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FREUD'S PSYCHOLOGY AND FREUD'S VIEW ON CONSCIENCE

§I. ON FRAME-CRITICISM

A CRITICISM of some theory of psychical life or other, for instance of the psychology of Freud, encounters difficulties, unless one does not mind to launch into superficial generalities. With sweeping criticisms not much is won, and much may be lost; what is won has generally negative value only, and what is lost has usually positive value. In the Freudian psychology, however one-sided and awry, and even false, this psychology may be, there is a peculiar depth, vitality, actuality and warmth, there is an intimate contact with concrete and real human life, which one misses in many other psychological systems. Under Freud's leadership many profound truths of psychological processes have been penetrated, which are lost in what I call frame-criticisms. To disentangle these truths from their thorough envelopment and embracement in the false Freudian frame-presuppositions, which ultimately are as metaphysical and speculative as any philosophical presupposition, is not so easy, especially if one is to see them in their relation to other truths accepted, and to reinterpret them in a frame, which one takes to be the correct or at least a better frame.

Frames¹ are the metaphysical pre-structures within which the facts are observed, analysed and explained. No scientist

¹ It must be noted that a frame is not a result of scientific investigations and generalizations, but a condition of them. The distinction between a "neutral" *fact* and a scientific *theory* conceals the truth that "neutral" facts are idealized abstractions. A fact is an objective happening, process or existence; but to recognize a fact as such requires a definite frame-view. The frame itself *ought* to be objective, but generally is not so, as is seen in the contradictory interpretations of mere fact. The sucking of a baby is seen by one as an instinctive, organic and purposive activity, by another as a series of mechanical reflex-processes, by a third as a satisfaction of a sex-drive, and so forth. The fundamental decision, on observing a fact, e.g. that it is only mechanically determined, or that it presupposes an organic principle of life, or that "consciousness" is revealed in it, or that the "unconscious" conditions it, or that spirituality and personality constitute its inner essence, etc.—whether a true (i.e. objective) or a false (i.e. subjective) frame-principle—is a pre-scientific and metaphysical decision. **Frame**→**fact**→**theory**→**frame** is the vicious circle of all genuinely "school"-science.

can begin and advance his researches without plunging into metaphysical decisions from the start. The higher an order in nature to which the object of research belongs is (the object of biological research being of a higher order than that of physical research, and the object of human psychology belonging to a still higher order), the more metaphysical pre-decisions are required. Watson is a thoroughgoing *metaphysician* when he decides that consciousness is to be banished from the domain of scientifically psychological investigations. So is Spranger when he posits an objective spirit as a necessary working-basis of an objective psychology. So is Wundt when he determines consciousness to be the genuine object of psychology. So are Wertheimer, Köhler and Koffka when they accept the "Gestalt" principle as the master-key of solving psychological problems. So are the phenomenologists, structuralists, introspectionists, associationists, correlationists, and so forth, when they ultimately decide upon the genuine method of psychological analyses. So are Freud, Jung and Adler when they take the unconscious domain and the psycho-analytical (and psycho-synthetic) methods as well as the methods of symbol-analysis to be fundamental to psychological research and to the understanding of human nature. So is every psychologist and every school of psychology when expounding the first and fundamental principles on which it is thought that a science of psychology could be construed. So is every scientist when determining his fundamental problems, the first questions he asks of nature, even before he begins his specifically scientific elaborations. To illustrate this in the case of biology: the difference between mechanism, vitalism and structuralism (holism), between evolutionism and constancy-theories, between monophylists, polyphylists and panphylists—and so forth—are largely and ultimately dependent on pre-scientific and philosophical choices or decisions.

"*The first principles*" without which no science is construable may be grouped as answers to three "first questions."

- (1) What is the object of investigation ?
- (2) How is this object formally constituted ?
- (3) How is this object materially constituted ?

The answers give us the object-principles, the main constitutive formal principles, and the main constitutive material principles. The system of these metaphysical principles I call

the frame. There are primary frame-forming principles necessary at the outset, and as the researches progress new metaphysical decisions are made, and thus the secondary frame-forming principles follow and determine the frame to a further extent. The necessity of a metaphysical pre-scientific frame as well as the possibility of several frames in the same science, *belie* the possibility of a neutral science. Choice must be made between the different possible principles that could constitute the frame. In answering these "first questions" the psychologist must, for instance, choose between :

(1) Soul or no soul; consciousness or no consciousness; the unconscious or not unconscious; spirit or no spirit; pure animality or something more and other than just animal life; personality or no personality; and so forth.

(2) Mechanic determination or not; purposive determination or not; structural determination or not; spontaneity or no spontaneity; determinism or not; monism, or dualism, or pluralism, or not; dynamism, or activism, or functionalism, or causalism, or none of these; and so forth.

(3) Sexualism or not; instinctivism or not; ideism or not; intellectualism or not; sensualism or not; voluntarism or not; emotionalism or not; behaviourism or not; and so forth.

Such decisions¹ are generally made as a matter of course and as a matter of facts, many a time without the foresight and insight of the implications of such decisions. It is of prime import to gauge the metaphysical nature of these choices, and to acknowledge the metaphysical basis of what we call "facts". There is no fact which is not seen in the light of the "first or frame-principles." Such decisions require a definite metaphysical enterprise and risk, of which many a psychologist is not fully aware. Surely Watson "*risks*" as much as Spranger or Freud! Without such decisions no science can begin. The validity of the decisions cannot (except in some negative cases, e.g. where mechanists could disprove vitalism by producing living organisms out of lifeless matter) be proved or disproved by facts—the observations of facts presupposing these decisions.

¹ A fact is observed within the unity of the special universe of facts, to which it belongs. The view of this unity fundamentally determines the observation of the fact concerned—whether the observer is conscious of the unity he presupposes, or not. It is a frame-determination of the observation of facts. *Facts, as observed*, are accordingly not those neutral and supreme as well as sovereign primates of knowledge as idolatrous science worships them. Of course, facts are necessary and of unique import, but the determination of what facts are is not infallible, as this depends to a large and fundamental extent on your metaphysical prejudices or presuppositions.

