Thus, perhaps, a close examination of Lamentations i. 1 confirms, rather than reveals an exception to, the law which I have suggested, and incidentally shows that הָעִיר is not merely metrically possible, which Budde had denied and which is all that Sievers claimed, but metrically required.

G. BUCHANAN GRAY.

THE NEW TESTAMENT LANGUAGE OF ENDEARMENT TO THE LORD JESUS CHRIST.

I.

No term of endearment to Christ in N.T. by the disciples.

ALTHOUGH the New Testament enshrines for us the ardent devotion of the disciples to their Lord, it does not contain in all the varied range of its writings one single expression of endearment which is applied either directly or indirectly to Him. In the present day we are familiar with such expressions as "precious Saviour," "dear Jesus," "my Jesus." A well-known hymn contains the lines:

> "To Thee, O dear, dear Saviour,
> My spirit turns for rest."

In a justly valued book of devotion, an eminent divine writes: "In this, as in all things, Jesus left us an example that we should follow His dear and worshipped steps." But familiar as this usage is to-day it has no parallel in the whole of the New Testament.

Not because first disciples were cold.

It was not that the first disciples were cold, formal or impassive. The mere memory of the names of Peter, John, Paul, Mary, and even Judas, puts such an idea at once to flight. Nor was it that the first disciples were deficient in the phraseology of endearment. In the Pauline letters, Amplias, Stachys, Persis, Timotheus, Philemon, Tychicus, Luke, Onesimus, are among those referred to as "beloved" (*ἀγαπητοί*). In the Petrine

letters Paul as well as the recipients are referred to by the same term. In the Johannine letters "beloved" is the constant form of address. Again, we have the occurrence in the Gospels of such diminutives as *παιδίον*, "little child; *κοράσιον*, "little girl"; *παιδίσκη*, "little maid"; *παιδάριον*, "little boy." All these are indications of an atmosphere of emotion which is the native air of terms of endearment. Nor is it possible to read the Epistle to the Philippians, with its chafing torrent of affection, and to doubt that the passionate enthusiasm which it reveals was rich in the expletives of love. The fourth chapter of the Epistle supplies us with an example in the first verse: *ἀδελφοί μου ἀγαπητοὶ καὶ ἐπιπόθητοι χαρὰ καὶ στέφανός μου, οὕτω στήκετε ἐν Κυρίῳ, ἀγαπητοί.* The *χαρὰ καὶ στέφανός μου* is sufficient evidence of the capacity of New Testament emotion to provide itself with a vehicle of endearing expression when occasion demanded. But apparently for Christ occasion did not demand. For opulent as the New Testament is in the experience and the expression of love, tracing as it does that marvellous river to its fountain-head in Christ, nevertheless for Christ Himself it has not one fond word, not one endearing phrase. Neither Paul nor Peter refers to Christ or addresses Him as *ἀγαπητός*. Charles Kingsley who loved to acknowledge the debt he owed to Frederick Denison Maurice, addresses him in one of his letters as "My dearest master." But Paul, though he loved to call himself the *δοῦλος Χριστοῦ*, never referred to Christ as his *Κύριος ἀγαπητός*. The nearest approach Paul ever makes to the widespread modern usage of endearment is in Philippians iii. 8, where by the possessive *μου* he betrays something of the same attitude. But that is all.

Three instances of term of endearment used of Christ.

It is true that there are three instances in the New Testament in which the term *ἀγαπητός* or its cognate *ἠγαπημένος* is applied to Christ. First, at the Baptism, "And lo, a voice from

heaven saying, This is my beloved (ἀγαπητός) Son in whom I am well pleased." Secondly, at the Transfiguration—a repetition of the same voice. Thirdly, in Ephesians i. 6, "grace . . . which he freely bestowed on us in the beloved, (ἠγαπημένῳ). But it is to be observed that in each of these cases the word "beloved" is used to express the heart of the Father towards the Son, and not the heart of the disciple towards the Lord. Paul greets Stachys as "beloved," and Timotheus as his "beloved son," and Paul himself is referred to as "our beloved brother." But neither Paul, nor Peter, nor James, nor even John, apply to Christ the term "beloved."

