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BOOK REVIEWS

Anthropological Approaches to the Old Testament

Edited by Bernhard Lang. Issues in Religion and Theology 8. S.P.C.K./Fortress Press, 1985. Pp. xii + 175. £3.50.

One of the characteristics of contemporary Old Testament scholarship is an increasing awareness of the potential insight to be gained from other scholarly disciplines: literary criticism and sociology would be two characteristic examples. Another such partner is anthropology, and so it is valuable to have this collection of 10 essays, all published since 1954, which can help to explore this relation.

The introductory essay by the editor, Bernhard Lang, does in fact show that the relation between biblical and anthropological study is of much longer standing, with Robertson Smith an honoured name. But the prolific work of Sir James Frazer, though a remarkable achievement, is much more obviously dated, and has indeed tended to bring any kind of comparative method into disrepute. After this historical sketch Lang outlines some current concerns of anthropologists that bear on biblical study, in a way that justifies the title of his own piece, "Anthropology as a new Model for Biblical Studies".

But anthropology is itself a very diverse discipline, and this is well illustrated by the essays that follow. First comes a brief note by F. Steiner suggesting that the rites in Gen. 47-48 might be explained in terms of Joseph's enslavement in Egypt bearing the implication that he was no longer to be regarded as Jacob's son – a point apparently not taken up by any of the standard commentaries on Genesis. I. Schapera acknowledges his debt to Frazer in a comparative study of "The Sin of Cain". J. W. Rogerson writes on "Corporate Personality": the ideas put forward by H. W. Robinson have been very influential, but must be seen to rest on a suspect anthropological basis. T. W. Overholt makes some interesting comparisons between the roles of Jeremiah and the American Indian religious figure, Handsome Lake: a fascinating study, though doubts remain about the extent of our knowledge of Jeremiah as an individual. The first half of the book is completed by the editor's recent essay "The Social Organisation of Peasant Poverty in Biblical Israel". Here the system of rent capitalism is outlined for the light it can shed on the world of the eight century prophets and the reasons for their denunciations of contemporary society.

More controversial and potentially even more rewarding are the essays in the second half of the book. This begins with the famous section on "The Abominations of Leviticus" from Mary Douglas' *Purity and Danger*, with its argument that anomaly as threat to holiness is the key to understanding. This point is then taken further by Michael Carroll, who proposes a Levi-Straussian nature/culture distinction as providing a more refined way of understanding Leviticus. The next essay is also by Carroll, and is an attempt to provide a structural analysis of several episodes in Genesis. Here the influence of Sir Edmund Leach is very apparent, and so it is appropriate that there should then be an essay by Leach himself: "The Logic of Sacrifice" from his *Culture and Communication*. Here structural analysis is applied to the requirements for sacrifice laid down in Exod. 25-Lev. 16. Whether or not the precise pattern detected by Leach is accepted as persuasive, we should at least be warned of the inadequacy of conventional modern western logic when applied to this particular biblical material. These chapters also provide the starting-point for the final essay, by Douglas Davies, "An Interpretation of Sacrifice in Leviticus," which again uses structuralist methods to show how sacrificial rituals can only properly be understood in the appropriate social (rather than individual) context. The book is completed with a useful bibliography and the usual indexes.

Taken overall this is a very worthwhile addition to what is already proving to be a most useful series. No doubt it is true that there is a natural human tendency for scholars in any discipline to be wary of what is going on beyond their usual frontiers, and this tendency is strengthened when one of the disciplines involves religion: a residual suspicion of the God-squad is still found, with the apparently incompatible demands that theology should stop pretending to be objective and limit itself to piety, and that it should stop pretending to have all the answers because it introduces God into every argument. A collection of this kind can do a great deal to show how much biblical scholars and anthropologists have in common; and where there is difference (as inevitably there must be) the nature of and genuine grounds for such difference.

R. J. Coggins

Women in the Ministry of Jesus

Ben Witherington III. C.U.P., SNTS Monograph Series 51, 1984. Pp. xi + 221. £17.50.

If there are still people around who think that Jesus was a misogynist, reading this revised Durham Ph.D. thesis on "Jesus' attitude to women and their roles as reflected in His earthly life", would be a suitable penance. A short and superficial chapter on "women and their roles in Palestine" is followed by an exegesis of passages considered relevant to the theme, but with minimal attention to their context in Jesus' ministry and teaching as a whole. The historical authenticity is first defended, quite reasonably in the case of the synoptic sayings and parables, much less so in the miracle stories and lengthy Johannine material. Inferences are then drawn from each about "Jesus' attitude to women". These are usually banal, never new and illustrated rather than demonstrated by the circumstantial evidence adduced. The author's exegesis is competent, but his historical judgment is defective, and despite talk of roles and status he shows no signs of the sociological awareness which should surely inform this kind of study. The question is framed with deliberate vagueness: Jesus' attitude. It invites a rather brief response: positive. Hard questions about Jesus' call to discipleship and its possibly disruptive implications for family life are avoided. Matt. 10.37, Luke 14.26 are not discussed, and Theissen's account of "Wanderradikalismus" is neither mentioned in the bibliographies nor discussed in the text. Witherington III is anxious to assert that Jesus is in favour of the family and "was attempting to reform, not reject, the patriarchal framework of His culture' (p. 129). "Male headship" is not threatened by Jesus' "attempt to liberate women from a social stereotype" (p. 20).

The level of historical argument is low: "If children are received openly by Jesus and if they have a place in the Kingdom, this may imply that giving birth to children and being a parent are seen as good things" (p. 16). Since Jesus speaks of women and "women's work" in his parables he evidently presupposes the worth of both (pp. 39f.), and women grinding at the mill "may tell us that Jesus thought some division of labour between male and female was natural and acceptable both in His own day and in the future" (p. 46). The claims made are cautious to the point of triviality. In a typical formulation, Mk. 12.40 and 41-44 "*may* reveal *something* about Jesus' attitude towards widows" (my italics). Clearly he did not rob them. But is that news? The author thinks the gospels, especially the Fourth, provide a generally reliable account of "Jesus' attitude" to widows etc., and he may be right. But he will not persuade anyone who is not already convinced. The value of this book lies not in its contribution to historical research on Jesus, which is negligible. It is very rare nowadays for any book to make a genuine contribution to that quest (a thought when selecting thesis topics). Its value as a modest addition to Christian reflection on the gospel material (which today includes raising questions about the historicity of the traditions) lies in the bits of information culled from other scholars. These can add interest to one's telling and retelling the gospel story in preaching and teaching. Read as conscientious reflection on the gospel *tradition* it escapes the censure due if judged as a piece of historical research. But this defence of such studies can only increase dissatisfaction over their theological value. Biblical study which merely casts scholarly dress over what we already know is no substitute for enlarging our understanding of Jesus, the gospel or the gospels.

Robert Morgan

What Crucified Jesus?

Ellis Rivkin. S.C.M. Press, 1986. Pp. xii + 79. £3.95.

People have been attempting to write "scientific" history about the life of Jesus for a long time now and one would suppose there was little room left for improvement. But every now and then some new evidence enters and reshapes the discussion, or else the focus on the available material is clarified afresh. Clarification of focus, provided with admirable economy, is the first contribution made by Rivkin's book.

It has other major virtues. A welcome feature of some recent scholarship, especially in America, has been a convergence of Jewish treatments of Jesus, such as Rivkin's, and those by Christian scholars. The whole subject, but especially the crucifixion and resurrection, has long been bedevilled by *parti pris*. The Jews killed the incarnate Son of God, said (or thought) the Christians; Jesus (who was probably a sort of Zealot) was put to death by the Romans and then the myth of his resurrection sent Christianity off down its false, dogmatic road, said the Jews. Now, most Christian scholars see no reason to underplay the Jewishness of Jesus, and Jewish scholars are found welcoming the remarkable and special charisma of Jesus. More ironically, we even have the spectacle of Jews countenancing the truth of the resurrection of Jesus, even if denying its doctrinal consequences (see the work of P. Lapide), at a time when Christian leaders express grave doubts about its facticity or its importance. It is interesting that Rivkin, while prudently denying a historian's competence to pronounce on the matter, understands perfectly well that belief in the resurrection of such a one as Jesus should have arisen in the Jewish, and especially the Pharisaic, context of the time; and he sees belief in it as beyond question the mark of the Christian position.

Again, lovers of irony will note both greater readiness to accept as historical aspects of the Gospels (the Synoptics at least) about which Christian scholars are often sceptical, and a religious warmth about Jesus which Christian scholars often eschew, doubtless out of the austere pursuit of objectivity. Rivkin can teach such persons how unhistorical it can be to keept the religious dimension at arm's length in making even an "objective" assessment of Jesus in his historical setting.

Rivkin's aim, however, is historical: can we identify with precision how, in the context of Roman Palestine, Jesus came to die? His method is to go straight for the leading features of the socio-political situation. Roman government worked through a wholly subservient high-priesthood, filled by a succession of its appointees. By a series of provocative acts, affronting Jewish susceptibilities, the government had created a situation of extreme tension and suspicion. Judaism, on the other hand, had developed its own ways of responding to the situation. There were two fundamental principles, by adherence to which relative safety might be sought: first, clear separation between the two realms of civil government and religious life. Thus, tribute could be paid and the everyday presence of the Romans could be borne, so long as Jewish observance, the life of God's Israel, was inviolate. Second, the leading groups in Jewish life, Sadducees, Pharisees and Essenes, had settled for a policy of "live and let live" in relation to one another: not mutual approval (for they each engaged in polemics against the others' doctrines), but mutual forbearance.

This position had been seriously disturbed, and the security of the nation threatened, when, from AD 6, certain Jews refused any longer to accept the *modus vivendi* with the Roman government, claiming God alone as lord of Israel, and so forbidding the payment of tribute to the alien power. In this new situation, not only revolutionaries of this breed but also what we should see as purely religious charismatics were highly suspect to the authorities. To preach divine action to bring in God's kingdom was scarcely less worrying than to engage in guerilla activity, for both could easily stir up the people in such volatile times.

