his epistles, he has the Greek or the Roman practice of adoption in view. That use, at all events, shows that if, when it first entered into his mind to avail himself of the term, he was thinking of adoption as practised by either of the two classic nations, he was constrained by his Christian convictions to employ it in a manner which invested it with a new, nobler sense than it had ever before borne. Adoption in Roman law denoted the investment of persons formerly not sons with some measure of filial status; *υἱοθεσία* in St. Paul's vocabulary means the solemn investment of persons formerly sons in an imperfect degree with a sonship worthy of the name, realising the highest possibilities of filial honour and privilege.[1]

A. B. BRUCE.

THE CHURCH AND THE EMPIRE IN THE FIRST CENTURY.

III. THE FIRST EPISTLE ATTRIBUTED TO ST. PETER.

THESE papers attempt to prove that the books of the New Testament which are treated give a picture of the relations between the State and the Christians, which is in itself probable, and which takes up every one of the scanty and incomplete statements of the non-Christian writers bearing on the point, puts each in its proper surroundings, and gives to each a much fuller meaning than it has when taken by itself.

Accordingly, to discuss the two classes of authorities, Pagan and Christian, side by side, was the aim of the lectures in which I treated the subject. The two distinguished authorities to whose criticisms I am replying have

[1] Usteri (*Paulinischer Lehrbegriff*) thinks that as Paul uses the word, the idea of adoption is not to be pressed. *Vide* note on *υἱοθεσία* at p. 194 of the work referred to.

preferred to discuss the subject purely on the one class of evidence, and to leave the other out of sight. If the point at issue had been the genuineness of the latter class of documents, this procedure would have been quite right. But the question between us is not literary, it is as to what was occurring in the period 64–90 A.D. It is not allowable to leave out of sight the evidence of the only documents that claim to be contemporary except on the ground that their claim is false and that they were produced at a later time. If they are genuine, they are weighty evidence, and ought to be weighed in comparison with the other evidence. Now the sole point of difference between Prof. Mommsen and myself turns on the evidence of the Christian documents. I frankly confess that, if the question had to be decided on the Pagan evidence alone, Suetonius's few weighty words must be accepted as the supreme authority, and we should have to conclude that, where evidence is so deplorably scanty, all that Tacitus adds beyond Suetonius is deficient in authority and precision, and must be disregarded. In that case Prof. Mommsen has said all that can be said, and I should accept his statement without a word of comment as being (like so much of his other work on Roman imperial history) a decisive, impartial, and perfect outline of the view which the evidence accessible suggests. But my point is that the Christian authorities supplement the dozen words in which Suetonius dismisses the subject; that they do not contradict but complete him, since it was not possible for him to express fully a long process of political and social history in a dozen words; and that the additions which Tacitus makes to Suetonius are in perfect agreement with the Christian evidence. It may perhaps seem that I am insisting on this too much and repeating the statement; but it appears to me to be so important and fundamental that it must be insisted on and reiterated. At each point in the examination of the evidence, I am compelled to state that the criticism to which

I reply has not taken this piece of evidence into account. Prof. Mommsen will perhaps reply that the scholars to whose province it belongs to decide as to the genuineness of the Christian documents which claim to belong to the first century have not agreed on the question; and that, till opinion is agreed on that point, he cannot consent to admit them as evidence. To that I can only answer that, in that case, my words at present do not affect him, but appeal only to those who admit the genuineness of the documents. I contend however that the admission of these documents sets the non-Christian authorities in a new light, and makes them more instructive, and that this fact is in itself a very strong proof of their genuineness. But beyond this I do not enter on the question whether the Christian authorities are genuine. The question has now, so far as I can judge, been sufficiently discussed; and, apart from theological issues (on which I do not enter), one need not waste time on it. Some learned and estimable scholars hold that the work purporting to be Tacitus's Annals is a fifteenth-century forgery; and many other opinions, which equally outrage literary feeling and historical possibility, can be supported by plausible and elaborate arguments. But such questions are mere curiosities, on which no serious investigator of history would spend more than a footnote; and the question as to the genuineness of the Pastoral Epistles would long ago have taken its place in the same category, had mere literary and historical issues been involved in it. That there are serious difficulties for the historical student in the Pastoral Epistles I fully acknowledge; and I do not profess to remove them, or even to discuss them. I merely urge that it is no solution of the difficulties to pitchfork these Epistles into the second century; that none of the critics who light-heartedly adopt a second century date have ever seriously faced the task of showing that these Epistles suit the historical situation into which they have been

