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the Church than that the Church has conquered America."[7] Obviously, the Americanization of the Church is not better than the Africanization of it—if this means that a particular culture domesticates the Gospel. What is needed, therefore, is not a refusal to relate the Gospel to culture but rather a continued subjection of our own culture to the judgment of the Gospel. p. 205

CONCLUSION

We have mentioned the most salient features of Mbiti's article, the essential argument of which is "the positive use of our culture in Church life" (p. 36). Instances of this positive use are: worship, the community, Church nurture and education, Christian values and ethics, Christian service and witness (pp. 31–34). For this, according to the author, "African culture needs to be studied, analysed, and utilized in the evolution of relevant spirituality and worship life of the Church" (p. 31). The necessity to integrate Christianity with African culture runs like an Ariadue thread in Mbiti's and other African writers;[8] it has been felt as far back as the second half of the nineteenth century by people like Mojola Agbebi.[9] One would have thought that we were beyond stressing the need and into specifics. It is precisely for this reason that Mbiti's article is somewhat disappointing. Given the title *Christianity and African Culture*, one hopes to find specific and definitive treatment of the subject. But this is not the case; the only specific section is "African Culture and Church Life" (pp. 31–36) which still remains rather general. In his conclusion Mbiti offers a fifteen point agenda for further consideration (pp. 37–38) which should have been the object of his article. Unless we deal with these points specifically, I am afraid we will accomplish little more than stressing the need to do this and that, which can be only empty slogans. Granted it is a difficult exercise but the reward is great for the rooting of the Gospel in our continent.

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Humanism and the Kingdom of God

by KLAUS BOCKMUEHL

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[7] Kantzer, Kenneth S. "Evangelicalism and the Inerrancy Question" *Christianity Today* (April 21, 1978) Vol. XXII, No. 14, p. 16.

[8] Mbiti, John S. "Theological Impotence" *op. cit.*, p 11; Ayandele, E. A. *A Visionary of the African Church* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1971) p. 3.

[9] Ayandele, E. A. *op. cit.*, p. 4.

IN ORDER to investigate the subject of humanism and the Kingdom of God let us first try to define the two concepts, then describe their relationship to each other.

I. DEFINITION OF CONCEPT

(a) What is Humanism

We do not encounter humanism as a closed and timeless system but only as a multiform history of conceptions, both in the sense of what true humanity should be and also how that ideal could be realised. This history began with Greek enlightenment when the Sophists, after the flagging of the folk religion, sought to anchor the goals and values necessary for human existence in man himself. The main stages of this history then are the ethics of Aristotle, the Stoics and Cicero, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment and German Idealism up to Nietzsche. In our day Marxism and Existentialism (Jaspers, Sartre) and the world-view of the Neo-Darwinists (Julian Huxley) claim to represent humanism.

For all these world-views man is the basic theme, the highest value, and the central if not the only object of thought and action. Moreover, all 'isms' are concerned not only with values but also with goals. 'Isms' describe programs and aspirations whose goal is expressed in the term used. Humanism, therefore, has a definite goal in view and pictures man not only as he is but also as he should be. The goal of humanism is the "true", "ideal", "future" man or perfect humanity reached through a process of development called "humanization".

Humanism, then, can be understood as a movement in a manward direction. If that is the definition of humanism, then of p. 207 course theology can also speak of "God's humanism", meaning God's condescension, God's movement in a man-ward direction as it takes place in the coming of Christ into the world. However, it must not be overlooked that the most common definition of humanism, i.e., "man in the centre", is also understood in another sense, namely, that man is not only the *object* but also the *subject* and steersman of that humanization process, man as his own creator and developer. Humanism then is the movement originating with man and aiming at man: radical humanism. Here, therefore, an emphatically *secular* answer is being given concerning the authority, the source and the measure of man's nature and destiny.

This creed, which makes man the overall departure point, can be found with varying degrees of both radicalism and of polemical rejection of all other authority, especially God's. Julian Huxley, for example, puts man in the centre, thus making him the object of a new religion. This obviously includes a moderate, dispassionate atheism. Friedrich Schiller, one of the initiators of German idealism, is stronger, describing the Fall (Gen 3) as "without doubt the greatest and most propitious occurrence in mankind's history"; it is only in emancipation from God that the way begins to man's free, artistic self-realization. Karl Marx is even more radical when at the beginning of his literary career he writes: "Prometheus is the chief saint in the philosophical calendar," i.e., *rebellion* against the gods is the point of departure for all progress. Only when God is no more can man be everything. Huxley's quiet and detached atheism is being replaced in Marx by a militant anti-theism.

