EJT (2015) 24:2, 114–131 0960–2720

The Theological Foundation of Christian Ethics: Methodological issues

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Mè suschèmatizesthe tô aiôni toutô, alla metamorphousthe tè anakainôsei tou nous, eis to dokimazein humas ti to thelèma tou Theou, to agathon kai euareston kai teleion (Rom 12:2).

RÉSUMÉ

L'étude proposée part de la conviction que la théologie et la réflexion chrétienne sur les questions fondamentales de la construction de l'éthique ne peuvent se séparer, ni la méthode du contenu. Comme toutes deux reposent sur le roc sous-jacent de la foi évangélique (*fides quae*), la théologie peut éclairer les décisions de premier rang sur le principe constitutif de ce qu'on qualifie d'éthique (le devoir, le Bien ?), la cible de l'évaluation et formation morale (l'acte ou l'*habitus* ? l'individu ou la communauté ?, et les sources des normes (quelle herméneutique ? le culte, la théologie – révélée ou naturelle – ou le contexte historique ?). Les partenaires du présent dialogue comprennent O. O'Donovan, P. Ricoeur, H. Burkhardt ; on prête attention au débat autour du livre récent de B. Brock.

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SUMMARY

The proposed inquiry starts from the conviction that theology and a Christian reflection on basic issues in ethical theory cannot be separated, nor can method from content. Since both rest on the bedrock sub-foundation of evangelical faith (*fides quae*), theology may comment on first-rank decisions concerning the constitutive principle of the ethical (duty, goodness/happiness?), on the target of moral evaluation and training (act or habitus, individuals or communities?), and on the sources of guidance (proper hermeneutics, worship, theology – revealed or natural -, historical context?). The main partners in the dialogue include Oliver O'Donovan, Paul Ricoeur and Helmut Burkhardt, while some attention is devoted to the debate around Brian Brock's recent book.

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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Die vorliegende Untersuchung geht von der Überzeugung aus, dass Theologie und eine christliche Reflektion über die grundlegenden Fragen von Ethiktheorie ebenso wenig voneinander getrennt werden können wie die Methode vom Inhalt. Weil beide Paare auf dem Fundament des evangelikalen Glaubens fußen (*fides quae*), ist Theologie in der Lage, über die wichtigsten Fragen aufzuklären zum konstitutiven Prinzip dessen, was Ethik ausmacht, (Pflicht/Gutes/Glück?), zum Ziel von moralischer Bewertung und Bildung (Handlung oder Habitus? Individuum oder Gemeinschaft?) sowie zu den Quellen für Normen (eigentliche Hermeneutik? Gottesdienst? Theologie – geoffenbarte oder natürliche – oder historischer Kontext?). Bedeutende Partner im Dialog sind hier Oliver O'Donovan, Paul Ricoeur und Helmut Burkhardt; ebenso ist die Andacht auf die Debatte um das jüngste Buch von Brian Bock gerichtet.

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1. Introduction

My topic is important at all times and its relevance in our late modern context is obvious.[1] The introduction can therefore concentrate on the clarification of the way the words of the title should be understood.

1.1 Theological

The author of this essay is a theologian without special expertise on ethics. I can only offer a theologian's observations on the foundation of ethics. This is slightly different from what the wording of my title would suggest. I excuse this (modest) departure with the consideration that Christian thinkers are called to participate in the larger debate: they grapple with the foundational problems that 'philosophers' also attend to. Oliver O'Donovan denounces the claim that Christian ethics have nothing to do with moral philosophy as a profitless 'bravado': 'At best it meant a theological abandonment of the field…'[2] The 'modern' partition between theology and philosophy is a porous one. I will keep in mind the general problem of ethical foundations – from a theological angle.

1.2 Foundation

Attacks on 'foundationalism' make many shy of using the word – but we should go free of the spell of *taboo* words! Whatever retains some force in anti-foundationalist arguments targets the Cartesian *Cogito* and the naïve assurance of pure empiricists; but the 'soul' of evangelical theological method is radically different. Of finer interest is Helmut Burkhardt's remark that the image of the building – which 'foundation' recalls – corresponds to the Greek word *èthos* (from which, of course, 'ethics' derives), which means first residence, whereas the biblical image, a more dynamic one, is that of the *way*.[3] Although some scholars, in the wake of Martin Heidegger, are happy to exploit the etymology of 'ethics',[4] it should not rule our use of words,[5] and, in the present case, bind the metaphor of foundations to a Greek *versus* a biblical perspective. Burkhardt wisely adds that one should not exaggerate the distinction he has highlighted.[6] After all, the image of building, with an emphasis on foundation, looms large in Scripture. It concludes our Lord's Sermon on the Mount (Mt 7:24-27), whose relevance for Christian ethics is undeniable.

My real problem relates to the *depth* of the foundations to consider. In a legitimate sense, the theological foundation of Christian ethics requires the whole biblical world-view, all the basic theological tenets of the faith. I feel, however, that dealing with such a wide deployment of truth would far exceed my embrace. I choose, therefore, to locate the said theological deposit of faith *below* foundation: it constitutes the bed-rock level upon which the foundation is laid; in other words: the presuppositions that form the 'fiducial framework' (Polanyi's phrase), the source of light and criteria.

Concretely, I mean the contents of classical 'evangelical' theology, as expressed, e.g., by John Stott in his beautiful 'testament'.[7] It includes, as most relevant to our topic, Trinitarian creational monotheism, the anthropology that goes with it (*imago Dei*, original sin, the doctrines of grace), the 'already and not yet' scheme of eschatology, and the total reliability of canonical Scripture, which is the Word of God written. I may insist on two features of created reality. God has established *laws* that govern the phenomena of this world (e.g. Jer 31:35), regularities that show his *wisdom* (Pr 3:19-20; 8:30, translating *'àmôn* 'craftsman, master-builder').[8] At the same time, we should recognise the 'granular' constitution of that reality: though none of them can subsist in isolation, creatures retain a distinct identity, a relatively enduring consistency, and should not be considered as mere intersections, knots or functions. This is the truth that the time-honoured metaphysical doctrine of *substance* tried to safeguard, and which the mighty critic of that doctrine, Herman Dooyeweerd, maintained under the name *typical individual structures* – how successful he was, I let others appreciate.[9]

1.3 Method

Choices of method often decisively orientate the development of arguments, and not seldom without being scrutinised carefully enough; I am inclined to focus on such. Yet, I am also in sympathy with Brian Brock's warning against 'the modern obsession with method'.[10] One of the meanings of *methodeia* is 'trickery', the clever manipulation of evidences, and both New Testament occurrences are pejorative (Eph 4:14; 6:11). The key consideration here is that method can never be separated from content: scientific procedures must adapt to the object of study. A methodological concern implies some measure of a reflective distance; it spurs vigilance as to the chains or reasoning, the adequacy of concepts, hidden assumptions, unwarranted disjunctions and symmetries, *principles* at stake and at work. The exercise could be called 'metaethics', the word which Paul Ramsey used.[11] I feel it grants me the freedom not to pursue the lines I will indicate, to suggest preferences without setting forth corresponding proof, to leave some issues 'open'. This may pass for a methodological decision!

2. The object of our study: the contours of 'ethics'

What referent[12] do we aim at when we say 'ethics'? The disjunction between *ethical* (doctrine, etc.) and *moral* is familiar. Paul Ricoeur gives it title-rank in one of his articles and it determines the architecture of its richest development in the field.[13] Helmut Burkhardt describes the same disjunction as a well-established phenomenon among Protestants.[14] Ethical is roughly equivalent to *teleological*, focussing on ends or goals, on the Good we are to pursue, and moral to *deontological*, focussing on duty, norms and obligation. Primacy goes to the ethical; Ricoeur labours hard to establish that primacy, and then to find a necessary place for the moral level, but many despise the latter and would destroy it altogether. Some, according to Burkhardt, attach ethics to inwardness (though one would rather find the reverse in Hegel). Another writer, the Catholic philosopher Nikolaus Lobkowicz, would use the word 'moral' for the norms which actually guide us in our daily lives, and 'Ethik' for the philosophical critique and grounding of these norms.[15]

'From the proper meaning of the words', Burkhardt firmly adjudicates, 'there is no real difference between the two concepts, and, above all, no reason for disparaging the "moral" concept.'[16] Between Greek *e/èthos* (plural *–è*) and Latin *mos* (plural *mores*), the roots whose presence is still being felt in the use of the words, a quasi-perfect equivalence of current meaning obtains. Ricoeur acknowledges that 'nothing in etymology and historical use requires making a difference'.[17] We may only allow that 'moral' retains a more Roman Catholic flavour, simply because of the larger place of Latin in Catholic education! The disjunction is not innocent: it participates of the culture's deep resentment against the thought of a superior authority, a Lawgiver and Judge – a God worthy of the name. It operates against what is left of the biblical imprint (*dei*, from which 'deontology' derives, occurs 104 times in the New Testament!). We shall not accept the disjunction.[18]

2.1 Deontology

The vocabulary debate resonates with the chief issue confronting us: what is the decisive trait that makes ethics to be ethics? What is the feature that specifies a moral consideration as such? To speak Dooyeweerdian, what is the 'nuclear moment' and kernel of meaning of that modality of human experience? Not all science of *mores* or *e/èthè* is eligible: *ethology* is not ethics!

