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THE EXPOSITORY TIMES.

Notes of Recent Exposition.

It is known that science and theology have recently been drawing more closely together. It is at any rate known that they have ceased to eye one another with the old unsleeping antagonism. How has the change come about? The causes are many, and not always easy to trace. But one cause is the interest that scientific men have been taking in the existence of a future life.

That interest is not due to Christianity. The believer in Christ has no more doubt of a future life than he has of the present life. 'In my Father's house are many mansions; if it were not so, I would have told you. I go to prepare a place for you.' Christ spoke these words and others like them. And not only did He speak plain words like these, but He lived a life on earth every act of which took a future life for granted. The believer in Christ has no doubt that if a man die he shall live again.

But the new interest in the future which men of science show has not come from Christ. Some of them take an interest in theology. But that is an afterthought. It is the result, it is not the occasion, of their interest in a life to come. The new interest in the future is due to the discovery that physical science cannot explain everything.

This is a genuine discovery. And it is now accepted by almost everybody. It is accepted even by Sir Edwin Ray Lankester. In an article in *The R. P. A. Annual* for 1915, he accepts the limitation of science without reserve. He expresses it mathematically. He suggests that we might regard the results of science as the contents of a bracket, as used in algebra. Inside the bracket he would place all the ascertained and ascertainable facts of physical science; outside it the facts (if they may be called facts) of religion and theology. And he has no hesitation either in confining science within the bracket or in acknowledging his interest in whatever may be without.

But there must be no confusion between the two. If the contents of the bracket are to be confined within it, the things that are without must not enter in. Sir Edwin Ray Lankester has written this article for the purpose of protesting against any attempt that may be made to arrive at the knowledge of a future life by the methods of physical science.

For it seems to him that all the progress which has been made by science during the last two hundred and fifty years has been made by rigidly adhering to the scientific method. What is that? It is the method of 'not blindly accepting a guess or belief as to the causes or relations of observed occurrences, but of at once testing such guess or

belief by framing an inference from it, the truth of which inference could be put to the proof of actual observation.' The Royal Society was founded in 1662. It was founded for the purpose of putting the scientific method into operation. And to the application of the scientific method, says Sir Edwin Ray LANKESTER, is due the whole of that vast mass of knowledge of physics, chemistry, and biology which has accumulated since the Royal Society was founded. He does not deny that some of the founders, and some of those who succeeded them, had no clear conception of the scientific method, or were not always careful to apply it. They had their own religious beliefs and theological speculations, and they often allowed them to interfere with the working of the method of science. But in so far as they did so, they retarded progress. The method of science is to observe physical facts, to classify them, to draw legitimate conclusions from them, and to insist at every step on the production of 'cases' which can be tested.

Now it so happened that at the last meeting but one of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, the President, Sir Oliver LODGE, forgot this fundamental rule. In his presidential address he expressed his personal belief in the existence of ghosts. He did not use that word. He spoke of 'discarnate intelligences.' But Sir Edwin Ray LANKESTER says that by 'discarnate intelligences' he meant what ordinary people would call ghosts. And ghosts he himself prefers to call them.

But why should not Sir Oliver LODGE express his personal belief in the existence of ghosts? Sir Edwin Ray LANKESTER does not deny his right—on another occasion. It is his right to do so at the meetings of the British Association that he denies. It is his right as President and in his Presidential Address. For it is understood that nothing shall be mentioned at the meetings of the British Association but that which is found inside Sir Edwin Ray LANKESTER's algebraical bracket.

Is this an act of intolerance on the part of Sir Edwin Ray LANKESTER? He says it is not. He says that his objection is not made to a belief which he does not share. It is not made because he denies the existence of ghosts. He does not deny their existence. He does not know whether they exist or not. What he objects to is that Sir Oliver LODGE at a scientific meeting introduced them unscientifically. He did not produce an example. He did not make it possible for the men of science who were present to test his belief. In the early days of the Association there were men who wished to introduce matters of doubtful disputation. The members insisted that they must 'bring in' an experiment or a specimen. They insisted that the vampire and the dragon should be placed "on the table," that angels should be brought before them, and their power of dancing on a needle's point exhibited, before they would discuss these things at all.' And because Sir Oliver LODGE did not observe this rule his Presidential address is condemned as unscientific and retrogressive.

