

Faith and Thought

Journal of the Victoria Institute

Published by

THE VICTORIA INSTITUTE

12 BURCOTE ROAD, LONDON S.W.18

Vol. 95 No. 1 Spring 1966

CONTENTS

Editorial	1
Teleology and the Causal Nexus Gordon E. Barnes, M.A.	4
The Development of Doctrine in the New Testament Alan E. Willingale, B.A., M.Th.	17
Modern Educational Trends: A Christian Perspective <i>The Langhorne Orchard Essay for 1964</i> Peter E. Cousins, M.A., B.D.	49
REVIEWS	69

© Copyright by The Victoria Institute and Contributors 1966

Printed in Great Britain by
RAITHBY, LAWRENCE & CO. LTD
at the De Montfort Press, Leicester and London

Faith and Thought

A Journal devoted to the study of the inter-relation
of the Christian revelation and modern research

Vol. 95

Number 1

Spring, 1966

EDITORIAL

The ever increasing application of scientific method to almost all areas of knowledge raises the important question as to whether it is possible to find a resting place anywhere in human experience. There are those, notably theologians, who still claim that there are truths which have already become known which no further discovery can alter; there are aspects of revelation which have been delivered once and for all, and are therefore complete. Scientists in different fields indicate that they find this kind of position difficult to understand. Indeed, the notion of revealed truth seems, to them, to beg the question, for revelation would appear to anchor us too firmly to the past. Is this distinction of outlook merely a question of words, or is there a fundamental difference amounting to a factual contradiction?

It is in the sphere of religion, though by no means only so, that the claim to finality is most persistently made. So long as theologians insist on the notion of divine revelation, human discovery can play but little part in their scheme of things. Truth in religion, it is often said, may be interpreted and re-interpreted. But it can never be superseded. A scientist, however, with all the implications of relativity behind him may find such assertions difficult to swallow. His objection to Christianity, or for that matter any other religion, is not so much that he takes personal exception to some specific doctrine, but that he cannot abide the over-all principle of authority

implicit in the very structure of religion, especially when it is based, as Christianity is, upon a single unique event – the Incarnation.

Christology, as some recent studies have shown, is not a closed subject. But the finality of Christ remains, and will continue to remain, the keystone of Christian apologetics. Bonhoeffer's *Christology* which has recently been given us in English translation by John Bowden shows how identical the Person of Christ is in the three aspects from which it may be contemplated: Present, Historic, and Eternal. The third section, however, has not come down to us since the original plan (worked out as a series of lectures at the University of Berlin in 1933) was not completed. Perhaps the most important of all Bonhoeffer's contentions in this *Christology* is that the present Christ is the Christ who is *geschichtlich*, present in, and involved in one's situation here and now in the processes of history.

But when we come back to the Jesus of history or the Gospels themselves, there seems to be but little idea of progress in the modern sense. There seems to be no foreshadowed perception of evolutionary processes. But progress there certainly is. In this Number the progress of doctrine in the New Testament is examined by a contributor who is not altogether new to our pages. We warmly welcome Mr Alan Willingale's contribution *The Development of Doctrine in the New Testament*.

The publication of Mr Gordon Barnes' address given at the *Annual General Meeting* in 1962 signalizes the author's return to England from a spell of teaching in the University of Nsukka in Eastern Nigeria. There have been indications from time to time that Mr Barnes has been helping the Institute by publicizing *Faith and Thought* in Africa, and we are indebted to him for the persistent interest which he has shown in the Institute during his absence abroad. And we take this opportunity of welcoming him back to this country again.

The Langhorne Orchard Prize for 1964 has been awarded to Mr Peter Cousins of Richmond, Surrey, for his Essay on *Modern Educational Trends: A Christian Perspective*. We are glad to have this Essay as an article in the present Number of the Journal.

This number also marks an important stage in the life of our Journal. We have now placed the printing of *Faith and Thought* in the hands of Messrs. Raithby, Lawrence & Co. Ltd. who are the proprietors of the *De Montfort Press*, Leicester. We trust that this will help in our efforts to make the Journal as widely read and known as possible. In particular, the Editor wishes to record his gratitude to Mr D. C. M. Bacon of the Company for his expert assistance and advice at every stage of this transfer.

GORDON E. BARNES, M.A.

Teleology and the Causal Nexus¹

1. Introduction

THE idea of cause-and-effect is presumably as old as conceptual thought; but it is to Aristotle that we must look for the origin of those metaphysical ideas which underlie the title of this paper, and which are a source of tension in many religious minds today.

It was Aristotle who formulated the famous doctrine of the four causes. Generalizing from what he had observed as processes occur, or objects take shape, in the hands of the artificer, or under the chisel of the sculptor, he postulated that every event and object was the consequence of four factors, which he named the material cause (the matter involved), the efficient cause (the hand, tool, or other object, which appears to produce, on the matter, the effect concerned), the formal cause (the image, or 'blue-print', in the controlling mind), and the final cause (the purpose or goal towards which that mind is working). When this doctrine was applied to human activities and mundane events, it was usually possible to distinguish, although not necessarily to specify, the four causes; but when it was applied to the universe as a whole, three of the four causes tended to coalesce as all being divine activity. Thus the Supreme Mind was, at the same time, Efficient, Formal, and Final Cause; leaving only the material cause as a separate factor.

Aquinas, who christianized Aristotle's metaphysics, completed the coalescence, and viewed the universe as being the product of the material cause, matter, and the Final Cause, God. To him, matter (*prima materia*) was incomprehensible because unobservable. The only observable things were

¹ Originally given at the Annual General Meeting, May, 1962.

objects, in which this basic stuff, *prima materia*, had been given different 'forms': the form of a stone, the form of a metal, the form of a plant, *etc.* What the natural philosopher studied, therefore, was, not just matter, but 'formalized' matter, matter given specific form, and possibly subjected to specific change, in order that it might fulfil the purposes of God, the Final Cause.

As science developed, the idea that God is continuously imparting 'form' to matter was gradually dropped, and material objects and events came to be regarded as the effects of the material cause alone. This is well illustrated by the fact that what Aquinas would have regarded as the properties of the 'form' imparted by God we today call 'the properties of matter'. Thus, in science, 'cause' became restricted to 'material cause', and God, as Final Cause, was forgotten. When, as sometimes happened, God was retained in the thought of the scientist, He was more often than not, merely a deistic God, a First Cause, who wound up the clockwork of the universe at the first moment of time and has allowed it to tick unmolested ever since. This is a far cry from the theistic Final Cause who is continuously guiding events that they might fulfil His purposes.

Although natural science has found it convenient to ignore the ultimate Final Cause, final causes cannot be ignored in other disciplines. In the arts the questions of the artist's aim, and of his success in achieving that aim, have continually to be asked; and in ethics the moral value of human aims has to be assessed. In theology this assessment is made in the light of the will of God, the Final Cause, 'who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will'¹.

It is this study of aims or final causes, whether in human or animal behaviour or in the universe as a whole, which constitutes teleology.

Thus there has developed a dichotomy in Western thought: on the one hand we have the scientific interpretation of the universe in terms of material causes; and, on the other, the theological interpretation which relates everything to the

¹ Ephesians i, 11.

Final Cause. The problem of many today is how to reconcile these two, mechanistic and teleological, interpretations.

I suggest that much of our present difficulty is due to our holding a wrong balance between the two. Christian thought has been so influenced by its contemporary materialistic environment that it has failed to give due weight to biblical emphases. Starting from unscriptural presuppositions, it has, in fact, developed a metaphysic which it now finds itself unable to reconcile with clear biblical teaching. This paper will firstly survey current and traditional thought on causality, secondly pin-point some of the problems raised thereby, and thirdly attempt to show that, by starting from biblical concepts, it is possible to develop a metaphysic which reconciles both theological and causal thought.

It will, no doubt, be apparent to any theologian or philosopher that this presentation is not the work of a professional colleague. It is rather an attempt by a working scientist, who has found traditional Christian metaphysics incommensurate with modern knowledge, to postulate a more satisfactory thought-model. The full implications, theological and philosophical, of the model have not been worked out; and, if and when they are, this model will probably also be found wanting. But if this paper stimulates some better qualified Christian thinker to take up the problem, and either develop or refute the concepts expressed herein, it will have achieved a useful purpose.

2. *The Causal Nexus*

The idea of the causal nexus has developed, by a process of refinement, from the commonsense view of causation, which is that a cause *produces* an effect: that is, that, in some sense, the cause is active, while the effect is passive and follows inevitably. Examples of the commonsense notion are: the impact of a moving billiard ball causing a stationary one to move; the friction of a match on the side of the matchbox causing the match to ignite; the fertilization of an egg causing the development of an embryo.

Yet a little thought soon reveals the shortcomings of this popular notion. Firstly, in none of the above examples is the effect any less active than the cause. The rolling of the struck ball, the combustion of the match, and the development of the embryo are physical, chemical, or physiological processes involving energy changes, just as their causes are. In fact, the concept of passivity is probably meaningless outside the context of volition.

Secondly, the effect, in the popular sense, is not inevitable. The struck ball might have been glued to the table; the match might have been wet; the embryo might have been poisoned; and the above effects would not have occurred. This sort of thing is common experience; but it is not allowed to destroy the notion of inevitability of effect, which can always be protected by invoking the idea of 'right conditions'. Thus the effect is envisaged as inevitably following the cause provided the right conditions prevail: *e.g.*, a match will necessarily burn when struck, provided that it is dry, that oxygen is present, that it has not been struck before, that it is struck with sufficient force, *etc.* (It is impossible to specify all that that *etcetera* embraces.)

But to divide these necessary factors into cause and right conditions is clearly illogical, for there is nothing to distinguish the one from the others. It is just as reasonable to designate the presence of oxygen as the cause and the friction, dryness, *etc.*, as right conditions as it is to designate the friction as the cause and the presence of oxygen, absence of water, *etc.*, as the right conditions. An effect, in the popular sense, then, is the consequence of the presence of a large number of necessary conditions, and cannot be related to one cause.

Yet the idea of the cause-effect relation persists as a fundamental presupposition of science. The scientist realizes that both cause and effect, in the everyday sense, are complexes of many factors, and it is his conviction that if he could simplify them sufficiently he would be able to find one factor *A* in the cause-complex and one factor *B* in the effect-complex which vary concomitantly: that is, whenever *A* is present so is *B*, and whenever *A* is absent so is *B*. Or, to put it another way, if *A* is present so is *B*, and if *B* is present so is *A*. The relation

between *A* and *B* is therefore symmetrical except that *A* always precedes *B*. *A* is designated the cause, and *B* the effect. A cause, in the scientific sense, then, may be defined as the *sufficient and necessary condition* of an effect. In order, therefore, to retain in use the concept of cause-and-effect, it has become necessary to refine the popular notion that, in some mechanistic way, a cause *produces* its effect; and it has become reduced to the idea that one simple factor *A* is inevitably followed by another, *B*. It is merely a convention that makes us regard *A* as producing *B*. It is just as logical to regard *B* as producing *A*, or to regard both *A* and *B* as produced by an unknown factor *C*. In fact, to be perfectly honest, all we can say is that, in our very limited experience, *A* has always been followed by *B*; and that we assume that it always will be; and, further, that we know no reason why it should be. Now it is this allegedly-inevitable *A-B* relation which has been called the 'causal nexus'.

It is a fundamental presupposition of science that the causal nexus is uniform throughout time and space. (In classical science all observations support this: but it is interesting to note that in modern sub-atomic physics [*e.g.*, radio-activity], where the principle of uniformity appears not to apply, it is orthodox to deny the causal nexus rather than admit its non-uniformity.) There are, however, no *a priori* grounds upon which the uniformity of the causal nexus can be established: the only philosophical basis for it is the *a posteriori* one that the principle works in practice.

3. Causality in Traditional Metaphysics

I think there is no doubt that, in the minds of scientists today, almost without exception, causality is the fundamental feature of the universe. The very *modus operandi* of nature is by the causal nexus; and therefore, whatever other descriptions may be validly given, a mechanistic description approaches nearest to basic truth. This attitude, first developed by physicists, has spread through the ranks of biologists, psychologists, sociolo-

gists, economists, and others, who, though readily admitting that their causal sequences cannot be so accurately determined as can those of the physicists, nevertheless accept the idea of the fundamentality of causation in their fields of investigation.

That scientists, and others who try to make their work as empirical as possible, should accept this idea is perhaps not surprising. But what is surprising is that much traditional theology appears to rest upon the same assumption.

Although Christian theism has always emphasized the primary causality (metaphysical causality) of God, it has usually regarded God as working within the created order through secondary causes (physical causality) recognizable by man. As E. L. Mascall says, 'The main tradition of classical Christian philosophy, while it insisted upon the universal primary causality of God in all the events of the world's history, maintained with equal emphasis the reality and the authenticity of secondary causes, both necessary and voluntary. . . . It is well known that intractable problems arise in the reconciliation of divine omnipotence with the reality of secondary causes, especially when the secondary causes are voluntary ones and when the discussion is extended from the realm of nature to that of grace . . . We are not concerned with its details here, but only with the fact that, whatever problems this raises for the intellect, the main tradition of Christian theism has firmly held that, in their different modes of primary and secondary causality respectively, both God and created agents are active in all the processes of nature'¹.

The cosmological argument of Natural Theology is an argument from causality. Originated by Plato, developed by Aristotle, incorporated in Natural Theology by Aquinas, and restated in many ways ever since, this argument starts from the idea of the universality of causation and reasons to the existence of God, either as the Unmoved Mover (in the present) or as the Uncaused Cause (in the past).

Even the teleological argument, formulated by Aquinas and elaborated by Paley, is, despite its name, a causal argument.

¹ E. L. Mascall, *Christian Theology and Natural Science*, Bampton Lectures 1956, Longmans.

It starts from the concept of design in nature and concludes that the Designer must exist. But the only ground upon which design can be recognized is the assumption of causality. If God chose to operate in nature without using causation (*i.e.*, in a non-uniform manner) no design could be discovered; and it is the assumption that a Designer could achieve His purposes only through causation that gives to the orderliness of nature its alleged metaphysical implications.

But perhaps the clearest indication of traditional ideas is afforded by discussions of miracles. From Aquinas to the present day (*e.g.*, C. S. Lewis) the prevailing idea of miracle is that it is an interruption of normal causation by the power of God, a supernatural intervention in the realm of nature. Aquinas viewed a miracle as a suspension of the normal working of nature, the making of an adjustment, and the restarting of normal causation. Lewis¹ sees it as the feeding of a new factor into the normal machinery. Other models have been employed; but the basic assumption in them all is the fundamentality of causation. Except for the miraculous events, the universe is continually maintained by causal mechanisms.

Now this traditional metaphysic raises serious problems, as Mascall points out in the passage previously quoted. Perhaps the biggest is that of human responsibility: why should God judge a man for his actions if his behaviour is causally determined by the interaction of his genes and his environment? Or why should we congratulate a successful man, or respect a man of moral integrity? It also raises the question why an omniscient and omnipotent God, in planning the universe to operate causally, should have left a few situations uncatered for, so that He had to work occasional miracles by 'breaking His own laws'.

These problems have been formulated within the framework of traditional metaphysics. I am aware that some of them may be resolved if we regard causality, not as a metaphysical principle, but as a methodological one, and by distinguishing

¹ C. S. Lewis, *Miracles*. Geoffrey Bles, 1947.

between observer- and actor-language¹. But if causality is transferred, in this way, from metaphysics to methodology, a gap is left in metaphysics. What thought-model is to be put in its place? How is the metaphysical maintenance of the created order to be envisaged?

In order to attempt a Christian answer to this question I shall start from biblical concepts.

4. *The Biblical View of the Universe*

The pages of Holy Writ give no indication that their original authors were metaphysicians, or indeed were bothered by the metaphysical problems that concern us today. Their attitude to the universe was essentially naive. Although they must have been aware of secondary causes, they seldom mentioned them². They viewed the universe as being continuously, directly, and immediately under the control of God, with the consequence therefore that material causes were of little significance.

This is well illustrated by the creation narratives of Genesis, which are remarkably free from the grotesque 'causal' sequences of contemporary creation myths. 'In the beginning God created'³; 'the Spirit of God brooded'⁴; 'God said, Let there be . . . and it was so'⁵. The New Testament writers adopt the same attitude when they say that He upholds 'all things by the word of His power'⁶, or that 'in Him all things hold together'⁷. Paul tells the Athenian philosophers that it is in God that 'we live and move and have our being'⁸. Jesus Himself indicated that God feeds the fowls of the air⁹, clothes the grass of the field¹⁰, gives good things to them that ask Him¹¹, makes His sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sends rain on the just and on the unjust¹².

¹ See writings of D. M. MacKay, e.g., 'Brain and Will', *Faith and Thought*, 90, pp. 103-115, 1958, and 'Divine Activity in a Scientific World', *Faith and Thought*, 91, pp. 75-96, 1959-60.

² There are a few references to casual agents, e.g., the wind, Ex. x, 19., Ex. xiv, 21.

³ Gen. i, 1.

⁴ Gen. i, 2.

⁵ Gen. i, 6-7, etc.

⁶ Heb. i, 3.

⁷ Col. i, 17.

⁸ Acts xvii, 28.

⁹ Matt. vi, 26.

¹⁰ Matt. vi, 30.

¹¹ Matt. vii, 11.

¹² Matt. v, 45.

Occasionally, the biblical writers, in order to emphasize the divine control of nature, even deny the existence of secondary causes. Thus Joseph in Egypt is recorded as saying to his brothers, 'It was not you that sent me hither, but God'¹; Jesus said, 'It is not ye that speak, but the Spirit of your Father which speaketh in you'²; and Paul said, 'yet not I, but Christ liveth in me'³. Quite clearly these statements are framed in the language of hyperbole, for in each case the context shows that the secondary causes denied are, in fact, operative; but the point of the hyperbole is to stress the direct control of God.

God's control is not only direct and immediate, but it is also teleological. Historical events occur because they fulfil God's moral and spiritual purposes, and the whole of history is working towards the goal which He has fore-ordained. This is clearly the teaching of the Old Testament writers, both historical and prophetic; and it is the basic assumption underlying their interpretation of history. What is true of national history in the Old Testament is, according to the New Testament, also true of the history of the church and its members. Although teleological expressions of God's activity are found on nearly every page of the New Testament, Ephesians i, 3-14 is perhaps the most comprehensive statement of this principle.

