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REASON AND IRRATIONALISM

"REASON" is one of those words which are very frequent on the lips and very nebulous in the mind. "Come, now, be reasonable," we say. We assume that we know the standard before we are asked to conform to it. We think of reason as that by which man, the rational being, *is* man. "Come, come," we say, "be a man." But, as Chesterton pointed out, to the crocodile which has just devoured its tenth explorer, we do not say, "Come, now, be a crocodile."

Perhaps we may say, in general, that there are two kinds of reason. (1) In the narrower sense, the word refers to the use of syllogistic argument, working on observation, and acting in accordance with (*a*) the laws of thought and (*b*) the postulate of a reliable system of cause and effect. (2) In its broader meaning, reason is that which validates conviction. It is not the conviction itself, but reflection on it; and it may be important to realize that reflection on an experience may *change* the experience. It is at least possible that reason in the act of reasoning may never be able to see the experience as it actually is. It may be in the position of the man who switches on the electric light quickly in order to see what darkness looks like.

I

1. Our first point is this: Reason in the narrow sense is not sufficient of itself for any demonstration. Working as it does by syllogistic argument, it must assume the cogency of the laws of thought. The conclusion of a syllogism follows from the premises by a kind of necessity, but it is not a necessity which can be proved by argument. The word "therefore" in the conclusion is an important part of the syllogism! You cannot prove by argument that the argument is valid. You cannot by reason demonstrate that reason is competent to do its work. There enters into reasoning an element akin to faith.

Nor can we outflank a second difficulty. If we look outward to the object, instead of inward to the subject, we find that there

is a measure of faith in all science. With faith in man's mind as capable of comprehending, there must go faith in the orderliness of nature. " There could be no science if we began with chaos on the part of the universe and incompetency on the part of man " (*Humanist Sermons*, p. 39).

2. The next point is that reason, even by such perfervid " rationalists " as Ingersoll, is taken to include the moral sense. Logical self-consistency is not enough. A totally different universe might be logically self-consistent. Why do we have *this* universe and not another ? The only answer to this question appears to be that of the idealist tradition from Plato onwards. Science and philosophy want to present reality as an intelligible system. But the system is not yet intelligible if we do not know why it is this system and not another. It must be shown as a self-authenticating reality. And reality can be self-authenticating only if it is good. " A materialistic universe, taken by itself, may have to be accepted as brute fact, but it cannot be understood " (Hodgson : *The Grace of God*, p. 51).

3. The third argument, therefore, must be to indicate that reason includes an element akin to *personal trust.* Reason is not to be confined to that which can be weighed and measured, counted and analysed, that is, to the object-matter of physics, chemistry, and the like. That which is amenable to these operations is not the real world. It must not be supposed that the impersonal is something easily intelligible. It is being increasingly realized that it is in fact far harder to understand than the personal. It might even be safe to say that, though we do not understand the personal fully, we do not understand the impersonal at all.

II

There is a type of judgment which is a judgment of reason, yet not capable of syllogistic proof. The ideal of the metaphysician is to arrive at certainty regarding the truth. How is he to reach it ? The answer depends on the kind of certainty which he desires. There are two contrasted types. (1) That which belongs to mathematical theorems ; to knowledge of present-day facts ; to the records of past history. This type of certainty rests on calculation, on observation, on the testing of reports. (2) The second type is that represented by knowledge concerning, for instance, a mother's love, a friend's loyalty.

In the first, concerned with matters of fact, our will must not enter. The personal equation is to be rigidly excluded. In knowledge of the second type, on the contrary, our will must enter into the matter before we arrive at certainty. If a man is a " trimmer ", if, in the German phrase, he hangs his coat against the wind, he can never believe, with certainty, in the existence of a man on whom he can rely absolutely, whom nothing will move from the line he has once conscientiously taken. He believes that every man has his price. In this sphere, (1) a man must have the thing within him before he can apprehend it elsewhere ; (2) a man must trust before he can be certain. The first type of knowledge distrusts everything that cannot be seen and handled, measured and proved. The second rests on trust.

