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Faith and Thought

A Journal devoted to the study of the inter-relation
of the Christian revelation and modern research

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EDITORIAL

In this Number of the Journal we are very pleased to include a contribution from Professor William Barclay who at present occupies the Chair of Divinity and Biblical Criticism in the University of Glasgow. There must be many thousands of Christian people who have benefited from Professor Barclay's commentaries on the New Testament in *The Daily Study Bible*, not to mention his other popular works such as *The Mind of Jesus, Crucified and Crowned* and a number of others. In the present article, Professor Barclay raises the question concerning the necessity for Theology as an academic discipline but cautions us against the personal dangers which theological study brings with it.

There was a time when a term like 'modernism' was regarded with horror by most, if not all, Christian people of a more evangelical persuasion. It is claimed, however, that a minimal theology must result in a minimal form of Christianity. Yet an intellectual approach pursued in a truly religious spirit may at times be more desirable than a lazy acquiescence in traditional dogmas. Possibly the gravest danger, as Emil Brunner put it, lies in accepting theology as a source of religious inspiration. In all ages the greatest teachers have recalled men to simplicity, to the spirit as opposed to the letter. And when this happens

there is liberation of spiritual energy – a feeling of escape from the trivial to the serious.

On one point, however, we should be under no illusion. Although an intellectual approach in theology may get rid of some of the accretions which have furred up essential Christianity, by itself it is no answer to the scientific challenge since this affects the most essential of religious beliefs – belief in God and in objective standards of morality. Hence the theologian may be assailed on two fronts. He may find himself charged with being half-hearted both in faith and thought, with satisfying neither the religious nor the scientific spirit. If so, then the need for much more serious conversations between scientists and theologians, perhaps guided by a more comprehensive means of communication between them, is obvious.

* * *

Two of the other articles in this Number, by Dr. Mikolaski and Mr. Alan Willingale, were originally given at meetings of the Institute in London. The contribution by Dr. R. E. D. Clark on *The Origin of Life* is also a most welcome contribution to the Journal. Dr. Clark's continuing support of The Victoria Institute especially on the Council over many years is deeply appreciated by his colleagues, and the Editor takes this opportunity of placing on record his personal thanks to him for much valuable assistance in seeking to widen the interest and appeal of *Faith and Thought*.

* * *

Note: It is with great regret that we have found it necessary to cancel the Meeting of the Institute which had been fixed for Saturday, 8th November. This date has proved to be impossible for a number of invited speakers to attend. Members and others are asked, however, if they will kindly await a further announcement for the Meeting to take place very early in the New Year.

SAMUEL J. MIKOLASKI, D. PHIL.

On the Nature of Man

'I am a man and count nothing human as indifferent to me'.¹ What is it that I as a man assert myself to be? Answers given to this question are strongly influenced by the three major Western philosophical traditions.

To begin with, systems of Idealism generally maintain that the universe is pervaded by mind or is ultimately of the nature of mind. The tendency in Idealism to denigrate the physical world has largely passed, though the ultimate value of particular personality is usually denied.² Recent theology which is expressed in the idealistic categories of the Heidegger-Tillich-type questions that God can be meaningfully called personal. For them God is not personal in the sense of being one with whom we co-operate as we do with our fellows. God is the Ground of our Being. The relation of the human self to the Ground of its existence is not an interpersonal relation.

Non-personal or supra-personal language such as that God is our Ground of Being does not strike me as being either higher or more meaningful than personal language. The denial that God is personal seems to be an important implicate of Idealism in which He is usually thought of as the rationale of the cosmic process. I agree that the process gives evidence of an individualizing tendency but disagree that this should be thought of as the self-realization of the divine perfection in some way. Systems of Idealism are thought to be hospitable to Christian thought because of their stress on spirit as against matter and

¹ *Homo sum: humani nil a me alienum puto.* (Terence, *Hauton Timoroumenos* I, 77).

² A. N. Whitehead attempts to give a scientific account of the world in terms of God making Eternal Objects (Ideals) available to Actual Entities which are developing in the cosmic process. Nevertheless, on their demise Actual Entities become food for other Actual Entities. Thus the discrete individual is not of ultimate value.

because they accept the reality of values. But at a critical juncture they jettison the ultimate value of personality. Personal existence is viewed as ephemeral or temporary as a means to some higher end.

Second, to my mind Naturalism is dominant in the ethos of our time. Its history from the time of Leucippas, Democritus and Epicurus is a consistent one. Everything can be accounted for by nature and its processes, including man and his values. J. H. Randall says of contemporary Naturalism:

‘It carries the idealistic emphasis that man is united to his world by a logical and social experience. But it rephrases the idealistic scheme of man’s activities and environment in biological and anthropological categories. While like the idealists it makes them all amenable to a single intellectual method, it formulates that method in experimental terms.’³

It is claimed by many that Naturalism is the only viable alternative in the scientific age which can develop a modern view of man for his future. Its advocates may be divided into two broad camps: (a) Behaviourists and (b) Humanists. The Behaviourist’s view of man is dominated by the premise that all human activity and human nature can be adequately accounted for by the stimulus response (S.R.). Strident voices have been raised against this on the grounds that man has been thereby mechanized and made bereft of any creative capacity. However, R. H. Thouless sees a subtle dilution of the absolute rejection of mentalistic language among some post-Watsonian behaviourists.⁴ Humanists like Arthur Koestler and J. Bronowski hold that there is a spiritual dimension to man as a creative agent which attests to his being more than a casually determined creature in all his activities.

‘Christians, I believe, can neither opt out of the scientific age nor concede the debate to Naturalism. The critical point for modern man is whether personality involves for essential human nature more than our discussing the function and dissolution of the body.

³ ‘The Nature of Naturalism’, in *Naturalism and the Human Spirit*, ed. E. Y. Krikorian. New York, 1944, p. 373.

⁴ R. H. Thouless (1963), pp. 15-16.

Konrad Lorenz's attempts to enter into more than ethological relations with animals have established a new trend in biological studies. Leonard Williams, who recently published a study of the Woolly monkey, says:

'Friendship and mutual trust that develop as a result of personal contact on a social plane yield a particular kind of knowledge, one that cannot be acquired through the bars of a cage, nor by field studies in the wild. It belongs to a dimension that cannot be experienced by the laboratory worker who is faced by a row of cages, or by the curator who makes his daily round of the zoo and shakes hands regularly with the orang-utan . . . I am concerned with the importance of personal relationship, as distinct from the attitudes of the scientific observer of the wild animal and the pet owner . . . intellectual affection, and the dread of anthropomorphism, of humanizing about animals, are stock ingredients of an immature sophistication which imagines itself to be representative of the scientific attitude.'⁵

This claim that personal relationship yields a certain kind of knowledge is an important divergence from received modern scientific tradition and one that the tradition will not be able to assimilate without important revisions of its outlook.

Based upon the biblical revelation, the third tradition is the Christian doctrine of the *creatio ex nihilo*. This implies that ultimate reality is of the nature of personal life and personal relations. The existence of the person depends on more than process; it depends on the divine sovereignty. For most Christians the doctrine of the *creatio ex nihilo* also implies that the world is not eternal as God himself is, but that it had a beginning.

There is an important relationship between the Christian doctrine of creation and the Christian view of personality. Neither the personal life of God nor the personal lives of human beings are transient modes in which a more real and enduring system of psychological patterns expresses itself. God and man should not be thought of as united in some more ultimate reality. This view is neither unphilosophical common sense nor anthropomorphic mythology but expresses a valid option about the reality of God and the individualizing world process which is under God's providential oversight. It is easier, I

⁵ Leonard Williams (1967), pp. 16, 53.

believe, to think that the will of the intelligent, purposing Creator is the source of all the personal and impersonal modes of existence in space and time than to entertain other alternatives.

From texts like Genesis i-ii, Psalm viii. and cxxxix. 13-16 we learn that man is the goal of the divine creative activity and the centre of God's interest. Empirical and theological duality appear noteworthy in the biblical teaching: (a) Man is aware of his biological or empirical origin. He is fashioned from the dust of the earth (Gen. ii. 7; iii. 19; Job xxxiv. 15; Ps. ciii. 14; Eccl. xii. 7). (b) Man is also made aware of his uniqueness in relation to God his maker within the context of the biblical revelation (Rom. i. 19-23). He is fashioned in the image of God (Gen. i. 26-27; ii. 7). In mind, in feeling and in willing, man is akin to God. He has his origin from God.

Given man's divine origin, what is his nature? The Hebrew word *nephesh* has a wide variety of physical and psychical connotations including throat, breath, sensation, emotion, desire, and even a dead body.⁶ Primarily it denotes 'life-principle' (Lev. xvii. 14) but can also denote all living creatures (*naphshim*, cf. Gen. i. 24, 30). *Nephesh* is the inner vital principle of the body and the body is the outward aspect of *nephesh*; nevertheless, it is distinguishable from its bodily vehicle (Deut. xii. 23; Is. x. 18). While it is predicable of both man and animals, in regard to man it also designates the person as a centre of self-conscious life, or as a living being. At his creation man became a living being, a living person, or a distinct spiritual reality (Gen. ii. 7; cf. Job xvi. 4; Is. i. 14). The term *ruach* (breath, wind, air) means spirit or breath of life (Gen. vi. 17, vii. 15). It denotes the energy or power of conscious life. *Neshamah*, the noun which corresponds to *nephesh*, and *ruach* occur together in Gen. vii. 22, 'all in whose nostrils was the *neshamah* of the *ruach* of life.' *Ruach* is used over the entire range of human and divine powers, including the personal influence of Yahweh's Spirit and the human person, whether of his intellectual, emotional, or volitional

⁶ A. R. Johnson (1964); cf. Eric C. Rust, *Nature and Man in Biblical Thought* (1953).

life, or of any one of these as representative of the entire person. Through these powers the vital, purposeful individual is known.

Thus seen, man is a self-conscious spiritual reality. Spirit as a constituent element of personality occurs in Job xxxii. 8; I Sam. xvi. 14; and Ps. civ. 4. The Hebrew term *basar* identifies the flesh, and its equivalent in Greek is *sarx*. Many parts of the body are commonly used as representative of the whole, but these are primarily the face, hand, reins, and heart.⁷ The body and its parts are instruments of the self, denoted by the Hebrew and Greek pronouns 'ni, 'noki, and *ego*.

In both the Old and New Testament the heart is uniquely the centre of self-conscious life and psychical activity (cf. Ps. 51; Rom. x. 9-10) and is therefore equivalent to the mind or self. In Greek the immaterial part of man is the *psyche* (soul) and the *pneuma* (spirit).⁸ Whether these are synonyms or two distinguishable yet vitally related aspects of the person continues to be vigorously debated. The biblical terms are nowadays usually understood to denote aspects of a unified bodily life, through which man is aware of himself, his environment and God. The uniqueness of man's spirit centres upon his being created in the image (*tselem*) and likeness (*demuth*) of God.⁹ Both terms occur in Gen. i. 26 and v. 3, *tselem* in ix. 6, and *demuth* in v. 1.

What the biblical terms mean for a modern Christian psychology and theology of man is uncertain. We are urged, properly I believe, to think of man as a psycho-physical whole. Nevertheless, I question that we have a sufficient theological grasp of the truth of the biblical terms for a modern understanding of man. It is not legitimate to intrude modern notions of personality into ancient patterns of thought, but the fear of doing this may be preventing us from seeing that ancient

⁷ Other parts so used are the flesh, head, mouth, eye, nostrils, forehead, internal parts, marrow, blood, and belly (cf. A. R. Johnson, 1964).

⁸ All three Greek terms occur in I Thess. x. 23, while soul and spirit occur together in Heb. iv. 12.

⁹ The later Greek and Latin equivalents are *eikon* and *homoiosis*, and *imago* and *similitudo*, respectively.

people thought of themselves as being individually personal much more fully than we have supposed.

We who stand within the Christian tradition tend not to fully appreciate how much its teaching has transformed our thought patterns on personhood. Nirad Chaudhuri says that the British brought new richness of life to India beyond economics and politics through concepts which were previously unknown in Sanskrit and among Hindus. Of the six he cites, three are: (a) the Christian idea that God is personal, (b) the idea that man as a personality is a thing of value in himself, and (c) the idea of love as a relationship between two people which is more than lust.¹⁰

If human personality originates in the creative act of God, awareness of our nature has grown within the context of God's self-revelation to men. Those times and places where men sensed that God was speaking and acting, especially when they were called to be his chosen instruments, are the classic instances through which the unique nature and destiny of man have been gradually more fully grasped. These occasions serve as the pattern of our understanding that a personal relation between God and every man is the divine intention through grace, and that this relation carries with it the truth of the unique spiritual nature of man as a personal being. Key instances of God meeting man in the Old Testament include Abraham (Gen. xvii. 1-8); Jacob (Gen. xxviii. 13); Moses (Ex. iii. 6, 13-14); Joshua (i. 1-9); David (I Sam. xxiii. 4); Elijah (I Ki. xix. 9-18); Isaiah (vi.); and Jeremiah (i. 4-6). 'I am the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob' expresses this, not only for each of the patriarchs in succession, but also for the whole of Israel and ultimately for the whole human race.

That God is personal is for Christians best shown in the Incarnation of the eternal second person of the Trinity, which throws light not only on the triune nature of God but also on the nature of man under God. As one ponders the mystery of Christ's life it is possible to infer that the divine image for man is freedom, which is consistent with the idea of a conscious

¹⁰ *The Listener* 78.2017, p. 664 (Nov. 23, 1967). The other three are patriotism, a purifying concept of Nature and the idea of physical beauty.

purposing spiritual reality. The inference may also suggest that an important goal of God's working in creation, providence and redemption is freedom, i.e., a community of free good persons who live in fellowship with God and share his work.

Far from being simply an abstraction, freedom is historically revealed in the life of Jesus Christ who as the 'second Adam' or 'last man' is the divine paradigm, analogue, or pattern for man (Rom. v. 12-21). Christ exhibits in his life the true freedom of God's man which he brings us through his life, death, resurrection and gift of the Spirit. He says, 'you will know the truth, and the truth will make you free . . . so if the Son makes you free, you will be free indeed.' (John viii. 32, 36 R.V.). When this is coupled with 'lo, I have come to do thy will, O God' we have the heart of freedom. It is exemplified in the Old Testament figure of the pierced ear of the voluntary slave (Ex. xxi. 1-6). This image is carried forward to Ps. xl. 6-8 and Heb. x where it forms a bridge to the New Testament so as to show the inner Christological unity of the Bible. The pierced ear is the mark of the slave who has publically and voluntarily pledged life-long devotion to his master.

Two preliminary points seem to be inferences from the biblical data. First, each man is a personal being who enjoys a self-conscious existence and is capable of purposeful action.¹¹ He is a thinking, feeling and willing creature. We cannot

¹¹ Boethius (d. 525 A.D.) defined *persona* as 'an individual substance of a rational nature' (*naturae rationalibus individua substantia*). *Individua substantia* is the latinization of *hypostasis*. I take it that Boethius' definition of *persona* converges upon two points, namely, individuality and rational nature. It should not be thought that language like *substantia* and *hypostasis* when applied to creatures ignores the world seen as developing process and that it expresses a static cross-section of it. The Cappadocian fathers were well aware of the danger of lifeless categories and they qualified their use of the ancient terms by dynamic concepts, including *energeia*. Thus the classical terminology is not necessarily materialistic, and we should not read back modern associations of the word substance into the classical and patristic uses. More recently Leonard Hodgson's definition of man parallels that of Boethius but it more realistically takes account of man's bodily life. Hodgson says, 'to be human is to be the conscious subject of experiences mediated through a particular body in space and time.'

arrive at a definition of man through a concept of his undifferentiated unity nor by reducing the distinctions within his nature to one or other of them, but neither dare we allow the distinctions to grow into divisions of man's nature. In the life of Christ we note his own self-conscious relation to the Father: 'I come' is the correlative of 'thy will'. We can get nowhere in Christian theology unless individual selfhood is a permanent and non-reducible reality.

Second, the spiritual reality of the self seems to imply a psychical realm which includes God and spirits and which transcends the physical realm. The human parallel concerns the duality of mind and brain which some recent neurological opinion allows.¹²

God is Creator of both body and mind and He has sanctified both. The doctrine of the resurrection shows what value is placed by the Christian faith upon the body. The doctrine of the Christian life corroborates this truth because the bodily life of man is the material of which the spiritual life is built. The Christian view of man is not to be ultimately free of the body, but the daily self-offering of the whole man to God and the ultimate redemption of body and spirit together.

