KING'S
Theological Review

PARADOX AND CHRISTOLOGY

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It is inevitable that the category of 'paradox', understood as *apparent* contradiction', should be applied to the doctrine of the person of Christ.[1] And it is understandable that theologians should from time to time invoke the wave-particle duality of the physicist's understanding of light and the electron in order to defend the use of paradoxical language in Christian theology. In this paper I shall attempt to indicate some of the limitations of such an appeal.

I

One of the most interesting studies of the relevance of the wave-particle paradox in theology is to be found in W. H. Austin's *Waves, Particles, and Paradoxes*.[2] Austin surveys the evidence for both the particulate and the wave character of light and electrons, and discusses Neils Bohr's complementarist interpretation of the dualities of quantum theory. He concludes by proposing 'a definition of complementarity'

> according to which it is a relation between two *models* used in an inquiry of some kind, e.g. an attempt at interpretation of a range of phenomena. Two models will be said to be complementary if both are used in the inquiry but the need to use both imposes restrictions on the freedom and precision with which each can be used. For example, if we are to use both wave and particle models for the electron without falling into outright contradiction, we must use wave packets as approximations to particles, and therefore . . . cannot handle the particle model in all the accustomed ways. We cannot, in particular, expect to attribute exact position or exact momentum to the particle, and the more nearly exact we make one the less exact the other can be[3] (p. 30).

Austin notes that many physicists reject Bohr's 'Copenhagen Interpretation' of the quantum theory, arguing for various reasons that a complementarist interpretation is unnecessary – for the paradoxes of physics are resolvable (pp. 31-36). Nevertheless he believes that complementarist interpretations of paradox might be useful in theology. This is particularly the case where alternative ways of treating theological paradoxes can be shown to be inadequate.

These 'standard alternative approaches to the interpretation of theological paradoxes' (p. 80) are worth considering further. They may be classified as follows:
(1) The *'paradox-minimizing approach'*. This 'dissolution' of paradox attempts to remove the appearance of contradiction. Austin distinguishes two techniques:
(a) 'One way is to replace the paradox . . . with a set of statements of equivalent meaning in which no paradox occurs' (p. 81) e.g. by discerning a key term that is being used in different senses; (b) the other way is by 'exhibiting formal-logical representations of the paradoxical statements as theorems within consistent formal systems' (*ibid.*), a technique that Austin describes as a 'promising tool' (p. 41).
(2) Two other approaches, however, treat *paradox as permanent and necessary* in theology, but are incompatible with a complementarist interpretation of paradox:
(a) the 'poetic interpretation':
> Here the paradoxes of religious discourse (many, if

not all of them) are taken to be like the paradoxes of poetry in that they convey insights through the clash of images, insights which could not be communicated in any other way . . . On this interpretation, poets and religious writers . . . use words and images in ways and for purposes radically unlike those of everyday discourse and scientific enquiry. The poetic interpretation is thus incompatible with a complementarist interpretation of religious paradoxes (p. 81).

A variant of this is the suggestion that 'theology consists of a poetic core, surrounded by a body of prose commentary' (p. 82).
(b) the 'sui generis interpretation' argues that all theological paradoxes reflect the master paradox of the religious ultimate claiming both that some predicates can be applied to the religious ultimate and that no predicates are applicable to it (p. 45; Austin calls this the 'affirmation-negation paradox').

In his treatment of the Christological paradox, Austin argues that 'none of the standard "alternative approaches" seem very successful':
> It is too specifically devoted to saying something unique about Christ to be a simple instantiation of the paradox of the religious ultimate. It does not seem to be a poetic paradox, though poetic use is sometimes made of it, for it originates in efforts to define what man ought to say of Christ, rather than in efforts to evoke insight through the interplay of clashing images. It has resisted dissolution, and indeed the Chalcedonian definition effectively blocks all the more obvious distinctions that might be invoked for this purpose (p. 85).

