WHAT IS THE RELIGIOUS OBJECT?

Not far from where the Middle West begins there was held recently a religious conference. One of the twilight meetings was addressed by a theologian. Simply yet graphically he told the story of his religious experience. In his youth he had yielded implicit obedience to his ecclesiastical superiors:—what was told him he had never questioned, never doubted. But when the cosmos of contemporary science dawned upon his delighted vision, the old world of authority departed as a scroll when it is rolled together. He took eager possession of the new lands, explored them, examined their riches and made trial of their prospects. But he had been disillusioned. With dismay he realised that he was like a ship drifting into the shallows and in danger of disaster on the rocks. Something had to be done, but what? To return to the belief of his youth, to "Fundamentalism," was impossible, because that, he was convinced, meant petrifaction of thought, and reduction of faith to blind trust in traditional formulas. On the other hand Modernism, the spiritual leadership of contemporary science, had been tried and found wanting. Whatever other excellencies it possessed, it certainly had for him no *religious* message. In this frame of mind he became acquainted with the "Theology of Crisis," and in particular with its doctrine of the Word of God and the Will of God. Here was the New Calvinism cleansed of all that made the old Calvinism offensive to the moral sense of right thinking men. The Word of God! What comfort to hear it! The Will of God! What blessedness to do it! At last he had found peace without stagnation, progress without feverishness, zest, joy, freedom, life. Enthusiastically he urged this "Way" upon his audience, and urged all to make trial whether these things were so or not.

Thus he ended, and in the listeners' ear

> "So charming left his voice, that they the while
> Thought him still speaking; still stood fixed to hear."

How many were won over to the speaker's view it is of course impossible to say. One thing nevertheless is sure:—the address suggests the importance of one of the most insistent contemporary theological problems, *What is the religious object?*

The formal meaning of this difficult question may be explained by recalling the distinction made in the scholastic terminology of the forefathers between *religio subjectiva* and *religio objectiva*. The former denotes a capacity in man, which under the influence of the latter becomes an ability. The religious object is that which is active in the *religio objectiva*. There must be such an object. There is no normal vision without light, no normal hearing without air, no normal tasting without sapid morsels, no remembering without something to remember, no thinking unless there is something about which to think. Similarly religious experience is inconceivable apart from some experienced *What*. The problem is to determine this *What*, this religious object. What is that which should arouse our holy emotions ? What should direct the pious will ? What should be the object of our religious devotion ? In a word, what *is* the religious object ?

No present problem surpasses this in interest ; none is of greater importance. If there is a seed of religion sown by God in every soul, and ineradicable by any human effort, is it not worth cultivating ? Grow it will, but whether the fruitage is to be a blessing or a curse depends, in part at least, on the objective conditions. Our age is vastly interested in the culture of religion, and rightly so. But religion cannot mean anything we choose, and culture inevitably demands norms. The norms we select are therefore tremendously important, for on them depends in this universe of divinely ordered sequence the outcome of our refining efforts.

Furthermore there is no way of avoiding an answer to this problem. Even they who think of religion as of a museum of archæology filled with interesting specimens of the aberrations of antique minds, find themselves confronted sooner or later with the inevitable questions : Which of these bewilderingly numerous objects of worship is the *best* ? Are all the historic objects to be rejected ? Have you anything to take their place ? If you have, what is it ? If you have not, why not ? No man who really thinks can by any possibility evade consideration of our problem. He must come to grips sooner or later with the great question of religion, and in this question an integral part is, *What is the religious object ?*

Our speaker had yielded once to the seductions of Modernism. Let us examine three solutions of our problem proposed by

present-day philosophy, no one of which we can well fancy could satisfy the demands of Pope Pius X's famous encyclical *Pascendi Gregis*.

The idealistic tradition continues in Professor H. B. Alexander. In his essay, *Apologia Pro Fide*,[1] the religious object is the "vision of the heavens" obtained through the use of intuitive reasoning. For in the intellectual realm Professor Alexander finds a dualism of intuitive and discursive reasoning. Religion depends on the use of the former; science employs the latter, and, unwilling to concede any validity to intuitional judgments, is thoroughly sceptical of all religion. It thinks that religion is "man-made," a fiction of the imagination without solid basis in reality. Alexander denies this conclusion. Is not science equally "man-made"? Is it not "a mansion . . . built up in a mathematical mode: its bricks are numbers and its apices are formulæ; and the joy we have in it is the childish joy of endlessly assembling and endlessly toppling over our structural fantasies"? Furthermore, "to live only with the discursive reason is to abide in a tomb and to live a living death." Science can give us the "image" or the "letters," whereas "not the image but the meaning, not the letters but the Logos, are the world's truth, its inner fact and its sole enduring fact."

