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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CALVINISM FOR THE REFORMATION OF PHILOSOPHY

(Continued from Vol. 4, p. 160.)

b. *The Syntheses of the Middle Ages*

31. Terminology need not engage us long here. When I use the words "Middle Ages," I certainly do not mean to assent to the minimising which, since JOHANNES ANDREA first used it in 1469,¹ has often echoed in this term. As to its meaning, I signify by it the West during the period from about 732 to about 1250.

32. This era is marked by the attempts to arrive at a synthesis between *Teutonic life* and life out of the time and the milieu of the *patres*, both of which had now for centuries been in contact with each other. While a similar fruitful contact was lacking in the East, a synthesis in this sense was also lacking. Meanwhile we must remember that it was a synthesis between two elements of which one—the time of the *patres*—already included many syntheses.

33. Up to this time the church, as far as its relation to the life of the state was concerned, had had most to do with the Roman Empire. Whatever had been changed in this relation since the first century for the benefit of the church, it had never really been a hearty relation. For after the change under CONSTANTINE the church had always to pay any concession given it by a surrender of its character. While the church viewed itself correctly as an institute of a very special character, the court had constantly considered it as an institute in the sense which the late Roman law attached to this word.

But now much began to change here. The opposition of the Emperor to the worship of images caused the Pope to look elsewhere for help. This help was offered by the Lombards who for a few centuries had inhabited the plateau of the Po valley and who were anxious to settle in the whole of Italy. But the Pope saw that if their plan succeeded his position would be just as dependent as was that of the Bishop of Byzantium. That is why he was directed to a power further away. Sacrificing the unity of Italy

¹ In an article on CUSANUS, see E. CASSIRER, *Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance*, Leipzig-Berlin, B. G. Teubner, 1927, page 36, note 1.

for the sake of the freedom of the church he called in the help of CHARLES MARTEL. MARTEL had meanwhile been succeeded in 741 by both of his sons; after the one had abdicated, PIPPIN III remained as the only duke of the Franks; in 751 he drove the Merovingians from the throne. But since this act conflicted with the Teutonic conception of the rights of dynasty, PIPPIN needed for the foundation of his rule a moral support which the church alone could give. Thus the Pope and the Major-domus found each other. The first mentioned was to sanction the kingship of the second by a church ceremony at the time of the coronation, for which PIPPIN, on his part, was to give part of the feudal estate which he had received from the Emperor, to the Pope and was to protect his vassal against the Lombards and support him against the Emperor.

The important thing in this contract was that many factors which had formerly disturbed the relation between church and state played no part here. On the side of PIPPIN, for instance, there was lacking the claim of the pontificate; at the same time, because of his ousting of the Merovingians, he stood in a strained relation to the Teutonic conception concerning the kingship by God's grace. And the church, on its side, had long since exchanged the idea of the "papacy of God's grace" for the other, that the Pope represented the deified pneumatic-prophetic High Priest upon earth. In this last named construction it was only necessary to incorporate the kingship in order to secure a fitting whole; thus there grew the thought of the *corpus Christianum*, that is, Christendom viewed as the holy empire (*sacrum imperium*), whose priesthood and kingship (*sacerdotium et regnum*) were both offshoots of the two-fold office of the deified Christ in His glory. ALCUIN—in whom the influence of the "Realistic" eclectic of BOETHIUS crosses that of AUGUSTINE—with the help of speculative exegesis of Luke xxii. 38, soon gave the necessary Scripture proof for the doctrine which fitted in with this construction, namely the *doctrine of the two swords*.¹ The burden of partial theism weighs upon this construction heavier than that of LEONTIUS: it also passes up the difference between the omnipotence of the Son and "all might" which is given to Christ as reward for His work, while besides this, it narrows down to a purely political office, human kingship, which has been restored in Christ.

¹ A. DEMPF, as above, pages 133-155.

The Pope stood doubly strong in the struggle about the images which the court at Byzantium must finally lose because of the weakening of the Monophysites in the East. PIPPIN's son, CHARLES THE GREAT, had aimed at the Emperor's throne and wanted the Pope to depose him on the basis of the doctrine of the two swords both because he called himself pontifex maximus, which honour belongs only to Christ, and because as ruler of state he meddled with church affairs. Although this did not happen, the well-known coronation on Christmas night of 800 sealed anew the dangerous, but certainly very imposing, new construction, which opened up for the church unknown possibilities, but which would soon trap it in countless questions; for the idea of a national church did not give up the struggle against the conception of the church as a world unity.

The theory of LEONTIUS won a success at another point—supported in this respect by the Eastern Neo-platonists: in the struggle about the worship of images the Western Neo-platonism of AUGUSTINE had to give up, in spite of its permeation in the matter of the “filioque.”

That decided for a great part the lot of the popular branch of Stoicism in pneumatism. While it could rejoice in the victory of the “filioque,” which—although scriptural—agreed terminologically with the old superordination theory of TERTULLIAN, the acceptance of the worship of images gave it a hard blow. Besides its interpretation of the “filioque” it could now find support, as far as official matters were concerned, only in the idea of a national church.

As far as the aristocratic offshoot of Nominalism is concerned, it was fed from the late Roman¹ institutes of law and ideas of law of the inhabitants of the East-Roman Empire which still found itself capable of withstanding the Saracens. Even in the dogmatic domain it lifted up its head for a short while in the Arianism of the Spanish supporters of the Adoption theory.²

34. They were not narrow-minded conflicts, but inner tensions which soon threatened the construction of the *sacrum imperium*. For the Teuton viewed the church as a subordinate part of the affairs of the people which needed to be supported by the king. And in the church the very correct idea that the

¹ H. FITTING, *Zur Geschichte der Rechtswissenschaft am Anfange des Mittelalters*. Rede zum Antritte des Rectorates am 12 Juli 1874 gehalten, Halle, Verlag der Buchhandlung des Waisenhauses, 1875.

² R. SEEBERG, as above, Vol. III, 4th ed., 1930, pages 57-82.

union between Christ and His church is more intimate than that between Him and the State which includes all citizens, also aroused dissatisfaction with the equalising of the *sacerdotium* and the *regnum*. Added to this there was the breaking up of the empire of CHARLES. In our day the regulation of the relation between "church and state" is hindered in many lands by the multiplicity of churches within one state, while in those days it was just the opposite: the church kept the unity which it had recently secured from the State, while the State fell apart into many miniature states. That led again, even as before, to a seeing of the divine entelechy only in the pneumatic priesthood of the glorified Christ. The *corpus Christianum* was now thought to be so constructed that the many rulers stood on a lower plane than the one Pope. In the *Donatio Constantini* (816) HILDUIN gave a reconstruction of history in the time of CONSTANTINE to fit in with the new ideals, and in the *Decretalia* of PSEUDO-ISIDORUS a similar revision of the Papal system was given. And it seemed as if these ideas could already be applied to the church-state which in 875 was raised from a feudal state to an independent kingdom.