Austin attempts a complementarist interpretation of Christology. He notes first of all that it is inappropriate to treat *God* and *man* as the complementary models, for 'this seems to suggest that "Christ" is a being who is neither God nor man . . . And this runs counter to the insistence that he is *truly* God and *truly* man' (p. 86). Further, the doctrine of the person of Christ is often said to improve our conceptions of God and man and this 'suggests that they are not being used as models in the inquiry in the same sense that waves and particles are used as models in physical inquiry. For in the latter the conceptions of waves and particles employed do not change . . .' (p. 89). Instead Austin suggests that the dominant Christological models[4] of 'Logos' and 'Messiah' might be treated complementarily, with the Chalcedonian definition laying down ground rules for the use of each model, 'so that it would not be developed in such a way as to preclude use of the other' (*ibid.*). In an interesting analysis Austin argues further that,
> We cannot . . . see Chalcedon as the direct confrontation of a strand of thought dominated by the Logos model and another strand dominated by the Messiah model. If there were such strands, they had been interwoven – in more than one way – well before Chalcedon, and the confrontation there was between different ways of interweaving the strands (p. 92).

II

It is interesting to compare Austin's analysis with that of Ian Ramsey. Ramsey distinguishes between 'avoidable' and 'unavoidable' paradoxes. Avoidable paradox 'spotlights some confusion or other' ('Paradox in Religion',[5] p. 196) that can be cleared up either by retracing our argument to expose unilluminating category mistakes ('retrospectively

negative paradoxes') or by overcoming the paradox in a more comprehensive hypothesis ('subsequently significant paradoxes'). Interestingly enough, it is to this latter category that Ramsey assigns both the wave-particle paradox and the Christological paradox.[6] Unlike Austin, then, Ramsey believes that the complementarist paradoxes are avoidable and resolvable.[7]

Ramsey claims, however, that there are unavoidable religious paradoxes – e.g. 'God is impassible yet loving . . . both transcendent and immanent' – that are permanent and irreducible. They arise in our attempts 'to describe what is both "seen and unseen" in language primarily suited to observables' (*ibid.*, p. 203). Yet Ramsey regards such paradoxes as 'logically explorable', for 'their structure can be investigated and explored' (p. 218). According to Ramsey, three techniques are useful here:
(1) Illumination may come from analysing the logic of 'I' which, like 'God', 'gives rise to unavoidable paradox in virtue of having to be associated with verifiable descriptions, yet distinguished from any or all of them' (p. 215[8]). This is similar to Austin's 'sui generis interpretation'.
(2) Another technique rests on the evocative function of religious discourse. Paradoxes are similar to the rest of religious language in that they are mainly rendered intelligible by the unveiling of the religious disclosures (revelations made known in moments of discernment or intuition) that lie behind them:
> Any unavoidable religious paradox will be defensible only in so far as it can be so structured as to be evocative of a disclosure situation comprising 'what is seen and more' (p. 216[9]).
In fact it would appear that technique (1) is to be justified in terms of (2), for I and God are only known in disclosure situations. Thus Ramsey's claim here is that paradox may be justified and explored by tracking it back to the original disclosure from which it arises. Here, as elsewhere, Ramsey concentrates on the evocative function of religious language at the expense of its representative, analogical use. He believes that religious paradox only arises when people mistakenly interpret the different models in multi-model theological discourse as 'picturing models' which all serve as literal descriptions of the same entity:[10]
Question: How can God be both a 'Father' and a 'Rock'? Clearly he cannot if both words are applied literally to God. Ramsey's answer to the question (*Answer 1*) is that God is both 'Father' and 'Rock' in the sense that the disclosure of God may be evoked by father-language and by rock-language. Such a theological paradox dissolves, Ramsey claims, when both kinds of language are 'harmonised by being tracked back to the same kind of situation' ('Paradox in Religion', 208), when we read theology 'backwards, back into the disclosure of God'.[11] The paradox of God's omnipotence and our free-will is similarly resolved in so far as we come to know the omnipotent God in a disclosure (reached by the qualification of 'powerful' by 'all') which is at the same time a self-disclosure in which we realise our freedom.[12] Similarly, God can be both 'loving' and 'impassible' for '*"God is impassible"* . . . is to be understood by its ability to evoke in terms of "passibility" stories . . . the characteristic theological situation' and *'God is loving'* (or rather, 'God is infinitely loving') has a similar evocative function. Thus 'Each assertion evokes the suitably odd situation' and 'each claims an odd positioning for the word "God"'.[13]

