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CHRISTIAN HOPE AND JESUS' DESPAIR

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> There the cross stands, thickly wreathed in roses.
> Who put the roses on the cross?
> The wreath grows bigger, so that on every side
> The harsh cross is surrounded by gentleness.[1]

One of the major preoccupations of Christianity in the two thousand years of its history has been the attempt to make the cross of Jesus respectable. We have draped it with roses, smoothed its wood, coated it with silver and gold. We have placed it between candles on an altar of white linen and surrounded it with incense and singing. We have even made the sign of the cross a blessing; it was a curse. It was a coarse wooden gibbet, where Jesus died between thieves, not candles, surrounded by executioners, not choir boys. And as he died, he had a cry of rejection and despair on his lips: "My God, why hast thou forsaken me?" If the cross of Jesus is the centre of Christianity, then the centre of Christianity is a place of despair, horror and absurdity, where hope is shattered and God is silent.

One of the great strengths of the theology of Jürgen Moltmann in his book *The Crucified God* is that he refuses to play down the awfulness of the cross; the only theology which he can find adequate will be "theology within earshot of the dying cry of Jesus."[2] And yet it is the very absurdity and god-forsakenness of Jesus' death which leads him to construct what he himself entitles a theology of hope.[3] I propose to examine how Jesus' cry of despair functions as a pivot point for Moltmann's understanding of Christian hope, paying special attention to Moltmann's effort to answer the "protest atheism" of Albert Camus. Camus was of course only one of many influences on Moltmann's thought; but the method with which he tried to reply to the existentialist tradition within which Camus stands[4] is instructive both for the insights into his theology which it offers and for the points at which (I shall argue) it ultimately breaks down.

For Camus, as for Nietzsche before him, atheism is not simply an intellectual rejection of God. It is not a question of examining arguments for the existence of God, finding them wanting, and, having drawn the atheistic conclusion, going on to other things. Rather, the absence of God is, paradoxically, a religious experience, an intense and life-transforming encounter with the existential aloneness and absurdity of a world on its own. Nietzsche tells the story of the madman entering the marketplace, wildly proclaiming the death of God, and the consequent lost plunging of the universe,

> Backward, sideward, forward in all directions. Is there any up or down left? Are we not straying through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space? . . . Do we not smell anything yet of God's decomposition? Gods too decompose. God is dead . . . and we have killed him . . . Who will wipe his blood of us? . . . Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must not we ourselves become gods simply to seem worthy of it?[5]

In less dramatic terms, part of what Nietzsche is doing here is pointing out the consequences of modern secularism; and in this, Camus would agree with him. We cannot adopt a naturalistic view of the universe without adopting the radical aloneness and lack of meaning which this entails: when a space shuttle encounters problems on the launch pad, we don't call a prayer meeting, we call the computer experts; but then we have no right to comfort outselves with pious thoughts of God and immortality and providence should the experts fail and the shuttle and its occupants go up in flames. In Camus' *The Outsider,* Meursault, in prison, is awaiting execution when the chaplain comes to see him, and asks him whether he had not ever wished there were an afterlife.

> Of course I had, I told him. Everybody has that wish at times. But that had no more importance than wishing to be rich, or to swim very fast, or to have a better-shaped mouth. It was in the same order of things . . . But, apparently, he had more to say on the subject of God. I went close up to him and made a last attempt to explain that I'd very little time left, and I wasn't going to waste it on God.[6]

It is facile to make a quick identification of Camus with Meursault;[7] nevertheless to this extent at least he is expressing Camus' opinion: if God is to be left out of life, then he must also be left out of death. And if, in life and death, man is on his own, then ultimately there can be no eternal significance to human existence. Although we are free to choose our actions and thus create our characters, in the end this freedom is a condemnation, since it leaves us finally with anxiety and despair yet without the consolation of any sort of ultimate meaningfulness.

