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THE EXPOSITOR.

THE RHETORIC OF ST. PAUL.

JOSEPHUS, in an interesting passage at the close of his *Antiquities*,[1] after boasting with characteristic self-complacency of his unequalled attainments in all Jewish learning, adds that he had also taken great pains to acquire the learning of the Greeks, and a grammatical mastery of the Greek language. He admits, however, that long familiarity with his native Aramaic had prevented him from gaining an accurate pronunciation of Greek, and tells us, by way of excuse, that his nation generally discouraged the acquisition of many languages, or the attempt to adorn their discourses with smooth periods — accomplishments which they disdained to share with slaves and freedmen.

But the position of St. Paul was very different from that of Josephus. The astute Jewish politician had been trained from early childhood up to the age of twenty-six in Palestine, and mainly in Jerusalem; and it is evident from his silence that he had not, during that time, been a pupil of Gamaliel, the only Rabbi who was sufficiently liberal to encourage, or even to tolerate, "the wisdom of Javan." He therefore grew up in the very head-quarters of the Aramaic dialect; and

[1] Josephus, *Antiq.* xx. 11, 2.

although Palestine was at that period sufficiently bilingual to furnish plenty of opportunities for learning Greek as a spoken language, it could never have been to Josephus quite so familiar as his native tongue. With St. Paul these conditions were reversed. By birth a Hebrew of the Hebrews, he was by training a Hellenist. He had grown up, certainly until boyhood, in one of the most famous of pagan cities, where he would only hear Aramaic in the synagogue, and perhaps sometimes in the family circle, but where he would hear Greek spoken on every side directly he stepped into the street. He must have learnt the language without any conscious labour, and almost as his mother-tongue. And when he went to Jerusalem, he became a member of the school of Gamaliel, which permitted the study of Greek authors, in order to unite —at least ideally—the *tallîth* of Shem with the *pallium* of Japhet. St. Paul's Greek is less strictly accurate and more provincial than that of his famous contemporary, but it is incomparably more forcible, and probably it was used with far greater ease. And there was this further difference between their styles: that while St. Paul cared very much for what he had to say, he cared to a much lower degree than Josephus about the *manner* of saying it.[1]

The notion, so often repeated, that St. Paul was a classical scholar, profoundly versed in heathen authors, is, as I shall prove elsewhere, a complete delusion. His quotations from Menander, Aratus, and Epimenides, are mere stock quotations, of which the two first occur in more than one writer, and the third is a familiar national proverb. They do not furnish the smallest

[1] 1 Cor. i. 17; ii. 4. *οὐκ ἐν πειθοῖς ἀνθρωπίνης σοφίας λόγοις.*

evidence of an advanced classic culture, the existence of which is decisively *disproved* both by the omission of all direct references in the Apostle's writings, even where we should naturally look for them, and by the total absence of any traceable *impress* left by the Greek authors on the most susceptible of intellects. It is, I think, certain that with the great masterpieces of ancient literature—with Homer, with Sophocles, with Plato, with Aristotle — Paul was absolutely unacquainted. There is, indeed, a close resemblance in form between him and one eminent Greek, the historian Thucydides; and a book was written in the last century, by Bauer, called *Philologia Thucydideo-Paulina* (1773), to shew how closely the two writers resembled each other in their *syntaxis ornata*, or "figures of speech." And yet no scholar has ever seriously maintained that St. Paul had read Thucydides. The narrative, so full of immortal interest to us, would probably have had little or no interest for a Jew, who, like all the rest of his nation, felt an almost entire indifference for secular history. The resemblances between the banished general and the hunted missionary are due to psychological causes. Both suffered from lifelong and virulent opposition; both stood in a relation of antagonism to the main current of feeling in their nation; both were men whose thoughts were of a nature to strain to the utmost the capacities of language; both, in the endeavour to obtain a direct grasp of conceptions in all their bearings, display "a love of antithesis and contrast, rising, not unfrequently, to paradox;"[1] both were accustomed to let the syllogism of grammar yield to the syllogism of emotion; both,

[1] See some excellent remarks in Baur, *Paulus*, ii. 281 (Eng. trans.).

though capable of the most powerful eloquence, display a certain disdain for literary polish, because, while they cared much for ideas, they cared little for the form in which they were expressed. The resemblances would have been nearly as striking if they had written in two different languages. It is, no doubt, a curious psychological fact, illustrative alike of St. Paul's peculiarities and of his complex training, that "it is in the dialectical skill of Aristotle, the impassioned appeals of Demosthenes, the complicated sentences of Thucydides, far more than in the language of Moses or Solomon, or Isaiah, that the form and structure of his arguments finds its natural parallel;"—yet at the same time it is all but certain that with the writings of those philosophers, orators, and historians, he was very little or not at all acquainted.