But Answer 1, of course, is only half the story. We must also offer *Answer 2*: that both 'Father' and 'Rock' may be used to represent God if they are used analogically, and if the analogical development of each model is such that it becomes compatible with the analogy derived from the other. Thus God is 'father-like' in the sense that he loves, cares and provides; he is also 'rock-like' in the sense that he is dependable, permanent and a source of 'shade' and 'rest'. God is not in every respect like a human father or a rock. This answer is entirely in line with Ramsey's own view of the representative function of models; he neglects to provide it himself only because he has become bemused by the evocative function of religious models.[14]
(3) Ramsey also invokes the formal function[15] of religious language in the exploration of religious paradoxes. For religious language often provides rules for consistent talking about God, rather than representative ('descriptive') talk concerning him. Ramsey analyses many religious doctrines as providing formal language rules (e.g. the doctrine of *communicatio idiomatum* in Christology,[16] and the concept of *perichoresis* in the doctrine of the Trinity[17]), and views the Creeds as essentially 'rules to guide all subsequent discourse'.[18] Thus the Christological paradox may be resolved by being treated in the formal mode:
> while words about 'human nature' and 'God' are logically diverse, yet they have to be mixed to talk about Jesus Christ

('Paradox in Religion', p. 200). Although this example lies in the category of avoidable paradox, Ramsey also adopts the formal mode analysis in his discussion of many of God's attributes (which give rise to unavoidable paradoxes).[19]

Just as the evocative analysis of religious language requires supplementing by a consideration of its representative function, so also does this formal analysis. For even rules need some justification, unless they are adopted entirely arbitrarily. And surely the ultimate justification of doctrinal rules is that they guide us in the production of a consistent systematic theology *which does in fact* adequately represent the nature and activity of God. Ramsey presumably would accept this point; but it can be taken further. For Ramsey does not provide us with any convincing examples of 'rules' which cannot be treated – if properly understood as qualified, analogical language – as 'representations' in some sense or another. Thus, for example, we have a rule instructing us to unite the 'logical strands' of Father-, Son-, and Spirit-language when constructing our doctrine of God. But the justification for this rule is that a Trinitarian doctrine of God more adequately represents his nature than any other account which might be proposed. And as the 'rule' comes to us couched in the material mode as a set of statements about God, rather than in imperative or formal-mode language, to treat it as a 'rule' is to move the doctrine of the Trinity one place further back. It is to convert it from a doctrine about God into a set of rules for constructing the doctrine of God. But our doctrine of God must itself be assessed in the material mode in terms of its adequacy as a representation of God. So this manoeuvre gains nothing in the long run, except in so far as it reminds us once again of the figurative nature of much religious language.

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I have argued, then, that Ramsey's techniques for exploring paradox need to be supplemented by a consideration of the representative function of the models employed in the paradox, and thus by an interpretation of paradox in terms of analogical predication.[20] And if we attempt – as I believe theologians must – to specify such religious analogies and provide a more determinate 'partial interpretation' of them,[21] then we are well on the way to resolving many of the paradoxes of religion,[22] however 'irreducible' they may seem at first sight.

III

We are now in a position to make a number of points relevant to the issue of paradox in theology.
(1) Ramsey, unlike Austin, regards the wave-particle and Christological paradoxes as avoidable: such complementary paradoxes can be largely resolved. Ian Barbour holds a similar view with regard to the wave-particle duality, and it is one which theologians ought to take note of:

> Complementarity provides *no justification for an uncritical acceptance of dichotomies*. It cannot be used to avoid dealing with inconsistencies or to veto the search for unity. The 'paradoxical' element in the wave-particle duality should not be over-emphasized. We do not say that an electron is both a wave and a particle, but that it exhibits wave-like and particle-like behaviour; moreover we do have a unified mathematical formalism which provides at least probabilistic predictions. And . . . we cannot rule out in advance the search for new unifying models (such as David Bohm's postulation of sub-atomic causal mechanisms), even though previous attempts have not yielded any new theories in better agreement with the data than quantum theory. Coherence remains an important ideal and criterion in all reflective enquiry.[23]

