THE EXPOSITORY TIMES.

Notes of Recent Exposition.

In the months of November and December 1906, at the Lowell Institute in Boston, and again in the month of January 1907, at Columbia University, New York, Professor William James delivered a course of lectures on Pragmatism. We do not envy those who heard the lectures. Professor William James is the only philosopher of our day whom the people can follow. But they can follow him just as agreeably when he writes as when he speaks.

The lectures have now been published by Messrs. Longmans, their title being the one word *Pragmatism* (4s. 6d. net). And when we read them we know that we have missed nothing by not being there when he delivered them. We know that nothing which the lecturer could have done by voice or gesture would have made them livelier than they are. When Professor William James is lecturing, he does not say 'does not,' he says 'does n't'; and he writes 'does n't' when he sits down to make a book. When he is lecturing he divides the whole world into two classes of philosophers, and he writes up the characteristics of the two columns on a blackboard. He prints the two columns on a page of his book, and we see them more clearly there than even on the blackboard, and we can return to them as often as we please.

The two classes into which Professor James divides all philosophers are 'the tender-minded' and 'the tough-minded.' Other names have been given to these two divisions of mankind. They have been called rationalists and empiricists. They have been called intellectualists and sensationalists. And they are likely to be called by these titles again. It is only Professor William James, determined that none of his audience shall go to sleep under his philosophical lectures, it is only he who speaks of the tender-minded and the tough-minded. But the important thing is that as he divides all mankind into these two classes, Professor James seems to say, not only that all men are philosophers, and not only that what a man's philosophy is determines what his life shall be, but also that what a man's philosophy is depends upon his temperament.

He says that all men are philosophers. With that, of course, all men agree. Next, he says that what a man's philosophy is determines what his life shall be. Let us look at that for a moment. Professor James opens his book with that. He opens his book by quoting a paragraph out of a collection of essays by Mr. Chesterton—out of that 'admirable collection of essays' called *Heretics*. 'There are some people,' says Mr. Chesterton, 'and I am one of them—who think that the most

practical and important thing about a man is still his view of the universe. We think that for a landlady considering a lodger it is important to know his income, but still more important to know his philosophy. We think that for a general about to fight an enemy it is important to know the enemy's numbers, but still more important to know the enemy's philosophy. We think the question is not whether the theory of the cosmos affects matters, but whether in the long run anything else affects them.'

Professor James quotes that paragraph from Mr. Chesterton, and then he adds, 'I think with Mr. Chesterton in this matter. I know that you, ladies and gentlemen, have a philosophy, each and all of you, and that the most interesting and important thing about you is the way in which it determines the perspective in your several worlds. You know the same of me.'

But when Professor James divides all mankind into two classes, calling the one class the 'tender-minded' and the other class 'the tough-minded,' he says, or seems to say, not only that whether a a man belongs to the one class or the other determines his view of the universe, but that a man belongs to one class or the other according to the temperament with which he is born.

He divides the world, we say, into two classes. He uses quite a variety of expressions for each class, so that not one of us may fail to find out to which class we belong. But the very titles which he gives to the two classes and everything that he says about them, seem to signify that a man belongs to one or the other not by choice but by temperament. We look, therefore, for a course of lectures on predestination in philosophy. How great is our amazement to find that not another word is said about temperament. Professor James proceeds with his lectures on Pragmatism on the understanding that every one of his audience is philosophically free to go and free to come, and expresses the hope that before he is finished every one of them will choose to become Pragmatists.

These are the columns on the blackboard and in the book—

The Tender-minded	The Tough-minded
Rationalistic (going by 'principles')	Empiricist (going by 'facts')
Intellectualistic	Sensationalistic
Idealistic	Materialistic
Optimistic	Pessimistic
Religious	Irreligious
Free-willist	Fatalistic
Monistic	Pluralistic
Dogmatical	Sceptical.

Now if we find ourselves in the one or the other of these columns, and if we are there, not by our own choice, but according to the temperament we were born with, what hope can Professor James have of making Pragmatists of us?

