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ALFRED ERNEST GARVIE: EARLY SCOTTISH CONGREGATIONALIST PROCESS THEOLOGIAN?

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One of Charles Hartshorne's literary habits is to provide lists of thinkers, past and present, who adopt similar positions on key theological issues to his own. There are a number of instances of the name of Alfred Ernest Garvie (1861-1945) appearing in those lists. Garvie was an eminent Scottish Congregationalist minister who, after ten years of pastoral ministry in Scotland, had a distinguished career as Professor and then Principal of Hackney and New College, London. His mature theological thought is found in a large three volume constructive theology published between 1925 and 1932.[1] Hartshorne credits him as being among those thinkers who suggest "that Christianity as such has no necessary ties with classical theism and no essential antagonism with panentheism".[2] In fact, according to Hartshorne, Garvie ranks as a panentheist "of genius or systematic ability".[3] Furthermore, he maintains that Garvie is one of a number of "philosophically equipped theists" who are learning to remove the "ambiguities and contradictions" which surropund "the traditional concepts of omnipotence, omniscience, and eternity".[4] The purpose of this paper is to examine Garvie's theology against the backcloth of Hartshorne's claims, and to ask and answer the question: "Was Alfred E. Garvie an early Congregationalist 'process theologian'?".

I

Garvie's theological sensibilities were governed by an apologetic concern to present the Christian Faith to his contemporaries in a way that lost none of its saving significance but made sense in a rapidly changing intellectual climate. Consequently, Christian theology became for him "an exposition, commendation and appreciation" of the significance of the fact of Christ for faith (CDG:22). However, for Garvie, theological work is not simply a matter of repeating the Christian Faith handed down from the past; rather, it is the revisionary exercise of presenting an account of the Christian Faith which, in responding to contemporary challenges to Christianity's credibility, is believable in the modern world. In following through his theological project, Garvie was not only certain that the Christian fact presents an effective challenge to contemporary atheism; he was also convinced that modern developments in historiography and science demanded a radical revision of traditional theological claims associated with the fact of Jesus. Indeed, until that revision is made, he believed the apologetic function of Christian theology is deficient.

Garvie's liberalism was nowhere more apparent than in his whole-hearted acceptance of the historical critical method which, he maintained, enables us "to interpret the significance and estimate the value of Christ" as never before (CDG:182-183). He insisted that an adequate Christian doctrine of God must reflect what has been revealed about God in the life and witness, death and resurrection, of Jesus Christ. The classical formulations of the Christian Faith were too much under the influence of Artistotle. If they had taken their point of reference from "what the Father is seen to be in the Son", Garvie believed that they would have been duty bound to affirm the immanence as well as the transcendence of God; they would have seen human hope rest not so much on an aloof Deity, an impassible eternal bystander, but more on a "fellow-sufferer who is intimately involved with the world's life" (CDG:185).[5]

Garvie was equally aware of the challenge posed to Christian theology by the rise of modern science. He saw theology and science "as allies in the one common task of discovering truth" (CDG:245). It was science which now gave theology the clue as to the mode of divine creation. If cosmic evolution was to be "interpreted theistically", then it was obvious to Garvie that theology must not speak of "*a transcendent static* but *an immanent dynamic* God, a God who is present and active in His world". If reality is processive, as Darwin had taught, and the temporal process is consequently all-important, he concluded that "God's creative, educative, redemptive activity must be in and by that process". The important new task for theology was "the discovery in the full stream of history of those divine currents that show the direction of the flow" of cosmic evolution (CDG:15). A shift of emphasis had to occur, therefore, from conceiving God in transcendent isolation from the world, in obedience to the dictates of Greek metaphysics, to viewing Deity as immanently involved in the evolutionary process. On the ability of theology to take this step Garvie staked the ultimate future of theistic belief (CDG:432).

