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GEORGE HERBERT: 'SOMETHING UNDERSTOOD'[1]

Christine Rees

When George Herbert, sometime Orator to the University of Cambridge, preached his first sermon to his parishioners in the little country church at Bemerton, we are told that he delivered it 'after a most florid manner, both with great learning and eloquence.'[2] Perhaps they would have been disappointed by anything less than a virtuoso performance from the new parson; but Herbert was the last man to be dazzled by his own eloquence—that 'flaring thing'[3] in his own phrase—and he could shrewdly gauge the needs and limitations of his audience (or any audience). In one of his poems, 'Miserie', there is a wry comment on our natural human resistance to being preached at or making a mental effort -

These Preachers make
His head to shoot and ake.

If there were any headaches in his congregation as a result of that brilliant inaugural sermon, Herbert soon soothed them away by reassuring his flock *'that for their sakes, his language and his expressions should be more plain and practical in his future Sermons.'* Maybe the reassurance was unnecessary. From the modern point of view it sometimes seems as though seventeenth-century audiences could only exist in a preacher's or lecturer's dream.There is a story told by Thomas Fuller in his *History of the Worthies of England* (1662) about Lawrence Chaderton, first Master of Emmanuel College at Herbert's own university, who once 'concluded his Sermon which was of two hours continuance at least, with words to this effect. *That he would no longer trespasse upon their Patience.* Whereupon all the Auditory cryed out . . . *for God Sake Sir Go on, go on.'* So he carried on impromptu, 'to their *contentment* and his *commendation.*' It is the kind of story that can encourage a certain nostalgia for the seventeenth century as an age of devotion, an age in which, as T.S. Eliot wrote of Little Gidding, 'prayer has been valid' and generally felt to be so. But in spite of an element of truth in this belief, such an attitude may sentimentalise faith in a way that Herbert himself, for instance, was never guilty of.

I chose to begin with Izaak Walton's account of a Herbert sermon rather than with a poem because it brings out so clearly Herbert's concern with making something understood. It shows his realism, his common sense; his acute awareness of the problematic gift of eloquence (throughout his poems you can see the tension, the pull between the 'florid manner' and 'more plain and practical' language); and, above all, his sense of priorities, for the reason he gives for toning down his future sermons is not the congregation's convenience but their salvation. *'Since'* he says *'Almighty God does not intend to lead men to heaven by hard Questions, he* [Herbert] *would not therefore fill their heads with unnecessary Notions'.* But if *'hard Questions'* so beloved of academics are set aside as unimportant, what does matter to Herbert? Again this first sermon gives us a clue in the choice of text. Proverbs, chapter 4, verse 23, 'Keep thy heart with all diligence'.

The injunction to scrutinize and guard the inmost self is one which Herbert the poet takes

as seriously as Herbert the priest. Poetry is a way of keeping the record straight between himself and God. Later in the same century Milton would set out to justify the ways of God to men on an epic scale in *Paradise Lost*: Herbert sets out more humbly perhaps to understand the ways of God with George Herbert, and ends up building a temple of lyric poems as full of music and soaring line as a great cathedral, but also as intimate as a country church. Herbert could hardly have failed to respond to the glory of cathedrals: for the last years of his life he lived within a few miles of one of the most beautiful in England, Salisbury Cathedral, where as he writes of Solomon's Temple 'All show'd the builders, crav'd the seers care.' But the title he gave to his poems refers as much to the human heart as to the church, visible or invisible. And this temple too showed the builder's—God's—care and craved the seer's. We have to learn to see if we are to understand.

Eloquence is a means to this end: his marvellous sonnet on prayer swoops from metaphor to metaphor like some bird of paradise in full display until it finally alights on the firm security of the simple phrase 'something understood'. But what exactly is understood? How can man's understanding meet with God's? In fact, in Herbert's poetry understanding is as often the product of intellectual resistance as of co-operation. George Herbert, as it happens, belonged to a family of considerable military distinction (appropriately the surname Herbert means bright host or army); in a metaphoric sense, he could be said to carry on the family tradition. When in his last illness he asked for his *'little Book'* to be given to his old friend Nicholas Ferrar of Little Gidding he described it in words which have become well-known:

> *. . . tell him, he shall find in it a picture of the many spiritual Conflicts that have past betwixt God and my Soul, before I could subject mine to the will of* Jesus my Master: *in whose service I have now found perfect freedom.*[4]

Here conflict takes the traditional form of a conflict of wills, man's self-will embattled against the divine will, the individual's struggling to be free without really knowing what freedom is. A number of Herbert's poems dramatize this kind of rebellion. But there are other more subtle forms of conflict in the poems which have a bearing on the struggle to understand. For instance, there are conflicting ways of seeing the same situation: in the face of the divine, human beings cling to their point of view as stubbornly as to their self-will, and in some ways it is more difficult to change something believed to be understood, than to change something willed. We use the phrase loosely, 'changing one's mind'. Part of the fascination of reading Herbert's poetry is watching him change his mind through the exercise of imagining things in different ways, even to the extent of imagining how he, George Herbert, looks from God's angle. At times he is a crumb of dust, a thing forgot—

> A wonder tortur'd in the space
> Betwixt this world and that of grace.
> ('Affliction IV')

At other times he is a flower, or a musical instrument awaiting a divine performance. What matters most is that he should count for something, that his life should make sense in the scheme of things. His greatest affliction is the absence, or apparent absence, of God from him, as though the artist had simply flung aside a lump of stone, its potential form unrealized, or left his lute in a corner, 'untun'd, unstrung'. Herbert, himself an artist, cannot bear wasted potential in any mode of being, especially the human. In the discipline of writing a poem, he constantly works upon the material in order to draw out meaning, to bring his own understanding into alignment with the divine point of view so far as is humanly and artistically possible.

The first 'Affliction' poem—there are five altogether scattered through *The Temple*—attempts to make 'something understood' of his personal experience by putting it in retrospect. From the outside, it is easy to glamorize Herbert's life as a textbook case of religious vocation. 'Thou hast made us for Thyself, and our hearts are restless till they find their rest in Thee'. Augustine's words fit Herbert exactly, and they might serve as epigraph to that beautifully pointed brief lyric, 'The Pulley', which ends

> If goodnesse leade him not, yet wearinesse
> May tosse him to my breast.

Herbert knew about all kinds of weariness. However attractive his life story may seem to us, with its contrast between the glittering prizes open to a man of Herbert's birth and talents—prizes which eluded him—and his ultimate vocation as country priest in pastoral Wiltshire, to Herbert himself the pattern was by no means so pleasing, or clear-cut. The version of his autobiography that he presents in 'Affliction (I)' is painfully enigmatic. It is not a straightforward conflict between God's claim and the claims of the 'world'. Nothing is what it seems: not the ecstasy and freshness of spiritual initiation, nor the admittedly more ambiguous reward of 'Academick praise'. God, in this account, traps, frustrates, and deprives his servant in a manner which passes Herbert's understanding:

When first thou didst entice to thee my heart,
I thought the service brave:
So many joyes I writ down for my part,
Besides what I might have
Out of my stock of naturall delights,
Augmented with thy gracious benefits.

. . .

At first thou gav'st me milk and sweetnesses;
I had my wish and way:
My dayes were straw'd with flow'rs and
happinesse;
There was no moneth but May.
But with my yeares sorrow did twist and grow,
And made a partie unawares for wo.

. . .

Whereas my birth and spirit rather took
The way that takes the town;
Thou didst betray me to a lingring book,
And wrap me in a gown.
I was entangled in the world of strife,
Before I had the power to change my life.

Yet for I threatned oft the siege to raise,
Not simpring all mine age,
Thou often didst with Academick praise
Melt and dissolve my rage.
I took thy sweetned pill, till I came where
I could not go away, nor persevere.

Yet lest perchance I should too happie be
In my unhappinesse,
Turning my purge to food, thou throwest me
Into more sicknesses.
Thus doth thy power crosse-bias me, not
making
Thine own gift good, yet me from my wayes
taking.

Now I am here, what thou wilt do with me
None of my books will show:
I reade, and sigh, and wish I were a tree;
For sure then I should grow
To fruit or shade: at least some bird would
trust
Her houshold to me, and I should be just.

Yet, though thou troublest me, I must be
meek;
In weaknesse must be stout.
Well, I will change the service, and go seek
Some other master out.
Ah, my deare God! though I am clean forgot,
Let me not love thee, if I love thee not.

'Let me not love thee, if I love thee not'—becomes more puzzling the more you look at it: how can it represent 'something understood'? Perhaps it is a spiritual victory won out of intellectual defeat. It is not comprehension but love which is the absolute necessity for Herbert. Throughout 'Affliction (I)' he has been struggling to understand a God who entices, betrays, entangles him in a life which mocks him with continual breakdowns in purpose and direction: 'I could not go away, not persevere.' Far from being perfect freedom, this service is a kind of slavery; worse still, a useless slavery. Yet, on the edge of throwing it over, Herbert is arrested by a sudden revelation; if things are as desperate as that, if he cannot love God, then he had better pray that God will not let him love Him. What looks at first glance like a vicious circle turns out to be a blessed one, for in the very framing of the prayer Herbert shows that it is love and not the failure of love that impels him. 'Ah my deare God!'

I find it fascinating to compare Herbert's subtle investigation of spiritual dilemmas in 'Affliction (I)' and other poems with some modern equivalent, such as a scene from an Iris

Murdoch novel. Take, for example, this conversation from *Henry and Cato*, in which Brendan addresses his friend and fellow-priest, Cato, who entered the priesthood after an initiatory experience of joy very like the one Herbert describes and who is now undergoing a crisis of faith:

> The spiritual life is a long strange business and you've got to be quiet and docile enough to go on learning. You're doing the strong man wrestling act, you're still at the heroic stage, you want to do everything yourself. And now that you've got an inkling of what's really involved you're appalled, or the ego in you is appalled. It's like a death sentence. It is a death sentence. Not pain, not mortification, but death. That's what chills you. That's what you experience when you say there is no one there. Up till now you have seen Christ as a reflection of yourself. It has been a comfortable arrangement . . .
>
> . . .
>
> . . . Ordinary human consciousness is a tissue of illusion. Our chief illusion is our conception of ourselves, of our importance which must not be violated, our dignity which must not be mocked. All our resentment flows from this illusion, all our desire to do violence, to avenge insults, to assert ourselves. We are all mocked, Christ was mocked, nothing can be more important than that.[5]

Although form and language change with the centuries, Herbert's assessment of the problem is no less probing than the modern novelist's. He, as it were, plays out both character roles in himself, is both analyst and subject. His fears and resentments arise from personal feelings which, as so often in artistic and religious temperaments, combine a sense of superiority with a sense of inadequacy. And he understands himself all too well. In 'Employment (II)' he returns to the same kind of difficulties as in 'Affliction (I)'. The poem begins with a gesture of self-assertion—

> He that is weary, let him sit.
> My soul would stirre
> And trade in courtesies and wit,
> Quitting the furre
> To cold complexions needing it—

but ends bleakly on the recognition of squandered opportunities, and human mortality:

> But we are still too young or old;
> The man is gone,
> Before we do our wares unfold.
> So we freeze on,
> Untill the grave increase our cold.

One recent writer on Herbert has remarked with insight that he 'was a person meant to be happy, one who never doubted that unhappiness is a deeply unnatural state.'[6] His unhappy poems are a way of coping with this unnatural state, sometimes by explaining it, sometimes by expressing it, making something out of it, always by understanding it. The therapy works not just for himself but for his readers, as he wanted it to.

Not surprisingly, he is quite often compared to the finest composers of classical chamber music, a Mozart or a Schubert. But unlike a musical composer Herbert has to work with language, which sets up its own kinds of deceptions and distortions. He was very conscious of this, as a number of lyrics on the inadequacy of 'poetic' language testify

> For, Thou art still my God, is all that ye
> Perhaps with more embellishment can say.
> (The Forerunners')

Inadequacy in one sense. but looked at from another angle the language of poetry might be said to be *over*-adequate, distractingly so. The aesthetic problem reflects the psychological one. it is possible to overcompensate for feelings of inadequacy by parading these feelings, and we find Herbert doing this deliberately to make a point. In the early poems of *The Temple*, his human capacities cannot cope with the Passion of Christ.

> Then for thy passion—I will do for that—
> Alas, my God, I know not what.
> ('The Thanksgiving')

> I have consider'd it, and finde
> There is no dealing with thy mighty passion.
> ('The Reprisall')

Perfect understanding and the perfect response

are delayed until the last poem in *The Temple*, 'Love (III)', which is, supremely, a happy poem, although or because it deals with the recurrent spiritual tensions which have built up throughout the work. Here again the speaker begins by emphasizing his inadequacy from his own point of view, but by the end of the poem it is the divine viewpoint of Love that prevails in this 'trade in courtesies and wit':

Love bade me welcome: yet my soul drew back,
Guiltie of dust and sinne.
But quick-ey'd Love, observing me grow slack
From my first entrance in,
Drew nearer to me, sweetly questioning,
If I lack'd any thing.

A guest, I answer'd, worthy to be here.
Love said, You shall be he.
I the unkinde, ungratefull? Ah my deare,
I cannot look on thee.
Love took my hand, and smiling did reply,
Who made the eyes but I?

Truth Lord, but I have marr'd them: let my shame
Go where it doth deserve.
And know you not, sayes Love, who bore the blame?
My deare, then I will serve.
You must sit down, sayes Love, and taste my meat:
So I did sit and eat.

The final image we have of God and Herbert is that of host and guest, 'something understood', the universal language of caring hospitality. *'In whose service I have now found perfect freedom'* said the dying poet; but in the end, in spite of the soul's willing offer of service, it is Love who takes upon Himself the form of servant as well as host at His own feast. No other poem by Herbert leaves us with a stronger sense of 'something understood' coexisting with a sense of something that passeth all understanding.

NOTES

1. This paper is based on a talk given in the series arranged by the Joint Christian Council of King's College in the Lent Term, 1979.
2. Izaak Walton, 'The Life of Mr George Herbert', *Lives*, World's Classics edn., repr. 1956, p.295.
3. 'The Windows'. All quotations from Herbert's poetry are taken from *The English Poems of George Herbert*, ed. C.A. Patrides, Everyman's University Library, 1974.
4. Walton, op.cit., p.314.
5. Iris Murdoch, *Henry and Cato*, Triad/Panther Books, 1977, pp.153-4.
6. Helen Vendler, *The Poetry of George Herbert*, Harvard University Press, 1975, p.259. My approach to Herbert in this paper is generally indebted to this fine critical study.

SIN, GUILT AND SHAME

Peter Byrne

1. Christian teaching on the original and universal character of sin has always given offence to those who have taken certain fundamental intuitions about human responsibility seriously. This teaching involves the notion that sin is an inherited, common property of the human race, a property in which we all unfortunately share simply by being members of that race. Not least amongst the paradoxical ideas engendered by these doctrines is the thought that one man may share in the sin of another. J.S. Whale in his *Christian Doctrine*[1] speaks of sin as having a 'solidarity aspect', and this theological teaching about sin seems to tell us that I share in, or am tainted by, the sin of others just by virtue of being a member of the human family.

2. It is not difficult to present the conflict between such ideas about collective sin and our ordinary notions of responsibility and guilt. The condemnation of the notion of collective sin from the standpoint of ordinary morality would go something like this[2]. One cannot be blamed or feel guilty for an act of omission unless one is responsible for that act or omission. But responsibility is essentially something that belongs to individuals not collectivities. For responsibility allows the possibility of blame and guilt being attached to one's acts only because, if one is responsible for an act, one has the power to act otherwise. One is responsible for it because one has control over it. So I cannot share in the evil deeds of other men because, by and large, I have no control over those deeds.

