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the Levitical offering of salt with sacrifices to the desire to typify prevention of putrefaction, one can only explain as another instance of the commentator's obsession with the idea of preserved meat. Sacrifices were consumed, not preserved. Moreover, salt is especially prescribed for sacrifices of cereals (Lev 2^{13}),[1] the so-called meal-offerings (called in the A.V. to us most misleadingly 'meat-offerings'); and cereal food, as long as it is kept dry, does not require salt to keep it good. No, the offering of salt with sacrifice depends on the quite simple reasoning: sacrifice is food; we need salt with food, therefore offer salt with sacrifice. Again we are back at salt for flavouring. But details of sacrificial ritual are uninteresting. Perhaps Jesus was as little interested in them as the ordinary man, assuredly less interested in them than commentators. It would be the vital meaning of the Old Testament or its striking sayings that would influence His language. Let any one familiar with the Bible ask himself what Old Testament verse comes to his mind when salt is mentioned. Surely it is, 'Can that which is unsavoury be eaten without salt?' (Job 6^{6}). Is it not at least possible that these words were in our Lord's mind?

(*c*) The natural use of salt which the ordinary person thinks of is not prevention of putrefaction—unless he happens to work in a bacon factory—but flavouring. Jesus generally had common things and common uses in mind.

'Ye are the salt of the earth,' then, means, not that Jesus hoped the presence of His disciples might prevent the world from putrefying, but that He hoped they would make it pleasant and palatable. He intended that they should add zest to life. His point appears to be exactly the opposite of that beautiful but foolish and untrue line of Swinburne:

> Thou hast conquered, O pale Galilean, and the world has grown grey at thy breath.

Jesus came to give life and to give it abundantly (Jn 10^{10}). He did not set out merely to keep the world from putrefying, but to save it (Jn 3^{17}), to make it entirely good and delightful. The Church has no right to be satisfied with an antiseptic and germicide function; her place is rather to bring zest to life, to make life worth living.

This throws light also on the Marcan passage, which is probably only a fragment and not organically related to the preceding verses (Mk 9^{50}): 'Salt is good; but, if the salt has become saltless (ἄναλον), wherewith will ye season it? Have salt in yourselves, and have peace one with another.' It is the people who add zest and interest to life who make for peace. Quarrels arise out of idleness and self-centredness. Jesus here suggests that His disciples are to be interesting people who help to keep the peace by making life interesting for others. If the Church has from time to time fallen from the high estate of making life good for people, it is because Christians constantly fall back into legalism and live a life of restrictions and prohibitions which does not add zest to the lives of others. The way to be the salt of the earth is to experience the gospel as the power of God to salvation (Ro 1^{16}), and to know the renewing of the mind (Ro 12^{2}) which comes from constant companionship with Christ (2 Co 3^{18}).

[1] Robertson Smith (*The Religion of the Semites*, p. 220) suggests that this was because cereal food requires salt, whereas meat and milk can be digested without it.

Recent Foreign Theology.

Troeltsch's Last Book.[1]

ERNST TROELTSCH died in February 1923. He was, with the exception of Harnack, the most influential thinker of theological Germany in the last ten years, and his end was hastened by bodily privations due to the terrible conditions prevailing on the other side of the Rhine. In the following month he was to have lectured in England and Scotland, when the opportunity would have been taken to pay honour to one illustrious alike by his learning, his eminence in philosophical theology, and his championship of an international goodwill inspired by the Spirit of Christ.

He had just published this massive volume on

[1] *Der Historismus und seine Probleme.* By Ernst Troeltsch. (Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. iii.) Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1922. Pp. xi, 777.

the philosophy of history. It contains a preliminary study of the conceptions which underlie such a philosophy, and was to have been followed, after an interval of two years, by the actual superstructure. But death broke off these plans.

Adequately to review a work of such magnitude would be a long task. But it may safely be described as an indispensable thesaurus of materials for all who are interested in its subject; and while its bibliographies may soon be antiquated, the substance of the book is of such living and original strength that its effect must last for years. Its intellectual energy never flags, even when the burden of learning might seem sure to break it down. For sheer indomitable tenacity of thinking, on some of the highest and most obscure problems thought can deal with, I should be perplexed to name its rival. All that can now be done is to enumerate the main heads of the discussion and select one or two points for comment.

The book opens with a chapter on the present-day revival of interest in the philosophy of history. Sections are devoted to the formal logic of historical interpretation, the relations of nature and history, and the contrast of Naturalism and what the writer calls 'Historism.' The first of these contains an extremely valuable handling of such questions as the following: What is meant by calling this or that person or movement 'an individual whole'? How in history are we to define originality and uniqueness? On what principles select our data? What makes a man 'representative' of an age? Is there such a thing as a 'general mind' or a social consciousness? Is anything in history an accident? Chapter II. deals with the acquisition of criteria for the estimate of historical facts and their relation to present ideals of human life. Here the problem is debated fully whether everything in history is individual, and whether we may rightly venture on universal propositions. Troeltsch makes Rickert's well-known distinction between the methods of science and history his point of departure, not shrinking, however, on occasion from trenchant criticism. The general finding is that we cannot state any absolute or timeless criteria by which progress in history is to be judged, but the leading of God (as faith would say) is to be found in the circumstances of the time, deeply and sympathetically interpreted. The whole complexity of the problem whether history can be construed by an Idea is laid before us. 'If we start from Idea and criterion, we land in an unhistorical rationalism and lose all connexion with actual historical research. If we set out from individual historical facts and thereby keep in touch with scholarship, a boundless scepticism threatens us. If we try to bring the two together by dexterous conceptions of development, the two parts of the whole constantly fly apart' (p. 162). There are memorable pages at this point on Hegel's grandeur and failure as an interpreter of the past and its outcome. It is no academic debate that Troeltsch conducts. The supreme reason for studying history, he holds firmly, is that we may guide and better the future. We can never evade a decisive leap into the future from the past. It follows that to choose our criteria of the worthy and desirable is an act of faith. The historian, if he is to avoid the gulf of pessimistic despair, must grasp the presence of a higher factor in human destinies.