The life of the Teutonic Christians was a bit strange in view of this modification of the new theory. The result was not only that two conceptions of the *corpus Christianum* came to the front—HRABANUS MAURUS remained true to the theory of ALCUIN—but also that both church and state, anxious to preserve the contact which had been secured, not in an arbitrary way, concentrated their attention more strongly upon the point of contact between both powers, namely, on the sacrament. That all this helped the earlier Aristotelianism with its over-estimation of the ecclesiastical pneumatic priesthood, and not the Augustinianism which Neo-platonically raised the elect, although bound to the sacraments and to the church, above it, is clear. It was on account of this that RATRAMNUS could not overcome the transubstantiation theory which was formulated for the first time in this period by RADBERTUS PASCHASIUS and which practically already came down to this, that, while the "accidentia" (taste, colour, etc.) of the bread and wine used in the sacrament remained the same, the "substances" of both were changed into those of the flesh and blood of the Christ—we see a satisfying of the strong desire for miracle united with an explanation which fits into the scheme of the Aristotelian "realism," although not agreeing

entirely with the Christianised Aristotelianism of LEONTIUS. Hence it was that GOTTSCHALK with his confession of a double predestination was defeated by the Semi-pelagianism of HRABANUS MAURUS. AUGUSTINE also lost territory on the other side when ERIGENA, diverging away from him, became an earnest follower of PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS. And because of that, the idea that the Holy Spirit was the world-soul, an idea which AUGUSTINE had constantly opposed, gained many followers in the West, and that just at a time when the church in the East, under the influence of Neoplatonism and of Monarchianism, rejected the "filioque" (867).

The constant growth of Neo-platonic and Aristotelian "Realism" which also in this period was accompanied by the strengthening of idealistic tendencies in literature, naturally signified no advantage for the teaching of the Stoics; and so it became a stowaway which kept itself hid partly in the legal life of the old empire and partly in the Apocalyptic writings which followed upon TYCONIUS.

35. The tenth century bears its old name "saeculum obscurum" up to the present day and that rightly. A few characteristics become clearer and show the importance of this period for the further progress of affairs. First of all, the declaration of the church-state that it was independent was a premature triumph: the struggle of the Lombardian nobles made the relation to Rome so chaotic that compared with this state of affairs the earlier vassalage was desirable. Because of the rise of East-France and the decay of the West as a result of the expeditions of the Norsemen, the German king was the one appointed to be feudal lord. His coronation as emperor of the West-Roman Empire of the German nation (962) was part of the reward for his assuming the feudal lordship over the Eternal City.

If we ask about the philosophy of this period, then we must distinguish between the light in the schools and outside. The first are "Realistic": the one of Auxerre follows ERIGENA—and remains untouched upon here; the one of Fulda follows BOETHIUS. The last mentioned school is that of the partial theistic "Realists." But in practice it no longer forms the unity of former days: outside of the schools a separate group in it can be clearly seen. ODO OF CLUNY and others set themselves at this time against the danger that the piety of the monks should be dissolved in the learning of Hellenistic speculation. In so far as this movement was negative it could be entirely justified;

for Christian piety and genuine science are really never identical : it is only when the Christian religion animates the man of science so that he is obedient to the Word of God also in his scientific work, only then may his scientific work and the results reached through it be called Christian. But this conception was certainly not that of the monks of Cluny. They put piety on a par with functions of faith and ethics, and in harmony with the ruling conception in the church, they distinguished these functions from the lower as the "supernatural" from the "natural," and—in an even more fatal confusion of ideas—as "sphere of grace" from "the domain of nature," as if "grace" were ever a human function and not always an expression of God's mercy!

This movement was thus an offshoot of the partial theistic, and at the same time "Realistic" church-idea of Rome, and thus certainly not Nominalistic. And yet it can be understood very well why it later on helped the Stoics. For, by confining piety to the functions of faith and ethics, it handed the rest over to paganism which thereby received opportunity to develop itself in various directions. As long as this movement did not point philosophy to this rump of nature as the source of knowledge, its "Realism" in the matter of the "supernatural" was able to restrain the revival of Nominalism, especially since it was supported by those "Realists" who did not accept this division. But when it went farther and secularised philosophy, this restraint was also removed.

It is true, affairs did not get thus far during the Middle Ages. But still, many factors helped to strengthen the position of Nominalism in the period after about 975. And those modifications which were at work in this school were already present in the last period previous to 975, and thus require mention here.

First of all we need to note that because of a royal marriage South-Italy changed from being a part of the East-Roman empire to the West-Roman empire in 973, and the first Western emperor of this territory was OTTO III (983-1002), who was very well orientated to Italy, who saw in JUSTINIAN his "most holy predecessor," and as a result bound all administration of justice to the *corpus iuris*.¹ Because of this the dominion of

¹ H. V. SCHUBERT, art. as above, page 41, quotes the Mon. Germ., Leges IV, 662 : tunc dicat imperator iudici : cave ne aliqua occasione Justiniani sanctissimi antecessoris nostri legem subvertas. (Then the emperor says to the judge : "See to it that you do not on any occasion change the law of our most holy predecessor Justinian.")

monarchical Nominalism in the South was assured of continuity, and the West was opened for the permeation of its principles.

In the second place, a political uncertainty arose among the old inhabitants of this Italian peninsula because of the German dominion over Italy, and this must sooner or later open a way for itself in popular-Nominalistic movements and theories. And then, too, when long after the conquest of Sicily by the Saracens in 849 the strait of Messina, the old main trade-route between East and West, continued to be unsafe, the trade shifted to the plateau of the North of Italy. And the old cities there, now flourishing anew, appeared, shortly after 1000, to be breeding places for the two offshoots of the newly advancing Nominalism.¹

36. Soon after the year 1000 the practically unlimited power of the Realistic wing of partial theism comes to a close. There were various factors at work here.

There was, in the first place, the danger which was attached to the application of the feudal system to ecclesiastical office-bearers, something which revealed itself more strongly in proportion to the increasing power of the rulers. The appointment of someone to a bishopric usually meant that the king was giving into the care of one of his subjects an important piece of property, so that the choice of future vassals was determined more and more by non-ecclesiastical factors. In fact, it was often dependent upon the amount of money which was paid to the ruler as a kind of rent. If this system was subject to just criticism from a political point of view, from the point of view of the church it was a much more serious business, because this feudal union between church and state in several countries forced the Pope to clothe with church office a man who had beforehand gained the favour of the ruler involved by payment of large sums of money. Because of this, this system, which was native to France, led everywhere in the West to the practice of simony. The East, where the feudal system was practically unknown, gradually loosened itself from Rome; in 1054 the schism was officially declared. It is no wonder that the eyes of the church office-bearers in the West were opened to the deadly danger of simony, a matter of which ALCUIN had already given account. And because of this there came a more general recognition of the priority of the Church above that of the State, especially from

¹ P. HÖNIGSHEIM, *Zur Soziologie der mittelalterlichen Scholastik* (Die soziologische Bedeutung der nominalistischen Philosophie), in: MELCHIOR PALYI, *Hauptprobleme der Soziologie*, Erinnerungsgabe für Max Weber, München und Leipzig, Duncker & Humblot, 1923, pages 173-218.

the side of the Church. The development of this thought differed: some saw the cone of earthly hierarchies at the top of which was the Church, as an unbroken thing, and others were inclined to separate the "domains" of "nature" and of "grace," which were viewed as functions.¹

In the second place we make note of the fact that Nominalism again made its appearance in public life. First of all in North-Italy. There flourished in the first half of the eleventh century the law-school of Pavia, the city where LANFRANC was born, and where besides Lombardian law the late-Roman law was also taught, and that as a subsidiary source of the national legislation. Equipped with this knowledge² ANSELM OF BESATE started out on a tour of Burgundy and Germany about 1050. Although he called himself a "peripatetic," his love for ARISTOTLE meant no more than a strong preference for syllogisms: really, he sided with CICERO, and thus with the Stoics. The leading representatives of the groups of partial theistic Realists stiffened their backs: Cardinal HUMBERT (*d.* 1061), a German representative of the unbroken hierarchical order, set himself against the reawakening Pelagianism, and GERARD OF CZANAD (*d.* 1046), a fellow-countryman of ANSELM, takes refuge from this danger in the dualism of "nature-grace." He no longer puts down the postulate of a Scriptural philosophy which ought to take the Scripture as source of knowledge in earnest, but accepts, without criticism, the Hellenistic philosophy, and then tries to escape the difficulty of its problems by forbidding it to make even the slightest criticism of the dogmas which have once been accepted. This conservatism does not perceive the double danger which threatened here both in the shutting out of reformation, and in the accepting of auxiliary troops for the defence of the situation,

