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INFORMATION FOR AUTHORS

The editors welcome contributions from authors outside the Faculty of Theology and Religious Studies at King's College. They should not exceed 5000 words in length, and should be of wide general interest in any areas of theological and religious studies. Articles should be clearly typed, double spaced and using one side of the paper only. Footnotes, which should be kept to a minimum, should be numbered in the text and listed at the end of the article. No payment is made for unsolicited articles, but authors will receive a number of copies of the number of the *King's Theological Review* containing their work.

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"PRAISE YE THE LORD! — THE LORD'S NAME BE PRAISED"

SERMON preached by The Most Reverend and Rt. Hon. Robert Runcie, Visitor to the College, at the 150th Anniversary Service held on Tuesday 17th November 1981.

Archbishop Howley presided over an opening ceremony for the Chapel in 1831. It lasted for four hours. One hundred and fifty years later, we have at least trained Archbishops in the art of brevity.

The Chapel, like King's itself, began its life at a time of fierce religious controversy. This college was conceived as an Anglican bastion and in the beginning Chapel services were compulsory. "Now", commented one Church journal with satisfaction, "there will be neither motive nor excuse for any parent to inflict upon his offspring the disgrace of education in the infidel and godless college in Gower Street." Indeed the religious tone of the early King's was so pronounced that one noble lord described it as "an institution for training Jesuits". He was thereupon challenged to a duel by the Duke of Wellington – the only duel the Iron Duke ever fought was for the reputation of this college.

A hundred and fifty years later, perhaps, controversy does not rage so fiercely, but there are still those who wonder whether a chapel really belongs in a place of science and learning, at the very heart of a university. I want to suggest that if we aspire at King's to educate the whole man then we botch the job by not paying attention to the development of the human faculty for worship.

That may seem a curious way of putting it. Worship is commonly understood as a somewhat peripheral activity for those who have a taste for well-choreographed togetherness. Many would also say that this is very much a minority taste at the moment, but I want to suggest two propositions about worship which I hope will make my meaning clear. First, everyone without exception is a worshipper. Second, whatever you worship inevitably marks you.

Modern people do not differ from Jacob in the story from Genesis, read as our First Lesson, in having a faculty for worship. Men and women are natural worshippers. Everyone is engaged in worship every day because human beings have so evolved that they constantly look beyond themselves to refer what they are and what they are doing to something or someone they regard as fearsome or attractive.

Whether we are aware of it or not, we are engaged in worship every day of our lives. But of course the gods people worship vary very much indeed. The most popular gods are abstract: they are dreams like Success; Security; Power; Wealth. They are abstract, but not impotent. They exert a powerful influence on how we behave, how we choose our friends, whom we invite to dinner, how we spend our money.

Sometimes, of course, the gods are other human beings. I once taught at a school at which some of the pupils were Americans. One of the girls worshipped a Puerto Rican wrestler named Bruno, who operated in Boston. We were both being driven rather dangerously through some country lanes and I remember her sitting on the back seat of the car shouting: "I'll die for Bruno, but I don't want to die for anyone else".

So in a university the question of the search for and the discovery of a worthy object of worship should be on the agenda. I believe that this chapel keeps that question alive and also provides a place where we can experience the Christian answer, which is that we worship the Father, as we see him in Jesus Christ, "for in Him the fullness of God was pleased to dwell". The Father is our point of reference for all that we do and for all that we are becoming.

Granted that worship is inescapable, it is clearly of very great importance for us to ask the question, "What am I worshipping? What is my dominant point of reference?" This becomes even more significant if you accept my second proposition about worship.

First, everyone is engaged in it whether they know it or not. Second, whatever you worship puts its mark on you. You cannot help giving away, often unconsciously, to others the name of the god you worship. This is because the dominant influence on your life, whatever it is, is going to leave a mark on you. This is true, not only of our behaviour, but also of our very faces. We have all registered the serence beauty of the faces of those who have devoted themselves to the worship of the God and Father of Our Lord Jesus Christ – perhaps the face of some nun comes to mind. We have all also noticed the strained and avid faces of those who really worship money or power, whatever formal religious allegiance they may profess. The truth is that, after the age of forty, we are in large measure responsible for our faces.

I believe that in trying to understand history you neglect this truth that man is a natural worshipper at your peril. We are used to looking at history as being governed by political and military events, or by economic factors, but the operation of the innate faculty for worship also has to be taken into account. One of the great themes in the history of human societies has been the search for someone or something worthy of worship. In default of a worthy vision, the faculty for worship which is in all of us and will express itself, come what may, will attach itself to an unworthy or even a dangerous vision. Who could fail to see in the Jonestown tragedy that the faculty for worship had been tragically misdirected? Who could fail to see in our own societies that the worship of money beyond all reasonable need or sense has distorted our social relations?

If we are all engaged in worship, and if the god we worship marks us profoundly, then our search for a worthy vision to inspire our worship should be urgent and strenuous. Any society or institution which fails to take this question seriously is in deadly peril. We give thanks that this chapel has been a focus for worship in this college for one hundred and fifty years and we pray that the education offered here will always be marked by the realism that, just as man the thinker and man the athlete need education, so, if we are to avoid living at a dangerously unconscious level, man the worshipper needs education too. The Christian worship here provides one way, which I believe to be the most profound and convincing, but which should at least be definite and vivid enough to help others in their search by allowing them to grow by defining their dissent from it.

"Praise ye the Lord! – The Lord's name be praised."

A PIT DIGGED FOR OTHER: PERILS IN MORAL AND SOCIAL THEOLOGY

G. R. DUNSTAN

I

On Tuesday, 14 November 1967 I had the honour to deliver in this College an Inaugural Lecture in the newly-established Chair of Moral and Social Theology, entitled *A Digger Still.*(1) Our then colleague, and still dear friend, Professor E.L. Mascall, put it about (though with no claim to infallibility in the matter) that my theme might be the production of spiritous liquor in Australia. He might well have been right, for nowhere had I seen, or have I yet seen, a definitive description of the scope of my subject. The *Daily Mail,* in reporting my appointment, located my professional interest in what has since brought fame to page three of *The Sun.* All I had was a verbal invitation from the then Dean, S.H. Evans – ratified, of course, by the formal procedures of the College and University – to come and pursue at King's what I was attempting already in Church House, Westminster: that is, developing (I suppose) a method in moral reasoning which set a theologian or two and a philosopher or two to work within a small company of specialists in medical science, or law, or professional or public life, to search out together the points of moral claim, of ethical interest, in various areas of practice, and then to postulate how those claims should be met. In that work I had had as colleagues Professor Ian Ramsey, later Bishop of Durham, Dr John Habgood who was to succeed Ramsey at Durham, Professor R.M. Hare and Professor Basil Mitchell. By the time I wrote my Inaugural Lecture I ventured to define for myself the intention of the College in these words: "To establish in a modern University, where a distinguished Faculty of Theology is already integrated with the life of other Faculties, and in the capital city where every activity of modern life is represented, a point of serious academic encounter between theology and other disciplines." I knew that my base, my only academic offering to this encounter, had to be theology. Yet, standing here as I did in a company of such distinguished theologians, I followed F.D. Maurice, who said he could not give himself "the grand title of a theologian", but was "*only a digger*": I was a digger still.

Now, fifteen years later, I emerge from my hole, my pit. It is "a pit digged for other". It is not indeed, as the Psalmist's was, a snare or mantrap into which, by the just judgment of Providence, I have fallen myself – though if a man digs deeply enough he must expect a tumble or two as he climbs in or out. The pit is digged for my successor, whom I am happy to welcome as a former colleague here in King's College, The Reverend Mr Keith Ward, of Trinity Hall, Cambridge. And the purpose of the pit becomes clear when we add Maurice's own gloss upon his being a digger, quoted in the newly-published Autobiography of J.M. Ludlow: "I am not a builder" (he said, more than once), "*but one who uncovers foundations for building on.*"(2) It was the intention, I suppose, of those who so kindly conspired against me to promote this lecture, that I should examine those foundations to see what they will now bear – muddied though they may be, sometimes, when the water-table is high.

II

My sub-title speaks of Perils in Moral and Social Theology. Some, of course, are peculiar to any of us who is marked out for martydom. Not all sitters in this Chair will be lucky enough, as I was, to be invited to Rome regularly over several years, to attend the Pontifical Commission which drafted the *Lex Ecclesiae Fundamentalis* for the Revised Code of Canon Law; or unlucky enough, in consequence, to have his Anglican blood shed on the flagstones once trodden by the Holy Inquisition, now by the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. But any may experience what is even more painful – exposure to television programmes or journalistic interrogation for which, through cast or habit of mind or lack of experience, he may be totally unsuited. The risk is high because his business is with contemporary moral issues of practical importance; and he cannot escape the fact of popular interest in them. Even if, recognizing his limitations, he keeps his distance from the TV studio and the portable tape-recorder, scarcely a week will pass without a young woman, "researching" (as she calls it) a TV programme, invading his peace by telephone to pick his brains upon some medical or other matter which she might be expected to read up for herself. And from the give-away newspapers for medical readers come callers for instant comment on events inadequately narrated or on reports not yet read. The practices raise serious questions about the right use, or exploitation, of academic time, and the proper responsibility of an academic to help in the forming of public opinion. His obligation he may recognize; but he cannot be indifferent to the fact that the programme is already biassed by the pre-selected questions put to him, and to the possibility that his replies may be distorted in an editorial process over which he has no control. Without confidence in the interrogator, he maintains his reserve. Happily we have colleagues in King's who can use the wireless and TV well.

In theory the moralist should welcome the public discussion of moral and social issues on which he works hard to form his own mind; in fact he may, in the evening retreat, either (having scanned the *Radio Times*) switch over in escape to music, or, if he resists that, submit himself to the provocation of tongues. He has to work hard, I say; for his first duty, when working at the ethics of a practice, is to master the relevant facts. ("If we ignore facts", F.D. Maurice wrote, "we change substances for supposition"; and R.M. Hare has written, more recently, of their place in moral thinking(3)). And facts change with demanding rapidity, especially in medical practice. It is never safe to use a lecture or paper again a few months later. In the issues of ethics and social policy attending the remedies for renal failure, for instance, techniques change in dialysis and transplant surgery, and with them the inter-relation of the two processes and the norms of selection for them; new immuno-suppressive drugs are synthesized, altering the balance of risk and benefit, as well as the requirements for matching and hysto-compatibility. The ethics of conception, gestation, fetal diagnosis, abortion, and the remedying of congenital disorders, are constantly called into question by rapid advances in the genetic sciences, in embryology and in the techniques of exploration and intervention. Judicial decisions and judgments in the Court of Appeal or the House of Lords determine the legal aspects of matters under discussion. In short, every encounter with a medical audience or with medical participants requires the revision

of old interim positions, and each revision based on a search of the journals or the literature of the subject. There is no comfortable reliance on past work from year to year.

It is hard for him, therefore, unless he is a saint (and the University does not appoint us for our sanctity) to endure the generalities of popular debate when so many of the refinements on which ethical analysis turns are obscured. The jargon corrupts our language with gratuitous suffixes and verbal jerry-building; transplantation and transportation; proportionality and confidentiality; hospitalization, institutionalization – and now communitization; decision-making, parameter and cohabitee; and, of course, the word which is dropped in anywhere as a substitute for any other, no matter what – situation.

Worse than this – even worse – is to hear the discussion imprisoned from the start in dubious, inappropriate or misleading categories. It is now common for any aspiration, legitimate or extravagant, and any disputable claim, to be advanced in the language of *rights.* I have come to suspect this language. I observe that the common law of England was concerned with liberties centuries before we imported the political notion of rights. Today, in popular debate, it appears to be enough to prefix the words "the right to" to any notion, verb or substantive, to imprint on it an indefeasible, indisputable claim, subjectively interpreted. So the euthanasia lobby progagates a "right to die" as a euphemism for a liberty to commit suicide (also miscalled a right) or for a claim upon someone else to commit murder. Abortion is popularly assuming the status of a right. Pressure groups for the humane treatment of animals think it necessary to invest animals with "rights", when they could articulate all their moral assertions more clearly, and more convincingly, in the language of duty: as a man I have a duty to protect animals from unnecessary suffering, whether or not they have rights. The inflation of the so-called rights of parents has complicated increasingly the ethics of paediatric care, especially of the handicapped new-born; though happily the judgment in the Court of Appeal in August 1981, in the wardship proceedings *re B,* the Hammersmith child Alexandra,[4] restated the interest of the child in such cases, against which parental wishes may not prevail. Parents have no property in a child, and, I suspect, few or no rights either. They have *duties* towards their children, including a duty to secure such medical care – and formal education – as will protect and enhance the child's interests. It seems to me – though subject heavily to correction, – that it is the proper function of the law, when the law is invoked, to protect parents in the exercise of that duty when willing, to encourage and assist them in it when not very willing or not very competent, and to relieve them of it, in the interest of the child, when they are clearly recusant, negligent or incapable. It seems to me that in language of this sort we can make sufficient moral assertions about the responsibilities of parents for their children without resort to the language of rights.

Meanwhile pressure grows to invest the unborn child with rights, including a right to be born without defect. So "wrongful life" suits are brought by children born handicapped, actions for damages against their parents for letting them be born. Fortunately the first attempt in this country was rebuffed by the Court of Appeal on 20 February 1982 [5]; but in the U.S.A. the "right" is vigorously asserted.

The language of rights, I suggested, is political language, not the normal or most natural language of morality or of the English concept of law. Political language is invading the discussion of medicine, conspicuously the discussion of mental illness and psychiatry. On the surface it appears to be a squabble about labelling, about authority to place patients into categories – a squabble in which the fact that mentally ill people actually suffer seems often to be overlooked. Beneath is a real conflict, as the debates on our own new Mental Health Bill demonstrate. The final question is whether, for fear of infringing the "rights" (or, as I would say, the liberty) of subjects, and for fear of increasing the power of institutions, political or professional, over individuals, good medical practice may be inhibited in ways from which both the patient and, in consequence, society itself, may suffer. The debate has been polarized harmfully in the U.S.A. where, on the one hand, individuals uncertain of their own innate capacities for living a reasonably contented life have invested their chosen psychiatrists with almost godlike authority over their thoughts, feelings and decisions; and, on the other hand, Szasz and his fellow-libertarians have driven to its extreme the right of anyone not to be treated or detained for psychiatric treatment without consent. My own hope is that whose who are pressing the libertarian view in the process of enacting a new Mental Health Bill for this country will consider very carefully some weighty medical, legal and philosophical reflections on that controversy in recent American literature. I refer particularly to papers edited by Spicker, Healy and Tristram Engelhardt in *The Law-Medicine Relation: A Philosophical Exploration* (1981)[6], and to another collection edited by Bloch and Chodoff entitled *Psychiatric Ethics* (1981)[7].

My own generalizations, influenced particularly by the first of these books, hardly reflect the gravity of my concern lest medical ethics in this country also should become dominated by political labelling and threats of litigation. It is not, I believe, unfair to say that in present-day American medical circles, the word "ethical" means that which would give a doctor a good defence to an action for malpractice in a court of law; "unethical" means that which would cost him or his insurers heavy damages. The fever is inflamed, to the advantage of lawyers who engage in it, by the "contingency fee" system. The cost to doctors in insurance premiums, and therefore to the provision or purchase of health care, is enormous. Here we have not in this College, or at King's College Hospital, an "Associate Professor of Pharmacology (Law)", or an "Assistant Professor of Paediatrics (Law)" or a "Professor of Obstectrics (Law)", as an equivalent American institution would now have. Instead we have a Centre of Law, Medicine and Ethics, in which three or four benign gentlemen (I hope), teachers, combine together to mount courses of lectures and other teaching and – when we can get a bit of money – to promote research. We have, in the University of London, that remarkable institution, now twenty years old, the London Medical Group – copied now in almost all the Medical Schools of Britain – where the discussion of medical ethics is promoted by and among the doctors, medical students and nurses themselves, with the invited participation of others with a contributory view – lawyers, philosophers, theologians and patients. It publishes an established *Journal of Medical Ethics*: it sponsors ethical research. The aim throughout is good medical practice, not the avoidance of litigation. The ethics must be practice-based; and the moralist who would take part in the exercise

must be continually sensitive to it. For myself, if I may speak personally on this occasion, I am indebted to those medical people who have kept me immersed in the tides of practice over these years – in the Medical Schools, the Royal Colleges, the Royal Society of Medicine, the Ciba Foundation, the Councils of St Christopher's Hospice and Trinity Hospice, and, more recently, in Research Ethics Committees. Without these, I might have read more books, and even written one or two; but I could not have fulfilled the duties of this particular Chair of Moral and Social Theology.

The work is not, indeed, entirely without literary monument. *A Dictionary of Medical Ethics*[8], now in its second edition, was partly edited here, though the two distinguished medical editors were from outside, one from the Royal Post-Graduate Medical School, the other from the University of Edinburgh. And for five years, once a term, three members of this College have been pursuing the similarities and differences in the Hippocratic, Jewish and Christian traditions of medicine, in a group containing the Chief Rabbi, a Catholic moralist, and doctors and medical scientists standing in those three traditions. The result, a book entitled *Consent in Medical Practice,* will be published by King Edward's Hospital Fund for London, in 1983.

III

I have rambled, rather, over medical issues because the College Centre of Law, Medicine and Ethics is joint host with the Faculty of Theology for this Lecture. Yet there are other things to do, other perils to undergo. The moralist is liable to be drawn into the affairs of Church and State: of the Church, to help to form the Christian conscience on this problem or that; of the State, to help administer or improve a service provided under Statute, or to work out the basis for a new Statute, or to discuss with Ministers and Civil Servants such national issues as Arms Control and Deterrence. In both sorts of company he is at risk: in the Church from the representative amateur, and from the Church House bureaucrat who fears lest the Church "say the wrong thing", or "not be heard to speak", even though it is uncertain what it should say; in the State from the formidable expertise which civil servants bring to their tasks, before which the moralist, with his few working principles and jumbled impressions, sits astonied. The ecclesiastical dread of academic theologians or of experts in anything was voiced by the late Cardinal Heenan in the Second Vatican Council, during the preparation of the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World: *Timeo expertos* (he said, or, according to another recension, for oral tradition is variable) *Timeo peritos et annexa ferentes.* ("I dread the experts, even with appendices in hand")[9].

Between Church and State lie a wide range of citizen activites, pressure groups, councils and committees for the promotion of good causes or the suppression of bad ones. Perils for the moralist abound, for the avoidance of which he may insulate himself in a lofy indifference to them all.

