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Richard Hanson: CHRISTIAN PRIESTHOOD EXAMINED. Lutterworth Press, 1979, 128 pp. £5.95.

(Unless otherwise stated all page references are to the book; all italics in quotations from the book are the reviewer's, not the author's)

This is an historical examination of Christian priesthood, with especial attention to its origins in the primitive church. There is no claim that we should all go primitive again: "It would be most unwise to attempt to reverse the development . . We cannot put back the clock of history" (94); nevertheless any doctrine "based on a false premise . . cannot result in a satisfactory theory" (89). Those who find it too much bother to construe the tantalising scraps of evidence left us by the primitive Church and prefer the simple answers provided by some supposed 'living voice of the Spirit' should find themselves another book. In a religion founded on the Word made flesh, no doctrine can claim authority unless it can trace its lineage back to the apostolic tradition.

The aim of the examination is to find a concept of priesthood acceptable both "to those traditions which already preserve the priesthood . . and to those traditions to whom the idea of a priesthood has hitherto been suspect or even anathema" (115); an aim to be pursued "with neither ecclesiastical bias nor inherited prejudice nor partiality, but with honest judgement and scholarly truth" (22). Ridding ourselves of recognised prejudice is one thing, ridding ourselves of unrecognised and therefore uncriticised assumptions is another. Mine will no doubt appear to the discerning reader of this review; Hanson's lead him to impassioned denunciations of 'sacerdotal priesthood'. Granted that this is qualified (96, 105), the concept of a 'non-sacerdotal priesthood' still seems a confusing of language to no good purpose. Since a 'non-sacerdotal *sacerdotium*' is a nonsense, all it can imply is that the word 'priest' is simply the English form of 'presbyter' and has no connection with *sacerdos*. This is clearly not what Hanson is after, since it would detach 'priests' not only from the priesthood of Christ but also from the priesthood of all believers.

Indeed, that is the last thing he wants. "What the priest has is authority, authority to represent the church, whether in ordaining or confirming or in celebrating the eucharist" (108); or, as we might say, the priest is the parson, the *persona* of the local church. Only thus can we re-capture the proper relation between 'the ordained priesthood' and 'the priesthood of all believers'. True enough, though one may doubt whether the obscuring of the latter conception was due to the machinations of the clergy (63). When Trent still holds that the sacrifice is offered 'ab ecclesia per sacerdotes', one may feel that the obscuration belongs less to Christian theology than to Christian sociology. In *Volkskirchen* the laity were content to leave priesthood to the full-time professionals. In the same circumstances the Protestant conception of 'an ordained ministry' produced a laity content to be ministered unto, leaving all ministry to the full-time minister.

But it is a pity that Hanson should have taken for granted Lightfoot's 19th century assumption that every representative is necessarily the delegate of those he represents. Quite apart from precedents in ancient law and patriarchal custom, no one would deny that the Son of Man, the Second Adam, the Lamb of God who bears the sins of the world represents humanity before God, he certainly did not draw his authority from a mass-meeting of the sons of Adam. But Hanson must maintain the Lutheran idea that the authority of the priest is delegated to him by the rest of the congregation, or otherwise he sees looming up the bogy of apostolic succession. So he asks (8-21) whether any ordained official ministry was instituted by Christ and transmitted by the apostles, and naturally gets a negative answer. *I Cor* xii and *Eph* iv (as Hort noted in 1897), tell us much about ministries, but nothing about an official hierarchy of ministries. As his brother ably demonstrated, even the apostolic ministry "is not to undertake some specialist

activity from which the rest of the faithful are excluded, but to pioneer in doing that which the whole church must do" (A.T. Hanson, *The Pioneer Ministry*, 1961, p.72).

But is 'ordained ministry', however familiar to us nowadays, the right category in which to examine early Church Order? Linton (*Das Problem der Urkirche*, 1932) examined *I Cor* v. 3-5, and found (*op.cit.* 201-201) an hierarchical church, but with an hierarchy of honour or status, not of ministry or function; a church where all ministries, whether *episkope* or *diakonia*, decision-making or evangelism, belonged to the whole Church, but to every man according to his order. Hatch had already pointed out in 1881 that 'presbyter' is not a ministerial or functional title, but a status-title, referring to what a man is, not what he does. It must mean not merely 'senior', but 'senior in Christ', since the Pauline equivalent is 'first-fruits'. Gerke in 1931 rightly argued that the 'presbyters' of *I Clem* xliv 4 are the 'first-fruits' of xlii 4, who are apointed as bishops *and deacons*. The basic title is 'presbyter', and when it is diversified by functional titles, the *episkopos* still has no monopoly of *episkope* nor the *diakonos* of service. Irenaeus' equation of *episcopatus successio* and *ordo presbyterii* shews clearly enough that for him the bishop is not merely a presbyter but The Presbyter; for in any status-hierarchy of seniority there must be one who holds the *primatus*—the key-term in Cyprian's exposition of Church Order. The title 'presbyter' is of course also given to the apostles, the first of all first-fruits. Seen in these categories, apostolic succession takes on a new look. A presbyteral hierarchy of first-fruits is not only a natural form for a Church engaged in mission, a seed growing towards a harvest, it follows the pattern set by the Lord when he chose Twelve to be the nucleus of his coming Church and Kingdom. I cannot understand why A.T. Hanson, having said (*op.cit.* p.123) "The ministry derives its authority from the fact that it is the church *in nucleo*", should then go on to say (*ib.* p.156) "It is not the ministry which constitutes the Church, but the Church the ministry". I repeat my comment on this ('Ordo Presbyterii', *Journ. Theol. Stud.* 1975): "It would be a strange nucleus which was itself constituted by the particles it gathers round it".

