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interpretation of Paul and Paulinism. In other words, one's attitude to the Pastorals forms—where one has studied them at all carefully—a test of the adequacy of one's insight into Paul and his spirit. And, as at present advised, I judge that the rejection of them as in general tone and attitude un-Pauline, argues either defective exegesis or a one-sided and partial view both of Paul and Paulinism.

Such is the view of the Pastoral Epistles to which I wished to invite attention. I hope at least to have shown that the issue is not the closed one which it is often represented, especially by the tone in which the negative conclusion is assumed as a kind of dogma or test of critical competence and open-mindedness. The fact is that either conclusion has its difficulties ; [1] and had time allowed, I think I could have shown that those of the negative theory are really greater [2] than those of the view which accepts the good faith of their own claim to Pauline origin, once it is freed from the incubus of having to assume Paul's release and subsequent activity, against which all really early external evidence seems to witness irrevocably.

VERNON BARTLET.

SUGGESTIONS ON THE HISTORY AND LETTERS OF ST. PAUL.

III. BELIEF AND BAPTISM.

WHAT is the force of the term "believe" (*πιστεύω*) in the Acts ? Does it necessarily imply that all who "believed" were converted and permanently became Christians

[1] Prof. Peake sums up those on both sides with his wonted fairness (*op. cit.*, pp. 69 f.). I hope I have succeeded in modifying, if not removing, most of those attaching to the positive side, and shown reason for getting beyond his intermediate position, viz., that while "the Epistles cannot have come from Paul's hand in their present form, yet they contain not a little Pauline material" (p. 71).

[2] Compare Wohlenberg, *op. cit.*, 63–66.

in the complete and final sense ? The answer to this question is of some historical importance, as will appear. First, however, let us take the general question, without prejudice due to the special cases which will come up.

The example of Simon Magus seems conclusive. Simon believed (Acts viii. 13), and was baptized. Yet it is hard to suppose that he became in the final sense a Christian, although for the time he was a member of the Church. The language of Luke, on the whole, suggests the opposite. Simon, it is true, after baptism, "continued with Philip; and beholding signs and great wonders wrought, he was amazed" (ἐξίστατο). Yet no word is said to mitigate the final condemnation pronounced on him by Peter: "thou hast neither part nor lot in this matter; for thy heart is not right." He is not described as repenting, but only as asking in fear of the future that Peter should pray for him.

It seems beyond question that Luke knew the reputation which Simon acquired,[1] and that he regarded the subsequent history of Simon as the natural result of what occurred at the beginning of his connexion with the Christians.

Luke seems to regard belief as the first stage in a process. The second stage is "turning to the Lord" (xi. 21), of which the seal is baptism (ἐπίστευον καὶ ἐβαπτίζοντο, xviii. 8, cp. viii. 13): it is a subsequent stage consequent on believing. Later ensues the settled Christian life of those who are styled in the perfect tense πεπιστευκότες, who are in the state that ensues for those who have believed (xxi. 20, 25, xix. 18, etc.).

A process is here presumed which regularly and usually passed through these stages; and in various places, e.g. xviii. 27, this process is described as a whole by mentioning

[1] Without accepting as historical the presumptions of the Pseudo-Clementine treatises, one must regard them as having a certain foundation in the belief and tradition of the Church about Simon.

only the first stage, belief, and assuming that the normal continuation followed. The context is the proof that "belief" implies all this. But is that always the case? does πιστεύω always imply that the person who believed went on through the later stages, and became a Christian in the fullest sense? If so, why should Luke often add a second verb, indicating one or other of the subsequent stages? I think that the state of mind called πιστεύειν sometimes advanced no further than intellectual assent and emotional impression; and it would not be safe to assert that belief always was followed even by baptism.

The preceding remarks lead up to the consideration of two cases. The first is Acts xiii. 12, "then the Proconsul (Sergius Paulus), when he saw what was done, believed, being astonished at the teaching of the Lord." Was the Proconsul converted to Christianity, or was he merely impressed deeply by what he saw and heard?

The question is roused by an interesting though incomplete inscription which was found at Pisidian Antioch in 1912. It is the beginning of a record of the political career of L. Sergius Paullus the younger, who may be recognised confidently as the son of the Proconsul of Cyprus. Professor Dessau confirms my opinion on this point, and in a letter which he kindly sent, he adds a brief statement of the family career in Roman Imperial history, with the comment, "evidently none of this family was Christian." In this I quite agree, but in my turn I ask, "Does Luke say that the Proconsul was Christian?"

The text is engraved on a block of stone, which once formed part of the wall of a building, in good letters of about 70 to 100 A D. Copied at Salir, one of the outlying quarters of Antioch, by Mr. J. G. C. Anderson and myself.