One of the reasons for the publication of THE ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF RELIGION AND ETHICS was the arrest that had taken place in the progress of Theology. For a long time Systematic Theology had made no progress. It was waiting to use the results of the new science of Biblical Theology. From that science much was expected, and much came. But Biblical Theology itself was by and by brought to a standstill. Seeking to discover and to systematize the contents of the Bible, men found that the Bible could not be studied by itself. Its contents could not be isolated from the contents of other religious books. They found that no further progress could be made until the means of comparison with the phenomena of religious life throughout the world was placed at their disposal.

THE ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF RELIGION AND ETHICS seeks to meet that necessity. It has other and larger aims. The whole range of the religious

teacher's interests is covered by it. The religious and moral life of the world is revealed in it. But the demand of Theology to be considered a progressive science, and to make progress, is never lost sight of. The seventh volume, which has just been published, contains many articles which directly meet the demand.

Among the rest it contains a series of articles on Incarnation. But the mention of Incarnation recalls another reason for the issue of the Encyclopædia. If it has a theological it has also an apologetic value. The opponents of Christianity have for some time been before the world with arguments drawn from the comparative study of Religion. And of all their arguments none has told so disastrously as the assertion that there had been many Christs in the world and that Incarnation was a superstition of almost universal acceptance.

The subject of Incarnation is dealt with in this volume by nine authors and in eleven articles. No facts are obscured. No bias, either for Christianity or against it, can be detected. What was wanted was simply a full and reliable knowledge of the facts, and these men, each of whom is an authority in the religion upon which he writes, have furnished it.

The most important article in the new volume of the *Journal of the Manchester Egyptian and Oriental Society* (Manchester Univ. Press; 5s. net) has been contributed by Dr. Louis H. Gray, one of the editors of The Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics, whose subject is 'Zoroastrian and other Ethnic Religious Material in the *Acta Sanctorum*.' But that article is of special interest only to Iranian scholars. In the same number, however, there is a note by Mr. M. A. Canney on a peculiar Hebrew expression, which comes within our province here.

It is the expression 'hip and thigh.' In Jg 15^8 it is said of Samson's slaughter of the Philistines, that 'he smote them hip and thigh.' The meaning, according to the commentators, is that they suffered a complete overthrow. And no doubt the commentators are correct. But why 'hip and thigh'? What is the origin of the phrase? And what appropriateness has it?

No one has been able to answer. Mr. Canney cannot answer. He believes that no answer is possible, for he believes that the phrase is a mistranslation.

Literally translated it is 'leg upon thigh,' which does not make for clearness. Professor G. A. Cooke takes it to mean 'so that the limbs of the slain fall one upon another.' Professor Moore suggests that the phrase is a wrestler's expression, and means 'to trip up.' But none of these meanings commends itself to Mr. Canney.

He believes that the word translated 'leg' (*shōk*) is a verb. It does not occur as a verb in Biblical Hebrew, but its equivalent (*sâka*) occurs in Arabic. This Arabic verb means 'to drive.' It is used of driving cattle; and it is used of sheep or goats 'pressing' one upon another. This, he believes, might easily pass into 'strike,' and so the meaning of the text would simply be that Samson struck the Philistines upon the thigh. Of course the expression is metaphorical still. The thigh is the seat of life and procreation; and thus the meaning is obtained of ruthless extirpation. Mr. Canney would translate Jg 15^8, 'and he smote them, striking upon the thigh, a great slaughter.'

A discovery of much interest to the student of Religion has been made in Rome. An account of it is given in *The Times* of December 24.

Excavations at the church of San Clemente, begun fifty years ago, but interrupted by the pouring in of water, probably from some ancient aqueduct, were resumed in 1902 and have been

continued until now. Every layer as it was dug up revealed another. First there was the ancient church, erected about the eleventh century. Below its pavement excavation uncovered another and older church, almost perfect in all essential details, and 'filled with matter of the greatest interest to the Christian historian.' Below this church, which cannot be later than the fourth century, there came to light a Roman house of the Imperial period, one chamber of which was evidently regarded as a holy shrine and had been arrayed as an oratory.

There is reason for believing that this is the very house in which St. Clement lived. For tradition says that he belonged to a noble family, possibly the Imperial family of the Flavii; and his father, according to the *Liber Pontificalis*, lived in the Coelian region. But this is not the lowest building yet. Below the dwelling-house of St. Clement there has been discovered a mass of masonry which had once been a strong fortress in the days when kings ruled in Rome—'very likely the residence of Tarquin, some five centuries before the birth of Christ.'