The new knowledge about the historical Jesus and the findings of biological science became the twin forces which drove Garvie to seek new ways for talking about the God-world relationship. And the adequacy of any proposed revision was clearly whether it was both appropriate to "the fact of Jesus" and credible in the modern scientific culture.[6] It seemed to Garvie that the appropriate and credible revision of the God-world relationship must be sought through the idea of divine immanence "so conceived as to be complementary to and not contradictory of the divine transcendence, and as to be distinguished from the identity of God and the world".[7] And to get the correct balance between transcendence and immanence, Garvie propounded a panentheistic model for the God-world relationship. The revisionary proposal sought to steer "the straight middle course" between the Scylla of Deism and the Charybdis of Pantheism to a safe harbour in Panentheism.[8] The resulting concept of God distinguishes but does not separate God and the world; it relates God and the world, derived from and dependent on God, so "that no reality above or beyond God will be possible for our thought" (CBG:437). God includes the world but the world does not exhaust the divine reality. Hence, as Garvie puts it, "the God in and through all" is also "over all"; therefore the immanence and transendence of God are held together in one concept as "complementary truths" (CDG:188).

A problem of all doctrines of divine immanence is their tendency to make God's relation with the world a matter of necessity rather than free choice, thus

undermining the transcendent sovereignty of God. Of this Garvie is fully aware. He forthrightly affirms that God is absolute and has no need of the world. The Absolute is also unchanging: "We cannot ascribe the conditions of development to God who eternally and infinitely is".[9] But how then does Garvie do justice to his intention to speak of God's involvement in a world that brings joy and pain to the divine life? Just when the ship he is steering seems to have foundered upon the rocks of the Scylla of Classical Theism, Garvie adjusts the rudder by introducing the ideas of divine *kenosis* and divine *plerosis* in the context of his trinitarian theology.

Building upon the Pauline idea of *kenosis* (Phil.2:7), Garvie postulates an eternal activity of self-limitation in the Godhead which becomes the necessary condition not only for "the fact of Jesus" but also for the manifestation of God in the whole cosmic process. God does not create or redeem out of necessity; rather, by free and loving decision, God's purpose is worked out by *kenosis*. Therefore, "the incarnation is the supreme instance of an activity of God which is illustrated by all creation; it is only by self-limitation that the Infinite can create within time and space a finite and changing world" (CDG:20). In the creative process what resembles God the least, the Deity controls the most; that which is most akin to Deity, God leaves the most free. The more God enters into the life of the world, the more the Deity lays aside the divine absoluteness. The creatures therefore are endowed with real autonomy and may oppose or co-operate with the Creator. Despite sin and evil abounding in the world, Garvie is confident that God is still firmly in control of the creative process (CDG:243). He is a *meliorist*, accepting that the world is partly bad, but believing that it is becoming better and will one day be the best (CDG:236). However, it is significant that the terms in which Garvie speaks of evolution include "progress" as well as "process". Nevertheless, he set his confidence in the future firmly inside the perspective of the Christian hope (CIHS:200).

Using the notion of *plerosis* (Eph.1:23), Garvie argues that the divine self-emptying leads to a form of self-expression in the world which is God's self-fulfilment. Not only does God achieve the divine purpose by self-emptying rooted in love, the Deity also derives joy when that love is returned. Garvie is critical of understandings of love which eschew the thought that God desires a response in personal relationship from those loved. When love is conceived solely in terms of giving benefits, he prefers the term "goodness". For him, love is a relational term, "a personal interchange, a giving as well as a receiving, a finding as well as a losing oneself in another" (CIHS:204). However, if God desires a loving response from the creatures, it is difficult to see what significance this can have for God, given Garvie's previous insistence that there is no development or change in God.[10] Why should God desire my love if even an infinite amount of love cannot make a jot of difference to the divine life?