But if Paul be so careless of style as these remarks would seem to imply, some may feel inclined to ask whether it is not a misnomer to talk of his rhetoric? Now as to this I would observe that it is only true to say that he is careless of style when by style we mean something polished and artificial. A style may be faulty, may be liable to a thousand criticisms, may be too rough or too ornate, or too indifferent to rhythm, or too neglectful of grammar, and yet may be incomparably the best style which a particular man could have used, because it sprang naturally from his character and education, and is therefore most exactly expressive of himself;—of himself as the complex total result of his original temperament, and of the modifications which it has undergone from the myriads of influences for which he has shewn the greatest affinity. The best style a man can have is "the style of his

thought." The style of Æschylus is turgid, that of Aristotle dry, that of Virgil elaborate; yet who would wish to alter a word or line that they have written? We should do wrong to make models of Milton's impassioned rhapsodies, or Sir Thomas Browne's quaint Latinisms, or Butler's emotionless aridity; but should we not have been the losers if they had written otherwise? Of modern writers, Macaulay is antithetic, Ruskin florid, Carlyle almost grotesque; yet we do not wish their style changed, because in each instance the style has "the defects of its qualities," and is most expressive of the individuality of those great writers. It is not true that Buffon said, "*Le style c'est l'homme*;" but it is true that he said, "Le style c'est *de* l'homme;"[1] and, as Grimm remarked about Montesquieu, it is "better to have *the style of genius* than to have *the genius of style.*"

Now, if there had been reviewers in the days of St. Paul, they might have passed upon him censures without end. How careless are those unfinished sentences! What ungraceful and tedious repetitions of the same word again and again! What extraordinary confusions of metaphors! What a barbarous cilicism! What a vulgar expression! What an obscure sentence! What a violent paradox! What a bitter taunt! If some friendly Atticist or Tarsian professor had got hold of one of the Epistles, to prepare it for publication, he would have made great havoc of it. We should have had whole sentences underscored, and softened down, and squared, and elaborated; graceful variations of the same term; phrases suited to the politest society; all

[1] Since writing this sentence I find that "Le style c'est l'homme même" *is* found in the earliest editions of Buffon, though the *de* is inserted (perhaps by error) in the later ones.

provincialisms and irregularities removed. So the Epistles of St. Paul might have been made as correct as those of Philostratus; but although it would have been impossible to reduce them to the vapid inanity of the immoral pagan sophist, it would have been but too possible to rob them of their characteristic life. Paul's arguments would no longer have been thunders; he would no longer have spoken "mere flames;" his phrases would no longer have been half battles; his words would no longer have been "like living creatures, with hands and feet."

But it is a mistake to imagine that, under these circumstances, we cannot talk of the Apostle's rhetoric. That word is so ignorantly misused by writers who pour forth their judgments on all conceivable subjects, that it is now understood to be a condemnation to call a writer "rhetorical." By that expression it is meant to be understood that he is artificially elaborate, that he is insincerely eloquent, that he goes out of his way to find ornamentation, that he only cares for what is called fine writing. It has become a sort of reproach, which might be levelled equally at the μυροβρεχεῖς *cicinni* of Mæcenas and "the sevenfold chorus of hallelujahs and harping symphonies" of Milton's prose. But what is rhetoric? It is nothing more or less than the art of expression; and that art may be inspired by genuine emotion, and come in the form of perfectly natural and spontaneous utterance. The style of a writer who is powerfully swayed by his feelings often seems to be modelled into conformity with certain artificial figures of speech, only because those very figures of speech—as is proved by their existing in all languages—are the immediate result of psychological in-

fluences. If rhetoric in general were my subject, it would be easy to shew that there is not a figure of speech which does not exist in the literature of every civilized language, whether Aryan or Semitic, and which is not found in the earliest recorded specimens of those literatures. I have in part shewn this in my *Chapters on Language;* and in the *Brief Greek Syntax* I have quoted numerous instances to shew that many of the figures of Greek rhetoricians were equally familiar to Hebrew prophets. But, setting figures of speech aside for the moment, a passage is rhetorical when it expresses what it has to express in such a manner as to bring it home with the utmost vigour to the mind of the hearer or reader. It is rhetorical when the thought owes something of its power of appeal to the form in which it is expressed no less than to its intrinsic force. In this sense St. Paul, like all the greatest writers in the world, is at times overwhelmingly rhetorical—rhetorical with the rhetoric of a deep emotion and an intense individuality.

Take, as a remarkable instance, the passage (Rom. ii. 17–23) on which I touched in a former paper, and which, following the correct reading, and bringing out the force of the words, may be rendered as follows :— "But if thou bearest the proud name of Jew, and reposest on the law, and boastest in God, and dost recognize the Will, and discriminatest things transcendent, and art confident that thyself art a leader of blind men, a light of them in darkness, an instructor of fools, a teacher of babes, having a form of knowledge and of truth in the law — thou, then, that teachest another, dost thou not teach thyself? Preacher against theft, art thou a thief? Forbidder of adultery, art thou

an adulterer? Loather of idols, dost thou rob temples?" Now, it would have been perfectly easy to express every thought in this passage in an entirely unrhetorical manner. The rhetoric consists, first, in the consummate irony of the apparently respectful picture of a Pharisee in all the full-blown prestige of sanctimonious dignity—and then the *aposiopesis* by which the sentence is broken off, the hypothesis unfinished, the construction changed, and, with a most unexpected apostrophe, the interlocutor is suddenly overwhelmed with a series of crushing questions. The very splendour and force of the passage lie in that element which we should characterize, and rightly characterize, as powerfully rhetorical.