These are familiar enough existentialist themes which Camus shares with others such as Nietzsche and Sartre. But Camus is doing far more than pointing out the dishonesty of living by secular categories and dying by religious ones, trying to shield ourselves from the loneliness and discomfort of the demise of God. The fundamental problem for Camus is the question of how to live, how to respond to this God-abandoned world in

> a period which, within fifty years, uproots, enslaves, or kills seventy million human beings,[8]

and it is this effort at response to appalling suffering which justifies calling Camus' atheism a religious experience. Nietzsche said, in the passage already quoted, that men will have to become gods now that God has died; but Camus puts it quite differently. In his novel *The Plague*, Dr. Rieux and Tarrou pause for a short rest in their exhausting efforts to save life.

> "It comes to this," Tarrou said almost casually, "what interests me is learning how to become a saint."
>
> "But you don't believe in God."
>
> "Exactly. Can one be a saint without God? — that's the problem, in fact the only problem, I'm up against today."
>
> ... "Perhaps," the doctor answered. "But you know, I feel more fellowship with the defeated than with saints. Heroism and sanctity don't really appeal to me, I imagine. What interests me is — being a man."
>
> "Yes, we're both after the same thing, but I'm less ambitious."[9]

In a world of plague and suffering and terror, becoming god-like would mean becoming like a being who sits aloof from all the tragedy; it would mean becoming inhuman. As the doctor says,

> Since the order of the world is shaped by death, mightn't it be better for God if we refuse to believe in Him, and struggle with all our might against death, without raising our eyes towards the heaven where he sits in silence?[10]

This is not a casual weighing up of the pros and cons of the likelihood of the existence of God. Indeed, in a sense it would be even more terrible if God **did** exist, for that would mean that God himself could look upon the suffering even of innocent children with an equanimity which would be moral enormity if found in man. The acceptance of such a God, not his rejection, would be blasphemy: in Stendahl's famous phrase, "The only excuse for God is that he does not exist."[11] Paneloux, the priest in the novel, has to come to terms with the fact that the God he serves is the God who permits the plague. At first, Paneloux preaches that this, too, is part of the plan of God, and seems to take a perverse sort of pleasure in the awfulness of it: it gives him a chance to enhance his reputation for powerful preaching. In a voice "vibrant with accusation" Paneloux says of the plague,

> It is a red spear, sternly pointing to the narrow path, the one way of salvation. And thus, my brothers, at last it has revealed to you, the divine compassion which has ordained good and evil in everything; wrath and pity; the plague and your salvation. This same pestilence which is slaying you works for your good and points your path.[12]

Camus here shows the superficiality and even the blasphemy of belief in a God who watches silently while he afflicts the town with horrible suffering. Paneloux says that "we should love what we cannot understand," but Dr. Rieux replies,

> No, Father. I've a very different idea of love. And until my dying day I shall refuse to love a scheme of things in which children are put to torture.[13]

Camus elsewhere comments on Ivan in Dostoevsky's *The Brothers Karamazov,* that here is an example of a man who, because he cannot acquiese to evil, cannot acquiese to a God who allows it.

> . . . even if God existed, even if the mystery cloaked a truth . . . Ivan would not admit that truth should be paid for by evil, suffering, and the death of innocents. Ivan incarnates the refusal of salvation. Faith leads to immortal life, but faith presumes the acceptance of the mystery and of evil and resignation to injustice. The man who is prevented by the suffering of children from accepting faith will certainly not accept eternal life.[14]

Yet although Camus rejects a Christianity which can accept without demur a pestilence that afflicts even the innocent, he also is at pains to show that this is not the only form of Christianity. Paneloux, though preaching about the plague as though it "works for good", is bigger than his sermon, and struggles against the suffering alongside the others. And having watched many, including innocent children, die horribly, he preaches another sermon, of stikingly different quality. Although he still affirms that ultimately we must simply have faith in God, that faith is no longer blind to evil but rather is the basis of working against it to the utmost. He says,

> The love of God is a hard love. It demands total self-surrender, disdain of our human personality. And yet it alone can reconcile us to suffering and the deaths of children, it alone can justify them, since we cannot understand them, and we can only make God's will ours.[15]

