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streets, and the hills like dust-heaps among back-to-back houses. . . . No! we cannot imagine it. We can only say that such a world would be like the worst sort of nightmare, and that we should all quickly go mad.' These words occur in a striking dissertation on *Art and Religion*, by the Rev. Percy DEARMER, D.D. (S.C.M.; 3s. 6d. net).

The writer finds that a disastrous confusion has arisen between Art and Life. During the general concentration upon science and commerce in the last century, there was a widespread tendency to forget the place of art in human life. At the same time in the religious world there was a fairly general idea that ethics was the only matter that need concern a religious man. 'Art had come to be regarded as a frivolous and rather naughty damsel, to be avoided by serious people.' The position, then, to-day is that art suffers from loss of contact with religion, and that religion suffers from loss of contact with art.

How is this disastrous confusion to be cleared away? It can only be by realizing that the spiritual life depends upon the three Ultimate Values—Goodness, Truth, and Beauty. 'The artist has to understand that beauty is not the only spiritual value. The religious man has to understand that goodness is not the only spiritual value. And the scientist has to understand that there are two other spiritual values besides truth.' These three Ultimate Values are co-ordinate, each one absolute in its own sphere, yet forming together a harmonious unity. Beauty *exists*; it is as real as goodness or truth. Art is man's answer to that beauty, and his worship of it. 'No doubt goodness comes first, and last. It is the supreme value of life, the final test of a man's soul. But truth cannot be disentangled from it; and beauty is the air in which truth and righteousness live, and which they help to create, as the air helps to make the grass and the trees. Without it the other two sicken and fade; and with its complete loss they would die, because reason itself would be overthrown.'

In the full recognition of the three Ultimate Values, and the due exercise of the spiritual activities which are man's response to them, will art, science, and religion maintain their independence, and find their essential harmony. 'Let us say to the artist, "If you are indifferent to the moral activity your art will suffer; because your art expresses your whole self, and your whole self needs to be worth expressing." And to the scientist, "Your difficult and engrossing work may dull your God-given æsthetic faculty; but remember that beauty *is*, even if you may have perhaps little eye or ear for it; do not spoil your science by a bad philosophy." And to the moralist—to the religious world which is still in the main only interested in morals, "The perfection of man is to understand all the spiritual activities, and to practise those which lie within his power." For unless a man's heart is thus purified, he will not have a true conception of God; and if he has not a true conception of God, to the extent of his untruth he will be worshipping a false god.'

Telescoped History.

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NOTHING can be plainer than that the Biblical, or at any rate the Old Testament, conception of historiography was very different from our own. Whether we consider the content or the form of the historical narratives, this is abundantly plain. Their very brevity is eloquent of a deep-seated difference of purpose. Contrast, for example, the Books of Kings with any ancient or modern history. The whole story of the Kings, which traverses about four hundred years, could be read, though doubtless not very carefully, in about six hours. Compare with this the elaborate treatment given

by Herodotus to the Persian war, or by Thucydides to the Peloponnesian war, or by Macaulay to the reigns of James II. and William and Mary. The Biblical historians omit or suppress hundreds, nay, thousands of facts which would have been of the profoundest interest and importance to us, and with which the earliest of them at least must have been familiar. The rebellion of Absalom was assuredly woven of more and subtler threads than are revealed in the Biblical story. And what would we not give for a fuller account of the rebellion of Jeroboam I., which cleft the monarchy in two, and sent the northern and southern kingdoms each upon its separate way? Doubtless the principal factors are luminous enough—Solomon's idolatry and his exploitation of the common people, his defiance of the religious and the democratic sentiment. The Biblical historians are masters of the fine art of concentration, but at numberless points they leave our legitimate curiosity unsatisfied. And they do so, because their writing is controlled by a purpose, which is nothing less than to justify to men the ways of God, as they understood them. All that does not seem to them to contribute to this purpose is irrelevant and is ignored.

Moses.

Now one of the strangest phenomena in their method of handling history is to telescope a movement into an event—a movement which may have taken decades or even centuries to run its course, into the event in which, or the personality in whom, it originated. If anything is certain in Hebrew history, it is that the legislation which is recorded at various points in the Pentateuch is the product of centuries of experience, and reflects, as indeed we should expect that it would, successive stages in the social, juristic, and religious development of the Hebrew people. The Book of the Covenant implies more primitive conditions than Deuteronomy, while the Deuteronomic legislation is admittedly earlier than the Priestly Code. True, there is a growing recognition of early, and in places of very early, material in P: but that does not alter the fact that these codes in their present form represent the developing mind of Israel in its application to social and religious problems, and that two centuries, less or more, separate each code from its predecessor. This is as good as certain and is all but universally admitted.