It is equally obvious that the biblical writers regarded God's activity as being completely free and unconditioned. The idea that He must act in conformity with fixed laws (even those of His own promulgation) is quite foreign to Scripture. The most obvious regularities of nature are interrupted from time to time: a day is extended⁴; the shadow on a sundial moves in reverse⁵; men walk upon the surface of the lake⁶; and a putrefying body revives⁷. The only factor that determines God's activity is His own pleasure. 'Our God is in the heavens: He hath done whatsoever He hath pleased'⁸, says a psalmist; while Paul describes Him as the One Who 'worketh all things after the counsel of His own will'⁹.

¹ Gen. xiv, 4-8.

⁴ Joshua x, 13.

⁷ Jn. xi, 44.

² Matt. x, 20.

⁵ 2 Kings xx, 11.

⁸ Ps. cxv, 3.

³ Gal. ii, 20.

⁶ Matt. xiv, 25 & 29.

⁹ Eph. i, 11.

The biblical view, therefore, is that the most fundamental characteristic of the universe is not causality but the direct, unconditioned, control of God, whereby He achieves His own purposes.

But when we speak of God's direct control, there is a danger that we may be merely substituting one 'mechanism' for another (as if God were now 'pushing' an object directly instead of through a system of levers that we call 'causal connexions') If this were so, our new metaphysic would be of little more value than the old. But if God is not 'pushing', what is He doing? I suggest 'speaking'. If there is, throughout Scripture, one expression which symbolizes God's activity, surely it is 'the Word'. It is the Word of God which operates in creation¹, in providence², in revelation³, in redemption⁴, in regeneration⁵, and in judgment⁶.

One significant fact about a word is that it does not 'push', or force a reaction; rather it elicits a response. When the centurion⁷ says to this man 'go', and he goeth, and to another 'come', and he cometh, the actions thereby provoked are not forced upon the servants; rather they act as they do because love, or fear, or desire for promotion, gives them the will to obey their superior.

So, whatever may be the nature of God's direct control of inanimate matter, I suggest His control of human affairs is best thought of as speaking, or commanding, and thereby eliciting a response.

If therefore our metaphysic is to be based upon biblical concepts, I believe we must view events as following one another, not because of any fundamental causal necessity, but because God freely chooses to act according to a particular sequence that will accomplish His purposes. The most significant relation, then, between event and event is a teleological one, and not the causal nexus.

¹ Jn. i, 3.

⁴ 1 Cor. i, 18 (Gk).

⁷ Matt. viii, 8-9.

² Heb. i, 3.

⁵ 1 Pet. i, 23.

³ Jer. i, 2.

⁶ Rev. xix, 13.

5. *Teleology and the Causal Nexus*

One of the traditional problems of Christian philosophy and apologetics is that of the relation between the principle of Uniformity of Nature and those irregularities which constitute one class of miracle (*e.g.*, the resurrection of a putrid body, a man's walking upon the surface of a lake, the multiplication of a few loaves and fishes to feed over five thousand hungry people, and others which clearly violate accepted natural laws). This problem has usually been expressed by posing such questions as: 'Why should God intervene in the normal course of nature?', or 'How can God interrupt His laws?', or 'Why the irregularities?'

If, however, the preceding argument is correct, we have been asking the wrong questions: if God's control is absolutely free, unconditioned, and teleological, the question that we must ask, and answer, is not 'Why the irregularities?' but 'Why the regularities?'. How and when does God use regularities to achieve His ends?

I want to suggest that God chooses to operate regularly (*i.e.*, by causality) only so far as is necessary to provide a framework for human responsibility. Man has been commissioned to subdue the earth and have dominion over the animals. He is expected to think rationally, to co-operate with his fellow man in society, and to communicate his thoughts to others. God holds him responsible for the consequences of his actions, and will one day judge every man according to his works. Now these would all be impossible but for regular causal relations which man himself can discover. So, in order that God might achieve some of His purposes through the agency of responsible human beings, He has seen fit to present to human experience a world in which man can discover sufficient causal regularities to enable him, by faith, to achieve God's will. It is thus a human responsibility to expect causal regularities, to search for them, and to act in accordance with them. This, I suggest, is a Christian *a priori* ground (and probably the only *a priori* ground) for the belief in the uniformity of the causal order, which is the basis of science.

But there is no reason at all why God should choose to act throughout the vast tracts of unobserved time and space in the same regular way as He acts in the limited field of human experience. In fact, even within that limited field He sometimes, on special occasions and for special purposes, acts in an unusual manner, unexpected by human observers. When He does so, the event causes surprise and wonderment, and is described, in New Testament language, as a *teras* (a wonder). It may teach man important truth, and is recognised as a *semeion* (a sign). It is evidence of divine power at work, and may be called a *dunamis* (an act of power).

I end this paper by summarising some of its salient points and drawing some conclusions.

The causal nexus, on analysis, is seen to be nothing more than the fact that certain events have always been found only to follow certain other corresponding events. Neither science nor philosophy can demonstrate any necessity for this relation, but it is normally assumed to be universally operative. The Christian accounts for this regularity by regarding it as God's consistent providential activity. God has no need to act in this manner – and, for all we know, much of His activity in time and space may not be regular – but He has chosen to operate through causality in the limited field of human experience, so that He might achieve His purposes through human responsibility. Thus causal connections are God's will in operation; the causal nexus is a teleological nexus; the material cause and the Final Cause are one. Hence, all four of Aristotle's causes are now seen to coalesce.

The deistic view, so popular last century and still colouring much Christian thinking today, that the universe is a piece of machinery originally set working by the Creator but ever since pursuing its independent course according to its built-in laws, is quite clearly erroneous: in fact, it is idolatrous. It leads to the attitude expressed by Wordsworth's lines,

To the solid ground of Nature
Trusts the mind that builds for aye.

This is 'worshipping the creation rather than the Creator'¹, and is nothing but refined paganism.

¹ Rom. i, 25.

The Christian's trust is not in nature but in the God of nature; but as this God is One Who, within human experience, normally acts through causality, the Christian's trust in God will lead to action guided by the regularities which man has discovered and which he summarises as natural laws. Thus a New Testament writer can say 'I will show you my faith by my works', and can emphasise the corollary that 'faith without works is dead'¹. The faith is in God, but the works are based upon natural laws.

The Christian, then, like the non-christian, will act in conformity with natural laws, and he will not *expect* miracles to occur. Nevertheless, if a miracle does occur, he, unlike the non-christian, will not necessarily be surprised, nor will he feel under an obligation to try to explain it away.

¹ James ii, 18 & 20.

ALAN E. WILLINGALE B.A., M.TH.

The Development of Doctrine in the New Testament

Introduction

The twenty seven books of the New Testament were written, on a conservative estimate, over a period of fifty years, roughly coinciding with the second half of the first century A.D. A more radical reckoning would make it extend another forty years into the second century to overlap the extra-canonical works of the Apostolic Fathers. A further fifteen to twenty years added at the front to take in the time from the beginning of the ministry of Jesus gives a total formative period of between two and four generations. Brevity set a limit to corruption.

Evidence of Development. The register of change in the earliest Church is the New Testament itself, but the traditional arrangement of entries does not exhibit a progression. The general drift may be discerned by re-ordering the books chronologically and fixing their authorship and provenance. Thereby is brought to view a map of types and even schools of theology. But to determine the precise direction it is necessary to go further and analyze the books themselves into layers of thought representing stages in the progress of theologizing. A pattern then emerges of a cascade from source through a succession of strata emerging in a broken stream. The five most clearly defined levels are (a) the teaching of Jesus (b) the teaching in the Primitive Church (c) Pauline doctrine (d) Johannine doctrine (e) consolidated Church tradition. The first is recovered by sifting the sayings of Jesus in the four Gospels to choose between, or reconcile, differences. The extreme position of some Form Criticism is that the whole of the framework of the narrative and most of the *logia* themselves are a product of the Church and not of Jesus. The first stratum,

of this footing, is bulldozed off, and the source must be sought at some lower level. The second is reconstructed by the collation and conflation of excerpts from many books, but most notably those by Luke. C. H. Dodd in his book *The Apostolic Preaching and its Developments* (1936) distinguishes between the public proclamation of the gospel message (*kerygma*) and the instruction of converts (*didachē*). He reconstructs the former from the speeches in the early chapters in Acts and from the mnemonic confessional formulae in the Epistles. It consists of a recital of the saving events of the birth, life, death, burial, resurrection, exaltation and promised return of the Christ, with the minimum of interpretation. This and similar formulae, credal and liturgical, belong to an oral stage before the writing of the New Testament. The third and fourth are reached by raking out of the writings attributed to Paul and John the material that is original to them as distinct from that which they share with and derive from their predecessors. Their meditations mark an advance upon the ungarnished *kerygma* and un glossed confessions. The fifth is retrieved by riddling from the later books of the New Testament the fused cinders of the first incandescence.

Conditions of Change. Three main factors have variously been held responsible for or contributory to the development of doctrine in the New Testament. Viewed as objective historical events they are indicated by three breaks in the continuity of growth at which the growing tips of Christian thinking may be thought to have undergone mutations; (a) the jump from the pre-resurrection to the post-resurrection situation (b) the transition from a Palestinian to a Hellenistic milieu (c) a putative postponement of the return of the risen Lord. Regarded as subjective experiences they correspond to three crises alleged to have confronted the infant Church and forced revaluations of belief. With these three factors are connected the three crucial questions to which all the main problems of development are reducible; of whether, or to what extent, (a) the distinctive doctrines of Christianity are a product of the mind of Jesus or of the early community (b) Hellenism rather than Judaism furnished the dominant thought-forms (c) a total transformation resulted from the apparent deferment of the Parousia.

The Originality of Jesus. The claim of Jesus to be recognized as the creative Founder of Christianity has been challenged in two ways. First, by the attempted demonstration that the record of His words and deeds reveals not the mind and intentions of the historical Jesus but of a Christ fabricated by the faith of the first generation of Christians. Second, by a search for parallels to His teaching in that of contemporary or near-contemporary sectarian or Rabbinical writings, or for alternative sources among the religio-philosophical systems of the Hellenistic world.

The older Source Criticism of the Gospels, which created the Synoptic Problem, went no further than to unplat the first three Gospels into a handful of literary sources used by the final redactors. That these rediscovered compositions recorded the *ipsissima verba* of Jesus and faithfully represented their original setting and the structure of His thought was not seriously questioned. The newer Form Criticism grinds the Gospels into granules of oral tradition, milling off the contexts and inter-connecting narrative as so much husk, attributable to the special interests of the primitive community, and in the end is scarcely able to arrest the process before the grains themselves are pulverized into the dust of scepticism. The way out of this valley of despair is not a retreat into pre-critical entrenchments but an advance into a firmer affirmation of the valid distinction between the primary fact of the preaching and teaching of Jesus and the secondary and derivative activity of apostolic interpretation. Undeniably the evangelists, writing as representatives of geographically dispersed churches with differing theological traditions, have allowed post-resurrections problems to determine in part the selection and ordering of their material (Lk. i. 3; Jn. xxi. 25). The Gospels are not biographies with any pretensions to scientific accuracy, but highly-charged, *ex parte* pamphlets pressing the unique status and vocation of their subject. The first three conform to the kerygmatic skeleton of the earliest preachers. The fourth has its own design, but this too, though marked by strong, chronological pointers, follows rather a thematic schema. In all four the Passion narrative has been cast in a mould determined by a dogmatic scheme of prophetic fulfilment. The

parables bear signs of their application to Church problems differing from those which perturbed the original audiences. It does not follow that the facts have been deliberately distorted, but it does mean that their recording is already and irreversibly interpretative. The Fourth Gospel has long been recognized as a deliberately theological document. Only in recent years have the Synoptics been seen to be comparably slanted. They are little less sophisticated, little less examples of evolved and florescent theologies. On this showing the sayings of Jesus in all four Gospels are like gems which have been cut and faceted, mounted and foiled, so that new lights flash from them as a result of the jeweller's art. In the Fourth Gospel the artistry is a degree more elaborate than in the synoptics, and the pasting is more obtrusive. But the stones themselves are natural and not synthetic. The second method of rejection may be considered under Hellenism. Here it remains only to observe two things. First, the possibility cannot be dismissed that the teaching of Jesus itself developed in the two or three years of His ministry as a result of the reaction or lack of response to His preaching. But, since the evidence is always likely to be too narrow either to prove or disprove the hypothesis, it would be wise not to rest too much upon it. Second, the dogmatism with which some critics treat every prophecy by Jesus of His impending Passion and Parousia as a *vaticinium ex eventu*, a forecast after the outcome, is always open to be rebutted by the demonstration that the cardinal tenets of Christian doctrine make more sense on the postulate that they go back to a creative impulse in Jesus than that they do not. It is the special merit of Alan Richardson's book *An Introduction to the Theology of the New Testament* (1958) that it does just this.

The Influence of Hellenism. The Gospel was broadcast on ground fertilized, since the conquest of Alexander, by the Greek language and outlook. The effect of the soil on the growing plant is already patent in the immediately post-canonical group of writers of the first half of the second century known as the Apostolic Fathers. By the second half of the century in the works of their successors the Apologists, what Harnack called the 'acute Hellenization' of Christian doctrine, had reached an advanced state. Furthermore by the mid-second

century a hydra-headed heresy was erupting within the Church known by the portmanteau term Gnosticism. The gnostic theory was that man is composed of a spark of intrinsic immortality expelled from the realm of pure flame for some primordial revolt of the gods and incarcerated in a body of inherently evil matter, escape from which, to return to the paradise lost, is only by the possession of the correct knowledge (*gnōsis*). The basic motif was worked up into a variety of complex cosmogonies all drawing upon a common pool of religio-philosophical syncretism compounded of Greek philosophy and oriental mythology which had for two centuries leaked into the Levant. There were myths of a primal or prototype man, a tyrannical demiurge and a redeemer demigod, and sacramental, mystical or frankly magical escape-routes for initiates. Granted that such was the nursery of developing dogma, was it earlier the very matrix of the Gospel? Conceding that patristic theology is so soon clad in Greek categories, were these also the very swaddling clothes? and more, was the germinating seed itself not merely couched in the Greek language but also informed by the Greek spirit?

Rudolf Bultmann avers that much of the distinctive thought of Paul and John is determined by gnostic motifs. R. Reitzenstein, W. Bousset and others sought to prove the dependence of Paul on a Heavenly Man myth and the Mystery Religions.

Two counter arguments may be advanced in support of the view that the source of Christian doctrine is, in germ as least, the mouth of Jesus, and that any Hellenistic elements are intrusive upon a stream already established in a Judaistic channel. First, no Gnostic document is extant which with any show of probability can be proved both to pre-date and act upon the New Testament. Bultmann has to assume that Gnosticism, which traditionally has been known as a second-century phenomenon, was already full-blown at the time of the Gentile Mission. Overt allusion in the New Testament, *e.g.* to the heresy at Colossae and the spurious *gnosis* of 1 Tim. vi. 20 are late and antagonistic. Second, scholars such as W. L. Knox and W. D. P. Davies have adduced arguments for tracing the main categories of early Christian doctrine to Rabbinic or sectarian Judaism rather than Hellenism.

Some early staining of the waters by Hellenistic (not pristine Hellenic) thought must be admitted as a major impulse to development, but the evidence is strong that they were first drawn from Hebraic wells by the hand of Jesus.

Frustrated eschatology. The thesis of the book by C. H. Dodd mentioned above is that the prime cause of doctrinal development in the New Testament was the fading of the hope of Christ's return and that Greek influence only came in as a secondary cause to fill a vacuum thus created. Dodd's point of departure is the difference between 1 and 2 Thessalonians. The first letter held out the hope of an imminent Advent. After a delay of three or four years with no consummation, some reappraisal was called for, and the rest of the New Testament, which was written subsequently, is the memorandum of it. 'The consequent demand for readjustment was a principal cause of early Christian thought' (op. cit. p. 33). Jesus Himself had taught that the kingdom was being consummated, the *eschaton* realised, within His active ministry (Mk. i. 15; Mt. xii. 28; Lk. xi. 20). When the Parousia failed to materialize the Church went back on this doctrine. Development took two main lines (i) a reconstruction on a modified plan of the futuristic Jewish eschatology such as appears in 2 Th. i. 7-10; ii. 3-10; Mk. xiii and the Apocalypse; this led to a blind alley and ran out, in the second century, into the barren sands of Chiliasm (Millenarianism), which in the end was disavowed by the Church (ii) 'a concentration of attention upon the historical facts of the ministry, death and resurrection of Jesus exhibited in an eschatological setting which have made clear their absolute and final quality as saving facts' (op. cit. p. 42). Such a 'realised eschatology', backward-gazing to past event instead of forward-looking to future dream, is found especially in Paul's doctrine of the new creation, the Platonic reinterpretation of the Age to come as a supra-mundane sphere in Hebrews, and above all in the Johannine sublimation of Jewish apocalyptic into a non-temporal mysticism.

In later works Dodd has given greater recognition to the degree to which Jesus Himself propounded a 'realised eschatology'. In this thesis his conclusions do not differ greatly from consistent eschatologists, such as Albert Schweitzer, who

read the progress of Christian doctrine in terms of an Hellenic cure for Jewish Apocalypticism of which Jesus Himself was a crazed victim. The apparent deferment of the Parousia is supposed to have forced upon the disappointed Church a complete revaluation of belief and practice. For a physical return upon the clouds was substituted a re-entry in spirit. Whatever in eschatology the Church refused to relinquish, but would no longer project upon the future, was referred to the completed life of the Christ. This is the whole explanation of the Gospels, and of the Fourth in particular. The Church had to reorganize itself as a permanent society, to institutionalize itself for an interminable programme of expansion. Whereas Jesus had taught an *interimsethik*, i.e. a moral code binding only for the short interval before His return, a rule had to be devised that would be valid always and everywhere. For this reason Matthew reads *didache* into *kerygma* in the Sermon on the Mount. A new emphasis was placed on the presence of the Spirit in the persisting Church, standing proxy for the departed Lord. Hence the doctrine of the Paraclete which *prima facie* conflicts with the Ascension. Had the gap been shorter no surrogate had been required. The sacraments underwent a change from parabolic signs of readiness for the last things into quasi-magical techniques for maintaining vitality until they arrived. The acme of this process is reached in Hebrews and the Fourth Gospel. Before the validity of some of these judgments is tested a common misapprehension needs to be removed. Some have thought that a single fact tells decisively against this scheme: the absence from the New Testament record of any crisis which necessitated a root and branch revision of the Christian message. They object that the expressions 'postponement' and 'deferment' beg the question because they presuppose a datable turning point. The problem with which Paul dealt in the second letter to Thessalonians was a local one and not one affecting the whole Church. Moreover, unless Luke invented the conversation preceding the Ascension (Ac. i. 6-8), the disciples knew they were in for a long wait. Nevertheless, it must still be allowed that (i) there is a difference between the New Testament writings, especially the Synoptics and the Fourth Gospel, which seems to betray a modification in

the hope (ii) the effect of a fading of the hope could be as great if it were not the result of a datable crisis in Church experience but only an indeterminate, progressive loss of the primitive tension between the 'already' and the 'not yet' (iii) if the return had taken place as soon as at least some in the early Church appear to have expected it the New Testament itself would never have been written. To that extent the existence of the New Testament witnesses to a lengthening of perspective. In what follows an attempt is made to sketch the course of development through the main stages by reference to the documentary analysis of the New Testament and the isolation of the dominant causes. Considerations of space determine the selection of those doctrines which most plainly illustrate the trends.

