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JOURNAL OF  
THE TRANSACTIONS  
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SECRETARY: E. WALTER MAUNDER, F.R.A.S.

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1915.

## 562ND ORDINARY GENERAL MEETING.

HELD IN COMMITTEE ROOM B, THE CENTRAL HALL,  
WESTMINSTER, ON MONDAY, JANUARY 18TH, 1915,  
AT 4.30 P.M.

THE VERY REV. HENRY WACE, D.D., DEAN OF CANTERBURY,  
TOOK THE CHAIR.

The Minutes of the preceding Meeting were read and confirmed.

The CHAIRMAN introduced the Rev. Canon E. McClure, and said that there were few men to whom the Church of England owed a greater debt than to the Literary Secretary of the Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge. He congratulated him on his courage in dealing with so wide a subject as "Modernism," since the amount of literature to be mastered was so immense. But he had great qualifications for this task, and no man was better able to fulfil it.

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### MODERNISM AND TRADITIONAL CHRISTIANITY.—

By the Rev. Canon E. McCLURE, M.A., M.R.I.A.

THE movement within the Roman Communion, named "Modernism" in the Papal Encyclical *Pascendi*, belongs to the present century. Its earliest exponent was Alfred Loisy, a French priest, who, in his *L'Évangile et l'Église* (Paris, 1902), laid down the principles of this fresh presentation of Christianity. This work was followed by other volumes of the same author, and by others emanating from the same school.

#### M. LOISY ON THE GOSPELS.

M. Loisy, in the work just named, shows how the Gospel is regarded from the Modernist point of view. This position may be best gathered from a short summary of his opinions thereon.

The Gospels, according to M. Loisy, are a patchwork, in which anything of an historical character is blended with a large amount of legend. The dates to which he ascribes the Synoptic Gospels are not those accepted by experts in this

country, or by Harnack in Germany. M. Loisy thinks the Gospel according to St. Mark was written at a period subsequent to the destruction of Jerusalem, probably about 75 A.D., and that its author was an unknown Christian of Hellenic culture. The Gospel of St. Matthew he ascribes to a non-Palestinian Jew who compiled it about the beginning of the second century. The narratives peculiar to St. Mark are, M. Loisy thinks, to be regarded rather as legendary developments having no historical value, than as real reminiscences. The chapters about the birth of Christ have not, in M. Loisy's opinion, the slightest historical foundation.

St. Luke's Gospel was probably written, he thinks, between 90 and 100 A.D. Certain touching passages in it—such as Christ weeping over Jerusalem, His prayer for His executioners, His promise to the penitent thief, and His last words, may, says M. Loisy, be in conformity with this spirit, but they have no traditional basis.\* The genealogical descent of Jesus through Joseph was, according to M. Loisy, an interpolation introduced in order to support the later idea of a Virgin Birth. As for the Fourth Gospel, it is in no sense historical, but the work, M. Loisy says, of the first and greatest Christian mystic.

#### M. LOISY'S OPINION OF CHRIST.

M. Loisy gleans from his critical examination of the Gospels the views of the "Career of Jesus," summarized as follows:—

Jesus was born of a pious family, about four years before the Christian Era. The terrifying teaching of St. John Baptist had for Him, as well as for many others, a great attraction, and He accepted Baptism at his hands. He attempted also to take his place when John was imprisoned and began by preaching around the Lake of Galilee, where He was compelled by the persistent demands of the crowd to "work miracles." This mission lasted only a few months, but was long enough to enable Him to enrol twelve auxiliaries, who, travelling two and two throughout the villages of Galilee, prepared His coming. Those who flocked to hear Him belonged to the lowest class. The main point in His teaching was the advent of the Kingdom of God—the sudden and speedy coming, or return, of the Messiah. His teaching was not acceptable to the Pharisees or the authorities and their hostility obliged Him to fly to the region

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\* *Les Évangiles Synoptiques*, p. 119.

north of Galilee. A conference with His disciples at Cæsarea Philippi led to a visit to the capital in order to proclaim Him there as the promised Messiah.

As they approached Jerusalem His disciples were afraid at the risks they were running, but Jesus calmed their fears by promising that they should soon be set on twelve thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel. In His entry into Jerusalem He exhibited His first manifestation of authority by cleansing the Temple courts, an act of violence in which, M. Loisy continues, He was doubtless assisted by His disciples. For some days after He preached daily about the Coming Kingdom, foiling with great dexterity the traps set for Him by the authorities. "But," says Loisy, "the situation could end only in a miracle or a catastrophe, and the catastrophe happened."\*

Jesus was arrested after a brief struggle between the satellites of the High Priest and His disciples, and the latter, without waiting to see the end, fled northward to their homes.

When brought before Pilate, Jesus probably answered "Yes" to the question whether He claimed to be a King. "But," adds Loisy, "the Johannine phrase, 'My kingdom is not of this world,' could never have been uttered by the Christ of history." This confession led naturally to His execution. "After which," Loisy continues, "we may imagine that the soldiers detached the body from the cross before evening, and placed it in some common ditch, into which it was customary to throw the remains of the executed. The conditions of burial were such that after the lapse of a few hours it would have been impossible to recognize the Carcase of the Saviour, even if it were sought for."†

The disciples, however, had been too profoundly stirred, Loisy says, to accept defeat. None of them, he asserts, had seen Jesus die, and, although they knew he was dead, they hardly believed it. Besides, they were fellow countrymen, Loisy continues, of those who had asked whether Jesus was not Elijah, or even John Baptist come to live again. What more natural, Loisy asks, than that Peter while fishing one day on the Lake should see the Master? "The impulse once given," Loisy adds, "this belief grew by the very need which it had to strengthen itself." Christ "appeared to the eleven." So it was their faith brought them back to Jerusalem and Christianity was born.

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\* *Ibid.*, p. 218.

† *Ibid.*, p. 223.

### FOUNDATIONS OF THE MODERNIST VIEW.

This is a startlingly novel presentation of the Gospels, and one naturally asks for the grounds upon which it is based.

The attitude of Modernists of the French school to the traditional presentation of Christianity depends on complicated causes, but chief among these is a conviction that an accommodation of the Christian Creeds to the critical views of intelligent men is absolutely essential. Scholarship, they contend, has given us the *real* Gospel—which differs much from the traditional—and enables us to construct afresh the true portrait of the Central Figure. If the Christian religion is to meet the needs of the present age, it must, they urge, be rebuilt upon this new base. They do not deny, but rather maintain, that the Roman Church of to-day is a natural evolution of the *traditional* New Testament. The base it is which is faulty, and the whole structure must be rebuilt. We see at the moment how the process of laying new foundations and making a new structure has fared at the hands of one of the leaders in the Modernist movement.

M. Loisy has given us lately a species of autobiography under the title of *Choses Passées*, that is, we may roughly translate it, "*Things Outlived.*" He had ministered at the altar of his Church until November, 1906, and even then, when the authorities had prohibited him from saying Mass, all he could say was that "This act had not lost for me all religious significance." He had given up, as he tells us, not only the faith of his childhood, but he no longer accepted any article of the Creed in any ordinary sense, unless the clause "Suffered under Pontius Pilate!" With this small residuum of the traditional creed he had still, before his excommunication, strange to say, faith in Christianity, that is, his concept of it, as a tremendous force in the world; and even towards the end of his ecclesiastical career consented to a proposal made to Rome by the Prince of Monaco, that he should be appointed Bishop of Monte Carlo! In 1908 he was excommunicated. Was it any wonder?

### TYRRELL'S VIEWS.

It was not long before the Modernist movement had found representatives in this country. Among these the late Father George Tyrrell stood out pre-eminent.

Tyrrell was born of Protestant parents at Dublin, in 1861. He has given us a short autobiography which has been admirably

supplemented by the Hon. Miss Petre in the *Life* published by her shortly after Tyrrell's death. In 1878 Tyrrell matriculated at Trinity College, Dublin, and began about the same time to attend surreptitiously Mass at Roman churches. In the following year he came to London, where he became less and less attached to Anglicanism and was at length received into the Roman Communion, but, as he says, "Personal relation of the whole matter to God was then, as now, very weakly conceived and felt."

He entered the noviciate of the Society of Jesus in 1880, and from that time until his dismissal in 1906 his critical and somewhat irritable mind was almost in continuous conflict with the principles of the Order.

#### TYRRELL ON SCHOLASTICISM.

He was captivated at first with Scholasticism, or rather with its great exponent, St. Thomas Aquinas, but he came finally to see that "the realism it defends plays," as he says, "into the hands of idealism." Yet, he adds, "it is perhaps not a more gross thought-system than that which Christ had to use as the vehicle of His revelation." Scholasticism was, at any rate, the *only* philosophy of the Roman Church: "it was, in fact," as he says, "Catholic philosophy by which our religion must stand or fall," and "every other system is, therefore, non-Catholic and heretical."

He saw that it is "necessarily the most coherent of all systems: every possible objection had been raised, and an answer found for it in accordance with the general underlying assumptions. To question or criticize these last," he says, "is to put one's self out of the pale of intelligence, and even of civility: as Kant and the critical school have done." And he gradually put himself outside this pale.

Scholasticism, while borrowing much from Aristotle, was a reaction against the view that the intellectual side of our nature was not *individual* but of a *universal* character. The "unity of the intellect" theory was regarded as a kind of Pantheism. It was, in the view of Aquinas, an illegitimate deduction from the philosophy of Aristotle. The active intellect could not be regarded rightly as a manifestation of a universal mind—as an attribute of a Cosmic Being or Existence. In the eyes of the Schoolmen such a doctrine would destroy individual personality and the root of morality.