L Sergio, L(uci) f(ilio), Paullo
filio, quattuorvir(o) v(iarum) c(urandarum) tri[b(uno)]
mil(itum) leg(ionis) vi Ferr(atae), quaest(ori),

"To L(ucius) Sergius Paullus the younger [1] (lit. son), son of Lucius, one of the board of four commissioners of streets, tribune of the soldiers of the sixth legion styled Ferrata, quaestor." The rest of his career was engraved on a separate stone, which has not yet been found. The second *filio* distinguishes him from a well-known father; and the character of the lettering shows that, as Mr. Anderson remarked, the inscription should be assigned to the Flavian period. L. Sergius Paullus must have been an official in the province Galatia before he attained the consulship,[2] most probably Governor; and the inscription was then placed in his honour by the Colony Antioch. Inscriptions in honour of governors are very common there; but inscriptions in honour of senatorial officials other than Governors are very rare (unless the official belonged to an Antiochian family).

The Proconsul of Cyprus, L. Sergius Paullus (such is the correct Roman spelling), had a son who passed through the regular senatorial career; and the first stages in the career of the latter are recorded in this inscription. He had also a great-grandson of the same name, who was consul about 150 A.D., and again in 168.[3] The family, therefore, was one of the ordinary Roman official type; and is in the last degree unlikely to have been Christian or to have sprung from a Christian ancestor. A Christian family would disappear from the official lists: their religion did not readily lend itself to the requirements of official life, or lead to Imperial or popular favour, although there certainly were some few Christian officials.

Is it, however, the case that Luke regarded the Proconsul

[1] In Greek inscriptions the same distinction is much more frequent, and is usually expressed by *νέος* or *νεώτερος*.

[2] If he had attained the Consulship, this would in ordinary course be stated after his name and before the earliest office of his career.

[3] The interval seems too long for the consul of about 150 to be regarded as grandson of the Proconsul of Cyprus in 47.

of Cyprus as a Christian? That depends on the force of πιστεύειν. The word is quite capable, certainly, of this sense; but I doubt if the words of Luke here imply more than intellectual belief accompanied by amazement at the marvel which he had seen, i.e. some very deep impression on the mind, but nothing beyond that of a permanently religious character.

The use of ἐκπλήττομαι elsewhere by Luke—three times in the Gospel, here alone in Acts—does not suggest that astonishment was a sure prelude to conversion. The use of the almost synonymous ἐξίσταμαι by Luke is equally unfavourable to that view. Mere astonishment is not the state of mind which favours real conversion; it produced the unreal and evanescent conversion of Simon Magus.

Meyer-Wendt and others consider that the Proconsul was converted; and Blass even connects ἐπίστευσεν ἐπὶ τῇ διδαχῇ τοῦ κυρίου—"he believed in the teaching of the Lord, being astonished (at the miracle)"—regardless of the order and of the analogies which he quotes (Luke iv. 32; Mark i. 22); but he has not persuaded Wendt to accept this translation, and is not likely to find others ready to follow him. Mr. Rackham, on the contrary, has a judicious and convincing note, in his edition of the *Acts*, to which I may refer the reader; and he concludes that a real conversion of the Proconsul would have had more serious consequences, whereas Paullus "had no more dealings with the Apostles, who leave Cyprus."

Luke lays full emphasis on the highly favourable impression which Paul made on the first Roman official with whom his mission work brought him in contact. This is in accordance with his general plan, and illuminative of his purpose in this history (as is pointed out in *St. Paul the Traveller*, pp. 304–309). It is unjustifiable to go further, and to think that the Governor was converted.

Some will be disposed to set no value on Mr. Rackham's first argument: "it seems incredible that at this date a Roman Proconsul could have been converted:—it would have made a great stir in the Church and in the world, of which some echo must have reached us." Admitting all this, they would simply add that Luke, being not a trustworthy historian, incorrectly represents Paullus as having been converted. Thus the mistranslation of the statement in the *Acts* would be made into a charge against the trustworthiness of the writer.

One piece of evidence seems conclusive. Luke iv. 32 uses the same words about the people of Capernaum as about the Proconsul, "they were astonished at His teaching," but they were not converted. The Proconsul was astonished at Paul's teaching; he admired it as a moral and intellectual display; he was delighted with the boldness and the power of these itinerant lecturers; but this spirit Luke does not regard as favourable to real conversion, and he adds the words to show the limitations of the case.

The other case is Acts xvii. 34: "certain men also clave unto him and believed, among whom was Dionysius the Areopagite, and Damaris," etc. In this case I believe that no Church was formed, and no baptism administered at the time. Doubtless the effect produced on a few persons was genuine and deep, but Paul did not then remain in Athens to follow it up. This we gather from a casual phrase of his, which opens up a wide question, and must be reserved for a separate Section IV.

IV. The Firstfruits of Asia.

A good deal of difficulty has been found in this description, which is applied by St. Paul in 1 Corinthians xvi. 15 to the household of Stephanas of Corinth. It has been understood to imply that Stephanas was the first convert

who belonged to the province of Achaia. What, then, is the relation between this and Luke's statement in Acts xvii. 34, as just quoted ?

It is contended that Dionysius or Damaris or some Athenian must have been the first convert in the province, and therefore either Luke's narrative is inconsistent with Paul's words, or there is some other meaning in the phrase "firstfruits of Achaia."