But not by disciples.

II.

The modern usage, then, is not derived from the New Testament stratum of Christian life. It probably dates from a later age, which has been coloured by the allegorical interpretation of the Song of Songs. It is at least evident from what has been said that the modern usage is foreign to the New Testament.

Why?

But when we have said so much, we are still left with an interesting and suggestive problem. It is this. If New Testament emotion flowed so easily into expressions of endearment when referring to the disciples, why was it that it never took that direction when referring to the Lord? The attempt to solve the problem fastens attention upon the attitude of the disciples towards the Lord. If our inquiry reveals some new element in their attitude to Him, it will reveal at the same time some new aspect of His Person, or at least re-emphasise one that is familiar.

"No love felt."

The first hypothesis is, obviously, that because we find no language of love applied to the name of Christ, therefore there was no love, as we understand love,

felt towards Him. He excited respect, reverence, awe—but not love. He was continually zoned about with the air of the Jericho road when He went before His disciples and they were amazed. They were always aware of the latent light of the Transfiguration. They were drawn to Him as to a portent. They were fascinated as sea-birds which dash themselves upon the brilliance of the lighthouse windows at night. But such a hypothesis as this will not bear the weight of the recorded facts. Mary took her costliest possession and in a moment lavished its wealth upon Him as though it were a little thing. When Peter had denied Him it was no prudential self-accusation that he felt. He went out and wept bitterly. Even Judas, when he found that Jesus was condemned, threw down his ill-gotten gain in a passion of remorse, and went and hanged himself. Joseph of Arimathaea begged His body. Mary Magdalene wept when she could not find it. The two heavy-hearted disciples on their way to Emmaus were showing such outward signs of grief that a stranger could remark upon the fact without exciting their comment. Stephen was stoned for Him. Paul, who in all his epistles utters not one word of endearment towards Him, yet suffered the loss of all things for Him, and was so inflamed with love for Him that He counted all things but as stable-sweepings that He might win Him. This is not awe or reverence or fascination only. It is love.

Impossible.

A more likely line of solution is that the disciples were conscious of a relationship with Christ which was something quite above and apart from their relation with their fellows. Their love for one another found its origin in Him. In Jesus the disciples were aware of a passion towards them of such a quality that they lost sight of their derivative passion towards Him, just as when the sun rises the stars pale their

An altogether new relation.

Sun and stars.

ineffectual fires and disappear. The love He manifested towards them was of such a quality as to leave them without a name for the extraordinary response it awakened in their own hearts. To have attempted to express it by the ordinary terms would have been to belittle it. "Dear," "beloved," "dearly beloved," "precious"—such terms would be but thimbles to take up the sea. Adjectives always limit and define. But here was something indefinable and limitless, and so they leave the infinite length and depth and breadth and height of the love undescribed by any word because they felt instinctively that no word can describe it. Hence we find that while the apostles readily applied their expressions of endearment to one another, yet with a fine reticence they refrained from applying them to Him. They spoke of Him as "Jesus" or "Jesus Christ" or "our Lord Jesus Christ" or as "our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ." The book of modern devotion says: "in His dear and worshipped steps." But the New Testament says quite simply: "in His steps."

Adjectives belittle.

The simplicity of N.T. reference to Christ.

There was an occasion when a courtier lavished upon Him the adjective "good," but he found himself checked, and the prodigal adjectival mood challenged by the question, "Why callest thou me good?"

It was not failure to appreciate Christ that made these apostles chary of expression. It was the very depth of their emotion that made them dumb. "The love of Christ constraineth us," says Paul—not our love to Christ but His love to us. That is the motive power of the apostolic life. The apostles are but as vessels swept onwards to their haven by an irresistible tide of unfailing love.

Depth makes dumb.