But "making God's will ours" is now no longer simply accepting the suffering of others; it is voluntarily identifying with that suffering, taking it upon ourselves to relieve others. Tarrou summarizes Paneloux' new position:

> When an innocent youth can have his eyes destroyed, a Christian should either lose his faith or consent to having his eyes destroyed. Paneloux declines to lose his faith, and he will go through with it to the end.[16]

So Camus is willing to accept that there is a Christianity less worthy of denunciation than the sort rejected by Ivan Karamazov, a Christianity which demands indentification with suffering not to accept it but as a means of struggle against it; in this he was influenced by the thought of Simone Weil whom he greatly respected.[17] Yet he remains unconvinced. He sees that there can be a faith in God that is not blasphemy. But he makes it clear that although he is willing to work beside Christians in the common struggle against evil, and valuing the common effort,

> working side by side for something that unites us — beyond blasphemy and prayers,[18]

this mutual effort should not be seen as a too-easy reconciliation. There are still deep differences between Camus and the Christian believer, differences which he himself insisted upon in a talk he gave at a Dominican Monastery:

> The other day at the Sorbonne, speaking to a Marxist lecturer, a Catholic priest said in public that he, too, was anti-clerical. Well, I don't like priests who are anti-clerical any more than philosophies that are ashamed of themselves. Hence I shall not try to pass myself off as a Christian in your presence. I share with you the same revulsion from evil. But I do not share your hope and I continue to struggle against this universe in which children suffer and die.[19]

In *The Plague*, Paneloux eventually falls ill in his efforts to help those who are suffering, but declines medical help for himself. When he dies, the verdict on the index-card says, "Doubtful case."[20]

It is this "Doubtful case" with which Moltmann struggles, in his effort to develop a theology which will take seriously the enormity of suffering and still provide a basis for the hope which Camus does not share. And at the centre of such a theology of hope, Moltmann finds his despair of Jesus, dying abandoned by God. Only when the implications of this are understood, he believes, can we have faith which could be labelled "protest faith", an adequate response to the protest atheism of Camus.

Moltmann shares with Camus the emphasis on integrity and authenticity. In *The Plague*, Dr. Rieux and Tarrou discuss whether in the absence of God they can become saints or even fully human: the latter is seen as more difficult. But this project of humanization is one which Christianity has often renounced. "God became man that we men might participate in God," said Athanasius,[21] and Christians have often thought that to become God-like they must struggle against their humanness. The *Imitatio Christi* of Thomas a Kempis, arguably the most-read book of medieval spirituality, is full of advice on how the imitation of Christ is the renunciation of self. But Moltmann, while not denying that rightly understood this may have value, sees the incarnation from a different perspective. With Luther, Moltmann argues that God became man, not so that man might become God, but so that man might recover his lost humanity. Jesus came, not so much to reveal to us what God is like, but to show us what man can be like, to point the way out of the alienated, inauthentic and dehumanized situation into which we have strayed. Nietzsche was right: if God is dead, man must become God. But ifman becomes God, then he is no longer human; in his efforts at divinity, he becomes alienated from his humanity. Thus Moltmann argues that a proper understanding of Jesus Christ is the antidote both to an anti-human theism and to what in the name of humanity becomes a dehumanizing atheism. He agrees with Tarrou in *The Plague:* it is much more ambitious to try to become human that to try to become a saint; but it is an ambition in which Jesus is the leader. And a God who becomes incarnate in Jesus of Nazareth cannot be a God who opposes this project of the humanity of man, but a God who supports it. In Moltmann's words,

> A God who is conceived of in his omnipotence, perfection and infinity at man's expense cannot be the God who is love in the cross of Jesus, who makes a human encounter in order to restore their lost humanity to unhappy and proud divinities, who 'became poor to make many rich.' God conceived of at man's expense cannot be the Father of Jesus Christ.[22]

