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"Proceedings of the Royal United Service Club." *From the same.*
"Proceedings of the Royal Institution." *Ditto.*
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"Proceedings of the Geological Society." *Ditto.*
"Proceedings of the Palestine Exploration Fund." *Ditto.*
"Warwickshire Natural History Society." *Ditto.*
"Proceedings of the Sydney Observatory." *Ditto.*
"Proceedings of the Canadian Institute." *Ditto.*
"Proceedings of the American Geographical Society." *Ditto.*
"Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society." *Ditto.*
"Proceedings of the United States Geological and Geographical Survey.
"Bombay Meteorology." By C. Chambers. *From the Secretary of State for India.*
"Continental and Island Life." By Dr. J. W. Dawson, C.M.G. *Ditto.*
"History of Licking County." By J. Smucker, Esq.
"Isms, Old and New." By the Rev. G. C. Lorimer. *Ditto.*
"London Review." *From A. McArthur, Esq., M.P.*
"Israel's Wanderings." *From L. Biden, Esq.*
"A Pocket of Pebbles." By the Rev. W. B. Philpot. *From the Author.*
"J. L. Paschal." By A. Lombard. *Ditto.*
"Mosaic Authorship of Deuteronomy." By the Rev. A. Stewart. *Ditto.*
"The Refutation of Darwinism." By T. W. O'Neill, Esq. *Ditto.*

Also Smaller Papers from Professor Claypole, Enmore Jones, Esq., and the Rev. Dr. Sexton.

The following paper was then read by the author :—

AN EXAMINATION OF MR. SPENCER'S "THEORY OF THE WILL." By the Rev. W. D. Ground.

WE saw in a former Paper that Mr. Spencer made common cause with the Realist Philosophers in asserting that the deliverance of consciousness must take precedence of all conclusions arrived at by a process of Reasoning. In holding such an opinion he shows his own good sense, his philosophical grasp and acumen, his clear scientific conceptions, and his determination to found his system on none of the mere alluvial strata of the Mind, but to get down far beneath to the solid rock which is underlying all. Here we can be completely at one with him. Any product of Reason, any conclusion arrived at by Reason, can, in the nature of the case, only be an elaboration of the materials given by consciousness, and it is far better, if we want to know what is in consciousness, to examine and analyse its primary elements, rather than a finished elaboration of these, into which some other element may have been imported. Every man of science acts on this

principle, and it is manifestly a dictate of common sense. A recent writer contends that Mr. Spencer's "metaphysical principles are empirical."* By this he can only mean that because Mr. Spencer shows that the Logical Laws are the slow growth in us, through unnumbered organisms, of much humbler elements of Mind, therefore they have been acquired by and are the result of the experience of those organisms. In my judgment such an argument is neither sound nor just, and it admits of a most effective rejoinder. Mr. Spencer may reply that, so far from deriving those Logical Laws from experience, he is, on the contrary, showing that they are the simple outgrowth of the one *à priori* principle which runs throughout the universe; he is showing that their roots stretch far away down, deeper than all things; he is assigning them an antiquity compared with which the date the Professor affixes makes them but of mushroom growth, and is giving them an authority which makes his *à priori* canon nothing more than their humble vassal.

So much Mr. Spencer might say on the ground of his synthetic system alone. But when in addition, in his analytic system, he expressly sets aside all possible rivals of the simple deliverances of consciousness, and proclaims his adhesion to consciousness alone, then it seems to me only fair and just to accept his disclaimer, and to regard his system as an honest attempt to found only on consciousness. The *à priori* is his structural element; his metaphysics are not empirical.

We have now to examine his Theory of the Will. He denies to the Will all moral freedom, taking up the position of the philosophical necessarian. Now, if Consciousness could be clearly shown to assert that we have a sense of moral Liberty, Mr. Spencer could be proved to contradict Consciousness on this point. No doubt some of the greatest philosophers, including Kant, Jacobi, Hamilton, contend that Consciousness does give us this sense of Freedom, and they attach to it the greatest possible importance. But others as strenuously deny it, and there is no more vexed question in all Philosophy. Leaving this, then, for the present at least, let us look at Mr. Spencer's reasoning on the matter.

Now, if Consciousness really asserts that we are morally free, there must be some break in Mr. Spencer's logical chain, since he asserts the exact contradictory. If, then, on examination we find such a break, it will so far be an evidence that Consciousness does make the assertion, and we shall then

* Professor Fairbairn, *Contemporary Review* for July.

be in a position, when Mr. Spencer's arguments are swept out of the way, to look carefully and dispassionately at the whole matter. We shall find, I think, that here Mr. Spencer is singularly weak—so weak, indeed, that what he says scarcely deserves the name of reasoning.

Let us, then, examine his theory.

Mr. Spencer's Theory of the Will is one of the most original and remarkable parts of his Philosophy. It will be remembered that he makes what is subjectively Mind to be, in its objective aspect, currents or motions of nervous molecules. He makes what we call Will, or an act of volition, to be the commingling, in one definite stream, of force, of a number of those nerve-currents, which, in a previous state of indecision, were colliding one against another. It is like many rivers debouching into a lake; they come rushing pell-mell; and this confusion in the currents represents, in its subjective aspect, the time of uncertainty; until, at length, one adverse stream has neutralised another, the lake becomes calm, and the one unobstructed current flows on; which current is the resultant of all the streams that there met. Thus it will be seen that Mr. Spencer's theory utterly denies the existence of any determining element in the Will itself; it makes the whole process to be merely mechanical, nothing more than the mixture of nerve-molecules. Or, to take another illustration of his theory from a contested county election. There are various polling places, where votes of various numbers are recorded—and these votes represent the different motives with their exact quota of weight—but *the result is arithmetically deducible from the completed polling-books*, and the delay in learning which candidate is returned arises, not from any contingency or uncertainty, but simply because time is required to arrive at the totals.

That such is Mr. Spencer's theory will be apparent from the following passages. He is describing what he calls Will, and he says:—

"On passing from compound reflex actions to those actions so highly compounded as to be imperfectly reflex—on passing from the organically-determined psychical changes, which take place with extreme rapidity, to the psychical changes which, not being organically-determined, take place with some deliberation, and therefore consciously; we pass to a kind of mental action, which is one of Memory, Reason, Feeling, or Will, according to the side of it we look at."*

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* *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i. p. 495 (2nd edition, from which all quotations are made).

Again he says:—

"When the automatic actions become so involved, so varied in kind, and severally so infrequent, as no longer to be performed with unhesitating precision,—when, after the reception of one of the more complex impressions, the appropriate motor changes become nascent, but are prevented from passing into immediate action by the antagonism of certain other nascent motor changes appropriate to some nearly allied impression; there is constituted a state of consciousness which, when it finally issues in action, displays what we term volition."*

Again he says:—

"An immense number of psychical states are partially aroused, some of which unite with the original impression in exciting the action, while the rest combine as excitors of an opposite action; and when, eventually, from their greater number or intensity, the first outbalance the others, the interpretation is that, as an accumulated stimulus, they become sufficiently strong to make the nascent motor changes pass into actual motor changes." †

But, in order to show what is Mr. Spencer's reasoning on the subject, I must trouble you with a long quotation. He says:—

"Long before reaching this point, most readers must have perceived that the doctrines developed in the last two parts of this work are at variance with the current tenets respecting the freedom of the Will. That every one is at liberty to do what he desires to do (supposing there are no external hindrances) all admit, though people of confused ideas commonly suppose this to be the thing denied. But that every one is at liberty to desire or not to desire, which is the real proposition involved in the dogma of free-will, is negatived as much by the analysis of consciousness as by the contents of the preceding chapters. From the universal law that, other things equal, the cohesion of psychical states is proportionate to the frequency with which they have followed one another in experience, it is an inevitable corollary that all actions whatever must be determined by those psychical connexions which experience has generated, either in the life of the individual, or in that general antecedent life of which the accumulated results are organised in his constitution.

"To go at length into this long-standing controversy respecting the Will would be alike useless and out of place. I can but briefly indicate what seems to me the nature of the current illusion, as interpreted from the point of view at which we have arrived.

"Considered as an internal perception, the illusion consists in supposing that at each moment the *ego* is something more than the aggregate of feelings and ideas, actual and nascent, which then exists. A man who, after being subject to an impulse consisting of a group of psychical states, real and ideal, performs a certain action, usually asserts that he determined to perform the action; and by speaking of his conscious self as having been something separate from the group of psychical states constituting the impulse, is led into the error of supposing that it was not the impulse alone which determined the action. But the entire group of psychical states which constituted the antecedent of the action, also constituted himself at that moment—constituted his psychical self, that is, as distinguished from his physical self.

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* *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i. p. 496. † *Ibid.* vol. i. p. 498.

It is alike true that he determined the action, and that the aggregate of his feelings and ideas determined it; since, during its existence, this aggregate constituted his then state of consciousness, that is, himself. Either the *ego*, which is supposed to determine or will the action, is present in consciousness or it is not. If it is not present in consciousness, it is something of which we are unconscious—something, therefore, of whose existence we neither have nor can have any evidence. If it is present in consciousness, then, as it is ever present, it can be at each moment nothing else than the state of consciousness, simple or compound, passing at that moment. It follows, inevitably, that when an impression, received from without, makes nascent certain appropriate motor changes, and various of the feelings* and ideas which must accompany and follow them; and when, under the stimulus of this composite psychical state, the nascent motor changes pass in actual motor changes; this composite psychical state, which excites the action, is, at the same time, the *ego* which is said to will the action. Naturally enough, then, the subject of such psychical changes says that he wills the action; since, psychically considered, he is at that moment nothing more than the composite state of consciousness by which the action is excited. But to say that the performance of the action is, therefore, the result of his free will, is to say that he determines the cohesions of the psychical states which arouse the action; and, as these psychical states constitute himself at that moment, this is to say that these psychical states determine their own cohesions, which is absurd. Their cohesions have been determined by experiences—the greater part of them constituting what we call his natural character, by the experiences of antecedent organisms; and the rest by his own experiences. The changes which at each moment take place in his consciousness, and among others those which he is said to will, are produced by this infinitude of previous experiences registered in his nervous structure, co-operating with the immediate impressions on his senses: the effects of these combined factors being in every case qualified by the physical state, general or local, of his organism.

