

CRITICAL AND EXEGETICAL  
COMMENTARY  
ON  
THE NEW TESTAMENT.

BY  
HEINRICH AUGUST WILHELM MEYER, TH.D.,  
OBERCONSISTORIALRATH, HANNOVER.

*From the German, with the Sanction of the Author.*

THE TRANSLATION REVISED AND EDITED BY  
WILLIAM P. DICKSON, D.D.,  
AND  
FREDERICK CROMBIE, D.D.

PARTS V. AND VI.  
*THE EPISTLES TO THE CORINTHIANS.*  
VOL. I.

EDINBURGH:  
T. & T. CLARK, 38 GEORGE STREET.  
MDCCCLXXVII.

PRINTED BY MURRAY AND GIBB,  
FOR  
T. & T. CLARK, EDINBURGH.

LONDON, . . . . . HAMILTON, ADAMS, AND CO.  
DUBLIN, . . . . . JOHN ROBERTSON AND CO.  
NEW YORK, . . . . . SCRIBNER, WELFORD, AND ARMSTRONG.

CRITICAL AND EXEGETICAL  
HANDBOOK  
TO THE  
EPISTLES TO THE CORINTHIANS.

BY  
HEINRICH AUGUST WILHELM MEYER, TH.D.,  
OBERCONSISTORIALRATH, HANNOVER.

VOL. I.  
FIRST EPISTLE, CH. I.—XIII.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FIFTH EDITION OF THE GERMAN BY  
REV. D. DOUGLAS BANNERMAN, M.A.

THE TRANSLATION REVISED AND EDITED BY  
WILLIAM P. DICKSON, D.D.,  
PROFESSOR OF DIVINITY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW.

EDINBURGH:  
T. & T. CLARK, 38 GEORGE STREET.  
MDCCCLXXVII.

## PREFATORY NOTE.

---



THE translation of the present volume has been executed by Mr. Bannerman with great care and scholarly accuracy; and I cannot but specially acknowledge my obligations to him for the pains which he has bestowed upon the work. Having taken charge of it in its passage through the press, I am, of course, responsible for the form in which it appears; but under the circumstances my revision has addressed itself mainly to such modifications as seemed needful or desirable in the interest of securing throughout the series that uniformity of rendering, which from the nature of the work is peculiarly important, but which translators acting independently of each other could hardly be expected to attain.

The explanations given in previously issued volumes of the series apply to the present, and need not be here repeated. But I may be allowed perhaps to express my belief that, as the Epistles to the Corinthians are peculiarly fitted, alike by the presence of elements of deep historical and personal interest, and by the comparative absence of doctrinal discussions, to illustrate the application of the principles and methods of *pure exegesis*, this portion of Dr. Meyer's Commentary—confessedly one of its best sections—will be found to furnish an invaluable discipline of initiation into exegetical study.

W. P. D.



## PREFACE.

---

**A**FTER having been mainly occupied of late years with the historical books of the New Testament, I have now to turn to the Epistles of Paul, and to devote renewed labour to their exposition. In the present sadly distracted age of the church I feel the deep gravity and responsibility of the task which I have to face all the more strongly, because I cannot but bear in mind that among all the sacred writings it was those very Epistles of Paul which were pre-eminently to the Reformers the conquering sword of the Spirit, and which exercised the most powerful influence in moulding the doctrinal system of our church. The characters of Paul and Luther form a historical parallel, to which nothing similar can be found in the whole series of God's chosen instruments for the furtherance of evangelical truth. We possess the divine light which Paul bore through the world, and in whose radiance the Reformers did their work; the whole Scripture, with all its treasures, becomes day by day more richly opened up to us by the labours of science; but everywhere, from the extreme right to the extreme left, there is party-strife; and, amid the knowledge that puffeth up, the unity of the Spirit is broken, faith languishes, and love grows cold. It is, in truth, as though we were giving all diligence to afford the confirmation of increasing experience to the malicious assertion of the Romanists, that Protestantism is already in full course of decomposition.

Our wounds will not be healed, but only deepened and widened, by arrogant boasting about our Confessions, which are after all but the works of men. Much less will the end be attained by a wanton attenuating, explaining away, or setting aside of the positive teachings of the N. T., and of the miraculous

facts in the history of redemption ; for these have subdued the world, and must continue to subdue it. Only in that which is and remains the “ norma normans ” for all faith and all teaching, and for the Confessions themselves,—only in the living word of revelation resides the God-given power to heal, which will promote the restoration to health, and the union, of the body of the church with surer and more lasting effect, just in proportion as the word is more clearly and fully understood and more truly and energetically appropriated, and as, through such understanding and appropriation of it, the supremacy of the word and of its high moral forces becomes more absolute and all-controlling. To this sacred supremacy the church herself with her doctrine must bow as well as the individual. For in laying down her principle of appeal to Scripture, the church assumed not only the possibility and allowableness, but also the necessity of a further development and—where need should be shown—rectification of her doctrine in accordance with Scripture. In this way the Confession points to an authority transcending its own ; and the church, built as she is immoveably upon the everlasting Rock, has placed herself under the law of growth, thereby giving augury of a future, which, according to the apostle’s promise (Eph. iv. 13 ff.), despite all the sorrows of the present, will not fail to be realized. To aid in preparing for this bright future, is what all exposition of Scripture should recognise as its appointed task, being mindful at the same time that the steps in the development of the divine kingdom are centuries, and that the ways of Him who rules over it are not our ways. If, therefore, a thorough and conscientious searching of the Scriptures should arrive, as regards this or that point of doctrine, at results which are at variance with confessional definitions, its duty, at the bidding of the exegetical conscience, is not in an un-Lutheran and unprincipled fashion to disguise such results or to cloak them with a misty phraseology, but, trusting to the sifting and conquering power of divine truth, openly and honestly to hand them over to the judgment of science and the church. To science and the church, I repeat ; for it is one of the follies of the day to seek to set these at variance—to impose limits upon the former which are opposed to its essential nature, and to set aside its voice and relegate it to silence under an imaginary belief that a service is thereby rendered to the church. Such a

piece of folly is unevangelical, and fit only for the *Tridentinum* and the Syllabus of the Bishop of Rome.

Now, if nothing save the pure word of God may or ought to prepare the way towards a better future for the church, then all expounders of that word have but one common aim placed before them,—namely, just to ascertain its *pure* contents, without addition or subtraction and with a renouncing of all invention of our own, with *simplicity*, *truth*, and *clearness*, without being *prejudiced* by, and *independent* of, dogmatic *à priori* postulates, with *philological precision*, and in strict *objectivity* as *historical fact*. Anything more than this they ought not as expositors to attempt; but in this—and it is much—it is required of them that they be found faithful. The plan of procedure adopted may vary; one may prefer the *glossematic*, another the *inductive*, method. I attach but little weight to this question of method in itself, although I cannot ignore the fact, attested by various works appearing at the present day in the region of Old and New Testament exegesis, that the inductive mode runs more risk of giving to *subjective* exegesis a free play which should be rigorously denied to it. One is very apt, under the influence of this method, to give something more or less, or other than, the pure contents of the sacred text. The ingenuity, which in this way has ampler room for manipulating the premisses—how often with the aid of refining sophistry!—and thinks itself justified in so doing, always miscarries in spite of all its plausibility and confidence, when it gives to the world expositions that offend against grammar and linguistic usage, or against the general and special connection, or against both. Often in such cases the doubtful recommendation of novelty<sup>1</sup> is purchased only by strange strainings of the text and other violent expedients,

<sup>1</sup> A great many entirely novel expositions of individual passages make their appearance now-a-days, of which I apprehend that hardly a single one will on trial prove itself correct. Not that I am unduly attached to the traditions of exegesis; but long experience and observation in this field of scientific inquiry have taught me that—after there have been expended upon the N. T., in far greater measure even than upon the O. T., the labours of the learning, the acuteness, the mastery of Scripture, and the pious insight of eighteen centuries—new interpretations, undiscerned hitherto by the minds most conversant with such studies, are destined as a rule speedily to perish and be deservedly forgotten. I am distrustful of such exegetical discoveries; and those of the present day are not of a kind to lessen my distrust. Apart from these there remain difficulty and reward enough for the labours of exegesis.

while clearness has not unfrequently to be sought for beneath the cloak of a laboriously involved phraseology, which itself in its turn seems to require a commentary.

In preparing this fifth edition, which was preceded by the fourth in 1861, I have not neglected to give due attention to what has since been done for the criticism and exposition of the apostolic Epistle.<sup>1</sup> While thus engaged, I have very frequently, to my regret, found myself unable to agree with von Hofmann's work, *Die heilige Schrift neuen Testaments zusammenhängend untersucht*.<sup>2</sup> I have nowhere sought this antagonism, but it was as little my duty to evade or conceal it. Our exegetical natures are very differently constituted; our paths diverge widely from each other, and the means which we have at our disposal, and which we deem it right to employ, are dissimilar. Possibly out of this very antagonism some advantage may accrue to the understanding of the New Testament.

<sup>1</sup> Klöpfer's *Exeg. - kritische Untersuchungen über den zweiten. Korintherbrief*, Götting. 1869, with the accompanying dissertation on the "Christ-party," appeared too late to be taken into consideration along with the other literature of the subject. But the dissertation in question belongs for the most part to the sphere of the *second* Epistle. It is from the second Epistle that it draws, more thoroughly and consistently than is done by Beyschlag, the characteristics of the Christ-party, combining these in such a way as to represent it as in fundamental opposition to the apostle's views and teaching with respect to Christology and Soteriology. I cannot, however, but continue to regard the process, which takes the traits for the delineation of the "Christ-party" from the *second* Epistle, as an unwarrantable one.—It was likewise impossible to include in my examination the just published book of Richard Schmidt, *die Paulinische Christologie in ihrem Zusammenhange mit der Heilslehre des Apostels*, Götting. 1870.

<sup>2</sup> This work is, for the sake of brevity, referred to merely by "Hofmann," other works of the author being more precisely designated by their title.

HANNOVER, 30th November 1869.

## EXEGETICAL LITERATURE OF THE EPISTLES TO THE CORINTHIANS.



[For commentaries and collections of notes embracing the whole New Testament, see Preface to the Commentary on the Gospel of St. Matthew ; for those which treat of the Pauline or Apostolic Epistles generally, see Preface to the Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans. The following list includes only those which relate to the Epistles to the Corinthians (together or separately), or in which one of these Epistles holds the first place on the title-page. Works mainly of a popular and practical character have, with a few exceptions, been excluded, as, however valuable they may be in themselves, they have but little affinity with the strictly exegetical character of the present work. Monographs on chapters or sections are generally noticed by Meyer *in loc.* The editions quoted are usually the earliest ; *al.* appended denotes that the book has been more or less frequently reprinted ; † marks the date of the author's death ; *c. circa.*]

AKERSLOOT (Theodorus), Reformed Minister in Holland : D'eerste Send-brief van Paulus aan die van Korinthen, kortelyk in haar t'samenhang uytgelegd. 4°, Lugd. Bat. 1707.

ALPHEN (Hieronymus Simon van), † 1742, Prof. Theol. at Utrecht : Ontleedende verklaring van Paullus tweden brief aan die Corinther. 4°, Amst. 1708, *al.*

AMBROSIASTER. See ROMANS.

BAUMGARTEN (Sigmund Jakob), † 1757, Prof. Theol. at Halle : Auslegung der beiden Briefe Pauli an die Corinther. 4°, Halle, 1761.

BILLROTH (Johann Gustav Friedrich), † 1836, Prof. at Halle : Commentar zu den Briefen des Paulus an die Corinther. 8°, Leip. 1833.

[Translated by William Lindsay Alexander, D.D., 2 vols.

12°, Edin. 1837-8.]

- BURGER (Karl Heinrich August von), Oberconsistorialrath at Munich: Der erste [und der zweite] Brief Pauli an die Korinther deutsch ausgelegt, 2 Bände. 8°, Erlangen, 1859-60.
- COCCEIUS [Koch] (Johann), † 1669, Prof. Theol. at Leyden: *Commentarius in Epistolas I. et II. ad Corinthios* [Opera].
- CONTZEN (Adam), † 1635, Jesuit at Mentz: *Commentaria in Epistolas S. Pauli ad Corinthios et ad Galatas*. 2°, Colon. 1631.
- CRELL (Johann), † 1633, Socinian teacher at Racow: *Commentarius in priorem Pauli ad Corinthios Epistolam* [Opera]. 8°, Racov. 1635.
- EMMERLING (Christian August Gottfried), † 1827, Pastor at Probsthaida: *Epistola Pauli ad Corinthios posterior, Graece, perpetuo commentario illustrata*. 8°, Lips. 1823.
- FLATT (Johann Friedrich von), † 1821, Prof. Theol. at Tübingen: *Vorlesungen über die Briefe an die Korinther*, herausgegeben von C. D. F. Hoffmann. 8°, Tübing. 1827.
- FRITZSCHE (Karl Friedrich August), † 1846, Prof. Theol. at Rostock: *De nonnullis posterioris Pauli ad Corinthios Epistolae locis dissertationes duae*. 8°, Lips. 1824.
- GRATAMA (Janus Aafeo): *Commentatio in Paulinae Epistolae prioris ad Corinthios caput vii*. 8°, Groning. 1846.
- HEYDENREICH (August Ludwig Christian), † c. 1856, Prof. at Herborn: *Commentarius in priorem D. Pauli ad Corinthios Epistolam*, 2 voll. 8°, Marb. 1825-7.
- HODGE (Charles), D.D., Prof. Theol. at Princeton: *An exposition of the First Epistle to the Corinthians*. 8°, Lond. 1857.  
*An exposition of the Second Epistle*. 8°, Lond. 1860.
- HOFMANN (Johann Christian Konrad von), Prof. Theol. at Erlangen: *Die Heilige Schrift Neuen Testaments zusammenhängend untersucht* (II. 2, 3 Briefe an die Korinther). 8°, Nördlingen, 1864-6, *al*.
- JAEGER (C. F. Heinrich): *Erklärung der beiden Briefe des Apostel Paulus nach Corinth, aus dem Gesichtspunkte der vier Partheien daselbst*. 8°, Tübing. 1838.
- KLING (Christian Friedrich), Dean of Marbach on the Neckar: *Die Korintherbriefe theologisch - homiletisch bearbeitet* [Lange's Bibelwerk, Theil VII.]. 8°, Bielefeld, 1861, *al*.  
 [Translated with additions by Daniel W. Poor, D.D., and Conway B. Wing, D.D. 8°, New York [and Edin.], 1869, *al*.]

- KLÜPPER (Albrecht), Tutor at Königsberg: Exegetisch-kritische Untersuchungen über den zweiten Brief des Paulus an die Gemeinde zu Korinth. 8°, Götting. 1869.  
 Commentar über das zweite Sendschreiben. 8°, Berl. 1874.
- KRAUSE (Friedrich August Wilhelm), † 1827, Private Tutor at Vienna: Pauli ad Corinthios Epistolae Graece. Perpetua annotatione illustravit F. A. W. Krause. Vol. i. complectens ep. priorem. 8°, Francof. 1791.
- LEUN (Johann Georg Friedrich), † 1823, Pastor at Butzbach in Hesse: Pauli ad Corinthios Epistola secunda Graece perpetua annotatione illustrata. 8°, Lemg. 1804.
- LIGHTFOOT (John), D.D., Master of Catherine Hall, Cambridge: Horae Hebraicae et Talmudicae in Epistolam priorem ad Corinthios. 4°, Cantab. 1664.
- MAIER (Adalbert), R. C. Prof. Theol. at Freiburg: Commentar über den ersten Brief Pauli an die Korinther. 8°, Freiburg, 1857.
- MAJOR [MAYER] (Georg), † 1574, Prof. Theol. at Wittenberg: Enarratio Epistolarum Pauli ad Corinthios. 8°, Viteb. 1558, *al.*
- MARTYR (Peter) [VERMIGLI], † 1562, Prof. Theol. at Strassburg: In priorem D. Pauli ad Corinthios Epistolam commentarii. 2°, Tiguri, 1551, *al.*
- MELANCHTHON (Philipp), † 1560, Reformer: Brevis et utilis commentarius in priorem Epistolam Pauli ad Corinthios et in aliquot capita secundae. 8°, Vitemb. 1561, *al.*
- MOLDENHAUER (Johann Heinrich Daniel), † 1790, Pastor at Hamburg: Erster und zweiter Brief an die Corinther nach dem Grundtext übersetzt mit Erklärungen. 8°, Hamb. 1771–2.
- MORUS (Samuel Friedrich Nathanael), † 1792, Prof. Theol. at Leipzig: Erklärung der beiden Briefe an die Corinther. 8°, Leip. 1794.
- MOSHEIM (Johann Lorenz von), 1755, Chancellor and Professor Theol. at Göttingen: Erklärung des ersten Briefes Pauli an die gemeine zu Corinthus. 4°, Altona, 1741.  
 Neue Ausgabe, nebst der Erklärung des zweiten Briefes herausgegeben von C. E. von Windheim, 2 Bände. 4°, Altona u. Flensburg, 1762.
- MUSCULUS [MEUSSLIN] (Wolfgang), † 1563, Prof. Theol. at Bonn: Commentarius in utramque Epistolam ad Corinthios. 2°, Basil, 1559, *al.*
- NEANDER (Johann August Wilhelm), † 1850, Prof. Theol. at Berlin: Auslegung der beiden Briefe an die Corinther. Herausgegeben von Willib. Beyschlag. 8°, Berl. 1859.

- OSIANDER (J. Ernst), Dean at Göppingen in Württemberg: *Commentar über den ersten Brief Pauli an die Korinther*. 8°, Stuttgart, 1849.  
*Commentar über den zweiten Brief*. 8°, Stuttg. 1858.
- POTT (David Julius), † 1838, Prof. Theol. at Göttingen: *Pauli Epistolae ad Corinthios Graece perpetua annotatione illustratae*. [Novum Testamentum Koppianum, V. 1.] 8°, Gotting. 1826.
- ROLLOCK (Robert), † 1598, Principal of University of Edinburgh: *Commentarius in utramque Epistolam ad Corinthios, cum notis Jo. Piscatoris*. 8°, Herborn. 1600, *al.*
- RÜCKERT (Leopold Immanuel), † c. 1845, Prof. Theol. at Jena: *Commentar über die Briefe an die Corinther*. 2 Bände. 8°, Lips. 1836–7.
- SAHL (Laurids), † 1805, Prof. of Greek at Copenhagen: *Paraphrasis in priorem Epistolam ad Corinthios*. . . . 4°, Hafn. 1778.
- SCHARLING (Carl Emil), Prof. Theol. at Copenhagen: *Epistolam Pauli ad Corinthios posteriorem annotationibus in usum juvenum theolog. studiosorum illustravit C. E. Scharling*. 8°, Kopenh. 1840.
- SCHMID (Sebastian). See ROMANS.
- SCHULZE (Johann Christoph Friedrich), † 1806, Prof. Theol. at Giessen: *Pauli erster Brief an die Korinther herausgegeben und erklärt*. —Zweiter Brief erklärt . . . 8°, Halle, 1784–5.
- SCLATER (William), D.D., † 1626, Vicar of Pitminster: *Utriusque Epistolae ad Corinthios explicatio analyticae, una cum scholiis*. 4°, Oxon. 1633.
- SEMLER (Johann Salomon), † 1791, Prof. Theol. at Halle: *Paraphrasis in primam Pauli ad Corinthios Epistolam cum notis et Latinarum translationum excerptis*. Et in secundam Epistolam . . . 12°, Hal. 1770–6.
- STANLEY (Arthur Penrhyn), D.D., Dean of Westminster: *The Epistles of St. Paul to the Corinthians; with critical notes and dissertations*. In two volumes. 8°, Lond. 1855, *al.*
- STEVART (Peter), † 1621, Prof. Theol. at Ingolstadt: *Commentaria in utramque Epistolam ad Corinthios*. 4°, Ingolstad. 1608.
- STORR (Gottlob Christian), † 1805, Consistorialrath at Stuttgart: *Notitiae historicae Epistolarum Pauli ad Corinthios interpretationi servientes*. 4°, Tübing. 1788.
- TIL (Salomon van), † 1713, Prof. Theol. at Leyden: *Kortbondige verklaring ouer den eersten Brief van Paulus aan die van Korinthen*. 4°, Amst. 1731.  
 [See also ROMANS.]



VITRINGA (Kempe), † 1722, Prof. Theol. at Franeker: *Exercitationes in difficiliora loca prioris Epistolae Pauli ad Corinthios.*

4°, Franek. 1784-9.

WINDHEIM (Christian Ernst von). See MOSHEIM (Johann Lorenz).

ZACHARIAE (Gotthilf Tranggott), † 1777, Prof. Theol. at Kiel: *Paraphrastische Erklärung der beiden Briefe an die Corinther, mit vielen Anmerkungen herausgegeben von J. K. Vollborth.* 2 Bände.

8°, Götting. 1784-5.

## ABBREVIATIONS.

*al., et al.* = and others; and other passages; and other editions.

*ad* or *in loc.*, refers to the note of the commentator or editor named on the particular passage.

*comp.* = compare. "Comp. on Matt. iii. 5" refers to Dr. Meyer's own commentary on the passage. So also "See on Matth. iii. 5."

*codd.* = codices or manuscripts. The uncial manuscripts are denoted by the usual letters, the Sinaitic by  $\aleph$ .

*min.* = codices *minusculi*, manuscripts in cursive writing. Where these are individually quoted, they are marked by the usual Arabic numerals, as 33, 89.

*Rec.* or *Recepta* = *Textus receptus*, or *lectio recepta* (Elzevir).

*l. c.* = *loco citato* or *laudato*.

*ver.* = verse, *vv.* = verses.

*f. ff.* = and following. *Ver. 16 f.* means verses 16 and 17. *vv. 16 ff.* means verses 16 and two or more following.

*vss.* = versions. These, when individually referred to, are marked by the usual abridged forms. *E.g.* *Syr.* = *Peschito Syriac*; *Syr. p.* = *Philoxenian Syriac*.

*p. pp.* = page, pages.

*e. g. exempli gratia.*

*sc.* = *scilicet*.

*N. T.* = *New Testament*. *O. T.* = *Old Testament*.

$\kappa.\tau.\lambda.$  =  $\kappa\alpha\iota\ \tau\acute{\alpha}\ \lambda\omicron\iota\pi\acute{\alpha}$ .

The colon (:) is largely employed, as in the German, to mark the point at which a translation or paraphrase of a passage is introduced, or the transition to the statement of another's opinions.

.... indicates that words are omitted.

The books of Scripture and of the Apocrypha are generally quoted by their usual English names and abbreviations. *Eccclus.* = *Ecclesiasticus*. *3 Esd.*, *4 Esd.* [or *Esr.*] = the books usually termed 1st and 2d *Esdra*s.

The classical authors are quoted in the usual abridged forms by book, chapter, etc. (as *Xen. Anab.* vi. 6, 12) or by the paging of the edition generally used for that purpose (as *Plat. Pol.* p. 291 B. of the edition of H. Stephanus). The names of the works quoted are printed in *Italics*. Roman numerals in small capitals are used to denote books or other internal divisions (as *Thuc. iv.*); Roman numerals in large capitals denote volumes (as *Kühner, II.*).

The references to Winer's Grammar, given in brackets thus [*E. T.* 152], apply to the corresponding pages of Dr. Moulton's English translation.

THE

FIRST EPISTLE OF PAUL TO THE CORINTHIANS.

---

INTRODUCTION.

SEC. 1.—THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY AT CORINTH.

**I**N Corinth (*bimaris Corinthus*), which, after its destruction by Mummius (146 B.C.), had been rebuilt by Julius Cæsar, made a Roman colony (Pausan. ii. 1. 2), and under the fostering care of the first emperors had been speedily restored to its ancient (see Hom. *Il.* ii. 570, and especially Pindar, *Ol.* xiii.) glory and voluptuous luxury (hence the expressions *κορινθιάζεσθαι*, *κορινθιαστής*, and *Κορινθία κόρη*; see also Dissen, *ad Pind. Fragm.* p. 640 f.; Ast, *ad Plat. Rep.* p. 404 D),—in that great "*Ελλάδος ἄστρον*" (Jacobs, *ad Anthol.* VI. p. 223), that rich commercial city, the seat of the Roman proconsulate, of the Isthmian games, of the fine arts, and of the learning of the Sophists, but also of the most shameless worship of Aphrodite carried on by a thousand consecrated courtesans,—the world-conquering faith of Christ had been planted *by Paul himself* (iii. 6). He came thither on his second missionary journey from Athens, and spent upwards of a year and a half there (see on Acts xviii. 1–17). He lodged with his fellow-craftsman Aquila, who was converted by him here (see on Acts xviii. 1, 2), and subsequently with the proselyte Justus (Acts xviii. 2–7), after his friends Silas and Timotheus had arrived (Acts xviii. 5), and Jewish opposition had caused him to separate from the synagogue and turn to the Gentiles (Acts xviii. 6 ff.). This had the wholesome result of rendering the church, from the very

first, a *mixed* (though with a majority of *Gentile* Christians, Acts. xii. 2) and a *very numerous* one (Acts xviii. 4, 8, 10), the most important in Greece, the mother-church of the province (i. 2), although only a few of the upper and more cultivated classes (1 Cor. i. 26 ff.) embraced the faith (such as, on the Jewish side, the president of the synagogue, Crispus; see Acts xviii. 8; 1 Cor. i. 14),—a natural effect, not so much of the simplicity of Paul's preaching<sup>1</sup> (for Apollos also failed to win over the higher classes), as of the intrinsic character of the gospel itself (i. 22, 23), which, with its preaching of the cross, did not suit the pretensions of the presumed higher culture among Jews and Gentiles, especially of their fancied philosophy and of their moral laxity.<sup>2</sup>

Some considerable time after the total failure of a public accusation brought by the Jews against Paul before the mild proconsul Gallio (see on Acts xviii. 12–17), the apostle departed from Corinth with Aquila and Priscilla (whom he left in Ephesus), and proceeded to Jerusalem, and thence through Galatia and Phrygia (Acts xviii. 18–23). While he, however, was traversing these countries, *Apollos*—an eloquent and fervid Jew of Alexandria, who, hitherto merely a disciple of John the

<sup>1</sup> Rückert, following Neander (comp. also Osiander, p. 6), thinks that the failure of the apostle's attempt at Athens to gain entrance for evangelical truth by associating it with Hellenic forms (Acts xvii.), had led him to the resolution of giving up every such attempt, and of proclaiming the gospel among the Greeks also in its entire simplicity. But the fact is, that in Athens Paul was in the *quite peculiar* position of having to speak in presence of philosophers by profession, and, in the first instance, to them exclusively. In Corinth, on the other hand, in the house of the proselyte Justus, it was at all events a very mixed audience (made up also of Jews and Gentiles, comp. Acts xviii. 8) that he had before him, one entirely different from those Stoics and Epicureans who laid hold of him in the ἀγορά at Athens. The Athenian address is therefore to be regarded as an *exception* from his usual mode of teaching, demanded by the special circumstances of the case. These circumstances, however, did not exist at Corinth, and accordingly he had no occasion there to teach in any other way than his ordinary one. Before his mixed audience in Corinth (and he could not regulate his course by the possible presence of individual philosophers among them) his preaching, simple, but full of power and fervour, was thoroughly fitted to make converts in numbers, as the result proved. And if these were for the most part from the humbler ranks, Paul was the last man to be led by that circumstance to adopt a higher tone; for he knew from long experience among what classes in society Christianity was wont everywhere to strike its first and firmest roots.

<sup>2</sup> Comp. generally, Semisch, *Paulus in Corinth*, in the *Jahrb. für Deutsche Theol.* 1867, p. 193 ff.

Baptist, had completed his Christian training with Aquila and Priscilla at Ephesus (Acts xviii. 24 ff., and the commentary thereon)—betook himself to Corinth (Acts xix. 1), where he, as a Pauline Christian, preached no other than Pauline Christianity (1 Cor. iii. 6), yet presented it in a different *form*, deviating with the art of his Alexandrian eloquence and with his employment of Alexandrian (Philonian) speculation, from the simple manner of the apostle (i. 17, ii.), probably also entering further than Paul had done (iii. 1) into several of the higher doctrines of Christianity. Now, it is easy to understand how this difference, although certainly not based upon any divergence in doctrine (iii. 5 f., iv. 6, xvi. 12), nevertheless, from the variety of individual tendencies among the Corinthians, and from the personal respect and love with which men clung to the old or the new teacher respectively, came to have the hurtful result that some, amidst mutual jealousy, assigned the higher place to the former and some to the latter, and that it gradually became a *point of partisanship* with them to call themselves adherents of Paul or of Apollos (i. 12),—which was not carried out without engendering pride and irritation, to the prejudice of the two teachers in question.

But the matter did not end with this division into two parties. There arrived at Corinth—taking advantage, perhaps, of the very time of Apollos' return to Ephesus—Judaizing teachers, *Petrine* Christians of *anti-Pauline* leanings, provided with letters of recommendation (2 Cor. iii. 1), perhaps from Peter himself among others, labouring to lower the authority of Paul (ix. 2), into whose field of work they intruded, and to exalt the authority of Peter (2 Cor. xi. 5). They seem, indeed, not to have come forward with any opposition to Paul's *doctrine*, for otherwise the apostle would, as in his Epistle to the Galatians, have controverted their doctrinal errors; in particular, they did not insist upon circumcision. But it was natural that, with their Judaizing tendencies generally, with their legal prejudice regarding the use of meats, with their stringency as to the moral law, and with their exaltation of Peter at the expense of Paul, they should find acceptance with the Jewish-Christian part of the community, since they were not slack in vainglorious assertion of the national privileges (2 Cor. v. 12, xi. 22, xii. 11), and that against the *very*

man from whom the hereditary pride of the Jews had everywhere suffered blows which it felt most keenly. Equally natural was it that their appearance and operations should not induce a union between the two sections that professed Pauline Christianity,—the adherents of Paul and of Apollos,—seeing that they had to wage war only against *Paul*, and not against Apollos, in so far, namely, as apostolic authority was claimed for the former only, and not for the latter. The declared adherents, whom they met with, named as their head *Peter*, who, for that matter, had never himself been in Corinth; for the statement of Dionysius of Corinth in Euseb. ii. 25, is either to be referred to a much later period (Ewald, *Gesch. der apost. Zeit.* p. 609, 3d ed.), or, as is most probable, to be regarded simply as an erroneous inference drawn from 1 Cor. i. 12. See Pott, *Proleg.* p. 20 f.; Baur in the *Tübing. Zeitschr.* 1831, 4, p. 152 ff.

The addition of a third party to the two already existing aroused a deeper feeling of the need for wholly disregarding that which had brought about and kept up all this division into parties,—the authority of men,—and for returning to Him alone who is the Master of all, namely, to Christ.<sup>1</sup>

"*We belong to Christ*" became accordingly the watchword, unhappily, however, not of all, nor yet in its right sense and application, but, on the contrary, of a section only; and these followed out their idea,—which was in itself right, but which should have been combined with the recognition of the human instruments of Christ (Paul, etc.),—not in the way of themselves keeping clear of schismatic proceedings and acknowledging all as, like themselves, disciples of Christ, but in such a manner that in their professed sanctity and lofty abstinence from partisanship they became themselves a party (i. 12), and instead of including the whole community—without prejudice to the estimation due to such servants of Christ as Paul and others—in their idea, they shut out from it the Pauline, Apollonian, and Petrine sections. The Christian community at Corinth, then, was in this state of *fourfold* division when Paul wrote to them our first Epistle; yet it is to be assumed, from xi. 18, xiv. 23,

<sup>1</sup> Augustine aptly says, *De verb. Dom., Serm.* 13: "Volentes homines aedificari super homines, dicebant: Ego quidem sum Pauli, etc. Et alii, qui volebant aedificari super Petrum, sed super petram: Ego autem sum Christi."

that the evil had not reached such a height of schism that the church no longer assembled at *one place* (in opposition to Vitringa, Michaelis, Eichhorn, Ewald, and others ; see on i. 2).

What further knowledge we have regarding the condition of the church at that time, especially as to the moral and ecclesiastical evils that prevailed, is derived from the contents of the Epistle itself. See § 2.

REMARK 1. For views differing from the above representation of the parties at Corinth, see on i. 12. To the more recent literature of the subject, besides the works on Introduction, belong the following : Neander, *Kl. Schrift.* p. 68 ff., and *Gesch. d. Pflanzung*, etc., I. p. 360 ff., 4th ed. ; Baur in the *Tüb. Zeitschr.* 1831, p. 61 ff., 1836, 4, p. 1 ff., and in his *Paulus*, I. p. 290 ff., 2d ed. ; Scharling, *De Paulo apost. ejusque adversariis*, Kopenh. 1836 ; Jaeger, *Erkl. d. Briefe P. nach Kor. aus d. Gesichtsp. d. vier Parth.*, Tüb. 1838 ; Schenkel, *De eccles. Cor. primæva factionibus turbata*, Basil. 1838 ; Goldhorn in Illgen's *Zeitschr. f. histor. Theol.* 1840, 2, p. 121 ff. ; Dähne, *d. Christus-parthei in d. apost. Kirche z. Kor.*, Halle 1842 (previously in the *Journ. f. Pred.* 1841) ; Kniewel, *Ecclesiæ Cor. vetustiss. dissensiones et turbæ*, Gedan. 1841 ; Becker, *d. Partheiungen in d. Gem. z. Kor.*, Altona 1842 ; Rübiger, *krit. Untersuchungen üb. d. Inhalt d. beid. Br. an d. Kor.*, Bresl. 1847 ; Lutterbeck, *neutest. Lehrbegr.* II. p. 45 ff. ; Beyschlag in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1865, p. 217 ff. ; Hilgenfeld in his *Zeitschr.* 1865, p. 241 ff. ; Holtzmann in Herzog's *Encykl.* XIX. p. 730 ff. ; comp. also Ewald, *Gesch. d. apost. Zeit.* p. 505 ff., 3d ed. Among the latest commentaries, see especially those of Osiander, Stuttg. 1847, Introd. § 4 ; Ewald, p. 102 f. ; Hofmann, 1864.

REMARK 2.—Care should be taken not to push the conception of this division into parties too far. As it had only recently arisen, it had not yet made itself felt to such an extent as to induce the church in their letter to Paul (see § 2) to write specifically about it (see i. 11). Nor can the dissensions have been of long continuance ; at least in Clem. 1 *Cor.* 47, they appear as something long past and gone, with which Clement compares later quarrels as something worse.

REMARK 3.—Only the first part of our Epistle, down to iv. 21, relates to the topic of the parties as such. Hence it is a very hazardous course, and one that requires great caution, to refer the further points discussed by Paul to the different parties respectively, and to characterize these accordingly, as Jaeger and Rübiger more especially, but also Baur, Hilgenfeld, Ewald, Beyschlag, and others have done to an extent which cannot be

made good on historical grounds. It is purely and grossly arbitrary to trace all the evils combated in both Epistles to the existence of the party divisions, and to depict these, and more particularly the Christine section, accordingly. The latter is not once mentioned by Clement,—a circumstance which does not tell in favour of the hypothesis that lays so much mischief to its charge.

## SEC. 2.—OCCASION, OBJECT, AND CONTENTS OF THE EPISTLE.

Before the date of our first Epistle there had been a letter—not now extant<sup>1</sup>—sent from the apostle to the Corinthians (1 Cor. v. 9); but when he wrote it, the party-divisions were not yet known to the apostle. He received tidings regarding them from “those of the household of Chloe” (i. 11), and on this account commissioned Timothy to visit Corinth (iv. 17), although our Epistle was to anticipate his arrival there (xvi. 10), since he had first to journey through Macedonia with Erastus (Acts xix. 22). That Apollos also (1 Cor. xvi. 12) had brought Paul information about the divisions is—judging from i. 11—not to be assumed; on the contrary, it seems probable that they had not perceptibly developed themselves so long as Apollos himself remained in Corinth. Next to the vexatious party-divisions, however, what gave occasion for the apostle's letter was the unchastity in the church, already spoken of by him in the lost Epistle, and which had now manifested itself even in a case of incest (v. 1 ff.). Besides this and other evils that called for his

<sup>1</sup> The two quite short Epistles extant in Armenian, from the Corinthians to Paul and from Paul to the Corinthians, are wretched apocryphal productions (first published by Phil. Masson in Joh. Masson, *Histoire crit. de la républ. des lettres*, vol. X., 1714; then by David Wilkins, 1715; by Whiston, 1727, and his sons, 1736; by Carpzov, Lips. 1776; and in Armenian and English by Aucher, *Armenian Grammar*, etc., Venet. 1819; see also Fabric. *Cod. Apocr.* III. p. 667 ff.). Rinck, indeed, has recently (in opposition to the earlier defence by Whiston, see the objections urged by Carpzov) sought to maintain the genuineness of both Epistles (*das Sendschr. d. Kor. an d. Apost. Paul. u. das dritte Sendschr. Pauli an die Kor. in Armen. Uebersetzung, neu verdeutscht*, etc., Heidelb. 1823), and that on the footing of holding the apostle's letter not to be the one mentioned in v. 9, but a later third Epistle. But against this utterly fruitless attempt, see Ullmann, *über den durch Rinck bekannt gemachten dritten Brief an d. Kor. und das kurze Sendschreiben der Kor.* in the *Heidelb. Jahrb.* 1823; Bengel, *Archiv.* 1825, p. 237 ff. Regarding the date of the composition of the lost Epistle, see Wieseler, *Chronologie des apost. Zeitalt.* p. 318.



intervention, there was quite a special and direct occasion for his writing in a letter of the church (vii. 1), brought to Paul by deputies from Corinth (xvi. 17), and containing various questions (such as with respect to celibacy, vii. 1 ff., and the eating of flesh offered in sacrifice, viii. 1 ff.), which demanded an answer from him,<sup>1</sup> so that he made the messengers—Stephanas, Fortunatus, and Achaicus—on their return the bearers of his own Epistle in reply (xvi. 12, 17).

In accordance with these circumstances giving occasion to the letter, it was the *aim* of Paul, first, to counteract the party-divisions and uphold his apostolic authority; secondly, to remove the unchastity which had gained ground; thirdly, to give instruction upon the points regarding which queries had been put to him; and finally, to communicate various other instructions, which, in view of the state of things among the Corinthians which had come to his knowledge, and partly also in view of the express contents of their letter, seemed to him necessary and useful, such as with respect to disorder in the public assemblies, with respect to gifts of the Spirit, with respect to the resurrection, and with respect to a collection that was to be set on foot.<sup>2</sup>

The *contents* of the Epistle are accordingly very diversified. After salutation and exordium (i. 1–9), the first main section enlarges upon and against the party-divisions, with a detailed justification of the apostle's mode of teaching (i. 10–iv. 21). Then Paul writes regarding the unchastity in the church (v.), and regarding the bad habit of having their disputes decided before heathen tribunals, thereafter once more warning them against impurity (vi.). Next he replies to the questions about marriage which had been sent to him (vii.), and to the inquiry regarding meat used in sacrifice (viii.–xi. 1), making in connection with his instructions as to the latter point a digression regarding the unselfish way in which he had discharged his apostolic office

<sup>1</sup> That this letter from the church was marked by a tone of confidence and pride of knowledge (Hofmann), cannot, with any certainty, be inferred from our Epistle, the many humbling rebukes in which bear upon *the evils themselves*, not upon that *letter* and its character.

<sup>2</sup> Observe that, in connection with these different topics, Paul never makes the teachers as such responsible, or gives directions to them,—a proof that he was far from cherishing the idea of a divinely instituted *order* of teachers. Comp. Höfing, *Grundsätze d. Kirchenverf.* p. 279 f., ed. 3.

(ix.). Then follow censure and admonition as to disorders in the assemblies of the church, partly with reference to the head-covering of the women, partly in regard of the love-feasts (xi.); then the detailed sections respecting spiritual gifts (xii.-xiv.), with the magnificent eulogy on love (xiii.), and respecting the resurrection of the dead (xv.). Lastly: injunctions about the collection for Jerusalem, miscellaneous remarks, and greetings (xvi.).

It is manifest from the salutation, when rightly understood, *that the Epistle was destined for the whole church at Corinth*, without excepting any party whatsoever, but including the rest of the Christians of Achaia.

### SEC. 3.—PLACE AND TIME OF COMPOSITION—GENUINENESS OF THE EPISTLE.

From xvi. 8, 19 it is certain that Paul wrote *in Ephesus*,<sup>1</sup> and that towards the end of his stay in that place, which did not last quite three years (see on Acts xix. 10), after he had despatched (Acts xix. 22; 1 Cor. iv. 17) Timothy and Erastus to Macedonia (the former to Corinth as well), and had already resolved to journey through Macedonia and Achaia to Jerusalem (Acts xix. 21; 1 Cor. xvi. 3 ff.). The *time* at which he wrote may be gathered from xvi. 8 (some time before Pentecost) and v. 6–8, from which latter passage it may be with reason inferred that, when Paul was writing, the feast of the Passover was nigh at hand. Consequently: *a little before Easter in the year 58* (see *Intro. to Acts*, § 4).

REMARK 1. The statement in the common subscription *ἐγὼ Paulὸς Φιλίππων* is an old (already in Syr.) and widespread error, arising from xvi. 5. In reply to the quite untenable grounds urged by Köhler (*Abfassungszeit der epistol. Schriften*, p. 74 ff.), who accepts it, and puts the date of composition after the (erroneously assumed) liberation from imprisonment at Rome, see Anger, *temp. rat.* p. 53 ff. Comp. Rückert, p. 12 ff.; Wurm in the *Tüb. Zeitschr.*

<sup>1</sup> Mill and Haenlein strangely took it to mean: not *in*, but *near* Ephesus, because Paul, in xvi. 8, did not write *ἐν* in place of *ἐν* 'Εφ. ! Böttger also (*Beiträge zur hist. krit. Einl. in die Paul. Br.*, Götting. 1837, III. p. 30) avails himself of this circumstance in support of his hypothesis, that the Epistle was written in *Southern Achaia*. See, against this, Rückert, *Magaz. f. Exeg.* I. p. 132 ff.

1838, I. p. 63 ff. The correct subscription is found in B\*\*, Copt. Chrys. Euthal. Theodoret, *al.*: πρὸς Κορ. α ἐγγράφη ἀπὸ Ἐφέσου.

REMARK 2. The decision of the question, whether Paul, previous to the writing of our two Epistles, had been only *once*, or whether he had been *twice*, in Corinth (so rightly Bleek in the *Stud. v. Krit.* 1830, p. 614 ff, and in his *Introduction*; Schrader, I. p. 95 ff.; Neander, Billroth, Rückert, Anger, Credner, Schott, Wurm, Olshausen, Wieseler, Reuss, Ewald, and many others, following Chrysostom, Oecumenius, Theophylact, Baronius, *et al.*), as also whether we must assume a second visit *between* our first and second Epistles, depends on 2 Cor. ii. 1, xii. 14, 21, xiii. 1, 2. See the particulars in the *Intro.* to 2 Cor. § 2.

As to the *genuineness*, there is no room for doubt in view of the external evidences (Polyc. *ad Philipp.* 11; Ignat. *ad Eph.* 2; Clem. Rom. *ad Cor.* i. 47, 49, *Epist. ad Diogn.* 12—Justin M. *c. Tryph.* pp. 253, 258, 338, *Apol.* I. p. 29 are uncertain—Iren. *Haer.* iii. 11. 9, iv. 27. 3; Athenag. *de resurr.* p. 61, ed. Colon.; Clem. Al. *paedag.* p. 96, ed. Sylb.; *Canon Murator.*; Tertull. *de praescrip.* 33, *al.*), and from the whole character of the Epistle (see especially Paley, *Horae Paulinae*), which, with all the variety of its subject-matter, bears the most definite impress of the peculiar spirit and tact of Paul, and displays the full power, art, and subtlety of his eloquence. Bruno Bauer alone in his wanton fashion has sought to dispute it (*Kritik der Paulin. Briefe*, II., Berl. 1851).

Παύλου πρὸς Κορινθίους ἐπιστολὴ πρώτη.

The simplest and probably oldest superscription is that of A B C D 8, min.: πρὸς Κορινθίους πρώτη.

CHAPTER I.

Ver. 1. κλητός] is wanting, indeed, in A D E, Clar. Germ. Cyr. (suspected by Mill and Griesb., bracketed by Lachm., deleted by Rückert), but was easily overlooked by those to whom the fact was known and familiar, that Paul in the beginning of his Epistles almost invariably styles himself ἀπόστ. 'I. X. διὰ θελ. Θεοῦ *without* κλητός; see 2 Cor. i. 1; Eph. i. 1; Col. i. 1; 2 Tim. i. 1. Comp. also Gal. i. 1; 1 Tim. i. 1; Tit. i. 1; only in Rom. i. 1 we find κλητός. — Instead of Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, read, on preponderant evidence, with Lachm. and Tisch., Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ. — Ver. 2. τῇ οὔσῃ ἐν Κορ.] is placed by B D\* E F G, It. after Ἰησοῦ; so Lachm. and Tisch. No doubt rightly, since the common arrangement of the words is plainly open to the suspicion of transposition on grounds of grammar, whereas there is no reason why, if it stood so originally, it should have undergone alteration. The hypothesis of Fritzsche, *de conformat. N. T. Lachm.* 1841, p. 44, that ἡγιασμ. ἐν X. 'I. had been left out, and then reinserted in the wrong place, is an arbitrary one, considering the weight of evidence on Lachmann's side, and seeing that the right place for the reinsertion would have been so unmistakeable. — τε καί] Lachm.: καί, according to B D G 8. But how easily τε might be dropped without its being noticed! — Ver. 14. Rückert has μου after Θεῷ, in accordance with A, 17, 57, al., and several vss. and Fathers. An addition from ver. 4. — Ver. 15. ἐβαπτίσθη] A B C\* 8, min. and several vss. and Fathers have ἐβαπτίσθητε; so Lachm. Rück. and Tisch. Rightly; the immediate context in vv. 14, 16 led to the introduction of the active at a very early date (Syr. Tert.). — Ver. 20. τούτου after κόσμου is wanting in very important witnesses. Deleted by Lachm. Tisch. and Rückert. A mechanical addition from the foregoing. — Ver. 22. σημειῶν] σημειῶ, adopted by Griesb. Lachm. Rück. Tisch.

Scholz, is so decisively attested by A B C D E F G  $\aleph$ , min. and many vss. and Fathers, that we must regard the singular as introduced through the recollection of Matt. xii. 38 f., xvi. 4, *al.* The reading *ἐπιζητούνσιν* in A points in the same direction. See the detailed justification of the plur. in Reiche, *Commentar. crit.* I. p. 121 ff. — Ver. 23. *ἔθεναι*] Elz.: *ἔλλησι*, against decisive evidence. Noted on margin, and then adopted in accordance with what goes before and follows. — Ver. 28. Before *τὰ μὴ ὄντα* Elz. has *καί*, against preponderant testimony. Suspected by Griesb.; deleted by Lachm. Scholz, Rück. and Tisch. Mechanical connection. — Ver. 29. *τοῦ Θεοῦ*] So Griesb. and all later editors, following decisive evidence. *Αὐτοῦ* in Elz. is an over-hasty correction, due to a failure to recognise the design of the repetition of *τ. Θεοῦ*. — Ver. 30. *σοφία ἡμῶν*] Approved by Griesb., adopted also by Lachm. Rück. and Tisch. Elz. and Scholz, however, have *ἡμῶν σοφία*. For the former order are A C D E  $\aleph$ , min. Vulg. ms. It. Harl.\*\* Or. Eus. *al.*, further, B, which has *σοφ. ἡμῶν*, and F G, which have *ἡ σοφία ἡμῶν*. *Ἡμῶν* was put first, in order to join *σοφία* closely to *ἀπὸ Θεοῦ*; while others marked the conception of the *true* wisdom by the article (F G).

Vv. 1–3. *Apostolic address and greeting.*

Ver. 1. *Κλητὸς ἀπόστ.* See on Rom. i. 1. A polemical reference (Chrysostom, Theophylact, and many others, including Flatt, Rückert, Olshausen, Osiander), which would be foreign to the winning tone of the whole exordium, would have been quite otherwise expressed by one so decided as Paul (comp. Gal. i. 1). — *διὰ θελ. Θεοῦ*] That his position as an apostle called by Christ was brought about *by the will of God*, was a truth so vividly and firmly implanted in his consciousness, that he commonly includes an expression of it in the beginning of his Epistles. See 2 Cor. i. 1; Gal. i. 1; Eph. i. 1; Col. i. 1; 1 Tim. i. 1; 2 Tim. i. 1. “*Sua ipsius voluntate P. nunquam factus esset apostolus*,” Bengel. Regarding *διά*, see on ver. 9 and Gal. i. 1. — *καὶ Σωσθένης*] Modern interpreters reckon him the *amanuensis* of the Epistle (see xvi. 21). But the mere *amanuensis as such* has no share in the Epistle itself, which must, however, be the case with one who holds a place in the introductory salutation. Since, moreover, in 1 and 2 Thess. we find *two* others besides Paul named with him in the superscription (who therefore *could* hardly both be mentioned as *amanuenses*), and even an indefinite number of “brethren” in the Epistle to the Galatians,

whereas in that to the Romans the amanuensis—who is known from xvi. 22—does *not* appear as included in the superscription, we must rather suppose that *Paul made his Epistle run not only in his own name, but also* (although, of course, in a subordinate sense) *in the name of Sosthenes*, so that the Corinthians were to regard the letter of the apostle as at the same time a letter of Sosthenes, who thereby signified his desire to impress upon them the same doctrines, admonitions, etc. This presupposes that Paul had previously considered and discussed with this friend of his the contents of the letter to be issued. Comp. on Phil. i. 1. Sosthenes himself accordingly appears as a teacher then present with the apostle and enjoying his confidence, but known to, and respected among, the Corinthians. There remains, indeed, the *possibility* that he may have also *written* the Epistle, but only in so far as we are *in utter ignorance* of who the amanuensis was at all. Had *Timothy* not already started on his journey (iv. 17, xvi. 10), he would have had a place along with, or instead of, Sosthenes in the salutation of the Epistle; comp. 2 Cor. i. 1. — Theodoret and most commentators, including Flatt, Billroth, Ewald, Maier, Hofmann, identify Sosthenes with the person so named in Acts xviii. 17; but this is rightly denied by Michaelis, Pott, Rückert, and de Wette. See on Acts, *l.c.* Without due ground, Rückert concludes that he was a *young* man trained up by Paul—a view least of all to be deduced from the assumption that he was the amanuensis of the letter. The very absence of any definite information whatever as to Sosthenes shows how utterly arbitrary is the remark of Chrysostom, Theophylact, Grotius, and Estius, that it was a great proof of *modesty* in the apostle to name him along with himself. — ὁ ἀδελφός] denotes nothing more special than *Christian brotherhood* (so also 2 Cor. i. 1; Col. i. 1, *al.*), not fellowship in the office of teacher. The *particulars* of the position of Sosthenes were well known to the readers.

Ver. 2. Τῇ ἐκκλ. τ. Θεοῦ] Θεοῦ is genitive of the owner. Comp. ἡ ἑκκλ. Num. xvi. 3, xx. 4. The expression is with Paul the standing theocratic designation of the Christian community, in which the theocratic idea of the Old Testament ἑκκλ. presents itself as realized; it is the *πλήρωσις* of this ἑκκλ. Comp. x. 32, xi. 16, 22, xv. 9; 2 Cor. i. 1; Gal. i. 13, *al.* — ἡγιασμ. ἐν Χ. 'Ι.] adds

at once a distinctive definition of quality to τ. ἐκκλ. τ. Θεοῦ (see the critical remarks), and thereupon follows the local specification of τ. ἐκκλ. τ. Θεοῦ. "*To the church of God, men sanctified in Christ Jesus, which is in Corinth.*" How common it is to find a participle in the *plural* standing in an attributive relation to a collective *singular*, may be seen in Kühner, II. p. 43; Pflugk, *ad Eur. Hec.* 39. Τῇ οὔσῃ ἐν Κορ., however, is *purposely* placed after ἡγιασμ. κ.τ.λ., because the thought is, that the church of God addressed does in itself and as such (not as *Corinthian*) consist of those sanctified in Christ. The ἡγιασμός is to be conceived as *consecration to God in the Christian church* (see above, τ. ἐκκλ. τ. Θεοῦ). Comp. on Rom. i. 7. This belonging to God as *His own* has its causal ground not out of, but *in Christ*—namely, in His redemptive work, of which the Christians have become, and continue to be, partakers (*perfect*) by means of justifying faith (Eph. i. 4 ff.; Heb. x. 10). Comp. Phil. i. 1. Ἐν Χ. Ἰ. gives to the ἡγιασμ. its *distinctively Christian character*. — κλητοῖς ἁγίοις] added, in order to a properly exhaustive description of that experienced benefit of God's grace of which the readers, as Christians, were assumed to be conscious; the new element introduced here lies in κλητοῖς. The *call to the Messianic kingdom* (conceived as issued *effectually*, comp. on Rom. viii. 28, and see Lamping, *Pauli de predestin. decreta*, Leovard. 1858, p. 32 f.) is, according to the constant conception of the N. T. (Rom. i. 6; Gal. i. 6 not excepted), given by *God* (ver. 9, Rom. viii. 30, ix. 24, *al.*; Usteri, *Lehrbegr.* p. 281) through the preachers of the gospel (Rom. x. 14; 2 Thess. ii. 14); see Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 386 f. — σὺν πᾶσι κ.τ.λ.] does not belong to κλητοῖς ἁγίοις, so that the readers were to be made sensible of the greatness of the *fellowship in which they, as called saints, stood* (Grotius, Bengel, Storr, Rosenmüller, Flatt, Billroth, Rückert, Olshausen, de Wette, Neander, Becker, Hofmann). But it belongs, as necessarily follows from 2 Cor. i. 1, to the *superscription as part of it* (on σὺν, comp. Phil. i. 1); yet neither so as to mark the Epistle as a *catholic one* (Theodoret, Estius, Calovius, Cornelius a Lapide, and others; comp. Schrader); nor so that Paul shall be held, while greeting the Corinthians, as *greeting* in spirit also the *universal church* (Osiander, comp. Chrysostom, Theodoret, Erasmus, Billroth, Heydenreich, and others); nor yet so that by

the ἐπικαλ. τ. ὄν. τ. Κυρ. were meant the *separatists*, in contrast to those disposed to adhere to the church (Vitranga, Michaelis), or as if σὺν πᾶσι κ.τ.λ. were meant to *comprehend all Corinthian Christians without distinction* (Eichhorn, *Einleit.* III. 1, p. 110, Pott); but so that the sense is in substance just that expressed in 2 Cor. i. 1: σὺν τοῖς ἁγίοις πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσιν ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ Ἀχαΐᾳ. See below on αὐτῶν τε καὶ ἡμῶν. The Epistle is primarily addressed to the Christians in Corinth; not, however, to them *merely*, but *at the same time also to the other Achaean Christians*, and the latter are denoted by πᾶσι . . . ἡμῶν. A comma is to be put after ἁγίοις. — τοῖς ἐπικαλ. τ. ὄν. τ. Κυρ.] confessional designation of the Christians, Rom. x. 12 f.; Acts ii. 21. Respecting the N. T. idea of the *invocation of Christ*, which is not to be held as absolute, but as *relative* worship (of Him as the Mediator and Lord over all, but under God, Phil. ii. 10 f.), see on Rom. x. 12. — αὐτῶν τε καὶ ἡμῶν] is joined with τοῦ Κυρίου by Chrysostom, Theodoret, Photius, Theophylact, Calvin, Beza, Piscator, Erasmus Schmid, Valckenaer, and others, including Billroth, Olshausen, Lücke (*de invocat. Chr.*, Götting. 1843), Wieseler (*Chronol. des apost. Zeitalt.* p. 324), in such a way as to make it an epanorthosis or (see Wieseler) epexegetis of the foregoing ἡμῶν. But apart from the fact that this ἡμῶν in the habitually used Κύριος ἡμῶν embraces *all* Christians, and consequently αὐτῶν τε καὶ ἡμῶν (ἡμῶν being referred to Paul and Sosthenes) would express something quite self-evident, and that, too, without any special significance of bearing,<sup>1</sup> the *position* of the words is decisive against this view, and in favour of attaching them to παντὶ τόπῳ, to which they necessarily belong as a more precise definition. Comp. Vulg.: "In omni loco ipsorum et nostro." If, namely, σὺν πᾶσι . . . ἡμῶν must denote the Achaean Christians out of Corinth (see above), then παντὶ τόπῳ requires a limitation to the geographical district which is intended. Now, this limitation is not already *laid down* by ἐν Κορίνθῳ (Lücke, Wieseler), since it was precisely in the superscription that the need of *definiteness* in designating the readers was obvious, but it is expressly *given* by

<sup>1</sup> It is supposed to convey a polemical reference to the party-divisions. See Wieseler, *l.c.* This can only be the case if αὐτῶν applies to the *Corinthians*. But in fact, according to the view of Lücke and Wieseler (see below), it cannot do so, but must apply to the *other Achaeans*.



αὐτῶν τε καὶ ἡμῶν, in such a way, namely, that αὐτῶν refers to the *Corinthians*, who, however, are indicated not by ὑμῶν, but by αὐτῶν, because from the point where the widening of the address (σὺν πᾶσι κ.τ.λ.) comes in, the *Corinthians* appear as third parties. Accordingly the Epistle is addressed: *To the Corinthian Christians, and to all who, in every place that belongs to them (the Corinthians) and to us as well (Paul and Sosthenes), call upon the name of Christ.* Every place in the province, namely, where Christians lived or a church existed (as e.g. in Cenchreæ, Rom. xvi. 1), was a place which belonged to the *Corinthians*, a τόπος αὐτῶν, in so far as the church at Corinth was the mother-church of the Christian body in Achaia; but each such place belonged also to *Paul* (and Sosthenes), in so far as he was the founder and apostolic head of Christianity in Corinth and all Achaia. It is quite in accordance with the ingenious subtlety of the apostle to give the designation of the provincials in such a form, as to make his own authority felt over against the prerogative of those living in the capital (αὐτῶν). As in Rom. xvi. 13 αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐμοῦ delicately expresses the community of *love* (comp. also 1 Cor. xvi. 18; Philem. 11; Soph. *El.* 417 f.: πατρὸς τοῦ σοῦ τε καὶ ἐμοῦ), so here αὐτῶν τε καὶ ἡμῶν the community of *right*. The objection that the sense in which they belonged to the *Corinthians* was different from that in which they belonged to Paul and Sosthenes (de Wette), fails to appreciate the *point* of the words. The offence which Hofm. takes at the reading τε καὶ (as though it must be equivalent to εἴτε) arises from a misunderstanding; it is the usual co-ordinating τε καὶ, which here has not even the *appearance* (Hartung, *Partik.* I. p. 100) of standing in place of εἴτε. Comp., on the contrary, Hartung, p. 101; Baeuml., *Partik.* p. 225. Observe, besides, that τε καὶ gives more rhetorical emphasis to the association of the two genitives than the simple καὶ; see Dissen, *ad Decm. de cor.* p. 165. Rübiger, *krit. Unters.* p. 62 f., has assented to our view.<sup>1</sup> Comp. also Maier. Those who join σὺν πᾶσι κ.τ.λ. to κλητοῖς ἀγ. (see above) usually take αὐτῶν τε καὶ ἡμ. as an analysis of the idea παντί: in every place, *where they and where we* (Paul and Sosthenes) *are*, i.e. *elsewhere and here in Ephesus*. See Calovius, Rückert, de Wette, Osiander. But how

<sup>1</sup> Also Burger in his (popular) *Auslegung*, Erl. 1859, and Holtzmann, *Judenthum u. Christenth.* p. 749.

meaningless this more precise explanation of *παντί* would be ! In fact, it would be absurd ; for, since the subject is *all* (*πᾶσι κ.τ.λ.*), in which the *ἡμεῖς* are thus already included, an analysis of it into *αὐτοί* (which the *πάντες* are surely already) and *ἡμεῖς* is utterly illogical. This applies also in opposition to Becker, by whom the *τόπος ἡμῶν* is held to be *Corinth*, and to refer to the *strangers* who come to Corinth. Others have, following Ambrosiaster, referred *αὐτῶν* to the *heathen lands*, and *ἡμῶν* to *Judaea* (Erasmus, Semler, Bolten ; similarly Schrader). Contrary to the text, as is also Wetstein's opinion : " *P. suum locum vocat, ubi ipse per praedicationem evangelii ecclesiam fundaverat. Tacite se atque Sosthenem . . . opponit peregrino falso doctori, qui in locum non suum irrepserat.*" Others refer *ἐν παντί . . . ἡμῶν* to the different meeting-places of the parties (Vitranga, Mosheim, Eichhorn, Krause, Pott, Ewald), so that the *τόπος ἡμῶν* would be the house of Justus (Acts xviii. 7), or, generally, the place where the church had stately assembled at first under Paul (Ewald) ; and the *τόπ. αὐτῶν* the meeting-house of the Petrine party, perhaps the Jewish synagogue (Pott), or, in general, the other places of assembly of the new sections (Ewald). But the presupposition that the church was broken up into parties locally separated from each other (see, on the contrary, xiv. 23, xi. 17 ff.) has not a single passage in the Epistle to justify it. Böttger, *l.c.* p. 25, holds, strangely, that *αὐτῶν* applies to the *Corinthian* Christians, and *ἡμῶν* to those of *Lower Achaia* (among whom Paul is supposed to have written ; see *Introd.* § 3) ; and Ziegler, that *αὐτῶν* applies to those in Corinth, *ἡμῶν* to those staying with Paul in Ephesus, Stephanas, Fortunatus, Achaicus (xvi. 17), and others. Hofmann propounds the peculiar view that *καὶ ἡμῶν* betokens that Paul was *at home*, and felt himself *to be so*, wherever Christ was invoked. As if the reader would have been capable of deducing any such ubiquity of spiritual domicile from the simple pronoun, and that, too, in the very address of the Epistle, without the slightest hint from the connection.

Ver. 3. See on Rom. i. 7.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See also the elaborate dissertation on the apost. benedictory greeting by Otto in the *Jahrb. für D. Theol.* 1867, p. 678 ff. The origin of that greeting, however, is hardly to be traced back, as the author holds, to the Aaronic blessing, Num. vi. 25 f. Otherwise it would always be *tripartite*, and, in particular, would not omit the

Vv. 4–9. *Conciliatory preamble*, by no means without real praise (Hofmann), assuredly not ironical (Semler, comp. Mosheim), which would be unwise and wrong; and not addressed merely to the party of Paul and that of Apollos (Flatt), which is at variance with ver. 2; but, as is alone in accordance with the character of Paul and with the words themselves, directed to the church as a whole under a persuasion of the truth of its contents,—bringing forward first of all with true affection what was laudable, so far as it existed, and lovingly leaving out of view for a time what was blameworthy, but withal soberly keeping within the bounds of truth and tracing all up to God.

Vv. 4, 5. *Μου*] as in Rom. i. 8. — *πάντοτε*] *always*, to be measured not strictly by the literal import of the word, but by the fervour of his constant love. Comp. 1 Thess. i. 2 f.; 2 Thess. i. 3. — *ἐπὶ*] *ground* of the thanks, Phil. i. 5; Polyb. xviii. 26. 4; Valck. *in loc.* The *grace of God*, which had been bestowed on them, is described more precisely in ver. 5 according to its effects. — *ἐν Χ. Ἰ.]* i.e. *in your fellowship with Christ*. By this is denoted the specifically *Christian* nature of the gift, in so far, namely, as it is not attained apart from Christ, but—otherwise it were a worldly gift—has *in Christ*, as the life-element of those who are its subjects, the distinctive sphere of its manifestation. Just in the same way ver. 5. — *ὅτι*] *that you, namely, etc.*, epexegetis of *ἐπὶ τῇ χάρι. κ.τ.λ.* — *ἐν παντί*] without limitation: *in all*, in every point; comp. 2 Cor. ix. 11; 1 Tim. vi. 18; Eph. ii. 4; Jas. ii. 5. To this Paul forthwith, and again with *ἐν* (comp. 2 Cor. vi. 4), adds the more precise definition chosen in reference to the state of things at Corinth: *ἐν παντὶ λόγῳ κ. πάσῃ γνώσει*: *in all discourse and all knowledge*—that is to say, so that no kind of Christian aptitude of speech, or of Christian intelligence, is wanting among you, but both—the former outwardly communicative aptitude, in virtue of which a man is *δυνατὸς γινώσκειν ἐξειπεῖν* (Clem. *Cor.* I. 48); and the latter, the inward endowment—are to be found with you richly in every form. This

characteristic *ἐλεος*. Now, the only Epistles in which it certainly occurs as *tripartite*, and with *ἔλεος*, are the (post-Pauline) ones, 1 and 2 Tim. and 2 John 3; also Jude 2 (but with a peculiar variation). It was only at a later date that the Aaronic blessing passed over into Christian liturgic use (*Constitt. ap.* ii. 57. 13); but a free reminiscence of that blessing may already be contained in the greetings of those late Epistles.

view, according to which λόγος is *sermo*, occurs in substance in the Greek commentators, in Calovius, Rückert, Neander, Hofmann, and many others, and is confirmed beyond a doubt by 2 Cor. viii. 7, xi. 6. As to the different *kinds* of Christian utterance, comp. 1 Cor. xii. 8. Λόγος is not therefore to be understood, with Billroth, de Wette, and Maier, of the *doctrine* preached to the Corinthians. Beza, Grotius, and others take λόγος to be specially the *donum linguarum*, and γνῶσις the *donum prophetiæ*, which, however, is not conveyed either in the words themselves or in the connection, and is, moreover, at variance with the subordinate importance attached to the γλώσσαις λαλεῖν (chap. xiv.). Lastly, as to the running together of the two: ἐν πάσῃ γνώσει τοῦ λόγου (Schulz, Morus, Rosenmüller), the very repetition of the πάσῃ, and the difference in point of idea between the two words, should have dissuaded its supporters from such a view; for λόγ. and γνῶσ. can as little be *synonymis* (Clericus, Pott) as רב and נע. Clement also, 1 Cor. 1, praises the former condition of the church with respect to τὴν τελείαν καὶ ἀσφαλῆ γνῶσιν.

Ver. 6. Καθὼς] *According as*, introduces the relation of that happy condition of things (ἐν παντὶ ἐπλουτίσθητε . . . γνώσει) to its cause. See on John xiii. 34, xvii. 2; 1 Cor. v. 7; Eph. i. 4; Phil. i. 7; Matt. vi. 12. — τὸ μαρτύριον τοῦ Χ.] characteristic designation of the *Gospel*, the publishers of which bear *witness of Christ*. Comp. 2 Tim. i. 8; Acts i. 8, iii. 15, *al.*; 2 Thess. i. 10; 1 Peter v. 1. Comp. μαρτ. τοῦ Θεοῦ, ii. 1. — ἐβεβαιώθη] is rendered by most: *is confirmed*,<sup>1</sup> *has been accredited* (Mark xvi. 20; Rom. xv. 8; Heb. ii. 3, *al.*); comp. also Rückert: "evinced as true by its effect on you;" and Ewald: "*guaranteed* among you by signs of the power of the Holy Spirit." So too, in substance, Hofmann. It is more in keeping, however, with the logical relation of καθὼς κ.τ.λ. to the foregoing, as well as with the βεβαιώσει of ver. 8 (comp. 2 Cor. i. 21; Col. ii. 7), to explain it of the *gospel becoming firmly established in their souls* (by steadfast faith), so that the opposite is expressed by the Johannine τὸν λόγον οὐκ ἔχετε μένοντα ἐν ὑμῖν (John v. 38). Comp. Billroth and de Wette. — ἐν ὑμῖν] *in animis vestris*.

<sup>1</sup> "Non de confirmatione externa verbi, quae fit per miracula, sed de confirmatione interna, quae fit per testimonium Sp. St.," Calovius. Chrysostom understood it of both; Theodoret, Theophylact, and others, of the miracles only.

Ver. 7. Result of τὸ μαρτ. τ. X. ἐβεβ. ἐν ὑμῖν, consequently parallel to ἐν παντὶ ἐπλουτ. ἐν αὐτῇ. The negative expression μὴ ὑστερεῖσθαι ἐν is conceived quite after the analogy of the positive πλουτίζ. ἐν (see on ver. 5), so that ἐν denotes that, *in which* one is behind (defectively constituted). Hence: *so that ye in no gift of grace are behind* (i.e. less rich than other churches). Comp. Plat. Pol. vi. p. 484 D: μηδ' ἐν ἄλλῳ μηδενὶ μέρει ἀρετῆς ὑστηροῦντας. Ecclus. li. 24. The sense would be different, if the words were μηδενὸς χαρίσματος (*so that no gift of grace is lacking to you*). See Rom. iii. 24; Luke xxii. 35; John ii. 3. Ruhnke. ad Tim. p. 51. Lobeck, ad Phryg. p. 237; ad Soph. Aj. 782. Χάρισμα is here to be taken (with Calvin and others, including Rosenmüller, Pott, de Wette, Maier) in the *wider* sense of the *spiritual blessings of Christianity generally*, in so far as believers are made partakers of them by the divine grace through the πνεῦμα ἅγιον (Rom. i. 11; 1 Cor. vii. 7); not, with most of the older expositors, as well as Billroth, Rückert, Olshausen, Hofmann, in the *narrower* sense of the extraordinary gifts (chap. xii. ff.). The proof of this is, first, that the immediately following ἀπεκδεχομ. κ.τ.λ. makes the μὴ ὑστερεῖσθαι ἐν μηδενὶ χαρίσματι appear as an *ethical* endowment; second, that the significant retrospective reference of the ἀνεγκλήτους in ver. 8 does not suit the χαρίσματα in the narrower sense, but does suit all the more strikingly the moral character of the Christian gifts of the Spirit in general. The form of expression in the singular here stands as little in the way of this view (in opposition to Hofmann) as at Rom. i. 11, and is, in fact, necessitated by the negative form of the discourse. Rückert, indeed, objects: "that Paul could not at all mean here those purely moral blessings, seeing that the Corinthians did not possess them." The apostle, however, is not speaking of every individual, but of the church taken as a whole (comp. already Chrysostom and Theophylact); and, moreover, expresses himself with much caution in a negative way, so that he only needs to answer for the presence of a *sufficienter praeditum esse* to stand comparison with other churches. — ἀπεκδεχομ. κ.τ.λ.] is a significant accompanying definition to what has gone before: *as persons, who are not in any wise afraid of the revelation of Christ* (1 Pet. i. 7; Col. iii. 3 f.) and wish it away, but who *are waiting* for it. This waiting and that afflux of grace stand in a mutual relation

of action and reaction. Bengel says rightly: "*Character Christiani veri vel falsi, revelationem Christi vel expectare vel horrere.*" The fact that there were among the Corinthians deniers of the resurrection (and consequently of the Parousia in its full idea)—which, we may add, might naturally enough cause this hope to become all the more vividly prominent in the case of the rest—does not take away from the truth of the words, which hold good of the church *a potiori*. Just as little can they (contrary to the winning tone of the whole preamble) have it as their design to *terrify* with the thought of the day of judgment (Chrysostom), or to *censure* the doubters (Grotius, Rückert), or even to make *ironical* reference to the fancied perfection of the Corinthians (Mosheim). The participial clause, which needed neither ὥς nor the article, is not merely a *temporal* definition—consequently "*for the time*" of the waiting (Hofmann)—any more than at Tit. ii. 13; Rom. viii. 23; Jude 21. — ἀπεκδ.] denotes the *persevering* expectation. See on Rom. viii. 19; Fritzsche in *Fritzschior. Opusc.* p. 150 ff. The word does not indicate the element of *longing* (de Wette). See Rom. viii. 25; 1 Pet. iii. 20. For the subject-matter, comp. Phil. iii. 20; Tit. ii. 13; 2 Tim. iv. 8; Luke xii. 36.

Ver. 8. "Ὁς] refers to Ἰησοῦ X., not, as Flatt, Pott, Billroth, Schrader, Olshausen, de Wette, Osiander, Ewald, Hofmann, with the majority of interpreters, assume, to the far-distant Θεός, ver. 4, —a view to which we are not compelled either by the Ἰησ. Χριστοῦ which follows (see below), or by ver. 9, seeing that the working of the exalted Christ is in fact subordinated to the will of God (iii. 23, xi. 3; Rom. viii. 34, *al.*). Comp. Winer, p. 149 [E.T.196]. The apostle, however, is so full of Christ, as he addresses himself to his Epistle, that throughout the preamble he names Him in almost every verse, sometimes even twice. Comp. Rom. i. 1–7. — καί] also, denotes that which *corresponds* to the ἀπεκδέχασθαι κ.τ.λ., what Christ will do. — βεβαιώσει] στηρίξει, Rom. xvi. 25; 1 Thess. iii. 13; 2 Cor. i. 21. The future stands here not *optatively* (Pott), but as expressive of a confident *hope* in the gracious working of Christ.<sup>1</sup> — ἕως τέλους] applies not to the end of *life* (Calovius,

<sup>1</sup> Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, and others, find in this expression an indirect censure; as a hint that they were σαλεύομενοι and ἐγκλήμασι νῦν ὑποκείμενοι. A view the more inappropriate, when we consider how natural and familiar to the apostle was the thought expressed with respect to all his churches.

Flatt, and others), but, as the foregoing τ. ἀποκάλ. κ.τ.λ. and the following ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ κ.τ.λ. clearly show, to the end of the *pre-Messianic period* of the world's history (the αἰὼν οὗτος, see on Matt. xiii. 32), which is to be ushered in by the now nearly approaching (vii. 29, xv. 51) Parousia. Comp. x. 11; 2 Cor. i. 13. It is the συντέλεια τοῦ αἰῶνος, Matt. xiii. 39 f., xxiv. 3, xxviii. 20; comp. Heb. ix. 26. — ἀνεγκλήτους κ.τ.λ.] *result of the strengthening: so that ye shall be free from reproach in the day*, etc. Comp. 1 Thess. iii. 13. See respecting this proleptic usage generally, on Matt. xii. 13; Phil. iii. 21, and Jacob, *Quaest. epic.* ii. 4, p. 136 ff. Stallb. *ad Plat. Rep.* p. 560 D. — τοῦ Κυρίου κ.τ.λ.] The repetition of the noun instead of the mere pronoun is common in the classics also (Ellendt, *ad Arrian. Exp. Al.* i. 55; Kühner, *ad Xen. Mem.* i. 6. 1), and elsewhere in the N. T. (Winer, *l.c.* and p. 136 [E. T. 180]). Here (as at 2 Cor. i. 5; Eph. i. 13; Col. i. 13 f., *al.*) it has solemn emphasis. Comp. ver. 21. — It is to be noted, moreover, that the blamelessness in the day of Christ (comp. Rom. viii. 33) is conditioned (2 Tim. iv. 7) by perseverance in the faith (through which justification is appropriated), and consequently rests on the imputation of faith (Rom. iv. 4 f.); but is nevertheless, in virtue of the moral character and power of faith, as also in virtue of sanctification through the Spirit, of a thoroughly moral nature (Rom. vi. 1 ff., viii. 1 ff.), so that the ἀνέγκλητος at the Parousia appears not, indeed, as ἀναμάρτητος, but as καινὴ κτίσις ἐν Χριστῷ (2 Cor. v. 17), who, being divinely restored (Eph. ii. 10; Col. iii. 10) and progressively sanctified (1 Thess. v. 23), has worked out his own salvation (Phil. ii. 12) in the consecration of the moral power of the new spiritual life (Rom. viii. 2 f.; Phil. i. 10 f.), and now receives the βραβεῖον of his calling (Phil. iii. 14), the στέφανος of the δικαιοσύνη (2 Tim. iv. 8), in the δόξα of everlasting life.

Ver. 9. Ground of this confident hope. Comp. 1 Cor. x. 13; 1 Thess. v. 24; 2 Thess. iii. 3; Phil. i. 6; Rom. xi. 29. Were the βεβαίωσις on the part of Christ (ver. 8) not to take place, the divine call to the κοινωνία τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ would remain without effect, which would not be compatible with the *faithfulness* of God, from whom the call comes, and who, by His calling, gives pledge to us of eternal salvation (Rom. viii. 30).—Rückert finds in δι' οὗ, because God Himself is the caller, a veritable misuse of

the preposition; and others, as Beza and Rosenmüller, explain it without ceremony by *ὑφ' οὗ*, which D\* F G in fact read. But Paul is thinking here in a *popular* way of the call as *mediated through God*. It is true, of course, that God is the *causa principalis*, but the mediating agency is also God's, *ἐξ οὗ καὶ δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα* (Rom. xi. 36); hence both modes of representation may occur, and *διά* may be used as well as *ὑπό*, wherever the context does not make it of importance to have a definite designation of the primary cause as such. Comp. Gal. i. 1; Plat. *Symp.* p. 186 E, *Pol.* ii. p. 379 E. Fritzsche, *ad Rom.* I. p. 15; Bernhardt, p. 235 f. —The *κοινωνία τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ* is the *fellowship with the Son of God* (genitive, as in 2 Cor. xi. 13; Phil. ii. 1; 2 Pet. i. 4), *i.e.* the having part in the filial relation of Christ, which, however, is not to be understood of the temporal relation of sonship, Gal. iii. 26 f. (*κοινωνίαν γὰρ υἱοῦ τὴν υἰοθεσίαν ἐκάλεσε*, Theodoret), nor of ethical fellowship (Grotius, Hofmann, and many others), but, in accordance with the idea of the *καλεῖν* which always refers to the Messianic kingdom, of *fellowship of the glory of the Son of God in the eternal Messianic life*,<sup>1</sup>—a fellowship which will be the glorious completion of the state of *υἰοθεσία* (Gal. iv. 7). It is the *δόξα τῶν τέκνων τοῦ Θεοῦ* (Rom. viii. 21), when they shall be *συγκληρονόμοι τοῦ Χριστοῦ, σύμμορφοι* of His image, *συμβασιλεύοντες* and *συνδοξασθέντες*, Rom. viii. 17; comp. vv. 23, 29; 2 Thess. ii. 14; Col. iii. 4; Phil. iii. 20 f.; 1 Cor. xv. 48 f.; 2 Tim. ii. 12.

Ver. 10–iv. 21. *First section of the Epistle: respecting the parties, with a defence of the apostle's way of teaching.*

Vv. 10–16. *Exhortation to unity* (ver. 10), *statement of the character of their party-division* (vv. 11, 12), *and how wrong it was* (vv. 13–16).

Ver. 10. "*Exhortation*, however, lest ye miss this end of your calling, *exhortation* I give to you," etc. — *ἀδελφοί*] winning and tender form of address, often introduced by Paul just at the point where he has a *serious* word to speak. Ver. 11, vii. 29, x. 1, xiv. 20, *al.* — *διὰ τοῦ ὀνόματος κ.τ.λ.*] *by means of the name*, etc., while I point you to the name of Christ, which, in truth, constitutes the *one* confession of all His disciples, and thereby set before you the motive to follow my exhortation. Comp. Rom. xii. 1, xv. 30; 2 Cor. x. 1; 2 Thess. iii. 12. Were the meaning

<sup>1</sup> Comp. Weiss, *biblische Theol.* p. 310.



*ex mandato Christi* (Heumann, Semler, Ernesti, and Rosenmüller), it would be expressed by ἐν τῷ ὀνόμ. (v. 4; 2 Thess. iii. 6, *al.*). — ἵνα] *design*, and in *this* form of conception, *contents* of the παρακαλῶ, as in xvi. 12, 15; 2 Cor. viii. 6, ix. 5; 2 Thess. ii. 17, and often in the Synoptic Gospels. — τὸ αὐτὸ λέγητε] *agreement of confessional utterance*, as opposed to the party-confessions of faith, at variance with each other, ver. 12. Luther renders it appropriately: "einerlei Rede führet." The *consensus animorum* is only expressed in the *sequel* (ἥτε δὲ κατηγορισμ. κ.τ.λ.); in the first instance it is the outstanding *manifestation* of the evil that Paul has in view. This in opposition to Erasmus, Grotius, Estius, Wolf, and many others, including Heydenreich and Billroth, who explain the phrase of this inward agreement, which Paul would have known well how to express by τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖν (Rom. xv. 5; Phil. ii. 2; 2 Cor. xiii. 11), or in some similar *correct* way, and which, even in such passages as Thuc. v. 31. 5, Polyb. ii. 62, is not *expressed*, but *presupposed*. More expressive still is Polyb. v. 104. 1: λέγειν ἐν καὶ ταὐτό, *to speak one and the same thing*. — καὶ μὴ ἢ ἐν ὑμ. σχίσματα] the same thought in *prohibitive* form (comp. Rom. xii. 14, *al.*), but designating the evil forbidden *more generally*, according to its *category*. — ἥτε δὲ κ.τ.λ.] *δέ*, but rather, but on the *contrary* (see Hartung, *Partikell.* I. p. 171; Klotz, *ad Devar.* p. 360; Baeuml. *Partik.* p. 95), introduces what ought to be the case instead of the forbidden καὶ μὴ κ.τ.λ. — κατηγορισμένοι] *fully adjusted, established in the right frame* (Vulg. *perfecti*; Theophyl. *τέλειοι*). Comp. 2 Cor. xiii. 11; Gal. vi. 1; Heb. xiii. 1; 1 Pet. v. 10; Luke vi. 40. When there are divisions in a society, the *κατάρτισις* is wanting (2 Cor. xiii. 9; comp. *καταρτισμός*, Eph. iv. 12); hence Greek writers also use *καταρτίζειν* in speaking of the establishment of right relations by the removal of disunion (as here), sedition, or the like, Herod. v. 28. 106; Dion. Hal. *Antt.* iii. 10. Whether any *figurative* reference, however, of *κατηρτ.* to the original sense of *σχίσματα*, *fissurae*, be intended (to make whole and good again what was broken or rent, comp. Matt. iv. 21; Mark i. 19; Esdr. iv. 12, 13, 16; Herod. v. 106), as Bos, Elsner, Valckenaer, Pott, Heydenreich, and others think, and as Luther, Calvin ("apte cohaereatis"), and Beza ("coagmentati") express by their renderings, may be doubted, because Paul does not more precisely and definitely indicate such a conception; while, on

the other hand, it was exceedingly common to use *σχίσμα* absolutely, and without special thought of its original material reference (Matt. ix. 16), to denote *dissidium* (John vii. 43, ix. 16, x. 19; 1 Cor. xi. 18, and even xii. 25). — ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νοῖ κ.τ.λ.] the sphere, in which they were to be *κατηρτ.* Comp. Heb. xiii. 21. *Νοῦς* and *γνώμη* differ as *understanding* and *opinion*. Through the fact, namely, that Christians in Corinth *thought* differently (*νοῦς*) on important matters, and in consequence of this difference of thinking, formed in a partisan spirit different *opinions and judgments* (*γνώμη*), and fought for these against each other, the *τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν* was wanting and *σχίσματα* prevailed. In opposition to this, the Corinthians were to agree together in Christian thinking<sup>1</sup> and judging; the right state of things was to establish itself among them in *ὁμονοεῖν* and *ὁμογνωμονεῖν* (Thuc. ii. 97; Dem. 281. 21; Polyb. xxviii. 6. 2). In *ἐριδες*, ver. 11, we have the manifestation of the opposite of both of these, of Christian sameness of thought and opinion. That sameness, therefore, does not preclude the friendly discussion of points of difference in thought and judgment, with a view to mutual better understanding and the promotion of harmony, but it doubtless does preclude *party-differences* and *hostility*. Ἀμφισβητοῦσι μὲν γὰρ καὶ δι' εὐνοίαν οἱ φίλοι τοῖς φίλοις, ἐρίζουσι δὲ οἱ διαφοροὶ τε καὶ ἐχθροὶ ἀλλήλοις, Plat. *Prot.* p. 337 B. Many other interpreters take *γνώμη* as referring to the *practical* disposition (to *love*); whereas *νοῦς* denotes the *theoretical* understanding. See Chrysostom, Theodoret, and Theophylact, who says: ὅταν γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν πίστιν ἔχωμεν, μὴ συναπτώμεθα δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀγάπην, τὰ μὲν αὐτὰ νοοῦμεν, διστάμεθα δὲ κατὰ τὴν γνώμην. But this separation between theory and practice is quite arbitrary; and *γνώμη* never means in the N. T. “disposition,” but always (even in Rev. xvii. 13, 17) *sententia, judicium*. Comp. the classical τῆς αὐτῆς γνώμης εἶναι, to have one and the same view, Thuc. i. 113, iii. 70. Eur. *Hec.* 127: ἐκ μιᾶς γνώμης, Dem. 147. 1: διὰ μιᾶς γνώμης γίνεσθαι, Isocr. *Paneg.* 38: τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει γνώμην, Plat. *Alc.* 2, p. 139 A. The converse: ἐγένοντο δίχα αἱ γνώμαι, Herod. vi. 109. Ver. 11. Motive for the foregoing exhortation. — ὑπὸ τῶν Χλόης] comp. Rom. xvi. 10; Winer, p. 179 [E. T. 238]. *What*

<sup>1</sup> The sense of “disposition” is wrongly attributed to *νοῦς* (Rückert, Neander, Maier). This is not the case even in Rom. i. 28, xii. 2; Eph. iv. 17; see *in loc.*

persons belonging to Chloe are meant, was as well known to the readers as it is unknown to us. Grotius and Valckenaer understood "*mortuae* Chloes *liberos*;" others generally, "*those of her household*;" others, again, "*slaves*," as undoubtedly such genitives are sometimes to be explained by *δοῦλος* (Schæf. *ad Bos. Ell.* p. 117 f.); comp. Plat. *Phaed.* p. 60 A. *Chloe* herself is commonly held to be a *Corinthian* Christian, members of whose household had come to Ephesus. It seems, however, more in accordance with apostolic discretion to suppose (with Michaelis) that she was an *Ephesian* well known to the Corinthians, members of whose household had been in Corinth and returned thence.—The name (familiar as a surname of *Demeter*) occurs also elsewhere; Hor. *Od.* i. 23, iii. 9. 6; Long. *Past.* 7. We may add that Bengel remarks well on ἐδηλώθη (comp. Col. i. 8): "*exemplum delationis bonae nec sine causâ celandae.*" It was in fact the fulfilment of *a duty of love*.

Ver. 12. *Now what I mean* (by this ἐριδες ἐν ὑμῖν εἰσι) *is this* (which follows), *that*, etc. Regarding the explicative λέγω, common also in Greek writers, comp. Gal. iii. 17; Rom. xv. 8. Calvin and Beza understand it, making τοῦτο retrospective: *I say this, because*, etc. But, not to speak of the less suitable meaning thus attained, τοῦτο in all parallel passages points invariably forward (Gal. iii. 17; Eph. iv. 17; 1 Cor. vii. 29, xv. 50), except when, as in vii. 35, Col. ii. 4, a clause expressive of design follows.—ἐκαστος] *Each* of you speaks in one of the forms following. Comp. xiv. 26. Chrysostom says aptly: οὐ γὰρ μέρος, ἀλλὰ τὸ πᾶν ἐπενέμετο τῆς ἐκκλησίας ἡ φθορά. — *Nothing* is to be supplied with the genitive Παύλου κ.τ.λ., for εἶναί τινος means *to belong to any one, addictum esse*. See Seidl. *ad Eur. El.* 1098; Ast, *Lex. Plat.* I. p. 621; Winer, p. 184 [E. T. 243 f.]. — Κηφᾶ] The Jewish name (כִּפְּי) is so usual with Paul (iii. 22, ix. 5, xv. 5, and see the critical remarks on Gal. i. 18) that it is only in Gal. ii. 7, 8 that we find Πέτρος employed by him; hence the less may we regard Κηφᾶ here as taken directly from the lips of the Jewish Petrine party (Estius).—The order of the four names is *historical*, following that in which the parties successively arose.—For a connected review of them and the relative literature, see *Introd.* § 1. The following remarks may be added from the exegetical standpoint: (1) The Χριστοῦ and ver. 14 ff. invalidate at once the

theory held by the Fathers (Chrysostom, Theodoret, Oecumenius, Theophylact, and others, see Rübiger, *krit. Unters.* p. 9) and many of the older commentators, including Michaelis, and based principally on iv. 6, that the three first names were fictitious merely, and used in order to avoid bringing forward by name the real heads of the parties. (2) There can be no reduction of the number of the parties below *four*, although many attempts have been made to bring together not only the partisans of Paul and of Apollos (as having but a formal difference), but also the Petrine and the Christine parties (J. E. Chr. Schmidt, *Bibl. f. Krit. u. Exeg.* I. p. 91; Baur in the *Tüb. Zeitschr.* 1831, 4, p. 61 ff., and in his *Paulus*, I. p. 291 ff., ed. 2; also Billroth, Lechler, and others); or else—which, however, is merely a drawing of them together in form—to reduce the four to two main parties, the apostolic and the Christine (Neander, Jaeger, and Schenkel); or, lastly, by exegetical expedients (Rübiger), either to get rid of the Christ-party *altogether* (see below), or at least to take them out of the list of *parties* by assuming that they were approved of by the apostle (Schott, with older interpreters). Paul, in fact, sets forth quite uniformly *four* definite diversities of confession standing in contrast, and then shows in ver. 13 how sad and how preposterous this state of division was.—In the face of this manifest mode of reckoning and disposing of the parties by the apostle himself in this passage, several theories, respecting more particularly (3) *the Christ-party*, must be dismissed as untenable. Among these is (a) the view repeatedly brought forward from the days of Chrysostom: <sup>1</sup> “Mentionem eorum propterea fecit una cum illis, quod, cujusnam generis essent dissidia inter Cor. excitata, *perspicue explicare* non poterat, nisi ita, ut diceret, alios hunc, alios illum praeferre doctorem, aliis (recte quidem, 1 Cor. iii. 23) se Christi sectatores simpliciter appellantibus” (Schott, *Isag.* 233). With respect to this, it is to be observed that iii. 23 implies *not* the justification of those λέγοντες· ἐγὼ δὲ Χριστοῦ, but the truth of the *idea*,<sup>2</sup> from the abuse of which that fourth party arose which

<sup>1</sup> He, however, holds that Paul added “ἐγὼ δὲ Χριστοῦ” καὶ οἱ κοῖνῃ (i. e. ἀφ’ αὐτοῦ, as Theophylact has it), βουλόμενοι βαρύτερον τὸ ἡγκλῆμα ποιῆσαι καὶ διῆσαι οὕτω καὶ τὸν Χριστὸν εἰς μέρη δοθέντα ἔν, εἰ καὶ μὴ οὕτως ποιοῦν τούτο ἐκείνοι. Comp. also Theodoret, who lays stress on the special wisdom of this procedure.

<sup>2</sup> The rightness of the confession: ἐγὼ δὲ Χριστοῦ, considered in and by itself, explains also why Clement, 1 Cor. 47, mentions only the other three parties and

in the passage before us appears under a precisely similar condemnation to that of the other three. (b) The theory invented by Baur<sup>1</sup> in behalf of the antagonism between Paulinism and Petrinism (comp. also Lechler, p. 386): that the same party called themselves both τοὺς Κηφᾶ, because Peter had the primacy among the apostles of the Jews, and also τοὺς Χριστοῦ, because they held direct connection with Christ to be the main mark of true apostleship, and therefore counted Paul far behind the other apostles;<sup>2</sup> that the Christ-party, in fact, were the most thoroughgoing disciples of Peter (comp. Billroth and Credner, *Einl.* sec. 132; also Reuss, and especially Holsten, *z. Ev. d. Paul. u. Petr.* p. 25 f.). (c) The opinion of Becker, that the Christine party were Jewish-Christians, who had attached themselves to the followers of Peter that had come from a distance to Corinth, but, as having been converted by Paul and Apollos, had called themselves not after Peter, but after Christ. (d) Rübiger's view, according to which the Christ-party is purely a creation of the exegetes, ἐγὼ δὲ Χριστοῦ being *the utterance common to the three parties*; so that all, indeed, professed allegiance to Christ, but the strife between them consisted in this, "that they made participation in Christ dependent on different teachers, each holding that they, inasmuch as they belonged to a particular teacher, had the real and true Christ,—a better Christ than the others." This explanation, if we judge in accordance with the preceding elements in ver. 12, is an exegetical impossibility. It has been already well

not the Christ-party as well. He is speaking against the attachment to *human* party-leaders. He *might* indeed, in some way suitable to the connection of his exhortation, have brought in the Christine party (which he doubtless would have done, if they had been as bad as they have been made out to be of late), but there was no necessity for his doing so. Hence it is unwarrantable to infer (with Rübiger) the *non-existence* of a special Christine party from its *non-mention*. Origen also does *not* quote the ἐγὼ δὲ Χριστοῦ with the rest of the passage in one instance, although he does in another.

<sup>1</sup> See Beyschlag, p. 225 ff.—Hilgenfeld (see his *Zeitschr.* 1865, p. 241) calls Baur's dissertation of 1831, "the ancestral stronghold of our whole criticism." If so, it is a *ruin*, like so many other ancestral strongholds. It could not so much as stand firm against the simple words ἐγὼ δὲ Χριστοῦ, into which Baur put a meaning as if Paul had written: ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν ἀποστόλων Χριστοῦ. The confession ἐγὼ δὲ Χριστοῦ necessarily transcends *all* apostolic authority, and excludes it.

<sup>2</sup> Comp. Hilgenfeld, who holds that they were immediate disciples of Christ, who sought to establish the exclusive authority of the original apostles, denying to Paul the Χριστοῦ εἶναι. See also Hilgenfeld in his *Zeitschr.* 1864, p. 165 f.

said by Calovius: "Et illi, qui a Christo Christianos se dicebant, quatenus ab aliis sese per schisma separabant, illo nomine sibi solum appropriato, schismatis rei erant." Since they are ranked, just as the others, under the category of the *σχίσματα* and *ἔριδες* (vv. 10, 11), and their fault is set before them as before the others, ver. 13, by *μεμέρ. ὁ Χριστός*, we cannot even characterize them, with Eichhorn, as *neutrals*.—To name Christ as their Head was so extremely natural for a party who, as contrasted with the others, wished to keep themselves free from all authority of human teachers (see Introd. § 1; also Rückert, Bleek, *Einkl.*, Hofm. 16 f.), that there is no need whatever for any attempt at a different explanation; such as Eichhorn's imagination, that they rested upon the sayings of Jesus in the *Protevangelium*; or the view of Grotius, Witsius, Wetstein, and Ziegler, that they had heard Christ themselves,<sup>1</sup> or at least their founder had (if the former, how disproportionately small must their number needs have been! and if the latter, they would surely have named themselves after their founder, since Peter, too, was a personal disciple of Christ). Equally undeserving of acceptance is Storr's view (*Opusc.* II. p. 252 ff.), adopted by Rosenmüller, Krause, Hug, Heydenreich, and Flatt (comp. also Bertholdt, *Einkl.* VI. p. 3319), that they had called themselves *τοῦ Χριστοῦ*, as followers of James the brother of Christ. This is an empty conjecture, not to be supported by ix. 5, xv. 9; and it has, besides, especially this against it, that the followers of the venerated James would have had no ground, as distinguished from the other parties, for not calling themselves *οἱ τοῦ Ἰακώβου* or *οἱ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ τοῦ Κυρίου*, and that James also would have been mentioned with the rest in iii. 22, as well as in Clem. 1 Cor. 47, if the Christ-party had not referred themselves directly to Christ.—This claim, moreover, of a direct relation to Christ as regards His exclusive authority, found its sufficient ground and justification in the general acquaintance with the doctrine and work of Christ, which was owing to the living presence of the gospel tidings in the churches. There is no evidence in the Epistles themselves of

<sup>1</sup> This view is taken up again by Thiersch, *d. Kirche im apost. Zeitalter*, p. 143 ff. He regards the Christ-party as *personal disciples of Christ*, who had come to Corinth from Jerusalem and probably also from Rome, with Pharisaic views, proud of their Hebrew descent and of their having known Christ in the flesh, disputing the apostleship of Paul, etc.

any other and *peculiar* connection with the Lord being laid claim to by the Christ-party. This holds especially of *Schenkel's* view, that the Christ-party, consisting of Jewish-Christians from Asia Minor with theosophic training, had asserted a supernatural connection with Christ through *visions and revelations*, their spiritual condition consequently having its analogues at a later date in Cerinthus, Marcion, the Montanists, and the like; and that this party had its continuation in those who opposed the presbyters in Clement's Epistle. Schenkel's theory (defended also by Grimm in the *Lit. Bl. zur allg. Kirchenzeit.* 1851, No. 82) bases itself especially on the passages ix. 1; 2 Cor. x. 7, xii. 1. To explain these, however, there is no need to suppose any allusion to *theosophic* opponents, or any reference to the Christ-party at all, since Paul—more especially if they had been a party standing in such (fanatical) antagonism *in point of principle* to himself—would have combated them directly and in detail, and that in the section of the Epistle which deals expressly with the party-divisions (down to iv. 21).<sup>1</sup> And to connect them with the opponents of the presbyters in Clement is all the more arbitrary, because that writer, while finding a parallel to the factions which he blames in the parties of Paul, Apollos, and Peter, makes no reference whatsoever to the Christ-party,—a silence which is eloquent enough to make us hesitate in ascribing to them any such extreme and dangerous character as some have lately imputed to them, and to incline us rather to the view of their fundamental principle being one in itself sound, but perverted in its application by party-spirit. In addition to de Wette, Lutterbeck, and Maier, Goldhorn and Dähne agree in substance with Schenkel, seeking amidst differences in detail to prove the existence of Jewish-Alexandrian philosophy in the Christ-party; just as Kniewel (comp. Grimm) regards them as forerunners of the Gnostics. According to Ewald, they are the adherents of some unknown teacher of *Essene* views, who, “founding, doubtless, on some special evangelic writing, and in accordance therewith exalting the example of Christ personally above all else, disapproved of marriage;” they were, *in truth, the first Christian monks and*

<sup>1</sup> The force of this argument is doubtless evaded by the assumption, that the leaders of the party had probably not developed their hurtful influence until after the arrival in Corinth of our first Epistle. But this is simply an unwarranted evasion.

*Jesuits*.<sup>1</sup> But it is very doubtful whether the rejection of marriage in chap. vii. should be traced precisely to the *Christ-party*; and, apart from this, there is not in the Epistles to the Corinthians a single vestige of the phenomena of *Essene* Christianity, or in particular of *Essene* asceticism, as at Rome and Colossae; while, on the other hand, the rejection of marriage does not appear among the Romans and Colossians who held *Essene* views. Comp. on vii. 1.—Lastly, after this examination of the different views entertained regarding the *Christ-party*, the question *whether they were Jewish* (as commonly held) *or Gentile Christians* answers itself to this effect, that *they were composed of both elements*, as also were the adherents of Paul and of Apollos. For we have not the slightest ground for assuming that, when the division in the church arose upon matters turning on the respect due to individual men, it was either Jewish Christians *alone*, or Gentile Christians *alone*, who gave themselves to the idea of renouncing the acknowledgment of any human teacher, and seeking instead to be *τοῦ Χριστοῦ*. This holds good in particular against Neander, who makes the *Christ-party* to be Gentile Christians, of a certain philosophic culture and of rationalistic tendency, to whom Christ appeared as a second, perhaps greater, Socrates, but who could not bring themselves to accept the doctrine of Christ in the form given to it by the apostles, and sought rather by philosophic criticism, which they exercised also on the doctrine of the resurrection (chap. xv.), to separate, possibly with the help of a collection of the sayings of the Lord, the pure teaching of Christ from the mass of received material. In how totally different a way must Paul have come forward against any such syncretistic rationalism! See, besides, in reply to this, Beyschlag, p. 220 ff. Altogether, there were but few men of philosophic training who had come over to Christianity at Corinth (ver. 26); and those who had at least a philosophic tendency found the food for which they sought with Apollos. And it is a groundless assumption to maintain that what Paul says against worldly wisdom (chap. i. 2)

<sup>1</sup> According to Ewald's *Gesch. d. apost. Zeit.* p. 506 f., ed. 3, they readily allowed themselves to be carried away by the zeal for the law of their Pharisaic brethren, and became a support for their position. Those of the *Christ-party* with Pharisaic tendencies were joined, too, by some who boasted that they had once known Christ Himself familiarly, nay, that they had seen Him when risen from the dead, so that they laid claim to apostolic estimation.



is spoken with a polemic reference to the Christ-party (this in opposition to Schenkel, Jaeger, Goldhorn, Dähne, Kniewel, and others); see, on the contrary, chap. iii. and iv. 6. In like manner, too, it is arbitrary, and in any case unsafe to proceed, from the point at which Paul passes from discussing the state of division in the church to speak of other existing evils (from chap. v. onwards), to apportion the latter among the several parties, and by this method, as well as by means of expressions and details from the second Epistle, to depict the character more especially of the Christ-party, whom Jaeger<sup>1</sup> makes in this manner to appear in the most damaging light, while Osiander<sup>2</sup> treats them prejudicially in another way, finding in them the originators of sectarian Ebionitism. Beyschlag, too, in his investigation, proceeds by the same uncertain path, putting together the characteristics of the Christ-party especially from the second Epistle. According to him they were Judaists, although free from Judaistic errors in doctrine, who depreciated the apostle Paul, but prided themselves on their Hebrew origin, their labours and sufferings for Christ, their more precise historical acquaintance with and information regarding Christ, whom they had known personally, as also on their visions and revelations of Him. In connection with this view, Beyschlag is forced to assume that it was only in the interval between the first and second Epistle that the Christ-party had developed such keen and personal antagonism to the apostle,—an assumption made also by Hilgenfeld. If, notwithstanding this development of hostility, they are to be taken as Judaists *free from Judaistic anti-Pauline doctrine*, we stand confronted by a complete anomaly in the history of the antagonism between the Judaistic and the Pauline currents in the apostolic church, so far as that is known to us from other quarters. And it seems the less possible to explain this anomaly by the supposition of a cunning reticence on the part of the per-

<sup>1</sup> He depicts them as wealthy Jewish Christians, familiar with Greek science, who professed attachment to the spirit of Christianity alone, but concealed under this mask lawlessness and immorality, and were deniers of the resurrection.

<sup>2</sup> Originating, according to him, from the Petrine party, they had, while holding fast to the idea of Christ being the Supreme teacher, fallen into a one-sided way of considering only His appearance as a man on earth, and more especially His teaching, and of allowing the theocratic aspect of the Lord's life and work to pass more out of sight.

sons in question, the more we see how bitter and passionate their opposition to Paul must have been, and the more we find it difficult—considering their cunning—to perceive why they should not have contented themselves with making common cause with the *Petrine* party, instead of forming a distinct faction of their own.

Ver. 13. *Μεμέρισται ὁ Χριστός*] affirmative (with Lachmann and Kniewel; so *τινές* as early as Theodoret), not interrogatory (as commonly taken), setting forth *the tragical result of the afore-said state of party-division*, ver. 12, and that with arresting emphasis from the absence of any connective particle: *Christ is divided!* i.e. in place of being whole and undivided, the One common Christ of all, He is *broken up into different party-Christis!* Such, that is to say, is the actual appearance of things when, of several parties mutually exclusive of one another, each seems to have its own separate Christ.<sup>1</sup> The reproach here conveyed suits the Christ-party also (against Rübiger), just as forming a *party*, but not them *alone* (Hofmann). The *interrogatory* rendering, common since Chrysostom: *Is Christ divided?* taken as a question of surprise, has nothing against it linguistically (see esp. Valckenaer, II. p. 71 f.), but it is liable to the objection that it is only with the following *μή* that the text gives us to recognise the beginning of the interrogative address. Had Paul intended *μεμέρ. ὁ Χ.* as a question, it would have been most natural for him in the flow of his discourse to carry on the same form of interrogation, and say: *ἢ Παῦλος ἐστ. ὑπ. ὑμ.* The text, I may add, gives no warrant for interpreting *Χριστός* of the *corpus Chr. mysticum*, i.e. *the church* (Estius, Olshausen, and others; *τινές* in Theodoret), or even of the *doctrina Chr.*, which is not *varia et multiplex* (Grotius, Mosheim, Semler, Morus, Rosenmüller). — *μή Παῦλος κ.τ.λ.*] *Paul surely was not*, etc. From this point on to ver. 16 the *incongruous nature of the first party-confession of faith* is specially exposed. Bengel aptly remarks: “*Crux et baptismus nos Christo asserit; relata: redimere, se addicere.*” The two questions correspond to the mutual connection between *believing* and *being baptized*. — *ὑπέρ*] *on behalf*

<sup>1</sup> The conception is not that Christ is *broken up into parts or fragments*, so that the one party should possess *this*, the other *that*, part (see Baur, de Wette, Rückert, Calvin, etc., with Chrysostom and Theophylact); for each party gave itself out as the possessor of the whole Christ, not simply of a part, He standing to it in the relation of its Lord and Head. To this conception corresponds, too, the *ἐγὼ δὲ Χριστοῦ*, instead of which it would not have been necessary that it should run, *ἐμοῦ ὁ Χριστός*, as Hofmann objects.

of, in the sense of atonement.<sup>1</sup> Comp. on Gal. i. 4; Eph. v. 2. — *εἰς τὸ ὄνομα*] in reference to the name, as the name of him who is to be henceforth the object of the faith and confession of the individual baptized. Comp. on Matt. xxviii. 19 and Rom. vi. 3. — There was no need of a single word more regarding the *first* of these two questions; the answer to it was so self-evident. But as to the *second*, the apostle has some remarks to make, vv. 14–16.

Vv. 14, 15. God be thanked, that I baptized only a very few among you! Accordingly no room has been left for the reproach being brought against me, as it might otherwise have been, that I had baptized into *my own name*! “*Providentia divina regnat saepe in rebus, quarum ratio postea cognoscitur*” (Bengel). Rückert finds fault with the *weakness* of this proof, since it was surely the same thing whether Paul had baptized personally or through his assistants. But unjustly. For, since Paul was not generally in the habit of baptizing in person, had he himself baptized many in Corinth, this might undoubtedly have been made use of afterwards by perverse minds for the possible slander that there was a specialty in the case, that he had baptized with his own hand in Corinth, because he did it into *his own name*,—a purpose for which, of course, he could not have employed others. Hofmann suggests wrongly: they might have interpreted it, as though he had wished to place the persons concerned “*in a peculiar relation*” to himself. This imported indefiniteness is against the definite sense of the words. Just as he had said before, that it was not *he* who had been crucified for them in place of *Christ*, so he says further, that they had not been baptized into *his name* instead of the name of *Christ*. But the two points just show how wholly *absurd* the confession *ἐγὼ μὲν εἰμι Παύλου* is, because it would have such absurd *premises*. — *Κρίσπου*] See Acts xviii. 8. — *Γάϊου*] See on Rom. xvi. 23. — *ἵνα μὴ*] is never elsewhere, and is not here, to be taken as: *so that not*, but it denotes the *design*, arranged in the divine providential leading, of the *οὐδένα ὑμ. ἐβάπτισα* (comp. ver. 17; 2 Cor. i. 9, *al.*).

<sup>1</sup> Lachm. reads *περὶ ὑμῶν*, instead of *ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν*, following only B D\* ; too weakly attested, and deserving of rejection also on this ground, that Paul always uses *ὑπὲρ* (even in 1 Thess. v. 10) where the death of Christ is placed in relation to *persons, for whom* He died. Comp. on xv. 3, which is the only certain passage in Paul's writings where *ὑπὲρ* occurs with an abstract term. See also Wieseler on Gal. i. 4.

Ver. 16. Another Corinthian family baptized by him occurs to his mind. He adds it conscientiously, and then cuts off any possibility of his being reproached with untruthful omission by *λοιπὸν οὐκ οἶδα κ.τ.λ.* Regarding Stephanas, we know nothing save from xvi. 15, 17.—*Λοιπὸν* is the simple *ceterum, otherwise, besides that*. Comp. 2 Cor. xiii. 11; 1 Thess. iv. 1; frequent in Greek writers also after Polybius.

Vv. 17–31. *Paul justifies the simplicity of his way of teaching by the contents of the gospel.* This, like all that follows on to iv. 21, is directed primarily against the pride of wisdom displayed by the party which certainly threatened most danger in the circumstances of the Corinthian church,—the party, namely, of *Apollōs* (not that of Christ); see iii. 4, iv. 6. As to the Petrine and the Christine-party, there is no special entering into details; it is only in passing that the judgment is extended so as to include them also (see iii. 22).<sup>1</sup>

Ver. 17. Rapid and skilful *transition* (comp. Rom. i. 16) *to this* (*οὐ γὰρ . . . εὐαγγ.*),<sup>1</sup> and *theme of the section* (*οὐκ ἐν σοφίᾳ . . . Χριστοῦ*). — *οὐ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.*] In the assured consciousness that the design of his apostolic mission was *teaching*, Paul recognised that *baptizing*, as an external office and one that required no special gift, should as a rule be left to others, the apostolic *ὑπηρεταί* (Acts xiii. 5), in order to avoid, for his own part, being drawn away from following out that higher aim, which was his specific calling. A very needful and salutary division of duties, considering the multitude of those converted by him! Peter, too, acted in the same way (Acts x. 48), and perhaps all the apostles. Nor was this contrary to Christ's command in Matt. xxviii. 19, seeing that, according to it also (comp. Luke xxiv. 47; Mark xvi. 15), teaching was the main business of the apostolic office, while the baptismal command was equally fulfilled by baptism performed by means of others authorized by the apostles.<sup>2</sup> — *οὐ . . . ἀλλ'*] is not here,

<sup>1</sup> Suggested naturally by what had been said in vv. 14, 16, and without any ironical side-glance at those who had prided themselves on their *baptizers* (Calovius); in particular, not levelled at boastings on this ground on the part of Jewish-Christians who had been baptized by Peter (Hofmann); nor yet against *teachers* “*qui praetextu ceremoniae gloriolam venantur*” (Calvin and Osiander). Such polemical references are dragged in without warrant in the text.

<sup>2</sup> According to Ritschl, *altkath. Kirche*, p. 369, baptism was performed on the others by those three, who themselves had been first baptized by Paul, and who

any more than elsewhere, to be taken as equivalent to *non tam . . . quam* (Beza, Piscator, Grotius, Estius, Storr, Rosenmüller, Flatt, Pott, and others; comp. also Fritzsche, *ad Marc.* p. 785), but *absolutely* (see Winer, p. 461 ff. [E. T. 621 ff.]; Klotz, *ad Devar.* p. 9 f.); and the absoluteness of the negation is not at all to be set down to the account of the strong rhetorical colouring (Rückert, comp. Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 306 [E. T. 356]). *To baptize* was really *not the purpose* for which Christ sent Paul, but *to preach* (Acts ix. 15, 20, xxii. 15, xxvi. 16–18); in saying which it is not implied that he was not authorized to administer baptism (εἰς μὲν γὰρ τὸ μέιζον ἀπεστάλη, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ καὶ τὸ ἐλαττον ἐνεργεῖν οὐκ ἐκωλύθη, Theophylact), but sent *in order to baptize* he was not. Comp. Chrysostom, Theodoret, and Theophylact.—οὐκ ἐν σοφίᾳ λόγου] does not belong to ἀπέστ. (Storr, Flatt), which would be an involved construction, but links itself closely to εὐαγγελίζεσθαι, as telling in what element that does not take place. The negation is *objective*, attaching to the object (Kühner, II. § 714. 1; Baumelein, *Partik.* p. 257 ff.), negating actually the ἐν σοφίᾳ; hence not μή. That σοφία λόγου is not the same as λόγος σόφος, λ. σεσοφισμένος (Erasmus, Grotius, and many others, including Flatt and Pott), but emphasizes σοφία as the main conception, may be seen in Winer, p. 221 f. [E. T. 296 f.] : *to preach without wisdom of speech*, without the discourse having a philosophic character,—as desired by the Hellenic taste. We are not to apply this, however, to the philosophic *contents* of the teaching (Storr, Rosenmüller, Flatt, and others), but to the *form*, which consists in the clothing of the doctrine in philosophic garb, in speculative skill, argumentative reasoning, illustration, elaboration of the matter, and the like, together with the effect which this, from the nature of the case, may have upon the doctrine itself. For it followed as a matter of course from Paul's being sent *by Christ*, that he was not to preach a *doctrine* of this world's wisdom (as did Plato, Aristotle, the Sophists, etc.); what he had to do was to deliver the substance of the εὐαγγελίζεσθαι—which is in truth *given* for all cases alike—without casting it in any philo-

had become overseers. Against this view it may be at once urged, that if he had regarded the baptism of those three in *that* light, Stephanas would not have occurred to him only by way of *afterthought*. Besides, there must have been baptized converts there before a presbytery could be erected. Comp. Acts xiv. 23.

sophic mould; his *speech* was not to be ἐν σοφίᾳ, lest its *substance* should lose its essential character. This *substance* was the crucified Christ, about whom he had to preach, not in the style and mode of presentation used by the wisdom of this world,—not in such a way that his preaching would have been the setting forth of a Christian philosophy of religion. Even the *dialectic* element in Paul's discourses widely differs from anything of this sort. — ἵνα μὴ κενωθῇ κ.τ.λ.] aim of the εὐαγγ. οὐκ ἐν σοφ. λ.: in order that the cross of Christ might not be emptied (comp. Rom. iv. 14) of its essence divinely effectual for salvation (Rom. i. 16). The cross of Christ—that Christ was crucified (and thereby won salvation for us),—this fact alone was the pure main substance (“nucleus et medulla,” Calovius) of the apostolic preaching, and as such has the essential quality of proving itself in all believers the saving power of God, and of thereby, in the way of inward living experience, bringing to nought all human wisdom (vv. 18, 19 ff.). Now, had the cross of Christ been preached ἐν σοφίᾳ λόγου, it would have been emptied of its divine and essential power to bless, since it would then have made common cause with man's wisdom, and therefore, instead of overthrowing the latter, would have exalted it and made it come, totally alien in nature as it was, in place of itself. Bengel says well: “Sermo autem crucis nil heterogeneum admittit.” — With marked emphasis, ὁ σταυρὸς τοῦ Χριστοῦ is put last.

Ver. 18. Establishment of the foregoing ἵνα μὴ . . . Χριστοῦ. Were, namely, the doctrine of the cross, although folly to the unbelieving, not a power of God to believers, it would be impossible to speak of a ἵνα μὴ κενωθῇ of its substance, the cross of Christ, as the aim of the εὐαγγ. οὐκ ἐν σ. λ. — The ἐστί with the dative expresses the *actual* relation in which the λόγος stands to both; it is for them *in fact* (not, as might be thought, simply in their judgment) the one and the other. — τοῖς ἀπολλυμ.] to those who are incurring (eternal) ἀπώλεια. Comp. 2 Cor. ii. 15, iv. 3; 2 Thess. ii. 10. The *present* participle<sup>1</sup> betokens either the *certainty* of the future destruction (Bernhardy, p. 371), or it brings the being lost before us as a development which is

<sup>1</sup> Bengel's ingenious exposition: “qui evangelium audire coepit, nec ut perditus nec ut salvus habetur, sed est quasi in *bivio*, et nunc aut perit aut salvatur,” is wrecked on the word ἡμῶν, which the *audire coepit* does not suit.

already taking place in them ; just as τοῖς σωζομ., *those who are being saved unto Messianic bliss*. From xv. 2, Rom. v. 9, 10, viii. 24, *al.*, also Eph. ii. 5–8, the former mode of conceiving it seems to be the correct one ; comp. ii. 6. Paul designates in this way the believers and unbelievers, ἀπὸ τοῦ τέλους τὰς προσηγορίας τιθεῖς, Theodoret. He has certainly (Rückert) conceived of both classes as *predestinated* (ver. 24 ; Rom. viii. 29, ix. 11, 19, 22 f. ; Eph. i. 4 f. ; 2 Thess. ii. 13, *al.*) ; but this point remains here out of view. — μωρία] This doctrine is to them (to their conscious experience) *an absurdity* (μωρία τε καὶ ἀλογία, Plat. *Epin.* p. 983 E ; Dem. 397, pen.). Why ? see ver. 22. Comp. 2 Cor. iv. 3. Billroth's answer is un-Pauline. — ἡμῶν] is not put last out of modesty (Billroth), but because the emphasis of the contrast lies on the idea of τοῖς σωζομ. Comp. Eur. *Phoeniss.* 1738. Pors. : ἐλαύνειν τὸν γέροντα μ' ἐκ πάτρας. — δύναμις Θεοῦ] Comp. on Rom. i. 16. That doctrine is to them (to their conscious experience) *God's power*, inasmuch, that is to say, as God works mightily in them through the saving tidings of the Crucified. The *contrast* is stronger than if it were σοφία Θεοῦ, and is also logically correct ; for δύναμις Θεοῦ necessarily presupposes the opposite of μωρία, because the power of God brings about enlightenment, repentance, sanctification, love, peace, hope, etc. Comp. Ignat. *ad Eph.* 18, where it is said of the cross, that it is to us σωτηρία κ. ζωὴ αἰώνιος.

Ver. 19. Establishment from Scripture of the foregoing τοῖς δὲ σωζομ. κ.τ.λ. : for were the word of the cross not *God's power* for the σωζόμενοι, God could not say of it in the Scriptures : " I will destroy," etc.—In the passage, Isa. xxix. 14 (a free quotation from the LXX., the difference between which and the original Hebrew is unessential), Paul, in accordance with the typical significance attendant on the historical sense,<sup>1</sup> recognises a prediction of the powerful working of the doctrine of the cross as that through which God would bring to nought and do away with the wisdom of man, *i.e.* empty it of its estimation. The justification of this

<sup>1</sup> According to which the reference is not generally to the final catastrophe of the present state of things in Israel before the dawn of the Messianic period (Hofmann), but, as the context shows, to the *penal judgments under Sennacherib*, in which the wisdom of the rulers and false prophets of Israel was to be confounded and left helpless.

way of viewing it lay in the *Messianic character* of O. T. prophecy in general, by virtue of which the historical sense does not exhaust the design of the utterances, but leaves open higher references to the further development of the theocratic relations, and especially to the Messianic era, which references are to manifest themselves *historically* by the corresponding facts of later date, and so be recognised from the standpoint of their historical fulfilment. See more in detail, on Matt. i. 22 f. Christ Himself confirms the Messianic reference of the prophetic utterance, Matt. xv. 8.—Regarding the distinction between σοφία and σύνεσις (*intelligence*), see on Col. i. 9.

Ver. 20. What this passage of Scripture promises, has occurred : *Where is a wise man*, etc. The force of these triumphant questions (comp. xv. 55, and see on Rom. iii. 27) is : *clean gone are all sages, scribes, and disputers of this world-period* (they can no more hold their ground, no longer assert themselves, have, as it were, vanished); *God has made the world's wisdom to be manifest folly!* As the passages, Isa. xix. 12, xxxiii. 18, were perhaps before the apostle's mind, the form of expression used rests probably on them. Comp. Rom. iii. 27, where ἐξεκλείσθη is the answer to the ποῦ; according to classical usage, Valckenaer, *ad Eur. Phoen.* 1662. Ewald holds ver. 20 to be a citation from a lost book; but we are not necessarily shut up to this conclusion by the γραμματεῖς, although the term does not occur elsewhere in Paul's writings, for this exclamation might easily have been suggested to him by the γραμματικοί of Isa. xxxiii. 18. *The three substantives* cannot well be taken as alluding to the synagogal phrases חכם ספר and רבן (Lightfoot, Vitringa), since Paul was not writing to a purely Jewish-Christian community. Attempts to explain the distinction between them have been made in a variety of ways. But it is to be noted that in what immediately follows τὴν σοφίαν represents all the three ideas put together; that γραμματεῖς, again, is always (excepting Acts xix. 35) used in the N. T. (even in Matt. xiii. 52, xxiii. 34, where the idea is only raised to the Christian sphere) of scribes in the Jewish sense; that the συζητήτης (Ignat. *ad Eph.* 18), which is not found in the Greek writers or in the LXX., is most surely interpreted *disputant*, in accordance with the use of συζητέω (Mark viii. 11, ix. 14; Luke xxiv. 15; Acts vi. 9, ix. 29, *al.*) and συζήτησις



(Acts xv. 2, 7, xxviii. 29); and further, that disputing was especially in vogue among the Sophists (οἱ οἰόμενοι πάντ' εἰδέναι, Xen. Mem. i. 4. 1). And on these grounds we conclude that σοφός is to be taken of human wisdom in general, as then pursued on the Jewish side by the scribes, and on the Hellenic side by the sophistical disputers, so that, in this view, γραμμ. and συζητ. are subordinated to the general σοφός in respect to matters of Jewish and Hellenic pursuit. Many exegetes (Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Oecumenius, and others, including Storr, Rosenmüller, Flatt, Billroth) depart from the view now stated in this respect, that they would limit σοφός to the *heathen* philosophers,<sup>1</sup> which, however, is precluded by the σοφίαν embracing all the three elements (comp. also ver. 21). This holds at the same time against Rückert, who finds here only the three most outstanding features in the intellectual character of the Hellenes: cleverness, erudition, and argumentativeness. But ver. 22 shows that Paul is not shutting out the Jewish element; just as his Jewish-Christian readers could see in γραμμ. nothing else than a name for the σοφοί of *their* people. Schrader, with older expositors (see below), understands by συζητ. an *inquirer*, and in a perfectly arbitrary way makes it refer partly to the pupils of the great training-schools of Alexandria, Athens, Jerusalem, etc.; partly to the disciples of the apostles and of Jesus Himself. But συζητ. could only denote a *fellow-inquirer* (comp. συζητεῖν in Plat. Men. p. 90 B, Crat. p. 384 C; Diog. L. ii. 22), which would be without pertinence here; while, on the other hand, according to our view, the σύν finds its reference in the notion of *disputare*. — τοῦ αἰῶν. τούτου] attaches to all the three subjects: *who* belong to the *pre-Messianic period of the world* ("quod totum est extra sphaeram verbi crucis," Bengel), and are not, like the Christians, set apart by God from the *νῆς τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου* to be members of the Messianic kingdom, in virtue whereof they already, ideally considered, belong to the coming αἰών. Comp. ver. 27; Gal. i. 4; Col. i. 13; Phil. iii. 20; Rom. xii. 2. Luther and many others take τοῦ αἰῶν. τ. as referring simply to συζητ.; but wrongly, for it gives an *essential* characteristic of the first two subjects as well. Of those who think thus, some keep the true

<sup>1</sup> In consequence of this, συζητητής has been regarded as comprising the Jewish and heathen dialecticians. See especially Theodoret.

meaning of αἰὼν οὗτος (as Rückert and Billroth); others render: *indagator rerum naturae*, physical philosopher (Erasmus, Beza, Drusius, Cornelius a Lapide, Justiniani, Grotius, Clericus, and Valckenaer), which is quite contrary to the invariable sense of αἰὼν οὗτ. — ἐμώρπεν] emphatically put first: *made foolish*, i.e. from the context, not: He has made it into *incapacity of knowledge* (Hofmann), which would come in the end to the notion of *callousness*, but: He has *shown it practically to be folly*, “*insaniens sapientia*” (Hor. *Od.* i. 34. 2), σοφία ἄσοφος (Clem. *Protr.* V. p. 56 A), by bringing about, namely, the salvation of believers just through that which to the wise men of this world seemed foolishness, the preaching of the cross. See ver. 21. The more foolish, therefore, this preaching is in their eyes and according to their judgment, the more they themselves are exhibited as fools (as μωρόσοφοι, Lucian, *Alex.* 40), and put to shame (ver. 27), since the κήρυγμα, held by them to be *foolish*, is that which *brings salvation*, not indeed to them, but to those who *believe*; ποία γὰρ σοφία, ὅταν τὸ κεφάλαιον τῶν ἀγαθῶν μὴ εὕρισκῃ; Chrysostom. Comp. Isa. xlv. 25, where μωραίνων is to be taken in precisely the same way as here. — τοῦ κόσμου] i.e. of profane non-Christian humanity, the two halves of which are the Jews and the heathen, vv. 22–24.

Ver. 21. More detailed explanation as to this ἐμώρπεν ὁ Θεὸς κ.τ.λ., specifying the *why* in the protasis and the *how* in the apodosis: *since* (see Hartung, *Partikell.* II. p. 259), *that is to say*, *in the wisdom of God the world knew not God through wisdom, it pleased God to save believers through the foolishness of preaching*. The wisdom of God was set before the eyes of the world, even of the heathen part of it, in the works of creation (Rom. i. 19 f.; comp. also Acts xvii. 26 f., xiv. 15 ff.); to the Jews it was presented, besides, in the revelation of the O. T. In this His manifested wisdom God might and should have been known by men; but they did not know Him therein (ἐν τῇ σοφ. τ. Θεοῦ οὐκ ἔγνω ὁ κόσμ. τ. Θεόν), —did not attain by the means which they employed, by their wisdom, namely (διὰ τῆς σοφίας), to this knowledge; whereupon God adopted the plan of saving (in the Messianic sense) believers through the opposite of wisdom, namely, through the foolishness of the gospel. — ἐν τῇ σοφίᾳ τ. Θεοῦ] is put first emphatically, because the whole *stress* of the antithesis in both protasis and

apodosis is meant to fall on the notions of *wisdom* and *folly*. By *ἐν* Paul marks out the *sphere*, in which the negative fact of the *οὐκ ἔγνω* ("in media luce," Calvin) took place; τοῦ Θεοῦ again is genitive *subjecti*, denoting, however, not the wisdom shown by God in Christ (Zachariae, Heydenreich, and Maier), nor Christ Himself even (Schrader and older expositors adduced by Estius), both of which would be quite unsuitable to the apodosis, but the wisdom of God manifested *before* Christianity in nature and Scripture.<sup>1</sup> Rückert is wrong in holding that ἐν τ. σοφ. τ. Θεοῦ is: "*in virtue of the wisdom of God, i.e. under its guidance and arrangement, the world knew not God through its own wisdom.*" Certainly Paul would not be made by this interpretation to say anything which would in itself be at variance with his view of the divine relationship to the matter; for with him the two factors of human action, the divine causality and the human self-determination, are so associated, that he may bring now the one and now the other into the foreground (comp. on Rom. ix.); but against it may be urged, partly the position of the words ἐν . . . Θεοῦ, which on Rückert's view would lose their weight and convey a thought here unessential, and partly the significant relation between the protasis and apodosis, according to which the measure taken by God (εὐδόκησεν κ.τ.λ.) appears as called forth by *men's* lack of knowledge, and hence the οὐκ ἔγνω would in such a passage be most unsuitably referred to the appointment of God, so as to excuse what is declared in Rom. i. 20 to be inexcusable. — οὐκ ἔγνω] Seeing that the Jews also are included, and that anything which would contradict Rom. i. 19–21 is out of the question, this must apply to the *true* knowledge of God, which was not attained, and which, if the κόσμος had reached it, would have caused the preaching of the cross to appear other than foolishness; comp. ii. 14. — διὰ τῆς σοφ.] applies to the heathen *world-wisdom* and the Jewish *school-wisdom*, since it is the *means* of knowledge employed without result (observe that by the οὐκ the *whole* from ἔγνω to Θεόν inclusive is negated) by the κόσμος for the knowing God. The *prepositional relation* cannot differ from that of the correlative

<sup>1</sup> Not simply in the *natural* revelation (Chrysostom, Calvin, Grotius, Estius, and many others, including Hofmann). For ver. 22 proves that the Jews, too, are included with the rest in the notion of the κόσμος.

διὰ τ. μωρίας which follows. Hence Theophylact interprets wrongly: διὰ τῆς ἐν εὐγλωττία θεωρουμένης σοφίας ἐμποδιζόμενοι. So, too, Billroth: "their own wisdom was the cause of their not knowing." — εὐδόκησεν ὁ Θεός.] *placuit Deo*, He pleased, it was His will, as Rom. xv. 26; Gal. i. 15; Col. i. 19; 1 Thess. ii. 8. See Fritzsche, *ad Rom.* II. p. 370. — διὰ τῆς μωρίας τοῦ κηρύγμ., i.e. *by means of the foolishness which formed the substance of the preaching* (of the gospel). That is the doctrine of the cross, ver. 18, which, as compared with the wisdom employed by the κόσμος as a means of knowledge, is a foolish doctrine, but in the counsel and work of God the means of salvation, namely, for the πιστεύοντας, which word, as solving the riddle of the divinely applied μωρία, stands emphatically at the end. For to the conscious experience of believers that resultless wisdom of the world is now foolishness, and the foolishness of the κήρυγμα the divine saving wisdom. — Notice, in conclusion, how the whole verse is a compact and stately co-ordination and dovetailing of correlative clauses. Remark, in particular, the repetition of σοφία and Θεός, "quasi aliquod telum saepius perveniat in eandem partem corporis," *Auct. ad Herenn.* iv. 28.

Ver. 22 f.<sup>1</sup> Protasis (ἐπειδή) and apodosis (ἡμεῖς δέ) parallel to the protasis and apodosis in ver. 21: *since as well Jews desire a sign as Hellenes seek after wisdom, we, on the other hand, preach*, etc. It is to be observed how exactly the several members of the sentence correspond to what was said in ver. 21; for Ἰουδαῖοι κ. Ἕλληνες is just the notion of the κόσμος broken up; σημεῖα αἰτοῦσι and σοφίαν ζητ. is the practical manifestation of the οὐκ ἔγνω . . . τὸν Θεόν; and lastly, ἡμεῖς δὲ κηρύσσομεν κ.τ.λ. contains the actual way in which the εὐδόκησεν ὁ Θεός κ.τ.λ. was carried into effect. And to this carrying into effect belongs in substance Ἰουδαίοις μὲν σκάνδαλον κ.τ.λ. down to σοφίαν, ver. 24,—a consideration which disposes of the logical difficulty raised by Hofmann as to the causal relation of protasis and apodosis. — The correlation καὶ . . . καί includes not only the two subjects Ἰουδαῖοι and Ἕλληνες, but the two whole affirmations; as well the one thing, that the Jews demand a sign, as the other, that the Gentiles

<sup>1</sup> Ver. 22 f. is the programme of the history of the development of Christianity in its conflict with the perverse fundamental tendencies of the world's sensualism and spiritualism; ver. 24, the programme of its triumph over both.

desire philosophy, takes place. — ἡμεῖς δέ] This δέ, *on the contrary, on the other hand*, is the common classical δέ of the apodosis (Acts xi. 17), which sets it in an antithetic relation corresponding to the protasis. See Hartung, *Partikell.* I. p. 184 f.; Baumlein, *Partik.* p. 92 f.; Bornem. *Act. ap.* I. p. 77. Examples of this usage after ἐπεί and ἐπειδή may be seen in Klotz, *ad Devar.* p. 371 f. The parallel relation, which the eye at once detects, between ver. 21 and ver. 22 (and in which a rhetorical emphasis is given by the repetition of the ἐπειδή used by Paul only in xiv. 16, xv. 21; Phil. ii. 26, besides this passage), is opposed not merely to Billroth and Maier's interpretation, which makes ἐπειδή . . . ζητοῦσιν introduce a second protasis after εὐδόκ. ὁ Θεός, but also to Hofmann's, that vv. 22–24 are meant to explain the emphasis laid on τοὺς πιστεύοντας; as likewise to the view of Rückert and de Wette, that there is here added an explanation of the διὰ τῆς μωρίας κ.τ.λ., in connection with which Rückert arbitrarily imagines a μέν supplied after Ἰουδαῖοι. — Ἰουδαῖοι and Ἕλληνες without the article, since the statement is regarding what *such as are Jews*, etc., are wont, as a rule, to desire. — σημεῖα] Their desire is, that He on whom they are to believe should manifest Himself by *miraculous signs*, which would demonstrate His Messiahship (Matt. xvi. 4). They demand these, therefore, as a *ground of faith*; comp. John iv. 48. That we are not to understand here miracles *of the apostles* (Chrysostom, Theodoret, Oecumenius, Theophylact, Bengel, and others) is clear, both from the nature of the antithesis, and from the consideration that, in point of fact, the apostles did actually perform σημεῖα (Rom. xv. 18 f.; 2 Cor. xii. 12). What the Jews desired in place of these were miraculous signs by which the *crucified*, but, according to the apostles' teaching, *risen and exalted*, Jesus, should evince His being the Messiah, seeing that the miracles of His earthly life had for them lost all probative power through His crucifixion (Matt. xxvii. 41 f., 63 f.). Comp. Reiche, *Comment. crit.* I. p. 123 f: To take, with Hofmann, the σημεῖα αὐτ. generally, as a *universal Jewish* characteristic, of the tendency to crave acts of power that should strike the senses and exclude the possibility of doubt, is less suitable to the *definite* reference of the context to *Christ*, in whom they were refusing to believe. Were the reading σημεῖον (see the critical remarks) to be adopted, we

should have to understand it of *some* miracle specifically accrediting the Messiahship; not, with Schulz, Valckenaer, Eichhorn, and Pott, of the illustrious *person of an earthly ruler*. Any such personal reference would need to be suggested by the connection, as in Luke ii. 34; but this is not at all the case in view of the parallel σοφίαν, nor is it so even by Χ. ἐσταυρ. in ver. 23. See on the latter verse. — αἰτοῦσι] is the *demand* actually uttered (that there be *given*); ζητοῦσι the seeking after and *desiring*, *anquirere* (correlative: εὐρίσκειν). — Χριστὸν ἐσταυρ.] *Christ as crucified* (ii. 2; Gal. iii. 1), and therefore neither as one who exhibits miraculous signs, nor as the originator of a new philosophy, such, possibly, as Socrates or Pythagoras. — σκάνδαλον] in apposition to Χ. ἐσταυρ. As *crucified*, He is to them an occasion for unbelief and rejection. Gal. v. 11. For His being put to a shameful death conflicts with the demand to have a Messiah glorified by miracles. — μωρίαν] because philosophy is what they desire as a guide to salvation; therefore to believe in Christ (not as one of the wise of this world, but) as crucified, is to them a *folly*, an absurdity; whereby, indeed, their own σοφία becomes μωρία παρὰ τ. Θεῷ, iii. 19.

