EJT (2018) 27:2, 147–161 0960–2720

The Soul in the Bible: Monism in Biblical Scholarship? Analysing Biblical Studies from a Systematic Point of View

Martine C.L. Oldhoff

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Systematische Theologen und christliche Philosophen, die ein dualistisches Konzept der Seele, des menschlichen Selbst oder des „Ich" jenseits des Todes beurteilen, zitieren häufig biblische Theologen zugunsten monistischer Positionen. Der vorliegende Artikel untersucht die potentielle Überschneidung zwischen biblischer und systematischer Theologie und analysiert die Kritik am Konzept der Seele oder am Dualismus in der heutigen Bibelwissenschaft. Zunächst werden aus systematisch-philosophischer Perspektive Dualismus und Monismus als metaphysische Positionen unterschieden. Danach wird die Art und Weise, wie der Begriff Seele von zeitgenössischen Auslegern verwendet wird, untersucht durch Beispiele aus zeitgenössischer alttestamentlicher und neutestamentlicher Wissenschaft zu den Begriff *nephesh* oder *psychē*. Bibelwissenschaftler stellen oft Behauptungen über Dualismus auf und unterstützen Monismus.

Anschließend werden die Wurzeln dieser monistischen Tendenz erforscht. Zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts fand die Dichotomie zwischen der ‚griechischen' Seele und einer hebräischen, jüdischen oder biblischen Vorstellung von der Auferstehung des Leibes Eingang in die Theologie. J. Kögel führte diesen Gegensatz in das einflussreiche biblisch-theologische Lexikon von H. Cremer ein. Kögel lehnt dabei ausdrücklich die metaphysische Kategorie von ‚Substanz' in Verbindung mit der Seele ab. Somit wird eine metaphysische Position eingenommen und eine dogmatische Annahme in die Bibelwissenschaft eingeführt. Dementsprechend kann die heutige monistische Tendenz als ein Versuch gewertet werden, metaphysische Sprache zu vermeiden. Dies verdeckt jedoch die Tatsache, dass biblische Ausleger in ihren Erläuterungen und Sprachwahl einen Physikalismus annehmen können.

* * * * * * * *

SUMMARY

Systematic theologians and Christian philosophers who evaluate a dualist concept of the soul, the self or 'I' that survives death often cite biblical scholarship in favour of monist positions. In this article the possible overlap between biblical theology and systematic theology is examined by analysing the critical attitude towards the concept of the soul, or dualism, in contemporary biblical scholarship. First, from a systematic-philosophic perspective, dualism and monism as metaphysical positions are distinguished. Next, the way in which the notion of the soul is considered and used by modern exegetes is examined through a sample of contemporary Old Testament and New Testament scholarship on *nephesh* or *psychē*. Biblical scholars often make claims about dualism and support monism.

The roots of this monist tendency are explored next. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the dichotomy between the 'Greek' soul and the Hebrew, Jewish, or biblical idea of the resurrection of the body entered theology when J. Kögel inserted this opposition into H. Cremer's influential biblical-theological lexicon. Kögel explicitly rejects the metaphysical category of 'substance', associated with the soul. In this way, a metaphysical position is taken and a dogmatic presupposition introduced in biblical scholarship. Correspondingly, the present-day monist tendency can be interpreted as an attempt to avoid metaphysical language. This clouds the fact that physicalism might be assumed by biblical interpreters in their explanation and choice of language.

* * * * * * * *

RÉSUMÉ

Les études de théologie biblique sont souvent citées à l'appui de positions monistes par les théologiens systématiques et les philosophes chrétiens pour porter une appréciation sur la conception dualiste de l'âme, du moi ou du « je » qui subsiste au-delà de la mort. L'auteur examine ici l'interface entre la théologie biblique et la systématique en analysant la critique, dans les études bibliques académiques, du concept d'âme ou de la conception dualiste. Elle commence par définir et distinguer la position moniste et la position dualiste du point de vue métaphysique en

théologie systématique et en philosophie. Puis elle examine de quelle façon la notion d'âme est traitée et utilisée par les exégètes modernes en considérant plusieurs travaux académiques sur les mots *nephesh* et *psych*ē. Les biblistes avancent souvent des considérations sur le dualisme et soutiennent la thèse moniste.

Elle explore ensuite les racines de cette tendance moniste. Au début du xx[e] siècle, l'opposition entre « la notion grecque » de l'âme et l'idée hébraïque, juive ou biblique de résurrection corporelle a fait son apparition en théologie. J. Kögel a fait intervenir cette opposition dans l'influent lexique de théologie biblique de H. Cremer. Kögel rejetait explicitement la catégorie métaphysique de substance associée à la notion d'âme. De la sorte, une prise de position métaphysique et un présupposé d'ordre dogmatique étaient introduits dans les études académiques de la Bible. Pareillement, la tendance moniste actuelle peut être vue comme une tentative d'éviter le langage métaphysique. Cela voile le fait que le physicalisme pourrait bien être présupposé comme allant de soi par les interprètes bibliques et orienter les explications qu'ils donnent des textes et le langage qu'ils adoptent pour ce faire.

* * * * * * * *

1. Introduction

The soul defined as the self or 'I' that survives death[1] proves alive among Western peoples. Social scientific research shows that some 41% of the British and 47% of the Dutch population believes in life after death, which implies a belief in a continuation of personal identity.[2] Such belief is present in Central and Eastern European countries as well: 27% of the Czechs, 33% of the Estonians, 41% of the Bulgarians, 47% of the Hungarians, 48% of the Latvians, 50% of the Lithuanians, 55% of the Serbians, 62% of the Ukrainians, 64% of the Moldavians, 64% of the Greeks, 71% of the Croatians, 72% of the Polish, 73% of the Bosnians and 81% of the Romanians is said to believe in the existence of heaven, which implies a belief in the soul as defined above.[3]

The Christian tradition has contributed to this belief, but the content of the underlying anthropology has started to change. Theological tradition up until the eighteenth century maintained that the human being was a composition of body and soul. While confessing the resurrection of the body, the personal essence was identified with the soul, asleep or alive with Christ until the moment of joining together with the transformed body.

Nonetheless, the concept of the soul as the self, 'I', or person[4] that survives death is criticised in contemporary Christian philosophy and systematic theology, by Western European and American scholars in particular. How did this concept of the soul become so suspect? Given the fact that the Bible is an authoritative source in Christian reflection upon the human being, one might ask whether biblical scholarship offers insights that demand a rejection of this notion.

Monism understands the human being as one single physical or spiritual unity. Dualism, by contrast, thinks of the human being as consisting of two substances: the soul and the body. The dualist basically holds the possibility that the soul, understood as the basis for speaking of the 'I', can exist apart from the body.[5] Both dualism and monism are metaphysical positions for the ontology of the human being. In contemporary systematic theology monist anthropologies tend to be considered as most biblically sound.[6]

Because systematic theologians usually take care to relate their reflections to contemporary philosophies and worldviews as well, one could also query whether the soul no longer fits into a modern worldview. For example, physicalism, the metaphysical claim that all that exists is physical and ultimately has physical causes, is an influential metaphysical position. It appears that systematic theologians and Christian philosophers working within this physicalist paradigm also refer to studies in biblical scholarship to support their claim that the human being is to be understood as merely a physical being. In Christian reflection, particularly non-reductive physicalisms are gaining ground. Non-reductive physicalists maintain that although everything that exists is ultimately made of and emerges from matter and energy, higher human capacities are not to be reduced to their physical substrate. For example, the non-reductive physicalist philosopher N. Murphy in *Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?* tellingly quotes a biblical scholar: 'James Dunn's account of Paul's conception of human nature makes a fitting conclusion to this volume.'[7] Consequently, another question arises: could there perhaps be a relationship between contemporary biblical scholarship and philosophical paradigms that helps to explain the critical stance in contemporary theology on the soul as the person that survives death?