"This subjective illusion, in which the notion of free-will commonly originates, is strengthened by a corresponding objective illusion. The actions of other individuals, lacking as they do that uniformity characterising phenomena of which the laws are known, appear to be lawless—appear to be under no necessity of following any particular order; and are hence supposed to be determined by the unknown independent something called the Will. But this seeming indeterminateness in the mental succession is consequent on the extreme complication of the forces in action. The composition of causes is so intricate, and from moment to moment so varied, that the effects are not calculable. These effects are, however, as conformable to law as the simplest reflex actions. The irregularity and apparent freedom are inevitable results of the complexity, and equally arise in the inorganic world under parallel conditions. To amplify an illustration before used:—A body in space, subject to the attraction of a single other body, moves in a direction that can be accurately predicted. If subject to the attractions of two bodies, its course is but approximately calculable. If subject to the attractions of three bodies, its course can be calculated with still less precision. And, if it is surrounded by bodies of all sizes at all distances, its motion will be apparently uninfluenced by any of them: it will move in some indefinable varying line that appears to be self-determined: it will seem to be *free*. Similarly, in proportion as the cohesions of each psychical state to others become great in number and various in degree, the psychical changes will become incalculable and apparently subject to no law.

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* There is evidently some mistake here, but those are the *ipsissima verba* of Mr. Spencer's work.

To reduce the general question to its simplest form: Psychical changes either conform to law or they do not. If they do not conform to law, this work, in common with all works on the subject, is sheer nonsense; no science of Psychology is possible. If they do conform to law, there cannot be any such thing as free-will.*

If now we carefully take to pieces this tissue of elaborate argument, we shall find, I think, that there is hardly one sentence in it which does not contain either a glaring misstatement, a palpable fallacy, or a clear *petitio principii*. Let us take the sentences in order.

1. In sentences two and three he says that "the real proposition involved in the dogma of free-will" is "that every one is at liberty to desire or not to desire." Now as to whether this is a just statement of the problem, we will call two witnesses of unimpeachable character—Kant and Hamilton. Kant says, "We only mean by liberty that negative property of our thinking frame not to be determined to act by physical excitements."† Still more clearly he says, "The instincts of man's physical nature give birth to obstacles which hinder and impede him in the execution of his duty. They are, in fact, mighty opposing forces which he has to go forth and encounter."‡ Again he speaks of "the force reason has to vanquish and beat down all the appetites which oppose the execution of the law."§ Clearly then Kant allows that we must desire, but says we have power to rein in our desires. Hamilton is just as clear. He speaks of man's liberty as "capable of carrying that Law" of Duty "into effect, in opposition to the solicitations, the impulsions of his material nature."‖ A few lines lower he speaks of Liberty as a power "capable of resisting and conquering the counter-action of our animal nature."‖ Thus Kant and Hamilton admit that we are compelled to desire, but they assert that our free-will can restrain desire. Mr. Spencer must therefore stand convicted, either of being ignorant of what they held, or else of a deliberate misrepresentation of the question at issue. On either supposition he stands convicted of glaring misrepresentation.

2. In the next sentence—sentence four—there is a fallacy. Let it be remembered that Mr. Spencer has to *prove* that the will is not free, and he is now advancing arguments which are supposed to prove it. This is his argument. "From the universal law that, other things equal, the cohesion of psychical states is proportionate to the frequency with which

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* *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i. pp. 500, 503.
† Kant, *Metaphysics of Ethics*, Calderwood's ed., p. 174. ‡ *Ibid.* p. 194.
§ *Ibid.* p. 198. ‖ Hamilton, *Lectures on Metaphysics*, vol. i. 4th ed., p. 29.

they have followed each other in experience, it is an inevitable corollary that all actions whatever must be determined by those psychical connexions which experience has generated." Now what, I ask, is the argument in this sentence save an assumption of the very point at issue?

It is contended, as Mr. Spencer surely knows, by those who hold the Freedom of the Will, that, be the connexion of psychical states what it may, be the organisation what it may, there is still, in every sane man, a power of bearing back the force of the organisation, and of going clean contrary to it. Such assert that there is a *free* element in the Will which makes it unlike to, and higher than, anything elsewhere to be found in the whole domain of consciousness. They declare that the chain of causation which obtains even in the majority of our mental operations, does not obtain in the region of the Will, that it stands solitary and unique—the organ of a free and responsible Personality—surrounded by a universe held in the chains of Law. That is the position taken up by the ablest advocates of Freedom. What argument does Mr. Spencer advance against this position? None whatever; he simply assumes that the will is ruled by the same unvarying law, and has the same definite succession of necessary states as those which obtain in other parts of the universe; which is the very thing advocates of its freedom say it has not. Mr. Spencer, therefore, does not meet the issue; he simply evades it. As we saw in our last Paper, he passed *per saltum* from solar rays to mental energies, so here, by a similar unwarranted leap, he passes from the admitted conformity to Law which marks other parts of our organisation to that unique Freedom and power of choice which resides in the Will alone.

3. In the next sentence but one there is the same unwarranted assumption of the very point in dispute. He calls it "an illusion" to think "that at each moment the *ego* is something more than the aggregate of feelings and ideas, actual and nascent, which then exists!" If this is not confounding the phenomena with the substance in which that phenomena inheres, I am at a loss to understand the meaning of language. "The aggregate of feelings and ideas, actual and nascent," means the various tracts which together cover over the whole area of consciousness—they are the various modifications of the substance of mind. Now, does Mr. Spencer, the advocate of Realism, the resolute Iconoclast of all Idealistic theories—does he mean, as he here says, that "the aggregate of feelings and ideas" is all that is in the *ego?* Does he really deny that there is an *ego* distinct from these, a substratum on which they repose?" If so, shade of Berkeley!

how thou art avenged, for thy fiercest assailant is now possessed by a double portion of thy spirit. Evidently Mr. Spencer here commits himself to a theory of the wildest Idealism. He denies the existence of all substance of Mind, and asserts that there are in us only a fleeting succession of transitory states! Just as well he might deny the existence of all substance of matter, and say that matter is nothing more than a bundle of phenomena. John Stuart Mill asserted this, but hitherto Mr. Spencer has been too wise. He can take up this position if he likes, but he will know the fate which in that case awaits him. Elsewhere he has many times said that mind as distinct from all phenomena of Mind is the one existence of whose reality we can be most absolutely certain, "is a truth transcending all others in certainty." * In this sentence, then, are two contradictions. He confounds substance with phenomena, which elsewhere he has carefully distinguished; and he denies, what he has in other places asserted, that Mind, as distinguished from its modifications, exists.

4. In the next sentence but one there is the same assumption. There is not one particle more of reasoning. He simply asserts that "the entire group of psychical states which constituted the antecedent of the action also constituted" (the actor) "himself at that moment—constituted his psychical self, that is, as distinguished from his physical self." Now here is a very clever and plausible sophism. We cannot say point blank that Mr. Spencer's statement is false, but as he means it, it is false. "The entire group of psychical states" may be, perhaps, held to make up a man's "psychical self," if within those "psychical states" that power of free-will which rules them all is included. But Mr. Spencer means by "psychical states" simply states of mind held in the bonds of unvarying law, with all freedom of will shut out. Hence his sentence, reasonably true in sound, is false in meaning, and no fresh argument is adduced. It is one more *petitio principii*.

5. In the very next sentence he makes the same round assertion, advancing no fresh argument.

6. In the next sentence he makes a break as if about to go on a new line of departure, and give us something more worthy of his masterly dialectic. But it is only to continue the same logical vice. He says:—"Either the *ego* which is supposed to determine or will the action is present in con-

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* *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i. p. 209.

sciousness or it is not. If it is not present in consciousness, it is something of which we are unconscious,—something of whose existence we neither have nor can have any evidence. If it is present in consciousness, then, as it is ever present, it can be at each moment nothing else than the state of consciousness, simple or compound, passing at that moment."

Obviously here is again only assertion, and no proof.

7. In the next sentence he makes the same unsupported assertion, saying, "this composite psychical state which excites the action, is at the same time the *ego* which is said to will the action."

8. The next sentence is very suggestive and self-revealing, but it contains only assertion, and no proof. He continues: "Naturally enough, then, the subject of such psychical changes (it is passing strange how, if these psychical changes are the man himself, as we have so often been told, there can be a *subject* of them—subject is what underlies phenomena, and if there are *only* the phenomena, the subject thereof is only a sort of hypostatised zero) the subject of such psychical changes says that he wills the action, since psychically considered he is at that moment" (the same round assertion as before) "nothing more than the composite state of consciousness by which the action is excited." This seems to me to be on the whole one of the most remarkable sentences in the whole compass of Philosophy. The poor "subject" is made to do duty in many aspects. In the first clause he is a being who alone makes possible all the "psychical changes," for a psychical change cannot take place save in a *psyche*, of which it is a change; in the second clause he is alive and active indeed, but under an illusion in thinking he wills the change; in the next clause he is reduced to "nothing more than the composite state of consciousness" by which the change was effected. Mr. Spencer must be pressed indeed for argument before he could put on paper such hollow reasoning.