¹ Naturally, there is no objection, in itself, against speaking of a "domain of grace". That is, as long as one remembers that this domain, as long as it is not more closely defined, is the same as the created realm, and is called that because and in so far as God looks down upon it with approval. That domain is much larger than that of the Church as body of Christ, and thus *a fortiori* larger than the life of this church as institute: in the most degenerate and remote tribes God often gives to certain people rich gifts of ability to rule in the life of family and people. Calvinists have always seen this, and it is this that lies in their term "common grace". The sphere of special grace stands in relation to common grace as that part which is reconciled to God and that part which is not so reconciled, in so far as God looks with good pleasure upon His creation. Thus the distinction between "common" and "special" grace is fully justified; the danger arises when one allows them to coincide with a dichotomy of functions of the same person. For then one goes back to the division of the Middle Ages, "Nature-grace," while one robs oneself of ever seeing this by using Calvinistic terms which mean something quite different.—The question as to whether one is not more safe by calling part of the domain of "common grace" (namely, in so far as it is not directly related to the preparation and the maintenance of the life of special grace) as the sphere of the "goodness of God," may, although in itself it is important, be laid aside because of its secondary importance here.

² H. FITTING, as above, page 9.

troops which—in so far as they were partial theistic—when measured by the norm of Sacred Scripture, were purely revolutionary.

37. The revolutionary thesis which is inherent in all partial theism, does not always bring with it opposition to the government, for the "Realists" among them very clearly recognise a unity in the State and—at least when they see it—in the Church. Stoicism, however, always nourishes the hallucination of sovereignty on the part of the individual, whether a ruler or a subject, and thus, although in the roots no more revolutionary than Realistic partial theism, presents an acute danger to the unity of the State and—in *casu* also of the Church, which it either consumes with an unbearable tension between a tyrannical ruler and his refractory subjects, or sacrifices to the gaining of personal ideals. And even when it places itself in the service of reformation, it betrays, both in its ideal—think here of the action against the marriage of the clergy—and its method, its revolutionary character. It is because of this, for instance, that the "pataria"-movement which deposed bishops without trial if they were guilty of simony or if they had been ordained by simonists, looks as much like the Donatistic action of an earlier century against the "traditores" as two drops of water. And even though the ecclesiastical regulations of these conditions (1061) put an end to this revolutionary action, this fermentation clearly shows how much power the Stoics still had among the people. Another witness to this is the acceptance which it had among the nobles of South-France, who wished to hinder their vassal, which motive was also a matter of importance in the investiture struggle when the German barons and dukes were anxious to be released from their oaths of allegiance by GREGORY VII because of his conflict with HENRY IV (1077). In this connection there is significance in the fact that the first crusade (1096-1099) was not led by kings, but mainly by noblemen of French origin.

And so the forces of Nominalism which worked destructively for the states were used by the Popes for the reaching of many an ideal. There was also progress in its theory in both its democratic and its aristocratic form.

The latter controlled education in the "worldly"-law which, because of the unrest at Rome, was shifted to North-Italy, so that it was now taught not only at Pavia, but also—and in a more monarchian direction—at Ravenna, and later also at

Bologna where, under IRNERIUS, it broke loose from the liberal arts and graduated as an independent science.

As far as popular Stoicism is concerned, we meet it first of all among those who did not know how to distinguish questions of law from questions of faith and ethics. The Romish confusion between being ordained into an office and the receiving of a sacrament, which appears in the instituting of the sacrament of holy orders, contributed to this condition. It was because of this, for instance, that PETER DAMIANUS came, *via* his creditable theory of the working of the sacraments (conceived mostly after Romish fashion), namely, that their working depends partly upon the believer, to view the question as to whether one was permitted to hold a church office or not, as a non-judicial one.¹ Another effect, which goes still further, can be seen in North-France where the population of the rising cities were not enamoured of the feudal conception of Church and State, and where Stoicism enthused several of the more learned. Thus ROSCELLINUS starts out from the indivisibility of individual things which, according to him, never *have* parts, but which can alone *be* parts of a collection which again can never be a thing-unity. The impression that this is so rests, according to him, upon the use of collective nouns as "house," "syllogism," etc. Naturally, in this way it was not possible for him to view a family, a state or the church as a unity. That his thing-concept was Aristotelian-Stoic, even as that of JOHANNES PHILOPONUS,² can be deduced from his tri-theism which was condemned in 1092. His disciple ABELARD not only deepened the view of language which ROSCELLINUS had, but also avoided his tri-theism: not the three Persons, but the unity of God was put on an equality with an indivisible individual, and thus he hesitated between the dynamic and the modal Monarchianism in his view of the Trinity. In the doctrine of the Mediator he accepted the democratic statement of the problem and leaned over to a Nestorian solution. As far as the doctrine of knowledge is concerned, as a real Stoic, he puts "believing" on a par with the acceptance of the existence of the external world, which for him was uncertain; and therefore he values it lower than the unscientific or the scientific knowledge concerning the Self.

¹ H. FITTING, as above, page 20.

² See above, paragraph 27.

Partial theistic "Realism" was for the time being sufficiently strong to condemn these opponents. At the same time the fact that the Nominalists were showing themselves again not only in Italy but also in France awakened unrest. This was especially the case because there was lack of agreement among the Realists.

There was first of all the conflict about the question concerning the priority of church or state. It is true that most of them accepted the first, but it furnished food for thought that just recently (1066) in England a scholastic of note, the so-called ANONYMUS OF YORK,¹ as a real German reached back behind the revolution of PIPPIN to the "kingship of God's grace" and, Christianising this, gave the political counterpart to the former construction of BONIFACE II. In this case in strong contrast to the high priesthood of Christ, which was called purely human, his kingship was deified, and parallel to this the king was placed above the national church, and the Pope degraded to the position of peace-maker in questions arising between the various national churches. And that this construction was not merely a theory originating in the study appears from the principles which controlled the concordat of 1106 between the King of England and the Pope.²

Of no less importance was the fiction in this circle regarding the Eucharist which was so important in the matter of the contact between people and church. It could be brought in against the construction of RADBERTUS PASCHASIUS that bread and wine did not change into the body and blood of Christ since smell, taste, and colour remained the same; and this argument of BERENGARIUS OF TOURS found acceptance not alone on the part of his Neo-platonic associates. Even his keenest opponents, such as LANFRANC, needed to take account of it. They could not let matters go by a meaningless reference to the tangibility of the elements, and therefore sought refuge in a closer development of the Aristotelian distinction between "substance" and "accident," maintaining that only the substances of bread and wine changed into the flesh and blood of the Lord. Meanwhile others who, even though they rejected the Neo-Platonic construction of BERENGARIUS, were yet much under the impression

¹ H. BÖHMER, *Der Yorker Anonymus, eine Studie zur Geschichte des Anglo-Normännischen Klerus*, Habilitationsschrift, Leipzig, Theodor Weicher, 1898.