Common sense will probably answer, still today: ethology is *descriptive*, but ethics *prescriptive*. The one deals with what *is*, and the other with what *ought* to be. Such is, basically, the deontological emphasis, though O'Donovan distinguishes between deontic and prescriptive.[19] The key notions that belong to the same constellation would be duty, obligation, norms, law and command, imperative, authority (which O'Donovan rightly defines, in earthly relationships, as 'the capacity of one human being to command the obedience of another through speech'[20]). The reference is to God's *will*; he decides what is *right* and what is wrong. Our position, Jochem Douma writes, 'is known as the Divine Command Theory. An act is right because and only because God so wills it.'[21] The thought of judgement is near: moral agents are *responsible* before the Judge (they give an account to the Authority above them); actions that conform to the law are morally praiseworthy, and those which do not deserve blame and condemnation, the agent incurs guilt; conscience accuses the agent who has broken the moral law in the role of an inward representative of the moral Judge. Most writers choose Immanuel Kant as the purest representative of the deontological view of ethics.[22] Although not all features are found with him, his supreme concern that duty be done for the sake of duty alone, the centrality of the 'categorical imperative', his emphasis on will as the locus of morality, the rational necessity he stressed to *postulate* a Lawgiver and Judge, do compose a paradigm of the deontological option. Maybe Emmanuel Levinas could also be named, despite his rejection of all rational order: the absolute intensity of the moral demand rips apart the cohesion of being,[23] the unconditional imperative cuts across all indicatives, the ethical requisition (whose epiphany shines on the face of the other human being) constitutes the subject, whom it summons and binds like a hostage – one may hear in such a preaching the paroxysm of the sense of obligation, *infinite* obligation.

Those who disagree find the deontological concentration lacking in 'humanity'. The teleological views start with humans as they are. People engage in purposive activities; their *e/èthè* are directed towards goals. The role of ethics is to shed light on the goals worth pursuing, to point to what is *good* for the agent. The Good is the central thought.

Ethical doctrines differ primarily through their rival identifications of the good. The ancient Greek philosophers did not doubt that human beings desire and seek *happiness*, the enjoyment of the good. Their moral teaching showed the way to happiness (including Socrates' message that one is happier if one suffers from injustice than if one behaves unjustly). While some located the supreme good in pleasure, or, at least, untroubled tranquillity, the most influential doctrines closely allied goodness and *being* (what is evil for humans is death, decline, destruction – non-being), the pure being of heavenly Ideas or the all-encompassing being of the divine-cosmic whole. Christian tradition accepted the legacy and wrought a new synthesis: a *transcendent eudemonism*, as it has been called, became the dominant view. In teleological perspective, God, who is *ipsum esse* (being-itself), is the *summum bonum*, the supreme Good, whose enjoyment (in beatific vision) is the End of human existence; it is at the same time the fulfilment of the being of human persons, the full flowering of their nature in the richer possession of being. While Bentham's utilitarianism is often put forward as the example of teleological ethics (with such glaring weaknesses and opposition to Christianity that it is not an option for us), the Catholic version is worth more attention. John Paul II's encyclical *Veritatis splendor* (1993) offers evangelical theologians a concise and conservative expression of that traditional model.[24] The other teleological example with high credentials and arguments worth pondering would be that of the liberal Protestant Paul Ricoeur, who starts with the desire and effort *to be* (Spinoza's *conatus*).

One can hardly deny that the first impression, when one reads Scripture, leans on the deontological side. The emphasis on command, precept, law and judgement is overwhelming. John Murray candidly observes: 'When we examine the witness of Scripture itself as to the origin of the canons of behaviour which the Scripture approves, we do not find that love is allowed to discover or dictate its own standards or patterns of conduct' – rather we are led by 'objectively revealed precepts, institutions, commandments…'[25] Burkhardt, who notices the contrast between the biblical emphasis on the divine will, expressed in commands to be obeyed (a structure which sinners may abuse) and modern 'autonomy', easily disposes of grammatically unsound objection that the Decalogue prohibitions are in the indicative mood.[26] The New Testament does not produce another sound: even in Paul's epistles – not to mention Matthew or James whom many would charge with legalistic tendencies – '[t]he just requirement of the Law, which is in tune with love, remains a standard of righteous living'.[27] One might add that 'bond' is a likely meaning of *b^{e}rît*, that which binds – at any rate, 'covenant' implies *obligation*. May we relate Kant's sensitivity in this matter to his pietistic upbringing? And Levinas' to what remains of biblical substance in talmudic and hasidic tradition?

Analysis appears to corroborate biblical impressions. Since David Hume, thinkers cannot ignore the difficulty of deriving what *ought* to be from what *is*. The 'naturalistic fallacy' has been exposed. Karl Barth shrewdly observed that promoters of the thesis that identifies what is natural biologically and what is moral offer the best refutation of it: they feel compelled to *preach* it.[28] With those who flatly deny obligation, dialogue is difficult: they resemble blind men, unable to perceive a basic, irreducible, ingredient of experience, a human *Urphänomen*.[29] Actually, I believe it is there (Rom 2:15), but repressed in ways that resemble the mechanisms psychoanalysis calls negation and disavowal (*Verneinung* and *Verleugnung*).[30] Yet, more honourable theories which try to extract 'oughtness' from being are found, under closer inspection, wanting. Why should the tendencies of my nature impose upon my freedom the obligation of fulfilment? Why should I feel guilty if I do not strive towards the fullness of my being? Why *ought* I to pursue my happiness (and/or that of others)? What 'is' can only yield the *ought* of duty, the authority of rightful command, if the principle of obligation has previously and surreptitiously been introduced into it. Even the fact of God's absolute power can crush creatures of dust but not obligate them: might does not make right, as Karl Barth perceived.[31] It is not obvious that the fullness of being entails being the moral End of created life: that thought has been called 'the supernaturalist fallacy'.[32] If we say: we *owe* our Maker everything we are, and if we do not simply mean the fact of our origin, we already presuppose obligation. The same with *reciprocity*, which has been proposed as a foundation of ethics: it answers to the taste of reason for symmetry, and can be attached to the Golden Rule.[33] Whence the moral force of reciprocal treatment? Barth himself, in the interest of his Christological grounding (a fact!), writes of our 'obligation which ensues [*sich ergibt aus*] from his [God's] gift, beyond measure and comprehension, of himself to us'.[34] But this requires the prior

acceptance of the rule: we ought to render thanks for a gift!

Even the ablest treatments fail to convince. The critical move in Ricoeur's patient demonstration is made when he claims that the 'standards of excellence' confer 'the properly ethical qualification' to the rules of an art or trade, which, in themselves are merely technical norms.[35] He claims it, but he does not show how a technically good physician becomes, as such, a morally good one. The self-assured tone of the statement conceals a *metabasis eis allo genos*. The standards of technical excellence acquire an ethical quality only when one assumes the prior obligation to strive for technical excellence. Another of Ricoeur's theses also deserves mention: *evil*, he argues, makes it necessary that ethics should be supplemented by moral doctrine (deontological): 'Because evil *is there*, aiming at the "good life" must undergo the trial of moral obligation…'[36] To this claim I would oppose that evil presupposes the norm which it violates, as the very construction of the word *anomia* testifies – and Ricoeur himself had come near this insight: 'I can only think of evil as evil when I start with that from which it is a defection.'[37] The entrance of sin into the picture only makes coercion necessary, while obligation in moral perfection is nothing but pure delight.[38] As to Roman Catholic traditional understandings, *Veritatis splendor* openly, though briefly, acknowledges that the principle of obligation precedes the construction of moral theory, through a quotation from Leo XIII: 'These prescriptions of human reason could not wield legal force were it not the organ and interpreter of a higher reason, to whom our mind and our freedom ought to obey.'[39]

2.2 Bible and santification

And yet, while we should maintain at all costs the deontological dimension of ethics, unpopular though it may be – *Mè suschèmatizesthe tô aiôni toutô* – we should also pay attention to the diversity of the biblical presentation. Already in its vocabulary: the will of God is defined as 'the good, what pleases him (and, presumably, those who live in the harmony of his fellowship), what is whole and fulfilling' (a possible paraphrase of Rom 12:2). As the Decalogue impressively reminds us, the issuing of God's commands is part of a most factual reality. 'Setting the Old Testament law in this perspective (God's redemptive action and human response to it)', Chris Wright aptly describes, 'is helpful in softening the otherwise starkly deontological flavour of the law.'[40] We should not reduce Old Testament ethics to commandments and precepts, apodictic or casuistic: the wisdom books are important, and the apparent 'consequentialism' of the warnings and advices of Proverbs. The first theme of Jesus' preaching and teaching is the 'kingdom of God' – God's rule, but also the reality that embodies the rule.[41] That God be the End of human actions agrees with the statement that all things are 'for him' (Rom 11:36). The biblical God deserves to be called the *summum bonum*: he is the only One absolutely good (Mk 10:18); he is the fountain of all goodness or good things (Jas 1:16); he gives himself as the good to be enjoyed by his faithful (Ps 16:2, 5, 11; cf. 1 Pet 2:3; Gen 15:1, if one understands, with NIV, that the Lord is himself Abraham's reward). It is of interest that Cornelius Van Til chose as the organising theme of his ethical teaching the Kingdom of God as humanity's *summum bonum*.[42]