But if God is not God at man's expense, this will entail a profound revision in our conception of him. The struggle for authenticity and humanity is, as the existentialists have shown us, a struggle against suffering and oppression wherever it is found. This is not optional. As Dr. Rieux reminds us in his fight against the plague,

> . . . there's no question of heroism in all this. It's a matter of common decency.[23]

But if to become human *means* to become involved in the struggle against dehumanization and suffering, and if this is the purpose of the Incarnation, then God can no longer be thought of as the one who sits silently in the heavens, permitting the tragedy, utterly unmoved by it all. God himself must be involved in this suffering with man: if man is to have hope, God himself must suffer God-forsakenness. If he does not, then he has no real solidarity with man, no real love which takes the sufferings of the beloved as his own. This means that the traditional doctrine of a God who cannot suffer, a God completely self-sufficient in his eternal infinity, must be rejected. If there is to be any theology after Auschwitz, it must be a theology which sees God suffering *in* Auschwitz, not immune to its anguish. Moltmann writes,

> Any other answer would be blasphemy. There cannot be any other Christian answer to the question of this torment. To speak here of a God who could not suffer would make God a demon. To speak here of an absolute God would make God an annihilating nothingness. To speak here of an indifferent God would be to condemn man to indifference.[24]

This is why Moltmann see the crucifixion as the centre of Christian theology, for here above all God takes suffering into himself. This has two aspects. In the first place, Jesus, the Son of God, suffers death and despair at the abandonment of the Father. Moltmann argues that the despair of Jesus on the cross is not simply despair at his own death, horrible though that is. Rather, his despair was a result of disillusionment in his whole concept of God. Jesus had lived by the conviction that God was for man, not against man; their ally, not theirjudge. Thus he emphasized forgiveness, love, solidarity with the outcast and oppressed. But in the end, God let him die. He did not vindicate Jesus' belief that God is a tender Father. So on the cross, Jesus is forsaken by God, and not only Jesus himself, but the whole world. Jesus' cry of despair is a cry that his life has been lived on a false premise: God is a silent God, impervious to suffering.

An yet it is this very silence of God, this very refusal to intervene in the suffering of Jesus, which makes it possible for God himself to suffer. What God the Father suffers is the god-forsaken death of his Son. This is not to say that when Jesus died, God the Father died; rather, it is a recognition of the grief of God at Jesus' death. Moltmann says,

> The suffering and dying of the Son, forsaken by the Father, is a different kind of suffering from the suffering of the Father in the death of the Son... The Son suffers dying, the Father suffers the death of the Son. The grief of the Father here is just as important as the death of the Son. The Fatherlessness of the Son is matched by the Sonlessness of the Father, and if God constituted himself as the Father of Jesus Christ, then he also suffers the death of his Fatherhood in the death of the Son.[25]

Hence the cry of despair as Jesus dies is the basis of Christian hope, for it is in that despair that God takes suffering into himself and thus makes possible human liberation. Camus has said, in words Moltmann quotes,

> For God to be a man, he had to despair.[26]

Indeed, Moltmann goes even further than this. Not only does the God-man despair, but the Father himself suffers forsakenness in the loss of his Son. Thus Moltmann offers this answer to Camus:

> The only way past protest atheism is through a theology of the cross which understands God as the suffering God in the suffering of Christ and which cries out with the god-forsaken God, 'My God, why have you forsaken me?' For this theology, God and suffering are no longer contradictions... God himself loves and suffers the death of Christ in his love. He is no 'cold heavenly power', nor does he 'tread his way over corpses', but is known as the human God in the crucified Son of Man.[27]

Through Jesus' despair, God demonstrates his solidarity with god-forsaken, suffering humanity, and liberates man from the alienating effort at becoming self-sufficient and inauthentic demi-gods, freeing them for the human dignity of working unitedly against all that dehumanizes.

But there is more to it than this. The story of Jesus does not end with the cry of despair on the cross, but with the message of Easter. This same man, who had died abandoned by God, was raised to life. And this means that, contrary to appearances on the cross, God *did* vindicate him and his lifestyle of genuine humanity. This, according to Moltmann, was the really astonishing thing about the Easter events. Jesus, who had been put to death in the most horrible way, condemned as a blasphemer, and forsaken by God, was raised from the dead.