Some measure the objective morality of their cause with the intensity of their moral feelings about it, and cannot tolerate indifference or dissent. Some, moved by Christian conviction, insist that there must be a specifically *Christian* solution to every human problem, and cannot understand when a Christian morlaist cannot instantly agree. There is of course a specifically Christian solution to the problem of the Falkland Islands. But the possibility of its adoption rests upon the hypothesis of prior acceptance by all parties of the total content of the Gospel, and a total and successful commitment to the Resurrection life. How difficult it was even for the earliest Christians, for whom Jesus, Calvary, the Resurrection and Pentecost were a recent and compelling experience, we may learn from the New Testament. The hypothesis is unrealizable in the world which it is a political responsibility to govern. To assume that there is a specific Christian prescription for ills created by a wholly different organization of the world and of life is to mistake the nature of Christianity and of politics, to the detriment of both. Once we have moved from a Resurrection *koinonia*, of which the animation is fellowship, to political organization, in which control is ultimately exercised by power, we move also from the language of Christian morality into that of political morality – a move back, if you will, from the spontaneous mutuality of a close-knit body to the moral reasoning of the natural man; from mutual self-giving in love to mutual and self protection in terms, at best, of an enforced distributive justice. If the two moralities *are* brought together, that conjuction is in and through the character of Christian men who find their vocation in politics, or law, or the profession of arms, or in those other civil occupations by which the fabric of an ordered world is sustained. There is no Christian reason for going to war, nor a Christian way of waging war; yet it may be right to go to war. (On determining whether we are right or not in being now at war, I spoke in the College on the first day of Term. The subject would make a lecture in itself.)

The peril, then, is of being trapped by a Christian vocabulary in uses for which it is not appropriate. It may be the word of Jesus in the Gospel; it may be the slogans of theology – "the two kingdoms", "justification by faith"; "eschatology" in various forms; a "theology of hope" or of "despair"; "liberation theology". The words, the imperatives, *may* have their place at some stage in the argument; but seldom can we *begin* from them.

If one is sometimes embarrassed by the Christian embrace in matters moral, so one is also by those who, at the first offence to moral susceptibility, seek to invoke the law: "there ought to be a law against it." In 1960 the then Archbishop of Canterbury wanted Artificial Insemination by Donor made into a statutory crime. I subscribed to a less prohibitive but still not encouraging position.[10] I would not sign the same memorandum of evidence today.

In the intervening decades I have analysed the problems more freely than I could then. But now the same demand, to legislate, is raised about the new and consequent developments in assisted fertility: *in vitro* fertilization, embryo transfer, sperm banks, surrogate motherhood, do-it-yourself kits for lesbians and spinsters – and experiments on fertilized ova to advance such studies and practices as immunology and gene therapy. It is easy to imagine abuse – rows of little Hitlers (or – why not? – of little Dunstans) cloned; it is easy to predict, more realistically, commercial exploitation: the business is well advanced in the U.S.A. Should we not guard against these abuses by legislating in advance, now? That is the proposal.

There was a short period in our history when we resorted to penal statutes to uphold our moral repudation of what were self-evident wrongs. It was at its height, I suppose, between Lord Ellenborough's Abortion Act of

1803 and the Contagious Diseases Acts of the late 1860s, or perhaps later. It was a response to a new wave of evangelical and humanist moralism which had awakened to the fact that with the decay of the ecclesiastical courts, moral offences, formerly punishable under the canon law, now went unpunished. The 1803 Act implied as much in the Preamble. Since then a partial reading of Mill on Liberty – partial because we have accepted all his restrictive judgments on the ambit of the criminal law while forgetting his reliance on a vigorously moral public opinion – we have rubbed quite a number of those offences out of the statute book. The purpose of a statute which creates an offence and assigns to it a penalty is to remedy an evident ill: we have, alas, no preambles of the old sort to our statutes now to tell us so; but that, I believe, is what their purpose is. The ill must be serious and general enough – particularly heinous if a very minority interest is affected – to warrant the mischief which such a statute must entail: the problems of enforcement, and a further, if necessary, restriction of liberty. The necessity of such a law must be demonstrated on consequential grounds: what evil is the action, if not forbidden, likely to entail? Clearly the interest most at risk in these experimental modes of conception is that of the children to be born from them. The risks of deformity can be estimated from teratology studies of comparable techniques with animals. Probably the law of tort is strong enough, with the threat of civil action, to restrain the impetuous practitioner. The risks of emotional damage from bartered or unsuitable motherhood are less predictable or preventable. But the difficulty would be to demonstrate that they are sufficiently worse than those of normal parenthood, within or without wedlock, to justify the creation of an offence. It may be that cognisance of these matters were better left to professional regulation, under codes of practice drawn and upheld by the respective Royal Colleges.

There remains the question of commercial exploitation. To this my approach must be even more speculative. There is no property in a corpse; and no property either, I believe, in a live human body. Can we extend this to a presumption of no property in human tissue, including semen and ova, fertilized or unfertilized? We do not sell human blood for transfusion in this country. We have the Peel Report on the use of human fetal tissue.(11) Could we work on from there, to prevent the spread in this country of the ludicrous and degrading adventurism already so profitable in America? To doubt whether there is a place for a new criminal law enactment in this field is not to deny the need for *law reform.* The law relating to the registration of birth, to personal identity, to bastardy, and to other areas of social consequence arising from new medical practice, is obsolete and, in some instances, mischievous. It should be the task of an Inter-Departmental Committee, following on the work which the Law Commission has already done, to make proposals on this to Parliament.

IV

The perceptive will have noticed how easily I slip back into the ethics of personal or professional relation, try as I will to escape. I forsook work on The Family early in my time here, in order to free myself for other tasks; only to be drawn back into it for four years with the Home Office and the DHSS – fruitless years, it now seems, while the Government is too preoccupied with economic recovery to make better use of the rich marital support services already at its disposal. I refer to the Consultative Document, *Marriage Matters* now somewhere on a shelf.(12) Ties of long personal friendship have kept me close also to the Institute of Marital Studies, and the world of psychotherapy behind it, from which I have learned far more than I have been able to give or teach. But what of the other life of this capital city in which the Maurice Professor was supposed to immerse himself? What of the City itself, the world of commerce?

As in other areas of work, effective action on business ethics requires the right context, the right company, in which the exchange, the moral analysis, can be made. I have, in fact, found myself working in such company on and off throughout my years here. Modest publications have followed. A group of friends did early work together at Worth Abbey, in Sussex. The Foundation for Business Responsibilities set me up among the sons of Belial from time to time; and the Christian Association of Business Executives, and its international counterpart, UNIAPAC, sometimes call on me to think. My students have, I hope, benefited from what I have fed back to them. Six did, certainly, in one vintage year, when they earned a champagne supper and ten pounds apiece for exposing themselves to clips of advertisements for an evening and recording their "reactions". This was called, by their hosts, *research.* Preliminary thinking for Lord Watkinson's Company Affairs Committee of the C.B.I. was done at St George's House, Windsor Castle, involving closely a former student of this College and Treasurer of its Council. The two Reports of that Committee had no chance to make the impact they deserved, because of a change of Government at a General Election. But the thinking continues; and it may yet shew itself in a *Dictionary of Business Ethics,* to stand alongside of the volume on medical ethics already published.

The perils for the moralist – for that is my theme – are obvious. Ethics and system are inseparable; he may well be trapped mentally within the system, even as he seeks to understand it. He is torn continually between the evident faults in the system and the evident integrity of men working within it, trying to raise the standards of the worst to those of the best. And he is not impressed by the alternative systems on offer. At all events, the Maurice Professor stands in a good tradition in encountering those risks; for the Christian Socialists, led here not so much by Maurice as by his lieutenant, J.M. Ludlow, a barrister of Lincoln's Inn, strove in the mid nineteenth century, not only to make it lawful for working men to associate in co-operative societies and trade unions, but also for the enacting of the statute which gave us the limited liability company; that was legislation worth campaigning for.

There remain wide areas of the national life still untouched. Industrial and economic relations were pursued by my counter-part in the University of Manchester, Professor R.H. Preston, who studied economics under Tawney at the L.S.E. before he turned to Theology. In his F.D. Maurice Lectures given here in 1977 he brought some of those studies into the College.(13) As for the ethics of war, it was indeed fortunate that in 1971 the then Principal, Sir John Hackett, was persuaded to establish a Lectureship in the Ethics of War in the Department of War Studies. The College has, in that Department, a strong team personally and professionally committed to the promotion of peace and of ethical restrains upon and in war. It is fortified now by the new Dean of the College, the Reverend Richard Harries,

who began post-graduate studies in the ethics of war here in 1970, and has brought his matured thinking on the subject back with him into our company; he is welcome. The College can boast expertise, not only in Law, Medicine and Ethics, but also in Theology, Ethics and War.

V

I began my work here, as I began this lecture, with a reference to Maurice in the first person singular: "I am only a digger." You must forgive me if that outcrop of grammatical vanity has been too prominent in this lecture. But, following Maurice again, it cannot intrude itself into the moralist's work without destroying it. Maurice proclaimed, with almost tedious fervour, that co-operation, not competition, was true to the nature of God's created universe. And the practical moral reasoning to which the holder of this chair is bound requires co-operation. He cannot work unless he has the confidence, and indeed, the friendship of practitioners in the arts which are his study. Maurice himself, though he could generate deep trust and friendship – even adoration – in some with whom he worked, seems yet to have been by temperament an isolate. He had a horror of "systems", "organizations", which led him to withdraw from his friends from time to time, so wrecking some of Ludlow's more promising schemes. And, of course, he was expelled for heterodoxy from this College: and, I am sometimes tempted to think, he may have enjoyed being expelled.

There was injustice in the process of his expulsion, leaving the College with a guilty conscience. The endowing of this Professorship was an act of reparation. I said in my Inaugural Lecture that the chair looked like an altar, and myself the first victim for sacrifice.

I hope the College has prospered, done rather better, since it purged its offence. Judging from the financial cuts imposed upon it now, we may need to search our consciences again, to see whether there is yet another sacrifice required to be offered. Yet the enterprise of the endowment itself succeeded. For this, thanks must be returned to many donors – former Kingsmen who could probably ill afford what they gave, as well as to City companies and other institutional contributors. Thanks must be returned to Sydney Evans, the then Dean, who concerted the efforts of the Council to establish the Chair, and to Mr David Hunter Johnston, then Treasurer of the Council. To Mr Myles Tempany, the College Bursar, must go the final accolade, for he it was who husbanded the money, and put it out upon usury, to that it earned such increase that the College can afford to appoint my successor, even in these hard times, without any period of vacancy. And what sort of problem is *that* for Christian Ethics?

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THEOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE BOOK OF ISAIAH: THREE INTERRELATED STUDIES

PETER R. ACKROYD

III. THEOLOGY OF A PROPHET

There are two ways of approaching the questions which underlie this part of our discussion.[1] One is to attempt a kind of biographical sketch and then to see how far actual prophetic material can be fitted into the sketch, giving a range of possible dates for particular passages. The other is to start from the book, essentially the only established point, and work back from that to ask what kind of prophet must we see behind the book so that what has eventually emerged can be intelligibly associated with him. Neither approach offers a fully rounded picture, and some of the reasons for this will emerge as we look at the possibilities.

A biographical approach

One clear reason appears as soon as we attempt a biographical sketch; it is that there is so meagre an amount of material available that any endeavour at reaching biographical coherence breaks down. Of course, many popular textbooks provide biographical outlines;[2] a close examination of them reveals how much is built on conjecture, on fitting together into a coherent scheme fragments of evidence and pieces of inference which do not in fact add up to a satisfying whole. This is true for all prophetic books – and indeed equally for all prophetic figures to be found in narrative works. It becomes evident that there is a clear reason for this: the ancient narrator or collector of prophetic material did not have a primary interest in the life and activity of the prophet. His interest lay in the significance of the message, and only here and there and incidentally is the material found to be attached to precise moments in time or to precise events. Even in the case of Jeremiah, where the situation is in some respects different from that which pertains for other prophets, the tangible amount of information is in reality much less than at first appears; even in that case, starting from attempted biography creates major problems.[3]

If we consider Isaiah, we may immediately observe the paucity of information. The opening verse, like that of most other prophetic books, provides a minimum of family statement – the name of the prophet and his father's name – and a chronological setting naming four kings of Judah from Uzziah to Hezekiah. This provides a period of some forty odd years between about 740 and 700 B.C., perhaps a little more at both ends. Some items of biographical information appear in chapters 6-8: an account of a visionary experience set in the year of King Uzziah's death (ch.6), from which various inferences have been drawn about the status and function of the prophet, particularly in relation to the royal house,[4] but these are inferences not given items; two accounts of encounters with king Ahaz in ch. 7, the first related to the narrative in 2 Kings 16 and including a reference to the prophet's son Shear-jashub, clearly a significantly named child, but nowhere are we told under what circumstances the name was given; the second, now linked with this but in fact clearly separate, in which the refusal by the king of a sign of confirmation of the divine purpose is countered by a statement of the naming of a child, the name Immanuel expressing faith in God as the opposite of Ahaz' attitude; a brief narrative in the opening of ch. 8 tells of the naming of another child, symbolic of speedy disaster on the kingdoms of Israel and Aram – a story which refers to other characters as witnesses of the naming, but they do not appear again; then there is a passage, also in ch. 8, which, as we saw in the previous study,[5] may refer to 'disciples', though this is uncertain, and which does refer to 'children' – or could that imply disciples? – who together with the prophet are signs of the divine purpose – this last passage introduced by a very abbreviated reference to what seems to be a commissioning of the prophet (8.11).[6]

After a long gap, ch. 20 offers a reference to another prophetic sign loosely associated – 'at that time' – with the Assyrian capture of Ashdod, probably 713 B.C., Isaiah is told to take off the sackcloth from his waist – but we are not told the circumstances or the precise reasons for his wearing sackcloth, a sign of mourning or penitence – and to remove his sandals, so that 'naked and barefoot' he proclaims the coming captivity of Egypt and Cush at the hands of Assyria. The passage is clearly associated with the theme of wrong dependence on anticipated help from these countries (cf. e.g. 31.1-3). 22.15-25 contains allusions to the fall of two officials, Shebna and Eliakim; both appear in chs. 36-37, with change of title; the relationship between the two passages is not explained nor is it clear that the two sections in ch. 22 are directly related, though that is how they are now presented.

The only other material which presents Isaiah is in chs. 36-39 the section which corresponds closely with 2 Kings 18-20. This shows various moments of activity in the reign of Hezekiah, associated with the Assyrian threat, with the king's illness and recovery, and with the visit of ambassadors from Babylon. Some further comment will need to be made on these chapters which provide, indeed, the only reasonably coherent section of material in which the activity of the prophet may be traced. But we may observe that these chapters are different in kind to the other information we have noted.[7] From chapter 40 on there is no reference to Isaiah at all.

If we add this up chronologically, we may see one incident in about 740 B.C., a group of elements associated with a period some five or six years later; one associated with about 713 B.C., a group centred around 705-701 B.C., and two for which no date is available, though the mention of the two officials by name would place them not too far from the 705-701 period.

Any further indication of the activity of the prophet can be only by inference from particular sayings, and the circularity of the argument then is often very apparent.

Outside the book of Isaiah – apart from the text in 2 Kings 18-20 – we have in the Old Testament nothing but stylised references in 2 Chron. 26 and 32 to Isaiah in connection with account of Uzziah and Hezekiah. We have seen what is offered in Ecclesiasticus, but there is no additional information there.[8] Later legends – detectable probably in the last part of Hebrews 11 – can tell of the martyrdom of Isaiah under Hezekiah's successor, but there is nothing to indicate any real independent evidence;[9] for the most part what is offered is a correlating of what is said about that king, Manasseh, in 2 Kings 21, in which the

prophecy (no prophets named) of disaster upon Jerusalem and Judah is specifically associated with his evil ways and he is also said to have shed innocent blood. The inference is that if Isaiah lived on into that reign – and we have no evidence one way or the other – then he must have been involved in the pronouncement of doom and must have been one of the innocent who was put to death. But there is no evidence and the legends which grew up are of interest for what they tell us about later thought and not as providing any tangible information. We may see the relationship of such material to the theme – again to be found in the New Testament – of a people guilty of rejecting and killing the prophets.[10]

Thus if we begin from this end, trying to fix certain points in the life of the prophet, we are left with dangerously little. We may easily be tempted to do one of two things in trying to reconstruct. We may associate prophetic material which seems to point to a particular kind of situation with one of the known points, and so get clusters of sayings attached to each of the periods for which any biographical material appears; then we may assume – as many writers have done – that, particularly in the twenty year gap between the time of Ahaz and the incident of ch. 20, Isaiah as it were retired into private life. There is not one jot of evidence to deny such a view; but neither is there any to support it. It is pure and unwarranted conjecture. Or – and this too is often done implicitly – we may believe that we can detect specific backgrounds to particular sayings, and project these into the gaps, thereby filling out the biography by inference; the argument is then circular and may easily lead to an almost entirely imaginery account of the prophet's activity.

The one positive element in such attempts at biographical reconstruction is the stress that this lays on the relationship between prophetic pronouncement and the realities of moments of human experience. It is the confident and surely entirely proper recognition that prophets spoke to their contemporaries, and that what they said was immediate and relevant. It affirms the reality of prophet and situation, but it can hardly go further than that. Yet there must be more to be explored if we are to understand the prophetic book and the prophet.

From the book to the prophet

So the second line of approach starts where we have started in each of the previous studies – from the book as we have it. And it may begin with a relatively simple question, to which, however, there is no simple answer. It is the question why the book of Isaiah is so large by comparison with those associated with the other three prophets who were his near contemporaries in the eighth century B.C. – Amos, Hosea and Micah. It is a question to which I have myself attempted to give a partial answer, and something of that attempt will appear in what follows.[11] But we may begin by recognising that the question is not to be answered by the circular argument which is often adduced: Isaiah was a greater prophet that the other three because a larger body of material has been associated with him; there is a larger prophetic book because he was a greater prophet. There are two comments to be made on that, apart from our noting the dubious reasoning. The stature of the other three prophets appears to be in no way in reality less than that of Isaiah; indeed one element in the tradition, found in Jer. 26,18f., appears to claim for Micah an influence on Hezekiah of a kind as great as or even greater than that which might be deduced for Isaiah, for here it is said that Hezekiah and all Judah feared God and sought his favour, and God repented of the calamity he had promised. Furthermore, a sober appraisal of the material of the four prophetic books in question strongly suggests that the amount which can with reasonable certainty be associated with the period of the prophets themselves is in all cases relatively small, and what is to be associated with Isaiah is hardly greater than that to be associated with either Hosea or Amos; the Micah collection is also small but his significance is not thereby shown to be less.

What we do have to reckon with here – and similar discussions would need to be conducted in regard to the related though not identical problems of the books of Jeremiah and Ezekiel – is that the attachment of a great wealth of material to the name of Isaiah is a measure of his later standing, of the way in which he was viewed at a later date. Hence we may ask what is likely to have created that view; and we may also ask whether we can detect something of the process by which it was developed.

How did the Isaiah tradition grow?