Analysis concurs. It is impossible ultimately to separate between being and obligation. What *ought* to be ought *to be*! Norms are intended to apply in a real context, and would lose all meaning otherwise; pure dualism would forbid them even to meet. There must be a link between the two main meanings of 'good'. This may be discerned in the major defenders of obligation. In Levinas' case, the opposition is so acute between ethical demand and all ontology and rational coherence that a link is difficult to find, unless one considers the opposition itself as the link! The paradox in which he glories, that we are 'constantly to unsay what is said, to go back to the act of saying which is always betrayed by what is said',[43] may be a symptom of embarrassment.[44] Even more significant: Levinas feels the need to make room for a rational, consistent, discourse on *justice*,[45] and he reaches that goal through the introduction of the *third* person. But how? In the book, 'furtively. Not just once, but twenty, thirty times, and each time incidentally, as if there was no reason.'[46] One may seriously doubt the adequacy of this move, which Ricoeur labels a 'coup de force'.[47] Kant's claims have been scrutinised by many. O'Donovan underlines Kant's recourse to the idea of 'humanity' to show that he had 'to appeal to some teleological determinant situated outside the rational will'.[48] Dooyeweerd argues that 'the Kantian conception of the moral motive, that of duty or respect for the moral law, if it is to have any moral meaning, presupposes a moral feeling-drive'.[49] Ricoeur offers the same argument in other words: respect is an

affection, autonomy is affected.[50] Lobkowicz sees in the third *Critique* (§ 63) a resurgence of ontological concerns,[51] and, at any rate, the doctrine of the postulates of Practical Reason shows that the moral will is concerned with realisation. Ricoeur also highlights Kant's confessed starting-point: 'the *fact* of reason'.[52]

O'Donovan has authored a magnificent attempt at a balanced synthesis, under biblical auspices.[53] He nowhere denies our obligation to submit to God's will, but the 'enemy' of his unrelenting struggle is 'modern voluntarism', the grounding of ethics on the pure choices of free-will, free from any norm or pattern that reality could lay upon humans. O'Donovan's central theme is that of *created order*, the order of the world or reality[54] which was established in creation and vindicated (therefore confirmed) by Christ's resurrection. In this order 'kinds' (*genera*) and 'ends' are combined and these have an *ethical* import. Morality is defined as 'man's participation in the created order'.[55] O'Donovan criticises sixteenth-century tendencies:

> Natural Law thinkers of the Renaissance and Counter-Reformation showed themselves under the sway of voluntarism when they asked what it was that gave the natural order its authority, and replied that it was authorized by the command of God. The creation thus appeared to them to be an inert thing, meaningless for human action until assigned by divine command a significance that it did not otherwise have. Our aim is simply to contradict this. The created order carries its authority for action in itself, because agents, too, are a part of the created order and respond to it without being told so.[56]

Such a weighty statement could cause some concern if it were not clear that O'Donovan fights against a view that completely disconnects ethics from the order of creation: as when Helmut Thielicke labels the divine command 'extraplanetary material.'[57] When O'Donovan asks 'How does God's word engage our obedience…?' he answers that two lines are found in Scripture (and follows them): 'God speaks *through* the order which reason perceives' and, as he remains free above that order, 'God's command *cuts across* our rational perceptions.'[58] This seems to correct what is found on the same page: 'divine authority will prevail only because it belongs to that first reality in which truth is grounded.' Contrary to the impression made by such words, O'Donovan does not draw obligation from the mere fact of being, and divine authority from ontological fullness as such: God's will in the first place produced that 'reality'. Actually, he also seems to yield to nominalist influence (!) when, dealing with Christ's authority, he objects to the view that this authority comes from Jesus' identity with the Logos: 'In its use of the Logos-concept as a bridging-notion between God and creation, is it not hinting that the moral order is not a *created* order at all, but an expression of the character of divinity?'[59] His powerful reply to Ockham demonstrates that it is not the case, and he affirms that 'God's freedom is exercised in congruence with itself',[60] a statement which implies (as I understand it) that it expresses God's character.

Compared with what I gather from Scripture and the synthesis of Burkhardt, O'Donovan's seems too much to stress world-order and to underplay the reflection of God's *nature* in his *tôrâ* and revealed wisdom (that enable humans to think God's thoughts after him), as well as the human calling to transcend the wordly horizon in moral union/fellowship with our Creator. Is 'created' the best qualification for the moral order established in creation and for creation? Yet, he does not deny them, and he provides a precious counter-weight to ruinous modern tendencies.

The key issue, it appears, is the relationship of being and obligation (or the right to obligate, to command). The upshot of the work we have surveyed, I suggest, is that we may neither identify nor separate the two. They are one, without confusion and in a way we cannot fathom, in God, in God alone. To God belongs ontological fullness, *ipsum esse*, as tradition has affirmed. 'Only the absolute *I Am*', Van Til teaches, 'can say, "I Am," without needing to say anything more.'[61] Despite widespread opinion, Exodus 3:14 so implies, and Ricoeur was happily open to this truth.[62] And *that* God is the Good, absolutely, in the normative, moral sense (Mk 10:18). Therefore the creation that proceeds from him (and reveals what we may know of him) has ethical import – yet without any confusion of fact and obligatory force: only according to God's free purposes, as he speaks through and in creation, to the only earthly creatures endowed with responsibility (ability to respond). Maybe the biblical concept of *holiness* corresponds to the intimate union of being and goodness – since the Lord himself, the King of the universe, is holy, and holy, and holy, so his images ought to be, so his people; their fulfilment of the

righteous demand of the law will become effective in reality through the process of their *sanctification*.

From a methodological viewpoint, we observe that the popular concept of *value* would combine reality and the authority of norms. This is why it is so attractive – and it suits a pluralistic outlook. But it could be a snare, though I do not deny that it may be useful. When the value of love is made the prominent concept, as Patrick Nullens realistically observes, one can be suspicious of the *vagueness* introduced.[63] Ricoeur strikes to the root when he writes: 'I hold the quasi concept of value to be a term of compromise…'[64] 'Value' is a mongrel concept: *neither* truly real *nor* clearly authoritative. When one lacks the courage of clarification, one can talk of values…

O'Donovan's formidable concentration on the created order of natural kinds and ends enables him to circumscribe the field of ethics in an original way – a methodological *plus*. Only *generic* duties, he shows, are properly moral, not the duty born of individual vocation (which proceeds from God's historical providence, not from the order of creation). 'Of course, there is a moral duty that we should follow our vocations – but that is a *generic* duty, not a particular one!'[65] It reminds us of Dooyeweerd's effort to pinpoint the kernel-meaning (or nuclear moment) of the ethical modality or law-sphere. It must be love, but love is not confined to the ethical modality, it characterises the central religious relation above or beyond the modal diversity. Distinguishing Christian religion and ethics is 'the "Cape Horn" of every Christian view of the "moral sphere"'.[66] A very careful progression, including a critical evaluation of W.J. Aalders' and Emil Brunner's proposals, reaches the conclusion: 'In the modal ethical relation love manifests itself on the normative law-side only in a balanced proportion between self-love and love of one's neighbour.'[67] Worth pondering, though it expels duties towards God out of the moral field.

One more issue relates to the definition of ethics. If, as we just said, moral obedience is a fruit of sanctification, should the doctrine of sanctification be a part of moral theology? Burkhardt almost vehemently calls for the inclusion of teaching on spirituality within the study of ethics.[68] His *Einführung in die Ethik* offers as its last and substantial part an exposition which corresponds to the soteriology of theology textbooks; actually, I have found it closely parallel to the third part of my *Doctrine du péché et de la rédemption*, which deals with the application of saving grace![69] In his own way, O'Donovan also includes a significant amount of soteriological material in his 'evangelical ethics': he can devote a page to baptism, or mark some sympathy for the theme of 'divinisation'.[70] Romans 12:2 might be quoted in support: the transformation and renewal of the mind belongs to the work of sanctification.

I see no theological objection to defining ethics so that it incorporates the working of grace in Christian life: the latter, I confess, provides the dynamic of moral behaviour. Yet, chiefly for practical reasons, I would prefer a narrower circumscription. It follows historical precedent, and makes dialogue with other persuasions easier. Theological permission can be found in the difference of viewpoints: dogmatics focus on God's work for us and in us, while ethics still focus on the works which we are called to accomplish. Soteriology and spirituality are primarily interested in our fellowship with God, whereas in the moral field we think first of discharging our responsibilities.

3. The object of ethics: what is to conform to God's will?

Exploring the contours of what we call 'ethics' was the first methodological step we had to make, of greatest complexity and import. There are, however, other issues which we are to consider – though it must be done more briefly. We must leave to the side Rainer Mayer's stimulating call for a reflection on 'the tension between Being, Duty [*Sollen*] and Will [*Wollen*]' and on the relationship between motive, means and goal.[71] The next question concerns that which ethical norms and moral orientations are to bring into conformity with God's will. *Mores* or *e/*èthè: yes, but more precisely? The object shows the polarity of 'act' and 'character', on the one hand, and individual and social ethics on the other; a word must be added on 'institutions' seen from a moral angle.

3.1 Acts

Act has been considered as the primary object of moral appreciation (and deliberation). Ethics is interested in *praxis* (which is distinct from *poièsis*[72]). As O'Donovan shows, even Thomas Aquinas, who emphasised *habitus* and virtue, 'is much more inclined to an act-analytical approach'[73] when it comes to moral appreciation. But the act itself is not a 'monad', a perfectly simple thing: an act is born from intention, it embodies it and makes it

'real'; whatever the intention, however, it is also something done in the moment with its own features which may conform or conflict with norms; and it produces consequences, some of them intended, some of them not at all. To which of these elements should ethical judgement attach itself?