Let us see first that certainty is not to be found in the former type of knowledge. It, in turn, may be divided into two sorts, (*a*) truths of reason ; (*b*) truths of fact—what Leibniz called *vérités de raison* and *vérités de fait*. The first type appears to give certainty because of its principle of non-contradiction, but this is at the expense of contact with the matters to which such laws of thought are applied. We have only a formal principle of certainty. As soon as we begin to fill it with content, uncertainty creeps in. For the other type—concerned with truths of fact—is not immediate knowledge. There is an ugly ditch between fact and truth. And even the law of non-contradiction does not go beyond the hypothetical. What it does say is that, if thinking is rational at all, it must proceed according to this law. It does not say that thinking *is* rational.

Now, therefore, we must return to the second of the two larger divisions—to judgments of trust and confidence. These are in a different category. Here we have a wholly different kind of certainty. Judgments of this type are, in fact, made again and again with great confidence. Men trust their friends far beyond what they can see and prove, and their confidence is reasonable. (So much so that it would be considered a dishonourable proceeding to ask for proofs of loyalty.) This is, indeed, the nearest approach we have to certainty in human affairs. And it comes, not by proof nor by argument, but by the way of trust. It is a different type of certainty. Its highest form is that shown by the religious man who trusts God in spite, as we say, of appearances. " Though He slay me, yet will I trust

in Him" (Job xiii. 15; cf. Karl Heim: *Glaubensgewissheit*, pp. 1-30).

It is important, above all, to notice that reason must not be confined to knowledge of the impersonal. There are those, says Canon Hodgson (*Essays in Christian Philosophy*, pp. 48-51, and *The Grace of God*, p. 153) who are still under the hypnotic influence of the nineteenth century, and count nothing real unless it can be "explained" in terms of physical necessity. We have passed beyond the time when it is possible to imagine that the impersonal is more intelligible than the personal. We are realizing that the impersonal must be explained by the personal, and not vice versa.

An essay by René Fülöp-Miller (*Hibbert Journal*, January 1936) is entitled "The Revolt against Reason". We are aware of this revolt in every sphere of human activity. In the realm of politics we have in Italy a Fascism which is opposed to all that is rational. It is not the calm reason of an educated people which is to be in control, but irrational forces, embodying the creative will of a nation and personalized in a Duce who has been not elected but mythically appointed. In Germany there is added to the idea of a Messianic Führer the concept of the sacred race, and the blood-myth. In science we have the Neo-Vitalism of Hans Driesch, and the astronomer who declares that the starry universe is not so much like a great machine as like a great thought. We have Planck suggesting that Nature, once supposed never to make a leap, moves all the time by leaps; and Poincaré, the astronomer, even hazarding the guess that if men had possessed eyes with the power of the microscope, the laws of nature would never have been discovered, since they are not able, he thinks, to endure too close and precise a scrutiny. In philosophy, we have Bergson turning away from rational cognition and falling back on the vital impulse, the *élan vital*. In psychology, we have learned of unconscious, irrational impulses, racial memories, and symbols, influencing, perhaps determining, the conscious life.

Yet it is safe to prophesy that, after the revolt, reason must return to its rightful place. What that is we may best determine by looking at those things with which reason is usually contrasted. As we are concerned primarily with the relation of reason to faith, these contrasts may be reduced to three. Reason is opposed (1) to authority; (2) to feeling; (3) to revelation.

III

It is certainly wrong to ascribe a high degree of rationality to the primitive mind. Marett complains of Frazer that he makes the savage reason like an honours graduate in philosophy. " Pure ratiocination seems to be credited with an effectiveness without a parallel in early culture. Almost as well say that, when man found he could not make big enough bags with the throwing-stick, he sat down and excogitated the bow and arrow " (*Threshold of Religion*, p. 34).

