

FAITH
AND
THOUGHT

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Faith and Thought

A Journal devoted to the study of the inter-relation
of the Christian revelation and modern research

Vol. 90

Number 2

Autumn 1958

EDITORIAL

The Dead Sea Scrolls have excited continuous discussion now for over ten years within different circles of the thinking world. So it was a particularly fitting occasion that marked the presentation of the Presidential Address at King's College, London, on 2 June 1958, when the Institute was again confronted with this most fascinating subject. Professor F. F. Bruce, who has already been accredited as an authority on the Qumran texts, spoke to us on the question of the relationships of Qumran and the New Testament. Those of us who were able to listen to the address as it was delivered were richly rewarded with a clear and concise account of some of the arguments which have been made for linking the Scrolls and the excavations at Khirbet Qumran with New Testament thought. We hope that our readers will gain similar benefit from the Address which now appears in this number.

We recall someone remarking that we are now living in times which are marked by the hand-in-hand advance of researches into 'the inscrutable mysteries of the future and the imperishable memories of the past'. Side by side with a contribution from the ancient world we have an examination of the suggestions that have been put forward in recent times which would link the functions of man's will with certain physical processes of the body and mind. Dr D. M. MacKay has kindly permitted us to reproduce two broadcast talks entitled *Brain and Will*, and it is hoped that his remarks will stimulate much discussion.

Once again, the Institute is offering an essay award under the Langhorne Orchard Trust. Details of the subject and conditions of award are set out in the following pages.

In this number we are publishing the discussion of several former papers, two of which appeared in the first number of this volume. We wish to endorse the suggestion already made to members of the Institute that we trust they will readily contribute towards the written discussion of the various articles. It would be appreciated if all written contributions, and matters relating directly to the contents of the Journal could be addressed to *The Editorial Secretary, 15 Quarry Road, London, S.W.18.*

Langhorne Orchard Prize Essay—1958

This award is made by the Council of the Victoria Institute for the essay, which in their opinion, best sets forth the subject chosen for the award. The value of the award is £40, and in some instances the Council may instruct the adjudicators to award a second prize of £10 if they see fit.

All entries should be typewritten, but should not exceed 7,000 words. They should be precise in thought and language, and should be preceded by a synopsis of not more than 200 words.

Candidates for the award should write under a pen name, which should be at the head of their essay. This name should also be placed on the outside of a sealed envelope containing the competitors actual name and address.

The title chosen for 1958 is:

‘Can an Historic Faith Convey Final Truth?’

Entries should be addressed to the Secretary of the Institute, 22 Dingwall Road, Croydon, Surrey, and should reach that address by not later than 1 April 1959.

The following extract is given for the guidance of Competitors.

Certain religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam, being the only important examples, claim that the truth was revealed not merely by and to their founders as a series of propositions, but that the very circumstances leading up to and surrounding the revelation were themselves revelation, i.e. that man's knowledge of truth is inseparable from history.

This attitude is under open attack from many directions. The scientist from the standpoint of evolution or psychology denies the finality of reliability of such a revelation; the philosopher stresses the essential relativity of history; the mystic questions the possibility of really knowing the infinite within the framework of the finite.

This is the background of the essay subject. Competitors will be at liberty to handle the question in a general way, provided that the problem as a whole is fairly stated.

REPORT OF THE COUNCIL FOR THE YEAR 1957

read at the

ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING

(2 June 1958)

Progress of the Institute

In presenting the Ninety-first Annual Report, together with the Balance Sheet and a Statement of Income and Expenditure, the Council is thankful to God for the continuation of the work of the Institute.

You have just listened to Professor Bruce's first address to the Institute as its President and his acceptance of that office has been one of the highlights of the Institute's year. The position has been vacant for a long time since the death of Sir Frederic Kenyon in 1952, because the Council was unwilling to rush and prepared to wait until God's guidance in this matter had become quite manifest. We have had many distinguished Presidents in the past and today we acclaim as their worthy successor a man who is not only distinguished in his field of study, but who has, in addition, a grace of words and charm of manner befitting to a President.

It seems to have been the custom hitherto to appoint a President for life, and, indeed, the first, Lord Shaftesbury, served for twenty-one years. We have promised Professor Bruce that we now propose to elect our Presidents for a shorter—a much shorter—period of years but we hope, indeed, we intend that one period in office shall not in any way disqualify the past President, and that we hope that he will honour us by consenting to at least a second term.

In recognition of Dr White's long and devoted service to the Institute, as an author of many papers, as a Council member and for many years its Chairman, the Council suggested that he should continue his connection as a Vice-President in the place of the late Dr Curr. We are very happy to say that that invitation was accepted and that Dr White will continue to give the Council directly the benefits of his wisdom and experience.

The second major item in the activities of the Institute this year has been the change in policy. For many years the Council has been disturbed by the difficulty of bringing the interest of the Institute to those who live outside London. Few of those not resident in the Home

Counties were able to share in the monthly meetings at Caxton Hall. Last year we held a number of meetings in University centres outside London. We propose to continue this plan and to seek thus to stimulate discussion among a wider circle of thinking men and women. In addition, instead of publishing a single volume of the Institute's Transactions annually, the Council intends to make papers available more quickly and more widely by presenting them as parts of a Journal to be published, at first, three times per year, and later, it is hoped, quarterly. This Journal is intended to be more than just a three-part Transactions. It will offer much better facilities for running commentary and discussion in which, we hope, a much larger proportion of our widespread membership will be able to take part than has been possible in the past when, as I have said, attendance at meetings has proved impossible for the majority.

To facilitate the production of this Journal the Council has appointed Mr David J. Ellis to be its Editorial Secretary. Mr Burtenshaw continues to act as Secretary to the Council and we thank him most sincerely for his willing and able services.

The Council had hoped to have the first number of the *Journal* here to show you. Unfortunately, printing difficulties have produced a last minute hitch. It will be going out in a day or two, and I do assure you that we shall appreciate very much your criticism, comments and advice so that the publication may quickly become a worth-while, and we hope a peculiar (in the proper meaning of the word!) addition to Christian literature.

This concludes the report on the work of the year, and I will now ask our Honorary Treasurer, Mr Francis Stunt, to present the Statement of Accounts.

The next item on the Agenda is the election of officers. None of our Vice-Presidents has wished to resign. I propose to move from the Chair, therefore, that our President, Professor F. F. Bruce, and our new Vice-President, Dr Ernest White be confirmed in their offices, and that Professor Anderson, Bishop Gough, and Professor Guthrie be re-elected as Vice-Presidents. There have been no resignations from the Council, and Mr Stunt has agreed to continue in the office of Honorary Treasurer.

The last item of formal business concerns the election of an Auditor. Our present Auditor, Mr G. Metcalfe Collier, of Metcalfe Collier, Hayward and Blake, offers, and is nominated by the Council for re-election for the ensuing year. There have been no other nominations and I move that Mr Collier be re-elected.

Balance Sheet as at 30th September, 1957

30.9.56	General Fund		30.9.56	General Fund	
	<i>Prepaid Subscriptions:</i>			<i>Subscriptions in Arrear:</i>	
	Fellows	£12 12 4		Fellows	£44 5 0
	Members	16 19 9		Members	64 2 11
	Associates	1 1 0		Associates	18 13 0
	Library Associates	4 4 0		Library Associates	16 16 0
£24	<i>Loan: W. E. Filmer, Esq.</i>	— — —	£142	<i>General Fund Investment: £253—3 %</i>	£143 16 11
35	<i>Sundry Creditors</i>	116 14 6	200	<i>British Transport Stock at Cost</i>	— — —
18	<i>Cash Overdrawn on General Fund</i>	230 10 11	45	<i>Office Equipment as at 1st October, 1956</i>	44 10 0
442			30	<i>Sundry Debtors</i>	— — —
			102	<i>Deficit on General Fund as at 1st October, 1956</i>	£102 7 2
				<i>Excess of Expenditure over Income for the Year</i>	91 8 5
					<u>193 15 7</u>
<u>£519</u>		<u>£382 2 6</u>	<u>£519</u>		<u>£382 2 6</u>
	<i>Special Funds</i>			<i>Special Funds</i>	
£575	<i>Life Compositions Fund</i>	£553 15 0	575	<i>Life Compositions Fund</i>	
508	<i>Gunning Trust</i>	508 0 0		<i>Cash</i>	£353 15 0
200	<i>Langhorne Orchard Trust</i>	200 0 0		<i>£253—3 % British Transport Stock at Cost</i>	200 0 0
220	<i>Schofield Memorial Trust</i>	220 0 0	508	<i>Gunning Trust: £673—3½ % Conversion Stock at Cost</i>	553 15 0
400	<i>Craig Memorial Trust</i>	400 0 0	200	<i>Langhorne Orchard Trust: £258 10s.—3½ % Conversion Stock at Cost</i>	508 0 0
238	<i>Prize Fund</i>	247 1 9	220	<i>Schofield Memorial Trust: £378 14s. 6d.—2½ % Consols at Cost</i>	200 0 0
			400	<i>Craig Memorial Trust: £376 7s. 4d.—3½ % War Stock at Cost</i>	400 0 0
			238	<i>Prize Fund: Balance on Deposit Account</i>	£47 1 9
				<i>£213 14s. 6d.—4½ % British Electricity at Cost</i>	200 0 0
<u>£2,660</u>		<u>£2,510 19 3</u>	<u>£2,660</u>		<u>247 1 9</u>
					<u>£2,510 19 3</u>

We have audited the accounts of which the foregoing is the Balance Sheet and have obtained all the information and explanations which we have required. Stocks of publications are held which do not appear in the Balance Sheet; subject to this, in our opinion the Balance Sheet shows a true and fair view of the affairs of the Institute, and is correct according to the books and records thereof, and the information and explanations given to us.

199 PICCADILLY, LONDON, W.1
20th December, 1957

A. C. DEANE
Chartered Accountant
METCALFE COLLIER, BLAKE & COMPANY

F. F. BRUCE, D.D.

Qumran and the New Testament

Presidential Address, 2 June 1958

I

THE most varied answers are given when we ask students of the Qumran texts what affinities exist between these texts and the New Testament. We are told that there are no affinities whatsoever; we are told that the career and passion of Jesus represent an 'astonishing reincarnation'¹—or, on the other hand, a pale reflection—of the activity and death of the Teacher of Righteousness; we are told that Jesus Himself was the Teacher of Righteousness of the Qumran texts, that the men of Qumran were Jewish Christians and that the Wicked Priest was the Apostle Paul;² we are told that the Qumran discoveries conclusively prove that Jesus never existed at all.³

All these answers cannot be true. But the intelligent layman need not stand in bewilderment before them, wondering which (if any) he is to believe. Much of the material on which these divergent accounts are based is accessible to him in one or more translations,⁴ and while some of these translations are defective in one way or another, he can see that some of the answers which are offered to him have little or no substantial foundation, while others deserve more serious attention.

One difficulty, with which we cannot deal here in detail, concerns the dating not only of the scrolls but of the original works which they reproduce, and not only of these works but of the persons and events referred to in them. In particular, to which generation should we assign the Teacher of Righteousness, the effective founder of the Qumran community? Did he meet his death under Antiochus Epiphanes (175-163 B.C.)? Did he flourish under one of the Hasmonean rulers; and if so, should we date his ministry in the second half of the second century B.C. or in the first half of the first century? Or should we bring him down to the Roman period, even to the point of identifying him with Menahem, son of Judas the Galilaean, whose attempt to seize

¹ A. Dupont-Sommer, *The Dead Sea Scrolls* (1950), p. 99.

² J. L. Teicher in *Journal of Jewish Studies*, 2 (1950), 94 ff., 121 ff.; 3 (1951), 53 ff., 128 ff.; 4 (1953), 53 ff., 102 f., 152 f.; 5 (1954), 38, 52 ff., etc.

³ *Komsomolskaya Pravda* (Moscow), Jan. 1958, as reported in the British press.

⁴ See especially T. H. Gaster, *The Scriptures of the Dead Sea Sect* (1957).

supreme power in Jerusalem in the autumn of A.D. 66 came to an end when he was captured and killed by Eleazar, captain of the temple, and his followers?¹ It is clear that, to some extent at least, these chronological problems must affect the relevance of the Qumran literature for New Testament studies. In other places I have indicated my preference for the view that the Teacher of Righteousness flourished mainly in the reign of Alexander Jannaeus (103-76 B.C.), and thus far I have not been persuaded to change my opinion by the arguments either for an earlier or for a later dating. At any rate, the Qumran community was certainly flourishing during the ministry of Jesus and the apostolic age.

II

The men of Qumran went out to their wilderness retreat in order to organise themselves as a new Israel, rather after the fashion of the tribes under the leadership of Moses. The nation as a whole had proved unfaithful to the covenant with the God of their fathers, but these men regarded themselves as the righteous remnant of the nation, the hope of the future, a miniature Israel, whose faithfulness would be accepted by God as a propitiation for the unfaithfulness of the nation at large. They attached special importance to the maintenance of the priestly and levitical classes, in order that, when the new age dawned, a pure sacrificial worship might be restored without delay and administered by those who had not gone astray as the majority of the priests had done.

The believing community of New Testament times similarly regarded itself as a new Israel, 'a remnant, chosen by grace' (Rom. xi. 5), 'a chosen race, a royal priesthood, a holy nation, God's own people' (1 Pet. ii. 9). The kingdom of God had been taken away from those who had shown themselves unworthy of their trust, and given to 'a nation producing the fruits of it' (Matt. xxi. 44). But instead of maintaining distinct priestly and levitical classes, as the Qumran community did, the Christian community was taught to consider itself corporately as 'a holy priesthood, to offer spiritual sacrifices acceptable to God through Jesus Christ' (1 Pet. ii. 5). Both communities regarded themselves as the people of the new covenant, but the Qumran community thought of the new covenant as a restoration of the old one.

The Qumran community, moreover, lived in the conviction that the end of the age then present, the 'epoch of wickedness', was at hand. Its thought and life were dominated by this eschatological conviction.

¹ Josephus, *Jewish War*, ii. 433 ff.

They believed that in the very near future all that the Old Testament prophets had foretold would be accomplished; indeed, they believed that their predictions had already begun to be fulfilled in the emergence of the community and the activity of the Teacher of Righteousness. Similarly, the early Christians looked upon themselves as those upon whom 'the end of the ages' had come (1 Cor. x. 11); for them, indeed, the new age had already dawned, although the old age had not completely passed away; they lived in the 'last hour' (1 John ii. 18), between the ascension of Jesus and His manifestation in glory.

In both communities this eschatological emphasis appears most clearly in their interpretation of the Old Testament. The commentaries discovered in the Qumran caves show us well enough how the Old Testament was interpreted there; the New Testament writings indicate plainly how it was interpreted in the primitive Church.

According to the Qumran commentaries, God revealed His purpose to His servants the prophets, but His revelation (particularly with regard to the time when His purpose would be fulfilled) could not be understood until the key to its understanding was placed in the hands of the Teacher of Righteousness. To him the mysteries were made plain by divine illumination, and he made known to the last generations what God was going to do in the last generation of all.¹ He taught his followers that all that the prophets had spoken referred to the time of the end, a time which was now almost upon them; and he so interpreted all that the prophets had spoken as to teach his followers their duty both while the end-time was coming and when it came.

