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' *"THEOLOGY IS ABOUT GOD." DISCUSS.*'[1]

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There is certainly plenty of theology around. Theology of race, theology of sex, theology of hope, theology of joy, theology of work, theology of unemployment, theology of power, theology of prayer, of worship, of mission, black theology, liberation theology, political theology, feminist theology, Marxist theology. The word 'theology', too, has passed into current jargon, though not in a flattering sense. It means, roughly, "an aprioristic, doctrinaire system of thought"; and a 'theological' answer to a question, say, in politics, is one derived from such a system of thought without regard either to the facts of the situation or the practicalities of dealing with them.

So, as I said, one way and another there is a good deal of theology about, of one sort or another. But the sort there is not a good deal of is the theology of God. "Oh, come", you may say, "all theology is about God. That is what the word means. What it says about God may be said indirectly, by back reflection from analysis of the world, but it is said." I do not deny this for a moment. My complaint is that theologies of this or that do indeed say a great deal about God; but because there is little proper 'theology of God' today, no attempt is made to check whether what is said is coherent or believable. Some theological writing makes *en passant* a great number of seeming statements about God; but if we collect them together, there is no way in which they can be fitted to one another. Such a work is *A Theology of Human Hope* by Rubem Alves. The word 'God' appears, if not on every page, yet with moderate frequency; but I do not see how, at the end of the book, it is possible to glean from these references any concept of God in himself, even a negative concept. 'God' is grammatically a substantive in the author's use; but God's function in the author's world-view is purely adjectival. God-statements are, in the end, poetic ways of referring to the quality of transcendence without which human freedom is, on Alves' scheme, impossible. In other words, liberation theology is the only theology because freedom is the *sine qua non* of human life, and therefore it is legitimate to describe the political and psychological attitudes that favour freedom as 'God's politics', 'God's purposes', 'God's salvation', because 'God' is our word *par excellence* for what is supremely important or significant—a use not at all unlike the adjectival use of *elohim* in the Hebrew of the Old Testament. But if you ask who or what is this 'God' who apparently has 'politics' and 'purposes', an answer is systematically excluded, because that would be to encourage Man in his fatal tendency to rest in an absolute, the ultimate enemy of freedom. It would, certainly, be possible to argue that this God is known here and now only in the world experienced in a certain way, but that beyond this world the God we have known thus indirectly will be revealed to us. But to Alves any such idea is anathema. "Transcendence triumphs," he writes, "when all absolutes disappear and when man has to live in the 'holy insecurity' of a totally secular world." Only such a world is one that Man can "accept

[1] A lecture given to the King's College Theological Society at King's College, London, on Friday, November 3rd, 1978.

. . . as his home". "The language of faith, as a language determined by and for history, does not speak about a meta-historical, meta-worldly realm in which hopes are fulfilled and sufferings are brought to an end . . . it is within [the] historical and earthly context and content that it speaks about the reality and possibility of human liberation, about the reality and possibility of freedom for life." For faith, then, this world is the only one in which God can be known, and we must therefore be content to know him only as a poetic epithet, a word from the past the content of which can equally well be expressed in other terms. We may well agree that to use a word that appears, at any rate, to denote something in this way, is probably the highest achievement of which faith is capable; for it is, in effect, to say, "This word seems to have absolutely no independent meaning whatever, but whatever it is that it does refer to I believe in." Needless to say, this basic standpoint yields some pretty achievements in the art of demythologising. Thus Alves quotes with approval some words of Norman O. Brown: "The question confronting mankind is the abolition of repression—in the traditional Christian language, the resurrection of the body. The resurrection of the body is a social project facing mankind as a whole, and it will become a practical political problem when the statesmen of the world are called upon to deliver happiness instead of power." Alves criticises Brown only for thinking that this project can be achieved by "psychiatry or any other process of individual liberation." "What is necessary . . . is a praxis that liberates society from the structures of repression."