## THOMAS AQUINAS.

Thomas Aquinas was born in 1227, and died in 1274. Following his master, Albertus Magnus, he adapted Aristotle to a complete scheme of Christian theology—with the following result: God makes known His will to men in two ways, by Reason and Revelation. These are not in antagonism, but support each other. Revelation consists of Scripture and Tradition; the latter is gathered from the teaching of the Fathers, the decisions of General Councils, etc. Reason is not the reason of any one person, but that of which the working is exhibited by the great philosophic minds of the past, Plato, Aristotle, etc. And just as it was necessary, in order to get a rational view of the universe, to trace back the successive contributions to it of the great thinkers of the past, so was it needful to work back to Scripture through the commentaries of its celebrated exponents. Aquinas began with his immediate great predecessors, and traced back the chain of teaching through them, and through the Fathers of the Church, to Scripture itself. His connected commentaries of the Fathers on the Gospels, based on this method, came afterwards to be called the *Catena Aurea*, or "Golden Chain."

The philosophy of Aristotle, with the Arab commentaries upon it, all in a Latin version, furnished Aquinas with his outlook on the Universe. He himself wrote commentaries on several of the works of Aristotle; and, thus equipped, he began his great work, the *Summa Theologiæ*, or "Sum of Theology," which he did not live quite to finish. That work is divided into three great sections, treating respectively of God, Man, and the God-Man. He thought, with Aristotle, that the existence of God could be proved by Reason, but he departed from his master in believing that the world was *created* and not *eternal*; and also as to the soul, which he regarded as created by God when a body was ready for it.

Like Aristotle, he regarded the world we perceive as *given* to our intelligence, and looked upon man from the point of view of the end to be accomplished. In dealing with the latter section of his subject, he discusses all the ethical, psychological, and theological questions which naturally arise. But the greater part is taken up with ethics. He distinguishes between the theological virtues—Faith, Hope, and Charity—which are *revealed*, and the natural virtues, which are founded on Reason. Faith, it is to be noted, means, with Aquinas,



belief in a proposition under the direction of the will acting on reasonable proof, and not trust in a Person.

The third section of the *Summa* centres the Christian religion on the Incarnation, whence all grace flows, through the Church and its Sacraments, for the redemption of the world. God became man that men might become partakers of the Divine nature. Aquinas did not live to finish this section, but it was completed later by other hands.

"Till about the date of my first essay," writes Tyrrell (*Life*, ii, 164), "I had not a firm faith, but a firm hope in the sufficiency of the philosophy of St. Thomas studied in a critical and liberal spirit." His hope was not realized, and he began to cast about for other means to bring about his reconciliation of the Church with what he considered the demands of modern thought. Newman's *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine* (London, 1845) seemed to Tyrrell at first to offer a means of solving his difficulties.

#### THE THEORY OF DEVELOPMENT.

The doctrine of development was not new in theology. Even as far back as the *Commonitorium* of Vincentius Lerinensis (434 A.D.), it had been advanced as illustrating how what was implicit in doctrine might come to be explicit.\*

Newman applied the theory of development some years before the issue of Darwin's *Origin of Species* to explain how the original "Deposit of the Faith" could be called the same as that held by the Roman Church to-day.

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\* St. Vincentius writes: "But someone will say, perhaps, 'Is there, then, to be no religious progress in Christ's Church?' Progress, certainly, and that the greatest. For who is he so jealous of men and so odious to God who would attempt to forbid it? But progress, mind you, of such sort that it is a true advance, and not a change, in the Faith. For progress implies a growth within the thing itself, while change turns one thing into another. Consequently, the understanding, knowledge, and wisdom of each and all—of each Churchman and of the whole Church—ought to grow and progress greatly and eagerly through the course of ages and centuries, provided that the advance be within its own lines, in the same sphere of doctrine, the same feeling, the same sentiment."

"The growth of religion in the soul should resemble the growth of the body, which, though it develops and unfolds in the course of years, yet remains the same. . . ."

"In like manner it is proper that the doctrines of the Christian Religion should follow these laws of progress, so as to be consolidated by the course of years, amplified by time, refined by age, and yet remain

Newman describes (*Doctrine of Development*, p. 37) what he means by development. "This process is called the development of an idea, being the germination, growth, and perfection of some living, that is influential, truth, or apparent truth, in the minds of men during a sufficient period, and it has this necessary characteristic—that, since its province is the busy scene of human life, it cannot develop at all except either by destroying, or modifying and incorporating with itself, existing modes of thinking and acting. Its development, then, is not like a mathematical theorem worked out on paper, in which each successive advance is a pure evolution from a foregoing, but it is carried through individuals and bodies of men; it employs their minds as instruments, and depends upon them while it uses them.

"It grows where it incorporates; and its purity consists not in isolation, but in its continuity and sovereignty." "It is," he continues, and here he uses Darwinian language before Darwin, "the warfare of ideas, striving for the mastery. . . . It is elevated by trial and struggles into perfection. . . . Here below to live is to change, and to be perfect is to have changed often."

One would have thought there was ample scope here for Father Tyrrell's reforming instincts, but he found at length the

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uncorrupted and unimpaired, full and perfect in all the measurements of its parts, and in all its proper members and senses (so to speak), admitting no further change or loss of distinctive characteristics, allowing no variation of boundary. . . .

"For it is right that the ancient doctrines or heavenly philosophy should, as time goes on, be carefully tended, smoothed, polished; it is not right for them to be changed, maimed, mutilated. They may gain in evidence, light, distinctness, but they must not lose their completeness, integrity, characteristic property.

"If once a licence of impious fraud be permitted, I should shudder to say how great will be the risk of Religion being destroyed and wiped out. For if any part of the Catholic Doctrine be laid aside, then another part, and also another, and likewise another, and yet another, will go as a matter of course and right. But when the parts one by one have been rejected, what else will follow in the end but that the whole be equally rejected?

"Again, moreover, if what is new begin to be mingled with the old, foreign with domestic, profane with sacred, this custom will creep in everywhere, until the Church at last will have nothing untampered with, nothing unimpaired, nothing complete, nothing pure, but there will only be a brothel of impious, shameless error, where formerly was a sanctuary of chaste and undefiled Truth. May the Divine Pity turn aside this wickedness from the minds of His own; be it rather the frenzy of the ungodly!"—Dr. Bindley's Translation of the *Commonitorium*.

view defective. "Personally," he says (*Life*, ii, p. 209), "I do not think his [Newman's] effort to unite the conception of development with the Catholic conception of tradition was successful or coherent . . . with his acceptance of the Roman Catholic idea of the *Depositum Fidei*, as being a divinely communicated 'Credo,' or theological summary—no synthesis with evolutionary philosophy was possible. I have only gradually come to realize this: so that I was formerly more of a New-*manite* than I am now." And yet he felt bound to add, "It was the *fiction* of an unchanged and unchangeable nucleus of sacred tradition that saved the Christianity of the Apostles from being quickly transformed out of all recognition" (*Life*, ii, p. 218).

All hope of a reformation by the application of development gradually died in him. Liberal Catholicism demanded not a *reformation*, but a revolution. Like Christianity on Judaism, Liberal Catholicism would have to be a graft on and not a growth from the existing Church (*ibid.*, p. 289). The deposit of the Faith was like the Ptolemaic astronomy, Tyrrell contended; it could not be *developed* into the Copernican.

He seems at length to have taken refuge in a kind of Mysticism divorced from dogma, and to have trusted to Pragmatism to propagate it. "Such is the truth of religion, namely," he says, "its *utility* for eternal life, *i.e.*, for the life of correspondence with the Absolute" (*ibid.*, p. 178).

"From the continual and endless variations of belief and devotion which originate in one way or other, the Spirit of holiness eventually selects and assimilates the good and useful, and throws away the worthless or mischievous by the slow logic of spiritual life and experience" (*ibid.*, p. 180).

#### TYRRELL AND PRAGMATISM.

Here we come face to face with Pragmatism pure and simple: the non-survival of the unfit. What is Pragmatism? In the *Popular Science Monthly* for January, 1878, Mr. C. S. Pierce invented the name to designate a rough-and-ready test of the truth or "value" of anything. His friend, Professor Wm. James, took up the name and developed Pierce's views, thus giving a wide currency to them. Pragmatism is practically an attempted answer to Pilate's scoffing question, "What is truth?" Intellectualism, according to Professor James, could not give a satisfactory answer, and yet an accessible solution of the question was continuously needed.

A thing that is true *works*. Empiricism—that is, a philosophy based on practical experience—is decisive in settling what is true or the reverse. Truth depends on application. What cannot be applied can have no *meaning*—that is the principle of Pragmatism. “It matters not to the Empiricist,” Professor James says, “from what quarter an hypothesis may come to him; he may have acquired it by fair means or foul; passion may have whispered or accident suggested it; if the total drift of thinking continues to confirm it, that is what he (the Empiricist) means by its being true” (*The Will to Believe*, p. 27). Truth, consequently, demands verification, and verification means successful emergence from the ordeal of experience. Initial certainty may, therefore, be dispensed with in our reasonings if they afterwards receive the support of continuous verification. So-called “necessary truths” are to be measured by what they lead to. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to apply the Pragmatical principle to science. The mathematics, for instance, of Conic Sections remained *valueless* for many hundreds of years before Kepler found a *value* for them, and changed our outlook on the Solar System. Pragmatism seemed to Tyrrell, however, to meet the case of religious traditions. Verification by survival from the ordeal of experience—both past and future—capacity to be assimilated and corroborated in the process, distinguishes for him true ideas from false. This is practically the position taken up by Ritschl and his school, according to which the justification of Christianity proceeds from spiritual experience and from that alone.