Human personality involves the activities of thinking, feeling and willing, but none of these occurs without involving the others. I suggest a four-fold way of understanding human nature. Man is a self, an intelligent self, a valuing self, and a purposing self, within the context of a bodily life.

¹² Note: J. C. Eccles (1953 and 1966); Ian Ramsey (1965), p. 161; Wilder Penfield in *Control of the Mind* (ed. S. M. Farber and R. H. L. Wilson, 1961); W. H. Thorpe (1961); R. H. Thouless (1963); and Sir Cyril Burt, 'Mind and Consciousness', in *The Scientist Speculates* (ed. I. J. Good, 1962). In each of these works argument is developed against the mechanistic or physicalistic view of man and in favour of postulating an agent other than the mechanism itself. The tripartite view of man has recently come back into discussion in the work of H. H. Price, Ian Ramsey, and J. R. Smythies. The latter expresses this division as body (extended), mind (partly extended, e.g., visual and somatic sense-data and images and partly not, e.g., auditory and olfactory sense-data and images) and spirit (i.e., Pure Ego, the Witness, which is not extended at all but which is the essential core of the human personality), in *Biology and Personality*.

I. Man is a Self

To be a personal is to be a self which the pronoun 'I' expresses as a commonplace of language. It would be wrong to make the commonplace incomprehensible. I take the self to be a non-reducible reality which we know ourselves and other selves to be by an immediate intuition. A person is not simply a unity of conscious experiences but the subject of that unity. He is a spiritual agent.

The scientific study of human behaviour tempts some to reduce mind to functions of the brain and the total person to functions of the body. Important advances have been made in exploring and charting the working of the human brain. Physiologically, thinking is based upon the patterned transfer of electro-chemical energy in the cerebral cortex and other related regions of the brain. Human behaviour when analysed at a given instant is a highly complex and multi-level reality, not only as to its complexity at a given close, but also as to the anterior processes which have produced it. These include thinking of which a person is consciously aware and also activity in the deeper parts of the brain and in the central nervous system which are not part of a man's conscious awareness. While many facts about the operation of the central nervous system are now known, we are no closer to being able to give a scientific account of self-conscious life. In the following extract W. Russell Brain describes perception as a physiological process:

'The neurologist observes the brains of animals and of other people. From the behaviour of both and from the answers which patients give to his questions, he discovers that when an object is perceived, a series of events occurs successively in time, beginning with an event in the object and ending with an event in the subject's brain. If the series is interrupted at any point between the object and the cerebral cortex (brain surface) of the subject, the object is not perceived. If the relevant area of the cortex is destroyed, the object again is not perceived. But if the relevant area of the cortex is electrically stimulated while the subject is conscious, sense-data of the kind aroused by an object are perceived by the subject. Thus it is held that the event immediately preceding, or perhaps synchronous with, the perception of an object is an event of a physio-chemical kind in the subject's cerebral cortex. The cortical neurones are normally excited in the way

just described from the external world, but if they should exceptionally be excited in some other way – for example by electrical stimulation or by an epileptic discharge – the appropriate sense-data would still be experienced. The only independently necessary condition for the awareness of sense-data, to use Broad's term, is thus an event in the cerebral cortex.¹³

What is the status of mind in the light of such a scientific statement? Some recent views are: (a) Traditional dualism maintains a single, fundamental barrier between mind and body which view, Bertrand Russell¹⁴ remarked, does have a basis on certain data of our experience. The modern dynamic view of matter and the neurological study of the brain have encouraged those who lean toward non-Cartesian dualism to discover ways in which mind and brain interact.¹⁵ (b) Bertrand Russell himself postulates two kinds of space, that of physics and that of perception, though he understands man's nature in wholly materialistic ways.¹⁶ (c) Further variations of materialism are Behaviourism, like that of J. B. Watson who rejected mind as an unnecessary element in describing human nature similar to William James's rejection of consciousness, and Gilbert Ryle who reduces mind to predictable activity and jettisons the inner world of private perceptions. (d) Arthur Koestler postulates the ego-environment dichotomy in a serialistic not single way so that at its upward end the hierarchy is open-ended or infinite.¹⁷ (e) W. Russell Brain holds a monistic view. He sees mind and brain as two aspects of one reality and expresses the faith that new knowledge will likely be able to explain mental activity in terms of physics and chemistry.¹⁸

¹³ W. Russell Brain (1951), p. 4; cf. p. 72–73.

¹⁴ Bertrand Russell, *Human Knowledge. Its Scope and Limits*, 1948, p. 217.

¹⁵ cf. J. C. Eccles (1953 and 1965), J. R. Smythies (1956) and H. Kuhlenbeck (1961).

¹⁶ Bertrand Russell, *Op. cit.*

¹⁷ Arthur Koestler (1967), pp. 208–19. cf. J. Bronowski (1967), p. 17.

¹⁸ W. Russell Brain (1966), pp. 79–80, cf. pp. 51, 97–98. Lord Brain discusses consciousness and the unconscious briefly (pp. 70–72, 74–76, 78), but I have not found a discussion of the meaning of self-consciousness in this or in his earlier books.

Does a neurological account of perception furnish an adequate statement of the nature of mind and by implication of the self? I do not think that we can ever escape from the reality of the self or ego as a primary datum of experience. My conviction of this truth is reinforced by the logic of scientific accounts such as the one which I cited from Lord Brain. Some comment on this is needed.

First, we note the frequent occurrence of personal pronouns as the subject of actions. In my judgment this points to the self as an existing reality which can grasp the meaning of things in the manner described by Lord Brain and which is also able to initiate courses of action purposefully. In *The Nature of Experience* (1959) Brain says, 'what I have just been giving you is a scientific account of what goes on in the nervous system when we perceive something.' (p. 8). To me such language shows how difficult it is to escape from the truth of the reality of the person who is more than the observable phenomena. The self intrudes into language patterns not simply out of habit, but because it is impossible to speak humanly without the reality of our personality showing itself. The intrusion is not simply verbal but logical. The matrix calls for it; indeed, the sense would vanish without the reality of the self.¹⁹

¹⁹ 'I used to regard the gulf between mind and matter as an innate belief. I am quite ready now to admit that I may have acquired it at school or later. But I find it more difficult to regard my ego as having such a second-hand basis. I am much more certain that I exist than that mind and matter are different.' E. D. Adrian, in J. C. Eccles (ed.), 1966, cf. also D. M. MacKay, *Ibid.*, pp. 252-253; W. Kneale (1962); John Beloff (1962); J. R. Smythies, in I. Ramsey (ed.) 1965; and H. Kuhlenbeck (1961), pp. 1, 114-115, 122. A. J. Ayer makes the personal subject 'literally identical with that to which we also attribute physical properties. If we ask what this subject is, the only correct answer is just that it is a person.' He admits that no solution has yet been found to the problem of how discrete experiences which are separated in time are nevertheless the experiences of the same self. The logical difficulties one faces when attempting to avoid that the discrete self is not identical with the physical attributes may be illustrated also from his language, 'these particular experiences can then be identified as the experiences of the person *whose* body it is.' (Italics mine. *The Concept of a Person* (1963), pp. 85-86, 113-114, 117).

Second, the foregoing is reinforced by the fact that Lord Brain uses the term 'subject' in more than one way. To speak of interrupting a series of events which occur between an object and the 'cerebral cortex of the subject' is a different use of the term subject from that where he talks of an object 'perceived by the subject.' In the first, 'subject' is used in the sense of a creature who is the object of scientific study and in this sense the use is indistinguishable whether it be of an experimental animal or of a man; whereas in the second, 'subject' is used in the sense of the conscious person. This difference is also shown by the distinction implicit in his opening remark where he says that the neurologist observes the brains of animals and people (here they are both objects of scientific study so far as their behavioural responses are concerned); and then adds 'and from the answers which patients give.' This last is a statement about and data of the reality of the self as more than the behavioural responses. I feel that the term subject is used by Brain in the sense (a) object of study, and (b) discrete personal reality.

Third, Lord Brain refers to the production of sense data and motor responses by artificial electric stimulation of certain cortical areas. Although the sense-data can be artificially produced they are nevertheless experienced as the appropriate sense-data. Does this furnish a sufficient account of mind and personality as extrapolated solely on the basis of electro-chemical discharges in the brain? The experiments conducted by Wilder Penfield of McGill University in Montreal yield important qualifying data.²⁰ Using conscious patients, Penfield has artificially stimulated selected areas of the cerebral cortex by means of low-voltage currents. Because the cortex is insensitive, the patient does not feel the current, but he is aware of the movements which the current causes him to make. Penfield says:

'When the neurosurgeon applies an electrode to the motor area of the patient's cerebral cortex causing the opposite hand to move, and when he asks the patient why he moved the hand, the response is: 'I didn't do it. You made me do it.' . . . It may be said that the patient thinks of himself as having an existence separate from his body.'

²⁰ Wilder Penfield in *Control of the Mind* (eds. Farber and Wilson, 1961). Cited by Arthur Koestler, *The Ghost in the Machine* (1967), pp. 203-204.

Then follows an attempt by the patient to regain control of those motor responses which were not his own:

'Once when I warned such a patient of my intention to stimulate the motor areas of the cortex, and challenged him to keep his hand from moving when the electrode was applied, he seized it with the other hand and struggled to hold it still. Thus, one hand, under the control of the right hemisphere driven by an electrode, and the other hand, which he controlled through the left hemisphere, were caused to struggle against each other. Behind the 'brain action' of one hemisphere was the patient's mind. Behind the action of the other hemisphere was the electrode.'

Penfield concludes on his demonstration as follows:

'There are, as you see, many demonstrable mechanisms [in the brain]. They work for the purposes of the mind automatically when called upon . . . These mechanisms that we have begun to understand constitute part, at least, of the physiological basis of the mind. But what agency is it that calls upon these mechanisms, choosing one rather than another? Is it another mechanism or is there in the mind something of different essence? . . . To declare that these two things are one does not make them so. But it does block the progress of research.'

Thus when Lord Brain says that 'mind is the function by which the living organism reacts to its environment,'²¹ one feels compelled to qualify this statement by his other comment that personality comprises a pattern like other energy patterns in nature but in some mysterious way it possesses a life of its own.²²

My fourth comment departs from Lord Brain's paragraph. The conscious subject with its freedom of choice and sense of responsibility for choices is a primary datum of experience which has no valid alternative in our limited attempts to apprehend man's essential nature. When we jettison the personal reality to which personal language points we end up with curious results. The full-fledged application of the behaviourist motif to human nature as a rubric into which the personal

²¹ W. Russell Brain (1966), p. 80.

²² W. Russell Brain (1951), p. 70.

reality and purposive intention are telescoped as mechanical reflexes, produces a highly comic effect. What would be gained, Williams asks, by saying:

'The Bavarian peasant made the emotive sound of "Ich liebe dich," or "George displayed the pre-copulation ritual to Bill's mate, but was inhibited by Bill's appeasement posture."' ²³

Koestler also cites the lengths to which behaviourist predilection can go when accounting for the language of the self. The following is from a contemporary American College textbook and it is offered by the authors as the essence of the scientific approach to the nature of human discourse:

'Once the psychologist discovers the principles of learning for simpler phenomena under the more ideal conditions of the laboratory, it is likely that he can apply these principles to the more complex activities as they occur in everyday life. The more complex phenomena are, after all, nothing but a series of simpler responses. Speaking to a friend is a good example of this. Suppose we have a conversation such as the following:

He: 'What time is it?'
 She: 'Twelve o'clock.'
 He: 'Thank you.'
 She: 'Don't mention it.'
 He: 'How about lunch?'
 She: 'Fine.'

Now this conversation can be analysed into separate SR units. 'He' makes the first response, which is emitted probably to the stimulus of the sight of 'She'. When 'He' emits the operant, 'What time is it?', the muscular activity, of course, produces a sound, which also serves as a stimulus for 'She'. On the receipt of this stimulus, she emits an operant herself: 'Twelve o'clock', which in turn produces a stimulus to 'He', and so on . . .

In such complex activity, then, we can see that what we really have is a series of SR connections. The phenomenon of connecting a series of such SR units is known as *chaining*, a process that should be apparent in any complex activity.²⁴

²³ Leonard Williams (1967), p. 54.

²⁴ F. J. McGuigan, 'Learning, Retention and Motivation,' in *Psychology* (ed. A. D. Calvin, 1961), p. 375. Cited by A. Koestler (1964), pp. 603-604.

The unity of the self is made up in part of the linkage by memory of its conscious states and by the preservation of the continuity of that awareness through a lifetime, which includes spanning periods of unconsciousness due to sleep, anaesthesia, and other causes. The self is known in the immediacy of one's own intuition and in personal relations where there occurs reaching out to the personality of another. The self cannot be observed in the way in which ordinary phenomena are observed. The mind is a private world but it is nevertheless one which can be made public by the agent himself. It is the public character of the agent's communication about his external world, as well as of his inner life including his purpose to act, which given to the self its empirical status and which demands for it recognition as a fact of experience. The self furnishes its own empirical criteria which are a part of its being truly known.

Most Christians agree that so far as we know a human self is complete only in a bodily life. A person is a spiritual agent which term points to the powers of his bodily life to act, and acts have to be somewhere. While he is spirit, this does not imply for man the goal of escaping embodiment in matter. On the contrary man is called upon by God to spiritualize his bodily life, i.e., to conduct it in accordance with conscious, intelligent, and beneficent purposes. An aspect of this bodily life is its affective side. The feelings are not a segment of personality or divisible from it, but function as perceptors of the mind through the brain, and from the mind to the brain and body as expressions of kindly or other feeling. Consciousness includes awareness of one's self as existing. Our emotional and perceptual experiences include this same awareness at successive stages of remove from this immediate intuition. We are aware of our self in emotional states such as love, happiness, or anger; or, as a self of having sensations of discomfort such as a stomach ache or a headache. But contact with objects, or with conditions or changes in our environment yield the awareness that the things we sense are not ourselves. Awareness of the self is a different awareness than awareness of objects which are beyond us, and in being aware of objects we are aware also of the self being aware of objects.

The various forms of relation point to a dynamic conception of the self and of the image of God for it. We experience relations which are to varying degrees personal: (a) a mutually impersonal relation is like that of stone striking stone; (b) a one-sidedly personal one is like that of a man striking a nail; and (c) a mutually personal one is like that of two persons conversing. But persons are to varying degrees personal depending upon their relationship to God as well as to one another. We have a distinctive character that is an index of our self-identity, but for Christians the pattern for this character is given historically in the Incarnate Lord who in the perfection of his spirituality knew fully what he did. In Christian faith is involved a heightening of personal distinctness and awareness not the absorption of personality, as the doctrines of the Incarnation and the Trinity imply.

II. Man is an Intelligent Self

While rationalism is obviously not the basis of the biblical revelation, this trite saying obscures that the biblical message is everywhere a rational appeal to intelligent beings. To be sure, it is more than this. It is a moral and emotional appeal as well; none the less, it cannot be less than an appeal to creatures with minds.

In the Old Testament the wisdom literature, especially the Book of Proverbs, is a well-known example of this. It appeals to common sense and understanding (Prov. i. 2-6) as much as to spiritual insight which derives from God (v. 7). These are two sides of one coin. To many theologians Wisdom in Proverbs viii. is a double *entendre*: it has the force not only of spiritual insight, but also personal or messianic overtones analogous to the Logos figure of the Fourth Gospel. The historical and other material of the Bible are equally an appeal to the mind. Elijah's satirizing of the Baal prophets on Carmel indicts the irrationality of idolatry (1 Ki. xviii. 27). An identical satirical take-off on the illogicality of idol making and worship

is found in Is. xlv. 14-18. My point (which needs no defence or justification because it is obvious) is made in Is. i. 3, 'the ox knows its master, and the ass its master's crib; but Israel does not know, my people does not understand.' What animals know instinctively, men ought to grasp better because they are creatures having intelligence. This neither makes revelation and reason antithetical nor does it base revelation upon reason; it simply states that man is a creature capable of rational thought. The revelation is addressed to creatures who are rationally capable of grasping it.

In the New Testament a parallel to Is. i. 3 is Lu. xii. 56-57, 'you hypocrites! You know how to interpret the appearance of earth and sky; but why do you not know how to interpret the present time? And why do you not judge for yourselves what is right?' It is reasonable to conclude that power and authority to forgive sins is equivalent to power and authority to heal (Lu. v. 23), Jesus points out. While Paul argued in a rational fashion about justice, self-control and future judgment Felix became convicted in his own heart (Acts xxiv. 25). The inference one draws from seeing a house is that it had a builder (Heb. iii. 4). Paul's attack upon the wisdom of the world in I Cor. i. 2 is in no sense an attack upon intelligence but upon the abuse of reason. The wisdom of the world and the foolishness of God are conflicting viewpoints, but the foolishness of God in the Cross comprises an intelligible whole which reflects God's wisdom when seen in its true light.

