

CRITICAL AND EXEGETICAL  
HANDBOOK  
TO  
THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS.

BY  
HEINRICH AUGUST WILHELM MEYER, TH.D.,  
OBERCONSISTORIALRATH, HANNOVER.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FIFTH EDITION OF THE GERMAN BY  
REV. JOHN C. MOORE, B.A.,  
AND  
REV. EDWIN JOHNSON, B.A.

THE TRANSLATION REVISED AND EDITED BY  
WILLIAM P. DICKSON, D.D.,  
PROFESSOR OF DIVINITY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW.

VOL. II.

EDINBURGH:  
T. & T. CLARK, 38 GEORGE STREET.  
MDCCCLXXIV.

PRINTED BY MURRAY AND GIBB,

FOR

T. & T. CLARK, EDINBURGH.

LONDON, . . . . HAMILTON, ADAMS, AND CO.

DUBLIN, . . . . JOHN ROBERTSON AND CO.

NEW YORK, . . . . SCRIBNER, WELFORD, AND ARMSTRONG.

CRITICAL AND EXEGETICAL  
COMMENTARY  
ON  
THE NEW TESTAMENT.

BY  
HEINRICH AUGUST WILHELM MEYER, TH.D.,  
OBERCONSISTORIALRATH, HANNOVER.

*From the German, with the Sanction of the Author.*

THE TRANSLATION REVISED AND EDITED BY  
WILLIAM P. DICKSON, D.D.,  
AND  
FREDERICK CROMBIE, D.D.

PART IV.  
*THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS.*  
VOL. II.

EDINBURGH:  
T. & T. CLARK, 38 GEORGE STREET.  
MDCCCLXXIV.

## PREFATORY NOTE.



THE work of translating Dr. Meyer's *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans* was, for reasons of practical convenience, divided between the Rev. John C. Moore, B.A., Hamburg (now of Galway), and the Rev. Edwin Johnson, B.A., Boston, Lincolnshire. The first portion of the present volume—down to the close of the eighth chapter—has been translated by the former, and the remainder (nearly three-fourths of the volume) by the latter. I have bestowed considerable care on the revision of the translation, and have carried it through the press.

With a view to expedite the progress of this undertaking, in which my interest deepens as it advances, but which I find to involve a greater expenditure of time and labour than I had anticipated, I have, with the consent of the Publishers, asked Professor Crombie of St. Andrews to join me in the editorship; and I am glad that a volume of the *Commentary on the Gospel of John*, edited by him, is ready to be issued along with this one on my part.

W. P. D.

GLASGOW COLLEGE, *August 1874.*



## THE

# EPISTLE OF PAUL TO THE ROMANS.

## CHAPTER VII.

Vv. 7-13. How easily might the Jewish Christian, in his reverence for the law of his fathers, take offence at ver. 5 (*τὰ διὰ τ. νόμου*) and 6, and draw the obnoxious inference, *that the law must therefore be itself of immoral nature*, since it is the means of calling forth the *sin-affections*, and since *emancipation* from it is the condition of the new moral life! *Paul therefore proposes to himself this possible inference in ver. 7, rejects it, and then on to ver. 13 shows that the law, while in itself good, is that which leads to acquaintance with sin, and which is misused by the principle of sin to the destruction of men.*

Paul conducts the refutation, speaking throughout *in the first person singular* (comp. 1 Cor. vi. 12, xiii. 11). This mode of expression, differing from the *μετασχηματισμός* (see on 1 Cor. iv. 6), is an *ιδίωσις*; comp. Theodore of Mopsuestia on ver. 8: *τὸ ἐν ἐμοὶ ὅτε λέγει, τὸ κοινὸν λέγει τῶν ἀνθρώπων*, and Theophylact on ver. 9: *ἐν τῷ οἰκείῳ δὲ προσώπῳ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν λέγει*. Thus he declares concerning *himself* what is meant to apply to every man placed under the *Mosaic law generally*, in respect of his relation to that law—before the turning-point in his inner life brought about through his connection with that law, and after it. The apostle's own personal experience, so far from being thereby *excluded*, everywhere gleams through with peculiarly vivid and deep truth, and *represents* concretely the universal experience in the matter. The subject presenting itself through the *ἐγώ* is therefore *man in general, in his natural state under*

the law, to which he is bound, as not yet redeemed through Christ and sanctified through the Spirit (for which see chap. viii.); without, however, having been unnaturally hardened by legal righteousness or rendered callous and intractable through despising the law, and so estranged from the moral earnestness of legal Judaism. Into this earlier state, in which Paul himself had been before his conversion, he transports himself back, and realizes it to himself with all the vividness and truth of an experience that had made indelible impression upon him; and thus he becomes the type of the moral relation, in which the as yet unregenerate Israelite stands to the divine law. "He betakes himself once more down to those gloomy depths, and makes all his readers also traverse them with him, only in order at last to conclude with warmer gratitude that he is now indeed redeemed from them, and thereby to show what that better and eternal law of God is which endures even for the redeemed," Ewald. Augustine (*prop.* 45 in *ep. ad Rom.*; *ad Simplic.* i. 91; *Conf.* vii. 21), in his earlier days, acknowledged, in harmony with the Greek Fathers since Irenaeus, that the language here is that of the *unregenerate* man; though later, in opposition to Pelagianism (especially on account of vv. 17, 18, 22; see *Retract.* i. 23, 26, ii. 3; *c. duas ep. Pel.* i. 10; *c. Faust.* xv. 8), he gave currency to the view that the "*I*" is that of the *regenerate*. In this he was followed by Jerome, who likewise held a different opinion previously; and later by Luther, Melancthon, Calvin, Beza (not by Bucer and Musculus), Chemnitz, Gerhard, Quenstedt and many others, more, however, among Protestant than among Catholic commentators (Erasmus says of him: "*dure multa torquens*;" and see especially Toletus). On the other hand, the Socinians and Arminians, as also the school of Spener, returned to the view of the Greek Fathers, which gradually became, and has down to the present day continued, the dominant one. See the historical elucidations in Tholuck and Reiche; also Knapp, *Ser. rar. arg.* p. 400 ff. The theory that Paul is speaking *simply of himself* and exhibiting his own experiences (comp. Hofmann), must be set aside for the simple reason, that in that case the entire disquisition, as a *mere individual* psychological history (7-13) and delineation (ver. 14 ff.), could have

no general probative force whatever, which nevertheless, from the connection with what goes before and follows (viii. 1), it is intended to have. Others, like Grotius, who correctly referred it to the state *anterior* to regeneration, and among them recently Reiche in particular, represent Paul as speaking *in the person of the Jewish people as a people*.<sup>1</sup> But, so far as concerns vv. 7-13, it is utterly *untrue* that the Jewish nation previous to the law led a life of innocence unacquainted with sin and evil desire; and as concerns ver. 14 ff., the explanation of the double character of the "I," if we are to carry out the idea of referring it to the nation, entangles us in difficulties which can only force us to strange caprices of exegesis, such as are most glaringly apparent in Reiche. Fritzsche also has not consistently avoided the reference of the "I" to *the people as such*, and the impossibilities that necessarily accompany it, and, in opposition to the Augustinian interpretation, has excluded, on quite insufficient grounds, the apostle himself and his own experience. Paul, who had himself been a Jew under the law, *could* not describe at all otherwise than from personal recollection that unhappy state, which indeed, with the lively and strong susceptibility of his entire nature and temperament, he must have experienced very deeply, in order to be able to depict it *as* he has done. Testimonies regarding himself, such as Phil. iii. 6, cannot be urged in opposition to this, since they do not unveil the inward struggle of impulses, etc. Similarly with Paul, Luther also sighed most deeply just when under the distress of his legal condition, before the light of the gospel dawned upon him, and he afterwards lamented that distress most vividly and truly. Philippi has rightly apprehended the "I" coming in at ver. 7 as that of the unregenerate man; but on the other hand, following the older expositors, has discovered from ver. 14 onwards the delineation of the regenerate state of the same "I,"<sup>2</sup>—a view

<sup>1</sup> Jerome on Dan. had already remarked: "*Peccata populi, quia unus e populo est, enumerat persona sua, quod et apostolum in ep. ad Rom. fecisse legimus.*"

<sup>2</sup> Comp. Calovius on ver. 14: "*Postquam legem divinam vindicavit vel pravae concupiscentiae omnem culpam transscribendam docuit, ejus vim sese etiamnum experiri ingemiscit apostolus, etiamsi renatus jam sit et justificatus.*" See also Calvin on ver. 14: "*Exemplum proponit hominis regenerati, in quo sic carnis reliquiae cum lege Domini dissident, ut spiritus ei libenter obtemperet.*"

inconsistent in itself, opposed to the context (since Paul does not pass on to the regenerate till viii. 1), and, when applied to the details, impossible (see the subsequent exposition). Hammond very truly observes: "*Nihil potest esse magis contrarium affectioni animi hominis regenerati, quam quae hic in prima persona Ego exprimuntur.*" Still Umbreit, in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1851, p. 633 ff., has substantially reverted, as regards the entire chapter, to the Augustinian view, for which he especially regards ver. 25 (*αὐτὸς ἐγώ*) as decisive; and no less have Delitzsch (see especially his *Psychol.* p. 387 ff.); Weber, *v. Zorne Gottes*, p. 86; Thomasius, *Chr. Pers. u. Werk*, I. p. 275 f.; Jatho; Krummacher in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1862, p. 119 ff.; and also Luthardt, *v. freien Willen*, p. 404 f., adopted this view with reference to ver. 14 ff. Hofmann, who in his *Schriftbew.* I. p. 556 to all appearance, though he is somewhat obscure and at variance with himself (see Philippi, p. 285 f., and *Glaubenslehre*, III. p. 243), had returned to the pre-Augustinian interpretation, in his *N. T.*, hampers a more clear and candid understanding of the passage by the fact that, while he decidedly rejects the theory that the "I" of ver. 7 is that of the unregenerate man, he at the same time justly says that what is related of that "I" (which is that of the apostle) belongs to *the time which lay away beyond his state as a Christian*; and further, by the fact, that he represents vv. 14–24 as spoken from the same present time as ver. 25, but at the same time leaves the enigma unsolved how the wretched condition described may comport with that present; and in general, as to the point in question about which expositors differ, he does not give any round and definite answer. For if Paul is to be supposed, according to Hofmann, in ver. 14 ff., not to treat of the *natural* man, and nevertheless to depict himself in the quality of his moral state *apart from his life in Christ*, we cannot get rid of the contradiction that the "I" is the regenerate man apart from his regeneration, and of the obscuring and muddling up of the meaning thereby occasioned. The view which takes it of *the unregenerate* is followed by Julius Müller, Neander, Nitzsch, Hahn, Baur, Tholuck, Krehl, Reithmayr, van Hengel, Ewald, Th. Schott. Ernesti, Lipsius, Mangold, Messner (*Lehre der Ap.* p. 220), and

many others, including Schmid, *bibl. Theol.* II. p. 262; Gess, *v. d. Pers. Chr.* p. 338; Lechler, *apost. u. nachapost. Zeitalt.* p. 97; Kahnis, *Dogm.* I. p. 595; the anonymous writer in the *Erlangen Zeitschr.* 1863, p. 377 ff.; Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* § 95; Märcker, p. 23; Grau, *Entwicklungsgesch.* II. p. 126. The just remark, that the apostle depicts the *future present* of the state (Th. Schott) does not affect this view, since the *future* state realized as present was just that of the *unregenerate* Israelite at the preliminary stage of moral development conditioned by the law. Compare Ritschl, *altkath. Kirche*, p. 70 f.; Achelis,<sup>1</sup> *l.c.* p. 678 ff.; Holsten, *z. Ev. d. Paul u. Petr.* p. 406.

Ver. 7. 'Ο νόμος ἁμαρτία;] *Is the law sin?* a something, whose ethical nature is immoral? Comp. Tittmann, *Synon.* p. 46; Winzer, *Progr.* 1832, p. 5; also Fritzsche, Rückert, de Wette, Tholuck, and Philippi. For the contrast see ver. 12, from which it at once appears that the formerly current interpretation, still held by Reiche and Flatt, "originator of sin" (διάκονος ἁμαρτίας, Gal. ii. 17), is, from the connection, erroneous; as indeed it would have to be arbitrarily imported into the word, for the appeal to Mic. i. 5 overlooks the *poetical* mode of expression in that passage. The *substantive* predicate (comp. viii. 10; 2 Cor. v. 21, *al.*) is more significant than an adjectival expression (ἁμαρτωλός), and in keeping with the meaning of the remonstrant, whom Paul personates. The question is not to be supposed *preposterous, setting forth a proposition without real meaning* (Hofmann), since it is by no means absurd in itself and, as an objection, has sufficient apparent ground in what precedes.—After ἀλλά we are no more to understand ἐροῦμεν again (Hofmann) than before ὁ νόμος ἁμαρτ., for which there is no ground (it is otherwise at ix. 30). On the contrary, this ἀλλά, *but*, brings in the *real relation* to sin, as it occurs in contrast to that inference which has just

<sup>1</sup> Who transfers the personal experience of the apostle, so far as it is expressed in ver. 14 ff., to the last stage of his Pharisaism, consequently to a period shortly before his conversion. But we have not sufficient data in the text and in the history for marking off, and that so accurately, a definite period in Paul's life. We may add that Achelis has aptly and clearly set aside the interpretation of the *regenerate* in the case of the several features of the picture sketched by Paul.

been rejected with horror: ἁμαρτία μὲν οὐκ ἔστι, φησὶ, γνωριστικός δὲ ἁμαρτίας, Theophylact. — τὴν ἁμ. οὐκ ἔγνων, εἰ μὴ δ. νόμου] *Sin I have not become acquainted with, except through the law.* The ἁμαρτία is sin as an active principle in man (see vv. 8, 9, 11, 13, 14), with which I have become experimentally acquainted only through the law (comp. the subsequent οὐκ ᾔδειν), so that without the intervention of the law it would have remained for me an unknown power; because, in that case (see the following, and ver. 8), it would not have become active in me through the excitement of desires after what is forbidden in contrast to the law. The τὴν ἁμ. οὐκ ἔγν., therefore, is not here to be confounded with the ἐπίγνωσις ἁμ. in iii. 20, which in fact is only attained through comparison of the moral condition with the requirements of the law (in opposition to Krehl); nor yet is it to be understood of the theoretic knowledge of the essence of sin, namely, that the latter is opposition to the will of God (Tholuck, Philippi; comp. van Hengel and the older expositors), against which view ver. 8 (χωρὶς νόμου ἁμαρτ. νεκρά) and ver. 9 are decisive. The view of Fritzsche is, however, likewise erroneous (see the following, especially ver. 8): I should not have sinned, "*cognoscit autem peccatum, qui peccat.*" — οὐκ ἔγνων is to be rendered simply, with the Vulgate: *non cognovi*. The sense: *I should not have known*, would anticipate the following clause, which assigns the reason.—The νόμος is nothing else than the *Mosaic law*, not the *moral law* generally in all forms of its revelation (Olshausen); for Paul is in fact declaring *his own* experimental consciousness, and by means of *this*, as it developed itself under *Judaism*, presenting to view the moral position (in its general human aspect) of those who are subject to the law of Moses. — τὴν τε γὰρ ἐπιθ. κ.τ.λ.] *for the desire (after the forbidden) would in fact be unknown to me,<sup>1</sup> if the law did not say, Thou shalt not covet.* The reason is here assigned for the foregoing: "with the dawning consciousness of desire conflicting with the precept of the law, I became aware also of the principle of sin within me, since the latter (see vv. 8, 9) made me

<sup>1</sup> οὐκ ᾔδειν, *I should not know*, more definite and confident than οὐκ ἔγνων. See Kühner, II. 1, p. 175 f. Comp. also Stallb. *ad Plat. Symp.* p. 190 C.

experimentally aware of its presence and life by the excitement of desire in presence of the law." *What* the law forbids us to covet (Ex. xx. 17 ; Deut. v. 21), was no concern of the apostle here, looking to the universality of his representation ; he could only employ the prohibition of sinful desire generally and in itself, without particular reference to its object.—On *τὲ* ... *γὰρ*, for ... *indeed*, comp. i. 26 ; it is not to be taken *climactically* (van Hengel), as if Paul had written *καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἐπιθ.* or *οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν ἐπιθ.* ἤδ. To the *τε*, however, corresponds the following *δέ* in ver. 8, which causes the chief stress of the sentence assigning the reason to fall upon ver. 8 (Stallb. *ad Plat. Polit.* p. 270D) ; therefore ver. 8 is still included as dependent on *γὰρ*. Respecting the imperative future of the old language of legislation, see on Matt. i. 21.

Ver. 8. *Δέ*] placing over against the negative declaration of ver. 7 the description of the positive process, by which the consciousness of desire of ver. 7 emerged : *but indeed sin took occasion*, etc. In this *ἀφορμὴν* placed first emphatically, not in *ἡ ἁμαρτία* (Th. Schott), lies the point of the relation. — *ἡ ἁμαρτία*] as in ver. 7, not conceived as *κακοδαίμων* (Fritzsche) ; nor yet the *sinful activity*, as Reiche thinks ; for that is the *result* of the *ἐπιθυμία* (Jas. i. 5), and the sin that first takes *occasion* from the law cannot be an action.—For examples of *ἀφορμὴν λαμβ.*, *to take occasion*, see Wetstein and Kypke. The principle of sin *took* occasion, not, as Reiche thinks, *received* occasion ; for it is conceived as something *revived* (ver. 9), which *works*. — *διὰ τῆς ἐντολῆς*] *through the command*, namely, the *οὐκ ἐπιθυμ.* of ver. 7. This interpretation is plainly necessary from the following *κατεργάσατο κ.τ.λ.* Reiche, following De Dieu and several others, erroneously (comp. Eph. ii. 15) takes *ἐντολή* as equivalent to *νόμος*. We must *connect* *διὰ τ. ἐντ.* with *κατεργ.* (Rückert, Winzer, Benecke, de Wette, Fritzsche, Tholuck, Umbreit, van Hengel, and Hofmann), not with *ἀφορμ. λαβ.* (Luther and many others, including Reiche, Köllner, Olshausen, Philippi, Maier, and Ewald), because *ἀφορμ. λαμβάνειν* is never construed with *διὰ* (frequently with *ἐκ*, as in Polyb. iii. 32. 7, iii. 7. 5), and because ver. 11 (*δι' αὐτῆς ἀπέκτ.*) and ver. 13

confirm the connection with *κατεργ.* — *κατεργ.* ἐν ἐμοὶ *πάσαν ἐπιθ.*] *it brought about in me all manner of desire.* Respecting *κατεργάζ.*, see on i. 27. Even without the law there is desire in man, but not yet in the ethical definite character of desire *after the forbidden*, as *ἐπιθυμία* is conceived of according to ver. 7; for as yet there is no prohibition, and consequently no moral antithesis existing to the desire in itself ("ignoti nulla cupido," Ovid, *A. A.* 397), through which antithesis the inner conflict is first introduced. *Every* desire is, in accordance with the quite general οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις, to be left without limitation. *No* desire (as respects category) was excluded. A reference to *the* desires, which the state of civilisation joined with a positive legislation calls forth (de Wette), is foreign to the connection. Comp. Prov. ix. 17. — χωρὶς γὰρ νόμου ἁμαρτία νεκρά] *sc. ἐστι*, not ἦν (Beza, Reiche, Krummacher), just because the omission of the verb betokens a *general* proposition: for *without the law*, i.e. if it do not enter into relation with the law,<sup>1</sup> *sin*, the sinful principle in man, *is dead*, i.e. *not active*, because that is wanting, by which it may take occasion to be alive. The potentiality of the *nititur in vitium* is indeed there, but, lacking the *reto* of the νόμος (τοῦ τὸ πρακτέον ὑποδεικνύντος καὶ τὸ οὐ πρακτέον ἀπαγορεύοντος, Theodoret), can exhibit no actual vital activity; it does not stir, because the antithesis is wanting. Hence the law becomes the δύναμις τῆς ἁμαρτίας, 1 Cor. xv. 56, though it is not itself τοῦ παρανομεῖν παραίτιος (Chrysippus in Plut. *de Stoic. Rep.* 33). Erroneous is the view held by Chrysostom, Calvin, Estius, Olshausen, and others, that *νεκρά* implies the *absence of knowledge* of sin (οὐχ οὕτω γνώριμος). The νόμος is here, as throughout in this connection, the *Mosaic* law, which contains the ἐντολή (vv. 7, 9, 12). That this may be and is misused by the principle of sin, in the way indicated, arises from the fact, that it comes forward merely

<sup>1</sup> According to Krummacher, indeed, the simple *χωρὶς νόμου* is held to mean: without knowing and laying to heart the significance of the law, which extends to the most secret motions, and condemns them. The dawning of this significance on the consciousness is then held to be *ἐλθούσης τῆς ἐντολῆς*. In this way people read between the lines whatever they conceive to be necessary.



with the *outward command* (*thou shalt, thou shalt not*), without giving the power of fulfilment; comp. Lipsius, *Rechtfertigungsl.* p. 63 ff. And the analogous *application*, which the general proposition admits of to the moral law of nature also, is indeed self-evident, but lies here aloof from the apostle's sphere of thought.

Ver. 9. *But I was once alive without the law.* ἐγὼ δὲ, the antithesis of ἁμαρτία; ἔζων,<sup>1</sup> antithesis of νεκρά; νόμου, just as in ver. 8. — ἔζων] The sense is, on account of the foregoing (νεκρά) and the following (ἀπέθανον, ver. 10) contrast, necessarily (in opposition to Reiche and van Hengel) to be taken as *pregnant*; but not with the arbitrary alteration, *videbar mihi vivere* (Augustine, Erasmus, Pareus, Estius), or *securus eram* (Luther Melancthon, Beza, Calvin, Piscator, Calovius, Bengel, and others, including Krummacher), thus representing Paul as glancing at his *Pharisaic state*, in which the law had not yet *alarmed* him,—a view which is at variance with the words themselves and with the antitheses, and which is certainly quite inadmissible historically in the case of a character like Paul (Gal. i. 14, iii. 23; Phil. iii. 6), who could testify so truly and vividly of the power of sin and of the curse of the law. No, Paul means *the death-free* (ver. 10) *life of childlike innocence* (comp. Winzer, p. 11; de Wette and Ewald *in loc.*; Umbreit in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1851, p. 637 f.; Ernesti, *Urspr. d. Sünde*, I. p. 101; Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 287; also Delitzsch), where—as this state of life, resembling the condition of our first parents in Paradise, was the bright spot of his own earliest recollection<sup>2</sup>—the law has not yet come to conscious knowledge, the moral self-determination in respect to it has not yet taken place, and therefore the sin-principle is still lying in the slumber of death. Rightly explained already by

<sup>1</sup> On the forms ἔζων and ἔζην, which are both classical, see Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* I. p. 738; Kühner, I. p. 829.

<sup>2</sup> Comp. Mimmern. ii. 3: πᾶσις ἐπὶ χρόνον ἀνέστις ἥβης περιτόμετα πρὸς θιῶν, εἰδότες οὐτε κακὸν οὐτ' ἀγαθόν. This recollection every one may have in looking back on the history of his own moral life; and even the realization of the moment, at which the life of childlike innocence took its end, is by no means inconceivable (as Hofmann objects). A dogmatic judgment cannot *a priori* be pronounced respecting such psychological experiences in the inner life. Hofmann himself

Origen : πᾶς γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ἔζη χωρὶς νόμου ποτὲ, ὅτε παιδίον ἦν, and by Augustine, *c. duas ep. Pelag.* i. 9. This is certainly a *status scurrilatis*, but one morally indifferent, not immoral, and not extending beyond the childhood unconscious of the ἐντολή. Hence, in the apostle's case, it is neither to be extended till the time of his conversion (Luther, Melancthon, etc.), nor even only till the time of his having perceived that the law demands not merely the outward act, but also the inward inclination (Philippi and Tholuck)—which is neither in harmony with the unlimited χωρὶς νόμου (Paul must at least have written χωρὶς τῆς ἐντολῆς), nor psychologically correct, since sin is not *dead* up to this stage of the moral development. From this very circumstance, it is clear also that the explanation of *those* is erroneous, who, making Paul speak in the name of his nation, are compelled to think of the purer and more blameless life of the patriarchs and Israelites before the giving of the law (so Grotius, Turretin, Locke, Wetstein, following several Fathers, and recently Reiche; comp. Fritzsche.)—The pregnant import of the ἔζων lies in the fact that, while the sin-principle is dead, man has not yet incurred eternal death (*physical* death has been incurred by every one through Adam's sin, v. 12); this being alive is therefore an analogue—though still unconscious and weak, yet pleasingly presenting itself in the subsequent retrospect—of the true and eternal ζώή (comp. Matt. xviii. 3) which Christ (comp. ver. 24 f.) has procured through His atoning work. The theory of a *pre-mundane life* of the pre-existent soul (Hilgenfeld in his *Zeitschr.* 1871, p. 190 f.) is a Platonism forced on the apostle (comp. Wisd. viii. 20, and Grimm *in loc.*) in opposition to the entire N. T. — ἐλθούσης δὲ τῆς ἐντολ. ] but when the command, namely, the οὐκ ἐπιθυμῆσεις of the Mosaic law, had come, i.e. had become present to my consciousness. To the person living still in childlike inno-

declares that a living and dying of the personal Ego is meant : “ so long as this Ego was not confronted by the command, it continued in the life given to it by God its Creator, which really deserved, as such, to be called a life.” But how the looking back, which our passage expresses, to this former life differs essentially and materially from the recollection of that of childlike innocence, is not clear to me. That ἔζων is, at any rate, the lost paradise of the individual inner history.

cence the *ἐντολή* was *absent*; for him it was not yet *issued*; it had not yet *presented* itself. Comp. on Gal. iii. 23. Reiche, consistently with his view of the entire section, explains it, as does also Fritzsche, of the historical Mosaic legislation. — *ἀνέζησεν*] is by most modern commentators rendered *came to life*. So Tholuck, Rückert, Fritzsche, Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette, Maier, and Hofmann. But quite contrary to the *usus loquendi* (Luke xv. 24, 32; Rom. xiv. 9; Rev. xx. 5), in accordance with which it means: *came again* to life. See also Nonnus, *Joh.* v. 25: *αὐτὶς ἀναζήσωσιν*, where (in opposition to the view of Fritzsche) *αὐτὶς* is added according to a well-known pleonasm; comp. *ἐπαναζώσει*, *reviviscet*, *Dial. Herm. de astrol.* i. 10, 42; respecting the case of *ἀναβλέπω*, usually cited as analogous, see on John ix. 11.<sup>1</sup> So, too, *ἀναζωόω* in Aquila and Symmachus means *reviviscere facio*. See Schleusner, *Thes.* I. p. 219. And also the frequent classical *ἀναβιώ* and *ἀναβιώσκειν* always mean to come to life *again*; Plat. *Rep.* p. 614 B; *Polit.* p. 272; Lucian, *Q. hist.* 40: *ἀνεβίουν ἀποθανών*, *Gall.* 18. Comp. *ἀναβίωσις*, 2 Macc. vii. 9. It is therefore linguistically correct to explain it, with the ancients, Bengel, and Philippi: *sin lived again* (*revixit*, Vulgate); but this is not to be interpreted, with Bengel, following Augustine and others: “*sicut vixerat, cum per Adamum intrasset in mundum*” (comp. Philippi), because that is foreign to the context, inasmuch as Paul sets forth *his* experience as the expression of the experience of every *individual* in his relation to the law, not speaking of humanity *as a whole*. The *ἀνέζησεν*, which is not to be misinterpreted as pointing to a *pre-mundane* sin (Hilgenfeld), finds its true explanation, analogously to the *ἀναβλέπω* in John ix. 11, in the view that the *ἁμαρτία*, that *potentiality* of sin in man, is originally and in its nature a *living* power, but is, before the *ἐντολή* comes, without expression for its life, *νεκρά*; there-upon it *resumes* its proper living nature, and thus *becomes alive again*. Comp. van Hengel: “*e sopore vigorem recuperavit.*”

<sup>1</sup> Generally, the citation of *other* verbs compounded with *ἀνά*, in which the latter means not *again*, but *up*, *aloft* (and that is, in fact, the case with very many), has no probative force. Passages should be quoted in which *ἀναζῆν* means merely to *come to life*, especially as the analogy of the classical *ἀναβίειν* is against it. This remark applies also against Hofmann's citations.

Ver. 10. 'Απέθανον] correlative of ἀνέζησεν, antithesis of ἔζων. It is neither to be understood, however, of *physical* nor of *spiritual* death (Semler, Böhme, Rückert; comp. Hofmann and others), but, as the contrast εἰς ζωὴν requires, of *eternal death*. This was *given* with the actual sin brought about through the sin-principle that had become alive; the sinner had *incurred* it. Paul, full of the painful recollection, expresses this by the abrupt, deeply tragic ἀπέθανον. — ἡ εἰς ζωὴν] *sc. οὖσα, aiming at life*. For the promise of *life* (in the Messianic theocratic sense, Lev. xviii. 5; Dent. v. 33; Gal. iii. 12), which was attached to the obedience of the Mosaic law generally, applied also to the ἐντολή. — εὑρέθη] *was found*, proved and showed itself in the actual experimental result; comp. Gal. ii. 17; 1 Pet. i. 7. Chrysostom has well said: οὐκ εἶπε γέγονε θάνατος, οὐδὲ ἔτεκε θάνατον, ἀλλ' εὑρέθη, τὸ καινὸν καὶ παράδοξον τῆς ἀτοπίας οὕτως ἐρμηνεύων, καὶ τὸ πᾶν εἰς τῶν ἐκείνων (of men) περιτρέπων κεφαλὴν. — αὕτη] *have*. To be written thus, and not αὐτή, *ipsa* (Bengel and Hofmann), after the analogy of ver. 15 f., 19 f. It has *tragic* emphasis. Comp. on Phil. i. 22.

Ver. 11. Illustration of this surprising result, in which ἡ ἁμαρτία, as the *guilty* element, is placed foremost, and its guilt is also made manifest by the διὰ τῆς ἐντολ. placed *before* ἐξηπάτ. *Sin* has *by means of the commandment* (which had for its direct aim my life) deceived me, inasmuch as it used it for the provocation of desire. An allusion to the serpent in Paradise is probable, both from the nature of the case, and also from the expression (LXX. Gen. iii. 13). Comp. 2 Cor. xi. 2. But such an allusion would be inappropriate, if it were "the struggle of the more earnest Pharisaism" (Philippi), and not the loss of childlike innocence, that is here described. As to the conception of the ἐξηπάτησε (sin held out to me something pernicious as being desirable), comp. Eph. iv. 22, Heb. iii. 13. — ἀπέκτεινεν] like ἀπέθανον in ver. 10.

Ver. 12. "Ωστε] The result of vv. 7-11. — ὁ μὲν νόμος] The contrast for which μὲν prepares the way was intended to be: "but sin has to me redounded unto death through the law, which in itself is good." This follows in ver. 13 as regards

*substance*, but not as regards *form*. See on ver. 13. — The predicates—*ἅγιος* (*holy*, as God's revelation of Himself, ver. 14; 2 Macc. vi. 23, 28), which is assigned to the Mosaic law generally, and *ἀγία, δικαία* (*just*, in respect to its requirements, which are only such as accord with the holiness), and *ἀγαθή* (*excellent*, on account of its salutary object), which are justly (comp. Acts vii. 38) attributed to the *ἐντολή* — exhaust the contents of the opposite of *ἀμαρτία* in ver. 7. They are *accumulated* on *ἡ ἐντολή*, because the latter had just been specially described in ver. 7 ff. as that which occasioned the activity of the sin-principle.

Ver. 13. Paul has hardly begun, in ver. 12, his exposition of the result of vv. 7–11, when his train of thought is again crossed by an inference that might possibly be drawn from what had just been said, and used against him (comp. ver. 7). He puts this inference as a question, and now gives in the form of a refutation of it what he had intended to give, according to the plan begun in ver. 12, not in polemical form, but in a sentence with *δέ* that should correspond to the sentence with *μέν*. — *ἀλλὰ ἡ ἀμαρτία] sc. ἐμοὶ ἐγένετο θάνατος*. Altogether involved is the construction adopted by Luther, Heumann, Carpzov, Ch. Schmidt, Böhme, and Flatt: *ἀλλὰ ἡ ἀμαρτία διὰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοι κατεργαζομένη (ἦν) θάνατον, ἵνα φανῇ ἀμαρτία. — ἵνα φανῇ κ.τ.λ.] in order that it might appear as sin thereby, that it wrought death for me by means of the good*. *ἵνα* introduces the *aim*, which was ordained by God for the *ἡ ἀμ.* *ἐμοὶ ἐγένετο θάνατος*. This purposed *manifestation* (*φανῇ* has the emphasis) of the principle of sin in its sinful character served as a necessary preparation for redemption,—a view, which represents the psychological history of salvation as a development of the divine *μοῖρα*. — *ἀμαρτία* is certainly shown to be the *predicate* by its want of the article and the parallel *ἀμαρτωλός* in the second clause. The predicate attributed to the *law* in ver. 7 is appropriated to that power to which it belongs, namely, *sin*. Ewald: that it might be manifest, *how sin*, etc. But *ἀμαρτία*, because it would thus be the sin-principle, must have had the article, and the “*how*” is gratuitously imported. — *ἵνα γένηται κ.τ.λ.] Climactic parallel* (comp. on 2 Cor. ix. 3; Gal. iii. 14) to *ἵνα*

φανῇ κ.τ.λ., in which γένηται is to be taken of the *actual result*; see on iii. 4. The repetition of the *subject* of γένηται (ἡ ἁμαρτία), and of the *means* employed by it (διὰ τῆς ἐντολῆς), may indeed be superfluous, because both are self-evident from what goes before; but it conveys, especially when placed at the close, all the weightier emphasis of a solemnly painful, tragic effect. The less, therefore, is ἡ ἁμαρτία διὰ τ. ἐντολ. to be separated from γένηται, and regarded as the resumption and completion of ἡ ἁμαρτία (sc. ἐμοὶ ἐγ. θάνατος); in which view there is assigned to the two clauses of purpose a co-ordinate intervening position (Hofmann), that renders the discourse—running on so simply and emphatically—quite unnecessarily involved. καθ' ὑπερβ., in *over-measure*, beyond measure. Comp. 1 Cor. xii. 13; 2 Cor. i. 8, iv. 17; Gal. i. 13; and see Wetstein. — διὰ τῆς ἐντολ.] *by means of the commandment*, which ἀγαθὸν it applied so perniciously; a pregnant contrast. — Observe the pithy, climactic, sharply and vividly compressed delineation of the gloomy picture.

Vv. 14-25. *Proof* not merely of the foregoing telic sentence (Th. Schott), but of the weighty main thought μὴ γένοιτο ἀλλὰ ἡ ἁμαρτία. "For the law is spiritual, but man (in his natural situation under the law, out of Christ) is of flesh and placed under the power of sin; against the moral will of his better self, he is carried away to evil by the power of the sinful principle dwelling in him."

Ver. 14. Οἶδαμεν] Ὡσανεὶ ἔλεγεν ὁμολογημένον τοῦτο κ. δηλὸν ἐστι, Chrysostom. Comp. ii. 2, iii. 19. It is not to be written οἶδα μὲν (Jerome, Estius, Semler, Koppe, Flatt, Reiche, Hofmann, Th. Schott), since the following δὲ would only correspond logically with the μὲν, if Paul, with a view to contrast the character of the *law* with his *own* character (so Hofmann), had said: οἶδα γὰρ, ὅτι ὁ μὲν νόμος κ.τ.λ.; or, in case he had desired to contrast his *character* with his *knowledge* (so Schott): οἶδα μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ., σάρκινος δὲ εἰμὶ, or εἰμὶ δὲ σάρκινος, omitting the ἐγώ, which is the antithesis of the νόμος. — πνευματικός] obtains its definition through the contrasted σάρκινος. Now σάρξ is the material phenomenal nature of man opposed to the divine πνεῦμα, animated and determined by the ψυχὴ

(comp. on iv. 1, vi. 19), and consequently *σάρκινος* (*of flesh*) affirms of the *ἐγώ*, that it is of such a non-pneumatic nature and quality.<sup>1</sup> So *πνευματικός* must affirm regarding the law, that *its essence* (not the *form* in which it is given, according to which it appears as *γράμμα*) is *divine* = *spiritual*: its essential and characteristic quality is homogeneous with that of the Holy Spirit, who has made Himself known in the law. For believers no proof of this was needed (*οἶδαμεν*), because the *νόμος*, as *νόμος Θεοῦ*, must be a holy self-revelation of the Divine Spirit; comp. ver. 12; Acts vii. 38. *In consequence* of this pneumatic nature the law is certainly *διδάσκαλος ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας πολέμιος* (Chrysostom), and its tenor, rooting in the Divine Spirit, is only fulfilled by those who have the *πνεῦμα* (Tholuck, with Calovius, joining together different references), as indeed the necessary presupposition is that it *θείῳ ἐγράφη πνεύματι* (Theodoret), and the consequence necessarily bound up with its spiritual nature is that there subsists no affinity between the law and death (Hofmann); but all this is not conveyed by the word itself, any more than is the *impossibility of fulfilling* the law's demands, based on its pneumatic nature (Calvin: "Lex coelestem quandam et angelicam justitiam requirit"). Following Oecumenius 2, and Beza, others (including Reiche, Köllner, and de Wette) have taken *πνεῦμα* of the higher spiritual nature *of man* (i. 9; Matt. xxvi. 41), and hence have, according to this reference, explained *πνευματικός* very variously. *E.g.* Reiche: "in so far as it does not hinder, but promotes, the development and expression of the *πνεῦμα*;" de Wette: "of spiritual tenor and character, in virtue of which it puts forward demands which can only be understood and fulfilled by the spiritual nature of man." So too, substantially, Rückert. But vv. 22, 25 show that *πνευματικός* characterizes

<sup>1</sup> Not merely *direction of life* (Ernesti, *Urspr. d. Sünde*, I. p. 77 ff.). Least of all is this rendering sufficient here, looking to the strength of the expression *σάρκινος*. Not, however, as though the *σάρξ* in itself were evil, something *originally* evil; but it is the seat of the sin-principle, by which it is used as its organ to make through it the moral will and the law ineffectual (ver. 14 ff., viii. 3), and—in the case of the regenerate—to react against the Holy Spirit. Thus the *σάρξ* itself is opposed to God, and has evil lusts and works, not in virtue of the necessity of its nature, but as the seat and tool of the sin-principle.

the law as νόμος Θεοῦ; consequently the πνεῦμα is just the *divine*, which the natural man, who knows and has nothing of the Spirit of God, resists in virtue of the heterogeneous tendency of his σάρξ. — ἐγὼ δέ] *but I*, i.e. according to the *ιδίωσις* pervading the entire section: *the man, not yet regenerate by the Holy Spirit, in his relation to the Mosaic law given to him*, —the still unredeemed ἐγὼ, who, in the deep distress that oppresses him in the presence of the law, ver. 24, sighs after redemption. For the subject is in vv. 14–25 necessarily the same—and that, indeed, in its unredeemed condition<sup>1</sup>—as previously gave its psychological *history* prior to and under the law (hence the *preterites* in vv. 7–13), and now *depicts its position* confronting (δέ) the pneumatic nature of the law (hence the *presents* in ver. 14 ff.), in order to convey the information (γάρ), that not the law, but the principle of sin mighty in man himself, has prepared death for him. It is true the situation, which the apostle thus exhibits in his own representative Ego, was for himself as an individual one long since past; but he realizes it as present and places it before the eyes like a picture, in which the standpoint of the happier present in which he now finds himself renders possible the perspective that lends to every feature of his portrait the light of clearness and truth. — σάρκινος, *made of flesh*, consisting of flesh, 2 Cor. iii. 3; 1 Cor. iii. 1; comp. Plat. *Leg.* x. p. 906 C; Theocrit. xxi. 66; LXX. 2 Chron. xxxii. 8; Ezek. xi. 19, xxxvi. 26; Addit. Esth. iv. 8: βασιλέα σάρκινον. The signification *fleshy*, corpulentus, Polyb. xxxix. 2. 7, is here out of place. It is not equivalent to the qualitative σαρκικός, *fleshly*, (see Tittmann's *Synon.* p. 23), that is, affected with the quality that is determined by the σάρξ. The σάρκινος, as the expression of the substance,<sup>2</sup> is far stronger; and while not including the negation of the moral will in man (see ver. 15 ff., 22, 25),

<sup>1</sup> Ewald: "He speaks, *if possible even more than previously*, from the standpoint of one *not yet redeemed*, who finds himself face to face with the law merely as a simple man, and consequently as still lacking all higher light and heavenly aid."—In fact, if all that follows can be asserted of the regenerate person, "the regenerate man would thus be also the unregenerate;" Baur, in the *theol. Jahrb.* 1857, p. 192; *neut. Theol.* p. 148.

<sup>2</sup> Comp. Holsten, *z. Ev. des Paul. u. Petr.* p. 397.



indicates the *σάρξ*—that unspiritual, material, phenomenal nature of man, serving by way of vehicle for sin—as the element of his being which so preponderates and renders the moral will fruitless, that the apostle, transporting himself into his pre-Christian state, cannot—in the mirror of this deeply earnest, and just as real as it was painful, self-contemplation—set forth the moral nature of the natural man otherwise than by the collective judgment, *I am of flesh*; the *σάρξ*, my substantial element of being, prevails on me to such an extent that the predicate *made of flesh* cleaves to me as if to a nature consisting of mere *σάρξ*. This is the Pauline *τὸ γεγεννημένον ἐκ τῆς σαρκὸς σάρξ ἐστίν* (John iii. 6). The Pauline *τὸ γεγενν. ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος πνεῦμά ἐστιν* follows in chap. viii. Since the *σάρξ* is the seat of the sin-principle (see ver. 18, comp. ver. 23), there is connected with the *σάρκινος* also the *πεπραμένος ὑπὸ τὴν ἁμαρτ.*, *sold*, as a *slave*, *under* the (dominion of) sin, *i.e.* as completely dependent on the power of the sin-principle<sup>1</sup> as is a serf on the master to whom he is sold: *ἡ πρᾶσις δούλου*

<sup>1</sup> These very predicates, as strong as possible, expressed without limitation, and in contrast to *πνευματικός*, should have precluded men from explaining it of the *regenerate* man, of the condition in the state of grace. Paul would have been speaking in defiance of his own consciousness (vi. 14, 22, viii. 2). See, moreover, Achelis, p. 681 ff. Theodoret has the true view: *τὸν πρὸ τῆς χάριτος ἄνθρωπον εἰσάγει πολιορκούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν παθῶν· σαρκὶν γὰρ καλεῖ τὸν μηδέπω τῆς πνευματικῆς ἐπικουρίας τετυχηκότα*. It is true that there are, in the case of the regenerate man also, “in natura carnali reliquiae prioris morbi” (Melancthon), and flesh and spirit are at warfare in him (viii. 5, Gal. v. 17); but he is not *σάρκινος* as opposed to *πνευματικός*, and not a slave sold to sin, else he must have fallen back again from his regenerate state. Very characteristic is the distinction, that in the case of the *regenerate* man the conflict is between *flesh* and *spirit* (*i.e.* the *Holy Spirit* received by him); but in that of the *unregenerate* man, between the *flesh* and his *own moral reason* or *νοῦς*, which latter succumbs, whilst in the regenerate the victory in the conflict may and must fall to the Spirit. Comp. on Gal. v. 17; also Baur, *Paul*, II. p. 158 f. All who have taken the subject in our passage to be the man already redeemed have necessarily fallen into the error (especially apparent in the case of Krummacher) of confounding the struggle between flesh and Spirit in the case of the regenerate person, with that described in our passage in the case of the still unregenerate man, who is not yet able to oppose the *πνεῦμα*, but only his own too weak *νοῦς*, to the power of sin in the flesh. From this error they should have been deterred by the very circumstance that in the entire passage (how wholly different in viii. 2 f.!) Paul is quite silent regarding the *πνεῦμα* as a power opposed to the *σάρξ* and the *ἁμαρτία*.

πάντως ποιεῖ τὸν πεπραμένον ὑπὸ τὴν τῆς ὑπηρεσίας καθιστάμενον ἀνάγκην, Theodore of Mopsuestia. Comp. 1 Kings xxi. 20, 25; 2 Kings xvii. 17; 1 Macc. i. 15. The *passive sense* of πεπραμ. finds its elucidation in ver. 23. πιπράσκεισθαι, in Greek authors (Soph. *Tr.* 251; Dem. 1304. 8; Lucian, *Asin.* 32) with τινί (comp. also Lev. xxv. 39; Deut. xxviii. 68; Isa. i. 1; Baruch iv. 6), is here coupled with ὑπὸ (comp. Gal. iv. 3) for the more forcible indication of the relation. Compare πιπράσκειν εἰς τὰς χεῖρας, 1 Sam. xxiii. 7; Judith vii. 25; and on the matter itself, Seneca, *de brev. vit.* 3.

Ver. 15 elucidates and assigns the reason of this relation of slavery. "*For what I perform I know not,*" i.e. it takes place on my part without cognition of its ethical bearing, in the state of bondage of my moral reason. Analogous is the position of the slave, who acts as his master's tool without perceiving the proper nature and the aim of what he does. Augustine, Beza, Grotius, Estius, and others, including Flatt, Glöckler, Reiche, and Reithmayr, erroneously take γινώσκω as *I approve*, which it never means, not even in Matt. vii. 23; John x. 14; 1 Cor. viii. 3; Rom. x. 19; 2 Tim. ii. 19; Ps. i. 6; Hosea viii. 4; Eccus. xviii. 27. Hofmann's view, however, is also incorrect, that *the* cognition is meant, "*which includes the object in the subjectivity of the person knowing,*" so that the passage denies that the work and the inner life have anything *in common*. In this way the idea of the *divine* cognition, whose object is *man* (Gal. iv. 9; Matt. xii. 23), is extraneously imported into the passage. — οὐ γὰρ ὃ θέλω κ.τ.λ.] The proof of the ὁ κατεργ. οὐ γινώσκω. For whosoever acts in the light of the moral cognition does not, of course, do that which is hateful to him following his practical reason (ὃ μισῶ), but, on the contrary, that towards which his moral desire is directed (ὃ θέλω). The person acting without that cognition, carried away by the power of sin in him, does not pursue as the aim of his activity (πράσσει, comp. on i. 32) that which in the morally conscious state he *would* pursue, but, on the contrary, does (ποιεῖ) what in that state is *abhorrent* to him.<sup>1</sup> The ethical power of reso-

<sup>1</sup> The μισῶ must not be weakened, as e.g. by Th. Schott, who makes it equivalent to οὐ θέλω in ver. 16.

lution, which decides for the good, is inactive, and man does the evil that he abhors. Paul consequently ascribes to the unregenerate man also the moral wish,<sup>1</sup> which he has in rational self-determination; but he denies to him the action corresponding thereto, because his moral self-determination does not come into exercise in the state of his natural bondage, but he is, on the contrary, hurried away to the performance of the opposite. His *θέλειν* of the good and his *μισεῖν* of the evil are not, therefore, those of the regenerate man, because the new man, in virtue of the holy *πνεῦμα*, emerges from the conflict with the *σάρξ* as a conqueror (against Philippi); nor yet the weak *velleitas* of the schoolmen (Tholuck, Reithmayr, comp. Baumgarten-Crusius); but a real, decided wishing and hating (comp. ver. 16), which present, indeed, for the moral consciousness the theory of self-determination, but without the corresponding result in the issue. The "I" in *θέλω* and *μισῶ* is conceived according to its moral self-consciousness, but in *πράσσω* and *ποιῶ*, according to its empiric practice, which runs counter to the self-determination of that consciousness. Reiche, in consistency with his misconception of the entire representation, brings out as the pure thought of ver. 15: "the sinful Jew, as he appears in experience and history, does the evil which the Jew free from sin, as he might and should have been, does not approve." As profane analogies of the moral conflict meant by Paul, comp. Epict. *Enchir.* ii. 26. 4: *ὁ μὲν θέλει (ὁ ἁμαρτάνων) οὐ ποιεῖ, καὶ ὁ μὴ θέλει ποιεῖ*; Eur. *Med.* 1079: *θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσων (stronger) τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων*, and the familiar "*video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor*" (Ovid, *Met.* vii. 19). See also Wetstein, and Spiess, *Logos spermat.* p. 228 f.

Ver. 16. Not an incidental inference (Rückert), but an essential carrying on of the argument, from which then ver. 17 is further inferred. For the relation of the *ἐγώ* to the law is in fact the very aim of the section (see ver. 25). — *ὁ οὐ θέλω*] *whereto I am unwilling*, for in fact I *hate* it, ver. 15. By *οὐ*

<sup>1</sup> For the idea that this *θέλειν* has only come to exist through regeneration (Luthardt, *v. freien Willen*, p. 405), is perfectly foreign to the expression, especially in its close connection with ver. 14, and is a pure *importation*.

the *θέλειν* is turned into its opposite. Comp. Bacuml. *Partik.* p. 278 ; Ameis on Homer, *Odys.* iii. 274. — *σύμφημι τῷ νόμῳ, ὅτι καλός*] since indeed the law also desires not what I do. My conduct, therefore, so far as my desire is opposed to it, appears, according to this contradiction, as a proof that *I concur with the law, that it is beautiful, i.e. morally good*; the *moral excellence* which the law affirms of itself (e.g. Deut. iv. 8) I also agree with it in acknowledging; in point of fact, I say *yes* to it. Comp. also Philippi and Hofmann. The *usual view*: *I grant to the law, that, etc.*, overlooks the *συν*, and the reference of the *τῷ νόμῳ* to *συν* (*I say with*). Comp. Plat. *Rep.* p. 608 B, *Theact.* p. 199 C, *Phaed.* p. 64 B ; Soph. *Aj.* 271, *Oed. R.* 553 ; Eur. *Hippol.* 265 ; Sturz, *Lex. Xen.* IV. p. 153. We may add that Chrysostom, *in loc.*, has appropriately directed attention to the *οἰκεία εὐγένεια* of the moral nature of man.

