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A table of contents for the *Journal of Theological Studies* (old series) can be found here:

[https://biblicalstudies.org.uk/articles\\_jts-os\\_01.php](https://biblicalstudies.org.uk/articles_jts-os_01.php)

pdfs are named: [Volume]\_[1<sup>st</sup> page of article]

The Universe that is real and true tells us what to make of the worlds of common sense, of the scientists and of the psychists. Now, in the history of some body of thought (e.g. a science) a new step may transform it and give it a new permanent direction; similarly some overpowering personal experience may change once and for all a man's history, and in this way even enable him to change the history of his environment, his little world. Hence when we reflect upon the *true* Universe of which we are integral parts and look back upon the progressive steps in its history, we can see how its meaning and value for us have been developed through the changes in and behind the Bible. The rise of Christianity is an event that may have lost its freshness, its historical vividness may seem a thing of long ago, yet it marked a new stage in the evolution of that Universe of which we and this world are only parts or phases. But religion points forward as well as back; it holds out its promise of an Avatar, another Buddha, a Mahdi, a prophet successor (Deut. xviii. 15), or a Second Coming. To-day there are scattered anticipations or hopes of some fresh and genuine revival of the religious spirit. Were there such a revival with all that religious realism that has operated so creatively in the past, it would inevitably have repercussions upon theology and philosophy. There is a natural transition from religion to philosophy; and any re-statement of a Christian philosophy, or of a philosophy of Christianity, would have a far larger field of experience upon which to draw than had the early Christian Fathers and their successors. Our problems would be approached from another angle, and description rather than proof would be the persuasive power: it would be the description of that true Universe in which the normal individual would recognize his self-evident position as an integral part of the whole.<sup>1</sup>

S. A. COOK

## NOTES AND STUDIES

### PHILO'S QUOTATIONS FROM THE OLD TESTAMENT

THE great preponderance in Philo of quotations from the Pentateuch over those from the rest of the O.T. on which Canon Knox contributed a note to the January number of the *JOURNAL* is undoubtedly very striking, whether measured by 283 pages to 17 (many of them

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Whitehead, *Modes of Thought* (1938), p. 66 sq.: 'Self-evidence is the basic fact on which all greatness supports itself, but proof is one of the routes by which self-evidence is often obtained.'

only a few lines) in Ryle or 2,000 to 55 in Leisigang's index to the Cohn Wendland text.<sup>1</sup> When Canon Knox reduces the 55 to 50 I agree on the whole, indeed I should make some further reduction. In *Quod Deus*, 136, where we find 'a parallel to this is the widow who discourses with the prophet'—then some ten lines of explanation that this widow is really a mind widowed of passion—then 'the widow mind says to the prophet, O man of God', &c., we really have one reference, not two. Again, in *De Ebr.* 143, the question addressed to Hannah, 'How long wilt thou be drunken?' and her answer, 'I have drunk no wine', are inseparable. Also the inclusion in the Index of Isa. xi. 6–10 on *De Praem.* 88 ff., might be questioned. I certainly hold with Cohn against Heinemann that in that remarkable passage, where while otherwise holding closely to Deut. and Lev. he expands the words 'I will destroy the wicked beasts out of the land' into the promise of the pacification of the animal world he is thinking of those famous verses, but there is no quotation or even similarity of language. On the other hand, Wendland failed to notice that Isa. l. 4 is quoted in *Quis Rerum*, 25, though without any indication of a quotation, or that in *S.P.L.* ii. 256 we have a fairly clear allusion to Ps. cxv. 8 (LXX), a psalm quoted elsewhere, 'They that made them may they become like them', or that in *De Praem.* 159, though it begins by citing Isa. liv. 1, it passes into the language of 1 Sam. ii. 5, which is twice definitely quoted elsewhere. Also I have suggested that in the Pacification of the animals, since he quotes both Job and Hosea elsewhere, he may well have in mind Job v. 23, 'the savage beasts shall be at peace with him', and Hos. ii. 18, 'I will make for him in that day a covenant with the wild beasts of the field'. And there may be other reminiscences which I and others have failed to observe. Anyhow, however, the figure 50 is near enough to the mark, but the 2,000 requires more adjustment.