Dr. Steinmann [1] maintains that Athens was not a city of the province Achaia, but, as a free and allied city, it was outside the province, an *externa civitas*.[2] If this were so, many interesting questions would arise; on which we need not enter. The previous question is whether Dr. Steinmann's statement, that in Roman usage Athens was not part of Achaia, can be accepted as correct: he admits, of course, that popular Greek usage might have loosely called Athens a city of the province, but infers that, if St. Paul spoke in that way, he followed, not Roman, but Greek custom.

Perhaps it would be well to state first my own opinion, and afterwards to add the discussion of Dr. Steinmann's view, which is necessarily very technical and full of Roman minute details.

No church was, as I think, founded in Athens during the first visit of St. Paul, which was hurried and came to an abrupt end.[2] How much is implied by the term "believed" is very doubtful (see the preceding Section); but at least it remains far from probable that any person was baptized there at this time. Matters did not go so far as baptism. Dionysius may then have made no further progress

[1] *Leserkreis des Galaterbriefes*, pp. 88–94.

[2] The reception of the address, which Paul delivered before the Court of Areopagus, and the cold and significant words of the Court, showed that for the time there was no "open door" in Athens. Paul had tried a philosophic way there, but in Ephesus returned to his ordinary method.

than Sergius Paullus, who, as we have seen, never became a Christian in the fullest sense, and therefore never was baptized. Now the household of Stephanas was baptized, and I should suppose that only baptized and established converts would be called "firstfruits." If Aquila and Prisca were converted by St. Paul (as seems probable,[1] though by no means quite certain) they would not be firstfruits of Achaia, as they were strangers in Corinth; the description is restricted to provincials of Achaia.

It is possible that the "household of Stephanas" as a whole, not Stephanas alone, is meant as the "firstfruits," and that a single earlier convert here or there would not impair the right of this entire household to be called the "first." Households frequently seem to have gone as a whole; the family was the real unit in a pastoral sense, and the congregation had to be worked through families. The relation to the family was an extremely important matter in the eyes of St. Paul, when giving pastoral advice;[2] and some traces of this fact in social life appear in the Acts (see x. 2, xi. 14, xvi. 15, 31–34, xviii. 8, compare also 1 Cor. i. 16, John iv. 53).

What is meant is that, whether or not the first to believe, Stephanas with his whole household was the first to throw in his lot with and actually to begin the young congregation in Corinth by resolving and asking to be baptized.[3]

In passing it may be remarked that friends have asked why I have not replied to Dr. Steinmann's book, which is

[1] It seems most probable that Luke implies, though he does not expressly say, that they were St. Paul's converts. He trusts to the sense and discernment of his readers, as he does in the case of Titius Justus and of Crispus. The circumstances show without any formal statement that they were converted by Paul.

[2] See EXPOSITOR, Feb., 1910, p. 178.

[3] On the difference between the mere presence of individual believers and the existence of a fully formed congregation I have written in the *Expository Times*, 1912, Oct., Nov.

written to a large extent in polemic against my views. I have waited till time should reply. The constitution of the province Galatia has been gradually revealed, and many difficulties have been cleared away. The subject, however, is an extremely complicated one, and can never be understood without a great deal of careful and minute study and a considerable knowledge of Roman provincial administration. In this respect I regret to be obliged to say that Dr. Steinmann's book leaves much to be desired; and I cannot find in it any argument to which I could reply without a long and detailed discussion of Roman law in the Eastern provinces generally and in Galatia specially.

Our points of view on these matters are hopelessly diverse. On one page after another I find in his book statements at which I can only wonder. It is unprofitable to carry on a discussion when there is so little in which we are agreed: there must be some common foundation on which we could build up detail by detail a serviceable structure of reasoned knowledge. Otherwise nothing can be gained by controversy.

Of this I find examples on every page that I look at; and I now take one wh ch lies outside of the Galatian question: Athens and the province Achaia and the meaning of "first-fruits of Achaia."

Here we are entirely outside of the province Galatia. Dr. Steinmann, however, cannot shake off the thought of Galatia. He goes into the question, not for its own sake, but in order to bang the South-Galatian theory. With this idea his mind is prepossessed, and consequently he has not been so careful about matters of Roman history and antiquities as he otherwise would have been.

Dr. Steinmann's conclusion, p. 94, seems to amount to this, that, if Paul used the term Achaia to include Athens, he was not in accordance with Roman ideas and custom,

since Roman usage of the term Achaia excluded Athens (*Athen von der roemischen Provinz Achaja ausgeschlossen war*). Accordingly, he considers that Achaia meant the country of Greece, and that this was an old Greek pre-Roman usage, derived perhaps from the fact that the Achaean League included almost the whole of Greece; but he quotes no proof of such Greek usage, and it is contrary to everything that I know or have been taught from childhood.[1] What I have always learned and understood as the accepted teaching is that Achaia to the Greeks of pre-Roman time was the strip of land on the north coast of the Peloponnesus, between Arcadia and the Gulf of Corinth, and that Corinth itself was not a part of Achaia in the Greek sense. The use of "Achaia" for Greece as a whole is Roman, due to popular inaccurate usage, like the Roman use of "Asia" for the kingdom of the Attalids and thereafter for the Roman province. Dr. Steinmann simply assumes that this wide use of the term Achaia was beyond all doubt a very ancient (Greek) custom (*ohne Zweifel sehr alt war*). From every statement in this conclusion and every step in the argument I would dissent: and, especially, the method of substituting a "beyond doubt" for the quotation of ancient authorities is unscientific and valueless.