Here we find a striking parallel with something that is emphasised time and again in the New Testament. The age of fulfilment has dawned. The prophets who foretold the blessing into which Christians were to enter 'searched and inquired about this salvation; they inquired what person or time was indicated by the Spirit of Christ within them when predicting the sufferings of Christ and the subsequent glory' (1 Pet. i. 10 f.). Much had been revealed to those prophets, but not everything. But those Christians to whom Peter wrote these words had no need to search and inquire in order to ascertain what person or time was indicated by the prophecies; they knew. The person was Jesus; the time was the time in which they were living. Words spoken by Peter on another occasion sum up the early Christian attitude to the Old Testament: 'This is what was spoken by the prophet' (Acts ii. 16). And again: 'Moses . . . and all the prophets who have spoken, from

¹ 1 Qp Hab. vii. 1-5; Zad. i. 10-12.

Samuel and those who came afterwards, also proclaimed these days' (Acts iii. 22, 24).

If it was the Teacher of Righteousness who taught the Qumran commentators their Old Testament exegesis, we need not search and inquire very long to discover who taught the apostles theirs. This note of fulfilment runs throughout the public proclamation of Jesus. 'The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand' (Mark i. 15). 'Today this scripture has been fulfilled in your hearing' (Luke iv. 21). 'Blessed are the eyes which see what you see! For I tell you that many prophets and kings desire to see what you see, and did not see it, and to hear what you hear, and did not hear it' (Luke x. 23 f.). 'Everything written about me in the law of Moses and the prophets and the psalms must be fulfilled' (Luke xxiv. 44). The Old Testament exegesis which pervades the apostles' preaching is that which they learned from Jesus on every occasion when He 'opened their minds to understand the scriptures' (Luke xxiv. 45).¹

Here, then, we have an important point of resemblance between the founder of the Qumran community and the founder of the Christian community, in that each imparted to the community which he founded its distinctive principles of Old Testament exegesis. But every time that we observe a resemblance between the two founders or the two communities, we observe a contrast within the resemblance; and such a contrast is apparent here. To the early Christians Jesus was the central theme of Old Testament revelation, which indeed found its fulfilment in Him. But to the Qumran sectaries the Teacher of Righteousness, while he was certainly a subject of Old Testament prophecy, was not its central subject; Old Testament prophecy reached out beyond him for its fulfilment. For Jesus appeared to His followers as the Messiah, to whom all the prophets bore witness (John v. 39; Acts x. 43); the Teacher of Righteousness, in spite of the great veneration with which *his* followers regarded him, was not the Messiah—not even a Messiah. He was to them pre-eminently just what they called him—the Teacher of Righteousness.

III

A number of Qumran documents show us the form which messianic expectation took at Qumran; and it is reasonable to suppose that the community learned its messianic expectation, as it learned so much besides, from the Teacher of Righteousness. This expectation was

¹ Cf. C. H. Dodd, *According to the Scriptures* (1952).

directed towards two distinct individuals who would arise in the end-time—a great priest and a great king. The great priest, the 'Messiah of Aaron', would be the head of the state in the new age.¹ The great king, the 'Messiah of Israel', was the promised prince of the house of David who would lead the people of God to victory over all their enemies in the eschatological warfare which the prophets had predicted. In the new age he would be subordinate to the 'Messiah of Aaron'. With these two Messiahs was associated a third figure, who did not, however, receive the messianic title; this was a great prophet, the second Moses of Deuteronomy xviii. 15 ff.²

While the Qumran community, to judge by the literature thus far published, never seems to have reached the point at which they believed the Messiah (or Messiahs) to have come, the New Testament is dominated by the announcement that the Messiah has come. And while the Qumran community distinguished the prophet, the priest and the king who were to arise at the end of the age as three individual personages, the New Testament presents Jesus as the prophet of whom Moses spoke, the heir to David's throne, and the perpetual priest of Melchizedek's order acclaimed in Psalm cx. 4. The traditional Christian doctrine of the 'threefold office' of Christ goes back to the earliest days. Jesus, of course, could not be regarded as a 'Messiah of Aaron' because He did not belong to the tribe of Levi; the one New Testament document which enlarges on the priestly aspect of His messianic work finds Old Testament authority for ascribing to Him a greater priesthood than Aaron's.³

But the prophetic portrayals of the prophet, the priest and the king do not exhaust the New Testament presentation of the Messiahship of Jesus. He Himself did not often voice a messianic claim; in view of popular expectations, such a claim would probably have been misunderstood. But on one notable occasion when He did claim to be the Messiah, He identified Himself not only with the Messiah who is invited in Psalm cx. 1 to sit at God's right hand, but with the 'one like a son of man' who comes with the clouds of heaven in Daniel vii. 13 to receive everlasting dominion (Mark xiv. 62). Indeed, His commonest designation of Himself was 'the Son of man'. But as He used the title, He identified the Son of man with the obedient and suffering Servant of the Lord in Isaiah xlii-liii; and it is the figure of the Servant

¹ Zad. xii. 23-xiii. 1; xix. 33-xx. 1; IQ Sa ii. 11-22; IQ Sb.

² IQS ix. 11; 4Q *Testimonia*.

³ Heb. v. 6; vi. 20 ff.

that controls Jesus' whole conception and fulfilment of His messianic mission.

The Qumran community, too, attached great importance to the Old Testament figures of the Servant of the Lord and the Son of man, but they do not appear to have interpreted them messianically. Instead, they believed that their own community was called upon corporately to fulfil what was written concerning both the Servant of the Lord and the Son of man. As they devoted themselves to the study and practice of the holy law, as they endured persecution at the hands of the 'Wicked Priest' and other ungodly oppressors, they believed that they were accumulating a store of merit which would avail not only to procure their own justification in God's sight but also to make propitiation for the sins of their misguided fellow-Israelites,¹ just as the Servant by his suffering was to bear the sin of many and make them to be accounted righteous (Isa. liii. 11 f.). But they also believed that when the epoch of wickedness came to an end, it would be their duty and privilege to undertake the rôle of the Son of man and execute judgment on the wicked—the wicked rulers in Israel as well as the wicked nations around.²

The New Testament presents the apostles as sharing in the mission of the Servant of the Lord (Acts xiii. 47) and declares that 'the saints will judge the world' (1 Cor. vi. 2), but both these activities are a participation in work which belongs primarily to Jesus as the Messiah.

As for the judgment which the men of Qumran expected to execute in the end-time, the *Rule of War* and other texts show that it was envisaged in traditional terms of military conquest and extermination. Nothing more unlike the achievement of Jesus could be imagined. Even when this traditional language is used of the triumph of Jesus in the New Testament (as it is in the Apocalypse), its meaning is transmuted as it declares the victory of the Messiah who conquered through suffering; it is in the rôle of the Lamb led to the slaughter that the Lion of the tribe of Judah prevails.³ But there is nothing metaphorical in the use of military terminology in the Qumran literature.

IV

Considerable interest has been aroused by the discovery of certain affinities of thought and language between the Qumran texts and St.

¹ 1QS iii. 6-12; iv. 20 f.; v. 6 f.; ix. 3-5.

² 1QS viii. 10; 1Qp Hab. v. 3-6.

³ Rev. v. 5 f.

John's Gospel.¹ However do these affinities may be evaluated, they provide additional evidence in support of the basically Hebraic character of this Gospel. They must not be exaggerated; and it might be good to bear in mind that practically every new discovery in Near Eastern religious literature of the late B.C. and early A.D. epoch has been hailed by someone as supplying the key to the problem of this Gospel. The Old Testament rather than the Qumran literature is the source-book of the Fourth Evangelist, but it is the Old Testament as fulfilled by Jesus. The Old Testament is also the source-book of the Qumran literature, but it is the Old Testament as it had passed through the mind of the Teacher of Righteousness and perhaps other interpreters of similar outlook. The opposition between light and darkness (to take one instance of the dualistic phraseology which the Qumran literature and this Gospel have in common) goes back ultimately to the first chapter of Genesis. Yet the way in which light and darkness, truth and falsehood, and so forth are opposed in the *Rule of the Community*, for example, reminds us particularly of the language of the Johannine Gospel and Epistles.

It has frequently been pointed out that the early chapters of St. John's Gospel deal with a phase of Jesus' ministry which was concurrent with the later ministry of John the Baptist. The dispute about purification mentioned in John iii. 25 is the sort of dispute which must have been very common in the Jordan valley and the Dead Sea region at a time when so many competing 'baptist' groups inhabited those parts.² The disciples of John and the disciples of Jesus were not the only people engaged in baptising there in those days. The men of Qumran had their own ceremonial washings, and so had other communities.

Now the unnamed disciple of John the Baptist who attached himself to Jesus along with Andrew (John i. 35 ff.) has been identified, very reasonably, with the disciple whose witness attests the record of the Fourth Gospel (John xxi. 24). If the beloved disciple was indeed at one time a follower of John the Baptist, this may indicate an indirect contact with Qumran. For, among all the theories which have been propounded to establish a connection between the Qumran movement and primitive Christianity, the least improbable are those which find

¹ See Lucetta Mowry, 'The Dead Sea Scrolls and the Gospel of John', *The Biblical Archaeologist*, 17 (1954), 78 ff.; W. F. Albright, 'Recent Discoveries in Palestine and the Gospel of St. John', in *The Background of the NT and its Eschatology*, ed. W. D. Davies and D. Daube (1956), pp. 153 ff.

² Cf. J. Thomas, *Le mouvement baptiste en Palestine et Syrie* (1935).

such a connection in John the Baptist, on the ground that he may well have been associated with Qumran before the day when the word of the Lord came to him and sent him forth to preach his baptism of repentance for the remission of sins in view of the approach of the Coming One.¹ If there is any substance in such theories, John's baptismal ministry must imply that he had discovered that the way of Qumran, noble as its ideals were, was not the way in which preparation should be made for the divine visitation.

In connection with the Gospels it may be added that a study of the calendar used by the Qumran community has strengthened the reasons for thinking that the discrepancies between the Synoptists and John regarding the chronology of Holy Week are due to the following of two distinct calendars.²

V

Another New Testament document in which affinities have been traced with the Qumran sect is the Epistle to the Hebrews. Dr. Yigael Yadin, in particular, has argued that the 'Hebrews' named in the traditional title of this epistle were Jews originally belonging to the Qumran sect, who were converted to Christianity but carried with them into Christianity some of their former beliefs and practices, with which the writer takes issue. Among these beliefs Dr. Yadin makes special reference to the idea of the angels' eschatological rôle (Heb. ii. 5), and to the conceptions of a priestly Messiah and of the prophet to appear in the last days. 'It is my sincere hope,' he says, 'that more competent students in the field of NT studies will either refute this suggestion or, if they agree to it—wholly or partially—will submit more data in its support.'³

In the form in which Dr. Yadin defends his thesis, it probably cannot be sustained. But the material which he has adduced must be added to the evidence already at our disposal for the presence in the early Roman church of elements derived from sectarian Judaism. Such elements are attested, for example, by the *Apostolic Tradition* ascribed to Hippolytus, early in the third century A.D. And there is little doubt in my mind that the Epistle to the Hebrews was written to a

¹ Cf. W. H. Brownlee, 'John the Baptist in the New Light of Ancient Scrolls', *Interpretation* 9 (1955), pp. 71 ff.; A. S. Geysler, 'The Youth of John the Baptist', *Novum Testamentum* I (1956), 70 ff.

² See A. Jaubert, *La date de la Cène* (1957).

³ Y. Yadin, 'The Dead Sea Scrolls and the Epistle to the Hebrews', *Scripta Hierosolymitana*, 4 (1957), 36 ff.

Jewish-Christian group in Rome in the sixties of the first century. I think that the work of the late William Manson put the Roman destination of the epistle on a firmer basis than ever before.¹ If, then, the new evidence indicates that the Judaism to which this group was in danger of slipping back exhibited features similar to those found in some Qumran texts, this will confirm an impression already formed by a comparison of certain allusions in the epistle (e.g. the 'instruction about ablutions' in Heb. vi. 2) with indications that the Jewish substratum of early Roman Christianity had affinities with some of the 'baptist' movements already mentioned. Some at least of these movements may be called Essene; this term was probably used to cover several religious groups in the Jordan valley and Dead Sea region which differed from one another in details but presented to the outsider a general resemblance in essentials.

VI

These are not the only parts of the New Testament which present parallels with the Qumran literature. Resemblances between the Qumran community and the milieu in which the First Gospel took shape have been traced by Krister Stendahl in *The School of St. Matthew* (1954). It may well be that some of Luke's special material was derived from Christian circles sharing in certain respects the outlook of Qumran. And Paul's use of the Old Testament occasionally reminds one of the methods of the Qumran commentators. But these and related fields of study cannot be surveyed here.

There is some reason to believe that, when the Qumran community was broken up towards A.D. 70 (as archaeological evidence indicates), some of its members (together perhaps with members of other Essene groups) made common cause with another body of refugees—the fugitive Church of Jerusalem which left its doomed metropolis and settled east of the Jordan. Some of the distinctive features of those Ebionites, as they are described by Christian writers of later generations, could be accounted for in terms of influences exercised by such a body as the Qumran community.² The presence of Essene influence in Ebionitism has long been recognised—by J. B. Lightfoot and F. J. A.

¹ W. Manson, *The Epistle to the Hebrews* (1951).

² Cf. O. Cullmann, 'Die neuentdeckten Qumran-Texte und das Judentum der Pseudoklementinen', in *Neutestamentliche Studien für Rudolf Bultmann* (1954), pp. 35 ff.

Hort, for example.¹ If in fact some of this influence came from the Qumran community, it may be that those Qumran refugees who joined the Ebionites came to acknowledge that their messianic hopes were fulfilled, not along the lines laid down by their former instructors but in the person of Jesus of Nazareth, envisaged more particularly in terms of the 'Prophet like unto Moses'.

A real disservice is rendered to the cause of historical research, whether our primary interest be the Qumran community or the origins of Christianity, when students propound theories which outrun the available evidence and present them to the public as if they were established facts. The discoveries at Qumran, with the light they throw on Old and New Testament studies alike, are sufficiently exciting without the sensational interpretations which have sometimes been placed upon them. They do not present, as the publisher's blurb on one popular work on the subject says, 'the greatest challenge to Christian dogma since Darwin's theory of evolution' (a gem of wishful thinking this!) but they do provide us with new and most welcome background material against which we can study the New Testament and the beginnings of Christianity with greater understanding. Of course, when any object is viewed against a new background, the object itself takes on a fresh appearance; and against the background supplied by the Qumran discoveries several passages in the Gospels and in the rest of the New Testament take on a new and vivid significance. For example, those passages which express the eschatological outlook of early Christianity, or its 'remnant' consciousness, take on a new significance, both by comparison and contrast, when they are viewed in the light of this contemporary movement which was also characterised by an eschatological outlook and a 'remnant' consciousness.

Finally, we should be restrained from premature dogmatism when we consider how fragmentary is our knowledge of the Qumran community as yet. Indeed, when everything that has been discovered is published—and this will be the work of years—the realisation that even that is but a fragment of what the library originally contained will continue to impose counsels of caution. But one thing is sure: the real *differentia* of Christianity is the person and achievement of Jesus (not, as is popularly supposed, His teaching by itself); and the appreciation of His essential uniqueness which the new knowledge has underscored is

¹ J. B. Lightfoot, *The Epistle to the Colossians* (1879), pp. 82ff.; F. J. A. Hort, *Judaistic Christianity* (1894), pp. 201 f.

likely to be enhanced, not diminished, as further additions are made to this knowledge.