Can anyone bring a rigorous answer? Scripture in its general tenor and common sense seem to favour a 'this, but not forgetting that' approach. Intention is important – which is normally of one piece with the act – and it must be taken into account, as in the case of unintentional homicide, when a mortal accident happened only through God's decretive will (Ex 21:11-14), though the murderer had not planned or willed it so. Even in this case, however, the act carries guilt, with judicial consequences. The focus in most biblical passages, e.g., in the lists in apostolic epistles, is on acts, *erga* (cf. 1 Cor 6:9-10; very precise, Rom 2:21-22). Judgement targets things done through the body (2 Cor 5:10). But consequences may not be ignored, the fruit that remains. No moral deliberation may be indifferent to consequences – a 'rigorism' that proclaims *Fiat iustitia, pereat mundus* should be deeply abhorrent to Christians.[74] Agents seem to be responsible for the foreseeable consequences of their acts, but not for longer-term effects, which are beyond their control. O'Donovan also recalls the important *Principle of Double Effect*, which helps us to distinguish between intended and unintended effects, foreseeable or not.[75]

Acts take time to perform, but themselves are inserted in the texture of more enduring realities: recent ethical reflection has pushed forward the permanent disposition in the subject which the scholastics called *habitus* (more than 'habit') and, if moral and praiseworthy, *virtue*. (*Virtus* is originally the force and courage of a valiant *vir*, and translates Greek *aretè*, excellence.) The trend has been hailed as a return to Aristotle: ethics should focus on these. O'Donovan writes of 'policies' we frame 'for the conduct of our lives'[76] and Donald D. Evans has coined (or borrowed) the word 'behabitives' for the basic attitudes which shape 'habitus, behaviour'.[77] The whole pattern of set dispositions and attitudes can be named 'character'. The whole progression may be described in the words of the quasi proverb: 'Sow a thought, you'll reap an act; sow an act, you'll reap a habit; sow a habit, you'll reap a character; sow a character, you'll reap a destiny.'

3.2 Character

Scripture and, again, common sense and experience, testify to the importance of character. Our Lord himself stressed that bad fruits grow on bad trees. Hebrews 5:14 confirms that through exercise (*hexis,* to which Latin *habitus* corresponds) a disposition may be strengthened and sharpened that plays a great part in behaviour – interestingly, as in Romans 12:2, the primary aspect is intellectual (an encouragement for cognitive psychology).

Yet, should character be a reference-point in moral deliberation? Ethical authors like Alisdair MacIntyre and Stanley Hauerwas apparently think along such lines, but O'Donovan brilliantly refutes them. Character is not known directly but through the acts of the person – exactly as Jesus taught: 'the tree is known by its fruit'; I should not consider my character when I have to deliberate, for it will twist my decision[78] – '[t]he inappropriateness of character-knowledge to the tasks of deliberation is the clearest demonstration of the epistemological priority of acts in disclosing character.'[79] Above all, the argument that makes character the ground of moral choice deserves to be called an 'argument of impenitence': for it rules out that the new situation I face may be the occasion for me to *repent* from ways that have entered my character.[80] Actually the 'neo-Aristotelians' are *not* faithful to Aristotle:

> The conception of moral decision as conscious projection of one's character really arises from the modern voluntarist conception of the self as historical project, the very conception to which many representatives of this school boast that they have found an alternative.[81]

3.3 Community

Christian ethics, in former times, mainly addressed the individual agent. The last decades have witnessed the spread of a strong reaction: the *community* is the true moral subject which through its life-style shapes the attitudes and sensitivities of its members; above all it is competent to interpret the ethical tradition it carries on in our days. This is true of each community, however diverse from its neighbour, in our pluralistic world. Many factors have fostered the flowering of this 'communitarian' mood and mindset: the late modern distaste for modern individualism (at the level of discourse: many who talk in that way behave as hyper-individualists, at least towards family or nation); the impact of the social sciences, some-

times with an active Marxist residue; in literary studies and hermeneutics, the influence of reader-response theories; among Christians, ecumenical openness… The most famous among the intellectual leaders, an original theologian, Stanley Hauerwas, has also imbibed a free church ecclesiology (mediated through his former colleague, the mennonite theologian John H. Yoder), with a stark contrast between the 'world', ruled by the powers of darkness and full of violence, and the church – the church is the community of the 'Peaceable Kingdom' whose ongoing history draws the ethical line.

In several respects, the communitarian perspective agrees with 'politically correct' preferences; many critics in the academy, however, have voiced their concerns. Roman Catholic scholars, as one could expect, consider Hauerwas' pessimism excessive: he underestimates the theology of creation and cultivates an unwarranted suspicion of human reason and freedom.[82] Evangelicals will react otherwise, but some will fear the temptation of Manichean over-simplification. The main burden of Catholic criticisms is even more central: the loss of universality.[83] This appears to be the most disquieting problem. The authority attributed to the community makes it immune for correction from outside. Brian Brock complains:

> To restate my reservation about the communitarians, they are so sure that they are the Church that close reading of Scripture seems to fade in importance'; their 'insulation… suggest a trajectory of domestication of Scripture and the God to whom it witnesses.[84]

How can the emphasis on community moulding escape relativism? Gordon J. Wenham summarises Brock's common sense question: 'Where there are differences of view, how do we judge who is being led by the Spirit?'[85] Communities, even 'Christian' communities, have been able, no less than individuals, of the most monstrous moral aberrations…

We should aim at a biblical balance. Reversing the idolatry of individual interest which is characteristic of aging modernity seems to be sound: a reaction of the immune system. Human nature, indeed, includes the need to belong, an essential social dimension, and we cannot deny that communities, *de facto*, shape the ethics of their members, in a holistic fashion, and orientate their reading of the sacred texts. To the Kantian question 'What ought I to do?' the wider question may gain priority: 'How shall we live?' But the anthropology of Scripture also highlights individual responsibility, together with the irreducible reality of the individual person, who may be said to transcend the group: not a more clog in the machine, not a mere cell in the body. Actually, all cultures were *communitarian*, until the breakthrough of the sense of the individual *in the Bible* – modern individualism being a corrupting secularisation of that sense! *De facto* individuals do rebel or criticise their community's *ethos*, and if they don't, it is still their choice. And *de jure*? They are answerable, ultimately, not to the community to which they do not belong *absolutely*, but to the God only Good who made them for himself, who put in their hearts 'eternity' (Ec 3:11) and has written there his moral law (Rom 2:15). The emphasis on individual terms of judgement in the New Testament is overwhelming: everyone will bear his/her own burden (Gal 6:5). As O'Donovan maintains with lucid courage, Jesus criticised the expropriation of the individual by the community:

> This criticism affirms the individual agent, in his secret chamber and apart from all observing eyes, as the recipient of God's moral demand; he is not merely a conforming member of the community which God addresses.[86]

3.4 Institutions

Since human life, as created, is irreducibly individual *and* social, a special paragraph must be added to the doctrine of norms and ends: on *institutions*. Ricoeur was careful to underline the point: ethics aim at 'the good life, with and for the other person, *in just institutions*'.[87] Under the word, he understands 'the structure of *life-together* of a historical community – people, nation, region, etc. –, a structure which cannot be reduced to interpersonal relations and yet tied with them in a remarkable way…'[88] Definition, precisely, is difficult! A number of scholars use the term to translate *ktisis* in 1 Peter 2:13, where political offices are in view, but this is disputed. I tend to use 'institutions' for stereotyped manners of proceeding among persons, which acquire a kind of objective existence (signified by tools and symbols, such as a palace) and a relative permanence in social life, invested with a measure of ethical authority.[89] They used to have an aura of prestige, indeed of sacred dignity – the moral crisis of our culture is to a great extent due to the loss of this aura. Theologically, they seem to correspond 'roughly' to the clas-

sical 'orders of creation', *Ordnungen*,[90] and to Bonhoeffer's 'mandates' work, family, authority, church.[91] I would resist putting the church, the New Creation humanity, in the same category as the orders of the first creation. The New Testament *Haustafeln* (codes listing household duties, e.g. in Eph 5-6) are also relevant. The topic surely invites further exploration. Methodologically, the trap to be avoided is a treatment of the various institutions as if they had the same status, in society, and before God.[92]

Debates have been most passionate on the institutions of family and political authority. I suggest that we should clearly distinguish, within the family, the institution of marriage and that of parenthood. Regarding the state, I only mention that O'Donovan has worked intensively on the subject, and authored the important book *The Desire of the Nations*.[93] His thesis, a bit surprisingly, changes the function of political authority with the advent of Christ, which is *reduced* to the righting of wrongs – leaving a more important role to the church in the ordering of society. This may correspond to tendencies in his overall view, and to his Anglican identity. Jonathan Chaplin's sympathetic critique is the best treatment I have read.[94]

4. Sources of moral truth: whence the guiding light?

Method is also about the identification of the guides we are to follow. Issues are legion… We can only offer sketchy comments on a number of them.