But the Bible does not admit it. There all these codes, with their mutually exclusive social implications, are solemnly and deliberately referred to Moses. It was he who set before Israel the 'judgments' which are enumerated in the Book of the Covenant (Ex 21^{1}). It was he who delivered the eloquent speeches in which the Deuteronomic legislation is embodied (Dt 1^{1}). It was to him that Jahweh communicated the minute ceremonial details which occupy so large a space in the Book of Leviticus. Of this last book, which in its present form critics almost unanimously regard as later than Moses by at least seven hundred years, chapter after chapter begins with the words, 'Jahweh said unto Moses.'

Here is a dilemma indeed, which is peculiarly vexatious to those who see the reasonableness and force of the critical arguments and who yet wish to retain their faith in the statements of the Bible. And it has to be clearly understood that the opposition is not merely between the statements of the Bible and the assertions of the critics, but sometimes between the Biblical statements themselves, so that, if we desire to retain our intellectual integrity, we are compelled to come to some kind of *modus vivendi* with them. The most instructive instance of this conflict occurs in connexion with the law of booty, which ordained that

> As the share of him who goes down into battle
> Is the share of him who remains with the baggage:
> They shall share alike.

The origin of this law is traced, in a passage whose historicity we have no reason to doubt (1 S 30^{21-25}), to an experience of David with some of his followers less magnanimous than himself. During his absence at Esdraelon among the Philistines, whose cause he was ostensibly supporting, Philistia and Judah had been ravaged by incursions of Amalekites. On his return to Ziklag, finding that the town had been burned and the women captured, David, after consulting the oracle, overtook and routed the foe, recovering all that had been lost, with much booty. Some of the unprincipled spirits who had taken part in the pursuit, proposed that those who had been too faint to help them should have no share in the booty. But David rebuked the proposal as an injustice and an ingratitude to the God who had graciously given them the victory, and there and then laid down the principle quoted above,

that all should share alike. 'And it was so,' we read, 'from that day forward, that he' (that is, David) 'made it a statute and an ordinance for Israel unto this day' (1 S 30[25]). This is a very living picture, and we can see the law springing out of that definite historical emergency. There is every reason to believe, as the narrative asserts, that that particular law was born that day, and that the father of it was David. But in Nu 31 it has a very different paternity: there it is Moses who enacts—or, to be more precise, Jahweh who instructs him to enact—that the prey be divided into two equal parts (vv.[27. 36. 42]), and that those who fight and those who remain behind are to receive equal shares. Here, again, the law is connected with a definite historical situation—this time a fight between Israel and Midian—but the whole account bears upon the face of it the unmistakable features of a midrash. Besides taking enormous quantities of booty, Israel, without losing a single man, succeeded in slaying every man of Midian. The improbability of this must be obvious; the impossibility of it will be more obvious still to one who remembers the distress to which Israel was reduced, three generations or so later, by the Midianites, who are supposed in this narrative (Jg 6[11]) to be exterminated. The same law is referred to David and to Moses—to David in a narrative inherently probable, to Moses in a narrative abounding in improbabilities, and reflecting, in its carefully apportioned percentages of the spoil to the priests and the Levites, the religious interests of a far later time. Under these circumstances, can there be any possible doubt that David is the originator of the law, and that we have here an indubitable instance of a law being assigned to Moses which was not his? Indeed, all the legislation, as we have seen, was assigned to him; and behind this conception, which the Bible itself furnishes us with the means of challenging, lies the undoubted fact that, in some real sense, he is the *fons et origo* of Hebrew law. At the beginning of Israel's history stands this mighty personality whose mind conditioned the whole subsequent development of the Hebrew genius. He did not create the law—that was necessarily the product of centuries; but he gave the impulse to it, and is doubtless responsible for some of it, possibly, for example, the Decalogue. The Hebrews, therefore, who were more interested in the spirit than in the facts of a movement, readily regarded him as the creator of the whole law, thus telescoping into one series of events at the beginning of their history a movement which occupied, as it could not but occupy, several centuries.

David.

