown? But we will not lengthen the ungrateful task of finding fault. We cannot call Mr. Gough's songs poetry in any very high sense of the word, but there is a good deal of not inharmonious verse which will be sufficiently commended to some readers by its quality of pious cheerfulness.

Anster Fair. By William Tennant, LL.D. With Memoir and Notes. Edinburgh: John Ross and Co. 1871.

This is a new edition of a poem which has long been held in good repute in Scotland, though in England it is still little known. The author, William Tennant, who was born at Anstruther in 1784, and died at Dollar in 1848, was one of that royal brotherhood of men, of whom it is the glory of Scotland to have produced so many, who plod through all difficulties and discouragements to ultimate fame

and honour. Of humble origin, afflicted with lameness, oppressed by poverty, he struggled on; mastering languages, laying up stores of learning, and rising step by step, till, from keeping a parish school, he, at last, filled the chair of Oriental Languages in the University of St. Andrews.

Tennant was the author of several works, both in poetry and prose; but his chief title to literary distinction is the poem now under our notice. *Anster Fair* was first published in 1812, at Edinburgh, and soon won for itself, in Scotland at least, a deservedly honourable reputation, and one which we venture to think will increase rather than diminish. It is a mock epic, full of serio-comic extravagance, abounding in rich innocent fun; touched, however, here and there, with a masterly grace of poetic description which considerably heightens the reader's enjoyment of the whole.

The poem shows how a certain "Rob the Ranter," so called from his piping propensities, with the kindly aid of sprightly Puck and his fairy wife, proves victor in a contest of ass-racing, bag-piping, sack-jumping, and story-telling held at Anster Fair, and so wins the hand of the fair maiden, "Bonnie Maggie Lauder." The plot is homely and simple, and the machinery familiar. There are not wanting weak lines and halting rhymes. But there is such truth of description, such quaintness of fancy, such vivacity, and movement, and genuine humour, all through the poem, as holds the reader's attention in most willing bonds. One of the most remarkable features of this poem is the ease and naturalness with which, every now and then, the author passes from the most ludicrous scenes to a strain of description full of a quaint, quiet, beauty and strength, indicative of rare power and delicacy of imagination. Nor less remarkable is the happy use of the familiar classical images of Homer and Virgil, which appear here quite at home in a charming serio-comic adaptation to homely Scottish life and scenery. On the whole, it is a capital poem—just the thing to relish in these serious hard-tensioned times. The impression it leaves is that of pure, downright fun—bright, unmixed enjoyment. It is just the book to beguile the tedium of a railway journey with, or to read to a half dozen friends during the long vacant pauses of a sea-side holiday. To this we will only add that the paper, type, and general get-up of the volume are creditable to the taste and enterprise of the publishers.

Verses and Translations. By C. S. C. Fourth Edition. Revised. Cambridge: Deighton, Bell, and Co. 1872.

This is a very charming little volume of scholarly recreations in English and Latin verse. Distant be the day when natural science and technical education shall dethrone Homer, Horace, and Virgil, when the tradition of Latin verse shall be forgotten, and the play that scholars delight in be known no more. The translations include pieces from Sophocles, Homer, Lucretius, Horace, and Virgil, as

well as Latin versions of a few well-known English poems and hymns. The English verses are parodies, charades, and some very clever mock-heroics full of wit and fun. We must find room for a few stanzas of C. S. C.'s proverbial philosophy.

OF READING.

Read not Milton, for he is dry; nor Shakspeare, for he wrote of common life:
Nor Scott, for his romances, though fascinating, are yet intelligible:
Nor Thackeray, for he is a Hogarth, a photographer who flattereth not:
Nor Kingsley, for he shall teach thee that thou shouldest not dream, but do.
Read incessantly thy Burke; that Burke who, nobler than he of old,
Treateth of the Peer and Peeress, the truly sublime and beautiful:
Likewise study "the creations" of "the Prince of Modern Romance;"
Sigh over Leonard the Martyr, and smile on Pelham the puppy:
Learn how "love is the dram-drinking of existence,"
And how we "invoke, in the Gadars of our still closets,
The beautiful ghost of the Ideal, with the simple wand of the pen."
Listen how Maltravers and the orphan "forgot all but love,"
And how Devereux's family chaplain "made and unmade kings;"
How Eugene Aram, though a thief, a liar, and a murderer,
Yet, being intellectual, was amongst the noblest of mankind.
So shalt thou live in a world peopled with heroes and master-spirits;
And if thou canst not realise the Ideal, thou shalt at least idealise the Real.

OFFICIAL WORKS ON THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR.

The Operations of the German Armies in France from Sedan to the end of the War. From the Journals of the Head-quarters Staff. By William Blumé, Major in the Prussian Ministry of War. Second Edition. London: Henry S. King and Co. 1872.

Tactical Deductions from the War of 1870-71. By A. v. Boguslawski, Captain and Company-Chief in the 3rd Lower Silesian Infantry Regiment, No 50. London: Henry S. King and Co. 1872.

Operations of the South Army in January and February, 1871. Compiled from the Official War Documents. By Count Hermann Von Wartensleben. London: Henry S. King and Co. 1872.

As professional works on the science of war, we are glad to leave the criticising of these volumes to military men and students of this particular department of things. In the German armies Captain Sword and Captain Pen appear to be one and the same man, and before the war was well over the fighting captains began to draw out the history of the campaign and reduce to literary form the experience won in the field. The literature of the late war is already extensive, and though, to readers like ourselves, it is a little too sulphurous to be pleasant, military men are appreciative and grateful, and there is no denying to it a certain kind of grim fascination. The

volumes before us have been well received in Germany, and cannot fail to be carefully studied in other European countries. There is something almost touching in the modesty, not unmingled with a shade of envy, shown by the English translator in his Preface to *Tactical Deductions*—"We in England have no practical experience in the matter, not having had the advantage of being engaged in any great war since rifled muskets and cannon, not to mention breech-loaders and mitrailleuses, came into general use. We must consequently draw upon the experience of other nations more fortunate (in a military sense), by which experience, it is to be hoped, we shall have profited, when it comes to our turn to enter the arena."

The history of the campaign discloses an unbroken series of French misfortunes and defeats. There is a monotony of failure wonderful to see. The great war-machine of Germany moves across the scene, never late, or ill-adjusted, or insufficient, and scatters, grinds, and crushes all that comes in its way with mechanic precision and completeness. The thing is so well done, and can be so neatly demonstrated afterwards with chalk and black-board, that, as an exercise for the skill and ingenuity of civilised men, nothing can surely compare with it. Perhaps it is only morbid readers to whom the thing is spoiled by a certain scent of blood. This, for instance, is very quietly told: "The casualties from 7th to 10th December amounted to near 4,000; on the enemy's side they must have been a good deal heavier, as was proved by the large number of wounded who were found during the few following days in every village, even as far as Blois, in an utterly helpless condition." So long as we deal with it thus in gross we get on pretty well,—these thousands of killed and wounded don't affect us very much; but when our ill-advised imagination settles on some luckless mother's son shattered and bleeding, lying out in the cold a couple of nights or so, filled with intolerable anguish, praying or cursing, it may be, until he dies with his white face and clenched teeth turned towards the stars, then our enjoyment is gone, and we cry, "I'll read no more."