3. Just as it is not difficult to see the prima facie conflict between this theological teaching and moral intuition, so it is not difficult to reinterpret the teaching and avoid its unpalatable consequences. For the conflict discussed only arises if sin is held to entail guilt or blame, and if the damnation that results from sin is thought of as the punishment guilt brings with it. The oddity of the notion of a corporate or universal sin is the oddity of the notion of a corporate or universal guilt. The moral monstrosity attaching to the notion of this sin is contained in the thought that one man may be blamed and punished for the deeds of another. But if we detach the notion of guilt from that of sin, and reinterpret talk of Hell so that it no longer refers to a place of punishment for this guilt, then the oddity and monstrosity evaporate. Sin may be described not as a form of guilt, which in some way all men inherit, but as a state of alienation natural to the human condition. This state of separation or distance from God is an inevitable part of human finitude and thus may be spoken of as a shared property of the human race. Sin, then, becomes something which can properly be inherited, since it is an inevitable part of the humanity we share in. This state of separation from God is not at the same time one of guilt, nor are damnation and Hell punishments meted out for this shared, inherited sin. They are rather 'poetic' representations of the limiting case of the state of deprivation which is the inevitable consequence of this alienation. In these ways the apparent injustices enshrined in the notion of an inherited, universal sin are removed[3].

4. When thus reinterpreted, these doctrines do not commit one to any of the paradoxes involved in notions of corporate responsibility. Far from clashing with our moral intuitions, they may seem to say something which even the secular moralist may feel is true and important. I do not wish to argue against such modern interpretations of the doctrine of original sin, rather I wish to supplement them by drawing upon other moral intuitions which support the doctrine. These intuitions centre upon the notion of shame.

5. Many writers have remarked upon the crucial fact about shame which I wish to make use of and which marks an important difference between shame and guilt[4]. This difference lies in

the fact that whilst one cannot feel guilty for the wrong deeds of other men, one may feel shame on account of others' wrong acts. The immoral acts and omissions of other men should not, if one is rational, produce feelings of guilt in one, but it may be quite proper and rational to let such acts provoke feelings of shame in one. This difference is founded upon another. What makes vicarious guilt irrational or inappropriate, is that guilt presupposes responsibility and responsibility cannot be vicarious. But shame may be in place even where there is no responsibility; feeling shame at the wrongful deeds of someone else does not at all imply that one is responsible for those deeds. One can highlight this contrast between guilt and shame even more by introducing the notion of remorse. It will be readily admitted that there is something very odd about feeling remorse at the actions of others. One may regret the wrongful deeds of others, but one cannot feel remorse on account of them. Yet even though one can only regret those acts, one can feel shame on account of them.

6. It is important to get clear about the precise claim I am making for the possibility of vicarious shame. One must recall here the distinction between being ashamed *for* someone else and being ashamed *because of* someone else[5]. The difference is that only in the latter case is the shame felt really one's own; only in the latter case does the shame felt involve a lessening of the image of one's own self. To feel ashamed for someone else is to enter sympathetically into their situation. It is to attempt to see their shortcomings, defects or failings from their standpoint. This sympathetic identification with another's lot is perfectly possible, but of its very nature it does not entail any feeling that one's own value or worth has been lessened. It may even be possible to sympathetically enter into someone's feelings of guilt or remorse. If one can take sympathetic identification so far as to feel their remorse or guilt, then we do not have here something that sharply separates guilt and shame. It is only feeling ashamed *because* of someone else's acts that provides a point of difference. This type of shame does provide a way in which the wrong-doing of others can reflect on oneself, but it does not at the same time overturn our intuitions about responsibility. Evil-doing can become a corporate matter without there being any need of doctrines of corporate responsibility.

7. This account of shame may be further expounded and defended by considering an example. I take it from Jane Austen's novel *Persuasion*. Sir Walter Elliot has moved to Bath. He is concerned to make his way in Bath society and to this end sets about ingratiating himself with socially important, but personally worthless people, much to the horror of the more discerning members of his family:

> "Sir Walter, however, would choose his own means, and at last wrote a very fine letter of ample explanation, regret and entreaty to his right honourable cousin. Neither Lady Russell nor Mr. Elliot could admire the letter; but it did all that was wanted, bringing three lines of scrawl from the Dowager Viscountess. 'She was very much honoured, and should be happy in their acquaintance.' The toils of business were over, the sweets began. They visited in Laura-place, they had the cards of Dowager Viscountess Dalrymple and the Hon. Miss Carteret to be arranged wherever they might be most visible; and 'Our cousins in Laura-place',—'Our cousins Lady Dalrymple and Miss Carteret', were talked of to everybody.
>
> Anne was ashamed. Had Lady Dalrymple and her daughter even been agreeable, she would still have been ashamed because of the agitation they created, but they were nothing. There was no superiority of manner, accomplishment or understanding. Lady Dalrymple had acquired the name of 'a charming woman', because she had a smile and a civil answer for everybody. Miss Carteret, with still less to say, was so plain and so awkward, that she would never have been tolerated in Camden-place but for her birth."[6]

As I read this passage Anne Elliot clearly feels shame *because of* her father's lapse, rather than simply feeling shame *for* him. Yet it is also clear from the context that she is in no way responsible for what happens, no blame attaches to her conduct.

8. Now someone puzzled about the possibility of vicarious shame may ask why, if Anne is no way to blame for what has been done, should its

evil at all reflect on her. Why should we share in the evil of other people's acts if we are in no way responsible for them? The answer must be that the example reflects the possibility of seeing one's own good and harm as being bound up with that of others. Here Anne Elliot sees herself as belonging to a wider unit: the family. Her fortunes are partly determined by the fortunes of this larger unit. Because of their common membership of this unit, what her father does may reflect upon her. People can feel vicarious shame because they feel their lives to be bound up with the lives of others through social institutions such as the family, the nation, the club etc. People's plans of the good, indeed their very identities, are dependent on the social relations which bind them to others[7]. David Richards sums up this point: "if, as part of a wider identity, one views the actions of others as part of the realization of one's ideal of the excellent, then one can be ashamed of their actions"[8]. So one answer to the question of why Anne should feel this shame is that her sense of belonging to the wider unit—the family—is important. One of the most central features of the moral outlook presented by Jane Austen's novels is that the good of the individual is only possible in the wider context of such social units as the family.

9. I have countered this objection against the possibility of vicarious shame by suggesting that the individual's sense of his own worth may be bound up with his sense of the worth of wider institutions to which he belongs. But my objector may not be at all satisfied with this. The point he may wish to insist on is this: that the agent's sense of his own *moral* worth cannot surely be affected by the doings of other members of his family or nation[9]. He may concede that it is natural for us to become emotionally involved in the successes or failures of others. But our moral stature cannot be increased or decreased by this association with others, unless our own conduct changes under their influence, because our moral worth depends directly upon the nature of our own acts. My own moral stature cannot be lessened through vicarious shame. Having stated this objection, I must admit that there is a sense in which it is unanswerable. It is unanswerable because it rests upon a tautology. As many writers use the phrase 'moral worth' it is a definitional truth that the moral worth of an individual depends upon nothing but the worth of his own acts. Moral worth is thought of as something essentially belonging to the agent's will; it is not affected by external circumstance and *a fortiori* not by the actions of others. If moral worth is the property of the agent's own will, then of course it cannot be lessened by vicarious shame. What I would wish to ask, however, is this: is moral worth (so defined) the only, or even the most important, type of human worth? Only if one gives an affirmative answer to this question, could one conclude straightway that we are not lessened at all by the wrongful acts of others and the shame they provoke. I shall say more later by way of explaining how our sense of worth could be lessened by vicarious shame, but it is worth pointing out now that we do recognise other types of human worth apart from the moral worth philosophers talk about. Think, for example, of the worth of a man blessed with some great artistic talent. The gifts of a great violinist or painter may increase our sense of his worth as a human being, even though these gifts were acquired through nature rather than through the exercise of the will.

10. The concrete example of vicarious shame presented is meant to illustrate the possibility of a certain human solidarity in wrong-doing which may be accepted by those who would reject the apparently barbarous notion of vicarious guilt. We have considered one objection to this possibility which essentially asks: if there is no feeling of guilt how can there rationally be a sense of loss of worth? In reply I have pointed to the way in which a sense of one's own worth may be tied up with the fortunes of collectivities, such as one's family or country, even though one is not responsible for all or even most of the actions of that collectivity. This is to separate sharply the notions of guilt and shame. But this separation is open to an objection from a completely different quarter: namely from those who think that collective guilt is, after all, possible. The fact that the good of individuals is often bound up with the good of collectivities to which they belong has been used to support the contention that one man can be answerable for another's misdeeds. In particular, it has been argued that a sense of nationality may be so

strong as to allow present citizens of a country to feel guilt at the past misdeeds of that country[10]. One should note here Karl Jaspers' apparent readiness to speak of the collective guilt of the German nation for the ghastly crimes committed under National Socialism[11]. Do we not all in some way feel responsibility for what is done in the name of our country?

11. If our sense of the collective aspect of wrong-doing is taken thus far it will again run up against our basic moral intuitions. Guilt is only rationally felt where I personally have fallen short of standards of right conduct. Of course it is reasonable in *some* circumstances to feel guilt on account of the acts of others. Others' wrong-doing may be the result of my bad influence upon them. Sometimes I may be in a position to prevent others' misdeeds, but fail to do so. So I may properly feel guilt at the actions of my country, if I was in a position to influence its government for the better or to prevent its agents from doing shameful things. But in this sort of case we do not have vicarious guilt or shame in any strict sense. For guilt here attaches to me essentially because *I* failed to do something which I reasonably could have been expected to do. The fact that I can and do influence other people's actions gives only a limited way in which I might share in the wrong-doing of others. The influence, for example, that a private citizen can exercise over the affairs of a large nation state is small and his control over the past doings of that nation is non-existent.

12. In so extending the range of guilt that may be felt on account of others' deeds, some writers may be influenced by an ambiguity or vagueness in the notion of responsibility. I may indeed feel responsible for the wrong-doings of an organisation or collectivity to which I belong, even though this wrong-doing was the result of other men's behaviour over which I could not reasonably have been expected to exercise control. But this feeling of responsibility may only amount to a recognition that my membership of the collectivity or organisation places upon me an obligation to help in putting right, or making reparation for, the effects of the wrong-doing[12]. So let us suppose that my Faculty at King's College is involved in some wrong-doing that hurts outsiders and that I am in no way implicated in the wrong-doing. Now the mere fact that I could say "I was in no way to blame for this" does not remove my responsibility in helping to make amends. If I take my membership of this larger unit seriously, I do assume a certain responsibility for what happens in that I realise that I am liable to help in putting things right. The important point to recognise is that not only does this sort of responsibility not entail blame, but also it need not bring with it any sense that my own worth or merit has been lessened by the wrong done. This sort of vicarious responsibility equally fails, then, to capture the sense of solidarity in wrong-doing that we are after.

13. I return to my point that it is the notion of vicarious shame, here distinguished sharply from guilt, which does capture this sense of solidarity. It is one of the merits of my example from *Persuasion* that it illustrates the type of shame in a pure form, untainted by either of the two possibilities discussed above. There is first no sense in which her father's conduct reflects wrongful acts or omissions on Anne Elliot's part. On the contrary, throughout the novel she is represented as the one member of the family (with Lady Russell) who acts to maintain the genuine honour of the family. Her father and elder sister put that honour at risk despite Anne's conduct, not because of it. Nor is this example complicated by a responsibility to make amends to others which might incline us to talk of shared answerability. For the wrong done by Sir Walter is one that redounds on himself and his family alone. No reparation is owed to others and so Anne's sense of sharing in the wrong done is not accounted for by a feeling that she must help in making amends to others.

14. So far the possibility of vicarious shame has been discussed in the context of a man's allegiance to organisations or collectivities larger than himself: families, nations, professional bodies. One who accepts what has been said so far may still question the extent to which vicarious shame serves to illuminate or support doctrines about the universal, original character of sin. For the latter refers to something that is common to the human race as such and as a whole, whilst we see that the scope of vicarious shame is limited. It enables us to share in the wrong-doing

of other men only in so far as there is some special tie between us, like that provided by common nationality. Could the mere fact of common membership of the human race provide a sufficiently strong bond for vicarious shame to operate?

15. We may approach this question by way of a particular example. We have spoken already of the possibility of a German feeling guilt at the crimes committed in the name of his country during the Nazi era. Whilst I would strongly question the appropriateness of guilt feelings here, I could certainly see how such a man could feel shame at those crimes, even though he did not actively or passively encourage them. I would find such a sense of shame natural. But could I, who have no connections with Germany, reasonably feel shame upon reading about such things? It seems to me that I could. The fact that those who performed these foul deeds were fellow members of the human race is a sufficient bond for me to feel vicarious shame. Indeed, I wish to go further and say that all men ought to hang their heads when they read of such things. Common membership of the human race is sufficient here because it allows the possibility of the following thought: "Human nature is capable of this". That men could perform such deeds tells us something about human nature, about the depths to which it can sink. This allows for the possibility of all of us feeling shame because such things took place when we remind ourselves of the common humanity we share with the men who did these things. These things were done by men. That they were done tells us something about the possibilities of human nature and our common humanity gives us a share in that nature.

16. I hope that the above argument may be allowed to stand despite the fact that the extent to which there is a common human nature is capable of endless philosophical debate. The claim about a common human nature can, I hope, be accepted at a common sense level. Its strength in this context lies in the fact that the evil deeds in question were not merely the casual aberrations of a few. They were systematically performed over a long period of time and involved the willing co-operation of many. What is more, there are numerous parallels to such systematic evils in the history of mankind. If we reflect upon such crimes and upon our common humanity with their perpetrators, it would be odd if we did not feel some shame because of these things. We do not, in the case of Nazism, even have the possibility of the specious thought that these things were done by primitive, uncivilised people. In many other respects, pre-War Germany was a highly civilised, cultured community.

17. A piece of science fiction fantasy may help to make the point I am after. Imagine that we did establish contact with beings from another planet. They wish to learn about the human race, about what sort of creatures human beings are. In order to enlighten these creatures we describe to them the history of the human race. It would be natural for us to swell with pride when recounting the deeds of some historical figures. For in a way the achievements of a Newton reflect well on all of us. Equally, however, it would be natural for us to feel shame as we told our visitors of some of the monstrous crimes committed by human beings. Such things would reflect badly upon the human race and it would be odd if we did not feel some sense of loss of worth as we recounted them.

18. I have laid stress upon talk of 'a common human nature' or of 'our common humanity' in attempting to show how vicarious shame might be used to justify aspects of the theological account of sin. Also supporting my argument is our readiness to speak of 'the human family'. If the recognition of kinship is sufficient to allow the possibility of vicarious shame, then the fact that we recognise a certain kinship with *all* men is significant. But again we must face the fact that some will object to my argument. Someone strongly disinclined to accept the suggestion that one man may share in the wrongdoing of another may want to know how these dismal reflections upon human nature could provide any reason for the guiltless individual to hang his head. For granted that human nature is capable of these crimes, two possibilities need then to be considered. Either these potentialities for evil have manifested themselves in the individual's life or they have not. If the former, then the individual is morally guilty, either through thought or deed. In which case he

should hang his head, but not because of some mysterious kinship that he has with other evil-doers, but rather because he himself is guilty before the bar of morality. He himself is responsible for evil thoughts or actions and there is nothing vicarious in the sense of wrong he feels. If, however, these evil potentialities have not in any way manifested themselves in the individual's life, then he has no reason at all to hang his head. He has done no wrong, and whatever evils in human nature the wrong-doing of others testifies to, since these evils have no sway in his life, he has in effect disowned them and should not be further haunted by them.

19. In a sense, this objection has already been met by what has gone before. It is based upon a refusal to see that there is a significant difference between a sense of guilt and a sense of shame, and also upon a refusal to see that while the former presupposes personal wrong-doing (if it is rational), the latter does not. We have seen that what vicarious shame does presuppose is a certain view of oneself and one's relations to others. One needs to see a certain community between oneself and others before one can feel shame at their misdeeds. The question is: does the mere fact of common membership of the human race provide a sufficient rational foundation for this sense of community? I can only contend that it does, at least in certain circumstances.

