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ABOUT THIS JOURNAL

FAITH AND THOUGHT, the continuation of the **JOURNAL OF THE TRANSACTIONS OF THE VICTORIA INSTITUTE OR PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY OF GREAT BRITAIN**, has been published regularly since the formation of the Society in 1865. The title was changed in 1958 (Vol. 90). **FAITH AND THOUGHT** is now published three times a year, price per issue £1.50 (post free) and is available from the Society's Address, 130 Wood Street, Cheapside, London, EC2V 6DN. The price of recent back issues (when available) up to the end of vol. 100 is 80p (post free).

FAITH AND THOUGHT is issued free to **FELLOWS, MEMBERS AND ASSOCIATES** of the Victoria Institute. Applications for membership should be accompanied by a remittance which will be returned in the event of non-election. (Subscriptions are: **FELLOWS**, £7.00; **MEMBERS**, £5.00; **ASSOCIATES**, full-time students, below the age of 25 years, full-time or retired clergy or other Christian workers on small incomes, £1.50; **LIBRARY SUBSCRIBERS**, £5.00. **FELLOWS** must be Christians and must be nominated by a **FELLOW**.) Subscriptions which may be paid by covenant are accepted by Inland Revenue Authorities as an allowable expense against income tax for ministers of religion, teachers of RI, etc. For further details, covenant forms, etc, apply to the Society. The Constitution and Aims of the Society were last published in **FAITH AND THOUGHT**, vol. 98, No. 1.

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A Journal devoted to the study of the inter-relation of the
Christian Revelation and modern research

AGM

The Annual General Meeting of the Institute was held at Chelsea College, London, S.W.3., on Saturday, 14th. May 1977. In the absence abroad of the President, the Chair was taken by Canon J. Stafford Wright, Vice-President.

The Minutes, previously published in the Journal, of the Annual General Meeting held on the 22nd. May, 1976 were taken as read and adopted.

On the nomination of the Council, the President, the Vice-Presidents, and the Honorary Treasurer were re-elected for further terms of office.

The Council's cooption of Dr. Colin A. Russell to fill a vacancy since the previous Annual General Meeting was formally ratified.

Mr. P.E. Cousins, Mr. David Mitcheson, and Professor M.A. Jeeves, nominated by Council, were re-elected for a further period of service on the Council.

In the absence of the Treasurer, the Secretary to Council presented the Annual Accounts and Auditors' Report for the year ended 30th. September 1976, which were adopted *nem. con.*

The re-appointment of Messrs. Metcalfe, Blake, and Co. as Auditors was confirmed.

THE CHAIRMAN'S REPORT

The Chairman gave a brief report, the main points of which are summarized below:

a) Whereas at the previous AGM he had announced the resignation of Dr. Robert Clark from the Editorship of *Faith and Thought*, he was now able to report that Dr. Clark had reconsidered his decision and had been able to continue his valuable service to the Institute. He expressed the VI's gratitude to the Editor for the hard work he continued to devote to the Journal, in circumstances of considerable personal stress. He was very happy to report that Dr. Clark was making a good recovery after a recent eye operation, which promised to improve his sight. The Editor's time in hospital and subsequent period of recuperation had been the cause of the delay in the publication of the Journal; but the editorial work was now rapidly being brought up to schedule again.

b) The annual accounts revealed that the Institute was now on a sounder financial footing than for many years. The increased subscriptions now payable appear to have made little significant difference to the Society's membership, and had enabled it almost to pay its way without dependence on charitable donations. Subscription income, however, was not quite meeting the annual expenditure; but it would be unrealistic to increase the subscriptions further. The Chairman therefore emphasized the need for increased membership. He invited present members to make more use of the publicity brochures and specimen copies of back numbers of the Journal to interest friends and colleagues. These publications are available on request from the Assistant Secretary.

c) The Chairman reported that the Editorial Committee, responsible for making recommendations to Council on editorial matters and for arranging symposia, etc., had become rather ineffectual because of its small membership and the consequent difficulty of getting sufficient members together for a worthwhile meeting. The Council had therefore decided that the Editorial Committee should be considerably augmented by the cooption of members with a wide range of interests not at present represented on the Committee, e.g., Biblical studies, Philosophy, History, Archaeology, Social sciences, Psychology, Comparative religion.

With an enlarged Committee, it should be possible to call a useful meeting twice a year. But even if some members were unable to attend the meetings it was hoped that they would still be able to contribute to the Committee's work by communicating their suggestions for papers, speakers, etc., and by keeping alert for new relevant publications in their own fields with a view to writing, or soliciting, reviews for the Journal. The Chairman would be glad to hear from any members who would be interested in joining the Committee to help in these ways.

NEW MEMBERS

FELLOWS

Dr. Robert Wm. Brian Ardill	Egham, Surrey
David Dallin Brodeur Ph.D.	Adelaide 5006
Rev. Dr. C.L. Karunaratna	Hainault
Wesley Kerr	Belfast
Dr. J.H. John Peet M.R.I.C.	Guildford

MEMBERS

Martyn Berry M.A., B.Sc., F.R.I.C.,	Maidstone, Kent
Adrian Brown B.A.,	Reading, Berks
Robert John Brown B.Sc.,	Cardiff
John Bryant M.A., Ph.D.	Cardiff
Peter John Dulley B.Ed.,	Kingston Upon Thames
Christine E. Elcock B.A.,	Sevenoaks, Kent
Mrs. Kinah P. Gover	Milton Keynes
John P.L. Hughes	Melbourne
Deaconess G.M.J. Kinnersley	London S.E.11
Dr. Arther J. Loveless	Ontario
Daniel H. Osmond Ph.D.	Toronto
John K. Walls M.A.	Hong Kong
David S. Williams B.D., A.I.B.	Loughton, Essex

ASSOCIATES

Graham S. Dove	South Woodford
Patricia M. Hopkins	Cromer
Brian C. Miller B.A.,	Worthing
Nicola M. Morgan B.Sc.	Buckhurst Hill
Alan Pibworth	Bedford
Rev. Martin H. Turner	Loughton

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College of Cape Breton
 Universitätsbibliothek
 Christian Heritage College

Nova Scotia
 Postfach, Germany
 El Cajon, California

MEETING

After the AGM the Society held a Symposium on —

SUPERSTITION AND THE OCCULT

Chairman: Rev. Charles W. Karunaratna LTh., MTh., PhD., D.D.

Speakers: Leslie Price B.A.,
 "BLACK, WHITE or GREY? — PROBLEMS OF DEFINITIONS AND
 BOUNDARIES"
 (Editor — The Christian Parapsychologist; Librarian and
 Council Member of The Society for Psychological Research)

Dr. M.G. Barker MB., FRCP., MRCPsych., DPsych.M.
 "THE ORIGINS AND ATTRACTIONS OF THE OCCULT"
 (Consultant Psychiatrist; Lecturer in Mental Health
 University of Bristol)

Canon J. Stafford Wright M.A.,
 "BIBLICAL ASSESSMENT"
 (Formerly Principal of Tyndale Hall, Bristol)

Rev. John Richards B.A.,
 "THE CHURCH AND THE OCCULT EXPLOSION"
 (Assistant Chaplain — Canford School; Secretary of Bishop
 of Exeter's Study Group on Exorcism 1964-74)

Canon J.S. Wright's paper is published in this issue of Faith
 and Thought. It is hoped to publish the other papers later.

Editorial

F.F. Stunt. We are deeply sorry to hear of the death of
 Mr. Francis F. Stunt, LL.B. on Sat. 9 July, 1977. He joined the
 Society in 1948, has been a Member of the Council and Honorary
 Treasurer for many years and until recently a Trustee. His help to
 the Society has been invaluable: time and time again when the Council
 faced grave difficulties he encouraged us to carry on. His

solicitors' office in London has been the Headquarters of the Society since 1970. Over the years he has served on the committees of many other Christian societies and he will be greatly missed. We extend our sympathy to his wife and family.

C.P. Martin. We are sorry to learn of the death of Dr. C.P. Martin, aged 84. Dr. Martin, who joined the V.I. in 1950, was the Robert Reford Professor of Anatomy, McGill University, from 1936-57 and thereafter Emeritus Professor of Anatomy at McGill.

Accounts. Fellows and Members who wish to see a copy of the audited accounts should write to the Assistant Secretary.

Biblical Creation Society. We have received a note from Mr. Nigel Cameron, the Chairman, and Mr. Paul Woodbridge, the Hon. Sec. of the Biblical Creation Society Steering Committee. Their aim is to "make available carefully-argued and scholarly literature to provoke informed discussion" on the origin of man. They write: "We will be glad to hear from anyone who can support us in this venture, whether by prayer, financial help, or the distribution of literature, particularly in Universities and Colleges." Correspondence should be addressed to the Honorary Secretary, The Biblical Creation Society, 16 Woodview Avenue, Chingford, London E4 9SL.

American Creationism. The increasing vociferousness of American Creationists (those who accept the arguments of Morris and Whitcomb in *The Genesis Flood*) is a cause of some concern. A recent article in the *Life of Faith* setting out and refuting some of these arguments used to prove that the earth is only a few thousand years old and showing that we must suppose it to be very much older, was followed by three letters from ACs. The first was gracious and was based on the premise that because we know nothing about the initial composition of rocks we cannot rely on radioactive datings. (This happens not to be true and was easily refuted.) The second and third were plain rude. The writer of the article was called an anti-creationist and, because in discussing the age of the earth he did not mention Adam, it followed that he did not agree with Jesus who did! Canon Victor Pearce, who has considerable experience in lecturing to young people, tells us that in Christian meetings there has been a great increase in rudeness on the part of Morris and Whitcomb's followers. They blandly assume that those who cannot follow the logic of *The Genesis Flood* deny the teaching of the Bible. It is sad that this subject should now be causing divisions among Christians.

Langhorn-Orchard Price. (See 103, 53). The Council has decided to award this to Professor R. J. Berry for his paper on Christian Attitudes to the Environment published in Vol. 102, p.131.

News & Views

SF PRETENDS TO BE SERIOUS

Carl Sagan, well-known for his interest in extra-terrestrial beings, is never at a loss for interesting suggestions. With E.E. Salpeter, an astrophysicist, he has recently come up with a fascinating, if bizarre, hypothesis (*Astrophysical Journal Supplement* 32, 737; *New Scientist*, 10 Mar. 1977 p.582).

The Moon, and now Mars and Venus too, having failed to provide evidence of life, is it not time to give attention to the other planets? Jupiter, for instance? In particular what about that curious object — the red spot on Jupiter? Can it just possibly consist of Jovian animals, red in colour? Sagan and Salpeter suggest that perhaps huge balloon-like red beasties float around in the Jovian clouds. In the earthly ocean photosynthetic plankton live at the surface, lower down fish gobble them up, and fish in turn have predators (including man!). Perhaps the three-fold arrangement is duplicated on Jupiter — their equivalents being the sinkers, floaters and hunters. The floaters, perhaps, move around rocket-wise by manipulating helium jets and so escaping, when they can, from the attention of the hunters. Have the hunters their enemies too? Perhaps not. In that case, perhaps, like whales before the days of whale hunting, they must grow to enormous sizes — probably many km across and, hopefully, large enough to be seen by the Mariner probes' close-up cameras. A genuine Popperian scientific hypothesis, this, capable of refutation by the camera! Fine! But it all sounds like the story of the wonderful fishes which, so our forebears argued, enjoyed their days swimming in the water-covered plant Venus; or the lunar inhabitants whose illuminated periodic fetes were visible even from earth, or the wonderfully clever engineers who built the canals of Mars bringing water from the poles to the desiccated deserts of their equator.

Another line of thought concerns complex organic molecules detected in space by radio astronomy. Cyanodiacetylene and more recently (Mar. 1977) cyanotriacetylene are said to have been detected in the constellation of Sagittarius B2 at the centre of our galaxy. Such molecules might easily convert into biologically interesting new substances (reported *Times* 9 Ap. 1977). In fact the di- and tri-acetylene groupings are found in compounds contained in many plants. If the cosmic identifications are correct it would still be difficult to understand how the very low concentrations in space

could make useful precursors of life on a planet. But the spectral evidence is far from convincing.

Yet another bright astronomical suggestion recently appeared in book form (Adrian Berry, *The Iron Sun*, Cape, £3.95). Here the author lets imagination run riot on black holes. In black holes the conditions are so bizarre that the known laws of physics break down and that gives opportunity for suggesting that anything may happen. So Mr. Berry's thoughts wander to a specially designed space-craft which enters a black hole through a "navigation tunnel". Once safely inside the velocity of light no longer sets a limit to the speed of travel. Ho presto and, many light years away, you pop out of a white hole, counterpart to the black hole that swallowed you up! If you should ever feel homesick, you have but to jump into another black hole and hope that its white mate will not be too far from earth.

"First find your black hole" might be an obvious retort. It does not daunt Mr. Berry. He reckons mankind should set about manufacturing "giant interstellar bulldozers" to scoop together all the flotsam and jetsam in the solar system, especially iron (whence the title of the book), and make a black hole out of it. This would be expensive — at present it would cost as much as the world's total technology — but in a few decades, when world population and technology have grown apace, it will cost only a few per cent of the world GNP. Asked by a BBC interviewer (14 Ap. 1977 a.m.) if he seriously thought mankind would attempt to travel around the galaxy in Adrian Berry style, he said that he had no shadow of doubt that this would happen eventually! By 2215 AD the world should be rich enough to start colonizing the galaxy. To make a black hole would involve collecting much more matter than the sun contains so that gravitationally the sun might find his passage through the sky somewhat wobbly. We are not sure what Mr. Berry would do about this. Also he seems to have forgotten that his chunk of iron would get very hot and might blow up as a supernova (R. Znajek, *Nature*, 267, 867).

Is history repeating itself? When the first flush of excitement occasioned by the advent of Christianity had begun to wane, when official Christianity had compromised itself hopelessly with the world, attempts were made to renew enthusiasm by the writing of imaginative novels in which 'saints' worked fantastic miracles, while apocryphal gospels appeared describing silly miracles supposed to have been performed by Jesus. Science is in a similar position today. It compromised with morality — science has "known sin" said Oppenheimer — and now everywhere its misuse leads to disillusionment. Today in SF, and near-SF appearing in scientific journals, we witness the ever-increasing popularity of bizarre ideas, more wonderful, even, than the miracles of the 'saints'.

COLONIZING THE GALAXY

It is now being urged that it should not be an impossible task to make rocket probes which can travel beyond the solar system. Alan Bond, once a Rolls Royce rocket engineer, together with friends in his team, has recently outlined the results of a four year study of a robot probe designed to reach Barnard's star, the second nearest star to us, which is some six light years distant. By igniting a succession of small hydrogen bombs the probe should achieve a velocity of 12% of the velocity of light and fifty years later would be able to transmit back photographs of the planetary body near this star.

This raises a problem which was much aired at the meeting of the British Interplanetary Society at which Bond spoke. If it is possible for civilised man to travel from one star to another, why has this not already been done if there are other civilisations in our galaxy? There was strong support for the view at the meeting that, since space travellers have not reached earth, it must be because we are the only technologically advanced form of life in the entire galaxy. (*New Scientist*, 1977. 74, 61)

This argument is now being used increasingly in the astronomical journals and it is felt to be very convincing even by those who in the past have inclined to think that man is by no means unique. The argument was developed in detail by M.H. Hart a year or two back (*Quart. J. Roy. Astron. Soc.* 1975, 16, 128-135) who argued that within a century or so rockets should achieve a speed of a tenth of that of light, using hydrogen as fuel. At this speed, according to Eric M. Jones (*Icarus*, 1976, 28, 421), assuming man's present procreation rate, the galaxy should become populated in about 5 million years. Even at lower speeds, it would take but a minute fraction of the time that has been available. And so again - are we alone?

OSCILLATING UNIVERSE?

What is the over-all density of matter in the Universe? The question is important because if the density exceeds a certain value, gravitational pull should be enough to draw the Universe together again after it has finished expanding. But below a certain critical density it would be expected that the expansion could continue indefinitely.

Till now, the generally accepted density of cosmic dust (graphite, silicates and perhaps ice) has been taken to be 10^{-26} g/c.c. a value estimated in various ways, for example by the extinction and polarisation of star light

Recent findings suggest that the figure was greatly over-estimated. The impact of micrometeoroids with space satellites is unexpectedly low by a factor of 1 - 10 thousand times while several other lines of evidence are pointing to the conclusion that the density has been over-estimated by a factor of *at least* 100 and probably much more. It would seem then that expansion must continue: the Universe is not set for periodic expansion and contraction. (P. Wessen *New Scientist*, 27 Jan. 1977, pp. 207-209).

EARLY EARTH AND GENESIS

In an interesting paper R.B. Hargraves discusses pre-cambrian geology (*Science*, 1976, 193, 363-371).

Given that the earth's surface was at one time molten, it is argued that the lighter sial of which continents are made must first have come to the surface, solidifying on top, and forming a globe-encircling sialic crust up to 12 km thick. As it cooled there must have come a time, within 0.3 and 1.5 billion years (b.y.) after the earth's formation, when the bottom of the crust was liquid (about 750°C.) with liquid basalt below. Eruptions, with frequent breaking through of basalt into the crust, would have caused the latter to break very easily, while under these conditions isostasy (weight equilibrium) would be maintained. The condensed ocean (2.8 km in depth or perhaps rather less) would have remained over the sialic shell, but in order for land to appear it would have been necessary, owing to isostasy, for 15.5 km of basalt to be erupted through the crust in order to reach the surface of the sea. Thus for a long period - reckoned to be up to 1.0 to 1.4 b.y. ago, the earth was probably covered completely by the ocean. In confirmation it is pointed out that, judging by the present recession of the moon, it should have been at the Roche limit (2.89 earth radii) between 1 and 2 b.y. ago and therefore would have broken up at an earlier period. Since it is still intact, loss of energy by tidal action must have been smaller in the past than it is today. At the present time the moon's energy is lost, mainly, by tidal action in shallow seas: if at an earlier epoch there was no land the moon's rate of recession would have been much less.

The development of early life in the light of this theory is discussed by W.M. Chamberlain and G. Marland (*Nature*, 1977, 265, 135). The idea that the earth was once ocean-covered is not, of course, new, though geologists have previously thought that land appeared much earlier (see, for e.g. *Science*, 1969, 164, 1229).

In another paper (*Geochimica et Cosmochimica Acta*, 1976, 40, 1095-1108) L.P. Knauth and S. Epstein discuss isotope ratios of hydrogen (D/H) and oxygen (O-18/O-16) in ancient American cherts. (Cherts consist of microcrystals of silica covered with -OH groups the H of which does not interchange with heavy hydrogen in boiling heavy water.)

The cherts, mixed with carbonates, are known to have been deposited in ancient seas. The hydrogen ratios are lower than for present-day sea-water, and the oxygen ratios higher, so that evaporation (which would raise both together) will not explain the altered ratios. Nor will a slow change in the composition of sea-water, unless this was remarkably irregular which seems unlikely, since the ratios both rise and fall with age. The temperatures at which cherts were deposited, explain the ratios and make estimates of the temperatures at the time of formation possible. The figures fit well with the view that temperatures were high, averaging 34°C in Upper Cambrian and Ordovician times, cooler (20-25°C) in Devonian to Permian; hot (35°C or more) in Triassic and cool (17°C) from Triassic to Tertiary.

In the later Precambrian (1.2 b.y.) temperatures were up to 33°C but at greater ages they were much higher, 38°C at 2 b.y. and 52°C for the still older cherts; they may even have been as high as 70°C at 3 b.y. As expected there are no fossils with any of the cherts which give temperatures of 50°C and upwards. For comparison, the present average temperature is 13-15°C. The authors cite the view of Fred Hoyle (*Quart. J. Roy. Astron. Soc.* 1972, 13, 328) that the sequence of early life forms on earth follows the sequence of the highest temperatures at which different groups of organisms can live (bacteria, 90°C; blue-green algae 70°C+; eucaryotes, 56-60°C, protozoa, 50°C etc.); higher organisms could not exist on earth until the temperature had cooled sufficiently. [High temperatures in early times may in whole or part, have resulted from dying radioisotopes.] The temperatures given are possibly 10-15°C above average as cherts may have formed faster when, in the summers, waters were warmer.

That these descriptions of the early earth fit in closely with the Genesis story will be immediately apparent. In Genesis chap.1 the earth is covered with water but all is in darkness, for with a hot ocean much of the water on the planet is present in the form of a covering of dense cloud. As cooling proceeds, light penetrates the mists and soon there is day and night. A clear atmosphere appears between the clouds above, which still envelop the globe, and the waters below - the clear air is the firmament, sky or heaven, in which, so we are later told, birds fly. Next land rises from the depths; the dry land is called Earth and the gathering of the waters, Sea. By this time a good deal of light is coming through the cloud layer and photosynthesis starts in earnest. Afterwards,

on day 4, the sun and moon become visible from the surface of the earth. That the entire description is written from the point of view of an imaginary observer on the surface of the earth is clear from the beginning, for otherwise it would hardly be said that darkness was upon the face of the deep. Looked at from outside, space only a white cloud layer covering the earth would have been visible.

WORLD POPULATION

The UN now estimates the birth rate over the world to be 33 per 1000, one less than 20 years ago. However both figures have a probable error of ± 2 per 1000 so it appears that there has been no significant change. World population now stands at 4.083 billion. If present trends continue it will be 6.182 billion in 2000 and 8.16 billion in 2015 AD. These figures are given by the Population Reference Bureau in Washington. In some countries (Libya, Kuwait, Rhodesia, Mexico and others) population is doubling every 18 - 20 years. (*Times* 7 Ap. 1977.) A few small countries in the West (Austria, Belgium) have achieved population stability or even slight decline (G. Britain, the two Germanies, and Luxembourg) but increase in global population is not affected.

The article "Mass Sterilisation at Gunpoint" (*New Scientist*, 5 May 1977) makes harrowing reading. It describes the attempts of the Congress Party in India to stabilize the population. The interuterine device (IUD) proved a failure after the mid-60s and attention turned to sterilisation. Since then 20 million people have been sterilised, 7 million in 1976. But the methods used were diabolical.

Houses were raided in the early morning, men were threatened that their wages would be withheld until they submitted, often the operation was performed by force up to three men holding the victim down, buses were attacked and men removed, surgeons did up to 100 vasectomies a day often in unsanitary conditions in open fields and on railway platforms: tetanus and other infections often followed but no follow-up facilities were made available. Not infrequently unmarried men were seized and others operated upon for a second time. In villages the mere sight of a car was often enough to cause a mass exodus after which people hid in the fields for weeks on end. All references to the subject in the press were forbidden by law but even so riots broke out - for example a family planning booth was burnt down in a Bombay suburb (*Times* 11 Mar. 1977). The result of family planning was to turn voters against the Congress party which was heavily defeated in the recent elections: it is unlikely that sterilisation will now continue except, perhaps, on a greatly

reduced scale. Meanwhile the population of India is 600 million, rising by a million a month.

Malcolm Muggeridge has pointed out that voluntary family planning in third world countries is counter productive. It is only the more intelligent and educated section of the population who are able to see the need for co-operation with the authorities. But this is the section of the community who need to be encouraged to produce the children on whom will fall the responsibility for creating wealth, employment, and economic food production in the years ahead.

DENBIGH ON THE INVENTIVE UNIVERSE

A fairly recent semi-popular but well referenced book on the philosophy of science (K.G. Denbigh, FRS, *An Inventive Universe*, Hutchinson, 1975) contains some interesting ideas and novel ways of putting things.

Particularly valuable, in a discussion on entropy, is the distinction between order or orderliness and organisation (chap.3). To illustrate the difference the author compares a living cell with a crystal (p.90), a comparison common enough, but one in which it is often overlooked that "one of the two entities in question is more orderly than the other but is less highly organised". The crystal is highly ordered because its component atoms or molecules repeat themselves quite accurately at fixed distances throughout the body of the material. But a cell, though highly organised, varies considerably in this respect from another cell of the same type. In its interior "there are no accurate repeating distances or shapes". Orderliness means smallness of deviation from a chosen state, but organisation means interdependence of various component parts.

Organisation may be subject to measurement in the sense that it is right to speak of amount of organisation. It could be hierarchical but is not necessarily so (e.g. in *Volvox*, which consists of a colony of cells, there is no centre of control). A rough measure of organisation, Dr. Denbigh suggests, might be the total number of connections, c , multiplied by the number, n , of distinctive component parts (i.e. not including replicas). If so, integrality, the measure of organisation = $c n$.

In biology integrality, which is connected with but is independent of entropy, tends to increase. Thus, as an egg develops, the integrality within the shell must certainly increase. (This might be questioned?) It is argued that over time the total integrality of the biosphere must have increased. (On p.106 the calculation given seems questionable since the integralities of individuals of

a species are added together, though it is questionable if they can be called distinctive.)

The idea is interesting but one wonders what the integrality of half a clock or a dead animal would be on this basis, relative to a clock or a live animal.

Like many others Dr. Denbigh is certain that there are no sharp breaks in nature. If man "claims the possession of free-will he must attribute the same power, to however small a degree, to all other natural entities. For what is no longer acceptable is a belief in a discontinuity, an abrupt break between man and nature," (p.11). "It would be wrong I think to suppose that there is any essential discontinuity between natural processes, on the one hand, and those involving purposive activity, or intentionality, on the other." — the development of a child being taken by way of example (p.113).

Thus science, in holding to the doctrine of the unity of nature, denies dualism. It is against the spirit and unity of science to hold "that scientific principles need to be introduced at higher levels when they are entirely inoperable at lower levels (p.142). Thus Denbigh's view is that "the possibility of consciousness must be supposed to be explicable, and in some sense latent, at the very deepest level of the reductionist system, i.e. at the level of the fundamental particles" (p.145). In this connection he quotes A.R. Peacocke with approval to the effect that man's evolution "demonstrates the ability of matter to display properties which we normally, in talking about this human level of matter, call mental, personal or spiritual" (p.169).

Throughout the book, the author shows himself to be well aware of the distinction between what is true in reality and what is merely useful as a scientific axiom. Determinism — and his discussion on the subject is excellent — cannot be proved and is improbable, but is scientifically useful. Belief in God proved useful, probably essential, for the early development of science, but Denbigh does not hold this belief to be true. But somehow this important distinction is totally lost sight of when the mind-body problem is discussed.

It is often convenient in science to think in terms of continuity, even though one knows that strict continuity is out of the question. It is convenient to think of the pH (acidity, etc.) of a very small cell as a continuous variable, even though the probability is that it contains a small discrete number of hydrogen ions.

Nernst introduced solubility products and assigned numerical values to very insoluble compounds (e.g. mercury sulphide) which suggest that the concentrations of the ions in the solution are in

balanced equilibrium with the solid – even though it may happen that on working things out there will be far less than one atom of, say, mercury in a sphere the size of the earth!

In such a case there is obviously a sharp break between water which does not contain and water which does contain one single atom or more of a particular element in question (or of a cell of a particular biological organism, for that matter). In short, continuity pleases the mathematical mind and simplifies science, but like determinism it is not true. Then what possible ground can there be for denying a sharp break between consciousness and non-consciousness? It is difficult to allay a suspicion that anti-theological prejudice is responsible, for Denbigh says plainly that he does not believe in God.