But human experience, one might object, varies with the type of mind in which it originates, and in all mental experience *material* interests predominate. Materialistic conceptions of things, it may be contended, must always, as they have done, shut eye and ear to all experience of the spirit world. But all the while—

“Die Geisterwelt ist nicht Verschlossen,  
Dein Sinn ist zu, dein Herz ist todt.”—

Goethe's *Faust*.

In Tyrrell's last book, *Christianity at the Cross Roads*, published after his death, he gives us a depressing picture of the Christ of the Gospels regarded from “the results of criticism.”

## THE CHRIST OF CRITICISM—TYRRELL'S VIEW.

Christ is here presented as believing Himself to be the "Son of Man," "the Messiah," the Centre of His own apocalyptic teaching. His mission was to warn His fellow-countrymen of the end of the dispensation as being close at hand. His moral teaching, he considers, with Schweitzer and against Liberal Protestantism, as an insignificant feature—subordinate altogether to the coming cataclysm—after which ethics would be superseded. Christ's ethical teaching was, moreover, he contends, not His own—"there is nothing original in the righteousness preached by Jesus" (p. 51). Tyrrell interprets even the Lord's Prayer as having its chief bearing on the celestial cataclysm and its sequel (p. 54). "Pessimism is the verdict of experience. Whether in himself or in the world: if a man has ideals for both, he is bound to find not only failure, but an iron law of inevitable failure" (pp. 117, 118). Christ had no hopes of an amelioration of the lot of humanity on earth. His Gospel was to be good news to those who despaired of the world (p. 119). He supposed Himself to be the Central Figure in a tremendous cataclysm—which never occurred.

## TYRRELL'S SYMBOLISM.

Although he adopts the "Apocalyptic Jesus" of Schweitzer, Christ's eschatological teaching, he says, "was not the Creation of His Spirit: He found it at hand" (p. 102). It was our "duty, however, to abandon the Apocalyptic form and retain what it stands for" (p. 102). "The idea of Jesus remains symbolic," and "the only remedy lies in a frank admission of the principle of Symbolism." "What each age has to do is to interpret the Apocalyptic Symbolism into terms of its own Symbolism." "When we realize," he says (p. 111), "how purely symbolic even our best and most fruitful scientific hypotheses must be . . . we can see that revelation involves no violation of the usual processes of thought, *nor calls for any special faculty.*" Here we see at one and the same time how "human" revelation has become to him, and how protean and elusive also has Symbolism. For symbols have to be interpreted into new symbols by each passing age.

From the foregoing summary of the views of Loisy and Tyrrell we can form some kind of idea of the impassable chasm between Modernism and the Roman Church. No possible

bridge could be thrown across it, and no resource was left to the Roman authorities but to condemn Modernism, root and branch.

### THE ENCYCLICAL PASCENDI.

The Papal Encyclical (*Pascendi*) condemning "Modernism" is a closely reasoned document. According to it the basis of Modernism is the philosophy of Kant which limits human knowledge to phenomena, and excludes the absolute from our cognition. The centre and sum of the Kantian philosophy is comprised in the following statement: "We can know only phenomena, not things in themselves, that is, Nature independent of an observer. For our knowledge must be in part determined by the constitution of our cognitive faculties, and we can never know what things are out of relation to those faculties."

This view, according to the Encyclical, excludes natural theology, which attempts to deduce the existence and source of the attributes of God from *external* evidence. God cannot be reached, the Modernists contend, by any *reasoning* process, but only in what they call "vital immanence," which is to be sought for in human experience, that is to say, in a pervasive feeling of need of the Divine, which implies the existence of its object.

This feeling, according to the Modernists, takes its rise in the *subconscious self*, from which it emerges into actual consciousness only when circumstances bring the Unknowable impressively before the mind. It is in this "vital immanence," the Modernists assert, and not in anything external, that *Revelation* takes place. If this revelation is associated with any phenomena of nature, or with human personality, it can only, the Modernist says, be so at the expense of distorting it, and hence arises the necessity of the historian and critic to restore it to its true character. This process constitutes the foundation of historical criticism. The Person of Christ, for instance, has been thus distorted from the real form in which It appeared on earth, by ascribing to It miraculous powers, but science and historical criticism, the Modernists contend, show that there cannot have been anything in the historical Christ which was not purely human. "Whatever, therefore," says the Encyclical, "savours of the Divine must, according to the Modernists, be 'eliminated from His history.'"

All religion, continues the Encyclical's exposition of Modernism, "is only a development of this religious sentiment

(or consciousness)." It is "the cause of all the things which have ever been, or ever will be, in any religion." This sentiment, being "vague at the best," needs illumination. In it "God indeed presents Himself to man: but so darkly and confusedly that He may scarcely, or not at all, be recognized by the believer." It has consequently to be made clear. "This is the office," the Encyclical proceeds, "of the intellect, whose function it is to think and analyze," and to form into concepts the "vital phenomena" as they take rise, and to express them in words. "Hence the maxim common among Modernists that a religious-minded man should *think* his faith," that is, "the intellect must work upon it as the painter brightens the faded impression on his canvas to make the figures stand out more clearly."

The secondary formulas, thus acquired, become *dogmas*, which, the Modernists say, "are intermediate between the believer and his faith." In regard to the latter they are "mere symbols;" in "regard to the believer they are mere instruments."

Dogmas must, they contend, be merely tentative and subject to frequent changes, and thus must exclude anything of a *fixed* character. In the process of "thinking his faith" the religious mind cannot "suffer a dualism to exist in him, and the believer feels within him an impelling need to harmonize faith with science." "This is to be achieved by subjecting the former to the latter." The Modernist makes theology to be an adjustment of the religious sentiment with the intellectual demands of science, which latter being progressive demands a continuous harmonizing. The principle of *immanence*, according to which the *religious sentiment* is the final judge of what is true in the plane of religion, effects the reconciliation with Science by introducing *Symbolism*. This symbolism is tentative and is subject to continuous *restatement*.

The *law of immanence* rejects the idea of the historical Christ having done anything involving superhuman authority. The Sacraments were not instituted by Him, but developed later from the felt need of giving to religion some sensible manifestation. They are mere "symbols and signs," having no other kind of efficacy than historical phrases, "which, having had the good fortune to impress minds, have proved to be powerful instruments for propagating certain great and impressive ideas."

The Holy Scriptures are to the Modernist a "collection of experiences, not indeed of those that may come to anybody, but of those choice and extraordinary experiences which may have

happened in any religion." They are not communicated from any external authority, but come from "God speaking from within through the impulse of *vital immanence* and *permanence*."

The Church does not owe its existence to the immediate institution of Jesus Christ, but is "the product of the *collective conscience* (or consciousness)."

According to this New Theology, "in a living religion everything is subject to change—according to the law of evolution—dogma, Church, sacred books, faith itself—the changes being brought about, not by the accretion of new and purely adventitious forms from without, but by an increasing penetration of the religious sentiment into the conscience" under the stimulus of new needs.

#### MODERNISM IN OTHER COMMUNIONS.

The Modernist movement is not confined to the Roman Church: indeed its principles had originally been derived from non-Catholic communions. Traditional Christianity has had to encounter rationalizing systems for ages. The feature which distinguishes Modernism from previous rationalistic movements is its intense conviction that religion has a divine foundation and that it is essential to human progress. But the religion to which Modernism gives its support is something absolutely different from traditional Christianity. Modernists of all communions agree that it is necessary to establish a harmony between the Christianity which has come down to them and the knowledge which they have acquired from other sources. Knowledge increases day by day, and there arises a natural question in every thoughtful Christian mind as to how this knowledge will fall in with the religious system which had previously become part of his mental life. Such minds feel it to be a kind of dishonesty to maintain a belief in traditional Christianity without taking into account what, on the face of it, seems logically inconsistent with received views, and yet is generally regarded as the assured results of human research. Intellectual demands, they feel, must have full satisfaction, even at the expense of religious exigencies, and they are quite prepared to jettison from the ship of the Church all that intellectualism regards as a danger to safe navigation.

Canon Streeter, for instance, in his Introduction to *Foundations*, lays down this principle: "The world," he says, "is calling for religion, but it cannot accept a religion if its theology is out of harmony with science, philosophy, and scholarship. Religion



if it is to dominate life, must satisfy both the head and the heart—a thing which neither obscurantism nor rationalism can do. At such a time it seems most necessary that those who believe that Christianity is no mere picturesque survival of a romantic past, but a real religion with a real message for the present and the future, should set themselves to a careful re-examination, and, if need be, restatement of the foundation of their belief in the light of the knowledge and thought of the day.”

Canon Streeter's position seems at first sight to be a sound one. The mind cannot for long contain a dualism of irreconcilables within it, and the new light obtained from incontestable knowledge must have a bearing on all previously acquired views.

We have come, therefore, to the real points at issue between “Modernists” and those who adhere to the traditional faith. The establishment of the validity of the knowledge of the day must necessarily be the first task to be taken in hand by the Modernists. Canon Streeter limits the field of investigation to the areas respectively of science, philosophy, and scholarship, and with the established result of that investigation Christian theology has to be brought into harmony.