He has this hope, because of what he means by Pragmatism. Is the world and every one in it either tender-minded or tough-minded? It has been so hitherto, but it shall be so no longer. For Pragmatism has come, and Pragmatism arrests the world *before* it becomes either tender-minded or tough-minded. How we can be arrested, if to be tender-minded or tough-minded is a matter of temperament, Professor James never says. But we may be arrested. This is the claim of Pragmatism; this is its greatness. The tender-minded and the tough-minded go into separate rooms in the hotel of life. But they cannot enter their rooms without passing through the corridor. Pragmatism is the corridor. After we pass through the corridor we still go into the one room or the other. But that we have passed through the corridor makes all the difference. We are idealists or materialists still. But we are idealists or materialists now with an open mind. Pragmatism gives the open mind.

When we become Pragmatists, then, we still pass on to be either tender-minded or tough-

minded. We still become either idealistic or materialistic, optimistic or pessimistic, dogmatical or sceptical. But with a difference. If, for example, we are tough-minded, it is probable that we shall deny the existence of God. But if we are pragmatists before becoming tough-minded, we shall not deny His existence. If we are tender-minded, we shall believe in God; and we shall believe in God if we are pragmatically tender-minded. But with a difference. The God of the tender-minded who have not adopted Pragmatism, is a God who is far away. He is the Absolute. He is the God of the Westminster Catechism—'infinite, eternal, and unchangeable.'

'Far be it from me,' says Professor James, 'to deny the majesty of this conception, or its capacity to yield religious comfort to a most respectable class of minds. But from the human point of view, no one can pretend that it does n't suffer from the faults of remoteness and abstractness. It is eminently a product of what I have ventured to call the rationalistic temper. It disdains empiricism's needs. It substitutes a pallid outline for the real world's richness. It is dapper; it is noble in the bad sense, in the sense in which to be noble is to be inapt for humble service. In this real world of sweat and dirt, it seems to me that when a view of things is "noble," that ought to count as a presumption against its truth, and as a philosophic disqualification. The prince of darkness may be a gentleman, as we are told he is, but whatever the God of earth and heaven is, He can surely be no gentleman. His menial services are needed in the dust of our human trials, even more than his dignity is needed in the empyrean.'

Therefore, in a word, this is the difference that Pragmatism makes. The God of the tender-minded is a gentleman, and the God of the pragmatically tender-minded is not a gentleman.

There are fifteen psalms in the Psalter which go by the name of 'The Songs of Degrees.' They are Pss 120–134. No one knows why they are called Songs of Degrees or who gave them that name. They are not separated in the Psalter into a group, and the commentators are unanimous in finding nothing in the Psalms themselves to connect them together. It is the only thing about them upon which the commentators are unanimous. They are called the Songs of Degrees simply because the title 'A Song of degrees' is found at the beginning of each of them.

At least that is the title which is found at the beginning of each of these psalms in the Authorized Version. In the Revised Version the Hebrew phrase is translated 'A Song of Ascents.' For until now translators have been quite unable to translate the phrase, because commentators have been unable to agree about its meaning. The variety of interpretation is remarkable. It will be found in its most instructive and entertaining form in the last Commentary on the Psalms, except one, that has been published in English. We mean the Commentary by Dr. W. F. Cobb.

The first interpretation is that Pss 120–134 were sung when the Israelites were returning from Babylon to Jerusalem. They should therefore be called 'Songs of Ascents,' because the people were ascending from the low-lying lands of Babylonia to the heights of the Holy City. The plural (Ascents) might then be used because there were two of them, one in 536 B.C., and another in 458 B.C. This has no doubt been the favourite interpretation of the phrase throughout the Christian history of the Psalter. But Dr. Cobb points out the absolutely fatal objection that Ps 122 and Ps 134 presuppose the existence of the Temple and its services.