On the other hand, we must not fall into the opposite error. Lévy-Bruhl argues that reason has no place at all in the primitive mind. He finds there only *pre-logical mentality*. The savage mind is not simply undeveloped : it is different in kind. The substratum of truth in this theory is found perhaps in two considerations. (1) For the primitive mind, action is much more important than thought. The rites and practices of worship come before the dogmas. As Marett says, savage religion is not so much *thought out* as *danced out*. (2) As with animals, primitive man is largely ruled by the association of ideas. For the savage mind, temporal sequence may mean necessary connection. He does not have any place for coincidence. But too much stress must not be laid on this. There are many occasions on which all of us accept sequences we cannot explain. We drive a car, perhaps, without knowing very much about the internal combustion engine. Perhaps the clearest example is that given by Professor Waterhouse (*Dawn of Religion*, p. 73). When we " dial " a telephone number, most of us do not know what happens. We believe that there is a scientific explanation, but it is enough for us that, given the right movements, the connection will be duly made.

It is evident that there is a vast difference between the mental processes of primitive man and those, say, of a modern scientist or philosopher. But the difference, surely, is one of degree, not of kind. Compare the savage mind with the mental processes of the *mob* to-day, and we find that the difference is greatly reduced. At root the mental mechanisms of child, savage, and developed minds, are alike. " Primitive emotion and superstition is not far beneath the surface of civilization. Scratch a Russian and you find a Tartar, scratch a civilized man and you find a savage. Civilized and savage are brothers ' under the skin ' " (Waterhouse, *op. cit.*, pp. 17, 18).

The absurdity of this theory of pre-logical mentality is seen by a single consideration. The savage could never have survived if for practical purposes he did not make use of the logical principles of causality and of non-contradiction (cf. Galloway, *Faith and Reason*, p. 74).

IV

Next we come to the theory that *all* religion, developed as well as primitive, is the outcome of suggestion. Admittedly the non-rational factor plays a very important part in the *acquisition* of belief. Man is suggestible. He does not believe a thing, as a rule, because reason shows it to be credible, even undeniable. He believes it because of influences brought to bear on him, in his home, in his training and nurture, in his adolescent or adult environment, in tradition.

George Steven (*The Psychology of the Christian Soul*, Chapter II) calls attention to the widespread effect of public opinion in our own day. It imposes itself upon us without our knowing. We imitate modes of thought and behaviour. We *conform*. And even the non-conformist does not escape. Those who defy the public opinion of which they are conscious are, in all probability, paying deference to another public opinion too subtle for them to detect. "A hooligan defies the police and the settled order of the nation, but acts for the applause of the public-house which he knows is waiting for him. At the opposite pole of the moral world, the martyr for civil or religious liberty may hear with his ears the yells of a frantic mob, but with his soul the praise of good men in other lands or other times."

The last part of his illustration brings us at once to the true estimate of the place of suggestion. Few escape its influence at the beginning. Occasionally we see those people who are *contra*-suggestible—the rebels, the "permanent opposition", those who set themselves violently against the currents of the day. If they hear of a "generally accepted" opinion, that is enough for them to denounce it. Those who are too much under the influence of suggestion are the undeveloped: reason has not won its rightful place in their lives. But those others, who make a point of resisting every suggestion, are quite as likely to be ill-equipped. Their attitude may perhaps be traced, in many cases, to an early experience of being tyrannized over. This has resulted in a constant refusal to be influenced even by a wise and

legitimate authority. The contra-suggestible are, in art and religion, the *cranks*. But, however great may be the part played by suggestion in the *acquisition* of belief, it is evident that it does not account for the tenacity with which belief is maintained. In the long run, and in the normal mind, reason takes its rightful place. Belief is modified and moulded through experience guided by reason (cf. Yellowlees, *Psychology's Defence of the Faith*, p. 23). If faith rested on suggestion alone, it would speedily die. There is plenty of disaster in life that seems to contradict it in the most intimidating way. Superficially, it is not the easy thing to believe that life is ordered by Infinite Love : there is a deeper insight in faith and it cannot be reduced to suggestion (see D. M. Baillie, *Faith in God*, p. 63).