We have, in the first place, to set traditional Christianity at one with modern science. But here we need to discriminate. Kirchhoff said, and many scientific men agree with him, “There is only one science—mechanics.” If we were to accept this dictum, there would seem to be no room for any accommodation between science and Christian theology, if that theology claims to meet *intellectual* demands. Christian theology, in such a case, cannot be of any interest to those who accept Kirchhoff's description, and may be ruled out. More than a hundred years ago it was imagined by philosophers that the universe could be explained on mechanical principles only. Laplace even conceived a physicist competent to foretell the progress of Nature for all eternity, if only the masses of matter, their position, and their initial velocity were given.

But there is now a seemingly more stable base for prediction of Nature's future than even the universality of gravitation. Within our own time the great principle of the conservation of energy\* has taken form as an undisputed acquisition of

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\* The theory of the conservation of energy was, like the atomic theory, anticipated by the ancients. Empedocles (500 B.C.) contended, against the hypotheses of absolute generation and decay, that nothing which previously was not could come into being, and that nothing existing could be annihilated. “Actual origination (*φύσις*) is a name void of objective meaning.” Ueberweg, *Hist. of Philosophy*, vol. i, p. 61, Eng. Trans.

science. And this is how this principle affects our outlook on the world: "All real process consists in the movement of masses; all motion is caused by motion only, and all change of motion of any body is caused by impact of some other body upon it." And again, "All physical energy becomes kinetic energy, or the momentum of masses, and the law of the conservation of energy asserts that the kinetic energy of the universe is a constant quantity."

This means that every form of physical activity that comes under our notice is an instance of motion caused by other motion only, and the sum total of the energy causing all motion is constant; it cannot be added to or diminished. Every motion taking place in the universe comes, according to this view, under this law.

Here we may well ask—in the interest of the contentions of Canon Streeter, who invokes science to his aid: Does the law of the conservation of energy really cover every form of activity in the universe, reducing such activity to physical movements which may be measured? Is human thought within its compass, including the human will? Thought cannot be weighed or measured. Is thought, is consciousness a factor in the physical movements of the universe? The strict upholders of the mechanical concept of the universe deny that consciousness in any form can influence in the slightest degree the course of physical events. That consciousness should be able to move the smallest particle of matter is a concept, it is contended, that would upset the law of the conservation of energy by making it possible to increase by that which is not physical motion the sum total of the kinetic energy of the universe.

Consciousness, while an attendant phenomenon on certain brain-processes, has, it is contended, no more efficiency in the world of matter than the shadows of a revolving wheel have on the motion of the latter. It is in cerebral changes only—in which consciousness is a kind of by-product—that, according to the mechanistic theory, efficiency lies. It has been proved that the cerebral cortex—the thin surface-layer of grey matter—is the part of the brain immediately concerned with certain mental processes. This cortex has been mapped out into areas, the integrity of which is essential to certain modes of consciousness, including the highest actions of thought. This and other parts of the brain, together with the spinal cord, are the seat of all nervous processes—and these processes, it is contended, are all of the nature of reflex action under varying

physical stimuli. Consciousness, including the will, has no influence, can have no influence, on these processes, and is therefore excluded from any effect on the world around us. The strong natural conviction that we can, by thought and will, exercise a control on our bodies, and, through them, on the external world, is regarded as fundamentally mistaken. All mental action is the mere ineffective transcript of reflex action in the world of matter. Many reflex actions, we know, are unattended by consciousness, and in such cases consciousness seemingly cannot be a factor in the action. There are also instances of reflex action attended by consciousness in which consciousness seems to play no effective part. The assumption that reflex action covers every form of human activity is an extension of the application of a principle, known to be effective in certain cases, to all instances.

And the result of all this—what is it? All human actions are the actions of automata. There is no freedom anywhere. An iron chain of physical causation links act with act. The phantasmagoria of human consciousness all down the ages is nothing but a futile shadow. The world could have gone on as it has done without consciousness at all. All the great thoughts of men, all systems of philosophy, all the wisdom of the world enshrined in books, all human conceptions which have led, according to common belief, to the great engineering triumphs of the world, are but needless transcripts, as far as the processes of physical nature are concerned, of reflex materialistic action.

#### MIRACLES AND THE MECHANISTIC THEORY.

The English Modernists would find it difficult to bring their theology, or, indeed, any theology into harmony with this view of nature. And yet their attitude towards the supernatural generally can in reality have no other base. "Spirit," "mind," *cannot*, according to the mechanistic theory act upon matter, therefore the miraculous, which implies such action, is excluded from the Modernist's theology. But logically much more than the miraculous is excluded: God, who is assumed to *rule* the universe, must, if He is not to be identified with nature-mechanics, be also excluded from exercising any providence in the world. In St. Augustine's time there were also men who denied the occurrence of miracles, but they still adhered to the belief that God made the world. St. Augustine showed their inconsistency (*De Civ.*

*Dei*, x, 11): "Those who deny that the invisible God works visible miracles are not to be listened to, since, even according to them, He made the world, which they plainly cannot deny to be visible. Whatever, therefore, is wonderful in the world is naturally of a lesser wonder than the whole world itself, which, without doubt, God created—that is, the heavens and the earth and all that therein is." To exclude God from interference in mundane affairs is to exclude Him also from Creation. In Shakespeare's time also there were impugnors of miracles:

*Lafeu.* "They say, miracles are past; and we have our philosophical persons, to make modern and familiar, things supernatural and causeless. Hence is it, that we make trifles of terrors; ensconcing ourselves into seeming knowledge, when we should submit ourselves to an unknown fear."—*All's Well that Ends Well*, act ii, sc. iii.

The Modernists are not, therefore, modern in their views about miracles. Such philosophical persons as Shakespeare mentions must always be forthcoming, for they will find a public more or less prepared for them. It is no easy matter to believe in miracles. Common everyday experience is against them. The Indian prince, who dismissed as unworthy of credence his informant testifying he had seen solid water, has his representative everywhere. The unfamiliar will always be on its trial, and requires strong evidence to substantiate it.

Hume's argument, that it is more natural that testimony should be false than that the uniformity of nature should be disturbed, seems very natural. But then we must remember that the uniformity of nature rests on testimony, and it comes at length to weighing testimony with testimony. The record of the first comet seen by man must have appeared very incredible to those who had not witnessed it.

The Rev. J. M. Thompson, who takes the Modernist position in regard to miracles, has no qualms in setting aside all evidence in their favour. He is at the same time a firm believer in the Divinity of Jesus Christ. This is his position, in his own words: "Though no miracles accompanied His entry into, or presence on, or departure from, the world; though He did not think, or speak, or act otherwise than as a man; though He yields nothing to historical analysis but human elements; yet, in Jesus Christ, God is incarnate discovered, and worshipped, as God alone can be, by the insight of faith" (*The New Test.*, 1911).

From this we see that Mr. Thompson is not prepared to give up the supernatural altogether. He thinks that science and supernaturalism can survive side by side, but only on the condition that the belief in miracles is rejected. The supernatural with him belongs to the spiritual realm, and no external signs of it are to be looked for. All the signs (*σημεία*), wonders (*τέρατα*), powers (*δυνάμεις*), mentioned in the New Testament, are instances of "suggestion," "faith-healing," or misrepresentations of natural events. It would seem, therefore, that Mr. Thompson is prepared, at the demand of the mechanistic theory of the universe, to give up all the New Testament miracles, but yet is not willing to accept its further demand that consciousness (which is the sphere of the spiritual) is nothing more than a by-product of physical activities, a by-product exercising no influence on the world's history.

If he were to admit that consciousness could alter the movement of one molecule of matter, his argument against miracles would fail. For it is on the assumption that external events are linked together by an iron chain of necessity that miracles are excluded from nature. Once admit that consciousness, including will, is operative on the physical world, and miracles stand on quite another footing. Clerk-Maxwell's hypothesis of "sorting demons," and Sir Oliver's "timing" and other movements, do not contravene the theory of the conservation of energy, and yet they may be directive of the course of events.

Sir Oliver Lodge, in his address as President of the British Association in 1913, says: "To explain the psychical in terms of the physical is impossible." "How life exerts guidance over chemical and physical forces" is puzzling, but the fact "admits of no doubt." "The universe is a larger thing than we have any conception of, and no one method of search will exhaust its treasures."

#### NEW LIGHT ON "LAWS" OF NATURE.

Scientific thinkers are beginning to realize that the universe is something greater than our concept of it. The theory of relativity, which has the support of many eminent men of science, gives us quite another outlook on nature. In the words of Professor Carnichael (*The Theory of Relativity*, New York, 1913): "It is a fresh analysis of the foundations of physical science." It asks the question, "In what respect are our enunciated laws of nature relative to us who investigate

them, and to the earth which serves us as a system of reference? How would they be modified, for instance, by a change in the velocity of the earth?" (p. 8). In discussing this question he shows that according to the theory there is no such thing as simultaneity in events happening at different places. Professor Planck (Berlin Address, October, 1913) is of the same opinion. "The question," he says, "whether two events occurring at different places are simultaneous or not had a positive physical meaning, quite apart from any previous inquiry as to the observer who took the time-measurement. At present the case is quite otherwise." He then proceeds to illustrate this principle.

"That the position of the observer conditions his knowledge is a commonplace. But it has a meaning more profound than this. If we could live, for instance, outside the shadow of the earth, we should never know anything of the starry heavens—of those suns in space, many of which "excel in glory" our own sun. Our solar light *masks* all other lights, and it is within the sphere of probability that what we know may hide rather than reveal a universe greater than our own. Think for a moment of a universe from which night, and the stars it reveals, should be for ever excluded! Think of the limitations of our "Laws of Nature" in consequence!

"Lord Kelvin often asked his audiences to transfer themselves in thought to the centre of the earth, where there would be no evidence of gravitation, nothing would have weight there—water would not flow, nor anything change its position. Think of the consequent limitation of our knowledge on the one hand with the extension of it in some respects on the other!