Ver. 24. Along with Χριστόν, which is triumphantly repeated, we are mentally to supply κηρύσσομεν: *but to the called themselves . . . we preach Christ as God's power and God's wisdom—i.e.* our preaching of Christ as crucified makes such an impression upon them,<sup>1</sup> that they come to know in their experience the manifestation and the whole work of Christ as that whereby God powerfully works out salvation and reveals His counsel full of wisdom; comp. ver. 30. Hofmann's construction, making Χριστόν to be *in apposition* to Χριστὸν ἐσταυρ., would be logically correct only on one of two suppositions: either if in ver. 23 there stood *merely* ἐσταυρωμένον without Χριστόν ("a crucified one . . . who is to them *Christ*"); or if, in ver. 24, some more precise definition, such as ὄντως or ἀληθῶς, were given along with Χριστόν. — αὐτοῖς] is not the *is* pointing back to τοὺς πιστεύοντας, so that τοῖς κλητοῖς would be in *apposition* to it (Hofmann); for in that

<sup>1</sup> For the preaching is not twofold, but one and the same, only spoken of in its respective relations to the two opposite classes of men. Comp. 2 Cor. ii. 16. That is the *crisis*, which the gospel brings about, and its influence on the called is to *make them free* (John viii. 33, 36; Rom. vi. 22).

case, notwithstanding the harsh and distant retrospective reference, αὐτοῖς would in fact be entirely superfluous; but the words αὐτοῖς δὲ τοῖς κλητοῖς—the αὐτοῖς being emphatically put first (2 Cor. xi. 14; Heb. ix. 23, *al.*, and very often in Greek writers)—go together as closely connected, and mean simply: *ipsis autem vocatis* (Vulg.), to the called *for their part, so far as they are concerned*, so that αὐτοῖς denotes the called *themselves* (Herm. *ad Viger.* p. 733), in contrast to *those round about them* still remaining in unbelief (Ἰουδαίους . . . μωρίαν). Instead of τ. κλητοῖς, we might have had τοῖς πιστεύουσιν (ver. 21); but how natural it was that the Θεοῦ δύναμιν κ.τ.λ., which was present to the apostle's mind, should have led to his designating the subjects of his statement according to the *divine* qualification which applied to them. Comp. ver. 26. As to κλητός, see on ver. 2.<sup>1</sup> That Paul did not write ἡμῖν, is to be accounted for on the ground of its being unsuitable to the κηρύσσ., which is to be here again understood; not, as Rückert thinks, because it seemed to him too hard to oppose ἡμ. to Ἰουδ. and ἔθνεσι. — Θεοῦ δύν. κ. θ. σοφ.] To all the κλητοὶ Christ is *both*. But the words are formally *parallel* to the two former demands in ver. 22; hence δύναμιν is put *first*. Respecting σοφίαν, comp. on ver. 30.

Ver. 25. Confirmation of the Θεοῦ δύν. κ. Θεοῦ σοφ. by a general proposition, the first half of which corresponds to the Θεοῦ σοφίαν, and the second to the Θεοῦ δύναμιν. — τὸ μωρὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ] *the foolish thing which comes from God*,<sup>2</sup> *i.e.* what God works and orders, and which appears to men absurd. Comp. τὸ σωτήριον τ. Θεοῦ, Luke ii. 30. — τῶν ἀνθρώπων] We are not to amplify this, with the majority of interpreters (including Beza, Grotius, Valckenaer, Zachariae, Flatt, Pott, Heydenreich, and de Wette),

<sup>1</sup> Comp. Clem. Alex. *Strom.* I. p. 314 (ed. Paris. 1641): πάντων ἀνθρώπων κεκλημένων οἱ ὑπακούσαι βουληθέντις κλητοὶ ὀνομάσθησαν. These also are the σωζόμενοι, ver. 18; the opposite is the ἀπολλύμενοι.

<sup>2</sup> This, according to the well-known use in Greek of the neuter with the genitive (Poppo, *ad Thuc.* VI. p. 168; Kühner, II. p. 122), might also be taken as abstract: *the foolishness of God*—the *weakness of God*. So τὸ μωρὸν, Eur. *Hipp.* 966. But Paul had the concrete conception in his mind; otherwise he would most naturally have used the abstract μωρία employed just before. The meaning of the concrete expression, however, is not: *God Himself, in so far as He is foolish* (Hofmann); passages such as 2 Cor. iv. 17, Rom. i. 19, ii. 4, viii. 3, are no proof of this. — As to the different accentuations of μωρός and μῶρος, see Lipsius, *grammat. Unters.* p. 25; Götting, *Accentl.* p. 304.

into τοῦ σοφοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπ., after a well-known abbreviated mode of comparison (see on Matt. v. 20; John v. 36), which Estius rightly censures here as *coactum* (comp. Winer, p. 230 [E. T. 307]), because we should have to supply with τῶν ἀνθρ. not the last named attribute, but its opposite; the true rendering, in fact, is just the simple one: *wiser than men*; men possess less wisdom than is contained in the foolish thing of God. — τὸ ἀσθενὲς τοῦ Θεοῦ] whatever in God's appointments is, to human estimation, powerless and resultless. The concrete instance which Paul has in view when employing the general terms τὸ μωρὸν and τὸ ἀσθενὲς τοῦ Θεοῦ, is the death of Christ on the cross, through which God has fulfilled the counsel of His eternal wisdom, wrought out with power the redemption of the world, laid the foundations of everlasting bliss, and overcome all powers antagonistic to Himself.

Ver. 26. Confirmation of this general proposition from the experience of the readers. The element of proof lies in the contrast, ver. 27 f. For if the matter were not as stated in ver. 25, then God would not have chosen the foolish of the world to put to shame its wise ones. By so doing He has, indeed, set before your eyes the practical experimental proof, that the μωρὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ transcends men in wisdom. Otherwise He would have acted in the reverse way, and have sought out for Himself the wise of the world, in order, through their wisdom, to help that which now appears as the μωρὸν τ. Θεοῦ to victory over the foolishness of the world. This holds, too, as against de Wette, who (comp. also Hofmann) makes γάρ refer to the whole series of thoughts, vv. 19–25, notwithstanding that the expressions here used attach themselves so distinctly to ver. 25. — βλέπετε] *imperative*. As such it has with logical correctness its hortatory emphasis;<sup>1</sup> but not so, if we take it as *indicative* (Valla, Erasmus, Castalio, Beza, Vatablus, Bengel, Rosenmüller, and Schrader). — τὴν κλήσιν ὑμῶν] is not to be taken arbitrarily, with Beza, Estius, Mosheim, Semler, Rosenmüller, and Pott, *pro concreto*, for ὑμᾶς τοὺς κλητούς, but as: *your calling* (to salvation through the Messiah); see, what was the nature of it as regards the persons whom God, the caller, had chosen (ver. 27 ff.). Krause and

<sup>1</sup> The γάρ is not against our taking it as imperative; Greek writers, too, use it with that mood, as e.g. Soph. *Phil.* 1043: ἔφικτι γάρ αὐτόν.



Olshausen run counter to the specific Christian sense of the word, and even to the general linguistic usage (see on vii. 20), when they make it mean, like the German word "*Beruf*" [*calling*], the *vitae genus*, the outward circumstances. — ὅτι] equivalent to εἰς ἐκεῖνο, ὅτι, *in so far, namely, as*. Plat. Prot. p. 330 E, Crat. p. 384 C, *al.* John ii. 18, ix. 17, xi. 51; 2 Cor. i. 18, xi. 10; Mark xvi. 14; Fritzsche, *ad Matth.* p. 248 f. — οὐ πολλοὶ σοφοὶ κ. σ.] that *not many* (among you) *are wise in the eyes of men*, etc. It is enough to supply the simple εἰσί, making οὐ πολλ., i.e. *but few*, the subject, and σοφ. the predicate; and there is no need for introducing an ἐκλήθησαν (*so commonly*), according to which οὐ π. σ. together would be the subject. Κατὰ σάρκα, specifying the kind and manner of the σοφία, marks it out as *purely human*, and distinguishes it from the *Christian* wisdom which proceeds from the Holy Spirit. For σάρξ comprises the simply human element in man as opposed to the divine principle. Comp. σοφία σαρκική, 2 Cor. i. 12; σοφία ψυχική, Jas. iii. 15; and see on Rom. iv. 1; John iii. 6. Estius aptly remarks: "Significari vult sapientiam, quae studio humano absque doctrina Spir. sancti potest acquiri." In substance, the σοφία τοῦ κόσμου, ver. 20, and the σ. τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου, ii. 6, are the same. — δυνατοί] We are not to supply κατὰ σάρκα here again; for that was essentially requisite only with σοφοί, and Paul otherwise would have coupled it with the third word (comp. ver. 20). That *mighty men of this world* are meant, is *self-evident*. — εὐγενεῖς] of *high descent*. Comp. Luke xix. 12; frequent in the classics. — Rückert objects that Paul, instead of proving the phenomenon recorded in ver. 26 to have proceeded from the divine wisdom, uses it as an argument for ver. 25, and so reasons in a circle. But this is without foundation. For that the phenomenon in question was a work of the divine wisdom, was to the Christian consciousness (and Paul was, of course, writing to *Christians*, who looked at it in the same light with himself) *a thing ascertained and settled*, which could be employed therefore *directly* to establish ver. 25 in conformity with experience.

Vv. 27, 28. Expanded (see τοῦ κόσμου and πᾶσα σάρξ, ver. 29) statement of the opposite: *No; the foolish things of the world were what God chose out for Himself*, etc. The *calling*, ver. 26, was in truth just the result and the proof of the *election*. Comp. 1 Thess.

i. 4 f.; 2 Thess. ii. 13 f.; Rom. viii. 30, ix. 23 f. — τὰ μωρὰ τοῦ κόσμου] *the foolish elements of the world* (mankind), *i.e.* those to whom earthly wisdom was a quite foreign thing, so that they were the simple among men. Comp. Matt. xi. 25. Many exegetes (including Theodoret, Luther, Grotius, Estius, Rosenmüller, Flatt, and Billroth) take the genitive as: *according to the judgment of the world*. Against this may be urged, partly, the very fact that when God chose to Himself the persons referred to, they too had not yet the higher wisdom, and consequently were not unwise merely *in the eyes of the world*; and partly, as deciding the point, the following ἀσθ. and ἀγεν., for they were, it is plain, really (and not merely in the eyes of the world) weak and of mean origin. — The *ncuters* (comp. on the *plural*, Gal. iii. 22) indicate the category generally, it being evident from the context that what is meant is the *persons* included under that category. See generally, Winer, p. 167 [E. T. 222], and the same usage among classical writers in Blomfield, *ad Aesch. Pers. Gloss.* 101. — ἵνα τ. σ. καταισχ.] *design.* The nothingness and worthlessness of their wisdom were, to their shame, to be brought practically to light (by God's choosing not them, but the unwise, for honour), no matter whether they themselves were conscious of this putting of them to shame or not. — The *thrice-repeated* ἐξελ. ὁ Θεός, beside the three contrasts of σοφοί, δυνατοί, and εὐγενεῖς (ver. 26), carries with it a triumphant emphasis. — τὰ μὴ ὄντα] The contrast to εὐγενεῖς is brought out by three steps forming a climax. This third phrase is the strongest of all, and sums up powerfully the two foregoing ones by way of apposition (hence without καί): the *non-existent*, *i.e.* what was as utterly *worth nothing* as if it had not existed at all (Winer, p. 451 [E. T. 608]). Comp. Eur. *Hec.* 284: ἦν πότ', ἀλλὰ νῦν οὐκ εἴμ' ἔτι. Dem. 248. 25; Plat. *Crit.* p. 50 B; and Stallbaum thereon. The subjective negation μὴ is quite according to rule (Baumelein, *Partik.* p. 296), since the participle with the article expresses a generic notion; and there is no need of importing the idea of an *untrue* although *actual* existence (Hofmann). We are not therefore to supply τι to τὰ ὄντα (as if μηδὲν εἶναι had been used before), but to explain it: *the existent*, what through repute, fortune, etc., is regarded as *that which is* (κατ' ἐξοχήν). Comp. Pflugk, *ad Hec. l.c.*: "ipsum verbum εἶναι eam vim habet, ut significet in aliquo numero

*esse, rebus secundis florere.*" — *κατηργ.*] Not *καταισχ.* again, because the notions *μὴ εἶναι* and *εἶναι* required a stronger word to correspond to them; one which would convey the idea of *bringing to nought* (i.e. *making worthless*, Rom. iii. 31).

Ver. 29. Final aim, to which is subordinated the mediate aim expressed by the thrice-repeated *ἵνα κ.τ.λ.* — *ὅπως μὴ καυχ. πᾶσα σάρξ*] Hebraistic way of saying: *that no man may boast himself*. Its explanation lies in the fact that the negation belongs to the verb, not to *πᾶσα σ.* (*חַיִּיבִי לֹא*): *that every man may abstain from boasting himself*. Comp. Fritzsche, *Diss. in 2 Cor. II.* p. 24 f. Regarding *σάρξ* as a designation of man in his weakness and imperfection as contrasted with God, see on Acts iii. 17. — *ἐνώπι. τ. Θεοῦ*] Rom. iii. 20; Luke xvi. 15, *al.* No one is to come forth *before God* and boast, I am wise, etc.; on this account God has, by choosing the unwise, etc., brought to nought the wisdom and loftiness of men, so that the ground for the assertion of human excellences before God has been cut away.

Ver. 30 f. In contrast (*δὲ*) to the *ὅπως μὴ καυχ. π. σ. ἐνώπιον τ. Θεοῦ*, we have now the true relation to God and the true and right *καυχᾶσθαι* arising out of it: *But truly it is God's work, that ye are Christians and so partakers of the greatest divine blessings, that none of you should in any way boast himself save only in God*. Comp. Eph. ii. 8 f. — *ἐξ αὐτοῦ*] has the principal emphasis: *From no other than God is derived the fact that you are in Christ* (as the element of your life). *Ἐξ* denotes the causal origination. Comp. Eph. ii. 8: *οὐκ ἐξ ἑμῶν, Θεοῦ τὸ δῶρον*, also in profane writers: *ἐκ θεῶν, ἐκ Διός* (Valckenaer, *ad Herod.* ii. 13); and generally, Winer, p. 345 [E. T. 460]. While Hofmann here, too, as in ver. 28, introduces into *εἶναι* the notion of the *true existence*, which they have from God "in virtue of their being included in Christ," others again, following Chrysostom, Theodoret, and Theophylact, take *ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ ἡμεῖς ἐστε* by itself in such a way as to make it express *sonship with God* (comp. Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* I. p. 553), and regard *ἐν* as conveying the more precise definition of the mode whereby this sonship is attained: *παῖδες αὐτοῦ ἐστε, διὰ τοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦτο γενόμενοι*, Chrysostom; comp. Calvin, Beza, Grotius, Flatt, Billroth, Rückert, Ewald, and others. But wrongly; for the conception *ἐκ Θεοῦ εἶναι* in the supposed sense is Johannine, but is not in accordance with the Pauline mode of expression (not

even in Gal. iv. 4); and εἶναι ἐν Χριστῷ was a conception so habitually in use (Rom. xvi. 7, 11; 2 Cor. v. 17; Gal. i. 22, *al.*), that it must have occurred of itself here also to the reader; besides, the ἀπὸ Θεοῦ which follows answers to the ἐξ αὐτοῦ. This applies, too, against Osiander, who, after ἐξ αὐτοῦ, mentally supplies γεγενημένοι: "being born of God, ye are members of Christ." — ὑμεῖς] with emphasis: *ye* for your part, ye the chosen out of the world. — ὃς ἐγενήθη . . . ἀπολύτρωσις] brings home to the heart the high value of that God-derived εἶναι ἐν Χριστῷ: *who has become to us from God wisdom, righteousness and holiness, and redemption.* Ἐγενήθη is simply a later (Doric) form for ἐγένετο (Thom. Mag. p. 189; Lobeck, *ad Phrym.* p. 108 f.), not, as Rückert makes it (comp. Luther: "*gemacht ist*"), a true *passive* in sense; comp. Acts iv. 4; Col. iv. 11; 1 Thess. ii. 14 (Eph. iii. 7, Lachm.). *Christ became to us wisdom, etc., inasmuch as His manifestation and His whole saving work have procured for believers these blessings; namely, first of all,—what was of primary importance in the connection of ver. 19 ff.,—wisdom, for to believers is revealed the counsel of God, in whom are all treasures of wisdom and knowledge (see ii. 7 ff.; Col. ii. 3); righteousness, for by means of faith we are through the Lord's atoning death constituted righteous before God (Rom. iii. 24 f., *al.*; see on Rom. i. 17); holiness (see on Rom. vi. 19, 22), for in those who are justified by faith Christ works continually by His Spirit the new holy life (Rom. viii. 1–11); redemption, for Christ has delivered believers, through His blood paid as their ransom (Rom. iii. 24, vi. 20, vii. 23), from the wrath of God, to which they were subject before the entrance of faith (see on Eph. i. 7, ii. 3).* The order in which these predicates stand is *not illogical*; for after the first *intellectual* benefit (σοφία) which we have received in Christ, marked out too from the rest by the position of the word, Paul brings forward the *ethical* blessedness of the Christian, and that in the first place *positively* as δικαιοσύνη and ἁγιασμός, but then also—as though in triumph that there was now nothing more to fear from God—*negatively* as ἀπολύτρωσις, in which is quenched all the wrath of God against former sin (instead of which with the Christian there are now righteousness and holiness). Hence in explaining ἀπολύτρ. we should not (with Chrysostom) abide by the general ἀπήλλαξεν

ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ πάντων τῶν κακῶν, which is already contained in what goes before ; nor again should we, with Grotius, Calovius, Rückert, Osiander, Neander, and others (comp. also Schmid, *bibl. Theol.* II. p. 325 ; and Lipsius, *Paulin. Rechtfertigungslehre*, p. 8), make it *the final redemption from death and all evils*, such as is the object of ἐλπίς, the redemption *perfecting itself beyond* our earthly life (Hofmann), or the *definitive acquittal at the last judgment* (Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 327). In the passages alleged to support the interpretation in question, this sense is given solely by the accessory defining phrases—namely, in Eph. i. 14 by τῆς περιποιήσεως, in iv. 30 by ἡμέραν, and in Rom. viii. 23 by τοῦ σώματος. Rückert (comp. Neander) is further of opinion that δικαιοσύνη κ.τ.λ. is merely *explanatory* of how far Christ is to us σοφία, namely, as δικαιοσύνη, ἁγιασμός, and ἀπολύτρ., and that these three refer to the three essential things in the Christian life, faith, love, and hope : the τέ binding together the last three words and separating them from the first. But (1) the τέ links closely together only δικαιοσ. and ἁγιασμ., and does not include ἀπολ. ; much less does it separate the three last predicates from σοφία ;<sup>1</sup> on the contrary, τε καί embraces δικ. and ἁγ., as it were, in one, so that then ἀπολύτρωσις comes to be added with the adjunctive καί as a separate element, and consequently there results the following division : (a) wisdom, (b) righteousness and holiness, and (c) redemption. See as to this use of τε καί . . . καί, Hartung, *Partikell.* I. p. 102 ; Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* I. p. 878 f. ; Baeumlein, *Partik.* p. 224 f. (2) Paul would, on this theory, have left his readers without the slightest hint of the subordinate relation of the three last predicates to the first, although he could so easily have indicated it by a ὥς or a participle. (3) According to the correct interpretation, ἀπολύτρ. is not something yet *future*, but something which has *already taken place* in the death of Christ. Bos (*Obs. Misc.* p. 1 ff.), Alethius, Clericus, Nösselt (*Opusc.* II. p. 127 ff.), Valekenaer, and Krause interpret in a still more involved way, holding that only the words from ὃς to Θεοῦ apply to Christ, and these are to be put in a parenthesis ; while δικαιοσύνη κ.τ.λ. are *abstracta pro concretis* (2 Cor. v. 21), and belong to ὑμεῖς

<sup>1</sup> With σοφία the τέ has nothing whatever to do. Hofmann makes it serve as a link of connection to σοφία. In that case, Paul must have written : σοφία τε καὶ δικαιοσ. κ. ἁγ. κ. ἀπολ.

ἔστε: "Ejus beneficio vos estis in Christo Jesu δικαιοσύνη κ.τ.λ.," Valckenaer. How ambiguous and unsuitable would such a statement as ὁς ἐγεν. σοφία κ.τ.λ. be for a mere parenthetical notice! — ἀπὸ Θεοῦ] *on God's part*, by God as the author of the fact. Comp. Herod. vi. 125: ἀπὸ δὲ Ἀλκμαίωνος . . . ἐγένοντο καὶ κάρτα λαμπροί. See generally, Ellendt, *Lcx. Soph.* I. p. 194; Winer, p. 348 [E. T. 464]; Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 280 [E. T. 325]. That it belongs to ἐγενήθη, and not to σοφία, is proved by the ἡμῖν which stands between. The latter, however, is not to be understood, with Rückert, as though it ran ἡ ἡμετέρα σοφία ("what to the Hellene his σοφία is, or is merely assumed to be, namely, the ground of confidence,—that Christ is to us"), else Paul must have written: ὁς ἡμῖν ἐγενήθη ἡ σοφία with the article, and have placed ἡμῖν first with the emphasis of contrast.—Observe further, that Paul has said ὑμεῖς with his eye still, as in ver. 26, upon the church to which his readers belonged; but now, in adducing the blessings found in Christ, he extends the range of his view to all Christians; and hence, instead of the individualizing ὑμεῖς, we have the ἡμῖν including himself and others.

Ver. 31. The fact that *God* is the author of your connection with Christ, and thereby of the blessings you receive as Christians (ver. 30), should, according to the divine purpose (ἴνα), determine you to comply with that word of Scripture which calls for the true lowly *καυχᾶσθαι*: *he that boasteth himself, let him boast himself in the Lord*, praise his own privileges only as God's work, boast himself only as the object of His grace.—That the *Κύριος* is not Christ (Rückert) but *God*, and not Christ and God (Hofmann), is proved by the emphatic ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ver. 30, and ἐνώπι. τ. Θεοῦ, ver. 29. Comp. on 2 Cor. x. 17.—The apostle quotes Jer. ix. 24, abbreviating quite freely, after the LXX. The construction, however, is *anacoluthic*; for Paul purposely retains the scriptural saying unaltered in its strong imperative form, and leaves it to the reader to supply the change from the imperative to the subjunctive, which the syntax, properly speaking, would require. Comp. on Rom. xv. 3.

## CHAPTER II.

VER. 1. μαρτύριον] A C  $\aleph^*$ , min. Syr. Copt. and some Fathers: μυστήριον. Approved by Griesb. and Ewald, adopted also by Rückert. A gloss written on the margin from ver. 7. Had μαρτύριον crept in from i. 6, the witnesses which have it would read also τοῦ Χριστοῦ instead of τ. Θεοῦ; but this occurs only in very few, some of which, besides, have μυστήριον. — Ver. 2. τὶ εἰδέναι] Elz. τοῦ εἰδέναι τι. But τοῦ is wanting in decisive witnesses; that τι should be put first is rendered certain by B C, min. Bas. Cyr. Isid. Chrys. Hil. Victorin. Aug., also D E (which have τὶ ἐν ὑμῶν εἰδέναι); and the external attestation must decide here. — Ver. 3. καὶ ἐγώ] Lachm. and Rückert read καγώ, with A B C  $\aleph$ , min. Or. Bas. *al.* Taken from ver. 1. — Ver. 4. After πειθοῖς Elz. has ἀνθρωπίνης, against preponderating evidence. Addition from vv. 5 and 13. In reply to Heydenreich's unfounded defence of the word, see Reiche, *Comment. crit.* I. p. 134. — The readings which alter πειθοῖς (πειθοῖ: 1, 18\*, 48, *al.* Or. Eus. *al.*; πειθανοῖς, Macar.), and those which either leave out λόγοις (F G, 74, *al.* Erp. Boern. Ambrosiast. Sedul.) or alter it (λόγων: Syr. Armen. Or. twice over, and several others: λόγου), are old shifts resorted to on failure to understand πειθοῖς, as also the short reading ἐν πειθοσοφίας must be so accounted. See the exegetical remarks, and Reiche, p. 133. — Ver. 7. The order of the words Θεοῦ σοφίαν (Elz. and Matth. invert it) is decisively attested, as also the order in ver. 10: ἀπεκάλ. ὁ Θεός. — Ver. 9. In place of the second ἃ, Lachm. and Tisch. have ὅσα, with A B C and some Fathers.<sup>1</sup> Rightly; ἃ is a mechanical repetition from what goes before. — Ver. 10. Instead of ὁ Tisch. reads γάρ, supported only by B, min. Copt. Sahid. Clem.— αὐτοῦ] is wanting in A B C  $\aleph$ , Copt. Clem. Bas. Cyr. It is deleted by Lachm. and Rückert. But considering the independent τὸ γάρ πνεῦμα which follows, it would have been more natural to omit αὐτοῦ or to add ἁγίου (so Didym.) than to insert αὐτοῦ. — Ver. 11. ἔγνωκεν is, in accordance with the vast preponderance of evidence, approved by Griesb. and adopted by Lachm. Tisch. and Rückert. Elz., however, Matth. and Scholz, have οἶδεν. Repetition of the pre-

<sup>1</sup> Clement, too, *Cor.* I. 34, has ὅσα, which certainly was not first imported from his quotation into that of the apostle (Hofmann). A converse proceeding on the part of the transcribers might rather seem more natural.

ceding *οἶδεν*, done mechanically or by way of gloss. In favour of *ἔγνωκεν* there is also the reading *ἔγνω* in F G, 23, and Fathers. — Ver. 13. *πνεύματος*] Elz. adds *ἀγίου*, against decisive evidence to the contrary. A superfluous and weakening definition. — Ver. 15. The *μέν* after *ἀνακρ.* in Elz. and Scholz (deleted by Lachm. Tisch. and Rück.) is wanting in A C D\* F G, 17, and many vss. and Fathers. It has arisen from the *δέ* which follows. In *Σ\** the whole verse is omitted through Homoioteleuton. *Σ\*\** has *μέν*. — *τὰ πάντα*] so also Rück. and Tisch.; Lachm. brackets *τά*; Elz. and Scholz have simply *πάντα*. But *τά* is attested by A C D, min. Ir. ms. Or. Nyss. Chrys.; *πάντα* is an old correction of the text, with the view of bringing in the masculine to correspond with the *οὐδενός* which comes after; hence, too, Didym. and Theodoret have *πάντας*. — Ver. 16. *Χριστοῦ*] Lachm. has *Κυρίου*, with B D\* F G, Theophyl. Ambrosiast. Aug. Sedul. Mechanical repetition of the preceding *Κυρίου*. Had *Κυρίου* been the original reading and explained by a gloss, the substitute for it would have been not *Χριστοῦ*, but *Θεοῦ*, seeing that every marginal annotator must have been aware from Isa. xl. 13 that the preceding *Κυρίου* referred to *God*.

Vv. 1–5. *Application of the foregoing section (i. 17–31) to the manner in which Paul had come forward as a teacher in Corinth.*

Ver. 1. *Κἀγώ*] *I too*, as is the duty, in accordance with the previous explanation (i. 17–31), of every preacher of the gospel. The construction is such, that *καθ' ὑπεροχὴν κ.τ.λ.* belongs to *καταγγ.*, as indicating the mode adopted in the *καταγγέλλειν*: *I too, when I came to you, brethren, came proclaiming to you, not upon the footing of a pre-eminence of speech (eloquence) or wisdom (philosophy), the testimony of God.* Against connecting the words in this way (which is done also by Castalio, Bengel, and others, Pott, Heydenreich, Schrader, de Wette, Osiander, Ewald), it is objected that *ἔλθων ἦλθον* gives an intolerable tautology. But this is of no weight (see the passages in Bernhardt, p. 475; Bornemann, *ad Cyrop.* v. 3. 2; Sauppe, *ad Anab.* iv. 2. 21; comp. on Acts vii. 34), and would, besides, apply to the construction *ἦλθον οὐ . . . σοφίας, καταγγέλλων* (Luther, Erasmus, Calvin, Grotius, and others, including Flatt, Rückert, Hofmann); further, it is more natural and more in accordance with the sense to think in connection with *καθ' ὑπεροχὴν κ.τ.λ.* of the manner of the *preaching* than of the manner of the *coming*. For that reason, too, *ἦλθον* is not placed after *σοφίας*. The preposition *κατά*, again, to express *mode* (Winer, p. 375 [E. T. 501]), is quite



according to rule; comp. καθ' ὑπερβολήν, κατὰ κράτος, and the like. — As to ὑπεροχή, *eminentia*, comp. 1 Tim. ii. 2; Plat. *Legg.* iv. p. 711 D; Def. 416; Arist. *Pol.* iv. 9. 5. Also κακῶν ὑπεροχή, 2 Macc. xiii. 6. — καταγγέλλων] Paul might have used the future, but the *present* participle places the thing more vividly before us as already begun with the ἦλθον. So especially often ἀγγέλλων (Valck. *ad Phoen.* 1082); e.g. Xen. *Hell.* ii. 1. 29: ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ἐπλευσεν, ἀγγέλλουσα τὰ γεγονότα, Plat. *Phaed.* p. 116 C, and Stallbaum *in loc.* See, in general, Winer, p. 320 f. [E. T. 429 f.]; Dissen, *ad Pindar. Ol.* vii. 14. — τὸ μαρτύρ. τοῦ Θεοῦ] in substance not different from τ. μαρτ. τ. Χριστοῦ, i. 6; 2 Tim. i. 8. For the preachers of the gospel give *testimony of God*, as to what He has done, namely, in Christ for the salvation of men. Comp. xv. 15. In accordance with i. 6, the genitive is not, with Calvin, Bengel, Osiander, and Hofmann, to be taken subjectively, as in 1 John v. 9 f.

Ver. 2. *For I did not resolve* (did not set it before me as part of my undertaking) *to know anything among you except Jesus Christ, and that the crucified, i.e. to mix up other kinds of knowledge with the proclamation of Jesus Christ, etc.*<sup>1</sup> Had Paul not disdained this and not put aside all other knowledge, his καταγγέλλειν would not have remained free from ὑπεροχή λόγου ἢ σοφίας. The *ordinary* reference of the negation to τι: *I resolved to know nothing*, etc., is in arbitrary opposition to the words (so, however, Pott, Flatt, Rückert, Osiander, Ewald). In ἔκρινα Calvin and Grotius find too much, since the text does not give it: *magnum dixi*; Hofmann again, too little, with Luther and others: *I judged, was of opinion*; for Paul could indeed discard and negative in his own case the *undertaking* to know something, but not the *judgment* that he did know something. His *self-determination* was, not to be directed to know, etc. Comp. vii. 37; 2 Cor. ii. 1; Rom. xiv. 13; Κρῖναί τι καὶ προθέσθαι, Polyb. iii. 6. 7; Wisd. viii. 9; 1 Macc. xi. 33; 2 Macc. vi. 14, *al.* He might have acted otherwise, had he *proposed* to himself to do so. — τι εἶδέναι] πρὸς ἀντιδιαστολήν τῆς ἐξωθεν εἰρηται σοφίας οὐ γὰρ ἦλθον συλλογισμοὺς πλέκων, οὐδὲ σοφίσματα, οὐδ' ἄλλο τι

<sup>1</sup> Causaubon remarks well, that Ἰησ. X. refers to the *person*, and κ. τοῦτ. ἱσταυρ. to the *officium*, and "in his duobus totum versatur evangelium." But the strong emphasis on the latter point arises from looking back to i. 17-24.

λέγων ὑμῖν, ἥ ὅτι ὁ Χριστὸς ἐσταυρώθη, Chrysostom. But the giving up of everything else is far more powerfully expressed by εἰδέναι (comp. Arrian, *Epict.* ii. 1) than if Paul had said λέγειν or λαλεῖν. He was not disposed, when among the Corinthians, to be *conscious* of anything else but Christ. The notion of *permission* (Rückert), which might be conveyed in the relation of the infinitive to the verb (see Lobeck, *ad Phryn.* p. 753; Kühner, *ad Xen. Mem.* ii. 2. 1; *Anab.* v. 7. 34), would here only weaken the force of the statement. Were τοῦ εἰδέναι τι the correct reading (but see the critical remarks), the right rendering of the genitive would not be: *so that* (Billroth), but: *I made no resolution, in order to know anything.* Comp. on Acts xxvii. 1. — κ. τοῦτ. ἐσταυρ.] notwithstanding the offence therein implied for Jew and Gentile, i. 18, 23. Comp. Gal. vi. 14.

Vv. 3, 4. After the probative sentence, ver. 2, Paul takes up again the connection of ver. 1, and that with the simple καί: *And I* for my part (with others it may have been different!) *fell into weakness and into much fear and trembling among you* (πρὸς ὑμ.; see on John i. 1). — γίνεσθαι ἐν, to fall into a state, etc. (and to be in it); so Thuc. i. 78. 1; Plato, *Prot.* p. 314 C; Dem. p. 179, *ult.* Comp. Luke xxii. 44; 1 Macc. i. 27; 2 Macc. vii. 9; Hist. Sus. 8. We might also join πρὸς ὑμᾶς to ἐγενόμην, not, indeed, in the way in which Hofmann interprets it, as if for ἐγενόμην there stood ἦμην (Mark xiv. 49), but in the sense: *I arrived among you* (2 John 12, and see generally, Fritzsche, *Ind. ad Lucian. Dial. Deor.* p. 85; Nägelsbach on the *Iliad*, p. 295, ed. 3); ver. 4, however, shows that what is here spoken of is not again (ver. 1) the *coming thither*, but the state *when there*. — The three phrases, ἀσθ., φόβος, and τρόμος, depict the *deep bashfulness* with which Paul was in Corinth, through his humble sense of the disproportion between his own powers and the great enterprise to which his conscientiousness kept him bound. In facing it he felt himself very *weak*, and was in *fear* and *trembling*. As for want of natural strength of will and determination, of which Hofmann speaks, there were no signs of anything of the kind in Paul, even judging from his experience at Athens; and no such weakness betrays itself in Acts xviii. 4–11. The connection forbids us from thinking, with Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Erasmus, Cornelius a Lapide, Grotius, and others, of the sufferings and persecutions (ἀσθ.), and of the

apprehension of dangers, which he had to undergo in Corinth; for the text hints nothing of persecutions and dangers, and these would not necessarily furnish the motive for simplicity in preaching (vv. 1, 4 f.), nay, might even excite to the greater rhetorical exertion. The weakness, etc., was of a deep ethical nature, being based on the entire renunciation of human wisdom and strength (ver. 5). Other exegetes wrongly understand ἀσθενεία even of *bodily* weakness, either generally *sickliness* (Rückert), or more especially *weakness in the chest and voice* (Storr, comp. Rosenmüller). — φόβος κ. τρόμος] always denote with Paul (comp. also Ps. ii. 11) the deeply vivid and keen apprehension of humility, lest it should be unable to meet the emergency concerned. See 2 Cor. vii. 15; Phil. ii. 12; Eph. vi. 5. — ὁ λόγος μου κ. τ. κήρυγμά μου] are indeed emphatically separated from each other by the repetition of the μου; but it is an arbitrary distinction to make the former of the two refer to the *form*, the latter to the *contents* (Heydenreich), or the former to the *privata*, the latter to the *publica institutio* (so Rückert and the majority of commentators). The former is the more general expression, the latter the particular: *my speech* generally (comp. 2 Cor. x. 10), and especially *my public preaching*. — οὐκ ἐν πειθοῖς σοφ. λόγοις] *sc. ἦν*, *non versabatur in*, did not move *in the element of persuasive words of wisdom*, such words as are philosophically arranged and thereby fitted to persuade. Πειθός is found nowhere else in the whole range of extant Greek literature, πιθανός being the word in use (Xen. *Cyr.* vi. 4. 5; Thuc. iv. 21; Dem. 928. 14; Josephus, *Antt.* viii. 9; and the passages from Plato in Ast, *Lcx.* III. p. 102. Meineke, *Menand.* p. 222). Πειθός, however, is formed from πείθω by correct analogy as φειδός from φείδομαι, etc. Comp. Salmasius, *de ling. Hellenist.* p. 86; Reiche, *Comment. crit.* I. p. 136 f. It was in all likelihood an adjective belonging only to the colloquial language of common life. Kypke, indeed (*Obs.* II. p. 193), would find some trace of it in Plato, *Gorg.* p. 493 A; but what we have there is a *play on the words* τὸ πιθανόν and πίθος, *a cask*, which has no connection whatever with πειθός. Pasor and Schrader make πειθοῖς to be the dative plural of πειθώ, *suada*, and what follows to be in apposition to it: *in persuasions, in words of wisdom*. But the plural of πειθώ also has no existence; and how abrupt such an apposition would be, as well as wholly at

variance with the parallel in ver. 13! The following are simply *conjectures* (comp. the critical remarks): Beza and Erasmus Schmid (after Eusebius), ἐν πειθοῖ σοφίας λόγων; Grotius, ἐν πιστοῖς κ.τ.λ.; Valckenaer, Klose, and Kühn (*Commentat. ad 1 Cor. ii. 1-5*, Lips. 1784), ἐν πιθανοῖς or πειθανοῖς κ.τ.λ. (comp. also Alberti, *Schediasm.* p. 105); Alberti, ἐν πειθοῦς (*suadae*) σ. λόγοις, or (so, too, Semler, Flatt, Rinck, Fritzsche in the *Hall. Lit. Zeit.* 1840, Nr. 100) ἐν πειθοῖ σοφίας (without λόγοις).—ἐν ἀποδείξει πνεύματος κ. δυνάμεως] Without there being any necessity for explaining the two genitives by a ἐν διὰ δυοῖν as equivalent to πνεύματος δυνατοῦ (so still Pott, Flatt, Billroth, Olshausen, Maier, with older expositors), the meaning may, according to our interpretation of ἀπόδειξις and to our taking the genitives in an objective or subjective sense, be either: *so that I evinced Spirit and power* (so Vatablus and others, with Pott and Billroth); or: *so that Spirit and power made themselves known through me* (Calvin: "in Pauli ministerio . . . quasi nuda Dei manus se proferebat"); or: *so that Spirit and power gave the proof* (Rückert, de Wette, Osiander, Neander, and Maier, following older commentators). The latter is most in keeping with the purposely-chosen expression ἀπόδειξις (found here only in the N. T.; Dem. 326. 4; Plato, *Phaed.* p. 77 C, *Theaet.* p. 162 E, and often; 3 Macc. iv. 20), and with the significant relation to οὐκ ἐν πειθοῖς σ. λόγοις. Paul means *the Holy Spirit* (ver. 10 ff.) and the *divine power* communicating itself therein, ver. 5 (Rom. i. 16; 2 Cor. iv. 7; 1 Thess. i. 5), which wrought through his preaching upon the minds of men, persuading them of its truth,—the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti internum*.<sup>1</sup> At variance with the text is the view of several of the older expositors (following Origen, *contra Celsum*, i. p. 5), who refer πνεύματος to the oracles of the O. T., and δυνάμ. to the miracles of the apostle; as well as the view of Grotius, that the former applies to the prophecies, and the latter to the cures, by means of which Paul had given the ἀπόδειξις.

Ver. 5. Aim of the divine leading, the organ of which the

<sup>1</sup> Theophylact is right in supposing as regards πνεύματος: ἀρρήτω τινὶ τρόπῳ πιστὸν ἐνιστοῖσι τοῖς ἀκούουσι. He makes δυνάμεις, however, apply to the miracles, as does Theodoret also, who takes the two elements together, and explains the clause of the θαυματουργία τοῦ πνεύματος. So, too, in substance, Chrysostom, according to whom it is by πνεύματος that the miracles are made to appear as *true* miracles.

apostle knew himself to be, in what is set forth in ver. 4: *in order that your faith (in Christ) may be based*, have its causal ground (comp. Bernhardt, p. 210), *not on man's wisdom, but on God's power* (which has brought conviction to you through my speech and preaching). That *ἵνα* introduces not *his own* (Hofmann), but the *divine* purpose, is clear from *ἐν ἀποδείξει κ.τ.λ.*, in which Paul has stated how *God* had wrought through him. Comp. *ἵνα* in i. 31.

Vv. 6–16. *Wisdom, however, we deliver among the perfect; but it is a higher wisdom revealed to us by the Spirit, which therefore only those filled with the Spirit, and not the sensuous, apprehend.* — Paul having, in i. 17–31, justified the simple and non-philosophical method of proclaiming the gospel from the nature of its contents, and having now, in ii. 1–5, applied this to himself and his own preaching among the Corinthians, there might be attributed to him the view that what the preachers of the gospel set forth was no *σοφία* at all,—a supposition which, in writing to the Corinthians above all, he could not safely leave uncontradicted. He now shows, accordingly, that among ripened Christians there is certainly a *σοφία* delivered, but not a philosophy in the common, worldly sense, etc.

Ver. 6. *Wisdom, nevertheless (unphilosophical as my discourse among you was), we deliver among the perfect.* — *λαλοῦμεν*] *we speak it out*, hold it not back. That the *plural* does not refer to Paul alone (so usually), but to the *apostolic teachers in general*, is clear from the *καὶ ἐγώ* in iii. 1, which introduces the particular application of the plural statement here. — *ἐν* means nothing else than *in, surrounded by, among, coram*; *λαλεῖν ἐν* corresponds to the *λαλεῖν* with the dative in iii. 1. We must therefore reject not only the rendering *for the perfect* (Flatt, with older expositors), which is in itself linguistically untenable (for even in such passages as those cited by Bernhardt, p. 212, the *local* force of *ἐν* should be retained), but also the explanation: *according to the judgment of the perfect* (Grotius, Tittmann, *de Spir. Dei mysterior. div. interprete*, Lips. 1814, in the *Syn. N. T.* p. 285), which would have to be referred, with Billroth, to the conception of *among*, since the corresponding usage of *ἐν ἐμοί, ἐν σοί*, in the sense, *according to my or thy view*, applies exclusively to these particular phrases (Bernhardt, p. 211). — The *τέλειοι* (comp.

on Eph. iv. 13), who stand in contrast to the *νήπιοι ἐν Χριστῷ*, are *those who have penetrated beyond the position of beginners in Christian saving knowledge to the higher sphere of thorough and comprehensive insight*. The *σοφία*, which is delivered to these, is the Christian analogue to philosophy in the ordinary sense of the word, the *higher religious wisdom of Christianity*, the presentation of which (xii. 8) is not yet appropriate for the beginners in the faith (iii. 1, 2). The *form* of this instruction was that of spiritual discourse (ver. 13) framed under the influence of the holy *πνεῦμα*, but independent of the teachings of philosophic rhetoric; and its *matter* was the future relations of the Messianic kingdom (vv. 9, 12) in their connection with the divine counsel of redemption and its fulfilment in Christ, the *μυστήρια τῆς βασιλείας τῶν οὐρανῶν* (Matt. xiii. 11),—that, which no eye hath seen, etc. Comp. Bab. Sanhedr. f. xcix. 1: “Quod ad mundum futurum: oculus non vidit, O Deus, praeter te.” The definitions now given<sup>1</sup> respecting the *σοφία Θεοῦ* are the only ones that neither go beyond the text, nor are in the least degree arbitrary, while they comprehend also the doctrine of the *κτίσις* as regards its Messianic final destination, Rom. viii.,—that highest analogue to the philosophy of nature. It may be gathered, however, with certainty from iii. 1, 2, that we are not to think here of any

<sup>1</sup> Comp. Rückert, who, as respects the matter, is of opinion that it includes the higher views regarding the divine plan of the world in relation to the development of the kingdom of God, and especially to the providential government of the Jewish people; regarding the import of the divine ordinances and appointments before Christ, for example, of the law in reference to the highest end contemplated—the kingdom of God; regarding the way and manner in which the death and resurrection of Christ bear upon the salvation of the world; as well as regarding the changes yet in the womb of the future, and, in particular, the events which are linked with the second coming of the Lord. Similarly, and still more in detail, Estius. According to de Wette, portions of this wisdom are to be found in the Epistle to the *Romans*, in the discussions on justification, on the contrast between Christ and Adam, and on predestination; in the Epistles to the *Ephesians* and *Colossians*, in the indications there given as to the divine plan of redemption and the person of Christ; in *our* Epistle, chap. xv.; views of the same kind in Heb. vii.–x., comp. iv. 11 ff. Osiander makes this *σοφία* to consist in the deeper dogmatic development of the gospel as regards its historical foundations and its eternal consequences reaching on to the consummation of the kingdom of God. Comp. Ewald, p. 139, according to whom its contents turn upon the gospel as the centre and cardinal point of all divine-human history, and for that very reason touch all the problems both of history as a whole, and of the creation. Hofmann rightly includes also the *final* glory of believers.

*disciplina arcani*. With the main point in our view as a whole, —namely, that σοφία denotes that higher religious wisdom, and τέλειοι those already trained in Christian knowledge, grown up, as it were, to manhood, —Erasmus, Castalio, Estius, Bengel, Semler, Stolz, as well as Pott, Usteri, Schrader, Rückert, de Wette, Osiander, Ewald, Neander, Maier, Hofmann, accord. Chrysostom, however, Theophylact, Theodoret, Luther, Calvin, Beza, Grotius, Rosenmüller, and others, including Tittmann, Flatt, Billroth, and Olshausen, understand by the τέλειοι the *Christians* generally, or the *true* Christians, to whom the apostle's doctrine (σοφίαν λέγει τὸ κήρυγμα καὶ τὸν τρόπον τῆς σωτηρίας, τὸ διὰ σταυροῦ σωθῆναι, τελείους δὲ τοὺς πεπιστευκότας, Chrysostom), appeared as wisdom, not as folly. “Ea dicimus quae plena esse sapientiae judicabunt veri ac probi Christiani,” Grotius. But iii. 2 is decisive against this view; for there γάλα denotes the instruction of beginners as distinguished from the σοφία (βρῶμα). Comp. the appropriate remarks of Castalio on this passage. — σοφίαν δὲ οὐ τ. αἰῶν. τ.] *wisdom, however, which does not belong to this age* (δέ, as in Rom. iii. 22, ix. 30; Gal. ii. 2; Phil. ii. 8), which is not, like the Jewish and Hellenic philosophy, the product and intellectual property of the pre-Messianic age. Comp. i. 20. Αἰῶνος τούτου σοφίαν ὀνομάζει τὴν ἔξω, ὡς πρόσκαιρον καὶ τῷ αἰῶνι τούτῳ συγκαταλυομένην, Theophylact. — οὐδέ] also (in particular) not. — τῶν ἀρχ. τ. αἰῶν. τ.] These are the *rulers* generally (comp. Acts xiii. 27), the *dominant powers* (*proceres*) of the *pre-Messianic time* among Jews and Gentiles. But to say that Paul's meaning is that he does not teach *politics* (Grotius), is to limit his words in a way foreign to the connection; he affirms generally that the σοφία in question is a wisdom to which holders of temporal power are strangers. Comp. ver. 8. It is a mistake to explain the ἀρχ. τ. αἰῶν. τ. as referring either to influential *philosophers and men of learning*<sup>1</sup> (Theodoret, Theophylact, and others, including Pott; comp. Neander: “the intellectual rulers of the ancient world”), or to the *demons*, connecting it with 2 Cor. iv. 4, John xii. 31 (Marcion, Origen, some writers referred to by Chrysostom and Theophylact, also Ambrosiaster, Estius,

<sup>1</sup> These are not even *included* (in opposition to Chrysostom and others, including Osiander), although the ἀρχοντες may have accepted their wisdom, played the part of patrons to them, etc.

Bertholdt), both of these interpretations being incompatible with the words, and forbidden by ver. 8; or lastly, to the *Jewish archontes* alone (Cameron, Hammond, Vorstius, Lightfoot, Locke, Stolz, Rosenmüller), which is contrary to the general character of the expression, and not required by ver. 8 (see on ver. 8). — τῶν καταργ.] *which are done away with, i.e. cease to subsist* (i. 28, xv. 24; 2 Thess. ii. 8; 2 Tim. i. 10; Heb. ii. 14), namely, when Christ returning establishes *His kingdom*. Comp. Rev. xvi.—xix. This reference is implied in the context by the emphatic repetition of τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου. The expedient of explaining it into: "Whose power and influence are broken and brought to nought *by the gospel*," Billroth (comp. Flatt and Rückert), rationalizes the apostle's conception, and does not even accord with history. — The *present* participle, as in i. 18. Comp. 2 Cor. iii. 7.

Ver. 7. Θεοῦ σοφίαν] *God's philosophy*, of which *God* is the possessor, who has made it known to those who proclaim it, ver. 10. This Θεοῦ is with great emphasis prefixed; the repetition of λαλοῦμεν, too, carries with it a certain solemnity, comp. Rom. viii. 15; Phil. iv. 17. — ἐν μυστηρίῳ] does not belong to τὴν ἀποκεκρ. (with which it was connected expressly as early as Theodoret; comp. Grotius: "quae diu in arcano recondita fuit"), but to λαλοῦμεν (Erasmus, Estius, Rückert, Schrader, de Wette, Osiander, Hofmann), not, however, in the sense: "*secreto et apud pauciores*" (Estius, Cornelius a Lapide), since there is no mention of a *disciplina arcani* (see on ver. 6), but rather: *by means of a secret*, i.e. *by our delivering what has been secret* (a doctrine hidden from the human understanding, and revealed to us by God, see on Rom. xi. 25). To this is to be referred also the rendering of Rückert and Neander: *as a mystery*. Most interpreters, however, join ἐν μυστηρίῳ with σοφίαν, sc. οὐσαν: *God's secret wisdom* (unknown but for revelation). So also Pott, Heydenreich, Billroth, Tittmann, Usteri, Ewald. But the article, although after the anarthrous σοφίαν not in itself absolutely necessary, would be omitted here at the expense of clearness. Paul would have expressed himself with ambiguity, while he might easily have avoided it by τὴν ἐν μυστηρίῳ. On the other hand, if he joined ἐν μυστ. to λαλοῦμεν, he *could* not, seeing that he wished to prefix λαλ. for the sake of emphasis, write otherwise. — τὴν



ἀποκεκρ.] as respects its *nature*, by virtue of which it not only had been hidden from all preceding generations, but remained unknown apart from divine revelation. Comp. vv. 9, 10; Rom. xvi. 25. The word, which in itself might be dispensed with, is added in order to introduce the following statement with completeness and solemnity. — ἦν προῶρ. ὁ Θεὸς κ.τ.λ.] There is no ground here for supplying (with the *majority* of expositors, including Pott and Heydenreich) ἀποκαλύπτειν, γνωρίσαι, or the like, or (with Olshausen) a dative of the person; or yet for assuming, as do Billroth and Rückert, that Paul meant by ἦν the *object* of the wisdom, the *salvation* obtained through Christ. For προῶρ. has its complete and logically correct reference in εἰς δόξαν ἡμ. (comp. Eph. i. 5), so that the thought is: “to which wisdom God has, before the beginning of the ages of this world (in eternity), given the predestination that by it we should attain to glory.” This εἰς δόξ. ἡμ. corresponds significantly to the τῶν καταργ. of ver. 6, and denotes the Messianic glory of the Christians which is to begin with the Parousia (Rom. viii. 17, 29 f.; 1 Thess. ii. 12). That wisdom of God is destined in the eternal divine plan of salvation not to *become* (Hofmann) this glory, but to *establish* and to *realize* it. This destination it attains in virtue of the faith of the subjects (i. 21); but the reference to the *spiritual glorification on earth* is not even to be assumed as *included with* the other (in opposition to de Wette, Osiander, Neander, and many older expositors), as also the correlative τῆς δόξης in ver. 8 applies purely to the *heavenly* glory. Bengel says well: “olim revelandam, tum cum principes mundi destruentur.” It reveals itself then as the wisdom that *makes blessed*, having *attained* in the δόξα of believers the end designed for it by God before the beginning of the world.

Ver. 8. “Ἦν] Parallel with the preceding ἦν, and referring to Θεοῦ σοφίαν (Calvin, Grotius, and most commentators, including Flatt, Rückert, de Wette, Osiander, Hofmann), not to δόξ. ἡμῶν (Tertullian, *contra Marc.* v. 6, Camerarius, Pott, Billroth, Maier); for the essential point in the whole context is the non-recognition of that *wisdom*.<sup>1</sup> — εἰ γὰρ ἔγνωσαν κ.τ.λ.] *parenthetical proof from*

<sup>1</sup> The simple uniform continuation of the discourse by ἦν has a solemn emphasis here, as in Acts iv. 10, and especially often in the Epistle to the Ephesians. All the less reason is there for taking it, with Hofmann, as equivalent in this verse to ταύ-

*fact* for what has been just asserted; for the ἀλλά in ver. 9 refers to ἦν οὐδεὶς . . . ἔγνωκεν. The *crucifixion of Christ*, seeing that it was effected by Jewish and heathen rulers together, is here considered as the act of the ἄρχ. τ. αἰῶν. *collectively*. — τὸν Κύριον τῆς δόξης] Christ is the *Lord*, and, inasmuch as His qualitative characteristic condition is that of the divine glory in heaven, from which He came and to which He has returned (John xvii. 5; Luke xxiv. 26; Phil. iii. 20 f.; Col. iii. 1-4, *al.*), *the Lord of glory*. Comp. Jas. ii. 1. In a precisely analogous way God is called, in Eph. i. 17, ὁ πατὴρ τῆς δόξης. Comp. Acts vii. 2; Ps. xxiv. 7; Heb. ix. 5. In all these passages the expression of the adjectival notion by the genitive has rhetorical emphasis. Comp. Hermann, *ad Viger*. p. 887. This designation of Christ, however, is *purposely chosen* by way of antithesis to ἐσταύρωσαν; for ὁ σταυρὸς ἀδοξίας εἶναι δοκεῖ, Chrysostom. Had the ἄρχοντες known that σοφία Θεοῦ, then they would also have known Christ as what He is, the Κύριος τῆς δόξης, and would have received and honoured instead of shamefully crucifying Him. But what was *to them* wisdom was simply nothing more than selfish worldly prudence and spiritual foolishness; in accordance with it Annas and Caiaphas, Pilate and Herod, acted. Comp., generally, Luke xxiii. 34; Acts iii. 17.

Ver. 9. Ἀλλά] *but*, antithesis to ἦν οὐδεὶς τῶν ἀρχόντων τ. αἰ. τ. ἔγνωκεν.—The *passage of Scripture*, which Paul now adduces, is to be translated: "*What an eye hath not seen, nor an ear heard, and (what) hath not risen into the heart of a man, (namely :) all that God hath prepared for them that love Him.*" In the connection of our passage these words are still dependent upon λαλοῦμεν. Paul, that is to say, instead of affirming something further of the *wisdom itself*, and so continuing with another ἦν (which none of the rulers have known, *but which*), describes now the mysterious *contents* of this wisdom, and expresses himself accordingly in the *neuter* form (by αὐτή), to which he was induced in the flow of his discourse by the similar form of the *language of Scripture* which floated before his mind. The construction therefore is not anaco-

στην (Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 243 [F. T. 282]), and as introducing a new principal sentence. The asyndetic similar co-ordination of several relative clauses is, from Homer onward (see Ameis on the *Odys.* xxiii. 299, *append.*), a very common usage in the classics also.

luthic (Rückert hesitatingly; de Wette and Osiander, both of whom hold that it loses itself in the conception of the mysteries referred to); neither is it to be supplemented by γέγονε (Theophylact, Grotius). The connection with ver. 10, adopted by Lachmann (in his ed. min.), and in my first and second editions, and again resorted to by Hofmann: *what no eye has seen*, etc., *God, on the other hand* (δέ, see on i. 23), *has revealed to us*, etc., is not sufficiently simple, mars the symmetry of the discourse, and is finally set aside by the consideration that, since the quotation manifestly does not go beyond ἀγαπῶσιν αὐτόν, καθὼς γέγραπται logically would need to stand, not *before*, but *after* ἃ, because in reality this ἃ, and not the καθὼς γέγραπται, would introduce the object of ἀπεκάλυψεν. — καθὼς γέγραπ.] Chrysostom and Theophylact are in doubt as to what passage is meant, whether a *lost prophecy* (so Theodoret), or Isa. lii. 15. Origen, again, and other Fathers (Fabricius, *ad Cod. Apocr. N. T.* p. 342; *Pseudepigr. N. T.* I. p. 1072; Lücke, *Einleit. z. Offenb.* I. p. 235), with whom Schrader and Ewald agree, assume, amidst vehement opposition on the part of Jerome, that the citation is from the *Revelation of Elias*, in which Zacharias of Chrysopolis avers (*Harmonia Evang.* p. 343) that he himself had actually read the words. Grotius regards them as “*e scriptis Rabbinorum*, qui ea habuerunt ex traditione vetere.” Most interpreters, however, including Osiander and Hofmann, agree with Jerome (on Isa. lxiv. and *ad Pammach. epist.* ci.) in finding here a free quotation from Isa. lxiv. 4 (some holding that there is, besides, a reference to lii. 15, lxv. 17); see especially Surenhusius, *καταλλ.* p. 526 ff., also Riggenbach in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1855, p. 596 f. But the difference in sense—not to be got over by forced and artificial interpretation of the passage in Isaiah (see especially Hofmann)—and the dissimilarity in expression are too great, hardly presenting even faint resemblances; which is never elsewhere the case with Paul, however freely he may make his quotations. There seems, therefore, to remain no other escape from the difficulty than to give credit to the assertion—however much repugnance may have been shown to it in a dogmatic interest from Jerome downwards—made by Origen and others, that the words were from the *Apocalypsis Eliac.* So, too, Bleek in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1853, p. 330. But since it is only passages from the *canonical* Scriptures that are ever cited by Paul with

καθὼς γέγρα., we must at the same time assume that he *intended* to do so here also, but *by some confusion of memory took the apocryphal saying for a canonical passage possibly from the prophecies*, to which the passages of kindred sound in Isaiah might easily give occasion. Comp. also Weiss, *biblische Theol.* p. 298. — ἃ ὀφθαλμοῖς οὐκ εἶδε κ.τ.λ.] For similar designations in the classics and Rabbins of what cannot be apprehended by the senses or intellect, see Wetstein and Lightfoot, *Horae*, p. 162. Comp. Empedocles in Plutarch, *Mor.* p. 17 E: οὐτ' ἐπιδερκτὰ τὰδ' ἀνδράσω, οὐτ' ἐπακουστὰ, οὔτε νόῳ περιληπτὰ. With respect to ἀναβ. ἐπὶ καρδ., ὥς ἢ ἤγ, *to rise up to the heart*, that is, become a consciously apprehended object of feeling and thought, so that the thing enters as a conception into the sphere of activity of the inner life, comp. on Acts vii. 23. — τοῖς ἀγαπ. αὐτόν] *i.e.* in the apostle's view: *for the true Christians*.<sup>1</sup> See on Rom. viii. 28. What God has prepared for them is the salvation of the Messianic kingdom. Comp. Matt. xxv. 34. *Constitt. Apost.* vii. 32. 2: οἱ δὲ δίκαιοι πορεύσονται εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον κληρονομοῦντες ἐκεῖνα, ἃ ὀφθαλμοῖς οὐκ εἶδε κ.τ.λ.

Ver. 10. Having thus set forth the hitherto *hidden* character of the divine σοφία, Paul now turns to its *unveiling*, as a result of which it was that that λαλοῦμεν of ver. 6 f. took place. In doing this he puts ἡμῖν emphatically first in the deep consciousness of the distinction implied in so signal a mark of divine favour. The *object* of ἀπεκάλ. is the immediately preceding ἃ ἡτοίμασεν κ.τ.λ. — ἡμῖν] *plural*, as λαλοῦμεν in ver. 6, and therefore neither to be referred to the apostle alone (Rosenmüller, Rückert, and others), nor to all Christians (Billroth, etc.). — διὰ τοῦ πνεύμ. αὐτοῦ] The Holy Spirit, proceeding forth from God as the personal principle of Christian enlightenment, of every Christian endowment, and of the Christian life, *is the medium*, in His being communicated to men (ver. 12), of the divine revelation; He is the *bearer* of it; Eph. i. 17, iii. 3, 5; 1 Cor. xii. 11, xiv. 6, *al.* — τὸ γὰρ πνεῦμα κ.τ.λ.] Herewith begins the *adducing of proof*

<sup>1</sup> Clement, *ad Cor.* I. 34, in quoting this same passage (with his usual formula for scriptural quotations, λίγαι γάρ), has here τοῖς ὑπομίνουσιν αὐτόν, remembering perhaps Isa. lxiv. 4 in the LXX. Clement also, there can be no doubt, held the passage to be canonical, which is explained, however, by the fact of his being acquainted with our Epistle. The *Constitt. apost.* too, vii. 32. 2, have τοῖς ἀγαπῶσιν αὐτόν. The so-called second Epistle of Clement, chap. xi., has the passage only as far as ἀνίστη.

for that ἡμῶν δὲ ἀπεκάλυψεν κ.τ.λ. which continues on to ver. 12, to this effect, namely: *For the Spirit is familiar with the mysteries of God, because He alone stands in that unique relation as respects knowledge to God, which corresponds to the relation of the human spirit to man* (vv. 10, 11); *but what we have received is no other than this Spirit of God, in order that we might know the salvation of God* (ver. 12), so that no doubt remains that we have actually the ἀποκάλυψις in question through the Spirit. That τὸ πνεῦμα means not the *human spirit*, but the *Holy Spirit*, is certain from what goes before and from vv. 11, 12. — ἐρευνᾶ] rightly interpreted by Chrysostom: οὐκ ἀγνοίας, ἀλλ' ἀκριβοῦς γνώσεως ἐνταῦθα τὸ ἐρευνᾶν ἐνδεικτικόν. Comp. Ps. cxxxix. 1; Rom. viii. 27; Rev. ii. 23. The word expresses the *activity* of this knowledge. But Paul was not thinking of "God's knowing Himself in man" (Billroth, comp. Baur), or of any other such Hegelian views as they would impute to him. — πάντα] *all things*, without limitation. Comp. Wisd. vii. 23; Ps. cxxxix. 7. — τὰ βάθη τοῦ Θεοῦ] Comp. Judith viii. 14: βάθος καρδίας ἀνθρώπου; see on Rom. xi. 33, also Plato, *Theact.* p. 183 E. The expression: "*depths of God*," denotes the *whole rich exhaustless fulness* which is hidden in God,—all, therefore, that goes to make up His being, His attributes, His thoughts, plans, decrees, etc. These last (see vv. 9, 12), the βαθύβουλον (Aeschylus, *Pers.* 143) of the Godhead, are *included*; but we are not to suppose that they *alone* are meant. The opposite is τὰ βάθη τοῦ Σατανᾶ, Rev. ii. 24. The depths of God, unsearchable by the cognitive power of created spirits (comp. Rom. xi. 33), are penetrated by the cognitive activity of His own immanent principle of life and manifestation, so that this, *i.e.* the Holy Spirit, is the power [Potenz] of the divine self-knowledge. God is the subject knowing and the object known in the intrinsic divine activity of the Spirit, who is the substratum of the absolute self-consciousness of the Godhead, in like manner as the human spirit is the substratum of the human *Ego*.

Ver. 11 assigns the reason for the καὶ τὰ βάθη τοῦ Θεοῦ just mentioned, and that in such a way as to represent the searching of these βάθη as *exclusively* pertaining to the Spirit of God, according to the analogy of the relation between the spirit of man and man himself. — ἀνθρώπων] should neither, with Grotius, be held

superfluous nor, with Tittmann, be suspected (it is wanting in A, Or. 1, Athan. Cyr. Vigil. taps.); on the contrary, it is designed to carry special emphasis, like τοῦ ἀνθρώπου afterwards (which is wanting in F G, and some Fathers), hence also the position chosen for it: ἀνθρώπων τὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου: *no man knows what is man's, save the spirit of the man which is in him.*<sup>1</sup> Comp. Prov. xx. 27. Were what is peculiar to him not known to the spirit itself of the man (who is made the object of contemplation), in that case no man would have this knowledge of the man; it would not come within the region of *human* knowing at all. The man's own spirit knows it, but no other man.—We are not, with many expositors, including Pott and Flatt, to add βάθῃ by way of supplement to τὰ τοῦ ἀνθρ. or to τὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ. This would be a purely arbitrary limitation of the universal statement, to which τὰ βάθῃ, as a qualitative expression, is *subordinated*. What are meant are the *relations* in general of God and of man, more especially, from the context, the *inner* ones. The illustration adduced by Grotius serves to bring out the sense more clearly: "Principum abditos sensus quis novit nisi ipse principis animus?" — ἔγνωκε] *cognita habet*. See Bernhardt, p. 378. For the rest, this οὐδεὶς ἔγνωκε is, as a matter of course, said not as in distinction from the *Son* (Luke x. 22), but from the *creatures*.

REMARK.—The comparison in ver. 11 ought not to be pressed beyond the point compared. We are neither, therefore, to understand it so that the Spirit of God appears as the soul of the divine substance (Hallet; see, on the other hand, Heilmann, *Opusc.* II.), nor as if He were not distinct from God (see, on the contrary, ver. 10), but simply so that the Spirit of God, the ground of the divine personal life, appears in His relation to God *as the principle of the divine self-knowledge*, in the same way as the principle of the human self-knowledge is the πνεῦμα of the man, which constitutes his personal life. Hence God is known only by His Spirit, as the man is only by his spirit, as the vehicle of his own self-consciousness, not by another man. With τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ Θεοῦ, Paul does not again join τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ, because the *man's* spirit indeed is shut up *in* the man, but not so the Divine Spirit in God; the latter, on the contrary, goes forth from Him, is communicated, and is τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ. See ver. 12.

<sup>1</sup> The τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ is an *argumentative* definition.—In the man the subject knowing is the Ego of the personal self-consciousness, hence τὸ πνεῦμα, not ἡ ψυχή. Comp. Delitzsch, *biblische Psychologie*, p. 193; Krumm, *de notionib. psychol. Paul.* p. 16 f.

Ver. 12. Δε] leading on to the second half of the demonstration which began with τὸ γὰρ πνεῦμα in ver. 10 (see on ver. 10). — ἡμεῖς] as ἡμῖν in ver. 10. — τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ κόσμου] i.e. *the spirit which unbelieving mankind has*. This spirit is *the diabolic πνεῦμα*, that is, the spirit *proceeding forth from the devil*, under whose power the κόσμος lies, and whose sphere of action it is. See 2 Cor. iv. 4; Eph. vi. 11, 12, ii. 2. Comp. John xii. 31; 1 John iv. 3, v. 19. Had we received *this* spirit,—and here Paul glances back at the ἄρχοντες τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου in vv. 6, 8,—then assuredly the knowledge of the blessings of eternity would have remained closed for us, and (see ver. 13) instead of utterances taught by the Spirit we should use the language of the human wisdom of the schools. It is indeed the πνεῦμα τῆς πλάνης as contrasted with the πνεῦμα τῆς ἀληθείας, 1 John iv. 6. Most commentators take τὸ πνεῦμα in the sense of *mode of thought and view*, so that the meaning would be: “Non sumus instituti sapientia mundana et saeculari,” Estius. So Theophylact, and after him Beza, Calvin, Grotius, and many others, including Morus, Rosenmüller, Flatt, Heydenreich, de Wette, Maier, and similarly Pott. But, according to ver. 10, τὸ πνεῦμα *must* denote, in keeping with the context, the *objective* spirit opposed to the Spirit of God; and that is, according to the decided dualistic view of the apostle (comp. esp. Eph. ii. 2), the *diabolic πνεῦμα*, which has blinded the understanding of the unbelievers, 2 Cor. iv. 4. Billroth’s explanation: that it is the *non-absolute* spirit, the finite, in so far as it persists for itself and does not resolve itself into the divine, is a modern un-Pauline importation; and this holds, too, of Hofmann’s exposition: that it is the spirit, in virtue of which the world is conscious of itself, knowing itself, however, only in that way in which alone its sinful estrangement from God leaves it possible for it to do so, not in God, namely, but out of God. If that is not to be taken as the diabolic spirit, then the conception is simply an un-Pauline fabrication, artificially worded so as to explain away the diabolic character. Lastly, Rückert’s view, that Paul meant: “we have received our πνεῦμα not from the world, but from God,” cannot even be reconciled with the words of the passage. — τὸ ἐκ τ. Θεοῦ] The ἐκ is employed by Paul here not in order to avoid the appearance of making this πνεῦμα the principle that determines the action of God (so Kling in the

*Stud. u. Krit.* 1839, p. 435), which were a needless precaution, but because this form of expression has a significant adaptation to the ἵνα εἰδῶμεν κ.τ.λ.; there can be no doubt about this *knowing*, if it proceeds from the Spirit which is *from* God (which has gone forth upon believers; comp. ver. 11, τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ), John xv. 26. — ἵνα εἰδῶμεν κ.τ.λ.] the divine purpose in imparting the Spirit which proceeded forth from God. This clause, expressive of design, containing the object of the ἀπεκάλυψεν in ver. 10, completely winds up the adducing of proof for the ἡμῖν δὲ ἀπεκάλ. ὁ Θ. διὰ τ. πν. αὐτ. — τὰ ὑπὸ τ. Θεοῦ χαρ. ἡμῖν] are the blessings of the Messianic kingdom, the possession of which is bestowed by divine grace on the Christians (ἡμῖν), not, indeed, before the Parousia as an *actual* possession, but as an *ideal* one to be certainly entered upon hereafter (Rom. viii. 24, 30; Col. iii. 3, 4); comp. Rom. vi. 23; Eph. ii. 8, 9. That to take it ideally in this way is correct (in opposition to Hofmann), is clear from the consideration that τὰ χαρισθέντα must be identical with ἃ ἡτοίμασεν ὁ Θεὸς κ.τ.λ. in ver. 9, and with the δόξα ἡμ. in ver. 7.

Ver. 13. Having thus in vv. 10–12 given the proof of that ἡμῖν δὲ ἀπεκάλ. κ.τ.λ., the apostle goes on now to the *manner in which* the things revealed were *proclaimed*, passing, therefore, from the εἰδέναι τὰ χαρ. to the λαλεῖν of them. The manner, negative and positive, of this λαλεῖν (comp. ver. 4) he links to what has gone before simply by the relative: *which* (namely, τὰ . . . χαρισθ. ἡμ.) *we also* (in accordance with the fact of our having received the Spirit, ver. 12) *utter not in words learned of human wisdom* (dialectics, rhetoric, etc.), *but in those learned of the Spirit*. The genitives: ἀνθρωπ. σοφ. and πνεύματος, are dependent on διδακτοῖς (John vi. 45). See Winer, pp. 182, 178 [E. T. 242, 236]. Pflugk, *ad Eur. Hec.* 1135. Comp. Pindar, *Ol.* ix. 153: πολλοὶ δὲ διδακταῖς ἀνθρώπων ἀρεταῖς κλέος ὥρουσαν ἐλίσθαι· ἄνευ δὲ θεοῦ κ.τ.λ., comp. *Nem.* iii. 71. Sophocles, *El.* 336: τὰ μὰ νουθετήματα κείνης διδακτά. It is true that the genitives might also be dependent upon λόγοις (Fritzsche, *Diss. II. in 2 Cor.* p. 27); but the context, having διδακτοῖς πνεύματος, is against this. To take διδακτοῖς (with Ewald) as meaning, according to the common classical usage, *learnable, quae doceri possunt* (see especially Demosth. 1413. 24; Plato, *Prot.* p. 319 B: οὐ διδακτὸν



εἶναι μὴδ' ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων παρασκευαστὸν ἀνθρώποις), does not agree so well with vv. 4 and 15.—The *suggestio verborum*, here asserted, is reduced to its right measure by διδασκατοῖς; for that word excludes all idea of anything mechanical, and implies the living self-appropriation of that mode of expression which was specifically suitable both to the divine inspiration and to its contents (“verba rem sequuntur,” Wetstein),—an appropriation capable of being connected in very different forms with different given individualities (Peter, Paul, Apollos, James, etc.), and of presenting itself in each case with a corresponding variety.—πνευματικοῖς πνευματικὰ συγκρίνοντας] *connecting*<sup>1</sup> *spiritual things with spiritual*, not *uniting things unlike in nature*, which would be the case, were we to give forth what was revealed by the *Holy Spirit* in the speech of *human wisdom*, in philosophic discourse, but joining to the matters revealed by the Spirit (πνευματικοῖς) the speech also taught by the Spirit (πνευματικὰ),—things consequently of *like nature*, “spiritualibus spiritualia componentes” (Castalio). So in substance also Erasmus, Beza, Calvin, Balduin, Wolf, Baumgarten, Kling in the *Stud. und Krit.* 1839, p. 437, de Wette, Osiander, Maier, etc., and rightly, since this sense suits the connection singularly well, and does not in any degree clash with the classical use of συγκρίνειν (Valckenaer, p. 134 f.; Porson, *ad Med.* 136). Plato has it frequently in this meaning, and in contrast to διακρίνειν. See Ast, *Lec. Plat.* III. p. 290 f. Other commentators, while also taking πνευματ. as *neuter*, make συγκρίνειν, *explicare*, namely, either: *explaining the N. T. doctrine from the types of the O. T.* (Chrysostom and his successors<sup>2</sup>), or: “exponentes ea, quae prophetae Spiritu Dei acti dixere, per ea, quae Christus suo Spiritu nobis aperuit” (Grotius, Krebs), or: “spiritualibus verbis spiritualia interpretantes” (Elsner, Mosheim, Bolten, Neander). But the first two of these renderings are against the context, and all the three are against the *usus loquendi*; for συγκρίνειν is never absolutely *interpretari*, either in

<sup>1</sup> Not *proving*, as Theodore of Mopsuestia takes it: διὰ τῶν τοῦ πνεύματος ἀποδείξων τὴν τοῦ πνεύματος διδασκαλίαν πιστούμεθα.

<sup>2</sup> So, too, Theodore: ἔχομεν γὰρ τῆς παλαιᾶς διαθήκης τὴν μαρτυρίαν, καὶ δι' ἐκείνης τὴν καινὴν βεβαιούμεν πνευματικὴν γὰρ κἀκείνη. . . καὶ διὰ τῶν τύπων δείκνυμεν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. Several of the older interpreters follow the Greeks in substance, including Calovius, who, on the ground of this passage, declares himself against the explanation of Scripture from profane writers!

profane Greek (in which, among later writers, as also in 2 Cor. x. 12, Wisd. vii. 29, xv. 18, 1 Macc. x. 71, it very often means to *compare*; comp. Vulgate: *comparantes*, and see Lobeck, *ad Phryg.* p. 278) or in the LXX. With the latter it is indeed the common word for the *interpretation of dreams* (פִּתְרִי, see Gen. xl. 8, 16, 22, xli. 12, 15; Dan. v. 12); but in such cases (comp. the passages from Philo, where διακρίνειν occurs, in Loesner, p. 273) we have to trace it back to the literal signification of *judging*,<sup>1</sup> namely, as to what was to be indicated by the vision in the dream (comp. κρίνειν τὸ σημαίνόμενον τῶν ὀνειράτων in Josephus, *Antt.* ii. 2. 2, also the Ὀνειροκριτικά of Artemidorus). The meaning, *to judge*, however, although instances of it may be established in Greek writers also (Anthol. vii. 132; Polybius, xiv. 3. 7, xii. 10. 1; Lucian. *Soloecc.* 5), would be unsuitable here, for this reason, that the phrase πνευματικοῖς πνευματικά, both being taken as neuter, manifestly, according to the context, expresses the relation of matter and form, not the judging of the one πνευματικόν by the other (Ewald), notwithstanding that Luther, too, adopts a similar interpretation: "*and judge spiritual things spiritually.*" Lastly, it is incorrect to take πνευματικοῖς as masculine, and render: *explaining things revealed by the Spirit to those who are led by the Spirit* (the same as τελείοις in ver. 6; comp. Gal. vi. 1). This is the view of Pelagius, Sedulius, Theophylact (suggested only), Thomas, Estius, Clericus, Bengel, Rosenmüller, Pott, Heydenreich, Flatt, Billroth, Rückert. To the same class belongs the exposition of Hofmann, according to whom what is meant is the *solution of the problem* as to how *the world beyond and hereafter* reveals and foreshows itself in what God's grace *has already bestowed* upon us (ver. 12) in a predictive sign as it were,—a solution which has spiritual things for its object, and takes place for those who are spiritual. But the text does not contain either a contrast between the world here and that hereafter, or a problematic relation of the one to the other; the contrast is introduced into τὰ χαρισθέντα in ver. 12,

<sup>1</sup> Hence, in Dan. v. 16 (in the history of the mysterious writing on the wall, which had to be judged of with respect to its meaning): δύνασαι κρίματα συγκρίναι, thou canst *pronounce utterances of judgment*. Comp. the phrase, recurring more than once in that same story of Belshazzar, in Dan. v.: τὴν σύγκρισιν γνωρίζειν, or: ἀναγγέλλειν: to make known or declare the judgment (as to what that marvellous writing might signify).

and the problem and its predictive sign are imported into *συγκρίνοντες*.<sup>1</sup> Again, it is by no means required by the connection with ver. 14 ff. that we should take *πνευματικοῖς* as masculine; for ver. 14 begins a new part of the discourse, so that *ψυχικός ἄνθρωπος* only finds its personal contrast in *ὁ δὲ πνευματικός* in ver. 15. Tittmann's explanation (*Synon.* p. 290 f., and comp. Baur) comes back to the sense: *conveying* (*conferentes*) spiritual things to spiritual persons, without linguistic precedent for it. — Note the weighty collocation: *πνεύματος, πνευματικοῖς, πνευματικά*.

Ver. 14. To receive such teaching, however, in which *πνευματικά* are united with *πνευματικοῖς*, every one has not the capacity; a psychical man apprehends not that which is of the Spirit of God, etc. — *ψυχικός ἄνθρωπος* is the opposite of the *πνευματικός* who has received the Holy Spirit (vv. 12 f., 15); he is therefore one *πνεῦμα* (the Holy Spirit) *μὴ ἔχων* (Jude 19). Such a man—who is not essentially different from the *σαρκικός* (see on iii. 1), but the mental side of whose nature is here brought forward by the word *ψυχικός*—is not enlightened and sanctified by the Spirit of God, but is governed by the *ψυχή*, the principle of life for the *σάρξ*, so that the sphere in which he works and strives is not that of the divine truth and the divine *ζωή*, but the purely human activity of the understanding, and, as regards practical things, the interests of the life of sense, the *ἐπιθυμια ψυχικά*, 4 Macc. i. 32, the *ἐπιθυμιαὶ ἀνθρώπων*, not the *θέλημα Θεοῦ*, 1 Pet. iv. 2. Comp. generally, Weiss, *biblische Theol.* p. 270 f. The higher principle of life, the human *πνεῦμα*,<sup>2</sup> which he has,

<sup>1</sup> Hofmann expounds as if Paul had written in ver. 12 f.: τὰ ἤδη νῦν ὑπὸ τ. θ. χαρισθέντα ἡμῖν, σημεῖα ὄντα τῶν μελλόντων, αὐ καὶ συγκρίνομεν . . . πνευματικοῖς πνευματικὰ λαλοῦντες. Comp. on the latter expression, Maximus Tyrius, xxii. 4: συνετὰ συνεισὶς λέγων.

<sup>2</sup> The distinction between *ψυχή* and *πνεῦμα*, as that which separates from each other the agencies of the lower and the higher life, answers certainly to the Platonic threefold division of man's nature into body, soul, and spirit (see, especially, Olshausen, *de naturae humanae trichotomia N. T. scriptoribus recepta*, in his *Opusc.* Berol. 1834, p. 143 ff.; and, on the other side, Hahn, *Theol. d. N. T.* i. p. 391 ff.). Not, however, as if Paul had borrowed this trichotomy (see, especially, 1 Thess. v. 23; comp. also Heb. iv. 12) from the Platonic philosophy, but this Platonic type of anthropology, current also with Philo and the Rabbinical writers, had, like the phrase *ὁ ἔσω* and *ὁ ἔξω ἄνθρωπος* (see on Eph. iii. 16), become popular (comp. Josephus, *Ant.* i. 1. 2, according to which God breathed *πνεῦμα* and *ψυχὴν* into man when first formed), and subsisted alongside of the twofold conception and the corresponding mode of expression

is not laid hold of and quickened by the Holy Spirit; the regeneration by the Holy Spirit, who operates upon the human spirit and thereby brings about the renewal of the man (comp. John iii. 6), has not yet taken place with him; hence the *psychical* man is really the *natural* man, *i.e.* not yet enlightened and sanctified by the Spirit of God, not yet born again,<sup>1</sup> although, at the same time, *ψυχικός* means not *naturalis* (*i.e.* *φυσικός* in contrast to *διδασκτός*, *τεχνικός*, and the like; comp. Polyb. vi. 4. 7: *φυσικῶς καὶ ἀκατασκεύως*), but *animalis* (Vulgate). Comp. *ψυχικὴ σοφία* as contrasted with that *ἄνωθεν κατερχομένη*, Jas. iii. 15. Many have taken up the idea in a one-sided way, either in a merely *intellectual* reference (*τὸν μόνους τοῖς οἰκείοις ἀρκούμενον λογισμοῖς*, Theodoret; see also Chrysostom, Theophylact, Beza, Grotius, Heydenreich, Pott; comp. too, Wieseler *on Gal.* p. 451), or in a merely *ethical* one (a man obedient to sensual desires; so, and in some cases, with an exaggerated stress on the sinfulness involved, it is interpreted by Erasmus, Vitringa, Limborch, Clericus, Rosenmüller, Valckenaer, Krause, and others). The two elements cannot be separated from each other without quite an arbitrary act of division. — *οὐ δέχεται*] The question whether this means: *he is unsusceptible of it, does not understand* (Vulgate, Castalio, Beza,

(v. 3 f., vii. 34; 2 Cor. vii. 1; Rom. viii. 10 f., *al.*). Comp. Lünemann on 1 Thess. v. 23. Luther, as early as 1521, has some excellent remarks on the trichotomy (printed also in Delitzsch's *bibl. Psychol.* p. 392 f.). He likens the *πνεῦμα* to the *Sanctum sanctorum*, the *ψυχή* to the *Sanctum*, and the *σῶμα* to the *Atrium*. Against Hofmann's arbitrary explaining away of a real threefold division (in his *Schriftbeweis*, I. p. 297 f.), see Krumm, *de notionibus psychol. Pauli*, p. 1 ff.; Delitzsch, *loc. cit.* p. 87 ff.; Ernesti, *Ursprung d. Sünde*, II. p. 76 f. We may add, that Hofmann is wrong in saying, with respect to this passage, that it has nothing whatever to do with the question about the dichotomy or trichotomy. It has to do with it, inasmuch as in virtue of the contrast between *ψυχικός* and *πνευματικός*, the *ψυχή* cannot be the seat and sphere of operation of the Divine Spirit, which is to be found rather in the human *πνεῦμα*, and consequently must be conceived as specifically *distinct* from the latter.

<sup>1</sup> Luther's gloss is: "The *natural* man is as he is *apart from grace*, albeit decked out as bravely as may be with all the reason, skill, sense, and faculty in the world." Comp. Calovius, who insists with justice against Grotius, that *ψυχικός* and *σαρκικός* differ only "*ratione formalis significationis*." Paul might have used *σαρκικός* here too (see on iii. 1); but *ψυχικός* naturally suggested itself to him as correlative to *δείχεται*; for the *ψυχή* cannot be the *receptaculum* of that which is of the Spirit of God. According to Ewald, the word points to the Greek *philosophers*, being a *gentle* way of designating them. But the expression is quite general; and how easy it would have been for Paul to let it be definitely known that the reference was to the philosophers (by *σοφῆς τοῦ κόσμου*, for example, or in some other way)!

Piscator, Grotius, Rückert, *et al.*); or: *he does not accept, respuir* (Peschito, Erasmus, and others, including Tittmann, Flatt, Billroth, de Wette, Osiander, Ewald, Maier), falls to be decided in favour of the *latter* view by the standing use of *δέχεσθαι* in the N. T. when referring to doctrine. See Luke viii. 13; Acts viii. 14, xi. 1, xvii. 11; 1 Thess. i. 6, ii. 13. Comp. 2 Thess. ii. 10; 2 Cor. viii. 17. — τὰ τοῦ πν.] *what comes from the Spirit*. This applies both to the matter and form of the teaching. See ver. 13. — *μωρία γὰρ . . . γινῶναι*] *ground of this οὐ δέχεται κ.τ.λ.*: *It is folly to him, i.e.* (as i. 18) *it stands to him in the practical relation of being something absurd, and he is not in a position to discern it*. The latter clause is not covered by the former (Hofmann), but appends to the relation of the object to the subject the corresponding relation of the subject to the object.—The statement of the *reason* for both of these connected clauses is: *ὅτι πνευματικῶς ἀνακρίνεται*: *because they (τὰ τοῦ πνεύμ.) are judged of after a spiritual fashion* (iv. 3, xiv. 24), *i.e.* because the investigative (*ἀνα*) judgment of them (the searching into and estimating their nature and meaning) is a task which, by reason of the nature of the subject-matter to be dealt with, can be performed in accordance with its own essential character in no other way than *by means of a proving and judging empowered and guided by the Holy Spirit* (a power which is wanting to the *ψυχικός*). *Πνευματικῶς*, that is to say, refers not to the *human* spirit, but to the *Holy Spirit* (see ver. 13) who fills the human spirit, and by the hallowing influence of divine enlightenment and power capacitates it for the *ἀνακρίνειν* of the doctrines of teachers filled with the Spirit who address it, so that this *ἀνακρίνειν* is an activity which proceeds *in a mode empowered and guided by the Spirit*. We may add that *ἀνακρίν.* does not mean: *must be judged of* (Luther and many others, among whom are Tittmann, Flatt, and Pott), but it expresses the characteristic relation, *which takes place; they are subject to spiritual judgment*. That is an *axiom*. But *this very sort of ἀνάκρισις* is what is lacking in the *ψυχικός*.

Ver. 15. *He who is spiritual, on the other hand, judges all things, but is for his own part (αὐτός) judged by no one; so lofty is his position, high above all the ψυχικοῖς, to whom he is a riddle, not to be read by their unenlightened powers of judging, to which τὰ τοῦ πνεύματος are folly! — ὁ πνευματικός]* he who stands under

the influence of the Holy Spirit, enlightened and led by Him. Comp. on *πνευματικῶς* in ver. 14. — *τὰ πάντα*] (see the critical remarks<sup>1</sup>) receives from the context no further limitation than that of the article, which is not *unsuitable* (Hofmann), but denotes the *totality of what presents itself to his judging*, so that it does not apply merely to *τὰ τοῦ πνεύματος* (Ewald : “all the deepest and most salutary divine truths”), the *ἀνακρίνειν* of which, on the part of the *πνευματικός*, is a matter of course, but means *all* objects that come within the sphere of his judgment. To everything that comes before him he can assign the right estimate in virtue of his power of judgment, enlightened and upheld by the Holy Spirit. He has the true critical eye of the *δοκιμάζειν* (1 Thess. v. 21) for all that offers itself to him to be judged. How often has Paul himself displayed this *ἀνάκρισις πνευματικῇ*, and that, too, in matters not connected with doctrine, under situations the most varied! *e.g.* in his wise availing himself of circumstances when persecuted and put on trial, during his last voyage, etc.; in his decisions concerning matrimonial questions, contentings at law, slavery, collections, and the like, in regard to which he manages with consummate tact, and with the most wonderful clearness, precision, and impartiality, to subject everything to the standard of a higher spiritual point of view; in his estimate of the different persons with whom he comes into contact; in the mode in which he adapts himself to given relations: in his sublime judgments, such as iii. 22; in his powerful self-witness, 2 Cor. vi. 4 ff.; in his noble independence from earthly things, 1 Cor. vii. 29 ff.; Phil. iv. 11 ff. — *ὅτι οὐδενός*] namely, who is not also *πνευματικός*. This follows necessarily from the foregoing *ὁ πνευματ. ἀνακρίνει τὰ πάντα*. Comp. too, 1 John iv. 1. The standpoint

<sup>1</sup> In connection with the reading *πάντα*, those who take it as *masculine* explain the clause very variously; *either*: “Quando audit alium loquentem vel docentem, illico dignoscere potest et dijudicare, utrum sit ex Deo necne” (Bos, Alberti); *or*: “Ego quidem . . . quemlibet profanum . . . dijudicare adeoque a *πνευματικοῖς* s. vere collustratis dignoscere possum” (Pott); *or*: “Convincere quemlibet profanum erroris potest” (Nösselt, Rosenmüller). Were the reading genuine, and *πάντα* *masculine*, it is only the first of these renderings that would be admissible; for, according to ver. 14, *ἀνακρ.* cannot mean *erroris convincere* (against Nösselt), and to restrict *πάντα* to the profane would be entirely unwarranted by the context, as is plain from *πνευματικῶς ἀνακρίνεται* in ver. 14 (against Nösselt and Pott). At the same time, it would also be arbitrary in adopting the first view to refer it only to the *loqui* or *docere*, and not also to deeds and other expressions of the life.

of the psychical man is too low, and his mode of thought too foreign in its presuppositions and principles, for him to be able to understand and judge of the pneumatic. In like manner, the blind (see as early as Chrysostom and Theophylact) cannot judge of the painter, nor the deaf of the musician.—How Roman Catholic writers have sought to render ver. 15, standing opposed as it does to the authority claimed by the church, serviceable to their own side, may be seen, *e.g.*, in Cornelius a Lapide: “Sin autem nova oriatur quaestio in fide aut moribus, eaque obscura et dubia, eadem prudentia dictat homini spirituali . . . ejusdem Spiritus judicio *recurrendum esse ad superiores, ad doctores, ad ecclesiam Romanam quasi matricem,*” etc.

Ver. 16. Proof for the αὐτὸς δὲ ὑπ’ οὐδενὸς ἀνακρίνεται. “For in order to judge of the πνευματικός, one would need to have known the mind of Christ, which we πνευματικοί are in possession of—to be able to act the part of teacher to Christ.” The form of this proof is an imperfect syllogism, the last proposition in which, as being self-evident, is not expressed.<sup>1</sup> The major proposition is clothed in the words of Isa. xl. 13 (substantially after the LXX.), comp. Rom. xi. 34. There, indeed, Κύριος applies to God; but Paul, appropriating the words freely for the expression of his own thought, applies it here to Christ (against Calvin, Grotius, and most older interpreters, also Platt, Osiander, Ewald, Hofmann), as the minor proposition ἡμεῖς δὲ κ.τ.λ. proves.—The νοῦς Κυρίου is the *understanding* of the Lord, embracing His thoughts, judgments, measures, plans, etc., the νοῦς being the faculty where these originate and are elaborated. The conception is not identical with that of the πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ (against Billroth, Neander, and many others), which rather, when imparted to man, makes his νοῦς the νοῦς Χριστοῦ, not being *itself* the νοῦς Χ., but that which constitutes its *substratum*. — ὃς συμβιβ. αὐτόν] *qui instructurus sit eum*, i.e. in order (after thus coming to know him) to instruct Him. See on this use of ὃς, Matthiae, II. p. 1068; Kühner, II. p. 529 ff. Regarding συμβιβάζειν, which is frequent in the LXX. in the sense of *instruere, docere*, but does

<sup>1</sup> Fully expressed, it would run thus: *No one can know the mind of Christ so as to instruct Him: but we, we πνευματικοί, are they who have the mind of Christ; therefore we are they also whom no one can know so as to instruct them, that is, just they who ὑπ’ οὐδενὸς ἀνακρίνονται, ver. 15.*

not occur with that meaning in Greek writers, see Schleusner, *Thes.* V. p. 154. This *ὁς συμβ. αὐτόν* is not "rather superfluously" taken in along with the rest of the quotation (Rückert), but is included as essential to the proof of the *ὕπ' οὐδενὸς ἀνακρίνεται*, since the *forming a judgment* assumes the capacity to *instruct* (act as master). This, then, is what he who would judge the *πνευματικοί* must be capable of doing with respect to *Christ*, since these have the mind of *Christ*. Chrysostom says well: *ὁς συμβιβάζει αὐτόν, οὐχ ἀπλῶς προσέθηκεν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ὃ εἶπεν ἥδη, ὅτι τὸν πνευματικὸν οὐδεὶς ἀνακρίνει· εἰ γὰρ εἶδέναι οὐδεὶς δύναται τοῦ Θεοῦ* (rather *Christ's*) *τὸν νοῦν, πολλῶ μᾶλλον διδάσκειν καὶ διορθοῦσθαι.*—To refer *αὐτόν*, with Nösselt (*Opusc.* II. p. 137 f.), to the *πνευματικός* (so, too, Rosenmüller and Tittmann, *l.c.* p. 294), is an involved construction rendered necessary only by failure to catch the simple course of proof. — *ἡμεῖς δὲ νοῦν X. ἔχ.*] the *minor proposition*, with the emphasis on *ἡμεῖς*, and the explanatory *Χριστοῦ* in place of *Κυρίου*. Paul includes himself along with the rest among the *πνευματικοί*. These are the *possessors* (*ἔχομεν*) of the mind of Christ. For, since they have the *Spirit* of Christ (Rom. viii. 9, 16), and since Christ is in them (Rom. viii. 10; 2 Cor. xiii. 5), their *νοῦς*, too, can be no mental faculty different in kind from the *νοῦς Χριστοῦ*, but must, on the contrary, be as ideally one with it, as it is true that Christ Himself lives in them (Gal. ii. 20), and the heart of Christ beats in them (Phil. i. 8), and He speaks in them (2 Cor. xiii. 3). Comp. respecting this indwelling of Christ in His believers, the idea in Gal. iii. 27; Rom. xiii. 14. *Οὐ γὰρ Πλάτωνος, οὐδὲ Πυθαγόρου*, says Chrysostom, *ἀλλ' ὁ Χριστὸς τὰ ἑαυτοῦ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ἐνέθηκε διανοίᾳ.* Many commentators (not recognising the process of proof) have interpreted *ἔχομεν* as *perspectam habemus* (see Tittmann, *l.c.*), as *e.g.* Rosenmüller and Flatt: "We know the meaning of the doctrine of Christ;" or Grotius: "Novimus Dei consilia, quae Christo fuere revelata."



## CHAPTER III.

VER. 1. καὶ ἐγώ] A B C D E F G 8, min. Clem. Or. Chrys. Damasc. read καὶ γώ, which Griesb. Lachm. Scholz, Rückert, Tisch. have adopted, and justly, considering the decisive testimony in its favour. — σαρκικοῖς] Griesb. Lachm. Rückert, Tisch. read σαρκίνους, with A B C\* D\* 8, 67\*\* 71, Clem. Or. Nyss. To be preferred on like grounds as in Rom. vii. 14. Here the interchange was especially aided by ver. 3, where, according to the preponderance of evidence, σαρκιν. is the true reading; for the fact that D\* F G, Or. Nyss. have σάρκιν. in ver. 3 also, is simply to be set down as the result of mechanical repetition from ver. 1, the difference in the sense not being recognised.<sup>1</sup> — Ver. 2. οὐδέ] Elz. has οὔτε, in opposition to all the uncials and most Fathers. The former is necessary here (Fritzsche, *ad Marc.* p. 157), but had οὔτε very often substituted for it by the transcribers. — ἐτι] is wanting in B; bracketed by Lachm. But how easily it might fall aside after οὐδέ through similarity in sound, or on the ground that it might be dispensed with when νῦν followed! — Ver. 3. καὶ διχοστασίας] omitted in A B C 8, some min. and several vss. and Fathers. Deleted by Lachm. Rückert, and Tisch. Were it genuine, why should it have been left out? An addition by way of gloss (even in texts used by Irenaeus and Cyprian) from Gal. v. 20. — Ver. 4. ἄνθρωποι] adopted also by Lachm. Rückert, and Tisch., followed by Ewald, according to almost all the uncials and several vss. and Fathers. The *Recepta*

<sup>1</sup> Fritzsche, indeed (*ad Rom.* II. p. 46, and *de conform. N. T. Lachm.* p. 49), holds that the form σάρκινος in this passage, Rom. vii. 14, and Heb. vii. 16, is an offspring of the transcribers. But it was precisely the other form σαρκικός, so well known and familiar to them, which thrust itself upon the copyists for involuntary or even deliberate adoption. Reiche, in his *Comment. crit.* I. p. 138, has made the most elaborate defence of the *Recepta*, and attempted to weaken the force of the evidence on the other side. See the same author, too, on Heb. vii. 16. The most decisive argument from the external evidence against the *Recepta* is, that precisely the weightiest Codices A B C 8, are equally unanimous in reading σάρκινος in ver. 1, and σαρκικοί in ver. 3; and we cannot at all see why the hand of an emendator should have inserted the more classical word only in ver. 1, while leaving the unclassical σαρκικοί in ver. 3. Besides, we have σαρκίαις in 2 Cor. iii. 3, entirely without any various reading σαρκικαῖς, from which we may conclude that the distinction in meaning between the two words was well known to the transcribers.

*σαρκικοί*, although still defended by Fritzsche and Reiche, is so decidedly condemned by the critical evidence (among the uncials they have only L and  $\kappa^{**}$ ), that it must be regarded as derived from ver. 3. Οὐχί, too, has flowed from the same source, instead of which, οὐκ is to be restored, with Lachm. Rückert, and Tisch., in accordance with A B C  $\kappa^*$ , 17, Dam. — Ver. 5. *τίς*] Lachm. and Rückert read *τί*, with A B  $\kappa$ , min. Vulg. It. Aeth. and Latin Fathers. The personal names very naturally suggested the masculine to transcribers.—The order Παῦλος . . . Ἀπολλῶς (in Elz. and Scholz) arose from ver. 4 ; compare i. 12.—Before *διάκονοι*, Elz. and Tisch. have ἀλλ' ἥ, which, however, from the decisive weight of testimony against it, must be regarded as an addition to denote the sense: *nisi nisi*. — Ver. 12. *τοῦτον*] is wanting in A B C\*  $\kappa^*$ , Sahid. Ambr. Deleted by Lachm. and Rückert. The omission, however, was easily occasioned by *Homoioteleuton*, and was aided by the fact that the word could be dispensed with. — Ver. 13. *τὸ πῦρ*] Lachm. Rückert, and Tisch. read *τὸ πῦρ αὐτό*, with A B C, min. Sahid. and several Fathers. Rightly ; the αὐτό not being in any way essential was easily disregarded. — Ver. 17. *τοῦτον*] Lachm. and Rückert have αὐτόν, which Griesb. too recommended, with A D E F G, min. Syr. Arr. Aeth. Arm. Syr. p. (on the margin) Vulg. and It. (*illum*), and Latin Fathers. But, after εἰ τις in the protasis, αὐτόν offered itself in the apodosis as the more common. — Ver. 22. *ἐστίν*] has preponderant evidence against it. Suspected by Griesb., deleted by Lachm. Rückert, and Tisch. A repetition from ver. 21.

Vv. 1-4. *Application of the foregoing section (ii. 6-16) to the Apostle's relation to the Corinthians.*

Ver. 1. *Κἀγώ*] *I also*. This *also* of comparison has its inner ground in the reproach alluded to, that he ought to have taught in a higher strain, and so ought to have delivered to the Corinthians that Θεοῦ σοφίαν spoken of in ver. 6 f. *Even as no other could have done this, so I also could not*. There is no reason, therefore, for holding, with de Wette (comp. Billroth), that καὶ ὑμῶν would have been a more stringent way of putting it.—ἀλλ' ὥς σαρκίνοις] namely, *had I to speak to you*. See Kühner, II. p. 604. Krüger on Thuc. i. 142. 4, and on Xen. *Anab.* vii. 2. 28. This brevity of expression is Zeugmatic. Σάρκινος (see the critical remarks) is: *fleshy* (2 Cor. iii. 3), not equivalent to σαρκικός, *fleshly*. See on Rom. vii. 14. Winer, p. 93 [E. T. 122], and Fritzsche, *ad Rom.* II. p. 46. Here, as in Rom. *l.c.* and Heb. vii. 16 (see Delitzsch *in loc.*), the expression is specially chosen in order to denote more strongly the unspiritual nature: *as to fleshy persons*, as to those

who have as yet experienced so little of the influence of the Holy Spirit, that the *σάρξ*—*i.e.* the nature of the natural man, which is opposed since the fall to the Spirit of God, and which, as the seat of the sin-principle and of lust, gives rise to the incapacity to recognise the sway of the Divine Spirit (comp. ii. 14), and to follow the drawing of the *νοῦς* towards the divine will (Rom. vii. 18, 25), by virtue of the Divine Spirit (see on Rom. iv. 1, vi. 19, vii. 14, viii. 5 ff.)—seemed to make up their whole being. They were still in too great a measure only “flesh born of the flesh” (John iii. 6), and still lay too much, especially in an intellectual relation, under the *ἀσθενεία τῆς σαρκός* (Rom. vi. 19), although they might also be in part *φυσιοῦμενοι ὑπὸ τοῦ νοὸς τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτῶν* (Col. ii. 18),—so that Paul, in order *strongly* to express their condition at that time, could call them *fleshy*. By *σάρκινος*, therefore, he indicates the *unspiritual* nature of the Corinthians,—*i.e.* a nature ruled by the limitations and impulses of the *σάρξ*, not yet changed by the Holy Spirit,—the nature which they still had when *at the stage of their first noviciate in the Christian life*. At a *later* date (see ver. 3) they appear as still at least *σαρκικοί* (guiding themselves according to the *σάρξ*, and disobedient to the *πνεῦμα*); for although, in connection with continued Christian instruction, they had become more effectually partakers also of the influence of the Divine Spirit, nevertheless,—as their sectarian tendencies (see ver. 3) gave proof,—they had not so followed this divine principle as to prevent the sensuous nature opposed to it (the *σάρξ*) from getting the upper hand with them in a moral and intellectual respect, so that they were consequently still *κατὰ σάρκα* and *ἐν σαρκί* (Rom. viii. 5, 8), *τὰ τῆς σαρκὸς φρονούντες* (Rom. viii. 5), *κατὰ σάρκα καυχώμενοι* (2 Cor. xi. 18), *ἐν σοφίᾳ σαρκικῇ* (2 Cor. i. 12), etc. It is therefore with true and delicate acumen that Paul uses in ver. 1 and ver. 3 these two different expressions each in its proper place, *upbraiding* his readers, not indeed by the former, but certainly by the latter, with their unspiritual condition.<sup>1</sup> The ethical notions conveyed

<sup>1</sup> According to Hofmann,—who, for the rest, defines the two notions with substantial correctness,—the distinction between *σάρκινος* and *σαρκικός* answers to that between *εἶναι ἐν σαρκί* and *κατὰ σάρκα*, Rom. viii. 5, 8. But the latter two phrases differ from each other, not in their real meaning, but only in the form of representation.—Holsten, too, *z. Ev. d. Paul. u. Petr.* p. 397 f., has in substance hit the true distinction between *σάρκινος* and *σαρκικός*.

by the two terms are not the *same*, but of the same *kind*; hence ἔτι in ver. 3 is logically correct (against the objection of de Wette and Reiche).

The *difference* between σαρκικός (also σάρκινος) and ψυχικός is simply this: ψυχικός is one who has not the Holy Spirit, and stands wholly outside of the sphere of His influence; whether it be that he has never yet received Him and is therefore still in the natural state without Christ (*homo naturalis*, as in ii. 14), or that he has been forsaken again by the Spirit (as in Jude 19). Σαρκικός, on the other hand, may not merely be predicated of the ψυχικός, who is indeed *necessarily* σαρκικός, but also (comp. Hofmann) of one who has, it is true, received the Holy Spirit and experiences His influence, but is not led by His enlightening and sanctifying efficacy in such a measure as to have overcome the power of sin (Gal. v. 17) which dwells in the σάρξ and sets itself against the Spirit; but, on the contrary, instead of being πνευματικός and, in consequence, living ἐν πνεύματι and being disposed κατὰ πνεῦμα, he is still ἐν σαρκί, and still thinks, judges, is minded and acts κατὰ σάρκα.<sup>1</sup> The ψυχικός is accordingly as such also σαρκικός, but every σαρκικός is not as such still or once more a ψυχικός, not yet having the Spirit, or having lost Him again. The *expositors* commonly do *not* enter upon *any* distinction between σάρκινος and σαρκικός, *either* (so the majority) reading σαρκικοῖς in ver. 1 also, *or* (Rückert, Pott) arbitrarily giving out that the two words are alike in meaning. The distinction between them and ψυχικός also is passed over in utter silence by *many* (such as Rosenmüller, Flatt, Billroth), while *others*, in an arbitrary way, make σάρκινος and σαρκικ. *sometimes* to be *milder* than ψυχικός (Bengel, Rückert, holding that in σαρκ. there is more of the weakness, in ψυχ. more of the opposition to what is higher), *sometimes* to be *stronger* (Osiander; while Theophylact holds the former to be παρὰ φύσιν, the latter κατὰ φύσιν, and the pneumatic ὑπὲρ φύσιν), or *sometimes*, lastly, refer the latter to the lower *intelligence*, and the former to the

<sup>1</sup> Ewald says truly, that the strict distinction between *spiritual* and *fleshly* came in first with Christianity itself. But so, too, the sharply-defined notion of the ψυχικός could only be brought out by the contrast of Christianity, because it is the opposite of the πνευματικός, and cannot therefore occupy a middle place between the two former notions.

lower *moral* condition as given up to the desires (Locke, Wolf, and others). — ὡς νηπίους ἐν Χριστῷ] statement justifying the foregoing ὡς σαρκ. by setting forth the character of their Christian condition as it had been at that time to which οὐκ ἠδυνήθην κ.τ.λ. looks back. The phrase denotes those who, in their relation to Christ (in Christianity), are still children under age, *i.e. mere beginners*. The opposite is τέλειοι ἐν Χ., Col. i. 28. See, regarding the analogous use in Rabbinical writers of תורנין (*sugentes*), Schoettgen *in loc.*; Wetstein on 1 Pet. ii. 2; Lightfoot, *Hor.* p. 162; and for that of נזר, Wetstein on Matt. x. 42. Before baptism a man is yet without connection with Christ, but *through* baptism he enters into this fellowship, and is now, in the first instance, a νήπιος ἐν Χριστῷ, *i.e.* an *infans* as yet in relation to Christianity, who as such receives the elementary instruction suitable for him (the γάλα of ver. 2). The εὐαγγελίζεσθαι, on the other hand, which leads on to baptism, is *preparatory*, giving rise to faith, and forming the medium through which their calling takes place; and accordingly it has *not* yet to do with νήπιοι ἐν Χριστῷ. The inference is a mistaken one, therefore (on the part of Rückert), that Paul has in mind here a *second* residence in Corinth not recorded in the Acts. His readers could not understand this passage, any more than ii. 1, otherwise than of the apostle's *first* arrival, of *the* time, consequently, in which he founded the Corinthian church, when he instructed those who gave ear to his εὐαγγελίζεσθαι in the elements of Christianity. — By ἐν Χριστῷ is expressed the specific field to which the notion of νηπιότης is confined; viewed *apart from* Christ, he, who as a new convert is yet a νήπιος, may be an adult, or an old man. Comp. on Col. i. 28.

Ver. 2. Keeping to the same figure (comp. Heb. v. 12; Philo, *de agric.* p. 301), he designates as γάλα: τὴν εἰσαγωγικὴν καὶ ἀπλουστεράν τοῦ εὐαγγελίου διδασκαλίαν (Basil. *Hom.* I. p. 403, ed. Paris. 1638), see Heb. v. 12, vi. 1 f., and as βρῶμα: the further and higher instruction, the σοφία, which, as distinguished from the γνώσιν τὴν ἐκ κατηχήσεως (Clemens Alexandrinus), is taught among the τέλειοι (ii. 6 ff.). Comp. Suicer, *Thes.* I. p. 721, 717. Wetstein *in loc.* — As regards the *zeugma* (comp. Homer, *Il.* viii. 546; *Odyssey*, xx. 312; Hesiod. *Theog.* 640), see Bremi, *ad Lys.* Exc. III. p. 437 f.; Winer, p. 578 [E. T. 777]; Kühner,

*ad Xen. Anab.* iv. 5. 8; also Nügelbach on the *Iliad*, p. 179, ed. 3. — ἐδύνασθε] *Ye were not yet strong and vigorous.* What weakness is meant, the context shows: in the figure, that of the body; in its application, that of the mind and spirit. Comp. regarding this absolute use of δύναμαι, δυνατός κ.τ.λ. (which makes any supplementing of it by ἐσθίειν βρῶμα and the like quite superfluous), Dem. 484, 25, 1187, 8; Aesch. p. 40. 39; Plato, *Men.* p. 77 B, *Prot.* p. 326 C; Xen. *Anab.* iv. 5. 11, vii. 6. 37; 1 Macc. v. 41; Schaefer, *ad Bos. Ell.* p. 267 ff. — ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἐτι νῦν δύν.] ἀλλ' οὐδέ, *yea, not even.* See Fritzsche, *ad Marc.* p. 157. Herm. *ad Eurip. Suppl.* 121, Add. 975. That Paul, notwithstanding of this remark, does give a section of the higher wisdom in chap. xv., is to be explained from the apologetic destination of that chapter (xv. 12), which did not *allow* him to treat the subject in an elementary style. There is no self-contradiction here, but an exception demanded by the circumstances. For the profound development of the doctrine of the resurrection in chap. xv. belonged really to the βρῶμα (comp. ii. 9), and rises high above that elementary teaching concerning the resurrection, with which every Jew was acquainted, and which Paul himself so often gave without thereby speaking ἐν τελείῳις, whence also it is rightly placed in Heb. vi. 1 among the first rudiments of Christian doctrine.

Ver. 3. Σαρκικοί] see on ver. 1. — ὅπου] equivalent seemingly to *quandoquidem* (see Vigerus, ed. Herm. 431); but the conditioning state of things is *locally* conceived. Comp. Heb. ix. 16, x. 18; 4 Macc. ii. 14, vi. 34, xiv. 11; Plato, *Tim.* p. 86 E; the passages from Xenophon cited by Sturz. III. p. 307; Herod. i. 68; Thuc. viii. 27. 2, viii. 96. 1; Isocrates, *Paneg.* 186. — ζῆλος] *Jealousy.* — κατὰ ἄνθρ.] *after the fashion of men.* Comp. on Rom. iii. 5; often, too, in classical writers, e.g. κατ' ἄνθρ. φρονεῖν (Soph. *Aj.* 747, 764). The contrast here is to the mode of life conformed to the Divine Spirit; hence not different from κατὰ σάρκα in Rom. viii. 4. — Respecting the relation to each other of the three words ζῆλ., ἔρ., διχοστ., see Theophylact: πατὴρ γὰρ ὁ ζῆλος τῆς ἐριδος, αὕτη δὲ τὰς διχοστασίας γεννᾷ. — On οὐχί, comp. Bengel: "nam *Spiritus* non fert studium partium humanarum." On the contrary, ζῆλος κ.τ.λ. are ranked expressly among the ἔργα τῆς σαρκός, Gal. v. 20.

Ver. 4. Γάρ] explanatory by exhibiting the state of conten-

tion *in concreto*. — *ἄνθρ.*] with a pregnant emphasis: are ye not *men*? *i.e.* according to the context: are ye not persons, who are absorbed in the unspiritual natural ways of men—in whose thoughts and strivings the divine element of life is awaiting? Comp. Xen. *Anab.* vi. 1. 26: *ἄνθρωπός εἰμι* (I am a weak, fallible man). What determines the shade of meaning in such cases is not anything in the word itself, but the connection. Comp. 1 Pet. iv. 2. The specific reference here has its basis in the preceding *κατὰ ἄνθρωπον περιπατεῖτε*, hence there is no ground for rejecting the reading *ἄνθρωποι*, with Fritzsche (*de conform. N. T. Lachm.* p. 48), as a *lectio insulsa* (comp. also Reiche), or for misinterpreting it, with Hofmann, into “that they *are surely men at all events and nothing less.*” This latter rendering brings in the idea, quite foreign to this passage, of the *dignity* of man, and that in such a way as if the interrogative apodosis were *adversative* (*ἀλλ’ οὐκ* or *οὐ μέντοι*). — It may be added that Paul names only the *two* parties: *ἐγὼ . . . Παύλου* and *ἐγὼ Ἀπολλώ*, not giving an *imperfect* enumeration for the sake of the *μετασχηματισμός* which follows (iv. 6—so, arbitrarily, de Wette and others), but because in this section of the Epistle he has to do just with the antagonism of the *Apollos-party* to himself and to those who, against his will, called themselves after him; hence also he makes the *μετασχηματισμός*, in iv. 6, with reference to himself and Apollos alone. — *ἐγὼ μέν*] This *μέν* does not stand in a logical relation to the following *δέ*. An inexactitude arising from the lively way in which thought follows thought, just as in classical writers too, from a like reason, there is often a want of exactly adjusted correspondence between *μέν* and *δέ* (Breitenbach, *ad Xen. Hier.* i. 9; Baumelein, *Partik.* p. 168 f.).

Vv. 5–15. Discussion of the position occupied by the two teachers: *The two have no independent merit whatsoever* (vv. 5–7); *each will receive his reward according to his own work* (vv. 8, 9); and, more especially, *a definitive recompense in the future, according to the quality of his work, awaits the teacher who carries on the building upon the foundation already laid* (vv. 10–15). The aim of this discussion is stated in iv. 6.

Ver. 5. *Οὖν*] *Now, igitur*, introduces the question as an inference from the state of party-division just referred to, so that the latter is seen to be the presupposition on which the question

proceeds. See Klotz, *ad Devar.* p. 719: "Such being the state of things, I am forced to propound the question," etc. Rückert thinks that Paul makes his *readers* ask: But now, if Paul and Apollos are not our heads, what are they then? Paul, however, is in the habit of indicating counter-questions expressly as such (xv. 35; Rom. ix. 19, *al.*). — *τί]* more significant than *τίς*; comp. ver. 7. The question is, *what*, as respects their position, are they? Comp. Plato, *Rep.* p. 332 E, 341 D. — *διάκονοι]* They are *servants*, and therefore not fitted and destined to be heads of parties; *ἄλλος ἐστὶν ὁ δεσπότης, ἡμεῖς ἐκείνου δοῦλοι*, Theodoret. — *δι' ὧν]* "*per quos, non in quos*," Bengel. Comp. John i. 7. They are but *causae ministeriales* in the hand of God. — *ἐπιστεύσ.]* as in xv. 2, 11; Rom. xiii. 11.<sup>1</sup> — *καί]* *and that*. *καὶ . . . ἔδωκεν* is not to be joined with ver. 6 (Mosheim, Markland, *ad Lys.* XII. p. 560 f.), seeing that in ver. 7 no regard is paid to this *καὶ . . . ἔδωκεν*. — *ἐκάστω ὡς]* the emphasis is on *ἐκάστ.*, as in vii. 17 and Rom. xii. 3. — *ὁ Κύριος]* correlative to the *διάκονοι*, is here *God*, not *Christ* (Theophylact; also Rückert, who appeals to Eph. iv. 7, 11), as what follows—in particular vv. 9, 10—proves. Comp. 2 Cor. vi. 4. — As respects the *ἀλλ' ἢ* of the *Textus receptus*: *nisi* (which makes the question continue to the end of the verse; comp. Eccclus. xxii. 12), see on Luke xii. 51; 2 Cor. i. 13.

Vv. 6, 7. Statement of the difference in the *διακονία* of the two, and of the success of the ministry of both as dependent upon God, so that no one at all had any independent standing, but only God. Therewith Paul proceeds to point out the *impropriety* of the *party*-relation which men had taken up towards the two teachers. — *ἐφύτευσα κ.τ.λ.]* We are not to suppose the *object* left indefinite (de Wette); on the contrary, it emerges out of *δι' ὧν ἐπιστεύσατε*, ver. 5, namely: *the faith of the Corinthian community*. This is conceived of as a *tree* (comp. Plato, *Phaedr.* p. 276 E) which was *planted* by Paul, inasmuch as he first brought the Corinthians to believe and founded the church; but *watered*<sup>2</sup> by Apollos, inasmuch as he had subsequently exerted

<sup>1</sup> *Ye have become believers*, which is to be understood here in a relative sense, both as respected the beginning and the furtherance of faith. See ver. 6. The becoming a believer comprehends different stages of development. Comp. John ii. 11, xi. 15.

<sup>2</sup> Augustine, *Ep.* 48, and several of the Fathers make *ἐπίτισιν* refer in a totally inappropriate way to *baptism*.



himself in the way of confirming and developing the faith of the church, and for the increase of its numbers; and lastly, blessed with *growth* by God, inasmuch as it was under His influence (τῆς γὰρ αὐτοῦ χάριτος τὸ κατόρθωμα, Theodoret) that the work of both had success and prospered. This making it to grow is the effect of grace, without which the "granum a primo sationis momento esset instar lapilli," Bengel. Comp. Acts xvi. 14, xiv. 27; 1 Cor. xv. 10. — ἐστὶ τι] may be taken to mean: *is anything of importance, anything worth speaking of* (Acts v. 36; Gal. ii. 6, vi. 3. Plato, *Phaedr.* p. 242 E, *Gorg.* p. 472 A, *Symp.* p. 173 B; Xen. *Mem.* ii. 1. 12). It is more in accordance, however, with the decided tone of hostility to all human estimation which marks the whole context to take τι in quite a general sense (comp. x. 19), so that of both in and by themselves (in comparison with God) it is said: they are *nothing*. — ἀλλ' ὁ αὐξ. Θεός] *sc.* τὰ πάντα ἐστὶ (1 Cor. xv. 28; Col. iii. 11), which, according to the apostle's intention, is to be drawn from what has been already said. An abbreviated form of the contrast, with which comp. vii. 19, and see generally Kühner, II. p. 604; Stallbaum, *ad Rep.* p. 366 D, 561 B. Theophylact says well: διδάξας, ὅτι Θεῷ δεῖ μόνῳ προσέχειν, καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν ἀνατιθέναι πάντα τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἀγαθά.

Vv. 8, 9. *The planter, on the other hand, and the waterer are one: each of them, however (and here we pass on to the new point of the recompense of the teachers), will receive his own reward, etc.* — ἐν εἰσιν] the one is not something other than the other, generically as respects a relation defined in the text (xi. 5; John x. 30, xvii. 11, 21), here: in so far as both are of one and the same official character, namely, as *workers in the service of God*. Theodoret: κατὰ τὴν ὑπουργίαν. — ἕκαστος δὲ κ.τ.λ.] πρὸς γὰρ τὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἔργον παραβαλλόμενοι ἐν εἰσιν· ἐπεὶ πόνων ἕνεκεν (*i.e.* in respect of the *pains and labour* expended) οὐκ εἰσιν, ἀλλὰ ἕκαστος κ.τ.λ., Chrysostom. — ἴδιον] both times with emphasis. Bengel puts it happily: "congruens iteratio; antitheton ad unum." The λήγεται, however, refers to the recompense at the last judgment, ver. 13 ff. — Ver. 9 gives now the *proof*, not for both halves of ver. 8, of which the first has been already disposed of in the preceding statement (in opposition to Hofmann), but for the new thought ἕκαστος . . . κόπον introduced by δέ. The

emphasis of proof lies wholly on the word thrice put foremost, Θεοῦ. For since it is *God* whose helpers we are ("eximium elogium ministerii," Calvin), *God* whose tillage-field, *God* whose building ye are : therefore it cannot be otherwise than that that *ἐκαστος . . . κόπον* must hold good, and none lack his reward according to his labour ("secundum laborem, non propter laborem," Calovius). — Θεοῦ συνεργοί] for we, your teachers, labour *with God*, the supreme Lord and Fosterer of the church, at *one* work, which is simply the furtherance of the church. The explanation : workers who work *with each other* for God's cause (Estius by way of suggestion, Bengel, Flatt, Heydenreich, Olshausen), is linguistically erroneous (see 1 Thess. iii. 2 ; Rom. xvi. 3, 9, 21 ; Phil. ii. 25, iv. 3 ; 2 Cor. i. 24 ; 2 Macc. xiv. 5 ; Plato, *Def.* p. 414 A ; Dem. 68. 27, 884. 2 ; Plut. *Per.* 31 ; Bernhardt, p. 171 ; Kühner, II. p. 172), and fails to appreciate that lofty conception of a δοῦλος Θεοῦ. — Θεοῦ γεώργ. and Θεοῦ οἶκ. set before us the Corinthian church, in so far as it is the object of the ministerial service of Christian teachers, under the twofold image of a *field for tillage* (γεώργ., Strabo, xiv. p. 671 ; Theag. in Schol. on Pind. *Nem.* iii. 21 ; Prov. xxiv. 30, xxxi. 16), which belongs to God and is cultivated, and as a *building* belonging to God (Eph. ii. 21), which is being carried up to completion.

Ver. 10. The former of these images (γεώργ.) has been the underlying thought in what has hitherto been said (vv. 6–8) ; the second and new figure (οἰκοδ.) is now retained in what follows up to ver. 15, the course of thought being this, that Paul, first of all, states the difference between his own work and that of others at this building, and then passes on to the responsibility which he who would build after him takes upon himself. — The χάρις is not the *apostolic office*, with which Paul was graced (Rom. xii. 3, xv. 15 ; Gal. i. 15, *al.*), for it was not exclusively an apostle who was required for the founder of a church (Rome, Colossae), but the *special endowment of grace*, which he had received from God to fit him for his calling ; and he was conscious in himself that he was qualified and destined just for the right *laying of the foundation*, Rom. xv. 20. — The *significant weight* of the words κατὰ . . . δοθ. μοι is to express humility in making the utterance which follows. Comp. Chrysostom and Theophylact. — ὡς σοφὸς ἀρχιτ.] proceeding as such an one would, going to work in this capacity.

To it belongs the *right* laying of the foundation in *strict accordance with the design* of the building, the reverse of which would be the part of an *unskilful* architect. *Without* a foundation no man builds; without a *proper* foundation no σοφός, i.e. no one who understands the art (Ex. xxxv. 10). Comp. Plato, *Phil.* p. 17 C, *de virt.* p. 376 A; Pind. *Pyth.* iii. 115, v. 115; Soph. *Ant.* 362. But Paul by the *grace of God* was a σοφὸς ἀρχιτέκτων. — What he understands by such a foundation, he himself tells us in ver. 11, namely, *Jesus Christ*, without whom (both in an *objective* sense: without whose appearing and work, and in a *subjective*: without appropriating whom in conscious faith; see ver. 11) a Christian society could not come into existence at all. This foundation *Paul had laid*, inasmuch as he *had made Christ to be possessed by the conscious faith of the Corinthian church*. Comp. on Eph. ii. 20. — θεμέλιον] The masculine ὁ θεμέλιος (see ver. 11; hence wrongly held by Ewald to be *neuter* here), attributed by the old grammarians to the κοινή (see Wetstein on ver. 11), is commonly found only in the plural, and that as early as Thuc. i. 93. 1. In the singular, 2 Tim. ii. 19; Rev. xxi. 19; Machon in Athen. viii. p. 346 A; 3 Esdr. vi. 20. — ἄλλος δὲ ἐποικοδ.] By this is meant not *merely* Apollos, but any later teacher of the Corinthians whatever (comp. ἕκαστος): “Not my task, however, but that of *another*, is the *building up*, the *carrying on* the *building*.” — πῶς] i.e. here: *with what materials*.<sup>1</sup> See vv. 12, 13. Without figurative language: “*Let each take heed what sort of doctrine* (as regards substance and form) *he applies, in order to advance and develope more fully the church, founded upon Jesus Christ, in its saving knowledge and frame of life.*” See on ver. 12. The figure is *not changed*, as has been often thought (“Ante fideles dixerat aedificium Dei, nunc aedificium vocat ea, quae in ecclesia Christiana a doctoribus docentur,” Grotius; comp. Rosenmüller); but the οἰκοδομή is, as before, *the church*, which, being founded upon Christ (see above), is further built up, i.e. developed in the Christian faith and life (which may take place in a right or a wrong way, see vv. 12, 13), by the teachings of the later teachers.

<sup>1</sup> According to de Wette, the force of the πῶς consists primarily in this, *that* they simply carry on the building, and do not alter the foundation (which was probably done by the opponents of the apostle). But the carrying on of the building, so far as that is concerned, is *presupposed* in πῶς οἰκοδομεῖ.

In like manner is a house built up by the different building-materials upon the foundation laid for it.

Ver. 11. *Γάρ*] justifies the foregoing warning, in so far as it is given exclusively to the *upbuilder*: for with the layer of the foundation it is quite different, *he cannot otherwise than*, etc.; but as regards the *upbuilder*, the case is, as ver. 12 ff. sets forth. We are not to bring in any intermediate thought to explain the *γάρ*, either with Billroth: "each, however, must bethink himself of carrying on the building;" or, with Hofmann, that in the case of all others the question simply concerns a right building up. Rather we are to note that ver. 11 stands only in a preparatory relation to ver. 12, in which the varying *πώς* of the *ἐποικοδομεῖν* is exhibited. — *δύναται*] *can*, not *may* (Grotius, Glass, and others, including Storr, Rosenmüller, Pott, Billroth); for it is the *Christian* church that is spoken of, whose structure is *incapable* of having another foundation. — *παρὰ τὸν κείμενον*] i.e. *different from that, which lies* already there. Respecting *παρά* after *ἄλλος* in this sense, see Krüger, *ad Dion.* p. 9; Stallbaum, *ad Phileb.* p. 51; Ast, *Lex. Plat.* III. p. 28. *The foundation already lying there*, however, is not that which Paul had laid (so most interpreters, resting on ver. 10; including de Wette, Neander, Maier, Hofmann); for his affirmation is *universal*, and if *no one* can lay another foundation than that which lies already there, Paul, of course, could not do so either, and therefore the *κείμενος* must have been in its place before the apostle himself laid his foundation. Hence the *κείμενος θεμέλιος* is that laid *by God* (so, rightly, Rückert and Olshausen), namely, *Jesus Christ Himself*, the *fundamentum essentiale*, He whom God sent, delivered up to death, raised again, and exalted, thereby making Him to be for us wisdom, righteousness, etc. (i. 30), or, according to a kindred figure, the corner-stone (Eph. ii. 20; Matt. xxi. 42; Acts iv. 10 f.; 1 Pet. ii. 6). Comp. 1 Tim. iii. 16. This is the *objective foundation*, which *lies there* for the whole of Christendom. But this foundation *is laid* (ver. 10) by the founder of a church, inasmuch as he makes Christ to be appropriated by believers, to be the contents of their conscious faith, and thereby establishes them in the character of a Christian church; that is the *doctrinal* laying of the foundation (*fundamentum dogmaticum*). — Observe further, that Paul says purposely *Ἰησοῦς Χριστός*, so as emphatically to designate the

personal, historically manifested Christ. This *ὅς ἐστιν Ἰησοῦς Χριστός* is the sum of the fundamental Christian confession of faith, John xvii. 3 ; Phil. ii. 11 ; Acts iv. 10 ff.

Ver. 12. *Δέ*] continues the subject by contrasting the position of him who builds up with that of him who lays the foundation (ver. 11). It is a mistake, therefore, to put ver. 11 in parenthesis (Pott, Heydenreich, comp. Billroth). — In connection with this carrying on of the figure, it is to be noted—(1) that Paul is *not* speaking of *several buildings*,<sup>1</sup> as though the *θεμέλιος* were that not of a house, but of a *city* (Billroth) ; against which ver. 16 (see *in loc.*) is decisive, as is, further, the consideration that the idea of Christ's being the foundation of a *city* of God is foreign to the N. T. (2) The figure must not be drawn out beyond what the words convey (as Grotius, *e.g.*, does: "Proponit ergo nobis domum, cujus parietes sint ex marmore, columnae partim ex auro partim ex argento, trabes ex ligno, fastigium vero ex stramine et culmo"). It sets before us, on the contrary, *a building rearing itself upon the foundation laid by the master-builder, for the erection of which the different workmen bring their several contributions of building materials, from the most precious and lasting down to the most mean and worthless.* The various specimens of building materials, set side by side in vivid asyndeton (Krüger and Kühner, *ad Xen. Anab.* ii. 4. 28 ; Winer, p. 484 [E. T. 653]), denote the various matters of doctrine propounded by teachers and brought into connection with faith in Christ, in order to develope and complete the Christian training of the church.<sup>2</sup> These are either, like gold, silver, and costly stones (marble and the like), of high value and imperishable duration, or else, like timber, hay, stubble (*καλάμη*, not equivalent to *κάλαμος*, a reed ; see Wetstein and Schleusner, *Thes.*), of little worth and perishable,<sup>3</sup> so that they—instead of, like the former, abiding at the Parousia in their eternal truth—come to nought, *i.e.* are shown not to belong to the ever-enduring *ἀλήθεια*, and form no part of the perfect knowledge (xiii. 12) which shall then emerge. So, in substance

<sup>1</sup> So also Wetstein : "Duo sunt aedificia, domus regia et casa rustici quae distinguuntur."

<sup>2</sup> Luther's gloss is appropriate : "This is said of *preaching and teaching*, by which faith is either strengthened or weakened."

<sup>3</sup> Compare *Midr. Tillin*, 119. 51, of false teachers : "Sicut foenum non durat, ita nec verba eorum stabunt in saeculum."