4.1 Scripture

Jean-Marie Aubert feared that pessimism relative to contemporary culture should lead ethical students to Scripture as their source, thus running 'the risk of falling into a new concordism or, even, the Lutheran fundamentalism of "sola scriptura"'.[95] Evangelicals, if they are consistent, will rather be attracted by that risk… Yet I confess some unease when I chance across statements that smack the fear of being labelled a 'fundamentalist' or use 'biblicist' with a pejorative slant.[96] The light on our path is the light of his Word, which, in God's providence, has entered the circle of our wanderings as God's Word *written*. Even in Eden, as Van Til loved to stress,[97] God expressed his will through a specific command (Gen 2:16). Any weakening of the authority of Scripture affects the foundation of Christian ethics.[98] But I must now leave this problem aside.

The 'hot' issue today concerns the way we *read* Scripture. There has been a rather vocal dissatisfaction with the alleged way of previous generations, with their concentration on law objectively studied. The new emphasis falls on the diversity of biblical genres, and, above all, on *narrative*. Even beyond the ranks of communitarians, narratives – of which the Bible is full – are considered the most potent factor in the moral shaping of a community. More recently, the language of worship, communal praise, has been the focus, in Brian Brock's important book *Singing the Ethos of God*.

The *locus* of possible dissent must be clearly identified. The use of all the kinds of biblical literature, and for ethical guidance, is welcome indeed. Beyond *tôrâ*, prophecy, wisdom, poetry – as when Chris Wright sums up the import of the Song of Solomon's celebration of legitimate sex: 'In this case, the Wisdom tradition adorns what the law protects.'[99] Narrative is morally instructive and a powerful vector of moral influence. There is a place for meditation, beyond rigorous exegesis, and communal worship is a precious context of ethical renewal. All this may be granted, and applauded. Problems begin when narrative becomes, in practice or even in theory, the only medium. Ricoeur himself warned that it should not engulf all the other genres: especially the mutual determination of story and *law* as a major Old Testament feature (already in the Yahwist document, as he accepts the theory).[100] Bartholomew agrees with O'Donovan that 'thought cannot live *sola narratione*'.[101] Gordon Wenham observes the obvious: narrative is often ambiguous. 'It is essential that *description* of behaviour is not confused with *prescription*' and we need the other texts to discern.[102] After all, giving ethical direction and making known the will of Authority is the very function for which the genres of law and wise admonition exist! Without them the risk that the servant mixes his own preferences with what the text says cannot be denied. The same with imaginative meditation! If the summary of Brock's 'relocation of hermeneutics' is correct: 'away from seeking the meaning of the text, toward encountering the text through lived, intimate, generative relationship',[103] one wonders what is left of the Word. Narrative, meditation, yes – provided the revelation of God's will in its more direct expression and least susceptible of human manipulation *controls* the experience.

It looks *as if* Christians wished to get rid of this control. Wenham does not see the warrant for Brock's sentiment 'that principles and rules, models

and virtues, cannot be derived from Scripture'[104] for such is the import of the 'relocation'. Donald Wood resists being 'forced into deciding between scriptural transparency and systematic cogency'[105] since he feels the pressure. Brian Brock himself replies and explains: 'if Christian ethics is a matter of applying or choosing to obey a set of principles we have in hand, we become like Hercules at the crossroads, reinstated as judges of our own destiny, which is to sever ourselves from God's dealings.'[106] *Prôton pseudos*! If we brush off the minor traits of caricature, we must say that for a servant to possess objective directions from his master, a set of 'principles' he is responsibly to apply, is the very condition of obedience; thus can he ratify his dependence on the master!

Brock, whose example is telling because of the high quality and evangelical substance of his contribution, puts forward another argument: 'The search for a hermeneutical "centre" of Scripture or a master-concept must always prove a failure and a distraction, for Scripture is a grammar, and a grammar has no "centre".'[107] The word 'grammar' occurs several times in the special issue of the *European Journal of Theology* devoted to Brock's book, and everyone seems to accept it. It is a remarkable symptom: for grammar has nothing to do with *truth*! Applying the same grammar, you can tell lies or tell the truth! Grammar may help us to understand the Word; this formal science can only be a tool in the service of the Word of Truth. This remark may be extended to George Lindbeck's thesis that assimilates the doctrines of the various churches to idioms, such as French, English… It ignores the basic Saussurian distinction between *langue* and *parole*; it betrays how lukewarm the passion for truth has grown in Christendom… If one claims that depriving the objective witness of Scripture of its determinative role in the search after ethical truth happily opens the space required for the Spirit's leading, this is nothing else than the old *illuministic* temptation, whose pernicious effects are so conspicuous throughout history and among present churches and cults.

There is no sound interpretation of Scripture without the Holy Spirit. We desperately need his help at least on three counts: he must remove the veil upon our hearts, he must heal our distorted spiritual sight; he grants to experience, to 'taste', the realities of which the texts speak; he adds *charismata*, special gifts to the church of Christ. But, since we are to *test* the spirits, the touchstone being the apostolic instruction (1 Jn 4:1-6; cf. Calvin's *Institutes* I,9) – if the Spirit is God's 'finger' (Lk 11:20), Scripture is his finger-print – the Spirit's leading can be discerned through the interpretation of Scripture *semetipsam interpretans*. Any insinuation that such a rule mutes the voice of the Spirit should be repelled as slanderous.

Interpreting Scripture as Scripture itself requires is synonymous with doing so *according to the analogy of faith*.[108] This validates O'Donovan's 'assertion of the need for an *architectonic hermeneutic*, or one that does justice to the shape of the edifice of Scripture as a whole'.[109] It also supports Patrick Nullens' call for a hermeneutic that takes seriously our Lord's saying in Matthew 22:40, and follows Augustine.[110] A central 'architectonic' problem is the relationship of Old and New Testaments, which impinges on many ethical problems.[111] We are made aware of the relevance of the debate when we read that Brock charges communitarian ethics, with apparent justification, with Marcionite tendencies.[112] We may note O'Donovan's learned defence of the Christian (already patristic) hermeneutical principle of the distinction between components of Old Testament law.[113] A clarification of the structure of the biblical history of dispensations or covenant(s) is important for Christian moral doctrine.

4.2 Theology

Reflecting on the analogy of faith already belongs to theology, but theology may be considered a source for ethics in two principal ways: as the legacy of *tradition* and as the systematic exposition of the *credendum*, providing locations and connections. Tradition should be treasured as an immensely useful assistant, a gift of God through the men and women he has excellently gifted. Though fallible, it is likely less so than our own brainchildren – being understood that we must wisely choose our tradition! It may protect us from the sway of fashion, and more broadly of the *Zeitgeist*. In Brock's proposal there is nothing more heart-warming than his desire to converse 'with the Saints Past and Present'. He dares attack the belief that one is bound to one's *epoch*, he wishes to think and read against the *schemata* of the age, he draws his inspiration from Augustine and from Luther:[114] Amen!

Karl Barth offers the superlative example of theology as a source. He insisted that ethics belongs *within* dogmatics and he ended each of the volumes of his *Kirchliche Dogmatik* with a (sometimes lengthy!) ethical section – among them the last 'fragment', IV/4 on baptism. The problem

with Barthian ethics is the problem with Barthian dogmatics. His 'christological concentration' leads him to enclose everything in the unique Event Jesus Christ, ethics as everything else: it concerns Jesus Christ as the sanctified man.[115] 'Man' never becomes 'subject' and remains a mere predicate.[116] God's command is *never* general and requires no interpretation.[117] Law does not precede but is the form of the Gospel, the one thesis that aroused much discussion (already put forward in 1936, in *Evangelium und Gesetz*). One cannot effectively distinguish creation from reconciliation. A telling illustration of Barth's shortcoming, despite the wealth of his insights, is the way he reduces all the options, apart from his own, to the two alternatives of legalism (obligation without the power) and antinominianism (power with no duty left).[118] The biblical situation is more complex: humans as created had both obligation and power; sinners remain under obligation, they retain power as the creational faculty of choice but have lost the actual power of full obedience (through self-love, etc.); regenerate sinners still remain under obligation (though they are accepted by God on the basis of Christ's obedience) and gradually receive the power to please God. This corresponds to the concrete pattern creation – fall – redemption which sound method will follow.

Barth touches on the *imitatio Christi*.[119] The theme, so central in the history of spirituality, also belongs to theology. The implications for ethics are obvious. The danger that it eclipses the central proclamation of atonement, Christ for us, once for all, is real. But this danger should not, in turn, lead to the erasing of an important New Testament truth. If due care is taken to 'sift', in Christ's behaviour, what belongs to his unique mission and depends on his deity, his moral model is a vital source for Christian ethics.

4.3 Nature and conscience

The question of natural law has been abundantly debated for centuries. Theologically, it runs parallel to that of natural revelation and natural theology, and the key methodological distinction is precisely that of revelation and theology: of the objective communication on God's part, and the perception, reception and interpretation on the human side. His christological concentration led Barth to the flat denial of any revelation before the incarnate Christ, the *only* Word of God: hence his famous *Nein* to Brunner; if he later mellowed his position, I believe his basic stance remained the same.[120] The creation – fall – redemption scheme enables us better to appreciate biblical data. As O'Donovan's entire work demonstrates, God establishes in creation an order with moral directions. Romans 1-2 can hardly bear any other reading. Burkhardt aptly notices the parallelism of *para ton ktisanta* in 1:25 and *para phy[u]sin* in 1:26.[121] Claus-Dieter Stoll pens a fine summary of the evidence:

> The various indications in the Old Testament as well as in the New of a morality expressing God's will and according to creation standards, and the fact that the prophets call to account also foreign peoples who do not know Israel's law, allow us to understand that the creation itself witnesses to a universal moral law, as it points to God's good purposes with his creation. This universal ethics is not only accessible to Israel but also to the peoples, though in a limited way for them because of the absence of the necessary criteria of interpretation and correction given in the explicit revelation of God's will.[122]

Yet, because of the noetic effects of sin (darkened intelligence), natural theology is not reliable, and the recognition of 'natural law' is corrupted by the concomitants of idolatry, human lies in the service of lust and greed. O'Donovan himself speaks of 'misknowledge'.[123] He even refers to 'Antichrist' for modern and late-modern corruption of a tradition informed by Christianity.[124] This explains why evangelical Protestants have not been convinced by many conclusions which Catholics draw in the name of natural law. It also enables us to account for the common elements between current ethics in most cultures and biblical teaching:[125] this should cause no embarrassment for these elements proceed from God's creation and may be retrieved – purged and inserted in new contexts.