It may be hard to see why the word 'Theology' appears in the title of Alves' book at all. It is not hard in the least to see why it is used by that great prophet of the political theology movement, Jürgen Moltmann. Moltmann wrestles constantly with the idea of God. He is also, by any criteria, I believe, a very great writer. Yet it is my firm conviction, which I recently tried to express in a review of *The Church in the Power of the Spirit*, that Moltmann's doctrine of God suffers from an inner inconsistency and confusion which make his picture of God ultimately unbelievable, and so vitiate the whole gospel of hope which he is concerned to proclaim. The essential incoherence of his doctrine of God is seen most easily in its moral aspect, the question of the sufferings of the Son and their relation to the Father's love. But this moral inadequacy is, I suspect, partly the result of Moltmann's having no metaphysical concept of what God might be and how he might function. Since he works continually with the Trinitarian conception of God this lack of a metaphysic is disastrous. There is no attempt to give any meaning in terms of the Godhead to a term, for example, absolutely crucial to Moltmann's whole scheme, namely 'Godforsakenness'; but the problem of what this can mean in a Trinitarian faith is surely central, and will never be answered unless the possible metaphysical implications are at least discussed, even if only to discount them.

It is no part of my intention to resume this evening the *Myth of God Incarnate* controversy. We are all, I suspect, glad of a respite from that for the moment. It is, however, worth pointing out in view of our present subject that the lack of a clear or positive doctrine of God was a major underlying embarrassment to that book. On the one hand, it was assumed by the contributors that the metaphysical difficulties of classic incarnation doctrine made that no longer tenable. On the other, various positive proposals were put forward, such as Maurice Wiles's "union of the divine and the human in the depths of the human soul", and Dennis Nineham's future "scenario about God," together with various references to God's activity. But both the negative critique of and the positive replacement for classic incarnation doctrine depend ultimately on a coherent doctrine of God to justify them. God must be such that the old scenario won't work but the new one will. There is, of course, the further issue that the weaknesses of the speculative thinking behind the Chalcedonian definition can be argued to lie basically in its doctrine of God; that is, that the puzzle of how God becomes incarnate is dictated not so much by the difficulty of working the Two Natures—One Person sum in Christ as by the fact that the relation of Nature to Person in God already contained unresolved logical problems. It is, therefore, at least reasonable to ask whether, if we think, as Frances Young obviously does, that at the moral level classic incarnationalism expresses a very profound insight, we might not make progress toward a

more satisfactory theological statement of this by looking again at the way we want to talk about God in himself.

Many theologians, of course, feel that to talk like this is to cry not for the moon (since that we can now have if we want it) but, let us say, for travel beyond the speed of light. This is partly, especially in this country, a surrender to what is still the majority philosophical view that metaphysics is impossible. But it is also something far less elevated, namely, an acceptance of the popular mentality, which says that there are only two kinds of existence. things, which with Dr Johnson you can kick, and thoughts, which exist when there are people to have them, and perish when there are not. Anything else is childish imagination, on the same level as belief in ghosts and fairies. The limitations of theology today are as much as anything a sheer failure of imagination, a foreclosing of possibilities which is in striking contrast, for instance, to the ever more fantastic outreach of imagination in scientific hypotheses. The particular importance, I would suggest, of interest in such matters as 'out-of-body states' is precisely that they awaken the imagination to possibilities that seemed to have been ruled out for good by advancing knowledge. Or, to take another example, some current cosmological theories, which envisage the possibility of an endless series of universes, as each in turn expands outwards and then collapses back into an all-devouring 'black hole', only to explode again and re-start the cycle, provide a very adequate setting for the visions of Origen, and his dizzying series of cosmic years during which the loving purposes of God are finally and ineluctably worked out.