(2) Even if the Christological paradox is regarded as 'unavoidable' and 'irreducible', it might still be treated – again using Ramsey's terminology – as 'explorable'. I have argued that Ramsey's analysis and justification of unavoidable paradox solely in terms of the evocative and formal functions of religious language is inadequate. We need to refer to its representative function as well. *In Waves, Particles, and Paradoxes*, Austin suggests a formal approach to the Christological paradox (p. 89). Bohr's own neo-Kantian epistemology expresses a scepticism[24] with regard to the possibility of our knowing the world in itself that tends to move in the same direction. Richard Swinburne writes:

> According to the Copenhagen Interpretation Quantum Theory is just a predicting device, and does not tell us about what the world is like. It cannot do so – because if it did it would have so say either (a) light is sometimes particles and sometimes a wave or (b) light is always particles and always a wave. But neither (a) nor (b) will do. (b) is self-contradictory – light either is or is not a material object. Yet it will not do to say (a), that the beam of light forced to show interference phenomena was a wave, and that forced to show the photoelectric effect was really a stream of particles. For all our evidence is that any one beam can be made to show either effect.[25]

Yet the majority of physicists – and many philosophers of science – still accept a realist, albeit a critical realist, epistemological position in opposition to such 'instrumentalism'.[26] They would agree with Barbour:

The complementarity of models, under these conditions, underscores *the inadequacy of literalism*. The use of one model limits the use of the other; they are not simply 'alternative models' having different domains or functions. They are symbolic representations of aspects of reality which cannot be consistently visualized in terms of analogies with everyday experience; they are only very indirectly related to observable phenomena. On the other hand, complementarity does not require us to treat models merely as useful fictions, or to accept a positivist interpretation. Complementarity when understood in this way is not inconsistent with critical realism.[27]

In both science and theology such a 'critical realism' is needed, for both scientific and theological models are analogical representations, rather than literal descriptions, of Reality.[28] Thus Swinburne comments;

> The alternative to the Copenhagen Interpretation is to say that light is both 'particles' and 'wave', only in extended senses of the terms which do not exclude each other. Light is a stream of 'particles', in a sense of 'particle' in which grains of sand and everything else which we would call 'particles' are particles, but in a sense in which some things which we would not call 'particles' are particles. Light is a 'wave', in the sense in which a water wave and everything else which we would call 'waves' are such, but in a sense in which some things which we would not call 'waves' are waves . . . With the new analogical senses of 'wave' and 'particle' is it coherent to suppose that light is both a stream of 'particles' and a 'wave'? I know of no straightforward proof that it is or that it is not. But there is clearly indirect evidence that there exist such objects and so that it is coherent to suppose that there are.[29]

(3) This brings me to a further point. Ronald Hepburn makes an important point about the use of paradoxical language in theology:

> Sceptics have wanted to say that the contradictions in accounts of God entail that there can *be* no God, just as the contradiction in a 'round square' entails that nothing can *be* a round square. But no one has suggested that because we were forced to use two irreconcilable explanatory models for light – that therefore there could be no such thing as *light*! But why should no one suggest this? Because 'light' is ostensively definable; because, that is to say, you can switch on a lamp in a dark room, and say '*That's* light'. You can draw someone's attention to an actual instance of what the word 'light' is used for. Paradox appears only when we attempt to gather up all we know about light, all the different, experimentally discovered features of its behaviour into one explanatory picture, and we find that two pictures, not one, emerge – a particle-picture and a wave-picture. But where a term receives an ostensive definition, our perplexity at its nature can never rises to such a pitch that we are forced to say, 'It is impossible that this should exist', no matter how unaccountable its behaviour.[30]