The thesis of the book is that nature is genuinely creative, or inventive. This is in contradistinction to the older view that "everything that happened was simply an unfolding of what had first been laid down [at the creation]", for between cause and effect there was equality and therefore nothing "in nature which might justify the word *creativity*" (p.120). I find the argument difficult to follow. Emergent qualities are described as essentially new, and mind or consciousness is spoken of as such a quality. Yet, if so, how can it be said to exist in some undeveloped form below the level of primitive organisms? And if it does, where is genuine creativity of nature to be found? Again one feels the author's failure to distinguish between the natural and the supernatural leads to some unclear thinking.

On a more positive note, however, Dr. Denbigh poses the perennial question, Is creation *ex nihilo* thinkable? (p.152). Though some philosophers and scientists have answered in the negative and even claimed that the idea is irrational, their difficulty, he says, seems to stem only from "factors arising from emotion and from practical experience". If atoms just appeared or disappeared, man would "lose his sense of security and so he emotionally resists the idea". Man has long made tools, but out of pre-existing materials, not out of nothing. Yet there are quantities in physics, such as entropy and also force (curiously overlooked in this book), and in biology integrality, which are created out of nothing. It is not therefore unthinkable, argues Denbigh, that the same might apply to matter.

Another interesting theme discussed in this book is D. Bohm's attack (*Causality and Chance in Modern Physics*, 1957) on "the mechanistic notion that the immense diversity of things can be reduced to no more than the effects of some definite and limited framework of laws" (p.130). Bohm puts forward the hypothesis of the *qualitative infinity of nature*. "By this he means the idea 'that nature may have in it an infinity of different kinds of things' and

thus has an inexhaustible richness and complexity." This is in conformity, says Bohm, with modern developments in physics which reveal "levels below levels below levels" (p.141). Denbigh finds this in agreement with his own conclusion that "ultimately complete information about real objects and situations can never be attained; the natural world can never be fully known" — a proposition which he calls the *Principle of the Unattainability of Complete Information*. We are reminded of Clerk-Maxwell's inaugural lecture at Cambridge in 1871 when, referring to the current notion that discovery in physics was near its end, he said, "We have no right to think thus of the inexhaustible riches of creation".

RAINBOW

H.M. Nussenzveig gives a very full account of the theory of the rainbow in a recent issue of the *Scientific American* (1977, 236, (4), 116). The sheer beauty of the heavenly bow has often fathered the thought than rainbows belong to art and aesthetics rather than to science. Thus Goethe declared that Newton's analysis of the bow would "cripple Nature's heart" while Charles Lamb and John Keats at a dinner party in 1817 proposed a toast "to Newton's health and confusion to mathematics". HMN gives contra-quotations to prove that the sense of beauty is not always destroyed by mathematical explanation.

Despite earlier work by Newton, Airy and others, the latest refinements in rainbow theory are only four years old! It is easy enough to account for the primary and secondary (inverted) bow but why is the space between them darker than the rest of the sky? And why do splashes of colour appear which are not part of the bows? The long history of rainbow explanation illustrates the point (see preceding section) that scientific explanations are never complete. However satisfactory and pleasing an explanation may seem, it always turns out that some point or points has been over-looked, so that there is more thinking to be done. No doubt, in time, rainbow theory will advance beyond its 1977 stage.

Thinking it over it is wonderful that God has put us in a universe where, though we can experience deep satisfaction from the measure of understanding granted to us, we are *always* reminded that our understanding is incomplete.

LOCUSTS

The desert locust usually leads a solitary existence but when conditions are right it becomes gregarious and gathers in swarms

each of which may cover up to 30 square miles. A swarm will eat tens of thousands of tons of food a day and reproduction is very rapid: a swarm can travel 2000 miles in 3 weeks. Locusts shift naturally to areas where rain has fallen; here they breed effectively laying eggs in the damp earth or sand with fresh vegetation available for the food (Stanley Bacon, *The Desert Locust*, 1972).

Over the last two or three years the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) has started to use both weather and land satellites to monitor some of the area of 10 million square miles near the Equator subject to locust invasions. The weather satellite shows where enough rain has fallen to make breeding grounds for locusts, while the land satellite monitors vegetation growth.

Already eight swarms have been spotted and treated with insecticides so that in each case the immediate danger of a locust migration was avoided. In September 1977 the geo-stationary Meteosat is due for launching: this will cover 90% of the potential locust area but still excluding India.

Since viewing from space makes surveillance of remote and inaccessible territory possible, it may well be that the victory over man's age-old enemy has been achieved at last. (*New Scientist*, 18 Nov. 1976, p.374 and Tony Loftas in *New Scientist* 17 Mar. 1977, p.631).

Since locust invasions have troubled mankind for thousands of years, one would have expected that St. John, in writing the Apocalypse, would have mentioned them specifically as the language he uses is so often reminiscent of the OT description of the plagues of Egypt. But he does not do so, which seems to imply that in the last days before the return of Christ locusts will no longer plague mankind. The same omission applies to our Lord's description of the last days as recorded in the Gospels. The latest developments are making these omissions intelligible to those who take prophecy seriously. (See also this JOURNAL 101, 3).

EVOLUTION AND COSMIC CONSTANTS

The idea that there may have been slow changes in the fundamental constants of nature since the time of the formation of the Universe is by no means new. Direct measurements within the time span of modern man have thrown little light on the subject, though comparisons of the various measurements of the velocity of light have often been published.

Last year it became possible for the first time to observe a red shift in the optical spectrum of a quasar and to compare it with the red shift of the same quasar using radio waves (the 21 cm line of neutral hydrogen). The same relative shift was found in the two cases which affords yet further strong confirmation that the increased wave-length of distant radiation is due to the Doppler effect. (Compare the change in pitch of the horn of a passing ambulance when it ceases to approach the observer and starts to recede.) The radiation from the quasar in question originated when the universe was between a third and a half of its present age. The fact that atoms were then vibrating at the same rates as they are today has made it possible to show that the mass of the proton and the ratio of the mass of the proton to that of the electron were the same then as now. The same conclusion is drawn with respect to the charge on the electron and the product of Planck's constant h and the speed of light c . It is concluded, therefore, that constants have not been changing with time. (*Astronomical Journal* 1976, 81, 293; *Physical Review Letters* 1976, 37, 179).

The point is of interest in connection with theories of evolution. J.B.S.Haldane suggested that a slow change in fundamental constants with time might make it possible to overcome one of the most serious objections to evolution — the objection based on size. Because weight depends on the cube of linear dimensions but area on the square it is impossible to imagine continuity between small creatures at the beginning of an evolutionary process, and large creatures at the end. Not at least if at each stage natural selection operates — a requirement of the Darwinian theory. For there must come a time when complete re-design is necessary and this cannot be achieved by a gradual process. To illustrate, because all creatures are constructed of atoms, there is a limit to the strength of a tendon of given diameter. Ultimately, therefore, the load which a muscle can take depends on the square of the dimensions. But the load it will have to bear will depend on the mass of the creature in questions, and therefore on the cube. As Galileo pointed out, we see the effect of this all through nature. Mammals are constructed on quite a different plan to insects. A grass hopper the size of an elephant would not be viable, nor an elephant the size of a grasshopper.

J.B.S. Haldane ingeniously suggested that it might be possible to overcome this difficulty if, as evolution was taking place, there were slow concomitant changes in the fundamental constants of nature. For instance the weight of an elephant of a given size might have increased very slowly with time. It now seems that no such way out of the difficulty is possible. The light from distant stellar objects long antedates the first appearance of life on earth, but it appears that there have been no changes in fundamental cosmic constants.

FAT

In the OT the fat of sacrifices was to be burnt on the altar (Ex 29:13, 25; Lev.3:5, 11; Lev.4 etc.etc.) "All fat is the Lord's. It shall be a perpetual statute throughout your generations, in all your dwelling places that you eat neither fat nor blood" (Lev.3:17). "The fat of an animal [that dies] may be put to any other use, but on no account shall you eat it" (Lev.7:22-25).

In recent years animal fats have come under suspicion in connection with heart disease. In a recent study (15 Belgian doctors in *The Lancet* 15 May 1977, p.1069) the death rate from heart disease in the northern Dutch-speaking part of Belgium is compared with that in the southern French-speaking sector. In the north much more margarine than butter is consumed but in the south, the consumption of butter per head is four times that in the north. On average there is no great difference between north and south as regards blood pressure, weight or smoking habits. In the south death from heart disease among middle aged men is much commoner than in the north and in each province it is said to correlate closely with butter consumption. In the two areas, medical teaching in the north, but not the south, has stressed the possible danger of animal fat which, the authors believe, accounts for the difference in the incidence of heart disease. A century ago and up to 1947 the death rates showed little if any difference. (See also this JOURNAL 102, 113).

THE VIRGIN BIRTH

Ten years ago Stafford Wright (this JOURNAL 1967, 95 (3), 19-29) outlined the problems that have to be faced when the Virgin birth is viewed in the light of biological knowledge concerning the chromosomal nature of inheritance and reproduction, i.e. normal human beings are made up of cells containing 23 pairs of chromosomes which carry the thousands of genes that make an individual what he or she is. One of these 23 pairs, the sex chromosome pair, is distinctive in males and females. In females the pair is made up of two 'X' chromosomes whereas males have one X and one smaller Y chromosome. Germ cells contain only one chromosome from each pair so that after fusion the new individual is made up of pairs of chromosomes, one of each pair being received from each parent. As Stafford Wright pointed out, if the Christ is to be fully man and fully divine both biologically and spiritually the intervention of the Holy Spirit described in Lk.1:35 and Mt.1:20 must have resulted in the contribution of 22 chromosomes plus the Y chromosome which Mary would be unable to provide.

Has recent progress in our understanding of reproduction and sex determination thrown any light on how this might be accomplished? Virgin birth (parthenogenesis) is a well recognised biological phenomenon. Under certain natural or artificial conditions female animals, including mice and rabbits, can be induced to develop an embryo from an ovum alone, with no contribution from a male. Such offspring will receive both chromosomes of each pair, including the female X chromosomes, from their mother and will therefore be genetically identical to her. Whether or not this has ever occurred in humans has never been proved but it is not impossible. Careful investigation of mother and daughter pairs can be done in the same way as twins can be tested to determine whether or not they are identical. In view of the cynicism with which claims of virgin births are usually viewed such testing has rarely been undertaken and only one such possible mother and daughter pair has been reported.

Even if parthenogenesis is accepted with the implication that Christ would be genetically virtually identical to His mother, the problem of His maleness remains. Male sex determination is initiated by the Y chromosome but it now seems likely that only a very small part of it, perhaps only a single gene, is required to start the embryo on the path of maleness, and once male sex has been determined the sex differentiation continues in a programmed manner. Although they are rare, men with two apparently normal X chromosomes have been described. How they became male is still a matter of research but the most likely explanation is that the male determining gene from the Y chromosome has been transferred to an X (or even another) chromosome. These men frequently have minor genital abnormalities and are likely to be infertile and do not really provide the answer to the origin of Christ as the perfect man.

Thus although parthenogenesis and a mutation on an X chromosome could theoretically give rise to a male offspring with no paternal intervention, it does not really allow sufficient divine contribution to the genetic make-up of the Son of God. As Stafford Wright concluded on theological grounds, a much more radical readjustment is required. Mutations are taking place spontaneously in genes all the time and it would be expected that a suitable set of 23 chromosomes could be derived from Mary's to encompass whatever characteristics were required for the Son of God, including the provision of a Y chromosome. It is widely accepted that the Y chromosome has evolved from the X so there is no need to postulate entirely new biological pathways. We are left therefore with the need for a miracle, indeed several miracles, but in view of the immensity of the prospect of God becoming Man surely a miracle is to be expected. Notwithstanding this miracle is one in which mechanisms can be envisaged by man's finite mind, it pales into minor significance when compared with the quite inexplicable

spiritual energy demonstrated by the Resurrection. (*Communicated by Prof. R.J. Berry, Royal Free Hospital School of Medicine, London and Mrs. Berry*)
 See W. Mittwoch, *New Scientist*, 13 Jan, 1977, p.74, also *Nature*, 265, 255.

SHORT NOTES

Plutonium. President Carter (who still teaches in the Sunday School of a Baptist Chapel) has high-lighted the danger inherent in a plutonium economy and is seeking to steer USA away from self-breeding reactors. With frequent movement of dangerous fissile material, the danger of theft and blackmail is bound to arise. In this connection attention has been drawn to the mysterious disappearance in Europe of 200 tons of Uranium ore from the high seas in 1968. No one has yet been able to discover what happened to it though suspicions have fallen on Israel (*Times* 2 and 3 May 1977.) The revelation of its loss was followed (4 May) by a report of the loss of thousands of pounds of enriched uranium and plutonium from plants in USA. Stock-taking to better than 2 or 3 per cent seems to be impossible. If, for example, plutonium is being extracted from used uranium rods, it is impossible to forecast exactly what the yield will be and if small, recurrent, thefts occur, they will not be detected. Yet only a few kilograms are necessary for the construction of a crude type of bomb, the assembly of which would not prove unduly difficult. It is hardly possible to imagine the terror which would be engendered if terrorists began to use bombs for purposes of blackmail (Cf. 2 Tim.3:1, etc.).

The Sun. The Sun, it appears, is not the well-behaved star that we supposed it to be. It has suffered gross changes (e.g. in the solar constant) over recent centuries and millenia but they are not periodic. Not only are there considerable variations in the 11-year sunspot cycle but it appears that between 1645 and 1715 there were no (or very few) sunspots at all. (*Nature*, 266, 405; Cf. Lk.21:25 etc.etc.)

Stars and Planetary Systems. A study of the 123 nearest stars, those visible to the naked eye in the northern hemisphere (i.e. within about 80 light years distance) showed that half of them have at least one companion. Corrections (e.g. for those with a companion rotating in a plane at right angles to the line of sight and so showing no Doppler Shift) raises this to *at least* 72%. The proportion may be considerably higher for if a companion is far away from its partner no Doppler Shift will be observed during the time of observation. It is not considered possible that planets capable of

supporting life can exist if their star or sun has a companion (*Sci.American* 1977, 236(4), 96) Cf. this JOURNAL 102, 107).

Scientific Scares. Increasing numbers of scientific scares are tending, increasingly, to breed contempt. When the FDA (Food and Drugs Administration) in USA banned saccharin on the ground that it can cause cancer of the bladder in rodents, it was expected that the public would be too scared to want it. The result of the ban, however, was to cause widespread stockpiling: drinks sweetened with saccharin rapidly disappeared from the shelves in the stores! (*Nature*, 266, 674) (Perhaps the ban will be lifted for, in order to ingest enough saccharin to be equivalent to that necessary to cause cancer in rats, a man would have to drink twice his weight of ordinary saccharin sweetened drink every day for a life-time. Diabetics who have used saccharin for many years show no tendency to get cancer of the bladder.) Amaranth (used to colour Ribena and other foods) was also banned in USA (*New Scientist* 29 Jan. 1976) but it is doubtful if any one in the UK avoids foods containing it.

Cancer-causing Chemicals. The revolting pictures of unfortunates dogs forced to smoke endlessly in laboratories in order to test the relative risks associated with various varieties of tobacco which appeared in the press a year or two ago must have proved very upsetting to Christians. Is it necessary that God's creatures should be treated so? It is gratifying that great progress has now been made in detecting carcinogenicity without the need for using living animals. Bruce Ames, of Berkeley, California uses an agar jelly seeded with mutants of the bacterium *Salmonella typhimurium*. In the presence of mutagens, which are normally cancer-producing, some of the bacteria revert to the 'wild type' which quickly grow into colonies seen as white dots. (However, the test is rather more complex than this brief description would suggest.) A large number of cancer-producing and other chemicals have been tested and there is a high correlation with what is already known about their carcinogenicity or otherwise (*Proc.Nat.Acad.of Science*, 1976, 72, 515).

Antichrist. Dr. Blanch, Archbishop of York, has recently commented on the growing tendency towards the cult of personality. Since 1949 Stalin, Mao Tse-tung, Nasser and Castro have had their "ruggedly handsome features displayed throughout the countries they ruled". "Within a decade Big Brother has extended his rule to well over a thousand million people." (Cf. Rev. 13, etc.)

President Amin of Uganda. John Kibukamusoke, a Ugandan, one time physician to Amin, and later Professor of medicine in Lusaka, has recently told the story of how, after Michael Ondaga, Ugandan Foreign Minister, died in 1973 his body was found floating in the Nile. Amin, who strongly believes that "if you eat a piece of your victim's liver his evil spirits will not haunt you", procured the body and ate some of the liver. (*Times*, 28 Ap. 1977).

Particles. A new kind of matter ("molecular charmoium") has been discovered (A. de Rujula, *Physical Rev.Let.* 1977, 38 (7), 317)¹. Its atom is built out of four quarks combined together, unlike the proton which contains three. The particle containing two quarks, with equal and opposite 'charm' is the psi particle, discovered in 1974.

Radioisotope Dating with a Cyclotron. Radioisotope dating is important to Christians for establishing the dates of ancient manuscripts, and in connection with the controversy over evolution. R.A. Muller (*Science* 1977, 196, 489-494), has shown that one can now date much older and smaller samples by using a cyclotron as a high-energy mass spectrometer. For C-14 dating one should be able to go back 40,000 to 100,000 years, with 1 to 100mg samples. For Be-10 dating, the age limit should be 10 to 30 million years, with 1mm³ to 10cm³ rock samples. (From Peter Clarke, Oxford)

Hooks or Nails. In the book of Exodus the tabernacle hangings were to be attached to the acacia wood with *waw*in, the plural of *waw*. It has hitherto been assumed that the word means a hook. But six years ago Miss Honor Frost, a marine archaeologist, found a Carthaginian warship sunk in the first Punic war of 250 BC between Rome and Carthage. On the planks there are many markings which show that there was some kind of mass production in ancient shipyards which makes credible the statement, for instance of Pliny, to the effect that 16 Romans built 100 ships in 60 days. The word *waw* appears frequently on the timbers and every time it is close to a nail used in the construction, suggesting that that was its meaning. The word is common to both Punic and Hebrew. (*Times*, 3 May 1977)

Genetic Engineering. Professor R.J.C. Harris, speaking on "Common Sense in Genetic Engineering" (Lorch Foundation Lecture given at High Wycombe in June) expressed the view that some critics of genetic engineering have been unduly sensational. Most of the work had been conducted with bacteria with 4,000 genes (compared with 3 million in man). There is a possibility that lowly organisms might be capable of exchanging DNA with higher ones: this might result in serious consequences though there are also great possibilities for good. (Reported, *The Third Way*, 14 July 1977)

¹This has recently been questioned.

Myth. The recent book *The Myth of God Incarnate* (ed. John Hick, SCM, £2.95) has occasioned much debate. The general consensus of opinion among Christians is that the title is unfortunate because the popular use of the word *myth* differs greatly from the technical theological use: in short the popular myth is an untruth but the technical myth may be true. However John Hick points out that according to historic Christianity, "the only doorway to eternal life is Christian faith", a position with which it appears that the authors of the book are in profound disagreement. John Capon's comment seems fully merited. "They have enacted the parable of the vinedressers. They have desired to keep the family name and inheritance while endeavouring to prove that the owner's son is not its rightful heir. They wish to occupy the vineyard without paying the owner his dues." (*The Third Way*, 14 July)

Deserts. According to Professor Kassas of the University of Cairo who was in London last year, the area of man-created desert is now nearly as great as that devoted to productive agriculture. The total desert area is 57 million square kilometres or 43% of the earth's land area. Every year the Sahara encroaches on an area twice the size of Cyprus. He warned that it is no easy thing to make a desert bloom and that "all over the world, when you go out into the desert and use modern intensive agriculture, the system fails". Only in very rich countries is there a hope of applying advanced technology to arid regions. (*New Scientist*, 7 Oct. 1976 p.4)

RC Church. Mgr Marcel Lefebvre, the rebel RC priest, has a strong following in Italy among the nobility. Lefebvre's complaint against the Pope is that he has become too accommodating and lenient. A Chapel in Cologne cathedral has been put aside for Muslim worship and the same would have happened in Marseilles if the local RCs had not objected. Lefebvre says that the basis of the RC church has been altered over the past 20 years. There have even been changes merely to please Protestant sects. If there is to be pluralism of the truth, why have a catholic sect when there are hundreds of other sects to choose from? "The Catholic church was the only true faith because Christ had founded it. He believed in one baptism, not two or three." Millions of the faithful, he says, are crying out "Stop, stop the comedy, the modernisation. Our Catholic religion will end if we go on like this. Leave things to tradition". Lefebvre has made up his mind, we read, "I do not want to die a Protestant", which seems to be his way of saying that he would like to see the Pope sacked and another more orthodox one put in his place. (*Times*, 7 Jn. 1977)

Conduct of War. The Geneva conventions relating to conduct of wars have been under revision. In the past there have been agreements based on the Christian concept of the just war which allow some scope for humanitarianism in war. But it is now thought that these

allow too much scope to the enemy in the case of insurrection. Rules forbidding perfidy, the issuing of orders to leave no survivors, and even one specifying that "constant care shall be taken, in the conduct of military operations, to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects "now go by the board. A few delegates expressed the unease felt by many. (*Times*, 7 Jn, 1977)

Excitement. Professor Ivor Mills, an endocrinologist at Cambridge University, has drawn attention to the danger of constant exposure to excitement. It is hardly to be wondered at, he said, that children who are kept in a state of excitement every evening are bored when they go to school the next morning. Excitement may arise from violence on the film or tv, from stress in family life or from sex stimulation by the media. "A lot of people in our society have been stimulated to the point where if something frustrates them they are likely to be either verbally or physically aggressive." he said. (*Times*, 17 May 1977)

Moral problems and science. In a well informed article (*The Times*, 28 Jn, 1977) Robert Reid outlines the "Moral Dilemmas of the Biological Revolution." New ethical problems facing mankind arise in the field of prenatal diagnosis. Since the 1960s it has been possible to remove samples of the amniotic fluid surrounding a foetus, to culture the foetal cells present in the fluid and to examine their chromosomes. Abnormalities such as mongolism, spina bifida and other genetic conditions can be diagnosed six months or more before birth. The sex of the child can also be determined, which is of importance in the case of sex linked diseases such as haemophilia which occur only in the male. Information of this kind given to parents, information not available a decade ago, confronts them with the moral choice of deciding whether to seek abortion. These choices now face the parents instead of the medical specialist. The right use of contraceptive methods faces mankind with yet another ethical problem, though this has been with us longer.

New York Blackout. The recent failure of the electric supply in New York, which followed the striking of the power lines by lightning, caused general disruption of the city. In the widespread looting 3400 people were arrested, 426 policemen were injured, and enormous damage was done to property. Shops were attacked, windows smashed and quite often the police could do no more than drive up and down streets clearing looters away. Asked why they stole, a typical reply was, "Why not? It was unreal. Everyone seemed to know exactly what to do." Looters seemed not to understand why the police were interfering. "I'm on welfare. I am taking what I need. What are you bothering me for?" A *Times* Leader (16 July 1977) drew attention to, (1) the terrifying vulnerability of a modern city which can be brought to a standstill either by natural events or by the exercise of industrial power by those who operate a few

key sectors: (2) the alarming reactions of human beings when once restraints are removed. (This is not only a Western phenomenon: widespread looting was reported from China after a recent earthquake.)

Discussion

Mr. D. C. Mandeville comments:

Noise and Helpfulness (p.10) — Observation daily, in noisy London, of others and also of oneself tends to confirm these conclusions. But (a) only if the noise is other peoples' noise; I doubt if a foreman in a metal box factory, or a fitter in the pits at Brans Hatch motor races, or a teenager at his favourite Disco for that matter, are any less aware of what is going on around them, and responsive to people's needs, than are their opposite numbers in quieter situations. Secondly, (b) it is not only helpfulness, but e.g. willingness to accept help, that is impaired by intrusive noise. One 'puts the shutters down' against the oppressive sensation and unwittingly also excludes other more deserving stimuli.

Paranoia in India (p.11) — I'm *unhappy* about the title. It implies a diagnosis (or else a value judgment) that I cannot support. My sympathies are with the Indians: I share some at least of their attitude of suspicion, towards such research; which can proceed from an unidentifiable blend of good and bad motives.

Smells (p.14) — Sounds, too, occasionally can evoke long-forgotten memories most effectively. I'm less sure of sights: but here there is the eerie Déjà-vu phenomenon, which occurs to some people.

Dr. Ralf Lovelock writes:

May I please express great appreciation for the three papers in Vol. 103 No. 2; as one who has struggled with the problem discussed for many years, I have found them of great help and provocative of much constructive thought. In particular may I please make a few comments on the paper by Dr. Sturch (p.100).

While the paper analyses the acute difficulties encountered in communicating 'heavenly truths' in earthly language, and directly alerts the communicator to the serious difficulties arising, it does not go very far in suggesting positive and constructive directions in which these difficulties can be met. Since the paper is concerned with communicating the Christian faith, it may be assumed that the truth of Christianity is accepted by the communicator, and hence there is no logical difficulty in taking some guidance in this direction from the Bible itself.

In the prologue to John's Gospel, God is presented as one who has struggled through human history with the problem of doing just this; the opening words of Hebrews sum up the method adopted by one much wiser than us — the witness through prophets recorded in the Old Testament, followed in "these last days" by a direct communication in the person of the Son. Human language has terms expressive only of direct experience plus those extensions developed through contact with God through successive generations of human life. Paul says (in Galatians) that when the comparatively crude anthropomorphic language of prophecy has served its purpose in developing spiritual awareness to a suitable level, God Himself intervened through, what John calls, The Word made flesh.

Whatever we may make of the Genesis record of creation so far as detailed history is concerned, it has one great lesson to teach, namely, that God created man 'in His image' and had a far reaching purpose for him. In the early ages this lesson had to be taught in anthropomorphic terms, in order to lead mankind towards the superior 'higher education' spoken of by Paul. When however the time was right, the lesson was extended at great cost to God by exhibiting that image, not in the physical animal frame common to all life, but in the higher values of life within which man's distinction from the animal creation lies, and wherein any imaging of God is centred.

In writing to the Corinthian Christians (2 Cor. ch. 5) Paul stresses that the Church, which appeals to men to be reconciled to God, must now take over God's role as witness to the world. In the first letter to that same church he insists that natural wisdom will never allow the absolutes of divinity to be analysed and expressed, for no man knows the spirit of man save the spirit of man that is within him: likewise only the Spirit of God can comprehend the things of God. That which only God can teach by making direct contact with man, man cannot in turn pass on to others by means of earthly wisdom alone. God, now indwelling His people and revealing Himself through their Christ-like character, must be present still, else words are of no avail. "I may speak in tongues of men or angels, but if I am without love" if I do not bring to others the character of God as shown in Christ "I am a sounding gong of a clanging cymbal."