Ver. 17. *Νυνὶ δέ*] does not introduce a *minor proposition* attaching itself with a “*but now*” (Reithmayr and Hofmann)—a view which is unsuitable to the antithetical form of the expression; nor is to be taken, with Augustine, as “*nunc in statu gratiae* ;” but it is the quite common and, in Paul’s writings especially, very frequent *as it is, however* (see on iii. 21), that is, *in this actual state of the case, however*; namely, since my *θέλειν*, notwithstanding my conduct, is not opposed to the law, but on the contrary confirms it. In connection with this view *οὐκέτι* also is not, possibly, *temporal*, “pointing back to a time in which it was otherwise with the speaker” (Hofmann), namely, to what is related in vv. 7–11, but *logical*, as in ver. 20, xi. 6 ; Gal. iii. 18. What is indicated by *νυνὶ δέ* stands to *ἐγὼ κατεργ. αὐτό* in an *excluding* relation, so that after the former there can be no mention of the latter. It is the dialectic *non jam, non item* (Bornemann *ad Xen. Cyr.* i. 6. 27 ; Winer, p. 547 f. [E. T. 772] ; comp. Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* II. p. 432). — *ἐγέ*] with emphasis: my personality proper, my self-consciousness, which is my real, morally wishing *I* ego. It is not this “*I*” that performs the evil (*αὐτό, i.e. ὃ οὐ θέλω*, ver. 16), but the principle of sin, which has its dwelling-place in me (the phenomenal man),

enslaving my better—but against its power too weak—will, and not allowing it to attain accomplishment. That ἐν ἐμοί is not, like ἐγώ, to be taken of the moral self-conscious “I,” is affirmed by Paul himself in ver. 18. But it is erroneous to infer, from what he here says of the ἐγώ, the necessity of the explanation in the sense of the regenerate person (see especially Calvin and Philippi); for if the power practising the evil be not the “I,” but the potentiality of sin, this accords perfectly with the state of the σαρκικός, ψυχικός (1 Cor. ii. 14), ὑπὸ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν πεπραμένος (ver. 14), consequently of the unregenerate, in whom sin rules, and not the grace and power of the Holy Spirit leading the moral Ego to victory. In the regenerate man dwells the *Spirit* (viii. 8; Gal. v. 16 f.; 1 Cor. iii. 16), who aids the “I” in conquering the sin-power of the flesh (viii. 13 ff.; Gal. v. 24).

Ver. 18. Basing of the ἀλλ’ ἡ οἰκοῦσα ἐν ἐμοὶ ἁμαρτία in ver. 17 on the human (not: Christian) experimental consciousness of the ἔμφυτον κακόν (Wisd. xii. 10). — τοῦτ’ ἔστιν ἐν τῇ σαρκί μου] More precise definition to ἐν ἐμοί, by which it is designated, in order to make the meaning clear beyond all doubt, according to its aspect of self-verification here meant; and the latter is expressly distinguished from that of the moral self-consciousness, conveyed by the ἐγώ in ver. 17.—That *good*, that is, moral willing and doing, consequently the opposite of ἁμαρτία, has its abode in the σάρξ of man, i.e. in his materio-physical phenomenal nature (comp. on ver. 14<sup>1</sup>), is negated by οὐκ οἰκεῖ . . . ἀγαθόν, and this negation is then *proved* by τὸ γὰρ θέλει κ.τ.λ. If the σάρξ, namely, were the seat of the moral nature, so that the will of the moral self-consciousness and that residing in the σάρξ harmonized, in that case there would be nothing opposed to the carrying out of that moral tendency of will; in that case, besides the willing, we should find also in man the performance of the morally beautiful (τὸ καλόν, “quod candore morali nitet,” van Hengel). On the identity of the καλόν and the ἀγαθόν, according to the Greek view of

<sup>1</sup> Jul. Müller, I. p. 458, ed. 5, wrongly takes it here as morally indifferent, “of the collective phenomenal reality of human life.” See against this especially vv. 15, 25, viii. 3 ff. Comp. also Rich. Schmidt, *Paul. Christol.* p. 14.

morality, see Stallb. *ad Plat. Sympos.* p. 201 C. — *παράκειται μοι*] *lies before me* (Plat. *Tim.* p. 69 A, *Phil.* p. 41 D; 2 Macc. iv. 4)—a plastic expression of the idea: *there is present in me*. Paul presents the matter, namely, as if he were looking around in his own person, as in a spacious sphere, to discover what might be present therein. There he sees the *θέλειν* (τὸ καλόν) immediately confronting him, before his gaze; but his searching gaze fails to discover (οὐχ εὕρισκω) the *κατεργάζεσθαι τὸ καλόν*. The performance of the good, therefore, is something not characteristic of the natural man, while that *θέλειν* of the moral “I” is present with him. “*Longe a me abest*,” says Grotius aptly in explanation of the reading οὐ *sc.* *παράκειται*, with which, however, οὐχ εὕρισκω is perfectly equivalent in sense; so that to render the latter “I gain it not, *i.e.* I can not” (Estius, Kyriake, Flatt, Tholuck, and Köllner), or, “it is to me *unattainable*” (Hofmann), is inconsistent with the correlative *παράκειται μοι*, as well as the εὕρισκω in ver. 21. Theodoret has rightly noted the ground of the οὐχ εὕρισκω: *ἀσθενῶ . . . περὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν, ἐτέραν ἐπικουρίαν* (namely, that of the Holy Spirit) *οὐκ ἔχων*. But the ἐγώ, which has the willing, can *not* at all be the *καινὸς πνευματικὸς ἄνθρωπος* (against Philippi), whose *θέλειν* is the “*fidei promptitudo*” (Calvin), because that ἐγώ, clogged by the sinful power of the flesh, is naked and void of the *κατεργάζεσθαι*. The latter is the simple *to bring about, to bring into execution* (see on i. 27); and if, in order to interpret it appropriately of the regenerate person, it be made to mean, *to live quite purely* (Luther), or the “*implere quia deest alacritate*” (Calvin), or the act *which is in harmony with the will sanctified by the Spirit of God* (Philippi), these shades of meaning are purely imported.

Ver. 19. Proof of τὸ δὲ *κατεργ.* τὸ καλόν οὐχ εὕρισκω in ver. 18. *For the good that I desire I do not; but the evil that I desire not, that I pursue.* Respecting the interlocking of the relative and main clauses, see Winer, p. 155 [E. T. 205].

Ver. 20. From this follows, however, the very proposition to be proved, ver. 17, that it is not the moral *self*, but the *sin-principle* in man, that performs the evil. — οὐ θέλω] as in ver. 16.

## Vv. 21-23. Result from vv. 14-20.

Ver. 21. Among the numerous interpretations of this passage, which Chrysostom terms *ἁσαφὲς εἰρημένον*, and the exposition of which has been given up as hopeless by van Hengel and Rückert, the following fall to be considered:<sup>1</sup>—(1) τὸν νόμον taken generally as *rule*, necessity, and the like: “*I find therefore for me, who am desirous of doing the good, the rule, the unavoidably determining element, that evil lies before me;*” so that it is substantially the ἕτερος νόμος ἐν τοῖς μέλεσι, ver. 23, that is here meant. So, in the main, Luther, Beza, Calvin, Grotius, Estius, Wolf, and others, including Ammon, Boehme, Flatt, Köllner, de Wette, Baumgarten-Crusius, Nielsen, Winer, Baur, Philippi, Tholuck, Delitzsch, *Psychol.* p. 379, Umbreit, Krummacher, Jatho, and the latest Catholic expositors, Reithmayr, Maier, and Bisping. But it is fatal to this view, that ὁ νόμος, in accordance with the entire context, can be nothing else than the *Mosaic* law, since a definition altering this wonted reference of the meaning is not appended, but is only introduced in ver. 23 by the addition of ἕτερον; further, that ὅτι ἐμοὶ τὸ κακὸν παράκειται is not a relation that presents itself in idea as a νόμος, but, on the contrary, as something *empirical*, as a *phenomenon* of fact; and lastly, that we should have to expect τὸν νόμον, in that case, only before ὅτι. (2) τὸν νόμον understood of the *Mosaic* law: “*I find therefore in me, who am desirous of doing the law, (namely) the good, that evil lies before me.*” According to this view, consequently, τὸ καλόν is in apposition with τ. νόμον, and ὅτι κ.τ.λ. is the object of εὐρίσκω. So, in substance, Homberg, Bos, Knapp, *Scr. var. arg.* p. 389, Klee, Bornemann in *Luc.* p. lxxvii, Olshausen, Fritzsche, and Krehl. But after what goes before (vv. 15-20), it is inconsistent with the context to separate ποιεῖν τὸ καλόν; and, besides, the appositional view of τὸ καλόν is a forced expedient, feebly introducing something quite superfluous, especially after the τὸν νόμον prefixed with full emphasis. (3) τὸν νόμον likewise taken of the *Mosaic* law, and ὅτι taken as *because*: “*I find therefore the law for me,*

<sup>1</sup> Leaving out of account Reiche's misinterpretation as to a double “I” of Jewish humanity.

who am disposed to do the good, because evil lies before me ;" i.e. I find therefore that the law, so far as I have the will to do what is good, is by my side concurring with me, because evil is present with me (and therefore I need the law as *συνήγορον* and *ἐπιτείνοντα τὸ βούλημα*, see Chrysostom). So substantially the Peschito, Chrysostom, Theophylact (*εὐρίσκω ἄρα τὸν νόμον συνηγοροῦντά μοι, θέλοντι μὲν ποιεῖν τὸ καλόν, μὴ ποιοῦντι δὲ, διότι ἐμοὶ παράκειται τὸ κακόν*) ; comp. also Origen, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Occumenius (less clearly Theodoret), Hammond, Bengel, Semler, Morus, and my own second edition. But the idea, which according to this view would be conveyed by the dative *τῷ θέλοντι ἐμοὶ κ.τ.λ.*, must have been more definitely and expressly indicated than by the mere *dativus commodi* ; moreover, this explanation does not harmonize with the apostle's purpose of summing up now, as the result of his previous view, the whole *misery*, in which the natural man sees himself when confronted with the law ; see vv. 22-25. Hofmann also, modifying his earlier similar view (*Schriftbew.* I. p. 549), now understands under *τ. νόμον* the *Mosaic* law, and takes *ὅτι* in the sense of *because*, but *τὸ καλόν* as predicate to *τ. νόμον*, the dative as depending on *τὸ καλόν*, and *ποιεῖν*, which is supposed to be without an object, as belonging to *θέλ.* The speaker thus declares what he recognises the law as being, "namely, *as that which to him, who is willing to do, is the good* ;" and he finds it so, "*because the evil is at hand to him* ;" when he "*comes to act*," the evil is there also, and presents itself to him to be done ; which contradiction between the thing willed and the thing lying to his hand makes him perceive the harmony between his willing and the law, so that, namely, he "*would be doing what he wills, if he were doing that which the law commands*." This extremely tortuous explanation, which first of all imports the nucleus of the thought which is supposed to be expressed so enigmatically, breaks down at the very outset by its assumption that *ποιεῖν* is meant to stand *without object* (when I come to act!), although the object (comp. vv. 15-20) *stands beside it* (*τὸ καλόν*) and according to the entire preceding context *necessarily belongs to it*,—a statement as to which nothing but exegetical subjectivity can pronounce



the arbitrary verdict that it is "*groundless prejudice*."<sup>1</sup> (4) Ewald's attributive reference of τὸ κακόν to the law is utterly erroneous: "*I find therefore the law, when I desire to do what is beautiful, how it lies at hand to me as the evil.*" Paul assuredly could not, even in this connection, have said τὸ κακόν of the divine law after vv. 12, 14; comp. ver. 22. (5) Abandoning all these views, I believe that τὸν νόμον is to be understood of the *Mosaic* law and joined with τῷ θέλοντι, that ποιεῖν is to be taken as infinitive of the purpose (Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 224), and ὅτι κ.τ.λ. as object of εὐρίσκω (comp. Esr. ii. 26): "*it results to me, therefore, that, while my will is directed to the law in order to do the good, the evil lies before me.*" What deep wretchedness! My moral will points to the law in order to do the good, but the evil is present with me in my fleshly nature, to make the θέλειν void! What I *will*, that I *cannot* do.<sup>2</sup> In connection with this view, observe: (a) That the position of the words τὸν νόμον τῷ θέλοντι ἐμοί serves, without any harshness, to set forth τὸν νόμον emphatically, just as often also in classical writers the substantive with the article is emphatically prefixed to the participle with the article, on which it depends (see Kühner *ad Xen. Mem.* i. 6. 13; Bornemann and Kühner *ad Anab.* v. 6, 7; Krüger, § 50, 10. 1; Bernhardt, p. 461);—

<sup>1</sup> Th. Schott does not indeed commit the mistake of separating ποιεῖν from τὸ κακόν, but he introduces in another way what is not in the text: "*I find the law for me, who am willing to do good, such an one as leaves the matter on the footing, that to me, etc.*"

<sup>2</sup> The objections urged against my explanation are very unimportant. It is said, in particular, that the inversion τὸν νόμον τῷ θέλοντι is *harsh* (Delitzsch), *forced* (Philippi), *strange and meaningless* (Hofmann). But it is not *harsher* than the numerous perfectly similar hyperbata found in all classic authors (comp. e.g. Xen. *Mem.* i. 6. 13, where the Sophists are termed τὴν σοφίαν οἱ παλοῦντες, Plat. *Apol.* p. 39 C: ὅμας οἱ ἐλίγχοντες, Herod. vii. 184: τὰς καμήλους τοὺς ἐλαύνοντας, Thuc. vi. 64. 5: ταῦτα τοὺς ξυνδράσκοντας, and Poppo *in loc.*; also Kühner, *Gramm.* II. 1, p. 532); and so far from being *meaningless*, the inverted arrangement, very appropriately to the sense, lays a great emphasis upon τὸν νόμον. For the νόμος, as the divine record of the καλόν, in contrast to the κακόν which lies in man, has the stress, which does not rest upon θέλοντι (Hofmann). Observe how the idea of the law is prominent and pervading down to the end of the chapter, and then again in viii. 2 ff. Least of all in the case of such an extremely difficult passage should people suppose that they may dismiss a linguistically unassailable explanation by vague and merely dogmatical objections.

(b) That θέλειν with the accusative as object of the willing, *i.e.* of the moral striving and longing, of desire and love, is particularly frequent in the LXX. (see also Matt. xxvii. 43 and the remark thereon); compare here, especially, Isa. v. 24: οὐ γὰρ ἠθέλησαν τὸν νόμον κυρίου. (c) Finally, how aptly the συνήδομαι γὰρ τῷ νόμῳ κ.τ.λ. in the illustrative clause that follows, ver. 22, harmonizes with the τὸν νόμον τῷ θέλοντι ἐμοί; while the subsequent βλέπω δὲ ἕτερον νόμον κ.τ.λ., in ver. 23, answers to the ὅτι ἐμοί τὸ κακὸν παράκειται. — The dative τῷ θέλοντι ἐμοί is that of the *ethical reference*: deprehendo *mihī*, experience proves it to me. Comp. εὔρεθι μοι, ver. 10; Hom. Od. xxi. 304: οἱ δ' αὐτῷ πρώτῳ κακὸν εὔρετο οἰνοβαρείων. Soph. Aj. 1144: ᾧ φθέγμ' ἂν οὐκ ἂν εὔρες. O. R. 546: δυσμενῇ γὰρ καὶ βαρὺν σ' εὔρηκ' ἐμοί. Oed. C. 970: οὐκ ἂν ἐξεύροις ἐμοί ἁμαρτίας ὄνειδος οὐδέν. Plat. Rep. p. 421 E; Eur. Ion. 1407.

Vv. 22, 23. Antithetical illustration of ver. 21. — συνήδομαι τ. νόμῳ τ. Θεοῦ] The *compound* nature of the verb is neither to be overlooked (as by Beza and others, including Rückert and Reiche), nor to be taken as a strengthening of it (Köllner), or as *apud animum meum lactor* (Fritzsche, Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette, Tholuck, and Philippi). It means: *I rejoice with*, which sense alone consists with linguistic usage (Plat. Rep. p. 462 E; Dem. 519. 10, 579. 19; Soph. Oed. C. 1398; Eur. Med. 136; Sturz, *Lec. Xen.* IV. p. 184; Reisig, *Enarr. Soph. Oed. C.* 1398). By this, however, we are not to understand the joy *over* the law, shared *with others* (van Hengel and others)—an idea here foreign to the connection; nor yet the joyful nature of *taking part in the law* (Hofmann), whereby the necessary conception of joy *in common* falls away; but rather: *I rejoice with the law of God*, so that *its* joy (the law being personified) is also *mine*. It is the agreement of moral sympathy in regard to what is good. Comp. on σύμφημι in ver. 16. So also συμπευθεῖν τινι, συναλγεῖν τινι, κ.τ.λ.; similarly συλλυπούμενος, Mark iii. 5. Rightly given in the Vulgate: “condelector *legi* (not *lege*) Dei.” Comp. 1 Cor. xiii. 6: συγχαίρει τῇ ἀληθείᾳ. The *Mosaic* law is described as νόμος Θεοῦ (genit. auctoris) in contrast to the ἕτερος νόμος,

which is the law opposed to God. — *κατὰ τ. ἔσω ἄνθρ.*] The rational and moral nature of man, determined by conscience (ii. 15), is, as the *inward man*, distinguished from the outward man that appears in the body and its members.<sup>1</sup> *ὁ νοῦς* in its contrast to *σάρξ* designates the same thing *a potiori*; see on Eph. iii. 16, 2 Cor. iv. 16; also 1 Pet. iii. 4, and Huther *in loc.* Philo (p. 533, Mang.) terms it *ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ*. — *βλέπω*] Here also Paul represents himself as a *spectator* of his own personality, and as such he *sees*, etc. — *ἕτερον*] a law of *another nature*, not *ἄλλον*. Comp. ver. 4, and on Gal. i. 6. — *ἐν τοῖς μέλεσί μου*] *sc. ὄντα*, correlative, even by its posi-

<sup>1</sup> It is erroneous to discover in the expression the designation of the *regenerate* man (Luther, Melancthon, Calvin, Calovius, Krummacher, and others), or to say (as Delitzsch does) that Paul means the higher better self produced or liberated by the grace of the discipline of the law (*Psychol.* p. 380). The unregenerate man also, whether the law have already taken him into its training or not, has the *ἔσω ἄνθρωπος*, and the connection alone must decide whether the *ἔσω ἄνθρωπος* of the passage relates to the redeemed or the unredeemed. The inner man is that which *receives* the Spirit and grace (comp. 2 Cor. iv. 16; Eph. iii. 16), and not the *work* of these. The latter is the *new* man (Eph. ii. 10, iv. 24). In our passage the entire connection decides that it is the *ἔσω ἄνθρωπος* of the *unregenerate* man which is meant, in his relation to the law; to him also belongs, as respects his moral "I" (although this is quite arbitrarily denied by Philippi, following Melancthon, and many others), the *συνήδομαι τῷ νόμῳ τ. Θεοῦ* (comp. ii. 15), and it must belong to him, since the sinful nature has its seat and home in the *σάρξ*, vv. 18, 25, as the *antithesis* of the *νοῦς*. This does not indeed consist with the assumption that it is precisely the *higher* powers of the natural man that by nature are at diametrical variance with God and His law (*Form. Conc.* p. 640 f.), but it nevertheless rests on an exegetic basis. Comp. on Eph. iii. 16. The *σάρξ*, however, with the power of sin dwelling in it, overpowers the *νοῦς*, so that it becomes in bondage, darkened, and in the activity of its conscience blunt and perverted; hence it requires *renewal* (xii. 2): comp. Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* § 95. There remains, therefore, the necessity for redemption of the whole natural man, as also his incapacity for self-attainment of salvation; and it is an error to see in that contradiction to the *Formula Concordiae* ought to shake the Pauline doctrine of atonement and justification by faith alone (Delitzsch). Delitzsch brings against me the charge of being un-Lutheran and unbiblical. The latter I must deny; the former does not affect me *as exegete*, since as such I have only to inquire what is exegetically *right* or *wrong*. Philippi, p. 307, ed. 3, *note*, quotes against me authorities (of very various kinds) which as such prove nothing; and reminds me of the position of investigation as to the idea of the *σάρξ*. I may be trusted to possess some acquaintance with the position of such investigations, including even those which the respected theologian has *not* embraced in his quotations and to some extent could not yet do so.

tion, with *κατὰ τὸν ἔσω ἄνθρωπον*. Fritzsche and Hofmann join *ἐν τοῖς μέλ. μου ἀντιστρατ.*,<sup>1</sup> whereby, however, the importance of the added elements *ἀντιστρατ. κ.τ.λ.* is more subordinated to the *ἐν τ. μέλ. μου*, and the symmetry of the discourse unnecessarily disturbed; comp. below, *τῷ ὄντι ἐν τοῖς μέλ. μου*. The *members*, as the instruments of activity of the *σάρξ*, are, seeing that the *σάρξ* itself is ruled by sin (vv. 18, 25), that in which the power of sin (the dictate of the sin-principle, *ὁ νόμος τῆς ἁμαρτ.*) pursues its doings. This activity in hand, eye, etc. (comp. vi. 13, 19), is directed against the dictate of the moral reason, and that with the result of victory; hence the figures drawn from war, *ἀντιστρατ.* and also *αἰχμαλωτ.* — The *νόμος τοῦ νοός*—in which the genitive is neither to be taken as that of the subject (Fritzsche: “quam mens mea constituit;” comp. Hofmann, “which man gives to himself”), nor exegetically (Th. Schott), but *locally*, corresponding to the *ἐν τοῖς μέλ. μου*—is not identical with the *νόμος τ. Θεοῦ* in ver. 22 (Usteri, Köllner, Olshausen, and others), just because the latter is the *positive* law of God, the law of *Moses*; but it is the *regulator* of the *συνιδέσθαι τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ* (ver. 22), *implied* in the moral reason and immanent in the *νοός*. As to *νοός*, which is here, in accordance with the connection, the reason in its *practical* activity, the power of knowledge in its *moral* quality as operating to determine the moral will,<sup>2</sup> see Stirn in the *Tüb. Zeitschr.* 1834, 3, p. 46 ff.; Beck, *bibl. Seelenl.* p. 49 ff.; Delitzsch, p. 179; Kluge in the *Jahrb. f. D. Th.* 1871, p. 327. The form *νοός* belongs to the later Greek. See Lobeck *ad Phryg.* p. 453. — *καὶ αἰχμαλ. κ.τ.λ.*] and makes me prisoner-of-war to the law of sin (makes me subject to the power of the sin-principle) which is in my members. The *με* does not denote the inner man, the *νοός* (Olshausen), for it, regarded in itself, continues in the service of the law of God (ver. 25); but the *apparent* man, who would follow the leading of the *νοός*. He it is, for the control of whom the law of sin contends with the moral law. The former conquers, and

<sup>1</sup> Compare Th. Schott, who however renders *iv*: in the power of my members.

<sup>2</sup> Consequently the morally willing *faculty* of the human *πνεῦμα*. Comp. (against Holsten) Pfeleiderer in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschr.* 1871, p. 165 f.; Kluge *l.c.*

thereby, while the moral law has lost its influence over him, makes him its prisoner-of-war (Luke xxi. 24; 2 Cor. x. 5); so that he is now — to express the same idea by another figure — πεπραμένος ὑπὸ τ. ἁμαρτίαν, ver. 14, — a trait of the gloomy picture, which likewise does not apply to the condition of the redeemed, viii. 2. — τῷ νόμῳ τῆς ἁμαρτ.] is *identical* with the νόμος that was previously, without more precise definition, called ἕτερος νόμος. Instead, namely, of saying: “and made me *its* prisoner,” Paul characterizes—as he could not avoid doing in order to complete the antithesis—the victorious law, not previously characterized, *as that which it is*, and says: αἰχμαλ. με τ. νόμῳ ἁμαρτ. Here τ. ἁμαρτ. is the *genitivus auctoris*; τ. νόμῳ, however, is not instrumental (Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact), but can only be taken as the dative of *reference* (commodi). The observation τῷ ὄντι ἐν τοῖς μέλεσί μου, emphatically added to make the disgrace more palpably felt, obviates the misconception that a power different from the ἕτερος νόμος was meant. We must dismiss, therefore, the distinctions unsupported by evidence that (following Origen, Jerome, and Occumenius, but not Ambrosiaster) have been attempted; e.g. recently by Köllner, who thinks that the ἕτερος νόμος means the demands of the sensuous nature, so far as they manifest themselves in individual cases as bodily lusts, while the νόμος τ. ἁμαρτ. is the sensuous nature itself conceived as a sinful principle; or by de Wette, who thinks that the former is the proneness to sin which expresses itself in the determinableness of the will by the sensuous nature, while the latter is the same proneness, so far as it conflicts with the law of God, and by the completed resolution actually enters into antagonism thereto (comp. Umbreit); or by Ewald (comp. also Grotius and van Hengel), who thinks that Paul here distinguishes *two pairs* of kindred laws: (1) the eternal law of God, and alongside of it, but too weak in itself, the law of reason; and (2) the law of desire, and along with it, as still mightier, the law of sin. Similarly also Delitzsch, Reithmayr, and Hofmann. The latter distinguishes the law of sin from the law in the members, in such a way that the former is prescribed by sin, as the lawgiver, to *all those* who are subject

to it; the *latter*, on the contrary, rules in the bodily nature of the *individual*, as soon as the desire arises in him.<sup>1</sup> — αἰχμαλωτίζω belongs to the age of Diodorus, Josephus, etc. (αἰχμαλωτεύω is still later). See Thom. Mag. p. 23; Lobeck *ad Phryg.* p. 442.

Ver. 24. The marks of parenthesis in which many include vv. 24, 25, down to ἡμῶν, or (Grotius and Flatt) merely ver. 25 down to ἡμῶν, should be expunged, since the flow of the discourse is not once logically interrupted. — ταλαίπωρος κ.τ.λ.] The oppressive feeling of the misery of that captivity finds utterance thus. Here also Paul by his "I" represents the still *unredeemed* man in his relation to the law. Only with the state of the *latter*, not with the consciousness of the *regenerate* man, as if he "as it were" were crying ever afresh for a new Redeemer from the power of the sin still remaining in him (Philippi), does this wail and cry for help accord. The regenerate man *has* that which is here sighed for, and his mood is that which is *opposite* to the feeling of wretchedness and death, v. 1 ff., viii. 1 ff.; being that of freedom, of overcoming, of life in Christ, and of Christ in him, of peace and joy in the Holy Spirit, of the new creature, to which old things have passed away. Comp. Jul. Müller, *v. d. Sünde*, I. p. 458 f., ed. 5. The objection of Reiche, that Paul would, according to this view, speak of himself while he was thinking of men of quite an opposite frame of mind, is not valid; for that longing, which he himself had certainly felt very deeply in his pre-Christian life, and into whose painful feelings he *transports himself back* all the more vividly from the standpoint of his *blissful state of redemption*,<sup>2</sup> could not but, in the

<sup>1</sup> Calovius gives the right view: "Lex membrorum et lex peccati idem sunt, ut e verbis apostoli (iv) τῷ νόμῳ τῆς ἀμαρτίας τῷ ὄντι ἐν τοῖς μέλεσί μου liquet." The clear words themselves do not convey, moreover, the distinction between the produced and the producer (Delitzsch); but, on the contrary, the law of sin coincides completely with the law of the members, as already Augustine perceived, *de nupt. et concup.* i. 30: "captivantem sub lege peccati, h. e. sub se ipsa." Comp. also Theodore of Mopsuestia, who declares himself expressly and decidedly against the interpretation of our passage as pointing to *four* laws.

<sup>2</sup> This applies also against Delitzsch's assertion, that the very form of this lamentation shows that it proceeds from the breast of a converted person. How natural is it, rather, that Paul should represent the redemption, as he had him-

consistent continuation of the *idiosis*, be here individualized and realized as present through his ἐγώ. And this he *could* do the more unhesitatingly, since no doubt could thereby be raised in the minds of his readers regarding his present freedom from the *ταλαιπωρία* over which he sighs. Reiche himself, curiously enough, regards ver. 24 as the cry for help of Jewish humanity, to which "a redeemed one replies" in viii. 1; ver. 25, standing in the way, being a gloss! — *ταλαίπ. ἐγὼ ἄνθρ.*] Nominative of exclamation: *O wretched man that I am!* See Kühner, II. 1, p. 41; Winer, p. 172 [E. T. 228]. — *ταλαίπ.*, Rev. iii. 17, very frequent in the tragedians: Plat. *Euthyd.* p. 302 B; Dem. 548. 12, 425. 11. — *ῥύσεται*] Purely future. In the depth of his misery the longing after a deliverer asks as if in despair: *who will it be?* — *ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τ. θανάτου τούτου*] *τούτου* might indeed grammatically be joined to *σώματος* (Erasmus, Beza, Calvin, Estius, and many others, including Olshausen, Philippi, Hofmann, and Th. Schott), since one may say, *τὸ σῶμα τ. θ. τοῦτο*; but the sense is against it. For that which weighs upon him, namely, the being dependent on the body as captive of the law of sin, lies in the fact that the body belongs to *this* death, *i.e.* to the death *incurred by sin* (which is not physical, but *eternal* death, comp. ver. 10 ff.), consequently to this *shameful* death, as its seat;<sup>1</sup> not in the fact that this relation takes place in the *present* body, or in a present time posited with the quality of the earthly body. If the words of the person who exclaims should amount to no more than "*the hopeless wish to get rid of the body, in which he is compelled to live,*" without expressing, however, the desire to be *dead* (Hofmann), they would yield a very confused conception. Moreover, by postponing the pronoun, Paul would only have expressed himself very unintelligibly, had his

self experienced it, and whose triumphant bliss he bore in his own bosom, as the object of the longing and sighing of the still unredeemed! And who can assert that he himself sighed *otherwise*, before Christ laid hold on him? Thus we here listen to the echo of what was once forced from his own breast. Where such sighing occurs, it is not the state of grace of the converted, but merely the operation of the so-called *gratia praeveniens* (comp. the *Erlangen Zeitschrift*, 1864, 6, p. 378 ff.).

<sup>1</sup> Comp. Ex. x. 17: *περιλίτω ἀπ' ἐμοῦ τὸν θάνατον τοῦτον.*

meaning been *hoc corpus mortis*, and not *corpus mortis hujus* (Vulgate). Comp. Acts v. 20, xiii. 26. The correct explanation therefore is: "*Who shall deliver me, so that I be no longer dependent on the body, which serves as the seat of so shameful a death?*" or, in other words: "*Who shall deliver me out of bondage under the law of sin into moral freedom, in which my body shall no longer serve as the seat of this shameful death?*" Comp. viii. 9, vi. 6, vii. 5, 10 ff.; Col. ii. 11. With what vivid and true plastic skill does the deeply-stirred emotion of the apostle convey this meaning! underneath which, no doubt, there likewise lies the longing "after a release from the sinful natural life" (Th. Schott). In detail, *τίς με ῥύσεται* corresponds with the *αἰχμαλωτίξ. με τῷ νόμῳ τῆς ἁμ.* in ver. 23; *ἐκ τοῦ σώμ.* with the *τῷ ὄντι ἐν τοῖς μέλεσί μου* in ver. 23; and *τούτου* denotes the death as occasioned by the tragic power of sin just described also in ver. 23; the *genitive* relation is the same as in vi. 6. The rendering "*mortal body*" is condemned by the close connection of *τούτου* with *θανάτου*, whether (inconsistently enough with the context, see vv. 23, 25, viii. 1, 2) there be discovered in the words *the longing for death* (Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Erasmus, Pareus, Estius, Clericus, Balduin, Koppe, and others), or, with Olshausen (introducing what is foreign to the argument), the longing "only to be redeemed from the *mortal* body, *i.e.* from the body that through sin has become liable to perish, so that the Spirit may make it alive." Finally, as in vi. 6, so also here, those explanations are to be rejected which, in arbitrary and bold deviation from the Pauline usage, take *σῶμα* not of the human body, but as "*mortifera peccati massa*" (Calvin, Cappel, Homberg, Wolf); or: "*the system of sensual propensities (σῶμα), which is the cause of death*" (Flatt); or: "*death conceived as a monster with a body, that threatens to devour the ἐγώ*" (Reiche).

Ver. 25. Not Paul himself for himself alone, but, as is shown by the following *ἄρα οὖν κ.τ.λ.*, the same collective "I" that the apostle has personated previously, speaks here also—expressing, after that anguish-cry of longing, its feeling of deep thankfulness toward God that the longed-for deliverance has



actually come to it through Christ. There is not change of person, but change of scene. Man, still unredcemed, has just been bewailing his wretchedness *out of* Christ; now the same man is *in* Christ, and gives thanks for the bliss that has come to him in the train of his cry for help. — εὐχαριστῶ τ. Θεῷ] For what? is not expressed, quite after the manner of lively emotion; but the question itself, ver. 24, and the διὰ 'Ι. Χ., prevent any mistake regarding it. — διὰ 'Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ] αἰτίου ὄντος τῆς εὐχαριστίας τοῦ Χριστοῦ· αὐτὸς γὰρ, φησὶ, κατώρθωσεν ἃ ὁ νόμος οὐκ ἠδυνήθη· αὐτὸς με ἐρρύσατο ἐκ τῆς ἀσθενείας τοῦ σώματος, ἐνδυναμώσας αὐτὸ, ὥστε μηκέτι τυραννέσθαι ὑπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας, Theophylact. Thus, to the apostle Christ is the *mediator* of his thanks,—of the *fact itself*, however, *that* he gives thanks to God, not the mediator through whom he *brings* his thanks to God (Hofmann). Comp. on i. 8; 1 Cor. xv. 57; Col. iii. 17; similar is ἐν ὀνόματι, Eph. v. 20. — ἄρα οὖν] *infers* a concluding summary of the chief contents of vv. 14–24, *from the immediately preceding* εὐχαριστῶ . . . ἡμῶν. Seeing, namely, that there lies in the foregoing expression of thanks the thought: “it is *Jesus Christ*, through whom God has saved me from the body of this death,” it follows thence, and that indeed on a retrospective glance at the whole exposition, ver. 14 ff., that *the man himself*, out of Christ—his own personality, *alone and confined to itself*—achieves nothing further than that he serves, indeed, with his νοῦς the law of God, but with his σὰρξ is in the service of the law of sin. It has often been assumed that this recapitulation does not connect itself with the previous thanksgiving, but that the latter is rather to be regarded as a parenthetical interruption (see especially Rückert and Fritzsche); indeed, it has even been conjectured that ἄρα οὖν . . . ἁμαρτίας originally stood immediately after ver. 23 (Venema, Wassenbergh, Keil, Lachmann, *Præf.* p. X, and van Hengel). But the right sense of αὐτὸς ἐγώ is thus misconceived. It has here no other meaning than *I myself*, in the sense, namely, *I for my own person*, without that higher saving intervention, which I owe to Christ.<sup>1</sup> The con-

<sup>1</sup> So also, substantially, Hofmann and Th. Schott; comp. Baur, Reithmayr, Bisping, Märcker, and Delitzsch, p. 383. Wrongly interpreted by Thomasius,

trast with others, which αὐτός with the personal pronoun indicates (comp. ix. 3, xv. 14; Herm. *ad Vig.* p. 735; Ast, *Lxx. Plat.* I. p. 317), results always from the context, and is here evident from the emphatic διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, and, indeed, so that the accent falls on αὐτός.<sup>1</sup> Overlooking this antithetic relation of the "*I myself*," Pareus, Homberg, Estius, and Wolf conceived that Paul wished to obviate the misconception as if he were not speaking in the entire section, and from ver. 14 onwards in particular, as a regenerate man; Köllner thinks that his object now is to establish still more strongly, by *his own* feeling, the truth of what he has previously advanced in the name of humanity. Others explain: "*just I*," who have been previously the subject of discourse (Grotius, Reiche, Tholuck, Krehl, Philippi, Maier, and van Hengel; comp. Fritzsche: "ipse ego, qui meam vicem deploravi," and Ewald); which is indeed linguistically unobjectionable (Bernhardy, p. 290), but would furnish no adequate ground for the special emphasis which it would have. Others, again, taking αὐτός as equivalent to ὁ αὐτός (see Schaefer, *Milt.* p. 65; Herm. *ad Soph. Antig.* 920, *Opusc.* I. p. 332 f.; Dissen *ad Pind.* p. 412): *ego idem*: "cui convenit sequens distributio, qua videri posset unus homo in duos veluti secari," Beza. So also Erasmus, Castalio, and many others; Klee and Itücker. But in this view also the connection of ἅπα οὖν κ.τ.λ. with the foregoing thanksgiving is arbitrarily abandoned; and the above use of αὐτός, as synonymous with ὁ αὐτός, is proper to Ionic poetry, and is not sanctioned by the N. T. Olshausen, indeed, takes αὐτ. ἐγώ as *I, the one and the same* (have in me a twofold element), but rejects the usual view, that ἅπα . . . ἁμαρτίας is a recapitulation of ver. 14 ff., and makes the new section begin with ver. 25;<sup>2</sup> so that, after the experience of

I. p. 278: *according to my Ego proper*. The αὐτὶς ἐγώ is, in fact, at the same time the subject of the second clause.

<sup>1</sup> It is maintained without due reason by Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Phaed.* p. 91 A, that if αὐτός stand before the personal pronoun (as here), the latter has the emphasis, and *vice versa*. The striking vivacity of Greek discourse has not bound itself down so mechanically. Comp. Bremi *ad Dem. Phil.* I. 24, p. 128; Herm. *Opusc.* I. p. 322 ff. In the particular cases the connection must decide.

<sup>2</sup> The section is also made to begin with ver. 25 by Th. Schott and Hofmann;

redemption has been indicated by εὐχαριστῶ κ.τ.λ., the completely *altered* inner state of the man is now described; in which new state the νοῦς appears as emancipated and serving the law of God, and only the lower sphere of the life as still remaining under the law of sin. But against this view we may urge, firstly, that Paul would have expressed himself inaccurately in point of logic, since in that case he must have written : ἄρα οὖν αὐτὸς ἐγὼ τῇ μὲν σαρκὶ δουλεύω νόμῳ ἁμαρτίας, τῷ δὲ νοτὶ νόμῳ Θεοῦ; secondly, that according to vv. 2, 3, 9 ff. the redeemed person is entirely liberated from the law of sin; and lastly, that if the redeemed person remained subject to the law of sin with the σάρξ, Paul could not have said οὐδὲν κατάκριμα κ.τ.λ. in ver. 1; for see vv. 7–9. Umbreit takes it as: *ceterum I*; a *climactic* sense, which is neither suggested by the context, nor in keeping with the deep humility of the whole confession. — δουλεύω νόμῳ Θεοῦ] in so far as the desire and striving of my moral reason (see on ver. 23) are directed solely to the good, consequently submitted to the regulative standard of the divine law. At the same time, however, in accordance with the double character of my nature, I am subject with my σάρξ (see on ver. 18) to the power of sin, which preponderates (ver. 23), so that the direction of will in the νοῦς does not attain to the κατεργάζεσθαι.

*Remark 1.* The mode in which we interpret vv. 14–25 is of decisive importance for the relation between the Church-doctrine of original sin, as more exactly expressed in the *Formula Concordiæ*,<sup>1</sup> and the view of the apostle; inasmuch as if in ver. 14 ff. it is the *unredeemed* man under the law and its discipline, and not the *regenerate* man who is under grace, that is spoken of, then Paul affirms regarding the moral nature of the former and concedes to it what the Church-doctrine decidedly denies to

the former with ἄρα οὖν, and the latter with εὐχαριστῶ. But it is only with οὐδὲν κατάκριμα that the new scene opens, of which the cry of thanksgiving, ver. 25, was only a *previous glimpse* broken off again by ἄρα οὖν αὐτὸς ἐγὼ κ.τ.λ.

<sup>1</sup> It employs our passage (see p. 660) for the inference: “Si autem in beato ap. Paulo et aliis renatis hominibus naturale vel carnale liberum arbitrium etiam post regenerationem legi divinae repugnat, quanto magis ante regenerationem legi et voluntati Dei rebellabit et inimicum erit.”

it<sup>1</sup>—comparing it (*Form. Conc.* p. 661 f.) with a stone, a block, a pillar of salt—in a way that cannot be justified (in opposition to Frank, *Theol. d. Concordienformel*, I. p. 138 f.). Paul clearly ascribes to the higher powers of man (his reason and moral will) the assent to the law of God; while just as clearly, moreover, he teaches the great disproportion in which these natural moral powers stand to the predominance of the sinful power in the flesh, so that the *liberum arbitrium in spiritualibus* is wanting to the natural man, and only emerges in the case of the converted person (viii. 2). And this want of moral freedom proceeds from the power of sin, which is, according to ver. 8 ff., posited even with birth, and which asserts itself in opposition to the divine law.

*Remark 2.* How many a Jew in the present day, earnestly concerned about his salvation, may, in relation to his law, feel and sigh just as Paul has here done; only with this difference, that unlike Paul he cannot add the εὐχαριστῶ τῷ Θεῷ κ.τ.λ.!

<sup>1</sup> Comp. Jul. Müller, *v. d. Sünde*, II. p. 238 f., ed. 5.

## CHAPTER VIII.

Ver. 1. After 'Ιησοῦ Elz. has *μὴ κατὰ σάρκα περιπατοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ πνεῦμα*, which, following Mill, Griesb. and subsequent critics have expunged. The words are wanting either entirely, or at least as to the second half, in a preponderance of codd., vss., and Fathers, and are an old inapposite gloss from ver. 4.—Ver. 2. *με]* B F G *ς*, Syr. Tert. Chrys. have *σε*, which Tisch. 8. has adopted. Repetition in copying of the preceding syllable.—Ver. 11. *διὰ τὸ ἐνοικοῦν αὐτοῦ πνεῦμα]* So Griesb., Matth., Scholz, Fritzsche, Lachm. and Tisch. 7., following Erasmus, Mill, and Bengel. The Recepta, again adopted by Tisch. 8., is *διὰ τοῦ ἐνοικοῦντος αὐτοῦ πνεύματος*. The witnesses (for an accurate examination of which see Reiche, *Commentar. crit.* I. p. 54 ff.) are so divided, that there is on neither side a decisive preponderance, although, besides A and C, *ς* also supports the genitive. The thought of itself, also, equally admits either reading. A decision between them can only be arrived at through the circumstance that the passage came to be discussed in the Macedonian controversy, wherein the Macedonians accused the orthodox of having falsified the ancient codices, when the latter appealed to the Recepta and asserted that it stood in all the ancient codd. See Maxim. *Dial. c. Maced.* 3. in Athanas. *Opp.* II. p. 452. This charge, though retorted by the orthodox on the Macedonians, is worthy of credit, because *διὰ τὸ ζ.π.λ.* already predominates in Origen and the oldest vss. (also Syr. Vulg.); consequently that assertion of the orthodox appears erroneous. The Recepta, indeed, is found in Clem. *Strom.* III. p. 344, Commel. 545. Pott.; but this single trace of its high antiquity loses its weight in opposition to the here specially important vss. and Origen (also Tert. and Iren.), and in the face of these bears the suspicion of orthodox alteration having been wrought on the text of Clement. It is possible, however, that even long previous to the Macedonian controversy the questions and disputes respecting the Holy Spirit may have occasioned now and again the changing of *διὰ τὸ ζ.π.λ.* into *διὰ τοῦ ζ.π.λ.* At all events, the dogmatic interest attached to both readings is too great and too well attested to admit of *διὰ τοῦ ζ.π.λ.* being referred, with

Bengel and Fritzsche, to a mere error in copying. In the controversy the *genitive* only (as introducing a relation different from that obtaining with the previous abstracts δι' ἀμαρτίαν and διὰ δικαιοσύνην) must have been welcome to the orthodox in defending the personality of the πνεῦμα. Among modern commentators, Rückert, Reiche, Philippi, van Hengel, and Hofmann have declared for the *accusative*; whilst de Wette, Krehl, Tholuck, and also Ewald, adopt the *genitive*.—Ver. 13. τοῦ σώμ.] D E F G, Vulg. It. Or. (who, however, gives both readings) αἱ. read τῆς σαρκός, which Griesb. recommended. An interpretation in the sense of the preceding.—Ver. 14. εἰσιν υἱοὶ Θεοῦ] Since among the uncials A C D E S read υἱοὶ Θεοῦ εἰς., while B F G have υἱοὶ εἰσιν Θεοῦ (so Lachm. and Tisch.), we must regard the Recepta as at all events too weakly attested. The preference belongs, however, to υἱοὶ εἰσιν Θεοῦ, because the omitted εἰσιν (it is absent also in the Sahid.) would be more easily inserted again at the beginning or end than in the middle.—Ver. 23. καὶ αὐτοὶ τῇν ἁπ. τ. πν. ἔχ. κ. ἡμεῖς αὐτοί] So Elz. The variations are very numerous. The readings to be taken into account, besides the Recepta, are—(1) καὶ αὐτοὶ τ. ἁπαρχ. τοῦ πνεύμ. ἔχ. καὶ αὐτοί: so B, Meth. Tisch. 7.;—(2) κ. ἡμεῖς αὐτοὶ τ. ἁπαρχ. τ. πν. ἔχ. αὐτοί: so D F G, Ambros. Fritzsche;—(3) κ. αὐτοὶ τ. ἁπ. τ. πν. ἔχ. [ἡμεῖς] καὶ αὐτοί: so Lachm. and, without bracketing ἡμεῖς, Tisch. 8., following A C S, min. Copt. Dam. The first of the three seems to have been the original reading; ἡμεῖς is an addition by way of gloss, which was written, in some cases, immediately beside the first καὶ αὐτοί (thus arose the reading of Fritzsche), and in some cases only beside the second, thus producing the reading of A C S, as well as the Recepta. With the reading of Fritzsche the second καὶ disappeared, because, after the insertion of ἡμεῖς had taken place in the first part, the subsequent καὶ αὐτοί was no longer taken analeptically, and therefore καὶ was found to be merely confusing. The reading αὐτοὶ οἱ τ. ἁπ. τ. πν. ἔχ. κ. ἡμεῖς αὐτοί has so exceedingly weak attestation, that on that very ground it ought (against Bengel and Rinck) to be rejected.—*υιοθεσίαν*] wanting in D F G, codd. of It. Ambrosiaster. But how easily it came to be omitted, when the *υιοθεσία* was viewed as something already possessed!—Ver. 24. τί καί] B\*\* E F G, Syr. Vulg. codd. of It. and some Fathers have only τί. So Lachm. But the very absence of need for the καί occasioned its omission.—Ver. 26. τῇ ἁσέ.] Approved by Griesb., adopted also by Lachm. and Tisch. But Elz. and Scholz have ταῖς ἀσθενείαις, against decisive testimony. The sing. is also supported by τῆς ἀσθενείας in F G, which is an explanatory addition to τῇ ἁσέ. Comp.

Ambros.: "*infirmi-<sup>2</sup>tatem nostrae orationis.*" The plural was substituted for the collective singular. — The reading *προσευξόμεθα* (Griesb. and others have *προσευξόμεθα*) is decisively attested. — After *ὑπερεντυγχ.* Elz. and Scholz have *ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν*, which, following A B D F G S\* al. Arm. and Fathers, Lachm. and Tisch. have expunged. A defining addition.—Ver. 28. After *συνεργεῖ* Lachm. reads *ὁ Θεός*, in accordance with A B, Or. It was readily believed that, on account of ver. 27 and 29, *πάντα* must be understood as accusative and God as subject. — Ver. 34. *μᾶλλον δὲ καί*] Lachm. and Tisch. S. have only *μᾶλλ. δὲ*, in accordance with A B C S, min. vss. and Fathers. But between *δε* and *εγ.* the seemingly unmeaning *καί* was easily overlooked and omitted. — The omission of the second *καί* (behind the first *ὅς*) is less strongly attested by A C S, and may be sufficiently explained by non-attention to the emphasis of the thrice-used word.—Ver. 36. *ἔνεκα*] According to A B D F G L S 17. al. *ἐνεκεν* is, with Griesb., Lachm., Tisch., and Scholz, to be substituted. See LXX. Ps. xlv. 23.—Ver. 37. *τοῦ ἀγαπ.*] D E F G, vss. and Fathers read *τὸν ἀγαπήσαντα*, which has against it the Oriental witnesses, and seems to be an alteration in accordance with an erroneous exposition of *τ. ἀγαπ. τ. Χριστοῦ* in ver. 35 (see the exegetical remarks on that passage).—Ver. 38. *οὔτε ἐνεστ. οὔτε μέλλ., οὔτε δυνάμεις*] So also Griesb., Lachm., Tisch., and Scholz. But Elz. has *οὔτε δυνάμ., οὔτε ἐνεστ. οὔτε μέλλ.* Against greatly preponderating evidence. A transposition, because *δυν.* seemed to belong to the category of *ἀρχαί*. The evidence in favour of *οὔτε δυνάμ.,* moreover, is so decisive and so unanimous, that it cannot, with Fritzsche, be regarded as an addition from 1 Pet. iii. 22, 1 Cor. xv. 24, or Eph. i. 21. Tholuck, Philippi, and Ewald reject these words. But their various position in different witnesses is quite explained by supposing that their place behind *μέλλ.*, as well as their general isolation, were regarded as surprising and confusing.