I see myself therefore as a presbyter, ordained by an episcopal Presbyter, who traced his *ordo presbyterii* back to the original Presbyters, the first of all first-fruits: and I am persuaded that this is the order the Lord willed for his Church. It is the presbyter who offers "ourselves, our souls and bodies" as one body in Christ, because apart from the presbyter there is no *ecclesia*, the Body of Christ in its public and liturgical manifestation, but only a pious assembly of individual Christians. I can even rejoice in the happy accident that the English word 'priest' is etymologically derived from 'presbyter'. 'Presbyter' defines the status, 'priest' its sacrificial aspect.

Not so for Hanson, for what he really wants is a non-sacrificing priesthood. This is again unfortunate, for in the New Testament, as in all religions at all times, 'priest' and 'sacrifice' go together. It is because Christ is High Priest that it is necessary that he also have somewhat to offer (*Heb* viii 3), because the Church is a holy priesthood that it is to offer spiritual sacrifices acceptable to God in Christ Jesus (*I Pet* ii 5). Yet in Hanson's description of 'true priesthood' (99-103), the priest is essentially a "go-between person", a mediator between God and man (which one would have thought to be the aspect of priesthood particularly suspect and anathema to Protestant traditions); the word 'sacrifice' is not mentioned, in relation either to the ordained priest, the priesthood of Christ, or the priesthood of all believers. The latter has in fact been treated (27-30) in terms of authority, not sacrifice, though the appropriate scriptural texts have been quoted.

Nowadays, when the laity are increasingly reluctant to regard themselves as sheep, surely it is time that we parsons followed St Paul's example (*Rom* xv 16) and thought of our vocation and theirs in priestly and sacrificial categories rather than in 'pastoral' ones—which, however hallowed by usage, are comparatively infrequent in the New Testament. Nowadays, when the search for individual depth clashes with the fact of increasing interdependence, surely the emphasis should not be on shepherds and shepherding, but on souls and bodies which can never be fulfilled unless they are offered as one living sacrifice, one body in Christ. That would be a concept of priesthood broad enough for general consensus, without untying the essential knot between priesthood and sacrifice.

But Hanson is haunted by a bogy of mere mass-priests, with a priesthood not merely defined by but confined to what he calls 'the eucharistic cult'; and sacrifice is for him too 'cultic' a term.

The unfortunate term is not 'sacrifice' but 'cult'. The French may know that *culte* is simply divine worship, particularly Protestant divine worship; but to the English it has pejorative and dismissive connotations. Hanson means it to have, for he comes near to defining it in terms of animal sacrifice (25). He also claims to have shewn that the earliest use of sacerdotal language for Christian clergy was "not in terms of the cult"(99). What he in fact has produced is an unsubstantiated guess that, in friendly conversation with pagans, Christians were embarrassed by the lame sound of *episcopus* and thought *sacerdos* more prestigious (44). It is an attitude difficult to attribute to Tertullian, who provides our first clear evidence, and who uses the term primarily in a 'cultic' setting, either of sacraments or sacrifice. The first hint chronologically comes in the rebutting of pagan slanders on the eucharist (*ad nat* I vii 26), while the unambiguous use of *summus sacerdos* is in discussion of the rite of baptism (*de bapt* xvii). Bévenot ("Tertullian's thoughts about the Christian priesthood", *Instr. Patr.* X, 1975) found difficulty in this latter text in translating "si qui est" if *summus sacerdos* is simply a synonym for *episcopus*. The difficulty disappears if it is taken as "the celebrant, he who has the liturgy", but then at once a *summus sacerdos* with a *leitourgia* throws us back on *I Clem* xl 5, which is undoubtedly in a eucharistic context.

Hanson dismisses this key-passage too lightly, mainly on grounds of the Protestant consensus on 'the ministry', which is itself unsure. While nobody supposes that high-priest, priest and levite were at this time clerical titles at Rome, we cannot accept his assertion that here we have simply Old Testament analogies of order, like the secular metaphors of xxxvi; for this passage is governed by xl 5: "The Master himself has fixed by his supreme will the places and persons whom he desires for these offerings and liturgies". It is the kind of Old Testament exegesis which Hanson (42) attributes only to the late 2nd century. This is almost where he wants to put *I Clement*: since Lightfoot's dating can no longer be taken seriously, "we can therefore place it later than 96 A.D."(36). We could also put it earlier on many grounds, including the form of its Old Testament citations and the study of its relation to *Hebrews*. Unless we are going to put it after Tertullian, we must suppose that *sacerdos* (as applied to clergy) entered the Christian vocabulary not only in a 'cultic' but in a Jewish cultic context, however spiritualised and however much incidental vocabulary it had borrowed from paganism by the time of Tertullian.