But there is another contributory factor to the present neglect of thought about God, and that is the study of theology today in our universities and colleges. Theology is not studied in order to find answers for ourselves to the questions, 'Is there a God?' and 'What is he like?' Theology is studied in order to find out what other people have thought about these questions; and, where a professional interest does intrude, as with the ordinand, to take over what bits and pieces from these past speculations seem still to be viable. There is a profound but subtle difference here which it is not easy to explain. Perhaps we may try to pinpoint it by asking, "How many theological students expect on their course to learn about God, as opposed to learning what other people say about God?" The answer, I suspect, is very few indeed. And let me sharpen the point by saying that to come to the study of Theology to learn what Christianity says about God, because I am a Christian, and that is what I need to know, is still not authentically learning about God but only learning what others think about him. Of course, the thoughts of the wise of all ages are very important. We need to study them with all the scholarly rigour urged upon us years ago, and so signally exemplified in our tutors. But *why* do we study them? To learn what they thought, because it was historically a stepping-stone on the way to what we think? To learn what they thought because we are required to think the same? Or to learn what they thought in order that it may help us to arrive at the truth? Let me put it in concrete form. If someone says to himself, "If God is real, then surely he must make some difference to life; what might that be?"—then he has a genuine motive for trying to understand what the prophets, the sages, the apocalyptists, Jesus himself, and many other people, not only Christians, have said. But if all he thinks to himself is: "These people are all in the Bible, I had better find out what they had to say"—then his motive is not genuine, at any rate not genuinely religious. One must be interested in the questions that are asked if there is to be any seriousness in one's relation to the answers, nay more, one must think of these writers as seriously potential givers of answers, or pointers toward possible answers, even if those answers are no more than "There is no answer", or, "You must live with the question because it is better to do that than to dismiss it as a non-question." So, I would say, all theological syllabuses start at the wrong end. We ought to start students off with questions like, "Is there a God?" or "Why do people suffer?"—or rather, if they do not wish to ask such questions, transfer them to English Literature or Civil Engineering, for if they do not want to find answers to such questions they have no business reading Theology—and then, when they are stuck at this point or that send them off to an Old Testament scholar to learn about the Psalms and Job and Daniel, or to a New Testament scholar to study the Passion narratives and St Paul, to a doctrinal

theologian, to an expert on Buddhism; and then come back to pool what they have learned, and say how it now seems. Always it ought to be the ultimate questions which send them off and motivate them to learn from others; the task of tutors and lecturers is to guide them to the relevant wisdom and explain its background and meaning. The tools too that will be needed fall into place, but into unusual places, and sometimes they will be unusual tools. For one thing I have argued for years; and still do not understand how anyone can be expected to do serious theology without a grounding in logic. Nor do I think anyone could seriously probe very far into the question of God as Creator without demanding to know something basic about the scientific study of the universe. The same would apply to any serious engagement with ethics. How many there are who hold forth with apparent absolute certainty about God's law in the race situation, who could not put two coherent sentences together explaining what racial distinctions are! In short, it is not so much the content of theological study which is wrong, though there are mistakes here, but the end from which it is approached. The result is that many never get round to asking the big questions at all, or, if they do, never connect what they have learned with any possible answers. The tradition feeds them nothing. They give their own superficial and vapid reflections, taking for granted that what other generations have said is of purely academic interest. Some, it is true, regard the legacy of the past in a different light. For them, the words in the sacred text have all the answers. But the tragedy here is that they go on believing this, even when their innermost soul protests with tears that this or that answer is inadequate, or even wrong. They are not authentically interested in truth, because the veridical quality of an answer is determined not by what it says but by where it occurs. They go to the sources not to be made wise in their personal snwers, but to be well informed in their official answers. The terrifying result is then so often that the questions cease to be human; they no longer feel them as agonizing or urgent. Only those can feel the questions as humanly important who know that all answers are fundamentally deficient.

And so it is with the great central question of God himself, for to an essential Yes or No to this question all our ultimate enquiries return. If a man or woman has a burning enough zeal to find the answer to the question of God, then that man or woman is qualified to study theology and can study it with benefit, and no one else either is or can. I can say that in this building and to this company, because of recent years Kings has been uniquely blest among Theological Departments and Colleges in having had scholars who believed in the primacy of the subject of God, and who were prepared to try to say something about him when all around others were abandoning the attempt, men who have cared about the truth of God, and have bent all their varied cares and studies that way.

It may be thought that I am harsh and sweeping in my strictures on the contemporary theological scene. Before, then, I go on to be even more so, let me state clearly and emphatically that in the anxiety I am now about to express I include myself. Perhaps indeed I am the only guilty one; you must judge. If I am, my next remarks will obviously be a great waste of time, however, so I apologize in advance, and promise to keep them brief. What worries me deeply about the current Christian scene in this country is, once again, that we have two depressing choices. On the one hand, though God may often be mentioned, his role is described in terms which make him wholly superfluous. To be quite blunt about it, he does absolutely nothing—or rather, the things he is said to do are No-things. He does not, for instance, 'answer' prayer. William Temple started the rot here, with his endlessly quoted maxim about prayer being not to bend God's will to ours but to conform our will to his. There probably never was a time when Christians did more intercession than they do today; but ironically, there also never was a time when they were more dubious in their heart of hearts about its value. All those cycles of prayer, those carefully worked out petitions at the Eucharist, what do they effect? Are they a sophisticated form of telepathy? Why are their results so random? If we say that this is because God answers sometimes Yes, sometimes No, on what basis can we distinguish those answers from what would have happened anyway? These are old questions, but they have considerable staying power. Consequently, the feeling spreads that prayer is basically a way of getting *us* to do something, perhaps *God's* way of getting us to do something, but not one that requires any action on his part. A similar development can be detected in the area of ideas