2. Biblical and systematic theology

Attentive to the observation that nowadays there seems to be common ground among systematic

and biblical theologians on the soul, this article seeks to offer an analysis and explanation of the way in which exegetes handle the notion of the soul. Since the burden of biblical proof in contemporary theology does not fall on those who adhere to a monist anthropology, it is relevant to analyse the biblical scholarly 'proof' that purportedly supports the rejection of the soul as the self or 'I' that survives death.

Hence, a precarious interdisciplinary endeavour is required. Biblical and dogmatic theology, nowadays more often referred to as 'systematic theology', have grown apart in the past centuries. The complex but genuine separation of systematic theology and biblical studies can be traced back to J.P. Gabler (1753–1826), who pleaded for a strict division between the two in order to liberate biblical studies from dogmatic presuppositions.[8] In the current division of tasks, the biblical scholar studies biblical texts in their historical and cultural context(s) and explains a particular dimension of them with (one of) the method(s) adequate to them. The systematic theologian can then incorporate these findings into a contemporary conceptual account of a specific topic. How systematic theologians treat biblical material and its interpretation by experts remains a sensitive subject. It is often difficult to do justice to the diligent research of biblical scholars, partly because systematic theologians select some sources from the enormous quantity of available scholarship.

Given the fact that the Bible has been interpreted differently over the centuries, the current philosophical reception of biblical research is a gripping case for the study of the division between dogmatic and biblical theology. In the Christian tradition, the Hebrew word *nephesh* and the Greek *psychē* were connected to the notion of the soul. Partly for that reason, in the last century the translation 'soul' for *nephesh* and *psychē* was criticised severely. Also, some biblical scholars of both the Old and New Testament do not hold back from expressing their views regarding the translation 'soul' in their explanation of *nephesh* or *psychē* in a biblical text. Is the division between systematic theology and biblical studies less rigid concerning this topic?

This article takes an interest in this case of possible overlap between biblical and dogmatic theology. It aims to explore the question: How is the notion of the soul considered and used in biblical scholarship? The focus is on *how* the word 'soul' functions in biblical interpretation. How do contemporary biblical scholars speak of the soul? Can one retrieve their own opinions and evaluations of the 'soul' when their exegeses of biblical language are studied? If so, what sort of notions do biblical scholars adhere to, and which ideas do they reject? This is a somewhat atypical question for biblical scholars, for they methodologically start with the biblical texts and language. It could be objected that philosophical concepts are introduced that are not found in the biblical texts. However, this article does not seek to impose philosophical categories on the biblical texts, but to critically examine exegeses and interpretations of these texts. The intention is to analyse scholarly biblical studies from a systematic theological point of view in order to better understand the dynamic relationship between systematic theology and biblical studies with respect to the notion of the soul.

The article thus seeks to contribute to the question of the relationship between biblical and systematic theology by analysing the contemporary monist – or more particularly (non-reductive) physicalist – consensus. It is important to trace the roots of the modern monist consensus in order to understand the shift to physicalism and to be able to evaluate whether the claim that it is 'the biblical view' is justified. Although the fact that the monist consensus is questioned suggests that there are reasons to doubt this consensus, the aim of this article is *not* to defend a monist or dualist account of the human being based on biblical material. Instead, it concentrates on analysing the monist consensus that appears to exist in both contemporary systematic and biblical accounts.

After a further clarification of method and some exegetical reasons for raising the research question, I will analyse comments upon the notion of the 'soul' in (mainly Western European) current Old and New Testament scholarship. I will demonstrate that biblical scholars make philosophical comments that go further than the biblical texts, sometimes showing a dogmatic or philosophical interest. Especially the 'Greek' way of thinking is blamed for poisoning the biblical soundings. For this reason I will examine the roots of the persistent dichotomy between the 'Hebrew' belief in the resurrection of the body and the 'Greek' concept of the immortality of the soul. J. Kögel's additions to H. Cremer's biblical-theological lexicon in the lemma *psychē* will prove revealing and elucidating in this respect. I will argue that this dichotomy is so persistent and irresolvable because of the philosophical claim that accompanies it: the

explicit denial that the biblical view of humanity can be rendered in a metaphysical, substantial, dualist frame of thought. Given the fact that this philosophical claim is (still) prevalent in culture, the persistence of this shunning of metaphysical categories in biblical scholarship is understandable. The result, however, is that it may seem as if biblical scholarship supports physicalism.

As stated above, the term 'soul' is used here in a dualist sense. When one analyses the debates between contemporary dualists and monists on the human person, dualists appear to be concerned with accounting for the experience of the first-person perspective, the existence of a 'subject' with a unified experience of reality. One dualist way or another, so the dualist maintains, one needs to refer to a mental or spiritual reality when one speaks about the subject because the first-person-perspective cannot be accounted for when one only refers to a physical substratum.[9] The dualist often also holds the possibility that the *person* can exist apart from her body.[10] Thus, a dualist concept of the soul is not bound to the word soul but can also be expressed by means of different words. For example, someone who says 'when I die I will go to heaven while my body awaits the resurrection' employs a dualist concept of the human being.

Asking how biblical scholars use 'soul' means inquiring 1) how they define 'soul' and 2) whether they express themselves on other meanings, such as the contemporary philosophical dualist definition of the word that is employed in this article. Dualism is a contaminated and unattractive term in many respects. However, it is used in this article because it is a philosophical concept. From this broad philosophical starting point, it follows that there is at this point no need to distinguish between historical dualisms, such as Platonic and Gnostic versions, which New Testament scholars and systematic theologians may sometimes have in mind when they evaluate 'dualism'.[11]

3. Dualism in the Bible?

The philosophical distinction between dualism and monism can elucidate the discussion on 'monism' and the soul in the Bible because biblical scholars appear to affirm and reject underlying ontologies in biblical texts. As mentioned above, the biblical basis for questioning a possible monist consensus in biblical scholarship needs to be clarified. Scholarly biblical studies on death, and life after death, in the Old and New Testament provide material to question the monist consensus.

First, the Old Testament knows of the shadowy existence of the deceased with which one should not get involved. Faith in life after death developed among the Jews, also in the Old Testament. The impetus for belief in an afterlife comes from the idea that humans live in relation to God and that this relation cannot end. This is observed in Job 19:25, Psalm 49:15 and 73:23. These texts share the conviction that the writer will be with God in both life and death.[12] It is, however, very difficult to establish how such existence is to take shape. Did the writer have any idea? The least that can be said is that the emphasis is on the relationship with the Lord which is believed to be stronger than death.

Adjacent to the fact of the development of belief in a continuing relationship with the Lord, the appearance of the spirit of Samuel in 1 Samuel 28, and the prohibitions in Deuteronomy to practise such rituals (e.g. Deut 18:9-12), provide illustrations of the belief in the possibility of contact with particular deceased persons.[13] To have contact with such a person means that this person must have survived in some way. This is indeed what 'soul' signifies in the dualist definition of soul employed in this article: the person.

In the third or second century BC, belief in the resurrection of the dead developed (undisputed in Dan 12:2 and 2 Mac 7:11). In the New Testament, it is attested that the Pharisees, Paul, the writers of Hebrews and Revelation, the first Christian communities (according to Acts) and Jesus shared this conviction. Whether such a belief in the resurrection presupposes a concept of the soul is a complicated question.[14]

In any case, the orientation of the person on God is crucial in every type of speech about life after death. G. Theissen points out that a concept of person developed in Hebrew circles, whereas Greek philosophy shows the development of an architecture of the soul.[15] From a philosophical perspective, the assumption of a 'person' that somehow survives death implies dualism if some sort of (temporary) independence of the person from the body is assumed.