When talking of divine creativity, Garvie sees some benefit in continuing to assert that God creates *ex nihilo*. The classical doctrine makes a crucial point: "It is an assertion that God alone is self-subsistent reality; that no other reality exists, underived from or independent of Him; and that it is His causality alone to which all derived and dependent reality is due" (CBG:454). It enables the theologian to give due recognition to the divine transcendence and hence to the essential distinction between Creator and creature. However, Garvie is hesitant to join tradition is assuming that the doctine means that God created the world out of nothing. "If it is true", he argues, "that *ex nihilo nihil fit* . . . then we must not take the words 'out of nothing' literally, but qualify them thus: 'other than what is in Himself'" (CBG:454). Garvie's concern to account for God's transcendence over the world is met by his insistence that God does not need this world to meet divine needs: "We may not ascribe to God any need except love's need of loving and of freely giving of its fullness" (CDG:247). But, in order to affirm the divine immanence, Garvie wants to "supplement" the traditional idea of creation with "*generation* as affirming immanence, the resemblance of Creator to His creatures" (CBG:459). Against the charge that his understanding limits God from within and without, Garvie reminds his critics that God's whole operation in the evolving creation is by *self*-limitation, *kenosis* and *plerosis*. While God is limited by this world, the Deity is not *necessarily* dependent on this world; it is perfectly possible that God could and may have other worlds in which to express divine love. Just which world God chooses to create and generate, and thus to become partially limited by and dependent upon, is purely a matter for God and God alone to decide. Since it had been proved demonstrably that the evolutionary principle lay at the heart of the world's development, it no longer seemed appropriate to Garvie to focus the Christian doctrine of creation solely on the question of the origin of the universe. Unless the battle with mechanistic science was to be lost at the outset, the theologian had to show that God was the chief causative agent at each stage in the continuing process of evolution. In order to make the universe intelligible, divine creativity had to be seen not only in terms of bringing worlds into being, but particularly in terms of preserving what has come into being through the evolutionary process and creating that which the process has yet to bring into being. In all this, Garvie was heavily influenced by Bergson's conception of "creative evolution", in which "the new is not simply deduced from the old" but "produced" and, hence, "other and more than the old" (CDG:189). And, what makes the *élan vital* creative is God's creative activity.

Just how God works creatively in evolution is a question Garvie never seems to make clear. The assertion that God is a creative agential force in the world process is often made, but the metaphyscial grounds for the assertion are noticeably absent. Using a human analogy, Garvie argues that the laws of nature represent God's *habits*. But God may have to resort in certain circumstances to acts which, "not inconsistent with but not conforming to those habits", are called miracles or "original acts". Garvie is perfectly clear that one must accept in principle the possibility of divine activity which is not explicable according to contemporary scientific knowledge. However, given that God will not contradict divine "habits", we must always examine claims for miracles on the assumption that further scientific knowledge may find a natural explanation for them.

Garvie's insistence upon giving a full account of the divine immanence necessitates him revising some of the

classical atttributes of God, particularly omnipresence, omniscience and omnipotence. He argues that the first part of each term points to the divine transcendence and the second part refers to the divine immanence. So, first, God is "wholly present in every point of space and moment of time" (CDG:246). Implied here is a strong sense of immediacy between God and the world and a real sense of God being present in (and hence limited by) the conditions of earthly space-time. Secondly, God knows all that there is as it is. However, due to God's self-limitation in space-time, divine fore-knowledge is ruled out. In this way, Garvie consistently attempts to protect the contingency of the world and human freedom. The Deity knows all the possibilities of contingent actions, the results of previous similar activity and the divine resources at hand to deal with each stage of the cosmic process as it arises. But regarding the future as it actually turns out God can only speculate. Thirdly, the divine self-limitation drives Garvie to affirm that "God's omnipotence means that God can do and does, within nature and history, all that is possible within the constitution He has given created reality" (CBG:448). The evil in the world must not necessarily be laid at God's door; nor must God be considered limited in any other way than by divine choice. God's activity is perfect given the parameters within which the Deity has decided to work. To expect God to work in any other way represents "disbelief in the sufficient and sovereign efficacy of grace" (CDG:314).

If these radical revisions are not enough of a challenge to Classical Theism, Garvie aims at the centre of traditional conceptuality in his sustained attack on the notion of divine impassibility. The central thrust of his opposition lies in his conviction that it undermines our whole understanding of the Incarnation. God is present, involved and affected by what transpires. Further, the basis of the Atonement, he believes, rests upon the immanent God in nature and history, in unity with humankind in Jesus Christ, reconciling the world to the divine-self. "What Christ did, God did in Him; what Christ suffered, God suffered in Him" (CDG:212). Further, Garvie considers the whole notion of a God who is totally aloof to the joy and pain of the world not only sub-Christian, but also a total irrelevance in a world torn apart by sin and evil. Writing soon after the horrors of the First World War had become apparent, he stresses that "the impassible God would be the monstrous heresy for the religious thought and life of today" (CDG:188). Garvie, therefore, conceives God as "fellow-sufferer", rejects Classical Theism's doctrine of the divine impassibility and adds to the usual list of divine attributes that of *omnipatience*. Despite the strictures of Classical Theism, God is affected by the divine experience of the world's suffering and joy; the Christian Deity is after all a God of feeling.