Take another celebrated passage—the sixth Chapter of the Second Epistle to the Corinthians. As he dictates that passage to his amanuensis, St. Paul seems to be struck with the spontaneous outburst of his own inspired eloquence, and pauses in the midst of it to say to the Corinthians, "Corinthians! our mouth has been opened to you, and our heart has been broadened," in order that he may found on this open-hearted passion of words the appeal: "Ye are not being straitened in us"—there is no compression, no limitation, in *my* love for you—"but ye are being straitened in your own feelings"—the coldness, the want of effusive sympathy, is with you. "I speak to you, then, as to children. Pay me back in kind: be ye, too, broadened in sympathy to me." But wherein consists the eloquence and rhetoric of the previous passage, in which he feels that he has poured out his very heart? St. Paul might have given, in the most specific and unrhetorical way, a catalogue of his persecutions and sufferings;

but in this Chapter the power of his description of what a Christian missionary should be, lies almost entirely in its rhetorical features—in its *copia verborum*, in its balanced rhythm, its varied use of the same preposition (ἐν), its sudden change (Verse 7) to another preposition (διὰ), and then in the sudden outburst of striking antitheses :—

"As deceivers and true; as being ignored yet fully recognized; as dying, and behold we live! as being chastened, and not being slain; as grieving, yet ever rejoicing; as paupers, yet enriching many; as having (ἔχοντες) nothing, and having all things to the full (κατέχοντες)."—Here we have not only *antithesis* and striking *paradox*, and the picturesque working out of a conception (*epexergasia*), but also that equality of clauses and assimilation of endings which was known to Greek rhetoric as *parisosis* and *paromoiosis*,[1] and which would come all the more naturally to St. Paul from his familiarity with the antithetic parallelisms of Hebrew poetry. Not only in this Chapter, but throughout this impassioned latter section of the Epistle (which some have regarded as a separate letter), St. Paul is evidently in what is called a rhetorical mood, which is merely equivalent to saying that he is writing with deep emotion. And it is remarkable that the same features of style invariably appear when he is referring to that "Iliad of woes" his missionary life. In 1 Corinthians iv. 8–11 we find it mixed with a most biting irony. In 2 Corinthians xi. 26 the colour of the picture is heightened by the repetition of the words

[1] Aristotle, *Rhet.* iii. 9, 9, of which 2 Cor. vi. affords abundant illustrations *e.g.*, "As dying, and, behold, we live" (general antithesis, ἀντικειμένη); ὡς λυπούμενοι ἀεὶ δὲ χαίροντες, &c. (*parisosis* of periods); παιδευόμενοι καὶ μὴ θανατούμενοι (*paromoiosis* of final syllables); to say nothing of the *paronomasia* of ἔχοντες and κατέχοντες.

"*in perils*" eight times in one verse, which, except for the purpose of rhetoric, is entirely needless, but was known to the ancient rhetoricians as *epanaphora*. It is a figure by no means infrequent in the writings of St. Paul. There is a fine instance of it in Philippians iv. 8: "Finally, brethren, *whatsoever things* are real, *whatsoever things* are venerable, *whatsoever things* are just, *whatsoever things* are pure, *whatsoever things* are lovable, *whatsoever things* are of good report; *if there be any* virtue, *if there be any* praise, think on these things." And again in Philippians ii. 1: "*If then there be any consolation* in Christ, *if any* comfort of love, *if any* participation of the Spirit, *if any* emotions and compassions, fulfil my joy." Another striking instance of this figure may be found in 2 Corinthians vii. 11: *ἀλλὰ ἀπολογίαν, ἀλλὰ ἀγανάκτησιν, ἀλλὰ φόβον, ἀλλὰ ἐπιπόθησιν, ἀλλὰ ζῆλον, ἀλλὰ ἐκδίκησιν.*

Ancient grammarians held it sufficient to divide all figures of speech into *figures of language* (*figurae verborum, elocutionis*, λέξεως) and *figures of thought* (*sententiae*, διανοίας). Aquila, a grammarian of the age of the Antonines, follows Cicero and other ancient authorities when he draws this distinction between them, that *figures of speech* disappear if you alter the words or their order, whereas *figures of thought* remain unimpaired by such a process.[1] But this classification is obviously superficial and unsatisfactory, and the distinction is only one of the roughest kind. It is a somewhat better arrangement to distinguish figures as falling under the heads of—

1. *Figures of colour, i.e.*, those which are due to the imagination, such as personification, simile, metaphor, allegory, metonymy, catachresis, &c.

[1] Cicero, *De Orat.* 3; Voss. *Instt. Orat.* v. 1; Glass, *Philologia Sacra*, p. 953.

2. *Figures of form*, whether due to passion or to conscious art, — which range over an immense field from the natural expressions of emotion to the merest elegances of verbal ornament; from the animation of *irony* and *aposiopesis* to such mere variations of style as *zeugma*, or of order, as *hysteron proteron* and *chiasmus*.

3. Figures depending mainly on the analogies of words, on unconscious association of ideas, on resemblances of sound, such as *alliteration*, *parisosis*, *homœoteleuton*, *parechesis*, *paronomasia*, and *plays on names*.

Now I do not at all intend to enter into an exhaustive discussion of the nature and origin of figures of speech, which would require a volume; or to furnish a complete and careful list of St. Paul's figures of speech, which would require more time than I can at present devote to the subject. But while I think it possible that the youthful Saul may have attended classes in the schools of Tarsus, in which he learnt the rudiments of Stoicism—an interesting question which I cannot now pursue—it seems to me not only possible, but extremely probable, that he had attended classes of Greek rhetoric, and gained a tincture of that then-prevalent training. That this was the case will, I think, hardly fail to be the inference of all who consider merely so much evidence as I shall furnish in this paper.