The Chairman, Dr R. J. C. HARRIS, said: You will all wish to join with me in thanking Professor Bruce for this, his first Presidential address 'Qumran and the New Testament'. It is, I understand, a rule of the Royal Society, a sister learned body of somewhat earlier foundation, that the lectures given before it should be 'intelligible to all the Fellows'. We do not have a similar rule, and it is perfectly obvious that, as far as Professor Bruce is concerned, we shall never require it.

These discoveries have been absolutely fascinating and I suppose that it is not impossible that similar, and perhaps more complete libraries still exist. Perhaps Professor Bruce can tell us what chance still remains—or has the whole area been systematically searched already?

The question which interests me most is that of the connection between the Qumran movement and primitive Christianity. Professor Bruce mentions one or two of the theories, in particular, the 'least improbable' ones which find a connection in John the Baptist. Does this suggest that the Qumran community was not a closed one, and that some, at least, of the men who went out to this wilderness retreat may have returned to the outside world? Is there any evidence, if Dr Yadin's thesis cannot be substantiated, that attempts were made to bring to the community, before its destruction, the news of the true Messiah?

It is, though in one sense only, gratifying to a mere scientist to find that students in historical and theological research also propound theories 'which outrun the available evidence and present them to the public as if they were established facts'. I thought only scientists tended to do this! There are, of course, always those who try to be one guess ahead of the rest, and we must thank our speaker tonight, not only for his balanced and sober account of the possible relationship between the Qumran community and the early Church, but also for the strictures of his last few sentences. In our desire to give good reasons for the faith which we hold we may sometimes be just as guilty of compounding them into facts as those like Komsomolskaya Pravda who desire to demolish that faith.

D. M. MACKAY B.SC., PH.D.

Brain and Will¹

PART I

LOGICAL VERSUS PHYSICAL INDETERMINACY

The classical debate

Everyone admits that some human actions may sometimes be determined by the physical state of the brain. No one doubts that the convulsions of epilepsy or the tremors of Parkinson's disease have, as we say, a physical cause; and most of us would admit that many of our less spectacular actions could probably also be traced back continuously to the physical action of our central nervous system. At least it would not worry us if it were so.

It worries nobody, as long as the actions concerned are not of a kind to which we attach moral significance. But as soon as we come to acts of choice in which questions of responsibility might arise, we find ourselves in the middle of a well-trodden battlefield. On the one hand, there are those who believe that if my choice is to be morally valid, the physical activity of my brain must at some point 'change its course' in a way which is not determined by purely physical factors. They do not mean only that the change would be too complicated to work out in practice—though in fact it probably would be. They believe that even with unlimited powers of calculation, and complete physical information about every part of the brain, it would be impossible to know the change in advance, because, they would say, the change does not depend only on physical factors. If it did, then the choice would not be a morally valid one.

According to this view, then, the brain is to be thought of as an instrument often likened to a pianoforte, with at least a few controlling keys open to influences of a non-physical kind. I shall refer to it, for short, as the 'open-system' view.

Over against this view we have a strong body of opinion, particularly among scientists, which maintains that even when I make a moral choice, the physical changes in my brain depend entirely on the physical

¹ This paper is based on two B.B.C. talks which were reprinted in *The Listener* issues dated 9 and 16 May 1957.

events that lead up to them. On this view there would be no discontinuity in the chain of physical cause and effect. A complete knowledge of the immediately preceding state, it is believed, would always be sufficient in principle to indicate beforehand which choice would be made. No openings are admitted for any non-physical influences to disrupt the expected pattern. We may refer to this as the 'closed-system' view of the brain.

On both sides there are plenty of varieties of opinion. Some who hold the 'open-system' view would maintain that each morally valid choice—each choice for which I may properly be held responsible—requires a miraculous physical change to take place in the brain. Others, such as Dr E. L. Mascall in his recent Bampton Lectures, hold that the well-known indeterminacy of small-scale physical events, first formulated by Heisenberg, could allow the brain to respond to non-physical influences without disobeying physical laws.

In the 'closed-system' camp there are even more varieties of opinion about the 'mental' aspect. Some robustly deny that there are any morally valid choices. They agree with the 'open-system' people that a choice could not be valid unless it falsified or went beyond what was indicated beforehand by the state of the brain—but they do not believe that human choices do so. Others, again, would argue that questions of moral validity are 'meaningless'; and so we could go on.

A Prior Question

But I am not concerned here to come down on one side or the other of this traditional fence. I simply do not know—nobody knows—to what extent the processes going on in the brain are physically determined. We are gradually accumulating evidence which suggests that brain tissue does behave according to the same physical principles as the rest of the body; and we now know also that no behaviour-pattern which we can observe and specify is beyond the capabilities of a physical mechanism. On the other hand, it is undeniable that some processes in the brain might occasionally be affected by physically indeterminate events of the sort which Heisenberg's Principle allows.

No, what I want to do is to undercut all discussion of this kind by raising a group of prior questions which might profitably have been asked before sides were picked on the traditional ground. The central question is: Could I be *excused* from responsibility if a choice of mine did *not* involve any physically indeterminate changes in my brain?

At first sight the answer may seem obvious. 'Surely', we may say, 'a choice which is uniquely indicated beforehand by the state of the brain cannot be called a "free" choice? If you could in principle predict how I shall choose before I make my choice, surely my choosing has no moral validity?' In one sense this is obvious. We should all agree that if we could be given a description of our action beforehand, and had no power to help or hinder its fulfilment, then we should have to admit that this action was not 'free' but involuntary. A sneeze, for example, at a sufficiently advanced stage, might be judged involuntary by this criterion. So would a simple reflex action like a knee-jerk or an eye-blink.

But—and this is the point—even supposing that the necessary brain-processes were determined only by physical factors, are we sure that what we normally call a 'free choice' could be described to us in advance? I think not. In fact I believe that whether the brain-mechanism is physically determinate or not, the activity which we call 'making a free choice' is of a special kind which could never be described to us with certainty beforehand. Suppose we are asked to choose between porridge and prunes for breakfast. We think: 'Let's see: I've had prunes all last week; I'm sick of prunes; I'll have porridge.' We would normally claim now to have made a 'free choice'. But suppose that some super-physiologist has been observing our brain-workings all this time; and suppose he declares that our brain went through nothing but physically determinate actions. Does this mean that he could have told us in advance that we would certainly choose porridge? Of course not. However carefully calculated the super-physiologist's proffered description of our choice, we would know—and he would know—that we still had power to alter it.

Logical Indeterminacy

No matter how much he tried to allow in advance for the effects of his telling us, we could still defy him to give us a valid description of what our choice would be. This is our plain everyday experience of what most people mean by our free choice: a choice which nobody could (even in principle) describe to us in advance. My point is that this vital criterion of freedom of choice, which we shall see later can be extended and strengthened, would apply equally well whether the brain were physically determinate in its workings or not. In either case, the state of our brain after receiving his description would not (and

could not) be the state on which he based his calculations. If he were to try to allow beforehand for the effects of his description upon us, he would be doomed to an endless regression—logically chasing his own tail in an effort to allow for the effects of allowing for the effects of allowing . . . indefinitely. This sort of logical situation was analysed some years ago in another connection by Professor Karl Popper, and the conclusion I think is watertight. Any proffered description of our choice would automatically be self-invalidating.

It is necessary, however, to carry the argument a stage further. One might get the impression from what I have said that our choice could not be proved free in this sense unless we succeeded in actually falsifying a would-be description of it. But this is not so. If we are supposing that our super-physiologist has access to all our brain-workings, then our freedom to nullify predictions of our choices can in principle be established simply by examining the structure—the blueprint, so to speak—of those brain-workings. It is not necessary actually to make the experiment of presenting us with an alleged 'prediction', in order to verify that the basis of the prediction would be invalidated. The point is simply that the brain is always altered by receiving information; so that the brain which has received a description of itself cannot possibly be in the state described. Provided that the parts of our brain concerned with receiving and understanding the information are linked up with the mechanisms concerned with our taking the decision (and nobody doubts this even on the 'closed-system' view), then it is logically impossible to give us—or even to make ourselves imagine—a valid description of a decision we are still deliberating, whether on the basis of advance observation or anything else. It is not that we are unable to ascertain the true description. It is that for us *there is no true description to ascertain*. For us the decision is something not to be ascertained but to be *made*. In fact, any description would be for us *logically indeterminate* (neither true nor false) because it would be self-referring in a contradictory way, rather like the statement: 'This sentence I am now uttering is false.'

It is this *logical* indeterminacy, of statements predicting our decisions, which has tended in the past to be confused with *physical* indeterminacy, as something which was thought to be necessary if a choice were to be morally valid. We all feel intuitively that there is something queerly 'undetermined' about the decisions we take—that there is something absurd and self-contradictory in trying to believe or even consider as 'true now' any advance description of them. I hope I have shown that

this intuitive feeling is entirely justified—but on grounds which have nothing to do with physical indeterminacy in the matter of our brains. We appear to be so constructed that any would-be prediction of our voluntary actions becomes for us merely an invitation to choose how to act. This is not only theory, but also empirical fact. If anyone tries to predict to us that we are about to choose porridge rather than prunes, no matter how scientific the basis of his statement, we can easily verify that he is simply giving us a fresh opportunity to make up our minds. Whether we decide in the end to fall in with his would-be prediction or to contradict it, we know—and he knows—that it has lost any scientific validity by being offered to us.

'I Knew You'd Choose That'

But, we may well ask, what if our super-physiologist does *not* tell me of his prediction? What if he just keeps his mouth shut and watches how I choose, and then says, 'Aha, I knew you'd choose that'? We must admit straight away that we should feel rather upset if anybody could do that to us every time we made a choice; and I must agree that I do not believe it could ever be done consistently in practice. Consistent success would be possible only if our brains *were* physically determinate, and if the super-physiologist could know the whole of our brain-workings, together with all the influences which would act on them from the outside world. The first supposition is doubtful and the second is certainly impossible on practical grounds of sheer complexity; and between them I think these considerations are enough to account for—and justify—our feeling of incredulity.

But suppose for the sake of argument that it *were* so: that although we can defy anyone to tell us how we are going to choose, yet a successful prediction of our choice could in principle be made by someone who keeps quiet about it. What then? Could we excuse ourselves from responsibility for our choice on these grounds? I do not think so. If we had no power to falsify his prediction, we might indeed excuse ourselves. But in this case there is no doubt that we have the power. Our silent observer is only denying us the opportunity to demonstrate it. He knows, as well as we, that in fact his prediction is only conditionally 'certain': certain just so long as we do not know it; and it is rather an odd sort of 'certainty' that you have to hide from someone in case it turns false! Clearly even when he kept quiet the sense in which his prediction was 'certain' would be a rather limited one.

As a matter of fact, the great majority of our choices day by day could be predicted with great success without even opening our heads, by anyone who knows us sufficiently well; but it never occurs to us to question our responsibility for them on these grounds. At least if it does I do not think it ought to, for all it means is that we make most of our choices 'in character'; not that we could not have chosen otherwise (if confronted with the allegedly 'certain' prediction), but simply that we were not inclined to—and might not have felt so inclined even if the prediction had been offered to us.

In short, the super-physiologist's knowledge, if our brain-workings accurately reflected what we were thinking, would do no more than enable him to make predictions as if he knew what was going on in our minds. In that case it would be surprising if he were not successful, so long as he kept quiet; but we could never appeal to his evidence in order to excuse ourselves from responsibility for such choices, for at most it could only offer *confirmation*—and not contradiction—of the mental processes in terms of which our moral responsibility would be judged.

To sum up thus far, I believe that brain-processes may well include some events which are physically indeterminate as well as many which are not. But I am suggesting that our responsibility for moral choices rests not on any physical indeterminateness of our brains, but on the logical indeterminateness to us of any advance description of our decisions. It is the unique organisation of our brains which gives this peculiar status to our decisions—not anything physically queer about their workings. If there is any physical indeterminacy, its effects will be entirely different, as we shall now see.

PART II

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PHYSICAL INDETERMINACY

Heisenberg's Principle

It is just over thirty years since Heisenberg enunciated his principle of indeterminacy, asserting that the motions of atomic particles can never be predicted exactly from the physical data available to us. Laplace's dream of a clockwork universe was gone; in fact, according to Eddington, just half of the data which we would require for a complete prediction of the universe are not available until after the change

we want to predict. But if this came as a blow to the classical physicists, it was welcomed with open arms in other quarters. To those who felt that the dignity of man was being threatened by the creeping spread of physical causality to the very mechanism of the brain, Heisenberg's principle seemed a God-send. Here, surely, was the solution to the problem of free will. 'If atomic particles are physically indeterminate in their movements, then, since my brain is made up of atomic particles, its activity is not physically determined, and my will is free'—so the argument ran.

I have been arguing that the kind of 'freedom' which physical indeterminacy would give us is not required in order to establish moral responsibility: that on the contrary, whether my brain were *physically* determinate or not, my choosing is for me a unique and *logically* indeterminate activity for which I could not escape full moral responsibility. We must now take a look at the other side of the picture; for I have no wish to deny that physically indeterminate events may sometimes take place in our brains; and it is interesting I think to see what kind of effects these events could have upon the delicate and complex processes going on in our heads.

The first thing to keep in mind is that the degree of physical indeterminacy allowed by Heisenberg's principle becomes more and more negligible, the bigger and heavier the objects we are studying. Indeed it is only with the smallest objects of all—electrons, for example—that it is really serious. A nerve cell may be a tiny object by everyday standards; but it is roughly a million million million times heavier than an electron; so the chances of its suffering appreciably from Heisenberg indeterminacy are small indeed. Even if we suppose that the controlling part of a nerve cell weighs only one-millionth of the whole, we are still thinking on a scale a million million times larger than that of the electron.

There are about 10,000,000,000 nerve cells in each of our brains; so the chance that some *one* of these should be disturbed by a physically indeterminate event is correspondingly greater. But this brings us to the second point. The brain is not like a wireless set, in which a single valve-failure is enough to upset the whole performance. The nerve cells in the brain seem to be organised on a principle of team-work, often with hundreds or even thousands of cells working together on any one job—rather like the individual strands in a rope. Even if one of our brain-cells were put out of action altogether, the chances are that it would make no significant difference. Only a most unusual

combination of circumstances could allow the behaviour of the brain as a whole to be affected.

One further point needs to be made before we discuss the implications of all this. The brain has to carry on its business in the face of all manner of physical disturbances besides those which Heisenberg has discussed. There are random vibrations due to the heat of the brain-tissue for example, random fluctuations in blood supply, and random disturbances reaching the brain from the outside world. These are not indeterminate influences in principle, but in practice they are far too complex to be predictable; and their effects are much larger than those due to Heisenberg indeterminacy, though similar in other respects. Yet, surprisingly enough, in spite of all those unpredictable influences, the brain still manages to work. It is in fact marvellously designed to be unaffected by disturbances of this kind. It follows that if the brain is at all affected appreciably by the physically indeterminate 'Heisenberg' variety of disturbance, this ought to be a much rarer occurrence than the other sorts, which are not absolutely unpredictable. Hardly any of the disturbances which do have significant effects are likely to be of the feeble Heisenberg type.