---

Chap. viii. *Happy condition of man in Christ.* — The certainty of salvation, which is represented in chap. v. 1 f. as the effect of justification by faith, appears here as brought about through the moral freedom attained in Christ. We see from this, that Paul conceived of faith not otherwise than as producing this freedom; so that faith is not only that which appropriates the atonement, but also the continuous subjective source and motive power of the divine life up to the final attain-

ment of bliss. See Luther's *Preface*, also his utterances quoted by Ritschl, *Rechtfert u. Versöhnung*, I. p. 142 ff., 180 f.

Vv. 1-11.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, the Christian is aloof from all condemnation, because he is free from the law of sin—a result which the Mosaic law could not accomplish, but which God has accomplished through Christ. Yet he must live according to the Spirit, and not according to the flesh; for the latter works death, but the former life.

Ver. 1. "*Ἀπα*] draws an inference from the immediately preceding *αὐτὸς ἐγὼ . . . ἁμαρτίας*. If I, for my own person, left to myself, am subject indeed with the reason to the law of God, but with the flesh to the law of sin, then it follows that now, after Christ (as deliverer from the law of sin, ver 2) has interposed, there is no condemnation, etc. This inference, and not that one must be in Christ, in order to get rid of every condemnation (Hofmann), is indicated by *γὰρ* in ver. 2 as a matter of fact that has become historical. It is arbitrary to seek a connection with anything more remotely preceding (Hofmann, Koppe, Fritzsche, Philippi, and Bisping, with *εὐχарιστῶ . . . ἡμῶν* in vii. 25; according to Bengel, Knapp, and Winzer, with vii. 6); but to suppose in *ἄρα* "a forestalling of the following *γὰρ*" (Tholuck), is linguistically just as mistaken as in the case of *διό* in ii. 1. Moreover, the emphasis is not upon *νῦν*, but on the prefixed *οὐδέν*: no condemnation therefore, none is now applicable, after that *αὐτὸς ἐγὼ κ.τ.λ.* has been changed through Christ, etc. This applies against Philippi's objection, that, according to our conception of the connection, *νῦν* should have been placed at the beginning. But the objection, that Paul must have continued with *δέ* instead of *ἄρα*, is removed by the observation that in the *αὐτὸς ἐγὼ*, properly understood, really lies the very premiss of the altered relation. — *νῦν*] temporally, in contrast to the former state of the case. Comp. vii. 6. Philippi erroneously holds *ἄρα νῦν* as equivalent to *ἄρα οὖν* — which it never is — being forced thereto by the theory that the regenerate person is the subject of discussion in chap. vii. 14 ff. Hofmann's view, how-

<sup>1</sup> On vv. 1-11 see Winzer, *Progr.* 1828. — On ver. 3, particularly the words *ἐν ἡμιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας*, see Overbeck in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschr.* 1869, p. 178 ff.



ever, that *νῦν* contrasts the present with the *future αἰών* (*even now*, during the life in the flesh), is also incorrect. Nothing in the context suggests it, and it must have been expressed in some such way as by *ἤδη*, or by a defining addition. — *οὐδὲν κατάκριμα*] *sc. ἐστι*: *no sentence of condemnation* (ver. 16), whereby God might deny them eternal life, affects them. The reason see in ver. 2. — *τοῖς ἐν Χ. 'Ι.] i.e.* to those in whose case Christ is the element, in which they are (live and move). The same in substance, but different in the form of the conception, is *πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ ἔχειν* and *Χριστὸς ἐν ὑμῖν* in vv. 9, 10.

Ver. 2.<sup>1</sup> *For the law of the Spirit leading to life delivered me in Christ Jesus from the law of sin and death.* For the right explanation, it is to be observed—(1.) The *νόμος τ. ἁμ. κ. τοῦ θαν.* necessarily, in view of the connection, receives the definition of its meaning from chap. vii. 23, 25, as indeed *ἦλευθ.* answers to the *αἰχμαλωτίξ.* in ver. 23. For this very reason neither the moral law (Wolf) nor the *Mosaic law* (Pareus, de Dieu, Semler, Böhme, Ammon, and Reiche) can be meant; the latter cannot, for the further reason that, after vii. 7, 12, 16, Paul *could* not thus name the Mosaic *νόμος* here, as Chrysostom has already urged. It is rather the law in our members, *the power of sin in us, which*, according to vii. 24, comp. vii. 10, 13, *is at the same time the power of (eternal) death (καὶ τοῦ θανάτου)*, that is meant. The *two* are one power, and *both* genitives are genitives of the *subject*, so that sin and death are regarded as ruling over the man. — (2.) Since the *νόμος τ. ἁμ. κ. τ. θαν.* cannot be the Mosaic law, so neither can the contrasted *νόμος τ. πν. τῆς ζωῆς* be the *Christian plan of salvation*, like *νόμος πίστ.* in iii. 27, but it must be an *inward power in the man* by which the law of sin and death is rendered powerless. It is not, however, the *νόμος τοῦ νοός* (which had become strengthened through Christ), as, following older expositors, Morus, Köllner, and Schrader think; because, on the one hand,

<sup>1</sup> In vv. 2, 3, we have one of the passages that are decisive in opposition to the affirmative answer which men have often attempted to give to the question, whether the Son of God would have appeared as man, had man not become sinful. See generally, Julius Müller, *dogm. Abh.* pp. 66 ff., 82 f.

νοῦς and πνεῦμα are specifically different, and if Paul had meant the law of the νοῦς, he must have so designated it, as in vii. 23; and, on the other hand, there would result the utterly paradoxical idea, that the law of reason (and not the divine principle of the πνεῦμα) makes man morally free. The τὸ πνεῦμα τῆς ζωῆς is rather the *Holy Spirit*, who, working inwardly in the Christian (ver. 5), *procures to him eternal life* (comp. 2 Cor. iii. 6); and ὁ νόμος τοῦ πνεύματος τῆς ζωῆς is the *ethically regulative government exercised by the πνεῦμα* (not the Spirit Himself, as Theodoret, Oecumenius, Theophylact, Maier, and Th. Schott understand it, but His ruling power). — ἐν X. 'I.] On account of ver 3, to be connected neither with τῆς ζωῆς (Luther, Beza, and others, including Böhme, Klee, Ewald, and Hofmann), nor with τοῦ πνεύμ. (Flatt; Tholuck: "the sphere, in which the Spirit of life operates"), nor with νόμος (Semler, Reiche), nor with ὁ νόμ. τ. πν. τ. ζ. (Calvin, Köllner, Glöckler, Krehl, and others), but with ἡλευθέρωσε. So Theodoret, Erasmus, Melancthon, Vatablus, and others, including Rückert, Olshausen, de Wette, Fritzsche, Reithmayr, Maier, Philippi, and Bisping. *In Christ*, the law of the Spirit has made us free; for *out of Christ* this emancipating activity could not occur (comp. John viii. 36); but *in the fellowship of life with Him*, in the being and living in Him (ver. 1), the deliverance which has taken place has its causal ground. The view which takes it of the *objective* basis that is laid down in the *appearance and work* of Christ, is unsuitable, because the discourse treats of the subjective ethical efficacy of the Spirit, which has the εἶναι ἐν Χριστῷ as the necessary correlative. — ἡλευθ.] *arist.* For it is a historical act, which resulted from the effusion of the Spirit in the heart. The progressive sanctification is the further development and consequence of this act.

Ver. 3. An illustration justifying the ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ ἡλευθ. κ.τ.λ., just asserted, by a description of the powerfully effective *actual arrangement*, which God has made for the accomplishment of what to the law was impossible. — τὸ γὰρ ἀδύνατον τοῦ νόμου is an *absolute nominative*, prefixing a judgment on the following κατέκρινε κ.τ.λ. "For the impossible thing

of the law—God condemned,” etc. That is, *God condemned sin in the flesh, which was a thing of impossibility on the part of the law.* See Krüger, § 57. 10, 12. Comp. also Heb. viii. 1, and on Luke xxi. 6; Wisd. xvi. 17; Kühner, II. 1, p. 42. It could only be *accusative*, if we should assume a general verb (like ἐποίησε) out of what follows, which would, however, be an arbitrary course (in opposition to the view of Erasmus, Luther, and others). The *prefixing* τ. γ. ἀδύν. τ. ν. has rhetorical emphasis, in contrast with the ἐν X. 'I. in ver. 2. Comp. Dissen, *ad Pind. Pyth.* iv. 152. On the *genitive*, comp. *Epist. ad Diogn.* 9: τὸ ἀδύνατον τῆς ἡμετέρας φύσεως, *what our nature could not do.* By a harsh hyperbaton Th. Schott takes a sense out of the passage, which it does not bear: *because the impotence of the law became still weaker through the flesh.* Erroneous is also Hofmann's view: “*the impotence of the law lay or consisted therein, that it was weak through the flesh.*” The abstract sense of “*powerlessness*,” or *incapacity*, is not borne by τὸ ἀδύνατον at all; but it indicates *that which the subject* (here the νόμος) *is not in a position for*, what is impossible to it. See especially Plat. *Hipp. maj.* p. 295 E; comp. 9. 22; Xen. *Hist.* i. 4. 6: ἀπὸ τοῦ τῆς πόλεως δυνατοῦ, *i.e.* from what the city is in a position to tender. Moreover, since the words taken independently, with Hofmann, would only contain a preparatory thought for what follows, Paul would not have had *asyndetically* ὁ Θεός, but must have proceeded by a marking of the contrast, consequently with ὁ δὲ Θεός; so that these words, down to κατὰ πνεῦμα in ver. 4, would still have been in connection with γάρ. And even apart from this, the supplying of the substantive verb would at most only have been indicated for the reader in the event of the proposition having been a general one with ἐστὶ<sup>1</sup> understood, and consequently if ἀσθενεῖ, and not ἡσθένει, were read. — ἐν ᾧ ἡσθ. διὰ τ. σαρκ.] *because it was weak* (unable to condemn sin) *through the flesh*, as is described in chap. vii. On ἐν ᾧ, comp. 1 Cor. iv. 4; John

<sup>1</sup> Like ver. 1. Paul would have written intelligibly: τὸ γὰρ ἀδύνατ. τοῦ νόμ. ἐν τούτῳ ᾧ ὅτι ἡσθένει; especially as, according to Hofmann, ᾧ would not be a mere copula, but would mean *situm erat, constitit in.* Mäcker, p. 25, nevertheless agrees with Hofmann.

xvi. 30; Winer, p. 362 [E. T. 484]. It is our causal *in that*; διὰ τ. σαρκ. is the cause bringing about the ἡσθένει: through the reacting influence of the flesh, vii. 18 ff. — ὁ Θεὸς τὸν ἑαυτοῦ κ.τ.λ.] God has, by the fact that He sent His own Son in the likeness (see on i. 23) of sinful flesh, and on account of sin, condemned sin in the flesh, that is, "God has deposed sin from its rule in the σάρξ (its previous sphere of power), thereby that He sent His own Son into the world in a phenomenal existence similar to the sinful corporeo-psychical human nature." — The participle πέμψας is not an act that preceded the κατέκρινε (Hofmann, referring it to the supernatural birth); on the contrary, God has effected the κατάκρισις in and with the having sent the Son. Respecting this use of the aorist participle, comp. on Acts i. 24; Eph. i. 5; Rom. iv. 20. — ἑαυτοῦ] strengthens the relation to ἐν ὁμ. σ. ἁμ., and so enhances the extraordinary and energetic character of the remedial measure adopted by God. Comp. ver. 32. We may add, that in the case of ἑαυτοῦ, as in that of πέμψας (comp. Gal. iv. 4) and ἐν ὁμ. σ. ἁμ. (comp. Phil. ii. 7), the conception of the pre-existence and metaphysical Sonship of Christ is to be recognised (in opposition to Hofmann); so that the previous μορφῇ Θεοῦ forms the background, although, in that case, the supernatural generation is by no means a necessary presupposition (comp. on i. 3 f.). See generally, Ernesti, *Urspr. d. Sünde*, I. p. 235 ff.; Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 317. — ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας] in the likeness of sinful flesh; ἁμαρτ. is the genitive of quality, as in vi. 6. He might indeed have come ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ, Phil. ii. 6. But no: God so sent His own Son, that He appeared in a form of existence which resembled the fleshly human nature affected by sin. The ἐν indicates in what material mode of appearance God caused His sent Son to emerge. He came in flesh (1 John iv. 2), and was manifested in flesh (1 Tim. iii. 16). Yet He appeared not in sinful flesh,<sup>1</sup> which

<sup>1</sup> In which, however, the idea is not conveyed, that, like a sacrifice, He was loaded with the sin of others (Reiche), which was the case only in His death, not at His sending. Holsten, following the precedent of Gennadius in Cramer's *Cat.* p. 123, has erroneously apprehended the σάρξ of Christ as having been really σάρξ ἁμαρτίας, and as having thus had the objective principle of ἁμαρτία, which in his case, however, neither attained to subjective consciousness nor to

is otherwise the bodily phenomenal nature of all men. Moreover, His appearance was neither *merely* bodily, *without* the *ψυχή* (Zeller), which, on the contrary, necessarily belongs to the idea of the *σάρξ*; nor *docetic* (Krehl; comp. Baur's *Gesch. d. 3. erst. Jahrh.* p. 310), which latter error was already advanced by Marcion; but it consisted of the general bodily material of humanity, to which, however, in so far as the latter was of sinful quality, it was not equalized, but—because without that quality—only *conformed*. Comp. Phil. ii. 7; Heb. ii. 14, iv. 15. The contrast presupposed in the specially chosen expression is not *the heavenly spirit-nature* of Christ (Pfleiderer)—to which the mere *ἐν σαρκί*, or *ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπου*, as in Phil. ii. 7, would have corresponded—but rather holy *unsinfulness*. — The following *κ. περὶ ἁμαρτ.* adds to the *How* of the sending (*ἐν ὁμ. σαρκ. ἁμαρτ.*) the *Wherefore*. The emphasis is accordingly on *περὶ*: and *for* sin, *on account of* sin,—which is to be left in its *generality*; for the following *κατέκρινε κ.τ.λ.* brings out something *special*, which God has done with reference to the *ἁμαρτία* by the fact that He sent Christ *περὶ ἁμαρτίας*. We are therefore neither to refer *περὶ ἁμαρτ.*, which affirms by

subjective act. See Holsten, *z. Ev. d. Paul. u. Petr.* p. 436 ff.; comp. also Hausrath, *neut. Zeitgesch.* II. p. 481 f. But if this was the conception which Paul had, what was the expression *ἐν ὁμοιώματι* meant for? In it lies the very *negation* of the *σάρξ ἁμαρτίας*—of the *σάρξ*, therefore, *so far as* it had the quality of sin. What Holsten advances in explanation of this expression is forced and irrelevant, as if it were precisely the reality of the being affected by sin that is affirmed. Comp. against this, Sabatier, *l'apôtre Paul*, p. 285.—Overbeck, along with various appropriate remarks in opposition to Holsten, comes nevertheless likewise to the conclusion that *ἐν ὁμοιώματι* bears, not a negative, but an affirmative relation to the *σάρξ ἁμαρτίας*, although the *ἁμαρτία* of the *σάρξ* of Christ never in His case became conscious *παράβασις*. But that the Son of God was sent in *sinful* flesh—which, according to Pfleiderer also (in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschr.* 1871, p. 523), is assumed to be implied in our passage as an ethical antinomy—would be a paradox opposed to the entire New Testament, which Paul *could* by no means utter (2 Cor. v. 21); and which, in fact, he with marked clearness and precision guards against by saying, not *ἐν σαρκὶ ἁμαρτίας*, but *ἐν ὁμοιώματι σ. ἁμ.*, and that in contrast to the quality of the *σάρξ* of all others, of which he had just predicated by *ἐν ᾧ ἡσθίενε διὰ τῆς σαρκός* a power so antagonistic to God. That paradox would have run: *ἐν σαρκὶ μὲν ἁμαρτίας, χωρὶς δὲ παραβάσεως*. See also Zeller in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschr.* 1870, p. 301 ff., who rightly comes to the conclusion that the *σάρξ* of Christ was *of like nature* to the *σάρξ ἁμαρτίας*, in so far as the latter was a *σάρξ*, but *of unlike nature*, in so far as it was *affected by sin*.

what the sending of the Son was occasioned, exclusively to the *expiation* (Origen, Calvin, Melancthon, and many others, including Koppe, Böhme, Usteri; comp. Baumgarten-Crusius), in which case *θυσίαν* (Lev. vii. 37 *al.*; Ps. xl. 6; Heb. x. 6, 18) was supplied; nor, with Theophylact, Castalio, and others, also Maier and Bisping, exclusively to the *destruction* and *doing away* of sin. It contains rather the *whole category of the relations* in which the sending of Christ was appointed to stand to human sin, which included therefore its expiation as well as the breaking of its power. The latter, however, is thereupon brought into prominence, out of that general category, by *κατέκρινε κ.τ.λ.* as the element *specially* coming into view. Hilgenfeld, in his *Zeitschr.* 1871, p. 186 f., erroneously, as regards both the language and the thought (since Christ was the *real* atoning sacrifice, iii. 25), makes *καὶ περὶ ἁμαρτ.*, which latter he takes in the sense of *sin-offering*, also to depend on *ἐν ὁμοιώματι*. — *κατέκρινε τ. ἁμ.*] This *condemnation* of sin (the latter conceived as principle and power) is that which was *impossible* on the part of the law, owing to the hindrance of the flesh. It is erroneous, therefore, to take it as: "*He exhibited sin as worthy of condemnation*" (Erasmus, de Dieu, Eckermann), and: "*He punished sin*" (Castalio, Pareus, Carpzov, and others, including Koppe, Rückert, Usteri; comp. Olshausen, and Köstlin in the *Jahrb. f. Deutsche Theol.* 1856, p. 115). *Impossible* to the law was only *such* a condemnation of sin, as should depose the latter from the sway which it had hitherto maintained; consequently: *He made sin forfeit its dominion*. This *de facto* judicial condemnation (a sense which, though with different modifications in the analysis of the idea conveyed by *κατέκρ.*, is retained by Irenaeus, Chrysostom, Theodoret, Valla, Beza, Piscator, Estius, Bengel, Reiche, Köllner, Winzer, Fritzsche, Baur, Krehl, de Wette, Maier, Umbreit, Ewald, and others) is designated by *κατέκρινε*, without our modifying its verbal meaning into *interficed* (Grotius, Reiche, Glückler, and others), in connection with which Fritzsche finds this death of the *ἁμαρτία* presented as *mors imaginaria*, contained in the physical death of Christ. Various expositors, and even Philippi, mix up the here foreign idea of

*atonement* ("to blot out by atoning"<sup>1</sup>); comp. also Tholuck and Hofmann. The expression *κατέκρινε* is *purposely chosen* in reference to *κατάκριμα* in ver. 1, but denotes the *actual* condemnation, which consisted in the *dominion* of the *ἁμαρτία* being *done away*,—its power was lost, and *therewith* God's sentence was pronounced upon it, as it were the staff broken over it. Comp. on John xvi. 11; and see Hofmann's *Schriftb.* II. 1, p. 355, and Th. Schott, p. 286. Yet Hofmann now discovers God's actual condemnation of sin ("the actual declaration that it is contrary to what is on His part rightful, that it should have man like a bond-servant under its control") in the emancipation of those who are under sin *by bestowal of the Spirit*,—a view by which what follows is anticipated, and that which is the divine *aim* of the *κατέκρινε* is included in the *notion* of it.—Observe further the thrice-repeated *ἁμαρτία*; the last alone, however, which personifies sin as a power, has the article. — *ἐν τῇ σαρκί*] belongs to *κατέκρ.*, not to *τὴν ἁμ.* (Bengel, Ernesti, Michaelis, Cramer, Rosenmüller, and Hofmann), because it is not said *τὴν ἐν τ. σ.*, and because this more precise definition, to complete the notion of the object, would be self-evident and unimportant. But God condemned sin *in the flesh*: for, by the fact that God's own Son (over whom, withal, sin could have no power) appeared *in the flesh*, and indeed *περὶ ἁμαρτίας*, sin has lost its dominion *in the substantial human nature* (*hitherto ruled over by it*). The Lord's appearance in flesh, namely, was at once, even *in itself*, for sin the actual loss of its dominion as a principle; and the *aim* of that appearance, *περὶ ἁμαρτίας*, which was attained through the *death* of Christ, brought upon sin that loss with respect to its

<sup>1</sup> See, against this, also Rich. Schmidt, *Paul. Christol.* p. 49 ff. He, however, takes *τίμωσις* likewise (comp. Hofmann) as prior to the *κατέκρινε*, holding that the latter, which took place through the death of Christ, had for its immediate object the *σάρξ* and sin only as a mediate object. The meaning, in his view, is: "God has pronounced sentence on the flesh, and therewith at the same time on the sin dwelling in it." The destruction of Christ's flesh is thus an act of universal significance, by which the flesh in general, and therewith also sin itself, has been condemned. But the text clearly and expressly assigns, not the flesh, but *τὴν ἁμαρτίαν*, as the immediate object of *κατέκρινε*, so that an impartial exegesis can only discover in *ἐν τῇ σαρκί*: where, i.e. in what material sphere, the act of the *κατακρίνειν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν* has taken place.

totality. Thus, by the two facts, God has actually deprived it of its power *in the human* *σάρξ*; and this phenomenal nature of man, therefore, has ceased to be its domain. Hofmann, without reason, objects that *τ. ἁμαρτ.* must in that case have stood *before* *κατέκρινε*. The main emphasis, in fact, lies on *κατέκρινε τ. ἁμαρτ.*, to which then *ἐν τ. σαρκί* is added, with the further emphasis of a reference to the causal connection. Many others take *ἐν τ. σαρκί* as meaning the *body of Christ*; holding that *in* this body put to death sin has been put to death at the same time (Origen, Beza, Grotius, Reiche, Usteri, Olshausen, Maier, Bisping, and others); or that the punishment of sin has been accomplished *on* His body (Heumann, Michaelis, Koppe, and Flatt). But against this it may be urged, that plainly *ἐν τ. σαρκί* corresponds deliberately to the previous *διὰ τ. σαρκός*; there must have been *αὐτοῦ* used along with it. Comp. Baur, *neutest. Theol.* p. 160 f.

Ver. 4. The *purpose which God had in this* *κατέκρ. τ. ἁμ. ἐν τ. σ.* was: in order that (now that the rule of sin which hindered the fulfilment of the law has been done away) *the rightful requirement of the law might be fulfilled*, etc. — *τὸ δικ. τ. νόμου*] Quite simply, as in i. 32, ii. 26 (comp. also on v. 16, and Krüger on Thuc. i. 41. 1): *what the law has laid down as its rightful demand*. The *singular* comprehends these collective (moral) claims of right as a *unity*.<sup>1</sup> Others, contrary to the signification of the word, have taken it as *justificatio* (Vulg.), understanding thereby sometimes *the making righteous* as the *aim* of the law, which desires sinlessness (Chrysostom and his followers, including Theodore of Mopsuestia), sometimes *the satisfaction of justice* (Rothe; comp. on v. 16). Köllner, following Eekermann, makes it *the justifying sentence of the law*: “that the utterance of the law, which declares as righteous,

<sup>1</sup> Many of the older dogmatic exegetes (see especially Beza, Calvin, Calovius, and Wolf *in loc.*) have explained the demand of the law, and the mode of its fulfilment, contrary to the context (since what is here spoken of is the proper morality of the Christian as emancipated), in such a way that the law's demand is to be understood as well of the punishments which it would require for transgression, as of the perfect obedience which it desires to have: Christ having fulfilled both by His double obedience in our stead, so that the demand of the law is fulfilled in us (by imputation).



and thus not only frees from the punishment of sin, but secures also the reward of righteousness, might be fulfilled on us, if we," etc. Substantially so (*δικ.* = *sententia absolutoria*), Fritzsche, Philippi, and Ewald ("the *verdict of the law*, since it has condemnation only for the sinners, and good promises for the remainder, Deut. xxviii. 1-14"). But against this it may be urged, first, that *δικαίωμα τ. νόμου*, because the genitive is a rule-prescribing subject, cannot, without urgent ground from the context, be taken otherwise than as *demand, rightful claim* (comp. also Luke i. 6 ; Heb. ix. 1, 10 ; LXX. Num. xxxi. 21) ; secondly, that vv. 3, 4 contain the proof, not for οὐδὲν κατάκριμα in ver. 1, but for ver. 2, and consequently ἵνα . . . ἡμῖν must be the counterpart of the state of bondage under the law of sin and death (ver. 2)—the counterpart, however, not consisting in the freedom from punishment and the certainty of reward, but in the morally free condition in which one does what the law demands, being no longer hampered by the power of sin and death, so that the fulfilment of the *δικαίωμα τοῦ νόμου* is the antithesis of the *ἁμαρτία* so strongly emphasized previously ; thirdly, that τοῖς μὴ . . . πνεῦμα is not the condition of justification (that is faith), but of the fulfilment of the law ; and finally, that in ver. 7, τῷ γὰρ νόμῳ τ. Θεοῦ οὐχ ὑποτάσσεται, οὐδὲ γὰρ δύναται is manifestly the counterpart of τὸ δικ. τ. νόμου πληρωθῇ in ver. 3. — *πληρωθῇ*] as in Matt. iii. 15 ; Acts xiv. 26 ; Rom. xiii. 8 ; Gal. v. 14, *al.* Those commentators who take *δικαίωμα* as *sententia absolutoria* take *πληρ.* as *may be accomplished* on us (*ἐν ἡμῖν*). — *ἐν ἡμῖν*] Not : *through us*, nor yet : *in us*, which is explained as either : *in our life-activity* (de Wette), or as referring to the *inward fulfilling of the law* (Reiche, Klee, and Hofmann), and to the fact that *God* fulfils it *in man* (Olshausen ; comp. Tholuck) ; but, as shown by the following τοῖς . . . περιπατοῦσιν κ.τ.λ. : *on us*, so that the fulfilling of the law's demand *shall be accomplished and made manifest in the entire walk and conversation of Christians*. This by no means conveys the idea of a merely *outward* action (as Hofmann objects), but includes also the inner morality accordant with the law ; comp. Ernesti *Ethik d. Ap. P.* p. 69 f. Regarding this use of ἐν, see Bernhardt, p. 211 f. ; Winer,

p. 361 [E. T. 483]. The *passive* form (not: ἵνα πληρώσωμεν) is in keeping with the conception that here the *law*, and that so far as it must *be fulfilled*, stands out in the foreground of the divine purpose. The accomplishment of its moral requirement is supposed to present itself as realized in the Christian, and that ἀδύνατον τοῦ νόμου of ver. 3 is assumed to be thereby remedied.—τοῖς μὴ κατὰ σάρκα κ.τ.λ.] *qui ipse qui ambularetis*, etc. These words give negatively and positively the specific *moral character*, which is destined to be found in Christians, so far as the just requirement of the law is fulfilled in them. The *μὴ* is here, on account of the connection with ἵνα, quite according to rule; Baeunlein, *Partik.* p. 287 f. In what that fulfilment *manifests* itself (Hofmann) Paul does not say,<sup>1</sup> but he announces the moral regulative that is to determine the inward and outward life of the subjects. He walks *according to the flesh*, who obeys the sinful lust dwelling in the σάρξ (vii. 18); and he walks *according to the Spirit*, who follows the guidance, the impelling and regulating power (ver. 2), of the Holy Spirit. The one excludes the other, Gal. v. 16. To take πνεῦμα *without the article* (which, after the nature of a proper noun, it did not at all need), in a *subjective* sense, as the pneumatic nature of the regenerate man, produced by the Holy Spirit (see esp. Harless on Eph. ii. 22, and van Hengel)—as it is here taken, but independently of the putting the article, by Bengel, Rückert, Philippi, and others, following Chrysostom—is erroneous. See on Gal. v. 16. It never means, not even in contrast to σάρξ,<sup>2</sup> the “renewed spiritual nature of man” (Philippi), but the sanctifying *divine principle itself*, objectively, and distinct from the human πνεῦμα. The appeal to John iii. 6 is erroneous. See on that passage.

Ver. 5. The apostle regards the description just given, τοῖς μὴ κατὰ σάρκα κ.τ.λ., as too important not to follow it up with a justification corresponding with its antithetical tenor.

<sup>1</sup> This would have required the *objective* negation, since the negation would attach to κατὰ σάρκα. In Plut. *Lyc.* 10, 19 (in opposition to Hofmann), the negation stands along with the participle, and the relation of dependence is given in the text. See Hartung, *Partikell.* II. p. 132.

<sup>2</sup> Observe that in ver. 10 the contrast is not σάρξ, but σῶμα—in opposition to Pfleiderer in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschr.* 1871, p. 177.

This he bases on the opposite *φρονεῖν* of the subjects, according to their opposite moral quality, so that the emphasis lies, not upon *ὄντες* and *φρονοῦσιν* (Hofmann, "as the *being* of the Ego is, so is also its *mental tendency*"), but, as shown by the antithesis *οἱ δὲ κ.τ.λ.*, simply on *κατὰ σάρκα* and *κ. πνεῦμα*. The *ὄντες* might be entirely omitted; and *φρονοῦσιν* is the predicate to be affirmed of both parties, according to its different purport in the two cases. — *οἱ κατὰ σ. ὄντες*] A wider conception (*they who are according to the flesh*) than *οἱ κ. σ. περιπ.* The latter is the manifestation in life of the former. — *τὰ τῆς σ. φρον.*] *whose thinking and striving are directed to the interests of the flesh* (the article *τῆς σ.* makes the *σάρξ* objective as something independent); so that thus, according to vii. 21 ff., the fulfilment of the law is at variance with their efforts. Comp. on *φρον.*, Matt. xvi. 23; Phil. iii. 19; Col. iii. 2; Plat. *Rep.* p. 505 B; 1 Macc. x. 20.

Ver. 6. A second *γάρ*. The former specified the reason (ver. 5), this second is *explicative* (*namely*); a similar repetition and mutual relation of *γάρ* being common also in Greek authors. Comp. xi. 24; see on Matt. vi. 32, xviii. 11; and Ellendt, *Lcx. Soph.* I. p. 340; Kühner, II. 2, p. 856. — *The striving of the flesh, namely* (comp. *νοῦς τῆς σαρκός* in Col. ii. 18), tends to bring man to (eternal) *death* (through sin), but the striving of the *Holy Spirit* to conduct him to (eternal) *life and blessedness* (of the Messianic kingdom). The explanation: the striving . . . has death as its consequence (Rückert, de Wette, and many others), is right as to fact (comp. vi. 21), but fails to bring out the personifying, vivid *form* of the representation, which, moreover, does not permit us to introduce the analytic reflection, that the enmity against God is the desire of the flesh "of itself," and that it is death "on account of God" (Hofmann, *Schriftbew.* I. p. 563). That death is *God's* penal decree, is true; but this thought does not belong here, where it is simply the destructive effort of the *σάρξ* itself that is intended to be conveyed, and that indeed, in accordance with the prevailing concrete mode of description, as a *conscious* effort, a real *φρονεῖν*, not as an *impulse* that makes the Ego its captive (Hofmann), since the same predicate *φρόνημα* applies to the

σάρξ as well as to the πνεῦμα. On εἰρήνη, *blessedness*, comp. ii. 10. Understood in the narrower sense (*peace* with God), it would yield a *hysteronproteron*, which Fritzsche actually assumes.

Ver. 7. Διότι] *propterea quod*, introduces the reason *why* the striving of the flesh can be nothing else than death, and that of the Spirit nothing else than life and blessedness: *for the former is enmity against God*, the source of life; comp. Jas. iv. 4. The establishment of the *second* half of ver. 6 Paul leaves out for the present, and only introduces it subsequently at vv. 10, 11, in another connection of ideas. — The ἔχθρα εἰς Θεόν has its ground assigned by τῷ γ. νόμῳ τ. Θ. οὐχ ὑποτάσσεται, of which τὸ φρόνημα τῆς σαρκός is still the subject (not ἡ σάρξ, as Hofmann quite arbitrarily supposes); and the inward cause of this reality based on experience is afterwards specified by οὐδὲ γὰρ δύναται (*for it is not even possible for it*). — δύναται] namely, according to its unholy nature, which maintains an antagonistic attitude to the will of God. This does not exclude the possibility of conversion (comp. Chrysostom), *after* which, however, the σάρξ with its φρόνημα is ethically dead (Gal. v. 24). Comp. vi. 6 ff.

Ver. 8. Δέ] is not put for οὖν (Beza, Calvin, Koppe, and others; comp. also Rückert and Reiche), but is the simple μεταβατικόν (*autem*), which, after the auxiliary clauses τῷ γ. νόμῳ . . . δύναται, leads over to a *relation corresponding* to the main proposition τὸ φρ. τ. σάρκ. ἔχθρα εἰς Θεόν, and referring to the persons in the concrete. The propriety of this connection will at once be manifest if τῷ γ. νόμῳ . . . δύναται be read more rapidly (like a parenthesis). According to Hofmann, the progress of thought is now supposed to advance from the condemnation of *sin* to the freedom from *death*. But such a scheme corresponds neither with the preceding, in which sin and death were *grouped together* (vv. 2, 6), nor with what follows, where in the first instance there is no mention of death, and it is only in ver. 10 f. that the special point is advanced of the *raising* from the dead. — ἐν σαρκί] is in *substance* the same as κατὰ σάρκα in ver. 5; but the *form of the conception* is: those who are *in the flesh* as the ethical life-

element, in which they subsist, and which is the opposite of the εἶναι ἐν πνεύματι in ver. 9, and ἐν Χριστῷ in ver. 1. Comp. on vii. 5. The one excludes the other, and the former, as antagonistic to God, makes the ἀρέσαι Θεῷ (comp. 1 Thess. ii. 15, iv. 1) an impossibility.

Ver. 9. Antithetic (*ye on the other hand*) application of ver. 8 to the readers. — εἴπερ] To take this word as *quandoquidem*, with Chrysostom and others, including Olshausen, is not indeed contrary to linguistic usage, since, like εἰ in the sense of ἐπεὶ (Dissen, *ad Dem. de cor.* p. 195), εἴπερ also is used in the sense of ἐπεὶπερ (see Kühner, *ad Xen. Anab.* vi. 1. 26). But in the present instance the context does not afford the smallest ground for this view; on the contrary, the conditional signification: *if certainly, if otherwise* (see Klotz, *ad Devar.* p. 528; Baeuml. *Partik.* p. 202), is perfectly suitable, and with it the following antithetic εἰ δέ corresponds. It conveys an indirect incitement to self-examination. We may add that Paul might also have written εἴγε without changing the sense (in opposition to Hermann's canon, *ad Viger.* p. 834). See on 2 Cor. v. 3; Gal. iii. 4; Eph. iii. 2. — οἰκεῖ ἐν ὑμῖν] That is, has the seat of His *presence and activity* in you. The point of the expression is not the *constantly abiding* ("stable domicilium," Fritzsche and others; also Hofmann); in that case it would have needed a more precise definition (see, on the contrary, the simple οὐκ ἔχει that follows). Respecting the matter itself and the conception, see 1 Cor. iii. 16, vi. 17, 19; 2 Tim. i. 14; John xiv. 23. Comp. also Ev. Thom. 10: πνεῦμα Θεοῦ ἐνοικεῖ ἐν τῷ παιδίῳ τούτῳ. See passages from Rabbinic writers on the dwelling of the Holy Spirit in man, quoted by Schoettgen, p. 527; Eisenmenger, *entdecktes Judenthum*, I. p. 268. The ἐν πνεύματι, which is not to be taken as "in the spiritual nature" (Philippi), and the πν. Θεοῦ οἰκεῖ ἐν ὑμῖν said with a significant more precise definition of πνεῦμα, stand towards one another in an essential mutual relation. The former is conditioned by the latter; for if the Spirit of God do not dwell in the man, He cannot be the determining element in which the latter lives. Compare the Johannine: "*ye in me, and I in you.*" According to Hofmann, the relation con-

sists in the Spirit being on the one hand, "*as active life-ground,*" the absolutely *inward*, and on the other "*as active ground of all life,*" that *which embraces all living*. This, however, is a deviation from the specific strict sense of the *πνεῦμα*, which, in accordance with the context, can only be that *Holy Spirit* who is given to believers; and the concrete conception of the apostle receives the stamp of an abstraction. — εἰ δέ τις πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ κ.τ.λ.] Antithesis of εἴπερ . . . ὑμῖν, rendering very apparent the necessity of that assumption. "*If, on the other hand, any one have not the Spirit of Christ, he does not belong to Him,*" is not in communion of life with Christ, is not a true Christian; for αὐτοῦ refers to *Christ*, not to *God* (van Hengel). Moreover, it is not the *non-Christians*, but the *seeming-Christians* (comp. 1 John iv. 13), who are characterized as those who have not the Spirit. — πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ] (comp. Phil. i. 19; 1 Pet. i. 11) is *none other than the Holy Ghost*, the Spirit of God. He is so called because the exalted Christ really communicates Himself to His own in and with the Paraclete (John xiv.), so that the Spirit is the living principle and the organ of the proper presence of Christ and of His life in them.<sup>1</sup> Comp. on 2 Cor. iii. 16; Gal. ii. 20, iv. 6; Eph. iii. 17; Col. i. 27; Acts xvi. 7. That *this*, and not perchance the *endowment of Christ* with the Spirit (Fritzsche), is the view here taken, is clearly proved by the following εἰ δὲ Χριστὸς ἐν ὑμῖν. Comp. Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 346. The designation of the Holy Spirit by πν. Χριστοῦ is *purposely selected* in order to render very conspicuous the truth of the οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ. Köllner wrongly lays down a distinction between the Spirit of *God* and the Spirit of *Christ*; making the former the *highest πνεῦμα*, the source and perfection of all πνεῦμα, and the latter the higher *God-resembling mind* that was manifested in *Christ*. But a distinction between them is not required by vv. 10, 11 (see on that passage), and is decisively forbidden by Gal. iv. 6, compared with Rom. viii. 14-16. We cannot even say, therefore, with Umbreit: "the Spirit of Christ is the medium, through which man obtains the Spirit of God;" nor, with van Hengel,

<sup>1</sup> Bengel: "testimonium illustre de sancta Trinitate ejusque oeconomia in corde fidelium."

who compares Luke ix. 55 : “ si vero quis *Spiritum, qui Christi est, cum eo non habet communem*,” with which Paul would here be aiming at the (alleged) Judaism of the Romans.

Ver. 10. The contrast to the foregoing. “Whosoever has not the Spirit of Christ, is not His; *if, on the other hand, Christ (i.e. πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ, see on ver. 9) is in you,*” then ye enjoy the following blissful consequences:—(1) Although the body is the prey of death on account of sin, nevertheless the Spirit is life on account of righteousness, ver. 10. (2) And even the mortal body shall be revived by Him who raised up Christ from the dead, because Christ’s Spirit dwelleth in you, ver. 11.—Vv. 10 and 11 have been rightly interpreted as referring to life and death *in the proper* (physical) *sense* by Augustine (*de pecc. merit. et rem. i. 7*), Calvin, Beza, Calovius, Bengel, Michaelis, Tholuck, Klee, Flatt, Rückert, Reiche, Glöckler, Usteri, Fritzsche, Maier, Weiss *l.c.* p. 372, and others. For, *first*, on account of the apostle’s doctrine regarding the connection between sin and death (v. 12) with which his readers were acquainted, he could not expect his τ. σῶμα νεκρ. δι’ ἁμ. to be understood in any other sense; *secondly*, the parallel between the raising up of Christ from death, which was in fact bodily death, and the quickening of the mortal bodies does not permit any other view, since ζωοπ. stands without any definition whatever altering or modifying the proper sense; and *lastly*, the proper sense is in its bearing quite in harmony with the theme of ver. 2 (which is discussed in vv. 3–11): for the life of the Spirit unaffected by physical death (ver. 10), and the final revivification also of the body (ver. 11), just constitute the highest consummation, and as it were the triumph, of the deliverance from the law of sin and death (ver. 2). These grounds, collectively,<sup>1</sup> tell at the same time against the divergent explanations: (1) that in vv. 10, 11 it is *spiritual* death and life that are spoken of; so Erasmus, Piscator,

<sup>1</sup> They do not permit, moreover, any such widening of the idea, as Philippi and Hofmann give to it. The former declares death to be, like the σῶμα itself, *spiritual-bodily*; as such it is even now the overruling principle, inhabiting soul and body. According to Hofmann, the body is meant as in *that* death-condition which only finds its *conclusion* in dying, but in virtue of all this there is *already present* that, which makes the body *incapable* of being a *manifestation of true life*.

Locke, Heumann, Ch. Schmidt, Stolz, Böhme, Benecke, Köllner, Schrader, Stengel, Krehl, and van Hengel. (2) That ver. 10 is to be taken in the spiritual, but ver. 11 in the proper sense; so Origen, Chrysostom, Theodoret, Occumenius, Grotius, Koppe, Olshausen, Reithmayr, and others; de Wette unites the moral *and* physical sense in *both* verses, comp. also Nielsen and Umbreit; see the particulars below. — νεκρόν] With this corresponds the θνητά in ver. 11. It conveys, however, the idea "*conditioni mortis obnoxium*" (Augustine) more forcibly, and so as vividly to realize the certain result—*he is dead!*—a prolepsis of the final fate, which cannot now be altered or avoided. Well is it said by Bengel: "*magni vi; morti adjudicatum deditumque.*" Our body is a *corpse*! Analogous is the ἐγὼ δὲ ἀπέθανον in vii. 10, though in that passage not used in the sense of physical death; comp. Rev. iii. 1; also ἔμψυχον νεκρόν, Soph. *Ant.* 1167; Epict. *fr.* 176: ψυχάριον εἰ βαστάζον νεκρόν. The commentators who do not explain it of physical death are at variance. And how surprising the diversity! Some take νεκρ. as a favourable predicate, embracing the new birth = θανατωθὲν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ (so with linguistic inaccuracy even on account of δι' ἡμ., Origen, Chrysostom, Theodoret, Occumenius, Theophylact, and with various modifications, also Erasmus, Raphel, Grotius, Locke, Heumann, Böhme, Baumgarten-Crusius, Reithmayr, and Märcker; comp. van Hengel, "*mortui instar ad inertiam redactum*"). Others take it as: *miserable by reason of sin* (Michaelis, Koppe, Köllner), comp. de Wette: "Even in the redeemed there still remains the sinful inclination as source of the death, which expresses its power;" Krehl as: "*morally dead*;" Olshausen: "not in the glory of its original destiny;" Tholuck: in the sense of vii. 10 f., but also "including in itself the elements of moral life-disturbance and of misery." Since, however, it is the *body* that is just spoken of, and since δι' ἁμαρτίαν could only bring up the recollection of the proposition in v. 12, every view, which does not understand it of *bodily* death, is contrary to the context and far-fetched,<sup>1</sup> especially since θνητά in

<sup>1</sup> Even though it be explained with Ewald, referring to vi. 2 ff., "*dead on account of sin*, in order that the latter should not again rule." Comp. van



ver. 11 corresponds to it. — δι' ἁμαρτίαν] The ground: *on account of sin, in consequence of sin* (Kühner, II. 1, p. 419), which is more precisely known from v. 12. Death, which has arisen and become general through the entrance of sin into the world, can be averted in no case, not even in that of the regenerate man. Hence, even in his case, the *body* is νεκρόν δι' ἁμαρτίαν. But how completely different is it in *his case with the spirit!* τὸ πνεῦμα, namely, in contrast to the σῶμα, is necessarily not the *transcendent* (Holsten) or the *Holy Spirit* (Chrysostom, Theophylact, Calvin, Grotius, and others); nor yet, as Hofmann turns the conception, the spirit which we now have *when Christ is in us* and *His righteousness is ours*; but simply our *human spirit*, i.e. the substratum of the personal self-consciousness, and as such the principle of the higher cognitive and moral activity of life as directed towards God, different from the ψυχή, which is to be regarded as the potentiality of the human natural life. The faculty of the πνεῦμα is the νοῦς (vii. 25), and its subject the moral Ego (vii. 15 ff.). That the spirit of those who are here spoken of is filled with the Holy Spirit, is in itself a correct inference from the presupposition εἰ Χριστὸς ἐν ὑμῖν, but is not implied in the word τὸ πνεῦμα, as if this meant (Theodoret and de Wette) the human spirit pervaded by the Divine Spirit, the pneumatic essence of the regenerate man. That is never the case; comp. on ver. 16. — ζωῇ] i.e. *life* is his essential element; stronger than ζῆ, the reading of F. G. Vulg. and MSS. of the It. Comp. vii. 7. With respect to the spirit of the true Christian, therefore, there can be no mention of *death* (which would of necessity be *eternal death*); comp. John xi. 26. He is *eternally alive*, and that διὰ δικαιοσύνην, *on account of righteousness*; for the eternal ζωῇ is based on the justification that has taken place for Christ's sake and is appropriated by faith. Rückert, Reiche, Fritzsche, Philippi (comp. also Hofmann), following the majority of ancient expositors, have properly taken δικαιοσύνην thus in the *Pauline-dogmatic* sense, seeing that the *moral righteousness of life* (Erasmus, Grotius, Tholuck, de Wette, Hengel: "*ne peccati principio serviat.*" But how gratuitously is this negative sense imported into the positive expression!

Klee, and Maier), because never perfect (1 Cor. iv. 4; Phil. iii. 9, *al.*), can never be ground of the ζωή. If, however, διὰ δικαιοσύνην be rendered: *for the sake of righteousness*, “in order that the latter may continue and rule” (Ewald, comp. van Hengel), it would yield no contrast answering to the correct interpretation of νεκρὸν δι’ ἡμ. It is moreover to be noted, that as δι’ ἡμαρτ. does not refer to one’s own individual sin (on the contrary, see on ἐφ’ ᾧ πάντες ἡμαρτον, v. 12), so neither does διὰ δικαιοσύνην refer to one’s own righteousness. — Observe, further, the fact that, and the mode in which, the δικαιοσύνη may be lost according to our passage, namely, if Christ is not in us,—a condition, by which the moral nature of the δικαιοσύνη is laid down and security is guarded against.

Ver. 11. According to ver. 10, there was still left one power of death, that over the body. Paul now disposes of this also, and hence takes up again, not indeed what had just been inferred (Hofmann, in accordance with his view of τὸ πνεῦμα, ver. 10), but the idea conditioning it, εἰ δὲ X. ἐν ὑμ.; not, however, in this form, but, as required by the tenor of what he intends to couple with it, in the form: εἰ δὲ τ. πν. τοῦ ἐγερ. Ἰ. ἐκ νεκρ. οἰκεῖ ἐν ὑμῶν. In substance the two are identical, since the indwelling of the Divine Spirit in us is the spiritual indwelling of Christ Himself in us. See on ver. 9. — The δέ, therefore, simply carries on the argument, namely, from the *spirit* which is ζωή (ver. 10), to the quickening that is certain even in the case of the mortal *body* (for observe the position of the καί). The apostle’s *inference* is: “The Spirit who dwelleth in you is the Spirit of Him that raised up Jesus; consequently God will also, with respect to your *bodies*, as dwelling-places of His Spirit, do the same as He has done in the case of Christ.” The self-evident *presupposition* in this inference is, that the Spirit of God dwelt in Jesus during His earthly career (Luke iv. 1, 14, 18; Acts i. 2; John iii. 34, xx. 22). — ζωοποιήσει] Not ἐγερεῖ, but the *correlate* of ζωή, ver. 10 (comp. ver. 6), and counterpart of νεκρὸν and θνητά, is purposely selected. Comp. 1 Cor. xv. 22. — θνητά] What he had previously expressed proleptically by νεκρὸν, he here describes according to the reality of the present by θνητά.

Observe, moreover, that Paul leaves out of view the fate of *those still living at the Parousia*. Their *change* is not included in the expression *ζωοποιήσῃ* (Hofmann), — a view which neither the sense of the word (comp. iv. 17 ; 1 Cor. xv. 22, 36 ; 1 Pet. iii. 18 ; John v. 21) nor the correlation with *ἐγείρας* permits. But to the readers' consciousness of faith it was self-evident from the analogy of what is here said to them with reference to the case of their being already dead at the Parousia ; 1 Cor. xv. 51 ; 2 Cor. v. 2-4 ; 1 Thess. iv. 15-17. — On the interchange of *Ἰησοῦν* and *τὸν Χριστόν* Bengel rightly remarks : “ Appellatio *Jesu* spectat ad *ipsum* ; *Christi* refertur ad *nos* ;” for Jesus as *Christ* is destined to be the archetype for believers even in an eschatological respect. — *διὰ τὸ ἐνοικοῦν κ.τ.λ.*] *on account of His Spirit that dwelleth in you*. Observe the emphatic prefixing of the *αὐτοῦ* relating to God. How could God, the Raiser up of Christ, who was the possessor of His Spirit, leave the bodies of believers, which are the dwelling-places of the same Spirit, without quickening ? The more characteristic *ἐνοικοῦν* (previously it was only *οἰκεῖ*) is a climax to the representation. — Köllner's explanation may serve to exemplify the conception of our passage *in an ethical sense* (Erasmus, Calvin, and many others) : “ So will He who raised up Jesus from the dead bring to life also your bodies that are still subject to death (*sin and misery*), that is, *ennoble also your sensuous nature and so perfect you entirely*.” But even apart from this arbitrary interpretation given to the simple *θνητά* (which ought rather with van Hengel to be interpreted : “ *quamquam mortalia idcoque minoris numeri sunt*”), how diffuse and verbose would be the whole mode of expressing the simple thought ! How utterly out of place this *dualism* of the representation, as if the divine work of the moral revivification of the body were something independent, alongside of and subsequent to that of the spirit ! See, moreover, generally on ver. 10, and the appropriate remarks of Reiche, *Commentar crit.* I. p. 62 ff. Lastly, according to de Wette's combination of the two senses—the moral and the physical—the thought is : “ This death-overcoming Spirit of God shall destroy more and more the principle of sin and death in your bodies, and

instead of it introduce the principle of the life-bringing Spirit into your whole personality, even into the body itself,"—a thought which opens up the prospect of the future resurrection or change of the body. But the resurrection will be participated in by all believers at once, independently of the development noticed in our passage, by which their bodies would have first to be made ripe for it; and even the change of the living at the Parousia is, according to 1 Cor. xv. 51 ff., not a process developed from within outwardly, but a result produced in a twinkling from without (at the sound of the last trumpet),—a result, which cannot be the final consequence of the gradual inward destruction of the principle of sin and death, because in that case all could not participate in it simultaneously, which nevertheless is the case, according to 1 Cor. xv. 51. Notwithstanding, this view, which combines the spiritual and bodily process of glorification, has been again brought forward by Philippi, according to whom what is here meant is the *progressive merging of death* into life, which can only be accomplished<sup>1</sup> by the *progressive merging of sin into the righteousness of life*, and of the *σῶμα* into the *πνεῦμα* (?). The simple explanation of the resurrection of the body is rightly retained by Tholuck, Umbreit, Hofmann, Weiss, and others; whilst Ewald contents himself with the indeterminate double sense of eternal life beginning in the mortal body.