On *figures of colour* I shall not touch. The Dean of Chester has published a little book on the metaphors of St. Paul, which deals to a certain extent with that branch of the subject. I will merely mention, in passing, the obvious circumstance that nearly all St. Paul's metaphors are social, agonistic, or military; and that.

through all his Epistles, almost the only metaphor which he derives from natural objects is that of the grafting of the wild olive branch into the fruitful stock, which, singularly enough, is founded on a method of grafting either non-existent or extremely rare.

But coming to the second head, *figures of form*, the instances are not only numerous, but are as varied as are the currents of human passion. Of these I will furnish a few specimens.

(1) CHIASMUS is a name derived from the Greek letter *Chi* (χ), because in it words are arranged cross-wise. It is extremely common in Latin. Thus in such a sentence as, "*Ratio consentit, oratio repugnat*," which would be the natural order of the words, a Latin writer, influenced partly by the *parechesis*, or resemblance of sounds, would be almost certain to write, as Cicero does—

Ratio consentit,
×
Repugnat oratio.[1]

placing the two substantives last, and the two verbs in the middle, as in the sentence—

He hath filled the hungry with good things;
The rich he hath sent empty away;

or in Milton's lines—

Reason'd high
Of freedom and *foreknowledge*, *will* and *fate*,
Fixed *fate*, free *will*, *foreknowledge* absolute.

There is a striking instance of this figure in the arrangement of the clauses in Romans ii. 6, 10, where the results of good and evil actions are stated twice over, but the glory and honour which shall follow

[1] Cicero, *De Fin.* iii. 3.

patient well-doing are put at the beginning and end, as though to leave the first and last, and therefore the strongest, impression, while the punishments of evil-doing are put twice over in the interspace. Bengel has called frequent attention to the use of this figure, which is, however, more common in the Epistle to the Hebrews than in the Epistles of St. Paul. It will be found in nearly every instance that even such changes of order have their own significance. How far more forcible, for instance, than the English is the Greek of 1 Corinthians iii. 17: *Εἴ τις τὸν ναὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ φθείρει, φθερεῖ τοῦτον ὁ Θεός.*

(2) EUPHEMISM is the employment of pleasant or harmless words for unpleasant things. It may arise from many different feelings. Among the Greeks it mainly originated in the dread of evil omens, which they carried to such an extent that *euphemein* and *favere linguis*, which originally meant "*to speak words of good omen*," came to mean "*to be silent*," because if, during a sacrifice or any solemn event, any words were used at all, some ill-omened word might slip out among them, and vitiate the entire ceremony. Hence they called the Furies the "*gentle ones;*" they spoke of a prison as "*a house;*" of an executioner as "*a public officer;*" of dying as "*something happening*," &c. That "beautiful bright people," as Faber says,

> Hesitated still
> To offend the blessed presences
> Which earth and ocean fill;
> Their tongues, elsewhere so eloquent,
> Stammer'd at words of ill.

Now, of this kind of euphemism there is naturally little or no trace in St. Paul, because he had none of the superstition in which it had its root; nor has he any of

that glozing *hypokorisma*, which puts a varnish upon deeds which men are not ashamed *to do*, but which their tongues hold it vile *to name*. To St. Paul death is death, infamy is infamy, and a lie a lie. But we *do* find in him the honourable euphemism which refrains from needlessly using coarse expressions. His language never wounds the most delicate sense of modesty. When duty requires, he can tear very rudely open the veil of Cotytto; yet when there is no such necessity, he not only adopts the most refined language, as in 1 Corinthians v. 1, 2 (ἔχειν . . . ὁ τὸ ἔργον τοῦτο ποιήσας) and 2 Corinthians vii. 11 (ἐν τῷ πράγματι), but even does so to an extent which, in some instances (*e.g.*, in 1 Thess. iv. 6), entirely and happily obliterates for modern readers the dark and terrible sense which his words had for the early Greek Fathers, as well as for his pagan contemporaries. It would have been better for the Church had all her writers imitated herein his modest reserve and "chaste bashfulness" of language. It is often a duty and a necessity to speak of sin. It can be rarely right to speak of it with wounding and brutal plainness. Language fails of its purpose, warning loses its power, if it is easy to miss its real meaning; but language, in order to be intelligible, does not need to become vile and coarse.

(3) Analogous in some respects to euphemism is LITOTES. The word properly means "smoothness," but it is a technical expression for MEIOSIS, or "lessening." It consists of the intentional use of an expression much less strong than the one which is intended and required. It is, in fact, the suggestion of a strong notion by the employment of an over-weak form of speech. The mental correction supplied by the reader

comes with all the more force because of its artistic suppression by the writer. Thus, if in speaking of the cannibal tyrant of Egypt, Virgil calls him "the *unpraised* Busiris," the reader instantly supplies with more indignation the thought, "unpraised? nay, *execrable.*" And when Pope writes—