² H. V. SCHUBERT, article as above, page 38.

of the rightness of his criticism, that the old objections still pressed down upon the new solutions of the church. Therefore they were of the idea that transubstantiation did not take place but that the Christ came into the bread and the wine. Especially two motives helped along the advocates of this theory of "impanation." In the first place, this construction agreed better than the other with the second Council of Chalcedon: if the distinction of LANFRANC and others fitted in the Aristotelian scheme, the solution of the impanation theory was a lengthening of the doctrine of incarnation as taught by LEONTIUS of BYZANTIUM and was thus linked to the earlier Christianising of Aristotelianism. Another thing must be added here. All Realistic partial theists rejected the Nominalistic view of DAMIANI and distinguished the magical working of the sacraments from the qualifications of the office bearer. But when one accepted transubstantiation and made this entirely dependent upon the official acts of the priests, then the conclusion could not be avoided that the simonists could also bring about transubstantiation. Partly because of this a man like HILDEBRAND who later on was to play such an important role in the investiture struggle, leaned toward the impanation theory,¹ for this recognised in the sacrament of the altar a factor about which the priest had nothing to say. Against this LANFRANC and others could merely say that the struggle against the Catharists made a total rejection of all dualism desirable; and the customary worshipping of the host, if the impanation theory were accepted, would amount to nothing but bread worship. And yet this argument, which had practice behind it, won the victory over the impanation theory in spite of LEONTIUS and GREGORY.² What this difference meant for the Realistic partial theists can be deduced from the fact that it appeared repeatedly, and after a while would keep the parties separated in the struggle between SCOTUS and THOMAS. The tension toward the end of the eleventh century was great.

¹ C. MIBBT, *Die Publizistik im Zeitalter Gregors VII*, Leipzig, J. C. Hinrichsche Buchhandlung, 1894, especially pages 435-438 and 595-598.

² SEEBERG, as above, pages 206-215. SEEBERG is wrong when on page 214 he says that the impanation theory is the root of the consubstantiation theory. The consubstantiation theory, which we will discuss later on in paragraph 43, is Nominalistic, and does not rest upon an Aristotelian but upon a Stoic idea of substance. This lapse on the part of the great historian of dogma can easily be explained. In earlier days when everything that was non-Thomistic in the Middle Ages was called "Nominalistic," BERENGARIUS of TOURS (par. 42) and QUIDORT (par. 43) were also called "Nominalists." That explains why their disagreements with the accepted theories concerning dogma were brought into relation with those of OCCAM (par. 43). Fortunately, this wrong view is quite generally discarded now; also by SEEBERG. This change needs to be followed by a correction in the terms indicating the various theories of the sacrament; and this will certainly come.

Although the majority shared the position of LANFRANC the election of HILDEBRAND to the papacy also gives food for thought.

The supporters and opponents of a rupture in the hierarchical order were engaged in a more intense struggle and neither of the two groups was ready to ignore the difference at this point. As a witness we have the debate in 1118 on the voluntary surrender¹ of "worldly" goods by the Church.

Finally, to grasp the tension which this group experienced in about 1100, we must call to mind the revival of the Platonic partial theistic "Realism" which was discovered by ABELARD of BATH among the Saracens on the shores of the Mediterranean Sea. For here, too, the danger of internal war threatened: the Platonic atomism could not ultimately go hand in hand with the immanent purpose-doctrine of Aristotelianism.

38. The middle and the end of the twelfth century also witness to the strengthening of the anti-Realistic tendencies within partial theism. This holds first of all for practical life: we have but to think of the weaver-disturbances in Flanders, the Anabaptist disturbances in South-France,² and the revolt of the Roman citizens under ARNOLD OF BRESCIA, and of the opposition of the Lombardian cities to the efforts of FREDERICK THE FIRST to introduce by force the feudal system which up to this time had not been able to root itself deeply here, which struggle was definitely crowned with success in 1183. The same tendencies controlled theoretic life.

If we distinguish again between the aristocratic and democratic Nominalism, we find that the last named group maintains the leadership. In fact, we can discover a western element which stands separate for the time being but later on is united with the older and arouses enthusiasm. Meanwhile, a study of the older Nominalism which was more orientated to the Eastern dogmatics shows us an interesting difference. On the one hand, we find the purely Stoic-and-Aristotelianising-Stoic school which we already saw in ROSCELLINUS and ABELARD, back in GILBERT PORRETANUS who views the Mediator as a monophysitic God-man, and who views the two natures Nominalistically as the non-sovereign attributes of this God-man. Subjecting himself to

¹ A. DEMPF, as above, page 217.

² Both PETRUS DE BRUIS, the leader of this movement, and ARNOLD OF BRESCIA, in whom the offshoot of the pataria-movement united with the preaching of the poverty-ideal against the Church, although the Church had itself rejected that ideal, were disciples of ABELARD. See G. FICKER, R.I.G., Vol. I, 1927, columns 561-562 and 1287.

the decision of the Synod of Soissons (1121), he wishes now to place philosophy at the service of dogma. But he wandered off immediately. Applying himself to the Neo-platonism of ERIGENA and discovering that PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS could not have been a hearer of Paul, he impoverishes the Realistic subordination of this author to the doctrine of one divine absolute person with the attributes of omnipotence, wisdom, and goodness. All of this is merely an approach to the anthropology which views the functionalistically conceived spirit of man as being first. This good function-nucleus is autonomous, so much so that, according to him, that which agrees with the judgment of this nucleus may not be called sin, with which proposition the conscience appeals not from the church to God's Word, but to one's self! The relation between different individuals is shut out since each is a world in himself and the highest which can thus be attained is mutual harmony.

If one attempts to define this Nominalistic construction more closely, then it appears that it belongs to pseudo-Neoplatonism. And it makes us think of Monenergisms.¹ But that does not mean to say that ABELARD also leaned toward this form of Monophysitism. Just as next to Stoic Monophysites we also met Duophysites,² it is possible as a pseudo-Neoplatonist to be a Stoic Duo-energist. But the investigation of ABELARD is not yet ended and so it will be safest merely to say that if in his second period he remained Nestorian, then he was a Duo-energist.

However ABELARD, during his second period, may have differed from his contemporaries, this theory remained orientated to the East. It is a different matter when we come to the pneumatism of JOACHIM of FLORIS (1130-1202). The expressions in his article on the Trinity are strongly tri-theistic, it is true.³ But in his later works an entirely different wind is blowing. They were written under the influence of the youngest representative of German symbolism which may not be called Nominalistic because it was Platonic and thus was Realistic partial theistic. We meet this tendency in PHILO at an earlier date.

¹ See above, paragraph 28.

² See W. KROLL, article in Pauly (Wissova)'s *Real-Enzyklopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaften*, 2nd ed., Stuttgart, J. B. Metzlersche Buchhandlung, VIII, 1913, column 792-823, and W. VON CHRIST (SCHMID-STÄHELIN), *Geschichte der Griechischen Literatur*, Vol. II, 2nd. ed., München, O. Beck, 1924, pages 1068-1072.

³ See SEEBERG, as above, III, page 408.

But that which differentiates the German symbolists of the twelfth century from PHILO and from HUGO OF ST. VICTOR is the conception that a historic sequence is recognised in the lower part of the cosmos which is here viewed as a symbol of the higher. This history was forced into the trinitarian scheme of creation, world history, and church history. In the latter the history of monasticism soon gained a place, as did also the increase of symbolical knowledge analogous with the increase of the number of sacraments by the church. The leading thought among the younger ones of this group is that the misunderstood church first arose in the world history, and thus later than it. This idea in connection with the dualism nature-grace led to the proposition that the non-worldly clergy, that is that part of the church office-bearers who, since they have not any state property under their control, is to be valued higher than the worldly clergy with whom this was the case. And from this, only one step was necessary to arrive at the expectation that after the cessation of the feudal system the future for the first named group would be most uncertain. Finally, the youngest member, HILDEGARD VAN BINGEN, sees in its visions the dawn of the day in which the non-worldly clergy will preach to the people the gospel, and this misunderstood in the spiritualistic sense. The Realistic German symbolism had already gone through all of this development when the Nominalist JOACHIM OF FLORIS learned to know it.¹ He connected it with his views of the Trinity and so arrived at the propositions of TERTULLIAN which had only been accepted by the Western pneumatists. But matters did not stop there. Following the line of TERTULLIAN² to the end, he also ended with chiliastic calculations on the basis of which he expected the coming of a new kingdom in about 1200. Bound with the ideals of some of the followers of FRANCIS this Western Nominalism would later become a mighty stimulus of the Renaissance.