The principles are accepted upon their "intuitive" and "objective" self-evidence, the difference of the choices being due to the imperfection of our intuitive functions, which in man are primarily perverted through the principle of sin. Even the acceptance of the causal principle in nature is speculative, and the almost universal recognition of this principle does not make it less metaphysical. Furthermore, the choice of the methods of investigation depends upon the object accepted as well as upon the aim of investigation, and is as metaphysically co-determined as are the determination of the object accepted and the aim of the investigation. There is more of philosophy in science than is dreamt of in the scientific world; and philosophy being permeated and conditioned by "theal" ("religious") and thus pre-philosophical decisions, there is even more of "religion" in science than scientists know of.

Frame-criticism, i.e. the butchering of the structures of one frame with those of another, is usually not so difficult, and has its value; but at the same time it conceals the dangers of plunging into vagueness, superficialities, sweeping generalities, and of letting many a valuable positive fact and truth slip by unperceivedly: the form being battered, and the material being lost. It is of greater value to save the facts and truths discovered within one frame, to disentangle them from their special frame-determinations and to reinterpret them in the frame taken to be the correct or at least the better one.

I do not intend to enter upon the characteristics of frames as such, of their relation to the facts, of the possibility of frame-changes or reforms,¹ but only insist upon the truth of the following general statement: A frame should be open to all changes objectively necessary, to all principles objectively given, to all objective discoveries, and thus be modifiable and pliable according to the demands of objective reality; a fixed, rigid, hard and one-sided frame can never do justice to the richness, many-sidedness, diversity and infinite variety of God's creation. Man's finalitude and imperfection necessitate some frame as an instrument of orientation, but the frame should be objective, and adaptable to any variation in the objectivity, and no humanistic distortion and perversion of objective reality by the frame should be allowable. Watson's frame is not open to the genuine

¹ For instance, on account of the original intuition of some ultimate principle constituting the observed fact, which principle "obstinately refuses" to be fettered by the frame accepted.

facts and truths of Spranger's psychology or those of Psychoanalysis, Spranger has no place for facts discovered in other systems, Freud is deaf to the summons of other Psychologies, and thus each system of these Psychologies proves its unpliability and unmodifiability, and in consequence demonstrates its enslavement to a rigid frame: the frame tyrannizing over and distorting the objective facts and truths.

§2. THE FRAME OF A CHRISTIAN PSYCHOLOGY

The frame of a Christian Psychology is ultimately as metaphysical as the frame of any psychology. Metaphysics (and philosophy in general) is again fundamentally influenced and at least in outline determined by pre-philosophical "theal" principles: the truths of the relations of the world to God. Whatever one's "theology" may be, his view of the universe is fundamentally influenced by his view of God. There is, for instance, an intrinsic connectedness between atheism, mechanism, materialism or energeticism, etc., and between pantheism, structuralism, organism, pan-vitalism or idealism, etc., and again between theism and an open attitude recognizing mechanical, structural, organic, material, biotic, spiritual, natural, supernatural, and many other original principles as *sui generis*, acknowledging diversity and variety as fundamental as the unity of the universe—which is a creation of God. Whatever the relation between one's "theology" and philosophy may be, his philosophy is (wittingly or unwittingly) co-determined by his "theology" or "faith". This truth is not recognized and accepted as it should be. The consistent mechanist, the consistent structuralist, the consistent materialist, the consistent pan-vitalist, and so forth, must to an important extent ascribe their consistency to their view of God and its import to their view of the unity of the universe. Even a simple observation of, for instance, a flower reveals it either as a complex of mere mechanical forces, or as a biotic and organic unity, or as a creation of God subject to His laws and ordinations, and so forth. Ultimately such a simple observation is (consciously or unconsciously) metaphysically as well as "theally" co-determined. Neutral observation, an observation uninfluenced by, and not related to, intuitional acceptance of principles and in many a case to the faith in God, who and whatever you may take God to be, is

ultimately impossible.¹ It is not the place to demonstrate this statement here. Its truth will be more explicit if you take man as an example. Psychology deals especially with man. Do you see man as a mechanical machine of material forces, or as a biotic (animal) organism principally not differing from other animals, or as a creature of God essentially differing from animal being? You may not always be explicitly conscious of his ultimate nature when observing him: unconsciously every observation of man presupposes your view of his ultimate nature. Whatever your view of this ultimate nature may be, it influences your observations—and your theory.

The Christian psychologist *consciously* accepts the influences of his faith and of his philosophy on his observations and thought. This is at least an advantage over those who are unwittingly influenced in their psychologizing by metaphysical and “theal” presuppositions.

I will only summarize *some* of the main “theal” determinations of the frame of a Christian Psychology, which determinations are to a high extent corroborated by the metaphysical contemplations and scientific observations of man and of his activities.

(1) God created man in His image, after His likeness, and perfect, man being absolutely subject to the laws of his “nature” as creature, the laws ordained by God.

(2) Man, although created in full harmony with nature, with the universe, occupies a distinct position, having dominion over every living thing that moveth upon the earth. This, as well as his being created in God’s image, signifies an essential difference between man and the other living beings on earth. Man is therefore no animal. There must be an essential difference between human and animal psychology.² Man’s status

¹ Just as the unity of a special universe of facts is a metaphysical determination of the facts observed within this universe, so the unity of all the universes of facts, which is the unity of *the* universe, determines to a high and fundamental extent the observation of facts, and is a “theal” determination of the observation of the facts—the view of the unity of *the* universe being cardinally dependent upon the view of God, who and whatever God is taken to be. In a Christian philosophy, God is the extraneous creator of the universe and of its unity. In a pantheistic philosophy God is the immanent principle of this unity. Compare in this connection the profound and very important discussions of Professor Vollenhoven in *THE EVANGELICAL QUARTERLY*, 1931-1932.

² It is tragic that modern psychology of man is in essence animal psychology. Genuine human psychology does hardly or not yet exist. This animalism of modern psychology is probably due to the influence of that modern faith in the, as yet, unproved and (as I see it) unprovable hypothesis of the evolution of man. This hypothesis has become a widely accepted frame-determinant of the modern scientists and philosophers in their observing of human activity. Man is seen as an animal, and the “facts” thus seen prove his animality! A grand vicious circle.

implies furthermore his liberty in the universe, as well as his responsibility to God for his "dominion" of the universe

(3) Man's sinfall made him imperfect and an inwardly and outwardly conflicting being.