> Narcissa's nature, *tolerably mild,*
> To make a wash would *hardly* stew a child;

he conveys more strongly by his *litotes* the intended impression of the cruel recklessness of womanly vanity. This is a figure which, by a Hebrew idiom, runs through the Hellenistic Greek of the New Testament, as far as the use of the negative is concerned, as in οὐ δικαιωθήσεται πᾶσα σὰρξ—"all flesh shall not be justified," for "no flesh shall be justified." But St. Paul makes deliberate use of it in such passages as 1 Corinthians xi. 22: "What am I to say to you? shall I praise you in this? *I praise you not;*" Romans i. 28: "God gave them over to a reprobate mind, *to do the things which are not convenient;*" Ephesians v. 4: "Neither filthiness, nor foolish talking, nor jesting, which *are not convenient;*" 1 Corinthians v. 6: "The subject of your boasting is *not good.*" In Philemon 18 he uses of the theft of Onesimus the euphemism of charity when he says, "If he hath wronged thee, or *oweth thee ought;*" and he again employs litotes when of this once untrustworthy fugitive he writes, "which in time past was to thee"—he will not write "injurious," but—"*unprofitable.*"

(4) PROPARAITESIS, or "previous deprecation," and *protherapeia*, which the Latins called *captatio benevolentiæ*, is the very common rhetorical method by which

a speaker or writer feels his way before making a difficult or offensive statement, or tries to conciliate beforehand the kindly feeling of his hearers or readers. We have very different instances of it in the false and fulsome flattery of Tertullus to Felix, compared with the perfectly true yet dignified and respectful address of Paul to this Procurator and afterwards to Agrippa. We have a marked instance of it in the solemn and pathetic attestation with which he prefaces the stern conclusion of the ninth Chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. We have specimens of it in the prefatory thanksgiving of every general Epistle, with the single exception of that to the Galatians. He had to speak to the Corinthians many bitter truths, yet he begins his letter even to the Corinthians with thanks to God for the gifts and graces which He had bestowed upon them.

(5) PARALEIPSIS, or PRAETERITIO (also called *occupatio*),[1] is an ingenious method of saying something which the writer says he will pass over, but to which nevertheless he wishes to allude. We have marked instances of it in Philemon 19: "I will repay thee—*not to say to thee* that thou owest to me even thyself besides." 1 Thessalonians v. 1: "Of the times and seasons, brethren, *ye have no need that I write unto you.*" The same convenient form occurs in 1 Thessalonians iv. 9, and in 2 Corinthians ix. 1.

(6) ZEUGMA is a figure by which, often out of mere carelessness, one verb is attached to two nouns of which it only suits the meaning of one, but naturally *suggests* a verb which is suitable for the other. It is a rare figure in English and in modern languages, partly perhaps because it requires in the reader a quicker

[1] Auct. *ad Herenn.* iv. 27.

apprehension than modern authors can rely on, and partly because the immense multiplication of modern literature has rendered it necessary that every sentence, so far as its *form* is concerned, should be comprehensible at a glance to readers whose time is limited. There is a figure akin to it called SYLLEPSIS, which, though often confounded with zeugma, is different from it. In *syllepsis* the same verb applies equally to two different nouns, but in a different sense. In English there is scarcely an instance of this which is not intentionally comic, as in Pope's remark about Prince Eugene, "This general is a great *taker* of snuff as well as of cities." Except occasionally in poetry, it always produces a comic effect, even when seriously intended, as when Lord Carlisle, in his *Sieges of Vienna*, said of Sobieski, that "he *flung* his powerful frame into the saddle, and his great soul into the cause." We are not surprised that there is no marked instance of syllepsis in the epistles of St. Paul, because it is for the most part a very technical and poetic figure. The nearest approach to it (I think) is in Galatians i. 10: "Am I now currying favour with (*πείθω*) men, or (conciliating) God?" But he has at least two striking examples of zeugma: one in 1 Corinthians iii. 2: *Γάλα ὑμᾶς ἐπότισα καὶ οὐ βρῶμα* — "I gave you (*to drink*) milk, not meat;" the other in 1 Timothy iv. 3: *κωλυόντων γαμεῖν, ἀπέχεσθαι βρωμάτων*— literally, "hindering to marry" [commanding, understand *κελευόντων* out of *κωλυόντων*], "to abstain from meats." To these expressions there is a remarkable parallel in St. Chrysostom, who says: "This I say, not as hindering you from forming connections, but" (bidding you) "to do this with moderation.

(7) OXYMORON ("sharply-foolish") is the paradoxical juxtaposition of opposite words, and we should naturally expect instances of it in any writer whose thoughts are often clothed in antithetic forms. It is, in fact, antithesis of the strongest kind reduced to the briefest compass, and sometimes existing in a single word, like *bittersweet*, γλυκύπικρος, θρασύδειλος, &c. It is found in Hebrew in such phrases as "drunken, but not with wine," and is frequent both in our poets and prose-writers, as in Shakespeare's—

> Dove-feather'd raven, fiend angelical;
> Beautiful tyrant, wolfish-ravening lamb;

or Spenser's—

> Glad of such luck, the *luckless lucky* maid
> Did her content to please their feeble eyes;

or in Tennyson's—

> His honour rooted in dishonour stood,
> And faith unfaithful kept him falsely true.

But it is specially prevalent in Greek and Latin, as in such well-known phrases as γάμος ἄγαμος, *impietate pia est*, &c.; St. Paul's oxymoron, "Dying, and, behold, we live;"[1] and, "She that liveth in pleasure is dead while she liveth" (ζῶσα τέθνηκεν),[2] is a favourite one. We have, for instance, such lines as—

> τὶς οἶδεν εἰ τὸ ζῆν μέν ἐστι κατθανεῖν,
> τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν;
> (Who knows if life be death, and death be life?)

which struck the ancients as so startling a paradox; and Dryden's—

> The *dead shall live, the living die*,
> And music shall untune the sky.