Let us challenge the position we have taken. Is the argument valid that there is no expression of love because

the love is so deep ? The answer is that there is a deeper manner of expression than by words. In the bereaved home there is something harder to bear than the sound of weeping and the sight of tears, and that is the spectacle of sorrow that is tearless and inarticulate. The deepest sorrow is silent.

"The Wye is hush'd nor moved along
And hush'd my deepest grief of all,
When fill'd with tears that cannot fall
I brim with sorrow drowning song.

The tide flows down, the wave again
Is vocal in its wooded walls ;
My deeper anguish also falls
And I can speak a little then."

It is when the river runs shallow that it is vocal. It is still waters that run deep.

Si monumentum quaeris circumspice.

Although St. Paul's Cathedral has many noble monuments to the illustrious dead that are interred in its precincts it has no monument to the architect. But on the stones are engraved the words : *si monumentum quaeris, circumspice.* It is even so with Christ. For others there are words of endearment in plenty. But for the Architect of Love Himself there is no endearing word. And yet the whole community of loving souls, "fitly framed together, and growing unto an holy Temple," is the great New Testament language of endearment and the glossary of love ; the lives of the saints in all lands and in all ages are the catholic expression of their response to Him who loved them and gave Himself for them. Love so amazing, so divine has claimed far more than the homage of their lips. It has claimed their soul, their life, their all. The humble and obedient life of serious devotion to the will of God is the true New Testament language of endearment to the Lord. "Not every one that saith unto me, 'Lord,

Lord,' shall enter into the kingdom of heaven: but he that doeth the will of my Father which is in heaven"; and "if ye love me, keep my commandments."

Even in this conclusion there are still implications to be worked out and suggestions to be traced, but if these have been made plain the object of this article is attained.

CUTHBERT McEVOY.

THE AIM AND SCOPE OF PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

II. PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION AS AN AUTONOMOUS SUBJECT.

IN the preceding article of this series I dwelt upon the close connexion which necessarily exists between theology and philosophy, and used the phrase 'philosophy of religion' in the broad and indeterminate sense of describing this general connexion. But this phrase has now come to possess a narrower and more definite meaning. Since the first half of the nineteenth century philosophy of religion has been distinguished as a special department of study, with a subject-matter of its own. In the time of Hegel works began to appear bearing the title of *Religionsphilosophie*, and that philosopher was the first writer of importance to give a systematic and comprehensive treatment of the subject thus described. Philosophy of religion, in this sense, is therefore one of the younger or more recently constituted departments of theology. Whereas knowledge of God is the result of philosophy, such knowledge, Hegel said, is made the beginning, and becomes the special object, of philosophy of religion. Philosophy of religion thus ceased to be merely a collection of utterances of philosophers, ranging from *obiter dicta* to lengthy reasonings, upon theological questions: it became something more systematic

and autonomous. It does not disregard, but, on its historical side, embraces the study of these utterances; but such study by no means constitutes the whole field of philosophy of religion. Nor does it renounce connexion with general philosophy. Metaphysical speculation presents us, it is true, with no single coherent and established philosophy of God and man, comparable in universality of acceptance with our empirical science of Nature; it has yielded, rather, a system of systems, in whose continuous evolution we see logical process and historical development largely identified. But a system comprising even partially incompatible systems is not a chaos of conflicting elements from which no intellectual 'results' can be collected; in the tissue of classic philosophical thought we are now able to distinguish assumptions that have been proved to be impossible, lines of tentative reasoning and research which have been found to lead nowhere, and at least some truths established beyond reasonable question. Such results lie to hand for application by the young science, the characteristics of which I am about to attempt to describe. As was remarked in the preceding article, the Christian theologian thus finds in existence various forms of rational theology based on other foundations, and deduced by partially different methods, from those which he, as an interpreter of a revealed religion, has been accustomed chiefly to employ. Not, indeed, that the Christian first encounters philosophical theology when he turns from his own traditional inheritance to contemplate the thought of Spinoza, Kant, or Hegel. The symbols which define the outlines of his Christian belief are themselves partly expressed in language whose use, as we have seen, is due to the familiarity of the Fathers with the best philosophic speculation of antiquity. I mean, rather, that in the contributions of pure philosophers—more especially those of the modern period, for ancient philosophy, apart