II

Only a superficial awareness of the philosophical theology of Charles Hartshorne is needed to see why he felt an affinity with Garvie's theological conclusions. The Congregationalist's insistence on uniting the divine transcendence and the divine immanence within a panentheistic model for the God-world relationship was thoroughly congenial to his own thought, as was Garvie's revision of the classical divine attributes.[11]

Hatshorne has attempted to develop a logically coherent and religiously satisfying concept of God which contains the positive insights of Classical Theism and Pantheism while avoiding their absurdities. The case for theism is proven, he believes, when it is freed from its usual conceptions and expressed in the often overlooked conceptuality of Panentheism, which conceives integrally both God's relationship with the world and the world's relationship with God.[12] Like Garvie, he believes Panentheism corrects the mistakes of both Classical Theism and Pantheism, while retaining their essential insights into the theistic issue. Classical Theism's assertion that there is "zero ineraction" between God and the world, such that "God may act, but cannot be acted upon",[13] and Classical Pantheism's denial of any kind of independent existence of God and the world are both unacceptable. Panentheism corrects Classical Theism by showing that God is really involved in and affected by the world;[14] on the other hand, it corrects Classical Pantheism by denying that God is totally identified with the world, showing how the Deity is the unique individual self which embraces the world. Hartshorne insists that his doctrine is distinct from Pantheism, being, in fact, the claim that "God includes all things".[15] As a whole is more than the sum of its parts, so God is more than the sum total of the processes which make up the world.

Both Garvie and Hartshorne are agreed, therefore, that Panentheism presents the most adequate way of conceiving the God-world relationship. But Garvie never really provides an adequate idea of how the relationship between God and the world is to be construed. Hartshorne, on the other hand, provides us with analogies to aid our understanding. He asserts that there is maximum interaction between God and the world similar to that between the mind and the body or the perfect ruler and the society ruled.[16]

God is conceived as "a social being, dominant or ruling over the world society, yet not merely from outside, in a tyrannical or non-social way; but rather as that member of the society which exerts the supreme conserving and co-ordinating influence".[17] This fits nicely with Garvie's insistence of "a mediating immediacy of God in nature and history" as being the basis upon which God's activity in the world is to be understood (CDG:185). God is then regarded as acting in two ways. First, the Deity enables what has come into being to continue as the condition of what is coming to be in the evolutionary process. Thus God *conserves* or *governs* the world. But, secondly, the main sphere of God's initiating activity lies in the human realm: "As God has a personal relation to each man, a purpose for mankind which He is fulfilling in and by each man, there is an activity of God, both through the system of nature and the course of history, which is named His *Providence*" (CDG:250).

Whereas Garvie admits that there is "divine activity in the psychical process", he repeatedly rejects a full blown panpsychism (CDG:465,248). Hartshorne, on the other hand, applies the mind/body analogy for the God/world

relationship strictly. God is intimately related to and acting upon *all* the constituent parts of the world which, to greater or lesser degrees, possess psychical characteristics that differ from those possessed by human beings in degree rather than kind.[18] For many this appears to be blatant anthropomorphism of the highest order;[19] and, inside the "Process Theology" school itself, Schubert Ogden has argued powerfully that Hartshorne's use of analogy breaks down.[20] Not surprisingly, Garvie wants to restrict sentience to the higher forms of life. He notes that "when mind becomes conscious, and still more when consciousness becomes self-consciousness, fresh stages of evolution are reached". It then follows, for him that "at these marked stages in the process, we may venture to speak of a divine initiative" (CDG:249). However, for many others, it will seem that Garvie is introducing God to explain what can be accounted for in purely scientific terms. It may be more plausible with David J. Bartholomew to limit the activity of God to determining the end and the lawfulness of the macro-universe and freely acknowledge the existence of indeterminism on the micro-scale.[21]