Philo's exegesis of the O.T. falls into three great systems. The Allegorical Commentary which occupies the first three volumes of Cohn, the Exposition of the Law, including the Biographical Treatises (the unwritten law in his view), which occupy vols. iv and v, and the Quaestiones, which except for fragments are only preserved in the Armenian. In the Quaestiones there are according to Ryle three quotations from Isaiah and Proverbs. In the Exposition there are

<sup>1</sup> I follow Canon Knox's system of reckoning every repetition of a quotation as a separate quotation, though I should have thought that the number of texts, giving the passages of which Philo shows knowledge, would have been better. The actual number of texts in the index quoted from outside the Pentateuch is 47, and all of those from the  $\beta$ , judging from the number on one page, are something just under 1,600.

perhaps not more than three, certainly not more than six from outside the Pentateuch, and all the rest belong to the Commentary. Now his quotations from every source may be divided into, what I may call for want of better names, the Direct and the Illustrative. When he is formally expounding a particular chapter or passage in Genesis, or a particular law, he must sometimes necessarily quote from it, and these quotations I call 'direct'; when he rambles from the passage or law into some other passage I call the quotation 'illustrative'. Now in the Exposition there is very little illustration, but a very large number of direct quotations. In the Commentary there is any amount of illustration, though also a considerable number of direct texts. On the other hand, outside the Pentateuch all the texts are illustrative, for he never formally expounds any part of it.<sup>1</sup> The real comparison therefore lies between these and the illustrative quotations in the Commentary. I should guess that this would reduce the proportion to something like 1,200 against something just under 50. Anyhow, however, that preponderance calls for some explanation.

I think it will be generally admitted that it is partially accounted for by the superior sanctity ascribed to Moses. The authors of the post-Pentateuchal books are regularly called disciples of Moses. The language in which Jeremiah is mentioned in *De Cher.* 49 seems half apologetic, 'the initiated should always try to learn from other initiates and so though initiated under Moses into the greater mysteries I was not slow to learn from Jeremiah'. In the fine account of the first making of the LXX in *Mos.* ii. 25-42, while he clearly states throughout that it was only the law that was then translated, he brings out clearly the great sanctity attached to that translation, how still in his own time the event was celebrated by the thousands who met on the island of Pharos, to thank God for that good gift 'so old yet ever young'. Is it too much to say that to him at any rate the non-Pentateuchal books were, compared to the Pentateuch, what the Apocrypha is to the Protestant compared with the O.T. or at any rate what the Old Testament is to the New?

Apart from this I think that Philo's personal predilections and studies will account for much if not for all. His scriptural work is the interpretation of the Pentateuch. Though the Commentary, as we have it, only deals formally with a small part of Genesis, the *Quaestiones* extend to *Exod.* xxxii, and the *Exposition* covers the whole. He has it at his fingers' ends, is ready with an interpretation on his own peculiar principles of every verse. When, as he says in *De Mig.* 35, after a period of frustration and emptiness inspiration flowed in upon him, and 'I obtained language, ideas, enjoyment of

<sup>1</sup> The nearest to an exception is the story of Hannah, see below.

light, keenest vision',<sup>1</sup> the familiar books of Moses would be the natural fountain. In fact, he quotes so little from the other books, especially the Prophets, because he does not know them in the same way. He has no doubt read some of them, probably all, but they have not shaped themselves in his mind into a vast system of allegory as the Pentateuch has. Really the question resolves itself into why did he confine his scriptural labours to the Pentateuch? Why did he not compose a *De Samson* and a *De Jona* as his imitators did? Can we hope to answer this? Why have I spent the best part of fourteen years on Philo? Why does Canon Knox devote himself to his particular branch of inquiry? Why, in fact, do specialists specialize? I know no answer unless it is the nursery retort to an inquisitive child 'because they choose to do so'.

If these considerations are not enough, and if it is suggested that another factor is the priority of the translated Pentateuch which caused Alexandrine exegesis on the other books to lag behind, I should not venture to give an opinion. *Prima facie*, I should think that it is a question of dates, if they are obtainable. I understand that very little is known on this subject, but I have not examined the evidence or lack of evidence, for on this part of his case I have no wish to controvert Canon Knox. But his argument depends far more on the 'distribution' of the texts, and this leads him to dogmatize on their sources and on what is Philo and not Philo in a way in which I cannot follow him; so much so that I feel bound to believe that there lies behind it some mystery which I have not fathomed. And if my criticisms induce him to set before us a clearer and more tangible account of what he means I should feel that they have amply justified their existence.

The argument opens with the observation that 23 of these 50 quotations appear in nine groups of two or three arranged in six sets according to the treatises in which they are found, and each of these is described in a few words. I find a good deal in these groups on which to comment, particularly in the descriptions.

In the first set the chief thing which I have to criticize is the use of the word 'contemplation' to describe the Elenchus which is symbolized by the words of the widow of Zarephath, 'O man of God thou hast come in to remind me of sin'. The Elenchus, always felt by Philonists to be one of his most striking ideas, is sometimes the

<sup>1</sup> Ἔσχον γὰρ ἐρμηνείαν, εὐρεῖσιν, φῶτος ἀπόλαυσιν, ὄξυδερκεστάτην ὄψιν. So I read this passage, the first words of which are corrupt in the MSS. σχέδον γὰρ ἐρμηνεύει εὐρεῖσιν—Markland ἔσχον γὰρ ἐρμηνείας ρεύσιν. But ἐρμηνεία and εὐρεῖσις are regular rhetorical terms for 'language' and 'ideas', corresponding to the Latin 'elocutio' and 'inventio'.

innate conscience *συμπεφυκῶς ἔλεγχος*, sometimes as here the divine Logos from without, testing and convicting sin. I do not know of a really satisfactory translation for the word. Kennedy gives 'testing power'. My late colleague rendered it in one place as 'the Challenger', in another 'the inward Monitor'. I have myself regularly used Conviction, though aware that it only gives one aspect. Contemplation belongs to a totally different region. But I think it must be a slip, as I see that Canon Knox in speaking of the same passage in his *St. Paul* has also used Conviction.