The Second Coming of Christ

The Expectation of Jesus. Jesus inherited a ready-made, dogmatic scheme of the Last Things from the apocalyptic tradition of the inter-testamental period. This had been created by political agitators who, under the literary devices of pseudonymity and privileged access to Divine secrets, incited the Jews to rebellion against occupying powers. They had invented the cast of celestial *dramatis personae*, the deterministic timetable of supra-mundane acts and scenes, and the imminent, catastrophic dénouement to the cosmic drama. The twofold critical question is: whether Jesus accepted or transformed this scheme, whether, that is, His eschatological programme was 'futuristic' or 'realized', and whether it was exhaustively one or the other. According to the theory of 'realized eschatology' the 'kingdom of God' is not to be understood as a 'realm' but a 'reign', which Jesus claimed to be inaugurating in His own person, words and deeds (Lk. xi. 20 and perhaps xvii. 21; Mk. i. 15). There remains, however, a group of irreducibly futuristic sayings in which He expects the cataclysmic wind-up of history within the generation (Mk. ix. 1; Mt. xvi. 28; Lk. ix. 27 cf.; Mk. xiv. 62; xiii. 30; Mt. xxiv. 34-6; Jn. xxi. 21-23). These are an embarrassment even if the 'Little Apocalypse' of

Mk. xiii be dismissed as a composite Church product. A balanced view of the attitude of Jesus to the future must take account of three things: (i) He was obliged to interpret His mission by reference to and in relation to the preconceived pattern. (ii) Nevertheless, He revised and rewrote the cosmic drama by casting Himself in the leading rôle of the heavenly Son of Man, modified the characterization by interpreting the extra-canonical apocalyptic tradition by reference to the canonical Daniel and the older prophetic tradition, and gave a twist to the plot by planning and executing a paradoxical consummation to burst the vessel with fresh content (iii) Yet still, at the end, He recognised an unfulfilled residuum of futurity which His solution did not immediately resolve and on which He declared Himself within His lifetime not merely unauthorized to pronounce but ignorant (Mk. xiii. 32 cf.; Ac. i. 7) Talk of the analogies of the fore shortening effect of views from mountain peaks and the loss from view of valleys intervening serves only to bolster a docetic opinion of omniscience in the Incarnate Son in conflict with Scripture.

The Retarded Return. There appears on the face of it to be a conflict of opinion on the nearness of the end. In some contexts the Parousia is imminent (1 Pet. iv. 7; Mk. xiii. 29; Rom. iii. 12; 1 C. vii. 29; Phil. iv. 5; Heb. x. 25, 37; Jas. v. 8f.; 1 Jn. ii. 18; Rev. xxii. 20). In others considerable delay is expected (cf. Mk. xiii. 7f. with Lk. xxi. 7-9 and Ac. i. 6f.). The suspicion arises that the latter proceed from a deliberate policy of dampening excessive enthusiasm. F. F. Bruce (*New Peake* pp. 928-30) uses as one criterion for the chronological arrangement of Paul's Epistles indications of a progression in his thinking on the Parousia, in particular a growing apprehension that his own death might intervene. The advance has affected whole areas of his thought. For example marriage, which in 1 C. vii. 1-8, 26-38 was at best a temporary expedient before the end becomes in Eph. v. 22ff. a permanent analogy of the relation between Christ and His Church. If Paul, writing probably in AD 50, had to disabuse the Thessalonians of the belief that the apocalyptic count-down was approaching zero (2 Th. ii. 1-12; cf. 1 Th. iv. 16f.), and Luke, writing perhaps in the eighties, had to caution against the same kind of fever (Ac. i. 6ff.), the author

of 2 Peter, whoever he was, writing certainly later than either (2 Pet. iii. 15f.) had to meet the taunt of delay and deal with it as a recognized theological problem (2 Pet. iii. 4) requiring exegetical solution (vv. 8ff.). Clearly by the turn of the century, in some parts at least, there was some loss of vigour in the hope. The official response was not, however, a pretence that the Lord was putting off the day or 'tarrying', but that those waiting were being impatient. Nothing was allowed to count for evidence against the pristine assurance.

Greek Transmutation. The contrast between the treatment of the doctrine in the Apocalypse and the Fourth Gospel is so strong that scholars have been unable to resist the temptation to choose the one and reject the other. Those who think that Jesus expected only a cataclysmic conclusion to history, regard the former as standing closer to His thought, and the latter as a Greek perversion of the Gospel. Those who like to think that Jesus scrapped the futuristic element in Jewish Apocalyptic without remainder, judge the Fourth Gospel nearer the essential genius of Christianity and the Apocalypse a regression to a pre-Christian dispensationalism and particularism. The stark antithesis is false. The Apocalypse is the radical revision of Jewish Apocalyptic, first undertaken by Jesus, taken to literary perfection. Every concept of the old tradition from Daniel onwards has been brought into captivity to Christ. If the result is bizarre, that is the essential idiom of the genre.

In the Fourth Gospel, by contrast, a futuristic and a fulfilled eschatology stand side by side, and this is a feature with a considerable weight in deciding the question of common or diverse authorship. The momentous stages of the apocalyptic eschatology are said to be both yet to be fulfilled prospectively and already realized presently. The final hour is coming (Jn. iv. 21; v. 28; xvi. 2, 25; vii. 6, 30) and has already arrived (Jn. iv. 23; v. 25; xvi. 32; xii. 23; xvii. 1). The general resurrection is still future (Jn. v. 28f.; vi. 39f. 44, 54; xi. 24), although the resurrection life is a potential possession in the present (Jn. xi. 25 cf.; iii. 15f. 36; vi. 40, 47). The traditional last Judgement is still awaited (Jn. v. 27-29; xii. 48) whilst the 'crisis' or 'dividing' is already taking place in the response to the preaching of Jesus (Jn. iii. 18-21; v. 24). The public

Parousia of traditional apocalyptic is still promised (Jn. xiv. 3 cf.; xxi. 23) but the Advent is also reinterpreted as a private return of Jesus to His 'friends' (v. 19) on spiritual conditions (v. 23), effected through the presence of the Spirit in the Church (v. 16f., 26). Some commentators have stressed the second of those elements to the exclusion of the first, as though John invented them. This is wrong because, as we saw above, the Synoptic record contains statements of 'realized eschatology' in the life of Jesus. Nevertheless the extra emphasis given to this aspect of the teaching of Jesus, and the different way in which it is expressed, owes something to a fresh situation in the Church and in particular to the Greek climate of the (possibly Ephesian) provenance. Other factors enter into the question of authorship but on this ground alone the conclusion seems inescapable that whilst the Apocalypse was written by a Jewish émigré to Asia Minor someone who was born there has had a hand in the final form of the Fourth Gospel.

The Person and Work of Christ

Three questions plot the path. Did Jesus assume or the Church apply His titles? Do some derive rather from Gentile than Jewish sources? Does later usage betray an abatement or abandonment of the expectation of an imminent Advent?

The Self Designation of Jesus. All four Gospels agree that He was reluctant to accept the title Messiah or (which is the same, 2 Sam. vii. 14; Ps. ii. 7) Son of God, although He accommodated some enquiries privately (Jn. iv. 26; Mt. xi. 2-5). Wrede explained this reticence by his theory of the Messianic secret, according to which the evangelists invented the injunctions of Jesus to silence (Mk. iii. 12; Lk. iv. 41) in order to excuse their installing Him in office whilst He was still strictly only the Messiah designate: in primitive belief Jesus only took up appointment as from and as a result of the resurrection (Rom. i. 4; Ac. ii. 36; xiii. 33). The real reason for His reserve was His rejection of nationalistic and materialistic connotations (Jn. vi. 15; Mt. iv. 3, 6; xii. 35-37). The title He expressly preferred was Son of Man (Mk. viii. 29-31; xiv. 61f.; Jn. i.

49-51; ix. 35-37). The model He chose for His conduct and career was the Servant of the Lord.

Son of Man. The main facts are clear. (i) The title does occur in the New Testament outside the Gospels except at Ac. vii. 56 (ii) In the Synoptics it is used virtually only by Jesus and then always of Himself. Analysis of Synoptic occurrences reveals (iii) three contexts; a future parousia, an impending passion, a present vocation; and (iv) that its use was confined to the period following Peter's confession at Caesarea Philippi and almost exclusively to private audiences with His disciples. (v) Pre-critical orthodoxy set the titles Son of God and Son of Man in antipodal relation, to signify full deity, and true manhood. Originally almost the exact opposite was true. The former referred to a human being (2 Sam. vii. 14; Ps. ii. 7). The latter was a celestial personage in the apocalyptic tradition represented by Daniel (2nd century BC or earlier), the Similitudes of Enoch (c. BC 35-71) and 4 Ezra (c. AD 81-96). (vi) Jesus adopted a predelineated role, but adapted it to His own requirements by giving it a Danielic rather than Enochic interpretation (Mk. xiii. 62 quoting Dan. vii. 13) and reinterpreting it by reference to the Isaianic Servant.

Servant of the Lord. The facts here too are plain. (i) Isa. liii. was one of the *testimonia* adduced by the early preachers (Ac. viii. 32f.; 1 Pet. ii. 22-25; Heb. ix. 28). And yet: (ii) Nowhere in the sayings of Jesus is the title used as a self-designation (Lk. ii. 37 only cites and like Matt. viii. 17 is not interpretative of His Mission) (iii) In all four Gospels the passion narrative bears signs of being moulded by Psalms xxii and lxix but contains no allusion to Is. liii. (iv) There is no express identification in Paul (v) The Jewish Targums on Is. iii, refer the exaltation and glory to the Messiah but the humiliation and suffering to the nation (vi) The Servant is never the subject of any pronouncement by Jesus about His vocation, though He often fills the predicate when the subject is the Son of Man (Mk. x. 45; viii. 31; ix. 31; Mt. viii. 20). Must we conclude that the evangelists introduced both appellations? The application of the sufferings of the Servant to the Messiah and the synthesis of the disparate concepts of Messiah, Son of Man and Servant are plainly Christian novelties. The creative fusion, however, took place

not in the Church, but in the mind of Jesus. The thesis has been put forward that because He began His ministry with the knowledge that He was the Suffering Servant (Mk. i. 11.; Lk. iv. 16-20; vii. 22) and did not mention the Son of Man until later, the former was normative to His thinking, which was fundamentally prophetic, and that He only adopted apocalyptic terminology to locate Himself on the thought-map of His contemporaries. This will not do. The frank admission that the whole mode of Jesus' thought is alien to the modern mind is preferable to an attempt to disguise the fact by an appeal to docetism.

Jewish and Gentile Christology. Why, if they were the chosen keys to His thought, is so little overt made of these titles outside the Gospels? Paul uses neither. Luke, writing like the other evangelists after Paul, represents Jesus as using them but drops both from Christian vocabulary early in Acts (Ac. v. 56 and iii. 13, 26; iv. 27, 30). The writer of the Apocalypse cites Dan vii. 13 (Rev. i. 13; xiv. 14) without using the title Son of Man despite his perfect grasp of the synthesis in the yoking of the images of Lion and Lamb (Rev. v. 5ff.). The reason may be that the peculiarly Jewish nomenclature proved an embarrassment in the Gentile Mission. The literal translation of the Aramaic periphrasis 'Son of Man' (meaning only 'man' or 'the Man') made bad Greek, and was liable to be confused with oriental myths and speculations of a primal or archetypal man. 1 Cor. xv. 47 may be polemically oriented against this type of thought. Similarly, to have used the Hebraism 'slave of Yahweh' in an environment in which slavery was an accepted social institution would have been to misrepresent the status of Christ and the character of God. Paul does not mind calling himself a 'slave of Christ' (Rom. i. 1) but shrinks from calling Christ the 'slave of God'. Luke in Acts gets round the problem by using the word 'boy' but Paul in Phil. ii. 7 (quoting perhaps an existing hymn) softens it to 'form of a slave'.

Attempts to establish Greek antecedents for other titles attributed to Christ have not proved convincing. In every case there is a Jewish candidate. For example, the expressions 'Lord' and 'Son of God' which in a Greek environment signified respectively the object of worship in a mystery cult and a

deified wonder-worker were already controlled by the Messianic significance of the latter and the use of the former in the Septuagint of God before ever the Gospel broke out of Palestine. That 'Lord' sprang out of an Aramaic background seems clear from early credal formulae using *Maran* (1 C. xvi. 22; xii. 3; Rom. x. 9; 2 C. iv. 5; Heb. vii. 14 cf.; Mk. xii. 35-37). Even the Logos doctrine of the prologue to the Fourth Gospel which may contain allusions to a principle of cosmology in the World-soul or Reason of Stoicism, of revelation in the Philonic commentary on Genesis i. and ii., of transcendence in the use of the word *memra* in the Jewish Targums as a paraphrastic avoidance of the Divine Name, of meditation in the Wisdom of Hellenistic Judaism, of soteriology in the teaching of the Corpus Hermeticum and was developed in the second century solely in reference to the first, nevertheless depends primarily upon the creative command of Gen. i. 3; Ps. xxxiii. 6 and the prophetic message of Jer. i. 4.

The Pre-existent, Cosmic Christ. Harnack had a neat theory of development in Christology which attributed it wholly to progressive hellenization. He held that in primitive Gentile Christianity there was an earlier 'adoptionist' type and a later 'pneumatic' type. In the former a man was assumed into the Godhead; in the latter a pre-existent being descended into flesh. Divine Sonship originally dated from the Resurrection (Rom. i. 4; Ac. xiii. 33) was first transferred to the Baptism (Mk. i. 11), then to the Birth (Lk. i. 35), and at last carried back in Paul and John into a pre-mundane eternity (Phil. ii. 26; Col. i. 15ff.; Jn. i. 1; viii. 58). To put it bluntly, the early Christians promoted their Lord to Godhood by degrees. The Achilles' heel of the theory is the pre-existence and cosmic status already implicit in the title Son of Man taken by Jesus. Nevertheless a progression may be discerned in the understanding of Christ's Person and Work which may be partly the result of a more leisurely reflection on the past attendant upon a relaxation of tension in the hope for the future.

The original kernel of the *kerygma* was the Passion story. Mark, the first Gospel, has no infancy story, Paul is apparently ignorant of (Gal. iv. 4) or disinterested in (2 C. v. 16) the matter. Matthew and Luke show considerable interest, but John seems

deliberately to substitute his Logos Prologue. The infancy stories and the doctrine of the Virgin Birth cannot, of course, guarantee the Deity or sinlessness of the Saviour. Nor do they prove pre-existence. The motive for their introduction is not to point to the Birth as a stage in an already established career but to insist upon Divine origin. John may have felt that the job had not been done efficiently. For him the Redeemer not only existed before birth, not only came from God, nor even simply took His source and origin in God, but was God (Jn. i. 1). In similar fashion the Wisdom Christology of Hebrews and Colossians goes far beyond the limited cosmic status and pre-existence of the Son of Man in Apocalyptic. Heb. i. 8ff. calls the Son of God by implication, and Col. i. 15, 19 stops just short of identity. The shift of interest from Christ as the *telos*, or goal of Creation (1 Cor. xv. 24-28) to Christ as its *archē*, or start (Col. i. 15ff.), which is the distinguishing feature of Wisdom Christology (from Prov. viii. 22-31) may well owe something to a sense of eschatological delay. But that is not the main point. These New Testament writers simply press to conclusion the logic of the claims of Christ; not merely those of Jesus regarding Himself, but those which He made upon His followers.

The Person and Work of the Spirit

Bultmann has a very radical view of development in the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. In the primitive preaching the Spirit is an independant personal power that takes temporary possession and causes miracles and striking mental phenomena. In Paul the Spirit becomes the power and norm of Christian conduct and the Bestower of the *charismata* (spiritual gifts). In John He becomes the power within the Church which brings forth both knowledge and the proclamation of the Word. The reason for the development is the disappointment in the hope of the return of Christ which made it necessary to reaffirm the presence in the Church of the Exalted Lord. Hence Paul's teaching on *charismata* and John's on the *Paraclete*. More specifically in Paul there

was the need to claim that the present life in the Church was the life of the Age to come.