"If, moreover, we could, departing from the earth, take up a position on any other object in space, our whole experience of things would be altered. 'Our laws of nature' and of its uniformity would be changed by the changed environment." "If everything in the universe," says Sir Oliver Lodge, "had the same temperature, nothing would be visible at all." Moreover, the consciousness in which the laws of nature are presented to us may not, as Plotinus and Professor Bergson agree be limited to the brain, and dependent on the molecular changes of the latter. The body, Plotinus contended, is in the soul and not the soul in the body.

Memory, says Professor Bergson, overflows the brain, and the brain is very probably an instrument of forgetfulness as well as of remembrance. Sir George Darwin, in his British Association Address, put forward the view that something for which he

had not a more appropriate name than memory was concerned in all organic evolution. This mnemonic theory, as it is termed, has been called in to explain heredity by the assumption that the germ-cells are charged with the memories of past generations (see Professor Dendy's *British Association Address*, August, 1914).

#### BREAKS IN NATURE-PROCESSES.

We are beginning, moreover, to see that Nature does not work continuously, but often by sudden leaps, for which no seeming preparation had been previously made. "Mutations," or sudden leaps, in the organic world are now recognized in cases where a long period of unbroken sameness preceded.

In the physical world also we have evidence of the same thing in Planck's Quantum Theory, which, owing to the fact that it explains several physical anomalies, is becoming generally accepted. It calls in question the *constancy* of Nature's operations. "The constancy of all dynamic operations," says Professor Planck, "has been an unquestioned assumption of all physical theories, which, based on the doctrine of Aristotle, maintains that *Natura non facit saltus*. But even in this ancient fortress recent investigations of physical science have made an important breach. In this case it is the principles of thermo-dynamics with which—owing to newly observed facts, the sentence just cited has come into collision; and if all the indications are not deceptive, the days of the validity of that saying are numbered. Nature, in fact, seems to work by leaps, and those, too, of a singular character." These leaps, he afterwards explains, are of an explosive and inconstant nature. This principle is on a par with the "mutations" already referred to, and the constancy and uniformity of Nature, which, in the eyes of some, seem to exclude the miraculous, are no longer to be regarded as unquestionable acquisitions of knowledge.

The Quantum Theory, moreover, as applied to heat-radiation, is inconsistent with the older mechanics (see *Nature*, January 22nd, 1914). Other considerations have lately thrown grave doubts on the universality of the Newtonian laws. The principles at work in the connection of the "whirl" of negative electrons with the positive nucleus in the atom are seemingly inexplicable by any known mechanical laws.

Dr. Norman Campbell, writing in *Nature* of January 22nd, 1914, raises the question of the universality of application of

mechanical principles. Dealing with the difficulty of accounting for the motion of electrons within the atom, he says: "It has recently been proposed to solve this difficulty by denying that the principles of mechanics are true in their application to systems of atomic dimensions. Such a solution may appear heroic rather than practical to those who have not followed the trend of modern physics; those who have, know that it is completely in accordance with the recent development of our ideas. The new conceptions, which were first introduced by Planck's theory of radiation, and have been applied with such striking results to the theory of specific heat and elasticity, are directly contradictory of those of the older mechanics."

Again, "Bohr's theory not only rejects the principles of mechanics, which the most conservative are being driven to abandon, but it indicates that fundamental propositions are to take their place."

Even the pervasive influence of gravitation has been recently called in question.

Professor Eddington (*Stellar Movements and the Structure of the Universe*, 1914) concludes, from a comparison of the proper motion of the "fixed" stars with their spectra, that the average velocity increases with the age of the star, and he throws out the momentous conjecture that matter in its elementary stage may not be subject to gravitation.

It seems clear from this extract that mechanical principles, applied to the constitution of the atom, are not in undisputed control of the universe, and it is only prudent to wait for further light before we adapt, as the Modernists are doing, our theology to the demands of a mechanical system which may have to give place to a wider generalization not conflicting with the possibility of the miraculous in nature.

Deprived, as the Modernists think they are, of any support for the supernatural from the science which they wrongly assume to be that of to-day, they take refuge in philosophy. The scholastic philosophy is, to them, no longer in harmony with modern thought. We need a new Aquinas, they think, to give us a satisfactory presentation of the Christian religion in a theological terminology of a truly philosophical character. The Modernists found such a philosophy in that of Emmanuel Kant and his followers. The distinction drawn by Kant between "Nature in itself"—which he regarded as unknowable—and the phenomena presented in consciousness, gave the Modernist all that he wanted to build up a religion from inward spiritual experience without reference to external



records. Renan was, perhaps, the first to apply the Kantian philosophy to religion in its historical aspect. "Religion," he says, "is false from the objective point of view, that is to say, in itself, and in regard to that which it commands to be believed; but it is eternally true from the subjective point of view, that is to say, from the need we have of it and of the religious sentiment with which it corresponds."\*

Spiritual experience, and not historical events, are to the Modernist the perennial source of all religion. The external element, like "Nature in itself," is presented to consciousness only as symbols of reality. Symbolism occupies, no doubt, a large field in religion. When we speak of God as "Light," as "Truth," as "Love," etc., we are using symbols to express truths beyond the reach of our faculties, but it does not follow that all revelation of matters not within the sphere of experience are merely symbols.

The Bishop of Oxford, Dr. Gore, in an admirable article in the *Constructive Quarterly* for March, 1914, limits the use of symbolism to the expression of truths which deal with "what lies outside our possible or actual human experience," or "concern the transcendent God, or regions of existence which lie in the beyond" (p. 68). "We are now urged," he goes on to say, "by our Modernist friends to extend the application of this principle so as to recognize that the phrases 'He was conceived by the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary,' and 'He rose again the third day from the dead,' are symbolical phrases." This Dr. Gore denies. "It cannot, with any show of reason, be denied," he goes on to say, "that the point of Christianity was that these things and the like miracles had actually happened; and that provision had been made that they should be proclaimed by competent witnesses. The insistence upon actual occurrence and competent witness in the New Testament is unmistakable" (p. 64). "With regard to the Bible language about angels and devils, it is one thing to recognize the language about the devil 'going about as a roaring lion, seeking whom he may devour,' or about the 'unclean spirit' going through dry places, etc., or about the Angels of little children beholding the face of God in heaven, as symbolical language; but it is quite another thing to dismiss from our minds the whole idea of good

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\* "La religion est fautive au point de vue de l'objet, c'est à dire en elle-même, et quant à ce qu'elle ordonne à croire; mais elle est éternellement vraie au point de vue du sujet, c'est à dire du besoin que nous en avons et du sentiment religieux auquel elle correspond."—*Patrice*.

and bad spirits, and their relation to us and influence upon us" (p. 57). "Again, the same principle applies to the revelation of what is 'above' and 'below' our present sphere of experience—to heaven and hell" (p. 32).

The Modernist view of symbolism rests, as we have seen, on the Kantian outlook.

It may be well in this connection to consider how that outlook is regarded by the most recent scientific investigators.

Professor Planck, in the Berlin Address (Oct., 1913), already referred to, presents the latest scientific view with regard to the Kantian outlook as contrasted with that of thirty-six years ago.

"Five and thirty years ago," he said, "Hermann von Helmholtz stated in this same place that our perceptions can never give us a picture, but at most merely a symbol, of the external world. For we are altogether lacking in a standard which would serve to show any kind of resemblance between the character peculiar to the external impression and the character peculiar to the consciousness to which it gives rise.

"All conceptions which we may form of the external world are, in the last analysis, reflections merely of our own consciousness. Is there any rational sense at all in setting up opposite our self-consciousness a 'Nature in itself' independent of the latter? Are not rather all the so-called 'laws of Nature' merely at bottom more or less serviceable rules by which we sum up, as accurately and conveniently as we can, the flow of events in our consciousness?"

"If this were the case," says Professor Planck, "then not only the ordinary judgments of men, but even exact investigation of Nature would at all times be in a fundamental error. For it is impossible to deny that the entire development of physical science up to the present aims, as a matter of fact, at as wide and deep a 'separation' as possible of the processes of external Nature from those that take place in the world of human consciousness.

"The escape from this entangling difficulty very soon presents itself if we follow for only a step farther the thought-process involved.

"Let us assume for the moment that a physical picture of the world has been found which satisfies all the claims which may be made upon it, and thus is capable of exhibiting perfectly accurately all the empirically discovered laws of Nature. In that case the assertion that the picture referred to resembles only after a fashion 'actual' Nature can in no wise be proved.

“ But this subject has also a reverse side, which is generally much too little accentuated. Equally true is it that the still far bolder assertion, namely, that the supposed world-picture represents absolutely truly ‘actual’ Nature in every point, without exception, is not in any manner to be refuted. For in order even to enter on a proof to the contrary it would be necessary to be able to say something with certainty about ‘actual’ Nature—but this confessedly is altogether out of the question. Here, as we see, a monstrous void lies before us into which no science may ever penetrate, and the filling up of this void is not the business of the Pure Reason, but of the Practical—the business of a sane view of the world.

“ Little as such a view of the world may be susceptible of scientific proof, we may safely rely upon it that it will stand fast against every storm, so long as it remains in agreement with itself and with the facts of experience. But let us not delude ourselves with the idea that it is possible, even in the most exact of all sciences of Nature, to make any progress entirely without a concept of the world, that is, altogether without unprovable hypotheses. Even in Physics the statement is valid, one cannot be saved without Faith—at least, faith in a certain reality outside ourselves.”