This state of affairs is, of course, described by Josephus. Suppose then, Rivkin bids us, that in the world of which Josephus tells, there had arisen "a charismatic of charismatics", a greater even than John the Baptist. What characteristics would he have displayed and what would have been the probable course of his career? The profile that emerges is almost indistinguishable from the career of Jesus, a man of such remarkable charisma that his "death would have ended in Life".

The death of such a one was not brought about by his religious views for religious reasons: he would meet the disapproval of groups like the Pharisees but would easily benefit from the policy of ultimate mutual forbearance. He was, like many others, a victim – the supreme victim – of

"the system", that is, of the Roman government of Palestine, as it strove to maintain itself through the agency of Caiaphas in the midst of great precariousness and tension. Questions of religious or theological propriety did not come into the matter; questions of political risk alone counted. To such a picture, the Synoptic Gospels broadly conform, though they write from the standpoint of religious adherence to Jesus.

Inevitably, there are loose ends – and one or two more ironies. Ignoring a whole scholarly industry, Rivkin is content to see Jesus' self-designation, "son of man", as coming from his adoption of Ezekiel's visionary prophetic role as part of his persona: the simplicity has a certain appeal. Josephus' virtual ignoring of Jesus remains a puzzle. And finally, the story of Jesus did not yield only the resurrection, towards which Rivkin is so positive, but also the early church in Palestine. It is in some ways less easy to fit into the picture painted by Rivkin some of the developments of its early years than the career of Jesus himself.

J. L. Houlden

The Interpretation of Mark

Edited by W. R. Telford. Issue in Religion and Theology 7. S.P.C.K., 1985.Pp. xi + 180. £3.50.

This collection of essays follows the pattern already established by the earlier volumes in the series: there is an introduction by the editor, then eight essays, a select bibliography, and indexes. A feature of this volume is that the span of time covered by the essays is shorter than in some of the previous collections; the earliest is 1964, and the latest is 1977. The authors are: E. Schweizer, T. J. Weeden, K. Kertelge, N. Perrin, J. Dewey, E. Best, R. C. Tannehill and S. Schulz; two of the contributions have been translated into English by R. Morgan.

The interpretation of no New Testament book has undergone a more radical change in the last 30 years than Mark. Dr. Telford traces the history of this change, starting at the beginning of the century with W. Wrede and the messianic secret, and going through to the present day and the prospect for the future. He thus provides the background for the essays he has chosen. It is a masterly piece of work; he says that he "was faced with the formidable task of assessing over 250 essays, articles and books on the Gospel, 90% of which were written after 1960". If it were appropriate to make a very minor criticism at this point, it would be that Dr. Telford passes over the immense contribution to Marcan interpretation made in England, before it became popular elsewhere, by R. H. Lightfoot. His three books are indeed included in the bibliography, but there is no mention of him in the introduction. A. M. Farrer, who developed many of Lightfoot's ideas, is mentioned in the introduction, and two of his books are listed in the bibliography, but not the eighth of his Bampton Lectures (*The Glass of Vision*, 1948) in which he discussed the end of Mark's gospel, anticipating later studies. It is also surprising that there is no reference to the important essay by G. D. Kilpatrick on Mark 13 verses 9-11 in *Studies in the Gospels* (Ed. D. E. Nineham, 1957).

The series is intended for the use of "students, teachers, clergy, and general readers". It would, as everybody agrees, be disastrous if knowledge of writers on Mark became a substitute for understanding the book. Our best guides will be those who illuminate the text: our worst will be those who come between us and the page. On this criterion, the most useful essays here are those by T. J. Weeden ("The Heresy that Necessitated Mark's Gospel"), J. Dewey ("The Literary Structure of the Controversy Stories in Mark 2:1-3:6") and R. C. Tannehill ("The Disciples in Mark: the Function of a Narrative Role").

J. C. Fenton

Jesus and Community

G. Lohfink. E.T. by J. P. Galvin, S.P.C.K., 1985. Pp. xii + 211. £4.95.

Did Jesus found a church? The heat with which that question was once debated has now dissipated. It is not so much that a universally agreed answer has been found as that the question has been seen to be the wrong one, adopting an anachronistic starting-point and taking Jesus's ministry out of its proper context. Yet the past decade or more has seen a new emphasis on the social dimension of both Old and New Testaments, while in Biblical study, as also in wider theological debate, the talk is now of "community". The absence of the article before that term in Lohfink's title signals the book's place in the 1980's; it may also obscure the fact that this is not one of a number of possible partners for the formula "Jesus and ———". Eschatology and community are inseparable; Jesus's ministry can only be understood against the background of Israel's eschatological hope of the gathering of the people of God. When Israel as a whole rejected the call to be gathered, Jesus turned to his disciples not as a new Israel nor as a remnant but as the prefiguration of the eschatological Israel. Yet as the eschatological gathered people of God they must manifest the rule of God – *in community*. Jesus's ethical teaching is not idealism, nor does it speak of some future state; its purpose is not to lead to despair and dependence on grace alone, neither is it for an *élite* or for the inner heart. It describes the life of the renewed people of God within whose social relationships is manifested God's reign; social relationships that are marked by the renunciation of violence, of retribution and of structures of domination; social relationships that stand in contrast to those of the rest of society – in short – another key-term for Lohfink – a *contrast society*.

Lohfink's use of the Gospel material is essentially conservative; he rarely discusses critical questions of authenticity and when he does he usually argues in favour of the material's historical reliability for Jesus's words or intentions. Yet his audience will not thereby be a narrow one any more than is his own background reading. It is no surprise to find the name of G. Theissen in the bibliography, for he has undoubtedly been influenced by the latter's description of the "First Followers of Jesus", while maintaining a more radical sense of the calling of the settled communities than does Theissen. The ability to take the fruits of such recent New Testament scholarship and to make them widely available is an enviable achievement; this is even more so when it is done without being patronising and without over-simplification – the discussion of the texts

is careful, reference is often made (in transliteration) to Greek terms and there is a recognition of those parts of the New Testament which fail to capture this ideal of community.

Yet as the book progresses its underlying concern becomes increasingly apparent. The second part asks whether this ideal of community was recognised in the life of the New Testament communities and in the early church. That it was both confirms in retrospect the reading of Jesus's intentions, and also gives to them and to the expectation that they are to be worked out in social reality a firmer authority. Authority for whom? It is contemporary parish life particularly within his own church which is Lohfink's focus of concern; he must establish his cause not only against those who dismiss Jesus's ethic of a contrast society as idealism or internalise it into individualism, but also against those who restrict it to a minority or who see the egalitarianism of the early church as an aberration, a period of experimentation before the development of structures within the mature church of the Fathers. Hence it is crucial that it is not until the age of Augustine that there is lost that awareness of the church – inevitably the term creeps in and assumes an increasingly important profile – as the gathered people of God living as a contrast society here in the midst of the wider society.

To maintain such a picture of the church during the early Patristic period Lohfink has to rely on the claims of Christian Apologists, refuting the charge of their bias by arguing that any Apology which was palpably false would be an exercise in futility. Inevitably, the argument becomes increasingly triumphalist, paying no attention to any evidence which might suggest that the church frequently reflected the values and conflicts of society at large, sometimes consciously conforming to it. His dilemma is that of anyone who seeks to recover an ideal period in the church's life and to give to it special authority, whether that period be within or beyond the time of the New Testament. Yet if the last section of the book disappoints, it is not because he fails to convince us that he has portrayed the real life of the early church; rather a recognition of the dilemmas the church faced as it sought to effect its calling and its frequent failure to do so, would have opened up new questions. While the book closes with a firm appeal to the grace of God and to his act of new creation which enables the church to be such a contrast society, it does not explore what that should mean in our context, in terms either of inner church structures or of its manner of life in the midst of society. These are urgent questions with no easy answers; it is because of the urgency and integrity with which they are at least provoked that the book deserves a hearing by any with a concern for the life in community of those called to be the people of God.

J.M. Lieu

Alternative Approaches to New Testament Study

Edited by A. E. Harvey. S.P.C.K., 1985. Pp. x + 144. £4.95.

This book presents good evidence that the British N.T. scene, perhaps despite appearances to the contrary, has not been entirely unaffected by the new trends affecting the discipline. However, in the best British pragmatic tradition we are not, in the main, presented with methodological essays, but with worked examples of the "alternative approaches" on offer.

Michael Goulder opens the volume with a passionate critique of orthodox Gospel criticism – a once impregnable edifice now under attack from several sides. Isolating eight hypotheses which made up the traditional paradigm he shows how the positing of five hypothetical lost bodies of tradition (Q, M, L, the Luke-John tradition and Jesus material) has put scholarship in a position where no theory can ever be falsified. Contrary evidence is massaged to support the ever more subtle reconstructions of succeeding generations of scholars. In place of critical orthodoxy a new paradigm is outlined (with new criteria for identifying traditions) in which the star role is played by Matthew, who, as a competent scribe, a fine parabolist, and an inspired poet, created, apparently *ex nihilo*, all the material which has been seen as Q and M. He is followed by Luke whose strong suite was parables and who likewise scarcely made use of an L source. For the traditionalist it is comforting to find that Goulder continues to believe in Jesus material and the priority of Mark.

John Drury applies a structuralist approach to Mk. 1:1-15 – and does his cause a great service by not despising history. The Gospels are attempts to commandeer the sacred past (the O.T.) and thus a structuralist approach still gives the historian a margin within which to work. In particular Drury finds that in the story of John the Baptist, Mark runs the nation's history backwards: the city and the land empty as the nation goes back to the threshold of its inheritance, the Jordan.

John Riches and Alan Millar plead against the tendency to think that a traditional concept (e.g., the Kingdom of God) must carry its traditional connotations (here, the "vivid apocalyptic conceptions") with it. Rather "a writer or speaker can employ familiar linguistic forms in new ways to express new thoughts while retaining the 'core' of their customary content". While this argument is to be welcomed for its clarity (and is given some support from considerations from the philosophy of language), this is scarcely an alternative to traditional history-of-traditions work.

With regard to approach, even less new ground is broken by J. Duncan M. Derrett in his discussion of "taking the cross and turning the cheek". These sayings are read in the context of the Jewish use of the crucifixion motif (understood to include a wide range of types of execution) and of a vengeance tradition respectively. A vast amount of historical and bibliographical material is offered to the well-informed reader but others may be baffled.