Jesus and the Spirit. The teaching of Jesus is no more than germinal and John explains why: the Holy Spirit was not yet given, because Jesus was not yet glorified (Jn. vii. 39). How then did Jesus understand the Spirit and His relationship to Him? On the face of it the Paraclete doctrine is unparalleled in the Synoptics. The word *parakletos* means 'helper' or 'advocate'. Jesus promises that He will send a *locum tenens* (a) to replace His physical presence (Jn. xiv. 16, 18; xvi. 7) (b) to guide the Church into a fuller understanding of His work (Jn. xiv. 17, 26; xv. 26; xvi. 13). Both functions are to be found in the Synoptics though in the much more restricted context of prompting in testimony before magistrates courts (Mk. xiii. 11; Lk. xii. 12; Mt. x. 20). Peculiar to Luke (xi. 13) and for that reason commonly regarded as the evangelist's gloss rather than an exact report is the statement that the Father is ready to give the Holy Spirit to them that ask. The usual assumption is that in the Synoptics Jesus is speaking only within the terms of the common Old Testament and Jewish doctrine of the Spirit of God and that the writer of the Fourth Gospel has elaborated and applied the legal metaphor of advocacy beyond its original bounds. Was he justified in doing so? Express references on the lips of Jesus are few. To them may be added references occurring in words addressed to Him or read by Him. All other allusions may represent His thought but in a scientific examination must be eliminated as gloss. The first and second groups fall into two main categories (i) the outpouring of Joel (Jl. ii. 28ff.) (ii) the Servant-Messiah as the Bearer of the Spirit (Is. xi. 1-2; xlii. 1). To the first belong the prophecy of John Baptist (Mk. i. 8; Mt. iii. 11; Lk. iii. 16; Jn. i. 29-34) which Jesus must have absorbed into His self-awareness, the advocate function already mentioned which is part of the promise of the New Age, the blasphemy against the Holy Spirit (Mk. iii. 29; Mt. xii. 32; Lk. xii. 10), and the exorcism connected with it (Mt. xii. 28). To the second belong the descent of the Holy Spirit at the Baptism (Mk. i. 10; Mt. iii. 16; Lk. iii. 22; Jn. i. 32ff.), and the reading from Is. lxi. if. in the synagogue at Nazareth (Lk. iv. 18) Jesus

added no new element to the old Jewish doctrine of the Spirit. His originality lay not in any fresh conception nor even in any novel combination. John Baptist had already synthesized the Joel outpouring with the Coming One (Mk. i. 18; Mt. iii. 11; Lk. iii. 16; vii. 19ff.; Jn. i. 29ff.) and moreover identified Jesus as the Spirit-Bearer and Baptizer. The new thing in the teaching of Jesus was His claim to be fulfilling the rôle. This is the point of His reply to the imprisoned John (Mt. xi. 4f.) which alludes to Is. lxi. if., and the claim that His activity is the inbreaking of the Kingdom (Mt. xii. 28). The evangelist plainly understood what Jesus had in mind when he quotes Is. xlii. (Mt. xii. 17ff.).

The Pentecostal Afflatus. The first Christians were not therefore unprepared to recognize the fulfilment of the Joel prophecy in the miraculous events of Pentecost (Ac. ii. 16-21). They are depicted as astonished at the Death and Resurrection (Lk. xxiv. 6, 11, 19ff.) but as expecting the outpouring of the Spirit (Ac. i. 2, 5, 8; Mt. xxviii. 19). If Jesus had indeed represented His Mission as the irruption of the Spirit-Age then these are no mere *vaticinia ex eventu*. In one respect, however, the earliest believers seem at first sight to have regressed from the teaching of Jesus. Peter refers to the Spirit as 'this thing' *i.e.* neuter, a force or influence (Ac. ii. 33). John Baptist seems similarly to have conceived the Spirit as an impersonal element or spiritual stuff, not unlike water or fire, in which a man might be immersed, whereas Jesus must have conceived Him as personal if He could act as an advocate and be blasphemed against. The dynamic, quasi-material concept of the Spirit has roots deep in the Old Testament. The Hebrew *ruach* like the Greek *pneuma* means basically 'air in motion', breath, or wind. The Greek word came to mean in a purely Hellenic setting, spirit or mind, in contrast to body, the ideal against the real. In the New Testament the Hebraic idea persists. The Spirit is miraculous divine power in contrast to human frailty and impotence. The Spirit is God at gale force. Such antithesis lies behind Jn. iii. 1-8. The sub-personal concept of this Spirit persists throughout the New Testament wherever such words as 'outpouring', 'giving', 'poured out', 'sealing' are used (*e.g.* Ac. ii. 38, x. 45; Rom. v. 5; 2 Cor. i. 22; 1 Th. iv. 18). Simon Magnus'

crazy bid to purchase the power with money (Ac. viii. 18ff.) is only conceivable on this assumption. On the other hand a more animistic, personal view is implied in the expression 'to lie to the Holy Spirit' (Ac. v. 3) and the guidance of Philip (Ac. viii. 29). Luke has a strong doctrine of the Holy Spirit in his two-volumed work on Christian beginnings so that it is difficult to tell how far his references betray his own doctrinal tendencies, but it is clear that we have to reckon with two concepts in the early Church, parallel to the Old Testament; on the one hand, a personal power taking possession of a man daemonically and over-riding his natural powers with supernatural ones, and on the other, an impersonal force which fills and overflows a man like a fluid, or inflates him to new dimensions with a pneumatic blast. Perhaps, since we are speaking of God Himself in action, both figures are needed to correct each other.

Alongside this dualism is another, also paralleled in the Old Testament, between the possession of the Spirit as a permanent endowment or 'seal' and possession by the Spirit for specific occasions and tasks. Again, these two are not incompatible. All believers were believed to enjoy the former and to have received the gift normally at baptism unless special defects in knowledge prevented it (Ac. ii. 38; xi. 47; viii. 15-17; xix. 1-6).

R. Bultmann reckons that two potential dangers were latent in the early doctrine of the Spirit which spelt possible danger for the Church. On the one hand, if special deeds of power were to be regarded as signs of endowment, then there would be a tendency toward the Hellenistic idea of the 'divine man' in place of the Christian. This tendency did in fact break out and shows itself in the extant legendary apocryphal Acts of the Apostles. Paul cautions against this kind of arrogance in 1 Cor. xiii. On the other hand, if the Spirit were held to be in subjective emotional experiences, the result might be individualistic ecstasy or mysticism in which the divine and the demonic would become indistinguishable. Paul foresaw this hazard too (1 C. xii. 2f.).

Paul on the Spirit. The man who did most to avert these disasters was Paul. As A. M. Hunter puts it, he did not originate the doctrine but advanced it in that he moralized, personalized and christianized it. Paul is the only writer in the New Testa-

ment who understands the Spirit as the power for ethical living (Gal. v. 22ff.; Rom. viii. 14). John Baptist demanded repentance as a pre-condition of and preparation for the gift, in this going beyond the prophecy of Joel. Jesus endorsed his demand when He announced that the Spirit-Age had arrived (Mk. i. 15) Peter too made moral reckoning a condition (Ac. ii. 38). But it was left to Paul to conceive the indwelling Spirit as the source of moral renewal. Further, 'Grieve not the Holy Spirit of God' (Eph. iv. 30) fully personalized Him. What does Dr. Hunter mean when he says that Paul 'christianized' the concept? He does not mean that Paul identified Christ with the Spirit, for he recognizes that such an exegesis of 2 Cor. iii. 17 is doubtful. He means rather that Paul fully integrates the manifestations of the power of the Spirit within the Church, in 'helps' and 'governments' and all the *charismata* of worship (1 Cor. xii) with the work of Christ. What contemporary Judaistic belief thought of as a crude miracle of a future Messianic age, Paul taught as manifesting in the present the power of the resurrection (Rom. viii; 1 Cor. xv). Paul may be said to have gone further and 'theologized' the idea of the Spirit, that is, achieved a fuller expression than his predecessors of the full Deity of the Spirit. Much of the language used of Him might if taken alone be regarded as describing an agent at work under God, or God in action in a sub-personal way. Paul conceives of the Spirit as privy to the mind of God as a man's thoughts are open only to his own mind (1 Cor. ii. 11). Only the Fourth Gospel, in the Paraclete passages, has so high a view of the Spirit as this. The trinitarian formula occurs fairly frequently in Scripture (*e.g.* Mt. xxviii. 19; Rom. i. 1-4; xv. 30; 2 Cor. xiii. 14; Col. i. 3-8 *etc*) but the doctrine of the Three in One is a much later product, a logical construct from the revelational evidence. AV. 1 Jn. v. 7 is, of course, not genuine.

The Sacraments

Baptism: Dominical Institution. Jesus could not Himself within His lifetime (Mt. xxviii. 19; Ac. i. 5) positively ordain a rite of

initiation into the Church because, as the evangelist explains (Jn. vii. 39), as yet the Spirit had not been given. The logic of John's disparagement of his own limited form (Lk. iii. 16), the early Church's critical rating of it (Ac. i. 5; xi. 16; xix. 1-5) and the figurative use in Mk. x. 38f. argue that Jesus found a mere water-lustration symbolically defective; for which reason, perhaps, He did not personally administer it (Jn. iv. 2). John's baptism, which was no crude *opus operatum*, but effective only on moral conditions (Mt. iii. 2, 8, 11), offered security from shipwreck in the cloudburst of wrath that was to flood the world on the irruption of the reign of God (Mt. iii. 2,7). The Messianic baptism, by contrast, would be at once a kiln-firing by immersion in the very element of judgement, the very storm of wrath, itself and an unction of the promised Spirit by which the rule of God should be established (Lk. iii. 16; Is. xxxii. 15; Ezek. xxxix. 29; Jl. ii. 28ff.). By this reasoning John's baptism ought to have evaporated. It appears, however, that Jesus endorsed its appropriation and adaptation (Jn. iv. 1; iii. 22) as an oath of allegiance to Himself (and hence the formula 'in His name', Ac. ii. 38, *etc*); and that His own submission (Mt. iii. 14f.) marked His formal ratification.

Pre-Pauline and Pauline Innovations. Christian, but not necessarily Hellenistic, additions were threefold: the sealing by the Name (1 C. i. 13; 2 C. i. 22; Eph. i. 13; iv. 30; Ac. viii. 16), the bestowal of the Spirit (Ac. ii. 38; viii. 16, 18; xi. 17; 1 Jn. ii. 20) and the elevation to the resurrection state (Rom. vi. 4-7; Col. ii. 12; iii. 1). Conceivably the disciples had already introduced the first within the lifetime of Jesus. The second is a post-resurrection phenomenon, an 'advance payment' or first instalment' (*arrhabōn*, 2 Cor. i. 22; v. 5; Eph. i, 14) of the eschatological out-pouring. The endowment was not inevitably, invariably and automatically connected with the due performance of the rite (1 C. x. 1-5; Ac. xix. 1-7; Jn. xx, 22). The interpretation of baptism as a dramatic representation of dying and rising again with Christ, and a proleptic actualization of the resurrection condition, must be secondary because the ceremony does not suit the symbolism of burial. Close analogy with initiation ceremonies into the Mystery Religions argues, but does not establish, a relation of dependence and derivation,

perhaps merely of invitation. Nor did Paul originate it (Rom. iv. 6. Do you not know . . . ?) Paul's own view is conditioned by the thought of incorporation into the body of Christ (1 C. xii. 13; Gal. iii. 27f.) which is rather a development of initiation into the redeemed community than induction to a state. If, as seems most likely, 1 C. xv. 29 refers to a peripheral practice of vicarious baptism on behalf of deceased relatives to ensure their participation in the final resurrection, some at least in the early Church must have thought the rite effected the results symbolized. But Paul did not hold this view. Participation in Christ's death takes place outside baptism also (cf. Rom. vi. 4-7 with Gal. ii. 19f.; vi. 14; Rom. vii. 4). Where effects are magically ensured exhortation is superfluous (Rom. vi. 11f.).

Sacramentalism. Allusions in books written by or under the influence of Paul to rebirth (Tit. iii. 5; Jn. iii. 3, 5; 1 Pet. i. 3, 23) and illumination (Heb. vi. 4; x. 32; Eph. i. 18) are probably all indirect references to baptism. It is a mistake to regard these as evincing a higher degree of sacramentalism or as the adoption of technical terms from the Mystery Religions. Sacramental efficiency was probably implicit from the start, albeit dependant on moral and spiritual conditions. Baptism in Scripture is not something a man does or does not to himself but that he submits to and receives. The New Testament writers were alive to the dangers of formalism (1 Pet. iii. 21). The Sacrament of Christian baptism is not directly mentioned in the Fourth Gospel although oblique allusions appear at Jn. iii. 5; xix. 34. The reasons for this cryptology are considered below in relation to the Lord's Supper. The story of the feet-washing (Jn. xiii. 3-20) does not merely supply an answer to the clumsy question, Who administered Christian baptism to the Twelve?; it explains more, that only that baptism joins men to Jesus, which is received at His own hand. This is John's anti-sacramentalist polemic.

The Lord's Supper

Dominical Institution. Did Jesus institute a cultic feast as a memorial of His death to be recurrently celebrated until

His return? There are three independent accounts; the Pauline (1 Cor. xi. 23–26), the Markan (Mk. xiv. 22–25, on which Mt. depends), and the Lukan (Lk. xxii. 16–19a; to which the Western reading 19b–20 is added from 1 C. xi). Their witness does not coincide. Of the two motifs, the sacrificial and the eschatological, Mark gives precedence to the first, Luke preserves only the second, and Paul holds both in balance, but with the latter transmuted. Which motif is the more original? The eucharistic prayer in the Didache, which clearly derives from a pre-Hellenistic, Palestinian source is eschatological throughout and makes no mention of the death. If ‘body’ in Luke xxii. 19a refers to the oneness of mystical fellowship (cf. 1 C. xii. 12f.) rather than the brokenness of death, Luke appears to concur and to preserve the more ancient emphasis. It seems likely, however, that Luke had a reference to the cup and therefore to the sacrificial death before the Pauline substitution. Both stresses are equally original. Jesus was acting a parable in which the Twelve stood proxy for the Israel-to-be. He was anticipating both the heavenly banquet which was a standard feature of the Age to come (cf. Mt. v. 6; viii. 11; xxii. 2; Lk. xiv. 15ff.) and also the covenant-union which He purposed His death should seal. The first element had already been adumbrated publically in the feeding of the five-thousand (Mk. vi. 32–44; Lk. ix. 11–17), whilst the foreshadowing of the second had been the subject only of private communications to His select disciples (Mk. viii. 31f.; ix. 9f., 31f.; x. 32–34, 45). The difficulty is that the eschatological references in Mk. xiv. 25 and Lk. xxii. 16 seem to envisage immediate entry upon the final reign of God without an interval, whereas Paul construes the words of institution to embody a command to repeated commemoration during an adjournment of the Advent. Even if 1 C. xi. 26 were discounted as Paul’s gloss, the words ‘remembrance’ and ‘as often as’ which are embedded in the very words of institution (1 C. xi. 24f.) would maintain the problem. It is inconceivable that Paul or any one of his predecessors should have interpolated them on his own authority. Paul claims to have received and be transmitting a tradition deriving from Jesus Himself (1 C. xi. 23) The antecedents of *anamnēsis* are Jewish (Exod. xiii. 9; Num. x. 10), not Hellenistic. The solution must

depend upon a total view of the intention of Jesus. If He meant to found a Church (*see below*) He might consistently have made provision for His influence to be kept live in it.

Pre-Pauline and Pauline Innovations. Some scholars have argued that the sacrament took its origin in the table fellowship of the common meals which Jesus shared with His disciples when He pronounced a grace or prayer of thanksgiving (*eucharist*). The celebration was originally in one kind only because wine formed no part of a poor man's meal. Hence the primitive title 'Breaking of Bread' (Ac. ii. 42, 46; xx. 7), the setting within the ordinary daily meal (Mk. xiv. 18, 22; Lk. xxii. 14; 1 C. xi. 25), and the meal-time appearances at which wine is not mentioned (Lk. xxiv. 30; Jn. xxi. 12-14). Paul is supposed to have added to this simple table tryst a re-enactment of the Last Supper, transforming it into a cultic banquet after the manner of the Mystery Religions at which initiates might participate in the death and resurrection of the chosen deity. The Corinthians could only have secularized their table communion (1 C. xi. 20-22, 23f.) if they did not know that it should be taken to stage again the Lord's death (1 C. xi. 26) and their taking part in it (1 C. xvi.; xi. 27-29). Paul was teaching them a new thing.

According to this view the Pauline doctrine has developed the original institution in five respects: (i) the cultic transformation of the Last Supper (ii) the symbolism of breaking the bread and pouring out the wine (1 C. xi. 24 RSV marg. 25 cf. Mk. xiv. 24) (iii) the perpetuation as a memorial feast (iv) the communion with the risen Lord conceived as personally present in the act, *i.e.* the real presence (1 C. x. 4, 14-22 cf.; Lk. xxiv. 30; Jn. xxi. 12-14) (v) the flesh and blood of the risen Christ as supernatural food by which His life is transferred to participants (1 C. x. 3f., 16-22; xi. 29 cf. Jn. vi. 51-58). But as regards these: (i) Paul seems to have been responsible for only one innovation consisting in the separation of the Eucharist or Lord's Supper from the *Agape* or Love-feast, and not the identification of the former with the latter (1 C. xi. 20, 23f.) (ii) If Jesus alluded to His sacrificial death He must almost inevitably have exploited the obvious symbolism (iii) To have established a memorial on the style of the Old Testament festivals to keep green the gratitude of the redeemed (*e.g.* Exod. xii. 14; xiii. 9) is in

keeping with Jesus' aim of founding a New Gospel (see below) (iv) and (v) which features are absent from the words of institution in any of the extant recounts and approximate most closely to the theory of the Mysteries, are not peculiar to Paul but common to all with a Hellenistic background.

John and After. A remarkable feature of the Fourth Gospel is the absence of an institution narrative. Its place is taken by the feet-washing (Jn. xiii. 1-11). At the same time a discourse on the bread of life arising out of the feeding of the five-thousand is the occasion for sacramental theorizing (Jn. vi. 26-35, 41, 47-58); and baptism finds mention in the same covert manner (Jn. iii. 5; xix. 34). Why is this? One possible answer is that already by the turn of the century mention of the sacraments is suppressed by a *disciplina arcani*. Another is that the omission is part of John's polemic against the identification of the Last Supper with a Passover Meal (Jn. xiii. 1; of Mk. xiv. 12, 16, 17). The fuller reason is rather that the Gospel was written not so much to divulge fresh information as to furnish an authoritative interpretation. John's total understanding of the Last Supper must be gathered partly from the theology of chapter six, and partly from his peculiar theological position. The final discourses, comprising a commentary upon a concluding theophany to a whole life of theophany, include the Paraclete sayings (Jn. xiv. 16, 26; xv. 26; xvi. 7) which teach the risen Lord's presence in a new mode (compare Paul). The discourse of chapter six speaks of eating flesh and blood in what looks like crude material terms which are deliberately set against the foil of misunderstanding (Jn. vi. 52). The bottom hinge of John's sacramental theology is that the procession of the Spirit depends upon the prior glorification of the Son in death (Jn. vii. 39; xii. 23; xx. 22 and the Paraclete promises). The bestowal of life comes only through the Spirit. John must then consistently avoid an account of the Last Supper which might suggest that Jesus could distribute the effects of His death before it had occurred. The top hinge is that the most realistic language of feeding on flesh and blood is only tolerable if the Spirit be understood figuratively (Jn. vi. 63).