20. One might add to this reply by stressing the fact that this sense of community is supported through a recognition of the role that luck or fortune plays in human affairs. Many philosophers would wish to deny that luck could in any way affect an individual's moral worth. This depends not on the contingencies of external circumstance but upon the orientation of the agent's own will. Despite this philosophical stance we do in ordinary life recognise that luck enters into moral guilt and innocence[13]. One way in which we recognise that luck enters into these matters is through the circumstances in which individuals find themselves having to make moral decisions. These are never entirely of their own making. We may be guilty of no moral evil, either in thought or in deed, but nevertheless admit that if we had lived through the circumstances that others had faced, we would not have maintained our virtuous character. The characteristic thought prompted by such an admission would of course be "There but for the grace of God go I" (a thought perhaps available to both believer and unbeliever). Here the kinship felt with the evil-doer simply on account of common humanity and human nature may be very strong indeed.

21. I have not tried in this paper to offer anything like a full justification of theological doctrines about the original and universal character of sin. We are obviously coming close to the import of such doctrines if we accept that our common humanity may be sufficient to give us a share in the wrong-doing of others. Our humanity is original, unacquired and inherited. I have tried to show the weakness in the simple claim that these doctrines about sin offend against our fundamental moral intuitions. What is true, it seems to me, is that though such doctrines conflict with some of our intuitions, they are supported by others. The ordinary moral consciousness does seem to recognise ways in which one man may share in the wrong-doing of another. The real point in articulating the distinction between guilt and shame is that it enables us to show that the ordinary moral consciousness is not here in conflict with itself. It shows why, though the theological doctrine *seems* flatly counter-intuitive, it is not.

22. None of this, as I said, provides a complete justification for theological teaching. For one thing, it is plain that if we can share in another's wrong-doing through vicarious shame, it is also true that we can share in other people's achievements through vicarious pride. Most of what can be said about wrong-doing and shame can be said mutatis mutandis of achievement and pride. So there could be a real debate (it would be between pessimists and optimists) as to whether our common humanity was an inheritance of sin or glory. Even if one did not wish to decide wholly in favour of the latter alternative, one might still wish to question strenuously the finality of theological teaching.

NOTES

1. London: Collins, 1957, p.46.
2. H.D. Lewis *Morals and the New Theology*, London: Gollancz, 1947, contains a forceful statement of this condemnation. See Chapters 5 and 6.

3. See K. Ward *Ethics and Christianity*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1970, for an example of such an interpretation.
4. See e.g. D.A.J. Richards *A Theory of Reasons for Action*, Oxford. Clarendon Press, 1971, p.254.
5. See Joel Feinberg *Doing and Deserving*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970, pp. 237-8.
6. Pp. 161-2 of the Penguin text.
7. See W.H. Walsh 'Pride, Shame and Responsibility' *Philosphical Quarterly*, Vol. 20, 1970, p.12.
8. *A Theory of Reasons for Action*, p.254.
9. See H.D. Lewis *Morals and Revelation*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1951, p.108.
10. See W.H. Walsh, op.cit. p.2.
11. In *The Question of German Guilt*, the relevant passages are reprinted in H. Morris (ed) *Guilt and Shame*, Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1971, pp.40-53.
12. Feinberg, op.cit. pp.232ff, makes a similar point.
13. See T. Nagel 'Moral Luck', *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume*, L, 1976, pp.137-151.

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WHAT THERE IS TO READ
I. CHRISTOLOGY

Colin Gunton and Graham Stanton

The first of a series of articles in which we offer to readers an attempted outline and classification of some of the bewildering variety of approaches to theology available today.

A. Systematic Theology

To understand the complexity of contemporary thinking about Christ, some brief account of its context is indispensable. That context is provided largely by the atmosphere of rational, if not rationalistic, criticism that has developed around all aspects of theological thinking. The modern critical movement has generated at once liberation from past stereotypes and constriction into new ones. For christology, the chief impact has been upon our belief in the historical veracity of the documents; the traditional belief in the uniqueness of Christ; and the availability for contemporary belief and worship of what sometimes seem like documents and beliefs belonging to a long past era. Perhaps it is this impression of a gulf between us and our foundation documents that is the most forcible. This (real or supposed) gulf has led to two phenomena in particular: an intensification of critical studies of the gospels in an attempt to unearth the 'historical' Jesus, and an increasing criticism of the credal formulations of Nicaea and Chalcedon. Thus Anthony Hanson in *Grace and Truth: a Study in the Doctrine of the Incarnation* (SPCK, 1975) makes an attack on Chalcedon's aridity in the name of a more biblical Christology, echoing and developing the radical critiques of Chalcedonian categories in Schleiermacher and Ritschl last century. The ancient creeds are attacked for various reasons, but in particular for their starting point in eternity. In contrast to this is the popular contemporary proposal to begin Christology 'from below'. What 'below' means here is very varied. Some of the proposals are as follows.

I

An obvious place to begin a search for the especial or supreme significance of Jesus is the record of his life on earth. The problem of this approach is that it appears to ground faith merely in some past event, quite apart from the fact that it has long been suspected of producing a picture of Jesus strongly reflecting the presuppositions of contemporary culture (Tyrrell's famous 'Liberal Protestant face, seen at the bottom of a deep well'). The advantage is of tying doctrine firmly to the concrete: to what happened in human time and history. One famous recent approach was to begin from Jesus' moral qualities, as 'the man for others' (John Robinson, *Honest to God*, SCM, 1972). Similarly, a beginning might be made from the reality of Jesus' experience of God and his capacity to draw to himself human loyalty and striving. Variations on this approach are to be found in *The Myth of God Incarnate* (Ed. J. Hick, SCM, 1977); notice particularly the title of one of the papers 'Jesus, the Man of Universal Destiny'.

Christology from below is not only a phenomenon of the Anglican and Protestant traditions. A number of recent Roman Catholic works share the approach. Thus P. Schoonenberg, *The Christ* (Sheed & Ward, 1974) presents a 'Christology of Jesus' transcendence as a man', reversing the usual direction of doctrine by attributing personhood and the rest primarily to the man Jesus, and seeing his divinity only in its terms. Similarly, E. Schillebeeckx's *Jesus: An Experiment in Christology* (Collins, 1979) is for the most part a long and detailed historical-critical investigation of the New Testament evidence about Jesus. Schillebeeckx concludes that Jesus was essentially an eschatological (but not messianic) prophet, whose experience of God was of one 'cherishing people and making them free'. It is on this basis that he goes on to elaborate his faith in Jesus as also somewhat more than this.

In some studies, the approach to Christology from below is placed in the context of a philosophical scheme. A fairly frequent phenomenon is the appeal to philosophies which attempt to understand the world according to some notion of evolution. The discovery that human life evolved rather than arrived on earth fully

fledged, so to speak, must necessarily be one of the influences on our thinking about Christ, especially if we are to take seriously the full reality of his humanity. The drawback to an over-reliance on these categories is also obvious. If we see Jesus as the crown of evolution, we run the risk of lifting him so far above our ordinary human condition that he is no longer 'one who in every respect has been tempted as we are, yet without sinning' (Heb. 4.15). Christologies linked to evolutionary or 'process' ways of seeing things come from both Protestant and Catholic directions. J.A.T. Robinson, *The Human Face of God* (SCM, 1973) sees in Jesus 'the clue to the mystery of . . . what the divine process is about and the meaning of human existence is'. Like Robinson, W.N. Pittenger, well known as an exponent of Process Theology, adopts in *The Word Incarnate* (Nisbet, 1959) a version of degree Christology to account for the difference 'from below' of Jesus from ourselves. From the Catholic tradition, a comparable enterprise is that of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin whose *The Phenomenon of Man* (Collins, 1959) continues to be influential.

Perhaps the essence of speculative philosophy since the end of the eighteenth century has been its tendency to see God, if any, within the world process rather than operating from without. This has influenced Christology in other ways than by the employment of evolutionary theologies. Theories deriving from Hegel of universal history underlie much work, especially, perhaps, that of Wolfhart Pannenberg whose *Jesus, God and Man* (SCM, 1968) remains one of the major works of Christology to be written since the war. Pannenberg argues that the meaning of history as a whole is the concern at once of modern man and of Christian theology. In the resurrection, whose historicity he defends at length, Pannenberg sees the key to the significance at once of Jesus and of history. Thus by examining the New Testament witness we can rise 'from below', from an apprehension of Jesus' fate, to a realisation of his oneness with God.

Often linked with Pannenberg is Jurgen Moltmann, whose *Theology of Hope* (SCM, 1967) was oriented to the themes of exodus and resurrection. His christology, *The Crucified God* (SCM, 1974) shares some of the concerns of christology from below, but in other respects reveals more traditional concerns. Though this book has received considerable criticism, its interest lies in its attempt to transform the Christian understanding of God by its emphasis on the reality of the Father's sharing in the Son's suffering on the cross. Moltmann rightly emphasises the political significance of such a transformation, and thus tends to be linked with the 'theologians of liberation'. The latter school, if it be such, has produced one attempt at a christology: Jon Sobrino, *Christology at the Crossroads: a Latin American Approach* (SCM, 1978). In some ways a disappointing book, it is interesting as an attempt to interpret christology through categories derived from politics rather than from science or philosophy.

II

Alongside the new directions, there are also books which try to wrestle with the inherited categories. Well known is D.M. Baillie's *God was In Christ* (Faber, 1961) with its attempt to understand the two-nature doctrine by analogy with the Christian experience of grace. David Jenkins, *The Glory of Man* (SCM, 1967) expounds the meaning of a Chalcedonian Christology for our understanding of God, man and the world, while John McIntyre, *The Shape of Christology* (SCM, 1966) analyses and expounds the different 'models' by which the reality of Christ has been and may be understood.

Finally a word should be said about those who believe that traditional formulations should have more influence in the shaping of contemporary thinking. E.L. Mascall, *Theology and the Gospel of Christ*, (SPCK, 1977) defends traditional christology and its trinitarian grounding, while T.F. Torrance *Space, Time and Incarnation* (O.U.P., 1969) argues that the Fathers' rethinking of the concepts of space and time has much to say to us in face of contemporary intellectual challenges. The first part of Karl Barth's *Doctrine of Reconciliation (Church Dogmatics* Vol. IV, T & T Clark, 1956), with its linking of Christology and reconciliation, remains of incomparable interest, while from the Roman Catholic side, Walter Kasper's *Jesus, the Christ* (Burns and Oates, 1978) combines great learning in biblical studies and theology with a straightforward reassertion of the interlinking of Christ and human salvation.

Colin Gunton

B. New Testament Christology

In the last ten years or so, discussions of the Christology of the New Testament writings have focussed on two related issues: the extent to which the various strands of earliest Christianity contain different Christologies and the extent to which it is possible to trace development in Christological thinking in the first century. It is not without significance that contemporary theologians who wish to set aside or sit very loosely to the Church's doctrinal tradition usually make strenuous efforts to establish their case by appealing to parts of the New Testament. They may refer to one strand within early Christianity (perhaps to Pauline rather than to Johannine Christology) or to a particular historical reconstruction of the development of Christianity. So, in *The Myth of God Incarnate* (ed. J. Hick, SCM, 1977), for example, one finds essays which suggest that Christology today should be anchored in the teaching of the historical Jesus or in the earliest Christology *before* Paul appropriated the idea of Jesus' incarnation in the course of dialectic with Samaritan missionaries in Corinth and Ephesus between 50 and 55!

Since scholars of most persuasions seem to accept that discussion of historical evidence is important for a contemporary Christology, there seems little risk that theologians will set aside historical issues as of no more than academic interest. A partial exception is D.E. Nineham's *The Use and Abuse of the Bible* (SPCK, 1978), where it is argued that in any age Christological thinking is so strongly conditioned by cultural factors that the formulations of one period cannot be taken over into very different cultural settings. On a thorough-going cultural relativist position (from which Nineham himself draws back) the historian is trapped in his own culture: a reconstruction of the past is no more than a mirage. Discussion of this important issue is by no means over.

In the next decade attention will probably be focussed not so much on narrowly historical questions as on 'cultural relativism' and a cluster of other problems of interpretation. A.C. Thiselton's *The Two Horizons* (Paternoster, 1980) is a sign of the times: its sub-title is New Testament Hermeneutics and Philosophical Description with special reference to Heidegger, Bultmann, Gadamer and Wittgenstein. Thiselton opens his large wide-ranging book with the question, 'Why should the interpreter of the New Testament concern himself with philosophy?', and goes on to show the importance of philosophical questions about the nature of language. The student of Christology, above all, must not by-pass such questions.

* * * *

Over the past decade a number of scholars have drawn attention to the diversity of the Christologies of the New Testament writers. Books tend to concentrate on one New Testament writer; attempts to expound *the* Christology of the New Testament are now out of fashion.

In his *Unity and Diversity in the New Testament* J.D.G. Dunn underlines the diversity of early Christianity; he also insists that the different unifying factors in first-century Christianity focus again and again on Christ, on the unity between Jesus the man and Jesus the exalted one (p.371). E. Schweizer's *Jesus* (SCM, 1971) holds together a strong emphasis on the affirmations of the post-Easter communities with a concern for historical inquiry into the totality of Jesus' life and death. W.G. Kümmel's *The Theology of the New Testament* (SCM, 1974) examines the message of Jesus, Paul and John and concludes that they are in agreement in a two-fold message. God has caused his salvation promised for the end of the world to begin in Jesus Christ, and in this Christ event God has encountered us and intends to encounter us as the Father who seeks to rescue us from imprisonment in the world and to make us free for active love (p.332). The contrast between Kümmel's soteriological and Dunn's Christological exposition of 'the centre of the New Testament' is interesting and significant.

It is hardly possible here to do more than note some major recent discussions of the Christology of individual New Testament writers: in most cases the books listed include examinations of other views and provide references for further reading. For Matthew, see J.D. Kingsbury, *Matthew: Structure, Christology, Kingdom* (SPCK, 1976); for Mark, R.P. Martin, *Mark: Evangelist and Theologian* (Paternoster,

1972), for Luke-Acts, E. Franklin, *Christ the Lord* (SPCK, 1975) and especially F. Bovon, *Luc le théologien: vingt-cinq ans de recherches (1950-1975)* (Delachaux, 1978). For the Fourth Gospel, see S.S. Smalley, *John: Evangelist and Interpreter* (Paternoster, 1978), J. Painter, *John: Witness and Theologian* (SPCK, 1975); and R. Brown, *The Community of the Beloved Disciple* (Chapman, 1979). We still need a thorough discussion of Paul's Christology; in the meantime, G. Bornkamm's *Paul* (Hodder, 1975) is a useful introduction. On Hebrews and Revelation we now have two fine studies, G.R. Hughes, *Hebrews and Hermeneutics* (CUP, 1979) and J.M. Court, *Myth and History in the Book of Revelation* (SPCK, 1980).

* * * *

There are now two excellent discussions of the origin and development of Christology available. C.F.D. Moule's *The Origin of Christology* (CUP, 1977) includes careful discussions of the familiar characterizations of Jesus as 'the Son of Man', 'the Son of God', 'Christ' and 'Lord'. A lengthy and closely argued chapter examines, mainly from the Pauline epistles, an understanding and experience of Christ as corporate. Moule insists that Paul was led to conceive of Christ as any theist conceives of God: personal, indeed, but transcending the individual category (p.95). In his *Son of God* (SCM, 1975), M. Hengel argues that the main lines of Christological development took place between AD 30 and AD 50, against a Jewish rather than a Hellenistic background. Both books refer to a number of important technical studies which are not readily accessible to the non-specialist, several of these studies do seem to rule out some of the more radical explanations of the origin and development of Christology.

The relationship between 'traditional' Christian doctrines and the evidence of the New Testament writings has been explored from a number of different angles. *The Myth of God Incarnate* is the best known example. *Incarnation and Myth* (ed. M.D. Goulder, SCM, 1979) contains essays from the contributors to the *Myth* and from some of their critics. The issues in the recent furore over the doctrine of the incarnation are not primarily exegetical, but doctrinal and philosophical. However, in a forthcoming study, *Christology in the Making* (SCM, 1980) J.D.G. Dunn explores thoroughly the origin and development of incarnational Christology.