Effects of Physical Indeterminacy

What, then, could we expect to be the effects of such unpredictable disturbances? In the first place, they would undeniably introduce a certain kind of 'freedom' into the brain's activity. But I suggest that this would not be the freedom characteristic of rational moral choice and responsibility, which we have seen to be something different. It would rather be of the kind we should call 'spontaneity' or even sometimes 'mental aberration'—according to the part of the brain affected by it. In most cases it would mean the interruption of a normal train of thought by an 'unbidden idea', as we would say, or by some 'unaccountable lapse'. Perhaps this really does happen on occasions. If it does, it raises the interesting question whether the person concerned could properly be held responsible for what has happened. So far from enhancing his responsibility, such undetermined events would seem if anything to lessen it. We may be reminded of the fact that great composers and artists have often disclaimed responsibility for their inspirations, saying that they 'received them unbidden', though I am far from suggesting that originality is only a matter of random disturbances in the brain. I only want to emphasise that in most cases the

unpredictability produced in this way would not seem to enhance responsibility for the resulting action.

But now, it may be asked, what if I were deliberating a choice between two possibilities which was so finely balanced that I could find no reason for favouring one rather than the other—like Buridan's donkey, which starved to death, we remember, because it could not choose between two equally tempting bundles of hay: might not the outcome ultimately be settled by one of these unpredictable disturbances? I think this might well be so, and that the resulting choice might be unpredictable even to a super-physiologist who knew all that was going on in our heads—and kept his mouth shut. But what would be our own view of such a choice? Would we want to give it a higher moral status than one in which the right issue was clear to us and we decided unwaveringly on principle? I doubt it. Indeed I think that to such a finely balanced choice I would attach if anything a lower moral significance—rather as if I had settled it by mentally tossing a coin.

There are, however, more subtle effects which unpredictable disturbances could have. When we make a choice, we take into account all the pros and cons we can think of, weigh them up, and decide accordingly. All of this, I believe, requires physical activity in our brains, which in a sense indicates or represents what we are thinking. Suppose that I make some choice which seems to me straightforward on the evidence I have considered. I see no reason to doubt that the corresponding physical activity in my brain might be equally 'straightforward'—in other words, it might well have nothing physically discontinuous or 'queer' about it. But now, how did I come to consider the evidence I did? Obviously, I could never think of all the factors that might conceivably be relevant. There is an unconscious selection of evidence, which I believe also involves a physical brain-process; and if this process were to suffer one of these unpredictable disturbances, I might well have no conscious awareness of it at all. It would mean simply that some factor, affecting my decision, would come to mind, or fail to come to mind, as a result. There would be nothing to indicate to me that anything unusual had occurred. And yet, in consequence of this disturbance, the different selection of factors might sometimes lead me just as clearly to the opposite decision.

In either case, I think I would be fully responsible for my decision. But in the second case it would have an unexpectedness, from the observer's angle, which it would lack if there had been no disturbance of the process by which the evidence was brought to my conscious

attention. To sum it up, I am suggesting that although physical indeterminacy in the brain is not necessary for moral responsibility, there is some evidence that occasional brain disturbances may be physically unpredictable, and that a small minority of these could be physically indeterminate. Such discontinuities, however, would show themselves more as a kind of originality or spontaneity, than in connection with a deliberate moral choice; and it is only if they affected the unconscious selection of evidence that they might be said to play any significant part in such a choice. Their general effect would be, if anything, to weaken rather than strengthen responsibility for any action which resulted.

From all this you will gather that I have not much hope of Heisenberg's indeterminacy as a gateway through which the mind acts on the brain. Perhaps it would be only fair to try to indicate how I think the two are related, for I believe most seriously in both the spiritual and the physical aspects of our human nature.

'Subject-language' and 'Object-language'

The trouble here, I believe, is that we have two different and entirely legitimate languages which we use about human activity, but that these tend to get mixed up in illegitimate ways. On the one hand there is what we might call 'subject-language', to which belong words describing mental activity, like thinking, choosing, loving, hating, and so forth. All of these are words defined from the standpoint of myself as the actor in the situation. From the standpoint of an observer of the situation, on the other hand, we can define an entirely different vocabulary, making up what we might call 'object-language'. To this belong words like 'brain', 'nerve cell', 'glandular secretion', 'electric current', and so forth.

The problem is to discover how descriptions in these two languages can be related. I think out some decision, let us say, and at the same time a scientist observes certain physical events in my brain. Are we to say that my decision causes the physical events, or that the physical events cause my decision, or is there some different way of relating the two? My own view, for what it is worth, is that my decision neither causes nor is caused by its immediate physical concomitants. For we can only say 'A causes B' when A and B are two activities (two separate events or sets of events). And my suggestion is that the mental activity I describe in 'subject-language' and the corresponding

brain-activity described in 'object-language' are not two activities, but two aspects of one and the same activity, which in its full nature is richer—has more significance—than can be expressed in either language alone, or even in both together.

I am not suggesting that mental activity is 'nothing but' an aspect of brain-activity: this would be the attitude which I call 'nothing buttery', and one might equally fallaciously maintain the converse. The idea is rather that each is a descriptive projection, so to say, of a single complex unity which we can call simply my-activity. An observer can describe my-activity under the aspect of brain-activity; I myself can describe it under the aspect of mental-activity; but each, and any, descriptive projection, however exhaustive in its own language, can do only partial justice to the complex and mysterious reality that is my activity as a human being.

As a crude illustration of what I mean by 'doing partial justice' imagine the two descriptions which a physicist and a telegraphist might give of a morse signal, sent by flash-lamp from ship to shore. The physicist might exhaustively record the duration and intensity of every light flash, without ever mentioning the message. The telegraphist might exhaustively record every word of the message without ever mentioning the intensity of the light. Each description, exhaustive though it is, requires to be complemented by the other in order to do justice to the significance of what took place. The two, as we say, are logically complementary. We do not debunk the one by claiming that the other is exhaustive, nor do we justify the one by trying to find discontinuities or gaps in the other.

The Unity of Mental and Physical

It would follow from this view that there is no need—indeed it would be fallacious—to look for a causal mechanism by which mental and physical activity could act on one another. Their unity is already a closer (and a more mysterious) one than if they were pictured as separate activities in quasi-mechanical interaction, one of them visible and the other invisible. Yet it is a unity which safeguards rather than threatens my responsibility for my choosings; for it makes nonsense of any suggestion that my body, rather than I myself, could be held responsible for them. This would be simply to muddle up the two languages—rather like asserting, or denying, that when a man feels in love, his brain-cells feel in love. Such a statement is neither true nor

false, but meaningless, because feeling in love is an activity of subjects, not of objects; and when a man is feeling in love, his brain-cells are presumably fully occupied doing something physically describable in 'object-language' as the correlate of this mental condition.

I would suggest indeed that the theory of mental activity as an 'extra' which interacts with the brain, is not only unnecessary, but also open to two serious objections. First, it hangs the whole of morality on an unsupported physical hypothesis—namely, that brain activity shows discontinuities, in the right places, which would require non-physical influences for their explanation. Even in the present primitive state of our knowledge this hypothesis now looks more improbable with every advance in the science of the brain. Secondly, the theory would deny my responsibility for any choices which did not entail physical discontinuity in my brain, even although I made them deliberately, and could defy anyone to describe them to me beforehand. This I believe to be flatly immoral, and a menace to a human being's right, as we say, to 'know his own mind'. If there were any question that someone's brain were disordered—prevented from functioning properly—then it might be legitimate to deny his responsibility. This could in principle be settled by examining the structure of his brain; but it would be fallacious to describe a brain as disordered merely because it failed to show any physical discontinuities, or because one could discern some of the pattern of physical cause-and-effect which was the necessary correlate of the man's mental activity. I believe that this represents a fallacy to be guarded against particularly in much of our contemporary thinking about the penal code. If I am right, there is need for a radical rethinking of the role of psychiatric evidence especially, in the assessing of moral, if not legal, responsibility.

But to follow this now would take us too far. I would just repeat once more the main contention of this paper—that to hang moral responsibility on theories of physical indeterminacy in the brain is both misguided and immoral: misguided, because my responsibility is adequately nailed to my door if my choice is *logically* indeterminate until I make it—which could be true even if my brain showed no physical discontinuities; immoral, because a reliance on physical indeterminacy would deny responsibility for choices (whether good or bad) for which I think a man has a right to claim responsibility. This is no less distressing because those who hold such views do so in the name of human dignity. But I believe that our true dignity lies in having the

humility to see ourselves for what we are: and I am convinced that the Christian doctrine of man at any rate, in all its fullness, requires no licence for his brain to suffer non-physical disturbances. There is, as I have said, a profound mystery in our human nature; but it stands wholly apart from any scientific puzzles that we may find in the brain. It will be in our wisdom to avoid any temptation to confound the two.

DISCUSSIONS

JACK W. HANNAH

The Presentation of the Christian Gospel, and its Impact on The Individual Today

On 14 January 1957 a paper by Mr Hannah on the Presentation of the Christian Gospel was read before the Institute by Mr A. H. Boulton. This paper was awarded the Schofield Memorial Prize for 1956.

Such a term as 'the Gospel' needs more than ever before to be clearly defined. The author stated that this was, in his view, the message that God through Jesus Christ seeks to establish a new relationship with man so personal that He wills to be known as Father. Further, the central theme of the message is that God wills to reign as Father, for the new kingdom is the realm of those new relationships. Mr Hannah continued, 'Since we conclude that the core of the Gospel is the establishment of a new relationship, the reign of God as Father, we must further become cognizant that it is a core that depends for its very existence on its communication. No cross was needed for God to forgive sins. Without man ever knowing it, God can forgive him his sins. Jesus forgave the paralytic his sins long before the cross (Mark ii. 5), and Paul writes that God passed over former sins (Romans iii. 25). No resurrection was needed for God to resurrect us to eternal life. But for God to establish personal relationships, He had to act. The message of personal relationship had to be incarnated; the Word became flesh. Jesus Christ came to give men the message of the new personal relationship they could have with God, but God required of this messenger the actual performance of the message, the exemplification of *agape*. Thus it is necessary that Christians should carry out the message in their lives. There is a Christian ethic, by which God works out His purpose through the activity of believers.'

The paper was closed by an examination of the historical significance of Christianity. This is important because the Gospel is capable of answering questions in every age by historical interpretation. The place of the Holy Spirit is also important. He it is who convinces the world of sin, righteousness, and judgment. Finally, the wrath of God is the inevitable portion of those who reject the message of the new

relationship. But not only is this so, but the wrath of God is also clearly expressed against those who profess to be enjoying the new relationship, but who show no care for it. God desires relationships with men in all seriousness, and the Church carries a great responsibility in setting forth the evidence of this new fellowship.

DR C. E. ALLAN TURNER: In my paper which, of course, I wrote without seeing Mr Hannah's, and to which I shall not refer, I felt that it was necessary to divide this subject up into three sections: Firstly, the Nature of the Gospel. It is obvious that we must examine the nature of the message before we consider its presentation. Secondly, some reference to the methods of presenting the Gospel. Finally, some indication of its impact.

It seemed to me when I attempted the task that it really required a very lengthy study of the New Testament, of Church History, and of modern Christian activities, and perhaps some reference to ecclesiastic statistics; and that, therefore, it would require a lot of time, and it might make a massive paper! One of the great difficulties about reducing things like that is that they tend to become scrappy and rather pedestrian sorts of documents.

The Gospel is a message which the Lord gave to the apostles to proclaim. He came as the Son of God with a message, and we find Him proclaiming this message from the beginning, and, as He did so, He was training the disciples, or apostles, for the purpose of doing the same work. We notice in the Gospels that the message is always connected with the idea of the Kingdom. Of course, it was preached to the Jews first: and the Jews expected a king. But the Gentiles also were ruled by kings, and had similar needs. As I see it, this message concerning the Kingdom was a call first of all, to fulfil the conditions of entry into the Kingdom. The first thing, and perhaps we might say, the only word that God has for the unconverted, the unregenerate man, is the word 'Repent'. He must change his mind: and then be born again: he has to become possessed, by some means, of a new nature through this change of mind, and through the divine operation within. This would result in an ability to obey the ethical injunctions which I believe were also part of the Gospel. And when the Lord preached He had in view His cross, which was going to provide the means of bringing into being this Kingdom. He also, of course, had in view the fact that He was going to rise from the dead, and, therefore, the message would be the message of the Risen King.

Behind all this development, particularly in the apostles' preaching, we see that God's purpose appears to be, on His side, and that perhaps with special relationship to the theology of the Old Testament. It was to be a vindication of Himself—God's holiness and God's love, were to be vindicated. Also He had a purpose in that He was going to have this message proclaimed to all the world. He knew beforehand quite obviously what was going to happen. The Lord hints at this in the promise that 'many are called, but few are chosen': and that He was going to call out from the peoples a people for Himself: just as the Jewish nation had been a people for Himself. He was going to bring into being, in other words, an ecclesia, a Church, and this Church was going to have authority in a future state. Perhaps we might even venture to say that the Church was going to act as God's government and Civil Service in the Kingdom.

Regarding methods it would seem that the main one of making known the Gospel, presenting the Good News, was by preaching. There is a very heavy emphasis on this in the Gospels and in the Epistles. It is interesting to see in the Acts that the preaching was not of one kind. Without pretending to know Greek, I find it interesting to see that a number of different Greek words are used to describe this process of preaching. In one case we have 'kerusso', which was to proclaim, to herald forth. In another case we have 'laleo', which was to talk the Gospel. In another, there was 'kataggello', which was to tell thoroughly. Another word was 'euaggelizo', from which we have the word 'evangelize' and which was to tell the Good News. And then, also, there was 'martureo', which was to witness. There are, of course, other words, but those named are used quite frequently: and to my mind they are suggestive of the variety of means used to put over the message. Of course, behind all these activities was the work of the Holy Spirit in the believer. This is clearly set out in Acts ii; the Holy Spirit inspiring the Apostles when preaching, and giving to them an assurance about the truths which they proclaimed, and particularly the truth of the Risen Lord.

I made some reference in my paper to modern methods, and it is interesting to see today that a large variety of means are used, and while we have not time to consider them in detail, it is worth noting that in this present century, and perhaps in the last decade in particular, many material means have been used: the radio, the film, and now television, to make known this truth. But it does not appear that preaching is, thereby, supplanted. These things are just means of communication,

of making known the Gospel. I feel, however, that there is a danger over the use of this modern apparatus because it would suggest that our success in making known the Gospel, is a matter of our own cleverness, or the extent of our advertising ability. Whether it is God's will that we should use these things, and use them in, shall we say, a worldwide way, as possibly they are employed in some circles, is a matter about which we may have various opinions. But what is essential, to my mind, is that the person making known the Gospel should be a man of integrity, one who really believes what he preaches, and who has been affected and transformed by it. This is the sort of thing which does convince people. Moreover, he, or she, needs to be a person of understanding who can appreciate the needs of his, or her, fellows, and can enter into the emotional or psychological state of people today. We, I suppose, are living in an age when there is not the poverty which obtained in the times when the Gospels were written, nor, perhaps, even the oppression which existed in western Europe. But today there is no happiness: there is a great lack of satisfaction, a great sense of frustration. People are longing for security, for satisfaction, for sympathy, for activity, for freedom, for a removal of this sense of frustration, and particularly for hope.