Outside the New Testament Ignatius takes the trend a stage further when he describes the communion elements as the

'medicine of immortality' (Ad. Eph. xx. 12). This is usually taken to represent Johannine theology at its logical terminus, but it is only fair to say that John would have repudiated the implication of immortality by dosage and that neither he nor Paul can be held guilty of Ignatius' replacement of their present foretaste of the future by his endless enjoyment of the timeless.

The Church

The Intention of Jesus. Did Jesus really mean to found a new religious community to which Gentiles would be recruited, or did He seek only the reformation of Israel through the medium of another Jewish sect? J. Jeremias points out that Jesus condemned the foreign missions of the Pharisees (Mt. xxiii. 15) and within His lifetime forbade His disciples to preach to non-Jews (Mt. x. 5). He expressly limited His own mission to the house of Israel (Mt. xv. 24) making exceptions only for the most importunate Gentiles (Mk. vii. 26; Mt. viii. 5ff.), a policy confirmed by Paul's description of His ministry (Rom. xv. 8). Verses which presuppose the Gentile Mission *e.g.* Mk. xiii. 10; xiv. 9; Mt. v. 13f.) or its inception by the risen Christ (Mt. xxviii. 19) are rated inferior evidence of His historical purpose. Similarly Jn. iv. 21-26, 41f. is supposed to illustrate Church hindsight.

On the other hand, within the Synoptic record, His breaking off the reading of Isa. lxi. if. before reaching the reference to God's vengeance on the Gentiles (Lk. iv. 16ff.), and His promise that they should have a share in salvation (Mt. viii. 18f.; xii. 41), an allusion to the Old Testament theme of the pilgrimage of the nations to Zion (Isa. ii. 2f.; Mic. iv. 1ff.), argues a less myopic view.

Albert Schweitzer opines that He may have thought of the elect from the heathen (Mt. xxi. 43) as destined to take the place of those among the elect of Israel who were disobeying His call (of the threat of John Baptist, Mt. iv. 9). For this reason He restricted His personal Mission to Israel because God Himself would appoint the Gentile candidates who were to fill up the number of the elect. The task which His commission did

not take in fell to Paul (Rom. xi. 13f., 25f.), who regarded the mystery of the inclusion of the Gentiles as a post-resurrection disclosure, and one with which he was peculiarly favoured (Eph. iii. 1-10). The germ of the formation of the Church lay, no doubt, in a unique loyalty demanded by Jesus the reward for which would be the future participation with the Son of Man in glory (Mt. v. 11f.; Mk. viii. 35ff.). If T. W. Manson is right, the Son of Man is a corporate, inclusive concept (so originally Dan. vii. 13 and 'the many' Mk. x. 45; xiv. 24 from Isa. liii. 11). Jesus was setting out to collect the true Remnant about Him to form the corporate entity, Son of Man. The description 'little flock' (Lk. xii. 32) exactly expresses the idea, and for that reason must surely be genuine. Every action of Jesus was studied. He set out to reconstitute Israel. His choice and appointment of the Twelve (Mk. iii. 14ff. and parallels) was an acted parable typifying and constituting a nuclear Israel. In the new world they were to be princes and patriarchs of a re-created People of God (Mt. xix. 27; Lk. xxii. 28ff.; Rev. xxi. 14) That is why Peter attached so much importance to making up the number and by the deliberately non-natural method of co-option by sacred sortilege (Ac. i. 22, 26). The crux at Mt. xvi. 18 coheres with this design. Jesus recognises Peter's confession that His Father has selected this member of the Twelve to be the first stone to be cemented to the foundation on which re-built Israel was to be erected (cf. 1 C. iii. 11; Eph. ii. 20ff.; 1 Pet. ii. 4ff.). But has the word *ekklēsia*, or its Aramaic or Hebrew equivalent, been read back on to the lips of Jesus? That depends on how the word was used in the early Church.

The Eschatological Congregation. Did primitive thought move from the idea of totality to the parts or from separate communities to the whole, from a 'catholic' concept of a transcendental entity manifesting itself in every place or from a 'congregationalist' picture of a host of little groups federating or amalgamating into one whole? In the Septuagint the Greek *synagōgē* as a rule is used to translate *ēedah*, the empirical congregation, whilst *ekklēsia* is reserved for *qahal*, the ideal covenant community, except that in the plural the latter is occasionally employed of separate meetings of people. Statistically nearly all

the New Testament occurrences of *ekklēsia* refer to local communities, a usage which probably owes more to the ordinary Greek for a public assembly of citizens duly summoned than to either the Septuagint plural or to etymology. No New Testament writer ever uses the singular as a collective, but very occasionally of a heavenly entity. (Eph. i. 22; v. 32f.). The Church idea, the concept of a spiritual seed or Remnant, a hidden band of loyalists who constitute a core of hope for the nation, has roots deep within the Old Testament (e.g. 1 Kg. xix. 14, 18; Isa. vi. 13; Ezr. ix. 2). Contemporary sectarian Judaism was full of the boast. *Ekklēsia* (*qahal*) on the lips of Jesus at Mt. xvi. 18 is a perfectly possible, and indeed probable, indication of His plan. Moreover, the currency of the New Israel concept in the New Testament is only explicable on the assumption that Jesus introduced it (Ac. iii. 25; Gal. vi. 16; Rom. ii. 29; Phil. iii. 3; Jas. i. 1; ii. 4-10; Rev. xxi. 9-14; Jn. iv. 22). The earliest Church had this awareness of being the 'congregation of Israel' at the 'end of days' (Ac. ii. 17ff.; xv. 14ff.) only because Jesus Himself had induced it.

The Body Concept. As time went on the Church lost the sense of proximity to the end of all things and began to come to terms with living in a pagan world. The Church ceased to be regarded as a dynamic fellowship of salvation galvanized by the Spirit, and came rather to be thought of as a static institution ruled over by priests who, as technicians in the sacred, were trained to draw strengthening grace from a cultic machine. The drift is already clearly discernable in the Apostolic Fathers. Can we also detect the trend within the New Testament? The plainest indication is supposed to be Paul's adoption and development of the body concept. F. F. Bruce (*New Peake* p. 938) notes a progression. At first he uses it as a mere simile by social analogy of the local congregation (1 C. xii. 12ff.; cf. vi. 15ff.; Rom. xii. 4). At this stage the head is one member amongst others. Later the figure of speech reaches beyond simile, Body and Head are set in hierarchical relation, and the application is to the Church catholic (Eph. i. 23; iv. 12; xv. 23; Col. i. 18; ii. 19). Radical scholars hold that Ephesians and Colossians are deutero-Pauline and represent a stage at which the concept had developed in a gnostic direction, when the

Church was conceived as a cosmic entity and celestial bride, as pre-existent and supramundane as the cosmic Christ Himself (so Eph. v. 25ff.; Col. i. 15ff.). Certainly these ideas appear shortly afterwards in the Apostolic Fathers (2 Clem. xiv. 1ff. Hermas Vis. ii. 4, 1; Ign Ad Smyr. i. 2; Ad Tr. xi. 2; Ad Eph. iv. 2). However, there is nothing peculiarly Greek or pagan or gnostic about the body-concept or the divine marriage that goes with it. There are four possible sources from which Paul could have derived the former: (i) the classical metaphor of the body of a commonwealth (ii) the eucharistic reference (1 C. x. 16f.) (iii) the Semitic category of social solidarity or corporate personality (iv) his own experience on the Damascus road (Ac. ix. 4 cf.; Mt. x. 40; xxv. 40). The first of these would not account for the catholic idea in Ephesians and Colossians. Possibly the last three were all united in Paul's mind by the doctrine of faith-union (Gal. ii. 20; Eph. v. 25). The idea of a divine marriage of God with Israel is writ large in the Old Testament (Ca.; Isa. lxi. 10; Hos. iii. 1ff. *etc*). There is no clear instance in the New Testament of an allusion to a pre-existent Church (the meaning of Rev. xii. 1ff. is extremely obscure).

The most noteworthy feature in the Pauline use of the body-concept is his care to stop short of such identification between Head and Body as would justify the highly misleading expression 'the extension of the Incarnation'. The combination with the marriage metaphor strengthens this resolve. The same care appears in John's use of the Old Testament image of the Vine (Jn. xii. 1f.). There is no gnostic confusion here, even if both writers have elevated the Church from earth to heaven. They are, of course, simply anticipating the eventual eschatological fulfilment of the union between the congregation of the last days and the Lord from the future.

The Ministry

The idea of the ministry matches the idea of the Church and the development in the one marches in step with development in the other.

The Provision of Jesus. Jesus made the very sketchiest administrative arrangements for the rule of the Church. The reason for this is not that He intended no such body but that He wanted it to be entirely Spirit-ruled in the interval before His return. Nor was this a foolhardy attitude in one who did not know the length of the interval. If the ultimate state of the heavenly community was to be awash with the Spirit there was no point in half-measures. The very lack of organisational detail was a deliberate policy (Mk. x. 35-45). The only provisions He did make were aimed to determine the specific nature of and encourage cohesion in the Church. These provisions were the appointment of the Twelve, the commissioning of Peter and the conferring of the power of the keys.

The twelve were not appointed to be office-holders in an institution but symbolic representatives of an ideal community and the cohesive core of its inception. They were the compendium of the New Israel, its fresh foundation (Eph. ii. 20 [perhaps]; Rev. xxi. 4). The fact that no two lists of their names agree suggests that their corporate significance exceeded their individual importance. Did Jesus Himself call them apostles? Luke says that He did (Lk. vi. 13) and Matthew associates their appointment with their dispatch on a mission (*apostellō*; Mt. x. 2, 5). Both depend on Mark who does not use the title in his account of their selection (Mk. iii. 14), although he does in connection with their mission (Mk. vi. 30). The Evangelists depict Jesus as sending the Twelve on a training course in Palestine in preparation for the world-wide mission that should follow His resurrection. Do they misrepresent Him any more than the Fourth Gospel which, without using the term 'apostle', portrays Jesus as commissioning the Twelve to be His witnesses (Jn. xiv. 26; xv. 27; xx. 21). Whether as a patriarchate or apostolate, their function was to be an active kernel of the New Israel to which true Jews should adhere. Jesus kept them by Him throughout His ministry (Mk. iii. 14) so that they might be His witnesses.

The primacy of Peter and the power of the keys are bedevilled by controversy but incontrovertibly scriptural. Peter received a special commission from the Chief Shepherd (Jn. x. 10; 1 Pet. v. 14; Heb. xiii. 20) to shepherd in His absence

(Mk. xiv. 27) not only the sheep of the little flock (Jn. xxi. 5; Lk. xii. 32) but also his fellow shepherds (Lk. xxii. 32). In different imagery, the authority of the keys wielded by the exalted Christ (Rev. i. 18; iii. 7) was vested in the apostles as a group (Mt. xviii. 15-20; Jn. xx. 23; Mk. xiii. 34) but the actual exercise of the prerogative conferred upon Peter (Mt. xvi. 19; Ac. v, 9). Peter was the first to be given a commission by the risen Christ (1 C. xv. 5; Lk. xxiv. 34 cf.; Gal. i. 16ff.; v. 9). The basis of this privileged position was not the possession of special qualities of intellect or character but the election of God. Jesus Himself did not choose him as He had selected the Twelve, but merely acknowledged His Father's nominee (Mt. xvi. 17). There was no question of Peter's being His sole vicar in His absence; the whole apostolate, even outside the Twelve, claimed this right (2 C. v. 20). Nor was Peter promised precedence at the Parousia; otherwise James and John could not have still contended for it (Mk. x. 37). Nor is there any word of a Petrine succession. The opportunity to mention it is not taken at Jn. xxi. 18f. If Peter appoints James his successor at Ac. xii. 17, which is extremely doubtful, it cannot be as leader of the Twelve. Nevertheless Jesus accorded to Peter a peculiar priority in the launching of the Church which polemical zeal has generally prevented Protestants from acknowledging.

Ecclesiastical Offices. The burning questions are (a) why within so short a time as the mid-second century there appeared first a diversification of offices within the Church, subsequently their graduation into a hierarchy and eventually the transformation of the institutional officials into entlic functionaries (b) to what extent this movement is already showing in the New Testament. The Church Order of the Pastorals is patently different from that in Ac. ii.

The twelve never ruled the Church as an exclusive college, although their special dignity continued to be recognized (1 C. xv. 5). Probably from the start the apostolate was a much wider body. To be one of the Twelve the qualifications were first-hand experience of Jesus from the time of John's baptism and witness of the resurrection (Ac. i. 21f.). To enjoy equal rank demanded a direct commission by revelation of the risen Lord (so Paul and James, 1 C. xv. 7ff.). But many others were apostles

(Ac. xiv. 4, 14; Rom. xvi. 7; 1 Th. ii. 6). The earliest Church was a pneumatocracy, ruled and guided by the Spirit (Ac. v. 3, 9; viii. 18ff., 29, 39; xiii. 2, 4 *etc.*). The wording of Gal. ii. 9 is not a jibe at the authority of the Jerusalem triumvirate but an accurate description of the indeterminate nature of their authority. The apostolate had an extensible complement and elastic function. The Twelve, no doubt, first set the norm of doctrine and association (Ac. ii. 42 cf.; 1 Jn. ii. 19) and tried to retain supervisory rights over the whole Church (Ac. viii. 14ff.; xi. 22) but it was not long before their rudimentary machinery of government could not cope with the explosion of membership. Each apostle was then presumably left to be responsible for the Churches of his own planting.

Since events overtook the inadequate administrative structure the theory of the ministry must be largely *ex post facto*. James, who appears to have enjoyed some sort of presidency in Jerusalem (Ac. xii. 17; xv. 2, 18) might well have founded a caliphate had not the Gentile Mission brought in the Greek world to redress the balance of the Jewish. Perhaps because the Twelve were being scattered (Ac. xii. 2, 17) the rule in Jerusalem began to pass into the hands of elders (Ac. xv. 4, 6, 22; xxi. 18) on the model of the synagogues. Events overtook the Apostles in the election of the seven Hellenistic 'deacons' (Ac. vi. 1f.). The Twelve did not appoint them but only ratified their popular election (Ac. vi. 3ff.). One of their number, Stephen, began immediately to usurp the authority and function of the Apostles in exercising a preaching task which they had reserved to themselves (Ac. vi. 2, 10ff.).

All these facts suggest that in the earliest Church there was no clear idea of the ministry, and in particular, no clear distinction of function. Later, there becomes apparent a distinction between officials of the institution and *charismatics* *i.e.* persons whose only authority derives from manifesting 'spiritual gifts'. At first probably all officials were *charismatics*. In the Pastorals the emphasis has changed and the qualifications for a bishop or deacon began to read like the job description for an advertisement in *The Guardian* (1 Tim. iii. 1ff.). The names now stand for substantive ranks in an establishment which has settled to the expectation of permanency in history.

The bishop has not yet been raised and singled out as in Ignatian nonepiscopacy.

Theories of Development

Space forbids an attempt to answer the questions whether the changes noticed may properly be said to be an unfolding of elements already present at the start or represent injections of novelty from extraneous sources, or whether, again, they were bound to occur by some necessity of logic, history or revelation. Many dogmatic theories have been propounded, of degeneration from pristine purity, of immanent entelechy, of *ad hoc* revelations to selected apostles. The theory expounded in the New Testament itself is of the transmission from Christ and the Apostles of a fixed tradition (1 Th. ii. 13; iv. 1; 2 Th. ii. 15; iii. 6; Gal. i. 9; 1 C. xi. 2, 23; xv. 1, 3; Rom. ii. 16; Phil. iv. 9; Col. ii. 6; Jude. iii; 2 Pet. ii. 21). In the Pastorals the *paradosis* (tradition, transfer, transmission) becomes (1 Tim. vi. 20; 2 Tim. i. 12, 14; ii. 2) the *parathēkē* (desposit, trust) of 'the Faith'. Two things should be noticed in this theory (i) The Apostles are thought of not as receiving additional impartations of information by revelation (1 C. xv. 1; Gal. i. 18; ii. 2) but only as being inspired with a fresh and deeper understanding (Gal. i. 11, 17; 2 C. xii. 1-4; and the Paraclete passages in Jn.) The theory itself undergoes development; the Pastorals admit, in effect, that the age of discovery or formative period is past in the change-over from a dynamic to static metaphor.

PETER E. COUSINS, M.A., B.D.

Modern Educational Trends: A Christian Perspective¹

Synopsis

THE essay begins with an analysis of the causes of current uncertainty in education. Today the generally accepted objective is individual self-fulfilment. The relationship of this to Christianity is discussed and it is shown both that only Christian education can achieve this aim and that religious education cannot justly be condemned as a conditioning process. A discussion of the problems of discipline and the education of the whole child makes it clear that, while seeking individual fulfilment has had beneficial results, it involves a danger that other Christian values may be overlooked. The tripartite system of secondary education is condemned as wrong and also undesirable, for grammar school as well as modern school pupils. Finally, it is suggested that the Christian's duty is to accept truth, whoever speaks it, but to supplement human incompleteness in the light of God's self revelation.

Society in Doubt

'The mind of a nation,' writes Spencer Leeson, *Christian Education* (p. 83), 'is reflected in its schools.' This is too often forgotten, both by the nation and by those concerned with education. The nation demands that the schools maintain standards which have implicitly been rejected by the community as a whole, as if the playground wall were a bastion against the divisive and destructive forces of the twentieth century. Educators are prone to plan for an ideal society,

¹*The Langhorne Orchard prize-winning Essay for 1964*

ignoring that in which they must work. This means that it is useless to demand some sort of 'clear lead' from our schools in 1965. They are as gravely afflicted as the rest of society with the 'sick hurry and divided aims' deplored by Matthew Arnold a century ago. The teacher facing his class is himself a prey to the uncertainties and doubts of the mid-twentieth century; he cannot communicate a certainty that he does not feel.