On p. 108 Dr. Steinmann says that in Pauline usage "Achaia is equivalent either to Corinth or to the whole of Greece, including Athens"—a pretty wide choice, destructive of any belief that the learned scholar has reached any clear geographical view—"and therefore is in no case fully coincident with the Roman official circuit of the province."

Now Dr. Steinmann proves at considerable length that Athens was a free and allied city (*libera* and *foederata*). This

[1] He actually quotes Pausanias's express statement, vii. 16, 7, that the Romans used the name Achaia in the sense in which the Greeks used Hellas, and Pausanias's explanation of the origin of this Roman usage.

proof was unnecessary: every one admits the fact, which is a matter of the most rudimentary knowledge. The question is whether such cities were or were not reckoned as cities of the province. That concerns not Athens alone, but a number of other free and allied cities. It does not answer the question to quote at length the privileges of such cities. Those privileges were honourable and highly esteemed Governors dismissed their lictors when they entered a free city. The citizens did not pay tribute.[1] The lawsuits in a free city were decided according to its own laws by the elected magistrates.

This whole subject requires retreatment. Dr Steinmann follows mainly Marquardt, *Staatsrecht* i., and quotes none of the more recent investigations on constitutional and legal points. He quotes Mommsen's History, but not his later articles. I shall use these along with Liebenam's *Städteverwaltung im roem. Kaiserreiche.*

This "freedom" was after all little more than nominal. Holm iv. 147 remarks that modern ideas of independence should not be introduced into the *libertas* of the "free" cities. It was absolutely inconsistent with Roman system to have a state within a state. The "free" state could exercise its freedom and use its laws only in so far as conduced to the well-being of the Empire.[2] "Even in the East, where Roman favour allowed many privileges to exist, it was evident that this 'freedom' meant really nothing, since the word of any Roman governor could nullify it."[3] When Maximus was sent to govern Achaia, Pliny wrote to him, viii. 14, urging him not to deprive Athens and Sparta of that nominal and shadowy freedom which they had had.

[1] We assume that all *liberae civitates* were also *immunes*. Yet contributions and taxes were frequently imposed on them: see Liebenam, p. 466.

[2] *Ein Staat im Staate war undenkbar*, Liebenam, p. 472.

[3] Liebenam, p. 473.

The right of "free" cities to govern according to their own laws caused after all no very great practical difference. True, the ordinary cities of the province had to accept the Roman law, but in practice Rome allowed great influence to local custom in the civilised Eastern provinces. Hence the law as administered in these provinces was a sort of compromise between strict Roman law and native custom. In some notable cases extraordinary care was taken to act according to the usage of the city. On this subject see Mitteis' *Reichsrecht und Volksrecht*, Liebenam, p. 466 ff., and the authorities quoted by him. I have followed Mitteis in my *Histor. Comm. on Galatians*.

Dr. Steinmann quotes as a proof that Athens and other allied cities were outside the province the fact that the Areopagus Court decided a criminal case in the reign of Tiberius. Doubtless it did so; but that was the privilege of all free cities: we know it for Amisos in the province of Bithynia-Pontus from Pliny's correspondence with the Emperor Trajan, while he was acting as governor. It is certainly wholly inconsistent with Pliny's conception of his duties and power to say that Amisos was outside of his province: he had distinct duties there, but these were narrower than in the ordinary cities of the province (*civitates stipendiariae*). The question as to the limit of his power in Amisos exercised his mind a little, but there was no question that he had power there. He was doubtful whether he should prohibit the continuance of clubs (*eranoi*) in Amisos, and consulted Trajan on this point. The Emperor's reply was that Amisos should be allowed to keep its clubs if they were in accordance with its own laws. A hint, however, is appended that the proconsul should keep himself informed whether the clubs tended to encourage riotous conduct and unlawful assemblies. The Emperors always reserved the power of annulling the rights of a *civitas foederata*, if this

seemed advisable for Imperial interests;[1] and, if clubs in Amisos were found conducive to disorder, the analogy of Imperial policy in other cases shows that the governor would be directed to interfere and probably to do away with the agreement (*foedus*). But Amisus was one of the Pontic cities associated in the provincial cult.

He tries to demonstrate that "*Athen gehöre gar nicht zur Provinz Achaia.*" There is, of course, a pedantic sense, almost a legal fiction, in which this statement is true under the Empire.[2] In certain matters of courtesy and form the fiction of independence of the "allied" and the "free" cities (*civitates foederatae*) and *liberae* was maintained. Marquardt points out that their autonomy was rather shadowy—I need not go into details—but he did not know, what is now proved, that, although the free city administered its own law there was always allowed an appeal to the Roman governor of the province, and that even an appeal to the Emperor could only take effect through the governor and with his sanction. This is known both for Achaia prov., and for Asia prov. I quote Mommsen in *Zft. der Savigny-St. f. Rechtsgesch.*, 1890, pl 36 f.: "*es ist für die Stellung der freien Städte von Wichtigkeit dass sowohl von Athen wie von Kos nicht bloss an den Kaiser sondern selbst*