Does this radicalization process, then, point to an inherent tendency in humanism towards autonomy and so to atheism, simply because it places man in the centre? Thus, does humanism inevitably develop into humanism-without-God unless express precautions are taken against this? For the moment, we will leave the possibility of a "Christian humanism" open.

(b) What is "the Kingdom of God"

While humanism can be understood only in the as yet unfinished history of its designs, the concept of the "lordship of God", unlike humanism, presents itself as *revelation*, not as a collection of propositions. p. 208 This revelation contains history as well, but a history whose content is most fully expressed and determined by the life of Jesus Christ. The concept of the kingdom or lordship of God is central to Christian belief. It is characteristic for biblical religion, perhaps even unique, as compared with the other great religions, such as Buddhism. God's relationship to his people and the world is described by use of political analogy, the relationship of a king to his subjects. This immediately eliminates the individualistic notions of salvation and the other-worldliness of certain religions.

Significant traits of this basic biblical conception can be found in the Old Testament: the terms of the covenant that Yahweh concludes with his people, Israel, is the clause: "you shall be my kingdom of priests, my holy nation" (Exodus 19:6).

The royal psalms and the message of the prophets underline in addition the universality of the kingdom of God; it is not limited to Israel but includes all nations. "The Lord is King … he has established his kingdom over all the world, and determined that it shall remain" (Psalm 93:1, see also 96:10). This indicates clearly that God's reign has already been *declared* and *established*, but still is in a process of realization and completion until it has penetrated everywhere.

The theme of God's lordship is to be seen also in the whole history of the life of Jesus. From the very beginning he proclaims the "gospel of the kingdom". After he was crucified on account of this very question (the inscription on his cross read "Jesus of Nazareth, king of the Jews") he speaks with his disciples about the kingdom of God during the forty days between his resurrection and ascension (Acts 1:3). The kingdom is the ground and content of the apostolic proclamation until his return (Matt 28:18–20; Eph 1:20–22 and Matt 24:14).

As in the Old so in the New Testament the universality of this kingdom is constantly emphasized, as is the fact that this kingdom is still in process of realization. That is to say, it is still controversial in the world. From its very beginning Jesus' ministry involves "all the kingdoms of the world and their glory" (Matt 4:8). Another person, at whose disposal they appear to be, offers them to him as a reward for allegiance. But Jesus affirms his loyalty to the one God. p. 209

The struggle for cosmic mastery evidenced in the temptation account, determines the content of Jesus' proclamation from that moment on: "Repent, for the kingdom of God is near!" These words are to be understood in light of Jesus' victory over the tempter and through it the realization of God's authority on earth. That struggle also gives a polemic note to the Lord's Prayer: "Thy kingdom come"—"Thy will be done." That becomes especially clear when the doxology to the Lord's Prayer (Matt 6:13 following 1 Chron 29:11–13) "for Thine is the kingdom and the power and the glory" is seen in contrast with the devil's offer (Matt 4:8).

This rule of God therefore must still "come upon" men everywhere (Matt 12:28). It must be realized in struggle; it must be received by men. That is God's concession to man's understanding and freedom of choice. His kingdom must succeed step by step as men are made disciples of Jesus until at one point it will be revealed that undisputably "the sovereignty of the world has passed to our Lord and his Christ and he shall reign forever and ever" (Rev 11:15; 12:10). Until then the kingdom of God is at war, in process of development. It comes about, as in the temptation of Jesus, by a change of lordship in an individual's life.

As in humanism, man has an essential place in the biblical doctrine of the kingdom of God. Man is, however, not the central or the exclusive theme, but he is an important theme in the message of the kingdom as it takes place in his life.

Again, just as in humanism, true humanity is not only a static dimension but a goal, a state that is still to be reached by a process of transformation into the image of Jesus Christ. The biblical message, too, recognizes the "not yet" that sees man as on the way between his nature and his destiny. Contrary to humanism, the full measure of true humanity is already real in one man Jesus, "the firstborn of the new creation." The process of humanization—if that is how one would refer to the transformation of men into Christ's image—has therefore a definite point of departure, the God-man Jesus Christ. God and his kingdom is also the point of departure in the sense of authority, origin and standard throughout. Here we are speaking of a movement from God to man and also from man to God.