(explaining it of the different *doctrines*), Clemens Alexandrinus, Ambrosiaster, Sedulius, Lyra, Thomas, Cajetanus, Erasmus, Luther, Beza, Calvin, Piscator, Justiniani, Grotius, Estius, Calovius, Lightfoot, Stolz, Rosenmüller, Flatt, Heydenreich, Neander, de Wette, Osiander, Ewald, Maier. Comp. Theodoret: *τινὲς περὶ δογμάτων ταῦτα εἰρῆσθαι τῷ ἀποστόλῳ φασίν*. Two things, however, are to be observed in connection with this interpretation—(1) that the several materials are not meant to point to specific dogmas that could be named, although we cannot fail to perceive, generally speaking, the graduated diversity of the constituent elements of the two classes; (2) that the second class embraces in it no absolutely *anti-Christian* doctrines.<sup>1</sup> To deny the first of these positions would but give rise to arbitrary definitions without warrant in the text; to deny the second would run counter to the fact that the building was *upon the foundation*, and to the apostle's affirmation, *αὐτὸς δὲ σωθήσεται*, ver. 15. Billroth makes the strange objection to this interpretation as a whole, that *χρυσόν κ.τ.λ.* cannot apply to the contents of the teaching, because Paul calls the latter the *foundation*. But that is in fact Christ, and not the further doctrinal teaching. In reply to the invalid objections urged by Hollmann (*Animadverss. ad cap. iii. et xiii. Ep. Pauli prim. ad Cor.*, Lips. 1819) see Heydenreich and Rückert. Our exposition is, in fact, a *necessity*, because it alone keeps the whole figure in *harmony with itself* throughout. For if the *foundation*, which is laid, be the contents of the *first*

<sup>1</sup> Estius characterizes the second class well as “*doctrina minus sincera minusque solida, veluti si sit humanis ac philosophicis aut etiam Judaicis opinionibus admixta plus satis, si curiosa magis quam utilis,*” etc. Comp. the *Paraphr.* of Erasmus, who refers specially to the “*humanas constitutiunculas de cultu, de victu, de frigidis ceremoniis.*” They are, generally, all doctrinal developments, speculations, etc., which, although built into the fabric of doctrine in time, will not approve themselves at the final consummation on the day of the Lord, nor be taken in as elements in the perfect knowledge, but will then—instead of standing out under the test of that great catastrophe which shall end the history of all things, like the doctrines compared to gold, etc.—be shown to be no part of divine and saving truth, and so will fall away. Such materials, in greater or less degree, every *Church* will find in the system of doctrine built up for it by human hands. To learn more and more to recognise these, and to separate them from the rest in accordance with Scripture, is the task of that onward development, against which no church ought to close itself up till the day of the final crisis,—least of all the evangelical Lutheran church with its central principle regarding Scripture, a principle which determines and regulates its stedfastly Protestant character.

preaching of the gospel, namely, *Christ*, then the *material wherewith the building is carried on* must be the contents of the *further instruction given*. It is out of keeping, therefore, to explain it, with Origen, Augustine, Jerome, Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Photius, and more recently, Billroth, "of the *fruits* called forth *in the church* by the exercise among them of the office of teaching" (Billroth), of the morality or immorality of the hearers (Theodoret: gold, etc., denotes τὰ εἶδη τῆς ἀρετῆς; wood, etc., τὰ ἐναντία τῆς ἀρετῆς, οἷς ὑπὲρπίσται τῆς γεέννης τὸ πῦρ); or, again, of the worthy or unworthy *members of the church themselves*, who would be moulded by the teachers (Schott in Röhr's *Magaz. für christl. Pred.* VIII. 1, p. 8 f., with Pelagius, Bengel, Hollmann, Pott). So, too, Hofmann *in loc.*, and previously in his *Schriftbeweis*, II. 2, p. 124. Both of these interpretations have, besides, this further consideration against them, that they do not harmonize in meaning with the figure of the watering formerly employed, whereas our exposition does. Moreover, if the ἔργον, which shall be *burned up* (ver. 15), be the relative *portion of the church*, it would not accord therewith that the teacher concerned, who has been the cause of this destruction, is, notwithstanding, to obtain *salvation*; this would be at variance with the N. T. severity against all causing of offence, and with the responsibility of the teachers. Rückert gives up the attempt at a definite interpretation, contenting himself with the general truth: *Upon the manner and way, in which the office of teaching is discharged, does it depend whether the teacher shall have reward or loss; he who builds on in right fashion upon a good foundation* (? rather: upon the foundation) *has reward therefrom; he who would add what is unsuitable and unenduring, only harm and loss*. But by this there is simply *nothing* explained; Paul assuredly did not mean anything so vague as this by his sharply outlined figure; he must have had before his mind, *wherein consisted* the right carrying on of the building, and *what* were additions unsuitable and doomed to perish. Olshausen (comp. also Schrader) understands the passage not of the efficiency of the teachers, but of the (right or misdirected) *individual activity of sanctification on the part of each believer in general*. Wrongly so; because, just as in ver. 6 ff. the planter and waterer, so here the founder and upbuilder *must* be teachers, and because the building is the

*church* (ver. 9), which *is being built* (vv. 9, 10). And this conception of the church as a building with a personal foundation (Christ), and consisting of persons (comp. 2 Tim. ii. 20 ; 1 Pet. ii. 4 f.), remains quite unimpaired with our exegesis also (against Hofmann's objection). For the further building upon the personal foundation laid, partly with gold, etc., partly with wood, etc., is just the labour of teaching, through which the development and enlargement of the church, which is made up of persons, receive a character varying in value. The *ἐποικοδομεῖν* takes place on the persons *through* doctrines, which are the *building materials*.

Ver. 13. Apodosis : *So will what each has done on the building* (τὸ ἔργον) *not remain hidden* (φανερὸν γενήσ.). Then the ground of this assurance is assigned : ἡ γὰρ ἡμέρα δηλώσει, *sc. ἐκάστου τὸ ἔργον*, *The day is κατ' ἐξοχήν, the day of the Parousia* (comp. Heb. x. 24), which is obvious from what follows on to ver. 15. So, rightly, Tertullian, *contra Marc.* iv. 2 ; Origen, Cyprian, *Ep.* iv. 2 ; Lactantius, *Inst.* vii. 21 ; Hilarius, Ambrosiaster, Sedulius, Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, the Roman Catholics (some of whom, however, in the interests of purgatory, make it out to be the day of *death*), Bengel, and others, including Pott, Heydenreich, Billroth, Schott, Schrader, Rückert, Olshausen, de Wette, Osiander, Ewald, Hofmann. It is un-Pauline, and also against the context (for wood, etc., does not apply to the doctrines of the Judaizers alone), to interpret the phrase, with Hammond, Lightfoot, Gusset, Schoettgen, of the *destruction of Jerusalem*, which should reveal the nullity of the Jewish doctrines. The following expositions are alien to the succeeding context : of *time in general* (comp. *dics docebit* : χρόνος δίκαιον ἄνδρα δείκνυσιν μόνος, Sophocles, *Oed. Rex*, 608 ; Stob. *Ecl.* I. p. 234,—so Grotius, Wolf, Wetstein, Stolz, Rosenmüller, Flatt, and others) ; or of the *time of clear knowledge of the gospel* (Erasmus, Beza, Calvin, Vorstius<sup>1</sup>) ; or of the *dies tribulationis* (Augustine, Calovius, and others). — ὅτι ἐν πυρὶ ἀποκαλ.] We are neither to *read* here ὅτε<sup>2</sup> instead of ὅτι

<sup>1</sup> Were this so, the text would need to contain an antithetic designation of the present time as *night*. And in that case, too, it would surely be the clear day of the Parousia which would be meant, as in Rom. xiii. 12.

<sup>2</sup> As regards the fact of the two words being often put the one for the other by transcribers, see Schaefer, *ad Greg. Cor.* p. 491 ; Kühner, *ad Xen. Anab.* i. 4. 2.



(Bos, Alberti), nor does the latter *stand for* the former (Pott), but it has a causative force: *because it is revealed in fire*,—the day, namely (Estius, Pott, Billroth, Rückert, Olshausen, de Wette, Ewald, Hofmann), not τὸ ἔργον, as Luther and the majority of interpreters (among them Heydenreich, Flatt, Schott, Neander) hold, following Ambrosiaster and Oecumenius; for this would yield a tautology with what comes next. Bengel, joined by Osiander, imagines as the subject of the verb ὁ Κύριος, which can be evolved from ἡ ἡμέρα only by a very arbitrary process, since the whole context never speaks of Christ Himself. — ἐν πυρὶ] i.e. *encompassed with fire* (see Bernhardt, p. 209; Matthiae, p. 1340), so that fire is the element in which the revelation of that day takes place. For Christ, when His Parousia draws nigh, is to appear coming from heaven ἐν πυρὶ φλογός (2 Thess. i. 8; comp. Dan. vii. 9, 10; Mal. iv. 1), i.e. surrounded by flaming fire (which is not to be explained away, as is often done: *amid lightnings*; rather comp. Ex. iii. 2 ff., xix. 18). This fire, however, is not, as Chrysostom would have it, that of Gehenna (Matt. vi. 22, 29, *al.*); for it is *in it* that Christ appears, and it seizes upon every ἔργον, even the golden, etc., and proves each, leaving the one unharmed, but consuming the other. The correct supplying of ἡ ἡμέρα with ἀποκαλ. supersedes at once the older Roman Catholic interpretation about *purgatory* (against which see, besides, Scaliger and Calovius), as the correct view of ἡ ἡμέρα sets aside the explanations of the *wrath of God* against the Jews (Lightfoot), of the *Holy Spirit*, who tries “*quae doctrina sit instar auri et quae instar stipulae*” (Calvin), of the fire of *trial and persecution* (Rosenmüller, Flatt, following Augustine, *de civ. Dei*, xxi. 26, Erasmus, and many old commentators; comp. Isa. xlvi. 10; 1 Pet. i. 7, iv. 12; Eccles. ii. 5), and of a *progressive process of purifying the mind of the church* (Neander). The idea rather is: “The decision on the day of the Parousia will show how each has worked as a teacher; if any one has taught what is excellent and imperishable, that, as belonging to the divine ἀλήθεια, will stand this decision and survive; if any one has taught what is worthless and perishable, that will by the decision of that day cease to have any standing, fall away, and come to nought” (comp. on ver. 12). This idea Paul, in accordance with his figure of a building, clothes in this *form*: “At the Parousia the fire, in

which it reveals itself, will seize upon the building; and then through this fiery ordeal those parts of the fabric which are of gold, silver, and precious stones will pass unharmed; but those consisting of wood, hay, and stubble will be burnt up." — ἀποκαλύπτεται] The result of this act of revelation is the δηλώσει already spoken of. The *present* marks the event as beyond doubt; the sentence is an axiom. — καὶ ἐκάστου κ.τ.λ.] not to be connected with ὅτι (Rückert), but with the clause in the *future*, ἥ γὰρ ἡμ. δηλώσει. Is ἔργον in the *nominative* (Theophylact, Oecumenius, and many others) or *accusative* (Billroth, Schott, de Wette, Osiander, Ewald)? The former is more in harmony with the sense of the passage, for so ὅπ. ἐστι is made to appear not as merely inserted, but in its befitting emphasis. For the form of the statement advances from the general to the particular: *the day will show it*, namely, what each has wrought; *and* (now follows the definite specification of the *quality*) *what is the character of the work of each,—the fire itself will test.* — τὸ πῦρ αὐτό] ignis ipse (see the critical remarks), *i.e.* the fire (in which the ἀποκάλυψις of the day takes place) *by its own proper working*, without intervention from *any other quarter*. Respecting the position of αὐτό after πῦρ, see Bornemann, *ad Xen. Mem.* ii. 5. 1. Were we to take it as the *object* of δοκιμάσει, pointing back to the preceding statement (Hofmann), it would be superfluous in itself, and less in keeping with the terse, succinct mode of expression of this whole passage. — δοκιμάσει] "*probabit, non : purgabit.* Hic locus ignem purgatorium non modo non fovet, sed plane extinguit," Bengel.

Vv. 14, 15. Manner and result of this δοκιμάσει. — μενεῖ] *will remain unharmed*; not μένει (*Text. recept.*) for κατακαίσεται, in ver. 15, corresponds to it. — μισθὸν λήψ.] namely, for his work at the building (without figure: *teacher's recompense*), from God, at whose οἰκοδομή he has laboured. Rückert holds that Paul steps decidedly out of his figure here; for the builder is not paid only after his work has stood the test of fire uninjured. But the building *is still being worked at* until the Parousia, so that *before* that event no recompense *can* be given. The fire of the Parousia seizes upon the building still in process of being completed, and now *he* alone receives recompense whose work, which has been carried on hitherto, shows itself proof against the fire.—As regards the form κατακαίσεται, *shall be burned down* (comp. 2 Pet. iii. 10), instead

of the Attic *κατακαυθήσεται*, see Thom. M. p. 511. — *ζημιωθείσεται*] *sc. τὸν μισθόν*, i.e. *frustrabitur præmio*. Comp. on *ζημιουῦσθαί τι*, to suffer loss of anything, Matt. xvi. 26 ; Luke ix. 25 ; Phil. iii. 8. See also Valckenaer, *ad Herod.* vii. 39. The thought is: He will, as a punishment, not receive the recompense which he would otherwise have received as a teacher. We are not to think of *deposition from office* (Grotius), seeing that it is the time of the Parousia that is spoken of. To take the *ζημ.*, with the Vulgate, *et al.*: *without object*, so that the sense would be: "*he shall have loss from it*" (Hofmann), gives too indefinite a conception, and one which would require first of all to have its meaning defined more precisely from the antithesis of *μισθ.* *λήψεται*. — *αὐτὸς δὲ σωθήσεται, οὕτω δὲ ὡς διὰ πυρός*] In order not to be misunderstood, as if by his *ζημιωθείσεται* he were denying to such teachers share in the future Messianic salvation at all, whereas he is only refusing to assign to them the higher rank of blessedness, blessedness as teachers, Paul adds: *Yet he himself shall be saved, but so as through fire*. *Αὐτός* refers to the *τὸν μισθόν*, which is to be supplied as the object of *ζημ.*: although he will lose his *recompense*, yet *he himself*, etc. Rückert is wrong in thinking that the builder is now regarded as the *inhabitant* of the house. Paul does not handle his figure in this confused way, but has before his mind the builder as still busied in the house with the work which he has been carrying on: all at once the fire seizes the house; he flees and yet finds safety, but not otherwise than as a man is saved through and from the midst of fire. Such an escape is wont to be coupled with *fear and painful injury*; hence the *idea* of this figurative representation is: *He himself, however, shall obtain the Messianic σωτηρία*,<sup>1</sup> yet still only in such a way that the catastrophe of the Parousia will be fraught with the highest anxiety for him, and will not elapse without sensibly impairing his inheritance of blessing. He shall obtain the σωτηρία, but only a lower grade of it, so that he will belong to those whom Jesus calls "*the last*" (Matt. xx. 16 ; Mark x. 31).

<sup>1</sup> For he has after all held to the foundation. The Messianic salvation is the gift of grace to those who believe in Christ as such; while the teacher's blessedness, as *μισθός* (which the general σωτηρία in and by itself is *not*), must be some specially high grade of blessing in the Messiah's kingdom. Comp. Dan. xii. 3 ; Matt. xix. 28.

The main point in this interpretation, namely, that *σωθήσ.* refers to the Messianic *σωτηρία*, is accepted by most expositors; but several, such as Rosenmüller and Flatt, take the future as indicating the *possibility* (a view which the very fact of the two preceding futures should have sufficed to preclude), and Grotius<sup>1</sup> has foisted in a *problematical* sense into the word (equally against the definitely assertive sense of those futures): "In summo erit salutis suae periculo. Etsi eam adipiscetur (quod boni ominis causa sperare mavult apostolus) non fiet id sine gravi moestitia ac dolore." It is a common mistake to understand *ὥς διὰ πυρός* in the sense of a *proverb* (by a hair's-breadth, see Grotius and Wetstein *in loc.*; Valckenaer, p. 157; and comp. Amos iv. 11; Zech. iii. 2; Jude 23), because the passage, looking back to ver. 13, really *sets before us a conflagration* (*ὥς*, as in John i. 14). It may be added that there is no ground for bringing into the conception the fire of the wrath of God (Hofmann), since, according to the text, it is the *selfsame* fire which seizes upon the work of *the one and of the other*, in the one case, however, proving it to be abiding, and in the other consuming it. Bengel illustrates the matter well by the instance of a shipwrecked man: "ut mercator naufragus amissa merce et lucro servatur *per undas*." Other commentators, again (Chrysostom, Oecumenius, Theophylact), understand it to mean: *He shall be preserved, but so only as one is preserved through the fire of hell*, that is to say, eternally tormented therein. So too of late, in substance, Maier. But the interpretation is decidedly erroneous; first, because, according to ver. 13, *πῦρ* cannot be allowed to have any reference to the fire of hell; secondly, because *σώζεσθαι*, which is the standing expression for being saved with the salvation of the Messiah, can least of all be used to denote anything else in a picture representing the decision of the Parousia.<sup>2</sup> This last consideration tells also against Schott's explanation (*l.c.* p. 17): "*He himself shall indeed not be utterly destroyed on that account; he remains, but it is as one who has passed through flaming fire (seriously injured)*," by which is

<sup>1</sup> So before him Theodore of Mopsuestia: ἀλλὰ καὶ ἂν σώζεται διὰ τινὰ ἰστίαν αἰτίαν σώζειν αὐτὸν δυναμένην.

<sup>2</sup> Hence, also, it will not do to refer *αὐτός*, with Otto, *Pastoralbr.* p. 144 f., to the *θεμίλιος*, which will remain safe, but covered over with refuse, ashes, and the like, which he holds to be indicated by *ὡς διὰ πυρός*.

denoted the divine award of punishment which awaits such a teacher at the day of judgment. It may also be urged against the view in question, that the sentence of punishment, since it *dooms to the fire*, cannot be depicted in the figure as a *having passed through* the fire.

Vv. 16-23. *Warning address to the readers*, comprising—(1) preparatory statement reminding them of the guilt of sectarian conduct as a destroying of the temple of God, vv. 16, 17,—verses which Chrysostom, Theophylact, and others quite mistakenly refer to the incestuous person; then (2) exhortation to put a stop to this conduct at its source by renouncing their fancied wisdom, vv. 18-28, and to give up what formed the most prominent feature of their sectarianism,—the parading of human authorities, which was, in truth, utterly opposed to the Christian standpoint.

Vv. 16, 17. *Οὐκ οἶδατε ὅτι κ.τ.λ.*] could be regarded as said in proof of ver. 15 (Billroth), only if Chrysostom's interpretation of *σωθήσεται . . . πυρός*, or Schott's modification of it (see on ver. 15), were correct.<sup>1</sup> Since this, however, is not the case, and since the notion of *σωθήσεται*, although limited by *οὕτω δὲ ὡς διὰ πυρός*, cannot for a moment be even relatively included under the *φθερεῖ τοῦτον ὁ Θεός* of ver. 17, because the *φθορά* is the very *opposite* of the *σωτηρία* (Gal. vi. 8), this mode of bringing out the connection must be given up. Were we to assume with *other* expositors that Paul passes on here from the teachers who build upon the foundation to such as are *anti-Christian*, "*qui fundamentum evertunt et aedificium destruunt*" (Estius and others, including Michaelis, Rosenmüller, Flatt, Pott, Hofmann), we should in that case feel the want at once of some express indication of the destroying of the *foundation*,—which, for that matter, did not take place in Corinth,—and also, and more especially, of some indication of the relation of antithesis subsisting between this passage and what has gone before. The apostle would have needed at least, in order to be understood, to have proceeded immediately after ver. 15 somewhat in this way: *εἰ δέ τις φθείρει κ.τ.λ.* No; in ver. 16 we have a *new* part of the

<sup>1</sup> This holds, too, against Ewald's way of apprehending the connection here: Are any surprised that the lot of such a teacher should be so hard a one? Let them consider how sacred is the field in which he works.

argument begun ; and it comes in all the more powerfully without link of connection with the foregoing. Hitherto, that is to say, Paul has been presenting to his readers—that he may make them see the wrong character of their proud partisan-conduct (iv. 6)—the relation of the teachers to the church as an οἰκοδομὴ Θεοῦ. But he has not yet set before their minds *what sort of an οἶκος Θεοῦ* they are, namely, the *temple* of God (hence ναός is emphatic). This he does now, in order to make them feel yet more deeply the criminality of their sectarian arrogance, when, after ending the foregoing discussion about the teachers, he starts afresh : *Is it unknown to you<sup>1</sup> what is the nature of this building of God, that ye are God's temple ?* etc. The question is one of *amazement* (for the state of division among the Corinthians seemed to imply such ignorance, comp. v. 6, vi. 15 f., ix. 13, 24) ; and it contains, along with the next closely connected verse, the sudden, startling preface—arresting the mind of the readers with its holy solemnity—to the exhortation which is to follow, ver. 18 ff. — *ναὸς Θεοῦ*] not : *a temple of God*, but *the temple of God*. For Paul's thought is not (as Theodoret and others hold) that there are several temples of God (which would be quite alien to the time-hallowed idea of the one national temple, which the apostle must have had, see Philo, *de monarch.* 2, p. 634), but that each Christian community is in a spiritual way, sensu mystico, the temple of Jehovah, the realized idea of that temple, its ἀληθινόν. There are not, therefore, several temples, but several churches, each one of which is the same true spiritual temple of God. Comp. Eph. ii. 21 ; Ignatius, *ad Eph.* 9 ; 1 Pet. ii. 5 ; Barnab. 4 ; also regarding Christian persons individually, as in vi. 19, see Ignatius, *ad Phil.* 7. This accordingly is different from the heathen conception of pious men being *temples* (in the plural). Valer. Max. iv. 7. 1, *al.*, in Elsner and Wetstein. — καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα] appends in how far (καὶ being the explicative *and*) they are ναὸς Θεοῦ. God, as He dwelt in the actual temple by the שכינה (Buxtorf, *Lex. Talm.* p. 2394), dwells in the ideal temple of the Christian church by the gracious presence, working and ruling in it, of *His Spirit*, in whom God communicates Himself ; for the Spirit dwells and

<sup>1</sup> This lively interrogative turn of the discourse, frequent though it is in this Epistle, occurs only twice in the rest of Paul's writings, namely, in Rom. vi. 16, xi. 2.

rules in the hearts of believers (Rom. viii. 9, 11 ; 2 Tim. i. 14). But we are not on this ground to make ἐν ὑμῖν refer to the *individuals* (Rückert and many others); for the *community* as such (ver. 17) is the *temple* (2 Cor. vi. 16 f.; Eph. ii. 21 f.; Ezek. xxxvii. 27). — Ναός did *not* need the *article*, which comes in only retrospectively in ver. 17, just because there is but *one* ναὸς Θεοῦ in existence. Comp. 2 Cor. vi. 16 ; Eph. ii. 21 ; Wisd. iii. 14 ; 2 Macc. xiv. 35 ; Ecclus. li. 44.

Ver. 17. Εἴ τις . . . ἅγιός ἐστιν] This is spoken of the *real* temple; the *application* to the church as the *ideal* one is not made until the οἷτινές ἐστε ὑμεῖς which follows. It is an anticipation of the course of the argument to understand, as here already meant, the latter *New Testament* place of the divine presence (Hofmann). — Every Levitical defilement was considered a *destroying* of the temple, as was every injury to the buildings, and even every act of carelessness in the watching and superintendence of it. See Maimonides, *de domo electa*, i. 10, vii. 7. Deyling, *Obs.* II. p. 505 ff. — φθερεῖ] placed immediately after φθείρει at the head of the apodosis, to express with emphasis the adequacy of the recompense. See Kühner, II. p. 626. What φθερεῖ denotes is the temporal destruction, the punishment of *death* which God will bring upon the destroyer of His temple, as in the LXX. φθείρω is often used of God as inflicting such destruction. Comp. Gen. vi. 13 ; Micah ii. 10 ; 1 Kings ii. 27, *al.* — ἅγιος] as the dwelling of God, sacred therefore from all injury, and not to be destroyed without incurring heavy divine penalty. — οἷτινές ἐστε ὑμεῖς] of *which character* (namely, ἅγιοι) *are ye*. In this we have the minor proposition of the syllogism contained in vv. 16 and 17: Him who destroys God's temple God will destroy, because the temple is holy; but ye also are holy, as being the spiritual temple; consequently, he who destroys you will be destroyed of God. Paul leaves it to his readers themselves to infer, for their own behoof, that in this reasoning of his he means by the destruction of the (ideal) temple the deterioration of the church *on the part of the sectarians*, and by the penal destruction which awaits them, *their ἀπώλεια at the Messianic judgment* (the φθορά of Gal. vi. 8). It is a mistake (with most commentators, including Luther) to regard οἷτινες as put for οἷ (see the passages where this *seems* to be the case in Struve, *Quaest.*

*Herod.* I. p. 2 ff.), and to make it refer to *ναὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ*: *which temple ye are*. That would rather yield the inappropriate (see on ver. 16) *plural* sense: *cujusmodi templa vos estis*. See Porson and Schaefer, *ad Eurip. Or.* 908. *Matthiae*, p. 977.

Ver. 18. *Μηδεὶς ἐαυτ. ἐξαπ.*] Emphatic warning, setting the following exhortation, as directed against an existing evil which arose out of *self-deception*, in that point of view; comp. vi. 9, xv. 33; Gal. vi. 7. Those who were proud of their wisdom did not discern that they were destroying the temple of God with their sectarian proceedings. Theophylact remarks well upon *ἐξαπατ.*: *νομίζων, ὅτι ἄλλως ἔχει τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ οὐχ ὡς εἶπον. — δοκεῖ*] *believes, is of opinion, not appears* (Vulgate, Erasmus); for it was the *former* that was objectionable and dangerous. Comp. viii. 2, xiv. 37; Gal. vi. 3. — *σοφὸς εἶναι . . . τούτῳ*] *ἐν ὑμῖν* belongs to *σόφος εἶναι*, and *ἐν τῷ αἰῶνι τούτῳ* defines the *σόφος εἶναι ἐν ὑμῖν* more precisely, to wit, according to his *non-Christian* standing and condition (comp. ver. 19): *If any one is persuaded that he is wise among you in this age, i.e. if one claims for himself a being wise in your community, which belongs to the sphere of this pre-Messianic period.* To the *αἰὼν οὗτος*, despite of all its philosophy and other wisdom falsely so called (i. 20, ii. 6), the true wisdom, which is only in Christ (Col. ii. 3), is in fact a thing foreign and far off; this *αἰών* is a sphere essentially alien to the true state of being wise in the church; in it a man may have the *λόγος σοφίας* (Col. ii. 23), but not the reality. We must not therefore, in defiance of its place in the sentence, link *ἐν τῷ αἰ. τ.* merely to *σόφος* (Erasmus, Grotius, Rückert, and many others), in doing which *ἐν* is often taken as equivalent to *κατά*. Origen, Cyprian, Chrysostom, Luther, Castalio, Mosheim, Rosenmüller, and others, join it to what follows, rendering either generally to this effect: "is a vulgo hominum pro stulto haberi non recuset;" or with a more exact development of the meaning, as Hofmann: whoever thinks himself to be wise in the church, "he, just on that account, is not wise, but has yet to become so, and must to this end become a fool in this present age of the world, because his wisdom is a wisdom of this world, and as such is foolishness in the eyes of God." But the emphasis does not lie upon the contrast between *ἐν ὑμῖν* and *ἐν τῷ αἰῶνι τ.*, but upon *σόφος* and *μωρός*, as is plain from the fact that in the clause expressive of



the aim we have the simple σοφός alone without ἐν ὑμῖν. It may be seen, too, from ver. 19 (σοφ. τοῦ κόσμου) that Paul had included ἐν τ. αἰ. τ. in the protasis. — μωρὸς γενέσθω] *i.e.* let him rid himself of his fancied wisdom, and become (by returning to the pure and simple gospel unalloyed by any sort of philosophy or speculation) *such a one* as now in relation to that illusory wisdom is a fool. — σοφός] with emphasis: *truly wise*. See Col. ii. 2, 3. The path of the Christian *sapere aude* proceeds from becoming a fool to wisdom, as from becoming blind to seeing (John ix. 39).

Ver. 19. Giving the ground of the μωρὸς γενέσθω demanded in order to the γίνεσθαι σόφον. — τοῦ κόσμου τούτου] *i.e.* such as is peculiar to the pre-Messianic world (humanity), like the Hellenic sophistry, rhetoric, etc.; comp. i. 21, ii. 6. — παρὰ τ. Θεῷ] *judice Deo*; Rom. ii. 13; Winer, p. 369 [E. T. 493]. How truly that wisdom was its own very opposite, and how utterly to be given up! — γέγρ. γάρ] Job v. 13, not according to the LXX., but expressing the sense of the Hebrew with quite as great fidelity. The passage, however, serves as proof, not for the warning and admonition in ver. 18 (Hofmann),—to take it thus would be arbitrarily to reach back over what immediately precedes the γάρ,—but, as ver. 20 also confirms, for the statement just made, ἡ γὰρ σοφία κ.τ.λ. If, namely, God did not count that wisdom to be folly, then He could not be spoken of as *He who taketh the wise in their craftiness*, *i.e.* who brings it to pass that the wise, while they cunningly pursue their designs, do not attain them, but rather their craftiness turns to their own destruction. Thus the hand of God comes in upon their doings and *takes* them in their craftiness, whereby He just practically proclaims His judgment regarding their wisdom, that it is *foolishness*. As respects πανουργία, comp. the Hellenic distinction between it and the true wisdom in Plato, *Menex.* p. 247 A: πᾶσά τε ἐπιστήμη χωριζομένη δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς πανουργία, οὐ σοφία, φαίνεται. — ὁ δρασσόμε. is not “ex Hebr. pro finito δράσσεται” (Pott, following Beza), but the quotation, being taken out of its connection, does not form a complete sentence. Comp. Heb. i. 8; Winer, p. 330 [E. T. 443]; Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 250 [E. T. 291].—On δράσσεσθαι with the *accusative* (commonly with the *genitive*), comp. Herod. iii. 13, LXX. Lev. v. 12, Num. v. 26.

Ver. 20. Πάλιν] as in Rom. xv. 10; Matt. iv. 7. The passage quoted is Ps. xciv. 11, and the only variation from the Hebrew and the LXX. is in putting σοφῶν instead of ἀνθρώπων, and that purposely, but with no violence to the connection of the original (the reference being to men of pretended wisdom). — μάταιοι] empty, thoughts (for Paul, at all events, had διαλογ. not σοφ. in view) which are without true substance. Comp. Plato, Soph. p. 231 B: περὶ τὴν μάταιον δοξασοφίαν.

Ver. 21. Ὡστε] Hence, that is to say, because this world's wisdom, this source of your καυχᾶσθαι ἐν ἀνθρώποις (see ver. 18), is nothing but folly before God, vv. 19, 20. According to Hofmann, ὥστε draws its inference from the whole section, vv. 10–20. But μηδεὶς καυχᾶσθω κ.τ.λ. manifestly corresponds to the warning μηδεὶς εἰαυτ. ἐξαπ. κ.τ.λ. in ver. 18, from the discussion of which (ver. 19 f.) there is now deduced the parallel warning beginning with ὥστε (ver. 21); and this again is finally confirmed by a sublime representation of the position held by a Christian (ver. 22 f.). — ἐν ἀνθρώποις] “id pertinet ad extenuandum,” Bengel; the opposite of ἐν Κυρίῳ, i. 31. Human teachers are meant, upon whom the different parties prided themselves against each other (ver. 5, i. 12). Comp. iv. 6. Billroth renders wrongly: on account of men, whom he has subjected to himself and formed into a sect. Εἴτε Παῦλος . . . Κηφᾶς in ver. 22 is decisive against this; for how strangely forced it is to make μηδεὶς refer to the teachers, and ὑμῶν to the church! — The imperative after ὥστε (comp. iv. 5, x. 12; Phil. ii. 12) is not governed by that word, but the dependent statement beginning with ὥστε changes to the direct. See Hermann, *ad Viger.* p. 852; Bremi, *ad Dcm. Phil.* III. p. 276; Klotz, *ad Devar.* p. 776. — πάντα γὰρ ὑμῶν ἐστιν] with the emphasis on πάντα: nothing excepted, all belongs to you as your property; so that to boast yourselves of men, consequently, who as party leaders are to be your property to the exclusion of others, is something quite foreign to your high position as Christians. Observe that we are not to explain as if it ran: ὑμῶν γὰρ πάντα ἐστιν (“illa vestra sunt, non vos illorum,” Bengel); but that the apostle has in view some form of party-confession, as, for example, “Paul is mine,” or “Cephas is my man,” and the like. It was thus that some boasted themselves of individual personages as their property, in opposition to the πάντα ὑμ. ἐ. It

may be added that what is conveyed in this πάντα ὑμῶν ἐστίν is not "the miraculous nature of the love, which is shed abroad in the hearts of believers by the Spirit, in virtue of which the man embraces the whole world, and enjoys as his own possession whatever in it is beautiful and glorious" (πάντα?), as is the view of Olshausen; but rather, in accordance with the diverse character of the objects thereafter enumerated, the twofold idea, that all things are destined in reality to serve the best interests of the Christians (comp. Rom. viii. 28 ff.), and consequently to be in an ethical sense their possession,<sup>1</sup> and that the actual κληρονομία τοῦ κόσμου (Rom. iv. 13 f.) is allotted to them in the Messianic kingdom. Comp. 4 Esdr. ix. 14. The saying of the philosophers: "*Omnia sapientis esse*" (see Wetstein), is a lower and imperfect analogue of this Christian idea.

Ver. 22. Detailed explication of the πάντα; then an emphatic repetition of the great thought πάντα ὑμ., in order to link to it ver. 23. — Παῦλος . . . Κηφ.] for they are designed to labour for the furtherance of the Christian weal. Paul does not write ἐγώ; as forming the subject-matter of a partisan confession, he appears to himself as a third person; comp. ver. 5. — κόσμος] generally; for *the world*, although as yet only in an ideal sense, is by destination your possession, inasmuch as, in the coming αἰών, it is to be subjected to believers by virtue of the participation which they shall then obtain in the kingly office of Christ (Rom. iv. 13, viii. 17; 1 Cor. vi. 2. Comp. 2 Tim. ii. 12). More specific *verbal* explanations of κόσμος, as it occurs in this full triumphant outpouring—such as *reliqui omnes homines* (Rosenmüller and others), the *unbelieving world* (comp. also Hofmann), and so forth—are totally unwarranted by the connection. Bengel says aptly: "Repentinus hic a Petro ad totum mundum saltus orationem facit amplam cum quadam quasi impatientia enumerandi cetera." The eye of the apostle thus rises at once from the concrete and empirical to the most general whole, in point of *matter* (κόσμος), *condition* (ζωή, θάνατος), *time* (ἐνεστώτα, μέλλοντα). — ζωή . . . θάνατος] comp. Rom. viii. 38. We are not to refer this, with Chrysostom, Theophylact, and Grotius, to the *teachers*: "si vitam doctoribus protrahit Deus," and "si ob evangel. mortem

<sup>1</sup> Hence Luther in his gloss rightly infers: "*Therefore no man hath power to make laws over Christians to bind their consciences.*"

obeunt" (Grotius, comp. too, Michaelis), nor to transform it with Pott into: things *living* and *lifeless*; nor even is the limitation of it to the *readers themselves* ("live ye or die, it is to you for the best," Flatt) in any way suggested by the text through the analogy of the other points. Both should rather be left without any special reference, life and death being viewed *generally as relations occurring in the world*. Both of them are, like all else, destined to serve for your good in respect of your attainment of salvation. Comp. Phil. i. 21; Rom. xiv. 7 ff.; 1 Cor. xv. 19 ff. Theodoret: *καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ θάνατος τῆς ὑμετέρας ἔνεκεν ὠφελείας ἐπηνέχθη τῇ φύσει. — εἴτε ἐνεστῶτα, εἴτε μέλλοντα*] Similarly, we are not to restrict *things existing* (what we find to have already entered on a state of subsistence; see on Gal. i. 4) and *things to come* to the *fortunes of the readers* (Flatt and many others), but to leave them without more precise definition.

Ver. 23. In ver. 22 Paul had stated the *active* relation of the Christians as regards ownership, all being made to serve them—a relation which, by its universality, must preclude all boasting of human authorities. He now adds to this their *passive* relation as regards ownership also, which is equally adverse to the same hurtful tendency, namely: *but ye belong to Christ*,—so that in this respect, too, the *καυχᾶσθαι ἐν ἀνθρώποις* of ver. 21 cannot but be unseemly. Rückert would make *πάντα γὰρ ὑμῶν ἐστι κ.τ.λ.* in ver. 22 the protasis and said by way of concession, so that the leading thought would lie in ver. 23: "All indeed is yours; but ye belong to Christ." We are, he holds, to supply *μέν* after *πάντα*. But, even apart from this erroneous addition, there may be urged against his view, partly the fact that an independent emphasis is laid upon the thought *πάντα ὑμῶν*, as is clear at a glance both from its explication in detail and from the repetition of the phrase; and partly the internal state of the case, that what Rückert takes as a concession really contains a very pertinent and solid argument against the *καυχ. ἐν ἀνθρώποις*. — *Χριστὸς δὲ Θεοῦ*] and *Christ, again, belongs to God*, is subordinated to God, stands in His service. For *κεφαλὴ Χριστοῦ ὁ Θεός*, xi. 3. Comp. Luke ix. 20. The strict monotheism of the N. T. (see on Rom. ix. 5), and the relation of Christ as the *Son* to the Father, necessarily give the idea of the *subordination of Christ under*

*God.*<sup>1</sup> As His equality with God and His divine glory before the incarnation (Phil. ii. 6), although *essential*, were still *derived* (εἰκὼν τ. Θεοῦ, πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως, Col. i. 15), so also the divine glory, which He has obtained by His exaltation after His obedience rendered to God even unto the death of the cross, is again a glory *bestowed* upon Him (Phil. ii. 9), and His dominion is destined to be *given back* to God (1 Cor. xv. 28). Since, however, this relation of dependence, affirmed by Χριστὸς δὲ Θεοῦ (comp. on Eph. i. 17), by no means expresses the conception of Arianism, but leaves untouched the essential equality of Christ with God (Theodoret aptly remarks: Χριστὸς γὰρ Θεοῦ οὐχ ὡς κτίσμα Θεοῦ, ἀλλ' ὡς υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ), it was all the more a mistake to assume (so Calvin, Estius, Calovius, and many others, including Flatt and Olshausen) that the statement here refers only to *the human nature*. It is precisely on the *divine* side of His being that Christ is, according to Paul (Rom. i. 4), the *Son* of God, and therefore as γέννημα γνήσιον . . . ὡς αὐτὸν αἴτιον ἔχων κατὰ τὸ πατέρα εἶναι (Chrysostom), not subordinate to Him simply in respect of His manhood. *But for what reason does Paul add here at all this Χριστὸς δὲ Θεοῦ*, seeing it was not needed for the establishment of the prohibition of the *καυχᾶσθαι ἐν ἀνθρώποις*? We answer: Had he ended with ὑμεῖς δὲ Χριστοῦ, he would then, in appearance, have conceded the claim of the Christ-party, who did *not* boast themselves ἐν ἀνθρώποις (and hence were not touched by ver. 22), but held to *Christ*; and this, in point of fact, is what Pott and Schott make out that the apostle here does. But this was not his intention; for the confession of the Christ-party was not, indeed, Ebionitic,—as if the Χ. δὲ Θεοῦ were aimed *against this* (Osiander),—but, although right enough in *idea*, yet practically objectionable on the ground of the schismatic *misuse* made of it. He rises, therefore, to the *highest absolute* jurisdiction, that to which even *Christ* is subject, in order in this passage, where he rejects the three parties who supported themselves on human authorities, to make the Christ-party, too, feel their error: *Christ, again, is*—not the head of a party, as many among you would make Him, but—*belonging to God*, and consequently exalted in the highest possible degree above all drawing in of His name

<sup>1</sup> See also Hahn, *Theol. d. N. T.* I. p. 120 ff. Gess, *v. d. Person Chr.* p. 157 ff. Ernesti, *Ursprung der Sünde*, I. p. 194 ff. Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 306.

into party-contentions. In this way, with no little delicacy, Paul sets the relation of the *fourth* Corinthian party also—of which ver. 22 did not allow the mention—in the light of the true Christian perspective; to do which by no means lay too far from the path of his exhortation (Hofmann), but was very naturally suggested by the concrete circumstances which he could not but have in his eye.

REMARK.—The reference in ver. 22 f. to the party of *Peter* and of *Christ* is to be regarded as simply *by the way*. The whole section from i. 13 to iv. 21 is directed against the antagonism between the *Pauline* and the *Apollonian* parties (comp. on ver. 4); but the idea πάντα ὑμῶν ἴστιν, which Paul holds up to these two, very naturally leads him to make *all* the parties sensible of their fault as well, although to enter *further* upon the Petrine and the Christ-party did not lie in the line of his purpose. The theory, so much in favour of late, which refers the polemic, beginning with i. 17, to the *Christ-party* (Jaeger, Schenkel, Goldhorn, Kniewel, etc.), has led to acts of great arbitrariness, as is most conspicuous in the case of Kniewel, who divides chap. iii. among all the four parties, giving vv. 3–10 to that of Paul and that of Apollos, vv. 12–17 to that of Peter, and ver. 18 f. to that of Christ; while in the contrasts of ver. 22 (εἶτε κόσμος . . . μέλλοντα) he finds the Christ-party's doctrine of the harmony of all contrasts accomplished in Christ as the world-soul.

## CHAPTER IV.

VER. 2. δ δε] Lachm. Rück. Tisch. read ῶδε, with A B C D\* F G κ, min. Syr. Eip. Aeth. Arm. Vulg. It. Jerome, Aug. Ambr. Pelag. Sedul. Bede. This vastly preponderating testimony in favour of ῶδε, and its infrequency with Paul (only again in Col. iv. 9), make the *Recepta* seem the result of change or error on the part of transcribers. — ζητεῖται] A C D E F G κ, min. have ζητεῖτε. Recommended by Griesb. But B L and all the vss. and Fathers are against it. A copyist's error. — Ver. 6. Instead of ε, A B C κ, 31, Syr. p. Copt. Athan. Cyril have ε; which is recommended by Griesb., and adopted by Lachm. Tisch. and Rückert. The Latin authorities have *supra quam*, which leaves their reading doubtful. The preceding ταῦτα naturally suggested ε. — φρονεῖν] is wanting in A B D\* E\* F G κ, 46, Vulg. It. and Latin Fathers. Rightly deleted by Lachm. Tisch. and Rückert.<sup>1</sup> A supplementary addition, in place of which Athanasius has φρονοῦσθαι. — Ver. 9. ὅτι after γάρ has preponderant evidence against it, and should be deleted, as is done by Lachm. Rück. and Tisch. Superfluous addition. — Ver. 13. βλασφ.] A C κ\*, 17 46, Clem. Origen (twice), Euseb. Cyril, Damasc. have δυσφ. Approved by Griesb., accepted by Rück. and Tisch. Rightly; the more familiar (for the verb δυσφ. occurs nowhere else in the N. T., comp. 2 Cor. vi. 8), and at the same time stronger word was inserted. — Ver. 14. νοουθετῶ] A C κ, min. Theophylact have νοουθετῶν. An assimilation to the foregoing participle.

Vv. 1-5. *The right point of view from which to regard Christian teachers* (vv. 1, 2); *Paul, nevertheless, for his own part, does not give heed to human judgment, nay, he does not even judge himself, but his judge is Christ* (vv. 3, 4). *Therefore his readers*

<sup>1</sup> φρονεῖν has been defended again by Reiche in his *Commentar. crit.* I. p. 146 ff. He urges that the omission is not attested by the Greek Fathers, and, out of all the versions, only by the Latin ones, and that the word is *indispensable*. But the latter is not the case; and the former consideration cannot turn the scale against the decisive weight of the chief codices, among which only C—and even that not certainly—has φρονεῖν.

should give up their passing of judgments till the decision of the *Parousia* (ver. 5).

Ver. 1. Οὕτως] is commonly taken as *preparatory*, emphatically paving the way for the ὡς ὑπηρ. which follows. Comp. iii. 15, ix. 26; 2 Cor. ix. 5; Eph. v. 33, *al.*, and often in Greek writers. The *καυχ. ἐν ἀνθρ.* before repudiated arose, namely, out of a false mode of regarding the matter; Paul now states the true mode. Since, however, there is no antithetic particle added here, and since the following epithets: ὑπηρ. Χριστοῦ and οἶκον. Θεοῦ sound significantly like the ὑμεῖς δὲ Χριστοῦ, Χριστὸς δὲ Θεοῦ which immediately precede them, οὕτως is rather to be regarded as the *sic retrospective* (*in this way, in such fashion*), and ὡς again as stating the objective *quality*, in *which* the ἡμεῖς have a claim to the οὕτως ἡμᾶς λογιζ. ἀνθρ. which is enjoined. Accordingly, we should explain as follows: *Under this point of view*, as indicated already in ver. 22 f. (namely, that all is yours; but that ye are Christ's; and that Christ, again, is God's), *let men form their judgment of us, as of those who are servants of Christ and stewards of divine mysteries.* Let us but be judged of as servants of Christ, etc., according to the standard of that lofty Christian mode of view (οὕτως), and how conclusively shut out from this sphere of vision will be the partisan *καυχᾶσθαι ἐν ἀνθρώποις!* Men will be lifted high above that. — ἡμᾶς] *i.e.* myself and such as I, by which other apostles also and apostolic teachers (like Apollos) are meant. In view of iii. 22, no narrower limitation is allowable. — ἀνθρώπος] not a *Hebraism* (ὁ ἓν, *one*; so most interpreters, among whom Luther, Grotius, and others explain it wrongly *every one*), but in accordance with a pure *Greek* use of the word in the sense of the indefinite *one* or *a man* (Plato, *Protag.* p. 355 A, *Gorg.* p. 500 C, *al.*). So also in xi. 28; Gal. vi. 1. Bengel's "*homo quivis nostris similis*" is an importation. — ὑπηρ. Χ. κ. οἶκον. μυστ. Θεοῦ] They are servants of Christ, and, as such, are at the same time stewards of God (the supreme ruler, iii. 23, the Father and Head of the theocracy, the οἶκος Θεοῦ, 1 Tim. iii. 15), inasmuch as they are entrusted with His *secrets*, *i.e.* entrusted and commissioned to communicate by the preaching of the gospel the divine decrees for the redemption of men and their receiving Messianic blessings (see on Rom. xi. 25, xvi. 25; Eph. i. 9; Matt. xiii. 11),—decrees in themselves unknown to



men, but fulfilled in Christ, and unveiled by means of revelation. They are to do this just as the steward of a household (see on Luke xvi. 1) has to administer his master's goods. Comp. as regards this idea, ix. 17; 1 Tim. i. 4; Titus i. 7; 1 Pet. iv. 10. There is no reference whatever here to the *sacraments*, which Olshausen and Osiander again desire to include. See i. 17. The whole notion of a *sacrament*, as such, was generalized at a later date from the actions to which men restricted it, sometimes in a wider, sometimes in a narrower sense. — Observe, moreover: between the *Father*, the *Master* of the house, and the *οἰκονόμοι* there stands the *Son*, and He has from the Father the power of disposal (comp. on John viii. 35 f.; 1 Cor. xv. 25 ff.), so that the *οἰκονόμοι* are His *servants*. Paul uses *ὑπηρέτης* only in this passage; but there is no ground for importing any special design into the word (such as that it is *humbler* than *διάκονος*). Comp. on Eph. iii. 7.

Ver. 2. If we read ὥδε (see the critical remarks), we must understand the verse thus: *Such being the state of the case, it is, for the rest, required of the stewards, etc., so that λοιπόν* (i. 16) would express something which, in connection with the relationship designed in ver. 1, remained now alone to be mentioned as pertaining thereto, while ὥδε<sup>1</sup> again, quite in accordance with the old classical usage (see Lehrs, *Arist.* p. 84 ff.), would convey the notion of *sic*, i.e. "*cum eo statu res nostrae sint*" (Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* II. p. 991). We might paraphrase, therefore, as follows: "*Such being the nature of our position as servants, the demand to be made upon the stewards of households<sup>2</sup> of course takes effect.*" If we abide by the *Recepta*, ὁ δὲ λοιπόν must be rendered: *But as to what remains, i.e. but as respects what else there is which has its place in connection with the relationship of service spoken of in ver. 1, this is the demand, etc.; comp. on Rom. vi. 10.* It is a perversion of the passage to make it refer, as Billroth does, to the preceding depreciation of the supposed merits

<sup>1</sup> The word would be singularly superfluous, and would drag behind in the most awkward way, were we, with Lachmann, to treat it as belonging to ver. 1, and to separate it by a point from λοιπόν.

<sup>2</sup> This ἐν τοῖς οἰκονόμοις is not "uncalled for and superfluous" after ὥδε (as Hofmann objects); for Paul had, in ver. 1, described the official service of the teachers by *two* designations, but now desires to attach what more he has to say in ver. 2 specially to the *second* of these designations, and hence he has again to bring in the οἰκονόμοι.

of the teachers: "*but what still remains for them is, that they can at least strive for the praise of faithfulness.*" The rest of the verse says nothing at all about a being able to strive; for *ζητεῖται ἐν* means nothing else but: *it is sought at their hand* (*requiritur*), i.e. *demanded of them*. See Wetstein. Hofmann's interpretation, too, is an impossible one. He makes *ὁ δὲ λοιπὸν* down to *εὐρεθῇ* to be the *protasis*; *ἐμοὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ.*, and that running on as far as *κύριός ἐστιν* in ver. 4, to be the *apodosis*: As respects that, however, which . . . is further required, namely, that one be found faithful, it is to me, etc. This interpretation gives us, instead of the simple, clearly progressive sentences of the apostle, a long, obscurely and clumsily involved period, against which on linguistic grounds there are the two considerations—(1) that *ὁ δὲ λοιπὸν ζητεῖται* would presuppose some demand already conveyed in ver 1, to which a new one was now added; and (2) that the *δέ* of the *apodosis* in ver. 3 would require to find its antithetic reference in the alleged *protasis* in ver. 2 (comp. Acts xi. 17; Baeumlein, *Partik.* p. 92 f.), namely, to this effect: *to me, on the contrary*, not concerned about this required faithfulness, *it is*, etc. Now the first is not the case, and the second would be absurd. Neither the one difficulty nor the other is removed by the arbitrarily inserted thoughts, which Hofmann seeks to read between the lines.<sup>1</sup> — *ἵνα*] is sought *with the design, that there be found*. Hence the *object of the seeking* is conveyed in the form expressive of *design*. That *εὐρίσκεισθαι* is not equivalent to *εἶναι* (Wolff, Flatt, Pott, and others) is plain here, especially from the correlation in which it stands to *ζητεῖται*. — *τις*] i.e. *any one of them*. See Matthiae, p. 1079; Nägelsbach on the *Iliad*, p. 299, ed. 3. — *πιστός*] Luke xii. 42, xvi. 10 ff.; Matt. xxv. 21 ff.; Eph. vi. 21, *al.* The *summing up* of the *duties* of spiritual service.

Ver. 3. I, for my part, however, feel myself in no way made dependent on your judgment by this *ζητεῖται κ.τ.λ.* — *εἰς ἐλάχιστόν ἐστιν*] *εἰς*, in the sense of giving the result: *it comes to something utterly insignificant*, evinces itself as in the highest degree unimportant. Comp. Pindar, *Ol.* i. 122: *ἐς χάριν τέλλεται*, Plato,

<sup>1</sup> In *λοιπὸν* he finds: "Besides this, that the stewards act in accordance with their name." By the antithetic *ἐμοὶ δὲ*, again, Paul means: "in contrast to those who conduct themselves as though he must consider it of importance to him." By interpolations of this sort, everything may be moulded *into what shape one will*.

*Alc.* I. p. 126 A; Buttmann, *neutest. Gramm.* p. 131 [E. T. 150]. — *ἵνα*] does not stand for *ὅταν* (Pott), nor does it take the place of the construction with the infinitive (so *most* interpreters); but the conception of design, which is *essential* to *ἵνα*, is in the mind of the writer, and has given birth to the expression. The thought is: I have an exceedingly slight interest in the design of receiving your judgment. — *ἀνακριθῶ*] “*fidelisne sim nec ne*,” Bengel. — *ἢ ὑπὸ ἀνθρ. ἡμ.*] or *by a human day* at all. The *day*, *i.e.* the *day of judgment*, on which a human sentence is to go forth upon me, is personified. It forms a contrast with the *ἡμέρα Κυρίου*, which Paul proceeds hereafter, not indeed to *name*, but to *describe*, see ver. 5. — *ἀλλ’ οὐδέ*] *yea, not even*, as in iii. 2. — *ἐμαυτὸν*] Billroth and Rückert think that the contrast between the persons properly demanded *αὐτὸς ἐμαυτ.* here, which, however, has been overlooked by Paul. But the *active* expression *ἐμαυτὸν ἀνακρίνω* is surely the complete contrast to the *passive* *ὑφ’ ὑμ. ἀνακρ.*; hence *αὐτός might*, indeed, have been added to strengthen the statement, but there was no *necessity* for its being so. — The *ἀνακρίνειν* in the whole verse is neither to be understood solely of unfavourable, nor solely of favourable judging, but of *any sort of judgment regarding one’s worth* in general. See vv. 4, 5.

Ver. 4. Parenthetical statement of the ground of Paul’s not even judging himself (*οὐδὲν . . . δεδικ.*), and then the antithesis (*δέ: but indeed*) to the above *οὐδὲ ἐμαυτ. ἀνακρίνω*. — *γάρ*] The element of *proof* lies neither in the first clause alone (Hofmann), nor in the second clause alone, so that the first would be merely concessive (Baumgarten, Winer, Billroth, Rückert, who supplies *μέν* here again, de Wette, Osiander), but in the antithetic *relation of both clauses*, wherein *ἀλλά* has the force of *at*, not of “*sondern*.” I judge not my own self, *because I am conscious to myself of nothing, but am not thereby justified*, *i.e.* *because my pure* (official, see ver. 2) *self-consciousness* (comp. Acts xxiii. 1, xxiv. 16; 2 Cor. i. 12) *is still not the ground on which my justification rests*. As regards the expression, comp. Plato, *Apol.* p. 21 B: *οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν ξύνοϊδα ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὢν*, *Rep.* p. 331 A; and Horace, *Ep.* i. 1. 61: “*nil conscire sibi, nulla pallescere culpa*,” Job xxvii. 6. — *οὐκ ἐν τούτῳ δεδικ.*] is *ordinarily* understood wrongly: “*I do not on that account look upon myself as guiltless*.” For the words *οὐκ ἐν τούτῳ*, negating justification by a good conscience, make it

clear that *δεδικ.* expresses the customary conception of *being justified by faith* (see on Rom. i. 17; so rightly, Calovius, Billroth, Rückert), since, on the view just referred to, we must have had *ἐν τούτῳ οὐ*.<sup>1</sup> The *οὐ* is as little in its wrong place here as in xv. 51. Note that the *δεδικαίωμαι* is to the apostle an undoubted *certain fact*; <sup>2</sup> hence we may not explain it, with Hofmann: Not thereby am I pronounced righteous as respects faithfulness in the fulfilment of my office, but only if (?) the Lord shall charge me with no neglect of duty. That would plainly make the *δεδικαίωμαι* *problematic*. — *Κύριος*] Christ, ver. 5.

Ver. 5. *Therefore judge nothing before the time, namely, with respect to me*; not as Billroth thinks: *one sect regarding another*, which is inadmissible in view of the preceding *ἀνακρ. με* and of the whole passage, vv. 3, 4, which all applies to *Paul*. The process of thought from ver. 3 onwards is, namely, this: “*For my part, you may judge me if you will, I make very little of that; but (ver. 4) seeing that I do not even judge myself, but that he that judgeth me is Christ, I therefore counsel you (ver. 5) not to pass a judgment upon me prematurely.*” — *πρὸ καιροῦ*] i.e. *before it is the right time*, Matt. viii. 29; Eccus. xxx. 24, li. 30; Lucian, *Jov. Trag.* 47. How long such judging would continue to be *πρὸ καιροῦ*, we learn only from what comes after; hence we must not by anticipation assign to *καίρος* the specific sense of *tempus reditus Christi*. — *τι*] i.e. *κρίσιν τινά*, John vii. 24. — *κρίνετε*] describes the *passing of the judgment*, the consequence of the *ἀνακρ.*, in a manner accordant with the looking forward to the Messianic

<sup>1</sup> Paul's thought has run thus:—“Were I justified by my conscience free of reproach, then I should be entitled to pass judgment on myself, namely, just in accordance with the standard of the said conscience. But seeing that I am *not* justified by this conscience (but by Christ), it cannot even serve me as a standard for self-judgment, and I must refrain therefrom, and leave the judgment regarding me to Christ.” This applies also against de Wette, who holds our exposition to be contrary to the context, because what follows is not *ὁ δὲ δικαίων*, but *ὁ δὲ ἀνακρίνων*. Moreover, the further imputation of moral desert is certainly not done away with by justification, but it remains in force until the judgment. *Διδικαίωμαι*, however, does not refer to the being found righteous at the day of judgment (against Lipsius, *Rechtfertigungsl.* p. 48), but, as the perfect shows, to the righteousness *obtained* by faith, which to the consciousness of the apostle was at all times a present blessing. — Observe further, how alien to Paul was the conception that the conscience is the expression of the real *divine* life in the man. Comp. Delitzsch, *Psychol.* p. 141.

<sup>2</sup> So precisely Ignatius, *ad Rom.* 5: *ἀλλ' οὐ παρὰ τοῦτο διδικαίωμαι*. The *certitudo gratiae* is expressed but as *not* based upon the conscience void of reproach.

*judgment.* Luther, Raphel, and Wolf render: *alium alii praeferre*; but this runs counter to the context, for it must be analogous to the general ἀνακρ. — ἕως ἂν ἔλθῃ ὁ κ.] Epexegetis of πρὸ καιροῦ: judge not before the time (judge not, I say), *until the Lord shall have come.* Then only is it a κάρριον κρίνειν, because then only can the judgment be pronounced rightly according to the Lord's decision. The ἂν marks out the coming as *in so far problematical* (depending upon circumstances; see Hartung, *Partikell.* p. 291), inasmuch as it was not, indeed, doubted, and yet at the same time not dependent upon subjective determination, but an object of expectant faith in the unknown future. Comp. Matt. xvi. 28; Mark ix. 1; Luke ix. 27, xiii. 35; Rev. ii. 25. — δς καί] καί is the *also* customary with the relative, the effect of which is to bring into prominence some element in keeping with what has gone before (Baumlein, *Partik.* p. 152; Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 243 [E. T. 283]). In His function as Judge, in which He is to come, He will do *this also*, He will light up, *i.e.* make manifest, what is hidden in the darkness. Respecting φωτίσει, comp. Eccclus. xxiv. 32; 2 Tim. i. 10; Plut. *Mor.* p. 931 C, and the passages in Wetstein. What *withdraws* itself from the light as its *opposite* (Hofmann, who takes καὶ . . . καί as meaning *as well, as also*) is *included* here, but not that alone. Compare rather the general statement in Luke viii. 17. — καὶ φανερ. τ. βουλ. τῶν καρδ.] a special element selected from the foregoing general affirmation. The *significant* bearing of what Paul here affirms of Christ at His coming is the application which the readers were to make of it to himself and the other teachers; it was to be understood, namely, that their true character also would only then become manifest, *i.e.* be laid open as an object of knowledge, but now was not yet submitted to judgment. — καὶ τότε . . . Θεοῦ] so that ye can only then pass judgment on your teachers with sure (divine) warrant for what ye do. The chief emphasis is upon the ἀπὸ τ. Θεοῦ, which is for that reason put at the end (Kühner, II. p. 625), and next to it upon what is placed first, ὁ ἔπαινος. This does not mean *praemium* (so Flatt, with older expositors, citing wrongly in support of it such passages as Rom. ii. 29, xiii. 3; 1 Pet. i. 7, ii. 14; Wisd. xv. 19; Polybius, ii. 58. 11), nor is it a *vox media* (as, following Casaubon, *ad Epict.* 67, Wolf, Rosenmüller, Pott, and

others assume wholly without proof); but it denotes simply *the praise, the commendation*. The apparent incongruity with *ἐκάστω* is obviated by the article: *the praise that appertains to him* (Bernhardy, p. 315) shall be given to each,—so that Paul here *puts entirely out of sight* those who deserve no praise at all. And rightly so. For his readers were to apply this to *him* and *Apollos*; hence, as Calvin justly remarks: “*haec vox ex bonae conscientiae fiducia nascitur*.” See ver. 4. Theophylact's view, although adopted by many, is an arbitrary one: “*unde et contrarium datur intelligi, sed mavult εὐφημεῖν*,” Grotius (so also Bengel, Billroth, Rückert, Olshausen). — *ἀπὸ τ. Θεοῦ*] not from *men*, as *ye* now place and praise the one above the other, but *on the part of God*; for Christ the Judge is God's vicegerent and representative, John v. 27 ff.; Acts x. 42, xvii. 31; Rom. ii. 16, *al.*

Vv. 6–13. *Now, what I have hitherto given utterance to in a manner applicable to myself and Apollos, has for its object to wean you from party-pride* (ver. 6). *Rebuke of this pride* (vv. 7–13).

Ver. 6. *Δέ*] pursuing the subject; the apostle turns now to the *final remonstrances and rebukes* which he has to give in reference to the party-division among them; in doing so, he addresses his *readers generally* (not the teachers) as *ἀδελφοί* with a winning warmth of feeling, as in i. 11. — *ταῦτα*] from iii. 5 onwards, where he brings in himself and Apollos specially and by name, assigning to both their true position and its limits to be observed by them with all humility, and then appending to this the further instructions which he gives up to iv. 5. *Ταῦτα* is not to be made to refer back to i. 12, where Paul and Apollos are not named *alone* (so Baur, following older expositors). — *μετεσχημ. εἰς ἑμάντ. κ. Ἀπολλῶ*] *I have changed the form of it into myself and Apollos, i.e.* I have, instead of directing my discourse to *others*, upon whom it might properly have been moulded, written in such fashion *in an altered form*, that what has been said applies now to *myself and Apollos*. It is on account of the contrast with *others* which floats before the apostle's mind, that he writes not simply *εἰς ἐμέ*, but *εἰς ἑμάντόν*; *εἰς*, again, denotes the *reference* of this change of form to the parties concerned. Respecting *μετασχηματίζειν*, to *transform*, comp. 2 Cor. xi. 14, Phil. iii. 21; Symm. 1 Sam. xxviii. 8; 4 Macc. ix. 21; Plato,

*Legg.* x. p. 903 E, 906 C (ῥῆμα μετεσχηματισμένον); *Lucian, Imag.* 9, *Halc.* 5; *Heliodorus*, ii. p. 93. The σχῆμα, to which the word here refers, is the form in which the foregoing statements have been presented, which has been other than the concrete state of the case at Corinth would properly have involved; for he has so moulded it as to make that bear upon himself and Apollos, which more properly should have applied to *others*. Now, who are those *others*? Not the order of teachers generally (*Calovius*, *Billroth*, *de Wette*, *Neander*, *et al.*, also my own former view), for in that case we should have no *change of form*, but only a *specializing*; but rather: the *instigators of parties in Corinth*, with their self-exaltation and jealousy, as is clear from the following clause stating the design in view, and from ver. 7 ff. It was *they* who split up the church and infected it with their own evil qualities. But from *Paul and Apollos* the readers were to learn to give up all such conduct,—from *those very men*, who had respectively founded and built up the church, but who by these partisans had been stamped with the character of heads of sects and so misused, to the grievous hurt of the Christian community. *Baur's* explanation is contrary to the notion of μετεσχημ., but in favour of his own theory about the Christ-party: what has been said of me and Apollos holds *also of the other parties*; this not applying, however, to τοὺς τοῦ Χριστοῦ, who are to be regarded as forming a peculiar party by themselves. Lastly, it is also a mistake (see *Introd.* § 1) to interpret it with *Chrysostom*, *Erasmus*, *Beza*, *Vatablus*, *Cornelius a Lapide*, and others: "I have put our names as *fictitious* in place of those of the *actual* leaders of parties;"<sup>1</sup> or to hold, with *Pareus* and *Mosheim*, that μετασχ. refers to the homely figures which Paul has used of himself and Apollos (gardeners, husbandmen, builders, house-stewards), from which the readers were to learn humility. These figures were surely lofty enough, since they represented the teachers as Θεοῦ συνεργούς! Moreover, the figures in themselves plainly could not teach the Corinthians humility; the lesson must lie in the intrinsic tenor of the ideas conveyed. — Ἀπολλώ] the

<sup>1</sup> *Michaelis*: "I know quite well that no sect among you calls itself after myself or Apollos . . . ; the true names I rather refrain from giving, in order to avoid offence," etc. But, as *Calovius* justly observes, the μετασχηματισμός is here, not "*per fictionis, sed per figuratōnis modum.*"

same form of the accusative as in Acts xix. 1. A B  $\kappa^*$  have Ἀπολλών. See regarding both forms, Buttmann's *ausf. Gr.* I. p. 207 f.; Kühner, § 124, ed. 2. — δι' ὑμᾶς] not in any way for our own sakes. — ἵνα ἐν ἡμῖν κ.τ.λ.] more precise explanation of the δι' ὑμᾶς ("instructionis vestrae causa," Estius): *in order that ye might learn on us* (Winer, p. 361 [E. T. 483]), that is to say, by having us before you as an example of shunning undue self-exaltation, in accordance with what I have stated regarding our official position, duty, responsibility, etc. — τὸ μὴ ὑπὲρ ὃ γέγραπ.] The elliptical: "*not above what is written*," is made to rank as a substantive by the τό (Matthiae, § 280); for φρονεῖν is spurious (see the critical remarks). The suppression of the verb after μὴ in lively discourse is common in the classics. See Hartung, *Partikell.* II. p. 153; Kühner, II. p. 607; Klotz, *ad Devar.* p. 607. The short, terse μὴ ὑπὲρ ὃ γέγραπ. may have been an old and familiar saying of the Rabbins (Ewald); only Paul never quotes such elsewhere. — ὃ γέγραπ. is by Luther and most expositors (including Storr, Rosenmüller, Flatt, Heydenreich, Pott, Billroth, Neander) made to refer to *what Paul has written in the preceding section*. But Grotius hits the truth in the matter when he says: γέγραπται in his libris semper ad libros V. T. refertur. Only Grotius should not have referred it to a single passage (Deut. xvii. 20; comp. also Olshausen) which the readers could not be expected to divine. It denotes generally *the rule written in the O. T.*, which is not to be transgressed; and this means here, according to the context, *the rule of humility and modesty*, within the bounds of which a man will not be vainly puffed up, nor will presume to claim anything that lies beyond the limits of the ethical canon of the Scriptures. Comp. Rückert, Reiche, Ewald. And Paul could the more readily express himself in this *general* way, inasmuch as all the quotations hitherto made by him from the O. T. (i. 19, 31, iii. 19) exhorted to humility. It is against the context to suppose, with Cajetan and Beza, that the reference is to the *dogmatic* standard of the O. T., which was not to be transcended by pretended wisdom. Chrysostom, Theodoret, and Theophylact went so far as to refer it to *sayings of Christ* (such as Mark x. 44; Matt. vii. 1; Theodoret even adds to these 1 Cor. vii. 24), which neither Paul nor his readers could think of in connection with the habitually used γέγραπ.—



Without having the slightest support in the use and wont of the language (for in passages like Pindar, *Nem.* vi. 13, Eur. *Ion.* 446 [455], *γράφειν* has just the ordinary force of *to write*), and wholly in the face of the N. T. usage of *γέγραπται*, Hofmann brings in here the general notion of the *definite measure* which is *ascribed*, adjudged to each by God (Rom. xii. 3). Nor is any countenance lent to this interpretation by *γράμμα* in Thuc. v. 29. 4; for that means a written clause (see Krüger). What Paul means is the objective *sacred rule of the Scriptures*, the presumptuous disregard of which was the source of the mischief at Corinth; "*ulcus aperit*," Beza. — *ἵνα μὴ εἰς ὑπὲρ κ.τ.λ.*] *For one another against the other*, is a telling description of the partisan procedure! The members of a party plumed themselves to such an extent on their own advantages, that one did so in behalf of the other (*ὑπὲρ*, comp. 2 Cor. ix. 2), seeking thereby mutually among themselves to maintain and exalt their own reputation (*εἰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ ενός*), and that with hostile tendency towards the third person, who belonged to another party (*κατὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου*). Olshausen understands *ὑπὲρ τοῦ ενός* of their *outbidding each other in pretensions*, which, however, would require the accusative with *ὑπὲρ*; and Winer, p. 358 [E. T. 478], renders: "*so that he deems himself exalted above the other*;" against which—apart from the fact that *ὑπὲρ* with the genitive does not occur in this sense in the N. T. (see, moreover, Matthiae, p. 1360)—the immediate context is conclusive, according to which it is he only who is despised by the *φυσιοῦμενος*, who can be the *ἕτερος* (the *different one*); and just as *εἰς* stands in *antithetic* correlation with *τοῦ ἑτέρου*, so *ὑπὲρ* also does with *κατὰ*; comp. Rom. viii. 31; Mark ix. 40. The *ordinary* interpretation is: "*On account of the teacher, whom he has chosen to be his head*," Rückert; comp. Reiche, Ewald, Hofmann. But like *εἰς*, so *ὑπὲρ τοῦ ενός* also must refer to the collective subject of *φυσιοῦσθε*, and consequently both of them together convey the same sense as *ὑπὲρ ἀλλήλων*, only in a more concrete way. Comp. 1 Thess. v. 11; Susann. 52; Eccus. xlii. 24 f.; 1 Macc. xiii. 28; often, too, in Greek writers.—The *φυσιοῦσθαι* of a *εἰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ ενός* takes place *κατὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου* in the jealous wranglings of mutually opposing parties *reciprocally*, so that each has always full room for the *κατὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου* (against Hofmann's objection). — *φυσιοῦσθε*] the

present indicative after *ἵνα* occurs only here and in Gal. iv. 17. The instances of it, wont to be adduced from classical writers, have been long since given up. See Hermann, *ad Viger.* p. 851 f.; Schneider, *ad Xen. Ath.* i. 11. The passages, again, in Kypke and Valckenaer, where *ἵνα* is found with the past indicative, were wholly inapplicable here. Comp. on Gal. iv. 17, note; Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Symp.* p. 181 E. On these grounds Billroth and Rückert assume that Paul had meant to form the subjunctive, but had formed it wrongly; so too, before them, Bengel characterized the form as a "singularis ratio contractionis;" and Reiche also, in his *Comment. crit.* I. p. 152, satisfies himself with the notion of an erroneously formed contraction. As if we were warranted in taking for granted that the most fluent in language of the apostles could not be safely trusted with forming the mood of a verb in *οω*! Winer finds here an improper usage of the later Greek.<sup>1</sup> But, apart from the absence of all proof for this usage in the apostolic age (it can only be proved in much later writings, as also in modern Greek; see Winer, p. 272 [E. T. 362]), had Paul adopted it, he would have brought it in oftener, and not have written correctly in every other case;<sup>2</sup> least of all, too, would he have put the *indicative* here, when he had just used the correct *subjunctive* immediately before it (μάθητε). Fritzsche (*ad Matth.* p. 836) took *ἵνα* as *ubi*, and explained: "*ubi* (i.e. *qua conditione*, quando demisse de vobis statuere nostro exemplo didiceritis) *minime alter in alterius detrimentum extollitur.*" At a later date (in *Fritzschorum opusc.* p. 186 ff.) he wished to resort to *emendation*, namely: *ἵνα ὃν ἡμῖν μάθητε τὸ μὴ ὑπὲρ ὃ γέγραπται φρονεῖν, ἕνα μὴ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἐνδὸς φυσιοῦσθαι κατὰ τοῦ ἐτέρου* (so, too, very nearly Theodoret). But although it might easily enough have happened that

<sup>1</sup> So, too, Wieseler on *Gal.* p. 378; Hofmann on *Gal.* p. 138. Barnab. 7: *ἵνα . . . διῷ*, is an earlier example than any adduced by Winer and Wieseler. But how easily *διῷ* might have been written here by mistake for *διῷ*, which is so similar in sound! (comp. Dressel, p. 17). Should *διῷ*, however, be the original reading, then *ἵνα* may just as well be *ubi*, as in our passage. The readings *ἀδελφοί* and *μετίχρησι* in Ignatius, *ad Eph.* 4, are dubious (Dressel, p. 124). — Buttmann's conjecture (*neut. Gr.* p. 202 [E. T. 235]), that the contracted presents, on account of the final syllable having the circumflex, represent the futures, is totally destitute of proof.

<sup>2</sup> 1 Thess. iv. 13 included (against Tischendorf). — In Col. iv. 17, *πληροί* is subjunctive. — As respects Lachmann's erroneous reading, 2 Pet. i. 10, Wieseler, p. 379, is right. — In John xvii. 3, Gal. vi. 12, Tit. ii. 4, Rom. xiii. 17, the indicative readings are to be rejected (in opposition to Tischendorf).

ἵνα μὴ should be written by mistake in place of ἕνα μὴ, the consequence of that mistake would in that case necessarily have been the alteration of φυσιοῦσθαι,<sup>1</sup> not into φυσιοῦσθε, but into φυσιώσθε, and the *subjunctive*, not the indicative, must therefore have had the preponderance of critical evidence in its favour (but it is found, in point of fact, only in 44, Chrys. ms.). The only explanation of ἵνα which is in accordance with the laws of the language, and therefore the only admissible one, is that given by Fritzsche, *ad Matth. l.c.*; ἵνα cannot be the particle of *design*, because it is followed by the indicative; it *must*, on the contrary, be the *local* particle, *where*, and that in the sense of *whereby*, *under which relation*, so that it expresses the *position of the case* (Homer, *Od.* vi. 27; Plato, *Gorg.* p. 484 E; Sophocles, *Oed. Col.* 627, 1239; Eur. *Hec.* ii. 102, 711, Andoc. vi. 9, *al.*; also Schaefer, *ad Soph. O. C.* 621; and Baeumlein, *Partik.* p. 143 f.). What Paul says then is this: in order that ye may learn the *ne ultra quod scriptum est*, *whereby* (i.e. *in the observance of which rule*) ye then (φυσιοῦσθε is the future realized as present) *do not puff up yourselves*, etc. Suitable though it would be, and in accordance with the apostle's style (Rom. vii. 13; Gal. iii. 14, iv. 5; 2 Cor. ix. 3), that a second telic ἵνα should follow upon the first, still the linguistic impossibility here must turn the scale against it. To put down the indicative to the account of the transcribers, has against it the almost unanimous agreement of the critical evidence in excluding the subjunctive (which would be inexplicable, on the supposition of the indicative not being the original). Again, to trace it back to the origin of the Epistle by assuming that Paul made a slip in dictating, or his amanuensis in taking down his words, is all the more unwarranted, seeing that the self-same phenomenon recurs in Gal. iv. 17, while the clause here, as it stands, *admits* of a rendering which gives a good sense and is grammatically correct. — The subjective form of the negation μὴ, in the relative clause, has arisen from the *design* cherished by Paul, and floating before his mind. Comp. e.g. Sophocles, *Trach.* 797: μέθες ἐνταῦθ' ὅπου με μὴ τις ὄψεται βροτῶν; and see Baeumlein, *ut supra*, p. 290; Winer, p. 447 [E. T. 603].

<sup>1</sup> The N, too, has φυσιοῦσθαι. But how often does that codex interchange αι and ε! Immediately before it has γιγναπται instead of γιγναπται.

Ver. 7. The words *ἵνα μὴ . . . ἑτέρου* are now justified by two considerations—(1) *No one maketh thee to differ*; it is a difference of thine own making, which thou settest between thee and others. (2) *What thou possessest thou hast not from thyself, and it is absurd to boast thyself of it as though it were thine own work.* Hofmann holds that Paul in his first proposition glances at his *own* difference from others, and in his second at the gifts of *Apollos*; but this is neither indicated in the text, nor would it accord with the fact that he and *Apollos* are to be examples of *humility* to the readers, but not examples to *humble* them—namely, by high position and gifts. — *σέ]* applies to each individual of the preceding *ὑμεῖς*, not therefore simply to the sectarian *teachers* (Pott, following Chrysostom and several of the old expositors). — The literal sense of *διακρίνει* is to be retained. The Vulgate rightly renders: “*Quis enim te discernit?*” Comp. Acts xv. 9; Homer, *Od.* iv. 179; Plato, *Soph.* p. 253 E, *Charm.* p. 171 C. This of course refers, *in point of fact*, to supposed *pre-eminence*; but Paul will not *describe* it as *pre-eminence* (contrary to the common rendering: *Who maketh thee to differ for the better?*). — *τι δὲ ἔχεις κ.τ.λ.]* δέ, like that which follows, heaps question on question. See Hartung, *Partikell.* I. p. 169. To what Paul is pointing in the general: “*But what possessest thou,*” etc., their own conscience told his readers, and it is clear also from the next question, *that*, namely, *of which they boasted*, their Christian insight, wisdom, eloquence, and the like. He certainly did not think of himself and the other teachers as the *source* (*ἔλαβες*) of the gifts (Semler, Heydenreich, Pott), which would be quite contrary to his humble piety, but: *οὐδὲν οἴκοθεν ἔχεις, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ λαβών*, Chrysostom. Comp. iii. 5, xii. 6, xv. 10. — *εἰ δὲ καὶ ἔλ.]* *again, even if thou hast received*, even if thou hast been endowed with gifts, which I will by no means deny. *Εἰ καί* is not meant to represent the possession of them as problematical (Rückert), but is concessive. Comp. 2 Cor. iv. 3. See Hermann, *ad Vigcr.* p. 832; comp. Hartung, I. p. 140 f.; Klotz, *ad Devar.* p. 519 f. — *τί καυχᾶσαι κ.τ.λ.]* *οὐδεὶς ἐπ’ ἀλλοτρίαις παρακαταθήκαις μεγαφρονεῖ, ἐπαγρυπνεῖ δὲ ταύταις, ἵνα φυλάξῃ τῷ δεδοκότι*, Theodoret.

Ver. 8. The discourse, already in ver. 7 roused to a lively pitch, becomes now bitterly ironical, heaping stroke on stroke, even as the proud Corinthians, with their partisan conduct,

needed a *νοθεσία* (ver. 14) to teach them humility. The transition, too, from the individualizing singular to the *plural* corresponds to the rising emotion. The *interrogative* way of taking the passage (Baumgarten) weakens it without reason; for the disapproval of such bitter derision (Stolz, Rückert) is, in the first place, over-hasty, since Paul could not but know best how he had to chastise the Corinthians; and, in the second, it fails to recognise the fact, that he, just in consequence of the purity of his conscience, could give rein to the indignant temper amply warranted in him by the actual position of things, without justifying the suspicion of self-seeking and thirst for power (this in opposition to Rückert). — In *κεκορ. ἐστέ, ἐπλουτ.*, and *ἐβασιλ.*, we have a vehement climax: *Already sated are ye, already become rich are ye; without our help ye have attained to dominion!* The sarcastic force of this address, which shows the repulsive shape in which the inflated character and demeanour of the Corinthians presented itself, is intensified by the emphatically prefixed *ἤδη . . . ἤδη* and *χωρὶς ἡμῶν*: “*already ye have, what was only expected in the coming αἰών, fulness of satisfaction and of enrichment in Messianic blessings; without our help* (mine and that of Apollos, ver. 6) *are ye arrived at the highest stage of Messianic power and glory, at the βασιλεία!*” You have already reached such a pitch of Christian perfection, are become without us such mightily exalted and dominant personages, that there is presented in you an anticipation of the future Messianic satisfaction, of the Messianic fulness of possession and dominion. Ordinarily, *κεκορ.* and *ἐπλουτ.* (comp. Rev. iii. 17) have been taken as referring specially to *Christian knowledge* and other *endowments* (comp. i. 5), and *ἐβασιλ.* either as referring likewise to knowledge, the highest degree of it being meant (Vater, Heydenreich), or to high prosperity and repute in general (Calvin, Justiniani, Lightfoot, Wetstein, Flatt, Pott), or to the quiet security in which kings live (Grotius), or to the “*dominium et jus statuendi de rebus Christianis*” (Semler), or to the domination of the one sect over the other (Estius), or of the teacher over his party (Billroth is undecided between these two views). But all these interpretations fail to do justice to the *sarcastic method of expression*, although they *in part* correctly enough describe the *state of the case*, which is here ironically presented. The right view may be seen in Hof-

mann also. In connection with the ἐβασιλ. left without being more precisely defined, nothing came so naturally and at once to the Christian consciousness as the thought of the *Messianic βασιλεία*.<sup>1</sup> And how well this idea corresponds to the wish which follows! If, however, ἐβασ. applies to the *Messianic* ruling (see on iii. 22; Usteri, *Lehrbegriff*, p. 370), and consequently to the συμβασιλεύειν of 2 Tim. ii. 12, comp. Rom. viii. 17, then in that case κεκορ. and ἐπλουτ. also, to preserve the symmetry of this ironical picture, must be understood in the sense of the *Messianic* consummation of all things, and must denote the being full and rich κατ' ἐξοχήν (namely, in the blessings of the *Messianic* salvation), which for the Christian consciousness did not need to be particularly specified. Comp. Matt. v. 6; 2 Cor. viii. 9. The *perfect* brings before us the *state*, the aorists the *fact of having entered* upon the possession. See Kühner, *ad Xen. Mem.* i. 1. 18. As to ἤδη, i.e. *now already*, see on John iv. 35. — χωρὶς ἡμῶν] without whose work, in fact, you would not be Christians at all! — καὶ ὄφελόν γε κ.τ.λ.] *and* (the thought suddenly striking his mind) *would that ye had indeed attained to dominion!* In the later Greek writers ὄφελον is used as a particle, and joined with the indicative, 2 Cor. xi. 1; Gal. v. 12. See Matthiae, p. 1162. Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 185 [E. T. 214 f.]. Γέ strengthens the force of ὄφελον; see Hartung, *Partikell.* I. p. 372 f.; Baeumlein, *Partik.* p. 55 f. The thought is: "Apart from this, that ye have *without us* become rulers, *would that ye had at least* (γέ) *become such!*" Comp. Klotz, *ad Devar.* p. 281 f. — ἵνα κ. ἡμεῖς ὑμῖν συμβασ.] Ye would doubtless in that case, Paul deems, suffer us also to have some share (beside you) in your government! The *subjunctive* is quite according to rule (in opposition to Rückert), seeing that ἐβασιλ. denotes something completed from the speaker's present point of view (*have become rulers*), and seeing that the design appears as one still subsisting in the present. See Klotz, *ad Devar.* p. 617 f.; Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Crit.* p. 43 B. — Observe, we may add, how the sarcastic climax ends at last with καὶ ὄφελόν γε κ.τ.λ. in a way fitted to put the readers deeply to shame. Comp. Chrysostom.

Ver. 9. Γάρ] giving the ground of the foregoing wish: *For the*

<sup>1</sup> So rightly also Schrader, Rückert, de Wette, Osiander, Ewald, Neander, Hofmann. Comp. Olshausen (who, however, gives a rationalizing view of the ruling).

position of us apostles is to my mind such, that to us the *συμβασ.* would even be a thing very desirable ! It is precisely the reverse of that !—In *δοκῶ* we have a palpable point in the statement. Comp. on vii. 40. Without *ὅτι* following, see in Kühner, *ad Xen. Anab.* v. 7. 13. — *ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀπ.*] does not refer simply to Paul (Calvin and others, including Schrader and Olshausen), which is forbidden by *τοὺς ἀπ.*, but to the *apostles generally*. The designation *τοὺς ἀποστ.* is added by way of contrast to their position, in which they, instead of being at all privileged as apostles, were *ἔσχατοι*. Observe further, how in this passage, on to ver. 13, Paul paints his picture of the apostles in colours drawn from his own personal experience. — *ἔσχάτους*] Predicate : as *homines infimæ sortis*. Comp. Mark ix. 35 ; Alciph. iii. 43 ; Dio Cassius, xlii. 5 ; Dem. 346, pen. It is joined with *ἀποστ.* by Erasmus, Castalio, Beza, and others, including Semler and Pott : “ Deus nos, qui postremi apostoli facti fuimus, tamquam *ἐπιθαν.* oculis alior. sistit ” (Pott). But in that case we should require to have *τοὺς ἀπ. τοὺς ἐσχ.*, or at least *τοὺς ἐσχ. ἀπ.*, because *ἐσχ.* would necessarily be the emphatic word ; and at anyrate, looked at generally, this would give us an inappropriate and unhistorical contrast between the experiences of the later apostles and those of the first. — *ἀπέδειξεν*] not : *fecit, reddidit*, but : *He has set us forth, presented us* as last, *caused us to appear* as such before the eyes of the world (see the following *θέατρον κ.τ.λ.*). Comp. 2 Thess. ii. 4 ; Plat. *Conv.* p. 179 C ; Dem. 687. 11 ; Xen. *Oec.* v. 10 ; Wyttenbach, *ad Plat. Phæd.* p. 72 C. — *ὡς ἐπιθανατ.*] as men condemned to death, so that we appear as such. How true in view of their constant exposure to deadly perils ! Comp. xv. 30 f. ; 2 Cor. xi. 23 ff. Tertullian’s rendering (*de pudic.* 14) : “ *veluti bestiarior,*” although adopted by Beza, Calvin, Grotius, Cornelius a Lapide, Michaelis, Schrader, and others, is an arbitrary limitation of the meaning. The correct explanation is given by Chrysostom and Theophylact. Comp. Dion. Hal. vii. 35. — *ὅτι θέατρον ἐγεν.* κ.τ.λ.] serves to make good the statement from *δοκῶ* to *ἐπιθαν.* ; hence it is a mistake to write *ὁ, τι* and connect it with *θέατρ.*, as Hofmann conjectures should be done (“ which spectacle we have in truth become to the world ”). The meaning is : *seeing that we have become a spectacle*, etc. *Θέατρον* is here like *θέα* or *θέαμα*, as Aesch. *Dial. Socr.* iii. 20 ; Ach. Tat.

I. p. 55. Comp. *θεατριζεσθαι*, Heb. x. 33; *ἐκθεατριζεσθαι*, Polyb. iii. 91. 10, v. 15. 2. — *καὶ ἀγγ. κ. ἀνθρ.*] specializes the *τῷ κόσμῳ*: to the whole world, *both angels and men*. The inhabitants of heaven and of earth gaze upon our hardships and persecutions as on a spectacle. — The word *ἄγγελοι* in the N. T., standing *absolutely*, is never used of the good and bad angels taken together (this against Zeger, Bengel, Olshausen, *al.*), nor of the bad alone (this against Vatablus, Estius, Calovius, Wolf, and others, including Flatt and Neander), but always only of the angels *κατ' ἐξοχήν*, *i.e.* of the *good* angels (comp. on Rom. viii. 38). Where it refers to the bad angels, it always has some addition defining it so (Matt. xxv. 41; 2 Cor. xii. 7; 2 Pet. ii. 4; Jude 6). Hahn's objection is a trifling one (*Theol. d. N. T.* I. p. 261): that the *angelic world generally* is meant; comp. also Hofmann. Yes, but the evil angels are no longer therein; see on Eph. ii. 2. Some have thought that we must bring in the *bad* angels, because *θέατρον* involves the idea: *a subject of mirth and mockery*. But this is purely arbitrary. The particular interest felt by the spectators in the drama of the apostolic fortunes might be very various, and even opposite in its nature; it is not here taken into consideration at all. Theodoret says well: *πᾶσιν εἰς θεωρίαν πρόκειται τὰ ἡμέτερα ἄγγελοι μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀνδρίαν θαυμάζουσι, τῶν δὲ ἀνθρώπων οἱ μὲν ἐφῆδονται τοῖς ἡμετέροις παθήμασιν, οἱ δὲ συναλγοῦσι μὲν, ἐπαμῦναι δὲ οὐκ ἰσχύουσιν*. The way in which the angels come in here, therefore, must not be regarded as simply proverbial and figurative (Baur).

Ver. 10. What very different sort of people *ye* are from *us*! — *μωροὶ διὰ Χ.*] for, because we concern ourselves about nothing else save Christ the crucified, are bent on knowing Him only, and on having nothing to do with the world's wisdom (comp. ii. 2), we are foolish, weak-minded men, for Christ's sake. Comp. i. 18, 25. — *φρόνιμοι ἐν Χ.*] wise men are ye in your connection with Christ, sagacious, enlightened Christians! Observe, that Paul could not write again *διὰ Χ.*; the Christian pseudo-wisdom had *other* motives. The nature of the irony, "*plena aculeis*" (Calvin), with which he scourges the worldly state of things at Corinth, does not allow us to supply anything else here but *ἐσμέν* and *ἐστέ*. — *ἀσθενεῖς*] *weak and powerless*. For in trembling and humility they came forward, making little of human agency,



trusting for all success to the simple word of Christ. Ye, on the contrary, are *ἰσχυροί*, *men of power*, able to take up an imposing attitude and to carry through great things. Comp. ii. 3; 2 Cor. xiii. 2 ff., x. 10. By an arbitrary limitation, Chrysostom, Theophylact, Grotius, and Estius refer *ἀσθ.* to their *sufferings*: "Quia multa mala patimur, nec resistimus quod est infirmitatis," and *ἰσχ.*: "Mala, si qua occurrunt, facile repellitis," Estius. — *ἐνδοξοί*] *celebrated, highly honoured personages*; *ἀτιμοί*: *unhonoured, despised*, Matt. xiii. 57; Hom. *Il.* i. 516; Plato, *Legg.* vi. p. 774 B, *Euthyd.* p. 281 C. — In the last clause the *first* person is the subject of the sarcastic antithesis, because Paul means now to speak *at more length* regarding the apostles.

Vv. 11-13. Down to the present hour this despised condition of ours continues uninterruptedly, manifesting itself also (*καί*) in all manner of privations, sufferings, and humiliations. — The assumption that we are not to understand this *ἄχρι τῆς ἄρτι ὥρας*, as also *ἕως ἄρτι* in ver. 13,<sup>1</sup> in a strictly literal sense, is rash, seeing that, even apart from the fact that we have no other means of knowing the precise position of Paul at that time (comp. 2 Cor. xi. 27), he is speaking here not of himself alone, but of the position of the *apostles in general*. — *γυμνητεύομεν*] *i.e. we lack necessary raiment*. Comp. on *γυμνός* in Matt. xxv. 36; Jas. ii. 15; and Theile *in loc.* The *verb*, as used both in this sense and of being lightly armed, belongs to the later Greek. The form *γυμνιτεύομεν* (Lachmann and Tischendorf), although vouched for by a majority of the codd., is nothing but an ancient clerical error; see Fritzsche, *de conform.* *Lachm.* p. 21. — *κολαφίζ.*] quite literally: *we are beaten with fists*. Comp. Matt. xxvi. 67; 1 Pet. ii. 20; 2 Cor. xii. 7. A concrete representation of rude maltreatment in general. — *ἀστατοῦμεν*] *we are unsettled*, have no abiding dwelling-place, Rufinus, *Ep.* 20. Theophylact: *ἐλαννόμεθα, φεύγομεν*. — *κοπιῶμεν κ.τ.λ.*] *we toil hard, working with our own hands*. Comp. as regards *Paul*, ix. 6 ff.; 2 Cor. xi. 7 ff.; 1 Thess. ii. 9 ff.; 2 Thess. iii. 8; Acts xx. 34; and who is in a position to deny that *others* of the apostles too acted

<sup>1</sup> The two expressions are synonymous; hence, too, this passage is a proof that the distinction between *ἄχρι* and *μέχρι*, maintained by Tittmann, *Synon.* p. 33 ff., is erroneous. See Fritzsche, *ad Rom.* I. p. 308 ff.

in the same way? Paul includes this among the elements of their despised condition, which he adduces; and he had a right to do so, for it was such in the eyes of the world, which could not and would not recognise and honour so noble a self-denial. — *λοιδορ. εὐλογ. κ.τ.λ.*] The picture of the ignominious condition of the apostles is continued, and its effect heightened by the contrast of their demeanour. We are so utterly empty and void of all honour with others, that as respects those who revile (insult, see Dissen, *ad Dem. de Cor.* p. 294), persecute, and slander us (*δυσφημ.*, see the critical remarks, and comp. 1 Macc. vii. 41; Aesch. *Ag.* 1078; Soph. *El.* 1182; Eur. *Herac.* 600), we do not in any wise defend ourselves or seek vengeance against them (as men do who have honour to vindicate and maintain); but, on the contrary, *wish good* to our revilers, *remain quiet and patient* towards our persecutors, and *give beseeching words* to our slanderers.<sup>1</sup> Whether Paul says this in remembrance of the words of Jesus in Matt. v. 44, Luke vi. 27 f., which became known to him by tradition (Rückert and others), is very dubious, considering the difference of expression; but the *disposition* required by Jesus lived in him. — *ὡς περικαθάρματα κ.τ.λ.*] Delineation, as a whole, of the condition hitherto—from ver. 11 onwards—sketched in single traits: *We have become as out-sweepings of the world, i.e.* our experience has become such, as though we were the most utterly worthless of existing things, like dirt which men have swept off from the face of the world. The *κόσμος* is the *world of men* (Rom. iii. 6, v. 12), corresponding to the *πάντων* which follows. *Περικάθαρμα* (from *περικαθαίρω*, to cleanse round about, on every side) means *quisquilliae*, what one removes by cleansing, both in a literal sense and figuratively, like our *offscourings*, *scum* (Arrian. *Diss. Epict.* iii. 22. 78). The simple *κάθαρμα* is more common; and it especially is often found in this figurative sense in Demosthenes and later writers (see Wetstein, Loesner, *Obss.* p. 276 f.; comp. also Kühner, II. p. 26). With this rendering Erasmus, H. Stephanus, Beza, Estius, and

<sup>1</sup> *Παρακαλοῦμεν*: being slandered, *we entreat*. See regarding *παρακαλ.*, *to entreat*, Bleek on Heb. II. 1, p. 454 ff. Theophylact puts it happily: *πρὸς τοῖς λόγοις καὶ μαλακτικοῖς ἀμειβόμεθα*. Comp. Acts xvi. 39. Grotius explains it: *Deum pro ipsis precamur*. But *Deum* and *pro ipsis* are unwarrantably inserted on the ground of Matt. v. 10, 44. Compare rather 2 Macc. xiii. 23: *τοὺς Ἰουδαίους παρεκάλειν, he gave good words to the Jews*.

others, including Rückert, de Wette, Ewald, Maier, Neander, Hofmann, are content, following Theodoret, Theophylact, and Oecumenius. *Καθάρματα*, however, is likewise used to denote those who, in times of plague and other public calamities, were offered up to expiate the wrath of the gods (see Schol. *ad Arist. Plut.* 454; Bos, *Exercitatt.* p. 125 ff.; Munth. *Obs. e Diod.* p. 321 f.), and in Prov. xxi. 18, *περικάθαρμα* corresponds to the Hebrew כִּפּוּר, while *περικαθαρός*, too, in Plato, *Legg.* vii. p. 815 C, means *lustratio*, and *περικαθατήριον* in Hesychius (*sub voce θεώματα*), a *sacrifice for purification*; and, on these grounds, Luther and many others (among them Pott, Olshausen, Osiander) assume that Paul refers here to that Greek sacrificial custom (see especially Photius, *Quaest. Amphil.* 155), and means by *περικάθ.* *expiatory sacrifices*, —the idea of “*reprobate, utterly worthless men*” being at the same time essentially involved, inasmuch as such men were taken for sacrifices of that nature (see Bos and Grotius). According to this view, the sense would be: “*contemnimur ut homines, qui ad iram Deorum ab omnibus hominibus avertendam sacrificio offeruntur*,” Pott; and Olshausen asserts, in spite of the *ὥς*, that Paul ascribes a certain power even to his sufferings. Now the current and constant word for the *expiatory offering* is *κάθαρμα* (not *περικάθαρμα*);<sup>1</sup> but, even supposing that Paul had conceived *περικαθάρματα* as *piacula*, he would in that case have again used the plural *περιψήματα* in the next clause, for *περίψημα* is synonymous with *περικάθαρμα*, and each individual would be a *piaculum*. If, on the other hand, he conceived *περικαθάρματα* as *offscourings, castings away*, he could very suitably interchange this phrase afterwards with the collective singular (*rubbish*). — *πάντων περίψ.*] *The refuse of all.* The emphasis lies on *πάντων*, and *ὥς* is to be supplied again before it. *Περίψημα* (what is removed by wiping) being substantially the same in meaning with *περικάθαρμα* (see Photius, *s.v.*, Tob. v. 18, and Fritzsche *in loc.*), has been as variously interpreted by the commentators. — *ἕως ἄρτι*] belongs to *ἐγενήθ.*, and repeats with emphatic force at the close of the description the selfsame thought with which it had began in ver. 11. — The torrent is at an end; now again we have the gentle stream of fatherly kindness, which, however, in ver. 18

<sup>1</sup> Hence Valckenaer holds the reading of G, min., *ὡςπερὶ καθάρματα*, to be the true one, because Paul “*ritus Graecos noverat et linguam.*”

once more swells into sternness and threatening. Observe how Paul at this point abandons the *comprehensive* plural form (*ἡμεῖς*), in order now at the close of the section to make his readers feel again, in the most impressive way, that *personal* relation of his to them, which he, as being the founder of the church, was entitled in truth to urge on their attention, despite of all the party-strife which had crept in.

Vv. 14-21. *Receive this censure* (from ver. 7 onwards) *not as meant to put you utterly to shame, but as an admonition from your spiritual father, whom ye ought to copy* (vv. 14-16), *for which cause I have also sent Timothy to you* (ver. 17). *But I*—this by way of warning to those who are puffed up!—*hope soon to come to you myself; am I to come to punish, or in gentleness* (vv. 18-21)?

Ver. 14. *Οὐκ ἐντρέπων*] The common interpretation is the correct one: *not putting you to shame*, not in such a way as to shame you, write I this (vv. 8-13). The *participle*, however, is not the same as an *infinitive*, but the meaning is: *I shame you not by what I am now writing to you*. See Heind. *ad Phaed.* p. 249 f.; Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Rep.* p. 495 D; Matthiae, p. 1289. Rückert prefers keeping to the general sense of *humbling, moving greatly*; but why should we, when we have in 2 Thess. iii. 14, Titus ii. 8, 1 Cor. vi. 5, xv. 34, the perfectly distinctive Pauline notion of the word? Comp. also Diog. L. ii. 29; Ael. V. H. iii. 17. And just because Paul feels the shaming element in his rebuke for the Corinthians, does he point out, so as to further the moral effect of his bitter words, what *according to his idea* his rebuke essentially is, not a putting to shame, but a fatherly admonition. Bengel says well: "*Exquisita επιθεραπεύα . . . Saepe quendam quasi leporem apostolus salva gravitate apostolica adhibet.*" — *νουθεῶ*] The *kindly intention* of the admonition is not conveyed in the word by itself (see on Eph. vi. 4, and comp. e.g. Plato, *Pol.* viii. p. 560 A: *νουθετούντων τε καὶ κακιζόντων*, Legg. ix. p. 879 D; Dem. 798. 19, *al.*), but in the context. Comp. Acts xx. 31. Plato, *Euthyd.* p. 284 E: *νουθεῶ σ' ἐταῖρον*. The *construction* is varied so as to give us not the *participle* again, but the *indicative* (as the opposite of *ἐντρέπων γράφω*, *taken together*), whereby the antithesis is made independent and so more emphatic. See Hermann, *ad Hymn. Hom.* p. 125. Kühner, II. p. 423.

Ver. 15 justifies the ὡς τέκνα μου ἀγαπ. νουθετῶ. — *For suppose ye have ten thousand tutors in Christ.* On μυρίους,<sup>1</sup> compare Matt. xviii. 24; 1 Cor. xiv. 19. — Respecting the *paedagogi* among the Greeks and Romans (comp. ἱερεῖς, 2 Chron. xxvii. 32; 2 Kings x. 1, 5; Esth. ii. 7; Rosenmüller, *Morgenl.* VI. p. 272), who, for the most part slaves, had it in charge to educate and give constant attendance upon boys till they came of age, see Wetstein and Hermann, *Privatalterth.* § 34. 15 ff. The name is *here* given *figuratively* to the *later workers* in the church, the ποτίζοντες (iii. 6–8), the ἐποικοδομοῦντες (iii. 10 ff.), in respect of their carrying on its further Christian development, after Paul (its *father*) had founded it, had given to it Christian life, had begotten it spiritually. Since the essential nature of the delineation here allowed of no other word alongside of πατέρας except παιδαγ., and since, moreover, Apollos also was reckoned among the παιδαγωγούς, we are not warranted in finding here expressed the idea of *imperious and arrogant leadership on the part of the heads of parties* (Beza, Calvin, and others, including Pott, Heydenreich, de Wette, Osiander). Compare, too, Erasmus: “paedagogus saevit pro imperio.” It is not even the *inferior love* of the later teachers (Chrysostom, Theophylact) that Paul wishes to make his readers sensible of, but only his *rights as a father*, which can be in no way impaired by all who subsequently entered the same field. — ἀλλ’ οὐ π. πατ.] *sc. ἔχετε.* The ἀλλά after a hypothetical protasis is the *at* of emphatic contrast, *on the other hand* (Nägelsbach on the *Iliad*, p. 43, ed. 3; Baeumlein, *Partik.* p. 11; Klotz, *ad Devar.* p. 93), and that, too, without a restrictive γέ, in the sense of *at certe*; see Kühner, *ad Xen. Anab.* vii. 7. 43. — ἐν γὰρ Χριστῷ κ.τ.λ.] *i.e. for in the life-fellowship of Jesus Christ no other than I myself has begotten you, through the gospel.* Just as ἐν Χριστῷ, in the first half of the verse, conveys the specific distinction of the παιδαγωγούς ἔχειν; so here, and that with the emphatic addition of Ἰησοῦ, it conveys that of the moral generation, which has taken place, not out of Christ, but in Him as the element of its being; and διὰ τοῦ εὐαγγελ. (comp. 1 Pet. i. 23) is the means whereby this establishment of their existence in the Christian sphere of

<sup>1</sup> The distinction drawn by the old grammarians between μύριοι (a numeral proper) and μυρίοι (an indefinitely large number) is without foundation. See Buttmann, *ausführl. Sprachl.* I. p. 284; Ellendt, *Lex Soph.* II. p. 144.

life has been brought about. In both these respects it differs from physical generation. The antithetic emphasis of the ἐγώ forbids us to refer ἐν Χ. Ἰ. to the person of the apostle: "in my fellowship with Christ, i.e. as His apostle" (de Wette, comp. Grotius, Calovius, Flatt, *al.*). — ἐγέννησα] Comp. ver. 17; Philem. 10; Gal. iv. 19. Sanhedr. f. 19. 2: "Quicumque filium socii sui docet legem, ad eum scriptura refert, tanquam si eum genuisset."

Ver. 16. Οὖν] since I am your father. — μιμ. μ. γίν.] *become imitators of me.* Paul does not add any more precise definition as to the matter ("in cura tutandae in ecclesia tum unitatis tum sanctitatis," Grotius thinks, but without warrant in the context); but the connection of the passage, after vv. 6-13, leaves no room for doubt that he has in view the discarding of conceit and self-seeking, and the putting on of humility and self-denial. — As regards the phrase μιμ. γίν., comp. xi. 1; 1 Thess. i. 6, ii. 14; Eph. v. 1; Phil. iii. 17; and as regards the idea, Xen. *Mcm.* i. 6. 3: οἱ διδάσκαλοι τοὺς μαθητὰς μιμητὰς ἑαυτῶν ἀποδεικνύουσιν.

Ver. 17. Διὰ τοῦτο] namely, in order to further among you this state of things meant by μιμ. μ. γίν. Chrysostom, Theophylact, Piscator, Rückert, Maier, make it refer to ver. 15: "on this ground, because I am your father." But that would convert ver. 16, quite arbitrarily, into a strange parenthetical interpolation. — ἔπεμψα ὑμ. Τιμ.] See *Intro.* § 2. He had already started upon his journey, but was not to arrive until after this Epistle had reached Corinth, xvi. 10; hence he must not be regarded as the bearer of it (Bleek). — τέκνον μου] comp. 1 Tim. i. 2, 18; 2 Tim. i. 2. The father sends to his children (ver. 14 f.) their brother, specially dear and faithful to himself, in whom, therefore, they too may have full trust. From the quite definite reference of τέκνα in ver. 14, comp. ver. 15, we are warranted in assuming with confidence that Timothy had been converted by Paul; his conversion, since in all likelihood he was from Lystra (see on Acts xvi. 1), being probably comprised in the statement in Acts xiv. 6, 7; for in Acts xvi. 1 he is already a Christian. — ἐν Κυρίῳ] specifies the characteristic relation in which Timothy is his beloved and faithful child (comp. Eph. vi. 21); for apart from the fellowship in faith and life with Christ, there is no relationship of father and son subsisting between Paul and Timothy at all. The expression is therefore not essentially different from ἐν πίστει,

1 Tim. i. 2. Comp. i. 3. — ἀναμνήσει] for the Corinthians seemed to have forgotten it.<sup>1</sup> — τὰς ὁδοὺς μου τὰς ἐν Χ.] *i.e. the paths, which I tread in Christ* (as my sphere of activity), *i.e. in the service of Christ*. The aim in view (διὰ τοῦτο) is to lead them to imitate the apostle by reminding them of the whole way and manner, in which he conducted himself in his calling alike personally and relatively; for must not the recalling of that conduct vindicate his character, so much misunderstood and depreciated in Corinth, and place it in such a light as would show it to be worthy of imitation? more especially in respect of his self-denial and humility, so far removed from the arrogance and self-seeking of the Corinthians. — καθὼς] is commonly taken as defining more precisely what has been already stated in a general way, as ὡς does in Rom. xi. 2, Luke xxiv. 20, Thuc. i. 1, and frequently elsewhere. See Bornemann in *Luc.* p. 141. But καθὼς means *sicut* (Vulgate), like the classical καθά or καθάπερ: *even as, in such fashion as*.<sup>2</sup> We must therefore abide by the meaning of the word, and interpret: he will recall to your memories my official conduct *in such fashion, as I teach in all places; i.e. he will represent it to you not otherwise than as it is everywhere exemplified in me by my capacity as a teacher, not otherwise therefore than in correspondence with the invariable method in which I discharge the vocation of my life, not otherwise, in short, than as it actually is everywhere*. In this way καθὼς refers not to the contents of διδάσκω, nor to the mode of preaching (neither of which would stand in a relation of practical significance to μίμ. μ. γίν.), but to the *peculiarity of character as a whole*, which distinguished Paul in his work as a teacher. — παντ. ἐν π. ἐκκλ.] This emphatic statement, with its double description, gives additional weight to the example to be imitated. Comp. Acts xvii. 30, xxi. 28.

Ver. 18. *As though now I were not coming to you, some are puffed up*. It is likely that these boasters, who belonged more probably to the Apollonians than to the Christ-party (ver. 19 f.),

<sup>1</sup> That Paul does not use διδάξει, to avoid giving offence, because Timothy was still young (Chrysostom, Theophylact), is an imagination pure and simple. Theodoret says aptly: λήθην δὲ αὐτῶν ὁ λόγος κατηγορεῖ· αὐτόπται γὰρ ἰγιγόνισαι τῆς ἀποστολικῆς ἀριτείας.

<sup>2</sup> Billroth renders it rightly: *eodem modo, quo*, but inserts quite unwarrantably an *ipse* after the *quo*.

believed and affirmed that the apostle had not the courage to appear again in Corinth (2 Cor. x. 1); and it is to prevent their being strengthened in their delusion by the mission of Timothy that Paul now adds these remarks, vv. 18-20. Hence we are not to make the new section begin here (Tertullian and Theodoret referred ἐφυσ. *τινες* even to the incestuous person, v. 1, and Theophylact makes it *include* a reference to him); on the contrary, it breaks upon us suddenly, like a thunderstorm, in v. 1. — Upon δέ as the fourth word in a sentence, see Winer, p. 519 [E. T. 699]. — ὥς, *as*, denotes: *on the assumption that*; see Matthiae, p. 1320. It introduces the ground of the ἐφυσιώθ. from the point of view of those that were puffed up. Comp. Kühner, II. p. 374; Lobeck, *ad Soph. Aj.* 281. — ἐρχομ.] not for ἐλευσομένου (Flatt), but indicative of the subsisting relation. "*Paul is not coming*" was their conception, and this made them bold and boastful; φιλαρχίας γὰρ τὸ ἔγκλημα τῇ ἐρημίᾳ τοῦ διδασκάλου εἰς ἀπόνοιαν κεχρησθαι, Chrysostom. — *τινές*] as in xv. 12.

Ver. 19. Ἐλεύσομαι δέ] the contrast emphatically put first: *come, however, I will.* — ταχέως] Comp. Phil. ii. 24; 2 Tim. iv. 9. As to how long he thought of still remaining in Ephesus, see xvi. 8. — ὁ Κύριος] to be understood not of Christ, but of *God*. See the critical remarks on Rom. xv. 32. Comp. Rom. i. 10; Jas. iv. 15. — γνώσομαι] what and how the boasters *speak* (τὸν λόγον), Paul will, on his approaching visit, leave wholly without notice; but as regards the amount of energy put forth by them in producing *results* for the kingdom of God, *of that* he will *take knowledge*. — τὴν δύναμ.] namely, *their power of working* for the advancement of the βασιλ. τ. Θεοῦ, ver. 20. To explain it as referring to the *power of miracles* (Chrysostom, Theophylact; not Grotius), or to the *power of their virtues* (Theodoret, Pelagius, Justin), is contrary to the context. Comp. what Paul says of *himself* in 1 Thess. i. 5. This practically effective *might*, which has for its primary condition the true power of the Spirit (of which de Wette understands it; we may recall Paul himself, Luther, etc.), was what the boasters *seemed* to have, but they let the matter rest at *words*, which were altogether lacking in the strength to effect anything. How wholly otherwise it was with Paul himself! Comp. ii. 4; 2 Cor. vi. 7.

Ver. 20. Justification of the γνώσομαι οὐ τὸν λόγον κ.τ.λ.



by an axiom. — ἐν λόγῳ and ἐν δυνάμει describe wherein the βασιλεία has its causal basis; it has the condition of its existence not in speech, but in power (see on ver. 19). Comp. on ii. 5. The βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ, again, is not here, as it never is elsewhere (see on Matt. iii. 2, vi. 10), and in particular never in Paul's writings (neither in this passage nor in Rom. xiv. 7; Col. i. 13, iv. 11; see on these verses), the church, or the kingdom of God in the ethical sense (Neander: "the fellowship of the divine life, which is brought about by fellowship with the Redeemer"), but the Messianic kingdom, in which, at its expected (speedy) manifestation, those only can become members who are truly believing and truly sanctified (Col. iii. 3 f.; Phil. iv. 18–21; Eph. v. 5, *al.*). But faith and holy living are not established by high-soaring speech (not by τὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις φαντάσματα, Plat. *Soph.* p. 234 E), but by δύναμις, which is able effectively to procure gain for the kingdom (Col. i. 28 f.; 1 Thess. i. 5; 1 Cor. ix. 19 ff.; 2 Cor. x. 4 f.).

Ver. 21. As the conclusion of the entire section, we have here another warning useful for the readers as a whole, indicating to them the practical application which they generally were to make of the assurance of his speedy coming. Lachmann, followed by Hofmann (after Oecumenius, Cajetan, Beza, Calvin), begins the new section with ver. 21. But this appears hardly admissible, since chap. v. 1 commences without any connective particle (such as ἀλλά, or δέ, or γάρ),<sup>1</sup> and since, too, in v. 1 ff. there is no further reference to the speedy arrival of the apostle. — τί] in the sense of πότερον. Comp. Plato, *Phil.* p. 52 D, and Stallbaum *in loc.* He fears the first, and wishes the second. "Una quidem charitas est, sed diversa in diversis operatur," Augustine. — ἐν ῥάβδῳ] with a rod; but this is no Hebraism, for ἐν denotes in pure Greek the being provided with. Heb. ix. 25; 1 John v. 6. See Matthiae, p. 1340; Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 284 [E. T. 330]. Comp. Ecclus. xlvii. 4: ἐν λίθῳ, armed with a stone. Lucian, *D. M.* xxiii. 3: καθιζόμενος ἐν τῇ ῥάβδῳ. The meaning of the figurative phrase, borrowed as it is from the relation of father, is: ἐν κολάσει, ἐν τιμωρίᾳ, Chrysostom. — ἔλθω] am I to

<sup>1</sup> For to regard v. 1 as an answer which Paul gives to himself unto his own question, as Hofmann does, is a forced device, which, in view of τί εἰλεται alone, is not even logically practicable.

come? See Winer, p. 268 [E. T. 356]. Chrysostom puts it happily: ἐν ὑμῖν τὸ πρᾶγμα κεῖται.—πνεύματι τε πραοτ.] not: with “a gentle spirit” (Luther, and most interpreters), so that πνεῦμα would be the *subjective* principle which should dispose the inner life to this quality; but: *with the Spirit of gentleness*, so that πνεῦμα is to be understood, with Chrysostom and Theophylact, of the *Holy Spirit*; and πραοτ. denotes that specific *effect* of this πνεῦμα (Gal. v. 22) which from the context is brought peculiarly into view. So in all the passages of the N. T. where πνεῦμα, meaning the *Holy Spirit*, is joined with the genitive of an abstract noun; and in each of these cases the connection has indicated *which* effect of the Spirit was to be named. Hence He is called πνεῦμα τῆς ἀληθείας (John xv. 26, xvi. 13; 1 John iv. 6), νίθεσις (Rom. viii. 15), τῆς πίστεως (2 Cor. iv. 13), σοφίας (Eph. i. 17), δυνάμεως κ.τ.λ. (2 Tim. i. 7), just according as the one or other effect of His working is exhibited by the context as characteristic of Him. Respecting the present passage, comp. vi. 1. It is to be observed, moreover, that the apostolic *rod of discipline* too is wielded in the power of the Holy Spirit, so that the selfsame Spirit works as a Spirit of gentleness and of corrective severity: ἔστι γὰρ πνεῦμα πραότητος καὶ πνεῦμα αὐστηρότητος, Chrysostom. Comp. on Luke ix. 55.—Instead of the form πραότης, Lachmann and Tischendorf have, in every passage in which it occurs in Paul's writings, the later πρᾶτης (except that in Gal. vi. 1 Lachmann retains πραότης; see regarding both, Lobeck, *ad Phryn.* p. 403 f.). The change is justified by weighty testimony, especially that of A B C (although they are not unanimous in the case of all the passages). In the other places in which it is found, Jas. i. 21, iii. 13, 1 Pet. iii. 15, πρᾶτης is undoubtedly the true reading.

## CHAPTER V.

VER. 1. After ἔθενεν Elz. has ὀνομάζεται, which is defended by Matthaei and Reiche, but in the face of quite decisive evidence. Supplied, perhaps from Eph. v. 3. Equally decisive is the evidence against ἐξαρθῆ, ver. 2 (Elz.). From ver. 13. — Ver. 2. ποιήσας] Rück. and Tisch. read πράξας, which Griesb., too, recommended, with A C 8, min. Or. ? Manes (in Epiph.), Epiph. Bas. The external evidence is pretty evenly balanced. But at all events the phrase ποιεῖν ἔργον was very familiar to the transcribers from the N. T.; hence πράξας should have the preference. — Ver. 3. ἀπών] Elz. Scholz, Tisch. have ὡς ἀπ., against A B C D\* 8, min. and several vss. and Fathers. According to the analogy of the ὡς παρών which follows, ὡς (as embracing the whole ἀπών . . . πνεύμα.) was first of all written on the margin, and then taken into the text. — Ver. 4. Ἰησοῦ alone (without Χριστοῦ) is the reading in both cases of A B D, Aeth. Clar. Lucif. and, as regards the second, of several other vss. and Fathers. So also Lachm. Rück. and Tisch. Rightly; the solemn character of the address gave occasion to the addition of Χριστοῦ. — Ver. 5. τοῦ Κυρίου Ἰησοῦ] So also 8. Rückert reads τοῦ Κυρ. ἡμῶν Ἰ. Χριστοῦ, with evidence of considerable weight in favour of it, but probably taken from i. 8. Lachm. brackets ἡμῶν Ἰ. X.; for B, Or. (thrice) Tert. (twice) Epiph. Aug. (once) Hilar. Pacian, have simply τοῦ Κυρίου. So Tisch. But since Ἰησοῦ occurs in *all* the other witnesses except those few, and since their discrepancies concern only ἡμῶν and Χριστοῦ, the Rec. τοῦ Κυρίου Ἰησοῦ should be retained; for Ἰησοῦ might very easily be overlooked, especially where four words, one after another, end in OR. — Ver. 6. ζυμῶν] The various readings δολοῦ (D\*, Bas. Hesych., recommended by Griesb.) and φθείρει (Lat. in Cerular.; *corruptit*: Vulg. Clar. and Latin Fathers) are interpretations. — Ver. 7. After ἐκκαθάρ. Elz. has οὖν, against a great preponderance of evidence. A connective addition, as are also καί before οὖν in ver. 10, and καί before ἐξαρ. in ver. 13. After ἡμῶν Elz. and Scholz read ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, contrary to decisive testimony. An inappropriate (for the apostle is speaking only of the death of Christ *in itself*, see Reiche, *Comm. crit.* I. p. 161 ff.) dogmatic gloss. — Ver. 10. ἡ ἀρπ.] καὶ ἄρπ. is the reading of almost all the uncials

and Clar. Boern. (so Lachm. Rück. and Tisch.);  $\eta$  was mechanically taken up from the context. — Ver. 11. Instead of  $\eta$  before  $\pi\acute{o}\rho\nu$ . Elz. has  $\eta$ , contrary to Syr. utr. Erp. Copt. Vulg. Ir. Tert. Chrys. and many other Fathers, also some min. The  $\eta$ , which occurs in B\*\* D  $\kappa$ , came in mechanically from the succeeding context. — Ver. 12.  $\kappa\alpha\iota$ ] is wanting in A B C F G  $\kappa$ , min. and several vss. and Fathers (suspected by Griesb., deleted by Lachm. and Rück.); the authorities which omit it are so decisive, that it must be regarded as an addition in favour of the apostolic power of discipline as respects those that are within. — Ver. 13.  $\epsilon\tilde{\xi}\alpha\rho\epsilon\tilde{\iota}\tau\epsilon$ ]  $\epsilon\tilde{\xi}\acute{\alpha}\rho\alpha\tau\epsilon$ , approved by Griesb., adopted by Lachm. Rück. and Tisch., has perfectly conclusive evidence in its favour. The former reading has arisen from Deut. xxiv. 7, a passage which has also given origin to the weakly-attested  $\kappa\alpha\iota$  before  $\epsilon\tilde{\xi}\alpha\rho$ . in Elz.

Vv. 1–8. *Reproof and apostolical judgment respecting an incestuous person in the church.*

Ver. 1. The censure of the party-divisions is concluded. Without note of transition, but after the closing words of iv. 21 with all the more telling force, the discourse falls with severity at once upon another deep-seated evil in the church. —  $\delta\lambda\omega\varsigma$ ] means simply *in general, in universum*, as in vi. 7, xv. 29, Matt. v. 34, and in Greek writers; it belongs to  $\acute{\alpha}\kappa\omicron\upsilon\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota$ , so that to the *general* expression  $\delta\lambda\omega\varsigma \acute{\alpha}\kappa\omicron\upsilon\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota \pi\omicron\rho\nu$ . there corresponds the *particular*  $\kappa\alpha\iota \tau\omicron\iota\alpha\upsilon\tau\eta \pi\omicron\rho\nu$ ., *sc. \acute{\alpha}\kappa\omicron\upsilon\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota*. The latter, however, is something worse than the former, hence the  $\kappa\alpha\iota$  is *intensive* (Hartung, *Partikell.* I. p. 134; Baeumlein, *Partik.* p. 147): *One hears generally* (speaking broadly) *of fornication among you, and even of such fornication one hears among you, as is not found among the heathen themselves.* To render it *certainly* (so as to indicate that it is no *dubius rumor, sed res manifesta*; so Calvin, Beza, Piscator, Estius, Elsner, Calovius, Wolf, *al.*) or *universally* (Schrader, Ewald) is against the meaning of the word, which may, indeed, signify *prorsus* or *omnino* (Vulgate), but neither *ubique* nor *certainly*. Rückert thinks that it *assigns the ground by means of a generalization* for the thought which is to be supplied after iv. 21: I fear that I shall have to use severity; and that Paul would more fittingly have written  $\gamma\omicron\upsilon\nu$ . This is arbitrary, and even in point of logic doubly incorrect, because  $\delta\lambda\omega\varsigma$  here introduces the report of a quite *special* offence, and therefore cannot assign a ground by *generalization*; and because, if the

*restrictive* γοῦν would have been better in this passage, Paul in using the *generalizing* ὅλως must have expressed himself *illogically*. — ἐν ὑμῖν] not: *as occurring among you* (comp. Ewald), for it is a defining statement which belongs to ἀκούεται; but: *one hears talk among you of fornication*, one comes to hear of it in your community. Paul expresses the state of things as it was perhaps made known to him by Chloe's people (i. 11) or others who came from Corinth, and spoke to him in some such way as this: *In the Corinthian church one learns the existence of fornication*, etc.; such things as these one is forced to hear of there! — ἐν τοῖς ἔθν.] ἀεὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐθνικῶν ὀνειδίζει τοῖς πιστοῖς, Chrysostom. Regarding the prohibition among the Jews: Lev. xviii. 8; Deut. xxii. 30; Philo, *de spec. leg.* p. 301; Michaelis, *Mos. R.* II. p. 206; Saalschütz, *Mos. R.* p. 766 f. The *instances* of such incest among the Greeks and Romans (see Maji *Obs.* I. p. 184) were *exceptions* contrary to law (see Elsner, p. 90; Wetstein and Pott *in loc.*), and abhorred (Wetstein, *l.c.*). — γυναῖκα τοῦ πατρός] *i.e.* בִּנְיָא, *stepmother*, Lev. xviii. 8, and the Rabbinical authorities in Lightfoot, p. 166. It was, no doubt, in view of the prohibition announced in Lev. xviii. 8 that Paul chose this form of expression (instead of the Greek designation μητρυιά), ὥστε πολλῇ χαλεπώτερον πλήξαι, Chrysostom. The departure from the usual arrangement of the words, too, γυναῖκά τινα τοῦ πατρός, puts an emphasis of ignominy upon γυναῖκα. — ἔχω] Many expositors, such as Calvin, Rückert, Neander, leave it undecided whether this refers to having her in *marriage* (Vorstius, Michaelis, Billroth on 2 Cor. vii. 12, Maier) or in *concubinage* (Grotius, Calovius, Estius, Cornelius a Lapide, Pott, Olshausen, Osiander, Ewald, Hofmann). But in favour of the former there is, first of all, the fact that ἔχω is never used in the N. T. in such a sense as that of the well-known ἔχω Αἰῖδα (Diog. Laert. ii. 75; Athen. xxii. p. 544 D), or "*quis heri Chrysidem habuit?*" (Terent. *Andr.* i. 1. 58), but always of possession *in marriage*<sup>1</sup> (Matt. xiv. 4, xxii. 28; Mark vi. 18; 1 Cor. vii. 2, 29. Comp. 1 Macc. xi. 9; Hom. *Od.* iv. 569; Herod. iii. 31; Thuc. ii. 29. 1; Xen. *Cyr.* i. 5. 4; Gregor. Cor. 931, ed. Schaef.; Maetzn. *ad Lycurg.* p. 121); but further, and

<sup>1</sup> Even in John iv. 18, where, however, the word must be kept in the peculiar significant mode of expression which belongs to the passage, as applied to an irregular, not real or legal marriage.

more especially, the use of the past tenses *ποιήσας*, ver. 2, and *κατεργασάμενον*, ver. 3, to designate the matter, which convey not the conception of illicit intercourse, but that of an incestuous marriage *having actually taken place*. Paul ranks this case under the head of *πορνεία* (see on Matt. v. 32); because, in the first place, he needed this general notion in order to describe the state of licentiousness subsisting at Corinth *generally*, and now further intends to designate definitely by *κ. τοιαύτη πορν. κ.τ.λ.* the *particular* occurrence which is included under this general category. Matt. v. 32, xix. 9, should have sufficed to keep Hofmann from asserting that *πορνεία* proves the case not to have been one of adultery. The objection, again, that Paul does not insist upon a divorce, is of no weight; for he does insist upon excommunication, and, after that had taken place, the criminal marriage—if the offender were not thereby sufficiently humbled to dissolve the connection of his own accord—would no longer concern the Christians (see vv. 12, 13). Another objection: How could the magistrates have tolerated such a marriage? is obviated, partly by the consideration that in that large and morally corrupt city the magisterial eye was doubtless blind enough, especially on the point of the *κοινωβιάζεσθαι* (see Introd. § 1); and partly by remembering the possibility that the offender, whether previously a Jew or—which is more likely—a heathen, having turned Christian, might put forward in his own defence before the tolerant magistracy the Rabbinical axiom that the becoming a proselyte, as a new birth, did away with the restrictions of forbidden degrees (Maimonides, *Jebhamoth*, f. 982; Michaelis, *Einl.* § 178, p. 1221; Lübker in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1835, p. 698 f.). Whether or not he belonged to one of the four parties (as, for example, to that of Apollos), we need not attempt to decide. See remark at the end of this chapter. — As to the *wife* of the incestuous person, nothing can be affirmed with certainty, and with probability only this, that she was *not a Christian*, else Paul would have censured her conduct also. Her *former husband* was still alive (so that she must have been divorced from or have deserted him), and was probably a Christian; 2 Cor. vii. 12.

Ver. 2. A question suddenly introduced with *and*, laying bare the incongruity of this state of things with the attitude previously

noticed (see Hartung, *Partikell.* I. p. 146 f.). — ὑμεῖς emphatic: Ye, the people among whom so disgraceful a thing can occur; for κοινὸν πάντων τὸ ἔγκλημα γέγονε, Chrysostom. — πεφύσ. ἐστέ] What is meant is the spiritual self-conceit already censured (iv. 6 ff., 18) regarding the lofty degree of Christian wisdom and perfection in general, which they supposed themselves to have reached; not pride in the incestuous person himself, who is conceived to have been a highly-esteemed teacher (Chrysostom, Theophylact, Grotius). — ἐπευθῆσ.] *are fallen into distress* (penitential mourning), for by reason of the fellowship between Christians (comp. xii. 26) ἔδει πευθῆσαι, διότι εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τῆς ἐκκλησίας ἡ διαβολὴ προεχώρησεν, Theophylact, comp. Chrysostom. — ἵνα ἀρθῇ κ.τ.λ.] The design which, according to the apostle's view, the ἐπευθ. ought to have had, and the attainment of which would have been its result, had it taken place: *in order that he might be removed*, etc. It intensifies and completes the contrast with their conceited self-assurance, and leads appropriately to the introduction of *his own judicial sentence*, which comes in, ver. 3, with ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ.; all the less, therefore, is ἵνα ἀρθῇ κ.τ.λ. to be regarded as forming such a judicial utterance (Pott, Hofmann) standing forth with imperative independence: *Away with him*, etc. (see on 2 Cor. viii. 7). That does not come in until ver. 13. — ἔργον] *facinus*, the nature of which is shown by the context. See Ellendt, *Lcx. Soph.* I. p. 671.

Ver. 3. Ἐγὼ μὲν γάρ] introduces the independent resolution already arrived at by himself, and therewith the justification of the ἵνα ἀρθῇ; *for he, Paul, for his part, has resolved already to inflict a yet heavier punishment upon him*. Comp. also Winer, p. 422 [E. T. 568]; the contents of vv. 3–5 correspond to the ἵνα ἀρθῇ in its connection with καὶ . . . ἐπευθῆσ. The μέν *solitarium* must be taken as meaning: *I at least*. See Hermann, *ad Viger.* p. 841 f.; Wunder, *ad Soph. Phil.* 159; Hartung, *Partikell.* II. p. 413. — τῷ πνεύματι] Comp. ver. 4: τοῦ ἐμοῦ πνεύματος, hence not to be understood, as Chrysostom and others hold,<sup>1</sup> of the *Holy Spirit*, against which τῷ σώματι also militates, comp. vii. 34; Rom. viii. 10; Col. ii. 5. — ἥδη κέκρ. ὡς παρών] *have made up my mind already, as though I were present* (per-

<sup>1</sup> So, too, Holsten, z. *Ev. d. Paul. u. Petr.* p. 385.

sonally superintending your community).<sup>1</sup> — τὸν οὕτω τοῦτο κατεργ.] belongs to πάραδ. τῷ Σατ., ver. 5, so that, after the intermediate statements which follow, the object of the sentence is taken up again by τὸν τοιοῦτον in ver. 5 (*hunc talem inquam*), comp. 2 Cor. xii. 2. See Matthiae, p. 1045; Schaefer, *Melet.* p. 84. Bengel says happily: "Graviter suspensa manet et vibrat oratio usque ad ver. 5." Not so happy is Hofmann's view, that τὸν . . . κατεργ. belongs to κέκρικα as an accusative of the object, whereupon παραδοῦναι κ.τ.λ. is then set down to a mixing up of two constructions, this being coupled with an inappropriate comparison of Mark xiv. 64. — οὕτω] *after such fashion, in such a way.* The way and manner thereby referred to as aggravating the offence were known to the readers, but are unknown to us. Respecting οὕτω in a bad sense, see on John xviii. 22, and Bremi, *ad Dem. Phil.* I. p. 120. Pott and Olshausen explain it wrongly: "*licet Christianus sit*," which is not implied in the text, and would state nothing special, for it was a matter of course that the person in question was not a non-Christian. — κατεργ.] *has perpetrated*, more emphatic than ποιήσας, ver. 2. See on Rom. i. 27.

Ver. 4. Four different ways of dividing the verse are possible: *either* ἐν τῷ ὀνόμ. belongs to συναχθ. and σὺν τῇ δυν. to παραδοῦναι (Beza, Justiniani, Calovius, Heydenreich, Billroth, Olshausen, Ewald, Hofmann), *or* both belong to συναχθ. (Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Calvin, Grotius, Rückert), *or* both belong to παραδοῦναι (Mosheim, Pott, Flatt, Schrader, comp. also Osiander); *or* ἐν τ. ὀνόμ. belongs to παραδοῦναι, and σὺν τ. δυνάμ. to the participial clause. Against the second and third of these views, there is the fact that the symmetry of the address would be needlessly destroyed by bringing in the authority of Christ twice over in the one division, and not at all in the other; against the first, again, there is this, that ἐν τῷ ὀνόμ. κ.τ.λ., as a *solemn formula of apostolic enactment* (2 Thess. iii. 6; Acts iii. 6, xvi. 18), links itself more suitably to the sense with παραδοῦναι κ.τ.λ. than with συναχθ. κ.τ.λ. (to the latter of which Matt. xviii. 20, εἰς τὸ ὄν., might

<sup>1</sup> Were the ὡς before ἀπάν the genuine reading, —and Hofmann persists in retaining it as such, notwithstanding that cod. N, too, has added its weight to the side of the overwhelming contrary testimony, —this ὡς might be very simply distinguished from that which stands before παρών in *this way*, that the first ὡς would mean *as*, and the second *as if*.



seem to offer not exactly a parallel, but still a similar representation). There remains therefore, as worthy of preference, the fourth method of connecting the words (Luther, Castalio, Estius, Bengel, Maier, *al.*; Neander with hesitation). Against this, Hofmann objects that ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι κ.τ.λ. ought not to have come in until after the participial clause; but quite under a misapprehension, for it is plainly of set purpose, and with all reason and propriety, that the apostolic sentence bears, so to speak, *on its very front* the seal of his *high and plenary authority*. — συναχθέντων . . . Ἰησοῦ] *after ye are assembled, and my spirit* (note the emphatic τ. ἐμοῦ), *with the power of Jesus* ("qui nostram sententiam sua potentia reddet efficacem," Erasmus, *Paraphr.*). The substance of the thought, namely, which this whole statement sets before us with concrete vividness and solemnity, is the following: I have already resolved *that ye hold an assembly of the church, in which ye shall consider me as present furnished with the power of Christ, and in this assembly shall declare: "Paul, in the name of Christ, with whose power he is here spiritually in the midst of us, hereby delivers over the incestuous man unto Satan."* Φρίκης μεστὸν συνεκρότησε δικαστήριον, Theodoret. — σύν] denotes *in efficient connection therewith*, that is to say, the spirit of the apostle is present in the assembly, not in virtue of his own independent power (comp. Acts iii. 12), but clothed with the authority of Christ, Winer, p. 366 [E. T. 458]. Thus the power of Christ is not conceived as the third party in the assembly,—a view in behalf of which Matt. xviii. 20, xxviii. 20 are cited; so Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Erasmus, Luther, Estius, and others, including Rückert and Maier.<sup>1</sup> For Paul bore this power in himself, being as an apostle its official possessor and organ, and *could* not therefore imagine himself meeting with other persons and with it in the third place, but: as being present *in immanent union with it* as Christ's apostle at the eventual act of judgment. It was just as the depositary of this power that he could give over the

<sup>1</sup> Chrysostom and Theophylact, however, leave the choice open between the two renderings: ἢ ὅτι ὁ Χριστὸς δύναται τοιαύτην ὑμῖν χάριν δοῦναι, ὥστε δύνασθαι τῷ διαβόλῃ παραδίδοναι, ἢ ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς μετ' ὑμῶν κατ' αὐτοῦ φέρεi τὴν ψῆφον. According to Theodoret, Christ is viewed as the *presiding authority*. Had the apostle, however, represented Christ to himself as forming the third in their meeting, he would hardly have used so abstract an expression (δυνάμει), but would have written at least σὺν τῷ πνεύματι τοῦ Κυρίου. Comp. Acts xv. 28.

sinner to Satan in the name of the Lord, and be assured that the sentence would take effect. According to Hofmann, by *σὺν τ. δυν. κ.τ.λ.* Paul means only to express this, that he *would rely upon the aid* of the power of Christ. Comp. the classic *σὺν θεοῖς, deorum ope* (Reisig, *Enarr.* p. lxiv.; Kühner, *ad Xcn. Anab.* iii. 2. 8). But the thought thus yielded, after the *ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι κ.τ.λ.* which has gone before it, would be far too weak.