[1] As Marquardt says, p. 74, Augustus deprived several *civitates foederatae* of their *libertas*, because they were using it in a way dangerous to public peace, Suet., *Aug.* 47. Byzantium was originally *foederata* (Tac. *Ann.* xii. 62): after the province Macedonia was formed, Byzantium was subject to the governor on the footing not of *foederata* but of *libera civitas* (Cic. *in Pis.* iii. 6). In A.D. 53 it was subject to Bithynia and was *stipendiaria* (Tacitus *l.c.*); but Pliny then calls it *libera* (*Nat. Hist.* iv. 11). Vespasian deprived it of *libertas* (Suet. *Vesp.* 8), which it regained and kept till Severus punished the city for a short time (Dio lxxiv. 14).

[2] Dr. Steinmann applies facts and principles of the Republican period respecting the allied and the free cities too directly to the Imperial time. It has now become clear that the Imperial administration interfered very freely with the rights of these cities, whenever there was any occasion; the tendency of discovery is to illustrate this truth.

an den Proconsul appellirt werden kann. . . . Nicht minder bemerkenswerth aber ist es, was Ramsay mit Recht der Inschrift entnahm, dass der Staathalter danach der Appellation an den Kaiser und überhaupt wohl der Beschickung des Kaisers aus seiner Provinz Folge zu geben wohl berechtigt, aber nicht verpflichtet ist."[1] Why did not Dr. Steinmann quote this important fact, which puts a very different aspect on the whole question?

I do not fancy that even Dr. Steinmann would press the fiction of the freedom of allied cities to the extent of maintaining that they as allies of Rome (*foederatae civitates*) were independent of the Emperor. The Emperor was the ultimate fountain of law for them; and any matter can be appealed from the Athenian courts to him. The governor of Achaia is an intermediate power; appeal to him is made from the city courts; and even an appeal to the Emperor must be sanctioned by the governor of the province before it can go forward to Rome.

To talk about Athens, or Kos, or Amisus, or Tarsus, or Mopsouestia in Cilicia, or Sagalassos, or Ephesus, or Smyrna, or a host of other cities, as being in any real sense outside of the province in which they were situated, is mere trifling. Many of them were outside the Roman Empire in the legal sense that an exile from Rome might live there; they administered their own affairs, indeed, but according to a *lex civitatis* which was fixed by Rome; their rights could be diminished or taken away by the Emperor, when he thought advisable; and, although the governor of the province did not interfere in their suits, yet any suit could be carried before him by appeal. The last is a decisive criterion: the governor of the province is the higher power in all law-cases, while the city officials are the subordinate power. The advantage of being free (*libera et immunis*) was in some

[1] Reprinted in his collected papers on legal subjects, vol. iii. p. 388.

respects great,[1] but in other respects this freedom would have been positively prejudicial, if it had not been in practice completely disregarded.

There is one grave and fundamental misconception which pervades the whole of Dr. Steinmann's reasoning on this subject. He seems to have never taken into consideration the great variety of privilege and honour and standing which existed among the cities and other units out of which a province was built up. This inequality of rights is a general feature of Roman administration at all periods. Cities were not treated all after the same fashion: they enjoyed very different standing according to their individual character and deserts towards Rome, or according to historical circumstances. As in Italy in the period from 270 to 89 B.C., so in the Eastern provinces in the first and second centuries, there was a wide diversity of rights and standing among the cities. The most privileged and honourable class was the Colonies: these were in Greece, Corinth and Patrae, in Macedonia Philippi, in Asia Parium and Troas, in Galatia Antioch and the Pisidian colonies. Next came the allied cities (*foederatae*) which were also free and immune from tribute. After them came the cities which were free and exempt from tribute (*liberae et immunes*) without having a treaty with Rome.[2] After them came the ordinary cities, which were subject to tribute (*stipendiariae*). Then the *demoi* or peoples which did not possess the Hellenic city constitution, but apparently were organised on the Anatolian village system (though we really possess no trustworthy knowledge about them). Last of all come the *ethnê*, in which

[1] Marquardt points out that the privilege of sheltering a Roman exile, while an apparent honour as implying independence, sometimes meant that the exiled Roman made himself a tyrant in the city where he settled.

[2] Practically they had the same rights as the *foederatae*, but the rights of the latter were perhaps a little more permanently certain, and the former could not call themselves friends.

Rostowzew recognises the population of the great Imperial estates, whose position approximated to that of serfs (though technically they were free), and whose organisation continued to be as in the pre-Roman period with the Emperor substituted for the ancient lord, priest or king or noble.[1]

In such a province as Asia all these various classes of states were brought together as a body. The ἔθνη were hardly perhaps honourable enough to be ranked along with the really free peoples. They were the private property of the Emperor and looked to him, not to the governor of the province. The Emperor's procurator and slaves managed their affairs. So far as they were outside of the province it was because they were unworthy of that honour: they corresponded in status rather to the people of client-kingdoms, not yet worthy of admission to the rank of provincials. Yet these *ethnê* are in certain inscriptions ranked as members of the Commune of the province Asia, and this is the absolute proof that they enter into the ultimate and fundamental being of the province.