One of these is the notion of *conscience*. It plays an important role in Paul's epistles and that to the Hebrews. We should be wary of its 'hypostatisation': as if conscience were the 'voice of God' on its own. Romans 2:14-15 may safely be interpreted of the reactions of the inner person in its relations with the world and with others, *coram Deo*. O'Donovan beautifully traces the history of the growing isolation of 'conscience', with an unfortunate separation from 'will'.[126]

4.4 History

The last issue on which I shall touch is that of ethical change *in time*. Does Christian ethics change as history runs its course and brings to the fore new insights and new problems, as one usually thinks? Evangelicals have been on the alert against the inroads of historical and cultural relativism, with ample justification in my eyes; the cult of novelty all around (based on the spectacular advances of natural sciences and technology) is often openly directed against the Christian heritage. O'Donovan does a splendid job of refuting the most sophisticated *historicism*. He reminds us that in the strict sense of the word, we *do* live in the same world as Abraham, and H.-G. Gadamer's *Horizontverschmelzung* may be a misleading metaphor.[127] He convincingly shows that the 'new' questions which arise because of new technical possibilities, such as *in vitro* fertilisation, are not really new *ethically*:

> If a moral 'issue' has arisen about this new technique, it has arisen not because of questions the technique has put to us, but of questions we have put to the technique.[128]

As we read so often the praise of God's immutable statutes, of the stability of the world which he guarantees – 'the earth is fixed…',[129] it is surprising to hear what Brock asserts: 'the tenor of Christian ethics is therefore appropriately focused on changes, on surprising appearances, in short, on advent'.[130] How typical of the 'epoch'!

And yet the God of creation is the God of history, who makes things new. If we confuse the two, we lose both, but we must avoid at all costs an ultimate dualism. Under the influence, maybe, of a disputable idea of divine eternity as pure a-temporality, classical and evangelical thought has not always seen the danger. There must be a way to accommodate the diversity of times, and therefore novelty, in the stability of God's revealed will. Rainer Mayer argues that the presence of casuistry in the law shows sensitivity to time-bound situations, and therefore legitimates change.[131] Even the Thomist thinker Jacques Maritain affirmed that 'humankind passes under historical skies *varied*' with, each time, a different 'moral physiognomy'.[132] The combination of unity and diversity in God's plan, in which he fore-ordains whatever comes to pass, provides the theological foundation for the corresponding character of ethics – but who can fathom the Lord's counsel?

In addition to the treatment of the changes between Old and New Testaments, already mentioned, a special issue deserves mentioning. Is the idea of moral *trajectories* helpful in ethical discussions? It is used for slavery: the abolition of slavery, though not found in the New Testament, is the end of a trajectory which starts in the New Testament and receives its impetus from the message. Should it be applied to women's roles and status?

Biblical history is determined by eschatology. As I conclude with a question-mark it is proper that I should add: on that Day, all the issues shall be solved. And more: on that Day, we shall be like him, sin being no more. We shall perfectly conform to His will. We shall joyfully embrace what is good, well-pleasing and fulfilling, we shall enjoy Him for ever who is the Good as the Three-Personed-God.

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Endnotes

1 This article is based on a lecture held at the biennial conference of the Fellowship of European Evangelical Theologians (FEET) in Orsay near Paris in 2014.

2 Oliver O'Donovan, *Resurrection and Moral Order: an outline for evangelical ethics* (Leicester/Grand Rapids: IVP/Eerdmans, 1986[1]) 182 [henceforth *RMO*]. I will often refer to this book, which I treasure as the deepest and richest treatment of Ethics I have seen in several decades.

3 Helmut Burkhardt, *Einführung in die Ethik. Teil I: Grund und Norm sittlichen Handelns (Fundamentalethik)* (TVG; Gießen: Brunnen, 1996) 17 [henceforth *EE*].

4 So Hans G. Ulrich, 'On Finding Our Place: Christian Ethics in God's Reality' in *European Journal of Theology* 18.2 (2009) 139: *ethos* is the *habitat* 'in which people belong. Martin Heidegger has preserved the Greek grammar of the term, translating *ethos* as "the place of dwelling", the place where people are at home. This reflection about the term *ethos* should not be seen as a linguistic sophism, but as a hint' in the direction of Brock's proposal. The reference to 'sophism' shows Ulrich aware of possible criticisms… Concerning Heidegger's philology, it is titillating to compare two translations of Heraclitus' Fragment 119: *èthos anthrôpô daimôn*. Heidegger interprets: 'Man dwells, inasmuch as he is man, in the nearness of God.' (*Lettre sur l'humanisme* to Jean Beaufret, German text and French translation by Roger Munier [Paris: Aubier-

Montaigne, 1966rev] 144, transl. 145). But E.R. Dodds interprets the same words: 'character is destiny' (*Les Grecs et l'irrationnel*, French transl. Michael Gibson [Champs 28; Paris, Flammarion, 1977] 182; since I had no access to the English original, I translated back from French into English; unless otherwise indicated, I translate my quotations from sources in other languages).

5 Against the 'etymological fallacy', James Barr, of course, but also Sylvain Romerowski's important synthesis, *Les Sciences du langage et l'étude de la Bible* (Charols: Excelsis, 2011), see references in the index, p.601. Etymology is a historical discipline which traces the semantic evolution of a word through centuries: the *etumon* reveals the older, not necessarily the truer, meaning. Knowing about the older meaning and the way it changed in time may enrich the understanding of present uses, stimulate meditation and provide preachers with illustrations. It may determine contemporary meaning inasmuch as the presence of the older sense, especially of the 'root' in derivatives, is still being felt (at least by the speaker or writer).

6 Burkhardt, *EE*, 17.

7 John R.W. Stott, *Evangelical Truth: A Personal Plea for Unity, Integrity & Faithfulness* (Downers Grove: IVP, 1999).

8 On the laws 'of nature' as created, see Lydia Jaeger's many books, especially *Lois de la nature et raisons du coeur. Les convictions religieuses dans le débat épistémologique contemporain* (Bern, etc.: Peter Lang, 2007), from her doctoral thesis, and at a more popular level, *Vivre dans un monde créé* (Marne-la-Vallée/Nogent-sur-Marne: Farel/Institut Biblique, 2007). Part of her work is now available in English translation.

9 Herman Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique of Theoretical Thought* Vol. III (s.l.: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1969) Part 1, chapter 2, 53-103, esp. 61-76. He interacts with the Thomist critique of the Jesuit Michael Marlet (72-74) and with Hendrik Stoker, who doubted the adequacy of Dooyeweerd's solution and who, with Cornelius Van Til, vainly tried to induce the change of Dooyeweerd's title to 'the philosophy of the creation idea', according to C. Van Til, 'Response to Robert D. Knudsen' in E.R. Geehan (ed.), *Jerusalem and Athens: Critical Discussions on the Theology and Apologetics of Cornelius Van Til* (s.l.: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1971) 303-304. One must register Dooyeweerd's confession: 'Let me begin with repeating that our Christian cosmonomic Idea contains the Idea of creation and is completely permeated with it' (*New Critique* III, 66), and: 'Theoretical thought here reaches its limits and thereby reveals that it is not self-sufficient' (66) – a sympathetic modesty. He makes clear that the 'substance' he rejects has an absolute character ('an absolute point of reference', 65; 'an independent *bearer* of meaning', 69). When he denies 'being' (Dutch: *zijn*) to creatures, he means 'independent being' and when he affirms them as 'meaning' (Dutch: *zin*) he does not deny reality (74); whether he has found all the means to carry out his intention is another story. As to Stoker, after listening to Dooyeweerd's critique, he saw fit to drop the word 'substance' and coined, instead, the word 'idiostance' (note to his 'Letter' to Van Til, in *Jerusalem and Athens*, 456 n. 35).

10 Brian Brock, *Singing the Ethos of God: On the place of Christian Ethics in Scripture* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007) xiii, as quoted by Bernd Wannenwetsch, 'Conversing with the Saints as they converse with Scripture: In conversation with Brian Brock's *Singing the Ethos of God*' in *EJT* 18.2 (2009) 129.

11 According to O'Donovan, *RMO*, 8.

12 This term, borrowed from linguistics, has been widely accepted, though conformity to the Latin origin would lead to the form 'referend' (from the gerundive), a form I have found (years ago!) used by a few French authors.

13 Paul Ricoeur, 'Ethique et morale' (1990), reprinted in *Lectures 1: Autour du politique* (Paris: Seuil, 1991) 256-269; *Soi-même comme un autre* (Gifford Lectures; Paris: Seuil, 1990) 199-344, a development he calls his 'petite éthique' (337).