R. Brown's *The Virginal Conception and the Bodily Resurrection of Jesus* (Chapman, 1973) is a sensitive discussion from a distinguished Roman Catholic exegete who has no hesitation in using historical critical methods. Brown has also written an outstanding study of the infancy narratives of Matthew and Luke, *The Birth of the Messiah* (Chapman, 1977) in which he pursues the historical questions and expounds the Christological emphases of the two evangelists.

In *God as Spirit* (OUP, 1977) G.W.H. Lampe argues that the model of a descent and an ascent of the Second Person of the Trinity, God the Son, is likely to confuse our attempt to answer the question, 'In what sense is Jesus alive today?' He opts for the concept of the indwelling presence of God as Spirit, in Jesus himself and, today, in the believing community (p.33). This lucid and wide-ranging study is enormously stimulating, even though one may wonder whether justice has been done either to the New Testament evidence or to the *intentions* of the classic Patristic formulations of Christian doctrine.

* * * *

Interest in the historical Jesus continues unabated. G.A. Wells asked *Did Jesus Exist?* (Elek/Pemberton, 1975) and, in answering 'No', he revived an old theory which even Soviet propaganda has abandoned. No early opponent of Christianity, whether pagan or Jewish, ever seems to have doubted that Jesus existed. So, not surprisingly, Wells has not been able to convince contemporary historians, whether Christian or not.

In his *A Future for the historical Jesus* (SCM, 1972) L.E. Keck examines most effectively the issues at stake when Christian theology assesses the importance of the historical Jesus. G.A. Vermes's perceptive study, *Jesus the Jew* (Collins, 1973) places Jesus firmly in a first century Jewish setting. When a book is hailed as 'the most important book on Jesus since Schweitzer's *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*', one turns to it with high expectations. J.P.

Mackey's *Jesus: the Man and the Myth* (SCM, 1979) is an interesting study, though the publisher's judgement is surely over-optimistic. Mackey's reconstruction of the historical Jesus is not particularly striking. His main thesis is rather more provocative: all religious language is 'mythological'; whatever is said about Jesus will have to utilize that kind of language. In *The Aims of Jesus* (SCM, 1979) Ben Meyer, a Canadian Roman Catholic, rehearses earlier quests for the historical Jesus, discusses hermeneutical issues and the appropriate historical methods to be used before setting out his own reconstruction of the teaching and actions of Jesus. He insists that 'once the theme of national restoration in its full eschatological sweep is grasped as the concrete meaning of the reign of God, Jesus's career begins to become intelligible as a unity' (p.221).

In his recent article, 'The Hermeneutical Significance of Four Gospels', in *Interpretation* Vol. 33 (October 1979), Robert Morgan puts his finger on issues which are bound to remain central in future Christological discussions and debate. Morgan insists that 'a reading of the Gospels which sets aside Christian doctrinal presuppositions leads to a purely human Jesus, and a theology which adopts this reading without reservation has already sided against the dogmatic Christology of traditional Christianity, Protestant as well as Catholic and Orthodox. This new anti-dogmatic version of Christianity has seemed to many theologians the only possible way forward in a world grown suspicious of dogma. That supposition comes naturally to New Testament scholars' (p.377). Is there a plausible alternative approach?

Morgan notes that in practice Christian scholars have long since learned to read the Gospels with bifocal spectacles: they read them 'just like any other book' (e.g. in historical study), but they also read them as Scripture in other contexts (e.g. liturgical and devotional), presupposing that they speak of God. It is at least worth asking whether christology should not take this duality seriously instead of starting ' "from below" with the (in principle if not in fact) cognitively more solid assured results of historical research' (ibid.). 'A Christian theological reading of the Gospels despises neither the historical facts (unlike Strauss, Kahler and Bultmann) nor the tradition of Christian evaluation (unlike most liberals). It seeks to hold these together, whereas historical research as such necessarily puts them asunder. It recognizes the distinction without following liberal kerygmatic theology in making it constitutive for Christology' (p.381). It remains to be seen whether these suggestions will be accepted as one way out of the impasse. The attempt to allow full rein to historical inquiry alongside full (but not uncritical) assent to the Church's Christological tradition is surely refreshing and most welcome.

Graham Stanton

JANE EMILY WILLS—1879-1944

Margaret Hodgetts

Jane Emily Wills, who is commemorated at King's College, London, by the presentation of a book token to every woman student completing the Bachelor of Divinity course, was born in Exeter on 13th November 1879, the eldest of four daughters of William Skinner Wills, an accountant, and his wife Emily, whose maiden name was Brent.

Of Jane's early education there is little record, but at least part of it was in the care of the local vicar; an associate recalls having been told that Jane's parents decided that her eager and enquiring mind could best be trained by him and that he delighted in teaching the little girl Hebrew and Greek. From 1895 to 1897 Jane attended Grosvenor College, Bath, and from 1897 to 1898, the University College of North Wales at Bangor. There is no record of her having remained there beyond that date and detailed records of her course of study are not now available. We may perhaps speculate that in the days when there were no student grants, Jane Wills may have been forced to give up full time study for financial reasons. Certainly there can have been no lack of aptitude or diligence, for her whole life bears witness to her great intellectual gifts and her dedicated use of these gifts in her vocation as scholar and teacher. It is often observed that very few people—if any—ever reach their potential achievement. Jane Emily Wills must be an outstanding example of one of those rare spirits who come within grasp of it.

In 1900 she embarked upon a course of private study under the direction of the University Correspondence College, Cambridge; these studies were to extend over several years, with the result that in 1905 she passed the Intermediate Examination of the University of London Bachelor of Divinity Degree and five years later graduated as an external student, among the first of the very few women to gain this distinction. At the same time she was studying for the Lambeth Diploma (Student of Theology) which she gained in the same year. Even allowing for a certain overlapping of syllabus, the amount of study required must have been phenomenal; what makes it even more astonishing—certainly, it may be hazarded, to our younger students—the remarkable Miss Wills was actually doing a job at the same time. From 1898 to 1906 she was engaged in teaching, for the most part in private schools, of which there were many at that time. But Miss Wills's attainments were not narrow or unbalanced, although Biblical and Religious Studies evidently took priority; it is recorded that in 1908 she was awarded the Diplôme de la Langue Francaise, degré supérieure, of the University of Caen.

In 1907 Jane Wills joined the staff of the Gravesend County School, then a mixed school, at premises known as Mayfield, where she held a position as form mistress. She was evidently a woman of many parts, and we may confidently assume that the entrusting of instruction to a teacher required rather more than the willingness on the teacher's part to teach an 'unpopular' subject. Miss Wills was responsible for the teaching of Holy Scripture, English, French, Latin and Music.

The school was re-organised as a school for girls only in 1910 when a separate Grammar School was opened for boys. In 1915 Miss Wills, who had remained in the girls' school, was promoted to the position of Second Mistress, with responsibility now for teaching Holy Scripture, Latin and Singing. In that same year she received a licence from the Archbishop of Canterbury to teach Theology.

The Headmistress at that time was Edith Margery Fox, and a close and lasting friendship was formed between her and Jane Wills, who was held in Miss Fox's highest esteem. When Miss Fox moved to the headship of the new Beckenham Girls' Grammar School in 1919, Jane Wills was appointed to the headship of the Gravesend School. There can be no doubt that whatever competition she may or may not have faced, she was in every way a most worthy candidate for this office, which she filled with such distinction for twenty-one years.

The school expanded and eventually was rehoused in a new building in Pelham Road (the present school) which was officially opened by the Duchess of Atholl in October 1929.

In 1935, the school's twenty-first birthday

year, Miss Wills had an opportunity to express in the school magazine foreword her gratitude to all who had contributed to the success of the school, making particular mention of the teaching staff: 'Words are insufficient to express my gratitude, appreciation and affection.' Mention was also made of the school secretary and the caretaking and household staff, who gave much ungrudging service. Jane Wills held the girls she taught in proud and affectionate regard and did not withhold praise when she considered it was deserved. She wrote. 'Apart from scholastic work, the school has bestirred itself valiantly for the needs of others and for the generations of schoolgirls who will follow . . . memory scarce recalls a girl who has in any way let down her school or failed in good days or bad to respond to its motto: "Per aspera ad astra".

It was with pride and satisfaction that in 1938 Jane Wills recorded that a member of her staff had been successful in gaining the Lambeth Diploma. 'Few other women in Kent own this distinction and it is the fruit of much hard reading and sacrifice of leisure.' And the same foreword reports on a pupil going to King's College to read for a degree in Divinity.

Whilst the attainment of a high academic standard was a matter which lay close to Jane Wills's heart, and although she herself was a first class scholar, with the scholar's love of learning for its own sake, she realised that not everyone was cast in the same mould. She wrote: 'In all walks of life, sound knowledge and a training in obtaining further knowledge for oneself are essential if, as we hope, our girls are to serve their generation in the future.' In writing of the Sixth Form, she refers to its immense value, not merely on the academic side, but in the training of character, in developing powers of readiness and service, and especially that power of leadership and vision which will be of the utmost importance later in life.' Later, in the same foreword. 'The duties of the home and care of children and sick will always be the natural outlets of women's energies and I am glad to note that our girls are responding to their natural vocation'.

This dedicated woman, who might by modern standards be regarded as having lived a narrow sheltered life, never coming into contact with the real world, was nevertheless gifted with that insight which allows of understanding without experience. She was well aware of the dangers involved when life was going too smoothly. Thus, in 1935. 'I look forward for the school, that its lines may not fall in *too* pleasant places, but that its difficulties may be those which may be courageously surmounted, so that generations to follow may be yet more courageous, yet more steadfast, girls gracious in manners, courageous in disposition, steadfast in trial, generous in success.'

There was an austerity about Jane Wills: it shows in her photographs, with her classic, rather beautiful face and severe hair style ('Gothic' was how one of her staff described her). But behind this austerity there was surely a warm heart, capable of deep affection. For example, the death through accident of a pupil is movingly recorded: 'with sorrow and sympathy for her sorrowing parents . . . in the short space of one term she had won for herself a good place in her form and in the esteem of her companions.'

The Gravesend School celebrated its Jubilee in 1964 and questionnaires and invitations were sent out to former pupils and members of staff. It seems that there was a good response and it is interesting to learn what a deep impression remained after many years of Jane Wills's influence on the girls who had been taught by her. One, who had made nursing her career and who had left the school in 1938 wrote: 'Miss Wills was Headmistress when I was at school and I have realised through the years since I left what a very fine woman she was. She tried to help all her pupils to develop the sort of character which would help them to be good members of the community in which they lived.' Another wrote from Canada, having been married in the War to an officer in the Canadian Army: 'Perhaps the most important of my memories is of the splendid standard of education offered which I only realised after I had left. The Headmistress was Miss Jane Wills . . . we all went in awe of her . . . she was a wonderful woman of great intelligence and the school ran like clockwork under her administration. She taught Latin, Greek and Scripture to the Sixth form'. Yet another, who left the school in 1925 and was herself on the point of retirement from teaching, wrote of 'Miss Fox's and Miss Wills's outstanding scholarship . the frequent prayer reading was from Ecclesiasticus "Wisdom cometh from the

opportunity of leisure". Miss Wills claimed that all her staff were ladies and I think we should all have subscribed to that. There was nothing shoddy about anything in the school.' This contributor recollected with gratitude the way in which the girls were encouraged to appreciate the arts, particularly those of music and painting. The picture in Miss Wills's room of St Genevieve watching over Paris by the nineteenth century French painter Puvis de Chavannes had given her particular delight. This same 'old girl', herself unmarried, also records Miss Wills's view of matrimony as a career which needed as much preparation and excellence as any other. She remembered, too, how Miss Fox and Miss Wills worked for the recognition of Religious Knowledge and Music in public examinations, both of which were taught to a high degree of excellence at Gravesend.

One former member of Staff, writing from Cheltenham, where she was teaching Classics at the Cheltenham Ladies' College, recalled with pleasure the happy atmosphere in the staff room at Gravesend and quoted one of the many verbal pearls which fell from Miss Wills's lips: 'The British Empire was never built by girls who were afraid to sleep away from home.'

Some light-hearted reminiscences of Jane Wills are related by former members of the staff: hats and gloves were required to be worn in the street at all times by all girls attending the school, these items being an essential part of the school uniform. Nor was the indulging in the purchase of ice creams to be tolerated, for it would not have pleased Miss Wills to meet a girl walking down the street with 'her hat in her hand and an ice-cream on her head'. Girls from the Gravesend School were forbidden to walk on the same side road as the boys from the Grammar School. Jane Wills was most solicitous for the correct behaviour of her staff at all times. One young teacher happened to stand on a desk to look out of a window at what was going on in the sports ground and the reprimand from Miss Wills came promptly, with the reminder that 'no lady ever looks out of a window'. With her undoubted command of the respect and affection of staff and girls, the school carried on its daily life with calm efficiency. However, Jane Wills was, like everyone else, human, and had been known on very rare occasions to lose her temper, it is significant to know that she had the humility to apologise to the member of staff concerned.

When one teacher, after having taught scripture for two terms, was asked whether she really wished to teach the subject and replied that she did indeed, Miss Wills told her that she must get herself qualified. It seems that Scripture, by whatever name it is called, was even then something of a Cinderella subject, but Miss Wills would have none of that. She suggested that the teacher should study for the University of London Diploma in Theology and in her business-like way arranged with the Classics mistress for coaching in Greek. The subject was considered by Miss Wills to be of great importance and the majority of girls took it as a subject in the School Certificate Examination. She would have been gratified to know that this tradition was carried on in the school in the years which followed.

Jane—as she was referred to by staff and others who came in contact with her, although few would have dared to address her in this way—had a real concern for the welfare of all her staff. If she could see that a young teacher was in difficulty, she would give every help and encouragement; if, however, she recognised that a member of staff would never really be happy or successful in a teaching career, she would unhesitatingly advise her to give it up. This outspoken advice, painful as it was for both parties, was for the ultimate good of the young teacher, hard though it may have been to accept at the time. Ambition for her staff was another of Jane's characteristics; she would urge the most able members of her staff to seek promotion, even though from the point of view of the school she would have preferred to keep them.

School prayers were an important part of the day. the school had a splendid organ and the music was supervised by Jane's sister Maude—so well remembered by one of the 'old girls'—a highly talented musician and an eccentric character who frequently gave way to exhibitions of temperament. Perfection in this daily observance was the standard expected by the Wills sisters; the psalms were sung to plainsong and all knelt for prayers, when collects from the Book of Common Prayer were used. There was a Bible reading and a hymn from 'Songs of Praise' was sung. A former member of staff also observed that 'the service would be punctuated by asides to any one of the assembly who coughed or flourished a handkerchief.' This same member of staff relates that her mother

frequently reminded her that in her first letter home she wrote: 'If I broke all the Ten Commandments, I'd be forgiven, but heaven help me if I drop my hymn book in prayers.'

Jane Wills's interest in Biblical and theological studies extended far beyond the confines of her school. A Hebrew scholar of some distinction, she contributed a commentary on the Book of Genesis to the first edition of the Teachers' Commentary, published by the Student Christian Movement in 1932. Throughout this study she emphasised the theme of the sense of the divine purpose and man's response, which she considered to form the contribution of the book to permanent religious thought. With her friend Edith Fox, Jane Wills kept abreast of modern scholarship by attendance at the Vacation Term for Biblical Study which was then held each summer alternately at Oxford and Cambridge. Miss Wills was a member of the Lambeth Diploma Committee for a number of years and is on record as having made the suggestion that no candidate should be allowed a First or Second Class Grade if her Greek was poor, no matter what marks she may have gained in other subjects. It is also recorded that she gave her whole-hearted support for the admission of men to work for the Diplomas and this did, in fact, come about some years later.