Like Garvie, Hartshorne radically revises the traditional attributes of God. Garvie's commitment to the transcendence of God requires him to speak of God as absolute, eternal, unchanging, supra-personal, etc.; but his corresponding commitment to the immanence of God also forces him to speak of God, in a certain sense, as relative, temporal, changing, personal, etc. At every juncture, Garvie wants to do justice to the two sides of the divine nature. But his problem is always the same – that of asserting, at one and the same time, seemingly contradictory divine attributes. The nearest he comes to providing a clue how this might be achieved is when he talks of the apparently contradictory attributes as being "aspects" of the divine reality (CBG:443).

Among Hartshorne's great achievements is that of providing us with metaphysical conceptuality to conceive the reality of God in a thoroughly dipolar manner.[22] Consequently, his doctrine can be described as *dipolar panentheism.*[23] When we consider the traditional categories used for the Deity we notice a number of polarites (e.g. active-passive, eternal-temporal, necessary-contingent, absolute-relative). Both Classical Theism and Pantheism, Hartshorne argues, decide which pole of the terms is good and admirable; then they predicate it of deity while wholly denying the presence of the other pole in the being of God. Thus they develop a monopolar prejudice. Hartshorne revokes this tendency, insisting that our conception of God must move from being monopolar to being dipolar.[24]

Hartshorne draws a tight distinction between the divine *actuality* (concrete, relative, passive) and the divine *existence* (abstract, absolute, impassive). Employing this careful distinction he argues that a dipolar conception of God, which takes account of the divine passivity, is not only more adequate but demanded. In dipolar panentheism, the concrete actuality of God is really related to the world and, hence, God can respond to it; while, when viewed abstractly in the divine existence God is all Classical Theism predicated of deity – "the immutable completeness of the One Who is Inclusively Loved".[25] The divine love is necessary and unsurpassable since it is inconceivable that God is not love or that there can be anyone more loving than the Diety; but it is also contingent and surpassable by God, but God *alone.* Likewise, Hartshorne holds that God is omniscient in the divine existence because it is of the divine nature to know all that there is to know; but God's knowledge is contingent since in the divine actuality God is finite and can only know what there is actually to know.[26] What in fact emerges from Hartshorne's work is a coherent and comprehensive panentheistic conceptuality which enables one to say all the things Garvie wishes to assert about the nature of God but without contradiction or recourse to paradoxical forms of expression.

A common criticism of Hartshorne's neoclassical theism is that dipolar panentheism makes God's relation to the world a matter of necessity rather than free grace, thus obliterating God's transcendence over the world.[27] But, once the distinctions upon which dipolarism is based are understood, this objection is significantly blunted. Hartshorne holds *both* that the creation of *some* world, and the divine involvement in that world, is necessary to God, *and* also that any particular world the Deity creates is inessential to God, being wholly the result of divine choice. Another way of putting it is to say that God never possesses *negative* freedom (the freedom to do nothing at all) but always possesses *positive* freedom (the freedom to do this instead of that). But why does God's existence make it "inevitable" that there be a world? Because "becoming" or "creativity" in neoclassical theism is of the divine essence in the same way that "being" is an essential attribute of God in Classical Theism. Also, God is love, and because *agape* is a relational term, it follows that God must always have *some* (though not necessarily *this*) world to love. In other words, all necessary restraints placed upon God are *either* the necessary consequence of God being God *or* the direct result of God choosing to create a world of free creatures who have power independent of the divine self.

Critics will continue, I suspect, to be uneasy about "relation-to-world-as-such" being constitutive of deity. However, unless contingency is somehow constitutive of God's reality then it is impossible to account logically for creation; a wholly necessary God cannot be said to create a contingent world. As Keith Ward has said, neoclassical theism's "view of the temporality and diplority of God does . . . provide the logical key to the ancient and central problem of reconciling creation and necessity. Only if God is temporal, can he be a free creator of a universe of free creatures; only if he is eternal, can he possess that necessity which is the foundation of the intelligibility of the world; only if he is dipolar, can he be both".[28] Hartshorne's critics need to examine further the logic of their demand that God be *totally* free to create or not to create.