So much for the popular Nominalism during the middle and close of the twelfth century. Its aristocratic twin fared equally well. In the North there can also be seen the late-Roman view of the State, and that by OTTO VON FREISING, the uncle of Barbarossa. As far as a visible future is concerned he thinks that it belongs to the Church and not to the State. But as long

¹ A. DEMPF, as above, pages 229-284.

² See above, paragraph 19.

as the State is there, the "princeps legibus solutus est" is valid in its domain.

In spite of all this, "Realism" easily retained its position; and no wonder, as long as it could boast the possession of a man like BERNARD OF CLAIRVAUX, who first reconciled the Pope with the French king and later found a wide hearing in his preaching of the second Crusade. But when this failed, enthusiasm cooled noticeably. The three chief rulers took part in the third Crusade, but their main motive was mutual jealousy. And BERNARD'S faith in the unbroken hierarchy found continually fewer advocates in the circle of the Realists in spite of his distinction between the domains of the two swords. The function dichotomy of "nature" and "grace," helped along by symbolism, constantly increased in influence. And with the cry of the monks for the "spiritualising" of the church there was coupled the louder cry of the laity for the "secularising" of the "natural."

39. The efforts of both groups undermine both the feudal system and its relation to the Church: the merchants despised the old nobility and the monks despised the feudal clergy. Especially the first named rejoiced when the introduction of the feudal system in the Latin Empire (1204-1261), established as result of a Crusade, from purely mercantile considerations, under the leadership of Venice, failed. The gain of the actions of both groups of advocates for the separation between "nature" and "grace" came to a third power, namely the kingship; for in the measure in which a ruler understood his time he came to stand much more free over against the older forces of feudal clergy and feudal lords, and the path to absolute monarchy lay open for him.

Now it first appeared what danger there lay in the equalising of the function of faith with religion which places all the functions in the service of God. For the life which lies below faith, rightly seeing itself free from the authority of the Church office-bearers, tore itself loose also from all bondage to the Word of God: ruler, merchant, and the industrial man had learned from the Church that the Church and the cash books had not much to do with each other. And the seriousness of the condition was increased in no small degree by the fact that the politics of the Guelfs had again raised Rome to an independent state (1208). For this was a different time from that of 875: soon the political

life in the reborn church-state would also cut itself loose from the Word-revelation and carry on politics which would be purely financial and therefore mammonistic.

The conclusion as regards the relation between faith and philosophy which fitted with this increasing secularisation of life would be made somewhat later. We need but mention a few facts here, which later on would create a large circle of adherents to this conclusion.

There is, to begin with, the preaching of FRANCIS OF ASSISI. Up to this time the supporters of the spiritualising of the church had constantly been enthused by the monastic ideal; in North-Italy they now saw the relation between the feudal system and monastery life and so rejected the second along with the first.

FRANCIS accepted the (Realistic) symbolism in the unhistorical style of PHILO and HUGO OF ST. VICTOR; then, *via* the love of his milieu—that the unnatural was getting tired of the “supernatural”—for “nature,” he arrived at nature-symbolism: the entire lower world is a symbol and all life is the enjoyment of a sacrament. He sees his life’s work in the preaching of the poverty-idea. But because sacrifice of luxury is suffering, this suffering comes to stand in the foreground both in Christology and in the doctrine of the Church sacraments: the Christ is here neither the Emperor of the feudal system, nor the High Priest or King of God’s grace—no, He is the Sufferer of poverty, and of the seven sacraments the one of the altar is chief.¹

As a second factor we need to mention the rise of the universities organised at the beginning as a kind of guild of teachers and students.²

The union of the two factors just named was made by the Pope, who, fearing the restlessness and the idleness on the part of the preachers of the poverty-idea, organised them into orders of monks—begging orders—and reminded them of the great scientific work which could be done.

As a fourth factor we mention the Arabian and the Jewish philosophy which was becoming increasingly better known. What requires attention here especially is the union of Greek speculation with the Mohammedan faith in the Koran in the

¹ A. DEMPF, as above, pages 284-298.

² Cf. DR. M. VAN RHYN, *Het leven aan een Middeleeuwsche universiteit*, in *Stemmen des Tijds*, XVI (1927), 12, pages 535-561.

trifling of AVICENNA, which was justly disapproved of by other Arabian philosophers;¹ and the union of Jewish faith in the Old Testament with this Greek speculation in the forced constructions of MAIMONIDES. Both struggled with the problem of the two sources of knowledge ("scripture" and "nature"), but by "nature" they did not understand the entire cosmos but the Aristotelian view of nature, and so the problem of the relation between the knowledge from one source and that from the other received the form of this puzzle: "How is the knowledge which comes to us through the Word-revelation of God (or—AVICENNA says—what we take to be that) to be united with the paganism of ARISTOTLE?" And this question was asked without perceiving the unlawfulness of this problem for those who believe the real Word-revelation.

The translation of the work of these authors helped along the Realistic partial theism; but Nominalism could also register gains. In the struggle of FREDERICK II against the Pope the late-Roman law, taught at the schools in Bologna and Padua and at the University of Naples, rendered exceptional services to absolutism. As far as the popular Nominalism is concerned we need to pay attention to two facts. In the first place, there are the handbooks which, in spite of the addition of new material (*logica nova*) from that part of the writings of ARISTOTLE which had just become known—these books remained, in true Nominalistic style, true to the supposition-logic (*logica modernorum*).² But no less does it require mention, with a view to the further progress of history, that JOHN OF PARMA bridged the gap between the Joachitic chiliasm and the scientific nature-symbolism of the Franciscans.³

40. If we take a glance backward, we can say that up to this time the best efforts have been spent in the seeking of a synthesis between the Greek-Hellenistic systems and the basic thoughts of Holy Scripture. Naturally, the acquired result could be reached only by seriously mutilating the original

¹ L. GAUTHIER, *Scolastique musulmane et scolastique chrétienne*. A propos d'un livre récent, in *Revue d'histoire de la philosophie*, II (1928), pages 221-253 and 333-365.

² UEBERWEG GEIJER, as above, pages 455-456.

³ According to HÖNINGSHEIM, in the article referred to, the relation between "old" and "new" Nominalism is still problematical; thus it seems to me that this division loses its significance. For the influence of the textbooks on logic was a factor more important than now. Deeper insight can only be gained by a combination of researches, in which the social element received an important place, but in which the history of the Church, of piety, of dogma and jurisprudence at the time of the patres, may not be undervalued.

content of both. But usually there had been little bargaining and the price was paid without much murmuring.

But things were going to change.

2. THE WEAKENING OF THE EFFORT AFTER SYNTHESIS IN PHILOSOPHY

41. Usually the beginning of the new period bears the name *Renaissance*. As we know, this term means "re-birth." Those who used this word first actually meant what the word indicates and that not for antiquity, but for themselves.¹ For a correct understanding of the change brought about in the meaning of this word at that time, we must remember that the Church of the Middle Ages, in a terrible over-evaluation of itself, had bound the re-birth (regeneration) inseparably to the sacramental grace of baptism and thus had taken this grace of God into its ecclesiastical system.² Now, when natural life frees itself from the Church then it retains the idea that "to be born again" is left to man. The great difference between this and the former centuries lies here, that man is no longer made equal to the priest of the supernatural sacrament-church who has a share in the entelechian Christ, but with the man who lives in the "natural" and who now reaches out after the ideal to regenerate himself according to the norm of antiquity.³

If one remembers this, one can more readily understand why the Renaissance began in one sphere of culture much earlier than in another. Looking back, we can now see that, without using the term, we have recognised the fact in the life of commerce and state and industry. It began later in literature. But in philosophy it began about 1250, as I shall show.