Another explanation is that these psalms were sung by the Jews as they went up to Jerusalem every year to attend the three great feasts. This is the interpretation which is favoured by perhaps

the majority of sober modern expositors, like Dean Kirkpatrick in the 'Cambridge Bible for Schools'; and it is no doubt the interpretation which suggested to the Revisers the translation 'A Song of Ascents.' Dr. Cobb would be glad to agree with it. 'But,' he says, 'it is to be wished that some evidence were forthcoming that the Jews of the Diaspora were in the habit of singing psalms on the road to Jerusalem.' Without that the explanation seems to be in need of something to stand upon, and even if that evidence were forthcoming Dr. Cobb would be at a loss to understand why special psalms were selected for such a purpose.

The most original contributions to the subject in our day (without including the one to which we are coming) is that 'ascent' is a musical direction meaning that these psalms are to be sung with a loud voice. But all that Mr. Cobb says about that is that it is 'a suggestion of despair.' We must not omit, although Dr. Cobb dismisses it as equally ungrounded, the conjecture that these psalms were sung as 'stations' on the fifteen steps which led from the Court of the Men to the Court of the Women.

Every expositor has his own opinion. What is Dr. Cobb's? 'It may be suggested,' he says, 'that the Temple-service did not always begin in the courts of the Temple itself, but that processions were as popular in Jerusalem as in London. On great festivals it is not unusual to add a procession to a Christian service, not merely from blind obedience to custom, but also from a desire to express in more moving fashion the more lively feelings of the worshipper. As the same feelings of human nature produce the same effects in the same circumstances, it is no very hazardous conjecture that a procession was part of the ceremonial of the three great feasts among the Jews, as it is nowadays at Christmas, Easter, or Pentecost. We have only to assume that a procession in which many pilgrims would take part started from the bottom of Mount Moriah and ascended to the Temple and its plateau, to have a simple and natural explanation both of the title *Pilgerlied* and *Song of Ascent*.'

We have given Dr. Cobb's explanation in his own words. It is as good as any of the others, and it is better than some of them. But it will not do. For it lacks just that evidence of the existence of such a custom which he himself very properly desired for the popular explanation of the yearly pilgrimages. It does not appear that, until now, the meaning of the phrase which is translated 'Song of Degrees' or 'Song of Ascents' had been assuredly discovered.

Now, however, the discovery seems to have been made. James William Thirtle, LL.D., D.D., has published a volume entitled *Old Testament Problems* (Frowde; 6s. net), the first part of which interprets the Songs of Degrees. Dr. Thirtle has already proved his originality in a study of the Titles of the Psalms. He does not claim absolute originality for the discovery of the meaning of the Songs of Degrees, for John Lightfoot made the same suggestion two hundred and fifty years ago. But Lightfoot's suggestion had been lost sight of. And Dr. Thirtle seems to have hit upon the interpretation independently.

The Songs of Degrees then— But first of all notice that in the absence of reasons compelling an abstract rendering of the word, we must translate 'A Song of *the* Degrees.' That is to say, whether 'degrees' is the right word or not, it ought to be preceded by the definite article. The degrees are some definite, well-known, already named degrees. Now in the English translation of the Bible, not only the best known degrees, but the only degrees that are mentioned (in the plural), are the degrees in the sun-dial of Ahaz. 'Behold, (we quote from Is 38^8) I will bring again the shadow of the degrees, which is gone down in the sun-dial of Ahaz, ten degrees backward. So the sun returned ten degrees, by which degrees it was gone down.' This was done for Hezekiah's

sake. Dr. Thirtle remembered at once that Hezekiah and his men had something to do with the literature of Israel. He remembered that when Hezekiah recovered from his sickness he wrote one song at least—is it not found in the Book of the Prophet Isaiah?—and resolved and said, 'Therefore we will sing my songs to the stringed instruments all the days of our life in the house of the Lord.' Dr. Thirtle had made his discovery. The Songs of the Degrees were the very songs which Hezekiah resolved to sing.