14 Burkhardt, *EE*, 18-19.

15 Nikolaus Lobkowicz, 'Überlegungen zur philosophischen Begründung der Ethik' in Helmut Burkhardt (Hrsg), *Begründung ethischer Normen* (TVG; Wuppertal/Basel: R. Brockhaus/Brunnen, 1988) 8-9.

16 Burkhardt, *EE*, 19.

17 Ricoeur, 'Ethique et morale', 256. In 1991, in his 'Postface au *Temps de la responsabilité*', reprinted in *Lectures 1*, 272, he uses both terms synonymously ('comme Frédéric Lenoir').

18 I already commented on the issue in Henri Blocher, 'Pour fonder une éthique évangélique' in *Fac-Réflexion* 40-41 (1997) 21-22, also with reference to Abraham Kuyper. I cannot avoid overlap between this article and the present paper, but I tried to keep it within bounds.

19 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 138. In order to do so he paints the deontic with unpleasant colours (a burden, it cuts across natural aspirations, 137) and understands 'prescriptive' of 'the action-directing function of all moral speech' – an entirely legitimate understanding, but many would take 'prescriptive' more narrowly, with a nuance of binding authority which non-deontological views of ethics find hard to sustain.

20 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 125. He avoids the common 'etymological fallacy' which appeals to the Latin root, *augere*, *auctor*, to blot out the normal, bur unpopular, meaning of the word.

21 Jochen Douma, 'The Use of Scripture in Ethics' in *EJT* 1.2 (1992) 110.
22 E.g., Lobkowicz, 'Überlegungen', 12.
23 This is the meaning of the title of (perhaps) Levinas' most significant book: *Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence* (The Hague: Martin Nijhoff, 1974[1] / Livre de poche Kluwer Academic, 1990).
24 Little known, a symposium deserves a mention here: Joseph A. Selling and Jan Jans (eds), *The Splendor of Accuracy: An Examination of the Assertions made by Veritatis Splendor* (Kampen/Grand Rapids: Kok Pharos/Eerdmans, 1994 and 1995). Modernists fire back! They are able, apparently, to uncover surprising inaccuracies in the magisterial document. Their motive is clear in Jans' words (167): the authors reject the view of 'God as ruling king and human beings as obedient servants' and understand 'God as the transcendental mystery of involved love and the human person as categorical moral subject'.
25 John Murray, *Principles of Conduct: Aspects of Biblical Ethics* (London: Tyndale Press, 1957) 24; cf. 106: 'The ethic of the New Testament is one of obligation; it requires obedience; it recognises authority…'
26 Burkhardt, *EE*, 50-52, 57.
27 Stephen C. Mott, 'Ethics' in Gerald F. Hawthorne, Ralph P. Martin and Daniel G. Reid (eds), *Dictionary of Paul and his Letters* (Downers Grove and Leicester: IVP, 1993) 271, who goes on: 'It provides a pattern, warning, instruction and exhortation, including matters as specific as sexual immorality and remuneration of elders…' The antinomian exploitation of statements about the 'law' in the defence of gratuitous justification and of Christian freedom is refuted by Paul's use of *entolè*, his quotations from the Torah, the *Haustafeln*… One benefit (maybe the only one!) of the 'New Perspective' is that it has deprived the antinomian misinterpretation of its credibility. On Paul's use of Hellenistic elements, cf. Helmut Burkhardt, 'Der Naturrechtsgedanke im hellenistischen Judentum und im Neuen Testament' in *Begründung ethischer Normen*, 81-97.
28 Karl Barth, *Die Kirchliche Dogmatik* II,2 (Zollikon-Zürich: Evangelischer Verlag, 1946[2]) 570 (near the beginning of § 36/1).
29 Burkhardt, *EE*, 91, borrows the word (the phrase *ethischer Urphänomen*) from Romano Guardini – in his context, of the concept of the Good; Burkhardt adds the implication of the unconditional opposition of Good and Evil.
30 On these two concepts, cf. Jean Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis, *Vocabulaire de la psychanalyse* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1981) 112-117. Freud started to differentiate between the two terms in the mid 1920s; basically, *Verneinung* (a few times *Negation*) refers to a presence of something in the Unconscious which its express denial, at the conscious level, betrays, while *Verleugnung* refers to the denial of an external fact of reality, whose perception is being suppressed. Laplanche and Pontalis, however, suggest (116) that *Verleugnung* may affect 'a foundational element of human reality' rather than a mere fact of perception: this would suit the sense of obligation well!
31 Barth, *Kirchliche Dogmatik* II,2, 613 (beginning of § 37/1).
32 Merold Westphal, 'Theism and the Problem of Ethics' in Ronald H. Nash (ed.), *The Philosophy of Gordon H. Clark: A Festschrift* (Philadelphia: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1968) 177.
33 Cf. Olivier du Roy, 'L'Explosion de la règle d'or au XVIIe siècle anglais' in *Revue d'éthique et de théologie morale* 278 (2014) 35-56.
34 Barth, *Kirchliche Dogmatik* II,2, 618 (§ 37/1, a little before middle part). Cf. 726: 'we are first subject to obligation [*erst sollen wir*], as distinct from all willing, because we owe this debt to God' (§ 38/1, about two/thirds after beginning).
35 Ricoeur, *Soi-même comme un autre*, 207.
36 Ricoeur, *Soi-même comme un autre*, 254.
37 Paul Ricoeur, *L'Homme faillible (Philosophie de la volonté II/ Finitude et culpabilité I)* (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1960) 160; this 'reference to the originary constitutes evil as offence, i.e. as de-parture, as de-viation.'
38 Ricoeur could have quoted 1 Tim 1:9: I suggest that *keitai* should be interpreted of the *promulgation* of the law, not of the existence of the moral principle itself.
39 § 44; my translation from the French version, presented by Jean-Louis Bruguès (Paris: Mame, 1993) 71. Other statements in the Encyclical seem more favourable to rational autonomy and a bit weak on the need for special revelation.
40 Chris Wright, 'Ethical Decisions in the Old Testament' in *EJT* 1.2 (1992) 135.
41 Lincoln D. Hurst wisely mitigates Gustav Dalman's choice of 'reign' over against 'realm': 'That it could not be both is hardly evident from Jesus' teaching. Even in English the word *kingdom* does service for both…' 'Ethics of Jesus' in Joel B. Green and Scot McKnight (eds), *Dictionary of Jesus and the Gospels* (Downers Grove and Leicester: IVP, 1992) 210.
42 Cornelius Van Til, *Christian Theistic Ethics (In Defense of the Faith III*), a syllabus (Dulk Christian Foundation; Philadelphia: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1974).
43 Levinas, *Autrement qu'être*, 278.
44 Commenting on Levinas' deliberately broken and excessive language, Ricoeur asks: 'Is this not the avowal that ethics severed from ontology has no direct, proper, appropriate language?' (*Autrement: Lecture d'*Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence *d'Emmanuel Levinas* [les Essais du Collège International de Philosophie; Paris: Presses