tossed; and that it is a mere travesty of historical criticism to thrust documents into a period without proving clearly that they suit the position. One of these difficulties alone here concerns us, and it appears now before us in a very different form from what it had not long ago. The fact that persecution is referred to in these Epistles has ceased to have any weight as an argument against their genuineness. The only question now is whether the type of persecution implied in them is consistent with the supposition that the State had fully determined its attitude and procedure towards the Christians.

To come now to the First Epistle of Peter. I have discussed the evidence derived from it at such length in chapter xiii. pp. 279–94, that I scruple to say more. It would be possible to make the exposition clearer and more detailed; but it may be doubted whether a longer exposition would go far to convince those whose opinion remains unaffected by what has been already said in the pages referred to. The view which I have stated steers a middle course between two opinions, which are as much opposed to it as they are to each other: one that that Epistle is written to encourage Christians exposed to persecution for the Name, and must therefore be a second century production; the other that the Epistle addresses Christians who are not exposed to any persecution beyond social annoyance, and that therefore it may have been composed even before A.D. 64. The view to which my argument led is (1) that the Epistle was written after the Roman government had inaugurated the procedure which was regular and proper throughout the second century (though not always carried into effect), viz., "persecution for the Name"; (2) it was written at the time when this fully developed procedure was newly introduced, and the writer is still partly under the influence of the previously existing procedure, and his tone represents the transition from that of the Pastoral Epistles to that of

the Apocalypse; (3) the period is in the second part of Vespasian's reign, 75–9 A.D. Without repeating the arguments already stated, I shall discuss some criticisms that have been made on various points in this triple inference.

That some passages point to accusations against Christians as criminals and malefactors rather than to simple condemnation for the "Name" is quite true; this fact however constitutes no argument against my view, but is part of my case. There occur passages of both kinds, indicating that "the writer stood at the beginning of the new period, and hardly realized all that was implied in it." This answer applies to one or two criticisms that have been made. When the Epistle was written procedure had developed into the stage of punishment "for the Name." The idea of suffering for "the Name" had become well defined and readily intelligible before iv. 14 and 16 could be written; and that implies a different procedure from the mere putting of Christians to death for certain serious crimes, even though the trial was forced through on notoriously insufficient evidence under the influence of popular panic and hatred. The period of martyrs in the strict sense had begun, the period when the sufferer could feel himself a witness to his faith and to his God, when he could know that the placard before him bore the words "hic est Christianus," and could glory in such a death, and not feel the shame of being proclaimed publicly as "murderer" or "*sacrilegus*" (p. 401, see also p. 294, *note**).

I must here refer to an objection, stated by a writer whose opinion I value very highly, and whose very kind notice of my book has especially gratified me, Dr. Marcus Dods. Even "admitting that the persecution referred to was directed by Roman officials," he considers it "very doubtful whether the passages adduced will bear the interpretation that Christians were 'sought out' by these officials." I fully admit the truth of this remark. In such

indirect allusions to the action taken by the State as occur in the Epistle, we can hardly expect to find clear and explicit statement as to details in that action. We have nothing to go upon except the general implication and tendency of the passages referring to persecution. Each one, when scrutinized too minutely, fails in the unmistakable directness of a witness in a court of law; the question which we are asking is not the one to which the witness is replying; and we must judge of his testimony according as it was given. Further, we must remember the difference between Roman and modern procedure, caused by the dependence of the latter on private initiative; the action of the Roman law even in criminal cases was to a very great extent dependent on popular co-operation. Hence "throughout First Peter the mixture of official and popular action is very clearly expressed" (pp. 295, 325, 373). I cannot resist the evidence that official action is a necessary part of the situation. Private action became powerful when it had legal proceedings to appeal to, but it "would be of little consequence unless abetted and completed by official judgment." Herein lies the strength of the language in iii. 15, "being ready always to give answer to every man that asketh you a reason concerning the hope that is in you."[1] It is quite true that, as has been stated in criticism of my view, the expression "seems rather to indicate a number of private inquisitors than the one public governor." That is precisely the case; but, in the first place, the words "every one" must not be taken to exclude the governor, and, secondly, the strength of these "private