They are called 'degrees,' or 'steps' (or even 'ascents' if you please, though that is not so appropriate), because of the degrees in the dial of Ahaz. And there are fifteen of them, because the number of the years of life granted to Hezekiah was fifteen years. Dr. Thirtle does not insist that Hezekiah composed them all, or even any of them. Four of the fifteen are in their titles assigned to David, and one to Solomon; and Dr. Thirtle, who has much more respect for these titles than scholars generally have in our day, is ready to accept David and Solomon as their authors. He thinks it is very likely that if Hezekiah could compose one song he could compose more. But even if he selected them all, and was only what we should now call the editor of the Songs of the Degrees, they come down at least from the age of Hezekiah and owe their place and title to him.

Do the psalms themselves agree? Dr. Thirtle accepts the challenge. He knows that sooner or later every theory of the origin and use of the Songs of the Degrees must pass the bar of internal fitness. He accepts the challenge. He goes over the incidents and allusions which these psalms contain, one after another, and he shows that there is nothing in them which makes the time of Hezekiah impossible, and much which makes it very appropriate.

Let us go over one of the psalms with him. And let us choose the first psalm of the group, the 120th. Its references are definite. If the theory does not break down over the 120th Psalm, it has at least earned some presumption in its favour.

Dr. Thirtle accepts the rendering of the Revised Version—except, of course, that his title is 'A Song of the Degrees.' The historical situation, then, is this. Sennacherib had come up and encamped against the fenced cities of Judah. Hezekiah saw that his purpose was to fight against Jerusalem. As the Chronicler puts it (2 Ch $32^{1.2}$) 'his face was to fight'—(see RVm for the literal Hebrew and compare the 7th verse of the psalm, 'they are for war'). By and by a force was sent against Zion, and surrender was demanded by Rabshakeh in terms which were not only hurtful to the dignity of the king but dishonouring to God. Letters were received which were an outrage upon the name of Jehovah. Having sought the prayers of Isaiah, Hezekiah went up into the Temple and spread one of the letters before the Lord. Isaiah was sent to prophesy the destruction of the Assyrian army and to assure Hezekiah of Divine protection—'I will defend this city, to save it, for mine own sake' (Is 37, 2 K 19, 2 Ch 32).

Does the situation agree? It was a time of distress, and in the time of his distress, Hezekiah called upon the Lord. The psalm opens—

> In my distress I cried unto the Lord,
> And he answered me.

The prayer of the second verse is—

> Deliver my soul, O Lord, from lying lips,
> And from a deceitful tongue.

Now the words which Rabshakeh used are these: 'Neither let Hezekiah make you trust in the Lord, saying, The Lord will surely deliver us.' Again, the words of vv.[2.3] are descriptive of the Assyrian general's peculiar mode of warfare, and v.[4]—

> Sharp arrows of the mighty,
> With coals of juniper,

seems to Dr. Thirtle, to be a singularly appropriate

denunciation of his impiety and deceit. Then follow the definite allusions—

> Woe is me, that I sojourn in Meshech,
> That I dwell among the tents of Kedar.

The general sense is all right. Hezekiah is surrounded with barbarians who are the enemies of the God of Israel. And if the tribes referred to are a surprise, the explanation may be the easy enough one of an ordinary poetic licence, Kedar and Meshech being used poetically for any barbarous horde that hates the name of Jehovah. But Dr. Thirtle is literal enough to point out that Kedar is actually denounced as an enemy of Judah in the time of Hezekiah (Is $21^{16.17}$).

Mr. Leonard W. King, Assistant in the Department of Egyptian and Assyrian Antiquities in the British Museum, is preparing a series of 'Studies in Eastern History.' He has already published *Records of the Reign of Tukulti-Ninib I.* in one volume. Now, in two volumes, he publishes *Chronicles Concerning Early Babylonian Kings* (Luzac; 8s. 6d. net each). The first volume contains an introduction, the second the texts and translations. Both volumes are written for the student of Assyriology, by whom they may not be neglected. But the first has a wider reach. It contains materials which frequently illustrate the History of the Old Testament. Among the rest it discusses the question of the historicity of the fourteenth chapter of Genesis, and, in particular, whether the Amraphel, King of Shinar, there named, is the same as Hammurabi.