from its historical import, is practically superseded—towards the scientific definition of theological concepts and the solution of numerous problems of theological import, the Christian teacher finds a body of thought which has passed through the fire of open and competent criticism, and such as is relevant to his own science, although it has for the most part professedly been elaborated in the absence of any reference to the historical facts on which Christianity is grounded.

This body of thought, let it be repeated, is not identical with what we are to call philosophy of religion, though the study of it is indispensable to the student of philosophy of religion. The pursuit which bears this title, in its stricter sense, is something more than the history of philosophical speculation in so far as it happens to have concerned itself with isolated religious problems, and something partly different from it. Nor is philosophy of religion to be identified with religiously inclined philosophising such as we meet with in neo-Platonism. It is not to be restricted, again, to the dogmatic theology of any particular positive religion, such as Christianity, when it has pressed philosophical concepts and methods into its service—as was the case with scholasticism. Philosophy of religion presupposes no one system of philosophy, nor any one distinct type of religion. It is not philosophical thinking prompted by a particular religion and pursued exclusively in the interests of that religion, but philosophical thinking which makes religion —religion in the broadest or most comprehensive sense— its object. It has to bear in mind, too, that the religious consciousness is only a part of human consciousness, and to endeavour to discover the significance of religion by obtaining a view of all aspects of human experience together. And it is one of the characteristics of the recent attitude of philosophy towards religion that religion is not dismissed

on the ground of its being either a human, not to say a priestly, invention, or a supernatural revelation; but rather is investigated as a normal factor in human life which philosophy must take account of and interpret. Lastly, let it be remarked that philosophy of religion is not to be looked upon as a department of literature to which may be relegated all discussions which are too indefinite, too idle, too rhetorical, or too obviously characterised by dilettantism, to gain recognition or footing in any of the better-known branches of theology or science. In no branch of research is long, patient, and thorough preparation more essential, and strenuous intellectual effort more imperatively required.

I have so far indicated that philosophy of religion has become a separate branch of knowledge with an individuality of its own, and have distinguished between the newer and the older, the narrower and the broader, senses in which the phrase which forms its title has been used. I would now remark that in spite of its acquired independence, this field of study is still very vaguely defined. The term philosophy of religion is employed, by writers of books upon the subject, with considerable elasticity; and there seems to be divergence of opinion as to how much, and as to what, should be denoted by it. The matter is not entirely one of words and convenient terminology.

Diversity of usage in this case implies difference of philosophical creed, and partly has its source also in the arbitrary selection of subject-matter for consideration which is naturally indulged in by individual writers in the absence of any universally accepted or logically acquired definition. A glance at some of the best-known works dealing with philosophy of religion will serve to verify this statement. One is devoted chiefly to empirical facts and generalisations concerning the origin, development, and

essential nature of religion, and to the connexion between religious belief and moral postulates; another treats almost exclusively of psychological questions, and the motives to belief; questions which seem, from the space allotted to them, to be thought by one author to be of paramount importance, will be almost ignored by another who equally professes to cover the whole ground. A lack of comprehensiveness of treatment, of system, of proportion and balance, and even of agreement as to what subjects should be included and what should be omitted from a treatise on philosophy of religion, prevails up to the present amongst those who have taken in hand to guide the student. This state of things, in so far as it is due to mere lack of definition, can be remedied when once the scope of the science has been objectively defined. As for differences of philosophical creed, they only lead indirectly to variety in the definition of the functions and scope of philosophy of religion; i.e., through having produced diversity of views as to what are the true functions and the scope of philosophy in general. So we may for the moment postpone the difficulty in the way of finding an universally acceptable definition of the philosophy of religion, attaching it to the word philosophy, which we provisionally take over with all its as yet unresolved ambiguity. We can then proceed to suggest that the most natural and obvious definition of philosophy of religion would be to philosophy in so far as it is concerned with religion. Whatever is meant, or should be meant, by the term 'philosophy,' as it stands alone, that (and nothing else, such as 'science'), should be understood by it when it forms part of the expression 'philosophy of religion.' Whatever be the functions of philosophy as a whole towards the special sciences and towards knowledge in general, the same should be the functions of philosophy of religion towards the particular science called the science of religion,