We must therefore look doubtfully at Hanson's claim that, in ordaining to "the office and work of a Priest in the Church of God" without further definition, the Church of England intended to invent the hitherto-unknown concept of a non-cultic, non-sacrificing priesthood. Against it we must set the judgement of the late Stanley Greenslade (hardly a crypto-Anglo-Catholic): "In contrast to the contemporary Roman ordinal and obviously of set purpose, the 16th century ordinals of the Church of England did not explicitly ordain a man to offer sacrifice. Everything depends upon what is implicit. In controversy, scores of Anglican theologians of historical importance repudiated the Roman doctrine of the eucharistic sacrifice as in itself a propitiatory sacrifice, and with that repudiated the conception of priesthood proportionate to it. But they normally admitted or taught that the eucharist is in a real sense sacrificial . . . so that its minister is a priest in a sense proportionate to the sacrificial aspect of the eucharist."('Ordo', *Scottish Journ. Theol.* 1956).

No Anglican can deny that the eucharist is in some sense sacrificial, since it involves "this our sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving", which (interpreted in terms of the General Thanksgiving) must involve "ourselves, our souls and bodies" and cannot thus be simply "the fruit of our lips". Hanson's line is that of Cranmer's *Defence*: we must detach the sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving from the bread and the cup, however much this may obscure the fact that we offer ourselves, not as individuals, but as one bread, one body in Christ; for the bread and the cup are too closely associated with the propitiatory sacrifice of Calvary. It is therefore hardly surprising that in discussing eucharistic offering in the early church (46-66), having started with the 'pure offering' of *Mal* i 10-11 (which, since its acceptability depends upon the intentions of the offerers, must be of ourselves,

our souls and bodies), he then discovers "*another* doctrine of offering . . . to present the bread and the wine in the eucharist so that they shall be blessed by God", while Justin "*actually* blends and combines these two" (47). This is reading Cranmer back into the primitive church. Whether one puts *Didache* xiv before or after Justin *Dial* xli, the first Christian quotations of *Mal* i 10-11 undoubtedly apply it to the eucharist, the prayer of thanksgiving over the bread and the cup. To say that "Irenaeus' teaching is that Christians offer to God *on the one hand* praise and thanksgiving (the 'pure offering') and *on the other hand* bread and wine" (48) is to ignore the plain statement in IV xxix 5 that the offering of the bread and the cup *is* the pure offering of *Mal* i 10-11, quoted in full. This surely puts another complexion on those patristic passages where Malachi is quoted without mention of bread and wine: for there the argument is that the God who needs nothing does not need to be fed on the flesh of bulls and goats, and everybody knew that the eucharistic bread and wine were there to feed us, not to feed God. Lactantius did not say that "sacrifice on our part can only consist of blessing *made by words*". He said (*Div Inst* VI xxv 14-15) that "his sacrifice is only blessing" (and not burning something on an altar), and that this sacrifice ought to be expressed in words. We are to be persuaded, however, that this supposedly mid-2nd century conjunction of two quite different offerings started off an inevitable decline, that "a church which began by contemptuously rejecting all forms of sacrifice except the most immaterial has come perilously near to instituting its own sacrificial cult, with altars and priests who offer sacrifices which . . . cannot be described as wholly *immaterial or spiritual*" (59). What are we to make of this conjunction of adjectives? It cannot, of course, and does not mean that the 'pure sacrifice' stops short at words, for then it would be not only immaterial but quite unsubstantial and unreal. I suspect that it means that the 'pure offering' in the *culte* must be simply 'the fruit of our lips', a peripheral element into which the action of the bread and the cup are inserted, and that such a eucharistic sacrifice can in practice be ignored, as it is for the remainder of the book. As for "immaterial or spiritual", words are signs, we receive the body and blood of Christ under a sign: why should we think spoken signs more immaterial and therefore more spiritual than acted signs? Hanson, however, thinks Cyprian teaches that we offer "Christ's body and blood, the *identical physical organism* which was his when he walked the lanes of Galilee and the streets of Jerusalem"(57). I can't find this either in Cyprian or in the Roman doctrine of transubstantiation.