9. In the next sentence we have the old assertion, but no proof. "But to say that the performance of the action is therefore the result of his free-will is to say that he determines the cohesion of the psychical states which arouse the action—and as these psychical states constitute himself at that moment"—(asserted and not proved once more) "this is to say that these psychical states determine their own cohesions, which is absurd."

10. In the next sentence he says, "their cohesions" (cohesions of these psychical states) "have been determined by experiences." But this is the very statement which the advocates of Freedom deny. They say that the cohesions made

by the Will are undetermined—that all "experiences" are only votes given in favour of a certain course—and that, be the voting what it may, the Will has a casting vote which can set aside any amount opposed to it, and by its simple decree compel the organisation to act as it pleases. To establish his proposition Mr. Spencer is bound to overthrow this doctrine. As we have seen, he has not advanced one real argument; he has only made assertions. The advocates of Freedom can make counter-assertions, and, for all that Mr. Spencer has contributed, the matter stands where it was.

11. In the next sentence there is the same unsupported statement.

12. The next suggests that what he calls the subjective illusion that our will is free is strengthened by an objective illusion, produced by the extreme complexity of the amounts and directions of the motives that urge it, which complexity is such as to make its action incalculable; and he shows that in proportion as material masses are acted upon by many forces do they move in a line which cannot be predicted, and hence they seem to be free. Any trained scientific intellect will, I think, see the worthlessness of this argument. Every mathematician will say in a moment that if a million forces be acting on a body, it will obey the resultant of them all,—and that between this and freedom there is a difference as wide as logical contradictories can make it.

No doubt the flight of a bird through the air seems to be free; but it seems so only to the untrained intelligence, and any one accustomed to the severities of scientific thought sees quite clearly that every movement of its wings is held in the bonds of fixed law as completely as a planet is held in its place in the heavens. Mr. Spencer's is only an *ad captandum* argument; the illusion would impose on no student of science.

13. Mr. Spencer then makes one final effort—a sort of closing charge, intended to sweep all opponents from the field,—he brings out one of his great generalisations, which are, as a rule, so far-reaching in their range and so penetrating and deadly in their sweep. Here, however, his artillery is loaded only with blank cartridge; there is a great appearance, but no force. He says, "To reduce the general question to its simplest form: Psychical changes either conform to law, or they do not. If they do not conform to law, this work, in common with all works on the subject, is sheer nonsense; no science of Psychology is possible. If they do conform to law, there cannot be any such thing as free-will."

This last sentence seems to show in what way Mr. Spencer

is misled. He evidently thinks that conforming to law makes free-will impossible. He has that inveterate materialistic bias, often engendered by scientific pursuits, which can only regard "law" as applying to material things—to masses or molecules—and it must have been evident that all through his Theory of the Will he has been thinking only of the currents of nerve-molecules, and has never had in clear vision the immaterial Mind which rides upon them. Thinking only of molecules he cannot see how they can be free; he is compelled, whilst he is in this materialistic vein, to regard the whole man as all made up out of them, and all contained within them; hence he is driven to make these molecules the determining power of each action, and to ignore altogether that immaterial Mind in the man whose existence is one of the structural doctrines of his Philosophy. This Mind may conform to law and yet be free:—the Will, which is one aspect of the Mind, may determine, within certain defined limits, along what lines the molecules shall go; it may make and carry out its decrees as it chooses; it may be free, and yet all the psychical changes will conform to law, a law the Will imposes.

It is easy to prove that there can be no contradiction between conforming to law and freedom. We can form the conception of an agent who is free, and is at the same time morally perfect. No one surely will contend that these are logical contradictories which cannot be combined in one concept (the illustration would hold if we regarded him as diabolically perfect); now this agent is by hypothesis free, and yet it is certain that his very perfection would lead him, with absolute precision, along the lines of that law which laid down the path of moral perfectness. His organisation being perfect would urge him along that path, his will being perfect and free would deliberately approve of the suggestions of the organisation, would accept them, and carry them out.

If we take up for a moment the Theistic position, the point can be more conclusively proved. Let us ask, "Is God free?" If not, then He also is bound in the same miserable chain of Fatalism. If He is free, yet when He gives fullest play to His energies is He not most completely conforming to law—the law of His own holy nature? If, then, the Creator can be free and also conform to law, the combination of the two concepts in one concrete instance is proved to be possible. Why, then, should it not be possible to the creature also? Made in the image of God, is it not probable that some of the Divine Freedom would be given to us? As we seek to train our children to be good and holy by setting them free in due

time from the restraints of law, seeking to educate in them a righteous principle which shall make them rule themselves wisely and well, and as we know that their attainment of this principle is worth all the possible slips and mischances they may make in gaining it, so the Divine Father may see that the true valour of righteousness can only be acquired by setting our spirits free, He may see that the advantages so secured far outweigh the disadvantages; He may recoil from having His Throne surrounded by a band of slaves who never had any choice as to whom they would serve; He may prefer the loyalty of free men; and to secure this He may launch out each human spirit on the ocean of life,—supplying abundance of charts and guides,—but casting on each the solemn responsibility of deciding to what port he will steer, what character he will have, what he will regard as the supreme good of his being. For God so to act is to make Life one grand moral test, and, so far we can judge, it is a course eminently worthy of the God of Righteousness.

It must now have been made evident that all through Mr. Spencer's reasoning on the subject of the Will he has got into a shallow vein, and never gets down to the depths which are found in other places of his philosophy. He seems here to have yielded himself to a preconceived notion, to have allowed that notion to rule the entire structure of his thought, and to have laid aside that habit of careful, dispassionate scrutiny which has, for the most part, characterised him. It is difficult to account on any other hypothesis for the utterly superficial character of the thought and argument he has here presented. If we formed our notion of his Philosophy from these few pages, what could we deem him but the very chief of empiricists? What can we gather from these but that our consciousness of Personality is a delusion,—that our *ego* is only a bundle of feelings and ideas,—that mind is only an aspect of matter,—that the logical laws are only registered sensations,—that consciousness is untrustworthy,—that matter is only phenomena,—that there is no rock of truth anywhere,—that we can be certain of nothing,—that we cannot be certain whether we can be certain of nothing,—that the whole universe is a quaking body where appearance is mixed with reality, and it is quite impossible to tell whether there is anything of either? That is the sorry stuff which may fairly be gathered from these unworthy pages. A more thoroughgoing contradiction to the doctrines which Mr. Spencer has elsewhere, over and over again, proclaimed to be structural and fundamental principles of his Philosophy, it is not easy to conceive. Then this mere surface of argument, which is just

like the strange *ego* he has conjured up,—the mere phenomena of thought without one particle of reality behind it,—this poor word-painting, utterly unbecoming a great philosopher, he attempts to keep in countenance by an illustration just as shallow, just as evasive of the point at issue, just as much a piece of mere paint as all that has gone before. No doubt those have something on their side who affirm that Mr. Spencer's whole system is an empiricism. It must be allowed that he has some clay mixed with his iron and his gold. His system is not homogeneous. Still, as Homer sometimes nods, I, for myself, prefer to appeal from Mr. Spencer, seemingly prejudiced, and certainly shallow and inconsistent, to his own deeper and grander self, and to hold that that is the true philosopher who has led us to found on the solid rock of truth, who has proclaimed that the evidence of consciousness transcends all other evidences, that the existence of mind is one of the most certain of truths. It is his masterly demonstration of these important principles which gives him a claim to our reverence and gratitude, and for the sake of these we can pass by his failing here. But the complete failure of a logician of his grasp to render a worthy reason suggests a very decided inference that the truth in the matter is altogether against him, and that even he is not powerful enough to bear back the overwhelming strength which that truth possesses.

In showing, then, that Mr. Spencer has not proved the bondage of the Will we have made another great chasm in his Philosophical system hardly less important than the chasm shown in the former paper to exist. Then it was proved, on Mr. Spencer's own showing, that although he allowed Mind and Matter to be at opposite poles of the universe, having between them a logical chasm which no effort of ours could span, he yet did attempt to pass logically from solar rays to mental operations, and that his whole system fell in utter chaos if this step was impossible. As it was impossible, it was in this way shown that all the Mind in the universe remained, on his system, quite unaccounted for, and that this omission made a yawning gap he could never fill up. We have shown in the present Paper that there is a similar hiatus when he attempts to pass from Intellect to Will. The continuity of his system depends on his showing that Intellect can pass into Will. If the reasoning of the present Paper be just, he has advanced nothing to show this. All the Will in the universe, then, remains on his system unaccounted for. In the next Paper I hope to show that his system is equally destitute of any trace of Conscience. "A System of Philosophy,"—an explanation of all that is in the universe,—which does not account for any

of the Mind, any of the Will, any of the Conscience, and yet claims to account for everything, must speedily lose its hold on intelligent men.

And it seems to me that he has gone a long way, quite unintentionally, of course, towards showing that the Will is free. As parts of his Philosophy form our most invulnerable defence against the attacks of Materialists and Idealists, so it may be that he has also supplied some of the most solid arguments for the Freedom of the Will. We have been assured by him that Mind and Matter are at the two opposite poles of being. They are x and y, two existences having no factors in common; no one thing being found in the one which is also found in the other. I understand his rhetoric to mean or to imply that they are logical contradictories, whatever the the one has that the other has not. They form a perfect series of antitheses, and if they are at the opposite poles of being, as he says, I do not see how this conclusion can be avoided. If they have any one element in common, there surely they can unite, and that element makes a bridge over the mighty chasm that divides them. But Mr. Spencer says no such bridge is possible; they are the Jews and Samaritans of the philosophical world, eschewing all intercourse with each other.