If belief in life after death developed from the Old Testament onwards, the existence of fierce philosophical monist positions seem less evident on the basis of the biblical data than is sometimes supposed. So how can biblical scholarly works be taken as support for monist and consequently (non-reductive) physicalist positions? I will carefully examine texts from bibli-

cal scholars who comment on dualism in order to answer the question. To this end I will take a sample of authoritative, widely received and relatively recent biblical scholarship on *nephesh* and *psychē*. Although a dualist definition of the soul is not tied to the Hebrew word *nephesh* or the Greek *psychē*, claims on dualism are mainly made when *nephesh* and *psychē* are concerned. Therefore, the sample is confined to comments on *nephesh* and *psychē.* Current biblical scholarship is taken as a starting point because contemporary scholars can be assumed to be standing on the shoulders of giants. Furthermore, systematic theologians and Christian philosophers usually rely on contemporary sources.

4. The 'soul' in Old Testament scholarship

Nephesh is found 654 times in the Old Testament and is one of its most researched words.[16] Thus, the sample of biblical scholarship on *nephesh* can only be very limited. I will first consider the chapter on *nephesh* in the still highly influential standard work on Old Testament anthropology of H.W. Wolff, *Anthropologie des Alten Testaments*. Wolff's writing on the *nephesh* was not new concerning the understanding of the human being as a unity or totality. Established theological dictionaries argue that *nephesh* is to be interpreted within the Old Testament's framework of understanding the human being as a unity.[17] This consensus already came into existence at the beginning of the twentieth century. Wolff, however, has proven to be an authoritative reference for Old Testament scholars in recent decades, in which the analysis of this article takes an interest. This section proceeds, secondly, with an analysis of two recent articles to explore if and how exegetes express philosophical assessments of 'the soul' when interpreting *nephesh*.

At the start of his chapter on *nephesh,* Wolff states that *nephesh* does *not* mean soul.[18] About Genesis 2:7 Wolff remarks that the human being does not have *nephesh*, but is *nephesh*.[19] He distinguishes seven main uses and therewith categories for translation of *nephesh* in the Hebrew Bible: 1) inner use of the throat, 2) outer use of the throat, neck, 3) human desire, 4) the human being in need, 5) life, 6) person, individual, being, and 7) personal or reflexive pronoun, e.g. *nephesh* as a variation on I.[20] The precise meaning of *nephesh* is dependent on the book in which it is found and the way in which the word is used. Wolff uses the German *Seele* for *nephesh* (category 4) when *nephesh* means the central organ of the suffering human being (e.g. Ex 23:9, Job 19:2, Ps 42:6, 12, 43:5, Isa 53:11, 2 Kgs 4:27).[21] With respect to the fifth meaning, Wolff notes that there is no speculation on the destiny of the soul beyond the boundary of death.[22] Whereas life in the Old Testament means having a relationship with God, to be dead is to have no relation to God anymore.[23] In the sixth category of meaning *nephesh* is also used collectively to denote a number of individuals (Gen 12:5, Lev 18:29, Isa 43:6) and descendants (Gen 46:15, 18, 22, 25, 26, 27) and can signify a dead person, even a corpse (Num 5:2, 6:11, 19:11, 13, Hag 2:13).[24] Although *nephesh* means 'person' in such instances, the person does not survive the earthly life.[25]

Wolff only translates the fourth meaning of *nephesh* as soul. Hence, the German *Seele* for Wolff means the central organ of the suffering human being or the emotional interior especially when negative emotions are concerned.[26] Thus, when he states that *nephesh* does not mean soul in the Hebrew Bible,[27] which meaning does he reject? The denunciation of the translation of *nephesh* with soul is not explained. It is not elucidated what Wolff understands by the German *Seele* in this instance. The context is different when Wolff employs his explicit definition of soul: the emotional interior.[28] Nothing about the soul in a dualist sense has been posited. Wolff withholds from firm expressions on the ontological status of his findings in the Old Testament text, both in the Israelite and contemporary context.

Despite Wolff's lack of a general judgment on dualism and his specific use of soul, he is presented as the biblical scholar who rejects the concept of soul in a dualist sense in an overview of the history of research in Old Testament anthropology by B. Janowski and D. Bester. The reason for judging his work convincing is 'the fact' that Wolff is able to overcome the dichotomy of body and soul or the trichotomy of body, soul and spirit by showing what *nephesh* actually means.[29] Janowski and Bester continue to describe how Wolff has explained that the 'nature' of human beings is in their behaviour, which is further intensified in newer exegesis.[30] Yet, how can one be so certain that there is no 'nature' of the human being in the Bible?

The line between avoiding projecting a presupposition and excluding a concept beforehand proves to be very thin. Janowski and Bester not

only avoid the term but reject the concept as defined above without further explanation. With this rejection of dualism, the human being is now to be defined as having diverse aspects, according to Janowski and Bester's overview.[31] One shared element is pointed out in the variety of anthropologies: the human being has a dialogical character: in relation to God, the human being becomes human.[32] Concerning further developments in Old Testament anthropology, it is emphasised that the body has become a central theme.[33] In line with the historical anthropological approach, the body is considered in its actual history because it is itself part of history.[34] Attention is also paid to the relationship between the body and the social structure of which it is part. With R.A. di Vito,[35] the writers contend that human beings *are* their social role and status and that there is no inner self or centre of the human being.[36] The summary of the article stresses again that Old Testament anthropology has no dicho- or trichotomy, but an integrative concept of the entire human being who through her body is anchored in the world.[37] It is characteristic of Ancient Israel that the human being is conceived as a psychosomatic unity.[38]

It needs to be asked, however, whether it is correct to posit that the Old Testament *excludes* speech on the human nature. The statement that human beings have no centre and *are* their social role and status demonstrates, in fact, a metaphysical claim about the views of Old Testament writers on human nature. Hence, Janowksi and Bester are taking a metaphysical position. Their article not only shows contentment about the fact that modern and Old Testament anthropologies converge, it also demonstrates that there is an implicit consensus in Old Testament anthropology: dualist anthropology is altogether absent from the Old Testament. Strongly put, the Old Testament rejects dualist anthropology and proposes that human beings are their body in relation to the world.

Janowski and Bester can be taken as paradigmatic for Old Testament anthropological research in their treatment of Wolff as the standard for Old Testament anthropology for the explanation of *nephesh* and the absence of the soul. For instance, M. Bauks writes that one of the reasons for avoiding the use of the word soul in Old Testament scholarship is Wolff's study of the use of *nephesh* in the Hebrew Bible: 'Wolff's observations induced the Hebrew Bible scholarship to avoid the term "soul"'.[39] She, furthermore, interprets the shunning of the term soul as fear of anachronistically projecting presuppositions into the reconstruction of ancient thinking. The presupposition would be the soul as an immaterial part of the person, the incorporeal remainder of the person.[40]

Bauks also attests to the monist tendency in her recent article on concepts of the soul. Although she observes that soul can have more meanings than the Platonic concept, she remains within the consensus that one should speak of a unity, not of a 'person' or 'self', with respect to Old Testament anthropology.[41] Therefore, to describe the meanings of 'soul' in ancient cultures, she proposes to search for a broader lexical field to describe the meaning of the concept. The soul-typology as used in the field of Religious Studies and Ethnological Studies would be apt for describing different human states and modes of existence.[42] In this field, the soul-typology is employed to denote the functions of the soul in different cultures and texts in order to avoid distinctions of soul characteristics as mortal/immortal, material/immaterial or inside/outside a person.[43] Bauks posits that *nephesh* marks a status, not an essence.[44]

Bauks' introduction of a broader perspective on the term soul from a different research field is a new and intriguing development in biblical studies. The desire for a more comprehensive view of the word soul to be able to observe new emphases in Old Testament anthropology as well as the acknowledgement that the word has various meanings is a move away from the fixation on the soul in one (dualist) meaning.[45] Nevertheless, it is not clear on which ground the distinction between status and essence is introduced. What is a status? And what is an essence? Bauks does not elaborate on these notions. Apparently, she wants to avoid every dualist implication with this preliminary remark. However, on what basis is anthropological duality excluded? The introduction of the soul-typology from the field of Religious and Ethnological Studies affirms the monist tendency.