Behaviourists vigorously oppose philosophical rationalism, but this attitude spills over into denigration of intelligence which is expressed in highly rationalistic ways. For them habit-formation not intelligence is the essence of mental progress. Novel ideas do not occur as insights grasped by creative minds, but are simply lucky hits among random tries, which are then repeated because they are useful, usually in a biologically satisfying way. Nevertheless, most naturalists today hold to the primary role of intelligence for man's contemporary life and for his future.

We may regard the brain as a machine which operates in accordance with the known laws of physics and chemistry, but the machine view of the brain does not adequately account for

the mind which is the spiritual agent or self. We do not know nature of mind, nor how the brain affects the mind in perception nor how the mind affects the brain in willed action. However, Eccles thinks that the delicate and complex neuronal net of the brain in which a very tiny impulse can be inherently accelerated and magnified in the network is the kind of system with which such interaction could take place.²⁵

A logical condition of defining intelligence is circularity: we cannot define it without employing it in our definition, just as we cannot even commence thinking rationally about our universe without assuming that it is a universe in which things make sense. Intelligence is the power of rational thought. It is our ability to deduce or to induce conclusions from evidence. It is a process of thought by which truth is grasped. It is the power of mind capable of adapting rational acts to ends and is in this sense an ability, more or less, which man shares in common with other creatures. Aristotle comments that Anaxagoras was like a sane man in relation to the haphazard comments of his contemporaries because he was the first among the ancient Greeks to introduce the concept of mind into philosophy.

Thinking is not a simple, uncomplicated process. The role of the unconscious as the seedbed of new ideas has yet to be more fully investigated. We are all swamped by restricting habits of thought which must somehow be by-passed. The inspiration of a novel idea often comes like a flash of insight. Even in abstract disciplines such as physics crucial theoretical advances occur as the result of intuitive creative imagination rather than by deduction. Examples can be cited, including the work of Max Planck.

We cannot ignore the role of conditioning in mental processes, which establish frames of reference as habits of thought in terms of which we see the world as a coherent and meaningful pattern. Habituation and the functions of the lower human brain in relation to the upper parts of the brain must be taken into account but they become meaningful only to a personal

²⁵ J. C. Eccles (1953), pp. 281-285.

intelligence. Intelligence is not solely cold, deductive reasoning. It is a highly fluid and imaginative activity.

The importance of imagination to human progress in the creation and development of the arts, and in the discovery of new ideas in science and philosophy is firmly established and widely acknowledged. But imagination can never be sheer flight of fancy else it ends in fantasy. Mankind has been led into grievous errors by his flights into unreason. History shows that imagination uncontrolled by reason has propelled mankind into tragedy, as in the irrational religious mythologies of the ancient civilizations or in the more recent doctrines which have shaped social, religious and political life such as the divine right of kings, the infallibility of the Pope, the Marxist theory of the relentless course of history independent of the human will, or the Nazi doctrine of the master race.

Imagination is crucial to human creative activity because no progress is made by purely logical steps, essential as these are. In the drama or novel the author mirrors life. The people and events which he creates by his imagination are often not real, or they are only partly historical, but the effect is of real life which can be rationally apprehended. The scientist is confronted by a vast array of facts which must somehow yield a frame of reference but no pre-set rules exist on how to arrive at the key-feature of the pattern. Nevertheless, the solution is not an irrational one. He must sense in at least a tenuous or preliminary way an intelligible pattern which yields an hypothesis to account for the pattern. This he proceeds to test. Literature is not simply a factual enumeration of the details of life and neither is science a simple listing of the facts of nature. They both demand the imaginative ordering or grouping of facts into intelligible patterns which involves a strong personal element. But this is a process of reason not of unreason for the creative flights of imagination are functions of intelligence, though they may easily fall into unreason.

Intelligence involves a free ranging activity of observing one's own life and the world around. Intelligent activity is exploration, observation, noting and taking account of what is around us. The higher primates and man have the capacity to be visually and dextrously curious about factual detail and

not primarily olfactorily, as are dogs. Correlation of hard, factual work and free-ranging imagination is a part of all creative achievement. Between the two occurs a period of incubation in which is generated the flash of inspiration. The whole creative process is a struggle of intelligence which often is guided by what seems to be only a hunch or an aesthetic sense of beauty or harmony somehow to be achieved.²⁶

To speak of intelligence as the crown of man should not be understood as deification of reason. I do not say that one develops skill in understanding or in living simply by the acquisition of logical tools. It is dangerous to leave any one of us alone with a discipline so that it becomes a distorting obsession. As thinking beings we are concerned not only with creative advance or new discoveries about nature, but also with the logic of life, with imaginative insight as to how all that we create can be used. There is a connection between morality and our apprehension of truth because to grasp truth is not a purely intellectual act but a moral act also. Scientific progress depends upon moral commitment to truth. To be a good scientist a man must be an honest scientist, as the Piltdown Man hoax points out sharply. In his well-known aphorism P. T. Forsyth remarked that the truth we see depends upon the men we are. Response to evidence involves a moral commitment to the truth and to act on the basis of the truth involves a moral commitment to do what is right. In the New Testament the natural man who is conditioned by the wisdom of this world is contrasted not with a Christian who is intellectually obtuse but with the man of the Spirit who has the mind of Christ (I Cor. ii. 16; cf. Eph. i. 17-18; Col. i. 9).

III. Man is a Valuing Self

It sounds odd to argue that man is a moral creature in the sense of being responsibly moral or responsible to the moral

²⁶ John Beloff thinks we cannot ultimately reduce mind to cybernetics, though he sees this as the most serious challenge to mind, because of three reasons: (a) lack of plausibility with respect to the facts of creative originality, (b) inadequacy to account for meaning and intention, and (c) inability to do justice to the unspecifiable component of human thought (1962, pp. 124-125).

law in view of the profound revolution on morals which we are undergoing in western society. In our time man is viewed ethologically in terms of mores not morals. This trend is based upon a powerful surge of naturalist sentiment. When one presses beyond inflammatory clichés like 'Victorian morality' and 'otherworldly ideas' which are contrasted with an allegedly scientific view of man, one discovers a fundamental rejection of any theistic premise and of its corollary, normative ethics. Is man not only biologically but also morally no different from other creatures, or does selfhood include a moral dimension which makes of him a valuing creature in a sense beyond that of values being motor affective responses? Present trends are generating a resurgence of egocentric behaviour which is articulated in behavioural-biological terminology.

In his address to the British Psycho-Analytical Society in 1965 the chief justice Lord Devlin said:²⁷

'There is no doubt, surely, that a sense of guilt about some things at any rate, exists in most human minds. I imagine that a great part of the time of psychoanalysts is spent in tracing mental aberrations back to irrational feelings of guilt. It is something that exists as a fact, and it is with its existence as a fact – something that exists in the human mind – that I want to deal here. There are those who hold that as there is no such thing as free will, there can be no justification for a sense of guilt.'

The sense of guilt depends on a sense of right and wrong and I believe that when we talk about a common sense of right and wrong we mean more than *mores*. I refer to the moral law which is a condition of personal life in the world. To talk about the moral law is not the same as to talk about traditional morals, though these two things are related. There is a moral order which determines the nature of human selfhood and which, for Christians, comprises the life blood of the community of persons in which God and man share their lives.

The rejection of normative morality derives not only from the behaviourist oriented approach to human nature but also from the depth approach associated with the name of Freud. Mowrer, a recent president of the American Psychological

²⁷ *The Listener*, 25th March, 1965, p. 438.

Association, challenges the Freudian reversal of the meaning of conscience which has profoundly influenced pastoral psychology studies for a generation:

'At the very time when psychologists are becoming distrustful of the sickness approach to personality disturbance and are beginning to look with more benign interest and respect toward certain moral and religious precepts, religionists themselves are being caught up in and bedazzled by the same preposterous system of thought as that from which we psychologists are just recovering.'²⁸

Mowrer contrasts 'guilt' and 'impulse' theories of anxiety as follows. Freud's theory, in brief, holds that anxiety derives from evil wishes which the individual would commit but which he dares not commit. Mowrer's alternative is the guilt theory of anxiety, namely, that it derives not from acts which the individual would commit but dares not, but from acts which he has committed but wishes he had not.²⁹ Later he wonders whether we have lost faith in God because we have lost faith in conscience.³⁰ Thus a new look is being taken at distortions of the nature of sin and guilt.

At issue is more than relative standards of traditional moral behaviour. The ethological approach to human conduct is an indispensable tool to our enlarged understanding of man. The question is, can all that man is be accounted for ethologically? Is man a moral creature and related to his fellow men and to God in moral ways which are more than habit formed reactions to stimuli?

Let us approach this question from within the citadel of the naturalistic perspective on value in order to ascertain how normative values like goodness and love are handled. For John Dewey thought and valuation arise only in problem situations.³¹ They originate in the biological matrix of the

²⁸ O. H. Mowrer, *The Crisis in Psychiatry and Religion* (1961), p. 52.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 37. He quotes A. T. Boisen, 'my observation is that the patient who condemns himself, even to the point of thinking he has committed the unpardonable sin, is likely to get well. It is the patient who blames others who does not get well.'

³¹ John Dewey, *Theory of Valuation* (1939).

organism's relationship to its environment where intellectual activity and valuation are instruments for securing satisfaction of need. Values relate to means employed to achieve ends. Hence, that is good which promotes or furthers a course of activity, and right in the sense of being inherently connected with that which is needed. The converse meaning is applied to the meanings of bad and wrong.

R. B. Perry's argument is similar. He defines value as interest, which expresses for him the motor-affective responses of organisms. Interest includes instinct, desire, feeling, will, and all their states, acts, and attitudes.³² After examining various combinations of value and interest, Perry concludes that value is 'any object of any interest'. Value is the motor-affective response of the organism to objects of interest in its environment, so that a sufficient account of value requires a precise account of interest. At this point Perry introduces a scale which norms interest but which cannot derive from the motor-affective response base from which he professes to work. He says that interest should be judged by its correctness, intensity, preference, and inclusiveness. He defines moral good in terms of comprehensiveness or commensurability of interest. It is achievement of an all-inclusive harmony of interests. Personal interest must be submerged to universal benevolence which works toward universal harmony.³³

How can the interest of others become one's own interest in a system where value is simply the motor-affective response of organism? Unresolved tension between egoism and altruism remains. Perry pleads that a situation where one outsider and the million are happy is better than just the million being happy. A harmonious society is to be found in love or benevolence.³⁴ Similarly Dewey was deeply concerned about the needy millions of people in India. How does one move from the egocentric behaviour of an organism natively satisfying its needs from the environment to the premise that it ought to be concerned about the interests of another organism? This

³² R. B. Perry, *General Theory of Value* (1926), p. 27.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 669.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 676.

is to ask again whether ethics can be built successfully upon a non-ethical footing. Naturalism does not furnish a rational justification of altruism on its behaviour-biological view of man and of value.

In saying that man is a moral self I mean that we share a common sense of right and wrong and a common sense that it is always better to do right than to do wrong. The sense of guilt depends upon our being affected by the difference between right and wrong. Can we conceive of a situation where men organize a society on the basis that it is always better to do wrong rather than right? To re-define the words 'good' and 'right' and 'bad' and 'wrong' to mean respectively what is useful to satisfy me or not is thereby to pre-empt the words of meaning which remains none the less. 'Good' and 'right' stand for values which are above my interests and modes of satisfaction. Can anything be wrong with genocide on the naturalist's premise? If that is 'right' which conduces to satisfaction of my need then men are expendable to the achievement of that satisfaction as the Nazis claimed, and genocide therefore becomes 'right'. I agree with Lord Devlin that a sense of guilt is indispensable to maintaining order in human society and would add that guilt is established by the moral law which is an essential constituent of the world order under God. Without it we would cease to be human. Lord Devlin says:

'I would therefore conclude that a sense of guilt is a necessary factor for the maintenance of order, and indeed that it plays a much more important part in the preservation of order than any punishment that the state can impose. If, with the wave of a psycho-analytical wand, you could tomorrow completely abolish the sense of guilt in the human mind, it would cause, I think it is no exaggeration to say, an almost instantaneous collapse of law and order.'³⁵

I can illustrate this from the contemporary Marxist, Milovan Djilas. In his novel *Montenegro* he grapples with the problem of the collapse of his own political ideal. Despite his naturalistic assumptions he cannot escape the moral issue and the force of

³⁵ *The Listener*, 1st April, 1965, p. 480.

moral good. Djilas puts the following words on the lips of the key character, Milos, who tomorrow morning will be hanged as a Serbian patriot by the Austrians:

'The footsteps continued to drip. In books there is always a dripping of water before an execution. And the beating of drums. They'll beat for me, too, to announce my death, to measure out the time, the time of our emergence onto the stage of Europe and the world, the time of my hanging.

But I have not many sins. I use the word 'sin' as if I were religious. But the expression isn't important. We atheists, for that matter, haven't yet invented a substitute for it. The idea is important. It is important what I think – if I can still think. I don't really believe in sin, yet I remember mine as if I were a believer, and a devout believer at that. My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me? Christ on the Cross in his last moments. Ha! I may become a Christian yet.'³⁸

The moral law is described in Scripture as the righteousness of God. God's holiness is first his majestic, transcendent separateness from his creatures (Is. vi. 1–3; Hos. xi. 9). He is the Holy One of Israel. Second, it means his ethical perfection as the moral law-giver of the universe (Is. v. 16; 1 Pet. ii. 9).

The righteousness of God is more than moral rectitude or justice because it includes grace. Jesus summarized the meaning of the divine righteousness as more than justice (Mt. v. 20). Justice is an essential and fundamental demand of the law, but God's own righteousness, which according to Paul is 'apart from the law', includes justification of the sinner. In Romans i. 16–17 the power of the Gospel of Christ saves men through righteousness working by grace. This dimension of love as a part of righteousness is what makes the Christian message so distinctive. Christ did not merely fulfill the law. To be sure, he did fulfill it perfectly, but his righteousness surpassed that of an eye for an eye, or love reciprocating love (Mt. v. 38, 46). It did not give to men what was their due rectorally but absorbed judgment through grace so that they might receive justification through forgiveness (Rom. iii. 21–26). The righteousness of God is the norm which must judge men

³⁸ London, 1964, p. 245.

rectorally (Rom. i. 18-19; iii. 19-20). It is the condition of moral, personal life. But in the Christian revelation it includes the freedom of God to love and redeem the sinner by means of grace which exhibits the unique character of that righteousness.

That man is a moral creature does not diminish the importance of his ethological study, it rather magnifies that importance. But a distinction needs to be made between moral law and mores, between righteousness and traditional morals. The conscience more or less accurately attests the moral law. Conscience gets its content from outside itself, hence it can be developed and conditioned in various ways even to approving of evil. But it recognizes a universal moral order to which it stands related. The moral law is a condition of discrete spiritual life's existing. It is the foundation of the ethical relations among men and of those between man and God. The moral law has its life in God. It derives from God but does not stand above Him. If we reject the moral law then the meaning of right and wrong collapses and, for Christians, such concepts as righteousness, sin and forgiveness are rendered meaningless. The final sanction of conduct is that it represents a righteousness unto God.

IV. Man is a Purposing Self

An individual personal reality man is capable of conscious, free, purposeful action. This action utilizes both the casual dependability and the contingency which we observe in the world order. Plato said that man is a self-moved creature who acts in relation to certain ideals. Man's nature and actions register the use of qualified freedom but for the Christian they point to more perfect freedom where all man's acts will be under the control of a morally and spiritually oriented intelligence.

The doctrine that man's mental development is the result of successful random tries is a derivative of the doctrine that man and all other organisms respond to their environment by conditioned reflex activity. In this view the initiative derives from the environment. The organism's chief end is to develop passive-response techniques which keep it in a state of problem-

free euphoria. The cycle is repeated endlessly every time the equilibrium is disturbed. Needs or problems generate response. Some organisms adapt effectively, others fail to do so. By natural selection those which fail to adapt are weeded out. In this way the myths of freedom and of purpose are discarded.

In his novel *Walden Two*, B. F. Skinner develops the theme of a behaviourist utopia. The mythical community is set in the American north-east and furnishes for its inhabitants a completely controlled environment, including their thoughts, habits and satisfaction of needs. Recourse to individual initiative therefore is regarded as harmful. Skinner has made his point crystal clear: he looks forward to the creation of a society where the idea of freedom will be only a bad dream, if it is allowed to be remembered at all. Skinner aims to control and predict all human behaviour just like natural phenomena.