For centuries education proceeded on the strength of certain basic assumptions. Thus it was assumed that society was stable, and that children must be trained to play their part in that station of life to which it had pleased God to call them, whether as leaders or led. The existing social order was underpinned by divine sanctions. Authority was exercised and accepted in an unquestioning way impossible to us who live in a post-Nazi age. Children had duties rather than rights and the adult's prerogative to impose his views and wishes was self-evident. Awkward questions about the subjects taught were answered with confidence in the theory that aptitudes might be transferred, so that the moral and intellectual stamina needed to learn to recite the rivers of Britain might later be applied to the business of living.

Three important factors largely account for the current uncertainty of those concerned with education. First, the mere scale and speed of social change. We have the impossible task of discerning trends, and extrapolating from these, in an attempt to predict what sort of society we are training our children for. Over and beyond the uncertainties implicit in this, we are faced by the question: assuming that we know the nature of the new society, how can we best train its future members? New conditions demand new measures, but how can we be sure what new measures are needed? Here the Christian has no special light to guide him. It is none the less true for being a cliché that his faith may show him what ends he should work for, but has nothing to say about what means are best adapted to secure those ends. Thus his religion will lead him to agree with the colleague who asserts on grounds of national self-interest, that we must remove the barriers that divide society, but he can give no easy 'Christian' answer to the question of what measures should be adopted to achieve this.

Yet it would be wrong to under-estimate the significance of a robust Christian faith in an age of uncertainty. A second important factor in the climate of opinion is the study of psychology. Here far-reaching and debatable conclusions are too often drawn from the limited and objective findings of research. An outstanding example may be seen in the current tendency to regard wrong-doing as the symptom of psychic disorder rather than evidence of a misdirected will. The wrong-doer needs sympathy, not condemnation; treatment, not punishment. Now the sincere Christian did not need Freud to tell him that the heart is deceitful and desperately sick; and he has good precedent for showing sympathy to the wrong-doer. But he cannot countenance any attempt to evade human responsibility, nor, if he accepts the teaching of Jesus as recorded in the gospels, may he reject retributive punishment.

Another example of the impact of psychology on education is the greater importance now attached to the emotional factor. Traditionally, teachers have been concerned to develop the minds of their pupils. True, the great teachers have always protested that education involves more than the intellect, but in practice (and even since Arnold of Rugby) it has been generally accepted that training the mind must be the first priority and that this, if rightly done, would entail development of the whole personality. The psychologist insists on the importance of emotional development, not only alongside intellectual training, but even as a pre-requisite to it. The Christian, who knows that in God's wisdom it was not by wisdom that men came to know God (1 Cor. i. 21), readily accepts the implications of this for the curriculum and organisation of the school.

Perhaps the strongest factor producing doubt and hesitation is the spirit of enquiry that characterizes modern man. The condition of scientific advance is unceasing questioning of all presuppositions, and the attitude that has proved fruitful in science has extended to all aspects of life. Whereas, formerly, prejudice favoured what was established and accepted, today the reverse is the case and change tends to be valued for its own sake. The onus of proof lies with those who defend the old ways. This questioning is not limited even to such important matters

as the nature of the teacher's authority, the subjects in the curriculum and the organization of secondary education. It is a commonplace to say that we have been living upon our spiritual capital. For some time it was accepted that although the Christian foundations of English education were crumbling, yet some good might result from religious teaching and that right thinking people were in any case agreed about the superstructure, whatever the state of the foundations. Today such agreement can no longer be taken for granted, and the child's right to Christian teaching is vociferously denied.

The Importance of the Individual

In all this uncertainty, educators have agreed in one absolute affirmation. Uncertain about society, uncertain about God, they insist on the supreme importance of the individual. Thus, *Education: its Data and First Principles* Nunn (p. 13): 'Educational efforts must... be limited to securing for everyone the conditions under which individuality is most completely developed – that is to enabling him to make his original contribution to the variegated whole of human life as full and truly characteristic as his nature permits; the form of the contribution being left to the individual as something which each must, in living and by living, forge out for himself.' Similarly, Jacks (*Modern Trends in Education* p. 113): 'Human perfection must be (education's) first objective.' It is not clear how this attribution of ultimate value to the individual can be justified on rational grounds. Nunn indeed writes (p. 25): 'There is more than physics and chemistry in even the humblest animal... the history of life (is) a striving towards the individuality which is expressed most clearly and richly in man's conscious nature.' It is assumed here that man *ought* to direct his efforts along the lines laid down by 'the history of life'; but such an assumption is open to the same objections as invalidate all attempts to move from "is" to "ought".

Whatever the grounds for this affirmation, it is widely accepted and of fundamental importance. We shall see that it is closely linked with such diverse issues as religious education,

discipline in schools, the decreasing importance of the parents' rôle, and the spread of comprehensive education.

Christianity and the Individual

At first sight, a philosophy of education based on individual fulfilment seems to have little to commend itself to the Christian. Human depravity is not only asserted by Paul; it is assumed by Jesus (Matt. vii. 11; Mark vii. 20-23), who calls upon His disciples to take up the cross of death to their self-centred way of life. Again, we remember the note of demand, of uncompromising authority, sounded throughout the Bible. Man's role must be one of creaturely obedience to the revealed 'Thus saith the Lord.' The Baptist's words concerning Jesus express the ideal relationship between God and man, master and disciple: 'He must increase but I must decrease' (John iii. 30). In the light of this, much recent educational theory stands condemned. The Christian cannot accept that human nature is like a beautiful plant which, given the right environment (and here alone, on this view, lies the teacher's duty), will grow to exquisite maturity. Such a view owes more to Rousseau and romanticism than to observation and common sense, let alone revelation. But it is fair to say that few educationists would defend the position that the way to achieve individual fulfilment is to aim directly for it. Man is a social animal and cannot reach maturity apart from social influences. If individual excellence exists it can be appreciated only against the background of such a norm, indeed it can only be achieved against such a background. Jesus said that the man who wishes to save his life must lose it, and this statement is related to (though by no means identical with) the truth that the only way to self-realisation lies through self-forgetfulness and absorption in some cause or group transcending the individual.

It is important that Jesus spoke in favourable terms of this desire to "save" one's life. In spite of all that has already been said, human perfection is an important objective of the Christian faith. 'I am come that they might have life and might

have it more abundantly' (John x. 10). Paul's metaphor of the body is based on the principle of differentiation and the place of the unique individual in the common life. Individual selfhood is deeply engrained in the Christian revelation. The Bible claims that in man God has chosen to create a being capable of defying Him. This act of defiance has not been followed by a violent repudiation of man's self-hood; on the contrary, God condescends to appeal: 'Come, let us reason together' (Isa. i. 18). His purpose is that man should respond as a person in the encounter of two individuals, and that ultimately the world should be peopled with individual men and women who have freely chosen to live in fellowship with their Creator and with one another, and thus to attain true human dignity as members of the new Creation made in the likeness of the Last Adam. It is this divine concern for the individual that leads Paul to describe his fellow as 'one for whom Christ died' (Rom. xiv. 15).

This is why freedom to follow the dictates of conscience matters so much to Christians. Compulsion or legal prohibition in the religious sphere offend against the principle that man must be free to accept or reject the love of God. To demand external obedience is worse than useless. God does not want it. He is not deceived by it. If the man who offers it believes that he is pleasing God then he is deceiving himself in a matter of grave urgency. This concern for a genuine, free, individual response is strikingly similar to the existentialist attitude to life. Sartre is an atheist, but the Christian will share his horror of *mauvaise foi*. Secondhand attitudes and conventional responses could be instilled into our pupils, and this might seem, to a superficial glance, very convenient to society, but such a policy ignores the way in which God has made man and chosen to deal with him. In the long run to stifle spontaneity means death to society. The Christian can no longer be content to train a child for 'that station in life to which it has pleased God to call him.' He has a duty to society which can be fulfilled only as the children in his charge achieve full development and are thus able to make their distinctive contribution to the common life. He dare not presume upon his status as adult or teacher in order to lay down the lines along which development must take place. Only God knows the potentialities of each individual He has

formed, and the teacher is answerable to God for his share in frustrating or fostering these unique gifts.

The danger is plain that the educational process, thus understood, may produce 'genuine' and 'spontaneous' individuals who will recognise no law above their own whim. There is much common ground between Christian and secularist in meeting this danger. Negatively they will insist that the freedom of other members of society to achieve fulfilment must be safeguarded; whatever might theoretically be the case, the individual must in fact live with others whose rights are to be respected. On the positive side it will be pointed out that 'it is not good that . . . man should be alone' (Gen. ii. 18), or, to put it in other terms, that he is a social animal who can develop as a human being only through involvement with others. Not only (to speak as a Christian) must I refrain from harming my neighbour; I must actively seek his good. Thus far we can expect agreement, but the Christian will wish to go further and to enter a region where the secularist cannot follow. Jesus laid down two conditions of human development; one we have mentioned – love to the neighbour. But He also spoke of love to God. Basic to the human condition must be reverence, humility, creatureliness. If God exists, then an outlook on life that sees man as self-sufficient is radically unbalanced and will result in a distorted individualism. Perhaps the secularist will admit the value of such an element. He may seek to foster a sense of mystery and depth in experience; but there is always a danger of narcissism when a man who does not acknowledge God clothes some other entity – even truth, humanity or beauty – with the divine majesty.

Undoubtedly the current tendency to see the ultimate aim of education in personal development corresponds to an important element in the Christian faith. Such a secularist view may even allow for the need to curb and control man's sinful nature. It may admit that a sentiment of reverence is desirable and seek to establish it. But all this would be described by the theologian as belonging to the realm of common, not saving grace. Man's chief end, the Christian believes, is to glorify God and to enjoy Him for ever. Thus full selfhood, complete personal fulfilment, can be achieved only through a

personal relationship with God. Nothing less than this will suffice to destroy all that hinders self-realization. Only in serving God can perfect freedom be found. The Christian teacher sees in this relationship, which transcends the educational process, the sole hope of achieving the end for which the process exists.

Religious Education

Personal committal to God in Christ and a consequent transformation of life, while they transcend the educational process, are not unconnected with it. 'How are they to believe in him of whom they have never heard?' (Rom. x. 14). If individual fulfilment is to be the goal of education, and if individual fulfilment in the deepest sense depends upon Christian discipleship, then Christianity must be taught in our schools. The teaching of Christianity was written into the 1944 Education Act and is obligatory in all maintained schools, a state of affairs that has aroused the hostility of a small but vocal minority, and gives uneasiness to some who are in general well disposed to Christianity and even to convinced Christians. A recent survey carried out by National Opinion Polls in March 1965, and reported in *New Society* on May 27th, has provided defenders of the provisions of the 1944 Act with a powerful argument. An overwhelming majority (over 90 per cent) of those questioned wished religious education to continue as at present. In a democracy there is presumably no more to be said. The nation wishes its children to be educated thus; if a minority of humanists object, let them found their own schools. The 1944 Act still represents the wishes of the nation as a whole.

On what grounds is the objection based? Why should this part of the curriculum alone attract so much attention? Plainly children should learn the facts about the Christian faith and, to a lesser extent, about other faiths, simply as part of their knowledge of the world and its inhabitants. Nobody can reasonably object to this. We may even go further and agree that children should be given some appreciation of what is meant by

religious experience. We do not consider a man educated unless he knows what it is to respond to beauty, for aesthetic experience is part of the human condition. It could be argued that, just as one function – some would say the most important – of a poetry or music lesson is to help the members of the class to *experience* poetry or music, so one function of religious education should be to enable pupils to experience what religion is about. As we have already seen, there are non-Christians who would to some extent agree with this, because of the value they would attach to feelings of reverence and wonder.

The fundamental objection, however, is not to the teaching of Christianity, but to its being taught *as true*. In other lessons, it is said, pupils are trained to collect and evaluate evidence and to reject what cannot be verified. Conclusions are reached which would be accepted by all, or almost all, rational beings. This is not the case with Christianity, which claims to be objectively true, but is indemonstrable. What makes the procedure even more disreputable is that it is children who are being taught thus. They are not yet capable of rational judgement, even if they possessed the data, and long before the age when they can make a decision they have been indoctrinated. This last accusation has carried weight with some Christians, who believe that respect for personality demands the end of religious education in schools, at any rate in its present form.

The word 'indoctrination' is certainly an ugly one. It suggests the sort of cynical conditioning practised by a totalitarian regime. Yet W. R. Niblett (*Education and the Modern Mind* pp. 54f.) does not scruple to write: 'Everyone has to be deeply and significantly indoctrinated from very early in life if he is going really to be a member of any community or nation.' He quotes from Coleridge's *Table Talk* 'I showed him my garden and told him that it was my botanical garden. "How so?" said he, "it is covered with weeds" – "Oh," I replied, "*that* is only because it has not yet come to its age of discretion and choice. The weeds, you see, have taken the liberty to grow, and I thought it unfair in me to prejudice the soil towards roses and strawberries!"' Today the secularist will not hesitate to inculcate respect for the individual. He will

train pupils to accept and to adopt democratic processes. Yet he would find it difficult to demonstrate their validity. Without doubt, the powerful support for religious education which we have noted derives largely from the realization, be it conscious or not, that the fundamental principles on which our society is based are Christian, and that without a Christian frame of reference they become at best weakened and at worst meaningless.

This does not mean that we may ignore the dangers implicit in the word 'indoctrination.' It is both wrong and unwise to treat people as if they were things. The cynical application of a near-Pavlovian conditioning process may arouse no scruples in the world of commerce, but the teacher – above all, the Christian teacher – will have nothing of it. If a man has been conditioned into a set of attitudes he may be conditioned out of them. The rational response of the whole man, not the conformism of an automaton, is the only sure foundation of social well-being. Over and above these claims of expediency, the Christian will remember that God calls men to choose freely whether they will acknowledge His claims or not; the Cross shows how real is the possibility of rejection.

Thus the objective of religious education will resemble that of training in the ideals and basic presuppositions of our society. Certain things will be presented as true and desirable and important. But the teacher will scrupulously avoid applying the sort of pressure which, used by an adult in authority, might induce a blind acceptance. He will be ready, indeed anxious, to discuss difficulties and to explore arguments against what he is teaching, and while freely admitting the impossibility of demonstrable proof will show the reasonableness of Christian positions. He hopes that the pupil will by an act of free choice commit himself to what he has been taught. Even should the choice be a negative one, it will at any rate have been made with a clear understanding of the issues involved. If this sort of teaching is wrong, then it is wrong not only in religious education but in a far wider context. But if this method is rightly followed in inculcating the convictions that nourish the roots of our society, then it is difficult to see how it is immoral when employed in teaching the Christian faith.

Discipline

There is much concern at what is felt to be a lack of discipline in our schools today. Standards of behaviour are said to have declined and teachers are accused of being unwilling to punish where punishment is needed. It is, of course, unreasonable to single out the schools in this connection. To repeat Spencer Leeson's words: 'The mind of a nation is reflected in its schools.' The same symptoms whose presence is deplored in the schools may equally be seen in the family, the factory and the office. Everywhere, standards once regarded as inflexible are yielding to pressure and persons in authority are unsure of how to exercise it.

Whatever the causes of this state of affairs, there can be no doubt that in the schools it is closely connected with the current concentration on the individual. Before seeing how this is so, we must rid our minds of the narrow, conventional idea of 'discipline.' By a sort of linguistic Gresham's law, the ideal of discipline as the attuning of a whole personality to the demands of a way of life or branch of study has degenerated into the stereotype of a sergeant-major or prison warden terrorizing the men in his charge. Whereas the teacher who is a 'good disciplinarian' should be the man through whom a class learns to experience and accept the demands made by a course of action or study he is usually thought of as the one who can most effectively impose his will on theirs.

In a school run on traditional lines, discipline derived from various sources. There was the discipline of academic achievement. Certain subjects were to be studied and if distinction – or even competence – in them were to be attained, then habits of order, diligence, control, must be established. This attitude was further sanctioned by the discipline of individual competition with the spur of public examination. The pupil who came top or who gained distinction was plainly superior to the one who came second or who gained only credit. Society accepted this, and so did the teacher, whose authority – another source of discipline – derives ultimately from society.

Today the study of a subject is thought of as a means rather than an end. It is the experience gained on the journey that

matters, rather than the destination reached. An examination pass in English Literature is in itself worthless; the important thing is the effect on the individual of his reading, that he should have enlarged his understanding of life and experienced the distinctive quality of this type of study. We have left far behind us the days when children were thought to derive some benefit from the mechanical learning of imperfectly understood and apparently irrelevant material. Everything studied must now be made interesting by being related to life and to the experience of the pupil. We learn mathematics by making a chicken coop, breeding hens and selling the eggs; and physics and mechanics by dismantling a motor car. Pupils may 'study' for the Duke of Edinburgh's Award in lessons and attend classes in make-up or rocket construction. Critics say that this is a false preparation for life, which demands that men give themselves to long spells of uninteresting and apparently unproductive work. It seems fair to reply that life provides some over-riding incentive; a man is not called upon to do dull and repetitive work for its own sake but always as a means to some end freely chosen; thus pupils learn to work hard in the context of some pursuit that has aroused their interest.

How can one assess the progress of a pupil in this case? Not, above all, by objective tests. Each individual is unique; how unjust and unreasonable to compare what is essentially different! The boy with an I.Q. of 100 has done well and deserves praise although his mark is only half that of his neighbour with an I.Q. of 150. The girl who has passed her Duke of Edinburgh test has worked as hard and developed herself as fully as the one who has gained an open scholarship. It is easy to jeer at this attitude and to say with the Dodo: 'Everybody has won and all must have prizes.' Yet the Christian will have much sympathy with these tendencies. 'Every one to whom much is given, of him will much be required' (Lukexii.48). God judges 'according to what a man has, not according to what he has not' (2 Cor. viii. 12). Similarly it is a good thing that the old tradition of ruthless competition, where it was a heinous sin to help your neighbour (shades of the Good Samaritan!) is being replaced by an atmosphere of friendly co-operation.