The present task of the idealist in an age that has attended almost exclusively to science is to use his intuition and to discover and recover the meaning of history. In the Great War and the depression that followed it we have had "a new lesson, a new revelation; it is ours to resolve it, not treading again in the ways of the departed, but seeking in our own fashion the light in which, despite all illusions, our life itself is an act of trust." Alexander then concludes, "And because the world *is* a symbol and life an expression of faith in the fact of a meaning, I find in the study of nature and of history but the one interest of the discovery of a true reading, and in the recorded history of Europe and of Christendom but the one possible meaning."

For Alexander, therefore, and for idealism generally, the solution of our problem is the higher aspect of the universe discovered by intuition. The value of every historical religion, Christianity included, is estimated by the degree in which it institutionally exemplifies this higher aspect.

[1] Published first in the *Philosophic Review*, Vol. XXIX, and reprinted in *Nature and Human Nature*, 1923.

The idealist is convinced that science does not and cannot give us the religious object. The neo-realist who speaks in A. N. Whitehead is sure that it does,[1] and that nothing else can. His argument in proof is a striking example of John Dewey's remark that "the mentality which has prevailed for three centuries is changing."

In his attempt to explain his understanding of the religious object Professor Whitehead informs us that he endeavours to join in as a fourth speaker in "that masterpiece," Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. It may be recalled that three characters are introduced in that work: Demea, the orthodox *a priori* theologian; Cleanthes, the liberal minded theist, who accepts the teleological argument from design, and argues against the narrower theology of Demea; and Philo, the sceptic, who adopts a position mediating between both. Hume, in a letter to Gilbert Eliot dated March, 1751, writes that his sympathies lay with Cleanthes, and that he meant him to be the hero of the dialogue. Yet Hume's thought was continuously shifting, and was mirrored now by one, now by the other. Yet on the whole, in contrast to Spinoza, for whom the being and nature of God was a mathematical problem, Hume held that it was a question for inductive science to settle. For the only kind of existence that can be demonstrated apart from the fact of our experience, is existence in general, or the totality of being: a totality composed, in Hume's opinion, of an indefinite number of concrete beings. With this as the "given," how is God to be described?

Professor Whitehead's general position is, we take it, similar to that of Cleanthes. For him the universe as we experience it is a process in which it (the universe) individuates itself in an interlocked plurality of beings. The process is the primal fact and calls for explanation. But how explain? Aristotle, so Whitehead thinks, made a great mistake when he proposed to describe the individual in terms of universals, because the correct way is to describe individuals in terms of their relations to other *individuals*. This method, however, is inapplicable to an entity like the universe that has no context. We must therefore try another method. We must discover the elements or principles without which the process could not go on. These Whitehead

[1] While the thinking of Professor Whitehead is many-sided, and is therefore difficult to classify, the consensus of opinion among those who claim to know is that he should be counted among the English neo-realists. Cf. R. W. Sellars in *Philosophy Today*. Edited by E. L. Schaub.

finds to be[1]: (1) Creativity: that aspect of the world whereby it continuously passes in time to something new; (2) The ideal entities: that aspect of the world which is not actual, but is exemplified in what is actual: (3) God: that aspect of the world whereby in creativity the ideal is realised in the actual.

This last, the religious object *par excellence*, must be made clear to our thought. But how? By elucidating the religious and moral elements in our experience, but in so doing, never treating God as an exception to all metaphysical principles, invoked to save them from collapsing,[2] but as their chief exemplification.

Since, then, we are dealing with a "philosophy of organism" or process, God as principle is both primordial and consequent. As primordial, God is "the unlimited conceptual realisation of the absolute wealth of potentiality." But that which is realised in abstraction is not so rich as that which is realised in the concrete. Still this aspect of God has religious value, because it presents Him as "the lure for feeling, the eternal urge of desire." God may also be viewed as consequent. The world process is related to Him and exercises necessarily a reaction upon Him. It completes His nature "into a fulness of physical feeling." Thus while His conceptual nature remains unchanged, He shares with every new creation its actual world. To quote[3]:

> "Thus, analogously to all actual entities, the nature of God is dipolar. He has a primordial nature and a consequent nature. The consequent nature of God is conscious; and it is the realisation of the actual world in the unity of his nature, and through the transformation of his wisdom. The primordial nature is conceptual, the consequent nature is the weaving of God's physical feelings upon his primordial concepts."