about grace. Grace is felt more and more to be something that is given through our own attitudes and behaviour to one another. The acid test here is the increasing emphasis on the Christian community as the indispensable factor. We have to do for each other what God used to do directly in his dialogue with the soul. Extended in a missionary direction this becomes the so-called 'Social Gospel'—the belief that God's love is revealed and effective only through human caring. Without disputing the necessity for human caring—what disciple of Jesus could properly do that?—one may still ask: if the power to care comes from the care we ourselves receive, where does God come into it? Is he, so to say, just the moral *primum mobile*? If so, could not a better case be made for Jesus as this *primum mobile*? And is that not precisely what for many theologians Jesus is anyway, the One who, by words and actions no longer significantly recoverable set in train an enterprise which has developed far beyond his vision, and now has its own constantly maturing character and momentum? One may, if one wishes to be orthodox, ascribe this to God the Holy Spirit, or with Teilhard to the entelechy of a cosmic Christ; but the changes tally so closely to changes in the values and programmes of human society that many cannot help wondering if they are not superfluous hypotheses. Is God not now a strictly constitutional sovereign, who may still announce bravely that 'My Government' will do this or that, but the speech is written by a human Cabinet, and any Bills they can get through God will automatically sign? By virtue of long experience God may know that these measures are disastrous, but there can be no question of blocking them. The built-in consequences of folly and wickedness you may, if you wish, describe as "divine judgment", and there is Scriptural precedent for so doing; but once again we are left with the question, "What difference does God make? Is he a real factor?" The same question-mark stands against the recent revival of language about 'God's purposes in history', or "opening our eyes to what God is doing today." Is it anything more than mere rhetoric, designed to sanctify a variety of political programmes and even violent revolution? Or to bolster up religion by crediting God with the achievements of humankind's better side?

These are well-worn issues, but only because little has been said to resolve them. One brief and, I consider, very helpful discussion of the problem of divine action in ths world—for all these separate questions reduce eventually to that—is the lecture which Maurice Wiles gave some years ago in the University of Manchester, and which is now available in his Explorations volume from S.P.C.K. It was called "Religious Authority and Divine Action", and faced squarely the question, "How can we go on using biblical language about God acting in the world?" Maurice's answer was that God's action, seen as such, is never simply a bare event, unilaterally caused, but a complex of event and response. What makes anything a divine act is the fact that it is responded to as divine, and only so becomes visible for what it is, namely when its divine character is revealed precisely by someone's ability to respond to it as divine. Thus, we may say, the escape from Egypt is revealed as divine act by Moses' acceptance and use of it as such, perils, disasters and all. Supremely, in the Cross of Christ, we see Jesus take failure, defeat and death, and respond to them as God's act, thus not, and it is vital to stress this, not making them God's act by acceptance and use, but revealing the reality of divine action hidden in them and in himself, and thus enabling us to say of them and him as one unity, "This hath God done." Jesus on the Cross thus becomes the (or a) supreme instance of divine action. Wiles is here developing thoughts which he quotes from Peter Baelz, *Prayer and Providence*, and from Schubert Ogden; but the basic approach is, of course, much older. It is present, for instance, in a famous passage of William Law: "Would you know who is the greatest saint in the world? It is not he who prays most or fasts most, it is not he who gives most alms, or is most eminent for temperance, chastity or justice; but it is he who is always thankful to God, who wills everything that God willeth, who receives everything as an instance of God's goodness, and has a heart always ready to praise God for it."

Obviously there are differences between Law's picture and that of the theologians I have mentioned. Law sees all events as determined by God for the best; they are, we may say, particular Providences. The saint is the one who sees this and responds to it worthily; to others it may often be veiled. The view of Baelz is rather that in the response of the saint, and supremely of

Jesus, to the God-given situation there occurs a creative act which makes the event into a divine act, realizes its potential: "Creator and creature are here at one. The divine love has conquered. God remains eternally the same God; but in and through the obedient response of Jesus his activity is more fully discerned because more fully expressed." Ogden's view is slightly different again. Wiles gives the famous words from Ogden's essay on Bultmann: "The New Testament claim 'only in Jesus Christ' must be interpreted to mean not that God acts to redeem only in the event of Jesus and in no other event, but that the only God who acts to redeem any event—*although in fact he redeems every event*—is the God whose redemptive action is decisively revealed in the Word which Jesus speaks and is."