In the second set we are told that *De Plant.* 29-39 quotes Ps. xciv. 9 and xxxvii. 4 to prove that God planted sense in the body and virtue in the soul. Now it is quite true that in this treatise, which is a discourse on the words 'Noah planted a vineyard', there is an antithesis between the two plantings, and that the first text 'he that planteth (ὁ φυτεύων) the ear shall he not hear', illustrates the first planting well. But the text that serves the same purpose for the second planting is 'God planted (ἐφύτεύσε) a garden in Eden'. Philo then digresses to a point, which he treats elsewhere, that Eden is the Hebrew equivalent to *τρυφή* (delight or luxury), and it is to illustrate this, not to prove anything, certainly not what is stated above, that he quotes the verse *κατατρύφησον τοῦ Κυρίου*, evidently because the word contains the same root. Indeed, considering that the two texts are far apart with a text from the Pentateuch intervening and have no real connexion of sense, I should not call this a group at all.

Again, we are told that *De Conf.* 39-51 quotes Ps. xxxi. 18, Jer. xv. 10, and Ps. lxxx. 6 to show that one must flee to God for help against sophists. In making a triplet of these I think he has quite missed the thread of Philo's thought. The treatise is a discourse on Gen. xi. 1-9, the Babel story, which is taken verse by verse and phrase by phrase. The first phrase is 'The whole earth was one voice and there was one lip to all', and several pages are occupied with a meditation on this, three or four times repeating the word *συμφωνία* and discussing various aspects of the 'symphony' of evil. In the course of this, by a series of leaps from texts to texts, he has finally got to the text 'let their cunning lips become speechless', with a reference to the 'lip' of the original verse and the corollary that they can only be silenced with the help of God. But here there is a break. We turn from the symphony of evil to the symphony of good. The chief characteristic of this is peacefulness, and so the sons of Jacob say 'we are men of peace'. But this at once leads to the thought that peace always involves war against evil, and so Jeremiah says 'My mother how great didst thou bear me, a man of combat', and while enlarging on this Philo quotes 'God has set us up for

a contradiction to our neighbours'. The two last texts are closely connected, and may stand as a couplet in the groups, but have no connexion with the first, which is several sections away and again separated from them by another quotation from the Pentateuch.

In the sixth set we are told that '*De Somn.* 2. 242-6 quotes Ps. xxxvii. 4, lxx. 9, and xlvi. 4 to prove that Wisdom is the delight of God and the river of God'. I cannot say that this is actually incorrect save in one small particular, but it seems to me totally inadequate, and if I linger on this it is partly to show the impossibility of summarizing Philo's thoughts in this way, and partly because it is a good specimen of the way in which Philo's curious mind habitually works. We start from the opening words of Pharaoh's dream, 'I thought that I stood at the edge of a river'. Now river is a symbol of Logos primarily in the sense of speech, and this is the main thought which governs the next 20 sections or so, in the course of which the three quotations from the Psalms mixed with others from the Pentateuch and elsewhere occur. The river of Logos may be either beneficial or mischievous. Let us hear what Moses has to say about the former. The first text is 'a river went forth from Eden to water the Paradise, thence it is separated into four heads (*ἀρχάς*)'. Eden is here the Divine Wisdom, the fountain, and the river is the Logos, for Philo, as frequently, has switched us over without a qualm from the literal to the theological sense of Logos. We are now reminded once more that Eden means *τρύφή*, God delights in wisdom and wisdom in God, and it is to illustrate the last part rather than the first that *κατατρύφησον τοῦ Κυρίου* is again quoted. Before we go further we must explain 'watering the Paradise', as watering virtue-loving souls, and also the four heads which obviously mean the four cardinal virtues, and as *ἀρχαί* can mean 'sovereignities' it suggests that the virtues are royal, thus agreeing both with the words addressed to Abraham, 'Thou art a king among us', and the famous Stoic paradox, 'the wise man is a king'. Then back to the Logos river. The Psalmist says 'the river of God is full of waters', that is to say it is kept full of wisdom from that perennial fountain, meaning no doubt the Divine Wisdom, and the might of the stream is illustrated by some phrase or word, possibly Homeric, introduced by the phrase *ὡς εἰπέ τις*, which the scribe could not tackle and marked a lacuna.<sup>1</sup> But there is another text from the Psalms, 'the current or rushing (*ῥοήματα*) of the river makes glad the city of God'. What is that