This was the position of France at the time of the Armistice of Versailles which led to the treaty of peace:—"More than 385,000 French soldiers, including 11,860 officers, were prisoners in Germany, nearly 100,000 interned in Switzerland, and the army of Paris, which was over 150,000 strong, would have been led captive into Germany, had hostilities broken out afresh. The prisoners included, with few exceptions, all the professional officers and trained soldiers that France possessed. The conquerors had taken all the warlike stores of three great armies and twenty-two captured fortresses, besides a number of guns, carriages, and weapons lost in different actions, amounting in all to 1,885 field and 5,378 garrison guns, and upwards of 600,600 small arms. The material of Bourbaki's army, too, was not to be restored to the French till the war was over. The fleet was in great measure disarmed; its officers, sailors, and stores had been expended on shore. One-third of all France was occupied by the German

armies; and the capital, to which the provinces had been accustomed to look for guidance, was in their power. They had as yet, indeed, refrained from occupying Paris, and the omission may possibly have led people here and there to dream of revictualling the city, and resuming the defence. Such dreams were, however, utterly vain, while 700 heavy guns were mounted on and between the forts ready to nip in the bud any effort at resistance. . . . At the same time there were 569,875 German infantry, and 63,465 cavalry, with 1,742 field-pieces on French soil on the 1st March. But, if the officers and officials, artillery and engineers' train, and departments of all kinds were to be added, the total strength of the German armies would appear to be in round numbers 1,000,000 men. Besides these, there were at home more than 250,000 men, reserve and garrison troops, available for garrison duty, guard of prisoners, and replacing casualties in the active army." Truly it was time to stop.

We may just say that these volumes are well translated, and, so far as the printing and binding are concerned, are admirably got up.

Diary of a Young French Officer in Chanzy's Army. From the French, by Roger M. With a Preface by C. J. Vaughan, D.D. Strahan and Co., London. 1872.

THIS simple and unpretending account of the personal experiences of a young French officer in the late disastrous campaign in France is written with a vivid descriptive power and a straightforward candour and honesty of purpose which are very refreshing.

Suddenly called from a studious existence at home to take part in the war, the writer obeyed the summons with a cheerful devotion to duty, which we have perhaps been too much inclined to consider purely English, and contrived, while performing most arduous duties, to keep an almost daily record of what passed around him. From these hasty jottings the volume before us is written, retaining the freshness of his impressions at the time the events occurred, while such reflections are added as circumstances afterwards suggested.

His narrative of the eventful months from August 1870 to March 1871, brings us face to face with the dreadful detail of war and the hardships of a winter campaign, aggravated by perpetual mismanagement. In the midst of much to bias the judgment, the calm and unprejudiced spirit of the writer is very remarkable. He is a true patriot, but by no means a blind one, as the following quotation will serve to show. Referring to the close of the war, he writes:—

"Generals Chanzy and Jaurès have, in their last orders, taken leave of us in very flattering terms. They bear witness that we have done our duty, and bestow great praise upon us, which I believe many of the soldiers in this battalion well deserve. But what importance can be attached to words which are repeated indiscriminately by everybody to everybody? I am weary of this universal praise-giving. If everyone in France has deserved nothing but compliments,

whom shall we accuse of our disasters? Can we believe that we have not been guilty of a series of grave errors? Is it right that we should all be praising one another, when the work we have accomplished is before our eyes? Where are the guilty? Where are the incapable, the weak, the self-seeking? For such there must be—above, below, and everywhere—to account for such results as we have seen. Who will tell the truth? Let us accept these official words with due respect, and let us be grateful for the goodwill of those who send them, and who have, no doubt, like ourselves, done their best. But let us none the less examine our conscience; let us confess that this nation, which worships itself even in the hour of humiliation, is not what it ought to be, and needs to be regenerated from its roots."

Such words from a Frenchman are full of hope for the future of France. Dr. Vaughan's preface will doubtless recommend this book to many readers; and we feel assured that no one can read *Eight Months on Duty* without being deeply interested.

The Days of Jezebel: an Historical Drama. By Peter Bayne. Strahan and Co. 1872.

Mr. Bayne is probably known to our readers as the author of several prose works, which have earned him some reputation as a vigorous thinker and a clear and forcible writer. This venture of his into the high and difficult region of the historical drama, though by no means completely successful, is, on the whole, a creditable and promising performance. Mr. Bayne possesses real poetic faculty, a fine imagination, and a musical ear. His style is lithe and sinewy, and abounds in choice epithet and apt metaphor. His conception of the dramatic situation is comprehensive and just, and shows wide and careful study. He very properly makes the determining motive of the play the mutual shock and resentment resulting from the meeting of such antagonistic elements as the fleshly, tolerant, pleasant culture of Phœnician Polytheism, on the one hand, and the more spiritual, but rigid and exclusive, Mosaic Monotheism of the Jews, on the other. These opposing elements find their highest expression and fiercest collision in Jezebel—Ahab's Sidonian queen—and Elijah, the fire-souled prophet of Jehovah. Truthful and powerful is the poet's description of the beautiful, imperious, unscrupulous queen, chafing with implacable resentment as she finds her magnificent and ostentatious *régime* of idolatry traversed by the open opposition of the more conscientious Jews, headed by the prophets. The character of Elijah, the other principal personage of the drama, is drawn with less force and distinctness than that of Jezebel; but, on the whole, with insight and skill. And the prophet's description of the scenes of his youth, of the stress of Divine afflatus which bore him on in his perilous task, of the subtle rising of half-unconscious ambition in his heart, and of his disappointment and dejection when it seemed as if his mission had

wholly failed, is marked by a beautiful simplicity of treatment, and some fine and tender touches of feeling. The conception of the vision at Horeb is striking and well wrought out, and, so far as we remember, original. When wind, and earthquake, and fire have passed, and the prophet sees from their effects that God is not in them, then there rises before him a vision of the Crucified, and from his pale lips goes forth "a still small voice," that, ever sounding on through all the ages, at length wins the world to righteousness and love. The following passage is from this part of the prophet's description of the vision, and affords a fair specimen of the poetry of the drama as a whole:—

> "He bowed his head,
> And hung, a lifeless form, upon the tree.
> And round that form, methought that I beheld,
> In adamantine pride and scornful hate,
> The principalities and powers of earth,
> The mighty idols that have blinded men!
> Tier above tier, in rangèd hierarchies,
> Nations, majestic in their sceptred pride,
> Armies, whose trumpets spoke the law o' th' world:
> All scowled defiance on that pallid form.
> It seemed the frailest thing as there it hung,
> Between the stars of God and graves of men,
> The frailest thing in all this universe.
> Then in the vision many, many years,
> By centuries, by thousands, rolled away.
> And toning, toning on, in spheric chime,
> That still small voice made melody Divine.
> And one by one those idols from their thrones
> Fell, crumbling into dust. And one by one
> Those nations failed, like sere leaves of the wood;
> Those armies slumbered in a stony sleep;
> The cycles of the world were long, the ear
> Of man was heavy; but that still small voice
> Went sounding, sounding on immortally.
> A thousand years were short for men to catch
> One of its tones; they learned the simplest last.
> And often, they that loudliest named the name
> Of Him that hung upon the tree, did most
> To drown that voice; and many woe-worn men,
> And tender tremulous women, died in fire—
> Half-conscious that a smile fell through the smoke
> Upon them from the Cross; and that the words
> Which the priests gnashed at, howling 'blasphemy'
> And 'infidelity,' were truer, far,
> To the deep melody of that small voice,
> Than chants that rolled and rang in choral peal
> Through proud cathedrals."