R. E. D. CLARK

CREATION AND THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN

The argument from design has been much criticised in recent years. The plausibility of the objections raised rests in large measure on a failure to distinguish between the three levels of design, at only one of which can the caption "Darwin killed the design argument" be made to appear plausible.

The invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly, not problematically or vaguely, but *clearly* — seen, being understood by the things that are made, the things that we see around us in nature, even His eternal power and Godhead. So clear is the evidence that in one sense all men know God and are without excuse if they are unthankful and glorify Him not as God (Rom. 1: 20-21). God "left not himself without witness", the witness being that of nature itself (Acts 14:17; Rom 10:18).

So at least thought St. Paul and many non-Christians, even, have held this or a similar view — Socrates and, later, the ancient Stoics, for instance, and the Deists also in modern times. Also most scientists until the time of Darwin.

Natural theology, clearly taught in the Bible, has been attacked so often and with such show of learning that many, even among Christians, take it for granted that it has no validity. According to the usual views, David Hume undermined the presuppositions that underlie the argument from nature to nature's God, while Kant showed convincingly that natural theology cannot be convincing in logic. Today, in England, even the Gifford Lectures, endowed by Lord Gifford for the defence of natural theology, sometimes serve as a platform for attack — as, for example, those by Karl Barth¹ and A.J. Ayer.²

Yet there are some, at least, who after studying a sizeable proportion of the literature against natural theology remain convinced that its critics are wrong and St. Paul right. It is impossible in a few hundred words to cover this vast subject, which has ramifications in theology, philosophy and all branches of science. In this article all that can be attempted is to highlight a few misunderstandings which have helped to bring natural theology into disrepute.

Proof

Firstly, confusion arises because the words *proof* and *prove* are commonly used in two senses — the mathematical and the everyday. Given axioms we prove a theory; given incriminating evidence we prove a criminal guilty, but there is a world of difference between the two kinds of proof. The axioms of mathematics are not written in the sky: mathematics is a form of reasoning, a department of logic, a symbolic language. Reasoning and language, though invaluable in our efforts to describe the real world, cannot of themselves prove anything about that world. Bertrand Russell tells us that though in early years he set out "with a more or less religious belief in a Platonic eternal world, in which mathematics shone with a beauty like that of the last Cantos of the *Paradiso*" he was forced in the end to the conclusion that it is "only the art of saying the same thing in different words".³ We can reason and argue about conceivable realities but before we can reach firm conclusions about the real world, we must introduce facts from that real world into our equations. We cannot prove by pure reason whether there are atoms, whether evolution is true or false, or whether God exists. Kant was right: pure reason cannot establish fact and so it cannot prove God's existence but, and Kant was emphatic on the point, neither can it prove God's non-existence. To reach solid conclusions about the real world we must introduce facts and make use of practical reason which can, of course, be mistaken. To practical reason the argument for God based on design in nature seemed cogent to Kant. Nature shows clear indications of purpose: the arrangements found are not what experience teaches us would result of themselves. "It would therefore be not only extremely sad, but utterly vain to diminish the authority of that proof... we have nothing to say against the reasonableness and utility of this line of argument, but wish on the contrary to commend and to encourage it (yet) we cannot approve of the claims which this proof advances of apodictic (necessary) certainty".⁴

Conceit of Words

A second point is this. Philosophers are apt to judge reality by words. They sometimes argue, or so it seems, that that which cannot be properly conceived or described cannot be. This argument is applied often enough to God. Because it is impossible to imagine God, or to describe Him in words, or to define Him in any adequate way, the atheist often argues that belief in God is unwarranted.

What applied to God applies especially to creation. In a book highly regarded in its day F.W. Westaway wrote of the "pathetically solitary pre-creation figure...represented as a much magnified man rareified to mere mind, existing by Himself with no sort of relation to anything else" and closed with the comment "How childish it all seems!".⁵ In the same vein and more recently the atheist A.J. Ayer remarks, "One would find it difficult to say in what sense the author of nature existed antecedently to his creation".⁶

Such reasoning must be rejected on two main counts. Firstly it exhibits an almost incredible conceit. Mysteries meet us at every turn in our contacts with nature. We do not understand how, by volition, we make our muscles contract; we do not understand how the intricate chemical structures of the germ plasma are translated into bodily form; the concept of the electron still baffles the greatest minds. On every hand words fail. Difficulties may be glossed over but in time they surface again. The difficulty of conceiving of or describing a pre-creation God is not greater than the difficulty of conceiving of or describing many other features of our world. Our difficulty is unrelated, one way or the other, to truth about reality.

Can we seriously ask what God was doing before He created heaven and earth? Maybe He had other jobs on hand. Was a previous universe annihilated before the start of the one we know? Who shall say? Such talk is like discussion about mountain ranges at the back of the moon in pre-sputnik days. It is less childish to refuse to argue from ignorance than to reach a conclusion based only on our inability to imagine or to find words.

The difficulty we experience when we try to conceive of God is hardly greater than the difficulty we experience when we try to conceive the universe we know. Our minds boggle when we think of the entire universe poised and exploding in limitless space, with no relation to anything at all outside itself. Why is the

universe just where it is in space and not elsewhere? Is it moving or rotating in space? Or is it stationary? How do we conceive of movement or of rotation when there is nothing else outside? It is evident to every thoughtful person that there are limitations to man's mental horizon: beyond those limits words fail. Yet no one in his senses argues that because it is so difficult to imagine the universe poised all alone in empty space, it would be better to deny that the universe exists. There is palpable evidence for its existence and that is that. There is also palpable evidence of design in that universe and how ever much we may play with words, there is no easy way of avoiding the conclusion that God, or Mind, or some thinking Power, lies at the back of things.

Moral Issue

This brings us to the central moral issue. The telling point which Jesus made against the Pharisees was that they applied a principle in one direction but failed to do so elsewhere in a similar context when it proved embarrassing to do so. (For example, they accepted that an animal should be rescued from a pit on the Sabbath day, but not that a man should be healed.) Similarly, if arguments used against natural theology are used at all, honesty demands that they should be used in parallel contexts even if the conclusions that might follow prove embarrassing.

Take just two examples. It is often said that natural theology assumes what is to be proved: you go to nature with a biased mind asking her to support what you already believe, or at least suspect, is true. You have decided beforehand the questions you will ask. Precisely. But this is also the problem with science. It is the problem which troubled Michael Faraday in all his working life, as Joseph Aggasi has shown.⁷ Faraday spoke of facts as supporting, even proving, his theories but knew in himself and often admitted that he was asking nature to support his preconceived theories: nor would he ever take *No* as nature's answer. His attitude to natural theology was the same as his attitude to science. The facts of science proved God yet you had to know beforehand what they would or *might* prove. All science is like this, for it is Baconian no longer! And not science only. The detective must have a theory on which to work or his observations will mean nothing to him. The doctor must know what symptoms he is looking for, or he will not be able to diagnose. The investigator of an air disaster must formulate possible causes, or he will learn nothing from the tangled mass of metal. The psychiatrist must formulate theories of his patient's illness or he will not know what

questions to ask or what memories are significant. In the biblical sense, then, it is hypocritical to argue that if the proofs of natural theology do not operate without reference to a possible conclusion they must be rejected, *unless* one is prepared to reason in the same way in other fields.

Our second example is this: the analogy between God's creation and man's breaks down, says Hume, on the ground that no one has seen God making a universe.

How then, we must ask, do men actually react when experience is missing? As a boy the writer remembers seeing a model ship in a bottle. He could not conceive how any man could have put it there, but though very puzzled indeed he did not imagine that man did *not* put it there, or that the ship had got there without design or intention. The history of engraved precious stones affords an example of a like kind, for the ancient art of engraving precious stones was lost in the middle ages with the result that no one at that time had seen such stones engraved nor could they imagine how it could be done. Nevertheless most people thought that the stones had been engraved by man and were not, as a few claimed, to be regarded as freaks of nature. In our own time Peter Worsley has told the story of the cargo cults of Melanesia.⁸ The natives disbelieved the whites who told them that aeroplanes are built in factories, for no one in that part of the world had ever seen a factory, nor did it seem conceivable that hypothetical factories could make aeroplanes. But no one supposed that aeroplanes made themselves, or that they had existed since the beginning of time; rather they were built by intelligent ancestors who now, after WW2, were bringing cargoes of presents, including food, as an earnest of the shortly dawning millenium.

The fact is that when faced with apparent design man normally assumes a designer, even though he may have had no experience of such a mind in the process of designing.

Darwin and the Design Argument

If we are to believe most modern writers, "Darwin killed the design argument" thus proving that Paley's arguments were invalid. It is disconcerting and astonishing to find this statement made again and again, often with the wrong reference to Paley, by those who have never read him. There is design in nature, sure enough, but natural selection did the trick we are told; so there is no need for a designer. In this way all serious discussion is short-circuited. Even the preliminaries of a serious discussion on the subject are overlooked by philosophers and theologians, though less often by scientists.

Intelligent discussion of design is near impossible unless we distinguish between different levels of design. Imagine a manufactured article — almost any fairly complex article will do. Its designer must first choose the materials he will use. He cannot make a typewriter out of wood, a book out of steel, a lathe out of ice, a twist drill out of copper, or a transformer using mild steel. The materials-scientist will have to be consulted to help choose or design materials suitable for the job in hand. Many properties will have to be considered and some of these, such as tensile strength or ability to withstand compression, may need to be different in different directions.

As technology advances, as complexity of products increases, design at this first level increases in importance. Today, alloys, composite plastics, even molecules, need to be designed. At this, the first level, design is vital.

Next, given properly designed materials small designed parts will need to be made available. A manufacturer will seek to obtain these, if he can, from firms specialising in making them: this will minimise his own work. Such parts may be screws, bolts, nuts, coloured wires, bearings, resistors, capacitors, neon lamps, integrated transistor circuits to be used in large numbers in computers or tv sets, and so on. All will have been designed with great care and a natural selection process will have operated to throw out the less reliable components, so that those available will usually be of high quality and durability. This we may call the second level of design.

Finally, at the third level, drawings will show how the parts are to be assembled to make the finished product. This is the design that will be shown in the application for a patent and because the lower levels of design are usually taken for granted in that they form part of current know-how, they are apt to be overlooked. Yet all three levels are vital if the final assembly is to function properly.

Design Levels in Nature

Do we find these levels represented in nature? Indeed we do. Many years ago Lawrence Henderson⁹ directed attention once more to what had been well-known in pre-Darwinian days: the fact that the environment is ordered with respect to the needs of life.

Many astonishing features in the chemistry of carbon, oxygen, hydrogen, carbon dioxide, water and so on were known in the nineteenth century. The properties of the elements and of their simple compounds dove-tailed together, as it were, in a wonderful

way to make life possible. Much has been discovered since then: the dove-tailing could hardly be more impressive. More difficult to discuss but obviously of equal importance are the physical laws which operate throughout the whole of nature. Even slight changes in the universal constants might have profound consequences. Analogy with nitrogen and with many simple compounds would lead the chemist to expect that the oxygen molecule, O_2 , for example, would be built up from two atoms sharing four of their electrons but, in fact, two electrons remain unshared. "We must confess that this is surprising" writes J.C. Speakman¹⁰ "some subtle effect, makes the latter (structure) slightly more stable. Whatever the underlying causes, the consequences are, literally, of vital importance." The high reactivity of oxygen depends upon its unusual structure.

The materials-science of nature harmonizes so perfectly with the needs of life that it can hardly be ascribed to chance. No one who has struggled to make a complex machine or process work successfully can easily take that view. Nor does natural selection work at this level: the constants of nature do not fluctuate about a mean and allow life to select the most favourable variations. The solvent properties of water have not improved with time; carbon dioxide has not gradually acquired the ability to distribute itself roughly equally between gas and aqueous phase; the "hydrogen bond", so vital to life, by reason of its power to hold molecules together as in the DNA spiral, did not arise as a favourable mutant among hydrogen atoms. Nor is it easy to argue that, had the environment been other than it is, life would have adapted itself to what *did* exist. In the past it was often suggested that forms of life based on elements other than carbon, might exist in far away parts of the universe. But investigation has shown that boron, silicon and germanium, the elements most like carbon, cannot conceivably build stable structures which might form the basis of life.¹¹

At this first level of design physical nature reveals itself not as a medley of independent parts, but as a wonderfully coordinated whole. Dr. Christopher Longuet-Higgins, a physical scientist in the secularist camp, expresses it thus, "For whatever reason the universe in which we live seems to have a great deal more internal logic than a mere assembly of spare parts — if such an understatement were not an insult to such a beautiful creation. In using the word 'beautiful' I think I speak for the vast majority of people who have worked at the frontiers of science. No one who looks closely at nature can fail to be moved by her austere beauty."¹² A striking feature of this beauty, this structure, in nature, is that it is quite unrelated to the

problem of evil. We are filled with wonder, but here we see no sign of the nature red in tooth and claw which is supposed to make the design argument unconvincing.

At the second level are the small mechanisms, structures and gadgets of the molecular world — DNA, ADP, enzymes, photosynthetic cells, muscle and nerve fibres, roots, ingeniously constructed bone cells and so on — repeated in millions in the living organism. Determined efforts made by Oparin in Russia and others to invoke natural selection at the pre-living stage to account for some of them do not carry conviction. Vast effort is being expended at the present time to discover possible ways in which the simplest forms of life could have arisen without design. Usually it is possible, in discussing one feature of life, to make a plausible hypothesis along these lines but the necessary hypotheses do not hang together well. Thus, to account for one feature we need a high concentration of ferrous iron in the pristine sea, to account for another we need a high concentration of hydrogen sulphide in the atmosphere. But the two are incompatible.¹³ And so on.

This is the level of the nuts and bolts of life. They can be built into complex and advanced forms of life of all kinds. Just as the mass-produced parts of which the manufacturer makes use can be utilised not only in washing machines, cars, tv sets, houses and churches, but also in bombs, guns and equipment used by gangsters, so again though design is manifest, the problem of evil does not arise. No one blames the inventor of glass because his product can be used in a gun sight.

At the third level we may invoke Darwin's principle of natural selection. It can no doubt accomplish a great deal, yet even here the difficulties are great. Some evolutionists such as G.A. Kerkut¹⁴ are convinced that it is not possible to bridge the main gaps between living creatures by natural selection. Nevertheless, if Darwin killed the design argument, he did it here but nowhere else.

It is possible, then, that at this third level natural selection has at times produced an appearance of design. And such appearance is not always suggestive of goodness at the back of nature, a fact convincingly set forth by Sir Charles Sherrington many years ago.¹⁵ If apparently evil design can be explained away by natural selection, so much the better from the Christian point of view! If not, the principle of design need not be imperilled. It is possible for the Christian to hold that into the creation, pronounced by God to be "very good"

(Gen. 1:21) 'tares', evil biological inventions, were sown by servants of Satan the god of this world. Perhaps it is literally true that the fangs of serpents, the stings of scorpions, and disease germs too, form part of "the power of the enemy" (Lk. 10:19). If so, they well have been designed for evil ends.

* * *

"Darwin killed the design argument". It is strange that the statement is ever taken seriously. No one who reads Victorian pre-Darwinian books can fail to note that an older generation did not put all its eggs into one basket. Much of the evidence they cited had nothing to do with animal structure. But this is another story.

So we are back with St. Paul again. Nature is supremely wonderful and speaks to us all of a thoughtful Being of fantastic knowledge and power behind the world of appearances. He is the Creator.

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"Time, Gentlemen, Please!"

In the middle of the nineteenth century, Edmund and Jules Goncourt settled in Paris. Together they went to most of the society functions of the day and, until 1870 when Jules died, they wrote a daily Journal which is still a delight to read. Though much was withheld, nine volumes of the Journal were published in Paris between the years 1888 and 1896. An English translation of a part of this work was published by Cassels in 1937. (Ed. L. Galantière. *The Goncourt Journals*, 1851-1870).

On April 7th, 1869, the two brothers tell us that they went to the Magny dinner. The conversation centred round the future of science. But their language is so inimitable that we cannot refrain from quoting:

"They were saying that Berthelot had predicted that 100 years from now, thanks to chemical and physical science, men would know of what the atom is constituted and would be able, at will, to moderate, extinguish and light up the sun as if it were a gas lamp. Claude Bernard, for his part, had apparently declared that in a hundred years of physiological science man would be so completely the master of organic law that he would create life in competition with God.

"To all this we raised no objection, but we have the feeling that when this time comes in science, God with His white beard will come down to earth, swinging a bunch of keys, and will say to humanity, the way they say at five o'clock at the Salon, 'Closing time, gentleman.'" (From *Science and Religion*, 1948, 1, 96)

J. A. WALTER

BRITAIN IN DECLINE: CHRISTIAN INTERPRETATIONS
OF SOCIAL CHANGE

In this timely paper Dr. Walter asks how we should attempt to evaluate the changes which are taking place in society. He reviews five approaches to the subject commonly encountered in christian circles and warns us against the danger of worshipping a mythical past rather than attempting the painful task of seeing what God has to say in our ever-changing present.

There is much talk both in the mass media and in christian circles about Britain being 'in decline'. Can we disentangle distinctively christian views of our changing society from the neatly packaged versions of the media? In this article I assume that our world and our nation in particular is undergoing some form of social, or sociological, change — and by this I mean that in various ways our society is undergoing change, not for the first or the last time. My main aim is to look at how as Christians we can evaluate this change.

We cannot even begin to describe social change without implicitly interpreting and evaluating it, so that the question of evaluation comes in at a very early stage. Evaluating change is fraught with difficulties. For example, how may we know what constitutes progress or deterioration? God made specific and general promises to Israel as a nation — promises such as the peaceful occupancy of a fruitful land untroubled by enemies. Thus, it was clear when Israel was forced into exile or when her enemies were prevailing against her that something was wrong, that things had deteriorated. By contrast, God has made no such specific promises to other nations, and so it is problematic knowing what constitutes a sign that things are in decline. In the absence of promises from God about the fortunes of society

we are likely to accept the interpretive frameworks of secular thinking uncritically. For example — and a very important example — since the industrial revolution and the days of Adam Smith and Karl Marx it has become a part of the conventional wisdom of industrial societies that economics lies at the base of everything. Hence if the economy is in bad straits, then everything else in society will suffer. If the economy is in a bad way, we suppose that the whole of society — all institutions and all groups within society — are also in a bad way. A recent example of christian thinking of this sort was the Archbishop's (1976) appeal to the nation — an economic crisis suggested to him that the nation is rotten in every area of life and needs regeneration in every area. Yet the assumption that the economy is the trigger for every aspect of society, is the root of all our evils, is a form of economic determinism. And it is a somewhat strange bedfellow of the more overt moral determinism — the idea that individual morality is the key to a healthy society — into which many evangelicals try to translate it.

Even if we do decide that economics are important, it is still highly debateable what constitutes a healthy economy — what is a healthy situation to the industrialist may be a sick situation to the trade unionist. Is an economy to be evaluated primarily by its level of consumption, its mode of production, or its distribution of goods? The following statement by Pope John XXIII at least recognises that we have to think before we automatically agree with the media about the state of the economy:

The economic prosperity of any people is to be assessed not so much from the sum total of goods and wealth possessed as from the distribution of goods according to the norms of justice.

The way in which we interpret social change is influenced by our initial feelings as to whether this change is a good or a bad thing. When we perceive things to be going smoothly for us, we tend not to seek explanations, indeed we may not even be aware that society is changing. It is only when our interests are thwarted, when our taken-for-granted world becomes problematic, that we begin to seek an explanation; only when our traditional lifestyle begins to creak do we need to think about how society works.

Thus the majority of theories of social change presuppose contemporary change to be some kind of 'decline' which needs to be stemmed. (Even apparently optimistic revolutionary theories begin by presupposing that society at present is not as it ought to be.) This at any rate seems to be the case with supposedly

christian explanations of social change. It is thus worth asking of such explanations how it is that their proponents initially come to believe that society is in decline or (in a few cases) progressing?

Having sketched out a few aspects of and difficulties in the process of interpreting social change, I will now briefly review five approaches to contemporary change (not necessarily British approaches) that Christians have claimed to be Biblical. This short survey is not meant to be comprehensive: firstly it only includes those approaches which I have recently come across, which is a rather arbitrary means of selection; secondly I identify each approach by means of specific examples and the examples chosen may not be wholly representative; and thirdly my review is not systematically critical but rather tends to note, merely, some of the more common uses, abuses and shortcomings of each approach.

(a) *Eschatology: Change as a Sign of the Times*

In this view the world is in a perilous state, and this is indicative of the imminent return of Christ. An example is given in the following from an article on violence in schools (*Spectrum*, Vol. 7:3, May 1975, p.26):

There is however...a measure of comfort perhaps in the realisation that the Bible tells of such a breakdown in the 'end times'. Paul was writing to the Thessalonians, who believed that a personal return of Jesus Christ to this world was imminent. But, Paul says, before that happens, the restraining power of God over evil will have to be removed from the world. The increase of evil will *appear to be without explanation to humanity* (my emphasis), but it will herald the personal return for which they looked. If we are in fact living in such a time, it is good to know not only that God foreknew and forewarned, but that it is the 'darkest hour before the dawn'.

This is a different kind of approach from the others to be considered in that it is not what we commonsensically today call an 'explanation', for it does not seek to make sense of an event A in terms of a prior event B and does not talk in terms of cause and effect. Rather, as the quote above says, in the last times men will be *unable* to explain the evil that is rampant.

This Biblical truth is clearly open to abuse if it is twisted round into the claim that as soon as strange and/or bad things start happening that we cannot explain, then this shows that the last days are coming. This reasoning is wrong because it assumes that just because I cannot humanly explain what is going on in society this means that no-one ever will or that other people differently situated in society cannot explain it either. Sociologists have amply documented how knowledge to some extent depends on our position within society, and historians how it depends on our intellectual heritage and traditions. Thus what may appear totally inexplicable to, say, middle class English Christians may be easily understood by a starving Indian peasant, and vice versa. Therefore the eschatologically-minded Christian should beware before absolutising his inability to explain contemporary events and going on to claim this as a sign of the times.

I do not wish to dismiss the eschatological approach, but merely to point out that it can be and has been abused. Its transcendence of cause and effect and its placing of contemporary events within the broad sweep of God's plan for us show up the fragmented and narrow way in which our rationalistic age now tries to understand historical events. How to relate an eschatological view to specific current events, however, indeed whether it *can* be related to such events at all, is problematic.

(b) Judgment: Change as a Judgment on Society

This is in some ways similar to the eschatological approach, but tends to relate current social malaise to specific past societal sins and possibly tends to look backward to these sins rather than a forward direction as does the eschatological view. This means that the judgment view is more amenable to adopting aspects of cause-and-effect reasoning, i.e. that event A (current malaise) is in some sense due to prior event B (social sin).

The approach is further different from the eschatological in that its proponents rely more on the Old Testament than on the New. In so far as reliance is on the OT, especially on the prophets, my characterisation of the approach as backward-looking is an oversimplification, for the passages in the OT in which Israel's misfortunes are proclaimed as a judgment on her sins almost always look forward to the possibility of repentance, forgiveness, and restoration. Thus the biblical concept of judgment avoids the heresies both of fatalism and of utopianism. Fatalism supposes the world to be in such a state that nothing can be done about it, and characterises the oft criticised gnosticism

of many evangelicals who have seen involvement in society as a waste of time. Utopianism is the secular belief that all social problems could be solved if only we had enough knowledge. Judgment, by contrast, claims that human suffering is brought about by ourselves and will always be a feature of our life and society here on earth, but that the effects of our sin can be considerably mitigated if we become aware of our responsibility and repent. Judgment talks not merely of decline but also of emergence into a new existence (Van Riessen pp.31-6).

Once again the judgment approach to understanding social change is open to abuse, since the singling out of one group within society whose sins are responsible for the misfortunes of the whole society has obvious attractions for the powerful and the comfortable. By scapegoating the sinning group the rest of us may rest complacently, and this can lead to the most appalling atrocities against the stigmatised group. What is impressive about many of the OT judgment passages is that either no one group is let off the hook, or else it is the ruling group at whom the finger is pointed (this was certainly the case with Jesus). In the Bible it is not possible for the powerful and comfortable to rest in complacency. When the concept of judgment is used today by preachers who name specific sins and specific sinful groups, however, this Biblical feature is too often absent. Instead we find the named groups tend to be the working class, the weak, and the deviant, while their sins are those of which the comfortable middle class congregation may rest assured it is not guilty — drink, gambling, promiscuity, and short-run hedonism generally. In this situation the preaching of judgment leads not to repentance but to complacency; if judgment must be preached at all it must be to the guilty, not to the supposedly innocent.

*(c) Sphere Sovereignty: Change as an ongoing
Process of Differentiation*

The theory of sphere sovereignty developed by the Dutch philosopher Herman Dooyeweerd claims that there are different spheres of reality which should be allowed freedom to develop according to their own nature. Thus, for example, the family and the state have different functions and proceed according to different internal dynamics, and so it was an advance in history when the state emerged as something distinct from the family, that is, when it differentiated itself from the family group. The saga of human history has on the whole been one of increasing differentiation, and this is deemed a good thing; thus contemporary attempts to recombine spheres, e.g. state take-overs of education or industry, are seen as something to be

fought against. This framework is outlined by Van Riessen (p.75), who cites the example of family and church:

Sphere sovereignty is a principle, a guidepost at the beginning of the history of humanity. It has to be brought into practice, unfolded, in the course of history. If the exegesis is correct, the text in Genesis 'In the days of Enoch men began to call upon the name of the Lord' means that an independent community of worship, the first church, freed itself from an undifferentiated family life. In the course of history different associations of society split off and become independent according to their respective natures.

Herein lies the problem though, for it is not at all clear that this particular exegesis is correct, nor is it clear quite how the theory derives from the Bible. As with secular theories of social evolution (e.g. Parsons) with which it bears some common features, the theory of sphere sovereignty does not make clear why societal differentiation is (a) so important for understanding present day social change, or (b) why it is such a good thing. Nor does it make clear how to fit the minutia of our complex world into such a wide-ranging theory.

The attractions of both secular and christian adaptations of the concept of societal differentiation are that our present world can thereby be very broadly located within a cosmic scheme, and that norms can be provided for future action (Nisbet). The schema tells us where we are going and where we have been, and this can be very reassuring. Whether it is also true is another matter.

(d) *The Secular City: change as an ongoing process of secularisation*

A rather different attempt to harness the concept of differentiation to a christian view of social change is to be found in Harvey Cox's book *The Secular City*. For primitive man, the social and natural worlds were sacred; the radical teaching of the Judaio-Christian faith was that God is not to be identified with this world but is transcendent and so man is free to act in a demythicised world. Cox claims that this process of secularisation — the fleeing of the gods from the forest and the consequent opening up of the world to man — is thoroughly Biblical, and the emergence of pragmatism and the demise of metaphysics in contemporary urban life is thus to be welcomed. This approach is also to be found in John Wild's *Human Freedom and Social Order*,

which welcomes man's freeing of himself from cosmological thinking and from the Platonic idea that reality is to be found other than in the everyday world.