> The new and scandalous element in the Christian message of Easter was not that some man or other was raised before anyone else, but that the one who was raised was this condemned, executed and forsaken man.[28]

Since he was the one who was raised, he is the one with whom God identifies, and thus the one whose love for man and concern for man's future is God's love and God's concern. Thus the hope of the suffering world rests on the suffering and vindicated Son of God. Not only can Christians work side by side with Camus for the humanity of man, conscious that God himself shares in the struggle; unlike Camus, they can do so in the hope that their efforts will not be ultimately meaningless. There is a hope for the future — the future of the world, because of the future of God. Ultimately the struggle is not absurd: Jesus has been raised from the dead and thus opens the way to hope for the liberation of all men. Moltmann says,

> In view of the misery of creation, the fact that the atonement is already accomplished, although the struggle continues, is incomprehensible without the future of the redemption of the body and of the peace which brings the struggle to an end. 'For Jesus is he who is to come. Everyone who truly encounters him, encounters him from the future, as the life to come, as the Lord of the world to come.'[29]

Thus the theology of Moltmann can be profitably studied as a response to the anguish and despair of protest atheists like Camus. The most impressive feature of Moltmann's thought, in my view, is his refusal to shirk the horrendous facts of human suffering, oppression, and dehumanization, and his effort not to pander cheap hope as an antidote to it. Instead, he meets the protest atheists more that half way, accepting the legitimacy of their cry for authenticity and their struggle against suffering, and offering them the despair of Jesus as the grounds for a costly hope, a hope that finds its pattern in the one who lives authentically by abandoning identity with God and accepting his identity as the way of the cross. This is why that cross cannot be prettified: a gold-plated cross in clouds of incense has nothing to say to the stench of plague-ridden human beings. Moltmann sees this clearly. In spite of this impressive honesty, however, I find problems with Moltmann's theology: I will mention three of them. In the first place, I have some worries about Moltmann's theological adequacy. As he himself points out, a theology whose centre rests on the despair of Jesus requires a radical revision of our concept of God. He discusses that revision in terms of the traditional doctrine of divine impassivity, and argues persuasively that that doctrine cannot be so stringently interpreted that it makes God immune to suffering.

> A God who cannot suffer is poorer than any man. For a God who is incapable of suffering is a being who cannot be involved. Suffering and injustice do not affect him. And because he is so completely insensitive, he cannot be affected or shaken by anything. He cannot weep, for he has no tears. But the one who cannot suffer cannot love either. So he is also a loveless being... But in that case is he a God? Is he not rather a stone?[30]

I am ready to be persuaded by this, and to accept Moltmann's claim that the doctrine of divine impassivity is a Greek legacy of dubious value, making God a close cousin of Aristotle's Unmoved Mover but unrelated to the responsive God of Abraham, Jesus, and Paul.

But there is another aspect to this theological revision which I find more problematical but to which Moltmann pays less attention in this book, and that is the doctrine of the trinity. To be sure, he insists throughout *The Crucified God* that his theology is utterly dependent on trinitarianism, and cannot be understood otherwise — in an "unChristian monotheism"[31] for example. But if there is the sort of distinction which Moltmann draws between the Father and the Son, so that the Son suffers death but the Father suffers grief, this entails that the Father and the Son are two separate centres of consciousness, two individuals. And this has traditionally been rejected as the heresy of tritheism.[32] Perhaps this is a tradition which Moltmann thinks is misguided, though in this book he does not explicitly say so; in any case, further explanation would be in order. However, I do not want to make unduly heavy weather of this point. The doctrine of the trinity is notoriously difficult, and if Moltmann falls foul of one or other aspect of Christian tradition regarding it, perhaps that is only yet another sign that the tradition itself needs rethinking — and perhaps Moltmann has provided a basis from which to do so. This need not, therefore, be a serious objection to his theology, only a point at which further clarification would be welcome.