It may be justly questioned whether the author has not gone beyond the bounds of dramatic propriety, as he has certainly transcended those of Scriptural warrant, in giving this turn to the vision, and making it the vehicle to the stern Hebrew prophet of a significance the full import of which seems to require advanced Christian culture to perceive and appreciate. And if this be an error, we have another

of the same sort in Elijah's farewell words to Jezebel, from which the reader will be surprised to learn that a Hebrew of the time of Ahab had strong objections to absolute monarchy, and could put them in a way not unbecoming an opponent of the late French Empire. This deficiency of the instinctive insight and tact so necessary in dramatic composition shows itself glaringly in one or two other instances. If Jezebel was an adulteress, of which, by the way, there is no evidence, surely it was not necessary to make that fact appear in the offensively bald way in which act iii. scene v. sets it forth. Still less was there any dramatic necessity for exaggerating the prophet's fine mockery of the priests of Baal into something approaching to ludicrous maniacal raving. The end, too, is somewhat disappointing. Instead of accelerated movement, and interest culminating, as it might justly have done, in a tragic close, we have a tolerably quiet argument between Elijah and Jezebel, finished by an unsuccessful dagger-stroke. Another defect of the poem is its want of that clear delicate modelling—that roundness, detail and finish—of character, which is essential to true drama, and for the absence of which no amount of fine description or sonorous declamation can compensate.

But notwithstanding its defects, the *Days of Jezebel* is a drama of considerable power. It is the work of one who is both a poet and a scholar. It cannot fail to interest the student of Old Testament times by its faithful and graphic representation of the state of things prevailing at a critical period of Jewish history; while the lover of poetry will find much to gratify him in its sounding lengths of blank verse, and in its two beautiful lyrics—one in praise of Sidon, and the other a really fine Hymn to Baal.

We lay down Mr. Bayne's book with the conviction that, with such real poetic ability as he undeniably possesses, this is not the best that he can do: that if only he would study how to lay on more of those subtle strokes of character which at once finish and reveal, and develope more of that tact, without which the best materials are ineffective, he might produce a drama worthy of a high and enduring success.

The Bennett Judgment.

Sheppard v. *Bennett: the Argument of Archibald John Stephens, Q.C., and the Judgment of the Judicial Committee, in Sheppard* v. *Bennett (Clerk).* Rivingtons, London, Oxford, Cambridge. 1872.

On the 8th of June last a judgment was delivered by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, on the Appeal of Sheppard *v.* Bennett, that had been anxiously expected by each of the great parties in the Church of England. The majority of High Churchmen on the one hand, and of Low Churchmen on the other, hoped for legal victory,

on a great and disputed question of Church doctrine, while Broad Churchmen, and those generally who regard the preservation of the Establishment as of the first importance, deprecated any decision that should be a real triumph or a real defeat to either. In the recent "Purchas Case" the issues raised were on matters of ritual, and the judgment was, so far as it went, adverse to the Ritualist party. In the case of Sheppard *v.* Bennett the controversy had advanced to the stage whither many on both sides wished it to be carried; for since the whole significance of the ritual question is to be found in its relation to doctrine, it is surely better that the doctrinal issue itself should be fairly raised, and not dealt with by inference and implication alone. Judgment was, accordingly, sought upon the doctrinal teaching of Mr. Bennett as to "the real and actual Presence of our Lord under the form of Bread and Wine, upon the Altars of our Churches." Many people, perhaps most, ventured to believe that the decision in the great ritual case would be followed by another in the same direction, but as much more emphatic as the issue was plainer and more direct. This expectation has not been realised, and the equilibrium of parties is, curiously enough, restored. The Purchas judgment placed some restraints upon a clergyman's procedure in the administration of the Lord's Supper, and consequently upon the indirect modes of teaching certain doctrine; but the Bennett judgment grants a freedom of direct teaching in the pulpit, which may well be accepted as an equivalent, and something more. As the matter now stands, the highest sacramental teaching heard in the English Church since the Reformation is declared not illegal, but the rites and ceremonies, which are the natural accompaniment and expression of that teaching, are prohibited. Their Lordships' account of the seeming inconsistency is that, "In the public or common prayers and devotional offices of the Church, all her members are expected and entitled to join; it is necessary, therefore, that such forms of worship as are prescribed by authority for general use should embody those beliefs only which are assumed to be generally held by members of the Church. In the case of Westerton *v.* Liddell (and again in Martin *v.* Mackonochie), their Lordships say, 'In the performance of the services, rites, and ceremonies ordered by the Prayer Book, the directions contained in it must be strictly observed, no omission and no addition can be allowed.' If the minister be allowed to introduce, at his own will, variations in the rites and ceremonies that seem to him to interpret the doctrine of the service in a particular direction, the service ceases to be what it was meant to be, common ground on which all Church people may meet, though they differ about some doctrines. But the Church of England has wisely left a certain latitude of opinion in matters of belief, and has not insisted on a rigorous uniformity of thought, which might reduce her communion to a narrow compass."

With the general principle here stated most people will agree: the difficulty lies in applying it to particulars. What, for instance, are the boundaries of that "latitude of opinion in matters of belief which

the Church of England so wisely leaves?" The Judicial Committee leaves those boundaries as it found them, undefined, but contents itself with declaring that Mr. Bennett has not transgressed them; after which, we imagine, it will not be very easy for any one else to do so, travelling, that is to say, in the same direction. In concluding his very learned argument, Dr. Stephens combats beforehand the application to Mr. Bennett's teaching of the elastic principle of tolerance and comprehension. He refers to the two distinct schools of thought which have existed within the Church of England, "widely divergent the one from the other, but both fairly comprised within her defined limits. These schools of thought have, at different periods in our history, been represented by Jewell and Overall; Andrewes and Tillotson; Robert Nelson and William Wilberforce; Dean Hook and the late Dean Goode. And these divergences of opinion will probably continue as long as the Church of England continues to exist. It should be distinctly understood, that with neither of these schools of religious thought does this argument in any degree interfere. The doctrine maintained by Mr. Bennett is as contrariant to the doctrine of these two schools of thought, as it is contrariant to the Formularies of the Church of England. If your Lordships affirm the doctrine of Mr. Bennett, viz.—

(1) That the *true* Body of Christ is present in the elements upon the altar;

(2) That the Priest makes a *real offering* of Christ to God in the Eucharist; and

(3) That *adoration* is due to Christ present in the consecrated bread and wine;

Then, there is no substantial distinction between the doctrine of the Church of England and the Decrees of the Council of Trent, in reference to

(1) The Real Presence;
(2) The sacrifice of Christ by the Priest; and
(3) The adoration of Christ in the elements;

Then Cranmer, Ridley, and Latimer can no longer be regarded as martyrs who suffered for the truth; and the Reformation itself becomes neither more nor less than an unjustifiable, and therefore sinful, act of schism." Each of these inferences appears to be perfectly logical, and we imagine that Mr. Bennett and his friends think so too. Much labour and learning have been spent in showing that the Articles of the English Church and the Decrees of the Council of Trent are not irreconcilable, and Dr. Stephens's way of putting this, so far from alarming the advocates of that view, would be readily accepted by them.