V

There is, however, one aspect of the non-rational factor in belief which deserves special consideration—the influence of the herd, the authority of the tribe or other social organism.

Durkheim has made a special study of this aspect. His statements are certainly too bald and uncompromising. The religious experience will never be understood without some consideration of the individual's attitude, his private hopes and fears, joys and sorrows, despair and blessedness. But the caution is needed, too. Religion cannot be accounted for by these private feelings *alone*. It is neither possible nor desirable to dissociate the individual from corporate religious experience. Isolation is incompatible with development. Man *is* a *politikon zoon*. If he can live a completely solitary life, he is no longer a man, but either a beast or a god.

Marett (*Threshold of Religion*, pp. 122 ff.) approaches the subject of communal religion by recalling the story from Herodotus (II, 2) of the experiment made by Psammetichus—the "incubator method" Marett calls it. He asks whether this *bekos* experiment could be carried out in religion. We cannot, perhaps, isolate a baby and watch to see whether, of its own accord, it begins, not merely to talk but to *pray*. We might, however, transplant a child from savage to civilized surroundings or vice versa. What would be the result ? "Would a young totemist notwithstanding evolve in the one case and a young Christian in the other ? Or would not the child acquire the religion of its adopted home, of the society that rears and educates

it ? Even when full allowance is made for the fact that each child reacts on its environment in individual fashion, can there be the slightest shadow of doubt that the supreme determining influence must rest with the social factor ? " (p. 135).

Whitehead declared that religion is what the individual does with his own solitariness (*Religion in the Making*, Chapter II). Probably the exact opposite is true historically. The social element is of fundamental importance. At this stage the individual is a tribesman rather than a man. " It was a natural, not a personal Providence," says Robertson Smith (*Religion of the Semites*, pp. 263-4), " that was taught by ancient religion. So much was this the case that in purely personal concerns the ancients were apt to turn, not to the recognized religion of the family or of the state, but to magical superstitions."

All this may be readily granted. But it is not necessary to take the next step, which is taken by the " Sociological " school. God, it is said, is simply a symbol for the social consciousness. Whatever is obligatory is of social origin. An absolute command can come only from that which is greater than ourselves. And the only thinking being which is greater than ourselves—so empirical science feels bound to say—is society. The religious and the social become identical terms. " The God of the clan can be nothing else than the clan itself." This is quite unwarranted. It means that religion is to be regarded as a collective hallucination, which takes the internal structure of society and transforms it into an objective reality (cf. Pringle-Pattison, *Studies in the Philosophy of Religion*, p. 38).

It is certainly not surprising that society should exhibit some of the features of God, since God is love, and acts in a Kingdom of Love. But, so far from it being true that God is only a symbol of society, the very reverse would appear to be the case. Society is a symbol for God. And only a very inadequate symbol. Three facts cannot be accounted for in the sociological theory. (1) Society takes notice only of the outward conformity of an act to its own laws. But, in religion, the important things are soon recognized to be the motive of the act and the purity of the heart. " Conscience takes on an authority which can, on occasion, defy all the behests of society, for man must now obey God rather than his fellows " (Farmer, *The World and God*, p. 57). (2) The pioneer in morality is almost always the man who breaks with conventional morality. Progress is

frequently due to the martyr, and the martyr is usually the rebel against society; his death is met at the hands of society. (3) Religion at its higher levels is something very different from conformity to public opinion. Now, that which is a criterion of real progress cannot be a non-essential at any stage in the development of religion, nor altogether lacking even in the earliest stages.

God is not a symbol for society; rather, society is a symbol for God.