The remoteness of this concept of God is somewhat relieved by the "images" under which Whitehead would have us think of this aspect of the world process. God is a "tender care that nothing be lost." God "loses nothing that can be saved." God is an "infinite patience . . . tenderly saving the turmoil of the intermediate world. . . ." God is "the poet of the world, with tender patience leading it by his vision of truth, beauty, and goodness."

In the closing pages of *Process and Reality* Whitehead puts the finishing touches upon his picture of the object of religion.

[1] *Religion in the Making*, p. 90.

[2] This in Professor Whitehead's view was the great error of Leibnitz.

[3] *Process and Reality*, p. 524.

Assume universal relativity. Then God is related to the world and the world is related to God. This means that God's "consequent" nature passes into the world in time in four creative phases in which the universe accomplishes its actuality. These four are:

(1) Conceptual origination, deficient in actuality, but infinite in extent of valuation.

(2) Physical origination in time of a multitude of actualities, with a deficiency of solidarity of individuals with one another.

(3) Perfected actuality: the many individuals become one everlastingly.

(4) The perfected actuality passes back into the temporal world and qualifies it so that each temporal actuality includes it (the perfected actuality) as an immediate fact of its experience.

The fourth phase is Whitehead's way of expressing God's love for the world. The love in the world passes into the love in heaven, and floods back again into the world. Thus "God is the great companion—the fellow sufferer who understands."

The Pragmatists in their solution of the problem of the religious object emphasise, in contrast to the Idealists and the Neo-Realists, the social aspect of our experience. Professor E. S. Ames of the University of Chicago[1] finds in the "Practical Absolute" the answer we seek. In explanation he offers the following:

The interests of science and philosophy are *reflective*; those of religion are *practical*. Therefore religion emphasises values rather than facts. Nevertheless religion has no values specifically and exclusively its own, because the objects to which it ascribes worth are in the concrete stream of actual human experience, and are therefore common to the economist, the statesman, the sociologist, the æsthete, etc. Each, however, regards this common possession from his own viewpoint and thus differentiation arises in things which in themselves considered are indifferent. Now society evolves from "level to level," each having what Ames calls its "internal pattern" in accord with which is the human experiences, religious and other, belonging to each. Thus there eventuates an evolution of religious values, of such sort that while they can be ranked in a "hierarchy," no single value is

[1] *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. XXXII, pp. 347-365.

permanently supreme, but now one, now another occupies according to the intrinsic pattern of the level the favoured place. In the modern world social sympathy, mutual aid, co-operation for the attainment of the common good, are the most highly prized religious values.

These values are felt to possess validity. How explain this fact ? Is it due to our familiarity with them, and that we have been assured of their worth times without number ? This may perhaps partially explain it, but a psychological analysis of the situation yields another suggestion. Religion has its being not in contemplation, but in action ; not in mere admiration of values, but in practical effort to achieve them. Every meaningful effort of this sort implies the definite selection of a plan. But only *one* plan can be carried out at a time, and the one chosen assumes—at least at the moment of action—an aspect of absolute worth or validity. This absolute at the moment of action is the "practical absolute."

How are we to select the plan ? Science claims no infallibility and yet it offers itself as the best guide in actually taking hold of the concrete difficulty in order to find a working solution in the face of all the facts. The plan of action thus set for us is the " practical absolute," and represents what is " absolutely the thing to do." " It proclaims the sure way of salvation, and discloses beyond doubt what must be taken as the categorical imperative of the divine will."

Such views of the religious object proved, as has already been remarked, unacceptable to our speaker. Apparently an increasing number share his dissatisfaction. The reason is not far to seek. These ways of understanding *religio objectiva* change the entire theological system and deprive it of its message. Divine revelation is replaced by human discovery ; the supernatural is a name for the higher natural, and the term God denotes something in man or nature, but only by poetic licence can this something be called personal and active. But why is the evangelical advocacy of the Word of God as the object of religion also unacceptable ? This question calls for an answer, but, first, what is that doctrine of the Word of God which in this incurious age is either neglected, or if remembered is rejected ?

