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West': the Chronicle is its own witness against itself, as it goes on to state that the result of crossing the sea was the subjection of 'the country of the West in its full extent.' Is Khallab in the Prologue of the Laws of Khammu-rabi really Aleppo? There was a Khallab in Babylonia, and it is more natural to suppose that this is the city intended, rather than a distant Syrian town whose name is elsewhere written Khal-ma-na in the cuneiform texts. Budu-yaman, finally, in the fragmentary annals of Nebuchadnezzar, should be corrected into Puṭu-yavan, 'Phut of the Ionians.' Cyrene is meant, of which Laarchus or Polyarchus was king, though all that is left of his name in the cuneiform tablet is the last syllable—*kú*. It was from Cyrene that the Egyptian Pharaoh Amasis drew at the time part of his troops.

In his transliteration and translation of the interesting letter discovered by Dr. Bliss at Lachish, Professor Rogers has followed Dr. Knudtzon. Knudtzon's readings, however, are not altogether

correct, as I found on a re-examination of the cuneiform original; the impossible name 'Pabi,' for example, has no existence. The following is my translation of the tablet:—

'[To . . .] the officer thus says [Ilu?]-abi: At thy feet I prostrate myself. Verily thou knowest that Dan-Hadad and Zimrida have made conspiracy (?) together, and Dan-Hadad says to Zimrida: "Send Isyara to me, O my father, [and] give me [3?] shields (?) and 3 slings and 3 falchions. I am gone out against the country of the king, and it has acted against me, but now I will get it back. As regards the scheme, he who has devised the scheme is Ilu-abu; send him therefore unto me. And [now] I am despatching Rabi-ilu; [my messenger?] will convey to him . . . these words."

Professor Rogers has enriched his book with well-chosen photographs, and has added to it a useful index. It is admirably printed: I have been able to discover only two misprints, '756' for 576 on p. 101, and שבייר for שניר on p. 303.

## The Doctrine of the Incarnation in the Creeds.

BY THE REV. A. E. GARVIE, M.A., D.D., PRINCIPAL OF NEW COLLEGE, LONDON.

### V.

(1) It may appear a rashness even to madness, if in closing I venture to suggest a few considerations towards a better metaphysic. (i.) We must start with the historical fact, as literary and historical criticism to-day shows that fact to be. What is doubtful must not be determinative of our Christology; but our construction must rest on the certain. I have already indicated what will fall out of our view, and what must be brought into it. The historical reality of the moral character, the religious consciousness and the mediatorial function of Christ is the datum to be dealt with. (ii.) These historical facts must be interpreted primarily in the interests of personal faith. We must not ignore the fact that the motive of the Ancient Creeds was religious. Athanasius' conception of the Christian salvation necessitated the assertion of the *ἁμοούσιον*. But it is to be feared that in subsequent controversies, not only did lower worldly motives enter, but even where these were absent, a merely intellectual interest

in definition of Christian truth asserted itself. While we need not go as far as Ritschl and his school in limiting Christian doctrine to what faith can immediately apprehend—and many recognize that faith includes an exercise of the intellect in appropriating divine truth, in making its own in distinct, consistent thinking the meaning of all its objects—yet not a speculative curiosity must guide our inquiries, but a personal moral and religious necessity to know God in Christ so as to trust fully, love freely, and serve faithfully. (iii.) For the interpretation of the historical facts in the interests of personal faith we are to-day not worse but better equipped with the metaphysical formulæ. It would be strange, indeed, if the twentieth Christian century were in this respect at a disadvantage in comparison with the fourth and fifth. Modern philosophy has a closer affinity to, because it stands in a greater dependence on, Christian truth than did ancient philosophy.

(2) We must first of all in attempting any re-

statement of doctrine get rid of the term substance from our doctrine of God and Christ alike, for its associations are physical and even material; we must substitute subject, spirit, or best of all person or personality. The two terms are now used interchangeably; but it would be well if we could distinguish them: *Personality* as the abstract noun connoting the qualities which belong to the person, and *Person* as the concrete noun denoting the individual existence to which these qualities belong, corresponding to the difference between manhood and man. Much would be gained for clearness of thought if we could get rid of the use of the term *person* to express the distinction of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, as it is now quite misleading, and tends towards tritheism; the terms mode, principle, or subsistence are too abstract and impersonal. I have not been able to discover a term that is satisfactory. So long as we use the word person of the Trinity, we cannot speak as I wish we could, of the one person of the Godhead as of the one person of Christ. Probably we must be content with the ambiguity of the term person as applied to the trinity in God and the unity of Christ, and try to avoid even the appearance of any modalism by speaking of the personality of God, when we want to assert the divine unity. That we should speak of the personality of God seems to me of urgent importance, as God in popular thinking is conceived of as a society.

(3) We may continue speaking of the two *natures* in Christ, so long as we keep clearly before ourselves that *nature* does not mean *substance*, but as an abstract noun connotes the qualities which belong respectively to God and man, that is divinity or Godhood, and humanity or manhood, and also so long as we recognize that in the realm of the spirit, in mind, heart, will, there is such affinity, and not contradiction between Godhood and manhood, that one person can be God and man without any duality of consciousness or activity, but in a perfect mental, moral, and religious unity. Nothing more helpful to Christology has modern philosophy offered to us than

Lotze's discussion of personality in God and man. Man's personality is imperfect, and God's alone perfect. The divine in Christ does not suppress but completes the human. Human receptivity of faith and divine communicativeness of grace are perfect personal unity in Him. It was because Christian thought had not reached this stage of enlightenment and insight, that Apollinaris was adjudged a heretic, and he himself falsely expressed a truth. The Logos need not displace the rational soul that Christ may be one.

(4) There are two other modern conceptions, the significance and value of which for Christology have not yet been adequately recognized, *immanence* and *evolution*. It has been already stated that the view of the creeds is *static*, and it has been implied, if not affirmed, that it is *deistic*, and *deistic* because *static*. If God be unchangeable, impassible in the sense of the creeds, He must necessarily be separated from the world and man. (i.) The divine immanence presupposes that in His activity in the world God must so limit Himself that the cosmic process and the human progress in time and space are real for Him, that He so far participates in change and suffering. Creation implies self-limitation of God (*Kenosis*); the immanence of the Creator in the Creation involves this still further. If we follow out this thought, does it not help us to conceive how God was really in Christ in human conditions? (ii.) The conception of evolution enables us to think of that divine immanence as progressive, not in the sense that God is more present in the end than in the beginning; but that in the progress of nature and man God becomes ever more manifest, and His Creation in becoming self-conscious becomes more conscious of Him. We can apply this conception of a progressive immanence most fruitfully to Christ. He in His person is the consummation of this process in nature and man; and in His personal development the consummation is gradually realized. As the manhood grows, so God is more fully in Him, until His glorified manhood becomes the perfect organ of the glory of God.