This notion of man-come-of-age has a lot in common with other theories of societal differentiation and social evolution for it sees society as having emerged from a monolithic collectivity in which religion was originally undifferentiated from social institutions. It also has much in common with the still popular idea of the early 19th century sociologist Auguste Comte that societies evolve from a religious phase through a metaphysical phase into the mature age of positive science.

Cox of course has been much criticised, and this is not the place to go into the debate in detail; it is worth outlining a few of the objections though (see Ramsey, and Hamilton) for some of these are relevant to other approaches outlined in this article. For convenience I will separate sociological and theological criticisms:

Theological criticisms. (1) Cox uses the Bible in a highly selective way (indeed he also uses sociology in the same way). Having decided that contemporary life in the secular city is a good thing, he turns to the Bible to find support. (2) If the secular is so good, it is not clear why Cox should turn to the Bible for his authority; surely there are better secular sources around? (3) He draws a very tenuous line between secularity (a consequence of the Biblical opening up of the world) which is a good thing, and secularism (a denial of the existence of a transcendental realm) which is a bad thing. Indeed, at times Cox appears to chuck God as well as metaphysical idols out of the window. And even if he does not do this, it would seem that the secular city which he so admires does.

Sociological criticisms. (1) Cox assumes that because secularisation exists it must be functional for society, and that because it is functional it must be good. Both assumptions are dubious. (2) Cox repeats a classic error of social evolutionism in seeing his own society as the peak of human civilisation. Thus he identifies the key characteristic of his society and then reinterprets the whole of human history in terms of this characteristic. (3) Cox supposes that biblical theism is the sole cause of modern science and industry. This is a common misunderstanding of Max Weber's thesis concerning the relation between the protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism; Weber saw Biblical theism as but one cause (though an important one) among many in the genesis of the modern era. Cox by contrast

commits himself to a kind of theological determinism, a monocausal explanation, which few would see as fitting the historical facts.

I have given some space to Cox because, for all his shortcomings, he is one of the few theologians who has seriously attempted to incorporate (what he sees as) sociology into a theology of social change — and a christian view of social change cannot afford to ignore sociology these days.* The challenge of Cox for us is — can we do any better?

(e) Moral Determinism: Social Change as the Result of Declining Personal Morals

According to a fifth view, perhaps epitomised in some of the statements from the Festival of Light, society is in a mess because of a loss of religious faith by its members, because of a lack of 'spiritual nerve', and because of a decline in 'moral standards'. This is a kind of reversal of economic determinism in that, instead of everything depending on economic activity, it all depends on personal faith and morals. As I have suggested earlier in the discussion of judgment, the model of moral determinism grossly distorts the Biblical treatment of social problems. In the Bible, social malaise develops not only as the result of idol worship or personal immorality, but as the result of these *together with* economic oppression and the misuse of political power. Moreover, as suggested in the discussion of secularisation, the idea of a single cause for the events of the modern world has been well and truly discredited in the aftermath of Max Weber's work. The power of this kind of argument for Christians though is considerable. A few years ago, when industrialisation and science seemed an unmitigated blessing, Christians were only too glad to take the credit by mis-quoting Weber and Tawney to the effect that these benefits were all due to our godly forebears. Now that the blessing has become somewhat tarnished, the corollary is that if only the nation would rediscover God and the old virtues then everything would be right as rain again.

From the perspective of Christians in the third world, however, this is by no means the only way of interpreting Britain's current economic situation. One does not have to dig around in the moral sphere in order to come up with an explanation of why our supposedly oh-so-precious economy is supposedly collapsing. Rather the problem is that the British

* Reinhold Niebuhr and Jacques Ellul are two others and a fuller treatment of our subject would have to look at their work in detail

have an idea that it is virtually God-ordained that they should for ever be top of the international economic and political league. Our leaders were all brought up in the age of Empire and their way of looking at things has been thoroughly moulded by the ideology that Britain rules the world, and indeed this view is present to some extent in the younger generation too. The facts that we have now lost our Empire and our sources of cheap raw materials mean that we have lost our former economic privileges and will now become like any other ordinary nation — somewhere in the middle of the league table. This need not be a problem or a crisis — it is only so if we continue to hanker after a past glory which had merely happened to be our good fortune for a century or so. This brings us back to the beginning of the article in raising the question of how we know that change means decline or progress; it may be neither, merely an economic fact of life. This fact only becomes a crisis if economics is paramount. The church's role should not be to join forces with the mass media in interpreting the economic situation as one of crisis and decline, but to be alongside people in this difficult and perplexing experience, to help them interpret it (Ellul p.69), and to help them see what new things God has in store for them. To the third world Christian who never believed in the western version of family life, it seems absurd for British Christians to claim that economic change and the possible end of civilisation is being caused by 'moral decay' and 'the decline in family life'.

There is always the temptation to hark back to the security of a past age, to invent a mythical version of the 'good old days', and to abandon the distinctively Judaic-Christian view of history that God is constantly at work. Pannenberg (p.315-6) outlines this difference by contrasting ancient Israel with her neighbours, neighbours who

could not find any meaning in that which incessantly changes as such. Human life seemed to be meaningful only insofar as it participated in a pre-temporal divine event which was reported by myth...Man saves himself from the threat of the constant change of history in the security of the changeless mythical primal reality...By way of contrast, Israel is distinguished by the fact that it experienced the reality of its God not in the shadows of a mythical primitive history, but more decisively in historical change itself.

In so far as we hanker after an idealised version of a godly and virtuous Empire, we too are worshipping a mythical past rather than attempting the painful task of seeing what God has to say in

our ever-changing present. Somehow or other, this is our task, renewed though we may be by the plethora of secular and christian models of change on the market.

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ALAN P. F. SELL

IMMANENTISM AND THE THEOLOGICAL ENTERPRISE

In this article it is taken for granted that the eighteenth century attacks upon the supernatural, the questioning of traditional apologetic methods, and the dissatisfaction of many with deism's remote deity prepared the soil in which immanentist thought could flourish. Dr. Sell shows, by reference to selected thinkers, that whilst there were several varieties of immanentism current in the nineteenth century, there was none which could entirely meet the theologian's requirements. Not indeed that that fact prevented some theologians from nailing their colours to immanentism's mast.

I

We begin with Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). It is a testimony at once to his genius and suggestiveness, but also to his inconsistency, that Kant has become not all things to all men, but very different things to very different men. His philosophical pilgrimage is well known. An enthusiastic disciple of Leibniz *via* Wolff, he never forsook the doctrine of innate ideas; the *a priori* ever weighed heavily with him. But Humean empiricism awoke him, as he said, from his dogmatic slumbers,¹ negatively convincing him that there was no justification for continuing to talk in Leibnizian terms about pre-established harmony and the like. Positively, Hume impelled Kant to seek a more excellent way than that of scepticism: Hume's empiricism could show us how things are, but could never pronounce upon how they must be: "it has hitherto been assumed that our cognition must conform to the objects; but all attempts to ascertain anything about these objects *a priori*, by means of conceptions, and thus to extend the range of our

knowledge, have been rendered abortive by this assumption. Let us then make the experiment whether we may not be more successful in metaphysics, if we assume that the objects must conform to our cognition".² Here is the essence of what Kant called his Copernican revolution in philosophy. Far from being *tabula rasa*, as Locke had maintained, the mind is active in creating knowledge out of what is empirically presented to it.³ This it does by the application of such *a priori* notions as space and time. Apart from this logically prior, unificatory, work of the reason, no meaningful experience would be possible. Equally, were there no sensory experience such categories as unity, plurality and causality, applying as they do to phenomena only, would be redundant. Professor Casserley has rightly said that for Kant, "The rationalist conception of innate ideas is, more carefully and guardedly stated, a valid one, but rationalist metaphysics are a delusion. The empiricist's distrust of rationalist metaphysics is justified, but natural science provides no clue to the mystery of the objective being of nature".⁴ The point may be illustrated by reference to the crucial category of causality.

Hume denied that the law of universal causation could be known *a priori* to be true, and Kant agreed that the rationalists had been mistaken in maintaining that such supposed necessary truths are directly intuited. The statement "every event has a cause" is not analytic, he argued. He did not agree with Hume, however, that the category of causation, being supplied by the mind, is inapplicable to phenomena. He therefore sought a way of showing that "every event has a cause" must be both synthetic and *a priori*. Were it not *a priori*, and thus in some sense necessary, we could have no assured knowledge of the world; were it not synthetic, that is, open to empirical verification, we should be imprisoned within ideas once more. Our knowledge is thus of phenomena only as perceived by our mind. We do not know the things in themselves, for these belong to the noumenal realm. Likewise, although reason prompts us to postulate such ideas as those of God, freedom and immortality we can have, strictly, no knowledge of these, for they are not phenomena. Are we then shut up to a scepticism as extreme as Hume's? Kant does not intend this result, for he considers that having clearly defined and limited the sphere of reason, he has left room for faith. Moreover, such faith is immune both to rationalistic demonstration and destruction. In all of this we have the seeds of an important bifurcation in post-Kantian thought; for on the one hand some came to rest in a Kant-inspired agnosticism, whilst on the other hand, some, grateful for the way in which Kant has made room for faith, launched out upon a sea of transcendentalism, or set off on the quest of experientially-confirmed faith claims.

If the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781, second edition 1787) leaves us with an idea of God which, though not intuited is not rationally justifiable, the *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788) employs the concepts of God, freedom and immortality as postulates — that is, as conditions, and not simply as presuppositions, of thought. Man's will, the practical reason, is subject to a self-imposed moral demand, the categorical imperative; man knows that he cannot refuse to acknowledge this demand; it is directly given in his experience, and is autonomous. As Professor Pringle-Pattison put it, "Man as noumenon, or purely rational being, gives the law; man as phenomenon receives it".⁵ Hence, morality does not depend upon religion: if it did morality would be heteronomous — a possibility which Kant shunned as undermining his belief that that is moral which is done for its own sake. However, by way of guaranteeing an eternal order in which the due apportionment of virtue and reward, evil and punishment will be completely achieved, we may, not irrationally, postulate God, freedom and immortality. This last train of thought is more fully elaborated in the *Critique of Judgment* (1790). But man remains his own lawgiver; his autonomy is firmly entrenched. Robert Mackintosh, as so often, encapsulates most of the difficulties in Kant in a few sentences:

On one side, the world we know by valid processes of thinking cannot, we are told, be the real world. Or, beginning from the other side; neither the reality which ideal thought reaches after, nor yet the reality which our conscience postulates, is the valid world of orderly thinking. The great critic of scepticism has diverged from idealism toward scepticism again, or has given his idealism a sceptical colour, mitigated — but only mitigated — by faith in the moral consciousness.⁶

Needless to say, this faith is remarkably different from biblical faith in a knowable (truly though not, of course, exhaustively) personal God who has revealed Himself supremely in Christ. Yet not a few later liberal theologians, rejoicing that Kant, by separating reason from faith, had once and for all demolished the old grounds of natural theology, came to believe that "doctrines whose validity thought failed to substantiate might be justified by religious faith".⁷ The words of Professor Van Til are scarcely too harsh: "the primacy of the practical reason as over against the theoretical reason... leads to the postulation of the wholly unknown God and of his manifestation through Christ in the world. And this Christ is also both wholly known and wholly unknown. As such it is that He is supposed to help man who has in the first place constructed Him".⁸ Lest the last sentence here seem too severe, let us attend to Kant's own

words: "Though it does indeed sound dangerous, it is in no way reprehensible to say that every man *creates a God* for himself... For in whatever manner a being has been made known to him... he must first of all compare this representation with his ideal in order to judge whether he is entitled to regard it and to honour it as a divinity".^{9a} Theologically, this overlooks the work of God the Holy Spirit. Philosophically, it places autonomous man above God. Psychologically — did not P.T. Forsyth somewhere say that the religious man does not review God's claims and then admit him when he is satisfied? *Isaiah* vi is more to the point.

Kant appears to think exclusively in terms of a natural religion. The question as to whether or not there is a word from the Lord never seems to occur to him. Indeed he has great respect for the person of Christ, though he really finds in him no more than an exemplar; and for Kant's "Son of God" we may read "moral ideal". For all his criticism of the rationalists, he ends up in a practical deism. Nor is that all. He is religiously unsatisfying because of his tendency to "use" God. Religion's real purpose is as a support for morality, and here God is very useful — but he is a *deus ex machina* no less than the deist's God.^{5b} Read Kant as we may, we find ourselves unable to resist H.R. Mackintosh's conclusion that "God is introduced with deep reverence, yet not for His own sake, but rather as a necessary presupposition of the moral system. He enters to effect a reconciliation between duty and happiness, becoming, in Herder's felicitous phrase, 'a nail to hold together a morality that was falling to pieces'".^{10a}

In view of all this it comes as no surprise to find that the note of the gospel is decidedly muffled by Kant. An inherently unknowable God, who is the projection of autonomous man's reason is not the holy Creator before whom man stands as sinner. Hence the exemplar Christ will suffice; and in the result of the Christian life is not a joyous life of fellowship with the risen Christ and his people, but rather a lonely attempt to attend to one's duties understood as divine commands. We do not say that Kant has no understanding of evil. On the contrary, he speaks of "man's natural propensity" to it, and he opposes the Aufklärung's "easy-going Optimism which is repugnant to the very genius of religion".^{5c} It is on the remedy that he is so weak. Yet, as Emil Brunner pointed out, had Kant moved from the view of evil as the breach of an impersonal law, to an understanding of sin as the wilful spurning of a holy, loving God, he would have forsaken the rational standpoint of the philosopher for that of the believer.¹¹ To Kant religion remained the determination to "look upon God as the lawgiver universally to be honoured".^{9b} This is Kant's greatest utterance on the matter; but since the

religious man's experience is not so much "I ought therefore I can", as "I ought but I cannot — who will deliver me?", it is also his most tragic. We do not find in Kant an attenuated gospel. We find law ultimately triumphant over grace, and that is no gospel at all.¹²

Already we begin to see how difficult it is to being "from below" and arrive at the Christian God. We shall see the same point illustrated as we turn to the father of modern theology, Schleiermacher. Then, when we come to Hegel we shall find that for all his talk about the Absolute, his immanentism leaves him thoroughly earth-bound, so to speak. Professor Aiken brings us sharply face to face with the issue when he writes that "from the time of Kant on...it is the thinking subject himself who establishes the standards of objectivity".^{13a} Can there be any commerce between this view and that which seeks to think God's thoughts after him? Have we, in Kant, and in so much that succeeds him, the old dispute between Jerusalem and Athens settled in favour of Athens?

II

Schleiermacher (1768-1834) appears to us to be both attractive and perverse. He opposed that rationalistic theological aridity which did not take account of pious feeling — to him it was "a badly stitched patchwork of metaphysics and ethics". He opposed those detractors of religion whose attacks upon the "evidences" of religion left true religion intact. As for Kant's God who is "brought back through the back door of ethics", he is no God at all, and the cultured despisers of religion are right to reject him. Unlike some theologians who "outgrow" the generality of the faithful, Schleiermacher maintained pastoral contact with the Church — Kantian individualism was not for him. He sought to combine "both religious interest and scientific spirit in the highest degree and in the best possible balance for theory and practice alike".¹⁴ With this objective we are in entire accord, and it is worth underlining in passing that his oft-mentioned romanticism notwithstanding, Schleiermacher stoutly opposed sloppiness of thought wherever he found it. Above all, in face of Christian scholasticism, Catholic and Protestant alike, he set Christ as Redeemer at the heart of his theology, so that we can at least understand why A.M. Fairbairn should have commended him for having saved religion "from friends and enemies alike".¹⁵ Yet it is hard not to believe that Schleiermacher leaves us with a

reduced Christianity, and that some of theology's subsequent weaknesses originate from him.

In 1799 Schleiermacher published his *On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers*, and on the basis of his understanding of religion there set forth he brought out his *The Christian Faith* in 1821, and a second edition of it ten years later. Central to his understanding of religion, and of Christianity as the highest expression of it, is the pious feeling. Eschewing both innate ideas and sensation, he contends that apart from this feeling there is no real religion. He carefully describes the nature of this feeling. It has nothing to do either with unconscious states, or with those moments of self-reflection in which we contemplatively view ourselves as *quasi* objects. Though not entirely divorced from knowing and doing, feeling is to be distinguished from them; certainly it is not derived from them — it is immediate. The characteristically religious feeling is one of absolute dependence, and it is designated by the word "God". Thus, "in the first instance God signifies for us simply that which is the co-determinant in this feeling, and to which we trace our being in such a state; and any further content of the idea must be evolved out of this fundamental import assigned to it".¹⁶ When a person recognises that the feeling of absolute dependence is indeed the consciousness of God, we may properly speak of revelation, though not in the sense in which God is given, or intervenes, from without.

We should grievously misunderstand Schleiermacher were we to suppose that his "feeling" is individualistic. Far from it: his doctrine of the Church, and of the new humanity in Christ entails the collective nature of the experience. It is, moreover, at least in intention, an experience of the *historic* Christ, apart from whom, in Schleiermacher's view, there would be no Christianity at all. Schleiermacher's centre is ever this Jesus, the proper man, as He is known in the individual's self-consciousness; in union with Him man finds true life. (Schleiermacher never makes it entirely clear why the feeling of absolute dependence requires the historic Christ; perhaps the truth is that Schleiermacher's Lutheranism cannot proceed without Him).

Even from this summary description we see the justice of W.A. Brown's claim that "the original feature in Schleiermacher's definition of Christianity is the combination of the speculative and the historic";¹⁷ but, to reiterate, he does not deal in the old rationalist speculations. Just as he waged war on the older rationalism, so in turn he has been charged with psychologism. That is, it has been denied that the analysis of one's feelings is informative of anything (least of all, of God) other than one's emotional states. It would not be difficult to find passages in

Schleiermacher's works which would, in isolation, justify this charge. We consider, however, that on balance H.R. Mackintosh has correctly assessed the situation when he concludes that Schleiermacher's over-all intention was to regard feeling as "a mode of objective apprehension, a species of emotional perception or awareness of spiritual things", and to view God "as confronting the soul in His real and infinite causality".^{10b, 18}

This most favourable interpretation does not, as far as we can see, get Schleiermacher out of the wood. To us it seems that his difference with the Enlightenment rationalists and with the deist is still, like Kant's, a family difference only. Whether reason or the pious feeling is to the fore, man remains the key to the system. The starting-point is variously my own reason, my own moral law, or my own feeling of absolute dependence; and we question these starting points, not least because from them flow those modifications or reductions of Christianity which we detect at several points in the work of those who espouse them. Let us then indicate those points in Schleiermacher's position which bear with particular force upon the question of the nature and relations of God and man.

Schleiermacher's work is pervaded, as we have implied, by anti-supernaturalism. The God who intervenes from without; still more, the God who remains without in ultra-deistic fashion, is not God at all. In harmony with this conviction is Schleiermacher's understanding of miracle. He contends that the traditional apologetic had erred in utilising the supposedly evidential properties of miracles conceived as divine breaches of the natural law. In fact piety requires no such miracles. On the contrary, since God is immanent in all things, the distinction between natural and supernatural occurrences no longer holds; "Miracle is simply the religious name for event. Every event, even the most natural and usual, becomes a miracle, as soon as the religious view of it can be the dominant. To me all is miracle".^{19a} In the interests of both science and religion "we should abandon the idea of the absolutely supernatural because no single instance of it can be known by us, and we are nowhere required to recognise it".^{20a} We do not wish here to defend the old understanding of miracle, nor to discuss Schleiermacher's alternative in detail. We simply outline his position as illustrative of his blurring of the creator-creature distinction. For what he says concerning miracles is a function of his general position which called forth G.P. Fisher's adverse, yet just, comment, "In the conception of God at the outset [of Schleiermacher's system] His transcendence is sacrificed and absorbed in His immanence".²¹

Does this mean that Schleiermacher is a pantheist? Just as it is difficult to make the charge of subjectivism hold against him in an unqualified way, so with the charge of pantheism. We do not believe that Schleiermacher intended to advocate pantheism — for all his admiration for Spinoza, for example, he dissociated himself from the latter's idea that there could be no reciprocity of relations or emotions between the deity and the individual. On the other hand, his way of equating all causation, including human, with divine providence made it difficult if not impossible for him to allow adequate freedom either to God or to man. It is as if he seeks both to dispense with supernaturalism and yet, even whilst asserting immanence, to transcend the temporal. The mystical impetus in this latter direction is nowhere more clearly indicated than when he says that since "the reason is completely one with the divine Spirit, the divine Spirit can itself be conceived as the highest enhancement of the human reason, so that the difference between the two is made to disappear. But further...whatever opposes the movements of the divine Spirit is the same as what conflicts with human reason; for otherwise there could not exist in man (as there does), before the entry of those divine influences, a consciousness of the need of redemption, which these very influences set at rest".^{20b} This blurring of the creator-creature distinction has called forth Professor Bloesch's comment, "In mysticism the eternal God calls to the eternal within man. In the Christian faith the eternal becomes man".²² Moreover it results in that anabaptism whereby "revelation" comes to mean "human discovery" (Compare ^{10c}, ^{19b}) and Christian proclamation becomes not the proximate cause of, but rather the way of describing, the emotional disturbance of salvation.²³

With a doctrine of God which, despite his best intentions, verges upon pantheism; with God conceived as cause or power, it is not surprising that Schleiermacher does not understand sin as wilful rebellion against a holy, righteous, loving Father. In the wake of Spinoza, who regarded sin as a defect whereby the sensual affections overcome man's reason, Schleiermacher conceives of a war within man between higher and lower states of consciousness. Of this war Adam is the first exemplar, and Christ is redeemer in so far as in him God-consciousness reached its highest expression. Union with him, elevation by him — these are the redemptive steps, and second-century understandings of *recapitulatio* come to mind. Far from being a state of radical alienation from God, "sin in general exists only in so far as there is a consciousness of it"; far from describing broken inter-personal relationships, sin "manifests itself only in connexion with and by means of already existent good, and what it obstructs is future good."^{20c} In Schleiermacher's emphasis

upon man's freedom to will ever more God-consciousness with a view to emulating Jesus, we have a rather more than incipient Pelagianism, and a corresponding weakness on the nature and redemptive necessity of divine grace. Redemption is a process rather than an act once more.

We thus come to the realisation that for all his emphasis upon the historic Christ, Schleiermacher's Jesus is so bound up with the relativities of history that his uniqueness is not established, though it is inconsistently adhered to. We might almost say that Schleiermacher's Christ is an incarnate idea rather than an incarnate person; certainly he by-passes much New Testament teaching concerning Jesus's life, and he will not allow the possibility that Jesus was tempted.^{20d} Small wonder that Dr. Lovell Cocks said of Schleiermacher's Jesus that he "stimulates our God-consciousness, but is not Himself the Word, being indeed no more than the 'occasion' of the emergence of something that is not a 'Word of God' at all, but the secret treasure of our human reason. Neither in its rationalistic nor its romanticist form has humanism been able to exhibit the Gospel as 'news' and Christ as the unique Mediator of salvation".²⁴

Concerning Schleiermacher's system as a whole, H.R. Mackintosh prophesied that "more and more it will impress rather by its contrast than by its likeness to the faith of Prophets and Apostles".^{10d} Not all have concurred, however, and it cannot be said that the question as to whether in theology we should begin "from below" or "from above" has yet decisively been settled.²⁵

III

We turn now to Schleiermacher's colleague Hegel (1770-1831)²⁶ who, although he started from the rationalistic side of Kant rather than from the psychological interests of Schleiermacher nevertheless promoted an immanentism which was as reductive of the gospel as was Schleiermacher's. Hegel set his face against that Romanticism represented by Schleiermacher, Jacobi and others. To him it seemed to make for conceptual weakness concerning the Absolute; it exalted intuition; and it fostered a truth-obscuring relativism.²⁷ He was no less opposed to that dualism between thought and the thing-in-itself which Kant had bequeathed to philosophy. Nor was Hegel alone in this; indeed his indebtedness to Fichte (1762-1814) and Schelling (1775-1854), though by no means complete, is clear. Fichte developed a naturalistic pantheism in which the material world is held to be

the construct of man the thinker — man whose thought is yet held to be derived from God's thought; and Schelling, anxious to give the material universe a real life of its own, so to speak, propounded the idea that nature is a never-absolutely-objective organism whose ultimate meaning is gained as it achieves consciousness in the thinking self. They both attempted to correct what they, and Edward Caird after them, took to be Kant's oversight, namely, that the phenomenal and noumenal realms "are essentially relative to each other, so that either, taken apart from the other, becomes an empty abstraction".²⁸ For his part Hegel suggested that Kant's doctrinal affirmation that we have no knowledge save of phenomena could be turned around against him, for the assertion is presumed to give us knowledge, yet it has nothing to do with phenomena. Hegel would allow no barriers in the quest of knowledge, and more than once rebuked Kant for attempting to learn to swim without entering the water.

Schelling's idea of movement, evolution, was vigorously pursued by Hegel. His Absolute was not a static object or substance susceptible to immediate apprehension, but a spirit — God even — which all encompasses phenomena. The phenomena remain real and are not absorbed by the Absolute; rather they are embraced by it in an eternal flux of immanent, evolutionary activity. The plasticity of the system is such that there could not be absorption of subject by object or *vice versa*; nor, as with Spinoza, do subject and object continue as individuals within a static substance; nor again, as with Schelling, is there a convergence upon a common abstract identity of nature and spirit. Above all we do not have in Hegel, contrary to what some have supposed, an aloof Absolute which transcends and is for ever apart from the phenomenal world. So concerned was Hegel with the real world that we may agree that he was "a man...possessed of an eye for the concrete only second to Aristotle's".²⁹ Hegel's Spirit acts immanently to gather up consciousness and nature within its own complete, yet ever mobile self-consciousness. (The somewhat strange conjunction of adjectives must be pardoned: it has been well said that with Hegel one must first attempt to grasp the system, or see the vision, and only then examine the parts).

From the human side, the hard way of rational thinking, rather than the softer mystic or intuitionist options represented respectively by Boehme and Jacobi, is the way by which man attains the truth; the route takes man through art, religion and philosophy — themselves the thesis, antithesis and synthesis of Absolute Spirit. There is no escaping rationality, for "that which is rational is real, and that which is real is rational". Thought and being, though in mutual contradictory opposition, are one, since there cannot be the one without the other. The

Absolute resolves all antitheses with which our experience confronts us; indeed our own selves are real only as they are caught up by the Absolute. This is not to say that there is no distinction between man and God. The distinction is, however, within man's "unhappy consciousness"; it pains man and God, and its resolution, though assured, is not yet. Meanwhile the dialectic proceeds as antithesis succeeds, yet never cancels or replaces, thesis, and as synthesis is ever more nearly approached. As G.R.G. Mure has it, "The triadic formula writ large is the total manifestation of absolute spirit alienating itself and returning upon itself through (and as) Nature and man".³⁰ In other words, in the dialectic process contradictions are resolved, not by being swept aside or explained away; nor, as with Fichte, by being regarded as apparent only; but by being caught up into a higher unity. It is not that Hegel deliberately set out to sabotage the law of contradiction as ordinarily understood by perversely maintaining contradictories. Rather, he sought a way of accommodating the *real* contradictoriness of human experience within a system which properly recognised the world as it is.^{31a} His theory must both accept the world as it is and at the same time, since the world is rationally grounded, deny that there can be any absolute and final contradictions. As Caird acknowledges,

The thought that there is a unity which lies beneath all opposition, and that, therefore, all opposition is capable of reconciliation, is unfamiliar to our ordinary consciousness for reasons that may easily be explained. That unity is not usually an object of consciousness, just because it is the presupposition of all consciousness ... It is the unity itself which gives its bitter meaning to the difference, while at the same time it contains the pledge that the difference can and even must be reconciled.^{31b}

It follows that both a proof and a disproof of the principle presuppose the principal itself. Hegel's contradictoriness is not, as with Aristotle, a static matter of logic. It is dynamic; it is as has been said, the fuel of his system.