Vv. 12–17. *Accordingly we are bound not to live carnally, for that brings death; whereas the government of the Spirit, on the other hand, brings life, because we, as moved by the Spirit, are children of God, and as such are sure of the future glory.*

Ver. 12. *Ἀπα οὖν*] Draws the inference not merely from ver. 11, but from the contents closely in substance bound up together of vv. 10, 11. "Since these blissful consequences are conditioned by the *Spirit* that dwelleth in us, we are not

<sup>1</sup> If it be attempted to apply this view to the different subjects concerned, the absurdity is encountered, that it is incapable of application to all those to whom no time is afforded between their conversion and their death, or between their conversion and the Parousia, for the development of the alleged spiritual-bodily process of glorification. This exposition, therefore, yields an idea which would even *à priori*, in the generality in which Paul would have expressed it, lack truth.

bound to give service to the *flesh*." That has not deserved well of us!—οὐ τῇ σαρκὶ . . . ζῆν] In the lively progress of his argument, Paul leaves the counterpart, ἀλλὰ τῷ πνεύματι, τοῦ κατὰ πνεῦμα ζῆν, without direct expression; but it results self-evidently for every reader from ver. 13. — τοῦ κ. σ. ζῆν] *in order to live carnally*. This would be the *aim* of our relation of debt to the flesh, if such a relation existed; we should have the carnal mode of life for our *task*. Fritzsche thinks that it belongs to ὁφ.: "Sumus debitores non carni obligati, nempe debitores vitæ ex carnis cupiditatibus instituendæ;" so also Winer, p. 306 [E. T. 410]. But in Gal. v. 3 Paul couples it with the *simple* infinitive; as in Soph. *Aj.* 587, Eur. *Rhes.* 965. Since he here says τ ο ὦ ζῆν, that *telic* view is all the more to be preferred, by which the *contents* of the obligation (so Hofmann) is brought out as its *destination* for us. The *idea* conveyed by κατὰ σάρκα ζῆν is that of *being alive* (contrast to dying) *according to the rule and standard of σάρξ*, so that σάρξ is the regulative principle. The more precise and definite idea: *carnal bliss* (Hofmann), is not expressed. We should note, moreover, τῇ σαρκὶ with the article (personified), and κατὰ σάρκα without it (qualitative), ver. 5.

Ver. 13. Reason for ver. 12—"for so ye would attain the opposite of your destination, as specified in vv. 10, 11." The μέλλειν (comp. iv. 24) indicates the "*certum et constitutum esse secundum vim* (divini) *fati*." Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* II. p. 72. — ἀποθνήσκειν] The opposite of the ζωή in ver. 10 f.; consequently used of the being transferred into the state of *eternal* death; and then ζήσεσθε in the sense of *eternal* life (see ver. 17). Comp. vii. 10, 24, viii. 6, 10. This dying does not exclude the resurrection of the body (Rückert), but points to the unblissful existence in Hades before (Luke xvi. 23) and after (comp. Matt. x. 28) the judgment. If it were true that Paul did not believe in a resurrection for unbelievers, he would stand in direct antagonism to John v. 28 f.; Acts xxiv. 15; Matt. v. 29 f., x. 28; and even 1 Cor. xv. 24 (see on that passage). Here also Philippi combines bodily, spiritual, and eternal death; but see above, on Rom. v. 12. And here it may be specially urged against this view, that the dying

and living are assigned purely to the region of the *future*. Occumenius aptly says: τὸν ἀθάνατον θάνατον ἐν τῇ γέννῃ. — πνεύματι] *i.e.* by means of the Holy Spirit, comp. vv. 4, 5, 6, 9, and the following πνεύματι Θεοῦ; consequently here also not subjective (Philippi and others: "pneumatic condition of mind"). — τὰς πράξεις τοῦ σώμ.] *The practices (tricks, machinations, see on Col. iii. 9; Luke xxiii. 51; Acts xix. 18; Dem. 126. 22; Polyb. ii. 7, 8, ii. 9. 2, iv. 8. 3, v. 96. 4; and Sturz, Lex. Xen. III. p. 646) which the body (in accordance with the νόμος ἐν τοῖς μέλεσι, vii. 23) desires to carry out. These we make dead (θανατοῦτε), when the Ego, following the drawing of the Holy Spirit, conquers the lusts that form their basis; so that they do not come to realization, and are reduced to nothing. Σῶμα is not used here for σάρξ (Reiche and others); Paul has not become inconsistent with his own use of language (Sturm in Tüb. Zeitschr. 1834, 3, p. 11), but has regarded the (in itself indifferent) σῶμα as the executive organ of the sin, which, dwelling in the σάρξ of the body, rules over the body, and makes it the σῶμα ἁμαρτίας (vi. 6), if the Spirit does not obtain the control and make it His organ. The term πράξεις, further used by Paul only in Col. iii. 9 (not ἔργα), is purposely selected to express the evil conception, which Hofmann ("acts") without any ground calls in question. It is frequently used thus by Greek authors, as also πράγματα. — The alternating antithesis is aptly chosen, so that in the two protases living and putting to death, in the apodoses death and life, stand contrasted with one another.*

Ver. 14. Reason assigned for the ζήσεσθε. "For then ye belong, as led by God, to the children of God (for whom the life of the Messianic kingdom is destined, ver. 17; Gal. iv. 7)." Theodore of Mopsuestia: δῆλον οὖν ὅτι οἱ τοιοῦτοι τὴν μακαρίαν ζωὴν παρὰ τῷ ἑαυτῶν πατρὶ ζήσονται. — ἄγονται] *i.e.* are determined in the activity of their inward and outward life. Comp. ii. 4; Gal. v. 18; 2 Tim. iii. 6; Soph. Ant. 620: ὅτω φρένας θεὸς ἄγει, Oed. C. 254 (Reisig, Enarr. p. LXI.); Plat. Phaed. p. 94E: ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ σώματος παθημάτων. The expression is *passive* (hence the *dative*), though without prejudice to the freedom of the human will, as ver. 13 proves.

"Non est enim coactio, ut voluntas non possit repugnare: trahit Deus, sed volentem trahit," Melancthon.—*υἱοὶ Θεοῦ*] Thus Paul elevates the hallowed theocratic conception, ix. 5, *to the purely moral idea*, which is realized in the case of those who are led by the Divine Spirit (which is granted only to those who believe in Christ, Gal. iii. 26). The *οὗτοι* is therefore not unemphatic (Hofmann)—which would make it quite superfluous—but has an excluding and contrasting force (*these and no others*, comp. Gal. iii. 7). Next to it *υἱοὶ* has the stress (hence its position immediately after *οὗτοι*, see the critical remarks), being conceived already as in contrast to *δούλοι*; see ver. 15. The *υἱοὶ Θεοῦ* are those who have been justified by faith, thereby lawfully received by Him into the fellowship of children with a reconciled Father (ver. 15), governed by the Holy Spirit given unto them (comp. Gal. iv. 6), exalted to the dignity of the relation of brethren to Christ (ver. 29), and sure of the eternal glory (of the inheritance). For a view of the relation in question under its various aspects in Paul, John, and the Synoptics, see on John i. 12.

Ver. 15 assigns the ground for ver. 14 in application to the readers. *For ye received not*, when the Holy Spirit was communicated to you, *a spirit of bondage*, that is, a spirit *such as is the regulating power in the state of slavery*.<sup>1</sup> This view of the genitive (Fritzsche, de Wette, Philippi) is required by the contrast; because the *υιοθεσία*, when the Spirit is given, is already present, having entered, namely, through faith and justification (Gal. iv. 6). Hence it cannot, with others (Köllner, Rückert, Baumgarten-Crusius, Hofmann, Reithmayr, following Theodore of Mopsuestia and others), be taken as the genitive of the *effect* (who works bondage). This also holds

<sup>1</sup> Πνεῦμα δουλ. is therefore *what the Holy Spirit received is not*. Comp. 2 Tim. i. 7. Altogether contrary to the context, Grotius, Michaelis, and others understand *affectus servilis*, taking it consequently not of the *objective* spirit, but *subjectively*; as do also Reiche, Baumgarten-Crusius, and de Wette, with whom Philippi agrees: "a *disposition of mind* such as one has in slavery (childhood)." Vv. 14, 16 ought to have precluded such a view. Chrysostom, Theodoret, and others understood it directly of τὸ γράμμα τοῦ νόμου ὡς παρὰ τοῦ πνεύματος μὲν δοθὲν, δούλους δὲ μᾶλλον ἀμύζον, Theophylact. Comp. Oecumenius: τὸν πνευματικὸν φησὶ νόμον.

against Lipsius, *Rechtfertigungslehre*, p. 170. — *πάλιν εἰς φόβον*] *again to fear*, conveys the aim of the (denied) *ἐλάβ. πν. δουλ.*, so that *πάλιν*, as its very position shows, gives a qualification, not of *ἐλάβ.*, but of *εἰς φόβ.*: “in order that ye should once more (as under the law working wrath) be afraid.” — *πνεῦμα υἰοθεσ.*] *i.e. a spirit which, in the state of adoption, is the ruling principle.* *Υιοθεσία* is the proper term for *adoption* (*θέσθαι υἱόν*, Plat. *Legg.* xi. p. 929 C; Arr. *An.* i. 23. 11); see Grotius and Fritzsche, *in loc.*; Hermann, *Privatalterth.* § 64. 15; comp. on Gal. iv. 5; also Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 340. Therefore not *sonship* in general (the Patristic *υἰότης*), as is the view of the majority; it is rightly rendered in the Vulgate: “*adoptionis filiorum*,” it does not represent believers as children of God *by birth*, but as those who by God’s grace (Eph. i. 5–8) have been *assumed* into the place of children, and as brethren of Christ (ver. 29). Those thus adopted *receive* the Spirit from God, but are not *begotten* to sonship through the Spirit (Hofmann); comp. Weiss, *l.c.* — The repetition of *ἐλάβετε πνεῦμα* has a certain solemnity. Comp. on 1 Cor. ii. 7; Phil. iv. 17. — *ἐν ᾧ*] *in whom*, as in the element that moves our inner life. Comp. on 1 Cor. xii. 3; Eph. ii. 18. — *κράζομεν*] *we cry*, the outburst of fervid emotion in prayer. Comp. on Gal. iv. 6. The transition to the *first* person takes place without special intention, under the involuntary pressure of the sense of fellowship. — *Ἀββᾶ*] See on Mark xiv. 36, and Buxtorf, *Lex. Talm.* p. 20. From the three passages, Mark, *l.c.*, Gal. iv. 6, and our present one, it may be assumed that the address אבנ (אב) was transferred from the Jewish into the Christian prayers, and in the latter received the consecration of special sanctity through Christ Himself, who as Son thus addressed the Father. This *Ἀββᾶ* gradually assumed the nature of a *proper name*; and thus it came that the Greek-praying Christians retained the Chaldee word in a vocative sense *as a proper name*, and further, in the fervour of the feeling of sonship, added along with it the specifically Christian address to the Father, using the *appellative* ὁ πατήρ in the appositional nominative (Kühner, II. 1, p. 42); so that the “*Abba, Father*,” now became



fixed.<sup>1</sup> It has been frequently supposed (and is still by Rückert, Reiche, and Köllner) that Paul added ὁ πατήρ *by way of explanation*. But against this view it may be urged, that in passages so full of feeling as Rom. viii. 15 and Gal. iv. 6, an interpretation—and that too of a word which, considering the familiarity with Jewish modes of expression in the churches of Rome and Galatia, undoubtedly needed no explanation, and was certainly well known also through the evangelistic tradition as the form of address in prayer that had flowed from the mouth of Jesus—seems unnatural and out of place. Besides, in all three instances, in Mark<sup>2</sup> and Paul, uniformly the mere Ἀββᾶ ὁ πατήρ is given without any formula of interpretation (τοῦτ' ἐστὶ or the like) being added. Other views—destitute, however, of all proof—are: that the custom which insinuating *children* have of repeating the father's name is here imitated (Chrysostom, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodoret, and Grotius); or that the *emphasis affectus* (Erasmus) is here expressed (either view would be possible only in the event of the passage standing as Ἀββᾶ, Ἀββᾶ); or even that it is meant to signify the Fatherhood of God for *Jews* and *Gentiles* (Augustine, Anselm, Calvin, Estius, and others). With our view Philippi is substantially agreed. Against the objections of Fritzsche, who regards ὁ πατήρ as an explanatory addition grown into a *habit*, see on Gal. iv. 6. — The *Father-name* of God in the Old Covenant (Ex. xx. 2; Isa. lxiii. 16; Hos. xi. 1; Jer. iii. 19, xxxi. 9) only received the loftiest fulfilment of its meaning in the New Covenant through the *υἰοθεσία* accomplished in Christ. Comp. Umbreit, p. 287 f.; Schultz, *alttest. Theol.* II. p. 98.

Ver. 16. More precise information respecting the preceding ἐν ᾧ κράζ. Ἀββᾶ ὁ π. — αὐτὸ τὸ πνεῦμα κ.τ.λ.] Not *He, the Spirit* (Hofmann, inappropriately comparing ver. 21 and 1 Thess. iii. 11); but, since αὐτός in the *casus rectus* always means *ipse*, the context supplying the more special reference

<sup>1</sup> It was owing simply to the provincial dialect of Palestine that אבא and not אב was used. Alberti, Tholuck, and Olshausen think it due to the former having a more childlike (lisping) sound. Other precarious views may be seen in Wolf, *Cur.*; Lightfoot, *Hor.* p. 654 f.

<sup>2</sup> In Mark xiv. 36 the expression is put into the mouth of Jesus from a later age. See *in loc.*

of the sense: *ipse spiritus*, that is, *Himself*, on *His own part*, the (received) *Spirit testifies with our spirit*; He unites *His own testimony that we are children of God* with the same testimony borne by *our spirit*, which (1 Cor. ii. 11) is the seat of our self-consciousness. — In *συμμαρτ.* the *συν* and its reference to *τ. πν. ἡμ.* are not to be neglected, any more than in ii. 15, ix. 1, as the Vulgate, Luther, Grotius, and Fathers, also Koppe, Rückert, Reiche, Köllner, de Wette, and others have done. Paul distinguishes from the subjective self-consciousness: *I am the child of God*, the therewith accordant testimony of the objective Holy Spirit: *thou art the child of God!* The latter is the *yea* to the former; and thus it comes that we cry the *Abba ἐν τῷ πνεύματι*. Our older theologians (see especially Calovius) have rightly used our passage as a proof of the *certitudo gratiae* in opposition to the Catholic Church with its mere *conjectura moralis*. Comp. Eph. i. 13, iv. 30; 1 John iii. 24, iv. 13. At the same time, it is also a clear *dictum probans* against all pantheistic confusion of the divine and the human spirit and consciousness, and no less against the assertion that Paul ascribes to man not a human *πνεῦμα*, but only the divine *πνεῦμα* become subjective (Baur, Holsten). Against this view, see also Pfleiderer, in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschr.* 1871, p. 162 f., who nevertheless, at p. 177 f., from our passage and chap. viii. generally, attributes to the apostle the doctrine that in the Christian the real divine *πνεῦμα* has become the proper human one, and *vice versa*; comp. on ver. 26. Against the *Fanatics* Melanethon truly observes, that the working of the Spirit in the believer begins “*prælucente voce evangelii.*” — *τέκνα*] The term *children*, expressive of greater tenderness, called forth by the increasing fervour of the discourse.<sup>1</sup> Comp. ver. 21. The aspect of the *legal* relation (of the

<sup>1</sup> Hofmann incorrectly imports the idea that *υἱός* emphasizes the *connection of life*, and *τέκνον* the *descent*; hence Christ is not called *τέκνον*, but only *υἱός*. This view is demolished by the fact that, precisely in virtue of His descent as the *μονογενής* and *πρωτότοκος*, Christ is the *υἱός*. He is not called *τέκνον*, simply because *υἱός* was the *prophetic* and *historical* designation of the Messiah consecrated by ancient usage. In fact, the LXX. render *promiscuously* *ἱδ* as well as *ἱδ* (which Hofmann compares) sometimes by *υἱός* and sometimes by *τέκνον*.

υιοθεσία) at the same time recedes into the background. Comp. Phil. ii. 15.

Ver. 17. From the *truth* of the filial relation to God, Paul now passes over by the continuative δέ to the sure blissful *consequence* of it,—and that indeed in organic reference to the ζήσεσθε promised in ver. 13. — From our *childship* follows necessarily our *heirship*. Comp. Gal. iv. 7. Both are to be left perfectly general, without supplying Θεοῦ, since it is only what follows that furnishes the concrete, more precise definition, in which here the general relation is realized. — κληρονόμοι Θεοῦ] The *inheritance*, which God once on a time transfers to His children as their property, is the *salvation and glory of the Messianic kingdom*. Comp. iv. 14. God is, of course, in this case conceived not as a *dying* testator, but as the *living* bestower of His goods on His children (Luke xv. 12). However, the conclusion (ver. 17) forbids us to disregard the idea of *inheritance*, and to find only that of the *receiving possession* represented (in opposition to van Hengel). — σύγκληρ. δὲ Χριστοῦ] Not something *greater* than κληρον. Θεοῦ, on the contrary in substance *the same*, but *specifically characterized* from the standpoint of our fellowship with Christ, whose *co-heirs* we must be as κληρον. Θεοῦ, since, having entered into sonship through the υιοθεσία, we have become Christ's *brethren* (ver. 29). Moreover, that Paul has here in view, not the analogy of the Hebrew law of inheritance that conferred a man's intestate heritage only on sons of his body, if there were such, but that of the *Roman* law (Fritzsche, Tholuck, van Hengel; see more particularly on Gal. iv. 7), is the historically necessary supposition, which can least of all seem foreign or inappropriate in an epistle to the *Romans*. — συμπάσχ.] Whosoever, *for the sake of the gospel*, submits to suffering (Matt. x. 38, xvi. 24), suffers *with Christ*; *i.e.* he has actual share in the suffering endured by Christ (1 Pet. iv. 13), drinks the same cup that He drank (Matt. xx. 22 f.). Comp. on 2 Cor. i. 5; Phil. iii. 10; Col. i. 24. This fellowship of suffering Paul regards as that which must be presupposed in order to the attainment of glory, of participation in the δόξα of Christ (εἶπερ, as in ver. 9); not indeed as *meritum*, or *pretium vitæ æternæ*, but as

*obedientia propter ordinem a Deo sancitum*, Melancthon. Comp. 2 Tim. ii. 11 f. This conviction developed itself, especially under the external influence of the circumstances of an age fruitful in persecution, just as necessarily and truly out of the inward assurance that in the case of Jesus Himself His suffering,<sup>1</sup> willed by God, and undertaken and borne in obedience to the Father, was the condition of His glory (Luke xxiv. 26 ; Phil. ii. 6 ff., *al.*), as it in its turn became a rich spring of the enthusiasm for martyrdom. Olshausen (comp. also Philippi) mixes up an element which is here foreign : " participation in the conflict with sin *in themselves* and in the world." Even without introducing this element foreign to the word itself, the *συμπάσχειν*, as the presupposition involved in the joint-heirship, has its universal applicability, based not merely on the general participation of all in the suffering of this time, but especially also on the relation of the children of God to the ungodly world (comp. John vii. 7, xv. 18 f., xvii. 14). — *ἵνα καὶ συνδοξ.] in order to be also glorified with Him ;* dependent not on *συγκληρ.* (Tholuck), but on *συμπάσχ.*, the divine final aim of which, known to the sufferer, it subjoins.

Vv. 18–31.<sup>2</sup> *Grounds of encouragement for the συμπάσχειν ἵνα κ. συνδοξ.* — Namely, (1) The future glory shall far outweigh the present sufferings, vv. 18–25. — (2) The Holy Ghost supports us, vv. 26, 27. — (3) Generally, all things must serve for good to those who love God, vv. 28–31.

Ver. 18. *Λογίζομαι]* *I reckon*, as in iii. 28 ; 2 Cor. xi. 5 ; Phil. iii. 13. In the *singular* we are not to discover a *turn* given to the argument, as if the apostle found it necessary to *justify* himself on account of the condition *εἵπερ συμπάσχ.* (Hofmann). Just as little here as in the case of *πέπεισμαι* in ver. 38. He simply delivers his judgment, which, however, he

<sup>1</sup> Here also set forth by Hofmann under the aspect of *treatment encountered by Him at the hands of the enemies* of the work of salvation.

<sup>2</sup> See, on the section about the groaning of the creature, Köster, in *Stud. u. Krit.* 1862, p. 755 ff. ; M. Schenkel, *von d. Seufzen der Creatur* (Schulprogr. Plauen), 1862 ; Frommann, in the *Jahrb. f. Deutsche Theol.* 1863, p. 25 ff. ; Zahn, in the same, 1865, p. 511 ff. ; Graf, in Heidenheim's *Vierteljahrsschr.* 1867, 3 ; Engelhardt, in the *Luther. Zeitschr.* 1871, p. 48 ff. (against Frommann) ; and against Engelhardt, see Frommann in the same *Zeitschrift*, 1872, p. 33 ff.

might have expressed with equal propriety in a form inclusive of others, as subsequently he has written *οἶδαμεν* (ver. 22). Such changing of the person is accidental and without any special design, especially as here he does not say *ἐγὼ γὰρ λογίζ*, or *λογίζομαι γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐγώ*, or otherwise give himself prominence. A certain *litotes*, however, lies (not indeed in the singular, but) in the use of *λογίζομαι* itself, which really contains an *οἶδα* and a *πέπεισμαι*. — *οὐκ ἄξια*] *not of equal importance, not of corresponding weight*; they are *unimportant*. On *πρός*, in comparison with, in relation to, comp. Plat. *Gorg.* p. 471 E: *οὐδενὸς ἄξιός ἐστι πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν*, Protag. p. 356 A; Winer, p. 378 [E. T. 505]. On *οὐκ ἄξιόν ἐστι* itself, however, in the sense: *non operae pretium est*, see Kühner, *ad Xen. Anab.* vi. 5. 13. Comp. Dem. 300 *ult.*; Polyb. iv. 20. 2. On the *subject-matter*, see especially 2 Cor. iv. 17. — *τοῦ νῦν καιροῦ*] *of the present time-period*. The *νῦν καιρός* marks off from the whole *αἰὼν οὗτος* (see on Matt. xii. 32) *the period then current*, which was to end with the approaching Parousia (assumed as near in xiii. 11, 12, 1 Thess. iv. 17, 1 Cor. vii. 29, and in the entire N. T.), and was thus the time of the crisis. — *μέλλ. δόξ. ἀποκ.*] *μέλλουσας* (see on ver. 13) is, as in Gal. iii. 23, prefixed with emphasis, correlative with the foregoing *νῦν*. Comp. 1 Cor. xii. 22; Plat. *Rep.* p. 572 B: *καὶ πάνν δοκοῦσιν ἡμῶν ἐνίοις μετρίοις εἶναι*. See Stallbaum *in loc.* — *ἀποκαλ.*] Namely, at the Parousia, when the *δόξα* which is now hidden (in heaven, comp. Col. iii. 3 f.; 1 Pet. i. 4) is to be revealed. — *εἰς ἡμᾶς*] *on us*, so that we are those, *upon whom* (reaching unto them) the *ἀποκάλυψις* takes place. Comp. Acts xxviii. 6. The *δόξα* comes to us, therefore, from without (with Christ descending from heaven; comp. Col. iii. 4; Phil. iii. 21; Tit. ii. 13); but is not conceived as having already begun inwardly and then becoming apparent outwardly (in opposition to Lipsius, *Rechtfert.* p. 206).

Ver. 19. *Γάρ*] introduces, from the waiting of the creation (to whose groaning that of Christians thereupon joins itself in ver. 23) for this glorious consummation, a peculiar *confirmation*, couched in a poetic strain, of the fact that the *ἀποκάλυψις τῆς δόξης* is really impending; and thus lends support

to the comforting *certainly* of that future manifestation, that is, to the element involved in the emphatically prefixed μέλλουσαν; comp. Calovius, Fritzsche, de Wette, Krehl, Reithmayr, and Bisping. From Origen and Chrysostom down to Hofmann, there has usually been discovered here a ground assigned for the *greatness* of the glory. But this is neither consistent with the emphatic prominence of μέλλουσαν, nor with the subsequent ground itself, which proves nothing as to the *greatness* of the δόξα, but stands to the *indubitableness* of the latter, otherwise firmly established and presupposed, in the relation of a *sympathetic testimony of nature*.<sup>1</sup> Least of all can γάρ introduce a *ground* of the apostle's *belief* for his own λογίζομαι κ.τ.λ. (van Hengel). According to Philippi, what is to be established is, that the δόξα is not *already* present, but *only future*, which, however, even taking into account human impatience, was quite self-evident. For the *nearness* of the δόξα (Reiche), just as before it was not expressly announced in the simple μέλλουσαν, the sequel affords no proof, since the element of speediness is not expressed. — ἡ ἀποκαταδοκία] The verb καταδοκεῖν (Xen. Mem. iii. 5, 6, frequent in Euripides) strictly means: *to expect with uplifted head*, then *to expect generally, to long for* (Valek. ad Herod. vii. 168; Loesner, Obs. p. 256 f.); and καταδοκία means *expectatio* (Prov. x. 28; Aq. Ps. xxxviii. 7). The strengthened (Vigerus, ed. Herm. p. 582; Tittmann, Symon. p. 106 ff.) ἀποκαταδοκεῖν (Joseph. Bell. Jud. iii. 7. 26; Polyb. xvi. 2. 8, xviii. 31. 4, xxii. 19. 3; Aq. Ps. xxxvi. 7; Alberti, Gloss. p. 106 ff.) and ἀποκαταδοκία (only elsewhere in Phil. i. 20) is the *waiting expectation* (not *anxious expectation*, as Luther has it) that continues on the strain till the goal is attained. See especially Tittmann, *l.c.*; Fritzsche in *Fritschior. Opuscul.* p. 150 ff. Without warrant, Loesner, Krebs, Fischer, *de vit. Lxx.* p. 128 f., and others, including Rückert, Reiche, and van Hengel, have refused to recognise the strengthening element of ἀπό, already pointed out by Chrysostom and

<sup>1</sup> The train of thought may therefore, expressed in Latin, be paraphrased somewhat thus: "τὴν μέλλουσαν κ.τ.λ. inquam, hæc enim spes nostra tantæ est certitudinis, ut confirmetur totius naturæ ad eundem finem nostrum tendentis expectatione spiritali." "

Theodore of Mopsuestia, although Paul himself gives prominence to it repeatedly in ἀπεκδέχ. (comp. vv. 23, 25 ; 1 Cor. i. 7 ; Gal. v. 5 ; Phil. iii. 20). — τῆς κτίσεως] Genitive of the subject. The waiting of the κτίσις is with rhetorical emphasis brought into prominence as something independent. See Winer, p. 221 [E. T. 239]. Ἡ κτίσις means—(1) *actus creationis* ; so i. 20, corresponding to the classic usage in the sense of establishment (Pind. *Ol.* 13. 118 ; comp. 1 Pet. ii. 13), founding (Polyb., Plut., and others), planting, etc.—(2) *The thing created*, and that (a) where the context supplies no limitation, quite generally like our *creation*, Mark x. 6, xiii. 19 ; 2 Pet. iii. 4 ; Judith xvi. 14 ; Wisd. ii. 6, *al.* ; and (b) where the context does limit it, in a more or less special sense, as in Mark xvi. 15, Col. i. 23 (of that portion of the creation, which consists of mankind), Col. i. 15, Heb. iv. 13 (of every individual creature) ; comp. i. 25, viii. 39 ; also καὶνὴ κτίσις in 2 Cor. v. 17, Gal. vi. 15. Since, then, the absolute ἡ κτίσις must receive its limitation of sense simply from the connection, the question is, What does the text in our passage exclude from the meaning of τῆς κτίσεως? There are plainly excluded not only the *angelic* and *demoniac* kingdom (see ver. 20), but also *Christians collectively*, as is clear from vv. 19, 21, and 23, where the Christians are *different* from the κτίσις, and even *opposed* to it, so that they cannot be regarded (according to the view of Frommann) as forming a *partial conception*, embraced also in the κτίσις.<sup>1</sup> But is the *non-Christian portion of humanity* to be excluded also? If not, it must be meant either *along with* something else, or *else alone*. If the former, then Paul, seeing that irrational nature at any rate remains within the compass of the idea, would have included under *one* notion this nature and the Jewish and heathen worlds, which would be absurd. But if non-Christian humanity *alone* be meant, then—(1) we should not be able to see why Paul should have chosen the term κτίσις, and not have used the definite expression κόσμος, which is formally employed for that idea elsewhere in his own writings and throughout the N. T.

<sup>1</sup> Frommann unjustifiably appeals to 2 Cor. vii. 7. See, on the contrary, also Zahn, *l.c.* p. 516 f., and Engelhardt, p. 49.

Besides, the *absolute* κτίσις nowhere in the entire N. T. means non-Christian mankind (in Mark xvi. 15 and Col. i. 23, πᾶσῃ stands along with it); and, indeed, πᾶσα ἡ κτίσις (Mark) and πᾶσα κτίσις (Col.) mean nothing else than the whole *creation* and every *creature*, and in these cases it is purely the context that shows that created *men* are meant, while at the same time it is self-evident *ex adjuncto* (for the discourse concerns the preaching of the gospel to the κτίσις) that Christians are not to be understood. (2) The hostile attitude of the then existing κόσμος towards the Christian body would cause the assertion respecting it of a sympathetic and, as it were, prophetic yearning for the manifestation of the children of God to seem a curious paradox, which, moreover, as a truth, in the case of the Jews and Gentiles, would rest on quite a different foundation, namely, the expectation of the Jewish Messianic kingdom, and on the other hand, the yearning dream of a golden age. (3) Again, the expressions in ver. 20 are of such a character, that they in no way make us presuppose in the writer such a conception of humanity subjected through sin to the θάνατος as Paul had, but allow us just to think of the κτίσις as having fallen a prey to the lot of mortality, not by its own free action, but innocently, and by outward necessity; the apostle would not have left the θάνατος unmentioned.<sup>1</sup> (4) Further, the hope of attaining to the freedom of the glory of the children of God (ver. 21) was only left to the κόσμος, in so far as it should be converted to Christ; but ver. 21, in point of fact, merely asserts that on the entrance of that glory the κτίσις is to be glorified also, without touching, in regard to mankind, on the condition of conversion—which assuredly Paul least of all would have omitted. (5) Finally, Paul expected that, previous to the entrance of the Parousia, the fulness of the Gentiles and all Israel would become christianized (xi. 25, 26), and had to shape his conception, therefore, in such a way as to make humanity, taken as a whole, belong to the υἱοῖς Θεοῦ when the manifestation of the kingdom should appear. And

<sup>1</sup> An antinomy of two different conceptions as to the origin of death (Frommann, 1872, p. 53) is certainly not to be found in Paul's writings. See on v. 12; 1 Cor. xv. 47 ff.



as to that, ver. 21 decidedly forbids the connecting of the notion of mankind with ἡ κτίσις. — There remains, therefore, as the definition of the notion of ἡ κτίσις in accordance with the text: *the collective non-rational creation*, animate and inanimate, the same which we term in popular usage “*all nature*” (comp. Wisd. v. 18, xvi. 24, xix. 6), from which we are accustomed to exclude intelligent beings. In view of the poetically prophetic colouring of the whole passage, the expressions of waiting, sighing, hoping, of bondage and redemption, excite the less surprise, since already in the O. T. instances of a similar propopoeia are very common (Deut. iv. 34; Ps. xix. 2, lxviii. 17, xcvi. 8, cvi. 11; Isa. ii. 1, xiv. 8, lv. 12; Ezek. xxxi. 15; Hab. ii. 11; Bar. iii. 34; Job xii. 7–9, *al.*); and Chrysostom very aptly remarks: ὥστε δὲ ἐμφαντικώτερον γενέσθαι τὸν λόγον, καὶ προσωποποιεῖ τὸν κόσμον ἅπαντα τοῦτον ἄπερ καὶ οἱ προφῆται ποιοῦσιν, ποταμούς κροτοῦντας χερσὶν εἰσάγοντες κ.τ.λ. Comp. Oecumenius and Theophylact. The idea of the glorification of all nature cannot be accounted *unpauline*, for the simple reason that it is clearly expressed in our passage; and because, moreover, as being connected with the history of the moral development of humanity according to Gen. iii. 17 f., and necessarily belonging to the idea of the ἀποκατάστασις πάντων (Matt. xix. 28; Acts iii. 21; 2 Pet. iii. 10 ff.; Rev. xxi. 1), it may be least of all disclaimed in the case of Paul, since it emanates from the prophets of the Old Testament (Isa. xi. 6 ff.; Ezek. xxxvii.; Isa. lxv. 17, lxvi. 1; comp. Ps. cii. 27; and see Umbreit, p. 291 ff.), and has thence passed over into the Rabbinical system of doctrine. See Eisenmenger, *entdeckt. Judenth.* II. p. 367 ff., 824 ff.; Schoettgen, *Hor.* II. pp. 71, 76, 117 ff.; Bertholdt, *Christol.* p. 214; Corrodi, *Chiliasm.* I. p. 376 ff.; Ewald, *ad Apocal.* p. 307 f.; Delitzsch, *Erläut. z. s. Hebr. Uebers.* p. 87. The above interpretation, therefore, of the κτίσις has been rightly adopted—only that the intelligent creatures have not in all cases been expressly or exclusively separated from it (*e.g.* Theodoret includes also the ἀόρατα, angels, archangels, etc., as Origen previously, and Erasmus and others subsequently, have also done)—by the majority of expositors, following most of the Fathers (in the first instance

Irenaeus, *Haer.* v. 32. 1), by Luther, Erasmus, Beza, Melancthon, Calvin, Cornelius a Lapide, Balduin, Estius, Grotius, Cocceius, Calovius, Calixtus, Seb. Schmid, Wolf, Bengel, and others, including Flatt, Tholuck, Klee, Usteri (in *Stud. u. Krit.* 1832, p. 835 ff., and *Lehrbegr.* ed. 4 and 5, pp. 373, 399 ff.), Rückert, Benecke, Schneckenburger, Reiche, Glöckler, de Wette, Neander, Nielsen, Reithmayr, Maier, Philippi, Ewald, Umbreit, Bisping, Lechler, *apostol. Zeitalt.* p. 143, Delitzsch, Ruprecht in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1851, p. 214 ff., Zahn, Mangold, Hofmann, and Engelhardt; comp. also M. Schenkel and Graf. Among these, however, are several who, like Luther, Beza, and also Fritzsche, wish to understand it too *narrowly*, merely of the *inanimate* creation,—a limitation not given in the text, and moreover antiprophetic (Tertullian, *ad Hermog.* 10); while, on the other hand, Köllner, with whom Olshausen agrees, takes it too *widely* of *all created things generally*. See, against this, the textual limitation explained above. If, however, in accordance with the above, the removal of intelligent beings from the compass of the *κτίσις* must be regarded as decided, the decision is fatal to the view of others, who, following the example of Augustine, explain ἡ *κτίσις* as *mankind*; and that either in the quite comprehensive sense of *mankind collectively* (in the state of nature), as, following older expositors especially scholastic and Roman Catholic, Döderlein, Gabler, Ammon, Keil (*Opusc.* p. 207), Grimm (*de vi vocabuli κτίσις*, Lips. 1812), Schulthess (*evangel. Belchr. üb. d. Erneuer. d. Nat.*, Zurich 1833), Geisler (in the *Annal. d. ges. Theol.* 1835, Jan. p. 51 ff.), Schrader, Krehl, van Hengel, Frommann, and others do; or, with exclusion of the Christians, *in the sense of mankind still unconverted*,<sup>1</sup> as Augustine himself suggested,<sup>2</sup> by which again,

<sup>1</sup> So Wetstein, Baumgarten-Crusius, Jatho, and Köster; formerly (in eds. 1, 2, 3) also Usteri, following Schleiermacher.

<sup>2</sup> His entire exposition (see *Expos. quar. propos. ex ep. ad Rom.* 53) runs thus:—"Sic intelligendum est, ut neque sensum dolendi et gemendi opinemur esse in arboribus et oleribus et lapidibus et ceteris hujuscemodi creaturis (hic enim error Manichaeorum est); neque angelos sanctos vanitati subjectos esse arbitremur: sed omnem creaturam in ipso homine sine ulla calumnia cogitemus. . . . Omnis autem est etiam in homine, et spiritualis et animalis et corporalis, quia homo constat spiritu et anima et corpore. Ergo creatura revelationem filiorum

however, many understood specially the unconverted *Gentiles* (Locke, Lightfoot, Knatchbull, Hammond, Semler, and Nachtigall), and various others the unconverted *Jews* (Cramer, Böhme, and Gersdorf). Others have even explained it of *Christians collectively*, as the *new creature* (Vorstius, Deyling, Nösselt, Socinians and Arminians). And just as little can *κτίσις* be equivalent to *ψυχή* (Märcker) or to *σάρξ*, and be supposed to designate the *creaturally element in the regenerate* (Weissbach in the *Sächs. Stud.* I. p. 76 ff., and Zyro in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1845, 2, 1851, p. 645 ff.). Compare also, regarding the various expositions, M. Schenkel, p. 9 ff.; and against the view which takes it of mankind, Engelhardt, *l.c.* — *τὴν ἀποκάλ. τ. νίων τ. Θεοῦ*] The event, the blissful catastrophe, whereby the sons of God become manifest as such (in their *δόξα*). How exalted the dignity in which they here appear above the *κτίσις*! Bengel: “ad creaturam ex peccato redundarunt incommoda; ad creaturam ex gloria filiorum Dei redundabit recreatio.” The *κτίσις*, in virtue of its physical connection with that *ἀποκάλυψις*, shall be a *partaker* in the blissful manifestation.

Vv. 20, 21. Ground of this longing. — *τῇ ματαιότη.*] Prefixed with emphasis: *vanitati*, to *nothingness*. The substantive (Pollux, vi. 134) is no longer found in Greek authors, but frequently in the LXX. (as in Ps. xxxix. 6). See Schleusner, *Thes.* III. p. 501. It indicates here the empty (*i.e.* as having lost its primitive purport, which it had by creation) *quality of being*, to which the *κτίσις* was changed from its original perfection. — *ὑπετάγη*] *was subjected, was made subject to*, as to a ruling power formerly unknown to it. This historical fact (*aorist*) took place in consequence of the fall, Gen. iii. 17.

Dei expectat, quicquid nunc in homine laborat et corruptioni subjacet. Erant enim adhuc credituri, qui etiam spiritu subiacebant laboriosis erroribus. Sed ne quis putaret, de ipsorum labore tantum dictum esse, adjungit etiam de iis, qui jam crediderant. Quamquam enim spiritu, i. e. mente, jam servirent legi Dei: tamen, quia carne servitur legi peccati, quamdiu molestias et sollicitationes mortalitatis nostrae patimur, ideo addit dicens: *Non solum*, etc. (ver. 23). Non solum ergo ipsa, quae tantummodo creatura dicitur in hominibus, qui nondum crediderunt, et ideo nondum in filiorum Dei numerum constituti, congemiscit ac dolet: sed etiam nosmet ipsi, qui credimus et primitias Sp. habemus, quia jam spiritu adhaeremus Deo per fidem, et ideo non jam creatura, sed filii Dei appellamur,” etc.

Comp. *Beresh. rabb. f. 2, 3*: "Quamvis creatae fuerint res perfectae, cum primus homo peccaret, corruptae tamen sunt, et ultra non redibunt ad congruum statum suum, donec veniat Pherez, h. e. Messias." See also Zahn, p. 532. The reference to an *original ματαιότης*, introduced even by the act of creation (Theodoret, Grotius, Krehl, Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette, and Köster), is historically inappropriate (Gen. i. 31), and contrary to οὐχ ἐκούσα, ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ., which supposes a previous state *not* subject to the ματ. Further, since the ὑποτάξας is subsequently mentioned, the interpretation *se subiecit* (Fritzsche) is thereby excluded. — οὐχ ἐκούσα, ἀλλὰ διὰ τ. ὑποτάξ.] This must occasion their expectation all the more; for their subjection is at variance with their original state and the desire of immunity founded thereon, and it took place "*invita et repugnante natura*" (Calvin, namely, through the guilt of human sin), *on account of the subjector* (διὰ with the accusative, comp. on John vi. 57), that is, because the counsel and will of the subjecting God (the contrast to one's own non-willingness) had to be thus satisfied.<sup>1</sup> The idea of another than *God* in τὸν ὑποτάξ. (Knatchbull and Capellus: *Adam*; Chrysostom, Schneckemburger, Bisping, and Zahn: *man*; Hammond and others, quoted by Wolf: the *devil*) is forbidden by the very absence of a defining statement, so that the subject is assumed as *well known*. According to Gen. iii. 17, it was indeed man through whose guilt the subjection ensued; but *God* was the subjector (ὁ ὑποτάξας). — ἐπ' ἐλπίδι ὅτι κ.τ.λ.] *on hope* (iv. 18) *that*, etc., may be joined either with ὑποτάξ. (Origen, Vulgate, Luther, Castalio, Calvin, Piscator, Estius, and others, including Ch. Schmidt and Olshausen) or with ὑπετάγη. The latter conjunction brings out more forcibly the ἐπ' ἐλπίδι; for this contains a new element by way of motive for the expectation of nature. ἐπί, *spe proposita*, indicates the condition which was conceded in the ὑπετάγη, as it

<sup>1</sup> The marks of parenthesis before οὐχ and after ὑποτ. are to be expunged, since the connection and construction proceed without a break. This applies also against Frommann, who assigns to this parenthesis merely the object of explaining the *passive* ὑπετάγη. Ewald puts in a parenthesis the entire verse, thus making ἐπ' ἐλπίδι connect itself with ἀπειδίχεται. But for this there appears likewise no reason.

were, the equivalent provisionally given for it, Acts ii. 24; Xen. *Mem.* ii. 1. 18, and Kühner *in loc.*; Ast, *Lex. Plat.* I. p. 767; Bernhardt, p. 250. — ὅτι] *that*, object of the hope (Phil. i. 20); not *nam*, as it is taken by most expositors, who join ἐπ' ἐλπίδι with ὑποτάξ.; among others by Schneckenburger, *Beiträg.* p. 122, who assigns as his reason, that otherwise the αὐτὴ ἡ κτίσις could not be repeated. But that repetition is necessitated by the emphasis of the similarity of the relation, which αὐτὴ ἡ κτίσις has over-against the children of God, for which reason Paul did not write ὅτι καὶ ἐλευθερωθήσεται (in opposition to Hofmann's objection). Besides, the purport of the ἐλπίς had necessarily to be stated, in order to give the ground of the expectation of the κτίσις as directed precisely to the manifestation of the sons of God. The indefinite ἐπ' ἐλπίδι would supply a motive for its expectation of deliverance in general, but not for its expectation of the glory of the children of God. This applies also against Hofmann, who refers ὅτι κ.τ.λ., as statement of the reason, to the whole preceding sentence, whereby, besides, the awkward idea is suggested, that the subjection took place on account of the deliverance to be accomplished in the future; it had, in fact, an entirely different historical ground, well known from history, and already suggested by the διὰ τὸν ὑποτάξ., namely, the implication of the κτίσις in the entrance of sin among mankind. — καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ κτίσις] *et ipsa creatura*, that is, the creature also on its part, not merely the children of God. There is simply expressed the similarity; not a *climax* (*even*), of which the context affords no hint. — τῆς φθορᾶς] Genitive of apposition: *from the bondage that consists in corruption*. See ver. 23. Incorrectly paraphrased by Köllner: "from the corruptible, miserable bondage." At variance with this is ver. 20, according to which τ. φθ. cannot be made an adjective; as is also the sequel, in which τὴν ἐλευθ. corresponds to τῆς δουλείας, and τῆς δόξης τ. τέκν. τ. Θεοῦ to the τῆς φθορᾶς. The φθορά (antithesis = ἀφθαρσία, ii. 7; 1 Cor. xiv. 42-50) is the *destruction*, that develops itself out of the ματαιότης, the κατάλυσις opposed frequently in Plato and others to the γένεσις (*Phaed.* p. 95 E; *Phil.* p. 55 A; Lucian, *A.* 19). Comp. on Gal. vi. 8. It is

not the *φθορά* in the first instance that *makes* the state of the *κτίσις* a state of bondage, as Hofmann apprehends the genitive; but the existing bondage is essentially such, that what is subjected to it is liable to the fate of corruption. — *εἰς τ. ἐλευθ.*] is the state, to which the *κτίσις* shall attain by its emancipation. An instance of a genuine Greek pregnant construction. See Fritzsche, *ad Marc.* p. 322; Winer, p. 577 [E. T. 776]. — *τῆς δόξης τ. τ. τ. Θ.*] Likewise genitive of apposition: into the freedom which shall consist *in the glory of the children of God*, i.e. in a glory similar thereto (by participation in it), not, as Hofmann thinks: which the glory of the children of God *shall have brought with it*. If, with Luther and many others, including Böhme and Köllner, *τῆς δόξης* be treated as an adjective: “to the glorious freedom,” we should then have quite as arbitrary a departure from the verbal order, in accordance with which *τῶν τέκν.* belongs most naturally to *τῆς δόξ.*, as from the analogy of the preceding *τῆς δουλ.* *τῆς φθορᾶς*. The accumulation of genitives, *τ. δόξης κ.τ.λ.*, has a certain solemnity; comp. ii. 5; 2 Cor. iv. 4; Eph. iv. 13, *al.* — Observe, further, how Paul has conceived the catastrophe, of which he is speaking, not as the *destruction* of the world and a new creation, but, in harmony with the prophetic announcements, especially those of Isaiah (Isa. xxxv., lxv. 17, lxvi. 22; comp. Zahn, p. 537; Schultz, *alttest. Theol.* II. p. 227), as a *transformation* into a more perfect state. The *passing away* of the world is the passing away of its *form* (1 Cor. vii. 31), by which this transformation is conditioned, and in which, according to 2 Pet. iii. 10, fire will be the agent employed. And the *hope*, the tenor of which is specified by *ὅτι κ.τ.λ.*, might, in connection with this living personification, be ascribed to all *nature*, as if it were conscious thereof, since the latter is destined to become the scene and surrounding of the glorified children of God. But that *ἐλπίς* does not pertain to *mankind*, whose *presentiment* of immortality, by means of its darkened original consciousness of God (Frommann), does not correspond to the idea of *ἐλπίς*; comp., on the contrary, Eph. ii. 12; 1 Thess. iv. 13. If, on the other hand, the *Gentile hope*, cherished amidst the misery of the times, as to a better

state of things (according to poets: the golden age of the *Saturnia regna*), were meant as an image of the Christian hope (Küster), then Paul would have conceived the *ἐλευθερωθήσεται* as conditioned by the future *conversion* of the Gentiles. But thus the *ἐλπίς* would amount to this, that the Gentiles should become *themselves children of God*, which is inconsistent with ver. 19. There, and likewise in ver. 21, the sons of God are the *third* element, for whose transfiguration the *κτίσις* waits, and from whose glorification it *hopes*, in ver. 21, that the latter shall benefit *it also*—the *κτίσις*—through participation therein; and be to it also deliverance and freedom from its hitherto enduring bondage. This is applicable only to the *παλιγγενεσία* (see on Matt. xix. 28) at the *Parousia*.

Ver. 22. Proof, not of the *ἀποκαταδοκία τῆς κτίσεως* (Philippi), which is much too *distant*, and whose *goal* remains quite unnoticed here; nor yet of the *δουλεία τῆς φθορᾶς* (Zahn), which was not the point of the foregoing thought at all; but of what was announced by *ἐπ' ἐλπίδι, ὅτι κ. ἂ. ἡ κτ. ἐλευθερωθήσεται κ.τ.λ.* For if that hope of glorious deliverance had not been left to it, *all* nature would not have united its groaning and travailing *until now*. This phenomenon, so *universal* and so *unbroken*, cannot be conduct without an aim; on the contrary, it presupposes as the motive of the painful travail that very hope, towards whose final fulfilment it is directed.<sup>1</sup> The *οἶδαμεν* (comp. ii. 2, iii. 19, vii. 14) is sufficiently explained as an appeal to the Christian consciousness, in which the view of nature stands in connection with the curse of sin.<sup>2</sup> The

<sup>1</sup> Consequently the element of proof does not lie in *οἶδαμεν*, but in the *ἐπ' ἐλπίδι* κ.τ.λ., introduced as well known. This in opposition to Hofmann, who refers *οἶδαμεν* γὰρ κ.τ.λ. back as probative to the thought *τῇ γὰρ ματαιότητι* κ.τ.λ. in ver. 20; and gives as the sense of the argument: "*The Christian would not speak of a subjection of the creature under vanity, if he looked upon its present existence as one satisfied in itself and this world as the best world.*" But it could not at all be an object to prove that relation of *ματαιότης*; (who can be supposed to have doubted it?); but it was an object to prove the *ἐπ' ἐλπίδι ὅτι* κ.τ.λ.; this is the *punctum saliens*, which is then further brought out in ver. 23 ff.