Garvie, without the same metaphysical skill, appears to be driven along a similar path. He also wants to locate any limitation upon God in the divine self, or account for it in terms of the Deity's self-limitation. In no way is he prepared to sanction unreservedly that God needs *this* world for self-fulfilment. However, when Garvie says that, "We may not ascribe to God any need except love's need of loving and of freely giving of its fullness" (CDG:247) it is not at all clear what he means. Is "love's

need" met by the existence of a social life inside the Triune life, as is often asserted? If this is what Garvie means, the familiar illogicality of a wholly necessary deity being said to create a contingent world returns because the Persons of the Trinity are non-contingent.[29] However, his insistence on the need for an economic as well as ontological Trinity perhaps suggests he means rather more than this. In fact, he refers to S. E. Stokes with approval as indicating what "seems to me to be the truth". Stokes speaks of "'a divine nature that is self-subsistent, timeless, and infinite in its perfection, and yet *infinitely needing* . . . The Divine Nature has inherent within it the means for the perfect satisfaction of its essential need, but were it possible to conceive the Divine Nature as apart from that which its need impels it ever to sustain in being, we should not be able to think of it as perfect or self-sufficient . . . The perfect unit of experiencing life is the divine timelessly self-sustaining Existent One *plus* that complementary and subordinate area of reality timelessly sustained in being by it'" (CBG:454-455, Garvie quotes from S. E. Stokes, *Satyakama*, or *True Desires*). And, as far as I can see, this is remarkably similar to Hartshorne's position.

III

Having discovered the main thrust of Garvie's theology and noted its similarities and differences to Hartshorne's neoclassical theism, we are now in a position to answer our question: "Was Alfred E. Garvie an early Congregationalist 'process theologian'?". The answer, of course, trades upon what we mean by "process theology". John B. Cobb Jr. has pointed out three senses in which the term can be used. It can refer to "a theological movement that developed at the University of Chicago Divinity School during the 30s" or "theology which systematically employs the philosophical conceptuality of Alfred North Whitehead or Charles Hartshorne".[30] Clearly, in neither of these senses can Garvie be called a "process theologian". But Cobb observes, thirdly, that the term may refer "to all forms of theology that emphasise event, occurrence, or becoming over against substance".[31] This is clearly applicable to Garvie with his determination to conceive reality in an evolutionary manner and attempt to replace Greek philosophical categories with modes of thought belonging to the Judaeo-Christian tradition found in the Bible. Consequently, we can say that Garvie was an early English Congregationalist "process theologian".