There are two lines which I think we may follow up in an approach to this question, and they centre on two distinct elements in the prophetic book. The first takes us to look somewhat further at the nature of the material in chapters 36-39, and the function which that passage performs with the book of Isaiah. The second involves some discussion of the presentation of the prophet in the opening chapters of the book (Isa. 1-12). Both of these have a contribution to make to the larger question of the relation between the prophet of the eighth century and the prophetic book which now bears his name. They provide pointers rather than complete answers, so that we must recognize that here too there is insufficient evidence for a full and rounded picture. The prophet himself, so meagrely known from the little fragments of biographical material, still stands largely concealed behind what has come to be associated with him. Both these lines of approach are concerned primarily with the question of how the prophet appears in the presentations of him which are offered. It is a further question to look beyond to see what we may detect behind these presentations.

We may, of course, observe that such a concealment is characteristic of all the notable biblical characters, not excepting those who appear to be best known: Moses remains elusive behind the immense wealth of tradition associated with him in the books from Exodus to Deuteronomy; the other great leaders, including such a heroic figure as David, are also largely inaccessible. In the New Testament, Jesus and Paul – to say nothing of the many others, often little more than names – are themselves discoverable only within the material of gospels and epistles, with Acts providing for Paul what is often both less and more than biography. But these are not here our concern; they serve to illustrate the general nature of this aspect of the problems of biblical interpretaion.

I

Chapters 36-39 are made up of three main sections of material. The first, 36-37 is concentrated on the attack on Jerusalem by the Assyrian army in the fourteenth year of Hezekiah and its withdrawal associated with a sudden and major disaster, ending with the assassination of the Assyrian

ruler responsible. The second, ch. 38, is loosely linked in chronology by the indeterminate 'in those days'; it includes reference to the defeat of the Assyrians as something still to take place (38.6), but is primarily concerned with the recovery of the king from illness and the granting to him of fifteen additional years of rule. There are difficult problems of chronology for this period of the history of Judah; they need not concern us here. We may simply note that Hezekiah is credited with a reign of 29 years (2 Kings 18.2), which makes the fourteenth year (36.1 = 2 Kings 18.13) and the fifteen further years fit that piece of information. The third, ch. 39, is also loosely linked chronologically by a phrase 'at that time' and by a reference to Hezekiah's recovery; it concerns the visit of envoys from a Babylonian, Marodach-Baladan, known to us from the Assyrian records as a rebel against his Assyrian overlord. The story does not, however, concern this, nor is the purpose of the visit a matter for comment. It turns on Hezekiah's showing to the envoys all his treasures and armoury, and indeed everything in his palace and kingdom; this provides the occasion for a prophetic utterance by Isaiah to the effect that everything that has been so seen by the Babylonian envoys will in due course be carried away to Babylon, together with descendants of the royal house. A relationship is thus posed between a moment in the period of Hezekiah which involved contact with Babylon and a moment more than a century later when the Babylonians conquered Judah.[12]

A consideration of these three sections of narrative shows certain aspects of the presentation of Isaiah. In the first, the story of siege and deliverance – in which in fact two narrative levels appear to be present, but both concerned with the same theme – Isaiah appears twice. On the first occasion he appears when a group of high officials is sent by Hezekiah to seek help through him from God in the face of the mocking and threats of the Assyrian officer who acts as spokesman for the Assyrian king. The response is a word of assurance, promising that the Assyrian king will be led by a spirit from God to hear a rumour which will cause him to withdraw to his own land, and there he will meet his death (37.6-7) There is a sequel to this at the end of chapter 37, precise in that it tells of the assassination of the Assyrian king; different in that it reports the activity of a destroying angelic being which brings disaster to the Assyrian army and causes the departure of the king (37.36-38). On the second occasion, in very similar circumstances, the threats of the Assyrians need an answer; in this second part of the narrative the threats are contained in a letter which Hezekiah is followed by a spontaneous message from Isaiah; this includes the poem (already mentioned)[13] which reverses the arrogant statements of the Assyrian king into a message of doom (37.22-29). This is followed by another short passage (37.30-32) which looks beyond the immediate moment of danger to the survival and rehabilitation of a remnant of Judah – a promise expressed in very general terms. This in its turn is followed (37.33-35) with a precise promise that the Assyrian will be unable to capture Jerusalem, or even to engage in siege operations against it; instead, he will return home and the city will be delivered.

We are not here concerned with questions of historical reconstruction; clearly the evidence of this complex passage is not easy to handle, especially in relation to other material in 2 Kings, not included here, and in the Assyrian records.[14] We are concerned rather with how Isaiah appears, as a prophet declaring the saving power of God, and stressing the absoluteness of God's power over those who set themselves up against him, and indeed, in the taunt poem, those who claim to do what belongs to God's prerogative alone. The point is underlined also by the prayer put into the mouth of Hezekiah (37.16-20), for this too concentrates on this supremacy of God, and vividly contrasts the living god of Israel with the non-existent gods of other nations – a theme to be found very fully developed in subsequent chapters in the book of Isaiah. And in addition, the promise for the future is expressed in terms of a restored remnant, survivors of the disaster to come, which will bring about a renewal of the 'house of Judah'. Important too is the fact that in the final verses of this section, there is the brief indication of the actual fulfilment of the judgement on the Assyrians, both in the general statement of supernatural defeat of the army, and in the precise doom for the Assyrian king who has been described as blaspheming against Israel's God.

All of this is directly concentrated on Hezekiah and the Assyrians; but the language used is itself indicative of further stages of interpretation of the underlying narrative tradition. This may be seen in several elements of the material. It may be seen – and this is a point not so far mentioned here – in the way in which the offer of peace made to the people of Jerusalem in ch. 36 is expressed in the language and style used in the book of Deuteronomy of God's giving to Israel of the land which it is to occupy; this clearly reflects a presentation later than Isaiah, associable with the period a century later when Judah was in the last years of its life and on into the period of its loss of temple, city and land. Both the prayer of Hezekiah and the poetic answer of Isaiah in ch. 37 are markedly reminiscent of the content and language of passages in the latter chapters of the book, virtually universally agreed to belong to a later period, in the main to the sixth century B.C., the period of Babylonian supremacy. The theme of the restored remnant is again one which appears in the book of Isaiah in passages most naturally to be seen as later reflections of disaster, in part in the offering of a reinterpretation of the name of that son of Isaiah, Shear-jashub, who appears, as we have seen, unexplained and inactive in the encounter with Isaiah and Ahaz in ch. 7; here there is very close analogy between 37.30-32 and 10.20-23 in which the exegesis of Shear-jashub is offered. The positive interpretation in this latter passage 'A remnant will return' is clear; we have no direct evidence for the significance given to the name originally, though clues enough to suggest that a negative interpretation is more than likely, i.e. 'Only a remnant will return' which makes the name of prophecy of doom and not a promise of survival and future hope.[15] These pointers to the interpretation of the story of Hezekiah's period in the context of later experience show that we are dealing with a presentation of Isaiah primarily as a prophet proclaiming well-being for his people. The validity of his prophetic message is underlined by the indication at the end of the section that the word of doom for Assyria and its king had been fulfilled; the truth of the promise is thereby also confirmed.

It is similar with ch. 38, where the message of death for Hezekiah is reversed into a promise of extra life; and the validity of the promise is confirmed by the giving of a sign, that of the turning back of the shadow of the sun. As we have already seen in the previous study,[16] the theme of new life

out of death is underlined in the Isaiah form of the text by a psalm which points with some clarity to the theme of deliverance and restoration from exile. Here again, such precise reference as is given is to the Assyrian threat.

In ch. 39 the situation changes, and the threat which is now seen to hang over the people is that of the Babylonians; not the Babylonians of the opening of the story, whose envoys have come to Jerusalem, but their successors of a century later who come as conquerors. With this passage the shift is complete. While hints in the text and possibilities of interpretation already indicate that the real interest in presenting these narratives is not that of describing what happened to Judah under Assyrian power, here the real intention becomes plain in the presentation of Babylon as the threat, and it appears evident from both this and the preceding hints, that these stories are now being told in the light of disaster at Babylonian hands. When these narratives appear in 2 Kings, they serve as pointers forward to the ultimate disaster, and it is significant that they there follow a long reflective passage in 2 Kings 17.7-41 which sees the significance of the downfall of the northern kingdom of Israel, just described, in relation to the subsequent downfall of Judah, referred to in v.20 of that passage. The fulfilment of prophetic threat on the northern kingdom confirms the propriety of similar threat to Judah. The sequel shows the interweaving of threat and doom and points to the description of the disaster in the chapters that follow to the end of 2 Kings. In the book of Isaiah, essentially the same passage performs a different function. It provides a lead in to the prophecies of salvation which follow; in fact it appears to stand within those prophecies, since ch. 35 which precedes is evidently closely related. The effect of this is that the opening of ch. 40, which suggests a new commissioning of a prophet who has access to the deliberations of the heavenly court, now stands next to the message of exile at the hands of the Babylonians; and the succeeding chapters in which deliverance from that exile is a major theme, set out in a variety of ways, become a new stage in the prophetic message, in which by implication the prophet Isaiah, associated in the narratives with an idealised figure of king Hezekiah, becomes the mediator of the divine promise, as also of other elements of warning and judgement in the remainder of the book.

For the moment, then we look away from analysis of the book and from a quite proper concern with the periods to which various elements in the material belong, and see a coherent message given under the authority of a prophet whose primary function is that of proclaiming the relationship between judgement and salvation.

II

Such a presentation of the prophet may now be set side by side with another, that to be found in the opening chapters, 1-12. Again, the details of analysis are not our concern, but we may observe a degree of similarity of structure which itself provides some pointers to the way in which the material has been handled. For, in the middle of these opening chapters, we have 6.1-9.7 (Hebrew 9.6), that section which in fact includes virtually all the information we have about the prophet Isaiah. On a close examination we find here a series of points of correspondence with the chapters we have just examined, often in small details of wording and reference.[17] Furthermore, we may note that it begins in ch. 6 with a prophetic commissioning associated with a scene in the heavenly court, though here that court is closely linked with the temple which is its earthly counterpart. Thus this passage begins with the prophetic commission, where 36-39 ends by leading into such a commission – and there are a number of verbal links between the two commission passages such as might suggest that we should associate the opening of ch. 40 even more closely with the narratives which precede it. But whereas the second commissioning scene of ch. 40 is set in a context which concentrates on the assurance of divine salvation, with disaster subordinated to this assurance; the commissioning in ch. 6 is set both in 6.1-9.7 and in the materials which stand on either side of it, in a context in which the main concentration is on doom and judgement. The major emphasis of the whole section is chs. 1-12 is indeed on judgement, against the whole people, against Jerusalem, against the worship of the temple, against the leadership, against social evils, and in chs. 7-8, against the Davidic king. Judgement at the hands of the Assyrians looms large over this material, though there are points here too at which we may detect a reworking that points to the later and major disaster at the hands of the Babylonians.[18] It is clear that an important element in the presentation of the prophet here is as a messenger of doom.

But in fact such a statement needs to be carefully qualified. For repeatedly in these chapters there are counterpoised elements of hope and indeed of confidence in salvation. Thus the repeated themes of judgement upon Jerusalem, its leadership and its worship, in chapter 1, are in fact interwoven with expressions of distress that the faithful city of ancient tradition has become what it now is and with expressions of hope in the restoration of that faithfulness. The Jerusalem, whose people are condemned for the improprieties of their worship, is the place to which in the immediately following opening of chapter 2 the nations of the world will come in acknowledgement of Israel's God. The overthrow of everything that sets itself up against God in the elaborate poem of 2.6-22 – itself probably also reworked to have reference to the later exilic situation – and the condemnations of the leadership and prophecies of doom of chapter 3, are answered in chapter 4 with the promise of a restored Jerusalem, a holy and purified place. The absoluteness of disaster in ch. 6 is countered by a confidence that the holy people of God is a preserved remnant (6.13). The disillusionment with Davidic kingship is offset by the hope of a new and ideal Davidic ruler in the opening of ch. 9. The woes and the doom poems of chapters 5 and 9 reach their climax in the opening of chapter 10 in a passage which appears to refer to the ultimate doom of the exile. But from this we move to the pronouncement of judgement on the Assyrians for their pride – echoes of the poem of ch. 37 – and themes of restoration – the preserved remnant, the threats of the invading army meeting at Jerusalem with the power of Jahweh of hosts. A new Davidic ruler, a new and golden age, and a focus for the gathering of the nations, the gathering of the scattered members of Israel and Judah, brings in the restoration from Assyria but in fact points to the restoration from the greater disaster of the Babylonian age (10-11).

Thus the prophet of doom is also presented as the prophet of salvation. And if we ask how this has come about the answer is in part to be seen in the psalm passage which

closes this section of the book in chapter 12. For here we meet with a remarkable fact. The psalm has no doubt been chosen to be placed here because it sums up confidence and hope in God, but it also appears to have been chosen because if offers a comment on the name of the prophet Isaiah. The prophet's name is made up of two elements, the name of God – the Yah or Yahu ending to the name – and the word meaning 'salvation' 'deliverance' 'victory'. But curiously this latter word is not used in the prophecies of Isaiah so far as we may distinguish them. In the book as a whole, it appears almost entirely in chapters 35, 40-66 all of which are much later; the occurrences in the book other than in those chapters are either in passages clearly equally late – chapters 17, 19, 25, 26, 33, and also in the developed narrative material of 36-39; or, in the only passage which could well be from Isaiah in ch. 30, the sense is that of 'be safe' rather than with any reference to divine saving power. We may observe that the interpretation and reinterpretation of names is relatively common in the book – so especialy with Shear-jashub and Immanuel, but also in name-plays in the later chapters (so 60.14, 18; 62.4). It is along with this device of reinterpretation that we may place the development of the understanding of the prophet Isaiah as what his name seemed to imply – the prophet of divine salvation. The psalm in chapter 12 invites the reader to reflect on this wider understanding of the prophet's function.

The prophet interpreted

It may be observed from these comments that a consideration of these two sections of the book points to two not unrelated ways of presenting the prophet. In 36-39, the prophet is depicted as associated with the message of deliverance from Assyria and of the hope of new life beyond present distress, and this particularly in that the prospect of exile in Babylon is set between the confidence of the message of victory over Assyria and the presentation of the oracles of consolation in chapters 40ff. In 1-12, the prophet, who is linked with a wide range of pronouncements of inescapable judgement, is presented also as the messenger of divine salvation. In some degree at least, this hopeful aspect of his message is presented in relation to reinterpretation of doom passages with the prospects of hope. The overall picture of the book's theology, which we saw sketched in the words of Ecclesiasticus,[19] is of a message of confidence and deliverance, but it is set against the background of words and judgement and experiences of disaster. The effect is that of chiaroscuro, the brilliance of the light of hope standing out against the blackness of judgement and distress. It is a portrayal which does justice to the theological outlooks shared by Jews and Christians in which there stand side by side the sober appraisal of the realities of human experience and the confident affirmation that God is God.

It remains only to touch on a last and delicate point. If we can see the prophet Isaiah within the book which bears his name, we see him first and foremost as he has been presented to us. Beyond the limitations of his own particular age, the moment of his lifetime and actual activity, he is seen associated with the immense wealth of material from certainly two centuries and very possibly nearly as much again. But what was he in reality, within the period to which he belonged?

To explore this involves a probing back through the book, with a careful analysis of its material and a consideration of the nature of individual passages within it. It is in part an assessment of the relationship between different elements of material that lie side by side, the discussion of levels of meaning within a particular pronouncement. It must be with an awareness of the meagre biographical information available to us, but without that information providing a straitjacket within which we attempt to fit the material. There is always the risk of deciding that a particular passage must belong to the original prophet because it appears to fit so well into a precise biographical and historical context; and there can equally be the opposite fallacy of assuming that passages which do not so fit must be of later origin. Our lack of information must lead us to be cautious.

It is, in fact, more possible to make general comments than to be fully precise. What often stands out is the contrast between passages – in the opening chapters of the book, and especially in chapter 6 – which speak in such dire terms of the totality of judgement, allowing of no relief whatsoever, and the themes of deliverance and salvation which appear to belong rather to the presentation of the prophet as a messenger of divine power and promise. There is a contrast to be seen between the assurance of the security of Jerusalem, which have a relationship of a complex kind to the non-capture of the city by the Assyrians, and those passages which appear to see nothing but total devastation, which allow no hope of any escape. Thus in chapter 29, the opening verses picture the holy city as brought to utter ruin:

> Then deep from the earth you shall speak,
> from low in the dust your words shall come;
> your voice shall come like a ghost from the ground,
> and your speech shall whisper from the dust (29.4).

The occurrence of this, with its total gloom, is the more remarkable since it is clear that the alternative tradition, that of divine deliverance, has deeply influenced its presentation as it now stands. For immediately following these words we meet with a totally contrasting element in which the theme of the onslaught of the nations against Zion is utilised – a theme that we have already noted[20] – and the picture is of the nations visited by God with calamity, bemused and bewildered, unable therefore to continue their campaign and reduced to impotence. The sharpness of the contrast shows at once the distinction between the prophet as messenger of doom to Jerusalem and the same prophet as the messenger of salvation and hence of doom for the powers ranged against God. The juxtaposition brings out sharply the levels of interpretation, and shows how one stage of prophetic teaching has been given a new setting. But in this too we observe that the effect is to set light against dark; the word of God in salvation is no piece of easy optimism, it is set against the background of the divine judgement on the failure of the community.

A similar element of contrast may be seen in a passage in chapter 22.8-11. The allusions strongly suggest that we have here a later reflection upon the moment of threat to Jerusalem by the Assyrians, particularly in that there is reference to work on the water supply which corresponds more or less closely to statements made elsewhere about Hezekiah's activities (2 Kings 20.20); other details are less clear, and it must be allowed that there is nothing which absolutely determines the date. But the interest lies in the fact that this reflection on the experience of siege and relief itself points to the inability of the people of Jerusalem to learn from experience; they concerned themselves with military defence, they did not 'look to its maker, or consider him who formed it long ago' (22.11), a comment using words that we have already seen in chs. 36-37 and beyond.[21] This passage of reflection is itself set in the context of a

picture of total disaster; the opening verses of the chapter tell of confusion in the city and of military defeat, of the overrunning of the land with the enemy armies, the laying open of Judah's defences; and the verses which immediately follow point to the failure of the community to respond to such an emergency (22.12f) and a final and utter word of judgement (22.14).

There are two points which emerge here. On the one hand the reflection on the Hezekiah period suggests a quite different reaction to that implied in chapters 36-37, and takes the consideration of that moment further by pointing to the community's need to look first to God and his determined will rather than to political contrivance; on the other hand, the surrounding material points to the exilic period, with the disaster of Babylonian conquest, and therefore the whole passage implicitly enjoins on the community of the later date a proper understanding of the divine will expressed in immediate experience, disaster needing to be appropriated if there is to be a future.