The premiss we must really question is "present the bread and the wine in the eucharist so that they shall be blessed *by God*" (47). Where does he find this? It is not there, as the unwary reader might suppose, in the text of Clement or Justin. Instead, what we have in *I Cor* x 16 is "the cup of blessing which *we* bless"; and that blessing and thanksgiving, *eulogein* and *eucharistein*, are practically synonymous can be seen by comparing the New Testament institution narratives. The association of the thanksgiving with the bread and the cup was not an innovation of Justin's. Not only Justin (*I Apol* lxvi 1), but Ignatius of Antioch half-a-century before (*ad Smyrn* vii 1) give to the bread and wine received as the flesh and blood of Christ this strange name of "The Thanksgiving", *eucharistia*. That testifies that even at the beginning of the 2nd century there was a close and long-standing association of the elements with the act of thanksgiving, an association which must at least go well back into the 1st century, if not indeed to *I Cor* x. We must surely suppose that the earliest Church saw more significance than we normally do in the "when he had given thanks" of the institution narratives. The signs under which we receive the body and blood are not only bread and wine, but *eucharistised* bread and wine. A comparison of *I Tim* iv 4 with Justin *I Apol* xiii 1-2, *Dial* cxvii shews that well into the 2nd century the eucharistic sacrifice was still firmly rooted in the Jewish thanksgiving at meals. You blessed something (in the metonymic sense of 'consecrate' or 'sanctify') by thanking or blessing God for it. You offered it to the God who needs nothing, not by wasting it with fire, but by acknowledging it as his, to be used according to his will. The earliest Church, in short, followed the meal-structure of the Last Supper, but clearly understood "Do this in my *anamnesis*" not only of the eating and drinking, but also of the giving thanks. Any eucharistic theory that separates the sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving from the bread and the cup is starting from a false premiss--indeed, one may ask

whether it is not putting asunder what the Lord joined together.

We might make more progress towards an ecumenical understanding of the eucharistic sacrifice if we asked what theological assumptions could alone explain the early eucharist, and use these to judge whether later explicit theologies are authentic or inauthentic developments. Here are my tentative suggestions.

First, that at the Last Supper not only the bread and wine were invested with a new significance, but also the thanksgiving. The Lord was understood not merely to have consecrated bread and wine (which every Jewish father did every day), but to have consecrated himself to the Father under the signs of bread and wine. It does not seem fanciful exegesis to suppose this the source from which was derived *John* xvii 19: "For their sakes I consecrate myself", and the universal Christian supposition that Calvary was sacrificial. When Cyprian says that"the passion is the sacrifice of the Lord which we offer", the immediate reference is not to Calvary but to the Last Supper. It might have been worth Hanson's while to consider whether Trent, in beginning its discussions in 1562 not with the relation of Calvary to the Mass, but with its relation to the Last Supper, was not starting from the right premiss.

Secondly, that the meal-imagery in itself spiritualised the conception of sacrifice (and in *Eph* v 1 there is surely more than a hint of *Mal* i 10-11). The essence of a spiritual sacrifice is not that it should be immaterial (one can hardly think of anything more crudely material than a crucifixion), but that it should be the free and glad offering of a spirit, a will (cf *Heb* x 4-10). God needs nothing, neither the flesh of bulls and goats, nor bread and wine, nor a broken body and shed blood. What is offered to the Father under the sign of the bread and wine is the will of Christ; what is given for our use under the sign of the bread and wine is the broken body and shed blood.

Thirdly, that since these early Christians applied *Mal* i 10-11 to their own eucharists, and since the acceptability of the sacrifice depended on the inner oblation of the offerers, they offered themselves, their souls and bodies under the signs of bread and wine. "In that which she offers, the Church herself is offered", as Augustine says.

Fourthly, as Linton insisted, 'the Church' does not mean the congregation apart from the clergy, and still less does it mean the clergy and congregation apart from Christ. The bread and wine was received as the body and blood of Christ because it was offered as the one body in Christ, with Christ as the high priest of our oblations. Apart from this, for the Church through the priest to say "This is my body, this is my blood" is either to indulge in historical reminiscence or to manipulate a magic formula. The church did not come together as individuals waiting to be brought into communion towards the end of the service. It was in communion when it came together, and all it did was in communion, as already the body of Christ by baptism. It ate of one bread because it had offered one bread, and you forbade a man to eat by forbidding him to offer. Hanson says "the idea that priests (or anybody else) offer Christ as a sacrifice is highly debatable" (98), but he doesn't debate it. Any idea that the Son can be offered to the Father by a third person, or that a clergyman can so manipulate bread and wine as to reproduce the bloody sacrifice of Calvary is indeed abhorrent; but that the members can share in the spiritual self-oblation of the Head, and can do so only because they are the fruit of that oblation—that is surely a different matter.

In short, we could argue that aberrations in eucharistic theology have in the main been produced not by adding things but by leaving something out -the identification with Christ in baptism. Baptism and the eucharist, so closely associated with each other in the early Church, became so divorced in both time and occasion that Luther could bring them together only with the odd supposition that the eucharist was some kind of continual repetition of baptism. With a renewed understanding of the doctrine of the Church we surely need no longer approach sacrifice, the eucharist and priesthood from 16th century premisses.

Douglas Powell

J.J. GRIESBACH: SYNOPTIC AND TEXT-CRITICAL STUDIES 1776-1976. Ed. by Bernard Orchard and Thomas R.W. Longstaff. (S.N.T.S. Monograph Series 34). pp.xvi + 224. Cambridge University Press, 1978. N.p.