Now if this conception be just, as it seems to me it is, surely it must be true that whatever is found in the one will not be found in the other. And beyond all question fixed causation does obtain in the world of Matter. Everything there is held in the iron grip of law. Thus it seems to me that such fixed causation cannot obtain in the realm of Mind, but that, as the logical contradictory of the law obtaining in Matter, the opposite rule, of Freedom, must obtain in the realm of Mind.

It can readily be ascertained whether Mind and Matter are logical contradictories in all other things. Certainly they seem to be. Matter is extended; Mind is unextended. Matter is unintelligent; Mind is intelligent; Matter has space relations and has weight; Mind has no space relations and has no weight. Matter is capable of motion or of transit in space; Mind, having no space relations, is incapable of motion. It seems to me the antitheses might go on *ad infinitum*. If, then, in every other conceivable category of thought Mind were the proved antithesis of Matter, that doctrine would have but a very precarious hold on a strong intelligence which asserted that in this one instance, viz., of bondage to fixed law, Mind and Matter were alike. One frail spider's web spanning the almost infinite chasm between Matter and

Mind—the frowning cliffs rising high on each side, needing the vision of an archangel to survey them, confronting each other in solemn isolation, and this one frail link alone binding them! the idea well-nigh becomes incredible. If separated, as Mr. Spencer assures us, they are completely separated, they must be logical contradictories with no bond of union.

This philosophical doctrine of the Freedom of the Will does not seem to me to be defended by the upholders of Revelation and of the Moral Law with anything approaching the zeal and fidelity that the magnitude of the matter demands. Kant may be said to have put forth the undivided energy of his keen and powerful intellect in order to establish the thesis of the Freedom or Autocraty of man's will, and to show that the whole Moral Law must stand or fall with it. He in effect binds up the two doctrines into one, and not unfrequently makes them synonymous. Thus he says, "We have now reduced the Idea of Morality to that of Freedom of Will."* Again, he says, "Autonomy of Will is the alone foundation of Morality."† and many other distinct statements, as well as the whole structure of the *Metaphysics of Ethics* go to show that, in his judgment, to deny Freedom to the Will was to make the idea of Morality impossible. He seems to me—and it is a growing opinion in our day—to have been one of those rare prophetic minds, ranking amongst the great men of all time who stand forth as the champions of eternal truth, whose glance sweeps down the centuries, and whose judgments express the thought of the All-wise God. Doubtless in his critical Philosophy Kant was mainly destructive, but in those of his works which are thrown up as bulwarks of the Moral Law, he seems to me to display a penetration and a power far beyond any mind of later times. No modest man can, I think, pit his judgment against Kant. Hamilton followed in his footsteps largely as his disciple, and he makes the same impressive declaration that Moral Liberty and Moral Obligation must stand or fall together. He says, "Virtue involves Liberty;"‡ he says, "The possibility of Morality depends on the possibility of Liberty; for if man be not a free agent he is not the author of his actions, and has, therefore, no responsibility,—no moral personality at all."§ In addition to these solemn and weighty statements it is clear that he determined to found his whole metaphysical system on the moral canons,

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* *Metaphysics of Ethics*, Calderwood's ed., p. 59.
† *Ibid.* p. 99.
‡ Hamilton, *Lectures on Metaphysics*, vol. i. p. 27, 4th ed.
§ *Ibid.* p. 33.

and that notable and noble parts of it are chiefly intellectual buttresses, thrown up to keep safe and intact the outworks of the Moral Law. He has examined all the intellectual antinomies, which Kant raised, but never solved,—he has combined them all in one conception, magnificent in its sweep, startling in its originality—the "Law of the Conditioned"—and any one who accepts that law has provided for him a fortress of incalculable strength, within which the doctrines of moral liberty and moral obligation may be defended against all assailants. John Stuart Mill attacked that "Law of the Conditioned" in what may honestly be described as a ferocious style, for he saw how invincible it made the Theistic position; but his poor little sophisms are now treated with the contempt they deserve. Mr. Spencer can be shown to have accepted as valid the main arguments which lead up to the "Law of the Conditioned," and it needs nothing more than a slight resetting of the Hamiltonian thesis in order to make it invincible against all attacks.

Kant and Hamilton are by this time almost proved to be of the prophetic order of men, for what they asserted to be a logical necessity has now actually come to pass. We just saw that they declared moral liberty and moral obligation to be indissolubly united, and that the denial to man of liberty must lead to the denial to him of moral obligation. Mr. Spencer's whole Philosophy is a startling commentary on this thesis; he denies liberty to man, and there is in his system no trace of moral obligation. He has lately proclaimed that the "sense of duty or moral obligation is transitory,"* and that as civilisation progresses, man's nature will become more perfectly co-ordinated, needing no moral directions. No one who watches the currents of thought in our day which deny to man Freedom of Will can question that denial of moral obligation accompanies them to no small extent. The advocates of Determinism and Automatism can see instinctively that our moral instincts are opposed to them, and that if these instincts remain in full force their theories cannot prevail; as the doctrine of their school sinks into Materialism, its antagonism to all moral principle, all sense of right, all authority of conscience, is at once more constant and more vehement; and in the lowest stages it reaches a point where man is made to be only a helpless mechanism, all future retribution is derided as an old world dream, and the worst impulses of his sensual nature are unblushingly defended. Thus, surveying the matter along the

* Spencer, *Data of Ethics*, p. 127.

whole line, from the noble utterances of men like Kant, to the refined yet negative morality of Mr. Spencer, and still on to men infinitely beneath him, mere human animals, who glory in their shame, the same truth meets us, that the denial to man of moral liberty—of perfect freedom to choose or reject either good or evil—leads, of necessity, to the denial to him of moral obligation. Put upon him at once the honour and the responsibility given him by his Creator; then he must live like an immortal being, or be condemned by his conscience if he does not. Take from him this crown, he soon descends, and, in inferior natures, begins to wallowwithout blushing in the mire.

It may be well to remark that the philosophical doctrine of the Freedom of the Will by no means necessitates that heresy of Pelagianism, branded as false by the Universal Church, which teaches that man, by his own inherent strength of Will, without the aid of Divine grace, can arise and work out his own salvation. No man was more diametrically opposed to this heresy than Augustine, no man was its more uncompromising antagonist, yet he himself held the philosophical doctrine of the Freedom of the Will. He says: "For who is there of us would say that by the sin of the first man free-will is utterly perished from mankind?"* Archbishop Usher, again, was one of the stanchest upholders of the need man has of converting and renewing grace, yet he was a resolute champion of the Freedom of the Will. He says: "Freedom of Will we know doth as essentially belong unto a man as reason itself; and he that spoileth him of that power doth in effect make him a very beast."† We may hold that men are morally free, that they are the fashioners of their own moral character and the arbiters of their own destiny, and yet have the most profound sense that until a power comes into them from above, and supplements their feeble efforts by the flood-tide of a Divine energy, they never can arise and work out a righteous character. Where to draw the exact line between the Divine and the human working it may be hard to say, and, as it is of no practical importance, perhaps it is not well to attempt it. It is sufficient that we remain within the broad lines upon which the Church Universal is practically unanimous, of the absolute need of the entrance into man of a Divine Spirit, who can refine and purify his Will, cleanse it from all earthly defilement, and lift it high into the regions of

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* "Quis autem nostrum dicat, quod priori hominis peccato perierit liberum arbitrium de humano genere?" *Cont. Pelag.* lib. i. cap. 2.

† Usher, *Answer to a Jesuit on Free-Will*, 445 (Cambridge ed. 1835).

God's holiness, where it can still stretch onward to the moral infinity that then comes into view. This doctrine of the helplessness of man, and his need of Divine grace, by no means conflicts with the doctrine of the Freedom of his Will. Some of the Scotch theologians have, I think, confounded unjustly man's need of grace with the doctrines of philosophical necessity. To my mind the two are in entirely different regions. Man is free to take his own course, but, if he proudly rejects the help God offers him, he will find that all schemes of his own are unavailing, and that his weak arm cannot bear back the forces which urge him in a downward direction.

Let us, then, understand that in this question of the Freedom or the reverse of the Will we are dealing with a matter of the greatest moral moment. If the will be free, then the moral nature of man at once comes into prominence; the conscience is seen to be seated on the throne; the awful moral sanctities are clearly revealed; the infinity of all questions connected with righteousness is made evident; the horizon which bounds our existence recedes before us, and we find ourselves placed as actors on the vast stage of the universe, furnished with helps and guides, but bidden to choose our own destiny, to take upon ourselves the solemn burdens of existence, and to say whether our path through life shall be, first, the battle-field of a hero, then the exultation of a conqueror, then the aspirations and holiness of a saint, and shall finally carry us throned and triumphant to our coronation amidst the saints of God; or whether that life-path shall be a misuse of opportunities, a despising of offered help, a mocking at the restraints of law, an intellectual selfishness, a gradual debasement, a final sinking into crimes for which no name can be found. Upwards or downwards man must go, and there seems an infinity in both directions. It behoves us all to choose the upward and happier path, knowing that we are quickly advancing to the last tribunal, where the secret action of every Will will be laid open, and all will be tried by just and universal Law.