A similar phenomenon meets us in the religious poetry of Israel. The Psalms are familiarly known as the Psalms of David, and this phrase carries, in the minds of those who use it, the implication that the whole Psalter is by him; indeed, till the eighteenth century this was the prevailing opinion. In the Psalter, if we include the titles, there was much to encourage this belief, though there was also something which should have given pause to minds critically inclined. By the superscriptions seventy-three psalms are ascribed to David, and a few are associated with definite incidents in his career; but though it is not impossible that David may have written some psalms, or at any rate portions of psalms found in our existing Psalter, the superscriptions are so seriously discredited either by palpable mistakes or by divergences in the Greek and Syriac Versions, that it is never safe to accept them as evidence for the authorship or origin of a psalm. The superscription of Ps 7, for example, in assigning it to David, connects it in some way with 'Cush the Benjamite'; unless this represents some tradition independent of the Books of Samuel, it seems to rest on a confusion of the Cushi of 2 S 18[31] with Shimei the Benjamite of 2 S 16[5]. However that may be, there can be no doubt of the inaccuracy of the superscription of Ps 34, which calls the Philistine king, before whom David feigned madness, Abimelech instead of Achish (1 S 21[14]), resting perhaps upon a hazy reminiscence of Abimelech of Gerar (Gn 20[2]), which was apparently in the Philistine country. Again, the superscriptions are sometimes demonstrably at variance with the contents of the psalms themselves. For example, Ps 59 contemplates a situation in which certain cruel and blasphemous men go about the *city*, whereas the superscription assigns it to the occasion when David's *house* was watched by Saul's emissaries. In the same psalm the enemies of the singer are described as *the nations*, that is, the heathen (cf. v.[5]). This relegation of psalms to David reaches the climax of absurdity in Ps 139, whose lateness is attested not only by its Aramaisms but by its theology, which is about as un-Davidic as it could possibly be.

The idea which it emphasizes with such persistent and persuasive power is the Divine omnipresence, but obviously centuries must separate the man who knew God to be in heaven and earth and Sheol and everywhere from the man who believed that when he was driven beyond the confines of Palestine he would inevitably fall under the jurisdiction of other gods (1 S 26^{19}).

This defiance of historical possibility which frequently characterizes the superscriptions is very eloquent of the tremendous place which David was believed to occupy in the department of sacred song. In later times it was carried the length of ascribing to him psalms which had no warrant even in very late textual tradition. As Robertson Smith[1] has reminded us, the Septuagint has ascribed to David a number of psalms where the Hebrew has no author's name at all (Pss 33. 43. 67. 71. 91. 93 to 99. 104. 137—Ps 137 of all psalms! 'by the waters of *Babel*'); and 'at least in four cases our Hebrew Bibles have the name of David where it has no right to be,' because that ascription is absent from the great majority of LXX MSS, which would assuredly have repeated it from the Hebrew text they were translating, had it been there. Still later, the same tendency is seen in the New Testament, where Ps 95 (vv.$^{7-11}$, 'to-day, if ye will hear his voice,' etc.) is quoted in He 4^{7} as 'in David,' though in the Hebrew it has no superscription at all. This simple phrase is charged with profound significance; it proves beyond a doubt that *David* practically means *the Psalter*, and it carried for those who used it the implication that David was the author of it all. Peter can argue on the day of Pentecost from Ps 16 on the assumption that it is the composition of 'the patriarch David,' who, with the *foresight* of a *prophet*, was speaking in it of 'the resurrection of the Christ' (Ac 2^{25-31}). Here, again, the inevitable conclusion is that this tradition represents not historical fact but telescoped history. The whole course of the movement which he only inaugurated is ascribed to him. The tradition has, of course, a real basis in fact. David was known to be a great minstrel and poet (cf. 2 S 1), an ardent worshipper of Jahweh, and earnestly bent upon building Him a temple; and so not unnaturally he came to be regarded not only as the father of religious song, but as the composer of much—and later, of all—of the Psalter.

[1] *Old Testament in the Jewish Church*, p. 96 f.

Solomon.

When we turn to the Wisdom Literature, a similar phenomenon greets us. The Proverbs are familiarly known as the Proverbs of Solomon, and not impossibly some of them may be his. He was pre-eminently the 'wise man' of Hebrew antiquity, and he is expressly said in 1 K 4^{32} to have spoken 3000 proverbs. The implication of that passage (cf. v.^{33}) is that those proverbs consisted of comparisons between men and trees or animals: that supposition is met by some (cf. Pr 6^{6}), but not by many, in the book. And there are many proverbs in one of the sections expressly ascribed to him (chs. 10–29) which could hardly by any chance have been his. The advice as to the proper demeanour in the presence of a king ($25^{6f.}$) would not come very naturally from one who was himself a king (cf. $23^{1ff.}$); nor, to say nothing of the praises of monogamy which would sound rather cynical on the lips of one who is credited with having had '700 wives, princesses, and 300 concubines' (1 K 11^{3}), would he be likely so to satirize his own government, as he would be doing in 29^{4}, if that dictum were his: 'he whose exactions are excessive ruins the land'?