Universitaires de France, 1997] 25).
45 Levinas, *Autrement qu'être*, 33 (announces the theme), *passim*, especially 146 n.1.
46 Ricoeur, *Autrement*, 26.
47 Ricoeur, *Autrement*, 27 (he develops his remarks on the following pages). Cf. also the treatment by Jean-Louis Chrétien, 'La Dette et l'élection' in Catherine Chalier and Miguel Abensour (eds), *Emmanuel Lévinas* (Biblio Essais 4173; Cahier de L'Herne, 1991) 273 (his whole essay 257-277 is remarkably perceptive).
48 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 47-48.
49 Herman Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique of Theoretical Thought* vol. II (s.l.: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1969) 150.
50 Ricoeur, *Soi-même*, 249.
51 Lobkowicz, 'Überlegungen', 16.
52 Ricoeur, *Soi-même*, 247.
53 In addition to *RMO*, I mention O'Donovan's beautiful summary 'Christian Moral Reasoning' in David J. Atkinson and David H. Field (eds), *New Dictionary of Christian Ethics and Pastoral Theology* (Leicester & Downers Grove: IVP, 1995) 122-127.
54 I presume that O'Donovan would welcome the connotations of the German word *Wirklichkeit* (more than the etymological flavour of *res*, 'thing'). What Eric Gaziaux reports of Alfons Auer's views could also be written of O'Donovan's: 'every duty has its foundation in being, and the good is what conforms to reality in the sense of effectiveness (*Wirklichkeit*). … The realist epistemology that is put to work requires an ascetic exercise to eliminate prejudices and to make reality into the measure of knowledge. There is correct knowledge when the human mind agrees with what is effective. … Ethics may be understood as the 'yes' given to reality-effectiveness (*Wirklichkeit*)'. Eric Gaziaux, 'Morale "autonome" et éthique "communautarienne": Quels rapports pour quelle éthique chrétienne?' in *Revue d'éthique et de théologie morale* 251/hors-série 5 (2008) 194; note 6 stresses that 'being' is replaced by *Wirklichkeit*, which Meister Eckhart used to translate 'actualitas'.
55 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 76.
56 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 127.
57 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 143.
58 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 132.
59 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 147.
60 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 136 (on Ockham, 134-136).
61 Van Til, *Christian Theistic Ethics*, 200.
62 Paul Ricoeur, 'De l'interprétation à la traduction' in the book he wrote with André Lacoque, *Penser la Bible* (Paris: Seuil, 1998) 335-371, especially 365ff. I would argue that the interest for the question of being is not absent from Old and New Testaments.
63 Patrick Nullens, '*Theologia caritatis* and the Moral Authority of Scripture: Approaching 2 Timothy 3:16-17 with a hermeneutic of love' in *EJT* 22.1 (2013) 44.
64 Ricoeur, *Soi-même*, 336 n.1. The compromise he thinks of is between universality and historicity.
65 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 43, cf. 157.
66 Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, II, 143.
67 Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique*, II, 160.
68 Helmut Burkhardt, 'Spirituality and Ethics' in *EJT* 19.1 (2010) 45-49, 48.
69 Some coincidences are striking. E.g., the interpretation of Romans 7 (Burkhardt, *EE*, 142-143) is practically the same, though it is not common, as the one I offered in 1972, in an *Ichthus* article!
70 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 259 (baptism), 56 and 65 ('The dangerous but exciting term "divinization"…'). This sounds a little surprising, given the accent on the restoration of created order. Could it be that the emphasis on the mere createdness of the moral order called for a compensation when supernatural grace became the theme?
71 Rainer Mayer, 'Ethik ohne Normen? Herkunft, Wesen und Kritik der Situationsethik' in *Begründung ethischer Normen*, 148. The chapter (147-167) offers a vigorous theoretical structure.
72 Lobkowicz, 'Überlegungen', 15.
73 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 208.
74 Lobkowicz, 'Überlegungen', 13. He brands Max Weber's distinction of an ethic of responsibility and an ethic of conviction as 'absurd'.
75 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 192-193.
76 O'Donovan, 'Christian Moral Reasoning', 124.
77 Quoted by Gordon J. Wenham, 'Reflections on *Singing the Ethos*', in *EJT* 18.2 (2009) 123.
78 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 206-207.
79 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 215.
80 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 216-217.
81 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 217.
82 Gaziaux, 'Morale autonome', 207-208. The article compares Auer and Hauerwas. Henri-Jérôme Gagey, 'Le Christianisme est-il une alternative? La tentation communautarienne en théologie', in the same issue of the *Revue d'éthique et de théologie morale* 251/hors-série 5 (2008) 233-234 emphasises that 'Jesus is not alone'; he also reports Jeffrey Stout's critique and uses the word 'dualism' (230). Incidentally, he quotes Hauerwas disclaiming the label 'communitarian': 'I am not a communitarian. I am a Christian' (224, cf. 220).
83 Gaziaux, 'Morale autonome', 202-206, 210-214; Gaziaux would opt for a 'dialectical' combination of historical rooting and universalising reason: 'Historically transmitted ethical norms are open for a critical assumption by reason' (211) – but whence the criteria for a critical assumption?
84 Brian Brock, 'Attunement to Saints Past and Present: Clarifications and Convergences' in *EJT* 18.2 (2009) 158.
85 Wenham, 'Reflections', 117. Though Wenham prefers to remain soft or weak on the issue, he

acknowledges 'the problem of schism, so that every ecclesiastical body claims it has the right to interpret Scripture in its own way, with a multitude of conflicting interpretations then being advocated.' Wannenwetsch, 'Conversing with the Saints', 128, notices the influence of 'postmodern aesthetics of perception' and concurs with Brock: 'To the degree in which the perspective of the latter was adopted, the turn to community appeared to suggest that the believing community itself was to "bestow" authority on the book it took to be normative.' But the church is *creatura verbi*.

86 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 156.

87 Ricoeur, *Soi-même*, 202 (the whole quote in italics in original).

88 Ricoeur, *Soi-même,* 227.

89 Mayer, 'Ethik ohne Normen', 151, writes: 'Values, through norms and models of behaviour find their expression in the social category, their enter firm, enduring, forms: we speak of *institutions.*'

90 On this, see Friedrich Beißer, 'Biblischer Schöpfungsglaube und die Begründung ethischer Normen' in *Begründung ethischer Normen*, 34-36 (wise indeed).

91 Mayer, 'Ethik ohne Normen', 153, differentiates between these 'mandates' and 'institutions'.

92 Cf. Burkhardt's admonition that we recognise various degrees of obligation when we apply Natural Law to social life, *EE*, 102.

93 Oliver O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations. Rediscovering the roots of political theology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

94 Jonathan Chaplin, 'Political Eschatology and Responsible Government: Oliver O'Donovan's "Christian Liberalism"' in Craig G. Bartholomew *et al.* (eds)*, A Royal Priesthood: The Use of the Bible Ethically and Politically. A Dialogue with Oliver O'Donovan* (Scripture and Hermeneutics Series 3; Cheltenham/Carlisle/Grand Rapids: University of Gloucestershire/Paternoster/Zondervan, 2002) 265-308.

95 J.-M. Aubert, 'Foi et morale. Parcours de morale fondamentale' in *Le Supplément (Revue d'éthique et de théologie morale)* 155 (1985) 79.

96 Wannenwetsch, 'Conversing with the Saints', 127, seems to accept the charge that 'biblicist accounts tend to' ignore the estrangement of the Word. Of course, who the biblicists are is not specified.

97 E.g., the excerpt from his *Christian Theory of Knowledge* in the Readings gathered by Greg L. Bahnsen, *Van Til's Apologetic* (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1998) 203-204; in his *Christian Theistic Ethics,* 130, Van Til reflects on the external character of this pre-redemptive special revelation.

98 I regret to read that O'Donovan, in one of his 'responses', 'makes full use of biblical criticism', a phrase which in ordinary parlance refers to a way of handling the text of Scripture which detracts from its full authority (Craig G. Bartholomew, 'Introduction' in *A Royal Priesthood*, 37; R.W.L. Moberly in the same book, 'The Use of Scripture in *The Desire of the Nations*', 46-64, finds inconsistencies in this regard, especially on the history of Israel – reconstructed or not?).

99 Wright, 'Ethical Decisions in the Old Testament', 128.

100 Paul Ricoeur, 'Biblical time', published in an English translation in Mark I. Wallace (ed.), *Figuring the Sacred. Religion, Narrative, and Imagination* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995) 171-172.

101 Bartholomew, 'Introduction', *A Royal Priesthood*, 38.

102 Wenham, 'Reflections', 117.

103 Simon Woodman, 'An "Alien in the land": A Summary of *Singing the Ethos of God* by Brian Brock' in *EJT* 18.2 (2009) 112.

104 Wenham, 'Reflections', 119.

105 Donald Wood, 'Some Comments on Moral Realism and Scriptural Authority' in *EJT* 18.2 (2009) 150.

106 Brock, 'Attunement to Saints', 159.

107 Donald Wood's summary (with reference to p.252 of *Singing the Ethos*), 'Some Comments', 151; Brocks's response, 'Conversing with the Saints', 158 also uses 'grammar'.

108 Henri Blocher, 'The "Analogy of Faith" in the Study of Scripture' in Nigel M. de S. Cameron (ed.), *The Challenge of Evangelical Theology: Essays in Approach and Method* (Edinburgh: Rutherford Books, 1987) 17-38.

109 Bartholomew, 'Introduction', *A Royal Priesthood*, 37.

110 Cf. the whole of Nullens' '*Theologia caritatis*', especially 42-43.

111 Douma, 'The Use of Scripture', 114, 116-118.

112 Wenham, 'Reflections', 118.

113 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 159-160.

114 Wannenwetsch, 'Conversing with the Saints', 130-132.

115 Barth, *Kirchliche Dogmatik* II,2, 598 (§ 36.1).

116 Barth, *Kirchliche Dogmatik* II,2, 611 (§ 36.2).

117 Barth, *Kirchliche Dogmatik* II,2, 740, 741, 750, 760 (despite misleading appearances, Barth claims, '*dieser Schein trügt*'), 785-786 (§ 38.2).

118 Barth, *Kirchliche Dogmatik* II,2, 671 (§ 37.3), the key words being *sollen* and *dürfen*.

119 Barth, *Kirchliche Dogmatik* II,2, 632-634 (§ 37.2).

120 Beißer, 'Biblischer Schöpfungsglaube', 30, reports that Barth sent a visitor to Brunner with the message 'Tell him – tell him: JA.' But the witness of creation is to be understood *post Christum*, inasmuch as creation, not independent of incarnation-reconciliation, reflects his glory.

121 Burkhardt, *EE*, 64. Also his 'Der Naturrechtsgedanke im hellenistischen Judentum und im Neuen Testament' in *Begründung ethischer Normen*, 90-91.

122 Claus-Dieter Stoll, 'Partikularität und Universalität in der Ethik des Alten Testaments' in *Begründung ethischer Normen*, 74.
123 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 82, 88.
124 Quoted by Bartholomew, 'Introduction', 34, and Chaplin, 'Political Eschatology', 283, in *A Royal Priesthood*.
125 See Burkhardt, *EE*, 90.
126 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 114-120.
127 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 161-162.
128 O'Donovan, *RMO*, 93 (92-93).
129 Wright, 'Ethical decisions', 126.
130 Brock, 'Attunement to Saints', 162.
131 Mayer, 'Ethik ohne Normen' in *Begründung ethischer Normen*, 151.
132 Jacques Maritain, *Humanisme intégral. Problèmes temporels et spirituels d'une nouvelle chrétienté* (Foi vivante 66; Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1968) 146.