The CHAIRMAN (Rev. Preb. ROW, M.A.).—On the part of the meeting I have now to propose a vote of thanks to the author of this paper, a vote which I feel sure we shall all very cordially tender for the extremely clear, distinct, and effective manner in which he has met the entire question. (Hear.) Before sitting down I wish to make a few remarks, as I shall not be able to remain until the end of the meeting, this being the first evening during the last two years upon which I have ventured out of doors. I think the paper throughout is exceedingly clear, and that it has ably met the position assumed by Mr. Herbert Spencer. One thing which greatly surprises me is, that books like those of Mr. Spencer—so utterly

contradictory to common sense, and to the very first intuitions of our nature—should have obtained the wide circulation which they have among a large circle, including many of the most powerful minds of our age. I have no hesitation in saying that the subject handled in this paper is the very central one of the present system of practical atheism. The great and all-important controversy at the present day centres around the efforts which a number of powerful intellects are making to confound between the material and the moral; and if it could possibly be established that this confusion does exist, and that the material dominates from one end of God's universe to the other, then the paper abundantly shows that there is an end of all morality; for unless the innermost intuitions of the mind are true when they tell us that if we are not free to do this or that, we can have no possible responsibility for the acts we do. (Hear.) It comes, therefore, to this, that the controversy lies very much within the limits of common sense. To tell me that for the evil I do I am not responsible, is in reality asking me not to see that gaslight now before me, when I am seeing it as plainly as possible. What gives a degree of plausibility to these speculations is the frequent use of a great number of hard words: the tendency to do this runs throughout the works of the whole of this class of writers. The number of these hard words is so great that I find my own intellect somewhat confused when endeavouring to read them, and I think that if the authors I refer to would only write in plainer English, their systems would very soon be absolutely exploded. When we are asked to believe that our personality is nothing but a mere succession of feelings, what is it that we are asked to accept? Why, something which entirely contradicts the whole testimony of the human race from the moment man appeared as man to the present hour. Those who maintain this view cannot express themselves in language without distinctly denying the theories they expound. This shows that there is something singularly absurd in the position they take. We have no certitude more certain than the permanency of the *ego*. To suppose that the whole experience of man from the commencement, both objectively and subjectively, is based on a simple delusion, would denote an amount of credulity exceeding anything that I can possibly conceive. But this is the result of the theories in question, notwithstanding the great names attached to them, that if they are accepted by the large body of mankind they will certainly end in subverting all sense of human responsibility. Evil then becomes merely a man's misfortune, not his sin; and crime, insanity; and the result will be that the sane portion of mankind will have to build a large number of asylums in which to place one-half of their fellows, so as to save themselves from possible dangers. There is only one other point upon which I would touch—I am bound to say that I cannot agree with the position which has been laid down to the effect that we can be philosophically free and at the same time theologically bound by necessity. I think that the position is hopelessly unmaintainable, that a thing can be theologically true, and philosophi callyfalse, or the converse. I do not care for any abstract theories. I say freedom is a fact—one of

which we are directly conscious, and therefore one of our highest certitudes ; and therefore, I hold, it is a great error to say we can be philosophically free in one sense and theologically not so in another ; and although some great names may be mentioned in support of the proposition, my reply is that I do not care whose doctrine it is, it is certainly not the doctrine either of reason or of the New Testament. (Applause.)

Rev. J. FISHER, D.D.—According to the paper, at page 110, we are told that "mind and matter are at the two opposite poles of being"; but that the author only means that they are objective and subjective sides of the same substance ; at any rate, it comes to that in the end. Two pages further on he says that Mr. Spencer denies liberty to man, and asserts that moral law must fade away out of the earth, and man will need no moral directions. In that case, of course, we must have the golden age.

The CHAIRMAN.—This is assumed in his last work.

Dr. FISHER.—On page 101 Mr. Spencer is quoted as saying,—"that the *ego* is something more than the aggregate of feelings and ideas" is an "illusion," and in the next sentence he speaks of man as subject to "psychical states!" On the next page we find Mr. Spencer quoted as speaking on the subject of "psychical changes"; but surely if man, the *ego*, and the psychical states and changes, be the same things, where is the subject? There is none. Mr. Spencer writes thus confusedly because he is a monist, using the language of a dualist. Monism cannot construct a language for itself. As regards freedom of the will, natural freedom is a ground of responsibility, and grace does not interfere with it. The will is the power of mind by which we choose aright ; but the exercise of the will is from the heart, and, as the heart. Will is the medium of active power, and operates according to the nature of the agent, and the nature of the agent is the source of power. What is needed to a good choice is an influence from God in the heart. A self-determining will is an absurdity, for if the will move itself it is both cause and effect. Motive determines the will. The motive determining the will has a place in the understanding, and it is through the understanding, which is the key to the heart, that the will is moved.

Rev. Preb. IRONS, D.D.—I think the paper which has just been read is a very important one, and it is none the less so for the statement it contains, that this is *the* question of the age, and one which we as Christians have not, as yet, sufficiently attended to. (Hear.) There is no doubt that St. Augustine contributed to the stream of Christian thought, and it has scarcely settled down into a clear and healthy condition from his day to ours. There is truth in the statement of the essayist, that the Scotch philosophers, who have a great deal to answer for in the matter, were so much afraid of the doctrine of free-will, that they absolutely practically denied it in the whole region, both of ethics and religion. I wholly deny that the grace which comes from God to assist the efforts of imperfect man, at all destroys human will. (Hear.) That it interferes with it I will admit, in some sense, as a matter of course. Why, otherwise, should it come at all? But if it gives a man clearer knowledge,

stronger powers, higher aspirations, that man is responsible for all he has so acquired. The doctrine of responsibility is grounded in our sense of retribution for all wrong that is done. I will grant very freely with all thankfulness to God, that in connexion with this doctrine of retribution, there is a sense that mediation between us and the judgment that is due to us is quite possible. A man does a wrong thing and fears the wrong he has done, but, at the same time, no man has put himself in this position without also having the feeling, that in some way or other some one will interfere. This interference we have, as Christians, in the mediation of Christ. However, leaving this question of Calvinism and freedom of will and sense of retribution, and hope of mediation and intervention, I should like to go back for one moment to the beginning of the paper, and I promise that I will not detain you more than a minute or two. It is a matter of common sense that the *ego* precedes every action of every kind performed by a human being. Action is not possible until there is an *ego* to act; and here we see the very blunder which pervades Mr. Herbert Spencer's philosophy. One is astounded to find that the same blunder has penetrated the whole of the materialistic mind of our age. They leave out the thought of this *ego*, which we are very properly told by Mr. Spencer goes before the action. But he afterwards tells us this *ego* is the result, or is identical with the circumstances in which we find ourselves—the feelings which arise within us. He quite forgets that if there are feelings there must be an *ego* to feel. Whose feelings are they? They are the feelings of the *ego*—of the man. And this leads me to object in the strongest way to the manner in which Mr. Herbert Spencer, and almost all of us, are in the habit of using popular abstract terms as though they were entities. Men say they are moved by motives. I may contemplate a certain thing and may consider it; but the motive does not move me. It is I who move in the whole matter. Men speak of their having a memory. I have not one. I am thankful to say, I remember. (Hear, hear.) I have legs, but I should not say they consist of walking and running: the walking and running are actions of the limbs set in motion by the *ego*. In every way we are injuring ourselves by abstract ideas. I do not deny that they are of great usefulness; as Berkeley pointed out, as instruments of thought they are absolutely necessary. Some of them are but collective terms. When we speak of a man, we use a word which is a general term, to describe what we mean, whether a white, a red, or a black man. It is a general term to describe the object we have in view. Every one knows what I mean in a general way, if I say, "as I came to this room to-night I met a man." You would not say I was speaking incorrectly if I did not describe how tall he was, nor how he was dressed, nor what nation he was of, whether, for instance, he was a Frenchman or a Dutchman. These general abstract terms are both useful and necessary for the common purposes of the language. There is also a higher type of abstract words, and it is needless to pretend that these abstract ideas are entities existing apart from us, when they are the descriptions of those actions which we ourselves perform, and not our wills, our memories, or our reflections. *I* will; *I* remember; *I* reflect; but do not tell

me that I use my memory; that makes a third party. I am not conscious of anything of the kind, nor do I believe that anybody in this room is. I know that some gentlemen, and, I may say, some ladies, have very strong wills. (Laughter.) But that means simply that they can will very strongly, and no one can mix in the society of either sex without finding that the individual can will. But to take it for granted that he has something in addition to himself which does the business of willing, is to me wholly unphilosophical; and this, to my mind, is the prevailing blunder of Mr. Herbert Spencer, *et hoc genus omne.* (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN.—There is no doubt that much confusion is caused by people saying that by freedom of will it is meant that a human being can do anything he pleases. I will only say in reference to what has been said by Dr. Irons, the great Truth was known in the days of Abraham, "Shall not the judge of all the earth do right?"