In spite of this, the trend is not without danger, as H. Wolff points out (*New Trends in English Education* pp. 184f.): 'The weakness . . . lies in . . . failure to provide any objective standards of progress . . . To place before the child the task of learning; of mastering something not easy; to foresee its difficulties and smooth its path, to persuade it of the value of honestly "having a go"; this is education . . . Any other approach leads to a "laissez-faire" attitude, and to a steady drop in standards of attainment.' Of course, the Christian as a citizen is not unconcerned about this risk, but beyond it he will discern another, more insidious and even more serious. It is what Wolff calls 'the failure to provide any objective standards.' We are in danger of making the individual the measure of all things. The aim of the artist is self-expression; in the ethical sphere, no action is wrong at all times and in all circumstances – it is the situation that counts; for the theologian, God is the name the individual gives to his own deepest concern. There is a grave possibility that the existence of an absolute will cease to be affirmed in any context. Certainly absolutes are in danger of departing from our schools; aims and achievements tend to be judged simply in terms of the capacity and needs of the individual.

At the same time, less respect is paid to the teacher in virtue of his position. This is just one example of the general decline in respect for authority, mentioned above. But it would be a mistake to imagine that teachers are in this respect helpless victims of a trend that they would resist if resistance were possible. Robin Pedley: (*The Comprehensive School* p. 174) refers to the way in which teachers today agree that 'a child's first need is love, and with love respect for the free growth of his personality: free, that is, from the arbitrary compulsion of elders, and disciplined instead by social experience.' Here we find a number of current educational commonplaces: the stress on individual development; the value assigned to "social experience" in the educative process; and the repugnance for external discipline. It should be noted that the ideal is not lack of discipline but a discipline freely chosen and self-imposed. This is not an unworthy ideal, and it has an important place in Christian ethics, as may be seen not only in the New Testament

distinction between the obedience of slaves and sons but also in the doggerel of 'Tis not do right because I must, But right because 'tis right.' The teacher's authority, on this view, does not proceed so much from his readiness to punish any infringement of the rules, as from the personal qualities he displays which evoke respect in his pupils. Pedley believes (p. 175) that 'today's friendliness between pupil and teacher is probably the greatest difference between the classrooms of 1963 and those of 1923.' This corresponds far more closely than does the traditional concept to the Christian view of divine authority as not arbitrary but grounded in God as the source of all goodness and value. This kind of mature and personally accepted self-discipline must surely be what we wish our children to learn.

Yet here too we encounter the danger of subjectivism. It is only a step from saying that authority should be personally and voluntarily accepted to saying that authority does not exist unless it is recognised. There is a risk that children trained in this way will grow up believing that God has no authority over them unless they allow it and that they may with impunity flout His will. For it is through human experience that we begin to learn about God and while there is an important element of truth in the viewpoint outlined above – and truth which must be affirmed – yet those who do not correct it by God's self-revelation are in danger of obscuring the existence of objective authority and of confusing the rule of law with tyranny. The divine imperative must be heard in our schools.

The Rôle of the Family

In general, education has been regarded as a matter of training the mind. This is certainly implicit in any system of examinations, which are designed to test how much candidates know. Arnold of Rugby set himself a larger task, and sought to strengthen body and character also. Although the maintained grammar schools claimed to imitate the 'public' schools in this, elementary education was largely concerned with the 'three R's.'

Increasingly we have come to see that education affects the whole man and cannot be restricted to the intellect. The brilliant mathematician or linguist who is emotionally immature is to this extent not a whole man. Manual skill, powers of imagination, a feeling for beauty – all these must be developed and take their place in a harmonious whole. Education must be a training for life, and life is not lived with the intellect only. We have already mentioned this tendency which transcends the sterile intellectualism that represents an undesirable part of our inheritance from Greece. The biblical idea of man as being a body-soul rather than being indwelt by some immaterial principle is more faithfully reflected in the current concern to educate the whole man.

It is also generally accepted that these educational benefits should not be reserved for children whose parents are both able and willing to pay for them. Enlightened self-interest alone would demand that the nation develop to the full its human assets. The Christian will approve of this for another reason also; the value set by God on each soul that He has created, each individual for whom Christ has died, makes it intolerable that children should be deprived of the chance to develop their gifts to the full. It is this concern that lies behind the free milk, subsidised school meal service and medical inspections, all concerned with the child's body and thus not at first sight touching his education. Today the physical health of our children is excellent; unfortunately the same cannot be said for their mental and emotional health. Teachers now realise that a child cannot do himself justice until psychological problems have been dealt with; this may involve trying to help the whole family, for it is rare to find an unstable individual coming from healthy environment. Part of the problem is the growing complexity of modern life, some of it inevitable (for example, increasing mechanization with its attendant strain) and some by contrast wholly unnecessary (for example, the incessant appeal of much advertising to our sexual and competitive tendencies.) Thus the schools feel they must help children to adjust to society by teaching both implicit and explicit on personal relationships, at home, at work, and between the sexes. All this is necessary, and too often if the schools do not take the respon-

sibility then nothing is done. But it cannot be denied that much of what is now being done by the schools has in the past been the responsibility of parents, whether or not that responsibility was effectively discharged.

The reluctance of parents to fulfil these responsibilities may in part be explained as due to the complexity of modern life and a national 'failure of nerve.' Whatever the reasons, the fact remains that parents are playing a decreasing part in the training of their children. This is happening at a time when the importance of the family is being stressed by psychologists as never before. Teachers also are realising that they can do little to mitigate the influence of a home whose standards are opposed to those of the school. The need for partnership between home and school is clearer than ever; but the school is taking over more and more of the parents' functions. The Roman Church deserves full credit for the way in which it has consistently asserted the priority of the family in God's plan for the child. All Christians must be concerned that parents should be encouraged to play a full part in the education of their children, not over against, but alongside the school. Yet there are still schools which will not tolerate a parent-teacher association; where, if one exists, its function is fund-raising; where no parent may speak to a teacher without making an appointment; where – incredible but true – there are notices in the playground marking the point beyond which parents may not go. The 1944 Act indeed pays lip-service to the ideal of parental choice in education, but this has proved a dead letter, and it sometimes appears as if the ideal parent (from the teacher's point of view) is the one who sends absence notes punctiliously and remains in all other respects incognito. Christian parents and teachers have a battle to fight on this front.

Selection and Rejection

Another provision of the 1944 Act which has attracted an increasing volume of criticism is the tripartite division of

secondary education. From the start there were some who felt this was wrong, but lately their numbers have been growing and it is plain that the tripartite system is doomed. In its simple form it is open to one overwhelming criticism: that human beings do not divide neatly and without residue into three categories at ten-plus (the age at which selection in fact occurs) or at any other age. To believe that they did was an administrator's pipe dream, and an outstanding exception to the generally accepted principle of studying the needs of the individual. It should be pointed out that the comprehensive system may also make an appeal on grounds of tidiness and administrative convenience. In a bureaucratic age there is a temptation to treat human beings as units not people and to accept solutions, in education and elsewhere, because they are convenient. This strikes at the roots of the Christian view of man and must always and everywhere be resisted.

To do them justice, those responsible for the 1944 Act were not simply concerned to make administration tidier. They inherited a situation where secondary education was the privilege of a minority, the rest being left to finish their school life in their old 'elementary' school. The Act was meant to remedy this and to provide secondary education for all, with age, ability and aptitude as the only criteria. But the system is open to criticism, in spite of recent modifications, first because it is unfair to those not selected for grammar school education, and secondly because it is unhealthy for those who are.

There can be no doubt of the injustice suffered by a substantial minority of children whose classification at ten-plus has not fairly represented their potential. Easier transfer from the modern school is only a palliative, unsettling the child concerned and draining the school of talent. The ideal is for such children to be educated from the start in a school where their needs can be met. But this is admittedly an imperfect world where justice for all may be impossible; it is argued that the tripartite system provides satisfactorily for the needs of most children, if not of all, and is especially helpful to those at either end of the scale. It is doing no kindness to the least able children to force them into competition with others who are

immensely superior, whereas in the modern school they may achieve some distinction, be given some responsibility. A comprehensive system would condemn them to nonentity. Similarly it is argued that the more able child would be held back by the presence of the less intelligent; to turn a grammar school into a comprehensive would blunt its academic 'edge', depriving the nation of intellectual excellence and the individual of the chance to use his gifts to the full.

If these assertions could be validated they would deserve serious consideration, for it would be intolerable to secure justice for some by denying it to others. The available evidence, however, does not substantiate them; there are few schools which are truly comprehensive, with a full complement of academic 'high-flyers', so that dogmatism is not justified. What is certain is that nobody seriously believes the secondary modern school is in any sense equal to the grammar school. Protest meetings are not organised in the name of the modern school. It is the grammar school pupil who is most highly thought of, who has most money spent on his education, and who is most likely to enter an occupation respected by all. The 'parity of esteem' mentioned in the Act remains a pious hope. We are labelling the majority of our youth as failures before their eleventh birthday; we treat people like objects to be graded. This is utterly opposed to the respect and care for the individual found in the teaching of the Old Testament prophets and in the life of Jesus. We should not be surprised that we face adolescent alienation from society on a scale formerly unknown. To ignore the revealed will of God is likely to have unpleasant consequences.

It is too readily assumed that the system is wholly beneficial to the grammar school pupil, and that whatever injustice may exist is confined to those who 'fail the 11-plus'. Yet society will suffer if our future executives and administrators are brought up segregated from the great mass of those who will, as adults, be affected by their decisions. This division of society into 'us' and 'them' has harmful consequences everywhere, and it is a commonplace example of this that the Christian faith has become so identified with middle class *mores* that conversion takes on overtones of class betrayal.

Over and above this, if we are genuinely concerned for individual development and believe that in the will of God this is effected largely through group activity, then we cannot remain satisfied with an educational system which confines a child's experience to a group united by a common assumption of intellectual superiority. God may be no respecter of persons, but we are effectively conditioning our children to be precisely what we claim God is not. The glory of the Church is said to be its catholicity; Christians rejoice to belong to a community where Jew and Greek, bond and free, male and female, are united and accepted on no other ground but the love of God in Christ. It is strange that Christians should support an educational system which does so much to ensure that these values are confined to the religious sphere, where they are harmless and present no threat to our class-ridden society.

The arguments for comprehensive education are often dismissed as social rather than educational. If education concerns the intellect alone, then the criticism is valid. What passes understanding is that Christians should ever have imagined this to be the case. If, as is surely the case, education is concerned with the development of the whole child, then it has a vitally important social aspect. Advance in this field might be thought worth while even at the cost of some loss of intellectual quality. In fact, however, there is no reason to think that the end of the tripartite system would entail such a loss, and solid ground for expecting it to benefit both society and the individual.

The Christian Perspective

If we have rightly singled out a concern for the individual as the dominant factor in contemporary educational thought, then we ought as Christians to be thankful. 'My delight was in the sons of men' (Prov. viii. 31). Nowhere can we find a concern for the individual equal to that of God in Christ, and we should rejoice if unbelievers also feel this concern. Whatever views are propounded, we dare not assess principles according to

the men who enunciate them. Good things *can* come out of Nazareth, and God has ordained neither that truth should be heard only from the lips of those who honour Him, nor that His followers should be infallible. But a truth held in isolation becomes a heresy, and where men ignore God's revelation of Himself they will inevitably fall into the error of emphasizing one aspect of truth to the exclusion of others. Such is the case today. Our Christian duty is not at all to deny what is true and right in modern thought about education (however unpalatable we may find it) but rather, accepting it gladly, to assert also those values which we as Christians find in scripture, and which are today in danger of being overlooked.

BOOK REVIEWS

Studies on the Reformation

BY ROLAND H. BAINTON

Hodder and Stoughton, London 1964. pp. 289, 25s.

This collection of essays by Dr Roland Bainton, who until recently was Professor of Ecclesiastical History at Yale University, varies in interest and quality as do so many such collections. There are the inevitable reduplications, in essays originally published at approximately the same time, as for example the three overlapping discussions of the psychoanalysis of Luther's personality. Similarly, as only one essay *Luther's Attitudes to Religious Liberty* has been seriously revised, parts occasionally seem somewhat dated, e.g., *New Documents on Early Protestant Rationalism*, which was originally published in 1938, though still of great interest. Some articles are general and of interest to the non-specialist, as, for example, the excellent *The Bible and the Reformation* which would be worth reading quite apart from its many other merits, if only for the dynamic extract from Luther dealing with Abraham and the sacrifice of Isaac; others, like *The Joachimite Prophecy: Osiander and Sachs* and *William Postell and the Netherlands*, while adding variety, will mean little to the general reader.

So much for the unevenness of the book. To offset such faults there is a solid body of interesting material both on Luther and also on the Left Wing of the Reformation and the problem of religious liberty. Professor Bainton writes as no mere antiquarian, as the select bibliography of his works indicates. The fact that he was a conscientious objector in the First World War lends authority to his appreciation of the problems of liberty. Likewise his interest in contemporary ecclesiastical and ethical problems makes some of his comments, for instance, in *The Anabaptist Contribution to History* all the more illuminating, though this could lead to distortion, as there are obvious dangers in associating the problems of contemporary American society with those of 16th century Europe.

The line between liberty and license is notoriously difficult to trace, as has so often been the line between spiritual and secular authority, and for this reason there is a peculiar relevance in Dr Bainton's essays on the more radical forms of the Reformation. How far the members of a society have private lives and how far their individualism is overruled in the interests of the majority, – these questions seem to be as pertinent today as they were three or four hundred years ago, especially as contemporary society somewhat resembles that of the pre-reformation era in the integration and interdependence of its members. Religious education, Lord's Day Observance, and the reform of laws against abortion and homosexuality are all pressing issues today, and ultimately they would seem to be related to the issues which sent Servetus to the stake and Ochino, in exile, into Poland.

The question in its final analysis must be formulated in some such terms as these. Of what is the fabric of social morality composed? Is dishonesty a more or less serious crime than unorthodoxy? Thus Castellio could ask 'Why does Calvin not bring about the death of hypocrites and the avaricious? Or does he think that hypocrites are better than heretics?' (p. 172), which Bainton sums up as 'an enunciation of the rights of error as a stage in the quest for truth. Error is not the goal, but honest error is nearer to the truth of religion than dishonest correctness' (pp. 219-20).

Today in our secularized society we are inclined to think that doctrinal orthodoxy is not an essential ingredient to social morality. Are we justified in this attitude? If deeds are related to creeds, and if we believe in the ideal of an integrated person, can we hope to have a code of law based on a Christian morality without making Christian orthodoxy one of the laws. If man's position before God is basically the mainspring of his behaviour, then it is logical to make unorthodoxy a crime as well as an infraction of the fourth commandment. On the other hand Bainton's quotation of Luther's assertion that 'Faith is a free work to which no-one can be forced' (p. 227) seems undeniable and therefore to shake the whole idea of legislation on a Christian basis.

In the light of such questions, Bainton's treatment of the problem as faced by men, who lived in a very different context, is very informative and thought provoking, especially when considering the varying 16-17th century views on Natural Law and reason, and also the different deductions that men made from the doctrine of predestination. Such questions however lead him to take the discussion still further and to consider the ecclesiastical question stemming from the philosophical issue, namely 'Can there be a visible church?' Bainton is forced to wonder whether the price paid by Castellio for liberty was not the disintegration of the Church (p. 177), which, no doubt, is applicable to what Troeltsch called the 'sectarian' concept. From here the author is led to the 'dichotomy between the concept of the Church as a remnant and the Great Commission' (p. 202).

In this respect the spiritual power of the Left Wing of the Reformation is striking. The idea of a gathered church could so easily have led to a complete failure in evangelism. But Dr Bainton assures us that this was not the case; so much so, that he suggests that Anabaptism, if unimpeded by the sword of the magistrate, might have become the prevailing form of the Church in Germany (p. 202). Similarly their originality is often forgotten. As Bainton says of Castellio's views on the difference between *scientia* and *conscientia*: Today it all sounds commonplace enough, but that is only because his views came later to be axiomatic in the West (p. 174).

In concentrating on this aspect of the book it may be felt that the essays on Luther have been neglected. These are in effect a series of appendices of varying interest to the author's *Here I stand* which will long remain an authoritative treatment of Luther, and for this reason it seems that they are not the important part of this collection of essays. The fact that the question of Liberty in the reformation is, as has been said, relevant in a peculiar way,

to our own day gives a unity to these essays and would seem to make this part of the book distinctive. However the equation of the 16th century problems with our own is a risky operation as we can only too easily ignore the huge changes in intellectual and social background, that have occurred. It is interesting to note that Calvin was quite prepared to recognize error in Acts 7-16 and Matthew 27-9 (p. 133), but early Protestant rationalism was a very different thing from its modern namesake.

Dr Bainton's appreciation of the spiritual significance of the Reformation stamps his writing with profundity. He recognizes very clearly the importance of the rediscovery of the scriptures. They became 'infinitely precious' because they were 'the record of the Word'. The Reformation rediscovered, *par excellence* in Luther, the historical element in Christianity, (p. 4). To Christ the centuries lead up, and from Christ the centuries lead out . . . Luther rejected naturalism, mysticism, moralism and institutionalism. Christianity, he held, rests on God's once-and-for all in Christ' (p. 5). In the Scriptures the historic Word made flesh was found, and with the reading of them men found life, because they were confronted with the Word. 'The Incarnation, the Crucifixion and the Resurrection constituted a unique self-disclosure of God in Christ . . . the unique historic role,' (p. 108). The rediscovery of the historical core of Christianity meant that the Reformers accepted the scandal of particularity rather than seeking to avoid it in subjective or institutional forms - it was a discovery that shook the world with a new breath of spiritual life.

T. C. F. STUNT

Faith and the Philosophers

Edited by JOHN HICK

Macmillan, New York, 1964, pp. 256, 35s.

The occasion of this symposium must have been an exciting and somewhat exhausting two days. Some 40 or 50 philosophers and theologians (the preface says 50, the jacket 40) foregathered at Princeton in December 1962 to celebrate the Theological Seminary's 150th year. The inevitable book which emerges from such affairs is in this case well worth reading for one sensitive and moving paper, the opening one on 'Faith and Belief' by H. H. Price of Oxford.

'It may happen to a person that he realizes, with surprise perhaps, that he cannot help believing in God . . . He would not wish to give up this belief . . . It is the most precious possession that he has, and far from wishing to give it up, he would wish anyone else to be in a similar condition'. But, says Professor Price, what if this person is a philosopher? 'A clergyman, we think, ought to give up his job if he does not believe in God. It almost seems that a philosopher ought to give up his if he does . . . Can (he) sincerely claim that his belief in God is reasonable?' (pp. 3, 8).