The prophet Isaiah

The prophet of the eighth century is visible only through this reapplication and this reflection upon earlier events; he has become much more than one who lived and spoke in a specific generation; he has become a spokesman to his people for time to come. What we know of the prophet remains meagre indeed; and yet in another sense we have broader understanding of him in the book which is associated with his name. The prophet Isaiah is known to us only in that larger context. To attempt to defend his status by attributing directly to him much or even all of the material of the book – as is still sometimes done[22] – is to lay a false emphasis on the authority of supposedly 'original' or 'genuine' material:[23] it is to miss the immense richness of a religious tradition in which the message of the prophet has been seen to be relevant to following generations, a message enriched by interpretation and enlarged by the addition of a wealth of new material. So Isaiah is made to speak beyond his own time and speaks over the centuries to his own people in the changed situations of later years. To attempt to analyse out what may be attributed to the prophet himself and what to his interpreters is a hazardous process, its results inevitably uncertain because of the integration of original message and developing interpretation of that message. While such analysis may at some points be straightforward, there is loss when too sharp a division is made between the first half of the book in which the Isaianic tradition is richly overlaid and the second half which has many points of contact both with the basic Isaianic tradition and also with its continuing reapplication.

In the presentation of the prophet, there is a two-way process. The tradition within which the original message is developed and indeed transformed has its authoritative standing for the community in that it is associated with the prophet; the authority of the prophet is itself a developing authority in that it is enhanced by the continuing validation of the tradition. When a later generation of hearers of the Isaianic message expounded and expanded it, they acknowledged the authority of that message as a word from God to themselves, and thereby underlined the authority of the prophet. So his significance becomes greater. The prophet cannot be separated from what is subsequently attributed to him; the appropriation of the richly variegated message of the book testifies to the status now accorded to Isaiah himself.

It was not my purpose in these studies to discuss the nature of biblical authority, not least because I am not sure how far generalised discussions of such a topic necessarily clarify the issues involved. My purpose has been rather to consider the book of Isaiah as a whole – in all its variety, in the levels of its tradition, and as it presents the prophet within that tradition – and to invite in these theological reflections a consideration of how such a book, and by inference how the biblical writings as a whole, exercise their powerful influence upon both Jewish and Christian communities. In the examination of some aspects of the book of Isaiah we may see biblical writing in the process of formation and recognize how that process itself is bound in with the acceptance of the authority – that is of the demands made – which the book acquires. Biblical authority is not something given as it were once and for all; it is a continually flowing movement between God and book and people, in which a deepening understanding of God comes through the process by which the book speaks to the people and the people respond to and reinterpret the book. There can be nothing stationary about this, as if the meaning were unalterably determined; there is a continuing interchange which expresses the reality of the conviction that 'the Lord has more truth yet to break forth out of his holy word.'[24]

1. For the previous two studies, see *King's Theological Review* IV/2 (1981), 53-63; V/1 (1982), 8-13.
2. A title such as that of J. Steinmann, *Le prophète Isaïe. Sa Vie, Son Oeuvre et Son Temps* (Paris, 1950), seems to imply knowledge of information we do not possess.
3. For Jeremiah, see R.P. Carroll, *From Chaos to Covenant. Uses of Prophecy in the Book of Jeremiah* (London, 1981), esp. ch. 1.
4. Cf. e.g. I. Engnell, *The Call of Isaiah* (UUA, 1949/4); A. Schoors, 'Isaiah, the Minister of Royal Anointment', *Oudt Stud.* 20 (1877), 85-107; H. Cazelles, 'Jesajas Kallelse och Kungaritualet', *SEA* 39 (1974), 38-58 = 'La vocation d'Isaie (ch. 6) et les rites "royaux"', in *Homenage a Juan Prado*, ed. L. Alvarez Verdes and E.J. Alonso Hernández (Madrid, 1975), 89-108.
5. *KTR* V/1 (see n.1), p.9.
6. On the nature of Isa, 6.1 - 9.7 (Hebrew 9.6), see O. Kaiser, *Das Buch des Propheten Jesaja. Kap. 1-12*, revised edn (ATD 17, Göttingen, 1981), 20f., 117-20.
7. Cf. my 'Isaiah 36-39: Structure and Function' to appear in *Von Kanaan bis Kerala. Festschrift J.P.M. van der Ploeg O.P.* (AOAT 211, Kevelaer, Neukirchen-Vluyn). For other references, see *KTR* V/1 (see n.1).
8. See KTR IV/2 (see n.1)., p.56.
9. Cf The Ascension of Isaiah, made up of two parts known as the Martyrdom of Isaiah and the Vision of Isaiah. For discussion, see M.A. Knibb in *The Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament* ed. J.H. Charlesworth (Doubleday, New York. To be published 1982) and O. Eissfeldt, *The Old Testament: An introduction* (Oxford, 1965), 609f.
10. Cf. O.H. Steck, *Israel und das gewaltsame Geschick der Propheten. Untersuchungen zur Überlieferung des deuteronomischen Geschichtsbildes im Alten Testament, Spätjudentum und Urchristentum* (WMANT, 23, Neukirchen-Vluyn, 1967).
11. See my 'Isaiah i - xii: Presentation of a Prophet', *VTS*, 29 (1977), 16-48.
12. See my 'An Interpretation of the Babylonian Exile: A Study of 2 Kings 20, Isaiah 38-39', *SJT*, 27 (1974), 329-52.
13. See *KTR* V/1 (see n.1), p.10
14. Cf. B.S. Childs, *Isaiah and the Assyrian Crisis* (SBT II, 3, London, 1967).
15. Cf. R.E. Clements, *Isaiah 1-39* (NCB, London, 1980), 83 for an interesting comment on possible meanings.
16. See *KTR* V/1 (see n.1), p.10f.
17. See my forthcoming study (n.7) and O. Kaiser, op. cit. pp.143f.
18. Cf. R.E. Clements, 'The Prophecies of Isaiah and the Fall of Jerusalem in 587 B.C.', *VT*, 30 (1980), 421-36.
19. See *KTR* IV/2 (see n.1), pp.56-7.
20. See *KTR* IV/2 (see n.1), pp.56-7.
21. Cf. 37.26; and frequent use in chs. 40ff. of the same vocabulary.
22. A tendency to be seen in H. Wildberger, *Jesaja* (BK X, Neukirchen-Vluyn 1965–), sometimes with an assurance which seems far from warranted.
23. Cf. B.S. Childs, 'The Sensus Literalis of Scripture: An Ancient and Modern Problem' in *Beiträge zur Alttestamentlichen Theologie. Festschrift W. Zimmerli* (Göttingen, 1977), 80-93; and my 'Original Text and Canonical Text', *USQR*, 32 (1977), 166-73.
24. John Robinson; reported as part of an address to the departing Pilgrim Fathers, 1620 (see *DNB*, 49 (1897), 18-22).

ODD MAN OUT IN MODERN THEOLOGY: F.R. TENNANT (1866-1967)

PAUL D.L. AVIS

The Cambridge philosopher and theologian F.R. Tennant (1866-1967), author of the massive *Philosophical Theology,* has been undeservedly neglected in recent study. None of the standard surveys of modern theology makes more than passing mention of his work and in some he is passed over completely. Whether this makes Tennant simply the odd man out in modern theology, or whether, in fact, he is a voice in the wilderness, is a question that deserves discussion. Shortly before Tennant's death, Professor H.D. Lewis claimed that his writings deserved more attention than they were currently receiving, and he expressed the hope that the significance of Tennant's work would soon be rediscovered and his books be widely used again. In spite of a reprint of the two-volume *Philosophical Theology,* Lewis' hopes appear not to have been fulfilled.(1)

It could be argued that Tennant brought neglect upon himself by his lack of sympathy with either of the two main options in modern protestant theology. He rejected outright both the experiential immediacy of the tradition of Schleiermacher and the revelational positivism of the school of Barth. 'A plague on both your houses!' sums up his view of the two main lines of development in modern protestant theology.

Not that Tennant was out of tune with all developments in contemporary theology. His stress on the method of metaphysical thinking and his belief in the spiritual ends of the physical universe put him in the company of Alfred North Whitehead and the process theologians, while his critical and historical approach to questions of revelation has much in common with the thought of Pannenberg.

In epistemology, Tennant was the disciple of James Ward (1843-1925), whose *Psychological Principles* he regarded as 'the greatest single work, of any age, on the human mind' (PhTh, I, vii). Ward's view of the purposeful, constructive, heuristic power of mind, while it has pragmatist connotations, links up with the philosophy of mind that Whitehead, Polanyi and Popper hold broadly in common, and which, beginning in the sphere of scientific method, has begun to turn back the tide of post-Enlightenment rationalism even in theology. (Thus, to take a topical example, Nicholas Lash draws on Gadamer's hermeneutics and George Steiner's work on language to criticise the authors of *The Myth of God Incarnate* for, fundamentally, a failure of imagination, a betrayal at the level of philosophy of mind.(2)) Tennant himself, however, did not escape rationalism altogether: his view of the Incarnation has more in common with the 'mythographers' than with their critics, and he leaves little room for revelation. But the notion of 'the elusive self', recently defended by H.D. Lewis, derives from James Ward via Tennant, and it is significant that in Tennant's thought our knowledge of the self – elusive, difficult to pin down, impossible to grasp immediately or directly, but nevertheless real and inescapable – is paradigmatic of our knowledge of God – the hidden, elusive God. Tennant develops the analogy between knowledge of the self and knowledge of God: 'Belief in God becomes reasonable if the idea of God be found as indispensable for explanation of the totality of our scientific knowledge about the world and man as is the idea of the soul for explanation of the totality of our knowledge about the individual mind' (PhTh, II, 254).

To make a systematic study of Tennant's rather demanding works would be a first-class education in philosophical theology and the problems of philosophy of religion. His critical distance from fashionable views would provide a healthy detachment, while the centrality of the issues he tackles would inevitably lead us to the fundamental questions of much modern theology and to a dialogue with its greatest minds. Tennant's distinctive position is most easily approached in *The Nature of Belief* (Centenary Press, 1943), while *Philosophy of the Sciences* (1932) provides a convenient stepping stone to the daunting *Philosophical Theology* (1928, 1930). Tennant's article 'Theology' in the *Encyclopedia Brittanica,* 14th edition, might also be mentioned here as a convenient summary of his position.

The present article makes no attempt to provide a comprehensive account of Tennant's thought. We shall concentrate instead on his view of the significance of religious experience for theological method. For Tennant's whole approach is governed by his rejection of the notion of immediate experience as developed in philosophy by Hegel and Bradly and in theology by Schleiermacher. For Tennant, knowledge of God – like knowledge of the world, the soul and other selves – is mediated and can only be attained by scientific and metaphysical study of the natural realm. Though first in the *ordo essendi,* God is last in the *ordo cognoscendi.* As Tennant puts it in the preface to *Philosophical Theology:* 'It is through knowledge about the self, mankind and the world that developed belief in God is mediated; and it is in relation to such knowledge, its nature, presuppositions, scope and validity, that the intellectual status of theology, and the reasonableness of theistic conviction, are to be estimated' (PhTh, I, v). Tennant's fundamental conviction, then, is that theological questions should be approached by way of our knowledge of the natural world and by rigorous philosophical argument. We shall have to ask, however, at the conclusion of this study, whether Tennant's proper rejection of the notion of *immediate* experience has not led him to overreach himself in a way that fails to do justice to the nature of religion as such, by ruling out its whole experiential dimension. But we turn now to a more detailed account of Tennant's distinctive method.

I

Theology, according to Tennant, demands a method that is both empirical and rational. The empirical, *a posteriori* approach follows from his basic epistemology: he believes that there are no 'thought-given realities' and that all knowledge derives from sense-data. These are not, admittedly, pure data - they presuppose some interpretation - but they are all we have to go on. We must begin from the elemental constituents of mental life - 'not with the elements into which they may be analysed, not the concepts which the conceptions of these elements may logically presuppose, nor the metaphysical entities of which observed actualities may be appearances, nor the simpler complexes that preceded them at earlier stages of our mental life' (PhTh, I, 1). By induction from these fundamental facts, we may form a basis for further construction. 'When the data have been described without suppression or mutilation,

without gratuitous interpretation in terms of suppositious theory framed according to predilection: then, and only then, can we reasonably proceed to consider what implications they contain and what metaphysical interpretation they may suggest or require' (PhTh, I, 3 cf 65).

This sounds very much like an outdated scientific positivism of the kind effectively discredited by Karl Popper in particular. But Tennant has no illusions about the possibility of pure induction of the type associated with the logic of J.S. Mill. It is true that, broadly speaking, induction must precede deduction - 'generalised premisses must be inductively obtained from the results of observation and experiment, before science can begin to be deductive' - but the act of induction itself, Tennant points out, involves the use of 'particular hypotheses, guesses, *anticipationes Naturae,* as well as fundamental postulates' (PhTh, I, 257ff). Tennant's empiricism is not a flight from theory: it is simply an acknowledgement of the need to submit to what is given. 'If to set out from fact, and to keep in touch with fact, be called empiricism, then, whatever else be found necessary, the empirical method is a *sine qua non* for knowledge of actuality of any sort' (PhTh, I, 5).

It is important to notice at this point – and it brings us to the heart of Tennant's significance for modern theological method – that the empricial, *a posteriori* method, does not lead him into a theological positivism, either experiential or revelational. Against Schleiermacher, Otto and the tradition of experiential theology based on self-authenticating encounter with the divine, Tennant claims that there can be no direct reading off of what is given in religious experience. There are no uniquely religious experiences or feelings: a moment is constitued as religious by virtue of the object that evokes it, and that object is interpreted in religious terms according to a set of beliefs already held on other grounds. Religious experience already presupposes a prior theistic belief and can only be evaluated, therefore, by means of a critical examination of that belief and a psychological analysis of how it arose.

On the other hand, Tennant is equally dismissive of a theological positivism of revelation. The historiographical factor and the phenomenon of development of doctrine decisively preclude this approach. The original data of revelation, on which beliefs are based, are merely postulated; they are not immediately accessible and can only be known at many removes. A positive theological science of revelation, along the lines laid down by Barth and developed by T.F. Torrance on the analogy of the physical sciences, is therefore ruled out by Tennant.

> The historiographical data of dogmatic theology are not of such a nature as to allow of that body of beliefs being regarded as certainly a science, or as a department of knowledge, save as knowledge concerning the history of thought. By a science I mean a systematisation of knowledge, or probable belief, based upon indubitable or verificable fact; and as the original interpreters of their own experiences are, in the present case, not accessible for cross-examination, the data of dogmatic theology cannot be verified as can those of a science, strictly so called (PhSc, 122).

I am aware that Tennant wrote this half a century ago and that it does not take into account more recent developments in philosophy of science that have had the effect of playing down the positivist element in scientific method. I would claim, however, that by focusing on the historiographical problems of Christian doctrine and the problematic nature of the data of theology, Tennant has put his finger on an issue that is not substantially affected by the qualification that needs to be made with regard to current thinking in philosophy of science. Again: when Tennant points out that we cannot cross-question claimants to revelation in the past, he is anticipating the sort of hermeneutical questions that have come to the fore in recent philosophical and theological work, notably in the writings of Hans-Georg Gadamer. Now while it is true to say that Tennant is not yet aware of the positive possibilities of this approach to hermeneutics, it needs also to be said that there is little sign at present that these developments have been fully reckoned with in theologies of revelation either.

Thus neither form of theological positivism, beginning as they do with an unquestioned given, whether it be the deliverances of religious consciousness with Schleiermacher or the *dogmata* of the Christian creed with Barth, can evade the challenge of thrashing out the arguments at the rational level. For Tennant, theology, like all the sciences, must not be only empirical but rational. Rationality is the second of his two methodological criteria. Reason is the sole instrument and arbiter in the quest for reality and truth – the only adequate tool for its acquisition, appropriation and evaluation. But Tennant is not advocating – or at least in his better moments he is not – the blunt instrument of the merely analytical and discursive reason. While Tennant may not attain to the idealist philosophy of mind associated with Coleridge, Polanyi and Lonergan, his is at least a Butlerian notion of rationality in which probability is the guide to truth and rationalistic ideas of logical proof are renounced. For Tennant, the venture of faith characterises all our knowledge of reality.

Tennant's method is thus open and continuous. He will have no tendentious abstraction of theological data from the whole of our knowledge. For him as for Pannenberg today, enquiry into God involves enquiry into all reality, for God is the ultimate reality that determines all reality. Theology, Tennant asserts, 'is not an isolated nor an isolable science; it is an outgrowth of our knowledge of the world and man. Revealed theology presupposes natural theology, and natural theology has no data other than those which experience supplies to science' (PhSc, 187). There is, for Tennant, an unbroken progression from the basic reading of sense-data to the constructions of natural theology, which is itself presupposed in 'revealed' theology. As Tennant puts it in another place: 'The sciences lead intellectual curiosity on to philosophy. And when philosophy finds its explanation in the supposition that the world and man constitute an organic whole, whose ground is God and whose *raison d'etre* is realisation of the good, it passes into natural theology' (PhSc, 191). Tennant's theological method thus involves a primary openness to all sources of knowledge and insight – with, however, one glaring exception: he systematically and programmatically excludes religious experience as a source of theological construction. We must now look more closely at the reasons for this.

II

Tennant's objections to theologies of experience are developed particularly in response to the thought of Schleiermacher. He is highly critical of Schleiermacher's attempt to establish experience – to the exclusion of metaphysical argument – as the basis of theological statement in his celebrated definition of Christian doctrine as an account of the Christian religious affections set forth in speech. Schleiermacher's revolutionary proposals would have made theology into a descriptive science founded on the empirical study of Christian consciousness.[3]

Tennant believes that he must prescribe a drastic antidote! He attempts to cut at the very root of this method by calling in question Schleiermacher's assumptions about the nature of experience. According to Tennant, concepts like 'immediate feeling of absolute dependence' (in *The Christian Faith*) and 'sense and taste of the infinite' (in the *Speeches to the Cultured Despisers of Religion)* are purely hypothetical: they 'denote experiences that no one has had' (PhTh, I, 326). The sort of experience that these concepts are meant to indicate is only possible, in fact, when a theoretical knowledge of the world has already been elaborated out of the genuine immediacies – sensation and feeling. This, Tennant believes, is the verdict of modern psychological analysis of experience. The method of genetic psychology – not of course available to Schleiermacher – will be found 'to reveal metaphysical assumptions lurking unsuspected in what are taken for data; to detect the mediacy of many supposed immediacies, the acquiredness of much that has passed for innate or *a priori*; and to show that part of what has been ascribed to our nature, is but second nature' (PhTh, I, 11n).

The theological method espoused by Schleiermacher, Otto and others, depends on the threefold claim of the immediacy, uniqueness and reality (or preferably, veridical status) of the experiences in question. All three claims are disputed by Tennant.