Return for a moment to the dwelling-house of St. Clement. For of all that this fertile excavation has revealed, the most important thing is the discovery in this house of two shrines belonging to two rival religions. The one shrine is Mithraic, the other Christian. The shrines are there together, but it is not to be supposed that they were used together. No doubt the Christian shrine was first. Then came Mithras, an intruder into a Christian home,—to be subsequently expelled again, after an unknown number of years, on the triumph of the Catholic Church. The position of these shrines, side by side in a great Roman's home, is testimony of the most impressive kind to the magnitude of the struggle between the religion of Mithras and the religion of Christ which was carried on so long and so doubtfully throughout the Roman Empire.

'Is it the pious duty of every believer in religion to renounce Friedrich Nietzsche and all his works?' The startling question—startling at such a time as this—is asked by Mr. Edwin Dodge HARDIN in the latest number of *The American Journal of Theology*. The title of the article is 'Nietzsche's Service to Christianity.'

Mr. HARDIN is not a follower of Nietzsche. There are followers, and they seem to be on the increase. 'Before his own death Nietzsche had the somewhat uncommon privilege of seeing his doctrines received, rather, seized with avidity, by many, and of being able to foresee in some measure how influential they were destined to become. More than a decade has passed since he died, and his philosophy is still making headway. Some of his characteristic ideas have been welcomed by men of action on both sides of the Atlantic, who find in them a sufficient excuse for themselves, if not an argument strong enough to convince society, for some of their relentless and unscrupulous methods of acquiring and using wealth and power.' But Mr. HARDIN is none of these.

He is a believer in Christ. And he knows very well that no man can be a believer in Christ and in Friedrich Nietzsche. Yet he firmly holds that along with the evil which he has done, Nietzsche has rendered a real service to Christianity. And he gives his reasons.

In the first place Nietzsche has compelled us to see the Christian Faith in its real greatness. 'When in the Roman Church the momentous task is undertaken of adding to the calendar of the saints one who is deemed worthy of the honour, in opposition to those who have been chosen to emphasize the merits of the candidate, a man of large scholarship and critical mind is appointed to the important office of devil's advocate. It is his duty, as his significant title suggests, to bring to light any flaws in the candidate's claim to saint-hood and to throw all possible objections in the way of his canonization. If his efforts prove to be

unavailing, the candidate is eventually crowned as saint with the added lustre that comes from the vindication of his merits against all assaults. Nietzsche may justly be regarded as a sort of devil's advocate in the case of Christianity. Its implacable and uncompromising foe, his very hostility serves the stimulating purpose of compelling Christianity to reveal what merits it possesses and to show such virtues as will stand the most searching and merciless criticism.'

Mr. HARDIN holds that criticism is a good thing. It makes us think, and that in itself is worth much. It forbids us to take things for granted. It compels us to weigh anew moral values which we thought were established for all time. Aeroplanes rise best against the wind; and if Christianity has motive power, it will rise against the wind of criticism, as it once rose against the wind of persecution, to far loftier heights than we are in ordinary times content to have it.

But we may not separate Christianity from Christian men. Nietzsche compels us to look at our own Christian lives. He shakes us with unnecessary roughness at times. But he shakes us. And if it is out of a slumber that is as harmful as it is pleasant he does a service to us. 'Indeed,' asks Mr. HARDIN, 'is he not thereby doing what the prophets of Israel did to arouse a comfortably complacent generation? They did it in their zeal for the Lord of Hosts; he has done it driven by his own remorseless convictions, but both accomplished practically the same end.'

Nietzsche was pitiless. He was always pitiless. But if he was pitiless to others, he was as pitiless to himself. If he saw a certain course to be right, he insisted on others following it, whatever it cost them, and he followed it himself. He followed it himself to its logical conclusion, regardless of the suffering it brought. He broke with Christianity, but he did not do so easily. Mr. HARDIN says he was not the kind of man to cast away the faith of his fathers and of his early years on a mere whim. On premises which were questionable, but which had some show of plausibility, he came to the conclusion that the Christian religion had been a hindrance to real human progress, and therefore he repudiated and denounced it. Mr. HARDIN will not believe that he denounced it out of sheer vanity and wrong-headedness.