<sup>1</sup> *De Som.* 11 has very little manuscript authority and what there is is very corrupt. The scribe has left some 20 spaces to be filled up and Wendland's text exhibits a huge number of emendations, 200 at least, and I have added or substituted several more.

city? No doubt it is in one sense the Cosmos, but still more it is the soul of the wise man, that city in which God says that he will walk, and thence we are carried on with thoughts about the true Jerusalem through several sections. The first quotation then is an incidental digression, the second pursues his theme of the Logos river, and the third carries it on into a new and fruitful region.<sup>1</sup>

Now it does not seem to me very remarkable that a fair number of these texts should appear in couples, for I cannot recognize more than one triplet, and that not a perfect one.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, it is more remarkable that of the 21 treatises in the Commentary two should have seven or eight, and six none at all. But neither seems to me of the kind to which we need attach significance. The significance which Canon Knox attaches to the groups will appear as we proceed.

In these groups Canon Knox finds four texts dealing with the Divine Wisdom; I can only find one. He gets three no doubt by transforming the Logos river into a Divine Wisdom river,<sup>3</sup> but where the fourth comes from I do not know. From outside the group he adduces five cases, three of which may be fairly claimed, but hardly the other two.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> I suspect that the same thought is to be found in *De Conf.* 108, where also the soul is a city, well or badly governed. The good soul-city is ruled by law and justice, and of this Philo says according to Wendland's text *θεοῦ δὲ ὕμνος ἡ τοιαύδε*. But of the two best MSS. one for *ἡ τοιαύδε* has *ἡ τοιαδέε* (*sic*) and the other *ἡ τοι ἄδεται*. The phrase 'such a city is a hymn of (or "to") God' seems very strange to say the least of it, and so too Cohn and Wendland, who suggested *ὄπαδος* for *ὕμνος*, or *ἐνομοκράτη* δ' or *εὐδόκιμος* for *θεοῦ δὲ ὕμνος*. None of these seems to me hopeful. I suggest *θεοῦ δ' ἐν ὕμνοις ἡ τοιαύδε ἄδεται* 'such a city is called in the psalms God's (city)'. Philo's regular form for 'in the psalms' is *ἐν ὕμνοις*, and the combination *ἐν ὕμνοις ἄδεται* occurs twice. There, however, *ἄδεται* is not used with a predicate, and though Hesychius gives *ἄδειν* = *ὀνομάζειν*, and an example of this from Aelian is cited, I should like to get better evidence for Philo using it in this way. If, however, the conjecture is right, the allusion will be to Ps. xlvii and perhaps lxxxvii also.

<sup>2</sup> *Quod Deus* 74, 77, 82 (Ps. ci. 1; lxxv. 8; lxi. 11). These three are linked together and form a 'group', described as 'the two powers of God'. The description fits the first two, but in the third the thought has shifted into something quite different.

<sup>3</sup> My view that these two are to be carefully distinguished finds support from an unexpected quarter, for Canon Knox in *St. Paul*, p. 60, writes that 'the Divine Wisdom is always associated with springs but never with a river, except in *Quis Rerum* 62'.

<sup>4</sup> *De Fuga* 197 can only be said to deal with the Divine Wisdom on the grounds that when something is definitely said or implied to be not something else it deals with that something else. Philo is discussing the two springs of good sense. The first mentioned is the spring of Divine Wisdom which is illustrated from texts in Genesis, in the next section we hear of the



All these he declares to be 'testimonies going ultimately back to the Wisdom tradition of Palestine'. Also because Hannah's name is said to mean grace, and this grace is in one place said to be the gift of the wisdom of God, 'it looks as if' the Hannah and Samuel quotations belong to the same family as the Wisdom quotations. Consequently the whole Hannah-Samuel-Wisdom group (here used in the sense of a common meaning), both those inside and outside groups (in the sense of group by juxtaposition), are declared to belong to the testimonies and are therefore not Philo.

At this point there is a lot that I want to know about Testimonies. I conceive of them as a collection of texts illustrating some idea or doctrine, and this will suit the Wisdom quotations or most of them. But when we come to Hannah-Samuel I am puzzled. The longest bit of discourse about them, *De Ebr.* 143-52, contains two (I should make them one) quotations. 'How long will thou be drunken? Put away thy wine from thee'; 'I have drunk no wine or strong drink, and I will pour forth my soul before the Lord', would surely be unintelligible by themselves unless indeed to impress the duty of sobriety, and some account of the whole story would be necessary. And what is the relation of these testimonies to the LXX, which *ex hypothesi* did not exist? Did they include the strange phrase 'I a woman am the hard day',<sup>1</sup> which replaces the 'I am a woman of a sorrowful spirit' of the Hebrew. And surely they could not provide Philo with the explanation which he gives of it or with the five lines from Hesiod with which he supports that explanation.