The phrase is of course Scriptural, and the meaning was found by collating the Scripture passages and classifying the

denotation. The result of this process yielded the following[1]: the Word of God denotes in Scripture, (1) God's creative power[2]; (2) The special revelation given "at sundry times and divers manners to the fathers by the prophets"[3]; (3) The laws, commands, precepts, etc., given to Israel[4]; (4) The Gospel in the New Testament as revealed by our Lord and His Apostles[5]; (5) Our Lord Himself.[6]

In accord with the theological method of the Reformers the next step was to establish the notion common to the five classes thus distinguished. This seemed to be "instrument of revelation," quite clearly in classes 2 to 5 inclusive, not so clearly in class 1. But even there it is plausible to argue that if the created universe is for the "glory" or self-manifestation of God, His Word as creative instrument also serves as revealing instrument.

The Word of God thus defined mediates between God and man just as words mediate between man and man. God utters His Word; He is its source and origin; man receives this Word, and his duty is to believe it and obey it. These propositions suggest the problem, What is for us the Word of God? This question is of both theoretical and practical interest. If the Scriptural witness is to be accepted, there was a long continued creative or miraculous uttering in one situation and another of the Word of God. Has this divine activity ceased or does it continue? If the latter, how does it continue; if the former, what replaces it?

The Anabaptists continued the Montanist faith that the divine revelatory action continues in individuals to whom under certain conditions the Holy Spirit communicates the mind of God. The Romanists also maintained that God continues when the need arises to communicate authoritative interpretations of the meaning of His truth to the head of the *ecclesia docens*. But the Reformers held that God's former ways of making known His will had ceased, and that Holy Scripture, God's Word written, stands as the permanent and sufficient rule of what we are to

[1] Cf. H. Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, Vol. I, p. 421.

[2] Cf. Gen. i. 3, Psalms xxxiii. 6, Rom. iv. 17, Heb. i. 3, xi. 3.

[3] Cf. the expressions, "The Lord said," or "the word of the Lord came," on nearly every page of the Old Testament.

[4] Cf. Ex. ix. 20, Psalms xxxiii. 4, cxix. 9, Rom. iii. 2.

[5] Cf. Luke v. 1, John iii. 34, v. 24, xvii. 8, Acts viii. 25, xiii. 7, 1 Thess. ii. 13.

[6] Cf. in the writings of John, John i. 1, 14, Rev. xix. 13.

believe concerning God and what duties God requires us to perform.

At first glance this seems to add but one more to the standing works of God, from which by observation and reasoning certain truths concerning Him are to be derived. Progress in this "science" would depend as in all similar cases on man's use of his power of discovery and his ability to record his discovery so as to make it available for others. This view of a *fides quae creditur* given once for all to the saints, if this were all that there is to it, would certainly be lacking in that fresh adaptation to ever-evolving emergency which the Anabaptist and the Romanist claimed as the superiority of their doctrine of a continuing revelation. But the Reformers also asserted their belief in the witness of the Holy Spirit to the Scripture. *Semper huic verbo adest praesens Spiritus Sanctus.* This meant that when the Christian and his Bible were together, there was always a third present, the Holy Spirit, and this third person supplied that element of individual adaptation to current need that every Christian has felt when reading the *Book.* In this fact of the presence of the Holy Spirit, promised by the Scripture itself, and confirmed by personal experience, the Reformers felt that in no respect was their teaching lacking in religious value when compared with the opinions of the Anabaptists and the Romanists.

This activity of the Holy Spirit, without which Holy Scripture could not produce the saving effect for which it was designed, is best explained by Calvin in his *Institutio* (1559), I, ch. vii. The expression he employs, *testimonium Spiritus Sancti*, seems to have been also used by Karlstadt,[1] but not with the meaning that Calvin attaches to it. It must be confessed that the name is more appropriate to the Anabaptist and Romanist views than it is to the Calvinistic. Nevertheless the doctrine of Calvin on the subject is not had by verbal analysis of the word "testimonium," but from the facts of the activity as derived from Scripture itself and confirmed by Christian experience.