Members of the Vacation Term whose attendance goes back to the era of Miss Wills and Miss Fox, recall her as an 'outstanding personality, always kind and encouraging . . . a great lady who never hesitated to express her opinions.' One member, who must have been very young at the time, remembers two very dignified and rather unapproachable ladies—obviously headmistresses and obviously Miss Wills and Miss Fox. It is somewhat refreshing to be told that Jane once lost her place in the Magnificat when she was conducting prayers at the Vacation Term.

Descriptions by those who remember Jane Wills show a remarkable consistency. 'She had', writes one former member of the staff, 'a presence which commanded respect immediately, but a lively and humorous twinkle in the eye belied the first impression of sternness. Not everyone was aware of the twinkle because she was without doubt a keen disciplinarian as far as girls and staff were concerned.' This assessment of her is endorsed by others. One writes. 'She was a good-looking, well-dressed, very dignified person. She had the highest standards, both for pupils and staff and could show her disapproval in a very marked way. The staff, particularly the younger members, were really frightened of her, but came to realise her high aims and respected her for them.'

Although Jane was held in such high esteem, it is recalled that she was somewhat lacking in tolerance for those less able than herself; she was not one who suffered fools gladly. She was also insistent upon the observance of the barriers which existed between the teaching staff, office staff and domestic staff.

Jane Wills's gifts were not only of an intellectual nature and she was well aware of the need for a vital spiritual life. She was a regular worshipper at All Saints' Church, Perry Street, Gravesend and an associate of the Community of All Hallows, Ditchingham, which she visited from time to time.

The evacuation of the school to Diss in Norfolk at the outbreak of war in 1939 greatly distressed her. She wrote of the devotion of the staff, ensuring that the work of the school would be steadily, thoroughly and efficiently carried on during the period of exile. In fact a considerable number of pupils and the headmistress herself returned to Gravesend when the exiles began to drift back to London during the early 'phoney' war days when the uncanny calm gave no hint of the destruction which was soon to descend upon the capital. She was not to remain for long, for with deteriorating health she retired at the age of sixty in July 1940. Already ill, she moved to Brixham in her native Devonshire, where she had a house. Some while after this she suffered a stroke. A friend recalls seeing her once after this and found her handicapped and very unhappy. Jane Wills died on 29th July 1944 at the age of sixty-four. The last photograph of this distinguished headmistress in the school's collection is a charming informal snapshot of her with her beloved little dog; she is kneeling on the grass beside him, smiling happily and her hair is slightly ruffled in the breeze. What a contrast to those formal groups showing her as the stately lady sitting in the midst of her devoted and admiring colleagues—a formidable and awe-inspiring collection. The conscious dignity of her position has been shed; the dignity of her person is innate.

In the Gravesend and Dartford Reporter dated 12th August 1944, there is an obituary which pays tribute to Jane Emily Wills and her work. 'Miss Wills, a scholar herself, was quick to detect and foster good academic ability. Gravesend will never be able fully to estimate how many of its girls owe the fulfilment of cherished ambitions to her encouragement and to her efforts on their behalf . . She sought in her selection of staff scholarship with evidence of ability to teach, but personality and character above all, and she seldom made a mistake.'

A memorial service was held at All Saints Church, Perry Street, Gravesend, where Miss Wills had regularly worshipped, on 14th October 1944, and at this service a prayer desk with an engraved brass plate bearing the name of Jane Emily Wills and date of death was dedicated. Perhaps the most fitting tribute was made by the Reverend Samuel Lister, her friend and associate, headmaster of the Boys' Grammar School and honorary assistant priest at All Saints' Church. In the Parish Magazine he wrote: 'She was intensely and increasingly concerned in the improvement of Divinity teaching in schools and colleges and she was ever willing to help those, both men and women, who took up the study and teaching of theology. Many a school and many a home owe much to her old girls, who have gained their first knowledge and guidance in religious matters under her inspiring teaching and leadership . . . A gracious and vital personality, who practised what she preached, she was loved and respected by all with whom she came into contact . . . We had hoped that when Miss Fox also retired and joined her, they would have had many happy years of retirement together in her quiet Devonshire home. It was symbolic of her consecrated scholarship when, on the last Sunday of her life, she followed Theodore Robinson's broadcast on the Psalms by reading the passages in her Hebrew psalter.'

A Jane Emily Wills Divinity Prize was instituted as a result of a trust made by Miss Wills, the Trustee being the Kent County Council, and any boy or girl at a Secondary School in Kent was eligible to enter. Such eminent scholars as F.F. Bruce and R.F.G. Tasker accepted invitations to act as examiners and subjects set over the years covered a wide range of topics, from 'The Bible and Archaeology' to 'What is Man?'

In her Will, Jane Emily Wills, after a few small bequests, left the residue of her estate, which was not large, to her married sister, Dora Foster, with the provision that if this sister pre-deceased her, the money was to be used in connection with the King's College, London Theological School (Women's Department). It is evident from subsequent events that Dora Foster survived Jane Wills, so that King's College did not inherit the money. In 1946 a group of Jane's friends subscribed a sum of money which it was agreed should be used at the discretion of the Dean of King's College in consultation with the Tutor of Women Theological students. The secretary of the Memorial Committee was Jane's friend and executrix, Edith Margery Fox: Miss Fox, herself keenly interested in encouraging the Theological education of women and realising that King's College would not inherit the money, must have taken it upon herself to raise a memorial fund. And so every woman student at King's who completes the Bachelor of Divinity course—whether she graduates or not—has the pleasant surprise of receiving a book token with a commemorative plate.

What kind of world was it in which Jane Wills carried on her work in Gravesend? 'Another world', observed a member of the Gravesend School staff; it was indeed.

Those of us who grew up and were educated in the 'long week-end' between the two great wars, the second of which was finally to put an end to the old order which had been tottering on in increasingly unsteady fashion for twenty years, owe much to the band of dedicated women, virtually all of them unmarried, who taught us. The men whom many of them undoubtedly would have married lay dead in the war graves of France and Belgium, victims of the wholesale slaughter of the 1914-18 war which decimated a generation. Miss Wills insisted that all her staff should be ladies and it is to these gallant ladies who by their example passed on to their pupils something of those values which they held dear that a great debt is owed.

Acknowledgments to:
The Gravesend and Dartford Reporter.
The Vicar and Churchwarden of All Saints' Church, Perry Street, Gravesend.
The Headmistress and past and present members of Staff of Gravesend School for Girls.
The Headmistress of Langley Park School for Girls (formerly Beckenham Girls' Grammar School) and past members of Staff.

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TWO KINDS OF AMBIGUITY

Malcolm Torry

What kind of language is appropriate to religion?—and, in particular, to Christian faith?

This is a problem which Christian faith shares with every other area of life—for *all* language is a problem. Words have shifting definitions—and these definitions themselves are expressed in words with shifting definitions. There is never a relationship between an object and a word without some question arising about that relationship.

In our talk about everyday life, we employ all manner of different kinds of language—analogy, (approximate) description, story, sarcasm, ambiguity, negative definition, etc. Our language does actually communicate (—though it will not convey *exactly* what we *intend* it to convey); and because it approximately communicates what we intend it to communicate, we continue to use it.

In our talk about Christian faith, we employ all manner of different kinds of language—analogy, (approximate) description, story, sarcasm, ambiguity, negative definition, etc. Our language does actually communicate (—though it will not convey *exactly* what we *intend* it to convey); and because it approximately communicates what we intend it to communicate, we continue to use it.

Are there right and wrong kinds of language? In this article I intend simply to begin the discussion by asking what kinds of language we ought *not* to use.

Language which intends to be exact description (as opposed to language which just *looks* like exact description) is problematical in any sphere—and should therefore be excluded from our religious discourse.

Perhaps the next most problematical area is 'ambiguity'.

An 'ambiguity' is an "equivocal expression. a doubtful or double meaning."[1] An ambiguity intends *not* to be clear.

In everyday life, there are two kinds of ambiguity. The first occurs where the two possible meanings of the statement can be expected to be grasped by the person communicated to. Then the ambiguity can be clever, and possibly amusing—and can provoke thought about the relationship between the two meanings. The second occurs where only *one* of the two possible meanings of the statement can be expected to be grasped by the person communicated to. Then the ambiguity can become simple dishonesty.

Do these same two uses exist in *religious* discourse? I shall discuss three examples before attempting an answer.

My first example is Matthew 5:17-20.

> [17]Think not that I have come to abolish the law and the prophets; I have come not to abolish them but to fulfil them. [18] For truly, I say to you, till heaven and earth pass away, not an iota, not a dot, will pass from the law until all is accomplished. [19]Whoever then relaxes one of the least of these commandments and teaches men so, shall be called least in the kingdom of heaven; but he who does them and teaches them shall be called great in the kingdom of heaven. [20]For I tell you, unless your righteousness exceeds that of the scribes and Pharisees, you will never enter the kingdom of heaven.[2]

For a long time it has been recognized that the arrangement of the short sayings in Matthew's Gospel reveals the writer's theology, but scholars have disagreed as to what point is being made in the passage we have chosen to consider. Jesus had come to 'fulfil' (plērōsai—v.17) the law—but in what sense to fulfil? One of the following three interpretations has generally been chosen by successive commentators of the first gospel—

(a) that Jesus had come to carry out the law,[3]

(b) that Jesus had come to reveal the true meaning of the law, to refine it, and to give to it a focus—the command to love,[4]

(c) that Jesus fulfilled the promises found in the Old Testament.[5]

All three of these interpretations regard the Old Testament law as still valid.

My hypothesis is that the gospel-writer, in his arrangement of what appear to be four originally quite separate sayings, is suggesting that Jesus completely overthrew the old law, and introduced his own new and eternally valid 'law of love'. I

also believe that, because there were people in the writer's congregation who were still devoted to the old law, he had to say this carefully, and that he found ambiguity the best way to do it.

The passage is certainly ambiguous—

v.17—The difficulty experienced in interpreting plērōsai suggests not simply that we cannot *discover* the clear meaning which the word possessed in this context, but that it never *had* a clear meaning with reference to this saying. The verse could mean either that the law is to be radically changed, or that it is valid as it stands and is to receive Jesus' total obedience—or anything between these two extremes. Neither is katalusai ('to abolish') univocal. The Greek word need not mean 'to destroy utterly', but simply 'to dismantle' (i.e., in preparation for a subsequent rebuilding out of the same material). The word's only other use in the gospels is in the context of sayings concerning the destruction of the temple—and, especially considering that these sayings may well refer to Jesus' person, they could well indicate a dismantlement in preparation for a better reconstruction.

v.18—If this gospel took this verse from the source that Luke took Lk. 16:17 from, then the 'till all is accomplished' (hēos an panta genētai) has been added by our writer. This last phrase does not refer to the end of all things, as that would be tautologous; but it might mean that the old law is valid until *what the law demands* has been 'accomplished'. Might the evangelist be suggesting that this 'accomplishment' has already taken place in Jesus' ministry, and that it is therefore *now legitimate* for 'dots' and 'iotas' to 'pass from the law' if that law is found to be less than perfect?

v.19—The 'commandments' referred to can be either those of the old or of the new law.[6] 'These commandments' could just as easily refer to the Beatitudes as to the Old Testament Law.

v.20—The 'righteousness' which is to exceed that of the scribes and Pharisees might be that which is impossible within the confines of the old law, and which is defined in terms of the new 'law of love'.

Matthew's Gospel does portray Jesus as abolishing the old law—written and oral together.

To take one example. Jesus dismisses the Pentateuchal food laws in one sentence—"Hear and understand: not what goes into the mouth defiles a man, but what comes out of the mouth, this defiles a man."[7] Yet, to the Jew, these laws stood on the same footing as the prohibitions against sorcery, blasphemy, and adultery, to name but a few. It is clear that Jesus overthrew the imperfect code in order to make way for the new 'law of love'—the law of the kingdom which he was to bring in by his death, resurrection and Parousia.[8]

Why did Mt. 5:17-20 *need* to be ambiguous? It may be that *Jesus* was ambiguous; or it may be that the gospel-writer was ambiguous.

That Jesus was ambiguous with reference to the law seems quite probable. The passage's meaning, at face value, is that the law is eternally valid. But Jesus expounded such antitheses as those we find recorded in Mt. 5:21ff .. Jesus did not want to alienate those who were devoted to the old law; rather he wanted them to understand his mission and to embrace the Kingdom of God. But he did not want to leave men within the fetters of the old law once they had seen the possibility of the new freedom of obedience to himself.

That the gospel-writer was ambiguous with reference to the law seems equally likely. Like Jesus, he did not want to alienate those members of his community who were still devoted to the old law. But he, like Jesus, wanted Christians to embrace the new 'freedom for obedience' which Jesus offered.

Jesus, in his ministry, brought physical and spiritual rescue. He abolished the Old Testament law and replaced it with his 'law of love'—the love which his ministry and Passion embodied, and which he invites his disciples to give back to him in their confession of him as Lord and in their lives of obedience. The Church neglects this revolution at its peril. The gospel which must be preached is one of release from physical and spiritual imprisonment, and not one of adherence to a set of moral instructions. It is the *response* to this release which takes the form of obedience to the new 'law of love'—an obedience which is directed towards a living Christ rather than towards a dead code.

Our communication of this revolution must be like that of Jesus and the gospel-writer. The law of love demands that no-one be alienated—*and* that the invitation to abandon an old law

and to take on a new be firmly given. Jesus and the gospel-writer have sanctioned purposeful ambiguity as the solution to this communicational problem.

My second example of ambiguity in religious discourse is Rudolf Bultmann's treatment of 'Jesus Christ'--and especially his use of the word 'Jesus'.

'Jesus Christ' is an 'eschatological event'[9]—an event which transcends world history, one which is attached to no one particular time and thus one which can have significance for me here and now, in my existential situation.[10] Such an event is 'historical'—but by this Bultmann does not mean what most scholars would mean by 'the historical event of Jesus Christ'. He means that 'Jesus Christ' is an event which happens for me now—in the context of *my* history, rather than in the context of Palestine's history nearly two thousand years ago.

Bultmann talks a great deal about the 'Jesus' the New Testament talks about. This man was a not very special rabbi who talked about God's kingdom and who died on a cross--though Bultmann does not think that we can know anything certain about him. This 'Jesus' is the content of the Church's preaching now, and it is as we listen to the Church's preaching (which is the same as that of the apostles) that God's Word comes to us. *This* is the paradox of the Christian Faith—that in the context of a man's action now (preaching) God's Word comes. It is not God coming as a particular man which is the paradox.

So what does Bultmann *mean* when he uses the word 'Jesus'?

Bultmann says that "the natural man has the stumbling-block to overcome of a chance historical event coming forward with the claim that it is the revelation of God."[11] But *which* historical event? We must remember that the Word's coming to me now is a 'historical event'—it is a part of *my* history.

Bultmann talks about "the historical figure, Jesus of Nazareth, to whom faith must look."[12] Is this the Jesus of nineteen hundred years ago? or is it the Jesus who comes to us now in the Church's preaching? *That* is a 'historical figure', as far as Bultmann is concerned—for the preaching is man's word and God's Word--and the 'man's word' has a content—'Jesus'.

"The Word of God is not some mysterious oracle, but a sober, factual account of a human life, of Jesus of Nazareth, possessing saving efficacy for man."[13] Is this 'factual account of a human life' anything other than a sermon preached today? We must remember that Bultmann does not think we can know anything about the Jesus of history—and that this does not matter. He *certainly* does not think that the Jesus of history can have 'saving efficacy'. Bultmann thus means here that, on the human side, God's Word is a sermon, holding out to us the need for decision. R.C. Roberts says that we either accept this interpretation of the passage, or we must say that Bultmann is here guilty of gross inconsistency.[14]

Roberts concludes that 'Jesus' "has now become a cipher for the concreteness, the 'historical', the here-and-now character of the kerygma, the fact that it confronts me in the moment."[15]

Bultmann's theological and philosophical commitments have led him to insist on a qualitative difference between God and the world. The only contact between the two is in the Word which comes to a man in his concrete situation.