(a) *Immediacy.* While Schleiermacher speaks of immediate consciousness of absolute dependence as synonymous with being in relation to God, and Otto of a non-rational, irreducible consciousness of the numinous, Tennant remains deeply suspicious of all appeals to 'immediate' experience.[4] He makes a fundamental distinction on grounds of genetic psychology, between two kinds of immediacy: the psychic or subjective – how things seem to us – designated by the symbol / , on the one hand, and the psychological or objective – how things really are – designated by the symbol *ps*, on the other. This distinction, based on James Ward's rejection of Bradley's account of 'immediate' experience, is central to Tennant's whole position. What seems immediate to us may be the product of hidden inference and interpretation; and this, Tennant asserts, is precisely the case where experience of God is concerned. 'When the Christian communes with God, his actual experience consists of consolations, upliftings, "feelings" of peace and joy, bracing of will and so forth. It does not necessarily include apprehension of the divine causation of those states, nor face-to-face vision of their alleged cause: "no man hath seen God at any time" (PhTh, I, 329).

(b) *Uniqueness.* Schleiermacher holds that the immediacy and uniqueness of our intuition of the world's and our own dependence on God secures the distinctiveness of 'piety' (or religious feeling) from 'knowing' (or science) and 'doing' (or morals). He explicitly denies that the feeling of dependence is 'itself conditioned by some previous knowledge about God'. Otto, similarly, alleges that the sense of the numinous is an 'absolutely primary and elementary datum', 'perfectly *sui generis*' and irreducible to any other mental state. Even more emphatically than Schleiermacher, Otto claims that the feelilng is not conditioned by any human constructions that we project upon the world: it has 'immediate and primary reference to an object outside the self'.[5]

Tennant, on the other hand, asserts that the alleged uniqueness of moments of religious experience is simply the result of interpretation according to theistic beliefs already held on other grounds. It is we who invest objects and experiences with a sacred character; for others, they may reveal nothing out of the ordinary. Psychological analysis can detect nothing unique in the process of apprehension of religious phenomena. What is given in experience is governed by the preconceptions we bring to it. On Schleiermacher's notion of the feeling of absolute dependence as consciousness of God, Tennant comments: 'The intuition in question plainly presupposes a system of abstract ideas, indeed science and philosophy, and is mediated by such knowledge.' He concludes: 'It seems to me difficult to imagine a more extravagant abuse of the word "immediate" than this of Schleiermacher's' (PhSc, 175).

(c) *Reality.* To assume without further ado that all religious intuitions have a veridical character, i.e. that they correspond to reality, is to overlook the distinction that so troubled Descartes, between the reality of ideas in the mind and their correspondence to an actual state of affairs in the real world. As Descartes rather ingenuously remarks, it might all be a dream.[6] UFOs, the Cheshire Cat and Never-never Land all exist – in the mind! And as Tennant points out, imaginary and idealised objects can evoke feelings as strong and as sublime as those evoked by 'actual' objects. He adds, for good measure, that, if religious intuitions guaranteed the reality of all that is experienced, 'all the powers and deities of all the mythologies and religions from the crudest nature worship to monotheism are all alike real' (PhSc, 176, 172).

Needless to say, Schleiermacher has no intention of taking on board any and every twinge of Christian feeling. He believes that the deliverances of the contemporary Christian consciousness must be tested against the normative expressions of Christian feeling in the New Testament (not the Old), the creeds and the protestant confessions. The process of evaluation is confined within the theological circle; it is entirely a process of *self*-criticism. This does indeed go some way towards meeting Tennant's rather crudely expressed objection. But it does not go nearly far enough. Tennant would not be satisfied with merely self-criticism from within the closed circuit of Christian commitment. He would claim that Christian belief must take its chance in the wide arena of academic enquiry and that it must be willing to submit itself to externally accepted criteria of validity. Among these tests – the use of historical and other empirical evidence, moral adequacy, logical coherence, for example – metaphysical argument must, for

Tennant, have a significant place. It is interesting that Tennant's position has been corroborated, from outside the circle of Christian commitment, by Ronald Hepburn in *Christianity and Paradox* when he argues that 'the theologians' embargo on philosophising about the religious encounter' must be lifted, and calls upon the philosopher of religion to 'step outside the felt experiences themselves' in critical reflection about their validity. Time and again in this book, one feels that it could be Tennant speaking.(7)

To sum up Tennant's response to Schleiermacher over the nature of religious experience: when the claim is made that Christian theology is derived from a study of experience, it is necessary to point out that 'primarily and fundamentally, religious experience presupposes the theological concept of the divine or the numinous and owes its uniqueness to saturation with that concept' (PhSc, 178). The true task of theology is, therefore, to establish by philosophical argument and in the light of all our knowledge, the validity of theism and its superiority to rival views of the world. The argument will thus be grounded in what may rationally be inferred from discursive enquiry into the nature of the world, man and history. From these alone, according to Tennant, are derived our notions of the numinous, the spiritual and the concept of God. Only then may we go back to experience and feel free to interpret it in the light of the beliefs we have reached on less direct grounds.

> If theology is not derivable from religious experience because religious experience already presupposes a theological and interpretative factor derived elsewhere, it follows that it is by a more circuitous path than the short cut of alleged immediacy, and by trespass on property other than that of religion as confined to alleged unique data, that theology must arrive, if it can arrive, at beliefs such as other sciences would account reasonable (PhSc, 180).

Tennant's position has been stated at length: some appraisal is now due.

III

Tennant is a valuable critic of closed, positivistic, types of theological method, whether these are theologies of experience, following Schleiermacher, or theologies of revelation, following Barth. The data of the former presuppose theistic beliefs acquired on other grounds; the original data of the latter are not accessible to us in any direct way: no theology of revelation can short-cut the ambiguities and contingencies entailed in hermeneutical work on the tradition which now mediates revelation to us. Theology is therefore obliged to adopt a position of openness and receptivity to what may be learned from other traditions, and it is bound to incorporate philosophical argument into its characteristic method. Tennant is right not to foreclose in advance the question of the sources and data of theology.

His claim that theological truth must be able to meet the same standards of rationality as truth in any other department of knowledge, and his stress on probability as the guide of life, are both sound. His recall to the importance of theory in the interpretation of 'fact' puts him in the same camp as Whitehead and Popper. And finally, Tennant rightly points out that revealed theology (to use the customary, but misleading term for theology that concerns itself with revelation) cannot stand in splendid isolation but presupposes natural theology. But there are also confusions and fallacies in Tennant's thought: these centre on his failure to do justice to the complex dynamics of realilty – in particular, to the fundamental epistemic principle of reciprocity: the reciprocal relation between theory and fact, subject and object, insight and inference, immanence and transcendence.

(a) Tennant does not make adequate allowance for the reciprocity of theory and fact. He wants to begin empirically from fact, admitting however that there are no pure uninterpreted facts – all sensation is germinal perception – and that there is no pure induction – theory is present from the first. What Tennant, with his stress on metaphysical thinking, apparently fails to see is that there are no pure theories either. We cannot build our conceptual apparatus from scratch, as Descartes tried to do. We stand in a tradition: our theories are usually secondhand, our concepts are imperfectly understood, and our words belong in a living context of usage and reference that governs the way they behave. Tennant cannot avoid an *a priori* element by beginning from facts: as he admits, there are no facts without theory, but theories too contain *a priori* elements. It is more realistic to recognise that we are plunged into a complex situation where fact and theory interpenetrate and interact from beginning to end.

(b) Tennant's view of the subject-object relation in experience is one-sided. While he allows for the role of theory in shaping what we experience, he does not sufficiently reckon with the extent to which theory is itself moulded by experience. This is evidently the obverse of point (a), but it needs to be stressed in its own right. Theory is not static and the mind is not strait-jacketed by rigid conceptual categories. Theories are free, flexible and responsive, as developments in philosophy of science and general epistemology since Tennant have served to remind us. Perception is not merely the imposing of a conceptual grid on inchoate *sensa*, not merely the creation of form, but, as Dorothy Emmet has put it, 'creation of form arising out of an initial situation of interrelated processes' within which 'the experiencing subject is a responsive centre'.(8)

(c) The third area in which the principle of reciprocity operates concerns the relation between insight and inference. Tennant's openness at the genetic level – the level of sources, of data – does not find a corresponding openness at the noetic level, that is to say, in the apprehension of truth. Tennant's philosophy of mind is ultimately rationalistic: he has no room for insight. His proper rejection of immediacy and self-authenticating intuitions leads him to an over-rationalised view of experience as purely inferential. The world, the soul, other selves and God are all mediate inferences to account for what is given in sensory experience. While Tennant rightly sees that intuition is present in every act of inference (PhTh, I, 379), this does not lead him to conjecture that we have the power of insight whereby we may apprehend realities that elude the plodding procedure of formal inference. Tennant's openness of method is vitiated at the noetic level by the exclusion of insight and with it the real givenness of religious experience.

(d) Our assessment of Tennant's position impinges, finally, on the polarity – or, to stay with the terminology used above, the reciprocal relation – of immanence and transcendence. We have seen that Tennant's weakness lies

in the crucial transition from the facts or phenomena of the world and experience to the religious interpretation of those 'facts'. Tennant's assertion that mere reflection and inference are sufficient to explain this transition does not convince. We can only do justice to the phenomena of religious experience by parting company with the inhibiting rationalism of the philosophy of mind espoused by Tennant and by calling upon the resources of an alternative epistemological tradition. We need to postulate the transcendent capacity of mind working in the tacit dimension – to invoke Plato's 'leaping spark', the *lumen siccum* of the Cambridge Platonists, Coleridge's 'Reason', Polanyi's 'personal knowledge', Lonergan's 'insight'.

The insight of faith arises from the sheer givenness of our experience of God in which we now encounter a reality that questions, judges and reforms the theories and preconception that we bring to it. This insight can be sparked off by aesthetic or moral experience and by the limit situations of life. It may be mediated by natural or personal symbols of the divine. It will certainly reflect our cultural background and intellectual history. But if, as Tennant would have it, theistic belief could only ever be read *into* experience and never read *out* of it, it would never arise in the first place. Now Tennant himself admits that God's immanence in the world is an active, not merely a passive relation (PhTh, II, 211). But if this is the case, we can go on to draw the conclusion that Tennant himself will not draw and to say that if God can be inferred *from* the world, it is solely because he is already apprehended *through* the world.[9] Here, however, we seem to approach the limits of purely philosophical enquiry into the nature of religious experience, for when Christian theology itself speaks of the givenness of our knowledge of God, it is speaking the language of *grace.*

1. J. MacQuarrie, *Twentieth-Century Religious Thought,* Loandon 1963, 71ff; J. Passmore, *A Hundred Years of Philosophy,* Harmondsworth 1968, 541; W. Nicholls, *Systematic and Philosophical Theology,* Harmondsworth 1969; H.D. Lewis, *Philosophy of Religion* (Teach Yourself Books), London 1965, 140, 224, F.R. Tennant, *Philosophical Theology,* 2 vols, Cambridge 1928, 1930 (hereinafter cited in the text as PhTh); ibid.m *Philosophy of the Sciences,* Cambridge 1932 (hereinafter cited in the text as PhSc).
2. N.L.A. Lash in M. Goulder, ed, *Incarnation and Myth: the Debate Continued,* London 1979, 19ff.
3. F.D.E. Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith,* ET Edinburgh 1928, 76. See also my article, 'Friedrich Schleiermacher and the Science of Theology', *S.J.T.*, xxxii (1979), 19-43.
4. Schleiermacher, op. cit., 12ff; R. Otto, *The Idea of the Holy,* Harmondsworth 1959, passim.
5. Schleiermacher, op. cit., 5ff, 17; Otto, op. cit., 21, 24.
6. R. Descartes, *Discourse on Method and the Mediations,* Harmondsworth 1968 (Penguin Classics), 58ff (Discourse 4).
7. R. Hepburn, *Christianity and Paradox,* London 1958, 47f.
8. D. Emmett, *The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking,* London 1945, 189.
9. See here D.L. Scudder, *Tennant's Philosophical Theology,* Yale and London 1940, 98.

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MEANING WITHOUT ORDER?

STEPHEN PLATTEN

Stating the obvious is an enterprise rarely helpful to the world at large. Still more is this true when the obvious appears by all accounts to be wrong. Exactly this sort of experience presents itself on occasions within the canonical scriptures, with regards to rewards and punishments. Psalms and lessons within the Divine Office often press the point home. For example, at one point the Anglican order places Psalm 37 alongside Proverbs 10. The thirty-fourth verse of Psalm 37 runs,

> 'Wait for the Lord and keep to his way,
> and he will exalt you to possess the land:
> you will look on the destruction of the wicked.'

and then verse 37,

> 'Mark the blameless man, and behold the upright:
> for there is posterity for the man of peace.'

The irritation runs deep, for apart from the dubious morality of such thoughts, the shallow doctrine of providence espoused seems in practice untrue. One's irritation at such thoughts may well increase, as one reads the Old Testament lesson, the first ten verses of Proverbs 10. Again the entire section seems to exhibit much of the same shallowness, but perhaps verse 3 reaches down to the very pit,

> 'The Lord does not let the righteous go hungry,
> but he thwarts the craving of the wicked.'

A few moments reflection reveal the manifest falsehood here contained.

Now it is not the intention here to illustrate a number of defective doctrines of providence in the Old Testament, for on such selective quotation it would hardly be just. Throughout the Old Testament, of course, one discovers a variety of views. Indeed, in reaction, one's mind might wander to other writers, provoking an initial response of something like, 'Thank God for Ecclesiastes!' Koheleth, of course, will have nothing to do with such vain thoughts. In 4.1 he remarks,

> 'And behold the tears of the oppressed, and they had no-one to comfort them! On the side of their oppressors there was power, and there was no-one to comfort them.'

and with still greater force in 9.11,

> 'Again I saw that under the sun the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, nor bread to the wise, nor riches to the intelligent, nor favour to the men of skill; but time and chance happen to them all.'

These last words bring us to the very centre of my area of puzzlement. Is there any rhyme or reason in God's dealings with men? How much sense does it make to talk of God working his purpose out? Is a worthwhile doctrine of providence possible, and if it is, does creation issue from God in a clear pattern or is randomness and indeed disorder part of the very nature of things? Certainly in the past, the mainstream of Christian theology seems to have opted for some form of ordered sequence of events leading to some final *telos*. This theological thread is one which is traceable right back to our roots in Jewish monotheism, as the passages quoted above show fairly clearly. Search the psalter and rarely is the triumph of the wicked taken with any seriousness. (Psalm 37 explores the difficulty with much sensitivity, but in the end it is assumed that evil will only bring destruction.) Again, the numerous theologies rooted in salvation history, from the Deuteronomist, through St Luke, and up to the present day seem to assert a similar point. A purpose is clear for all to see if only we open our eyes widely enough.

Now the culmination of the process of thought for Christian theology lay in the teleological argument. For Aquinas, the deduction of such an argument began with the obvious orderliness of the universe, from which could be inferred a supreme intelligence, the originator of such order, whom everyone knew to be God. It is an argument which has passed through many vicissitudes. We are still beckoned by many to look at the natural world and discern God's tell-tale footprints upon the sands of space and time. We are told that such signs of order are discernible on both the micro and macro scale. So we are directed to the regularity observed in the structure of the atom. Electrons speed around the nucleus in beautifully defined energy-levels. Then there is the phenomenon of life. Each animal seems purpose-built to live out its life in its own environment. Giraffes have long necks to reach food on high branches – chameleons change colour and disappear from human view, and so the list could be multiplied. But as if this were not enough, the universe itself fits together like the bricks of a child's playroom. Animals and plant-life are but the beginning in Augustine's great chain of being. Then we can move on beyond the earth to contemplate the tapestry of the heavens. The planets and stars in their courses have their fixed places, like the bricks in the fairy castles of the child's mind. All this reaches its culmination in the beautifully structured universe of Dante's 'Divine Comedy'. And from here, 'tis but one step to the Creator, so the hymn,

> 'Crown him, ye morning stars of light,
> Who fixed this floating ball.'

For many, of course, this pattern is not obvious, and so as we noted teleology in theology has passed through many vicissitudes. The concept of the great chain of being has been challenged over the centuries. The existence of predator and victim has pointed to 'nature red in tooth and claw'. Others have found purpose and form more difficult to discern – possibly they did not play with bricks in their youth!

Of late, this whole notion of purpose and easily defined providence has undergone another fearsome attack. The aggressor has been that war-weary warrior – Darwinian evolutionary theory, sometimes seen as a supporter of teleology. The greatest impact has come from Jacques Monod's 'Chance and Necessity', a book of exemplary clarity and hence challenge.[1] Monod's book is a paradoxical mixture of old and new, both in its science and in its underlying philosophical convictions. The theory of evolution propounded is traditional and Darwinian – what is novel is his lucid justification of such a theory, using the insights of molecular biology. The philosophy underpinning all is Cartesian, the universe is reduced to mathematics – his innovation is the raising of this insight to that of an atheistic metaphysical principle.

The basis of Monod's theory is simple enough. Evolution,

and so life, is based on the twin notions of chance and necessity. The reproductive life-processes throw up *chance* mutations. Mutations which are 'fitted' to their environment survive and indeed are perpetuated by the *necessity* of invariant reproduction, which he shows to be a highly conservative process. Life reproduces itself with few mistakes. It is by this two-pronged process, then, that evolution marches on. Monod makes the point that any teleonomy or purposeful activity exhibited by living things cannot be prior to their appearance on the evolutionary scene. Randomness precedes invariance and so teleonomy becomes a secondary factor. If the giraffe has a long neck, and this is helpful to his survival, it is merely by chance that he received such physical advantage. The advantage happily ensured his survival thereafter. This realisation leads Monod to reject all animisms, that is, theories which postulate some form of purposeful development of the human race and the world as a whole. These exiled animisms include all religions, many philosophies and, indeed, Marxism. For Monod, the objective knowledge represented by scientific thought makes such animisms redundant, and so meaningless myths. Their usefulness lies in a myth-strewn past. In a similar vein to the writings of Camus, man must recognise his loneliness in the world and come to terms with it. All life, including the moral life must be based upon objective knowledge. It is a stark creed, apparently facing despair and loneliness with a stoic defiance.

Not surprisingly, it has had its critics, not least from behind the Christian ramparts.[2] Such criticisms have varied in their potency, but at least three arguments have been advanced by a number of writers. The first of these common criticisms relates to Monod's Cartesian philosophical foundations.[3] It is perfectly clear that it is unsatisfactory to reduce all to mathematics; this is reductionism in the true sense of the word. Much of biology and most of the human sciences are not reducible to this level. Mathematics remains a servant and not the master of these disciplines. The second two criticisms appear to spring from this root and are in one sense philosophically derivative therefrom. First of all, is objective knowledge, based upon the model of the empirical sciences, the only form of knowledge? Few philosophers today would adhere to such a sterile creed, which smacks of the pre-war Vienna school of pure logical positivism. Surely poetic, moral and indeed religious modes of expression can speak of reality, and that in an irreducible manner. Finally, Monod's theory revives the age-old argument between atomism and holism. For Monod, all is explicable in terms of an atomised world. The greater is always explained only by the behaviour of its smaller component parts. Biology and physics are, as we noted, finally reducible to mathematics. And yet, surely the whole is greater than the sum of its parts? A group of people behaves quite differently from a set of individuals acting alone.[4] The behaviour of a football crowd is sufficient to clinch this point. Physics has shown similar truths to be applicable in terms of particles and bodies acting upon each other.