<sup>2</sup> This consciousness is the necessary premiss of the Christian idea of the Palingenesia of the universe at the end of history, Matt. xix. 28. Hence Frommann is in error in discovering in the above *οἶδαμεν* the overthrow of our explanation of *κτίσις*.

perfectly superfluous assumption, that the apostle had a book before him containing a similar deduction (Ewald), is suggested by nothing in the text. — In *συστενάζει* and *συνωδίνει* the *συν* is not a mere strengthening particle (Loesner, Michaelis, Semler, Ernesti, and Köllner), but, on the contrary (comp. Beza), finds its natural reference in *πᾶσα*, and denotes “gemitum et dolorem communem inter se partium creaturæ,” Estius.<sup>1</sup> Calvin, Pareus, Koppe, Ewald, and Umbreit, following Oecumenius, have indeed referred *συν* to the groaning being *in common* with that of the *children of God*; but against this view ver. 23 is decisive, and the reference to *men* generally, with whom the *κτίσις* sighs (Fritzsche), is foreign to the context. Fritzsche, without due reason, asserts the want of linguistic usage in favour of our view. For it is unquestionable that, in accordance with the usage of analogous verbs, *συστενάζειν* may denote the common sighing of the elements comprised in the collective *πᾶσα ἡ κτίσις* among themselves<sup>2</sup> (comp. Eph. iv. 16: *πᾶν τὸ σῶμα συναρμολογούμενον*, comp. ii. 21; Plat. *Legg.* iii. p. 686 B: *ἐπεὶ γενομένη γε ἡ τότε διάνοια καὶ συμφωνήσασα εἰς ἓν*, Dem. 516. 7: *συνοργισθεὶς ὁ δῆμος*, 775. 18: *συνταράττεται πᾶς ὁ τῆς πόλεως κόσμος*). That concrete examples of that nature cannot be quoted, is not decisive against it, since *συστενάζειν* (Eur. *Ion.* 935, comp. *συστένειν*, Arist. *Eth.* ix. 11) and also *συνωδίνειν* (Eur. *Hcl.* 727; Porphy. *de abst.* iii. 10) are only extant in a very few passages. Comp. generally Winer, *de verb. compos.* II. p. 21 f. Just the same with *συναλγεῖν*, Plat. *Rep.* p. 462 D, and *συλλυπεῖσθαι* p. 462 E. — *συνωδίνει*] Not an allusion to the *הבלי המשיח* (Reiche), because the *dolores Messiae* (see on Matt. ii. 3) are peculiar sufferings, that shall immediately precede the appearance of the Messiah, whilst the travail of nature has continued since as early as Gen. iii. 17 (ver. 20). But the *figure* is the same in both cases—that of the pains of labour. All nature groans and suffers anguish, as if in travail, over-against the moment of its deliverance. The conception of the *ωδίνειν* is based on the fact that the

<sup>1</sup> So already Theodore of Mopsuestia: *βούλεται δὲ εἰπεῖν, ὅτι συμφῶνως ἰπὶ δίκνυνται τοῦτο πᾶσα ἡ κτίσις.*

<sup>2</sup> Comp. also Nügelbach, *z. Ilias*, p. 193, ed. 3.



painful struggling of the *κτίσις* is directed towards *the* longed-for change, with the setting in of which the suffering has accomplished its end and ceases. Comp. John xvi. 21. — ἄχρι τοῦ νῦν] that is, up to the present moment; so incessantly has the sighing continued. Formerly Frommann imported the thought: until now, when *the revelation of the true goal in Christ* has taken place; see, against this, Zahn, p. 524 f. However, Frommann has now corrected his view. Hofmann erroneously takes it as: *now still*, in contrast to the future change. Comp. rather Phil. i. 5. The *point of beginning* of the sighing and travelling is that *ὑπετάγη* in ver. 20. Comp. also ἕως τοῦ νῦν in Matt. xxiv. 21. *Now still* would be ἔτι νῦν, 1 Cor. iii. 2.

Ver. 23. Climax of the foregoing proof that the ἐπ' ἐλπίδι, ὅτι κ.τ.λ. of the *κτίσις*, ver. 21, is well founded. "Otherwise, indeed, we Christians also would not join in that sighing." — οὐ μόνον δέ] *scil.* πᾶσα ἡ κτίσις στενάζει. — What follows must be read: ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτοὶ, τὴν ἀπαρχὴν τοῦ πνεύματος ἔχοντες, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς στενάζομεν. See the critical remarks. *But we also on our part, though we possess the first-fruits of the Spirit, sigh likewise in ourselves.* — τὴν ἀπαρχ. τ. πνεύμ.] τ. πν. is the *partitive* genitive, as is involved in the very meaning of ἀπαρχή. Comp. xvi. 5; 1 Cor. xv. 20, xvi. 15; Jas. i. 18; and all the passages of the LXX. and Apoc., where ἀπ. stands with the genitive of the thing, in Biel and Schleusner. Comp. Herod. i. 92; Plat. *Legg.* vii. p. 806 D; Dem. 164. 21; Thuc. iii. 58. 3; Soph. *Trach.* 758; Eur. *Or.* 96; *Phoen.* 864; *Iou.* 402; also ἀπαρχή τῆς σοφίας, Plat. *Prot.* p. 343 A; and ἀπαρχαὶ ἀπὸ φιλοσοφίας, Plut. *Mor.* p. 172 C. By the possessors, however, of the ἀπαρχή τοῦ πνεύματος, are not exclusively meant the *apostles*, who at Pentecost had received the first outpouring of the Spirit, and among whom Paul includes himself on account of his miraculous conversion (Origen, Oecumenius, Melancthon, Grotius, and others). He means rather *the Christians of that age* generally, since in fact they—in contrast to the far greater mass of mankind still unconverted, for whom, according to Joel iii. 1, the receiving of the Spirit was still a thing of the future (xi. 25 ff.)—were in possession of that, *which first had resulted from the communication of the Spirit*,

and which therefore stood related to the *collective* bestowal as the *daybreak*. So, on the whole, Erasmus, Wetstein, Morus, Reiche, Köllner, de Wette, Olshausen, Küster, and Frommann; see also Müller in the *Luther. Zeitschr.* 1871, p. 618. Paul does not say simply τὸ πνεῦμα ἔχοντες, but, in the lofty feeling of the *privilege*,<sup>1</sup> which he discovered in the *earlier* calling and sanctification of the *then* Christians: τὴν ἰπαρχ. τ. πν. ἔχ.; “even we, though favoured so pre-eminently that we possess the *first-fruit gift* of the Spirit, cannot refrain from sighing likewise.” This we remark in opposition to the oft-repeated objection, that it was not an element of importance whether they had received the πνεῦμα at the first or a few years later; and also in opposition to the quite as irrelevant objection of Hofmann, that the conception of a measure of the Spirit to be given forth by degrees is nowhere indicated. This conception has no place here, and the Spirit is one and the same; but if, in the first instance, only a comparatively small portion of mankind has received it, and its possession in the case of the remaining collective body is still in abeyance, this serves to constitute the idea of an ἰπαρχή in relation to the whole body. Nevertheless, the sense: *best* gift of the Spirit (Ch. Schmidt, Rosenmüller), is not conveyed by τ. ἰπαρχήν, because that must have been suggested by the context, and also because Paul could not have regarded the later communication of the Spirit as less valuable. Further, the sense of a merely *provisional* reception of the Spirit, taking place, as it were, *on account*, in contrast to the *future full effusion in the kingdom of heaven* (Chrysostom and other Fathers, in Suicer, *Thes.* I. p. 423; Calvin, Beza, Pareus, Estius, Calovius, Semler, Flatt, Tholuck, Philippi, and Bisping; comp. also Pileiderer), is not contained in ἰπ. τ. πν., because Paul, had he wished to speak here of a preliminary reception in contrast to the future plenitude, must necessarily, in accordance with the connection, have so spoken of that of the *νίθσσία* or *δόξα*, not of the Spirit, and because a full effusion of the Spirit at the Parousia is nowhere taught in the N. T. The Spirit already *received*, not a new and more

<sup>1</sup> This is certainly no “*side-glance* at other Christians” (as Philippi objects), which would be both a far-fetched and a disturbing element.

perfect reception of it in the future αἰών, by its quickening activity leads to and conditions the eternal ζωή, in which God is then all in all (1 Cor. xv. 28). Others, again, make τ. πν. an exegetical genitive of *apposition*: *the Spirit as first-fruits*, namely, of the state of glory. So Bengel, Keil, *Opusc.*, Winer, p. 495 [E. T. 667], Baumgarten-Crusius, Reithmayr, Rückert, Maier, Hofmann, Zahn, and Engelhardt; comp. also Flatt. But however Pauline the idea may be (2 Cor. i. 22, v. 3; Eph. i. 14; comp. Rom. ii. 5), it would, when thus expressed, be liable to be misunderstood, since the readers were accustomed to find in the genitive with ἀπαρχή nothing else than that, of which the latter is a portion; and how intelligibly Paul *might* have expressed himself, either in accordance with 2 Cor. *l.c.* and Eph. *l.c.*, by τὸν ἀρραβῶνα, or by τ. ἀπ. (*scil. τῆς υἰοθεσ.*) ἐν τῷ πνεύμ. ! This applies, at the same time, against Fritzsche, who takes τοῦ πνεύμ. as genitive of the *subject*, and the *first* gifts of the Spirit as in contrast to the σωτηρία which the Spirit will give to us in the αἰὼν μέλλων. Against this it may also be urged that the Holy Ghost is not described in the N. T. as the *Giver* of eternal life (not even in such passages as 2 Cor. i. 22, v. 5; Eph. i. 14, iv. 30; Gal. vi. 8). It is *God* who, in like manner as He calls and justifies, *confers* also the eternal δόξα (ver. 30). The Spirit *operates* to eternal life by His government (ver. 2), and is the ground (ver. 11) and pledge (ἀρραβών) of that life; but He does not *give* it.<sup>1</sup> — καὶ αὐτοί] Repeated and placed along with ἐν ἑαυτοῖς with earnest emphasis: *et ipsi in nobis ipsis*. The latter is not equivalent to ἐν ἀλλήλοις (Schulthess and Fritzsche), but denotes, in harmony with the nature of the deep, painful emotion, the *inward* sighing of the *still* longing of believers; which suffers, is silent, and hopes, but never complains, being assured of the goal that shall be finally reached. Hofmann incorrectly would join κ. αὐτοί ἐν ἑαυτοῖς with ἔχοντες. But this would leave the καί, which, according to the common connection with στενάζ,

<sup>1</sup> Hence also the expression used by Luther, in the explanation of the third article in the Smaller Catechism, does not accord with the New Testament mode of expression. The sense in which he meant it is brought out, however, in the Larger Catechism.

has its appropriate correlative in the sighing of the *κτίσις*, without a reference. For, when Hofmann sets it down as the object of the *καί* to emphasize *personal possession* on the part of the Christians in contrast to the *future participation of the κτίσις*, there is thus forced on this *καί* the meaning of *already*; and this all the more arbitrarily, since *καὶ αὐτοί* just precedes it in the quite common sense of *et ipsi* (Baumlein, *Partik.* p. 151; Breitenbach, *ad Xen. Hell.* iii. 1. 10), and its emphatic repetition is very appropriate to the lively emotion of the discourse. — *νόθεοις ἀπεκδεχ.*] *whilst we wait for the adoption of children.* It is true, believers *have* already this blessing (ver. 15), but only as *inward* relation and as *divine right*, with which, however, the objective and real state does not yet correspond. Thus, looked at from the standpoint of *complete realization*, they are only to *receive νόθεσίαν* at the Parousia, whereupon the *ἀποκάλυψις τῶν υἱῶν τ. Θεοῦ* and their *δόξα* ensues. Comp. also Matt. v. 9, 45; Luke vi. 15. In like manner the *δικαιοσύνη* is a present possession, and also one to be entered on hereafter. Comp. on v. 19; and see on Gal. v. 5; Col. iii. 3 f. Luther incorrectly joins *νόθεοις* with *στενάζ.*, which, with an accusative, means *to bewail* or *beavail* something (Soph. *Ant.* 873; *Oed. C.* 1668; Dem. 690. 18; Eur. *Suppl.* 104; and often elsewhere). — *τὴν ἀπολ. τ. σώμ. ἡμ.*] epexegetis: (namely) *the redemption of our body* from all the defects of its earthly condition; through which redemption it shall be glorified into the *σῶμα ἄφθαρτον* similar to the glorified body of Christ (Phil. iii. 21; 2 Cor. v. 2 ff.; 1 Cor. xv. 51), or shall be raised up as such, in case of our not surviving till the Parousia (1 Cor. xv. 42 ff.). So, in substance (*τοῦ σώμ.* as gen. *subj.*), Chrysostom and other Fathers (in Suicer, *Thes.* I. p. 463), Beza, Grotius, Estius, Cornelius a Lapide, and most modern expositors. On the other hand, Erasmus, Clericus, and others, including Reiche, Fritzsche, Krehl, and Ewald, take it as: *redemption from the body.* This is linguistically admissible (Heb. ix. 15); we should thus have to refer it, not to death, but to deliverance from this earthly body *through the reception of the immortal and glorious body* at the Parousia, 1 Cor. xv. 51. But in that

case Paul must have added to τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν a qualitative more precise definition, as in Phil. iii. 21

*Remark.*—If we adopt the common reading (ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτοὶ τῇ ἀπ. τ. πν. ἔχοντες, καὶ ἡμεῖς αὐτοὶ κ.τ.λ.), which Ewald and Umbreit follow, while Rückert, Philippi, Tholuck, and Hofmann declare themselves in favour of ours (see the crit. remarks), αὐτοὶ . . . ἔχοντες is understood, either as meaning the Christians of that age generally, and καὶ ἡμεῖς αὐτοὶ the apostles (Köllner, following Melancthon, Wolf, and many others), or Paul alone (Koppe, Reiche, Umbreit, and many others); or, the former is referred to beginners in Christianity, and the latter to those who have been Christians for a longer time (Glückler); or, both (the latter *per analepsin*) are referred to the apostles (Grotius), or to the Christians (Luther, Beza, Calvin, Klee, Maier, Köster, and Frommann). The interpretation referring it to the Christians is the only right one; so that ἡμεῖς brings into more definite prominence the repeated subject. The ἔχοντες, without the article, is fatal to every reference to subjects of two sorts.

Ver. 24. Τῇ γὰρ ἐλπ. ἐσώθ.] Ground of the νίθεσίαν ἀπεκδ., so far as the νίθεσία is still object of expectation; for in hope we were made partakers of salvation. The dative, “non mediis, sed modis” (Bengel), denotes that to which the ἐσώθ. is to be conceived as confined (Winer, p. 202) [E. T. 271], and τῇ ἐλπ. is prefixed with the emphasis of the contrast of reality; for “sic liberati sumus ut adhuc speranda sit hereditas, postea possidenda, et ut ita dicam, nunc habemus jus ad rem, nondum in re,” Melancthon. Comp. Tit. iii. 7; Col. iii. 3 f. Following Chrysostom, others (recently Rückert, Köllner, and de Wette) take the dative in an *instrumental* sense: *by hope*—thus assuming that Paul characterizes *faith*, the proper medium of salvation, as hope. Incorrectly, because in general Paul specifically distinguishes faith and hope (1 Cor. xiii. 13),<sup>1</sup> while he always bases salvation only on faith, from which hope thereupon proceeds (comp. Col. i.

<sup>1</sup> See even Melancthon, who rightly observes: “Differunt autem fides et spes, quia fides in praesentia accipit remissionem peccatorum . . . sed spes est expectatio futurae liberationis.” Faith precedes the latter.

27); and here especially, as is shown by what follows, he brings into prominence the *definite* conception of *hope*, which as δόξα μελλόντων (Plat. *Legg.* I. p. 644 C) rests in the προσδοκία ἀγαθοῦ (Plat. *Def.* p. 416 A). Hofmann also takes τῇ ἐλπ. in the sense of the *means*, but so that it shall signify the *benefit hoped for*, the object of the waiting, *which God has offered to us in the word*, by which *we were converted to faith* (Col. i. 5). Thus, however, the thought that we have been saved by hope (instead of by faith, Eph. ii. 8) is set aside only by the insertion of parenthetical clauses. And in Col. i. 5, the blessing hoped for, heard of through preaching, is set forth as the ground, not of conversion or salvation, but of *love*. — ἐλπίς δὲ κ.τ.λ. . . . ἀπεκδεχ.] is a deduction from τῇ ἐλπ. ἐσωθ., closing the first ground of encouragement, and meaning substantially: “the nature of hope, however, involves our *patiently waiting for*.” — βλεπομένη] But a hope (δὲ μεταβατικόν) that is *seen*, i.e. whose object lies before the eyes (comp. on the objective ἐλπίς, Col. i. 5; 1 Tim. i. 1; Heb. vi. 18; Thuc. iii. 57. 4; Lucian, *Pisc.* 3; Aeschin. *ad Ctesiph.* 100). Comp. 2 Cor. iv. 18. — τί καὶ ἐλπίζει;] *Why doth he still hope for it?* By καὶ is indicated the—in the supposed case groundless—*accession* of hope to sight (1 Cor. xv. 29). Comp. generally, on this strengthening use of the καί, *etiam*, in lively *interrogation*, Klotz, *ad Devar.* p. 633 f., and on 1 Cor. *l.c.* Bengel aptly remarks: “*cum* visione non est spe opus.”

Ver. 25. Δι' ὑπομ.] *With patience*, perseveringly. Heb. xii. 1; Kühner, II. 1, p. 418. — The *indicative* ἀπεκδεχ., which is not, with Estius, Koppe, Köllner, and others, to be taken as *expectare debemus*, does not announce the *virtuous operation* (Grotius), but simply the *situation*, which the circumstance that we hope without seeing involves. The *ethical position* assigned to us is, that we patiently wait for the object of our hope.

Ver. 26. The second ground of encouragement (see on vv. 18–31), connected with the immediately foregoing by ὡσαύτως.<sup>1</sup> — τὸ πνεῦμα] The objective *Holy Spirit*. See vv.

<sup>1</sup> The progress of thought is simple: “If we hope for what we see not, then

16, 23, and what follows, where the activity of the πνεῦμα is described as something distinct from the subjective consciousness. Köllner incorrectly takes it (comp. Reiche) as: the Christian life-element; and van Hengel: "*fulciæ sensus* a. Sp. s. profectus." — συναντιλ.] The συν must neither be neglected (as by many older expositors, also Olshausen), nor regarded as a mere strengthening adjunct (Rückert and Reiche). Beza gives the right explanation: "ad nos laborantes refertur." *He joins His activity with our weakness, helps it.* See Luke x. 40; Ex. xviii. 22; Ps. lxxxviii. 22. — τῇ ἰσθενείᾳ ἡμῶν] Not specially *weakness in prayer* (Ambrosiaster and Bengel), for in what follows there is specified only the particular *mode of the help*, which the Spirit renders to us in our infirmity. It is therefore to be left general: *with our weakness*,—so far, namely, as in that waiting for final redemption adequate power of our own for ὑπομονή fails us. — τὸ γὰρ τί προσευξ. κ.τ.λ.] Reason assigned, by specifying *how* the Spirit, etc.; *in prayer*, namely, He intercedes for us.—On τό, see Winer, p. 103 [E. T. 135]. It denotes *what* of praying comes into question in such a position. Comp. Krüger, *Xen. Anab.* iv. 4. 17. — τί προσευξ. καθὸ δεῖ] *what we ought to pray for according as it is necessary*, in proportion (comp. 2 Cor. viii. 12; 1 Pet. iv. 13) to the need. The latter is the subsequently determining element; it is not absolutely and altogether unknown to us what we ought to ask, but only what it is necessary to ask *according to the given circumstances*. Usually καθὸ δεῖ is taken in reference to the *form* of asking, like πῶς in Matt. x. 19; but thus the distinctive reference of the meaning of καθὸ, *prout* (comp. Plat. *Soph.* p. 267 D; Baruch i. 6) is neglected. Chrysostom rightly illustrates the matter by the apostle's own example, who ὑπὲρ τοῦ σκόλοπος τοῦ δεδομένου αὐτῷ ἐν τῇ σαρκί (2 Cor. xii.) had prayed for what was not granted him. According to Hofmann, καθὸ δεῖ connects

the matter stands with us, (1) on *the footing*, that we with patience wait; but likewise (2) on *the footing*, that the Spirit helps us." The ὡσαύτως, *pariter ac, itidem* (see generally Köllner, II. 1, p. 564), introduces a *symmetrical corresponding relation*, which is *added* on the *divine side to our waiting*. Comp. Mark xiv. 31; 1 Tim. v. 25; Tit. ii. 6; Plat. *Symp.* p. 186 E, *al.*; 2 Macc. xv. 39; 3 Macc. vi. 33.

itself with οὐκ οἶδαμεν, so that the thought would be: "*we do not so understand as it would be necessary.*" But how much too feeble in this connection would be the assertion of a merely *insufficient* knowledge! — ὑπερευτυχάνει] i.e. ἐντυχάνει ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, *He applies Himself for our benefit* (counterpart of xi. 2), namely, τῷ Θεῷ, which addition is read by Origen. The double compound is not elsewhere preserved, except in the Fathers, but it is formed after the analogy of ὑπεραποκρίνομαι, ὑπεραπολογέομαι, and many other words. The superlative rendering of it (Luther: "He intercedes for us *the best*") is improbable, since ἐντυχάνει does not already express the notion of that which is much (v. 20) or triumphant (viii. 37; Phil. ii. 9), or the like, which would admit of enhancement. — στεναγμ. ἀαλαήτοις] i.e. *thereby that He makes unutterable sighs*, sighs whose meaning words are powerless to convey. The idea therefore is, that the Holy Spirit sighs unutterably in our hearts (ver. 27), and thereby intercedes for us with God, to whom, as heart-searcher, the desire of the Spirit sighing in the heart is known. It was an erroneous view, whereby, following Augustine, Tr. VI. on John ii., most expositors, who took τὸ πν. rightly as the *Holy Spirit*, held the στεναγμ. ἀαλα. to be unutterable sighs *which the man*, incited by the Spirit,<sup>1</sup> *hears forth*. The *Spirit Himself* (comp. also Hofmann) must sigh, if He is to *intercede* for us with sighs, and if God is to understand the φρόνημα of the Spirit (ver. 27); although the Spirit uses the human organ for His sighing (comp. the counterpart phenomenon of *demons* speaking or crying

<sup>1</sup> According to Philippi: "the sanctified human spirit," whose sighing is traced back to its ultimate origin, the Spirit of God Himself. In the cordial marriage of the Spirit of God with that of man, there takes place, as it were (?), an *incarnation* of the former. This mysticism is not in harmony with the N. T., which always distinguishes clearly and specifically between the Holy Spirit and the human spirit, as in ver. 16. This applies also against Pfeiderer in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschr.* 1871, p. 178 f., who thinks that *our* spirit is to be distinguished from the *divine* Spirit dwelling in us only in such a way, that the two stand related merely as the *form* to the real *contents* of the self-consciousness. In cases such as our passage, according to his view, the Ego *knows* itself in objective consciousness as furnished with the Divine Spirit, without *feeling* itself to be so in the subjective consciousness. In this way there is substituted for the twofold spirit in our passage a twofold form and activity of the Christian consciousness, which the plain words do not permit.



out of men), as He likewise does elsewhere for His speaking, Matt. x. 20. See also on Gal. iv. 6. The tongue is analogously, in the case of speaking with tongues, the organ of the Spirit who speaks. The necessary explanation of the *πνεῦμα* as meaning the *Holy Spirit*, and the fact that the sighs must be *His* sighs, overturn the rationalizing interpretations of Reiche: "Christian feeling cherishes, indeed, the quiet longing in the heart, and therewith turns, full of confidence, to God, but nevertheless does not permit itself any inquisitive wishes towards Him;" and of Köllner: "The Spirit gained in Christ . . . works in man that deep and holy emotion in which man, turned towards God in his inmost feeling, cannot, in the fulness of the emotion, express his burden in words, and can only relieve his oppressed heart by silent groanings." A mere arbitrary alteration of the simple verbal sense is to be found in the view to which Chrysostom, Occumenius, Theophylact, and others have recourse, that the Spirit is here the *χάρισμα εὐχῆς*, in virtue of which the human soul sighs. Comp. Theodoret, who thinks that Paul means not *τὴν ὑπόστασιν τοῦ πνεύματος*, but *τὴν δεδομένην τοῖς πιστεύουσιν χάριν ὑπὸ γὰρ ταύτης διεγειρόμενοι κατανυττόμεθα, πυρσευόμενοι προθυμότερον προσευχόμεθα κ.τ.λ.* The question whether, moreover, *ἀλαλ.* should, with Beza, Grotius, Wetstein, Koppe, Flatt, Glöckler, Fritzsche, Baumgarten-Crusius, Reithlmayr, van Hengel, Köster, and others, be rendered *unexpressed*,<sup>1</sup> *i.e. dumb*, not accompanied with words, or, with the Vulgate and the majority of commentators, *inexpressible* (for the expression of whose meaning words are insufficient), is decided by the fact that only the latter sense can be proved by linguistic usage, and it characterizes the depth and fervour of the sighing most directly and forcibly. Comp. also 2 Cor. ix. 15; 1 Pet. i. 8.; Anth. Pal. v. 4 (Philodem. 17); Theogn. 422 (according to Stob. *Scrm.* 36, p. 216).

Ver. 27. *Ὁ ἔρουν. τὰς καρδ.*] Traditionally hallowed (1 Sam. xvi. 7; 1 Kings viii. 39; Ps. vii. 10; Prov. xv. 11; Jer. xvii. 9 f.), description of God, bearing on the subject in

<sup>1</sup> As *ἄρρητος* may be used; but not *ἀμύθητος*, which always means, *unutterable, unspeakable*.

hand; for it is *in the heart*, as in the central laboratory of the personal self-conscious life (comp. Delitzsch, *Psychol.* p. 254), that the praying Spirit sighs, Gal. iv. 6. — ὅτι] Not *for*, as many think, including Tholuck, Rückert, de Wette, Philippi, Ewald, and Umbreit. What follows in fact conveys no real ground, since God would *in every case* know the purpose of the Spirit, and to take οἶδε in the pregnant sense: *understands and hears* (so Rückert, following Calvin), is utterly unjustifiable, especially after ὁ ἔρουν. κ.τ.λ. The ὅτι is rather *that*, annexed by way of explanation: *that He, namely*. Comp. Grotius, Estius, Benecke, Reiche, Fritzsche, Maier, Krehl, Baumgarten-Crusius, Bisping, Reithmayr, van Hengel, and Hofmann. See on Phil. i. 27, ii. 22, *al.* — κατὰ Θεόν] This, explained by Origen "*secundum divinitatem*," does not mean: *on the instigation of God* (Tholuck, appealing improperly to 1 Cor. xii. 8), but: *in accordance with God, i.e. so as God desires it*, κατὰ γνώμην αὐτοῦ, Theodore of Mopsuestia. Comp. 2 Cor. vii. 9, 10; 4 Macc. xv. 2; Plat. *Apol.* pp. 22 A, 23 B. The sense: *in pursuance of the divine disposal*, more common in classic usage (see Wetstein on the passage, and Valeken. *ad Herod.* iii. 153), is here foreign. Böhme, Reiche, and Fritzsche render it *before God, with God* ("in Deum quasi conversus"). This is indeed justifiable from a linguistic point of view (Bernhardy, p. 240), comp. Wisd. v. 1, Eccus. xxxiv. 6; but how superfluous and unsuited to the emphasis of the prominent position assigned to it! With the emphasis on κατὰ Θεόν it cannot appear strange that Paul has not written κατ' αὐτόν, but has rather named the subject. Comp. Xen. *Mem.* i. 3. 2: εὔχετο δὲ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς, . . . ὥς τοὺς θεοὺς κάλλιστα εἰδóτας κ.τ.λ. The omission of the article, which does not render the expression adverbial (against Hofmann), establishes in the case of Θεός no difference of sense (Winer, p. 115 f. [E. T. 151]). — ὑπὲρ ἁγίων] *for saints*, without the article because *qualitative*; "*sancti sunt et Deo propinqui et auxilio digni, pro quibus intercedit*," Bengel. On ἐντυγχ. ὑπὲρ τινος, *to pray for any one*, see Bähr on Plut. *Flamin.* p. 83.

Ver. 28. Third ground of encouragement; comp. on ver. 26. — οἶδμεν δέ] *It is known to us, however* (as in ver. 22). This

δέ is not: *on the other hand, however*, in contradistinction to the sighing discussed since ver. 22, as Hofmann thinks—a reference, that must have been marked in some way or other (at least by the stronger adversative ἀλλά). It is the usual μεταβατικόν, and carries us from the special relation discussed in ver. 26 f. over to a *general* one, the consciousness of which must finally place the good courage of the believer on a footing all the more sure. — τοῖς ἀγαπ. τ. Θεόν] the dative of *communion*. Paul characterizes as lovers of God (κατ' ἐξοχ.) the true *Christians* (comp. 1 Cor. ii. 9, iii. 8; Eph. vi. 24; Jas. i. 12), as is plain from τοῖς κατὰ κ.τ.λ.<sup>1</sup> — πάντα] *everything*, *i.e.*, according to the context, *all destined events*, even those full of pain not excepted (ver. 35). On the thought, comp. Plat. Rep. p. 613 A. — συνεργεῖ] *works along with*, that is, *contributes*; βοηθεῖ, Hesychius. See Wetstein. The συν does not refer to the common working together of the elements contained in πάντα (comp. ver. 22), but to the idea of the fellowship in which he who supports necessarily stands to him who is supported. Comp. on ver. 26. — εἰς ἀγαθόν] indefinitely: *for good*; it works *beneficially*. Comp. Theogn. 161; Hom. Il. x. 102; Plat. Rep. l.c.; Eccclus. xxxix. 27; Rom. xiii. 4. Reiche erroneously takes it as: “the good of the Christians, their eternal welfare.” In that case, the article at least must have been used as in xiv. 16; and some witnesses in reality add it. Bengel has the right view: “*in bonum, ad glorificationem usque*” (ver. 30). — τοῖς κατὰ πρόθ. κλητοῖς οὖσιν] These words may mean either (οὖσιν as predicate, joining on): “*since they are the called according to His purpose*” (so Hofmann), or (taking τοῖς in conjunction with οὖσιν), *as to those who (quippe qui, i.e. since they indeed) are the called according to His purpose*. So usually; and this latter is the true rendering, because otherwise οὖσιν would be put not only quite superfluously, but also in a way very liable to misconception, since it would occur to every reader, at the first glance, to join τοῖς with οὖσιν.

<sup>1</sup> In this very description of the Christian estate there is implied a *ground of conviction* of the οἶδαμεν, the certainty of which is thereupon still more precisely explained. Hofmann finds a retrospective glance at v. 1 ff., but only by means of his incorrect view of ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ Θεοῦ, v. 5.

Had Paul meant what Hofmann thinks he did, he would have written simply τοῖς κ. π. κλητοῖς without οὖσιν, or possibly οὔτινές εἰσιν οἱ κ. π. κλητοί. — Respecting the idea itself, there is causally involved in the relation of being *the called* according to His purpose (for the emphasis rests on κλητοῖς), *the certainty that to them all things*, etc. ; for otherwise that high distinction, which God has conferred upon them according to the purpose of His grace, would be vain and fruitless, which is impossible (ver. 30). The πρόθεσις here meant is the free decree formed by God in eternity for imparting bliss to believers through Christ (ix. 11 ; Eph. i. 11, iii. 11 ; 2 Tim. i. 9 ; Eph. i. 9). In accordance with that decree, the *call* of God to the Messianic salvation through the preaching of the gospel (x. 14 ; 2 Thess. ii. 14) has gone forth to those comprehended in that decree. Therefore, when Paul terms the Christians κλητοί, it is self-evident that in their case the call has met *with success* (1 Cor. i. 24), consequently has been combined with the converting operation of the divine grace,—without the latter, however, being found *in the word itself*, or the word being made equivalent to ἐκλεκτοί. Comp. Lamping, *Pauli de predest. decreta*, Leovard. 1858, p. 40 f. Christians are *at the same time* κλητοί, ἐκλεκτοί (ix. 11), ἄγιοι κ.τ.λ. ; but the significations of these predicates correspond to different characteristic qualities of the Christian state. Consequently, just as it was quite a mistaken view to interpret πρόθεσις of the personal self-determination of the subjects (Chrysostom, Theodoret, and others), so also it was an unbiblical and hazardous distinction (see against this, Calovius) to put the called κατὰ πρόθεσιν in contrast with those who are called μὴ κατὰ πρόθ. (Augustine, Estius, Reithmayr, and others). Weiss aptly observes, in the *Jahrb. f. Deutsche Theol.* 1857, p. 79 : “ Election and calling are inseparable correlative ideas ; where the one takes place, there the other takes place also ; only we cannot take cognizance of the former as an act before all time and within the divine mind, while the latter becomes apparent as a historical fact.” Comp. also his *bibl. Theol.* p. 386 f.

Vv. 29, 30. More detailed development and expression of τοῖς κ. πρόθ. κλ. οὖσιν,—as a continued confirmation of the

οἶδαμεν, ὅτι κ.τ.λ. “For this divine plan of salvation advancing from the *πρόθεσις* to the *πλήσις*, leads the Christian safely and surely to the *δόξα* ;” hence it is not conceivable that anything whatever, in opposition to this plan, should exercise other than a beneficial influence upon them (ver. 31 ff.). — *προέγνω*] foreknew, namely, as those who should one day, in the way of the divine plan of salvation, become *σύμμορφοι τῆς εἰκόνης τ. υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ*.<sup>1</sup> That this character, in which they were foreknown by God, presupposes the subjection to faith (the *ὑπακοή πίστεως* i. 5), was self-evident to the Christian reader. Erasmus aptly remarks : “Non temere elegit Deus quos elegit, novit suos multo antequam vocaret.” The text merely gives the terminus of the *προ* in *προέγνω* and *προώρισε* quite indefinitely, namely : *before their calling*. More precise definitions, therefore (e.g. that of Tholuck : “before the foundation of the world,” though in itself correct, Eph. i. 4, iii. 11), should not be *here* given. The taking of the *προέγνω* in the sense of *prescience*, demanded by the signification of the word, has been followed (though with various, and in part very arbitrary, attempts to supply *that, as which* the persons concerned were foreknown by God) by Origen, Chrysostom, Augustine, Ambrosiaster, Jerome, Theophylact, Oecumenius, Erasmus, *Paraphr.*, Toletus, Calovius, and others, including Reiche, Neander, Tholuck, Reithmayr, Maier, Philippi, van Hengel, Hahn, Ewald, Weiss, and others. The question whether *this* exposition or the *other* of the *pre-election* (Calvin and others, including Rückert, Usteri, Köllner, de Wette, Fritzsche, Krehl, Baumgarten-Crusius, and Lamping), is the true one, cannot be got rid of by mixing up the two conceptions (Umbreit) ; nor is it to be decided by dogmatic presuppositions, but simply by the usage of the language, in accordance with which *προγ.* never in the N. T. (not even in xi. 2, 1 Pet. i. 20) means anything else than *to know before-*

<sup>1</sup> This filling up of the idea of *προέγνω* is implied, namely, in what follows. If God has *destined* them beforehand to a future fashioning in the likeness, etc., He must also have already *known* them beforehand as those who should one day be thus fashioned. Consequently we are not to understand the *predisposition to love* (ver. 28) as the object of the *προέγνω* (Weiss *l.c.* p. 74 f., and *bibl. Theol.* p. 385). Bengel well remarks on *συμμόρφους κ.τ.λ.* : “Hic est character prae-cognitorum et glorificandorum.”

*hand* (Acts xxvi. 5; 2 Pet. iii. 17; Judith ix. 6; Wisd. vi. 13, viii. 8, xviii. 6). Comp. Philippi *in loc.*, and his *Glaukenslehre*, IV. 1, p. 117 ff., ed. 2. That in classic usage it ever means anything else, cannot be at all proved. See, on the contrary, Hom. *Cer.* 258; Xen. *Ap.* 30; Plat. *Rep.* p. 426 C; *Theact.* p. 203 D; *Tim.* p. 70 C; Eur. *Hipp.* 1072; *Dem.* 861. 13; Lucian, *Prom.* 20. Comp. also *πρόγνωσις* and *προγνωστικός*. An appeal is made to the familiar use of *γινώσκ.* in the sense of *judicial* cognizance, or even of *other resolutions* and decisions (Herod. iv. 25, i. 74, 78; Thuc. iv. 30, iii. 99, and many other instances). But, in the first place, it is never in this sense joined with the accusative of the person without an infinitive; and secondly, there is no such precedent of usage for the compound *προγινώσκειν*, current as it was in Greek authors; for the few passages in which it means *to take forethought about something* (Thuc. ii. 64. 5; Xen. *Cyr.* ii. 4. 11, with a very doubtful reading) are not suitable for comparison, either as regards the sense, or as respects the union with the personal accusative in our passage. The incorrectness of this explanation is confirmed, moreover, by the analogy of the following clauses, which always add another and *different* idea to the one preceding. The right interpretation remains, therefore: *præcognovit* (Vulg. = *præsevit*), which, however, is neither to be altered, with Augustine, Vatablus, Grotius, Estius, and others, into *approbavit jam ante*, to which view also Tholuck and Rückert incline (see on vii. 15); nor to be taken, with Hofmann, in that sense of *γινώσκειν* which obtains in 1 Cor. viii. 3, xiii. 12, Gal. iv. 9, 2 Tim. ii. 19 (an *appropriating* cognizance of what is *akin* and *homogeneous*, according to Hofmann). The latter, to which also Delitzsch ultimately comes, *Psychol.* p. 39,<sup>1</sup> is incorrect, because in accordance with it the *πρόγνωσις* would be a relation of communion already entered into actively by God, which would necessarily include the *προορισμός*, and consequently exclude the latter as a special and accessory act. For to suppose that Paul, with *προέγνω* and *προώρισε*, does not mean two acts following each other in succession, but

<sup>1</sup> Comp. Calvin: the *πρόγνωσις* is an "*adoptio*, qua filios suos a reprobis semper discrevit;" this notitia being dependent *a beneplacito* of God.

asserts the former of the persons, and the latter of the character ascribed to them (Hofmann), is wholly groundless in presence of the clearly progressive description of the apostle. The right view, since faith is the subjective ground of salvation, is that held by Calovius and our older dogmatists: "*quos credituros praevidit vel suscepturos vocationem.*" It is *God's being aware in His plan*, by means of which, before the subjects are destined by Him to salvation, *He knows* whom He has to destine thereto. Comp. on xi. 2. — *καὶ προώρισε] them He destined also beforehand.* To what? *συμμόρφ. τῆς εἰκ. τ. υἱ. αὐτ. : to be conformed to the image of His Son, i.e. to be such as should present the image of His Son in their conformation.* From the following *εἰς τὸ εἶναι κ.τ.λ.* it is plain that Paul here means the same which in ver. 23 he has designated as *υἰοθεσίαν, τὴν ἀπολύτρωσιν τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν*, consequently the *glory* to which God has predestined them, the state of the *μέλλουσα δόξα* (ver. 18), so far as this shall be the same (even in respect of the glorified body, Phil. iii. 21, 1 Cor. xv. 49) as that which the exalted Christ has. Comp. 2 Cor. iii. 18, 1 John iii. 2. The *fellowship in suffering* (Calvin, Grotius, Calovius, and others) is here remote. What Paul has in view must be the same as he denotes in ver. 30 by *ἐδόξασε*, consequently the *conformitas gloriae*. This very thought of the entire glorious *appearance*, which he means, has suggested the vivid expression *συμμόρφ. τ. εἰκόνης*; wherefore we are not, with Chrysostom (*ὅπερ γὰρ ὁ μονογενὴς ἦν φύσει, τοῦτο καὶ αὐτοὶ γεγόνασι κατὰ χάριν*), Theophylact, Bengel, and others, to refer it to the *present υἰοθεσία*. Theodoret has the right view. The conformity of the *inner* being is not conveyed in the expression (Hofmann understands it as *included*), but is the moral presupposition of the glory meant. — *σύμμορφος* (Lucian, *Amor.* 39), in Phil. iii. 21 with the dative, here with the *genitive*. See Bernhardt, p. 171; Kühner, II. 1, p. 295. — *εἰς τὸ εἶναι κ.τ.λ.*] Not an inferential clause (see on i. 20), but—as the very notion of *προώρ.* embraces the purpose—the *final aim* of *προώρ. συμμόρφ. κ.τ.λ.* Nor is the main thought contained in *ἐν πολλ. ἀδελφ.*, as de Wette very arbitrarily supposes; but, on the contrary, Paul contemplates *Christ* as the One, to whom the divine decree referred *as to its*

*final aim.* Christ was to fulfil His lofty commission not merely by standing in the relation of His glory to the Father as the *μονογενής*, but by being the *First-born among many brethren*, i.e. among many who through Him, the *essential and primordial* Son of God, should, as *adopted υἱοὶ Θεοῦ*, and consequently in so far as His *brethren*, have attained to the same *δόξα* of sharing the possession of the dignity and privilege (Col. i. 18) of the First-born.<sup>1</sup> Comp. also Heb. i. 6, and Lünemann *in loc.* — *ἐκάλεσε*] Like *κλητοῖς* in ver. 28. For those who despised the invitation to salvation conveyed to them through the preachers of the gospel did not belong to the called, whom God *προέγνω* and *πρωόρισε*; the following *τούτους κ. ἔδικ.* also presupposes that the calling has been attended with the result of the *ὑπακοή πίστεως*. Comp. on ver. 28. Hence the divine saving grace is to be conceived as working by means of the word on those who become called, namely, in opening and preparing the heart for the reception of the word,<sup>2</sup> Acts xvi. 14; Phil. i. 6, 29; John vi. 44. God has *fore-known* those who would not oppose to His gracious calling the resistance of unbelief, but would follow its drawing; thereafter He has *fore-ordained* them to eternal salvation; and when the time had come for the execution of His saving counsel, has *called* them, etc. (ver. 30). With the *κλήσις* begins the execution of the *προορισμός* in accordance with the *πρόγνωσις*; and the *subjects* concerned are, in contrast to the multitude standing outside of this divine process of salvation, the *ἐκλεκτοί* (ver. 33). — *ἐδικαίωσεν*] *Justification* is consequently the *sole ground* of the glorifying; sanctification is *added to it*, in order that the justified may attain that goal in the way that God desires. — *ἐδόξασε*] *Justification*, as a divine act of imputation, is really (not merely ideally or in principle, in opposition to Lipsius, *Rechtfert.* p. 48 f.) *accomplished*; but the *glorification* falls to the *future* (ver. 21, v. 2, and constantly in N. T.; comp. also 1 Cor. ii. 7, Rom. ix. 23). Notwithstanding, the *arist* neither stands for the *future* nor for the *present* (in opposition to Köllner; see

<sup>1</sup> Comp. Philippi, *Glaubensl.* II. p. 214, ed. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Comp. Lathardt, *v. freien Willen*, p. 427; Julius Müller, *dogmat. Abhan II.* p. 264 ff.



Herm. *ad Viger.* p. 746); nor does it express anywhere in the N. T. a habit, as Flatt thinks—against which view, in the present instance, the analogy of the preceding aorists is decisive; but it represents the *de facto* certainly future glorification as so necessary and certain, that it appears as if already given and completed with the ἐδικαίωσεν. “Whom He *has justified*, them He has—viewing the relation from its final aim—therewith *also glorified*.” See Herm. *ad Viger.* p. 747; Kühner, II. 1, p. 142. In order thus to place the glorification on the same platform of certainty with the προέγνω, προώρισε, ἐκάλεσε, and ἐδικ., Paul selected the proleptic aorist. On the other hand, the triumphant flow of the great chain of thought and the thoroughly Pauline boldness of expression (comp. on Eph. ii. 5) are misapprehended, if the act be regarded as accomplished only *in the decree of God* (Grotius, Reiche, and Umbreit); or if the expression be referred to the glory of God possessed “*at first only inwardly and secretly*” (Hofmann), or to “*repute with God*” (Märcker), or to the *bestowal of grace* and *υιοθεσία* here below (Chrysostom and his followers, Ambrosiaster, Pelagius, and Erasmus), to which also van Hengel adheres, appealing to John xii. 28.

Vv. 31–39. Inference from vv. 29, 30. *So, then, the Christian has to fear nothing that might be detrimental to his salvation; but on the contrary he is, with the love of God in Christ, assured of that salvation.*—This whole passage is (observe the logical relation of ὅτι in ver. 29, and οὖν in ver. 31) a commentary on ver. 28. And what a commentary! “Quid unquam Cicero dixit grandiloquentius?” Erasmus on ver. 35. Comp. Augustine, *de doctr. Chr.* iv. 20. A sublime ὄγκος τῆς λέξεως (Arist. *Rhet.* iii. 6) pervades the whole, even as respects form.

Ver. 31. *What shall we therefore say (infer thence) with respect to these things (vv. 29, 30)?* — εἰ ὁ Θεὸς κ.τ.λ.] Here-with begins a stream of triumphant questions and answers (on to ver. 37) which contains *what we say*. — The ὁ Θεὸς ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν briefly sums up the divine guardianship according to the tenor of vv. 29, 30. — τίς καθ’ ἡμῶν;] a question not of challenge (Hofmann), with which the following does not

accord, but of the sure, already triumphant certainty that all hostile power must be unsuccessful and harmless for us. On *εἶναι κατὰ τινος*, comp. Ecclus. vi. 12; Wisd. iv. 6; Plut. *Nic.* 21; and on the contrast of *ὑπὲρ* and *κατά*, 2 Cor. xiii. 8.

Ver. 32. The *answer* to the foregoing question,<sup>1</sup> likewise interrogative, but with all the more confidence.—*ὅσγε*] *quippe qui*, *He, who indeed*, brings into prominence causally the subject of what is to be said of him by *πῶς κ.τ.λ.* (see Baernlein, *Partik.* p. 57 f.; Bornemann, *ad Xen. Symp.* iv. 15; Maetzn. *ad Lycurg.* p. 228). This causal clause is with great emphasis prefixed to the *πῶς κ.τ.λ.*, of which it serves as the ground (the converse occurs *e.g.* in Xen. *Mem.* iv. 4. 14; Aristoph. *Ran.* 739). — *τοῦ ιδίου*] full of significance, for the more forcible delineation of the display of love. A contrast, however, to the *υἱὸς θεοῦς* (Theophylact, Pareus, Wetstein, Tholuck, Olshausen, Baumgarten-Crusius, Fritzsche, Philippi) is not implied in the text. Comp., rather, viii. 3: *τὸν ἑαυτοῦ υἱόν.* — *οὐκ ἐφείσατο*] Comp. xi. 21; 2 Cor. xiii. 2; 2 Pet. ii. 4, 5; frequent also in classic authors. “Deus paterno suo amori quasi vim adhibuit,” Bengel. The prevalence of the expression, as also the fact that Paul has not written *τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ ἀγαπητοῦ*, makes the assumption of an allusion to Gen. xxii. 12 seem not sufficiently well founded (Philippi, Hofmann, and many older commentators). The juxtaposition of the negative and positive phrases, *οὐκ ἐφ., ἀλλ’ . . . παρέδ.*, enhances the significance of the act of love. On *παρέδωκεν* (unto death), comp. iv. 25. *σὺν αὐτῷ*: *with Him who, given up for us*, has by God's grace already become ours. Thus everything else stands to this highest gift of grace in the relation of *concomitant accessory gift*. — *πῶς οὐχὶ καὶ*] *how is it possible that He should not also with Him*, etc.? The *καὶ* belongs, not to *πῶς οὐχί* (Philippi), but to *σὺν αὐτῷ*; comp. iii. 29; 1 Cor. ix. 8; 1 Thess. ii. 19. The inference is *a majori ad minus*. “Minus

<sup>1</sup> That question no longer required a *corroboration* (Hofmann) after ver. 28 ff. Besides, Paul would have expressed this meaning by *γάρ*. Regarding the frequent use of *γί* to introduce the *answer* in classical Greek, see Klotz, *ad Devar.* p. 292 f.; Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* I. p. 347; Baernlein, *Partik.* p. 62; Kühner, II. 2, p. 734.

est enim vobis omnia cum illo donare, quam illum nostri causa morti tradere," Ambrosiaster. Comp. Chrysostom. — τὰ πάντα] *the whole*, of what He has to bestow in accordance with the aim of the surrender of Jesus; that is, not "*the universe of things*" (Hofmann), the κληρονομία of the world, which is here quite foreign, but, in harmony with the context, vv. 26-30: the collective saving blessings of His love shown to us in Christ. This certainty of the divine relation toward us, expressed by πῶς κ.τ.λ., excludes the possibility of success on the part of human adversaries.