Apart from this Canon Knox's way of dealing with the Hannah-Samuel story seems to me singularly misplaced. This 'greatest of the kings and prophets' as he calls him deeply impressed Philo, and he has made of him a *Τρόπος*, enthroned him with the Pentateuchal saints and heroes as a type of character, and added him to the stock to which he turns for moral and spiritual lessons. So too the psalmist, 'Moses and Aaron among his priests and Samuel among such as call upon his name'. And surely this is quite natural. The profane may

supreme and most excellent spring. God is that most august (*πρεσβυράτη*) spring and it is of this spring that Jer. ii. 13 is quoted.

On 1 Sam. x. 22, 23 Philo says that Samuel will not instruct Saul in the duties of kingship (alluding to LXX. ver. 25 *δικαίωμα τοῦ βασιλέως*, E.V. manner of the kingdom), while he is lying in the baggage, i.e. body and sense. Canon Knox paraphrasing this as 'anointing to the kingdom' seems to claim it as a D.V. text. It is clearly human wisdom, for Philo goes on that he is not yet competent to listen to the principles of kingship and wisdom is kingship, for the wise man is a king, obviously quoting the Stoic paradox.

<sup>1</sup> Or perhaps 'hard-gentle' (from *ἡμερος*) as Adler supposes Philo to have understood the phrase.

not always like Samuel; my own profaner side shares that feeling, but he is undoubtedly the most powerful and impressive figure in the religious history of Israel to the appearance of Elijah. And his mother's song which has inspired the Magnificat is unique in the historical books. No finer piece either of writing or thinking is to be found in the Commentary than the way in which he interprets the final words of Hannah's answer, 'I will pour forth my soul to the Lord', as the voice of that most sacred of libations, the soul of the mystic, pouring and diffusing itself beyond the bounds of the created Universe till it reaches the vision of the Uncreated. And because we have two quotations, the answer of the saint and the question of the ribald soul<sup>1</sup> which induces it—to find in these the evidence of a Palestinian testimonium seems to me something of a bathos.

The next step in the argument is as follows: Having as he thinks found seven texts in either Wisdom or Hannah-Samuel outside the groups he adds these to the 23 within the groups, and thus accounts for 30. Later it appears that those which do not belong to the H.-S.-W. family appear to be 'infiltrations from Palestinian or possibly Hellenistic centres which had developed a tradition of biblical exegesis when more of the scriptures were available in Greek'. At any rate as contrasted with the remaining texts they are Not Philo. Now what does this argument, according to which any quotation within a group is Not Philo, amount to? Take one particular group. In *De Mig.* 157, after describing how those who 'crave after lust' shed tears, he remarks that the good also weep, sometimes at the folly of the bad, but sometimes also for joy. On this he first quotes Andromache's 'laughing tearfully', and then continues (per-versely no doubt, but with that we are not concerned) 'of these it is said in the Psalms "thou shalt feed us with the bread of tears" and "my tears have been my bread day and night"'. Now if he had only quoted one verse it would be or might be Philo; as he quotes two it is not Philo but an infiltration from Palestinian or Hellenistic circles. Is this a travesty of the reasoning? Not, I think, as the argument stands. If there is anything better behind it, it is for Canon Knox to state it. I should add that I must not be supposed to deny that this or any particular quotations from any part of the O.T. may be infiltrations. Canon Knox knows infinitely more about

<sup>1</sup> In the LXX the question is asked by the *παιδάριον* (servant) of Eli. Philo naturally seizes on the word, taking it in the sense of 'boy', and makes the question a symbol of the careless rebellious mind (*νεωτεροποιός*) which mocks at excellence. Would the 'testimony' have furnished him with the phrase on which the thought is based?

such things than I do, and indeed he could hardly know less. It seems to me eminently reasonable that there should be such things. I only question the dogma that they can known to be such merely by appearing in couples.

Any one who has read these notes up to this point will be probably asking, as I do, what is the exact meaning of saying that the quotations are Not Philo. If it merely means that the quotations themselves were not suggested to him directly by reading the books, but came through some other intermediate source, the suggestion, though I see no reason for it, is harmless. If it means that the handling of them was not original it is another matter, for it is not the text but the handling of the text which makes the sermon. That Canon Knox uses the phrase in the latter sense seems to be implied by his relegating the Hannah story to Not Philo, and it appears more clearly in the following instance.