The immediate occasion for the great change which we are here recording lay in the works of the leading philosophers of antiquity which were now becoming known. The better knowledge of their paganism is due especially to the many translations of these works, partly from the Arabic and Hebrew, and partly from the Greek. They were quite far from correctly stating the point of view of the authors. Even today many

¹ K. BURDACH, *Reformation, Renaissance, Humanismus*, zwei Abhandlungen über die Grundlagen moderner Bildung und Sprachkunst, Berlin, Gebr. Paetel, 1918, pages 13-96.

² DR. A. KUYPER, *Locus de Salute* (Dictaten Dogmatiek IV, 2nd ed.), Kampen, J. H. Kok, 1910, pages 71 ff.

³ K. BURDACH, as above, pages 175-180.

Nominalists understand the art of making the great Realists like PLATO and ARISTOTLE their allies—think of NATORP's interpretation of PLATO. Besides, the time had not yet dawned when the chief thoughts of Scripture were clearly understood. So we seek in vain in the Renaissance for a clear statement of the synthesis of the Middle Ages, something which is possible only when both philosophy and Scripture are rightly understood. But the Renaissance did see the difference between many philosophical writings and their mediæval interpretation.

So at least it brought about an important clearing up of things. And this we can truly appreciate even though we regret keenly that the growing insight usually led to a strengthening of paganism.

42. Most of the criticism of this period suffered from that Realism which up to this time had rejected the dualism between "nature" and "grace." For the anti-Christian tendency of the Arabic and Jewish "Realists" did show clearly the glory of a Christianised ARISTOTLE. In contrast to this the advocates of the spiritualising of the Church and of the secularising of the non-church "nature" soon had a solution ready. For with the increasingly popular tendency which distinguished "nature" and "grace" as "domains" the question must arise, sooner or later, whether philosophy perhaps did not belong to but *one* of these two so that the quest for a synthesis could be abandoned. And this question needed to be stated with emphasis as soon as the "natural" was again viewed through the spectacles of an author who not only did not know anything of the "supernatural" domain, but who in his system of immanent purposiveness *could not* have room for it. And here, too, the stating of the question already implied that the answer would be in the affirmative. For he who distinguishes between "nature" and "grace" as two functions has loosed the connection between "nature" and the Word of God, and is, as far as it is concerned, already *a priori* congenial with paganism. We must not underestimate the significance of this change of front for the philosophy of the Christians. Up to this time they had accepted the postulate that a Christian philosophy had to correspond to Christian faith. And even though one feels that the Fathers and the Middle Ages were a bit easy in their efforts to satisfy this postulate—at the same time making it unnecessarily difficult—the fact, that the demand was there, witnessed

to the courage of faith. But now this postulate is abandoned. THOMAS not only turns himself against AUGUSTINE but really against the whole Christian philosophy when he gives to philosophy as its only source of knowledge the Aristotelian conceived "nature," and as the only organ the "natural" reason, this latter also to be understood in an Aristotelian sense. To be sure, "supernatural theology" cannot succeed without some correction and filling in from the Holy Scriptures; and the *desiderium naturale* of the philosopher, according to him, reaches out for the crowning of his "natural theology" through this world of the *donum superadditum*. And the "Realism" of this lower doctrine concerning God—at least as far as it concerns man—agrees entirely with that of the supernatural—think here of LEONTIUS OF BYZANTIUM!—so that all danger of landing at a "double truth" is warded off.¹ But the appreciation both of the intention and of the gigantic struggle which THOMAS waged against the worldly clergy, against the Averroists, and against the less consistent BONAVENTURA, may not blind us to the fact that this result was secured with the double price of the "Realistic" (and thus metaphysical-idealistic) one-sidedness, and the higher price of the secularising of philosophy. That is, that after the State, commerce, and industry, now philosophy also is cut loose not only from the Church but also from the Word-revelation. The search for a Christian philosophy is finished here: the paganistic philosophy of ARISTOTLE is the "philosophia perennis."

Naturally, this new view met with opposition, for the search for a synthesis had lasted too long that all of them could give up together. BONAVENTURA especially set himself against the more consistent THOMAS. But to no avail: already in the following generation the "Realists" in his order, the restless Franciscans, would nearly all attach themselves to SCOTUS. Now Scotus did look at the relation between the "domains" of "nature" and "grace" otherwise than THOMAS. The domain of "grace" was, in his view, not so much the complement of "nature" as its correlate, so that these two "domains," according to him, are related to each other about as the two foci of the ellipse of the "potestas ordinata" whose mutual distinction rested upon

¹ A. DEMPFF, as above, pages 376-398.

the "potestas absoluta" of God. Besides the poverty-ideal which enthused more the circle of the Franciscans than the order of the Dominicans, there was also the motive for accentuating the difference between the domain of nature and that of grace within the *potestas ordinata*, and that was the keener application of Aristotelianism in philosophy. This is apparent in his theory of the Lord's Supper, which in order to give observation its rightful place as an element in knowledge, accepts the criticism of BERENGARIUS and restates the impanation theory¹ in his own terminology.² So the urge for a secularising of philosophy was no less strong among the SCOTISTS than among the followers of THOMAS.

Now, what attitude did the Nominalists take over against this effort? Here, too, the necessary clearness can be reached only when we make a sharp distinction between the aristocratic and the democratic group.

First of all, let us discuss the democrats. The sovereign part which they accept in every man, could not fit itself into a higher unity of church and state. And so when they wanted to give the increasingly popular dualism between nature and grace its full due, they were forced to place both in the non-sovereign part. Thus we understand why ROGER BACON who, terminologically, stood under the influence of the Neo-platonism which was so strong in England, distinguished between a threefold illumination of the intellect in the following manner: the first—the *illuminatio communis*—is given to everyone; the second—the *illuminatio traditionalis*—comes only to members of the church; and the highest—the *illuminatio specialis*—comes only to the "elect" in the sense of "free" spirits. Trichotomy is here, just as with all Stoics since MARCUS AURELIUS, a dichotomy with a sub-dichotomy in the non-sovereign part. The agreement of their theories with those of the Monophysites in the time of the Fathers is clear to these people; this being apparent in OLIVI³

¹ See above, paragraph 37.

² SEEBERG, as above, III, page 523; cf. note 2 on p. 409.