[1] The proper force of these words is not seen without taking the Greek into account: the language of law is sharply distinguished, in English, from the language of ordinary life and of literature. In Greek it was not so; and in this passage we have language which belongs to all three spheres, rendered in the Authorised Version by words that are wholly non-legal. ἕτοιμοι ἀεὶ πρὸς ἀπολογίαν παντὶ τῷ αἰτοῦντι ὑμᾶς λόγον περὶ τῆς ἐν ὑμῖν ἐλπίδος: ἀπολογία is strictly an answer to a legal charge; and this idea from the sphere of law underlies the wider popular sense in which it is here used.

inquisitors" lay entirely in the fact that they only put the questions which the state authorised them to put as potential prosecutors, and which the public governor would put as soon as any private prosecutor brought the case to his knowledge. Without this power in reserve the question of the private inquisitor had no terror; but with official action to back him, every private person was armed with the terror of a *delator*. The author of this Epistle is here alluding to one of the most characteristic features of Roman life, one which is described times without number in the Roman writers, the *delatores*, or, to adopt the felicitous expression which I have just quoted, "private inquisitors." There was no regular class of lawyers; the distinction between the lawyer and the private person hardly existed; and every citizen was free to act as a lawyer, pleading not merely on his own behalf, but for his friends, or in prosecution of his opponents or enemies. Volunteer prosecutors could often look forward to a reward for their exertions, if successful; and under the early Empire such private inquisitors were strenuously encouraged by the government. Juvenal speaks of the very coast being peopled with "private inquisitors," on the look out for breaches of the law (iv. 47). Horace mentions two such private inquisitors, who go about a terror to evil-doers, though the innocent can laugh at them. The advice given in the Pastoral Epistles, and in a considerable part of First Peter, is an amplification of the thought in this passage of Horace (*Satires*, I. 4, 64–70). I have pointed out that at a later time a class of lawyers, or "private inquisitors"[1] seems to have arisen, who made a specialty of Christian cases (p. 480, *note* 4).

[1] It is strictly true that the "private inquisitors" of Roman time have developed into the "legal practitioners" of our modern life; the chief difference between them lies in the fees which the "private inquisitor" is now required to pay, the dinners which he is required to eat, and the legal status and title which he thus acquires.

Intentionally I have enlarged on this detail, as an example "how vividly various passages in the Epistle express the character of Roman procedure," etc. (see p. 294). This and many other such points constitute what I have called the *romanised* character of this Epistle (p. 286 f.), stamping it as written by a person accustomed to Roman life and manners.

It is an important point that the Epistle falls naturally into the place assigned to it, and that many passages in it are seen to be full of reality and applicability to the actual facts of the situation, instead of being vague generalities, when one reads it from this point of view. In particular the strange and practically unique word ἀλλοτριοεπίσκοπος,[1] instead of being an unsolved puzzle, is seen to be a clear, distinct, and apposite term, referring pointedly to a prominent fact in the historical situation. Divorced from its real surroundings the word has seemed obscure and unintelligible. Restored to its surroundings, it introduces us to a new page in the history of Roman procedure, and affords a striking example of the influence of Greek philosophy on Roman law, which through the learning of Dr. E. Zeller, and the kindness of Prof. Mommsen (who sent me a copy of Dr. Zeller's little paper as soon as it appeared), can now be described. Dr. Zeller's paper "on a Point of Contact between later Cynicism and Christianity" was read before the Berlin Academy on 23rd February, 1893, a week before my book was published; and in it he takes the same view of the meaning of the term that I have done, illustrating it with his breadth of knowledge, and setting it in its proper place in the history of ancient thought. As the paper is hidden in the *Sitzungsberichte* of the Berlin Academy, 1893, pp. 129–132, it will be convenient for the reader that I should mention one or two points in it that bear on

[1] It occurs only in 1 Peter, iv. 15, and in passages which are imitated from that verse.

our subject, referring him to the author's own statement, if he wishes to enjoy properly a most charming little essay.