Having described humanism and the lordship of God we can now attempt to relate the two concepts. Both concepts, each in p. 210 its own way, make man the object of their consideration and concern. Both offer an image of man, information as to what man is, and a goal as to what he should be. In short: *both have a concept of humanity and the way of its realization*. This parallelism makes possible a further invesigation of the theme which can be stated more precisely: *Humanism and the kingdom of God in pursuit of the realization of true humanity*. We will therefore have to deal with both the respective conceptions of humanity and the respective means proposed for its realization.

II. THE CONCEPT OF HUMANITY IN HUMANISM

(a) The Decision for the Principle of Self-Realization

The Latin term humanitas from which our word "humanity" is derived, alongside the quantitative meaning of "mankind" includes two qualitative meanings: it is a rendering of the Greek word *philanthropia* (love for mankind) as well as of *paideia* (education, training, culture). Even today we use derivatives that point in the two different directions: "humanitarian" refers to help given to those in need, while the "humanities" are the subjects included in a classical education. The adjective "humane" still includes the double meaning of "tender, kind-hearted" as also "tending to refinement, polished."

History shows that humanism has understood the concept of humanity essentially in the sense of *paideia*, i.e. education, urbanity, cultivation of the individual. Werner Jaeger, who sought to validate what he called a "third humanism" (after the pattern of the Renaissance and of German idealism) in his masterly studies on the intellectual world of Greece (*Paideia* 1933/44) makes the option only too clear when he writes "*Humanity* has, since the time of Varro and Cicero, a second and higher and stronger meaning alongside the older and more common definition which does not here come into consideration: it describes the education of man to his true form, towards his real humanness. That is real Greek *paideia* …"

The ideal of humanism is therefore described as "noble, fully educated human nature" and as the development of the personality so that it corresponds with the ideal. Humanism aims at self-realization. And this is the same state denoted by the key concept p. 211 of ancient ethics, *eudaimonia* (happiness or satisfaction).

(b) The Fluctuation in Humanism's Concept of Humanity

All the values mentioned so far are formal concepts which can be filled with quite different contents. Consequently, in the history of humanism the answer to "what is true human existence?" has varied widely.

(1) Kallikles

The Sophists (the "first humanists" according to W. Jaeger) understood by *eudaimonia* sensual pleasure, especially that made possible by domination of other people. Thus education was to be aimed at a small elite who had the ability and the resources to enjoy life. We see this clearly in Plato's dialogue "Gorgias" when the Sophist Kallikles says, "he who would live aright must let his appetites become as great as possible. He must not limit them, but then he must also be able to satisfy them, however great they are, by his courage and intelligence. He must gratify them wherever his desires lead him." Kallikles suggests, in addition, that the gratification of the *hunger for power* promises the greatest enjoyment. Thus he stresses the ability "to create for oneself a kingdom of power and domination," and underlines this by countering Socrates' proposal for self-mastery with "How can anyone be happy who serves anybody?" His human ideal is clearly sensual and material self-realization whereby the individual, whether by means of inherited advantages or by study, stands over against the mass and exploits it. It is an ideal of life apart from—or rather, and worse—*against* one's fellow man.

(2) Aristotle

The Nikomachean ethics of Aristotle, the first "gentleman's ideal", has as its basic principle *mesotes*, the middle way or "moderation". Comparing this with Sophism, it represents a remarkable refinement and cultivation in the attaining of the ideal of self-development. Aristotle's "virtue of distinction" presents *eudaimonia* as honour and intellectual satisfaction granted by the development of rich talents and the creation of a great work admired by all. The ideal here is the aristocratic, independent, wealthy, widely educated, and politically active man who acts on a large p. 212 scale, presenting his town with a new community hall, a theater or a warship. He enjoys the applause of his fellow citizens, but only insofar as they represent some worth and their approval counts.