The Apostle uses this figure in Romans i. 20: τὰ . . .

[1] 2 Cor. vi. 9. [2] 1 Tim. v. 6.

ἀόρατα αὐτοῦ . . . καθορᾶται—*invisibilia ejus videntur*—"His *unseen* things are *clearly seen.*"

Romans xii. 11: *τῇ σπουδῇ μὴ ὀκνηροὶ*—"In *haste*, not *sluggish.*"

3 Thessalonians iv. 11: *φιλοτιμεῖσθαι ἡσυχάζειν*—"To be *ambitious* to be *quiet.*" (Comp. Acts v. 41, "They were deemed worthy to suffer shame.")

1 Corinthians viii. 10: *οἰκοδομηθήσεται εἰς τὸ τὰ εἰδωλόθυτα ἐσθίειν*—"Shall be *built up* into eating idol-offerings:" "*ruinous edification.*" (Comp. Tertullian's *aedificari in ruinam, Praescr.* 3.)

Romans i. 22: *φάσκοντες εἶναι σοφοὶ ἐμωράνθησαν*—"Alleging themselves to be wise, they were befooled." This phrase will remind the reader of the *insaniens sapientia* of Horace,—the term which he applied to his false philosophy.

In Ephesians vi. 15, as part of the panoply of *war*, we have the preparedness (*ἑτοιμασία*) of the gospel of *peace.*

2 Corinthians viii. 2: "Their deep poverty abounded to the wealth of their liberality. (Comp. the word *πτωχοπλούσιος.*)

2 Corinthians vii. 10: (*μετάνοιαν . . . ἀμεταμέλητον*) "Repentance not to be repented of." Here the oxymoron is stronger in the English than in the Greek.

We come now to the third division of figures. Some instances of oxymoron also fall under the head of PARONOMASIA (the Latin *annominatio*), a figure of which St. Paul is peculiarly fond. There are two kinds of *paronomasia.* One is a change of meaning in a word caused by the alteration of a single letter;[1]

[1] "Parva verbi immutatio in litterâ posita." Cicero, *De Orat.* ii. 63; Auct. *ad Herenn.* iv. 21; Quint. ix. 3, 66, &c.

the other is, more generally, a play upon words which have some kind of resemblance, either in sound only or also in meaning. The first class of paronomasias may be illustrated by Shelley's line—

And like a cloud dyed in the dying day;

the second, by Sheridan's correction of his remark about Gibbon: "*Luminous*, did I say? I meant *voluminous*." An instance of this kind is found in James i. 6: "He that *wave*reth is like a *wave* of the sea," where it does not occur in the original; and one of the former kind in the Prayer-book: "Among all the *changes* and *chances* of this mortal life." Both classes of paronomasia are found in St. Paul. Of the first we have no less than three instances in the first chapter of the Romans.

Romans i. 29: πορνείᾳ, πονηρίᾳ, . . . φθόνου, φόνου. Romans i. 31: ἀσυνέτους, ἀσυνθέτους. Again we find it in Romans xi. 17: τινες τῶν κλάδων ἐξεκλάσθησαν. And in Hebrews v. 8 we have the common instance, ἔμαθεν ἀφ' ὧν ἔπαθεν, which is found in the proverb παθήματα μαθήματα, *nocumenta documenta*.[1]

(1) The other form of *paronomasia*, a play on words of similar sound, is perhaps the most frequent of all St. Paul's rhetorical figures. It often consists in the change of preposition in a compound verb, as in 2 Corinthians iii. 2: "Ye are our epistle, known and read (γινωσκομένη καὶ ἀναγινωσκομένη) of all men." This particular play of words is found in the well-known

[1] Alliteration (1 Cor. ii. 13; 2 Cor. viii. 22; ix. 8, &c.) sometimes almost amounts to paronomasia. St. Paul is so fond of this figure, that it even leads him to the use of most unusual words, as πεισμονή, in Gal. v. 8. Comp. Rom. iii. 3; xvi. 2 (παραστῆτε . . . προστάτις); Ephes. i. 23; iii. 19; Gal. iv. 17; 1 Tim. i. 8.

story of Julian returning the New Testament to St. Basil, with the untranslatable paronomasia, *Ἀνέγνων ἔγνων κατέγνων·* to which the Saint replied, *Ἀνέγνως οὐκ ἔγνως εἰ γαρ ἔγνως οὐκ ἂν κατέγνως* ("You read it, but understood not; for, had you understood, you would not have condemned.") Compare Acts viii. 30.

Other instances are—

(2) Philippians iii. 2, 3: the famous contrast of genuine spiritual *circumcision* (*περιτομὴ*) and the mere physical mutilation of *concision* (*κατατομή*).

(3) Romans i. 28: "And as they *refused* (*οὐκ ἐδοκίμασαν*) to have God in knowledge, God gave them up to a *refuse* (*ἀδόκιμον*) mind." Here the force of the words is remarkable. It shews that the punishment was in kind: sin was the punishment of sin.