Professor O'DELL.—I fully appreciate the manner in which Mr. Ground has, throughout his paper, kept to the subject under discussion, and kept clear of theological matter. Mr. Herbert Spencer has challenged us in regard to the question of the will, and on reading his works, the conclusion I have come to from time to time is that his statements are very much opposed to our universal experience, especially in regard to the subject before us to-night. If we appeal to our experience concerning the will, I think we shall be able to obtain more truthful information than we can derive from what has been written by Mr. Herbert Spencer. In considering the question, "Is the will free?" let us ask ourselves—can we go to the right or to the left? Can we live or die? I can do any or either of these things. I can, if I choose to do so, act in opposition to my own intelligence, which tells me certain things, and that one course is wise and another foolish. We all know that we can go directly contrary to that which we believe to be right, and we know also that highly intelligent and cultured men have acted in opposition to their own reason. There have been men who have been educated in the highest colleges, who have acted in the basest manner, thus showing that they had wills which could deprave them to the lowest depths in direct negation of all the culture they had received. On the other hand, we are also aware that there have been men reared in the lowest haunts of vice and misery, who have shown their freedom of will in an entirely different direction. Quite independently of the teaching they have had, they have exercised their wills in opposition to all evil influences. Again, we have the fact that there are men who will not allow their wills to be bound by laws, as Mr. Herbert Spencer must at least acknowledge,—men who refuse to obey the laws of their country, laws the breaking of which brings immediate punishment upon them, and in doing this they act in opposition to their judgment and to every good influence brought to bear upon them. Moreover, I would say it is not only in opposition to reason and reflection, and to the laws of the country, and without any sufficient inducement, but men are also known to assert their wills in opposition to the laws of God, which they acknowledge

and believe to be right and true. Men having full belief in the pains and rewards of eternity, have, nevertheless, gone in entire opposition to that belief, thereby proving that, universally, the will is absolutely free. (Hear.) Mr. Herbert Spencer is spoken of as a man of philosophic grasp and of clear scientific conception. All I wish to say is this, that if I were to take Mr. Herbert Spencer's assertions as entitled to my fullest credence, I could not believe in Christianity—in other words, I hold that it requires more faith to believe in Mr. Herbert Spencer, than to believe in Christianity.

Mr. W. GRIFFITH.—I think we are very much indebted to the author of the paper for having proved false or erroneous some of the arguments of Mr. Herbert Spencer. We need not refer to the Spencerian theory to understand the necessarian view. Whoever will look into the works of Hume and Priestley will fully understand that line of thought. They asserted that the connexion between motive and action is similar to that of cause and effect in physics; that human actions are the result, not of choice, and that they are the sequences of physical causes, not the consequences of deliberate reason. Even those who in theory contend for the doctrine of necessity, in practice ignore it. Was Mr. Herbert Spencer a mere automaton when reading previous philosophical authors? Did he exercise no deliberation when he composed his essays? And when he had selected a publisher to print and circulate his opinions, were each and all of these processes the mere result of a fortuitous concurrence of material atoms?

If we rightly define the word law, we shall be able to understand all the fallacies which pervade the arguments of Mr. Spencer, and which have been refuted by the author of this paper. Then it will not be requisite to follow those arguments *seriatim*. How do we define what we mean by the word "law"? Is it a mere sequence of effect? Is that a true proposition? Surely not. There are laws physical and laws moral. The former must take effect; the latter ought to be obeyed. The latter, when defined according to the nature of things, suppose disobedience possible, and postulate the freedom of the will. Most sound writers on morals and jurisprudence will tell you that law is the expression of the will of the law-giver enforced, by some sanction, upon the moral being. If you once admit this definition of law the whole scheme of Spencer falls to the ground, and needs no further exertion to destroy it. But destruction is not construction. It is easy to criticise and find fault with anything; but we ought to consider what we shall substitute in its place.

We have to establish, as a matter of fact, that the will is free. The mere destruction of Mr. Spencer's theory by Mr. Ground hardly establishes the positive side of the question. Dr. Irons appealed with great force to the feelings of the human mind, and, undoubtedly, there is a great deal in what he said. That is one argument in support of freedom of the will. But there are others. We may say, for instance, that every language proceeds on the supposition of the freedom of the will. How do you explain those words in the English language which are used to signify determination, choice, or judgment, without supposing freedom

o choice and ability to judge and determine? And if we turn to other languages we shall find that it is the same in the French, German, Greek, or Hebrew, as it is with us. In fact, the whole consensus of States and peoples, who have and do use language, supports the conclusion that language supposes freedom of will. Again, to appeal to other facts—I do not wish to enter on the theological arguments founded upon prayer and praying to the Supreme Being, because we are discussing the more scientific aspect of the question, and it is well to lay aside for a moment the theological—but, when we wish to influence an angry man, do we not entreat him? When a father wishes to persuade his child, does he not use the arguments of persuasion, and does he not, in following such a course, presuppose freedom of will in the child he seeks to persuade? Again, in politics also, what do we mean by a petition or prayer to Parliament? Is not that a process intended to influence the intelligence of the representatives of the nation? And what is meant by sending those representatives to Parliament, but that they are to exercise their intelligence and their wills for the benefit of the nation?

Mr. Herbert Spencer has advanced somewhat beyond Mr. Hume and Mr. Priestley. He has, with great plausibility, told us that there are certain nerve-currents, and that these are evidenced in what he calls nervous energy and force. This is perfectly true: there is, doubtless, such a thing as nervous energy, and such a thing as force, which are exhibited in the raising of the hand, the movement of the foot, or in any action of the body. In all this he has surpassed Hume and Priestley, but after all he has not established anything as to this nervous energy which Dr. Carpenter and other physiologists had not taught. (Hear, hear.) To support his other and more dangerous tenets he has appealed in terms of some eloquence to the consciousness of each individual. But individuals differ and disagree. Whose consciousness shall we take? Our own is preferable to that of another man's, especially when, like Mr. Spencer, he lowers us in the scale of moral beings. But the question being as to the nature of men in general, must be determined by the voice of preponderating testimony. But how, it may be asked, are the suffrages to be collected? In every civilised nation the induction has been already made, the suffrages taken; the case has been tried, and the decision is on record; the verdict has been given without reference to the controversy in dispute.

What, let me ask, is the object of Parliament in making a law? What is in the mind of the Legislature when it passes a law for the benefit of the nation at large? Does it not forbid, condemn, and impose a punishment for the transgression of that law, on the supposition that men and women, as a rule, individually possess self-control and the power of choosing the good and rejecting the evil? Being a practising barrister, I know, we all know, what is frequently put forward as the defence of those who have broken the law. When a criminal is put on his trial for a particular offence, how often does he plead that he has committed it by accident or mistake or unintentionally,—that he had no guilty mind. And the defence of accident is

admitted. For instance, if a person, while defending his house against a robber, shoots his own servant when he intends to shoot the burglar, he is held not to be guilty of murder. He exercises his will in shooting, but there is no vice in what he does. In doing what he had a legal right to do he has unwittingly done what he did not mean to do. There is a defect in the use of the will. Then, if you take the case of an infant; he may be put on his trial, but unless the understanding has been developed, "he," says the law, "ought to be, as a matter of course, acquitted; because he is not held to be responsible until he has reached years of discretion." Again, take the case of a lunatic; he is acquitted on its being shown that there is a defect of the understanding, and that he is not able rightly to exercise the will. It is there held that there is no moral, or at least no legal, vice in the will. All these instances go to prove that the administration of the law proceeds on the supposition that there is freedom of the will, and that the accused is punishable for its improper exercise. Again, we must recollect that this is not merely the state of the law in England. The French laws proceed on the same line; so also do those of Germany and other European states. In fact, the testimony of the whole civilised world shows that the freedom of the will is looked upon as essential to guilt, and no one is punished unless that freedom exists. I will but mention the testimony of conscience, and the evidence derived from that. If we look to ourselves and remember what have been our own failings in the past experiences of our lives, we shall, as individuals, admit at once that we have had freedom to choose the right and avoid the wrong. Passing to the second part of the subject, I must say that to some extent I agree with Dr. Irons in his criticisms on the statements that have been made respecting the theological and moral view of freedom of will. I think it has been conclusively proved, not only that the theory of Mr. Herbert Spencer is unstable, but also, as a matter of fact, that freedom of will does exist, although it is true that great writers, such as Augustine, have taken up the theological question, and have somewhat obscured the doctrines of Christianity thereby. But Augustine was not consistent. I think Mr. Ground is correct in saying that Augustine asked how can there be guilt if there is no freedom of the will? But at another period of his life he wrote as if he looked on grace as irresistible, and held that freedom of the will did not exist. But the question is, What is Christianity? and not, What were the views of St. Augustine? We can recur to the original record, and we find St. Paul asserts not only the supremacy of Divine grace, but also the freedom of the will. He tells us in the Epistle to the Philippians, ii. 12 and 13, that we are to "work out our own salvation," and at the same time he says:—"It is God which worketh in you, both to will and to do of His good pleasure." This single text illustrates in a remarkable way the complex problem that may be raised as to the operations of the grace of God and the freedom of the will at the same time. (Applause.)

Mr. J. Enmore Jones.—It seems to me that Mr. Herbert Spencer has in his mind only two facts—psychical and physical,—and that his argument is

grounded simply on these, which, in theological terms, we call the soul and the body. He seems to have lost sight of one other element. Most, if not all of us are often conscious of impulses and strength not our own, and we come as Christians to the contemplation of the three great powers we are told of by the Apostle—body, soul, and spirit,—it appears to me that this third power is a power which is not recognised by Mr. Herbert Spencer. I think that if this power were better defined, we should get rid of a great deal of the difficulty which has hitherto helped to obscure the matter. I have referred to this fact, so as to point out what I think has been very much overlooked, namely, that this power which we call spirit, has been especially created in us by the Deity and connected with the two other powers—the soul and body. The soul is, as Mr. Herbert Spencer says, attached to the body, and intermingles and works with it in a mysterious way; but I say that these two are acted upon so as to produce visible effect, by the spirit, which Mr. Herbert Spencer has not alluded to.