Ver. 5. *Τὸν τοιοῦτον*] *the so-constituted*, comprises in one word the whole abhorrent character<sup>1</sup> of the man. Note the similar expression in 2 Cor. ii. 7. — *παράδοῦναι τῷ Σατανᾷ* is—although the phrase may not occur in Jewish formulae of excommunication (Lightfoot, *Horae*, p. 167 ff., but see Pfaff, *Orig. jur. eccles.* p. 72 ff.)—the characteristic designation of *the higher Christian grade of excommunication, with which there was essentially joined the ordaining in the power of the apostolic office* (not simply the *presupposition*, as Billroth's rationalizing interpretation has it), *that Satan should plague the person delivered over to him with corporeal inflictions*. Therein consisted the difference between this peculiar species of the *קריה* which had passed over from the synagogue to the church, and the simple *αἶρεν ἐκ μέσου*, ver. 2, comp. ver. 13. The latter could be performed by the *church* itself, whereas the *παράδοῦναι τῷ Σατ.* appears in this passage, as in 1 Tim. i. 20, to be reserved for the plenary authority of an *apostle*. It pertained to the apostolic *ἐξουσία*, 2 Cor. xiii. 10. Comp. the analogous penal power in the cases of Ananias and Elymas, Acts v. 1 ff., xiii. 9 ff. The *simple* exclusion belonged to the church independently, ver. 2; and the apostle calls upon them in ver. 13 to exercise this right of theirs. To himself, again, in the power of Christ, belonged the title and the power to inflict the *intensified* penalty of excommunication, the delivery to Satan, of which, accordingly, he does not say that *the church* ought to execute it, but that *he* has already resolved, etc. Observe, too, that *παράδοῦναι* is *active*; he does not say *παράδοθῆναι*, but *he himself* will do it. There is no reason to doubt the fact of this power being the prerogative of the apostleship, as the higher authority vested with power to punish<sup>2</sup> (Lipsius, *Rechtfertigungsl.* p. 181, Hofmann); comp. also

<sup>1</sup> Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* II. p. 843.

<sup>2</sup> Even if 1 Tim. is not an apostolic Epistle, 1 Tim. i. 20 is at all events written in the *belief* that the delivery to Satan was effected not by the church, but by *the apostle*.

Ritschl, *altkath. Kirche*, p. 373. As regards the special assumption, again, that the thought would be complete in itself without τῷ Σατανᾷ (Hofmann), 1 Tim. i. 20 should have been enough, even taken singly, to preclude it; for, judging from that passage, one might rather say that εἰς ὄλεθρον τ. σαρκός was obvious of itself. The delivery over to Satan can only be viewed as an *express* and *declaratory* act of relegation from Christian fellowship into the power of the ἄρχων τοῦ κόσμου; not as if Satan were but he, "through whom the evil-doer should *come to experience* what was *destined* for him" (Hofmann), which would not imply an exclusion from the church at all. Many other expositors, following Chrysostom and appealing to the case of Job, find here *only* the handing over to Satan *for bodily chastisement*,<sup>1</sup> and *not* along with that the *excommunication* (Lightfoot, Bochart, Wolf, *al.*). But this is against the connection, according to which (see vv. 2, 13) the παραδ. τῷ Σατανᾷ cannot belong to a different category from the αἶρευν ἐκ μέσου. At the same time it is not quite identical with it,<sup>2</sup> not *simply* a *description* of the *excommunication* (Calvin, Beza, and others, including Semler, Stolz, Schrader, Maier), seeing that the bodily result is indicated by εἰς ὄλεθρ. τ. σαρκ. as *essential* and as explaining itself to the reader without further interpretation. — εἰς ὄλεθρ. τ. σαρκ.] is that which is to be effected by Satan on the man delivered over to him: *for behoof of destruction of the flesh*, i.e. in order that (ἐλκει πονηρῇ ἢ νόσῳ ἑτέρα, Chrysostom) his *sinful fleshly nature*, which is turned to account by the indwelling power of sin as the work-place of his desires and lusts, might be emptied of its energy of sinful life by the pains of bodily sickness, and might in so far perish and come to nought.<sup>3</sup> It is not his σῶμα that is to *die*, but his σάρξ

<sup>1</sup> So also Grotius, who, moreover,—and in this Billroth follows him,—rationalizes παραδοῦναι into *precari Deum, ut eum tradat*.

<sup>2</sup> So, too, Theophylact on 1 Tim. *l.c.* Comp. Balsamon, *ad Can.* vii. *Basil.* p. 938, where it is said that we term subjects of Satan: οἱ χωριζόμενοι ἀπὸ τῆς κοινωνίας τῶν πιστῶν, similarly Theodore of Mopsuestia in *Cram. Cat.* p. 92, who explains it of the *excommunication* (the *result* of which is the dominion of Satan; and Paul gives the name here from that *result*, in order the more to *overawe*), and then ὄλεθρον σαρκός: τὴν κατὰ τὸν παρόντα βίον διὰ τῆς μεταμιλίας συντριβήν. Comp. Ambrosiaster, *Augustine, contr. Parm.* iii. 2; Pelagius, Anselm.

<sup>3</sup> The expression: ὄλεθρ. τ. σαρκ., is too strong and characteristic to allow of its being understood merely of the *pains of repentance* breaking the sinful impulses. The repentance, too, was, in fact, just as likely to have remained lacking as to have

(Rom. viii. 13 ; Col. iii. 5). The reason why the word *σάρξ* is here purposely selected, and not the ethically indifferent *σῶμα*, was correctly discerned by so early an expositor as Chrysostom, although many more recent interpreters, such as Rückert, have failed to perceive it. Hofmann also takes, in substance, the right view, *Schriftbeweis*, I. p. 462. To make, however, as he does (p. 105), the *ὁλεθρ. τ. σαρκ.* the same as *διαφθείρεται ὁ ἔξω ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος*, 2 Cor. iv. 16, accords neither with the real meaning nor with the ethical relations of the case. As regards the two telic statements: *εἰς ὁλεθρ. τ. σ.* and *ἵνα τὸ πνεῦμα κ.τ.λ.* (which last expresses the *final design* of the whole measure of the *παραδοῦναι κ.τ.λ.*), observe that it is with *an anti-Christian purpose* that Satan smites the man delivered over to him with bodily misery, but that against his own will this purpose of his is made to *serve God's aim of salvation*. — *ἵνα τὸ πνεῦμα κ.τ.λ.*] *in order that his spirit*, the underlying element of the higher moral life, of the true *ζωή*, *may be saved* (with the Messianic salvation) *on the day* of the (approaching) Parousia. That the *σῶμα*, again,—in which the *σάρξ* has lost its life, so that it is no longer the *σῶμα τῆς σαρκός*, Col. ii. 11,—should then be glorified, was a thing which did not need to be expressly stated to the Christian eschatological consciousness. See so early an expositor as Chrysostom. Calovius puts it well: “Non ergo dividit hominem apostolus, quasi eum partim interire, partim servari velit. Nam nec corpus interire potest sine divulsione ab anima, nec anima servari absque corporis salute.” Now this Messianic salvation was to Paul's mind not merely a *possible* thing (Olshausen), but he *expected it* as a result, which, in virtue of the saving power of Christ, could not fail to ensue after the slaying of the sinful impulses by the *ὁλεθρος τῆς σαρκός* in the case of the man led by this punishment to conviction of sin and true penitence. The *παραδοῦναι τῷ Σατ.* was therefore a *paedagogic* penal arrangement, a “*medicinale remedium*” (Calovius), as is shown by the whole scope of this passage and 1 Tim. i. 20 (not

set in, had it not been for these *bodily pains* intervening after the delivery over to Satan as a means of humiliation and discipline (comp. *ἵνα παιδευῶσι*, 1 Tim. i. 20, and Huther on that verse). Thereby the whole *mortification of the old man* was to be brought about, inasmuch as the *σάρξ* constitutes the moral essence of the old man in virtue of the power of sin which dwells in it (Rom. vii. 18), and which guides and governs him. The *σάρξ* is to perish, in order that the *δικη* of *ὁλεθρος αἰώνιος* may not be inflicted at the day of judgment (2 Thess. i. 9 ; comp. 1 Tim. vi. 9).

by the term *παράδοῦναι* itself, as Chrysostom, Theodoret, and Theophylact maintain, on the ground of Paul's not having written *ἐκδοῦναι*),—a measure, in connection with which the *πνεῦμα* remained out of Satan's power and accessible to the gracious influences of Christ, inasmuch as it retained the vital principle of faith, which was to develop its supremacy just in proportion as the *σάρξ* was destroyed. This may suffice to set aside Rückert's censure of the apostle's proceeding, on the ground that the punishment might easily have led to the utter destruction of the sinner, and, moreover, that Paul acted "*imprudently*" (comp. Baur, I. p. 335 f., 2d ed.), since he could not have compelled the Corinthians to obey him in the matter. He *does not, in fact*, actually *ordain*<sup>1</sup> the *παράδοῦναι τῷ Σατ.*, but says merely that he, for his part, has already *resolved on* this, confining himself, therefore, certainly (against Lipsius and Hofmann) to the *threat*<sup>2</sup> in the meantime; and what he *desires* for the present is just the simple *αἶρεῖν ἐκ μέσου* (comp. ver. 13), which also was done by the majority, as we learn from 2 Cor. ii. 6, and that with the best results! Comp. Bengel on ver. 3. Upon the whole, too, we may believe that Paul knew his own powers of apostolic discipline, and may trust him to have been satisfied that, to try milder measures first (the omission of which Rückert blames as arising from passion), would not with the person concerned have had the effect aimed at.

Ver. 6. In face of the necessity for such measures as these — *how odious appears that of which ye make boast! Rather ought ye to consider that a little leaven, etc., and* (ver. 7) *sweep out the old leaven!* *Καύχημα* is not the same as *καύχησις*, but: *materies gloriandi* (see on Rom. iv. 2); and what is meant by it is not the incestuous person (Chrysostom, Theophylact, Grotius) as a man of high repute for wisdom in Corinth, but the condition of the Corinthians as a Christian church, inasmuch as they boasted themselves of this so confidently, while morally it was foul enough

<sup>1</sup> Baur, however, is of opinion (*Paulus*, I. p. 334) that as it never did come in the instance before us to the working of an actual apostolic miracle, so neither did such a thing ever take place in any other case. See, on the other hand, Rom. xv. 19; 2 Cor. xii. 12; 1 Cor. xii. 10, 29 f.

<sup>2</sup> Hence, too, the idea that the readers were to let him know of the day fixed for the meeting in question (Hofmann), is not conveyed in the passage, and is, indeed, quite alien to its scope.

and full of shameful abuses! αἰσχρὸν κλέος, Eur. *Hcl.* 135. — οὐκ οἴδατε κ.τ.λ.] Basis of the admonition which follows in ver. 7. The meaning of the proverbial saying (comp. Gal. v. 9, and on the figure of the leaven, which is very frequently used elsewhere, and that in different senses, Matt. xiii. 33; Luke xiii. 21; Matt. xvi. 6; Mark viii. 15; Luke xii. 1) is *ordinarily* defined to be this: *that a corrupt man corrupts the whole church.* But ver. 8 proves that Paul was thinking not of persons, but of abstract qualities in connection with ζύμη and ἄζυμα. The meaning, therefore, must be: *Know ye not that one scandal in the church robs the whole church of its moral and Christian character?* Comp. also Hofmann. In virtue of their relation as members of a common society, all become chargeable with guilt by the toleration among them of a single scandalous offence, and their ἀγιότης is gone!

Ver. 7. Ἐκκαθάρατε τὴν παλ. ζύμ.] From what has been already said, the meaning *apart from the figure* cannot, it is plain, be: *Exclude from your communion the incestuous person* (Chrysostom, Theophylact, Cornelius a Lapide, Zeger, Estius, Michaelis) *and other notorious offenders* (Rosenmüller), but: *Empty your church of the sinful habits, which still remain among you from your pre-Christian condition* (as a residuum of the unregenerate παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος, Rom. vi. 6; Eph. iv. 22; Col. iii. 9). Comp. Theodoret, Calvin, de Wette, Osiander, Ewald, Maier, Neander, Hofmann. Flatt, Pott, and Rückert join the two ideas together; but this is unwarranted and against the unity of sense of the passage. Respecting τὴν παλαιάν, comp. Ignatius, *Magnes.* 10: τὴν κακὴν ζύμην τὴν παλαιωθείσαν καὶ ἐνοξίσασαν. — The expression ἐκκαθάρ. (comp. Plato, *Euth.* p. 3 A; LXX. Deut. xxvi. 13) is selected in view of the custom, based on Ex. xii. 15 ff, xiii. 7, and very strictly observed among the Jews, of removing all leaven from the houses on the day before the Passover (see as to this, Schoettgen, *Hor.* p. 598; Lund, *Jüd. Heiligh.*, ed. Wolf, p. 1111 f.), which was meant to be a sign of the moral purification of the house (Ewald, *Alterth.* p. 475 f.). — νέον φύραμα] *a fresh kneaded mass, i.e. figure apart: a morally new church*, freshly restored after the separation from it of all immoral fermenting elements, its members being νέοι ἄνθρωποι through Christ (Col. iii. 9, 10). As respects the difference between νέος and

καλώς, see on Col. iii. 10.—καθώς ἐστε ἄζυμοι] *in accordance with your unleavened character, i.e. in keeping with the ethical nature of the position of a Christian, which, as such, is separated from sin. For this ἄζυμον εἶναι is the essential characteristic in the Christian,—who is, it is taken for granted, reconciled to God, born again, spiritually dead and risen again with Christ (Rom. vi. 2 ff.), and who as a new κτίσις of God (2 Cor. v. 17; Eph. iv. 24; Col. iii. 10) in the καινότης πνεύματος (Rom. vii. 6) is free from the law of sin and death (Rom. viii. 2), and constantly developing the powers of a divine life towards perfect holiness (vi. 11; 2 Cor. vi. 14 ff.), being alive unto God as His child in whom Christ lives (Gal. ii. 19, 20)—and sin in such an one (the being leavened) is abnormal. Hence Christians are—according to this higher mode of regarding the position of a Christian—ἄζυμοι. There is as little warrant for rendering ἐστέ here by esse debetis (Flatt, Pott, Billroth, following Chrysostom, Theophylact, *al.*) as in Luke ix. 55. Rosenmüller holds that ἄζυμ. has here its proper meaning: as ye now “vivitis festos dies azymorum.” But ἄζυμος, in fact, does not mean *qui abstinet fermento* (as Grotius would make out, likening it to ἄσιτος, ἄοινος), but *non fermentatus* (comp. ὀίσις). Plato, *Tim.* p. 74 D; Athen. iii. p. 109 B; Gen. xix. 3; Ezek. xxix. 2, *al.* Moreover, Paul could not address these words in that proper meaning to the church as a whole, even if the Jewish-Christians among them still kept the Jewish Passover. —καὶ γὰρ τὸ πάσχα κ.τ.λ.] The motive for ἐκκαθάρατε κ.τ.λ. The emphasis is on τὸ πάσχα,<sup>1</sup> and καὶ γάρ does not mean simply *for, etenim*, but *for also* (Hartung, *Partikell.* I. p. 137 f.; Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Gorg.* p. 467 B), the “also” introducing the objective relation of things corresponding to the exhortation which had just been given. The paschal lamb slain, and the leaven not purged out—what a contradiction that is! Paul designates Christ as the Christians’ paschal lamb which had been slain (Deut. xvi. 6; Mark xiv. 12; Luke xxii. 7), because He is the antitype of the Passover lamb under the law, inasmuch, namely, as His blood was shed, not by any means merely “as the beginning of redemption which*

<sup>1</sup> Theodoret renders wrongly, for it is against the order of the words (as if it were καὶ γὰρ ἡμῶν τ. π.): ἔχομεν καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀμὸν τὴν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἰουρργίαν καταδιξάμενοι; comp. Luther and Neander. Erasmus translates correctly: “*Nam et pascha nostrum.*”

made it possible" (Hofmann, *Schriftbeweis*, II. 1, p. 323), but, according to the whole N. T., as the atonement for believers, [and that, too, on the very same day (the day before the feast of the Passover, see on John xviii. 28) on which, from the earliest times, the blood of the paschal lambs had been shed as an expiation for each family (see Ewald, *Alterth.* p. 466 f.; Keil, § lxxxii. 11). Comp. also John xix. 36. In connection with this verse it has been justly remarked (comp. on John xviii. 28, and Lücke in the *Gött. gel. Anz.* 1834, p. 2020), that Paul could not with propriety have given this title to Christ, if he had followed the Synoptical account of the day of Jesus' death. Comp. *Introd. to John*, § 2. In point of fact, had he followed the tradition of the Synoptists, that death-day, as being the 15th Nisan, would, by the mode of conception necessarily arising from his Jewish nationality, have hindered his calling Christ antitypically the slain Paschal lamb. For a Passover lamb slain on the first day of the feast would have been, to a Jewish mind moulded according to the ancient and venerated appointment of the divine law, a "*contradictio in adjecto*;"<sup>1</sup> even supposing that the point of the comparison—which, in accordance with the invariable Pauline mode of regarding the death of Jesus (comp. also on John i. 29), must of necessity be His *being slain as a* *ἱλαστήριον*, Rom. iii. 25—were the *new divine polity* of the holy people, to which the death of Jesus stands, it is said, just in the same relation as the slaying of the paschal lamb in Egypt to the deliverance of Israel out of Egypt (as Hofmann objects). Wieseler, in his *chronol. Synopsis*, p. 374 f. (comp. also his *Beitr. z. Würdigung d. Ev.* p. 266), urges as an argument on the other side, that in x. 16, τὸ ποτήριον τῆς εὐλογίας, as a technical phrase for the cup in the Lord's Supper, shows that this cup was identified with that of the Passover. Assuredly! but it shows also, in necessary connection therewith, that Christ slain on the 14th Nisan was the *Paschal Lamb* of

<sup>1</sup> This passage, too, therefore goes to establish the position that *John's* narrative, and not the *Synoptic*, is the historically correct one as regards the day of the death of Jesus. Observe how the Rabbinical tradition also agrees with this. See Gemara Bab. in *Sanhedr.* vi. 2: "Traditio est, *vespera Paschatis* suspensum fuisse Jesum." It is well known that the 14th Nisan (the Preparation-day) was called ערב פסח, *vespera Paschatis*. The fabulous circumstances linked with the death of Jesus itself in the passage of the Talmud referred to, do not affect the simple statement as to the time when it took place.



believers. The Supper, therefore, which brought them into fellowship with the body and blood of Christ, could not but present itself to the Christian consciousness as the paschal *meal*, corresponding to the eating of the paschal lamb, and so, too, the *cup* in the Supper as the antitype of the paschal cup. Consequently chap. x. 16, taken in connection with the passage before us, speaks *for* and not *against* the account in John. It is, however, from the view held by the primitive church respecting the Supper as the antitype of the paschal meal, that the origin of the Synoptical tradition is to be historically understood. See on John xviii. 28.

Ver. 8. The paschal lamb having been slain, there follows the *keeping of the feast*, and that not with leaven, but with what is unleavened. Since, then, Christ has been slain as the Christian's paschal lamb, they too must keep their feast in an ethical sense, that is to say, by leading a holy life, without sinful admixture, with pure and true Christian virtue. Hence the admonition: *let us therefore keep feast*, etc. The *ἑορτή* implied in *ἑορτάζ.* is, it is true, the *feast of the Passover*, but in such a sense that the keeping of the Passover is meant to be a figurative representation of the character of the whole of a *Christian's walk and conversation*, because this is to be without moral leaven, etc. Comp. Philo, *de congr. er. qu. gr.* p. 447 D. It may be added, that Theodore of Mopsuestia says aptly: *ὡς γὰρ παρὼν, οὕτω πρὸς τοὺς παρόντας λοιπὸν διαλέγεται. — ἐν ζύμῃ παλ.*] Precisely as in ver. 7; not as a designation of the incestuous person (Michaelis, Rosenmüller, Heydenreich), which would, besides, have required the article. *Ἐν* is used in the sense of *provided with*. Comp. on iv. 21. — *μηδὲ ἐν ζύμῃ κακ. κ. πον.*] singles out something special from the general *μὴ ἐν ζ. παλ.*: *and in particular not with the leaven of maliciousness and wickedness* (see on Rom. i. 29). The genitives are genitives *appositionis*. The apostle must have had ground enough in the condition of the church, even apart from the case of the incestuous man, for laying such peculiar stress in the way of warning upon *nequitia* and *malitia*. — *ἀζύμοις*] from *ἄζυμα*, *what is unleavened*, i.e. *πίστis* (Ex. xii. 15, 18). There is nothing (such as *ἄρτοις*) that needs to be supplied. — *Εὐλικριν.* and *ἀληθ.* differ from each other only in degree; the former is moral *purity* (*καθαρότης διανοίας καὶ ἀδολότης οὐδὲν ἔχουσαι συνεσκιασμένον καὶ ὑπουργον*,

Theophylact on 2 Cor. i. 12); the latter, moral *truth*, the essence of actual moral goodness. See on John iii. 21; Eph. v. 9; Phil. iv. 8.

REMARK.—This whole allegory, vv. 6–8, would have been unnatural on Paul's part, had he been writing this Epistle, which was written before Pentecost (xvi. 8), *after* Easter, and so *between* that feast and Pentecost,—extremely natural, on the other hand, if the Jewish Passover was then in immediate prospect. Were that the case, this very allegory, *which is taken up by him in no other place*, would offer itself to him unsought, so that the peculiar stamp of his discourse would be accounted for as bearing the impress of the festal thoughts awakened within him by the approach of the Passover. The passage before us, therefore, compared with xvi. 8, is rightly regarded by Bengel and most of the succeeding commentators (comp. especially Wieseler, *Chronologie d. Apost. Zeitalt.* p. 327 ff.) as giving evidence of the fact that Paul was now writing shortly before Easter. The few expositors who oppose this view (Henke on Paley's *Hor. Paul.* p. 413 ff.; Eichhorn, *Einl.* III. p. 138; de Wette, Curtius, *de temp. quo prior P. ad Tim.*, etc. p. 43; Schrader, II. p. 132; Hofmann) have only this in their favour, that a demonstrative proof is of course impossible. But it is a misunderstanding of the passage to find in it an admonition to celebrate properly the *approaching feast of Easter* (see especially Heydenreich). Considering the *figurative* nature of the expression (see on ver. 8), we must not try to draw any inferences from this passage as to the question *whether* or *how* Christians kept the feast of Easter in those days (against Weitzel, *Passahf.* p. 183 ff.; Lechler, p. 350). Theophylact says well: δεικνυσιν ὅτι πᾶς ὁ χρόνος ἑορτῆς ἐστὶ καὶ τοῖς Χριστιανοῖς διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῶν δοθέντων αὐτοῖς ἀγαθῶν διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ ἄνθρωπος γέγονε καὶ ἐτύθη, ἵνα σε ἑορτάζειν ποιήσῃ. Comp. Hilgenfeld, *Paschastreit*, p. 173 f.

Vv. 9–13. *Citation and fuller explanation of a passage of the former letter which had been misinterpreted in Corinth by his malevolent adversaries.* The new section begins without a connective particle, like vi. 1, v. 1.

Ver. 9. *Sequence of thought*: What I have written to you thus far concerning the exclusion of the incestuous person, and concerning the purging out of the leaven, leads me now to speak of the passage in my former letter which has been misunderstood among you, etc. — ἐν τῇ ἐπιστολῇ] i.e. in the letter which I wrote to you, and so: in my letter, by which Paul means the letter to the Corinthians, composed before the present one and in the posses-

sion of his readers, but not in ours. So rightly Ambrosiaster, and after him Calvin, Beza, Estius, Clarius, Zeger, Grotius, Calovius, Bengel, Wetstein, Mosheim, Semler, and many others, including most modern interpreters. Chrysostom, again, Theodoret, Theophylact, Erasmus, Cornelius a Lapide, Fabricius, Wolf, Glass, Baumgarten, Bolten, Stosch (*de epp. ap. non deperd.* 1753, p. 75 ff.), and Müller (*de trib. Pauli itinerib. Corinth. suscept. de epistolisque ad eosd. non deperdit.*, Basil. 1831), understand it of the *present Epistle*, either supposing that a reference is intended to vv. 2 and 6, or even making ἔγρ. apply to ver. 11. This method of interpretation arises for the most part from dogmatic prejudices,<sup>1</sup> and has against it the following considerations: *first*, the parallel passage in 2 Cor. vii. 8; *secondly*, that ἐν τῇ ἐπ. would in that case be singularly superfluous; *thirdly*, the fact that μὴ συναγαμ. πόρν. occurs neither in ver. 2 nor ver. 6; and *finally*, that no occasion at all had been given in the preceding statements for any such misapprehension as is here corrected. Lange, in his *Apostol. Zeitalter*, I. p. 205, pronounces in a peculiarly positive way that the hypothesis of a lost Epistle is a "*fiction*;" Paul means the present letter, but distinguishes it as a letter from the *ecstatic act* which he had just performed through the medium of this letter, namely, the transference of himself in spirit into the midst of the church; what he wishes to declare is the *permanent epistolary significance* of that act. But this itself is quite an empty "*fiction*," since there is not a trace of an ecstasy here, since Paul would, on this theory, have taken the very vaguest way possible of expressing his supposed meaning, and since the parallel statement in 2 Cor. vii. 8 is decisively against any such arbitrary fancies. It may be added that, when Rückert holds that the article here, and the absence of any defining adjective, prove the lost Epistle to have been the only one which Paul had then already sent to Corinth, this, on a comparison with 2 Cor. vii. 8, appears to be an over-hasty conclusion, although, so far as the

<sup>1</sup> Grotius aptly remarks: "Satis Deo debemus, quod tot (epistolae) servatae sunt, ad quas si et singulorum vita et regimen ecclesiae dirigatur, bene erit." Comp. Calvin. Calovius, in order to defend the integrity of the canon against the Roman Catholics, insists upon the distinction—which itself owes its origin to a dogmatic retrospective inference—between *canon particularis* and *universalis, temporalis* and *perpetuus*. Divine Providence, he holds, did not design the lost Epistle *ad usum canonicum perpetuum* of the whole church, and therefore allowed it to perish.

fact itself is concerned, it may be regarded as correct, seeing that we have no hint of any other lost letter having also preceded our first Epistle. — *συναναμιν.*] *to mix oneself up with, have intercourse with*, 2 Thess. iii. 14; Athen. vi. p. 256 A; Lucian. *Cont.* xv. Comp. the affirmative *στέλλεσθαι ἀπό*, 2 Thess. iii. 6. — *πόρνος*, in the N. T. and in Ecclus. xxiii. 16, signifies *fornicator*.<sup>1</sup> See also Lennep. *Phalar. ep.* xi. p. 60. 2.

Ver. 10. More precise negative explanation of the rule laid down in the said letter, *μὴ συναναμ. πόρν.*, which had been misinterpreted among the Corinthians (as Paul gathered probably from their letter to him) into a prohibition of association with fornicators *among those who were not Christians*; perhaps from a disposition to connive at the offenders within the bosom of the church itself. — *οὐ πάντως τοῖς πόρν. τ. κ. τ.*] is dependent on *μὴ συναναμιν.*; it stands in a relation of *opposition* to the preceding *πόρνοις*, and explains what that *πόρνοις* did *not* mean. "I wrote to you to refrain from intercourse *with fornicators*, (i.e.) *not absolutely*<sup>2</sup> *with the fornicators of this world*." An entire cessation of intercourse with *πόρνοις* in that sense of the word, it would, of course, be impossible to establish, seeing that you cannot go out of the world; but what I meant was *Christians* given to fornication, ver. 11. Comp. Plato, *Pol.* v. p. 454 C: *οὐ πάντως τὴν αὐτὴν κ. τὴν ἑτέραν φύσιν ἐπιθέμεθα, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος μόνον κ.τ.λ.* The *οὐ* instead of *μὴ* is correct enough (in opposition to Rückert), because *οὐ πάντως τ. πόρν. τ. κ. τ.* conveys something which is *objectively* denied, a definition of the notion of *πόρνοις*, which *does not occur*. Comp. Buttmann, *ncut. Gr.* p. 334 [E. T. 389]. The conception is a different one, e.g., in Plato, *Pol.* iv. p. 419 A: *ἐὰν τίς σε φῇ μὴ πᾶν τι εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν τούτους*. Commentators often supply *ἔγραψα* after *οὐ*; so, among the rest, Olshausen; *not (wrote I, meant I): with the fornicators of this world in general*. But what an arbitrary separation this is of the mutually connected words *οὐ πάντως*! And the interpretation in question has this, too, against it, that *τ. κόσμου τ.* does not refer to the world in

<sup>1</sup> In the classics, mostly of *unnatural* vice (with males). Becker, *Charides*, I. p. 346 ff.; Hermann, *Privatalterth.* § xxix. 22.

<sup>2</sup> The phrase *πάντῃ πάντως*, which is common with Greek writers (Lobeck, *Paral.* p. 57), would have been still stronger if used in place of *πάντως*, *altogether, absolutely*. See generally on ix. 22.

general, but to those who were non-Christians (see below), so that the "*in general*" would be *logically* incorrect. Rückert takes οὐ πάντως as an intensified negative like that in Rom. iii. 9 (comp. Luther), and supplies ἔγραψα after it: "*By no means did I write; i.e., the import of my prohibition was by no means, to have no intercourse with the fornicators of this world.*" But so understood, the words would lend countenance to intercourse with fornicators not Christian, which cannot be Paul's meaning. His intention is merely to set aside the misinterpretation which had been put upon his words, as if he had meant thereby to enforce an absolute cessation of intercourse with unchaste men outside the Christian society. Lastly, Billroth is wrong in rendering, after Chrysostom and Theophylact (τὸ πάντως ὡς ἐπὶ ὁμολογημένου τέθεικε πράγματος): "*not, of course, with the fornicators of this world.*" In that case, we should have had at least πάντως οὐ, for the sense would be, as Theophylact himself states: καὶ πάντως οὐ τοῖς πόρνοις τ. κόσμου συναναμίγνυσθαι ἐκώλυσα, τουτέστι τοῖς τῶν Ἑλλήνων.— τοῦ κόσμου τούτου] *who belong to this (ante-Messianic) world, not, like the Christians, to the Messiah's kingdom as its future members; hence it is the ἀλλότριοι τῆς πίστεως* (Theodoret) who are here denoted, whose opposite is the ἀδελφός in ver. 11. To understand it of *mankind in general*, Christians and non-Christians together (Pott, Hofmann, *al.*), is, seeing that τούτου is joined with it, contrary to the apostle's mode of using language (Gal. iv. 3; Col. ii. 8; Eph. ii. 2; 1 Cor. iii. 19, vii. 31; 2 Cor. iv. 4), and contrary also to the context (vv. 11, 12). Afterwards, when Paul is thinking of the world of men *in general*, he purposely omits the τούτου.— ἡ τοῖς πλεονέκταις κ.τ.λ.] We may suppose that Paul, in the passage of his former letter now alluded to, had warned them not merely against πόρνοις, but also against those guilty of the other kinds of vice indicated here, and yet more specifically in ver. 11. Hence: "*with the fornicators of this world, or—not to overlook the others, with whom also I forbade you to hold intercourse—with those greedy of gain, and violently grasping at it.*" These two, connected with each other as general and particular by καί (see the critical remarks), are conceived of as *belonging together* to one category. It is otherwise in ver. 11, where each of these sins is viewed by itself. As to ἄρπ., the essential characteristic of which

is *violence*, comp. Luke xviii. 11; Soph. *Phil.* 640: κλέψαι τε χάρπάσαι βία. — *T. κόσμου τ.* is to be understood again after ἄρπ. and εἰδωλ. See ver. 11. — ἐπεὶ ὀφείλετε κ.τ.λ.] *for so* (were you absolutely and entirely to break off from the heathen fornicators, etc.) *you must needs go out of the world* (ἐτέραν οἰκουμένην ὀφείλετε ζητῆσαι, Theophylact), since nowhere could you be perfectly relieved from casual contact with such non-Christians. I should thus have demanded what was impossible. As regards the direct ὀφείλετε, comp. vii. 14; Rom. iii. 6, xi. 6, 22. It is attested by B, Chrysostom, and Theodoret. In place of it, Lachmann, Tischendorf, Rückert, and Hofmann read ὠφείλετε, which has, indeed, the preponderance of evidence in its favour, but must be considered as an emendation. The *strangeness* of the conclusion is not conveyed by the ἄρα (Hofmann, following the mistake of Hartung), but by the case itself assumed, in which the ἄρα merely introduces what was indubitably involved in the supposed protasis (comp. Baeumlein, *Partik.* p. 19 ff.). See against Hartung, Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* I. p. 214.

Ver. 11. *Νυνὶ δέ]* *But thus* (see on Rom. iii. 21), in reality as contrasted with the aforesaid misconstruction, *I did write to you.* Herewith Paul now introduces the *true* meaning of the passage from his letter quoted above, ver. 9. Other expositors make *νυνὶ δέ* refer to *time*: *but at present* (Cajetan, Morus, Pott, Heydenreich). But the whole context is against this; according to it, Paul's design is simply to define more precisely the purport of that phrase in his former letters: “*μὴ συναναμίγνυσθαι πόρνοις.*” He has done this only *negatively* in ver. 10, but goes on now to do it *positively* in ver. 11. Further, were a contrast drawn between the present and the former letter, the *present* γράφω would have been more natural and more distinct than the epistolary *aorist* (see on Gal. vi. 11); nay, to obviate the misunderstanding, it would have been a thing of necessity, iv. 14. — ἀδελφὸς ὀνομαζόμεν.] the most important element in the more definite explanation<sup>1</sup> which Paul is giving of his misunderstood prohibition: *being*

<sup>1</sup> This more detailed definition, therefore, cannot have been given expressly in the lost Epistle, but must have been taken for granted as self-evident. Otherwise they *could* not have so misinterpreted the συναναμίγ. πόρνοις as they had actually done. For there is no indication in the text that the misinterpretation was a *wilful* and *malicious* one, arising out of κακία κ. πονηρία, ver. 8 (Hofmann).

called a brother, *i.e.* bearing the name of Christian. Comp. ὄνομα ἔχειν, Rev. iii. 1. Estius, following Ambrosiaster, Augustine, and Oecumenius, joins ὀνομαζ. with what comes after, in the sense of: *if a brother is a notorious fornicator*, having the name of being such. But ὀνομάζεσθαι means always simply *to be called*, without any such pregnancy of significance either in a good or bad sense (even in Eph. i. 21, v. 3; Rom. xv. 20). Had Paul wished to express the meaning of: *bearing the character and repute of a fornicator*, he must have used the phrase ὀνομάζεσθαι εἶναι πόρνος (Plato, *Pol.* iv. p. 428 E; *Prot.* p. 311 E). Besides, it is unlikely that he should have expressly limited the prohibition to *notorious* fornicators alone, and thereby weakened its moral force. — λοιδορος] as in vi. 10; comp. on iv. 12. — εἰδωλολάτρης] Estius observes well that this applies to *the* Christian, who “sive ex animo, seu metu, seu placendi voluntate, seu quavis alia ratione inductus, infidelium sacris se admiscet; ut vel idolum colat, opere saltem externo, vel de idolothyti edat.” Comp. vi. 9, viii. 10, x. 7, xiv. 1; John v. 21; and Düsterdieck *in loc.* Among the frivolous Corinthians, such reversions to the old habits and fellowship might not be uncommon. — μέθυσος] used by old writers only of the female sex; but of the male also in later Greek, after Menander. See Wetstein; Lobeck, *ad Phryn.* p. 151 f.; Meineke, *Menander*, p. 27. — There are no traces discernible of a logical order in the *series* of vices here enumerated beyond this, that the three which are of specifically *heathen* character are put first, and then three others follow, which destroy the peace of the *church-life*. — τῷ τ. μηδὲ συνεσθ.] parallel, though by way of climax, to the μὴ συναναμ.; hence not anacoluthic in point of construction. As regards the meaning, again, we must not limit it to the *Agapae* (Vorstius, Mosheim, Stolz, Heydenreich), which would suit neither the quite general phrase συνεσθ. (comp. xi. 20) nor the intensifying μηδέ. It means: *with one so constituted* (comp. ver. 5) *not even to have fellowship at table* (neither to ask him to your table, nor sit with him at his). Comp. Luke xv. 2; Gal. ii. 12. This implies of course of itself, that they ought also to have no fellowship at the *Agapae* with such persons. Εἰ δὲ κοινῆς τροφῆς τοῖς τοιοῦτοις οὐ δεῖ κοινωνεῖν, ἥπου γε μυστικῆς τε καὶ θείας, Theodoret. Respecting the distinction between the μὴ συναναμίγν. and excommunication, see 2 Thess. iii. 15.

Ver. 12 f. The reason-for his having spoken in reference to the Christians, and not those without the Christian pale: *for it does not at all concern me to be passing disciplinary judgments upon the latter.* — *τὶ γάρ μοι*] *for what concern is it of mine?* etc. See Wetstein on the passage, and Schaefer, *ad Bos. Ell.* p. 598. The emphasis falls so entirely upon *τί* and *τοὺς ἔξω*, that we have not *ἐμοί*, which is not needed even if the reading *καὶ* (*even, besides*) *τ. ἔξω* be adopted. — *τοὺς ἔξω*] was with the Jews the standing name (*חיצונים*) for the heathen (see Lightfoot, *Hor., ad Marc.* iv. 11; Schoettgen on this verse; Kypke, II. p. 198); and so, in like manner, with the Christians it was the standing appellation for all who were *non-Christians*, as being outside the fellowship of the true people of God (Col. iv. 5; 1 Thess. iv. 12; 1 Tim. iii. 7). — *οὐχὶ τοὺς ἔσω ὑμεῖς κρίνετε;*] By this question Paul appeals, in justification of what he has just said: “what does it concern me,” etc., *to the exercise of judicial functions by his readers themselves* in the administration of church discipline, in so far, that is to say, as that discipline bore upon their *fellow-Christians*, and not upon those outside of the Christian society. Rückert thinks that Paul means to say: *Judging is not my matter at all* (seeing that the members of the church were judged by their fellow-members themselves; while those without, again, God would hereafter judge). But judging was doubtless his matter (see vv. 4–6, vv. 11, 13), only not respecting those *ἔξω*. What he means is rather this: “To judge those who are *not Christians* is no concern of mine, any more than *you* take in hand to judge any others except your *fellow-believers*.” “Ex eo, quod in ecclesia fieri solet, interpretari debuistis monitum meum, ver. 9; cives judicatis, non alienos,” Bengel. The simple *κρίνετε* is altered in meaning by Billroth: *Is it not enough that ye?* etc., as well as by Castalio, Grotius, *al.*: *judicare debetis* (we find this interpretation as early as Theophylact). The Corinthians *actually judged*, every time that they passed a sentence of ecclesiastical discipline. Lastly, it is a mistake to render, as is done by *τινές* in Theophylact, Knatchbull, Hammond, Michaelis, Semler, Rosenmüller, Flatt, Heydenreich: *No; judge ye your fellow-Christians!* *Οὐχί* is not a suitable answer to *τί*, and would, besides, require *ἀλλά* after it (Rom. iii. 27; Luke i. 60, xii. 51, xiii. 3, 5, xvi. 30), and that with a clause forming a logically correct antithesis to the question put.



Ver. 13. *But of those that are without God is judge*,—not I and not you. This statement appears more weighty and striking when taken as a sentence by itself, than as a continuation of the question (and still in dependence upon οὐχί; so Lachmann, Rückert, Olshausen, Hofmann). The accentuation κρινεῖ—although preferred by Luther, Grotius, Estius, Wetstein, Bengel, Valckenaer, *al.*, Lachmann, Scholz, Rückert, Olshausen, Tischendorf, Ewald, Hofmann (in accordance with Arm., Copt., Vulgate, Chrysostom, *al.*)—is to be rejected, because it is clear from the context, that so far from there being any necessity for the reference to the last judgment which would give occasion for the *future* (Rom. iii. 6, ii. 16), on the contrary the present κρίνει (Erasmus, Castalio, Beza, Calvin, *al.*, Pott, de Wette) corresponds in much the most natural way to the preceding κρίνειν and κρίνετε. According to this view, then, the future judgment is neither exclusively pointed to by κρίνει, nor is it thereby excluded; but the judgment of those who are non-Christians is described *generally as a matter for God*, whenever and however it may take place.—Paul has now ended his more definite explanation and correction as regards that misunderstood statement in his letter, ver. 9. But for the Corinthians what more direct inference could be drawn from this explanation, than the duty of expelling the offender already spoken of, whom they should indeed have excluded before (ver. 2)? Hence the apostle adds, without further preface (note, too, the *aorist*), the brief categorical command: ἐξάρατε κ.τ.λ. This injunction corresponds so exactly to the LXX. version of Deut. xxiv. 7, that it must be set down as simply arbitrary to deny that the form of expression here was purposely selected from remembrance of that passage. Μωσαϊκὴν τέθεικε μαρτυρίαν, θεῷ νόμῳ βεβαιώσας τὸν λόγον, Theodoret. Hofmann conjectures that Paul wrote καὶ ἐξαρεῖ τε, and that this meant: “*and no less will He (God) also take away the wicked one* (those who are wicked in general) *from the midst of you* ;” but this is neither critically established—since the *Recepta καὶ ἐξαρεῖτε* is on critical grounds to be utterly rejected—nor grammatically admissible, for the assumed use of καὶ . . . τέ is foreign both to Attic prose and to the N. T.;<sup>1</sup> nor, finally, is it in accordance

<sup>1</sup> The apparent proof-passages from Greek writers are either founded on corrupt readings or are deprived of their force when correctly explained. See especially

with the context, for τὸν πονηρόν manifestly refers to the specific malefactor of ver. 2, and to his exclusion from the church; comp. Augustine: "τὸν πονηρόν, quod est *hunc* malignum." — ὑμῶν αὐτῶν] is more expressive than the simple ὑμῶν: *out of your own midst*, in which you have hitherto tolerated him. Bengel's comment hits the mark: "antitheton *externos*."

REMARK.—Paul has ended what he had to say against the party-divisions in chap. iv. That the evils censured in chap. v. (and vi.) had any connection in point of principle with the party-divisions, is a view which finds no trace of support in the apostle's way of speaking of them. Hence, too, it is impossible to prove that the persons at whom Paul's censures were levelled belonged to any one special party, and if so, to which. In particular, we must refrain from attempting to refer the πορνεία in question, and its odious manifestation, to one definite party, and to the principles held by it, whether to the *Pauline* section (Neander), or the *Christ-party* (Olshausen, Jaeger, Kniewel), or the *Apollonians* (Räbiger). This much only may be regarded as certain, that the misuse of Christian freedom, so far as that *in principle* lay at the root of the mischief (vi. 12), cannot be charged upon the *Petrine* party.

Bornemann, *ad Anab.* i. 8. 3; Kühner, *ad Memor.* iv. 2. 28; Hartung, *Partikell.* I. p. 113 ff.; also Krüger on *Thuc.* i. 9. 3. The *atque etiam* would have been rendered by καὶ . . . καὶ. With respect to the occurrence of καὶ τε and καὶ . . . τε, without a corresponding καὶ after it, in Homer, Herodotus, etc., see Nägelsbach on the *Iliad*, p. 176 f., ed. 3; and on the whole subject, comp. Matthiae, § 626, p. 1504 f.

CHAPTER VI.

VER. 2. *ἦ*] is wanting in Elz., but has decisive evidence in its favour. — Ver. 5. *λέγω*] Lachm. has *λαλῶ*, on the authority of B alone. In the absence of internal grounds for decision, this is too weakly attested, far weaker than in xv. 34. — *ἐν*] so Griesb. Lachm. Scholz, Rück. Tisch., following B C L *κ*, min. Chrys. Theodoret, *al.* How easily the familiar *ἔστιν* (so Elz.) would creep in! — *σοφὸς οὐδὲ εἷς*] Lachm. and Rück. read *οὐδεὶς σοφός*, with B C *κ*, min. Copt. Damasc. D\* E, Clar. Germ. Aeth. Athan. have simply *σοφός*; F and G have *οὐδὲ εἷς σοφός*. In A, the whole passage vv. 3–6 is wanting (from the similarity of the two last syllables *ίστων* in vv. 2 and 6). From this it appears that the evidence for *οὐδεὶς σοφός* certainly preponderates, against which, however, there must be set the difficulty of seeing why this reading should have undergone alteration. Were *σοφὸς οὐδὲ εἷς*, on the other hand, the original reading (D\*\*\* L, most of the min. Vulg., both Syr. Ar. p. and the majority of the Fathers), we have in the first place a very natural explanation of the omission of *οὐδὲ εἷς* (which Griesb. approves of), inasmuch as copyists went right on from *σοφός* to *ός*, and the two other variations would then arise from dissimilar critical restorations of the text. — Ver. 7. Elz. has *ἐν ὑμῶν*, against decisive evidence. An interpretation. — Ver. 8. *καὶ ταῦτα*] Lachm. Rück. and Tisch. have *καὶ τοῦτο*, following A B C D E *κ*, min. vss. and Fathers. Rightly; the plural crept in, because *two things* were mentioned (*ἀδικ.* and *ἀποστ.*). — Ver. 9. There is conclusive evidence for reading *Θεοῦ βασιλ.* in place of *βασιλ. Θεοῦ*. In ver. 10, again, this order is too weakly attested to be received. — Ver. 10. The *οὐ* before *κλήρη* is wanting in A B C D E *κ*, min. Copt. Ignat. Method. Athan. Chrys. *al.* Deleted by Lachm. and Rück. with justice; for while the preceding *Θεοῦ* might in itself just as easily lead to the omission as (by repetition of the last syllable) to the insertion of the *οὐ*, the latter was favoured by ver. 9. — Ver. 14. *ἡμᾶς*] Elz. has *ὑμᾶς*, against decisive testimony (perhaps from Rom. viii. 11). — *ἐξεγερεῖ*] Lachm. and Ewald read *ἐξεγείρει*, with A D\*. B and 67\*\* have *ἐξήγειρε*. The *Recepta* should be adhered to, with Tisch., following C D\*\*\* E K L *κ*, min. Vulg., both Syr. Copt. Aeth. Arr. and many Fathers. The connection makes the future necessary as the cor-

relative of καταργήσει in ver. 13, and the evidence in its favour is preponderant, in view of the divided state of the codd. for the other readings. As to ἐξήγειρε and ἐξεγείρει, the former looks like a mechanical repetition of the preceding tense, and the latter a slip of the pen. — ἡ οὐκ (not the simple οὐκ) has decisive evidence on its side. — Ver. 19. τὸ σῶμα] Matth. and Tisch. read τὰ σώματα upon insufficient evidence, part of which is in favour of the plural in ver. 20 also. The alteration to the plural was naturally suggested by the connection. — Ver. 20. καὶ ἐν τῷ πνεύματι ὑμῶν, ἅτινά ἐστι τοῦ Θεοῦ is deleted by all modern editors (except Matth.) since Mill and Griesb., following A B C\* D\* E F G 8, min. Copt. Aeth. Vulg. It. Method. Didym. Cyr. Maxim. Damasc. Tert. Cypr. Ir. Ambrosiast. and all the Latin Fathers. An ascetic addition, although a very old one (occurring even in the Syriac), which got into all the wider circulation because a church-lesson begins with δοξάσατε. Comp. Reiche, *Comm. crit.* I. p. 165 ff.

Vv. 1–11. *The readers are not to go to law before the heathen (vv. 1–6); and generally, they are, instead of contending with one another, rather to suffer wrong than to do it, bearing in mind that the unrighteous shall not become partakers in the Messianic kingdom (vv. 7–10), and that they, as Christians, have become pure, holy, and righteous (ver. 11).*

Ver. 1. A new section, not connected with what has gone before. Paul starts at once with a question of lively surprise: *Dare<sup>1</sup> any one, etc., and so plunges in mediam rem.<sup>2</sup>* The connections of thought, which some have traced out, are arbitrary inventions. This applies not only to Baur's view (in the *theol. Jahrb.* 1852, p. 10 f.),—that it was the damage done to the Christian cause in public opinion, both by the immorality discussed in chap. v. and by the lawsuits carried on before the heathen, that

<sup>1</sup> Bengel says aptly: “*grandi verbo notatur laesa majestas Christianorum.*” Schrader imports an *ironical* meaning into the word, which is irrelevant. The right interpretation is given by Chrysostom: *τόλμης ἐστὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ παρανομίας.* See as to *τολμᾶν*, *sustinere, non erubescere*, Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Phil.* p. 13 D; Jacobs, *ad Athen. addit.* p. 309. Comp. the proverbial phrase *παῖν τολμᾶν*.

<sup>2</sup> It is out of the harmony with the fervid tone of the whole passage, in which question is heaped on question, to understand ver. 1 as *affirmative* (against Lachmann). Least of all can we agree with Hofmann in taking the words down to *ἀδίκων* affirmatively, and then regarding *κ. οὐχὶ ἰπ. τ. ἁγίων* as a query which strikes in there: for *ἰπ. τ. ἀδίκων, καὶ οὐχὶ ἰ. τ. ἁγ.* is plainly just the ordinary antithesis of assertion and negation joined together by *καὶ οὐ*. To make Hofmann's rendering logically tenable, it would be needful that Paul should, instead of *κ. οὐχὶ*, have written: *καὶ τὶ οὐχί*, and *why not* before the saints?

led the apostle thus to pass from the one subject to the other, —but also to the connection which Hofmann seeks to establish between this passage and the censure pronounced upon the *insufficient judicial action* taken by the church with its members after the occurrence of the case already adverted to. The judicial proceedings now referred to are plainly of quite *another* kind, not in the way of discipline, but of private lawsuits; and, moreover, as to former judicial action of the church, not merely was it *insufficient*, but *nothing of the sort* had taken place at all with respect to the πόρνος. Paul does not employ so much as a δέ, or an ἀλλά, or any other form of connection, but goes on with epistolary freedom, leaping, as it were, from one point of censure to another. — τὶς] *any one whatever*. The quite general treatment of the subject which follows shows that no specific individual (Semler) is meant, although it must be left undetermined whether some specially striking case, possibly that of a rich and powerful man (Ewald), may not have given occasion for the apostle's sending these admonitions. — πρᾶγμα] *lawsuit, matter of dispute*. Comp. Xen. Mem. ii. 9. 1; Demosth. 1120. 26; Josephus, Antt. xiv. 10. 7. — κρίνεσθαι] *go to law, litigare*; see on Rom. iii. 4; Wetstein, ad Matth. v. 40. — ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων] *before* (Winer, p. 351 [E. T. 469]) *the unrighteous*; a specially significant designation of the *heathen* (see on Gal. ii. 5), as contrasted with the Christians, who are ἄγιοι (see on i. 2). Chrysostom puts it well: οὐκ εἶπεν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀπίστων (as in ver. 6, where the opposite of ἀδελφός was required), ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων, λέξιν θεὸς ἥς μάλιστα χρεῖαν εἶχεν εἰς τὴν προκειμένην ὑπόθεσιν, ὥστε ἀποτρέψαι καὶ ἀπαγαγεῖν. There is indeed a *contradictio in adjecto* in the κρίνεσθαι ἐπὶ τ. ἀδίκων! For the *Rabbinical* prohibitions of going to law before the heathen, see Eisenmenger, *Entdeckt. Judenth.* II. p. 472 ff. (c.g. *Tanchuma*, f. 92. 2: "Statutum est, ad quod omnes Israelitae obligantur, eum, qui litem cum alio habet, non debere eam tractare coram gentibus"). The tribunal intended by Paul is not merely that of *arbitration*, which had passed over from Judaism (see Michaelis, *Einh.* II. p. 1221 f.; comp. Lightfoot, *Hor.* on ver. 4; Vitranga, *de Synag.* p. 816 ff.) to Christianity, but his meaning is: instead of carrying on lawsuits against each other before the heathen, they were to adjust their disputes before Christians, which could of course be done only in the way of arbitra-

tion<sup>1</sup> (comp. ver. 5); according to this, therefore, different *forms* of the κρίνεσθαι are present to the apostle's mind in speaking of the judgment ἐπὶ τ. ἀδ. and ἐπὶ τ. ἀγ.; in the former case, that by *legal process*; in the latter, that by *arbitration* through means of δαιιτηταί. — Theodoret remarks justly (on ver. 6), that the prohibition of the κρίνεσθαι ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων is not at variance with Rom xiii. 1 ff.: οὐ γὰρ ἀντιτείνειν κελεύει τοῖς ἄρχουσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἡδικομένοις νομοθετεῖ μὴ κεχρῆσθαι τοῖς ἄρχουσι. Τὸ γὰρ αἰρεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ παρὰ τοῖς ὁμοπίστοις δοκιμάζεσθαι τῆς αὐτῶν ἐξηρτᾶτο γνώμης.

Ver. 2. "Ἡ οὐκ οἶδατε κ.τ.λ.] unveils the entire *preposterousness* of the course with which his readers were reproached in the indignant question of ver. 1: "Dare any of you do that,—or know ye not?" etc. Only on the ground of this not knowing could you betake yourselves to such unworthy κρίνεσθαι! Σὺ τοιουν ὁ μέλλων κρίνειν ἐκείνους τότε, πῶς ὑπ' ἐκείνων ἀνέχη κρίνεσθαι νῦν; Chrysostom. — τὸν κόσμον κρινούσι] *at the last judgment, namely, sitting along with Christ as judges over all who are not Christians* (κόσμος). Comp. as early a passage as Wisd. iii. 8. We have here the same conception<sup>2</sup>—only generalized with respect to the subjects of judgment—as in Matt. xix. 28; Luke xxii. 30. It stands in essential and logical connection with the participation in the glory of Christ (iv. 8; Rom. viii. 17; 2 Tim. ii. 11 f.), which Christians are to attain after the Parousia, and after they themselves have been judged (Rom. xiv. 10; 2 Cor. v. 10; 2 Tim. iv. 1). We must not, however, refer this (with Hofmann) to the period of the reign of Christ and His people predicted in Rev. xx. 4 (when the κόσμος, too, shall be subjected to their judicial authority), especially seeing that Chiliasm is a specifically Apocalyptic and not a Pauline conception; comp. on xv. 24. Chrysostom again, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theophylact, Schol. *ap. Matth.*, Erasmus, and others, explain it of an *indirect, not literal* judging, namely, either by the faith and life of Christians placing the guilt of the κόσμος in a clearer light in the day of judgment (Matt. xii. 41), or by their *approv-*

<sup>1</sup> Hence this passage does not at all run counter to the injunction to obey magistrates. Comp. Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 417.

<sup>2</sup> Observe that this view necessarily presupposes the *resurrection of unbelievers* also (Acts xvii. 31). Comp. on xv. 24.

ing of the judicial sentence of Christ (Estius, Maier). But this (although assumed by Billroth as the *ideal* truth which underlay the words of the apostle, unconsciously to himself) is an alteration of the sense which runs counter to the context; for the whole argument *a majori ad minus* is destroyed, if κρινοῦσι is to be understood in a one-sided way as equivalent to κατακρ., and if no proper and personal act of judgment is designed.<sup>1</sup> It is a mistake also to hold, with Lightfoot, Vitringa, Baumgarten, Bolten, that Paul means *quod Christiani futuri sint magistratus* (Lightfoot), which is at variance with ver. 3, and with the conception of the speedily approaching Parousia. Mosheim, Ernesti, Nösselt, Rosenmüller, and Stolz turn the "shall judge" into "can judge," comparing ii. 15, 16. But this, too, is to alter the notion of κρίνειν in a way contrary to the text (judge of); and the *can*, since it would have an emphasis of special significance here, and would denote "be in a position to," would require to be expressly inserted. Comp. rather the prophetic basis of the thought in Dan. vii. 22. — καὶ εἰ ἐν ὑμῖν κ.τ.λ.] The quick striking in of the καί in the very front of the question is as in ver. 2; see also Fritzsche, *ad Marc.* p. 123. — εἰ ἐν ὑμ. κρ. ὁ κόσμ.] repeats with emphasis, and with an individualizing force (ὑμῖν), the contents of the truth already stated and established to the believing consciousness (hence the present κρίνεται). The ἐν ὑμῖν, here emphatically put first, does not mean, as Chrysostom and Theophylact think,<sup>2</sup> *in your instance, exemplo vestro* (see above), but *among you, i.e. in consessu vestro* (see Kypke, II. p. 199), so that the essential meaning is not different from *coram* (Ast, *ad Plat. Leg.* p. 33. 285); comp. ἐν δικασταῖς, Thuc. i. 53. 1, ἐν νομοθέταις κ.τ.λ. See, too, the passages in Wetstein. The ἐν therefore by no means stands for ὑπό (Raphel, Flatt, *al.*), although we may gather from the context that the ὑμεῖς are themselves the parties judging (vv. 2, 4). Nor has it the force of *through* (Grotius, Billroth, *al.*), in support of which it is a mistake to appeal to Acts xvii. 31, where, owing to the connection, ἐν stands in a wholly different relation from what it denotes here. Here the

<sup>1</sup> Hence, too, it is unsuitable to transform the concrete meaning of this question into a general participation in the reign of Christ (Flatt, Heydenreich).

<sup>2</sup> Comp. too, van Hengel, *ad Rom.* ii. 27: "*vita vestra cum vita eorum comparanda.*"

word *ἐν* is selected in view of the following *κριτήρια*, the Christians, who are in future to judge, being conceived of, in order to the more vivid representation of the idea, as a *judicial assembly*. — *ἀνάξ. ἔστε κριτ. ἔλαχ.*] *κριτήριον* does not mean *matter of dispute, case at law*, as most expositors (even Pott, Flatt, Rückert, de Wette, Osiander, Maier, Ewald) wish to take it, with no evidence at all from the usage of the language in their favour, but *place of judgment (tribunal, seat of justice*, Jas. ii. 6; Plato, *Legg.* vi. p. 767 B; Susanna, 49), or *judicial trial* which is held (*judicium*). Comp. the precept: *μὴ ἐρχέσθω ἐπὶ κριτήριον ἔθνικόν*, *Constitt. ap.* ii. 45. Precisely so with *δικαστήριον*. The latter sense, *judicial trial* (Lucian, *bis accus.* 25; Polybius, ix. 33. 12, xvi. 27. 2; Judg. v. 10; Dan. vii. 10, 26), is the true one here, as is evident from ver. 4. 'We render therefore: *Are ye unworthy to hold very trivial trials? i.e.* trials in which judgment is to be given upon very insignificant matters (in comparison with the lofty and important functions which are to devolve upon you when the future judgment shall be held). The Vulgate translates freely but correctly as to the sense: "indigni estis, qui de minimis judicetis?" According to Chrysostom and Theophylact, others understand here the *heathen* courts of justice, either *affirmatively* (so, as it appears, Chrysostom and Theophylact themselves; so, too, Valckenaer, *al.*) or *interrogatively* (Billroth): *and that it is unworthy of you to be judged before courts of so low a kind?* Similarly, Olshausen. But ver. 4 is decisive against this; for we have there the very same thing which in ver. 2 is expressed by *κριτηρ. ἔλαχ.*, described as *βιωτικὰ κριτήρια*.

Vv. 3, 4. Climactic parallels to ver. 2, ver. 3 corresponding to the first half of the preceding verse, and ver. 4 to the second; hence ver. 4 also should be taken as a *question*. — *ἀγγέλους*] *angels*, and that—since no defining epithet is added—in the *good* sense, not as Chrysostom, Theodoret, Oecumenius, Theophylact, Erasmus, Beza, Calovius, Bengel, and most commentators make it, *demons* (Jude 6; 2 Pet. ii. 4), nor good *and* bad angels (so Cornelius a Lapide, *al.*; also, as it would appear, Hofmann). Other expositors, such as Grotius, Billroth, Rückert, de Wette, leave the point undecided. But comp. on iv. 9. That *angels* themselves shall come within the sphere of the judicial activity of glorified believers, is stated here as a proposition established to the



believing consciousness of the readers,—a proposition, the ground for which is to be found in the fact that in Christ, whose glorified saints will reign with Him, is given the absolute truth and the absolute right, and, consequently, the highest judicial court of resort, even as regards the world of angels, from the jurisdiction of which not even the loftiest of created beings can be excepted. There is nothing of a more detailed nature on this subject in the N. T.; but comp. in general, Heb. i. 14, according to which their service must be one for which they are to render an account; and Gal. i. 8, according to which, in a certain supposed case, they would incur an *ἀνάθεμα*.<sup>1</sup> All modes of explaining away the simple meaning of the words are just as inadmissible as in ver. 2; as, for example, Chrysostom: *ὅταν γὰρ αἱ ἀσώματοι δυνάμεις αὐταὶ ἔλαττον ἡμῶν εὐρεθῶσιν ἔχουσιν τῶν σάρκα περιβεβλημένων, χαλεπωτέραν δώσουσι δίκην*; Erasmus: “*vestra pietas illorum impietatem, vestra innocentia illorum impuritatem condemnabit*,” Calovius: the *judicium* is *approbativum*, making manifest, that is to say, before the whole world the victory of the saints already in this life over the devil; Lightfoot: what is meant is, that the influence of the kingdom of Satan is to be destroyed by Christianity; while Nösselt, Ernesti, and Stolz make it *ability* to judge, if an angel were to preach a false gospel (Gal. i. 8). — *μήτιγε βιωτικά*] is not to be included in the question, so that we should have to put only a comma after *κρινοῦμεν* (as Tischendorf does). For *βιωτικά*, things *which belong to the necessities of this life, disputes as to the meum and tuum* (comp. Polybius, xiii. 1. 3: *τῶν βιωτικῶν συναλλαγμάτων*), will not be among the subjects of the *future* judgment, to which *κρινοῦμεν* refers. We must retain, therefore, the mark of interrogation after *κρινοῦμεν* (Lachmann), and put a full stop after *βιωτ.*, so that *μήτιγε βιωτ.* may be seen to be the condensed *conclusio*: *to say nothing then of private disputes!* i.e. *How far less can it be doubtful that we have to judge βιωτικά!* Comp. Dem. Ol. i. (ii.) 23, and Bremi in loc. p. 159. See generally as to *μήτιγε* (found only here in the N. T.), *nedum sc. dicam*; Herm. *ad Viger.* p. 803; Schaefer,

<sup>1</sup> Observe also the different classes of angels referred to in Rom. viii. 38; Eph. i. 21; Col. i. 16; 1 Pet. iii. 32. We cannot conceive these distinctions in rank to exist without *ethical* grounds. Moreover, the angels are not to be regarded as *absolutely* good, Mark x. 18. Comp. on Col. i. 20.

*Appar. ad Dem.* I. p. 265; Hartung, *Partikell.* II. p. 154 f. Regarding the relation of βιωτικός to the later Greek, see Lobeck, *ad Phryn.* p. 355.—The *antithesis* of ἀγγέλους and βιωτικά turns on this, that the former belong to the higher superterrestrial sphere of life (ὡς ἂν ἐκείνων οὐ κατὰ τὸν βίον τοῦτον ὄντων, Theodore of Mopsuestia). The ἀγγέλ. without the article is *qualitative*.

Ver. 4. Βιωτικά μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.] takes up βιωτ. at once again with emphasis. Comp. Herod. vii. 104: τὰ ἂν ἐκείνος ἀνάγῃ ἀνάγει δὲ ταὐτὸ ἀεί.—The sentence may be understood as a *question* (of astonishment), so de Wette, Tischendorf, Ewald, *al.*; or as a reproachful *statement*, so Lachmann. The former, if τ. ἐξουθ. be correctly explained, corresponds best with the whole structure of this animated address (see on ver. 3). Μὲν οὖν is the simple *accordingly, thus*.<sup>1</sup> Κριτήρια are here also not *lawsuits*, but *judicia*, as in ver. 2. The meaning therefore is: *If ye then have courts of trial as to private matters, i.e. if ye are in such circumstances as to have to hold courts of that kind.* Comp. Dem. 1153. 4: ἐχόντων τὰς δίκας, *qui lites habent administrandas*. Hofmann's rendering is a most involved one, making βιωτ. κριτ. predicate to τοὺς ἐξουθ. ἐν τ. ἐκκλ., and ἐὰν ἐχ. a *parenthetical clause*, to which we are to supply as its object ἐξουθενήμενους.<sup>2</sup> — καθίζετε] *do ye*—instead of taking some from among yourselves for this purpose—*set those down*, etc.? namely, upon the judgment-seat as judges, which follows from κριτήρια. Comp. Plato, *Legg.* ix. p. 873 E; Dem. 997. 23; Polyb. ix. 33. 12. It is the *indicative*, and the ἐξουθενήμ. ἐν τ. ἐκκλ. are the *heathen*. So in substance Valla, Faber, Castalio, Luther, Calovius, Wolf, *al.*, including Pott, Flatt, Heydenreich, Schrader, Rückert, Olshausen, de Wette, Ewald, Maier, Neander, Weiss; Osiander is undecided. To this it is objected that καθίζ. does not suit heathen magistrates, and that ἐν τ. ἐκκλ. indicates the ἐξουθ. as members of the church (see especially Kypke, II. p. 201). But neither objection is valid; for the term καθίζετε is purposely *selected* as *significant* of the strange audacity shown in making the matter in dispute *dependent* on the decision of a heathen court, and that

<sup>1</sup> Introducing the more detailed development of the thought to which expression had been given already. See Baumlein, *Partik.* p. 181.

<sup>2</sup> How meaningless this would be! Moreover, see below. Comp. also Laurent. *neutest. Stud.* p. 127.

in special keeping with the contrast (τοὺς ἔξουθ.), while the text does not give τοὺς ἐν τῇ ἐκκλ. Moreover, by τ. ἔξουθ., Paul does not mean to describe the contempt for the heathen as *justifiable* (Hofmann's objection), but simply as *existing*, as a fact, however, the universal existence of which made the absurdity of the procedure here censured very palpable. Other interpreters make καθίζ. imperative, and the ἔξουθ. members of the church held in small account: take (rather) *minimos de piorum plebe* as arbiters. So the Vulgate, Peschito, Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Erasmus, Beza, Vatablus, Calvin, Grotius, Estius, Bengel, Wetstein, Hofmann, *al.* But not to speak of the *rather* generally supplied from imagination, nor of the fact that to designate those less *capable of judging* as τ. ἔξουθ. ἐν τ. ἐκκλ. would be far from wise, and likely to lend countenance to the specially Corinthian conceit of knowledge,—if this were the true sense, Paul would have had to lay stress upon the *church-membership* of the despised persons, and must have written at least τοὺς ἔξουθ. τοὺς ἐν τ. ἐκκλ. For οἱ ἔξουθ. ἐν τ. ἐκκλ. are *those who are despised in the church*, which leaves it altogether to the context to decide whether they themselves belong to the church or not. Now, that the latter is the case here is shown by vv. 1, 2, and especially by ver. 5: οὐκ ἐνι ἐν ὑμῖν. Arrangements of words like τοὺς ἔξουθ. ἐν τῇ ἐκκλ. for τοὺς ἐν τ. ἐκκλ. ἔξουθ. are common enough in classical writers also. See Kühner, *ad Xen. Anab.* iv. 2. 18. — *τούτους*] with an emphasis of disdain. See Dissen, *ad Dem. de Cor.* p. lii. f., 225; Krüger, *Anab.* i. 6. 9; Ellendt, *Lex Soph.* II. p. 460.

Ver. 5. Πρὸς ἐντρ. ὑμῶν λέγω] is to be referred, as is done by Lachmann, Tischendorf, Neander, and Hofmann, to ver. 4, comp. xv. 34 (it is commonly referred to what comes after), so that the following question *unfolds the humiliating consideration* involved in ver. 4. The address thus acquires more point and impressiveness. — οὗτως] belongs not to λέγω (Hofmann), but to οὐκ ἐνι κ.τ.λ., and sums up the state of things: *sic igitur, rebus ita comparatis*, since you τοὺς ἔξουθενημένους καθίζετε. See Bornemann in Rosenmüller's *Repert.* II. p. 245 ff.; Hermann, *ad Viger.* p. 933. C. Fr. Hermann, *ad Lucian. de hist. conser.* p. 161. It is otherwise understood by Chrysostom, Theophylact, Luther, *al.*, including Flatt, Billroth, Rückert, Olshausen, Ewald, who make

it: *so much, so completely* is there lacking, etc. But it is only the definition of *mode*, not of *degree*, that will suit the absolute negation of this clause, intensified as it is by οὐδὲ εἷς. — Regarding ἐνι, see on Gal. iii. 28. The σοφός carries point against the Corinthian self-conceit. — οὐδὲ εἷς] *ne unus quidem*. “Quod est vehementius,” as Erasmus well puts it, “cum sitis tum multi.” See on John i. 3, and Krüger, *Anab.* iii. 1. 3; Bornemann and Poppo, *ad Cyrop.* ii. 1. 21. Comp. *non ullus* (Kühner, *ad Cic. Tusc.* i. 39. 94) *nemo unus* (Locella, *ad Xen. Eph.* p. 137). Frequent in Isocr., see Bremi, I. *Exc.* iii. — ὅς δυνήσεται] purely future in force: *who* (as cases shall occur) *will be able*. — διακρίναι] *to judge*, as arbitrator. — ἀνὰ μέσον τ. ἀδ. αὐτοῦ] *between* (LXX. Gen. xvi. 5; Ex. xi. 7; Ezek. xxii. 26; Isa. lvii. 11; Matt. xiii. 25; Theocr. xxii. 21; Strabo, xi. 5. 1, p. 503; Polyb. x. 48. 1, v. 55. 7) *his* (Christian) *brother*. The expression, τ. ἀδελφοῦ, is meant to *put to shame*. The singular is used for this reason, that τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ must mean the *plaintiff* who brings on the lawsuit (not the *defendant*, as Ewald would have it), *between whom* (and, as is obvious, the defendant) the arbitrator, called into requisition by the bringing of the suit, pronounces his decision. Were the *plural* employed, that would indicate the *two* litigants generally, but not the party *bringing on the suit* in particular. Hofmann, contrary to the plain meaning of the words, understands the phrase of the *self-decision* of the individual demanding or refusing, namely, as to the point where his right ceased and his wrong began. In that case, Paul, if he wished to be intelligible, would have required to say something like this: διακρίναι ἐν ἑαυτῷ πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ. Moreover, οὐδὲ εἷς (or οὐδεὶς, as Hofmann reads) would militate against this view, seeing that it contains what would be, according to ver. 1, a *disproportionate* accusation, if the meaning is not, “not a single man fitted to be an arbitrator.” — The reading, τ. ἀδελφοῦ κ. τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ αὐτοῦ (Syr. Arr.), is an interpretation, although recommended by Grotius and again by Laurent.

Ver. 6. Quick reply to the preceding question: *No* (see Hartung, *Partikell.* II. p. 37; Baeumlein, *Partikell.* p. 10 f.) *brother goes to law with brother, and that* (see on Rom. xiii. 11) *before unbelievers*.<sup>1</sup> How then can there be such a wise man

<sup>1</sup> To take the sentence as a reproachful assertion (so Luther, Beza, Lachmann,

among you? He would assuredly, by his intervention as arbitrator, keep the matter from coming to a lawsuit, which, as between Christian brethren, and that, too, before a heathen court, is altogether unfitting and unworthy! *Κρίνεται* in precisely the same sense as in ver. 1, *κρίνεσθαι ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων*.

Ver. 7. *Μὲν οὖν*] as in ver. 4; it now brings under special consideration the foregoing *ἀδελφ. μετὰ ἀδ. κρίνεται*—namely, as to what the real character of such a proceeding may be in itself viewed generally (*ὅλως* being taken as in v. 1), apart from the special element unhappily added in Corinth, *ἐπὶ ἀπίστων*. The *μὲν* corresponds as little (against Hofmann) to the *ἀλλά* which follows in ver. 8, as the *μὲν* in ver. 4 to the *ἀλλά* in ver. 6. The *ἤδη* is the logical *already* (“*already then, viewed generally*”), in reference to something special, by which the case is made yet worse. Comp. Hartung, *Partikell.* I. p. 240 f. — *ἡττημα*] a defeat (see on Rom. xi. 12), *i.e.* damage, loss, and that, according to the context, not *moral decay* (so commonly), or *hurt to the church* (Hofmann), or *imperfection* (Billroth, Rückert), or *weakness* (Beza); but, it redounds to your coming short of the *Messianic salvation* (see ver. 9). — *ἐαυτῶν*] like *ἀλλήλων*, but giving them to feel, more strongly than the latter would, the *impropriety* which had a place in *their own circle* (Kühner, *ad Xcn. Mem.* ii. 6. 20). — *κρίματα*] as in Rom. v. 16, Wisd. xii. 12, *legal judgments*, which they had respectively obtained (*ἔχετε*). — *ἀδικεῖσθε . . . ἀποστερ.*] *middles: to allow wrong and loss to be inflicted on themselves*. Comp. Vulgate. See Bernhardy, p. 346 f. As to the matter itself, see Matt. v. 39 ff.; example of Jesus, 1 Pet. ii. 23.

Ver. 8. The question beginning with *διὰτί* in ver. 7 still continues: Why do ye not rather allow yourselves to suffer wrong, etc., and not, on your part, do wrong, etc.? This view, instead of the *ordinary* one, which makes ver. 8 an independent sentence like ver. 6, is necessary, because *ἡ οὐκ οἶδατε* in ver. 9 has its logical reference in *διὰτί*. The reference, namely, is this: “*There is no ground conceivable for your not,*” etc. (*διὰτί . . . ἀδελφούς*), “*unless that ye knew not,*” etc. (*ἡ οὐκ οἶδατε*). — *καὶ τοῦτο ἀδελφούς*] to whom nevertheless, as your brethren, the very

Osiander, Hofmann), makes the passage sterner and more telling than the common way of viewing it as a *question*, which is adopted also by Tischendorf and Ewald.

opposite was due from you! With respect to the climactic *κ. τοῦτο*, and *that*, see on Rom. xii. 11, and Baeumlein, *Partik.* p. 147.

Ver. 9. *Ἡ οὐκ οἶδατε*] See on ver. 8. To supply an unexpressed thought here ("Do not regard the matter lightly," Billroth; "This is a far greater *ἡττημα*," Ruckert; that *ἡττημα* to the church "they could only fail to perceive, if they did not know," etc., Hofmann) is just as arbitrary as to do so in ver. 2. — *ἄδικοι*] the general conception (under which the preceding *ἀδικεῖν* and *ἀποστ.* are included): *unrighteous, immoral*. See the enumeration which follows. — *Θεοῦ βασιλ.*] the *Θεοῦ* coming close after *ἄδικοι*, and put first for emphasis (see the critical remarks). As to the truth itself, that *ἀδικία* excludes from the Messiah's kingdom, see on Gal. v. 21; and as regards what is implied in the Messianic *κληρονομία*, on Gal. iii. 18; Eph. i. 11. — *μὴ πλανᾶσθε*] for that moral fundamental law was more easily, it is plain, flung to the winds in frivolous Corinth than anywhere else! Possibly, too, some might even say openly: *φιλόανθρωπος ὢν ὁ Θεὸς καὶ ἀγαθός, οὐκ ἐπεξέρχεται τοῖς πλημμελήμασι μὴ δὴ φοβηθῶμεν!* Chrysostom. Hence: *be not mistaken* (*πλανᾶσθε*, *passive*, as also in xv. 33; Gal. vi. 7; Luke xxi. 8; Jas. i. 16; comp. the active form in 1 John iii. 7), followed by the emphatic repetition of that fundamental law with a many-sided breaking up of the notion *ἄδικοι* into particulars, not, however, arranged systematically, or in couples, nor reducible, save by force, to any logical scheme;<sup>1</sup> in this enumeration, owing to the state of matters in the place, the sins of sensuality are most amply specified. — *πόρνοι*, *fornicators* in general; *μοιχοί*, *adulterers*, Heb. xiii. 4. — *εἰδωλολ.*] see on v. 11. — *μαλακοί*] *effeminate*, commonly understood as *qui muliebria patiuntur*, but with no sufficient evidence from the usage of the language (the passages in Wetstein and Kypke, even Dion. Hal. vii. 2, do not prove the point); moreover, such catamites (*molles*) were called *πόρνοι* or *κίναιδοι*. One does not see, moreover, why precisely *this* sin should be mentioned twice over in different aspects. Rather therefore: *effeminate luxurious livers*. Comp. Aristotle, *Eth.* vii. 7: *μαλακὸς καὶ τρυφῶν*, Xen. *Mem.* ii. 1, 20, also *μαλακῶς*, iii. 11. 10: *τρυφή δὲ καὶ μαλθακία*, Plato, *Rep.* p. 590 B. — *ἀρσενοκοῖται*] *sodomites*, who

<sup>1</sup> Comp. Ernesti, *Ursprung der Sünde*, II. p. 29f.

defile themselves with men (1 Tim. i. 10; Eusebius, *Praep. evang.* p. 276 D). Regarding the wide diffusion of this vice, see the passages in Wetstein; comp. on Rom. i. 27, and Hermann, *Privatalterth.* § 29. 17 ff.

Ver. 11. How unworthy are such of your new *Christian* relations! — ταῦτα] of persons in a contemptuous sense: *such trash, such a set.* See Bernhardt, p. 281. — τινές] more exact definition of the subject of ἦτε, namely, that all are not meant. It is the well-known σχῆμα καθ' ὅλον καὶ μέρος (Kühner, II. p. 156). Comp. Grotius. Valckenaer says well: "vocula τινές dictum paulo durius emollit." Billroth is wrong in holding (as Vorstius before him) that ταῦτά τινες belong to each other, and are equivalent to τοιοῦτοι. In that case ταῦτά τινα would be required, or τοιοῖ τινες. See Ast, *ad Plat. Legg.* p. 71; Bornemann, *ad Xen. Cyr.* ii. 1. 2; Ellendt, *Lcx. Soph.* II. p. 832. — ἀπελούσ. κ.τ.λ.] describes from step to step the new relations established by their reception of Christianity. First of all: *ye washed yourselves clean*, namely, by your immersion in the waters of baptism, from the moral defilement of the guilt of your sins (you obtained, through means of baptism, the forgiveness of your sins committed before you became Christians). Comp. Acts xxii. 16, ii. 38; Eph. v. 26; 1 Pet. iii. 21. Observe the use of the *middle*, arising from the conception of their *self-destination* for baptism. Comp. ἐβαπτίσαντο, x. 2. We must not take the middle here for the *passive*, as most expositors do, following the Vulgate (so Flatt, Pott, Billroth, Olshausen, Ewald), which in part arose—as in the case of Olshausen—from dogmatical preconceptions; neither is it to be understood, with Usteri (*Lehrbegriff*, p. 230) and Rückert (comp. Loesner, p. 278), of *moral* purification by laying aside everything sinful, of *the putting off the old man* (comp. Rom. vi. 2 ff.), against which the same phrase in Acts xxii. 16, and the analogous one, καθάρισας, in Eph. v. 26, militate strongly. This moral regeneration *exists* in connection with baptism (Tit. iii. 5), but is not *designated* by ἀπελούσ., although its subjective conditions, μετάνοια and πίστις, are *presupposed* in the latter expression. The producing of regeneration, which is by water and Spirit, is implied in the ἡγιάσθητε which follows: *ye became* (from being unholy, as ye were before baptism) *holy*, inasmuch, namely, as by receiving the δωρεὰ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος (Acts ii. 38)

ye were translated into that moral altitude and frame of life which is Christian and consecrated to God (John iii. 5; Tit. iii. 5; Eph. v. 25, *ἀγιάση*). Rückert and Olshausen take it in the theocratic sense: "ye became set apart, numbered among the *ἅγιοι*." Comp. Osiander, also Hofmann: "*incorporated in the holy church*." But the progression of thought here, which marks its advance towards a climax by the repetition of the *ἀλλά*, requires, not a threefold description of the transaction involved in baptism (Calvin, Hofmann), but three *different* characteristic points, dating their commencement from baptism, and forming, as regards their substance, the new moral condition of life from which those who have become Christians ought not again to fall back. — *ἐδικαιώθητέ*] *ye were made righteous*. This, however, cannot mean the *imputative* justification of Rom. iii. 21 (de Wette, Osiander, Hofmann, with older commentators); because, in the first place, this is already given in the *ἀπελούσασθε*; and secondly, because the *ἐδικαιώθητε*, if used in this sense, would have needed not to follow the *ἀγιάσθητε*, but to precede it, as in i. 30; for to suppose a *descending* climax (Calovius) is out of the question, if only on account of the *ἀπελούσ.*, which so manifestly indicates the *beginning* of the Christian state. What is meant, and that by way of contrast to the notion of *ἀδικία* which prevails in ver. 9 f., is the *actual moral* righteousness of life,<sup>1</sup> which has been brought about as *the result of the operation of the Spirit* which began with baptism, so that now there is seen in the man the fulfilment of the moral demands or of the *δικαίωμα τοῦ νόμου* (Rom. viii. 4), and he himself, being dead unto sin, *δεδικαίωται ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας* (Rom. vi. 7), and *ἐδουλώθη τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ* (Rom. vi. 18), whose instruments his members have now become in the *καινότης* of the spirit and life (Rom. vi. 13). This *δικαιωθῆναι* does not stand related to the *ἀγιασθῆναι* in any sort of tautological sense, but is the effect and outcome of it, and in so far, certainly, is also the moral *continuatio justificationis* (comp. Calovius), Rev. xxii. 11.—The thrice repeated *ἀλλά* lays a

<sup>1</sup> There is therefore no warrant for adducing this passage, as is done on the Roman Catholic side (even by Döllinger), in opposition to the distinction between justification and sanctification. Justification is comprised already in *ἐπιλεύς*. Comp. Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* pp. 342, 345 ff. Its subjective basis, however, is one with that of sanctification, namely, faith.



special emphasis upon each of the three points. Comp. Xenophon, *Anab.* v. 8. 4 ; Aristophanes, *Acharn.* 402 ff. ; 2 Cor. ii. 17, vii. 11 ; Wyttenbach, *ad Plat. Phaed.* p. 142 ; Bornemann, *ad Xen. Symp.* iv. 53 ; Buttmann, *neut. Gramm.* p. 341 [E. T. 398].—*ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι . . . ἡμῶν*] is by most expositors made to refer to all the three points. But since *ἐν τῷ πνεύματι κ.τ.λ.* does not accord with *ἀπελούσ.* (for the Spirit is only received *after* baptism, Acts ii. 38, xix. 5, 6 ; Tit. iii. 5, 6 ; the case in Acts x. 47 is *exceptional*), it is better, with Rückert, to connect *ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι . . . ἡμῶν* simply with *ἐδικαιώθ.*, which best harmonizes also with the *significant* importance of the *ἐδικαιώθητε* as the crowning point of the whole transformation wrought in the Christian. The *name of the Lord Jesus*, *i.e.* what pronouncing the name “*Κύριος Ἰησοῦς*” (xii. 3) affirms,—this, as the contents of the faith and confession, is that in which the becoming morally righteous had its causal basis (*ἐν*), and equally had it its ground in *the Spirit of our God*, since it was He who established it by His sanctifying agency ; *through that name* its origin was subjectively conditioned, and *through that Spirit* it was objectively realized. Were we, with Hofmann, to bring *ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι . . . Θεοῦ ἡμῶν* into connection with the *πάντα μοι ἔξεστιν* which follows, the latter would at once become limited and defined in a way with which the antitheses *ἀλλ’ κ.τ.λ.* would no longer in that case harmonize. For it is precisely in the *absoluteness* of the *πάντα μοι ἔξεστιν* that these antitheses have their ethical correctness and significance, as being the moral limitation of that axiom, which therefore appears again absolutely in x. 23. — Observe, further, how, notwithstanding of the defective condition of the church in point of fact, the *aorists ἡγιάσθ.* and *ἐδικαιώθ.* have their warrant as *acts of God*, and in accordance with the *ideal* view of what is the specifically Christian condition, however imperfectly as yet this may have been realized, or whatever backsliding may have taken place. The *ideal* way of speaking, too, corresponds to the *design* of the apostle, who is seeking to make his readers feel the *contradiction* between their conduct and the character which as Christians they assumed at conversion ; *σφόδρα ἐντρεπτικῶς ἐπήγαγε λέγων ἐννοήσατε ἡλίκων ὑμᾶς ἐξείλετο κακῶν ὁ Θεός κ.τ.λ.*, Chrysostom. And thereby he seeks morally to *raise* them.

Vv. 12-20. *Correction of the misunderstanding of Christian*

liberty, as though fornication, equally with the use of meats, came under the head of things allowable (vv. 12-17). Admonitions against fornication (vv. 18-20).

Vv. 12-14. Connection and sequence of thought. *In this new condition of life* (ver. 11) *all things are allowed to us, but they must be for our good,—all things allowed, but we on our part must remain free* (ver. 12). *Among these allowed things is the use of food, as what is in accordance with nature and appointed by God merely for a time* (τὰ βρώματα . . . καταργ., ver. 13). *Wholly otherwise is it with the use of the body for fornication; that is anti-Christian* (τὸ δὲ σῶμα . . . σώματι, ver. 13), *and contrary to the eternal destiny fixed by God for the body* (ver. 14).—Not without reason did Paul, when reckoning up the different forms of ἀδικία in ver. 9, place πορνεία first. Comp. v. 1; 2 Cor. xii. 21. But Corinthian Epicureanism, starting from the Hellenic mode of viewing this matter, which was altogether very lax (Herm. *Privatalterth.*, § 29. 13 ff.), easily found for itself even a certain justification of fornication, namely, in the doctrine of Christian liberty in *adiaphoris*, the maxim of which is: πάντα μοι ἔξεστιν. Now we may infer from the passage before us that this erroneous justification had *actually* been brought forward, that more than one voluptuary in the church had, as Paul was informed, actually declared that just as satisfying the desire for food was an *adiaphoron*, so also was satisfying the desire for sensual pleasure by fornication. Comp. Baur in the *theol. Jahrb.* 1852, 1 and 3; Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 420 f. Olshausen, indeed, thinks that Paul would have given an absolute command to exclude all such persons from the church, and that therefore it is only the *possibility* of so gross an abuse of Christian liberty that is implied here. But the former is an arbitrary assumption,<sup>1</sup> and the latter has these two considerations against it—first, that in no other Epistle does Paul touch on this possibility, although the opinion that licentious intercourse was allowable was widely spread among the Greeks and Romans; and secondly, that the statement of the

<sup>1</sup> Olshausen reasons thus: Since in vi. 9 unnatural vices are named with the rest, we should have to conclude that the πάντα μοι ἔξεστιν was applied to these also in Corinth; now Paul would surely never have suffered persons guilty of such abominations to remain in the church. But in vv. 13 ff. the apostle is speaking quite distinctly and constantly of the πορνεία alone, not of unnatural sins.

moral difference between the use of meats and whoredom is of too special a kind to be naturally accounted for in the absence of actual occasion. Neander, whose objections lose their force, if we only do not go the length of assuming that this adia-phoristic view of fornication had become universal in Corinth, or had been formally published and propagated there as a doctrinal tenet, is of opinion that Paul meant to begin here upon the theme of meat offered to idols (comp. x. 23), but was led on after the first half of ver. 13 to draw a contrast (perhaps in order to guard against a misunderstanding of his words, perhaps also in opposition to those who denied the resurrection) which conducted him so far away from his theme, that it was only in chap. viii. that he made his way back to it again from another point. But how arbitrary this is! And how entirely unexampled a thing, that the apostle should so far forget himself, and write in a manner so irregular and open to misconception! Chap. x. 23 lends no support to this exposition, for it is obvious that the same maxim could be made to apply in very many different directions. Rückert's exegesis is only a little less violent; he supposes that, in the question addressed to the apostle about the sacrificial meat, the party eating it had adduced the *πάντα ἔξεστιν* in their favour, and that Paul had only *transferred it here in order to guard against the abuse of it respecting fornication* (in substance, therefore, coinciding with Olshausen). To the ordinary interpretation Rückert objects, that the Corinthians in their letter would certainly not have described the *πορνεία* as prevailing among them, nor would they have undertaken the defence of it to the apostle whom they knew so well. But this objection is unfounded; for from v. 1 we must assume that Paul had come to know of the state of morals at Corinth through *oral* reports, and consequently had not learned the abuse there made of the *πάντα ἔξεστιν* through expressions in the Corinthian *letter* (this against Hofmann also). According to Ewald, there had been doubts and debates concerning the obligation of the Jewish laws about *food* and *marriage*; Paul therefore lays down in ver. 12 the principle which should decide all such cases, and then at once, in ver. 13, disposes shortly of the first point in dispute, in order, at a later stage (chap. viii.-x.), to speak of it more at length, and hastens on in ver. 13 ff. to the second point. Against this we may urge, first, that the first point

was surely too *important* to be disposed of by so brief a hint as that in ver. 13; secondly, that the two halves of ver. 13 stand in an *antithetic* relation to each other, which gives the first half merely the position of an *auxiliary* clause; thirdly, that chap. viii.-x. do not deal with the question of food in general, but with that of eating *sacrificial flesh* in particular; and lastly, that ver. 13 ff. have likewise quite as their *special* subject that of *fornication*. — πάντα μοι ἔξεστιν] might be regarded as *the objection of an opponent* (so Pott and Flatt, with older expositors); hence also it is understood by Theodoret as a question. But this is unnecessary (for surely it is, in point of fact, a Christian, and indeed a specially Pauline principle), and arbitrary besides, since there is here no *formula* of objection (such as ἐρεῖς οὖν, or the like). Comp. on ver. 13. — It would be self-evident to the reader that πάντα meant *all that was in itself indifferent* (whatever was not anti-Christian). — μοι] spoken in the character of *a Christian in general*. Comp. ver. 15. Bengel says well: “Saepe Paulus primâ personâ singul. eloquitur, quae vim habent gnomes.” Comp. Gal. ii. 18. — συμφέρει] is *profitable*. This must not be arbitrarily restricted, either in the way of taking it as equivalent to οἰκοδομεῖ (Calvin, *al.*, also Billroth after x. 23), or by confining it to one's own advantage (Grotius, Heumann, Schulz, Olshausen). What is meant is *moral profitableness generally* in every respect, as conditioned by the special circumstances of each case as it arises. So, too, in x. 23. Theodore of Mopsuestia, it may be added, says rightly: ἐπειδὴ γὰρ οὐ πάντα συμφέρει, δῆλον ὡς οὐ πᾶσι χρηστέον, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὠφελοῦσι μόνοις. — οὐκ ἐγώ] *not I for my part*. The subjection will not be on *my* side, but the *things* allowed will be what is brought into subjection. This tacit contrast is indicated both by the position of οὐκ ἐγώ and by ὑπό τινος. The common interpretation: “ego sub nullius redigar potestatem” (Vulgate), does not correspond to the order of the words. — ἐξουσιασθ.] purely future in force: *shall be ruled* by anything whatever. This result, that on my part moral freedom should be lost through anything, will not ensue! Otherwise the thing would plainly be *not* allowed. I shall preserve the power of moral self-determination, so as to do or leave undone, just according to the moral relations constituted by the circumstances of the case, what in itself would be allowed to me. Comp. the great thought in

iii. 22, and Paul's own example in Phil. iv. 11, 12. Were *τινός* *masculine* (Ambrosiaster, Erasmus, Vatablus, Ewald, *al.*), the meaning would then be, that in things indifferent a man should not yield himself to be tutored and dictated to by others (Ewald). But, in point of fact, it is *neuter*, being in contrast to the thrice repeated and emphatic *πάντα*.—The *paronomasia* in *ἔξεστιν* and *ἐξουσ.* was remarked by expositors as early as Chrysostom and Theophylact. *All is in my power, yet it is not I who will be overpowered by anything.* Regarding *ἐξουσιάζειν* (which is not used in this sense by Greek writers), comp. Eccles. vii. 19, viii. 8, x. 4 f.

Ver. 13. *Τῇ κοιλίᾳ*] *sc. ἔστι, belong to*, inasmuch, that is to say, as they are destined to be received and digested by the belly (the *ὑποδοχῇ τῶν σιτίων*, Photius in Oecumenius). Comp. Matt. xv. 17.—*τοῖς βρώμασιν*] inasmuch as it is destined to receive and digest the food.—This reciprocal destination according to nature is the *first* element, which, in its relation to the second half of the verse, is intended to call attention to the fact, that the case of fornication is totally different from that of the use of food,—that the *latter*, being *in accordance with its destination*, belongs to the category of the *adiaphora*; while *fornication*, on the other hand, which is *anti-Christian*, is contrary to the relation of the body to Christ. The *second* element (which, however, is very closely connected with the first), by which this is made manifest, consists in what God will hereafter do on the one hand with the *κοιλία* and the *βρώμασι*, and on the other hand (ver. 14) in respect of the body's relation as pertaining to Christ, which latter relation is imperishable, in contrast to the perishable nature of the things first mentioned.—*ὁ δὲ Θεὸς . . . καταργ.] i.e.* God, however, will (at the Parousia) cause such a change to take place in the bodily constitution of man and in the world of sense generally, that neither the organs of digestion as such, nor the meats as such, will then be existent. To such passing away is this relation destined by God! With respect to the glorifying of the body here indicated, comp. Matt. xxii. 30; 1 Cor. xv. 44, 51. Melancthon aptly says: "*Cibi et venter . . . sunt res periturae; . . . ideo sunt adiaphora;*" and Bengel: "*quae destruentur, per se liberum habent usum, Col. ii. 20 ff.*" Comp. Castalio, and among more modern expositors, Schulz, Krause, Billroth, Rückert, Schrader, Olshausen, de Wette,

Osiander, Ewald, Maier, Neander, Hofmann.<sup>1</sup> Pott, Flatt, and Heydenreich (and see still earlier writers in Wolf) approximate to this view, but take τὰ βρώματα . . . καταργ. as words of an *opponent*, the premisses of a conclusion as to the allowableness of fornication, which conclusion is impugned by Paul in the τὸ δὲ σῶμα κ.τ.λ. which follows. But the apostle has not given the slightest hint of this passage being a dialogue; moreover, had it been so, he would have begun his reply in ver. 13 with ἀλλά again (as in ver. 12, according to this dialogistic view). Other interpreters, following Chrysostom and Theophylact, make the design of ὁ δὲ Θεὸς κ.τ.λ. to be a warning against excess. Comp. Calvin, Grotius, Calovius, *al.* But this, although in harmony with the ἀλλά in ver. 12, would stand in no logical relation to the ὁ δὲ Θεὸς κ.τ.λ. of ver. 14, and thereby the inner connection of the whole address (see above) would be broken up. — καὶ ταύτην καὶ ταῦτα] Regarding the use of the double οὗτος for ἐκεῖνος . . . οὗτος, which is not common, see Bernhardt, p. 277. Comp. Josh. viii. 22; 1 Macc. vii. 46, ix. 17. — τὸ δὲ σῶμα] Paul cannot name again here a single organ; *the whole body* is the organ of fleshly intercourse;<sup>2</sup> see ver. 16. — τῇ πορνείᾳ] *for fornication* (conceived of as a personal power), for its disposal and use. — τῷ Κυρίῳ] inasmuch as the body is a member of Christ. See ver. 15. — τῷ σώματι] inasmuch, namely, as Christ is destined (has it as His function) to rule and use the body as His member. "Quanta dignatio!" Bengel. It is a mistake to make the phrase refer to the raising up and glorifying of the body, which it is the part of Christ to effect (Ambrosiaster, Anselm, Thomas, Grotius); for this would destroy the unity of mutual reference in the two clauses (comp. above, τὰ βρώματα κ.τ.λ.), and, besides, the resurrection is brought forward afterwards as something separate from the preceding, and that, too, as the work of God (parallel to the ὁ δὲ Θεὸς κ.τ.λ. in ver. 13).

<sup>1</sup> Several of them, however, fall into the mistake of making the *date* of the καταργ. to be at *death*, which καὶ ταῦτα alone shows to be inadmissible.

<sup>2</sup> Neither our text nor Luke xx. 35 gives any support to the assumption that those partaking in the resurrection will be *without sexual distinction*. The doing away of the κοιλία refers simply to the cessation of the earthly process of nutrition; it does not affect the identity of the body, which Delitzsch (*Psychol.* p. 459), without warrant from Scripture, pronounces to be independent of the *external* continuance of distinction between the sexes. Such assertions lead to fantastic theories ἐπὶ ὁ γίγνασται.

Ver. 14. This is parallel in contents and form to the sentence, ὁ δὲ Θεὸς . . . καταργήσει, in ver. 13: *Now God has not only raised up the Lord, but will raise up us also by His power.* The body, consequently, has a destiny which stretches on into the future eternal αἰών; how wholly different therefore from the κοιλία, that organ of temporal nourishment, which will cease to be!—καὶ τὸν Κύρ. ἡγειρε] necessary assurance of what follows. See Rom. viii. 11. Comp. 1 Cor. xv. 20; Col. i. 18; 2 Cor. iv. 11, 14.—καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐξεγερῇ<sup>1</sup>] The bodily change in the case of those still alive at the time of the Parousia (xv. 51; 2 Cor. v. 2-4; 1 Thess. iv. 15 ff.) did not need to be specially mentioned, since Paul was not here to enter into detail upon the doctrine of the resurrection. Comp. on Rom. viii. 11. He therefore, in accordance with the τὸν Κύρ. ἡγειρε, designates here the consummation of all things only *a potiori*, namely, as a *raising up*, speaking at the same time in the person of *Christians generally* (ἡμᾶς), and leaving out of view in this general expression his own personal hope that he might survive to the Parousia.—The interchange of ἡγ. and ἐξηγ. (out of the grave, comp. ἐξανάστασις τῶν νεκρῶν, Phil. iii. 11) is accidental, without any special design—in opposition to Bengel and Osiander's arbitrary opinion that the former word denoted the *first-fruits*, and the latter the "*massa dormientium*."<sup>2</sup>—αὐτοῦ]—not αὐτοῦ, because uttered from the standpoint of the writer—applies to *God*, not to Jesus (Theodoret); and διὰ τῆς δυνάμ. αὐτ. should be referred not to both the clauses in the sentence (Billroth), but, as its position demands, to ἐξεγερῇ; for to the ground of faith which the latter has in καὶ τὸν Κύριον ἡγειρε, Paul now adds its undoubted *possibility* (Matt. xxii. 29), perhaps glancing purposely at the deniers of the resurrection, τῇ ἀξιοπιστίᾳ τῆς τοῦ ποιούντος ἰσχύος τοὺς ἀντιλέγοντας ἐπιστομίζων, Chrysostom.

Vv. 15-17. That fornication is not an indifferent thing like the use of meats, but anti-Christian, Paul has already *proved* in

<sup>1</sup> If ἡγείρει were the true reading (but see the critical remarks), the tense employed would in that case bring before us as *present* what was certain in the future. If ἡγούμε were correct, we should have to interpret this according to the idea of the resurrection of believers being implied in that of Christ, comp. Col. ii. 12.

<sup>2</sup> Against this view may be urged the consideration, in itself decisive, that in the whole of chap. xv. ἡγείρω is the term constantly used both of Christ's resurrection and that of believers; whereas ἐγείρω occurs in all the N. T. only here and Rom. ix. 17 (in the latter passage, however, not of the rising of the dead).

vv. 13, 14, namely, from this, that the body belongs to Christ and is destined by God to be raised up again. How *deserving of abhorrence* fornication is on that account, he now brings home to the mind of his readers in a striking and concrete way. The immorality of fornication is certainly taken for granted in ver. 15 f., yet not in such a manner as to make Paul guilty of a *petitio principii* (Baur in the *theol. Jahrb.* 1852, p. 538 f.), but on the ground of the proof of this immorality already *given* in vv. 13, 14. In ver. 15 f. the apostle does not seek to *prove* it over again, but to teach the Corinthians to *abhor* the sin. — οὐκ οἴδατε κ.τ.λ.] He here takes up once more, and exhibits with greater fulness, the thought in ver. 13, τὸ σῶμα τῷ Κυρίῳ, as the basis for the following warning: ἅρας οὖν κ.τ.λ. — μέλη Χριστοῦ] Inasmuch, that is to say, as Christ, as the Head of the Christian world, stands to it in the closest and most inward fellowship of organic life (see especially Eph. iv. 16), and forms, as it were, one moral Person with it; the *bodies* of the individual believers, who in fact belong to the Lord, and He to them for this world and that which is to come (ver. 13 f.), may be conceived as Christ's *members*, just as from the same point of view the whole church of Christ is His collective organ, His body (Rom. xii. 5; Eph. i. 23; Col. i. 18, ii. 19; 1 Cor. xii. 13, *al.*). — ἅρας] Shall I then *take away*, take off, the members of Christ, *and*, etc. Billroth sees in ἅρας simply minuteness of description, indicative of deliberation, as in πρῶ. But this is to confound it with λαβών. The Vulgate renders rightly: *tollens*; Luke vi. 29, xi. 22; John xi. 48; Plato, *Pol.* ix. p. 578 E, *Tim.* p. 76 B; Sophocles, *Trach.* 796; 1 Macc. viii. 18. What is depicted is daring *misappropriation*. The plural τὰ μέλη denotes the category, for the matter "non quanta sit numero, sed qualis genere sit, spectatur," Reisig, *Conj. in Aristoph.* p. 58. Since the Christian's body is among the members of Christ, the *πορνεύειν* is a deed whereby a man takes away the members of Christ from Him whose property they are, and makes them a harlot's members. — ποιήσω] *future*: *Shall this case occur with me?* shall I degrade myself to this? so far forget myself? Rückert and Osiander hold that it is the aorist subjunctive: *should I*, etc. (see Herm. *ad Viger.* p. 742). It is impossible to decide the point.

Ver. 16. "Ἡ οὐκ οἴδατε] "Or if this μὴ γένοιτο (conveying, as



it does, a *negative* to that question) still appears to you to admit of doubt, even after the statement of the nature of the case given in ver. 15, then ye must be ignorant that," etc. This ἢ οὐκ οἴδατε cannot correspond with the οὐκ οἴδατε of ver. 15 (Hofmann: "either the one or the other they must be ignorant of," etc.), for ὅτι ὁ κολλῶμ. κ.τ.λ. manifestly refers to the conclusion from the preceding expressed in ἄρας οὖν, and therefore is subordinated to the question answered shudderingly with μὴ γένοιτο. In ver. 19, too, the ἢ οὐκ οἴδατε refers to what has just before been said. — κολλῶμ.] *who joins himself to* (פֶּרְשֵׁי), indicating the union in licentious intercourse. Comp. Eccus. xix. 2; Gen. ii. 24; Ezra iv. 20. — τῇ πόρνῃ] the harlot with whom he deals (article). — ἐν σῶμά ἐστιν] *is a single body*; previous to the κολλᾶσθαι he and the person concerned were *two* bodies, but he who is *joined* to the harlot—an united subject—is *one body*. — ἔσονται γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] Gen. ii. 24 (quoted from the LXX.) speaks, indeed, of *wedded*, not *unwedded*, intercourse; but Theodoret rightly points out the *paritas rationis*: ἐν γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο κάκεινο τῇ φύσει τοῦ πράγματος. — φησὶν] Who it is that says it, is self-evident, namely, *God*; the utterances of the Scripture being His words, even when they may be spoken through another, as Gen. ii. 24 was through Adam. Comp. on Matt. xix. 5. Similarly Gal. iii. 16; Eph. iv. 8; Heb. viii. 5; 1 Cor. xv. 27. Ἡ γραφή, which is what is usually supplied here, would need to be suggested by the context, as in Rom. xv. 10. Rückert arbitrarily prefers τὸ πνεῦμα.<sup>1</sup> — οἱ δύο] *the two in question*. The words are wanting in the Hebrew text, but are always quoted with it in the N. T. (Matt. xix. 5; Mark x. 8; Eph. v. 31) after the LXX., and also by the Rabbins (*e.g.* Beresh. Rabb. 18); an addition of later date in the interests of monogamy, which, although not expressly enjoined in the law, came by degrees to prevail, in accordance with its adumbration from the first in the history of the creation (Ewald, *Alterth.* p. 260 f.). — εἰς σάρκα μίαν] יְהִי לְאֶחָד בָּשָׂר. See on Matt. xix. 5.

Ver. 17. Weighty contrast to ὁ κολλῶμ. τῇ πόρνῃ ἐν σῶμά

<sup>1</sup> To take it *impersonally*: "it is said," as in 2 Cor. x. 10, according to the well-known usage in the classics, would be without warrant from any other instance of Paul's quotations from *Scripture*. Comp. Winer, *Gr.* p. 486 [E. T. 656]; Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 117 [E. T. 134].

ἐστι, no longer dependent on ὅτι. — κολλᾶσθαι τῷ Κυρίῳ, an expression of close attachment to Jehovah, which is very common in the O. T. (Jer. xiii. 11; Deut. x. 20, xi. 22; 2 Kings xviii. 6; Eccus. ii. 3, *al.*). It denotes here, *inward union of life with Christ*, and is selected to be set against the κολλ. τῇ πόρνῃ in ver. 16, inasmuch as in both cases an *intima conjunctio* takes place, in the one *fleshly*, in the other *spiritual*. We are not to assume that Paul was thinking here, as in Eph. v. 23 ff. (comp. 2 Cor. xi. 2; Rom. v. 4), of the union with Christ as a *marriage* (Piscator, Olshausen, comp. also Osiander); for in that mystical marriage-union Christ is the *Bridegroom*, filling the *man's* place, and hence the contrast to κολλ. τῇ πόρνῃ would be an unsuitable one. Olshausen's additional conjecture, that when the apostle spoke of τῇ πόρνῃ there floated before his mind a vision of the great whore who sitteth upon many waters (Rev. xvii. 1), is an empty fancy. — ἐν πνεύμα ἐστι] conceived of as the analogue to ἐν σώμα. Comp. 2 Cor. iii. 17. This is the same Unio mystica which Jesus Himself so often demands in the Gospel of John, and in which no ethical diversity exists between the πνεῦμα of the believing man and the πνεῦμα of Christ which fills it; Christ lives in the believer, Gal. ii. 20, as the believer in Christ, Gal. iii. 27, Col. iii. 17, this being brought about by Christ's communicating Himself to the human spirit through the power of the Holy Spirit, Rom. viii. 9-11. Now, be it observed how, by *fleshly union* with a harlot, this high and holy unity is not simply *put in hazard* (Hofmann), but excluded altogether as a moral *impossibility*! Comp. the idea of the impossibility of serving two masters (Rom. vi. 16), of fellowship with Christ and Belial, and the like. It is unnecessary to say that this has no application to union in marriage, seeing that it is ordained of God, "ob verbum, quo actus concubialis sanctificatur," Calovius. Comp. Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 421.

Vv. 18-20. Direct prohibition of fornication, strengthened by description of it as a sin against one's own body, which is in fact the temple of the Holy Spirit, etc.

Ver. 18. Φεύγετε τὴν πορν.] Inferred from the foregoing verses (13-17), but expressed in all the more lively way from not being linked to them by any connective particle. "Severitas cum fastidio," Bengel. — πᾶν ἀμάρτημα κ.τ.λ.] *asyndetic corroboration*

of the preceding prohibition. Paul does not say anything here incapable of being maintained in its full stringency of meaning (Rückert, de Wette), nor is there any reason for taking *πάν*, with Michaelis, Flatt, Pott, and others, in a *popular* sense, as equivalent to *almost all* (comp. Theodore of Mopsuestia and Melancthon: "cum quodam candore accipiatur de iis, quae *sacpius* accidunt"); but the truth of his words is based on the fact that every other sinful act (*ἁμάρτημα*), if it has to do at all with the body, works upon it from without, and consequently holds a position in reference to the body external to the same. The sinner makes that which is not of the body, but outside of it, as *e.g.* food and drink, to be the instrument of his immoral act, whereby the *ἁμάρτημα*, viewed in its relation to the body, comes to stand *ἐκτὸς τοῦ σώματος*, and has there the sphere of its occurrence and consummation. This holds true even in the case of the suicide, whose act is in fact a sinful use of external things, the instance of a man's voluntarily starving himself not excepted (against Hofmann's objection), for this is accomplished by the abuse of abstinence from food (which is equally an external relationship), and therefore *ἐκτὸς τοῦ σώματος*. How entirely different from the case of all such other sinful acts stands the state of things with unchasteness, where there is sin, not *ἐκτὸς τ. σώματος*, but *εἰς τὸ ἴδιον σῶμα*! See below. In connection with this passage, expositors indulge in many arbitrary and sometimes very odd interpretations<sup>1</sup> and saving clauses. Among these must be reckoned the exposition of Calvin and others, *by way of comparison*: "secundum plus et minus." Neander, too, imports a meaning which is not in the

<sup>1</sup> Chrysostom, Theophylact, Erasmus, *al.*, single out as the characteristic point—contrary to the literal tenor of the passage—the defilement of the *whole* body by fornication, on which ground a *bath* is taken subsequently. This latter point Theodoret also lays stress upon, explaining, however, the expression by the fact that the man who commits other sins *οὐ τοσαύτην αἰσθῆσιν λαμβάνει τῆς ἁμαρτίας*, while the profligate, on the other hand, *εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν αἰσθάνεται τοῦ κακοῦ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα βδελύσσεται*. Chrysostom's interpretation of the *whole* body has been taken up again by Baur (in the *theol. Jahrb.* 1852, p. 540 f.). The body in its *totality*, he holds, is meant, inasmuch as it is one body with the harlot, and in virtue of this unity the fornicator has the object of his sin not without himself, but *in* himself, and sins against the body identified with his own self. But all this is *not in the text*, and no reader could read it into the text. Hofmann, too, imports what is neither expressed in the words themselves nor suggested by the antithesis, —the obscure notion, namely, that, as in the case of the glutton, after completing the deed "*the thing of his sin does not remain with him*" (?)

words, that fornication desecrates the body in its very *highest and most enduring significance* (namely, as the sum of the *personality*). According to Chr. F. Fritzsche (*Nova Opuse.* p. 249 f.), what is meant is that all other sins do not separate the body of the Christian from the body of Christ, this taking place only through fornication (ver. 15). But the general and local expression ἐκτὸς τ. σώματος ἐστίν does not correspond with this special and ethical reference, nor are we warranted in attributing to one of such ethical strictness as the apostle the conception that *no other sin* separates from the body of Christ, ver. 9 f.; Rom. viii. 9, *al.* — ὁ ἐὰν κ.τ.λ.] *which in any case whatever* (Hermann, *ad Viger.* p. 819) a man shall have committed. Respecting ἐάν, instead of ἄν, after relatives, see Winer, p. 291 [E. T. 390]. — ἐκτὸς τ. σώμ. ἐστίν] *inasmuch as the sinful deed done has been one brought about outside of the body.* — εἰς τὸ ἴδιον σῶμα] *For his own bodily frame is the immediate object which he affects in a sinful way, whose moral purity and honour he hurts and wounds by his action.* Comp. on εἰς, Luke xv. 18. He dishonour his own body, which is the organ and object of his sin. Comp. Beza. The apostle says nothing at all here of the *weakening effect* upon the body itself (Athanasius in Oecumenius, and others).

Ver. 19 justifies the ἁμαρτάνει in respect of the specific description of it given by εἰς τὸ ἴδιον σῶμα. "*Commits sin,*" I say, *against his own body*; or, in case ye doubt that, and think perhaps that it does not matter so much about the body, *know ye not that* (1) *your body* (i.e. the body of each one among you, see Bernhardt, p. 60) *is the temple* (not: *a temple*, see on iii. 16) *of the Holy Spirit which is in you* (Rom. viii. 11); and that (2) *ye belong not to your own selves* (see ver. 20)? Fornication, therefore, so far as it affects your own body, is a desecration of what is holy, and a selfish rebellion against God your Lord. — οὗ ἔχετε ἀπὸ Θεοῦ] gives edge to the proof,<sup>1</sup> and leads on to the second point (οὐκ ἐστὲ ἐαυτῶν). Οὗ is under attraction from ἀγ. πν. (Winer, p. 154 [E. T. 203]). — καὶ οὐκ κ.τ.λ.] still dependent upon ὅτι, which is to be supplied again after

<sup>1</sup> Chrysostom: καὶ τὸν διδωκότα τίθεικεν, ὑψηλόν τι ὁμοῦ ποῶν τὸν ἀκροατὴν, καὶ φοβῶν καὶ τῷ μεγέθει τῆς παρακαταθήκης καὶ τῇ φιλοτιμίᾳ τοῦ παρακαταθεμίμου. Further, as to the idea of the body being the temple of the Holy Spirit, in opposition to the abuse of it in debauchery, comp. Herm. *Past. Sim.* v. 7.

καί, not an independent statement (Hofmann, who takes the καί as meaning *also*), which would needlessly interrupt the flow of the animated address.

Ver. 20. *For* (proof of the οὐκ ἔστὲ ἐαυτ.) *ye were bought*, i.e. redeemed from the curse of the law, Gal. iii. 13; from the wrath of God, Eph. ii. 3; from the bond of the guilt of sin, Rom. iii. 19–21; and acquired as God's property (Eph. ii. 19, i. 14), *for a price*, which was paid to God for your reconciliation with Him, namely, the blood of Christ, Matt. xxvi. 28; Rom. iii. 24 f.; 2 Cor. v. 18 ff.; Eph. i. 7; 1 Pet. i. 18 f.; Rev. v. 9. We have the same conception in Acts xx. 28, although there, as also in 1 Cor. vii. 23, and Tit. ii. 14, the church is represented as the property of *Christ*; but see John xvii. 9. — τιμῆς] strengthens the ἡγοράσθ. as the opposite of acquiring without an equivalent. Comp. vii. 23. The *common* exposition (following the Vulgate): *magno pretio*, inserts without warrant what is not in the text (so, too, Pott, Flatt, Rückert, Osiander, Olshausen, Ewald).<sup>1</sup> Comp. Herod. vii. 119, and the passages in Wetstein; and see already Valla. — δοξάσατε δὴ κ.τ.λ.] *Do but glorify*, etc. This is the moral obligation arising out of the *two* things grasped by faith as certainties, ver. 19. Regarding the δὴ of urgency with imperatives, see on Acts xiii. 2 — ἐν τῷ σώμ. ὑμ.] not instrumental, nor as in Phil. i. 20 (comp. Rom. xii. 1), but so expressed, because the exhortation proceeds upon the footing of the whole tenor of ver. 19, in which the body is described as a *temple*; *in your body*, namely, practically by chastity, the opposite of which would be an ἀτιμάζειν τὸν Θεόν (Rom. ii. 23) in His own sanctuary!

<sup>1</sup> How *high* a price it was (1 Pet. i. 19) would suggest itself readily to the readers, but is not implied in the word itself.

## CHAPTER VII.

VER. 3. *ὀφειλὴν*] Elz. and Matt. read *ὀφειλομένην εὐνοίαν*, against decisive evidence. Erroneous explanation.—Ver. 5. *τῇ νηστείᾳ καὶ* after *σχολάσητε* (not *σχολάζητε*, Elz.) is an inappropriate addition in the ascetic interest; and *συνέρχεσθε*, in place of *ἦτε*, is a gloss.—Ver. 7. *γάρ*] A C D\* F G *8*\*, min. It. Copt. Goth. and several Fathers have *δέ*. Approved by Griesb., and adopted by Lachm. Tisch. and Rück. The *γάρ* was an incorrect gloss upon the *δέ*.—Instead of *ὅς . . . ὅς*, read, with Lachm. and Tisch., following the majority of the uncials, *ὁ . . . ὁ*. In ver. 10 again, Lachm. and Rück. put *χωρίζεσθαι* in place of *χωρισθῆναι* (with A D E F G); but, considering the weight of authority on the other side, *ἀφιέναι* must dissuade us from the change.—Ver. 13. *οὗτος*] approved also by Griesb., adopted by Lachm. Rück. and Tisch. The evidence against *αὐτός* (Elz.) is conclusive. But this induces us to read *αὕτη* in ver. 12 also (with Lachm. Tisch. and Rück.).—*αὐτόν*] Lachm. Tisch. and Rück. have *τὸν ἄνδρα*, approved by Griesb. also, and on conclusive grounds. *Αὐτόν* has crept in from uniformity to ver. 12. Had there been a gloss, we should have found a corresponding variation of *αὐτήν* in ver. 12 as well.—Ver. 14. *ἀνδρί*] The uncials from A to G, *8*\*, Copt. Baschm. It. Jerome, and Augustine, read *ἀδελφῶν*. Recommended by Griesb., adopted by Lachm. Rück. and Tisch. *Ἀνδρί* is an explanatory addition.—Ver. 15. *ἡμᾶς*] Tisch. has *ὑμᾶς*, but the evidence for it is weaker; and *ὑμᾶς* would easily come in from ver. 14.—Ver. 17. *Κύριος*] Elz. and Matt. read *Θεός*, and, after *κέκληκεν*: *ὁ Κύριος*. Against conclusive testimony; *Κύριος* was glossed and dislodged by *Θεός*, and then afterwards reinserted in the wrong place. Hence in G, Boern. we have *ὁ Κύριος . . . ὁ Κύριος ὁ Θεός*.—Ver. 18. Instead of the second *τις ἐκλήθη*, Lachm. Tisch. and Rück. read *κέκληταί τις*, with A B *8*, min., and additional support from D\* F and G, which have *τις κέκλη*. The *Recepta* is a mechanical repetition from the first clause of the verse.—Ver. 28. *γῆμης*] B *8* have *γαμήσης*; and, since in A we have *γαμήση*, and in D E F G *λάβης γυναῖκα*, which is plainly a gloss, the evidence preponderates in favour of *γαμήσης* (Lachm. Tisch.); *γῆμης* arose out of what follows.—Ver. 29.<sup>1</sup> After *ἀδελφοί* Elz. has *ὅτι*, against A B K L *8*,

<sup>1</sup> Respecting ver. 29, see Reiche, *Comment. crit.* 1. p. 178 ff.

min. Baschm. Syr. p. Vulg. Eus. Method. Basil, Theodoret, Hierat. *al.* An exegetical addition. — τὸ λοιπὸν ἐστίν] A B 8, min. Copt. Syr. p. Arm. Slav. Eus. Ephr. Basil, Cyr. have ἐστὶ τὸ λοιπὸν. Now, seeing that D\* has simply ἐστὶ λοιπὸν, and F G 67\*\* Boern. Vulg. Method. Tert. Jerome, Ambrosiast. *al.* have ἐστὶ, λοιπὸν ἐστίν, the reading of A, etc., is best accredited. That in the Received text originated in the wish to indicate the fact that τὸ λοιπὸν was regarded as belonging to what had gone before,—a connection which is expressly set forth in several codd. vss. and Fathers (see Tisch. and Reiche). As to whether a comma should be placed between ἐστίν and τὸ λοιπὸν, which is done by Lachm. Tisch. Rück. and Scholz, see the exegetical remarks on the verse. — Ver. 31. τῷ κόσμῳ τούτῳ] Lachm. Tisch. and Rück. read τὸν κόσμον, with A B 8, also D\* F G 17, which, however, add τοῦτον. The dative was a correction to bring it into accordance with the common usage; τοῦτον (τούτῳ) again an addition from what follows. — Vv. 32–34. ἀρέσει] Lachm. and Rück. have ἀρέσῃ, with A B D E F G 8 21 46, Eus. *al.* But it was very natural that, in place of the future (K L, almost all the min. Clem. Or. Meth. Ath. Epiph. and many others), the more usual subjunctive should creep into the text. — Ver. 34.<sup>1</sup> μεμέρισται κ.τ.λ.] Καὶ μεμέρισται occurs in A B D\* 8, min. Syr. p. Copt. Vulg. Cyr. Jerome, and many other Fathers, and is joined to what precedes it by most of the codd. Copt. Vulg. Cyr. Jerome (who expressly states that this connection is according to the original), Pel. Bede, *al.* On the other hand, it is construed with what follows by Syr. Arr. Arm. It. Chrys. Theodoret, Basil, Oecum. Theophylact, Tert. Ambr. Aug. Sedul. and Latin codices in Jerome. The καὶ after μεμέρ., which is wanting in Elz., is conclusively attested by A B D\*\*\* F G K L 8, min. Aeth. Vulg. It. Chrys. *al.* Going on with the verse, we find ἡ ἄγαμος after γυνή in A B 8, some min. Vulg. and several Fathers; while, on the other hand, there is no ἡ ἄγαμος after παρθένος in Vulg. Jerome, Aug. Euseb. *al.* We have the choice left us, therefore, between the following two readings (and modes of connecting the words): (1) [καὶ] μεμέρισται καὶ ἡ γυνὴ καὶ ἡ παρθένος· ἡ ἄγαμος μεριμνᾷ κ.τ.λ., and (2) καὶ μεμέρισται. Καὶ ἡ γυνὴ ἡ ἄγαμος καὶ ἡ παρθένος ἡ ἄγαμος μεριμνᾷ κ.τ.λ. The latter is adopted by Lachm. and Rück.; but is *not* to be preferred, because it offers no difficulty whatever, and, consequently, no occasion for any change. The former, on the contrary (found in D\*\*\* F G K L, and many min. It. Slav. Chrys. Theodoret, Dam.), presented a stone of stumbling in the μεμέρισται, which was either not understood at all, or misunderstood. Where not understood, it was left out altogether (so even Cyprian: “uxori. Sic et mulier et virgo innupta cogitat,” etc.); where misunderstood (that μερίζεσθαι must mean *curis distrahi*, see Jerome,

<sup>1</sup> Respecting ver. 34, see Reiche, *Comment. crit.* I. p. 184ff.

*adv. Jovin.* i. 7), it was connected with the preceding clause by *καί* (which appears, therefore, to be spurious). This made *γυνή* be taken as *mulier vidua* (Aeth.); and hence *ἡ ἄγαμος* was either pushed forward (Vulg.), or else left in connection with *παρθένος*, and the same word added to *γυνή* as well (A B N, Lachm.). Scholz, too, has the words as in our reading,<sup>1</sup> but spoils it by his quite wrong and abrupt method of punctuation: *τῇ γυναικί μεμέρισται. Καὶ ἡ γυνή καὶ ἡ παρθένος ἡ ἄγαμος μεριμνᾷ κ.τ.λ.* — Ver. 34. *τὰ τοῦ νόμου*] omitted in B alone, which, however, is approved of by Buttmann (*Studien u. Krit.* 1860, p. 370). — Ver. 37. *ἰδραῖος ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ*] Lachm. reads *ἐν τῇ καρδ. αὐτοῦ ἰδραῖος*, which has conclusive evidence in its favour; on the other hand, there is no sufficient ground for omitting *ἰδρ.* (as Griesb. does) or *αὐτοῦ* (deleted by Tisch.). As regards *ἰδραῖος* in particular, which is omitted only by F G, It. Aeth., it was very likely to be left out as being unessential, so far as the sense was concerned, after *ἑστήκεν. — αὐτοῦ τοῦ*] is deleted by Lachm. Rück. and Tisch. in accordance with A B N. In place of it, Tisch., following the same authorities, has *ἐν τῇ ἰδίᾳ καρδίᾳ*. The evidence, however, for *αὐτοῦ τοῦ* (the uncials D E F G K L) is too weighty and uniform, while *τοῦ* again was in appearance so cumbrous and superfluous, and such a natural occasion for writing *ἰδίᾳ* instead of *αὐτοῦ* presented itself in the preceding *ἰδίου θελήμ.*, that our conclusion is to retain the *Recepta*. — Instead of *ποιεῖ*, A B N 6 17 37, Copt. have *ποιήσει* (as also where it occurs for the second time in ver. 38), which is adopted by Lachm. and Rück. (B 6 17 37 have *ποιήσει* also the first time in ver. 38.) But in default of internal reasons for a change, these witnesses, having no support from the Fathers, and next to none from the vss., are too weak to warrant it. — Ver. 38. *ὁ ἐγκαμίζων*] Lachm. and Rück. have *ὁ γαμίζων τὴν παρθένον ἑαυτοῦ*. Now it is true that *γαμίζων* occurs in A B D E N 17 23 31 46, Clem. Method. Basil., and *τὴν παρθ. ἑαυτ.* (or *τ. ἑαυτ. παρθ.*, so Rück.) in much the same codices and Syr. Erp. Arm. Baschm. Aeth. Vulg. Clar. Germ. Clem. Basil. *al.* But the whole reading is manifestly of the nature of a gloss, *ἐγκαμίζων* being explained sometimes by *γαμίζων τὴν παρθ. ἑαυτ.*, sometimes by the addition to it of *τὴν παρθ. ἑαυτ.* The latter phrase crept into the text *beside ἐγκαμ.*, the former *in place* of it. — Instead of *ὁ δέ* read *καὶ ὁ*; so Griesb. Lachm. Schulz, Rück. Tisch., upon conclusive evidence. The antithesis gave rise to the *ὁ δέ*. — Ver. 39. After *δέδεται* Elz. has *νόμῳ*, against A B D\* F<sup>a2</sup> N\*\*, min. with many vss. and Fathers. Taken from Rom. vii. 2, although Reiche doubts this. — *ἐὰν δέ*] Tisch. has *ἐὰν δὲ καί*, upon insufficient evidence; the *καί* might

<sup>1</sup> It is defended also by Reiche and retained by Tisch. Elz. varies from it only in omitting the *καί* after *μεμέρισται*, which was justly reinserted by Bengel.

<sup>2</sup> Fragment of a Codex of the 7th century. See Tisch. *Monum. sacr. ined.* p. 460.



easily come in through writing the next syllable twice over, or by a clerical error such as *κεκοιμηθη* (so F G).

CONTENTS.—Instructions regarding marriage, matrimonial intercourse, and divorce (vv. 1–17); then an excursus upon the theme that the reception of Christianity ought not to alter the outward relations of life (vv. 17–24); lastly, about virgins—as to how far celibacy in general is advisable for both sexes (vv. 25–34), and whether a father does better to let his daughter remain single, or give her away in marriage (vv. 35–38). The same advice, to remain unmarried, is given to widows (ver. 39 f.). Comp. on this chapter, Harless, *die Ehescheidungsfrage*, 1861.

Ver. 1. *Δέ*] leads over to the answering of questions put in the letter from Corinth. — *ἐγράψατέ μοι*] Differences of opinion must have prevailed respecting the points discussed in this chapter, and these had been laid before the apostle by the church. In particular, there must have been at Corinth opponents of marriage. This is wrongly denied by Baur, who imagines merely an attempt made among the Corinthians to defend fornication from the analogy of marriage; of which there is not a trace in the apostle's words. Whether, now, the doubts in question, more especially as to the lawfulness of marriage,<sup>1</sup> were mixed up with the *subsistence of the parties* at Corinth, it is impossible to make out with any certainty, although in itself it seems likely that a matter of opinion so important practically would be turned, with other points, to account in the interest of party. Grotius holds that those who raised such points of debate were “*sub Christianorum nomine philosophi verius quam Christiani.*” But such of the Greek philosophers as advocated views adverse to marriage did so upon the ground of the *cares* and *dangers* connected with marriage (see Grotius *in loc.*), not from any doubt regarding its *morality*, as, according to vv. 28, 36, must have been the case among the Corinthians. Further, it is certain that the adversaries of marriage could *not* be of the *Petrine party*;

<sup>1</sup> If the opinion that fornication was lawful (vi. 12 ff.) arose at Corinth out of an Epicurean libertinism, the doubts regarding the lawfulness of marriage must have flowed from the opposite source, to wit, from the perverted moral extravagance of others, who, because of the intercourse of sex involved, counted marriage also an impure thing, and would have the maxim: *καλὸν ἀνδρῶν γυναικὶς μὴ ἀπτισθαι*, to be of absolute and universal application.

for Peter himself was married (Matt. viii. 14; 1 Cor. ix. 5), and the Judaizing tendency, which cannot be proved to have had an Essene-Ebionitic character in Corinth (Schwegler, I. p. 163 f.<sup>1</sup>), could be nothing else but favourable to marriage (see Lightfoot, *Horæ*, p. 189). Olshausen (comp. also Jaeger, Kniewel, Goldhorn, Ewald) decides for the *Christ-party*, in whose idealistic tendency he considers there were contained the germs both of moral indifference and of false asceticism. But this party's idealism in general is a pure hypothesis, which is as little established by proof as their *Essenism* in particular, to which Ewald traces back the rejection of marriage among the Corinthians.<sup>2</sup> In the last place, that it was the *followers of Paul* (Storr, Rosenmüller, Flatt, Pott, Neander, Rübiger, Osiander, Maier; Rückert refuses to give a decision), who—in opposition, perhaps, to the Petrine party, and appealing to the celibacy of Paul himself, he never having been married (see on ver. 8)—overvalued celibacy, and pronounced marriage to stand lower in point of morality and holiness, is the most likely view, for this reason, that the apostle's sentiments upon this point were in themselves, as we see from the chapter before us, quite of a kind to be readily misunderstood or misinterpreted by many of his disciples—more especially in partisan interests—as being unfavourable to marriage.<sup>3</sup> It merely required that men should overlook or wish to overlook the *conditional* character of the advantages which he ascribes to single life. The opponents of marriage referred to in 1 Tim. iv. 3 were of a totally different class. Those with whom we are now concerned did not forbid marriage and so endanger Christian liberty (otherwise Paul would have written regarding them in quite another tone), but

<sup>1</sup> One section of the Essenes even declared itself against celibacy, Josephus, *Bell.* ii. 8. 13; Ritschl, *altkath. Kirche*, p. 185.

<sup>2</sup> According to Ewald (comp. too, his *Gesch. der apost. Zeit.* p. 503 f.), the Christ-party appealed to the *example of Christ* in regard to this point especially. But had that been the case, we should surely have found some traces of it in Paul's way of discussing the question, whereas, on the contrary, the reference which he deems it due to make is rather to *his own example* (ver. 7). Looking at the matter as a whole, it is *prima facie* improbable that any one should have adduced the unwedded life of Christ as an argument against marriage—in the first place, because He, as the incarnate Son of God, held too lofty a place in the believing consciousness to present a standard for such earthly relationships; and secondly, because He Himself in His teaching had so strongly upheld the sanctity of marriage.

<sup>3</sup> Just as they were often misinterpreted, as is well known, in after times in the interests of the celibate system, of nunneries and monasteries.

simply undervalued it, placing it morally *below* celibacy, and advising against it, hence, too, as respects married persons, favouring a cessation from matrimonial intercourse and even divorce (vv. 3 ff., 10 ff.). — *καλὸν ἀνθρώπῳ*] With respect to what you have written to me (*περὶ κ.τ.λ.*, absolute, as in xvi. 1, 12; Bernhardt, p. 261; Bremi, *ad Demosth. Ol.* p. 194; Maetzner, *ad Antiph.* p. 170), *it is good for a man*, etc., that is to say: *it is morally salutary*<sup>1</sup> *for an (unmarried) man not to touch a woman*. That, in a general theoretical point of view, is the prevailing axiom, which I hereby enunciate as my decision; but in a practical point of view, seeing that few have the gift of continence, the precept must come in: because of fornication, etc., ver. 2. In Paul's eyes, therefore, the *γυναικὸς μὴ ἄπτεσθαι* is, indeed, something morally salutary in and by itself; but this affirmation, made from a general point of view, finds its necessary limitation and restriction in the actual facts of the case, so that just according to circumstances marriage may be equally a duty. Hence the *καλὸν κ.τ.λ.* is not appropriate for the defence of celibacy in general ("si *bonum* est mulierem non tangere, *malum* ergo est tangere," Jerome, *ad Jovin.* i. 4, and see especially Cornelius a Lapide *in loc.*) — *ἄπτεσθαι*, like *tangere* in the sense of *sexual intercourse* (Gen. xx. 16, xxi. 11; Prov. vi. 29). See Wetstein and Kypke, II. p. 204 f. Marriage is the particular case coming under this general *γυναικὸς ἄπτεσθαι*, to be treated of in detail hereafter. Rückert, failing to recognise this progress in the apostle's argument (so, too, Kling in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1839, p. 444), holds that the reference is to sexual intercourse in *marriages already formed* (and that nothing is said of *entering into* matrimonial connections). Did Paul, as Kling supposes, here give it as his opinion that "*a chaste life, as of brother and sister*, was more consonant, on the part of married persons, with delicacy of moral feeling" (*καλόν*); this would be a sentimental *error*, which ought not to be attributed to him, whether considered in itself, or in view of his high appreciation of marriage as a union of the sexes (2 Cor. xi. 2; Rom. vii. 4; Eph. v. 28 ff.). — The

<sup>1</sup> That we have in *καλὸν κ.τ.λ.* a moral axiom, a statement of what is *ethically* salutary, not a mere utilitarian principle of practical prudence, is clear, especially from the comparison in the last clause of ver. 9, and from vv. 32-34, where the ethical benefit of it is explained.

axiom is enunciated *without a μέν*, because it is, in the first place, *conceived simply in itself*; the limitation which follows is *added* with *δέ* by way of antithesis. Comp. on Eph. v. 8, and Fritzsche, *ad Rom.* II. p. 433. Precisely so, too, in ver. 8.