The editor's own contribution seeks to set Paul's acceptance of punishment from Jewish synagogues in its social context. While Jewish Christians wished to remain within Judaism their variant beliefs would be tolerated, but they would constantly run the risk of punishment on account of their behaviour, particularly with regard to the laws concerning food and ritual purity. Paul tells us that he received the "40 strokes save one" five times and Harvey suggests that the acceptance of such punishment might have confirmed to the Christian that he "was not acting *for the sake* of abiding by the Law". Further, such a dangerous course was pursued for theological and practical reasons:

God had not finally cast off the Jews, and many churches were founded precisely from groups of Jews within existing synagogues. This lucid essay would serve as a good introduction to the recent resurgence of N.T. studies informed by insights drawn from the study of the social context of religion.

F. Gerald Downing takes up the cause of what will undoubtedly come to be known as audience criticism. The early Christian texts are currently being read as enclosed narrative worlds with no attention being paid to the conventions of their audiences. The latter would, however, have heard the texts from within their section of Graeco-Roman culture. It is therefore the interpreter's task to engage in the "quest of the historical audience". Further, the audience's contribution to the creation of the texts has to be assessed. This is most likely to lie in the area of selection, the author responding to the expectation for particular features. Thus Luke-Acts is to be read in the context of narrative and historiographical conventions as evidenced by Josephus, Jesus' message would have sounded like the preaching of the Cynics, Mark is to be heard with Roman ears and, rather curiously and only as a negative argument, Paul ought not to be heard from a later Gnostic position.

Finally, and in an unsympathetic climate, Leslie Houlden bravely addresses the question of a theological approach to the New Testament. After an account of why this type of approach has fallen on hard times he goes over to the offensive and suggests that systematic theology should put its own house in order. The theologians should recognise what has been learnt by N.T. historians: doctrine is autonomous of the formulations of the past, and has to be created in the present, certainly with reference to, but not tied by, tradition, in the light of present experience. The N.T. scholar can contribute an analysis of the procedure by which the earliest Christian faith arose and constantly call attention to the story of Jesus.

D. V. Way

The Saga of God Incarnate

Robert Crawford. University of South Africa/T. & T. Clark, 1985. Pp. xii + 106. £7.95.

Robert Crawford's contribution to the debate on christology is more a report on the issues than a sustained original contribution to theology, though some constructive suggestions are made. The book contains five chapters and two appendices. The first chapter is a valuable summary of the views and presuppositions of what appears to be the reigning view in British christology, and concludes by saying that "current theology advocates an 'action' rather than a 'substance' one" (p. 7). This is the cue for some criticisms of fashions and assumptions. Modern "mythologizing" interpretations face logical and theological problems, as well as questions about their outmoded view of modern scientific approaches to the world. Similarly, in the last chapter, current shibboleths about "pluralism" and "secularization" are outlined and criticised.

The heart of the book's positive proposal is to be found in chapter four, where an attempt is made to give an account of what it might mean to say that Jesus is both God and man. This is, however, less successful than the critical work, because it fails to engage with the essential matter of the nature of God and his relation to the world. In commenting on p. 25 that "the new model of the cosmos is more like an organism than a machine", Dr. Crawford points to the real problem, and this is that neither of them is satisfactory. To begin to develop an adequate christology we must move beyond both "models" to a concept of God in personal relationship with a world which as creation bears his stamp and so is a fit place for his presence in flesh.

The two appendices provide some useful historical background, the first revealing the deist and unitarian background of the "mythographers", the second a review of christological developments over the last few centuries in the light of patristic theological debate.

Colin Gunton

The Probability of God

Hugh Montefiore. S.C.M. Press, 1985. Pp. 195. £6.95.

The Bishop of Birmingham took a three months' sabbatical in California to write this book. He clearly used the time to the full, amassing a vast amount of scientific knowledge, apparently digesting it without too much difficulty, and presenting it here in a fascinating and readable form. The general aim is to rehabilitate the design argument, to argue that it is much more probable than not that the universe is intentionally willed by a wise and powerful God. This enterprise has been undertaken before, notably by F. R. Tennant and Charles Raven. But science moves on by leaps and bounds, and Montefiore is able to call up vast new resources from more recent scientific work. The book is a worthy successor to those distinguished Anglican works of the earlier 20th century.

Montefiore covers a remarkably wide field with apparent mastery of his material – from the cosmology of the Big Bang to the ecosystem of the atmosphere and the oceans; from the theory of neo-Darwinism to the genesis of the brain in the human species. On all these matters he presents a balanced and very helpful selection of quotations and sources. He often wrote to experts in the field, and received courteous replies, which he quotes. His data have been carefully checked, and his presentation of his evidence is exemplary.

One of the most interesting features that emerge is the open-mindedness of scientists to the possibility of non-mechanistic explanations, and their frequent confessions about the huge extent of our ignorance of how the world works. There is clearly a new climate of opinion abroad, which is rarely avowedly materialistic, but which is able to confess both an appreciation of the mystery of nature and a desire to find some complete explanation of its ways, which may transcend science as we know it. It is no longer thought that science has explained everything, and that only a few minor details remain to be cleared up. Rather, everything is in the melting-pot; and we can hardly foresee what is to come.

In this context, Montefiore does not press his case beyond its strength. He sets out the way in which present knowledge of the universe discloses a whole series of

extraordinary coincidences, correlations and finely balanced relationships without which human life, or indeed any form of personal life, could not have existed. He accepts that there is no way of disproving that these could all have come about by chance. But his argument is that it seems very improbable that they did so. They suggest, he argues, that there is in matter an inner tendency to produce conscious life, a nisus towards the personal, which gives evidence of purpose in creation. The simplest, most economical and satisfactory explanation of these things, he says, is that God willed them so to be. Indeed, once one sees the possibility of such an explanation, the chance-hypothesis comes to seem "wildly improbable".

There is no doubt that this is a very good book – informed, reliable and judicious. But does it make its case? The central concept is that of probability; and it is just here that the main difficulties lie. If you say that something is probable, you usually mean that, relative to some sequences of regularities which you have established in the past, it is likely to ensue. Probability is relative to knowledge; and it only functions against a background of established regularity. I can say it is improbable I will change into an elephant, because people have never been known to do that sort of thing; it would conflict with well-established regularities in nature. But if I say that the universe is improbable, what have I got to measure it against? And what regularities can be in question? I do not say that such a use of concept of probability is impossible. But it would need to be carefully explained and defended.

Montefiore gives some idea of what he has in mind when he says that God "is the simple and adequate explanation of all the puzzling matters of which we have spoken" (152). Can we say that it is more probable that there is such an explanation than not? We might say that everything seems to have had an explanation so far; so it is probable that the universe will have an explanation. But, as Hume pointed out, the larger the leap, the weaker the induction; and such an argument does not have a high probability (i.e. it is not very reliable). Perhaps we could say, "If there is a simple, adequate explanation, then God is the best one". And there is a use of "improbable" where it means "inexplicable, on any known principles". I think this is what Montefiore wants; because he says, "I believe very strongly in the Principle of Sufficient Reason" (8). Of course, if that is an axiom, then it is not just improbable, it is impossible, for anything to lack an explanation. The only question then is, what sort of explanation?

The axis of Montefiore's argument is the listing of a long series of events, all improbable in themselves, which give rise to an increasingly ordered and complex state, ending (so far) with human beings. Thus the present state of the universe depends upon a long series of very precise antecedent states, a slight difference in which would have prevented the existence of the present state. That, of course, would be true of any present state whatsoever. To make the argument significant, we have to add that the present state is highly desirable or valuable; and that the series is progressively more highly ordered – which, if random shuffling procedures are used, is increasingly improbable as time goes on (improbable, that is, relative to the set of possible outcomes which random shuffling permits). Then we can say, as Montefiore does, that the simplest explanation is "that matter orders itself in a way that is optimal for life" (171) – i.e. laws of nature are not like random shuffles of a finite deck of cards; but more like tendencies to unfold potentialities present from the first in the structure of matter.

The appeal of this explanatory notion of "unfolding tendency" is increased when we consider the amazing speed, fecundity and complexity of the emergence of animal species and of humans. It seems at least as if natural selection and random genetic mutation alone do not provide the sole explanation of evolution. "The scientific method does point to some kind of purpose in creation," he says; although "if there is an overall plan, then it is by no means clear. There are so many culs-de-sac, dead ends, false starts" (96).

The evidence he gets from biologists is certainly impressive; but at this point mysteries accumulate around what is meant by the inner tendency of matter to produce ordered forms. Montefiore wishes to explain this by the working of the Holy Spirit. Yet he says, "At no time would there have been any interference with the natural functions of its component parts in any creature" (139). He does not like the idea of God "intervening" in the natural order. Things happen we would not expect by chance; but "this is not because of external pressure, but because of the bias implanted in matter" (161). So the view seems to be deistic; we are told that God is immanent everywhere, but that he does nothing in particular. In the end, the proffered explanation is that God wills the universe to be what it is; and he makes it so that it has an inner tendency to greater complexity and order. I am not denying that this could be explanatory; but it remains unclear just what sort of explanation it is. For it is admitted that "we are ignorant about the options open to the creator"; so does it really explain anything to say that a creator chose it to be thus? And it is unclear what sort of thing an "inner bias" or "tendency" might be. Is Montefiore proposing the necessity of a Final Cause as part of a complete scientific explanation, a sort of Aristotelian lure for the material world? Or does he want a more active principle, as is suggested by talk of "the Spirit *working*" in creation? Or is he saying that God, like an almighty Programmer, set up the universe so that it would achieve a goal in due course?

In these comments, I am not at all meaning to dismiss the book. On the contrary, it provides a rich source of material for rethinking the nature of scientific investigation and the relation of God and the world. I mean only to suggest that there remain puzzles and obscurities which need to be further explored. I am inclined to think that the case the book does make is that the notion of "chance" is unhelpful in understanding nature, at least as any sort of basic inexplicable surd; and that some form of purposive explanation is not ruled out by modern scientific knowledge, but is even positively suggested by it. In some sense of probable, perhaps this does make the existence of God more probable than it might be on some other views of the nature of the universe.