How far the notion of the herd may lead even wise men astray is illustrated in a passage from Professor Gilbert Murray (*The Stoic Philosophy*, p. 41). "We are gregarious animals; our ancestors have been such for countless ages. We cannot help looking out on the world as gregarious animals do; we see it in terms of humanity and of fellowship. Students of animals under domestication have shown us how the habits of a gregarious creature, taken away from its kind, are shaped in a thousand details by reference to the lost pack which is no longer—the pack which a dog tries to smell his way back to all the time he is out walking, the pack he calls to for help when danger threatens. It is a strange and touching thing, this eternal hunger of the gregarious animal for the herd of friends who are not there. And it may be, it may very possibly be, that, in the matter of this Friend behind phenomena, our own yearning and our almost ineradicable instinctive conviction, since they are certainly not founded on either reason or observation, are in origin the groping of a lonely-souled gregarious animal to find its herd or its herd-leader in the great spaces between the stars." One cannot read such passages without hearing that "inward monitor" whispering the word "bosh!" The occasions must be very few indeed—I can think only of the Kentucky camp meetings—on which worshipping congregations have suddenly broken out into barking.

VI

Closely linked with the influence of the herd is the part played by tradition. In order to arrive at the truth in matters of belief, it is said (cf. Karl Adam, *Spirit of Catholicism*, p. 38), we must get rid of self. "Autonomous" thinking lies in delusion. "The first 'autonomous' man . . . was Adam," when he took the fruit of the forbidden tree. "And so man . . . fell sick and died. His self was his sickness and his self

was his death." We readily agree that, when the mind is humble, reverent, receptive, it is then open to the deepest convictions. Man must rid himself of pride and of the unworthy elements both in morality and in intellect; but the self, surely, must stand secure and autonomous. To get rid of it, to seek for heteronomy, is to open the door to the very doubtful and dangerous conclusion that truth may in the end be that which is given, let us say, in the unconscious.

The same warning is required by that trust in the authority of the word of Scripture which, being exaggerated, leads to Bibliolatry. One writer has said that "we put out a person's own eye, and then try to persuade him that he ought to see with someone else's eye."

On the other side it may be asserted that autonomous thinking involves the danger of losing all certainty in belief: of falling back into pure subjectivity. That is an unreal and unnecessary fear. Final certitude, indeed, is not to be looked for, where none is in perfect communion with God. It is asymptotic. Yet it is real. In the highest forms of experience there may still be doubt, but on one point there is certitude, namely that doubt is not due to any failure in the Divine revelation, nor to any essential inapprehensibility of the Word of God.

VII

When we turn from the contrast of reason and authority to the opposition between reason and feeling, something should be said of the work of Rudolf Otto. His irrationalism presents as the characteristic of religion, not feeling in general, nor the feeling of dependence, but that specific feeling of reverential awe which is directed to the numinous, the *mysterium tremendum*. Assuredly we must agree with Otto when he insists that "religion is not exclusively contained and exhaustively comprised in any series of 'rational' assertions." Man cannot by searching find out God. But it is very important to observe that this feeling of the beyondness, the transcendence of God, in the higher levels of religion, is essentially a product of man's sense of the *ethical* loftiness of God and the contrasted frailty of man. We are prepared to say that it was a "numinous" feeling which prompted Isaiah to exclaim, "Woe is me! For I am undone" and Simon Peter to cry, "Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord."

Again, the origin of a thing is not its essence. It is impossible to say precisely what hopes and dreams, or what fears and "shudderings", gave the first impetus to man's religious quest, but, whatever they were, they are not to be regarded as the essence of the religious consciousness. It might be claimed that the feeling of "awe", "religious dread", is still present even in the highest manifestations of religion; but we should have to add that it is so transfigured as to be almost unrecognizable. It is religious awe which stands before Holy *Love*. The alteration in the understanding of the object of devotion has brought about a correspondingly profound change in the nature of the feeling. The associated feeling of mystery is never absent from the religious mind at any level of culture. But this is only one side of the truth. "A God perfectly comprehended could not be the God of experience, but a God who was utterly incomprehensible could not be the object of trust and love" (Galloway, *Faith and Reason*, p. 86).