To conclude this section, it should first be noted that Wolff's limited use of the word soul together with his rejection of the idea that *nephesh* is the same as soul, has been used by subsequent generations of Old Testament scholars as an argument for the dismissal of dualism in any sense in the Old Testament. Second, the consensus on *nephesh* is a consensus on the concept of the soul in a dualist sense. This state of the matter appears to have grown into a consensus in Old Testament scholarship that the Old Testament writers reject dualism and that any concept of the soul is alien to

them. The idea that the *nephesh* is not the soul in a dualist sense has led to the conclusion that there is no dualism in the Bible. Third, there is growing openness to using the word soul in respect to the Old Testament, as Bauks demonstrates. Soul is not merely seen as a word that denotes anthropological dualism, as was also observed in Wolff's anthropology.

5. The 'soul' in New Testament scholarship

The word *psychē* is found 93 times in the books of the New Testament, and like *nephesh*, its use is diverse. In contemporary translations, *psychē* is often translated as 'life' or a personal pronoun, in line with the Hebrew *nephesh.* There is some agreement that dualist anthropologies might sometimes be in view in New Testament texts, because of the Jewish-Hellenistic cultural environment with which New Testament writers interacted. Consequently, *psychē* is more ambiguous than *nephesh* with respect to dualism. Therefore, my method in this section and the next is slightly different. First, I take a sample of exegetical comments on ambiguous New Testament texts which contain *psychē* to see how scholars approach the matter. Afterwards I describe and reflect upon the evaluation of Paul's use of *psychē* by prominent Pauline scholars.

In several cases the meaning of *psychē* is ambiguous or the word may denote the self that can be separated from the body.[46] What, for example, is the meaning of *psychē* in Hebrews 6:19, a text about hope that is as a firm anchor for one's *psychē*? Or in Hebrews 10:39, where believers are said to believe to preserve their *psychē*? There is diversity in interpretation. Some contemporary commentators consider the writer's use of *psychē* as a designation of the human being's life in its entirety.[47] One also finds the understanding of 'the essential person that transcends death' (for 6:19, 10:39 and 13:17).[48] The same variety of positions is found regarding 3 John 2, 'Loved one, I hope that all is well with you and that you are healthy, as it is well with your soul.' Many commentators want to avoid any kind of dualism and speak of *psychē* in an original manner, for example: 'the sentient and most precious aspect of human existence',[49] the entire personality from diverse perspectives ('*seiner ganzen Persönlichkeit, nur unter verschiedenen Gesichtspunkten*')[50] or 'life in its relationship to God in Christ'.[51] Some scholars permit a distinction that sounds dualistic. John would have demarcated a difference between physical and spiritual life[52] or he uses *psychē* for the bearer of heavenly life.[53]

In the Gospels, the case of Mark 8:35-36 (Mt 16:25-26, Lk 9:24-25) divides New Testament scholars as reflected in contemporary translations. The *New Revised Standard Version* translates Mark 8:36 as 'For what will it profit them to gain the whole world and forfeit their life?'. The *New International Version* translates soul instead of life, except in Luke where they translate 'their very self'. One could explain *psychē* as the totality of human life[54] or leave the meaning of the word undecided.[55] There are also scholars who see in verse 36 the meaning of soul in the sense of eternal life.[56] Another option is 'the self', without further specification,[57] or the self that implies the entire person.[58] When Matthew's version is concerned, exegetes speak of *psychē* as (true) life that transcends this earthly life.[59] The way in which exegetes comment on these verses is especially revealing with respect to how the word soul is treated. One, for example, finds the statement that *psychē* in Mark 8:35 does not mean soul as a part of the human being. *Psychē* is *nephesh* in the sense of life as a whole. Then, the statement follows that a post-mortal existence is envisaged, the promise of a life beyond death, which is to be interpreted as Jesus' resurrection.[60] Another example is the idea that *psychē* is not to be translated with 'soul' but with 'life'; meaning '… not merely physical life but life in the deeper and more fundamental sense of one's true being, and thus life that transcends death'.[61] These two examples have in common that they come very close to the dualist notion of the soul in this article because they accept the idea of a form of continuing existence. Notwithstanding, the translation of *psychē* as 'soul' is rejected.

Finally, the notorious text Matthew 10:28 must be considered: 'Do not fear those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul; rather fear him who can destroy both soul and body in hell.' This text is widely considered as an example of a dualist belief that the soul survives the body, yet only because God has power over it.[62] Some exegetes explicitly speak of Greek influence and dualism or a dichotomy.[63] There is, however, much hesitation to use the word soul, perhaps to avoid the impression that it concerns life that is from itself eternal, as in a Platonic concept of the soul.[64] The text precisely stresses that God gives life to body and soul. Nonetheless, an implicit rejection of dualism is

found here as well: '... it means more the essential person than an ontologically separable component of a person'.[65] It could be asked what 'essential person' refers to.

The outcome of this brief overview of commentaries on texts which contain the term *psychē* is modest: there is no consensus on how the word should be interpreted in the various instances. However, the caution surrounding the word *soul* (or the German *Seele*) is noteworthy. An explanation could be that specific concepts of the soul are associated with the term soul. The alternatives, nonetheless, are remarkable. Solutions are sought in formulations such as life (that transcends death) and the essential person (that transcends death).

6. The 'soul' in Pauline scholarship

The brief stocktaking of the comments on *psychē* demonstrated that there is a tendency to interpret *psychē* as holistically as possible: the human being is a whole. The Pauline writings provide scholars with plenty material to research the use of anthropological terms and implied anthropologies. Paul was traditionally interpreted dualistically so it is understandable that the Pauline writings remain at the centre of discussion when the soul in the New Testament is concerned. R. Bultmann set the stage for the last sixty years of research on Pauline anthropology in the same way that Wolff did for Old Testament anthropology. The consensus that the human being is a unity and that the various anthropological terms are coterminous for the entire person can be traced back to him.[66] Since Bultmann Pauline and New Testament anthropology, in general, is no longer understood in dichotomous or trichotomous terms. In that respect, he can be regarded as a watershed in New Testament scholarship.

In his *Theologie des Neuen Testaments* Bultmann treats the anthropological concepts in Paul when he discusses *sōma, psychē, pneuma* and *zōē, nous, syneidēsis* and *kardia*.[67] The most comprehensive notion of the human existence is *sōma* because it is also part of the human's 'being' in the resurrection life.[68] For Bultmann, human beings do not *have* their *sōma* but *are* their *sōma,* and therefore *sōma* can be replaced by I.[69] It is the person as a whole. To the extent that human beings can relate to themselves, they are *sōma.*[70] Bultmann observes that *psychē* has the same meaning as *nephesh,* the power of the natural life or this life itself.[71] It is the specific human vivacity that is characteristic of the striving, willing and working towards something.[72] It can also have the meaning of 'I' or 'person'.[73] *Pneuma,* which can be used in the same way as *psychē*, similarly can mean person and substitute a personal pronoun.[74] Summarizing the preceding concepts, Bultmann affirms what was already implicit in the texts: the three words express different possibilities of seeing the human being, the I, the person. The human being does not consist of parts, neither are *psychē* and *pneuma* higher principles in the human being. Similarly, life (*zōē*), mind (*nous*), conscience (*syneidēsis*) and heart (*kardia*), each with their particular emphasis, are considered to be expressions of the I.[75]

Bultmann's interpretation of these words in the Pauline corpus can be paraphrased as follows: every anthropological word is coterminous for the entire human being, the subject, and can be substituted for the pronoun I or the word person, although the words signify different aspects of the human being's existence. A human being is a person in its entirety, a subject in relation to itself and God. However, Bultmann can be asked 1) why these terms refer to the entire person in Paul and 2) why the human being has no parts in Paul. The assumption underlying both principles of interpretation is that Paul thinks in terms of aspects of the human, who is principally a whole. Both the idea that the anthropological terms in Paul's letters denote aspects of the human being and the conclusion that they are coterminous for the entire human being are metaphysical statements on the ontology of the human being.