Chapter III. analyses the very difficult notion of 'development' throughout the generations, and asks how far the idea of a Universal History of man is sound. There may be progress within this movement or that other, but is there progress on the whole? We do not know. Enough that each larger grouping has its own life and its own ideals, and that we have a right to faith in an immortality in which the life of the individual will be perfected. But with this reverent agnosticism Troeltsch combines a brave persistence in facing the question how, in reading the story of the world, we are to correlate the ideas of development and value—the movement, that is, and the standard by reference to which we must judge whether the movement is up or down. What is the dialectic of history? What is the dynamic that keeps it going and forging onward? He strives to put aside preconceived ideas and form his eventual judgment in the light of what has been written about the meaning of development by Marx, Comte, Spencer, von Hartmann, and many more. The names of Dilthey, Bergson, and Max Weber are often mentioned, invariably with critical deference. A section near the close on 'History and the Theory of Knowledge' is crowded with fascinating problems and would alone make the book worth study. The general idea of cosmic evolution, it shows convincingly, is not an idea of development at all, but merely of change. Since history is not a part of biology, the attempt to

explain its movement by biological categories, as if moral consciousness were an ornamental accident of human life, is grotesquely false. But is the development what we think it to be, even with the proviso that bad thinking can be corrected by better? How do we know, or rather understand, what is going on in other men's souls? The only possible answer to these problems is that our thinking, to be true, must be grounded in the life of God, from whom all minds derive; in and through the simple or complex data of sense-perception we must intuitively *divine* the deeper meaning of the human lot.

It will be seen that faith has a large share in this ultimate conclusion. History, if it is to rise above the level of cultured showmanship, must be rooted and grounded in the trust that the Eternal reigns and will prevail. It is a tribute to the profound religion of the dead thinker that in the tragic plight of his country he could still formulate and defend this immemorial creed.

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Contributions and Comments.

Two Brief Marginal Notes in the Text of Philippians.

EVERY student of the Epistle to the Philippians is aware of the difficulty of translating 1[22], and the purpose of this note is to suggest that two brief marginal comments have at that point entered into the text. The following considerations, as it seems to me, go a long way towards justifying the hypothesis.

(*a*) There is, first of all, the difficulty, just mentioned, of extracting a satisfactory sense out of the text as it stands. The *crux* is so familiar that there is no need to do more than mention it. It cannot be said that any one of the many renderings that have been proposed is satisfactory.

(*b*) Again, if we omit the words εἰ δὲ τὸ ζῆν ἐν σαρκί, τοῦτό μοι καρπὸς ἔργου, the remainder of v.[22], namely, καὶ τί αἱρήσομαι οὐ γνωρίζω, attaches itself easily and naturally to v.[21], 'For me to live is Christ, and to die is gain; and which to choose I cannot tell.'

(*c*) Furthermore, the portion of v.[22], whose removal thus leaves a natural and unambiguous sequence of thought, consists—apart from the words εἰ δέ by which it is introduced—of two groups of four words, namely, τὸ ζῆν ἐν σαρκί and τοῦτό μοι καρπὸς ἔργου. Now the first two words of each of these groups occur in the immediate context, namely, τὸ ζῆν in v.[21], and τοῦτό μοι in v.[19], and it is interesting in the highest degree to note that the remaining words in each group (that is, ἐν σαρκί and καρπὸς ἔργου) would form a most apt comment on the words τὸ ζῆν and τοῦτό μοι occurring in v.[21] and v.[19] respectively. It goes without saying that ἐν σαρκί is an appropriate comment on τὸ ζῆν in v.[21]; and if it be said that it is too obvious a comment to have been made, one way of answering the objection is to say that it is not more obvious than the two words enclosed in brackets in Bengel's comment, which runs: *Quicquid vivo* (*vita naturali*), *Christum vivo.*

As for the τοῦτο in v.[19], its exact significance is not immediately evident. In vv.[12-18] Paul speaks of the influence of his presence and experience in Rome on the preaching of the word in the great metropolis. The majority of the preachers had been stimulated to greater activity. Their motives, it is true, are mixed, but that after all is not a matter of supreme moment; what matters, says Paul, is 'that in every way, whether in pretence or in truth, Christ is proclaimed; and (he proceeds) therein (ἐν τούτῳ) I rejoice, yea, and will rejoice.' Now comes v.[19]: οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι τοῦτό μοι ἀποβήσεται εἰς σωτηρίαν, κ.τ.λ. The indefiniteness of the τοῦτο here is due seemingly to the fact that Paul's language is influenced by Job 13[16]. Ellicott remarks that 'τοῦτο here can only mean the same as τούτῳ, v.[18]—the more extended preaching of the Gospel of Christ.' In other words, τοῦτο means the effect of the greater activity of the preachers in Rome, and it is difficult to see how it could be more aptly described than by means of the terse comment—καρπὸς ἔργου.

I suggest, then, that some early reader of the Epistle to the Philippians wrote in the margin of his copy the two brief comments: τὸ ζῆν—ἐν σαρκί