There is a *non sequitur* on p. 131, which is probably just a slip. From the fact that I can apparently conceive a contradiction it does not follow that no being is demonstrable unless its contrary implies a contradiction. What follows is that from the fact that I can apparently conceive of God's non-existence, it does not follow that it is possible, even logically, for God not to exist. The complexity of the requisite sentence makes the *non sequitur* understandable.

Keith Ward

Enlightenment and Alienation: An Essay towards a Trinitarian Theology

Colin E. Gunton. Marshall Morgan & Scott, 1985. Pp. 165. £5.95.

The Enlightenment has in recent years been subject to a somewhat ambivalent assessment. On the one hand are the self-appointed heirs and successors of the Enlightenment's programme of man's release from heteronomously-imposed authority, who want to carry the task of autonomous liberation in the name of enlightened rationality still further. On the other hand are those who see in the Enlightenment nothing but man's estrangement from the true sources of human life and who escape from the burden of rationality into all kinds of fashionable mythologies. Professor Gunton's new book does not fall into either of these categories. While arguing eloquently and passionately against the alienating consequences of the Enlightenment, which he sees as disastrous for the undertaking of modern theology, he is nevertheless careful not to condemn uncritically the whole of the Enlightenment's heritage. Indeed, the main contention of his book, that a trinitarian theology provides the possibility of overcoming some of the most desperate alienations of human beings from the world and from each other, depends both on taking leave of some of the Enlightenment's most cherished dogmas and on retaining some of its seminal insights.

In the first part of the book ("Seeing and Believing", 11-54) Colin Gunton offers an analysis of the main trends of the Enlightenment's theory of perception (Descartes, Locke, Hume, Kant) which in his view lead by their emphasis on the passivity of the senses and the ordering activity of the mind to an ever widening gulf between the human mind and reality. It was Kant who recognized the threat to the validity of all our experience implied in the Humean account of perception, and who tried to overcome the resulting scepticism by postulating a universal mental framework as the structuring power of the diversity presented to us by our senses. Gunton contrasts this solution with the "dissenting voices" of Berkeley, Coleridge and Polanyi. According to Gunton, Berkeley is not to be interpreted as an idealist, but as a critical realist: the aim of his argument that the passivity and rationality of perception could have no other explanation than the constantly creating and preserving agency of God would seem to be to safeguard the correspondence of our ideas with the reality of the world. Coleridge's rehabilitation of the imagination as the active process in which a person transcends the "despotism of the eye" and gets in touch with reality is further developed in Polanyi's theory of personal knowledge, which is interpreted as a conscious departure from the Enlightenment's dichotomy of knowledge and belief and its accompanying division of passive perception and active conceptual construction. If the paradigm of knowledge is not an ideal of omniscience but the process of learning, then in perception the human person can be regarded as actively indwelling the material world by means of his or her senses, not in order to bring it under the control of the mind, but in order to receive passively the structure of the real world. Taking up "hints and pointers" from these counter-currents of the Enlightenment, Gunton argues that a trinitarian understanding of God makes it possible to understand perception and knowledge as always fallible and as only eschatologically complete participation in the inherent rationality of God's creation. Under this theological presupposition can the alienation of the person from reality be overcome.

Part II of the book ("Thinking and Acting", 55-107) starts with a justification of the Enlightenment's demand for autonomy, which Gunton sees as directed against a conception of God as necessary power that denies human freedom. But Gunton is even more critical of the Enlightenment's proposed alternative of authentic humanity. The ideal of the autonomy of the individual will seems dangerously near to a human imitation of the picture of God from which the Enlightenment wanted to liberate humanity. Gunton shows that this conception of autonomy implies dangerous breaks between the moral agent and reality and an alienation of the individual from other persons. The trinitarian conception of God, for the interpretation of which again appeal to Coleridge is made, has in Gunton's view as its correlative an understanding of reality which implies the reciprocity of subject and object. This means that one does not have to choose between a mechanistic explanation of human freedom and the alienating autonomy of the individual will. In this part the emphasis is on the work of the Son who, as the revelation of authentic humanity, enables us to see God as related to human beings and the world in such a way that human freedom is made possible without alienation from other persons and from the world.

The third and last part of the book ("Reading and Understanding", 111-153) concentrates on the problems of the interpretation of Scripture. Gunton here identifies the heritage of the Enlightenment as the problem of the gap between what the texts say and what they mean, a gap which can be bridged only by the activity of the interpreter who has to impose an order on the complex diversity of historical events to which the texts are taken to refer. This diagnosis (which takes up the central thesis of Hans Frei's *The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative*) does not lead Gunton to prescribe a return to a precritical or an advance towards a postcritical interpretation of Scripture as adequate treatments for the ills of biblical interpretation. Rather, he argues for a critical use of the methods of historical criticism which (following suggestions by B. S. Childs) takes the canonical form in which the texts have reached us as the starting-point of theological interpretation.

If it is the function of the canon "to lay down a unifying pattern of insights to show that it is the same God that is being described and referred to here" (R. E. Clements, quoted on p. 137f.), then – Gunton argues – the task of unification might be made easier, if God were understood in trinitarian terms. This is also seen as the basis for a reshaping of the understanding of "inspired meaning", which for Gunton is not a "wholly other" kind of meaning discernible only by believers, but "simply a successful version of meaning in general" (p. 145). Both aspects of this view of the interpretation of Scripture, i.e. the canonical approach and the reformulated doctrine of inspiration, define an attitude towards Scripture which is not primarily that of a judge handing down a decision, but rather that of a pupil exercising judgement in participating in the eschatological gift of the Spirit.

This original and brilliantly written essay is one of the most important contributions towards a theological assessment of the cultural situation in which we live. As such, it deserves to be widely read, not only by theologians, but also

by those enlightened critics of Christian theology who are still interested in dialogue with Christian theologians. Even one in agreement with the general thrust of the argument, however, might question some of Gunton's historical and systematic judgements, because different assessments might broaden the basis on which one could build in the task of theological reconstruction. For instance, is Schleiermacher to be seen only as a theologian who asserted the wrong kind of dependence on God, or is he not rather one of those thinkers who (very much like Coleridge) early diagnosed the alienating effects of the Enlightenment and devised philosophical and theological means to overcome them? Would not Paul Tillich (no less than Karl Barth and Eberhard Jüngel) be an ally in the search for a theological understanding of authentic humanity, since he does not seem to take "a middle way between autonomy and heteronomy" (p. 96), but tried to show that only on the basis of autonomy can a non-heteronomous understanding of theonomy be reached? These questions are of minor importance compared to the one question that Colin Gunton firmly puts on the theological agenda: what exactly is the form and the status of a doctrine of the Trinity that seems implied by this trinitarian theology?

The importance of this book should not be seen exclusively in the theological proposals it makes and in the questions it provokes, but also in the method employed. Colin Gunton does not argue for the *necessity* of a trinitarian understanding of God and the world; rather, he wants to establish *possibilities* "in such a way that there is mutual illumination from God to the world and, in direct correspondence from the world to God" (p. 52). This "sceptical", yet optimistic, attitude shows that he is not only a passionate critic of the Enlightenment's alientation, but also an heir to its liberation.

Christoph Schwöbel

Freedom and Alienation

Hywel D. Lewis. Scottish Academic Press, 1985. Pages x + 159. £10.50 (paperback), £6.75 (paperback).

Professor Lewis, in his preface to this third volume based on his Gifford Lectures in 1966-68, says that what he is to show is that "Science does not explain everything". Without denying anything it does explain, he wants to prove that our thoughts and intentions make the kind of difference to what we do which cannot be reduced to mere physical causation. He predicts – perhaps a little too pessimistically – that his line of argument will find no favour with fashionable philosophical opinion at the present time but nevertheless regards it as the only plausible way of accounting for that "conviction of freedom" which ordinary people have.

His arguments revolve around the following question: Is there not something about the "I", or self, as subject, which cannot be netted entirely in mere accounts of the nature of that subject's experiences and the way in which they are inter-related, much less in mere accounts of their physical concomitants or preconditions? When, for example, I have a pain, it will not do to say simply that an experience of pain is occurring at such and such a time and place; what I am inescapably aware of is that it is *my* pain and not anybody else's. If I am asked for evidence that this awareness is veridical, I can point to nothing beyond the awareness itself. For want of any better way of putting it, I have an intuition of selfhood.

Lewis sets himself to show that this intuition is embedded inextricably in our ordinary ways of thinking and talking. For example, apart from it our moral notions of obligation and responsibility would be incoherent. When used in their specifically moral senses, words such as "right" and "wrong" etc. are not merely verbal devices for encouraging or discouraging certain forms of behaviour which the speaker happens to think desirable or undesirable; the whole moral way in which we use these expressions makes it clear that what we are purporting to praise or blame thereby is the free agency, in the last analysis, of independently existing selves.

This thesis is defended at length in chapters which show the author's comprehensive acquaintance with arguments to the contrary. Lewis takes on all comers, from philosophers who have understood the intricacies of our concept of the freedom of the will as subtly as P. H. Nowell-Smith to sociologists who have attempted to dispose of it as ham-handedly as Barbara Wootton. There follow chapters on the darker side of the "conviction of freedom"; namely, on the alienation which guilt may generate and the loneliness in which our intuition of selfhood may land us. The latter is illustrated from contemporary literature.

Coming specifically to religion, Lewis sees an insurmountable divide between, on the one hand, all forms of monism according to which apparently independent existents including persons are really modes of one ultimate divine being and, on the other hand, all forms of pluralism according to which such existents are genuinely real and distinct from the one transcendent source of their being. Dependence is one thing but identity, another. Our "conviction of freedom" is the ultimate guarantee that we are not identical with God; but it is also the final ground for belief in our dependence upon Him. That hunger for fellowship with God – and incidentally with others in Him – to which religion bears witness would be inconceivable apart from our intuition of freedom; for it is only beings who are in some sense independent of other beings, whether divine or human, who can be conceived to long for fellowship with these others.