Now all of this criticism seems reasonable, but at times, Christian critics go on from here and appear to submerge themselves in a flood of Teilhardian euphoria.[5] The success of their own critique goes to their heads, and somehow out of the wreckage of Monod's theory, rises a new Teilhardian synthesis which flies in the face of chance and randomness. Flying up like a phoenix, it arrives in a new age of untrammelled optimism, where presumably at the close of the day, all will end happily ever after. The fallacy assumed here is that any notion of chance is either anathema to the Christian theologian, or unnecessary in any real sense. The most measured reaction to Monod is exemplified in the work of Arthur Peacocke. He carefully analyses the meaning of chance, probability and randomness, and shows how and when these are necessary concepts, to which we must needs be alert.[6] Perhaps his crucial sentence is,

> '. . . *pace* Monod, I see no reason why this randomness of molecular event in relation to biological consequences, that Monod rightly emphasises, has to be raised to the level of a metaphysical principle interpreting the universe.'[7]

In other words, the random movement of molecules is not a sufficient principle to explain the path taken by the entire universe.

Accepting this counter, however, the result of this slightly tedious dialogue on the borderlands of science, philosophy and theology may be vital for our doctrine of providence. Surely we should learn something from Monod's contentions. Chance can now be seen to play a considerable part in the workings of the universe. In some manner, randomness must be seen as part of the way things are. God's way with his world does appear at times to pass near the roulette table. Disorder and randomness do not necessarily imply meaninglessness. Instead, any meaning included within the processes of the universe may be considerably more subtle.[8] Equally, the converse is true. Order need not imply meaning. Indeed, the eighteenth century Deists reduced the reality of God almost to vanishing point, whilst rejoicing in the patterns discernible within the world and seeing God as no more than their originator. Elizabeth Templeton makes this point in a discussion of the place of disorder.[9] Hence it should be clear that an acceptance of randomness need not deny that the Almighty originally span the roulette wheel, but this will be explored later on. My initial point is that a reasoned acceptance of randomness leads us toward a more satisfactory view of God's providence and a more acute awareness in man of his own contingency. It will mean that the course of God's world is not predetermined and it may mean that the final goal is not set before all time.

We arrive, then, at the second stage of our argument, having taken randomness into our theological system and as part of God's way with his creation. As children we are given bricks, but there is no programme as to how they should be fitted together.[10] Each brick is not numbered for its position in the structure, as in the transatlantic removal of a Scottish castle, or of London Bridge. Instead, the *possibility* remains, it seems, that all could end up as a heap of bricks, in total disorder.

Disorder brings us to a second scientific concept related to that of randomness and germane to these reflections, the concept of entropy. The study of thermodynamics has shown that all systems in the universe are tending in the direction of greater disorder. To put it in technical terms, entropy is always increasing. Once again this is a difficult pill to swallow and take into the Christian theological digestive system. Yet still it is a challenge which we cannot

avoid, since it is concerned with the sum and hence the result of the randomness already explored. If simple teleologies and doctrines of providence are trivial and manifestly untrue, why should there necessarily be any tendency toward order? If randomness is part of God's creation, then will it not tend to ever increasing disorder? In the article referred to earlier, Elizabeth Templeton[11] has demonstrated how Christian theology is soaked in the notion of order and she appeals for much of this to be squeezed out. Seeking for order often mirrors our own desperate searching for ultimate security. But if God's way with his creation includes randomness, then surely at some point we must expect an increase in entropy. So much of our experience of the world seems to be in terms of disturbance and disorder.

At this point, however, a number of issues are raised by parallels in science. The first is that it has become clear that it is possible for steady-state systems to operate within a general environment of increasing chaos. A human analogy would be that often a highly ordered mind keeps a desk and a study which bear comparison with an realistic picture of the *inferno*. From within science, this model seems to be the only possible explanation for the emergence of life, from what is generally termed the 'primaeval soup'.[12] The suggestion is that within such disorder, there are systems which can effectively neutralise themselves and work the other way. If man is now, in some sense, the business manager of evolution, this will probably mean that chance is not king of the universe. It is possible for us to choose one direction rather than another, although of course the most distant consequences will still appear random to the naked eye.

The second set of issues raised by our glance at entropy is that which revolves around notions of order, law and chance. What do we mean when we talk of order and is there any consensus? As I look down a kaleidoscope, I see a pattern of many colours, and as I turn the screen, so the patterns change. Order is scrambled, a new pattern is formed. So with the familiar trick of the diagram of two faces. Some see it as two faces looking to each other, others as a standing goblet. Finally, on a still more banal level, I sit daydreaming at the ceiling during a lecture. After a few minutes, all sorts of fantasy have been born, the cracks in the plaster have become the outlines of a pig sniffing a basket of straw. It becomes clear that, as we go on, order and pattern and purpose develop out of the human mind, at least to some extent. Order is the necessary construct which we place upon our world in order to make life bearable. It is presumably against such false constructs that Beckett and Ionesco are protesting in their drama. How do we decide when such projected patters hold no validity? Presumably one of the major criteria is consensus. But consensus will change and this is just as true in science. Earlier views seemed to point to more obvious patterns. The atom, for example, was built of three basic particles locked into a structured pattern. Evolution was purposeful development. Now the atom is built of any number of particles, whose positions can only be described in terms of probability, and which often behave more like waves than particles anyway. Such an account may or may not be seen as describing order. Or again, evolution now seems to issue from chance and randomness. Order is less than obvious. How contagious is the disease which disperses order?

Suffice to say that patterns need not vanish without a trace. There is still predictability even if a variety of paths must be left open. This holds good within the worlds of science and theology. Arthur Peacocke notes that law and chance need not simply be juxtaposed. Rather, the world can be seen in terms of different potentialities. They are there to develop and seek a number of possible targets. We return to the child's playroom. Any good set of bricks includes cubes, cylindrical blocks, arches, pyramids and so forth. The child has a vast number of possible buildings which he may erect. He could make a bridge, a railway station or a tower, but in each case the bricks will determine something but not everything of the final result. The possibility of total disorder is still there, but working within the system is the child – an island of potential order in a sea of entropy.

Discussion of randomness and disorder has immediate implications for both theological methodology and metaphysical discourse. The openness of the world just described requires theology to be viewed as an intellectual and experiential process. The very unpredictability of the way of the world will require us constantly to be renewing our theological reflections. The same must be true, then, of the metaphysical speculations which will ensue. What exactly is the Almighty up to all of the time? What kind of a God is implied by the picture which has developed of a universe where much seems to remain in the melting pot for most of the time?

Certainly it points us in the direction of process theology. Any talk of potentiality immediately calls Whitehead to mind.[13] Now, amongst others, Austin Farrer has criticised process theology for limiting God too much.[14] The problem, he suggests, is that God becomes so relative to the world and human response as to be virtually contingent upon it. Farrer himself is not wedded to all of the mediaeval absolutes and allows the life of the world to affect God. God and man drift apart, when man fails to conform his will to that of God. Farrer's thesis cannot be accepted wholly, however. For he goes on to talk of God as having a life apart from the world. It is difficult to know in what sense we are to understand this. If it suggests that as well as relating to humanity, God lives a life relating only to himself, then it seems difficult to give this content. For if this is so, how are we ever to have gained knowledge of such a life? Secondly, it seems to imply the possibility of us climbing into the mind of God. Once again, this seems to be a logical impossibility.[15] Indeed this is one of the main drawbacks to the social doctrines of the Trinity, upon which Farrer calls for support. The attractive part of Farrer's thesis, however, is his admission that God is affected by his world, coupled with his notion of God's 'prior actuality'. To state it in simplistic terms, this second concept asserts that God came first[16] and so preserves his transcendence.

If I should happen to have children, then as a loving parent, I cannot help but relate to and be affected by my offspring. If my young son falls into the road and is hit by a car, I experience an agony too. If he should shout at me or deny me love, then I shall be hurt. Both of these experiences will affect me profoundly and may in some sense alter the course of my life practically and emotionally. None of these facts, however, alters the case that it was my decision, a contingent decision, that set in train the process whereby the child was born, and through which these later facts be came a possibility. The initiative lay with me in the beginning,

and, on Farrer's model, so it does with God. His existence precedes ours, both logically and temporally.

This approach would fit well with our earlier conclusions. The bricks are there entirely in a contingent sense. Alongside this, however, man is left freedom – creation as a whole develops from potentialities towards one out of a number of possible targets. The randomness and disorder, which are part of man's experience of God's creation are not compromised. We are not seers looking out upon a planned and assured future. Instead, we live out the everdeveloping history of God's world.

We cannot, however, leave the story here. The game with the bricks leaves us with some still unanswered questions. These concern the morality of that game. Might not the final pattern achieved with the bricks be trivial? Or indeed might not the final result be ultimate disorder, the bricks heaped in no pattern whatsoever – the child left with empty deams? Moreover, in the end, can the child do anything about it – does he not operate in a random and heartless world, unprogrammed and unresponsive? Doesn't the very randomness we perceive deny all our efforts to intervene? Many of these questions are caught up together in lines of Louis McNeice, who writes,

> 'It's no go my honey love, it's no go my poppet;
> Work your hands from day to day, the winds will blow the profit.
> The glass is falling hour by hour, the glass will fall for ever,
> But if you break the bloody glass you won't hold up the weather.'[17]

But the thorough going fatalism implied here is not the inevitable conclusion of our foregoing argument. Indeed, man's responsibility in such an 'un-programmed' creation is much the greater. So W.H. Vanstone,

> 'If God is love, and if the universe is his creation, then for the being of the universe God is totally expended in precarious endeavour, of which the issue, as triumph or tragedy has passed from his hands. For that issue, as triumphant or as tragic, God waits upon the response of His creation.'[18]

Hence all is not chance, yet all is far from predetermined. Man's response will affect how potentialities move towards the numerous possible targets.

This has obvious implications for theology and human behaviour. We can see that our responsibility as co-creators with God no longer allows us to sit back and let the world go by. To revive McNeice's images, at times we may be required to break the 'bloody glass'. Elizabeth Templeton catches the mood well, when she notes,

> 'If . . . there are theological grounds for dissatisfaction with the given structures of human existence, then it is less easy for faith to sleep so promiscuously with acceptance of the status quo.'[19]

This means that theology holds immediate significance for our attitude to the world. We have the opportunity to choose paths and potentialities. The constructs of order and purpose which we place upon the world are often too glib, and assume a predetermined pattern which removes from us any responsibility. Entropy may need to increase, theology and morality will ever be exploring and reconstructing. The venture will constantly open up new vistas to the theological eye.

One further question remains, however, as to the morality of a system including such randomness. Dostoievsky has one of his characters reacting to such apparent randomness experienced in the form of indiscriminate suffering, by returning to God the ticket for such a life.[20] God there may be, but such a perverse God is not one with whom he would wish to relate. Or again, Thomas Hardy sees all in terms of the fates; evil powers dominate the universe, and so, at the end of 'Tess of the D'Urbervilles', after Tess's death, he can note, 'The president of the Immortals had ended his sport with Tess'.[21] To such charges, the Christian theologian has no easy answers. For many Christians, the only answer is to say that, at that point, their awareness of God's love within the universe is sufficient to hold these other horrors in tension. In the end, however, this is less of an answer that a rejoinder within the individual's own consciousness. But then no-one expects an answer to the problem of evil in ten lines.

The conclusion, which this entire enterprise is likely to provoke, is that it raises as many questions as it solves. What has become of the Platonic/Augustinian view of an ordered world? Are there any signposts or guidelines which can lead us through this confusion and disorder? Indeed, what is the net result of our reflections?

The initial conclusion is simple enough. Randomness and increasing disorder are two concepts to be taken with greater seriousness in the process of theological exploration.[22] In practical terms, this means that the course of God's world is not predetermined, but instead the various paths which we trace are open.[23] Brian Hebblethwaite appears to assume the point in a recent paper:

> 'If . . . we can accept that God has made a genuinely open world, in which the precise course of events is not predetermined, and in which the emergent human creature is genuinely free to make or mar his world, we avoid attributing the world's ills directly to the divine causality – though, of course, we believe God is ultimately responsible for making such a world.'[24]

Man is thus allowed freedom and response. There is still, however, a further question raised by this whole approach. Have we now opened up the world to total chance, in the sense of absolute randomness? To put it more explicitly, by suspending any defined notion of purpose, do we suspend any defined notion of goal? Can we have our cake and eat it? We return to the child's bricks. It seems that the only fixed commodity is the number and variety of the bricks. It will be up to the child to select just those he wishes. He may not use them all. This is bound to mean that the final goal is affected by the process of building.

The central theological question is: is it merely the path which is unclear, or is the destination unclear as well? Following from our analogy, it would seem that the latter must be the case. God's final purpose may not have been fixed prior to all time and before all creation. Instead it may be evolving with his world.[25] To suggest anything else seems first of all to be attempting to enter the mind of God. How can we know his plan for his creation? Also it seems to make any notion of God's interaction with his world purely apparent or theoretical. If God is affected by the world, then this seems bound to affect the final result.

Now all this may seem highly disquieting. Indeed it may ask of us, how could we commend to others or even to ourselves a theistic context to life which had to hold in suspense what the final outcome might be? Are there any logical or moral grounds which could permit us to take such a gamble? It seems perhaps that there are two illuminators which may persuade us to take the risk. The first is hinted at in the child's bricks once again. We accepted that the number and variety of bricks was limited, and so, consequently, must be the possible number of targets. So with our world, we receive it as given, and despite the myriad random possibilities, there is still a limit imposed by this givenness. We can only work with this world and our reflections and experiences within and upon it. The paths and goals are still countless, but not infinite. This is effectively the point of accepting Farrer's 'prior actuality' of God. God comes first and the givenness of the world is rooted in the transcendent creator.

The second constraint is hinted at within our quotation from Vanstone. We assume God to be loving. This assumption in itself is a gamble, but for the Christian, presumably, the signs are seen as sufficient in this world to take it on trust. The logic underlying this assumption is well stated in this remark by the process theologian Schubert Ogden:

> 'Logically prior to every particular religious assertion is an original confidence in the meaning and worth of life, through which not simply all our religious answers, but even our religious questions, first become possible or have any sense.'[26]

In itself, the assertion that God is all-loving can too easily collapse into the worst sort of religious cliché, for where is the evidence for such love? Perhaps two clues might be suggested. The first lies simply in our own experience of the world. Often tragedy and evil appear to triumph, but intermittently, shafts of light may break through. Evil is transformed – love seems to be the ultimate victor. On its own, this clue is not sufficient; it merely hints at the possibility of a loving God. The second clue for the Christian lies in the point of focus found in Jesus. The overarching theme discernible in the New Testament reflections upon Jesus is one of self-emptying, self-denying love. Of course, it is recorded in so many different ways. This we might expect from the varied personalities of those who experienced its power. This, however, does not weaken the claim for the centrality of such love in God. This reaches its culmination in the manner of Jesus' death and the transformation it effected and still effects. God seems to lie at the centre of this paradigm of inexhaustible love. In the final analysis, there is no objective proof of these assertions, but for the Christian they are sufficient to allow him to take the necessary gamble of faith.

However impenetrable, then, the final goal may seem, we assume it to be guaranteed by the love of God. This makes the journey no less daunting, hair-raising and at times insecure, but it does give meaning to life. Meaning then is fixed in love and not in order and design. Love in all human life is perhaps the most random of all our experiences. Relationships spring up when least expected and they require immense risk and often result in great hurt and disorder. The final goal or union in such relationships may often be an experience of ultimate disorientation and apparent total disorder, but the worth of the journey and destination are hardly in question. Might not the journey with God be so too?

1. J. Monod, *Chance and Necessity*. (E.T.) London, 1972.
2. Notably: W.H. Thorpe, *Purpose in a World of Chance*. Oxford, 1978., J. Lewis (ed). *Beyond Chance and Necessity*, London, 1974. A.R. Peacocke, *Creation and the World of Science*. Oxford, 1979.
3. *Beyond Chance and Necessity*, op. cit., espec. Warnock pp.7ff, and Lewis pp.27ff.
4. This is the main argument of Reinhold Niebuhr's classic, *Moral Man and Immoral Society*. New York, 1932.
5. Espec. W.H. Thorpe, op. cit., and note a recent revival of interest in Teilhard, an example being John Cowburn's treatment of the problem of evil in *Shadows and the Dark*. London, 1979.
6. Note Peacocke's useful analysis of what chance means to the scientists, op. cit. pp.90ff.
7. Peacocke, op. cit. p.94.
8. Note the interesting article in *The Guardian*, May 1st 1980, p.11, entitled 'The subatomic anarchy show'. This takes up Einstein's point that 'God doesn't play dice' and shows how Quantum theory and the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle have made subatomic phenomena far less predictable and more indetermiuate, a point also made by Peacocke. op. cit. Ch. III.
9. 'In Defence of Disorder', *Theology*, November 1977, pp 413ff.
10. I am grateful to the Revd. Dr. Jeff Astley for pointing to an alternative image, that of an author producing a literary work. Neither image, however, is final. The author image gives a clearer picture of *creation ex hihilo*, but undoubtedly the child and the bricks is a clearer image for demonstrating *randomness*. This only serves to emphasise the general disclaimer of the Christian theologian on the question of analogy.
11. Templeton, op. cit.
12. For a good account see Peacocke, op cit. pp.98f.
13. I am not, however, arguing in favour of A.N. Whitehead's thorough-going process metaphysic, where God seems to be reduced almost to the contingent level of man.
14. 'The Prior Actuality of God', in A.M. Farrer, *Reflective Faith*, London, 1972, pp.178ff. This receives a sympathetic discussion in an unpublished article by Edward Henderson of Louisiana State University.
15. This particularly follows from John Hick's notion of an 'epistemic distance' between man and God. See p.54 in *God and the Universe of Faiths*, London, 1973, and elsewhere.
16. Only in this logical sense might we assert God's existence apart from man.
17. Louis McNeice, 'Bagpipe Music' (Final stanza). *Collected Poems*, London 1966.
18. W.H. Vanstone, *Love's Endeavour, Love's Expense*. London, 1977. p.74. This entire chapter, and indeed the whole book, seems to imply an 'unprogrammed' universe.
19. Templeton op cit p.421f.
20. F. Dostoievsky, *The Brothers Karamazov*, Pt.I. p.276 (Penguin edition), Harmondsworth 1958.
21. Thomas Hardy, *Tess of the D'Urbervilles*, p.508 (Greenwood edition) London, 1967.
22. John Hick is concerned to embrace a certain randomness in his notion of mystery and suffering, in his 'vale of soul-making' theodicy. If suffering were not random, then all could be predicted and explained in terms of simple reward and punishment, which would trivialise his approach to suffering. See *Evil and the God of Love*, London, 1966 pp.369ff. and *Universe*, op cit. pp.58ff.
23. See Frank Kermode, *The Genesis of Secrecy*, Harvward, 1979, especially the concluding words, p.145, 'For the world is our beloved codex . . . .'
24. B. Hebblethwaite 'Some Reflections on Predestination, Providence and Divine Foreknowledge, *Religious Studies* 15. No. 4 (Dec. 1979) pp.432ff. At this point, Hebblethwaite is concerned with the problem of evil, but only within the context of the extent or possibility of divine foreknowledge.
25. See the argument jon the 'evolution of love' in A. Elphinstone *Freedom, Suffering and Love*. London 1976.
26. Schubert Ogden, *The Reality of God and Other Essays*, London, 1967, p.34.