and towards theology in general. Whatever subdivisions, or separate studies, there are in philosophy, there should be the same number, corresponding each to each, in philosophy of religion. If philosophy be the queen of the sciences, and exercise functions towards the other sciences such as none of them can exercise on its own behalf or for another, philosophy of religion is the same royal personage, but regarded in the capacity of governor of a single province, rather than as supreme over the whole of her kingdom. The extent of the regal rights which she enjoys in the sub-kingdom will depend on the degree in which her monarchy is absolute or limited. In other words, the functions of philosophy of religion should be identical with those of philosophy, but exercised over a limited area; and the scope of philosophy of religion should be determined by the capacities with which we credit philosophy and by the boundaries which we assign to the territory of religion. In short, philosophy of religion is philosophy in so far as it makes religion its subject-matter; it belongs to philosophy but relates to religion.

Such is the definition, and the mode of determining the scope and content, of philosophy of religion which seems to me at once the most natural and the most scientific. It would seem hitherto to have escaped attention through its unobtrusive obviousness. Its employment would certainly have served to introduce clearness of treatment into a subject which to this day has remained without either internal order or external delimitation; and for this reason I shall henceforth adopt it.

But the difficulty attaching to its use, which I just now postponed, must be removed before we can profitably apply it. That difficulty consists in the lack of an universal consensus among philosophers in consequence of which the teacher in this field must generally use a provisional rather

than a categorical mode of statement, and which obliges him to present arguments for and against controverted questions rather than cut and dried answers to problems. Philosophy is indeed often disparaged because it so seldom furnishes us, as science does, with a body of results as to which experts are unanimously agreed. Certainly it can boast of no *Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus.* Still, there are worse states than that of 'learned ignorance.' And there is positive value in the study of the *attempts* of the best human intellects to attain to truth such as, from its very nature, is immensely more difficult of access than other kinds, if only for the reason that we are thereby helped to state the problems with less confusion of thought and fewer unconscious prepossessions, to avoid paths which have been found to lead astray, and pitfalls into which the unlearned immediately stumble. This character of philosophy, which gives it the appearance of a pursuit rather than of a system of knowledge, forces itself upon us at the outset of our present task. For we are confronted with conflicting opinions as to what should be signified by the word 'philosophy.'

As to one function of philosophy, indeed, all its teachers may be said to be agreed, in that they bestow upon philosophy the title *scientia scientiarum.* Philosophy is universally allowed to be the science of the sciences at least in the sense that it correlates, systematises, and unifies their results, combining them into a general knowledge of a cosmos. Just as it is the duty of each of the special sciences to generalise, within its sphere, the facts of which it makes an inventory and a classification, so is it the duty of the *scientia scientiarum* to transcend the limits of each and all of those specific groups of facts and laws, and to combine them under higher laws, under universal principles. This is one of the relations in which philosophy stands to the

special sciences, such as the physical and biological sciences, or empirical psychology. If this were its only relation to empirical knowledge, philosophy would not differ in kind from any of the positive sciences themselves; it would possess wider scope, but identical functions. And this is precisely what one school of philosophers, by no means without influence on current theological thought, has maintained. The positivists will only credit philosophy with the methods and the results of the positive sciences, and deny to it all other alleged functions. Thus philosophy is banished from much of her ancient domain; or rather the rest of her domain is declared to be non-existent dream-land. According to this view of philosophy, our subject, philosophy of religion, would be narrowed down to the merely empirical sciences of the psychology of religious emotion, comparative study of religious rites, and theological mythology. Metaphysics, or the inquiry into the nature of ultimate reality and the latent conditions of knowledge, being renounced by the positivist as a futile search for the unknowable, his philosophy of religion could be expected to throw no light on the invisible and eternal.