NOTES

1. The volumes in Garvie's system of constructive theology are: *The Christian Doctrine of the Godhead* (London: Hodder and Stoughton Ltd., 1925), *The Christian Ideal for Human Society* (London: Hodder and Stoughton Ltd., 1930) and *The Christian Belief in God* (London: Hodder and Stoughton Ltd., 1932). References to these books will be given in the text by use of the respective abbreviations: CDG, CIHS and CBG, followed by the appropriate page number. Garvie calls his three volume work, "a system of Christian thought, life, and work" (CIHS:21) and suggests that "the last in time should be regarded as the first in order" (CBG:21).
2. Charles Hartshorne and William L. Reese, *Philosophers Speak of God* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953: 270).
3. *Ibid.* 153.
4. Charles Hartshorne, *Reality as Social Process: Studies in Metaphysics and Religion* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1953): 179.
5. Garvie frequently conceives God as "fellow sufferer" with human beings. In a typical example he says: "God is a fellow-sufferer with man, centrally, supremely in Christ and His Cross, but always and everywhere also where men suffer" (CDG:334). Cf. A. N. Whitehead's famous description of God as "the great companion – the fellow-sufferer who understands" (*Process and Reality* corrected edition, eds. David Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburn (New York and London: The Free Press, 1978): 35). Garvie and Whitehead were contemporaries on the staff of the University of London, although in different faculties. Could Whitehead have obtained this terminology from Garvie or vice versa?
6. For the terms "appropriateness" and "credibility" as warrants for theological adequacy see Schubert M. Ogden, *The Point of Christology* (London: SCM Press, 1982): 4.
7. Alfred E. Garvie, "The Divine Immanence as the Basis of Theological Statement", *The Christian Certainty and the Modern Perplexity* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1910): 10.
8. *Ibid.* 133.
9. *Ibid.* 161.
10. *Ibid.* 163.
11. Hartshorne's position can be found in the following books, which hereafter will be referred to by way of the indicated abbreviations: *MVG: Man's Vision of God* (Chicago: Willett Clark & Co., 1941; recent edition 1964 Archum Books, Connecticut); *DR: The Divine Reality* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1948); *RSP: Reality As Social Process: Studies in Metaphysics and Religion; PSG: Philosophers Speak of God;LP: The Logic of Perfection* (Lasalle, Illinois: Open Court, 1962); *ANT: A Natural Theology for Our Time* (Lasalle, Illinois: Open Court, 1967); *CSPM: Creative Synthesis And Philosophic Method* (London: SCM Press, 1970). Hartshorne has also written on the subjects of pscychology and bird song! See *The Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1934) and *Born to Sing: An Interpretation and World Survey of Bird Song* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1972).
12. See *DR*: 116-119; *CSPM*: 261-274; *PSG*: 499-514; *RSP*: 110-125.
13. *ANT*: 68.
14. "Since God, to be worshipful, must be surpassable, his scope cannot be less than cosmic, and there can be no possibility of an individual beyond the reach of his influence or from which he could not receive influence. Likewise, whereas ordinary individuals maintain themselves only in some environments, not in all, the unsurpassable individual must have unlimited ability to adapt to varying states of reality." *ANT*: 39.
15. See *RSP*: 120.
16. See *RSP*: 29-43 and *ANT*: 97.
17. *RSP*: 40.
18. For an interesting and informative discussion of the mind/body analogy for the God/World relationship from outside the sphere of Process Theology see Grace M. Jantzen, *God's World, God's Body* (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1984). A powerful criticism of the approach is found in Thomas F. Tracy, *God, Action and Embodiment* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1984).
19. See Maurice Wiles, *God's Action in the World* (London: SCM Press, 1986): 32-33.
20. Schubert M. Ogden, "The Experience of God: Critical Reflections on Hartshorne's Theory of Analogy", eds. John B. Cobb Jr. and Franklin I. Gamwell, *Existence and Actuality: Conversations with Charles Hartshorne* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1984): 16-36. Also, in a review of Grace M. Jantzen, *op. cit.*, Brian Hebblethwaite points out "the powerful disanalogy between the physical universe and a single organism. The universe is a field of interacting organzied systems of matter or energy. There is nothing remotely comparable to a single central nervous system. Consequently, on no world model can the physical universe, however present to and aware of it God may be, be the means whereby God is aware and acts, still less suffers with his suffering creatures . . ." *Theology*, LXXXVIII, 723 (May 1985): 237.
21. See David J. Bartholomew, *God of Chance* (London: SCM Press, 1984).
22. For a thorough account of Hartshorne's philosophipcal theism see Eugene H. Peters, *Hartshorne and Neoclassical Metaphysics: An Interpretation* (Lincoln: The University of Nebraska Press, 1970) and Santiago Sia, *God in Process Thought* (Dordrecht, Boston and Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985).
23. For a discussion of the basic philosophical axioms which undergird Hartshorne's position see Peters, *op. cit.*: 113-127.
24. For a full discussion of Hartshorne's notion of dipolarity see *RSP*: 110-125 and *PSG*: 1-15.
25. *ANT*: 16.
26. See *PSG*: 510-511.
27. See Colin E. Gunton, *Becoming and Being: The Doctrine of God in Charles Hartshorne and Karl Barth* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978).
28. Keith Ward, *Rational Theology and the Creativity of God* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982): 230.
29. ". . . in so far as the three Persons implied an inner social life of deity, a believer in the social theory of reality must think there was truth in the idea . . . But he must also hold . . . that the notion of this divine life as having nothing temporal about it, or as involving no social relativity of God to the world as well as of God to God, tended to spoil the doctrine." Charles Hartshorne. *RSP*: 24. See also *MVG*: 124.
30. John B. Cobb Jr., *Process Theology as Political Theology* (Manchester, England and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Manchester University Press and The Westminster Press, 1982): 19.
31. *Ibid.*