(4) Romans ii. 1: "For wherein thou judgest (*κρίνεις*) another thou condemnest (*κατακρίνεις*) thyself." Similarly, in 1 Corinthians xi. 29–31, the play on the words "judgment," "discernment," "condemnation" (*κρίνειν, διακρίνειν, κατακρίνειν*), which derives such force from the paronomasia, is lost in the English. Not only do we miss the lesson that if *discernment* (*διάκρισις*) be neglected, the retribution comes as a *judgment* (*κρίμα*), which is intended only as a Divine education (*παιδευόμεθα*), but which, if ineffectual, leads to *condemnation* (*κατάκριμα*), but we also lose inevitably the force and beauty of the figure in the original Greek.

(5) Romans xii. 3: "Not to be *highminded* (*ὑπερφρονεῖν*) above what he ought to be *minded* (*φρονεῖν*), but to be *minded* to be *soberminded* (*σωφρονεῖν*)." This elaborate paronomasia resembles the famous *οὐ φρονήματι μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ καταφρόνηματι* of Thucydides ii. 62.

(6) 1 Corinthians vii. 31: "Using (*χρώμενοι*) this world,

as not using it to the full" (καταχρώμενοι). Compare *supra* on 2 Corinthians vi. 10 (ἔχοντες . . . κατέχοντες), and 2 Corinthians v. 4 (ἐκδύσασθαι . . . ἐπενδύσασθαι).

(7) 2 Corinthians iv. 8: "Perplexed (ἀπορούμενοι), but not in despair" (ἐξαπορούμενοι). Comp. 2 Corinthians v. 4.

(8) 2 Timothy iii. 4: "Lovers of pleasure (φιλήδονοι) more than lovers of God" (φιλόθεοι).

(9) 2 Thessalonians iii. 11: "Not *busy*, but *busybodies*" (μηδὲν ἐργαζομένους ἀλλὰ περιεργαζομένους). This keen paronomasia, which St. Paul repeats in 1 Timothy v. 13 (οὐ μόνον δὲ ἀργαὶ ἀλλὰ καὶ . . . περίεργοι), "*Busy in the female school of idleness*," makes me think that St. Paul must have been familiar with the Latin proverb, *strenua inertia*, "busy idleness," and that he may even have heard the story of Domitius Afer, who described Mallius Sura[1] as one of a class who were *non agentes, sed satagentes*.

(10) 2 Corinthians x. 12: ἐγκρῖναι ἢ συγκρῖναι ἑαυτούς κ.τ.λ. Here it is impossible in English to reproduce the paronomasia.

It has been supposed by some writers that, since Paul probably *thought* in Syriac, there are traces of paronomasia in his thoughts where they do not appear in his Greek. Thus, in 1 Corinthians i. 23, 24, the words in Syriac might be: "We preach Christ crucified, to the Jews a stumbling-block (*micsol*), and to the Greeks folly (*mashcal*); but to them that are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and the wisdom (*secel*) of God." But conjectures of this kind are apt to degenerate into mere plays of the fancy.[2]

[1] Quint. vi. 3, 54.

[2] See Glass, *Philologia Sacra*, p. 959.

The ancients of all nations were more fond than the moderns of what we should call plays, or puns, on names. We regard it as an instance of frigidity (ψυχρότης) and bad taste. Macaulay rebukes the tendency to it in Southey, and classical commentators heap abuse on Æschylus for his fondness for these "cold etymologies." Nevertheless, we find them in even the most classic of modern writers, and Wordsworth does not hesitate to begin his poem to Charles Lamb with the lines—

> From the most gentle creature nursed in fields
> Had been derived the name he bore.

Of this particular play of words there are, I think, clear traces in St. Paul. Pleading for Onesimus, he says, with an obvious reference to the meaning of his name "Profitable:" "Yea, brother, may I *profit* by thee (ἐγώ σου ὀναίμην) in the Lord" (Verse 20); as before he had said, "My son 'Profitable,' once to thee 'unprofitable,' but now 'profitable' to thee and to me" (Verse 11). It is true that here the words for "unprofitable" and "profitable" are not from the same root as Onesimus, probably because there was no such word as *anonesimos* in Greek. There is, indeed, *anonetos;* but on the one hand the paronomasia was all the more graceful for being a little softened down, and on the other it is not impossible that the words actually used (*euchrestos, achrestos*) may themselves involve another delicate play on words. It is well known that the ancients confused the name *Christos*, "anointed," a word which had purely Semitic connotations, with the common word *chrestos*, "excellent," and hence they spoke of the *Christians* as *Chrestians.* Now the Christians in no wise objected to this mispronunciation,

since it paid an involuntary compliment to their moral character, to which more than one of the ancient Fathers alludes. That the error began very early is clear from the fact that Suetonius attributes the expulsion of the Jews from Rome to their incessant tumults at the instigation of an agitator named *Chrestus*. Most historians have agreed that, since no person of that name is alluded to in contemporary history, the Romans, knowing nothing of the nature of Messianic disputes between Jews and Christians at Rome, in which the name *Christus* was often mentioned, imagined him to be some living person, whose name they misunderstood and mispronounced. If so, the error had already begun to be current in St. Paul's days, and he may mean to imply, not only that Onesimus is now "profitable," and no longer "unprofitable," but, further, that he is now no longer "Christless," but "a good Christian." It must be borne in mind that, in the prevailing *itacism* of that day, between *achrestos* and *achristos* there would be hardly an appreciable difference of pronunciation.