The impact of the Gospel has been affected, I would suggest, by a number of factors. Here we can only just mention them. There are social factors. It would appear that in times of oppression and poverty the message has been rather more effective: in New Testament times; and in the time of the industrial revolution, thinking of the great Methodist movement, and also, perhaps, in the middle of the last century, the nineteenth century. Its impact has been hindered during the last century by other influences, and two, which I will not enlarge upon, would appear to be, the scientific movement with its materialistic interpretation of life; and the Modernist movement, with its heavy criticisms of the text of Scripture, which attacked, or weakened its authority. These two forces have tended to reach down to the young: and children have been brought up, therefore, to question the value of the Gospel, and the authority of its message. But I feel that the situation at present is not without hope. People are, I think, rather more interested in religion, if freed from a lot of its traditional shackles: and it would seem that young people today are asking questions about it, and are finding them answered by faithful men of God. It is heartening, too, to see how the Evangelical movements are progressing in the colleges and universities, and schools, and how much more interest is

being taken in religious education in the schools. We have a better quality of teacher and a more convinced person entering into this work. Man is left nevertheless, when the Gospel is presented to him, with a choice: and this, one of three: Rationalism, which has, of course, invaded some of the churches; the Dogma, which we find in one ancient church in particular, but those appear to be in conflict with the third choice the true Gospel, which is the Word of God. And the Gospel, to my mind is not restricted, for example to John iii. 16—the simple Gospel—but rather it is the whole counsel of God which we have set forth in the New Testament.

THE REV. M. C. BURRELL: One of our greatest difficulties today is that of *communicating the Gospel in terms that mean something to the non-churchgoer*. How much present-day teaching and preaching is intelligible to the average churchgoer, let alone the strangers who come on special occasions? And what about parish magazines? Often they are couched in 'ultra-pious' language that puts off the honest pagan. If we fail to present the Gospel in terms that can be understood, is it any wonder that people fail to respond to its challenge? We have to face the fact that the majority of people do not think or feel as we do. Therefore they do not see things from our point of view or understand our language.

A short time ago, I carried out an experiment in an attempt to discover how many of the recognised technical terms of Christianity, terms that are used regularly in our pulpits, are really understood by those who hear them. A group of young churchgoers, keen Christians, people who were considered to have a reasonable grasp of basic Christianity, were asked to write down the meanings of certain words. Here are the results. Only two understood the meaning of the word justification. Four people did not know the meaning of Incarnation and of the others who attempted an answer only one made the suggestion, 'God in Christ'. On Regeneration they were more successful for five had 'second birth' or 'being born again'. But even here some could speak only of taking up the Christian life. One person ventured the suggestion that regeneration was 'when you go up to heaven'. Three people had no idea of the meaning of Grace. Of the rest, one suggested 'niceness', two were nearer with 'the love of God for man', but only one had the thought of a free gift from God to man. The answers to the word Advent were even more illuminating. One said it was a fasting period, another said it was when the Holy Spirit came to the

disciples, a third thought it was the journey of the wise men. Only two mentioned the Second Coming and none Christ's First Coming. The average age of those taking part was eighteen and a half.

A survey of individual papers was also most enlightening. One girl of twenty of good intelligence, with a good church background first as a Baptist and then as an Anglican, a keen Christian, a Sunday school teacher, and a regular member of the choir, had the following results. She could not attempt the meanings of Grace, Sanctification, Advent, and Pentecost, she had no real idea of the meaning of Incarnation, Revelation and Sacrament, and she gave a moderately correct answer to Justification and Regeneration.

Now all these young people were Christians and had a fairly good church background. If those words meant so little to them, what do they mean to the average outsider?

Two conclusions force themselves upon us. First, we must teach our regular members more doctrine, because they are the people who must pass on the Gospel to others. Secondly, we must use technical terms sparingly, and always with an explanation, otherwise non-Christians will not understand what on earth we are talking about.

The trouble is that most of us still speak in the language of the Authorized Version, which for all its beauty and value to the educated Christian, means little to the average non-Christian. It is out of date. Language is living and constantly changing. Therefore we must be able, not only to quote accurately from the Bible, but also to put the teaching of the Bible in simple terms that the 'uninitiated' can understand. Otherwise we shall give them the impression that a religion couched in sixteenth-century English is beautiful, and uplifting, but of no real practical value today.

There is, however, a *danger that we must avoid*. In our efforts to present the Gospel in intelligible terms, we must be careful to present the New Testament Gospel. We must not water it down to suit present day tastes. There is a real scandal in the Gospel. It is still a stumbling block to some and foolishness to others. Moreover, this has nothing to do with the terminology of the Gospel, but with the content of the Gospel. In seeking to get to grips with modern man, we must be careful that we do not present a modern counterfeit Gospel.

That this warning is necessary can be seen from a quick glance at *The Times* special publication, 'Fundamentalism, a Religious Problem'. This gathers in one cover a number of letters to the editor which were

published in that newspaper just before Dr Billy Graham's mission in the University of Cambridge. The contention of many was that such evangelism would result in 'disillusionment and disaster for educated men and women'.

Without spending time on all the views expressed in that publication, it is fair to say that it was the presentation of the Biblical Gospel that was being questioned by some of the opponents of Dr Graham. In view of this, we, like the First Century Christians, must present uncompromisingly the Gospel given by God's revelation. That Gospel is Christ. All that we know of Christ is contained in the Bible. Therefore if the Good News of Christ is to be proclaimed with authority, then it must be the Good News contained in the Bible. Another form of the Gospel is not the Gospel at all, but the misleading teachings of scholars who base their ideas on theological speculation.

We must, however, use *modern methods of presentation*. Listen to these words of A. J. Watts. 'It is possible to go into a day-school . . . and watch the teaching of history, geography, or chemistry by the most modern methods, with all the help that visual aids can give, and yet to find the technique of the religious instruction fifty years behind the times.' That criticism might be made legitimately with regard to the general presentation of the Christian Gospel. Even though the posters with which we are confronted every day tell us that propaganda through eye-gate is recognised as profitable by all the business world, as Christians we fail to use the appeal through the eye. Meanwhile non-Christian, and even anti-Christian, influences are allowed to colour people's outlook on life. As Christians we are challenged to enter the field of advertising in a much more realistic way. It will cost money, but the money will be well spent.

Systematic and persistent propaganda should also be carried out by the local church in a smaller area. Well produced leaflets, of the type used by political parties at the time of an election, could be delivered to every home in the area at regular intervals. Something like the humorous leaflets produced by J. B. Phillips might well be a pattern to follow. The Communists give us an example. Bob Darke, a former Communist, wrote this. 'The selling of the *Daily Worker* is organised like a military campaign. . . . Hackney Communists sell about 20,000 extra copies of the *Daily Worker* every Saturday. . . . When Party members have reported that a block of flats is sympathetic to the Party then it is invaded almost daily by comrades who knock at every door and flourish a copy of the paper under every nose.' Can we, as

Christians, be less concerned about spreading our answer to the world's needs?

THE REV. JOHN A. CAIGER (*Chairman*) said: It is suggested that I should make one or two remarks at this point just to initiate the discussion. Since the time is going I do not think I ought to speak for long, but just make one or two comments on the paper which we have in our hands, in particular.

I felt, as I read this paper through, distinctly out of sympathy with its approach to the subject. That is not to indicate a lack of sympathy with its author, of course, but I felt there was some fundamental difference between his standpoint and my own in the approach to this theme. I think that can, perhaps, best be expressed by making use of one or two rather hackneyed descriptions. I think he would probably own to the description of 'Liberal' as distinct from my own preference to be described as an 'Evangelical of the more Conservative School'. I think, probably, that lies at the heart of the difference which I myself feel between his approach and mine: and I think, ultimately, therefore, the difference which I see so markedly depends upon the difference of view that he and I would hold in regard to the inspiration and authority of the Bible. That I suppose is, after all, the ultimate point of controversy between the two schools of thought.

I do think that there is a great deal that is inadequate in what he has said in his paper in regard to his definition of the Gospel. He does invite comment at this point because he sets out quite distinctly to develop a definition of the Gospel. It seems to me that he has given us a true statement of certain aspects of the Gospel. He lays emphasis on the fact that God is revealed to us as a Father, which is a very essential element of the Gospel. He lays emphasis upon the importance of fellowship in the Church as an expression of the Gospel, which is perfectly right. He lays a great deal of stress upon the importance of Agape—Christian love—as representing care and concern for one's neighbour. All of this is perfectly right in its place, but these things, even taken together, do not constitute the whole Gospel. It seems to me that this definition does not help us because, whilst it lays down that the Gospel proclaims this new relationship between God, as Father, and man, it does nothing towards defining the quality of this new relationship, or the way in which the moral and spiritual demands of that relationship may be met. This is precisely where the problem, or, if you like, the predicament enters in. The whole question is, How

can man enter into this relationship with God? God is holy: man is sinful. At once we are faced with the kind of basic problem which the New Testament is facing all the time, involving, as it does the holiness of God, and the sinfulness of the race, and not only that, but the idea of judgment, on the one hand, and of grace, on the other, leading us, inevitably, to the meaning of the Cross, and the Resurrection.

So I would feel that right at the start the definition of the Gospel that is given is inadequate on those grounds. I would say that it is far too narrow. He says on page 27: 'The simple phrase "Christian Gospel" is itself fraught with meaning.' We agree with that. But the question is, What is its meaning? And here I find myself agreeing with what Dr Turner has said—that the Gospel in the New Testament is not even the simple gospel of John iii. 16. Our Lord when He gave His commission to the Church, said, and Mark gives us this version: 'Go ye into all the world and preach the Gospel to every creature.' In Matthew it is: 'Go ye and teach the nations, teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you.' Now it seems to me that there we have a far more adequate indication of the Gospel, and its content. It is the message of all that Christ Himself has taught, and that involves a great deal more than the author of our paper would indicate.

There are one or two other things which I feel ought to give rise to discussion. For example on page 28, where he is talking about Peter's approach to the Jews on the Day of Pentecost, he draws a lesson which I think is valid enough up to a point, that Peter is, obviously, applying the truth that he holds to the needs and awareness of his congregation. I do not think we need quarrel with that. But Mr Hannah seems to indicate that since he has done that, therefore he has not given them the doctrinal content of the early Church's Gospel. It seems to me that Peter is doing both. He is giving them the essential doctrinal content of the Early Church's Gospel, and he is expressing and declaring it in terms that his Jewish hearers can understand. And I think that is the sort of thing which we, as Christians, would always seek to be doing.

A little lower down on page 28, talking about these various explanations of the death of Christ, he says: 'Similar divergent ideas are found in 1 John i., 7 and ii. 2.' But the fact that there are different ideas in these two passages does not, necessarily, indicate that they are divergent. I would say they are complementary. In explaining the meaning of so profound an event as the sacrificial death of the Son of

God, one would expect to find quite a variety of pictorial ideas necessary to draw out its full meaning.

There are one or two other minor points of that kind. On page 30 at the top of the page, he says: 'In reality the early church recognized the message of Jesus as the gospel even before the crucifixion and resurrection.' He gives me the impression very much that his standpoint is that of the 'Liberals'. I would have thought that a rather earlier generation than our own was infected with the idea that in order to get at an understanding of the true Gospel, one must do away with Paul, and get right back to the Jesus of history, the idea being that it was in the pure message of Jesus of Nazareth that we find the Gospel, and that we must get rid of the hindering accretions of Paul's teachings in order to get back to the simplicity of the original message. I never can understand that point of view. C. S. Lewis, I think it is, in a Preface to J. B. Phillips's translation of the Epistles, points out that far from being a true statement, in point of fact the truth seems to lie in the opposite, namely that the original theological explication of the Church's message is to be found in the Epistles, which were written and circulated first. The Gospels and the Acts, by and large, were written later, and they were written for people who were already Christians: so that the message of the Early Church, and its explication of the message of Christ, is to be found in the Epistles. We cannot, therefore, so easily dispense with Paul, since the Gospels were written later than some of his Epistles. The Epistles represent an earlier tradition, and there is nothing incompatible between them and the Gospels. But I think we do despite to the Epistles if we follow Mr Hannah at this point.

In the Gospels we are exhorted to 'repent and believe the gospel', and then follows the teaching of the Sermon on the Mount. As Dr Turner has reminded us, we have this emphasis on repentance, this insistence that man must be born again, and all the ethical implications of citizenship in the Kingdom of Heaven. Then there comes the turning-point in the ministry of Jesus. Following the confession at Caesarea Philippi, Matthew uses this very significant phrase, 'From that time forth began Jesus to show unto His disciples that He must go unto Jerusalem and suffer many things and be killed, and rise again the third day'. 'From that time'—that does not mean to say that there is any divergence between the early ministry of Jesus, which was the Gospel, and the later ministry of Jesus, which, for some reason, was not. On the contrary, this is obviously the moment when our Lord feels that

He can begin to educate His disciples into the true meaning of His coming, and the nature of the work that He was to do, and its relation to the message already preached. And from that time onward you find again and again as He withdraws Himself from the crowds into the smaller circle of the apostles, He is teaching them all the time about the Cross. So that it seems quite unfair to suggest that the Gospel that Jesus preached was purely and simply this message of the Sermon on the Mount.

Then in regard to the paragraph at the bottom of page 31: 'Since we conclude that the core of the gospel is the establishment of a new relationship, the reign of God as a Father, we must further become cognizant that it is a core that depends for its very existence on its communication.' I do not like that. However, we will pass that by. 'No cross was needed for God to forgive sins. Without man ever knowing it, God can forgive him his sins. Jesus forgave the paralytic his sins long before the cross (Mark ii. 5), and Paul writes that God passed over former sins (Rom. iii. 25).' That to me is a quite extraordinary reference. Romans iii. 25 says: 'Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past, through the forbearance of God.' If any verse teaches that it was in virtue of the Cross, and of Christ's sacrificial death upon the Cross, that the sins of those who lived prior to the Cross were forgiven, surely it is here. And yet Mr Hannah says that God passed over sins without any necessity for the Cross. That kind of thing does rather take away one's confidence.

There are various things that must be in our minds as we look through the paper. There is a final one on page 38 in regard to the statement that 'We may conclude cautiously with E. Stauffer and H. A. A. Kennedy that Paul does not discuss clearly the fate of those rejecting the gospel'. While there may be great difficulties in regard to the fate of those who reject the Gospel, and we would not minimise them, to say that Paul does not discuss it clearly, I think, does less than justice to the facts, especially with such a passage as 2 Thessolonians i. 4-10 in mind.

That is, perhaps, viewing the paper from a negative point of view, but we have positive contributions also—the Fatherhood of God: the fellowship of believers: the love of Christians—all of which are very vital. And then we have the positive statements and suggestions that have been made by Dr Turner, and the Rev. M. Burrell, which are of such value. I think at this point I will throw the meeting open for

discussion, and leave you to take up these points as you feel disposed.

The author of the paper says on page 32: 'Since the Christian gospel has its ultimate source in the historical event of Jesus, the method of the gospel for answering questions must be that of historical interpretation.' Once again that is inadequate. Paul makes it perfectly plain that he depended on what he called revelation for his understanding of the knowledge of Christ. A revelation is much more than an historical interpretation, very much more. It seems to me that we are driven back again to the fact that, as Christians, we are bound to accept what we may call apostolic authority. The 'Liberal' wants to feel that revelation is continuous through the centuries, and that he has as much authority to speak as the apostles had. But the teaching of the Apostles is the vehicle through which the revelation of God comes to us, and we are bound to accept them as the ultimate authority. That is why I disagree so entirely with this idea of historical interpretation. I am not sure that the Ascension of Christ could be considered as being subject to an historical interpretation. It all depends upon what you mean by the phrase.