The idea was current in Greek philosophy from the days of Socrates onwards that it was the duty of the true philosopher to stir up his fellow men to live rightly and attend to the welfare of their own souls. Beyond all other Socratic schools, the Cynics insisted on this duty of the philosopher; and they expressed it in various ways: sometimes that the philosopher ought to be the physician of souls, sometimes that he ought to be a spy upon (κατάσκοπος), or an overseer of (ἐπίσκοπος) the actions of man. Dio Chrysostom relates that Diogenes the Cynic went of old to the Isthmian games, not to enjoy the spectacle, but to keep an eye on mankind and its folly (ἐπισκοπῶν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ τὴν ἄνοιαν αὐτῶν). Especially was this a prevalent and guiding thought among the Cynic philosophers of the early Roman Empire, who use the same old terms and metaphors as the earlier philosophers. Epictetus urges in particularly strong and manifold ways that the true philosopher must boldly, and without regard to consequences, act the overseer over other men (ἐπισκοπεῖν) in every department of their life, directing them, advising them, never shrinking from the reproach that he is interfering in other people's business, for everything that concerns mankind is the true philosopher's business.

I have pointed out that to the Pagan observer the Cynics and the Christians seemed to be "two members of one class, differing in some respects, but on the whole of the same type" (p. 352, *note*); and this extract from Dr. Zeller's exposition shows how deep-seated and real the analogy was, and how natural it was that the same unpopularity, though in very different degrees, accompanied both these schools of morals. Both interfered with the established order of society; both criticised keenly and unsparingly the faults of the time; both committed all the faults enumerated in long

array in the passage which I have imitated from Aristides (p. 351 f.); but the Christians did so with incomparably greater boldness and greater effect, and were correspondingly more hated as being the more dangerous of the two schools. At the same time the very similarity of their aims, combined with the difference of method that they preached, placed the two schools (like rival schools of medicine) in vehement opposition to each other. The cynic could only appear to the Christian preacher a mere charlatan in his attempts to cure the sickness of men's souls; and the Cynic retorted with hatred on the Christian. Thus, for example, as Dr. Zeller has observed, the bitter assault of the Cynic philosopher Crescens on Justin Martyr is a fair example of the usual relations between the schools.[1]

It is a curious coincidence, but only an accidental coincidence, that the term *ἐπίσκοπος*, which was so important in the Christian Church, should be so prominent as a description of the true Cynic philosopher. The Christian *ἐπίσκοπος* derived his title from a different idea. But there remains in the remarkable term *ἀλλοτριοεπίσκοπος*, as Dr. Zeller has pointed out, a trace of the application to the Christians of the same idea that was used by the Cynics. The populace considered that the preacher, Cynic or Christian alike, was an *ἀλλοτριοεπίσκοπος*, a person thrusting himself into the direction of what was not his own business. The accusation was familiar to Epictetus, and perhaps the very term is referred to in his denial of the charge: "when the philosopher is directing the affairs of human beings, he is not busying himself about other people's business but about his own" (*οὐ τὰ ἀλλότρια πολυπραγμονεῖ ὁτὰν τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἐπισκοπῇ ἀλλὰ τὰ ἴδια*, III. 22, 97).

[1] Dr. Zeller is, however, not correct when he connects Crescens's attack with Justin's trial and condemnation in 163 (this, and not 165 as he has it, is the date preferred as probable by Borghesi). I need only refer to Canon Scott Holland's discussion in the *Dict. of Chr. Biography* for the proof that the quarrel with Crescens belongs to a much earlier period of Justin's life.