Werner Jaeger emphasizes that the ancient concept of virtue and education was not at first individualistic, only gaining that character after the collapse of the Greek *polis* in later antiquity and in Hellenism. But it has maintained that emphasis up to the present day in the concepts of humanist scholars. Jaeger explains that in the early days virtue was a concept linked with the structure of social life. From a purely external and formal point of view, this observation is correct. The Sophists, for example, taught the off-spring of the town's aristocracy, who could afford this style of private education, to successfully make their way in society. And the political horizon of Aristotle's educational ideal (the "social reference of virtue" according to Jaeger) is hardly more respectable. He presents an internal ethos of the ruling elite, in which the slave is not seen as a subject of action, where tradesmen and artisans are looked down upon because of their economic position, and where none of those participate in the striving for distinction. They are disqualified because—a significant formula—they are "condemned to live for others." Aristotle's idea of virtue is not concerned with these who are, after all, also part of society or at least of mankind. To be precise, the liberality of his high-minded hero is indeed concerned with the township sphere, but not *for* the township; the city is only the theatre of glory for the self-presentation of the individual.

Even the excellent virtue of *philia* (friendship) as proposed by Aristotle ultimately creates an impression of egocentricity. It is a dominant category insofar as it presupposes

time, a value judgment about the other person which precedes all actions and must first declare the other one worthy of one's friendship. Behind this there is everywhere the sociological concept of concentric circles around the central point of the self. Parents love their children because they are, as it were, a part of themselves. Friends love each other because they find in the other a reflection of their own class and sentiments (and are therefore best found in the circle of one's own family or from people of one's own age).

Aristotle's ethics even lay the foundation for further development p. 213 towards the individualistic Stoic ideal of life. The tendency of Stoic philosophers to present the individual as sure of himself and, despite all theoretical love of mankind, striving above all to realize his individuality, is already prepared in Aristotle's ethics when he teaches that one should regard lightly the recognition given him by others, for only the upright man himself knows what he is worth and others cannot estimate him by the real standard of his merit. So ultimately the significance of the state, as well as of society, disappears for the individual who is content in himself.

(3) Cicero

The works of Cicero unquestionably represent the highest summit of classical humanism, if not of all humanist thought. Here we come to the *other* formulation of the concept of humanity, namely humanity as affection for one's fellow-man, *humanities* in the sense of "philanthropy", indeed even as *humanitas contra minores*, as kindly inclination towards the weaker one—perhaps because this humanism has a religious direction. Limits, however, still remain in that this picture of authentic humanity again is linked to the idea of a potent personality and so attains a scent of condescension. Works of charity, for example, here for the first time made obligatory, are to be performed *honoris causa*—for the sake of the name of a good man. The individual and his moral development remain the final reference point.

(4) Interim Summary

Kallikles and Aristotle represent the two opposing ideals of humanity which constantly recur in the history of secular humanism. Cicero, however, is not simply hailed as the master of form and language but also taken seriously as a teacher of probity and compassion, and thus humanism flows into the son developing stream of Christian humanism. Humanity as self-realization, the goal of secular humanism, will hereafter be linked either to Kallikles or Aristotle, and from now on we will deal solely with the intentions and possibilities of this secular humanism.

In a modification of the typology of art given by Friedrich Nietzsche one could call these two programs of the ideal of self-realization a "Dionysian" humanism (from Dionysios) and an "Apollonian" humanism (from Apollo, the god of order and p. 214 form). The former is primarily concerned with vitality, the other with shape and form.

These two versions of the ideal are necessarily in conflict with each other, and the overall problem in the history of humanism is the continual to and fro, toppling over from one to the other, from high spirituality to vital intoxication, from stark sexuality or the worship of naked power, to the necessity of sobriety of shape and form—until the game begins again. The goal concept of humanity thus remains uncertain.

A second problem common to these two is the integration of one's fellow man: how can a program of total self-realization of the individual (whether carnal or intellectual) be linked with the existence of one's fellow man? It is this problem which in recent days has become ever more pressing with the growth in consciousness of an increasing number of people.

(5) Modern Humanism

The history of secular humanism only comes to light again in Italy's Renaissance movement. After a thousand years of absolute domination of Christian ideas it produces as its most effective model a new Kallikles, the extremely influential *Prince* of Machiavelli and a cult of personal realization of power which, unrestrained by any considerations, raises lack of scruple to the level of principle for its surprise-effect. After the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation, the history of humanism continues into the Enlightenment as a form of humanism that belongs more or less to the "Apollonian" type.