In this connection it is helpful to understand what Calvin writes concerning his psychological views. In the *Institutio* (1559), II, ch. ii, 2, it is stated that the faculties of the soul are *intellectus*, *sensus*, and *appetitus*, or "which appellation is now more commonly used," *voluntas*. As in Scholasticism, Calvin

[1] "Meinetwegen bedürfte ich des äusseren Zeugnisses nicht, ich will mein Zeugniss vom Geiste, von meiner Inwendigkeit haben."

uses the word "faculties" not to imply that the soul suffers division, but to designate various operations of the *unitary* soul. *Intellectus* is the name for the whole soul in the activity of perceiving plus reflecting upon what is perceived (*intellectus ratione praeditus*). In the scholastic usage which Calvin follows, there was a contrast between direct knowledge or intuition, and indirect or discursive knowledge. The former, that due to the activity of *intellectus*, refers to our acquaintance with the so-called "higher objects"[1]; the latter, that due to "discourse," works by means of syllogisms and results in "science." If we keep this distinction in mind, we can understand Calvin's remarks on the knowledge of God. His interest is not in a "science" of God, in which God is the conclusion of some syllogism, but in a direct apprehension of God as He acts in His works or speaks in His Word.[2] *Sensus* is the soul as it is in touch with the sensible world around us, and therefore exposed to its solicitations. *Appetitus* was the usual name for an inclination that has for its object the satisfaction of one of the organic needs, hunger, sex, motion, etc., but Calvin uses it as synonymous with *voluntas*, an inclination that can respond to the leadings of the *intellectus*.

Now Calvin places the *voluntas* mid-way between *intellectus* and *sensus*. If it yielded to the light given by the former, it would go well; if to the call of the latter, ill. Man's most important function in Calvin's view is right action, and right action occurs when *voluntas* follows the highest truth, divine truth, and resists the temptation of the flesh. But Calvin did not in any way agree with those who thought that sin had left unimpaired the intellectual powers of man, and that therefore the one thing necessary was to present the truth concerning salvation. Sin had ruined all man's functions. Therefore there is required an activity of the Holy Spirit, both to prepare the written Word of God, and to renew the soul in order that it might grasp what was offered to it.

We might put the case more graphically as follows. In the *Institutio* Calvin has in mind the sinner aware of his lost state

[1] Cf. Aristotle, Eth. Nic. x, 7, 2.

[2] This distinction of higher and lower was reversed by Kant. For this thinker intuition is restricted to space and time; all the rest of our knowledge is the result of "discourse" applied to the objects individuated by space and time. This had disastrous consequences for the "intellectual" knowledge of God as accepted by orthodox Christianity. Alexander, as explained in our remarks on his understanding of the religious object, returns to the pre-Kantian order.

and crying, "What must I do to be saved?" This question arises in a situation that calls for action, for the exercise of will, and the answer that satisfies the occasion must take the form of an imperative or a command. But commands are not likely to be obeyed unless recognised as authoritative. The Calvinist's answer was either "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ," or some equivalent statement. When asked as to the authority for this command, his invariable answer was that it was God's command. But how recognise it? The intellect recognises it as our power of *direct* knowledge or intuition of the higher verities. This is faith, defined elsewhere by Calvin as a steady and certain knowledge of the divine benevolence towards us. The will accepts this knowledge and conforms itself accordingly. This eventuates in repentance and the other active graces of the Christian life.

The sinner then perceives the command as of God and acts obediently. This is to be connected with the power of the Holy Spirit. He it is who renders the mind capable of perceiving the truth of the Word of God; He it is who makes the will strong to act appropriately. It is not a matter of inference that the command is grasped as coming from God. It would be if the matter could be put so, "The command is authoritative, *because* Holy Mother Church says it is." It is not a matter of having new propositions placed in one's mind. It would be if salvation came in the Anabaptist's way of fresh disclosures of truth in keeping with the person, the time and the place. Emotional reactions are irrelevant and Calvin does not mention them, since he saw that when one is bending all his powers to fulfil a command that pent-up state of psychic activity commonly called emotion has already been resolved. Æsthetic experience does not adequately illustrate it, although such illustration is often used, because such experiences merely register our pleasure or displeasure, our attraction or repulsion, when in the presence of some thing presented to our consciousness, but they have little to do with our will in the sense that Calvin has in mind. In fact the experience is *sui generis*. The Word of God conveys the command. The elect instantly recognise the divinity of the command and bend every energy to obey it. They can do so because of the renewing activity of the Holy Spirit. This happens at the beginning and through the entire Christian life, whenever the Word of God is presented to the people of God.