The *De Mut.* has a long digression of 60 sections called by Canon Knox an interpolated section in which instances of double names are treated. Besides Abraham and Sarah from which it starts it discusses five pairs, Jacob-Israel; Joseph-Psonthonphanech (Zaphenath-paneah); Benjamin-Benoni; Jethro-Raguel; Hoshea-Joshua, and incidentally also the meaning of the names of Reuben, Simeon, Ephraim, Manasseh, Midian, Beelphegor (Baal Peor), and Moses are given. This insertion, says Canon Knox, knows Hebrew and thus is not from Philo, but this has to be modified, for he observes that 'the Lord is my shepherd' is quoted in this insertion, and this text for certain reasons he believes to be Philo. Accordingly he suggests that the tract was edited in Alexandria and revised by Philo. I think this means, though I am not at all sure, that the rest of the treatise is by Philo, but the interpolation of 60 sections is not, though it has been revised by him. Either this revision must have been very drastic or the editor must have been a marvellous imitator, for these sections as we have them are so saturated with Philo's thought and language that no one could possibly suspect their genuineness except for this unfortunate exhibition of the knowledge of Hebrew. And what is this knowledge of Hebrew? Apparently it is shown in the etymological interpretation.<sup>1</sup> Now for all I know Canon Knox's knowledge of Hebrew might enable him to detect a special correctness in these 17 etymologies as contrasted with the 150 others which are scattered about the treatises, though this would not be conclusive as the majority of the 17 reappear elsewhere. But he does not mean

<sup>1</sup> The exact words are: 'It gives parallels to the change of names (i.e. Abram to Abraham, Sarai to Sarah?) which appear to be reasonably possible for allegorical etymology'.

this, for he refers for support to Stein's *Allegorische Exegesis*, pp. 20 ff. Stein is arguing that Philo knew no Hebrew, an opinion, I think, generally held. This is shown by the badness of many etymologies, and is not invalidated by those that are good as these were obtained from elsewhere. He quotes a few specimens both of bad and good, and as it happens the only one he quotes from *De Mut.* (Beelphegor) is among the good. Am I justified in thinking that this is the one fact on which the denial of the Philonic origin of the 60 sections and the elaborate theory of an Alexandrian edition revised by Philo is built? <sup>1</sup> Even if there is more behind, any argument from etymologies is worthless. For if Philo knew no Hebrew (and Canon Knox starts with assuming this) it is obvious that he must have derived the 150 from elsewhere, either from an onomasticon or information from expert or seemingly expert friends or as Stein holds from the current allegorical tradition, or from all three, and such information would naturally include good, bad, and indifferent. The etymologies themselves indeed may be properly called Not Philo, but, of course, it does not follow that the teaching drawn from them is not his genuine work.

There is another large part of a treatise from which Canon Knox might be understood to exclude Philo, though he does not actually say so. This is *De Ebr.* 33-95, where, in connexion with the law about the disobedient son in Deut. xxi, he expounds the fine parable of the four sons, two of whom obey one parent and not the other, one disobeys both, and one obeys both, the mother being education, who is equated to human law and convention, the father philosophy equated to religion. Of this Canon Knox says that Bousset has shown that 'this is part of a philosophical tract revised in a theological sense and the reviser has' done so and so. I should rather say that Bousset argues, which I prefer to 'show', that behind these sections

<sup>1</sup> Not perhaps entirely, for it appears that the main body of the treatise is also suspect. 'The quotation from Job xiv. 4 (as Job says) in 48 with a text widely different from LXX suggests a source which is of a more Palestinian type.' I do not know whether the suggestion refers to the mention of Job's name or to the text of the quotation. As to the former the mention of Jeremiah's name in the quotation in *De Cher.* 49 does not appear to have disqualified Philo. Indeed we are told that 'he might have worked it in himself'. As to the latter, 'Palestinian' would appear to have no connexion with the Hebrew text. For surely *τίς γὰρ καθαρὸς ἀπὸ βύπτου, κἂν μία ἡμέρα, ἐστὶν ἢ ζωῆς;* is nearer to the LXX *τίς γὰρ καθαρὸς ἔσται ἀπὸ βύπτου; οὐθεὶς ἐὰν καὶ μία ἡμέρα ὁ βίος αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς* than to the Hebrew represented by the R.V. 'who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean? not one, seeing his days are determined'. Perhaps, then, the editing extended to the main tract. What was the *Ur-De-Mut.*, what did the editor do and what was it that Philo accomplished? All these are points on which I seek enlightenment.

there is an earlier tract which Philo has used, retaining a few fragments of it. He does not for a moment suggest that Philo is not the author of the parts in which the original theme is remodelled, and even in the fragments which Philo has retained he points out much recasting. The only passage which he seems to regard as definitely un-Philonic is the conclusion of 'the son obedient to both' in which he is depicted as the Sage, joining piety and holiness with the knowledge of all the interests of life and of every art. I hold this passage to be eminently Philonic much in the same tone as the praise of variegation in *De Somn.* i. 202 f., and when Bousset goes on to describe the two strands, one a secular Hellenistic spirit and the other a dreamy religious mystic, he seems to me to give an excellent description of Philo himself. He is ever passing with bewildering rapidity from Hellenism to Judaism, and indeed it is this which constitutes his chief interest. As for Bousset's theory I do not deny its possibility, and it would solve one or two difficulties which I have noted, but I do not think it amounts to a demonstration, and at any rate it is Philo himself speaking throughout.<sup>1</sup>