In July, 1976, a colloquium was held in Munster to celebrate the bicentenary of the publication of Griesbach's synopsis of the Gospels, and this volume is a collection of the most important papers presented to the conference. Griesbach made a distinctive contribution to New Testament studies in three fields: by his synopsis, by his work as a textual critic, and by his advocacy of the theory that Mark produced a digest of Matthew and Luke. These papers, by G. Delling, H. Greeven, B. Reicke, G.D. Kilpatrick and others, leave no serious doubt that Griesbach's lasting service lay in the first two fields. Every New Testament student soon learns the indispensability of a synopsis, and textual critics have never gone back on Griesbach's principles. Yet the colloquium would not have been held for either of these reasons, if it had not been that W.R. Farmer has been trying to revive the Griesbach theory of synoptic relationships; and it is here that the main interest of the book must lie for the ordinary reader. Indeed, the heart of the volume is a translation of Griesbach's *Commentatio*, the Latin work in which his thesis was advanced.

There is a general feeling today that the standard solution of the Synoptic Problem is due for re-examination, but not to the extent of putting the clock back two hundred years. Fifteen years have passed since Farmer's first attempt to revive the Griesbach hypothesis, and the scholarly world at large has found it vastly implausible. Griesbach's argument was directed against the dominant Augustinian theory that Mark used only Matthew, and he rejected the priority of Mark largely because he was still committed to the belief that the author of the first Gospel was Matthew the apostle. Anyone who follows Griesbach in the assiduous use of a synopsis, and in his text-critical principle that the reading is to be preferred which explains other readings, will soon be forced to abandon the priority of Matthew, and will take a great deal of persuading that the question is worth reopening.

George B. Caird

CHRISTIAN BELIEFS ABOUT LIFE AFTER DEATH. By Paul Badham. S.P.C.K. 1978. pp.175. £3.50.

Dr Badham's book is a paperback edition of a work originally published in 1976. Its main merits are twofold: on the one hand he attempts to take account of relevant material and discussions from biblical, doctrinal and philosophical writings, on the other hand he does distil from these different sources, and from the various Christian beliefs about life after death, a single clear thesis which he elaborates and defends. The actual text, as distinct from the footnotes (all six hundred and seventy-three of them), amounts to about one hundred and forty pages, and within that compass much ground is covered.

The view which is finally proposed is by no means uncontroversial, and involves a rejection of the idea of bodily resurrection, either for Jesus, or for subsequent believers. Rather, belief in the immortality of a non-corporeal soul is defended, and with it, the acceptance of mind-body dualism. *En route*, the common view that belief in an immortal soul is a Greek intrusion into the Judeo-Christian tradition is contested.

A great danger in writing on these topics is that one will replace one implausible surmise by another, and certainly Dr Badham has no two doubts about the "bizarre" or "incoherent" nature of a number of the speculations which he criticizes. For example, he discounts the view that Jesus' resurrection body is a "spiritual body", as a "logical hybrid", states that "the traditions which imply that Jesus' corpse was raised from the grave should be rejected as "internally incoherent", and regards Pannenburg's postulation of "a general resurrection at the last day" as "bizarre".

His counter-proposal to these views is an appeal to H.H. Price's suggestion that the life to come is to be one in which our experiences are comparable to those images of our present dream-life, and in which we are to communicate with one another telepathically. He expounds and defends this view with both conviction and interest, and his criticism of the mind-brain identity thesis, which argues that sensations simply are brain-states, and that therefore minds cannot be other than brains, is well-formulated.

There are, however, a number of points at

which the argument of the book has substantial limitations. Two or three examples will indicate the misgivings which I have about the foundations upon which Dr Badham's thesis is based. As he has clearly demonstrated in the case of some of the Early Fathers, if one begins to speculate in certain sorts of ways, it is very easy to lose one's bearings, and to accept the legitimacy of all questions asked at their face-value. Certainly all questions show either ignorance or misunderstanding, and should be taken seriously. Sometimes, however, taking them seriously is to refuse to answer them in their own terms, but to insist first upon re-structuring them. The place where the tracks of Dr Badham's approach lead him into most obvious error is where he commends his adopted view on the basis that it comes nearer to answering "the classic Sadducean question of the much-widowed woman." That this is a point in favour of a Christian belief in life after death would require a rather ingenious exposition of Mark 12.18-27! Nor do I think that this is a mere detail, for I believe that the really important divide on the issue of immortality is between those who think that the appropriate form of discussion is to delineate what the main contours of post-mortem existence are, and those who, for philosophical or religious reasons, eschew such speculation. Undoubtedly there are dangers whichever path one follows, but having chosen his path Dr Badham is perhaps so eager to reach his goal, that he has lost contact with his base camp.