We are, I believe, compelled to allow for contingency and freedom as real aspects of our experience and of the world order. All sane men assume that they have the ability to control or to modify their own actions by willing to do so and that they have the power to exercise control over the direction of events under given conditions. There is no scientific basis for denying the freedom of the will, which must be assumed if indeed we have the power to investigate our world intelligently and to act in purposeful ways. There is a difference between unaware habituated activity and sources of inspiration of which we are not fully aware which quicken creative activity. Habituated acts derive from constant repetition or pressure from above which establishes patterns of electro-chemical response. These can be simple or complicated such as the skill of driving a car or of touch typewriting. But in creative activity there is pressure from within the mind to break out through and beyond the barriers which conditioning has imposed upon our ways of acting and of seeing things. This is far different from habituated patterns of even skilled activity.

I should not be understood as being opposed to the principle of habituation but only to its misuse in mechanizing man and denying to him freedom and creativity. Our experience I believe demands a view which will combine the idea of a dependable world order (expressed roughly in the idea of cause

and effect) with the reality of contingency and the resultant place for freedom which contingency affords. To be sure, Christians have tended to ignore the force of the habituation principle as an explanation for certain kinds of behaviour, but I do not think that this charge can be laid against certain biblical teaching, notably its doctrine of sin. If, on one side, sin involves the conception of freedom and moral responsibility for the use of that freedom then, on the other, the doctrine of sin reinforces the conception of a dependable world. The habituating effects of sin on the body and on the spirit of man are everywhere warned against in Scripture. Paul says, 'all things are lawful to me, but I will not be brought under the power of any' (I Cor. vi. 12).

Personal life spiritually qualified has a capacity for purposeful creative activity. Sheer intellectual brilliance, as in the case of a child prodigy who is a mathematical wizard, is not the apex of manhood's achievement. This is expressed better by a concept of the capacity for creative imagination combined with a feeling for life. It is to know the nature and value of life and to harness the powers of life for good. Related to this is man's ability to grasp the meaning of time and to make it his own. Man is able to think out of time, out of the present moment to the past, and to relate both to the future.

To be personal includes the power to choose between kinds of action, i.e., whether to choose to act with increasing freedom or to choose to act in such ways as increase habituation and hence limit freedom of action. One can also opt for habituated acts which constitute an increase of freedom. The higher the spirituality of personal life the less causally predictable are its choices, because as the spirituality of life increases its choices refer less to the antecedents of action and more to moral goals in relation to which decisions are taken.

The terror of our moral life is that we are responsible for the ways in which we condition ourselves. The terms 'thy law' and 'my heart' in the Christologically interpreted text to which I referred point in part to the causal and volitional elements of our experience. The dependable world of which we are a part is real, and our choices which can determine whether things go this way or that are real. We are responsible for

the right use of life but once we have made choices we cannot always control the course of events which ensues. This is due to our inability to see the ends of our actions fully and clearly.

For men as spiritual beings the world should become increasingly transparent to thought. Then we will know more fully what the effects of our choices are and will therefore be able to make them with greater freedom. In our Lord's life we note his self-conscious purpose to do the Father's will: 'neither came I of myself, but he sent me' (John viii. 42; vii. 28-29). This purpose issues from an inner core of righteousness where knowledge of the will of God and positive response to that will unite: 'my meat is to do the will of him that sent me, and to finish his work' (John iv. 34). Our Lord's life powers and the powers of the world around him were put into captivity to the will of the Father. He knew fully what he did: 'the works which the Father hath given me to finish, the same works that I do, bear witness of me, that the Father hath sent me' (John v. 36; ix. 4).

The Christian doctrine of grace is relevant to our discussion at this point because grace means that the relations between God and the world are personal and moral. Through grace God remains God and man can be free. The Christian revelation claims in part that God is fashioning a race of free men and women who in co-operation with their Maker will maximize goodness in the universe. Men are value-creating creatures. Their acts should increase not decrease freedom.

The uneasy tension between man's lower and higher self will not, I believe, be cured by chemical means alone, though we look forward to the day when more is known and more can be done about man's brain and some of his tendencies. Fundamentally, man needs a transformation of his inner life. In Christ this redemption is provided by God not only through the death on the Cross but also in the perfection of our Lord's normative humanity. To be truly spiritual involves the capacity to decide rightly. Put into common language it means knowing fully what one is doing. This calls for an increase of our scientific knowledge of the world as well as for the redemption and re-direction of our capacities and interests so as to use all our knowledge according to God's will.

Conclusion

The individual person exists only in community with other persons. Our personality is in part the product of interpersonal relations, therefore our liberty must be subsumed under the laws of God to have regard for the use of the world and of our relations with others for the highest ends. This is in part the significance of the one and the many in the Church conceived of as ecclesia and as soma. In the New Testament there are no granular Christians because they are all members of a body which functions under Christ its head. The same applies to the highest levels of interdependent family life (Eph. v. 22-33). Interdependent personal life is expressed in Scripture ultimately in the trinitarian life of God which life Christians are called to share. The prayer of our Lord in John xvii. concerns distinct selves in the unity of interdependent life. Here I find the clearest biblical definition of unity which also demands full recognition of the ultimate value of discrete personal life: 'I in them and thou in me, that they may be perfect in one . . . that they may all be one; as thou, Father, are in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us'.

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R. E. D. CLARK, M.A., Ph.D.

The Origin of Life*

The beginnings of life have long constituted a red rag to the atheist bull. Since Darwin's time evolution is supposed to have destroyed the argument for design based on the structure of species but Darwin declined to discuss the origin of life itself, declaring that one might as well discuss the origin of atoms. Atheists awaited the day when the origin of life could be profitably discussed from a materialistic point of view: now they think the day has come.

In his recent book, Professor J. D. Bernal tells us that he has been interested in this subject since his early days. However, the intellectual climate at Cambridge in the '20s and '30s discouraged baseless speculation – Rutherford himself was reputed to have said, 'Don't let me catch anyone talking about the universe in my laboratory!'. So young Bernal kept quiet. In 1922, Oparin – whom Bernal used to meet on his visits to Russia – set the ball rolling and J. B. S. Haldane followed soon after. Both served to whet J. D.'s appetite. Oparin's long essay was soon developed into a book (English edition, 1938) which was translated into many languages and used by the Russians to spread atheism. Haldane returned to the theme in later years.

Oparin's hypotheses took the following form. First organic molecules of biological interest came into existence. This could hardly have happened in the presence of free oxygen – so it was postulated (1936) that the early atmosphere was *reducing* – consisting of methane, ammonia, perhaps hydrogen, etc., with some carbon dioxide and water vapour. With these gases

* Essay Review of J. D. Bernal's *The Origin of Life*, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967, 55s. The subject was last discussed by the Victoria Institute in 1949 by Dr. R. J. C. Harris, *q.v.*

suitable energy sources (radioactivity, electric discharges, ultra-violet light) *do* form such organic molecules as was discovered by Miller (1953), though many other compounds are also formed – about 85 per cent of the organic product formed by sparking in this early work is still unidentified.

Gradually as the materials accumulated the sea thickened to become a ‘primitive soup’ (Haldane). After a time precipitation began in the form of small blobs (*coacervates*). A primitive kind of natural selection then started and gradually the wonder was accomplished!

In his recent book, Professor Bernal sets out to analyse these and other suggestions more critically than has been done before, at least by the atheist school. The result is a not very readable yet interesting book, well illustrated and well documented – marred most unfortunately by a good deal of careless composition and manifest prejudice.

The main text occupies about 200 pages and this is followed by several Appendices (130 pages). In these we may find Oparin’s original paper (1924) now given in English translation for the first time, the early essay by J. B. S. Haldane, a paper by G. Mueller on carbonaceous meteorites, a section by Bernal on generalized crystallography, a bibliography (122 references), a curious set of questions with answers by the author, and a useful glossary. Finally, there is an index.

The author’s method is to develop, first of all, the ‘myth’ of how life *might*, have developed. Three stages are distinguished – biologically interesting molecules are formed, they polymerize, then life and evolution commence. At this stage of the book difficulties are cheerfully dismissed by bold assertion, on the basis of ‘what I say three times is true’. Before Darwinian evolution could commence ‘there must have been a long and slow chemical evolution’; life ‘may and indeed must’ have occurred elsewhere than on earth; ‘the phenomenon of consciousness would be likely to evolve . . . to permit predatory feeding . . .’. With many more ‘musts’ and ‘would-be-likely’s’ the story is complete.

The general picture of the early earth is as follows. For an aeon or so (1 aeon = 10^9 years) after its formation about 4.5 aeons ago, the earth was very hot – or if not physically so, it

was at least 'hot' in the radioactive sense. So life could not start until 1-1.5 aeons had elapsed. The earliest forms of primitive life claimed are dated at 3.1 aeons ago, so the atmosphere must then have been reducing and life was confined to extremely small organisms which gained their energy by the equivalent of fermentation. About 0.7 aeons ago the atmosphere became oxidizing as a result of photosynthesis and morphological evolution took a sudden leap forward.

Professor Bernal is, of course, too good a scientist to leave the subject here. In the past, he says, 'there has been altogether too much slurring over the present difficulties in the study of the origin of life' (page 193). So in the chapters which follow, he discusses some of the difficulties and objections which have been advanced.

How did life start? There are formidable difficulties at every stage. Is it true after all that the conditions on the early earth were reducing - say after the first aeon when radioactivity had subsided? Much evidence points the other way. Ultra-violet light must have decomposed water to give oxygen (converted to ozone) and hydrogen - which escaped into space. The ozone layer came close down to the surface. It oxidized the early rocks turning them red. 'It must be admitted that the positive evidence for the existence of a reducing atmosphere on the earth [in the early days] is very slender and controversial at that' (page 123).

Let that pass. Suppose amino acids were formed in sufficient quantity for life to start, and that they remained undecomposed by the ozone and ultra-violet light. Various calculations for the concentration of the 'primitive soup' then give 0.1 per cent (Hull) and 25 per cent (Urey). Bernal himself thinks that some protection might have been afforded by adsorption on mud, but agrees that he has few followers in this. Hardly an encouraging start.

A living organism depends on the presence of enzymes which are proteins. But reproduction depends on nucleotides (DNA, etc.). The mechanisms by which DNA produces messenger-RNA, which in turn and in a different locality in the cell, produces enzymes, is highly complex. But which started first? The nucleotides or the enzymes? Proteins are not self-repro-

ducing, so it must have been the nucleotides. But if so, how did natural selection start? Suppose some of the nucleic acid spirals were more fit to survive than others, then perhaps we could imagine that they would have improved themselves? But they would not be organisms and, in any event, they would soon run out of the chemicals needed to make themselves. Some mechanism would have to evolve in order for the nucleic acid code to create the organism and natural selection would have to operate upon the organism and not upon the nucleic acids which are the mechanisms responsible for the reproduction. The problem fairly bristles with difficulties. What has Bernal to say about this? He is clearly confused: he leaves no clear picture in the mind as to what possible ways around the difficulty might be open; but, honest man, he apologizes for his vagueness!

The general gist of the argument is that the living organism – even of the simplest kind – is so complex that it could not have started at all in its present form, or anything remotely resembling that form. So we must ask first of all, how much simpler organisms, much simpler than is biochemically rather than morphologically, came into existence. But there is no clear evidence that they ever existed at all. So we are called upon to explain *something*, but we do not quite know what.

Now the difficulty, really, is to explain not the sophisticated system of today but any unsophisticated system that might have preceded it. Such argumentation necessarily involves postulation of proto-systems, proto-enzymes, proto-coenzymes and proto-nucleic acids. This in itself is objected to on the grounds that, following Occam's Razor, we have no right to multiply systems without reason. Here I think we have a reason, but the reason only allows us to postulate a system, it does not tell us precisely what system to postulate. Here, again, we must admit that we have to diverge considerably from what has been accepted as a scientific method in the past (p. 147).

Difficulties continue to come thick and fast. For instance, seeing how rarely the correct combinations of atoms must have come about in order to form the theoretically simplest self-reproducing system that could exist – the complexity of which can be dubiously calculated – a period *vastly* longer than a few aeons would apparently be required. How then did it all

happen so quickly? Again, what about the formation of the first nucleated cell? Here matters 'are even less satisfactory' (p. 133). Yet again, why is it that, despite all the interesting synthetic experiments of recent years, no one has been able to form a fat using electric sparks? But never mind. It will all come straight in the end. 'As long as we can count on finding some part of our picture of the world that cannot be understood, a way can always be found for divine interventions' (p. 141).

Thus, in chapter after chapter, Bernal shows how vast is our ignorance, how difficult it is to line up the no-life to life transition with what we know of biochemistry and physics. Many, in fact most, of these difficulties are new: no one ever guessed that the materialistic picture would be so difficult to piece together. From all of which Bernal draws a quite startling conclusion: 'The region of the mysterious is rapidly shrinking. Enough is known, at any rate, to know (*sic*) that the old explanations cannot possibly be right'. And so we are invited to admire Engels for his 'intuition' that 'life is the mode of motion of albumens' (p. 172) but to be scornful of 'explanations in terms of creator gods or life forces' which 'are soon seen to be tautological expressions of ignorance'. The fact is that Bernal makes no bones about his Marxist sympathies but has no use for Christian nonsense, for even for what are loosely called 'Christian values' which must often be opposed strenuously in order to bring in a happy godless world. Death troubles him a little – but perhaps it won't be very long before we learn the trick of not growing old (p. 178). Also there is much disharmony in our present non-Marxist world but 'once the potentialities of an evolving universe are fully, or even partially, grasped by the whole of mankind' we shall all co-operate happily and war will be no more (p. 180).

The book is beautifully produced and no misprints were noted. But it is odd that Professor Bernal sometimes slips up on matters of fact – even at quite an elementary level. It is not true that Giordano Bruno died merely for believing in a plurality of worlds (p. 174): he was indicted for many much more serious charges. Hebrews 11:1 does not equate faith with 'pure wishful thinking' (p. 166). It is untrue to say that 'Wöhler had

already shown by his experiments in 1828 that urea could be produced from inorganic materials' (p. 21) – he made no such claim and his starting point was *organic*. The statement that enzymes merely speed up changes 'which would occur spontaneously in any case' (p. 61) is misleading and, in general, false. 'The Reverend Dr. Paley' did not set forth 'the argument for divine creation and maintenance of the world' in his *Evidence for Christianity* as stated on p. 141, but in another book. The argument about entropy on p. 151, in which it is said that the 'very low entropy' of an organism is matched by an even lower entropy of a crystal is irrelevant and misleading. The formula for glutamine on p. 331 is incorrect and it is obviously not a misprint. It hardly seems justified to say that the Red Spot on Jupiter 'must' be caused by 'further synthetic processes' involving carbon and nitrogen compounds – Wildt's explanation (metals and ammonia) is surely worthy of mention.

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Why Theology?

It may at first sight seem strange to connect the word theology with the Synoptic Gospels at all. The word theology has suggestions of abstruse thinking, recondite speculation, elaborate statement, erudite terminology, which all seem far removed from the apparent simplicities of the Synoptic Gospels. The leaders of the Jews called the early disciples 'uneducated and common men' (Acts iv. 13; AV, 'ignorant and unlettered men'). It must be remembered that when they so described them they were not thinking of them as totally illiterate. What they were saying was that these disciples were laymen with no technical religious knowledge and with no theological education. It is not to say that they were unable to read or write; it is to say that they were not theologians as the Rabbis were.

It is true that in the Synoptic Gospels there is no carefully and comprehensively wrought out scheme of theology; and it is equally true to say that Jesus was not a systematic theologian in the technical sense of the term. But what does theology basically mean? To have a theology is to have a coherent and consistent view of God, man and the world. The Stoics defined philosophy as 'knowledge of things human and divine and their causes' (Marcus Aurelius 3.1.5; Sextus Empiricus, *Math.* 9.13; Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* 333; Cicero, *De Off.* 2.5 - *sapientia rerum divinarum and humanarum causarumque scientia*: Cicero, *Tusc.* 4.57; 5.7; Seneca, *Ep.* 89.5 - *sapientia est nosse divina et humana et horum causas*). Just so Quintilian demands of the orator a knowledge of things human and divine (*Inst.* 12.2.8). Jurisprudence is defined as 'the knowing of things human and divine and the knowledge of that which is just and unjust' (Ulpian *Dig.* 1.1.10.2; Justinian, *Instit.* 1.1.1.).

Knowledge of things human and divine, knowledge of God and man stand closely and indeed inextricably connected. Minucius Felix has it: 'Things are so coherent, so closely com-

bined and interconnected, that, without careful consideration of the nature of the deity you cannot know that of man' (*Octavius* 17.2).