I think Lewis is entitled to claim, as he does, that his conception of an independently existing self, distinct from brain or body and irreducible to a series of physical or mental events, fits in with our ordinary ways of thinking and talking. But the other side of the coin is, of course, the reductionist conception of the self, classically propounded by David Hume. Before leaping to the conclusion that Lewis's arguments are self-evidently triumphant, those who come new to the subject or have not thought about it recently, would be well advised to consider some competent contemporary representation of the reductionist case (as, for example, that to be found in Derek Parfit's *Reasons and Persons*, Oxford, 1984). There they will find it argued that personal identity can be adequately accounted for in terms of physical or psychological continuity. It is said to suffice that experiences can be linked with one another – our experiences of remembering for example with those of what is remembered, or of intending with those of what was intended. Parfit contends that, once we think of ourselves in these reductionist terms, our fear of death will be less

daunting and our sense of fellowship with others more rewarding; an opinion, which certainly raises the question whether the concepts of fellowship with God and other persons, which are so central to the Christian religion, really are as closely linked to our intuition of selfhood as Lewis seems to think.

But whatever we may feel about all that, one cannot but admire the elegance and clarity which characterise this latest of Professor Lewis's writings as they do all his previous ones, the scholarship and fair-mindedness with which he always attempts to state the counter-arguments he has to answer in defending his own, and the consistency and skill with which through a long and distinguished career he has ploughed his own philosophical furrow in the interest of truths of which, it has seemed to him, others were losing sight.

W. D. Hudson

Ecumenical Theology and the Elusiveness of Doctrine

Paul Avis. S.P.C.K., 1986. Pp. xv + 142. £5.95.

Dr. Avis tells us that his book was provoked by the Anglican-Roman Catholic Commission's *Final Report* in 1982. His criticisms are not directed against the assumption that *doctrinal* agreement between the two churches is a possibility - this he accepts. The really intractable differences are "differences of 'horizon', of ultimate assumptions regarding the approach to truth and the methods, norms and sources of theology" (xii). Most of the book is therefore concerned not with detailed examination of the ARCIC texts, but with a discussion of the different presuppositions which govern Anglican and official Roman Catholic theology (the word "official" is important, since the views of Catholic theologians such as Rahner and Küng are constantly contrasted with the pronouncements issuing forth from the Vatican).

An important difference between Anglican and official Roman Catholic approaches is seen by Avis to lie in their attitudes towards pluralism - the fact that in both society and church there are different and to some extent contradictory points of view which must somehow co-exist. Rome has not yet adjusted to this feature of modern life:

> Its recognition of pluralism has been muted and half-hearted. Recent disciplinary episodes reveal that there is at present no intention of embracing the implications of the modern pluralistic situation in a liberal culture. To this extent, the official Roman Catholic attitude can be accused of cultivating an ostrich-like air of unreality.

The Anglican attitude is thus preferable:

> The acceptance of pluralism as we find it in the Anglican Church denotes the eminent realism of Anglicanism. There is no need to apologize too much for the alleged defects of Anglicanism - its lack of discipline, its reticence where dogmatic definitions are concerned, its breadth of permitted opinion. Its pragmatism is not always born of a weary cynicism: at its best it is the product of sagacity, a sense of realism about the world as it is in the providence of God, a willingness to look the facts in the face and to make the best of them. (116)

We have here the familiar liberal Protestant contrast between a rigid orthodoxy and tolerance of different theological standpoints within a single church. In good Protestant fashion (and not without reason), the Pope's authority to issue binding decisions is declared to be incompatible with "the liberty of conscience" which is "intrinsic to Anglicanism" (80). But Avis is aware that Anglicanism's easygoing tolerance has recently been attacked from within by Stephen Sykes as lacking integrity, and he therefore argues that Anglican "comprehensiveness" should issue not merely in the juxtaposition of mutually opposing views within a single communion, but in the quest for a *synthesis* of the positive points contributed by different traditions within Anglicanism. Coleridge and F. D. Maurice point towards such an approach; Maurice's dictum, that the Church of England is to be "most Catholic when she is most Protestant", is quoted approvingly (124).

This step from "pluralism" to "synthesis" seems to me to be problematic. Despite Sykes, it is possible to defend a pluralism which consists merely of the juxtaposition of different points of view (which is the reality of contemporary Anglicanism); it is at least better than the obvious alternative, sectarianism. But the notion of "synthesis" is one which - despite its laudable intentions - seems very difficult to apply in practice. It would be hard enough to explain how one could be most Catholic when one is most Protestant, but next to impossible to explain how one could be most liberal when one is most fundamentalist, or vice versa. Some theological differences are simply irreducible, and that is not always a bad thing. Tolerating views with which one disagrees is not necessarily symptomatic of a lazy complacency, in the church any more than in society.

Underlying the contrast between Anglican and Roman Catholic attitudes towards pluralism are two different views of the nature of revelation, according to Avis. He argues that the transcendent God is ultimately a mystery which cannot be adequately represented by any dogmatic definition. Alongside affirmative theology, the *via negativa* has stressed the utter inadequacy of our speech about God, and our knowledge of him is thus at best "a form of learned ignorance" (3). This leads to the central contention of the book, that the official Roman Catholic view of revelation in terms of "revealed truths" is erroneous, and that ARCIC has distorted the genuine Anglican position by acceding to that notion. Avis feels that this "propositional" view has now been rendered impossible by the emphasis in the philosophy of science on the provisional and tentative nature of our knowledge, and by the relativism resulting from historical study. There are thus no dogmatic decisions, however venerable, which can be authoritatively declared to be "free from error" and so binding on all Christians. Our apprehension of truth is a matter of personal encounter rather than intellectual assent:

> Reality remains a mystery that does not lend itself to clear and distinct description. The closest we can come to capturing reality in words remains at the level of the tacit rather that the explicit. Our most refined and exact concepts are but blunt instruments for the delicate task of interpreting a world of meaning that in its heights and depths surpasses the furthest reach of human imagination. Myth, poetry, symbol, metaphor and analogy come closest and point us forward, but ultimately they themselves fail. (9)

Avis therefore criticizes ARCIC's claim that a formal definition by the magisterium may "enrich" our "grasp of the truth" – enrichment comes not from infallible dogmas but rather from "mutual fellowship in joy or sorrow, from the resources of the liturgy, from music and literature" (65). The "principle of reverent agnosticism" is authentically Anglican, whereas official Roman Catholic theology is implacably opposed to the suggestion that "doctrine attempts merely a vague approximation to the truth" (46).

There is much here with which one may well sympathize; and yet one wonders whether this almost exclusive emphasis on the *via negativa* and the inadequacy of language is really satisfactory. To reject the possibility of ecclesiastical decisions miraculously preserved from error is something with which most non-Catholics (and some Catholics) would immediately agree. But it does not follow from this that the most one can expect from theology is "vague approximations", and that "clarity, precision, distinctness, objectivity are spurious when applied to statements of doctine" (40). The statements of theology are of course provisional and inadequate, since the God revealed in Jesus Christ remains mysterious. But it is also true that the mysterious God actually *has* revealed himself in Jesus Christ, and this creates the possibility not just of an indefinable encounter with an ultimate reality but of *logos* about *theos* – rational discourse about God. Such at least seems to be the implication of the New Testament, with its strong emphasis on the preached word and on Jesus himself as the Word.

Francis Watson

From Controversy to Co-existence. Evangelicals in the Church of England 1914-1980

Randle Manwaring. C.U.P., 1985. Pp. xi + 227. £19.50.

It is remarkable that Cambridge University Press should have accepted this book for publication, for it is written from an openly partisan point of view and belongs more to the genre of propaganda than to that of history or of theology. What it says is what, it seems, evangelicals like to hear: their myths are set down here as if they were solid fact. Naturally, every book has a certain amount of tendency, a certain ideological preference, but few are so unashamedly partisan as this work, and the writer lacks both the theological insight and the historical ability to understand the issues involved in what he is describing. Rather than attempt any fairness in his historical sketch, the author simply perpetuates the aspects that conservative evangelicals have found congenial. For example, he (rightly) stresses the centrality of Billy Graham in the whole rise of mid-century evangelicalism, and on other pages he praises Karl Barth as a prophet of protest against liberalism and humanism. He does not mention, probably does not know, that Barth, when he heard Graham's preaching, was horrified by it, considering that it put a law in the place of the Gospel. Similarly, he thinks of Nazism as an outstanding representative of humanism and the like, but he does not think how many of those who in the early years supported Hitler were those who held the same values which animate this book, those of tenacity to traditional Protestantism and longing for a return to strict morality.

In pattern the book is an informal history, or rather anecdote, and its theme is the move of Anglican evangelicals from a largely negative position of opposition through growing success in the post-war years and into an increasing posture of co-existence in more recent times. The centrality of the great personalities of the evangelical firmament, in recent years John Stott and Jim Packer, is made clearly evident. The author writes as an insider and much of the inner self-consciousness of evangelicalism is well conveyed by his writing. The influence of organisations such as the Crusaders, the Children's Special Service Mission, and the Christian Unions in colleges and universities is made very clear.

Central to the argument, in a certain way, is chapter 9, "The Fundamentalist Issue," where Manwaring wants, quite reasonably, to defend evangelicals against the supposition that they are all fundamentalists. Of course they are not and, in spite of what he says about my own writings on the subject, I never supposed that they were. But, if they are not, then a new problem at once arises, which pierces to the heart of our author's assurance of the rightness of evangelicalism. As soon as fundamentalism is gone, then evangelicalism – at least as it is here expressed – loses all basis for its incessant claims that it is more biblical than any other form of Christianity. It is not. The Bible, taken as authoritative, points in other Christian directions than the evangelical. The continual self-assurance of Mr. Manwaring that he and his friends have absolute biblical authority on their side is a relic of fundamentalism; without it, they have no basis for their claims. Once the more moderate positions about scripture, mentioned here and there in this book, are accepted, then evangelicals will have to accept that, in degree of obedience to biblical authority, they are no better than the rest of us. But few signs of comprehension of this lesson can be seen in this book.