HOW DID THE HOLY SPIRIT GET INTO THE TRINITY?

J.M. ROSS

There is no good reason to doubt that within a generation of his death Jesus was widely regarded in the Church as not merely Messiah and Son of God, but as God himself in human flesh. This is stated or implied in many places in the New Testament, if the Greek is allowed to yield its natural sense. A few examples are sufficient for the present purpose. As early as the already existing hymn incorporated by Paul into Phi. 2.5-11, that status of Jesus before his incarnation is described as "equality with God". In 2 Thes. 1.12 Paul wrote "according to the grace of our God and Lord, Jesus Christ." In Rom. 9.5. he wrote of the Israelites "of whom is Christ in his human aspect, who is over all things, God blessed for ever." The writer to the Hebrews (1.8) applies to Christ the words of the Psalm (44 LXX) which says "Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever." In Mark 4.35-41 the stilling of the storm is narrated in language borrowed from the first chapter of Jonah and ends with the question "Who then is this, that even the wind and the sea obey him?" implying that the Lord Yahweh is present in person. According to Acts 20.28 (in the best manuscripts) Paul referred to "the church of God, which he purchased to himself with his own blood." The first chapter of John's Gospel asserts that the word was God, and that (according to the best manuscripts of verse 18) "the only-begotten God who is in the bosom of the Father has declared God to us." The Epistle to Titus mentions (2.13) "the glorious manifestation of our great God and Saviour Jesus Christ"; and in the book of Revelation divine honours are paid to the Lamb, both separately (5.12) and jointly with God (5.13). The same language — alpha and omega, first and last — is used of God (1.8, 4.8) and of Christ (1.17 and 2.8).

There is equally no good reason to doubt that quite early the Holy Spirit was regarded by the Church as on a level with the Father and the Son. Just as Christ and God are at times equated in the New Testament, so are the Holy Spirit and God. In 2 Cor. 3,17–18 the Lord of Exodus 34.34 is identified with the Holy Spirit who gives liberty to Christian believers. At Acts 5.9 Peter, who had already rebuked Ananias for trying to deceive God (verse 4), rebuked Sapphira in her turn for trying to tempt the Spirit of God; it was the same thing in different language. Thus it is not surprising that the Church quite early came to speak of God in a threefold manner. We find this in the New Testament not only in the well-known cases of the benediction at the end of 2 Corinthians and the baptismal formula in Matt. 28.19, but in many other places where the three persons of the godhead are linked together. An interesting example is 1 Cor. 12.4-6, where for rhetorical effect Paul cites the three persons of the single godhead one after the other as the source of the various spiritual gifts. "There are diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit; and diversities of ministries, but the same Lord (i.e. Jesus); and diversities of workings, but the same God (sc. the Father) who works all things in all." Other examples of the same collocation may be found at Eph. 2.18 ("through Christ we both have access in one Spirit to the Father") and Jude 20 ("praying in the Holy Spirit, keep yourselves in the love of God, waiting for the mercy of our Lord Jesus Christ").

But though the New Testament writers thought of God as threefold, they are not always clear as to the practical distinction between God the Son and God the Holy Spirit. Paul can use identical language to describe the work of Christ and of the Spirit. For instance at Rom.8.9-11 he writes "You are not in the flesh but in the Spirit, if the Spirit of God dwells in you. But if anyone does not possess the Spirit of Christ, he does not belong to him. If Christ is in you . . . the spirit is life through righteousness. But if the Spirit of him who raised Jesus from the dead dwells in you . . ." The dwelling of Christ within the believer and the dwelling of the Spirit within him mean precisely the same thing. Similarly in 1 Cor. 2.9-16 Paul interchangeably says we have divine wisdom because we have the Spirit of God and because we have the mind of Christ. At 1 Cor.15.45 Paul says that the second Adam "became a life-giving spirit", applying to God the Son the chief attribute of God the Spirit. This conflation of Son and Spirit is not merely Pauline. According to the Fourth Gospel Jesus said he would send the Spirit to abide with his disciples for ever (14.16) and remind them of his teaching (14.26), but in the same discourse he said he would himself make his abode with them (verse 23), and in the next chapter we read that Christ is to be as intimately related to his own as a vine is to its branches. It would appear that the early Church was convinced that their Lord in consequence of his resurrection was alive and active in the world, ready to take up his abode in the hearts and lives of his people, so that they could live as his agents, speak his words, and carry out his will. But if this was true of Christ the Son, what need was there of a third person of the Trinity? By all means talk of the spirit of Christ (with a small s, according to our modern orthography) and the spirit of God, meaning the divine influence exercised upon those who commit themeselves to God through faith in Christ; but why call this influence God, in the same sense as Christ is God? Why did they not rest content with what is in fact the religion of many Christians today to whom the Holy Spirit is no more that another name for the risen Christ, so that for practical purposes they are binitarians?

Professor G.W. Lampe in his Bampton Lectures *(God as Spirit,* 1977, pp. 133, 144, 168-9) discussed the question why the early Church found it necessary to distinguish Jesus as God and the Holy Spirit as God. His solution to the problem is not very clearly expressed, but he seems to have thought that the Christians felt the need of a Mediator between God and this world, a Mediator who would unite the divine and human natures and therefore different from the universal Logos or Spirit postulated by the Stoics. It was not sufficient to identify the existing presence of the risen Christ in the hearts of believers with the Holy Spirit, because the Christians looked forward to a personal encounter with Christ at his return to earth — an encounter not adequately described in terms of Spirit. This explanation is less than convincing because it ought to have been possible for the writers of the New Testament to speak in terms both of the indwelling Christ here and now and the future person-to-person encounter at the *parousia*, both of these concepts being closely connected with God's power and influence, without the need to deify that power and influence as a separate entity under the name of the Holy Spirit.

No doubt the early Christians found it necessary to distinguish between Christ the Second Adam or incarnate Logos and the Spirit which inspired his works and prophetic utterances on earth (Luke 4.1, 18); no doubt also it was

convenient to distinguish between the exalted Christ who was to come again as Judge and the Spirit by which in the mean time he gave life to believers; but why did they think of this Spirit as God and not just as the power or influence of God?

It would seem that the problem is not soluble so long as we start from the deification of Christ and then go on to consider why it was necessary to deify the Spirit also. It is however questionable whether this was the way that the Trinity took shape as a matter of history. It is unlikely that the earliest Christians would have identified Christ with God immediately after his resurrection; in those days resurrection from death was not thought of as a unique act of which only a god could be capable. It is probable that only gradually did the Church come to the conclusion that Jesus had been God himself on earth; it was perhaps twenty years before the hymn quoted in Philippians was composed. But while Christology was taking shape it is not at all unlikely that a separate doctrine of the Holy Spirit was rapidly developing as a result of the experience of Pentecost. Whatever actually happened on that occasion, those who experienced it must have thought it quite unique — something new in the history of Israel, literally an epoch-making event. They may not have immediately understood it in terms of another manifestation of the risen Christ, for there was no visible sign of the person of Jesus, but they would at once have seen it as a fulfilment of Joel's prophecy that in the last days the Spirit of the Lord would be poured out on all flesh, i.e. on Jews and gentiles alike. It was clear to those who had been through the experience of Pentecost that the Spirit of the Lord God who had anointed Isaiah (Is.61.1) was now animating all the Lord's people.

So the problem before the first Christians was not "If Christ is God, how are we to think of the Spirit?", but rather "If God is personally present by a novel outpouring of his Spirit, how are we to think of Christ?". They could not identify him with the Holy Spirit, because the Spirit — God's creative and enlivening power — cannot be thought of as assuming human form, dying, rising, ascending to heaven, and returning visibly to earth in judgement. But God in Christ, intervening for the salvation of the world, could hardly be given lower status that the Spirit of God so powerfully present at Pentecost and in the other divine manifestations displayed by believers as a consequence of their baptism. Therefore if the Holy Spirit is God on earth, no less honour must be given to Christ who must be thought of as also God on earth and now seated at the right hand of the Father. No doubt it took some time for the Church to clarify the distinction between the Son and the Spirit, but this account may explain how it was that the Church became trinitarian and not binitarian.



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BOOK REVIEWS

An Introduction to Old Testament Study.

John H. Hayes. SCM Press 1982. pp.400. £5.95

Few words have proved more misleading to those contemplating the serious study of the Bible that 'introduction'. One wonders how many intending students have looked at the Introduction to the Old Testament of, say, Eissfeldt or Fohrer, and have decided at once that if this is the mere introduction, then the real thing must be more complex still, and that biblical study is not for them. The first thing that needs to be said about Hayes' volume, therefore, is that this is introduction in the non-technical sense: what the blurb correctly describes as a "guide and textbook for those coming new to Old Testament study". The book was published in the U.S.A. in 1979, and a small edition distributed in this country; what is here reviewed is the first British edition.

As an introduction to the nature of contemporary Old Testament study if fulfils its purpose admirably. The first chapter is concerned with Canon; then different types of critical study (textual-, source- and form-criticism) are described and their results evaluated. (Literary criticism in the modern sense is not discussed.) The remainder – just over half of the book – is devoted to the Old Testament books themselves, sometimes individually, sometimes grouped together, and the characteristic problems associated with each are set out. Hayes does not attempt to hide from the reader which solution he regards as more likely, but there are no short-cuts of the kind which would obviate the need for students to work at the issues for themselves. The end-product is, inevitably, uneven – the prophetic literature, for example, is dealt with very summarily, though some interesting points are made about the role of prophets — but overall Hayes succeeds in achieving clarity without any minimising of complexities or scholarly disagreements. There are excellent bibliographies for each section; the indexes seem somewhat perfunctory, but this may not be important since the book is so clearly organised.

Detailed comment is inappropriate in a brief review, and would in any case consist much more of discussion of disputed points rather than of disagreement or dissatisfaction. Perhaps more instructive is to note the way in which there is here reflected a different kind of approach to the material from that which has long been customary. Convention has decreed that the literature should be slotted into an outline history of Israel in introductory treatments, as is done by, for example, B.W. Anderson in *The Living World of the Old Testament*. Such an approach works well for some Old Testament books but is very inappropriate for others. Here, though historical study is not decried, the emphasis is to a much greater extent on the books as such. Given this general approach, the scrappy treatment of the prophetic literature is all the more disappoiting; in the index Isaiah (the whole book) is given about as many references as 2 Chronicles or Ecclesiastes; and Ezekiel has fewer still. But a book of this kind should be judged by what it does contain rather than criticised for what is lacking; and on such criteria it can be strongly recommended.

Richard Coggins

Jesus and the Constraints of History (The Bampton Lectures 1980).

A.E. Harvey, Duckworth 1982 pp 184. £7.50

More than a century of questing in various ways for the historical Jesus can leave one wondering if there is any future in it. The influence of each solution or essay is unlikely to outlast its own generation, much less to command a consensus within it. Even scepticism, defended as a theological virtue, and accompanied by a creative use of mythology or an existential identification with the first Christians, can hardly be said to have established a basis of agreement.

Canon A.E. Harvey, in a book developed from his 1980 Bampton Lectures, claims to provide a new approach to counter this pessimism, through the notion of historical "constraints". The most general statements about Jesus, in themselves only a slight development on the minimal historical position such as Kierkegaard's, can be given definition and content when considered in relation to the available options of the wider historical contexts; the yield is a significant quantity and precision of historical information when correlated with the evidence of the gospel traditions. And so we learn what it means to talk of the constraints of the Jewish and Roman political situations, and of the expectation of a new age; what are the constraints on the activity of a teacher of the Law, of a prophetic figure, and of a worker of miracles; and what (more hypothetically) it might mean to talk about 'Christ' as a kind of popular nickname for the 'anointed one' before his death, and so what the consequences might be of talk about him after his death, under the constraints of Jewish monotheism.

The modern reader is likely to approach this book with his own historical contraints, influenced by the way he has been taught to regard questions of the Jesus of History. If he is on the lookout for positive signs, he will recognise them here in the ways of using our growing stock of historical background information and sociological studies to positive effect, with the prospect of giving historical validation to an account of Jesus. If the modern reader is more sceptical, it is unlikely that he will be so readily satisfied. How independent, he may ask, is the independent evidence here employed to historical effect? Others have used the fragments of historical evidence outside the New Testament to advantage. But can one really say that the "historicity" of the crucifixion "is assured by the unusual circumstance that it occurs in the ancient creeds of the church " (p.11)? How independent from the New Testament are the creeds, to provide historical confirmation?

The method might be considered vulnerable in two major respects. Firstly, the potential of an argument from historical constraints might be said to rely on its detailed and systematic application in the context of information theory, and therefore the effect is reduced by an arbitrary use of the notion. Secondly, in the sceptic's eyes, the weak point of the argument must be in the correlation of the background information with the gospel traditions. It is here that the conventional judgements of gospel criticism, the criteria of multiple attestation, of dissimilarity, or the unusual/awkward

idea that proves it must be true, are variously deployed. Thus the evidence from the gospel tradition is found to correspond to one of the available options open to Jesus. But there is selectivity in the choice of gospel material; it suits the process of association of ideas, but it introduces a large element of subjectivity into an open historical enquiry. And there is an optimistic movement back from the evangelist to the original witnesses and ultimately to Jesus himself (as when the range of miracle stories preserved by the evangelists can illustrate Jesus' choice among the options of miracle working - p.111). There may have been all kinds of constraints at work upon individual evangelists in the way they dealt with particular topics, which are quite different from the constraints upon Jesus himself.

We have to tread warily and cautiously, because there are still gaps in our knowledge of the periods and cultures, as well as uncertainty about the contexts of the New Testament writings. Such a correlation required greater certainty about the texts as well as a more comprehensive range of historical options; otherwise the risk might be like the one-eyed man leading the blind on a circular path. And there are other risks as well in this enterprise. At the one extreme the talk of options runs the risk of reducing the decision about Jesus to an assessment of mere potentialities (such reductionism upset J. Enoch Powell writing in the *Spectator*). Or at the other extreme we find a constant pressure to talk about Jesus transcending available options, while this historical method and the limits of the evidence provide no means of assessing innovation (cf. p 87).

But this general critique neglects features of lasting value. It is good that the lectures have been so well expanded and documented. I will certainly go back especially to the concluding chapter on 'Son of God: the Constraint of Monotheism', and to the discussion of Isaiah 61, documented on pp. 152f., which is the basis of the argument about the name 'Christ'.

John M. Court

Paul's Idea of Community. The Early House Churches in their Historical Setting.

Robert Banks. Paternoster Press, 1980. pp. 208 £4.40.

The title and subtitle of this book indicate two distinct kinds of enquiry which are less obviously related than Dr Banks assumes. The subtitle applies to the less extensive but more satisfactory element in what he has to offer. Drawing on some of the work recently done on the sociology of early Christianity, he makes a number of observations about the churches with which Paul was involved, and in doing so, shakes many unnoted anachronisms in the assumptions many of us bring to the reading of Paul's letters. Banks thinks that Christians usually met in quite small groups. In Rome — extending Minear's reconstruction — he pictures not only house-churches but also what sound suspiciously like Christian Unions recruited within the staff of large households and among those practising the same trade (p. 39). These groups contained too many people for them ever to meet as a body; hence Romans 1.7 could not address a church in Rome at all. Even in Corinth, Banks regards a central meeting as infrequent: the maximum capacity of the largest available room was forty-five (p. 42), but even this was too large a number for regular assembly (why? and in any case how does Banks arrive at his estimate? Was Corinth so much less prosperous than Pompeii, where the largest room in the most opulent houses looks as though it would hold about twice Banks' figure?). Pursuing a different line of enquiry, Banks makes some interesting contrasts between the Christian groups and the two most closely comparable ones in the Hellenistic environment, the synagogue and the fraternities of those initiated into this or that mystery religion. In the synagogue, it was the Torah that drew people to their point of mutual encounter; in the mystery fraternities, it was the cult. But for Christians 'the focal point of reference was neither a book nor a rite but *a set of relationships*, and . . . God communicated himself to them not primarily through the written word . . . or mystical experience and cultic activity, but *through one another*' (p. 111, author's italics; but is not this contrast too sharply drawn, when we know so little about relationships within either of the other two groups? And does the comment altogether square with what we know about religious aspirations in Corinth?). Banks has further conjectures – again, both interesting and a little outrunning the evidence – about the distinctiveness of Christian attitudes to class and gender differences.

These comments about what was actually happening in the house-churches lie side by side with the progressive exposition of the author's main thesis about the nature of 'Paul's idea of community'. This idea was, for Banks, neatly contained in the word *ekklesia* itself, since the term 'stresses the centrality of meeting for community life: it is through gathering that the community comes into being and is continually re-created' (p. 51). This 'gathering', which involves in Banks' view some mystique which is never clearly explained, gives 'clearest expression' to the truth revealed to Christians by the Spirit (p. 79); 'theocratic in structure', each house-church is '*a participatory society* in which authority is dispersed throughout the whole membership' (pp. 150f, author's italics). Paul worked to bring about highly egalitarian communities for which very low numbers and essential similarity to the (adult) family were necessary requirements; the resultant interrelationships, with their peculiar intimacy, formed – to paraphrase Banks a little – 'nothing less than the gospel itself in corporate form' (p. 189).

In much of this, Paul is presented, no doubt unintentionally, as a kind of practical sociologist: he had formed his theory about community, and set about putting it into practice. But there are more serious criticisms to be made. Banks has provided historical reasons why the Pauline communities were so small, and some, at least, of the qualities of community life that he lists as Paul's desiderata are ones that arise naturally in small groups. Further: did not Paul have something to learn as well as to teach in his relations with some of his churches? In Corinth, it is true, there were views about the nature of community which were at sharp variance with Paul's. Yet might not Aquila and Priscilla have brought with them from Rome some sense of what Christian community life should be like? We do not, of course, know how much the first churches were aware of what was going on elsewhere in the Christian world; but it is at least not ruled out that some of the distinctive characteristics Banks describes were to be found in churches not of

Paul's foundation, and that the communities he did found learned good things as well as bad from sources other than Paul. Was not Paul, in part, articulating and reinforcing ideals of community which he already saw, here and there, in his churches, rather than forming and imposing his own 'idea'?