On a more specifically philosophical note, there are some inaccuracies or contradictions. For example, on p.68, he attributes to Anthony Quinton the view that there can be spatially unrelated spaces and temporally unrelated times. The error here is that although Quinton accepts a possible plurality of spaces, he states in the article which Badham cites, "we cannot conceive of such a state of affairs in the case of time." This is not merely of passing significance, for if one is going to speculate about the possible forms of life after death, then an absolutely first-order question concerns temporality. Further, one of the major philosophical problems bearing on belief in life after death concerns the problem of the continuing identity of the individual from pre- to post-mortem existence. Some of the philosophical difficulties here have been put most acutely in Bernard Williams' puzzle about reduplication. Williams is not referred to in the book, but John Hick's outline of the problem is quoted on p.73. Dr Badham's way of disposing of the difficulty is to appeal to an article of faith; "that each individual person is unique and precious in the sight of God", and that therefore, presumably, we can be sure that Williams' question can be conveniently ignored. But, of course, this will not do, because the question at issue is not, "Is it reasonable to suppose that God will create two resurrected Freds for only one present life Fred?" but it is rather "What does the lack of spatio-temporal bodily continuity, giving rise as it does, to the conceivability of reduplication, do to our concept of personal identity?" Despite the intrinsic interest of some of the other philosophical discussions, there are grounds here for suggesting that the non-specialist should be careful about swallowing all the philosophical material, hook, line and sinker.

Nonetheless, the book is a provocative and very readable treatment of one of the most problematic areas of contemporary Christian belief.

Stewart R. Sutherland

NOVUM TESTAMENTUM GRAECE. Edited by K. Aland, M. Black, C.M.Martini, B.M. Metzger, and A. Wikgren ('Neste-Aland, 26th edition). Deutsche Bibelstiftung, Stuttgart, 1979 (available through the British and Foreign Bible Society). pp.78*, 779. £4.60.

The appearance of the long-awaited 26th edition of Nestle is something of an event in New Testament scholarship. Up to now, the Bible Society's standard text edited by Kilpatrick in 1958—familiar to most readers of this *Review* and all too familiar to a good many of them—has presented the best critical text and the fullest overall report of significant variant readings that have been available (the United Bible Societies' *The Greek New Testament*, third edition 1975, gave full textual apparatus for only a selected number of passages). Thus, until Professor

Kilpatrick completes his expected revision of the B.F.B.S.'s text, Nestle-Aland will remain the best critical edition of the Greek testament that is to hand, and is 'indispensable for all future work concerned with the original text of the New Testament'. The commendation is that of Bishop Lhose, editor of the *Zeitschrift fur die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft* (vol. 70, 1979, p.262), who points out that the editors had available the full total of some 5,300 witnesses to the text in forming their entirely new and independent decisions on readings, and that in this process 'all the papyri and uncials and a great number of minuscules were taken into consideration'.

This slim volume, slightly larger in page size than Kilpatrick's *Kaine Diatheke* but more compact, is an astonishing example of *multum in parvo*, and the only possible criticism is that this has been achieved by the use of fonts for the text and the very generous apparatus respectively which place some slight strain on legibility. 78 pages of introduction (given in full both in German and in English) give full notes on the Greek witnesses and the versions and the patristic evidence, and a full guide—which the reader will certainly need—to the use of the apparatus; and the four appendices include a list of all alleged OT quotations and allusions.

One or two passages may be mentioned to indicate the nature of the critical text itself. At Mk 1.41, 'he had compassion' is retained (contrast the Greek text underlying the NEB—'he was angry'). The full 'words of institution' are printed at Lk 22.17ff, but with a clear presentation of the textual evidence. Lk 22.43f (the 'drops of blood' passage in the Gethsemane narrative) is printed in double brackets as 'known not to be a part of the original text'. At Jn 1.18 we read (with Kilpatrick) 'only-begotten God'. At 1 Cor 13.3—this time against Kilpatrick—we find 'that I might boast', not 'that I might be burned'. As in Kilpatrick, 'at Ephesus' at Eph. 1.1 is placed in single brackets ('of doubtful authenticity'). All in all, then, at least at first glance, a conservative text, but the most authoritative now existing.

C.J.A. Hickling

EXPLORATIONS IN THEOLOGY 5 by Donald Mackinnon. SCM Press Ltd. London, 1979. pp.ix + 213. £4.50

The thirteen essays collected in this volume were written between 1967 and 1977, eight of them for annual meetings of the Colloquium on the philosophy of religion convened by Enrico Castelli in Rome. Three public university lectures and the Presidential Address to the Aristotelian Society are also included and a hitherto unpublished address on the problematic relationship of moral goodness to intellectual insight as raised by reflections on the life and commitments of Tillich, Frege and Kittel. Brought together like this, they provide a unified expression of the author's mind as he wrestled during that decade with deep and central problems in human life and human commitments in a contemporary context anatomised with penetrating and costly sensitivity. His mastery of method in the field of philosophical investigation is deeply satisfying and healthily contagious for the assiduous reader. His ultimate intention, in each phase of intricate and deeply honest exploration, is to bring his hearers within sight of the presence, the effective presence, of the transcendentally divine in the context where we have to practise human life with intellectual commitments.