E. J. G. TITTERINGTON: I am sorry Mr Hannah is not able to be here, for I am going to be critical, and do not like to say what I feel I must without his having an opportunity to reply in person.

This is to my mind a most deplorable paper, from every angle. In the first place, I dislike an academic approach to what is essentially a practical question. Then I find it difficult to see what connection the contents of the paper have with the title. It is occupied mainly with a consideration of what is the Gospel. What little it has to say about its presentation is so nebulous as to be worthless; on the impact of the Gospel there is nothing at all.

But my main objections are more serious. There seems to be a show of learning combined with some very shallow thinking, especially where the Scriptures are concerned. Thus on page 28 an attempt is made to interpret diversity of expression with regard to the Cross as a divergence of view, covering an underlying uncertainty. The statement on page 29 that 'the resurrection was not early witnessed abroad in detail as central to the gospel' seems to reveal a very superficial reading, if not a wilful distortion of the Scriptures. Worse still, we are told on page 31 that 'no cross was needed for God to forgive sins . . . no resurrection was needed for God to resurrect us to eternal life' (cf. p. 34). The first paragraph of page 32 is really a gospel of works,

and this is brought out more clearly on page 33, 'the *didache* of the church was an ethic'.

A gospel in which the crucifixion and resurrection of the Lord Jesus Christ is not central, and in which Christ Himself is not central, is no gospel. It is not worth presenting at all and can have no power to make any impact if it is. A Gospel that is a gospel must deal with sin: and must vindicate not only the love of God, but the righteousness of God. One could say much more, but I forbear.

On the subject of the paper generally, I would say that there is plenty of evidence that people are not unwilling to listen to the Gospel, if it is presented to them in a way that they can understand. There is known to be a large audience for religious broadcasts on radio and television, among those who never attend a place of worship. A well-known journalist once told me that no subject brought so much correspondence to the newspapers as religion. I have recently witnessed the impact that can be made by the presentation of the Gospel in a limited way by methods that to some might appear crude, but which has left abiding results behind it. But certain prerequisites are necessary. First, a transparent sincerity, and an interest in those we are seeking to reach. There is a widespread suspicion of religious folk, not all of it groundless, that must be dispelled. Then we must learn to speak the tongue of the common people. Our religious jargon gets nowhere. A book that had a wide vogue some years ago was called *Thinking Black*. The author, Dan Crawford, maintained that for an effective presentation of the Gospel in Africa we must learn the thought forms of the African. Something of this kind is needed not only in Africa. We must learn how the 'man in the street' really thinks, and adapt our message accordingly. This does not mean the use of vulgar language, but merely that we must tune the wavelength of our presentation to the receiver; and not expect him to tune in to ours.

MARY F. COSTON: I am grateful for this paper. The facts presented favour conservatism while the liberal person may nod in assent to so worthy a presentation because of scholarship. If the paper is out of conviction of Bible truth it is an over-all picture of God's purpose for man and man's position in the family of God today. The delivery of Christ's message today through chosen vessels is a manifestation of the power of God and a revelation of His plans for the Ages and the individuals place in it today who believe. How true the success of the delivery of the Gospel message depends upon the chosen vessel, his

consecration, his love for Christ. . . . His Word and the power of the Holy Spirit.

DR R. J. C. HARRIS: My chief criticism of this paper would be that, while the author has developed his own views of what the Gospel is, he has said very little about its presentation, and nothing about its impact. More specifically I would like to refer again to page 31 and comment on Mr Hannah's contention that 'without man ever knowing it, God can forgive him his sins'. I have always believed, in fact, I still believe, that God's forgiveness of man's sins follows man's repentance. I find great difficulty in understanding how such repentance could be other than a conscious act, i.e. man always knows. In that same paragraph, however, there is one point which the author does well to direct our attention, and that is that, just as God required of His Son the actual performance of the message, 'the exemplification of *agape*', so the extent to which we commend the Gospel to others is the extent to which we are willing to exemplify, for them, 'our fellowship with God through our fellowship with one another'.

MR LEITH SAMUEL: I strongly disagree with the statement (p. 26) that the message has undergone adaptation in its presentation to the world, so far as genuine Christians are concerned. Certain points of it may have been more emphasised at different times, but I thank God for 'truth unchanged, unchanging'. Moreover, the multitude of denominations do not bear witness to the variableness of the Gospel, so much as to the blindness of professing Christians to vital matters that need reforming; disloyalty to revealed truth, or failure to comprehend revealed truth. These are surely the reasons for sub-divisions, not the variableness of the Gospel.

I wonder if Mr Hannah has really grasped Paul's teaching on the Cross? Because all the facets of the jewel are not seen flashing together in one place, are we going to say that we have many inconsistent gems instead of one gem! The teaching was *consistent* even if in no place do we find a *comprehensive* statement of all that could be said about the Cross.

Quoting Ignatius, Clement, and Brunner with Paul (p. 29) would rouse the ire of Augustine or Bishop Latimer. 'It is not what the Fathers have said.' 'It is what they *should* have said, i.e. in the light of the inspired scriptures.' There is a gulf between the best of the Fathers and the Apostles at their most complicated!

I find no conclusive evidence of inconsistency in the records of the Christophanies. They complement one another in a wonderful way. I would like to protest against the phrase that the accounts are 'indicative of later *emendation*'.

If 'according to the Scriptures' (p. 29) does not indicate the fulfilment of prophesy, then words are meaningless. 1 Corinthians xv. 3, 4.

My most serious criticism is against the statement in the last paragraph on page 31: '*No cross was needed for God to forgive sins*' . . . 'God passed over former sins.' Why quote Romans iii. 25 and ignore the answer to the problem that he raises *in the context from which he is quoting*? It was because of the Cross on which 'the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world' was to suffer, that God was able to forgive sins. Surely Hebrews ix. 22 'without shedding of blood is no remission' has an *absolute* strength, not for Jewish thinkers only, but for all the world. And surely sin must be dealt with by a holy God before He can resurrect us to eternal life.

B. C. MARTIN: I should be very surprised if the author's interpretation of the title provided is in complete accord with that intended. Apparently he sees in this title evidence 'that there is widespread opinion that the Gospel is not . . . of the nature of a fixed dogma for every person in every generation'. For myself I would not read this into it, nor do I imagine that such inference was intended. Surely, the title refers to modern methods of trying to 'get over' to people today, the one and only Gospel—'the faith once for all delivered to the saints'—and the impact made by such methods.

The Christian Gospel refers not only to the historical events of the Incarnation, Crucifixion, Resurrection and Ascension of Jesus Christ, but also to the New Testament interpretation of those events. To regard 'New Testament' interpretation as 'a philosophy of history' produced by 'the genius of the Hebrews' (p. 33), and allow man in each succeeding generation the prerogative of doing that which he plainly has neither the right nor the competence to do, namely, to interpret afresh the meaning and relevance of the great historical facts connected with Jesus Christ, is to invite an unending series of 'other Gospels' upon which St Paul pronounced an anathema (Gal. i. 8). Let there be, by all means, fresh methods of presentation, but let it be presentation of New Testament doctrine: all else tends to heresy and to a misleading of the people we are trying to help.

THE REV. H. L. ELLISON: I am very sorry that Mr Hannah is not personally present, for I would have had pleasure in congratulating him not only on winning the prize but also on his skill at getting some of his logical *non sequiturs* past the adjudicators.

The opening paragraph is a good example of this. If we except some 'liberal' forms of Protestantism—obviously if the accuracy, validity and authority of the New Testament documents are denied, the final picture of the Gospel is apt to wear a strange look—the best theology down the centuries may have varied in emphasis, but has been reasonably unanimous in defining the Gospel. The varying emphasis in practice is merely a commentary on varying majority social trends. The same is true of our multitude of sects. If we once again omit some products of the liberal controversy, the question that has created sects is not what the Gospel is, but how it can be appropriated and best maintained.

A gospel that is to be valid for all men at all times is bound, even in the New Testament, to bear the marks of the interests and needs of the audience in its actual proclamation, but we are given sufficient examples of the apostolic preaching under differing conditions for us to see that there was a basic *kerygma* independent of the audience. It is further a real *non sequitur* to suggest that because a topic was of special interest to the hearers, it was therefore not part of the Gospel. In particular the references to prophecy ('as Jews they were interested in prophecy') taken in conjunction with certain later statements suggests that Mr Hannah either depreciates or rejects the authority of the Old Testament revelation. Obviously our interpretation of what the Gospel is will be deeply affected by whether we consider that Jesus was or was not the fulfilment of the valid and authoritative revelation of God in the Old Testament, and no valid discussion is possible if this point is glossed over.

Is the message of Jesus the Gospel? Modern scholarship is reasonably agreed that there is very little really original in the teaching of Jesus in the Synoptic Gospels, when it is compared with the sayings of the early rabbis. The main difference is one of emphasis. It is simply not true that Jesus was free to disobey the Sabbath, etc., because He knew God as Father: He was free to do it because He was the Son of Man, the Messiah in the fullest sense, not merely in that of popular expectation, the fulfilment of the Old Testament revelation. The good news of the kingdom, i.e. the kingly rule, of God was not teaching about that rule, but the statement that the Ruler had come among men. In other words Jesus, the Messiah, IS the Gospel.

The Incarnation, the Crucifixion, the Resurrection, the Second Coming are all parts of the Gospel, not because they are needed to satisfy common human needs, but because they belong to the essence and not to the accidentals of the life of Jesus. If the author holds otherwise, thereby rejecting the authority of the New Testament documents, he should have stated the fact.

He is perfectly correct in stating that the most important part of the work of Jesus is to bring men into a new relationship with God, but repeatedly we find in experience that to isolate 'the most important part' is to deprive it of much of its value. It is possible so to preach Christ as to forget this new relationship or to deprive it of meaning, and the result is not the Gospel. But equally to empty the incarnation of its full meaning, or to regard the crucifixion and resurrection as little more than accidentals always in the long run cuts the vital nerve of the proclamation of the new relationship.

I maintain that the proclamation of the Gospel is the proclamation of Jesus as Messiah, as King, High Priest, Prophet, Suffering Servant and Son of Man. Some will be led to Jesus through the theology about Him; others will be led to the theology through personal contact with Him. In either case the reality of the contact will be seen in a new relationship with God 'in Christ', and this relationship will express itself in fellowship with all others in this new relationship.

J. H. MARTIN: Mr Hannah's assessment of the place of the wrath of God in the presentation of the Gospel (p. 38) appears to be completely at variance with both the teaching of Christ, and of St Paul. For not only did Christ display righteous anger against the pride and hypocrisy of the Jews (cf. Matt. xxiii. 29-33; Mark vi. 1-6, xi. 6-19), but He also repeatedly warns of the danger of destruction in Hell as a result of sin. (Cf. Matt. v. 22; Mark ix. 42-50.) Paul also clearly states that unbelievers are living under the wrath of God which will one day come upon them (cf. Eph. ii. 3, v. 6; Col. iii. 6; Rom. ii. 5), and there is no plainer statement than Romans chapter one of the fact that *all* sin wherever and in whomsoever it is found inevitably incurs the wrath of God because of His nature. As R. Haldane says (*Ep. to Romans*, p. 55): 'The same creation which declares that there is a God and publishes His glory, also proves that He is the enemy of sin and the avenger of the crimes of men, so that the revelation of wrath is universal and none can plead ignorance of it.' Romans one, verse thirty-two says it is the actual refusal to recognise that revelation of wrath that

brings men under condemnation. While Paul does not state so clearly as the Gospels the doctrine of Hell, the fact of condemnation and the wrath of God are prominent themes.

It is the cross itself that is the fullest revelation of the wrath of God against sin, and unless this aspect, which must be an integral part of any scriptural doctrine of the Atonement, is preached to the unbeliever there can be no true conviction of sin and consequently no real repentance and new spiritual life.

THE REV. J. K. MICKELSEN: Mr Hannah's prize essay is challenging indeed. It deserves reading by those who desire a Church that is more like her Head. Mr Hannah truly remarks (p. 37), 'The very body that makes this possible does not show internal, personal care'.

However, it seems that the saying 'His strong point is also his weak point' applies to this essay; for the essay's valuable emphasis on God's 'Personal Fatherhood with man' leads to the conclusion (p. 31), 'No cross was needed for God to forgive sins'. Such an emphasis of the personal relation between God and man as to lead to the above conclusion seems—to paraphrase one of the essay's remarks (p. 27)—to be an idea of such potential that it has served as the basis of this essay. One facet of the gospel, even an important one, must not be emphasised to the derogation of other facets.

Though it is true that sins were passed over before the cross (Rom. iii. 25), yet it is the cross, the propitiatory death of Christ, that justifies God's forbearance. Without the shedding of blood there is no remission of sin (Heb. ix. 22); but it is impossible for the blood of animal sacrifices to take away sins (Heb. x. 4); therefore, our Lord Jesus Christ is the Lamb of God who takes away the sin of the world (John i. 29). Christ's death is for sins before the cross as well as after.

If I understand Mr Hannah correctly, he seems to have implied (pp. 27, 28, 29) that the differing viewpoints recorded in the New Testament are logically irreconcilable. Such a view of God's revelation, I would think, leads to adverse implications for science and philosophy: for scientific theory seeks for unity, such as Einstein hoped to demonstrate with his Unified Field Theory; and philosophy, for the most part, believes in a meaningful universe. If there be irreconcilables in God's Word, can we expect that there will be none in God's world?

AUTHOR'S REPLY: I should first like to say that there is a certain confusion in my mind as to why my essay was selected. I must confess that when I wrote the essay I was unacquainted with the Victoria Institute, its aims, or theological temper. I saw the notice for the contest and was attracted by the subject—there was no knowledge on my part as to what kind of society would be judging the essay. However, after reading past proceedings and the foregoing criticisms, it is evident that I did not write anything in general sympathy with the society. Nevertheless, I think it is admirable that the adjudicators did not bar from their consideration a controversial essay. My desire is that even if I be wrong (which, of course, I think not), the essay may direct our attention to some neglected aspects of the Christian Gospel and may awaken some to at least rethink what the Gospel means to them.

Several have criticised that my essay does not fit the title. I'm not surprised. I collected materials and started writing on the title in at least three different ways including a consideration of modern methods for reaching people today. But I never felt certain that the title indicated this. However, rather than blame its ambiguity, I think the title was well chosen—it requires one to think about the Gospel in its many aspects. And this, as a matter of fact, was responsible for my paper. I started out, some might be surprised, with the idea that the core of the Gospel was surely the proclamation of the cross—but I ran into biblical and theological difficulty; I then considered the core as being the resurrection, and again, difficulty. This was the reason why I had to put so much stress on the nature of the Gospel. However, I think anyone who is clear about what I think the nature of the Gospel is will have no difficulty understanding that I have also been discussing much about its presentation and impact. I had the feeling that many of the criticisms indicated that some were not seeing the forest for the trees (however, I am not hereby suggesting that my trees are to be ignored!).

Obviously the criticisms require me to make a statement about the nature of revelation and authority. To me the New Testament is a collection of documents written by men who early were connected with the movement centring around Jesus. They give various stories about this man, opinions about him, writings concerning the movement springing from him, or speculations concerning the meaning or future of this movement. While all of the documents show that their authors had inspiring insights into these matters, their primary value lies in their being documents of the early church (thus helping

us to understand the historical beginnings of Christianity) and in their witness to Jesus. Their witness to Jesus has encountered my need and experience in such a manner that I am convinced that Jesus is *the* Revelation of God to mankind. Jesus Himself is *the* revelation, not the New Testament. We have the task to determine and interpret what is *the* Revelation from the documents of the early church.