As is well known, Hepburn is critical of the sort of ostensive definition of God appealed to by encounter theologians. We do not necessarily need to go along with him in this criticism, but we should note that it is not *God*

who is being pointed to as the referent of the Christological paradox.[31] But who is being pointed to? Is it the *historical Jesus* whom we must understand by means of divine and human models (or Logos and Messiah models)? Or is it the *risen Christ* of (some Christians') religious experience? Many theologians would plump for the former, but we do seem to need to distinguish between Jesus-of-history-Christologies and Christ-of-faith-Christologies and make some attempt to relate them. The ostensive definition that allows us to use both divine and human language of Christ is certainly more problematic in the case of Christ-of-faith-Christologies. However, is not it in both cases the applicability of the models/language in the first place that should be questioned? There is surely a profound disanalogy between the wave-particle and the Christological examples. For Jesus does not seem to show any 'divine-behaviour' *that is incompatible with his 'human-behaviour'* (in the way that light shows 'wave-behaviour' that *does* seem to be incompatible with its 'particle-behaviour'). There does not seem to be anything paradoxical in a fully human, non-divine, being speaking and acting as Jesus did.[32] The soteriological dimension of the work of Christ can be explained by means of an exemplarist revelational analysis that is fully compatible with the view of Jesus as a man who was used by God as the medium of his revelation, and the mediator of his love to men. Such an analysis requires us to predicate no divine rôle of, or element in, Jesus *that is incompatible* with his humanity. In short, Christology need not be paradoxical.

(4) We should recall Austin's rejection of the use of 'God' and 'man' as models in his study of the Christological paradox. Now although 'Jesus is both God and man' is certainly paradoxical,[33] 'Jesus is both Logos and Messiah' is much less so – for it offers us much more scope for arguing about the meaning of the terms used. And some New Testament scholars would argue that the status of the 'Logos-model' in New Testament theology is such that it can be applied to the human Jesus without paradox.[34] The doctrinal formulation 'Jesus Christ is the Word of God incarnate'[35] seems to express this Logos/Messiah 'complementarity' and is at the very least less paradoxical[36] than the bald assertion that 'Jesus is God'. For, *prima facie*, 'the *Word of* God *incarnate*' does seem to qualify the term God in two ways. Those ways need to be spelled out, and they may be spelled out so as to make the statement non-paradoxical. Of course the Chalcedonian phrase 'truly God and truly man' still glosses the assertion, but that phrase itself demands interpretation – which could diminish its paradoxical nature.[37]

(5) My final point, however, is that what Austin calls the 'poetic interpretation' seems to me to be the most fruitful way of analysing religious paradox. Austin argues that 'the claim that all cognitively significant religious discourse is poetic in character is, on the face of it, highly implausible' (*Waves, Particles, and Paradoxes*, p. 82). This is true. The Athanasian creed, for example, is not a poem. But that does not prevent us from arguing that the real home of the paradoxes of the faith is religion proper, rather than theology. Theology is the second-order interpretative analysis that should be striving to go beyond, to articulate and expound, the first-order language of religious hymns, prayers, confessions and exhortations. And it is this *religious* language that is often poetic, metaphorical, mythological and paradoxical. The 'incarnation', then, should not be treated as a doctrine showing the paradox of complementarity. Rather it should be regarded as a mythological, paradoxical story. It is a story of considerable religious

worth as a first-order expression of the value to be placed on the person of Jesus[38], and perhaps as having in addition the 'engineering function'[39] of evoking an experience of the presence and activity of God 'in' and 'through' Jesus. But 'the *doctrine(s)* of the incarnation' is (are) the attempt(s) of theologians to explain and understand such a story; to go beyond the paradox and provide a coherent, consistent and plausible analysis of the 'presence' of God 'in' Christ. *Religion* would do well to keep its Christological paradox[40] – and maintain its sharpness well honed. Provided, that is, that the religious paradox 'works'. But paradoxes do not 'work' in the very different language game of *theology*. What is needed in theology is some explanation, understanding and transcending of paradox by means of models and analogies, so as to articulate as clearly as possible the truth about him who is the truth.

1. Cf., e.g., B. Hebblethwaite in M. Goulder (ed.), *Incarnation and Myth*, SCM (1979), p. 61, and C. F. D. Moule, 'The Manhood of Jesus in the New Testament', in S. W. Sykes & J. P. Clayton (eds.), *Christ, Faith and History*, CUP (1972).

2. *Rice University Studies*, 53, 2 (Spring, 1967).