In this sense the Synoptic Gospels are clearly theological documents, and Jesus had a theology, for they and he most certainly proceed on a coherent and consistent view of God, man and the world. It is our task to penetrate behind the unsystematic words of the Gospels to the basic truths which lie behind them.

The study of theology is always attended by two dangers.

i. There is the danger of being too critical, too analytical, too detached, the danger of treating the whole study as no more than an intellectual exercise and adventure. Beatrice Webb, later Lady Passmore, looking back on the studies and the discussions of the Fabian Society, used to speak of 'the stimulus of the mental hike'. There is the danger of looking on the whole enterprise as no more than a fascinating and intellectually exciting mental hike.

It is repeatedly insisted that we must study the New Testament as we would study any other book, that we must submit it to the same critical analysis and to the same acid tests, to the same detailed examination, and to the same stringent investigation. With that insistence everyone will be in total agreement. But there are two things to be said about it.

(a) First, religion and revelation cannot be separated. Therefore, theology for the Christian is the study of what is given – a fact to which we shall return. The Christian believes not only in the necessity of thought but also in the fact of revelation. The Christian theologian is free to move, but to move within a given area, although that area may be very wide. He is not spinning ideas out of his own head, as a spider spins its web. He is applying his mind to that which is given. Theology is thought exercised on revelation.

(b) Second, although we must study the New Testament with the same methods as any other book, we do not study it for the same purpose as any other book. The object of study is quite different. Other books may be studied for the information they may bring; they may be studied for their historical interest; they may be studied for their intrinsic beauty. But the New

Testament is studied by the Christian because it is for him the supreme rule of faith and life. It is through it that the Christian looks for the saving power of God, and it is in it that he finds his rule of life. He studies this book in order to act on this book. He studies it because it has in it that which it itself calls life. It must never be forgotten that for the New Testament truth is that which must be done as well as that which must be known. The Fourth Gospel speaks of the man who *does* the truth (John iii. 21). The method of study will be the same, but clearly the object of study is different.

This will mean that when we approach the study of New Testament theology we have to do so with a certain attitude of mind. We will not be content with intellectual activity and acrobatics, with mental research, with academic discipline – although all these things will necessarily have their place. We shall be concerned with the divine values which lie behind all these things, and we shall remember that the final end of this is commitment to that which we discover. We are concerned not only to know the truth but also to do and to accept the truth. Long ago Origen made a remark about the study of the Fourth Gospel. He said that no one could understand the Fourth Gospel unless, like the John of the Fourth Gospel, he had lain upon the breast of his Lord. In the study of New Testament theology, devotion has to be added to strenuous mental activity. We may well remember that in the Pastoral Epistles the writer – Paul or another – says, not, ‘I know *what* I have believed’, but, ‘I know *whom* I have believed’ (2 Tim. i. 12). At the end of the search there lies a person.

J. S. Whale quotes a saying of Melancthon, the friend of Luther, and himself no mean theologian: ‘To know Christ is not to speculate about the mode of his Incarnation, but to know his saving benefits’. And Dr. Whale himself goes on to say:

‘You may spend years on the sacred texts, the wearisome minutiae of linguistic and archaeological study, the arguments about the deepest things by which men live. But by studying these facts it is easy to lose the life which alone gives them unity and meaning . . . The mind may labour with great concepts such as those of the Trinity in unity, but the whole man cries out for the living God. As Luther put it, “He

who merely studies the commandments of God (*mandata dei*) is not greatly moved. But he who listens to God commanding (*deum mandantem*), how can he fail to be terrified by majesty so great?"

It is precisely the failure to remember this that has sometimes, not altogether unjustly, brought theology into disrepute as an arid and unprofitable discipline. It has always been claimed that theology is the Queen of the Sciences, but it was possible for Reuchlin, speaking of the theologians of the University of Cologne in the 18th century, to call them 'a species of most inhuman men who call themselves theologians'. Erasmus, speaking of the same type of mind and approach wrote: 'The life time of a man is not enough for these pseudo-questions and useless labyrinths of subtleties. When shall we find out what the Christian life is, if octogenarians have learned only to doubt?' Dr. Whale himself has described the attitude of mind which is not uncommon, and which is fatal to real theological study: 'Instead of putting off our shoes from off our feet, because the place whereon we stand is holy ground, we are taking nice photographs of the burning bush from suitable angles; we are chatting about theories of the Atonement with our feet on the mantelpiece instead of kneeling down before the wounds of Christ.'

This is an attitude with which we are familiar, and which we must try to avoid.

ii. There is the opposite danger of the attitude which is the opposite of that which we have been describing. There is the attitude which sees theology as the affair of the pedants and the pundits, but as of no importance at all to the ordinary man. To some extent – although now to a lesser extent – this has been the attitude in Germany. Norman Perrin writes (*The Kingdom of God in the Teaching of Jesus*, p. 35): 'For Germany theological discussion has been, and up to a point still is, the province of the academically trained theologian rather than that of the general lay member of the Church.' This he contrasts with the situation in Britain and in America. It may well be that herein is the very reason why German theology has always been regarded as the essence of the abstruse and the unintelligible.

But, if it is dangerous to see theology as nothing but intel-

lectual exercise, it is at least as dangerous to empty the religious life of all intellectual content altogether. It is fatal for any Church to begin to regard theology as the affair of the expert.

There is always a paradox and a tension in religion. Certainly, God, just because he is God, is unknowable. And equally certainly, God, just because he is God, must be known because man cannot do without him. So Dr. Whale writes: 'Christian testimony which raises no questions for the heart does raise them for the thought . . . They may be insoluble, but not to tackle them would mean intellectual suicide . . . We are meant to serve God with the mind, even where the mind is impotent to compass ultimate and ineffable mysteries. The obligation to be intelligent is a moral obligation.'

There is an even deeper reason than that why a faith must be a thought-out faith. That which is superficially held is easily lost. Unless a faith has been thought out and thought through, it will be in serious danger of complete collapse when the devastating experiences of life descend upon it. To be possessed it must be possessed by the whole man. A faith which is based on no more than an emotional experience is almost inevitably an impermanent thing, because it is characteristic of emotion to cool. Faith to be real must be the result of the combination of the activity of mind and heart. Harold Loukes wrote:

'No man is safe without faith, in the sense of an underlying view of life which offers him a means of interpreting the chaos of experience, a guide that, like the scientist's theory, tells him where to look, and what to pay attention to, a point of reference to which he can turn in his doubts.'

Faith then is based on certain certainties, and certainties are not attainable except by the effort of the whole man.

Quite as dangerous as the basing of faith on emotional experience is the making of it the glib repetition of conventional words and phrases, learned at second-hand. When a man is speaking or teaching or arguing, if anyone stops him and asks him, 'What do you mean by that?', he should be able to give an answer, and an answer which is his own.

There are two very significant passages in the New Testament which deal with the relationship of men to Jesus Christ. At Caesarea Philippi Jesus asked his disciples who men were

saying that he was. They told him that the popular verdict was that he was John the Baptist, or Elijah, or one of the prophets. Then there comes the second question: 'But who do *you* say that I am?' (Mark viii. 27-30). The implication is clear. It is not enough to repeat what others have said about Jesus Christ. There must be a personal thinking out and a personal discovery. Again, when Jesus was on trial before Pilate, Pilate asked him: 'Are you the king of the Jews?' Jesus answered: 'Do you say this of your own accord, or did others say it to you about me?' (John xix. 33f.). The implication is the same. Any verdict on Jesus must be a verdict at which a man has himself arrived, and not something which he merely repeats on the authority of someone else.

It is clear that the discipline and the adventure of personal thought are essential, and obligatory. All through the study of theology it is necessary to remember that such study is more than an intellectual exercise, and that yet at the same time it must exercise the mind to the limits to which the mind can go.

We must go on now to define still further the necessity for theological study. First, let us again define theology, and in particular let us try to see wherein it, as it were, differs from religion. R. A. Ward defines theology as follows:

'Theology is reflection upon the divine revelation given and received, which yields the truth of God in the form of precise language, with truths related to truths.'

Theology then consists of the exercise of the human mind upon the material given by God. The difference then between religion and theology has been well put thus - in religion God is always 'Thou', in theology God is always 'He'. In religion God is a person to be encountered; in theology God is a truth to be known.

Paul Tillich has said: 'Every religion must have its *gnosis*.' Every religion must have that activity in which revelation and experience are passed through the mind, and are thus stated, formulated, understood, interpreted and appropriated.

i. Theology is necessary to satisfy the mind. Long ago Plato said that the unexamined life is the life not worth living; and it is equally true that the unexamined faith is the faith not worth having. No untested thing can be trusted. This is true of

material things. A bridge will be submitted to the most stringent tests before the passage of traffic is entrusted to it; and a faith must be submitted to equally demanding tests before a life can be entrusted to it.

Sydney Cave has said that there are three moments in Christian experience and in Christian theology. First, there is the moment of *revelation*, when a man encounters and is confronted with the truth. Second, there is the moment of *appropriation*, when a man takes into his own life the results of the truth revealed. Third, there is the moment of *intellectual interpretation*, when a man seeks to understand the why and the how of the experience which he has had.

An analogy has been suggested from another area of knowledge. Take the case of a flower. There is first the existence of the flower; that is revelation. There is second the seeing of the beauty and the smelling of the perfume of the flower; that is appropriation. Third, there is the science of botany which examines and classifies and defines the flower; that is intellectual interpretation. And in this analogy another truth yet emerges. Without that last section, without the science of botany, the flower can neither be properly cultivated, reproduced and perhaps developed into something still more beautiful and still more useful.

It is true that there are some people who can and do quite properly halt at the end of the second of these two stages. There are people who are content to see and to enjoy the flower without becoming botanists. And there are people who are content to know and to appropriate the saving benefits of God in Jesus Christ without the further step of interpretation.

I once listened to a lecture by Paul Tillich of great brilliance but of great obscurity. After it in conversation I said to him: 'Did you really expect everyone to understand what you have just been saying?' 'Oh no,' he answered. 'Well then,' I said, 'am I to understand that you are advocating a kind of new gnosticism in which religion is for the intellectual élite and in which the simple ordinary people have no part? Are you advocating a faith on two levels, one for the intellectual aristocrat and one for the intellectual peasant?' 'Oh no,' he said again. I asked him to explain. 'Well,' he said, 'it is like this. The truths of religion

are simple and can be grasped and appropriated by the simplest and the most childlike mind. What is difficult is the conceptualization of these truths.' This is completely true. Anyone can grasp and accept the offer of God in Jesus Christ, just as anyone can see and smell the flower. It is when you move to the intellectual task of understanding, formulating, interpreting, systematizing that the thing becomes difficult.

Then why bother? Why must someone undertake this impossible task? We have seen that, however keen be the pleasure given by the flower to the uninstructed, the science of botany is still necessary for the reproduction and the development of the flower. The same thing holds good in theology. Wherein then lie the special necessities for theology? Why is it necessary that, not everyone, but at least someone must undertake the adventure and the discipline of theological thought?

ii. Theology is necessary for teaching and for apologetic purposes. Phillips Brooks said: 'Doctrine is truth considered with reference to being taught.' There are two inter-related areas here.

(a) Truth has not only to be appropriated; it has also to be transmitted. It has to be shared with others, and it has to be passed down from generation to generation. It is impossible to transmit an experience; but it is possible to transmit a body of truth.

In any science and in any craft both the knowledge and the technique have to be reduced to a system and handed on. Both the theory and the practice of the thing have to be taught and learned. If we are going to pass on the Christian faith to the next generation, and if we are going to communicate it to this generation, there needs to be a body of truth to be passed on and to be communicated. True, it will not remain static, for truth is alive and not fossilized. It will grow and it will develop, but the basic and essential principles will remain the same. The internal combustion engine of today is a very much more complicated affair than the internal combustion engine of even thirty years ago; but its development is due to the fact that the principles which govern it were discovered and set down and systematized and passed on. That which has to be taught has first to be systematized; and it is so with Christian truth.

(b) But the faith has not only to be transmitted; it has also to be defended. It will always be subject to critical argument and to attack. If it is to be defended, it must be known. The argument of the opponent must be met with the argument of the Christian. This is precisely what Peter said to his converts: 'Always be prepared to make a defence to anyone who calls you to account for the hope that is in you' (I Peter iii. 15). Further, that defence must be an intelligent defence. There is no point in trying to close an argument with a quotation from Scripture or with the declaration, 'The Bible says', if we happen to be arguing with a man who does not accept the authority of the Bible at all.

It is not sufficiently realized that the preaching of the early Church was not the monologue which preaching has become; it was essentially a dialogue. Again and again the words *argue* and *dispute* appear in the narrative of Acts. People in the synagogue in Jerusalem arose and disputed with Stephen and could not withstand the wisdom and Spirit with which he spoke (Acts vi. 9f.). Very soon after his conversion Paul was preaching in the synagogue in Damascus and confounding the Jews by proving that Jesus was the Messiah (Acts ix. 22). So in Jerusalem on his first visit Paul proclaimed, spoke and disputed (Acts ix. 29). He argued in the synagogue at Thessalonica (Acts xvii. 2). He did the same at Athens (Acts xvii. 17). At Corinth he argued daily in the hall of Tyrannus (Acts xix. 9). Of course, this was easy in the Jewish synagogue in which there was no one person to preach the sermon, and in which anyone who had a message to give was free to give it, and where there was time to discuss the matter afterwards. But the opportunity for argument still plentifully exists; and to enter into a contest with an opponent with no equipment in what Christianity really says and means is to enter a fight naked and unarmed and doomed to defeat. The man who would defend the faith must know the faith, and he must know it in a way in which he has thought it out and not like a parrot repeating by heart conventional phrases. Harold Loukes speaks of the danger of traditional testimony when it becomes 'a way of avoiding thought'. 'To abide by a testimony may be simply to have our minds made up for us.' E. F. Scott has said that, oftener than we think, the

failure of Christianity as a moral force is due to no other cause than intellectual sloth.

The man who would defend the faith in a world which is often indifferent and sometimes hostile must know not only what Christianity says, but also why it says it and what it means, which is simply to say that he must have a theology.

iii. Theology is necessary as a test and touchstone. Every voluntary association of people is in one sense necessarily an exclusive body. People who come into it have to accept its rules and its regulations and its principles, and, if they will not, they cannot become or remain members of it. This is to say that any Church has to define, express, set out, and explain its beliefs. This is the work of the theologian. Brunner has said that the work of the theologian is comparable to the work of the analytical chemist. The analytical chemist tests the food which is offered for sale, and only if it passes his test can it be offered for sale, and, if it is submitted to his test, and fails to pass it, it stands condemned. It is impossible to separate preaching and theology. Behind the preaching stands the theology. Theology does not necessarily give the expression of preaching, but it does give the content of it. No preacher is entitled to preach what he likes, unless he likes to found a Church of his own. And that is precisely why a Church must have its theology and its theologians.

iv. We may add one further point, and in our present situation it is a point of very considerable importance. It is impossible to have an ethic without a theology. Theology and ethics cannot be separated. A man acts in a certain way because he thinks in a certain way. Thought ultimately determines action.

Let us take the most obvious of all examples. In any society a man will be treated in accordance with what he is assumed and believed to be. In the society contemporary with the New Testament a slave was a thing; he was classified as a living tool; it was perfectly legal for his master to beat him, imprison him, starve him, torture him and even kill him. He only differed from cattle and oxen in that he could speak. He could be dispensed with and literally thrown out as an outworn spade or hoe or plough was discarded, when it was past its work. This was the standard and natural way to treat a slave – and a slave is a man. Set beside that the famous story of Muretus the

wandering scholar of the Middle Ages. He was very poor. Penniless and ill he was once in a pauper's institution. The doctors did not think that he was really conscious and still less did they know that this apparently wretched creature could speak the scholar's Latin. Let him die, they said. He is only a worthless creature, a *vile corpus*. Whereat Muretus murmured in the same Latin: 'Call no man worthless for whom Christ died.' The moment you introduce the Christian theology the whole status of man as man is changed, and with that change the whole ethic of the relationship of man to man is altered.

A man's idea of God will decide what that man is like. Belief in a savage God will beget a merciless man; belief in a God of love ought to produce a man of love. Ethics and theology are inextricably bound together. For the preservation and defence of the Christian Faith, for the continuance and the communication of the Christian Faith, for the sanction of the Christian ethic, theology is essential.

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Can we recognize a Miracle?