I have been troubled as to how to answer the criticisms fairly and yet with brevity. What seems basically required is a statement about Christ's work of atonement. I understand atonement in its simple sense to refer to bringing two parties together into fellowship who were originally at odds. Now it takes two for such reconciliation; even if one party holds no animosity toward the other and is desirous for fellowship, it amounts to nothing until the other party is also willing. The point I wish to make is that God always has been the willing party. When we say God forgives a man his sins we mean God is there meeting man, ready for fellowship. God is not the problem child; we ourselves are! We tend to picture God as the absolute of every nice, virtuous quality that crosses our fancy; and then we find we are faced with our man-created, paradoxical monster who is of such a quality of absolute holiness, absolute righteousness, absolute wrath, absolute love that 'it' can only be of *use* to us when we devise mysterious means to appease it or to get the absolute love to the forefront of the other qualities. Actually we can only profess ignorance of whom God is except as we know Him in Jesus. The cross of Jesus shows man who is the party that won't be reconciled—man! In this recognition one can only fall before God and cry for His mercy—and to his amazement man finds God has already forgiven him and has been trying to meet him since He first called to Adam, 'Where art thou?'

When an individual comes to this recognition of his true condition and takes hold of the fellowship, he finds it is not a mystical communion but a fellowship of service *with* and *for* others. Hence, he finds himself necessarily in the local church. But I would not say, nor do I think Jesus taught, that he who does not come into such a fellowship or recognise his condition as the stubborn, selfish party would be eternally rejected. For each individual God is the judge, and it simply would be legalism for me to think I could define the way of salvation for all men. Some *will be rejected* and some *will be saved* eternally, but it is not the Christian's prerogative to assume too strongly whom they will be—not even in the case of himself. We cannot

circumscribe Matthew xxv. 31-46. In other words my essay is written from the point of view that the church is not primarily meant to be a fellowship of the eternally saved, but is a fellowship of those appointed by God to carry out His purpose in the world. In this the Christian rejoices because he has the *foretaste* of eternal fellowship with God and the *privilege of serving* the purpose of God.

Two criticisms of Rev. Caiger's must be answered specifically. First, he quoted Romans iii. 25 as being misused by me. I think not. He quoted the Authorized version which has rendered *dia* with the accusative incorrectly. This form indicates the reason why something happened. Hence I translate it as: 'Jesus Christ whom God put forth to be a place where man meets God by faith in his blood for a sign of His righteousness *because* in His forbearance He passes over former sins.' Second, Rev. Caiger quoted 2 Thessalonians i. 4-10 in refutation of the assertion that Paul does not speak clearly about the fate of the unbeliever. However, even though it is difficult and abrupt to say this without going into details unwarranted in this publication, I must simply state that I do not believe the second Thessalonian epistle to be of Pauline authorship.

G. D. KILPATRICK, D.D.

The Transmission of the New Testament and its Reliability

On 15 April 1957, Professor Kilpatrick delivered an address to the Institute on the subject of the textual integrity of the Bible. The many successions of copyists through whom the text was handed on until the dawn of the age of printing made certain kinds of scribal errors almost inevitable. But scholars and laymen alike can rejoice in the fact that manuscript discoveries have improved our knowledge of ancient authorities to a considerable extent, and have even enabled us to trace the text of the Gospels, for instance, to a period prior to the formation of a fourfold Canon. Stylistic variations of New Testament writers can be discerned from the Greek Text of the New Testament, but certainty of the text of any passage must still remain only conjectural. But, nevertheless, our texts and versions leave us with little doubt concerning 'the general impression of soundness that the New Testament text makes. . . .'

PROFESSOR F. F. BRUCE (*Chairman*) said: We may count ourselves fortunate in having secured Professor Kilpatrick as our lecturer on this subject, for there is no one in this country who is in a better position to discuss the transmission of the New Testament text, or who can speak on it with greater authority. He has almost completed a new edition of the Greek New Testament for the British and Foreign Bible Society, and he is a member of an international team of scholars who are engaged in preparing a new and exhaustive critical apparatus to the text of the New Testament. We may count ourselves fortunate, too, because he has presented in such a lucid manner to non-specialists the subject-matter of a field in which he is an acknowledged expert. This is something which not all specialists can do.

Before I invite you to discuss his paper, there are two points of interest on which I should like to comment.

One of these concerns the early textual history of the Pauline Epistles. If it can indeed be established that these circulated separately before the first edition of the Pauline *corpus* was published, this would tell against the position of the Chicago school of Goodspeed and others, according to whom Paul's letters were first published in the form of

the *corpus Paulinum*, about the end of the first century. I should have thought that the little we do know about the early history of some of his letters—I think of the evidence for two or more recensions of Romans, the instructions for the exchange of the Colossian and Laodicean epistles, the possible encyclical character of Ephesians—would have made it *a priori* probable that they did to some extent circulate separately in the period immediately following their composition, and therefore would have individual textual histories in the period before they were collected—whether by Onesimus or someone else. If further study confirms the conclusion indicated by Kenyon's figures, this will be a matter of considerable importance in other fields than that of pure textual criticism.

The other point that struck me was Professor Kilpatrick's cautionary remark that even authors' copies cannot be assumed to be flawless. In the case of Paul's Epistles we have the further consideration that there never were 'authors' copies' or autographs; he regularly dictated his letters to an amanuensis. That allows a very primitive opportunity for slips. I have sometimes wondered, for example, whether the variation between $\epsilon\chi\omicron\mu\epsilon\nu$ and $\epsilon\chi\omega\mu\epsilon\nu$ in Romans v.1 may not go right back to the time when Paul said the one thing and Tertius wrote down the other. (By the first century A.D., I suppose, there would be hardly any difference in pronunciation between the two forms.)

I have great pleasure in thanking Professor Kilpatrick, in your name, for his stimulating exposition; and now I shall be glad to hear further comments on the subject he has been dealing with.

R. B. WITHERS: One point must strike the reader very forcibly: the assertion that the four Gospels came into being about A.D. 140. This is not only a guess, but a most unlikely one. On the contrary, the canon must have existed before the Apostle Paul wrote the last of his epistles (Col. i. 25); and the Gospel section may have existed within a decade after Pentecost. Perhaps 'may' is an understatement, for the Gospels and Paul's earlier epistles must have existed when Timothy was a child. The usual gloss, that 2 Timothy iii. 15 refers to the Hebrew Scriptures, cannot possibly be sustained in view of the second half of the verse.

Furthermore, as a summary of the Gospels 1 Corinthians xv. 3-5 is utterly inadequate unless Paul is taking for granted that his readers were fully familiar with them. On that assumption, but no other, the three short verses make an admirable and completely sufficient opening

for the summary of the evidence for the resurrection of the Lord Jesus and the wonderful treatise on its consequences.

Apart from these points, there is hardly any direct evidence for the dating of the Gospels; but to me it has always seemed fantastic to suppose that those who saw the tremendous events they relate waited for years and years before committing their recollections to writing. Human nature is not like that.

Some may be interested to learn that I have a paper on this subject in *The Differentiator* for June 1956 and that there will be another next June.

W. E. LESLIE: Professor Kilpatrick refers to our printed Greek text in connection with the use of the phrase 'answered and said'. These texts are of two types: there is the late type from which the Authorised Version derives, and the critical type reaching back far beyond the fourth century from which, substantially, the Revised Version was translated. In the Authorised Version Mark has about thirty examples of 'answered and said'. The Revised omits fifteen of these. Thus the use of the phrase had become more frequent between the early and the late type of Greek text. If the additional readings mentioned by Professor Kilpatrick were in manuscripts known to the critical Editors, they were presumably rejected as interpolations.

It is interesting to compare the variations in the text of the four Gospels in the use of this phrase with, for example, Westcott and Hort's *Noteworthy Rejected Readings*. If the number of words be taken as Matthew 15,000, Mark 10,000, Luke 19,600, and John 15,500, the results can be compared as percentages.

THE REV. J. K. MICKELSEN: Dr Kilpatrick's paper on the text of the New Testament is thought provoking. I had not before heard of the arguments he uses to show the antiquity of the text. His remarks on conjectural emendation reminded me about the one emendation (in Jude 5) adopted in the Revised Standard Version of the New Testament. (See the statement to this effect by Frederick C. Grant, 'The Greek Text of the New Testament' in *An Introduction to the Revised Standard Version of the New Testament* (c. 1946), p. 41.)

Dr Kilpatrick's remarks, page 100, to the effect that the emendation of John xix. 29 is the most plausible emendation to be suggested for the New Testament. In view of the fact that the Revised Standard Version (1946) rejects the emendation of John xix. 29 and adopts the

emendation of Jude 5, I would like Dr Kilpatrick to comment on the text and emendation of Jude 5.

If it is not too far afield from the purpose of Dr Kilpatrick's present paper, I would appreciate some comments on the present status of textual studies of the New Testament. (I have in mind especially the international project, with headquarters at Oxford and Chicago.)

MR G. W. ROBSON asked whether Professor Kilpatrick or Professor Bruce would be willing to make any comment on the bearing of the subject on the conception of a verbally inerrant original. He had been very grateful to Professor Kilpatrick for the argument from manuscript variation for pushing back the date of original writing so near to the event. But the possibility had been raised of variation even in the authors' copies (p. 98 of the paper, supported by a homely example of Professor Kilpatrick's having written one thing when he meant another); or even as between the author's dictation and the amanuensis' transcription, particularly with words which differ only in spelling, not in pronunciation (Professor Bruce's 'we have' versus 'let us have' in Rom. v. 1.) If one held the notion of verbal inerrancy, one would be inclined to postulate providential preservation from error for an ultimate original. The popular illustration which he had always found helpful was that, though every copy of a Rembrandt might be defective in some detail, there had been the original Rembrandt!

In a similar way, the helpful thesis of the individual author's grammatical idiosyncracies (e.g. John's genitive *aleethees* and predicative *aleethinos*) raised the question whether weighty spiritual lessons could justly be drawn from verbal distinctions which might be merely stylistic.

It had been customary to take as a starting-point (1) an original with every word distinguishable, and each different word carrying a distinctive meaning—in context of course—as a direct word of the Holy Spirit; (2) the living application of each such word by the same Spirit—(2) being limited to the extent that (1) is now recoverable out of manuscript variation. If, however, in places there never had been a veritable original, then, in those places neither premise was valid.

Could some help be given in this direction?

DR R. J. C. HARRIS: An article appeared recently in *Penguin Science News* by A. Q. Morton, in which were described almost mathematical methods of investigating manuscripts, e.g. word frequency, the length

of papyrus pieces, and the number of lines thereon, and so forth. The implication was that the copying was adjusted to the writing material available, and that, for such a reason, pieces might be subtracted or added to the texts. Could Professor Kilpatrick give us his opinion of the validity of this sort of investigation?

In reply to this discussion, PROFESSOR KILPATRICK said: First let me thank you, Mr Chairman, for your kind words on my paper which mean the more as you yourself have laboured in this field. I am glad to have your support for the suggestion that our tradition of the text of the Pauline Epistles does not begin at the time when the *corpus* of Pauline Epistles was formed but goes back to a time when each Epistle circulated independently. I did not bring into the argument references to the recensions of Romans, and to the relations of the Epistles to the Colossians, the Ephesians and the Laodiceans, because I was not clear that these issues as we know them are older than the time when the *corpus* of the Epistles was formed.

Thank you too for your point about the dictation of the Pauline Epistles by the Apostle. I gladly take it up and add it to my argument.

Mr Withers has concluded from my paper that I asserted 'that the four Gospels came into being about A.D. 140'. This was far from my intention. I think that the four Gospels came into being before A.D. 140 and am sorry if anyone else has construed my paper in the sense in which Mr Withers has understood it.

Mr Leslie's remarks raise several points. As he reminds us, printed texts vary in their presentation of the phrase 'answered and said', and their variation goes back to a similar variation in the manuscripts. Where some manuscripts have 'answered and said' and other manuscripts omit it which are likely to be right? The answer I have suggested requires us to part company on occasion with the nineteenth-century editors. They took the view that for the most part the fourth-century manuscripts were right. Since their day scholars have been less and less inclined to follow particular manuscripts and more ready to decide each variation on its own merits.

The Rev. J. K. Mickelsen's reference to Jude 5 deserves full consideration. The conjecture rendered in the Revised Standard Version goes back to Westcott and Hort. I have looked at a number of commentators, but none accept the conjecture and several do not mention it. This reaction to the suggestion does not excuse us from trying to see whether it has intrinsic merit.

The manuscripts between them have three readings, the Greek equivalents of God, Lord, and Jesus. Now Lord is ambiguous, it may mean either God or Christ and the same is true of the Greek term *kurios*. It is conceivable that scribes were concerned to substitute the less ambiguous terms for the more ambiguous and replaced *kurios* by the Greek equivalent for God or for Jesus or Christ. We get the variation between the three possibilities elsewhere at Ephesians v. 17 and Colossians iii. 13, for example, at each of which places *kurios* seems to be original.

This explanation can apply to Jude 5 and if it is sound *kurios* will be the original reading. With this reading we can make good sense of the passage and there is no need to emend.

To Mr Mickelsen's enquiry about the present state of New Testament textual studies the following reply may be made. The International Critical Greek New Testament is making good progress. Much of the evidence for Luke, the next volume to appear, is collected and it is hoped to publish it in the near future.

As this edition becomes available it presents us with another problem. The International Critical Greek New Testament does not itself provide a new text but only the raw materials in its apparatus for constituting such a text. The making of a new text is a separate task and in undertaking it we shall have to reconsider the methods and procedures of textual critics.

Mr Robson's question and comments bring us right into a serious problem. The textual critic usually assumes, I will not say, a verbally inerrant original but a faultless one. Any errors in our manuscripts of an author are deemed to be faults created in the course of transmission. This assumption has proved a very helpful one in the reconstruction of the text of non-Biblical authors. On the other hand editors of these texts are from time to time led to conclude that the author's own copy was faulty.

How does the matter stand with the New Testament? It is at least arguable that in a few places the text of our manuscripts is unsound. If the text of the original was sound, it has not come down to us. We can only wonder in that case how much of our text has suffered. If the text of our original, the author's copy, was faulty, what becomes of scriptural inerrancy?

It may be pointed out in passing that while it would be foolish to say that it was impossible that our New Testament originals had 'every word distinguishable' all the evidence is against it. The practice

of word division established itself only in the ninth century A.D. This would make it possible for an author to intend one thing and a copyist to understand by the text another.

Mr Robson's paragraph beginning 'It had been customary' raises questions that go beyond this paper though he rightly points out that the questions arise out of it. His reference to the Holy Spirit may help us here and with it a consideration of the ways of God with man in other spheres, the Christian community, for example, and the individual believer. This means that our doctrine of Scripture should be put alongside the doctrines of the Church and of grace.

Dr Harris's question brings to notice certain enquiries that crop up from time to time. It would be much simpler if we could solve our textual problem by mathematics. Unfortunately certain features of book production in antiquity make this impossible. If we could expect the New Testament autographs to conform to definite rules, many questions could be answered. For example if we could assume that they were written on books and not on rolls, that they had one and not two columns to the page, that they had so many lines to the column and so many letters to the line, there might be a place for mathematics. Unfortunately it is just on matters of this kind that the evidence is all in favour of variety. We usually find that the mathematical calculations assume some point or other that we have no grounds for assuming, and that it is just at this point that the mathematical approach breaks down.