Ver. 2. *In order, however, that offences in the way of fornication* (see on this plural of the abstract, Kühner, II. p. 28; Maetzn. *ad Lycurg.* p. 144 f.) *may be avoided in practice, the rule holds good: Let every man have<sup>1</sup> a wife of his own* (properly belonging to himself in marriage), etc. On *διὰ*, comp. Winer, p. 372 [E. T. 497]. Rückert, de Wette, and Maier are wrong in maintaining that *ἐχέτω* is *permissive* merely,—Rückert, indeed, making it so only to the extent of a man's *retaining* his wife. The latter is disproved by vv. 9, 10, and the former by the fact that the immediately following *ἀποδιδότω* in ver. 3 is not to be taken as permissive, any more than the *γαμησάτωσαν* which answers to *ἐχέτω* in ver. 9. It is opposed, further, by the consideration that *διὰ τὰς πορνείας* is a determining element of a *moral* kind, which must therefore necessarily lead not to a mere permissibility, but to a positive obligation (already noted by Erasmus). This injunction, however, is a moral rule, to which exceptions may occur from higher considerations in cases where no danger of fornication is apprehended and there is the "donum continentiae," as Paul himself had shown by his own example,—in which, nevertheless, no support whatever is given to any sort of celibacy *enforced by law*, a thing which, on the contrary, our text decidedly discountenances. Rückert thinks further that Paul exhibits here a very poor opinion of marriage; and Baur (in the *theol. Jahrb.* 1852, p. 15 ff.) has more fully developed this idea so as to assert that the apostle's view of marriage is at variance with the moral conception of it which now prevails.<sup>2</sup> Comp. also Rothe, *Ethik*, III. p. 614. But can it be true, then, that *he*, who looked upon the union with Christ itself as the analogue of wedded life, valued marriage only as a "temperamentum continentiae"? No! what he does is this: out of all the different grounds on which marriage rested in his mind, he selects just

<sup>1</sup> This *ἔχειν* is nothing else but the simple *habere* (to possess); it does not mean *intercourse in marriage*, which ought to be *continued* (Kling, Heydeureich, following Cameron and Estius). Paul comes to that only in ver. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Comp. in opposition to this, Ernesti, *Ethik des Ap. Paulus*, p. 115 f.

that one which, in the first place, specially concerned his readers (remember the *κορυθιάζεσθαι*), and in the second place, had peculiar weight in connection with the nearness of the Parousia. That approaching catastrophe might furnish him with sufficient reasons for leaving unmentioned those higher ends of marriage which reached forth into a more remote future, and confining himself to the immediate practical relations of the brief, momentous present. See ver. 26 ff. Keeping in view the present *ἀνάγκη*, the near approach of the Lord, and the necessity, therefore, of an undivided surrender to Him, Paul had, *under these given circumstances*, recognised in the state of single life what in and by itself was *καλὸν ἀνθρώπῳ*, *if only no fornication and heat were conjoined therewith*. It is from *this* point of view, which was presented to him by the *then existing condition of things* (and hence without at all contradicting Gen. ii. 18), that the apostle handles the subject, discussing it accordingly in a special aspect and from one particular side, while the wider and higher moral relations of marriage lie beyond the limits of what he has now in hand. — Observe, further, how sharply and decisively the expression in ver. 2 (comp. Eph. v. 22, 25) excludes not only concubinage and sexual intercourse apart from marriage generally, but also all polygamy.

Vv. 3, 4. The *occasion* for this injunction, which otherwise might very well have been dispensed with, must have been given by the statement in the letter from Corinth of scruples having arisen on the point. See on ver. 1. — *τὴν ὀφειλὴν*] *the due in the matter* (Rom. xiii. 7), *i.e.* according to the context, as euphemistically expressed, the *debitum tori*.<sup>1</sup> See ver. 4. The word does not occur at all in Greek writers; see Lobeck, *ad Phrym.* p. 90. Nor does it in the LXX. and the Apocrypha. — *ἡ γυνὴ τοῦ ἰδίου σώμ. κ.τ.λ.*] Explanatory of ver. 3. *The wife has no power over her own body*, namely, as regards cohabitation, *but the husband* has that power; *likewise* (ὁμοίως) *also, on the other hand*,

<sup>1</sup> If we adopted the common reading *τὴν ὀφειλομένην*, we should not take it, with Grotius, *al.*, in the same sense as given above, but generally, with Calvin and others, as *benevolentiam*. For the expression for that special idea is not *εὐνοία* (not even in Philo, *de Abr.* p. 384), but *φιλότης* (Homer), *μίξις*, *συνουσία*. The author of the gloss, therefore, must either have misunderstood *τὴν ὀφειλὴν*, or, understanding it rightly, have used a wrong expression to explain it. The reading *ὀφειλομένης τιμῆς* in Chrysostom points to the former alternative.

the converse holds, so that "neutri liceat alteri conjugale debitum poscenti denegare," Estius. Corresponding statements of the Rabbins may be seen in Selden, *uxor. Hebr.* iii. 6. 7. — Bengel says happily respecting *ιδίου*, that it forms with *οὐκ ἐξουσιάζει* an *elegans paradoxon*.

Ver. 5. *Withhold not yourselves from each other, unless it were perhaps (nisi forte, comp. 2 Cor. xiii. 5 ; Luke ix. 13) that ye did so as occasion emerged (ἄν), by agreement for a time (supply ἀποστερήτε ἀλλήλ.; see on Luke ix. 13).* The obvious meaning is euphemistically expressed by ἀποστερ.; ἄγαν τοίνυν ἁρμοδίως τοῦτο τέθεικεν ἐπὶ τῶν οὐ συμφώνως τὴν ἐγκράτειαν αἰρουμένων, Theodoret. — *ἵνα σχολάσῃτε κ.τ.λ.*] ἵνα introduces the *design* of the concession just made ἐκ συμφών. πρὸς καιρόν: *in order that ye may have free leisure for prayer*—may be able to give yourselves to it without being drawn away and distracted by sensual desire and the pleasures of sense. What Paul means is not the ordinary praying of the Christian heart, which ought to ascend ἀδιαλείπτως (1 Thess. v. 17 ; Eph. vi. 18), but such *extraordinary exercises in prayer* as they might have determined specially to devote themselves to for a longer period (a series of days). We are not to assume that such domestic devotions, as the apostle here plainly supposes to be engaged in by husband and wife in common, had been already then connected with Christian *festivals*; probably they were still entirely dependent upon the wants and wishes of individuals. But the idea of cohabitation being excluded for a time by religious exercises, is found both among the Jews (Ex. xix. 15 ; 1 Sam. xxi. 4) and the heathen. See Wetstein and Dougt. *Anal.* II. p. 111 f. *Comp. Test. XII. Patr.* p. 673 : *καιρὸς γὰρ συνουσίας γυναικὸς αὐτοῦ, καὶ καιρὸς ἐγκρατείας εἰς προσευχὴν αὐτοῦ. — καὶ πάλιν ἦτε*] still dependent on ἵνα, indicates *σεμνῶς* the being together again for matrimonial intercourse. With respect to ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτό,<sup>1</sup> comp. on Acts i. 15. — *ἵνα μὴ πειράξῃ κ.τ.λ.*] *design of the καὶ πάλιν . . . ἦτε: in order that Satan may not tempt you to sin (to breach of the marriage-vow) on account of your incontinency, because ye are incontinent; for "Satanas vitiorum scintillas excitat," Grotius. Ἀκρασία, which occurs again in the N. T. in its older form of ἀκράτεια, Matt. xxiii. 25, comes from ἀκρατής (κρατεῖν), and is the opposite of*

<sup>1</sup> Erasmus remarks rightly: "ut intelligas, eos ante fuisse separatos *thalamis*."

*ἐγκράτεια*. See Lobeck, *ad Phryn.* p. 524; Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Rep.* p. 461 B. Rückert conjectures that the word means: *not mingling in matrimonial intercourse (on account of your non-participation therein)*. This is quite against usage; for ἀκρᾶσία (with the *a* long, from ἄκρατος), in the Ionic form ἀκρησίη, means *bad mixture*, as opposed to εὐκρασία. See Theophrastus, *c. pl.* iii. 2. 5; Dio Cassius, lxxvii. 22. Paul had reason enough to affirm *incontinency* of the Corinthians generally, and to call their attention in warning to this *lack of moral strength*, on which the devil would base his attempts to find access to them with his temptations. Comp. 2 Cor. ii. 11.

Ver. 6. Τοῦτο] does not refer to what follows (J. Cappellus, Rosenmüller), which it does not suit; nor to ver. 2 (Beza, Grotius, de Wette, Gratama, Baur, Hofmann); nor to all that has been said from ver. 2 onwards (Bengel, Pott, Flatt, Billroth, Rückert, Osiander), for vv. 2–4 contain precepts actually obligatory; nor to κ. πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἦτε (Origen, Tertullian, Jerome, Cornelius a Lapide, *al.*), which is but a subordinate *portion* of the preceding utterance. It is to this utterance: μὴ ἀποστερεῖτε . . . ἀκρ. ὑμῶν, which directly precedes the τοῦτο, that it can alone be made to refer without arbitrariness,—an utterance which might have the appearance of an ἐπιταγή, but is not intended to be such. What Paul means is this: Although I say that ye should withhold yourselves from each other by mutual agreement only perhaps for the season of prayer, and then come together again, so as to escape the temptations of Satan; yet that is not to be understood *by way of command*, as if you might not be abstinent at other times or for a longer period ἐκ συμφώνου, but *by way of indulgence* (“*secundum indulgentiam*,” Vulgate), so that thereby *concession is made* to your lack of continency, it is allowed for. Theophylact puts it well: συγκαταβαίνων τῇ ἀσθενείᾳ ὑμῶν, and Erasmus: “*consulo vestris periculis*.” — συγγνώμη occurs here only in the N. T. (Ecclus., pref. i. and iii. 13), but very often in Greek writers,—not, however, in the LXX. It means invariably either *forgiveness*, or, as here, *forbearance, indulgence, γνώμη κριτικὴ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ὀρθή*, Aristotle, *Eth.* vi. 11. Hammond and Pott transgress the laws of the language by making it the same as κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν γνώμην. So even Valckenaer; comp. Calovius, Flatt, Heydenreich, *al.* Ewald, too, renders without

any support from the usage of the language: "*with the best conscience.*"

Ver. 7. I do not say *by way of command* that you should withhold yourselves only for the time of prayer and then be together again; *but indeed* (δέ) *I wish* that every one had the gift of continency, as I myself, and so could restrain himself, not merely at such isolated periods for some particular higher end; still (and that justifies what I said: *κατὰ συγγνώμην*) this gift is not vouchsafed to all. There is no more ground for supposing that μέν should be supplied (after λέγω) in connection with this δέ, than there is in ver. 2 (against Rückert). — *ὡς καὶ ἐμαυτόν*] *as also I myself*, that is to say, *endued with the donum continentiae*, ἐν ἐγκρατεῖα, Chrysostom. See what follows. He does not mean his state of single life, but its charismatic *basis*. The καί is, as for instance in Acts xxvi. 29, the quite commonly used καί of comparison. — *χάρισμα*] *a special endowment bestowed by divine grace, fitting him for the purposes of the kingdom of God*. Comp. on xii. 1-4; Rom. xii. 6. It is of course, and necessarily (because communicated through the Spirit), conceived as existing *within* the church. The words πάντας ἀνθρώπους do not contradict this; for Paul could most warrantably wish *to all men* that gracious gift, which he as a *Christian* was conscious that he possessed, and as to which he knew that even within the Christian pale it was vouchsafed to one and withheld from another. — *ὁ μὲν οὕτως κ.τ.λ.*] is not to be understood as if the first οὕτως meant the gift of continence, and the second a man's suitableness for wedded life (de Wette, with older commentators, beginning with Theodoret and Theophylact), but in a quite *general* sense: the one has his peculiar gift of grace *after this fashion*, the other *in that*; the one *so*, the other *so*. Under this general statement, the possession of continence, or some other gracious endowment in its place, is *included*. As to the double οὕτως, comp. LXX. 2 Sam. xi. 25: *ποτὲ μὲν οὕτως καὶ ποτὲ οὕτως καταφάγεται ἡ ῥομφαία*, also Judg. xviii. 4; 2 Kings v. 4; 2 Sam. xvii. 15. It is not so used in Greek writers.

Vv. 8, 9. *Λέγω δέ*] leads on from what is contained in ver. 7 (from the subjective *wish* of the apostle and its objective limitation) to the *rules* flowing therefrom, which he has now to *enunciate*. Rückert holds that the transition here made by Paul is from the married to the unmarried. But were that the case, τοῖς δὲ ἀγά-



μοις would require to stand first (comp. ver. 10); the emphasis is on λέγω. — τοῖς ἀγάμοις] what is meant is the whole category, *all without distinction*, including *both* sexes, not simply *widowers* (Erasmus, Beza, Grotius, Calovius, Estius, *al.*, including Pott, Heydenreich, Billroth, Ewald); for the phrase opposed to it, τοῖς γεγαμηκόσι, in ver. 10, embraces *both* sexes; and hence ἀγάμ. cannot apply to the *unmarried men* alone (Rückert). The additional clause, κ. ταῖς χήραις, by no means justifies a restrictive rendering; for in it the καί does not mean *also* (Hofmann), but, as the connective *and*, singles out specially from the general expression something already included in it: *and in particular* the widows. The idiom is an ordinary one both in classical and N. T. Greek (Matt. viii. 33; Mark xvi. 7; and often elsewhere); see Fritzsche, *ad Marc.* p. 11, 713. Comp. here Soph. *O. R.* 1502: χέρσους φθαρῆναι κἀγάμους. It was a special wish of Paul's, therefore, that the *widows* should remain unwedded, doubtless in the interests of the church (Rom. xvi. 1; 1 Tim. v. 9 ff.). — καλὸν (as in ver. 1) αὐτοῖς, *sc.* ἐστὶ; comp. ver. 40. — ἐὰν μείνωσιν κ.τ.λ.] *if they shall have remained as I also (have remained), i.e. unmarried.* The opposite of this is γαμησάτωσαν, ver. 9. The ὡς κἀγώ therefore receives here from the context a different meaning than in ver. 7. Luther, Grotius, and others infer from this passage that Paul was a widower;<sup>1</sup> so, too, Ewald. But this conclusion rests upon the assumption, which is linguistically inadmissible, that ἀγάμοις denotes widowers alone (*i.e.* χῆροι); and, moreover, would not be a safe inference even were the assumption sound. Acts vii. 58, moreover, is against this; for one could not place Paul's marriage *after* the stoning of Stephen. — οὐκ ἐγκρατεύονται] to be closely joined together: *are incontinent.* See Hartung, *Partikell.* II. p. 122; Maetzner, *ad Antiph.* p. 267; Ameis on *Hom. Od.* ii. 274. The verb ἐγκρατεύεσθαι (Ecclus. xix. 6) is foreign to the older Greek, although this precise phrase: οὐκ ἐγκρατ., is sanctioned by Thomas, p. 30, and Phryn. p. 442. See Lobeck, *ad Phrygn.* *l.c.* — γαμησάτ.] Regarding the later form of the aorist ἐγάμησα, see Lobeck, *ad Phrygn.* p. 742. — πυροῦσθαι] *to be in a flame*, of vehement emotions (2 Cor. xi. 29; 2 Macc. iv. 38, x. 35, xiv. 45;

<sup>1</sup> The prevalent and correct tradition of the ancient church was that Paul was never married (Tertullian, Jerome, Chrysostom, *al.*). The contrary is stated in Clem. Alex. (in Eus. *H. E.* iii. 30).

of love, Anacreon, x. 13); it means here, "occulta flamma concupiscentiae vastari," Augustine, *de sancta virginit.* 34. Comp. Suicer, *Theas.* II. p. 895; from the Rabbins, the history of Amram in Lightfoot, *Horae*, p. 190; from the classics, Jacobs, *Del. Epigr.* v. 34. — κρείσσον] not because it is the least of two evils (Rückert, Kling; comp. Estius), but because to marry is no sin (vv. 28, 36), while to burn is sinful (Matt. v. 28).

Ver. 10. But to those *who have married*; this is opposed to the γαμησάτωσαν, which referred to *future* marriages. Accordingly, just as γαμησάτ. applied only to *Christians* of both sexes leading a single life, so γεγαμηκόσι, too, refers exclusively to married persons both of whom were *Christians*. It is perfectly correct, therefore, to designate the married persons, where one party in the union was not a Christian, by τοῖς λοιποῖς, ver. 12; for, apart from the cases discussed down to ver. 12, there are no others remaining to be spoken of except those living in mixed marriage. Rückert understands τοῖς γεγαμηκόσι to mean specially the *newly married people*; Paul, he holds, has a particular case in view, in which a single man perhaps had married a widow, which had been disapproved of by some; and, because the apostle had given an opinion in ver. 8 unfavourable to such marriages, he must now forbid the dissolution of a union of that sort when once formed. But the fact of the ἀγάμοι and the widows being coupled together in ver. 8 lends no support whatever to this, for ἀγάμοις applies to *both* sexes. Moreover, were the *perfect* participle, which is the present of the completed action, meant here to convey the notion of "newly married," this would need to be indicated either by some addition (such as νεωστί), or undoubtedly at least by the context. The fact, again, that Paul speaks first and chiefly of the wife (which Rückert explains on the ground of *the wife* having desired a separation), may very reasonably be accounted for, without supposing any special design, in this way, that the cases in which a *wife* separated herself from her husband presented to the Christian consciousness the *most anomalous* phenomenon in this sphere, and notwithstanding might not unfrequently occur in the wanton city of Corinth even within the Christian society.<sup>1</sup> This is quite sufficient, without

<sup>1</sup> That we are to ascribe the tendency to such separation precisely to *devout enthusiasts* on the part of Corinthian wives leading them to shrink from matrimonial

there being any need for assuming that the apostle had been *questioned* about some case of this kind (Hofmann), particularly as the passage itself gives no sign of any such interrogation, but simply disposes of the point in the evenly course of the discussion regarding marriage, and with a view to its completeness. — οὐκ ἐγὼ, ἀλλ' ὁ Κύριος] The negation is absolute. Paul knew from the living voice of tradition what commands Christ had given concerning divorce, Matt. v. 31 f., xix. 3-9; Mark x. 2-12; Luke xvi. 18. Hence ὁ Κύριος, *sc.* παραγγέλλει, for the authority of Christ lives on in His commands (against Baur, who infers from the present, which is to be supplied here, that Paul means the will of Christ made known to him *by inspiration*). It is otherwise in 1 Thess. iv. 15. As regards the ἐγώ, again, Paul was conscious (ver. 40) that his individuality was under the influence of the Holy Spirit. He distinguishes, therefore, here and in vv. 12, 25, not between *his own* and *inspired* commands, but between those which *proceeded from his own* (God-inspired) *subjectivity* and those *which Christ Himself supplied by His objective word*. Since, now, the πνεῦμα Θεοῦ in no way differs from the πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ (Rom. viii. 9-11), Κυρίου ἐντολαί (xiv. 37 according to the *Text. recept.*) could be predicated of the former class of precepts also, although neither in the same sense as of the latter, in which Paul's own subjectivity had no share whatever, nor with the same force of absolute obligation; but, on the contrary, only in so far as the other party *recognises* them as ἐντολὰς Κυρίου (xiv. 37). — μὴ χωρισθῆναι] *let her not be separated*, which, however, is not purely passive here (as in Polybius xxxii. 12. 7), but means: *let her not separate herself*. Isae. viii. 36, p. 73. For the rest, vv. 13, 15 prove that this phrase and μὴ ἀφιέναι in ver. 11 are not so different, that the former can be used *only* of the wife and the latter *only* of the husband.

Ver. 11. From ἐάν τε καταλλ. is a parenthesis pure and simple,

intercourse (de Wette, comp. Hofmann, p. 146), is a view which is inadmissible for this reason, that Paul, having before him such a mere error of feeling and judgment, would have made a disproportionate concession to it by saying μείνω ἄγαμος. The state of morals at Corinth is explanation enough, more especially in connection with the easy and frivolous way in which divorces took place in Greek social life generally (Hermann, *Privatalterth.* § xxx. 14-16), not merely by *dismissal* on the part of the husband (ἀποτίμειν), but also by *desertion* on the part of the wife (ἀπολείπειν); comp. Bremi, *ad Dem.* I. p. 92.

disjoined from the rest of the sentence which continues with *καὶ ἄνδρα*. But in case she should perhaps (*ἐὰν δέ*) even (*καί*, i.e. in fact, actually; see Hartung, *Partikell.* I. p. 132 f.) be separated (have separated herself); in this Paul is not granting something in the way of exception, as though the preceding injunction were not to be taken too strictly (which is set aside at once by *οὐκ ἐγὼ, ἀλλ' ὁ Κύρ.*, ver. 10), but he supposes a future case, which will possibly arise notwithstanding the commandment of the Lord's just adduced. The *ἐὰν καί* therefore, with the *δέ* of antithesis, introduces, as in ver. 28, an occurrence which will possibly be realized in the *experience of the future* (Hermann, *ad Viger.* p. 834; Winer, p. 275 [E. T. 367]). This in opposition to Rückert, who maintains that the words refer to that specific case (see on ver. 10), and mean: *if, however, she should perhaps have already separated herself* before receiving this decision; and likewise to Hofmann, who renders: *if such a separation has actually already taken place* within the church, thereby presupposing that such a thing will henceforth never take place there again. — *μενέτω ἄγαμος*] assumes that her marriage is not to be looked upon as really dissolved; hence she would be guilty of adultery should she contract another union. Comp. Matt. xix. 9. — *ἢ*] or else; comp. on ix. 15. — *καταλλαγήτω*] passive, leaving it undefined as to who was the active subject in the case (see Buttmann, I. p. 368; Winer, p. 245 [E. T. 328]): *let her be reconciled*, be friendly again with her husband. The voluntary separation of the wife from her husband is, in fact, just the cancelling of her peaceful relation to him, which is to be restored again. — *καὶ ἄνδρα γυν. μὴ ἀφίεναι*] and that a husband put not away a wife, send her from him, separate himself from her. Comp. Herod. v. 29: *ἀπέντα ταύτην τὴν γυναικα*. The clause added by Christ (in accordance with Schamai's doctrine): *παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας*, Matt. v. 32, xix. 9, does not occur in Luke xvi. 18 or Mark x. 11. We are not warranted in supposing that Paul was not aware of this exception having been recognised by Christ, or that he had perhaps never heard of it at all, for the simple reason, that the validity of *this* ground of divorce was self-evident. Comp. on Matt. v. 32.

Ver. 12. The *λοιποί* are those who, before their conversion,

had entered into marriage with a non-believer, so that one of the two had become a Christian and the other not. See on ver. 10. — οὐχ ὁ Κύρ.] For, as respected *such* marriages, *Christ* had given no command. He had no occasion to do so. Observe how suitably Paul refrains here from again using παραγγέλλω. — συνευδοκεῖ] *approves with him* (comp. on Rom. i. 32), joins in approving; for Paul takes for granted that the *Christian* partner on his side approves the continuance of the union.<sup>1</sup> It is alien to the scope of the passage to hold, with Billroth, that in συνευδ. is implied the contempt of the heathen for the Christians. Regarding οἰκεῖν μετὰ, *to dwell with*, of living together *in marriage*, see Seidler, *ad. Eur. El.* 99: ἐν γάμοις ζευχθεῖσαν οἰκεῖν, comp. 212. — It may be noted, moreover, that ver. 12 f. does not give permission to a Christian to marry a non-believer. “Non enim dixit: si quis ducit, sed: si quis habet infidelem,” Pelagius. περὶ τῶν πρὸ κηρύγματος συναφθέντων ἔφη, Theodoret.

Ver. 13. Καὶ οὗτος] a common turn of expression (instead of ὅς κ.τ.λ.) in connection with καί. See on Luke x. 8 and Kühner II. p. 526. — μὴ ἀφίετω τ. ἄνδρα] *let her not put away her husband*, not send him from her. To translate otherwise (*let her not leave him*) is, in view of ver. 12, altogether arbitrary. The Vulgate renders correctly: “non dimittat virum.” The apparent unsuitableness of the expression is happily explained by Bengel (on ver. 10): “*Separatur pars ignobilior, mulier; dimittit nobilior, vir; inde conversa ratione etiam mulier fidelis dicitur dimittere, et vir infidelis separari*, vv. 13, 15.” In the *mixed* marriage Paul regards the *Christian* partner, even when it is the wife, as the one who, for the sake of Christianity, would have to *send away* the non-believer, were this in accordance with Christian principles. But these do not permit of it, and so the Christian wife is not to *send away* the non-believing husband, if he is willing to dwell with her; that would be on her part a *presumptuous* violation of duty. Comp. Harless, *Ehescheidungsfr.* p. 85. This view of the apostle's has no connection with the right conceded even to wives among the Greeks and Romans of divorcing themselves from their

<sup>1</sup> Hence the compound συνευδοκεῖ is used rightly and of deliberate purpose in the second part of the statement also, although there the husband is the subject, and it ought not to be supplanted by the simple εὐδοκεῖ, according to B (in opposition to Buttmann in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1860, p. 369).

husbands (loose principles on this subject were held also among the Rabbins; see Lightfoot, *Hor.* p. 191). But certainly Paul did not regard the Christian partner in a mixed marriage as the one who *was to rule* in general (in opposition to Olshausen); the head in every marriage, if it was to continue at all, was, in his view, according to Gen. iii. 16, the *husband*. 1 Cor. xi. 3, xiv. 34; Eph. v. 22; Col. iii. 18; 1 Tim. ii. 11 f.

Ver. 14.<sup>1</sup> *For*—this justifies the injunction given in vv. 12, 13—the *unholiness of the non-believing partner is taken away in virtue of his personal connection with the believer; he is sanctified*—this sanctification having its *causal basis* in the person of the Christian consort with whom he stands in married union, and the possible stumbling-block of self-profanation through continuing in such a marriage being thereby removed. Paul's judgment, therefore, is that the Christian *ἀγιότης*, the higher analogue of the Jewish theocratic consecration to God, affects even the non-believing partner in a marriage, and so passes over to him that he does not remain a profane person, but through the intimate union of wedded life becomes partaker (as if by a *sacred* contagion) of the higher divinely consecrated character of his consort, who belongs to the Israel of God, the holy *φύραμα* (Gal. vi. 16; Rom. xi. 16).<sup>2</sup> The clause: *ἐπεὶ ἄρα τὰ τέκνα κ.τ.λ.*, shows that what the *ἄπιστος* is here said to have entered upon is not the moral holiness of the *new birth* (the subjective condition of which is nothing else but faith), but the holy consecration of that *bond of Christian fellowship* which forms the *ἐκκλησία Θεοῦ*, of which holiness, as arising out of this fellowship, the non-believing husband, in virtue of the inner union of life in which he stands to his Christian consort, has become a partaker (not, of course, without receiving a blessing morally also). The non-believer is, as it were, affiliated to the holy order of Christians by his union of married life with a Christian person, and, so soon as his spouse is converted to Christ and has thereby become holy, he too on his part participates in his

<sup>1</sup> Comp. on this verse, Otto against *Abrenunciation*, 1864.

<sup>2</sup> In a mixed marriage, therefore, the Christian *ἀγιότης* forms, in relation to the non-Christian unholiness, the *preponderating* element, extending the character of sanctity even to what of itself would be profane; as Chrysostom expresses it: *νικᾷ ἡ καθαρότης τῆς γυναίκος τὴν ἀκαθαρσίαν*. Comp. the paraphrase of Erasmus: "Non inficit deterioris impietas alterius pietatem, quin illud potius praeponderat quod melius est et efficacius."

own person (not "simply in his *married* relationship," to which Hofmann, following older interpreters, unwarrantably restricts the meaning of the text) in his consort's holiness, the benefit of which he receives in virtue of his fellowship of life with her, so that he is no longer *ἀκάθαρτος* as hitherto, but—although *mediately* after the fashion described—a *ἡγιασμένος*. The manifold misinterpretations of the older commentators may be seen in Poole's *Synopsis* and Wolf's *Curæ* (e.g. Calovius and others hold that *ἡγ.* refers to the *usus conjugalis* as sanctified *per preces* fidelis conjugis; Tertullian, Jerome, Theodoret, Castalio, Estius, *al.*, think that it points to his being destined to be converted afterwards, so that the meaning would be *candidatus fidei est*). Observe, moreover, in how totally different a way Paul regarded the relation of the Christian who had connected himself with a *harlot* (vi. 15). In that case the harlot is the preponderating element, and the members of Christ become unholy, members of an harlot. — With *ἐν τῇ γυν.* and *ἐν τῷ ἀνδ.*, comp. *ἐν σοὶ πᾶς ἔγωγε σώζομαι*, Soph. *Aj.* 519; *ἐν σοὶ ἔσμεν*, *Ocd. R.* 314, and the like; Ellendt, *Lex Soph.* I. p. 597. — *ἐπεὶ ἄρα κ.τ.λ.*] *because according to that* (if, namely, that *ἡγιασται* did not hold good; comp. v. 10), i.e. *because otherwise your children are unclean*, profane. That Christians' children are *not* profane, outside of the theocratic community and the divine covenant, and belonging to the unholy *κόσμος*, but, on the contrary, *holy*, is the *conceded* point from which Paul proves that the non-believing husband is sanctified through his believing wife; for just as in the children's case, that which makes them holy is simply the specific bond of union with Christians (their parents); so, too, in the case of the mixed marriage, the same bond of union must have the same influence.<sup>1</sup>—Had the *baptism* of Christian children been then in existence, Paul could

<sup>1</sup> The essence of this bond of union, as regards the children, does not lie in their being *born* or *begotten* of Christian parents; for the children, although holy for their parents' sakes, might be born or begotten before the father or mother had embraced Christianity. Nor are we warranted in saying, with Hofmann, that the child, as *the gift of God*, is holy for its relation to its parents, who, so far as that is concerned, do not regard the *sin with which it is born*. That is arbitrarily to limit the apostle's thought, and to read all the most essential points of it from between the lines. On the contrary, the relationship which Paul here enunciates simply and without any artificial saving clause is one which consists in the *immediate close fellowship of life*, by virtue of which the consecration of Christian holiness attaching

not have drawn this inference, because in that case the ἀγίωσις of such children would have had *another* basis.<sup>1</sup> That the passage before us does not even contain an exegetical justification of infant baptism, is shown in the remarks on Acts xvi. 15 (against de Wette in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1830, p. 669 ff., Neander, Olshausen, Osiander, and older expositors). Neither is it the point of departure, from which, almost of necessity, paedobaptism must have developed itself (Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 423); such a point is rather to be found in the gradual development of the doctrine of original sin. — ἡμῶν] should not be restricted, as is done by most expositors, following Chrysostom (so recently, Pott, Flatt, Ewald, Harless), to *those involved in mixed marriages*;<sup>2</sup> but, as Paul himself makes clear by changing the person, referred to *the readers as Christian in general*<sup>3</sup> (de Wette, Schrader, Rückert, Olshausen, Osiander, Neander, Maier, Hofmann; Billroth is undecided), not, however, to the exclusion of the children of a mixed marriage, since it must be logically inferred that these, too, could not fail to have from their Christian father or mother at least “quandam sanctitatis adspersionem” (Anselm). In how far the offspring of mixed marriages were counted holy by the Jews, may be seen in Wetstein and Schoettgen *in loc.* — νῦν δέ] *but so*, as in ver. 11.

Ver. 15. Paul had before enjoined that the *Christian* partner should not make a separation if the non-Christian consents to remain. But what, if the *non-Christian* partner seeks separa-

to the parents passes over from them to their children also, to whom otherwise, as being still ἀπίστοις, the predicate ἀκάθαρα would rightly belong. Equally close and cordial is the fellowship of life between husband and wife, while every other kind of mutual connection is less intimate, and forms a more distant degree of vital union. It is upon this *paritas rationis* that the validity of the argument depends.

<sup>1</sup> Comp. *Jebamoth*, f. lxxviii. 1: “Si gravida fit proselyta, non opus est, ut baptizetur infans quando natus fuerit; baptismus enim matris ei cedit pro baptismo.”

<sup>2</sup> Ἀκάθαρτοι is taken by many as equivalent to *spurii*. See Melancthon in particular: “Si non placeret consuetudo conjugal, filii vestri essent spurii et eatenus immundi, ἀκάθαρτοι. At filii vestri non sunt spurii; ergo consuetudo conjugal Deo placet.” He interprets ἀκάθαρτοι after כִּמְיָר in Deut. xxiii.

<sup>3</sup> Comp. Müller, *v. d. Sünde*, II. p. 383, ed. 5. Our passage, however, ought not to be adduced to prove the universal pollution of men by nature and birth, for ἀκάθαρα must denote, not moral, but theocratic uncleanness, like the κοινά of Acts x. 28. This against Ernesti also, *Ursprung der Sünde*, II. p. 162 ff. The children of Christians are, it is plain according to this verse, holy already (without baptism) at a time of life at which it is as yet inconceivable that the uncleanness should be removed through fellowship with the Redeemer by faith.



tion? In that case they were to let such an one go without detention (*χωρίζεσθω*, permissive, see Winer, p. 291 [E. T. 390]); "*suas sibi res habeat; frater sororve sit aequo animo*," Bengel. And the reason for this was: "*A believer in such circumstances is not enslaved, nay, surely* (*δέ* after the negative clause) *it is in peace that God has called us*," so that this our calling forbids such a living together as would be *unpeaceful* through constraint. — *οὐ δεδούλ.*] *is not enslaved*, so, namely, as still to remain bound in marriage to such a *χωριζόμενος*.<sup>1</sup> The expression brings out the *unworthy* character of such a relationship. Comp. Gal. iv. 3; Plato, *Pol.* ix. p. 589 E; Soph. *Trach.* 256; 4 Macc. iii. 3 f., xiii. 2. See, on the other hand, the simple *δέδεται* in ver. 39. — *ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις*] not, as Hofmann takes it: "*In matters of the natural life*," to which marriage belongs, but in accordance with the context: *under such circumstances*, i.e. in such a position of things, where the non-believing consort separates himself. Luthers renders well: "*in solchen Fällen*." Comp. *ἐν τοῖσδε*, Soph. *Oed. Tyr.* 892. *ἐν τούτοις*, Plut. *Glor. Ath.* p. 350 A; Phil. iv. 11; *ἐν οἷς*, Antiph. i. 6, and Maetzner *in loc.*, p. 131. Only a comma should be placed after *τοιούτοις*. — *ἐν εἰρήνῃ*] is not the same as *εἰς εἰρήνῃν* (Rosenmüller, Flatt, Rückert, following older expositors; comp. also Billroth), or *ἵνα ὦμεν ἐν εἰρ.* (de Wette, Osiander, Gratama, Maier); for that which is stated is not *to what* God has called us (see, on the other hand, ver. 22; 1 Pet. v. 10), but *in what ethical form* God's call has taken place. He has *so* called us, namely, to the Messiah's kingdom, that He therewith caused *peace* to be proclaimed to us in respect of our relation to others (Eph. ii. 14 ff.). Analogous to this is the *ἐν* in Eph. iv. 4; 1 Thess. iv. 7; comp. also on Gal. i. 6. To understand, however, the *εἰρήνῃ* as referring to the peace of the soul *with God* (Harless, Hofmann) would be possible only if *δεδούλ.* were to be referred to binding of the *conscience*. And even in that case we should expect as correlative rather *ἐν* or *ἐπ'* *ἐλευθερίᾳ* (Gal. v. 13).

<sup>1</sup> Weiss, in the *Deutsch. Zeitschr.* 1866, p. 267 (comp. his *bibl. Theol.* p. 423), understands *διδούλ.* of the *burden of the conscience* in view of Christ's command respecting the indissolubleness of marriage. Precisely so Hofmann. But had Paul meant this, he must have indicated it more particularly. According to the context, *οὐ διδούλ.* is the opposite of the *μὴ ἀφίτω* in vv. 12, 13, denoting *legal necessity*, like *ἰδύται* in ver. 39.

REMARK.—Since *desertion* (χωρίζεται) appears here as an admissible ground for divorce, this has been thought to conflict with Matt. v. 32, xix. 9, and various explanations have been attempted (see Wolf *in loc.*). But the seeming contradiction vanishes, if we consider ver. 12, according to which Jesus had given no judgment upon *mixed* marriages; Matt. v. 32, therefore, can only bind the believing consort, in so far that he may not be *the one who leaves*. If, however, he is left by the non-believing partner, then, as this case does not fall under the utterance of Christ, the marriage may be looked upon as practically dissolved, and the believing partner is not bound. But to apply, as is often done, the permissive χωρίζεσθω also to such marriages as are *Christian* on both sides—the χωρίζόμενος, that is to say, being an unchristianly-minded Christian (Harless)—is exegetically inadmissible, seeing that the λοιποί who are here spoken of (see ver. 12) constitute the specific category of *mixed* marriages, in which, therefore, the one partner in each case falls to be reckoned among τοὺς ἕξω. So also pref. to 4th ed. p. vii. f. — Our text gives no express information upon the point, whether Paul would allow the Christian partner in such a union to *marry again*. For what οὐ δεδούλωται negatives is not the constraint “*ut caelebs maneat*” (Grotius, *al.*), but the necessity for the marriage being continued.<sup>1</sup> It may be *inferred*, however, that as in Paul's view mixed marriages did not come under Christ's prohibition of *divorce*, so neither would he have applied the prohibition of *remarriage* in Matt. v. 32 to the case of such unions. Olshausen is wrong in holding a second marriage in such cases unlawful, on the ground of its being, according to Matthew, *l.c.*, a μοιχεία. Christ Himself took no account of mixed marriages. Nor would ver. 11, which does not refer to marriages of that kind, be at variance with the remarriage of the believing partner (in opposition to Weiss, *bibl. Theol. l.c.*).

Ver. 16. Confirmation of the foregoing thought, that the Christian *is not bound* in such cases, but, on the contrary, ought, in accordance with his vocation, to live in peace; *for neither does the (Christian) wife know whether she, by continuing to live with her (non-believing) husband, shall be the means of his conversion, nor does the (Christian) husband know*, etc. This uncertainty cannot

<sup>1</sup> Photius, as cited by Oecumenius, says very justly: οὐκ ἔχει ἀνάγκην ὁ πιστὸς ἢ ἡ πιστὴ ἐν τοῖς ἀπίστοις τοιαύτην, ὥς αὐτῷ ἐπίκειται ἐπὶ τῶν πιστῶν· ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ παντὶ τρόπῳ, χωρὶς λόγου πορνείας οὐκ ἔξιστιν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τοὺς συναφθίντας χωρισθῆναι· ἰνταῦθα δὲ, ἂν μὲν συνιδοκῇ τὸ ἀπιστον μίρος τῷ πιστῷ συνικνύν, δι' ἣν μὴ λύσειν τὸ συνικνύσιον· ἂν δὲ στασιάζῃ καὶ τὴν λύσειν κινῶν ποιῇ, οὐ διδούλωται ὁ πιστὸς· οὐδὲ τὸ μὴ χωρισθῆναι.

be the basis of any constraint to the hurt of their peace. Comp. de Wette, Osiander, Neander, Ewald, Maier, Hofmann. Most expositors, on the other hand, from Chrysostom downwards, take *εἰ* in the sense of *εἰ μὴ* (see also Tholuck, *Bergpredig.* p. 251 f.), and hold that ver. 16 enunciates a new reason for *not* breaking up the marriage, namely, the possibility of the conversion of the non-believing husband. *Ἀνάδεξαί φησιν ἐπὶ χρησταῖς ἐλπίσι τὸν πόνον ἔχεις τὸν Θεὸν τῆς προθυμίας ἐπίκουρον*, Theodoret. That is to say, they find in *ἐν δὲ εἰρήνῃ κ.τ.λ.* the thought: yet the Christian partner should do everything to maintain peace and bear with the heathen consort,—and either link *to this* the new reason given in ver. 16 (Flatt, Rückert, Olshausen, following Calvin and others), or else regard ver. 15 as a *parenthesis* (Grotius, *al.*). But the parenthetic setting aside of ver. 15 is as arbitrary as the turn given to the idea of *ἐν δὲ εἰρήνῃ κ.τ.λ.* is contrary to the context. With respect again to taking *εἰ* as equivalent to *εἰ μὴ*, it is perfectly true that *εἰ*, following upon the notion of uncertainty, may answer in meaning to *εἰ μὴ* (Thuc. ii. 53. 2; Krüger, § lxxv. 1. 8; Esth. iv. 14; 2 Sam. xii. 22; Joel ii. 14; Jonah iii. 9); but the thought which would thus emerge does not suit the connection here, because in it the point is the *οὐ δεδούλωται*, to which the proposed rendering of the *εἰ* would run counter.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, this use of *εἰ* is foreign to the N. T., often though it occurs in the classics (see especially Kühner, *ad Xen. Mem.* i. 1. 8, *Anab.* iii. 2. 22). — *τι*] precisely as the German: “*was weisst du, ob*,” etc., so that in sense it is the same as: *how, in how far* (Ellendt, *Lcx. Soph.* II. p. 823); it is not therefore the accusative of the object. Comp. *τι οἶει, τι δοκεῖς*, Xen. *Hier.* i. 15. Regarding the *future σώσεις*, comp. Stallbaum, *ad Gorg.* p. 249; Klotz, *ad Devar.* p. 508.

Ver. 17. *Εἰ μὴ*] is meant, according to Grotius, to introduce an exception from the *τι οἶδας*: “*Illud quidem, quod dixi, non scis, sed hoc debes scire* ;” or, more exactly, since *εἰ μὴ* is not the same as *ἀλλά* (see on Gal. i. 7): *Nothing but the duty dost thou know*, etc. Comp. my 3d edition. But this mode of joining on the verse is very harsh and forced in itself, and is, besides, unsuitable for this reason, that ver. 16 was only a subordinate thought, to which *εἰ μὴ*

<sup>1</sup> A limitation of the *οὐ δεδούλωται*, and that, too, of a quite general sort, comes in only with the *εἰ μὴ κ.τ.λ.* in ver. 17.

κ.τ.λ. as a newly introduced leading idea stands in no logical nexus. The logical connection of εἰ μὴ, *nisi*, etc., is, on the contrary, to be sought in the leading thought of the foregoing passage, which was οὐ δεδούλωται κ.τ.λ. This οὐ δεδούλωται . . . Θεός was enunciated without any limitation being put upon it hitherto. It was further confirmed in ver. 16. Paul desires now, in order to avert all frivolous and reckless procedure, to add to it the necessary limitation in the shape of a general principle of a practical kind, which should never be forgotten in connection with it.<sup>1</sup> We may paraphrase accordingly somewhat in this fashion: "*The believer is not in bondage in this matter, having, on the contrary, been called in peace, and not so much as knowing whether he shall save his non-believing consort; he is not in bondage, only<sup>2</sup> he is not to use this freedom in a light and regardless way, but to remember that it is limited by the rule that every one ought to abide in a conservative spirit by the position in which God has placed and called him, and to conduct himself accordingly, instead of possibly seeking to break it up without any very pressing cause.*" Comp. as in substance agreeing with this, Olshausen, de Wette, Osiander, Ewald, Maier. Pott holds that χωρίζεται should be supplied after εἰ μὴ; but the antithesis would require εἰ δὲ μὴ, and the rule which follows would be very superfluous in a case where no separation had taken place, more especially after ver. 12 f. Vater and Rückert supply σώσεις: "But even if thou shouldst not, the general rule applies in every case." Were that correct, we should of necessity find εἰ δὲ καὶ μὴ. Lastly, there is the view of those who would join εἰ μὴ to the preceding clause (τινές in Theophylact, Knatchbull, Homberg, Hammond, Olearius, Morus, and recently Hofmann): *if thou shalt save thy wife, if (or) not?*<sup>3</sup> Now this is not, indeed, excluded by the μὴ (as Rückert thinks, who requires οὐ; but see

<sup>1</sup> Paul had doubtless ground enough in the rich experience of his career for giving this warning. How often in the cases of conversion to Christianity must the deep inward change have had linked to it a yearning after some change of outward relationships!—an offence against the practical rule: "*Qua positus fueris, in statione mane*" (Ovid, *Fasti*, ii. 674), which Paul here gives expression to in a *Christian* form.

<sup>2</sup> Respecting εἰ μὴ in the sense of πλὴν, see Poppo, *ad Thuc.* III. 1, p. 216; and respecting the principal sentence annexed to it, Buttmann, *neut. Gram.* p. 308 [E. T. 359].

<sup>3</sup> Hence the reading ἢ μὴ in more recent codd. Severianus in Oecumenius, Chrysostom, ms. Syr. p. on the margin.

Hartung, *Partikell.* II. p. 123) ; still the addition would be quite inappropriate to the sense of the two questions, for these convey the idea : *thou knowest not at all if*, etc., with which the alternative *neene* does not harmonize,—on which ground, too, Hofmann makes ver. 16 to be the concluding confirmation of the whole admonition beginning with τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς in ver. 12. This, again, is impossible, for this reason, that the *first* part of the counsel given to the λοιποὶ has already received its confirmation in the γάρ of ver. 14, and in accordance therewith the γάρ of ver. 16 must now refer in the way of confirmation only to the *second* part of the said counsel, as contained in ver. 15. Hofmann's interpretation is in the most complicated opposition to the plan and development of the apostle's argument. Rinck, in his *Lucubr. crit.* p. 142 f. (and so previously Theodoret), connects from εἰ μὴ on to Κύριος with the preceding passage : "nescis enim, an salvum cum facturum sis, nisi prout quemque Dominus adjuverit." But ἐκάστω ὡς ἐμέρ. ὁ. K. and ἑκάστων ὡς κέκλ. ὁ. Θ. are manifestly parallel, and, as such, contain not a frigid repetition (Rinck), but an earnest exhaustion of the thought. — ἐκάστω ὡς] the same as ὡς ἐκ., but with emphasis on the ἐκάστω. Comp. iii. 5, x. 16 ; Rom. xii. 3. *As the Lord* (God) *hath apportioned to each* (has bestowed his outward lot), *as* (i.e. ἣ κλήσει, ver. 20) *God hath called each* (to the Messiah's kingdom), *so let him walk*, i.e. according to the standard of this outward position (without seeking, therefore, to break with it or step out from it, vv. 20, 24) let him regulate his conduct, his course of life. Ἐμέρισεν, *has given his portion* (Polybius, xxxi. 18. 3, xi. 28. 9 ; Eccclus. xlv. 20 ; 2 Macc. viii. 28 ; 4 Macc. xiii. 18), refers to the earthly relations of life, according to which, e.g., a man may be married to this person or that (and it is to *this* relationship that the primary application is to be made), may be circumcised or uncircumcised, a slave or free,<sup>1</sup> etc. See ver. 18 ff. These relationships of life are here regarded as a whole, out of which each individual has received

<sup>1</sup> The *call* of the individuals to salvation took place in these differently apportioned positions and relationships in life. Hence the ὡς ἐμίρισεν takes precedence of the ὡς ἐκλήκειν. Hofmann is wrong in holding that the ὡς ἐμίρισεν might lie on this side or on that of the calling, and might consist even in a change of the situation in which they had been when called. This mistake should have been precluded even by what follows, which always starts from those circumstances alone which subsisted at the time of the calling ; see vv. 18, 21, 24.

his μέρος from God (τὸ μεμερισμένον, Lucian, *D. D.* xxiv. 1), in accordance with the varying *modes* (ὡς) of the divine apportionment. Comp. the classical ἡ εἰμαρμένη, *sors attributa*. We have neither to supply περιπατεῖν (Hofmann), nor anything else. *What* the Lord has apportioned is just the μέρος, which each man has. Reiche, *Comm. crit.* I. p. 175 ff., understands μερίζειν in the theocratic-Messianic sense, and makes ὁ Κύριος refer to *Christ*: "in qua vitae externae sorte ac statu (ὡς, conf. ver. 18) cuique Dominus beneficiorum suorum quasi partem tribuit." According to this, what would be meant would be the μερίς τοῦ κλήρου τῶν ἁγίων (Col. i. 12), which, however, refers to the bliss of the *future αἰών*, and would require, therefore, to be understood here *proleptically*. But there are two considerations which put a decided negative upon this view; first, the reference assumed for the absolute ἐμέρ. is not suggested by the context, (see, on the contrary, ver. 18 ff.); and, in the second place, logically the calling must *go first*, since *before* it there can be no mention of the Messianic μερίζειν (Rom. viii. 30, x. 14; Col. i. 12). This holds also against the essentially similar interpretation of Harless, which *co-ordinates* ἐμέρ. with the calling. — κέκληκεν] a completed transaction continuing to the present in its results, hence the *perfect*; the *aorist* ἐμέρ., on the other hand, indicated something merely which *took place* as an act of the *past*, and this act occurred *before* the κέκληκεν, at birth, or some other point in life. — καὶ οὕτως κ.τ.λ.] showing the importance of this rule, which Paul is not by any means laying down simply with a view to the special state of things at *Corinth*, but, etc., ἵνα τῷ ἔχειν καὶ ἄλλους κοινωνοὺς προθυμότεροι περὶ τὴν ὑπακοὴν διατεθῶσι, Theophylact. — διατάσσ.] *I ordain, appoint*, xi. 34, xvi. 1. Observe the evidence here of apostolic power over the church.

Ver. 18 ff. Further explanation of this injunction by way of example, and not bearing simply on the case of Christians living in mixed marriage.<sup>1</sup> — The *protases* do not convey a *question* either here or in ver. 27, being in the rhetorically emphatic form of the hypothetic indicative. See Bernhardt, p. 385. Comp. Kühner, II. p. 561. — μὴ ἐπισπάσθω] *ne sibi attrahat*, sc. *praeputium*. A surgical operation frequent among the later Jews

<sup>1</sup> Theodoret says well: εἴτα συνίτω; ἀπὸ τοῦ προκείμενου εἰς ἕτερα μισαβαίνει, πᾶσι νομοθετῶν τὰ κατὰλληλα.

(1 Macc. i. 15, and Grimm *in loc*; Josephus, *Antt.* xii. 5. 1), described in detail by Celsus, vii. 25. 5, or otherwise performed, by which a sort of foreskin was again drawn over the *glans*—resorted to not only in cases of perversion to heathenism, but also from shame or fear of heathen eyes, before which men sought to avoid appearing (in baths, for example, or otherwise) as *circumcised*. With Christians this might especially be occasioned by a shrinking from the eyes of *Gentile converts*. See, besides Wetstein, Groddeck in Schoettgen's *Horae*, p. 1159 f.; Lightfoot, p. 194; Lübker in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1835, p. 657. Such persons were styled כְּשִׁיטִים. See Buxtorf, *Lex. Talm.* p. 1274. — ἐν ἀκροβ.] Comp. Rom. iv. 10.

Ver. 19. Comp. Rom. ii. 25 ff.; Gal. v. 6. From the Christian point of view *it matters nothing* whether a man be circumcised or not; comp. viii. 8. — ἀλλὰ τήρησις ἐντολ. Θεοῦ] *but keeping of the commands of God, sc. τὰ πάντα ἐστι*, as in iii. 7. According to the Christian idea (Rom. xiii. 8), there is no difference between this and the faith that worketh by love (Gal. v. 6). Billroth is wrong in taking it as: "*In themselves* circumcision and uncircumcision are alike indifferent; such things are of importance only *in so far as* they are an observing of the commandments of God;" for ἡ ἀκροβ. cannot be included with the other under τήρ. ἐντ. Θεοῦ.

Ver. 20. An emphatic repetition of the *rule* after giving the *illustration* of it. Comp. ver. 24. — ἐν τῇ κλήσει ἧ ἐκλήθη] Since Calvin, expositors have often understood κλήσις of the *outward position in life*, like our *calling* [*Beruf*], and have supplied ἐν before ἧ in accordance with the pure Attic idiom (Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Phaed.* p. 76 D; Kühner, *ad Xen. Mem.* ii. 1. 32). So, recently, Rückert. But although κλήσις (Dionys. Hal. *Antt.* iv. 18) does expressly correspond to the Latin *classis*, a *division of the burgesses*, according to the true derivation of that technical term from the Greek, yet even profane writers never use κλήσις in the sense of *avocation* [*Beruf*] (rank, and the like); and in the whole N. T. the *Christian* meaning of καλεῖν and κλήσις is that in which they are invariably used, and so here also: *in the calling* (to the Messianic kingdom) *through which* (ἧ being the *dat. instrum.*, as in 2 Tim. i. 9) *he was called*. This may have been, that is to say, a κλήσις going forth from God to a circumcised man or an uncircumcised, to a slave or a freeman, etc. If, now, the man, for example, who was called in circumcision by a *vocatio circumcisi*

thereafter restores the foreskin, so as to give himself out for an uncircumcised person, he does not abide in the calling through which he was called. The right interpretation is already given by Chrysostom and Theophylact (ἐν οἷῳ βίῳ καὶ ἐν οἷῳ τάγματι καὶ πολιτεύματι ὧν ἐπίστευσεν, ἐν τούτῳ μενέτω· κλησιν γὰρ τὴν εἰς τὴν πίστιν προσαγωγὴν φησι). Comp. ver. 17: ὡς κέκληκεν ὁ Θεός. The emphatic ἐν ταύτῃ (vi. 4) points at the misdirected yearning for *another* state of matters through which *another* κλησις would present itself, as *e.g.* through the ἐπισπᾶσθαι a being called ἐν ἀκροβυστίᾳ, etc.

Ver. 21. Μὴ σοι μελέτω] *let it give thee no concern*, let it be all the same to thee. Hom. *Il.* ii. 338, x. 92; Plato, *Phaed.* p. 95 B; *Tim.* p. 24 B; *Wisd.* xii. 13; Mark iv. 38, *al.* What it is that ought to give him no concern, is plain from the immediate context, namely, *his being called as a slave*; not, as Hofmann would read into the text, *his seeming to be doomed to lifelong slavery*. — ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ κ.τ.λ.] *but, even if thou art in circumstances to become free, use it rather*, namely, the having been called as a slave; make use rather (instead of becoming free) of thy "vocatio servi" by remaining true to thy position as a slave. Comp. ver. 20. So, in substance, Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact. Camerarius, Estius, Wolf, Bengel, and many of the older interpreters; among more modern expositors, de Wette, Osiander, Maier, Ewald,<sup>1</sup> Baur (in the *theol. Jahrb.* 1852, p. 26 ff.), also Vaihinger in Herzog's *Encykl.* XIV. p. 474 f.; Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 417 f. The ἀλλά is nothing else than the German *sondern*, corresponding to the preceding μὴ σοι μελ., and εἰ καὶ is *etsi* (Herm. *ad Viger.* p. 832; Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Apol.* p. 32 A; Baeumlein, *Partik.* p. 151), so that it conveys the sense: *even although, if even*; and in the conditional clause the emphasis is made by καὶ to fall upon δύνασαι. The Syriac, however ("elige tibi potius quam ut servias"), and most modern commentators, supply τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ after χρῆσαι, with Luther, Erasmus, Castalio, Beza, Calvin, Grotius, Cornelius a Lapide, and many others (a view mentioned, too, by Chrysostom). *Paul's advice*, they hold, *is*

<sup>1</sup> Who, however, expounds χρῆσθαι as meaning *to let oneself be used*, i.e. *to be dependent*, without being able to establish any precedent for such a rendering. Regarding χρῆσθαι without a dative of the object, see Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Rep.* p. 452 C, 489 B.



rather to avail oneself of the opportunity of becoming free. But this is grammatically incorrect, because it goes in the face of the *καί*,<sup>1</sup> and contrary also to the connection, for Paul would thus be contravening his own thrice-repeated injunction: *let each man remain*, etc. The ground specially founded on (in a very unhermeneutical way) by Rückert, that the old interpretation is against the *spirit* of the apostle, is untenable; for the advice to use the opportunities of obtaining freedom—an advice comparatively unimportant and paltry in view of the Parousia believed to be at hand—by no means corresponds with the apostle's lofty idea that all are one in Christ (Gal. iii. 28; 1 Cor. xii. 13; Col. iii. 11); that in Christ the slave is free and the freeman a slave (ver. 22); as, indeed, ver. 22 can furnish a confirmation of ver. 21 only on the ground of the old exposition, descending from Chrysostom, *αλ.*, of *μᾶλλον χρῆσαι*. It may be added, that that idea of true Christian equality carries in itself the germ of the *abolition* of slavery; the latter is the ripe fruit of the former. The moral consciousness of Christendom has not in this respect *advanced beyond* the standpoint of Paul (Baur); it is but a further *development* of the same *principle* which he enunciates, the future influence of which, however, upon the removal of slavery the apostle himself was not led to consider more closely from his expectation of the nearness of that great change which was to bring in for *all* believers the glorious liberty of the children of God. He left slavery, therefore, unassailed, as he did civil relations in general,

<sup>1</sup> What devices have been practised of late with this *καί*! Billroth thinks that it indicates an accessory thought: "this, too, is not to be denied, that if thou canst be free," etc. Rückert thinks that it denotes a climax and properly (?) belongs to *ἐλευθ.*: "but if thou mayest even be free," etc. Olshausen holds that *spiritual* freedom is implied in *καλλίσθαι*, and that, starting from this idea, Paul goes on: "but if in addition to thy spiritual freedom thou canst obtain also bodily liberty, avail thyself of it rather." Even Neander substantially agrees with this. But upon Billroth's view *καί* would require to come before *εἰ*; upon Rückert's and Olshausen's, before *ἐλευθ.*; and the turn given to the clause by the latter is but one proof out of many that men may make anything out of everything, if they—*will*. Hofmann considers that *καί* lays emphasis on the *reality* (comp. on ver. 11) as contrasted with the mere *wish*, which wish, however, is only brought in by an erroneous explanation of *μή σοι μιλίτω*. He even maintains that, according to our understanding of the verse, Paul must have written *καί εἰ*. He *might* have written either, and would, had it been *καί εἰ*, have meant *even in the case that*; but he meant *εἰ καί* (if thou art even in a position to, etc.), and therefore wrote it and nothing else. The latter is as little absurd as the former.

not even asking, in his letter to Philemon, that Onesimus should be set free, but introducing the idea of Christian love, unity, and equality (xii. 13 ; Gal. iii. 28 ; Eph. vi. 8 ; Philem. 16 ; Col. iv. 1),—an idea, the consequence of which is necessarily the cessation of slavery, although just as necessarily it was not natural for the apostle, with his eye turned to the approaching Parousia, to single out this consequence and apply it for an age of the world which, in his view, was on the point of passing away. It may be further noted that he does not *forbid* an exchange of slavery for freedom, which was in itself allowable ; but he *dissuades* from it as a trifling way of dealing with the position in question, under the circumstances of the time, when viewed from the height of the Christian standpoint.

Ver. 22. *For the converted slave is Christ's freedman ; in like manner, too* (ὁμοίως καὶ introduces the precise reversal of relations which here also takes place), *the freeman who becomes a Christian is the slave of Christ.* That moral freedom (comp. John viii. 36) and this moral slavery are of course essentially identical (Rom. vi. 16 ff. ; Eph. vi. 6 ; Col. iii. 24) ; but Paul grounds here his admonition in ver. 21 by showing that the matter may be looked at from a twofold *point of view* : the Christian slave should recognise *his* relation to Christ as that of an ἀπελεύθερος Χριστοῦ,<sup>1</sup> and the *freeman's* relation as that of a δοῦλος Χριστοῦ. This will serve in his case this end, not by any means (as Hofmann illogically inserts into the text, despite the μένειν again required in ver. 24) that he should count it unnecessary to remain in the position of a slave,<sup>2</sup> but, on the contrary, that he should abide contentedly in his station without coveting after freedom. — ὁ ἐν Κυρίῳ κλ. δοῦλ.] *the slave who is called in the Lord, i.e. who has received the Christian calling.* That is to say, this κλησις has not taken place, as any other might, *out of* Christ, but *in* Him, as being the distinctive element in which it has its specific character. The ἐν Κυρίῳ, which might have been understood of itself, is expressly *added* here, because it was meant

<sup>1</sup> So that "εἰ σῶμα δοῦλον, ἀλλ' ὁ νοῦς ἐλεύθερος," Soph. *Fragm.* 677, Dindorf.

<sup>2</sup> Paul is, in fact, guarding by this grand utterance of his against all unjust contempt for the condition of outward slavery,—a feeling which vanishes in the light of Christianity side by side with all unjust estimation of the worth of mere outward freedom.

to be an emphatic correlate to the *Κυρίου* which follows. It is wholly foreign to the argument to imagine a contrast here with the *earthly* master (Hofmann), as in Eph. vi. 5; Col. iii. 22, iv. 1. — *ἀπελεύθερος* with the genitive is not used here in the common sense of *libertus alicujus*, some one's manumitted slave, for the master hitherto had been sin or Satan (see on vi. 20); but simply *a freedman belonging to Christ* (comp. *κλητοὶ Ἰησοῦ* X., Rom. i. 6), after Christ, namely, has set him free *from the service of another* (comp. Ignatius, *ad Rom.* 4). This was self-evident to the consciousness of the reader.

Ver. 23. *For a price* (see on vi. 20) *were ye* (my readers in general) *bought* (namely, by Christ to be His slaves); *become not* (therefore) *servants of men*; *i.e.* do not make yourselves dependent upon what men wish and demand of you, instead of allowing your conduct to be moulded by Christ's will and service. Paul designs that this should be applied to the mistaken submission shown on the part of the church to such as wished that men should break up or alter their civil relationships and other existing situations to please them, and in compliance with their solicitations and deceptive suggestions. This more specific reference of the warning, in itself conveyed in general terms, we may naturally gather from ver. 24. Instigations and seductions of this kind, arising partly, perhaps, from fanatical excitement, must plainly have occurred at Corinth in connection with circumstances of the details of which we are ignorant; for otherwise the whole of the minute instructions from ver. 17 to ver. 24 would lack any concrete basis. The interpretation with which Chrysostom and Theophylact content themselves is therefore much too vague: that Paul is forbidding men-pleasing generally, and compliance with immoral demands. So also Theodoret's view, that he enjoins *μὴ δουλοπρεπὲς ἔχειν φρόνημα*. Osiander and Neander's rendering is too general also ("every kind of wrong dependence"). It is altogether alien to the context, vv. 17–24, to suppose that *ἀνθρώπων* refers to Paul, Cephas, Apollos, etc. (Rückert), and that the meaning is substantially the same as had been expressed in iii. 21 by *μηδεὶς καυχάσθω ἐν ἀνθρώποις* (Hofmann). Equally out of accordance with the subject in hand is Billroth's exposition (given before by Vatablus), that the apostle exhorts *the slaves* not to do their service *for the sake of men*, but for the Lord's sake

(Col. iii. 22). Heydenreich, on the other hand, holds (with Menochius, Hammond, Knatchbull, Mosheim, Michaelis, Zachariae) that he is admonishing *the freemen* not to sell themselves into slavery. But, even putting out of account the second person plural, which directs the words to the readers generally, were that the meaning, Paul would undoubtedly have called attention to a new illustration of his rule, as he does in vv. 18, 21. And how unlikely a thing that men went into slavery in those days *for the sake of Christianity* (for according to the connection it is *this* motive which must be presupposed, not : *for gain's sake*) !

Ver. 24. To conclude the whole digression, the weighty rule is once more enunciated (ἐν ᾧ κ.τ.λ.: In whatever relationship, in whatever outward position, etc.), and now with the strengthening clause *παρὰ Θεῶ*, which describes the ἐν τούτῳ μένειν according to its moral and religious character ; that outward abiding is to be of such a kind that therein the man shall abide inwardly *with God* (the caller), which moral relation of fellowship is locally represented in a concrete way by *παρά* ("a Deo non recedens," Estius). Comp. Theophylact,—who, however, makes out a special reference to immoral obedience to masters,—Schrader, Rückert, Neander, Osiander. De Wette limits the meaning to the relation of a Christian slave, as in ver. 22, which, after the general ver. 23, is inadmissible. The common interpretation, "*coram Deo*" (Calvin), "*Deo inspectante*" (Grotius), which would imply : "perpetuo memores, vos in ejus conspectu versari" (Beza, comp. de Wette), would correspond to the current phrase ἐνώπιον τοῦ Θεοῦ. Hofmann makes ἐν ᾧ and ἐν τούτῳ refer to *Christ* (comp. ver. 22) ; the call took place *in Christ to God*, and therefore every one is to have *in Christ* (on His mediatorial foundation) his abiding *with God*. The perfect conformity of ver. 24 with ver. 20 ought, had it stood alone, to have prevented this misinterpretation. But besides, the call is given *from God*, not *to God*, but to eternal Messianic life (comp. on i. 9).

Ver. 25. Δέ] indicating the transition to a new section in the discussion on marriage. — *παρθένων*] *virgins*. We are not to understand this (with Theodore of Mopsuestia, Bengel, Semler, Zachariae, Schleusner, Schulz, Rosenmüller, Flatt, Pott, Olshausen, Ewald) of the *unmarried of both sexes*, young men and maidens, which is contrary to the ordinary usage of the language (see too,

vv. 34, 36, 37); for in such passages as Rev. xiv. 4, Oecumenius, *Quacst. Amphil.* 188; Nonnus on John xix. 26; Fabricius, *Pseudepigr. V. T.* II. pp. 92, 98; also Arist. *Eq.* 1302, the word is *maidenly*; and that it ever with Greek writers means *a single man* in the proper sense, is at least very doubtful. — γνώμη] *view, opinion*. As regards γνώμ. δίδωμι (2 Cor. viii. 10), see the examples in Kypke, II. p. 205. — The sense most in accordance with the context for πιστός is that of *reliable*, i.e. *trustworthy* (1 Tim. iv. 9). The more general *faithful* (in the service of Christ; so Billroth, Rückert, Ewald) is less suitable; and least of all the simple *believing*, as Hofmann would have it. Paul's being an ἀξιοχρεὼς σύμβουλος (Theodoret) he ascribes to the mercy of Christ; for he knows well in himself that that characteristic would not belong to him without Christ's gracious call to the apostleship, and without enlightenment and aid from Him. Comp. also ver. 40. Hence ὡς (quippe) ἐλεημένος κ.τ.λ.

Ver. 26. In *carrying out* his theme *de virginibus*, Paul proceeds as follows: first, in the passage extending to ver. 35 he gives a general recommendation of single life to *both sexes*, and only then deals with the subject of virgins exclusively on to ver. 38. — οὖν] *therefore*, introduces now the γνώμη in accordance with what was said in ver. 25. — ἀνθρώπων] refers, as the more detailed remarks in ver. 27 ff. prove, not to *virgins* alone (Hofmann), as applied to whom, besides, it would be an awkward expression,<sup>1</sup> but means: *a person*, including both sexes. It is otherwise in ver. 1. — οὕτως] *so, as he is*, i.e. *unmarried*, which follows from τ. παρθένων, ver. 25. To be so Paul esteems *salutary* (καλόν, as in ver. 1), not absolutely and in itself, but because the Parousia is near, and still nearer, therefore, must be the general calamities which are to precede it, the *dolores Messiae*, כְּבִי מִשַׁח (see on Matt. xxiv. 3). These form the *instant* (iii. 23) *distress*, i.e. a distress which is impending and has already begun to set in. Comp. Matt. xxiv. 19. The persecutions (Pott, Flatt, Hofmann, after older expositors) are only a part of it. Matrimonial cares and sufferings, again (Schulz, following Theophylact and others), are not meant at all. See ver. 39 ff. — As little are we to understand “impending constraint through marriage” (Cropp in the *Jahrb. f. Deutsche*

<sup>1</sup> ἄνθρωπος as a *feminine* usually answers in Greek writers, as is well known, to the German colloquial phrase: “*das Mensch.*”

*Theol.* 1866, p. 103), against which *θλίψιν* alone, in ver. 28 and ver. 31, testifies with sufficient clearness. Comp. rather *τῇ ἐνεστώσῃ ἀνάγκῃ*, 3 Macc. i. 16, the distress *having set in*, and see generally on Gal. i. 4. — The construction is anacoluthic, so that *τοῦτο*, which belongs to *νομίζω*, prepares for the following *καλὸν ὑπάρχειν* on to *οὕτως εἶναι* (comp. on Rom. ii. 3 and Kühner, § 631. 2); but then *ὅτι καλὸν κ.τ.λ.*, which states the contents of the *νομίζω*, instead of ending simply with *ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ οὕτως εἶναι*, begins from the beginning again, and that with a *ὅτι*, which comes in in place of the construction with the infinitive (Kühner, § 771. 5). A manifest confusion of expression, into which in dictation Paul might be especially likely to fall by forgetting, after the enunciation of the principal thought *διὰ τ. ἐνεστ. ἀνάγκ.*, that he had already said *καλὸν ὑπάρχειν*. Hence, too, it is more natural to connect *διὰ τ. ἐνεστ. ἀνάγκ.* with what precedes it than hyperbatically with *ὅτι κ.τ.λ.* (Ewald, Hofmann<sup>1</sup>). Translate: *My opinion, then, is this, that it is good on account of the impending distress,—that it is good [I think] for a person to be in such a position.* Heydenreich holds wrongly—as the fact of there being no *αὐταῖς* added is enough of itself to show—that *ὅτι* should be read, so that Paul would say that what is good *for the man* is good *for them*, namely, single life. De Wette takes *τοῦτο* as equivalent to *παρθένον εἶναι*, and then renders *ὅτι* by *because*: “because it is in general good for a man to be unmarried.”<sup>2</sup> But this “in general” is not in the text, and yet of necessity it would have required to *be* there, for without it the argument emerges as an *idem per idem*; and in truth, even were the “in general” expressed, the main statement would be an inappropriate one, since it would contain nothing to establish the essential element *διὰ τ. ἐνεστ. ἀνάγκην*. The *anacoluthon* of the passage belongs to those in which “celeritate quadam abrepti novam enuntiationem inchoamus priore nondum absoluta,” Bremi, *ad Lys.* Exc. V. p. 442.

Ver. 27. Lest the *γνώμη* in ver. 26 should be misinterpreted as favouring divorce, he now prefaces his further discussion of the

<sup>1</sup> Ewald, moreover, takes *τὸ οὕτως εἶναι* to mean “that it should be so,” referring to the following rule *δίδισαι, κ.τ.λ.*

<sup>2</sup> This rendering occurs in substance in Erasmus, Castalio, Calvin. Beza, too, agrees with it in his explanation of *τεῷ*, but understands *ὅτι καλὸν κ.τ.λ.* as resumptive.

subject with the rule, which is appropriate here only as a caveat : *let not the married desire to be loosed*. The construction is as in ver. 18. — *γυναικί*] *dativus communionis*, as in Rom. vii. 2, and with Greek writers. It is plain, especially from vv. 29 and 34, that *δέδ. γυν.* does not mean *betrothal* (Ewald and Hofmann), but that *γυνή* denotes a *married wife*. — *λέλυσαι*] does not imply : art thou *separated* from (Mosheim, Semler), but art thou *free* from, unentangled with a wife, *single* ("sive uxorem habueris, sive non," Estius ; comp. so early an interpreter as Photius)? See ver. 28, and comp. Xenophon, *Cyr.* i. 1. 4, where *λελύσθαι ἀπ' ἀλλήλων* is equivalent to *αὐτόνομα εἶναι*.

Ver. 28. *Οὐχ ἡμαρτες*] But should it be the case that thou shalt have married, *thou hast not sinned* therein. Comp. Matthiae, p. 1203 ; Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 172 [E. T. 199]. Hofmann is wrong here also (comp. on ver. 11) in holding that *ἐὰν δὲ καί* means : but if *already actually*, etc. — *γῆμη ἢ παρθ.*] Here as in 1 Tim. v. 11 the term *γαμεῖν* is applied, indeed, to the woman (see on ver. 39), but without violation of rule, since it is not joined with an accusative. Comp. Fritzsche, *ad Marc.* p. 424. — *τῇ σαρκί*] not in the ethical sense, but (comp. Gal. iv. 13) for the material, animal part of man's nature. In troublous times the married man is exposed to special anguish from sufferings of this kind (hunger, nakedness, sickness, misusage, banishment, etc.). Whether we have here a dative of appropriation (trouble for the flesh ; see on 1 Cor. xii. 7 ; Bernhardt, p. 88), or whether it belongs to the verb, cannot well be determined. — *ἐγὼ δὲ ὑμ. φείδομαι*] but I, for my part, *deal tenderly towards you*, in advising you rather to remain unwedded ; for by this advice, if you will follow it, I spare you from such *θλίψις*.

Vv. 29—31. *This, however, I say*, i.e. of what follows I assure you. Comp. xv. 50. *Δέ* leads over to something wherewith Paul ("as it were prophesying," Ewald) *designs to secure the more acceptance* for the counsel, which he has given with the view of sparing his readers. Pott, Flatt, and others take *τοῦτο δὲ φημι κ.τ.λ.* as a more precise explanation of *θλίψιν . . . τοιοῦτοι*, and then vv. 32—35 as a more precise explanation of *ἐγὼ δὲ ὑμ. φείδ.* Two things militate against this—first, the more emphatic import of *φημί* (comp. also x. 15, 19 ; Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* II. p. 906), which is stronger than *λέγω* ; and secondly, the correct view

of *συνεσταλμ.* (see below). Rückert takes it: "Happen, however, what may, marry ye or not, *this* remark I cannot suppress." But were that the meaning, *τοῦτο δέ φ.* would require to follow at once after *οὐχ ἡμαρτε.* — *ὁ καιρός*] *the space of time*,—subsisting up to the Parousia,—not *our earthly lifetime* in general (Calvin, Vorstius, Estius, *al.*); neither is it merely the time yet to elapse *ere that ἀνάγκη arrives* (Reiche), which would be more distinctly indicated than by the simple *ὁ καιρός*; besides, the *ἀνάγκη* has already begun to make itself felt, *ἐνεστῶσα*, ver. 26. — *συνεσταλμένος*] is taken by most recent expositors (Schulz, Rosenmüller, Stolz, Pott, Heydenreich, Flatt, Rückert, Olshausen, Neander; Billroth is undecided) as meaning *calamitosum*. But without warrant of usage; for in passages such as 1 Macc. iii. 6 (comp. Polyb. v. 15. 8, xxiv. 5. 13; Plato, *Lys.* p. 210 E; Isocrates, p. 176 A; Philo, *Quod omn. prob. liber*, p. 609), v. 3, 2 Macc. vi. 12, 3 Macc. v. 33, *συστέλλω* means to *humble*, to *overthrow*, which does not suit with *καιρός*. The correct translation is that of the *old* interpreters (so also de Wette, Osiander, Ewald, Maier, Hofmann, Weiss): *compressed*, i.e. *brought within narrow limits* (Plato, *Legg.* iii. p. 691 E; Demosth. 309. 2; Lucian, *Icar.* 12; comp. *συστολή*, *abbreviation*). The space of time remaining is only of *brief duration*. In connection with this, *τὸ λοιπόν* is generally made to refer to what *precedes* (Peschito, Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Beza, Grotius, *al.*, including Billroth, Olshausen, de Wette, Osiander, Reiche, Ewald, Maier, Neander): the time is *henceforth (in posterum, see Fritzsche, ad Matth.* p. 777; Kühner, *ad Xen. Anab.* ii. 2. 5) cut short,—a mode of connecting the words, however, which makes *τὸ λοιπόν* convey a superfluous idea. Others hold that it refers to what *follows* (Tertullian, Cyprian, Jerome, Vulgate, Erasmus, Calvin, *al.*, including Heydenreich and Rückert), and that in the sense of "*ergo agendum, quod sequitur*," Estius; comp. Luther: "*weiter ist das die Meinung*." But how obscure the expression would thus be! The *telic* sense of *ἵνα*, too, would be deprived of its logical reference to what precedes. Lachmann, Tischendorf, and Hofmann, adopting the reading which puts *ἐστὶ* before *τὸ λοιπόν* (see the critical remarks), place a comma after the verb: *συνεσταλμ. ἐστίν, τὸ λοιπόν ἵνα κ.τ.λ.*, i.e. *the time is shortened, in order that in future, etc.* Comp. as regards this position for *ἵνα*, on Eph.



iii. 18 ; Gal. ii. 10 ; Rom. xi. 31. This is preferable, because τὸ λοιπὸν is thus put emphatically forward in its essential and important meaning: in order that *henceforward* these relationships may be dealt with in a wholly different way than hitherto. Comp. upon the subject-matter, Matt. xxiv. 42 ff. — ἵνα introduces the *design* of συνεσταλμ. ἐστὶ in the arrangements of God.<sup>1</sup> Beza, Billroth, Schrader, Hofmann make it refer to τοῦτο δέ φημι. But we may see from παράγει γὰρ κ.τ.λ. in ver. 31 that Paul was thinking of so great results as the aim, not of his *assertion*, but of the *thing* asserted,—a view which agrees thoroughly with his religious contemplation of the world, Rom. v. 20, vii. 13, viii. 17, xi. 31 ; 2 Cor. iv. 7, vii. 9, *al.* He looks upon everything as fitted into the plan of moral redemption under the government of God. — ἵνα καὶ οἱ ἔχ. γυν. κ.τ.λ.] The meaning is: *In order that each may keep himself inwardly independent of the relations of his earthly life*,—that the husband should not by his married state lose the moral freedom of his position of a Christian in heart and life; that the sorrowful should not do so through his tribulation, nor the joyful through his good fortune, nor the merchantman through his gain, nor he who uses the world through his use of it. We see the reverse of this independent attitude in Luke xiv. 18-20. There the heart cleaves to temporal things as its treasure, Matt. vi. 21. By giving ἵνα its proper reference, it is made clear that Paul neither designs to *lay down rules* here ("that the married ought to be as though unmarried," etc., Rückert, with many others), nor to *depict the uncertainty of temporal possessions* (Grotius and Pott); which latter meaning is what Reiche also brings out: "quandoquidem propediem mutata rerum terrestrium facie, laetitiae et tristitiae causis mox evanidis, *tempus deficit malis bonisque sensu percipiendis.*" — καὶ οἱ ἔχοντες γυν.] *Even the married.* This καὶ singles out the first point for special emphasis, because it was the one on which the discussion chiefly turned; καὶ in the instances which follow is the simple *and*. — οἱ ἀγοράζ. ὡς μὴ κατέχ.] *the buyers as not possessing* (2 Cor. vi. 10), that, namely, which they buy. — ὡς μὴ καταχρ.] may mean, like the Latin *abuti*, so far as the word in itself is concerned, either:

<sup>1</sup> There is therefore no ground here for beginning a new sentence with τὸ λοιπὸν ἵνα, and taking ἵνα in the imperative sense (comp. on v. 2). So Laurent, *neut. Stud.* p. 130.

*as not abusing it* (Syriac, Tertullian, Theodoret, Theophylact, Oecumenius, Luther, Beza, Cornelius a Lapide, *al.*, including Olshausen and Billroth, the latter of whom considers that Paul gives us here the explanation of his foregoing paradox), or: *as not using it* (Vulgate, Calvin, Grotius, Estius, *al.*, including Pott, Rückert, de Wette, Osiander). Comp. ix. 18. So frequently in Greek writers; see Krebs, p. 291; Loesner, p. 280 f. The latter of the two meanings should have the preference here from the analogy of the preceding clauses. The compound verb—which ought not to have the sense of *at one's own pleasure* (Hofmann) imported into it—serves merely to give greater emphasis to the idea; see Bremi, *ad Isocr. Panegy.* § ix. p. 21; Herodian. viii. 4. 22. Translate: *Those who use this* (pre-Messianic) *world as not making use of it.* There is no reason either for taking *καταχρ.* in the sense of *using up* (Reiche, Ewald), because this meaning, although in itself admissible on linguistic grounds (Diog. Laert. v. 69; Lys. p. 153. 46; Isocr. p. 55 D), only weakens the force of the antithesis in a way contrary to the relation subsisting between all the other antitheses. — *χρησθαι* in the sense of *uti* with an accusative (see the critical remarks) occurs here only in the N. T.;<sup>1</sup> in classic Greek not at all (in Xen. *Agcs.* xi. 11, the true reading is *τῷ μεγάλῳφρονι*), and seldom in later Greek (Schaefer, *ad Gregor. Cor.* p. 691). See also Bornemann, *Acta apost.* I. p. 222. *Καταχρησθαι*, however, often occurs in that sense with the accusative (Lucian, *Prom.* 4; Plut. *Demetr.* 23), and it may have been occasioned here by the writer's thinking of the compound verb. Comp. Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 157 f. [E. T. 181].

Vv. 31, 32. Lachmann places only a comma after *τούτου*, in which he is followed by Billroth, Rückert, Olshausen, and Maier. From *παράγει* on to *εἶναι* would thus form collectively a ground for the preceding *καὶ οἱ χρώμενοι κ.τ.λ.* This would be correct, if the foregoing words conveyed an exhortation, or if *ἵνα* in ver. 29 were dependent upon *τοῦτο δέ φημι*. Since, however, what is conveyed in the preceding statement is the *design of God*, the full stop after *τούτου* should be retained; the words from *παράγει* on to *τούτου* form thus a confirmatory addition to *οἱ χρώμενοι . . . καταχρώμενοι*, while *θέλω δέ*, again, marks the advance to some-

<sup>1</sup> Hence Fritzsche (*de conform.* Lachm. p. 31) rejects it as an error of the copyists.

thing new, to *what Paul, in view of this passing away of the fashion of this world, now desires of his readers, namely, that they should be ἀμέριμνοι, i.e. without worldly cares* (see vv. 33, 34). — *παράγει*] is *passing away*, in accordance with the *καιρὸς συνισταλμ.* in ver. 29. *Τὸ σχῆμα, habitus, i.e. status externus.* See Wetstein. It is not the transitory character of earthly things in general that is meant (so most of the older expositors and Billroth; comp. also Hofmann), but the expiry of the *αἶὼν οὗτος*, the end of which is the world-embracing catastrophe of the Parousia, the transformation of the form of this world, and therewith of its whole temporal constitution, into the new heaven and the new earth. Comp. 1 John ii. 17; Rev. xxi. 1; Rom. viii. 19 ff.; 2 Pet. iii. 10; Matt. v. 18. Grotius, Valckenaer, and Flatt are wrong in holding that the meaning is: “non manebunt, quae nunc sunt, res tranquillae, sed mutabuntur in turbidas,” and that the expression is taken from the language of the theatre (changing the scene, Eurip. *Ion*. 166; Lucian, *Herm.* 86). Our rendering is demanded by vv. 26, 29, and by the eschatological view of the N. T. generally. — *θέλω δὲ κ.τ.λ.*] Comp. *ἐγὼ δὲ ὑμ. φείδομαι* in ver. 28. — *τὰ τοῦ Κυρίου* (the cause of Christ) is more precisely defined by what follows. — The readings *ἀρέσει*, how he *shall please*, and *ἀρέσῃ*, how he *may please* (see Stallbaum, *ad Sympos.* p. 216 C; Fritzsche, *ad Marc.* p. 350), are equally suitable so far as the sense is concerned.

Ver. 34. Taking the reading *μεμέρ. κ. ἡ γυνὴ κ. ἡ παρθένος* (see the critical remarks), we have: *The wife, too, and the maiden are divided*,<sup>1</sup> i.e. they are severed from each other as regards their interests, are separate in what they care for, *personae, quae diversae trahuntur*. The way in which *μερίζεσθαι* is used (see Reiche, *Comment. crit.* I. p. 195) to denote division into different tendencies, views, party-positions, is well known (Matt. xii. 25, 26; Mark iii.

<sup>1</sup> If we adopt Lachmann's reading (defended especially by Hammond among the older expositors), which Ewald also follows (leaving out, however, the second *ἡ ἄγαμος*), the meaning will be: *The married man cares . . . how he may please his wife, and is divided* (in his interest). *And the unmarried wife* (widowed or divorced) *and the unmarried maiden cares*, etc. Hofmann, too, prefers this reading, taking the *καί*, which it has before *ἡ γυνή*, in the sense of *also*. The betrothed maiden, in his opinion, is no longer *ἄγαμος*. But in the whole context there is only the simple distinction made between married and unmarried persons. Betrothed maidens, too, belong to the latter class; comp. ver. 36: *γαμίζουσιν*.

24-26 ; Polybius, viii. 23. 9 ; Herodian, iii. 10. 6, iv. 3. 3) ; but the expression is *selected* here in reference to the different kinds of *μεριμνᾶν*. Theophylact says well : οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχουσι φροντίδα, ἀλλὰ μεμερισμένοι εἰσὶ ταῖς σπουδαῖς, καὶ ἡ μὲν περὶ ἄλλα σπουδάζει, ἡ δὲ περὶ ἄλλα. Comp. Theodoret. The simple rendering : “ *There is a difference* ” (Chrysostom, Luther, Grotius, Mosheim, Zachariae, Heydenreich, and others), would still conduct one back to the sense *divisa est*, but would give too general and meaningless an idea.—*Μεμέρ.* is in the *singular*, because it stands at the head of the sentence, and ἡ γυνὴ κ. ἡ παρθένος embraces the female sex as a whole made up of two halves. Comp. Kühner, II. p. 58 f. ; Bernhardt, p. 416 ; Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 110 f. [E. T. 126].—*ἵνα ᾗ ἁγία κ.τ.λ.*] Comp. 2 Cor. vii. 1. This moral consecration to God of her whole personality, which she strives after, is the *πὼς ἀρέσει τῷ Κυρίῳ explicated*. One can hardly conceive that Paul *avoided* the latter phrase on the ground of possible misconstruction (Hofmann). This, considering the sacredness of the idea of *ἀρέσκειν τῷ Κυρίῳ*, would be a piece of *prudery*, which is unlike him.

NOTE.—There is no ground for inferring from vv. 32-34 that Paul, himself unwedded, looked “ somewhat askance ” upon marriage (Rückert). To assume any such onesidedness of view on his part would be a very hasty proceeding (see on ver. 2). On the contrary, what we have here is not his view of *how, from the nature of the case, things must necessarily subsist*,<sup>1</sup> but only his *experience of how in point of fact they usually did subsist*. This experience he (ὁ ἄγαμος) had arrived at, on the one hand, by consideration of his own case and that of many other unmarried persons ; and, on the other, by observing the change of interests which was wont to set in with those who married. We have here, therefore, a purely *empirical* support for the preference of celibacy,—a preference, however, which with Paul is simply relative, depending upon the nearness of the Parousia and the end of the world, and also upon the subjective gift of being holy in body and spirit (comp. Acts xiv. 4). The expectation of these events being so near has remained unfulfilled, and thereby is invalidated the Pauline support which has been often found in our text for celibacy, which, as a legal requirement, is in principle thoroughly un-Pauline (comp. ver. 35).

<sup>1</sup> Paul himself, it is plain, had intercourse with numbers of eminent servants and handmaids of the Lord (Priscilla, etc.) who were married. This in opposition to Cröpp in the *Jahrb. f. Deutsche Theol.* 1866, p. 102.

The apostle, moreover, is speaking generally, and not to one special class among his readers.

Ver. 35. *Τοῦτο*] refers to the recommendation of single life contained in vv. 26–34. — *πρὸς τὸ ὑμ. αὐτῶν συμφ.*] *for your own advantage*. The genitive with *συμφέρον* used as a substantive, as in x. 33; see Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Rep.* p. 338 C. — *οὐχ ἵνα κ.τ.λ.*] explaining more in detail, negatively and positively, the *πρὸς . . . συμφέρον*. *To cast a noose upon one* is a figurative expression, originally borrowed from the chase (less probably, from warfare), for the idea of *depriving of freedom* (bringing under binding and limiting relations). Comp. Prov. vii. 21, and see Wetstein and Loesner *in loc.* The sense of “giving occasion to scruples” (Billroth, comp. Bengel) does not correspond so well with the figure and the connection. — *ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ εὖσχ. κ.τ.λ.*] *but to promote the habit of comeliness and undivided waiting upon the Lord* (in faithfulness to Christ). For this habit prevailed chiefly, according to the apostle’s experience, on the side of the *ἄγαμοι*; see vv. 32–34, where, too, he makes it clear beyond doubt *what comeliness* he means here—namely, such a manifestation of the inner life in all outward embodiment, as corresponds with consecration to the Lord. It is not merely *chastity* in the narrower sense that is intended, but all moral purity and consecration in so far as these manifest themselves in demeanour, in speech, gesture, bearing, etc., as the *comely form* of Christian life, as the ethical “*decorum*” of the Christian. Its sacred nature and the foul contrasts to it are set forth in Rom. xiii. 13, 14.—The dative of appropriation, *τῷ Κυρίῳ* and *ἀπερισπ.*, are conjoined with the *εὐπάρ.*, used as a substantive, to make up the unity of the idea.—*εὐπάρεδρος* does not occur elsewhere. Hesychius explains it by *καλῶς παραμένον*. — *ἀπερισπ.*] “*absque distractione, i.e. ἄνευ τοῦ μεριμᾶν τὰ τοῦ κόσμου*,” Kypke, II. p. 207. Comp. *περισπᾶσθαι*, Luke x. 40. Regarding the connection of the word with the later Greek, see Lobeck, *ad Phryg.* p. 415. Xenophon, *Ages.* i. 4, has *ἀδιασπᾶστος*. The adverb attaches itself to *εὐπάρ.*, defining its meaning precisely. See on xii. 28.

Ver. 36. *Ἄε*] introduces something opposed to the *εὖσχημον*. — *ἀσχημονεῖν*] means *ἀσχήμονα εἶναι* (comp. *εὖσχημονεῖν* = *εὖσχήμονα εἶναι*, Plat. *Legg.* v. p. 732 C), and may therefore be explained either in the *active* sense (to *act dishonourably*, conduct oneself in

a dishonourable way, Plato, *Pol.* vi. p. 506 D, *Theact.* p. 165 B; Xen. *de re eq.* xi. 6; Herodian, v. 8. 16; Lucian, *de sacrif.* 7), or in the *passive* sense (*to have dishonour*, Eur. *Hec.* 407; Herodian, viii. 3. 21; Deut. xxv. 5; Ezek. xvi. 7). The former of the two interpretations is the common and the correct one, namely: *if any one thinks that he is acting dishonourably towards his virgin* (daughter or ward), *i.e.* if he thinks that he is bringing disgrace upon her; which means, however, not the disgrace of *old maidenhood* (see Soph. *Ant.* 810 ff., *O. Rex.* 1492 ff.; Eur. *Hcl.* 291; comp. Ecclus. xlii. 9; and Lenep, *ad Phalar.* p. 362), but the dishonour of *seduction*, which the father or guardian fears he may give occasion to by refusing permission to marry; see the following context (against Theodoret: ὁ δὲ τὴν ἀγαμίαν ἀκοσμίαν ὑπολαμβάνων, Theophylact, *al.*). Taking it in the *passive* sense, we have: *if any one thinks to have disgrace in respect of his virgin* (from seduction, or her being left unwedded). So in substance the Syriac ("despici"), Grotius, Mosheim, Zachariae, Heydenreich, Pott, Neander; comp. Hofmann, who holds that what is here expressed is *the matter of fact of its being the father's fault* that the daughter remains unmarried. But even apart from the consideration that ἀσχημ. is *most commonly* found in the active meaning (see also xiii. 5), there is this against the second rendering, that ἐπί with the accusative takes for granted that ἀσχημονεῖν implies *activity*, since it states the *direction in which* it is exerted (comp. ἀσχημονεῖν εἰς τινα, Dion. Hal. ii. 26).—νομίζει] "Si perspecto filiae suae ingenio judicet, coelibatui non esse aptam," Calvin. — εἰ δὲ τις ἀσχημονεῖν, κ.τ.λ. is supposed: *in case she pass her time, pass the highest point of her youthful bloom.* As regards the ἀκμή itself, see Plato, *Rep.* p. 460 E: ἀρ' οὖν σοι ξυνδοκεῖ μέτριος χρόνος ἀκμῆς τὰ εἴκοσιν ἔτη γυναικί, ἀνδρὶ δὲ τὰ τριάκοντα, and Stallbaum, *ad hunc loc.*; other definitions of the age may be seen in Locella, *ad Xen. Eph.* p. 145. Paul's opinion is, that *before* the ἀκμή is reached the ἀσχημονεῖν . . . νομίζει is not likely to take place with the father or guardian of the girl; but, judging from experience, he conceived that the maiden who is ὑπέρακμος would be more ready to yield to a lover, if she is not allowed to marry. Respecting the word ὑπέρακμ., which is not found in ancient Greek, see Eustath. *Il.* i. p. 11, 31; *Od.*

p. 1915, 29. The classical writers use instead of it the perfect of παρακμάζειν, as in Xen. *Mem.* iv. 4. 23; or the adjective παρακμαστική, as in Galen, VI. p. 312, 14. — καὶ οὕτως ὀφείλει γίνεσθαι] depends on the εἰ:<sup>1</sup> and if so (namely, that the virgin marry), it must be. Thus there is added to the subjective condition of things, expressed in δέ τις ἀσχημ. κ.τ.λ., the corresponding (not heterogeneous, as Hofmann objects) objective condition on the part of the maiden, whose natural temperament makes marriage needful. It is quite akin to the German phrase: und wenn's nicht anders sein kann [and if it cannot be otherwise]; the expression has a somewhat euphemistic turn, as referring to the daughter's inclination to marriage, which determines the ὀφείλει. According to Rückert, κ. οὕτ. ὀφ. γίν. depends upon εἰ: and she must remain so (i.e. unwedded). But the indicative ὀφείλει is decisive against this rendering; and what an amount of straining is needed to make γίνεσθαι equivalent to remain! for she is unwedded, and, if she so remains, cannot become so. — ὁ θέλει ποιεῖτω] not: let him do what pleases him (so ordinarily; but this is contrary to the context; see what follows, and the preceding ὀφείλει), but: let him do what he intends (to give his virgin in marriage). Theodoret puts it well: τὸ δοκοῦν πραττέτω. — γαμεῖ(τωσαν) namely, the virgin and he who wishes to have her. It is arbitrary, considering the general form of the whole discussion (ver. 25), to maintain, as Rückert does, that the plural refers to a particular couple respecting whom the Corinthians had asked a question. Wolf, Heydenreich, and others adopt a needlessly harsh assumption, that Paul passes here from the singular to the plural (the virgins). Billroth again propounds the very unlikely view that "the youths" should be supplied here as the subject, and αὐτήν as the object.

Ver. 37. *He who, on the other hand, stands stedfast in his heart,* is of a stedfast and unchangeable mind, firm in disposition and

<sup>1</sup> Theophylact begins the apodosis with καὶ οὕτως: γίνεσθαι, φησὶ, καὶ οὕτω. πῶς; ὁ εἶλεν ποιεῖτω. In that case κ. οὕτως ὀφ. γίν. would be quite superfluous, the καὶ deprived of its reference, and οὐχ ἁμαρτ. would not suit the obligatory ὀφείλει. Similarly Hofmann, who follows the same view, paraphrasing it thus: "This too (?) is a necessity arising from the nature of the case, that he do what he will." Laurent also makes καὶ οὕτως ὀφ. γίν. the apodosis, expounding it to mean: so it must be in this case also. The clauses which follow he considers explanatory; and καὶ must go back for its reference all the way to ver. 9: not merely in the case of the πυρεῖσθαι.

resolution. Comp. xv. 58; Col. i. 23, iv. 12. — *μὴ ἔχων ἀνάγκην*] *without having constraint* (objective necessity), as he, in ver. 36, whom the natural temperament of his virgin causes to fear the *ἀσχημονεῖν* before explained. — *ἐξουσίαν δὲ ἔχει κ.τ.λ.*] contrasted with the *μὴ ἔχ. ἀνάγκ.* (δέ, *but rather*) as the correlative positive state of free disposal in respect of what he himself wills. Strictly speaking, therefore, we should have the participle here, but instead, there is again a change in the construction. Comp. on iv. 14; Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 327 f. [E. T. 382]. — *τοῦτο*] is not explained—though this is the *common* supposition—by the infinitive which follows; were that the case, we should have *τὸ τηρεῖν*, or (as in *Od.* i. 82; 1 Thess. iv. 3; Jas. i. 27, *al.*) the simple infin. (comp. the critical remarks). But Paul leaves the reader to gather from the connection what is meant by *τοῦτο* (namely, *not giving the maiden in marriage*). The *design* of this *τοῦτο κέκρικεν* (*conclusum habet*) is then declared by *τοῦ τηρεῖν*: *in order to keep* (to preserve in her maidenly state) *his own maiden*. And this is not a mere periphrasis for not giving in marriage (as de Wette objects), but rather the design which the father or guardian has in his *τοῦτο κέκρικεν*, *by virtue of his right to dispose of his own child*: observe the emphatic *τὴν αὐτοῦ παρθένον*. That *the maiden's will* should be left entirely out of account by Paul, can surprise no one who is aware of the power given to fathers among the Jews (comp. Ewald, *Alterth.* p. 267) and Greeks (Herm. *Privatalterth.* § 30. 2 ff.). — *καλῶς ποιεῖ*] in the sense of action, *morally right*, the positive side of the *οὐχ ἁμαρτάνει* of ver. 36, and in so far stronger here; hence, too, it is represented in ver. 38 by *κρεῖσσον ποιεῖ* in relation to the *καλῶς ποιεῖ*, which is equivalent to *οὐχ ἁμαρτάνει*.

Ver. 38. Result of vv. 36, 37, *καὶ . . . καί, as well . . . as also*. Paul had thought of saying *καλῶς ποιεῖ* in the second clause also, but thereupon *strengthens his expression* (*κρεῖσσον*) so as to correspond with the *relations* of the two predicates, *οὐχ ἁμαρτ.* in ver. 36, and *καλῶς ποιεῖ* in ver. 37. — *ὁ ἐγγαμ.*] *he who marries her* (his virgin, ver. 37) *out* (gives her out of his family in marriage). This going “out” is not taken into account in the second clause. — *κρεῖσσον*] for see ver. 34. Regarding *ἐγγαμ.*, comp. Matt. xxiv. 38; it is not preserved in Greek writers.

Vv. 39, 40. An appended rule respecting second marriage



on the part of women, occasioned probably by questions from the Corinthians. — *δέδεται*] *sc. τῷ ἀνδρί*; she may not separate herself from him and marry another. Comp. ver. 27; Rom. vii. 2. — *ὃ θέλει γαμηθῆναι*] *to whom she desires to be married*. Comp. Mark x. 12. *Γαμεῖ μὲν γὰρ ὁ ἀνὴρ, γαμεῖται δὲ ἡ γυνή*, *Schol. ad Eur. Med.* 593. As regards the later form *γαμηθῆναι*, instead of the Attic *γαμεθῆναι*, see Lobeck, *ad Phryn.* p. 742. — *μόνον ἐν Κυρίῳ*] *only in the Lord*, not apart from Christ as the specifically determining element of the new union; *only in a Christian way*, *i.e. only to a Christian*, *s.c. let her be married*.<sup>1</sup> So among the early interpreters, Tertullian, Cyprian, Ambrosiaster, Jerome, Theodoret, Grotius (who puts it happily: *intra ecclesiam*), Estius, *al.*, or also Olshausen and de Wette. This does not run counter to ver. 12 ff., where, in fact, *those* mixed marriages are meant which date from *the pre-Christian period*, and in which only one spouse has become Christian. Chrysostom, Theophylact, Calvin, Beza, Calovius, Wolf, and others, including Pott, Platt, Heydenreich, Billroth, Rückert, Osiander, Neander, Maier, Ewald, all understand the phrase to mean: *in a Christian spirit, acting as a Christian should*, in the fear of the Lord, etc. (several of the above-named interpreters, as Platt, Rückert, Osiander, Neander, Maier, include also the point that the husband must be a Christian, or lay the chief stress upon this, as Hofmann and Weiss). But what we have here is plainly a limitation of the *ὃ θέλει* so emphatically put first. Moreover, the wider and more general the meaning ascribed to *ἐν Κυρίῳ*, the more inappropriate it seems in connection with the foregoing definite rules, which all take for granted that the action is Christian. — *μακαριωτ.*] *more blessed*, *i.e. not merely more spared from troubles* (vv. 26, 28), but, in accordance with the higher reference which *μακάρι.* invariably has in the N. T., enjoying the blessed relation, which arises out of withdrawal from worldly cares and self-surrender to Christ. See vv. 32–34. As to greater blessedness *in heaven*, which some have dragged in here in the interests of celibacy (Ambrosiaster, Cornelius a Lapide, *al.*, including Hirscher, *Moral.* III. p. 502), there is not a word of that in the text, even if we should read *ἔσται* in place of *ἐστίν*. — *κατὰ τ. ἐμὴν γνώμην*] *ἐμὴν* carries the emphasis of apostolic self-conscious-

<sup>1</sup> Paul's view, therefore, is not in accordance with the legislative permission of marriage between Christians and Jews.

ness. — *δοκῶ δὲ καὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.*] so that I therefore may expect you to regard my opinion, not as a mere individual judgment, but as arrived at under the influence of the Holy Spirit which is imparted (*ἔχειν*) to me also, and hence as worthy to be received and followed.—Respecting *δοκῶ*, *mihi videor*, the note of Estius may suffice: “minus dicit, plus volens intelligi.” Comp. iv. 9.—*καὶ γὰρ*] like other teachers who have received His gifts.—In the two expressions coming together—of which *δοκῶ* has a touch of irony (comp. Dissen, *ad Dem. de Cor.* p. 230 f.)—there is implied a side-glance, but whether precisely to the *Petrine party* (Neander, Rübiger, *al.*) may be doubted. It is safer to say generally: to opponents of his full standing as an apostle in Corinth. Comp. Calvin.

## CHAPTER VIII.

VER. 2. *δέ*] is wanting in A B  $\aleph$ , min. several vss. and Fathers. Deleted by Lachm. Rück. and Tisch., as Griesb., too, had recommended. Added for the sake of connection, as was also *γάρ* (after the first *οὐτε*) in ver. 8, which is omitted likewise in A B  $\aleph$  17, *al.* — *εἰδέναι*] It is true that A B D E F G  $\aleph$ , min. Clem. Nyss. Theodoret, Damasc. have *ἐγνωκέναι* (recommended by Griesb., adopted by Lachm. Rück. and Tisch.); but what goes before it and what follows make it clear that *ἐγν.* is a gloss. The reading *εἶναι*, too, in 39, 91, 109, tells in favour of *εἰδέναι*. — *οὐδέπω οὐδὲν ἔγνωκε*] Lachm. and Rück. have *οὐπω ἔγνω*, which was recommended by Griesb. in accordance with testimony of very considerable weight, in substance the same as that in favour of *ἐγνωκέναι* instead of *εἰδέναι*. But the peculiarity of the emphatic *Recepta* does not show the hand of a gloss-writer. What has taken place has rather been the reduction of the original reading to the simple *οὐπω ἔγνω*, at first, perhaps, by omitting the superfluous *οὐδὲν*, all the more readily that it was preceded by *οὐδέπω*, whereupon *ἔγνωκε* became transformed into *ἔγνω*, either from the next word beginning with K, or by the influence of the inf. *γινῶναι* which follows, while *οὐδέπω* was displaced, as in many other cases (John vii. 39; Luke xxiii. 53; Acts viii. 16), by the more familiar *οὐπω*. — Ver. 4. *ἕτερος*] is wanting in A B D E F G  $\aleph^*$  min., with several vss. and Fathers. Condemned by Mill and Griesb., deleted by Lachm. and Rück. But why should any one have added *ἕτερος*? That it should be omitted, on the other hand, was all the more likely, because the word seemed superfluous, and might even appear offensive ("there is no other God but one" might by possibility mean: "*there is but one other God*"). — Ver. 7. *τῇ συνειδῇσει*] Lachm. and Rück. read *τῇ συνηθείᾳ*, with A B  $\aleph$ , some min. Copt. Bashm. Aeth. Syr. p. (on the margin) Damasc. Approved also by Griesb. and Rinck. *τῇ συνειδῇσει*, however, as the more difficult reading, should be retained. See also Reiche, *Comment. crit.* I. p. 200 ff. It was noted on the margin how the *συνειδήσις τοῦ εἰδώλου* arose, namely, by *τῇ συνηθείᾳ*, and then this phrase easily crept into the place of the original *τ. συνειδ.*—It is preferable, however, to put *ἕως ἄρτι* before *τοῦ εἰδώλου* (Lachm. Rück. Tisch.), with B D E F G  $\aleph$  31, 37, 116, and several vss. and Fathers; in the *Recepta* we have

transposition in the interest of the construction. — Ver. 8. *παρίστησι*] A B  $\aleph$ , min. Copt. Bashm. Clem. Origen (twice), Athan. Cyr. Damasc. have *παρστήσει*. Recommended by Griesb., adopted by Lachm. Rück. and Tisch. Rightly; the presents which follow gave rise to the same tense here. *Συνίστησι*, which has but weak support, is a gloss.—There is considerable evidence (especially A B  $\aleph$ ) in favour of omitting the *γάρ*, and putting the negative clause first in what follows (Lachm. Tisch.). The transcriber would have a mechanical inclination to place the positive half of the statement first. — Ver. 9. There is decisive evidence for reading *ἀσθενέειν* instead of the *Recepta* *ἀσθενούσιν*. — Ver. 11. *καὶ ἀπολείται*] In place of *καί*, A has *οὐ*, after the verb (so Rück.), while B  $\aleph^*$  17, Copt. Bashm. Goth. Clem. have *γάρ*, which is adopted by Lachm. and Tisch. The last of the three readings is the true one; *γάρ* not being understood, was explained in some cases by *καί*, in others by *οὐ*. Instead of *ἀπολείται*, read with Lachm. Rück. and Tisch. *ἀπόλλυται*, on the authority of A B D\*  $\aleph$ , several min. Copt. Goth. Clem. Bas. Antioch. Chrys. Theodoret, and Damasc. The future arises from a mechanical alteration of the text after *οικοδομηθ*. — *ἀδελφός*] Lachm. Rück. and Tisch. have *ὁ ἀδελφός* after *γνώσει*, which has conclusive evidence in its favour. The *Recepta* originated in a mistaken attempt to help out the construction. — *ἐπὶ*] Lachm. Rück. and Tisch. read *ἐν*, which is supported by decisive testimony.

CONTENTS.—To eat flesh offered to idols is a thing morally indifferent for all who understand rightly what an idol is (vv. 1–6). Still, for the sake of those who are more weak, we should refrain from so eating, if it is a stumbling-block to them (vv. 7–13).

Ver. 1. *Ἀέ*] marks the transition to a *new* subject, which the queries from Corinth led the apostle to discuss. — *περὶ τῶν εἰδωλοθ*.] Since this is taken up again in ver. 4, it is clear that vv. 1–3 cannot form an independent series of thoughts (Hofmann), but that ver. 3 is the *close* of a *logical parenthesis* (not a *grammatical* one, because at what is its true beginning the construction undergoes no interruption). It is not to be made to *begin* at *ὅτι* (*for*) *πάντες*, as is done by Luther, Bos, Er. Schmid, Raphel, Wolf, Bengel, Valckenaer, and others, among whom are Olshausen and Maier; for the fact that *ἡ γυνῶσις φυσιοῖ* stands unconnected with what precedes it, and the sense of *ὅτι* in ver. 4 (*that*), are decisive against this. The true commencement is only at *ἡ γυνῶσις φυσιοῖ* (so, with older commentators, Pott, Rückert, de

Wette, Osiander, Ewald, Neander; Billroth is undecided on the point), so that the preceding *γνώσιν ἔχομεν* has very naturally given occasion to the warnings which begin with *ἡ γνώσις φυσιοῦ*. — *εἰδωλόθυτα*, *things offered to idols*, *κρέα εἰδωλόθυτα*, 4 Macc. v. 1, are those parts of the animals offered in heathen sacrifices, which remained over after the priests had received their share, and which were either consumed in the temple or at home in connection with sacrificial feasts (Doughty, *Anal.* I. p. 234 ff.; Hermann, *gottesd. Alterth.* § xxviii. 22), or else (by poor or miserly persons) sold in the flesh market. Comp. on Acts xv. 20.<sup>1</sup> The Christians might thus easily come to eat such meat, either through being invited to a feast by heathen acquaintances (x. 27), or, again, by buying it in the market (x. 25), and thereby offence would be given to scrupulous consciences; while, on the other hand, those of a freer spirit, and with more of Paul's own mode of thinking, might be apt to make light of the matter, and withal forget how a Christian ought to spare the weak. To assign the strong and the weak to one or other of the four *parties* respectively, is, to say the least of it, a very uncertain process, whether we are disposed to find the former in the Christ-party (Olshausen, Jaeger) or in the Apollonians (Räbiger). As regards the weak, see ver. 7, and the remark subjoined to it. — *οἶδαμεν*] should not be joined directly with *περὶ κ.τ.λ.*, but the latter clause is to be taken as in vii. 1: *Now, as respects meat offered to idols, we know that*, etc. Hofmann, following Semler, but in the face of all the Versions and Fathers, reads *οἶδα μὲν* (*I know, indeed, that*), by which he gains nothing but a *μὲν solitarium*, which would be all the more uncalled for, seeing that the corresponding antithetic clause, where he ought to find *ἡ δὲ γνώσις*, follows immediately. There is still less reason here for writing it as two words than in Rom. vii. 14, where it is, in point of fact, succeeded by a *δέ*. The *subject* of *οἶδαμεν* consists of all those, besides the apostle himself, of whom the *γνώσιν ἔχομεν*

<sup>1</sup> Paul, however, makes no reference to the decree of the apostles either here or elsewhere, which is in keeping with his consciousness of his own direct and independent apostolic dignity. Comp. on Acts *loc. cit.*, and on Gal., *Introd.* § 3. Moreover, this very chapter, along with chap. x., shows plainly that, in virtue of his independent position as an apostle, he had early enough shaken himself clear of all applications of the temporary agreement come to at Jerusalem which might conflict, upon points in themselves indifferent, with the principles elsewhere enunciated by him, although coupling this with a wise forbearance towards those who were weak in the faith.

holds good, that is to say, of *Paul and the* (as regards this point) *more enlightened* Christians: *I and those like myself* in this. Theophylact puts it rightly (comp. Chrysostom): *πρὸς τοὺς τελείους διαλέγεται, ἀφείδους τοὺς ἀτελεστέρους*. Since *οἶδαμεν* and *ἔχομεν* must have one and the same subject, Rückert is wrong in taking the first indefinitely: *it is well known*. Olshausen understands it of *all Christians*, and seeks to remove the contradiction between that and ver. 7 in this way: he distinguishes *γνώσις* and *ἡ γνώσις*, making the former to be *a certain ground of knowledge* in general; the latter, *the specific knowledge of how the form and the power of idolatry stand related to each other*. But the *γνώσις* in ver. 1, although without the article, has been already defined very exactly as regards its contents by *περὶ τ. εἰδωλ.*, and still more by ver. 4, so that *ἡ γνώσις* in ver. 7 can mean nothing else but *the γνώσις under discussion*; consequently the contradiction would remain. De Wette's exposition is better; he holds that in ver. 1 Paul is speaking quite generally, and, as it were, theoretically (comp. also Ewald), while in ver. 7 he refers specially to the Corinthians. But such a theoretic generality would have needed to be expressed by the first person alone *without πάντες*, if the *οὐκ ἐν πᾶσιν* in ver. 7 were to have any logical pertinence; while, on the other hand, if we are to maintain that general meaning in ver. 1 as it stands, we should have arbitrarily to insert into the *πάντες* there the unexpressed idea, "*properly speaking, all Christians as such*" (Ewald), or to give to the *ἔχομεν* the sense of "*should have*."<sup>1</sup> Others, following Er. Schmid ("we at Corinth are all wise enough"), regard *the Corinthians* as the subject, and take (Nösselt, *Opuscula*, II. p. 152, Rosenmüller, Pott, Heydenreich, Flatt) the words *περὶ . . . ἔχομεν*, and then *ὅτι οὐδὲν εἰδωλον* in ver. 4 on to ver. 6, as quotations from the Corinthian letter, the refutation of which begins with ver. 7. But this is unnatural; for in that case Paul would have brought the passage *ἡ γνώσις φυσιοῖ κ.τ.λ.*, on to ver. 3, into his refutation as well. Further, it is contrary to the apostle's habitual way of writing, for he always marks out the words of an opponent as such by some formula; and lastly, it is quite unnecessary, seeing that the supposed contradiction between ver. 1 and ver. 7 vanishes on considering the change of person (from the *first* in ver. 1 to the *third* in ver. 7).—

<sup>1</sup> So Elwert, *Progr., Quaestiones ad philol. sacram. N. T.*, Tübing. 1860, p. 17.

γνώσῳ] have *knowledge*; of *what?* is plain from the context, namely, of the way in which flesh offered to idols should be regarded. The contents of the statement are more fully expressed in ver. 4.

Vv. 1-3. Now follows the caveat inserted parenthetically with a view to γνώσῳ ἔχομεν. — The *article* turns the abstract γνώσις into a noun appellative. — The *knowledge* (in and by itself, namely) puffeth up (iv. 6, v. 2); but the love (to the brethren; comp. Rom. xiv. 14, 15) edifieth (x. 23), furthers the progress of the church (viewed as οἰκοδομή Θεοῦ, see iii. 9) towards Christian perfection. It is, indeed, the necessary ἡγεμονικόν to the effectively sympathetic and humble application of the knowledge. Comp. chap. xiii., especially ver. 4. — Vv. 2 and 3 explain the preceding statement, both from the wrong nature of the supposed knowledge and from the preciousness of love to God. — Since the γνώσις in and by itself, divorced from love, is never a real knowledge, but only such as a man fancies himself to have (iii. 18), Paul characterizes here what he before designated by ἡ γνώσις as a δοκεῖν εἰδέναι τι; and since the love to the brethren does not essentially differ from the love to God, but is simply its expression in the fellowship of believers, he now characterizes the former as ἀγαπᾶν τὸν Θεόν. One can hardly mistake the impress of deep and pregnant meaning in this whole passage, so like the manner of John, especially in his Epistles. — τί] *anything whatever*, any object of the γνώσις. Pott and Flatt interpret: *something wonderful*; but this does not correspond so well with the sententious character of the verse. — οὐδέπω κ.τ.λ.] he knows *nothing at all as yet* in such a way as to bring it under the name of knowledge, as that must by moral necessity be constituted from the Christian standpoint. The conceit of knowledge is onesided, superficial, partial, false, unpractical, in its character. In order to the γινῶναι καθὼς δεῖ we must of necessity have love, which regulates the knowledge morally, gives it proper depth, and makes it practically salutary. Comp. xiii. 2. As regards the repetition of the negative (Luke xxiii. 53; John xix. 41; Acts viii. 16), comp. Schömann, *ad Is.* p. 469; Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Crat.* p. 398 E). — Ver. 3. οὗτος] with emphasis: *he*, to the exclusion of the other who prides himself on his knowledge. — ἔγνωσται ὑπ' αὐτοῦ] This is rationalized by

Billroth in his usual fashion into: "*God recognises Himself in him*;" but it means simply: this man *is known by Him*. The statement is a pregnant one. Instead of making it logically complete by saying: "it holds good of such a man not merely that he *knows* in the true sense, but also that he *is known* of God," the apostle states simply the latter and greater truth, which of itself implies the former. The *ἐγνωσται ὑπ' αὐτοῦ* shows the *importance and preciousness* of the love spoken of, in accordance with its *holiness*; for if God *knows* a man, that implies a relation between God and him of no indifferent or ineffective kind, but an *activity* of God, which *passes over* to the man, so that he as the object of the divine knowledge experiences also the efficacy of the *disposition* in and with which God knows him, of His love, gracious care, etc. The idea, therefore, is that of the *effective* divine knowledge, which becomes part of the inner *experience* of the man, and which is the *causa salutis*,<sup>1</sup> so that God in thus knowing the man carries out that saving fellowship with him, which was purposed in His own counsel, Ps. i. 6; Gal. iv. 9; 2 Tim. ii. 19. Comp. Hofmann, *Schriftbeweis*, I. p. 258 ff. See also on xiii. 12. Other interpreters supply the thought *ut suum discipulum* (Erasmus) or *inter filios* (Calvin), and the like. Comp. Usteri, *Lehrbegriff*, p. 283. But that is to *insert* a meaning not in the text. Others, again, take it as *approbatus est* (Piscator, Clericus, Gataker, Grotius, Wolf, Mosheim, Semler, Morus, Vater, *al.*, following Fathers in Suicer, *Thes.* I. p. 762). But this is as much against linguistic usage (see on Rom. vii. 15) as Augustine's *edoctus est* (so, too, Beza, Pareus, Er. Schmid, and others, including Nösselt, Rosenmüller, Heydenreich, Pott, Flatt), so that the passive would correspond to a Hophal. Olshausen's mysterious fancy is contrary to the whole context, which demands the simple conception of *knowing*; he finds in *γινώσκειν* (as in γγ', see on Matt. i. 25) the *bridal* (?) relation of the soul to God.

Ver. 4. *Οὖν* *igitur*, takes up again the interrupted statement (ver. 1); comp. xi. 20, and see on Mark iii. 31, and Baeumlein, *Partik.* p. 177. — *τῆς βρώσ. τ. εἰδ.*] more precise definition of the

<sup>1</sup> Comp. *Constit. ap.* v. 16. 3: *μὴ γινώσκοντες*; Θεὸν διὰ τοῦ κηρύγματος πιστεύσαντες ἔγνωτε αὐτόν, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐγνώσθητε ὑπ' αὐτοῦ διὰ Ἰησοῦ τοῦ σωτῆρος κ. λυτρωτοῦ τῶν ἐλπιζόντων ἰπ' αὐτόν.



indefinite τῶν εἰδωλοθ., ver. 1. There is no reason any more than formerly for writing οἶδαμεν here as οἶδα μὲν with Hofmann. — ὅτι οὐδὲν εἶδωλ. ἐν κόσμῳ] *that there is not an idol in the world.* Paul's meaning here is not: what the heathen adore as gods is something absolutely without existence (see, on the contrary, ver. 5 and x. 20); but: no heathen god exists as the being which the heathen supposes him to be; and so there is no adequate reality, corresponding to the heathen conception of a god Jupiter, Apollo, etc. Most of the old interpreters, with the Vulgate, Luther, and Beza (also more recently, Michaelis, Rosenmüller, Flatt, Heydenreich), took οὐδὲν to mean *nil*: "that an idol is a nonentity." Comp. Jer. x. 3; Isa. xli. 24, *al.*, Addit. to Esth. iv. 8; Sanhedr. f. 63. 2: "Noverant utique Israelitae, *idolum nihil esse.*" Comp. also Joseph. *Antt.* viii. 13. 6. But this must be held incorrect, seeing that ἐν τ. κόσμῳ does not harmonize with it, and because of the parallel expression οὐδεὶς Θεός. — καὶ ὅτι οὐδεὶς κ.τ.λ.] *and that there is no other God but one.* The εἰ μὴ refers simply to οὐδεὶς Θεός, not to ἕτερος. See on Gal. i. 19.

Vv. 5, 6. Confirmatory elucidation of the preceding statement ὅτι οὐδὲν εἶδωλον . . . εἰ μὴ εἷς.

Ver. 5. *For* (γάρ) *even* (καί) *if really* (εἴπερ, see Hartung, *Partikell.* I. p. 343; Baeumlein, *Partik.* p. 202) *there exist so-called gods, whether in heaven or on earth.* Heathenism conceived heaven and earth to be filled with beings whom they called gods (Jupiter, Apollo, and so forth; gods of the woods and the rivers, etc.). Paul does not admit the existence of such gods,<sup>1</sup> but merely *supposes* it, and that with καὶ εἴπερ, *i.e.* *even in the case that, if there be in reality, if after all,* whereby of course "in incerto relinquitur, utrum jure an injuria sumatur" (Hermann, *ad Viger.* p. 834), this, however, not being implied in εἴπερ by itself, but by the connection in which it stands here. Comp. Rom. viii. 9, 17, etc.; and see Baeumlein, *l.c.* The supposed case—the reality of which is still left to stand on its own footing—is then established, so far as its possibility is concerned, by ὥσπερ κ.τ.λ.: *as there are, indeed, gods many and lords many.* What is conceded here is the premiss from which that

<sup>1</sup> We know from x. 20 that he did not allow that the gods as such existed at all, but held those beings regarded as gods to be *demons*. Comp. Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 279.

possibility may be drawn as a consequence. If there exist, that is to say, a multitude of superhuman beings, who come under the category of *θεοί* (in the wider sense) and *κύριοι*, then we must admit that it is possible that those whom the heathen call gods—Jupiter, Apollo, and so on—have an actual existence.<sup>1</sup> The *θεοὶ πολλοί* and *κύριοι πολλοί* are, as the connection necessarily leads us to understand, not human rulers, deified kings, and the like, but the *superhuman powers* (angels), of whom it is said in Deut. x. 17: ὁ γὰρ Κύριος ὁ Θεὸς ὑμῶν, οὗτος Θεὸς τῶν θεῶν καὶ Κύριος τῶν κυρίων. Comp. Ps. cxxxvi. 2, 3. Most commentators take *εἰσὶ* as said *e gentiliū persuasione* (so Pott, Flatt, Heydenreich, de Wette, Ewald, Neander, Maier), which would give as the sense of the whole: “*if there be in reality so-called gods among the heathen, as, indeed, they speak of many gods and lords*” (de Wette). But this explanation runs counter to the fact that *εἰσὶ* is put first with emphasis; and the *e gentiliū persuasione* is neither expressed nor hinted at in the text, but is a pure insertion of the commentators, and that with the less warrant, seeing that it is the emphatic *ἡμῖν* in the apodosis that first introduces a contrast with others. This applies, too, against the arbitrary distinction made by Billroth, who maintains that only the first *εἰσὶ* denotes real existence (the *λεγόμε. θεοί* being *demons*, x. 20), while with the second we should supply: *in the view of the heathen*. Rückert takes both the first and second *εἰσὶ* in the right sense, but makes *εἴπερ* mean,—contrary to the rules of the language,—*although it must be conceded that* (which is not its meaning even in such passages as those given by Kühner, II. § 824, note 2), and supposes that the apostle conceived the angels and demons to be the realities answering to the *λεγόμε. θεοί*.<sup>2</sup> — As regards *καὶ εἰ*, *etiam, tum, si*, which marks the contents of the conditional

<sup>1</sup> The meaning of the verse, therefore, freely rendered, would be: *For even if we suppose that the gods of the heathen mythology have a real existence, which is no such absurd supposition, seeing that there is not merely One God and One Lord* (in the wider sense of these words), *but gods many and lords many*: still for us Christians, etc., ver. 6. Hofmann agrees substantially with our exposition of the passage. See also his *Schriftbew.* I. p. 348.

<sup>2</sup> There is no ground whatever for bringing in the demons here from x. 20 (this in opposition to Olshausen and others). The second part of the verse, which makes no further mention of *λεγομένοις θεοῖς*, should have sufficed of itself to prevent this; still more the correlation in which the many gods and lords stand to the *εἰς θεός* and *εἷς Κύριος* in ver. 6.

clause as *uncertain*, comp. on Mark xiv. 29 ; and see Hermann, *ad Viger.* p. 832 ; Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Apol.* p. 32 A. It is here the "*etiamsi de re in cogitatione posita*," Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* I. p. 884. Examples of *καὶ γὰρ εἰ*, *for even if*, may be seen in Hartung, *Partikell.* I. p. 141.

Ver. 6. Apodosis : *yet have we Christians but one God, the Father*, etc. Therefore : οἶδαμεν ὅτι οὐδὲν εἰδωλον κ.τ.λ. The ἐστίν to be supplied after ἡμῖν is the simple verb substantive. — ἀλλ'] as in iv. 15. — Θεὸς ὁ πατήρ] might be *taken together* here as *forming one conception*, like Κύριος ὁ Θεός (Fritzsche, *ad Matt.* p. 168) ; it agrees better, however, with the εἰς Κύριος I. X. which follows, to understand ὁ πατήρ as in apposition to Θεός and defining it more precisely. By ὁ πατήρ, and the relative definitions of it which follow, the εἰς Θεός has its specific character assigned to it, and that in such a way as to make the reader feel, from the relation of the One God to the world, and from his own relation to Him, how the Christian, despite that *plurality* of gods, comes to rest in the thought of the *unity* of God, and how idols are with him put out of account altogether. Comp. Hofmann, *Schriftbew.* I. p. 348. — ὁ πατήρ] in the *Christian* sense, according to the idea of the *υἰοθεσία* of Christians. Rom. viii. 15 ; Gal. iii. 26. — ἐξ οὗ τὰ πάντα] as to primary origin. See on Rom. xi. 36. — καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰς αὐτόν] *i.e.* *and we Christians are destined to serve His purposes* : He is our *End*. Here again, after the καί, we have the deviation from the relative construction, common with the apostle from his preference for direct address. Comp. on vii. 13. Bernhardt, p. 304. It is arbitrary to take εἰς in such a narrow sense as is given to it by Piscator, Grotius, Rosenmüller, *al.* : *for God's honour* ; but positively incorrect to take it for ἐν, with Beza, Calvin, and others ; or for ἐξ, with Schulz, Heydenreich, and Pott. Billroth interprets it in Hegelian fashion : "that man should be *towards* God, should return *into* Him as his First Cause, not remain *for himself*." This has only a seeming likeness to Augustine's "Fecisti me ad te, et inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te," *Conf.* i. 1. Olshausen, following older expositors (Calovius, Estius, *al.*), finds the Trinity here also (comp. on Rom. xi. 36), which is obviously wrong, were it only for this reason, that we have neither one subject alone named in this passage (as at least in Rom. *loc. cit.*), nor three, but

two.<sup>1</sup> He holds, with Billroth (comp. also Neander), that the εἰς refers to the agency of the Holy Spirit in bringing all back to its primary origin.<sup>2</sup> — δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα] does not apply to the new moral creation (Grotius, Stolz, Pott), and consequently cannot include all that is involved in *redemption and atonement* (Baur, *neut. Theol.* p. 193), which is clearly against the sense of the preceding τὰ πάντα; but it means that Jesus Christ, in His pre-mundane existence, as the Son of God (not as the Ideal Man or the like), as πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως (in John's phrase, as Λόγος), was He through whom<sup>3</sup> God brought about the creation of the world. See on Col. i. 15 ff. Comp. John i. 3. Usteri, *Lehrbegriff*, p. 315 ff.; Rübiger, *Christol. Paul.* p. 29 ff.; Hahn, *Theol. d. N. T.* § 85; Lechler, p. 51 f.; Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 318. Philo calls the λόγος the ὄργανον, δι' οὗ κατεσκευάσθη (ὁ κόσμος). See *de Cherub.* I. p. 162. In Rom. xi. 36, δι' οὗ is said of God, and the reference is therefore of a different kind than here. — καὶ ἡμεῖς δι' αὐτοῦ] is not to be referred to the physical creation (Rückert); for the idea thus elicited would not only be tame and obvious of itself, but also out of keeping with what has previously been stated of God, the second clause in which, κ. ἡμεῖς εἰς αὐτόν, adds a different, namely, an *ethical* relation. The reference here is to the *new creation of believers* (Eph. ii. 10; 2 Cor. v. 17; Gal. vi. 15); this is effected by God *through Christ*, who, as in the physical creation, is the *causa medians*. Just as we Christians have but one God, the true Creator, whose designs we serve; so, too, we have but *one Lord, the true Mediator*, to whom all things owe their being, and we our *Christian* existence, that which we are as *Christians*. This "*one God and one Lord*" shuts out the whole heathen gods as such, so far as the Christian consciousness is concerned.

<sup>1</sup> Hence we find, in some of the later codd. and Fathers, additional clauses respecting the Spirit, namely, καὶ ἐν πνεύμα ἁγίῳ, ἐν ᾧ τὰ πάντα κ. ἡμεῖς ἐν αὐτῷ, and : καὶ ἐν πνεύμα ἁγ. δι' οὗ πάντα. But so early an expositor as Chrysostom remarks expressly that the Spirit is *not* mentioned here.

<sup>2</sup> In order to bring out the "*all*" (Rom. xi. 36), Olshausen affirms : "Inasmuch as the church is destined to receive all men into it, and inasmuch as it exerts a reflex restorative influence even upon the *κτίσις* (Rom. viii. 19 ff.), those who believe are equivalent to things as a whole." An instance—to be taken as a warning—of exegetical subjectivity in the interest of dogmatic preconception.

<sup>3</sup> Not ἐξ οὗ, which holds only of the Father, although εἰς ὃν could be said of the Son also (comp. Col. i. 16).

Ver. 7. "We know that there is no idol, etc.; however, this *γνώσις* that we speak of (*ἡ*) is not in all; but doubtless (the *δέ* as in vii. 37, and very often—so ver. 9—after a negative clause) there are many who," etc. — *τῇ συνειδήσει ἕως ἄρτι τοῦ εἰδώλου*] *in virtue of their conscience till now regarding the idol*, i.e. through this, that their moral consciousness is still burdened with the conception of an actual existence of the heathen gods as such. The opposite of the *συνειδήσις τοῦ εἰδώλου* is: *οἶδαμεν, ὅτι οὐδὲν εἶδωλον ἐν κόσμῳ*, ver. 4. Because those who are weak in the faith have not risen to this conviction, but still remain under the belief that the idols really exist, therefore they eat the meat offered to idols *as meat offered to idols*, i.e. their conception in eating it is, not that it is the same as other meat, and consequently to be partaken of without scruple and without receiving any idolatrous defilement, but that it is really meat consecrated to an idol which is assumed to exist, and hence that to eat of it is sinful. — *συνειδήσις*<sup>1</sup>] means simply *conscience* (neither *judicium*, as many maintain, nor *obscure conception*, as Schulz would have it; Billroth's rendering is better, though still inexact: "conviction that there are εἰδωλα;" so also Reiche, Maier), and *τοῦ εἰδώλου* is the *object* of the moral consciousness, the *article* indicating the idol in a *generic* way. As to the gen. with *συνειδ.*, comp. Heb. x. 2; 1 Pet. ii. 19; so also frequently in Greek writers. The context shows what the relation is as regards meaning (here it is that which is inherent in the consciousness as its contents). — *ἕως ἄρτι*] marks off the time more sharply than "always as yet" (Hofmann), which would be *ἔτι*; it means, "up to this very hour" (iv. 13, xv. 6, and in all other passages). Taking the usual order of the words, it would most naturally attach itself to *ἐσθίουσι*; but since the place which on critical grounds must be assigned to it is before *εἰδώλου* (see the critical remarks), it must be joined to *τῇ συνειδήσει*. We might have expected *τῇ ἕως ἄρτι συνειδήσει τοῦ εἰδώλου* or *τῇ συνειδήσει τοῦ εἰδώλου τῇ ἕως ἄρτι*; even in Greek authors, however, one finds adverbial attributives used in this loose adjectival way without

<sup>1</sup> See generally, besides von Zetzschwitz (*Profangrücit.* pp. 52 ff., 75), Köhler, *Schriftgemässe Lehre vom Gew.*, 1864; Delitzsch, *Psychol.* p. 123 ff.; Lindes, *de vi et ratione συνειδήσεως ex N. T.*, Lund, 1866; R. Hofmann, *Lehre vom Gew.*, Leipz. 1866.

any connecting article; and Paul himself in other places employs this mode of expression (see on xii. 28; 2 Cor. xi. 23; Phil. i. 26; Gal. i. 13). — It is an artificial construction, and without sufficient ground, to supply a second *συνειδήσει* (without the article) after *τῇ συνειδ.*, and connect *ἕως ἄρτι τοῦ εἰδώλου* with this. — *ἀσθενὴς οὖσα*] *because it is weak*; for were it strong, it would no longer have suffered itself to be morally bound by the conception of idols, and hence would not have been *defiled* (made conscious of guilt) by eating, because in that case the eating would be *ἐκ πίστεως* (Rom. xiv. 23). *Μολύνειν* (comp. 2 Cor. vii. 1), of *ethical* defilement; also in Ecclus. xxi. 28; Porphyry. *de Abstin.* i. 42; Synesius, *Ep.* 5. Comp. Titus i. 15: *μαίλνειν*. Observe here *the two sides* of the conscience: it was *weak to begin with*, and *afterwards* it is defiled as well.