A definitive God-man encounter in a particular man back in world history is no part of Bultmann's Christian faith. But Bultmann wants to be regarded as a Christian theologian. He believes that by using the insights of both dialectical theology and of existentialist philosophy he can be both true to God and relevant to man. However, many Christians find his doctrine not a little unpalatable—and it would be even less palatable if he were to *admit* what he simply must believe if he is to be consistent—that, if Jesus of Nazareth had not lived, the sermon could still be preached, the Word could still come, and we could still be lifted from inauthentic to authentic existence--and thus the Christian Gospel would be unchanged.

Bultmann uses the word 'Jesus' in a way which will look familiar to many Christians—but, to those who can grasp the direction of his thought, 'Jesus' will be seen for what it is—a cipher for the present historical context in which God's Word comes to us.

My third example of purposeful ambiguity is nearer to us both geographically and tempo-

rally—it is the title of the book, *The Myth of God Incarnate*.[16]

My point in relation to this book is a simple one—the use of 'myth' in the title is ambiguous. Anyone who has sufficient inclination and theological background to read the book will give the word one meaning, anyone who simply reads the title will give it another.

The very fact that Maurice Wiles takes a whole chapter to tell us what 'myth' means proves that the word's definition is by no means easy even for a theologian—but I believe Bultmann to be representative when he says that "mythology is the use of imagery to express the other worldly in terms of this world and the divine in terms of human life, the other side in terms of this side."[17] But *Chambers' Twentieth Century Dictionary* gives a variety of meanings—1. "an ancient traditional story of gods or heroes, especially one offering an explanation of some fact or phenomenon:" 2. "a story with a veiled meaning:" 3. "mythical matter: a figment: a commonly-held belief that is untrue, or without foundation." We must remember that a dictionary's only task is to record meanings actually in circulation; it does not aim to tell us what the word *ought* to mean for us. The first couple of definitions here refer to 'stories'—and the Incarnation, to most people, is a dogma, and not a story. Thus, the non-theological member of the public, reading the title of *The Myth of God Incarnate*, can *only* go away with the third set of meanings in his mind. He will think that the writers have declared to be false the very foundation of Christian Faith. The writers may well have done nothing of the sort—but the title-reader will not know that.

The writers have engaged in ambiguity. They have done this to be provocative (—to create debate, and not to sell copies, I hope). The *careful* reader will find the title a focus for his thoughts about the use of the language of 'incarnation'—the non-careful or non-theologically-literate reader of the title will think that he knows what the writers mean.

In the introduction, we distinguished between two types of ambiguity—1. that which is ambiguous to both parties in the conversation, and 2. that which is ambiguous to the speaker, but univocal to the hearer. It is now clear that the two sorts do exist in religious discourse.

Our first example is of the first type—with maybe a touch of the second. A 'new law' was expected at the End of the Age—and any Jew meditating on Mt. 5:17-20 *and* on the rest of the gospel could reasonably be expected to appreciate the ambiguity, and to learn from it. Nowadays this is not the case—but this does not affect the original intention of the ambiguity.

Our second example is of the first type for some, and of the second type for others. Anyone familiar with the theological presuppositions underlying Bultmann's work will see the ambiguity in his use of the word 'Jesus' and will learn from it. Anyone *un*familiar with Bultmann's presuppositions will not see the ambiguity, and may well go away with a false impression of what Bultmann thinks of the Jesus of history.

Our third example is similar to the second. Some will understand the ambiguity in the use of the word 'myth', and will learn from it. Others will gain a false impression of what the writers believe, simply because they do not have the theological background to enable them to grasp both sides of the ambiguity.

In everyday life, we judge the first kind of ambiguity we mentioned to be admissible, the second not. In that our second and third examples each contain elements of both sorts, and predominantly the second sort (—for the non-theological audience is larger than the theologically-literate), they must come under scrutiny. In that they contain elements of the first sort, they cannot be immediately condemned as dishonest. But neither can they be regarded as wholly honest pieces of religious discourse.

Malcolm Torry

1. *Chambers' Twentieth Century Dictionary*.
2. Revised Standard Version.
3. H. Ljungmann (in *Das Gesetz Erfüllen: Mt. 5:17ff und 3:15 untersucht* (Lund, 1954) quotes with approval Zahn's thought that the law was 'empty' until the time of Christ, as no-one had perfectly obeyed it. Jesus accepted the law as it stood and obeyed it, thus '(ful)filling' it (plērōsai here meaning 'to fill up'). Ljungmann

supports this interpretation of Mt. 5:17 by recourse to the plērōsai in Mt. 3:15 (which is the word's only other use in the active voice in the first gospel)--'Let it be so now; for thus it is fitting for us to fulfil all righteousness.'

4. Ljungmann--"Jesus hebt das Gesetz nich auf, nein, er 'vollendet' es" (*op.cit.* p.23) ("Jesus did not cancel the law; no, he 'consummated' it"), where the German 'vollendet' embraces both 'termination' and 'completion'

5. Albert Descamps (quoted by Ljungmann) says that Jesus came to 'realise' the law. The law was 'fulfilled' in a sense similar to that in which the prophets were fulfilled. plērōsai is often used in Matthew's Gospel in this sense, but always in the passive voice (as in the frequent expression, hina plērōthē to rhēthen . . .). However, this explanation does not account for the parallel positions in which plērōsai and katalusai appear in 5:17. By accepting the 'prophetic fulfilment' interpretation of plērōsai, it is difficult to take the two words as opposites.

6. Eduard Schweizer (in *The Good News according to Matthew* also makes this suggestion, and points out that the original context of the saying may have been a collection of Jesus' sayings rather than a discussion of the validity of the law.

7. Mt.15:10,11.--cf. Mk. 7.14-23. Matthew omits Mark's katharizōn panta ta brōmata ('declaring all foods clean)(7.19). He does not want to say unambiguously that Jesus has overthrown the Mosaic law.

8. It could be objected that in some instances Jesus endorsed the dictates of the old law, and sometimes even put them on a firmer footing. But this does not necessarily mean that Jesus is insisting on the old law's validity. It is just that, in some cases, the old law happens to agree with Jesus' other concerns.

9. cf. Karl Barth's talk of God's revelation occurring in His Word. What Bultmann says about the 'eschatological event' is very similar to what Barth says about the 'Word of God'.

10. Bultmann learnt his existentialist philosophy from Heidegger, who said that, by 'resolution', man passes from inauthentic existence (attached to the world) to authentic existence (open to the future). By calling this change 'faith', and by saying that the Word of God brought it about, Bultmann formed a synthesis between existentialism and Barth's 'Word' theology.

11. R. Bultmann, *Essays Philosophical and Theological*, (English translation of *Glauben und Verstehen*, II), (SCM, 1955), p.133.

12. R. Bultmann, *Faith and Understanding*, (English translation of *Glauben und Verstehen*, I), (SCM, 1969), p.265.

13. *Kerygma and Myth*, (ed. H.W. Bartsch), vol. I, (SPCK, 1953), p.44.

14; Robert Campbell Roberts, *Rudolf Bultmann's Theology*, p.119.

15. Robert Campbell Roberts, *Rudolf Bultmann's Theology*, p.105.

16. SCM, 1977.

17. *Kerygma and Myth*, (ed. H.W. Bartsch), vol. I, p.10.

BOOK REVIEWS

Richard Hanson: CHRISTIAN PRIESTHOOD EXAMINED. Lutterworth Press, 1979, 128 pp. £5.95.

(Unless otherwise stated all page references are to the book; all italics in quotations from the book are the reviewer's, not the author's)

This is an historical examination of Christian priesthood, with especial attention to its origins in the primitive church. There is no claim that we should all go primitive again: "It would be most unwise to attempt to reverse the development . . We cannot put back the clock of history" (94); nevertheless any doctrine "based on a false premise . . cannot result in a satisfactory theory" (89). Those who find it too much bother to construe the tantalising scraps of evidence left us by the primitive Church and prefer the simple answers provided by some supposed 'living voice of the Spirit' should find themselves another book. In a religion founded on the Word made flesh, no doctrine can claim authority unless it can trace its lineage back to the apostolic tradition.

The aim of the examination is to find a concept of priesthood acceptable both "to those traditions which already preserve the priesthood . . and to those traditions to whom the idea of a priesthood has hitherto been suspect or even anathema" (115); an aim to be pursued "with neither ecclesiastical bias nor inherited prejudice nor partiality, but with honest judgement and scholarly truth" (22). Ridding ourselves of recognised prejudice is one thing, ridding ourselves of unrecognised and therefore uncriticised assumptions is another. Mine will no doubt appear to the discerning reader of this review; Hanson's lead him to impassioned denunciations of 'sacerdotal priesthood'. Granted that this is qualified (96, 105), the concept of a 'non-sacerdotal priesthood' still seems a confusing of language to no good purpose. Since a 'non-sacerdotal *sacerdotium*' is a nonsense, all it can imply is that the word 'priest' is simply the English form of 'presbyter' and has no connection with *sacerdos*. This is clearly not what Hanson is after, since it would detach 'priests' not only from the priesthood of Christ but also from the priesthood of all believers.

Indeed, that is the last thing he wants. "What the priest has is authority, authority to represent the church, whether in ordaining or confirming or in celebrating the eucharist" (108); or, as we might say, the priest is the parson, the *persona* of the local church. Only thus can we re-capture the proper relation between 'the ordained priesthood' and 'the priesthood of all believers'. True enough, though one may doubt whether the obscuring of the latter conception was due to the machinations of the clergy (63). When Trent still holds that the sacrifice is offered 'ab ecclesia per sacerdotes', one may feel that the obscuration belongs less to Christian theology than to Christian sociology. In *Volkskirchen* the laity were content to leave priesthood to the full-time professionals. In the same circumstances the Protestant conception of 'an ordained ministry' produced a laity content to be ministered unto, leaving all ministry to the full-time minister.

But it is a pity that Hanson should have taken for granted Lightfoot's 19th century assumption that every representative is necessarily the delegate of those he represents. Quite apart from precedents in ancient law and patriarchal custom, no one would deny that the Son of Man, the Second Adam, the Lamb of God who bears the sins of the world represents humanity before God, he certainly did not draw his authority from a mass-meeting of the sons of Adam. But Hanson must maintain the Lutheran idea that the authority of the priest is delegated to him by the rest of the congregation, or otherwise he sees looming up the bogy of apostolic succession. So he asks (8-21) whether any ordained official ministry was instituted by Christ and transmitted by the apostles, and naturally gets a negative answer. *I Cor* xii and *Eph* iv (as Hort noted in 1897), tell us much about ministries, but nothing about an official hierarchy of ministries. As his brother ably demonstrated, even the apostolic ministry "is not to undertake some specialist

activity from which the rest of the faithful are excluded, but to pioneer in doing that which the whole church must do" (A.T. Hanson, *The Pioneer Ministry*, 1961, p.72).

But is 'ordained ministry', however familiar to us nowadays, the right category in which to examine early Church Order? Linton (*Das Problem der Urkirche*, 1932) examined *I Cor* v. 3-5, and found (*op.cit.* 201-201) an hierarchical church, but with an hierarchy of honour or status, not of ministry or function; a church where all ministries, whether *episkope* or *diakonia*, decision-making or evangelism, belonged to the whole Church, but to every man according to his order. Hatch had already pointed out in 1881 that 'presbyter' is not a ministerial or functional title, but a status-title, referring to what a man is, not what he does. It must mean not merely 'senior', but 'senior in Christ', since the Pauline equivalent is 'first-fruits'. Gerke in 1931 rightly argued that the 'presbyters' of *I Clem* xliv 4 are the 'first-fruits' of xlii 4, who are apointed as bishops *and deacons*. The basic title is 'presbyter', and when it is diversified by functional titles, the *episkopos* still has no monopoly of *episkope* nor the *diakonos* of service. Irenaeus' equation of *episcopatus successio* and *ordo presbyterii* shews clearly enough that for him the bishop is not merely a presbyter but The Presbyter; for in any status-hierarchy of seniority there must be one who holds the *primatus*—the key-term in Cyprian's exposition of Church Order. The title 'presbyter' is of course also given to the apostles, the first of all first-fruits. Seen in these categories, apostolic succession takes on a new look. A presbyteral hierarchy of first-fruits is not only a natural form for a Church engaged in mission, a seed growing towards a harvest, it follows the pattern set by the Lord when he chose Twelve to be the nucleus of his coming Church and Kingdom. I cannot understand why A.T. Hanson, having said (*op.cit.* p.123) "The ministry derives its authority from the fact that it is the church *in nucleo*", should then go on to say (*ib.* p.156) "It is not the ministry which constitutes the Church, but the Church the ministry". I repeat my comment on this ('Ordo Presbyterii', *Journ. Theol. Stud.* 1975): "It would be a strange nucleus which was itself constituted by the particles it gathers round it".

I see myself therefore as a presbyter, ordained by an episcopal Presbyter, who traced his *ordo presbyterii* back to the original Presbyters, the first of all first-fruits: and I am persuaded that this is the order the Lord willed for his Church. It is the presbyter who offers "ourselves, our souls and bodies" as one body in Christ, because apart from the presbyter there is no *ecclesia*, the Body of Christ in its public and liturgical manifestation, but only a pious assembly of individual Christians. I can even rejoice in the happy accident that the English word 'priest' is etymologically derived from 'presbyter'. 'Presbyter' defines the status, 'priest' its sacrificial aspect.

Not so for Hanson, for what he really wants is a non-sacrificing priesthood. This is again unfortunate, for in the New Testament, as in all religions at all times, 'priest' and 'sacrifice' go together. It is because Christ is High Priest that it is necessary that he also have somewhat to offer (*Heb* viii 3), because the Church is a holy priesthood that it is to offer spiritual sacrifices acceptable to God in Christ Jesus (*I Pet* ii 5). Yet in Hanson's description of 'true priesthood' (99-103), the priest is essentially a "go-between person", a mediator between God and man (which one would have thought to be the aspect of priesthood particularly suspect and anathema to Protestant traditions); the word 'sacrifice' is not mentioned, in relation either to the ordained priest, the priesthood of Christ, or the priesthood of all believers. The latter has in fact been treated (27-30) in terms of authority, not sacrifice, though the appropriate scriptural texts have been quoted.

Nowadays, when the laity are increasingly reluctant to regard themselves as sheep, surely it is time that we parsons followed St Paul's example (*Rom* xv 16) and thought of our vocation and theirs in priestly and sacrificial categories rather than in 'pastoral' ones—which, however hallowed by usage, are comparatively infrequent in the New Testament. Nowadays, when the search for individual depth clashes with the fact of increasing interdependence, surely the emphasis should not be on shepherds and shepherding, but on souls and bodies which can never be fulfilled unless they are offered as one living sacrifice, one body in Christ. That would be a concept of priesthood broad enough for general consensus, without untying the essential knot between priesthood and sacrifice.

But Hanson is haunted by a bogy of mere mass-priests, with a priesthood not merely defined by but confined to what he calls 'the eucharistic cult'; and sacrifice is for him too 'cultic' a term.

The unfortunate term is not 'sacrifice' but 'cult'. The French may know that *culte* is simply divine worship, particularly Protestant divine worship; but to the English it has pejorative and dismissive connotations. Hanson means it to have, for he comes near to defining it in terms of animal sacrifice (25). He also claims to have shewn that the earliest use of sacerdotal language for Christian clergy was "not in terms of the cult"(99). What he in fact has produced is an unsubstantiated guess that, in friendly conversation with pagans, Christians were embarrassed by the lame sound of *episcopus* and thought *sacerdos* more prestigious (44). It is an attitude difficult to attribute to Tertullian, who provides our first clear evidence, and who uses the term primarily in a 'cultic' setting, either of sacraments or sacrifice. The first hint chronologically comes in the rebutting of pagan slanders on the eucharist (*ad nat* I vii 26), while the unambiguous use of *summus sacerdos* is in discussion of the rite of baptism (*de bapt* xvii). Bévenot ("Tertullian's thoughts about the Christian priesthood", *Instr. Patr.* X, 1975) found difficulty in this latter text in translating "si qui est" if *summus sacerdos* is simply a synonym for *episcopus*. The difficulty disappears if it is taken as "the celebrant, he who has the liturgy", but then at once a *summus sacerdos* with a *leitourgia* throws us back on *I Clem* xl 5, which is undoubtedly in a eucharistic context.