3. i.e. the Heisenberg uncertainty principle.

4. Cf. I. T. Ramsey, *Models and Mystery*, OUP (1964), p. 14. For Ramsey's account of 'dominant models' cf. 'Talking about God . . .' in F. W. Dillistone (ed.), *Myth and Symbol*, SPCK (1966), p. 90; *Christian Discourse*, OUP (1965), pp. 20, 58; 'Theological Literacy', *Chicago Theological Seminary Register* LIII, 5 (1963), p. 28.

5. *The Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supp. Vol. XXXIII (1959).

6. *ibid.*, pp. 199ff; cf. J. H. Gill, *Ian Ramsey*, Allen & Unwin (1976), p. 99. *Pace* M. Goulder, 'Paradox and Mystification', in *Incarnation and Myth*, p. 59 n. 3 – although Ramsey's qualification in 'Paradox in Religion' p. 201 should be noted.

7. 'What theologians have to do . . . is something like what Bohm has done . . . in the wave-particle case by giving a harmonious mathematical treatment to what seems to be two disparate approaches . . . a task which at least in principle is only like discovering (say) that discourse both about straight lines and ellipses can be harmonised within discourse about a cone' (I. T. Ramsey, *Mind*, LXXII, 286, 1963, p. 298). David Bohm is a physicist who adopts a non-complementarist treatment of the wave-particle paradox (cf. Austin, *op.cit.*, pp. 32f.).

8. Cf. *Religious Language*, SCM (1957), pp. 88f; 'The Paradox of Omnipotence', *Mind*, LXV, 258 (1956), p. 265.

9. Cf. *Freedom and Immortality*, SCM (1960), p. 53.

10. Cf. 'The Paradox of Omnipotence', *passim*.

11. 'Hell' p. 221, in G. N. A. Vesey (ed.), *Talk of God*, Macmillan (1969). The evocative function of religious language is analysed most fully in *Religious Language*.

12. *Freedom and Immortality*, pp. 59f.

13. *Religious Language*, p. 89; cf. 'Paradox in Religion', pp. 207ff.

14. Cf. W. H. Austin, 'Models, Mystery and Paradox in Ian Ramsey', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, VII, 1 (1968), p. 43. For Ramsey's account of the representative function of religious models see 'Letter to the Editor', *Theology*, LXXIV, 609 (1971), p. 126. According to Ramsey, qualified-models are 'appropriate currency' for our articulations about what is disclosed in a religious disclosure (cf. *Religious Language*, p. 92), they serve as theological 'approximations' in our attempts to represent God in human language (cf. *Christian Discourse*, pp. 70f; *Models for Divine Activity*, SCM [1973], p. 23).

15. Sentences about words are said to be in the 'formal mode', while sentences about entities and events are in the 'material mode'.

16. Cf. 'Logical Empiricism and Patristics', *Studia Patristica*, 5, 111 (1962), p. 545.

17. Cf. *Models for Divine Activity*, p. 46.

18. On *being Sure in Religion*, Athlone (1963), p. 87; cf. *ibid.*, pp. 52ff.

19. Cf. e.g., 'A Personal God', p. 70, in F. G. Healey (ed.), *Prospect for Theology*, Nisbet (1966).

20. Cf. *Religious Language*, p. 185; V. Mehta, *The New Theologian*, Weidenfeld & Nicholson (1966), p. 100.

21. E. R. MacCormac, 'Scientific and Religious Metaphors', *Religious Studies*, 11, 4 (1975), p. 405; cf. P. C. Hayner, 'Analogical Predication', *The Journal of Philosophy*, LV, 20 (1958), p. 861.