VIII

Reason or Revelation

Thirdly, the question arises whether reason is altogether disclaimed in favour of *revelation*. For the contemporary "Theology of Crisis" God is the "completely Other", the absolute over against all relative. Because man is fallen from God, therefore the finite is incapable of the Divine. God is not to be found in nature, in history, or in human experience of any kind, but only in revelation as it reaches us in the Word of God. And the distinctive feature of the Bible is not its ethics, nor its religion, nor its history, but the breaking through of the Divine into human life.

In Barth's doctrine of revelation we are frequently faced by the dangers which inevitably follow any depersonalizing of man. If the mind of man plays *no* part, then only a mechanized inspiration, magically enforced, is left to us. And Barth appears only to be pushing his difficulty one stage back. For the Bible is the record of those who did find God, where Barth says He is not to be found, in nature, in history, and in personal experience.

Barth rejects altogether the *analogia entis* (likeness of being between God and man). He substitutes for it an *analogia fidei* (likeness through faith). But if we surrender the *analogia entis*,

we must really give up thinking of God as personal, since the idea of personality is known to us first in man.

Such distrust of reason goes very deep. It drives us back to ask how it is possible for an intelligible word of God to come to creatures who are wholly different from God; how God can reveal Himself to man unless there is some kinship between Himself and the recipient of His revelation. Reason, the Barthian forgets, is also revelation. Deny the authenticity of reason's judgment and you make it for ever impossible for man to tell *when* he has the truth: *when* God is speaking to him. Irrationalism is bound to end in agnosticism.

The truth and error contained in the pronouncements of this school of thought have been aptly summarized by Dr. Temple (*Nature, Man, and God*, p. 396): "The error of the Barthian school of theology—for that it contains error when judged by the canons of either natural reason or Christian revelation I cannot doubt—is, like every other heresy, an exaggeration of truth. To deny the reality of moral progress, or that moral progress is an increasing conformity to the Divine, is wanton. To deny that revelation can, and in the long run must, on pain of becoming manifest as superstition, vindicate its claim by satisfying reason and conscience, is fanatical. But that revelation is altogether other than rational inference from previous experience is vitally important. . . . In so far as God and man are spiritual they are of one kind; in so far as God and man are rational, they are of one kind. But in so far as God creates, redeems and sanctifies while man is created, redeemed and sanctified, they are of two kinds. God is not creature; man is not creator. God is not redeemed sinner; man is not redeemer from sin. At this point the Otherness is complete."

Christian faith must philosophize, since Christ is the truth as well as the way and the life. Faith must make use of reason. But it is also true that reason must take faith into account. Reason validates conviction. But to understand how comprehensive reason is, we must consider all kinds of conviction; and religious convictions (those which are subsumed under the word "faith") form a large and important section.

Religion could come only to a nature that is essentially rational. But religion is not the activity of reason alone. We must agree that religious truth is apprehended and taken possession of by an activity of the mind; but we must avoid the

mistake of supposing that reason, which is able to appropriate religious truth, is therefore competent to discover it.

IX

In our own day the question is frequently being asked whether that which is styled "Humanism" is not enough (cf. especially the Humanism of Dr. John H. Dietrich and Dr. Curtis W. Reese, its founders and high priests in America). Its forces are arrayed against authority, against feeling, against revelation. In opposition to these is put a reasoned sense of the dignity of man. It is what we might call reason in the widest sense of the term, but reason which is unreasonably determined to deny *ab initio* the possibility of the supernatural.

It is evident that reason, in this philosophy of life, either fails to be self-sufficient or it is self-contradictory. It implies, for example, intuitive apprehension of the reasonableness of each step in the argument. Thus it must be widened to include (1) the element of intuition; (2) certain assumptions or postulates; (3) much wider evidence. The world of thought becomes its province. Insufficient in itself, it always points beyond itself. Faith is not reason, yet faith is reasonable. And, on the other hand, every form of rationalism, every dreamed-of "religion without revelation", is confronted with the insoluble problem of the unsatisfied demands of reason itself.