The German philosophy subsequent to the Kantian proceeds on the assumption that no dualistic concept is necessary to explain consciousness. Consciousness needs no “Nature in itself” as an exciting cause of its activity, *everything* is in the sphere of consciousness. A world outside consciousness is, to some of the successors of Kant, unthinkable.

It is to this philosophy that Canon Streeter appeals in his Preface to *Foundations*, and Mr. W. H. Moberly contributes to this work an article on “God and the Absolute,” in which he endeavours to sketch out, on the basis, presumably, of Hegelianism, a philosophy in which the religious difficulties of the day may be met. He does not seem satisfied with his own conclusions, and adds at the end with commendable frankness his misgivings. “We have raised,” he says, “a very ambitious problem, and our suggestions towards its solution are, at the best, fragmentary and unsatisfying. The reader can hardly avoid feeling this, for the writer himself feels it strongly.” The philosophy which is to form a basis for Modernist theology is, therefore, yet to seek, and if the view cited above as to a world limited to subjective experience is any guide to the trend of scientific thought, the great fabric of Monism, built up with much labour by

successive German thinkers, is already beginning to crumble to pieces.

The last of the triad with which modern Christian theology must be harmonized is "Scholarship." And here it is necessary to make a few preliminary remarks. The "discoveries" of scholars obtain a hearing all the more readily if they traverse prevailing beliefs. Affirmations do not naturally attract as much attention as negations, and the knowledge of this fact is not without its influence on students of theology, whose temporal future may largely depend upon their making their mark in the world. Strauss and Baur found a Victorian public to take interest in their destructive criticisms of the then prevailing Christology. Have these critics made a permanent impression on religious thought? Drews in our own time has found a translator to put into English his myth-theory of Christ, but with no effect. The discussion as to the origins of the Synoptic Gospels, and as to their respective dates, has ended, as Harnack himself admits, in practically establishing the traditional view. So there is not much more to be done by scholarship in this domain.

It is in the reconstruction of the mental environment of our Lord that recent research claims to have made startling discoveries.

Weiss and Schweitzer—strange as it may seem to those who have carefully studied their views—have given "Modernists" their chief material for a reconstruction of the Person of Christ, and of the faith of the Apostolic Church. Even Canon Streeter, in *Foundations*, regards Schweitzer as a factor in modern theology, although he seems to acknowledge that Schweitzer's views are pushed to extremes. "Fresh light," he says, "is always blinding, especially to those who see it first, and new views rarely secure attention except when pushed to extremes. That this is the case with the eschatological school, and especially with Schweitzer, its literary genius, few will deny" (p. 78). Canon Streeter even admits (p. 76) that "Recent researches in the field of what is known as apocalyptic eschatology have shown (those religious hopes and ideas) to have dominated the minds of so many of His (our Lord's) contemporaries" (p. 76). The resuscitation of the Book of Enoch, and of pre-Christian Apocalyptic literature generally, was a God-send for the German critics. Schweitzer, with a naively patronizing air, says, as quoted by Canon Streeter, "As of old Jacob wrestled with the Angel, so German theology wrestles with Jesus of Nazareth, and will not let Him go until He bless it—that is, until He

will consent to serve it, and will suffer Himself to be drawn by the Germanic spirit into the midst of our time and our civilization."

The rediscovered Christ of Schweitzer, "drawn by the Germanic spirit," is to replace the Christ of traditional Christianity! What a demand upon faith! Even supposing that Judaism at the time of our Lord were interpenetrated with the concepts of the Book of Enoch, and of other Apocalyptic literature, in the process of the spiritual evolution of the Church, that is, under the guidance of the Holy Ghost, such concepts must have sloughed off at an early date. The fact that we have to go to Abyssinia, converted to Christianity in the fourth or fifth century, for the only complete MSS. of the Book of Enoch, and that we cannot find in their original languages most of the other Apocalyptic documents in question, is sufficient proof that the views contained within them had ceased to be of interest to the early Church. The evidence, moreover, that these particular views were generally current in our Lord's time is not of a convincing character. There were, as anyone reading Dr. Charles's articles in the *Encyclopædia Biblica* must see, varied eschatological views presented in pre-Christian-Jewish Apocalyptic literature. What reason, then, is there for assuming that Christ culled from a mass of conflicting opinions that form of eschatology, adopted by Schweitzer, and made it the substance of His teaching? There is no indication that the custodians of the Jewish records knew anything in Christ's time about the Schweitzer-view, and no one has as yet, I believe, pointed out any survival of these cataclysmic views in post-Christian-Jewish literature.\*

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\* Canon Charles's articles in the *Encyclopædia Biblica* on Apocalyptic Literature and Eschatology furnish all that is required to enable the reader to come to a sane conclusion on Schweitzer's views. Dr. Charles gives us an analysis of the Apocalyptic literature current in the period shortly before and after our Lord's time. The works dealt with include the *Fourth Book of Esdras* (called the *Second* in the *English Apocrypha*), which is ascribed to 81-96 A.D.; the kindred *Apocalypse of Baruch* (50-100 A.D.); *The Ascension of Isaiah* (50-80 A.D.); *The Book of Jubilees* (72-104 A.D.); *The Ascension of Moses* (4 B.C.-30 A.D.); *Testament of the XII Patriarchs* (from second century B.C.-30 A.D.); *The Psalms of Solomon* (anterior to 64 B.C.); *The Book of Enoch* (the groundwork written before 98 B.C.); *The Sibylline Oracles* (the Jewish portions, iii, 1-62, written before 31 B.C.; ii, 97-817, about 190 B.C., book iv, about 80 A.D.; the Christian portions, iii, 63-92, and ii, 167-170, late Christian; book v is mainly Jewish, written about 80 A.D.; books vi and vii are Gnostic, written about the third century A.D.; book viii is Christian, and belongs to the second and third centuries A.D.; the earlier and later books are

The theory of evolution—a department of science with which modern theology must be harmonized, a principle also implied in the first chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews—if applied to the growth of Christianity, shows that the only survival in the Church of to-day of anything like Schweitzer's cataclysmal theory is the persistent belief in the Second Advent of our Lord—which can be otherwise explained.

The Apocalyptic elements in the *canonical* books of the Old Testament lend, if they are considered without bias, little or no support for the views that the coming of the Messiah would be attended by an immediate and cataclysmal ending of the age. The "kingdom of heaven," to all competent commentators before the rise of the eschatological school, had its beginnings here on earth and its consummation in the far future. It was identified later with the Church of Christ. St. Augustine's *City of God* is the exposition of this. But the eschatologists have no patience with such a view. The catastrophic end of the age, which our Lord in His ignorance thought to be at hand, that is the only key to the Gospel and to the knowledge of Christ's Person. The Church, according to the eschatologists, has persistently throughout the ages presented a wrong concept of Christ's mission, which was simply to warn all men to withdraw their thoughts from temporal things, and to centre them on the coming cataclysm,—any teaching of incidental morality being merely *interimsethic*.

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partly Jewish and partly Christian, and were written in the second and third centuries A.D.).

It is from these Apocalyptic documents and from certain portions of the Old Testament that the Eschatologists have endeavoured to present a new view of the environment of thought and feeling in which our Lord moved when on earth, and a fresh conception of His Person and mission. It will be seen from the dates ascribed to these documents by the critics that most of them belong to the period *after* the destruction of Jerusalem (70 A.D.). Hilgenfeld (*Die jüdische Apokalypitik*, Jena, 1857), who dealt with this subject long before Weiss and Schweitzer, saw (p. 240) that this class of literature arose from the pressure from time to time of the Gentile world upon Judaism.

At various crises in Jewish history Apocryphal writings under the name of some well-known prophet appeared in order to foster hopes for the *ultimate* triumph of Israel, and for future vengeance upon its adversaries. The destruction of Jerusalem was the last of these crises, and *after* it five of the documents mentioned above took their origin. These documents, therefore, could have had nothing to do with our Lord's attitude, or that of the writers of the Synoptic Gospels, in regard to the last things summed up in "the day of the Lord." The Fourth Book of Esdras (II Esdras in our Apocrypha) is typical of this class. St. Jerome calls it and I Esdras *Apocryphorum tertii et quarti somnia*. The Roman

Is it not more than astonishing that intelligent men should give even a cursory attention to such a theory? Yet some of the Modernists regard it as an assured result of *scholarship* and contend that our Christology must be altered accordingly. If students of Palæontology were to present us with a fossil-man of the Pleistocene age—such as that exhumed at Piltdown recently—and tell us that from his cranial structure he surpassed the *Homo sapiens* of to-day, and that Nature had made a vast mistake in not evolving this type instead of that which she had selected, we might, if the proof were strong enough, believe this. If we were asked, however, to regard the condition and environment of the Pleistocene man as the *highest*, and to adapt *our* mode of existence to that environment—if we could discover it—should we give the proposal a moment's consideration? And yet we are virtually asked to set aside consistent tradition, the result of a long process of selection and survival under Divine guidance, for a thing of shreds and patches gathered together by modern experts from an alleged independent study of the original documents, and from a new examination of our Lord's temporal environment. Scholarship, it is contended, has now become strictly scientific, and its results to be depended on as we depend upon those of scientific experts. Would scientific men accept this contention? Science can always submit its conclusions to exacting tests. To what tests are we to submit the modern reconstruction of the Gospel records?