These general principles (his being a creature, a ruler, and his sinfall) are theal, and as such pre-philosophical and pre-scientific; they are divinely revealed truths. In philosophy the meaning and import of these principles must be gauged in connection with the general "system" of principles in philosophy, and in psychology in connection with the general coherence of facts. That means that we must study man, as we see him now to-day and in history, in the light of the above-named principles in order to discover and understand the principles and facts that determine him and his development. To the Christian Psychologist, the studying of man in the light of these principles means the studying of man as he really and objectively is, as God's revelation will not contradict His creation; it means that the principles and facts objectively discovered will increasingly reveal the objectivity and truth of these principles.

The frame of a Christian Psychology of man summarized may be :

(1) The soul, as the ultimate principle of unity of psychic life; consciousness as the principle of self-revelation, and also as the principle of revelation of the universe, and ultimately also of man's relation to God; the unconscious in many different senses and forms as the cradle of conscious activities, as the keeper of many treasures acquired in conscious activity, as the determiner of man's activities without his control and also as the hotbed of the workings of sin, and so forth; the spirit primarily as the principle of idio-archic activity, guidance, government, responsibility, and so forth; his so-called animality as the principles of the preservation of his organic life as well as of the continuance of the human race; personality as the principle of responsible behaviour and activity; and so forth. In other words, psychology must see man as a microcosmos, subject to a complicated system of qualitatively different laws, and as a relatively self-determining being essentially different from pure animality.

(2) Some processes are determined mechanically, some purposively, some structurally, some are spontaneous, some idio-archic, some autokinetic, there is in some sense liberty, in

some other sense determinateness, there is a series of qualitatively different functions and activities united and connected in the central principle of the ego; not all processes are dynamic; and so forth.

(3) There are different original drives and instincts, as well as ideational and intellectual processes, there are an original will-activity, emotions, outward behaviour, and so forth.

A more open and all-sided frame hardly could be given. But it at once places the Christian psychologist before the task to investigate the *unity, coherence and connectedness* of all these different principles in man. There is place in this frame for any new principle or any new fact not yet discovered—without the danger of distortion. I believe that no system of psychology nor any school of psychology is built upon falsehoods only; in each there is some relative truth well grasped and falsely generalized. In consequence, with the correct critical attitude, a Christian Psychology may learn and profit almost from any psychology, and give the relative truths discovered by each school, their due place in the Christian frame.¹

It is necessary to explain some of the terms mentioned above. Man's activities are either responsive (presupposing stimuli) or spontaneous. The facts of spontaneous activity are not always recognized by psychologists. This distinction, however, does not correspond to the distinction of mere animal and also human activity—in so far as some kind of spontaneous activity may also be attributed to animals. In order to give an effective criticism of Freud's Psychology, which essentially is animalistic, another distinction is required, for which psychology does not yet, as far as I know, present the necessary and unambiguous scientific terms. There is a kind of spontaneous activity, which is specifically human only, and there is a kind of spontaneous activity which we also find in animal life. Man has dominion over every living thing, and also over his own life; animal being lacks this dominion. Psychic processes presupposing conscious self-dominion, conscious self-control, personal guidance, self-government, etc., are spontaneous and not responsive, but are essentially different from those spontaneous activities which "happen to man", which are in a sense automatic, and which follow their own

¹ Due to the limitedness of man and of his observation, intuition and thought, and due to the influence of the principle of sin, it is possible that several different frames of a Christian psychology may be defended—these frames differing the most in peripheral problems and coinciding in central principles. Finally, however, only one frame can be *the* true and *the* objective frame.

laws. Purposive thinking; deliberate will-activity, command of the passions, love, æsthetic evaluation, religious worship and so forth differ in principle from the "passive" process of association of ideas, the subjection to an intensive lust or to passionate activity, to sensual desires, to the pleasure-principle, to *idées fixes*, and so forth. In the one case a central self-conscious principle dominates the psychic processes, in the other the psychic processes move relatively free from this dominion and may even master the central principle. The first kind of spontaneous activity I suggest to term idio-archic, the second kind of spontaneous activity auto-kinetic.¹ The import of this distinction will become clear in our criticism of Freud's theory. In so far as spiritually psychical processes may become autokinetic (e.g. in habit-forming), idio-archic activity may not be identified with these processes.

In conclusion I wish to remark that the order of primal functions as well as the mutual relation of these functions by anticipation, retrocipation, systasis, etc.—as this is ingeniously elaborated by Professor Vollenhoven and Professor Dooyeweerd of the Free University—is of great value to a Christian psychology, especially in the determination of the unity and coherence of the various principles of a Christian frame. Unfortunately this cannot be demonstrated in detail in this article.

§3. FREUD'S FRAME

(1) The *unconscious* psychic processes within *animal* organisms is the object of psycho-analytical study. The unconscious, as the matrix of all conscious and unconscious activity, can only be indirectly investigated by analysing conscious processes. Consciousness, however, is only a lengthening-piece of the unconscious, viz. that piece come into contact with reality, and is ultimately subordinated to the unconscious mechanisms. Consciousness, furthermore, is no true and genuine revealer of the unconscious, but (due to reality's influence) reveals the unconscious processes distorted, in symbols, sublimated, and so forth. The import of consciousness is only instrumentary to the unconscious, and instrumentary to the psycho-analyst in analysing the unconscious. The main determinants of man's behaviour and development are to be found in the unconscious. The

¹ It is necessary on account of clarity of thought to "coin" these new terms.

unconscious is the ultimate key to the understanding of human behaviour.

(2) The laws that govern the psychical processes are *mechanical* through and through.¹ Man's actions are deterministically conditioned resultants of a system of mainly unconscious forces. The nature of psychical processes is *dynamic*. The concept of psychical "energy" used by Freud is nothing but physical energy transplanted to the psychical domain. The unity of the psychical processes does not exist: psychic life consists of a quantitatively pluralistic and qualitatively dualistic system of conflicting drives. Mechanism, determinism, dynamism and pluralism are the formal characteristics of this frame.