1. Reason is unable to achieve what nevertheless it recognizes as necessary. It always points forward to something higher, in which alone reason can become complete. Reason without revelation is not reasonable, because it is not self-consistent. Its own bafflements demand faith. It can make the demand—indeed it makes it inevitably—but it is unable to satisfy the demands which it cannot refrain from making. Without revelation, reason would not even make the demand for consistency and self-completion. Like faith, reason also is from without, from above, from the Wholly Other.

2. The same is seen to be true when we turn from the intellectual demands of reason to the emotional and ethical. Poets and artists may recognize that their work is not their own (cf. the dying words of William Blake, "It is not mine! It is not mine!"). They are the instruments. The reality which they are trying to interpret is a reality which is seeking to reveal itself through them.

More important are the ethical demands. The humanist will not be prepared to admit those perplexities of reason which are, for many of us, the most serious, namely, the inability of man to repair the ethical system when it is violated, to bring about the forgiveness of sins and the overruling of evil for good. For an *argumentum ad hominem*, therefore, we must go to his own conception of morals. Dr. Reese writes (*Humanist Sermons*, p. 46), " Man achieves his spiritual values because he feels the need of them." It is a dangerous statement for a humanist to make, when his thought of religion is that it is a wish-fulfilment; and yet it is a statement which he is bound to make in one form or another if he wishes to preserve his belief in morality. Now belief in God is at least as reliable as belief in moral values. You cannot remove the one without removing the reasonable grounds for accepting the other.

X

The book entitled *Things and Ideals* is one of the few writings in which a humanist of to-day has seriously faced the profound perplexities which Humanism leaves unresolved. At the end of that book Professor Max Otto has a poignant chapter on *The Hunger for Cosmic Support.* He advocates the renunciation of every attempt to find a Friend behind phenomena; every quest for companionship with a Being beyond the fleeting aspect of nature. We acknowledge ourselves to be " adrift in infinite space on our little earth, the sole custodians of our ideals." We are psychically alone. Men, who are comrades in doom and agents of each other's weal or woe, must not go down the years estranged from the one friend they have—each other.

Men have been afraid to face the truth, he says (p. 230). And the nature of their fear shows that religion is only wish-fulfilment. They desire a purposive universe, and psychic kinship with a transcendent Being. But their fear, when anyone threatens to remove these objects of longing, is not a fear of intellectual confusion. On the contrary, what gives the demand its vitality is the fear of *emotional* confusion.

Clearly, Otto's initial mistake is to suppose that the two types of disquietude can be separated. It is foolish to assume that the effect of removing the idea of God can be confined to the intellectual field. Suppose any instance of the violent uprooting of a belief firmly held. Suppose that I were to look

into my shaving mirror one morning and find that it was no longer my own face that the mirror reflected. Professor Otto would say, This is just a strange phenomenon which we must investigate calmly and dispassionately; there is no call to be upset or alarmed. I *should* be upset. I demand the right to be alarmed!

Reason is not enough. It is true that religion must not be *irrational* or *sub-rational*. The task of reason is to make impossible all religions save the best. But religion must always be *supra-rational*, as it were rational *plus*.

The emotional confusion arising from the removal of the idea of God is a proof of the firmness with which the conviction of His being is held. Emotional and intellectual confusion may not always be rigidly separated. It did not need modern psychology to prove that emotional confusion, so far from indicating a trifling disturbance, may arise from the denial of truth in the inward parts. The disappearance of the thought of God may be due, not to any enlightenment of the understanding, but, as we well know, to apathy, forgetfulness, disobedience. Our peace and patience, grounded in the idea of God, are not created because we *feel* that here is truth, but by the *truth* which we feel and know.

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