My question is not that of belief but that of knowledge, not whether miracle or a miracle is credible but whether we could know a miracle if we met one. My thesis is that so long as a miracle was defined as a breach of the natural order it was at least theoretically possible to identify an event as one, whereas as soon as the definition ceased to be acceptable the means of recognition to which it lent support also ceased to be admissible. Since it becomes impossible to say what shall count as a miracle the question of credence is not even reached. Neither confidence nor credulity counts for anything if nothing remains to which it may attach. My conclusion is that if faith is to stand it must stand on the proposition that the objects of faith are not discernible but revealed. Miracle is not merely primarily but exclusively a religious category. To attempt to define miracle scientifically is nonsense.

The question may be approached from a number of directions but the route of the answer is always the same.

I. Is a miracle logically possible?

It was once thought possible to identify a miracle as a breach, transgression or suspension of invariant laws of nature. The possibility was parasitic on the doctrine of the *a priori* uniformity of nature. With the overthrow of that dogma a basic method of selection is lost.

Before the rise of modern science candidates could be selected by rule of thumb. Every marvel was *prima facie* a miracle. Anything abnormal qualified in the preliminary sorting. The

scientific outlook reduced all phenomena so the rule of law and miracle came to be defined as a violation or interruption of that rule. A miracle was an exception begging for an exceptional explanation.

This view has at least the merit of furnishing a ready means of identification and that of immediately provoking an explanation viz., that the Law-giver was over-riding or suspending the ordinary operation of his laws. So long as the laws of nature were conceived after the manner of positive enactments, the decrees or statutes of cosmic administration imposed upon events in advance of their occurrence and exacting their obedience prescriptive rather than descriptive, transgressions of the code could be conceived as counter-enactments. On this footing miracles were indicative of God's continuing legislative action.

But the emphasis on prescription bred the doctrine of a necessity laid upon wants, and consequently the dogma of the logical impossibility of miracle. Hume assumed the dogma but was too shrewd to try to prove it. 'A miracle is a visitation of the laws of nature, and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined'. J. S. Mill was more rash and couched the doctrine in explicit terms but begged the question by universal terms like 'invariable' or 'hitherto unvarying'. T. H. Huxley, the agnostic, objected to Hume's definition because, he wrote, it implied that 'that which never has happened never can happen without a violation of the laws of nature', whereas we are never in a position to assert so much. Hume, he thought, cheated by making the impossibility of miracles done by definition. There is no 'must' about 'fact'.

The modern statistical, probabilistic view of scientific laws has overthrown the dogma. Anything may happen. But the loss of certitude is double-edged. We cannot be certain a miracle can never happen but equally we cannot be sure we could spot one if it did. Miracles have lost their distinguishing badges and insignia. An event which does not call for the shoulders of a legion of angels suddenly loses its significance; but more than that, it becomes peculiarly unobtrusive, unnoticed. And the

unknown and unnoticed can evoke neither belief nor disbelief.

II. Is a miracle historically feasible?

This is the same question, in the context now not of scientific knowledge but of historical knowledge. The question extends beyond that of credibility to that of feasibility. Once it has shifted from 'Could it happen?' to 'Did it happen?' there is no stopping at 'What is the evidence?', for immediately the next question bounds into view, 'Is it feasible?' And this makes the problem of recognition that much harder.

There simply are no criteria for dealing with an event unlike any other, unique. We just lack the equipment to digest, absorb, assimilate the totally exceptional into our ordering of experience. The difficulty lies not in the admission of the evidence but in the assessment and evaluation of it. The real problem is to know what would count for an absolutely unique event. We cannot even get an argument for acceptance or rejection off the ground because we do not know what of the evidence available constitutes data, warrants for data, warrants for warrants and so on. Pure logical possibility is merely a pre-condition for the empirical possibility. Non-self-contradiction is not a *prima facie* case for a miracle but only clears the road to the practical question, 'Is this solution to be taken seriously' or 'Is this conclusion, given the evidence, a feasible one?'

My point is not whether miracle is more or less believable but whether it is true that escape from the demand for logical compatibility makes recognition any easier. T. H. Huxley has a telling illustration in his criticism of Hume. If, he says, a person said he saw a piebald horse (let's say now a Red Arrow bus) in Piccadilly I would believe without hesitation; if he said a zebra (shall we say a hovercraft?) I would hesitate and test his previous experience; if he claimed to have seen a centaur (how about a flying saucer or a magic carpet?) I would emphatically decline to credit his statement. Huxley is not returning to a demand for logical possibility. His argument purports to rest on the undogmatic conformity of present with past experience; but its true base is sheer practicality. If something is just not feasible we cannot surmount our doubt or disbelief any more

than we can drink brackish water against the stomach. If that something were an alleged miracle we should be unable to see it because we could not begin to believe what did not make some sort of sense.

We do not question whether, in Huxley's parable, the witness (or the record) is honest or 'telling the truth', but whether he knows what he is talking about.

III. Is a miracle theoretically explicable?

If we cannot assign a cause does it immediately follow that God did it? Or are there other alternatives? My doubt at this point is whether we could distinguish a supernatural from a natural cause assuming we could discriminate the latter.

Our difficulty is that we do not know the limits of human power or the ordinary powers of nature. Even assuming we had some way of labelling the candidates for explanation by reference to supernatural causes we could not take the immediate step of attributing them to acts of God. Miracles don't come already tagged or labelled like ringed birds.

Possible alternative explanations might be that the event under consideration was a highly complex natural event, some kind of uncaused event, an impersonal event (i.e. one attributable to a cause rather than an agent, in effect rather an act), the act of some superhuman but subdivine agent, or sheer surd.

Confidently to attribute an event to the personal intervention of God we need to have some idea of what an act of God would be like in advance of the event. The nearest we can get is to say, 'If I had arranged this I would have done it thus.' But as soon as we start qualifying (to allow for a wider ongoing context) and specifying (to get at the presumed *sine qua non*) we get lost.

IV. Is a miracle theologically distinguishable?

The problem here is finding a yardstick for distinguishing the ordinary and the extraordinary activity of God. If God is acting all the time what is it about a miracle that makes it differ? The problem is the old theological problem of the relation between general and special providence.

We may put it this way. If nature is to be regarded as an organic expression of divine creativity the traditional distinction between general and special providence becomes blurred. Suppose it is legitimate to regard the regularities of nature as analogous to those parts, aspects or functions of the psycho-neural system which not only operate below its threshold of consciousness but also are more primitive than the brain system (breathing, blinking, coughing, etc.); and miracles as superventious like *controlled* breathing, etc. Have we any way of knowing what events are habitual (involuntary) and what deliberate (voluntary) to God? The analogy is a crude one and breaks down on functions such as heartbeat which are not within the control of the subject. But it serves well enough to point the utter impossibility of earmarking miracles by reference to Divine ascription. In order to attribute an action to a person, to hold him responsible in any way for it, one must have some idea already what it is to be a person and to have purposes expressed and executed in action. We have such a concept and we can ascribe actions to persons in an intra-mundane context, but we reach far beyond our ordinary ideas of personhood when we attempt to go beyond the naturalistic description of an event and attribute it to a supra-mundane agency.

V. Is a miracle religiously warrantable?

Have we a cleaver to sunder genuine from spurious, authentic from inauthentic, authorized from unauthorized miracles?

Many apologists abandoned the attempt to locate miracles theologically by a fix from a preconceived doctrine of God and tried instead to isolate some miracle stories as of especial religious value.

The difficulty is that miracle stories are found both within and outside the Canon, both in the past and in the present. Moreover now miracles are recorded in writings, indistinguishable in form from the general legendary and mythological material of the animistic stage of culture. The old deist jibe was that the miracle stories were a product of priestcraft, invented by custodians of the sacred to hold the gullible in thrall. That theory won't hold water. We now know that the genre is native

to a certain cultural milieu. But now the problem is that if that general cultural background is valid against miracle, if the expectation of finding miracle stories in a certain kind of literature is a *prima facie* case against miracle, is it valid within as well as outside the Canon? And if it is so valid, how do we choose between those within and those without, and, assuming we find reasons for accepting those within in preference to those without, can we go on to discriminate between those within?

Some apologists have sought to erect a religious test of coherence or congruity with previous revelation. Something like this test (congruity with the Torah of Yahweh) is used by the writers of Deuteronomy and Jeremiah who wish to divide true and false prophets. There are difficulties. In the first place the test would have been inapplicable to the first recorded miracle and could only be put into effect once a set had built up. Once membership of the class has grown there arises an interference element in what information theorists call 'noise'. Furthermore no classification of the miracle stories in either the Old or the New Testament is entirely satisfactory. Some – the iron floating on the water, and the fish swallowing a stater – are axiologically problematic. If the class boundary is indeterminate and the membership not uniform or homogeneous, admission to or exclusion from the club becomes problematic. The truth is that this congruity test presupposes an external measure, extrinsic to the category, which authenticates candidates and authorizes admission.

VI. Does miracle produce belief or belief miracle?

Must we then conclude that miracle is primarily, essentially or exclusively a religious category? That miracles are not evidences of God, or credentials of a prophet, themselves seem to need the testimony of the Spirit.

Locke objected to the usual definition of a miracle current in his time ('an extraordinary operation performable by God alone') on the ground that we lack knowledge both as to the powers of nature and as to other spiritual beings than God. Instead he defined a miracle as 'a sensible operation which, being above the comprehension of the spectator, and in his

opinion contrary to the established course of nature, is taken by him to be divine'. He drew the conclusion that 'it is unavoidable that what is miracle to one will not be to another'. Locke laid stress on the subjective element in miracle as against the objective aspect and the transobjective reference viz., God

What we need is a definition which will take in all three. I propose 'An extraordinary and striking event taken by the believer in God to be a special disclosure of His power and purpose'. By that definition miracle is exclusively a religious category. The fact that an event identified as a miracle may or may not be susceptible of scientific description is not its *differentia*, nor indeed either necessary or unnecessary to its classification. On this footing a miracle is not something we recognize but is given us to see, is revealed to faith. Flesh and blood do not disclose it to us, but our Father in heaven.

This conclusion may well be unpalatable to the Christian apologist who would hope to extract some proof value from the biblical miracles. But it seems to be the only view in record with the biblical view itself.

LEWIS A. DRUMMOND, PH.D.

Idealism Still Speaks: Some provoking thoughts in the philosophy of C. A. Campbell

Introduction

Since the so-called 'Revolution in Philosophy', many thinkers consider philosophical idealism to be a dead issue. And this attitude is not restricted to the purely philosophical world alone, it has made its impact on the theological scene as well. Yet one wonders, as C. A. Campbell has put it, if it is not true that 'the majority of Idealism's critics are surely in real danger of throwing away the baby with the bath-water . . .'¹ At any rate, it would seem that Professor Campbell, as an idealist, has some very important things to say, at least to those of us who would grant that metaphysical enquiry has some legitimacy. And it would seem mandatory that the serious theologians listen to what he has to relate. May it be stated at the very outset that it is this author's contention that aspects of Campbell's concepts quite well demonstrate that idealism is not to be summarily consigned to the grave. Now if this be true, these issues should be set forth for consideration. This, therefore, shall be the purpose of this paper. Our first consideration shall be:

I. Campbell's starting point

Professor Campbell is frank to admit that 'my starting point is Bradley's epistemology'.² Following Bradlian scepticism, Campbell contends that the ultimate nature of reality is for us 'beyond knowledge'. Ultimate reality in its *final* character cannot be grasped by any process of finite experience. Many facets of human experience support this primary thesis. Cognition, moral action, and religious experience all attest to the idea that reality

¹ C. A. Campbell, *Scepticism and Construction*. (London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., p. ix.)

² *Ibid.*, p. v.

is 'supra-rational'. And as these forms of experience are held by Campbell to be basic to one's being, he feels entitled to say that our very nature obliges us to assert the supra-rational character of ultimate reality. This admitted metaphysical scepticism thus becomes 'the converging point of a variety of independent lines of thought'.³

Of course, metaphysical scepticism is not new or novel in idealistic philosophy. For example, Plotinus, Plato (in his most profound passages), Schelling, and F. H. Bradley all speak in this sceptical tone. Also, a vast multitude of religious mystics, the vedic literature, etc., claim the validity of a supra-rational reality. Yet, the concept is in opposition to the completely rational system of Hegelian idealism. It is well known that the Hegelian Absolute was thoroughly rational, i.e., there is no part of reality that cannot in principle, if not in fact, be realized by rational thought. Now it is this doctrine that Campbell rejects in his supra-rationalism. Campbell's Absolute is 'unknowable', i.e., the rational process of thought cannot, in principle or fact, attain to ultimate reality.

Campbell first argues for a supra-rational reality from the old Bradlian idea that the cognitive judgment implies contradiction. Campbell declares that the judgment, i.e., the essence of all thinking,⁴ is the assertion of 'unity in diversity'. Neither 'unity' nor 'diversity' can be eliminated in predication. Unless there is unity, the terms simply 'fall apart'. Again, unless there is genuine diversity, there is no movement of thought at all. Thinking cannot be expressed in the formula "'A" is "A"'. Therefore, as all thinking must unite differences, the formula "'A" is "B"' is proposed as the true form of cognitive activity.

³ *Ibid.* p. vi. It may be that there are still some who would outright reject at the very start *any* type of metaphysical enquiry on the basis of some version of the verifiability principle. But as often pointed out, this principle is built upon a pre-supposition that it cannot itself verify. Metaphysical enquiries seem a legitimate task to this writer and cannot be considered a meaningless endeavour, at least to those whose epistemological pre-suppositions allow for such knowledge.

⁴ Space precludes Campbell's arguments for the contention that *all* thinking is judgment. Suffice it to say that he argues along quite traditional idealistic lines.

Is "A" is "B" any improvement over "A" is "A", however? To some extent, Campbell tells us, but there are still grave difficulties. It seems obvious to him, that strictly speaking, 'B', as long as it is different from 'A', is 'not "A"'. So the formula actually reads "A" is not "A". Now it is evident that this not only asserts. It annuls at the same time.

Therefore, it would seem that, formally speaking, the uniting of differences produces constant self-contradiction. And by this the intellect is repulsed. Thus the thought process seeks a mediation or system wherein the differentials and the unity of the judgment can be harmonized, i.e., it seeks for a ground to unite the differentials of the judgment into a perfect unity which can alone characterize the real. This alone can satisfy the intellect. But it is a futile effort Campbell contends, for

'. . . although such a unity is the inherent demand of the intellect, and thus needful for the assurance of apprehending ultimate reality, it is a unity that is not attainable by the intellect. And this failure, it will appear, is a failure not merely in degree. It is a failure in principle. For – and this is the central paradox of human experience – the route which the intellect takes, and must take, in its effort to realize its ideal, is one which never can, by reason of its intrinsic character, lead to the desired goal of mutually implicatory system or unity in differences – which never can, therefore, yield us apprehension of the real.'⁵

So the route that the intellect *must* travel can never lead to its goal of a perfect, self-implied whole⁶. Thus it is a path that can never lead to ultimate reality. Consequently, reality must be disparate from every thought product. And the term 'disparate' is to be taken in its fullest sense. Thought and reality are strictly incommensurable. Therefore, one must conclude that:

'Reality owns a character which transcends thought – a character for which, since a label is convenient, we may term 'supra-rational', and there is no possibility of measuring the degree in which any particular content of thought manifests the character of reality.'⁷

This is metaphysical scepticism.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 14–15.

⁶ Campbell argues that it is never evident how the relations are related to the terms. A further ground must be sought and *ad infinitum*.

⁷ Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

Now the problem Campbell must face rests in the fact that the mind *does* assign the terms 'truth' and 'reality' to many of its concepts. And if reality and thought are incommensurable, how is this to be accounted for? Here Campbell employs his own version of the Kantian idea of the 'Noumenal' and 'phenomenal' worlds. Campbell tells us that Noumenal truth, or truth about *Ultimate* reality is unattainable by finite cognition. To attain to this truth would be to transcend one's own finitude. Yet we do live in a practical, phenomenal world, Campbell points out. There is not only the world of 'things-in-themselves', there is also the objective world as actually cognized by us. And this world has its own meaning and criterion of truth.⁸ It is not ultimate or noumenal truth, to be sure. Yet it is 'finally valid for human experience,'⁹ for it is the only kind of truth *concretely known*. Thus an empirical investigation of our phenomenal world is well in order. Still, one must always bear in mind

'. . . the distinction between Ultimate or Noumenal Truth, the kind of satisfaction which the intellect ideally wants, and what may be called Phenomenal truth, the kind of satisfaction at which in practice the intellect can alone significantly aim.'¹⁰

Now this is Campbell's epistemological foundation upon which he builds his system of thought. It must be admitted that many serious objections have been raised to this sceptical principle, but they cannot be presented in this limited space. Neither can defence of Campbell's position be undertaken here. The foregoing is simply presented as the starting point from which Campbell presents the things that seem to be of real importance to him today.