Ver. 33 ff. It is impossible that this σὺν αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα ἡμῖν χαρίσεται should be frustrated, either on the side of God, with whom no accusation of His elect can have the result of their condemnation (ver. 33, down to κατακρίνων in ver. 34), or on that of Christ, whose death, resurrection, etc., afford the guarantee that nothing can separate us from His love (ver. 34, Χριστὸς ὁ ἀποθανὼν, on to ver. 36). In the analysis of this swelling effusion we must return to the method for which Origen, Chrysostom, Theodoret, and other Fathers paved the way, and which Erasmus followed: namely, that to the question τίς ἐγκαλέσει κ.τ.λ. the answer is: Θεὸς ὁ δικαίων· τίς ὁ κατακρίνων; and then follows, moulded in similar form to that answer, the expression, passing over from God to Christ, Χριστὸς . . . ἡμῶν τίς ἡμᾶς χωρίσει κ.τ.λ.; so that after δικαίων, and also after ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, only a colon is to be inserted. *Who shall raise accusation against the elect of God? Answer, in a boldly triumphant counter-question,—God is the justifier, who the condemner?* (there is consequently no one there to condemn, and every accusation is without result! Comp. Isa. l. 8.) And as regards Christ: *Christ is He that has died, yea rather also has risen again, who also is at the right hand of God, who also intercedes for us: who shall separate us from the love of Christ?* This view (followed also by van Hengel, but by Hofmann only with respect to the first portion as far as κατακρίνων), though abandoned by nearly all modern expositors,<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The difficulty started by Philippi, that corresponding to the τίς ἐγκαλ. κατὰ ἐκλ. Θεοῦ in ver. 33, there is introduced, with the τίς ἡμ. χωρ. κ.τ.λ. of ver. 35, a question for which nothing prepares the way, and which is not answered in the

is corroborated by its entire accordance with the sense, by the harmony of the soaring rhetorical form, and by its freedom from those insuperable difficulties which beset the modes of division that differ from it. Of the latter, two in particular fall to be considered. 1. Luther, Castalio, Beza, Calvin, Grotius, Wolf, and many others, including Ammon, Tholuck, Flatt, Fritzsche, Philippi, Reithmayr, and Ewald, take Θεὸς ὁ δικαίων as affirmative answer to τίς ἐγκαλέσει κ.τ.λ.; then τίς ὁ κατακρίνων as a new question, and as the affirmative answer thereto: Χριστὸς ὁ ἀποθανὼν κ.τ.λ., thus: *Who shall accuse, etc.? God is the justifier* (consequently no accuser shall succeed). *Who is the condemner? Christ is He that has died, etc.* (so that He cannot, therefore, condemn us in judgment). But against this view it may be urged, (a) that Θεὸς ὁ δικαίων and τίς ὁ κατακρίνων are, as regards both substance (δικαίων and κατακριν.) and form (Paul has not written τίς κατακρινεῖ to correspond with τίς ἐγκαλέσει), correlative, and therefore may not, without arbitrariness, be separated; (b) that in ver. 34 Christ is not at all described as a judge, which would be in keeping with the ὁ κατακρίνων, but, on the contrary, as redeemer and intercessor; (c) that, if τίς ἐγκαλέσει is at once disposed of by Θεὸς ὁ δικαίων, it must be already quite self-evident that there can be no κατακρίνων, and consequently τίς ὁ κατακ., as a new question, would be something superfluous and out of keeping with so compressed an utterance of emotion; (d) and, finally, that in the entire context there is no mention of the last judgment. 2. The theory, that came into vogue after Augustine, *doctr. Chr.* iii. 3, and Ambrosiaster (adopted in modern times by Koppe, Reiche, Köllner, Olshausen, Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette, and Maier, also by Griesbach and Lachmann; Tholuck is undecided), consists in supplying ἐγκαλέσει with Θεὸς ὁ δικαίων, and taking it as a

*forgoing* ver. 34—is incorrect in itself, since the answer to this question is certainly yielded by ver. 34; and it mistakes, moreover, the truly *lyric* character of the magnificent passage. Tholuck's objections, as also those of Hofmann, regarding the second half (from Χριστὸς ὁ ἀποθανὼν onwards), are quite unimportant. The latter lays particular stress on the fact that Paul has not added ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν to ἀποθανόν. As if that purpose of the ἀποθ. were not perfectly self-evident, especially amidst such a vehement flight of the discourse!

question, and dealing in a corresponding manner with *Χριστὸς . . . ἡμῶν* also: *Who shall accuse? Shall God do so, who justifies? Who shall condemn? Shall Christ do so, who has died, etc.?* But against this view it suffices to urge the decisive reason, that to conceive of God as *accuser* (before Christ) is destitute of scriptural analogy, and could not at all have occurred to the apostle. Hofmann takes *Χριστὸς . . . ἐντυγχ. ὑπὲρ ἡμ.* as a *question with two dissimilar relative adjuncts*, of which the first declares how it was possible, after the question *τίς ὁ κατακρ.*, to subjoin the further question, whether it might not be feared with regard to Christ that He should condemn where God acquits; while the second shows the impossibility of such a fear. But this artificial interpretation, in connection with which the first and second *καὶ* (see the critical remarks) are condemned as not genuine and this condemnation is acutely turned to account, fails, so far as the substance is concerned, on the very ground that the thought of its being possible perhaps for *Christ* to *condemn* where *God acquits* would be an *absurd* idea, which could not occur to a Christian consciousness; and, so far as form is concerned, on the ground that the second relative clause is annexed to the first with entire similarity, and therefore does not warrant our explaining it, as if Paul, instead of *ὃς καὶ ἐντ.*, should have written *ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐντ.*—In detail, observe further: The designation of Christians in ver. 33 as *ἐκλεκτοὶ Θεοῦ* is *selected* as having a special bearing on the matter, and renders palpable at once the fruitlessness of every *ἐγκλησις*; while *Θεός* coming immediately after *Θεοῦ* has rhetorical emphasis.—*κατὰ ἐκλ. Θεοῦ*] *i.e.* against those whom God has chosen<sup>1</sup> out of the *κόσμος* (John xvii. 6) to be members of His Messianic peculiar people to be made blessed for Christ's sake, according to His eternal decree (Eph. i. 4); comp. on ver. 30. This is the Christian conception (comp. 1 Pet. ii. 9) of the Old Testament *ἐκλεκτ.* (Ps. cv. 43, cvi. 5; Isa. xlii. 1, lxv. 9; Wisd. iii. 9, *al.*). The elect constitute the Israel of God, Gal. vi. 16. Regarding the genitive *Θεοῦ* (*ἐκλ.* is used quite as a substantive; comp. Col. iii. 12; Matt. xxiv.

<sup>1</sup> Against Hofmann, who (*Schriftbew.* I. p. 223 f.) calls in question the reference to others, non-elect, see on Eph. i. 4.

31 *al.*), see Fritzsche, *Diss.* II. p. 31; Pflugk, *ad Eur. Hec.* 1135. The *absence of the article* (comp. ver. 27) in the case of ἐκλ. Θεοῦ brings out the *quality* of the persons.—The predicates of Christ in ver. 34—under which His *death* is to be conceived as an atoning death, His *rising again* as having taken place διὰ τὴν δικαίωσιν ἡμῶν (iv. 25), and His *being at the right hand of God* as personal participation in the government of the world (Eph. i. 20, Col. iii. 1, *al.*; comp. also Dissen, *ad Pindar. Fragm.* xi. 9) in the heavenly dwelling-place of the Father's glory (see on Matt. vi. 6)—exclude the possibility of any one separating us from the love of Christ. For, as regards His *past*, He has proved by His *death* the abundance of His love (v. 6 f.; Eph. iii. 18 f.), and this demonstration of His love has been divinely confirmed by His *resurrection*; and as regards His *present*, through *His sitting at the right hand of God* He possesses the power to do for His own whatever His love desires, and through His *intercession* He procures for them every protection and operation of grace from the Father (Heb. vii. 25, ix. 24; 1 John ii. 1). But this intercession (comp. ver. 26 f.) is the continuous *bringing to bear* of His work of atonement, completed by His ἱλαστήριον, on the part of Christ in His glory with the Father; which we are to conceive of as real and—in virtue of the glorified corporeity of the exalted Christ, as also in virtue of the subordination in which He even as σύνθρονος stands to the Father—as *request* properly so called (ἐντευξις) through which the “*continuous quasi vigor*” (Gerhard) of redemption takes place. Comp. John xiv. 16. There has been much dogmatic and philosophical explaining away of this passage on the part of systematists and exegetes. Some apt observations are to be found in Düsterdieck on 1 John ii. 1, who nevertheless, without assigning his exegetical grounds, calls in question that the intercession is *cocalis et oralis*. As such, however, it *must* be conceived, because it is made by the glorified God-man; though the more special mode in which it takes place is withdrawn from the cognizance of our earthly apprehension. Comp. Philippi, *Glaubensl.* IV. 2, p. 336, ed. 2. — μᾶλλον δὲ is the *imo vero, vel potius*, by which the speaker amends his statement (see

on Gal. iv. 9); for what would Christ's having died have been of itself? how could it have been to us the bond and the security of His love against all distresses, etc., ver. 35 f., if the divine resurrection had not been added to it? Paul therefore appends to the bare ἀποθάνων, by way of correction: *imo vero etiam resuscitatus*, in which the καὶ, *also*, signifies: *non solum mortuus, sed etiam resusc.*; comp. Eph. v. 11. It is thus clear that (contrary to Hofmann's view) this καὶ was quite essential and indispensable; for it was not the ἀποθάνων itself, but its having been mentioned *alone* and *without* the resurrection belonging to it, that needed correction. It is, moreover, self-evident that all this application of the corrective expression is here merely of a *formal* nature, serving to bring into marked prominence the two elements in their important correlation. — The δὲ καὶ occurring twice has a certain solemnity. — Ver. 35. τίς] Paul puts the question by τίς, not τί, in conformity with the parallel τίς ὁ κατακρίνων. The circumstance that he subsequently specifies *states and things*, not *persons*—which, however, naturally suggest themselves to the conception of the reader—cannot lead any one astray, least of all in such a bold flight of rhetoric. — ἀπὸ τῆς ἀγάπ. τ. Χριστοῦ] Most expositors take τοῦ X. (comp. Eph. iii. 19) as genitive of the *subject*, and *rightly*, because this view was already prepared for by ver. 34 (in which the great acts of Christ's love toward us are specified), and is confirmed by ver. 37 (διὰ τοῦ ἀγαπ. ἡμᾶς), and by ver. 39, where the ἀγάπη τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡ ἐν Χριστῷ comes in the place of the ἀγάπη τοῦ X. This excludes the interpretation of others, who understand it of *the love to Christ* (Origen, Ambrosiaster, Erasmus, Majus, Heumann, Morus, Köllner, and Ewald). Köllner's objections to our view do not touch its *true* sense, since the point in question is not a possible interruption of the love of Christ to us, nor yet the hindering of our access to it (Philippi), but a possible *separation from the love of Christ* (that helps to victory, ver. 37) *through hindrances interrening between it and us, which might nullify its manifestation and operation upon us and might thus dissolve our real fellowship with it.*<sup>1</sup> It was therefore very unwarranted in de Wette

<sup>1</sup> The tribulations, etc., are, forsooth, not something which might form a wall

(comp. Calvin, Rückert, and Tholuck) to convert, in accordance with v. 5, the love of Christ into "the joyful *feeling* of being loved by Christ," which ver. 37 does not permit, where manifestly the *aid* of the exalted Christ, who has loved us (comp. Matt. xxviii. 20; Phil. iv. 13), is meant.

Ver. 36. The marks of parenthesis are to be expunged, because the construction is unbroken, and ἀλλ' ἐν τούτ. πᾶσιν in ver. 37 refers to ver. 35 *and* ver. 36. On the accumulation of designations that follows, comp. 2 Cor. vi. 4 f.; and on the so frequently repeated ἦ, Xen. Mem. i. 1. 7, Soph. O. C. 251. By way of scriptural proof for the most extreme element mentioned, for ἡ μάχαιρα, Paul quotes a passage, in accordance with which even the slaying *sword* has here its place already prophetically indicated beforehand. In Ps. xlv. 23 (quoted exactly from the LXX.), where the historical meaning refers to the daily massacres of Jews in the time of the Psalmist (in an age after the exile, but not so late as the Maccabean), he recognises a type of the analogous fate awaiting the Christian people of God, as their sacred-historic *destiny*. Κατάλληλος τοῖς προκειμένοις ἡ μαρτυρία· ἐκ προσώπου γὰρ ἀνδρῶν εἴρηται τὸν αὐτὸν ἐσχηκότων σκοπὸν, Theodoret. Therein lies the *justification* of this typical view. But since our passage specially mentions only the *being put to death* and the *slaying*, we have no right to make the reference which Paul gives to them extend, with Hofmann, to the *treatment in general* which the Christians should have to experience, instead of leaving it limited to μάχαιρα.—ὅτι] *for*. A part of the quotation, without relevant reference to the connection in our passage.—ἔνεκεν σοῦ] There is no reason whatever for departing, with Köllner (comp. Hofmann), from the reference of the original text to *God*, and referring σοῦ to *Christ*. For, in the first place, the probative point of the quotation does not lie in ἔνεκεν σοῦ (but in θανατ. and ἐλογ. ὡς πρόβ. σφ.); and in the second place,

of separation between us and the love of Christ, such as they might produce perhaps in human fellowship—so that the affection of any one should be unable to reach us or act upon us. Philippi introduces a foreign element, when he holds that the tribulations might seem to us signs of the *divine wrath*, and thus mislead us into *unbelief* in the existence of the divine love.



the very massacres of the Christians took place on account of *God*, because they continued faithful to *Him* in Christ, while the denial of Christ would have been a denial of *God*, who had sent Him. Hence martyrdom was regarded as a *δοξάζειν θανάτῳ τὸν Θεόν* (John xxi. 19). — *ὅλην τὴν ἡμ.*] Not *quotidian* (Castalio, Grotius, and Glöckler); Paul follows the LXX., who thus translate לְכָל־יְמֵי. It means: the *whole day* (comp. x. 21; Isa. lxii. 6; Ex. x. 13; 1 Sam. xix. 24; 1 Macc. v. 50) *are we murdered*, so that at every time of the day murder is committed upon us (now on this one, now on that one of us); it ceases not the livelong day. And this is the consequence of the fact, that we *have been counted* (aorist) *as sheep for the slaughter*, reckoned like sheep destined for slaughter.

Ver. 37. *But in all this*—namely, what is specified in vers. 35 and 36—*we conquer*, etc. This *ἀλλὰ* does not break off an incomplete sentence (Hofmann), but is rather the simple antithetic *at, but*, whatever sufferings and dangers may await us. — *ὑπερνικ.*] We gain a victory that is more than victory; we are *over-victorious*. Luther well renders: “*we overcome far*.” Comp. v. 20. It does not involve more than this; neither the *casiness* of the victory (Chrysostom, Theophylact), nor the “*in cruce etiam gloriamur*” (Beza), which is rather the consequence of this victory; for a sublime testimony to the latter, see 2 Cor. iv. 8–11. In the ancient Greek *ὑπερνικ.* is not extant, but it occurs in Socr. *H. E.* iii. 21, Leo Tact. xiv. 25, although in a derogatory sense (*νικᾶν μὲν καλόν, ὑπερνικᾶν δὲ ἐπίφθονον*). Nevertheless there is contained in our passage also a holy *arrogance of victory*, not selfish, but in the consciousness of the might of Christ. — *διὰ τοῦ ἀγαπ. ἡμᾶς*] He who hath loved us is the *procureur of this our victory*, helps us to it by His power. Comp. esp. 2 Cor. xii. 9. That it is not *God* (Chrysostom, Estius, Grotius, Bengel, and others, including Reiche, Köllner, Olshausen, and van Hengel) that is meant, but *Christ* (Rückert, de Wette, Philippi, Tholuck, Ewald, and Hofmann), follows, not indeed from Phil. iv. 13, but from the necessary reference to *τίς ἡμ. χωρ. ἀπὸ τ. ἀγ. τ. Χ.* in ver. 35; for ver. 37 contains the *opposite* of the separation from the love of Christ. — *ἀγαπήσ.*] denotes the act of love *κατ’ ἐξοχήν*, which Christ

accomplished by the sacrifice of His life. This reference was self-evident to the consciousness of the readers. Comp. v. 6; Gal. ii. 20; Eph. v. 2, 25.

Vv. 38, 39. Paul now confirms what he had said in ver. 37 by the enthusiastic declaration of his conviction that no power, in whatever shape it may exist or be conceived of, etc. For the singular *πέπεισμαι* there is as little necessity for seeking a special reason (Hofmann, *e.g.*, thinks that Paul wished to justify the *confidence*, with which he had expressed ver. 37) as in the case of *λογίζομαι* in ver. 18, especially as ver. 37 contains only the simple assertion of a state of fact, and not a *how* of that assertion. — The following expressions (*θάνατος κ.τ.λ.*) are to be left in the generality of their sense, which is, partly in itself and partly through the connection, beyond doubt; every arbitrary limitation is purely opposed to the purpose of declaring *everything*—everything possible—incapable of separating the believers from the love of God in Christ. Hence: *οὔτε θάνατος οὔτε ζωή*: *neither death nor life*, as the two most general states, in which man can be. We may die or live: we remain in the love of God. The mention of *death first* was occasioned very naturally by ver. 36. It is otherwise in 1 Cor. iii. 22. Grotius (following Chrysostom and Jerome, *ad Aglos.* 9) imports the idea: “*metus mortis; spes vitæ*,” which Philippi also regards as a “correct paraphrase of the sense.” — *οὔτε ἄγγελοι οὔτε ἀρχαί*] *Neither angels* (generally) *nor* (angelic) *powers* (in particular). *ἄγγ.* is, with Chrysostom, Theophylact, Beza, Tholuck, Philippi, Fritzsche, Hofmann, and others, to be understood of *good* angels, because the wicked are *never* termed *ἄγγελοι* without some defining adjunct (Matt. xxv. 41; 2 Cor. xii. 7; 2 Pet. ii. 4; comp. Jude, 6). The objection repeated by Reiche (who, with Clemens Alexandrinus, Toletus, Grotius, Estius, and others, understands it of *wicked* angels), that an attempt on the part of the good angels to separate Christians from God is inconceivable, does not hold, since, according to Gal. i. 8, the case of such an attempt falling within the sphere of possibility could certainly be—not *believed*, but—*conceived* ex hypothesi by Paul. Theophylact already aptly says: *οὐχ ὡς τῶν ἀγγέλων ἀφιστώντων τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπὸ Χριστοῦ*,

ἀλλὰ καθ' ὑπόθεσιν τὸν λόγον τιθεῖς. Against the view that ἄγγ. denotes good *and* wicked angels (Wolf, Bengel, Koppe, and van Hengel), the linguistic usage is likewise decisive, since according to it the absolute ἄγγ. signifies *nothing* else than simply *good* angels. Comp. on 1 Cor. iv. 9. — ἀρχαί] obtains, through its connection with ἄγγ., its definite reference to particular powers in the category of angels—those *invested with power* in the *angelic* world. Paul recognises a diversity<sup>1</sup> of rank and power in the angelic hierarchy (of the good and the wicked), and finds occasion, especially in his later epistles, to mention it (Col. i. 16; Eph. i. 21; 1 Cor. xv. 24; Eph. vi. 12; Col. ii. 15); without, however (comp. on Eph. i. 21), betraying any participation in the fluctuating definitions of the later Jews. See, respecting these definitions, Bartolucci, *Bibl. rabb.* I. p. 267 ff.; Eisenmenger, *entdecktes Judenthum*, II. p. 370 ff. Olearius, Wetstein, Loesner, Morus, Rosenmüller, Flatt, and Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 460, refer ἀρχ. to *human ruling powers*; van Hengel to “*principatus quoslibet.*” Against these its connection with ἄγγ. is decisive, because no contrast is suggested of non-angelic powers. Just as little, because without any trace in the text, are we to understand with Hofmann the ἀρχαί, in contrast to the good God-serving ἄγγελοι, as spirits “*that in self-will exercise a dominion, with which they do not live to the service of God,*” i.e. as *evil* spirits. — οὔτε ἐνεστῶτα οὔτε μέλλοντα] *neither that which has set in nor that which is future.* Comp. 1 Cor. iii. 22. Quite *general*, and not to be limited to *sufferings* (Vatablus, Grotius, Flatt, and others). ἐνεστ., however, does not absolutely coincide with the idea *things present* (as it is *usually* taken), which is in itself linguistically possible, but is never the case in the N. T. (see on Gal. i. 4); but it denotes rather *what is in the act of having set in*, has already begun (and μέλλ. that, the emergence of which is still future). So, according to Gal. i. 4; 1 Cor. iii. 22, vii. 26; 2 Thess. ii. 2. Aptly rendered by the Vulgate: “*instantia.*” Comp. Lucretius, i. 461: “*quae res instet, quid porro deinde sequatur.*” — οὔτε δυνάμεις] *nor powers*; to be left

<sup>1</sup> In opposition to Hofmann, who without any reason denies this (*Schriftbew.* I. 347). See Halm, *Theol. N. T.* I. 282 ff.; Philippi, *Glaubensl.* II. 307 ff., ed. 2.

in its utmost generality, personal and impersonal (Hofmann arbitrarily limiting it to the latter). The common interpretation, *angelic powers*, would be correct, if its position after *ἀρχαί* were right; but see the crit. remarks. The incongruity of the apparent *isolation* of this link vanishes on observing that Paul, in his enumeration, twice arranges the elements *in pairs* (*θάνατος . . . ἀρχαί*), and then twice again *in threes* (viz. οὔτε ἐνεστ. οὔτε μέλλ. οὔτε δυνάμ., and οὔτε ὕψωμα οὔτε βάθος οὔτε τίς κτίσις ἑτέρα), and the latter indeed in such a way, that to the two that stand contrasted he adds a third of a general character. — οὔτε ὕψωμα οὔτε βάθος] *neither height nor depth*; likewise without any alteration or limitation of the quite general sense of the words. *No dimension of space* can separate us, etc. Arbitrary definitions are given: *heaven and hell* or the *nether world* (Theodoret, Bengel, Wetstein, Michaelis, Klee, Baumgarten-Crusius, Ewald, and Hofmann); *heaven and earth* (Fritzsche; comp. Theophylact, Morus, and Flatt); *the height of bliss and the depth of misery* (Koppe); *spes honorum* and *metus ignominiae* (Grotius, Rosenmüller); *sapientia haereticorum* and *communes vulgi errores* (Melanethon); *neque altitudo, ex qua quis minaretur praecipitium, neque profundum, in quo aliquis minaretur demersionem* (Thomas Aquinas, Anselm, Estius). — οὔτε τίς κτίσις ἑτέρα] *nor any other created thing whatever*, covers all not yet embraced in the foregoing elements; and thus the idea of “*nothing in the world in the shape of a creature*” is fully exhausted. The attempt to bring the collective elements named in their consecutive order under definite *logical categories* leads to artificialities of exposition, which ought not to be applied to such enthusiastic outbursts of the moment. — Instead of τῆς ἀγ. τοῦ Χριστοῦ (ver. 35), Paul now says, τῆς ἀγ. τοῦ Θεοῦ τῆς ἐν Χ. Ἰ., not thereby expressing something different, but *characterizing* the love of Christ (toward us) as the love of God which is in Christ Jesus. The love of Christ, namely, is nothing else than the love of God Himself, *which has its seat and place of operation in Christ*. God is the original fountain, Christ the constant organ and mediating channel of one and the same love; so that in *Christ* is the love of God, and the love of Christ is the love of God in Christ. Comp. v. 6, 8.

## CHAPTER IX.

Ver. 3. The verbal order ἀνάθεμα εἶναι αὐτὸς ἐγώ (recommended by Griesb., adopted by Lachm. and Tisch.) receives preponderant attestation from A B D E F G, min., vss., and Fathers; as also from **8**, reading εἶναι before ἀνάθ. Erroneously attached to ὑπόμνην, αὐτὸς ἐγώ became placed before ἀνάθ. (Elz.).—Ver. 4. αἱ διαθήκαι] B D E F G, min., Vulg., with several Fathers, read ἡ διαθήκη, which Lachm. has adopted. An alteration, because the plural was understood of the Old and New Test. (Gal. iv. 24), and yet the latter could not be considered as a privilege of the *Jews*.—Ver. 11. *κακόν*] Lachm. and Tisch. read φαῦλον, according to A B **8**, min., Or. Cyr. Damasc. Rightly; the *more usual* opposite of ἀγαθόν easily intruded.—Ver. 15. The order τῷ Μωϋσεὶ γάρ is decidedly to be received, with Lachm. and Tisch., following B D E F G **8**. The Recepta τ. γ. M. is a mechanical alteration.—Ver. 16. ἐλεοῦντος] A B\* D E F G P **8**, 39, read ἐλεῶντος; so Lachm. and Tisch. But since in no other passage of the N. T. is ἐλεάω, the form belonging to the κοινή (see *Elzigm.* M. 327. 30), to be found; and in ver. 18 only D\* F G have ἐλεᾷ instead of ἐλεεῖ (and yet in both places Paul doubtless used one form); it is most probable that Ω instead of OR was merely an early copyist's error, which, as the form -αω was actually in existence, became diffused, and also induced in some Codd. the alteration ἐλεᾷ in ver. 18 (so Tisch. 7).—Ver. 27. κατὰλειμμα] A B **8**\* Eus. read ὑπόλειμμα; so Lachm. and Tisch. Rightly; see LXX. Isa. x. 22.—Ver. 28. ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ, ὅτι λόγον συντετυμημένον] is wanting in A B **8**\*, 23\*, 47\*, 67\*\*, Syr. Aeth. ERp. Copt. Eus. Damasc. Aug. It certainly bears the suspicion of being an addition from the LXX.; but its deletion, which Lachm. and Tisch. 8 have carried out, is precluded by the ease with which it was possible for transcribers to turn from συντεμίων at once to συντετυμημένον.—Ver. 31. The second δικαιοσύνης is wanting in A B D E G **8**, 47, 67\*\*, 140, Copt. It. Or. and several Fathers, and is marked with an obelus in F. Omitted by Lachm. and Tisch. 8. But the omission admits of no sense accordant with the context. See the exeg. notes. The weight of the omitting codd. is much diminished by the counter-

testimony of ancient vss. (including Syr. and Vulg.) and of most Greek Fathers. The omission itself might easily, from the frequent recurrence of the word in vv. 30, 31, occur through a homocotelenon, which led, in the first instance, to the disappearance of the words *εἰς νόμ.* *διαιρέσιν* (they are still absent from 2 min.), followed by their incomplete restoration. — Ver. 32. *νόμω*] Wanting in A B F G S\*, min., Copt. Vulg. and several Fathers. Rightly deleted by Lachm. and Tisch. A defining addition. — The *γάρ* after *προσέκοψαν*, which is wanting in A B D\* F G S\* 47\*, Copt. It. Vulg. ms, Goth. Ambr. Ruf., Dam. (and is omitted by Lachm. and Tisch. 8), is simply a connective insertion. — Ver. 33. *ἄρα*] has preponderant evidence against it, and must, with Lachm. and Tisch., be struck out. An addition from x. 11, where it stands in all the witnesses.

Chap. ix.—xi.<sup>1</sup> On the non-participation hitherto of the greater part of the Jews in the Christian plan of salvation; and specially (a) the lamentation over this (ix. 1–5); (b) the *Theodicee* on its account (ix. 6–29); (c) the *fault* thereof, which rests upon the Jews themselves (ix. 30–33 and x. 1–21); (d) the *consolation* in reference to this (xi. 1–32), with final *giving glory* to God (xi. 33–36). Paul could not do otherwise, he *must* still settle this great problem; this is inevitably demanded by all that had gone before. For if the whole previous treatise had as its result, that only *believers* were the recipients of the promised salvation, and if nevertheless the Messianic promise and destination to salvation had their reference in the first place (comp. i. 16) to the Israelites, concerning whom, however, experience showed that they were for the

<sup>1</sup>On this section, see Nösselt in his *Opusc.* I. p. 141 ff.; Beck, *Vers. e. pneumatisch hermeneutischen Entwickel. d. neunten Kap.*, etc., Stuttg. 1833; Steudel in the *Tüb. Zeitschr.* 1836, I. p. 1 ff.; Baur, *ib.* III. p. 59 ff.; Haustedt in Pelt's *Mitarbeiten*, 1838, 3; Meyer, *ib.*; Hofmann, *Schriftbew.* I. p. 210 ff.; Krummacher, *Dogma von der Gnadenwahl*, Duish. 1856, p. 142 ff. (though less for the purpose of strict scientific exegesis); Weiss, *Prædestination-lehre d. Ap. P.* in the *Jahrb. f. Deutsche Theol.* 1857, p. 54 f.; Lamping, *Pauli de prædest. decreta*, Leovard. 1858, p. 127 ff.; Beyschlag, *d. Paulin. Theodicee* Rom. ix.—xi., 1868; also Th. Schott and Mangold.—According to Weiss's criticism, based on style, the whole section, chap. ix.—xi., would be an interpolation; according to the view on which Baur proceeds (see *Introd.* § 3), the three chapters would be the *chief portion* of the whole epistle.

most part *unbelieving* (comp. John i. 11), this contradictory relation thus furnished an *enigma*, which Paul, with his warm love for his people, could least of all evade, but in the solution of which he had on the contrary to employ all the boldness and depth of his clear insight into the divine plan of redemption (Eph. iii. 4 ff.). The *defence of the efficacy of his Gentile apostleship* (Th. Schott, and in another way Mangold and Sabatier) is not the *object* of the section—that object Paul would have known how to meet directly—but such a defence results indirectly from it, since we see from the section how fully the apostle had recognised and comprehended his place in connection with the divine plan of salvation. The *problem itself*, the solution of which is now taken in hand by the apostle, was sufficiently serious and momentous to be treated with so much detail in this great and instructive letter to the important mixed community of the world's capital, which, however, does not thereby appear to have been a Jewish-Christian one.

Vv. 1-3.<sup>1</sup>] The new section is introduced without connection with the foregoing, but in a fervent outburst of Israelitish patriotism, the more sorrowful by contrast with the blessedness of the Christian previously extolled and so deeply experienced by the apostle himself. This sorrow might be deemed incredible, after the joyous triumph which had just been exhibited. Hence the extremely urgent asseveration with which he begins: *truth I speak in Christ*, that is, in my fellowship with Christ; *ἐν Χ.* is the *element*, in which his soul moves. Just so Eph. iv. 17; 1 Thess. iv. 1; 2 Cor. ii. 17, xii. 19. The explanation adopted by most of the older commentators (especially Joh. Capellus, Clericus, Locke), and by Nösselt, Koppe, Böhme, Flatt, Reiche, Köllner, and others, of *ἐν* in the sense of *adjuration*, is a perfectly arbitrary departure both from the manner of the apostle, who never swears by Christ, and also from Greek usage, which would have required *πρός* with the genitive (Kühner, II. 1, p. 448; Ellendt, *Lcx. Soph.* II. p. 647); and cannot at all be justified from Matt. v. 34, LXX. Jer. v. 7, Dan. xii. 7, Rev. x. 6, because in these

<sup>1</sup> On vv. 1-5, see Winzer, *Progr.* Lips. 1832.

passages ὁμνύειν expressly stands beside it. — οὐ ψεύδομαι] πρότερον δὲ διαβεβαιοῦται περὶ ὧν μέλλει λέγειν ὅπερ πολλοὶς ἔθος ποιεῖν, ὅταν μέλλωσί τι λέγειν παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀπιστοῦμενον (comp. c.g. Acts xxi. 21), καὶ ὑπὲρ οὗ σφόδρα ἑαυτοῦς εἰσι πεπεικότες, Chrys. Compare 1 Tim. ii. 7. Conversely, Lys. iv. 12 : ψεύδεται κ. οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει. — συμμαρτ. μοι τῆς συνειδ. μου] ground assigned for the οὐ ψεύδ.: *since with me (agreeing with my express assurance) my conscience gives testimony.* Compare ii. 15, viii. 16. — ἐν πνεύμ. ἀγίῳ] is by no means to be connected with τῆς συνειδ. μου (Grotius and several others, Semler, Ammon, Vater : “conscientia a Spiritu sancto gubernata”), because otherwise τῆς would not be wanting ; but either with οὐ ψεύδομαι (Cramer, Morus, Nösselt, Koppe, Rosenmüller, Flatt, Winzer, Reiche, Köllner, Fritzsche ; of whom, however, only Winzer and Fritzsche take it not as an oath, but as equivalent to ὡς ἐν πνεύματι ἀγίῳ ὧν), or— which is the nearest and simplest—with συμμαρτ. (Beza, Böhme, Tholuck, Rückert, de Wette, Maier, Philippi, van Hengel, Hofmann, and others). Compare Matt. xxii. 43 ; Luke ii. 27 ; Mark xii. 36 ; 1 Cor. xii. 3. The testimony of his conscience, Paul knows, is not *apart from* the πνεῦμα that fills him, but “*Spiritu sancto duce et moderatore*” (Beza), *in that πνεῦμα.* And thus the negative οὐ ψεύδ. receives its sacred guarantee through a concurrent testimony of the conscience ἐν πνεύματι ἀγίῳ, as the positive ἀλήθ. λέγω had received it through ἐν Χριστῷ. This very appropriate symmetry dissuades us from joining συμμαρτ. μοι κ.τ.λ. to ἀλήθ. λέγω, so that οὐ ψεύδ. would be only “*thrown in between*” (Hofmann). — ὅτι λύπη κ.τ.λ.] *that, etc.* A comma only preceding. Over what is this sorrow ? Over the exclusion of a great part of the Jews from the Messianic salvation. With tender forbearance Paul does not express this, but leaves it to be gathered by the reader from what follows, in which he immediately, by γάρ, assigns the ground for the greatness and continuance of his sorrow. — ἡὺχόμεν] *I would wish, namely,* if the purport of the wish could be realized to the advantage of the Israelites. Comp. on Gal. iv. 20, where also no ἄν is annexed. But van Hengel takes it of a *wish which had actually*



arisen in the mind of Paul amidst his continual sorrowfulness. So also Hofmann: the wish had entered his mind, though but *momentarily*. But a thing so incapable of being fulfilled he can scarce have actually wished; he *would* only wish it, *if* it were capable of being fulfilled; *this* is expressed by *ἡχόμην*, and that without *ἄν*, as a definite assurance; comp. on Acts xxv. 22; Gal. iv. 20; Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 187; Kühner, II. 1, p. 178. On the wish itself, comp. Ex. xxxii. 32. — *ἀνάθεμα*] or, in the Attic form, *ἀνάθημα* (Lobeck, *ad Phryg.* pp. 249, 445, and *Paralip.* p. 391 ff.), in Greek writers (also Luke xxi. 5; 2 Macc. ii. 13, *et al.*) a *votive offering*, corresponds frequently in the LXX. to the Hebrew *חֵרֶם*, and means *something devoted to God without redemption* (Lev. xxvii. 28); then—in so far as such a thing was devoted to the divine *wrath*, and destined to *destruction* (see Ewald, *Altorth.* p. 101 ff.)—*something abandoned to destruction*; a *curse-offering*. So in the N. T. See Gal. i. 8, 9, 1 Cor. xii. 3, xvi. 22, which passages at the same time prove that the (later) special sense of *חֵרֶם*, as denoting the Jewish curse of *excommunication*, is not to be here introduced. The *destruction*, to which Paul would fain yield himself on behalf of his brethren, is not to be understood of a *violent death* (Jerome, Limborch, Elsner, and others, also Michaelis, Nösselt, Flatt), but, as *ἀπὸ τ. Χ.* renders necessary, of the *everlasting ἀπώλεια*. It has been objected that the wish must thus be irrational (Michaelis: “a *frantic prayer*”); but the standard of selfish reflection is not suited to the emotion of unmeasured devotedness and love out of which the apostle speaks. Groundlessly, and contrary to Paul’s usage elsewhere, Hofmann weakens the positive notion of the expression into the negative one of *the being excluded from Christ*. This element is implied in *ἀπὸ τοῦ Χ.* as the specific *accompanying relation* of the *ἀνάθεμα*. Bengel well remarks that the *modulus ratiocinationum nostrarum* as little comprehends the love of the apostle, as does a little boy the *animos heroum bellicorum*. — *αὐτὸς ἐγὼ*] belonging to *εἶναι* by attraction (Kühner, II. 2, p. 596): *I myself, I, as far as my own person is concerned*. Comp. on vii. 25. Paul sees those who belong to the fellowship of his people advancing to ruin through their unbelief; therefore he

would fain wish that *he himself* were a curse-offering, if by means of this sacrifice of his *own self* he could only save the beloved *brethren*. The contrast, with reference to which *αὐτὸς ἐγώ* is here conceived, lies therefore in *ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀδελφ. μου*, whose unhappy state appears already in vv. 1, 2 so sad in the eyes of the apostle; not in the *duty* of the apostle's *calling* (Th. Schott); and least of all in a "*nescio quis alius*" (Fritzsche). Theodoret and Theophylact (comp. Chrysostom) refer back to viii. 39 (*I myself*, whom nevertheless nothing can separate, etc.); but this lies too far off. Van Hengel (after Krehl): "*Ipsc ego, qui me in Christi communionem esse dicat.*" But ἐν X. in the previous instance was merely an accessory definition. — ἀπὸ τοῦ X.] *away from Christ*, separated from Him. Comp. 2 Thess. i. 9; Gal. v. 4; 2 Cor. v. 6, xi. 3; Lev. xxvii. 29; and see generally, Nägelsbach on *Ilias*, p. 188, ed. 3; Ameis on *Hom. Od. Anh.* ξ, 525; Buttm. *acut. Gr.* p. 277. Christ is not conceived as *author* of the *ἀνάθ.* (Nösselt, Morus, Flatt, and others); for ἀπὸ (comp. Lev. xxvii. 29) does not stand for ὑπό, which latter D E G actually read in consequence of this erroneous view. — ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀδελφ. μου] ὑπὲρ is here also not *instead of* (Rückert, Tholuck, Olshausen, and many others), but *for the advantage of*, for their deliverance. Grotius aptly paraphrases: "*Si ea ratione illos ad justitiam veram et ad aeternam salutem possem perducere.*" — κατὰ σ.] subjoined, without the connective of the article, as a familiar accessory definition, which blends with the principal word into a single notion. Comp. 1 Cor. x. 18; Eph. ii. 11, vi. 5. Moreover, there lies in the addition τ. συγγ. μ. κ. σ. already something conveying with it the wish of love, and that from the *natural* side; the *theocratic* grounds for it follow, ver. 4 ff.

Ver. 4. Οἷτως κ.τ.λ.] *quippe qui, who indeed*; a description — assigning the motive for what is said in ver. 3 — of the ἀδελφῶν κατὰ . . . σάρκα according to their theocratic privileges, and first of all by significant designation according to their ancient and hallowed (Gen. xxxii. 28, xi. 1; 2 Cor. xi. 21 f.; Phil. iii. 5; John i. 48) national name Ἰσραηλῖται. To the latter are then attached the relative definitions, which

are *threefold* (ὡν...ὡν...ἐξ ὡν); the first of them embraces *six* particulars connected by *καί*,—purely sacred-historical divine benefactions. — *ἡ υἰοθεσία*] *the adoption*. They are those adopted by God into the place of children, which must of course be understood, not in the Christian (chap. viii.) but in the old theocratic sense, of their adoption, in contradistinction to all Gentile peoples, to be the people of God, whose *Father* is God. Comp. Ex. iv. 22 ff., xix. 5; Deut. xiv. 1, xxxii. 6; Hos. xi. 1, *et al.* In the *υἰοθεσία* of the N. T. (see on viii. 15), the specific essence of which is the reconciliation obtained for Christ's sake, there has appeared the antitype and the completion of that of the O. T. — *καὶ ἡ δόξα*] The *fivefold καί* lends an emphatic weight to the enumeration. *ἡ δόξα* is *the glory κατ' ἐξοχὴν*, *i.e.* כְּבוֹד יְהוָה (Ex. xxiv. 16, xl. 34, 35; 1 Kings viii. 10, 11; Ezek. i. 28; Heb. ix. 5), *the symbolically visible essential communion of God*, as it was manifested in the wilderness as a pillar of cloud and fire, and over the ark of the covenant; the same as שְׁכִינָה, of which the Rabbins maintained (erroneously, according to Lev. xvi. 2) that it had hovered as a cloud of light *continually* over the ark of the covenant. See Ewald, *ad Apoc.* p. 311. But *ἡ δόξα* is not *the ark of the covenant itself* (Beza, Piscator, Hammond, Grotius), for in 1 Sam. iv. 22 the ark of the covenant is not *called* “the glory of Israel,” but this is only *predicated* of it. Others understand *the whole glory of the Jewish people in general* (de Dieu, Calovius, Estius, Semler, Morus, Böhme, Benecke, Köllner, Glöckler, Fritzsche, Beck). Incorrectly, since it is merely *individual* privileges that are set forth. — *αἱ διαθήκαι*] not *the tables of the law* (Beza, Piscator, Pareus, Toletus, Balduin, Grotius, Semler, Rosenmüller), which it cannot denote either in itself or on account of the following *νομοθ.*; nor yet *the O. and N. T.* (Augustine, Jerome, Calovius, and Wolf, in accordance with Gal. iv. 24), which would be entirely unsuitable in respect of the N. T.; but *the covenants concluded by God with the patriarchs since Abraham*. Compare Wisd. xviii. 22; Ecclus. xlv. 11; 2 Macc. viii. 15; Eph. ii. 12. — *ἡ νομοθεσία*] The (Sinaitic) *giving of the law*. This is “*una et semel habita per Mosen*,” but the “*testamenta frequenter statuta sunt*,” Origen.

There is no ground for taking it, with others (including Reiche, de Wette, Fritzsche), not of the act, but of the contents, like νόμος (why should not Paul have written this?). Certainly, he who has the νομοθεσία has also the νόμος; but on that account the two *significations* are to be kept distinct even in places like 2 Macc. vi. 23. The giving of the law was a *work* (comp. Plat. *Legg.* vi. p. 751 B: μεγάλου τῆς νομοθεσίας ἔργου ὄντος), by which God, who Himself was the νομοθέτης, had distinguished the Israelites over all other peoples. — ἡ λατρεία] *the cultus* κατ' ἐξοχήν, the service of Jehovah in the temple. Comp. Heb. ix. 1. It corresponds to the νομοθ., in consequence of which the λατρεία came into existence; just as the following αἱ ἐπαγγελίαι (κατ' ἐξοχήν, the collective *Messianic promises*) is correlative to the αἱ διαθήκαι, on which the ἐπαγγ. were founded. The *chiasmus* in this order of sequence (comp. Bengel) is not accidental; but αἱ ἐπαγγελίαι is intentionally put at the end, in order that now, after mention of the *fathers*, to whom in the first instance the promises were given, the *Promised One Himself* may follow.

Ver. 5.<sup>1</sup> Now, after that first relative sentence with its six theocratic distinctions, two other relative clauses introduce the mutually correlative *persons*, on whom the sacred-historical calling of Israel was based and was to reach its accomplishment. — οἱ πατέρες] Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, who are *per excellentiam* the patriarchs, Ex. iii. 13, 15, iv. 5; Acts iii. 13, vii. 32. — καὶ ἐξ ὧν κ.τ.λ.] The last and highest distinction of the Israelites: *and from whom Christ descends, namely, according to the human phenomenal nature*, as a *human phenomenon*, apart from the spiritually-divine side of His personality, according to which He is not from the Jews, but (as υἱὸς Θεοῦ κατὰ πνεῦμα ἀγιοσύνης, i. 4) is ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ. Regarded in the light of His supernatural generation, He would be also κατὰ σίρκα of God. Comp. Clem. *Cor.* I. 32: ἐξ αὐτοῦ

<sup>1</sup> See on ver. 5, Herm. Schultz, in the *Jahrb. f. Deutsche Theol.* 1863, p. 462 ff., where also a list of the earlier literature is given; Grimm, in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschr.* 1869, p. 311 ff. Among the English opponents of the Unitarians there is to be especially noted, in defence of the orthodox explanation, Smith, *Scripture testimony to the Messiah*, 1847, ed. 4, II. p. 370 ff.

ὁ κύριος Ἰησοῦς τὸ κατὰ σάρκα. On the article τὸ κ. σ., see Heind. *ad Gorg.* p. 228; Buttm. *neut. Gr.* p. 84. The καὶ before ἐξ ὧν forbids the reference of the latter to οἱ πατέρες. — ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων Θεὸς εὐλογ. εἰς τ. αἰῶνας] This passage, which has become of dogmatic importance, has received *two* different leading interpretations, by the side of which yet a *third* way, namely, by taking to pieces the relative sentence, came to be suggested. (1) The words are referred (placing a comma after σάρκα) to *Christ, who is God over all, blessed for ever*.<sup>1</sup> So, substantially, Irenaeus (*Hacr.* iii. 16. 3), Tertullian (*adv. Prax.* § 13, p. 2101, ed. Seml.), Origen, Cyprian, Epiphanius, Athanasius, Chrysostom, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Augustine, Jerome, Theodoret, and later Fathers; Luther, Erasmus, *Paraphr.*, Flacius, Calvin, Beza, and most of the older expositors; and of the later, Michaelis, Koppe, Tholuck, Flatt, Klee, Usteri, Benecke, Olshausen, Nielsen, Reithmayr, Maier, Beck, Philippi, Bisping, Gess, Krummacher, Jatho, Hahn, Thomasius, Ebrard, Ritschl, Hofmann, Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 306, Delitzsch, and others; in a peculiar fashion also, Herm. Schultz (see below); de Wette is undecided. (2) The words are regarded (placing a period after σάρκα, as do Lachm. and Tisch.) as a *doxology to God*, isolated from the foregoing: “*Blessed for ever be the God who is over all.*” So none of the Fathers (as to those erroneously adduced by Wetstein, see Fritzsche, p. 262 ff.<sup>2</sup>), at

<sup>1</sup> So also the *Catech. Racov.* 159 f. But, in its view, since there are not two Gods, “*qui natura sit Deus*” cannot be understood. Conversely, Flacius infers from ἐπὶ πάντων, that Christ is designated as *naturaliter Deus*.

<sup>2</sup> Yet the non-reference to Christ is indirectly implied in Ignatius, *Tars.* interpol. 5 (οὐκ αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων Θεός κ.τ.λ.), and *Phil.* interpol. 7. The reference to *God* is also found in a fragment ascribed to Diodorus, in Cramer, *Caten.* p. 162, where it is said: ἐξ αὐτῶν φησὶν ὁ Χριστός. Θεὸς δὲ οὐ μόνον αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ ποιῇ ἐπὶ πάντων ἐστὶ Θεός. In the Arian controversies our passage was not made use of. But at a later period it was triumphantly made available against the Arians. Thus Oecumenius, *e.g.*, exclaims: ἵνα αὐτὰ λαμπρότατα Θεὸν τὸν Χριστὸν ὀνομάζῃ· ὁ ἀπόστολος· αἰσχύνητι τρισάθλιε Ἀριεῖ, ἀκούων παρὰ Παύλου δοξολογούμενον τὸν Χριστὸν Θεὸν ἀληθινόν! Comp. Theophylact; also Proclus, *de fide*, p. 53, who says generally of our passage: παρίσδυσιν συκοφαντίας ἀποστιχίζει τοῖς φιλολοιδόροις. In Cyril of Alexandria this passage is insisted on in opposition to the assertion of Julian, that only John calls Christ God; whilst the *πρακτικά* of the Synod of Ephesus make no reference to it, which is, however, carefully done in the Synod of Antioch. See the passages in question in Tisch. 8, who also observes that, among the codd. C L. 5, 47, place a full stop after σάρκα.

least not expressly; but Erasmus in his *Annot.*, Wetstein, Semler, Stolz, and several others, and recently Reiche, Köllner, Winzer, Fritzsche, Glöckler, Schrader, Krehl, Ewald, van Hengel, and, though not fully decided, Rückert. See also Baur, II. p. 231; Zeller, in the *Theol. Jahrb.* 1842, p. 51; Rübiger, *Christol. Paul.* p. 26 f.; Beyschlag, *Christol.* p. 210. Now the decision, which of the two leading interpretations fits the meaning of the apostle, cannot be arrived at from the language used,<sup>1</sup> since, so far as the words go, both may be equally correct; nor yet from the immediate connection, since with equal reason Paul might (by no means: *must*, against which is the analogy of ver. 3; and the divine in Christ did not belong here, as in i. 3, necessarily to the connection) feel himself induced to set over-against the human side of the being of Jesus its divine side (as in i. 3), or might be determined by the recital of the distinctions of his nation to devote a doxology to God, the Author of these privileges, who therefore was not responsible for the deeply-lamented unbelief of the Jews; just as he elsewhere, in peculiar excited states of piety, introduces a giving glory to God (i. 25; 2 Cor. xi. 31; Gal. i. 5; comp. 1 Tim. i. 17). Observe, rather, with a view to a decision, the following considerations: Although our passage, referred to *Christ*, would term Him not *ὁ Θεός*, but (*who is God over all*) only *Θεός* predicatively (*without* the article), and although Paul, by virtue of his essential agreement in *substance* with the Christology of John, might have

<sup>1</sup> As van Hengel has attempted, who starts from the idea that the contrast to be thought of in *τὸ κατὰ σάρκα* (according to him: "non quatenus spiritus divini participes erant") *excludes a wider antithesis*, and therefore a point must necessarily be placed after *σάρκα*. Such prepositional definitions with the accusative of the article *τὸ* or *τὰ* (see also Kühner, II. 1, p. 272) certainly denote a complete contrast, which is either expressly stated (as e.g. Xen. *Cyr.* v. 4. 11, *νῦν τὸ μὲν ἐπ' ἡμοῖς οἰχομαι, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ σοὶ σίσωσμαι*; Plat. *Min.* p. 320 C; Rom. xii. 5, *τὸ δι' καθ' ἑνός*), or may be self-evident from the context, as i. 15, xii. 18, and very frequently in the classics. The latter would, however, be the case in our passage according to the ancient ecclesiastical exposition, inasmuch as the contrast obviously implied in *τὸ κατὰ σάρκα* would permit us mentally to supply a *τὸ κατὰ πνεῦμα* as suggesting itself after *ὁ ὢν*. That self-evident negative antithesis: *non quoad spiritum*, would thus have in *ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων Θεός κ.τ.λ.* its *positive elucidation*.

affirmed, just as appropriately as the latter (i. 1), the predicative *Θεός* (*of divine essence*) of Christ, because Christ is also in Paul's view the Son of God in a metaphysical sense, the image of God, of like essence with the Father, the agent in creation and preservation, the partaker in the divine government of the world, the judge of all, the object of prayerful invocation, the possessor of divine glory and fulness of grace (i. 4, x. 12; Phil. ii. 6; Col. i. 15 ff., ii. 9; Eph. i. 20 ff.; 1 Cor. viii. 6; 2 Cor. iv. 4, viii. 9); yet Paul has *never*<sup>1</sup> used the express *Θεός* of Christ, since he has not adopted, like John, the Alexandrian form of conceiving and setting forth the divine essence of Christ, but has adhered to the popular concrete, strictly monotheistic terminology, not modified by philosophical speculation even for the designation of Christ; and he always accurately distinguishes God and Christ; see, in opposition to such obscure and erroneous intermingling of ideas, Rich. Schmidt, *Paulin. Christol.* p. 149 ff. John himself calls the divine nature of Christ *Θεός* only in the introduction of his Gospel, and only in the closest connection with the Logos-speculation. And thus there runs through the whole N. T. a delicate line of separation between the Father and the Son; so that, although the divine essence and glory of the latter is glorified with the loftiest predicates in manifold ways, nevertheless it is only the Father, to whom the Son is throughout subordinated, and never Christ, who is actually called *God* by the apostles (with the exception of John i. 1, and the exclamation of Thomas, John xx. 28)—not even in 1 John v. 20. Paul, particularly, even where he accumulates and strains to the utmost expressions concerning the Godlike nature of the exalted Christ (as Phil. ii. 6 ff.; Col. i. 15 ff., ii. 9), does not call Him *Θεός*, but sharply and clearly distinguishes Him as the *κύριος* from

<sup>1</sup> Not even in 2 Thess. i. 12 (in opposition to Hofmann's invention), or in Eph. v. 5. As regards the *Pastoral Epistles*, if they actually denominated Christ *Θεός*, this would be one of the signs of a post-apostolic epoch. But not once do they do this. The most specious passage is still Tit. ii. 13, respecting which, however, Huther is in the right, and Philippi, *Glaubenslehr.* II. p. 208, ed. 2, is incorrect. In 1 Tim. iii. 16, *ὁ* is to be read, with Lachm. and Tisch.; on Tit. i. 4 even Philippi desires to lay no particular stress; it has, in fact, *no bearing whatever* on our passage, any more than Col. ii. 2 (see *in loc.*).