How does all of this bear upon the question of the God-man relation? We first underline the point that Hegel who "lived, apparently, for no other purpose than that of playing secretary to the Absolute"^{32b} adopts a thoroughly immanentist stance. There is no transcendent Other here. The issue is so clear that it is surprising that it has so frequently been misunderstood, as, for example by J.C. O'Neill who claims that Hegel and Bultmann err in adopting the Enlightenment's God who cannot work visibly on the world.³² This is the reverse of what Hegel did, and we endorse the verdict of Dr. DeWolf that "Hegel... is, par excellence, *the* philosopher of continuity, by reason of the fact that he shows so explicitly how thoroughly he means to resolve all the apparently

conflicting elements of experience and being in the one unbroken life of the all-inclusive Process, the Spirit which is the Absolute".³³ The eternal Spirit unfolds itself in the universe — indeed, the universe *is* that unfolding, and the Absolute is the totality of things. Such a view cannot but do violence to the concept of the personality of God, and nowhere is this more clearly seen than in connection with the Hegelian Trinity, which H.R. Mackintosh concisely stated, and pertinently criticised as follows:

As pure abstract idea God is Father; as going forth eternally into finite being, the element of change and variety, God is Son; as once more sublating or cancelling this distinction, and turning again home enriched by this outgoing in so-called self-manifestation or incarnation, God is Holy Spirit. Such a Trinity, clearly, represents that which is in no sense eternal but only coming to be; it has no meaning, or even existence, apart from the finite world. It is a dialectical triad, not Father, Son and Spirit in any sense in which Christian faith has ever pronounced the three-fold Name.^{10e}

(We recall that the latter-day idealist F.H. Bradley denied that the Absolute was personal, moral, beautiful or true.³⁴)

In Hegel's idea of a God of becoming, who is inseparable from his creation, we have the genesis of that notion, sentimentalised by some later liberal theologians, that God needs us as much as we need him. The tendency of Arminianism thus finds metaphysical justification; and some of Hegel's left wing successors upheld a position which "does away with the self-existence and independent reality of the Deity, identifies God with man's thoughts about Him, and makes the communion of man with God to be nothing but man's communion with himself or with the progressive spirit of the race".³⁵ In this way, and for all his concern with history, Hegel leaves us with an unhistorically rooted, idealised Christianity in which, not surprisingly, the God-man as an historic person has little place. This despite phrases which appear to tell in an opposite direction: "*Christ has appeared*; a Man who is God; God who is Man, and thereby peace and reconciliation have accrued to the World".³⁶ Here is Hegel, the true Lutheran, at his most final. But he was not ever thus, and G.H.R. Mure has well said that "Jesus was in fact for him much less real in Nazareth and Jerusalem than he was in Martin Luther's inner consciousness".³⁷ Christianity's main role, as far as Hegel is concerned, is to provide a fund of doctrines symbolic of

that relation between the finite and the infinite which it is philosophy's business to delineate.

Anyone who beings from as close and *total* a kinship between God and man as Hegel posits will almost inevitably be in difficulties over the doctrines of sin, grace and redemption. Hegel does not indeed underestimate sin. He takes it very seriously, though not, we feel with that moral urgency which can flow only from a real grasp of God's holy otherness over against the (genuine) individual. He does not grasp the tragedy of alienation, for his evolutionary theory encourages an optimism which regards sin as a necessary step towards self-determined moral goodness. As a later prominent Hegelian wrote, "there is nothing in evil which cannot be absorbed in good and contributory to it; and it springs from the same source as good and value".³⁸ It was this kind of remark which prompted Reinhold Niebuhr to speak of the almost unanimous "easy conscience of modern culture"³⁹ — though as Professor Pingle-Pattison noted, Hegel himself spoke much of the *labour* of the Spirit, whose ultimate triumph, though a foregone conclusion, is not easily won.^{5d}

Given this understanding of sin the atonement can only be a further testimony to the rhythmic unity of God and man. It is the means whereby God as Absolute Spirit reconciles himself to himself by the death of Christ understood as symbolic of the resurrection of Spirit. Again we see the result of the lack of genuine individuality in either God or man. There is truth in the charge that Hegelianism has no room for Hegel — hence Kierkegaard's protest against it. Nor does there seem to be any room in Hegelianism for God apart from Hegel. Here we have the consummation of that humanistic, rationalistic-immanentist thrust which from the Renaissance onwards had been gathering increasing momentum. It is one thing to regard union with God as a sharing of his nature; it is quite another to regard it as a pantheistic absorption into his being. Many will feel that the latter is too high a price to pay for salvation from deism; and many Christian thinkers may well find themselves in unusual agreement with McTaggart, who opined that as far as Christianity is concerned Hegelianism is "an enemy in disguise — the least evident but the most dangerous".⁴⁰ The danger is at its height in the bland disregard in Hegelianism of anything resembling God's regenerating grace.

IV

If one were to write a history of nineteenth century western Christianity under some such title as "The Ramifications of Immanentism", a surprisingly comprehensive account could result. We use the term "Christianity" advisedly, for, whether positively or negatively, immanentism influenced both thought and practice. Thus, to take some random examples: Professor Horton Davies finds a link between immanentism and the preference of most nineteenth-century Free Church theologians and ministers for Zwinglian, memorialist, views of the Lord's Supper, rather than for the High Calvinist doctrine; and again, between immanentism and that embarrassment to certain liturgiologists, the Harvest Festival.⁴¹ For some ecclesiological implications of immanentism we might turn to H.B. Wilson's article on "The National Church" in *Essays and Reviews* (1860). He suggested that since the old dogmatic standpoints of the Church of England were ripe for supercession, a new Church should be envisaged, built, in undogmatic fashion, upon the moral consciousness of the nation. In the field of scientific advance immanentist theory and investigatory zeal acted as mutual stimuli upon one another. Finally, as he reflected upon the missionary situation at the beginning of the twentieth century, Dr. A.E. Garvie expressed concern lest the concept of God as already immanent in man should undermine the missionary enterprise by reducing the importance of the historic Christ, and by minimizing the tragedy of sin and, in consequence, the need of a Saviour.⁴²

Returning to more strictly intellectual matters we find that immanentism inspired no one variety of philosophy. We have already seen that the immanentist tendency was shared by men in other ways so different at Schleiermacher and Hegel; but in the nineteenth century the proliferation of immanentism is even more remarkable, and inspires both kindred and diametrically opposed philosophies. Over some of these we need not delay,⁴³ for they were so clearly out of accord with Christian thought that few theologians, if any, thought of expressing their views in terms of them. Thus, there were positivistic and agnostic varieties of immanentism which, since they ruled out a transcendent object, whilst deeming such an object the *sine qua non* of religion, had no use for religion at all — except, in some cases, as an emotional crutch for the weak-minded. There was materialism (as equally immanentist as its opposite, absolutism), whose high priest Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-72),⁴⁴ with *quasi*-discipular dialectic licence, turned Hegelianism on its head, made actual matter

rather than mind his fundamental principle, equated God with man's nature, and resolved theology into anthropology. There was Auguste Comte (1798-1857),⁴⁵ whose positivism, whilst denying the transcendent, allowed for a religion of humanity wherein interpersonal relations were accorded divine status. Dr. Elliott-Binns notes Frederic Harrison, E.S. Beesly and J.H. Bridges as being among Englishmen who took Comtism seriously. That not all were thus inclined is evidenced by the wag who alleged that at their Fetter Lane meetings for the worship of humanity there were three persons and no God.⁴⁶ Professor William A. McKeever of the University of Kansas was among Americans who exalted man: "Man is my best expression of Deity", he wrote, "and so I bow reverently at this shrine".⁴⁷ It was left to Professor R.W. Sellars and others to make the point that man is not fit object of worship, and therefore that "the very attitude and implications of worship must be relinquished".⁴⁸ The pragmatists, of whom F.C.S. Schiller (1864-1937) is a prominent British example, tended to agree.

Other varieties of immanentism made a considerably greater appeal to Christian thinkers, and hence the perils of reductionism were correspondingly greater. We continue to speak of *varieties* of immanentism, for some have written as if monism alone appealed to theologians. The monistic tendency of all forms of immanentism cannot be denied, but it is only proper to note how earnestly some sought to resist it. Of these some were moved by a romanticism which made for a decidedly immanentist transcendentalism (a paradox shortly to be resolved); others, making the Incarnation the foundation of their theology, were at least as indebted to the Alexandrian theologians as they were to Hegel. It goes without saying that the continuing Platonist insistence upon the God-man continuity, though by no means exclusively immanentist, had clear immanentist features.⁴⁹ But, yet again, a cautionary word: to think too much in terms of groups or schools would suggest a degree of tidiness, and a series of master-disciple relationships, which do not always appear. We shall follow the relatively safe chronological path, making our points as we go.

Dr. Vernon F. Storr listed the following distinctive features of Romanticism:⁵⁰ (1) The belief that man is not simply an intellectual being, and that reason, far from being merely the logical faculty, is "a creating and unifying factor". (2) The awakening of the spirit of wonder. (3) The high place accorded to the imagination. (4) An emphasis upon the sympathy between man and the natural order. These, taken all together, made for a profounder study of man's psychology than had ever before been undertaken; and made possible a new apologetic which would no longer rely upon external evidences (which were being increasingly called into question with the growth of biblical

criticism), but which would appeal to the religious man's spiritual experience.

Such an atmosphere was one in which Coleridge (1772-1834)⁵¹ revelled — though never uncritically. Thus, for example, whereas he was at first greatly impressed by Schelling, he later cooled towards him. Again, whilst acknowledging his debt to the Cambridge Platonists, and to More and Smith in particular, he went further than they in understanding the continuity between God and man to be moral and spiritual, and not intellectual only: "God in His wholeness, and therefore chiefly in His holiness, not merely God's *mind* in man's *mind* — that was the note; with the necessary consequent, that Christian truth was at the same time an affirmation of this immanence and a means of intensifying it still more".⁵² To Coleridge man is essentially a spiritual being, but he by no means endorsed monism. On the contrary, from Kant he inherits a transcendentalism, though not one which leads him either to Kant's scepticism or to the deist's absentee deity. In a very important footnote Professor Welch draws his readers' attention to three factors in Coleridge's experience which modified his indebtedness to the Platonists, to Kant and to others. They are "the quality of personal religion, in which prayer and the struggle of sin and redemption were at the center ... Second... a deep sense of social need and a hope for the revitalization of English society and the church — a cause which he wanted to serve... Third, Coleridge's religious thinking developed from a position within the historical Christian faith. He had little interest in religiousness in general".⁵³

It was, indeed, Coleridge's profound sense of the reality of moral evil, together with his high view of conscience, which proved the greatest bulwark against the pantheistic tendencies in his thought. For him sin could never be anything other than sin, and redemption was required. This conviction coloured his attitude towards the older rationalism which, he thought, did not really get to grips with the whole man at all; and it prompted his quest of a theory of rationality which should both make good this deficiency by permitting genuine apprehensions of divine reality; but which would set its face against simple emotionalism whether pietistic or evangelical. Further, he sought an understanding of reason which appreciated reason's bounds and was not afraid to pause before the ineradicable mystery which lay at the heart of things. He was thus led to distinguish between the understanding and the reason. The former provides us with experimental knowledge *via* sensation, whilst by means of the latter we intuitively apprehend spiritual truth which is not amenable to empirical verification.⁵⁴

Coleridge's distinction was employed by the American transcendentalists from about 1830,⁵⁵ though Dr. Buell has made it clear that their definition of reason varied from one to another:

Those who recognised such a faculty sometimes called it by different names, such as 'Spirit', 'Mind', 'Soul', and they also differed in the claims they made for it. For some Transcendentalists it was simply an inner light or conscience; for others it was the voice of God; for still others it was literally God himself immanent in man. Some regarded the informing spirit primarily as an impersonal cosmic force; others continued to think of it in traditional anthropomorphic terms.⁵⁶

As with Coleridge then, their transcendentalism was immanently anchored, so to speak. They opposed pantheism, but were equally averse in spirit to external evidences of religion. Instead, like their fellow-Unitarian, the Englishman Martineau (1805-1900), they made conscience the seat of authority in religion, and were to that extent at one with the immanentist spirit of the times. They had the example of Channing (1780-1842), by whose assertion of the dignity of man they had been much impressed, and with whose criticisms of what was regarded as a degrading Calvinism they were in utter sympathy. Dr. McLachlan informs us that the monument to Channing in Boston bears the legend, "He breathed into theology a humane Spirit and proclaimed a new divinity of man".⁵⁷

Supreme among the transcendentalists was Emerson (1803-82) for whom man was equally in harmony with nature as with God. Theodore Parker (1810-60) evinces that difficulty to which we saw that Hegelianism could tend, namely, he is reluctant to ascribe personality (and, for that matter, impersonality) to God on the ground that to do so "seems to me a vain attempt to fathom the abyss of the Godhead, and report the soundings".⁵⁸ Loyal to the Congregationalist family (out of which American Unitarianism had sprung) was Horace Bushnell (1802-76), whose New Theology opposed tritheism and the governmental theory of the atonement; upheld the divinity of man, and sought to show that the fundamental truths of religion are hindered rather than helped by the older apologetic methods of shoring them up.

Meanwhile in Britain the general immanentist tendency was being upheld by Erskine of Linlathen (1788-1870), and by his friend John McLeod Campbell (1800-72), whose book *The Nature of the Atonement* (1856) played down the penal aspects of the

atonement, and whose belief that Christ's saving work had been done for all and not for the elect only caused such heart-searching in conservative Scottish circles.⁵⁹ Another Scot, Carlyle (1795-1881)⁶⁰ exercised a wide influence upon theological thought, not so much because he erected a persuasive system, which he did not, but because he seemed to strike certain chords which, as many thought, would have to appear in any adequate theological score. Among these were his anti-materialistic immanentism inspired by Goethe, and his strong sense of the moral law — inherited from a Calvinism with which, as with institutional Christianity generally, he was in other respects profoundly disenchanted.

Among those of the Church of England who were most receptive to new ideas we note Connop Thirlwall (1797-1875) — a student of Schleiermacher — and Julius Hare (1795-1855). The latter carried forward the main emphases of Coleridge, utilising the doctrine of the Holy Spirit in relation to such themes as progress and development, which were shortly to become theological talking-points of the first importance. Supreme among the Anglicans influenced by Coleridge, however, was F.D. Maurice (1805-72).⁶¹ Like his mentor, Maurice stood firmly for the trustworthiness of spiritual experience. God does not have to be sought as if he were afar off. He is immanent in man and our seeking of him is itself a response to his prior presence. Against High Calvinism and High Anglicanism alike Maurice maintained the essential divinity of man, urging that the essence of sin is refusal to acknowledge that fact; salvation is the glad recognition of it. For his denial of the eternity of punishment Maurice was deposed from his Chair at King's College London in 1854 — he would lose his position rather than have the God-man continuity disrupted. His immanentist-transcendentalism found its chief expression as he developed his "Greek" Logos theology of the Incarnation. To him the supreme meaning of the Incarnation was that the world, far from being fallen, is *already* redeemed. Not surprisingly, Maurice's emphasis upon the atonement is relatively slight.

Other more adventurous Anglicans included the contributors to *Essays and Reviews*.⁶² Eschewing external religious evidences, they sought to do some theological ground-clearing and, in the process, to prise open the minds of their readers. Conscience and reason were, for them, the joint touchstones of valid doctrine, and both conscience and reason were helped rather than hindered by the scholarly advances in science and biblical criticism that were being made. A generation later *Lux Mundi* (1889) was more positively "Greek" and incarnational. Among its illustrious contributors was J.R. Illingworth (1848-1915) who, for all his

indebtedness to the post-Hegelianism of T.H. Green, had no intention of blurring the creator-creature distinction, as may be seen from one of his later works, *Divine Transcendence* (1911). In this he was at one with Charles Gore, the editor of *Lux Mundi*, who was later to criticise the Modern Churchmen's Union in such a way as to draw the following response from one of the Union's distinguished members: "Dr. Gore is correct in affirming that we believe that...the difference between Deity and Humanity is one of degree. The distinction between Creator and creature, upon which Dr. Gore and the older theologians place so much emphasis, seems to us to be a minor distinction".⁶³

We come full circle to the professional philosophers, and we note Edward Caird (1835-1908) and T.H. Green (1836-92)⁶⁴ as being more or less faithful disciples of Hegel. The qualification is important, since whilst, for example, Green endorsed Hegel's criticisms of Kant, he nevertheless felt that Hegel's own system was over-ambitious and on one occasion declared, "It must all be done over again".⁶⁵ For Green mind is constitutive of the relations which make up the world; there is no possibility of isolating phenomena and of considering them in abstraction from mind. With all of this Caird agreed and so, in broad terms, did the younger absolutists, F.H. Bradley (1846-1924) and Bernard Bosanquet (1848-1923). C.C.J. Webb properly observed, however, that these last were even more strongly immanentist than their older contemporaries, and that they did not subscribe to the doctrine of immortality, which inspired the teleology of both Caird and Green.^{63a} Neither would they, like Caird, have invoked the Incarnation of Christ as signifying the truth of the claim that God was immanent in all men. Both Bradley and Bosanquet denied personality to God and regarded their Absolute as superceding the God of religion altogether. By the time we come to McTaggart (1866-1925) God is entirely redundant.

Not surprisingly, the tendency of post-Hegelian immanentism to exclude the truly personal identity of both God and man gave rise to some influential thinkers who came to be known as the personal idealists. Of these one of the earliest and greatest was Professor A.S. Pringle-Pattison (1856-1931) whose criticisms of Hegel are to be found in his *Hegelianism and Personality* (1887). One of the best summaries, and most gracious criticisms, of his position is that by his pupil H.R. Mackintosh.^{66a} Pringle-Pattison's main platform is that "in the conditions of the highest human life we have access, as nowhere else, to the inmost nature of the divine".⁶⁷ Mackintosh welcomes this, but questions how far his teacher's identification of God with the Absolute allows for the fatherhood of God. He is also hesitant concerning the

notion of the mutual reciprocity of relations between God and man, for this may lead to the false suggestion that "God needs man for existence just as man needs God".^{66b}

v

How shall we assess the immanentist thrust in nineteenth-century thought? First, immanentists of all kinds are to be applauded for having set their faces so firmly against deism; and immanentists of certain kinds are further to be praised for their staunch opposition to naturalism; for with neither deism nor naturalism can Christian theology happily trade. Secondly, the generosity of spirit and openness of vision which characterises the best of the immanentists is a welcome relief from the more arid patches of earlier rationalism, whether philosophical or theological.

Having allowed all this, we cannot overlook the fact that all types of immanentism really look to man — to his reason, his conscience or his religious experience — as the arbiter of truth. This makes them part of that very broadly rationalistic post-Renaissance humanistic family which includes Descartes, Locke, Schleiermacher and Hegel, all of whose members sat more or less loosely to certain aspects of the Christian message. Having noted this all-embracing tendency, we now note certain difficulties which arise in connection with particular varieties of immanentism.

Professor A.C. McGiffert once questioned whether theology needed the doctrine of immanence at all. He quoted McLeod Campbell as saying that "The one great word of the New Theology is unity — the unity of the individual with the race, and of the race with God", and commented, "Much that the conception of divine immanence conserves is taught by the Christ of the synoptists — the nearness of God, the kinship of man and God, the value of the present life — but all this might be taught also by one whose philosophy was of another sort".⁶⁸ This is a fair judgement as applying to monism, but not all nineteenth-century immanentists took that line, as we have seen. In particular, the "Greek" incarnational line represented by Maurice and the *Lux Mundi* group upheld the transcendent, maintained the creator-creature distinction, and met pantheism head on. That the monists should be in greater peril at this point was almost inevitable, and their danger was one inherited, however unconsciously, from Spinoza as much as from Hegel. As A.E. Garvie was to say, "In the new theology the distinction between God and man, which morality and religion alike demand, is confused, if not altogether denied".⁶⁹

Although Coleridge never minimised sin, many of the monists could not give a due account of it. Hence H.R. Mackintosh's complaint concerning the "sophistical manipulation of moral evil"^{66c} which characterises all absolutisms: evil, for them, can only be on the way to good. Similarly, Professor L. Hodgson urged against William Temple that "if all creation, including myself, be God fulfilling Himself in His historical self-expression, then I, even the sinful I when engaged in sinning, am in the last analysis a mode of God's self-expression".⁷⁰

Again, the immanentist was frequently in difficulties with the historical. As Strauss said, giving the game away, "It is not the fashion of the Idea to pour its fulness in a single life".^{66d} Certainly the general tendency has been for immanentists of the monistic kind to be more than a little embarrassed by the Jesus of history; and those Logos immanentists who made so much of the Incarnation tended to do so on principles which made redemption much more of a symbolic idea than an historically accomplished fact: man was already divine, and hence a *relatively* radical atonement would suffice.

We are the first to grant that the Christian theologian has no biblical or other warrant for excluding God from any part of his creation. We have more than a suspicion, however, that the immanentist way of avoiding deism's remote deity leaves us with more problems than it solves. May it not be that the way to ensure that both immanence and transcendence are accorded their due weight is *via* a fresh appraisal of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit? But that is a theme for another time — and for a more strictly theological journal.

REFERENCES AND NOTES

- 1 Kant, *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysic*, trans. P.G. Lucas, Manchester UP 1953, p.9.
- 2 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. J.M.D. Meiklejohn, 1964, p.12.
- 3 We italicise these words in order to make plain the fact that Kant is not a straightforward idealist. In fact, as Professor H.D. Aiken reminds us (Ref. 13, p.33), Kant did not hold that mind is the sole reality, or that the mind creates the world it knows. Further, things-in-themselves are independently real. They are not, however, objects of knowledge, and hence "about them the understanding has properly nothing whatever to say". Thus Dr. Alexander is

near the mark when he interprets Kant has holding that "In the constitution of knowledge the mind contributes as much as it receives". See *The Shaping Forces of Modern Thought*, Glasgow 1920, p.156. But this assertion must not be understood in such a way as to overlook Kant's powerful streak of realism, or to make him a Berkeleyan phenomenalist-idealist who believes that we actually perceive things-in-themselves. Cf. the following paragraph.

- 4 J.V. Langmead Casserley, *The Christian in Philosophy*, 1949, p.125.
- 5 A.S. Pringle-Pattison, *The Philosophical Radicals*, 1907, (a) p.224; (b) p.266-7; (c) p.256; (d) 291.
- 6 R. Mackintosh, *Enc. Brit.* 11th Ed., Art "Theism".
- 7 George Galloway, "What do religious thinkers owe to Kant?" *The Hibbert Journal* 1907, 5, 650.
- 8 C. Van Til, *A Christian Theory of Knowledge*, Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed 1969, p.153.
- 9 I. Kant, *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*, trans. T.M. Greene and H.H. Hudson, N.Y., Harper Torchbooks 1960, (a) p.157n; (b) p.95. Later in the same work, however (pp.178-9), Kant does allow that the idea of grace, though wholly transcendent, is one which we are entitled to assume will effect in us what nature can not, on condition that we use our powers aright. We here verge upon a Pelagianising doctrine of works: in fact God's grace is unconditional, or it is not grace. Again, Kant says that apart from hope in grace, we have no confidence that the evil in man will be overcome. Such utilitarianism seems to make a prop out of grace. Michael Despland provides a useful discussion of Kant on grace in his *Kant on History and Religion*, Montreal & London: McGill-Queen's U.P. 1973, chap. IX.
- 10 H.R. Mackintosh, *Types of Modern Theology*, 1937, (a) p.23; (b) p.48; (c) p.71n; (d) p.100; (e) p.105.
- 11 E. Brunner, *The Mediator*, trans. Olive Wyon, Philadelphia: Westminster n.d., p.142, Cf. H.F. Lovell Cocks, *By Faith Alone*, 1943, p.34; and D.M. Mackinnon, "Kant's Philosophy of Religion", *Philosophy* 1975, 50, pp.131-144.
- 12 Though H.J. Paton (*The Categorical Imperative*, 1947, p.196) writes: Kant's "Formula of Universal Law, insisting as it does on the spirit as opposed to the letter of the moral law, is his version of the Christian doctrine that we are saved by faith and not by works". Two comments require to be made here: (i) The formula as here described is rather a plea for integrity and a denunciation of hypocrisy. (ii) The Christian doctrine, which as Professor Paton expresses it might imply that faith itself is a work, is that we are saved by grace through faith.

- 13 H.D. Aiken, *The Age of Ideology*, N.Y. Mentor Books 1956, (a) p.15; (b) p.71.
- 14 Quoted by C. Welch, *Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, Yale UP 1972, p.63.
- 15 A.M. Fairbairn, *Christ in Modern Theology*, 6th edn. 1894, p.224.
- 16 F.D.E. Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith*, trans. and ed. H.R. Mackintosh and J.S. Stewart, Edinburgh, 1960, p.17. For *On Religion* we use trans. J. Oman, New York: Harper Torchbooks 1958. It is thus misleading when R.S. Franks ("Trends in Recent Theology", *The Congregational Quarterly*, 1945, 23, 19-29; p.22) says that "Schleiermacher found a new starting-point for theology by going back to Calvin's idea of religion as the way in which we depend upon God"; for to Calvin the dependence was upon a God supernaturally revealed in his Word; to Schleiermacher the supernatural reference is excluded. As W.P. Paterson says "What Schleiermacher was impressed by in Christian experience was in truth an important fact — it was the same fact which impressed Calvin when he studied the content of the believing mind and heart, and was aware of a joyful feeling of assurance that a divine work of reconciliation and regeneration had been wrought, and that it had been wrought by the instrument of the Word of God. The difference was that while Calvin rightly interpreted the feeling as a finger-post pointing to the mine of revealed truth, the subjective school in its typical representatives has looked upon it as being itself the spiritual mine". *The Rule of Faith*, 1912, pp.168-9. Compare Van A. Harvey, "A Word in Defense of Schleiermacher's Theological Method", *The Journal of Religion*, 1962, 42, 151-170 with Franks; and for the alternative view see Kenneth Hamilton, "Schleiermacher and Relational Theology", *ibid.* 1964, 44, 29-39.
- 17 W.A. Brown, *The Essence of Christianity*, Edinburgh, 1904, p.171.
- 18 Cf. J. Macquarrie's sympathetic article, "Schleiermacher Reconsidered", *The Expository Times* 1969, 80, pp.196-200 and S. Sykes, "God and World in Schleiermacher", *The Month* 2, 1970, pp.79-83.
- 19 Schleiermacher, *On Religion*, Ref. 16, (a) p.88; (b) p.89.
- 20 Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith*, Ref. 16, (a) p.183; (b) p.65; (c) p.277; (d) para. 98; (e) para. 100.
- 21 G.P. Fisher, *A History of Christian Doctrine*, 1896, Edinburgh, 1949, p.510.
- 22 Donald G. Bloesch, "The Missing Dimension", *Reformed Review* 1973, 26, 166.