Another example of the claim that Paul does not think of 'parts' of the human being is provided by J.D.G. Dunn in chapter three of *The Theology of Paul the Apostle* where Paul's anthropology is at stake. According to Dunn, it is important to notice that Paul's theology is relational and therefore his anthropology as well. Thus, persons are defined as persons by their social relations.[76] Furthermore, persons are conceived in a Hebrew way, which is 'aspective' instead of 'partitive'. The latter is a Greek mode of conceiving the human person. Aspects relate to the entire human being ('I am a European'), parts imply distinctness in a whole ('a university has classrooms'). Although this a simplified view, Dunn prudently affirms Paul's Hebrew way of thinking, while acknowledging that Hellenistic thought was influential in Jewish diaspora circles and that the distinction between Hebrew and Greek thinking should not be stressed.[77] Nonetheless, his category of aspects

guides his further explanation of anthropological terms. The rather Greek term *nous* is also to be understood in this manner:

> As it is more accurate to speak of the human *sōma* as the embodied 'I', so it would be more accurate to speak of the *nous* as the rational person, the perceiving, thinking, determining 'I', the 'I' not simply at the mercy of outside powers but able to respond and to act with understanding.[78]

When *psychē* is explained, its Hebrew use in the tradition of *nephesh* 'denotes the whole person, the "living *nephesh*" of Gen 2:7'.[79] For Dunn, 'aspect' appears to function as a reference to the entire person. Hence, 'dimension' is also used.[80] The conclusion is that '… Paul's conception of the human person is of a being who functions within several dimensions.'[81] Humans are 'beings' to whom all sorts of adjectives apply: living, reflective, social, weak, rational, etc. The language of 'parts', however, is inappropriate, because he or she is principally a whole.

What does this mean? Dunn is careful not to make a dualist or monist claim with his language of aspects, person and whole; he shuns metaphysical language. Ironically, his writings are consequently interpreted as support for a non-reductive physicalist conception of the human being.[82]

N.T. Wright expresses himself explicitly on dualism. On *psychē* in Paul, he writes that it means what *nephesh* regularly expressed: the whole human being seen from the point of one's inner life. He contrasts this understanding with that of a Platonic soul.[83] At different places, Wright, on the basis of Paul's writings, assumes what philosophically is labelled as a dualist notion of the human nature: '… the *body* is 'asleep' in the sense of 'dead', while the real person – however one wants to describe him or her – continues.'[84] Meanwhile, Wright insists that he does not hold a dualist concept of the human being himself. He is consequently criticised by philosophers who are unhappy with his criticism of the soul based on the New Testament while assuming a concept of the soul.[85] It seems that Wright identifies the word soul with a Greek notion of the soul.

7. Assessment

So far the survey of Old and New Testament scholarship observed that biblical scholars are very reluctant to interpret *nephesh* and *psychē* as soul in the sense of the soul that possibly survives death. They are reticent to suggest support for a particular philosophical position on the nature of the human being: a dualist position. Some biblical scholars, N.T. Wright for example, discard the notion of the soul, while also positing that a 'person' that survives death can be assumed. Similarly, Bultmann's and Dunn's words about the entire person that is to be understood 'aspectively' instead of 'partitively' are remarkable. Meanwhile, biblical texts are taken to denote the human being as a whole and as a 'person'. The denial of a Platonic soul in the historical context can only partly explain the widespread avoidance of dualist categories and the accompanying insistence on categories such as 'aspective' and 'dimensional'. Given the fact that 'person' does not necessarily exclude the dualist concept of the soul as employed in this article, one wonders why it is so common in biblical scholarship to reject 'a Greek soul' and even to warn for dualist interpretations of the text.

At this point, I like to draw attention to the fact that Hebrew monism is widely considered as a valuable and intrinsic thread in the biblical tradition in which possible Greek dualist features are considered as extrinsic digressions. J. Barr has suggested that the widespread idea that the Hebrew and Greek way of thinking exclude one another explains the current denunciation of the soul in theology. The soul (Greek) and the resurrection of the body (Hebrew) are considered as mutually exclusive. In this view, the Greek soul implies dualism and the Hebrew resurrection monism. Barr criticises this dichotomy of Greek and Hebrew thinking not least concerning concepts of the soul and the resurrection of the body.[86] He describes the two 'parties' in this debate as 'immortalists' and 'resurrectionists' and interprets the shift from the belief in the immortality of the soul to an exclusive emphasis on the resurrection of the body as a reaction against theological liberalism. The general resurrection of Jesus Christ had to be affirmed.[87] Questioning the antithesis between Greek and Hebrew thought with respect to the soul and the resurrection, Barr contends that the New Testament arose in a Hellenistic environment and that the 'Jewish' culture of that time had been affected by its Hellenistic surroundings, as attested, for example, in the apocrypha.[88]

Even though biblical scholars nowadays recognise that 'Hebrew' and 'Greek' cannot be conceived as contrasting cultural worlds, the suspicion towards the 'Greek soul' and 'partitive' interpre-

tations (cf. Dunn, above) remains remarkable. To understand what undergirds the opposition between the 'Greek idea' of an immortal soul and the 'Hebrew' resurrection of the body, the roots of this polarity need to be traced. Why do modern scholars consider the soul and the resurrection of the body to be mutually exclusive? Following Barr's suggestion that the contrast between the two originated in dogmatic theology from the beginning of the twentieth century onwards, we might look for instances of this dichotomy in the authoritative biblical interpretations of that period.

8. The roots of the dichotomy

R. Jewett's standard work on Paul's anthropology, *Paul's Anthropological Terms* (1971), provides an entrance into the history of biblical scholarly research on *psychē*. The idea that *psychē* is a Greek equivalent of *nephesh* in Paul's letters found wide reception after H. Lüdemann's *Anthropologie des Apostels Paulus* (1872).[89] In Lüdemann's explanation of *psychē* as physical life force, however, no explicit anti-Greek expression is found.[90] Neither is such a position found in H. Cremer's *Biblisch-theologisches Wörterbuch der Neutestamentlichen Gräcität*, first published in 1866.[91] Cremer edited and added lemmas to the book during the rest of his life, resulting in a growing lexicon: the first edition comprised 558 pages, the ninth 1120. *Psychē* proved a remarkable stable lemma. Except for a small improvement in structure and the addition of some biblical examples, Cremer did not alter this lemma; his explanation of *psychē* remained the same. He relates the Greek *psychē* in the LXX to *nephesh,* which is life as individual being that as the subject of life bears in it the life principle. *Psychē* in the New Testament is described as life as distinct individual existence, as well as the subject or 'I' of this life.[92]

After Cremer's death, J. Kögel edited Cremer's lexicon and worked extensively on the *psychē* lemma. It was he who introduced a contradiction between the resurrection of the body and the immortality of the soul. Here we have an exegetical discussion of *psychē* in the early twentieth century in which this dichotomy is found. Although it cannot be asserted that this is the *oldest* source, it is plausible that it is one of the first and as such representative of the origins of this dichotomy. A comparison of Cremer's editions with Kögel's edited version shows that Kögel made significant changes to the text of this lemma. Most importantly, Kögel added an extensive passage at the point where Cremer wrote about the *psychē* as the subject of life and the 'I'.[93] He posits the idea that *psychē* as life in the body cannot be divided from the body and continues with the statement that the *psychē* is not a substance for itself ('noch weniger ist sie eine Substanz für sich'). *Psychē* and *soma* belong together and can only be opposed conceptually.