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Church excludes these and the Prayer of Manasses from its Canon, but prints them at the end of the Vulgate, "that they should not be lost, as they are cited by some of the Fathers, and occur in some old Bibles, both printed and MS." (Preface). II Esdras is a Jewish work with certain Christian additions, including the first two chapters. Upon these have been based apparently the "Reproaches" used on Good Friday, and from chapter ii an adaptation of the words, *Requiem æternitatis dabit vobis . . . et Lux perpetua lucebit vobis*, used in the Roman Office for the Dead. The work is, therefore, composite, as the Rev. G. H. Box shows in his recent work on the subject, although Dr. Sanday, in his Preface to that work, would regard it as having proceeded from one, and that a Jewish, hand. The work had at one time considerable currency, St. Ambrose, and Gildas the British writer having used it freely. The Eschatological element in it occurs in chaps. ii, 27, 37, and xiii, 32.

*The Apocalypse of Baruch* is of a similar character, and with *The Ascension of Isaiah*, *The Book of Jubilees*, and the later portions of *The Sibylline Oracles* were written after our Lord's time.

It is to *The Book of Enoch* especially, which has been previously dealt with, that the Eschatologists look. The fragment which has come down to us of *The Ascension of Moses* was written in Hebrew, but contains no reference to a Messiah, if Joshua is not to be regarded as representing Him.

It is a little over a hundred years ago since the Battle of Trafalgar was fought. Experts have from time to time examined log-books, reminiscences of the survivors, letters written immediately after the battle, and yet we see, from a quite recent controversy in *The Times*, that the mode of Nelson's attack is still a matter of question. Are experts of to-day likely to succeed better in dealing with documents, none of them quite contemporaneous, describing events of nineteen hundred years ago? As the world of to-day inherits its civilization all that was worth preserving of its past, so the Church of Christ of to-day, a living organism, inherits all that under Divine guidance has been worthy of permanence in the deposit of the faith once for all *given* to it, and developed throughout the ages.

Historical scholarship has its uses. It can show the steps, for instance, by which our monarchy, from the reign of King John, became, through Magna Charta, the Bill of Rights, the Act of Settlement, etc., what it is to-day. But could it reimpose by any rational process the political system of King John's time on the nation of to-day? And something like this is the attempt of the eschatologists—to give us, under the sanction of "scholarship," a new Christ and a new Gospel for that which evolution, under Divine selection, has secured for us. The Church of to-day, with its long career of conquest behind it, has in its living energies a prestige and promise with which the substitutes advanced by Modernism could never compete.

There is one great difficulty which the Modernists have never seemingly faced. Supposing for the moment that their

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*The Testament of the XII Patriarchs* sees the eventual triumph of Israel, the Conversion (or destruction) of the Gentiles, and the establishment on earth of the Messianic kingdom, in which there will be only one people and one tongue. Then follow the Resurrection and Judgment.

*The Psalms of Solomon* deal with the triumph of Israel, the return of the ten tribes, a period of prosperity following, ending with vengeance on adversaries.

The documents here briefly described, together with the Biblical passages dealing with the "last things," form the basis of the startling views of the Eschatologists. The chief Biblical passages are here given, that the reader may have before him the whole of the real foundations upon which such a wonderful superstructure is raised.

1 Sam. ii, 10; Ps. xcvi, 13; Isa. ii, 10-22; xiii, 6-13; xxvii, 1, 2; xxx 33; lxvi, 15-24; Jer. xxx, 7, 24; Dan. vii, 9; Joel ii, 1-17; ii, 18-32; Amos v, 18-20; Zeph. i, 7-14; Mal. iv, 1-6.

Matt. xii, 36; xiii, 40-43; xvi, 27; xxiv, 31 to end; Mark xiii; Luke xvii, 20 to end; Acts i, 7; ii, 11; iii, 20 to end; xvii, 31; Rom. ii, 5-16;



presentation of the Gospel was the original one, how comes it, we may well ask, that it was left to German critics and their followers in this country to discover it in the present century? Traditional Christianity has held the field since the early centuries of our era, and the lines of its evolution can be traced to the present day. The Modernist concept of the Gospel is, as Modernists admit, a quite new departure, and in no sense the product of organic continuity from the beginning of our era.

The attempt of the Modernists to reconstruct the foundations of the Faith and to build a *new* religion upon them, is, indeed, in direct conflict with the principle of evolution which, as all naturalists agree, conditions all progress. Dr. H. Bradley (*Ethical Studies*, p. 173) shows how this principle works, and, incidentally, one may gather how inconsistent with its operations is the Modernist effort to substitute for traditional Christianity an entirely new concept of the Gospel.

“‘Evolution,’ ‘Development,’ ‘Progress,’ all imply,” he says, “something identical throughout, a subject of the evolution, which is one and the same. If what is there at the beginning is not there at the end, and the same as what was there at the beginning, then evolution is a word with no meaning. Something must evolve itself, and that something, which is the end, must also be the beginning. It must be what moves itself to the end, and must be the end which is the ‘because’ of the motion. Evolution must evolve itself to itself, progress

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xiv, 10; I Cor. xv; II Cor. v, 10; Phil. i, 14; ii, 10; I Thess. iv, 16 to end; v, 12; II Thess. ii, 1-15; II Tim. iv, 8; Titus ii, 13; Heb. ix, 27; II Pet. iii, 3-18; Jude 14, 15; Apoc. i, 7; iii, 3; xvi, 15; xx, 15 to end.

The value of the pre-Christian Apocalyptic literature on the eschatological question, in the eyes of Jewish writers such as Jost, Graetz, etc., is regarded as nil. The stream of Jewish tradition since the time of Christ offers similar evidence, as does post-Christian Jewish literature, which is purely legalistic.

Canon Charles, however, is of opinion that it helped much in the transition from Judaism to Christianity. He is also of the opinion that “the expectation of the nearness of the end formed a real factor in Jesus’ view of the future,” but he is cautious, in discussing the other side of the question, to add, “There are, on the other hand, many passages which just as clearly present us with a different aspect of the future.” He shows his attitude towards the Weiss theory by dismissing with little ceremony the latter’s contention (in support of his eschatological theory) that there is no conflict between Mark xiii, 32 and xiii, 30.

A reaction against the Weiss-Schweitzer-view is already at work, and the hasty patrons of it in this country must feel more and more that they have damaged, by supporting it, their reputations as unbiassed critics.

itself, go forward to a goal which is 'itself'—development bring out nothing but what was in, and bring it out, not from external compulsion, but *because* it is in it."

Dr. Bradley's view of evolution was meant to show inferentially the absurdity of prevailing concepts. He did not see, perhaps, that it was destined to express the latest opinions of biologists on the subject. In his Presidential Address to the British Association at Melbourne in August, 1914, Professor Bateson seemed inclined to place the potentialities of all evolutionary processes in the primordial protoplasm. "At first," he says, "it may seem rank absurdity to suppose that the primordial form or forms of protoplasm could contain complexity enough to produce the divers types of life. But is it," he asks, "easier to imagine that these powers could have been conveyed by extrinsic additions?" The answer is in the negative if we are to trust the trend of modern research.

Professor Bateson is inclined not only to regard the primordial protoplasm as containing *within it* potentially all the forms which have since proceeded from it, but also, to look upon the process of development as caused, not by extrinsic additions, but by *loss* of certain elements inhibitory of change—"evolution by loss," and not by factors acquired from without, is a new view, but it seems to fall in with much of our present knowledge.

We have learned of late, for instance, that abnormal development in the mental and physiological constitution of human beings are held in check by certain *inhibitory* functions. If these be removed, we have as a result unbridled and irregular products. A parallel to this inhibitory physiological action is to be found sociologically in what we call "self-control." Individuals and nations that lose their "self-control" are a prey to wild revolutionary impulses, even supposing that these impulses are necessary to further developments. That the future should be actually contained in the present is not startling when we think, as Professor Bateson instances, that what became Shakespeare was once a minute speck of protoplasm, and that all additions to that speck were exclusively such material as would go to the building up of an ape or a rat. Christianity had within it at the outset all that it has since displayed to the world. We may safely trust, from the analogy of the organic forces at work in nature, that it will evolve from itself new forces which for the moment may be "masked." That a new and vital Christianity could arise from the labours of destructive German and other critics would require a miracle to make credible.

## DISCUSSION.

The Rev. MARTIN ANSTEY rose to propose a hearty vote of thanks to Canon McClure for the masterly review he had given them of a very wide subject. There was only one word in the title of the lecture to which he took exception. For the word "traditional" he would substitute the word "historical" Christianity. The word "traditional" was associated with the Romish view of Christianity as based on Holy Scripture and tradition, whereas in truth it rested on the written Word of God, and was in danger of being corrupted by the traditions of men.

Christianity was one complete, coherent, consistent whole, dominated by one central principle, springing from one supreme Person, and embedded in actual facts of past history. It was not a system of theories or a scheme of thought. Its relation to Holy Scripture was intimate, intrinsic, vital. It involved belief in (1) certain fundamental facts, (2) certain definite interpretations of those facts, and (3) certain duties or laws of conduct enjoined as arising out of the Christian interpretation of the fundamental Christian facts. These facts were contained in the four Gospels, and the Book of Acts. The interpretations were contained in the first part of the Epistles, and the duties in the latter part of the Epistles. The Christian Creeds were not metaphysical theories, but statements of fact. "I believe in Jesus Christ, who was born of the Virgin Mary, suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, dead and buried; the third day He rose again from the dead . . ."—these were the fundamental facts upon which, and not upon any philosophical theory, Christianity was based.