One further item in the doctrine of the Word of God as the religious object must now be presented. In Conf. Helv. Post. Ch. 1, Beza wrote, *Praedicatio verbi Dei est verbum Dei. Proinde cum hodie hoc Dei verbum per praedicatores . . . annunciatur in ecclesia, credimus ipsum Dei verbum per praedicatores . . . annunciari et a fidelibus recipi.* This is to be understood as follows. The copy of an artistic masterpiece is always less in æsthetic stimulus value than the original; the critical exposition of literary works may obscure and even displace what they are meant to explain, but the repetition of commands by the under-officers means no loss of effectiveness. Evangelical preaching is not the æsthetic reproduction of literary masterpieces, nor critical expositions of ancient documents, but the repetition of what God commands us to believe concerning Himself and to do in the line of our duty. The divinity of the command loses nothing by being repeated, and is still the religious object used by the Holy Spirit to direct the activity of the renewed soul.

Why is the evangelical advocacy of the Word of God as the object of religion unacceptable to so many? Undoubtedly the main reason is the literary and historical critical method of treating Holy Scripture. In literary criticism diction, phraseology, syntax, style, concepts, etc., are the criteria to determine the dates of the Biblical books and the integrity of the text. In the hands of radical critics this method is used to support the theory of a generally discrepant and contradictory duplication in both the narrative and the hortatory portions of Scripture. In historical criticism the theory of development is applied usually in such manner as to necessitate the conclusion that the Scripture story and teaching do not represent what must have been the real course of events.

In general the Neo-Calvinism urged by our speaker in the opening of this essay accepts the critical position. *Bibelglaube schliesst Bibelkritik nicht aus, sondern ein,*[1] writes Emil Brunner, and then proceeds to tell us,[2] in words that win the approval of the "modern" men, that the Bible is full of mistakes, contradictions, erroneous interpretations of innumerable human, natural and historical relations: that it is overgrown with mythology even in the New Testament. But he assures us that these features in no way detract from the Scripture authority for our faith. They

[1] *i.e. Faith in the Bible does not exclude Biblical Criticism, but includes it.*

[2] *Religionsphilosophie Evang. Theologie*, p. 79.

belong to the human element through which the Word of God sounds out. Then he warns us that we must not use the Scripture as a fetich, a book of oracles, a " gottliches Konversatsionslexikon " of infallible instruction about all possible and impossible things. But how are we to separate the divine truth from the human untruth ? What knife are we to use to prune away the mythological weeds from the person and teaching of our Lord ? These and other similar questions Brunner does not answer.

Still more radical in expression is Rudolf Bultmann. Adopting as his philosophical basis Martin Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit*, he tells us that immersed as we are in the stream of time we are in no position to rise beyond contingent and relative judgments. Nevertheless, of one thing we may be sure :—we must make a decision for God, and what helps us in this regard is Holy Scripture in general and the teaching of Christ in particular. We know more of the Lord's teaching than we do of His person, and the proper use of the former is helpful in our decision. But, asks the evangelical Christian, how can the certainty of faith, without which no real decision for God has ever been possible, be based on a set of postulates that in every age of the history of philosophy eventuated in scepticism ?

We turn to Karl Barth. We find extensive discussions of the Word of God and many noble and inspiring thoughts. But in the main we make the disappointing discovery that while placed first, the Scripture is but part of the preaching of the Church which, continued through the centuries, has been the phenomenon which postulates as *Ding-an-sich* " back " of it a *Deus loquens*.[1] But the old Calvinist asks many questions. How distinguish the true from the false in this preaching ? Even if the Church were united, how are we to guide our faith in the maze of contradictory and impossible and often absurd teachings that emanate ceaselessly from present pulpits ? But these and many such questious are hard to answer on the basis of the Barthian interpretation of the Word of God as the preaching of the Church.

Meanwhile the evangelical will still cling to his solution of the problem of *religio objectiva*. He well knows the obstacles that assail his faith, but he asks himself, were Christ and His apostles deceived as to the nature of the Holy Scriptures they

[1] Cf. H. W. Van Der Vaart Smith : *Die Schule Kark Barths und die Marburger Philosophie*, in *Kant Studien*—Band XXXIV, Heft 3/4, 1929.

gave to the Church? Has the whole Church been deceived through twenty centuries of faith in the Holy Scriptures? If they were, then what sure source of information have we concerning the Covenant of Grace upon which our salvation depends? As Dr. Warfield once said: "It may sometimes seem difficult to take our stand frankly by the side of Christ and his apostles. It will always be found safe."

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