The judgment of the Privy Council gives Mr. Bennett at least the victory of an acquittal, tempered, however, with severe censure for "rash and ill-judged words, which are perilously near a violation of the law." It should be distinctly borne in mind, more particularly perhaps by those who are not members of the Church of England,

that in this case, as in those of Mackonochie and Purchas, the issue was not, what is erroneous, but, what is unlawful. To quote from the judgment in the Gorham case, "The question which we have to decide is, not whether the opinions are theologically sound or unsound, . . . but whether those opinions are contrary and repugnant to the doctrines which the Church of England, by its articles, formularies, and rubrics, requires to be held by its ministers." It has been repeatedly laid down that Church Courts know nothing of theological truth and falsehood as such, and are only competent to determine whether the language used by the members of the Church is or is not contradictory of the language used in the dogmatic bases of the Church. The Court is asked to decide what is or is not compatible with certain doctrinal standards; those standards are assumed to be final authorities; but what doctrines are true or untrue in themselves is quite another question, into the discussion of which no Ecclesiastical Court will allow itself to be drawn. Even in religious communities possessing compact organisation and sharply-defined theological bases, the task of determining what may or may not be fairly taught is not so easy as might be supposed; but in an ancient and historical Church, whose formularies date from different periods, and have been gradually shaped by influences of many kinds, the difficulties of such a task can hardly be overrated. We are not at all disposed to doubt either the fairness or the learning of the judges, though their decision is a great disappointment to all who care for the Protestant character of the Church of England. We have no doubt that their interpretation of the Church's formularies is correct, and that, consequently, they are right in deciding that "the language of the respondent was not so plainly repugnant to the articles and formularies as to call for judicial condemnation." But we shall watch with interest the result within the Church of England of decisions like this. Suppose it made manifest that the people are, upon the whole, Protestant, and the Church to which they belong, and which they thought was Protestant too, is, in its doctrinal standards interpreted by the highest Court, nothing of the kind,—what then? How long will it meet the difficulty to say that "such and such doctrine is not incompatible with the standards of the Church?" So soon as any very great or widespread conviction is at work, the standards themselves will inevitably be challenged. Alike in Church and State, there are times when an appeal to the law is not, and cannot be, the end of strife. The controversies of quiet times may be carried on by suits at law, and settled by legal verdicts; but when the stirring of men's minds passes certain limits, on finding the law against them, they say, "So much the worse for the law," and aim at its amendment or overthrow. It is true that willingness to accept the decisions of law is a condition ordinarily essential to the very existence of society, but an unwillingness, nay, a moral inability, to accept those decisions is now and again even more to be desired than obedience. From the comparative equanimity with which the Bennett Judgment

has been received, we gather that the ordinary resources of the law are, as yet, equal to the occasion. If, however, it should happen by and by, that any considerable number of Churchmen come to regard this doctrine of the Real Presence as nothing less than blasphemous, there will be eruption or disruption of some sort, as there has been in days past. A note or two of this kind was sounded a while ago by the leaders of the High Church party when the verdict went against them. Last year Dr. Liddon wrote, in his letter to Sir J. T. Coleridge:—"It is a serious source of weakness to our Church at this moment that we have a Supreme Court that fails to touch the conscience of a large part of the clergy." And Dr. Pusey, about the same time, wrote:—"Our forbearance is stretched more and more, till the tension may be too great. We may be driven (and God only knows how soon) to decide whether it be right and faithful to our God, '*propter vitam vivendi perdere causas*,' for the sake of an establishment which has such a fleeting life, to see *that* wrested from us which alone gives to establishments their value. May God guide you in the coming crisis, which perhaps may come ere I depart hence, though also perhaps not." The present judgment will similarly exercise the conscience of another section of the clergy, and it is this kind of strain, first in one direction and then in another, that makes the continuance of the present state of things in the Established Church somewhat precarious. So soon as either the High Church or the Low Church conscience finds the situation positively intolerable, the great doctrinal controversy will leave the Law-courts, and enter upon a much more stirring and eventful stage.

Longer English Poems. With Notes Philological and Explanatory, and an Introduction on the Teaching of English. Edited by J. W. Hales, M.A. London: Macmillan and Co. 1872.

Teachers of English will find this a suggestive and serviceable book. The poems are arranged in chronological order from Spenser to Shelley, and include a specimen or two of most of the best names between. The notes are ample and good. In connection with the increased attention now given to English literature in schools and universities, there is, we think, some danger of confounding literary history with literature itself. It is one thing for a boy to "cram" the dates when certain authors "flourished" and certain books were written, and another thing for him to acquire a real knowledge of the best writers, to be made familiar with the "volumes paramount" of his own language, and learn to appreciate and take pleasure in them. Mr. Hales's notes are particularly good in their references to parallel and kindred passages, and they will suggest to the student how he may form a kind of "liber posterum" of his own. We will give an example. In Milton's *Hymn on the Nativity* is the following stanza:—

> "Ring out, ye crystal spheres;
> Once bless our human ears
> (If ye have power to touch our senses so),
> And let your silver chime
> Move in melodious time,
> And let the bass of Heaven's deep organ blow,
> And with your ninefold harmony
> Make up full consort to th' angelic symphony."

For this "music of the spheres" the following references are given. Milton's *Arcades*, l. 62—67:—

> "Then listen I
> To the celestial Syrens' harmony,
> That sit upon the nine infolded spheres," &c.

Comus, 112—114:—

> "The starry quire,
> Who in their nightly watchful spheres
> Lead in swift round the months and years."

Two other passages from *Comus* are given, and then, *Paradise Lost*, v. 618:—

> "And in their motions harmony Divine
> So smooths her charming tones, that God's own ear
> Listens delighted."

Then follow the lines from the *Merchant of Venice*":—

> "There's not the smallest orb which thou behold'st
> But in his motion like an angel sings,
> Still quiring to the young-eyed cherubins," &c.

with other references to passages in Shakespeare.
Then come the lines from *Hudibras*:—

> "The music of the spheres,
> So loud it deafens mortal ears,
> As wise philsophers have thought,
> And that's the cause we hear it not."

The list is not yet exhausted; but this will show that these notes cannot fail to interest a student or help a teacher.

Introduction to the Study of Biology. By H. Alleyne Nicholson, M.D., D. Sc., M.A., &c., Professor of Natural History and Botany in University College, Toronto. London: Blackwood. 1872.

It requires courage and strong conviction on the part of a rising zoologist to write a book like this. It is a book destined in its own department to fashion the world for its fame, and not its fame for the world. It embraces the latest discoveries and the most philosophical inferences in biology, and yet it ventures to question the truth of popular materialistic theory. The habitual method of certain scientific and

quasi-scientific journals, is to treat with contempt every intellectual effort that runs counter to the popular philosophy. But a decided reaction is apparent, and Professor Nicholson's valuable little book is in every sense opportune. Its accuracy in all established matters the most inveterate opponent would not venture to question. Every page gives evidence of unwearying care. Without passion or prejudice, the author perceives the real bearing of his subject on human thought and action, and chooses to ignore the authority of popular speculators, and adhere only to facts. The bearing of biological questions on moral and religious thought can hardly be exaggerated. Their influence direct and indirect is important beyond measure, and the tendency of current biological *speculation* is to retard the day of the world's moral and religious liberty. Professor Nicholson's book gives a general view of vital phenomena, and is intended as a foundation for special and elaborate zoological studies. It is intended at once for the student and general reader, and we heartily commend it to both. It begins with a discussion of the difference between the vital and the non-vital, and, following out the distinctions between animals and plants, proceeds to state with exquisite clearness the principles of biological classification. The elementary chemistry of living beings, physiological function, and the laws of development follow; these being succeeded by masterly chapters on spontaneous generation, on the origin of species, and on distribution in space and time.