On the other hand, most philosophers who are not positivists or phenomenalists believe that the phenomenal implies the noumenal and partially reveals it; that the existence of knowledge involves implications: and that these preconditions of knowledge and of phenomenal existence—the subject-matter of epistemology or science of knowledge, and ontology or science of being, respectively—are capable of being scientifically studied and of yielding knowledge.

It is not necessary for our purpose to attempt to refute the one of these views and to prove the other. As the futility of metaphysics could only be demonstrated by metaphysical arguments—the success of positive methods

being in itself no proof of the necessary failure of others—it must be assumed that at least so much of metaphysic must be admitted into philosophy as is essential to prove the barrenness of all the rest. And indeed there are few or no philosophers at the present day who, if they repudiate ontology, are unwilling to recognise in the study of knowledge itself, its nature and validity, a genuine science or an essential department of philosophy. For in seeking the preconditions and implications of the very existence and possibility of knowledge, philosophy does not part company with experience, as the extremer, and perhaps now extinct, positivism asserted. It is not the case that positive science, since it has come to know itself, appeals solely to 'experience,' or that metaphysics while seeking to transcend experience is all the time necessarily severed from it. The implicates of experience which metaphysic seeks to unfold, though 'beyond' experience in the sense that they are not given in sensible experience, are not necessarily 'beyond' experience in the sense that they are undiscoverable by reflecti ve thought.

If this contention be valid, there are two departments of philosophy, which together constitute metaphysics, the inquiry into the nature and structure, the validity and the limits, of knowledge in general, and the inquiry as to the nature of ultimate reality. These problems obviously lie outside any of the natural sciences and indeed outside all the empirical sciences put together. And though perhaps they never may be solved, yet inquiry concerning them ought not to be foreclosed because one particular school of philosophers has come to the conclusion that they are insoluble. This would savour of sectarian intolerance. Until the positivist has succeeded in convincing all his brother philosophers of the tenability of his position and has shown precisely how epistemology and ontology may

be known to be but imaginary sciences, we must continue provisionally to place them in the domain of philosophy, which, by common consent, takes all knowledge for her sphere.

Philosophy, in this case, would not be the *scientia scientiarum* solely because her function is to relate the particular sciences and to weave their more important conclusions into a coherent whole, thereby bringing to light, perhaps, truth not discoverable by any single science. She would enjoy that title rather in virtue of her function of examining the latent presuppositions of these sciences, and of raising problems with which they are not concerned, but the solution of which they tacitly and unreflectingly assume. Philosophy and science are not so much distinguished by their method, as by what they respectively take for granted. Science can presuppose, without injury to herself, anything which furthers her work, and can be satisfied with truth that is relative, abstract, departmental. Philosophy, however, can start from no untested assumptions; if she cannot be presuppositionless, she will at least be fully aware of what her presuppositions are and how much they mean. Science takes facts as she finds them, and proceeds to generalise them; philosophy—when metaphysical—rather fixes her attention on what is implied in the very existence of facts at all. Philosophy, as Professor William James put it, is only "an unusually obstinate attempt to think clearly and consistently."