He came to believe that there were two standards of morality in the world. One he called 'master-morality'; the other 'slave-morality.' The master-morality is that of the few; it is the morality of the free and independent men in the world who have at all times constituted the minority. The slave-morality is that of the great 'bulk of humanity who are deficient and feeble in body and mind, and whom he regards as the legitimate instruments and even, should the necessity arise, victims of their rightful masters.'

In the lives of the masters, pity and its kindred emotions have no place. For they are not virtues, they are vices. 'They serve no higher end than on the one hand of prolonging the sufferings of the underlings whose existence at best is a poor and inadequate affair and who were better exterminated as summarily as possible, especially if it becomes evident that they can render no more service to their superiors, and on the other hand of prejudicing the judgment and impairing the will of those who yield to them.' Now he could not help observing that the emotion of pity is a great feature in the religion of Christ. In the religion of Christ, therefore, he saw the slave-morality run riot. In the sentiments of pity, humility, patience, brotherhood, reverence, and the like, he found the marks of slaves who emphasized these qualities because they were of most service to themselves in the struggle for existence. To Nietzsche the Sermon on the Mount became anathema.

What service can all this render to Christianity? Directly, says Mr. HARDIN, none at all. Indirectly, a great deal. It compels us to examine ourselves. We are Christians. Are we living out

our Christianity? Are we living it out to the full? What are we doing with the Sermon on the Mount? Mr. HARDIN says that 'One alone thought religion out and lived it out to its logical conclusion, and He died on a cross. May it not be that many of the ills from which society suffers and for which Nietzsche held Christianity in part at least responsible are due less to the fact that Christian principles and morals exist at all than to the fact that they have not been lived enough?'

We believe with all our heart that those virtues which Nietzsche called vices are the very glory of our Faith and the hope of the world. But it is possible enough that by bringing us into the light of his lurid antagonism he has compelled us to see whether we are really ready to have pity on others as God has had pity upon us.

Even in his 'superman,' that peculiar creation of Nietzsche's genius, Mr. HARDIN finds something that may be of service to us. 'Nietzsche draws the picture of a future social condition in which a few strong men, having lived down what he regards as the perverted morality of to-day, shall be the guiding influence of the rest of mankind. Their value to society will have become recognized, and accordingly they will be given places of power and direction. False notions of altruism and of responsibility to their inferiors will have no place in their thoughts. While incidentally and even inevitably conferring benefit upon society by their dominion, which will be wise and strong, they themselves will be the sufficient justification of their ascendency. Untroubled by the religious phantasies and the moral scruples of their inferiors, they will become themselves the creators of new moral values.' These supermen are not gross or self-indulgent. Hard and remorseless towards their inferiors, they are equally hard and remorseless towards themselves. They find the joy of life in the struggle against hardships and in the glad sense of dominion. They rejoice in their strength, they seize with avidity the present moment, and they fall fighting to the last.

This is not Christianity. Mr. HARDIN does not claim that it is. Christianity insists upon an altruism which Nietzsche utterly scorned. But Christianity, like Nietzsche, recognizes the inestimable worth of the individual and sees for him vast and glorious possibilities. 'Christ's message was unquestionably social, but he sought the regeneration of society through the regeneration of the individual. His distinctive teachings were to individuals and not to masses of men, and to individuals he committed the fortunes of the cause to which he devoted his life.'

There is even an element of likeness, and it is an important element, between the superman of Nietzsche and the follower of Christ. 'Nothing could be more unlike and contradictory than on the one hand the dominion of superman founded upon the most inexorable egoism and on the other the kingdom of heaven whose law is love. But in both we see an expectation of better things and a motive for hopeful effort. Christianity believes the best is yet to be, and Nietzsche, travelling by a strange and altogether different road, reaches a similar destination and unconsciously confirms the age-long earnest expectation of humanity which has found its satisfying and perfect fulfilment in the word of Christ.'

And Mr. HARDIN will forgive much to Nietzsche on account of the end. 'Some years before his death his bodily infirmities increased and were accompanied by insanity. The apostle of superman succumbed to the weakness of human flesh, and from his darkened mind was dissipated the consciousness of the will to power. The intrepid philosopher of ruthless independence became helpless and wholly dependent upon the compassion and care of others. And Friedrich Nietzsche, who had despised pity and compassion as infirmities to be suppressed, by an irony of fate lived to see the day when he himself became the object of these peculiarly Christian virtues.

'"Galilean, thou hast conquered!"'