Mr. King believes that they are the same. He believes that Amraphel is simply another form of the name Hammurabi. 'Our new information,' he says, 'enables us to accept unconditionally the identification of Amraphel with Hammurabi, and at the same time it shows that the chronological order of the Priestly Writer, however artificial, was calculated from data more accurate than has hitherto been supposed.' And by identifying Amraphel with Hammurabi, Mr. King believes that he has fixed the date of Abraham.

Now, Mr. King is no apologist for the Old Testament. If he fixes the date of Abraham, and finds the chronology of the Priestly Writer reliable, it will be safe for us to follow him, though it may not always be pleasant. The difficulty hitherto of identifying Amraphel with Hamnurabi and thus fixing the date of Abraham, has been the difference between the date of Abraham according to the Biblical chronology, and the date of Hammurabi according to the monuments. According to Archbishop Ussher's chronology, the Exodus took place in 1491 B.C. And since, according to the Hebrew Text, 645 years separated the Exodus from the Call of Abraham, we should obtain for the latter event the date 2136 B.C. But the monuments prove that Hammurabi did not reign before the twentieth century B.C., so that, if the Hebrew chronology is right, Abraham lived 150 years before him.

How is this difficulty overcome? Some have overcome it by choosing 430 years instead of 645 for the interval between Abraham and the Exodus, 430 being the number found in the Samaritan Version and the Septuagint. But Mr. King does not take that method. For it seems to him an arbitrary thing to take only this number out of the Samaritan Version and the Septuagint, and follow the Hebrew Text for all the rest. And after all, it does not bring Hammurabi and Abraham together.

Mr. King lets Archbishop Ussher go, and all the data he relied upon. For there is certainly a difference between Archbishop Ussher's date for Solomon and the date of the Assyrian monuments, a difference of forty or fifty years. Moreover, it seems to Mr. King extremely unlikely that the Exodus could have taken place at so early a period as 1491 B.C., because during the fifteenth century Palestine was an Egyptian province under Egyptian administration. He concludes, therefore,

that it is better to fix the period of the Exodus by means of evidence that is external to the Bible. And when he has fixed the date of the Exodus, he can fix the date of Abraham.

Now Mr. King believes that Ramses II. was the Pharaoh of the oppression, because one of the store-cities built by the Israelites in Egypt was named Raamses, and the other, Pithom, is proved to have been founded during his reign. And if Ramses II. was the Pharaoh of the oppression, then Merneptah, his successor, was the Pharaoh of the Exodus. Well, the approximate date of the accession of Merneptah was 1244 B.C. And if we add to this the 645 years which, according to the Hebrew Text, separated the Exodus from the Call of Abraham, we come very close indeed to the date of Hammurabi. Mr. King is evidently astonished that he can take any date from the Hebrew Text at all. 'We may conclude,' he says, 'that the chronology of the Pentateuch, with regard to the length of time separating Abraham from Moses, exhibits far greater accuracy than we have hitherto had reason to believe.'

'The literary and historical criticism of the Hebrew Sacred Books, which has been going on for the last hundred years and more, may now be regarded as having completed its task. The books of the Old Testament have been analysed and rearranged, and the history has been reconstructed on the lines laid down finally by Wellhausen in his *Geschichte Israels*, published in 1878; and that the work is accomplished we may conclude from the fact that Continental scholars have ceased to write merely for specialists, and have begun to issue innumerable *Volksbücher*, dealing with Hebrew literature and history, from the new point of view, and intended not for scholars, but for the general reader.'

This is said by the Rev. T. H. Weir, B.D., in an article in *The Contemporary Review* for September on 'Arab and Hebrew Prose Writers.' Now Mr. Weir is a pupil of Professor James Robertson of Glasgow, with whom Wellhausen has never had the last word. We are therefore not surprised to find that as soon as he has said that the work of Old Testament Criticism is accomplished, he gives himself to its undoing.