The chief feature of the book is its determination to treat as science only what is known, and to relegate speculation to its proper place. In dealing with the question of a physical basis of life, the author admits the universality of the proteine compound in which life inheres. "It does not appear that the phenomena of life can be manifested by any and every form of matter; and a very little reflection ought to convince us that it would be very surprising if the reverse were the case." Chemical and electrical phenomena require their own proper media for manifestation; and the very fact that there are electrical non-conductors, proves that a certain "physical basis" is required for their disclosure. Theoretically, therefore, a "matter of life" might have been safely anticipated. Still it has not been proved that the protoplasm of Huxley, the bioplasm of Beale, has an unvarying chemical composition, while other substances, as the mineral salts, are essential to life. That this proteine compound is a condition of life is consequently demanded by the fact; but that it is the cause of vitality is wholly another question. To say that life results from the combined properties of the albuminous compound, just as water results from the combined qualities of oxygen and hydrogen, is in no way warranted by the facts. That there is an intimate connection between "protoplasm" and life is all that the evidence of the case justifies us in asserting. We have no right to affirm that it is even a property of the matter in which it inheres. He who asserts that the phenomena are the result of a vital force is equally logical. Neither can do more than infer, but the more philosophical view as to the nature of the

connection between life and its material basis, is the one which regards vitality as something superadded and foreign to the matter, by which vital phenomena are manifested. And we have no more right to assume that vitality ceases to exist when its physical basis is removed, than we have to assume the non-existence of electric force because there is no conductor to display it. The simplest vital phenomenon has in it something over and above the merely chemical and physical forces which we can demonstrate in the laboratory. Digestion, for instance. Undoubtedly there is much in it that is purely chemical; but there is much more that no chemistry can explain. The amœba—a mere shapeless mass of moving sarcode—digests rapidly and constantly without a trace of organism! An organism when dead we assume to be chemically the same as the living organism, but we cannot prove it. An analysis of living protoplasm is impossible. That there is a force—an activity—in the vital form totally wanting in the invital, it is almost absurd to insist: what that something is we cannot tell—perhaps shall never know. To ignore its existence, however, would be to violate every canon of philosophy. Hence the "term vital force may be retained with advantage." The assertion that living matter differs in its chemical properties from the same matter dead, is indeed, no longer an assumption. Dr. Beale has proved that it has the power of taking up and becoming tinted by an ammoniacal solution of carmine, a property wholly wanting in the same plasm when dead. The attempt, therefore, of certain teachers to make us believe that they explain vital operations, is to be reprehended by every scientific biologist. What do we really know of the vital energy of a plant from being told that carbonic acid, water, and ammonia are by the agency of light brought into a *chemico-vital affinity* by which the components of the plant are held together and increased? Is it not transparent that the conditions of the phenomena and their cause are confounded? The chemical and calorific rays of the sun are, of course, essential to the performance of vital function in a plant; but the real difficulty is to know how the transformation is effected. How do plants convert sunlight and dead elements into vital form? To tell us in the most philosophical verbiage that they do so is not to explain it. How on the chemico-physical theory of vitality can it be explained that the protoplasm of an acorn builds itself into an oak by means of sunlight and inorganic components, and the protoplasm of an amœba—in all respects essentially the same in chemical composition and structure—has no power whatever to do so? And how are the phenomena of reproduction, whether animal or vegetable, to be interpreted or explained apart from a true vital agency? "In the present state of our knowledge . . . we must conclude that we cannot refer all the forces which we see at work in . . . an organism to known chemical or physical forces. Even those we do know act with the utmost unlikeness in the vital and the non-vital, as well as in the plant and the animal; while, if they could be proved to be wholly chemico-physical, the *process* of elaboration cannot be compared with that with which we are familiar in the laboratory."

In a chapter on the "Differences between Animals and Plants," Dr. Nicholson insists on retaining and giving its due importance to what is known, rather than removing landmarks solely at the bidding of current theory. He rejects the proposal of Haekel for the establishment of a *fourth kingdom* in nature. Because the German naturalist —essentially a "system"-maker—finds that there are enormous numbers of organisms, discoverable by means of the microscope chiefly, which are so little known to us that we are unable to decide whether they be vegetable or animal, he proposes to make a new kingdom called *protista*, relying for its characteristics on the fact that the organisms it includes are doubtful. The weakness of this proposal has been more than once pointed out by English naturalists, and Professor Nicholson wisely adopts the division into vegetable and animal, carefully pointing out the lines along which they recede from and approach each other.

The chapter on Homology is one that must be read with interest by every biologist; and the more advanced evolutionists will find in it matters which, though briefly put, deserve their attention. Herbert Spencer's attempt to explain the (evolutional) "cause" of the "lateral homology," or structural identity of parts on two sides of the body in large groups of animals, is questioned and disproved with remarkable force; and Mr. Ray Lancaster's attempt to introduce into biology new words which of necessity imply an acceptance of the theory of evolution, is shown to be unnecessary so far as the science itself is concerned, and utterly inadmissible when subjected to severe analysis.

The chapter on classification is in every sense excellent, and the question as to how species may be defined is dealt with most carefully. The Professor insists on the sterility of "hybrids," and claims that the only definition of species which science can adopt is one which implies no theory. He considers a species "an assemblage of individuals which resemble each other in their essential characters, are able, directly or indirectly, to produce fertile individuals, which do not (as far as human observation goes) give rise to individuals which vary from the general type *through more than certain definite limits.*"

The most inefficient portion of the book is that which deals with the elementary chemistry of living beings. It is accurate, but wanting in detail. "Reproduction" is most comprehensively treated, and occupies a considerable portion of the book. It is a chapter which we envy the general reader—not before acquainted with the facts—the pleasure of reading.

Spontaneous generation of course claims consideration in a treatise of this sort, and this claim is carefully and dispassionately met. The most important of Dr. Bastian's experiments—intended to establish the hypothesis of the non-vital origin of lowly vital forms—are looked at in all their bearings, and some very cogent reasons given for believing that "some fallacy lurks under the experiments." The article on the "Origin of Species" we earnestly commend to all thoughtful readers. It is not polemic. No side is taken—it would have been

unwise in such a book—but the facts and the difficulties on both sides are clearly and concisely stated, leaving the reader, unconfused by subtlety of language and illustration, to judge for himself.

"Distribution in Space" is a charming chapter; that on "Distribution in Time" of necessity fails. It is impossible to epitomise palæontology in a dozen pages. We detect throughout the book what some biologists will deem an egregious error, viz. the reiterated assertion that plants can only build up their protoplasm in sunlight. Most experimenters on lowly forms of life, with Pasteur at their head, affirm that fungi have been produced in sealed flasks placed in absolute darkness. As there is, however, much yet to be learned on this subject, it was probably wise to treat it as not proven. We heartily commend this book to the student who desires to lay a broad foundation for biological knowledge, and to the general reader who wishes to possess a more accurate acquaintance with biological facts than polemic articles in quasi-scientific periodicals will afford.

An Exposition of Fallacies in the Hypothesis of Mr. Darwin. By C. R. Bree, M.D., F.Z.S., &c. &c. Longmans, Green and Co. London. 1872.

We have read this book with remarkable interest and equal regret. Its author possesses knowledge and ability that might with immense profit have been exercised on his theme; but he has allowed inaccuracies of statement and exposition to blurr its pages which, we regret to believe, will entirely nullify its influence. The habit—not of Mr. Darwin—but of the majority of his disciples, is to jeer an opponent out of court, by a parade of such flaws as this book exhibits, pronouncing him incompetent to criticise on the score of ignorance. The most elaborate arguments and the most efficient array of facts are thus triumphantly discarded, and forbidden a hearing, because their authors have been unguarded in a few statements or inaccurate in elucidation. The object of Dr. Bree's book is one with which we entirely sympathise; its general efficiency we warmly commend; but in the interests of truth we deplore the errors on the one hand, and the declamation on the other, to which he has committed himself.