NOTE.—The *ἕως ἄρτι*, which points back to their state before conversion, puts it beyond question that the *weak* brethren are not to be conceived of as *Jewish-Christians*, but as *Gentiles*, whose conscience was still burdened with the belief, brought with them from the heathen period of their lives, that the idol was a divine reality. They must have supposed the idols to be subordinate divine beings (not *demons*, as Neander thought, which, according to x. 20, would have been the *correct* conception), from whose worship they had been brought to that of the one Supreme God; so that they could not look upon the consumption of sacrificial flesh as a mere harmless eating of meat, but had their conscience always hampered with the thought that by so eating they were brought into contact with those idol-deities. Theophylact puts it rightly (comp. Chrysostom): *ἦσαν γὰρ πολλοὶ ἐξ εἰδωλολατρίας τῇ πίστει προσελθόντες οἱ ἕως ἄρτι, τουτέστι καὶ μετὰ τὸ πιστεῦσαι, τὰ εἰδωλόθυτα ἐσθίουσιν ὡς εἰδωλόθυτα*. Theodoret says: *οὐχ ἡ βρωσις μολύνει, ἀλλὰ ἡ συνείδησις τὴν τελείαν οὐ δεξαμένη γνῶσιν, ἔτι δὲ τῇ πλάνῃ τῶν εἰδώλων κατεχομένη*. This in opposition to the common view, that the weak brethren are to be sought among the *Petrine party*. Schenkel even goes the length of explaining the *name* of that party from the abstinence of the members from sacrificial flesh; therein they held strictly, he thinks, to the Apostolic Council, whose decree had been arrived at specially through the influence of *Peter* (?). The correct view, that the weak brethren were *Gentile-Christians*, is advocated also by Hofmann, and finds expression in Lachmann's reading of *συνηθεία*.

Ver. 8 f. This is not an objection urged by the Corinthians in defence of their eating meat offered to idols, which is then

followed, in ver. 9, by the apostle's reply (Calvin, Pareus, Mosheim, Zachariae, Pott, Heydenreich, Billroth); for here, too, we have no formula to mark that an objection is being adduced, and those who ate the sacrificial flesh would in their interest have required to write: οὔτε ἐὰν μὴ φάγωμεν, περισσεύομεν, οὔτε ἐὰν φάγωμεν, ὑστερούμεθα. No, Paul is now going on (the advance being indicated by δέ) to show what regard should be paid to those weaker brethren: "Now, food is not the determining element in the Christian's relation to God; to abstain from it does no harm, and to partake of it gives no advantage (see the critical remarks). Therefore (ver. 9) ye ought not to make yourselves a cause of stumbling to the weak through your liberty to eat sacrificial flesh." If food were not a thing indifferent,—if abstinence from it brought loss, and partaking of it blessing with God,—then it would be our duty not thus to adapt ourselves to the weak. — οὐ παραστήσει] it will not (in any case which may arise; future) present us to God; non exhibebit nos Deo, i.e. it will not affect the position of our moral character in the judgment of God, either for the worse or for the better. We have thus a description of an *adiaphoron* in its relation to God. Comp. Bengel, Osiander, Hofmann. Most interpreters take the word in the sense of *commendabit*, or, keeping by the *Rcc.* παρίστησι, *commendat*, as if it were συνιστήσει or συνίστησι. This is untenable according to the rules of the language; and it is illogical besides, for both the cases which follow οὔτε . . . οὔτε are included under the collective conception, οὐ παραστ. τ. Θεῷ.<sup>1</sup> — ὑστερούμ.] do we come short, do we lack anything in our relation to God. The opposite of this (comp. Phil. iv. 12) is περισσ.: we have an overflowing abundance, something more than mere sufficiency in our relation to God; τουτέστιν εὐδοκιμοῦμεν παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ ὡς ἀγαθόν τι ποιήσαντες καὶ μέγα, Chrysostom. — βλέπετε δέ] The δέ, now then, introduces what is their positive duty, as contrasted with the foregoing negative state of the case. — πρόσκομμα] stumbling, i.e. occasion to act contrary to conscience. Comp. Rom. xiv. 13.

Ver. 10. Τίς] any such weak brother, namely. — τὸν ἔχοντα

<sup>1</sup> This holds also against the modification which Valckenær, Rückert, and de Wette have made upon the ordinary view: "does not bring us near to God, does not put us into a position to appear before Him." Comp. Theophylact: οὐκ οἰκτιροῖ ἡμᾶς τῷ Θεῷ.

γνώσιν] *quippe qui cognitionem habes*, in significant apposition to σέ. It is just this, which the weaker believer knows respecting the stronger, that leads him astray. — ἐν εἰδωλείῳ κατακείμενον] Their liberal-mindedness went, it seems, so far that they even reclined at table in *idol-temples* with those who held the sacrificial feasts there. The *absolute prohibition* of this abuse of liberty (which follows afterwards in x. 14–22) would not have come in suitably here, where *the connection of itself naturally led* the apostle simply to point out in the way of warning the bearing of such conduct upon the weak. — Instances of the use of εἰδωλείον — which does not occur in profane writers — from the LXX. and the Apocrypha, may be seen in Schleusner, *Thes.* II. p. 246. See also Eustath. *ad Od.* vi. p. 263. 17. In the *Fragm. Soph.* 152 (Dind.), the true reading is ἐδώλια. — οἰκοδομηθήσεται] is neither a *vox media* (Clericus, Elsner, Wolf, *al.*), nor does it mean *impelletur* (Castalio, Kypke, Hermann, Stolz, *al.*) or *confirmabitur* (Syr., Grotius, Zachariae, Schulz, Billroth), but as always in the N. T. : *will be built up, advanced in a Christian frame of mind, so as to eat* (εἰς τὸ ἐσθ.). To be brought to eat sacrificial flesh *while one is weak* (ἀσθεν. ὄντος, opposite of γνώσιν ἔχειν), is, as Calvin rightly expresses it, a *ruinosa aedificatio*, seeing that the foundation which it ought to have, the πίστις, is wanting. We have here, therefore, an ironically significant *antiphrasis*; without the ἀσθ. ὄντος it might be a case of a real οἰκοδομῆσθαι; things being as they are, however, it can be so *only in appearance*, and, in reality, it is the very *opposite*.<sup>1</sup> *Egregie aedificabitur!* The hypothesis (Storr, *Opusc.* II. p. 275 f.; Rosenmüller, Flatt, comp. Neander), that Paul borrows the word from the letter of the Corinthians to him (in which they had said that by partaking of sacrificial flesh people edify the weak), and gives it back to them in an antiphrastic way, cannot be established, and is unnecessary.

Ver. 11. Ἀπόλλυται ("terrificum verbum," Clarius) γάρ unfolds the meaning of the antiphrastic element of the preceding οἰκοδ., the γάρ introducing the *answer* (Hartung, I. p. 477; Klotz, *ad Devar.* p. 240; Baumelein, *Part.* p. 72), in which the apostle's irony loses itself in the deep earnestness which underlies

<sup>1</sup> Wetstein compares with this the passage in *Nedarim*, f. 40. 1 : "Si dixerint tibi juniores aedifica, et seniores demolire, audi seniores et non audi juniores, quia aedificatio juniorum est demolitio, et demolitio seniorum est aedificatio."



it: *he is in truth utterly ruined*, etc. — ἀπόλλυται is meant here, as in Rom. xiv. 15, of destruction κατ' ἐξοχήν, the *eternal ἀπώλεια* to which a man becomes liable when he falls from the life of faith into that of sin through violation of his conscience. See on Rom. xiv. 15. Billroth, indeed, holds the γάρ here to be quite inexplicable, unless we take ἀπόλλ. simply in the sense of *is led astray* (but see the critical remarks); while Rückert declares the γάρ utterly useless. Nevertheless, ἀπόλλυται κ.τ.λ. makes it clear and unmistakeable how the case stands with the preceding οἰκοδομηθ., so that γάρ is logically correct. — ἐν τῇ σῇ γνώσει] belongs to ἀπολλ.: *by means of thy knowledge*, so that it, through the use thou hast made of it, has occasioned this destruction. Ἐπί (see the critical remarks) would be: *upon* thy knowledge, so that it was the *ground* of what took place. — ὁ ἀδελφ. δι' ὃν X. ἀπ.] a weighty twofold motive for not bringing about such a result. Comp. Rom. xiv. 15. The δι' ὃν X. ἀπ. is *frustrated* by the ἀπολλ.! Comp. ver. 12. Bengel says well in reference to δι' ὃν: "ut doceamur, quid nos fratrum causa debeamus." Respecting διά, comp. Rom. iv. 25.

Ver. 12. Οὕτω] When ye sin against the brethren *in this way*, as described in vv. 10, 11. — καί] *and especially*. — τύπτοντες] in *substance* the same thing as μολύνοντες in ver. 7, only expressed by a different metaphor, which makes the *cruelty* of the procedure more apparent. What befits a weak conscience is *forbearance*, not that it should morally *receive blows*, should be *smitten* through offence done to it as with a wounding weapon (Hom. *Il.* xix. 125; Herod. iii. 64; Xen. *Cyr.* v. 4. 5; Prov. xxvi. 22), so that now, instead of being but a *weak*, it becomes a *bad* conscience. — αὐτῶν] put first because correlative to the εἰς Χριστόν which follows; in the latter is finally concentrated the whole *heinousness* of the offence.

Ver. 13. Comp. Rom. xiv. 21. The classic διόπερ, *for that very reason* (because the offence in question is such a heinous one), meets us with certainty in the N. T. only here and x. 14. — βρώμα] *any kind of food*, indefinitely. Instead now of saying in the apodosis: "then I will never more eat of it," etc., he names the *special kind* of food (κρέα) presenting itself in *application* to the subject discussed, by abstaining from which, at any rate, the use of *sacrificial* flesh and the σκάνδαλον thereby given would be excluded. — οὐ μὴ φάγω] "Accommodat suae personae, ut

facilius persuadeat," Piscator. The expression is not by way of exhortation, but of *assurance*, "*then I will certainly not eat*," etc. Τοῦτο ὡς διδάσκαλος ἄριστος τὸ δι' ἑαυτοῦ παιδεύειν ἃ λέγει, Chrysostom. — εἰς τ. αἰῶνα] *to all eternity, nevermore*; hyperbolical mode of expressing the most thorough readiness. Comp. as regards the idea, Rom. xiv. 21. — ἵνα μὴ κ.τ.λ.] For this is what I should bring about, if he holds the flesh which I eat to be sacrificial flesh (ver. 9). Observe the emphatic repetition of the words, and the different order in which σκανδαλ. and τ. ἀδελφ. μ. are placed.—That the maxim here enunciated cannot be an universal rule *in adiaphoris*, has been pointed out already by Erasmus. Comp. Gal. ii. 5 with 1 Cor. ix. 19 ff. and Acts xvi. 3. It does not hold, when the truth of the gospel comes to be at stake. Comp. Gal. ii. 14.

## CHAPTER IX.

VER. 1. οὐκ εἰμι ἐλεύθερος; οὐκ εἰμι ἄπ.] So A B 8, min., and most of the vss., with Tertullian, Origen, Ambrosiast. Aug. Pelag. Cassiodorus, Bede, Griesb. Schulz, Lachm. Tisch. Elz. inverts the order of the questions, and is defended by Pott, Rinck, Reiche, *Comm. crit.* I. p. 206 ff., Hofmann. But it was very natural to transfer οὐκ εἰμι ἄπ. to the first place as the *more important* point, and the one *first* expounded in detail by the apostle himself (vv. 1–3). — Ver. 2. τῆς ἐμῆς] Lachm. Rück. Tisch. read μου τῆς, with B 8, 17, 31, 46, Or. Rightly; the *Recepta* is a more precise definition of the meaning inserted in view of ver. 3. Had μου crept in from the τὸ ἔργον μου in ver. 1, it would have been put after ἀποστολῆς. — Ver. 6. τοῦ] is wanting, it is true, in A B D\* F G 8, 17, 46, Isidor., and is deleted consequently by Lachm. and Rück.; but the omission was very naturally suggested by vv. 4, 5. — Ver. 7. ἐκ τοῦ καρποῦ] Lachm. Rück. Tisch. read τὸν καρπὸν, with A B C\* D\* F G 8\*, 17, 46, 137, Sahid. Boern. Tol. Flor. Harl. Vulg. ms. Bede. The *Recepta* is an alteration in accordance with what follows, made without observing the difference in meaning. — Ver. 8. ἡ οὐχὶ καὶ κ.τ.λ.] There is decisive testimony in favour of ἡ καὶ ὁ νόμος ταῦτα οὐ λέγει; approved by Griesb., adopted by Lachm. Rück. Tisch. It was altered because not understood. — Ver. 10. ἐπ' ἐλπίδι τοῦ μετέχειν] So Griesb. Lachm. Scholz, Rück. Tisch., with A B C 8\*, 10, 17, 71, Syr. utr. Erp. Copt. Sahid. Baschm. Arm. Or. Eus. Cyr. The *Recepta* again (defended by Reiche) is: τῆς ἐλπίδος αὐτοῦ μετέχειν ἐπ' ἐλπίδι. Since, however, this ἐπ' ἐλπίδι is omitted also by D\* F G, 46, it has such a weight of evidence against it<sup>1</sup> that it must be rejected at once; τῆς ἐλπίδος αὐτοῦ μετέχειν, again, is so plain as regards its meaning, that had it been the original reading it could hardly have given rise to any change. If, on the other hand, it was not observed that we have to supply ἀλοῶν after ἀλοῶν, the ἐπ' ἐλπίδι τοῦ μετέχειν remained unintelligible, and τῆς ἐλπίδος αὐτοῦ was put in as a gloss to obviate the difficulty; then this mistaken gloss in some cases *displaced* the original words, in others, got *mixed up*

<sup>1</sup> Reiche would attach this addition (which quite mars the sense in the *Recepta*) to the next verse; but there, too, especially as standing first, it would obtrude upon the antithesis something quite foreign to it and unsuitable.

with them (Elz.). — Ver. 11. *θερίσομεν*] C D E F G L, min. Vulg. It. Theodoret, have *θερίσωμεν*. So Lachm. on the margin. Tischendorf is right in receiving it into the text; grammarians took offence at the subjunctive after *εἰ*. — Ver. 13. There is decisive evidence for reading *παρεδρ.* here with Lachm. Rück. Tisch. (approved also by Griesb.), and in ver. 15 *οὐ κέχρημαι οὐδενί τ.*, with Griesb. Lachm. Scholz, Rück. Tisch. — Ver. 15. *ἵνα τις κενώσῃ*] There is great diversity here. B D\* *κ\**, Sahid. Bashm. have *οὐδείς κενώσῃ* (so Lachm.). A has *οὐδείς μὴ κενώσῃ* (so Rück.). F G, 26, give us *τις κενώσῃ*. The *Recepta*, which is specially defended by Reiche, *ἵνα τις κενώσῃ*, has only a partial support from C D\*\*\* E I K *κ\**, the majority of the min. and vss., Chrys. Theodoret, Damasc. Theophyl. Oec., because most of these authorities are in favour of *κενώσῃ*, which is adopted by Tisch. But the Received reading, as well as the *τις κενώσῃ*, seems to be an attempt to amend the original — but not understood — text in B (which A only intensifies), so that we ought to read: *ἢ τὸ καύχημά μου οὐδείς κενώσῃ*. See the exeget. remarks on the verse. — Ver. 16. *καύχημα*] D E F G *κ\**, It.: *χάρις*. Not strongly enough attested; an old gloss in accordance with Luke vi. 32–34. Instead of *γάρ* after *οὐαί*, Elz. has *δέ*, but against conclusive evidence. A false correction. There are decisive grounds for reading, with Lachm. and Tisch., *εὐαγγελίσωμαι* in place of the second *εὐαγγελίζωμαι*; the *Recepta* is a repetition from the first. — Ver. 18. Elz. and Scholz have *τοῦ Χριστοῦ* after *εὐαγγέλ.*, in opposition to decisive evidence. — Ver. 20. *μὴ ὧν αὐτὸς ὑπὸ νόμον*] omitted in Elz., but given by almost all the uncials and many vss. and Fathers. Homoeoteleuton. — Ver. 21. The genitives *Θεοῦ* and *Χριστοῦ* (Elz. and Scholz have the datives) have decisive testimony in their favour, as *κερδάνω τοὺς ἄν.* also has (so Lachm. Rück. Tisch.); the *Recepta* *κερδήσω ἀνόμους* was formed upon the model of ver. 20. — Ver. 22. The *ὡς* before *ἀσθ.* is wanting in A B *κ\**, Vulg. Clar. Germ. Or. Cypr. Ambrosiast. Aug. Ambr. Bede. Deleted by Lachm. and Tisch. It was a mechanical addition on the plan of the preceding clauses. — The article before *πάντα* (Elz. Scholz) is condemned by a great preponderance of authority. — Ver. 23. *τοῦτο*] The most and best of the uncials, with the majority of vss. and Fathers, have *πάντα*; recommended by Griesb., adopted by Lachm. Rück. Tisch. *τοῦτο* is a gloss inserted to define the meaning more precisely; for the same reason Sahid. Arm. read *ταῦτα δὲ πάντα*. — Ver. 27. *ὑποπιάζω*] So Elz. Lachm. It has such a mass of weighty testimony on its side (A B C D\* *κ*, min. Or. Chrys. Theodoret, Theophyl. Oec.) that the other readings, *ὑποπιᾶζω* (F G K L min. Fathers) and *ὑποπιέζω* (D\*\*\* E, min. Fathers), must be rejected even on the ground of external evidence alone, all the more that the vss. *castigo* (Vulg.),

*subjicio, macero, affligo, domo*, do not show clearly which reading they follow. Notwithstanding, ὑποπιάζω has been defended of late, especially by Matth. ("πιάζειν loco πιάζειν aliquos male habuit"), Reiche, Hofm., and adopted by Tisch. It appears to have been simply the production of ignorant and mechanical transcribers, who were familiar with πιάζω or πιάζω, but took offence at ὑπω (with Ω).

CONTENTS.—That principle of loving self-denial which Paul had just laid down for himself *in respect of the single point in question* (viii. 13), he now confirms *by referring to his general demeanour*, of which that one resolve was merely a particular expression, and shows, in a frank, deeply impressive, and striking elucidation, how he, notwithstanding that he was free and an apostle (vv. 1-3), yet refrained from pressing his well-grounded right to have himself (and a consort as well) supported by the churches (vv. 4-18), and adapted himself to the needs of all men (vv. 19-23). His readers, therefore, should be like champions at the games in striving for the everlasting crown, preparing themselves to this end through the exercise of self-control, even as he too sought, by self-renunciation, to become worthy of the prize (vv. 24-27). Not until chap. x. does he come back from this digression to the special topic (of the sacrificial flesh) with which it stands connected. It is not of the nature of an apology as regards its whole plan and design, but only incidentally so in some isolated references (vv. 2, 3, 5, 12).

Ver. 1. The first two questions bring out the fact that he was seemingly exalted far above any such consideration and renunciation on his own part as he had announced in viii. 13; the third question corroborates the full purport of the second; and the fourth places him in probative relation to his readers, whom Paul καὶ αὐτοὺς εἰς μαρτυρίαν καλεῖ, Theodoret. — ἐλεύθερος] *free*, dependent upon no man. Comp. ver. 19. — Ἰησοῦν . . . ἑώρακα] Observe the *solemnity* of the phrase; his readers *knew* what was implied in it on his lips. The reference here is not to his having seen Christ *in His earthly life*, which would have had nothing to do with his apostleship, and which, moreover, cannot be proved to have taken place in the case of Paul at all,—certainly not from 2 Cor. v. 16,—but to the sight of the *glorified Jesus*, which was first vouchsafed near Damascus to call him to be an apostle (Acts ix. 17, xxii. 14 f., xxvi. 16; 1 Cor. xv. 8), and was often repeated

afterwards, although in different forms (Acts xviii. 9, xxii. 17 f.; 2 Cor. xii. 1).<sup>1</sup> It is an arbitrary thing to exclude those later appearances (Estius, Flatt, Billroth, Olshausen, Osiander, Hofmann), since they, too, were granted to the apostle *as such, and in connection with his apostolic relation to Christ*; they could only serve to confirm his position of equality in the apostleship, and in this bearing were doubtless familiar to his readers from Paul's own lips. — ἐν Κυρίῳ] does not belong to ἔργον; just as little does it to ὑμεῖς (Pott), or to ὑμεῖς ἐστε alone (Rückert), but is meant to bring out the Christian character of the *whole* τὸ ἔργον μ. ὑμεῖς ἐστε. For *out of* Christ, *in* whom (as the object of faith) the Christian lives and moves, outside of this element of the new life and standing, the Corinthians, who owed their *Christian* existence to the apostle, were not his work. The rendering: *by the help of the Lord*, is arbitrary, and does not suit the context. Some of those who adopt it understand Κύριος of God (Beza, Piscator, Flatt, Rückert, *al.*, following Chrysostom and Theophylact). Comp. iv. 15.

Vv. 2, 3. Not a parenthesis, but a statement interposed in his own defence, occasioned by οὐ τὸ ἔργον κ.τ.λ., and flowing from a heart deeply moved. — ἄλλοις] *i.e. in relation to others*, who, not belonging to your community, do not own my apostleship as valid for them.<sup>2</sup> "We have no Apostle Paul," say they! Comp. as to

<sup>1</sup> Baur takes advantage of this stress laid on the fact of having seen Christ, to support his hypothesis as to the close connection of the Petrine and the Christ-party. See against this Rübiger, p. 128 f. According to Schenkel, the allusion is to the visions of the Christ-party (the existence of which he has first of all to assume). The true view is, that Paul is here indicating how, in respect of this point also, he stands in no whit behind the original apostles. Ἐπειδὴ μετὰ τὴν ἀνάληψιν τοῦ σωτῆρος ἐκλήβετο, ἵχον δι' ὁρᾶν οἱ ἀπόστολοι παρὰ πᾶσι μιγίστην ὡς τῆς τοῦ Κυρίου θεῆς ἡξιωμένοι, καὶ τοῦτο προστίθειν, Theodoret. And it is no lower thing to have seen Christ in His glory than to have seen Him in His humiliation upon the earth. Comp. Calvin. As against the interpretations which make this a *visionary* beholding of Christ (Baur, Holstein, *al.*), see Beyschlag in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1864, p. 220 f. How very distinctly Paul himself describes, especially in Acts xxii. 14, a *bodily* appearance! See also Gal. i. 1, comp. with ver. 15. Nothing contrary to this can be proved from the words ἰωρακίνας and ὁφθῆναι (xv. 8), since these do not determine the *kind* of seeing and appearing. Comp. *e.g.* the use of the latter term in Acts vii. 26 of a *bodily* appearing.

<sup>2</sup> It was unquestionably by stranger Petrine Christians that the anti-Pauline influence had been exerted upon the Corinthian church. So much is clear, but nothing more. Rübiger thinks that they were the instigators of the Petrine party in Corinth. Schenkel makes them of the Christ-party. Hofmann explains the expres-

the relation of the dative, viii. 6. — οὐκ εἰμί] See Winer, p. 446 [E. T. 601]. — ἀλλάγε] *still at least*. See Hermann, *ad Viger*. p. 826. The γε intensifies the ἀλλά of the apodosis (see on iv. 15, viii. 6): see Klotz, *ad Devar*. p. 24 f. It cannot be said with any critical certainty that ἀλλάγε ever occurs in the classics undivided (without one or more words put between the two particles). See Klotz, *l.c.* p. 15, and Heind. *ad Plat. Phaed.* p. 86 E; Stallbaum, *ad Rep.* p. 331 B.—Taking the reading ἡ γὰρ σφραγ. μου τ. ἀποστ. (see the critical remarks), the meaning is: *my seal of apostleship*, with the emphasis on σφραγ. As to the word itself, see Rom. iv. 11. Theodoret well remarks: ἀπόδειξιν γὰρ τῶν ἀποστολικῶν κατορθωμάτων τὴν ὑμετέραν ἔχω μεταβολήν. — ἐν Κυρίῳ] as in ver. 1; it belongs to the whole preceding clause: ἡ σφραγίς τ. ἐμ. ἀπ. ὑμ. ἐστε. For out of Christ the Corinthians were no seal of Paul's apostleship. See on ver. 1. They were this seal to him, inasmuch as they had become Christians through his agency (in general, not through his miracles in particular, as Flatt holds with older expositors). — ἡ ἐμὴ ἀπολογ. κ.τ.λ.] statement of *what the foregoing comes to*, added without any connective particle, and so all the more emphatic; not merely a repetition of the last clause in other words (Hofmann), which would be an admissible interpretation only if αὕτη ἐστὶ were absent, or if ἐστέ occurred again. — τοῖς ἐμὲ ἀνακρ.] *to those who institute an inquiry regarding me* (comp. Acts xix. 33; 2 Cor. xii. 19), who question my apostleship. Both ἀπολ. and ἀνακρ. are purposely-chosen forensic expressions. Comp. as to the latter, Luke xxiii. 14; Acts iv. 9, xii. 19, xxiv. 8, xxviii. 18. — αὕτη] *this*, namely, this fact, that you are the seal of mine ἀποστολή. It does not refer to *what follows* (Chrysostom, Ambrosiaster, Grotius, Calovius), for ver. 4 continues the series of questions begun in ver. 1, and what follows does not contain any further defence of his apostleship (which, moreover, would be quite unsuitable here).—Observe, lastly, the emphasis of ἐμὴ and ἐμέ, expressive of a well-grounded sense of his own position.

Ver. 4 f. Returning from the digression in vv. 2, 3, Paul

sion from the difference between the ἀποστολὴ τῆς πιμιτομῆς and that τῆς ἀπρὸςυστίας. But that is going too far; for all circumcised Christians were not anti-Pauline, and the express contrast here is with the ὑμεῖς, among whom must be included the Jewish-Christians who were in Corinth.

begins a new series of *questions*, with the view of now making good the *prerogative arising out of his apostleship*, which in point of fact he declined to exercise. — *μὴ οὐκ ἔχομεν*] *i.e. we surely are not destitute of the right to lead, etc.?* Comp. Rom. x. 18; 1 Cor. xi. 22. The *plural* cannot be restricted in its reference to *Paul alone*, seeing that it has just been preceded, and is again followed in ver. 6, by the *singular*, but must imply that the apostle is thinking *both of himself and of whosoever else acts in like manner*. More particularly, ver. 6 shows that he has here in his eye, not *his companions in labour generally* (Hofmann), but *Barnabas in particular besides himself* (for see the *μόνος* in ver. 6), and him *only*. It may be added, that Calovius is right in saying, against the abuse of this passage in the interests of monasticism, that Paul is not speaking here of what “*semper et ubique vitari oportet*” sed de eo tantum quod in casu noxii scandali infirmorum fratrum vitandum est.” — *φαγεῖν κ. πιεῖν*] *i.e. at the cost of the churches*. To understand it of non-observance of the Jewish laws about food (Hunnius, Heydenreich, Billroth, comp. Olshausen), or of *sacrificial* flesh and wine (Schrader), is contrary to the context. See ver. 6 ff. The *right of eating and drinking*, in the sense in which the reader would *naturally understand it* as an apostolic prerogative (Luke x. 7), required nothing to be added to define it. The analogy of Matt. xi. 19 (Hofmann) has no bearing on the clause before us, the point of view there being that of *asceticism*.—The *infinitives* are exegetical, and need no τοῦ (Matt. ix. 6; Mark ii. 10, *al.*). — *ἀδελφὴν γυν. περιάγ.*] *to lead about (along with me on my official journeys) a sister (a female believer) as a wife*. The view taken by several of the Fathers (see Aug. *de op. Monach.* iv. 5, Jerome, *τινὲς* in Theodoret, Theophylact; comp. generally, Suicer, *Thes.* I. p. 810), that a *serviens matrona* is meant (so also Erasmus, Cornelius a Lapide, and Estius), is against the plain meaning of the words, without shadow of historical support in the life of the apostle, supposes a somewhat unseemly relation, and is contrary to the example of Peter, Matt. viii. 14.<sup>1</sup> It has, however, been still defended of late by Roman Catholic writers (Maier) on wholly insufficient grounds.

<sup>1</sup> Valla perceived rightly “*fuisse apostolos suas uxores comitatas*,” but thinks that they were called *sisters*, “*quod tanquam non uxores jam erant*.” An “*elegans argutia*” (Calvin)!



On *περιάγειν*, comp. Xen. *Cyr.* ii. 2. 28 ; it occurs oftener in the middle, as Xen. *Mem.* i. 7. 2 ; Polyb. xx. 5. 8. — *ὡς καὶ οἱ λοιπ. ἄπ.*] It does not follow from this that *all* the other apostles were married, but the *majority* of them must have been so, otherwise the phrase, which must be meant to hold at least *a potiori*, would be unsuitable. — *καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ τοῦ Κυρίου*] Now, the brethren of the Lord are in Acts i. 14 expressly distinguished from the Twelve ; further, in Gal. i. 19, James, the Lord's brother, is equally distinguished from those who were apostles in the narrower and original sense (such as Peter) ; and further still, we have no trace in any of the lists of the apostles (Matt. x. 2 f. ; Mark iii. 16 f. ; Luke vi. 14 f.) that there were "brethren of the Lord" among the Twelve,—a supposition which would also be decidedly at variance with John vii. 3 ; Mark iii. 21. The *ἀδελφοὶ τοῦ Κυρίου*, therefore, should not be put on a level with Cephas (Hofmann), and sought within the number of the Twelve, but are the *actual brothers* of Jesus, not His *half-brothers* merely (sons of Joseph by a former marriage), but His *uterine* brothers, later-born sons of Joseph and Mary (Matt. i. 25 ; Luke ii. 7 ; Matt. xii. 46, xiii. 55), who had become believers and entered upon apostolic work after the resurrection of Jesus (xv. 7 ; Acts i. 14), and among whom James, in particular, as president of the church in Jerusalem (Acts xv. 13, xxi. 18), had obtained a high apostolic position (Gal. ii. 9). See on Acts xii. 17 ; Gal. i. 19. This view (which is held also by de Wette, Billroth, Rückert, Osiander, Neander, and Ewald, among the more recent expositors of the passage before us) runs counter to what was formerly the common view, namely, that of Jerome, which still prevails with Roman Catholics, and is supported by Hengstenberg and others, that the phrase denotes the *sons of Christ's mother's sister*, so that James, the Lord's brother, would be identical with the son of Alphaeus (but see on John xix. 25), and would bear the name of "brother of the Lord" (πρῶτος in the wider sense) as a title of honour from his near relationship to Jesus. Comp. on Matt. xii. 46. In like manner Lange, in his *apost. Zeitalter*, p. 189, understands the *Alphacidæ* to be meant ; they were, he holds, the *adopted* brothers of Jesus, Joseph having *adopted* as his own the children of Alphaeus, who was his *brother*, after the latter's death. All this is nothing but arbitrary imagination, resting simply upon the false assumption that Mary brought

forth Jesus, not as her *first-born* (Matt. i. 25 ; Luke ii. 7), but as her *only* child. Lange is wrong here in making the *καί* a proof that the brethren of the Lord were among the Twelve, and are but singled out from their number in this verse for special mention. What Paul says is rather: "as also the other apostles and the brethren of the Lord;" and then, having set before us this august circle formed by the Twelve and those brethren of the Lord closely associated with them since the resurrection of Jesus (Acts i. 14), in which, too, he himself, as an apostle, had an equal place, he singles out in conclusion the most illustrious of them all, one who was looked upon as the head of the whole circle (Gal. i. 18), by adding: "*and, i.e. and, to mention him in particular by name, Cephas;*" so that it is only the last *καί*, and not the second as well (as Hofmann, too, maintains), that carries the force of *special distinction* (Fritzsche, *ad Marc.* p. 11); comp. Mark xvi. 7.—The *design* of the whole question, *μὴ οὐκ ἔχ. ἔξουσ. ἀδελφ. γ. π.*, has no bearing upon scruples (of the Christ-party) as to marriage being allowed (Olshausen), but is closely connected with the purport of the first question, as is plain from *περιάγειν*: "Am I denied, then, the right to live at the cost of the churches, and to have, like the other apostles, etc., a consort journeying along with me from place to place?" in which latter case a similar support from the churches is, from the nature of the circumstances, and from the scope of the context (vv. 4, 6), manifestly assumed as a matter of course.—Peter's wife is called by tradition sometimes *Concordia*, sometimes *Perpetua*. See Grabe, *Spicil. Patr.* I. p. 330.

Ver. 6. "[H] or, i.e. *unless it were true that*, etc. In that case, indeed, the *ἐξουσία*, of which I spoke in vv. 4, 5, must of course be wanting! We have therefore no *third ἐξουσία* introduced here (Pott, Rückert), but *ἡ conveys an argument*, as it usually does. — *Βαρνάβας*] see on Acts iv. 36. He was formerly (see on Acts xv. 38) Paul's companion in his missionary labours, and as such held a high apostolic position (Gal. ii. 9). — *τοῦ μὴ ἐργάζ.*] Have we not the right to *cease from working*? Paul supported himself by tent-making (Acts xviii. 3); in what way Barnabas did so, is unknown. Both of them, very probably, after mutual consultation, had laid it down as a principle to maintain themselves by their own independent labour, and acted upon this

rule even when working separately, whereas the rest of the apostolic teachers (see *μόνος*) claimed support from the resources of the churches. *Ἐργάζεσθαι* is the word constantly used for *working*, 2 Thess. iii. 8; Acts xviii. 3; Homer, *Il.* xviii. 469, *Od.* xiv. 272; Xen. *Cyr.* i. 6. 11, *al.* The rendering: *hoc operandi* (Vulgate and Latin Fathers), arises from a different reading (without the *μή*).

Ver. 7. *Proof* of this apostolic right τοῦ μὴ ἐργάζεσθαι from three analogies in common life, by applying which to the preachers of the gospel it is made manifest that these have the right to live from the gospel. "Pulchre confertur minister evangelii cum milite, vinitore, pastore," Bengel. Comp. 2 Cor. x. 3 ff.; Matt. xx. 1; John x. 12; Acts xx. 28; Eph. iv. 5. — *ἰδίους ὄψ.*] *i.e.* so that he pays his own wages (Luke iii. 14; Rom. vi. 23).—The difference of construction in the two clauses with ἐσθίει (τὸν καρπὸν, see the critical remarks, and then ἐκ), is to be regarded as simply an accidental change in the form of conception, without diversity in the substance of the thought. With ἐκ (comp. Ecclus. xi. 17; Tob. i. 10, *al.*) the expression is partitive; in using the *accusative* Paul has the fruit (the grapes) in a purely objective way before his mind. See generally, Kühner, II. p. 181. The wages of shepherds in the East consists to this day in a share of the milk. See Rosenmüller, *Morgenl.* VI. p. 97.

Ver. 8. Transition to the *proof from Scripture* of the above ἐξουσία. — It is not supposed surely that I speak this (namely, what I say of that apostolic prerogative in applying to it the rule of these ordinary analogies) after the manner of a man (according to mere human judgment, as a purely human rule, and not a divinely given one)? or the law too, does it not say this? Is it silent concerning this principle? Does it contain no statement of it? — κατὰ ἄνθρ.] The opposite of this is κατὰ τὸν νόμον τοῦ Θεοῦ. Comp. on Rom. iii. 5; Gal. iii. 15. Theodoret gives the idea correctly: εἰ δέ τιμι ἀνθρώπινος εἶναι ταῦτα δοκεῖ λογισμὸς, ἀκούετω τοῦ νόμου διαβρῆδην διαγορεύοντος. — ἦ] as in ver. 6. "I should not speak this after man's way of thinking, if it were the case that the law contained nothing of it." This is the affirmative sense of the interrogative phrase. — καί] too; the law is conceived of as the higher authority coming in over and above the individual λαλῶ. — οὐ] negatives the λέγει; see the

critical remarks. Comp. ver. 7.—As to the difference to be noticed between λαλῶ and λέγω, see on Rom. iii. 19; John viii. 43.

Ver. 9. Γάρ] introduces the *answer which is to prove* that the ταῦτα οὐ λέγει does not hold good. — τῷ Μωϋσ. νόμῳ] carries a certain solemnity, as coming after ὁ νόμος in ver 8. The quotation is from Deut. xxv. 4, given exactly according to the LXX., where it is forbidden to keep the ox that drew the thrashing machine from eating by a muzzle (φιμός, κημός), which used to be done among heathen nations (Varro, i. 25; Cato, *de re rust.* 54). See Michaelis, *Mos. R.* III. § 130. The motive of the prohibition, in accordance with that spirit of tenderness towards the lower creation which breathes throughout the whole law (see Ewald, *Altcrth.* p. 222), was humanity to the helpful animals. See Josephus, *Antt.* iv. 8. 21; Philo, *de Carit.* p. 711 F. The same citation is made in 1 Tim. v. 18. Comp. also *Constitt. Ap.* ii. 25. 3. — φιμώσεις] = κημώσεις, which B\* D\* F G, Tisch. actually read, and which we should accept as genuine, since the former might easily creep into the text from the LXX. Regarding κημοῦν, *to muzzle*, comp. Xen. *de re eq.* v. 3; Poll. i. 202. As to the future with the force of an imperative (*thou wilt*—that I expect of thee—not muzzle an ox in the thrashing-floor), see on Matt. i. 21.—Beginning with μὴ τῶν βοῶν, there follows now the *interpretation* of this law, given in the form of a twofold question which runs on to λέγει, first of all, negatively: *God does not surely concern Himself about oxen?* To modify this negation by an “only” (so Erasmus and many others, among whom is Rückert: “for nothing further than”) is unwarrantable, although even Tholuck’s view in its latest form still amounts to this (*das A. T. im N. T.*, ed. 6, p. 40). What Paul means is, that this class of creatures, the oxen, are *not* the objects of the divine solicitude in that provision of the law; what expresses the care to be taken for the oxen, is said not for their sakes, but δι’ ἡμᾶς. Οὐ γὰρ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀλόγων ὁ νόμος, ἀλλ’ ὑπὲρ τῶν νοῦν κ. λόγον ἔχόντων, Philo, *de Sacrif.* p. 251. Manifestly in this way the apostle *sets aside*<sup>1</sup> the actual *historical sense* of that prohibition (Josephus,

<sup>1</sup> Not simply *generalizes* (Kling in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1839, p. 834 f.; comp. Neander), nor “*subordinates the one to the other*” (Oslander), nor the like, which run counter to the plain meaning of the words. Luther’s gloss, too, goes astray

*Antt.* iv. 8. 21) in behalf of an allegorical sense,<sup>1</sup> which, from the standpoint of a purely historic interpretation, is nothing but an *application* made "a minori ad majus" (comp. *Bava Mezia*, f. 88). But this need not surprise us, considering the freedom used in the typico-allegorical method of interpreting Scripture, which regarded such an application as the *reference* of the utterance in question designed by God, and which from *this* standpoint did not take the historical sense into account along with the other at all. The interpreter, accordingly, who proceeds upon this method with regard to any particular passage does not call in question its historical meaning *as such, considered in itself*, but only (as was self-evident to his readers) as regards *the higher typical destination* of the words, inasmuch as he goes to work not *as a historical*, but *as a typico-allegorical* expositor. It is in the typical destination of *the law in general* (Col. ii. 17), whereby it pointed men above and beyond itself, that such a mode of procedure finds its *justification*, and on this ground it has both its *freedom*, according as each special case may require, and at the same time its *ethical limit*, in the necessity of being in harmony with what befitted God.

Ver. 10. *Or*—since that cannot be supposed—is *this* the true state of the case, *that He saith it altogether for our sakes?*—*πάντως*] in the sense of *in any case, wholly, absolutely*, as in v. 10, ix. 22; see the remarks there. Comp. Acts xviii. 21, xxi. 22, xxviii. 4, also Rom. iii. 9. The rendering: *of course, certainly*, is equally admissible as in Luke iv. 23, but would suit an affirmative statement better. Theophylact says well (following Chrysostom): *ὡς ἐπὶ ὁμολογουμένου τέθεικεν, ἵνα μὴ συγχωρήσῃ μηδ' ὅτι οὖν ἀντειπεῖν τῷ ἀκροατῇ.*—*δι' ἡμᾶς*] cannot mean *men* in general (so most expositors, Hofmann, too, concurring), but must refer to the *Christian teachers* (Chrysostom, Theophylact, Estius, Rückert, Neander, *al.*); this necessarily follows both from the whole connection of the argument and from the *ἡμεῖς* in ver. 11, since it is an entirely arbitrary assumption to make the latter word have a different subject from our *ἡμᾶς*.—*λέγει*] *sc. ὁ Θεός* supplied from the foregoing clause, not *ἡ γραφή* (Ol-

with a naive simplicity of its own: "God cares for all things; but He does not care that anything should be *written* for oxen, seeing that they cannot *read*."

<sup>1</sup> Comp. also Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 296.

shausen). — γάρ] as in ver. 9. — ἐγράφη] namely, the utterance of the law cited in ver. 9. — ὅτι] cannot have an *argumentative* force (Luther, Beza, Calvin, and others, among whom is Neander); nor is it the simple *that* of quotation (Rückert, who indeed looks upon what follows as cited from some apocryphal book, in which Ewald concurs with him), so that ἐγράφη would refer to the next clause,—but it is *explicative* merely (Castalio, Pott, de Wette, Osiander, *al.*, comp. also Hofmann), setting forth the *typico-allegorical contents* of these words of the law in so far as they were written δι' ἡμᾶς, that is, for the *Christian teachers*: namely, that the plougher is bound to plough in hope, and the thrasher (is bound to thrash) in hope of having his share. The ἀλοῶν and the ἀροτριῶν is thus no other than the gospel teacher, as necessarily follows from δι' ἡμᾶς; the passage of the law now under consideration gives occasion to his being *figuratively* designated (see as early expositors as Chrysostom and Theophylact) in accordance with the idea of the γεώργιον Θεοῦ (iii. 9), without, however, the two words being intended to signify *different* departments of teaching,—a notion which receives no countenance from the context. It is teaching in general that is here represented by two analogous figures. Figure apart, therefore, the meaning is: that the teacher, namely, is bound<sup>1</sup> to exercise his office of teaching, in hope to have profit therefrom. Οὐδὲν οὖν ἕτερον τὸ στόμα ἀκήμωτον ὃν τοῦ ζώου τούτου βοᾷ ἢ ὅτι τοὺς διδασκάλους τοὺς ποιοῦντας δεῖ καὶ ἀμοιβῆς ἀπολαύειν, Chrysostom. It is a mistake to apply the words, as is commonly done, to the *literal* plougher and thrasher. Such a maxim of ordinary life would, it is plain, be wholly foreign to the *typico-allegorical* character of the argument, and generally to the nature of the mystical interpretation of Scripture, which Paul follows here; the result would be something unsuitably *trivial*. Nor is it simply an *application* of the moral idea of the precept to the spiritual work that the apostle would have his readers make; there is not the slightest trace of this in his words, but the material work serves directly as the *foil* to the spiritual. Theophylact puts it rightly: ὁ διδάσκαλος ὀφείλει ἀροτριᾶν κ. κοπιᾶν ἐπ' ἐλπίδι ἀμοιβῆς κ. ἀντιμισθίας. — ἐπ' ἐλπίδι] has

<sup>1</sup> Ὀρεῖται, *debet* (Vulgate). Hofmann goes against linguistic usage in turning it into the sense of *being entitled*, as if he read δικαίως ἴσται, or something to that effect.

the chief emphasis, and belongs to *ὀφείλει*, being its conditioning basis (as in Rom. iv. 18, viii. 21; Titus i. 2). *What* hope the plougher is to cherish, is self-evident, namely, to enjoy with others the fruits of his ploughing; the *reference of the figure* is obvious from the context. — *τοῦ μετέχειν*] to wit, of the grain thrashed. As to the *genitive*, see Rom. v. 2, *al.*

Ver. 11. Application of ver. 10, and that in such a way as to make the readers feel *ὅτι μείζονα λαμβάνουσιν ἢ διδόνουσιν*, Chrysostom; an argument *a majori ad minus*. — *ἡμεῖς*] does not include Barnabas, who cannot be proved ever to have joined company again with Paul after the separation recorded in Acts xv. 39, and who certainly had no share in founding the church at Corinth. The apostle means *himself* along with his *companions* of that period, when by casting forth the seed of the gospel he founded the church to which his readers belonged (*ἐσπείραμεν*), Acts xviii. 5; 2 Cor. i. 19. — *ἡμεῖς ὑμῶν*] An emphatic juxtaposition, the emphasis of which is further heightened by the *ἡμεῖς ὑμῶν* which follows. — *τὰ πνευματικά*] *spiritual things*, Christian knowledge, faith, love, etc., inasmuch as these are the blessings which, *proceeding from the Holy Spirit* (Gal. v. 22), become the portion of believers through the sower's work of preaching the gospel (Matt. xiii. 3 ff.). Contrasted with these are *τὰ σαρκικά*, the things which have nothing to do with the Holy Spirit, but belong to the lower sphere of man's life, to his sensuous, corporeal nature, such as food, clothing, money, etc. Comp. as regards the antithesis, Rom. xv. 27. — *μέγα*] *res magni momenti*, Xen. *Cyrop.* vii. 5. 52, *Anab.* vii. 7. 27. It means here, from the connection: something *disproportionate*. Comp. 2 Cor. xi. 15. — *θερίσωμεν*] see the critical remarks. The *sub-junctive* after *εἰ* "respectum comprehendit experientiae" (Hermann, *de partic. ἄν.* p. 97); see regarding this idiom on Luke ix. 13, and Hermann, *ad Viger.* p. 831; it occurs in Homer and the lyric poets, and, although no certain instance of it can be given from the Attic prose writers, is frequent again in later Greek.

Ver. 12. Confirmation from the example of others. — *ἄλλοι*] *other teachers* generally, who came into the church after the apostle and his associates (comp. iii. 10), and who were still there. Chrysostom, Theodoret, Pott, and others understand them to be *false teachers*, so as to obviate any appearance of collision between

Paul and the apostles. But there was, in fact, no other apostle whatever among the rest of the *Corinthian* teachers. — τῆς ὑμῶν ἐξουσίᾳ.] *the authority over you,*<sup>1</sup> i.e. according to the context: the right to claim their support from you. Ὑμῶν is thus the genitivus *objecti* (as in ver. 6, comp. John xvii. 2; Matt. x. 1, *al.*), not *subjecti*, as if it meant: “leave, *which you give*” (Schrader), which does not correspond with the conception that Paul had of the case in vv. 4–11. To understand the word in the sense of *means* (Schulz, with Castalio, Salmeron, Zeltner, Ewald), i.e. *resources*, which are at your command, may be justified by classical usage (Plato, *Legg.* viii. p. 828 D; Thuc. i. 38. 3, vi. 31. 4), but not by that of the N. T., and is excluded here by the scope of what immediately follows. Chrysostom, in accordance with his assumption that false teachers are meant, makes the reference to be to their *tyrannical* power over the Corinthians. *Conjectures* (such as that of Olearius: ἡμῶν, which is actually the reading of 2. 52, and to which Rückert and Neander too are inclined; or that of Cappellus and Locke: οὐσίας) are quite superfluous. — The second ἀλλά is opposed to the οὐκ ἐχρησ. Comp. Hom. *Il.* i. 26 f.; Plato, *Sympos.* p. 211 E, and often elsewhere.—μᾶλλον] *potius*, we the founders of your church. — πάντα στέγομεν] *we endure all things* (see Wetstein and Kypke, *II.* p. 213), should be left indefinite: labours, privations and the like, arising from our not using the right in question. Comp. xiii. 7. — ἵνα μὴ ἐγκοπῇ. κ.τ.λ.] For how easily, supposing the apostle's labours had been less independent, or that some suspicion of self-interest, ambition, or greed of gain had rested upon him and his companions, might *hindrances* have been put in the way of the gospel as regards its reception, effect, and diffusion! And how powerfully must that sacred cause have been commended and furthered by such an example of noble self-denial! Respecting ἐγκοπῇ, comp. Dion. Hal. *de comp. verb.* p. 157. 15.

Vv. 13, 14. An additional proof of the above right on the part of the teachers, drawn now from the sphere of the Israelitish theocracy, namely, from the example of the priests and the corresponding command of Christ Himself. Then, in ver. 15, ἐγὼ δὲ . . . τούτων repeats the contrast to this. — The *first* of the two

<sup>1</sup> Observe the emphasis conveyed by putting the ὑμῶν first: *over you*, who are surely under obligation to me first of all, and not to them.



parallel halves of ver. 13,<sup>1</sup> which together describe the *ἱερατεύειν* (Luke i. 7), characterizes the priests *generally*: οἱ τὰ ἱερά ἐργαζ., *who do the holy things, i.e.* whose work is to perform divine service; the *second* clause again is more *specific*: "who are constantly busied at the altar of sacrifice" (προσεδρ. and παρεδρ., of an *official*, and especially of a priestly, *assidere*, Diod. Sic. i. 40; Josephus, *cont. Ap.* i. 7; Lucian, *Asin.* 5; Kypke, II. p. 213). As regards τὰ ἱερά, *res sacrae, i.e.* what belongs to the divine cultus, comp. 3 Macc. iii. 21 (according to the true reading); Demosth. 1300. 6; and often elsewhere in the classics. *They eat from the sanctuary*, inasmuch as they have their support from what is brought into the temple (sacrifices, shewbread, first-fruits, etc.); *they have their share with the altar of sacrifice*, inasmuch as they take to themselves their part of the offerings which belong to the altar. See Num. xviii. 8 ff. Beza puts it well: "altaris esse socios in dividenda victima." It is incorrect to explain the first clause as referring to the *Levites* and the second to the *priests* (so Chrysostom, Theophylact, Vitringa, Wolf), for the Levites were not τὰ ἱερά ἐργαζόμενοι, but only ἱερόδουλοι (3 Esdr. i. 3), and therefore, in respect of their occupations, are no fitting analogues to the preachers of the gospel; see rather Rom. xv. 16; Phil. ii. 17. On this ground we must refuse even to *include* the Levites here (against de Wette, Osiander, Maier, *al.*). Rückert understands both clauses to refer to the Jewish *and heathen* cultus and its ministers. But in the mind of the apostle, looking at things from the theocratic point of view of his nation, the ἱερόν and the θυσιαστ. are simply κατ' ἐξοχήν, those of Israel (Rom. ix. 4); and how could he otherwise have said οὕτω καὶ κ.τ.λ., ver. 14, seeing that the *heathen* priestly institute was by no means of divine appointment? For these reasons we cannot even say, with Ewald, that the words refer *primarily* indeed to Num. xviii., but are couched in such a *general* form as to apply also to the priests in the *heathen* temples. The mention of τῷ θυσιαστηρ. is especially opposed to this interpretation, since

<sup>1</sup> The *paraphrastic description* of the priests from their employments serves to make the representation uniform with that in ver. 14. The *double* designation, however, brings out the analogy with the Christian teachers in a more clear and telling way for the purposes of the argument. The *holy thing* at which they labour is the gospel (Rom. xv. 16), and the *offering* which they present is the faith of their converts (Phil. ii. 17), and, consequently, those converts themselves (Rom. i. c.).

for Paul there can be but the one altar; comp. x. 18. — οὕτω καὶ ὁ Κύριος κ.τ.λ.] *so, i.e. in accordance with the relation of things stated in ver. 13, hath the Lord also, etc.* 'Ο Κύριος is *Christ*; the allusion is to such sayings of His as Matt. x. 10, Luke x. 8, here referred to as handed down by living tradition. By the καί, again, the command of *Christ* is linked to the foregoing relations *under the O. T. economy*, with which it corresponds (comp. Chrysostom). The order of the words is enough of itself to show that the reference is not to *God*, for in that case we must have had: οὕτω καὶ τοῖς τὸ εὐαγγ. καταγγ. ὁ Κύριος διέταξε. — For examples of the idiom ζῆν ἐκ, see Kypke.

Ver. 15. 'Εγὼ δέ] Paul now reverts to the *individual* way of expressing himself (ver. 3), effecting thereby a lively *climax* in the representation. From this point onward to the end of the chapter we have a growing torrent of animated appeal; and in what the apostle now says regarding his mode of acting, his desire is that *he* alone should stand prominent, without concerning himself about others, and how they might act and appear in these respects. — οὐδενὶ τούτων] *none of these things*; Oecumenius, Theophylact, Estius, Rückert, *al.*, make this refer to the *grounds* of the ἐξουσία in question which have been hitherto adduced. But there is no reason why we should not refer it simply to the immediately preceding statement as to the ordinance of Christ regarding the ἐκ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου ζῆν. Of what belongs to that ordinance (food, drink, money, clothing, etc., see Acts xx. 33)—of none of these things (τούτων) had Paul availed himself. How common it is for Greek writers also to use ταῦτα of a single thing, when considered in its different component elements, may be seen in Kühner, § 423, note; Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Apol. Soc.* p. 19 D. Hofmann holds that the "*facts from the history of redemption*," cited in vv. 13, 14, are meant. But οὐδενὶ implies that what is referred to is a *multitude* of things, which is summed up in τούτων. — Observe the use of the *perfect* κέχρημ. to describe a continuous course of action. It is different with ἐχρησάμ. in ver. 12. — A *full stop* should be put after τούτων; for with οὐκ ἔγραψα δὲ ταῦτα (all from ver. 4 to ver. 15) there begins a new section in the apostle's address. — ἵνα οὕτω κ.τ.λ.] *in order that* (for the future) *the like* (according to what I have written, namely, that the preachers of the gospel should be supported by

the churches) *should be done in my case* (comp. Luke xxiii. 31 ; Matt. xvii. 12).—*μᾶλλον*] *potius*, namely, than let myself be supported (not *magis*, Vulgate). — *ἢ τὸ καύχημα μου οὐδεὶς κενώσει*] (see the critical remarks) expresses what is to take place, if the *ἀποθανεῖν* does not ensue. That is to say, the *ἢ* cannot here be the *than* of comparison,<sup>1</sup> as it would be were we to adopt the *Recepta*, which in fact has just arisen from men failing rightly to understand this *ἢ*. It means “*aut,*” or *otherwise* (comp. vii. 11 ; Acts xxiv. 20), equivalent to *εἰ δὲ μὴ*, and so specifying “*what will take place, if the thing before named does not happen*” (Baeumlein, *Partik.* p. 126), so that it is equivalent in sense to *alioguin*. See Ast, *Lcx. Plat.* II. p. 12 ; Kühner, *ad Xen. Anab.* i. 4. 16 ; Ellendt, *Lcx. Soph.* I. p. 750 f. ; Baeumlein, *l.c.* What Paul says is : “*Rather is it good for me to die, i.e. rather is death beneficial for me, or otherwise, if this ἀποθανεῖν is not to ensue and I therefore am to remain alive, no one is to make my glory void.*” Comp. as to this asseveration, 2 Cor. xi. 10. — *τὸ καύχημά μου κ.τ.λ.*] *i.e.* No man will ever bring me to give up my principle of preaching without receiving anything in return, so as to produce the result that I can no longer have ground for glorying (*καύχημα* here too means *materies gloriandi*, as in v. 6 and always). Lachmann’s conjecture (*Stud. u. Krit.* 1830, p. 839, and *Praef.* p. xii.), which is adopted by Billroth : *νῆ τὸ καύχημά μου οὐδεὶς κενώσει* (comp. xv. 31), breaks up the passage unnecessarily ; and the same meaning would be arrived at more easily and simply, were we merely to write *ἢ* with the circumflex, in the sense of *sane*, which is so common in the classics (Baeumlein, *Partik.* p. 119 f.) : *in truth, no one will make my glory void.* But this use of *ἢ* does not occur in the N. T. Rückert’s opinion is, that what we find in the old MSS. gives no sense at all ;<sup>2</sup> we

<sup>1</sup> My own former view (ed. 2) was to this effect, that instead of saying : “*Better for me to die than to take recompense,*” Paul made an aposiopesis at *ἢ*, breaking off there to exclaim with triumphant certainty : *My καύχημα no man will make void !* According to this, we should have to supply a dash after *ἢ*, and take what follows independently. I now regard this interpretation—although approved by Winer, p. 532 [E. T. 715]—as too bold, being without analogy in the N. T., in which, as with classical writers, the suppression of the apodosis occurs only after conditional clauses (comp. Rom. ix. 22 f.). Maier has followed this view ; as does Neander, on the supposition that Lachmann’s reading were to be adopted.

<sup>2</sup> The readings of B D\* N\* and A give the *above* sense ; F G again, with their *τις κενώσει*, in which it is simplest to take the *τις* as an interrogative (comp. Boerner :

cannot tell what Paul actually wrote; but that the best [how far?] of what we have to choose from is the *Recepta*. Ewald, too, and Hofmann, follow the latter.—It does not follow from ver. 14 that by ἀποθανεῖν we are to understand precisely *death by famine* (so Billroth, with Theophylact, Erasmus, Piscator, *al.*); but the thought is generally to this effect: so far from letting myself be supported by the churches, I will rather be kept by death from this disgrace, by which, while I live, I shall let no one rob me of my glory. The idea is that of ἀντὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἀποθνήσκειν εὐκλεῶς, Isocr. *Evag.* 1. The apostle's καύχημα would have been *made empty* (κενώσει), if he had been brought to a course of action whereby that in which he gloried would have appeared to be without reality. Comp. 2 Cor. ix. 3. He would thus have been shown to be κενευχῆς (Homer, *Il.* viii. 230).

Ver. 16. Why Paul has every reason (γάρ) to hold his καύχημα thus fast. *For the preaching of the gospel, taken by itself, does not put him in a position to boast himself.* All the less, therefore, can he afford to give up the only thing that does place him in such a position, namely, his preaching without recompense. — ἀνάγκη γάρ μοι ἐπικ.] *sc. εὐαγγελίζεσθαι*, as is proved by what goes before. Comp. Homer, *Il.* vi. 458: κρατερὴ δ' ἐπικεῖσεν ἀνάγκη, and the common phrase in the classics: ἀνάγκην ἐπιθεῖναι. — οὐαὶ γάρ μοι ἐστίν] Comp. LXX. in Hos. ix. 12. *Woe* betides him, *i.e.* God's threatened judgment will fulfil itself upon him (in the coming day of judgment), if he shall not have preached the gospel (εὐαγγελίσωμαι, see the critical remarks); from this is evident (γάρ) how the ἀνάγκη arises, namely, that he *must* preach; he *cannot* give it up, without incurring eternal destruction.

Ver. 17 f. The sentence immediately preceding this verse, οὐαὶ γὰρ . . . εὐαγγ., was merely a thought interposed, a logical parenthesis, to the contents of which Paul does not again refer in what follows. In ver. 17 f., accordingly, with its γάρ, the reference is not to this preceding sentence οὐαὶ κ.τ.λ., so as to establish it by way of dilemma (which was my former interpretation), but to ἀνάγκη μοι ἐπικείται, ver. 16 (comp. de Wette,

“*quis evacuat*”), give the plain and good sense: *for it is better for me to die* (than that such a thing should happen in my case); *or who will bring my glory to nought?*

Osiander, Hofmann), and that indeed in so far as these latter words were set down to confirm the previous assertion, *ἐὰν εὐαγγελίζωμαι, οὐκ ἐστὶ μοι καύχημα*. The correctness of this reference of the *γάρ* which introduces ver. 17 f., is confirmed by the fact that the leading conceptions in the argument of ver. 17 f., to wit, *ἐκὼν* and *ἄκων*, are correlative to the conception of *ἀνάγκη* in ver. 16. The *γάρ* in ver. 17 thus serves to justify the second *γάρ* in ver. 16, as we often find, both in Greek writers and in the N. T., *γάρ* repeated in such a significant correlation as we find here (see Fritzsche, *ad Rom.* II. p. 110 f.). In order to prove that he has rightly established his previous statement *ἐὰν . . . καύχημα* by adding *ἀνάγκη γάρ μοι ἐπικείται*, the apostle argues, starting now from the opposite of that *ἀνάγκη*, and therefore *c contrario*, as follows: "*For supposing that I carry on my preaching (τοῦτο πράσσω) of free self-determination, then I have a reward, of which, consequently, I can glory; but if I do it not of my own free will (and this, in point of fact, was the case with the apostle), then it is a stewardship with which I am entrusted, which therefore (this is the purport of the interrogatory clause which follows, τίς οὖν κ.τ.λ.) involves no reward for me.*" — From this simple course of thought—in which the *μισθὸν ἔχω* refers to the certain possession hereafter of the *Messianic* reward,<sup>1</sup> and is conceived as the more specially defined contents of the *καύχημα* in ver. 16, —it will be seen that the apodosis of the second half of ver. 17 is *οἰκονομίαν πεπίστευμαι*, that these words, consequently, should neither be put in a parenthesis nor attached to the protasis (so Knatchbull, Semler, Hofmann—comp. also his *Schriftbeweis*, II. 2, p. 332) by reading *εἰ δὲ ἄκων οἶκον. πεπίστευμαι* together, to which *τίς οὖν κ.τ.λ.* would then become the apodosis;<sup>2</sup> —a view under which the significant bearing of the purposely chosen phrase *οἶκον. πεπίστευμαι* is entirely lost sight of. Billroth,

<sup>1</sup> On *μισθὸν ἔχων*, comp. Matt. vi. 1. It is the opposite of *οὐαί μοι ἐστίν*, and hence *μισθός*; cannot mean the reward which lies in the very action itself, namely, the *self-satisfaction* to which it gives rise (Hofmann).

<sup>2</sup> As regards the *οὖν* of the apodosis, see on Rom. ii. 17–24. It would have been exceedingly *uncalled for* after such a short and perfectly simple protasis as that in the text. In Herodotus ix. 48, which Hofmann adduces (also Hartung, *Partik.* II. p. 22), it is otherwise (*οἱ δ' ὦν κ.τ.λ.*). Moreover, it is a special peculiarity of Herodotus to put *οὖν* before the apodosis; whereas, with Paul, it occurs only in Romans *loc. cit.*, where it comes in after an accumulated series of protases and, as an epianalepsis, was quite appropriate.

failing to recognise how essential εἰ δὲ ἄκων, οἶκ. πεπίστ. is to the argument, makes it parenthetical, and understands ἄκων (with Bengel, Zachariae, and Schulz) as meaning *non gratis*, which is contrary to the signification of the word. Many expositors render ἑκὼν and ἄκων by “*with joy and gladness*” and “*with reluctance*” (so Calovius, Piscator, Estius, Kypke, Rosenmüller, Flatt, Pott, *al.*; comp. also Ewald); but this runs counter to the fact that, as τὶς οὖν . . . μισθός shows, the apostle’s own case is not the first, but the last of the two cases supposed by him, and that he found himself indeed in the official position of a preacher without having chosen it of his own free will,—being rather apprehended (Phil. ii. 12), and, through his call (Acts ix. 22, 26), as it were constrained by Christ (ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄκων, Plato, *Legg.* v. 734 B),—but, notwithstanding, pursued his work with heart and hand.—οἰκονομᾶν πεπίστ.] οἶκον. has significant emphasis; as to the construction, comp. Rom. iii. 2; Gal. ii. 7. If I preach ἄκων, so Paul holds, then the apostleship, with which I am put in trust, stands in the relation of the *stewardship of a household* (iv. 1); for that, too, a man receives not from his own free choice, but by the master’s will, which he has to obey; and hence it follows (οὖν) that *no* reward awaits me (this being the negative sense of τὶς . . . μισθός; comp. Matt. v. 46; Rom. vi. 21; 1 Cor. xv. 32); for a steward—conceived of as a slave<sup>1</sup>—can but do his duty (Luke xvii. 10), whereas one who works of his own free will does more than he is bound to do, and so labours in a sense worthy of reward. The meanings which some expositors find in οἶκ. πεπ. are inserted by themselves; thus Pott explains, “*nihilosecius peragendum est*,” comp. Schulz, Rosenmüller, Flatt, Schrader, Neander, and older interpreters; while Grotius makes it, “*ratio mihi reddenda est impositi muneris*.” The words convey nothing more than just their simple literal meaning. What, again, is *inferred* from them, Paul himself tells us by *beginning a new sentence* with τὶς οὖν. To suppose a middle clause omitted before this sentence (with Neander, who would insert, “How am I now to prove that I do it of my own free will?”) is to make a purely arbitrary interruption in the passage.—ὁ μισθός] *the befitting reward*. Neither here nor in the first

<sup>1</sup> This is not an *arbitrary* assumption (as Hofmann objects), since it is well enough known that the οἰκονόμοι were, as a rule, slaves.

clause is *μισθός* the same as *καύχημα* (Pott, Rückert, Ewald, *al.*); but it is viewed as standing in the relation of the inducing *cause* to that *ἐστὶ μοι καύχημα*, supposing the latter to take place. This also applies against Baur in the *theol. Jahrb.* 1852, p. 541 ff., who, moreover, pronounces the apostle's argument an unsound one. The distinction which Paul here makes is, in his opinion, at variance with the absolute ground of obligation in the moral consciousness, and is either purely a piece of dialectics, or has for its real basis the idea of the *opera supererogationis*. In point of fact, neither the one nor the other is the case; but Paul is speaking of the *apostolic reward* hereafter, concerning which he was persuaded that it was not to be procured for him by his apostolic labour in itself, seeing that he had not, in truth, come to the apostleship of his own free will; rather, in his case, must the element of free self-determination come in in another way, namely, by his labouring without receiving anything in return. In so far, accordingly, he must do something more than the other apostles in order that he might receive the reward. He had recognised this to be his peculiar duty of love, incumbent upon him also with a view to avert all ground of offence, but not as implying surplus merit. The latter notion is discovered in the text by Cornelius a Lapide and others.

Ver. 18. "*ἵνα*]" is taken by Grotius as meaning *if*, by Luther and most interpreters—among whom are Rückert, de Wette, Osiander, Ewald—as used in place of the exegetical infinitive, so that it gives the answer to the foregoing question.<sup>1</sup> The first of these renderings is linguistically incorrect; the second would have to be referred to the conception: "*I ought*," etc., but yet does not suit the *negation*: "*I have therefore no reward*," which had its animated expression in the question: *τίς οὖν κ.τ.λ.* It is much better to interpret *ἵνα εὐαγγ.* κ.τ.λ. as stating the *aim*, according to God's ordination, of this negative condition of things: *in order that I should preach without recompense* (which is the first thing to give me a prospect of reward, as being something which lies

<sup>1</sup> Wetstein, with whom Baur agrees, remarks: "*argute dictum, nullum mercedem accipere, haec mea merces est.*" But had Paul intended any such *point*, he must have expressed it by *ἀμισθός* or *ἀμισθί*. He would possibly have written *ἵνα ἀμισθός κηρύξω τὸ εὐαγγ.*, or something similar, if he had put *ἵνα* at all instead of the infinitive.

beyond my official obligation). Hofmann's view is, that Paul asks, What reward (viz. none) *could induce him to this*, to make the gospel message free of cost? But plainly it was just his *supporting himself* in the discharge of his vocation, *which went beyond the obligation of the οἰκονομία*, and consequently made him worthy of reward, which the work of the οἰκονόμος, taken by itself alone, did not do. Moreover, this interpretation of Hofmann's would require an expression, not of the design (ἵνα), but of the inducing ground (such as δι' ὅν). The ἵνα is used here, as so often in the N. T., to indicate the *divine teleology* (Winer, p. 427 [E. T. 573]).—εὐαγγελίζ. ἀδάπ. θήσω τὸ εὐαγγ.] *i.e. in order that I, by my preaching, may make the gospel something not connected with any outlay* (on the part of the receivers). As regards this very common use of τίθημι, *facio*, see Kypke and Loesner *in loc.* Comp. also on Rom. iv. 17, and Hermann, *ad Viger.* p. 761. There is no need of going out of the way to render it, with Beza: *set forth*, with Grotius: *collocare*, like τιθέναι χάριν, or with Pott: *to set before them* (as spiritual food). "Ἰνα, with the future indicative, conveys the idea of continuance. See Matthiae, p. 1186. Among the older Greek writers ὅπως (also ὅφρα) is ordinarily used in this connection (Matthiae, *l.c.*; Kühner, II. p. 490), while this use of ἵνα is, to say the least, very doubtful (see against Elmsley, *ad Eur. Bacch.* p. 164, Hermann, *ad Soph. Oed. Col.* 155; Klotz, *ad Devar.* p. 629 f.) in the N. T. again, and with later authors it is certain (Winer, p. 271 [E. T. 361]; Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 202 [E. T. 234]).—εἰς τὸ μὴ καταχρ.] aim of his ἀδάπ. τιθέναι τὸ εὐαγγ.: *in order not to make use of.* To understand καταχρ. as meaning *to misuse* (comp. on vii. 31), would give a sense much too weak for the connection (against Beza, Calovius, and others, among whom is Ewald). The right rendering already appears in the Greek Fathers.—ἐν τῷ εὐαγγ.] *i.e. in docendo evangelio.*—The ἐξουσία μου is not exclusively that indicated in ver. 4, but the apostolic prerogative generally, although in application to this particular point.

Vv. 19–22. Confirmation of this εἰς τὸ μὴ καταχρ. τ. ἐξ μου by his practical procedure in other matters, which was such, that not to renounce the use of that ἐξουσία would simply be to contradict himself; it would be a gross inconsistency.—ἐκ πάντων] *Mase.* It belonged to the apostolic ἐξουσία to put himself in



bondage to no man, but to be independent of *all* (ver. 1; comp. Gal. i. 10); to hold and to make good this position of freedom towards every one, was a result flowing from, and a constituent part of, his rights as an apostle (in opposition to Hofmann, who asserts that a position precisely the converse of this was the only one logically tenable by the apostle).<sup>1</sup> Notwithstanding, Paul had made himself a bondsman to *all*, accommodating himself to their necessities in ministrative self-denial. It is only here that ἐλεύθερος occurs with ἐκ; elsewhere (Rom. vii. 3; comp. Rom. vi. 18, 22, viii. 2, 21) and in Greek writers with ἀπό.—τοὺς πλείονας] *i.e.* according to the context: the greater part of the πάντες, not: more than are converted by others (Hofmann). Comp. x. 5. By acting otherwise he would have won, it might be, only individuals here and there.—κερδήσω] namely, *for Christ and His kingdom*, by their conversion. Rückert explains it as meaning: to carry off as an advantage *for himself*, which Hofmann, too, *includes*. But the precise sense of the phrase must be determined by the *context*, which speaks in reality of the apostle's *official labours*, so that in substance the meaning is the same as that of σώσω in ver. 22. Comp. Matt. xviii. 15; 1 Pet. iii. 1. Regarding the *form* ἐκέρδησα, see Lobeck, *ad Phryn.* p. 740.

Ver. 20. Explanation in detail of the preceding verse (καὶ *epexegetical*).—*To the Jews Paul became as a Jew, i.e.* in his relations to the Jews, whom he sought to convert, he behaved in Jewish fashion, observing *e.g.* Jewish customs (Acts xvi. 3, xxi. 26), availing himself of Jewish methods of teaching, etc., *in order to win Jews*. Jewish Christians are not included here (Vorstius, Billroth); for these were, as such, already won and saved.—τοῖς ὑπὸ νόμον] *to those under the law*; not really different from τοῖς Ἰουδαίοις, save only that they are *designated here from their characteristic religious position*, into which Paul entered. The universal nature of the expression is enough of itself to show that Judaizing Christians cannot be intended; nor *proselytes*,—although

<sup>1</sup> According to Hofmann, Paul establishes the negative question τίς οὖν μοι ἰστὶν ὁ μισθός by the sentence linked to it with γάρ, which states that, so far from receiving reward, he had given up his freedom, etc., for the same end for which he refrained from claiming support. This view is connected with his incorrect rendering of ver. 18, and falls with it.

they are by no means to be excluded from either category,—because they, too, would not have their specific characteristic brought out by ὑπὸ νόμον. The very same reason holds against the supposition that the *rigid Jews, the Pharisees*, are meant. The first of these three views is taken by Theodoret, the second by Theodore of Mopsuestia, Grotius, Mosheim, *al.*; Theophylact is undecided which of the two to prefer, comp. also Chrysostom; Lightfoot and Heydenreich adopt the third. — μὴ ὦν αὐτὸς ὑπὸ νόμον] *although I myself* (for my own part) *am not*, etc., a caveat very naturally arising from his consciousness of the high value of his freedom as regards the law, Gal. ii. 19. There is no proof of any apologetic design here (in reference to such as might have said: Thou *must* do so and so, Rückert). Paul did *not* add any remark of this kind in connection with the preceding clause, because in respect of *nationality* he *actually was* an Ἰουδαῖος. — τοὺς ὑπὸ νόμ.] The article denotes the class of men in question.

Ver. 21. Τοῖς ἀνόμοις] *i.e. to the heathen*, Rom. ii. 12. Comp. Suicer, *Thes.* I. p. 366. — ὡς ἄνομος] by holding intercourse with them, giving up Jewish observances, teaching in Hellenic form (as at Athens, Acts xvii.). Comp. Isidor. Pelus, ed. Paris. 1638, p. 186. — μὴ ὦν κ.τ.λ.] must similarly be regarded not exactly as a defence of himself (Grotius, Rückert), but as arising very naturally from the pious feeling of the apostle, who, with all the consciousness of his freedom of position towards the Mosaic law, which allowed him to be τοῖς ἀνόμοις ὡς ἄνομος, always recognised his subjection to the divine νόμος revealed in Christ. In spite, therefore, of his thus condescending to the ἀνόμοις, he was by no means one *without* legal obligation to God (no ἄνομος Θεοῦ<sup>1</sup>), but one—and this is precisely what brings out the absolute character of the opposite—who stood within the sphere of legal obligation to *Christ*. And Paul was conscious that he stood thus in virtue of his faith in Christ, who lived in him (Gal. ii. 20), and in conformity with the gospel, which ruled him as the

<sup>1</sup> Hofmann's conjecture, that Paul wrote Θεῷ (following it, however, with Χριστοῦ), has virtually no critical foundation, and is wholly devoid of exegetical basis. Hofmann explains the passage as if he read ἔνομος Χριστοῦ οὐκ ὦν ἄνομος Θεῷ, making Paul say of "his being shut up in the law of Christ, that it made him one who was not without law in his relation to God."

νόμος τοῦ πνεύματος καὶ τῆς χάριτος (Chrysostom), and was to him accordingly the higher analogue of the venerated νόμος (Rom. iii. 27), which has its fulfilment in love (Rom. xiii. 10); comp. Gal. vi. 2. The two genitives Θεοῦ and Χριστοῦ denote simply *in relation to, in my position towards*; they thus give to the two notions ἀνομος and ἔννομος their definite reference.

Ver. 22. The ἀσθενεῖς are *Christians* weak as yet in discernment and moral power (viii. 7 ff.; Rom. xiv. 1, xv. 1; Acts xx. 35; 1 Thess. v. 14). The terms κερδήσω and σώσω are not inconsistent with this view, for such weak believers would, by an inconsiderate conduct towards them, be made to stumble, and *would fall into destruction* (viii. 11; Rom. xiv. 15). To understand the phrase as denoting *non-Christians* from their lack of the higher powers of Christian life, especially of strength of conscience (Rückert, de Wette, Osiander, Hofmann), is against the formal use of οἱ ἀσθενεῖς, and cannot be justified by Rom. v. 6. Comp. also 2 Cor. xi. 29. — ὥς ἀσθενής] “perinde quasi simili tenerer imbecillitate,” Erasmus, *Paraphr.* — τοῖς πᾶσι κ.τ.λ.] *to all* (with whom I had to do) *I have become all*, have suited myself to them in all ways according to their circumstances. Comp. as regards πάντα γίνεσθαι,<sup>1</sup> the passages cited in Kypke, II. p. 215 f., and observe the *perfect* here at the close; comp. Col. i. 15. — Paul did not need to say to his readers that in this whole picture of his συγκατάβασις he is expressing no mere men-pleasing or anti-Christian connivance at sin, but the practical wisdom of the truest Christian love and self-denial in the exercise of his apostolic functions; he trusts them to understand this from their knowledge of his character. Comp. also Gal. i. 10, ii. 3–5. This practical wisdom must be all the more regarded as a fruit of *experience* under the discipline of the *Spirit*, when we consider how fiery and decided his natural *temperament* was. And who can estimate how much he achieved by this method of working! Comp. Neander in opposition to Rückert’s unfavourable judgment. Augustine puts it well: “non mentientis actus, sed compatiēntis affectus.” — πάντως] *in any case* (comp. on ver. 10, and Plato, *Phaedr.* p. 266 D; 2 Macc. iii. 13; 3 Macc. i. 15; the reverse of οὐδαμῶς, Plato, *Soph.* p. 240 E; comp. the frequent

<sup>1</sup> Not to be confounded with the expression πάντα γίνεσθαι τινι, which means *instar omnium fieri alicui*, as in Xen. *Eph.* ii. 13; comp. Locella *in loc.*, p. 209.

phrase *πάντη πάντως*, Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Phaed.* p. 78 D). Should the apostle *in every case*, in which he adapted himself as described in vv. 19–22, save *some*,—that is, in the one case of accommodation *these*, in the other *those*, but in all *some*,—there would result the *πλείονες* of ver. 19, whom it was his design to win as there summarily set forth. — *σώσω*] make them partakers in the Messianic salvation, vii. 16, x. 33; Rom. ix. 27, *al.* Not different in substance from *κερδήσω*, but stronger and more specific, as was suitable in expressing the *final result*. Comp. 1 Tim. iv. 16.

Ver. 23. *Πάντα δὲ ποιῶ*] quite general; *now all that I do* is done for the gospel's sake. — *ἵνα συγκοιν. αὐτοῦ γέν.*] Epexegetis of *διὰ τὸ εὐαγγ.*: *in order that I may become a fellow-partaker therein*. Comp. on *συγκοιν.*, Rom. xi. 17. Whoever is included as belonging to those in whom the salvation proclaimed in the gospel shall be fulfilled (at the day of judgment), enters along with them when this fulfilment is accomplished into the participation of the gospel, to wit, through sharing in the common fruition of that which forms the *real contents* of the message of salvation. Hence the meaning in substance is: *in order to become one of those in whom the gospel will realize itself*, through their attaining the Messianic salvation. Note the *humility* of the expression; he who laboured more than all others, has yet in view no higher reward for himself than just the salvation common to all believers. Flatt and Billroth make it: *in order to take part in the spreading of the gospel*. But the aim here stated corresponds to the *βραβεῖον* in ver. 24. The *inward* salvation of the *moral* life again (Semler and Pott) is only the ethical path of development, whereby men ultimately reach the *συγκοινωνία* here intended. Comp. Phil. iii. 10 ff.

Ver. 24 ff. Exhortation to his readers to follow his example, clothed in figures borrowed from the relations of athletic competition among the Greeks (comp. Phil. iii. 12 ff.). — Doubtless Paul, writing to the Corinthians, was thinking of the *Isthmian* games, which continued to be held even after the destruction of the city by Mummius (Pausanias, ii. 2). There is no sufficient ground for supposing the *Olympic* games to be meant, as those in which the foot-race formed a peculiarly prominent feature (Spanheim, Wolf, *al.*), for running was not excluded at the other places of com-

petition; and it is not necessary to assume that the apostle had a knowledge enabling him to make nice distinctions between the different kinds of contest at the different games. — τὸ βραβεῖον] λέγεται δὲ οὕτω τὸ διδόμενον γέρας τῷ νικήσαντι ἀθλητῇ, ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν διδόντων αὐτὸ βραβευτῶν βραβεῖον, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν ἀθλούντων ἀθλον, Scholiast on Pindar, *Ol.* i. 5. Στέφος δὲ ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀγῶνος (the Isthmian) πίτυς (*pine*), τὸ δὲ ἀνέκαθεν σέλινα (not ivy, but *parsley*) καὶ αὐτοῦ ἦν ὁ στέφανος, Scholiast on Pindar, *Isthm.* ὑπόθεσις; comp. Plutarch, *qu. symp.* v. 3, and see Boeckh and Dissen, *ad Pind. Ol.* xiii. 33; Hermann, *gottesdienstl. Alterth.* § 50. 27, ed. 2. In the *application* (ἵνα καταλ.), we are to understand the future *Messianic salvation* which all may reach. Comp. 1 Tim. vi. 12. — οὕτω τρέχετε, ἵνα] should not be rendered, as it is by most expositors, “so run, that,”—which the ἵνα, as a particle expressive of design, makes inadmissible (comp. vv. 26, 27),—but: *in such way run* (like the one referred to), *in order that*. This does away, too, with the awkwardness which would otherwise be involved in εἰς with the plural καταλάβητε. Paul exhorts his readers to run in a way as worthy of the prize (so to shape their inner and outer life), as the one who, by decision of the judge, receives the crown for the foot-race, in order that they may attain to it (*i.e.* the crown of the *Messianic salvation*). There is no need for the arbitrary insertion of the idea: “as is necessary, in order that,” etc. (Hofmann).

Ver. 25. Δέ] marks the transition to the course of conduct observed by *any* competitor for a prize.—The emphasis is on πᾶς. It is from it that the conclusion is then drawn in ver. 26, ἐγὼ τοῖνυν. — ὁ ἀγωνιζόμεν.] used as a substantive. The statement is as to what *every competitor* does to prepare himself for his struggle; *in all respects he is abstinent* (ἐγκρατ., see on vii. 9). The word ἀγωνίζεσθαι denotes every kind of competition, and includes therefore the more specific τρέχειν (comp. Herod. v. 22; Xen. *Anab.* iv. 8. 27: ἀγωνίζεσθαι στάδιον). Regarding the *abstinence* (especially from wine, sexual intercourse, and all heavy food except a good flesh-diet), by which the competitors had to prepare themselves for the struggle for ten months previously, see Intpp. ad Hor. *Art. Poet.* 412 ff.; Valckenaer, p. 251; Rosenmüller, *Morgenl.* VI. p. 97 f.; Hermann, *gottesd. Alterth.* § 50. 16 f. — πάντα] Accusative of more precise definition. See

Lobeck, *ad Aj.* 1402. Comp. ix. 25. — ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.] *illi quidem igitur*, to wit, the competitors proper. — ἡμεῖς] *we Christians*. The πάντα ἐγκρατεύεσθαι holds of both the ἀγωνιζόμενοι, only with the first it is in the sphere of the *body*; with the second, in the *moral domain*. That the Christians, as striving in the moral field, actually πάντα ἐγκρατεύονται, is assumed by Paul, speaking from his ideal point of view, as a thing of course.

Vv. 26, 27. *So run I then*, seeing that I, for my part, according to ver. 25, am prepared by such abstinence to strive for the *incorruptible crown, in such a way as*, etc. The apostle thus sets his own ethical mode of striving (as a runner and combatant) before his readers as a pattern. Respecting the following τοῖνυν, which Paul has only in this passage, comp. Luke xx. 25; Heb. xiii. 13; Hartung, *Partik.* II. p. 349; Baeumlein, *Partik.* p. 251 f. — οὐκ ἀδήλως] *sc. τρέχων*. The word means *unapparent, not clear*, reverse of πρόδηλος. It may either be applied *objectively* to an action which is indistinct and not cognizable to others (Luke xi. 44; 1 Cor. xiv. 8); or *subjectively*, so that the man who acts, hopes, etc., is *himself* not clear, but *uncertain* and *hesitating* as to manner, aim, and result; comp. 2 Macc. vii. 34; 3 Macc. iv. 4; Thuc. i. 2. 1; Plato, *Symp.* p. 181 D; Soph. *Trach.* 667; Dem. 416. 4; Polyb. xxx. 4. 17, viii. 3. 2, vi. 56. 11, iii. 54. 5: ἀδήλος ἐπίβασις; also in Xenoph., Plutarch, etc. So here; and hence we should render: *not without a clearly conscious assurance and certainty of running so as to reach the goal*. Comp. Vulgate, “non in incertum;” Chrysostom: πρὸς σκοπὸν τινα βλέπων, οὐκ εἰκῇ καὶ μάτην, Phil. iii. 14, κατὰ σκοπὸν διώκω ἐπὶ τὸ βραβεῖον, Bengel, “Scio quod petam et quomodo,” Melanchthon, “non coeco impetu sine cogitatione finis.” Hofmann takes it otherwise: “in whose case it is *quite apparent whither he would go*,” thus bringing out the *objective* sense; comp. also Grotius. But this would convey too little, for as a matter of course it must be plain in the case of every runner in a race whither he would go. Homberg’s rendering is better: “ut non in obscuro sim, sed potius inter reliquos emineam.” Comp. Ewald: “not as in the dark, but as in the sight of all.” Still this does not correspond so well with the parallel ὡς οὐκ ἄερα δέρων, which implies the conception of the *end* in view. Alex. Morus and Billroth (comp. Olshausen) understand it as

meaning, *not without definite aim* (not simply for private exercise). But this runs counter to the whole context, in which Paul is set forth as an *actual* runner in a racecourse, so that the negative thus conveyed would be inappropriate. — οὐκ ἀέρα δέρων] The boxer ought to strike his opponent, and not, missing him, to beat the air, to deal strokes in air. Comp. the German phrase, “in’s Blaue hinein.” See Eustath. *ad Il.* p. 663, 17, and the instances given by Wetstein. Comp. Theophilus, *ad Autol.* iii. 1. The context (see above on ἀδῆλ.) forbids us to render, with Theodoret, Calovius, Bengel, Zachariae, Billroth, Rückert, Olshausen, Hofmann, and others: *not in imaginary combat merely*, without a real antagonist (σκιαμαχία). Respecting the οὐκ in this passage, see Winer, p. 452 [E. T. 609]. — ἀλλ’ ὑπωπιάζω κ.τ.λ.] *but I beat my body blue*,—alteration of the construction, in order to make the thought stand out in a more independent way; comp. on vii. 37. The ἀλλά, however, can have the effect only of presenting what is here stated as the opposite of ἀέρα δέρων, not as that whereby a man simply prepares himself for the contest (Hofmann, comp. Pott). Paul regards his own body (the σῶμα τῆς σαρκός, Col. ii. 11, the seat of the nature opposed to God, of the law in his members, comp. Rom. vi. 6, vii. 23) as the adversary (ἀνταγωνιστής), against whom he fights with an energetic and successful vehemence, just as a boxer beats the face of his opponent black and blue (respecting ὑπωπιάζειν, comp. on Luke xviii. 5, and Bos, *Exercitt.* p. 140 ff.), so that those lusts (Gal. v. 17), which war against the regenerate inner man, whose new principle of life is the Holy Spirit, lose their power and are not fulfilled. It is in substance the same thing as τὰς πράξεις τοῦ σώματος θανατοῦν in Rom. viii. 13; comp. Col. iii. 5. The result of the ὑπωπιάζω κ.τ.λ. is, that the body becomes *submissive* to the moral will,<sup>1</sup> yea, the members become weapons of righteousness (Rom. vi. 13). Hence Paul adds further: κ. δουλαγωγῶ, *I make it a slave* (Diodorus, xii. 24; Theophrastus, *Ep.* 36; Theophyl. Simoc. *Ep.* 4), which also “a pycitis desumptum est; nam qui vicerat, victum trahebat adversarium quasi servum,” Grotius. Against the abuse of this passage to favour ascetic scourgings of the body, see Deyling, *Obss.* I. p. 322 ff., ed. 3. — ἄλλοις κηρύξας] *after*

<sup>1</sup> Comp. the weaker analogies in profane writers, as Xen. *Mem.* ii. 1. 28; Cicero, *Off.* i. 23. 79.

*having been a herald to others.* The apostle still keeps to *the same figure*, comparing his preaching, in which he summoned and exhorted men to the Christian life, to the office of the *herald* who made known the laws of the games and called the champions to the combat. Rückert, who (with Chrysostom, Grotius, *al.*) regards *κηρ.* as denoting preaching without reference to the work of a herald, reminds us, in opposition to the above view (comp. de Wette), that the herald certainly did not himself join in the combat. But this objection does not hold, for *with Paul the case stood thus*: He, *in point of fact*, was a herald, who *joined personally in the contest*; and he had therefore to carry through his figure upon *this footing*, even although he thereby departed from the actually subsisting relations at the combats in the games.—*ἀδόκιμος*] *rejectancus, unapproved, i.e.* however, not “*ne dignus quidem, qui ad certamen omnino admittar*” (Pott),—for Paul is, from vv. 26, 27, actually in the midst of the contest,—but *praemio indignus*,—*μὴ τοὺς ἄλλους τὸ δέον διδάξας αὐτὸς τοῦ τέλους τῶν ἀγώνων παντελῶς διαμάρτω*, Theodoret.



CHAPTER X.

VER. 1. γάρ] Elz. has δέ, against decisive evidence. An alteration arising from failure to understand the connection. — Ver. 2. ἔβαπ-  
-τίσαντο] A C D E F G  $\aleph$ , min. Dial. Bas. Cyr. *al.* have ἔβαπτίσθησαν.  
Recommended by Griesb., adopted by Lachm. and Rückert. It is,  
however, an alteration to which copyists were induced by being  
accustomed to the passive of βαπτ.; the middle is sufficiently  
attested by B K L, Orig. Chrys. *al.* — Ver. 9. Κύριον] So B C  $\aleph$ ,  
min. and several vss. and Fathers. The readings Θεόν and Χριστόν  
are interpretations, the first occurring in A, 2, Slav. ms. Bede, the  
second adopted by Elz. Scholz, and Tisch. on the authority of  
D E F G K L, min. vss. Fathers; defended also by Reiche.  
Epiphanius avers Χριστόν to be a change made by Marcion. —  
Vv. 9, 10. Elz. adds καί after καθώς; but this has too powerful  
testimony against it to be admissible on the ground of ver. 8. It  
is deleted by Lachm. Tisch. Rückert. — Ver. 9. ἀπόλωντο] Rückert,  
following A (?) B  $\aleph$ , reads ἀπόλλυντο, as he does also in ver. 10 on  
the authority of A. Rightly in both cases; the change of tense  
was overlooked. — Ver. 11. πάντα] is wanting after δέ in A B 17,  
Sahid. and several Fathers. It comes before it in D E F G  $\aleph$ , 3,  
Aeth. and some Fathers. Bracketed by Lachm., deleted by Rück.  
and Tisch.; an addition naturally suggested. — τύποι] Lachm. and  
Rück. read τυπικῶς, following A B C K  $\aleph$ , min. Syr. p. (on the  
margin), and many Fathers. Rightly; the *Recepta*, defended by  
Reiche, is a repetition from ver. 6. As connected with τυπικῶς,  
however, and resting on very much the same attestation (including  
 $\aleph$ ), συνέβαινεν should be adopted in place of συνέβαινον. — κατήντησεν]  
Lachm. and Tisch. have κατήντηκεν, on the authority of B D\* E\* F  
G  $\aleph$ , 39, 46, and some Fathers. An instance of the frequent trans-  
formation of the perfect into the aorist form, with which the  
transcribers were more familiar. — Ver. 13. Elz. has ὕμᾱς after  
δύνασθαι; but this is an addition opposed by decisive evidence.  
— Ver. 19. Lachm. Rück. and Tisch. invert the order of the two  
questions, following B C\*\* D E  $\aleph$ \*\*, min. Copt. Sahid. Aeth. Vulg.  
Aug. Ambrosiast. Pel. Bede. Rightly. One of the two queries  
came to be left out, owing to the similarity in sound (so still in A  
C\* and  $\aleph$ \*), and was afterwards restored where it seemed to stand

most naturally (according to the order of origin and operation). Reiche, nevertheless, in his *Comm. crit.* I. p. 240 f., tries to defend the *Recepta* (K L, with most of the min. Syr. utr. Goth. and Greek Fathers). — Ver. 20. α̅ θύει τὰ ἔθνη] Lachm. Rück. and Tisch. read α̅ θύουσιν, on very preponderant evidence (as also θύουσιν afterwards). The missing subject τὰ ἔθνη was joined on to θύουσιν (so still in A C 8), which thereupon drew after it the change to θύει. — Ver. 23. Elz. has μοι after πάντα, against decisive evidence. Borrowed from vi. 12. — Ver. 24. After ἐτέρου Elz. has ἕκαστος, in face of decisive testimony. Supplied, perhaps, from remembrance of Phil. ii. 4. — Ver. 27. δέ] is wanting in A B D\* F G 8, and some min. Copt. Vulg. Antioch. Chrys. Aug. Ambrosiast. Pel. al. Lachm. and Rück. are right in rejecting it as a mere connective addition. — Ver. 28. ἱερόθυτον] approved by Griesb., and adopted by Lachm. Rück. Tisch. Elz. and Scholz again have εἰδωλόθυτον, contrary to A B H 8, Sahid. and the indirect witnesses given by Tisch. The commoner word (which is defended by Reiche) was first written on the margin, and then taken into the text. — After συνείδησιν Elz. has τοῦ γὰρ Κυρίου ἡ γῆ κ. τὸ πλῆρωμα αὐτοῦ. A repetition of the clause in ver. 26, which crept from the margin into the text; it is condemned by decisive testimony, as is also the δέ which Elz. puts after εἰ in ver. 30.

---

CONTENTS on to xi. 1.—The warnings supplied by the history of our fathers urge us to this self-conquest (vv. 1–11). Beware, therefore, of a fall; the temptation has not yet gone beyond what you are able to bear, and God's faithfulness will not suffer it to do so in the future; flee, then, from idolatry (vv. 12–14). This exhortation is supported, as regards the eating of sacrificial meat, by the analogies of the Lord's Supper and the Jewish usages in partaking of sacrifices (vv. 15–18). And therewith Paul returns from the long digression, which has occupied him since ix. 1, to his main subject, which he is now in a position to wind up and dispose of with all the more vigour and terseness (vv. 19–xi. 1).

Ver. 1. Γάρ] Paul had already, in ix. 26 f., set himself before his readers as an example of *self-conquest*; he now *justifies* his special enforcement of this duty by the warning example of the fathers. Πλείον αὐτοὺς δεδίξασθαι βουλευθεῖς τῶν κατὰ τὸν Ἰσραὴλ ἀναμνήσκει, καὶ ὅσων ἀπήλυσαν ἀγαθῶν καὶ ὅσαις περιέπεσαν τιμωρίαις. καὶ καλεῖ τύπους τούτων ἐκεῖνα, διδάσκων ὡς τὰ ὅμοια πείσονται τὴν ὅμοιαν ἀπιστίαν κτησάμενοι, Theodoret. — οὐ θέλω ὑμ. ἀγν.] indicating something of importance. See on Rom.

xi. 25. — οἱ πατέρες ἡμ.] *i.e.* our forefathers at the time of the exodus from Egypt. The apostle says ἡμῶν, speaking, as in Rom. iv. 1, from his *national* consciousness, which was shared in by his Jewish readers, and well understood by his Gentile ones. The idea of the *spiritual* fatherhood of all *believers* (Rom. iv. 11 ff., de Wette, *al.*), or that of the O. T. ancestry of the N. T. church (Hofmann), would suit only with *holy* ancestors as being the *true* Israel (comp. Rom. ix. 5 ff.; Gal. vi. 16), but does not harmonize with the fact of the fathers *here* referred to being cited as warnings.— πάντες] has strong emphasis,<sup>1</sup> and is four times repeated, the coming contrast of οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πλείοσιν, ver. 5, being already before the apostle's mind. *All* had the blessing of the divine presence (ὑπὸ τ. νεφ. ἦσαν), *all* that of the passage through the sea; *all* received the analogue of baptism, *all* that of eating, *all* that of drinking at the Lord's Supper; *but with the majority* God was *not* well pleased.— ὑπὸ τ. νεφ.] The well-known (τήν) pillar of cloud (Ex. xiii. 21 f.), in which God's presence was, is conceived as spreading its canopy over (ὑπό) the march of the people that followed it. Comp. Ps. cv. 39; Wisd. x. 17, xix. 7. — διὰ τῆς θαλ.] See Ex. xiv.

Ver. 2. The discourse flows on in uninterrupted stream, beginning with the ὅτι in ver. 1, to the end of ver. 5; then follows the application in ver. 6. — εἰς τὸν Μωϋσῆν] *in reference to Moses*, so that they thereby devoted themselves to Moses as the deliverer and mediator whom God had sent them. Comp. on Rom. vi. 3; Matt. xxviii. 19. — ἐβαπτίσαντο] *they had themselves baptized*, had the same thing, that is to say, done to them in reference to Moses as you had done to you in reference to Christ. The *middle*, which is not put here for the passive,—comp., on the contrary, what was said regarding ἀπελούσ., vi. 11,—is *purposely* chosen, as in Acts xxii. 16, to denote the *receptive* sense (see Kühner, II. p. 18; Valckenaer, p. 256; Winer, p. 239 [E. T. 319]); for although ἐβαπτ., and the subsequent ἔφαγον and ἔπιον, do not represent any apparent *merit*, yet they certainly assume the *reception* of those wonderful divine manifestations, which nevertheless could not place the fathers, to whom such high privileges had been vouchsafed, in a position of safety afterwards, etc. — ἐν τῇ νεφ.] *ἐν* is *local*, as in βαπτίζειν ἐν ὕδατι, Matt. iii. 11, *al.*, indicating

<sup>1</sup> Grotius: "tam qui sospites fuere, quam qui perierunt."

the *element in which*, by immersion and emergence, the baptism was effected. Just as the convert was baptized *in water* with reference to *Christ*, so also that O. T. analogue of baptism, which presents itself in the people of Israel at the passage of the Red Sea with reference to *Moses*, was effected in the *cloud* under which they were, and in the *sea* through which they passed. So far as the sacred *cloud*, familiar to the readers, is concerned, there is no need for the assumption, based somewhat uncertainly on Ps. lxxviii. 9, of a "*pluvia ex nube decidua*" (Wolf, comp. Pott); neither, again, is it enough to define the point of comparison simply as Grotius does (comp. de Wette): "*Nubes impendebat illorum capiti, sic et aqua iis, qui baptizantur; mare circumdabat eorum latera, sic et aqua eos, qui baptizantur.*" The cloud and the sea, both being taken together as a type of the water of baptism, must be regarded as similar in *nature*. Comp. Pelagius: "*Et nubes proprium humorem portat;*" so also Bengel: "*Nubes et mare sunt naturae aqueae (quare etiam Paulus de columna ignis silet).*" Theodoret, on the other hand, with several more, among whom are Schrader, Olshausen, and Maier, makes the cloud a symbol of the *Spirit* (John iii. 5); but this would have against it the fact, that the baptism in the cloud (answering, according to this view, to the baptism of the Spirit) had *preceded* the baptism in the sea (water-baptism); so that we should have an incongruous representation of the baptism with water and the Holy Ghost. The cloud and the sea do not represent the *two* elements in baptism, the former the *heavenly*, and the latter the *earthly* one; but both together form the undivided type of baptism. The type appropriated the subjects to Moses as his; the antitype appropriates them to Christ as His redeemed ones; and in both instances this is done with a view to their salvation, as in the one case from temporal bondage and ruin, so in the other from that which is spiritual and eternal. We may add, that there is room enough for the play of typico-allegorical interpretation, to allow the circumstance to be kept out of account that the Israelites went *dry* through the sea (Ex. xiv. 16 ff.). The most arbitrary working out of the exposition of details may be seen in Theodoret.

Vv. 3, 4. Just as all received the self-same type of baptism (vv. 1, 2), so too all were partakers of one and the same analogue

of the Christian ordinance of the Supper.<sup>1</sup>—τὸ αὐτό] so that each one therefore stood on the very same level of apparent certainty of not being cast off by God.—The βρῶμα πνευματικόν is the *manna* (Ex. xvi. 13 ff.), inasmuch as it was not, like common food, a product of nature, but came as bread from heaven (Ps. lxxviii. 24 f.; Wisd. xvi. 20; John vi. 31 f.), the gift of God, who by His Spirit wrought marvellously for His people. Being vouchsafed by the χάρις πνευματικῆς of Jehovah, it was, although material in itself, a χάρισμα πνευματικόν, a food of supernatural, divine, and spiritual origin. Comp. Theodore of Mopsuestia: πνευματικὸν καλεῖ καὶ τὸ βρῶμα καὶ τὸ πόμα, ὡς ἂν τοῦ πνεύματος ἄμφω διὰ τοῦ Μωϋσέως κατὰ τὴν ἀπόρρητον αὐτοῦ παρασχόντος δύναμιν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ πνευματικὴν ἐκάλεσεν τὴν πέτραν, ὡς ἂν τῇ δυνάμει τοῦ πνεύματος ἐκδοῦσαν τὰ ὕδατα. What the Rabbins invented about the miraculous qualities of the manna may be seen in von der Hardt, *Ephem. phil.* pp. 101, 104; Eisenmenger's *entdeckt. Judenth.* II. p. 876 f., I. pp. 312, 467. Philo explains it as referring to the Logos, *Leg. alleg.* ii. p. 82, *Quod deter. pot. insid. sol.* p. 213.—πόμα] Ex. xvii. 1–6; Num. xx. 2–11. Regarding the forms πόμα and πῶμα, see Lobeck, *Paral.* p. 425 f.—ἐπινον . . . Χριστός] a parenthetic explanation in detail as to the quite peculiar and marvellous character of this πόμα. The *imperfect* does not, like the preceding aorist, state the drinking absolutely as a historical fact, but is the *descriptive* imperfect, depicting the *process* of the ἐπινον according to the peculiar circumstances in which it took place; it thus has a *modal* force, showing *how* things *went on* with the πάντες . . . ἐπινον, while it was taking place. Bengel remarks rightly on the γάρ: “qualis petra, talis aqua.”—ἐκ πνευματ. ἀκολ. πέτρας· ἡ δὲ πέτρα ἦν ὁ Χ.] *from a spiritual rock that followed them; the Rock, however* (which we speak of here), *was Christ*. Πνευματικῆς has the emphasis; it corresponds to the preceding πνευματικόν, and is explained more specifically by ἡ δὲ π. ἦν ὁ Χ. The relation denoted by ἀκολουθούσης, again, is assumed to be self-evident, and therefore no further

<sup>1</sup> Bengel well says: “Si plura essent N. T. sacramenta, ceteris quoque simile quiddam posuisset Paulus.” At the same time, it should be observed that the ecclesiastical notion of a sacrament does not appear in the N. T., but is an abstraction from the common characteristics of the two ordinances in question. Both, however, are equally essential and characteristic elements in the fellowship of the Christian life. Comp. Baur, *neut. Theol.* p. 200; Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 353.

explanation is given of the word. The thoughts, to which Paul here gives expression, are the following:—(1) To guard and help the Israelites in their journey through the wilderness, *Christ* accompanied them, namely, in His pre-existent divine nature, and consequently as the Son of God (= the *Λόγος* of John), who afterwards appeared as man (comp. *Wisd.* x. 15 ff.). (2) The *rock*, from which the water that they drank flowed, was not an ordinary natural rock, but a *πέτρα πνευματική*; not the mere appearance or phantasm of a rock, but an actual one, although of supernatural and heavenly origin, inasmuch as it was *the real self-revelation and manifestation* of the Son of God, who invisibly accompanied the host on its march; it was, in other words, the *very Christ* from heaven, as being His own substantial and efficient presentation of Himself to men (comp. *Targ. Isa.* xvi. 1, and *Philo's* view, p. 1103 A, that the rock was the *σοφία*). (3) Such being the state of the case as to the rock, it must of necessity be a rock that *followed*, that *accompanied* and *went with* the children of Israel in their way through the desert; for Christ in His pre-existent condition, the heavenly “substratum,” so to speak, of this rock, went constantly with them, so that everywhere in the wilderness His essential presence could manifest itself in their actual experience through the rock with its abundant water; and, in point of fact, did so manifest itself again and again. In drinking from the *rock*, they had their thirst quenched by *Christ*, who, making the rock His form of manifestation, supplied the water *from Himself*, although *this* marvellous speciality about the way in which their thirst was met remained hidden from the Israelites. — Since the apostle's words thus clearly and completely explain themselves, we have no right to ascribe to Paul, what was a later invention of the Rabbins, the notion that *the rock rolled along after the marching host* (*Bammid-bar*, *R. S.* 1; *Onkelos* on *Num.* xxi. 18–20; and see *Wetstein* and *Schöttgen*, also *Lund*, *Heiligth.*, ed. *Wolf*, p. 251); such fictions as these, when compared with what the apostle actually says, should certainly be regarded as extravagant aftergrowths (in opposition to *Rückert* and *de Wette*). It is just as unwarrantable, however, to explain away, by any exegetical expedient, this rock which followed them, and which was Christ. The attempts which have been made with this view run directly counter to the plain

meaning of the words; e.g. the interpretation of Erasmus, Beza, Calvin, Piscator, Drusus, Grotius, Lightfoot, Billroth, *al.* (which dates from Theodore of Mopsuestia), that the rock means here what came from it, *the water* (!), which, they hold, followed the people and *prefigured* Christ (ἦν). That ἦν denotes here *significabat* (so too Augustine, Vatablus, Salmasius, Bengel, Loesner, *al.*), is a purely arbitrary assumption, seeing that Paul neither *says* ἐστὶ, nor τύπος ἦν, or the like, nor even *indicates* in any way in the context a typico-allegorical reference. This applies also against what Ch. F. Fritzsche has in his *Nova opusc.* p. 261: "The rock in the wilderness was a rock of blessing, strength, and life-giving for the Jews, and thus it *prefigures* Christ," etc. Paul does not say anything of the sort; it is simply his expositors who insert it on their own authority. Baur, too, does violence to the apostle's words (comp. his *neut. Theol.* p. 193), by asserting that Paul speaks of Christ as the πνευμ. πέτρα only in so far as he saw a *type* which had reference to Christ in the rock that followed the Israelites, according to the allegoric interpretation which he put upon it.<sup>1</sup> See, in opposition to this, Rübiger, *Christol. Paul.* p. 31 f.; Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 319. The *ordinary* exposition comes nearer to the truth, but fails to reach it in this respect, that it does not keep firm enough hold of the statement, that "*that rock was Christ*," and so of its *identity* with Him, but takes Christ to be the Rock only in an ideal and figurative sense, regarding Him as different from the rock from which the water flowed, but as the author of its supply. So, in substance, Chrysostom,<sup>2</sup> Oecumenius, Theophylact, Melanchthon, Cornelius a Lapide, and many others, among whom are Flatt, Kling in the *Stud. und Krit.* 1839, p. 835; Osiander, Neander, Hofmann.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Baur is wholly unwarranted in taking πνευματικός, ver. 3 f., in the sense of *typical* or *allegorically significant*. His appeal to Rev. xi. 8 and Barnab. 10 is irrelevant.

<sup>2</sup> οὐ γὰρ ἡ τῆς πέτρας φύσις τὸ ὕδωρ ἡφίστη φησὶν οὐ γὰρ ἂν καὶ πρὸ τούτου ἀνέβλυζεν, ἀλλ' ἐτίμα τις πέτρα πνευματικὴ τὸ πᾶν εἰργάζετο, ταυτίστιν ὁ Χριστὸς ὁ παρὼν αὐτοῖς πανταχοῦ καὶ πάντα θαυματοργῶν.

<sup>3</sup> Comp. his *Schriftbew.* I. p. 171: "The rock from which the water flowed was a natural one, and stood fast in its own place; but the true Rock that really gave the water was the יְהוָה צוּר (Isa. xxx. 29), was *Jehovah*, who went with Israel." By not calling the Rock *God*, but *Christ*, the apostle points forward, as it were (according to Hofmann), to the application which he is about to make of the words, namely,

Ver. 5. *Οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πλείοσιν*] *not with the greater part of them.* A tragical *litotes*. Caleb and Joshua alone reached the land of promise. Num. xiv. 30. — *κατεστρώθησαν*] *were struck down.* Comp. Num. xiv. 16, 29. Their dying in the wilderness (some by a violent, some by a natural death) is here vividly portrayed, in accordance with Num. xiv., as death by the hand of God (Herod. viii. 53, ix. 76; Xen. *Cyr.* iii. 3. 64; Judith vii. 14; 2 Macc. v. 26). Comp. also Heb. iii. 17.

Ver. 6. The typical reference of what is adduced in vv. 1–5 to the Christians: *These things* (while they so fell out) *became types of us, i.e.* historical transactions of the O. T., guided and shaped by God, and designed by Him figuratively to represent the corresponding relation and experience on the part of Christians. See regarding *τύπος*, on Rom. v. 14. — *ἐγενήθησαν*] The *plural* is by attraction from the predicate *τύποι*. See Kühner, II. p. 53 f.; Krüger, § lxiii. 6. Hofmann (comp. vi. 11) takes the Israelites as the subject: “*They became this as types of us;*” but the recurrence of the *ταῦτα* in ver. 11 should have been enough of itself to preclude such a view. — *ἐπιθυμητ. κακῶν*] quite general in its reference: *desirers* (Herod. vii. 6; Dem. 661 *ult.*, and often in Plato) *of evil things* (Rom. i. 30). To restrict it to the “*Corinthios epulatores*” (Grotius) is arbitrary; for it is equally so to confine the *καθὼς ἀκαίεινοι ἐπεθ.* which follows solely (Rückert, de Wette, Osiander, Neander), or particularly (Hofmann), to the desire of the Israelites *for flesh* (Num. xi. 4), whereas in truth the words refer generally to the evil lusts which they manifested so often and in so many ways upon their journey, that particular desire not excluded.

to the cup which Christ gives us to drink. But Paul's words are so simple, clear, and definite, that it is impossible to get off by any *quid pro quo*. For the rest, it is to be observed that in this passage, as in the previous one, where the crossing of the sea is taken as a typical prefiguration of baptism, we have doubtless a *Rabbinical* process of thought on the part of the apostle, which, as such, is not to be measured by the taste of our day, so that this unvarnished exegetical conception of it might be set down as something “absurd,” as is done by Hofmann. The Rabbinical culture of his time, under which the apostle grew up, was not done away with by the fact of his becoming the vessel of divine grace, revelation, and power. Comp. Gal. iv. 22 ff. Our passage has nothing whatever to do with Isa. xxx. 29, where men go up into the temple to Jehovah, the Rock of Israel. It is of importance, however, in connection with Paul's doctrine regarding the pre-existence of Christ and its accordance with the doctrine of the Logos.



Ver. 7. There follows now upon this *general* warning the first of four *special* ones against sins, to which the ἐπιθυμεῖν κακῶν might very easily lead. "Eligit, quod maxime Corinthiis congruebat," Calvin. — μηδέ] *also* in particular *do not*. Comp. Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 314 [E. T. 366]. The repetitions of μηδέ which follow, too, from ver. 8 to ver. 10 are *also* negated, but in continuance of the special prohibitions. — γίνεσθε] in the second person, because of the *special* danger to which his readers, from their circumstances, were exposed. Comp. on ver. 10. — εἰδωλόλατρά] What Paul means is the *indirect* idolatry involved in partaking of the heathen sacrificial feasts. Comp. on v. 11. This is clear from the quotation which he goes on to make (φαγεῖν κ. πιεῖν). Comp. vv. 14, 20, 21. The passage cited is Ex. xxxii. 6 according to the LXX.; it describes the sacrificial feast after the sacrifice offered to the golden calf. The τινὲς αὐτῶν, four times repeated, *certain of them*, notwithstanding of there being very many (although not all), brings out all the more forcibly the offences over-against the greatness of the penal judgments. Comp. on Rom. iii. 3. — παλζεῖν] *to be merry*. This comprised *dancing*, as we may gather from Ex. xxxii. 19, and from ancient customs generally at sacrificial feasts; but to make this the thing specially referred to here (Hom. *Od.* viii. 251; Hesiod, *Scut.* 277; Pindar, *Ol.* xiii. 123) does not harmonize with the more general meaning of פָּנָסָ in the original text. To understand the phrase as indicating *unchastity* (Tertull. *de jcjun.* 6) is contrary to Ex. xxxii. 18, 19, and Philo, *de vit. Mos.* 3, pp. 677 D, 694 A.

Ver. 8. Ἐπόρευσαν] Num. xxv. 1 ff. — εἴκοσι τρεῖς] According to Num. xxv. 9, there were 24,000. So too Philo, *de vit. Mos.* 1, p. 694 A; *de fortit.* p. 742 D; and the Rabbins in Lightfoot, *Horae*, p. 205; also Josephus, *Antt.* iv. 6. 12. A *slip of memory* on the apostle's part, as might easily take place, so that there is no need of supposing a variation in the tradition (Bengel, Pott), or an error in his copy of the LXX. (Ewald). Among the arbitrary attempts at reconciliation which have been made are the following: that Paul narrates only what happened on one day, Moses what happened on two (Grotius); that Moses gives the maximum, Paul the minimum (Calvin, Bengel); that 23,000 fell *vi divina*, and 1000 *gladio zelotarum* (Krebs, after Bernard and Havercamp

on Josephus, *loc. cit.*); that Paul states merely what befell the tribe of Simeon (Michaelis). Cajetan and Surenhusius would have us read *εἴκοσι τέσσαρες*, as, in point of fact, is given in a few codd., but manifestly by way of correction. Osiander too leans to this; comp. Valckenaer.

Ver. 9. *Ἐκπειρ.*] Stronger than the simple verb (*to prove to the full*), Matt. iv. 7; Luke x. 25. Comp. the classic *ἐκπειράομαι* (Herod. iii. 135; Plat. *cp.* 13, p. 362 E). *To try the Lord*,<sup>1</sup> יהוה יִחַי, means generally, *to let it come to the point whether He will show Himself to be God*; in this case: *whether He will punish* ("quousque itura sit ejus patientia," Grotius). See in general, Wetstein, *ad Matt.* iv. 7. What special kind of trying Paul has here in view, appears from *καθὼς κ.τ.λ.*, where the reference is to the people after their deliverance *losing heart* over the contrast between their position in the wilderness and the pleasures of Egypt. See Num. xxi. 4–6. The readers therefore could not fail to understand that what the apostle meant was *discontent* on their part with their present *Christian* position, as involving so much renunciation of sensual pleasures formerly indulged in. How many, forgetting the blessings of their spiritual deliverance, might look back with a discontented longing to the licence of the past! It is a common opinion that Paul designates their *participation in the sacrificial feasts* as a tempting of God (comp. ver. 22, where, however, the connection is totally different, and *τὸν κύριον* does not apply to God at all). So Billroth, Rückert, de Wette, Osiander, Maier; but this is quite at variance with the context, because not in keeping with the historical events indicated by the *καθὼς καὶ κ.τ.λ.*, and familiar to the readers. The context equally forbids the interpretations of Chrysostom and Theophylact: the *craving for wonders*; Theodoret, the *speaking with tongues*; Grotius, the conduct of the *schismatics*; and Michaelis, that of the *anti-Pauline party*. — *ἐπείρασαν*] namely, *αὐτόν*, not in an absolute sense (Winer, Reiche). — *ἀπὸ ἀλλυγτο*] see the critical remarks. The *imperfect* lays the stress on the *continuous* development of what occurred, and thus places it in the foreground of the historic picture. See Kühner, II. p. 74.

<sup>1</sup> The *Κύριος* is *God* in Num. xxi. 4 ff. Paul's readers, whose familiarity with the history in question is taken for granted, had no reason to refer it to *Christ* as the *λόγος ἁσαρκος* (from which comes the *Recepta Χριστόν*).

As to *ὑπό* with *ἀπώλλ.*, see Valckenaer, p. 261. Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* II. p. 880.

Ver. 10. *Nor murmur*, etc.; expression of *contumacious discontent* (Matt. xx. 11; Phil. ii. 14), without right or reason. *Against whom?* is discovered from the *narrative*, to which Paul here refers us. That this is to be found not in Num. xiv. (the more common view), but in Num. xvi. 41, 49 (Calvin, de Wette, Osiander, Neander, Maier, Ewald), is clear, in the first place, because *ἀπώλλ. ὑπὸ τ. ὀλοθρ.* denotes a *violent* death, which does not tally with Num. xiv.; and, in the second, because *τινὲς αὐτῶν* cannot apply to the whole people (except Caleb and Joshua), which it would have to do according to Num. xiv. If, however, what Paul has here in view is the murmuring against *Moses and Aaron* after the death of Korah and his company (Num. xvi. 41, 49), then his prohibition must refer not to discontent *against God* (which was, moreover, referred to already in ver. 9), but only to murmuring *against the divinely commissioned teachers* (Paul, Apollos, and others), who, in their position and authoritative exercise of discipline, corresponded to the type of Moses and Aaron as the theocratic leaders and teachers of the rebellious people. And it is for this reason that he uses the *second* person here, although the first both precedes and follows it. Amidst the self-conceit and frivolity which were so rife at Corinth, and under the influences of the party-spirit that prevailed, there could not fail to be perverse dispositions of the kind indicated, which would find abundant expression. Comp. the evils prevalent in the same community at a later date, against which Clement contends in his epistle. — *ἀπώλλ. ὑπὸ τ. ὀλοθρ.*] namely, the 14,700, whose destruction (Num. xvi. 46 ff.) is ascribed to the *plague* (מַדְבָּה) of God. Paul defines this more closely as wrought by the *Destroyer* (Πιεσυχίος, *λυμεών*), who is the executor of the divine plague, just as in Ex. xii. 23 the מַדְבָּה executes the plague (מַדְבָּה) of God, — this *personal* rendering of מַדְבָּה (according to others, *pernicies*), which was the traditional one from the earliest times among Jews and Christians alike, being followed by the apostle also. The *ὀλοθρευτής* (ὁ ὀλοθρεύων, Ex. xii. 23; Heb. xi. 28; Wisd. xviii. 25. Comp. 2 Sam. xxiv. 16; Isa. xxxvii. 36; Job xxxiii. 22, *al.*; Acts xii. 23) is the *angel* commissioned by God to carry out the slaughter; and he again is neither to be conceived of as an *evil* angel

(a conception still foreign to the *old* Hebrew theology in general; see also 1 Chron. xxi. 12; 2 Chron. xxxii. 21; 2 Macc. xv. 22, 23), nor rationalized into a pestilence. The Rabbinical doctrine of the מלחך המות (see Eisenmenger, *entdecktes Judenth.* I. p. 854 ff.) developed itself out of the Hebrew idea. — Ὀλοθρεύω, and the words formed from it, belong to the Alexandrian Greek. See Bleek on *Heb.* II. p. 809. But the reading ὀλεθρ., although in itself more correct, is very weakly attested here.

Ver. 11. Ταῦτα] These facts, referred to in ver. 6 ff. — τυπικῶς] in a typical fashion,<sup>1</sup> in such a way that, as they fell out, a typical character, a predictive reference, impressed itself upon them. Eisenmenger (II. p. 159 f., 264, 801) gives passages from the Rabbins in support of the principle of the interconnection of the whole theocratic history: "Quicquid evenit patribus, signum filiis,"—a principle generally correct according to the idea of the θεὰ μοῖρα. It is only among the Fathers that we find τυπικός and τυπικῶς used anywhere else in this sense (it is otherwise in Plutarch, *Mor.* p. 442 C). — συνέβαινον] brings out the progressive development of the events; the aorist ἐγράφη simply states the fact. Comp. on ver. 4, and Matthiae, p. 1117. The δέ contrasts ἐγράφη κ.τ.λ. with what precedes it, expressing "quod novum quid accedit, oppositionem quandam," Hermann, *ad Viger.* p. 845: "that it was written, again, was for," etc. — πρὸς νουθεσίαν ἡμῶν] for our admonition (comp. on iv. 14). That is to say, when we are tempted to the same sins, then should the thought of those facts that happened τυπικῶς, warn us not to bring down upon ourselves like judgments by like offences. As to the later form, νουθεσία in place of νουθέτησις and νουθετία, see Lobeck, *ad Phryn.* p. 512. — εἰς οὓς κ.τ.λ.] is not opposed, as Hofmann would have it, to the beginning of Israel's history, to which the transactions in question belong, which is neither conveyed by the text nor in itself historically correct (for the beginning of that history lies in the days of the patriarchs); but it gives point to the warning by reminding the readers how nigh at hand the day was of retributive decision. Τὰ τέλη τῶν αἰώνων is identical with ἡ συντέλεια

<sup>1</sup> The *Recepta* τύποι would mean: These things happened to them as types; comp. ver. 6. Hofmann takes ταῦτα δὲ τύποι as an independent clause. But what an arbitrary disruption of the sentence this would be! And how thoroughly self-evident and void of significance the συνέβαινον ἑκείνοις would in that case be!

τῶν αἰώνων, Heb. ix. 26, the concrete τὰ τέλη (the ends) being put here for the abstract συντέλεια (consummation). In other words, upon the supposition of the Parousia being close at hand, the last times of the world were now come; the αἰῶνες, which had their commencement at its beginning, were now *running out their final course*. The plural expression τὰ τέλη, here used, corresponds to the conception of a *plurality* of periods in the world's history, whose common consummation should carry with it *the final issues of them all*.<sup>1</sup> With the Parousia the αἰῶνες ἐπερχόμενοι (see on Eph. ii. 7) begin to run. What is implied by the plural is not *one thing running alongside of another*, in particular, not the time of Israel and the time of the Gentiles (Hofmann), but the *succession* of the world-periods, one *coming after* another. So always, where αἰῶνες occurs in a temporal sense.—κατήντηκεν] *They have reached to us, i.e. have fallen upon our lifetime, and are now here*. The αἰῶνες are conceived of as stretching themselves out, as it were, in space. Comp. xiv. 36.

Ver. 12. Ὡστε] *Wherefore*, warned by these instances from the O. T.—ἐστάναι] *whosoever thinks that he stands, i.e. is firm and secure* (Rom. v. 2, and comp. on 1 Cor. xv. 1) in the Christian life, namely, in strength of faith, virtue, etc. Comp. Rom. xiv. 4.—βλεπέτω, μὴ πέσῃ] points to the *moral fall*, whereby a man comes to live and act in an unchristian way. The greater, in any case, the self-confidence, the greater the danger of such a fall. And how much must the moral illusions abroad at Corinth have made this warning needful! Others understand the continuance in, or falling from, a *state of grace* to be meant (see Calvin, Bengel, Osiander). But all the admonitions, from ver. 6 onwards (see, too, ver. 14), have a direct reference to falling *into sins*, the *consequence* of which is a falling from grace so as to come under the divine ὀργή (comp. Gal. v. 4).

Ver. 13. Encouragement to this βλεπέτω μὴ πέσῃ. "Your temptations, as you know, have not hitherto gone beyond your strength, neither will they, through the faithfulness of God, do so

<sup>1</sup> Weiss, in his *bibl. Theol.* p. 301, gives a different interpretation, making τὰ τέλη the *goals*. Each of the past αἰῶνες, according to his view, served as a preparation for the time of full maturity. But Paul always uses τέλος in the sense of *end* (in 1 Tim. i. 5 it is otherwise); and this, too, is the most natural meaning here, where he is speaking of the lapse of periods of time. The thought is the same as in πλήρωμα τῶν καιρῶν, Eph. i. 9 f.

in the future." Rückert follows Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Grotius, Bengel, Zachariae, and others, in his interpretation: "You are not yet out of danger; the temptations which have hitherto assailed you were only human ones, and you have not withstood them over well (?); there may come others greater and more grievous." Similarly Olshausen, de Wette, Osiander, Neander, Ewald; so that, according to this view, Paul seeks first of all to humble, and then, from πιστός onwards, to encourage,—a connecting thought, however, *being interpolated* between the two clauses ("sed nunc major tentatio imminet," Bengel). — πειρασμός] The context makes no special mention of *sufferings and persecutions* (Chrysostom, Theodoret, Camerarius, Grotius, Ewald, *al.*), but of *incitements to sin* in general, as things which, if not overcome, instead of being a discipline to the man exposed to them, will bring about his πλπτειν; but suffering is *included* among the rest in virtue of the moral dangers which it involves. Pott restricts the reference too much (comp. also Hofmann): "tentatio quae per invitationem ad convivium illa vobis accidit," which is inadmissible in view of the general terms employed in ver. 12; the particular application follows only in ver. 14. — εἰληφεν] marks the continuance of the fact of its not having taken them. It has not done so, and does not now. This use of λαμβάνειν, in reference to fortunes, states, etc., which *seize upon* men, is very common in the classics (Thuc. ii. 42; Pind. *Ol.* i. 130; Xen. *Symp.* i. 15, and often in Homer). Comp. Luke v. 26, vii. 16; Wisd. xi. 12; Bar. vi. 5. — ἀνθρώπινος] *i.e.* *viribus humanis accommodatus*, οὐχ ὑπὲρ δὲ δύναται ἄνθρωπος. See Pollux, iii. 131. The fact that in the second clause of the verse this phrase has ὑπὲρ δὲ δύνασθε and τοῦ δύνασθαι ὑπενεγκεῖν corresponding to it, militates against the rendering: "*not of superhuman origin*" (comp. Plato, *Alc.* i. p. 103 A; *Phaedr.* p. 259 D; *Rep.* p. 497 C, 492 E), *i.e.* either not *from the devil* (Melanchthon, Piscator, Vorstius, *al.*), or not *from God* (Olshausen, who finds an allusion in the second clause to the *dolores Messiae*). Comp. οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνη κακία, Polyb. i. 67. 6, and the like; Plato, *Prot.* p. 344 C, *Crat.* p. 438 C; οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνης δυνάμεως, Thuc. vi. 78. 2; ὅσα ἄνθρωποι (*sc.* *δύνανται*), Plato, *Rep.* p. 467 C; μείζον ἢ κατ' ἄνθρωπον, Soph. *Oed. Col.* 604. Chrysostom: ἀνθρώπινος, τουτέστι μικρὸς, βραχὺς, σύμμετρος. — πιστός] for if He allowed them to be tempted beyond their

powers, He would then be *unfaithful* to them as regards His having called them to the Messianic salvation, which now, in the case supposed, it would be impossible for them to reach. — ὅς] in the sense of ὅτι οὗτος, like the German “er der.” Comp. Bernhardy, p. 291. “Ὅσως would be still more emphatic. — ὁ δύνασθε] *what you are in a position to bear*. The context shows the more special meaning. Comp. on iii. 2. — ἀλλὰ ποιήσει κ.τ.λ.] *but will with the (then existing) temptation make also the issue, i.e. not the one without the other*. God is therefore conceived of *here* as He who *makes* the temptation, *i.e.* brings about the circumstances and situations which give rise to it (comp. on Matt. vi. 13), but, *previously*, as He who *lets* men be tempted. The two things, according to Paul’s view of the divine agency in the world, are in substance the same; the God who allows the thing to be is He also who brings it to pass. Hence the two modes of conception may be used interchangeably, as here, without contradiction. Comp. on Rom. i. 24. — τ. ἔκβασιν] the *issue* (*egressum*, Wisd. ii. 17, viii. 9, xi. 16; Hom. *Od.* v. 410; Xen. *Anab.* iv. 1. 20, iv. 2. 1; Polyb. iv. 64. 5) from the temptation, so that one escapes out of it morally free (comp. ἐκ πειρασμοῦ ῥύεσθαι, 2 Pet. ii. 9); similarly Eur. *Med.* 279, ἔκβασις ἄτης. Theophylact gives the sense with substantial correctness, τὴν ἀπαλλαγὴν τοῦ πειρασμοῦ; but it is unsuitable to make, as he does, the σὺν κ.τ.λ. refer to *coincidence in time* (ἅμα τῷ ἐπελθεῖν ὑμῖν τὸν πειρασμόν); so also Hofmann. Bengel puts it well: “καί, *etiam*, *indivulso nexu*.” — τοῦ δύνασθαι ὑπεν.] does not say wherein the issue might consist (*of being able to bear* the temptation; comp. Fritzsche, *ad Matth.* p. 844), for the δύνασθαι ὑπεν. is no ἔκβασις (the taking it so is *illogical*); but it is the *genitive of design*: *in order that you may be able to bear it* (the temptation). Were it not that God gave the ἔκβασις along with the πειρασμός, the latter would be too heavy for you; you would not be able to bear up under it, but would be crushed altogether. But that is not His *will*. That ὑμᾶς should be supplied to δύν. ὑπεν., is clear of itself from what precedes. See Kühner, *ad Xen. Mem.* iii. 6. 10.

Ver. 14. Διόπερ] *for this very reason* (viii. 13), to wit, in order that you may not withdraw from this saving guidance of the faithful God, and deprive yourselves of it; idolatry would

*separate you from God.* Comp. ver. 22. And they would make themselves indirectly guilty of idolatry *by partaking of the sacrificial feasts.* See vv. 7, 20 f. As respects *φεύγειν ἀπό*, *fugiendo discedere a*, see on Matt. iii. 7. Rückert would draw a distinction here to the effect that, had the verb been joined with the *accusative* (vi. 18), it would have indicated that the readers were *already involved* in idolatrous worship; but this is untenable (2 Tim. ii. 22; Wisd. i. 5; Plato, *Legg.* i. p. 636 E; Soph. *Phil.* 637, *Oed. R.* 355), being a confusion of the phrase in question with *φεύγειν ἐκ* (Xen. *Anab.* i. 2. 18; Tob. i. 18). The precise meaning here must be sought in the *context*, which certainly gives us only the idea of the danger being at hand (ver. 7).

Ver. 15 ff. Paul has just been forbidding his readers to participate in the sacrificial feasts, *on the ground of its being idolatry.* This he now explains by the analogy of the holy fellowship, into which the Lord's Supper (vv. 15–17), and participation in the Israelitish sacrifices (ver. 18), respectively brought those who partook of them. It does not follow from his second illustration that the idols were gods, but that they were demons, with whom his readers should have no fellowship; one could not partake both of Christ's table and of the table of demons (vv. 19–22). The former excludes the latter.

Ver. 15. *Ὡς φρόνιμοις*] *i.e.* to those of whom I take for granted that they are intelligent; *ὥς* indicates the *mode of contemplation*, the aspect under which he regards his readers in saying to them, etc. Comp. iii. 1; 2 Cor. vi. 13, *al.* See Bernhardt, p. 333. — *λέγω* refers to *κρίνατε ὑμ. ὃ φ.* (comp. vii. 12), and *ὃ φημι* points to what follows in vv. 16–18. “*As to intelligent men (who can judge aright), I say: judge ye what I affirm.*” On the difference between *λέγω* and *φημί*, comp. Rom. iii. 8; Herod. iii. 35; Xen. *Apol.* 13, *Anab.* i. 7. 18, vi. 6. 16, ii. 1. 14; Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* II. p. 906. — The emphasis is on *ὑμεῖς*; your own judgment shall decide.