In the province of Achaia there were some differences from Asia; but the general principle remains the same.

Now why should the free and allied cities be deemed by Dr. Steinmann too honourable to be degraded into the province, when the *Coloniae*, whose burgesses were all Roman citizens[2] and which were, so to say, outlying portions of Rome itself, serving as garrisons in the province, are ranked by him as parts of the province? That he does so rank them, though he never actually says so, is proved by the

[1] These estates had in many cases belonged to one or other of the great Sanctuaries, whose gods were often extremely wealthy as owners of lands and lords over the cultivators. Brandis on "Asia" (Pauly-Wissowa, *Realencyclop.*, p. 1556 f.) gives a different explanation of ἔθνη in this usage; but Rostowzew rejects it in his *Studien zur Gesch. des röm. Kolonats*, p. 262.

[2] The *incolae*, who had not Roman citizenship in a *colonia*, were not burgesses and had no place in the popular assembly: they were mere residents, yet they had many privileges,

fact that his whole argument is directed to show that, while Corinth was part of the province, Athens was not. Had he forgotten that Corinth was a *Colonia?*

There is, of course, a sense in which the *Coloniae* were outside the province; all its citizens, as Romans, were even more completely emancipated from subjection to the provincial governor than the citizens of free and allied cities. Corinth was the capital and official residence of the proconsul of Achaia. Pisidian Antioch was the military centre and a sort of secondary capital of the southern part of the province Galatia, Lugudunum (Lyon) of the Three Gauls. It was a special honour to a province to contain one or more *Coloniae* which represented the full Roman qualification as the ideal in front of the province. The province is, ideally speaking, a sort of imperfect Rome: the *Colonia* is the perfect Rome in visible and material form within the province. It is false to the Roman idea of the province to put the *Colonia* outside of it.

The case of Smyrna is an excellent parallel to that of Athens. Smyrna is given by Marquardt as only a free, but not an allied city. He has, however, omitted the evidence of Cicero in his Eleventh Philippic ii. 5, which is quite conclusive: "a city which ranks among our most faithful and most ancient allies." The account of the Asian War and the treaty that ended it in Livy xxxvii. f. must be understood as implying a treaty, though the treaty (being of older date) is not mentioned.

As an allied state Smyrna had the right of sheltering exiles from Rome, i.e. exiles who were expelled from the Roman Empire could go to live there and had the right of being received as citizens. This constituted it a *civitas extera*, i.e. outside the Empire and the province (Marquardt, page 80, with note 1). The same right belonged to Thessalonica (as he says) and Cyzicus and Patrae; but surely

no one would argue that in any real sense these were not parts of the provinces Macedonia and Asia and Achaia.

As regards Smyrna, Tacitus has preserved the report of the argument which it laid before the Senate in support of its claim to construct a temple dedicated to Tiberius and Livia and the Senate (*Annals*, iv. 55). Now Smyrna was the oldest ally and the most faithful friend of Rome in the East, occupying an honourable position corresponding to Marseilles (Massalia) in the West. Its chief glory and its special characteristic as a city of the Empire was its faithfulness. It laid its case before the Senate because it was a city of the province. It had no standing in this matter except as a city of the province. The Commune of the province had resolved to have this temple as a new seat of the Imperial cult, and eleven cities of the province claimed the honour of being chosen as seat of the new temple. Smyrna was one of these. It assumes to have the right to compete for the privilege: other ten cities claimed to be preferred. All the eleven present their claim as cities of the province. If Smyrna had been *extra provinciam*, it would not have sought an honour which was reserved for the province. If other cities had thought that Smyrna was not a city of the Province, they would have argued that Smyrna was disqualified as being outside the province. The right to compete is accorded to Smyrna by universal consent.

The argument in this case is the most perfect proof that Smyrna was a city of the province Asia, accepted and honoured as such by the Senate and by the whole province. Yet, if there were any city which was pre-eminent in the East as the friend and ally of Rome, the conspicuous "free and allied city" in the fullest sense, that city was Smyrna. Athens had massacred its Roman inhabitants, joined Mithradates, and been besieged and captured by Sulla. In that same war Smyrna's sympathy and loyalty to Rome had been

conspicuous. In the public Assembly the citizens, hearing of the sufferings of Sulla's soldiers from the winter cold, stripped themselves of their outer garments (which were of thicker material), and sent them to the shivering Romans. Any honour and privilege that attached to a *civitas foederata* belonged above all others to Smyrna; and yet it claimed the title "first and fairest (city) of (the province) Asia."

It is instructive to read the previous chapter (iv. 15) in which Tacitus describes the nature of the case. The Commune of Asia was the expression of the provincial unity and loyalty: it was the association of all the cities of the province in the common worship of the Imperial god and his divine ancestors. To be a member of the Commune was to be a member of the province.

It would be valueless to argue that Smyrna in its case before the Senate appeals to its conduct in 195 B.C., when it dedicated the first temple to Rome long before a Roman prov. existed, and to infer that the construction of a temple to Tiberius did not prove it to be a city of the province. The point, however, is this. Smyrna might build its own special temple to the Emperor, and this would prove no provincial connexion; but the temple, which it was finally selected by the Senate to build, was a temple of (the province) Asia, and only cities of the province could have such a temple. A special legate of the proconsul of Asia was appointed to superintend the building.