The second difficulty I have is much more disturbing. For Moltmann, everything depends on the resurrection, for it was this that finally vindicated Jesus and showed God to be on the side of humanity. Were it not for the resurrection, Jesus' cry of despair would be the last word: he , and the world, would be God-forsaken. But Moltmann's account of the resurrection is very unclear. He points to the contrast between the public, historical crucifixion of Jesus and the very different status of "the Easter visions and the Christian symbol" of which there was no "unpartisan knowledge established on a neutral basis," and says,

> The resurrection of Jesus from the dead by God does not speak the 'language of facts', but only the language of faith and hope, that is, the 'language of promise'.[33]

What does this mean? Does it mean that it is mistaken to talk about a factual resurrection of Jesus the way we talk about a factual crucifixion? If so, then why should it be a symbol for faith? If Jesus did not rise from the dead with the same historical reality as the historical reality of his crucifixion, then was not after all his despairing cry the truth? On the other hand, if he did literally rise out of the tomb, how exactly does this constitute a vindication: what is the difference between vindication and magic here?

If my interpretation of Moltmann is correct, then his view is that Jesus' despair is the basis for Christian hope precisely *because* in the resurrection God vindicated Jesus and showed that he shared Jesus' solidarity with humanity. But if Jesus was not actually raised, if the resurrection is merely a term used as a symbol of hope, it would seem in this context to be a grotesquely misguided symbol, for if Jesus was not raised, then he was not vindicated, and his cry of god-forsakenness must be on all our lips. All the faith in the world cannot turn an untruth into truth; and if it is not true that God has identified himself with man, then using symbolic talk of resurrection is a pitiful self-deception. Jesus' death, then, is a heroic act, the more heroic in that he knew it would be misinterpreted, but one which shows finally that God is not involved. As Camus wrote,

> He cried aloud his agony and that's why I love him . . . The unfortunate thing is that he left us alone, to carry on, whatever happens . . . knowing in turn what he knew but incapable of doing what he did and of dying like him.[34]

Thus if Moltmann's account is to go beyond that of Camus, if Jesus' despair really is not the final word and because of the resurrection there really can be Christian hope, Moltmann will have to offer a much more precise and convincing account of what Easter faith might be and how it is justified. Perhaps this is possible; I recognize that giving a coherent account of the doctrine of the resurrection is a different assignment. But given its decisive role in Moltmann's theology, it is a serious deficiency in his system that this point is left so vague.

Finally, it remains to ask whether Moltmann's answer to Camus is convincing, even assuming that he can provide a satisfactory response to the above difficulties. What Camus and other protest atheists find intolerable is the idea that so much suffering should be permitted by a God who is able to prevent it: this is the point of Camus' frequently misinterpreted comment that

> when man submits God to moral judgement, he kills him in his own heart . . .God is denied in the name of justice.[35]

A God who permits moral enormities is a God who, even if he exists, makes the only possible response that of Ivan Karamazov — wanting to "hand back his ticket." Now, if Moltmann is right, then what he has shown is that God does *not* sit in aloof silence from the suffering of this world. God himself becomes incarnate and suffers with us. Jesus suffers death, despair, and god-forsakenness on the cross, and the Father takes the suffering into himself in his grief and anguish at the anguish of the Son. If this is so, then Moltmann has impressively shown us God's solidarity with us in our suffering, and shown that in our struggle against it, we are not alone, without meaning and without hope. This in itself is a great deal. Yet in the end it leaves us with the main problem still unanswered: why does God permit the suffering in the first place? If he is struggling with us in it, then he is not the monstrous deity which we would have to renounce in the name of decency; but this is so only if he is doing all he can against evil. Yet evil continues. Does this mean that God himself is powerless to stop it? If so, that requires a revision of the concept of God of a magnitude which Moltmann has not anticipated, and which undermines the possibility of hope. If not, if God *could* prevent evil but does not do so, then are we not back with the protest atheists? "The only excuse" for that sort of half-heartedly struggling God would be "that he does not exist".