It will be clear, then, that Dr Banks gives no comfort to those who hope to find a Pauline basis for traditional ecclesiology; but theologians of all schools will be grateful for this contribution to the theology of community, whether it is rightly identified as Paul's or not. And few students of the New Testament will read Banks without learning from him – though it may be at the price of some irritation. Writing, here, for a wide public, he has used footnotes only for biblical references. He has, indeed, listed chapter by chapter the main works he has consulted, and this forms a useful bibliography. But over and over again one asks what evidence supports a statement, and the only answer lies – if one is lucky – in the index of one or other of the works cited for that chapter. Worse, a number of highly discussible statements are made without any indication how they would be expanded or defended. Perhaps a more technical study is to follow the present one. If so, it will certainly deserve careful scrutiny.

C.J.A. Hickling

The Analogical Imagination.

David Tracey, SCM Press, 1981. pp. 467. £12.50.

A reading of Professor Tracey's work will, says the publisher's blurb, 'bring hope and encouragement to the tired and the jaded.' Since I was given the book to review at the end of a day of examiners' meetings, it promised to be just the thing for me.

Promising, too was Professor Tracey's insistence that theological work is to be managed as a 'conversation'. His idea of conversation, however, proves to include rather more complex sentences than I would think usual among friends. His book reaches its length of over 450 close and small printed pages in great part by the deployment of sentences like that which states: 'Just as all written discourse expresses the original gap of distanciation between the saying and the said (event and meaning) so too all literature exploits this same strategy of participation – distanciation via the several strategies of composing a work generically: semantics, syntax, genre, style', (p. 129), or that which, with a characteristic hint of the school attendance register, asks 'Is it mere happenstance that those theologies which show the most promise of achieving classical status (Karl Barth, Rudolf Bultmann, Bernard Lonergan, H. Richard and Reinhold Niebuhr, Karl Rahner, Paul Tillich – to name only the generation of the "giants") all employ some explicit model of Christian self-transcendence implying what we earlier named some form of a journey of intensification', (p. 133). Even Professor Tracey has forgotten by the end of that sentence that his opening requires him to conclude with a question mark. Or perhaps he is as impatient of such occasional interrogatories as he generally is of commas. He has, after all, an urgent thesis to propose concerning our pluralist culture.

Pluralism is 'a fundamental enrichment of the human condition', (p. ix). In our pluralist condition, however, those who believe that they have received a divine truth must, if their belief is not to be reduced to a personal quirk, find a way of presenting that truth in the public *fora*. Professor Tracey risks a tentative sociology of theology as it is proposed to the women and men at the Chicago railroad station, to the don at the conference, and to the bishop in the midst of the congregation. To these distinguishable listeners the theologian, offers 'fundamental', 'systematic', and 'practical' theologies. But his more interesting sociological observation is concerned with the likeness of response in our culture to the claims made by art and theology to present 'truth' and 'meaning'. He sets himself to consider the case of a 'classic' work of art in our society in order to elucidate the 'religious classic'.

'While we do fancy we are judges of Cicero or Shakespeare we shall not understand them', remarked F.D. Maurice. Professor Tracey would be as reverent, if less succinct, as the King's College divine. Sometimes, reading a book and, one must presume, looking at a painting, or hearing a song, he has the experience that 'something else may be the case'. This is a phrase he borrowed from Dr Doroty Van Ghent on meeting it as a quotation in Dr Giles Gunn's *The Interpretation of Otherness*. 'When that realized experience is not fully determined by the needs and exigencies of the present moment and is backed by the winnowing process of time and the critical appreciation of the wider community of capable readers, we recognize that we may be in the presence of a classic,' (p. 107). There is, despite Professor Tracey's protestations, something of the 'affective fallacy' here. Something exhibited in a reference to the novels of Céline and the films of Riefenstahl as provoking that conversation 'already operative' in the work of 'the grand "moralists" of the Western critical tradition from Plato to Dr Johnson, Matthew Arnold, Leo Tolstov, and, in our own time, F.R. Leavis' (p. 123). Exhibited, again, in the treasuring as 'minor classics' the works of Noel Coward, (p. 154), and Nancy Mitford, (p. 166). But not exhibited in any sustained criticism of any particular work of literature. Professor Tracey declines each opportunity to offer a reading of a text. He is unmindful of J.S. Mill's warning 'how vague and unsatisfactory all precepts of Method must necessarily appear, when not practically exemplified'.

His avoiding comment upon texts is, perhaps, most unfortunate for his persuading the reader, when he shifts his conversation from 'classics' to 'religious classics', and attends to the apostolic witness to the Christ. He writes of 'the distinct New Testament uses of proclamation, narrative, symbol, and reflective thought (as the most relatively adequate paradigm) along with apocalyptic and doctrine as distinctive corrective genres', (p. 239), but he does not pause to elucidate these usages. He concentrates attention on 'the relative inadequacy of any religious form for communicating its meaning', (p. 200), and relates this inadequacy of the religious classic to both the 'unsteady, always partly flawed, partly accidental' command of form 'in the greatest classics', and the inherently 'dangerous' character of that memory of

Jesus expressed in the New Testament texts. His conversation, at this point, is replete with references to the 'uncanny'. As it is the usual office of a 'religious classic' to manifest and proclaim the 'uncanny', so it is the theologian's task to formulate 'our uncommon experiences of the uncanny into the rubric of an analogical imagination', (p. 363). This late reference to his eponymous method must give a reader hope of some resolution of Professor Tracey's thesis. He had expressed the expectation in his Preface, that when 'that analogical strategy is finally rendered explicit' in the last chapter, the reader would not find its entry surprising. But it is not until p. 447 that the reader has an opportunity to tease out the meaning of the phrase. It would seem that by 'analogical' Professor Tracey intends a reference to the consideration of how like and how unlike experiences are, and by 'imagination' to the power we have to sympathise with others. The sympathetic consideration of the strangenesses within human experience might lead, certainly to conversation in a pluralist culture. I take it that some such thought informs Professor Tracey's conviction that theologians 'need to reflect upon the pluralism *within* the Christian tradition in order to reflect upon the pluralism *among* the religious traditions or the pluralism *among* the analyses of the situation', (p. 448). Thence we may go forward to 'the future concreteness of the whole', (p. 451).

'Analogy' and 'imagination' are fine words and an exciting conversation might well arise around them, whether the talk were pluralist or not. I fear that by the time Professor Tracey had reached this close, I was a trifle jaded, even with the great matters he proposes, and certainly very tired.

Hamish R.G. Swanston

The Authority of Grace. Essays in Response to Karl Barth.

W.A. Whitehouse. Edited by Ann Loades. T and T Clark, 1981. pp. xxiv + 247. £4.95.

At a time when some theologians are joining with opponents of Christianity in teaching that the idea of God is the enemy of human freedom, it is salutary to find a volume entitled as is this one. *The Authority of Grace* is a selection from the writings of Alec Whitehouse, who is now retired but is remembered with affection by many former students and colleagues at Durham and Canterbury as a great teacher of theology and a free theologian pursuing a course aware of but refusing to be cowed by the ever-changing fashions of theology. The subtitle indicates the manner of the theology: in response to but by no means in thrall to the century's greatest theologian.

The first part of the book concentrates on the matter defined by the subtitle, and contains extended reviews of some of Barth's books, particularly the volumes of *Church Dogmatics* which emerged after the last war. He sees the great achievement of Barth to have spoken 'with such clarity and persuasiveness about *God*, and His method of working in history, with persons and with material things' (p. 6). In particular Barth is claimed to have 'eradicated the last traces of that framework' in which deists and their orthodox opponents discussed the problems of theology. But the review articles reveal also a commentator who is aware of the weaknesses of Barth's theology, especially as they appear in the doctrine of creation.

When Whitehouse leaves Barth it is to explore in his own way the reality of God. The response is many sided, for example in a discussion of Braithwaite's famous Eddington lecture, where the place of authority in Christian ethics is probed: 'the authority of grace expressed in the freedom with which God loves' (p. 142). A similar development occurs in discussions of the relation between theology and the natural sciences, where he argues that we cannot evade the questions set to us by the sciences by appealing to such 'non-natural' features of our experience as 'consciousness, culture, personality, values, history.' Rather we must develop a theology of nature 'by looking at physical reality in the hope of recognizable hints or echoes of grace in its ambiguities' (p. 184).

It is this quest for correspondences between the grace of God made real in Jesus Christ and the grace of God to be found in the world which reveals the difference between a theologian responding to Barth and one known as 'Barthian'. It becomes particularly apparent in the group of papers in which Whitehouse engages with the question of the relation between divine and human authority, especially as the latter is exercised in the state. The book's last article, written in 1981, 'Authority, Divine and Human' wrestles with the problem of authority as it came into our history with Augustine, was rejected by such as Nietzsche and has to be faced today. What, in particular, are they to say who cannot make Nietzsche's cry 'God is dead' their own? Here a way forward is sought by directing our attention to the kind of authority represented by the Gospel and its centre in a person, and one understood to stand in a particular relation of love and obedience to God. However, such authority is not thrown at us in an authoritarian way, but used to evoke echoes of appropriate uses of authority in the modern world. That is an instance at once of the way the authority of grace operates, and of how theology must be done in the modern world.

Colin Gunton

The Passionate God.

Rosemary Haughton. Darton, Longman & Todd, 1982 pp. 335. £12.95.

Originality is a rare quality and *The Passionate God* is a rare book; but it is a strange book, compelling and irritating at the same time, and it will provoke extreme reactions in its readers. Whether or not one will be prepared to consider its argument seriously will depend on the extent to which one is able to accept the author's understanding of 'Romantic Passion' and her determined use of its as an instrument for interpreting the Christian religion. Her aim is clear and her application is rigorous: 'Romance gives us a language which

can open up the whole of Christian theology.' (p. 27) A claim as startling as this needs to be substantiated and the first sixty pages of the book contain an attempt to give some definition to those frequently-occurring but elusive terms 'romance' and 'passion'. I am not at all sure that her account of the appearance and growth of the phenomenon of Romance – a rather sketchy affair based largely upon C.S. Lewis's theories in his book *The Allegory of Love* – is accurate. It has a far more complicated, perhaps longer and more puzzling history than she allows; so it is fortunate that, in the end, her thesis does not depend upon historical accuracy. It does depend, however, upon her power to persuade us that what she has understood by 'romantic passion' can be seriously entertained as a real means of describing and analysing our unversal experience.

Essential to this understanding of romance are concepts of 'exchange', 'breakthrough' and 'spheres'. The latter pair are, I believe, the author's own coinage; 'exchange' however is at least as old as Christianity, though Rosemary Haughton acknowledges it as having been conveyed to her in its most powerful form in the writings of Charles Williams. It is clear that he is the source of many of the ideas in this book and the final chapter includes extended quotations from his Arthurian poems. Her debt to him is profound, but I cannot help feeling that her work would have been more convincing and stimulating if she had allowed his intellectual scepticism to temper some of her wilder imaginings. However, on the concept of 'exchange' she writes with great force and percipience. The notion of the universe as a vast structure of 'exchange' involves 'thinking of everything not just as part of an infinitely complex web of interdependence, but as a moving web, a pattern of flowing, a never-ceasing in-flow and out-flow of being.' (p. 21)

Furthermore, the universe is not to be regarded as a 'fixed' system; it is composed of 'spheres' which are capable of moving in and out or each other at points where a 'breakthrough' is possible: the breakthrough itself being caused by the passion of romantic love. The spheres are material and immaterial, and the immaterial is no less real than the material. Her examples of the immaterial 'breaking through' into the material in incidences of visions, ghosts, poltergeists, levitations etc. need not prevent the more sceptical amongst us from receiving sympathetically her account of the Transfiguration of Jesus and his Resurrection, or her interpretation of the doctrine of the Incarnation in these categories. Indeed, one could say, what better way is there for making the Incarnation intelligible than a way which talks of it as the breaking through of God's passionate love into the sphere of human existence at its most vulnerable point?

The central doctrines of the Christian tradition are all examined in this remarkably courageous and comrehensive book: Incarnation, Atonement, Revelation, the Church, the Sacraments, life in the Spirit, the Last Things. Of particular interest is her treatment of eschatology and the prickly question of the Second Coming. She remarks, correctly, that this has been an intractable problem with which all theology and all Christian life has had to struggle, and in a brief exposition of the thought of St. Paul she offers a theory, which believers must take seriously, that 'the *timing* of the End of all things depends on the activity of the Church, especially in prayer.' (p. 165) "Even so. Come Lord Jesus." If this is true, what a terrible, but glorious burden has been laid upon the followers of Christ by their Lord.

Of course, even sympathetic readers will find a good deal to complain of in this book. The progress of the argument is not always clear; the writing is sometimes slack and slangy. I do not, for instance, believe it is possible to enter into the inner experience of the historical figure of Jesus of Nazareth and reconstruct his psychology in the way the author does; and while I believe, with her, that there is today in Christianity 'a stretching of older theological concepts which will not serve because they were developed to fit an experience of life which is now irrelevant', I do not believe that the new styles of faith, life and ministry are beginning to emerge yet, and I need much more persuasion before I can accept that they will emerge along the lines suggested in the later chapters of this book. The speculations of these pages do not grow organically out of the theology which has preceded them. Imagination has given way to special pleading: interesting but unconvincing.

B.L. Horne

G.W.H. Lampe. Christian, Scholar, Churchman.

A Memoir by friends. Mowbrays, 1982. pp. 144. £5.95.

All those who knew Geoffrey Lampe, and especially those who knew him well, will treasure this book and be inestimably grateful to Professor Moule for the sensitivity, perception and accuracy with which he has drawn together the variegated threads of Professor Lampe's life and death, not into a biography but into "a series of portraits drawn by observers of various periods and from a variety of different angles". (p. 1). Merely to read the headings of the sections into which the contributions have been assembled – Geoffrey, the Friend; Early Days at Oxford; Army Chaplain; St. John's College, Oxford; Birmingham; Cambridge: As a Theologian, A Board's Eye-View, The Patristic Greek Lexicon, As a Fellow of Caius College, The Board of Extra-mural Studies, As a Canon of Ely, In General Synod, the Anglo-Scandinavian Conference; 'Holy Living and Holy Dying': Five Glimpses of Geoffrey Lampe, A Memoir by Mother Mary Clare SLG, From the Family, An Address at a Private Thanksgiving Eucharist, An Address at the Memorial Service – is to be reminded of the wide range, as well as the depth, of Geoffrey Lampe's activities, interests and experience. It happens that most of the contributors are themselves distinguished in various forms of public life and all of them were Geoffrey's friends and colleagues. Geoffrey had many distinguished friends but one of his greatest gifts was that of making friends with people of all ages and in all walks of life. In each of their homes he and his wife, Elizabeth, shared their happiness and enjoyment of life with inumerable people. In Ely, especially, 'there were dinner parties to meet scholars from European and American universities, friends from the town and colleagues from Cambridge; and as often as not there would be a guest in the house in need of a home or a rest . . . but the same warm welcome awaited every visitor to the Black Hostelry, and the family shared their obvious happiness with all their

guests and neighbours.' (p. 85). This reviewer knew Geoffrey Lampe well for nearly thirty years as a research student, friend, and colleague in various undertakings, and because Geoffrey and Elizabeth delighted that their friends should know each other, it is possible to observe that one of the most remarkable things about this Memoir is that we can all recognize in it the man whom we loved and respected and from whom we learnt so much, even though, so great was his stature as Christian, Scholar and Churchman, that it may be that we learnt different things.

In one way and another many of the contributors describe the massive contribution which Professor Lampe made in his pure field as a theologian, which Birger Gerhadsson summed up in his In Memoriam notice for Svensk teologisk Kvartalshrift (57/1981): 'Geoffrey Lampe was a very learned man. His home ground was in patristics.. .. but hardly anywhere in theology or the humanities was he really out of his depth. He moved easily within the great and small questions of exegetical debate, and had a real understanding of current affairs in Church and theology, as well as of the background of such questions in church history, history of doctrine, systematic theology, ethics and practical theology. His openness and breadth lent him a redoubtable skill in debate which he readily deployed both in international ecumenical gatherings and at home in England. . . . his presentation was always relaxed, with the clarity of a real teacher, and an individual approach to the interesting problem. This ease of manner perhaps concealed his assured first-hand knowledge of his extensive and sometimes obscurely inaccessible material . . ." (p. 102) If Professor Moule's remarkable Memoir to an outstanding theologian is likely to appeal predominantly to those who worked with Professor Lampe, or were influenced by him, inside and outside the University context, it is a book to be read by those who did not know him personally and those who are currently studying in theological colleges. The study of his many publications, (of which an almost complete bibliography is given by Dr. George Newlands in Professor Lampe's posthumous collection of essays, 'Explorations in Theology'. 8, SCM 1981) will be greatly illumined by the insights of his friends. It is to be hoped, nevertheless, that a serious study of the development of Geoffrey Lampe's theological thought across the years, which lies outside the scope of this book, will be undertaken.

The last sections of the book contain very moving memories and recollections contributed, so courageously and so shortly after his death, by his wife and children. The small group of close friends who were present at the private Thanksgiving Eucharist in the Chapel of Gorville and Caius College, Cambridge, a few days after Geoffrey's death in August 1980, and the vast congregation who attended the Memorial Service in Great St. Mary's Church, Cambridge on 18th October 1980, will be glad to have on permanent record the addresses given on those occasions by Professor C.F.D. Moule and Bishop P.K. Walker, respectively, and to know that they are now offered to a much wider circle of readers.

Probably the most remarkable section of the Memoir is the last, the Mere's Commemoration Sermon under the title 'Preparation for Death' preached by Geoffrey Lampe himself when he knew he was dying. This frankly honest and deeply moving utterance revealed, as did so much else, that he was not only one of the most penetrating and acute theologians of the twentieth century, but that he was also a great theologian in the old, patristic, sense of the term: "one whose prayer is true". It is fitting that the last words of the Memoir should be Geoffrey's own, revealing that unity of doctrine and life which gave to all he was and all he said such great authenticity:

> "It seems, then, that to prepare against the fear of death we need to make the most of life: to enjoy life ourselves and to be thankful for it; to do our best to make it possible for other people to enjoy it more; to move through the enjoyment of life into the enjoyment of God the source and giver of life, and to begin to experience that renewal of ourselves through his love which gives us the promise of fuller life to come. To make the most of life is to come to be persuaded with St. Paul 'that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord.' " p.144

In the interests of accuracy it is perhaps worth pointing out that on p. 100 G.E. Newson was Master of Selwyn College and that A.G. Parsons should read R.G. Parsons.

Lorna Kendall

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

Peter R. Ackroyd was formerly Samuel Davidson Professor of Old Testament Studies at King's College, London.

Paul Avis is Vicar of Stoke Canon, Exeter.

G.R. Dunstan was Frederick Denison Maurice Professor of Moral and Social Theology at King's College from 1966-82. We print here his valedictory lecture given earlier this year.

Stephen Platten is Residentiary Canon of Portsmouth Cathedral.

John M. Ross, now retired, has contributed a number of articles, chiefly on the text and criticism of the New Testament, to learned journals.

Books Received

Barker, E. (Ed.) *New Religious Movements* (Essays) Studies in Religion and Society. Vol. 3. Edwin Mellen Press.

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