The work of the protagonist of German Idealism, J. W. von Goethe, constitutes a whole compendium of the two types of secular humanism. In the "muscleman" period of his youthful poem "Hercules", as also generally in his early "Sturm und Drang" writings, there is a return to Dionysian humanism. By contrast, at the height of his glory Goethe represents the Apollonian type. The most famous of his works, *Faust*, reveals all the problems of secular humanism in the life of this Renaissance type man. Faust's goal is the complete development of the person and the enjoyment of the whole world even at the cost of a covenant with the Evil One. Therefore the first love affair already brings death and the final scene demonstrates that the integration p. 215 of one's neighbour, who is hindering one's own development, does not come off. In nature, re-created by Faust for the well-being of mankind but especially for the assurance of his own posthumous glory, there remains a peaceable elderly couple, Philemon and Baucis, living at a place which Faust desires. So the other person is a thorn in the flesh which is then removed without pity. Apollonian humanism too, which strives not directly for happiness but for the performance of its creativity, destroys life. The artist, the scientist and the statesman with their titanic efforts to create their life's work, again and again find themselves like King Ahab who, in order to round off his splendid possessions, acquired Naboth's vineyard with the shedding of blood.

Hardly unsurpassable, this Faustian, Apollonian-Dionysian humanism comes to a head in the work of Goethe's successor, Friedrich Nietzsche. Here we find the extreme development of the philosophy of self-enhancement and the gratification of the "strong, healthy man", a downright imperial egotism. It is the return of Kallikles—and also a corresponding hatred of Socrates and Plato on principle. Nietzsche explicitly recommends "to push what is on the brink of falling", but also, if necessary, to make sick that which is healthy if it stands in the way of one's own development. After the pattern of Machiavelli, Nietzsche also presented his philosophy with respect to the collective actions of nation and race, thereby directly preparing the way for the unscrupulous practices of the national-socialist Third Reich with its euthanasia programme.

This development, then, clarifies for us the dilemma of secular humanism, i.e. that Apollonian humanism is always being swallowed up by Dionysian "in-humanism". In the final analysis neither system can guarantee the existence of one's fellow man. While the Apollonian humanist, concerned only with himself and his work, either relates his neighbour to it or ignores him, the Diony sian tends to consume him.

(6)Marxism

Against the background of this problematic history of humanism Marxism appears as the gigantic attempt to secure the development of the individual *and* the concerns of society at the same p. 216 time. In his *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* of 1844, the young Marx emphatically expresses the ideal of the "rich, all-round and profoundly developed man" of the future. But in contrast with the history of secular humanism, which, even in its most recent and varied representatives as Karl Jaspers and Julian Huxley, constantly

appears as an individualism, Marx envisages the emergence of that man as possible only in a paradoxical future union of individualism and communism.

However, if we again enquire into the whereabouts of the fellow man, he is primarily taken into account only in the shape of an abstract future neighbour to whom the concrete, present neighbour can even be sacrificed. In its development Marxism has demonstrated itself to be a very "consuming" humanism. It believes that it must "consume" today in order to be able to sustain tomorrow. Its goal-orientedness opened the door for the phrase "the end justifies the means", and its radical secular humanism led to such unlimited applications of this phrase that Stalinism, including the personality cult, brought in a world-scale, unscrupulous Machiavellianism.

(7) The Methods of Secular Humanism towards the Realization of True Humanity

We must now ask "By what means does secular humanism intend to reach the goal of humanity?" It appears that secular humanism here finds itself in a dilemma similar to the one regarding what content "humanity" was to have after all.

At this point we may perhaps distinguish between a parenetic and a dictatorial, legalistic humanism. The well-meaning humanist, who has definite ideas about what must be changed in the world so that it may be more humane, will first appeal to the good in mankind. He appeals, for example, to conscience or to man's self-respect, principles which since Democritos have been thought able to take the place of God in assuring correct behaviour. But the appeal to individual conscience is not sufficient, for Kallikles exploits the weak with a seemingly clear conscience and indeed with an appeal to "natural law"; i.e. the right of the stronger to dominate in nature. Therefore parenetic humanism moves from an appeal to a general sense of fairness on to an impassioned entreaty which, however, pleads the different demands of humanity p. 217 with mere "must" formulations, and which gives no more motive than the warning that humanity would otherwise perish.

In the concluding words of a representative symposium volume, *The Humanist Frame*, Aldous Huxley contradicts himself as soon as he addresses the realization of the perceived good. Knowledge, he admits, does not produce any action by itself. It only directs action which has to be set in motion by feelings and the will. Nevertheless a few lines later he concludes his thoughts with the sentence: "Knowing the good thing that we might do, and knowing also the disastrous things that are happening and will happen if we continue to act as we are acting now, we may perhaps be moved to will the consummation which our philosophy assures us will be desirable—the realization of our full humanity." So at the end there is clear helplessness concerning the power to achieve that which is good. Parenetic humanism is at a loss when it is a matter of moving from theory to practice.