Moltmann does not pretend that he has solved the problem of evil; he only argues that in the evil, God is with us, not against us. Yet unless God is doing everything he can in the struggle, he is giving less of himself than decent human beings: suffering, even voluntary suffering, cannot be a *substitute* for doing all we can. But if God really *is* doing all he can, and he is omnipotent, then why does evil remain? The fundamental problem for a protest atheist is how an omnipotent God who allows such a world can be believed in; and unless Moltmann is willing to sacrifice the doctrine of omnipotence, he has not provided an answer to this problem. The best we are left with is a chastened Father Paneloux, who in his second sermon says,

> Who would dare to assert that eternal happiness can compensate for a single moment's human suffering? He who asserted that would not be a true Christian, a follower of the Master who knew all the pangs of suffering in his body and his soul. No, he, Father Paneloux, would keep faith with that great symbol of all suffering, the tortured body on the Cross: he would stand fast, his back to the wall, and face honestly the terrible problem of a child's agony.[36]

This gives us, indeed, a pattern to follow, a pattern of solidarity with human suffering and with the suffering of Jesus, a pattern of life shared with the protest atheists, "working side by side . . . beyond blasphemy and prayers." But it does not give us the answer to the fundamental problem: how can God permit such evil to exist? Even if Moltmann is correct in what he says, what he leaves unsaid leaves us with this most intractible difficulty of all. And the final verdict must be the verdict on the index card of Father Paneloux: "Doubtful case".

1. Goethe *Die Geheimnisse. Ein Fragment* Quoted in Jürgen Moltmann *The Crucified God* (E.T. SCM, London, 1974) p. 35.

2. *The Crucified God* p. 201.

3. Jürgen Moltmann *Theology of Hope* (E.T. SCM, London, 1967).

4. Camus himself rejected the label "existentialist" in order to stress his differences from Sartre.

5. Friedrich Nietzsche "The Madman" *The Gay Science* (E.T. Walter Kaufmann, Random House, New York, 1974).

5. Albert Camus *The Outsider* (E.T. Penguin, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1961) p. 117.

7. As has been pointed out by Conor Cruise O'Brien *Camus* (Fontana Modern Masters, Collins, London, 1970).

8. Albert Camus *The Rebel* (E.T. Penguin, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1962) p. 11.

9. Albert Camus *The Plague* (E.T. Penguin, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1960) pp. 208-9.

10. *The Plague* pp. 107-8.

11. Quoted in *The Rebel* p. 58.

12. *The Plague* pp. 82-3.

13. *The Plague* p. 178.

14. *The Rebel* p. 51.

15. *The Plague* p. 186

16. *The Plague* p. 187.

17. I owe this point to an unpublished paper by Stewart Sutherland "Belief and Unbelief: Simone Weil and Albert Camus".
18. *The Plague* p. 178.

19. Quoted from notes translated by Justin O'Brien in a collection of pieces, *Resistance, Rebellion and Death* (Hamish Hamiton, 1961).

20. *The Plague* p. 191.

21. Quoted in *The Crucified God* p. 228.

22. *The Crucified God* p. 250.

23. *The Plague* p. 136.

24. *The Crucified God* p. 274.

25. *The Crucified God* p. 243.

26. From an untranslated section of *The Rebel,* quoted in *The Crucified God* p. 226.

27. *The Crucified God* p. 227.

28. *The Crucified God* p. 176.

29. *The Crucified God* p. 102. The quotation is from H.J. Iwand.

30. *The Crucified God* p. 265.

31. *The Crucified God* p. 265.

32. For a fuller discussion of individual consciousness and tritheism, see G.W.H. Lampe *God as Spirit* (OUP, Oxford, 1978) pp. 224-8.

33. *The Crucified God* pp. 172-3; cf. p. 204.

34. Albert Camus *The Fall* (E.T. Penguin, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1963) p. 84.

35. *The Rebel* p. 57.

36. *The Plague* p. 183.