A blunder simply intolerable in an author attempting to expose the fallacies of Darwin is found on the very first page in the book. It is a diagram; and purports to present graphically the descent of man on the theory of Darwin. We reach the marsupials correctly, depicted in the diagram by a kangaroo; then we have a blank for the "implacental progenitor of placental mammals;" then follows "man's ancient ancestor, with cocked ears and tail, prehensile feet, both sexes bearded and hirsute, males with great canine teeth;" after which comes the lemur, the simiadæ, and the catarrhine or Old World monkeys! Now any careful reader of *The Descent of Man* must detect instantly the inexcusable error this involves; for Mr. Darwin's hypothetical ancestor of man is placed by him *after* the

catarrhine monkeys. On the second page Dr. Bree says that Mr. St. George Mivart has proved that natural selection "has not a basis of truth," whereas that author aimed simply at showing that natural selection was incompetent to accomplish what Mr. Darwin claimed for it. More than once our author declares that Dr. Hooker asserted, in his address to the British Association at Norwich, that "*every* philosophical naturalist" had accepted the doctrine; and pages are devoted to the contradiction of this. Whereas, in fact, the word "*almost*" was inserted by Hooker before "every," which entirely alters the phrase. Herbert Spencer is, at least on two occasions, wholly misunderstood; and in endeavouring to elucidate Darwin's views as to "mimicry," he makes it appear that the insects were supposed to have the power to change *themselves* when they discovered that protection would result from resemblance to another form.

There are many more similar mistakes: they are none of them absolutely serious save the first, and perhaps the last we have referred to; but they condemn the book; they paralyse its mission. And this is deeply to be deplored; for it abounds in brilliant reasoning and striking fact. Some trenchant arguments are employed to show the utter unlikeness existing between the physical and vital forces. The attempt to assimilate the production of an organism to the crystal building power of the inanimate world is admirably dealt with; and as a preparation for the discussion of natural selection, evolution as expounded by Herbert Spencer is elaborately examined. And here one of the characteristic blunders of the book vitiates a whole chapter of reasoning. Discussing the "Integration of Matter," as enunciated by Herbert Spencer, Dr. Bree quotes as follows:—"Every mass, from a grain of sand to a planet, radiates heat to other masses, and absorbs heat radiated by other masses; and in so far as it does the one it becomes integrated, while in so far as it does the other it becomes disintegrated." On this quotation Dr. Bree remarks: "Integration of matter, therefore, is the *absorption* of heat! And heat . . . is 'tremulous motion'—therefore, integration of matter is the absorption of motion."

In discussing embryology in relation to development, the author insists that "there is a real and significant difference in the embryo of man as compared with brutes from the earliest moment of its structural existence," and instances the position of the arches which develope on the notochord,—the neural arch or vertebral column being backward in man and upward in brutes; and the hamial arch or chest bones being forward in man and downward in brutes. Dr. Bree "rejects *in toto* the potentially endowed protoplasm, or the meteoric mass and the evolution of species," and insists with great vigour on special creations as a philosophical necessity; reminding the reader that the matter does not hinge upon whether this or that mode of origin comports best with the notions of certain philosophers, but which is supported by the greatest number of *facts*. On the question

of specific variability there are some excellent facts and clear reasonings; all proving that whatever variation in nature may do, it is utterly incompetent to effect the issues insisted on by "natural selection." An excellent chapter follows on the Causes and Amount of Variability, and the "selection" of this artificially in "breeding." He urges that no deviations in form are congenital or hereditary, and gives the foot of the Chinese women as a proof; which, although it has been cramped for thousands of years, is yet at birth as normal as an European's. Dr. Bree objects to Mr. Darwin's argument respecting mans similitude to brutes as manifested in his liability "to receive from the lower animals and to communicate to them certain diseases." The author contends that whilst hydrophobia and glanders may be communicated to man, there is no instance of the brute receiving disease from man. The slight point projecting from the inner margin of the helix of the human ear—pointed out by Woolner, and declared by Darwin to be an instance of reversion indicating our descent from a pointed eared ancestor, Dr. Bree declares to be a "myth"—he having failed wholly in discovering it. We have observed it in two instances in the same family; but in one there were *three* points and in another *two*; indicating of course by the same reasoning an ancestor whose ears had more points than one! In seeking to account for the development of language, Mr. Darwin says that the sounds uttered by birds have a close analogy to language, for all the members of the same species utter the same emotional cries; but although song-birds sing by instinct, yet the actual song is *learnt* from the parents. Dr. Bree points out that in the great majority of cases it is only during incubation that the male sings; the young, in fact, rarely hear their father's notes. Besides, the hedge sparrow or the reed warbler, who often hatch the cuckoo's eggs, can scarcely teach the young cuckoo its call note. On Instinct, Reason, and the Moral Sense there is a good chapter; and some really excellent passages and illustrations are given in the discussion of Sexual Selection. The views of each of the prominent supporters of Mr. Darwin are elaborately reviewed, and the partial surrender of Owen, and the absolute acceptance of the doctrine of evolution by Lyell, are freely considered. Then the "line of descent" marked out for man by Darwin is critically analysed, and the true relations of the several groups considered with much comprehensiveness and skill. And yet it is in the mal-arrangement of this series that the most serious error of the book is found. There are some excellent chapters on Teleology, containing beautiful proofs of design; and the book closes with an essentially orthodox chapter on "Evolution and Theology."

We have read this book with a pleasure which has greatly increased our regret that it is marred by such serious errors; and we can only hope that a second edition may be shortly called for in which their correction will be effected.

Town Geology. By the Rev. Charles Kingsley, F.L.S., F.G.S., Canon of Chester. London: Strahan and Co. 1872.

This is a very pleasant book. Canon Kingsley has never written seven more interesting chapters. They are in his most agreeable style, and on that branch of natural science which has ever been his favourite. To the student of geology we commend this as a book that will at once incite him in his labours and disclose to him the meaning of his studies; and to the general reader, unconcerned with the "record of the rocks," and even careless of science altogether, we commend it as a literary treasure—sparkling with humour, abounding with apt and beautiful illustration, evincing a thorough grasp of geological science, and presenting us with the very poetry of nature.

The object of the book is to awaken a desire in younger minds for the study of natural science. The several chapters originally took the form of lectures to the young men of Chester, and to this, perhaps, may be attributed the delightful ease which distinguishes them. They are not lessons in geology after the common fashion; but they exhibit the processes of reasoning and induction by which the scientific geologist reaches his conclusions; and the whole has special reference to the United Kingdom, thus giving the reader a most accurate and delightful view of the various causes that have operated through past epochs in bringing about the present geological phenomena of his native land.

The Preface is a vigorous essay on the importance of science as a means of education, and in his own pleasant way Mr. Kingsley shows it to be the shortest path to "freedom, equality, and brotherhood." There can be no more worthy brotherhood than that which made Hugh Miller, the Cromarty stonemason, and Michael Faraday, the bookbinder's boy, the friends and companions of the noblest and most gifted on earth. There can be no equality truer than that which science gives. It cannot be learned by paying able teachers. Whoever would be a master must teach himself; "and if the poor man is not the rich man's equal in those qualities, it must be his own fault, not his purse's. Many shops have I seen about the world in which fools could buy articles more or less helpful to them; but never saw I yet an observation shop, nor a common-sense shop either."

Canon Kingsley is a uniformitarian in geology, and begins with "The Soil of the Field," which opens up the whole question of recent deposits. "The Pebbles in the Streets" deals with boulders and glacial action. "The Stones in the Wall" furnish a delightful chapter on rock formations and fossils. "The Coals in the Fire" is the heading of a capital description of the carboniferous period. "The Lime in the Mortar" leads the way to cretaceous formations and coral reefs, and "The Slates on the Roof" acquaints us with those wonderful deposits, the Laurentian, the Cambrian, and the Silurian.

The volume is beautifully printed, tastefully bound, and dedicated to the Chester Natural History Society.