(3) Freud's frame recognizes only two kinds of (mainly unconscious) forces or drives: the *death-drives* and the *sexual drives*; the former are the original in the sense that they existed before the latter; the latter are the more important in the sense that they are more active and "noisier" in determining man's behaviour and development. It means that Freudianism is *practically* overwhelmingly sexualistic and partly "mortalistic". It means, too, that *theoretically* Freudianism is pessimistically and primarily "mortalistic".

Freud's object of research is accordingly a quantitatively pluralistic and qualitatively dualistic system of conflicting animalistic, dynamic and primarily unconscious mechanisms. Thus Freud sees man. Man's behaviour is a mechanical resultant of a mechanical system of conflicting forces, mainly unconscious, partly moulded under influence of reality and partly inherited—and with partly a sexual and partly a mortal nature.

Freud's philosophy of death is, I think, of import for an understanding of this frame. Death is the essential end of life, and the first kind of drives which originated with life were the drives which led the individual as directly as possible to life's destination, viz. death. Only external circumstances (outer reality) caused, as the times went by, an increase of diversions from the original and short path from birth to death, as well as an increase of complication of these detours. When new complication arose, viz. the possibility of fertilizing the germ-cells, the specific life-drives (the sexual drives) came into existence.

¹ Even the *striving* for satisfaction of the drives is not genuinely teleological but comparable with a balloon's "striving" towards the skies, or a falling stone's "striving" towards the earth,—towards its rest position.

They intensify and increase the disturbance evoked by life's origination out of a lifeless, "calm" and "peaceful" matter.¹ The workings of these sexual drives (or libido) is relatively well known to the psycho-analyst, the workings of the death-drives relatively unknown, the former being the more active determinants of man's behaviour, the latter being "mute". But, notwithstanding this, the sexual drives remain in the service of the death-drives, nature employing even sexuality to attain life's end: death. The potential immortality of the germ-cells is but a lengthening of the route to death.

A corner-stone of Freud's frame has, as psycho-analysis progressed, become that much debated principle of Freudianism: *infantile sexuality*. Of import to Freud is not only that infantile sexuality exists, but even more that it is repressed, especially by society and its moral code, and that in being repressed it becomes the most important factual determinant of man's life—even the matrix of high cultural achievements: religious, moral, æsthetical, social and others. Infantile sexuality is to the Freudians the most important principle of explanation of man's behaviour in general; it is even the *sine qua non* of orthodox Freudianism.

§4. SOME OF THE FUNDAMENTAL FACTS OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

Time forbids to analyse and to re-interpret the many and genuine facts discovered by Freud but entangled in his frame-shackles; only a few of the fundamental facts will be selected.

Freud's fundamental *formal* facts are, besides others: (*a*) the existence of psychical conflicts; (*b*) the facts of repression; (*c*) the dynamic nature of the repressed; (*d*) the influence of the repressed on man's behaviour—or the destinies of the repressed (the different manifestations, etc.). Freud's fundamental *material* facts are, besides others: the import, workings and influence of especially the sexual drives in man, and also of the death-drives. For the analysis of conscience, as Freud sees it, we must also draw the attention to the complex of these drives centred about the ego (the ego-mechanism) and of those centred about the super-ego or ego-ideal. Of import is to remember that Freud's factual material is usually psychically and mentally *abnormal* individuals—his theory originating in his psycho-pathological and psychiatric researches and labours.

¹ Which also is the "end", the "aim" of life.

The first fact to which Freud draws our attention is that man is a being *in conflict* with himself and with his surroundings. Whether he knows of his conflicting nature or not does not matter. Man strives for satisfaction of his drives. Reality does not always give the opportunity, the object of satisfaction, e.g. being absent. But reality (in the form of society) also hinders and forbids satisfaction: you may not satisfy your sexual love of your mother, nor may you satisfy your sexual love of yourself, e.g. by playing with the genital parts, and so forth. (These examples out of the sexual sphere could, of course, be multiplied with many out of the non-sexual sphere, but that would not be in harmony with Freud's frame.) Within oneself sexual self-love (auto-erotism and narcissism) conflicts with the sexual love of others (object-love). The unconscious system, which Freud calls the id, conflicts with the ego-mechanism; this group of ego-forces conflicts with the demands of reality, as well as with the commands of the mechanism of the ego-ideal. Within the unconscious many incompatible drives and groups of drives conflict: and ultimately we have that very profound conflict between the sexual drives and the death-drives. Do not almost all emotions of man betray *man's conflicting nature*? Fear, anxiety, shame, sorrow, compunction, anger, even joy, and so forth are related to actual or abated psychical conflicts within man or of man with reality. To make the facts of actual conflicts, and especially of the inner and unconscious actual conflicts, fundamental to psychological theory is of no mean significance to psychology. Such a psychology at least stands nearer to life and reality and has more "warmth" than many psychologies with other "primal" facts. Not to be satisfied with theoretizing about such conflicts, but to investigate them scientifically and concretely, is a requirement which the psycho-analysts fulfil.

The following fact of significance is the fact of *repression*. Drives (or, more generally, desires, inclinations, wishes, etc.) are not always to be satisfied. Your own moral standards or those of society do not allow their satisfaction. A married man, for instance, sexually loves a married woman, not his wife. This drive may not be satisfied. Satisfaction would end or fulfil the drive. The only other way out of this conscious conflict is the repression of the drive, i.e. this drive is made unconscious, or driven back to the unconscious domain, whence it came. Thus we all repress the unpermissible or not-to-be-satisfied drives.

(We, of course, not only repress sexual drives, but also hunger, thirst, the desire of theft, of cursing, of listening to conscience, of praying to God, and so forth, but to analyse these as specifically not related to the sexual and the death drives would be incompatible with Freud's frame.) I must in this connection, however, point to something else. Freud puts us before the dilemma: either satisfy the unpermissible; or repress it, and submit yourself to the many a time disadvantageous consequences of repression. This disjunction is too narrow. A third possibility Freud did not see, owing to his abnormal material investigated, and it proves the logical danger of arguing from the abnormal to the normal—a mode of argument which puts everything on its head. The third possibility is given in what I call idio-archic self-conquest or self-control. It is possible, however difficult, to take the sting out of an unpermitted drive without repressing it and without satisfying it; we find it, for instance, in the process of self-renewment, which we know of in our moral and religious struggles. I admit the difficulty of analysis of these processes, but maintain their originality as facts, i.e. their irreducibility to either satisfaction or repression. This kind of spontaneity Freud could not discover, because mentally abnormals are what they are, exactly in their loss of this principle of idio-archic activity, the control over a large part of the psychic domain.)