- 23 Thus, "At the Reformation, in the Puritan upheaval, and in the Wesleyan revival, it is much clearer that the preaching of a gospel was a cause of the spiritual convulsion, than that the constituent ideas of this gospel were a description and interpretation of the emotional phenomena". W.P. Paterson, *Ref.* 16, p.128.
- 24 H.F. Lovell Cocks, *op. cit.*, ref. 11, p.98. See ref. 10e and the perceptive comments of James B. Torrance, "Interpretation and Understanding in Schleiermacher's Theology: Some Critical Questions", *The Scottish Journal of Theology*, 1968, 21, 268-282.
- 25 See e.g. M.F. Wiles, *The Remaking of Christian Doctrine*, 1974; and for comments upon it see *inter alia* Nicholas Lash, "The Remaking of Doctrine: Which way shall we go?" *Irish Theological Quarterly*, 1976, 43, 36-43.
- 26 In addition to the works on Hegel referred to below see, J.H. Stirling, *The Secret of Hegel* (1865), Edinburgh, 1898; Robert Mackintosh, *Hegel and Hegelianism*, Edinburgh, 1903; W.T. Stace, *The Philosophy of Hegel* (1924 and 1955).
- 27 Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, trans. J.B. Baillie, 1931, Vol. I, pp.70 ff.
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- 31 See E. Caird, ref. 28, (a) Chap. III; (b) pp.138, 140.
- 32 J.C. O'Neill, "Bultmann and Hegel", *Journal of Theological Studies* 1970, 21, 400. O'Neill's earlier point to the effect that Hegel and Bultmann rejected the anti-Enlightenment romanticism which made God accessible to feeling only is well made, p.395.
- 33 L. Harold DeWolf, "Liberalism: A Re-evaluation. 1 Motifs of Continuity and Discontinuity", *Religion in Life*, 1963, 32, 335. Royce is quoted in support.
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- 37 G.R.G. Mure, "Hegel, Luther and the Owl of Minerva", *Philosophy* 1966, 41, 132. In this article the question is raised as to whether Hegel really thought that his own position implied its own supercession — and also, since the two were in his view inextricably interwoven, the supercession of Christianity. The suggestion is made that Hegel's Lutheranism prompted his moments of recoil from eternal flux, though such moments were never decisive.
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- 39 R. Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, I p.129.
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- 41 H. Davies, *Worship and Theology in England: From Newman to Martineau, 1850-1900*, Princeton UP and OUP 1962, pp.83, 210.
- 42 A.E. Garvie, *The Missionary Obligation in the light of the Changes of Modern Thought*, 1914, pp.65-9.
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- 44 For Feuerbach see W.B. Chamberlain, *Heaven wasn't his Destination*, 1941.
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- 46 L.E. Elliott-Binns, *English Thought 1860-1900*, 1956, p.65.
- 47 W.A. McKeever, *Man and the New Democracy*, NY, 1918, p.94.
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- 50 V.F. Storr, ref. 49, pp.127-30.
- 51 For Coleridge see C.R. Sanders, *Coleridge and the Broad Church Movement*, Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1942.
- 52 H.W. Clark, *Liberal Orthodoxy*, 1914, p.140.
- 53 C. Welch, ref. 49, p.114.
- 54 Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, 6th edn. 1848, I pp.168-192.
- 55 See Lawrence Buell, *Literary Transcendentalism*, Cornell UP 1973, p.4. For Channing see *Memoir* by W.H. Channing, 1848; for Emerson see J.E. Cabot, *A Memoir of Ralph Waldo Emerson*, 2 vols. 1887 and B. Perry, *Emerson Today*, Princeton UP 1931; for Parker see J. Weiss, *Life and Correspondance of Theodore Parker*, NY, 1884; for Bushnell see M.B. Cheney, *Life and Letters of Horace Bushnell*, NY, 1880, and T.T. Munger, *Horace Bushnell, Preacher and Theologian*, Boston: 1899.
- 56 Buell, ref. 55, p.5. He further notes that "Almost all reached Transcendentalism by way of Unitarianism before they were thirty years old; more than half were at least trained for the Unitarian ministry; almost all the men attended Harvard. Many were from backgrounds of wealth and gentility..." p.7. Not indeed that all Unitarians were open to new ideas. Some remained epistemologically with Locke, and R.V. Holt, commenting on the reception accorded by his fellow Unitarians to Martineau notes George Armstrong, faithful to Locke, who confessed "to a hatred of the instinctive, transcendental and what-not German school of moral and metaphysical philosophy - the spawn of Kant's misunderstood speculations - the dreams of the half-crazed Coleridge, and the inane fancy of the Hares, Sterlings, Whewells, in loud and varied succession since". See R.V. Holt, *The Unitarian Contribution to Social Progress in England*, 2nd rev. edn. 1952, p.343.
- 57 John McLachlan, *The Divine Image*, 1972, p.158. He further quotes Martineau (*Essays* I p.103) as saying that Channing's "sense of the inherent greatness of man" was "a fundamental point of faith".
- 58 T. Parker, *Works* 1863, I p.104.
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- 60 For Carlyle see D.A. Wilson, *Life of Thomas Carlyle*, 6 vols. 1923-34.

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- 62 In addition to the general works listed above see P.O.G. White, "Essays and Reviews", *Theology*, 1960, 63, 46-53; Ieuan Ellis, "'Essays and Reviews' Reconsidered", *ibid.*, 1971, 74, 396-404.
- 63 H.D.A. Major in *The Modern Churchman*, 1921, 11, 357; quoted by A.M. Ramsey, ref. 61, p.73.
- 64 For Caird see H. Jones and J.H. Muirhead, *The Life and Philosophy of Edward Caird*, Glasgow: 1921; for Green see W.H. Fairbrother, *The Philosophy of T.H. Green*, 1896. For accounts of how Hegelianism came to England see J.H. Muirhead, *The Platonic Tradition*, chap. II, and A.M. Quinton, "Absolute Idealism", *Proc. British Academy*, 1971, 57, espec. pp.322-6. For some theological reactions to idealism see A.P.F. Sell, "Christian and Secular Philosophy in Britain at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century", *The Downside Review*, 1957, 93, 122-143.
- 65 E. Caird's preface to *Essays in Philosophical Criticism*, eds. A. Seth and R.B. Haldane, 1883, p.5. Caird explains that by this remark Green meant that "the first development of idealistic thought in Germany had in some degree anticipated what can be the secure result only of wider knowledge and more complete reflexion".
- 66 H.R. Mackintosh, *Some Aspects of Christian Belief*, 1923, (a) Chap. "A Philosopher's Theology"; (b) p.266; (c) p.300; (d) quoted, p.294.
- 67 A.S. Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy*, OUP 2nd edn. 1920, p.157.
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J. STAFFORD WRIGHT

THE BIBLICAL ASSESSMENT OF SUPERSTITION
AND THE OCCULT

In this paper, given at the V.I. Symposium on SUPERSTITION AND THE OCCULT at Chelsea College, Manresa Road, London S.W.3, on 14 May 1977 the author gives a bird's eye view of biblical teaching on the occult.

The Bible refers to superstition and the occult far more frequently than casual recollection would suggest. It would, in fact, be possible to make this paper an encyclopedic review of various practices and the texts that deal with them. Indeed almost every practice could form the theme of a complete paper.

One must therefore look for general principles, the chief of which is that the Bible sets its face against all forms of magic and the occult. It is consequently in striking contrast with almost every religion and society in the world. From the very earliest recorded time until the present day superstition and magic have been treated as legitimate for those who know how to use them.

In general the Biblical attitude is entirely consistent in its basic background, namely the supremacy of the One God, a jealous God who has made men and women for Himself. His jealousy is desire for their welfare. He has given them a material world in which to develop with Himself, but they have an awareness under the surface that life is more than material. The hunger of the heart is meant to find satisfaction in God, but it is possible to pull aside the blanket of the dark and to penetrate a sphere of non-material forces and experiences. One may even break into a world of entities that are as enticing as God, without making demands of moral and spiritual obedience. Superstition thus becomes a non-moral substitute for religion, in which walking under a ladder is more disastrous than telling a lie, and wearing a charm will cover a multitude of sins. Somehow non-material powers, personal or impersonal, assume the status of a capricious god.

Magic goes further. Either by his own inner resources, or by collusion with spirit entities, or both, the practitioner attains mysterious power that is not open to the average person, although the practitioner can distribute the benefits or curses to his clients and their enemies. The magician eats of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and becomes as God.

The consistent attitude of the Bible is that, while there are non-material and spiritual levels, it is for God to use them as He sees fit: it is not for man to intrude into their domain. For example, from time to time God uses angels to carry out His purposes. He may indeed use them invisibly more frequently than we realise, but certainly the Bible records their appearance on occasions. The angel simply acts and speaks as the messenger of God; indeed the word *angel* is identical with *messenger* both in Hebrew and Greek. But man is never to make contact with the angels from his side. Indeed Colossians 2, a chapter which clearly has magicians in view, condemns 'the worship of angels' (v.18).

So, to sum up this far, the Bible, claiming to speak as the revelation of God, and knowing man's weakness for substitute religious experiences, bans those avenues into the occult that at the least are blind alleys that obscure the way to God, and at the worst are roads to destruction.

What then are these avenues? There is a fairly comprehensive list given in Deut. 18.10,11, although admittedly the translator is not always certain how to express the practice that the Hebrew names. The verses begin with the offering of a son or daughter in the fire, a practice which was still rife in the time of Jeremiah (19:4). This offering to a pagan god is not part of our subject now. There follows a list of banned practitioners of the occult, which it is best to translate rather literally so as to see why modern translations vary over one or two of them:

1. Diviner. The root word, *qasam*, is connected with dividing or allotting, and here may refer to allotting someone's fate, perhaps by foretelling the future. Thus Saul asks the woman of Endor to divine for him (1 Sam. 28:8), and Jeremiah tells the people not to listen to diviners who were speaking of an early return from captivity (29:8).

2. Soothsayer. The Lexicon says that the origin of the Hebrew *anan* is unknown. If it is connected with a similar word meaning *cloud*, the soothsayer would be one who used natural phenomena to tell fortunes. Today he would read the tea cups

or the cards. Probably the objects induced a slight trance state in which clairvoyant capacities were released. Again Jeremiah condemns them as spurious predictors (27:9).

3. RSV has *augurs*; NEB *diviners*. The Lexicon suggests that the root word *nachash* means to learn by omens, and this would fit admirably what is said of Balaam, a natural psychic, in Num. 24:1; "he did not go, as at other times, to meet with omens" (RSV). He realised that "there is no enchantment against Jacob" (23:23); the Hebrew uses the same word. Balaam could find nothing to indicate that there would be any efficacy in such curses as he could muster.

4. *Sorcerer*. The AV translators, at a time when there was something of a panic over witchcraft, translated this as *witch*. There is no reason why witchcraft should not be included, but one doubts whether the Hebrews knew of witches in the modern sense. At the same time the root *kashaph* is thought to denote cutting plants to make a magic brew. If so, this is the first word in this list that speaks of magic that takes the offensive and casts spells. Thus Isaiah 47:9 speaks of sorceries and enchantments being used in vain to stave off the fall of Babylon.

5. The next word certainly indicates one who casts spells, and NEB adopts this translation. RSV has *charmer*, and its only other occurrence is in connection with snake charming (Psalm 58: 5b). The Hebrew *chabhar chebher* has the root meaning of *joining a joining*, presumably making magic knots like the women in Ezek. 13:17-23, who made magic armbands, although the words are not actually used of them.

6, 7, 8. I want to leave the final 3 words for consideration later. The RSV translates them, 'medium, wizard, or necromancer'. The NEB has 'one who traffics with ghosts and spirits, and no necromancer.' The words may thus be relevant for modern mediumship and spiritualism.

These two verses place a ban on the sort of practices that the Israelites were likely to meet. Indeed we know from objects and writings from Egypt and Mesopotamia that they could not have missed them. Whatever their precise meaning, they cover protective magic, which is what superstition mostly supplies; fortune telling with an eye to the future; and active magic in the form of spells. In the light of discoveries in the Near East, we should probably divide fortune telling into simple precognitive claims and the use of means, such as the inspection of the entrails of a sacrificial animal. A remarkable find

from Megiddo is a clay model of a liver marked all over with signs and symbols. This use of sacrificial animals is included in the list of means used by the king of Babylon to determine his course of action (Ezek. 21:21). Ezekiel also includes the use of *rhodomancy* here (i.e. divination through the fall of arrows or sticks) and the use of *teraphim*, which we shall consider later. Incidentally, it is surprising to find how many artificial forms of divination have been used down the ages. John Gaule in *Mysmantia* (1652) lists some fifty methods.

A significant omission from the list in Deuteronomy is astrology, although 4:19 warns against worship of the heavenly bodies. The Bible regards these as marking out the seasons of the year (Gen. 1:14), but it also shows that on occasions they served as special signs, e.g. the star in the East at the birth of Christ, the darkening of the sun at the crucifixion, and signs in the sun, moon, and stars to herald the Lord's return (Luke 21:25), although some believe that these latter signs are not to be taken literally, but symbolically. Astrology as such is treated chiefly as a subject of ridicule. Thus Babylon cannot be saved by "those who divide the heavens, who gaze at the stars, who at the new moons predict what shall befall you" (Isa. 47:13), nor need Israel "be dismayed at the signs of the heavens because the nations are dismayed at them" (Jer. 10:2). And in Daniel the astrologers cannot discover the king's dream (2:27) nor the writing on the wall (5:5-16).

If we divide methods of divination into non-mechanical and mechanical, we can count the false prophets in the former category. Probably they were basically psychic, that is, they had some clairvoyant gifts, and they went into a partial trance state when they received what they believed to be their messages. Some of them prostituted their gift in the service of pagan deities, as did the prophets of Baal in Elijah's day (1 Kings 18). Others regarded themselves as prophets of Yahweh, but their inner vision was clouded by what they wanted to believe. Thus the prophets in 1 Kings 22 urged the kings to go up to Ramothgilead and prosper, while only Micaiah saw the disaster that would follow. In Jeremiah's day the false prophets, especially Hananiah, affirmed a speedy return from exile. Jeremiah not only foresaw that the Babylonian domination would last for approximately seventy years from 605 BC, but also foretold correctly that Hananiah would die within a year (28:16,17).

There are two possibilities in considering false prophets. A man may have genuine precognitive capacities, but may use them in the interest of a false deity. This automatically excludes him as a prophet to be followed in spite of his true predictions

(Deut. 13:1-5). On the other hand a prophet who uses the Lord's Name, but makes a false prediction, is not inspired of God (Deut. 18:20-22). Modern experience shows that trance and semi-trance pronouncements often contain a blend of truth and of the speaker's own wishes. As Jeremiah says in 23:16, "They speak visions of their own minds, not from the mouth of the Lord", and their dreams also are "the deceit of their own heart" (vs. 25, 26). We might prefer to speak of their subconscious or unconscious. Hence even prophets have to be included under the heading of messengers from beyond the veil. Some are genuine, but others are dangerous.

There is a little more to be said about mechanical methods. Some wish to include lots and the Urim and Thummim as forms of divination, but this is absurd. To toss a coin before a match is not divination. Lots were used to secure fair treatment in distributing the promised land among the tribes (Num. 26:55), to disclose guilty Achan (Josh. 7:14-18), and to choose Saul as king (1 Sam. 10:20-24), although in fact God had already chosen him through Samuel (1 Sam. 10:1). The last recorded use of the lot was in the choice of Matthias, (Acts 1:23-26), which, as some have pointed out, was before the pouring out of the guiding Spirit at Pentecost. After that it was the Holy Spirit who said, "Set apart for me Barnabas and Saul..." (Acts 13:2).

The Urim and Thummim were worn on the high priest's breastplate. They were used on occasions to give a Yes or No answer. This comes out clearly in 1 Sam. 23:10-12, where David obtains Yes answers to two questions about his possible arrest. Again, all modern translations of 1 Sam. 14:41 follow a text which gives Saul's words as "If this guilt is in me or in Jonathan... give Urim; but if in Israel, give Thummim." This is the nearest we come to discovering how these two stones were used, but we note that they were used solemnly in the context of prayer, perhaps being drawn out of their pouch containers.

The interesting and still undiscovered technical piece of occult practice is the use of the teraphim. Although plural in form, the word is singular in usage. It was evidently an image, sometimes small enough to be easily concealed, as by Rachel, who stole Laban's teraphim (Gen. 31:34). Yet the image might also be large, though not certainly so, since David's wife put the teraphim in his bed to deceive the messengers of Saul into thinking that David had been taken ill (1 Sam. 19:13). Elsewhere teraphim are used for magical purposes. Samuel equates them with divination and iniquity (1 Sam. 15:23). The king of Babylon uses teraphim to discover his plan of action (Ezek. 21:21).

In Zech. 10:2 teraphim, diviners and dreamers prove to be ineffective liars.

Perhaps the best way to bring these passages together is to derive the word from *rephaim*, the dead (RSV. the shades) in Prov. 2:18, Isa. 14:9 etc. They may then have been images of departed ancestors, preserved for a similar purpose to the Chinese ancestral tablets. Records from Mesopotamia have shown that possession of the household idols gave a son or son-in-law the primal right of inheritance. This accounts for Rachel's theft in the interests of Jacob, and possibly for Michal's securing of teraphim from Saul's home, but we cannot tell how they were used magically.

Before turning to some more specific points in the Old Testament, we ought to see the very few references to the occult in the New. The term *Magos* is used of the wise men from the East in Matthew 2. We can only guess at who they were, but they had evidently studied Jewish traditions among the many Jews still living in Mesopotamia. They may or may not have been astrologers in the usual sense, and the star, or configuration of stars, which they observed, was something different from the reading of the heavens in the usual astrological manner.

The term is used again of the magicians Simon and Elymas and their magic (Acts 8:9,11 & 13:6,8). Later in Acts 19:19 we have converts who had formerly practised magic arts (*periērga*) bringing their books to be burned. The only other reference, if we omit the girl at Philippi, is the use of the word *pharmakos* and cognates to describe sorcery as one of the works of the flesh (Gal. 5:20) and one of the evils of mankind and of Babylon the Great in Rev. 9:21; 18:23; 21:8; 22:15.

Returning now to the Old Testament, we ought to note a few passages where the Bible might seem to countenance superstition and even occult practices. Thus Leah uses mandrakes to cause fertility (Gen. 30:14-16) with apparent success. There is so much to be learned about fertility drugs that I would hesitate to deny the power to mandrakes in view of their use down the ages. But one must distinguish between a biblical command and a simple record of what happened, mandrakes or no mandrakes. Leah does not seem to have had fertility problems.

There is the story of Jacob's peeled rods producing variegated sheep and goats (Gen. 30:37-43). Whatever Jacob may have thought about the rods, it has been pointed out that he secured the results by selective breeding (v.41).

Finally under this head, did Joseph practise hydromancy in Egypt? He told his steward to say that the cup in Benjamin's sack is the one by which he divined (Gen. 44:5). The word is *nachash* (No.3 above). The reference is undoubtedly to a form of scrying. By gazing fixedly into liquid, a psychically inclined person sees pictures taking shape, as in crystal gazing. The probability is that a light auto-hypnotism releases psychic vision. We cannot say for certain that Joseph actually used this method, since it comes as part of a series of incidents in which Joseph and his steward are deliberately deceiving the brothers. In fact in v.15 Joseph claims that he has been divining, whereas, as the story shows, his recognition of his brothers needed no divination at all.

Obviously there is much more that could be said on the whole subject of the occult, but most of it would be of purely academic interest, as is obvious from what we have already said. But mediumship and spiritualism, which we left on one side in Deut. 18:11, is obviously relevant today. We need the answer to several questions. Does the verse refer to mediumship as it is known today? If so, does the ban still apply? If not, to what does it refer?

The three practitioners are translated by RSV as *Medium*, *Wizard*, and *Necromancer*. If the first and third are correct, and refer to contacting the departed, the translation *wizard* is out of place in between. Hence NEB has one who "traffics with ghosts and spirits, and no necromancer". The weakness of this translation is that people do not traffic with ghosts. Similarly the Jerusalem Bible has "consults ghosts or spirits, or calls up the dead".

The first practitioner is one who consults an *obh*. We shall look for the meaning of this later. The second is *yiddeoni*, from the root *yadah*, meaning to *know*. Hence a *knowing one*. Is this a man, or, as the lexicon says, a familiar spirit who is believed to have superior knowledge? The idea still lingers that the departed speak ex cathedra, as it were. The third practitioner is one who inquires of the dead, which is the literal translation. This should not be translated as necromancer, which commonly suggests the use of a corpse for magical purposes. The word for *dead* here is the equivalent of our *departed*. There are two other Hebrew words for dead bodies.

Let us take the middle word first and note its use in Scripture. It is coupled with *obh* again in Lev. 19:31; "Do not go after the *obhoth* and the *yiddeonim*" (both plural). Lev. 19.6 speaks in similar terms, and adds that God will set His face

against one who does so. There is no question of a death penalty for a client. But in Lev. 20:27 the death penalty is prescribed for a man or a woman in whom, or with whom, (either translation is possible) is an *obh* or a *yiddeoni*.

It is thus a reasonable conclusion that an *obh* and a *yiddeoni* are very similar, and it is surprising that Leonard Argyle in *Nothing to Hide*, virtually ignores the latter. Leviticus suggests that both are sought after by a client *via* the person who possesses them. This is even clearer in Isaiah 8:19; "When they say to you, Consult the *obhoth* and the *yiddeonim* who chirp and mutter, should not a people consult their God? Should they consult the dead on behalf of the living?" Consulting *obhoth* and *yiddeonim* is here exactly parallel to consulting the departed. Isaiah notes the change of voice that is characteristic of some mediumistic communications today. He speaks of it as varying between the twitter of a swallow and the low pitch of the dove or even the growl of a lion, for the word translated *mutter* is used of both in 31:4 and 38:14. The swallow with its twitter and the dove with its moan both come together in 38:14 with the same two verbs as are used in 8:19.

One further passage will enable us to draw the case together. It is the famous incident of the woman of Endor, not a witch but certainly a medium, who was expected to contact the departed. She is twice called "a woman who is mistress of an *obh*" (1 Sam. 28:7). The word translated *mistress* is a feminine of *baal*, lord or owner, and it would make good sense if the woman spoke of 'my control'. It is true that she is taken over by the spirit, but the spirit is dependent on her ownership if it is to manifest.

This is the conclusion towards which these arguments have been working. We are bound to say that the passages refer to mediums who have contact with, or possession by, spirits. If we make a distinction, we could fairly conclude in the light of modern mediumship that the *obh* is the regular control, and the *yiddeonim* are other spirits who can be called up and who respond in voices that are different from that of the medium.

There are only two passages that might upset this interpretation. One is 2 Kings 21:6, with the virtual parallel in 2 Chron. 33:6, where Manasseh used (RSV) an *obh* and *yiddeonim*. The word translated *used* (*asah*) is frequently translated *made*, but it is almost as general in scope as our English *do*, with many different translations, amongst which *used* is perfectly legitimate. Manasseh need not have made some solid objects.

The other is a reference to kings putting away *obhoth* and *yiddeonim* (1 Sam. 28:3; 2 Kings 23:24), but one can put away the spirits by banning the mediums.

There are some earnest Christians who believe that, in spite of the Old Testament ban, there is a place for Christian mediums (or sensitives) today. They commonly quote some of the minor commands of the Law, and say that, since they have been set aside, we need not insist on retaining the ban on mediumship. There is, however, a difference between, say, food laws which were repealed by Christ when, according to Mark 7.19, 'He declared all foods clean', and by Peter's vision in Acts 10,15 -- a difference between these and laws which have to do with permanent spiritual relationships. Moreover this argument would allow me to use sorcery, magic, and divination, which are here standing side by side with mediumship.

However, we must obviously see what light the New Testament throws on a possible lifting of the ban. The spirit in the mediumistic girl at Philippi was treated as an enemy to be cast out even though it testified to the truth of the Gospel (Acts 16:16-18). But, more importantly, in 1 Cor.15 and 1 Thes. 4 where Paul consoles Christians for the loss of loved ones, he does not say, as spiritualists would, 'Next Sunday our prophet-mediums will put you in touch with them.' Instead, he assures them that in Christ, who has risen from the dead, they will meet their loved ones again. The ban on direct communication has not been lifted. The Old Testament speaks of false prophets, and the New Testament does the same. The spirits have to be tested to see their attitude to Jesus Christ's incarnation and deity (1 John 4:1-3). Note that the good spirit is the Holy Spirit, the bad one is some hostile or misleading spirit. The test is not concerned with establishing whether the communicating spirit is your pious grandfather, for the New Testament knows of no such communication.

There is another attempted line of justification for the use of Christian mediums. This is to pick out the word *obh* and interpret it in isolation from the two following words. This is the line followed by Leonard Argyle in *Nothing to Hide*. In one single place, Job 32:19, *obh* means a leather wineskin. Transferring this to the other passages, Argyle concludes that the so-called medium was the possessor of a bag which 'makes a piping sound when pressed'. The medium was thus a fake, herself a 'windbag'.

Argyle continues by quoting the LXX translation of *obh*, which in Greek is *eggastrimuthos*, a ventriloquist, one who speaks in the belly. Evidently thinking of stage ventriloquism, Argyle concludes that the alleged medium was a fake ventriloquist. I spent some time in the University Library going through references that cover the period of the Septuagint translators and the early centuries of the Church, especially the new Lexicon by Lampe. In every quoted example, the word refers to someone who is genuinely possessed. The question is in which part of the body the spirit settles, a question which is still unanswered, except that some seem to use the voice box. But, since ectoplasm commonly comes from the belly, it is at least possible that some people experienced the spirit there. Theodotus defines *eggastrimuthos* as "Certain people who are energised by demons, whom the Greeks called *inner seers* since the daimon seems to speak from within"(quoted in Lampe). Or, to quote Plutarch (*Moralia* 414E), "To think, as do the *eggastrimuthoi* Eurycles of old and now the Pythones, that the god himself clothes himself with the bodies of the prophets, and speaks using their mouths and voices as instruments." One might add Plato (*Sophist* 252c) who laughs at the wonderful *eggastrimuthos* Eurycles, who finds his own ideas contradicted by the voice from his belly.

So, when the LXX uses the word as an equivalent of *obh*, it uses it to mean medium, and as the third word it has *one who enquires of the dead*. Thus the LXX has no intention of introducing fraudulent mediums with skin bottles. As regards the exact meaning of *obh* this is still a mystery. The Book of Job contains many unusual words and usages. But it is quite in order to follow, amongst others, Gaster and Albright, and find a cognate in the Arabic *aba* meaning to *return*, a most suitable title for a spirit.