⁸ In contrast to most idealists, Campbell argues that the correspondence theory of truth is the *meaning* of phenomenal truth. Yet he holds with idealism that coherence is the *criterion* of truth. This later view grows out of his insistence upon an 'ideal intermediary' in all finite cognition, thus following Kant.

⁹ Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 82. The similarity between Campbell and Kant are quite clear. This seems to have developed largely because of Campbell's rejection of Bradley's concept of 'degrees of truth'.

Therefore, with this foundation in mind we move on to discuss Campbell's projection of:

II. A Free and Substantial Self

It is well known that 'the question of mind and body is a major crux in modern philosophy.'¹¹ It is also clear that the vast majority of contemporary thinkers follow in broad outline the naturalistic approach as perhaps best epitomized in Gilbert Ryles' *The Concept of the Mind*. But once again Campbell breaks with the concensus of current thought and projects the idea of a substantial self that is at least conceivably separable from the body.

Professor Campbell begins his argument by pointing out that a thinking subject is always to some degree aware of itself. Self-consciousness is a presupposed fact in all cognition. As the cognitive judgment invariably assumes some objective reality, by the same token, it also implies a cognizing subject that is subjectively conscious, however inexplicitly, of itself. Further, this thinking subject must somehow be the *same* subject throughout its varying cognitive experience. To substantiate this contention Campbell declares that cognition is never of the nature of an 'atomic simple'. Any object that is not seen as related to other objects has no significance for the judging mind. Even a 'this' is for cognition a 'this - not that'. 'This' only has meaning as it stands opposed to 'That'.

'What is cognized, then, is never bare A, but always A in some sort of relationship to B (C, D, etc.). But unless the subject to which B (C, D, etc.) is present is the same subject as that to which A is present, no relationship, obviously, could be apprehended between B (C, D, etc.) and A.'¹²

Campbell further feels that cognition implies not only a subject that is identical to itself in all its varying cognitive modes,

¹¹ H. D. Lewis, 'Mind and Body'. Some observations on Mr. Strawson's view. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* (Presidential Address), Volume lxiii. (1962-1963), p. 1.

¹² C. A. Campbell, *On Selfhood and Goodhood*. (London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1957), p. 75.

but one that is also *conscious* of that identity. Consciousness of identity is as vital as the fact of identity, for the apprehension of A and B would still fall into separate worlds of experience if the subject were unaware of his identity in both judgments.

Campbell thus feels that it is safe to say that a cognizing subject is the same subject in all its cognitive modes and is conscious of that identity. Now it is obvious that here an important conclusion can be drawn, for the clear implication of this contention is that the subject self is something ‘“over and above”’ its particular experience; something that has, rather than *is*, its experiences, since its experiences are all different, while *it* remains the same.’¹³ After all, that which is active in cognition can hardly be the activity itself.¹⁴ In a word, the self must be a ‘substance’.

But of what is this identical substantial self an identity? Summarily stated, the self is to be identified with a *conscious* subject. The subject self thinks, feels, and desires. And these are clearly conscious states of mind. Although there are pressing problems concerning the self’s relation to the body, the self as revealed in self-consciousness is at least an identity of mind or spirit. And although it may be discovered that the self is more, Campbell feels one can say that ‘“I” is *at least* a “spiritual substance”’.¹⁵

However, the pressing issue of mind-body relationship must be faced. The question here as Campbell puts it, is:

‘Is the union of body and mind within the self a merely *de facto* union, so that their separation is at least conceivable? Or is it an *essential* union, so that a self which is not an ‘embodied mind’ is not a thinkable conception at all?’¹⁶

In seeking an answer to this query, Professor Campbell appeals to common sense. He declares that ordinary thinking

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

¹⁴ ‘To deny that the self is *reducible* to its experiences is by no means to deny that the self manifests its real character (in whole or in part) *in and through* these experiences’. *On Selfhood and Goodhood*, p. 82.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 85.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

people believe that the question of whether or not the self can survive the destruction of the body is at least an intelligible enquiry. Yet no one would intelligently ask if the self would survive the destruction of the mind. So in ordinary opinions, at least, a mind is viewed as essential to the self in a manner in which the body is not. Moreover, Campbell feels that in such matters, the ideas of the ordinary intelligent man are not to be discredited just because of his lack of sophistication. In such issues as these, there is a sense in which he 'knows what he is talking about'. Thus, summarily stated, Campbell concludes, along with the common man, that the mind is related to the body in a mere *de facto* union, *not* in an essential union.

Still, it must be understood that Campbell views this concept as applying only to the ontological self. It does *not* apply to the self *qua* man. Man *per se* is a biological species as well as a spiritual being. And it is the failure to make the distinction between the ontological self and the self *qua* man that dispose some to say that common sense believes in the essential union of the mind and body.¹⁷

Now the implications of Campbell's concept of the self and his position on the relationship of mind-body have profound significance concerning belief in the idea of 'life after death'. They at least afford an 'abstract possibility' that the self can exist after the death of the body, he tells us. Perhaps an abstract possibility is not as much as some would desire, but at any rate

'. . . it leaves the way open for discussion on their own merits the various ethical and religious considerations bearing upon the problem of immortality, which, so far as I can see, we should be obliged to rule out of court *a priori* if it were indeed the case that any self to *be* a self must be an *embodied* self.'¹⁸

This now paves the way into Campbell's important concepts concerning the freedom of the self. The issue to be faced in this

¹⁷ Space again precludes a detailed presentation of Campbell's arguments against the idea of an essential mind-body union. His quite interesting and convincing polemic against Gilbert Ryles' position is found in the *Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 3 (1953). Of course, Campbell in no way denies that the mind and body react in a cause-effect relationship.

¹⁸ Campbell, *op. cit.*, pp. 102-103.

area of thought is: does the self have genuinely open possibilities in conative action? Of course, absolute idealism is largely a deterministic philosophy in regards to the doctrine of freedom. The only element of freedom it grants to the finite self is that man *qua* rationally organized being reflects the rationality of the free absolute. But this idea is far removed from the common-sense connotation of the term 'freedom'. Moreover, there is psychological as well as philosophical determinism. Campbell points out that the behaviouristic psychologists see man as a mere product of heredity and environment. And as the individual has little or no control over these factors, he cannot be said to be free in any real sense. Then there are others who state that the whole issue is a mere pseudo-problem, e.g., Moritz Schluk and Nowell Smith.

Still, in spite of the concensus of many thinkers, the man in the street feels that he has true open possibilities when he makes a decision. And if this be true, 'the act must be *self-caused*, (and) *self-determined*'.¹⁹ But it is clear that in the case of professional thinkers, there is 'almost universal acquiescence . . . that free will in what is often called the "vulgar" sense is too obviously nonsensical a notion to deserve serious discussion'.²⁰ However, regardless of this fact, and in the face of onslaughts from both metaphysical and psychological determinists, Campbell frankly confesses that, 'I myself firmly believe that free will, in something extremely like the "vulgar sense", is a fact.'²¹

Yet it is vital to see that Campbell places the entire issue of freedom in an ethical and moral setting. He departs in some degree from the 'vulgar sense' of freedom and holds that it is in the realm of moral action *alone* that genuine freedom exists.

'There is *one* experimental situation, and *one only*, in our view, in which there is any possibility of the act of will not being in accordance with character; *viz.*, the situation in which the course which formed character prescribes is a course in conflict with the agent's moral ideal; in other words the situation of moral temptation.'²²

¹⁹ C. A. Campbell, *In Defence of Free Will*. (Glasgow: 1938), p. 8.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 21.

This now leads into a brief discussion of some aspects of Campbell's ethical views. Campbell considers it vital that the essential freedom of the substantial self be preserved in the moral sphere, for on this hinges the whole validity of moral praise and blame.

Now it is important to see in more detail just what kind of freedom Campbell recognizes as a precondition of moral responsibility. He first points out that freedom must pertain primarily to *inner* acts. As the nomenclature itself implies, it is a problem of the *will*. Therefore, it seems obvious that overt acts have no essential relevance to the issue. Secondly, these inner acts are such that the person involved is seen as the *sole author*. No external determinants eliminate the *self-determined* nature of the acts. This is vital, for 'the agent must be not merely a cause but the *sole* cause of that for which he is deemed morally responsible'.²³

Of course, no one would care to deny the impact made by heredity and environment upon one's choices. Furthermore, it is generally acknowledged that the acting subject has little or no control over these influences. This is the reason why we make allowances in moral praise and blame for bad heredity and/or environment. Yet we still feel that there is something for which a man is totally responsible; something of which he is the sole author. In the third place, it must be asked whether or not this 'sole authorship' suffices to make the act a morally free act. Could it not be that the act is no more than a necessary expression of the agent's nature? Campbell denies this suggestion, for it seems obvious to him that a condition of moral responsibility is that the agent *could have acted otherwise*. It is his basic conviction that 'a man can be morally praised or blamed for an act *only* if he could have acted otherwise'.²⁴ These are the three conditions of a morally free and responsible act.

Now we must see just how Campbell presents his doctrine of moral decision activity. He tells us that the term 'moral decision' is 'not the decision as to what is our duty, but as to

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

²⁴ Campbell, *On Selfhood and Goodhood*, p. 102. (Italics mine).

whether we shall do our duty'.²⁵ Such a decision is called for when one is thrust into a conflict between what he clearly believes to be his duty and what he feels as his strongest desire. In other words, moral decision arises in a situation of moral temptation. And not only is the decision in such a situation entirely a moral matter, it is the very core of the moral life.

Clearly, there are difficulties in casting the moral situation in the mode of a conflict between one's sense of duty and one's strongest desire. For example, it has been maintained that one's strongest desire can only be intelligibly grasped *after* the event of choosing. In such a view, the strongest desire was merely the course followed. But Campbell holds that we often know *during* the conflict itself what we would do if we were to allow our 'desiring nature' to dictate our choice. And we can surely measure the relative strength of our competing desires.

Now if a conflict between the sense of duty and the strongest desire is the essence of the situation in which free moral decision operates, there are two important points to be made. First, the decision is the moral agent's own decision. In other words, it is an instance of self-activity. Secondly, and of vital importance, moral decision 'is experienced as something which, though (as we have seen) issuing from the self, does not issue from the self's *character* as so far formed'.²⁶ Now throughout one's life, and at every stage, there is a developing – yet relatively stable – complex of emotive and conative dispositions. This complex we call 'character'.

'The self activity of moral decision, then, as experienced, differs very significantly from the self-activity of ordinary choices in virtue of the fact that while in both cases it is the self that is active in the former case it is not the self merely *qua* formed character that acts, but the self as somehow *transcending* its own formed character.'²⁷

This concept of the self transcending its own formed character is vital to Campbell's whole idea of morality. For it is only as one makes the will-effort to rise above his formed character and act according to his sense of duty that he is morally praiseworthy. This is the basis of all morality.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 148.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 149–150.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 150.

Now Campbell admits that his idea of the self transcending its own formed character is rather paradoxical. But this because such an act is a true creative act. And:

'If an act is creative, then nothing can determine it save the agent's doing of it. Hence we ought not to expect to understand it in the sense of seeing how it follows from determinate elements of the self-character; for then it would just not be a 'creative' act.'²⁸

Moreover, such an approach to the concept of a free self lends more credence to the contention that reality in its final character is supra-rational.

Now if the self is a morally free, creative, substantial entity, theism takes on real significance, for, as Campbell points out

'... whatever may be the precise relationship between 'self' and 'soul', it is at least certain that, where there are no 'selves' in this sense, there can be no 'souls' in any sense that interests the theologian.'²⁹

And it seems abundantly clear that 'theology without a soul would seem to amount to something very like a contradiction in terms'.³⁰

Therefore, we finally consider:

III. Campbell's Theistic Views

In approaching this aspect of Professor Campbell's thought, it is vital to see that Campbell feels that theism must be approached primarily from the religious perspective. A true theism can only be grasped when it is approached from religious experience. Thus he initially sets forth the idea that all genuine religion is essentially belief in a worshipful Being. Now it follows that if the object of worship is deemed to be worshipful, certain attributes must be true of that Being. First, all real worship is directed towards a supernatural Being. All genuine religion has a certain element of *mystery* surrounding the worshipful object, Campbell contends. The worshipful's 'mode of being and functioning is not "intelligible" to us in the way in which we

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 153.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

suppose that the familiar processes in things and persons are "intelligible".³¹ In a word, it has something of a supernatural quality. Secondly, a worshipful Being must be one of transcendent value. This follows because worship implies *adoration*. And such an emotion can only be evoked by that which is felt to possess transcendent value.³²

Finally, the worshipful must be a Being of transcendent power. Campbell argues for this postulate by pointing out that worship is permeated with a sense of *awe*. And the objective correlate of awe is power, i.e., power that is mysterious and overwhelming. Now the power of the worshipful is not *merely* mysterious. For power to inspire genuine awe, it must also be a transcendent power.

Thus Campbell concludes that the worshipful must be endowed with 'Mystery, power, value – in all essentials, Otto's *mysterium tremendum et fascinans* . . .'³³

Now with these principles set forth, Campbell summarizes by setting forth a detailed definition of religion.³⁴ He tells us that

. . . religion may be defined as 'a state of mind comprising belief in the reality of a supernatural Being or beings endowed with transcendent power and worth, together with the complex emotive attitude of worship intrinsically appropriate thereto.'³⁵

It must be granted that it may appear *prima facie* that there is a great gulf between the truth of religion and the truth of theism.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 240.

³² This aspect of the worshipful is important in that it excludes from the ranks of true religion some of the 'cults'. For the end purpose of the apotropaic religions, for example, is merely to mollify the hostility of demons. Thus the objects of such 'worship' can hardly be seen as possessing transcendent worth. Furthermore, many of the so-called 'primitive religions' fare little better under the qualification that the worshipful must possess transcendent worth. So long as these religions seek only to curry the favour of the 'gods', they cannot view these gods as objects of transcendent worth.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 247.

³⁴ He points out that he is using the term 'religion' in the 'careful and considered linguistic usage of competent persons and, also that it is religion in its basic form as experience, not religion as the objectification of that experience in historic institutions . . .' *On Selfhood and Goodhood*, p. 248.

³⁵ Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 248.

Yet Campbell contends that the gulf is not wide at all, nor is it a mere linguistic ineptitude to identify generic religion with theism. The reason is, 'theism is not just one species of religion among others, but rather the *proper culmination of the development that is intrinsic to religion as such*'.³⁶ Therefore, the central tenets of theism *are* the central beliefs of the generic religious attitude when it is fully developed. So the common man is quite justified when he identifies true religion and theism, for they are in essence one and the same.

Yet, religion is not to be equated with a purely *rational* theism. It is Campbell's feeling that a purely rational theism lacks internal consistency. He reasons on the basis of the extreme difficulty of attributing, in a literal sense, characteristics like good, wise, powerful, etc., to a God who is infinite and self-complete. For a rational, literal meaning cannot be given to such terms if God is perfect and infinite as theism claims him to be. What then is the proper approach to belief in God? Campbell emphatically declares that our choice is 'Either symbolic theology or no theology at all'.³⁷

However, is a symbolic theology at all practicable? Is it possible to justify in any way the attributing of qualities to God while at the same time realizing that these very qualities cannot be taken in a literal sense?

It is a difficult procedure, Campbell admits. Still, it seems that the task has been quite successfully accomplished by Rudolf Otto in his classic volume, *Das Heilige*.

It is Otto's contention that the distinctive character of the worshipful is 'Holiness'. But rational concepts just cannot exhaust the meaning of 'Holy'. There is something more in the apprehension of the Divine than can be expressed rationally. This 'something more' Otto calls the 'numinous'. Now as the numinous cannot be conceptually defined, one must 'direct his mind to a moment of deeply felt religious experience, as little as possible qualified by other forms of consciousness'³⁸ if he is to grasp fully the significance and meaning of the Holy. And a

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 255.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 323.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 329.

careful introspective analysis of our numinous experiences throws light on three basic aspects of one's religious life. Otto describes these aspects in the previously quoted phrase 'mysterium tremendum et fascinans'. The 'mysterium' aspect of the numinous experience indicates that one is in contact with something 'wholly other', i.e., something 'whose kind and character are incommensurable with our own, and before which we therefore recoil in a wonder that strikes us chill and numb'.³⁹ The 'tremendum et fascinans' gives content to this mysterium aspect of the experience. The 'tremendum' has three elements, viz. (1) the numen is grasped as awe-inspiring, and (2) as overwhelming in might and majesty, and (3) as superabounding in living energy and 'urgency'. Finally, the 'fascinans' is described as a 'blissful rapture by the mysterious enchantment and allure of the numen . . .'⁴⁰ This is the numinous experience.