The Fairfield Orchids. A Descriptive Catalogue of the Species and Varieties grown by James Brooke and Co., Fairfield Nurseries. With Chapters upon the History, &c., of these Plants. London: Bradbury, Evans, and Co.

This little work is avowedly a trade catalogue; but it presents some advantages over the Manuals of Williams and Appleby. It is not only more picturesque in its general treatment of the subject—indeed, rather too much so in many places—but it has attached to the description of each species a reference to some published figure of the plant. It is, further, more scientific than the Manual of Williams, inasmuch as it carefully distinguishes between such orchids as appear to be distinct species and those which, though honoured with high-sounding names, are but varieties of well-known forms. Dealers discover some variety with a spot more or less than usual upon its petals; they give it a grand name, and send it out to the world at a high figure as a new species. This is not honest, and we are glad to see that Messrs. Brooke and Co. have endeavoured to avoid the error. At the same time we must complain of the insufficiency of the practical directions for the treatment of these plants. Experienced growers do not need what are given, and they are insufficient for young beginners. The book speaks too generally of the specific requirements of orchids in reference to soils, potting, &c. A good manual, giving to young florists minute directions as to the details of the treatment best adapted to each species of orchid, is yet a desideratum.

Thoughts for the Times. By the Rev. H. R. Haweis, M.A. London: H. S. King and Co.

We cannot admit that these are, in any wholesome, worthy sense, "Thoughts for the Times." Not that we are captious about the title of the book. It is, in a sense, appropriate enough, for the thoughts are, undoubtedly, the present day thoughts of some people, thoughts that we can only hope a wiser to-morrow will have left behind. Mr. Haweis, a London clergyman of considerable popularity, is one of the outriders of the Broad Church party, and his pace must, we imagine, sometimes amuse and sometimes alarm the older and quieter members of that party. He is of opinion that "we are in the midst of one of those great transition periods which came upon the world about the time of Christ, or again about the time of the Reformation," and he sees, "not without anxiety, yet with a firm faith in the future, how the old things are passing away, whilst all things are becoming new." Though "not without anxiety," as he says, Mr. Haweis is yet very

cheerful amidst crumbling creeds and the general falling to pieces of old beliefs, and addresses himself with a light heart to the task of re-stating the great questions concerning God and man. Seeing that "our popular theology gives us (we are sorry for the language we have to quote, but it will show the author's complete emancipation from the conventional) a patch-work God, an artificial Christ, and a scheme of redemption irreconcilable with any intelligent theory of either God or Christ," it is time that all this should be set to rights. We want to know, "not what the clergy can twist out of the Bible about God—not what they have voted God to be in seminaries, text-books, and Church Councils—but what *is* God." Fortunately Mr. Haweis is equal to this and much more. With the help of Mr. Matthew Arnold, he guides us to the infinitely cheering conclusion that God is, in relation to physical law, "a stream of tendency;" in relation to moral law, "a Power that makes for righteousness;" and, to complete the definition, there is the "sympathetic element in God," which he ventures to call "His minor personality." Perhaps we do not feel much nearer to the central meaning of things than before, and have some lingering preference for the old dogmas on which Mr. Haweis is so very severe, preferring them, it may be, in our miserable blindness, to the new ones, although they do date from the dark times before "Mr. Arnold had pointed out a sure basis for a definition of God." Well, he tries again, and surely we must be hard to please if he cannot help us this time, for, turning his back on Church Councils and the like, he will re-state the doctrines of the Trinity and original sin in a pleasant, offhand manner, showing how "new life may be poured into the Articles by the rational method of treating them." He first of all takes the Prayer-book, and reads Article No. I., "Of Faith in the Holy Trinity," making this humorous little comment upon it: "There was, no doubt, some powerful meaning intended by the framers of this Article, which to them did not seem opposed to common sense. But they have not, as far as I can see, been fortunate in their attempt to hand that meaning down to us." Mr. Haweis believes it is possible so to re-state the doctrine of the Trinity as to clear away the difficulties which in its usual form it presents to the human understanding in the nineteenth century. "And," says he, "I will try to do it." As for the first great difficulty, the conception of three in one, there is nothing surely in that; "you, as you live, and move, and have your being, you are a Trinity in Unity," that is, body, soul, and spirit, and "when you once grasp the central principle of variety in unity, when you survey the vast array of facts in the known universe—facts in the animal kingdom, facts in the life of communities, facts involved in the very constitution of the human creature, body, mind, and spirit—I say the doctrine of God's Trinity in Unity presents no difficulties at all." Nor is there any difficulty further on, if you will only throw the antiquated formularies on one side and follow the author. "Our first idea of God is that of a vast, co-ordinating, perhaps impersonal, force . . . we mean that unknown something which was the original inspirational ground of

being. Well, let us suppose that to be our first rough notion of God—God, in the widest sense, the Father." Next, "man seeks God, and feels that He is not far off, but near; and in that moment when this impulse, intuition, consciousness, call it what you will, is upon him, what happens? Why, "you conceive God under the limitation of humanity. And thus God comes before you under a secondary aspect, cast in the form and found in the fashion of a man. If we had no historical Christ at all . . . we should be obliged to make a Christ, because our mind incarnates God in the form of Christ irresistibly and inevitably. And such a Christ, whether ideal or historical, will be God the Son." But how shall you get refreshment from the presence of God? "By an effluence, like that of radiance from flame, by the Spirit that comes forth from the Father and the Son—an effluence going into the soul, just as my thought pierces your brain, just as the feeling of human tenderness pierces your heart, subdues you, encircles you, melts you. So His radiant Spirit-effluence subdues, and pierces, and melts. And that is the Holy Ghost." We are lost in curious speculation respecting the order of mind that can be satisfied with such poverty-stricken extemporising as this. Once more it is the offer of "new lamps in exchange for old ones;" but it must be a dark-lantern indeed that one would barter for such means of illumination. We do not know how to state precisely the relative proportions of candour and conceit shown in these discourses. Perhaps the best way of putting it is, that the conceit is very candid, and the candour very conceited. Witness the following passage from a discourse "On the Character of Christianity:"—"What are we to think of Jesus Christ's miracles? Well, they are simply questions of historical evidence. You know a great many educated men think that the miracles were no miracles at all; that they either never took place at all, or that they did not take place as they are reported to have taken place; in fact, a great many thoughtful persons in their hearts accept the moral teaching of Christ, but reject the miracles. These people probably call themselves Unitarians, or are favoured by some other appropriate nickname by their friends. I confess, my brethren, I once thought that there was a great deal to be said for this view of the question; but I will not disguise from you the fact that as I have grown more mature, and weighed a greater number of facts, I am far from being of opinion that this view about the miracles of Jesus Christ is the correct view, viz. that they never happened at all." In taking leave of Mr. Haweis, we may express the friendly wish that before we meet him again as a religious teacher, he may have grown even "more mature," and weighed a still "greater number of facts," and, amongst other things, may have ceased to believe that a willingness to consider everything an open question is the best characteristic of a religious mind.

Septimius: a Romance. By Nathaniel Hawthorne. London: Henry S. King and Co. 1872.