REV. J. STAFFORD WRIGHT, M.A.

Evidence for Religious Beliefs of Palaeolithic Man

T. C. MITCHELL: I read with great interest Mr Stafford Wright's paper on the evidence for religious beliefs of Palaeolithic man (*Faith and Thought*, 90 (1958), pp. 4-14), and found his arguments to the effect that the evidence is too meagre to establish the existence of religion in Palaeolithic times most suggestive. I would feel, however, that the fact that the evidence is so relatively meagre would suggest that the best position in the present state of knowledge is one which would leave the matter open. While Mr Stafford Wright has shown that the evidence can be interpreted to show no religion, it is also possible to interpret the evidence the other way, as most anthropological writers do, projecting, to some extent it is true, present situations into the past. If the religious interpretation is taken, it shows no more than gross idolatry.

In this case there would be four possible situations in Biblical terms: Pre-Adamic men with religion; Pre-Adamic men without religion; Adamic men with religion; Adamic men without religion. The teaching of the Bible is that soon after the appearance of man, there was widespread declension from God, and only a small faithful remnant. In examining the remains of Upper Palaeolithic man, *Homo sapiens* in physical type, and producing art which would pass without objection in a modern exhibition, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that these were 'Adamic men'.

A possible view, therefore, is one which would see in the Upper Palaeolithic remains the third of the above possibilities, Adamic man with religion, evidence therefore of the fallen state of early man.

E. J. G. TITTERINGTON, O.B.E., M.A.

The Gift Of Tongues

REV. J. K. MICKELSEN (U.S.A.): I would like to see some reaction to the thesis of B. B. Warfield—which was based on Acts 8—‘This case of the Samaritans was of great importance in the primitive Church, to enable men to distinguish between the gifts of grace and the gifts of power. . . . It is of equal importance to us, to teach us the source of the gifts of power (which includes the gift of tongues), in the Apostles, apart from whom they were not conferred . . . the power of working miracles was not extended beyond the disciples upon whom the Apostles conferred it by the imposition of their hands. As the number of these disciples gradually diminished, the instances of the exercise of miraculous powers became continually less frequent, and ceased entirely at the death of the last individual on whom the hands of the Apostles had been laid . . . the confinement of the supernatural gifts by the Scriptures to those who had them conferred upon them by the Apostles, affords a ready explanation of all the historical facts.’ This extract is taken from Warfield’s *Miracles, Yesterday and Today, True and False* (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. 1953 (reprint of Scribner’s 1918 edn., which was entitled ‘Counterfeit Miracles’), pp. 23 f.

H. L. ELLISON: The late Mr Titterington’s interesting paper seems to call for two comments. There is very little controversy today in instructed circles about the past fact or the present possibility of speaking in tongues, i.e. languages identifiable as such and unknown to the speakers. The real question seems to be whether the content of what is said would justify us in regarding it as a noteworthy religious phenomenon, or merely as a para-psychic manifestation. In these days when the tape recorder has become a popular toy, it should be possible to obtain sufficient tapes without the speakers’ knowledge to form some opinion what proportion is gibberish, and what proportion genuine language. Of the latter enough should be translatable to give some idea to what extent it is truly the outpouring of a heart to God.

Where I must part company with Mr Titterington is in his suggestion that where tongues are interpreted they become equivalent to prophecy. The statement is based partly on the over-readiness in the Pentecostal movement to equate fervour with inspiration, and so to

recognise as prophecy exhortations that fall far short of the teacher's gift instead of going beyond it. It would, however, be very difficult to bring much evidence for interpreted tongues that have proved of much value to those present. In the vast majority of cases, there is no evidence available that the interpretation had in fact much relation to the unknown tongue—unknown both to its user, who spoke he knew not what, and to its interpreter, who gave the sense without knowing the words.

I am ready to recognise that certain individuals and congregations need this form of stimulus, but the Church at large must judge the manifestations, in so far as they are comprehensible, by their relation to revelation as a whole. This can be done only if there is a reliable record of what has been said.

REVIEWS

Ideals in Medicine. Edited by VINCENT EDMUNDS and C. GORDON SCORER.
Tyndale Press. Price 12s. 6d.

This volume is a most timely publication and it is to be hoped that it will be very widely read, and especially by senior medical students and newly qualified doctors, whose needs for guidance in the ethics of medicine it is chiefly designed to meet. Great and fundamental changes have taken place in the organisation of medical practice in this country in the last ten years since the introduction of the National Health Service, and it is becoming increasingly clear that these changes have ethical repercussions and have led to an insidious lowering of the ethical standards of medicine in several respects. In such circumstances it is important for all doctors to re-examine their own standards in this respect, and *Ideals in Medicine* will certainly help them to do this, and one hopes that it will have a very wide circulation.

The book presents the findings of a study group of Christian doctors whose avowed object was to examine and 'present the distinctively Christian ideals as they may be employed in the service of medicine'. The various chapters are contributed by twelve different doctors from various branches of the medical profession, and they cover a wide variety of subjects as the chapter titles indicate. 1. The distinctive ethical code of the Christian doctor. 2. The doctor's personal standards. 3. The satisfactions of a family doctor. 4. The doctor's relationships with patients, their families and his colleagues. 5. The Christian and sexual problems. 6. The control of life. 7. The Christian approach to the disabled, the incurable and the dying. 8. Problems of treatment, research, and professional secrecy. 9. Some problems of psychological medicine. 10. Child development, mental deficiency and child delinquency. 11. Faith Healing, and the doctor-minister relationship. 12. Ultimate loyalties. 13. Medical Missions. 14. The doctor himself.

In addition to these chapters there are two Appendices, one, a memorandum of the Medical Research Council on the ethical problems posed by modern clinical investigation and controlled trials of drugs, and the other, the code of medical ethics adopted by the General Assembly of the World Medical Association in 1949. There is also a very valuable bibliography to guide the serious student who wishes to press his enquiry further.

As with all books of composite authorship, there is some unevenness between the various contributions and a certain amount of overlapping, but on the whole the editors are to be congratulated on having succeeded in welding the chapters together into a connected and most readable volume. The aim of the book is to present the guiding Christian principles in medical ethics rather than to attempt a detailed examination of all the particular problems which may face the doctor in the field of ethics in his professional life, but many if not most of these problems are in fact considered and many illustrations of the application of the Biblical principles to specific situations are very helpfully presented. The reader will look in vain in this book for dogmatic and cut and dried answers to the problems with which it deals. The authors' aim has been rather to stimulate their readers to constructive personal thought and study, and indeed

they express the hope that the book will provoke serious thought and encourage discussion of the whole subject of ethical standards in the field of medicine. Other points of view than the Christian are sympathetically and fairly presented and the differing judgment on many of the questions adopted by different sections of the Christian Church are given their full weight and are placed against the background of the Biblical principles as far as they can be ascertained, but in each case the reader is challenged to weigh the evidence and come to his own decision. Such an approach may not commend itself to the person seeking ready made answers to his problems, but it must in the long run provide a more secure foundation for personal beliefs and standards and as such this book provides a welcome addition to very limited literature which is at present available on the subject.

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Evolutionary Theory and Christian Belief. By DAVID LACK, F.R.S.

It has been a pleasure to read this little book. It is not, to be sure, a profound contribution to the debate between Christian Faith and Evolutionary Theory, but then it does not set out to be. It aims rather at assessing the present position, and describing how the matter stands in the best-informed and fairest-minded circles at the moment. The author, a biologist of repute, is Reader in Ornithology at Oxford and Director of the Edward Grey Institute. One is therefore not surprised at finding the scientific angle presented more fully and with greater clarity than the theological; but that is not to say that the author's outlook is biased. One thing that made the book so enjoyable to the reviewer was his very obvious effort, for the most part successful, to be fair to both sides. There is not a trace of ridicule or misrepresentation; nor is there any sign of a refusal to consider attentively the best arguments which the opposite camp—or what is usually considered the opposite camp—can bring forward; for Dr Lack is himself not only a convinced believer in Darwin's theory of natural selection as the mechanism of evolution, but also holds that the theory applies to the physical side at least of man's nature.

In his opening chapter Dr Lack reviews the history of the conflict from the famous encounter of Huxley and Bishop Wilberforce at Oxford in 1860, to the present day. It is refreshing to find an eminent biologist writing, with obvious sincerity, of Wilberforce's 'rare personal charm', of his greatness as a man, and of Gladstone's high estimate of him to Queen Victoria. He is ready to admit that he may have spoken rather flippantly at the critical juncture; but he is unwilling to let this realisation blind him to the fact that both sides made mistakes, and that theological prejudice was by no means the only obstacle to the attainment of the truth. As is well known Darwin was buried in Westminster Abbey. Is this symbolical of what has happened to the conflict he provoked? The author seems to think so; the problem itself is only buried,

and sooner or later both sides must awake to the realisation that it is far from solved.

Dr Lack next proceeds to a brief statement of the evidence for the evolution of man. He regards the fossil record we now possess as constituting facts adequate to establish the theory of man's animal ancestry, and on this point the reviewer is quite unqualified to contest his verdict. But at least this must be conceded: if one feels misgivings about the Darwinian reading of the facts the obligation remains to give an alternative and adequate account of them; and if one feels constrained to oppose the Darwinian interpretation by arguments drawn from an entirely different source—such as the Holy Scriptures—then one must be sure that one's own conclusions are not, like those of the other side, similarly based on misinterpreting the data. The contestants of both parties, are, after all, alike human and fallible; and it is a great merit of this book that it is prepared to attribute to each side an equal measure of both fallibility and sincerity.

The popular conception of science, as of theology, is, naturally enough, some distance behind that of the leaders of contemporary thought, though it is a pity that it is often so far behind. The new respect for the Bible and its theology among scholars has not yet reached the man-in-the-street; nor, more pertinently, has the growing respect for the Bible among some of the more widely thoughtful men of science reached very far amongst their colleagues. It is very much to be hoped that this state of affairs will soon be rectified, and it is a hopeful sign when men of the stature of von Weirsacker among the physicists and David Lack among the biologists express openly their conviction that Genesis is to be taken seriously. Having said this, it is a pity that Dr Lack's chapter on The Truth of Genesis must be criticised; but the fact is that the biologist's careful and thoughtful study in his own subject is not quite maintained when he treads on less familiar ground. Thus he asserts that the two accounts of creation in Genesis chapters i and ii are very different and in part contradict each other; and he instances the assertions that birds arose from the waters in chapter i (verse 20) and from the ground in chapter ii (verse 19). A reference to the Revised Version would have solved this discrepancy; further, a comparison of the clauses in Genesis iii. 19 lends very strong support to the view that the expression 'formed out of the ground' cannot really be pinned down to a literalistic interpretation. The meaning is far profounder; in fact, Genesis has suffered all along from the exegesis of interpreters who could see no further (literally!) than the ends of their noses, and consequently has not been given credit for its profound insights. [In this connection the reviewer prefers the term 'literalistic' to 'literal'; for to agree, as Dr Lack seems to do, with the majority opinion of scholars that not 'every word of the Bible is literally true' might seem to be to agree that the Bible contained error; whereas to agree that not every word is *literalistically* true would carry no such objectionable connotation.]

After declaring his own conviction that natural selection is adequate, by itself, to account for the magnificent diversity of living things we see today the author passes on to consider some of the major objections to it. On the purely biological level there is the well-known argument that it is very difficult to imagine the selective advantage to be gained from a complex development—

like the power of flight in birds or the egg-laying habits of the European cuckoo—before this development had arrived at completion. It has often been pointed out that the argument drawn from the difficulty of imagining something is in essence a very weak one; but it persists nevertheless. Dr Lack uses his specialist knowledge as an ornithologist to answer this particular objection with reference to the two instances quoted; and in the reviewer's opinion he does so convincingly. His success here adds weight to his arguments when later in the book he grapples with the problem as to whether there are elements in man's make up whose origin defies explanation in terms of natural selection or indeed, in terms of any sort of evolution. It is well known of course that in recent years several biologists of standing, notably Huxley, Waddington and Simpson, have endeavoured to resuscitate the view that man's moral nature, to instance just one of his higher powers, is the product of evolution by natural selection. Dr Lack is frankly very sceptical on this point, and while he confines his arguments to the biological level, and so of course draws them from a fragment only of that totality we call human experience, it is nevertheless heartening to find him arguing as he does.

There is not space in this short review to touch on many of the other interesting points discussed by the author: as to whether natural selection means evolution by luck and chance (as some of its opponents would assert) or by mechanistic determinism (as others would argue); as to whether or not it is legitimate to postulate a Guiding Mind or Life Force behind the process; or whether such things as death, famine and parasitism are to be regarded as essentially evil. On all of these problems the author throws an interesting, if modest, light. Where he is weakest is on the points at which his arguments move from the relatively familiar ground of biology on to the wider fields of philosophy and logic. But it is here surely that the real battle lies. We sometimes forget that all thought, scientific or otherwise, is the activity of a thinking subject; ultimately therefore the thinking 'I' must refuse to be left out of the synthesis of knowledge. This realisation is something that often fails to dawn on the evolutionary biologist; instead of the 'I' being central to his picture (as of course it ought to be, as the very originator of the picture), it becomes just the final product of a long process which went on very well, thank you, when the 'I' had never been so much as heard of. There is something philosophically very unsatisfying in all this; it must seem almost indecent of the mind, as a very junior, and one might almost say, accidental newcomer to the cosmos, to think itself capable of prying into such high matters. This is of course a point on which Darwin himself hesitated; but many of his followers have been less diffident. It is here perhaps that biology stands in need of learning something from the experience of physics. Physics, as is well known, has had to come to terms with philosophy; and both in the realms of the very small and of the very great it has had to admit the essential role of the observer into its descriptions. Biology, concerned not merely with matter but with life, will have to go further; and in its evolutionary aspects will have to come to terms not only with philosophy but also with history; and if it presumes to embrace in its doctrines the higher faculties of man, with theology and every other discipline also. This may be brushed impatiently aside as a light prospect; but it must be remembered that in its rapprochement with philosophy physics suffered a

reorientation of the most drastic kind. Its older descriptions, it is true, still remained as exact in the sphere of every-day experience as ever they were; but their inner significance had been transformed, and the physicist had attained a radically new viewpoint. Is it not prudent to expect that some change, at least as radical, awaits evolutionary biology? Can one escape the feeling that the facile, self-contained schemes of those to whom natural selection is everything have a very rough future in store for them?

Perhaps a beginning can be made by the biologist taking seriously, as the physicist has done, the notion of complementarity. He has good cause to, for already he is familiar with the situation through his study of mind and brain, instincts and glands, and so on. But the process needs to go much deeper, and his enquiries to be made much wider. This will mean, of course, that he ceases to be a biologist pure and simple; but the evolutionist has long since ceased to be such. What taking complementarity seriously will mean for him may not be altogether clear at the moment; but at least it will involve him in this, the preparedness to accept an intellectually respectable and well attested viewpoint as valid as his own, even if it seems to meet it in head-on collision. It is out of the stress of such apparent antagonisms, after all, that most of humanity's greatest advances have come. This is the way in which the reviewer, personally, views the conflict which forms the subject of this book; and it is with this conviction that he accepts both Genesis as Divinely-given revelation, and at the same time rejoices in the light which scientific enquiry is able to throw on the biological aspects of human existence.

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