And if Proverbs, as a whole, for many good and sufficient reasons, cannot have come from the pen of Solomon, still less can the Book of Ecclesiastes. The language alone stamps it as one of the very latest books in the Old Testament: it was probably written about 700 years after Solomon was in his grave. Even the conservative Delitzsch admits that if the book be of Solomonic origin, then there is no such thing as a history of the Hebrew language; and Driver argues that 'the tone and the social and political allusions show that it is, in fact, the product of a far later age. The tone is not that in which Solomon could have spoken. The Solomon who speaks here is a different character from the Solomon of history. The historical Solomon, the ruler of a great and prosperous empire, could not have penned such a satire upon his own administration if 3^{16} (the place of judgment filled by wickedness) 4^{1} (the wrongs done by powerful oppressors) 5^{8} (one corrupt ruler appealing above another) were written by him. When he alludes to kings, he views them from below, as one of the people suffering from their misrule.' It is as plain as can be that Solomon cannot have been the author of such

a book, but the selection of him as the mouthpiece of its sentiments is singularly appropriate. He, with his abundance, had more than any other the opportunity to test life at every point, and the exceptional wisdom with which tradition credited him would give unique value to his judgment.

So here, again, we have telescoped history. The Wisdom Literature—not indeed all, but much of it—is ascribed to the great historical figure who stands at the beginning of the movement.

The Conquest of Canaan.

Another interesting exhibition of this principle occurs in Jos 21^{43-45}, where a later writer represents the conquest of Canaan as completely and finally effected within one generation and before the death of Joshua. 'Jahweh gave Israel all the land he swore to give their fathers, and they possessed it, and dwelt in it. And Jahweh gave them rest round about, according to all that he swore unto their fathers; and there stood not a man of all their enemies before them; Jahweh delivered all their enemies into their hand. There failed not ought of any good thing which Jahweh had spoken to the house of Israel: all came to pass.' Now, considered as history, this statement is in the flattest contradiction to the facts, as attested not only by the first chapter of Judges, but by the Book of Joshua itself (cf. 16^{10} $17^{12f.}$). We know that the conquest of Canaan was not completely effected till long after Joshua's death, and the oldest sources frankly admit that in many districts it was never thoroughly effected at all (cf. Jos 15^{63} 16^{10} 17^{11-13}, Jg 1^{19-36}). In the passage quoted at length, and especially in the last verse, it is clear that we are listening to the voice of the preacher who interprets facts rather than of the historian who records them. With Jahweh upon the scene, working so manifestly for His people, the conquest was already, under Joshua, ideally complete; and later writers, with the preacher's instinct for religious values and removed by centuries from the facts, had no difficulty in presenting it as actually complete.

Creation.

Is it too much to see, as Sir George Adam Smith has suggested,[1] the same type of mind operating in the priestly story of Creation (Gn 1)—the type which is unfamiliar with the idea of development, which fixes upon results rather than upon the age-long processes by which they were reached, and which, whether in philosophy or in politics, ignores secondary and gradual causes? 'This was especially the way of the Semite, ever absolute in his thinking as in the expression of his thought. He described physical phenomena, now known to be of long development, as having happened instantaneously, or, as the first of Genesis puts it, in *a day*. He presents the creation of the Universe as the act of the Word of God on seven successive days! So also'—he skilfully argues—'does he present Deuteronomy, the fruit of centuries of the Spirit's influence on Israel, as the utterance in one day of Moses.'

[1] *Deuteronomy*, p. cxii.

Ezra.