The first four essays direct attention to features of that context which do not move other philosophers and theologians in this country to any searching response. Two of them examine the epoch-making capacity of Lenin to leave an imprint on events by his personal interweaving of theory and practice, and an essay on the concept of *raison d'etat*, set between them, serves to give us 'a purchase-hold on the elusive realities of political existence'. Lenin's clear perception of the opposition between idealism and realism in the understanding of history provides a link forward to subsequent essays on this persisting philosophical controversy in its wider ramifications. Against the deep-seated anthropocentric folly of idealisms which encourage human thought to suppose that it may create its own objects, Mackinnon is expertly ready to remind us of Kant's ultimate insistence on the authority of what is objective and to develop this insistence with skill and passion against the arrogance of crypto-idealism in the texture of much that passes as modernised

Christian theology in this country and America at present. I am reminded of the essay *Christ and the Christian Principle* contributed by P.T. Forsyth to the volume *London Theological Essays* in 1911, the burden of which should be eloquently re-expressed, with sensitivity to the wide-ranging complexity of human reality as we taste it today. Professor Mackinnon has done this and much more. It is a notable feature of these essays that his crucial philosophical thrust, explicit in what I regard as the central paper entitled *Finality in Metaphysics, Ethics and Theology*, is embellished with carefully worded references to human enterprise in science, historiography, art, morality, politics, metaphysics and theism, which never fail to set these activities in correct perspective for contemporary evaluation. He is a demanding thinker and readers must take time and pains to absorb what he says. Their reward, in deepened and corrected insight, will be immense.

W.A. Whitehouse

PROTESTANT AND ROMAN CATHOLIC ETHICS: Prospects for Rapprochement. By James M. Gustafson. SCM Press, London 1979. pp.xii + 192.

This is an admirable book—admirable precisely because it is *not* exciting, does *not* issue in a kind of 'Agreed Statement on Ethics', and does not allow its ecumenical concern to degenerate into a facile optimism. Not, to be sure, that I am at all against Agreed Statements. I think it is helpful to be able to find formulae on which theologians of different traditions can agree, if only to show that such formulae can be found after all. But long-standing differences in approach and method in different Christian traditions inevitably run deep, and no formula, however technically accurate, will suffice for ecumenical progress in default of a painstaking (and even painful) effort to trace and deal with the underlying divergences which will condition the ways in which no matter what agreed formula is accepted and understood. It is to this task that Gustafson addresses himself.

Oddly enough, it appears to me as a Roman Catholic that Gustafson, despite his modest apology for possibly allowing his own background to show through his treatment, is on the whole more favourable to the Roman Catholic authors whose work he analyses than he is to his fellow-Protestants. At the very least, it must be said that he has achieved an enormous degree of insight and sympathy with the good, as well as with the more problematic, aspects of Roman Cacholic moral theology. How rare and welcome it is to find someone writing about one's own tradition who does not constantly betray himself as an 'outsider' to its spirit. Whether those on the other side will be equally happy with his treatment is not for me to say, though I hope they will. Certainly, his well-documented and constructive scholarship must surely inspire confidence.

After an initial chapter outlining the historical roots of the differences between Roman Catholic and Protestant ethics, Gustafson considers the shifts that have taken place on both sides in the last fifty years or so, under three principal headings. the approach to practical reasoning and casuistry, their philosophical assumptions and background; and their theological presuppositions. All three chapters seem to me admirable. His philosophical analysis is direct and uncomplicated; and his stress on the problems of the relationship between nature and grace seems to me to be entirely correct and extremely well worked out. In a brief review, it is not possible to give even an outline of the results of his detailed inquiry without the risk of oversimplification. In general, however, his thesis is twofold. There has, in all three areas, been a movement towards what might be called the middle ground. Catholics have become more conscious of the Biblical dimension of moral theology, and Protestants more aware of the need for a philosophical underpinning for their theological reasonings. Protestants have endeavoured to develop a much more rigorous approach to particular moral issues, and Catholics have recognised the necessity of making sure that their casuistic tradition does not become a moral straitjacket. Secondly, however, and heartening as these convergences doubtless are, Gustafson argues strongly that there remain basic disagreements in method and approach which are not much nearer to being solved. He sees the principal need to be the working out of an approach to the 'sources' of Christian ethics

(Biblical and subsequent tradition, philosophical insight, scientific information, and human experience) which is both comprehensive and systematic. It is not enough, he would maintain, for moral theologians to move towards the middle ground if they do so merely in a somewhat haphazard and pragmatic way. Those who blunder across one another in a mist may at most raise two cheers for companionship.

Three cheers, then, for the study of method! Gustafson has shown that such an enterprise need not at all be divorced from more immediately practical concerns, and I think his book demonstrates that the time is ripe for such an undertaking to begin. I venture to suggest that, on the evidence of this book, there are few people better equipped to give a lead in the field.

The book is modestly priced, and besides raising central issues in an unambiguous way, offers by far the best survey I know of recent work in Christian ethics. Its range is considerable, and its even handed clarity a delight. Highly recommended.

Gerard J. Hughes, S.J.,

THREE MILE AN HOUR GOD. By Kosuko Koyama. SCM Press. £2.95.

The theologian Kosuko Koyama comes to the Bible from his roots in the Japan of the 1930 to 1945 wars and from the atmosphere of the plurality of religions and cultures of South East Asia -Shintoism, Buddhism, Hinduism, Zoroastrianism, Islam and Asian Christianity. Added to all this is his experience of society and education in the West and his extensive Biblical studies. His previous book, "Waterbuffalo Theology", aroused much interest a few years ago.