I observed just now that in so far as that department of metaphysics which makes knowledge, or the knowing relation, its object of study can be distinguished from that which concerns itself with ultimate being, the former of these is not so commonly refused the right to exist as is the latter. Ancient and medieval philosophy consisted largely of ontology of a naïve and dogmatic kind. For Wolff, to

whom the term ontology owes its currency, this branch of metaphysic included the study of being in general and the supposed theoretic knowledge of the three fundamental types of known being, God, the finite soul, and the world. This partly scholastic and partly modern system, composed of rational theology, rational psychology, and rational cosmology, Kant undertook to demolish by means of his critical, epistemological philosophy; and since his day ontology has commonly been used as a term of reproach. If indeed ontology were what the positivist has asserted it to be, viz., the search for knowledge of ultimate reality altogether apart from its appearance in sensible experience, there would be little ground for including the discussion of its problems in the sphere of philosophy. But there is an ontology which professes to escape this condemnation, and to study reality in so far as it can be determined from the *implicates* of knowledge and phenomenal existence. Such metaphysic deals with reality as known, and, *prima facie* at least, seems justified in its claim to be a genuine department of philosophy.

I have dwelt in some detail upon the rival views as to whether or not metaphysics in the form of either or both of its two subdivisions, epistemology and ontology, should be included in the meaning of the word philosophy, partly because the discussion may have served to make clear, to such as are not students of philosophy, what is the nature of the subject-matter with which philosophy proper undertakes to deal, and partly because the divergence in question seemed to place an obstacle in the way of our attempt at a definition of philosophy of religion. I may now say that this apparent obstacle is at once removed if we can all agree to define philosophy *in terms of the questions or problems with which it professes to deal*, without prejudice as to the conclusions that may be reached. The demurrer of

positivism, being based on a conclusion, thus falls. And surely, philosophy being a pursuit rather than a system of attained knowledge, this is the only way in which it can rightly and fairly be defined. It is in this way that Professor Sidgwick sought for its definition, in a work entitled *Philosophy, its Scope and Relations*, a book which may be strongly recommended to any who wish to pursue further studies in this connexion. Of course conclusions as to what philosophy can and cannot know, when reached, must colour the views of individuals or of particular schools as to what the legitimate scope of philosophy is; but as the quest for conclusions is also philosophy, and as different philosophers have arrived at different conclusions on the issue, it would seem impossible to define philosophy, in so far as it is an unaccomplished quest, otherwise than as Sidgwick recommended.

Our preliminary difficulty being, then, removed, we may consider that in defining philosophy of religion to be philosophy dealing with religion, or with theological questions, we may have found a definition which (1) does no violence to generally received terminology; (2) begs no disputed questions; (3) marks off the province of philosophy of religion from those of adjacent or cognate departments of knowledge (such as comparative study of religions, or psychology of religion) as distinctly as possible; and (4) designates a coherent body of problems.

From this definition it will follow that philosophy of religion will naturally and necessarily be capable of subdivision into the same number of main departments as go to constitute philosophy as a whole. What these are may be briefly indicated. The first main division is that which separates theoretical from practical philosophy. The former province is concerned with the existential, and with knowledge cognitively determined. Practical

philosophy, on the other hand, deals with values. As religion has its 'practical' side—in the technical sense of the word—there will therefore be a practical, as well as a theoretic, province of philosophy of religion. The ethical systems of the various religions would fall into this practical province. And inasmuch as the supreme synthesis which philosophy is required to make is the co-ordination of its theoretical and practical divisions, or the transcending of the difference between what is and what ought to be, it will be in the capacity of philosophy of religion that she must alter her final word. Theoretical philosophy is capable of further subdivision, on lines at which we have already hinted. There is a department of philosophy which is concerned with generalising and unifying the laws and generalisations of the special sciences. As this function is discharged by carrying out the methods of the empirical and positive sciences, we may call this province of philosophy the positive. The corresponding province of philosophy of religion will similarly be concerned with unifying the more philosophically significant results of the various types of empirical investigation of religion, such as the psychology of religious experience, and the comparative study of actual religions as they are presented in beliefs, rites, and customs. It will further comprise all attempts to find a way from Nature to God, and much of the theology usually called 'natural theology,' which is derived from the study of Nature regarded as containing a revelation of God.