There is another paragraph, only loosely connected with what I have been discussing, on the *De Conf.* with which I cannot in any way agree. This treatise opens with denouncing the scepticism of the Jews who compared the story of Babel to that of the Aloeidae, and found other faults with the narrative. Canon Knox says that 'the general midrash on the building of the tower of Babel as agreement of men or the parts of man's nature to commit evil is interpolated with digressions which seem to have in view the theme with which

<sup>1</sup> It is worth noting that one point with which Bousset made considerable play is based on a false reading. In § 80 Philo having disposed of the φιλομήτορες and the φιλοπάτορες and dealt shortly with the disobedient to both parents continues: 'We will now speak of those who reverence both education and right reason', i.e. both parents. The next words in Wendland's text which Bousset uses and quotes are ὧν ἦσαν οἱ τῷ ἑτέρῳ τῶν γονέων προσκειμένοι τῆς ἀρετῆς ἡμιτελεῖς χορευταί, which he translates 'to whom belong those who attach themselves to one of the parents, they are half complete in the choir of virtue'. Here, said he, is a streak of the original theme in which the half perfect came third and fourth; the words expressly state that these ἡμιτελεῖς are now to be described. Philo has left these words in but does not follow them up and the sentence 'stands in the air'. But Bousset did not look at the bottom of the page which shows that τῆς ἀρετῆς was a correction for τὴν ἀρετήν. If that is restored the sentence runs 'of whom those who attach themselves to one parent are disciples only half perfect in virtue' (χορευταί as elsewhere meaning the rank and file as opposed to the leaders). In this case his argument such as it is disappears. Adler later showed that ἀρετήν was right from a very parallel place in *De Dec.* 110 where those who observe the first five or the last five commandments to the neglect of the other half are ἡμ. τὴν ἀρετήν. I have restored τὴν ἀρετήν in my text.

it opens'. I do not recognize this description of *De Conf.*, and I cannot find digressions of the kind suggested. Philo after describing the criticisms mentioned above with the substance of which, judging by comparison of his own in the same vein, I fancy he had some sympathy<sup>1</sup> though he abhors the spirit in which they are made, says he will leave the literalist to deal with them and will confine himself to the spiritual lessons. He then proceeds in an orderly manner, taking word after word and phrase after phrase, and allegorizing them. The first head as I have said above is the 'one voice and one lip', and it is mainly in this I think that the agreement of men to commit evil is to be found. I reckon some 13 or 14 heads of this kind which I indicated in the analysis which I prefixed to my translation, and on re-reading it I do not see any reason to alter anything. To take a couple of examples: 'Before we are scattered about' shows that the wicked know at the bottom of their hearts that judgement awaits them, while 'Nothing shall fail from them of all that they attempt to do' teaches us that the worst punishment God can give the sinner is to leave him unrestrained in his wickedness. It is all, of course, worthless as interpretation, yet contains a good deal of rich thinking. Many of these main heads have subdivisions and digressions, but nowhere can I see any return to the rationalists of the opening sections. The nearest approach to it is contained in a few lines of § 142, where he says that a profane person might criticize the phrase 'The tower which the sons of men have built' as a pleonasm, but this is only introduced to lead up to his theory that the sons of men, the ungodly, are contrasted with the godly who are sons of God. When he deals with the verse 'Let us build a tower whose head shall reach to Heaven' (§ 114) it is interpreted as the thoughts of those who starting from wrongdoing to men go on to attack heavenly verities, and the examples given are denying the existence of God and creation, and particularly of providence. Possibly this is the passage which Canon Knox regards as a digression referring to the people denounced in the opening. It is certainly not a digression but a main head, and any such reference seems to me gratuitous, and indeed prohibited by the parallel passage in *De Somn.* ii. 283 ff., where much the same explanation of the same text is given and no such rationalist argument has preceded.

<sup>1</sup> Mangey, indeed, credited him with something more than sympathy. For in *De Somn.* ii. 283, where in the accepted text the Babel-builders are said to be three, he thought that Philo might be identifying them with the Aloeidae. But the Aloeidae to the best of my knowledge were always two. And I hope to have cleared up the difficulty by emending *τρεις* to *τρίτοι*. See my notes on this.