He begins with the Names of God. For, 'the whole of the current analysis of the first six books of the Bible had for its starting-point,' he says, 'the occurrence in them of the two names for God, the proper name *Jehovah* (rendered in the English Versions LORD) and the appellative *Elohim*.' Mr. Weir does not think that the conclusions drawn from the different names of God in the Hexateuch will stand. For he is a student of Arabic, and when he turns to the Korān he finds there also two words for God, the proper name Ar Rahmān and the appellative Allāh. Ar Rahmān occurs in the Korān some fifty-five times. In nearly every case it is absolutely synonymous with Allāh. Yet no one, he says, supposes that the chapters or verses in which the former name occurs are by a different hand from the rest of the Korān.

So if the comparison with Arabic will stand, and Mr. Weir is careful to point out the similarities between the literature of Islam and the literature of the Israelites, then the occurrence of a new name for God does not always mean a new author or source. Besides, there are cases where only the personal name for God could possibly be used. It is impossible, for example, to speak of building an altar to Elohim (which may mean God, gods, a god, or even a goddess), because, of course, every altar is built to some Elohim. If, therefore, it is said that an altar is built to Jehovah, the introduction of that name into a narrative in which only Elohim has hitherto occurred does not prove that another author or a redactor has been at work. But all this is no doubt somewhat elementary. Mr. Weir has greater things to follow.

He comes to the duplicate narratives. There are two accounts of the Creation and of the Flood; there are two explanations of the names Bethel (Gn 28^{19} 35^{15}) and Israel (32^{28} 35^{10}), and either two or three of the name Isaac (17^{19} 18^{12} 21^{6}); two independent accounts are combined in our present story of Joseph; and so on, down to the books of Judges and Samuel, in which we have duplicate biographies of several of the judges, as well as of Saul and of David. How does criticism account for these? The generally accepted solution of these facts, says Mr. Weir, is that, two or three continuous narratives being in the hands of the compiler of these books, he regularly inserted two or more accounts of one and the same event, even when these accounts were mutually contradictory. Upon which Mr. Weir remarks that such a proceeding is 'unparalleled and incredible.'

But the duplicate narratives are there. How does Mr. Weir account for them? He turns again to the literature of the Arabs. In Arabic literature, he says, we find the same duplicate narratives, and even the same contradictions. For the Arab historian or biographer is anxious above all things to get at the facts, and consequently he sets down all the divergent accounts or traditions of an event, and sometimes adds his own opinion as to which is correct.

Let us see, then, what the difference is. The difference, says Mr. Weir, between the Arabic writer and the Hebrew in dealing, for example, with the origin of the name 'Israel' would have been this. The Arabic writer would have placed the two traditions as to the origin of the name, one immediately following the other, and would have given his authority for each. The Hebrew writer separates the traditions, setting each in its proper place from the point of view of the chronology, and does not name his authorities. But Mr. Weir admits that they both use authorities, and that in both cases the authorities may be written. It does not seem to matter much, therefore, how the final hand arranges his sources. Different sources having been used with their inevitable difference of style, it is difficult to see why a careful critic should be unable to detect them. Mr. Weir, it is true, goes on to say that difference of style does not necessarily imply difference of authorship. There are great differences of style in the Korān, but no one claims difference of authorship there. He would be ready to acknowledge, however, that the cases are scarcely parallel. The difference in style between one part of the Korān and another may not be too great for one man's hand at different periods and under different experiences, while the difference between one part of the Hexateuch and another may be so great as to demand different authors.

Mr. Weir is more convincing when, in the end of his paper, he points out that a difference of vocabulary means in Arabic, and therefore possibly in Hebrew, not a difference of date but only a difference of locality or tribe. But he has himself to confess that Biblical critics, 'starting from other premisses,' have arrived at this very conclusion, 'for the majority of them hold that J belonged to Judah and E to Ephraim.'