Distinct from all such positive philosophy, we have metaphysics. This word is sometimes employed as if it were synonymous with ontology: a practice which makes one of the two terms a superfluity, while it deprives us of a word which is most useful for designating as an unitary whole the province of theoretic philosophy usually called metaphysics, and which embraces the two more or less

distinguishable, but not wholly separable, studies, ontology and epistemology. The subdivision of theoretic philosophy of religion will similarly be completed, so far as the broadest outlines go, when we have placed theological metaphysics over against positive philosophy of religion, and have marked out within the former of these provinces the closely related pursuits of ontology and epistemology as concerned with theological interests.

This systematic arrangement of our subject into its natural departments may thus be expressed in tabular form :



It now only remains to clothe this skeleton by enumerating the more important specific problems belonging to each subdivision of philosophy of religion which has been indicated.

The field of Practical philosophy, in so far as it possesses theological interest, will include religious ethics, and in the particular case of Christian ethics will deal with the ethical elements in the Christian conception of God and His relation to the world. It will discuss the moral postulates and their place in theistic arguments such as the moral proof of God's existence. The investigation of the metaphysical principles presupposed in religious ethics, and of the validity of arguments based on deliverances of the practical reason, however, belongs, notwithstanding 'practical' aspects, to the theoretical department of philosophy.

Turning to this other of the two main divisions into which

philosophy of religion falls, I may first make somewhat more complete the partial enumeration of the problems encountered in the secondary department which has been called by the name of positive. Here we are in the region of empirical generalisations. The chief questions, interesting to philosophy, supplied by the empirical sciences, psychological and sociological, which investigate religious experience and its manifestations, are those as to the origin, the developement, and the essential nature or distinguishing characteristics, of religion. The first two of these problems are at present largely matters of conjecture; the last is largely a question of logical definition. But psychology, in its study of the various forms of religious experience, is yielding results which may aid the complete characterisation of distinctively religious experience.

As empirical investigation of religion can only discover the human side of revelation—the aspect of it which may be called discovery—it can only be when knowledge of the metaphysical kind has been substantiated that positive philosophy, returning enriched with such knowledge to its own task, is able to assign a definite meaning to 'revelation,' and to measure the worth and significance of the distinction usually drawn between natural and revealed religion, or reason and revelation. Lastly, the relation of the physical sciences to theology, their harmony or conflict with theological dogmas, their capacity to supply any basis for arguments for or against the existence of God—these and cognate questions fall largely within the scope of the 'positive' section of philosophy of religion.

Metaphysics, as we have seen, comprises ontology and epistemology, though scarcely any problem belonging to the sphere of the one of these sub-departments can be discussed without crossing the line which roughly separates it from the other. But, however they may be approached

and handled, the problems of the being and nature of God, of Creation, of the finite soul and its relation to God, of immortality, of God's relation to the world, of the nature of evil, of theodicy, are all instances of the subject-matter which constitutes theological ontology. I do not intend to imply that the list just given is exhaustive.

On its epistemological side, theological metaphysic is concerned with the nature and validity of knowledge. It distinguishes clearly between the several types of truth and knowledge such as are illustrated respectively by the immediate perception, here and now, of the individual subject; the necessary truth of pure sciences like mathematics and formal logic; and knowledge such as confronts us in the natural sciences. It studies these types of knowledge, compares and contrasts what claims to be theological knowledge with each of them, and in so doing attempts to investigate the claims of mystical intuition to yield objective truth, and to define precisely what should be meant by reasonable belief; it estimates the relation between faith and knowledge, criticises the claim of science to be the only possible kind of demonstrable knowledge, and the contention of agnosticism and scepticism that knowledge is unattainable: finally, it seeks to set forth the validity of the inferences drawn from historical facts. Epistemological philosophy, in a word, investigates the truth of religion, and may therefore be said to be the most fundamental department of the whole subject. Indeed every student will be aware that it is within this department of philosophy of religion that the burning questions of the present time chiefly lie; and for apologetic and dogmatic theology epistemological questions are at the present moment all-important.

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