Hanson dismisses this key-passage too lightly, mainly on grounds of the Protestant consensus on 'the ministry', which is itself unsure. While nobody supposes that high-priest, priest and levite were at this time clerical titles at Rome, we cannot accept his assertion that here we have simply Old Testament analogies of order, like the secular metaphors of xxxvi; for this passage is governed by xl 5: "The Master himself has fixed by his supreme will the places and persons whom he desires for these offerings and liturgies". It is the kind of Old Testament exegesis which Hanson (42) attributes only to the late 2nd century. This is almost where he wants to put *I Clement*: since Lightfoot's dating can no longer be taken seriously, "we can therefore place it later than 96 A.D."(36). We could also put it earlier on many grounds, including the form of its Old Testament citations and the study of its relation to *Hebrews*. Unless we are going to put it after Tertullian, we must suppose that *sacerdos* (as applied to clergy) entered the Christian vocabulary not only in a 'cultic' but in a Jewish cultic context, however spiritualised and however much incidental vocabulary it had borrowed from paganism by the time of Tertullian.

We must therefore look doubtfully at Hanson's claim that, in ordaining to "the office and work of a Priest in the Church of God" without further definition, the Church of England intended to invent the hitherto-unknown concept of a non-cultic, non-sacrificing priesthood. Against it we must set the judgement of the late Stanley Greenslade (hardly a crypto-Anglo-Catholic): "In contrast to the contemporary Roman ordinal and obviously of set purpose, the 16th century ordinals of the Church of England did not explicitly ordain a man to offer sacrifice. Everything depends upon what is implicit. In controversy, scores of Anglican theologians of historical importance repudiated the Roman doctrine of the eucharistic sacrifice as in itself a propitiatory sacrifice, and with that repudiated the conception of priesthood proportionate to it. But they normally admitted or taught that the eucharist is in a real sense sacrificial . . . so that its minister is a priest in a sense proportionate to the sacrificial aspect of the eucharist."('Ordo', *Scottish Journ. Theol.* 1956).

No Anglican can deny that the eucharist is in some sense sacrificial, since it involves "this our sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving", which (interpreted in terms of the General Thanksgiving) must involve "ourselves, our souls and bodies" and cannot thus be simply "the fruit of our lips". Hanson's line is that of Cranmer's *Defence*: we must detach the sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving from the bread and the cup, however much this may obscure the fact that we offer ourselves, not as individuals, but as one bread, one body in Christ; for the bread and the cup are too closely associated with the propitiatory sacrifice of Calvary. It is therefore hardly surprising that in discussing eucharistic offering in the early church (46-66), having started with the 'pure offering' of *Mal* i 10-11 (which, since its acceptability depends upon the intentions of the offerers, must be of ourselves,

our souls and bodies), he then discovers "*another* doctrine of offering . . . to present the bread and the wine in the eucharist so that they shall be blessed by God", while Justin "*actually* blends and combines these two" (47). This is reading Cranmer back into the primitive church. Whether one puts *Didache* xiv before or after Justin *Dial* xli, the first Christian quotations of *Mal* i 10-11 undoubtedly apply it to the eucharist, the prayer of thanksgiving over the bread and the cup. To say that "Irenaeus' teaching is that Christians offer to God *on the one hand* praise and thanksgiving (the 'pure offering') and *on the other hand* bread and wine" (48) is to ignore the plain statement in IV xxix 5 that the offering of the bread and the cup *is* the pure offering of *Mal* i 10-11, quoted in full. This surely puts another complexion on those patristic passages where Malachi is quoted without mention of bread and wine: for there the argument is that the God who needs nothing does not need to be fed on the flesh of bulls and goats, and everybody knew that the eucharistic bread and wine were there to feed us, not to feed God. Lactantius did not say that "sacrifice on our part can only consist of blessing *made by words*". He said (*Div Inst* VI xxv 14-15) that "his sacrifice is only blessing" (and not burning something on an altar), and that this sacrifice ought to be expressed in words. We are to be persuaded, however, that this supposedly mid-2nd century conjunction of two quite different offerings started off an inevitable decline, that "a church which began by contemptuously rejecting all forms of sacrifice except the most immaterial has come perilously near to instituting its own sacrificial cult, with altars and priests who offer sacrifices which . . . cannot be described as wholly *immaterial or spiritual*" (59). What are we to make of this conjunction of adjectives? It cannot, of course, and does not mean that the 'pure sacrifice' stops short at words, for then it would be not only immaterial but quite unsubstantial and unreal. I suspect that it means that the 'pure offering' in the *culte* must be simply 'the fruit of our lips', a peripheral element into which the action of the bread and the cup are inserted, and that such a eucharistic sacrifice can in practice be ignored, as it is for the remainder of the book. As for "immaterial or spiritual", words are signs, we receive the body and blood of Christ under a sign: why should we think spoken signs more immaterial and therefore more spiritual than acted signs? Hanson, however, thinks Cyprian teaches that we offer "Christ's body and blood, the *identical physical organism* which was his when he walked the lanes of Galilee and the streets of Jerusalem"(57). I can't find this either in Cyprian or in the Roman doctrine of transubstantiation.

The premiss we must really question is "present the bread and the wine in the eucharist so that they shall be blessed *by God*" (47). Where does he find this? It is not there, as the unwary reader might suppose, in the text of Clement or Justin. Instead, what we have in *I Cor* x 16 is "the cup of blessing which *we* bless"; and that blessing and thanksgiving, *eulogein* and *eucharistein*, are practically synonymous can be seen by comparing the New Testament institution narratives. The association of the thanksgiving with the bread and the cup was not an innovation of Justin's. Not only Justin (*I Apol* lxvi 1), but Ignatius of Antioch half-a-century before (*ad Smyrn* vii 1) give to the bread and wine received as the flesh and blood of Christ this strange name of "The Thanksgiving", *eucharistia*. That testifies that even at the beginning of the 2nd century there was a close and long-standing association of the elements with the act of thanksgiving, an association which must at least go well back into the 1st century, if not indeed to *I Cor* x. We must surely suppose that the earliest Church saw more significance than we normally do in the "when he had given thanks" of the institution narratives. The signs under which we receive the body and blood are not only bread and wine, but *eucharistised* bread and wine. A comparison of *I Tim* iv 4 with Justin *I Apol* xiii 1-2, *Dial* cxvii shews that well into the 2nd century the eucharistic sacrifice was still firmly rooted in the Jewish thanksgiving at meals. You blessed something (in the metonymic sense of 'consecrate' or 'sanctify') by thanking or blessing God for it. You offered it to the God who needs nothing, not by wasting it with fire, but by acknowledging it as his, to be used according to his will. The earliest Church, in short, followed the meal-structure of the Last Supper, but clearly understood "Do this in my *anamnesis*" not only of the eating and drinking, but also of the giving thanks. Any eucharistic theory that separates the sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving from the bread and the cup is starting from a false premiss--indeed, one may ask

whether it is not putting asunder what the Lord joined together.

We might make more progress towards an ecumenical understanding of the eucharistic sacrifice if we asked what theological assumptions could alone explain the early eucharist, and use these to judge whether later explicit theologies are authentic or inauthentic developments. Here are my tentative suggestions.

First, that at the Last Supper not only the bread and wine were invested with a new significance, but also the thanksgiving. The Lord was understood not merely to have consecrated bread and wine (which every Jewish father did every day), but to have consecrated himself to the Father under the signs of bread and wine. It does not seem fanciful exegesis to suppose this the source from which was derived *John* xvii 19: "For their sakes I consecrate myself", and the universal Christian supposition that Calvary was sacrificial. When Cyprian says that"the passion is the sacrifice of the Lord which we offer", the immediate reference is not to Calvary but to the Last Supper. It might have been worth Hanson's while to consider whether Trent, in beginning its discussions in 1562 not with the relation of Calvary to the Mass, but with its relation to the Last Supper, was not starting from the right premiss.

Secondly, that the meal-imagery in itself spiritualised the conception of sacrifice (and in *Eph* v 1 there is surely more than a hint of *Mal* i 10-11). The essence of a spiritual sacrifice is not that it should be immaterial (one can hardly think of anything more crudely material than a crucifixion), but that it should be the free and glad offering of a spirit, a will (cf *Heb* x 4-10). God needs nothing, neither the flesh of bulls and goats, nor bread and wine, nor a broken body and shed blood. What is offered to the Father under the sign of the bread and wine is the will of Christ; what is given for our use under the sign of the bread and wine is the broken body and shed blood.

Thirdly, that since these early Christians applied *Mal* i 10-11 to their own eucharists, and since the acceptability of the sacrifice depended on the inner oblation of the offerers, they offered themselves, their souls and bodies under the signs of bread and wine. "In that which she offers, the Church herself is offered", as Augustine says.

Fourthly, as Linton insisted, 'the Church' does not mean the congregation apart from the clergy, and still less does it mean the clergy and congregation apart from Christ. The bread and wine was received as the body and blood of Christ because it was offered as the one body in Christ, with Christ as the high priest of our oblations. Apart from this, for the Church through the priest to say "This is my body, this is my blood" is either to indulge in historical reminiscence or to manipulate a magic formula. The church did not come together as individuals waiting to be brought into communion towards the end of the service. It was in communion when it came together, and all it did was in communion, as already the body of Christ by baptism. It ate of one bread because it had offered one bread, and you forbade a man to eat by forbidding him to offer. Hanson says "the idea that priests (or anybody else) offer Christ as a sacrifice is highly debatable" (98), but he doesn't debate it. Any idea that the Son can be offered to the Father by a third person, or that a clergyman can so manipulate bread and wine as to reproduce the bloody sacrifice of Calvary is indeed abhorrent; but that the members can share in the spiritual self-oblation of the Head, and can do so only because they are the fruit of that oblation—that is surely a different matter.

In short, we could argue that aberrations in eucharistic theology have in the main been produced not by adding things but by leaving something out -the identification with Christ in baptism. Baptism and the eucharist, so closely associated with each other in the early Church, became so divorced in both time and occasion that Luther could bring them together only with the odd supposition that the eucharist was some kind of continual repetition of baptism. With a renewed understanding of the doctrine of the Church we surely need no longer approach sacrifice, the eucharist and priesthood from 16th century premisses.

Douglas Powell

J.J. GRIESBACH: SYNOPTIC AND TEXT-CRITICAL STUDIES 1776-1976. Ed. by Bernard Orchard and Thomas R.W. Longstaff. (S.N.T.S. Monograph Series 34). pp.xvi + 224. Cambridge University Press, 1978. N.p.

In July, 1976, a colloquium was held in Munster to celebrate the bicentenary of the publication of Griesbach's synopsis of the Gospels, and this volume is a collection of the most important papers presented to the conference. Griesbach made a distinctive contribution to New Testament studies in three fields: by his synopsis, by his work as a textual critic, and by his advocacy of the theory that Mark produced a digest of Matthew and Luke. These papers, by G. Delling, H. Greeven, B. Reicke, G.D. Kilpatrick and others, leave no serious doubt that Griesbach's lasting service lay in the first two fields. Every New Testament student soon learns the indispensability of a synopsis, and textual critics have never gone back on Griesbach's principles. Yet the colloquium would not have been held for either of these reasons, if it had not been that W.R. Farmer has been trying to revive the Griesbach theory of synoptic relationships; and it is here that the main interest of the book must lie for the ordinary reader. Indeed, the heart of the volume is a translation of Griesbach's *Commentatio*, the Latin work in which his thesis was advanced.

There is a general feeling today that the standard solution of the Synoptic Problem is due for re-examination, but not to the extent of putting the clock back two hundred years. Fifteen years have passed since Farmer's first attempt to revive the Griesbach hypothesis, and the scholarly world at large has found it vastly implausible. Griesbach's argument was directed against the dominant Augustinian theory that Mark used only Matthew, and he rejected the priority of Mark largely because he was still committed to the belief that the author of the first Gospel was Matthew the apostle. Anyone who follows Griesbach in the assiduous use of a synopsis, and in his text-critical principle that the reading is to be preferred which explains other readings, will soon be forced to abandon the priority of Matthew, and will take a great deal of persuading that the question is worth reopening.

George B. Caird

CHRISTIAN BELIEFS ABOUT LIFE AFTER DEATH. By Paul Badham. S.P.C.K. 1978. pp.175. £3.50.

Dr Badham's book is a paperback edition of a work originally published in 1976. Its main merits are twofold: on the one hand he attempts to take account of relevant material and discussions from biblical, doctrinal and philosophical writings, on the other hand he does distil from these different sources, and from the various Christian beliefs about life after death, a single clear thesis which he elaborates and defends. The actual text, as distinct from the footnotes (all six hundred and seventy-three of them), amounts to about one hundred and forty pages, and within that compass much ground is covered.

The view which is finally proposed is by no means uncontroversial, and involves a rejection of the idea of bodily resurrection, either for Jesus, or for subsequent believers. Rather, belief in the immortality of a non-corporeal soul is defended, and with it, the acceptance of mind-body dualism. *En route*, the common view that belief in an immortal soul is a Greek intrusion into the Judeo-Christian tradition is contested.

A great danger in writing on these topics is that one will replace one implausible surmise by another, and certainly Dr Badham has no two doubts about the "bizarre" or "incoherent" nature of a number of the speculations which he criticizes. For example, he discounts the view that Jesus' resurrection body is a "spiritual body", as a "logical hybrid", states that "the traditions which imply that Jesus' corpse was raised from the grave should be rejected as "internally incoherent", and regards Pannenburg's postulation of "a general resurrection at the last day" as "bizarre".

His counter-proposal to these views is an appeal to H.H. Price's suggestion that the life to come is to be one in which our experiences are comparable to those images of our present dream-life, and in which we are to communicate with one another telepathically. He expounds and defends this view with both conviction and interest, and his criticism of the mind-brain identity thesis, which argues that sensations simply are brain-states, and that therefore minds cannot be other than brains, is well-formulated.

There are, however, a number of points at

which the argument of the book has substantial limitations. Two or three examples will indicate the misgivings which I have about the foundations upon which Dr Badham's thesis is based. As he has clearly demonstrated in the case of some of the Early Fathers, if one begins to speculate in certain sorts of ways, it is very easy to lose one's bearings, and to accept the legitimacy of all questions asked at their face-value. Certainly all questions show either ignorance or misunderstanding, and should be taken seriously. Sometimes, however, taking them seriously is to refuse to answer them in their own terms, but to insist first upon re-structuring them. The place where the tracks of Dr Badham's approach lead him into most obvious error is where he commends his adopted view on the basis that it comes nearer to answering "the classic Sadducean question of the much-widowed woman." That this is a point in favour of a Christian belief in life after death would require a rather ingenious exposition of Mark 12.18-27! Nor do I think that this is a mere detail, for I believe that the really important divide on the issue of immortality is between those who think that the appropriate form of discussion is to delineate what the main contours of post-mortem existence are, and those who, for philosophical or religious reasons, eschew such speculation. Undoubtedly there are dangers whichever path one follows, but having chosen his path Dr Badham is perhaps so eager to reach his goal, that he has lost contact with his base camp.