Julian Huxley, the important representative of neo-Darwinian humanism, has for many years been propagating the need for a psycho-social evolution of humanity (an evolution which he thought was already in process), i.e. for a change of attitude as the means of realizing full humanity. Having obviously despaired of the good will and judgment of mankind, he has finally set his hope on a "eugenic evolution", that is to say, the production of true humanity by means of biological engineering and controlled procreation. Frederick Crick, who shares those same opinions has, as we are given to understand, already considered the legal measures needed to be taken that will put an end to the purposeless procreation of present day humanity and ensure the successful improvement of mankind. With this he moves in fact from parenetic to dictatorial humanism.

Marxism has been on this way from the very beginning. It sets out from the principle that, in his present condition of self-alienation, man is a wolf toward his fellow-man. All means are to be employed to conquer and subdue the beast. Marxism is not afraid to make

use of Machiavellianism in order to conquer Machiavellianism. It propagates enmity as a means to the goal of brotherhood. For the time being dictatorship is to ensure social behaviour by decree. It leads to an aggravation of the lordship of man over man in the name of the liberation of man. There p. 218 is a belief in a future historical transformation-point. But this faith is demolished for many by the suffering of so many innocent people in the present. The use of force, not merely to stem evil but to create the true man, seems a deed of sheer despair. Both parenetic and dictatorial humanism fail before the inexplicable egotism of man who constantly withdraws from the ideal and indeed necessary claims of humanity.

To summarize: the history of secular humanism shows three apparently invincible problems:

(a) When man is the highest authority, then uncertainty reigns concerning the content of "humanity". For the questions "What kind of man?" and "Which design of humanity?" the Apollonian or Dionysian remain impossible to decide.

(b) Without a higher authority Dionysian humanism can never be brought into shape or form. Dionysian as well as Apollonian humanism leave man's fellow-man insecure and unprovided for. The question "How is brotherhood possible?" remains unanswered, indeed it was never even asked through the long history of secular humanism. What is needed, therefore, would be a binding statement concerning the content of humanity which would at the same time ensure the existence of one's neighbour.

(c) Besides these two cul-de-sacs there remains the perplexity concerning the means of achieving true humanity. Needed here is a new kind of motivation beyond parenesis and dictatorship that would be able to bridge the ugly gap between theory and practice.

III. HUMANITY UNDER THE LORDSHIP OF GOD

(a) Humanity as Love of Neighbour

We have already stated in the introduction that the reign of God includes an image of true human existence set before men as a goal. The kingdom of God, too, is concerned with a humanization of man. In contrast with humanism, however, the Christian faith starts from the fact that this image of perfect man, this concept of humanity, has already been realized in one man, Jesus Christ. Therefore the process of humanization is to be understood as a process of assimilation, of being made similar to Jesus Christ.

Let us list a few features which would characterize humanity p. 219 under God's rule. Basic to this humanity is the "Double Commandment of Love", " 'Love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul and with all your mind.' That is the great and first commandment. The second is like it, 'Love your neighbour as yourself' " (Matt 22:37–39). Jesus completely fulfilled this commandment and thereby showed not merely a theoretical proposition but the practical realization of humanity under the rule of God. *He is the man for God and the man for others*.

Already in the Old Testament the neighbour's right to life is guaranteed concretely and in particular by God's authority (cf. the guarantee given in the various commandments concerning the protection of one's neighbour by the returning formula: "for I am the Lord, your God," in Leviticus 19, above all in the resume: "You shall love your neighbour as yourself, for I am the Lord" (Lev 19:18). Jesus then makes it our duty to care for our neighbour's life and eternal salvation. For Jesus, God's authority occupies the first place. He gives visible proof that responsible and comprehensive care for one's neighbour is only possible under the condition not just of obedience but of *love for God*.

Humanity under the rule of God has its centre of gravity not in the self but outside the self, in God and in one's neighbour. This alternative to the self-centred world-view of secular humanism (see above) is strikingly seen in the Parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10:25–37) with which Jesus expounds the command to love one's neighbour. A lawyer, talking to Jesus, begins a discussion concerning the concept of neighbour with the question "Who is my neighbour?"—a question which might also have been asked by the Greeks. Jesus brings the discussion to a close by questioning the prevailing concept of neighbour: "Who was a neighbour to the one who fell into the hands of robbers?" It is no longer me but the neighbour who stands in the centre of the world-view of love.