So far I find myself in entire agreement with Dr. Zeller; and the coincidence in our views, starting from such opposite premises, is especially gratifying. But at this point, unfortunately, we diverge. Dr. Zeller unhesitatingly dates First Peter in the second century, "hardly earlier than Justin's First Apology" (*i.e.*, about 130–140 A.D.). On the contrary, I find that this use of the term ἀλλοτριοεπίσκοπος points to a first century date, and is very difficult to reconcile with a second century origin for the Epistle. Dr. Zeller is, however, so firmly persuaded of the second century date that he does not even put the question whether the term and the facts implied in its use in the Epistle suit the historical circumstances of the period to which he assigns First Peter. His dating is to him an axiom from which he starts, not a theory which he is testing. The words of the Epistle, iv. 15, 16, seem to me to point to the interpretation that the writer is distinguishing between two kinds of accusation, and advising his correspondents and disciples as to the tone and conduct that are suitable to each (a point discussed in my last paper, EXPOSITOR, August, p. 113). They should be proud, and regard it as an honour to be punished as Christians; but that they should be punished for murder, or theft, or as guilty of immorality, or as ἀλλοτριοεπίσκοποι, is a thing from which they naturally and rightly shrink, and for which they should strenuously try to avoid giving the slightest occasion. Unless these were charges that had been commonly brought against Christians before the tribunals,[1] and unless Christians had actually suffered in many cases on these grounds, there is no appositeness in the passage.

But during the second century such charges were not

[1] Three of these charges are discussed, or alluded to many times in my book (pp. 205, 237, 247, etc.). Theft is not one that seems specially appropriate, but it was probably brought in to help to give legal ground for charges of influencing by unlawful means the minds of converts, and acquiring possession of their money or other property. The practice was to get up a case which could be sent for trial, and trust to prejudice for success in carrying it through.

those on which Christians suffered. I have described over and over again the procedure, keeping as close as possible to the words of the actual witnesses, and must urge once more that it is essential in investigations of this kind to distinguish clearly the procedure and the charges which characterized the state-action at different periods. The belief that the Christians were guilty of the crimes mentioned in iv. 16 was widely spread, and constituted to those Pagans who reasoned on the matter a justification for their treatment (such as Pliny and Aristides, pp. 205 and 351 f.); but the crimes were not required or used to bring about the condemnation of Christians. It has already been pointed out (EXPOSITOR, July, p. 19) that these charges were employed in the second century only against those Christians who had recanted, and who therefore were not amenable to the more serious charge. But according to the view which has been set forth in my chapter xi., such charges of criminality constituted the ground on which Christians were executed under the Neronian procedure. We have deduced this from the natural interpretation of Tacitus's detailed account; we have found it in perfect agreement with the tone of the contemporary Pastoral Epistles; and we now find that it gives the simple and sufficient explanation of the language of First Peter. In particular, we find that on this theory the punishment of death, in connexion with the charge of "tampering with other people's business," is intelligible. The Epistle puts the ἀλλοτριοεπίσκοπος on a level with the murderer and the thief in respect of the punishment that awaited him. So severe a punishment for such a charge is so unusual that it must arise out of an exceptional state of things; and we have found that Tacitus leads up naturally to the same connexion of charge and penalty. Under the interpretation that the influence acquired by the Christian over his converts was an unlawful interference with the will of others and the ordinary habits of society, and

was gained by unholy and magical arts, the crime of being ἀλλοτριοεπίσκοπος had come to be a capital charge. Nero had given his sanction to this method of judging charges against Christians, and his example had been followed by provincial governors, especially in Asia Minor, whose congregations are addressed in this Epistle. We find, then, that the passage under discussion is out of keeping with the circumstances of the second century, while it is in keeping with the circumstances of A.D. 65–75, as we have described them. Then, and then alone, did the imperial government unreservedly pander to popular prejudice, and mould its procedure entirely to suit popular scandal.