The repressed drives lead us to the domain of *the unconscious*. The unconscious is not a system of latent dispositions, it is a field of fighting forces. Our behaviour and development is (I should say partly, Freud says predominantly) dependent on the results of the unconscious battles. The repressed drive—and this is of vital importance to psycho-analytical theory—is *not annihilated* or bereaved of its power and sting, it is not made latent, but it remains an active and *dynamically* determining force in the battlefield of the unconscious, and somehow unconsciously also a determinant of conscious behaviour. Of significance is that in being unconscious it fights without or with the help of other unconscious drives (e.g. in forming complexes) its own battle. (I would say that it is lost to idio-archic self-control, influences man without his knowledge of this influence, and becomes an autokinetic determinant.) How many prejudices of man, how many criticisms of his neighbour, how many praises of his beloved are unconsciously determined by repressed drives?

May dearth of Christian love and the harshness of some criticism, let us say, of a fallen daughter, not sometimes be unconsciously due to the parent's repressed inclinations of the same kind as that which led to the daughter's fall? The main point is: the repressed drive is not inactive, but a dynamic and unconscious determinant of psychic processes. (Next to this dynamic unconscious field in man's psychic life Freud accepts a pre-conscious non-dynamic latent field, viz. the memory-system.)

With reference to *the destinies* of the repressed drives, many interesting discoveries have been made. I can only refer to them in a somewhat summarizing way, and will give Freud's view of them without critical remarks. The nature of the drives is to strive for satisfaction; the nature of the unconscious drives in addition to strive to become conscious, where only satisfaction is attainable. The censor (i.e. the forces which resist their attaining consciousness) has to be overcome, if possible. The unconscious drives "dodge" many a time the censor by the use of symbolical manifestation, especially in dreams, and thus indirectly seek some satisfaction. They are not recognized in their original character and intentions (their latent true and original "meaning") and are allowed into consciousness in their symbolical enclothing (their manifest "meaning"). Even in art, religion, philosophy, and so forth, such symbolical manifestations play their rôle. The repressed drive may also re-enter consciousness in a desexualized form by means of sublimation—in which the sexual energy is transmuted into high achievements (e.g. intellectual love, in creative work of art and science, in moral and religious experiences, in social work, and so forth); the sexual energy is thus employed in new and derived channels. The repressions may reveal themselves in conversions (the transmutement of sexual energy in physiological (physical) energy) e.g. in twitchings of the cheeks, or of the arms, in swollen lips, red eyes, muteness, stuttering, itching, and so forth. The repressed drives may reveal themselves in slips, mistakes, blunders, in emotional transposition or transference (the transplacement of the effect from one idea, object or person to another—or from one person to the psycho-analyst). They may reveal themselves in sexual impotency, in the loss of conscious emotions, in anæsthesia, amnesia, inattention, in intensifying conscious emotions, in hypermnesia, in the experience of the *déjà vu*, in regressions (the return to infantile experiences) and so forth. The repressions

may cause mental disturbances—all kinds of neuroses—and most kind of mental diseases. The ways in which such drives may determine the behaviour and development of man are manifold.

Although exaggerating in somewhat one-sided fashion the influence of the sexual drives, Freud has placed us before definite problems and truths with reference to the relation between the spiritual processes (moral, religious, æsthetic activities, etc.) and sexuality, which cannot simply be put aside notwithstanding one's conviction of the modal differences between these in nature and origin. Freud's definite acceptance of death-drives and their workings is an interesting and not necessarily negative challenge to Christian thought. We will return to these problems in another connection.

§5. A RE-INTERPRETATION OF THESE FACTS IN THE CHRISTIAN FRAME

Man is *in conflict* with himself, the sinfall and the inheritance of sinfulness being the ultimate ground of his conflicting nature. This Christian truth has been expounded in Christian literature for ages. For a psychological analysis of these conflicts and their workings, a Christian Psychology may learn something from the Freudian analyses of conflicts, after having freed them from the specifically Freudian frame. The ultimate and basic conflict in man is man's conflict with God. In consequence of this conflict, man is in conflict with himself and with society. The origin of his conflicting nature the Christian frame posits to be of a religious and of a moral nature. It is the leading forces in him that plunged him into disharmony with God, with himself, with society and with nature. The forces which lead to disharmony and chaos are called: sin. (Metaphysically spoken, sin in man could be related to what Freud calls death-drives.) The primal conflicts being of a religious and moral nature effect other conflicts in man, man being a unity, and his spiritual activities not being isolated from other activities. On account of their relative integration with other psychical activities, on account of the possibility of transference, the facts of resonance and induction the religious and moral defects are the grounds of the general defects of man's nature—of his universally conflicting nature. This means that not every conflict analysed is to be explained in terms of religiosity and morality, but each conflict

in its particular kind and in its relation to psychical processes in general. Otherwise the Christian Psychologist would commit the same mistake as Freud, i.e. to explain all qualitatively different principles in terms of one or two particular principles.

Man sees his conflicts with his own "eyes". His "view" of things has become as imperfect as he himself is. In consequence the results of the conflicts are dependent upon what he (in imitation of society or independently) takes to be the necessary or desirable line of activity, irrespective of whether he has "seen" and decided correctly and objectively or not. This must be considered in the analysis of man's behaviour.