We might call this a neighbour-centred humanity in contrast to the ego-centred concept of humanity. While humanism usually has its goal in the formation—even perhaps the religious formation!—of the individual personality, and therefore can be fully described in terms of the individual, the humanity of Jesus is only realized in encounter with God and fellow-man. Of the two meanings of the word *humanitas*, *philanthropia* now decisively p. 220 comes to the fore. And the one who practices that philanthropy will also find *paideia* but in a new sense, in terms of formation of character and in terms of goodness.

The humanity of the Good Samaritan stands in sharpest contrast to Kallikles' ideal of life. Jesus seeks not his own happiness but service of his fellow-man. He in fact is fully aware of the antithesis between the Dionysian ideal of existence and the way of life under the rule of God. In an inconspicuous parable in Matt 24:45–51 he describes the contrasting ways in which two servants behave during their master's absence. One constructs for himself a provisional, practical atheism ("the master is a long time coming"), eats and drinks with his drunken friends (intoxication as a Dionysian principle!) and beats his fellow-servants who naturally stand in the way of his self-development. The other servant, faithful to his commission in the interim period, provides food for the household at the proper time and so participates in God's own sustaining work for his creation (cf. Ps 104:27). Jesus teaches in this parable that man is either a *consumer* or a *sustainer* of his neighbour. There is no third way.

This alternative is again made strikingly clear in the life of Jesus himself. Matthew 14 juxtaposes Herod, who holds a banquet and slays John the Baptist, with Jesus who feeds the hungry five thousand. Further antithesis to the attitude of Kallikles, namely "service instead of personal happiness" is the explicit instruction of Jesus to his disciples in Matthew 20. Here too it has the form of an either-or: "You know that in the world rulers lord it over their subjects and their great men make them feel the weight of their authority" (Jesus, as it were, knew Kallikles and his descendants) "but it shall not be so with you. Among you, whoever wants to be great must be your servant" (Matt 20:25ff.). The perplexed question of Kallikles, "How can anyone be happy if he serves anyone?", becomes clearly irrelevant if we are concerned not with the servitude of one who has no other choice, but with service freely chosen and a sacrifice offered in the imitation of Jesus (Matt 20:28). Such a one will always experience the rule of the kingdom of God: "He who exalts himself will be abased but he who humbles himself will be exalted."

We have seen that secular humanism, humanism without God, produces a humanity without fellow-man. The lordship of God p. 221 lays our neighbour so much on our hearts that next to God he becomes the centre of our life's activity.

(b) The Means of the Kingdom of God towards the Realization of True Humanity

When Jesus says "A new commandment I give to you that you love one another" (John 13:34) and underlines his appeal with his own example in washing the disciples' feet, does this mean that also in the kingdom of God only admonition and example are available as

the means to reach true humanity—something that can also be found in the history of secular humanism?

The lordship of God means neither law nor mere parenesis. That can be seen already in the Old Testament. It has been discovered that the Decalogue, the basic law of God's rule, bears a formal similarity to the contemporary Hittite master-vassal contracts. Israel lives with the consciousness that she is not a troop of slaves under the thumb of an oriental despot but, as it were, a people of which each is a royal official. Correspondingly, the creation narrative sees man as God's representative and steward who has received God's instruction for responsible execution.

The same idea is to be found in the New Testament parable of the talents, but more so, as Jesus says explicitly to his disciples "I do not call you servants; you are my friends." They are "God's fellow-workers" and "envoys plenipotentiary of Christ", who look after his work on earth.

They are all of that and can do all of that because Christ has "disclosed everything" to them as his friends (John 15:15). This is a pointer to the gift of the Spirit which is given to the disciples as a sign of the beginning of God's kingdom (Acts 1:6–8). God's Lordship and God's Spirit go together. In contrast to other kingdoms the reign of God simultaneously imparts an inspiration which also enables the subjects of the kingdom—or rather the emissaries plenipotentiary of the kingdom—to act at all times in accordance with the intentions of their king (1 Cor 2:16). This is why Paul can say "Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom" (2 Cor 3:17), and St. Augustine, "The service of God is perfect freedom."