Within the spheres discussed, the principle for which we have been contending will hardly be disputed by any one who knows the facts, but the application of it may have far-reaching consequences in unexpected directions. Let us consider the achievements ascribed by the historians to Elijah and Ezra, and let us take the case of Ezra first, as his is perhaps the easier to dispose of. It is universally admitted that our present books of Ezra and Nehemiah are in a state of great confusion, and that no intelligible picture of the sequence of events emerges from them as they stand. It has been customary to suppose that Ezra came to Palestine in 458 B.C., armed with authority from Artaxerxes I. to investigate the religious condition of Judah and Jerusalem and to teach the law, and that he introduced drastic measures of religious and social reform. Nehemiah arrived in 444 endowed with full powers as governor of Judah: he rebuilt the walls of Jerusalem and designed measures to have it strongly guarded and more thickly peopled. Ezra took advantage of the opportunity thus afforded to reorganize the national life on the basis of the law-book which he had brought from Babylon and solemnly read before the assembled people. In 432 Nehemiah paid a second visit to Jerusalem, during which he discovered that some of the abuses formerly repressed, had revived; whereupon he instituted a vigorous, and in part violent, campaign of reform.

Now there are many improbabilities in this assumed order of events. Professor C. F. Kent is undoubtedly right when he says that 'Nehemiah's

acts all give the impression of being pioneer reform measures,' preliminary and preparatory to the *later* work of Ezra; and the belief here indicated that Nehemiah is prior to Ezra is gaining ground. 'The situation which Ezra finds on his arrival appears to presuppose a settled and orderly life, which was hardly possible until the city was fortified and the walls built by Nehemiah; indeed, Ezra, in his prayer, mentions the erection of the walls as a special exhibition of the Divine love (Ezr 9^9). Further, Nehemiah's memoirs make no allusion to the alleged measures of Ezra; and, if Ezra really preceded Nehemiah, it is difficult to see why none of the reformers who came with him from Babylon should be mentioned as supporting Nehemiah. Again, the measures of Nehemiah are mild in comparison with the radical measures of Ezra. Ezra, *e.g.*, demands the divorce of the wives (Ezr $10^{11ff.}$), whereas Nehemiah only forbids intermarriage between the children (Neh 13^{25}). In short, the work of Nehemiah has all the appearance of being tentative and preliminary to the drastic reforms of Ezra. The history certainly gains in intelligibility if we assume the priority of Nehemiah, and the text does not absolutely bind us. Ezra's departure took place "in the seventh year of Artaxerxes the king" (Ezr 7^7). Even if we allow that the number is correct, it is just possible that the king referred to is not Artaxerxes I. (465–424 B.C.), but Artaxerxes II. (404–359).'[1] In that case the date of Ezra's arrival would be not 458, but 397, and every incident in the Books of Ezra-Nehemiah, as rearranged on this basis, falls into its place.

But why this displacement and antedating of Ezra's expedition? It may, of course, have been due to the accidental confusion of the two kings who bore the name of Artaxerxes; but considering the Chronicler's passionate interest in the priesthood—and it is quite certain that Ezra-Nehemiah forms part of a single work to which Chronicles belongs—it is more probably due to the desire to give the priest Ezra precedence over the layman Nehemiah. Professor C. C. Torrey, who holds that the Chronicler was 'by taste and gift a novelist'[2] rather than an editor, has argued that Ezra is really nothing but a creation of the Chronicler's imagination. Without carrying scepticism to so extreme a point, we do seem justified in believing that his story furnishes us with another illustration of telescoped history (also, incidentally, of misplacement), and that reforms which were the deposit of at least fifty years of experiment and experience have been set at the beginning of the movement instead of at the end.

[1] See my *Introduction to the Old Testament*, p. 337.
[2] *Ezra Studies*, p. 250.

Elijah.

More interesting still is the story of Elijah, as in it the question of miracle is involved. There is not a more dramatically splendid scene in the Bible than the contest enacted on Carmel between the lonely representative of Jahweh and the prophets of the Baal. We are left with the impression that, at the supreme moment, Jahweh defended His cause and justified His servant by a miraculous exhibition of His power. 'Then the fire of Jahweh fell, and consumed the burnt-offering, and the wood, and the stones, and the dust, and licked up the water that was in the trench. And when all the people saw it, they fell on their faces, and said, Jahweh, he is God; Jahweh, he is God' (1 K $18^{38f.}$). Then the prophets of the Baal were seized, and Elijah slew them—apparently all of them, for his command had been to 'let not one of them escape.' Jahweh triumphed, Elijah triumphed, the Baal was discredited and his prophets were destroyed.