The same applies to the continual reference back to the Reformation, the Reformed Faith and the like, which the writer insists to be the sole true heritage of the Church of England. There is not much doubt that evangelicals *aspire to* continuity with the Reformed tradition. This aspiration is repeated in this book as if it was a factual reality. But are Anglican evangelicals, as a matter of fact, anywhere near the Reformed tradition? One who comes from that tradition may be permitted to doubt it. To people who belong to the actual tradition of the Reformation, Anglican evangelicals give little impression of knowing what a Reformed church is like at all. They seem more like people who draw their resources from a more modern well of piety and sentiment, often sectarian in character, as is well illustrated by the importance of closed evangelical societies, so rightly stressed in this book. But, even more so, part of the heritage of the Reformed churches is a stress on *loyalty* to the church. If this book is a right account of Anglican evangelicals, one cannot see much sign of *loyalty* to the Church of England. That just is not a factor. The loyalty of evangelicals is to evangelicalism. They know that evangelicalism is right. The church is the field in which they work, and they want to have a bigger say in it than they have had; but the motive of *loyalty* to the church, as a Christian and equal in status with loyalty to evangelical convictions, is scarcely contemplated here.

Thus one is left wondering how far Anglican evangelicalism depends on truly Anglican roots at all. The underlying theology of this book, in so far as it could be said

to have one, seems to derive from the thought of "pure" or sectarian evangelical groupings rather than from historic Anglicanism. Thus the position of Dr. Martyn Lloyd-Jones, who demanded secession from the existing churches in order to form a new evangelical church, is given respectful attention (p. 201). Of course few followed this suggestion, but that it should even be discussed seems to place us quite outside the Anglican tradition.

Nor can the author cope with the intellectual matters that he has to face from time to time. His treatment of the *Honest to God* discussion is unthinkingly prejudiced. The primitivity of his conceptions is displayed when he asks us to suspect that there was a connection between the Bishop of Woolwich's book and the wild doings of John Profumo in the same year. And, after all, did not John Robinson speak for a good number of evangelicals, as well as other Anglican believers? Do evangelicals really affirm the "three-tier universe", and do they insist that God is literally "up there"?

But nowhere is the writer's inability to cope with the questions he himself is handling more evident than in the matter of Hermeneutics. This, he tells us, was the "shock" theme of the Nottingham Congress (p. 200). But he does not explain why. Yet the question is there in a form that threatens the whole evangelical self-consciousness: one sees the biblical text through the spectacles of one's own tradition. "A Christian Union Bible Study Group will hear the text only in a 'Christian Union' kind of way" (quoted from Thiselton). But this, if right, means that for evangelicals the real authority is not the Bible, but their own evangelicalism through whose spectacles they read it. Not surprisingly, a shock; but the author, having mentioned the subject, just passes it by.

As has been said, Mr. Manwaring presents the evangelical point of view throughout and has little time or understanding for any other. He does indeed see that there have been faults and excesses at times and that there has been some reason for the unpopularity that evangelicals have sometimes suffered. But on the whole all these things have been getting better and better. Evangelicals are becoming more committed to the Church of England, he says: but how can they really do so, when, on his own showing, their very evangelicalism prevents them from anything more than the most grudging recognition that anything deemed by them to be unevangelical belongs to genuine Christianity? In spite of ups and downs, evangelicalism has always been right and is now right.

In criticising this book I am far from saying that the actual situation in evangelicalism is worse than the depiction of it that Mr. Manwaring gives us. On the contrary, by his own enthusiastic and partisan depiction he casts a worse light on the evangelical mind than it as a whole and in actuality is likely to deserve, a worse light than a critical or impartial discussion would have cast. For his own depiction, if it is valid, gives above all the impression that evangelicalism is a fundamentally selfish movement, self-seeking and self-centred, seeking its own advancement and glorying in it, mean-spirited and advantage-seeking in debate. Thus Mr. Manwaring's advocacy does discredit to much that is fair and humble in the evangelical character. And this brings us back to the central problem. Those of us who have personal experience of evangelicalism remember two dark sides of it: its complete destruction of all fairness in religious argument, and the rubbishy character of the ideas it so commonly disseminated as interpretations of the Bible. These two problems still lie at the centre, if Manwaring's depiction is a true representation.

James Barr

Westminster, Whitehall and the Vatican: The Role of Cardinal Hinsley, 1935–43

Thomas Moloney. Burns and Oates, 1985. Pp. 263. £9.95.

In June 1939 bombs exploded in the Strand, Piccadilly and Park Lane as part of the IRA's campaign to make the British withdraw from Ireland. Arthur Hinsley, Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster, condemned the violence and threatened its perpetrators with excommunication. From Dublin, the IRA warned Hinsley that he should not use the Catholic Church to defend British aggression in Ireland; from Armagh, the Primate of All Ireland, Cardinal MacRory, informed him that he agreed the violence was indefensible, but pointedly drew his attention to the IRA's belief that it was acting out of patriotic motives and in response to past and continuing English injustices in Ireland. In England, anxious members of the Catholic laity told Hinsley that the IRA was generating anti-Catholic feeling; for their part, the Catholic bishops in England (some of whom were Irish), rejected Hinsley's view that IRA prisoners on hunger strike in English jails should be told that they would be refused the sacraments and Christian burial if their suicide resulted.

The Irish question, with its sadly familiar characteristics, provides a striking illustration of the pressures and constraints which Hinsley laboured under as Archbishop of Westminster between 1935 and 1943. The priority he gave to the interests of English and Welsh Catholics frequently created tension between himself and leaders of Catholics elsewhere. At home, his sympathy for lay demands for a more active role in church life, which he believed would lead to deeper commitment and church growth, brought him into conflict with his own bishops and clergy, defending their prerogatives of leadership. There was little that Hinsley could do about this; the Archbishop of Westminster was no more than the permanent president of the Bishop's Conference of England and Wales, and was bound to follow the wishes of the majority.

If this lack of primatial authority stopped Hinsley imposing change on his bishops, it also required of him great tact when dealing with Whitehall, which had little understanding of his constitutional position. Ministers and officials often approached him, expecting results, whenever they wanted Catholic support for Government policy. Whitehall was, for example, anxious that British Catholics should not look favourably on the seemingly Catholic inspired régime at Vichy, nor that hostility to atheistic Communism – the *bête noire* of the Catholic Church since 1917 – should create opposition to Anglo-Soviet co-operation after the German invasion of Russia in 1941. An astute diplomatist himself, and with a conception of the national interest often similar to that of British officials, Hinsley was usually willing and able to do what the Foreign Office asked of him.

Although Hinsley spent 10 years in Rome as Rector of the English College and seven as the Holy See's Apostolic Delegate to British Africa, his relations with the Vatican throughout his time at Westminster were less close than might have been expected. The Abyssinian crisis, which burst soon after Hinsley arrived in England early in 1935, showed him the unwisdom of too intimate a connection with the Vatican, whose policymakers were predominantly Italian and sympathetic to Mussolini. The Vatican's appointment of an Apostolic Delegate to London in 1938 upset Hinsley because it was made without his knowledge, but at least the Vatican was prudent enough to appoint an Englishman rather than an Italian.

For all the meticulous care with which Dr. Moloney examines his activities, no clear picture of Hinsley himself ever emerges. The archives of the Archbishop of Westminster and of the Foreign Office, the main sources, reveal a true statesman of the church, wise, resourceful, sensitive and humble in public and ecclesiastical affairs; but they say almost nothing of what Hinsley was like as a man, of how he was regarded by those who worked with him, or of what was his vision, if any, of the task entrusted to him. The nearest we come this is in what the author views as Hinsley's dearest project, conceived in the dark days of 1940, the "Sword of the Spirit". This was "a campaign of prayer, study and action" whose object was "the restoration in Europe of a Christian basis for both public and private life". Hinsley secured at its inception a high degree of lay involvement and hoped for its advance along inter-denominational lines. But the hostility of the Catholic bishops and the lukewarmness of the Anglican establishment – George Bell was a notable exception – had effectively killed it by 1942. The comment on this episode, that "if the diocesan bishops of the day tended to act over-protectively, there were sound historical reasons for this which Hinsley both understood and respected" (p. 204) seems generous to a fault. Hinsley's failure to do more to ensure the success of a scheme that engaged him so deeply requires a fuller explanation than the one provided. If somewhat uncritical, Dr. Moloney's book is often absorbing for the light it casts on the activities of Catholic clergy and laity in the 1930s; it should prove of value to students of ecclesiastical and international history alike.

Paul Stafford

The Sinews of the Spirit: the Ideal of Christian Manliness in Victorian Literature and Religious Thought

Norman Vance. C.U.P., 1985. Pp. x + 244. £22.50.

This aptly titled book, which centres on the writings of Charles Kingsley and Thomas Hughes, puts in its proper Victorian context the style of English religion popularly known as "muscular Christianity". Dr. Vance, in a detailed and careful study, demonstrates that this was but one aspect of a concern with the ideal of manliness which ranged much wider. "Physical vigour and prowess," "patriotic and military qualities," "the traditions of chivalry" and the exaltation of particular moral standards are all aspects of this ideal of manliness. It might be preached as an examplar of Christian virtue, or it might slip free from any but the most tenuous Christian moorings to become in the later part of the century a cult of athleticism or imperial exploit.

In endeavouring to proclaim a gospel of Christian manliness, Kingsley in particular attacked what he saw as a distorted, other-worldly and ascetic Christianity. In his celebrated clash with Newman in the 1860s the battle, as Dr. Vance rightly points out, was not so much about mendacity as about "Manichaeism", "a battle between different religious temperaments and different views of religious character". In an age in which Millais' portrayal of *Christ in the House of His Parents* had been labelled "a pictorial blasphemy", because it associated Christ with the details of everyday life, there was a need to affirm the human reality of the Incarnation. It was part of what would appear to be a continuing tension in the religious life of England between those who define Christianity as "spiritual" (and understand that to mean "concerned with the salvation of the soul and a future life"), and those who proclaim that the very salvation Christianity proclaims is a redemption of the world created by God in all its aspects.

Against world-denying Evangelicalism and what were frequently considered the un-English (if not unnatural) refinements of Tractarian piety, Kingsley proclaimed the worth of physical strength, courage and health, the importance of the family and married love, and a call to service as patriot or social reformer. A "crusader" (in the modern sense) was a title which embodied much of this manly ideal. Yet this cult of manliness was only one-sidedly Christian. It promoted vigorous Christian action, it knew little of Christian contemplation. Asceticism was narrowing and negative, the thin-bloodedness of the pale Galilean. There was no sense that it might be the demanding discipline of true attentiveness to God. Over-simplified contrasts were drawn, as between the "manly Goth and the effeminate Roman". Esau was vindicated at the expense of Jacob. In his novel, *Hypatia*, set in those early centuries of the church beloved by the Tractarians, it is not the Tractarian ideal which Kingsley exalts. He writes approvingly of the ostrich-hunting bishop, Synesius, as an endorsement of the sporting clerics of the 19th century.