Rev. F. N. Oxenham.—I suppose it will be admitted that in examining any philosophical problem, if we are in search of the truth, we ought not to allow any weight to supposed consequences. I mean that we should not permit ourselves to be at all influenced towards rejecting or towards accepting any theory, because it involves, or appears to involve, some consequence which we object to, or which we welcome. This, I suppose, we should all admit as a general rule. But, on the other hand, if a theory is put before us which obviously carries with it the negation of any well-known and indisputable truth, then we are justified in saying, "inasmuch as this theory necessarily involves the denial of what we know to be true, we do not care any further to inquire into it. It contradicts what is certainly true, and therefore it must be false." Consequently, when we come across a theory which is admitted to be contradicted by the evidence, not of one language only, but of all languages, by the accordant evidence of all mankind in every country and of every age, by the establishment of every civilised government ever known (for all governments are constructed on the theory that man is a responsible being, and *can* do, or abstain from doing such things as are enjoined, or forbidden: the belief that this is so is evidenced by every law that was ever made),—when, I say, we come across a theory thus irreconcilably at variance with the universal testimony of mankind, we cannot justly be accused of prejudice if we put it aside, saying that we do not care to inquire into it. It is obviously false, being at variance with an undenied and undeniable truth. Now it seems to me that the tendency of Mr. Herbert Spencer's argument is not to disprove the freedom of the will, but simply to ignore that there is such a thing as will at all. He is really arguing for the thesis, that our *desires* are not free; and in showing this, he appears to think that he has shown that our *will* is not free. Our desires, he asserts, are the joint result of impulses over which we have little or no command. He brings much evidence to show the truth of this thesis, which we have no desire to question; and then, having proved this, he imagines that he has disposed of what he calls "the dogma of free-

will." "*The real proposition,*" he says, "*involved in the dogma of free-will is, that every one is at liberty to desire or not to desire.*" This is a complete misconception. The question is not whether we are free to desire or not to desire, but whether we are free to follow our desires or not to follow them. Mr. Spencer's assumption that will is nothing more than the result of those forces which produce natural desire, is an assumption not only without evidence to support it, but in the teeth of evidence which denies it. I cannot *desire* to be hanged, or shot, or suffocated, or to undergo any great pain; but I can *will*, I can *choose* to undergo any of these things. My desire to do a thing or not to do it, may be, I admit, simply an effort of nature beyond my control, the result of the joint action of various involuntary impulses, as Mr. Herbert Spencer has very clearly defined it. We do not quarrel with him for saying that our *desires* are the mere outcome of these natural impulses; but we do quarrel with him for assuming that our *will* has the same origin and nothing more. And when he jumps to the conclusion that the will is not free *because* the natural desires are not free, we are compelled to pull him up, and to protest that such a conclusion is wholly unwarrantable. It is, in short, simply ignoring that there is any such thing as will. I shall not, however, dwell farther on this, as Dr. Irons has already so clearly reminded us what is the true character of the will as one most important element in the *ego*: but I wished to call attention to the fact that Mr. Spencer is not really *arguing* against the freedom of the *will*; he is arguing against the freedom of the *desires*, and then *assuming* that the freedom of the will is by the same arguments disproved. (Applause.)

Rev. C. L. ENGSTRÖM.—Thirteen or fourteen years ago, when I was reading the Duke of Argyll's book, *The Reign of Law* I saw what every one must see who gives the subject sufficient consideration, that the mind is subject to law as well as the body, and I think that unless we grasp this thought we cannot understand Mr. Herbert Spencer's argument. Further, we are wrong, I think, if we regard the (free) will as a separate originating force; the mistake seems to arise from the use of the word will in two entirely different senses. A *strong will* really indicates a strong mental nature, especially in regard to the desires, but *free will* is the ability to choose which of two or more existing forces shall come into operation. A strong will is a magnificent force directed by free will for good or for evil. The responsibility rests with the free will, though the strong will, which is merely an instrument in its hands, gets the blame when it is misdirected. But not to dwell overmuch on this magnificent, but subject force, we ought, as it seems to me, to hold that above the body and the mind, which consist, according to the best philosophers, of three departments—feelings, ideas, and desires—there reigns supreme a thing called the (free) will, and that that free will has the power in the case of every human being of *directing* actual forces, whether physical or psychical. It is a directing power and not a creative power—resembling the pointsman, who sees a railway engine hurrying along a line, and by the simple movement of a lever, gives it that direction which secures the safety of the train. And so all through the life of the human being this will of

ours (most free, when voluntarily subordinating itself to the higher Will of the Creator) directs our course for good or evil, it being in accordance with the way in which the will operates within us that we become good or bad. From the earliest moment of conscious choice we are admitting or excluding, fostering or destroying, good feelings or bad feelings, good ideas or bad ideas, good desires or bad desires, and side by side exalting or depressing the higher (psychical) or the lower (physical) natures, and in the case of a Christian welcoming or driving away the Holy Spirit of God, or the arch enemy. Thus from moment to moment we are weaving into that nature and character, with which we started on our course, new threads, and thus we by free will change the stream of our tendencies, and become what we are—heavenly, Christian, godlike, or earthly, sensual, devilish. (Hear.)

Rev. W. D. GROUND.—I thank you all very much for the kind attention you have given to my paper. When I see the notes of this discussion, I shall think them over and add what I may deem it best to say. But let us all clearly understand that in this matter, although we need not accept the philosophical doctrine of necessarianism, we ought, as devout Christians, to accept the great doctrine of grace. I think the remarks made by Mr. Enmore Jones may help us at least to an illustration of the matter. He spoke of the inspiration,—I cannot call it anything else,—which occasionally comes upon us. Now it seems to me that, in much the same way, a power which we receive from above appears to come behind the will, when we have placed the will in a right direction, which power acts like a breath or *afflatus*, bearing us on towards divine thoughts and desires. This seems to me the action of divine grace. But at the same time I think that the assertion of man's need of such grace is consistent with the maintenance to the fullest extent of the philosophical doctrine of the freedom of the will; and that it is impossible to deny this freedom of the will, and yet to defend successfully man's moral responsibility. This is the great citadel we must maintain at all cost. We must say that the sense implanted within us, which tells us we are free and uncontrolled, is the deepest and truest part of our being, and nothing else must be allowed to usurp its place. No doubt there are intellectual difficulties in holding the theory of moral liberty. For myself I accept heartily Hamilton's "Law of the Conditioned," which, I hold, sweeps away all the difficulties, establishes reason on a rock which cannot be shaken, and provides an impregnable fortress for all the doctrines which contain the philosophy of moral obligation. (Applause.)

The meeting was then adjourned.

REMARKS BY THE RIGHT HON. THE LORD O'NEILL.

I look upon both this and the former paper contributed by Mr. Ground as very valuable contributions to the literature of the Victoria Institute. In the present one he seems to me to have quite correctly pointed out the fallacy which pervades Mr. Herbert Spencer's system of psychology, namely, his making the *ego* to be nothing but the aggregate of feelings and ideas, existing at each moment. Where or in what such ideas and feelings exist, is a question to which Mr. Spencer does not supply us with a satisfactory answer. He does not, of course, mean all ideas and feelings throughout the universe, inasmuch as these consist of innumerable aggregates; and if he means those belonging to any one person, he is not consistent with himself, inasmuch as, on his theory, there is no such thing as personality in any intelligible sense of the word. His view would destroy the *ego* altogether. For who can guarantee that the aggregate of ideas and feelings at any one moment will be the same as at another? In fact, this aggregate is ever-varying. I may be thinking of one subject at one moment and of another at another. I may be glad now, and sorry a few moments hence. In short, my state,—*i.e.*, the aggregate of my ideas and feelings,—may at any instant be quite different, nay, opposite, to what it was at the instant immediately preceding. Indeed, it is scarcely possible, on Mr. Spencer's principles, to express oneself correctly on this subject. For when I say, "I may be glad or sorry," or when I speak of the aggregate of *my* feelings, &c., an *ego* distinct from those ideas and feelings is necessarily implied; nor could I express my meaning intelligibly without implying it. Mr. Spencer himself, as Mr. Ground has observed, although his language is most carefully chosen, cannot help, in one passage, speaking of "*the subject* of such psychical changes," &c., although he does not admit that there is any subject in which such changes could take place. In short, with all his ingenuity, he cannot get over the fact that feeling cannot take place unless there be something which feels, nor can thought be exercised unless there be something which thinks. As well might we assert that there may be motion without anything moving or being moved. Thus ideas and feelings necessarily imply an *ego* which perceives and feels, and which, at the same time, is distinct from perception and feeling, as being the subject of which these are states or accidents. Well may Mr. Ground say that the fiercest assailant of Berkeley appears here possessed of a double portion of his spirit. In fact, in asserting that the *ego* is but an aggregate of ideas and feelings, he goes as far as Hume, who did much to explode Berkeley's views (though such was not his intention) by showing the consequences to which they lead, when logically carried out. Berkeley held that the only realities are Mind and Ideas, the former being the vehicle of the latter. Hume saw no necessity for the vehicle, considering that Ideas do not require such; and between his theory and that of Mr. Spencer it is not easy to see any difference. Berkeley imagined that his theory gave the death-blow to materialism, as, indeed, the

denial of the existence of Matter would, at first sight, appear to do. Yet here we have Mr. Spencer, the prince of materialists, actually carrying Berkeley's views to an extreme never contemplated by their propounder.