After the aridity of so much discussion of this question by unbelieving philosophers who (on their own admission) literally do not know what they are talking about, it is doubly refreshing to find a careful analysis by someone who does. First, from the outside as it were, Price shows himself fully aware of the difficulties presented by religious claims. 'One of the misfortunes of the theist is that the state of affairs which he believes to exist would indeed be the best one conceivable if it did exist'. He is thus specially liable to be suspected of wishful thinking. Or again 'there is something inappropriate . . . in talking *about* God at all. The proper thing is not to speak about him, but to address him . . . But unfortunately it is speaking 'about', not speaking 'to', which is the philosopher's task (5f.).

The imputation of 'wishful thinking', however, is gently resisted as begging the question. 'There is something in us (perhaps in everyone) which makes us wish to love God. But perhaps there is also something in us which makes us wish *not* to love him, nor to have anything to do with him . . . Denial or doubt, or even suspense of judgment, *can* be "wishful", as much as affirmation' (p. 12). The linguistic problem must be tackled by using speech *about* addressing'; but how true is the warning (p. 6), that 'in our attempt to talk about the attitude expressed in addressing God, we are no longer in the attitude we are trying to describe, and may well forget what it actually feels like to be in it'!

In some respects – for example in the absence of explicit Christology, and the stress laid upon 'meditative practices' (pp. 16ff.) the balance of Price's account of faith may be criticized as departing a little from that of the New Testament; but the whole paper is enriched by authentic insights into the nature of 'the faith-attitude' and that personal knowledge of God which he sees as its essence and its vindication.

Among the other papers particular interest and value attaches to William Alston's sane discussion of *Psychoanalytic Theory and Theistic Belief* and the rejoinders it elicited, in view of the current use and abuse of Freudianism by exponents of the 'New Theology'. A useful discussion also develops around Alasdair MacIntyre's thought-provoking analogy (pp. 115–133) between the efforts of sceptics to understand Christianity and those of anthropologists to understand a primitive culture. His argument that *disbelief* is always required for understanding is, however, courteously refuted by the Jesuit Norris Clarke, who points out that this is plausible only in cases where the belief to be understood is presupposed to be false.

The long concluding section on 'Irrationalism in Theology' contains valuable references, but as the discussion makes clear, the tetchy treatment of Barth's position in particular, by Brand Blanshard, is far from satisfactory. In the words of E. A. Dowey who follows him, 'Mr Blanshard fails to take his subject, Barth, seriously enough to make all his comments interesting'. The reader may find this a charitable understatement.

On the whole, *Faith and the Philosophers* is not an exciting book, however lively its origin. Its quality is distinctly uneven – though in this respect it may serve a useful purpose in highlighting the people who have something

worth saying. But no justice can be done in a review to the refreshing impact of some of the papers mentioned, outstandingly that of Price. This at least should be read by every believer – and every unbeliever – who feels the force of current disquiet over the status of religious affirmations, and longs to know how a really honest and really competent philosopher would interpret his faith if only he had it.

D. M. MACKAY

The English Reformation

BY A. G. DICKENS

Batsford pp. 374, 50s.

The famous opening sentence of Professor Powicke's *Reformation in England* seems to have dominated much of the recent writing on the subject, with the result that there is a regular neglect of the religious aspects of the history of the 16th century and an insistence that 'the mainspring of the Reformation was political.' One recalls Professor Gordon Rupp's gentle remonstrance (somewhat as a voice in the wilderness) to the effect that the reformation in England 'had after all, something to do with the beliefs of Christian men . . .' and was not to be explained solely in terms of a 'lustful monarch and predatory gentry.' In his *Lollards and Protestants in the Diocese of York*, Professor Dickens declared his wish 'to shun the well-worn themes of high policy and central government, of monarchs, parliaments, statesmen and theologians,' and in his new book he has far from forgotten the common man of the Reformation and his spiritual problems.

In addition to this sympathy towards the spiritual aspects of the Reformation and his refusal to shrug off the episode as a merely political phenomenon, Professor Dickens has a distinguished record as one who has ransacked local archives and edited for publication a variety of useful documents. A general history of the English Reformation coming from his pen is, therefore, something of an event and we are very far from being disappointed with the finished product. We should like to express our gratitude to Professor Barraclough for persuading the author to attempt the work and likewise to the publishers for accepting a manuscript far larger than the one they commissioned and for presenting it so beautifully. (It will not, I hope, be taken as ingratitude if I observe that 'addition' (p. 7, line 40) should presumably read 'addiction,' and that Robert Parkyn seems to have slipped out of the otherwise excellent index.)

Professor Dickens finds 'one of the more fruitful concepts of the Reformation in the doctrine of *adiaphora*,' (p. 340), and views his subject from the position of a moderate Anglican, with the result that he appreciates both sides of the question without being uncritical of either.

His book begins with a masterly survey of the background to the Reformation, dealing with popular religion, the *devotia moderna* and mysticism, Lollardy, Christian Humanism and the ecclesiastical organisation of the

period. He reaffirms his view that the inspiration of heresy in England until 1530 was 'overwhelmingly Wycliffe,' (p. 27), but appreciates the important links with the continental reformation after that date as the doctrine of Justification by Faith alone, 'the keystone' of Luther's doctrine, was 'unparalleled in Wycliffism' (p. 59).

Professor Dickens fully appreciates the 'impact of the vernacular Bible' and 'that blissful sense of release and new awakening' that accompanied the rediscovery of the Scriptures, (p. 72). There is a strikingly European character about the circle around Barnes at Cambridge (as opposed to the less intellectual group at Chelmsford, described by William Malden) studying Erasmus' Greek text and discussing the writings from Germany. What Dr Elton summarily dismissed as a group of 'small-time heretics,' was in fact the counterpart of those many other groups in Naples, Viterbo, Meaux, Valladolid, Seville, (not to mention the more familiar Protestant countries.) The author fully appreciates their importance and the importance of their Christian Humanist background. Not all of the Cambridge group went the same way (Gardiner was probably among them) but a substantial number of them were 'the men who led the first generation of English Protestants . . . who preached, wrote, accepted high office or embraced martyrdom in the cause' (p. 68). It is natural enough therefore that the author does not ignore the role of Tyndale (though we were surprised that he should say that his *Prologue to the Romans* is a faithful translation of one of Luther's own commentaries (pp. 60, 73)).

Moving on to the events of the Henrician and Edwardian Reformation, Professor Dickens retains his broad perspective bearing in mind the reception of the reforms at the local level with a wealth of illustrative detail. He pays careful attention to social and economic problems, though concluding that 'reformation history cannot be converted into a mere shadow of economic and social history' (p. 69). He recognises in his discussion of the origins of the reformation, the important rôle of 'the international connections, the anti-clerical outlook, the mobility and relative political immunity' of the European merchant classes. 'Ideas not in themselves economic advanced naturally along the lines laid down by economic men' (p. 69). He gives particular attention to the issues in the dissolution and transfer of ecclesiastical property and points to the serious gaps in the evidence of 'doctrinaire historians.' This is entirely in accord with his assessment of classical Puritanism as 'an essentially other-worldly religion dominated not only by an almost morbid moral sensitivity but by a real distrust of "modern" capitalist enterprise,' (p. 317). Indeed Professor Dickens is very careful not 'to denounce or justify essentially religious movements by reference to the non-religious phenomena accompanying them' (p. 335).

The Marian reaction and the fortunes of the exiles in Europe is well described as also is the account before it, of the making of the English Bible. Generally the whole treatment is remarkably comprehensive (though perhaps at an earlier stage we might have heard more about More, and for that matter Erasmus). The final part is devoted to the foundations of the Eliza-

bethan Settlement in which Puritanism is seen as a very important part of the Anglican community.

The complexity of the reformation and our inability to generalise is made very clear. On both sides of the dispute there were changes in opinion and great hesitancy. (*e.g.* the schoolmaster and physician, Richard Argentine, 'an enthusiastic Reformer under Edward VI, a strong Catholic under Mary, and a remorseful Anglican under Elizabeth' (p. 222)). 'If Cranmer's biography and opinions cannot be made wholly consistent, neither can Gardiner's' (p. 174). In such a context one recalls how Vergerio, the Bishop of Cappadocia finally became a Lutheran and fled from Italy as a result of the great impression made upon him by the mental anguish of the lawyer Francesco Spiera who, after abjuring twice publicly, then repented and died in despair thinking that he had sinned against the Holy Ghost. Certainly in England the experience of so many changes in such a short period must have led to the search for a moderate position. Professor Dickens however sees this moderation as a much earlier tendency. He regards Frith and Starkey as the forerunners of later Anglican comprehensiveness, and maintains that Cromwell's ministry was not merely a negative period of reform but a time during which men were 'groping their way towards a Reformation of compromise and detachment... a settlement based on comprehension rather than narrow orthodoxy... It remains imperceptive to date the genesis of Anglicanism from the accession of Elizabeth or even from the publication of Cranmer's First Prayer Book' (p. 182).

It was precisely this fear of extremes which makes the reformation in England such an indefinite and incomplete episode. Moderation and compromise may have been judicious later to prevent the national church becoming 'a club for religious athletes,' (p. 320), but in the earlier period it was just this attitude that hindered the least controversial reforms on a diocesan level. 'Hooper might do his utmost to play the part of a primitive apostolic bishop, but without tangible support from the government and from society at large he could scarcely hope to rebuild the material foundations of a teaching church' (p. 243).

It will be seen that Professor Dickens is not afraid to assess either the rectitude or wisdom of the events he is dealing with, so that his book proves both stimulating and provocative. His judgments, however, do not obtrude upon his account which is always excellently documented. He writes with a singularly rare combination of wit, lively expression, spiritual understanding and charity.

T. G. F. STUNT

A Library of Protestant Thought

JOHN WESLEY Edited by ALBERT C. CUTLER

O.U.P., 1964 pp. 516 52s

The *Library of Protestant Thought* presents in this volume a representative collection of Wesley's writings, with introductions and notes, designed to exhibit his thought as a theologian. Much otherwise inaccessible material is

reproduced, and so far as possible less accessible material is preferred to that already available in the *Journal*, *Sermons*, and *Letters*.

The result is a fascinating introduction to a remarkable man, in all his characteristic mixture of genius and of the ordinary. It would be presumptuous for a non-specialist to attempt an analysis of Wesley's thought on a first reading of this volume, or to attempt a criticism of the selection: but on even a general acquaintance with the collection, there are features which immediately stand out as significant.

The editor contributes an invaluable and perceptive *Introduction*, in which he traces Wesley's career and development, with particular reference to the influence of his early reading of Jeremy Taylor, William Law and Thomas a Kempis, and of the ancient literature of the eastern fathers. (An interesting and important link is traced back in a note on page 9, through the so-called Macarius the Egyptian, to Gregory of Nyssa). Professor Outler has as a result little sympathy with the view which makes Wesley the heir of Continental Protestantism, and points out that Wesley's references to Luther and Calvin are on the whole negative. His doctrine of justification by faith came rather through the Anglican reformers.

The selected writings are classified under three main headings. *The Theologian Self-Interpreted* brings together a wide selection of self-analysis and of self-imagery, and devotes a separate section to the crucial Aldersgate experience. Part Two, *Theological Foundations*, includes a selection of doctrinal summaries, and also collects together groups of extracts bearing upon the main themes of Wesley's teaching. Finally, *Theologies in Conflict* contains material on Wesley's main disputes—in particular with the Moravians and Calvinists, and within Anglicanism.

Of particular interest is the perspective in which the collection sets the Aldersgate experience. 'Wesley's first biographers took it as his actual conversion to authentic Christianity, and succeeding generations have made of it a pious legend' (p. 51). Such is the editor's own blunt appraisal, and he himself firmly dates Wesley's conversion to a 'sudden focusing of faith and personal commitment' in 1725 (p. 6). That Wesley's experience of 24 May 1738 was climactic there can be little doubt, and none can deny that he then entered for the first time upon full assurance. But was it his conversion? His own identification of assurance with justifying faith (which cost him several of his followers, including Howel Harris) must have supported the traditional interpretation of the experience: yet the debate in 1747 with Howel Harris and others (which is recorded on pp. 165–167) serves only to illuminate the essential artificiality of Wesley's view, when brought to the test of experience; and the editor suggests that Wesley himself loosened his rigorous identification of justification and assurance after that year (p. 53). Wesley wrote precisely four months before Aldersgate Street: 'I went to America to convert the Indians but, oh, who shall convert me?' (p. 44). Yet such moments of spiritual crisis had occurred before and were to occur again, though less poignantly and frequently. As late as 27 June 1766 a letter to his brother Charles contains the astonishing statement: 'Therefore I never

believed in the Christian sense of the word' (p. 81). It might be for the general health of evangelical thinking if the too stereotyped concepts which have been constructed from the Aldersgate experience were replaced by a more realistic acknowledgement of the variety of God's working in the human soul.

The strongest feature to emerge from the collection of writings is the intensity with which Wesley held to the doctrinal and the absolute importance of practical disciplined Christian living. Deriving from his early reading, this passionate devotion to holy living was to develop into his characteristic teaching on sanctification and perfection: a fusion of the Eastern and Anglican traditions of Christian holiness as disciplined love and as aspiring love (p. 10). It lay behind his views on perseverance, and caused him to take issue both with Luther, who, he felt, understood justification but was ignorant of sanctification, and with Roman writers, who understood sanctification but nothing of the nature of justification (pp. 107, 108). It lay behind the intense discipline which he imposed upon his societies, a discipline which caused him to adjure his lay assistants: 'Avoid all lightness as you would avoid hell-fire, and laughing as you would cursing and swearing' (p. 145), and to lay down a diet of reading which appears singularly indigestible (pp. 146, 162)! It lay also behind his great controversies – with the mystics, with the Moravians, and with the Calvinists – with the mystics, with the Moravians, and with the Calvinists – in all of whom he saw the same colouring of antinomianism. Some of the words in which he dismissed the mystics are not irrelevant today:

'It was nothing like that religion which Christ and his apostles lived and taught. I had a plenary dispensation from all the commands of God. The form ran thus: 'Love is all; all the commands beside are only means of love; you must choose those which you feel are means to you and use them as long as they are so.'" Thus were all the bands burst at once.' (p. 47).

Wesley, in a sense, is a type of his age. In temperament a conservative, rooted firmly in the traditions from which he sprang, he is yet at the point of transition. The sheer logic of events forced his honest simplicity of mind into positions akin to those of the most radical reformers. At times his words are those of a medieval, but his actions those of a modern. The secret, perhaps, was that like all the great reformers he went back to the final authority of Scripture; and from the Scriptures the timeless Word spoke afresh to him:

'From the very beginning, from the time that four young men united together, each of them was *homo unius libri* – "a man of one book." God taught them all to make his "word a lantern unto their feet, and a light in all their paths." They had one, and only one, rule of judgment: namely, the oracles of God (cf Rom. 3-2, Heb. 5-12). They were one and all determined to be "Bible-Christians"' (p. 106).

His doctrine of the Church, for all his Anglicanism, becomes by the sheer pressure of circumstances, that of the 'gathered church' – so much so, indeed, that he dissents from Article 19 as too narrow, because it adds to the 'congregation of faithful men' the conditions of the preaching of the pure

Word of God and the due administration of the sacraments (pp. 312-314). And his expressed views on fellowship and inter-communion become almost identical with those expressed in the next century by another reformer who, in his church actions, was yet more radical – Anthony Norris Groves, the early leader of the ‘open’ Plymouth Brethren (pp. 96, 97).

Yet, in the last analysis, even a collection such as this cannot do full justice to Wesley’s position, by approaching him through Conference minutes and other documents bearing on the tentative heart-searchings of himself and of early Methodism, and containing the uncompromising austerity of the regime it imposed upon its officers and adherents, the collection leaves the reader with a sense of something missing. That something is the very heart and essence of Wesley’s robust appeal to the multitudes – his appeal to the free, pardoning, indiscriminating love of God. Here is a question and answer from the Third Annual Conference of 1746:

Q What inconvenience is there in speaking much of the wrath and little of the love of God?

A It generally hardens them that believe not and discourages them that do.’ (p. 163).

For that note we must still turn to what will always remain the most compelling expression of the genius of the Wesleys – their sublime hymnology.

F. ROY COAD

The Method and Message of Jewish Apocalyptic

BY D. S. RUSSELL

London, S.C.M. Press, 1964 pp. 464 60s.

This is a handsome addition to the already well-known *Old Testament Library*. The author of this work is Joint Principal of the Northern Baptist College, Manchester, and has put students and scholars very much in his debt with a book which is clearly the most comprehensive of its kind since the work edited by R. H. Charles, *The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament* first appeared in 1913.

The present work takes into account the Dead Sea Scrolls as a fine example of late apocalyptic writing in Judaism, and shows how, in spite of the various exegetical schools which claimed authority in inter-testamental days, the Qumrân commentators, in common with most other exegetes, maintained a profound veneration for Scripture. There never seems to have been a time when the Law and the Prophets were not finally normative for doctrine and morals in Judaism.

But the decline of prophecy in Judaism opened up a new era in religious writing. Principal Russell shows what relationships there existed between the apocalyptic writers and their prophetic predecessors, particularly in the matter of the re-interpretation of the former by the latter. The author

modestly undertakes an 'attempted explanation' (p. 134) of the phenomenon of pseudonymity by seeing the indebtedness of apocalyptic writers to ancient authors as something which was so great and organic that apocalyptic writers could scarcely have claimed originality at all. Hence their adoption of the pseudonym. There is also the phenomenon of a more highly developed psychology in apocalyptic writing, which stands more in relation to later Pauline thought, suggests the author, than it does to former writers. In these two aspects, Principal Russell makes a fresh and authoritative contribution to the study of apocalyptic literature.

The message of the apocalyptic writers, seems, on the face of it, to be one which ever undergoes change and adaptation. Yet there are certain underlying premisses which make for a general unity of their message, in spite of the fact that they were 'middle men' between the classic interpretation of the events of history, and that which came to fruition in the teaching of Christ and after. The author believes that the influence of foreign ideas is especially marked in the message of these writers, and particularly in the realm of ideas expressing the fact of life after death, though the general argument of the book is that, regarding the *origins* of such beliefs lies in the basic conviction that man could expect a continuance of his fellowship with God after this life.

There are two useful appendices at the end of the book dealing with Christian lists of Jewish apocryphal books, and psychological terms employed within apocalyptic writings. A well arranged bibliography, and three classified indices end this most readable and valuable work.

D. J. E.