I myself find it hard to attach much meaning to Ogden's words here. The whole sentence is a tangle of confusions. What is meant by God redeeming every event? We have slipped carelessly from God acting *in* the event of Jesus to redeem to God redeeming all events, presumably including the event of Jesus. The argument to be coherent ought to have run from God acting to redeem *in* the Jesus-event to God acting to redeem in all events, but being decisively revealed as doing so in Jesus. Jesus reveals that God is always and everywhere active to redeem. But how? How does an event become redemptive if there is no Jesus to complete it? Were all the other Roman crosses God active to redeem? Hardly so. Perhaps that is why Ogden slipped unconsciously into saying that God acts to redeem every event—simply because so many events seem to need redeeming. But by what possible line of argument can we move from Jesus as a redeeming event to everything as a redeeming event? Is it not much more logical to see Jesus, the particular fact of Jesus, as the *differentia* which makes this event one of divine redemption, distinct from other events? Baelz feels this, but is also aware of another trap opening up. If Jesus' response to his God-given predicament is what makes the event a special act of God, then why call it an act of *God* at all? So he writes: "(God's) activity meets with the creaturely response which it seeks and towards which it is directed. It is fulfilled in the response which it evokes. It penetrates and enables the relatively independent activity of the creature." Once more we watch the anxious wrigglings of Semi-Pelagianism. In what sense did God's activity evoke Jesus's response? What was God's activity in the case of the Cross? How did it 'enable' Jesus to make his response? And what response? Baelz makes it easy for himself by quoting John's *tetelestai* , "It is finished." Would the argument have run so well, if he had quoted "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me"? All these attempts to explain God's activity in terms of human response, Wiles's as well, eventually collapse, because they simply will not take seriously the reality of *evil*. "All events are divine; but when one includes a human response of love it becomes a special divine act, revelatory and redemptive"—that is what they seem to be saying. "All events also seek to evoke and enable such a response"—that too is explicitly stated. One can ask only, What world are they living in? What century? What earthly paradise?

A long way back I used the words, "On the one hand," to introduce this investigation into those Christians today who seem to be talking about God as real but are not. I have not forgotten that there ought to be an, "On the other hand", which must be briefer. The opposite pole in contemporary Christianity is, of course, that which finds God's activity plentifully: guidance is given which is amazingly vindicated by the results; prayers are answered specifically and speedily; the sick are healed, miraculous gifts of tongues, the literal speaking of other languages, unknown to the speaker, are vouchsafed. These experiences confirm belief in the biblical testimony, and in the traditional interpretation of Jesus and his work. God is very real for such people, and the anomalies and difficulties—why are some prayers answered, not others? what about guidance which leads to human disasters? what about similar phenomena among people of other religions or no religion at all?—are never seriously considered. But it is not hard to see why this wing of the Church grows and advances. It does have something to offer—it has *a* God. The other approach is one of practical atheism. Can we say anything to stir its adherents from the creeping paralysis that has almost extinguished religious belief in them?

The first point to which we might draw their attention is that the evidence they are prepared to take seriously is carefully limited. It is highly significant that they will not accept, as in any

sense an objective reality, that event without which there would have been no Christian faith at all: the Resurrection of Jesus. That there are many profound problems attaching to this story no one will deny. But only on *a priori* grounds can we rule out the view that the resurrection faith of the disciples was the proper interpretation of phenomena which they experienced, and which were of such a kind as to have existed even if there had been no one to experience them. And if their interpretation was correct then this was an event which within the terms of the universe as we know them is impossible, and therefore, unless we are prepared to suspend judgment indefinitely, calls for explanation in a frame of reference beyond that of the universe we observe.