But what really happened on Carmel? Did fire descend from heaven, whether by an opportune lightning flash or in some yet more wonderful way? Did Elijah really enjoy a decisive triumph? In the very next chapter he takes to flight; he is afraid (19^3 LXX ἐφοβήθη, וַיַּרְא—a touch which the Hebrew has skilfully obliterated by reading וַיַּרֵא, 'and he *saw*'), afraid and dejected, and his work, so far from being accomplished, has to pass into other hands—the hands of Hazael, Jehu, and Elisha. The question of the historicity of the Carmel episode can only be discussed in the light of the larger question of the relation of the Elijah cycle of stories to the Elisha cycle. That, speaking broadly, one cycle depends upon the other, is undeniable; no other hypothesis is reasonable in view of the large measure of correspondence between the two cycles. Both prophets raise a child, an only son, from the dead; both miraculously fill a poor widow's jar (or jars) with oil; both are described as 'the chariots of Israel, and the horsemen thereof.' Which cycle depends on the other? Unquestionably the tales about Elijah make a more original and majestic impression, and

one is tempted to suppose that the Elisha tales are modelled on those of Elijah. On the other hand, considering the prominent place of Elisha in securing success for Israel in her Aramæan wars, it must be admitted that 'the chariots of Israel, and the horsemen thereof' is more appropriate as a designation of Elisha than of Elijah; in which case the title will have been later transferred to Elijah, and here, at any rate, the Elijah cycle would be the borrower.

Without discussing this difficult and delicate question, it should be noted that in the invaluable chapters 2 K 9 f., which are purely historical and entirely free from the legendary elements which meet us at every turn in both cycles of stories, it is explicitly stated that, in a revolution instigated by Elisha in the interests of Jahwism, '*Jehu* destroyed the Baal out of Israel' (2 K 10^{28}). The story of how this was done is crowded with vivid and unimpeachable detail, and we cannot but feel that here, at least, we are standing upon the solid ground of history; and inevitably the question rises to our minds: Is this the really historical fact of which the Carmel scene is the poetical (or legendary?) counterpart? In both stories the cause of Jahweh brilliantly triumphed—in the one at the hands of Elisha and Jehu, and in the other at the hands of Elijah. In arguing this point Gunkel[1] finely says: 'Now we can understand the curious contradiction between the Carmel and the Horeb tale: in the first Elijah wins the victory over the Baal, in the other he at first despairs of Jahweh's cause, and then he sees the victory, but only afar off. Here the historical and the legendary stand side by side: historical is Elijah's lament that he stands alone, that he is weary of the fight for a forlorn cause; legendary is the great triumph which the historical Elijah was not spared to see with his own eyes. We have, therefore, to understand the Carmel story not as a real event in the life of Elijah, but as the dream of his own glowing heart or of one of his supporters: what could they have wished for more than that fire should fall from heaven and decide in favour of the true God, and that the prophet might slay the Baal priestlings with his own hand? Here one may see a characteristic trait of religious legend: later generations cannot bear to think that in his lifetime the greatly honoured man had to depend, like all of us, on hope and faith, and, besides, they are offended at the secular manner in which the Baal was finally exterminated from Israel.'

[1] *Elias, Jahve, und Baal*, p. 39.

There is, of course, a type of mind to which such an explanation will seem a dishonourable and disingenuous subterfuge, not only a cavalier but a blasphemous attempt to eliminate the miraculous action of God from a great historical crisis where the true faith was in deadly peril. More welcome to such a type would be the opinion of Kittel, who argues in his Commentary on Kings that, 'though God, whom the narrator regards as Immediate Cause, is not an object of exact scientific thought, yet any one who can believe in the existence and operation of a living God and His intervention in the world, will find even for such an event, which, from the point of view of science, remains wrapped in obscurity, an explanation which will satisfy, if not his scientific thought, at any rate his religious conviction. He will take into account the fact that we stand here at one of the most decisive points in the religious history of Israel and consequently of humanity. Had Elijah been defeated and had Baal triumphed in Israel, the consequences would have been incalculable.' This is unquestionably a defensible position, but its force is somewhat blunted by the fact that the legendary element in the Elijah (as in the Elisha) cycle is so obvious and pervasive; and those who are unconvinced by the argument will find relief, even if not unmixed with a little misgiving, in the view that here we have another instance of telescoped history. The movement which ended in the extirpation of Baalism at the hands of Elisha and Jehu was initiated by Elijah, and he is credited, like Moses, David, and Solomon, with the full consequences of this movement which he only inaugurated and inspired.

Does this principle find any application in the New Testament—in the Trinitarian formula, for example, which in Mt 28^{19} is carried back to Jesus; in the discussions between Him and 'the Jews' in the Fourth Gospel, which may reflect problems which had to be faced by the early Church; and elsewhere? We leave it to New Testament scholars to say.