Ver. 16. *Τὸ ποτήριον*] It is most natural to take this as in the *accusative*, after the analogy of the second clause of the verse (against Rückert). Respecting the  *attractio inversa*, as in Matt. xxi. 42, see Bornemann, *Schol. in Luc.* p. 16 f.; Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 247 [E. T. 288]; Kühner, II. p. 512. This Greek fashion of “*trajection*” is of such common occurrence, that it is a piece



of pure arbitrariness to infer, with Hofmann, from the *accusative* here that the *action* of blessing and breaking, of which the elements are the objects, *makes* them the *κοινωνία*. — Paul names the *cup first*, not because at the sacrificial feasts men thought less about food than about a pleasant meeting primarily for enjoying wine (they came for eating and drinking), but because he means to speak at more length about the bread, and in connection with it, especially to discuss the Israelitic partaking of the sacrifices, *as it suited his theme of the meat offered to idols*. For this reason he begins here by disposing briefly of the point concerning the cup. In chap. xi. he does otherwise, because not regarding the matter there from this special point of view. — τῆς εὐλογίας] *genit. qualit.*, i.e. *the cup over which the blessing is spoken*, namely, when the wine contained in it is expressly consecrated by prayer to the sacred use of the Lord's Supper.<sup>1</sup> It is a mistake to understand τῆς εὐλογ. actively: *the cup which brings blessing* (Flatt, Olshausen, Kling), as the more detailed explanations which follow are sufficient of themselves to prove. They equally forbid the explanation of Schulz: *the cup of praise*<sup>2</sup> (comp. Kahnis, *Lehre vom Abendm.* p. 128). Neither should the phrase be viewed as a *terminus technicus* borrowed from the Jewish liturgy, and answering to the כּוּם הברכה. See on Matt. xxvi. 27, and Rückert, *Abendm.* p. 219 f. — ὃ εὐλογοῦμεν] an epexegetis giving additional solemnity to the statement: *which we bless, consecrate with prayer, when we celebrate the Lord's Supper*. Comp. Mark viii. 7; Luke ix. 16; 1 Sam. ix. 13. *Εὐλογ.* in

<sup>1</sup> *Who* had to officiate at this consecration? Every Christian man probably might do so at that time, when the arrangements of church-life as regards public worship were as yet so little reduced to fixed order. In Justin Martyr's time (*Apol.* i. 65) it fell to the *προστάς*, but so that the president is conceived as representing and acting in fellowship with the congregation. See Ritschl, *alkathol. K.* p. 365 f. The *plurals* in the passage before us are the utterance of the *Christian consciousness of fellowship*, to which it makes no difference who, in each separate case, may be the ministerial *organ* of the fellowship. Kahnis explains them from the *amen* of the congregation (Justin, *loc. cit.*); but that itself was primarily the time-hallowed expression of that consciousness.

<sup>2</sup> With excessive arbitrariness Hofmann (comp. his *Schriftbew.* II. 2, p. 225 f.) insists on taking *εὐλογία* otherwise than *εὐλογοῦμεν*; the former, in the sense of an *ascription of praise*, with *God* as its subject: the latter, in the sense of *consecrating the cup*. The consecration, according to him, makes the difference between it and the Passover cup. But the said difference could not have been expressed by Paul in a more unsuitable or perplexing way than by repeating the same word.

its literal sense must not be confounded with *εὐχαριστ.* (Erasmus, Zwingli, Melanchthon, Beza : "quod cum gratiarum actione sumimus"), although the prayer *was*, in point of fact, a thanksgiving prayer in accordance with Christ's example, xi. 24 f. As to the difference between the two words, comp. on xiv. 16. — οὐχὶ κοιν. τ. αἵμ. τ. Χ. ἐστὶ] This is aptly explained by Grotius (after Melanchthon and others) : "*κοινωνίαν* vocat id, *per quod fit ipsa communio.*" The cup, *i.e.* its contents as these are presented and partaken of, is the *medium* of this fellowship; it is *realized* in the partaking.<sup>1</sup> Comp. i. 30; John xi. 25, xvii. 3; Rodatz in Rudelbach's *Zeitschrift* 1844, 1, p. 131; Fritzsche, *ad Rom.* II. p. 31. The sense therefore is: *Is not communion with the blood of Christ established through partaking of the cup?*<sup>2</sup> Ἔστί never means anything else than *est* (never *significat*); it is the copula of *existence*; whether this, however, be *actual* or *symbolical* (or allegorical) existence, the context alone must decide. Here it must necessarily have the former sense (against Billroth), for the mere *significance* of a participation would go no way towards proving the proposition that eating meat offered to idols was idolatry; and as, therefore, in ver. 18 it is not the *significance*, but the *fact* of the participation, that is expressed (comp. ver. 20), so also must it of necessity be here. *What sort of a participation* it might be, was of no importance in the present connection, for the apostle is dealing here simply with the *κοινωνία* in itself, not with its nature, which differed according to the different analogies adduced (vv. 18, 20). It cannot therefore be gathered from this passage whether he was thinking of some kind of *real*, possibly even *material* connection of those eating and drinking in the

<sup>1</sup> Hofmann too comes to this in substance after all, although he tries to escape from it, taking *κοινωνία* as "*the matter of fact of a joint (?) participancy,*" and then opining that the apostle has in view an eating of the bread and drinking of the wine, which *by means of* this corporeal process, and without its being possible to eat and drink merely bread and wine, *makes us joint-partakers* of the body and blood of Christ. In support of the meaning thus assigned to *κοινωνία*, Hofmann appeals inappropriately to i. 9; 2 Cor. xiii. 13; 1 John i. 3. *Joint participancy* would be *συγκοινωνία*; comp. *συγκοινωνός*, ix. 23; Rom. xi. 17; Phil. i. 7.

<sup>2</sup> It is plain from vv. 18, 20, 21, that *κοινωνία* is here neither *communication*, apportioning (Luther, *al.*, including Kling, Billroth), which it never means in the N. T. (see on Rom. xv. 26), nor *consortium, societas* (Erasmus : "quod pariter sanguine Christi sumus redempti," comp. Zwingli). See also Kahnis, *Abendm.* p. 132 f.

Supper with the body and blood of Christ,<sup>1</sup> or, on the other hand, of an *inward* union realized in the *believing consciousness*, consisting therefore in the *spiritual contact* whereby the believer, who partakes of the elements, is conscious to himself in so partaking of being connected by saving appropriation with the body and blood of reconciliation. But we see clearly from xi. 24 f. that Paul *could* only mean the latter, since at the institution of the Supper the body of Christ was not yet slain, and His blood still flowed in His veins.<sup>2</sup> See, besides, on Matt. xxvi. 26. Again, if the *glorified* state of His body, *i.e.* the *σῶμα τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ* (Phil. iii. 21), set in only with His ascension, and if, when He instituted the Supper, His body was still but the *σῶμα τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ*, which soon after died upon the cross for reconciliation (Col. i. 22), while, nevertheless, the first Lord's Supper, dispensed by *Jesus Himself*, must have carried with it the whole specific *essence* of the sacred ordinance—that essence depending precisely upon the *future crucifixion* of the body and *outpouring* of the blood,—then the apostle cannot have in view the *glorified*<sup>3</sup> *σῶμα* and *αἷμα* as being given and partaken of through the *medium* of the bread and wine. Otherwise, we should have to attribute to Paul the extravagant conception,—which is, however, equally out of harmony with the institution itself and without shadow of warrant in the apostle's words, nay, at variance with what he says in xv. 50,—that, at the last Supper, Jesus had His pneumatic body already at His disposal to dispense as He would (Olshausen, Hofmann), or that a momentary glorification, like that on the Mount, took place at the time of instituting the

<sup>1</sup> For the rest, it is plain enough from the correlative *σῶμα* that the *αἷμα* τ. x. denotes the *blood*—not, as D. Schulz still maintains, the bloody *death*—of Christ (which, considered in itself, it might indeed *symbolize*, but could not be called. Fritzsche, *ad Rom.* I. p. 274; Kahnis, *Abendm.* p. 60 f.).

<sup>2</sup> When Rodatz objects that an *ideal* union with the actual body slain and blood shed is a *logical contradiction*, he overlooks the fact that the material sphere is not beyond the reach of inward appropriation. Spiritual communion may have reference to a material object, without excluding a symbolic process in which “*signatum non cum signo sed nobiscum unitur*” (Vossius, *de baptismo*, p. 11). Comp. Kahnis, *Dogmat.* I. 621: “Bread and wine form not a mere symbol, but a *sign*, which is at the same time *medium* ;” see also III. p. 489. The important alteration in the Latin *Confess. Aug.* Art. X. of 1540, points in the same direction.

<sup>3</sup> Rückert also (*Abendm.* p. 224 ff.) holds that Paul conceived the body and blood in the Supper as *glorified*; that, in virtue of the consecration, the participant

Supper, as Kahnis formerly held; but see now his *Dogmat.* I. p. 622; and comp. also, on the other side, Ebrard, *Dogma vom heilig. Abendm.* I. p. 109 f. Either, therefore, the apostle regarded the *κοινωνία* of Christ's body and blood as being different before His glorification from what it was afterwards, or it was in his eyes, both before and after, the inward spiritual fellowship realized by the inner man through the medium of the symbol partaken of, as an appropriation of the work of atonement consummated through means of His body and blood, and consequently as a real life-fellowship, other than which, indeed, he could not conceive it as realized when the Supper was instituted. Comp. Keim in the *Jahrb. für Deutsche Theol.* 1859, p. 90; Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 355. Against this *κοινωνία* subjectively realized in the devout feeling of the believer, and objectively established by the divine institution of the ordinance itself, it is objected that the phrase, "fellowship of the body and blood," expresses at any rate an *interpenetration* of Christ's body and the bread (according to the Lutheran synecdoche; comp. Kahnis' former view in his *Abendm.* p. 136, also Hofmann, p. 219). But this objection asserts too much, and therefore proves nothing, seeing that the fellowship with Christ's body and blood realized by means of the *symbol* also corresponds to the notion of fellowship, and that all the more, because this eating and drinking of the elements *essentially is the specific medium* of the deep, inward, real, and living *κοινωνία*; hence, too, the "calix communionis" cannot be possibly a *figurata loquutio*. This last point we maintain against Calvin, who, while insisting that "non tollatur figuræ veritas," and also that the thing itself is there, namely, that "non minus sanguinis communionem anima percipiat, quam ore vinum bibimus," still

partakes of the glorified blood, etc. Rückert, of course, discards all questions as to mode in connection with this view which he ascribes to the apostle, but which he himself considers a baseless one (p. 242). His mistake lies in deducing too much from *πνευματικόν*, which is neither in ver. 3 nor anywhere else in the N. T. the opposite of *material*, but of *natural* (1 Pet. ii. 5 not excluded); and the *πνεῦμα* to which *πνευματικός* refers is always (except Eph. vi. 13, where it is the *diabolic* spirit-world that is spoken of) the *Divine πνεῦμα*. In the case of gifts which are *πνευματικά*, it is this *πνεῦμα* who is always the *agent*; so with the supply of manna and water in the wilderness, and so, too, with the bread and wine received in the Lord's Supper, inasmuch as in this *βρῶμα* and *πόμα* the communion of the body and blood of Christ is realized, which does not take place when bread and wine are partaken of in the ordinary, natural way.

explains away the *κοινωνία* of the blood of Christ to the effect, "dum simul omnes nos in corpus suum inserit, ut vivat in nobis et nos in ipso." — *ὃν κλώμεν*] There was no need to repeat here that the bread, too, was hallowed by a prayer of thanksgiving, after the *cup* had been already so carefully described as a cup consecrated *for the Supper*. Instead of doing so, Paul enriches his representation by mention of the other *essential symbolic action* with the bread; comp. xi. 24. That the breaking of the bread, however, was *itself* the *consecration* (Rückert), the narrative of the institution will not allow us to assume. — *τοῦ σώματος τ. Χ.*] in the strict, not in the figurative sense, as Stroth, Rosenmüller, Schulthess, and others: "declaramus nos esse membra corporis Christi, i.e. societatis Christianae," comp. also Baur, *neut. Theol.* p. 201. This interpretation is at variance with the first clause, for which the meaning of the Supper as first instituted forbids such a figurative explanation (in opposition to Zwingli<sup>1</sup>); nor can this be justified by ver. 17; for

Ver. 17 confirms the statement that the bread is a communion of the body of Christ. *For it is one bread; one body are we, the many, i.e. for through one bread being eaten in the Supper, we Christians, although as individuals we are many, form together one (ethical) body.* This union into one body through participation in the one bread could not take place unless this bread were *κοινωνία* of the body of Christ, which is just that which produces the one body—that which constitutes the many into this unity. The proof advances *ab effectu* (which participating in the one bread *in and of itself* could not have) *ad causam* (which can only lie in this, that this

<sup>1</sup> Zwingli, in his *Respon. ad Bugenh.*, explains it thus: "Poculum gratiarum actionis, quo gratias agimus, quid quaeso, aliud est quam *nos ipsi*? Nos enim quid aliud sumus nisi ipsa communio, ipse coetus et populus, consortium et sodalitas sanguinis Christi? h. e. ille ipse populus, qui sanguine Christi ablutus est." The most thorough historical development of Zwingli's doctrine is that given by Dieckhoff in his *evang. Abendmahlslehre im Reformationszeitalter*, I. p. 428 ff. Rückert remarks with justice that Zwingli has here lost his footing on evangelical ground altogether. But Calvin, too, has lost it, inasmuch as he makes everything turn upon the spiritual reception of the *glorified* body, i.e. upon receiving the vivifying power which flows from it, whereas the words of institution have to do simply with that body, *which was to be crucified for the atonement* and with *its* fellowship. As to Calvin's doctrine of the Supper, see, besides Henry and Stähelin, Kahnis, II. p. 494 ff.

bread is the communion of Christ's body). The argument<sup>1</sup> does not imply a *logical conversion* (as Rodatz objects); but either the effect or the cause might be *posited from the Christian consciousness as premiss*, according as the case required. See a similar process of reasoning *ab effectu ad causam* in xii. 12. Comp. also Luke vii. 47. According to this, *ὅτι* is just the *since, because (for)*, so common in argument, and there is no need whatever to substitute *γάρ* for it (Hofmann's objection); *ἐστὶ* is to be supplied after *εἰς ἄρτος*; and the two clauses are placed side by side *asyndetically* so as to make the passage "alacrior et nervosior" (Dissen, *ad Pind. Exc.* II. p. 276), and, in particular, to bring out with more emphasis the idea of *unity* (*εἰς . . . ἓν*) (comp. Acts xxv. 12). The *οἱ γὰρ πάντες κ.τ.λ.* which follows leaves us no room to doubt how the asyndeton should logically be filled up (*and therefore also*); for this last clause of the verse excludes the possibility of our assuming a mere relation of *comparison* (as there is one bread, so are we one body; comp. Heydenreich, de Wette, Osiander, Neander, *al.*). The *οἱ γὰρ πάντες*, too, forbids our supplying *ἐσμέν* after *ἄρτος* (Zwingli, Piscator, Mosheim, Stolz, Schrader, comp. Ewald); for these words indicate the presence of another conception, inasmuch as, repeating the idea conveyed in *εἰς ἄρτος*, they thereby show that that *εἰς ἄρτος* was said of *literal* bread. This holds against Olshausen also, who discovers here the *church* as being "*the bread of life for the world!*" Other expositors take *ὅτι* (comp. xii. 15 f.; Gal. iv. 6) as introducing a protasis, and *ἐν σ. κ.τ.λ.* as being the apodosis: "*because it is one bread, therefore are we, the many, one body*" (Flatt, Rückert, Kahnis, Maier, Hofmann, following the Vulgate, Castalio, Calvin, Beza, Bengel, *al.*<sup>2</sup>). In that case either we should have a further exposition about the bread (Hofmann), no sign of which, however, follows; or else this whole thought would be purely parenthetical, a practical conclusion being drawn in passing from what had just been stated. But how remote from the connection would such a side-thought be! And would not Paul have

<sup>1</sup> Comp. Bengel: "Probat poculum et panem esse *communione*. Nam panis per se non facit, ut vescentes sint unum corpus, sed panis id facit quatenus est *communio*," etc.

<sup>2</sup> Rückert, however, has since assented (*Abendm.* p. 229 ff.) to the modifications proposed by Rodatz, of which mention is presently to be made.

required to interpose an *οὖν*, or some such word, after the *ὅτι*, in order to avoid misunderstanding? Interpreters would not have betaken themselves to a device so foreign to the scope of the passage, had they not too hastily assumed that ver. 17 contained no explanation at all of what preceded it (Rückert). Rodatz agrees with the rest in rendering: "because there is one bread, therefore are we, the many, one body," but makes this not a subordinate thought brought in by the way, but an essentially *new* point in the argument; he does this, however, by supplying after *ἐν σῶμα*, "*with Christ the Head*" (comp. also van Hengel, *Annot.* p. 167 f.), and finding the *progress* of the thought in the words supplied. But in this way the very point on which all turned would be left to be filled in, which is quite unwarrantable; Paul would have needed to write *ἐν σῶμα αὐτοῦ τῆς κεφαλῆς*, or something to that effect, in order to be understood. — *οἱ πολλοί*] correlative to the *ἐν σῶμα* (comp. v. 15, 19): *the many*, who are fellow-participants in the Lord's Supper, *the Christian multitude*. The very same, viewed, however, in the aspect of their *collective aggregate*, not, as here, of their multitudinousness, are *οἱ πάντες*, *the whole*; comp. Rom. v. 15, 18. The *unity* of bread is not to be understood *numerically* (Grotius, who, from that point of view, lays stress upon its size), but *qualitatively*, as one and the same *bread of the Supper*. The thought of the bread having become a unity out of many separate grains of corn is foreign to the connection, although insisted on by many expositors, such as Chrysostom, Augustine, Erasmus, Calovius, *al.* — *ἐκ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἄρτου μετέχ.* is interpreted by some as if there were no *ἐκ*: "since we are all partakers of one bread" (Luther). This is contrary to the linguistic usage, for *μετέχειν* is joined with the genitive (ver. 21, ix. 12) or accusative (Bernhardy, p. 149), but never with *ἐκ*; and the assumption that Paul, in using *ἐκ*, was thinking of the verb *ἐσθίειν* (xi. 28), is altogether arbitrary. The linguistically correct rendering is: *for we all have a share from the one bread*, so that in analysing the passage we have to supply, according to a well-known usage (Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 138 [E. T. 158]), the indefinite indication of a part, *τί* or *τινός*, before *ἐκ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἄρτου*. Hofmann, too, gives the correct partitive sense to the expression. The article before *ἐνός* points back to what has been already said.

Ver. 18. *Another*<sup>1</sup> analogue to prove that participation in the sacrificial feasts is idolatry. — *κατὰ σάρκα*] without the link of the article, because *Ἰσρ. κατὰ σάρκα* is regarded as a single idea. Comp. on Rom. ix. 3. *Israel after a purely human sort* means the born Israelites, the Jews, as distinguished from the *Ἰσρ. κατὰ πνεῦμα* (Rom. ii. 28 f.; Gal. iv. 29; comp. Gal. vi. 16), which the Christians are, in virtue of their fellowship of life with Christ the promised *σπέρμα* of Abraham. It was very natural for the apostle to add *κατὰ σάρκα*, seeing that he had just been speaking of the sacred ordinance of the Christians. — As to the Jewish sacrificial feasts, see Michaelis, *Mos. R.* II. pp. 282, 346 f., IV. § 189. — *κοινωνοὶ τοῦ θυσιαστ.*] This is the theocratic bond of participation, whereby the man stands bound to the sacrificial altar, who eats of the sacrifice belonging to it as such. The Israelite who refused to eat of the flesh of the sacrifice as such, would thereby practically declare that he had nothing to do with the altar, but stood aloof from the sphere of theocratic connection with it. The man, on the other hand, who ate a portion of the flesh offered upon the altar, gave proof of the religious relation in which he stood to the altar itself. The question which may be asked, *Why did not Paul write Θεοῦ instead of θυσιαστ.?* is not to be answered by affirming that he could not ascribe the *κοιν. τοῦ Θεοῦ εἰσὶ* to the *Ἰσρ. κ. σάρκα* (Rückert, *Abendm.* p. 217, and Neander; but could he not in truth, according to Rom. ix 4 f., xi. 1, say this of the people of God?), or by asserting that he could not well have attributed so high an effect to the sacrificial service (de Wette; but why should he not, seeing he does not specify any particular kind of fellowship with God?). But the true reply is this: the *κοινωνία Θεοῦ* would have been here much too vague and remote a conception; for that fellowship belonged to the Jew already in his national capacity as one of the people of God generally, even apart from partaking of the sacrifices. It was by the latter that he showed the narrower and more specific relation of worship in which he stood to God, namely, the peculiarly sacred *κοινωνία* (Ex. xx. 21 ff.) *τοῦ θυσιαστηρίου*. Hence the inappropriateness of the view taken by

<sup>1</sup> Which does not therefore by any means place the Lord's Supper in the light of a sacrificial feast (Olshausen, Harnack, *Gemeindegottesd.* p. 195; comp. also Kahn, *Abendm.* p. 30). See against this view, Hofmann, *Schriftbew.* II. 2, p. 232.



Rückert and many others, that Paul leaves the inference open : " and hence, too, with God," and of that of Rodatz, that the altar is put for the *offering*.

Vv. 19, 20. By these two analogues, vv. 16–18, the apostle has now justified his warning given above against the sacrificial feasts as a warning against idolatry (ver. 14). But from the case of the Jewish sacrificial eating last adduced, his readers might easily draw the inference : " You declare, then, the idolatrous offerings and the idols to be what the heathen count them ? " For whereas the apostle adduced the *κοινωνία* of the Jewish *θυσιαστήριον*, and that as an analogue of the heathen *θυσιαστήρια*, he seemed thereby to recognise the *κοινωνία* of these too, and consequently also the real divine existence of the idols thus adored. He therefore himself puts the possible false inference in the shape of a question (ver. 19), and then annuls it in ver. 20 by adducing the wholly different results to which ver. 18 in reality gives rise. The inference, namely, is drawn only from ver. 18, not from vv. 16–18 (de Wette, Osiander, Hofmann, *al.*), as ver. 20 (*θύουσιν*, correlative to the *θυσιαστηρίου* of ver. 18) shows. — *τί οὖν φημι ;* ] *what do I maintain then ?* namely, in following up ver. 18. Upon this way of exciting attention by a *question*, comp. Dissen, *ad Demosth. de cor.* p. 347. Krüger, *Anab.* i. 4. 14. — *τί ἐστιν* ] *is something*, i.e. *has reality*, namely, as *εἰδωλόθυτον*, so that it is really flesh which is consecrated to a god, as the heathen think, and as *εἶδωλον*, so that it really is a divine being answering to the conception which the heathen have of it ; as if, for instance, there were such a being as Jupiter in existence, who actually possessed the attributes and so forth ascribed to him by the heathen. To accent the words *τί ἐστιν* (Billroth, Tischendorf, comp. Ewald) would give the sense : *that any idol-sacrifice* (and : *any idol*) *exists*, in the capacity, that is to say, *of idol-sacrifice* and *of idol*. Either rendering harmonizes with viii. 4. In opposition to the latter of the two, it must not be said, with Rückert, that *ἐστι* would need to come immediately after *ὅτι*, for the last place, too, is the seat of emphasis (Kühner, II. p. 625) ; nor yet, with de Wette, that the one half (*εἰδωλόθυτον*) is not so suitable, for the context surely makes it perfectly plain that Paul is not speaking of *absolute* existence. But since both renderings are equally good as regards sense and expression,

we can only decide between them on this ground, that with the second the  $\tau\acute{\iota}$  would be superfluous, whereas with the first—which, following the Vulgate, is the common one—it has significance, which should give it the preference. At the same time, we must not insert any pregnancy of meaning like that in iii. 7 (*of influence and effect*) into the  $\tau\acute{\iota}$ , as Hofmann does without warrant from the context; but it is the simple *aliquid*, the opposite of the non-real, of the *non-ens*. —  $\alpha\lambda\lambda\prime$ ] refers to the negative sense of the preceding question. Hence: “No; on the contrary, I maintain,” etc. See Hartung, *Partikell.* II. p. 37; Baeumlein, p. 10 f. —  $\alpha\theta\acute{\epsilon}\omega\sigma\omega$ ] see the critical remarks. The subject is self-evident: *the sacrificers* (the *heathen*, who sacrifice). Kühner, II. p. 35 f.—The assertion, again, that the heathen sacrifices are presented to *demons* and not to a real God ( $\Theta\epsilon\acute{\omega}$ ), follows ( $\omicron\upsilon\upsilon$ , in ver. 19) from the fellowship in which the Jew who ate of the sacrifices stood to the altar on which they were offered; inasmuch as confessedly it was only the *Jewish*  $\theta\upsilon\sigma\iota\alpha\sigma\tau\acute{\eta}\rho\iota\omicron\nu$  with its sacrifice that belonged to a real God, and consequently the heathen  $\theta\upsilon\sigma\iota\alpha\sigma\tau\acute{\eta}\rho\iota\alpha$  and their offerings could not have reference to a God, but only to beings of an opposite kind, *i.e.* demons. —  $\delta\alpha\iota\mu\omicron\nu\acute{\iota}\omicron\iota\varsigma$ ] does not mean *idols*, false or imaginary gods (Bos, Mosheim, Valckenaer, Zachariae, Rosenmüller, Heydenreich, Flatt, Pott, Neander), which is contrary to the uniform usage of the LXX. and the N. T.,<sup>1</sup> and would, moreover, yield a thought quite out of keeping with the context; for it was the apostle's aim to point to a connection with an antichristian *reality*. The word means, as always in the N. T., *demons, diabolic spirits*. That the heathen worships *quoad eventum* (of course not *quoad intentionem*) were offered to devils, was a view derived by all the later Jews with strict logical consistency from the premisses of a pure monotheism and its opposite. See the LXX. rendering of Deut. xxxii. 17; Ps. cvi. 37,—a reminiscence of which we have in Paul's expression here,—Ps. xcv. 5; Bar. iv. 7; Tob. iii. 8, vi. 14, and the Rabbinical writers quoted in Eisenmenger's *entdeckt. Judenth.* I. pp. 805 ff., 816 ff. So Paul, too, makes the real existences answering to the heathen conceptions of the gods, to be *demons*, which is essentially connected with the Christian idea that heathen-

<sup>1</sup> Acts xvii. 18 is uttered by *Greeks* according to *their* sense of the word; but in Rev. ix. 20 we are to understand *demons* as meant.

dom is the realm of the devil; for, according to this idea, the various individual beings regarded by the heathen as gods can be nothing else but diabolic spirits, who collectively make up the whole imperial host of the ἀρχῶν τοῦ κόσμου τούτου (Eph. ii. 2, vi. 12), who is himself the ἀρχηγός.<sup>1</sup> Comp. Hahn, *Theol. des N. Test.* I. p. 366 f.; Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 279. The ancient church, too, followed Paul in remaining true to this idea. See Grotius on this passage. Usteri, *Lehrbegr.* p. 421 ff. As to the consistency of this view with that expressed in viii. 4, see the remarks on the latter verse. Rückert therefore (with Grotius) is wrong in altering the representation to this effect, that according to Paul the demons had “*given the heathen to believe*” that there were gods to whom men should sacrifice, in order to obtain for themselves under their name divine worship and offerings, and that *in so far* the sacrifices of the heathen were presented to demons. The LXX. rendering of Deut. xxxii. 17 and Ps. xcv. 5 should of itself have been enough to prevent any such paraphrase of the direct dative-relation. — οὐ θέλω δὲ κ.τ.λ.] *that I, however, do not wish*, still dependent upon ὅτι, the reply to τὶ οὖν φημι being only thus completed. The κοινωνοὺς points back to κοινων. in ver. 18. The article in τῶν δαιμ. denotes this *class* of beings.

Ver. 21 gives the ground of the foregoing οὐ θέλω δὲ ὑμᾶς κ.τ.λ. — οὐ δύνασθε] of *moral impossibility*. “Nihil convenit inter Christum et impios daemones; utrisque serviri simul non potest nisi cum insigni contumelia Christi,” Erasmus, *Paraph.* Comp. 2 Cor. vi. 15. — ποτήριον Κυρίου] *a cup having reference to the Lord, i.e. according to ver. 16: a cup which brings into communion with Christ*. Its analogue is a ποτήριον δαιμονίων; the latter was *quoad eventum*, according to ver. 20, the cup out of which men drank at the sacrificial feast, inasmuch as the whole feast, and therefore also the wine used at it, even apart from the libation (which Grotius, Munthe, Michaelis, de Wette, and others suppose to be meant), made the partakers to be κοινωνοὺς τῶν

<sup>1</sup> Mosheim objects that if Paul held this belief, he must have pronounced the sacrificial meat to be positively unclean. But it had surely received no *character indelebilis* through its being set apart for the altar. If not partaken of *in its quality as sacrificial meat*, it had lost its relation to the demons, and had become *ordinary* meat, just as Jewish sacrificial flesh, too, retained the consecration of the altar only for him *who ate it as such*.

δαιμον. (ver. 20). — *τραπέξης Κυρίου*] refers to the whole *κυριακὸν δαίπνον*, xi. 20. Instances of *μετέχειν* with *τραπέξης*, and like expressions, may be seen in Loesner, *Obs.* p. 288.

Ver. 22. *Or do we provoke the Lord to jealousy?* to prove that He will not suffer us to set Him on the same level with the demons? The connection is this: "*You cannot*, etc., ver. 21, *unless it were the case that we Christians were people whose business it is to provoke Christ to jealousy.*" Hence the *indicative*, which should not be taken as deliberative, with Luther and others, including Pott, Platt, and Rückert (*or would we defy the Lord?*), but: *we occupy ourselves therewith, are engaged therein.* Comp. Bernhardy, *Syntax*, p. 370. The phrase, *τὸν Κύριον*, however, should not be referred to God on the ground of the allusion undoubtedly made here to Deut. xxxii. 21 (so *commonly*, as by Ewald, Pott, Billroth, Rückert, Olshausen), but (as by de Wette and Hofmann), on account of ver. 21, to *Christ*. — *μὴ ἰσχυρ. κ.τ.λ.*] *we are not surely stronger than He?* i.e. we are not surely persons, whom His strength, which He would put forth against us to carry out the promptings of that jealousy,<sup>1</sup> cannot get the better of? Comp. Job xxxvii. 23. Chrysostom already correctly notes the *abductio ad absurdum*, with which Paul winds up this part of his polemic against the eating of sacrificial meat.

Ver. 23. In connection, however, with this matter also, as with a former one, vi. 12, the principle of Christian *liberty in things indifferent* admitted of application, and had no doubt been applied in Corinth itself. Paul therefore now proceeds to treat the subject from this purely ethical side, introducing the new section without any connective particle (Buttmann, *neut. Gram.* p. 345 [E. T. 403]), and enunciating in the first place the aforesaid principle itself, coupled, however, with its qualifying condition of love.

<sup>1</sup> According to Hofmann, Paul means *that* strength, which men must suppose themselves to possess if they are confident that they can take part *with impunity* in the sacrificial feasts, whereas Christ can by no means endure the sight of such participation on their part without becoming jealous. But the idea, "*with impunity*," would be arbitrarily imported into the passage. The greater strength, upon this view of it, would be in truth the capacity—not existing in Christ—to do what was *morally impossible* (ver. 21). Had this, however, been the apostle's meaning, he would have needed, in order to be logical and intelligible, to reverse the order of his clauses, so that *ἰσχυρότεροι* should have its sense determined by *οὐ δύνασθαι* in ver. 21. According to the present order, the meaning of *ἰσχυρ.* is determined by *παραζηλοῦμεν* to be the strength which could *make head* against that of the ζῆλος thus aroused.

Thereafter in ver. 24 he lays down the general maxims arising out of this qualification; and then in vv. 25 ff. the special rules bearing upon the eating of meat offered in sacrifice. — οἰκοδομεῖ] promotes the Christian life of the brethren, viii. 1. Comp. on Rom. xiv. 19. See the counterpart to this in Rom. xiv. 13, 15, 20. — As to συμφέρει, see on vi. 12.

Ver. 24. *Let no one be striving to satisfy his own interest, but, etc.* Comp. ver. 33. We must not impair the *ideal*, to which this rule gives absolute expression (otherwise in Phil. ii. 4), by supplying μόνον and καί, as Grotius and others do. See rather Rom. xv. 1 f. Even the limitation to the question in hand about sacrificial feasts (Pott), or to the *adiaphora* in general (Billroth, de Wette, Osiander), is unwarranted; for the special duty of the οἰκοδομεῖν is included under this quite general rule, the application of which to the matter in dispute is not to come till afterwards. — After ἀλλά we are mentally to supply ἕκαστος from the preceding μηδεὶς. See Bernhardt, p. 458; Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Symp.* p. 192 E, *Rep.* p. 366 C; Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 336 [E. T. 392].

Ver. 25. On μάκελλον, *shambles, slaughter-house* (Varro, *de ling. Lat.* 4, p. 35; Dio Cass. lxi. 18), see Kypke, II. p. 219. Comp. Plut. *Mor.* 752 C: μακελεία. It passed over into the Rabbinical writings also; see Drus. *in loc.* — μηδὲν ἀνακρίν.] *making no investigation* (Vulg. *interrogantes*; not: *condemning*, as Grotius, Ewald, and others take it, contrary to the meaning of the word), i.e. instituting no inquiry about any of the pieces of meat exposed for sale, as to whether it had been offered in sacrifice or not. The *weaker* Christians, that is to say, were afraid of the possibility (see on viii. 7) of their buying sacrificial meat at the fleshmarket, because they had not yet risen to see that the flesh of the victims when brought to the public mart had lost its sacrificial character and had become ordinary meat. They would probably, therefore, often enough make anxious inquiries over their purchases whether this or that piece might have been offered at the altar or not. The *stronger* believers did not act in this way; and Paul approves their conduct, and enjoins all to do the same. — διὰ τὴν συνείδησιν] may be taken as referring either (1) to μηδὲν ἀνακρίνοντας as to the required mode of the πᾶν ἐσθίειν: *eat all without inquiry, in order that your conscience*

*may not be troubled*, which would be the case if you were told : This is meat offered to idols (so Erasmus, Rosenmüller, Hofmann, and others, following Chrysostom);<sup>1</sup> or (2) simply to ἀνακρίνοντες : *without making any inquiry on grounds of conscience*. So Castalio, Calvin, Beza, *al.*, including Billroth and Ewald (the latter, however, rendering : “*condemning* nothing on account of conscience”). The second method of connection is preferable, both because it gives the simplest and most direct sense for διὰ τ. συνείδ., and also because of the τοῦ γὰρ Κυρίου κ.τ.λ. that follows,—words by which Paul designs to show that, as regards such questions about food, there is really no room for holding a court of conscience to decide upon the lawfulness or unlawfulness of eating. He means then that his readers should partake freely of all flesh sold in the fleshmarket, without for conscience’ sake entering into an inquiry whether any of it had or had not been sacrificial flesh. The flesh offered for sale was to be *flesh* to them, and nothing more; conscience had no call whatever to make any inquiry in the matter; for the earth is the Lord’s, etc., ver. 26. Other interpreters understand *the conscience of others* to be meant : “No investigation should be made . . . lest, if it turned out to be sacrificial flesh, the conscience of any one should be rendered uneasy, or be defiled by participation in the food;” so Rückert, and so in substance Vatablus, Bengel, Mosheim, and others, including Flatt, Pott, Heydenreich, de Wette, Osiander, Maier. Comp. viii. 7, 10. But it could occur to none of the apostle’s readers to take τὴν συνείδ. as referring to anything but their own individual conscience. It is otherwise in ver. 28, where δι’ ἐκεῖνον τὸν μνηύς. prepares us for the transition to the conscience of another person; while the οὐχὶ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ in ver. 29 shows that in vv. 25 and 27 it was just the reader’s *own* conscience that was meant.

Ver. 26 supplies the religious ground for the injunction just given : μηδὲν ἀνακρίνειν διὰ τ. συνείδησιν, expressed in the words of Ps. xxiv. 1 (comp. Ps. l. 12), which Paul here makes his own. If the earth and its fulness belong to God, how should it be necessary before using somewhat of them for food to institute an investigation on grounds of conscience, as if such gifts of God

<sup>1</sup> “Vitandum enim est offendiculum, si incidat, non accersendum,” Erasmus adds in his Paraphrase with fine exegetical discernment.

could be in themselves unholy, or involve sin in the use of them? Comp. 1 Tim. iv. 4. For the rest, the passage affords another proof that the apostle had now in principle gone beyond the standpoint of the decree of Acts xv. Comp. on viii. 1, remark. — As to *πλήρωμα*, *id.* *quo res impletur*, see Fritzsche, *ad Rom.* II. p. 469 ff. Calvin had already put the point well: “Terra enim, si arboribus, herbis, animalibus et aliis rebus careret, esset tanquam domus . . . *vacua*.”

Ver. 27. Δέ] of continuation. In the matter of *invitations* too the same principle holds good, only with the incidental limitation adduced in ver. 28. Note the *emphasis* conveyed by the *unusual* place of the *καλεῖ*, in contrast to the *τὸ ἐν μακέλλῳ πωλούμ.* which has been already spoken of. Attention is thus called to the fact that a *second* and a *new* situation is now to be discussed; before, the reader was in the *fleshmarket*; now, he is a *guest at a feast*. — It is plain, at the same time, from ver. 28, that what is meant is not the invitation to *festivals in express connection with sacrifice*, but to *other* heathen feasts, at which, however, flesh offered to idols might occur; for in the case of a sacrificial feast the *ιερόθυτόν ἐστι* was a matter of course. — *καὶ θέλετε πορ.*] “Admonet tacite, melius forte facturos, si non eant, ire tamen non prohibet,” Grotius.

Ver. 28. Ἐὰν δέ τις κ.τ.λ.] *But should it so happen that some one*, etc. It is clear from this that the *host* (Grotius, Mosheim, Semler) is not meant, otherwise *τίς* (ver. 27) would not be repeated, and besides, *δι' ἐκείνον . . . συνείδησιν* would not suit; but a *fellow-guest*, and that not a *heathen* (Chrysostom, Theophylact, Erasmus, *al.*, including de Wette and Maier, according to whom the thing is done maliciously, or to put the Christian to the test<sup>1</sup>), nor a heathen *or* Christian indifferently (Flatt), nor a *Jew* (Wetstein), but a *Christian* fellow-guest (Osiander, Neander, *al.*), who, being himself still under the influence of the ideas about sacrificial flesh, warns his fellow-believer at the table against defilement; and, moreover, a *Gentile* Christian (see remark on viii. 7), who had somehow learned — perhaps only

<sup>1</sup> Ewald, too, holds the *τίς* to be a *heathen* (“the host, as most interpreters take it, or very possibly a companion at the table”), who gave the hint in a frank and kindly way, as not expecting that a Christian would partake of meat of that sort.

since coming to the house—that the flesh from the altar was to form part of the feast.<sup>1</sup> According to Reiche, in his *Comment. crit.*, we should not seek to define the *τίς* more specially, but leave it quite general. But this is at variance with the apodosis, which takes for granted that, in the case supposed, eating of flesh would involve a want of forbearance towards the *μηνύσας*, as was obviously implied of necessity in the *διὰ* after what had already been said in viii. 7–13. The *τίς*, therefore, must be one whose conscience required to be spared, consequently neither a heathen nor a Jew, but, in accordance with viii. 7 ff., only a brother who was of weak conscience. This holds against Hofmann also, who assumes that the case supposed in ver. 28 might occur just as well if the *seller* knew the buyer to be a Christian as if the *host* or any of his *family* knew the guest as such. To leave the *τίς* thus indefinite is, besides, the more clearly wrong, seeing that the rule for *buying* meat had been finally disposed of in vv. 25, 26, and cannot extend into ver. 28, because ver. 28 is included under the case of the *invitation* brought forward in ver. 27, and this case again is very distinctly separated by the very order of the words (see on ver. 27) from that of the *purchase* in the market, ver. 25. — *δι' ἐκεῖνον τ. μηνύσ. κ. τ. συνείδ.*] for the sake of him who made it known, and of conscience, i.e. in order to spare him and not to injure conscience. The (*διὰ*) *τὴν συνείδησιν* is the *refrain* which serves to give the motive for the rules laid down since ver. 25. To *whose* conscience this refrain points here, Paul does not yet say (else he would have added *αὐτοῦ*), but utters again first of all this moral watchword without any more precise definition, in order immediately thereafter in ver. 29 to express with the special emphasis of contrast the particular reference of its meaning designed here;<sup>2</sup> for in vv. 25, 27, the *συνείδησις* had a different meaning. This *κ. τ. συνείδησιν*, therefore (the *καί* here being the simple *and*), carries with it something to whet curiosity; it stands forth in the first place as a sort of *riddle*, so to speak, which is to find its solution in

<sup>1</sup> De Wette's objection, that one of such tender conscience would hardly have gone to a heathen festival at all, carries weight only on the supposition of a *sacri-ficial* feast being meant.

<sup>2</sup> Hence *τ. συνείδ.* should not be understood of conscience in *abstracto* (Hofmann: "conscience as such, no matter whose," although in the first place that of the *μηνύσ.*).



ver. 29. — Regarding *μηνύσ.*, see on Luke xx. 37. If we imagine the *μηνύσ.* to be a *heathen*, the *κ. τ. συνείδ.* lands us in an insoluble difficulty. For *either* (1) we should, with Ewald, suppose that this heathen's view of the matter was, that the Christian, being warned, would not eat, but, on the other hand, if he did, would be still worse than a Jew, converting liberty into licentiousness; comp. Erasmus, *Paraphr.*<sup>1</sup> But in that case how very obscurely Paul would have expressed himself, especially when in the whole context *συνείδησις* means *the Christian consciousness raising scruples for itself*, and that in respect of what was lawful or unlawful! Or (2) we should have, with de Wette, to take *τὴν συνείδησιν* as not the conscience of the *μηνύσ.* at all, but that of third persons (weak Christians), which, however, ver. 29 forbids us to do, unless we are to regard Paul as writing with excessive awkwardness. — *ιερόθυτον*] used of sacrificial flesh also in Plutarch, *Mor.* p. 729 C. The term is *purposely chosen* here instead of *εἰδωλόθυτον*, as a more honourable expression, because the words are spoken at table *in the presence of heathen*. We may be sure that this delicate touch is due to no corrector of the text (in opposition to de Wette and Reiche). As to the usage of the word in Greek, see Lobeck, *ad Phryg.* p. 159.

Ver. 29 f. Lest now any one should understand this *last διὰ τ. συνείδ.* as meaning *one's own* conscience, as in vv. 25, 27, and so *misunderstand* Paul with his high views of Christian freedom, he adds here this emphatic explanation, and the reason on which it rests (*ἵνατί γάρ . . .* ver. 30). — *τὴν ἑαυτοῦ*] *his own individual* conscience, his, namely, who was warned. — *τοῦ ἑτέρου*] *of the other in the case*, points back to the *τὸν μηνύσαντα*, whose conscience, too, is afterwards included under *ἄλλης συνειδήσεως*. — *ἵνατί γάρ κ.τ.λ.*] *For why is my liberty*, etc., that is: *for it is absurd that another man's conscience should pronounce sentence (of condemnation) upon my liberty* (my moral freedom from obligation as regards such things, indifferent as they are in themselves). This is the *reason*, why Paul does not mean one's own conscience when he says that

<sup>1</sup> Similarly Hofmann also thinks of the "bad opinion of Christianity" which the *μηνύσ.* first of all, but others as well, would have occasion to form, so that the Christian's liberty would be subject to the tribunal of the moral consciousness of others.

to spare conscience one should abstain from eating in the case supposed (ver. 28), but the conscience of the other. One's own conscience, the distinctive moral element in one's own self-consciousness, does not *need* such consideration; for it remains unaffected by the judgment passed and slander uttered, seeing that both are without foundation. The only motive for the abstinence, therefore, is the sparing of the conscience of others, not the danger to one's own. Similarly Bengel; comp. de Wette. The *ordinary* interpretation—adopted by Heydenreich, Flatt, Billroth, Rückert, Olshausen, Neander, Maier, Ewald, Hofmann; Osiander is undecided—is that of Chrysostom, taking the words as the reason for the rule in ver. 28, in the sense of: "For why should I give occasion to others to pass judgment upon me and to speak evil?" or, "There is no reason for letting it come to such a pass, that a Christian's liberty should be subjected to that tribunal of the moral consciousness of others," Hofmann. But even apart from the fact that the text says nothing about "giving occasion," or "letting it come to such a pass," it is a very arbitrary proceeding to take a clause standing in such a marked way in the course of the argument as *συνείδησιν* . . . *ἐτέρου*, and to thrust it aside as something only incidentally appended. The connection, too, of the conditional protasis with the interrogative *τί* in the apodosis in ver. 30, makes it clear enough that Paul wishes to bring out the *absurdity* of the relation between the two conceptions. Comp. Rom. iii. 7, *al.* Vatablus, Schulz, and Pott find here and in ver. 30 the objection of an opponent "ad infirmitatem fratrum suorum se conformare nolentis." The *γάρ* is not inconsistent with this (see Fritzsche, *ad Matth.* p. 807), but the *οὖν* is (ver. 31).—Observe the difference between *τοῦ ἐτέρου* (*alterius*) and *ἄλλης* (*alius*, i.e. *alienae*), by which *any other* conscience *whatever* is meant.—*χάρτι*] Dative of the manner: *gratefully, with thanks*. Comp. Eph. ii. 5, where, however, the context shows that the meaning is *by grace*; see in general, Bernhardt, p. 100 f. It refers to the grace at meat. By understanding it as *beneficio Dei* (Beza, Grotius, Heydenreich, Hofmann), we bring in *Dei* entirely without warrant, and overlook the parallel *εὐχαριστῶ*, the idea of which is the same with that of *χάρτι*.—The twice-used *ἐγώ* is emphatic: *I for my part*.—*μετέχω*] The object of the verb is self-evident: food and drink.

Comp. ὑπὲρ οὗ. — εὐχαριστῶ] "Gratiarum actio cibum omnem sanctificat, auctoritatem idolorum negat, Dei asserit; 1 Tim. iv. 3 f.; Rom. xiv. 6," Bengel.

Vv. 31-33. The section treating expressly of the participation in sacrifices has been brought to a close. There now follow, introduced by οὖν (which here marks the inference of the general from the particular), some additional admonitions, in which are expressed the leading moral rules *for all right Christian conduct*; ἀπὸ τοῦ προκειμένου ἐπὶ τὸ καθολικὸν ἐξήγαγε τὴν παραίνεσιν, ἕνα κάλλιστον ὅρον ἡμῖν δοῦς, τὸ τὸν Θεὸν διὰ πάντων δοξάζεσθαι, Chrysostom. — ἐσθίετε and πίνετε are to be understood in a perfectly *general* sense, although the subject which the apostle had been handling hitherto naturally suggested the words. Rückert is wrong in holding that it would be more correct if ἐάν stood in place of εἰ. The εἰ is here also "particula plane logica, et quae simpliciter ad cogitationem refertur," Hermann, *ad Viger.* p. 834. Τί, again, does not stand for the Attic ὅτιοῦν (Rückert), but the emphasis is on ποιεῖτε: be it that ye *eat*, or *drink*, or *do* anything; so that the three cases are: *eating, drinking, acting*. — πάντα] without any limitation whatever. "Magnum axioma," Bengel. A Christian's *collective* action should be directed harmoniously towards the one end of redounding *to the glory of God*; for all truly Christian conduct and work is a practical glorifying of God. Comp. vi. 20; Eph. i. 12; Phil. i. 11; 1 Pet. iv. 11; John xv. 8. The opposite: Rom. ii. 23.

Ver. 32. Ἀπρόσκοποι] become *inoffensive* (by constantly increasing completeness of Christian virtue). See on Phil. i. 10. — καὶ Ἰουδ. καὶ Ἑλλ. καὶ τ. ἐκκλ. τοῦ Θεοῦ] *i.e.* *for non-Christians and for Christians*. The former are spoken of *under two divisions*. It is a mistake to suppose, with Beza, that the reference is to Jewish and Gentile *Christians*, which is at variance with καὶ τῇ ἐκκλ. τοῦ Θεοῦ, since the three repetitions of καὶ stand on the same level. Hence also it will not do to lay all the emphasis, as Billroth does, upon τῇ ἐκκλ. τοῦ Θεοῦ, although it is true that it is designated in a significant way, as in xi. 22. The rule is clearly quite a general one; and it places on the same level the three classes with whom intercourse must be held without giving any occasion for moral offence.

Ver. 33. Πάντα πᾶσιν ἀρέσκω] See ix. 19 ff. πάντα, *in every*

*respect*, ix. 25. ἀρέσκω, *am at the service of*. It denotes what takes place on *the apostle's* side through his endeavour, namely, to be the servant of all, and to be all things to all men (ix. 19 ff.); not the result of his endeavour, as if he actually did please all (see on Gal. i. 10); for πᾶσιν ἀρέσκειν τὸν συμβουλευόντα καὶ τὰ κοινὰ πράττοντα ἀδύνατον, Dem. 1481. 4. Comp. Rom. xv. 2; 1 Thess. ii. 4. — τῶν πολλῶν] *of the many*, the multitude, opposed to the unity of his own single person. Comp. on ix. 19; Rom. v. 15; and on the idea, Clement, *ad Cor.* I. 48: ζητεῖν τὸ κοινωφέλες πᾶσιν, καὶ μὴ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ. — ἵνα σωθῶσι] *ultimate end*, for the sake of which he sought their good: that they might be sharers in the *Messianic salvation*. Comp. ix. 22. "Ex eo dijudicandum utile," Bengel.

## CHAPTER XI.

VER. 2. ἀδελφοί] is wanting in A B C  $\aleph$ , min. Copt. Sahid. Aeth. Arm. Athan. Cyr. Bas. Chrys. Deleted by Lachm. and Rückert. A natural addition at the beginning of a new section. Comp. x. 1, xii. 1, where not a single authority omits it. Had it been in the original text here, there was no inducement to leave it out. It is otherwise in xv. 31, Rom. xv. 15. — Ver. 5. αὐτῆς] αὐτῆς (Lachm.) occurs in A C D\* F G L  $\aleph$ , min. Chrys. Theodoret, *al.* This is such a preponderance of evidence against the *Recepta* (preferred by Tisch. on the authority of B E K Or.), that we must suppose the latter to be an exegetical change for the sake of clearness. — Ver. 7. γυνή] A B D\* F G  $\aleph$ , 73, 118, Dial. Isid. Theodoret read ἡ γυνή, which is adopted by Lachm. Rück. Tisch. Rightly; the article was omitted as in the verse before and after. — Ver. 11. Elz. has the two clauses in inverted order (which Rinck defends), but there is decisive evidence against it. To put the man first seemed more natural. — Ver. 14. ἡ] is wanting in witnesses of decisive authority; deleted by Lach. Rück. Tisch. Added to mark the question. — αὐτῇ ἡ φύσις] A B C D H  $\aleph$ , min. Damasc. have ἡ φύσις αὐτῇ (so Lachm. and Tisch.); F G Arm. Tert. simply ἡ φύσις. In the absence of grounds of an internal kind, the weight of evidence on the side of ἡ φ. αὐτῇ should make it be preferred. — Ver. 17. παραγγέλλων . . . ἐπαινῶ] Lachm. Rück. Tisch. read παραγγέλλω . . . ἐπαινῶν, on the authority of A B C\* F G min. Syr. utr. Arr. Aeth. Arm. Vulg. Clar. Börn. Ambrosiast. Aug. Pel. Bede. This is a preponderance of evidence—all the more that D\*, with its reading of παραγγέλλω, οὐκ ἐπαινῶ, must here remain out of account. Then, too, ver. 2 compared with ver. 22 made οὐκ ἐπαινῶ come most naturally to the copyist; so that altogether we must give the preference to Lachmann's reading, which is, besides, the more difficult of the two (against Reiche, who defends the *Recepta*). — Ver. 21. προλαμβάνει] A, 46, *al.* have προσλαμβάν. So Rückert. But this is plainly an alteration, because the πρό, *prae*, was not understood. — Ver. 22. ἐπαινέσω] So also Lachm. on the margin (but with ἐπαινῶ in the text) and Tisch., following A C D E K L  $\aleph$ , all min., several vss. Chrys. Theodoret. The *present* crept in from its occurrence before and after. — Ver. 24. After εἶπε Elz. has λάβετε, φάγετε; but in the

face of decisive evidence. Taken from Matt. xxvi. 26.—*πλόμενον*] omitted in A B C\* *8*\*, 17, 67\*\*, Ath. Cyr. Fulg. In D\* we have *θρυπτόμενον*; in Copt. Sahid. Arm. Vulg. *αλ., διδόμενον*. Justly suspected by Griesb., and deleted by Lachm. Rück. Tisch. Mere supplements.—Ver. 26. The *τοῦτο* which stands after *ποτήριον* in Elz. is condemned by decisive evidence. So, too, the *τοῦτον*, which Elz. has after *ἄρτον* in ver. 27, is a later addition.—Ver. 29. *ἀναξίως* does not occur in A B C *8*\*, 17, Sahid. Aeth.; nor does *τοῦ Κυρίου* (after *σῶμα*) in these and some other witnesses. Lachm. and Tisch. delete them both; and both are glosses. What reason was there for omitting them if in the original?—Ver. 31. There is a great preponderance of evidence in favour of *οἱ* instead of *γάρ*. The latter is an explanatory alteration.—Ver. 34. *εἰ*] Elz. has *εἰ οἱ*; but there is conclusive evidence for rejecting it.

CONTENTS.—(1) How requisite it is that women cover their heads in the public assemblies for the worship of God,<sup>1</sup> vv. 2–16. (2) Regarding the abuses of the Agapae, and the right way of celebrating them, vv. 17–34.

Ver. 1 belongs still to the preceding section.—Become *imitators* of me. *Become* so, Paul writes, for there was as yet a sad lack of practical evidence of this imitation; see also x. 32 (comp. Kühner, *ad Xen. Anab.* i. 7. 4).—*καὶ γάρ*] as *I also have become an imitator*, namely, of Christ. Comp. on Matt. xv. 3. Christ as the highest pattern of the spirit described in x. 33. Comp. Phil. ii. 4 ff.; Rom. xv. 3; Eph. v. 2; Matt. xx. 28.

Ver. 2. Conciliatory preamble to the sharp correction which follows.—*δέ*] is simply the *autem* leading on to a *new* subject; hence we are not to seek any set purpose in the similarity of sound between *μιμηταί* and *μέμνησθε*.—*πάντα*] because you are *in all respects* mindful of me. Rückert's explanation: "you think on everything that comes from me" (xvi. 14), is needlessly far-fetched, seeing that *μέμνημαι* with the accusative, very frequent in Greek writers, does not occur in the N. T., and the absolute *πάντα* is common enough (ix. 25, x. 32).—*καὶ καθὼς κ.τ.λ.*] and because you hold fast the traditions in the way in which I delivered them to you. This is the practical result of what was stated in the fore-

<sup>1</sup> Much fruitless trouble has been taken to connect even the non-veiling of the women with the state of parties at Corinth. Now it has been the *Pauline party* (Neander), now the *Christ-party* (Olshausen), and now the *followers of Apollos* (Rübiger), who have been represented as the opponents of veiling.

going clause. *Παραδόσεις* might refer to doctrine as well as to usages and discipline (comp. Gal. i. 14; Col. ii. 8; 2 Thess. ii. 15, iii. 6; Plato, *Legg.* vii. p. 803 A; Polyb. xi. 8. 2); but the tenor of the following context shows that Paul means here directions of the *latter* sort, which he had given to the Corinthians orally (and also perhaps in his lost letter, v. 2). He had, at the foundation of the church and afterwards, made various external regulations, and rejoices that, on the whole, they had not set these aside, but were *holding them fast* in accordance with his directions (*κατέχετε*, comp. xv. 2; 1 Thess. v. 21; Heb. iii. 6, x. 23). As to the connection of *παρέδωκα . . . παραδόσεις*, see Winer, p. 210 [E. T. 281].

Ver. 3. "After this general acknowledgment, however, I have still to bid you lay to heart the following particular point." And now, first of all, the *principle* of the succeeding admonition. Respecting *θέλω . . . εἰδέναι*, comp. on x. 1; Col. ii. 1.—*παντὸς ἀνδρ.*] note the prominent position of the word, as also the article before *κεφ.*: *of every man the Head*. That what is meant, however, is every *Christian* man, is self-evident from this first clause; consequently, Paul is not thinking of the general *order of creation* (Hofmann), according to which Christ is the head of *all things* (Col. i. 16 f., ii. 10), but of the organization of *Christian* fellowship, as it is based upon the *work of redemption*. Comp. Eph. v. 21 ff.—*κεφαλῇ*, from which we are not (with Hofmann) to dissociate the conception of an organized whole (this would suit in none of the passages where the word occurs, Col. ii. 10 included), designates in all the three cases here the *proximate, immediate Head*, which is to be specially noted in the second instance, for Christ as head of the church (Col. i. 18; Eph. i. 22, iv. 15) is also head of the woman (comp. Eph. v. 22 f.). The relation indicated by *κεφ.* is that of organic *subordination*, even in the last clause: *He to whom Christ is subordinate is God* (comp. iii. 23, xv. 28, viii. 6; Col. i. 15; Rom. ix. 5; and see Kahn, *Dogm.* III. p. 208 ff.), where the dogmatic explanation resorted to, that Christ in His *human* nature only is meant (Theodoret, Estius, Calovius, *al.*), is un-Pauline. Neither, again, is His *voluntary subjection* referred to (Billroth), but—which is exactly what the argument demands, and what the two first clauses give us—the *objective* and, notwithstanding His essential equality with God

(Phil. ii. 6), *necessary* subordination of the Son to the Father in the divine economy of redemption.<sup>1</sup> Much polemic discussion as to the misuse of this passage by the Arians and others may be found in Chrysostom, Theodoret, and Theophylact. — Gal. iii. 28, indeed, shows that the distinction of the sexes is done away in Christ (in the spiritual sphere of the Christian life); but this *ideal* equality of *sex* as little does away with the empirical subordination in marriage as with differences of rank in other earthly relations, *e.g.* of masters and servants. — κεφ. δὲ X. ὁ Θεός] The gradation of ranks rises up to the *supreme Head over all*, who is the Head of the *man* also, mediately, through Christ. This makes it all the more obvious that, on the one hand, the man who prays or speaks as a prophet before God in the assembly ought not to have his head covered, see ver. 7; but that, on the other hand, the relation of the women under discussion is all the more widely to be distinguished from that of the men.

Ver. 4. First inference from the aforesaid gradation of rank. — This inference is a *plea of privilege for the men*, which was but to prepare the way for the censure next to be passed upon the women. Had Paul meant to *correct* the men because they had prayed or preached as prophets at Corinth with their heads covered (Chrysostom and many of the older commentators; see against this view, Bengel, and especially Storr, *Opusc.* II. p. 283), he would have gone into the matter more in detail, as he does in what follows respecting the women. — προσευχ.] of praying aloud in the public assemblies. For that Paul is giving instructions for the sphere of *church-life*, not for *family worship* (Hofmann), is quite clear from the *προφητεύειν* added here and in ver. 5, which does not suit the idea of the private devotions of a husband and wife, like the *σχολάζειν τῇ προσευχῇ* in vii. 5, but always means the *public* use for general edification of the *χάρισμα* referred to, namely, that of apocalyptic utterance (Acts ii. 17 f., xix. 6, xxi. 9; 1 Cor. xiii. and xiv.; Matt. vii. 22). Moreover, vv. 5 f. and 10 *presuppose publicity*; as indeed *a priori* we

<sup>1</sup> Melancthon puts it well: "Deus est caput Christi, non de essentia dicitur, sed de ministeriis. Filius mediator accipit ministerium a consilio divinitatis, sicut saepe inquit: Pater misit me. Fit hic mentio non arcanæ *essentiae*, sed *ministerii*." — Even the exalted and reigning Christ is engaged in this *ministerium*, and finally delivers up the kingdom to the Father. See xv. 28.



might assume that Paul would not have prescribed so earnestly a specific costume for the head with a view only to the family edification of a man and his wife. It was precisely in the necessity of avoiding *public* occasion of offence that such precepts could alone find ground enough to justify them; they were not designed by the liberal-minded apostle to infringe upon the freedom of a woman's dress *at home*. How can any one believe that he meant that when a wife desired, in the retirement of her own house, to pray with her husband (and how often *in a moment* might an occasion for doing so arise!), she must on no account satisfy this religious craving without first of all putting on her περιβόλαιον, and that, if she failed to do so, she stamped herself as a harlot (ver. 5 f.)! — To take προσευχ. as equivalent to γλώσσαις λαλεῖν (Baur) is not justified by xiv. 13, although speaking with tongues may have occurred in connection with public prayer by women. — προφητ.] See on xii. 10. The force of the *participles* is: Every man, *when* he prays or speaks as a prophet, *while* he has, etc. — κατὰ κεφ. ἔχων] *sc. τί.* See Fritzsche, *Conject.* I. p. 36. Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 127 [E. T. 146]. *Having (something) down from the head, i.e. with a head-covering.* The Jewish men prayed with the head covered, nay, even with a veil (*Tallith*) before the face. See Lightfoot, *Horae*, p. 210 f. Michaelis, *Anm.* p. 244 f. Hellenic usage again required that the head should be bare on sacred occasions (Grotius on ver. 2; Hermann, *gottesd. Alterth.* § 36. 18 f.), while the Romans veiled themselves at sacrifices (Serv. *ad Aen.* iii. 407; Dougt. *Anal.* II. p. 116). The *Hellenic* usage had naturally become the prevalent one in the Hellenic churches, and had also commended itself to the discriminating eye of the apostle of the Gentiles as so entirely in accordance with the divinely appointed position of the man (ver. 3), that for the man to cover his head seemed to him to cast dishonour on that position. — καταισχ. τὴν κεφ. αὐτοῦ] So, with the *spiritus lenis*, αὐτοῦ should be written, from the standpoint of the speaker, consequently without any reflex reference (his *own* head), which the context does not suggest. The emphasis of the predicate lies rather on καταισχύνει, as also in ver. 5. Every man, when he prays, etc., *dishonours* his head. *In what respect* he does so, ver. 3 has already clearly indicated, namely (and this meets Baur's objection to the

apostle's argument, that the duty of being veiled should attach to the man also from his dependence, ver. 3), inasmuch as he cannot represent any *submission to human authority* by a veil on his head without thereby sacrificing its dignity. His head ought to show to all (and its being uncovered is the sign of this) that no man, but, on the contrary, Christ, and through Him God Himself, is Head (Lord) of the man. We are to understand, therefore, τὴν κεφαλὴν αὐτοῦ quite simply like κατὰ κεφαλῆς, of the *bodily* head (Erasmus, Beza, Grotius, Estius, Bengel, Flatt, Ewald, Neander); not, with Oecumenius, Theophylact (doubtful), Calvin, Calovius, and others, including Heydenreich, Rückert, de Wette, Osiander, Maier, Hofmann, of *Christ*, which is not required by ver. 3, and is positively forbidden by vv. 5, 6, 14, which take for granted also, as respects the man, the *similar* conception of the κεφαλῇ, namely, in the *literal* sense. This holds also against the double sense which Wolf, Billroth, and Olshausen assume the passage to bear, understanding it to refer to the literal head *and* to Christ as well.

Ver. 5. A second inference of an *opposite* kind from ver. 3, namely, with respect to the *women*. — Prayer and prophetic utterances in meetings on the part of the women are assumed here as allowed. In xiv. 34, on the contrary, *silence* is imposed upon them; comp. also 1 Tim. ii. 12, where they are forbidden to *teach*. This seeming contradiction between the passages disappears, however, if we take into account that in chap. xiv. it is the *public assembly of the congregation*, the whole ἐκκλησία, that is spoken of (vv. 4, 5, 12, 16, 19, 23, 26 ff., 33). There is no sign of such being the case in the passage before us. What the apostle therefore has in his eye here, where he does not forbid the προσεύχεσθαι ἢ προφητεῦειν of the women, and at the same time cannot mean *family* worship simply (see on ver. 4), must be *smaller* meetings for devotion in the congregation, more limited circles assembled for worship, such as fall under the category of a *church in the house* (xvi. 19; Rom. xvi. 5; Col. iv. 15; Philem. 2). Since the subject here discussed, as we may infer from its peculiar character, must have been brought under the notice of the apostle for his decision by the Corinthians themselves in their letter, his readers would understand both what kind of meetings were meant as those in which women might pray and speak as

prophetesses, and also that the instruction now given was not abrogated again by the "*taceat mulier in ecclesia*." The latter would, however, be the case, and the teaching of this passage would be aimless and groundless, if Paul were here only *postponing* for a little the prohibition in xiv. 34, in order, first of all, provisionally to censure and correct a mere external abuse in connection with a thing which was yet to be treated as wholly unallowable (against my own former view). It is perfectly arbitrary to say, with Grotius, that in xiv. 34 we must understand as an exception to the rule: "*nisi speciale Dei mandatum habeant*." — ἀκατακαλύπτῳ] Polyb. xv. 27. 2. As to the dative, see Winer, p. 203 [E. T. 271]. — τὴν κεφαλ. αὐτῆς]—see the critical remarks—is, like τ. κεφ. αὐτοῦ in ver. 4, to be understood of the *literal* head. A woman when praying was to honour her head by having a sign upon it of the authority of her husband, which was done by having it covered; otherwise she dishonoured her head by dressing not like a married wife, from whose head-dress one can see that her husband is her head (lord), but like a loose woman, with whose *shorn* head the *uncovered* one is on a par. — ἐν γὰρ ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ.] for she is nothing else, nothing better, than she who is shorn. As the long tresses of the head were counted a womanly adornment among Jews and Gentiles, so the hair shorn off was a sign either of mourning (Deut. xxi. 12; Homer, *Od.* iv. 198, xxiv. 46; Eurip. *Or.* 458; Hermann, *Privatalterth.* § xxxix. 28) or of shamelessness (Elsner, *Obss.* p. 113), and was even the penalty of an adulteress (Wetstein *in loc.*). What Paul means to say then is: a woman praying with uncovered head stands in the eye of public opinion, guided as it is by appearances, on just the same level with her who has the shorn hair of a courtesan. — ἐν κ. τὸ αὐτό] emphatic: *unum idemque*. See instances in Kypke, II. p. 220. The subject to this is πᾶσα γυνὴ κ.τ.λ., not the appearing uncovered, so that strictly it ought to have been τῷ ἐξυρῆσθαι (Billroth). And the *neuter* is used, because the subject is regarded as a general conception. Comp. iii. 8. Respecting the dative, see Kühner, II. p. 244; Krüger, § xlviii. 14. 9. — The form *ξυράω* has less authority in Attic writers than *ξυρέω*. See Lobeck, *ad Phryn.* p. 205.

REMARK.—The evil, which Paul here rebukes with such sharpness and decision, must have broken out after the apostle had left

Corinth; had he been present, he would not have allowed it to emerge. It arose probably from an unseemly extension of the principle of Christian liberty, occasioned by the fact of women partaking in the special gifts of the Spirit, ver. 4, and doubtless under the influence of the greater laxity of Hellenic ideas about female dress. The letter from the Corinthians, when referring to the way in which the apostle's instructions were acted upon at Corinth (ver. 2), must have contained an inquiry put to him upon this particular point (comp. on ver. 5). The fact that Paul makes no allusion to *virgins* here proves that they were not involved in the wrong practice, although Tertullian (*de virginib. veland.*) unwarrantably applies our passage to them also.

Ver. 6 gives the ground of *ἐν ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ.*, ver. 5. That ground is, that the step from not being covered to being shorn is only what *consistency demands*, while the dishonour again implied in being shorn requires that the woman should be covered; consequently, to be uncovered lies by no means midway between being shorn and being covered as a thing indifferent, but falls under the same moral category as being shorn. *For when a woman puts on no covering*, when she has once become so shameless, *then she should have herself shorn too* (in addition). A demand for *logical consistency* (Winer, p. 292 [E. T. 391]) serving only to make them feel the *absurdity* of this unseemly emancipation from restraint in public prayer and speaking (for ver. 5 shows that these rules cannot be *general* ones, against Hofmann). To understand it simply as a *permission*, does not suit the conclusion; comp. on the contrary *κατακαλυπτέσθω*. — τὸ κείρ. ἢ ξυρᾶσθαι] “Plus est radi (ξυρ.) quam tonderi,” Grotius. Comp. Valckenaer. *Ξυρ.* means *to shave*, with the razor (ξυρόν). The two words occur together in Mic. i. 16, LXX. Note the absence of any repetition of the article in connection with the double description of the one unseemly thing.

Vv. 7–9. *Γάρ*] introduces the grounding of the *κατακαλυπτέσθω*, consequently a *second* ground for the proposition under discussion (the first being vv. 3–6). The argument sets out again (comp. ver. 3) *e contrario*. — οὐκ ὀφείλει] does not mean: *he is not bound*, which, as ver. 3 shows, would not be enough; but: *he ought not*, etc., in contrast to the woman who *ought* (vv. 5, 10). Comp. 2 Cor. xii. 14. — εἰκὼν κ. δόξα κ.τ.λ.] The obligation to pray, etc., with the head covered would be inconsistent with this

high dignity, because to cover the head is a sign of submission to human power, ver. 10. A man as such (*ἀνὴρ*) is the *image of God* (Gen. i. 26 f.), inasmuch as he, being Adam's representative, has dominion over the earth. Other elements of what constitutes the image of God are not, according to the context, taken into account here, nor are the ecclesiastical definitions of it. He is also *the glory of God*, inasmuch as, being the image of God, he, in his appearance as man, practically represents on earth in a human way the majesty of God as a ruler. Rückert, following older interpreters (given in Wolf), holds that *δόξα* is meant here as the rendering of *כְּמוֹת*, Gen. i. 26; as also the LXX., in Num. xii. 8, Ps. xvii. 15, translates *כְּמוֹתָא* by *δόξα*. But had Paul *wished* to convey the meaning of *כְּמוֹת*, a passage so important and so familiar as Gen. i. 26 would certainly have suggested to him the word used there by the LXX., *ὁμοίωσις*. *Δόξα* corresponds simply to the Hebrew *כבוד*. — Paul describes only *the man* as being the image and *δόξα* of God; for he has in his eye the relation of *marriage*, in which rule is conferred on the *man* alone. The woman accordingly has, in harmony with the whole connection of the passage, to appear simply as *δόξα ἀνδρός*, inasmuch, namely, as her whole wedded dignity, the high position of being spouse of the man, proceeds from the man and is held in obedience to him; so that the woman does not carry an independent glory of her own, an *ἰδίᾳ δόξα*, but the majesty of the *man* reflects itself in her, passing over to her mediately and, as it were, by derivation. Grotius compares her happily to the moon as “*lumen minus sole*.” This exposition of *δόξα ἀνδρός* is the only one which suits the context, and corresponds in conception to the preceding *δόξα Θεοῦ*, without at the same time anticipating what is next said in vv. 8, 9. The conception of the *δόξα*, which is *Θεοῦ* in case of the man and *ἀνδρός* in that of the woman, is determined by the idea of the *ordo conjugalis*, not by that of *humanity* (Hofmann) originally realized in the man but passing thence into a derivative realization in the woman. — Paul omits *εἰκὼν* in the woman's case, not because he refused to recognise the divine image in her (except in an *immediate* sense), but because he felt rightly that, in view of the distinction of sex, the word would be unsuitable (comp. de Wette), and would also convey too much, considering the subordinate position of the

woman in marriage. — Ver. 8. *For there is not* such a thing as *man from woman*, etc., but the relation of the two as respects being is the converse. — Ver. 9. The γάρ here is *subordinate* to that in ver. 8: “*for there was not created a man for the woman’s sake, but conversely.*” This is the concrete historical establishment, from the *narrative* of their *creation*, of the relation between the two sexes, which had been generally stated in ver. 8; in giving it, Paul, with Gen. ii. 18 in his view, does not bring in ἐκ again, but διά, which, however, considering how familiar the history was, throws no doubt upon the genuineness of the ἐκ. In καὶ γάρ the καί (which has the force of *even indeed*, Hartung, I. p. 135) belongs to οὐκ ἐκτίσθη. The present genetic relation of the two sexes, ver. 8, began as early as the creation of the first pair.

Ver. 10. Διὰ τοῦτο] namely, because the relation of the woman to the man is such as has been indicated in vv. 7–9. — ἐξουσίαν ἔχειν ἐπὶ τῆς κεφ.] *to have a power*, i.e. *the sign of a power* (to wit, as the context shows, *of her husband’s power*, under which she stands), *upon her head*; by which the apostle means *a covering for the head*.<sup>1</sup> So Chrysostom,<sup>2</sup> Theodoret, Oecumenius, Theophylact, with the majority both of ancient and modern commentators, including van Hengel, *Annot.* p. 175 ff.; Lücke in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1828, p. 571 f., Billroth, Rückert, Olshausen, de Wette, Osiander, Ewald, Neander, Maier, Weiss, Vilmar in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1864, p. 465 f.; comp. Düsterdieck in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1863, p. 707 ff. Just as in Diodor. Sic. i. 47, in the phrase ἔχουσιν τρεῖς βασιλείας ἐπὶ τῆς κεφ., the context shows beyond a doubt that βασ. means symbols of *one’s own* power (diadems), so here the connection justifies the use of ἐξουσία to denote the sign of *another’s* power; the phrase thus simply having its proper reference brought out, and by no means being twisted into an opposite meaning, as Hofmann objects. Comp. also the ornaments of the Egyptian priests, which, as being symbols of truth, bore the name of ἀλήθεια, Diod. Sic. i. 48. 77; Ael. V. H. xiv. 34. Schleusner explains ἐξουσ. as *a token of the honour* (of the married

<sup>1</sup> Luther’s gloss is: “That is the veil or covering, by which one may see that she is under her husband’s authority, Gen. iii. 16.”

<sup>2</sup> Ἄρα τὸ καλύπτεσθαι ὑποταγῆς καὶ ἰξουσίας. And on ver. 7 he says: As the man ought to pray uncovered in token of his ἀρχή, so for the woman it is a mark of presumption τὸ μὴ ἔχειν τὰ σύμβολα τῆς ὑποταγῆς.

women over the single). But both the context (ver. 9) and the literal meaning of *ἐξουσία* are against this. Bengel and Schrader make it a sign of *authority* to speak in public. But the whole connection points to the authority of the husband over the wife. There is not a word in the whole passage about the *potestas orandi*, etc., nor of its being granted by the *husband* (Schrader). Hagenbach's view (*Stud. u. Krit.* 1828, p. 401) is also contrary to the context, seeing that we have previously *διὰ τὸν ἄνδρα*; he understands *ἐξουσία* as a *mark of descent*. Paul, he holds, formed the word upon the analogy of *παρουσία κ.τ.λ.*,—a view that does not even leave to the term its lexical meaning, which was surely familiar enough to the apostle and his readers. Other expositors make *ἐξουσία* *directly* to signify a *veil* (Michaelis, Schulz), to establish which they have appealed in the most arbitrary way to the help of Hebrew words (Cappellus, Clericus, Hammond, Semler, Ernesti). Hitzig again, in the *theol. Jahrb.* 1854, p. 129 ff., gives out the term to be a *Jewish-Greek* one, derived from *ἐξ ἴσου*; because the veil had, he maintains, two overhanging halves which balanced each other in front and behind. But what is fatal to every attempt of this kind is that *ἐξουσία*, *power*, is so very *familiar* a word, and suits perfectly well here in this its ordinary sense, while, as the name of a veil, it would be entirely without trace and without analogy in Greek. As for the derivation from *ἐξ ἴσου*, that is simply an etymological impossibility. Other interpreters still assume that *ἐξουσ.* means here not a *sign* of power, but *power itself*. So, in various preposterous ways, earlier commentators cited by Wolf; and so more recently Kypke and Pott. The former puts a comma after *ἐξουσία*, and explains the clause: “*propterea mulier potestati obnoxia est, ita ut velamen (comp. ver. 4) in capite habeat.*” But the sense of *ὀφείλειεν τι* would rather have required *ὑπακοήν* in place of *ἐξουσίαν*. Pott again (in the *Götting. Weihnachtsprogr.* 1831, p. 22 ff.) renders it: “*mulierem oportet servare jus seu potestatem in caput suum, sc. eo, quod illud velo obtegat.*” Not inconsistent with linguistic usage (Rev. xi. 6, xx. 6, xiv. 18; comp. Luke xix. 17), but all the more so with the context, since what ver. 9 states is just that the woman has *no* power at all over herself, and *for that very reason* ought to wear a veil. Hofmann, too, rejects the symbolical explanation

of ἐξουσία, and finds the metaphorical element simply in the local import of the phrase ἐπὶ κεφαλῆς (comparing it with such passages as Acts xviii. 6, where, however, the idea is wholly different in kind). He makes the thought to be: the woman must have a power upon or over her head, because she must be subject to such a power. In that case what would be meant would be her husband's power, which she must have over her. But the question in hand was not at all about anything so general and self-evident as that, but about the *veiling*, which she was bound to observe. The *conjectural* interpretations which have been attempted are so far-fetched as not to deserve further mention. We may add that there is no evidence in antiquity for the *symbolism* which Paul here connects with the veiling of the women in assemblies (the hints which Baur founds upon in the *theol. Jahrb.* 1852, p. 571 ff., are too remote). We have the more reason, therefore, to agree with Lücke in ascribing it to the ingenious apostle himself, however old the custom itself—that married women should wear veils in public—was in Hebrew usage (Ewald, *Alterth.* p. 269 f.).—διὰ τοὺς ἀγγέλους] which Baur uncritically holds to be a gloss—a view to which Neander also was inclined—is not a *formula obsecrandi* (Heydenreich, who, with Vorstius, Hammond, Bengel, and Zachariae, strangely assumes a reference to Isa. vi. 2), but a clause adding to the *inner* ground (διὰ τοῦτο) an *outward* one: “for the sake of the angels,” *in order to avoid exciting disapproval among them.* Τοὺς ἀγγέλους αἰδέσθηντι, Chrysostom. Erasmus puts it well in his *Paraphrase*: “Quodsi mulier eo venit impudentiae, ut testes hominum oculos non vereatur, saltem ob angelos testes, qui vestris conventibus intersunt, caput operiat.” That the holy angels are present at assemblies for worship, is an idea which Paul had retained from *Judaism* (LXX. Ps. cxxxviii. 1; Tob. xii. 12 f.; Buxtorf, *Synag.* 15, p. 306; Grotius *in loc.*; Eisenmenger, *entdeckt. Judenth.* II. p. 393), and made an element in his *Christian* conception,<sup>1</sup> in accordance with the ministering destina-

<sup>1</sup> Since the apostle is speaking of meetings for worship, it is unsuitable to make the reference be to the angels as *witnesses of the creation of the first pair*; so van Hengel, *Annot.* p. 181 f., following a Schol. in Matthiae. Any allusion to Gen. vi. 1-4 (suggested already by Tertullian, *al.* Comp. also Kurtz, *d. Ehen d. Söhne Gottes*, p. 177, and Hofmann) is wholly foreign to the passage. Hofmann imports into it the idea: “that the spirits which have sway in the corporeal world might be



tion ascribed to them in Heb. i. 14, but without any of the Jewish elaborations. It must remain a very doubtful point whether he had *guardian angels* (Acts xii. 15 ; Matt. xviii. 10) specially in view (Jerome, August. *de Trin.* xii. 7 ; Theodoret, comp. Theophylact), seeing that he nowhere says anything definite about them. Other expositors make the reference to be to the *bad* angels, who would be incited to wantonness by the unveiled women (Tert. *c. Marc.* v. 8 ; *de virg. vel.* 7, *al.*),<sup>1</sup> or might incite the men to it (Schoettgen, Zeltner, Mosheim), or might do harm to the uncovered women (Wetstein, Semler). Others, again, understand it to mean *pious men* (Clem. Alex.), or the *Christian prophets* (Beza), or *those presiding in the congregation* (Ambrosiaster), or *those deputed to bring about betrothals* (Lightfoot), or *unfriendly spies* (Heumann, Alethius, Schulz, Morus, Storr, Stolz, Rosenmüller, Flatt, Schrader) — all mere attempts at explanation, which are sufficiently disposed of by the single fact that ἄγγελοι, when standing *absolutely* in the N. T., *always* denotes *good angels* alone. See on iv. 9. The correct exposition is given also by Düsterdieck, *l.c.*, who shows well the fine trait of apostolic mysticism in διὰ τοὺς ἀγγέλους.

Ver. 11. Paul's teaching from ver. 7 onward might possibly be misinterpreted by the men, so as to lead them to despise the women, and by the women so as to underrate their own position. Hence the caveat which now follows (ἐπάγει τὴν διόρθωσιν, Chrys.) against the possible dislocation of the *Christian* relation of the two sexes: *nevertheless, neither is the woman without the man, nor the man without the woman in Christ, i.e. nevertheless there subsists such a relation between the two in the sphere of the Christian life (ἐν Κυρίῳ), that neither does the woman stand severed from the man, i.e. independent of, and without bond of fellowship with, him, nor vice versa.* They are united as Christian spouses (comp. ver. 3) in mutual dependence,

tempted to enter into that relation to the woman which is assigned to her husband." Hilgenfeld too, in his *Zeitschr.* 1864, p. 183, makes it refer to the story in the Book of Enoch, 5 f., about the transgression of the angels with the daughters of men. What an importing of carnal lust! And were not the women whom the apostle here warns in *part* matrons and grey-headed dames!

<sup>1</sup> *Test. XII. Patr.* p. 529 should not be adduced here (against Bretschneider). The passage contains a warning against the vanity of head-ornament, the seductive character of which is proved by an argument *a majori ad minus*.

each belonging to the other and supplying what the other lacks; neither of the parties being a separate independent person. The *ἐν Κυρίῳ* thus assigns to the relation here expressed the distinctive sphere, in which it subsists. Out of Christ, in a profane marriage of this world, the case would be different. Were we, with Storr, Heydenreich, Rückert, Hofmann, to take *ἐν Κυρίῳ* as predicative definition: "neither does the woman stand in connection with Christ without the man, nor *vice versa*," this would resolve itself either into the meaning given by Grotius: "Dominus neque viros exclusis feminis, neque feminas exclusis viris redemit;" or into Hofmann's interpretation, that in a Christian marriage the relation to the Lord is a common one, shared in by the two parties alike. But both of these ideas are far too obvious, general, and commonplace to suit the context. Olshausen (comp. Beza) renders it, "*by the arrangement of God.*" But *ἐν Κυρίῳ* is the *statedly used* term for *Christ*; the reference to the *divine arrangement* comes in afterwards in ver. 12.

Ver. 12. *For, were this not the case, the Christian system would be clearly at variance with the divine arrangement in nature.* This against Rückert, who accuses ver. 12 of lending no probative support to ver. 11. — *ἡ γυνὴ ἐκ τοῦ ἀνδρ.*] *sc. ἐστὶ*, namely, in respect of *origination at first*. Comp. ver. 8. — *ὁ ἀνὴρ διὰ τῆς γυν.*] in respect of *origination now*. *Ἐκ* denotes the direct origination in the way known to all his readers from the history of woman's creation in Gen. ii. 21 f.; *διὰ* again the mediate origin by birth, all men being *γεννητοὶ γυναικῶν*, Matt. xi. 11; Gal. iv. 4. Paul might have repeated the *ἐκ* in the second clause also (Matt. i. 16; Gal. iv. 4), but he wished to mark the difference between the first and the continued creation. And in order to bring out the sacred character of the moral obligation involved in this genetic relation of mutual dependence, he adds: *τὰ δὲ πάντα ἐκ τ. Θεοῦ*: *now all this*, that we have been treating of ("vir, mulier et alterius utrius mutua ab altero dependentia," Bengel), *is from God*, proceeding from and ordered by Him. As regards *this ἐκ*, comp. 2 Cor. v. 18; 1 Cor. viii. 6; Rom. xi. 36.

Vv. 13–15. By way of appendix to the discussion, the apostle refers his readers—as regards especially the *praying* of the women, which had given rise to debate—to *the voice of nature herself*. He asks them: Is it seemly,—judge within yourselves concerning it,

—is it seemly that a woman should offer up prayers uncovered? Does not *nature herself* even (οὐδέ) teach you the opposite? — ἐν ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς] without any influence from without; comp. x. 15.— τῷ Θεῷ] superfluous in itself, but added for the sake of *emphasis*, in order to impress upon them the more deeply the unseemliness of the uncovered state in which the woman comes forward to deal with the Most High in prayer. — Regarding the different constructions with πρέπον ἐστι, see Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 239 [E. T. 278].—The φύσις is the natural relation of the judgment and feeling to the matter in question,—the native, inborn sense and perception of what is seemly. This instinctive consciousness of propriety had been, as respected the point in hand, established by custom and had become φύσις. Comp. Chrysostom. The manifold discussions, to little purpose, by the old commentators regarding the meaning of φύσις, may be seen in Poole's *Synopsis*, and in Wolf. It is here, as often in Greek writers (comp. also Rom. ii. 14), the contrast to education, law, art, and the like. It cannot in this passage mean, as Hofmann would have it, the *arrangement of things in conformity with their creation*—that is to say, the *arrangement* of nature in the *objective* sense (so, frequently in the classics), for the assertion that *this* teaches all that is expressed by the ὅτι ἀνὴρ κ.τ.λ. would go much too far and be unwarranted. Were we, again, to assume that ὅτι does not depend at all on διδάσκει, but gives the *ground* for the question, so that διδάσκει would require its contents to be *supplied* out of the first half of the verse, how awkwardly would Paul have expressed himself, and how liable must he have been to misapprehension, in putting ὅτι instead of conveying his meaning with clearness and precision by γάρ! And even apart from this objection as to the form of expression, we cannot surely suppose that the apostle would find in a fact of aesthetic custom (vv. 14, 15)—that is to say, a something in its own nature accidental, and subsisting as an actual fact only for the man accustomed to it—the confirmation of what the *order of things in conformity with their creation* teaches. — αὐτῇ] independently of all other instruction. — Upon the matter itself (κόμην δὲ ἔχειν καὶ εὐκομον εἶναι γυναικώτερόν ἐστι, Eustath. *ad Il.* iii. p. 288), see Perizonius, *ad Ael. V. H.* ix. 4; Wetstein *in loc.* In ancient times, among the Hellenes, the luxuriant, carefully-tended hair of the head was the mark of

a free man (see generally, Hermann, *Privatalterth.* § xxiii. 13 ff.). Comp. also 2 Sam. xiv. 25 f. In the church, both by councils and popes, the *κομποφοεῖν* was repeatedly and strictly forbidden to the clergy.<sup>1</sup> See *Decretal. lib. iii. tit. i. cap. 4. 5. 7.* — ὅτι ἡ κόμη ἀντὶ περιβ. δέδ.] Ground for long hair being an ornament to a woman: *because it is given to her instead of a veil*, to take its place, to be, as it were, a natural veil. This again implies that to wear a veil, as in the case in hand, is a decorous thing. For if the *κόμη* is an honour for a woman *because it is given to her in place of a veil*, then the *veil itself* too must be an honour to her, and to lay it aside in prayer a disgrace. "*Naturae debet respondere voluntas,*" Bengel. *Περιβόλαιον*, something thrown round one, a covering in general (see the Lexicons, and Schleusner, *Thes.* IV. p. 289), has here a special reference to the *veil* (καλύπτρα, κάλυμμα) spoken of in the context.

Ver. 16. The apostle has done with the subject; but one word more of warning now against all controversy about it. — δοκεῖ] Vulg.: "si quis autem videtur contentiosus esse." This would imply that sort of *forbearing courtesy* in the δοκεῖ, according to which one "*videri aliquid esse, quam vere esse dicere maluit,*" Fritzsche, *ad Matth.* p. 129. Comp. Frotscher, *ad Xen. Hier.* p. 92. Sturz, *Lex. Xen.* I. p. 757 f. So de Wette and Winer, p. 570 [E. T. 766]. But one can see no reason for Paul's choosing any such special delicacy of phrase. If, again, we understand the words to mean: if any one *likes to be*, or *has pleasure in being*, contentious (Luther, Grotius, Rückert), that is to confound the expression with the construction δοκεῖ μοι.<sup>2</sup> The simplest explanation, and, at the same time, quite literally faithful, is, as in Matt. iii. 9, Phil. iii. 4: if any one *is of opinion*, if he *thinks*, or *is minded to be*, etc.; but to import the notion of *permission* into the infinitive here, in connection with this rendering (Billroth), would be arbitrary, because without warrant from the text (Kühner, *ad Xen. Mem.* ii. 1. 1). — ἡμεῖς τοιαύτην κ.τ.λ.] declara-

<sup>1</sup> If we are to look upon the tonsure, however, as a symbol of the spiritual life in contradistinction to the vanities of this world (see Walter, *Kirchenr.* § 212), then this by no means corresponds to the view held by the apostle in our text. Long hair on the head is a disgrace to a man in his eyes; because he regards it as a sign of human subjection.

<sup>2</sup> So, too, δοκῶ μοι, *libet, volo.* See Ast, *ad Plat. Phaed.* p. 251. Also διδοκταί μοι. See Ast, *Lex. Plat.* I. p. 552.

tive: *Let him be told that we*, etc. Comp. Rom. xi. 18. See Winer, p. 575 [E. T. 773]. — ἡμεῖς] *I and those who are like-minded with me.* — τοιαύτην συνήθ.] *such a custom.* Interpreters refer this either to the censured practice of *the women being unveiled* (Theodoret, Erasmus, Grotius, Bengel, Michaelis, Semler, Rosenmüller, Heydenreich, Flatt, Billroth, Olshausen, Ewald, Neander, Maier, Hofmann), or to the *custom of contention* (Chrysostom, Ambrosiaster, Beza, Calvin, Piscator, Estius, Calovius, and others, including Rückert and de Wette). The latter suits the immediate context, and is *required* by ἡμεῖς; hence we cannot, with Theophylact and Osiander, leave it an open question which of the two references should be preferred. The οὐδὲ αἱ ἐκκλ. τ. Θεοῦ is not against this view; for what is asserted is not that all individual members were free from the love of strife, but only that the *churches* as a whole were so. These last are distinguished by οὐδὲ αἱ ἐκκλ. τ. Θεοῦ from the *individuals* implied in ἡμεῖς. Neither does the expression *συνήθεια* throw any difficulty in the way of our interpretation; on the contrary, occurring as it does in this short concluding sentence of deprecation, it lends to it a certain *point* against the readers, some of whom seem to have allowed this vice of contentiousness to grow with them into a *habit*; it was their miserable *custom*! — The abnormal position of isolation, into which their controversial tendencies would bring them, should surely suffice to prevent their indulging them!

Ver. 17. Transition to the censure which follows. *Now this* (what I have written up to this point about the veiling of the women) *I enjoin*,<sup>1</sup> *while I do not praise* (i.e. while I join with my injunction the censure), *that ye*, etc. The "litotes" οὐκ ἐπαινῶν glances back upon ver. 2. Lachmann's view, according to which the new section begins at ver. 16, so that φιλόνεικος would relate to the σχίσματα in ver. 18, has this against it, that παραγγέλλω always means *praecipio* in the N. T. (vii. 10; 1 Thess. iv. 11; 2 Thess. iii. 4, 6, 10, 12, *al.*), not *I announce*, and that no injunction is expressed in ver. 16. Moreover, we should desiderate

<sup>1</sup> Hofmann irrelevantly objects to our making τοῦτο refer to the preceding passage, that Paul has previously *enjoined* nothing. He has, in fact, very *categorically enjoined* that the women should be veiled (comp. esp. vv. 5, 6, 10), and not simply expressed his opinion upon a custom that displeased him.

some conclusion to the foregoing section, and, as such, considering especially that the matter in question was such a purely external one, ver. 16 comes in with peculiar appropriateness. Other expositors, such as Lyra, Erasmus, Piscator, Grotius, Calovius, Hammond, Bengel, Rückert, also Ewald and Hofmann (comp. his *Schriftbeweis*, II. 2, p. 235 f.), refer *τοῦτο*, after the example of the Greek Fathers, to what *follows*, inasmuch, namely, as the exposition now to begin ends in a *command*, and shows the reason why the church deserves *no praise* in this aspect of its church-life. Paul has already in his mind, according to these interpreters, the directions which he is about to give, but lays a foundation for them first of all by censuring the disorders which had crept in. Upon that view, however, the *τοῦτο παραγγ.* would come in much too soon; and we must suppose the apostle, at the very beginning of an important section, so little master of his own course of thought, as himself to throw his readers into confusion by leaving them without anything at all answering to the *τοῦτο παραγγ.* — ὅτι οὐκ εἰς τὸ κρεῖττον κ.τ.λ.] does not give the *reason* of his not praising, but—seeing there is no *ὑμᾶς* with *ἐπαιν.*, as in ver. 2—states *what it is* that he cannot praise. Your coming together is of such a kind that not the *melius* but the *pejus* arises out of it as its result; that it becomes worse instead of better with you (with your Christian condition). Theophylact and Billroth make τὸ κρεῖττ. and τὸ ἥττον refer to *the assemblies themselves*: “that you hold your assemblies in such a way that they become worse instead of better.” A tame idea!

Vv. 18, 19. *Πρώτον μὲν γάρ*] The second point is found by most expositors in ver. 20 (so Billroth, Rückert, Olshausen, de Wette, Ewald, Maier, Winer, p. 536 [E. T. 721]). In that case Paul first of all censures here generally the divisions which appeared in their assemblies, and then in ver. 20 links on by *οὖν* the abuse of the Lord's Supper as a consequence of those divisions. But this view has against it the fact that he follows up ver. 18 neither by censure nor correction of what was amiss, which he would not have omitted to do, considering the importance of the matter in question, if he had regarded ver. 18 as touching upon a distinct point from that in vv. 20, 21. Moreover, in ver. 22, *ἐπαινέσω ὑμᾶς; ἐν τούτῳ οὐκ ἐπαινῶ*, which has reference to the *οὐκ ἐπαινῶν* of ver. 17, proves that in

his mind vv. 18–22 formed not two rebukes, but one. This serves, too, by way of reply to Hofmann, who insists on taking *πρῶτον*, in spite of the *μέν* that follows it, not as *firstly*, but as *before all things, above all*. The true view, on the contrary, is (comp. also Baur in the *theol. Jahrbücher*, 1852, p. 558 ; Rübiger, p. 135 ; Osiander), that *οὖν* in ver. 20 does not introduce a second point of reprehension, but takes up again the first point, which had been begun in ver. 18 and interrupted by *καὶ μέρος τι κ.τ.λ.* (see on viii. 4),—an interpretation which is strongly supported by the repetition of the same words *συνερχομ. ὑμῶν*. In using the term *σχίσματα*,<sup>1</sup> Paul has already in his mind the separations *at the love-feasts* (not the party-divisions of i. 12, Theodore, and many others), but is kept for a time from explaining himself more fully by the digression which follows, and does so only in ver. 20. Still, however, the question remains: *Where is the second point, which πρῶτον leads us to expect?* It commences in xii. 1. Paul censures two kinds of evils in connection with their assemblies—(1) the degeneration of the Agapae (vv. 18–34), and (2) the misapplication of the gifts of the Spirit (xii. 1 ff.). The *πρῶτον μέν* is left out of account while he pursues the first point, and instead of following it up with an *ἔπειτα δέ*, after completing his discussion, he passes on in xii. 1 with the continuative *δέ* to the second subject, making no further reference to that *πρῶτον μέν γάρ* in ver. 18. How common it is in classic writers also to find the *πρῶτον* followed by no *ἔπειτα*, or anything of the kind, but another turn given to the sentence, may be seen in Maetzner, *ad Antiph.* p. 191 ; Bremi, *ad Lys.* I. p. 31. Comp. on Acts i. 1, and on Rom. i. 8, iii. 2.—*ἐν ἐκκλ.] in a church-meeting.* This is conceived of as a *local sphere* (comp. Bengel: “*vergit ad significationem loci*”), in which the *συνέρχεσθαι* takes place by the arrival of members ; as we also say: “in einer Gesellschaft zusammenkommen.” Comp. Winer, p. 386 [E. T. 515]. Although the apostle might have written *εἰς ἐκκλησίαν* (Lucian, *Jou. Trag.* 6), yet we must neither take *ἐν* in the sense of *εἰς* (Vulgate, Rückert, Schrader), nor impute to the word *ἐκκλ.* the meaning: *place of assembly* (Grotius, Wolf,

<sup>1</sup> Chrysostom well remarks: οὐ λίγει ἀκούω μὴ κινή ὑμᾶς συνδιπνῶν, ἀκούω γὰρ κατ' ἰδίαν ὑμᾶς ἰστιάσθαι καὶ μὴ μετὰ τῶν πνιγμένων ἀλλ' ὃ μάλιστα ἱκανὸν ἦν αὐτῶν διασῆσαι τὴν διάνοιαν, τοῦτο τίθειαι τὸ τοῦ σχίσματος ὄνομα, ὃ καὶ τούτων ἦν αἴτιον.

Heydenreich), nor understand it adverbially, as with abstract terms: *congregationally* (Hofmann). — There should be no comma after ἐκκλ.; for συνέρχ. κ.τ.λ. connects itself in meaning not with ἀκούω, but with σχίσματα κ.τ.λ. — ἀκούω] in the sense of ἀκήκοα, denoting continuance. See Ast, *ad Plat. Leg.* p. 9 f.; Bernhardt, p. 370; Kühner, *ad Xen. Mem.* iii. 5. 26. — μέρος τι] *for a part*, partly, Thuc. i. 23. 3, ii. 64. 2, iv. 30. 1; Isocr. p. 426 D. He cannot bring himself to believe *all* that he has heard of the divisions at their assemblies. A delicate way of showing the better opinion that he still has of his readers, not a reference to the uncertainty of the source whence the news reached him (Hofmann). — δεῖ] according to God's decree. It is the "necessitas consequentiae" (Melancthon); for the ἵνα which follows indicates, according to the apostle's teleological view (comp. Matt. xviii. 7), the end ordained by God, namely, that the *tried*, those who have not suffered themselves to be carried away by party-agitation, *should become manifest*. — καὶ αἰρέσεις] It cannot be proved (although Rückert, Neander, Hofmann, and others hold) that αἰρέσεις is something *worse*<sup>1</sup> than σχίσματα (and that καὶ *must mean even*), as Pelagius, Estius, and Calovius would take it; for καὶ may be simply *also* (among other evils *also*), and in Gal. v. 20—where, moreover, σχίσματα does not come in at all—Paul does not intend to construct an exact climax, but merely to *heap together* kindred things. Now, seeing that our Epistle says nothing of absolute party-separations, but always shows us merely party-divisions subsisting along with outward unity, one cannot well make out *wherein* the worseness of the αἰρέσεις consisted; for to hold, with Rückert, that εἶναι means to *ensue*, and points to the *future* (as Hofmann too maintains), is a perfectly groundless assumption. The αἰρέσεις *were there*, were not merely *coming*; it will not do to confound εἶναι with γίνεσθαι or ἐλθεῖν (Matt. xviii. 7; Luke xvii. 1), a mistake into which J. Müller also falls, *l.c.* We must therefore, with Chrysostom, Grotius, Olshausen, *al.*, regard αἰρέσεις as another form of designation for the same thing (the σχίσματα). It does not mean *heresies* in the

<sup>1</sup> So also J. Müller, *v. d. Sünde*, I. p. 538, ed. 5, holds that σχίσμ. denotes the *inner disunion* in the church, which shows itself in *positive division and faction* (αἰρίσις). Wetstein, on the contrary, considered αἰρίσις a "*mollius vocabulum*" than σχίσμα.



sense of *false doctrine* (2 Pet. ii. 1), as Calvin, Calovius, and others maintain; neither does it refer simply to the separations in keeping the Agapae (Chrysostom, Oecumenius, Theophylact); but—as is clear from the nature of the sentence as assigning a more general reason for what had been said—to *factionous divisions in the church generally*<sup>1</sup> (according as there existed tendencies and views at variance with each other and destructive of harmony). Comp. on Gal. v. 20.

Ver. 20. *Ὅν*] resuming after the parenthesis; see on ver. 18. — *ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτό*] *to the same place*. See on Acts i. 15. — *οὐκ ἔστι κυριακ. δεῖπν. φαργ.*] *there does not take place an eating of a Lord's Supper*, i.e. *one cannot eat a Lord's Supper in that way*; it is morally *impossible*, since things go on in such fashion as ver. 21 thereupon specifies by way of proof. We have here the very common and familiar use of *ἔστι* with the infinitive, in the sense of: *it is possible, one can*, as in Heb. ix. 5. So e.g. the passages from Plato given by Ast, *Lex.* I. p. 622; Hom. *Il.* xxi. 193, *al.*; Thuc. viii. 53; Soph. *Phil.* 69; Aesch. *Pers.* 414; Polyb. i. 12. 9, v. 98. 4. It occurs in the classics also for the most part with the negative. See generally, Valckenaer on Eurip. *Hippol.* 1326. Beza, Estius, Zachariae, de Wette, Ewald, Maier, Winer, *al.*, render it otherwise, as if there were a *τοῦτο* in the text: *this is not*, etc. And even if there were such a *τοῦτο*, it would have nothing here to connect itself with. — *κυριακὸν δεῖπνον*] *a meal belonging to the Lord*, consecrated to Christ; comp. ver. 27, x. 21. The name was given to the *love-feasts* (Agapae, Jude 12), at which the Christians ate and drank together what they severally brought with them, and with which was conjoined the Lord's Supper properly so called (x. 16, 21; comp. on Acts ii. 42), so that the bread was distributed and partaken of *during* the meal and the cup *after* it, according to the precedent of the original institution. Comp. Tertullian, *Apol.* 30. Chrysostom, indeed, and Pelagius held that the Lord's Supper *came first*; but this is contrary to the model of the first institution, came into vogue only at a later date, and rests purely upon the ascetic idea that it was unbefitting to take the Eucharist *after* other food. To understand here, as Hofmann does, not the whole

<sup>1</sup> It is arbitrary to ascribe the disturbance about the Lord's Supper to one special party at Corinth, such as the Christ-party (Olshausen), or that of Apollos (Räbiger).

*meal*, but merely the *celebration of the Lord's Supper*, which was conjoined with it, is not in keeping with the phrase *δεῖπνον*, the precise scope of which is determined by the *meal so originally instituted* (John xiii. 2) to which it points.

Ver. 21. *Προλαμβάνει*] *takes beforehand* his own meal (as contrasted with *κυριακ. δεῖπν.*, comp. Chrysostom: τὸ γὰρ κυριακὸν ἰδιωτικὸν ποιούσιν). Instead of waiting (ver. 33) till a general distribution be made and others thus obtain a share (comp. Xen. *Mem.* iii. 14. 1), and till by this means the meal assume the form of a *κυριακὸν δεῖπνον*, he seizes at once for himself alone upon the portion which he brought with him, and holds therewith his own private meal in place of the Lord's Supper. The expression is not "in the highest degree surprising," as Rückert calls it; but it is very *descriptive* of the existing state of matters. Grotius (comp. de Wette) is wrong in supposing that the *rich* ate first, and left *what remained* for the poorer members. This runs counter to the *ἕκαστος*, which must mean *every one* who brought anything with him. Of course, when the rich acted in the way here described, the poor also had to eat whatever they might have brought with them by themselves; and if they had nothing, then this abuse of the Lord's Supper sent them empty away, hungry and put to shame (vv. 22, 33). — *ἐν τῷ φαγεῖν*] not *ad manducandum* (Vulg.), but *in the eating, at the holding of the meal*. — *πεινᾷ*] because, that is to say, he had nothing, or but little, to bring with him, so that he remained unsatisfied, receiving nothing from the stores of the wealthier members. — *μεθύει*] *is drunken*, not giving the exact opposite of *πεινᾷ*, but making the picture all the fuller and more vivid, because *πεινᾷ* and *μεθύει* lead the reader in both cases to imagine for himself the other extreme corresponding to the one specified. We must not weaken the natural force of *μεθ.*, as Grotius does, to "plus satis bibit." See on John ii. 20. Paul paints the scene in *strong* colours; but who would be warranted in saying that the reality fell at all short of the description?

Ver. 22. In a lively succession of questions the apostle shows how unsuitable and unworthy this procedure of theirs was. — *μη γὰρ οἰκίας κ.τ.λ.*] *γὰρ* has *inferential* force; see on Matt. xxvii. 23; John ix. 30; Acts xix. 35; and Winer, p. 416 [E. T. 559]; Kühner, *ad Xen. Mem.* i. 3. 10: *you surely are not with-*

out houses? The sense of *astonishment* (Hartung, *Partikell.* I. p. 478) is conveyed by the question, not by the γάρ. — ἡ τῆς ἐκκλησίας . . . ἔχοντας] a second counter question, which divides itself into two parts: <sup>1</sup> or, again, is it the case with you that you are persons whose business it is (1) generally to *despise the church of God* (which you show by your not counting its members worthy to eat and drink on a common footing with you), and (2) *to cause the poor to be put to shame*? The latter could not but feel themselves slighted, if they were not thought worthy of having a share in what the wealthier had provided. The main emphasis in the first clause is upon τῆς ἐκκλ. τ. Θεοῦ (Θεοῦ, "*dignitas ecclesiae*," Bengel, comp. ver. 16); in the second, upon καταισχύνετε. — Respecting οὐκ ἔχειν, *not to have*, to be poor, see Wetstein on 2 Cor. viii. 13; comp. οἱ ἔχοντες, *divites*, in Ast, *ad Plat. Legg.* v. p. 172; Bornemann, *ad Anab.* vi. 6. 38. Here, however, we have μή with the participle and article, because the *class* is referred to (Baeumlein, *Partik.* p. 296). — τί ὑμῖν εἶπω κ.τ.λ.] *what shall I say to you? Shall I give you praise?* On *this* point I praise *not*. If we keep ver. 17 in view, to connect ἐν τούτῳ with ἐπαινῶ gives a more suitable emphasis for the words than to link them with the preceding clause (Lachmann, Hofmann, with various codices and versions). On *other* points he <sup>pp</sup> already praised them, ver. 2. The apostle's *deliberative* and *ceremonious* mode of expressing himself, and the result that he arrives at, could not but make the readers themselves feel how much they deserved the reverse of praise in this matter.

Ver. 23. Ground of the ἐν τούτῳ οὐκ ἐπαινῶ. *For I, for my part, have received the following instructions from Christ touching the institution of the Lord's Supper,<sup>2</sup> which I also delivered to you.* How should it be possible then that your disorder should meet with praise, so far as I am concerned, at variance as it is with the knowledge of the matter obtained by me from Christ and communicated to you? — ἀπὸ τοῦ Κυρίου] Had Paul written παρὰ τ. κ., this would have denoted that he had received the instructions *directly* from

<sup>1</sup> The underlying dilemmatic conclusion is: Persons who act as you do have *either* no houses, etc., or they despise the church of God, etc.; you have houses, therefore you despise, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Not merely regarding its *design* and *requirements* (Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 353 f.); for the special account of the institution itself, which follows, goes beyond that.

Christ (Gal. i. 12; 1 Thess. ii. 13, iv. 1; 2 Tim. iii. 14; Acts x. 22; John vi. 45, viii. 40, x. 18); ἀπὸ τ. κ., on the other hand, means *forth from* the Lord, *from the Lord's side as the source*, so that the preposition taken by itself leaves the question open whether the relation referred to be an *indirect* (so generally, including Gal. iii. 2; Col. iii. 24) or a *direct* one (as in Col. i. 7; 1 John i. 5; 3 John 7). And Hofmann does not go further than this indefinite relation, holding the only idea expressed here to be that of *origin* from the Lord; comp. also his *Schriftbew.* II. 2, p. 211. But seeing that, if what Paul had in view had been an *immediate* reception, it would have been natural for him, and of some importance for his argument, to express this distinctly by using *παρά*, while yet in point of fact he uses only *ἀπὸ*, we are warranted in assuming that he means a reception, which issued indeed from Christ as originator, but reached him only *mediately* through another channel. This applies against Calovius, Bengel, Flatt, and others, including Heydenreich, Olshausen, de Wette (assuming a *confirmation* by special revelation of what he had learned from report), Osiander, who all find here a *direct* communication from Christ. The argument of Schulz and de Wette, however, against this latter view, on the ground of the word *παρέλαβ.* being in itself inappropriate, will not hold, especially when we view it as correlative to *παρέδωκα*; comp. xv. 3. <sup>in</sup>

The question now remains: Does Paul, in asserting that his account of the institution *proceeded* from the Lord, mean to say simply that he received what follows by a *tradition* descending from Christ,<sup>1</sup> or by a *revelation* issuing from Christ? The latter alternative, which Rückert also adopts (*Ap. Theol.* p. 194 f.), is not to be rejected on the ground of the foregoing narrative being something with which all were familiar. It is quite possible that it was wholly unknown to the apostle at the time of his conversion; and even apart from that, it was so important for his apostolic vocation that he should have a sure and accurate knowledge of these facts, and to receive it by way of special revelation was so completely in harmony with Paul's peculiar position as an apostle, since he had not personally been a witness of the first Lord's Supper, that there is nothing to forbid our assuming that he received his account of the institu-

<sup>1</sup> So Neander and Keim in the *Jahrb. für Deutsch. Theol.* 1859, p. 69.

ion of this ordinance, like his gospel generally, in the way of authentic revelation from Christ. As to the *form* of mediate communication through which Christ had caused these facts to reach Paul, not appearing to him for this purpose Himself, we must leave that point undecided, since very various kinds of *media* for divine revelations are possible and are historically attested. It may have been by an utterance of the Spirit, by an angel appearing to him, by seeing and hearing in an ecstatic state. Only the contents of the revelation—from its essential connection with the *gospel*, and, in fact, with its fundamental doctrine of the work of reconciliation — exclude, according to Gal. i. 1, 12, 15, the possibility of human intervention as regards the apostle in the matter; so that we should not be justified in supposing that the revelation reached him through some *man* (such as Ananias) commissioned to convey it to him by the Lord. As to the view that we have here a mere *tradition*, on the other hand, recounted by Paul as originating with Christ, the apostle himself decides against it both by his use of the singular (comp. xv. 3), and also by the significant prominence given to the *ἐγώ*, whereby he puts forward with the whole strength of conscious apostolic authority the communication made *to himself, to him personally*, by the Lord, over-against the abuse, contrasting with it, of the Holy Supper among the Corinthians. Had he meant simply to say: “I know it through a tradition proceeding from Christ,” then his *ἐγώ* would have been on the same level with every other, and the emphatic prominence which he gives to the *ἐγώ*, as well as the singular *παρέλαβον*, would be quite unsuitable, because without any specific historical basis; he would in that case have written: *παρελάβομεν γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ Κυρίου*. We have certainly therefore in this passage not merely the oldest account of the Lord’s Supper, but even “an authentic explanation given by the risen Christ regarding His sacrament” (Olshausen); not one directly from His lips indeed, but conveyed through some medium of revelation, the precise form of which it is impossible for us now to determine, whereby we have a guarantee for the *essential contents* of the narrative independently of the Gospels, although not necessarily an absolute ultimate authority establishing the *literal form of the words of institution* (even in opposition to Matthew and Mark), since a revelation of the history, nature, and meaning

of the institution might be given even without any verbal communication of the words spoken in connection with it. — *ὁ καὶ παρέδ.*] *which I* (not only received, but) *also delivered to you*. Conversely in xv. 3. Instances of *παραλαμβ.* and *παράδοῦναι*, in the sense of *discere* and *tradere*, may be seen in Kypke. — *ὅτι*] *that*, as in xv. 3, not *for*, as Luther and Hofmann render it. The latter translation would leave untold *what* Paul had received and delivered, in spite of the importance of the matter in question; and it derives no support from the repetition of the subject, *ὁ Κύριος*, since that, with the addition of the sacred name *Ἰησοῦς*, gives a *solemn emphasis* to the statement. It is the full doctrine of the Lord's Supper, which they owe to him, that he is now setting before his readers. — *ἐν τῇ νυκτὶ ᾗ παρεδίδοτο* (*imperfectum adumbrativum*, see Kühner, II. p. 73): *in the night in which His betrayal was going on* (hence not the aorist). It is a deeply solemn and arresting thought, contrasted with the frivolity displayed among the Corinthians at the Agapae. The preposition is not repeated before the relative. Comp. Xen. *Anab.* v. 7. 17, *Mem.* ii. 1. 32, with Kühner thereon; Plato, *Phaed.* p. 76 D, with Heindorf and Stallbaum *in loc.* — *ἄρτον*] *bread* (a cake of bread), which lay on the table.

REMARK.—The agreement which prevails between Paul's account of the Supper and that of Luke, is not to be explained by a dependence of Paul upon Luke (Grotius, comp. also Beza), but conversely. See on Luke xxii. 20, remark.

Ver. 24. *Τοῦτό μου ἐστὶ τὸ σῶμα*] *This is my body* (the body of me). The emphasis lies not on the enclitic *μου*, but on *τὸ σῶμα*. See, further, on Matt. xxvi. 26, and see Keim (in the *Jahrb. für Deutsch. Theol.* 1859, p. 73), as against Ströbel (in Rudelbach's *Zeitschr.* 1854, pp. 598, 602 ff.), who would have *τοῦτο* not to refer to the broken bread at all, but to point forward to what is to be designated by the predicate. This *τοῦτο* can mean nothing else whatever but: *this broken bread here*, which again *necessitates* our taking *ἐστὶ* as the copula of the *symbolic* "being."—Otherwise the identity of the subject and predicate here expressed would be, alike for the speaker and the hearers, an impossible conception; the body of the Lord was still alive, and His death, which answered to the breaking of the bread, was yet in the future.

When we come, therefore, to define ἐστί more precisely in connection with that *first* celebration of the Supper, it is to be taken as "being" in the sense of *proleptic* symbolism; and thereby the very possibility of the Lutheran synecdoche (upon which even Mehring falls back, in the *Luther. Zeitschrift*, 1867, p. 82) is done away. — τὸ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν] κλώμενον is spurious. We must supply simply ὃν: *which is for your behoof*, namely, by its *being broken* (slain<sup>1</sup>). Christ's body was not, indeed, literally *broken* (John xix. 33), but in His *violent* death our Lord sees that accomplished in His body which He had just done with the bread. This is the point of what He beholds in the broken bread looked upon by Him with such direct creative vividness of regard; but in truth the simple τὸ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν is more in keeping with the deep emotion of the moment than any attempt to expound in a more detailed way the symbolism which both *presents* and *interprets itself* in the breaking of bread; and Matthew and Mark have not even this "for you." — τοῦτο ποιεῖτε] to wit, what I now do; not merely the *breaking* of the bread joined with a thanksgiving prayer, but also—as the action itself became the silent commentary on this τοῦτο—the *distribution* and *eating* of the bread; comp. ver. 26. — εἰς τ. ἐμ. ἀνάμν.] *in remembrance of me*, presupposes His *absence* in body for the future; see on Luke xxii. 19. We may add that these words also do not occur in Matthew and Mark, whose simple τοῦτό ἐστι τ. σῶμά μου carries with it a presumption of its being the original, unexpanded by any later explanation or reflection. Generally speaking, a like preference must be accorded to the narratives of the Supper by Matthew and Mark (and between those two, again, to that of Mark) over those of Paul and Luke.

<sup>1</sup> This more precise explanation of the absolute τὸ ὑπὲρ ὑμ., sc. ὃν, is to be drawn from the preceding ἔκλασι; and hence the addition of κλώμενον is very *correct* in point of interpretation. But the word was not *spoken* by Jesus, only the *thought* was expressed in the *action* of breaking the bread. This *silent* language of lively depicting suits well with the deep emotion of the moment; and there is no ground either for regarding the reading which admits κλώμενον as *probable* on internal evidence (Kahn, *Dogmat.* I. p. 616), or for characterizing that which rejects it as "*vaga et frigida*" (Reiche, *Comm. crit.*); nor will it do to explain the omission of the word by John xix. 36 f. (Hofmann). As to Hofmann's making κλώμ. refer only to the violent *bending and wrenching*, as the term is used of men under torture (see Wetstein) and by physicians, the very fact that the bread was *broken* should have sufficed of itself to forbid the idea.

Ver. 25. Ὡσαύτ. κ. τ. ποτ.] *sc.* ἔλαβε καὶ εὐχαριστήσας ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς (this last is to be taken from ἔκλασε), vv. 23, 24. — τὸ ποτήρ.] the cup which stood before Him. It was the cup which closed the meal, although there is no ground to connect μετὰ τὸ δεῖπν. here with τὸ ποτήρ., as Pott does. — ἐστίν] in the position which it has here, is decisive against our connecting ἐν τῷ ἐμῷ αἵμ. with ἡ κ. διαθ., as most interpreters do (Erasmus, Beza, Calvin, and many others, including de Wette, Rodatz, Maier, Hofmann), although Luther (in the *gr. Bek.*) rightly rejects that connection. What Christ says is, that *the cup is the new covenant in virtue of His blood*, which, namely, is in the cup. For in the wine of the cup the Lord sees nothing else than His blood which was about to be shed. This vividly concrete, direct, but *symbolical* mode of view at that solemn moment stands out in the sharpest contrast with the strife of the churches on the subject (for the rest, see on Luke xxii. 19 f.). Christ's *blood* became, by its being poured forth, the *ἱλαστήριον*,<sup>1</sup> whereby the new covenant<sup>2</sup> was founded (Rom. iii. 24 f., v. 3), the covenant of grace, in which were established, on man's side, faith in Christ,—not, as in the old covenant, the fulfilling of the law,—and on God's side forgiveness by the way of grace, justification, sanctification, and bestowal of eternal Messianic salvation. Comp. 2 Cor. iii. 6. And the Lord looks upon the cup as this covenant, because He sees in the wine of the cup His covenant-sealing blood. The cup therefore, in this deeply vivid symbolism of view is, as that which *contains* the covenant-blood, to Him the *covenant*. — τοῦτο ποιεῖτε] to be taken so as to harmonize with ver. 24. Hofmann is wrong in thinking that Paul lays such special emphasis on this statement of the purpose of the Supper, because it appeared incompatible with the Corinthian mode of observing it. The apostle has no intention whatever here of laying emphasis either on one thing or another ;

<sup>1</sup> The *atonement* through the death of Jesus is at any rate the necessary *premiss* of even the symbolical interpretation of the Lord's Supper. With every attempt to explain away the *atonement* death, the Supper becomes utterly unintelligible. Comp. Ebrard, *Dogma vom Abendm.* II. p. 752 ff.

<sup>2</sup> The word *covenant* is unquestionably genuine, for it is common to all the narratives ; but the designation of the *διαθήκη* as *καινή* dates from Paul, being a later more precise definition of the phrase. *Καινῆς* in Matt. xxvi. 27 and Mark xiv. 24 is spurious. This applies also in opposition to Baur in the *theol. Jahrb.* 1857, p. 551.



he wishes only to *report*, in their simple *objectivity*, the sacred words in which the original institution was couched. What he desires to lay stress upon as against the Corinthians, comes in afterwards in ver. 26 ff. — *ὡςάκις ἂν πίν.*] peculiar to this account of the ordinance: *as often as ever* (*quotiescunque*, see Kühner, II. p. 94; comp. Bengel) *ye drink it*; the context supplies *τοῦτο τὸ ποτήρ* as the object of *πίν.*, without its having to be represented by a pronoun (*αὐτό*). See Krüger, § 60. 7; Kühner, *ad Xen. Mem.* i. 3. 4. The will of Jesus, according to this, is that *every time*, when they drink the *concluding cup* at the meal of communion, they should, in remembrance of Him, do with it as has now been done. Hofmann would make the words mean: *as often as ye are together at a* *ἄρτος*. But how can that be conveyed by the simple *πίνετε*? And it was certainly not a *drinking meal*, but a regular *δεῖπνον* (ver. 25). — Note, further, as to the *ἂν*, that it is placed after *ὡςάκις*, “quia in hac voce maximum sententiae pondus positum est,” Kühner, *ad Xen. Mem.* i. 1. 16.

Ver. 26. Not still words of *Christ* (Ewald),<sup>1</sup> in citing which Paul glides involuntarily into the form into which they had by this time become moulded in the church; for against this view there is (1) the unsuitableness in itself of such a *ὑστερον πρότερον* in the expression (especially after ver. 23); (2) the fact of the words being linked to the preceding by *γάρ*, which is less in keeping with the tone and direct form of the words of institution, but, on the other hand, naturally marks the apostle himself again beginning to speak; and (3) the fact that Luke has nothing of a similar kind in his account of the Supper. The *common* view is the right one, that *Paul* proceeds here *in his own person*. But what he gives is neither a further reason assigned for *οὐκ ἐπαίνῳ* in ver. 22 (so Hofmann, in connection with his incorrect interpretation of *ὅτι* in ver. 23), nor is it an experimental elucidation of the last words of ver. 25 (the *ordinary* view), for the contents of ver. 26 stand rather in the logical relation of *consequence* to the foregoing narrative of institution. No; *γάρ* is to be taken here (comp. on ver. 22) in its *inferential* sense, and made to refer to the whole preceding account of the origin of the Supper. We may paraphrase

<sup>1</sup> In the *Constit. ap.* too (viii. 12. 16) they are placed in Christ's mouth, but with the change of *τὸν θάνατον τὸν ἡμῶν καταγγίλλει, ἄχρισ ἂν ἴδω*.

thus: *Such, then, being the facts of the original institution, it comes to pass that as often as ye, etc.* — τὸν ἄρτον τοῦτον] the bread prescribed according to this appointment of Christ; τὸ ποτήριον: the cup now spoken of, the *eucharistic cup*. — καταγγέλλετε] *ye proclaim* the Lord's death, *i.e.* ye declare solemnly in connection with this ordinance, that Christ has died for you. This καταγγέλλειν cannot without arbitrariness be taken as merely a declaring *by action* (so commonly); it can only be taken as actually *oral*.<sup>1</sup> How it took place, we do not know. The Peschito (the Vulgate has *annuntiabit*) rightly took καταγγ. as *indicative* (so also Theophylact, Beza, Bengel, de Wette, Osiander, Kahnis, Neander, Maier, Rückert in his *Abendm.* p. 211, Hofmann), which Grotius and others ought not to have changed into *annuntiare debetis*; for the proclamation in question was an *essential* thing which *took place* at the Supper, and therefore an *admonition* to it would have been inappropriate. Even in the case of unworthy participation the καταγγέλλειν referred to was not omitted; the admonition, therefore, could only have respect to the worthiness of the participation, with which that καταγγέλλειν was connected; and, in point of fact, such an admonition follows accordingly in ver. 27 f. We must reject therefore the view commonly taken by other interpreters (and necessarily adopted by Ewald in accordance with his view of the verse as given above), namely, that καταγγ. is *imperative*. See, besides, Rodatz in Lücke and Wieseler's *Vierteljahrschr.* I. 3, p. 351. — ἄχρις οὗ ἔλθῃ] *until He shall have come*; for the apostle was convinced that the Parousia was close at hand, and therefore future generations could not have been present to his mind in writing thus; but *to apply* his words to them is historically necessary and right. — ἄχρις stands without

<sup>1</sup> Καταγγίλλειν is always an actual *proclamation*, never a mere *giving to be known* by deeds. Were the latter the meaning here, Paul would be using a *poetical* expression (something like ἀναγγίλλειν in Ps. xix. 1 f.), which would be not at all suitable in view of the context. I regret that Hofmann has been so hasty in censuring my assertion of the necessity of the above interpretation, as if it carried absurdity on the face of it. We do not know in what forms a *liturgical* element had already developed itself in connection with a rite which had now been observed for some quarter of a century. And have not the eucharistic liturgies up to this day, even the oldest that we are acquainted with (in Daniel, *Codex liturg.*), as for instance the "Liturgia Jacobi," essential parts, which are a καταγγίλλειν of the Lord's death? Comp. too the explicit confession prescribed at the Jewish feast of the Passover, Ex. xii. 27, xiii. 8.

ἀν (see instances in Lobeck, *ad Phryn.* p. 15 f.), because the arrival of the Parousia is conceived as absolutely certain, not as conditioned by any contingencies which might possibly delay it (Hermann, *part. ἀν*, p. 109 ff.). In Gal. iv. 19 also, Paul, in the earnestness of his love, conceives the result as equally certain (against Rückert's objection). *After the Parousia the Lord Himself is again there.* Theodoret: μετὰ γὰρ δὴ τὴν αὐτοῦ παρουσίαν οὐκέτι χρεία τῶν συμβόλων τοῦ σώματος, αὐτοῦ φαινομένου τοῦ σώματος· Διὰ τοῦτο εἶπεν ἄχρις οὗ ἂν ἔλθῃ. To eat *with Him* will then be a new thing (Matt. xxvi. 29); but until then the proclamation here spoken of is not to be silenced. How that thought was fitted to keep constantly before their minds the solemn responsibility of an unworthy participation in the Supper (see ver. 27)! In this way Paul links to the καταγγέλλειν of the communicants the fear and trembling of the *Maran atha*, xvi. 22.

Ver. 27. From that καταγγέλλειν κ.τ.λ. it follows how great is the sin of participating *unworthily*. This reference of the ὥστε is sufficiently pointed and appropriate not to require us to go back further (to all that has been said from ver. 20 onwards), as Rückert would have us do. — ἡ πίνῃ] ἡ does not stand for καί (Pott and older expositors);<sup>1</sup> but the meaning is: a man may partake of the one *or* the other unworthily, he is alike guilty; *neither* in the case of the bread *nor* of the wine should there be an unworthy participation. We must remember that the two elements were not partaken of in immediate succession, but the bread during the meal and the wine after it, so that the case was quite a possible one that the bread might be partaken of in a worthy, and the cup in an unworthy frame of spirit, and *vice versâ*. Comp. also Hofmann. The guilt, however, of the one or the other unworthy participation was the *same*, and was alike *complete*; hence ἡ is not repeated in the apodosis. Roman Catholics (see Estius and Cornelius a Lapide) find in this ἡ a support for their "*communio sub una*." See Calovius in opposition to this. — τοῦ Κυρίου] as κυριακόν in ver. 20, x. 21. — ἀναξίως]

<sup>1</sup> To this mistake, too, is to be traced the *reading* καί (in A D, some min. vss. and Fathers), which Fritzsche, *ad Rom.* III. p. 191, and Rückert approve. It was suggested by ver. 26, and gained support from the καί which follows; but is not necessary, for there is a change of conception.

in an unworthy manner, i.e. in a way morally out of keeping with the nature (x. 16) and design of the ordinance (ver. 24 f.). Paul does not define it more closely; hence, and because an unworthy participation may, in the concrete, occur in many different ways, the widely differing definitions of interpreters,<sup>1</sup> which are, however, quite out of place here. For the apostle leaves it to his readers to rank for themselves their particular way of communicating under the general ἀναξίως, and not till ver. 29 does he himself characterize the special form of unworthy participation which prevailed among them by ὁ γὰρ ἐσθίων κ. πίνων. See on the verse. — ἔνοχος ἔσται κ.τ.λ.] ἔνοχος with the dative and genitive (see Matthiae, p. 850) expresses the liability of guilt (see Bleek on Heb. ii. 15): he shall be—from the moment he does so—under guilt to the body and blood of Christ, i.e. crimini et poenae corporis et sanguinis Christi violati obnoxius erit (comp. Jas. ii. 10, and the classical ἔνοχος νόμοις, Plat. Legg. ix. p. 869 B E); inasmuch, namely, as the proclamation of the Lord's death at the participation in the bread and the cup presupposes a moral condition which must be in keeping with this most sacred act of commemoration; and if the condition of the communicant be of

<sup>1</sup> Theophylact, following Chrysostom, makes it ὡς περιφώντας τοὺς πίνητας. Theodoret holds that Paul hits at those fond of power in Corinth, the incestuous person, and those who ate the things offered to idols, and generally all who receive the sacrament with bad conscience. Luther: "he is worthy who has faith in these words, 'broken for you, etc.'" Grotius: "qui hoc actu curat, quae sua sunt, non quae Domini." Bengel: "qui se non probant." Flatt: not with thankful remembrance of the death of Jesus, not with reverence towards Him, not with love towards others; so also in substance Rückert in his Commentary, and—with more detail and to some extent differently—in his work on the Lord's Supper, p. 234. Billroth: with offence to the brethren. Olshausen: what is primarily meant is want of love, a disposition to judge others, but with the underlying idea that it is impenitence that makes an unworthy communicant. Kahn: "unbelief, which does not acknowledge a higher intrinsic worth in the Lord's Supper." At all events, it is the lack of a constantly present, lively, and active faith in the atonement brought about by Christ's death, which is the source of the various states of moral unworthiness in which men may partake of the Supper; as was the case also with the Corinthians when they degraded it into an ordinary meal for eating and drinking (and Hofmann goes no further in his explanation of the ἀναξίως). The more earnest and powerful this faith is, the less can that participation, by which we are conscious of coming into communion with the body and blood of the Lord, and thereby commemorating Him, take place in a way morally unworthy. Bengel is right indeed in saying: "Alia est indignitas edentis, alia esus" (comp. Rückert, Abendm. p. 253); but the latter in its different moral form is the necessary consequence of the former.

an opposite kind, then the holy body and blood, into communion with which we enter through such participation, can only be abused and profaned. Comp. ver. 29, *μὴ διακρίνων κ.τ.λ.* The often repeated interpretation: "par facit, quasi Christum trucidaret" (Grotius, following Chrysostom and Theophylact), appears once more in Ewald; but it neither corresponds sufficiently with the words themselves (for had Paul meant that, he would have said distinctly and suitably: *ἐνοχος ἔσται τοῦ θανάτου τοῦ Κυρ.*), nor with the parallel thought in ver. 29. This holds, too, against Ebrard's view (*Dogma v. Abendm.* I. p. 126); each man by his sins has a share in causing the death of Jesus; if now he communicates unworthily, not only do his other sins remain unforgiven, but there is added this fresh guilt besides, of having part in nailing Christ to the cross (which, with every other sin, is forgiven to the man who communicates worthily). But that would be surely no *new* guilt, but the continuance of the *old*; and in this sense Kahnis explains it, *Dogmat.* I. p. 620. But to bring out this meaning, the apostle, if he was not to leave his words open to misunderstanding (comp. John iii. 36, ix. 41), must have written not *ἐνοχ. ἔσται*, but *ἐνοχ. μένει* or *μενεῖ*. Olshausen again, with older expositors, thinks that our passage implies a powerful argument against all Zwinglian theories of a merely commemorative ordinance. This, however, is too hasty and uncertain an inference; because the profanation of an acknowledged symbol, especially if it be one recognised in the religious consciousness of the church (suppose, *e.g.*, a crucifix), does injury to the object itself represented by the symbol. Hofmann is not justified in disputing this. Comp. Oecolampadius, Piscator, and Scultetus, who adduce, as an analogous case, an injury done to the king's seal or picture.<sup>1</sup> Rückert, on the other hand, is wrong in supposing that we have here a proof that the bread and wine

<sup>1</sup> Luther's objection to this in the *Grosse Bekenntniss* resolves itself, in truth, into mere hairsplitting. The argument of the old systematic divines again is: The object against which we sin must be present; we sin against the body and blood of Christ; therefore these must be present. This conclusion is incorrect, because the major premiss is so. The *presence* of the object "in quod delinquimus quodque indigne tractamus" (Quenstedt) is not *always* necessary, and need not be a *real* presence. Thus a man sins against the *body* of Christ, even when he sins against what is recognised as the sacred *symbol* of that body, and against the *blood* of Christ, in like manner. Comp. also Neander.

are only *symbols*.<sup>1</sup> For, even granting that they are *really* the body and blood of Christ, there was ground enough for the apostle's warning in the fact that his readers seemed to be forgetting this relationship. Our conclusion therefore is, that *this passage in itself* proves neither the one theory nor the other, as even Hofmann now acknowledges, although he goes on to infer from ver. 29 that Christ's real body and blood are partaken of in the Sacrament. See, however, on ver. 29, and comp. on x. 15 f.

Ver. 28. Δέ] carrying onward: "now, in order not to incur this guilt, let a man examine himself, etc.;" let him search into his frame of mind and moral condition (τὴν διάνοιαν ἑαυτοῦ, Theodore of Mopsuestia) to see whether he will not partake unworthily;<sup>2</sup> comp. διακρίνειν, ver. 31. — καὶ οὕτως] and so, after he has examined himself, and in that case. See on Rom. xi. 26. Every reader, not addicted to hairsplitting, would understand here of course that this did not apply to a case in which the result of the self-examination was to make the man feel himself unworthy. There was no need, therefore, for Flatt and Rückert (following Lightfoot, Semler, Schulz) to take δοκιμάζ. as meaning to *make qualified*, which it never does, not even in Gal. vi. 4; 2 Cor. xiii. 5; 1 Thess. ii. 4. — ἀνθρῶπος] as iv. 1.

Ver. 29. Since ἀναξίως is spurious (see the critical remarks), ὁ ἐσθίων κ. πίνων might be understood absolutely: *the eater and drinker*, who turns the Supper, as was actually done at Corinth, vv. 22, 34, into a banquet and carousal. This was the view I held myself formerly, taking μὴ διακρίνων in the sense: *because* he does not, etc., as in Rom. iv. 19. But after ver. 28, whose ἐσθίειν κ. πίνειν finds expression here again, it is simpler and most in accordance with the text to render: "*He who eats and drinks* (the bread and the cup), *eats and drinks a judgment to himself, if he does not*, etc.," so that in this way μὴ διακρίνων κ.τ.λ. conditions the predicate, and is not a modal definition of the subject. The apostle might have written simply κρίμα

<sup>1</sup> Otherwise in his treatise *vom Abendm.* p. 236, where, on the ground of x. 3 f., x. 16, he does not doubt that what is meant is a direct offence committed against the very things there present.