THERE is something pathetic in the fact that Hawthorne's last work, a story left unfinished at his death, is a romance of Immortality. Septimius is a young New Englander, a student, supposed to be preparing for the ministry, but loosing from his belief and drifting nowhere precisely, until he is grasped in a strange manner by the metaphysical problems of man's being. His thought and imagination settle morbidly upon the mystery of death, which vexes him as an anomaly, an abrupt, inconsequent ending of things for man, to which he cannot reconcile himself. Future life does not redress the problem: indefinite prolongation of this life is what he wants, and aims at having, by means that come to him in vague, shadowy suggestions, and glimmer just beyond his horizon, refusing to reveal themselves more clearly. He quarrels with Providence, and resents life on its present terms. "I doubt, if it had been left to my choice, whether I would have taken existence on such terms; so much trouble of preparation to live, and then no life at all; a ponderous beginning, and nothing more. . . . How is this rich world thrown away upon us, because we live in it such a moment! What mortal work has ever been done since the world began? because we have no time. No lesson is taught. We are snatched away from our study before we have learned the alphabet, as the world now exists. I confess it to you frankly, my dear pastor and instructor, it seems to me all a failure, because we do not live long enough." Those who are acquainted with Hawthorne's peculiar power will be prepared for his weird and subtle portraiture of this passionate dreamer. The instinct of an undying principle within us is exhibited, making the profound mistake of interpreting itself into a promise, not of spiritual immortality, but of "the life that now is" drawn out for ever. At times we detect a trace of wistfulness, a sigh of regret coming as it were through the fantastic argument that Septimius is ever building up, but, for the most part, the reproof and antidote closely underly it, conveyed in scarce distinguishable irony, or even in humour that lets a half-sad smile break upon its face at last. The rules for long life which Septimius deciphers from an old manuscript are of this latter sort.

"Do some decent degree of good and kindness in thy daily life, for the result is a slight pleasurable sense that will seem to warm and delectate thee with felicitous self-laudation; and all that brings thy thoughts to thyself tends to invigorate that central principle by the growth of which thou art to give thyself indefinite life. . . . From sick people, maimed wretches, afflicted people—all of whom show themselves at variance with things as they should be—from people beyond their wits, from people in a melancholic mood, from people in extravagant joy, from teething children, from dead corpses, turn away thine eyes and depart elsewhere.

". . . Say thy prayers at bed-time, if thou deemest it will give

thee quieter sleep; yet let it not trouble thee if thou forgettest them." The story hovers for a long time on the borders of the supernatural, and we are led to think that the elixir of life which Septimius has all but discovered will yield itself to him at last, though at some price that shall defeat his hopes. But on the threshold of the marvellous, and with a fine glamour enveloping the narrative, the supernatural element disappears, and the cold, pure, shining liquid, distilled in mystic fashion from many a rare plant, is no water of life, but a deadly poison, which Sybil Dacy drinks and dies, leaving Septimius crushed and bewildered by the failure of his dream. We have said that this story was left unfinished. The reader will find Hawthorne's memoranda of alterations and details to be worked out enclosed in brackets. In the middle of the story the lady with whom Septimius is in love becomes his half-sister. In an ordinary tale such a change would greatly disconcert the course of things, but it does not much matter here. The interest centres in Septimius and his day dream, to which the author's rare subtleness of intellect and charm of style give an interest that makes the imperfections of the narrative of very little moment.

The Wesley Tune Book. Revised and Edited by Henry Miles, Mus. Doc. London: Novello, Ewer and Co. Manchester: Thos. J. Day.

This is one of the best collections of hymn-tunes we have seen, and for the special object aimed at, beyond doubt the very best. The tunes have been selected with reference to the *Wesleyan Hymn Book* and the requirements of Methodist worship, with a more satisfactory result than has been attained before. We find the traditions of the past represented by the best tunes of the old masters, and by a few which, although rigorous theory would have excluded them, must be considered as having earned their right to honourable recognition. It is impossible for the most devoted admirer of old ways to ignore the recent additions to our resources in the way of psalmody; but, on the other hand, it is to be hoped that organists and choir masters will not merely follow the latest fashion of the hour, to the disparagement and neglect of the wealth of psalmody that has been growing for centuries. The compilers of the *Wesley Tune Book* appear to us to have dealt wisely in this matter, and the congregation that fairly uses it will not be adopting the music of a school or sect, but of the best composers ancient and modern. Special attention has been given to the "peculiar metres," of which there are so many in the *Wesleyan Hymn Book*,—hymns that rank high for devotional and poetic merit, but seldom sung in public for want of suitable tunes. For these Dr. Hiles and Dr. Gauntlett have written several new tunes, which we commend to the notice of musical amateurs. Our only misgiving is lest they be too good,—in the sense at least of requiring a general standard of musical taste and intelligence not to be found,

we fear, in many congregations. Dr. Hiles has done his work as editor with his usual accuracy and elegance. We should have noticed this *Tune Book* on its appearance, six months ago: by our delay in doing so we are enabled to add that a second edition has been already called for.

Hermann Agha: an Eastern Narrative. By W. Gifford Palgrave, Author of "Travels in Central Arabia," &c. Two Volumes. London: Henry S. King and Co. 1872.

This is a pure and beautiful story, told with much skill and equal tact and delicacy. It is chaste in conception, in style, and in diction. Its descriptions are simple; its adornments elegant. The story has the great charm of translating us from the drear and exhausted region of ordinary fictional writing to the freshness and novelty of the East. The difficult task of casting Eastern modes of thought and life into our Western moulds is well executed. We have a vivid and accurate, if limited, picture of the conditions of Arab life; enriched with the sparkle of many an Arab proverb. It is singularly free from exaggeration in either plot or sentiment. So long as fiction is used to adorn fact, this "Eastern Narrative" will deserve a place amongst the better examples of that class of writing.

Western India, before and during the Mutiny: Pictures drawn from Life. By Major-General Sir George Le Grand Jacob, K.C.S.I., C.B., late Special Political Commissioner, Southern Mahratta Country, &c. London: Henry S. King & Co. 1871.

Brief, sketchy records of an eventful period of India's history; giving an insight into peculiar customs, and Native and European intrigues. A growl of complaining against authorities is not entirely suppressed; paths of reform are indicated; and a few thrilling scenes fairly depicted.

A Voice from the Back Pews to the Pulpit and Front Seats, in answer to "What think ye of Christ?" By a Back Pewman. London: Longmans. 1872.

A coarse ill-conditioned attack on Christian doctrine. The writer makes great parade of straightforwardness and simplicity, but is evidently self-sufficient enough. He caricatures with a free hand the doctrines he rejects, and shrinks from nothing in the way of irreverent language. "The Creed doctrine of the Atonement makes Christ a beast, or a substitute for a beast." It is not pleasant to linger over this book, nor would it be profitable to reply to it. We trust this short notice will not retard by a day the oblivion that awaits it.

The Moabite Stone: the Substance of Two Lectures. By W. Pakenham Walsh, A.M. Fifth Edition. Dublin: G. Herbert. London: Hamilton and Co. 1872.

Mr. Walsh gives, in pleasant readable form, an account of the discovery of the stone, and all the information respecting it that is yet obtained. The illustrations include a reduced *fac-simile* engraving of the stone itself, and full-size copies of parts of the inscription, from which the reader will understand the character of the Moabite letters, and their relation to the chief alphabets with which we are acquainted. The rapid sale of this very cheap and admirable little book shows the interest that the subject has excited, and should encourage those who aim at giving to the general public the best results of Biblical learning and research.

The Haunted Crust, and other Stories. By Katherine Saunders. Two Vols. London: Strahan and Co.

The story whose somewhat affected name gives the title to these volumes is but a poor one. Far-off suggestions of Dickens and of George MacDonald come to us as we read. The humour seems to us a little forced, and the religious tone, if not characteristic of a school, to be that which has been made popular by a well-known writer or two, and which, to our mind, is not very much better than the "goody" talk in the little books about "Tommy and Harry" that are now so out of date. The second volume, however, contains the far more powerful story, "Gideon's Rock," which was published as the Christmas number of *Good Words* a year or two ago, and was a deserved success.