I see another such play on names in Philippians iv. 3. After beseeching two Philippian ladies—Euodias and Syntyche—to reconcile their differences, he adds: "And I beg thee also, true yokefellow, assist these women, seeing that they were fellow-wrestlers of mine in the gospel." In this passage the word *Sygyge* (Σύζυγε) has usually been understood as an ordinary noun, and has been supposed to apply to Clement, to Lydia, to St. Peter, and even (by Clement of Alexandria) to Paul's wife! I have very little doubt that it was a proper name—the name of Syzygus, a Philippian convert. If so, to call him "true Syzygus"—yokefellow by name and yokefellow

by nature—would be a genuinely Attic play of words, which might be paralleled by scores of passages in the Greek tragedians, and indeed in all poets, down to Shakespeare's

> O Hero, what a hero hadst thou been!

or—

> Thou, Leonatus, art the lion's whelp,
> The fit and apt construction of thy name.

The only objection to this view, which gives to the passage an appropriateness which it receives from no other interpretation, is that the name Syzygus—though a perfectly natural name—does not occur elsewhere. This, however, would by no means disprove the application of the passage. There must have been scores of names, especially in the provinces, of which no trace has come down to us, and Syzygus, as a proper name, would simply have to take its place with other *hapax legomena*, such as occur in every writer. Who would have doubted that there were "Politarchs" at Thessalonica, though not a single writer mentions them except St. Luke, and though the word only occurs in one single inscription?

St. Jerome thinks that he discovers a more latent instance of this kind of *annominatio* in Galatians i. 6, where he supposes that in the words, "ye are so soon being *removed*" (μετατίθεσθε), St. Paul refers to the resemblance of the name Galatae to the Hebrew *Galal*, "to roll."

I might have adduced many other instances of Paul's figures of rhetoric, such as—

CLIMAX. Romans v. 3, 5; viii. 29, 30; x. 14, 15, &c.

ANADIPLOSIS, or the forcible repetition of words. Romans ix. 30; Philippians ii. 8, &c.

EPANODOS, or inverted repetition of words. Galatians ii. 16, &c.

EPANORTHOSIS, or forcible correction of a weak or insufficient expression. Romans viii. 34; Galatians ii. 2, iii. 4, &c.

And to these might be added *asyndeton* (1 Cor. xv. 43; 1 Tim. i. 17; 2 Tim. ii. 3–5, 10, 11, &c.), *polysyndeton*, *antiptosis* (Col. iv. 17; Gal. vi. 1; iv. 11), *synathroismos* (Rom. i. 16–32; 2 Cor. xii. 20; Gal. v. 19, &c.), &c., but I spare the reader a multitude of these technical names, which might easily be added.[1] This much, at any rate, is certain, that the figures of Greek Rhetoric occur in St. Paul far more frequently and in in a far more specific way than they do in the other writers of the New Testament. I think, then, that I have furnished some evidence in favour of the thesis with which I started — namely, that it is far from improbable that, as a boy in Tarsus, he had attended some elementary class of rhetoric, which, indeed, may have been only a part of his education in the grammatical knowledge of the Greek language. Tarsus was at this time a university town, in which there were many professional rhetoricians; and there was no branch of rhetoric to which, in the age of the emperors, more attention was paid than to the study and elucidation of rhetorical figures. They had commanded the attention alike of eminent philosophers and obscure grammarians. If St. Paul's parents intended from the

[1] I do not reckon *anakoluthon*, or unfinished construction, among St. Paul's figures of speech, because his numerous *anakolutha* are accidental, not rhetorical. They are due to his eagerly pressing forward with his subject, as in Rom. xvi. 25–27; ii. 17–21; i. 8; 1 Cor. xi. 18; Col. i. 22, &c. The mere change into a participle or other construction is hardly to be accounted an *anakoluthon*, as in Eph. iv. 2; Col. iii. 16, &c. Perhaps the nearest approach to a rhetorical *anakoluthon* in St. Paul is Gal. ii. 6; 2 Thess. ii. 3, 7.

first to send him to the school of Gamaliel, they would naturally be aware of the cosmopolitan liberality for which that school was celebrated. To some of the Rabbis—as we see from the Talmud—a knowledge of Greek learning opened a career of ambition; and the Pharisee of Tarsus, seeing the brilliant capacity of the youthful Saul, may have thought that an elementary training in Greek Rhetoric, for which the city of his home offered exceptional facilities, would be the best way of preparing his son for future distinction among the Hillelites of Jerusalem. If so, the lessons which he had learnt were not thrown away, though they were applied to very different objects than had at all been dreamt of by one who meant his boy to be like himself —a Pharisee of Pharisees, a Hebrew of Hebrews.

F. W. FARRAR.

THE SOLILOQUY OF JOB.

SECOND MONOLOGUE. (CHAPTER XXXI.)

AND yet, radical and mournful as is the change in the whole tone and tenour of his life, it is utterly unprovoked. It springs solely from the change in God, who has withdrawn his presence from him and become "very cruel," although he has done nothing to

> blunt his love,
> Or lose the good advantage of his grace,
> By seeming cold or careless of his will.

On the contrary, as he proceeds to shew in *Chapter* xxxi., he has made that Will the one rule both of his inward and of his outward life.

This Chapter is perhaps the most lovely in the whole Poem, and its theme is worthy of the exquisite