A fundamental attribute of any conflict is its unpleasantness, and the tendency (e.g. desire) to overcome it. This may be done by satisfying the somehow undesired tendency or by repressing it or by mastering it in spontaneous self-control. Let us take the phenomenon of religious disbelief (as an example of non-sexual nature in contradiction to Freud). The tendency to disbelief is in conflict with the desire to believe. This tendency may be satisfied by obeying its summons and by blinding oneself to the desire to believe. The desire to believe may be too strong to be put aside and even strong enough to repress the tendencies to disbelief. Or these tendencies may be mastered by self-examination, prayer, consults and so forth leading to a renewed conviction and understanding of the doubted questions, which conviction and renewed faith may take the sting out of the disbelieving tendencies. Or the desire to disbelief may be repressed. The repression is an act of a weakling: he shuns his task of spontaneous self-control, of consciously facing the battle. The repressed doubt, however, is in its repressed state not annihilated, but may do its worst, especially in unforeseen moments, and unconsciously determines him in many a way—religious doubt may even lead to insanity, as facts prove. I think that many of the Freudian facts of repression and manifestations, etc., could explain such typical religious conflicts, without necessitating an appeal to sexuality (and to death-drives).

The general meaning of the Freudian facts reinterpreted and stated in general psychological terms is the following:

Man is imperfect; he has many shortcomings (moral, religious, social, sexual, educational, intellectual, physical, and so forth). His knowledge of his shortcomings is painful to him. He has a "natural" tendency to belie it. He strives to conceal

his sins and his imperfections for God, for man, for himself. If he appreciates social praise, he will do his utmost to conceal his defects for society. Concealment is the negative aspect of the positive dissimulation, of the self-masking. The fact of self-masking is as universally human as the facts of man's defects and their unpleasantness. The mask may intend to hide something from the eye of God, from the view of man, or from man's own view. Everyone desires to appear before society and himself better than he really is. In this self-masking we have the conflict and, to some extent, the repression. As long as man masks himself consciously, and knows his dissimulated self not to be his real self, not much harm is done (psychically spoken); the repression is not yet complete. His shortcomings are only hidden from a direct view, but have (in a definite sense) not yet slipped from the reins of spontaneous self-control, i.e. from idio-archival activity. The pleasure in the mask, however, the painfulness of the conflict, the repetitions of these mask-pleasures, and of the painfulness of being unmasked, ultimately lead to a definite self-revaluation: man believes in his mask, and is unconscious of the masked shortcomings—of his special sins; the repression is complete. The repressed self, however, is *not* made ineffectual and latent: it now, probably more than before, determines man's behaviour, without his knowing it—indirectly and unconsciously. Definite harm is now done to him; he is not liberated from his undesired shortcomings, he has not mastered them, but he is now unconsciously enslaved to them and they have slipped out of his self-control. These repressed drives act on their "own accord"—autokinetically. The process of dissimulation which ultimately led to the self-revaluation and repression of the "old" self is not necessarily always done consciously, many a time it "happens" even "instinctively"—i.e. without the due recognition of it by self-consciousness; but although "happening instinctively" it generally is open to discernment by self-consciousness—which fact proves the necessity of self-examination. The doubting of the word of a friend may be due to the repression (and thus not mastering) of one's own mendacity. The hate of a talented neighbour may be unconsciously due to one's own lack of these talents, the lack of which not being known to his masked self. The anger with a wife's supposed infidelities may be due to the husband's repressed infidel inclinations. Such examples could be multiplied almost

infinitely. The destinies of the repressed shortcomings are manifold: symbolization, sublimation, regressions, conversions, transference, neuroses and so forth may signify some of the possibilities. These phenomena, however, have to be understood and explained *disentangled* from the Freudian frame-determinations. It is of import in such explanations to remember that the unconscious or the repressed is not necessarily only of a sexual (and of a mortal) nature, and that the different functions of man (religious, moral, æsthetic, rational, juridical, social, sexual, nutritive, and so forth) are all original, *sui generis* and irreducible to other functions.

In conclusion we may say that man, instead of mastering his sinfulness, represses his sins and seeks liberation from sin in dissimulations; this gives the sin, liberated from man's control, a relatively free hand to determine man's behaviour unconsciously, autokinetically—making man more sinful than he was, and even in cases ruining his health and sanity. Instead of repressing his sins, i.e. in making them unconscious and autokinetic, he ought to remain keenly conscious of them and seek his mastering of them in confession, prayer, compunction, self-renewment and self-control. Self-control, that remarkable spontaneity in man which animal being lacks, is the exact opposite of the autokinetic determinations in man's unconscious domain.

The autokinetic nature of the repressed shortcomings due to man's confidence in his masked and simulated self is, as I see it, the true and genuine kernel of Freudianism, as well as of Jung's psycho-synthesis and of Adler's individual psychology. They all are one-sided in narrowing down the nature of the repressed shortcomings, the one seeing it to be more specifically sexual, the other not necessarily sexual but still animalistic, the third believing it to be an experienced shortage of power or strength (*Wille zur Macht*). This more specific determination of the repressed is of secondary importance—the general principle being discovered by Freud, accepted and recast by Jung and Adler. There are undoubtedly sexual weaknesses, as well as weaknesses of power, which man represses, and sexual repressions are better explainable by Freud, whereas Adler gives a better explanation of the inferiority-complex—but why should the nature of the repressed shortcomings be thus confined to either sexuality or vitality? Religious, moral, social, æsthetic, political, and many other simulations and self-maskings are, after all, just as possible

as only those recognised by Freud, Jung, Adler, and others. The repressions of disbelief in religious experience may be as perilous to man as the repressions of his adulterous inclinations. How many diplomatic mistakes may have been due to the political self-masking and repression of political weaknesses? How many an artist may have made a failure of his career on account of his repressions? There is more in the psychic domain than only sexuality, mortality and vitality. The essential momentum, however, always is: the repressed does not become latent and inactive, but remains in more than one way a determining force in man's life.