**Θεός**, even in x. 9, 1 Cor. xii. 3 (in opposition to Ritschl, *Altkath. K.* p. 79 f.). The post-apostolical period (and not at all 2 Pet. i. 1, see Huther) first obliterated this fine line of separation, and often denominated Christ **Θεός, ὁ Θεὸς ἡμῶν**, and the like. So, *e.g.*, already several of the Ignatian epistles in the shorter recension (not those *ad Magnes., ad Philadelph., ad Trall.*, not even chap. vii.) and the so-called second epistle—not the first<sup>1</sup>—of Clement, nor the epistle of Polycarp. In the closest internal connection herewith stands the fact, that in the properly apostolical writings (2 Pet. iii. 18 does not belong to them, nor does Heb. xiii. 21) we never meet with a doxology to Christ in the form which is usual with doxologies to God (not even in 1 Pet. iv. 11); therefore, in this respect also, the present passage would stand to the *apostolic* type in the relation of a complete *anomaly*.<sup>2</sup> Besides, the insuperable difficulty would be introduced, that here Christ would be called not merely and simply **Θεός**, but even *God over all*, and consequently would be designated as **Θεὸς παντοκράτωρ**, which is absolutely incompatible with the entire view of the N. T. as to the dependence of the Son on the Father (see Gess, *v. d. Pers. Chr.* p. 157 ff.; Kahnis, *Dogm.* I. p. 457 ff.), and especially with passages like viii. 34 (**ἐντυγχάνει**), 1 Cor. iii. 23, viii. 6, xi. 3, Eph. iv. 5, 6, and notably 1 Cor. xv. 28. Accordingly, the doxology of our passage cannot be referred to Christ, but must be referred to *God*; although Philippi continues of opinion that the *former* reference has *all* in its favour and *nothing* against it. On the other hand, Tholuck (see also Schmid, *bibl. Theol.* II. p. 540, ed. 2) does more justice to the objections against the old ecclesiastical interpretation, which Messner also, *Lehre d. Ap.* p. 236 f., prefers, but only with a certain diffidence; whilst Herm. Schultz (comp. Socinus, in

<sup>1</sup> There certainly occurs at chap. ii., in Clement, the expression **τὰ παθήματα αὐτοῦ** (*i.e.* τοῦ Θεοῦ), where we are not to correct it into **μαθήματα**, with Hilgenfeld. This expression, however, is fully explained, without Christ being named **Θεός**, from the Pauline view: **Θεὸς ἦν ἰν Χριστῷ κόσμον καταλλάσσειν ἑαυτῷ**, 2 Cor. v. 19.

<sup>2</sup> The doxology in xvi. 27 does not refer to Christ. 2 Tim. iv. 18 certainly refers to Christ; but this is just one of the traces of post-apostolic composition.



Calovius, p. 153) comes ultimately to a lower acceptance of the notion of Θεός, which is meant not metaphysically, but only designates the fulness of power committed to Christ for behoof of His work, and excludes neither dependence and coming into being, nor beginning and end. Against the latter suggestion it may be decisively urged, that thus characteristics are attached to the notion Θεός, which, compared with the current Pauline mode of expression, directly annul it, and make it interchangeable with κύριος, as Paul uses it of Christ (Eph. iv. 5, 6; Phil. ii. 11; 1 Cor. viii. 6, and many other passages). See, in opposition to it, also Grimm. If we suppose the quite singular case here to occur, that Paul names Christ *God*, yea God over all, we need not shrink from recognising, with the orthodox interpreters, an expression of the fact that Christ is not *nuncupative*, but *naturaliter* God (Flacius, *Clav.* II. p. 187). (3) Another way, that of taking to pieces the relative clause, was suggested by Erasmus, who proposed to place the point (as in Cod. 71) after πάντων (in which Locke, Clarke, Justi, Ammon, Stolz, Grimm, &c., and in *de Johann. Christol. indole Paulinae compar.* p. 75 f., Baumgarten-Crusius, Ernesti, *Urspr. d. Sünde*, I. p. 200 ff., and Märcker follow him), so that *qui est super omnia* (or *omnes*) refers to Christ (comp. Acts x. 36), and then the doxology to God follows. But how intolerably abrupt is this!—not merely the brief description given of Christ, but also the doxology itself, which with ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων loses its natural connection with the preceding. Again, with this separation would disappear the motive for Paul's not having put εὐλογ. in the first place, as usually (comp. 2 Cor. i. 3; Eph. i. 3; also the doxologies in the LXX.). This motive is, namely, the emphasis which Θεός obtains by the characteristic description ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων (*the God who is over all*).<sup>1</sup> Still more disjointed and halting the language becomes through the punctuation of Morus (who, however, concurs in referring the whole to Christ): ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων, Θεός, εὐλογ. εἰς τ. αἰ.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> With emphasis, too, in the LXX. Ps. lxxviii. 20, κύριος ὁ Θεός appears to be prefixed to εὐλογ. Yet the translator must have had 𐤀𐤓𐤕 twice in the original text.

<sup>2</sup> Otherwise Hofmann (comp. his *Schriftbew.* I. p. 144; also Kahnis, *Dogmat.* I. p. 453 f.): Paul predicates ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων of Christ, and then causes Θεός

Why Reiche, whom Krehl and van Hengel have followed, although rightly referring the whole to God, has adopted this punctuation (*He who is over all, God, be praised for ever*), we cannot perceive; ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων Θεός, taken independently, forms in fact, according to a quite customary manner of expression, one phrase, so that Θεός is *not* without the article. Comp. 1 Cor. iii. 7; Kühner, II. § 464, 8, c. Finally, Grotius (not also Schoettgen, as Schultz states) would consider Θεός as not genuine, and would refer ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ π. εὐλ. to *Christ*, to whom “*laus et honor debetur supra omnes, i. e. etiam supra Abrah., Isaac. et Jacob.*” But that Θεός is not wanting in the *Peschito*, as Grotius maintains, is decisively settled (see Koppe), and the witnesses who actually omit it (*edd.* of Cyprian, and Hilary, Leo once, Ephraem) are much too weak and doubtful; see Bengel, *Appar. crit. in loc.* Quite arbitrary is the conjecture of Sam. Crell (Artemonius): ὢν ὁ ἐπὶ κ.τ.λ. — ἐπὶ πάντων] *neuter*. The limitation which takes it as masc. (Syr., Beza, Grotius, Socinus, Justi, Hofmann, and others), in which case it is by some held to apply to men generally, by others to the patriarchs,<sup>1</sup> must have been presented by the context; but it is not at all suggested by anything, not even in the reference of the sense, which Fritzsche introduces: “*qui omnibus hominibus prospicit Deus, ut male credas Judaeos ab eo destitutos esse, etc.*”—ἐπὶ indicates the relation of the *rule* *over all things*; see Lobeck, *ad Herodian.* p. 474, *ad Phryg.* pp. 164, 174; Bähr, *ad Plut. Alc.* p. 162. God is the παντοκράτωρ, 2 Cor. vi. 18; often in the Apocalypse, ὁ μόνος δυνάστης, ὁ βασιλεὺς τῶν βασιλευόντων κ.τ.λ., 1 Tim. vi. 15, 16.

ἐλόγ. εἰς τ. αἰῶν. to follow as a *second predicate*. But if we once believe that the sentence must be referred to Christ, it is in any case far more in keeping with the emotional flow of the language to leave the whole unbroken, without making an artificial abatement from the result, that Paul has named Christ ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων Θεός. This artificial abatement is thus brought out by Hofmann: he takes ἐπὶ πάντων as in contradistinction to ἔξ ὧν, and Θεός as in contradistinction to κατὰ σάρκα, after which arbitrary analysis the twofold antithetic sequence of thought is supposed to be: “*He who supremely rules over all has come forth out of this people, and, in respect of the self-transmitting human corporal nature, the re has come forth out of this people He who is God.*” As though Paul had written: ἔξ ὧν ὁ Χριστός; ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων τὸ κατὰ σάρκα, ὁ ὢν Θεός ἐύλογητός εἰς τ. αἰῶνας, Gess.

<sup>1</sup> Van Hengel assumes that the *Israelites* and *patriarchs* and *Christ* are intended.

Vv. 6–13. First part of the *Theodicée*: *God's promise, however, has not become untrue through the exclusion of a part of the Israelites; for it applies only to the true Israelites, who are such according to the promise, which is confirmed from Scripture.*

Ver. 6. Having in vv. 4, 5 adduced the great divine prerogatives of his people, and given honour to God for them, as his Israelitish sympathies impelled him to do,<sup>1</sup> his thought now recurs to that utterance of grief in vv. 2, 3, over-against which (δέ) he now proposes to *justify* the God of his people. Quite unnecessarily Lachmann has put vv. 3–5 in a *parenthesis*. — οὐχ οἶον δέ, ὅτι] does not mean: *but it is not possible that* (Beza, Piscator, Grotius, Homberg, Semler, Ch. Schmidt, Morus, Böhme, Rosenmüller, Benecke, Ewald); for in that case ὅτι would not be allowable, but the infinitive must follow (Matthiae, § 479; Krüger, § 55. 3. 1); moreover, as Calvin has rightly observed, οἶον τε would be found, at least according to the invariable usage (4 Macc. iv. 7; Xen. *Anab.* ii. 2. 3, vii. 7. 22; and Bornemann, *in loc.*; *de Rep. Ath.* ii. 2; *Mcm.* iv. 6. 7; *Thuc.* vii. 42. 3; *Soph. Phil.* 913; *O. C.* 1420; Ast, *Lex. Plat.* II. p. 425), instead of which scarcely an uncertain example (as Gorgias, *pro Palam.* in Wetstein) is forthcoming of the simple οἶον without τέ, whilst the masculine οἶός εἰμι (without τέ) is frequent (see Schömann, *ad Is.* p. 465; Weber, *Dcm. Aristocr.* p. 469; Kühner, II. 2, p. 702. 580). It is rather to be explained by the very current usage in later Greek (Lennep, *ad Phalar.* p. 258; Fritzsche on our passage) of οὐχ. οἶον with a following finite tense; e.g. οὐχ οἶον ὀργίζομαι in *Phryn.* p. 372, and the passages from Polybius in Schweighäuser, p. 403). According to this usage, the attracted οἶον is not to be resolved, with Hermann, *ad Viger.* p. 790, into τοῖον οἶον, because the following verb does not suit this, but with Fritzsche into τοῖοντοῦ ὅτι: *the matter is not of such a nature, that.* But since Paul has here expressed ὅτι, he cannot have conceived it as contained in οἶον: in reality he has fallen into a mixing up of two kindred modes of expression,—namely, of οὐχ

<sup>1</sup> And yet Hofmann terms the words ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων Θεός κ.τ.λ., taken as a doxology, an *uncalled-for*, and *aimless, insufferable interruption*. Psychologically, a very unjust judgment.

οἶον with a finite tense, and οὐχ ὅτι, *i.e.* οὐχ ἐρῶ ὅτι. See Tyrwhitt, *ad Arist. Poet.* p. 128; Hartung, *Partikell.* II. p. 153 f.; Kühner, II. 2, p. 800 f. *Without* this intermingling he would have written οὐχ οἶον δὲ ἐκπέπτωκεν; but *consequent* on this intermingling he wrote οὐχ οἶον δὲ, ὅτι ἐκπ., which accordingly may be analyzed thus: οὐ τοῖον δὲ λέγω, οἶον ὅτι, *I do not speak of a thing of such kind, as (that is) that.* So also substantially Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 319, and previously, by way of suggestion, Beza. The deviation from Greek usage into which Paul has fallen renders also necessary this solution, which *deviates*<sup>1</sup> from the analysis of the Greek οὐχ οἶον δὲ ἐκπέπτ. (without ὅτι); and we have here, amongst the many solecisms falsely ascribed to the apostle, a real one. Observe, moreover, the *strength* of the negation implied in οὐχ οἶον; for this affirms that the lament of the apostle was to be *something quite other* than a lament over the frustration of the divine word. According to Hofmann, ἡνχόμεν is to be again supplied to οὐχ οἶον, and ὅτι to be taken as *because*,<sup>2</sup> so that thus Paul would deny that he had for that *wish* the *ground* which is named in ὅτι ἐκπέπτωκεν κ.τ.λ. This is—independently of the arbitrariness of the insertion of ἡνχόμεν—incorrect, just because the thought that this ἡνχόμεν could have had that *ground* would be an *absurd* thought; for it would suppose a fact, which is inconceivable as a *motive* of the wish. — ἐκπέπτωκεν] *has fallen out of its position, i.e. fallen through, become unavailing, without result.* See Plut. *Tib. Gracch.* 21; Ael. *V. H.* iv. 7; Kypke, II. p. 173 f. So διαπίπτειν, Josh. xxi. 45; Judith vi. 9; and πίπτειν, Josh. xxiii. 14; both in use also among the Greeks; comp. ἐκβαλλεσθαι, Dissen, *ad Pind. Nem.* xi. 30. The opposite is μένειν, ver. 11. Comp. also 1 Cor. xiii. 8. — ὁ λόγος τ. Θεοῦ] namely, not the *Dei edictum* (ver. 28) as to the bestowal of blessing only on the *election* of the Israelites, as Fritzsche, an-

<sup>1</sup> Fritzsche prefers to assume a *constructio prae* τὸ σημαίνεσθαι, so that Paul has written ὅτι, because in οὐχ οἶον ὅτι lies the essential meaning: *sed multum abest.*—Van Hengel proposes to resolve the expression thus: τοῖονδ' αὖτε, οἶον τοῦτο ἴσται, οὐ λέγω ὅτι.

<sup>2</sup> Comp. also Erasmus, Castalio, Reithmayr.

icipating, would have it, but generally *the promise given by God to the Israelites*, by which the assurance of the *Messianic salvation* is obviously intended. This sense the context yields generally, and especially by ἐξ ὧν ὁ Χριστὸς τὸ κ. σ., ver. 5, without our having exactly to think of Gen. xii. 3, where the promise is to *Abraham* (Th. Schott). — οὐ γὰρ πάντες κ.τ.λ.] *for not all who spring from Israel*, not all υἱοὶ Ἰσραήλ (ver. 27), *are Israelites* (Israel's children, according to the divine idea), so as to be all destined to receive the salvation promised to the Israelites. Comp. Gal. iv. 29, vi. 16. The *first* Ἰσραήλ is the name of the *patriarch*; the *second*, instead of which the old reading Ἰσραηλῖται (D. Chrys.) contains a correct gloss, is the name of his *people* (xi. 2, 7, 26, *al.*). Mistaking the subtle emphatic character of this mode of expression, Hofmann, in spite of the clear οἱ ἐξ, takes the first Ἰσρ. also as a name of the people, so that the sense would be: the *unity* of the people is something other than the *sum of its members*. To οἱ ἐξ Ἰσρ. corresponds σπέρμα Ἀβρ., ver. 7.

Ver. 7. *Nor yet, because they are descendants of Abraham, are they all (his) children.* — Before οὐδ' a colon only is correct, because the discourse proceeds continuously, annexing denial to denial. — εἰσὶ] The subject is that of the previous clause, οἱ ἐξ Ἰσραήλ. The τέκνα of Abraham, as significantly contrasted with the mere bodily descendants (σπέρμα), are those destined by God to receive the promised salvation. Comp. Matt. iii. 9; John viii. 33, 39; Justin, *c. Tryph.* 44. That it is not *God's children* that are to be understood (although they *are* such), as, after Theodoret and several others, Glöcker afresh takes it, is manifest from the foregoing parallel οὗτοι Ἰσραήλ, and from the fact that it is not till afterwards that τέκνα τ. Θεοῦ are spoken of. — Wrongly, but in consequence of his erroneous understanding of the ὅτι, ver. 6, Hofmann regards οὐδ' ὅτι εἰσὶ σπ. Ἀβρ. as the negation of a second ground of the ἡνέχονην, so that then a new sentence begins with πάντες τέκνα. This view the obvious correlation of οὐδ' . . . τέκνα with the preceding οὐ γὰρ πάντες κ.τ.λ. should have precluded. — After ἀλλ' we are not to supply γέγραπται or οὕτως ἐρρέθη, which would be quite arbitrary; but the saying in Gen. xxi. 12, which is

well known to the reader as a saying of God, is subjoined unaltered and immediately (comp. Gal. iii. 11, 12; 1 Cor. xv. 27) without a *καθὼς γέγραπται* (xv. 3; 1 Cor. i. 31) or the like being introduced, or the second person being altered into the third; simply because it is taken for granted that *the saying is one well known*. — ἐν Ἰσ. κληθ. σοι σπέρμα] closely after the LXX., which renders the original literally. In the original text we read לְךָ יִרְשָׁה בְּיָצִיחַ: *through Isaac posterity shall be named to thee, i.e. through Isaac it will come to pass to thee, that posterity of thine shall have the status and the name of the σπέρμα Ἀβρ.* (comp. Heb. xi. 18); the descendants of Isaac (consequently not the Ishmaelites) shall be recognised as thy posterity (and therewith as the heirs of the divine promise).<sup>1</sup> But *the apostle* has otherwise apprehended the sense of the passage according to its *typical* reference; for it is evident from the relation of ver. 9 to ver. 8, that he *limited* that saying to the person of Isaac himself, who (not Ishmael) was the *promised* child of Abraham, and thus represented in himself the character of the true posterity of Abraham accounted as such by God. Hence, in the *sense of the apostle*: “In the person of Isaac will a descendant be named to thee;” i.e. Isaac will be he, in whose person the notion “descendant of Abraham” shall be represented and recognised. Paul finds in this divine declaration the idea enunciated (ver. 8), that not on bodily descent (which was also the case with Ishmael), but on divine promise (which was the case with Isaac, ver. 9), the true sonship of Abraham is founded. Usually (not by Philippi and Ewald, who concur with our view) the passage is understood, conformably to the historical sense of the original, not of the *person* of Isaac, but of his *posterity*; which, because Isaac himself was the son of promise, represents the true descendants of Abraham according to the promise. But to this posterity *all* Israelites certainly belonged, and it would therefore be inappropriate to set

<sup>1</sup> According to Hofmann, the sense is: “The race, whose ancestor Abraham is assumed to be, shall bear Isaac’s name.” This sense would, instead of בְּיָצִיחַ, require יִצְחָק בְּיָצִיחַ, and in the Greek τῷ ὀνόματι (Isa. xliii. 7) or (xlviii. 1) τῷ ὀνόματι Ἰσαάκ.

them down, by virtue of their extraction from Isaac, as the type of the true sonship of Abraham, when the very claim to that sonship, resting upon bodily descent, is to be withdrawn from them. The *person* of Isaac *himself*, as contrasted with Ishmael, was this type, which was thereupon repeated in Jacob, as contrasted with Esau (in their *persons*), vv. 10–13. Chrysostom aptly indicates the reference to Isaac himself: *διὰ γὰρ τούτου εἶπεν ἐν Ἰσ. κλ. σ. σπ., ἵνα μάθῃς, ὅτι οἱ τῷ τρόπῳ τούτῳ γεννώμενοι τῷ κατὰ τὸν Ἰσαὰκ, οὗτοι μάλιστα εἰσι τὸ σπέρμα τοῦ Ἀβραάμ· πῶς οὖν ὁ Ἰσαὰκ ἐγεννήθη; οὐ κατὰ νόμον φύσεως, οὐδὲ κατὰ δύναμιν σαρκός, ἀλλὰ κατὰ δύναμιν ἐπαγγελίας.* — *κληθήσεται*] *nominativus*. See Winer, p. 571 f. [E. T. 769]; Eur. *Hee*. 625, and Pflugk, *in loc.* The opinion of Reiche, that *καλ.* denotes *to call out of nothing* (see on iv. 7), which it signifies also in Gen. xxi. 12, so that the sense would be: “In the person of Isaac a descendant will be imparted to thee,” is erroneous, because that saying of God was uttered *after* the birth of Isaac. — *σοι*] Dative of ethical reference. — *τοῦτ’ ἔστιν*] *This purports, thereby the idea is expressed*. Rightly Grotius: “Haec vox est explicantis *ὑπόνοιαν* latentem, quod *ἔστι* dicitur Hebraeis.” — *τέκνα τ. Θεοῦ*] Paul *characterizes* the true descendants of Abraham, who are not so from bodily generation, as *God’s children*, that is, as such descendants of the ancestor, whose Abrahamic sonship is not different in the idea of God from that of sonship to Him, so that they are regarded and treated by God as *His* children. — *τὰ τέκνα τῆς ἐπαγγ.*] might mean: *the promised children* (so van Hengel); for the *promised* child of Abraham was Isaac (ver. 9), whose birth was *the realization of a promise* (and so Hofmann takes it). But that Paul had the conception that Isaac was begotten *by virtue of the divine promise*, is evident from Gal. iv. 23 (see *in loc.*), and therefore the genitive (as also previously *τῆς σαρκός*) is to be taken *causatively*: the children of Abraham *who originate from the divine promise*, who are placed in this their relation of sonship to Abraham through the creative power of the divine promise, analogously to the begetting of Isaac; *ἡ τῆς ἐπαγγελίας ἰσχὺς ἔτεκε τὸ παιδίον*, Chrysostom. — *λογίζεται*] by God. Comp. iv. 3, 5. — *εἰς σπέρμα*] that

is, as an *Abrahamic* posterity. See ver. 7. To understand *Gentiles* also, is here foreign to the context (in opposition to Beyschlag); see. vv. 9-13. *Abraham's* race is treated of, to which not *all* who descend from him are without distinction reckoned by God as belonging.

Ver. 9. Proof of the foregoing ἀλλὰ τὰ τέκνα τῆς ἐπαγγελίας. "The children of *promise*, I say, for a word of *promise* is that which follows: about this time, etc." Hence, therefore, we see that not the bodily descent, but the divine *promise*, constitutes the relation of belonging to Abraham's fatherhood. The quotation is freely put together from Gen. xviii. 10 and xviii. 14, after the LXX. — Το κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον, at this time (namely, of the next year), corresponds הַיּוֹם הַבָּא in the original (comp. 2 Kings iv. 16, 17; Gen. xvii. 21), which is to be explained: as the time *revives*, that is, when the time (which is now a thing of the past and dead) returns to life; not with Fritzsche: in the *present* time (of the next year), which suits the words of the LXX.,—where, by way of explanation, the classical εἰς ὥρας, over the year, is added,—but not the Hebrew. See Gesenius, *Thes.* I. p. 470; Tuch and Knobel on Gen. xviii. 10. On the whole promise, comp. Hom. *Od.* xi. 248 f., 295.

Ver. 10. A fresh and still more decisive proof (for it might be objected that, of Abraham's children, Sarah's son only was *legitimate*) that only the divine disposal constituted the succession to Abraham which was true and valid in the sight of God. Comp. Barnab. 13. The more definite notion of *promise*, which was retained in the preceding, is here expanded into the more general one of the *appointment* of the divine *will* as made known. — οὐ μόνον δέ] See generally on v. 3. What is supplied must be something that is gathered from the preceding, that fits the nominative Πεβέκκα, and that answers as regards sense to the following ἐρρέθη αὐτῇ. Hence, because τῇ Σάρρα precedes, and with ἀλλὰ καί another *mother's* name is introduced, we must supply, as subject, not *Abraham* (Augustine, Beza, Calvin, Reithmayr, van Hengel; comp. also Hofmann, who however thinks any completing supplement useless), but Σάρρα; and moreover, not indeed the definite λόγον



ἐπαγγελίας εἶχεν or ἐπηγγελμένη ἦν (Vatablus, Fritzsche, Winer, Krehl, Baumgarten-Crusius), but the more general λόγον or ῥῆμα Θεοῦ εἶχεν, which is suitable to the subsequent ἐρρέθη, as well as to the contents of the sayings adduced in vv. 12, 13: “*But not only had Sarah a saying of God, but also Rebecca, etc.*” We must therefore throw aside the manifold arbitrary supplements suggested, some of which are inconsistent with the construction, not suiting the nominative ‘Ρεβ., as *e.g.*: “non solum id, quod jam diximus, documentum est ejus, quod inferre volumus; Rebecca idem nos docet” (so Grotius, also Seb. Schmid, Semler, Ch. Schmid, Cramer, Rosenmüller, and several others; comp. Tholuck and Philippi); or: τοῦτο ἦν (Rückert, de Wette), so that the nominative ‘Ρεβ. forms an *anacoluthon*, and the period begun enters with ver. 11 upon quite another form (how forced, seeing that vv. 11 and 12 in themselves stand in perfectly regular construction!). It is only the semblance of an objection against our view, that not Sarah, but Abraham, received the word of promise, ver. 9; for Sarah was, by the nature of the case, and also according to the representation of Genesis, the co-recipient of the promise, and was mixed up in the conversation of God with Abraham in reference to it (Gen. xviii. 13–15); so that Paul, without incurring the charge of contradicting history, might have no scruple in stating the contrast as between the *mothers*, as he has done. — ἐξ ἐνὸς κοίτην ἔχουσα] *Who had cohabitation of one (man)*, the effect of which was the conception of the *twin* children. The contextual importance of this addition does not consist in its denying that there was a breach of conjugal fidelity, but in its making palpably apparent the invalidity—for the history of salvation—of bodily descent. She was pregnant by *one* man, and yet how different was the divine determination with respect to the two children! — ἐξ ἐνός] masculine, without anything being supplied; for Ἰσ. τ. π. ἡμ. is in apposition. κοίτη, *couch, bed*, often *marriage bed* (Heb. xiii. 4), is found seldom in the classical writers (Eur. *Med.* 151, *Hippol.* 154; not Anacr. 23, see Valck. *Schol.* II. p. 594), with whom εὐνή and λέχος often have the same sense, euphemistically used as equivalent to *concubitus*, but frequently in the LXX.

See Schleusner, *Theos.* III. p. 347. Comp. *Wisd.* iii. 13, 16. — τοῦ πατρ. ἡμ.] from the *Jewish* consciousness; for the discourse has primarily to do with the Jews. Comp. iv. 1. If Isaac were to be designated as the father of *Christians* (Reiche, Fritzsche), the context must have necessarily and definitely indicated this, since believers are *Abraham's* (spiritual) children. We may add that Ἰσ. τοῦ πατρ. ἡμῶν is not without a significant bearing on the argument, inasmuch as it contributes to make us feel the independence of the determination of the divine will on the theocratic descent, however legitimate.

Vv. 11, 12. *Although, forsooth, they were not yet born, and had not done anything good or evil, in order that the purpose of God according to election might have its continued subsistence, not from works, but from Him who calls, it was said to her, etc.* — μήπω] not οὐπω, because the negative relation is intended to be expressed *subjectively*, that is, as placed before the view of God and weighed by Him in delivering His utterance. See Winer, p. 450 [E. T. 608]; Baumelein, *Partik.* p. 295. Comp. *Xen. Cyr.* iii. 1. 37. — The *subject* (αὐτῶν) to the participles is not expressed, according to a well-known classical usage (Matthiæ, § 563; Kühner, *ad Xen. Anab.* i. 2. 17), but it would be self-evident to the reader from the history familiar to him, that the *twins of Rebecca* were intended; Winer, p. 548 [E. T. 736]. — The sentence expressive of purpose, ἵνα . . . καλοῦντος, is placed with emphasis before ἐρρέθη, and therefore not to be placed in a parenthesis. — ἵνα] introduces the purpose which God had in this, that, notwithstanding they were not yet born, etc., He yet gave forth already the declaration of ver. 12. *He thereby purposed, namely, that His resolve—conceived in the mode of an election made amongst men—to bestow the blessings of the Messianic salvation should subsist, etc.* — ἡ κατ' ἐκλογ. πρόθεσις<sup>1</sup>] can neither be so taken, that the ἐκλογή precedes the πρόθεσις in point of time (comp. viii. 28), which is opposed to the nature of the relation, especially see-

<sup>1</sup> Taken by Beek in a rationalistic sense: "The fundamental outline which serves as a standard for the temporal training of the ἐκλογή, and pervades their temporal development in all its parts."

ing that the *πρόθεσις* pertains to what was antecedent to time (see on viii. 28);<sup>1</sup> nor so that the *ἐκλογή* follows the *πρόθεσις*, whether it be regarded as the act of its fulfilment (Reiche) or as its aim (Krehl). These latter interpretations might certainly be justified linguistically (see Kühner, II. 1, pp. 412, 413), but they would yield no *specific peculiarity of the act* of the *πρόθεσις*. Yet, since *κατ' ἐκλογὴν* must be the characteristically distinctive mark of the purpose, it cannot by any means denote: the resolution adopted *in respect of* an election (Grotius, Rückert); but it must be apprehended as an essential *inherent* of the *πρόθεσις*, expressing the *modal character* of this divine act: *the purpose according to election, i.e. the purpose which was so formed, that in it an election was made*. The *πρόθεσις* would have been no *πρόθ. κατ' ἐκλογὴν*, no "propositum Dei electivum" (Bengel), if God had resolved to bless *all without exception*. His resolve to vouchsafe the Messianic blessedness did *not*, however, concern all, but *those only* who were to be comprehended in this very resolve (by virtue of His *πρόγνωσις*, viii. 29), and who were thereby, by means of the *πρόθεσις* itself, *chosen out* from the rest of men (xi. 5), and thus the *πρόθεσις* was no other than *ἡ κατ' ἐκλογὴν πρόθεσις* (comp. Bengel, Flatt, Tholuck, Beck, Fritzsche, Philippi, Lamping). In a linguistic aspect *κατ' ἐκλογ.* (frequently in Polybius, see Raphel) comes under the same category with the well-known expressions *κατὰ κράτος*, *καθ' ὑπερβολὴν κ.τ.λ.* (Bornem. *ad Cyrop.* i. 4. 23; Bernhardt, p. 241). Comp. xi. 21; 1 Tim. vi. 3. But it is incorrect to alter, with Carpzov, Ernesti, Cramer, Böhme, Ammon, Rosenmüller, the signification of *ἐκλ.*, and to explain *ἡ κατ' ἐκλ. πρόθ.* as "propositum Dei liberum." For, as *election* and *freedom* are in themselves dif-

<sup>1</sup> Since the divine *πρόθεσις* is antecedent to time (Eph. iii. 11; 2 Tim. i. 9), as is also the *ἐκλογή* (Eph. i. 4; and see Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* § 126), we cannot, with Beyschlag, p. 38, understand it of the plan developing itself in history, pertaining to the history of God's kingdom, as God forms it in the calling of Abraham and executes it up to the apostolic present. Mistaken also is van Hengel's view, according to which the *κατ' ἐκλογ.* *πρόθ.* is to be limited to the determination of choice respecting the two brothers, and *μὴν* to the abiding realization of it in the posterity of both sides, while *οὐκ ἐξ ἑργων, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ καλῶντος* is supposed to be a gloss.

ferent conceptions, so in those passages which are appealed to (Joseph. *Bell. Jud.* ii. 8. 14; Psalt. Sal. ix. 7), ἐκλ. is none other than *electio*; and especially in the N. T. ἐκλογή, ἐκλέγεσθαι, and ἐκλεκτός are so stately used for the dogmatic sense of the *election to salvation*, that no alteration can be admitted. In general, Hofmann has rightly understood it of the *quality, which the purpose has from the fact that God chooses*; along with which, however, he likewise transposes the *notion* of the ἐκλογή into that of the *free act of will*, "which has its presupposition only in the chooser, not on the side of the chosen." This anticipates the following, which, moreover, joins itself not to ἐκλογή, but to the abiding of the κατ' ἐκλ. πρόθεσις; hence ἐκλογή must be left in its strict verbal sense of *election*. The ἐκλογή may in and by itself be even an unfree act of will; its freedom does not lie in the notion in itself, but it is only to be inferred mediately from what is further to be said of the μένειν of the κατ' ἐκλ. πρόθεσις, viz. οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων κ.τ.λ. — μένη] The opposite of ἐκπέπτωκεν, ver. 6. Comp. Xen. *Anab.* ii. 3. 24; Eurip. *Iph. T.* 959; Herod. iv. 201. It is the *result aimed at* in such a declaration as God caused to be given to Rebecca before the birth of her two sons: His purpose according to election is meant to remain unchangeable, etc., so much He would have to be settled in His giving that declaration. — οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων κ.τ.λ.] is by most joined, through a supplied οὔσα, to πρόθεσις τ. Θεοῦ;<sup>1</sup> by Fritzsche regarded even as a supplementary definition to κατ' ἐκλογήν, in which he is followed by Lamping, as though Paul had written ἡ οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων κ.τ.λ. But for rejecting the natural and nearest connection with μένη there is absolutely no ground from the sense which thus results: the elective

<sup>1</sup> Luther, however, with whom agree Hofmann and Jatho, connects with ἡ ῥίθη αὐτῇ. But this last has already its defining clause in μᾶλλον κ.τ.λ., and that a clause after which οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων κ.τ.λ., annexed to the ἡ ῥίθη αὐτῇ as a definition of mode, would be something self-evident and superfluous. Hofmann insists, quite groundlessly, that, according to the ordinary connection of οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων κ.τ.λ., instead of οὐκ, μή must have been used. On account of the following ἀλλ' κ.τ.λ., on which the main stress is meant to be laid, οὐκ, even in a sentence expressing purpose, is quite in its place. See Buttm. *Naut. Gr.* p. 302, 8. The negation adheres to the ἐξ ἔργων, see Kühner, II. 2, p. 747 f.

resolution must have its abiding character *not on account of works, which the subjects concerned would perform, but on account of God Himself, who calls to the Messianic salvation.*<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων κ.τ.λ. is a causal specification annexed to the—in itself independent—μένη, namely, of its objective actual relation (hence οὐ, not μή), and should be separated from μένη by a comma (Paul might more formally have written: καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων κ.τ.λ.). Hence the objection that μένειν ἐκ is not found is of no importance, since μένη in itself stands absolutely, and ἐκ is constantly employed in the sense of *by virtue of, by reason of*. See Bernhardt, p. 230; Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* I. p. 551.<sup>2</sup>—On the form ἐρρέθη, which, instead of the Recepta ἐρήθη, is to be adopted with Lachmann and Tischendorf, following the preponderance of testimony, in all passages in Paul, see on Matt. v. 21, and Kühner, I. p. 810 f.—The quotation is Gen. xxv. 23, closely following the LXX.; ὅτι forms no part of it, but is recitative. *In the connection of the original text, ὁ μείζων and ὁ ἐλάσσ., the greater and the smaller, refer to the two nations represented by the elder and younger twin sons, of which they were to be ancestors; and this prediction was fulfilled first under David, who conquered the Edomites (2 Sam. viii. 14); then, after they had freed themselves in the time of Joram (2 Kings viii. 21), under Amaziah (2 Kings xiv. 7; 2 Chron. xxv. 11) and Uzziah (2 Kings xiv. 22; 2 Chron. xxvi. 2), who again reduced them to slavery; and lastly, after they had once more broken loose in the time of Ahaz (2 Chron. xxviii. 17; according to 2 Kings xvi. 6, they had merely wrested the port of Elath from the Jews), under Johannes Hyrcanus, who completely vanquished them, forced them to be circumcised, and incorporated them in the Jewish state (Joseph. *Ant.* xiii. 9. 1). Paul, however, has in view, as the entire context vv. 10, 11,*

<sup>1</sup> This characteristic designation of God as ὁ καλῶν makes it apparent that the attainment of the salvation entirely depends on Him.

<sup>2</sup> Not essentially different from our view is that of Tholuck, de Wette, Philippi, who regard οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων κ.τ.λ. as a subjoined definition of the whole final clause: "And this indeed was not to be effected by virtue of works, etc." (Philippi). But Rückert incorrectly explains it, as though the passage ran μένη μὴ ἐξ ἔργ. κ.τ.λ.

13 evinces, in ὁ μείζ. and τῷ ἐλάσσ., *Esau and Jacob themselves*, not their *nations*; so that the *fulfilment* of the δουλ. is to be found in the *theocratic* subjection into which Esau was reduced through the loss of his birthright and of the paternal blessing, whereby the theocratic *lordship* passed to Jacob. But inasmuch as in Gen. *l.c.* the two brothers are set forth as representatives of the nations, and their *persons* and their destiny are not consequently excluded,—as, indeed, the relation indicated in the divine utterance took its beginning with the brothers themselves, by virtue of the preference of Jacob through the paternal blessing (Gen. xxvii. 29, 37, 40),—the apostle's apprehension of the passage, as he adapts it to his connection, has its ground and its warrant, especially in view of similar hermeneutic freedom in the use of O. T. expressions. — ὁ μείζων and τῷ ἐλάσσ. have neither in the original nor in Greek the *signification*: the first-born and the second-born, which indeed the words do not denote; but Esau, who is to come to birth first, is regarded as the *greater* of the twins in the womb, and Jacob as the *smaller*.

Ver. 13. "This utterance (ἐρρέθη) took place in conformity with the expressly testified (in Mal. i. 2, 3, freely cited from the LXX.) love of God towards Jacob and abhorrence of Esau." Thus, *that* utterance agrees with *this*. But just like Paul, so the *prophet himself* intends by Ἰακώβ and Ἡσαῦ, not the two *nations* Israel and Edom, but the *persons of the two brothers*; God *loved* the former, and *hated* the latter (and therefore has exalted Israel and destroyed Edom). — The *corists* are, in the sense of the *apostle*—as the relation of καθὼς γέγραπ. to the preceding, imparting information respecting the subjective ground of the divine declaration in ver. 12, shows—to be referred to the love and abhorrence entertained towards the brothers *before their birth*, but are not to be understood of the *de facto* manifestation of love and hatred by which the saying of Gen. xxv. 23 had been in the result confirmed (van Hengel). Ἐμίσησα, moreover, is not to have a merely privative sense ascribed to it: *not to love*, or *to love less* (as Fessel, Glass, Grotius, Estius, and many, including Nösselt, Koppe, Tholuck, Flatt, Beck, Maier, Beyschlag), which is not admissible even in

Matt. vi. 24, Luke xiv. 26, xvi. 13, John xii. 25 (see, against this and similar attempts to weaken its force, Lamping); but it expresses the opposite of the positive ἡγάπ., viz. *positive hatred*. See Mal. i. 4. And as that love towards Jacob must be conceived of as completely independent of foreseen virtues (ver. 11), so also this hatred towards Esau as completely independent of foreseen sins (in opposition to the Greek Fathers and Jerome on Mal. i.). Both were founded solely on the free elective determination of God; with whom, in the necessary connection of that plan which He had freely adopted for the process of theocratic development, the hatred and rejection of Esau were presupposed through their opposite, namely, the free love and election of Jacob to be the vehicle of the theocracy and its privileges, as the reverse side of this love and choice, which the history of Edom brought into actual relief.

Vv. 14–18. Second part of the *Theodicée*: *God does not deal unrighteously, in that His πρόθεσις according to election is to have its subsistence, not ἐξ ἔργων, but ἐκ τοῦ καλοῦντος; for He Himself maintains in the Scripture His own freedom to have mercy upon or to harden whom He will.*—This reason has *probative* force, in so far as it is justly *presupposed* in it, that the *axiom* which God expresses respecting Himself is absolutely worthy of Him. Hence we are not, with Beyschlag, to refer the alleged injustice to the fact that God now prefers the *Gentiles* to the *Jews*, which is simply imported into the preceding text, and along with which, no less gratuitously, the following receives the sense: “*the Jews have indeed become what they are out of pure grace; this grace may therefore once again be directed towards others, and be withdrawn from them*” (Beyschlag).

Ver. 14. A possible inference, unfavourable to the character of God, from vv. 11–13, is suggested by Paul himself, and repelled. — μὴ ἀδικ. παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ;] *But is there not unrighteousness with God?* Comp. the question in iii. 5. παρὰ, with qualities, corresponds to the Latin *in*. See Matthiae, § 588. 6. Comp. ii. 11.

Ver. 15. Reason assigned for the μὴ γένοιτο, not for the *legitimacy of the question* μὴ ἀδικία π. τ. Θ. (Mangold, p. 134), so that the *opponent's language continues*, until it “culmi-

nates in the audacious exclamation of ver. 19." *Γάρ* after *μὴ γένοιτο* always relates to *this*. Bengel rightly remarks on *γάρ*: "Nam quod asserimus, *Dei assertum est irrefragabile*." — τῷ Μωϋσ. γ. (see critical remarks) brings into strong relief the venerated *recipient* of the word, which makes it appear the more *weighty* (comp. x. 5, 19). The citation is Ex. xxxiii. 19, verbally following the LXX. (which would have more closely translated the Heb. by ἐλεῶ ὃν ἂν ἐλεήσω κ.τ.λ.).<sup>1</sup> In the *original text* it is an assurance by God to Moses of His favour now directly extended towards him, but expressed in the form of a divine *axiom*. Hence Paul, following the LXX., was justified in employing the passage as a scriptural statement of the general proposition: God's mercy, in respect of the persons concerned, whose lot it should be to experience it, lets itself be determined solely by His own free will of grace: "*I will have mercy upon whosoever is the object of my mercy*;" so that I am therefore in this matter dependent on nothing external to myself. This is the *sovereignty* of the divine compassionating will. Observe that the *future* denotes the *actual* compassion, fulfilling itself in point of fact, which God promises to show to the persons concerned, towards whom He stands in the *mental relation* (ἐλεῶ, *present*) of pity. The distinction between ἐλεῶ and οἰκτεῖρω is not, as Tittmann, *Synon.* p. 69 f., defines it, that ἐλ. denotes the active mercy, and οἰκτ. the compassionate kindness, but that the same notion *misericordi* is more strongly expressed by οἰκτ. See Fritzsche. Comp. Plat. *Euthyd.* p. 288 D: ἐλεήσαντέ με καὶ οἰκτεῖραντε. The latter denotes originally bemoaning sympathy, as opposed to μακαρίζειν (Xen. *Anab.* iii. 1. 19). Comp. οἶκτος (to which ὀδυρμός, Plat. *Rep.* iii. p. 387 D, corresponds), οἰκτίζω, οἰκτρὸς κ.τ.λ. On the form οἰκτερίσω, see Lobeck, *ad Phrygn.* p. 741. — ὃν ἂν] The ἂν is that everywhere usual with the relative in the sense of *cunque*. Hence conditionally expressed: *if to any one* I am gracious, etc. See generally Hartung, *Partikell.* II. p. 293 f.; Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* I. p. 119. Consequently,

<sup>1</sup> Even thus ἐλεῶ would be future *indicative*, not *subjunctive* (in opposition to Fritzsche's criticism). See Bornemann, *ad Xen. Apol.* 16; Poppo, *ad Cyrop.* ii. 1. 13; Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Rep.* p. 61. 5 D.



not merely the mercy in itself, but also the determination of those who should be its objects, is designated as a free act of God, resting on nothing except on His elective purpose, and affecting the persons according to it; for the emphasis lies in the relative clause on the repeated  $\delta\upsilon\ \alpha\upsilon$ , as  $\alpha\upsilon$  generally has its place after the emphatic word.

Ver. 16. Paul now infers from this divine word the doctrine implied in it of the causality of the divine redemption. —  $\text{o}\dot{\upsilon}\ \text{το}\dot{\upsilon}\ \text{θ}\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma$ ] *sc. ἐστί.* Accordingly, therefore, it (the participation in that which has just been designated in the divine utterance as  $\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$  and  $\omicron\iota\kappa\tau\iota\rho\mu\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$ ) is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God who is merciful; it depends not on the striving and urgent endeavour of man, but on the will of the merciful God.<sup>1</sup> The relation of the *genitive* is: *penes*. See Bernhardt, p. 165; Kühner, II. 1, p. 316 f. —  $\tau\rho\acute{\epsilon}\chi\epsilon\iota\upsilon$ , a figurative designation of *strenuously active endeavour*, borrowed originally from the competitive races (1 Cor. ix. 24). Comp. Gal. ii. 2, v. 7; Phil. ii. 16; also in the classical writers. Incorrectly, Reiche (following Locke and others) thinks that  $\theta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma$  was probably chosen with reference to the wish of Abraham to instal Ishmael, and of Isaac to instal Esau, in the heirship; and  $\tau\rho\acute{\epsilon}\chi\epsilon\iota\upsilon$  with reference to the fruitless running in of Esau from the chase (Theophylact understands it of *his running off to the chase*). For Paul, in fact, draws an inference with his  $\alpha\dot{\rho}\alpha\ \text{o}\dot{\upsilon}\nu$  only from the divine utterance issued to Moses; and hence we are not even to conjecture, with van Hengel, a reference to Pharaoh's hasty pursuit of the Israelites. Not on the runner himself depends the successful struggle for the prize (in opposition to Reiche's objection), but he, whom God has chosen to obtain it, now on his part so runs that he does obtain it. Consequently the conception is, that man by his  $\tau\rho\acute{\epsilon}\chi\epsilon\iota\upsilon$  never *meritoriously acquires* the divine favour; but, fulfilling the predetermination of God, he, in the power of the grace already received, *demerits himself conform-*

<sup>1</sup> The proposition in the *generality* with which it is expressed forbids the assumption of a particular reference to *Israel* (Beyschlag), whose moral and religious endeavour (ver. 31) hinders not the right of God's world-ruling majesty to open the heart of the Gentiles for the gospel, and not that of the Jews.

ably to it; hence Paul, in another place, where the context suggests it, *exhorts* to the *τρέχειν* (1 Cor. ix. 24). Beck's opinion, that *θέλειν* and *τρέχειν* are here intended not in the moral sense, but metaphysically and juridically, is nothing but an exegetically groundless deviation from the simple and clear meaning of the words. — τ. ἐλεοῦντος Θεοῦ] to be taken together. Had Paul intended τ. ἐλεοῦντος as *independent*, and Θεοῦ as an *apposition*, he would have only weakened the antithetic emphasis by the very superfluously added Θεοῦ (in opposition to Hofmann).