22. Cf. W. H. Austin, *Waves, Particles and Paradoxes*, pp. 47f.

23. I. G. Barbour, *Myths, Models and Paradigms*, SCM (1974), p. 77; cf. *ibid.* p. 91.

24. Cf. I. G. Barbour, *Issues in Science and Religion*, SCM (1966), pp. 293f.

25. *The Coherence of Theism*, OUP (1977), pp. 66f. Agnosticism about the ontological status of scientific theoretical entities can lead to a non-realist position that can either take the form – as here – of 'instrumentalism' (which regards scientific theories not as statements about theoretical entities but as instruments – e.g. rules of inference – for predicting observable phenomena) or be expressed in the related, but more explicitly positivist, account of 'descriptivism' or 'reductionism' (in which the sentences of a scientific theory are treated as statements referring to observable rather than unobservable entities). Cf. A. M. Quinton, *The Nature of Things*, RKP (1973) pp. 288f; E. Nagel, *The Structure of Science*, RKP (1961), pp. 118ff.; I. G. Barbour, *Issues in Science and Religion*, ch. 6 and p. 303.

26. Cf. the discussions in Nagel pp. 137ff., 145f.; Barbour, *Issues* ... , p. 166; R. Harré, *The Philosophies of Science*, OUP (1972), ch. 3; G. Maxwell, 'The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities', in H. Feigl and G. Maxwell (eds.), *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Sciences*, Vol. III, Univ. Minnesota Press (1962); K. R. Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, RKP (1972), pp. 111ff.; M. Hesse, *Science and the Human Imagination*, SCM (1954), pp. 150f. Cf. also a later book by W. H. Austin; *The Relevance of Natural Science to Theology*, Macmillan (1976), ch. 2.

27. *Myths, Models and Paradigms*, p. 78; cf. *Issues in Science and Religion* p. 161.

28. Cf. I. G. Barbour, *Myths, Models and Paradigms*, pp. 48, 50, 69 and *Issues* ..., *pp. 172, 216ff.; F. Ferré*, 'Mapping the Logic of Models in Science and Theology', in D. M. High (ed.), *New Essays in Religious Language*, OUP (1969), pp. 74ff. and 'Metaphors, Models and Religion', *Soundings*, LI (1968), p. 344. I would argue that such a critical realism is espoused by Ian Ramsey also, although his treatment of language as formal mode discourse often obscures this. Cf. *Models and Mystery*, OUP (1964), pp. 20f; 'Models and Mystery' *Theoria to Theory*, I, 3 (1967), p. 268 etc.

29. *op.cit.* pp.67f. Cf. Barbour, *Issues* ... ,pp. 293f.

30. *Christianity and Paradox*, Watts (1958), p. 18; cf. *ibid.* p. 186.

31. Hepburn's discussion of the indirect ostensive definition of God through our pointing to Jesus (as God incarnate) is not really relevant to our discussion: *op.cit.*, ch. 5.

32. Cf. D. Cupitt, *The Debate about Christ*, SCM (1979), ch. 6.

33. If not a straight contradiction: cf. J. H. Hick, *God and the Universe of Faiths*, Macmillan (1973), pp. 170f.; *The Myth of God Incarnate*, SCM (1977), p. 178; 'Letter to the Editor: Incarnation', *Theology*, LXXX, 675 (1977), p.204.

34. This is how I would interpret C. H. Dodd, *The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel*, CUP (1953), pp. 280ff. Cf. also G. B. Caird, 'The Development of the Doctrine of Christ in the New Testament', in N. Pittenger (ed.), *Christ for Us Today*, SCM (1968), pp. 76ff. The application of 'Son of God' language to the human Jesus seems even less paradoxical – cf. W. G. Kümmel, *Theology of the New Testament*, SCM (1974), p. 111; O. Cullmann, *Christology of the New Testament*, SCM (1963), p. 293.

35. Cf. N. Lash in *Incarnation and Myth*, p. 41.

36. It is patently *not* a self-contradiction.

37. Cf. J. H. Hick, *God and the Universe of Faiths*, Ch. 11. The problem is whether Hick's 'love of God incarnate' Christology adequately expresses the *totus deus* confession – cf. *op.cit.* p. 159. Cf. also D. Cupitt in *Incarnation and Myth*, pp. 47ff.

38. Cf. J. H. Hick, *The Myth of God Incarnate*, ch. 12; *Incarnation and Myth*, pp. 47ff.

39. Cf. N. Smart, 'Paradox in Religion', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary Vol. XXXIII (1959), p. 224.

40. On the value of paradox see J. Wisdom, *Paradox and Discovery*, Blackwell (1965), ch. XI.

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