Dr. Steinmann, p. 94, is possessed with the strange idea that Achaia could acquire a Roman name only in 44 A.D., when it was given to the senate as a province separate from Macedonia.[1] But even when it was under the same governor

[1] He forgets that it was made a separate province in 27 B.C. He also forgets that the constitution of Achaia was regulated by the *lex Mummia*, imposed by its conqueror in 146 B.C. (Liebenam, p. 469), Macedonia by the *lex Aemilia*, 167 B.C.

as Macedonia it was the Roman province Achaia, and not merely a part of Macedonia. The province was *Macedonia et Achaia* [1] (Tac. Ann. i. 80, v. 10; Dio Cass. lviii. 25); Cicero often speaks of Achaia, meaning the Roman province.

If free cities were outside the province, not merely Athens, but also Sparta, all the Eleutherolacones, Delphi, Thespiae, Tanagra, Abae, Pharsalus, Elatea, Patrae, Nicopolis, Mothone, Pale and Pallantion, also the Ozolian Locrians and Amphissa,[2] were so. Brandis in Pauly-Wissowa i. 191 adds Thyrreion (*foed.*), Plataea (*lib.*) and states that it is false to think that Achaia did not become a province until 27 B.C.; it was a province from 146. In 67 A.D. Nero made all Greece free: Vespasian at once revoked the freedom. The freedom released the country from taxation, but did not take it out of the Empire; moreover this act was a freak and not a sober Roman device for government.

The democratic constitution was suppressed in the free cities, and a timocratic organization was substituted by Rome.

In C.I.L. viii. 7,059 an official is mentioned as being governor in Athens, Thespiae, Plataeae, and Thessaly, from which Brandis (Pauly-Wissowa i. 194) infers that Thessaly belonged to the same province as Athens, Thespiae and Plataeae, i.e. to Achaia.

The criticism to which Dr. Steinmann's argument about Athens exposes itself is this. Whereas Marquardt's account accommodates itself naturally to the new evidence, because he confines himself to stating the actual facts and their necessary implication, and therefore the more recently discovered facts come in to complete the picture, which he draws in bare outline; Steinmann, on the contrary, selects

[1] Like Lycia et Pamphylia, two provinces under one governor: so Galatia et Cappadocia 72–106 A.D. and the Tres Eparchiae.

[2] Marquardt gives two inconsistent lists, p. 325, 10, and p. 328, 2.

certain facts from Marquardt to suit a preconceived purpose; he groups them to produce a certain effect; he slurs over the facts stated by Marquardt which tell against him, mentioning some of them without pointing out their bearing on his case; he argues from our lack of knowledge, which is false and unscientific method; and the consequence is that the newly discovered facts are dead against him. Let any person read through Marquardt's non-partisan statement in the light of the new knowledge, and he will see for himself that this is so.

While Marquardt mentions that, so far as the right of sheltering Roman exiles was concerned, certain cities in the provinces were *exterae*, he never applies practically this pedantic survival of ancient right. In practice he always treats these provincial allied cities under their province, showing his opinion that they after all belonged to the province, and he lays little stress on their special standing. He expressly calls Amisus the most easterly city of the province Bithynia (p. 350), and gives its municipal custom as a proof of Roman behaviour towards provincial cities (p. 143); and so on. Only with regard to Athens he infers too much from the shadowy liberty[1] that was left to it, and says that it was exempt from the authority of the proconsul; the authorities on whom he relies are not sufficiently clear to prove this, and Mommsen (quoted by Steinmann) expresses the fact more carefully; "Athens was not under the fasces of the proconsul," i.e. when he entered the city the proconsul was not preceded by axe-bearing lictors; cases were carried on appeal from courts in Athens to the hearing of the proconsul.

Marquardt mentions that Athens differed from the rest of the province Achaia in never using the provincial era;

[1] Pliny, *Epist.* viii. 24; Dio Chrys., ii. p. 200 R.; Plutarch, *præc. ger. reip.* 32, § 8 (quoted by Marquardt, p. 86).

and Steinmann religiously follows him, quoting this as a very weighty fact. There is nothing in this antiquated fallacy. (1) There prevailed extreme and capricious variety in regard to chronology in Hellenistic and Hellenic cities; and Athens, like many other Greek cities, dated by its own magistrates. (2) No provincial era was used in Achaia,[1] and neither Athens nor any other city of the province dated by a provincial era (Kaestner *de Aeris*, 66 f., Kubitschek *Aera* in Pauly-Wissowa *Real-Enc.*). This piece of evidence is worse than valueless; it is fictitious. Why does not Dr. Steinmann learn Achaian facts before writing about the province?