But we must not give this description of the religious experience a naturalistic meaning. The emotions excited are not like the natural emotions. For, 'the glory of God is something that eye cannot behold, or tongue tell'.⁴¹ Actually, the numinous consciousness is an *a priori* consciousness, i.e., it

'. . . issues from the deepest foundation of cognitive apprehension that the soul possesses, and, though it of course comes into being in and amid the sensory data and empirical material of the natural world and cannot anticipate or dispense with those, yet it does not arise *out of them*, but only *by* their means.'⁴²

This is the non-rational strand in the idea of the Holy. But how can the religious consciousness, if the Holy transcends rational concepts, attribute conceptual characteristics to the numinous object? Otto finds the answer in what is conveyed by the word 'schematism'.⁴³ Campbell defines Otto's usage of the term by pointing out that

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 331.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 332.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 333.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 333-334.

⁴³ Otto borrows this term from Kant and has been accused of turning Kant upside down (H. J. Paton, *The Modern Predicament*). Yet this criticism seems to be greatly over-exaggerated and does not really invalidate Otto's position.

'... the emotions which the numinous object evokes in us, though qualitatively unique, have a *felt analogy* with certain emotions evoked in us by attributes and objects in ordinary experiences of which we can form clear conceptions. It is on the basis of these *felt analogies* that a 'conceptual translation' or schematism of the pure numinous content becomes possible.'⁴⁴

There is an 'inward necessity of the mind', as Otto puts it, that simply compels us to think of Deity as overwhelmingly possessing value, power, etc.

Now it is clear that 'analogy' implies difference as well as identity. And in the case of the numinous experience, the difference is of vital importance. For the numinous experience comes to us in the aura of a supra-natural, supra-human, supra-rational occurrence.

Still, one is always tempted to rationalize the experience. But this is because it is most difficult to maintain the 'white-hot temperature' of the numinous experience. Yet at the same time, a rational strand has its place. For we could not even think of the experience apart from rational cognition. But the rational concepts that grow out of the experience must be understood as analogies only.

Therefore, it seems to Campbell that Otto has clearly shown that incontestably, the only kind of theology possible is a symbolic theology. Thus we are shut up to a supra-rational theism. But the issue to be faced in a supra-rational theism is, in what sense, satisfactory to religion, can the rational concepts that we do assign to God be presumed to be *valid* symbols of their symbolizandum?

It is clear that any symbol is valid if anyone accepts it as a symbol. But this is a mere subjective validity and will not do for religion. Theism demands that the symbol be objectively true and necessary, i.e., it must be valid not just for some minds, but for mind as such. But Campbell is convinced that the symbols of the supra-rational theist are valid for all. After all, this was the whole point of Otto's argument. Campbell thinks it most clear that

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 337 (Italics mine).

'... certain rational concepts are applied to God through . . . an *a priori* schematism of numinous experience; that, by an inward necessity of the mind, not by the accidental circumstances of particular minds, that the identity (despite the difference) of these concepts with the nature of the supra-rational object of religious experience is affirmed. The basis of this inward necessity . . . (is) the felt analogy between the emotions evoked by the numinous object and the emotions evoked by the 'rational' qualities in question.'⁴⁵

Therefore, Campbell contends that there is good justification for the claim that the rational concepts attributed to God have objective validity as symbols of the nature of the supra-rational God. For they are necessitated by the very nature of the mind when we try to 'think' God. As Campbell puts it, 'the human mind, *qua* religious, *cannot but* think its object in these terms even while it fully recognizes their utter inadequacy as literal representations'.⁴⁶

But is there any *objective* validity to religion or supra-rational theism? If there is none, few would care to embrace the idea of a supra-rational theism. It will be remembered that Campbell has already argued that cognition points to a supra-rational ultimate reality. And if this be true

'... we have something more than the bare elements of a *rapprochement* between metaphysics and religion, something that promises a genuine, if partial, metaphysical corroboration of the objective validity of the religious consciousness.'⁴⁷

Furthermore,

'... as the unity of the ultimate reality of metaphysics is a unity in difference, a unity of which the differences are its self-manifestation, it would appear . . . that it is the unity of *mind* that is by far our best symbol.'⁴⁸

And a perfect, ultimate mind or spirit *must* necessarily be thought of as the highest conceivable in wisdom, goodness, and power. Now as these symbols apply to ultimate reality, it was also found that they apply symbolically to God. And if such be the case, here is strong evidence for the identification of the

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 353-354.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 355.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 402.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 409 (*Italics mine*).

God of true religion with the supra-rational absolute of metaphysics, thus giving objective validity to supra-rational theism. It is on this basis that Campbell contends for the objective validity of his supra-rational theism.

Conclusion

Now it is granted that little argumentation is presented to substantiate these three important aspects of Professor Campbell's thought presented here. Moreover, it is conceded that his views have been set forth in barest skeleton form. Yet what he has to say concerning the self, morals, and theism, seems most important to this author, especially in the light of the fact that we live in a day when metaphysics and theology have been widely branded as 'meaningless' by the hardcore empirical mind. Thus his concepts are merely outlined here with the hope that they may stimulate more detailed study and discussion. And in the course of this endeavour it may perhaps appear, as the author has contended, idealism does still speak.

CORRESPONDENCE

Some Thoughts on Science and Religion

BY A. G. CURNOW

Faith and Thought, vol. 97, p. 41

R. E. D. CLARK writes:

Though the present writer is in full sympathy with the conclusions of Mr. Curnow's paper, there are three main points which would seem to call for comment.

(1) Mr. Curnow gives the impression that Darwin's *Origin* was at once attacked by a majority of Christians. The effect, he says, 'almost bordered on panic . . . it is difficult now to conceive the horrors . . . no book ever published, before or since, caused so much consternation in the public mind. . .'

This is, of course, the popular myth – popularized especially by the atheists. It bears little relation to the truth, as Alvar Ellegard, who has conducted extensive investigations into all the main periodicals of the day, has shown.¹ Darwin's book was published at the high price of £1 (equivalent to £10 or more today) and it did not at once receive attention: indeed, Ellegard says that the immediate attention it received was *less*, not more than that meted to *Essays and Reviews* or to Colenso's *Pentateuch*. Moreover, most of the reviews were *favourable*. It was only later that a number of the religious organs which at first received Darwin's work favourably became anti-Darwinian.

Even the much-maligned Samuel Wilberforce – though it is true that he playfully wondered if we all came from 'some primeval fungus' or whether 'favourable varieties of turnips are tending to become men' did in fact give a long and masterly refutation of Darwin's book, based on scientific evidence only as he understood it at the time (it is said that he was helped by Richard Owen in this).² It is at the close of *this* review that he says, 'We have no sympathy with those who object to any facts or alleged facts in nature . . . because they believe them to contradict what it appears to them is taught in Revelation'. (p. 256). One suspects that Wilberforce's misplaced sense of humour may have been misinterpreted as prejudice. At all events, if Huxley came out hero at the British Association meeting, it was not because he was *less* prejudiced than Wilberforce. Indeed, his prejudice stands out a mile: of the clergy he could say 'I should like to get my heel into their mouths and scrr-r-unch it round!'³

(2) Mr. Curnow quotes a well-known passage from J. B. S. Haldane in which he says that materialism cannot be true, because if true it would cut off the branch on which the materialist is sitting (see Curnow, p. 48). It ought to be pointed out that Haldane later withdrew his argument and adopted a communistic materialistic philosophy.⁴

(3) On p. 52 it is disconcerting to find Mr. Curnow apparently endorsing the view that science is always in a state of 'swift changefulness'. Of course this is true on the frontiers of science – we may well expect views on pulsars and

mesons to change in years to come! – but as Christians we need to emphasize that science aims at the discovery of truth. When a scientific truth is established it does *not* change. Does any one expect that the discovery that the heart pumps blood round the body will one day be shown to be false? Or that the ingenious arguments of a century ago which led to a knowledge of the relative weights of the chemical atoms, are misguided? Or that benzene molecules are not after all built up from six carbon atoms arranged in a ring? Or that mosquitoes do not spread malaria? Such talk is moonshine. It is the faith of the scientist that truth, once discovered, is true for all time, even though, especially in the case of measurements, there may be better approximations.

REFERENCES

- ¹ *Darwinism and the General Reader: The Reception of Darwin's Theory of Evolution in the British Periodical Press, 1859–72*. Goteborg, 1958.
- ² *Quart. Rev.* 1860, **108**, 225.
- ³ See C. E. RAVEN, *Science, Religion and the Future*, 1943, p. 46.
- ⁴ See A. FLEW, *Rationalist Annual*, 1955.

BOOK REVIEWS

Faith and the Christian World View

BY DAVID I. DYE

Exeter, Paternoster Press, 7s 6d

Dr. Bernard Dixon has recently indulged in some well-merited mockery at 'the way some scientists talk' (*New Scientist*, 11 Ap. 1968). By way of illustration he imagines a child who asks if he *must* have porridge for breakfast. 'Yes', says Papa, 'It has been suggested by Mummy that, in view of the external coldness, the eating of porridge by you will cause an increase in bodily temperature. Furthermore, in regard to the already mentioned temperature considerations, your grandma-knitted gloves and wool-lining-hooded coat will have to be worn'. And so on.

The satire is horribly apt: many scientists are forgetting that in early days the natural philosophers sought to express themselves in the simplest language possible in contradistinction to the non-scientists of the day who indulged in pompous verbiage and 'great swellings of style'.

Not only is the boot now on the other foot but, alas, some devout Christian believers have set themselves to the task of explaining Christianity in the new stilted language of science. Dr. Dye is not the worst offender, but he certainly *does* offend: 'We postulate that biblical statements comprise a data

category . . . ' (p. 62); the Bible as we possess it is not, he says, exactly as it was when first inspired by God because 'the presently available recorded data are faulty in some respects' (p. 68); 'guilt arising in the personality [where else might it arise?] from conflict between one's wilful actions and one's conscience can disrupt personality integration [*personality* is a noun, *personal* is the adjective]' (p. 91); 'an additional data source (Herodotus) is available' (p. 107); and so on.

Style apart, this is a good book – and even the style will not deter those among the younger generation who know no other! The author sets out to show that 'the available physical data can be consistently interpreted together within a biblical Christian philosophical framework'. He examines the three basic postulates of science – that physical reality exists and is observable, that logic is relevant to its description and that causality (whether statistical or otherwise) operates in nature and concludes that though based on faith, science is philosophically neutral. To this neutrality the Christian is at liberty to add religious presuppositions – in particular that God exists and that He has revealed Himself in Christ.

Towards the middle of the book the Bible is quoted freely and the reading becomes less heavy going. Nevertheless the treatment is a little superficial; there are many quotations and references to the writings of others; but little if anything is new. A novel feature, perhaps, is the stress on the ambivalence of Scripture – the *creation* might refer to the universe, or the galaxy, or the solar system, says the author.

The coverage is wide – ancient human fossils, Godel's theorem, modern physical theory, psychotherapy, sin as egocentricity (the challenge to this view E. La B. Cherbonnier, *Hardness of Heart*, 1956, Cf. M France, *The Paradox of Guilt*, 1967, is not mentioned); ancient history, biblical criticism, the origin of life and so on are all introduced. The information is generally reliable and it is evident that the author has read widely. Except for the aforementioned frequently intruding, excessively *data*-charged ostensibly objectivized style, the volume is a worthy addition to the Paternoster Christian Student's Library.

R. E. D. CLARK

Revolt against Heaven

BY KENNETH HAMILTON

Exeter, Paternoster Press (Christian Student's Library), 7s 6d

By the revolt against heaven Mr. Hamilton means the all-pervading anti-supernaturalism of our day. He examines the historical sources of this in Schliermacher, Bultmann, Tillich, van Buren, etc., and has much to say about J. A. T. Robinson's views. The closing chapter is on Bonhoeffer's supposed

'religionless Christianity'. The author concludes that all claims by the anti-supernaturalists 'by begging the question of a criterion of meaning, simply throws a smoke-screen, hiding the fact that the supernatural character of the Gospel is the vital issue'. Fifty years ago liberal theology was seeking to loose itself from outworn creeds, today it is seeking to re-express Christian doctrine in new images, but its effect is equally destructive of all that is important in Christianity.

R. E. D. CLARK

From Eternity to Eternity, Erich Sauer (1954, reprinted 1967) 7s 6d

What is Man? J. Stafford Wright (1955, reprinted 1968) 6s

The Mark of Cain, S. Barton Babbage (1966) 6s

Exeter, Paternoster Press

If books be intended to inform the mind, each of these three has something to offer. If they be intended as aids to thought, this particular reader would beg leave to pass by the first two.

The present generation is perhaps working harder on the problem than any since Augustine, and regarding the question 'What is man?' as the ultimate one in politics, sociology, education, jurisprudence and even in medicine and religion. The supplanting of Pilate's 'What is truth?' by David's 'What is man?' as the major problem in theology was forecast by Archbishop Frederick Temple as long ago as when he wrote.

For Erich Sauer, man seems to appear in the guise of the raw material of the Kingdom of God; the cards in the Hand of the Great Patience Player, some black, some red, some high, some low, all alike being turned up on the table of history until the whole pack is 'out'. 'The developments within the creation prove that the business of the Lord is a triumphant victorious progress.' (p. 83). One and a half square feet of coloured Chart pasted inside the back cover, preceded by nine closely printed pages of *Introduction to the right reading of the Chart* indicates the stages by which the End is achieved. To question the wisdom of attempting such a chart is . . . 'unjust and foolish' (p. 11) and I will not risk the charge; but the question which bothers me is – in such a context – 'What is man?'

Sauer doubtless proves his point that it is part of the purpose of God in creating man that there should be peace, social righteousness, good health and fruitful labour in the earth, (p. 54). Is the individual man then but the fortunate recipient of God's saving grace, or alternatively the rebellious subject of His righteous judgment? The unprivileged reader, bleeding in Vietnam or undernourished in Sihar might be pardoned for feeling like the anonymous K in Kafka's *The Trial*, of whom Barton Babbage has so much sympathetic understanding. Sauer seems to have lost Joe Egg somewhere between Eternity and Eternity.

Stafford Wright, however, asks the question plainly, and examines it clinically. Freud, Jung, Adler, Gilbert Murray, Agnes Sanford, and the Psychic Research Society are drawn upon; Clairvoyance, Telepathy, Ectoplasm, Levitation, Poltergeists, Ecstatic utterances and Psychedelic drugs are considered; there is a whole chapter on Precognition and Psychometry.

Biblical usage of 'Spirit', 'Soul' and 'Body' are reviewed, but when the attempt is made to draw the threads together, the terminology is changed, and we are told 'The principle of life, or life-stream, is the prerogative (*sic*) of God Himself. It flows from Him continuously, and when a living creature dies, this life-principle in it is drawn back into the living God'. 'What parents produce is a personal being, owing its existence to continued contact with the divine life-stream already there in the cells, and capable of developing'. 'Unfortunately every man and women is infected with the disorganization of sin'.

Again, one is left with the impression that the writer is not writing of real people. Joe Egg has got lost somewhere between Nostrodamus and Kurt Koch.

It is refreshing – albeit in the end, equally inconclusive – to turn to Barton Babbage. The material of his research is modern literature from Dostoevsky to Graham Greene, and the focus is on the experience of guilt. Sauer and Wright both refer in passing to 'original sin'; Babbage calls his witnesses from amongst professional observers of the human scene. Out of their own mouths he describes with sympathy and a reasonable minimum of observer bias, the ubiquity of animality, the impotence of will, alienation, guilt, the fear of death; the reality of the experience of forgiveness, cleansing of the conscience, repentance, love, and the dynamism of sexuality.

This book is shorter than either of the others, but one closes it having made contact with authentic people with recognizable experiences. There is wisdom here too. 'When the Church is tempted to use miracle, mystery and authority as a device for winning men and effecting their salvation, we must say what Jesus said . . . "You shall not tempt the Lord your God"'. The chapter on 'Good, Merry and Joyful Tidings' is a delight.

But still we are without a persuasive attempt to answer the question 'What is man?'

Perhaps in the last quarter of this century, when a new prophet has emerged, opened our eyes and been crucified for his message, we shall achieve that fresh and relevant presentation of the redemption that in Christ Jesus which will do for Existential Man what Augustine and Anselm did in their own Millennia for Aristotelian Man. In the meantime, perhaps we might see Joe Egg in the mirror held up to us by Dostoevsky, Kafka, Masefield or some other from Barton Babbage's witness box.

G. METCALFE COLLIER