Dr. Vance shows clearly the different ways in which Coleridge, Thomas Arnold and Carlyle all influenced this tradition. He exonerates Dr. Arnold from responsibility for the public school games and sports tradition so often laid at his door. Above all the pervasive influence of F. D. Maurice upon not only Kingsley and Hughes, but on this whole tradition is underlined – an influence which may even have been enhanced by his expulsion from his chair at what Dr. Vance describes as "that conservative reservoir of Anglican orthodoxy", King's College, London. Thomas Hughes' novels, *Tom Brown's Schooldays* and the lesser-known *Tom Brown at Oxford* are analysed carefully by Dr. Vance as exemplars of the ideal of manliness, which is summarised more succinctly in Hughes' hymn, "O God of truth, whose living word upholds whate'er hath breath". Later decades were to see both the flourishing of alternative ideals, such as "aesthetic Hellenism" and the absorption of the ideal of Christian manliness into traditions to which Kingsley was inimical, Evangelicalism and the successors of the Tractarians. In different ways the *Boy's Own Paper* and the Boys' Brigade continued the tradition.

In this detailed survey Dr. Vance has not only given us a fine study of Kingsley, but reminded us of the importance of a style of religion which still has its adherents in English Christianity. One may cavil over small points (Pusey's tract on fasting as an example of Tractarian dubious argument (p.

35), or Bishop Selwyn being characterised as "warlike" (p. 86)), but this is a book which by careful criticism and detailed exploration of a major 19th century theme both illuminates a much wider area of Victorian literature and religion and poses implicitly the question of how the Christian understanding of human nature may be persuasively and imaginatively portrayed. The 19th century did this in part by the production of Lives of Jesus (which somewhat disappointingly Dr. Vance does not discuss). New Testament criticism means this way is no longer open to us. No more in the light of feminist concern is manliness in the 19th-century sense. Perhaps it will be left to a scholar of the next century to write a companion study of the ideal of Christian feminism in late 20th-century literature and religious thought under a different title – *The Sinews of the Spirit* would hardly do for that!

Geoffrey Rowell
Keble College, Oxford

What's Right With Feminism

Elaine Storkey. Third Way Books, S.P.C.K., 1985. Pp. 186. £3.95.

As the title suggests, Elaine Storkey has directed her arguments at those Christians (especially of evangelical leanings) who have already assumed, without investigation, that feminism is "all wrong", a dangerous secular ideology which should be resisted by the faithful. Her book proceeds with admirable clarity to set out the feminist case with regard to women's unequal situation: at work, at home, in education, in law, and in the church itself. She indicates a variety of feminist analyses, offering definitions of the liberal, Marxist and radical feminist positions. Her third, and shortest, section scans Christian responses, both negative and positive, and finally she makes the case for a "biblical feminism": in her terms, a Christian feminism that is consistent with an evangelical understanding of biblical authority.

It would obviously be unfair to demand extensive and original argument in a book which is intended as an introductory work, but I sensed that the author was severely constrained by her envisaged readership. I was continually frustrated by the brevity of each chapter, and wanted much more analysis of the situation outlined. Although the style is readable, statistics are accessibly presented, and there are some trenchant quotations to enliven the text, anyone who has followed the feminist debate with even minimal attention over the last few years will find the treatment rather preliminary. On the other hand, the book may be too serious and moderate to attract readers ignorant of the debate whose previous diet has been only the ill-considered anti-feminist tract. (The author unveils some unsuspected horrors currently lurking on popular church bookstalls.)

One of the most interesting philosophical questions the author touches on is whether or not contemporary feminism is purely a child of the Enlightenment, and therefore whether a specifically *Christian* feminism can offer a perspective much more deeply critical of modern post-Enlightenment culture. However, Storkey shows no knowledge of other Christian feminists (e.g. Angela West) who have explored this issue. Indeed, throughout the book, her references are scanty to what is now a considerable body of theological work that is both Christian and feminist. "Broadly-Christian feminism," which Storkey distinguishes from her own "biblical feminism", is barely mentioned. Apart from sowing the unfair implication that only evangelical Christianity can be regarded as properly "biblical", Storkey distorts the picture by concentrating, among individual writers, only on Mary Daly. Daly's explicitly post-Christian position may offer a neat counterbalance to the virulently anti-feminist camp, but it is hardly representative of mainstream Christian feminism. The otherwise uninformed reader would suppose that the author was virtually alone in treading some kind of middle ground. Even such major writers as Reuther, Fiorenza, Russell and Trible are not discussed, where they are mentioned at all.

There were further disappointments for me in the author's habit of introducing important issues in a clear and sensitive way, only to resolve these rapidly into "sound" evangelical conclusions without having satisfactorily argued the case. For instance, she outlines the difficulty of reconciling the twin Englightenment themes of "freedom" and "nature" – and the subsequent opposition (crucial for some feminist argument) between individual autonomy and either biological or sociological determinism. But then she collapses the dilemma into the banal statement:

> "Freedom comes from following the Maker's instructions"

(a tired old sermon point which in fact betrays a typically Enlightenment, thoroughly mechanistic view of creation). Her ethical discussions follow a similar path. After an initially sympathetic and well-considered exploration of the rationale for political lesbianism, and an acknowledgement that

> "many lesbian relationships are closer to the norms of truth, commitment, love and faithfulness than many heterosexual marriages",

Storkey does not hesitate to assert her belief that

> "practising lesbianism is not a Christian option".

It is as if she wants her evangelical tradition to step outside its usual framework of thinking, but is ultimately unwilling to live with some of the uncertainties this entails.

So I was constantly aware of the book this might have been, but isn't: namely, a genuinely original (and much-needed) evangelical contribution to the debate about feminism. The author recalls to evangelicals their history of fighting social oppression; throughout, her case for feminism rests on an appeal to the Christian conscience in the face of continuing injustice. But passion, whether of intellectual discovery or of political commitment, is somehow lacking. The fascinating historical section on the Bible-based feminism of the 19th-century temperance league (male alcoholism was blamed for domestic violence against women) remains only an excursus. Nor, though the author pleads convincingly for less dogmatism concerning the interpretation of "subordinationist" biblical texts, is there much theological freshness.

If Elaine Storkey had risked engaging in the potentially explosive – and personally demanding – encounter between a robust evangelical faith and a strong feminist commitment (rather than simply trying to moderate both approaches) the resulting insights could have been exciting. She is clearly a writer capable of imaginative and forceful reasoning; it is a pity that she has settled instead for a tone of sweet reasonableness which I suspect will persuade neither feminists nor evangelicals.

Janet Morley

Mount Fuji and Mount Sinai

Kosuke Koyama. S.C.M. Press, 1984. Pp. 273. £7.95.

No Other Name?

Paul F. Knitter. S.C.M. Press, 1985. Pp. 288. £9.50.

Professor Koyama, who now teaches Ecumenics and World Christianity at Union Theological Seminary, New York, has, so he claims, spent his life poised between Mount Fuji and Mount Sinai: which is to say, between his country, Japan's, assimilation of the religious traditions of Shintoism, Confucianism, and (most influential of all) Mahayana Buddhism; and the Judaeo-Christian traditions of Mount Sinai into which his paternal grandfather was baptised.

Koyama was himself baptised in 1942 into the religion of his country's then enemy. His book is a personal and moving account of his theological pilgrimage since then, somewhat loosely described under four biblical themes: "All its cities were laid in ruins before the Lord, before his fierce anger" (Jer. 4.26); "My help comes from the Lord who made heaven and earth" (Ps. 121.2); "You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain" (Ex. 20.7); and "My mind is turning over in me. My emotions are agitated all together" (Hos. 11.8). Koyama claims that these themes are deeply "disturbing" to the spiritual orientation of the East, but the traumatic events of 1945 have led him to ponder them. His dialogue, as a son of Mount Fuji, with the traditions of Mount Sinai has been "a strange and moving experience".

That experience has also been a complex one. East and West have mingled uneasily in modern Japan. In particular, her defeat in war in 1945 was the result of a perverted spirituality which had exalted the Emperor as an idol. Yet that spirituality is curiously western rather than eastern.

Complex, too, is the question of truth in the dialogue between Mount Sinai and Mount Fuji. It is not a simple matter of the one being true and the second false. For example, in an excellent chapter on Ecclesiastes (19), Koyama asserts that the Buddha and Paul make more sense of how the world really is than does the Preacher's nihilism, his exhortation to eat, drink and be merry. For the Buddha, the finality of death can be challenged by eradicating self and selfishness. For Paul, nature's futility is not hopeless in the Preacher's sense of vanity: it brings the fulfilment of a promise of liberty for the whole created order. To be sure, the Buddha and Paul are far apart, but not so far as is either from the Preacher.

Koyama believes that the broken, crucified Christ is the hope of the world. From his brokenness comes the love of God, his passionate, agitated involvement with creation, a theme which eastern religion needs to hear.

His book is dedicated to the memory of Herbert Brand, "an English gentleman, through whose preaching, in broken Japanese, my grandfather was converted to Jesus Christ". Koyama's grandfather was impressed that in no way did Brand's preaching make derogatory comments about Buddhism or Japanese culture. It is not the least of the merits of Koyama's book that it breathes the spirit of Brand.

The great merit of Professor Koyama's work is not its structural coherence (indeed, he is a rather rambling writer) but the personal experience it enshrines. *No Other Name*, on the other hand, could have been written by somebody who has never met a person of another Faith, except for its assurance that the author has done so. No doubt its origins as lectures given at Xavier University, Cincinnati, where Knitter is a professor of Theology explain its donnish, textbook, impersonal "feel". Yet Knitter's is a very fine book of its kind, a far better achievement than Alan Race's recent and slightly overrated *Christians and Religious Pluralism*, to which Knitter pays generous tribute. Race's book explores something of the same ground as does Knitter, but his three categories of understanding (exclusiveness, inclusiveness and pluralism) form a much too simple and simplistic means of analysing Christian assessments of other faiths.