Concerning the Freudian fundamental material facts, it must be admitted that we generally under-rate the import of sexuality in life. Freud's candour and courage in his uncovering of the sexual forces in man must be appreciated. Man does not know enough and seems not to wish to know too much of his sexuality—allowing it to determine his life autokinetically. This latter fact is Freud's main fact and the ground of his far-reaching generalizations. But the influence of sexual drives in man's life reaches far beyond the just sexual sphere. Psychological life cannot be divided into a number of mutually intrusion-proof drawers. There is a relative integration and mutual permeation of the biotic and of the spiritual forces in man; and within the sphere of the biotic the different sexual, power, and nutrition drives are mutually integrated and permeated, as is also the case with the different drives in the spiritual sphere: the religious, the moral, the social, the æsthetic and other drives. Freud's one-sidedness is his only acknowledging sexual and death drives as original. That sexuality may somehow intrude in religious, æsthetic and other experiences, that there is an intimate connectedness between spiritual love and sexual lusts in marriage, that in general sexuality may be of influence in almost any specifically non-sexual domain of psychic life—are, I think, undoubtable truths. In how far such a permeation of sexuality into non-sexual spheres is principally necessary and practically unavoidable, and in how far it is only factual and a purifying of man's spiritual life from sexual influences may be possible and desirable, are problems I only wish to suggest. It is a great truth Freud teaches us, viz. that factually sexuality is a greater force in, and influences a larger area of, man's psychic life than was thought before him. Sexuality is undoubtedly a

most potent force in man's life, and unconscious sexuality the more so, and in being of sensual origin as well as of an undeniable intensity it may even be possible that this force is the most potent of all man's forces.

The recognition of original and positive death-drives in man may lead to unforeseen possibilities of explanation. Freud does confess his relative ignorance of the workings of these drives, since they are not so easily investigable as the sexual drives, but does maintain that their presence in psychical life is established and demonstrable. It may be an open question how far frame-presuppositions have influenced the analyses which led to the belief in such drives. But still—is the existence of such drives in man simply to be denied—and if not, could they not also determine man's behaviour and development? Man does die and commits murder and suicide, he wages war, he wishes for his own death or for the death of others. In a Christian Psychology such drives, if accepted, will ultimately be seen in relation to the disorganizing principle: sin; it is, however, an interesting problem in how far death-drives must be taken as concretely determining and explanatory principles (*a*) in the physiological domain (some process, law or principle of the cell-structure and cell-development determining an end of evolution, growth and life), (*b*) in the psycho-physical domain, (*c*) in the purely psychical domain (not only as secondary or acquired drives, which are undeniable, but especially as primary drives) and (*d*) in the psycho-spiritual domain (in fundamental connection with the principle of sin). Whatever the answers may be, Freud undoubtedly has placed the Christian scientist before a grand problem with significant possibilities: the investigation of possible death-forces.

§6. SOME CRITICAL REMARKS ON FREUD'S FRAME

I will not enter into criticisms of the mechanism, sexualism, pluralism, dynamism, determinism and animalism of Freud's psychology. These characteristics of one-sidedness, tokens of false generalizations, can easily be disproved from a Christian standpoint.

With reference to Freud's unconscious and the primacy of the unconscious must be said:

(*a*) That the leading functions in man (his spiritual functions, his self-conscious control and government of his powers) deserve

to be acknowledged as the primate of the psychic processes. In dreams again, the primate of the manifest (conscious) contents has to be acknowledged, although the presence of "hidden meanings" in some dreams may be admitted.

(b) There are different kinds of unconscious "spheres" which have to be distinguished, which cannot be taken to be the one unconscious, and which centre around consciousness in different relations to consciousness. There is the physiologically unconscious whence our hunger, thirst and sexual impulses come, and whence also our perceptions in some sense originate. There is the unconscious domain of inherited dispositions and talents—and the unconscious domain of acquired dispositions and "psychical habits". There is the unconscious of repressed experiences. There is the unconscious of memory (which not necessarily is merely latent). There is the unconscious telepathic experiences, of experiences of clairvoyance, etc. There is the unconscious (or super-conscious?) of spiritual experiences, where religious experiences find spiritual contact, where intuitions originate, whence the voice of conscience may come, and so forth. Hellpach¹ distinguishes between the following kinds of unconsciousness: that which is not remembered; that which is not intended; that which is not perceived; that which is mechanized; that which can be reproduced; that which produces; the psychic real; the absolute. Dwelshauvers² distinguishes: l'inconscient-physiologique; l'inconscient automatique; le coconscient; l'inconscient latent-actif; l'inconscient de memoire; l'inconscient affectif; l'inconscient héréditaire; l'inconscient dynamique (which embraces several of the former); l'inconscient rationel. (Even the term consciousness is embarrassingly ambiguous, having at least ten different meanings.) At any rate the monism as well as the primate of some particular unconscious is untenable.³

(c) The unconscious need not be overwhelmingly determined by sexual conflicts only, many non-sexual (and non-mortal) conflicts playing there a role as important as the sexual conflicts.

Man's relation to reality is otherwise than Freud sees it. The objects are not only drive-satisfiers. They have a significance of their own, irrespective of the drives which seek them. Consciousness is in principle the instrument of revealing objective reality to man. The non-acceptance of the objectivity of the

¹ Cf. A. Kuyjers, *Het onbewuste in de nieuwere paedagogische psychologie*, Chapter IV.

object in the being conscious of the object (whether a colour or a tree, whether a relation of numbers or a work of art, whether man or God) next to the subjectivity of the object when imagined or subjectively created will always be fatal to psychology. Let us take the phenomenon of guilt experienced in conscience as an example. Guilt is an objective relation between some individual and God or some other individual. In experiencing my guilt in conscience I experience myself in some definite relation to the Lawgiver, to God. Here we have a definite subject-object relation, and the object as object is of the same fundamental importance to the experience as the subject as subject. Freud only acknowledges an intra-subjective relation of one mechanism of forces (the super-ego) to another mechanism of forces (the ego). The object as object does not exist. Man, however, does not only act in intra-subjective determinations, nor not only in definite subject-object relations, but also purely objectively on account of intra-objective relations (e.g. a judge pronouncing a sentence on some law-transgressor). The acknowledgment of a subject-independent objectivity is for psychology as necessary as the acceptance of psychical processes as such. Here Freud mistakes the role of reality in psychical activity. To Freud, reality (the objects which satisfy the drives or cause the repression of the drives) has no own subject-independent significance, its import is only instrumentary to subjective needs : reality is ultimately but a satisfyer or a represser of drives. Reality is not objectively significant but only subservient to psychical activity. By overstressing the causal viewpoint and by seeing objectivity only as subservient to subjectivity the real object is lost, truth, beauty, the morally good, the holy, God, all become creations or productions of subjective activity. A significant subject-object contact in consciousness is lost, and one is plunged into an extreme psychologism and subjectivism. The significance of the object as object irrespective of subjective needs is a limit to a causalistic psychology, a limit not acknowledged by Freud's pancausalism. There are other difficulties in Freud's treatment of this problem. What is the exact relation between drive and object ? How does a drive fix itself to an object ? How is transplacement possible ? Are the drives originally object-less ? How can object-experiences be made unconscious, and how are they as residua of former conflicts even inheritable ? (e.g. how is the *castration*-complex inheritable as

castration-complex or how are former ego-ideals inheritable ?) More problems are hidden in these questions than Freud seems to admit. A dogmatic acceptance of the drive-object relation conceals the critical points.