Those who exclude the Resurrection of Jesus make life easy in one way: a Deist absentee landlord with a soft heart imposes no strain on the mind. He could as easily be true as not. He can be taken out of the cupboard like a Teddy Bear for comfort at times of stress or bereavement. But in the end he is not worth bothering about. He makes no difference. He is certainly not needed to complete our understanding of Jesus, for he bears no resemblance to any God that Jesus ever talked about. Anything worthwhile about Jesus is much more convincingly explained in purely human terms. It has never been in any way clear to me why anyone should see Jesus's death on the Cross as a triumph of love and goodness. All right: let us say that he did die forgiving his enemies. That may have been a triumph over himself and his natural impulses to bitterness and hatred. But it was in no sense a triumph of love and goodness in the world or in the lives of others. There is nothing whatever to suggest that the people he forgave were ever prompted by that to ask themselves whether they needed forgiveness, much less to be changed by it. There is nothing to suggest that his own friends saw it as a victory of any sort, or that their presuppositions could have left them free to do so. By all moral, human standards of judgment the Cross was a disaster and a defeat. It may have been a victory on Jesus's part to accept such defeat rather than bend or desert his convictions--but how do we know that that has anything to do with God? To talk about Jesus as revealing God's love on the Cross is mere self-delusion. There was no way, no way at all in which anyone could at the time have seen in the Crucified Jesus anything remotely approaching a revelation of God. Nor do I believe that at any period of history would anyone have seen him as such. It is a matter of simple historical fact that we have learned to see him as such only because of the primitive Church's belief in the Resurrection. That is what connects Jesus with God, that and that alone.

But if we accept this resurrection faith then we are, I believe, accepting that bogey of all right-minded philosophically trained theologians, an interventionist God. And once accept that, and where do you stop? In a book which has had an incalculable influence on me, *The Pillar of Fire* by Karl Stern, there is a passage which is relevant to our point. Stern was a Jew who eventually became a Roman Catholic, after fleeing from Germany as a refugee from the Nazis. At one point in his life he went to see Martin Buber: "I told him that I had been studying the Epistle of St John, and that I found there the spirit of Judaism expressed with such purity and in such overwhelming intensity that I could not understand why we did not accept the New Testament . . . To this he replied that he could well understand my enthusiasm. 'However', he said, 'if you want to accept Christ and the New Testament . . you must also believe in the Virgin Birth and the Resurrection of Christ from the dead.' . . . He began to talk of the giving of the Law on Sinai, and whether God really pronounced the ten commandments himself in his own Voice . . . 'Perhaps there was only one word said.' . . . In retrospect it is interesting that I could not at all understand why the Voice of Sinai as a true physical phenomenon . . . presented a problem to Buber. He was much more logical than I. Because if that Voice was possible, then the Incarnation was possible too." And to a Christian one may say, Accept the Resurrection, and the whole world is open and vulnerable to the activity of God, not in the general sense of creation and sustaining, but at particular historical points. God can and will act within history, not totally submerged in ordinary realities, but between these realities, in unique and discontinuous ways. And what sort of a God is that? How are we to think of him? Theology *is* about God. Christian Theology ought to be about the God implied by the foundation beliefs of the Christian community.

One more point. Why should God act in that way? I think I have already said enough to hint

why, as I see it, he might have done. The fact of evil—or, if you prefer it, evil facts. The co-existence of evil and good in the universe is proof enough that God's generalised, providential activity is not sufficient to overcome evil. And if divine victory depends on our response to his prompting in creation, then God might as well give up, for the human race at large is not so nice as British or American theologians. If the response of any rational creatures, here or in other worlds, has any essential part to play, then it will not be evoked except by the two-fold assurance that God is with us, in our predicament, that God will not forsake us for all our evil, and that God will win—through the grave and gate of suffering and death no doubt—but win in the end. That is the source of faith and hope and commitment to love; and that is what faith in the Resurrection offers us. The Resurrection suggests indeed a great many things which I cannot go into now: to mention but one, it suggests to me that evil was spiritual in origin and that the universe was made to be the place and means whereby evil should be defeated. But, speculation apart, I am passionately convinced that there is a divine programme to destroy evil; that we are privileged to play a small part in it by taking up the Cross and following Christ; that God has opened our eyes and inspired our hearts to this by his interventionist act in raising Jesus from the dead; and that to jettison faith in that act as superfluous is to do one's damnedest for the victory of evil against God. If our doctrine of God does not allow for the Resurrection of Jesus then Theology's first task must be to find a doctrine of God that does allow for it, for that alone will be the truth. And if there is anything more important than finding for our lost and bewildered race the truth about God I do not know what it may be.