On a more specifically philosophical note, there are some inaccuracies or contradictions. For example, on p.68, he attributes to Anthony Quinton the view that there can be spatially unrelated spaces and temporally unrelated times. The error here is that although Quinton accepts a possible plurality of spaces, he states in the article which Badham cites, "we cannot conceive of such a state of affairs in the case of time." This is not merely of passing significance, for if one is going to speculate about the possible forms of life after death, then an absolutely first-order question concerns temporality. Further, one of the major philosophical problems bearing on belief in life after death concerns the problem of the continuing identity of the individual from pre- to post-mortem existence. Some of the philosophical difficulties here have been put most acutely in Bernard Williams' puzzle about reduplication. Williams is not referred to in the book, but John Hick's outline of the problem is quoted on p.73. Dr Badham's way of disposing of the difficulty is to appeal to an article of faith; "that each individual person is unique and precious in the sight of God", and that therefore, presumably, we can be sure that Williams' question can be conveniently ignored. But, of course, this will not do, because the question at issue is not, "Is it reasonable to suppose that God will create two resurrected Freds for only one present life Fred?" but it is rather "What does the lack of spatio-temporal bodily continuity, giving rise as it does, to the conceivability of reduplication, do to our concept of personal identity?" Despite the intrinsic interest of some of the other philosophical discussions, there are grounds here for suggesting that the non-specialist should be careful about swallowing all the philosophical material, hook, line and sinker.

Nonetheless, the book is a provocative and very readable treatment of one of the most problematic areas of contemporary Christian belief.

Stewart R. Sutherland

NOVUM TESTAMENTUM GRAECE. Edited by K. Aland, M. Black, C.M.Martini, B.M. Metzger, and A. Wikgren ('Neste-Aland, 26th edition). Deutsche Bibelstiftung, Stuttgart, 1979 (available through the British and Foreign Bible Society). pp.78*, 779. £4.60.

The appearance of the long-awaited 26th edition of Nestle is something of an event in New Testament scholarship. Up to now, the Bible Society's standard text edited by Kilpatrick in 1958—familiar to most readers of this *Review* and all too familiar to a good many of them—has presented the best critical text and the fullest overall report of significant variant readings that have been available (the United Bible Societies' *The Greek New Testament*, third edition 1975, gave full textual apparatus for only a selected number of passages). Thus, until Professor

Kilpatrick completes his expected revision of the B.F.B.S.'s text, Nestle-Aland will remain the best critical edition of the Greek testament that is to hand, and is 'indispensable for all future work concerned with the original text of the New Testament'. The commendation is that of Bishop Lhose, editor of the *Zeitschrift fur die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft* (vol. 70, 1979, p.262), who points out that the editors had available the full total of some 5,300 witnesses to the text in forming their entirely new and independent decisions on readings, and that in this process 'all the papyri and uncials and a great number of minuscules were taken into consideration'.

This slim volume, slightly larger in page size than Kilpatrick's *Kaine Diatheke* but more compact, is an astonishing example of *multum in parvo*, and the only possible criticism is that this has been achieved by the use of fonts for the text and the very generous apparatus respectively which place some slight strain on legibility. 78 pages of introduction (given in full both in German and in English) give full notes on the Greek witnesses and the versions and the patristic evidence, and a full guide—which the reader will certainly need—to the use of the apparatus; and the four appendices include a list of all alleged OT quotations and allusions.

One or two passages may be mentioned to indicate the nature of the critical text itself. At Mk 1.41, 'he had compassion' is retained (contrast the Greek text underlying the NEB—'he was angry'). The full 'words of institution' are printed at Lk 22.17ff, but with a clear presentation of the textual evidence. Lk 22.43f (the 'drops of blood' passage in the Gethsemane narrative) is printed in double brackets as 'known not to be a part of the original text'. At Jn 1.18 we read (with Kilpatrick) 'only-begotten God'. At 1 Cor 13.3—this time against Kilpatrick—we find 'that I might boast', not 'that I might be burned'. As in Kilpatrick, 'at Ephesus' at Eph. 1.1 is placed in single brackets ('of doubtful authenticity'). All in all, then, at least at first glance, a conservative text, but the most authoritative now existing.

C.J.A. Hickling

EXPLORATIONS IN THEOLOGY 5 by Donald Mackinnon. SCM Press Ltd. London, 1979. pp.ix + 213. £4.50

The thirteen essays collected in this volume were written between 1967 and 1977, eight of them for annual meetings of the Colloquium on the philosophy of religion convened by Enrico Castelli in Rome. Three public university lectures and the Presidential Address to the Aristotelian Society are also included and a hitherto unpublished address on the problematic relationship of moral goodness to intellectual insight as raised by reflections on the life and commitments of Tillich, Frege and Kittel. Brought together like this, they provide a unified expression of the author's mind as he wrestled during that decade with deep and central problems in human life and human commitments in a contemporary context anatomised with penetrating and costly sensitivity. His mastery of method in the field of philosophical investigation is deeply satisfying and healthily contagious for the assiduous reader. His ultimate intention, in each phase of intricate and deeply honest exploration, is to bring his hearers within sight of the presence, the effective presence, of the transcendentally divine in the context where we have to practise human life with intellectual commitments.

The first four essays direct attention to features of that context which do not move other philosophers and theologians in this country to any searching response. Two of them examine the epoch-making capacity of Lenin to leave an imprint on events by his personal interweaving of theory and practice, and an essay on the concept of *raison d'etat*, set between them, serves to give us 'a purchase-hold on the elusive realities of political existence'. Lenin's clear perception of the opposition between idealism and realism in the understanding of history provides a link forward to subsequent essays on this persisting philosophical controversy in its wider ramifications. Against the deep-seated anthropocentric folly of idealisms which encourage human thought to suppose that it may create its own objects, Mackinnon is expertly ready to remind us of Kant's ultimate insistence on the authority of what is objective and to develop this insistence with skill and passion against the arrogance of crypto-idealism in the texture of much that passes as modernised

Christian theology in this country and America at present. I am reminded of the essay *Christ and the Christian Principle* contributed by P.T. Forsyth to the volume *London Theological Essays* in 1911, the burden of which should be eloquently re-expressed, with sensitivity to the wide-ranging complexity of human reality as we taste it today. Professor Mackinnon has done this and much more. It is a notable feature of these essays that his crucial philosophical thrust, explicit in what I regard as the central paper entitled *Finality in Metaphysics, Ethics and Theology*, is embellished with carefully worded references to human enterprise in science, historiography, art, morality, politics, metaphysics and theism, which never fail to set these activities in correct perspective for contemporary evaluation. He is a demanding thinker and readers must take time and pains to absorb what he says. Their reward, in deepened and corrected insight, will be immense.

W.A. Whitehouse

PROTESTANT AND ROMAN CATHOLIC ETHICS: Prospects for Rapprochement. By James M. Gustafson. SCM Press, London 1979. pp.xii + 192.

This is an admirable book—admirable precisely because it is *not* exciting, does *not* issue in a kind of 'Agreed Statement on Ethics', and does not allow its ecumenical concern to degenerate into a facile optimism. Not, to be sure, that I am at all against Agreed Statements. I think it is helpful to be able to find formulae on which theologians of different traditions can agree, if only to show that such formulae can be found after all. But long-standing differences in approach and method in different Christian traditions inevitably run deep, and no formula, however technically accurate, will suffice for ecumenical progress in default of a painstaking (and even painful) effort to trace and deal with the underlying divergences which will condition the ways in which no matter what agreed formula is accepted and understood. It is to this task that Gustafson addresses himself.

Oddly enough, it appears to me as a Roman Catholic that Gustafson, despite his modest apology for possibly allowing his own background to show through his treatment, is on the whole more favourable to the Roman Catholic authors whose work he analyses than he is to his fellow-Protestants. At the very least, it must be said that he has achieved an enormous degree of insight and sympathy with the good, as well as with the more problematic, aspects of Roman Cacholic moral theology. How rare and welcome it is to find someone writing about one's own tradition who does not constantly betray himself as an 'outsider' to its spirit. Whether those on the other side will be equally happy with his treatment is not for me to say, though I hope they will. Certainly, his well-documented and constructive scholarship must surely inspire confidence.

After an initial chapter outlining the historical roots of the differences between Roman Catholic and Protestant ethics, Gustafson considers the shifts that have taken place on both sides in the last fifty years or so, under three principal headings. the approach to practical reasoning and casuistry, their philosophical assumptions and background; and their theological presuppositions. All three chapters seem to me admirable. His philosophical analysis is direct and uncomplicated; and his stress on the problems of the relationship between nature and grace seems to me to be entirely correct and extremely well worked out. In a brief review, it is not possible to give even an outline of the results of his detailed inquiry without the risk of oversimplification. In general, however, his thesis is twofold. There has, in all three areas, been a movement towards what might be called the middle ground. Catholics have become more conscious of the Biblical dimension of moral theology, and Protestants more aware of the need for a philosophical underpinning for their theological reasonings. Protestants have endeavoured to develop a much more rigorous approach to particular moral issues, and Catholics have recognised the necessity of making sure that their casuistic tradition does not become a moral straitjacket. Secondly, however, and heartening as these convergences doubtless are, Gustafson argues strongly that there remain basic disagreements in method and approach which are not much nearer to being solved. He sees the principal need to be the working out of an approach to the 'sources' of Christian ethics

(Biblical and subsequent tradition, philosophical insight, scientific information, and human experience) which is both comprehensive and systematic. It is not enough, he would maintain, for moral theologians to move towards the middle ground if they do so merely in a somewhat haphazard and pragmatic way. Those who blunder across one another in a mist may at most raise two cheers for companionship.

Three cheers, then, for the study of method! Gustafson has shown that such an enterprise need not at all be divorced from more immediately practical concerns, and I think his book demonstrates that the time is ripe for such an undertaking to begin. I venture to suggest that, on the evidence of this book, there are few people better equipped to give a lead in the field.

The book is modestly priced, and besides raising central issues in an unambiguous way, offers by far the best survey I know of recent work in Christian ethics. Its range is considerable, and its even handed clarity a delight. Highly recommended.

Gerard J. Hughes, S.J.,

THREE MILE AN HOUR GOD. By Kosuko Koyama. SCM Press. £2.95.

The theologian Kosuko Koyama comes to the Bible from his roots in the Japan of the 1930 to 1945 wars and from the atmosphere of the plurality of religions and cultures of South East Asia -Shintoism, Buddhism, Hinduism, Zoroastrianism, Islam and Asian Christianity. Added to all this is his experience of society and education in the West and his extensive Biblical studies. His previous book, "Waterbuffalo Theology", aroused much interest a few years ago.

In his preface, Koyama stands in the new prosperous Tokyo of 1978: "Why is there such total destruction? I asked in the wilderness of Tokyo. Gradually I began to see the mysterious relationship between destruction and idolatry—not only for the individual but for the life of the nation." This book is a collection of 46 Biblical reflections as he seeks the source of healing for the wounds inflicted by the destructive power of idolatry—whether this be the false worship of the nation/emperor, technology or religious practices, Christian or other.

The book is divided into four sections, "Life-Deepening", "World Meeting", "Nation Searching" and "Justice Insisting". The personal experience of God in the Christ who confronts evil in the place of inter-section, the Cross, leads on to reflections on the Incarnation in Israel, the land of inter-section of races, languages, religions and world-empires. From this whole-world view, Koyama passes on to see the impact of the Incarnation on the life of nations, particularly on Japan. This leads him to complete the circle in the section on Justice, back—or forward -to the dignity of human life which is meant for communion with God.

These reflections are high-lighted with refreshing images from Japanese, Indian and Thai thought-forms and customs, with vivid pictures from daily life, reminding one of Jesus' own parables. He digs deeply into the meaning of words, and blends all with a penetrating Biblical scholarship. Particularly arresting for me is his use of the Bridge symbolism from Zoroastrianism and Buddhism connecting it with the Roman use of "Pontiff" for Emperor and Pope and contrasting this with the Cross symbolism, the encounter by Christ with the chaotic waters of tribulation *under* the bridge of safety.

This is a book for spiritual nurture, but not one which leaves the reader wrapt in a cocoon of holy isolationism. It seeks to relate the depth meeting with God -at a 3-miles-an-hour pace—with the world's present spiritual malaise. Personal factors play a large part in whether such a book will find approval or not, but it would be surprising if most Western readers did not find something in these reflections to provoke new thought and understanding.

Jean Robinson

THE PASTORAL NATURE OF THE MINISTRY. By Frank Wright. SCM, 1980. 89pp. £2.50.

As Canon Frank Wright acknowledges at the outset of this excellent little book, the pastoral

work of the churches in this country is not built on any very solid foundation of pastoral theology. In the Church of England especially, too much is expected of parish clergy in the way of training their curates who in practice just have to get on with the job without much help in bridging the gap between theological theory and parish experience. In an age of professional specialisation, this is bound to make the pastor ask: What is the area of my professionalism? He is not likely to be much comforted with the assurance that he is the last glorious amateur! The pastor may be trained theologically but not feel himself to be a theologian or even a teacher, his claim to the cure or care of souls is now challenged by other obviously qualified professions. No wonder many clergy turn to administration or to liturgy in order to claim at least that dimension of professional expertise.

This small book is therefore very welcome since it does at least begin to unpack some of the questions which contribute to the pastoral uncertainty in today's church. Canon Wright suggests that the uniqueness of Christian ministry lies in a difference of context from other pastoral work it is based on a vision, a sense of the sublime, which transforms the pastor himself and his pastoral relationships. Acting upon the vision of man's wholeness which we see in Jesus Christ, the pastor seeks to call men and women to that fulness of life and to that mature humanity. But it seems that Canon Wright is not clear in his own mind what is the relationship between what the Church has traditionally called sanctification and what today's psychological writers speak of as 'personal growth' and 'self-actualisation'. But perhaps when Jesus speaks of the self which is to be denied, and Maslow speaks of the self which is to be actualised, the problem is essentially one of language rather than of meaning. When psychologists speak of self-fulfilment, this is something quite different from the gratification of selfish desires which Jesus urges men to deny. Is it possible to suggest that the 'self' which is to be actualised is what St Paul means when he speaks of the 'formation of Christ' within us?

Although we may well understand the pastor's search for a dimension of professional expertise, the author wisely points to the dangers of imposing a distance in this way between those who help and those who need help. The model which Jesus gives us of the one who cares and who brings healing is one which includes within itself weakness and helplessness. Jung himself agreed that only the wounded physician heals and can heal only insofar as he has been healed himself.

I would like to hope that this book will play a part in the renewal of pastoral theology in this country and also stimulate the essential dialogue between religion and the psychological sciences which has never been taken up here in the way it has, for example, in the United States.

John Slater

ERRATA in Vol. II No. 2

We regret there were two errors in the review by J.M. Ross of *Text and Interpretation: Studies in the New Testament presented to Matthew Black*:

p.86 4th paragraph, last sentence should read:

He thinks it surprising that this interpretation, to be found in Bengel's *Gnomon*, has been so long neglected. Jacques Dupont gives additional reasons for the reading *henos de estin chreia* in Luke x.42, beyond those in the U.B.S. *Textual Commentary*, and expresses surprise that the editors of the U.B.S. Greek New Testament rated its probability so low as C.

p.87 2nd paragraph, line 10 should read:

valuable inference for Christian ethics today.

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

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BOOKS RECEIVED

BOSCH, D.J.	*Witness to the Word* Marshall, Morgan & Scott £8.95.
BRYANT, C.	*The Heart in Pilgrimage* D.L.T. £3.95.
DRURY, J.	*The Pot and the Knife* S.C.M. £2.95.
EVERY, G.	*Understanding Eastern Christianity* S.C.M. £3.25.
GIBELLINI, R. (Ed.)	*Frontiers of Theology in Latin America* S.C.M. £5.50.
HABGOOD, J.	*A Working Faith* D.L.T. £4.95.
HUNTER, A.M.	*The Fifth Evangelist* S.C.M. £2.95.
MOLONEY, F.J.	*Disciples and Prophets* D.L.T. £7.95.
PANIKKAR, R.	*The Vedic Experience* D.L.T. £10.50.
PEREZ-ESCLARIN	*Atheism and Liberation* S.C.M. £3.95.
PIPER, J.	*Love Your Enemies* C.U.P. £9.95.
SANDERS, E.P. (Ed.)	*Jewish and Christian Self-Definition* S.C.M. £10.50.
WRIGHT, J.R.	*A Communion of Communions: One Eucharistic Fellowship* Seabury Press £9.95.
ZIESLER, J.	*The Jesus Question* Lutterworth Press £4.95.

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