Knitter's is a much more subtle book. Its content is explained by its sub-title, "A Critical Survey of Christian Attitudes Toward the World Religions". The introductory chapter argues that religious pluralism, though a newly experienced reality for many (western) people today, seems to be the way things really are. In Part I, three chapters describe popular attitudes toward religious pluralism: that all are relatively true; that all are essentially the same; that all have a common psychic origin. Part II records Christian attitudes toward religious pluralism: the conservative Evangelical model that there is one true religion; the mainline Protestant model that salvation is only in Christ; the Catholic model that there are many ways but only one norm; the theocentric model that there are many ways to the centre. In the two chapters which constitute Part III, Professor Knitter suggests his version of a more authentic dialogue than heretofore.

Old hands at inter-religious dialogue will be grateful for the clear presentation of material in Parts I and II, but will (or should!) be acquainted with the issues and authors mentioned and discussed. Part III will be the section to which they turn with most eagerness. The first chapter in that section explores the uniqueness of Jesus. The final chapter argues for doing before knowing in dialogue, and suggests that truth is not always *either-or* but sometimes *both-and*. This chapter also touches on the need for a global theology. Knitter draws on many others to make his points - clearly, the shadow of Cantwell Smith crosses the last chapter, but his is only one influence. To be honest, these last two chapters are not particularly new in their approach; Part III is something of a disappointment.

But the virtues of Parts I and II are considerable. Knitter is a superb marshaller of information and communicator, and his work is warmly recommendable to students and to teachers. Pastors who work among Christians in multi-Faith areas could find it to be an invaluable basis for a discussion group which deals seriously with the ways of God in the world of today.

Martin Forward

The Cross against the Bomb

Robin Gill. Epworth. £2.50.

When the current epidemic of crypto-pacifism was at its height, particularly in church circles, *The Cross and the Bomb* offered an enema to the body politic. A group of essayists, including three from King's College, London, Ulrich Simon, Keith Ward and myself, set out to give a reasoned, moral and Christian defence of a policy of nuclear deterrence. *The Cross against the Bomb* by Robin Gill of Edinburgh University is a riposte to the earlier book, whose claims he finds "deeply disturbing".

The thought of what nuclear weapons are capable of doing to our fellow human beings is indeed disturbing. The temptation, for all of us, is to want to have nothing at all to do with them or their justification. The problem is that we live in a world in which such weapons are not the only evil. First, it is of the very nature of major states to want to expand their power and influence. Secondly, totalitarian Communism is a highly destructive system, inimical to the human spirit, and its stated aim, to be achieved by peaceful means if at all possible, is still world-wide domination. Unfortunately this book, like many others, does not convey the impression that more than one evil, that of nuclear weapons, is really taken into account. But the principle of proportion, which is fundamental to Just War theory, is a relationship between two terms. We live in a world in which the possibility of a new Hitler or Stalin arising cannot be ruled out. Each of them was responsible for the millions of dead that would be caused by a major nuclear strike. For all the apparent benignity of Reagan and Gorbachov this kind of fact must not be allowed to slip out of sight, particularly when the evil of nuclear weapons is being discussed.

Robin Gill considers a number of claims but at their heart is the assertion that not all uses of nuclear weapons would inevitably violate the principles of the Just War tradition. Everyone agrees, certainly all the contributors to *The Cross and the Bomb*, that a major nuclear exchange would be the worst conceivable evil and that nothing could justify it. The question is therefore whether a limited use would automatically and inevitably escalate into use which would contravene the Just War principles of discrimination and proportion. Robin Gill argues that it would. This is not, however, the view of many strategists. More crucial, from a moral point of view, could it ever be right to allow the fear of escalation to inhibit all resistance to perceived aggression? This would be a disastrous and deeply immoral message to convey, for it would allow the most ruthless states to think that if only they raised the stakes high enough they could obtain what they wanted.

There could be more agreement between the contributors to *The Cross and the Bomb* and Robin Gill than the latter perhaps allows. But it would involve Robin Gill coming clean at a number of points where at the moment there is a blurring. For example, it would be highly desirable (so many of us think) to make NATO less dependent on an early use of nuclear weapons. This could be done by having a more adequate conventional capability, which, for the first time, is possible without a vast increase of manpower. Robin Gill is, however, unwilling to pay for the price of an adequate conventional force and adds "as human ingenuity devises ever more destructive conventional weapons their moral justifiability should also be questioned". The point about E.T. (Emerging Technology) however is not that it is more destructive but that it is more accurate. Small conventional warheads can home-in on individual tanks or obliterate runways at regular intervals. The new precision-guided weapons obviate the necessity of a vast explosion over a wide area.

Robin Gill is indignant at the charge that "Nuclear Pacifism", of which he is an exponent, is really just a form of pacifism. But there is a crucial similarity between the two. Nuclear pacifism entails the inevitable conclusion that beyond a certain point – the nuclear threshold – a determined enough adversary would not be resisted by weapons that matched his own. Pacifists draw the line at all weapons, nuclear pacifists at nuclear weapons, but in both cases an enemy knows, and knows in advance, that beyond that line he can make his adversary cave in and capitulate.

Richard Harries

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Grace Jantzen is lecturer in the Philosophy of Religion at King's College, and one of the editors of the *King's Theological Review*.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Anglican Cycle of Prayer 1986. C.I.O. Pp. 129. £2.20.

P. Avis *Ecumenical Theology and the Elusiveness of Doctrine*. S.P.C.K. Pp. xv + 142. £5.95.

E. Barker *The Making of a Moonie. Choice or Brainwashing?* Basil Blackwell. Pp. ix + 305. £5.95 (paperback).

R. Beckwith *The Old Testament Canon of the New Testament Church*. S.P.C.K. Pp. xiii + 528. £35.00.

J. H. Charlesworth *Old Testament Pseudepigrapha and the New Testament*. S.N.T.S. Monograph Series, C.U.P. Pp. xxiv + 213. £19.50.

B. S. Childs *Old Testament Theology in a Canonical Context*. S.C.M. Press. Pp. xvi + 255. £10.00.

R. E. Creel *Divine Impassibility. An Essay in Philosophical Theology*. C.U.P. Pp. xi + 238. £25.00.

D. H. van Daalen *A Guide to the Revelation*. S.P.C.K. Pp. x + 205. £5.95.

M. C. Felderhof (ed.) *Religious Education in a Pluralistic Society*. Hodder and Stoughton. Pp. ix + 148. £5.95.

J. Gernet *China and the Christian Impact*. C.U.P. Pp. 310. £12.50.

R. Gill *A Textbook of Christian Ethics*. T. and T. Clark. Pp. xiii + 571.

R. Hanson *Studies in Christian Antiquity*. T. and T. Clark. Pp. ix + 344. £16.95.

J. M. Hull *What Prevents Christian Adults from Learning?* S.C.M. Pp. xii + 243. £6.95.

M. de Jonge (ed.) *Outside the Old Testament*. Cambridge Commentaries on Writings of the Jewish and Christian World 200 B.C. to A.D. 200. C.U.P. Pp. xv + 263. £11.95.

G. Karakunnel *The Christian Vision of Man*. Asian Trading Corporation, Bangalore. Pp. xviii + 285.

S. N. C. Lieu *Manichaeism in the Later Roman Empire and Medieval China. A Historical Survey*. Manchester University Press. Pp. xviii + 360. £35.00.

A. L. Loades *Kant and Job's Comforters*. Avero. Pp. vi + 174.

J. Lochman *The Faith We Confess. An Ecumenical Dogmatics*. T. and T. Clark. Pp. xiv + 274. £14.95.

D. Lyon *The Steeple's Shadow*. S.P.C.K. Pp. x + 165. £3.95.

R. Manwaring *From Controversy to Co-Existence. Evangelicals in the Church of England 1914-1980*. C.U.P. Pp. xi + 227. £19.50.

J. Moltmann *God in Creation. An Ecological Doctrine of Creation*. S.C.M. Pp. xvi + 365. £10.00.

H. P. Nebelsick *Circles of God. Theology and Science from the Greeks to Copernicus*. Scottish Academic Press. Pp. xxviii + 284. £16.00.

R. Page *Ambiguity and the Presence of God*. S.C.M. Press. Pp. ix + 230. £10.50.

W. Pannenberg *Anthropology in Theological Perspective*. T. and T. Clark. Pp. 552. £24.95.

J. Partain and R. Deutsch *A Guide to Isaiah 1-39*. S.P.C.K. Pp. x + 262. £5.95.

J. Polkinghorne *One World. The Interaction of Science and Theology*. S.P.C.K. Pp. xiii + 114. £4.50.

K. Rahner *I Remember*. S.C.M. Press. Pp. 111. £5.95.

E. Rivkin *What Crucified Jesus?* S.C.M. Press. Pp. xii + 79. £3.95.

J. Sacks *Wealth and Poverty. A Jewish Analysis*. Social Affairs Unit. Pp. 23.

N. Smart *et al* (ed.) *Nineteenth Century Religious Thought in the West*, Vol. III. C.U.P. Pp. ix + 342. £30.00.

E. Storkey *What's Right with Feminism*. S.P.C.K. Pp. vi + 186. £3.95.

T. F. Torrance *Reality and Scientific Theology*. Scottish Academic Press. Pp. xvi + 206. £10.00.

G. S. Wakefield *The Liturgy of St. John*. Epworth. Pp. ix + 102. £3.95.

A. Walker *Restoring the Kingdom. The Radical Christianity of the House Church Movement*. Hodder and Stoughton. Pp. 303. £5.95.

T. Walter *All You Love is Need*. S.P.C.K. Pp. xv + 173. £3.95.

J. B. Webster *Eberhard Jüngel. An Introduction to his Theology*. C.U.P. Pp. viii + 182. £20.00.

V. White *The Fall of a Sparrow. A Concept of Special Divine Action*. Paternoster. Pp. 208. £7.50.

A. Wilkinson *Dissent or Conform? War, Peace and the English Churches 1900-1945*. S.C.M. Press. Pp. xvii + 361. £10.50.

J. D. Zizioulas *Being as Communion*. D.L.T. Pp. 269. £9.95.