Even if we were to allow Argyle's interpretation, we have still not taken account of the *yiddeonim*, and, although Argyle, rightly objecting to the title *necromancer* for the final member of the three, points out that the words are used only here, this last phrase certainly means, 'One who enquires of the dead'. It is almost as though the verse rounds off its meaning by using this general statement to cover all that is meant by the previous two.

It would take far too long to discuss the reason for the ban. Obviously spiritualism easily draws people from God as the primary object of devotion. I believe that a majority of messages are accounted for by clairvoyance and telepathy between medium and client, and to that extent they are deceptive in their alleged origin. But when one goes deeper and seeks theological

and philosophical answers from advanced spirits, the messages are wholly destructive of the Gospel that is centred in the deity, unique incarnation, atonement, and bodily resurrection of the Lord Jesus Christ, and thus are likely to emanate from evil spirits, if we apply the tests as John does in his first Epistle.

At the same time one can allow that God permits the return of the departed if He sees fit. Moses and Elijah returned at the Transfiguration. Abraham did not say that it was impossible for Lazarus to return, but only that it would be useless. Jesus did not deny that there were such entities as ghosts when He was mistaken for one in the upper room, but pointed out that His risen body was of a different quality from that of a spirit (Lk. 24:36-40). While one knows the power of suggestible hallucination, one need not dispute the word of someone who claims to have seen a loved one after death. What is wrong, according to Scripture, is any attempt to obtain a second communication through a medium.

So we return to what we said near the beginning of this paper. Any communication from the unseen must be initiated by God and not manipulated by men and women. Even prayer is to be drawn out by the Holy Spirit (Rom. 8:26,27). I personally would include natural psychic capacities as part of the make-up of some men, women, and children. These gifts should be handed over to God, like every gift, and He will either use them or suppress them as He sees fit. Danger comes through developing these capacities within the context of spiritualism.

I have not made any reference to exorcism. Some would count belief in spirits as superstitious and attempts to expel them as magical. The Bible treats them as real, and, although secular literature indicates that pagan exorcisms were done by magicians, the Bible does no more than refer to Jewish exorcists, whom Christ admitted did cast out demons (Matt. 12:27), and who tried to obtain results by using the name of Jesus (Acts 19:13-17). Magical exorcism consisted largely in setting one spirit against another.

With this we must close a paper which could have gone on and on. Like the Bible, I am against these things!

ESSAY REVIEW

ESSAYS BY JOHN LUCAS

The English of these essays¹ is clear, concise and graceful. None of the ideas are fog-bound. This is a great blessing -- which we have already come to expect from John Lucas.

This book contains a collection of 18 'occasional pieces' tossed off from time to time during the past few years. They do not form one thesis; and they all need further development. "If I had more time, I should rewrite these pieces into a coherent whole: but if I had had more time they might never have been written at all. They are occasional pieces, occasioned sometimes by an argument with a friend or with myself, sometimes by a meeting of the Metaphysicals, sometimes to provide a paper at someone's request...I grudge the tutorials and seminars and committee meetings which prevented me from following up ideas while they were still fresh in my mind. But equally, without the stimulus of particular arguments in particular contexts I might never have been moved to articulate my own views at all, and it was other men's disagreements that led me to develop arguments in favour of positions I had half-consciously taken up but had never adequately maintained or defended". (p.ix) Thus Lucas is not an advocate arguing one case; he is not pompous; he does not set out to be a systematizer in the heavy German mode; he goes in for wise waspish stings rather than for sledge-hammer refutations. It is to be hoped that some of his readers will be excited into further thinking about his own hints and *obiter dicta*.

It is made clear in the Author's Preface that the papers have some common themes and are set against a particular intellectual background. Like others, he found the philosophical climate of Oxford one of extreme aridity. "An ability not to be convinced was the most powerful part of a young philosopher's armoury: a competent tutor could disbelieve any proposition, no matter how true it was, and the more sophisticated could not even understand the meaning of what was being asserted." Epistemology, logic and semantics tended to exclude other questions of larger import. But John Lucas refused to believe that profundities can be "settled by the niceties of English usage." Indeed the last essay in the book is entitled *Non Credo*. He rejects phenomenalism, solipsism, materialism, determinism, irrationalism, emotivism, pragmatism, subjectivism, together with many other *bliks*, assumptions and philosophies.

These occasional pieces (whether philosophical papers or sermons) do not really lack unity. John Lucas has already written an equally clear and graceful book, of a much more technical sort, on *The Freedom of the Will* (OUP, 1970). In this he sought to show that the doctrine of absolute determinism cannot logically be maintained. It is logically self-contradictory and therefore *certainly* false. But if the absolute determinism of the philosophers (and therefore the 'predestination' of the theologians) *must* be false, a number of theological and moral statements need to be re-examined. What about the relations between human freedom (what Tennant used to call 'delegated creativity') and divine providence, whether general or special? The term 'Grace' in these essays seems to comprehend all the ways in which God may help, guide, restrain, enlighten and provide for us. Some preachers and theologians insist on our temporary power to frustrate God's own aims: but they insist equally on God's power to win the game in the last move. This is not an altogether satisfactory 'model': if your reviewer, an amateur chess-player, were playing an enjoyable game of chess with the greatest of all Chess Masters - alleged to be omniscient - he might feel little more than a puppet, fated to *lose*. This might induce in the Christian believer just that sort of schizoid paranoia which upsets John Wren-Lewis and Feuerbach alike.

But assuming that we do have moral freedom and do in fact influence our own destiny and that of the world, we need to examine the meaning of 'Acts of God', whether they be 'miracles' or providential 'guidance'. We also need to discuss the principles according to which we ought to act and the standards by which we might be judged to be successful or unsuccessful. This brings us to the meaning of blame and praise. The moralists (especially the neo-Kantians) and the psychotherapists view such matters from very different angles.

The problems connected with blame and praise lead on to 'forgiveness', a matter which is discussed by moralists, psychologists and theologians alike. It is usually supposed to be the Christian virtue *par excellence*. But what does it *mean*? Lucas's essay (No. 10) on this is excellent. If forgiveness is hard to get, then the situation is sub-Christian. If it can be obtained too freely then this may be somewhat insulting to the offender. I can shrug off an offence with "It doesn't really matter" when in fact it matters to me very much indeed. Or I can emphasise extenuating circumstances in such a way as to imply (falsely) that there was no moral fault at all. This again may imply moral contempt. Surely I cannot interpret Christ's prayer, "Father, forgive them for they know not what they do" to mean

"They are such stupid morons, and so utterly lacking in any moral sense that one could hardly expect anything better from them." Yet the psychologist's attitude of 'acceptance', without any attempt at moral judgment, may sometimes be equally insulting. According to Lucas "Most Christian thinking about forgiveness has been either too soft or too hard. The soft doctrine of forgiveness — the one most in fashion in this present age — construes forgiveness as a general indifference to what other people do. If people do wrong and tender their apologies — or even if they do wrong and do not tender their apologies — we should not mind, and carry on regardless...Christians of earlier generations often erred in the opposite way by having too tough a doctrine of forgiveness. They were overwhelmed by a sense of man's littleness and God's goodness, and the enormity of man's supposing that he could get away with defying God's will, and could expect still to be admitted to God's good books. Underlying this doctrine is a conflation of a number of different insights: that God's standards are very much higher than man's, so that almost nothing I can do can be good enough for Him; that man's motives are mixed and his heart corrupt, so that his repentance is seldom truly sincere; and, above all, that forgiveness, like friendship, is a favour, not a right. It is easy to express these insights by assimilating the language of penance and forgiveness to that of penalty and pardon; but penalties, if not remitted, can be paid, and once paid cannot be further exacted; whereas, since no amount of penitence and penance can force forgiveness, we are led to view the penalties imposed by God's justice as being disproportionately severe in order to be commensurable with His mercy in pardoning us and restoring us to His favour. What has gone wrong is that we are attempting to express insights about personal relationships in essentially inappropriate legal terms. Forgiveness is not a legal concept, a sort of celestial pardoning, but a personal one. We cannot be forgiven as of right, any more than we can be favoured with God's friendship as of right. God is not obliged to like us or regard us as His children any more than we are obliged to like one another or regard one another as brothers. But God does, as we, on occasion and to a limited extent, do." (pp.84-85)

Essay No. 9 on 'Forgiveness and Frustration' was a paper for the Anglican Marriage Commission. It concerns the bearing of forgiveness on the doctrine of marriage: can our marriage vows ever be *frustrated* and therefore made null and void by the behaviour of a spouse? Can the Church forgive those who seek to remarry after divorce? What would such forgiveness mean?

In general, Christian ethics are based on our personal relationship with God and Christ. They are responses to God's love. They are not based on "the austere impersonality of the categorical imperative." (p.137)

Another important paper republished here is No. 11 on "Childlike Morality". This was a reply to an article by Professor P.H. Nowell-Smith in the *Rationalist Annual*, 1961. Professor Nowell-Smith had maintained that religious morality is infantile.

Essays No. 6 and 7 give an account of sin and of Atonement and Redemption. The key concept of atonement and redemption is divine love, and this involves a discussion of the logic of love. Here again, John Lucas treats the interaction between God and man as analogous to a personal relationship. It is not analogous to a legal relationship.

Perhaps the key essay of the book is No. 8, *Reasons for Loving and Being Loved*. This is so elegant and subtle and so psychologically perceptive that it might be unfair to précis it or to quote from it. The question is, "Should a person be loved on account of some of his characteristics or should he, rather, be loved for himself alone? Either way we run into difficulties. If we say that it is the characteristics which constitute the reason why someone should be loved, we seem to be denying his unique individuality, and to be saying that anyone with these characteristics is worthy to be loved." (p.64) "This is to denature personality. You are no longer uniquely you, but merely one among many potential bearers of specific lovable characteristics. And so you protest and say that you want to be loved not because you are F, G, and H, but simply because you are you. But that too is unacceptable. It divorces your 'youness' from all your characteristics." (p.64)

The importance of this essay is that it is attacking a reductionist analysis of personality. However carefully the scientific analysts may analyse a person, there is always 'more to the person than all the characteristics' cited. "At every stage any account of what it is that makes a person lovable will be based on only some initial segment of the infinite list of features that characterize him...We cannot say what they all are, but believe that they individuate uniquely: no other person could have all the significant characteristics the same as you do. And so it is natural to say that I love you because you are you." (p.68)

Several other important essays remain unmentioned in this review. But they are all graceful and suggestive. It is much to be hoped that John Lucas will eventually find the time to make a general sketch of Christian theology on these lines and in this style.

A.C. ADCOCK

1. J.R. Lucas, *Freedom and Grace*, SPCK, 1976, 138pp., £3.95.



Our Home

Writing on the failure to find life on Mars or Venus Thomas H. Jukes writes in *Nature* (267, 751) - "And so the Earth spins on its orbit delicately poised between the sterile inferno of Venus and the cold and dreary desolation of Mars. We are just the right distance from the Sun to be the planet of harvest, dew and rain; the source and abode of life, unnumbered as the sand."

ESSAY REVIEW

A HISTORY OF THE CICCUC¹ AND SOME PERSONAL REMINISCENCES

Dr. O.R. Barclay has recently written a welcome history of the CICCUC (Cambridge Intercollegiate Christian Union) which celebrates its centenary this year. The strange title (*What ever happened to the Jesus Lane Lot?*) is a reference to the group of students, known as the Jesus Lane Lot, who proved to be the embryonic CICCUC of those days.

Dr. Barclay, a former CICCUC President and now General Secretary of the Universities and Colleges Christian Fellowship (UCCF, formerly IVF) has kept in touch with the CICCUC since his days at Cambridge and has obviously worked hard to compile this very readable and interesting story of the CICCUC from its earliest days right up to 1977. In doing so, he has made good use of J.C. Pollock's *A Cambridge Movement* (1953).

In the present book there are nine chapters in all covering, usually, ten or twenty years apiece. The overall picture is most inspiring, for the CICCUC in Cambridge has spread its influence during the century over the entire world. There were times when most CMS missionaries and a high proportion of ordinands in the C. of E. were CICCUC men. The influence of the Christian Union at Oxford was less marked and, of course, until recent times Cambridge and Oxford, with London as a later addition, were the only English Universities. Today such institutions are numerous and the influence of any one of them, including Cambridge, is correspondingly less.

Many interesting themes and points of view find expression in this book which tells how successive generations of students faced new and ever changing situations. Many of the difficulties encountered were caused by the rise of liberal theology which came to be accepted by nearly all scholars from the turn of the century onwards. Why? Charles Smyth, a historian, finds the chief cause to be the enormous missionary emphasis existing in the christian student world of the time. Theological leadership and teaching at home was left to lesser minds, for the most part lacking strong christian convictions: the ablest of committed Christians went abroad where missionary casualties were high, especially as malaria was still rampant in many countries. The average life of the

Bishops of Sierra Leone, for instance, was at one stage little more than two years! On the other hand "missionary blood-letting" was its glory and led under God to the foundation of evangelical churches all round the world.

Having once started to read this book I found it nearly impossible to stop! For me, the reviewer, it brought back legions of memories of Cambridge days, for I knew so many of those mentioned. One could only wish that the book has been three times the length! To have covered so much ground in 200 pages, and to have done it so interestingly is a credit to the author. Nevertheless the sheer brevity at times means that there is an occasional jump to another topic just as one is becoming fascinated by what one has already read. No doubt, however, a longer book would have proved less interesting to non-Cambridge men!

In the remainder of this essay I shall try to fill in the picture a little for the period when I was up (1925-39). Though the result is bound to be ideosyncratic, it will probably be of interest to many readers.

I think the first CICCU man I got to know at all well was L.S.B. Leakey, apart, that is, from old school friends who came to Cambridge at the same time. Leakey had been at St. John's for a year and had come, with very little money, to train to be a missionary (see his autobiography). His boyhood, spent among the Kikuyu in Kenya, set him up in life with an unusual outlook. As a scholar of St. John's he was required to read grace (in Latin) at Hall and with others he set about creating a record by doing it in the shortest possible time — being hauled before the Dean for his efforts! A trifle irreverent, I felt, especially as he was CICCU representative at the time. Looking back I think the explanation may be that he hardly understood a word of Latin and so did not realise what the prayer of thanksgiving was all about. Cleverly, he discovered that the University Statutes did not absolutely insist on Latin or Greek for Little-Go (the entrance examination): any non-European language would do instead. So he offered Kikuyu which he knew, perhaps, better than anyone else in England at the time. This put the University in a bit of a spot. They looked around for a suitable examiner and were advised that a certain Mr. L.S.B. Leakey should be approached! In the end I rather think he examined and passed himself, or at least helped his examiner to examine him! Later, while still an undergraduate, he was called upon to lecture to his own class.

Returning to the story, something suddenly happened. I never quite learned what, but the CICCU Executive fired Leakey from his position as college representative of the Union (the late R.M. Scantlebury then became representative) and he was deeply hurt. The trouble may have had something to do with his belief in man's evolution, but Leakey did not think his views were in any way in conflict with the Bible. Leakey was a passionately dedicated Christian. Every night before Hall he had a prayer meeting in his college rooms and after the row with the CICCU Executive he poured out his soul to God, many a time, praying for his friends in College. I could not understand why this deeply devout, lovable if unorthodox fellow, who had come at great personal cost from far away Kenya and from missionary parents, with the intention of becoming a missionary himself, should have been rejected by the far less mature Christians of the Executive. Soon after this sad experience Leakey began to think that the missionary societies might reject him too. So he changed his line to anthropology and shocked the narrower Christian world by writing *Adam's Ancestors*. But he did not lose interest in mission work and for years after, when back in Cambridge, he would attend the CICCU daily prayer meeting (DPM as it was called) and pray aloud.

No doubt it was right -- and Barclay defends the position well -- for the CICCU to maintain a distinctive witness. But it was infinitely sad that in doing so it sometimes caused great pain to other Christians. One is reminded of the rejection of F.W. Newman (brother of the Cardinal) by J.N. Darby in the early days of the Brethren Movement. The tragic side of Christian orthodoxy and of distinctive witness deserves some comment in Barclay's book, I think. Unfortunately it receives none.

Leakey was fascinating to talk to. He gave me some insight into the silly mistakes Christians can make by failing to check easily ascertained facts. For instance in Kenya, a missionary had translated "virgin" in the NT by a word which to the native means a girl who has regular sexual affairs with boys but is not married. Without knowing it, missionaries were teaching or implying that this was the right thing for young Christians to do, for they always said that Mary was such a good woman!

In the late 1920s and in the '30s the CICCU was relatively small and much despised by academics. I remember (in 1929) reading Canon Raven's book, *A Wanderers Way*, in which he lampoons CICCU men as follows. "Most of its members fall into one of two types" he says, "they are either highly suggestible with that strange and almost unearthly look which is the seal of a child-like faith,

or they are hard, thin-lipped, obviously repressing a mass of unexamined doubts, men of strong will and narrow bigotry". Either way, says Raven, they only manage to maintain their faith "by withdrawing from contact with their fellows, by living in a close community, and by rigid discipline of prayer-meetings and Bible readings. The amount of harm they do to the religion of Jesus is simply incalculable". And again, "It seemed incredible that anyone with sufficient education to pass Little-go should still believe in the talking serpent, or Jonah's whale, or Balaam's ass, or Joshua's sun, or the cryptograms that foretold the second advent."

Faced with that kind of criticism, it was too much to expect inexperienced undergraduates like me, straight from school, to have the wisdom of Solomon. Some of us reacted strongly — at least I did! Many a rare battle ensued with prominent theologians of the time — the College Chaplain, Bethune-Baker, J.M. Creed (the Dean) and others! An ignorant freshman one might well be, but it seemed wrong not to denounce the hypocrisy of reverend gentlemen who had affirmed belief in the Holy Scriptures and creeds to gain their positions, yet who openly tried to turn us undergrads into partners in their unbelief!... And not theologians only... In a chemistry Supervision in College my Supervisor used God's name in vain...well... a fellow student whom I had not seen or heard of for 50 years reminded me only the other day at a college reunion of what transpired! Probably I was rude and insolent but in the end God used my protest in a wonderful way.

The fact was that one had to fight to keep sane and true to God. Or so it seemed at the time. Many other CICCU men probably felt the same. And as a form of release they would sometimes do the strangest things. There was — (I had better not print his name!) who armed himself with brushes and little tins of paint and went into the RC church where he proceeded to paint their images for them. Very naughty! One member of the CICCU, who later became President, after indulging in the usual (for those days) riotous behaviour on the 5th of November dislodged a policeman's helmet (later the kind policeman gave it to him and the helmet is still a treasured possession!) and was taken with other undergraduates into custody for the night where he taught them all to sing hymns and choruses!

In some ways, however, the Cambridge so fiercely critical of our evangelical Christianity made us (me at least) sceptical of the sceptics. I owe much to W.H. Mills, FRS, my research supervisor, a world renowned stereochemist. In his brilliant and inspiring lectures he cared for no man's reputation. Theories invented in Victorian times which had been repeated in text-books for half a

century and more and regurgitated by generation after generation of students were quickly and unceremoniously dismissed as nonsense in the light of simple experimental evidence, and often with dry humour. In chemistry you can frame experiments to test theories, in theology this is just what you cannot do. It hardly seemed plausible to suppose that Wellhausen and his ilk were right, dead right, while the great chemists of the past had so often been wrong, especially when they relied too much on their brains instead of experiment and observation.

I read physiology for Part 1 of the Natural Sciences Tripos and tried to broaden my interests by attending lectures at scientific societies where biologists often spoke. When evolution cropped up, famous men sometimes introduced the subject almost apologetically. That Darwin's doctrine of the selection of the fittest could account for more than a minute fraction of the wonders of biology always seemed to me highly improbable. One well known atheist, a man whose knowledge seemed astronomical, ridiculed the theory without mercy. In scientific circles it seemed to be accepted, not because of any plausibility it might possess, but for want of something better. Or else it was a faith held, passionately, by people who did not think carefully about what was involved. Here was a marvellous nineteenth century theory purporting to explain the whole realm of life. But would anyone take such a theory so seriously outside the field of biology? Chemistry was the most advanced of the sciences. In its early days the Newtonian chemists maintained that all particles were held together by gravity. In the nineteenth century progress was impeded by the doctrine that all atoms must possess positive or negative electric charges which serve to stick them together in compounds. These and other comprehensive theories, in their day, at least, must have seemed quite as plausible as Darwin's later theory, but they turned out to be wrong or (as with charged atoms) true only within a limited range. There seemed to be no grounds for taking Darwinism too seriously, though evolution was probably true within limited ranges.

I think most CICCU men either rejected evolution or had serious doubts. But with liberal theologians, or "modernists" as they were then called, it was otherwise. They talked about evolution as if there was no possibility of legitimate doubt. Charles Raven was one offender (though one was grateful to him later for his criticism of mechanistic evolution and in other ways too). For him evolution was the Holy Spirit. After reading his book (*The Creator Spirit*, 1927) one could only feel that this opinion was as silly as that of Robert Roberts, the Christadelphian (author of *Christendom Astray*, 1861) who identified the Holy Spirit with electricity. As time

passed I felt increasingly that, even if CICCU men were not all as thoughtful as one would have liked them to be, yet God kept them wonderfully free from the sophisticated nonsense prevalent in other religious circles. Sensible earnest discussion and seeking for truth was possible with CICCU friends: those who thought we were lunatics had on the whole little useful to say. I realise looking back that I must often have seemed to outsiders, and some insiders too, self-opinionated, even arrogant. But was there not arrogance too in those who dismissed God's revelation as of no account, who denied even that we are sinners and need forgiveness, all on the flimsy basis of woolly-minded materialistic theorizing?

There were other ways, too, in which the theological faculty destroyed its own credibility. Chris Cook (C.L. Cook) of Pembroke College who read theology told me how on one occasion, as a raw undergraduate, he mentioned a flighty idea of his to one of his lecturers. Some time later the man reproduced the idea back to Chris, saying that he could not remember which professor had made the interesting suggestion though he was sure that he had heard it quite recently! As Chris rightly said, one could hardly imagine this happening in any other Faculty! Or again, points which to a Bible reading student like me seemed very elementary indeed, seemed to lie at the fringe of knowledge among theologians. I remember saying at a meeting that, what ever His disciples might have thought, there was a good deal in the NT to show that Jesus Himself did not expect His second advent to be near at hand. And a theologian looked at me gravely and said in a condescending way that I had uncommon discernment! One evening, (this was a few years later) Joseph Needham gave a lecture on Theological Embryology to the St. John's Theological Society. The theological faculty was well represented. Needham told the story of how the RC theologians (they held a conference on the subject at the Sorbonne in 1733) reckoned that if there was any chance of a baby dying in its mother's womb before it was born, it was essential for the well being of its soul that it should be baptised. So a devout RC surgeon, F.E. Cangiamilla by name, invented a syringe for the purpose with a little cross at the end through which the baptismal water was poured. One child suffered five baptisms, in all, each 'under condition' just in case the one before was invalid! The theologians, who seemed never to have thought of this, were quite flumuxed! Soon they started to argue that in their opinion nothing magical happened to a child at baptism but that baptism was a convenient initiation into the church where it would grow up in Christian surroundings. I asked them whether, seeing that this was so, they would find it needful to baptise a child that was at the point of death, who clearly had no prospect of growing up in the church.

Silence! Needham looked round saying that he thought this was a highly relevant question. There was a long silence in which you could have heard a pin drop. Finally someone said that one ought not to be too logical! Again one felt that professional theologians apparently did not think their position out any more carefully than CICCU men and were hardly to be trusted when they maintained that belief in the Bible was unscholarly.

On the other hand even the liberal theology of those days was not all unprofitable. I regularly attended lectures, organised by the SCM, at which F.R. Tennant spoke. Though a bit pompous they were impressive and helpful. And to Dr. A.C. Bouquet, too, whose theological seminar I joined, I owe a deep sense of gratitude. But neither of these scholars were anti-evangelical. Later, I attended C.D. Broad's Lectures for Part 2 of the Moral Sciences Tripos. They were a trifle dull, but his writings influenced me greatly. Though an atheist he did as much as anyone to confirm my faith and I have learned since that I am not alone in this. Years later I wrote to tell him so and to thank him and had a kind letter in reply. All these experiences confirmed my loyalty to the CICCU. If its members (and me too) made mistakes, at least their hearts were in the right place.

Quite often older Christians circulated amongst us. There was one George —, a retired missionary, who created much disunity in the CICCU with his teaching about a second blessing which he claimed to have received. He had achieved a state of sinlessness as a result and he told us that he had done nothing wrong for (I think) forty years. So an undergrad deliberately stamped on his toes and George said angrily, "Why did you do that?..."! Hampden-Cook, the Editor of Weymouth's translation of the NT retired in Cambridge and visited us (or me) often, seeking to put across his strange preterist idea of the second coming of Christ. And of course we all knew Basil Atkinson who figures much in Barclay's book. Tales of Basil and his doings were legion. When Buchman's teaching on guidance was doing the rounds, Basil published his little book *Is the Bible True?* (2/6) A CICCU wit summed up the position:

Basil, Basil, tell me the answer do
 Tell me, tell me, is the Bible true?
 Veriker likes to shout it.
 Buchman has guidance to doubt it.
 But now we can get,
 For two and six net,
 An unbiased account by you.

(Veriker, if I remember correctly, was on the staff of the Crusader's Union).

I shall never forget how, in the days of the Open Air meetings run by the CICCUC, on one occasion the President of the SCM was asked to speak. Afterwards, when it was Basil's turn he referred to this "determined attack by the Enemy". Most of us were shocked especially as nothing, so far as we knew at all heretical, had been said. To his credit, be it said, Basil was much wiser in later days and was a pillar of strength and friendship to the CICCUC until the end of his life as Barclay rightly says.

Much as one agreed with what CICCUC preachers said, the standard they set was often very low — though there were a few notable exceptions (especially Rendle Short, Mowll the schoolmaster and brother of the bishop, and some missionary speakers). They came, often, for weekends from country parishes where the standards of preaching were not up to academic level! Sometimes astonishing things were said. I remember one preacher saying that he would never read a book in which "He" referring to our Lord, was spelt with a small h — which, as an undergrad (later an eminent professor) pointed out, meant that he never read the NT!

Barclay mentions the ever-cheerful L.F.E. Wilkinson ("Wilkie") who at the time of the General Strike "drove a tram with a zest and fervour that even Jehu might have admired." I shall never forget seeing Wilkie dodging across the road just in front of a lorry as it turned into East Road. It was in the summer term when examinations were pending. Having escaped an accident so narrowly Wilkie twisted his head round and shouted out to the lorry driver, "Nearly an aegrotat!".