There are two things which give the plain man confidence in accepting at least the main results of Old Testament criticism. The first thing is, that the professional teachers of the Old Testament are so rarely found on the other side. And the second is, that when one who is a true scholar and has made a special study of the Old Testament, sets himself, through training or temperament, against the Higher Criticism, he usually gives much more than he takes away, and often ends with the admission that he is a Higher Critic himself.

Some reference was made last month to an article by Dr. Hastings Rashdall on the Modern Missionary Motive. It is worth returning to. Not the article, but the subject.

To refer to the article, however, for a moment. It is a curious thing that when Dr. Rashdall describes the modern missionary motive, he does not touch the Person of Christ. In all the history of the Church, it is neither the civilizing agency of Christianity, nor the supremacy of the Christian religion, that has sent the missionary to the heathen. It is devotion to a personal living Lord. When the earliest of all the missionaries states *his* missionary motive, he states it in the words: 'Christ Jesus as Lord, and ourselves as your servants for Jesus' sake' (2 Co 4^5).

'Christ Jesus as Lord'—that is the gospel which St. Paul carried to the Corinthians; 'and ourselves as your servants for Jesus' sake'—that is the motive which made him carry it. 'Your servants,' he says. And when Dr. Plummer comes to this word to expound it, 'The Greek word (δούλους),' he insists, 'must have its full meaning.' It is not 'servants,' it is 'bondservants'; it is not 'bondservants,' it is 'slaves.' You fancy Dr. Rashdall's missionaries debating whether they consider Christianity the best religion, and how far it is a civilizing agency, before they set out for the Congo or the Khassis; and you imagine St. Paul already on his way to Corinth because he owes a debt to these Corinthians, because he is their slave for Jesus' sake.

'Christ Jesus as Lord,' he says. The elements of that gospel may not have stood out separately to his mind as he wrote, but they had come separately to him at the beginning. 'Jesus' had come first. But not Jesus of Nazareth merely. Not merely the great thinker, the supreme teacher, the man and brother. We all preach Jesus now, the human Jesus who was tempted like as we are (omit the words, 'yet without sin'), who sorrowed and suffered and was able to sympathize. We preach Jesus. The name means 'Saviour.' But we have dropped its meaning out of the name. We all preach Jesus now, but He is merely a man of like passions such as we are.

'Christ' came to St. Paul next. By what a history He came! It may be that our fathers compelled St. Paul to read the Old Testament as an evangelical member of the Church of England. But even if his first and most impressive thought of the Messiah was not that 'surely he hath borne our griefs and carried our sorrows,' still, the road along which the name Christ came to him, was rich with Divine promise and human hope. But the singular virtue of the name 'Christ' lay in its conjunction with the name 'Jesus.' When the two names went together, St. Paul got more light thrown on what 'Christ' meant, than even on what he understood by 'Jesus.'

He says 'Christ Jesus *as Lord*.' Professor Deissmann has lately rescued the word 'Lord' out of the rubbish heaps of letters and documents which the peasants of those lands passed from hand to hand and then threw away; and we see that in the time of St. Paul, 'Lord' was throughout the whole Eastern world 'a universally understood religious conception.' The men and women who wrote papyrus letters in Egypt, for example, often assure their correspondents of their prayers to 'the Lord Serapis' (*New Light on the New Testament*, p. 79). Now, the Apostle spoke to the peasant and used the peasant's language. And when he told the Corinthians that his gospel was summed up in the words 'Christ Jesus as Lord,' they understood at once that Jesus the Messiah had come to occupy the place of God to St. Paul, and had a right to the submission and service of the slave.

Christ Jesus as Lord—as Lord in the Oriental sense—is it incredible? is it impossible? The 'Liberal Theologian' may say so. But if the missionaries had not come with 'Christ Jesus as Lord,' the Liberal Theologian would have remained 'unchristian and uncivilized' to this day.