<sup>2</sup> Confession is an institution of the church, meant to aid in carrying out this rule of the apostle's, in which the absolution gives assurance that one does not eat and drink unworthily.

γὰρ αὐτῷ ἐσθίει κ. πίνει, μὴ διακρ. τ. σ.; but the circumstantial description of the subject of the sentence for the second time by ὁ γὰρ ἐσθίων κ. πίνων carries a certain *solemnity* with it, making one feel the *risk* incurred by going on to eat and drink. — κρῖμα αὐτῷ κ.τ.λ.] a concrete expression (comp. 2 Cor. ii. 16) of the thought: *he draws down judicial sentence upon himself by his eating and drinking*. The power to effect this turns on the ἐνοχος ἔσται κ.τ.λ., ver. 27; and therefore nothing is decided here against the symbolical interpretation of the words of institution. That the κρῖμα is a *penal* one, is implied in the context (Rom. ii. 2, iii. 8, xiii. 2; Gal. v. 10). The *absence of the article*, again, denotes not eternal condemnation, but *penal judgment in general* without any limiting definition. From vv. 30 and 31 we see that Paul was thinking, in the first place, of *temporal judgments* as the penalty of unworthy communicating, and that such judgments appeared to him as chastisements employed by God to avert from the offender eternal condemnation. With respect to the dativus *incommodi* αὐτῷ, comp. Rom. xiii. 2. — μὴ διακρίνων τὸ σῶμα] *if he does not form a judgment upon* (so διακρ., Vulgate, Chrysostom, Theophylact, Bengel, de Wette, Weiss) *the body, i.e. the body κατ' ἐξοχήν*, the sacred body, into communion with which he enters by partaking of the Supper, and respecting which, therefore, he ought to form a judgment of the most careful kind, such as may bring him into full and deep consciousness of its sacredness and saving significance (on διακρ., comp. xiv. 29; Matt. xvi. 3). Comp. Chrysostom: μὴ ἐξετάζων, μὴ ἐννοῶν, ὡς χρὴ, τὸ μέγεθος τῶν προκειμένων, μὴ λογιζόμενος τὸν ὄγκον τῆς δωρεᾶς. Usually (so too Ewald, Kahnis, Hofmann) commentators have taken διακρ. in the sense of to *distinguish* (iv. 7), and have rendered accordingly: *if he* (or, following the reading which puts ἀναξίως after πίνων: *because he*) *does not distinguish the body of Christ from common food*.<sup>1</sup> Hofmann, again, seeing that we have not τοῦ Κυρίου along with τὸ σῶμα, holds it more correct to render: *if he does not distinguish the body, which he who eats this bread partakes of, from the mere bread itself*. Both these ways of explaining the word, which come in substance to the same thing, proceed upon the supposition *either* that the body of Christ is that with which

<sup>1</sup> So Luther's gloss: who handles and deals with Christ's body as if he cared no more for it than for common food.

we enter into fellowship by partaking of the symbol (which is the true view), *or* that it is partaken of "in, with, and under" the bread (Lutheran doctrine), *or* by means of the transubstantiation of the bread (Roman Catholic doctrine). But in ver. 31, where *διακρίνομεν* is taken up again from our passage, the word means to *judge*, not to *distinguish*, and we must therefore keep to that meaning<sup>1</sup> here also. — It was needless to add *καὶ τὸ αἶμα* to *τὸ σῶμα*, because the *σῶμα* is regarded as that which had suffered *death* by the shedding of its *blood*; comp. ver. 26, also x. 17. The *twofoldness* of the elements has its significance to thought only in the equal symbolism of the two; apart from that symbolism, reference to it would be inappropriate, since, objectively, they cannot be separated.

Ver. 30. Proof of that *κρίμα ἑαυτῷ . . . πίνει* from the present experience of the Corinthians themselves. — Paul knew that there were at this time many cases of *sickness*, and not a few of *death* (*κοιμῶνται*), among them; and he saw in this a divine chastisement for their unworthy use of the Lord's Supper. The explanation which refers this to *moral weakness and deadness* (Valckenaer, Morus, Krause, Eichhorn) is not to be rejected (as by Rückert) on the ground that this moral sickness and deadness must have been represented as the *cause* of the unworthy participation (for, from the Pauline standpoint, they might quite as well be regarded as its *consequence*, see Rom. i. 24 ff.). But it is to be set aside, because such a sense must have been suggested by the *context*, whereas there is not the remotest hint of it, either by itself or in connection with the physical interpretation (Olshausen). — *κοιμῶνται*] *dormiunt*, *i.e.* are *dead*. Comp., regarding this euphemistic allusion, what is said on xv. 18. Elsewhere in the N. T. we find the *perfect* or *aorist*. But comp. Lachmann's reading in 1 Thess. iv. 13. — It is impossible to establish a definite distinction of idea between *ἀσθενείς* and *ἄρρωστοι*. Grotius and Bengel hold the latter to mean more than the former; Wetstein and Tittmann again (*Synon.* p. 76) differ from them in this. Both words denote want of strength from sickness.

Vv. 31, 32. *If, on the other hand, we judged ourselves* (submitted

<sup>1</sup> Which stands in significant correspondence with *κρίμα* (comp. too, the oxymoron in ver. 31): a *judgment* . . . if he does not *form a judgment*. Hence there is the less warrant in the text for the meaning "*distinguish*."



our own condition to moral criticism ; parallel to δοκιμάζειν ἑαυτόν, ver. 28), *then should we not receive any judgment* (judgment of condemnation, ver. 29); *but when we do receive a judgment* (in point of fact, by temporal sufferings), *we are chastened* (punished in a disciplinary way) *by the Lord* (by God), *in order that we may not be condemned* (namely, at the last judgment) *with the world* (along with the anti-Christian part of mankind). Note the oxymoron : διεκρ. κριν. κατακριθ., answering significantly to the mutual relation of κρίμα and διακρίνων in ver. 29. In both passages we have the same sort of pointed alliteration, corresponding to their internal connection (which is plainly enough marked by the διὰ τοῦτο, ver. 30, and δέ, ver. 31, although Hofmann denies it). — As to the divine *chastisement*, which lies within the sphere of the divine redemptive agency (Heb. xii. 6 ; Tit. ii. 12 ; also 1 Tim. i. 20 ; 2 Tim. ii. 25), comp. J. Müller, *v. d. Sünde*, I. p. 339 f., ed. 5. — The use of the *first person* gives to the sentence the gentler form of a general statement, not referring merely to the state of things at Corinth, but of universal application.

Ver. 33. Conclusion from this proposition, general in its tenor, for the conduct of the readers at the love-feast, when they came together to keep it (εἰς τὸ φαγεῖν, not belonging to ἀλλ. ἐνδέχ.). — ἀδελφοί μου] “perterrefactos rursum hac blanda compellatione solatur,” Grotius. — ἀλλήλ. ἐκδέχθε] *wait for one another* (“in vicem exspectate,” Vulg.), xvi. 11, so that no one ἴδιον δεῖπνον προλαμβάνει. This *closing* admonition corresponds to the censure, with which the section *began* in ver. 21, and there is therefore no need for departing from this rendering, which is adopted by Luther, Erasmus, and the majority of commentators. Theophylact : δεικνύων, ὅτι κοινὰ εἰσι τὰ ἐκείσε εἰσφερόμενα, καὶ δεῖ ἀναμένειν τὴν κοινὴν συνέλευσιν. Others translate : *Receive ye one another*, namely, *convivio*, as a contrast to despising the other guests, and keeping them from sharing in what you yourselves have to give. So Pott, Rückert, Olshausen, Ewald, Hofmann, following Mosheim, Michaelis, Morus, Schulz, Rosenmüller. But in the N. T. ἐκδέχσθαι (xvi. 11) means always *exspectare* (comp. Soph. *Phil.* 123 ; Polyb. xx. 4. 5, iii. 45. 6 ; Apollod. i. 9. 27 ; also in Plutarch, *al.*), although in classical writers, as well as in the LXX. and Apocrypha, the meaning *excipere* is far more frequent. The

latter sense Paul would have expressed by the simple δέχεσθαι, or by προσλαμβάνεσθαι (Rom. xiv. 1).

Ver. 34. To satisfy hunger, is a thing to be done at home. The Agapae should not be used as meals for such material purposes; they have a higher significance. Comp. ver. 22. Others take it: "If any one has such keen hunger that he cannot wait for the distribution, let him rather take a previous meal at home" (Billroth; comp. Erasmus, *Paraph.*). But how much of this is arbitrarily imported into the text!—τὰ δὲ λοιπά] What has not yet been regulated in this section, vv. 17–34. The reference is to matters connected with the love-feasts; not indeed of a doctrinal kind, but, as the word διατάσσεσθαι is enough of itself to show, pertaining to outward order and arrangements, vii. 17, ix. 14, xvi. 1; Gal. iii. 19; Tit. i. 5. A passage taken advantage of by Roman Catholics in support of their doctrine of *tradition*. And, no doubt, it does serve to establish in general the possibility of the existence of apostolic traditions; but in each particular case in which such traditions are asserted, the burden of bringing forward the proof lies always upon those who make the assertion, and it can never be produced. — ὡς ἂν] *whenever* I shall have come; in the temporal sense = *simulatque*. See on Phil. ii. 23, and Hartung, II. p. 289.

# CHAPTER XII.

VER. 2. *ὅτι ὅτε*] approved by Griesb., adopted also by Lachm. (who brackets *ὅτε*, however), Scholz, Rück. Tisch. with A B C D E L 8, min. and several vss. and Fathers. The *ὅτι* alone (Elz. with F G min. Syr. Erp. Clar. Germ. Oec. Ambrosiast.), and the weakly attested *ὅτε* alone (which Billroth and Ewald prefer), are two different attempts to help out the construction, whose difficulty leads Reiche again to defend the *Recepta*. — Ver. 3. Instead of the *Recepta* *Ἰησοῦν* and *Κύριον Ἰησοῦν*, which Reiche upholds, read *Ἰησοῦς* and *Κύριος Ἰησοῦς*, with Lachm. Rück. and Tisch., following A B C 8, min. and several vss. and Fathers. The accusatives are the work of copyists altering the *oratio directa*, which struck them as unusual. — Ver. 9. In place of the second *αὐτῶ*, A B, min. Vulg. Clar. Germ. and Latin Fathers read *ἐνί*. So, rightly, Lachm. Rück. Tisch.; *αὐτῶ* has crept in after the preceding. — After *σώματος* in ver. 12, Elz. has *τοῦ ἐνός*, against greatly preponderating testimony. A gloss. — Ver. 13. *εἰς ἐν πνεύμα*] Many various readings; the best accredited is *ἐν πνεύμα* (B C D\* F G 8, 17, 73, 80, with several vss. and Fathers). So Lachm. Rück. Tisch. Reiche. The insertion of the *εἰς* arose from comparing the clause with the first half of the verse. Then, according as the words were understood to refer to the Supper or not, arose the readings *πόμα* (with or without *εἰς*) instead of *πνεῦμα*, and *ἐφωτίσθημεν* (said of baptism, as the Greek Fathers were accustomed to use it) instead of *ἔποτ*. — Ver. 31. *κρείττονα*] A B C 8, min. Syr. Aeth. Vulg. ms. Or. (twice) read *μείζονα*. So Lachm. Rück. Tisch. But while *κρείττονα* might easily appear a doubtful expression in itself, and even objectionable as implying the contrast of “worse,” *μείζονα*, on the other hand, was very naturally suggested by xiii. 13, xiv. 5.

---

CONTENTS. — *Concerning the Spirit's gifts.*<sup>1</sup> The fundamental characteristic of speaking in the Spirit is the confession of Jesus as the Lord (ver. 3); but the especial utterances of the Spirit, which are

<sup>1</sup> Baur, in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1838, p. 646 f., holds that the abuse of the *glossolalia* in Corinth, which has certainly given occasion to this section of the Epistle, had arisen in the party-interest of the Petrine Christians in opposition to the

given to individuals for the welfare of the community (vv. 7-10), differ one from another (vv. 4-6). The Giver of all gifts, however, is one and the same Spirit; for Christians form an organic whole, like the limbs of one body, so that none of them ought either to judge himself in a depreciatory spirit (vv. 11-20), or to ignore the need and worth of those with fewer or lower gifts (vv. 21-30). Still there ought to be a striving after the more excellent charismata; and Paul will show his readers the best kind and mode of thus striving (ver. 31). — The peculiar *difficulty* attaching to this whole section is very truly described by Chrysostom: τοῦτο ἅπαν τὸ χωρίον σφόδρα ἐστὶν ἀσαφές· τὴν δὲ ἀσάφειαν ἢ τῶν πραγμάτων ἄγνοιά τε καὶ ἑλλειψις ποιεῖ, τῶν τότε μὲν συμβαινόντων, νῦν δὲ οὐ γινομένων.

Ver. 1. Δέ] leads over from the matter previously discussed to another, in connection with which also abuses had crept into the church (see on xi. 18). We are warranted in assuming that the discussion of such a subject, so comprehensive and entering so much into details, was occasioned by questions put in the letter from Corinth (vii. 1, viii. 1). — τῶν πνευματικῶν] is to be taken (with Chrysostom, Luther, and most expositors) as *neuter*, stating the *theme* in a quite general way: *On the forms of action which proceed from the Holy Spirit and make manifest His agency in the life of the church.* The speaking with tongues is *specially* taken up only in chap. xiv., so that it is a mistake to regard πνευματ. as referring to this alone (Storr, Heydenreich, Billroth, Baur in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1838, p. 644, and Wieseler in the same, p. 711, also Ewald). The πνευματικά are in their nature the same as

Pauline. The former, he maintains, had brought the γλ. λαλ. to bear against the latter, denying to Paul the apostolic character and consequently the possession of the πνεῦμα ἅγιον. But there is no trace of this whatever in the apostle's treatment of the subject; for the word thrown out at vii. 40, in connection with a totally *different* occasion, has no bearing at all upon this question; and xiv. 6 and 18 take for granted that his readers admitted that Paul himself had the gift of the *glossolalia*, and that in a high degree. Rübiger, too, agrees in substance with Baur, assuming, as he does, an opposition between the Pauline προφητεύοντες and the Petrine γλώσσαις λαλοῦντες. But there is not the slightest support in the text either, in general, for connecting the subject in hand with the state of parties at Corinth, or, in particular, for ascribing the *glossolalia* to any one special party (Dähne, *e.g.*, regards it as a piece of Alexandrian fanaticism among the *Christ-party*). Van Hengel's conjecture, also (*Gave d. talen*, p. 111 f.), that Apollos had brought the *glossolalia* to Corinth, where it had been abused and had degenerated, lacks all definite foundation.

the *χαρίσματα*, ver. 4. Other interpreters make it *masculine* (Grotius, Hammond, Clericus, Locke, Semler, Morus, Rosenmüller, Stolz, Heydenreich, Ewald, Hofmann, also David Schulz, *d. Geistesgaben der ersten Christen*, p. 163; and Hilgenfeld, *die Glossolalie*, 1850, p. 16): *concerning the inspired*, whether genuine or not; Ewald renders: "concerning the men of the Spirit" (speakers with tongues). But in xiv. 1 we have the theme recurring as τὰ πνευματικά. — οὐ θέλω ὑμ. ἀγνοεῖν] *I will not leave you in ignorance.* Comp. x. 1; 1 Thess. iv. 13. Theodore of Mopsuestia puts it aptly: θέλω ὑμᾶς καὶ τῶν πνευματικῶν χαρισμάτων εἰδέναι τὴν τάξιν, ὥστε βούλομαι τι καὶ περὶ τούτων εἰπεῖν.

Ver. 2. Reason (comp. on διό, ver. 3) why he wishes to instruct them concerning the πνευματικά. The pneumatic condition into which they had entered as Christians was, of course, an entirely new one to men who had been heathen, entirely without precedent or analogy in the experiences of their former sad estate,—all the more, therefore, requiring to be subjected to a trustworthy and correct judgment. — The construction, when we adopt the reading ὅτι, ὅτε, is simply this: the object-sentence begins indeed with ὅτι, but instead of ending with ἀπήγεσθε, or repeating ἦτε before ἀπαγόμεν, runs off into the participle,—an anakoluthic use of the ὅτι not uncommon also in classic writers, after parenthetic clauses, even when but short, have intervened. See Krüger on *Thuc.* iv. 37; Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Apol.* 37 B; Heind. *ad Plat. Gorg.* p. 481 D. Translate: *Ye know that, at the time when ye were heathen, ye were led away to the dumb idols, in whatever way people led you.* Buttmann (*neut. Gr.* p. 329 [E. T. 383]) holds that the sentence after ὅτε ἔθνη ἦτε passes with ὥς into an indirect question. But ὥς ἂν ἦγεσθε, from its position between πρὸς τ. εἰδ. τ. ἁφ. and ἀπαγόμεν, can only be a parenthetic clause. In that case, too, ἀπαγ. would be cumbrous and dragging at the end of the verse; it must convey a weighty closing thought, to which ὥς ἂν ἦγεσθε serves as modal definition. Hofmann, although not reading ὅτι, ὅτε, but simply ὅτι with Elz. (which in fact does away of itself with all real difficulty), has twisted and obscured the whole passage in a very unhappy way.<sup>1</sup> — ὅτε ἔθνη ἦτε] A

<sup>1</sup> Hofmann insists, namely (1st), on reading *οἶδα τι* instead of *οἶδα τι*, and (2d) *ὥς ἀνήγεσθε* instead of *ὥς ἂν ἦγεσθε*, and (3d) on taking *ὅτι ἔθνη ἦτε* as: *because ye were*

reminder to his readers of their sad *ποτέ*, to which Paul often turns back their eyes from their happy *νῦν* (Eph. ii. 2 f., 11, 13, v. 8; Col. i. 21, iii. 7; Rom. xi. 30). — *πρὸς τὰ εἰδωλα*] namely, in order to worship them, sacrifice to them, invoke them, inquire of them, and the like. — *τὰ ἄφωνα*] (Plat. *Pol.* I. p. 336 D, and often elsewhere; Dem. 292. 6. 294. 19; 2 Macc. iii. 24) impresses on the readers that idols, which were themselves *dumb* (comp. Hab. ii. 18; 3 Macc. iv. 16), could produce no pneumatic speaking. Notice the emphatic repetition of the article. — *ὡς ἂν ἦγεσθε*] as ye were at any time led. Regarding this *ἂν* of repetition, see Fritzsche, *Conject.* I. p. 35; Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 186 f. [E. T. 216]; comp. on Acts ii. 45. — *ἀπαγόμενοι*] becoming led away. The force of the *ἀπό* is not that of removal from the normal condition of the natural knowledge of God (Rom. i. 19 ff.), an interpretation which would need to be suggested by the context; but it serves *vividly to set forth the result*. The consequence of the *ἄγεσθαι*, namely, was the *ἀπάγεσθαι*, the being involuntarily drawn away from the surroundings in which they were actually placed to the temples, statues, altars, etc. of the idols. We may take it for certain, from Paul's views of heathenism (x. 20; Eph. ii. 2), that he thought of *Satan* as the *leading power*. Hilgenfeld aptly compares the passage in Athenagoras, *Legat. pro Christ.* p. 29, ed. Col.: οἱ μὲν περὶ τὰ εἰδωλα αὐτοὺς ἔλκοντες οἱ δαίμονες εἰσιν κ.τ.λ. The opposite is *πνεύματι ἄγεσθαι*, Rom. viii. 14; Gal. v. 18; Matt. iv. 1. Others make it: *a sacerdotibus* (Valckenaer, *al.*), and the like. — We may note further both that *homoioteleuta*, such as *οἶδατε, ὅτι ὅτε . . . ἦτε*, occur even in the best writers, showing that the resemblances

*heathen*, and that as specifying the reason for what follows, in which, for the sake of emphasis, *πρὸς . . . ἄφωνα* is put before the *ὡς*. But how *involved* the whole general structure of the sentence becomes in that way! How wholly *uncalled for*, nevertheless, and inappropriate would be the investing of the quite superfluous (quite superfluous, to wit, as specifying a reason) "*because ye were heathen*," with all the emphasis of being *put first* in a hyperbaton which is, moreover, *doubled*! And how *strange* the choice of the compound *ἀνήγισθε*, since it does not (as Hofmann supposes) convey the notion of *whither* (which is expressed by *πρὸς*), but that of *upward*, as *ἀνάγειν* always means to lead up! The *τί*, too, after *οἶδα*, would not be suitable even in a *logical* point of view (see note on ver. 3).—Laurent, in his *neut. Stud.* p. 132, agrees with Hofmann in so far that he also reads *ὡς ἀνήγισθε* instead of *ὡς ἂν ἦγισθε*. For the rest, he retains *οἶδατε*, and neither reads *ὅτι* nor *ὅτι*, *ῶτι*, but simply *ῶτι*, which is supported by very slender evidence.

of sound were not offensive to them (Lobeck, *ad Aj.* 61, *Paral.* p. 53 ff.), and also that the subject in hand is brought all the more vividly and impressively home by the *adnominatio*, ἡγεσθε, ἀπαργόμενοι (Bremi, *ad Lys.* I. *Exc.* vi. p. 209).

Ver. 3. Διό] *therefore*, because the experiences of spiritually gifted men could not be known to you in your heathen state,<sup>1</sup> and you have consequently all the more need of sound instruction on the subject, *therefore I give you to know*: the fundamental characteristic of speaking by the Spirit is, *that Jesus is not execrated, but confessed as Lord*. Paul expresses this in the two parallel thoughts: that the former, the *execration*, comes from the lips of no inspired person; and that the latter, the *confession of the Lord*, can only be uttered by the power of the Holy Spirit. Both the *negative* and the *positive* marks are thereby given; and it is arbitrary to lay the whole stress, as Billroth and Rückert do,

<sup>1</sup> Similarly de Wette; comp. Bengel, and, yet earlier, Luther's gloss. Osiander drags in a contrast between the one Lord of the Christians and the many *κύριους* of heathenism. Moreover, widely differing statements as to the connection are to be found among interpreters. Chrysostom, Oecumenius, and Theophylact trace it back in a perfectly arbitrary way to the contrast between the unconscious mania of heathen inspiration and the conscious inspiration of Christians. Comp. Neander: "because it is now otherwise with you, and you have become free organs of the Holy Spirit." Kling (in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1838, p. 496) makes it: "that you may not suffer yourselves to be again carried away to blind worship of an unintelligible phenomenon" (?). Theodoret holds that what is referred to is the contrast between the *διαφωρία* of heathenism and the *συμφωνία* in Christianity. In like manner Rábiger: "because your heathen cultus did not rest upon a common Divine Spirit ruling in you all, I make it known to you that there is such a principle in Christianity in the *πνεῦμα Θεοῦ*." But in this way the essential point on which the question hinges is only gained by *abstraction* out of what Paul *actually* says, and that in the interest of the assumption that he designs to secure for the *glossolalia* the respect due to it as against the opposition of the Pauline party. Paul is here making known to his readers the *criterion* of Christian inspiration as regards its confession, and that for *this reason* (διό), because they, as formerly serving dumb idols, had all the more *need* of this *γνῶσις*. The words before us yield no more than this. Ewald also imports too much into them: You will not surely wish back your former heathen days; . . . it is in the light of that old state of things that one first really comes rightly to understand and feel the value of Christianity, and so forth. Hofmann shapes the connection in accordance with his construction of the text in ver. 2: because Paul does not wish to leave his readers in the dark *περὶ τ. πνευματικῶν*; and because, on the other hand, he knows what their old life had been as respects divine service, *therefore* he gives them the following instructions. This is *logically incorrect*. For the second element in this case would not be one *brought forward in addition* to the first (τί), but one already *lying at the root of it*; and Paul must therefore have written, not *οἷδά τε* (as Hofmann reads), but *οἶδα γάρ*.

upon the second half, and to regard the first as almost superfluous and a mere foil to the second. Paul must, moreover, have had his own special *reasons* for placing such a *general guiding rule* at the head of his whole discussion in answer to the question, Who in general is to be held an inspired speaker? Among all the different forms and even perversions of the gift of speaking in the Spirit at Corinth, men may have been divided upon the question, *Who* was properly to be regarded as speaking by the Spirit, and who not? and against all arbitrary, envious, exclusive judgments on this point the apostle strikes all the more powerfully, the more he brings out here the *width* of the specific field of speaking in the Spirit, and the *more simply and definitely* he lays down at the same time its characteristics. To find any special reference here to the *speaking with tongues*—and in particular to go so far in that direction as to assume (Hofmann, comp. his *Schriftbew.* I. p. 309) that the first clause guards against anxiety in presence of the *γλώσσαις λαλεῖν*, and the second against undervaluing the *προφητεύειν*—comes just to this, that Paul has expressed himself in a highly unintelligible way, and arbitrarily anticipates the elucidations in detail which follow. — *ἐν πνεύματι Θεοῦ*] so that the Holy Spirit is the element which pervades his inner life, and in which the *λαλεῖν* takes place. Comp. on Rom. viii. 15; Matt. xxii. 43. — *λαλῶν*] *uttering himself, speaking*; *λέγει*, on the other hand, has reference to the *object* of the utterance. Comp. on Rom. iii. 19; John viii. 43; Schulz, *Geistsgaben*, p. 94 ff. — *ἀνάθεμα Ἰησοῦς*] *sc. ἐστί, accursed* (see on Rom. ix. 3; Gal. i. 8), fallen into eternal perdition *is Jesus!* This is the anti-Christian (especially the Jewish) confession; the Christian is: *Κύριος Ἰησοῦς, Jesus is Lord!* Comp. Phil. ii. 11. Why did Paul not say *Χριστός*? Because, from its original appellative meaning, it would not have suited the first clause (*ἀνάθ.*); in the second, again, its appellative meaning is contained in *Κύριος*; and in both it was essential to name the historical Person who was the Messiah of the Christians' faith as exalted to be the *σύνθερος* of God. It is self-evident, we may add, that Paul regarded the *Κύριος Ἰησοῦς* as the *constant watchword* of the believing heart, and the *keynote* of inspired speech. "Paulus loquitur de confessione perseveranti et in tota doctrina," Melancthon. — Regarding the confession itself, comp. 1 John iv. 1 f., where the



proposition is of substantially the same import, only still more directly aimed against false teachers.

Ver. 4. Although the fundamental character of all inspired speaking is not in any case different: *there are, notwithstanding, distributions of grace-gifts* ("divisiones gratiarum," Vulg.), *but it is the same Spirit* (from whom they proceed). Comp. Heb. ii. 4, and Lünemann upon that passage. *Χάρισμα*,<sup>1</sup> a specifically N. T. word, foreign to ordinary Greek, is used here in the narrower sense (for in the wider sense, every manifestation of divine grace—in particular, every part of the Christian possession of salvation, and every activity of the Christian life—is a *χάρισμα*). It means any extraordinary faculty, which operated for the furtherance of the welfare of the Christian community, and which was itself wrought by the grace of God, through the power of the Holy Spirit, in special individuals, in accordance, respectively, with the measure of their individual capacities, whether it were that the Spirit infused entirely new powers, or stimulated those already existing to higher power and activity, Rom. xii. 6 ff. Regarding *διαίρεσις*, *distribution*, comp. ver. 11; Xen. *Cyr.* iv. 5. 55; Plat. *Soph.* p. 267 D, *Phaedr.* p. 266 B, *Polit.* p. 275 E; Polyb. ii. 43. 10; Eccus. xiv. 15; Judith ix. 4. The charismatic endowment is not something undivided; we do not find a unity and equality among the gifted, but there are *distributions donorum*, so that one has this peculiar *χάρισμα*, and the other that, dealt out to him as his own appointed share. If we take *διαίρέσεις* to mean *differences* (Beza, and many others, including de Wette, Ewald), this is equally lawful so far as linguistic usage goes (Plat. *Soph.* p. 267 B, *Prot.* p. 358 A), but does not correspond to the correlative purposely chosen by the apostle in ver. 11, *διαποῦν*.

Vv. 5, 6. Continuation of the representation of the difference and yet relative unity of the *χαρίσματα*, illustrated in two characteristic forms of their action, in so far, namely, as they present themselves practically as *διακονίαι* and as *ἐνεργήματα*. These are not merely different names for the charismata (as the Greek Fathers held), nor yet distinct species of them (Estius and others), but different forms of expression in which they show themselves

<sup>1</sup> Comp. Krumm, *De notionib. psychol. Paulin.*, Gissae 1853, p. 35 ff. As regards the difference between the general Christian *χαρίσματα* and the extraordinary, see *Constitt. ap.* viii. 1. 1 ff.

and appear to the observer.—*And there are distributions of services, but it is the same Lord* (Christ as Lord of the church) who is served thereby. To make the *διακονίαι* refer to the specific offices in the church, ver. 28 (Beza, Grotius, Estius, Olshausen, and many others), is to narrow the meaning too much; for in accordance with the first sentence, and in accordance generally with the comprehensive scope of the whole three sentences, all charismata must be meant, in so far, namely, as all, according to the relation of their exercise to Christ, manifest themselves as services rendered.—“*And there are distributions of workings* (deeds of power), *but it is the same God who works them all* (ἐνεργήματα) *in all* (in all who are acting in the power of the Spirit).” Ἐνεργ. is as little to be taken in a special sense here as διακ. in the previous sentence; it is neither to be referred to the working of miracles alone (so most interpreters on the ground of ver. 10, where, however, it is joined with δυνάμ.). nor to the healings of the sick (so Olshausen, quite arbitrarily). No, all charismata may manifest their operation in deeds (comp. on ἐνεργήματα, Polyb. ii. 42. 7, iv. 8. 7; Diod. iv. 51), whether these may be miraculous or not.

REMARK.—The Divine Trinity is here indicated in an ascending climax (comp. on Eph. iv. 6), in such a way that we pass from the Spirit, who bestows the gifts, to the Lord, who is served by means of them, and finally to God, who, as the absolute First Cause and Possessor of all Christian powers, works the entire sum of charismatic deeds in all who are gifted. This passage has always (from Chrysostom and Theodoret onwards) been rightly adduced in opposition to anti-Trinitarian error (comp. too Calovius against the Socinians); but it is to be observed also here, that with all the equality of nature and inseparable unity (2 Cor. xiii. 13) of the Three, still no dogmatic canon can do away with the relation of subordination which is also manifest. Comp. Gess, *v. d. Person Christi*, p. 158 f.; Kahnis, *Dogm. III.* p. 206 ff.

Ver. 7. Δέ] leading on to the like destination of all the gifts. The emphasis lies on πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον. This is the aim, which is the same in the case of every one who receives a gift. To each one is the manifestation of the Spirit (his making known the Holy Spirit to others by charismatic acts) given with a view to benefit (in order to be of use, see xiv. 12). The genitive is to be taken in this objective sense (with Billroth, Schulz, *Geistesg.* p. 164, and Hofmann), because there exists no reason

here for departing from the similar meaning of *φανέρ. τῆς ἄληθ.* in 2 Cor. iv. 2 ; and we have no other instance of the use of the word except in the Fathers. Calvin, Rückert, de Wette, and most expositors understand it *subjectively*: *the self-revelation of the Spirit*. Even on the first interpretation there is not too much concession to independent human activity (in opposition to de Wette), as is plain from the very idea of the *δίδοται*.

Ver. 8 ff. Now one man may receive one, and another another endowment from the same Spirit. The following nine charismata, enumerated in a preliminary way up to ver. 10 (besides which, others are afterwards mentioned, ver. 28), are divided into three classes, which cannot, however, correspond to the three *διαίρέσεις*, vv. 4–6, because there *each* sentence comprises *all* charismata. The *external* division is distinctly marked by Paul himself in this way, namely, that he notes the transition to a *new* category by *ἐτέρω*<sup>1</sup> (while for subdivision *within* the classes he uses *ἄλλω*), thus: (1) ver. 8, by *ὃ μὲν*; (2) ver. 9, by *ἐτέρω δέ*; (3) ver. 10, by *ἐτέρω δέ*. The *logical* division again, although not rigidly carried out, presents itself without constraint as follows:

I. Charismata which have reference to *intellectual* power:

1. *λόγος σοφίας*.
2. *λόγος ἰγνώσεως*.

II. Charismata which depend upon special *energy of faith*:

1. The *πίστις* itself.
2. Its agency in *deeds*, namely,
  - a. *ἰάματα*.
  - b. *δυνάμεις*.
3. Its agency in *words*, namely, the *προφητεία*.
4. Its *critical* agency, the *διάκρισις πνευμ.*

III. Charismata which have reference to the *γλῶσσαι*:

1. Speaking with tongues.
2. Interpretation of tongues.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Whether after *ἑτέρω*, vv. 9 and 10, we read *δι* or not (which Lachmann brackets in ver. 9 and deletes in ver. 10) makes no difference at all as regards the marking of the divisions (in opposition to Hofmann); the divisions mark themselves by the way in which the *ἑτέρω* stands out from the many repetitions of *ἄλλω*. In several cases the *δι* too, after *ἄλλω*, is wanting in important witnesses.

<sup>2</sup> Other modes of division may be seen in Kling, *Stud. u. Krit.* 1839, p. 477 ff.; Englmann, *von d. Charismen*, 1848, who, however, divides them into *official* and

Ver. 8. Ὡ μὲν] This is followed by ἄλλω δέ instead of ὧ δέ. An unexact expression, as in ver. 28. Comp. Xen. *Anab.* iii. 1. 35; Hermes in Stob. *Ecl. phys.* 52, p. 1082.—λόγος σοφίας] Discourse of wisdom, discourse the contents of which are σοφία. The distinction drawn by many (including Schulz, Neander, Billroth, Olshausen, comp. also Froschammer, *von d. Charismen*, 1850, p. 28 ff.) between this and λόγος γνώσεως, according to which the former is a more *practical*, the latter a more *theoretical* method of teaching (Bengel, Storr, Rosenmüller, Flatt reverse it, comp. Cornelius a Lapide), is an unlikely one, seeing that the separation between theory and practice is not in keeping with the nature of inspired discourse. The more correct view is indicated by ii. 6 f. compared with xiii. 2; σοφία, namely, is the *higher Christian wisdom* (see on ii. 6, comp. Eph. i. 17) in and by itself, so that discourse, which enunciates its doctrines (mysteries), elucidates, applies them, etc., is λόγος σοφίας. This, however, does not yet imply the *deep and thorough knowledge* of these doctrines, the speculative insight into, and apprehension and elaboration of, their connection, of their grounds, of their deeper ideas, of their proofs, of their ends, etc., and a discourse which treats of *these matters* is λόγος γνώσεως.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly the σοφία cannot cease at the Parousia, but the γνώσις ceases, xiii. 8, because it belongs to the category of imperfect temporal things. Others interpret otherwise. Chrysostom,<sup>2</sup> Theodoret, Oecumenius, Theophylact are wrong in holding that the possession or the want of the teaching faculty

*non-official*, which does not correspond with the conception and nature of the gifts; Krumm, *l.c.*, who bases his division on the categories πνεῦμα, καρδία, νοῦς; de Wette renounces any arrangement; Hofmann divides according to the categories of the *cognitive* faculty (λόγ. σοφ. and λόγ. γνώσεως), of the *volitional* faculty (πίστις, ἰάματα, δυνάμεις), and of the *power of the Holy Spirit* (προφητεία κ.τ.λ.). Bengel puts it aptly: “ἃ ἑτέρω ἑτέρω: huic, alteri, alteri,—genera tria.”—The distinction between II. and III. arises from the fact that the γλῶσσαι were an entirely *peculiar χάρισμα*, in connection with which the agency of the νοῦς was absent. In ver. 23 also the glossolalia is ranked in a class by itself.

<sup>1</sup> According to Ewald, λόγος σοφίας embraces more the intelligent explanation and establishment of recognised truths, with a view to profit in life; λόγος γνώσεως, more the treatment of obscurer and more hidden portions of knowledge. But ii. 6 ff. shows that the latter also are included under the σοφία.

<sup>2</sup> Paul and John, he says, had the λόγος σοφίας; the λόγος γνώσεως was possessed by οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν πιστῶν, γινώσκοντες μὲν ἔχοντες, διδάσκοντες δὲ εὐτως οὐ δυνάμενοι. In like manner now Krumm asserts, “γνώσεως, proprietatem in argumentis, σοφίας, in forma positam esse.”

makes the difference between σοφία and γνῶσις. See, on the contrary, xiii. 8 ; 2 Cor. xi. 6. Baur makes γνῶσις refer to the unfolding of the deeper meaning of Scripture chiefly through allegorical exegesis, which is totally without proof. De Wette gives no explanation : Osiander explains as we do. Hofmann makes σοφία a property of the *subject* (see in opposition to this, ii. 6 : σοφίαν λαλοῦμεν), one, namely, which qualifies for right judgment in general ; γνῶσις, again, *a relation to an object*, namely, the thorough mastery of it in the particular instance in hand. But in that case the γνῶσις would only be the *application* of the σοφία *in concreto*, and Paul would thus not be adducing two χαρίσματα distinct in character from each other.—κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ πνεῦμα] *according to the same Spirit*. Comp. ver. 11, and the classical κατὰ Θεόν, according to divine *destination* (Valckenaer, *ad Herod.* iii. 153). The prepositions διὰ, κατά, ἐν, are not equivalent in meaning (Rückert), but they so express the relation of the Spirit to the divine bestowal (δίδοται), according to the different aspects of His participation therein, as to show that He is *medians*, *normans*, or *continens*, with respect to the different gifts in question.

Ver. 9. Ἑτέρῳ] not ἄλλῳ again, because introducing another class which *differs* in kind from the preceding one. Comp. on Gal i. 6 ; 2 Cor. xi. 4 ; Matt. xvi. 14. — πίστις] cannot be the *fides salvifica* in general, seeing that this is a possession common to all and required of *every* Christian, not a peculiar charisma of certain individuals. Hence it has been understood by most commentators, following the Fathers (see in Suicer, *Theas.* II. p. 727), to refer to the *fides miraculosa*, Matt. xvii. 20. But this is clearly too narrow a meaning, since not only the ἰάματα and δυνάμεις are ranked under this head, but also the προφητεία and the διακρίσεις πνευμ. What is intended, therefore, must be a *high degree of faith in Christ* produced by the Holy Spirit, a *heroism of faith*,<sup>1</sup> the effects of which manifested themselves in one in healings, in another in wonders, in a third in prophecy (Rom. xii. 6), in a fourth in discernment of spirits. — ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ πν.] *in the same Spirit*, so that, contained in this Spirit, the χάρισμα is given, and

<sup>1</sup> “Ardentissima et praesentissima apprehensio Dei in ipsius potissimum voluntate, ad effectus vel in naturae vel in gratiae regno singulariter conspicuos.”—BENGEL.

the Spirit thus includes in Himself the gift. — *χαρίσμ. ἰάμ.*] *gifts, through means of which healings are effected.* The instances in the Acts of the Apostles show that this does not mean natural skill, but cures wrought by spiritual power upon bodily maladies (miraculous cures). Comp. Mark xvi. 18 ; Acts iv. 30. It does not, however, exclude the application of natural means in connection with the power that wrought the cure (Mark vii. 33, viii. 23 ; John ix. 6, *al.* ; Jas. v. 14). The plural *χαρίσματα* points to the different kinds of sickness, for the healing of which different gifts were needful.<sup>1</sup>

Ver. 10. *Ἐνεργήματα δυνάμ.*] *workings* (ver. 6) *which consist in acts of power.* It is a purely arbitrary assumption that by this is meant merely the "*potestas puniendi sentes, qualis exercita in Ananiam, etc.*" (Grotius, following Chrysostom and Theophylact, comp. also David Schulz). They are in general—excluding, however, the cures already assigned to a special gift—*miraculous works* (comp. Acts iv. 30), which, as the effects of a will endowed with miraculous power, may be very various according to the different occasions which determined its action (2 Cor. xii. 12 ; Heb. ii. 4 ; also Rom. xv. 19). Instances of raising the dead belonged likewise to this division.<sup>2</sup> — *προφητεία*] *prophetic speech, i.e. address flowing from revelation and impulse of the Holy Spirit, which, without being bound for that matter to a specific office, suddenly* (xiv. 30) *unveils the depths of the human heart* (xiv. 25) *and of the divine counsels* (iii. 10 ; Eph. iii. 5), *and thereby works with peculiar power for the enlightenment, admonition, and comforting of the faithful* (xiv. 3), *and so as to win over the unbelieving* (xiv. 24). As respects the substance of what he utters, the prophet is distinguished from the speaker with tongues by this, that the latter utters prayers only (see below) ; and as respects form, by the fact that the prophet speaks intelligibly, not in an ecstatic way, consequently not without the

<sup>1</sup> As Baur rationalizes all these charismata : *πίστις* being, according to him, a peculiarly strong faith in *Divine Providence* ; the *χάρισμα ἰαμάτων* being the gift of *praying* with special power and fervency for the sick, with more or less confident promise of recovery, if it please God ; and the *ἐνεργήμ. δυνάμ.* being proofs of extraordinary mental fortitude and energy in the interests of Christianity.

<sup>2</sup> But not instances of the casting out of demons (Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 410), which are to be placed under the category of the *ἰάματα* (comp. Matt. xv. 28 ; Luke vi. 17, ix. 42 ; Acts x. 38).

exercise of reflective thought; he differs from the διδάσκαλος thus: ὁ μὲν προφητεύων πάντα ἀπὸ τοῦ πνεύματος φθέγγεται· ὁ δὲ διδάσκων ἐστὶν ὅπου καὶ ἐξ οἰκείας διανοίας διαλέγεται, Chrysostom on ver. 28. Comp. generally on Acts xi. 27. Lücke, *Einkl. in d. Offenb. Joh.* p. 29. Güder in Herzog's *Encyclop.* XII. p. 210 f. — διακρίσεις πνευμ.] *judgments of spirits*, i.e. judgments which avail, and that immediately on hearing the utterances, for the preservation of the church from misleading influences, by informing it from what spirits the utterances proceeded, and by whom they were carried on in the different cases (hence the plural διακρίσεις), whether consequently the Holy Spirit, or the human spirit merely, or even demoniac spirits (1 Tim. iv. 1; 1 John iv. 1) were at work; καὶ γὰρ πολλὰ τότε τῶν ψευδοπροφητῶν ἦν διαφορὰ, τοῦ διαβόλου φιλονεικοῦντος παρυνποστῆσαι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τὸ ψεῦδος, Chrysostom. Respecting διάκρισις, comp. on Rom. xiv. 1. — γένη γλωσσῶν] The γλώσσαις λαλεῖν in Corinth was identical with that mentioned in Acts x. 46 and xix. 6, identical also with the speaking at Pentecost, Acts ii., according to its *historical* substance (see on Acts, *loc. cit.*), although not according to the form preserved by *tradition* in Luke's account, which had made it a speaking in foreign languages, and so a miracle of a quite peculiar kind. Most commentators, indeed, following Origen and the Fathers generally (with exceptions, however, as early as Irenaeus and Tertullian), have taken γλώσσαι in this passage also as meaning *foreign languages* (so Storr, Flatt, Heydenreich, Schulthess, Schrader, Rückert, Ch. F. Fritzsche, Maier), and that, too, in the view of the majority, *unacquired* languages;<sup>1</sup> only a few (among the most recent of whom are Schulthess, *de charismatib. Sp. St.*, Lips. 1818, and Schrader, also Ch. F. Fritzsche in his *Nov. Opusc.* p. 302 ff.) regarding them as *acquired by learning*.<sup>2</sup> The former view is held also by Rückert

<sup>1</sup> So, too, Zinsler, *de charism. τοῦ γλ. λαλεῖν*, Aug. Vind. 1847, — a Roman Catholic prize-essay which obtained the prize, but is destitute of all scientific worth. Of a much more thorough description is another successful prize-essay (also Roman Catholic), by Englmann, *von den Charismen*, etc., Mainz 1848, who explains it in the same way of foreign languages; as also Froschammer, *Charismen*, 1850; and Maier, *Die Glossolalie des apost. Zeitalt.* 1855.

<sup>2</sup> Ch. F. Fritzsche's view is: At Corinth, as in seaport towns generally, there were labourers, fishers, etc., who, from their intercourse with foreign sailors, had become so far acquainted with different languages as to be able to converse about matters of ordinary life. Many of these people had become Christians, and having now learned

("the faculty, in isolated moments of high inspiration, of praising God in languages which they had not previously learned") and Bäumlein in the *Stud. d. evangelischen Geistlichkeit Würtemb.* VI. 2, 1834, pp. 30-123; Osiander; Kling in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1839, p. 487 ff.; to some extent Olshausen and Bauer in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1843, p. 658 ff.; 1844, p. 708 ff. See, in opposition to it, especially Bleek in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1829, p. 17 f.; Bauer in the *Tübing. Zeitschr.* 1830, 2, p. 104 ff.; Schulz, *Geistesgaben*, p. 57 ff.; Zeller, *Apostelgesch.* p. 89 ff.; van Hengel, *de Gave der talen*, Leiden 1864, p. 90 ff. Even putting out of account the singular expression *γλώσση λαλεῖν*, which is supposed to refer to a foreign language, and the psychological impossibility<sup>1</sup> of speaking languages which had not been learned, the following considerations tell decidedly against the view of foreign languages: (1) It would make xiv. 2 untrue in all cases in which persons were found among the audience who understood the languages spoken. (2) In xiv. 10, 11 we have the *γένη φωνῶν* (languages) expressly distinguished from the *γένη γλωσσῶν* (see unfounded objections to this in Bäumlein, p. 92, and in Hofmann), and the former adduced as an *analogue* of the latter. (3) What is contrasted with the *glossolalia* is not speaking in one's native tongue, but speaking with employment of the understanding (xiv. 15); and the *glossolalia* itself is characterized as *λαλεῖν πνεύματι*. (4) In xiv. 6 there is contrasted with the *γλώσσ. λαλεῖν* the speaking *ἐν ἀποκαλύψει, ἐν γνώσει κ.τ.λ.*, which could all, of course, be done in any language; hence the unintelligibleness of the *glossolalia* is not to be sought in the *idiom*, but in the fact that what was spoken contained neither *ἀποκάλυψις* nor *γνώσις*, etc. (5) Upon this theory, the case supposed in xiv. 28 could not have occurred

that it had been predicted by the prophets that in the Messianic times the Holy Spirit would bring about a speaking concerning divine things in strange tongues (Isa. xxviii. 11 f.; Joel iii.), they had accordingly applied this oracle to themselves, "quos pro sua, licet tenui, exterarum linguarum peritia prae ceteris idoneos putassent, quos Spiritus s. barbaris linguis de rebus divinis disserere juberet." Since, however, most of the Christians did not understand this speaking in strange tongues, there had to be an interpretation into Greek, and the interpreters in their turn, not less than the speakers, regarded their ability as flowing from the Holy Spirit. So it all resolves itself into naïve self-deception and imagination!

<sup>1</sup> This is made only the more evident, if we suppose (comp. e.g. Kling) that one speaking with tongues could perhaps even take elements from very different languages and join them creatively together in a harmonious combination.



at all, since every speaker would have been able also to interpret. (6) In xiv. 18 Paul states that he himself possessed the *glossolalia* in a high degree, but adds that he did not exercise it in the church,—from which it would follow that Paul was in the habit of praying in private, before God, in foreign languages! (7) In xiv. 9, διὰ τῆς γλώσσης plainly means *by the tongue*, which, however, would be a quite superfluous addition if the point were not one concerning speaking with *tongues* (not with *languages*). (8) Paul would have discussed the whole subject of the χάρισμα in question from quite another point of view, namely, according to the presence or non-presence of those who understood foreign languages. Billroth therefore is right in opposing, as we do, the hypothesis of foreign languages; but he still holds fast the signification *language*, and maintains that the *glossolalia* was “*the speaking of a mixed language, which comprised the elements or rudiments of actual historic languages of the most widely different kinds, and was the type of the universal character of Christianity.*” But to say nothing of the Quixotic arbitrariness of the conception of such a medley, to say nothing also of the fact that the first rudiments of languages must have been only very imperfect, unadapted for supersensuous themes, and wholly unsuitable as a means of expression for ecstatic inspiration—this view is opposed by almost all the considerations adduced against the hypothesis of foreign languages applied with the requisite modifications, and in addition by the phrase γλώσση λαλεῖν without the article; for the mixed language would surely not have been indefinitely *a language*, but *the language κατ’ ἐξοχήν*, the primeval speech. Rossteuscher, too (*Gabe d. Sprachen im apost. Zeitalter*, 1850), explains it as *languages*, and infers from xiii. 1 that the *glossolalia* in 1 Cor. was the speaking in *angelic languages* (Acts ii. : in *human languages*), the designation being formed with reference to the characteristic of this mysterious language, that it betokened a converse alone with God, such as the angels have. So also, in substance, Thiersch, *Kirche im apost. Zeitalt.* p. 67 f. But this whole conception is shown to be erroneous when we consider that, if the specific characteristic of the phenomenon had been its *angelic* nature, the latter would have found its expression in the very *name* of the thing, and would also have been made mention of by Paul in his certainly pretty minute discussion

of the subject; whereas, on the contrary, in xiii. 1 a speaking *ταῖς γλώσσαις τῶν ἀγγέλων* is only *supposed* as an *imaginary* case to heighten the contrast. Generally, however, the explanations which make it a *speaking in a language or languages*, are incompatible with the whole account of it which follows, even if we try to represent to ourselves the phenomenon and the designation as Hofmann does. According to him, the question is regarding languages spoken by the speaker only in virtue of his being carried away by the Holy Spirit, the distinctions between which, however, were not to be considered as differences between the language of one nation and another, but arose out of this, that the Holy Spirit gave impulse and power to the speaker to make his language for himself for what he had to utter at that very moment, so that the language moulded itself specially in the mouth of each individual respectively for that which had to be uttered. Those expositors who departed from the signification *language* entered on the right path.<sup>1</sup> But that by itself was not enough to bring them to what was positively the right meaning. For Bleek in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1829, pp. 3-79, 1830, p. 43 ff., explains it as *glosses*, i.e. *antique, highly poetic words and formulae, to some extent consisting of provincialisms*. This view is equally opposed by most of the considerations which tell against the foreign languages, as well as by xiii. 1; and further, it has against it the fact that *γλ.* in the above sense is a *terminus technicus* which occurs, indeed, after Aristotle, although for the most part in grammarians, but which the New Testament writers probably did not so much as know; and also the consideration that the singular *γλώσση λαλεῖν, γλώσσαν ἔχειν, γλώσση προσεύχεσθαι*, as well as the expression *γλώσσαι ἀγγέλων*, would be quite absurd. See further, Baur, *loc. cit.* p. 85 ff. (who, however, in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1838, p. 618 ff., has come over in substance to Bleek's view); Schulz, *loc. cit.* p. 20 ff., and in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1839, p. 752 ff.; Wieseler in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1838, p. 723 ff.; Hilgenfeld, *Glossologie*, 1850, p. 28 ff. The result of all this is, that there is only the signification *tongue* remaining for *γλώσσα*, so that *γλώσσαις λαλεῖν* expresses *an uttering oneself with tongues*. This is not, however, to be taken as justifying the extreme view of Bardili

<sup>1</sup> Luther too, up to 1528, had "tongues," but from that date onwards has "languages." In chap. xiv., however, he has still "tongues" in 1545.

(*significatus primitiv. vocis προφητ.*, etc., Gott. 1786) and Eichhorn (*Biblioth.* I. pp. 91 ff., 775 ff.; II. p. 755 ff.; III. p. 322 ff.), according to which what is meant is a *lisp* of inarticulate tones;<sup>1</sup> for such a strange form of expression for inspiration, for which Paul would hardly have given thanks to God,—such a *play* of spiritual utterance as would hardly have made any certain charismatic exposition possible,—must have been clearly presented by the text, in order, despite these considerations, to warrant its assumption. Comp. on Acts ii. But the text characterizes the speaking in tongues as utterance of prayer (xiv. 13–17) in which the *νοῦς* falls into the background, and therefore unintelligible without interpretation. There must thus, certainly, have been a want of connection, since the reflective faculty was absent which regulates and presents clearly the conceptions; there may even have been inarticulateness in it, sometimes in a greater, sometimes in a less degree; but must it on this account have been a mere babbling? May it not have been a speaking in ecstatic ejaculations, abrupt ascriptions of praise to God, and other mysterious outbursts in prayer of the highest strain of inspiration? Baur, too, *loc. cit.*, agrees in substance with this;<sup>2</sup> as also Steudel in the *Tüb. Zeitschr.* 1830, 2, p. 135 ff.; Neander; Kuntze in the *theol. Mitarb.* 1840, p. 119 ff.; Olshausen (who, however, takes γλ. as *languages*, and holds himself obliged, on the ground of Acts ii., to include also the use of foreign languages); de Wette; Delitzsch, *Psychol.* p. 362 f.; Zeller in the *theol. Jahrb.* 1849, 1, p. 43, and *Apostelgesch.* p. 111. Comp. too, Ewald, *Jahrb.* III. p. 270 ff., who, however, derives from the speaking with tongues the ἀββὰ ὁ πατήρ, which is in itself so intelligible, and which does not pre-

<sup>1</sup> Wieseler approached nearest to this view, understanding “an ecstatic speaking in unintelligible expressions, i.e. in soft, scarcely audible, inarticulate words, tones, and sounds, in which inspired pious feeling found vent” (*Stud. u. Krit.* 1838, p. 738). The same writer, however, has more recently (see *Stud. u. Krit.* 1860, p. 113 ff.) modified his view to this extent, that he now explains the ecstatic *soft* praying as being only one special γίνες γλωσσῶν, no longer making it the universal form of all speaking with tongues, and in other respects agreeing in substance with our interpretation. But there is nothing in the whole section to lead to the idea of even a *soft kind* of glossolalia; on the contrary, the comparisons, in particular, with the flute, lyre, trumpet, and cymbal, as well as with foreign languages, are decidedly against this. A soft lisp might run along with it, but was assuredly no special γίνες γλωσσῶν.

<sup>2</sup> Comp. also Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 410.

suppose any high inspiration, and the unutterable sighings, Rom. viii. 26, which do not belong to the sphere of the λαλεῖν. Similarly van Hengel, p. 105, who, again, conceives the original glossolalia (*"open-hearted and loud speaking to the glorifying of God in Christ,"* see on Acts ii.) to have become so degenerate and abused by the Corinthians, that it was now *"a spiritless counterfeit, a product of pride and vanity,"* and so no longer to the glory of God in Christ,—an assumption which leaves it unexplained why Paul should not have denounced an abuse of this kind in the severest way, and how he could even place his own speaking with tongues upon the same level with that of the Corinthians. Hilgenfeld, who understands it to mean language of immediate divine suggestion (*"divine tongues, spirit-voices from a higher world"*), is not disposed to keep distinct from each other the two meanings of γλῶσσα, *tongue* and *language* (so also Zeller, Delitzsch, and others), although Paul himself keeps them distinct in xiv. 10 f. Schulz limits the conception too narrowly to ascriptions of praise to God,<sup>1</sup> since, in fact, xiv. 13–17 shows that it included prayer, praise, and thanksgiving. We are accordingly to understand by γλῶσσais λαλεῖν *such an outburst of prayer in petition, praise, and thanksgiving, as was so ecstatic that in connection with it the speaker's own conscious intellectual activity was suspended, while the tongue did not serve as the instrument for the utterance of self-active reflection, but, independently of it, was involuntarily set in motion by the Holy Spirit, by whom the man in his deepest nature was seized and borne away.*<sup>2</sup> As regards this

<sup>1</sup> The result of his investigation is presented by Schulz, p. 160, as follows: "The extraordinary excitement of mind, which at times possessed believers in Christ in the primitive church at the thought of the salvation now manifested in Christ, of the blessedness of God's chosen children now realized after the fulfilment of his earlier promises, and which, under certain circumstances, rose even to ecstasy, was itself regarded as a special gracious gift of the Godhead, and since no nearer means of explanation offered itself, as an immediate operation of the Holy Spirit. Every one therefore willingly yielded himself to such an exaltation of spirit, and had no scruple in giving vent to his joy of soul by joyous and jubilant tones, shouting aloud the praises of God in song, partly in old and familiar strains, partly in newly formed ones, without any concern for the fact that in this way he might easily fall into boundless extravagances, improprieties, and troubles. *This singing of praise to God, arising in and from that condition of ecstasy,—these triumphant, loud-sounding strains of jubilation (not the condition of ecstasy itself), are in our judgment what is denoted by the formulas γλῶσση and γλῶσσais λαλεῖν.*"

<sup>2</sup> In the ancient church we have, as analogies to the glossolalia, to some extent

matter, it is conceivable—(1) that the abeyance of the *νοῦς* made this *λαλεῖν* so disconnected and mysterious for hearers who were bound to the conditions of the *νοῦς*, that it could not be understood by them without *ἐρμηνεία*. Incomprehensible sounds, partly sighing, partly jubilant cries, broken words, expressions new in their form and connection, in which the deepest emotion struggled to express itself, and in whatever other ways the tongue might give utterance to the highest surgings and heavings of the Spirit,—it remained unfruitful for others, if no interpretation was added, like a foreign language not understood. Equally conceivable is it (2) that in such utterances of prayer, the tongue, because speaking independently of the *νοῦς*, apparently spoke of *itself*,<sup>1</sup> although it was in reality the organ of the Holy Spirit. It was not the *I* of the man that spoke, but the *tongue*,—so the case *seemed* to be, and so arose its *designation*. But (3) because that ecstatic kind of prayer showed itself under very different characteristic modifications (which we doubtless, from want of experience of them, are not in a position to establish), and the same speaker with tongues must, according to the varying degrees, impulses, and tendencies of his ecstasy, have expressed himself in manifold ways which could be easily distinguished from each other, so that he appeared to speak with different tongues, there arose both the plural expression *γλώσσαις λαλεῖν* and the mode of view which led men to distinguish *γένη γλωσσῶν*.<sup>2</sup>

(Ritschl, *altkath. K.* p. 473 ff.) the *Montanistic* ecstasies (see Schwegler, *Montanism*, p. 83 ff.; Hilgenfeld, *Glossolalie*, p. 115 ff.; comp. Lücke, *Einl. in d. Apokal.* I. p. 324, ed. 2); in modern times, the ecstatic discourses of the French and German inspired ones (Goebel in the *Zeitschr. f. histor. Theol.* 1854, p. 287 ff.), as well as the *Irvingite* speaking with tongues (Hohl, *Bruchstücke aus d. Leben Irv.*, St. Gallen 1839, *evangel. Kirchenzeit.* 1839, No. 54 f.; 1839, No. 83 f.; Reich in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1849, p. 195 ff.), and ecstatic incidents at Revivals and among the American Methodists (Fabri, *d. neuesten Erweckungen in America*, etc., 1860); as likewise glossolalic phenomena, which are narrated of clairvoyants (Delitzsch, *Psychol.* p. 364 f.). But earlier still we have another analogue in Philo's conception of the divinely inspired speaking of the prophets; the prophet only *seems* to speak himself, *κατα-χρήται δὲ ἕτερος αὐτοῦ τοῖς φωνητηρίοις ὄργανοις, στόματι καὶ γλώττῃ πρὸς μήνυσιν ὧν ἂν εἴλῃ* (*quis rer. div. haer.* I. p. 510, Mang.).—Regarding the essential difference of *somnambulist* phenomena, which may be compared with the speaking with tongues, see Delitzsch, *Psychol. loc. cit.*—There is not the remotest ground for thinking of an *ecclesiastical secret language* (Redslob, *Apokal.* I. 1859).

<sup>1</sup> The tongue was not *γλῶσσα ὑπήκοος τῷ λογισμῷ*, Plut. *Mor.* p. 90 B.

<sup>2</sup> Baur, in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1838, p. 628 ff., professes himself, so far as the plural expression *γλώσσαις λαλεῖν* is concerned, an adherent of Bleek's theory, which

—ἐρμηνεία γλωσσ.] *Interpretation of tongues*, i.e. *a making of tongues intelligible in speaking*, a presentation of the sense of what they say.<sup>1</sup> The condition for this was the capacity of the νοῦς, produced by the Spirit, to receive what was prayed for in *glossolalia*. The man speaking with tongues *might* himself (xiv. 5–13) have the χάρισμα of the interpreter (comp. the classical ὑποφότης), but did not *always* have it himself alone, as Wieseler also now admits (*Stud. u. Krit.* 1860, p. 117) in opposition to his own earlier view.

Ver. 11. Amid all this diversity, however, what unity of the operative principle!—ἐνεργεῖ] namely, as the divine power endowing the different individuals differently. See what follows. Διάφοροι μὲν οἱ κρουνοὶ, μία δὲ πάντως πηγὴ, Theodoret. — ἰδίᾳ] *seorsim, severally*. See Bernhardt, p. 185. Comp. Plato, *Menex.* p. 249 B: ἅπερ ἰδίᾳ ἐκάστω ἴδια γίγνεται. Pind. *Nem.* iii. 42; and very often in classical writers. Elsewhere in the N. T.: κατ' ἰδίαν. — καθὼς βούλεται] not: *arbitrarily*, but (comp. on Matt. i. 19): *in accordance with the determination of His will*, which by no means precludes this divine self-determining action of the Holy Spirit from proceeding in a manner corresponding

in other respects he impugns, with two limitations, however (see p. 636): (1) that we are not to connect with γλῶσσαι the conception of a poetic, inspired mode of speech; and (2) that Bleek's explanation is not to be applied to the passages in the Acts. According to Baur, it is "*a speaking in strange, unusual phrases which deviate from the prevailing usage of the language.*" The pressure of the overpowering feeling, which strove for expression, called to its aid these forms of speech, which were partly borrowed from foreign languages, partly at least not in use in the ordinary language of common life. These forms of speech were, according to him, the γλῶσσαι, and the γλώσσαις λαλῖν was an intensified γλώσση λαλ. But if γλῶσσα, both in its singular and plural form, is to mean *tongue* (see p. 622), then γλῶσσαι (the plural) cannot at the same time mean *utterances of the tongue, peculiarities of language* (see p. 634 f.).—The different explanations of γίνη γλ. may be easily known from the different views of the nature of the χάρισμα in itself. Those interpreters, e.g., who understand γλῶσσαι of foreign languages, think of the *variety of languages* (Chrysostom on ver. 1: ὁ μὲν τῇ Περσῶν, ὁ δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαίων, ὁ δὲ τῇ Ἰνδῶν, ὁ δὲ τῇ ἑτέρᾳ τινι τοιαύτῃ εὐθὺς ἐφλέγγετο γλώσση); Eichhorn: "all sorts of unintelligible tones;" Schulz: "many various strains of divinely inspired songs of praise;" Wieseler (1838): the inarticulate lisping itself, *with and without its interpretation*; Rossteuscher: "human and angelic languages," xiii. 1; Hilgenfeld: different kinds of divinely suggested speech; Hofmann: all the different sorts of peculiar forms of the language in the mouth of each individual.

<sup>1</sup> How the ancient interpreters conceived of *this χάρισμα*, may be seen, e.g., in Theodoret: ἀνὴρ γὰρ πολλὰκις τὴν Ἑλλάδα γλῶτταν μόνῃσι δίδως, ἑτέρου τὴν Σκυθῶν καὶ Θρακῶν διαλεγόμενον, τὴν ἱερηνίαν προσέφιρε τοῖς ἀκούουσι.

to the natural and general Christian capacity, and to the peculiar disposition and tendency of the minds, of men. Hence, on the one hand, the possibility that, from the human side, particular charismata may be *obtained by effort*, ver. 31, xiv. 1; and also, on the other hand, the duty of not estimating slightly the gifts of others. Observe, further, in *καθὼς βούλεται* the *personality* of the Spirit.

Ver. 12. Illustration of how one and the same Spirit works all the charismata as He will; namely, just as the case stands *with the body*, that its many members make up its unity, so also does it stand in like manner *with Christ*, whose many members likewise constitute the unity of His body. 'Ο Χριστός is not the *Christian church*, but *Christ Himself*, inasmuch, that is to say, as He, as the *Head* of the church, has in its many members His organic body,<sup>1</sup> which receives forth from Him, the Head, the whole harmonious connection and efficiency of all its members and its growth. Christ is not conceived as the *Ego* of the church as His body (Hofmann), but as in all parallel expressions of the apostle (see especially Eph. iv. 16, 25, v. 30; Rom. xii. 4 f., and above on vi. 15), as the *Head* of the church, and the church as the *body* of the Head. Ver. 21 does not run counter to this; see on that passage. — The repetition of τοῦ σώματος, which is superfluous in itself, or might have been represented by αὐτοῦ (comp. Lobeck, *ad Aj.* p. 222, ed. 2; Kühner, *ad Xen. Anab.* i. 7. 11), serves here emphatically to bring out the unity.

Ver. 13. Confirmation of this unity from the holy *inward* relation which conditions it. *For even by means of one Spirit were we all baptized into one body*—i.e. for even by this, that we received one and the same Holy Spirit at our baptism, were we all to be bound together into one ethical body. Comp. Titus iii. 5. — In καί, which belongs to ἐν ἐνὶ πν., is conveyed the indication of the relation *corresponding* to what was spoken of in ver. 12; ἐβαπτίσθ., again, is not to be taken *tropically*, as is done by Reiche also ("de Spiritu sancto largiter nobis collato"), following Venema, Michaelis, Rosenmüller, Krause, Flatt, and admitting only an *allusion* to baptism; but, as the word itself must have suggested to the reader, of the *actual baptism*, only in such a way that by ἐν ἐνὶ πνεύματι it was to be brought prominently before

<sup>1</sup> Comp. Ehrenfeuchter, *prakt. Theol.* I. p. 57 f.; see also *Constitt. ap.* ii. 59. 1.

the mind from its *spiritual* side, according to its *materia coelestis*, in so far as it was a baptism of the *Spirit*. Comp. Hofmann also, now in opposition to his own *Schriftbew.* II. 2, p. 28. This βαπτισθῆναι ἐν ἐνὶ πνεύματι has taken place εἰς ἐν σῶμα, in reference to one body (Matt. xxviii. 19; Rom. vi. 3; 1 Cor. x. 2), i.e. it had as its destination that we should all now make up one body. Regarding εἴτε Ἰουδαῖοι κ.τ.λ., comp. Gal. iii. 28; Col. iii. 11. — The second *hemistich* does not begin already with εἴτε Ἰουδαῖοι κ.τ.λ., in which case καὶ before πάντες would be only in the way (comp. also iii. 22; Col. i. 16), but starts only from καὶ πάντες, so that the reception of the one Spirit at baptism is once again declared with emphasis. The reference to *baptism* was correctly made by as early commentators as Chrysostom,<sup>1</sup> Oecumenius, Theophylact; in recent times, by Rückert, Baur, de Wette, Ewald, Maier, Hofmann: *and we were all given to drink of one Spirit* (comp. Eccles. xv. 3). To represent the *communication* of the Spirit which took place at baptism as a *giving to drink*, followed naturally from the conception of the *pouring out* of the Spirit,<sup>2</sup> John vii. 37 ff.; Acts ii. 17; Rom. v. 5; and is here, after being already mentioned with ἐν ἐνὶ πνεύματι, brought forward yet again *independently* and with peculiar *emphasis* as the *inward correlate* of the ἐν σῶμα. This καὶ π. ἐν πν. ἐποτ. refers neither (Augustine, Luther, Beza, Calvin, Estius, Grotius, Calovius, Osiander, Neander, Kahnis, Kling, and many others) to the *Lord's Supper* (most adopting the reading εἰς ἐν πν., which would mean: *in order to make up one Spirit*), nor "to the further *nourishment and training in Christianity* through the Divine Spirit, who constantly renews Himself in every Christian" (Billroth, Olshausen), in connection with which the reference to the Lord's Supper is not excluded. The aorist is against both these interpretations, for its temporal significance must be the same with that of ἐβαπτ., and against the former of them is the reading ἐν πνεῦμα (without εἰς), by which the reference to the Lord's Supper (see, in opposition to this, Theophylact) is debarred in this way, because the idea that we drink the Holy Spirit in the Lord's Supper is not biblical, not

<sup>1</sup> He gives first the explanation referring it to the Lord's Supper, but then goes on: ἡμεῖς δὲ δοκεῖ νῦν ἐκείνῳ λίγειν πνεύματος τὴν ἐπιφοίτησιν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ βαπτίσματος καὶ πρὸ τῶν μυστηρίων ἐγγινομένην ἡμῖν.

<sup>2</sup> Comp. also Isa. xix. 10: πιστόσκειν ὑμᾶς κύρις πνύματι κατανύζων.



even underlying x. 3 f. See, besides, Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 355. Rückert refers correctly καί . . . ἐποτ. to the reception of the Spirit as an event happening once for all, but takes the relation of the two clauses in such a way, that what Paul means to say is, "we are not simply one body, but also one spirit." In that case he would not have written ἐν ἐνὶ πνεύματι in the first clause.

Ver. 14 ff. For the further illustration (γάρ) of this unity, the figure of the human body is again brought forward in order now to carry it out more minutely, and to show by it in detail on to ver. 26 how preposterous it is to be discontented with the gift received, or to despise those differently gifted. On the whole passage, comp. the speech of Menenius Agrippa in Livy, ii. 32, also Seneca, *de ira*, ii. 31; Marc. Anton. ii. 1, vii. 13; Clem. *Cor.* I. 37. — ὅτι οὐκ εἰμὶ χεῖρ] because I am not hand, I am not of the body, do not belong to it. — οὐ παρὰ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ.] cannot, with Erasmus, Luther, Castalio, Beza, Calvin, and most expositors, including Griesbach, Scholz, Flatt, Schulz, de Wette, Ewald, Maier, Neander, be taken as a *question* (which Billroth, Rückert, Hofmann, following Bengel and others, rightly reject), so that the double negative should strengthen the denial: *num ideo non est corporis?* In this case, namely, οὐ would only be the ordinary interrogative, which presupposes an affirmative answer; but as such it can by no means warrant or explain an intensifying repetition. And an anadiplosis of the οὐ (Klotz, *ad Devar.* p. 696 f.; Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Symp.* p. 199 A) would be suitable in an earnest declaratory sentence, but not in such a question as this. We must therefore delete the mark of interrogation, as Lachmann also and Tischendorf have done, so as to make οὐ serve as a negative for the whole sentence, while the succeeding οὐκ applies simply to the ἔστιν. We render consequently, *so is he not on that account* (namely, because he asserts it in that discontented expression) *no part of the body*; that peevish declaration does not do away with what he is, namely, a member of the body. — Regarding παρὰ with the accusative in the sense of: *for the sake of, in virtue of, on account of*, see Klausen, *ad Aesch. Choeph.* 383; Krüger on *Thuc.* i. 141. 6; so often in Demosthenes. By τοῦτο<sup>1</sup> cannot be meant: this, *that it is not the hand* (Billroth and others), but only (comp. Hofmann), as the

<sup>1</sup> Comp. παρὰ τοῦτο, 4 Macc. x. 19; παρὰ ταῦτα πάντῃ, Judith viii. 25.

logical relation of the protasis and apodosis requires: this, *that it gives vent to such discontent about its position of not being the hand*, as if it could not regard itself in its capacity of foot as belonging at all to the body. Erasmus in his *Paraphrase* happily describes the temper of the member which spoke in this way as: "*deplorans sortem suam.*" — It may be added, that as early an interpreter as Chrysostom has appreciated the fact of Paul's placing together foot and hand, eye and ear, as *analogous* members: ἐπειδὴ γὰρ οὐ τοῖς σφόδρα ὑπερέχουσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὀλίγον ἀναβεβηκόσι φθονεῖν εἰώθαμεν.

Ver. 17 exposes the preposterous character of the preceding language. — ὀφθαλμός] *sc. ἦν*, ver. 19. — ὄσφρησις] Plato, *Phaed.* p. 111 B, *the sense of smell.*

Ver. 18. Νυνὶ δέ] *but so, i.e. but in this way*, as the case really stands, has God given to the members their place (ἔθετο), etc. — ἐν ἑκαστον αὐτῶν] is in apposition to τὰ μέλη, and defines it more precisely. — ἡθέλησεν] To this simple *will* of God each member has to submit itself. The thought in καθὼς βούλεται, ver. 11, is different.

Ver. 19 f. *If, on the contrary, the whole of the members, which make up the body, were one member*,—if they, instead of their variety, formed one undifferentiated member,—*where were the body?* In that case there would be no body existent, for its essential nature is just the combination of different organs,—a new *abductio ad absurdum*. — *But so* (as ver. 18) *there are indeed many members, but one body.* The antitheses in vv. 18 and 20 manifest, in contradistinction to the perverseness of vain longing after gifts not received, the necessity of the existing relation to the organic and harmonious subsistence and life of the church.

Ver. 21. Hitherto, in vv. 15–20, this figure has been used to rebuke those who were discontented with what they considered their lesser gifts; we now come to those who were proud of their higher gifts and contemptuous towards the less highly gifted. — οὐ δύναται] of the impossibility conditioned by the indispensableness of the hand for the eye. — πάλιν] as in Matt. iv. 7, v. 33, *again*,—since the case belongs to the same category. Comp. on 2 Cor. x. 7; Rom. xv. 10. — ἡ κεφαλὴ] *the head*, consequently the part of the body which stands highest, compared with the feet, the members that stand lowest. That

Paul, in his specializing representation, has in view *simply* the corporeal members *as such*, and therefore introduces the *head* also upon the scene with the rest, without in any way thereby touching upon the idea of Christ as the Head of the church (comp. on ver. 12), is plain from the whole picture, which, in its concrete details, is as far as possible from giving occasion to allegorical interpretations of the several parts of the body.

Vv. 22, 23. No; the relationship of the members is, on the contrary, of a different sort; those accounted *weaker* are *necessary*; likewise those held to be *less honourable* are the *more honourably attired*; those which are *unseemly* are invested with all the greater *seemliness*. What *particular* members Paul specially meant here by the *weak* (Theodoret, Estius, and several others hold: the brain and inward organs; Hofmann: "the delicate inward parts;" Bengel: the hands; most commentators, including Billroth: the eyes and ears) and by the *ἀτιμοτέροις* (*usually*: the feet; Grotius and Calovius: "venter cum iis quae sub ventre sunt;" Kypke: the intestines) cannot be definitely settled in detail, since he only says in a summary way: "How contrary it is to the natural relation of the members, if one were to say to the other (as in the preceding illustration the eye to the hand, or the head to the feet), I have no need of thee! Such contemptuous treatment can find no warrant either in the weakness, or the less honourable character, or the unseemliness of any member; for the members which we count weak are shielded from depreciation by their necessity; those held less honourable, by their more honourable dress; and those which are unseemly, by their seemly covering." Since, however, it is of itself undoubted that he reckoned the *prudenda* (τὰ αἰδοῖα) and the *breech* among the *ἀσχήμονα*, we may further, without arbitrariness, set down the delicate organs of sense, such as the *eye* and *ear*, among the *ἀσθενέστερα*, and among the *ἀτιμότερα* again the members specially cared for in the way of adornment by dress, such as the trunk, hips, and shoulders. — πολλῶ μᾶλλον] the logical *multo potius*. — τὰ δοκοῦντα] *which appear*, like ἃ δοκοῦμεν, ver. 23. Chrysostom aptly says, that what is conveyed is not τῆς φύσεως τῶν πραγμάτων, but τῆς τῶν πολλῶν ὑπονοίας ἢ ψήφου. The *position* is, as in Plato, *Rep.* p. 572 B, καὶ πάντῃ δοκοῦσιν ἡμῶν ἐνίοις μετρίους εἶναι. Comp. p. 334 C. — The first *καὶ* in ver. 23

subjoins another category, the two members of which are put in order of climax (*ἀτιμότ., ἀσχήμ.*). — *ἀτιμότερα εἶναι τοῦ σώμ.*] *to be more dishonourable parts of the body*, than others; “*comparativus molliens*,” Bengel. — *τιμὴν περισσ.*] *honour in richer measure* than others, namely, *by the clothing*, which is indicated by *περιτίθ.* (Matt. xxvii. 28; Gen. xxvii. 16; Esth. i. 20; Prov. xii. 9; 2 Macc. xi. 13, xii. 39, xxiii. 32; Hom. *Il.* iii. 330, xiv. 187). — *τὰ ἀσχήμ. ἡμ.*] *our unseemly parts*. Theodore of Mopsuestia says well: *ἀσχήμονα ὡς πρὸς τὴν κοινὴν ὄψιν ἀποκαλεῖ*. Notice, too, that we have not here again the milder relative comparative. — *ἔχει*] *They have* greater seemliness than others; it becomes their *own*, namely, through the more seemly covering in which they are attired. On the purport of the verse, Chrysostom remarks rightly: *τί γὰρ τῶν μορίων τῶν γεννητικῶν ἀτιμότερον ἐν ἡμῖν εἶναι δοκεῖ; ἀλλ’ ὅμως πλείονος ἀπολαύει τιμῆς, καὶ οἱ σφόδρα πένητες, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν γυμνὸν ἔχουσι σῶμα, οὐκ ἂν ἀνάσχοιντο ἐκεῖνα τὰ μέλη δεῖξαι γυμνά*. According to Hofmann, we are to supply *τοῦ σώματος* from what goes before in connection with *τὰ ἀσχήμ.*; the words from *ἡμῶν* to *ἔχει*, again, are to be taken as: *they bring with them a greater seemliness* (a more seemly demeanour) *on our part*. Needless artificial, and contrary to the *τὰ τὲ εὐσχήμ. ἡμῶν* which follows.

Ver. 24. *Τὰ δὲ εὐσχήμ. ἡμ. οὐ χρ. ἔχ.*] which should be separated from what precedes it only by a comma, is not designed *to set aside an objection* (Chrysostom, Theophylact), but it appertains to the *completeness* of the subject that, after the *ἀσχήμονα* have been spoken of, the remark in question should be added regarding the *εὐσχήμονα* also, in order to let nothing be wanting in the exhibition of the *adjustment* which takes place in connection with the variety of relation subsisting between the members. *Εὐσχημοσύνην περισσ. ἔχειν* naturally supplies itself from the foregoing context to *οὐ χρεῖαν ἔχει*. All the less ground is there for connecting *ἡμῶν* with *οὐ χρ. ἔχ.* (Hofmann, comp. Osiander), which would give the thought: *they stand in no need of us*, which is too general, and which would still need to be limited again by what precedes it. — *ἀλλ’ ὁ Θεὸς κ.τ.λ.*] cannot be antithesis to the foregoing negative (Hofmann), which would bring the special subordinate thought *οὐ χρεῖαν ἔχει* into a connection quite disproportionately grand and far transcending it.

There should, on the contrary, be a full stop placed before ἀλλ', so as to mark the beginning of a *new* sentence; and ἀλλ' rather *breaks off* (at, see Baeumlein, *Partik.* p. 15) the delineation of the mutual relations of the members, which has been hitherto given, in order now to raise the readers to the higher point of view from which this relationship is to be regarded, that of the *divine appointment and destination*. — συνεκράσε] *He has mingled together, i.e. united into one whole out of differently constituted parts.* — τῷ ὑστεροῦντι] *to that which stands after, remaining back behind others, i. 7, viii. 8; Plato, Pol. vii. p. 539 E, Epin. p. 987 D (see also on Matt. xix. 20), i.e. to the part which, according to human estimation, is meaner than others.*<sup>1</sup> — περισσ. δούς τιμ.] *δούς is contemporaneous with συνεκράσε: so that He gave, namely, when He granted to them, according to vv. 22, 23, respectively their greater necessity and the destination of being clad in a more honourable and more seemly way.*

Ver. 25. Σχίσμα] *i.e. disunion*, such as is vividly represented by way of example in ver. 21. — ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ κ.τ.λ.] in order that, on the contrary, there may be one and the same interest, to which the members mutually direct their care for each other. Comp. Liv. *loc. cit.* What Paul has in view in the τὸ αὐτό, which he so emphatically puts first, may be gathered from the ὑπὲρ ἀλλήλων, namely, the welfare of every other member. Comp. ver. 26. The plural μεριμνῶσι with the neuter noun is to be explained from the *distributive* sense (Kühner, *ad Xen. Mem.* iv. 3. 12); in ver. 26, on the other hand, the *totality* of the members is expressed.

Ver. 26. And how perfectly is this design of God realized in the mutual sympathy of the members! This happy result of the divine appointment stands most suitably here at the close of the whole discussion before the application ensues in ver. 27, although Hofmann denies the connection of thought. — δοξάζεται] *is glorified*, which may take place practically by flourishing growth, by adornment, dress, anointing, and the like, and further by

<sup>1</sup> In how far, is stated in vv. 22, 23. By a very arbitrary importation of ideas, Hofmann holds that τὸ ὑστεροῦν means the *loins and genitals*, a part of the body which, while falling behind the rest in honour, is distinguished by the honour of *serving for the self-propagation of man*. Neither that specific reference in itself, nor this more precise definition of the greater honour referred to,—out of place as it is in this connection,—could ever have been guessed by a reader from ver. 22 f.

recognition of its usefulness, beauty, strength, dexterity, and so forth. — In view of the sympathy of the whole organism, and in consideration of the personifying style of the description, the concrete literal sense of the verse ought by no means to be modified.

Ver. 27. Application of all that is said of the human body (vv. 14–26) to his readers: *now ye are* (in order now to apply to you what has been hitherto said, you then are) *the body of Christ and members proportionately*. In each Christian church the (ideal) body of Christ presents itself, as in each is presented the (ideal) temple of God; but each church is not a separate body of Christ; hence, just as with the idea of the temple (see on iii. 16), we must keep entirely away from us the conception of a plurality, as if the churches were *σώματα Χριστοῦ*, and understand *σῶμα Χριστοῦ* not as *a body*,<sup>1</sup> but as *body* of Christ, the expression without the article being *qualitative*. — Now if the church, as a whole, is Christ's *body*, then the individuals in it are Christ's *members* (comp. vi. 15), but this *not without distinction*, as if every one could be any member; but *ἐκ μέρους*, *according to parts*, according as each one respectively has his own definite part in the body of Christ, consequently his especial place and function which have fallen to him *pro parte* in the collective organism of the church. *Ἐκ* betokens the accompanying circumstance of the fact, Bernhardt, p. 230; the expression, however, does not stand here as in xiii. 9, 10, 12, in contrast to that which is *perfect* (Hofmann), but, as the context shows, in contrast to the united *whole*, the *κοινόν*; comp. *ἐκάστου μέρους*, Eph. iv. 16. Luther puts it well, as regards the essential meaning: "each one according to his part." Comp. Calvin. Other interpreters understand, with Grotius (who explains it like *οἱ κατὰ μέρους*): *si ex partibus fit aestimatio*, considered as individuals. So Billroth, Rückert, Ewald, Maier. But what would be the object of this superfluous definition? That *μέλη* refers to individuals, is surely self-evident. Chrysostom held that the Corinthian church was thereby designated as part of the church universal.

<sup>1</sup> Baur, too, founds upon the absence of the article, and takes it to mean, "*a body which has the objective ground of its existence in Christ*," so that the genitive would be *objecti*. But in *every* place where the body of Christ is spoken of the genitive is *subjecti*; Paul would in that case have written *σῶμα ἰν Χριστῷ* (comp. Rom. xii. 4).

So also Theodoret, Theophylact, Beza, Wolf, Bengel, and others. But a glance at other churches was entirely alien from the apostle's purpose here.

Ver. 28. More precise elucidation of the ἐκ μέρους, and that in respect of those differently gifted and with extension of the view so as to take in *the whole church*; hence Paul adds ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, and thereby averts (against Hofmann's objection) the misunderstanding of καί (which is to be taken as *and indeed*), as if there had been *Corinthian* apostles. — Regarding ἔθετο, comp. Acts xx. 28. — οὓς μὲν] *certain ones*. In beginning thus, Paul had it in mind to make οὓς δέ follow after; but in the act of writing there occurred to him the thought of the enumeration according to rank (comp. Eph. iv. 11), and so οὓς μὲν was left without any continuation corresponding to it. Afterwards, too, from ἔπειτα onwards, he again abandons this mode of enumeration. Comp. Winer, p. 528 [E. T. 711]; Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 313 [E. T. 365]. According to Hofmann, μὴ πάντες κ.τ.λ., ver. 29, is meant to form the apodosis of κ. οὓς μὲν κ.τ.λ., so that the subject of πάντες is contained in οὓς: "Those, too, whom God has placed in the church firstly as apostles . . . are they all apostles, all prophets?" etc. But οὓς μὲν can be nothing else than the quite common distributive expression, and not equivalent to οὗτοι μὲν, οὓς, as Hofmann would have it (appealing inappropriately to Isocr., *Paneg.* 15); and the proposition itself, that those appointed by God to this or that specific function have not also collectively (?) all other functions, would be in fact so self-evident, and the opposite conception so monstrous, that the apostle's discourse would resolve itself into an absurdity. — ἐν τῇ ἐκκλ.] The Christian church generally, not simply the Corinthian, is meant, as is proved by ἀποστ.; comp. Eph. i. 22; Phil. iii. 6, *al.* — ἀποστόλους] in the wider sense, not merely of the Twelve, but also of those messengers of the Messianic kingdom appointed immediately by Christ at a later time for all nations, such as Paul himself and probably Barnabas as well, likewise James the Lord's brother. Comp. on xv. 7. The apostles had the *whole fulness of the Spirit*, and could therefore work as prophets, teachers, healers of the sick, etc., but not conversely could the prophets, teachers, etc., be also apostles, because they had only the special gifts for the offices in question. — προφήτ.] See on ver. 10. — διδασκάλους]

These had the gift of the Holy Spirit for preaching the gospel in the way of intellectual development of its teaching. Comp. on ver. 10 and Acts xiii. 1; Eph. iv. 11.<sup>1</sup> — *δυνάμεις*] *sc. ἔθετο, i.e.* He instituted a category of spiritual gifts, which consists of *miraculous powers*. Paul does not designate the *persons* endowed with such powers (Hofmann, who appeals for support to Acts viii. 10, and compares the names of the orders of angels), but, as the following particulars show, his discourse passes here into the abstract form; by no means, however, because there were no concrete representatives of the things referred to (Billroth, Rückert), but probably because variations of this kind, even without any special occasion for them, are very natural to his vivid style of representation. Comp. Rom. xii. 6–8, where, in the reverse way, he passes from abstracts to concretes. — *ἀντιλήψεις*] *services of help* (2 Macc. viii. 19; 3 Macc. v. 50; Ecclus. xi. 12, li. 7; Ezr. viii. 27, *al.*; not so in Greek writers), is most naturally taken, with Chrysostom and most interpreters, of the duties of the *diaconate*, the care of the poor and sick. — *κυβερνήσεις*] *governments* (Pind. *Pyth.* x. 112; Plut. *Mor.* p. 162 A; comp. also Xen. *Cyr.* i. 1. 5; Polyb. vi. 4. 2; Hist. Susann. 5), is rightly understood by most commentators, according to the meaning of the word, of the work of the *presbyters* (bishops); it refers to their functions of *rule and administration*, in virtue of which they were the *gubernatores ecclesiae*. The (climactic) juxtaposition, too, of *ἀντιλήψ.* and *κυβερν.* points to this interpretation. — Regarding *γένη γλωσσῶν*, see on ver. 10. — The *classification* of all the points adduced is as follows: (1) To the *gift of teaching*, the most important of all, belong *ἀπόστ., προφ., διδάσκ.*; (2) to the *gift of miracles*: *δυναμ., χαρίσμ., ἰαματ.*; (3) to the gift of *practical ad-*

<sup>1</sup> As Eph. iv. 11 speaks only of the *exercises of teaching activity*, the remaining charismata which are named here found no place there. The *evangelists* specially mentioned, in addition, in that passage were assistants of the apostles, and therefore did not require to be specially adduced here, where the point of view extended further than to the departments of *teaching* merely. The *ποιμίνες καὶ διδάσκαλοι*, Eph. *l.c.*, are as *ποιμίνες* included under the *κυβερνήσεις*. — Observe, further, that the divine appointment of the persons referred to took place in the case of the apostles, indeed, by an immediate *call* along with the *endowment*, but in the case of the rest by the *endowment*, the emergence of which, in the *standing* services of the church, regulated the *choice* of the churches under the influence and indication of the Holy Spirit (comp. on Acts xx. 28). Comp. also Höfling, *Kirchenverfassung*, p. 272 f., ed. 2, and see on Eph. iv. 11.



*ministration* (τὰς τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν οἰκονομίας, Theodoret): ἀντιλήψ. and κυβερν.; (4) to the *ecstatic* χάρισμα: the γένη γλωσσῶν (see on ver. 10). This *peculiar* character of the last named gift naturally enough brought with it the position at the *end* of the list, without there being any design on Paul's part thereby to oppose the overvaluing of the *glossolalia* (in opposition to Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, and many others). It is only the ἀπόστ., the προφήτ., and the διδάσκ. which are expressly adduced in *order of rank*; the ἔπειτα and εἶτα which follow only mark a further succession, and thereafter the enumeration runs off *asyndetically*, which, as frequently also in classical writers (see Krüger, *Xen. Anab.* ii. 4. 28), takes for granted that *completeness* is not aimed at. The two enumerations, here and in vv. 8–10, *supplement* each other; and Rom. xii. 6 ff. also, although the most incomplete, has points peculiar to itself.

Vv. 29, 30. None of these functions and gifts is *common property of all* (all gifted persons). This Paul expresses in the animated queries: *But all surely are not apostles?* and so on; whereby, after the same thing had been done positively in ver. 28, the ἐκ μέρους of ver. 27 is now clearly elucidated afresh in a negative way—in order to make the readers duly sensible of the *non omnia possumus omnes*, and of the preposterousness of envy against other gifted persons. — δυνάμεις] *Accusative* depending on ἔχουσιν, not *nominative*, as if it denoted wonder-working *persons* (Bengel, Rückert, de Wette, Osiander, Hofmann, and others); see on ver. 28. — Paul here passes over the ἀντιλήψ. and κυβερν., since it was of no importance to make a complete repetition. — With reference to the whole thought, comp. Homer, *Il.* xiii. 730 f.

Ver. 31. It is not the wish of Paul, by what he has said from ver. 4 up till now regarding the different gifts of the Spirit, to repress the eager striving after them. But the important question is as to the *nature of the gifts* and the *manner of the striving*. Hence: *But be zealous after the better gifts of the Spirit*,<sup>1</sup> those which are more essential than others, and have a more absolute value for the highest welfare of the church (ver. 7). The δέ is

<sup>1</sup> Regarding ζηλοῦν τι, to seek eagerly to attain something, comp. Dem. 500. 2 (ἐρετάν), 504. 8 (δωριεύς), 1461. 9 (τὰ ἀγαθὰ); Polyb. vi. 25. 11 (τὸ βίλειον); Wisd. i. 12 (θάνατον).

the *autem* marking the transition to a new point. — Ζηλοῦτε, again, does not conflict with ver. 11, because the will of the communicating Spirit is not an arbitrary one, but makes the receptive capacity and the mental tendency of the individual to be elements in its own self-determination. The zealous striving after the better gifts consists therefore negatively in this, that one makes such *χαρίσματα*, as are less generally necessary and have less value for the church (as *e.g.* the *glossolalia*, the reception of which was sought after by many for the sake of show), less the aim towards which he directs his will and cultivates a susceptibility; positively, again, it consists in this, that one makes those better gifts, on the other hand, the object of his ardent desire and the aim of his self-active development, in order to reach in this way the definite degree of receptivity needful to be the organ of the agency of the *πνεῦμα* in question, and thereby to become, by the free will of the Spirit, partaker of the better gifts.<sup>1</sup> It is perfectly plain that in this *ζηλοῦν supplicatory prayer* is also included; but it is arbitrary to limit the conception to it, as does Grotius: “*agite cum Deo precibus, ut accipiatis*” (comp. Heydenreich, Rückert, Hofmann). Equally arbitrary, too, is every departure from the hitherto invariable sense of *χάρισμα*; as *e.g.* Morus and Ewald hold faith, hope, and love to be meant; and Billroth, the fruits arising from love; Flatt, again (comp. Osiander), even imports the right *use* of the gifts which should be striven after. Comp. on the contrary, as to the difference in value of the charismata, xiv. 2 ff. — καὶ ἔτι κ.τ.λ.] and furthermore, yet besides (Luke xiv. 26; Heb. xi. 36; Acts ii. 26; often thus in Greek authors), besides prescribing to you this *ζηλοῦτε, I show you* (now, from chap. xiii. 1 onwards) *a surpassing way*,<sup>2</sup> an exceedingly excellent fashion, according to which this *ζηλοῦν* of yours must be constituted. By this he means that the striving after

<sup>1</sup> Theophylact aptly says (comp. Chrysostom): ἡνίκατο ἡρέμα, ὅτι αὐτοὶ αἰτιοὶ εἰσι τοῦ τὰ ἰλάττονα λαβεῖν· διὰ γὰρ τοῦ εἰπεῖν· ζηλοῦσι, τὴν παρ' ἑκείνων σπουδὴν ἀπαιτεῖ καὶ τὴν πλείω ἐπιθυμίαν περὶ τὰ πνευματικά. Καὶ οὐκ εἶπε· τὰ μείζονα, ἀλλὰ τὰ κρείττονα, τοῦτίστι τὰ ὠφελιμώτερα. Comp. Bengel: “Spiritus dat ut vult, sed fideles tamen libere aliud prae alio possunt sequi et exercere. Deus operatur suaviter, non cogit.” So also de Wette.

<sup>2</sup> Paul has not put the article to *δὲν*, “*suspensos nonnihil tenens Corinthios*,” as Bengel says, who also observes with fine discernment upon the present *δίκνυμι*, “*jam ardet Paulus et fertur in amorem*.”

the better gifts must always have *love* as its determining and impelling principle, without which, indeed, the gifts of the Spirit generally would be worthless (xiii. 1 ff.), and the *κρείττονα* unattainable. Love is thus the most excellent way, which that *ζηλοῦν* ought to keep. Rückert (so also Estius) finds here the meaning: "I show you a far better way still, in which ye may walk, namely, the way of love, which far surpasses all possession of charismata;" and so, too, in substance, Hofmann: "even away beyond the goal of the better charismata I show you a way," *i.e.* a way which brings you still further than the *ζηλοῦν τ. χαρ. τ. κρ.* But Paul surely did not conceive of the striving after the better charismata as becoming unnecessary through love, but rather as necessarily to be connected with love (xiv. 1, 39). Besides, he would logically have required to attach his statement not by *καί*, but by *ἐγὼ δέ* or *ἀλλά*; but even *a priori* it is improbable that he should have merely set down the weighty *ζηλοῦτε δὲ τ. χάρισμ. τ. κρείττ.* in such a naked way, and should have forthwith forsaken it again with the remark that he would now give instructions *away beyond the better gifts*. Grotius and Billroth connect *καθ' ὑπερβ.* with the *verb.* The former renders: *by way of superfluity* (so also Ewald); the latter: "*after a fashion which, as being the best, is certain of its success.*" But the meaning, *by way of superfluity* (*ἐκ περισυίας, ἐκ τοῦ περισσοῦ*), corresponds neither to the N. T. use of the phrase (Rom. vii. 13; 2 Cor. i. 8, iv. 17; Gal. i. 13; comp. 4 Macc. iii. 18), nor to its use elsewhere in Greek (Soph. *Oed. Tyr.* 1196; Polyb. iii. 92. 10, ix. 22. 8; Lucian, *p. merc. cond.* 13; Dem. 1411. 14). Moreover, Paul could hardly have considered the following instructions, especially in view of the circumstances of the Corinthians, as given "further by way of superfluity." It militates against Billroth, again, that the apostle's thought could not be to recommend the *manner of his instruction* regarding the way, but only the *way itself*, as excellent. On the other hand, to take the *καθ' ὑπερβ. ὁδόν* together is grammatically correct, since it is a genuine Greek usage to attach adverbs of degree to substantives, and that generally by prefixing them. Bernhardt, p. 338; Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 83 f. [E. T. 96]; comp. on 2 Cor. xi. 23; also on 1 Cor. viii. 7, vii. 35; Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Phaed.* p. 93 B. We find this connection given in the Vulgate, by

Chrysostom and Theophylact (καθ' ὑπερβ. τουτέστιν ὑπερέχουσιν), Luther, Erasmus, Castalio, Calvin, and most interpreters. Bengel suggestively describes the superlative conception, which is attached to ὁδόν by καθ' ὑπερβολήν, "quasi dicat: *viam maxime vialem.*"

# CHAPTER XIII.

VER. 3. ψωμίω] Elz. has ψωμίζω, which is condemned by almost all the uncials. — καυθήσωμαι] A B 8, 17, Codd. in Jerome, Copt. Aeth. Ephr. Hier. have καυχῆσωμαι. But ἵνα καυχῆσωμαι (given up again even by Lachm.) is a manifest addition, which was written on the margin to call attention to the loveless motive, and supplanted the similar and *difficult* ἵνα καυθήσωμαι (C K, min. vss. Chrys. Theodoret, and Latin writers). — Instead of the *subjunctive*, Tisch. has the future *indicative* καυθήσωμαι (D E F G I, min. Mac. Max.), which of course could be easily changed by ignorant copyists into the subjunctive, anomalous though it was. — Ver. 8. ἐκπίπτει] Lachm. reads πίπτει, following A B C\* 8\*, min. and several Fathers. Rightly; the simple form was defined more precisely by way of gloss. Comp. Rom. ix. 6. — γνώσεις, καταργηθήσονται] A D\*\* F G 8, 17, 47, Boern. Ambrosiast. have γνώσεις, καταργηθήσονται. So Rückert (Lachm. on the margin). The plural crept in after the preceding. — Ver. 10. τότε] Elz. Scholz read τότε τό, against decisive testimony.

---

CONTENTS.—The want of love makes even the greatest charismatic endowments to be worthless (vv. 1–3); excellencies of love (vv. 4–7); eternity of love in contrast to the transient nature of the charismata (vv. 8–13).—This praise of love—almost a psalm of love it might be called—is as rich in its contents drawn from deep experience as in rhetorical truth, fulness and power, grace and simplicity. “Sunt figurae oratoriae, quae hoc caput illuminant, omnes sua sponte natae in animo heroico, flagrante amore Christi et huic amori divino omnia postponente,” Valekenae, p. 299. In no other passage (comp. especially, Rom. xiii. 8–10) has Paul spoken so *minutely* and in *such a manner* regarding love. It is interesting to compare the eulogy of *Ἔρως*—so different in conception and substance—in Plato, *Symp.* p. 197 C D E. A Christian eulogy on love, but one far inferior, indeed, to the apostle’s, may be seen in Clement, *Cor.* I. 49.

Ver. 1. 'Εάν] is not equivalent to εἰ καὶ with the optative (Rückert), but it supposes something, the actual existence of which is left dependent on circumstances: *assuming it to be the case, that I speak*, etc. — ταῖς γλώσσαις τῶν ἀνθρ. κ. τ. ἀγγ.] To say that γλῶσσαι must mean *languages* here (Rückert, Olshausen, Baur, Rossteuscher), is an arbitrary assertion.<sup>1</sup> Why may it not be held to mean *tongues*? The expression is analogous to the well-known Homeric one—only much stronger: εἴ μοι δέκα μὲν γλῶσσαι δέκα δὲ στόματ' εἶεν, *Il.* ii. 489. Comp. Virgil, *Aen.* vi. 625; Theophil. *ad Autol.* ii. 16: οὐδὲ εἰ μυρία στόματα ἔχοι καὶ μυρίας γλῶσσας. The meaning is: *Supposing that I am a speaker with tongues, from whom all possible kinds of articulate tongues might be heard, not simply those of men, but also—far more wonderful and exalted still—those of the angels.* Paul thus describes the very loftiest of all conceivable cases of *glossolalia*. The tongues of *angels* here spoken of are certainly only an abstract conception, but one in keeping with the poetic character of the passage, as must be admitted also with respect to the old interpretation of *angelic languages*. Beza says well, that Paul is speaking “*ὑπερβολικῶς ex hypothesi*, ut plane inepti sint, qui h. l. disputant de angelorum linguis.” Comp. Chrysostom: οὐχὶ σῶμα περιτιθεῖς ἀγγέλοις, ἀλλ' ὃ λέγει τοιοῦτόν ἐστι καὶ οὕτω φθέγγωμαι ὡς ἀγγέλοις νόμος πρὸς ἀλλήλους διαλέγεσθαι. Others, such as Calovius, Bengel, and several more, have thought of the languages used by the angels *in their revelations to men*; but these surely took place in the form of *human* language. The

<sup>1</sup> Rückert: “If I spoke all languages, not only those of men, but also—which would certainly be a higher gift, higher than your γλώσσαις λαλεῖν which you esteem so highly—those of the angels.” So likewise Flatt. Baur renders strangely: “If I spoke not simply in isolated *expressions* taken from different languages, but in those different *languages themselves*; and not simply in the languages of men, but also in the languages of the angels.” This climactic ascent from *glosses* to the *languages themselves* is surely a pure importation. Rossteuscher, if his theory of an “*angel's language*,” which was the Corinthian *glossolalia*, were correct, would require, in conformity with the plural expression, and with his view of the human languages (the latter being the languages of the nations spoken in Acts ii.), to make the passage refer to *many different* languages of the angels, which they sought to speak at Corinth. If γλῶσσαι meant *languages* at all, Hofmann would be in the right in holding that *no kind* of speaking should be *excluded* here from the wonderful utterances in question, since the angels also doubtless speak among themselves or to God, so that Paul would go *beyond* what actually took place by *including* also the modes of utterance of the angels.

ἄρρητα ῥήματα of 2 Cor. xi. have also been brought in, where, however, there is nothing said of angels. — Why the apostle *begins* with the γλώσσ. λαλ., is correctly divined by Theodoret (comp. Chrysostom, Oecumenius, Theophylact): πρῶτον ἀπάντων τέθεικε τὴν παρεξέτασιν ποιούμενος τὸ χάρισμα τῶν γλωσσῶν, ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο παρ' αὐτοῖς ἐδόκει μείζον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων. It had become the subject of over-estimation and vanity to the undervaluing of love. — ἀγάπην] *i.e.* love of one's neighbour, which seeks not its own good, but the good of others in a self-forgetting way. Ver. 4 ff.—*A sounding metal and a shrill-sounding cymbal, i.e.* like these, a mere dead instrument of a foreign impulse, without all moral worth, γέγονα *have I become* (and am so: perfect), namely, in and with the actual realization of the supposed case. See Buttmann, *neut. Gram.* p. 172 [E. T. 199]. To interpret χαλκός as a brazen musical instrument (Flatt, Olshausen, with many older commentators), which would otherwise be admissible in itself (comp. generally, Dissen, *ad Pind. Ol.* vii. 83), is wrong here, for the simple reason, that one such is expressly named in addition. The text does not warrant our departing from the general *metal*; on the contrary, it proceeds from the indefinite to the definite (*cymbal*), from the crude to the product of art. Comp. Plato, *Prot.* p. 329 A: ὥσπερ τὰ χαλκεία πληγέντα μακρὸν ἤχει, *Crat.* p. 430 A. — κύμβαλον] brazen basins were so called, which were beaten upon, 2 Sam. vi. 5; 1 Chron. xiii. 8, *al.*; Judith xvi. 2; 1 Macc. iv. 54; Joseph. *Antt.* vii. 12. 4; Xenophon, *de re eq.* i. 3; Pind. *Fr.* 48; Lucian, *Bacch.* 4, *Alex.* 9; Herodian. v. 6. 19. — ἀλαλάζον] *screaming*, an epithet no doubt *purposely chosen*, which is manifestly at variance with the theory of the soft and scarcely audible (Wieseler, 1838), nay, noiseless (Jaeger) nature of the *glossolalia*. The κύμβαλα were ὀξύφθογγα (*Anthol.* vi. 51). Comp. ἀλαλαγμός of cymbals (Ps. cl. 5) and other loud-sounding instruments, Eur. *Cycl.* 65, *Hel.* 1368.

Ver. 2. That Paul adduces only *two* charismata (προφητεία and πίστις) in the protasis, and consequently uses καὶ εἰδῶ . . . γινῶσιν to mark out the degree of προφητεία, is shown plainly by himself in his repeating the καὶ εἰάν. In the case of these gifts also he is supposing the highest conceivable degree. — τὰ μυστήρια πάντα] *the whole of the mysteries, i.e.* what remains hidden from human knowledge without revelation, as, in particular, the divine

decrees touching redemption and the future relations of the Messianic kingdom, iv. 1; Matt. xiii. 11; Rom. xvi. 25, *al.* — *γνῶσιν*] *profound knowledge* of these mysteries, as xii. 8. The verb connected with it is εἰδῶ, but in such a way that the latter is to be taken here zeugmatically in the sense: *I am at home in* (Homer, *Od.* ii. 121; *Il.* xviii. 363, xv. 412). Observe further, that before it was *μυστήρια*, but here *πάσαν*, which has the emphasis; translate: "*the mysteries one and all, and all knowledge.*" To these two departments correspond the *λόγος σοφίας* and the *λόγος γνῶσεως* in xii. 8. — *πάσαν τ. πίστιν κ.τ.λ.*] *the whole heroism of faith* (not specially the *faith of miracles*, see on xii. 9), so that *I displace mountains*. — The latter phrase in a proverbial sense (to realize the seemingly impossible), as Jesus Himself (Matt. xvii. 20, xxi. 21) had already portrayed the omnipotence of faith. But without love, even in such an instance of the might of faith there would still not be the *fides salvifica*, Matt. vii. 22. — *οὐδέν εἰμι*] in an *ethical* respect, *without any significance and value*. Comp. 2 Cor. xii. 11; Arist. *Eccl.* 144; Soph. *Oed. Rex*, 56; Xen. *Anab.* vi. 2. 10, *al.*; Wisd. iii. 17, ix. 6; Bornemann, *ad Xen. Cyr.* vi. 2. 8; Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Symp.* p. 216 E; Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* II. 430. — Notice further, that Paul only *supposes* the cases in vv. 1 and 2 in a general way; but they must be conceived of as *possible*; and their possibility arises from the fact that, in the midst of the charismatic phenomena which made their appearance as if by contagion in the church, men might be carried away and rapt into states of exaltation without the presence of the true ground of the new inward life, the new creature, the true *καινότης ζωῆς* and *πνεύματος* (Rom. vi. 4, vii. 6).

Ver. 3. "And supposing that I do outwardly the very highest works of love, but without really having love as my inward motive, then I have no advantage therefrom, namely, towards attaining the Messianic salvation" (1 John iii. 14). Comp. Matt. xvi. 26; Gal. v. 2. — *ψωμίζειν τινά τι* means properly: to feed any one with something in the way of putting it by morsels into his mouth; then generally, *cibare aliquem aliqua re*, Rom. xii. 20. See the LXX. in Schleusner, V. p. 569; Valckenaer, p. 303. Only the thing is mentioned here in connection with the verb, but who the persons (*the poor*) are, is



self-evident, as also the meaning: *cibando consumsero*. Comp. Poll. vi. 33. — καὶ ἐὰν παραδῶ κ.τ.λ.] a yet higher eternal work of love, surrender of the body (Dan. iii. 28), *self-sacrifice*. — ἵνα καυθήσομαι] (see the critical remarks) *in order to be burned*. The reading καυθήσομαι would be a *future subjunctive*, a barbarism, the introduction of which in pre-New Testament Greek is due only to copyists. See Lobeck, *ad Phryn.* p. 720 f.; Buttman, *neut. Gramm.* p. 31 [E. T. 35]. The sense should not be defined more precisely than: *in order to die the death by fire*. To refer it, with most interpreters since Chrysostom, to the fiery death of the *Christian* martyrs, is without support from the known history of *that* period, and without a hint of it in the text. Probably such martyr-scenes as Dan. iii. 19 ff., 2 Macc. vii., hovered before the apostle's mind. Comp. Fritzsche, *de conform. Lachm.* p. 20.

Ver. 4. Love is personified; the living concrete *portrait of her character*, in which power to edify (viii. 1) reflects itself, is presented as if in sharply drawn outline, with nothing but short, definite, isolated traits, positively, negatively, and then positively again, according to her inexhaustible nature. — μακροθυμεῖ] *she is long-suffering*; in face of provocations controlling her anger, repressing it, giving it up, and maintaining her own proper character. The general frame of mind for this is χρηστεύεται: *she is gracious* (comp. Tittmann, *Synon.* p. 140 ff.), Clem. *Cor.* i. 14. The verb is found, besides, only in the Fathers. — Observe here and in what follows the *asyndetic* enumeration, and in this "incitator orationis cursus ardorem et affectum" (Dissen, *ad Pind. Exc.* II. p. 275). But to write, with Hofmann, following Lachmann, ἡ ἀγάπη μακροθυμεῖ. Χρηστεύεται ἡ ἀγάπη, is less suitable, for this reason, that, according to the traditional division, the long list of negative predicates which follows is very appropriately headed again by the subject. — οὐ ζηλοῖ] negation of all passionate, selfish feelings towards others (envy, jealousy, and such like). — οὐ περπερεύεται] *she boasts not, practises no vaunting*. See Cicero, *ad Att.* i. 14; Antonin. v. 5, and Gatak. *in loc.*; also Winer, *Beitr. zur Verbess. d. neutest. Lexicogr.* p. 5 ff. Comp. πέρπερος in Polyb. xxxii. 6. 5, xl. 6. 2; Arrian. *Epict.* iii. 2. 14.

Ver. 5. Οὐκ ἀσχημονεῖ] *she acts not in an unseemly way*. See on vii. 36. To hold that Paul was thereby alluding to unsuitable attire in the assemblies (Flatt), involves an inappropriate

petty limitation, as does also the reference to unseemly conduct on the part of those speaking with tongues (de Wette). He means generally everything that offends against moral seemliness. — τὰ ἐαυτῆς] comp. x. 33. — οὐ παροξύνεται] *does not become embittered*, does not get into a rage, as selfishness does when offended. This is the continuance of the μακροθυμία. — οὐ λογίζεται τὸ κακόν] *she does not bring the evil*, which is done to her, *into reckoning* (2 Cor. v. 19; Rom. iv. 6, *al.*; Ecclus. xxix. 6; Dem. 658. 20, 572. 1, *al.*). Comp. 1 Pet. iv. 8. Theodoret puts it happily: συγγινώσκει τοῖς ἐπταισμένοις, οὐκ ἐπὶ κακῷ σκοπῷ ταῦτα γεγενῆσθαι λαμβάνων. Others render: *she thinks not evil* (Ewald; Vulgate: “non cogitat malum”). This thought, as being too general in itself, has been more precisely defined, either as: “*she seeks not after mischief*” (Luther, Flatt, and several others; comp. Jer. xxvi. 3; Nah. i. 9), which, however, serves so little to describe the character of love, that it may, on the contrary, be said to be a thing self-evident; or as: “*she suspects nothing evil*” (Chrysostom, Melancthon, Grotius, Heydenreich, and others; comp. also Neander), which special conception, again, would be much too vaguely expressed by λογίζεται.

Ver. 6. Ἐπὶ τῇ ἀδικίᾳ] *over immorality* (Rom. i. 18, ii. 8), when she sees this in others. In view of the contrast, Chrysostom and others, including Hofmann, take this in too narrow a sense: οὐκ ἐφῆδεται τοῖς κακῶς πάσχουσιν, understanding it thus of *delight in mischief*; comp. Luther: “sie lachet nicht in die Faust, wenn dem Frommen Gewalt und Unrecht geschieht.” Theodoret puts it rightly, μισεῖ τὰ παράνομα. It is just the *generality* of this thought which specially fits it to form the *cornerstone* of all those negative declarations; for in it with its significant contrast they are all summed up. — συγχαίρει δὲ τῇ ἀληθ.] The ἀλήθεια is personified, and denotes *the truth κατ' ἐξοχήν*, the divine truth contained in the gospel, Col. i. 5; Eph. i. 13; Gal. v. 7; 2 Thess. ii. 12, 13; John i. 17, *al.* Love *rejoices with* the truth, has with it one common joy, and this is the most complete contrast to the χαίρειν ἐπὶ τῇ ἀδικίᾳ; for to make morality prevail, is the ethical aim of the ἀλήθεια (2 Thess. ii. 12; Rom. ii. 8), whose joy it is, therefore, when she is obeyed in disposition, speech, and action (1 Pet. i. 22, ὑπακοή τῆς ἀληθείας); and her companion in this joy is *love*. Usually ἀλήθεια

has been understood of *moral truth*, *i.e. morality*, as in v. 8 ; either, with Theodoret, Flatt, and most interpreters: *she rejoices over what is good*,—a rendering, however, from which we are debarred by the compound *συγχ.* ; or, with Chrysostom: *συνήδεται τοῖς εὐδοκιμοῦσι*, Billroth: “she rejoices with those who hold to the right,” Rückert: “she rejoices with the man, who is saved to morality,” Osiander: “she rejoices with the heart, which is filled with the truth and with obedience towards it.” Thereby there is made an arbitrary change in the conception, according to which, in conformity with the antithesis, the *δικαιοσύνη* (the opposite of the *ἀδικία*) is not the subject, in fellowship with which love rejoices, but the object of this common joy ; the subject with which love rejoices is the truth. According to Hofmann, the meaning of the passage is, that love has her joy withal, *when the truth comes to its rights in that which befalls any one*. But so also there is no sufficient justice done to the compound *συγχ.*, and the more precise definition, “*in that which befalls any one*,” is imported.

Ver. 7. *Πάντα*] popular hyperbole. Grotius aptly says: “*Fert, quae ferri ullo modo possunt.*”—*στέγει*] as in ix. 12: all things *she bears*, holds out under them (*suffert*, Vulgate), without ceasing to love,—all burdens, privation, trouble, hardship, toil occasioned to her by others. Other interpreters (Hammond, Estius, Mosheim, Bengel, *al.* ; Rückert hesitatingly) understand: *she covers all up*, *i.e.* excuses all wrong. Likewise correct from a linguistic point of view, according to classical usage ; but why depart from ix. 12 ?—*πάντα πιστ.*] Opposite of a *distrustful* spirit ; *bona fides* towards one's neighbour in all points.—*πάντα ἐλπίζει*] opposite of *that* temperament, which expects no more good at all from one's neighbour *for the future* ; good confidence as to the *future* attainment of her ends.—*πάντα ὑπομένει*] *all things she stands out against*—all sufferings, persecutions, provocations, etc., inflicted on her. This is the established conception of *ὑπομονή* in the N. T. (Matt. x. 22, *al.* ; Rom. xii. 12 ; 2 Cor. i. 6, *al.*), according to which the *endurance* is conceived of as a *holding of one's ground*, the opposite of *φεύγειν* (Plato, *Tim.* p. 49 E, *Theaet.* p. 177 B). Comp. 2 Tim. ii. 10.—Note further how the expressions *rise* as they follow each other in this verse, which is beautiful in its simplicity: if love encounter from others what

may seem *too hard* to be endured, *all things she bears* ; if she meet what may cause *distrust*, *all things she trusts* ; if she meet what may destroy *hope* in one's neighbour, *all things she hopes* ; if she encounter what may lead to *giving way*, *against all she holds out*.

Ver. 8. Up to this point the *characteristics* of love have been given ; now on to ver. 13 her *imperishableness* is described, in contrast to the purely temporary destination of the gifts of the Spirit. — οὐδέποτε πίπτει] (see the critical remarks) *never does she fall*, i.e. *she never falls into decay*, remains always stedfast (μένει, ver. 13). The opposite is : καταργηθήσονται, παύσονται. Comp. Luke xvi. 17 ; Plato, *Phil.* p. 22 E ; Soph. *Ant.* 474 ; Polyb. x. 33. 4, i. 35. 5 ; Dem. 210. 15. The *Recepta* ἐκπίπτει (Rom. ix. 6) is to be taken in precisely the same way. Theodoret puts it well : οὐ διασφάλλεται, ἀλλ' αἰὲ μένει βεβαία κ. ἀκίνητος, ἐς αἰὲ διαμένονσα· τοῦτο γὰρ διὰ τῶν ἐπαγομένων ἐδίδαξεν. — In what follows εἴτε opens out in detail the general conception of *χαρίσματα*. *Be it again* (different kinds of) *prophesyings*, *they shall be done away* ; *be it* (speaking) *tongues*, *they shall cease*, etc. This mode of division and interpunctuation is demanded by δέ (against Luther and others, including Heydenreich). Prophecy, speaking with tongues, and deep knowledge, are only appointed for the good of the church for the time *until* the Parousia ; afterwards these temporary phenomena fall away. Even the *gnosis* will do so ; for then comes in the perfect knowledge (ver. 12), and that as the common heritage of all, whereby the deep knowledge of gifted individuals, which is still but imperfect, as it occurs *before* the Parousia, will necessarily cease to subsist.

Vv. 9, 10. Proof of the last and of the first of the three preceding points. The second stood in need of no proof at all. *For in part* (ἐκ μέρους ; its opposite is ἐκ τοῦ παντός, Lucian, *Dem. enc.* 21) *we know*, imperfect is our deep knowledge, *and in part we speak prophetically*, what we prophetically declare is imperfect. Both contain only fragments of the great whole, which remains hidden from us as such *before* the Parousia. — ὅταν δὲ ἔλθῃ κ.τ.λ.] *but when that which is perfect shall have appeared* (at the Parousia ; otherwise, Eph. iv. 13), *then will that which is in part* (the *gnosis* and the prophecy therefore also, seeing they belong to the category of the partial) *be done away*. The appearance of the perfected condition of things necessarily brings with it the abolition of

what is only partial. With the advent of the absolute the imperfect finite ceases to exist, as the dawn ceases after the rising of the sun. We are not to supply, with Hofmann, *γινώσκειν* and *προφητεύειν* (as substantival infinitives) to τὸ τέλειον and to τὸ ἐκ μέρους, by which unprecedented harshness of construction the sense would be extorted, that only the *imperfect* *γινώσκειν* and *προφητεύειν* will cease to make room for the perfect. But what Paul means and says is that these charismata generally, as being designed only for the aeon of the partial, and not in correspondence with the future aeon of the perfect, will cease to exist at the Parousia; their design, which is merely temporary, is then fulfilled. With the advent of the Parousia the other charismata too (xii. 8 ff.) surely cease altogether: not simply that the imperfection of the way in which they are exercised ceases.

Ver. 11. Illustration of what was said in ver. 10 by an analogy taken from each man's own personal experience in life, inasmuch, namely, as our present condition, when compared with our condition in the αἰὼν μέλλων, is like that of the child in comparison with that of the man. The man has *given up* the practices of the child. — ἐφρόνουν refers to the interest and efforts (device and endeavour), ἐλογ. to the judgment (reflective intellectual activity). To make ἐλαλ., however, point back to the *glossolalia*, ἐφρ. to the prophesying, and ἐλογ. to the *gnosis* (Oecumenius, Theophylact, Bengel, Valckenaer, Heydenreich, Olshausen, D. Schulz, Ewald; Osiander undecided), is all the less warranted an assumption, seeing that ἐφρ. and ἐλογ. are no specific correlates of the prophecy and *gnosis* respectively.

Ver. 12. Justification of this analogy in so far as it served to illustrate the thought of ver. 10. — ἄρτι] *i.e.* before the Parousia. δι' ἐσόπτρου] *through a mirror*; popular mode of expression according to the optical appearance, inasmuch, namely, as what is seen in the mirror appears to stand *behind* it. The meaning is: *our knowledge of divine things is, in our present condition, no immediate knowledge, but one coming through an imperfect medium.* We must think not only of our glass mirrors, but of the imperfectly reflecting metal mirrors<sup>1</sup> of the ancients (Hermann, *Privatalterth.* § 20. 26). Τὸ ἔσοπτρον περίσθησι τὸ ὁρώμενον ὁπωσδήποτε,

<sup>1</sup> Hence the designation χαλκοὶ διαυγής for a mirror. See Jacobs, *ad Anthol.* VI. p. 378.

Chrysostom. This is enough of itself to enable us to dispense with the far-fetched expedient (Bos, Schoettgen, Wolf, Mosheim, Schulz, Rosenmüller, Stolz, Flatt, Heydenreich, Rückert, and others) that ἑσοπτρον means *specularc*, a window made of talc (*lapis specularis*, see Pliny, *Nat. Hist.* xxxvi. 22). In support of this, such Rabbinical passages are adduced as *Jevamm.* iv. 13, "Omnes prophetae viderunt per specular (כְּאִיפְקָרִי) obscurum, et Moses, doctor noster, vidit per specular lucidum." See Buxtorf, *Lcx. Talm.* p. 171; Wetstein *in loc.* But against this whole explanation is the decisive fact that the assumed meaning for ἑσοπτρον is quite undemonstrable, and that no expositor has succeeded in establishing it. It always means *mirror*, as do also ἔνοπτρον and κάτοπτρον (Pindar, *Nem.* vii. 20; Anacreon, xi. 2; Plutarch, *Præc. conjug.* 11; Luc. *Amor.* 44, 48; Wisd. vii. 26; Ecclus. xii. 11; Jas. i. 23); a talc window is διόπτρα (Strabo, xii. 2, p. 540). — ἐν αἰνύματι] which should not be separated from δι' ἑσόπτρον by a comma, is usually taken adverbially (Bernhardy, p. 211), like αἰνυματικῶς, so that the object of vision shows itself to the eye in an *enigmatic way*. Comp. also Hofmann, who holds that what is meant is an expression of anything conveyed in writing or symbol, of such a kind that it offers itself to our apprehension and eludes it in quite equal measure. But αἶνυμα is a dark *saying*; and the idea of the *saying* should as little be lost here as in Num. xii. 8. This, too, in opposition to de Wette (comp. Osiander), who takes it as the *dark reflection in the mirror*, which one sees, so that ἐν stands for εἰς in the sense of the *sphere* of sight. Rückert takes ἐν for εἰς on an exceedingly artificial ground, because the seeing here is a *reading*, and one cannot read εἰς τὸν λόγον, but only ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. Luther renders rightly: *in a dark word*; which, however, should be explained more precisely as *by means of an enigmatic word*, whereby is meant the word of the gospel-revelation, which capacitates for the βλέπειν in question, however imperfect it be, and is its medium to us. It is αἶνυμα, inasmuch as it affords to us, (although certainty, yet) no full clearness of light upon God's decrees, ways of salvation, etc., but keeps its contents sometimes in a greater, sometimes in a less degree (Rom. xi. 33 f.; 1 Cor. ii. 9 ff.) concealed, bound up in images, similitudes, types, and the like forms of human limitation and human speech, and

consequently is for us of a mysterious and *enigmatic nature*,<sup>1</sup> standing in need of the future λύσις, and vouchsafing πίστις, indeed, but not εἶδος (2 Cor. v. 7); comp. Num. xii. 8. To take ἐν in the *instrumental* sense is simpler, and more in keeping with the conception of the βλέπειν (*videre ope aenigmatis*) than my former explanation of it as having a *local* force, as in Matt. vi. 4; Eccclus. xxxix. 3 (*in aenigmate versantes*). — τότε δέ] ὅταν δὲ ἔλθῃ τὸ τέλειον, ver. 10. — πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον] according to the Hebrew פָּנֶיךָ לְפָנַי (Gen. xxxii. 30; comp. Num. xii. 8), *face to* (coram) *face*, denotes the *immediate vision*. Grammatically πρόσωπον is to be taken as nominative, in apposition,<sup>2</sup> namely, to the *subject* of βλέπομεν, so that πρὸς πρόσωπον applies to the *object* seen. And it is *God* who is conceived of as being this object, as is evident from the parallel καθὼς καὶ ἐπεγνώσθην. — ἄρτι γινώσκω κ.τ.λ.] consequence of the foregoing spoken *asyndetically*, and again in the first person with individualizing force, in the victorious certainty of the consummation at hand. — ἐπιγινώσκειν καθὼς καὶ ἐπεγνώσθ.] cannot mean: then shall I know as also I *am known*, i.e. as *God knows me* (so most interpreters), but (observe the *aorist*): as also I *was known*, which points back to the era of conversion to Christ (for the apostle himself, how great a remembrance!), when the Christian became the object of the divine knowledge (see on viii. 3) turning to deal with him effectually. The meaning therefore is: “*but then will my knowledge of God be so wholly different from a merely partial one, as it is now, that, on the contrary, it will correspond to the divine knowledge, so far as it once at my conversion made me its object, namely (opposite of ἐκ μέρους) by complete knowledge of the divine nature, counsel, will, etc., which present themselves to me now only in part.*” Notice further that the stronger term ἐπιγινώσκειν is selected in correspondence with the relation to the preceding simple γινώσκω (Bengel, *pernoscam*; see Valckenaer, *ad Luc.* p. 14 f.), and that καί is the ordinary *also* of equivalence. It may be added, that this likeness of the future

<sup>1</sup> The objection, that Paul would hardly have called the revelation αἴνigma (see de Wette) is sufficiently set aside by the consideration that he calls it so *relatively*, in relation to the unveiling *still to come*. Melancthon puts it happily: “Verbum enim est velut involucre illius arcanæ et mirandæ rei, quam in vita coelesti coram aspiciemus.”

<sup>2</sup> As *appositio partitiva*. See Matthiae, § 431. 3. Fritzsche, *ad Matth.* iii. 12. Krüger, § 57. 10.

knowledge to the divine is, of course, *relative*; the knowledge is "in suo genere completa, quanta quidem in creaturam rationalem cadere potest," Calovius.

Ver. 13. *Ἡ νῦν δὲ* *nunc autem, and thus*, since, according to ver. 8 to 12, the present temporary charismata do not continue but cease in the future age, *continue* (into the everlasting life and onward in it) *faith, hope, love*.<sup>1</sup> This explanation of *νῦν δὲ* in a conclusive sense, as xii. 18, 20, and of *μένει* as meaning eternal continuance,<sup>2</sup> has been rightly given by Irenaeus, *Hacr.* ii. p. 47, iv. 25; Tertullian, *de pat.* 12; Photius in Oecumenius, p. 553; Grotius, Billroth, de Wette, Osiander, Lipsius (*Rechtfertigungsl.* pp. 98, 210), Ewald, Maier, Hofmann. For, although the majority of interpreters since Chrysostom (including Flatt, Heydenreich, Rückert, David Schulz, Neander) have explained *νῦν δὲ* in a *temporal* sense: "but for the present, so long as that glorious state lies still far off from us" (Rückert), and *μένει* of continuance in the present age (in the church), this is incorrect for the simple reason, that Paul, according to ver. 8 ff., expected the charismata to cease only at the Parousia, and consequently could not have described merely the triad of faith, hope, and love as what was now remaining; the *γνώσις* also, prophecy, etc., remain till the Parousia. Hence, too, it was an erroneous expedient to take *μένει* in the sense of the *sum total*, which remains as the result of a *reckoning* (Calvin, Bengel, and others).—*πίστις*] here in the established sense of the *fides salvifica*. This remains, even in the world to come, the abiding *causa apprehendens* of blessedness; what keeps the glorified in *continued possession* of salvation is their abiding trust in the atonement which took place through the death of Christ. Not as if their everlasting glory might be lost by them, but it is their assured possession just through the fact, that to them as

<sup>1</sup> The three so-called theological virtues. But faith and hope might also be called *virtues*, "quia sunt obedientia, quam postulat Deus praestari suo mandato," Melancthon.

<sup>2</sup> If, again, it be assumed that the conception of *μένει* differs in reference to its different subjects, this is nothing but arbitrary importation. Osiander (comp. Theophylact before him) holds that the *μένει* has different degrees; in the case of faith and hope, it lasts on to the Parousia; in the case of love, it is absolute, onward beyond the Parousia. And as distinguished from the charismata, it denotes in the case of faith and hope the *constant* continuance as opposed to the *sporadic*. What *accumulated* arbitrariness! Lipsius is correct in substance, but does not define specifically enough the conception of the *πίστις*.



συγκληρονομοί of Christ in the very beholding and sharing His glory the faith, through which they *become* blessed, must remain *incapable of being lost*. The everlasting fellowship with Christ in the future αἰών is not conceivable at all without the everlasting continuance of the living *ground* and *bond* of this fellowship, which is none other than *faith*. — ἐλπίς] equally in its established N. T. sense, *hope of the everlasting glory*; Rom. v. 1, and frequently. This abides for the glorified, *with regard to the everlasting duration and continued development* of their glory. How Paul conceived this continued development and that of the Messianic kingdom itself to proceed in detail, cannot indeed be proved. But the idea is not on that account unbiblical, but is necessarily presupposed by the continuance of hope, which is undoubtedly asserted in our text. Moreover, in xv. 24, steps in the development of the future βασιλεια are manifestly given, as indeed the everlasting δόξα generally, according to its essential character as ζωή, is not conceivable at all without development to ever higher perfection for the individual, and therefore also is not conceivable without the continuance of hope. The conception of this continued development is not excluded by the notion of the τέλειον, ver. 10, but belongs thereto.<sup>1</sup> Billroth is wrong in saying "faith and hope remain, in so far as *their contents* is eternal." That is to confound the objective and subjective. De Wette (comp. Maier) holds that "faith and hope, which go directly to their object, remain *by passing over into sight*." But in that way precisely they would *not* remain (Rom. viii. 24; Heb. xi. 1), and only *love* would remain. For all the three the μένειν must be meant in the same sense. Our interpretation, again, does not run counter either to 2 Cor. v. 7 (where surely the future *seeing* of the salvation does not exclude the continuance of the *fides salvifica*), or to Rom. viii. 24, Heb. xi. 1, since in our text also the hope meant is hope of *something future* not yet come to *manifestation*, while the *fides salvifica* has to all eternity a suprasensuous (Heb. *loc. cit.*) object (the atoning power of the sacrifice of Jesus). Hofmann transforms it in his exposition to this, that it is asserted of the *Christian* who has believed, hoped, and loved that he brings thither with him what he *is* as such, so that he has an abiding heritage in these three things. But that is not what Paul

<sup>1</sup> Comp. also Delitzsch, *Psychol.* p. 473.

says, but simply that even in the future aeon, into which the charismata will not continue, Christians will not cease to believe, to hope, to love.—τὰ τρία ταῦτα] brings the whole attention, before anything further is said, earnestly to bear upon this triad.—μείζων δὲ τούτων] is not to be taken as μείζων δὲ ἢ ταῦτα, for τούτων must apply to the foregoing τὰ τρία ταῦτα, but as: *greater however* (comp. xiv. 5) *among these*, i.e. *of higher value* (than the two others) *among these three, is love*. Regarding μείζων with the gen. *partitivus*, comp. Matt. xxiii. 11. Hofmann has no warrant for desiderating the article; comp. Luke ix. 46. *Why* love holds this highest place, has been already explained, vv. 1–7;<sup>1</sup> because, namely, in relation to *faith* love, through which it works (comp. Gal. v. 6), conditions its moral worth (vv. 1–3) and the moral fruitfulness of the life of Christian fellowship (vv. 4–7); consequently without love (which is *divine* life, 1 John iv. 8, 16) faith would be something egotistical, and therefore spurious and only apparent, not even existing at all as regards its true ethical nature;<sup>2</sup> from which it follows at the same time that in relation to *hope* also love must be the greater, because if love fails, the hope of future glory—seeing that it can only be cherished by the true faith which works by love—cannot with reason exist at all (comp. Matt. xxvi. 35 ff.).

<sup>1</sup> The interpreters who take νῦν δὲ to mean, *but for the present*, follow for the most part Chrysostom in stating it as the higher worth of love, that it alone continues in eternity, while faith and hope, as they assume, cease. According to de Wette, Paul seems darkly to indicate the truth that love is the *root* of faith and hope. But even apart from the fact that this is not a Pauline thought, the reader could not be expected after ver. 7 (where nothing of the kind is even indirectly indicated) to arrive at such a thought. Baur too imports what is not in the text when he says that Paul calls love the greatest, because it is what it is immediately, in an absolute way, and hence also remains always what it is.

<sup>2</sup> *Justification*, however, would be by love, only if *perfect* satisfaction were rendered to its requirements, which is not possible (Rom. xiii. 8). Hence the divine economy of salvation has connected justification with *faith*, the necessary fruit and evidence of which, however, is love. Comp. Melancthon, "Aliud est causa justificationis, aliud est necessarium ut effectus sequens justificationem . . . ut in vivente dicimus necessario motum esse, qui tamen non est vitae causa." See also *Form. Conc.* p. 638 ff.