The accentuation of the super-biotic functions in man (the moral, the religious, the æsthetic, etc.) in contradiction to Freud's animalistic (and overwhelmingly sexualistic) psychology Freud refutes by pointing out that he does acknowledge these "higher" processes in man and that he sees them in a causal relation, the higher somehow being produced by the lower. The criticism of the essential difference between the biotically psychical and the spiritually psychical is not effectual enough when the spiritual and the biotic is simply seen in a causal relation, as is the case in Freud's view of psychical life. Even the elucidation of biotic causality as non-mechanical but organic, and of spiritual causation (e.g. in the case of the will-activity) as non-mechanical and non-biotic but idio-archic, will not lead us too far when these causalities are taken to be reducible to mechanical causality, as is the case in Freud's psychology. The only method of an effective criticism seems to me to be the discovering of facts inexplicable with Freudian mechanisms. What have all the facts, as explained by Freud, in common which facts, not discovered, seen, nor explained by Freud lack, and *vice versa* ? (The same question in a more general and changed form is : What have all the abnormal individuals analysed by Freud in common, which the normal individuals, not analysed by Freud, lack, and *vice versa* ? The abnormal (and Freud mainly analysed such individuals, and where he analysed normals he saw them in the light of his knowledge of abnormal) lack the principle of normality, the normals the principle of abnormality. But what exactly do we connote by these principles ?)

All the psychic facts, as seen by Freud, are autokinetic. They are necessarily so in correspondence with Freud's view of the ego, and of psychic life. The conflicting drives, each of which is relatively independent, have the principle of activity and determination within themselves and are not rooted in some fundamental directing principle. Let us take the example of a piano player : through habit the fingers roll over the keys almost automatically ; could they be loosened from the control of the player and "move themselves", they would act autokinetically. According to Freud an autokinetic system of a plurality of

mechanical drives determine man's behaviour. Even the ego, as the organizer of psychical activity, is a complicated system of autokinetic drives within the larger system of autokinetic drives. The mentally and psychically abnormal people, now, are exactly abnormal on account of their psychical activities being determined *mainly autokinetically*. In a true and thoroughgoing autokinetic system of drives there is no place for real idio-archic oversight, idio-archic determination, idio-archic responsibility, idio-archic self-control and true personal dominion. There is no monarch, no monarchical order, no government when the "subjects", as a chaotic revolutionary mob, fight *omnes contra omnes*—they even are no "subjects" but simply individuals. The principle of abnormality is the monism of autokinetic activities, or at least the primacy of autokinetic activity above idio-archic spontaneity. The principle of normality is dominion, responsible self-control, in other words the subjection of autokinetic activity to idio-archic spontaneity. Freud's gravest error is his oversight of the idio-archic spontaneity in man. The error is most probably due to his starting-point of psychological research, psycho-pathology and psychiatry, and to his logically false deduction of the normal from the abnormal. True psycho-pathology is only possible on the foundations of normal psychology, whence only it is logically possible and correct to deduce the principle of abnormality in contrast with the principle of normality. But there is some depth in Freud's generalizing of the principle of abnormality in man. Even Christianity accepts a general abnormality of man through his inheritance and development of sin. Normality and abnormality here have, however, another denotation and another connotation than normality and abnormality in the above arguments. In the criticism of Freud, abnormality and normality were taken to denote psychical differences within humanity, in the Christian acknowledgment of man's abnormality was meant the ultimate imperfection of man's nature, whether psychically normal or abnormal in the other sense. Abnormality in the latter case does not exclude idio-archic spontaneity—abnormality in the former case does.

I will conclude with a few remarks on the corner-stone of Freud's psychology. I do not believe in infantile *sexuality*, although I admit the existence of infantile facts related to genital-experiences; nor do I admit that infantile sexuality is

principally necessary and of basic importance to psychical development. The argument that sexuality should develop gradually and continually is, as I see it, absurd. The human embryo has no necessity of practising the use of his eyes in order to be able to perceive, when born ; a child who never has had any experience related to his genitals before his sexual maturity, will be in no sense the worse for it compared with a child having had ample experiences related to his genitals. The argument of necessity of practice is nonsensical. The opinion that a child when sucking enjoys sexual pleasures, and likewise when being caressed, is a perverse, a false view of life. *Sexual* experiences only originate in maturity, where the need of completion, of supplement by the opposite sex, is aroused. No infant has such basic needs. The movement of the little finger is no grasping, and likewise the infant's playing with the genitals no sexual experience. A subordinate mechanism is put into activity, loosened from the structures of sexuality as such. How this is possible, how genital experiences originate in infancy, is no problem of sexuality as such. Local physiological friction, the cleansing of the genital parts by the parents, abuses by servants, and so forth, may be causes of these principally unnecessary phenomena. There may be even deeper causes, e.g. the parents' sexual life during pregnancy somehow inducing these relatively isolated tendencies in the embryo. Fully acknowledging the import of infantile experiences for later life, and the facts of regression, and with full acknowledgment of the profound insights into psychical and especially sexual life given by Freud's researches, I must state, as my opinion, that the acceptance of repressed infantile sexuality as THE corner-stone of psycho-analytical theory is Freud's gravest absurdity.¹

(To be continued.)

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¹ To explain avarice by means of infantile anal-erotism (the sexual pleasure of withholding the faeces) or to explain "Calvin's theory" of predestination and election by means of positing a strong sexual and infantile father-hate in Calvin (as is done by Pfister) is clear nonsense. To Freud, however, this method of understanding man is the master-key.