And this is not the final step. The Greek idea of immortality, the existence of the soul for itself, is contrasted with the Jewish and biblical idea of resurrection. Kögel writes:

> … erst dann begreifen wir auch d. grofsen Unterschied d. durchgebildeten jüd. u. bibl. Anschauung von d. griech. (s.o.) u. verstehen wir, inwiefern nun in d. Tat für diese Anschauung d. ganze Schwergewicht liegt auf d. leibl. Auferstehung gegenüber d. blofsen Unsterblichkeitsidee. Denn d. Auferweckung hat es mit d. Frage nach d. Fortdauer im leibl. Dasein zu tun, hingegen d. Unsterblichkeitsglaube mit d. Fortdauer d. Seele. Aber eine Existenz d. Seele für sich kennt im letzen Grunde d. Jude u. d. Bibel nicht, wenigstens soweit sie ihre Gedanken rein u. konsequent durchführen.[94]

Kögel's addition to Cremer's text proceeds to reassert the unity of the human person, then repeats his rejection of the idea of *psychē* as substance, and finally adds that *psychē* can be understood as 'life'.[95]

Thus, Kögel not only added the contradiction between resurrection and soul, but accompanies it with the explicit rejection that *psychē* is to be understood as a substance for itself ('eine Substanz für sich').[96] 'Greek' is now an equivalent for 'substance for itself', as it is also in later biblical exegetes. In the successor of Cremer-Kögel's theological dictionary, G. Kittel and G. Friedrich's *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament,* E. Schweizer's lemma *psychē* contains the rejection of the idea that *psychē* would be a substance that survives death. *Psychē* lives from God's acting, the communion with God that will pass judgement and through it find completion.[97] Indeed, both Kögel and Schweizer, but also Cullmann in his notorious essay *Immortalité de l'âme où résurrection des morts?,* draw attention to the dependency of the human being on God.

Still, this theological emphasis on a human dependency on God does not explain the profound reluctance to speak of a concept of the soul. The

contradiction between the resurrection and the soul, after all, is a modern phenomenon: a model of complementarity has been the norm throughout theological history. Kögel's text shows that the contradiction between the immortal soul and the resurrection can be understood as a contradiction between substantial categories and so-called 'biblical' terms. He presents the contradiction and adds a rejection of the soul as 'substance'. Therefore, the hypothesis is ventured that the unsolvable contradiction between the soul and the resurrection of the body or the partitive Greek and dimensional Hebrew way of thinking is best explained by reluctance to allow metaphysical terms in theology. Indeed, at the end of the nineteenth century German theology had a particular interest to distinguish philosophy and its metaphysical systems from theology, exemplified especially by A. Ritschl. Interestingly, Cremer is said to have had a similar desire as Ritschl, viz. to reflect religiously or theologically, instead of in philosophical terms. Both men are examples of theologians that wanted to separate philosophy and theology.[98] Cremer's desire to use theological, biblical language instead of philosophical categories provides a background to his lexicon.

Kögel's adjustment of Cremer's lemma on *psychē* transforms it into a more dogmatic text. Ironically, the possible desire to distinguish between biblical theology and philosophy results in the introduction of a new philosophical claim in biblical theology: this particular philosophical translation is impermissible. Given the contested status of metaphysics, this move will not have upset many people and may have gone largely unnoticed. However, this particular philosophical claim provides a key to the seemingly irresolvable conflict between the resurrection of the body and the concept of the soul which also developed as a contrast between the 'Hebrew' and the 'Greek' way of thinking. The 'Greek soul' is associated with metaphysics and as such shunned.

During the twentieth century, criticism of metaphysics, particularly substance metaphysics, was developed further in continental as well as Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophical traditions. Although an explicit rejection of 'substance' is not always present in biblical interpretations, the idea that the biblical language excludes 'partitive' or 'Greek' accounts is still widely present and can be taken as an indication that metaphysics, dualist metaphysics in particular, are not acceptable in theology.

The key to understanding today's monist tendency in biblical studies is therefore analogous to what was observed in Kögel's adjustments in the *psychē* lemma. Contemporary scholarship shuns metaphysical language, albeit often implicitly. The tendency to translate *nephesh* and *psychē* with words such as 'person', 'I' or 'dimension' can be interpreted as avoidance of discussions about the ontology of the human being and of metaphysical language. Nonetheless such translations sometimes still imply dualism (self or 'I' that survives death). Bultmann's association with Heidegger and existentialism is well known, but not every exegete who follows Bultmann will eschew Greek metaphysics for the reasons he does. The contemporary avoidance of metaphysical language can be interpreted as a philosophical-cultural phenomenon: in a postmodern paradigm, metaphysics is undesirable because doing metaphysics presupposes an objective structure in the world that can be described.[99]

The above does not eradicate the fact that this conviction itself expresses a metaphysical stance in the sense of a claim about the (absence of a) structure of reality. Even though the word 'person' may indeed not imply a defined ontology, the explanation of the translation frequently entails a rejection of the translation with soul. When it is said that one should not think of soul, substance, essence or metaphysics, the exegete often makes a metaphysical claim herself. Often, though not exclusively, this claim entails a negative judgment on dualism and an affirmation of monism (as in Bauks and Bultmann). The underlying idea seems to be that the soul implies dualism and if the terminology of 'parts' is avoided, ontology is circumvented as well. However, a rejection of a partitive view is also an ontological claim, especially when alternative language is proposed, such as 'aspects' instead of 'parts', and the 'unity' of the human is being stressed.

In an academic environment in which physicalism is dominant, one can very well imagine that modern physicalist paradigms influence biblical scholars in their choice of language. These paradigms may seem to fit the way in which the human being is conceived (e.g. in terms such as unity, body, the importance of the physical) while highlighting the non-physical, subjective aspects or dimensions of the human being (e.g. Bester and Janowski, Dunn, Wright). Could it perhaps be the case that biblical scholars are unaware of the physicalist connotations of their translations and the consequences of their language for further

physicalist arguments because of their confidence that they are withholding from metaphysical statements? Ironically, a possible alignment with physicalism would be a (inconsistent) consequence of the desire to avoid metaphysics.

The effects of the desire to avoid metaphysical language offer possibilities for Christian physicalists to refer to modern biblical scholarship for support for their philosophical claims. The work of J.B. Green provides an example of a biblical scholar who aligns his work with a physicalist account of the human being. Green contends that biblical anthropology concurs with (non-reductive) physicalism and sees possibilities for (biblical) theology to be compatible with contemporary natural science in this respect.[100] The majority of biblical scholars do not adopt Green's explicit physicalist position, but the ease with which they affirm the physicality of the human being combined with their shunning of dualism is nonetheless convenient for Christian physicalists.

9. Conclusion

This article has investigated how the notion of the soul is used and considered in biblical scholarship. In the sample that was taken, leading voices in modern biblical scholarship were found to be monistic, especially in their rejection of possible anthropological dualism in the Bible. Concerning Old Testament scholarship, there is a growing awareness of the fact that the word soul can have different meanings, yet the human being in the Old Testament is univocally said to be an inseparable unity. The sample of commentaries on *psychē* in New Testament texts demonstrated some diversity. It was, nonetheless, remarkable that the idea that this may point to a concept of the self or the person that can survive bodily death was sometimes rejected by exegetes without much reflection or arguments. The comments upon *psychē* by Pauline and other New Testament scholars showed that whereas Platonic concepts may be rightly rejected, the category 'dualism' as a whole also seems to be excluded and a unitary perspective defended. Likewise, duality is sometimes dismissed while a concept of the person that survives this earthly life is assumed. The critical stance towards the soul can partly be explained by the identification of the word soul with a Platonic understanding of the soul without the affirmation of the resurrection of the body. Some scholars want to accentuate the biblical emphasis on the dependency of the human being on God.

However, these reasons do not sufficiently explain the profound reluctance towards the notion of the soul. Tracing the roots of the assumed dichotomy between the Hebrew monist view of the resurrection of the body and the Greek dualist concept of the soul helped to elucidate the conundrum. This antithesis was discovered in Kögel's edition of Cremer's biblical-theological lexicon. In this text the notion of the soul is associated with metaphysics, particularly in terms of substances, and thus perceived as being opposed to biblical language and categories. Hence, a dogmatic presupposition is introduced in biblical scholarship that forbids a dualist account of the human being on the basis of biblical data. Although the intention of criticism on substance metaphysics may be to uphold the distinction between dogmatic, systematic or philosophic theology and biblical studies, this *a priori* exclusion of one particular rendition of biblical texts dishonours the very separation of the disciplines. The disapproval of (substance) metaphysics in some philosophical currents is not a sound argument for accepting or positing the exclusion of any dualist account of the meaning of biblical anthropological texts. Furthermore, the shunning of metaphysical language in contemporary biblical scholarship clouds the fact that physicalist philosophy may influence the interpretation of the Bible in today's context. Thus, surveying the monist consensus in biblical scholarship appeared relevant for the reflection upon the complicated relationship between two sub-disciplines of theology. Distinguishing biblical from systematic theology remains a thorny issue.