Even in regard to the chief glory of Athens, the University and its administration, the Emperor interfered as he pleased. It was required that the four Masters of the Schools should be Roman citizens; and this regulation, according to Mommsen, must have been made certainly early in the Empire and probably by Augustus. The regulation was relaxed by Hadrian, who permitted the head of the Epicurean School (and probably the others on the same principle) to be chosen from Non-Romans. This we learn from his rescript, which was discovered and first published in 1890 and immediately commented on by Diels, Mommsen and others.[2]

Dr. Steinmann's long discussion of the rank of Athens and its relation to the province is vitiated by neglect of important facts. The neglect was, of course, unintentional:

[1] Some rare cases in which a provincial era seemed to be used by a city of Achaia are now better explained: the dating is not from the foundation of the province, but from a different era.

[2] *Archiv. f. Gesch. d. Philosophie*, iv. 487 f.; *Zft. d. Savigny St. f. Rechtsgesch.*, 1891, p. 152 f. It is an interesting fact that the students of the School co-operated in the selection of a Scholarch (as was previously known) and were even empowered to depose an unworthy Professor and appoint a successor to him (which was revealed by the newly discovered inscription containing this rescript.

he would not have passed over any fact bearing on his subject, as his whole intention is to be judicial and complete. But he simply follows a book published in 1881, taking it as the final statement of the law, though any one who studied Roman law or Roman history, or the Eastern provincial administration would have put him right, if he had sought to learn what is known on the subject.

Now it was a great source of wealth to the city that the Governor should reside, or should even hold the assizes, in it,[1] and any free or allied city which had the opportunity would not have wasted it by vainly pleading that it was outside the province. Many free and allied cities were seats of *conventus:* Thessalonica and Antioch were always the residence of the governors of Macedonia and Syria, Ephesus and Tarsus of the governors of Asia and Cilicia. Ephesus and Tarsus, and Smyrna and Laodiceia on the Lycus were *conventus* from the beginning. In Ephesus (Acts xix.) the Secretary (γραμματεύς) warned the people in the theatre that if they did not dissolve the irregular assembly (i.e. not permitted in the νόμος, *lex civitatis*), the city would be called to account (obviously before the proconsul, whom the Secretary has just previously mentioned as the fountain of justice).

Dr. Steinmann admits that several allied and free cities of this class were the residence of the governor of the province, and that in others the Roman assizes (*conventus*) were held by the governor. These admitted facts give away his case. What meaning does Dr. Deissmann attach to the expression that those free cities were outside of the province, if these facts are true? It was the basis of provincial administration that a governor could not reside outside his province, or exercise his power legally anywhere

[1] On this enrichment see, for example, *Cities of St. Paul*, p. 273.

except in his province. Now at the *conventus* the governor exercised the full and absolute authority over the provinces; he represented the judicial dignity and the power of Rome. If Athens or Smyrna or any of the other free and allied cities were outside the province, the governor could not possibly exercise his supreme judicial authority or fix his residence permanently in any of them. To be the residence of the governor of the province, a city must be in the province.

He attempts to bolster up his case by pleading that Thessalonica and the others were not allied, but belonged to the lower class of free cities. The rights of the two classes, however, were the same;[1] the superiority of the allied cities lay in the more assured permanence of the rights. The question that concerns us is whether these rights caused the city that possessed them to be ranked outside the province or not; and although Ephesus or Tarsus might lose its rights more easily than Athens or Amisus, yet so long as it possessed those rights, the effect on status was the same. In fact, allied cities are frequently described simply as "free" (for example, so always by Pliny); and the occurrence of a city in a list of *liberae civitates* does not prove that it did not belong to the other and higher class of *foederatae*.[2]

Except in certain quite unimportant details, therefore, the free and allied cities were regularly counted as cities of the province. They ranked along with the other cities as members of the Commune or Association of provincial cities. Ordinary usage and so far as is known Roman custom ranked them as provincial cities; they were places into which the governor of the province entered in perform-

[1] Marquardt asserts this quite positively, p. 80: see also Mommsen, *Staatsrecht*, iii. p. 654, *n.* 4, and 658.

[2] See Mommsen, *loc. cit.*

ance of his duty, although he respected the rights which they possessed. Paul and Luke thought and spoke of Athens and Smyrna and other free cities as cities of Achaia or Asia, and they were justified by Roman custom. Dr. Steinmann's case is valueless and founded on misconception and omission of evidence, sometimes on actual errors in facts.

W. M. RAMSAY.

THE LITERARY RIDDLE OF THE "EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS."

KEENLY as the questions of the authorship, destination, and purpose of the "Epistle to the Hebrews" have been debated in recent years, it can scarcely be said that there is anything like general agreement regarding any of the crucial points. This, it seems to me, is largely due to a defect of method, the failure to determine with precision what the problem is which demands a solution, to settle upon a fixed starting point, and to proceed in a reasoned orderly fashion from ascertained fact to inference, and from the better known to the less known. A brilliant lead was given by Harnack in his well-known article in the *Zeitschrift für neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*. But subsequent discussion has concentrated mainly on the merits and defects of Harnack's suggestion of Prisca and Aquila as the probable authors. As a consequence the real outstanding merit of his contribution has in great measure been lost sight of. His greatest service undoubtedly was to show that for New Testament Introduction the first problem is *how to explain the fact that a writing of such power and historical significance has come down to us without any indication of its authorship or original destination*. That there is extant no primitive Christian tradition as to the authorship is a matter of universal knowledge. But the