The atmosphere at the time of the General Strike was quite fantastic. Students went off in gangs when they heard that various groups of workers had gone on strike. Chemical enthusiast that I was, I volunteered to work at the gas works — but the men there obligingly kept at work. Later I was just about to go to the London docks when, quite suddenly, the strike collapsed. At the time of the Strike all over Cambridge people were milling around with nothing to do, only too anxious to talk. Once I went down Mill Road. Soon I got talking with a man about Christianity. Within a minute or so an enormous crowd had collected. Then the police pushed their way in to say that I or we had completely blocked Mill Road to traffic, so would I please talk in a side road. It proved impossible to push one's way there so the police came again and this time they managed, somehow, to stop us talking. The crowd milled its way to Parker's Piece. Before long I found myself addressing, not all successfully, an audience of several hundred! Looking back I feel humbled for I never really knew how to rise to the opportunities offered.

The Willie Nicholson mission, described by Barclay, was a high light for all who were up at the time. It was not possible for me, at least, to go every night, for work pressure on us science students was intense and G.F.C. Searle could be quite fearsome towards students who had not written up their last experiment in physics. Searle, an antivivisectionist and Christian Scientist, was quite a character. Often he reduced women students in his class to tears and then invited them to breakfast for the following morning. Once a young lady was in despair because the needle of her magnetometer kept moving unaccountably and it proved impossible for her to take a reading. She appealed to Searle for help. He summed up the position with alacrity and shouted loudly for us all to hear - "Well! If you will wear steel corsets!" I did not like following the voluminous directions he issued with each experiment too slavishly and sometimes altered things to modify the experimental set-ups. At last Searle's wrath was kindled. "Some men are fools!" he started. I looked at him straight in the face and said "Yes Sir, I quite agree with you. But are you implying that I am one of them?" "Well" and he looked away, "I wouldn't like to put it quite like that" he said. He walked off sheepishly and never spoke to me again throughout the course for which I was deeply thankful. His young demonstrator was always more than helpful. In later years Searle always chatted in the friendliest of ways when we met in the street and once or twice I visited his home.

To continue, I managed to get along to the mission several nights and brought friends. In the pulpet Willie Nick was exuberant, shockingly crude, but in deadly earnest. At DPM we met him daily and there his character was quite changed. He was delightful, humble and saintly: it was impossible not to love him. Those who did not see this side of him were often offended, including a friend of mine who reckons that he was put back months in his search for God by Willie Nick. (But another friend, Ted Yorke of Caius, was wonderfully converted.) One memory is still vivid. Nicholson had been preaching solidly since 8.30 p.m. and now it was just before 10 o'clock by which time, at some colleges, students were expected to be in. A man right in the front of the church got up and walked quietly down the aisle to leave. It was not a gesture of defiance by the look of things: in any case a mocker would surely have made his protest much earlier in the evening! But Willie was roused to wrath! He shouted, he yelled, he thundered at that wicked sinner who was certainly choosing hell instead of Christ and whose conscience had so obviously been pricked. Why should he walk out just as the moment of decision had come? On and on he fulminated till the poor fellow had left by the door. How wrong this seemed at the time but it brought home the lesson that one can love and

admire fellow Christians even though they do things which, to us, may seem revoltingly wrong. God makes use of all kinds of quaint people and certainly He saw fit to make use of this fiery Irishman. Episodes like this also help us to feel sympathetically towards non-Christians when they criticise those who work for God.

Finally, I cannot thank God enough for the CICCUC. From the very start it provided warm friendship for an impecunious and otherwise lonely undergraduate. I shall never forget going, for the first time, to Dr. McCombie's chemical laboratory where there was no formal teaching and one was left a good deal on one's own though with some supervision. At once T.L. Livermore, then in his second year, who had seen me at DPM, recognised me and made me feel at home. Under H.R. Gough's Presidency a CICCUC Club was opened in the town and there was a CICCUC hockey club called the DODOS where men like me who did not shine at sport could enjoy themselves. (The College athletic clubs of those days at once dropped your name if your standard of play was below average.) For some reason I got in with the Sidney Sussex CICCUC (J.S. Wright and others) as much or more than with those of St. John's which was perhaps rather weak at the time. Soon I made many good friends outside the CICCUC too. How sad it is with friendships that though they are so many and so precious, it is impossible to keep up with more than a very very few. For fellow Christians at least we have the hope that "with the morn/
Those angel faces shine/Which I have loved long since and lost awhile"

¹ O.R. Barclay, *Whatever Happened to the Jesus Lane Lot?*, IVP, 1977, 176pp, £2.25 and £0.95.

REVIEWS

Cynthia Petteward, *The Case for Possession*, Colin Smythe Ltd., 1975, 129pp., £2-50

This is an interesting book, though unorthodox from a Christian point of view. The author does not deny that there may be demons who possess people, but she holds that all the cases of possession she has studied are best explained in terms of the earth bound spirits of those who have died. She has an interesting chapter on reincarnation in which she pictures a person who has died finding him/her self free to enter a yet untenanted body, a foetus or a new born child. In cases of possession the spirit, feeling lost and bewildered, becomes parasitic on an already existing individual.

The book compares in some detail the writings of Carl Wickland who worked among the insane in the USA (*Thirty Years among the Dead*) and Dr. Inacio Ferreira who is still alive and works in a hospital in Brazil. The first volume of Ferreira's work covered the years 1934-45, the second appeared in 1949 and the third is yet on the way. These are written in Portugese, have not been translated, and were unknown to Wickland. However, the claim is made that both came to very similar conclusions as a result of similar experiences.

Possessing spirits usually show an extremely evil disposition. However "sheer brutality and ugliness of thought and behaviour is not a criterion of diabolic origin" though "many observed cases of possession by discarnate human humans exhibit a horrifying degree of distorted evil-mindedness." Ferreira (there are said to be in all 24 mental hospitals in Brazil where the same methods are used) treats patients by showing sympathy with the possessing spirits. At first there is often violent opposition. The idea is to persuade the spirit to repent and, if possible, by making use of a medium, to enlist the aid of the spirit's dead relatives from the other world. When once an earth-bound spirit has seen the evil of its ways, it will start on the upward path (as in spiritist doctrine). It is claimed that many permanent cures have been effected in this way.

In a later chapter the author draws attention to one striking difference between Wickland and Ferreira which she does not understand. "The conception of the after-life varies from culture to culture... one type of after-life could be characteristic of one culture, another of another, and they could be mutually exclusive, though intermingling where races intermingle." This suggests that in the after-life everything is created by thought, including pain and all forms of suffering. In Brazil there is a great deal of personal hatred and vendettas are common. The dominant religion there is a curious mixture of Roman Catholicism and Spiritualism, with wide acceptance of reincarnation and both the patients and the spirits possessing them claim to have lived before. The spirits explain that they possess patients in order to give vent to vendettas. These often go back for generations, sometimes indeed for three or four centuries. Often they are associated with great cruelty. Wickland, on the other hand worked in USA where both family vendettas and belief in reincarnation are rare. None of the spirits he encountered claimed to be motivated by a desire for revenge and only once did one claim to have lived in human form before. Cruelty, however, was common.

The general picture which emerges is that there is no justice in the life to come. Earthbound spirits may suffer and be persecuted for long periods, though with little sense of the passage of time: they may also suffer for faults which were not their own.

The conclusion reached is that one must always be kind to the spirits. Merely casting them out will mean that they will make off to possess other people.

The book contains a good deal of referenced material on multiple personality and alleged reincarnation which makes it a mine of information despite the author's marked spiritistic leanings.

There is no academic attempt to prove the spirit hypothesis but William James (1906) is quoted with approval: "The refusal of modern 'enlightenment' to treat 'possession' as a hypothesis to be spoken of as even possible, in spite of the massive human tradition based on concrete experience in its favour, has always seemed to me a curious example of the power of fashion in things scientific. That the demon theory will have its innings again is to my mind absolutely certain. One has to be 'scientific' indeed, to be blind and ignorant enough to suspect no such possibility".

Biblical cases of possession are considered and it is argued that Jesus showed no sympathy for the spirits whatever. This is

not perhaps true. It would not be unnatural to detect such a note in the words "Rejoice not that the spirits are subject to you".

An attempt is made to argue that the "demons" of the NT might very well be dead people. If so, says the author, it puts the RC church in a difficult position. For the church teaches that it is sinful to converse with the dead, which (if the spirits are dead people) rules out exorcism!

Despite the mass of material which the spiritists pour out, it would seem to the reviewer that the facts are more easily squared with traditional Christian doctrine than with that of the Spiritists. One can hardly feel confident that possessing spirits, or spirits with whom controls of mediums purport to make contact, are telling the truth when they say they were once human beings on earth, seeing that (as we are informed by the author for the former at least), they quite often forget their earthly names, yet remember all kinds of trivial details about their former lives which are often verifiable.

The cultural difference, so puzzling to Miss Petteward, suggests that what possessing spirits say about themselves and their motives is wholly unreliable. They say what will appear plausible to those around. In a land where vendettas are common and reincarnation widely accepted, they claim to be people who have lived before and who are working out vendettas on their enemies. In the USA where such ideas are not culturally acceptable, no such claims are made and only one of Westland's spirits claimed to have lived in human form before. Writing from Yencheng, Ku, China, Dr. H.W. White who studied the subject first hand (see his book *Demonism Verified and Analysed*, 1922) says, "The Impersonation hypothesis seems to fit the case. The 'demons' in this country often claim to be foxes or weasels, but in New Zealand they represent the pig concept. I have never heard of a pig demon in China" (personal communication, 6 June 1934).

One further comment. If reincarnation is common among men and if Spiritists are right in thinking that mankind is on the upward path, so that even the worst of sinners will slowly learn good ways and reach higher spheres, then one might suppose that mankind is slowly improving. For those who reincarnate have gained more and more experience between their numerous lives on earth as the ages pass and have evolved morally in the process. But can it seriously be said that this is so?

REDC

Donald Bridge and David Phipers, *The Water that Divides: The Baptist Debate*, IVP, 1977, 208pp, £1.60.

"Baptism is once again the subject of keen discussion among Christians of all kinds". It is incredible but true that divisions on whether or no children should be baptised led in the past even to killings. Today it leads to discussion only, but also to a great deal of embarrassment, especially after conversions.

In this book Donald Bridge, a baptist (note the small b) and David Phipers, a paedobaptist (i.e. one who baptises infants) join forces and make constructive suggestions for a way forward. The pattern is based on Acts 15 where the differences arising in the early church were not dissimilar to those facing us today: there was give and take on both sides. It is suggested that baptist churches should accept into membership those who have been accredited members of other churches, but demand baptism for those who have recently been converted and join the church from the outside. This and other suggestions are all sensible and animated by a christian spirit and it is likely that they will command wide assent.

The book itself consists of three parts. In Part 1 the references to baptism in the NT are discussed: this is followed by two chapters, one by each of the authors, expressing their own points of view. Part 2, by far the saddest, outlines the history of the subject from the earliest times, stress being given to the Radical Reformation and the cruelties of the Reformers towards so-called anabaptists. Part 3 is concerned with baptism today: in this two chapters provide an outline of the problems facing paedobaptists and baptists respectively, after which "the real issues" and the way forward receive attention. The treatment is interesting and profitable.

A possible criticism is that in the discussion on paedobaptism attention is confined to whether or no children should be baptised: the language of the Prayer Book in connection with such baptisms receives no attention. Yet many might feel that this is more objectionable, even, than infant baptism itself.

Some of the historical asides are very interesting. For example Martin Luther believed that in the act of baptism faith is infused into the life of the infant. He quoted Lk. 1:4 ("the babe in my womb leaped for joy" and Lk. 1:15(which says that John would

be "filled with the Holy Spirit, even from his mother's womb") to prove that infants can be filled with the Holy Spirit and so may possess at least enough faith for baptism to be meaningful. But it is curious that those, in Protestant circles, who use arguments of this kind fail to go further. For if a child before it is born can possess faith, then why should it not be baptised before it is born? Here Roman Catholics are more consistent than Protestants. Another curious argument (p.49) is this: "Not only is it unrealistic to demand faith before baptism, it is also unscriptural. Jesus said, Judge not, that you be not judged." But the author (DP) later admits that since it is obviously wrong to baptise the children of unbelievers, it will always be necessary to judge whether the parents are genuine Christians or not. So what is the point of the earlier comment?

The book starts off with the promise that with rare exceptions (Salvationists and Quakers) all Christian groups regard baptism as the door of entry into the church. The proof text for this is 1 Cor. 12:13, "By one Spirit were we all baptised into one body", a verse quoted a number of times, but unsupported by any other Scripture. It can reasonably be argued that these words are quoted out of context. The passage is concerned with spiritual gifts and the baptism may be the baptism of the Holy Spirit (Hans Conzelmann, in *1 Corinthians*, Fortress Press, 1975) suggests that it refers to the experience of Pentecost rather than the rite of water baptism. In any case the rite of NT baptism is associated with forgiveness of sins rather than church membership. It is disappointing that this point is not raised.

Unfortunately, the book is badly indexed.

REDC

P.J. Wiseman, *Clues to Creation in Genesis*. Edited by Donald Wiseman, Professor of Assyriology, University of London, Marshall Morgan and Scott, 1977, 232pp, £2.95.

In 1936 the late Air-Commodore P.J. Wiseman published *New Discoveries in Babylonia about Genesis* and followed it up with *Creation Revealed in Six Days* in 1948. Both these books are of outstanding merit. In the first Wiseman compared the Genesis story of the Creation with ancient tablets found in the middle East. He pointed out that these tablets often have a colophon, or title, indicating the contents and that these are often placed at the end. He concluded that the

structure of the book of Genesis suggests that originally it also was recorded on tablets. In this case the title of the first chapter must be the colophon at the beginning of chapter 2 in our bibles, "These are the generations of heaven and earth..." He pointed to other possible colophons scattered through Genesis giving the sources of the material: it was therefore needless to postulate composite authorship by J, E and P.

In the second book Wiseman argues that nowhere in the OT does the text say that God created the heavens and the earth in six days — the word translated "made" in the fourth Commandment ("In six days the Lord *made* the heaven and the earth") is only so translated in about a third of its occurrences: other translations, such as 'did something (unspecified) about', or even 'shewed', 'revealed' etc., are at least equally permissible and make better sense. Our Lord's teaching that the Sabbath was made for man is taken to mean that when God rested on the seventh day, He rested to give man an example, not because He, God, was tired! The simplest interpretation of the creation story is, therefore, that on successive literal days God told Adam in the garden about how He had made the world. This is still, we believe, by far the most convincing and sensible way of bringing the Genesis story into line with the rest of our knowledge about our planetary home.

Despite earlier reprintings, these books have been out of print for some years. Professor Donald Wiseman, P.J.W.'s son has now edited and combined them into a single volume. The text is substantially unchanged but small alterations, for the sake of clarity, have been made, and there is new matter in the notes. Some of the older dated material has been omitted.

REDC

Kenneth Leach, *Soul Friend: a Study of Spirituality*,
Sheldon Press, 248pp, £3.95.

Kenneth Leach is the Rector of St. Matthew's, Bethnel Green, the author of *Youthquake*, and a cleric who has been actively involved in the drug scene in Soho. His experiences have led him to realise that the Church has failed to meet what he calls "The Spiritual Quest of Youth". This book he intends to be "in part a compendium of resources into the world of Christian Spirituality" so that those seeking direction may know where to find it, namely in the tradition of prayer.

The book's opening chapter expresses the viewpoint that young people today are turning away from the drug scene and the permissiveness associated with it, to a search for inner meaning, a spiritual meaning in life. The author gives a masterly panoramic view of a wide range of "voyages of discovery" from transcendental Meditation to Charismatic renewal. He concludes that there is a search for the inner world, for power and direct experience of the Spirit and for justice as an integral element in the gospel. This sets the foundation for the rest of the book - "The linking of contemplation and action as one of the essential aims of spiritual guidance." Hence the need for spiritual guides today, or as they were called in former days "soul friends", to direct the spiritual journeys of Christians.

Chapter 2 gives a lucid and comprehensive account of spiritual direction in the Christian Church. The hints in the NT, personal guides in non-Christian religions, the Desert Fathers, the monks, Loyala St. Theresa, St. John of the Cross and on to modern exponents of the quests for spirituality - each receives a brief but penetrating analysis. Here is a masterly review of their essential teaching and methods.

There follows a chapter on modern pastoral counselling with psychological orientation. Later Leech seeks to point out the crucial differences between such psychological counselling and that of true spiritual direction, even though the concern for healing is common to both. The author believes that the sacraments are basically concerned with wholeness of life "with healing for body and spirit".

In his treatment of the sacraments prayer plays a leading role; it is fundamental to all such means of grace, as well as to the life of the spiritual director himself. There naturally follows the chapter on "Prayer in the Christian Spiritual Tradition" Here we find in succinct form a resumé of the various methods of prayer as practiced within the Catholic tradition. There are references to some Protestant movements and particularly to recent Pentecostal experiences. The valuable wisdom of these Christian guides is distilled, for the author, into three truths, the spiritual necessity of orthodoxy, the materialistic basis of spirituality and the life of prayer as a way of progress. It is with the last named that spiritual direction is concerned. "Progress always involves danger, and in the life of prayer the disciple must know that there are dangers on the road". Hence the essential role of the spiritual guide through the stages of purification, illumination and union with God.

Chapter 4 is entitled "The Practice of the Life of Prayer". The subtitles convey the ground covered: "Obstacles to Prayer", "Prayer of the Body", "Discipline of the Mind", "Disturbed Prayer" and "Towards Contemplative Prayer".

Kenneth Leech concludes this book with a plea for a return to personal spiritual direction. He distinguishes clearly between the use of confession and spiritual direction. His constant thesis is the essential role of spiritual guides in the quest for spirituality. He adds an appendix intended primarily for priests to help them in the skills of their task.

This book represents an amazing distillation of Christian ascetic and moral theology both ancient and modern. To have written it is an impressive and valuable achievement. Although the emphasis is on the Catholic tradition of spirituality, the book is full of wise and helpful advice for all interested in counselling. It is a call, a much needed call, for growth in holiness which all branches of the Church should heed. However, the author leaves this reviewer with a few questions unanswered. Some of the methods adopted in prayer seem to border on the psychological as opposed to the spiritual and are also to be found in non-Christian movements, even though they may find support in the experience of the great mystics of the Church. But more vital to the reviewer is the absence in the treatment of spirituality of the effects of justification by faith. Hence the undue emphasis and dependence upon the spiritual guide, confession and the sacraments. Moreover, it seems to be assumed that the norm of spirituality is that of the mystics rather than the pattern set in the New NT. Nevertheless the book is a brilliant exposition of the Catholic approach to spirituality and to spiritual direction. It ought to challenge Protestants to look to their foundations and to be more deeply concerned with biblical spirituality based on justification by faith.

J. GWYN-THOMAS

Stephen Clissold, *The Wisdom of the Spanish Mystics*,
Sheldon Press, 1977, 88pp, £1.50.

This book has two sections. The first is a brief historical account of mysticism in Spain. It sets the religious background to the writing of these Spanish mystics of the 15th and 16th centuries when Spain was at the height of its power. Great

contrasts were present in the life of the nation — the Inquisition, the riches of the New World, the Armada and what it symbolized — and seemingly incongruously this amazing search for great spirituality in the life of a few, among them St. Teresa and St. John of the Cross. The author's account is lucid and interesting and will be helpful to anyone seeking an introduction to this subject.

The second section contains 149 short "Stories and Sayings" culled from autobiographical writings — diaries, accounts of conscience, memoranda of a number of Spanish mystics, both the well known and the less known. The author has chosen to "to reflect the many-faceted experiences" of these seekers after God. There are many pearls of wisdom, some amusing anecdotes, and some extraordinary experiences related, all are interesting, often challenging, sometimes perplexing. This book is light reading though with sufficient matter to stimulate the desire for more. The price seems high for such a brief work.

J. GWYN-THOMAS

Richard Campbell, *From Belief to Understanding*,
Australian National University, Canberra 1976, 229 pp.
\$A 6-95

This is another full length study devoted to St. Anselm's Ontological Argument, with the difference that Dr. Campbell regards St. Anselm's reasoning not as a proof of God's existence but as an exercise in faith seeking understanding. Anselm starts not from a set of impersonal propositions (as the Five Ways of Aquinas, for example, do) but from the speech-acts of faith and devotion.

What St. Anselm is attempting to do (and succeeding in doing, according to Dr. Campbell) is to move from faith to vision. Not to prove that God's existence is logically necessary (as many modern philosophers take him to be trying to do) but to show that no one properly understanding what God is can think that God is not. This approach to the *Proslogion* certainly seems to have support in the text, and accords in general with Anselm's general theological and philosophical method.

The book consists of an annotated translation of *Proslogion*, II-IV, a re-interpretation of it, a statement of the arguments Dr. Campbell

thinks it contains, and an assessment of the relevance and the force of the argument today. Dr. Campbell challenges the interpretation of Norman Malcolm according to which Chapter III is an (albeit unintentional) alternative argument to that given in Chapter II. But how can it be an alternative, Dr. Campbell asks, when its conclusion is different? On Dr. Campbell's interpretation Chapter II (in which God hardly figures at all) is an argument for the existence of something than which a greater cannot be thought, while in Chapter III, in which the language of address to God recurs, Anselm argues that the individual whose existence is proved in Chapter II is identical with God.

The last two chapters of the book are a bit of a let down. Given that the *Proslogion* is not a proof of God's existence, what is it? In these chapters Dr. Campbell attempts to discuss the status of the argument as a piece of philosophical reasoning. He protests against the a-historical character of much modern philosophising, but what exactly he is claiming for the argument remains unclear.

The book as a whole contains a number of independent discussions of interest, on names, change, existence and necessity. But the heart of the book will be too long and detailed, and in parts too technical, for any but the most determined students of St. Anselm.

PAUL HELM

A.R. Millard, *The Bible BC, What Can Archaeology Prove?*
IVP, 48pp, £0.50.

Stimulated by the recent Magnus Magnusson's BBC TV programmes on *The Archaeology of Bible Lands*, Dr. Millard writes this excellent booklet to show that, despite anything Magnusson may have said, there is no case in which archaeology has disproved the Bible record. From the nature of the evidence, proof is not, of course, possible but in very many instances archaeology makes the Bible stories extremely plausible. Small as it is, the booklet is packed with information. Dr. Millard is Rankine Senior Lecturer in Hebrew and Ancient Semitic Languages at the University of Liverpool and has been epigraphist on a number of archaeological excavations in the Near East.

REDC

I.H. Marshall, *The Origins of New Testament Christology*, IVP, 1976, 132pp, £1.95.

This publication marks the first volume in the new IVP series "Issues in contemporary theology", edited by I.H. Marshall. One may only hope that subsequent contributions will attain to the same excellence. The series is devoted to brief studies "of issues of current biblical and theological interest" in order to provide a useful guide to the student who may well be overwhelmed by the literature.

Certainly the debate about the origins of NT christology has produced an abundance of such literature. However, the student seeking an introduction to this problem will not be the only one to benefit from Marshall's discussion. Any scholar impressed with the implications of the application of a tough-minded historiographical method to New Testament documents will also undoubtedly be impressed with the author's uncompromising approach. In this Marshall reflects the best in contemporary scholarship. Because of a considerable reserve, those conclusions he does offer commend themselves highly.

In just eight short chapters Marshall has managed to assess most of the salient features of the debate and offer a surprising amount of insight. The first chapter sets the debate in its historical context. It presents a selection of key contributions made during the past hundred years or so which remain influential today. Next, the Author turns to the social milieu in the first four decades of the early Church. A great deal has been made in christological thought of the supposed differences in the way in which christology developed according to the different communities in which the traditions were transmitted. Marshall criticizes the facile stratification through which Jesus-traditions purportedly seeped — first Palestinian-Jewish Christianity, then Hellenistic-Jewish Christianity, finally Gentile Christianity — as well as the contention that these communities had well-defined borders. In the third chapter he rigorously applies form and tradition-critical criteria to the Jesus-story, demonstrating that the only adequate explanation for the Jesus who appears there is that Jesus Himself had a christology the principal outlines of which remain visible. The chapters which follow explore key titles of Jesus, "Who is this Son of Man?", "Are you the Christ?", "Jesus is Lord", and "If you are the Son of God". In each case it is clear that Jesus did think about Himself and His mission in these terms, and it was

under the impact of His person and career that the early Church continued to think about Him in the same way.

Perhaps the most exciting portion of Marshall's study is in the third chapter which anchors the rest. It is startling to discover how much of the Jesus-tradition survives the most stringent historical criticism.

There were two disappointments. Wisdom christology figures no less importantly in the contemporary debate than any other element, and it deserved a full chapter to itself, especially as it seems that the discussion promises to become even more intense in the days ahead. Also, many of the results of Martin Hengel's *Son of God* were overlooked in that chapter. In spite of these points the student and scholar have been given a valuable aid. It will not crowd the shelf!

WILLIAM L. SCHUTTER

John Adair, *The Becoming Church*, SPKC, 244 pp, 1977. £5.50.

The author of this book, who holds a London University Doctorate in history, has of recent years been engaged in the field of management and social theology. Encouraged no doubt by his experience as consultant in diocesan re-organisation to the present Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishop of Chichester, he has produced this treatise on the future of the church as he foresees it. He writes as an Anglican and his statistics are for the most part drawn from the national church, which gives the book a less than comprehensive balance.

Any book about the church which includes a chapter heading 'Church in Decline' brings out the worst in the reviewer. It is a caption much beloved of the media who have no particular reason to be friendly to the Church of England, but it is surprising to find it used, without any interrogation mark, by a loyal church member who has his ears to the ground as much as Dr. Adair seems to have. It is, of course, a statistical assumption, based entirely on numbers of clergy, communicants, baptisms and so on. If numbers were everything in religion, then a numerical decline such as these figures disclose might be of importance. But the spiritual life of the church, which is the only really important side of it, cannot be measured in figures. The author does not

tell us whether he thinks the church has less or more vitality than it used to have. As a historian one would have expected him to give some assessment of this.

Readers of this Journal will regret that Dr. Adair does not seem to appreciate fully, in commenting on recent liturgical changes in the Church of England, what has been happening to its evangelical wing. He speaks of the acceptance of Holy Communion as the central service on Sunday, as being a move 'towards the Catholic pole.' This is not so. The growth of Family Communion services as the main Sunday act of worship was endorsed by the Keele Conference and has been a marked feature of many evangelical ministries in recent years without any veering on their part in an Anglo-Catholic direction. Indeed, evangelical influence clearly lies behind several of the changes which eventually led to the present 'Series III' Holy Communion service which is now so widely used by high and low church alike.

One has the feeling that had Dr. Adair been more familiar with the evangelical scene he would have acknowledged the vitality and influence of so many of their churches. He would have found them in the forefront of those who encourage the laity in Christian work and witness, though he does admit that the decline in number of men being ordained will give the laity the opportunity to show their true potential when the clergyman no longer 'does it all for them.'

No doubt the nature of his professional work predisposes Dr. Adair to devote most of his book to church organisation. Consequently such rare items as the following show up against the dull background of ecclesiastical administration, but they are far too few: 'A church with the cross at its centre, as opposed to an ornament upon altar or table, would be willing to change in fundamental ways if only the risen life of Christ could shine more fully,' and the statement that the only justification for change in the ways of a church is 'that the identity of Christ may find a fuller expression in the world.'

HUGH EVAN HOPKINS

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