Martine C.L. Oldhoff is a PhD candidate in systematic and biblical theology at the Protestant Theological University, Amsterdam. Her address is De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, Netherlands, or m.c.l.oldhoff@pthu.nl

Endnotes

1 This broad definition of soul is based upon a philosophical definition as found in S. Goetz, 'Substance Dualism' in J.R. Farris and C. Taliaferro (eds), *The Ashgate Research Companion to Theological Anthropology* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015) 125–137. Contemporary analytic philosophers defend numerous dualist positions, such as Cartesian dualism, interactive dualism, emergent dualism, dualist hylomorphism and holistic dualism. For arguments that personal identity can only be grounded in an

immaterial person see R. van Woudenberg, *Het mysterie van de identiteit: Een analytisch-wijsgerige studie* (Nijmegen: Uitgeverij SUN, 2000). Although I have now defined dualism by means of the modal thesis of possibility that the soul can exist apart from the body, a concept of the soul does not require or necessarily lead to a doctrine of the intermediate state. Cf. J.T. Turner, 'How to Lose the Intermediate State without Losing Your Soul', in R.K. Loftin and J.R. Farris (eds), *Christian Physicalism: Philosophical Theological Criticisms* (London: Lexington Books, 2018). Furthermore, the argument of this article does not presuppose a dualist view on the soul.

2 N. Spencer and H. Weldin, *Post-religious Britain?: The faith of the faithless* (London: Theos, 2012) 24; J. de Hart, *Geloven binnen en buiten verband: Godsdienstige ontwikkelingen in Nederland* (Den Haag: Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau, 2014) 73.

3 Pew Research Center, 'Pew Research: Soul in Central and Eastern Europe', *Pew Research Center's Religion & Public Life*, 10 May 2017, www.pewforum.org/2017/05/10/religious-beliefs/ [accessed 1 June 2017]. The percentages for belief in the soul are even higher: 44% of the Czechs, 63% of the Hungarians, 66% of the Bulgarians, 69% of the Estonians and Lithuanians, 73% of the Polish, 75% of the Serbians, 76% of the Bosnians, 77% of the Croatians, 78% of the Moldavians, 80% of the Latvians, 81% of the Ukrainians and Romanians and 83% of the Greeks are said to believe in the soul. However, 'soul' is not defined.

4 Most dualists hold that the soul is the human person, others that a human person consists of soul and body.

5 W.D. Hart, 'Soul' in J. Kim and E. Sosa (eds), *A Companion to Metaphysics* (Blackwell Companions to Philosophy; Oxford: Blackwell, 1995) 464–465.

6 E.g. M. Harris, 'When Jesus lost his Soul: Fourth-century Christology and Modern Neuroscience', *Scottish Journal of Theology* 70.1 (2017) 75–77.

7 N. Murphy, *Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?* (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 246, refers to J.D.G. Dunn, *The Theology of Paul the Apostle* (Grand Rapids & Cambridge: Eerdmans, 1998) 78, Dunn's conclusion in which he writes about dimensions. On page 21 she also refers to Dunn to support her thesis.

8 A.W. Zwiep, *Tussen tekst en lezer: een historische inleiding in de bijbelse hermeneutiek*, Part I (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 2009) 382–386.

9 E.g. the essays by W. Hasker and E. LaRock in T.M. Crisp, S.L. Porter and G.A. ten Elshof (eds), *Neuroscience and the Soul: The Human Person in Philosophy, Science, and Theology* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2016).

10 Hart, 'Soul', 464–465. See also endnote 1.

11 E.g. N.T. Wright, *Surprised by Hope* (London: SPCK, 2007) 92, 100–103.

12 B. Janowski, 'JHWH und die Toten' in A. Berlejung and B. Janowski (eds), *Tod und Jenseits im alten Israel und in seiner Umwelt: Theologische, religionsgeschichtliche, archäologische und ikonographische Aspekte* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009) 450; J. Smith, *Dust or Dew: Immortality in the Ancient Near East and in Psalm 49* (Cambridge: James Clarke, 2012) on Psalm 49; K. Spronk, *Beatific Afterlife in Ancient Israel and in the Ancient Near East* (Kevelaer / Neukirchen-Vluyn: Butzon & Bercker / Neukirchener Verlag, 1986) 310–334.

13 These were practices related to the Canaanite religion which lived on as undercurrent in folk religion. Spronk, *Beatific Afterlife*, 244–257, 345.

14 John W. Cooper, *Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting: Biblical Anthropology and the Monism-Dualism Debate* (Leicester: IVP, 2001), 191–194, 200–202, discusses objections to such a concept of the soul. One can, for example, argue that there is no intermediate state or that there is no soul but a bodily being that remains.

15 G. Theissen, *Erleben und Verhalten der ersten Christen: Eine Psychologie des Urchristentums* (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2007) 62–64.

16 C. Westermann, 'Seele' in E. Jenni und C. Westermann (Hrsg.), *Theologisches Handwörterbuch zum Alten Testament* Band II (München & Zürich: Kaiser & Theologischer Verlag, 1976) 72.

17 H. Seebass, 'nps' in G.J. Botterweck, H. Ringgren und H.J. Fabry (Hrsg.), *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Alten Testament* Band V (Stuttgart usw.: Kohlhammer, 1986) 538; Westermann, 'Seele', 88.

18 H.W. Wolff, *Anthropologie des Alten Testaments* (München: Kaiser, 1973) 25: 'Was heisst hier napas? Sicher nicht "Seele".'

19 Wolff, *Anthropologie*, 26.

20 Wolff, *Anthropologie*, 26–47.

21 Wolff, *Anthropologie*, 35–37.

22 Wolff, *Anthropologie*, 40.

23 Wolff, *Anthropologie*, 161.

24 Wolff, *Anthropologie*, 42–43.

25 Wolff, *Anthropologie*, 43.

26 Wolff, *Anthropologie*, 35-37.

27 Wolff, *Anthropologie*, 25.

28 Wolff, *Anthropologie*, 35-37.

29 D. Bester und B. Janowski, 'Anthropologie des Alten Testaments: Ein forschungsgeschichtlicher Überblick' in *Der Mensch in alten Israel. Neue Forschungen zur alttestamentischen Anthropologie* (Freiburg: Herder, 2009) 10.

30 Bester und Janowski, 'Anthropologie', 11.

31 Bester und Janowski, 'Anthropologie', 12.

32 Bester und Janowski, 'Anthropologie', 12–13.

33 Bester und Janowski, 'Anthropologie', 16–30.

34 Bester und Janowski, 'Anthropologie', 20–24.

35 R.A. di Vito, 'Old Testament Anthropology and the Construction of Personal Identity', *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 61.2 (1999) 217–238, spec. 231.