In his preface, Koyama stands in the new prosperous Tokyo of 1978: "Why is there such total destruction? I asked in the wilderness of Tokyo. Gradually I began to see the mysterious relationship between destruction and idolatry—not only for the individual but for the life of the nation." This book is a collection of 46 Biblical reflections as he seeks the source of healing for the wounds inflicted by the destructive power of idolatry—whether this be the false worship of the nation/emperor, technology or religious practices, Christian or other.

The book is divided into four sections, "Life-Deepening", "World Meeting", "Nation Searching" and "Justice Insisting". The personal experience of God in the Christ who confronts evil in the place of inter-section, the Cross, leads on to reflections on the Incarnation in Israel, the land of inter-section of races, languages, religions and world-empires. From this whole-world view, Koyama passes on to see the impact of the Incarnation on the life of nations, particularly on Japan. This leads him to complete the circle in the section on Justice, back—or forward -to the dignity of human life which is meant for communion with God.

These reflections are high-lighted with refreshing images from Japanese, Indian and Thai thought-forms and customs, with vivid pictures from daily life, reminding one of Jesus' own parables. He digs deeply into the meaning of words, and blends all with a penetrating Biblical scholarship. Particularly arresting for me is his use of the Bridge symbolism from Zoroastrianism and Buddhism connecting it with the Roman use of "Pontiff" for Emperor and Pope and contrasting this with the Cross symbolism, the encounter by Christ with the chaotic waters of tribulation *under* the bridge of safety.

This is a book for spiritual nurture, but not one which leaves the reader wrapt in a cocoon of holy isolationism. It seeks to relate the depth meeting with God -at a 3-miles-an-hour pace—with the world's present spiritual malaise. Personal factors play a large part in whether such a book will find approval or not, but it would be surprising if most Western readers did not find something in these reflections to provoke new thought and understanding.

Jean Robinson

THE PASTORAL NATURE OF THE MINISTRY. By Frank Wright. SCM, 1980. 89pp. £2.50.

As Canon Frank Wright acknowledges at the outset of this excellent little book, the pastoral

work of the churches in this country is not built on any very solid foundation of pastoral theology. In the Church of England especially, too much is expected of parish clergy in the way of training their curates who in practice just have to get on with the job without much help in bridging the gap between theological theory and parish experience. In an age of professional specialisation, this is bound to make the pastor ask: What is the area of my professionalism? He is not likely to be much comforted with the assurance that he is the last glorious amateur! The pastor may be trained theologically but not feel himself to be a theologian or even a teacher, his claim to the cure or care of souls is now challenged by other obviously qualified professions. No wonder many clergy turn to administration or to liturgy in order to claim at least that dimension of professional expertise.

This small book is therefore very welcome since it does at least begin to unpack some of the questions which contribute to the pastoral uncertainty in today's church. Canon Wright suggests that the uniqueness of Christian ministry lies in a difference of context from other pastoral work it is based on a vision, a sense of the sublime, which transforms the pastor himself and his pastoral relationships. Acting upon the vision of man's wholeness which we see in Jesus Christ, the pastor seeks to call men and women to that fulness of life and to that mature humanity. But it seems that Canon Wright is not clear in his own mind what is the relationship between what the Church has traditionally called sanctification and what today's psychological writers speak of as 'personal growth' and 'self-actualisation'. But perhaps when Jesus speaks of the self which is to be denied, and Maslow speaks of the self which is to be actualised, the problem is essentially one of language rather than of meaning. When psychologists speak of self-fulfilment, this is something quite different from the gratification of selfish desires which Jesus urges men to deny. Is it possible to suggest that the 'self' which is to be actualised is what St Paul means when he speaks of the 'formation of Christ' within us?

Although we may well understand the pastor's search for a dimension of professional expertise, the author wisely points to the dangers of imposing a distance in this way between those who help and those who need help. The model which Jesus gives us of the one who cares and who brings healing is one which includes within itself weakness and helplessness. Jung himself agreed that only the wounded physician heals and can heal only insofar as he has been healed himself.

I would like to hope that this book will play a part in the renewal of pastoral theology in this country and also stimulate the essential dialogue between religion and the psychological sciences which has never been taken up here in the way it has, for example, in the United States.

John Slater

ERRATA in Vol. II No. 2

We regret there were two errors in the review by J.M. Ross of *Text and Interpretation: Studies in the New Testament presented to Matthew Black*:

p.86 4th paragraph, last sentence should read:

He thinks it surprising that this interpretation, to be found in Bengel's *Gnomon*, has been so long neglected. Jacques Dupont gives additional reasons for the reading *henos de estin chreia* in Luke x.42, beyond those in the U.B.S. *Textual Commentary*, and expresses surprise that the editors of the U.B.S. Greek New Testament rated its probability so low as C.

p.87 2nd paragraph, line 10 should read:

valuable inference for Christian ethics today.