God's reign in man begins with regeneration, a basic renewal and transformation of the individual, which imparts the Holy p. 222 Spirit, i.e., spontaneity, insight and power to do the good. This is far from the naivety both of the classicist and the modernist, who believe that the description of goodness alone will suffice. Far from all purely parenetic or legalistic demands, the kingdom of God sends the experience of renewal, the indicative before the imperative, to perform the new deed.

Both the Old and the New Testaments set out from the presupposition that mankind needs such a "new birth" in order to solve the riddle of history, i.e. that man often recognises what is good but nevertheless does not do it. So the prophet Jeremiah promised a new covenant from God with man in which the commandments, the instruction as to what is good, no longer encounter man from the outside as an alien demand but are implanted in his very heart to become his own attitude, given by the Spirit of God. The promise has been fulfilled ever since the first Pentecost, when the Spirit was poured out on the company of Jesus' disciples. By his Spirit the disciples of Jesus receive the mind of Jesus, the perfect man; and by the Spirit love is poured into their hearts (Rom 5:5). Thus the kingdom of God itself provides for its realization, the realization of humanity in the lives of those who open themselves to receive it.

(c) Critical Objections

To be sure we must here heed the voice of criticism. For example one of the main theses of anarchist Bakunin is that the reign of God is often replaced by the reign of a human hierarchy which does not allow the fruits of humanity to ripen and which fruits it is indeed unable to create. Such a degeneration in the history of Christendom can always be identified as a consequence of forgetting the work of the Holy Spirit. The kingdom of God and the Spirit of God are so separated that neither the representatives nor the enemies of Christian doctrine can imagine that by his Spirit God gives both direction and power to reproduce Jesus' humanity without the mediation of a priestly caste. Yet the characteristic of the kingdom of God is that it grants the Spirit and, with it, grants the individual freedom

of movement adequate to every situation within the framework of the law of God that serves the conservation of God's creation. God's reign effects humanity through law and Spirit. p. 223

Another justifiable criticism will be directed against the obvious lack of teaching about the lordship of God in certain traditions of historical Christianity. The Lutheran Reformation hardly did much to foster the concept of the kingdom of God. This is also alien to some parts of evangelicalism where the message contains only an individualistic, eschatological soteriology. When one of the great poets of the period between the Reformation and pietism sang "When will I arrive at the place where I will embrace you for ever?" he tended to go straight against the perspective in Jesus' words "the kingdom of God has come upon you." In the former, the self is the subject and the theme; in the latter it is the kingdom. In the former, there is the abandonment of earth and humanity (notice the first person singular). In the latter, Jesus proclaims the struggle of the kingdom for the universe so that God might be Lord of heaven and earth.

VI. CONCLUSION

If humanity under the lordship of God is thus distinguished from two of its major corruptions, we can then summarize the relation between humanism and the kingdom of God concerning the realization of true humanity. Both have the common theme of humanization of man. Both have their starting point in an awareness of the imperfection of man as he is. Both recognize, as a result of this, the necessity of ethics and so of the question "What should I do?" and, consequent upon that, the urgency of the deeper question "How should I be?"

In its search for humanity, humanism without God falls into the three cul-de-sacs of (1) the uncertainty concerning the ideal of humanity, (2) the lack of integration of the neighbour into one's activity, and (3) the lack of power to realize the goal. However, these cul-de-sacs and their solution are the explicit themes of the Bible; in Jesus is determined what true humanity is, and this is not just defined but tangibly demonstrated. Under the influence of the kingdom of God, the life of one's neighbour is not only guaranteed but is committed to especial care. And the reign of God imparts the power to do good which leaves behind the constant alternation on the way to humanity, of weak exhortation and equally powerless dictatorship. In the search for true humanity p. 224 the kingdom of God offers exactly what is lacking in humanism. This explains why the history of humanism secretly is a history of struggle with God.

It is necessary that humanism should again grasp the ideal of *humanitas* in its full meaning, including both *philanthropia* and *paideia*. The neighbour belongs to the basic pattern of human existence. It is necessary, too, that humanism, for the sake of our fellow-man, should turn from atheism and return to the commission of God, that it should put the free suzerainty of God in the place of the presumptuous sovereignty of man. "Almighty man" or Almighty God—this alternative is valid for humanism, too. Humanity, the goal of humanism, is only possible under the kingship of God.

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