36 Bester und Janowski, 'Anthropologie', 26.
37 Bester und Janowski, 'Anthropologie', 31.
38 Bester und Janowski, 'Anthropologie', 32.
39 M. Bauks, '"Soul-Concepts" in Ancient Near Eastern Mythical Texts and Their Implications for the Primeval History', *Vetus Testamentum* 66 (2016) 183.
40 Bauks, 'Soul-Concepts', 181–182.
41 Bauks, 'Soul-Concepts', 183.
42 Bauks, 'Soul-Concepts', 183–184.
43 Bauks, 'Soul-Concepts', 182; the field of Religious and Ethnological Studies does not like thinking in dualist terms either.
44 Bauks, 'Soul-Concepts', 183, 193.
45 Cf. A. Schüle, '"Soul" and "Spirit" in the Anthropological Discourse of the Hebrew Bible' in M. Welker (ed.), *The Depth of the Human Person: A Multidisciplinary Approach* (Grand Rapids & Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2014) 147–165; A. Schüle, 'The Notion of Life in the Anthropological Discourse of the Primeval History', *Hebrew Bible and Ancient Israel* 1.4 (2012) 483–501.
46 Also 1 Pet 2:11 and 2:25.
47 H. Hegermann, *Der Brief an die Hebräer* (Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1988) 140; W.L. Lane, *Hebrews 1-8* (Word Biblical Commentary 47A; Dallas: Word, 1991) 153.
48 G.L. Cockerill, *The Epistle to the Hebrews* (New International Commentary on the New Testament; Grand Rapids & Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2012) 290.
49 R.E. Brown, *The Epistles of John: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* (Anchor Bible 30; New York: Doubleday, 1982) 704.
50 R. Schnackenburg, *Die Johannesbriefe* (Herders Theologischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament; Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2002) 321.
51 S.S. Smalley, *1,2,3 John* (Word Biblical Commentary 51; Waco: Word, 1984) 346.
52 H.J. Klauck, *Der zweite und dritte Johannesbrief* Band 2 (Evangelisch-Katholischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament XXIII; Zürich: Benziger & Neukirchner, 1992) 81.
53 G. Strecker, *Die Johannesbriefe* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1989) 360.
54 J.B. Green, *The Gospel of Luke* (New International Commentary on the New Testament; Grand Rapids & Cambridge: Eerdmans, 1997) 374.
55 J. Marcus, *Mark 8-16* (Anchor Yale Bible 27A; New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2009) 618, argues that soul, self and life, all three are possible.
56 A.Y. Collins, *Mark: A Commentary* (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2007) 409.
57 H. Klein, *Das Lukasevangelium* (Meyers Kritisch-Exegetischer Kommentar über das Neue Testament; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006) 342.
58 D.L. Bock, *Luke 1:1–9:50* (Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1994) 855.
59 R.T. France, *The Gospel of Matthew* (New International Commentary on the New Testament; Grand Rapids & Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2007) 638; U. Luz, *Matthew 8–20* (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2001) 385; D.A. Hagner, *Matthew 14–28* (Word Biblical Commentary 33B; Dallas: Word, 1995) 484.
60 D. Lührmann, *Das Markusevangelium* (Handbuch zum Neuen Testament 3; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1987) 152.
61 Hagner, *Matthew 14–28*, 484.
62 W.D. Davies and D.C. Allison, *Matthew 8–18* (International Critical Commentary II/3; London & New York: T&T Clark, 1991) 206; D.A. Hagner, *Matthew 1–13* (Word Biblical Commentary 33A; Dallas: Word, 1993) 285–286; Luz, *Matthew 8–20*, 101; J. Nolland, *The Gospel of Matthew* (New International Greek Testament Commentary; Grand Rapids & Bletchley: Eerdmans & Paternoster, 2005) 436; Theissen, *Erleben und Verhalten*, 63; D.L. Turner, *Matthew* (Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008) 278–279.
63 Davies and Allison, *Matthew 8–18*, 206; Hagner, *Matthew 1–13*, 286; Luz, *Matthew 8–20*, 101.
64 France, *Matthew*, 403; for O. Cullmann, *Immortalité de l'âme où résurrection des morts?: Le témoigage du Nouveau Testament* (Neuchatel: Delachaux & Niestlé, 1956) 48, the immortal soul exemplifies the autonomous self, whereas the resurrection of the body represents the dependent self. The 'soul' in Mt 10:28 can also die and the human being is completely dependent upon God in a further life.
65 Nolland, *Matthew*, 436.
66 J.B. Green, *Body, Soul and Human Life: The Nature of Humanity in the Bible* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008) 5; Theissen, *Erleben und Verhalten*, 80–81, who himself rejects this consensus.
67 R. Bultmann, *Theologie des Neuen Testaments* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck] 1961) 193–226.
68 Bultmann, *Theologie*, 193.
69 Bultmann, *Theologie*, 195.
70 Bultmann, *Theologie*, 196.
71 Bultmann, *Theologie*, 204–205.
72 Bultmann, *Theologie*, 206.
73 Bultmann, *Theologie*, 205.
74 Bultmann, *Theologie*, 206–207.
75 Bultmann, *Theologie*, 210–222.
76 Dunn, *Theology*, 53.
77 Dunn, *Theology*, 54.
78 Dunn, *Theology*, 74.
79 Dunn, *Theology*, 76.
80 Dunn, *Theology*, 77.
81 Dunn, *Theology*, 78.
82 See above N. Murphy (introduction).
83 N.T. Wright, *The Resurrection of the Son of God* (Christian Origins and the Question of God Volume

III; London: SPCK, 2003) 283.

84 Wright, *Surprised by Hope*, 184.

85 Goetz, 'Substance Dualism', 128; B.L. Rickabaugh, 'Responding to N.T. Wright's Rejection of the Soul', *The Heythrop Journal* 59.2 (2018) 201-220.

86 He uses Cullmann's *Immortalité de l'âme où résurrection des morts* as example of the dichotomy. However, Cullmann seems to reject especially the idea that the soul would be autonomous, because he wants to stress the dependence of the human being on God. The fact that Cullmann also adheres to the idea of an intermediate state softens the antithesis greatly.

87 J. Barr, *The Garden of Eden and the Hope of Immortality* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993) 94–96.

88 Barr, *Garden of Eden,* 107–116.

89 R. Jewett, *Paul's Anthropological Terms: A Study of Their Use in Conflict Settings* (Arbeiten zur Geschichte des antiken Judentums und des Urchristentums X; Leiden: Brill, 1971) 346.

90 H. Lüdemann, *Die Anthropologie des Apostels Paulus und ihre Stellung innerhalb seiner Heilslehre: nach den vier Hauptbriefen* (Kiel: Paul Tuche, 1872) 6.

91 H. Cremer, *Biblisch-theologisches Wörterbuch der Neutestamentlichen Gräcität* (Gotha: Perthes, 1866) 539–544; contra Jewett, *Paul's Anthropological Terms*, 339, who gives an account of the 1923 edition prepared by Kögel, but in the main text refers to Cremer as the one who writes about an opposition between the belief in the soul and the resurrection.

92 Cremer, *Wörterbuch*, 1866, 539–544; H. Cremer, *Biblisch-theologisches Wörterbuch der Neutestamentlichen Gräcität*, 9. Auflage (Gotha: Perthes, 1902) 1070–1074.

93 J. Kögel, *Hermann Cremers Biblisch-theologisches Wörterbuch des Neutestamentlichen Griechisch*, 11. Auflage (Gotha & Stuttgart: Perthes, 1923) 1140. The 11th edition is identical to the 10th (‚unveränderter Andruck der völlig durchgearbeiteten zehnten Auflage').

94 Kögel, *Wörterbuch,* 1140.

95 Kögel, *Wörterbuch,* 1141.

96 Kögel, *Wörterbuch,* 1140–1141.

97 E. Schweizer, „ψυχη D. Neues Testament", in G. Kittel und G. Friedriech (Hrsg.), *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament* Band 9 (Stuttgart usw.: Kohlhammer, 1973) 644: 'Seine Psyche ist demnach nicht eine über den Tod hinaus bleibende Substanz, sondern das Leben aus Gottes Handeln, die sich ereignende Gemeinschaft mit Gott, die durch das Gericht hindurch ihre Vollendung finden wird.' He further posits that the continuity between life in faith and the resurrection life is in God's faithfulness (656).

98 E. Cremer, *Hermann Cremer: Ein Lebens- und Charakterbild* (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1912) 314; E. Schaeder, *Gedächtnisrede auf Hermann Cremer* (Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie 32; Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1929) 12.

99 E.g. G. Vattimo, *After Christianity* (New York: Colombia University Press, 2002) 3–4.

100 Green, *Body, Soul and Human Life*, esp. 17-34, for the explanation of his method.