Mr. Ground has done good service in pointing out the distinction between the metaphysical and the theological doctrines respecting the human will. As in the one, so in the other, there are various shades of opinion, the theologians believing that their views are in accordance with the Scriptures, while the metaphysicians consider theirs to be such as reason discovers. The various views prevalent among theologians divide conveniently into three primary ones: —1, that of the Pelagians, who deny that the descendants of Adam and Eve are born with a nature prone to sin, and who, consequently, look upon all mankind as morally free, requiring no spiritual aid to counteract the allurements of "the world, the flesh, and the devil;" 2, that of those who believe that all are born with the taint of original sin, and without moral freedom until divine grace confers it upon them by restoring them to that "image of God" which was lost to man through the Fall; and that, when they are thus restored, they are free either to yield themselves to the divine influence or resist it, as their will may determine; and, 3, that of those who, agreeing with the last-mentioned class in denying moral freedom to those unaided by grace, yet differ with them as to the effect of grace on the minds of those to whom it has once been imparted. Instead of holding that men are free to accept or reject spiritual influences, they believe that grace, once given, is irresistible, and that they to whom it is imparted, although still subject to sins and imperfections, will never be allowed to fall away finally and be lost. And inasmuch as the world, and even the Christian Church, contains many who show no symptoms of that improvement of character which is a mark of divine grace, it is almost a necessary corollary from this third division of doctrine that grace is not offered to all, and that many are left in that helpless and enslaved state from which nothing that they can do will save them. And such, accordingly, is the view adopted by most of those who hold grace to be irresistible.

The question, Which of these three theological views is the most conformable to Scripture, is one of pure theology, and it would, as I conceive, be out of place to discuss it in these pages. It is more to the point to observe that that they all belong to a region quite apart from the metaphysical question. The most strenuous asserter of free-will in the theological sense,—the Pelagian,—might, without inconsistency (however untruly), deny it with Mr. Spencer in the metaphysical sense. All that the Pelagian cares to assert is that all men are born free from original sin, and do not require divine aid to keep them from offending God. It is enough for him, therefore, that the will should be uncontrolled, either by sinful propensities on the one hand, or by spiritual influences on the other. This conceded, it is a matter of indifference to him whether, as a metaphysical tenet, the relation of the will to the brain-molecules be held to be that of master or slave. He denies original sin. To the metaphysician of Mr. Spencer's school it is a matter of

no importance whether he does or no. It is a question into which the latter does not enter. He considers us mere machines, unable to direct or control our wills, which are the slaves of mechanical law; and it is nothing to him whether the impelling power is terrestrial or celestial.

REMARKS BY THE REV. CANON SAUMAREZ SMITH, B.D.

(Principal of St. Aidan's College.)

Thanks for sending me proof of Mr. Ground's paper. I wish I could be present at the discussion of it. It seems to me most important that the tendencies of Determinism current in some of the philosophical and scientific literature of the day should be strenuously opposed by philosophical arguments as well as by theological teaching.

I think that Mr. Ground has shown, clearly and temperately, the thoroughly unsatisfactory nature of Mr. H. Spencer's reasoning, in the extracts quoted.

Mr. Spencer refuses to take into account one side of the *dual* deliverance of consciousness. He reduces all his calculations to the standard of Matter, for, in spite of his language about Mind, he does in effect make Mind a product of Matter. He regards man as a bundle of transitory psychical conditions with no *ego*, as the subject of the mental phenomena, and yet he regards the phenomena as real.

He seems to treat of our consciousness as if it were not inseparable from *self*-consciousness. He argues, in fact, that this self-consciousness (by which surely we must mean consciousness of a freedom to will in a certain measure) is an "illusion"; and that instead of an individual power to choose, or refuse, certain lines of action, our "composite psychical state," in which we only imagine that we are exercising any personal volition, is a predetermined product of an "infinitude of previous experiences registered in (man's) nervous structure, co-operating with the immediate impressions on his senses."

Mr. Ground has clearly shown how Mr. Spencer contradicts himself in speaking of "the subject" of psychical changes, while he practically denies that there is any such subject.

No one can make a thorough philosophical estimate of human nature who ignores the *personal* side of the original "deliverance of consciousness." The "*I am*" of man lies at the root of all conscious exercise of intelligence, emotion, choice; and you cannot theorise away this positive factor into a mere mystical zero, any more than you can get rid of the great primal *I AM* by refusing to think of Him as knowable.

It is by means of *volitions* that a man is most directly conscious of his own personality. He knows that he can resist certain impulses and inclina-

tions ; that he can refuse to do what he is commanded to do by others, or tempted to do by some motive to which his reason or judgment does not assent. Conscious of this freedom (for freedom it is, however it may be ultimately limited by Law or moulded by a higher Will), man feels himself to be a responsible agent. Without it, he would not be man.

The philosopher, metaphysical or ethical, must, if he honestly take into account all phenomena, treat the existence of free-will in man as a fundamental truth. The theologian has another question to deal with (though it is very much bound up with the broader philosophical one) when he inquires into the amount of moral strength, or extent of moral helplessness, found in the human will, after it has been once perverted by disobedience to Divine Law.

The metaphysical postulate is, that man's will is free : the ethical axiom is, that man is responsible for what he does ; the teaching of the Christian religion is, that man's will, perverted and enfeebled for good by sin, is by God's grace restored to the highest condition of freedom, where the Divine will and the human will concur, and in the *service* of God man finds his perfect *freedom*.

FURTHER REPLY BY THE AUTHOR.

I have now read with extreme care, many times over, the remarks made by the various speakers, and the notes since appended by Lord O'Neill and Canon Saumarez Smith. The whole forms, I think, an instructive commentary on the unity in variety which marks those who think alike on the deepest and most formative conceptions. There is one spirit dwelling in all, —the differences are only superficial, the unity is deep and structural. Necessarily from eleven minds united we get a larger and more complete view of the full-orbed truth than can be obtained by any one mind. As the chairman and several of the speakers agree that the Freedom of the Will is the one point wherein the upholders of Revelation and the Moral Law clash most distinctly, and in irreconcileable antagonism, with the advocates of Determinism and Automatism, I trust that the importance of the subject will justify me if I attempt to reduce to a consistent logical unity what has been contributed by all who have taken part in the discussion. Truth is one,—it is the intellectual expression of the one God ; all his servants have broken glimpses of the full-orbed idea ; what one lacks another supplies. Let us then try to blend all into one clear and luminous image. We all are agreed that the *ego* is an entity, the subject of its various states, which states, for convenience, we classify into intellect, emotions, desires, conscience, and will. Two (Dr. Irons and Canon Saumarez Smith) point out very justly that the *ego*, as the centre and seat of personality, is the active and deter-

mining power, holding in control all the faculties. Lord O'Neill, Prebendary Row, and others, show that to deny the existence of this *ego* is to deny the central fact of consciousness, on which consciousness all our knowledge founds. We all again agree that this *ego* has various desires, which clash one with another, and one (Rev. F. N. Oxenham) points out that Mr. Spencer's reasoning is justified, if there are *only* desires in us. But then we all assert that there is a power in us which rides above and controls the desires. Canon Saumarez Smith shows that it is the consciousness of this power which most distinctly calls up the sense of personality. Examining the nature of this power, the Rev. C. L. Engström points out that its chief office is directive, and not creative, pointing out a line to be taken, and not a δύναμις which moves along that line; and Mr. Enmore Jones fits it with this by reminding us that when our will has indicated the direction to be taken, a breath or *afflatus* sometimes comes upon us, which is like a wind swelling out our sails, and bearing us on in the direction to which we have made the prow of our ship to point. Now, a power which is directive is only an executive; it simply points out the way to be taken, and it needs the guidance of other forces, if, indeed, it be guided by intelligence at all. This intelligence we all assert. (Any one who says he is not intelligent probably speaks the truth.) But we all agree that this directive power in us is free; that it is under the supreme control of the *ego*. But being free, and able to steer any whither, it needs some object on which the eye can be fixed, which object, as Dr. Fisher reminds us, is what we call the determining motive. The motive chosen, he also says, is at once the outcome and index of the moral state. Dr. Irons, again, reminds us that the motive is only an incitement to action; it does not move us, it is the *ego* that is the moving force. Motive is only the object on which the *ego* has fixed, and it can no more move us than the pole-star can move the sailor who steers by it. Asserting, as we all do, that the *ego* has freedom of choice, Mr. W. Griffiths contributes valuable and weighty arguments in support of the proposition. The system of jurisprudence in all countries of the globe, he shows, implies it, and the distinction drawn between unintentional wrong, wrong committed by infants or lunatics, and wrong committed by criminals, shows clearly that all human jurisprudence makes intent or motive to be the essential factor in deciding the moral quality of an action. Professor O'Dell then shows that the extent of this freedom is unlimited, and that not even the tremendous penalty of eternal destruction can supply motive sufficient to move the will of some. We all agree that there is a power in us called conscience, which claims the right to decide the motives which we choose to rule us, and that on disobeying this power we incur the condemnation called guilt. The Rev. C. L. Engström then puts the climax on the metaphysical argument by showing that we reap as we have sown, we are changed into the shape of the motive we have chosen to rule us.

We come next to the bearing of the question on theological truths. We all hold that although man is free, he has yet not strength, of himself, to choose the right and the holy. This inability seems to me explained by the

two truths urged by the Rev. C. L. Engström and Mr. Enmore Jones. The first shows that the will is directive. Therefore, willingly yielding to the gentle pressure of the good spirit, a man may himself fix his direction towards good. But this mere direction *has no dynamical force*, it is only something which can point. Behind this directing element, then, a power in the nature of an energy, or a δύναμις, may come, which can fill out the directing will with a heavenly power, and bear it onward, in the direction it has chosen, towards the embodied motive which it has selected to rule. This has seemed to me for some years the philosophical reconciliation of the two counter-truths of man's freedom and responsibility (growing, as Prebendary Row remarks, out of the very centre of the moral character of God), and of man's need of divine grace, laying the axe at the root of all human pride, and bidding each one of us remember that we are only empty vessels, which, to be of any use, the divine fulness must fill. I think this welds into a coherent logical unity the substance of what has been said.