Modernism was an attempt to adapt Christianity to an anti-Christian system of philosophy. In the eighteenth century an attempt was made to adapt Christianity to the prevailing anti-Christian philosophy of Deism. In the nineteenth century a similar attempt was made to adapt it to the prevailing philosophy of Pantheism. Modernism was an attempt to adapt it to the prevailing monistic philosophy of the twentieth century. Modernism did not base its theories upon the facts of history, but endeavoured to adapt the facts to its theories. Hence it rejected the fact of the Virgin Birth, and substituted for the Fall a doctrine of the rise of man. But facts were not to be set aside in this manner. When duly

attested and proved by witnesses at once honest, capable, and contemporary, they could not be overthrown. The witnesses attesting the facts of the Gospels were honest. Paley proved this by showing that they died to attest the truth of their testimony. Hume suggested that, though honest, they may not have been capable. But they were quite competent to attest the truth of the things which they had seen and heard. Hence the endeavour of modern higher critical scholarship to prove that they were not contemporary, and to date the Gospels and the Epistles from the second or third centuries. These attempts had all ended in failure. The testimony of the Apostles to the facts of the Gospels had never been disproved. It was the testimony of honest and capable men as to facts which they had seen with their own eyes, heard with their own ears, and handled with their own hands. And it was confirmed by the perpetual testimony of the Holy Spirit in the hearts of those who believed. The truth of the facts which formed the basis of Christianity could only be overthrown by discrediting the witnesses, and this had never been done. Modernism was not an adaptation of Christianity to the needs of the modern mind, but the substitution for it of another Scheme which was not a modification, but a repudiation, of the Christian Scheme as a whole.

Lt.-Col. MACKINLAY desired heartily to second the vote of thanks to the Lecturer for a most valuable paper.

The Modernist rests his position upon a denial of the historical character of the Gospels. The writings of St. Luke, apart from their inspiration, are now regarded by careful scholars as accurately historical. Not only does he allude to many well-known contemporaneous events, such as the enrolments in the Roman Empire, the pro-consulship of Gallio, etc., but he gives most accurately the exact titles of various Roman officials as proved by recently discovered inscriptions, as well as certain geographical boundaries recognized in his day as demonstrated by Sir W. M. Ramsay. He describes most naturally the effects of the love of money on various persons, and he gives other graphic touches true to human nature. Such writings are not consistent with the inclusion of myth and fable. The orderly historical character of the puzzling central chapters of St. Luke's Gospel is now being demonstrated.

This line of attack on the Modernist position showing the historical accuracy of one of the Gospels has only been employed of late

years, but it is an effective one, and should be still further developed.

The Ven. Archdeacon BERESFORD POTTER had listened to the paper with much pleasure; it was very gratifying that one who, from his official position as Secretary of a Society, might be expected to write more or less "to order," should impress his readers, as did Canon McClure, so strongly with his absolute fairness and desire for the truth.

If we referred back to our Lord's time, we saw how He condemned the Jewish teachers of His day, who had degraded Judaism, and how He sought to recall His hearers to the great spiritual truths underlying Judaism. Is it impossible that Christianity may have suffered some degradation, some lowering of spiritual vitality, during the long centuries of its existence, and that we, like the Jews, may need to be recalled to a more spiritual attitude?

The speaker thought that the Church owed something to the Modernist thinkers, though, in the swing of the pendulum, one might naturally expect that mistakes would arise. We could not accept Loisy's teaching, nor all that Father Tyrrell wrote; yet Tyrrell's view that the test of spiritual truth was its effect in uplifting the spiritual life of man was one with which he entirely agreed. He had lately had the pleasure of a conversation with Mr. Thompson, and was entirely assured as to his religious spirit and fairness of mind; at the same time he could not admit that there was any consistency between his denial of miracle and his strong belief in the Incarnation.

The CHAIRMAN read a note from SIR ROBERT ANDERSON in which he expressed his sense of distress and pain that Canon McClure's paper ended by offering no alternative to Modernism save "traditional Christianity." "Tradition" had supplied the platform from whence rationalism had launched its attacks upon Holy Scripture and on the faith of Christ; our only sure refuge was "God and the Word of His Grace."

The CHAIRMAN remarked that he felt sure Sir Robert had misunderstood Canon McClure's use of the word "traditional." The lecturer was not referring to that which is often termed "Tradition," but to primitive Christianity as contrasted with some recent conceptions. For our knowledge of what Christianity is we must fall back upon the Bible; it stands upon no other rock than

that of Holy Scripture. Many people were unaware how full and complete was the testimony of the early Church to the Bible—to quote the Epistle to the Hebrews, “we also are compassed about with so great a cloud of witnesses.” Traditional Christianity, that is to say Christianity as derived from the mere traditions of men, had done immense harm by preparing the way for “Modernism”; belief had been asked for a vast mass of quite unhistorical events, and these fictions had clouded men’s faith in the great historical facts of the life of Christ. There was only one way by which to escape from these entanglements: let us go back to Holy Scripture.

He greatly admired Canon McClure’s patience in his study of these products of German philosophy. After all, there was nothing specially modern about them: they were simply revivals of ancient Gnosticism, and were unspeakably dreary and monotonous. More than sixty years ago the late Dean Mansel had them exposed, and had shown that the Modernists had not advanced at all beyond their predecessors. All the Modernist arguments and theories were hopelessly deficient in one essential particular: they had no answer to the question, how we may be saved from our sins.

He wished that we could get rid of abstract terms. It was not with Christianity that we were concerned, but with Christ. As long as we fixed our gaze on that Divine Figure, these speculations vanished.

The reason why Modernism had made less progress in this country than on the Continent was no doubt that our people knew the Bible. There was one thing for which this nation was deeply indebted to the English Church. From the Reformation onward, it had been the rule that the Bible should be systematically read aloud in Church in the common tongue every Sunday. The value of this might be learnt from one illustration. Renan, in his *Vie de Jesus*, characterised the discourses of the Lord which are recorded in the fourteenth and three following chapters of St. John’s Gospel as arid and metaphysical. Everyone who had read those chapters with the slightest spiritual apprehension knew that that was simply nonsense. There were no parts of Holy Scripture that were so full of life and comfort to all. We Christians were far too timid; we stood on the defensive and were apologetic, when we should be boldly asserting and insisting upon the greatest facts in

all history. We ought to exalt the Person of Christ; we ought to proclaim the Words of Christ, and to maintain their paramount claim on the obedience of all men.

The LECTURER briefly acknowledged the vote of thanks, and expressed his obligation to the Rev. M. Anstey for his criticism of the word "traditional"; by that word he had wished to connote "historical Christianity"—Christianity as based on the great historical facts of our Lord's Birth, Life, Death and Resurrection.

The meeting adjourned at 6.10 P.M.

#### WRITTEN COMMUNICATION.

The Rev. Chancellor LIAS writes: This war has given the *coup de grâce* to, what I may venture to call, German sceptical criticism. For more than a hundred years, from Eichhorn onwards, we have had a succession of German critics whose aim has been to minimize the credit of Holy Scripture, and to such a height had the tyranny of Germanism in this country grown that an article for a paper would be refused, a book would be received slightly or ignored, if it did not conform to the Germanic fashion. Yet there were those of us who saw that this Germanized criticism was not what it professed to be,—scientific; it rested upon assertion, not upon facts or first principles. And we foresaw that either a reaction must come or this country cease to be Christian, for the Christian religion could not stand upon such foundations as those that were left to it. What none of us dared to foresee was the appalling object-lesson which this war presents us of a country which has abandoned Christianity and Christ, has not only rejected Jehovah, but gone back to Odin, and has set up a morality worse than any ever seen before, a morality resting avowedly on force alone.

I proceed to a few brief and disconnected remarks on the paper. Newman's theory of development is stated on p. 62; whether this development be true or false did not seem to matter in Cardinal Newman's estimation, for he considered that it took place according to men's ideas of "congruity," "desirability," or "decorum"; it was therefore neither logical nor scientific, and depended entirely on "the taste and fancy" of the developer.

On p. 61, there is a reference to the large-minded and most valuable *Commonitorium* of Vincentius Lerinensis, wherein he lays down that the germ of truth is essential and unchangeable, but its explanation and application are gradual and progressive. The Modernist view mentioned on p. 67 is not altogether wrong; where it fails is that it often tries to evaporate the germ on which faith must rest. Bishop Hampden and Charles Kingsley did a good work when they reminded us that the Christian religion rested on a foundation not of theories, but of facts; facts which can be recognized and assimilated even by children and the most ignorant of adults.

On p. 72, it is curious to note how Mr. Thompson sets aside all the evidence for miracles, but expects men to believe Jesus Christ to be Divine without any external evidence at all. Mr. W. H. Moberly's article on "God and the Absolute" is mentioned on p. 79. In a paper I read before the Institute in February, 1883, I endeavoured to show that the God in Whom Christians believe was neither the "Absolute," nor the "Infinite," nor the "Unconditioned"; these were mere intellectual formulæ, whereas we Christians believe in a Living Being,—no abstract category of the metaphysician, but One Who is all Life, all Truth, all Love.

On pp. 81–85, we have a presentation of Canon Charles's analysis of the dates and contents of the various books of Apocalyptic literature which have come down to us. For the most part, critics do not break up these into infinitesimal fragments, assigned to different dates, in the way in which they break up the Old and New Testaments, so that the Germanizing critics would have us believe that Christianity, which all admit to be the best and purest of all religions, rests upon unauthorized and unsatisfactory accounts of its Founder, clumsily embodied in an extraordinary and inexplicable mosaic. If this were so, it would be the clearest possible proof that the religion resting on such a basis was simply an imposture and delusion. If God came down from heaven to enlighten and to save mankind, we may be sure that He would have taken care that His Message to man would have been properly and accurately transmitted, even as His Church has always believed it to have been.