³ UEBERWEG-GEIJER, as above, pages 490-492, and fr. H. GERZ, *Petrus Olivi en de introspectieve methode*, in *Collectanea Franciscana Neerlandica*, Hertogenbosch, Teulings' Uitgeversmaatschappij, 1927 ff. II (1931), pages 307-320. It is interesting to note that he takes over the Church's use of the expression two natures, but still clings to the Stoic basic proposition: physis or individual nature equals hypostasis or substance. The one substance is then pure matter, the second is the vegetative and sensitive soul. That *this* "duophysitism" in Christology is not Nestorian but Apollinarian appears from his proposition that in usual cases the ratio is traced back to the Father, but in the case of the Mediator it is divine.

who was acquainted with the work of PHILOPONUS¹ through the translation into Latin by WILLIAM OF MOERBEKE. PHILOPONUS does not only strengthen OLIVI in his Stoic conception of the theory of knowledge; but his view of death, and his impetus-theory also goes back to PHILOPONUS. The keenness of the disciple is seen herein, that he saw through the non-Aristotelian character of the entelechy as spoken of by the master, and rejected Aristotelianism in real Stoic fashion. Materially OLIVI did not follow PHILOPONUS slavishly either: his great significance lies just here, that while he is also a disciple of JOHANNES OF PARMA, he also takes over ideas from JOACHIM OF FLORIS. We no longer find any trace here of Chiliastic computations, but the old spirit still lives in the enthusiastic expectation of a Messianic future of science that has been confused with spiritual life, in many cases analogous with the attitude of the French Positivists in the beginning of the nineteenth century. Concluding, it may be said that in this period the democratic Nominalists still cling to the synthesis, and are not yet making use of a conscious secularising of philosophy as was the case with THOMAS, against whom OLIVI contends at this point.

The aristocratic Nominalists were in a different position. The acceptance of the dualism "nature-grace" led in their circle to the so-called "curialism."² Its leading representative during this period is AEGIDIUS ROMANUS. He sees and describes the relations in states such as France very clearly: the thirst for gold which consumes the life of individuals, also controls the politics of the courts. Now, this sad state of affairs in the "natural" demands a power which can guarantee justice in the world. And this power can be found only in the church-state: all who belong to another state, both rulers and subjects, are "servi" of the church, and only those who in baptism have received the (churchified) regeneration, and who stand in sacramental communion with the church, have rights, and therefore can have property, for instance, and the others cannot. Here the independent church-state is thought of in the categories

¹ Note here the following: first, the theory of the two substances; second, the conception that the ratio belongs to the anima, but still appears and acts as forma regens in relation to corpus and anima; third, the hypostatizing of the self-consciousness: "nothing is more sure than the self-consciousness," OLIVI says—see H. GERZ, as above, page 310; fourth, occasionalism. When we come to a discussion of DESCARTES these points of agreement as well as others of difference will be brought up again.

² A. DEMPF, as above, pages 441-468.

of the late-Roman law. Practically, philosophy is secularised here just as by THOMAS, even though this is not done *upon the basis* of the dualism "nature-grace."

43. Very serious objections could be brought in against curialism. First of all, from the side of the rulers who could not understand why a state in Italy had the right to govern other states, and much less, why the Pope as ruler should control the dispensing of grace. In politics this led to a twofold attitude. The French court tried to degrade the curia to a tool for its own politics, in which attempt they were successful during the seventy year exile of the Popes in Avignon (1307-1376). The result was that the courts of England and Germany were jealous of the French king, and at the same time were less inclined than ever before to recognise the curia and its almost exclusively financial politics. In England this conflict led to the further development of the parliamentary system.

The opponents of curialism among the partial theists were found among the "Realists" as well as among the democratic Nominalists. Both groups learned now to distinguish between the sacrament-church and the church-state.

According to the *consistent* Realists—the disciples of THOMAS and SCORUS—each of these had its own super-individual entelechian unity. But the practice of the nominalistically-controlled state-life, especially in France, became too much also for many Realists. That is why they accepted the Nominalistic view for the states—also the church-state—while they maintained the Realistic view for the Church as sacrament-church. OTTO OF FREISING had risked a similar combination. But with him the State was, first of all, but a part of the historical life, which was viewed Platonically, and in the second place there was lacking the division of the old church-idea into the two other ones of sacrament-church and church-state, something which had sense only after 1208. JOHANNES QUIDORT, the representative of the viewpoint which we are now discussing, was not a Platonist, but a follower of ARISTOTLE, and more closely, follower of THOMAS. It is because of this that all symbolism is foreign to him. Besides, he makes use of the Thomistic distinction between Church and State to separate the church-state from the sacrament-church, and then views the first nominalistically with all of the life of state, and the second he views realistically. Naturally, it is not possible for him in this view of things to define the relation

between the function-domains of "nature" and "grace" in the spirit of the great Realists: the higher one with its entelechian unity is neither the complement (THOMAS) nor the correlate (SCORUS) of the lower, since this lacks all unity. Total Realism does not, according to him, satisfy. But neither does the consistent Nominalism. It is only when they are united that they give account, each of one half, and the theoretical tension between the two corresponds completely to that tension which exists practically between the Church and the State. Because of this, being consistent in both domains, he is the first one to accept the theory of popular-sovereignty in the theory of state;¹ but at the point of the eucharist in the doctrine of the Church he accepts the impanation theory.²

This doctrine of this tension, spoken of above, could easily swing over into scepticism. But even then the last word is to be spoken by the Realistic function-dichotomy of "nature" and "grace," of state and church, of organism and anima, so that we can better speak here of a "semi-realism" and a "semi-nominalism." Matters with the Nominalists were in a different condition. They could feel justly happy because of the approach made to them by the semi-realists in the doctrine of the state; besides, they could view with malicious joy the fact that their opponents were in great difficulties. But there was gain to be gotten here also for their own group. For if one held fast to the idea that the main incision lay between the sovereign spirit and the psychical-organic realm which was subject to it, then this very tension in the lower realm because of its tension, could help them to become aware of the quiet at their own centre. PETRUS AUREOLUS³ worked the tension of the "semi-realism" out in this fashion in his Nominalistic scheme: when the Church, in answering the questions about death and sacrament, posits all manner of propositions which science rejects, both are right. For in spite of all contradiction, they have this proposition in common, that they both stand on their own territory under the validity of the logical *principium contradictionis*, that each one forbids the other to posit theses on *its own* domain which will be *mutually* contradictory. And so sovereign reason gives to both nature and grace their own domains, and the office-bearers

¹ A. DEMPF, again, pages 422-424.

² SEEBERG, again, page 522; see also note 2 on page 409.

³ B. LANDRY, *Pierre Auriol, Sa doctrine et son rôle*, in *Revue d'histoire de la philosophie*, II, 1928, pages 27-48 and 133-141.

of these two function-domains have no more to do with each other than this, that they are under obligations to obey the one sovereign, the norm of the *principium contradictionis*, the law for thought, which here is deified, entirely in the spirit of PLATO and the RENAISSANCE.

Even as the conception of QUIDORT could not satisfy the consistent Realists, so that of AUREOLUS could not satisfy the full-blooded Nominalists. OCCAM, for instance, is consistently Nominalistic not only in his theory of the State, but also in his theory of the sacrament-church. As for this last proposition, we need but to think of his denial of the unity of the church office; according to him it would be very possible that each country should have its own Pope.¹ In regard to the relation between the Church and the natural domain his theory of the sacraments is of importance: he denies both transubstantiation and the impanation-theory, and arrives at the doctrine of consubstantiation. According to him the glorified body of Christ is present in many places at the same time; but, since it is a "spiritual body" and—according to trichotomy—a "between-thing" between "spirit" and "body," it can only accompany the bread and wine, and cannot be changed into it, nor enter into it.² Political life and church life stand side by side here, but they can be thought of together in perfect harmony, he thinks. He perceived that in his time the reality of affairs was different, but he explained this by saying that the curialists had degraded the sacrament-church into a church-state, by which arrangement the first mentioned had laid aside the demands of poverty in order to move about in the domain of nature, the domain of state and law, and there to acquire much property.³ Thus both domains, however nominalistically constructed, do stand in the same relation, he thinks, as they do with SCORUS. But whereas in the scheme of this Realist the idea of nature-grace had the last word to say in anthropology, so that what he thought to be the free will was identical with the function of faith which earned salvation by faith in the miraculous, matters are entirely different with OCCAM as Nominalist: in his view, a sovereign spirit is enthroned in each man, above the sphere of nature and also that of grace. An analogous difference strikes

¹ SEEBERG, again, page 586.