All this makes me wonder whether Canon Knox pays sufficient attention to the thread, if thread it may be called, of Philo's thought. When twelve years ago my late colleague forced upon me the task of writing a general introduction to our ten volumes for which I felt very inadequately equipped, I rather foolishly wrote in the first draft that Philo's ramblings in a way reminded me of Mrs. Nickleby's. The general editor justly shocked cut it out. But what I meant was I think true, that, however inconsequent the rambling is as a whole, you can always see, if you look close enough, what it is that has led him on from point to point. Still it is an awful tangle, and the analyses which I have mentioned were made quite as much for my own benefit as for my readers'.

As to my own views about Philo's originality I have very little to say. As a translator I have not been directly concerned with it. I should naturally expect that much of the exegesis was not original. Philo was not the man to ignore what seemed to him worth saying because some one else had said it before him, and many remarks scattered throughout the treatises show that plenty of exegesis of his type existed for him to draw from. If any one likes to think that there is nothing original and that all Philo is 'not Philo' I cannot bring any very definite argument to refute him. His predecessors in exegesis have practically all perished. There is some resemblance of thought in the fragments of Aristobulus, and two of his interpretations of a text may be found in Aristeas, but I do not know of any others. But I think we can get an idea of how he would have treated these predecessors from his treatment of the one predecessor in another department who is still extant, Plato. There is a vast amount of Plato in the Commentary, a few definite quotations, but the use of Plato, of his thoughts, his phrases, his figures, appears everywhere. But they have been absorbed and adapted to their context. and his Platonizing cannot be fairly called stealing or plagiarizing. I get the same impression about his exegesis of the Scriptures. Wherever the thoughts come from they are not simply set down side by side; they are what he calls in *De Conf.* 184 a *κρᾶσις*, not a *μίξις*; they are fused in his mind and clothed in his language. In fact in spite of many puzzling contradictions he is, take him all round, 'one voice and one lip'.

I am really sorry to disagree so completely with Canon Knox. Some months ago when I wrote to him to say that his interpretation in *St. Paul* of a section in the *De Praem.* seemed to me quite impossible he replied maintaining his view, but apologizing for his 'temerity' in differing from me. I return the compliment implied with interest. I feel the 'temerity' of so flatly contradicting a scholar

equipped with such a vast range of erudition. And I envy and admire the ingenuity both of him and Philo; even when it is carried to excess I respect it as an infirmity of noble minds. But it is often carried to excess in Philo, and I cannot help feeling that Canon Knox in this note has repaid him in his own coin.

F. H. COLSON

### THE HEBREW ROOT לֹהַט

IN *J.T.S.* xl. 392-4 Professor Driver would refute my criticism of his rendering of Ps. lvii. 5 and the theory that the enemies whom the psalmists frequently denounce are sorcerers.

The point turns on whether the rendering of the Hebrew לֹהַט 'devoured' (Driver)<sup>1</sup> is probable, or whether the word means 'bewitched' as in Ex. vii. 11. I gave<sup>2</sup> three grounds for claiming that the word belongs to the language of sorcery: (a) it is used of Egyptian enchantments in Ex. vii. 11<sup>3</sup>; (b) in Arabic it means 'to hit with an arrow';<sup>4</sup> (c) it is used of hostile words.

Professor Driver asserts that 'bewitch' produces 'a very improbable sense'. But is not this to beg the question? Why is it improbable that a Hebrew poet should complain that he has been bewitched by men as dangerous as lions who use the organs of speech to bring curses and spells, when the same poet's Babylonian and Arabian neighbours frequently used such language? In the Babylonian poem which I quoted<sup>5</sup> the lion who would eat up the poet is a sorcerer, and in early Arabian poetry the men who inflict injury on their foes by verse and curse are lions with teeth and claws.<sup>6</sup>

I agree that words should be given their natural meaning, but that does not always imply a meaning natural to us. It is agreed that the psalmist complains that he is lying among lions who devour men, using teeth and tongue to do so. In the twentieth century a poet presumably would mean that he lived among dangerous slanderers, but by similar language Israel's neighbours meant more. The Hebrew

<sup>1</sup> *J.T.S.* xxxiii. 39-40.

<sup>2</sup> *Prophecy and Divination*, 282-3.

<sup>3</sup> In Exod. vii. 22, viii. 3, 14 לֹהַט (which in Syriac means 'to curse') is used. The Talmud (Sanh. 67b quoted by Levy, *N.C.B.* 423 a) distinguishes לֹהַט from לֹהַט thus: 'לֹהַט לַטִּיָּהָם refers to the works of sorcerers, לֹהַט לַטִּיָּהָם to the works of demons'. The demons correspond to the *shaiṭān* who inspired the curses of the Arabian poets.

<sup>4</sup> See Wheeler Robinson, 'Prophetic Symbolism', 5, in *Old Testament Essays*, London, 1927.

<sup>5</sup> p. 288, repeated by Prof. Driver, *ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *Diwān Ḥassān* 58, 15 كهمة ضيمم يحيى عربنا 'like the bite of a lion protecting his lair'.