On the other hand the view taken by Dr. Sanday, and the similar view stated by Prof. Mommsen, seem to me not to fully explain the language of First Peter. Nero's action on this view consisted in first punishing a certain number of Christians on the charge of arson, and thereafter in instituting "general measures of repression . . . partly in defence of the public gods, partly against the excesses said, probably not in all cases unjustly, to reign among them." The spirit of Prof. Mommsen's article as a whole shows that he considers (like Dr. Sanday) that these "general measures of repression" were exactly of the type prevalent in the second century. But I can only repeat that we must not ignore the essential difference implied in punishing Christians for excesses, and punishing them simply because they plead guilty to being Christians. The former procedure brought the punishment of Christians under the ordinary criminal law, proving them to be criminals and punishing them accordingly. Prof. Mommsen himself has cleared up the nature of the latter procedure, showing that it was not founded on the ordinary laws, but on the administrative authority of the great magistrates and, in particular, of the Emperor and his delegates.[1]

[1] From this statement it appears how far I am from being able to accept one

Even if we can admit that the two methods of procedure were practised side by side for a time, and that the procedure was variable and not yet clearly determined, this very variability would be a fact peculiar to the first century, and specially to the period A.D. 65–80. I find no trace of such variation in the second century. A document like 1 Peter, which bears witness to such variation, would still be marked out as belonging to the first century. But the view to which I incline is that we must take our choice between these two kinds of procedure. They are not consistent with each other, and neither evidence nor natural probability justifies us in saying that they were practised side by side.[1] Nero, as we have said, was precluded from the latter procedure by the formal decision of the supreme court in A.D. 63 acquitting Paul; but the former procedure was quite

point in the criticism of a very generous and friendly reviewer in the *Guardian*. He objects to the view of Prof Mommsen, which I have adopted, that "the persecutions were not based upon definite laws, but were administrative acts"; and he is inclined to think that some definite edict or even law is necessary to explain the "determined attitude of the Imperial Government, and the fact that throughout their treatises the Apologists always speak of Christianity as illegal." Prof. Mommsen has put it in the strongest terms (and I have followed him to the best of my ability) that Christianity was opposed to the most fundamental principles of the Roman State: it was far more than merely illegal, it was anti-Roman. But it seems to me that the language of Pliny is inconsistent with the supposition that there was any formal law or edict against Christianity (pp. 210, 223): the difficulty of the case has always been how to reconcile the existence of persecutions with the utter want of any proof or probability that there was any such law. Then Mommsen showed that no difficulty existed, because the proceedings against Christians were never judicial. That is a matter of fact, not of opinion. The reviewer plunges us back into the difficulty by insisting that there must have been some law. When the reviewer goes on to say that he sees no necessity to explain away the language of Sulpicius Severus, who speaks about laws against Christians, I must point out that, in regard to Sulpicius, the point that has always to be proved is whether a statement in him can be admitted as possessing any value. In this case every consideration is against attaching the slightest value to his word; and I have been even too polite in my treatment of his reflections.

[1] I must explicitly disclaim the opinion that they *could* not exist side by side. I merely think that the evidence is not in favour of it, and that without express evidence it seems natural to suppose that the two procedures were successive, not contemporary.

open to him. The inference appears to me necessary that his procedure was such as I have contended; and First Peter implies that such procedure continued for some years, and that it extended over the eastern provinces.

It has been shown how short was the time during which further developments of Nero's procedure could have taken place. It began in the summer or early autumn of 64 A.D., and in the latter part of 66 Nero left Rome for Greece, and evidently let the government drift. Had he gone on and taken the step, easy indeed in itself, towards the final stage of treating the Christian name as in itself illegal, it would have been this final stage that spread to the provinces. But if Nero did not make the step before he left Rome, there is no room for any further step till the wars of the succession ended, and Vespasian was seated on the throne.

W. M. RAMSAY.

(To be continued.)

ON THE PROPER RENDERING OF ΕΚΑΘΙΣΕΝ IN ST. JOHN XIX. 13.

BOTH in the Authorised and Revised English Versions of the New Testament, the verb *ἐκάθισεν* is here taken in a neuter or intransitive sense, and is rendered "sat down." The word is thus made to refer to Pilate himself, and implies that the Roman governor then took his place on the tribunal, as being, at the time, under Cæsar, the supreme ruler among the Jews. Luther, in his translation of the passage, goes so far as to insert the word "sich," *seated himself*, "setzte sich," and in so doing, as we shall see, he has been followed by almost all his learned countrymen down to the present day. But for acting thus, there is really no warrant in the original. The verb stands by itself in the Greek without an object; and, if anything is