² SEEBERG, as above, pages 525ff.; and 788.

³ A. DEMPFF, as above, pages 510 ff.

us in their doctrine of God. According to both of them nature and grace together form the domain of the *potestas ordinata*. But when SCORUS places above this the *potestas absoluta*, he merely wishes to express the idea that the difference between nature and grace rests in the will of the Triune God. But these terms get an entirely different meaning with OCCAM. Even as his predecessor, he thinks of the relation between the three Persons in the Trinity as being analogous to the human functions: the Holy Spirit, the *Spiritus Sanctus*, is for him not—as with SCORUS—the connection between Father and Son, but the highest in the Trinity, to whom alone the *potestas absoluta* belongs.

According to this, then, religion—which is the relation which the Spirit establishes between man and the Word-revelation—is not seated in the heart as the centre of all functions, but in a centre-function. Faith here is not something working through love, but love is, according to OCCAM, a separate sphere. Naturally, we can make the observation that we have to do here with a quasi-domain. But the concern here is not a term, but the process of the secularising of life. The dualism nature-grace had contributed to the secularising of the sub-church domain; now the Nominalism of the fourteenth century draws the line still further: even the life of the Church seems yet to be sacrificed to this secularisation-urge. In this way religion, which ought to control the whole of life, is now pushed outside of the last domain which “Realism” had reserved for it: the religion of the heart, from which are the issues of life, is here falsified into an internal activity of the “free spirit” which either surrenders all of life—the domain of the *potestas ordinata*—with the exception of the science that is not yet bound to this religion, into the hands of paganism, or takes that life under the device of setting it free from “legal” bonds, and uses it as an experimenting-ground for carrying on its Chiliastic fantasies.

So much as far as the relation of the “free-spirits” to the life which lies below their worth, is concerned. But let us now spy them out in their own domain. There they meet the Spirit of God. Naturally, they do not know Him to be Sovereign, and that they are the subjects: they are themselves sovereign, too! So really there is no relation: between sovereigns we can only speak of harmony of intentions, so that it is not possible to indicate a relation. It remains, therefore, merely to typify

the difference for which, as in the case of APOLLINARIS,¹ the words "changeable" and "unchangeable" can do good service: the Spirit of God is unchangeable, and thus always wills the same, while the human will is changeable and therefore is constantly chasing after other things. He does speak of "predestination," but it must be understood that we must guard ourselves against interpreting it in a Calvinistic sense, for a Pelagian is speaking here, and "predestination" with him means nothing more than the "pronoia" of the old-Stoic, by which God takes all sins committed by other sovereigns—and why not also those committed by Himself? (HOLKOT!), and carries them on to another goal. That is why he can accept this predestination, and at the same time insist that in the mutual relation between God and man the first approach can come from man exactly as well as from God.²

It was in vain that BRADWARDINE, moved by so much Pelagianism, made a plea for the honour of his God: even opponents of OCCAM, such as FRITZ-RALPH, whose theory of the kingship of God's grace was assisting the Anglicanism which was then already showing itself, remained partial theist. And even WICLIFF, although a student of BRADWARDINE, was not able to escape this nationalistic influence in England. Much less was there mention of repentance in France, even though most of the Nominalists in the neighbourhood of Avignon remained somewhat more restful than before. Far-reaching conclusions were made: NICOLAUS D'AUTRECOURT denied all causal relation, doing this on the basis of the harmony between different substances; and in Paris physics³ developed in a direction which led to the present crisis, which cannot be overcome as long as one does not break⁴ with Stoic principles.

Conditions in Germany were no more hopeful. For while LOUIS OF BEIEREN sided with the democratic Nominalists,

¹ See *The Evangelical Quarterly*, vol. 4, No. 2, page 149, note 4.

² SEEBERG, as above, 769-771.

³ See above, paragraph 42.

⁴ I want here to mention but two theses of Nominalism in regard to physics, although they are usually discarded today. In the first place, the impoverishing of the activity to knowing activity on the ground of which the physical which was known, and which naturally—because investigated by the physicist—is *gnostisch* passive, has for centuries been looked upon as being just simply passive. In the second place the equalising of the difference between the physical and the psychical (inclusive analytical!) with the difference between the external and the internal. Because of this error all the involved sciences suffered loss: in logic and psychology there was, on this basis, no room for the recognition of the purely logical and psychical object-functions such as the being-understandable and the being-observable; on the other hand, physics could not place the relations within the atom: the physical was "outside", and the atom had an individual, "thus" and indivisible existence!

Curialism gained visible influence, especially among the Augustinian order. And Realism was less fitted here than elsewhere to carry on its task: for while ECKHART and others—according to the latest researches of KARRER-PIESCH¹—were Thomists, yet, although they were absorbed chiefly in supernatural theology—in which THOMAS had never completely stayed away from Neo-platonism—they had little use for the “natural”; and as far as the Church is concerned, they did not only ignore its law and history, along with THOMAS, but they also ignored its offices. And their speculation on the birth of God in every believer, with its dangerous analogies between the psuche of a male or female Christian² and Mary, robbed many of a view of or an understanding of the great historical facts of salvation.

44. Thus matters stood when democratic Nominalism was subjected to the fire-test of the Councils. As long as in these Councils the symptoms of the Reformation were being seen, the Nominalism of the main speakers was not taken seriously. And yet, that furnished the theological basis for the entire conciliaristic movement which had also a practical significance when, after the moving of the Pope back to Rome, France appointed a contra-Pope. Thus a papal schism arose which because of the manner of its origin was more serious, and lasted longer (1378-1415) than any other, and could only be overcome by a general council after the ruling democratic party in France refused to surrender their point. Now it became apparent that those who had constantly undermined all authority, could not even govern the church-state themselves. For when at the first council the party of D'AILLY, which pleaded for general recognition of the French Pope, could win no more than its opponents, they decided to depose both Popes and nominate a third, so that at the close of the meetings there were three Popes! The spirit of the second council was characterised by the academic debate as to the place which councils occupied in church law, and the sad case against Huss. In the first council the aristocratic and democratic Nominalists were opposed to one another,³ while in the second council they were united in the hatred with which since olden times everyone who is Pelagian turns against everyone who defends the sovereignty of God.

¹ DOERRIES, article in R.I.G., II, 1928, 10-11.

² R. OTTO, *Meister Eckehart's Mystik im Unterscheide von östlicher Mystik*, in *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, Neue Folge, 6 (1925), pages 325-350 and 418-436.

³ KOENINGER, article *Episkopalismus* in R.I.G., III, 1929, 206-207.

Meanwhile, the impotency of Nominalism to help the church out of the bog became more and more clear. The older leaders of the party are put to shame: GERSON withdraws from active interest, and D'AILLY also quietens down.¹ But this flight from difficulty brought no positive gains. Part of the younger generation understood this, and saw that they were placed before a truly chaotic situation. In the third council this group, disillusioned by the course of affairs, accepted the maxim of the "Realists" as necessary for the guidance of the church-state. A victory over self, if you will. But we must remember that in the Nominalist this is always accompanied by a deep consciousness of injured majesty. That explains the bitterness that is characteristic of all Pragmatism, also that of the time just preceding the Reformation, which can therefore be better considered in a following chapter.

(To be continued.)

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¹ Among others, upon WESSEL GANSFORT, zec RUDOLPH STADELMANN, *Vom Geist des ausgehenden Mittelalters*, Studien zur Geschichte der Weltanschauung von Nicolaus Cusanus bis Sebastian Franck, Halle, M. Niemeyer, 1929, page 102.