Ver. 17. Γάρ] *Establishment* of this doctrine *e contrario*,<sup>1</sup> as the inference of ver. 18 shows. — ἡ γράφη] for in it *God* speaks; comp. Gal. iii. 8, 22. — τῷ Φαραῶ] Paul has selected two very striking contemporaneous and historically connected examples, in ver. 15 of election, and here of rejection. The quotation is Ex. ix. 16, with a free and partly intentional variation from the LXX. — ὅτι] does not form part of the declaration, but introduces it, as in ver. 12. — εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο] brings the meaning into stronger relief than the *ἐνεκεν τούτου* of the LXX.: *for this very purpose* (for nothing else). Comp. xiii. 6; 2 Cor. v. 6, vii. 11; Eph. vi. 22; Col. iv. 8. — ἐξήγειρά σε] The LXX. translates יִתְקַדְּשֶׁנָּךְ by διετηρήθης, i.e. *virus servatus es*, and so far, leaving out of view the factitive form of the Hebrew word (to which, however, a reading of the LXX. attested in the Hexapla with διετήρησά σε corresponds), correctly in the historical connection (see Ex. ix. 15). Paul, however, *expands* the special sense of that Hebrew word to denote the *whole appearance* of Pharaoh, of which general fact that particular one was a part; and he renders the word according to this general relation, which lies at the bottom of

<sup>1</sup> The counterpart of that *illud* is, namely, the divine *hardening*; and if this likewise presents itself as dependent only on the divine determination of will,—as the language of Scripture to Pharaoh testifies,—what is said in ver. 16 thus receives a further scriptural confirmation from the correlative counterpart. Beyschlag also recognises a reasoning *e contrario*, but sees in Pharaoh the type of Israel, unto whom the gospel has not merely remained strange, but has tended to hardening. Thus in this type “the present exchange of rôle between Israel and the Gentile world is illustrated in a terrible manner.” This change of rôle is imported.

his view, and in reference to which the active form was important, by: *I have raised thee up*, that is, *caused thee to emerge*; thy whole historical appearance has been brought about by me, in order that, etc. Comp. the current use of *ἐγείρειν* in the N. T., as in Matt. xi. 11, xxiv. 11; John vii. 52, *et al.*; Ecclus. x. 4; 1 Macc. iii. 49; and the Hebrew *עִלָּה*. So, in substance, Theophylact (*εἰς τὸ μέσον ἡγαγον*), Beza, Calvin,<sup>1</sup> Piscator, Bengel, and various others, including Reiche, Olshausen, Rückert, Beck, Tholuck, Philippi; formerly also Hofmann; comp. Beyschlag: "*I have allowed thee to arise.*" The interpretation: *vivum te servavi* (Vorstius, Hammond, Grotius, Wolf, and many, including Koppe, Morus, Böhme, Rosenmüller, Nösselt, Klee, Reithmayr), explains the Hebrew, but not the expression of the apostle; for Jas. v. 15 ought not to have been appealed to, where the *context* demands the sense of "*erigere de lecto graviter decumbentem.*" Yet even now Hofmann compares Jas. v. 15, and explains accordingly: *I have suffered thee to rise from sickness.* But this would only be admissible, provided it were the sense of the original text, which was assumed by Paul as well known; the latter, however, simply says: *I allow thee to stand* for the sake of, etc. (comp. Knobel, *in loc.*), with which also the LXX. agrees. Others explain: *I have appointed thee to be king* (Flatt, Benecke, Glöckler). Others: *I have stirred thee up for resistance* (Augustine, Anselm, Köllner, de Wette, Fritzsche, Maier, Bisping, Lamping, comp. Umbreit), as *ἐγείρειν* and *ἐξεγείρ.* denote, in classical usage, *to incite*, both in a good and bad sense; comp. 2 Macc. xiii. 4; Hist. Sus. 45. But these special definitions of the sense make the apostle say something so *entirely different* both from the original and from the LXX., that they must have been necessitated by the connection. But this is not the case; not even in respect to the view of Augustine, etc., since in ver. 18 *ὃν δὲ θέλει, σκληρύνει* is not inferred from the *verbal sense* of *ἐξήγ. σε*, but from the relation of the *ὅπως κ.τ.λ.* to the *ἐξήγειρά σε (εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο* evinces this),—a relation which would presuppose a hardening

<sup>1</sup> "Deus Pharaonem a se profectum dicit eique hanc impositam esse personam."

of Pharaoh on the part of God, and for the reader who is familiar with the history (Ex. iv. 21, vii. 3, xi. 10, xiv. 4, *et al.*), actually presupposes it. — ὅπως ἐνδείξ. κ.τ.λ.] namely, by means of thy final overthrow; not: by means of the leading out of Israel (Beyschlag), against which is ἐν σοί. — ἐνδείξ.] *may show*, may cause to be recognised in thy case. Comp. iii. 25; Eph. ii. 7; 1 Tim. i. 16. — δύναμιν] LXX.: ἰσχύν. With Paul not an intentional alteration, but another reading according to the Hexapla (in opposition to Philippi). — διαγγ.] *might be thoroughly published*. Comp. Luke ix. 60; Plat. *Protag.* p. 317 A; Pind. *Nem.* v. 5; Herodian, i. 15. 3, ii. 9. 1; Plutarch. *Camill.* 24. — τὸ ὄνομά μου] As naming *Him* who has shown Himself so mighty in the case of Pharaoh. For the opposite, see ii. 24; 1 Tim. vi. 1. — ἐν πάσῃ τῇ γῇ] in the whole earth; a result, which in the later course of history (comp. Eusebius, *praep. ev.* ix. 29), especially was fulfilled in the dispersion of the Jews and the spread of Christianity, and continues to be fulfilled. The explanation: in the whole land (van Hengel), is less in keeping with the tendency of the original text than the all-comprehensive destination of this great judgment of God.

Ver. 18. Result from vv. 15–17. — σκληρύνει] Opposite of ἐλεεῖ, not merely negative like οὐκ ἐλεεῖ (Bengel), but positive: He *hardens* him, makes him thereby incapable of being a σκευός ἐλέους (ver. 23). Such an one becomes σκληρός τε καὶ ἀμετάστροφος (Plato, *Crat.* p. 407 D), σκλ. καὶ ἀπειθής (Plato, *Loer.* p. 104 C), in a moral respect.<sup>1</sup> Comp. Acts xix. 9; Heb. iii. 8, 13, 15, iv. 7; σκληροκαρδία, Matt. xix. 8; Mark xvi. 14; Rom. ii. 5; see also Soph. *Aj.* 1340, *Trach.* 1250; Lobeck, *ad Aj.* p. 384; from the O. T., Umbreit, *d. Sünde*, p. 113 ff. Vv. 19 ff. prove that all warping or alteration of

<sup>1</sup> For an analogous *pagan* conception, comp. especially Euripides, in Lyeurgus *adv. Leocr.* p. 198 (§ 92):

ὅταν γὰρ ὀργὴ δαιμόνων βλάβῃ τινα,  
τοῦτ' αὐτὸ πρῶτον ἱξαφαιρεῖται φρενῶν  
τὸν νοῦν τὸν ἰσθλὸν, εἰς δὲ τὴν χεῖρ τρίπτει  
γνώμην, ἵν' εἰδῇ μηδὲν ὧν ἀμαρτάνει.

See also Ruhnken, *ad Vell. Patere.* ii. 57, p. 265 ff.

this sense of the word is erroneous ; that the suggestion, *e.g.*, in Origen and several Fathers, in Grotius, Koppe, Flatt, Klee, Maier, and others, that only the divine *permission* is intended (comp. Melancthon : “ Indurat, i. e. *sinit esse durum, nec convertit eum*”), is erroneous ; and equally erroneous is the interpretation *duriter tractat* (Carpzov, Semler, Cramer, Ernesti, Schulthess, *Exeg. Forsch.* II. p. 136 ; comp. Beck, p. 75 f.), which is contrary to the signification of the word (also in the LXX. Job xxxix. 16 <sup>1</sup>). Evidence to the same effect is supplied by the *twofold* representation given of the hardening of Pharaoh in Exodus, where it appears partly as *self-produced* (viii. 15, 32, ix. 34 ; comp. 1 Sam. vi. 6), partly as *effected by God* (iv. 21, vii. 3, ix. 12, x. 20, 27, xi. 10). Of these two ways of regarding the matter, however, Paul, suitably to his object, has expressly adopted the latter ; Pharaoh *hardened by God* is to him the type of all who obstinately withstand the divine counsel of salvation, as Israel does. In opposition to Beck’s evasive expedients, see Lamping. On the *hardening itself* Olshausen remarks :—(1) That it presupposes already the beginnings of evil. But this is at variance with *ὃν θέλει* and *ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ φυράματος*, ver. 21. (2) That it is not an aggravation of sin, but a means of preventing its aggravation. But Pharaoh’s history is against this. (3) That the total hardening is an expression of simple penal justice, when sin has become sin against the Holy Ghost. But in that case there could be no mention of a *ὃν θέλει*. The clear and simple sense of the apostle is, that it depends on the free determination of God’s will whether to bless with His saving mercy, or, on the other hand, to put into that spiritual condition, in which a man can be no object of His saving mercy (but rather of His *ὀργή* only). Accordingly, the will of God is here the *absolute* will, which is only in the *ἐλεεῖ* a will of grace, and not also in the *σκληρύνει* (in opposition to Th. Schott). Of the style and

<sup>1</sup> In Job, *l.c.*, *ἀπισκλήρυνει*, LXX., is said of the ostrich, which renders *hard*, i. e. *makes hardy*, its young ones. Comp. Leon. Tarent. 11 ; Athen. I. p. 24 D ; Theophr. *C. pl.* iii. 16. 2, v. 15. 6. Such is also the meaning of *ἀποσκληρώω*. The sense of the original (פִּשְׁקֵן) is not decisive. The LXX. has understood it as *ἀπισκληρ.* Comp. Lamping, p. 188 f.

manner in which the older dogmatic interpreters have here introduced qualifying clauses in the interests of opposition to absolute predestination, the development of the matter by Calovius may serve as an example. He maintains, that when it is said that God hardens, this is not to be taken *ἐνεργητικῶς* or *effective*, but (1) *συγχωρητικῶς*, propter *permissionem*; (2) *ἀφορμητικῶς*, propter *occasionem*, quam ex iis, quae Deus agit, sumunt reprobi; (3) *ἐγκαταλειπτικῶς*, ob *desertionem*, quod gratia sua deserat reprobos; (4) *παραδοτικῶς*, ob *traditionem* in sensum reprobum et in ulteriorem Satanæ potestatem. But Philippi's suggestion of the immanent *law* which the divine freedom carries within itself,—according to which God will have mercy upon *him* who acknowledges His right to have mercy on whom He will, and to harden whom He will; and will harden *him* who denies to Him this right,—will only then come into consideration by the side of what Paul here says, when (see remarks after ver. 33) we are in a position to judge of the relation of our passage and the connection that follows it to the moral self-determination of man, which the apostle teaches *elsewhere*; seeing that no further guiding hint is here given by Paul, and, moreover, that immanent law of the divine freedom, as Philippi himself frankly recognises, is *not at all here* expressed. For now the apostle has been most sedulously and exclusively urging nothing but the complete independence of the divine willing in *ἐλεεῖν* and *σκληρύνειν*,<sup>1</sup> which the *Form. Cone.* p. 821 does not duly attend to, when it maintains that Paul desired to represent the hardening of Pharaoh as an example of divine *penal justice*. Not “ut eo ipso Dei *justitiam* declararet,” has Paul adduced this example, although it falls *historically* under this point of view, but as a proof of the completely *free self-determination* of God to harden *whom He will*. Accordingly, the hardening here appears by no means, as has been lately read between the lines, “as a consequence of preceding *conceived self-righteousness*” (Tholuck), or “such as the man himself has willed

<sup>1</sup> Observe that in *ὁ ἐλεῖ* the emphasis falls on *ἐλεῖ*, not—as in ver. 15, where *ἔω* was added—on *ὁ*. In the second clause this emphatic *ὁ ἐλεῖ* is then repeated, on which occasion *καὶ* (*again, on the other hand*) brings out the corresponding symmetry of the relative definition on both sides (Hartung, *Portik.* I. p. 168 f.).

it" (Th. Schott), or conditioned by the divine standard of holiness confronting human sin (Weiss), or with an obvious presupposition of human self-determination (Beyschlag). Elsewhere the hardening may be adjudged as a *punishment* by God (Isa. vi. 9 ff.; Ps. lxxix. 28; see Umbreit, p. 310 f.), but not so here. The will of God, which in truth can be no arbitrary pleasure, is no doubt holy and just; but it is not here apprehended and set forth under this *point of view* and from this *side*, but in reference to its *independence of all human assistance*, consequently in accordance with its *absolute ascitas*, which is to be retained in its clear precision and without any qualifying clause to the words  $\delta\upsilon\ \theta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\iota\ \acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\epsilon\iota$ ,<sup>1</sup> and must not be obscured by ideas of mediate agency that are here foreign.

Vv. 19-21. *Third part of the Theodicee: But man is not entitled to dispute with God, why He should still find fault. For his relation to God is as that of the thing formed to its former, or of the vessel to the potter, who has power to fashion out of a single lump vessels to honour and dishonour.*

Ver. 19. An objection supposed by the apostle (comp. xi. 19) which might be raised against ver. 18, not merely by a Jew, but generally. —  $\sigma\upsilon\nu$ ] in pursuance of the  $\delta\upsilon\ \delta\grave{\epsilon}\ \theta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\iota\ \sigma\kappa\lambda\eta\rho\acute{\upsilon}\nu\epsilon\iota$ . —  $\acute{\epsilon}\tau\iota$ ] logical, as in iii. 7, and frequently: If He hardens out of His own determination of will, *why does He still find fault?* That fact surely takes away all warrant from the reproaches which God makes against hardened sinners, since they have been hardened by the divine will itself, to which no one yet offers opposition (with success). —  $\tau\tilde{\omega}\ \gamma\grave{\alpha}\rho\ \beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda.\ \kappa.\tau.\lambda.$ ] ground assigned for the question,  $\tau\acute{\iota}\ \acute{\epsilon}\tau\iota\ \mu\acute{\epsilon}\mu\phi.$  —  $\acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\eta\kappa\epsilon$ ] *Who withstands?* whereby, concretely, the *irresistibility* of the divine decree is set forth. *The divine decree is exalted above any one's opposition.* According to the present opinion of Hofmann (it was otherwise in the *Schriftbew.* I. p. 246 f.), the opponent wishes to establish that, if the words  $\delta\upsilon\ \theta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\iota$ ,

<sup>1</sup> Hofmann rightly remarks: the  $\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\epsilon\iota\nu$  is designated as an act, *whose object one is in virtue of the fact, that God wills to make him its object.* Just so it stands with the  $\sigma\kappa\lambda\eta\rho\acute{\upsilon}\nu\epsilon\iota\nu$ , by which God fulfils His own will in the person concerned, without having his action and character as a ground of determination in the matter.

σκληρύνει be correct, *no one may offer opposition to that which God wills*,<sup>1</sup> and therefore God can in no one have *anything to censure*. But thus the thought of the question τίς ἀνθέστηκε would be one so irrational and impious (as though, forsooth, no sinner would be opposed to God), that Paul would not even have had ground or warrant to have invented it as an objection. That question is not *impious*, but *tragic*, the expression of human weakness in presence of the divine decree of hardening. — On the classical βούλημα (more frequently βούλευμα), *the thing willed, i.e. captum consilium* (only here in Paul), see van Hengel, Lobeck, *ad Aj.* 44. Comp., as to the distinction between βούλομαι and θέλω (Eph. i. 11), on Matt. i. 19.

Ver. 20. Μενοῦνγε] *Imo vero*, here not without irony: *Yea verily, O man* (ii. 1), *who art thou (quantulus es) who replicst against God?* See on Luke xi. 28; also Ast, *Lex. Plat.* II. p. 303. On σὺ τίς εἶ, comp. xiv. 4; Plato, *Gorg.* p. 452 B: σὺ δὲ . . . τίς εἶ, ὦ ἄνθρωπε; Paul does not give a *refutation* of the τί ἔτι μέμφ., but he repudiates the question as *unwarranted*; “*abrumpit quaestionem*” (Melanethon), and that wholly from the standpoint of the entirely unlimited divine omnipotence, on which he has placed himself in the whole of the present connection, and consistently with that standpoint. — ὁ ἀνταποκριν.] For in τί ἔτι . . . ἀνθέστ. there is contained an *oppositional reply*, namely, to *God's finding fault*, not to the *saying* of Scripture, ver. 17 (Hofmann), which the apostle's present train of thought has already left behind. On the expression, comp. Luke xiv. 6; Judg. v. 29; Job xvi. 8, xxxii. 12. The word is not found in the Greek writers. But ἀνταποκρίνεσθαι, says Paul, as little belongs to man against God, as to the thing formed belongs the question addressed to its former: *Why hast thou made me thus* (as I am)? This *comparison* is *logically correct* (in opposition to Usteri, *Lehrbegr.*

<sup>1</sup> The general expression “opposition” [Widerpart] does not correspond with sufficient definiteness to the notion of ἀνίστημι, since the latter everywhere signifies the real and active *resistere*. So also in Paul (xiii. 2; Gal. ii. 11; Eph. vi. 13). Comp. Soph. *Fragm.* 234; Dindorf: πρὸς τὴν ἀνάγκην οὗδ' Ἀρεὶ ἀνίσταται. Plato, *Symp.* p. 196 D.



p. 269), since the *tertium comparationis* generally is the *constituting of the quality*. As the moulder produces the quality of the vessel formed by him according to his own free will, so God constitutes the moral quality (fitted for blessedness or not so) of men as He will. Only when it is maintained that the comparison with the thing formed must properly refer only to the first formation of men, and not to the subsequent ethical moulding of those created (as in Pharaoh's case, whom God hardened), can its logical correctness be denied. But Paul wrote in a popular form, and it is to do him injustice to press his simile more than he himself, judging by the tenor of the entire connection, would have it pressed. Glöckler (following Pareus) finds in *μὴ ἐρεῖ κ.τ.λ.* and ver. 21 an *argumentatio a minore ad majus*: "If not even in the case of an effigy can such a question be addressed to its former, how much less can man, etc." But this also is to be quite laid aside, and we must simply abide by the conception of a simile, since that question on the part of the thing formed cannot certainly be conceived as really taking place, and since the simile itself is of so frequent occurrence in the O. T., that Paul has doubtless employed it by way of reminiscence from that source. See Isa. xxix. 16, xlv. 9; Jer. xviii. 6; Wisd. xv. 7; Eccus. xxxvi. 13. Vv. 21-23 also show that Paul sets forth God Himself under the image of the potter. According to Hofmann, the sense of the question resolves itself into a complaint over the *destiny*, for which the *creature* is *created* by God. But the contextual notion of *ποιεῖν* is not that of *creation*, but that of *preparation, adjustment* (vv. 21, 22), correlative to the making of the potter, who does not *create* his vessels, but *forms and fashions* (*πλάσαντι*) them thus or thus; and *οὕτως* simply *specifies the mode* of the making: *in such shape*, in such a kind of way, that I have *not* issued from thy hands as one of *another* mould. Comp. Winer, p. 434 [E. T. 584]. It is the *τρόπος* of the *ποιεῖν*, which presents itself in the *result*.

Ver. 21. [*H*] The sense, without an interrogation, is: *Unless perhaps the potter should not have power over his clay* (*τοῦ πηλοῦ*), *to make* (*ποιῆσαι*, the infinitive of more precise definition), etc. Comp. Wisd. xv. 7. — *ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ φυράμ.*] The *φύραμα* (comp.

on xi. 16; 1 Cor. v. 6) is the *lump* of the *πηλός*, mixed with water and *kneaded*, out of which the potter makes the different vessels. In the *application* of the simile, *the same lump* denotes human nature in and by itself, as it is alike in all with its opposite moral capabilities and dispositions,<sup>1</sup> but not yet conceived of in its definite individual moral stamp. Out of this, like the potter out of the clay-dough which is susceptible of various moulding, God—who does not merely “*allow to come into being*” the different moral quality of individuals, in order *then* to fulfil on them the *ἐλεεῖν* or *σκληρύνειν* which He will (Hofmann), but effectively *produces* it—makes partly such as are destined to stand in honour (namely, as partakers of the Messianic glory), partly such as are to stand in dishonour (namely, through the eternal *ἀπώλεια*). Comp. vv. 22, 23. See also 2 Tim. ii. 20, 21. The former is the *effect* of His *ἐλεεῖν*, as in the case of Moses; the latter that of His *σκληρύνειν*, as in the case of Pharaoh. Much too general and rationalizing, in opposition to the text, is van Hengel's view, that the figure refers generally to the “*inexplicabiles divini rerum humanarum regiminis rationes* ;” and Beyschlag's view amounts to the same thing: “out of the material of the human race (?) which is at His disposal as it continues to come into existence, *to stamp individuals with this or that historical destination*” (?). — *εἰς τιμήν*] This is the *destination* of the vessel; it is either to be *honoured*, so that it has *τιμήν* (as *e.g.* a sacred vase), or is to experience the opposite, so that *ἀτιμία* cleaves to it (as *e.g.* an utensil destined to foul use). — Observe the *purposely-chosen arrangement of the words*: the juxtaposition of *οὐκ ἔχει* (or *lacks*), the juxtaposition of *ὁ κεραμεὺς τοῦ πηλοῦ* (although *τοῦ πηλ.* belongs to *ἐξουσ.*; comp. Buttman, *neut. Gr.* p. 332), and the prefixing of *εἰς τιμήν*.

Vv. 22–29. *Fourth part of the Theodicée: God, full of long-suffering, has borne with vessels of wrath, in order without to make known His glory on vessels of mercy, as which He has*

<sup>1</sup> This *massa* is by Augustine onesidedly viewed as “*peccato originali infecta, corrupta damnationique obnoxia*,” so that then the vessels *εἰς τιμήν* are those which *ad amandam in gratiam*, and the vessels *εἰς ἀτιμίαν* those which *ad lucidum debitum relinquuntur*.

also called us Christians both out of the Jews and out of the Gentiles. Comp. on vv. 22, 23; Wisd. xii. 20, 21. These two kinds of σκεύη are necessarily the same as those meant in ver. 21 (in opposition to Weiss, p. 66 f., and *bibl. Theol.* p. 383). This is shown by the retention of σκεύη, as well as by the attributes κατηρτισμένα and ἀ προητοίμασεν corresponding to the ποιῆσαι of ver. 21, just as εἰς ἀπόλειαν aptly corresponds to the εἰς ἀτιμίαν, and εἰς δόξαν to the εἰς τιμήν, ver. 21. The former vessels as κατηρτισμένα εἰς ἀπόλειαν are necessarily σκεύη ὀργῆς, for the divine ὀργή and ἀπόλεια are correlates, which suppose one another. But the guilt, which is supposed by the notion of ὀργή, is, in the entirely consistent connection of our passage, presented—by the καταρτίζειν which precedes the guilt, and in virtue of which God has made them such as they are and not otherwise—as the consequence of the moral development conditioned by this previous preparation. Weiss fails to recognise the *oncsidedness* of the mode of view here necessarily intended and boldly carried out by the apostle, which will not, moreover, bear the attempts of Hofmann to explain it away, or those of Beyschlag to twist the notion; the latter least of all, on the subjective ground that the strictly understood notion of σκεύη ὀργῆς is *incapable of fulfilment*, which at the absolute standpoint of the text it is *not*.

Ver. 22 f. forms a conditional interrogative sentence, the *apodosis* of which is not expressed, but is gathered from the context, viz.: *Wilt thou still be able to venture the ἀνταποκρίνεσθαι τῷ Θεῷ of ver. 20 f.? Must thou not utterly become dumb with thy replies?* Comp. on John vi. 61; Acts xxiii. 9; Luke xix. 41: see also Calvin and Calovius, *in loc.*; Fritzsche, *Conject.* p. 30; Hartung, *Partikell.* II. p. 212; Dissen, *ad Dcm. de cor.* p. 297. This *aposiopesis* with εἰ δὲ corresponds perfectly to our: *but how if*, etc. It is to be translated: "*But how if God, although minded to manifest His wrath and to make known His power, has endured with much long-suffering vessels of wrath, which are nevertheless adjusted for destruction, in order also to make known the riches of His glory on vessels of mercy, which He has prepared beforehand for*

glory?" *Paraphrased*, the sense is: "*But if God, notwithstanding that His holy will disposes Him not to leave unmanifested His wrath and His power, but practically to make them known, has nevertheless hitherto, full of long-suffering, endured such as are objects of His wrath, and spared them from the destruction, to incur which they are nevertheless constituted and fitted like a vessel by the potter—endured them and spared them not merely as a proof of such great long-suffering towards them, but also with the purpose in view of making known, during the period of this forbearance, the fulness of His glorious perfection in respect to such as are objects of His mercy, whom He, as the potter fashions a vessel, has prepared beforehand, and put in order for eternal glory,—how, in presence of that self-denying long-suffering of God towards vessels of wrath, and in presence of this gracious purpose, which He withal, at the same time, cherishes towards the vessels of mercy, must any desire to dispute with God completely depart from thee!*"—In detail the following points are to be observed:  $\delta\epsilon$  is neither equivalent to  $\sigma\upsilon\nu$ , nor resumptive, but the simple  $\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\beta\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\acute{o}\nu$ , making the transition to something *further*, *namely*, from the previous dismissal of the objector to the *refutation* which puts him to shame.<sup>1</sup> Tholuck (comp. also Weiss, Reithmayr, and others) takes it *antithetically*, so that the sequence of thought would be: "I assert this as God's absolute right against you, if you choose to take your stand on the point of right; but how if God *has not so much as even dealt thus*, etc.?" But such an interpretation, which would require the contrast to be much more strongly marked than by the mere  $\delta\epsilon$ , is at variance with the retention in the sequel of the figurative  $\sigma\kappa\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\eta$  and their preparedness; because it is thence evident, that what Paul had previously said concerning the freedom of God to prepare men of different character and destiny like potters' vessels, he by no means intended to cancel, as if God *had not thus dealt*.  $\Theta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omega\nu$  is, with Fritzsche, Philippi, Lamping, and several others, to be resolved by *although*, because only thus is there yielded the logi-

<sup>1</sup> Hofmann asserts, with singular dogmatism, that the *metabatic*  $\delta\epsilon$  (Hartung, l. p. 165) is not fitted to introduce the transition to a *stronger* reply. Why not? It introduces a *new* point (Baumlein, p. 90).

cally correct preparation for the notion of πολλή μακροθυμία, which is a *self-denying* one; the θέλει ἐνδείξασθαι κ.τ.λ. is the constant *essential characteristic* of the holy God, and yet He has borne, etc. The analysis: *because* God willed (so most, including de Wette, Rückert, van Hengel), yields the sense that God has, in order thereupon to issue all the more evident a penal judgment, endured patiently, etc.; but this would not amount to a πολλή μακροθυμία, but in fact to a delay occasioned by an ungodlike motive, and having in view the heaping up of wrath. Unworthy of God, and only rendered possible by the importation of parenthetical thoughts, is the sense which Hofmann educes: God has *not* so borne with those men, *that He would first see how it would be with them*, in order then to deal with them *accordingly*; but He has done so *with the will already withal firmly settled*, to prove, etc. That *negative* and this *already firm settlement* of will are read between the lines. — Θέλων is placed at the *head* of the sentence, in order by contrast the more forcibly to prepare the mind for the notion for which it is intended to prepare, that of the μακροθυμία. Τὸ δυνατόν αὐτοῦ is *what is possible to Him, what He is in a position to do*. Comp. viii. 3, τὸ ἀδύνατον τοῦ νόμου. Xen. Hell. i. 4. 13, τοῦ τῆς πόλεως δυνατοῦ. As to the matter itself, see 3 Macc. ii. 6. The aorist ἤνεγκεν does not refer to the long forbearance with *Pharaoh* (Chrysostom, de Wette, and most); the reference to him has been already concluded with ver. 18; but Paul intends generally the *time hitherto* (which will in like manner run on under this divine long-suffering up to the *Parousia*), when God has still restrained the will of His holiness, and has not yet accomplished the destruction of the objects of His wrath, which He will do for the first time in judgment. The σκεύη ὀργῆς, without the article, *vessels of wrath*, denotes not *some*, but such σκεύη generally,<sup>1</sup> *qualitatively* understood, namely, vessels which are prepared (ver. 20 f.) to experience God's wrath on themselves, to be the objects of it. The effect of this wrath, which will go

<sup>1</sup> And that so that both kinds of vessels exist among Jews and Gentiles (see ver. 24); in opposition to van Hengel, who thinks that the vessels of wrath represent only the *Jewish people*; comp. also Weiss and others.

forth at the judgment, is *everlasting destruction*; <sup>1</sup> hence *κατηρτ. εἰς ἀπώλ.*, *adjusted for destruction* (not “ripe for destruction,” as Weiss and Hofmann explain), serves to bring the *μακροθυμία* into still clearer relief, which is not that which *waits* for the *self-decision of human freedom* (Beyschlag), especially for *amendment* (in opposition to Bengel, Tholuck, and others), but that which *delays the penal judgment* (comp. on Luke xviii. 7), the *prolongatio irae*, Jer. xv. 15, *et al.* The passage ii. 4 f. is no protest against this view, since the apostle does not there, as in the present passage, place himself at the standpoint of the absolute divine will. The subject who has adjusted those concerned for *ἀπώλεια* is *God*; <sup>2</sup> and any saving clause whereby the passive sense is made to disappear, or the *passive* expression—which, after ver. 20 f., not even a certain refinement of piety is to be suggested as underlying—is made to yield the sense that *they* had adjusted *themselves* for destruction, or had *deserved* it (see Chrysostom, Theodoret, Occumenius, Theophylact, Grotius, Calovius, Bengel, and many; also Steudel, Olshausen, Reithmayr, Beck, Hofmann, and Krummacher), is opposed to the literal meaning and to the context (ver. 21). See also Lamping, p. 213. Hofmann’s interpretation especially: “who *had advanced* to that point, and *found* themselves therein,” is wrecked on his incorrect explanation of *τί με ἐποίησας οὕτως*, ver. 20. In *καὶ ἵνα κ.τ.λ.*, *καὶ* is *also*, *introducing*, in addition to the object involved in the previous *ἐν πολλῇ μακροθυμίᾳ*, that *accessory* object which God had in view in enduring the vessels of wrath *in reference to vessels of mercy* (the use of the genit. *ἐλέους* corresponds to that of *ὀργῆς*, ver. 22). Besides His great long-suffering towards *those*, He would *also* make known how rich in glory He was towards *these*. For had He not so patiently tolerated

<sup>1</sup> Hahn, *Theol. d. N. T.* I. p. 166 f., erroneously refers the *ὀργή* and the *ἀπώλεια* to *time*, as opposed to eternity. The employment of *εἰς δόξαν* in contrast is decisive against this view. Comp. Ritschl, *De ira Dei*, p. 15. This remark also applies against Beyschlag, p. 57, who thinks that I change notions *pertaining to the history of God’s kingdom* into abstract dogmatic ones. As though the everlasting *ἀπώλεια* and the everlasting *δόξα* were not precisely the *issues of that kingdom’s history*!

<sup>2</sup> Comp. also Estius and Lechler, *apost. Zeit.* p. 123.

the *σκεύη ὀργῆς*, but already caused the penal judgment to set in upon them (which is to be thought of as setting in along with the *Parousia*, not antecedently to this, like the destruction of Jerusalem), He would have had no space in which to make known His glory on *σκεύεσιν ἐλέους*. But this purpose was to be served exactly by that long period of forbearance, during which such *σκεύη* as were prepared beforehand by God for eternal *δόξα* should through their calling (ver. 24) be led to Christ, and thereby the fulness of the divine glory should be made known in respect to them; which making known is matter of fact (Eph. iii. 10). In *τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ*, the context directs us to think of the *divine majesty* in relation to its beneficent glory, its glory in the bestowal of blessing; but *εἰς δόξαν*, as the opposite of *εἰς ἀπώλ.*, denotes the everlasting *Messianic glory* (viii. 21, 30). The verbs *ἐτοιμάζειν* and *καταρτίζειν* are not as different from one another as *existence* (*Dasein*) is from *mode of existence* (*Sein*),—an assertion of Hofmann's as incorrect as it is devoid of proof,—but *ἐτοιμάζειν* also denotes to *constitute qualitatively*, to prepare in the corresponding quality (1 Cor. ii. 9; Eph. ii. 10; Philem. 22; Matt. iii. 3; Luke i. 17, ii. 31; John xiv. 2, *et al.*). Comp. here especially 2 Tim. ii. 21. Against such an error the well-known reflexive use of *ἐτοιμάζειν ἑαυτόν* (Rev. viii. 6, xix. 7) should have warned him, as well as the equivalent use of the middle (1 Macc. v. 11, xii. 27, and very frequently in the classics). It is solely with a view to variety and illustration that Paul uses for the same notion the *two* verbs, of which Hofmann rationalizes the *ἐτοιμάζειν* to mean: "that it is God who *has caused* those who attain to glory *to come into being for the end* of possessing the glory, to which they thereupon attain by the fact that He pours forth His own upon them." Nor is there anything peculiar to be sought behind the change from passive to active; the transition to the active was more readily suggested by the thought of the activity of *love*. The *προ* in *προητοίμασεν* is not to be disregarded (see on Eph. ii. 10); nor is it to be referred to the time before birth, nor to the *acterna electio* (the latter is the act of God, which before time *preceded* the *præparatio*); but to the fact that God has so previously fashioned

the *σκεύη ἐλέους*, before He makes known His glory on them (just as the potter fashions the vessel), that is, has constituted in them that ethical personality, which corresponds to their destination to obtain eternal *δόξα* through Christ.<sup>1</sup> In *ἐπὶ* the act of making known is contemplated as *extending* over the men, who are its objects. If, with Beza and Fritzsche (*Conject.* p. 29; not abandoned in his *Comment.* p. 343 f., but placed *alongside* of the ordinary mode of connection), we should make *καὶ ἵνα γνωρίσῃ κ.τ.λ.* dependent, if not simply on *κατηρητισμένα* (Rückert), yet on *κατηρτ. εἰς ἀπώλειαν* (so also Beyschlag), in which case *καὶ* would have to be taken most simply as *and*, the entire balance of the discourse would be deranged, inasmuch as the important thought *καὶ ἵνα γνωρίσῃ κ.τ.λ.*, on which the whole sequel depends, would be subordinated to a mere secondary definition. The centre of gravity of the argument lies in the bearing with the vessels of wrath on the part of the divine long-suffering; and *thereof* in ver. 23 there is brought forward an explanation glorifying God, which is *added* in respect to the *σκεύη ἐλέους*.<sup>2</sup> The connection above referred to would also certainly yield a severity of thought, a *rigour* of telic view, which, granting all the boldness of deduction with which Paul follows out the idea of predestination, yet finds nothing further in accord with it in the whole treatise; the thought, namely, that God has made ready the *σκεύη ὀργῆς* for destruction, in order, *through the effect of the contrast*,<sup>3</sup> the more fully to make known His glory in the

<sup>1</sup> Thus the *πρετοιμάζω*, *to prepare beforehand*, is to be understood according to the context (vv. 21, 22), in the real sense, therefore, of actual *constituting*, as previously *κατηρτ.*, and not in the sense of the mere *predestination* in the divine counsel (Philippi), to which also the explanation of Delitzsch, *Psychol.* p. 40, amounts, who represents God as having eternally before Him "the whole future state of the facts as to the decision" of the subjects, and dealing accordingly. Comp. Matt. xxv. 34, 41; 2 Tim. ii. 21; Eph. ii. 10.

<sup>2</sup> Beyschlag incorrectly objects, that thus the notion of long-suffering is deprived of its value; for it is no more such, if it is exercised not for the sake of its objects, but for the love of others. This does not take account of the fact that Paul has certainly expressed with sufficient definiteness, by his *καὶ* before *ἵνα*, that he is speaking only of an aim which subsisted *along with* others, not of that which took place *alone*.

<sup>3</sup> Beyschlag here pushes to the utmost his explanation *from the history of*



σκεύεσι ἐλέους. — It is further to be remarked, (1) That the interrogative conditional sentence forming an aposiopesis *terminates with* ver. 23, and is not (with Fritzsche) to be extended to ver. 24, since all that follows from ver. 25 onward belongs to the topic started in ver. 24. (2) That we are *not*, following Reithmayr and older commentators with Philippi,<sup>1</sup> to supply a second εἰ between καί and ἵνα in ver. 23, and to assume that Paul had intended at the close of ver. 23 to say ἐκάλεσεν αὐτούς, but that he at once directed his glance at the concretes, and therefore wrote οὓς καὶ ἐκάλεσεν ἡμᾶς instead of ἐκάλεσεν αὐτούς. Thereby a rambling and confusion in the presenting of his thoughts is, quite unnecessarily, imputed to the apostle, which would be very glaring, particularly in a dialectic passage so stamped throughout with clearness, definiteness, and precision as the present. Similarly, but still more confusedly, Tholuck. The language in vv. 22, 23 is condensed and rich in thought, but runs on according to plan and rule in its form. (3) The *apodosis* (which on our understanding is not expressed) is not to be found in ver. 23, because this would only be possible by arbitrarily supplying *hoc fecit*, or the whole preceding chief sentence. So Ewald:

*God's kingdom*, in order to obtain the very opposite of this rigour: "If God now drives the Jewish people through hardening towards destruction, He does certainly no more towards them than what they have richly deserved (?); but, at the same time, by breaking the brittle shell of Judaism, in which the gospel has germinated (?), He turns the same to account for the unfettered adoption of the Gentile world, and brings in, along with the day of judgment (?) on Israel, the day likewise (?) of the glorification of the community chosen (?) by Him out of all the world." This is consistent *interpolation*, with an elastic *interpretation* of the strict notions conveyed by the words.

<sup>1</sup> In regard to my explanation, Philippi stumbles especially at the fact that Paul has not written ἐπὶ πλείονα σκίση ἰλίου. But the apostle has in truth the two kinds of σκίση in view solely according to their *quality*; the opposition thought of by him is purely *qualitative*; a *numerical* comparison did not concern him. Had God not been so long-suffering towards *vessels of wrath*, He would not have been able to make known how rich in glory He was towards men of an opposite sort—towards *vessels of grace*. The reflection is not concerned with how *many* of one and the other class were in reality extant; but with the fact that God, with His long-suffering exercised in spite of His holy will towards the first category, had purposed at the same time the making known of His δόξα respecting the second category. Philippi's doubt, still expressed in the third edition, touches Fritzsche's exposition, but hardly mine.

"so He did that also, in order that He might make known, on the other hand, the riches of His glory, etc.," so also Th. Schott and Hofmann. — With our explanation agree substantially Calvin, Grotius, and several others; including Winer, p. 530 [E. T. 713]; Baur, in the *Theol. Jahrb.* 1857, p. 200; Lamping and van Hengel, whilst Umbreit educes something which has no existence in the passage, as though it ran: *εἰ δὲ ἔθελεν ὁ Θεὸς . . . ἀλλ' ἤνεγκεν κ.τ.λ.* (He has, on the contrary, endured, etc.)

Ver. 24. Not a confirmation of the design of the divine endurance expressed in ver. 23 (Hofmann), but as the continuation of the relative construction most readily suggests, the *concrete more precise designation of those intended by* *σκεύη ἐλέους*, and that for the confirmation of what was said of them by *ἂ προητοιμάσεν εἰς δόξαν*. The *καί* denotes what is added to this *προητοίμ.* *ἐ. δ.*: as which *σκεύη II.* has also called us to this glory of the Messianic kingdom. — *οὗς*] attracted by *ἡμᾶς* into the same gender. See Bernhardt, p. 302; Winer, p. 156 f. [E. T. 207]. The *relative* after an interrogative sentence has the emphasis of an *οὗτος γάρ* (Kühner, *ad Xen. Mem.* i. 2. 64); but the *masculine* is first introduced here, not in the preceding relative sentence (against Hofmann's objection), because the neuter expression *ἂ προητοίμ.* was required by the conformity with the correlate *κατηρτισμένα*. — *οὐ μόνον κ.τ.λ.*] Therefore without preference of the Jews. "Judæus credens non est eo ipso vocatus, *quod* Judæus est, sed vocatus est ex Judæis," Bengel.

Ver. 25. Of the *καὶ ἐξ ἐθνῶν*<sup>1</sup> it is shown that it is in accordance with (*ὡς*) a divine prophetic utterance. The *ἐξ Ἰουδαίων* required no confirmation from prophecy; but the

<sup>1</sup> According to Hofmann (comp. his *Weissag. u. Erf.* II. p. 215, and *Schriftbew.* I. p. 251), Paul has referred the quotation to the Jewish people, in so far, namely, as it was called out of free grace, according to which the bestowal of grace promised by Scripture appears as an act of God not founded on the condition of the subjects. But this after the immediately preceding *ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ ἐθνῶν* is quite inadmissible, as it is also forbidden by the transition to *Israel*, which first appears in ver. 27. Very rashly, Hofmann terms the establishing of the typically prophetic reference to the *Gentiles* an "idle talk." Comp. 1 Pet. ii. 10, with Wiesinger and Huther thereon. See also on x. 20. The simply correct view is already given by Chrysostom.

other statement required it the more, inasmuch as it was exactly the Gentiles who had become believing that had been introduced as *σκεύη ἐλέους*, in place of the Jews who had remained unbelieving. — ἐν τῷ Ὄσ.] *in libro Hosae*: comp. Mark i. 2; John vi. 45; Acts vii. 42. The passage Hos. ii. 25 (the citation varies both from the LXX. and the original text) treats of the idolatrous *people of the ten tribes*, to whom God announces pardon and renewed adoption as the people of God. *The apostle* recognises in this pardon the type of the reception of the Gentiles to salvation, and consequently, as its prophetically *Messianic* sense, a prediction of the *calling of the Gentiles*; and from this point of view, which has its warrant in the likeness of *category* to which the subjects belong (comp. Hengstenberg, *Christol.* I. p. 251), he has also introduced the deviations from the words of the original and of the LXX., transposing the two parallel sentences, and rendering the thought ἐρῶ τῷ οὐ λαῷ μου κ.τ.λ. (LXX.) by καλέσω κ.τ.λ., because the divine κλήσις of the Gentiles loomed before him as the Messianic fulfilment of the saying. Yet we are not thereby justified in understanding καλέσω and κληθήσονται, ver. 26, *immediately* in the sense of *vocation* (Fritzsche); for καλεῖν τινά τι, *to call any one to something*, is without linguistic warrant, and the departure thus assumed from the original and from the LXX. would be *unnecessary*, and would amount to a *mechanical* proceeding. On the contrary, καλεῖν is to be left in its ordinary signification *to name* (comp. Hos. i. 6); the divine *naming*, however, as “my people, my beloved,” of which the Gentiles were previously the very opposite, is in point of fact none other than just their *calling to Messianic salvation*, in consequence of which they are then *named* also from the human side υἱοὶ Θεοῦ ζῶντος (ver. 26), and are therewith *recognised* according to the theocratic *status* which they have obtained. The vivid thought laid hold of the expression καλέσω the more readily, since in this word to *call* and to *name* form a single notion. Accordingly we must translate: *I will name that which is not my people, my people; and her who is not beloved, beloved.* Both expressions refer in the original to the significant names of a son (בֶּן אֲהָבָה) and of a daughter (בִּת אֲהָבָה) of the prophet, which

he had been directed to give them as symbolically significant of the rejection of the people, Hos. i. 6-9.—On the *οὐ* standing beside the noun with the article, where the denial refers to a concrete definite subject, see Baumannlein, *Partik.* p. 276.

Ver. 26. Hos. ii. 1 (almost literally from the LXX., i. 10) is joined to the former passage, so that both are regarded as forming *one* connected declaration. Often so in Rabbinical usage, even when the passages belong to different writers. See Surenhusius, *καταλλ.*, p. 464. 45. — *καὶ ἔσται*] *וְהָיָה*, *and it* (the following) *will come to pass*. Comp. Acts ii. 21. These words are included in those of the prophecy (see also the LXX.), and therefore a colon is not to be placed after *καί*, as though they were the apostle's (Hofmann and others).—These words also treat, *in Hosea himself*, of the theocratic restoration of the exiled people of the kingdom of Ephraim, so that *ἐν τῷ τόπῳ οὗ*<sup>1</sup> denotes *Palestine*, whither the outcasts were to return (not the place of exile, as Hengstenberg, I. p. 248, and others think). But *Paul* recognises the antitypic fulfilment, as before at ver. 25, in the *calling of the Gentiles*, who, previously designated by God as not His people, *become* now, in consequence of the divine calling, *sons of the living (true) God*. See on ver. 25. But in this sense of Messianic fulfilment, according to Paul, the *τόπος οὗ ἐρρέθη αὐτοῖς κ.τ.λ.* cannot be *Palestine*, as it is in the historical sense of the prophet; nor yet is it "the communion of saints" (de Wette, comp. Baumgarten-Crusius: "the ideal state, the divine kingdom"), nor the "*coetus Christianorum, ubi diu dubitatum est, an recte gentiles reciperentur*" (Fritzsche); but simply—and this is also the ordinary explanation—the *locality of the Gentiles*, the Gentile lands. *There*, where they dwelt, *there* they, called by God to the salvation of the Messiah, were now named sons of the true God; and *there*, too, it had been before said to them: Ye are not my people! *in so far*, namely, as this utterance of rejection was the utterance of *God*, which, published to the Gentiles, is conceived, in the plastic spirit of poetry, as *resounding in all Gentile lands*. To suppose the locality *without significance* (Krehl), is inconsistent with its

<sup>1</sup> For analogous examples of *οὗ* after *ἐν τῷ τόπῳ*, see Bornemann, *Schol. in Luc.* p. 132.

being so carefully designated. And to take ἐν τῷ τόπῳ οὗ, with Ewald, not in a local sense at all, but in that of *instead that*, even if it agree with the Hebrew (comp. Hitzig), cannot be made to agree with the Greek words. The LXX. understood and translated מְקוֹם אֲשֶׁר *locally*, and rightly so.

Vv. 27, 28. If Paul has, in vv. 25, 26, shown ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ ἐθνῶν to be based on prophecy, he now begins, seeing that the accepted Gentiles have taken the place of the excluded Jews, also to adduce prophetic evidence of the exclusion of the greater part of Israel. — δέ] leads over to *another* prophet,<sup>1</sup> who prophesies something further, and that concerning *Israel*: "*But Esaias cries respecting Israel*, etc." — κράζει] Of the loud crying, and therewith peculiarly *impassioned*, profoundly moved, and urgent call of the speaker, comp. Acts xxiii. 6, xxiv. 21; John vii. 28, 37, xii. 44, i. 15. — ὑπέρ] Like περί, *in respect of*, as, since Demosthenes, frequently with verbs of saying. The quotation is Isa. x. 22 f., not quite closely following the LXX., and with a reminiscence (ὁ ἀριθμ. τ. υἱῶν Ἰσρ.) of Hos. ii. 1. — τὸ ὑπόλειμμα σωθ.] *The remnant concerned* (with emphatic accentuation, *i.e.* not more than the remnant) *will be saved*; that is, in the sense of the apostle: out of the countless great people *only that small number which remains after the rejection of the hardened mass will attain to the Messianic salvation*.<sup>2</sup> With this understanding Paul employed the trans-

<sup>1</sup> Only this view agrees with the connection, since the prophet Hosea was previously cited *by name*, and now *another* is likewise introduced *by name*. Therefore we are not to say, with van Hengel, that by δέ the prophet is placed in contradistinction to *God Himself speaking*. But Hofmann's opinion, that the position of ὑπὲρ τοῦ Ἰσρ. (for Paul has not placed ὑπὲρ δὲ τοῦ Ἰσρ. first) proves that ver. 25 refers to Israel, is incorrect; because, if ver. 25 did not refer to the Gentiles, Paul would have had no reason for here adding ὑπὲρ τ. Ἰσρ., since in the very passage under citation Israel is expressly named. The train of thought is: (1) *Hosea* gives the divine prediction respecting the not-God's-people (respecting the *Gentiles*), vv. 25, 26; (2) but *Isaiah* utters a prophecy which contains information respecting the relation of *Israel* to the reception of salvation. Thus *both prophets* establish what was said in ver. 24, οὐ μόνον ἐξ Ἰουδαίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ ἐθνῶν, — namely, *Hosea* the καὶ ἐξ ἐθνῶν, and *Isaiah* the οὐ μόνον ἐξ Ἰουδαίων. Thus the emphasis in ver. 27 lies primarily on Ἰσραὴλ δέ, whose prophecy, differing from the oracle of Hosea, is to be introduced by the significant κράζει ὑπὲρ τ. Ἰσρ. Paraphrase somewhat thus: But *Isaiah*, what do we hear from him? We hear the cry respecting *Israel*, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Hofmann misinterprets the passage in *Isaiah*, making it to mean that *the*

lation in the LXX.—not verbally exact, but corresponding to the Messianic reference—of יָשׁוּב by σωθήσεται (which they understood of the deliverance by a return into Palestine) in the *Messianic* sense. In *Isaiah* the word refers to the return to God, is *converted*, of which the Messianic σώζεσθαι is just the consequence.

Ver. 28. The Hebrew runs: כְּלֵין הָרִין שִׁטָּף צָדִיקָה בִּי כָּלָה וְנִחְרָצָה צָדִיקָה יְהוָה צְבָאוֹת עֲשֵׂה בְּקֶרֶב כָּל־הָאָרֶץ. *Extirpation is decided,<sup>1</sup> streaming justice (i.e. penal justice); for extirpation and decision (penal decision) the Lord Jehorah Zebaoth makes (i.e. is on the point of executing) in the midst of the whole earth (on Zion).* The LXX. did not understand these words, and translated them incorrectly (on how they came to do so, see Fritzsche, also Maier, in the *Theol. Jahrb.* 1845, I. p. 190 f.). This cannot be denied; nor are we, with Olshausen, to attempt to conceal or smooth over the fact by arbitrary interpretation of the Hebrew. Paul has nevertheless felt no scruple in abiding by their translation with a few unimportant deviations, since its sense is not less suitable than that of the original to the con-

whole people Israel, which shall return, be it never so numerous, is called a "remnant," for the reason that it has come out of a severe time of distress. In correspondence with this sense, the passage, which is incorrectly translated by the LXX. (because they have ἰὼν γίνηται, and add αὐτῶν to κατάλιμμα), is held to be rightly understood by Paul: "that the remnant which obtains salvation is one with the people, of which the case is supposed, that it is then as numerous as the sand by the sea." Against this it may be urged (1) that שִׁטָּף יָשׁוּב בּוֹ according to the context (comp. also vii. 3) cannot mean: the return of the people will be the return of a remnant, so that the latter would be the people itself, but only: a remaining part (not the mass) will return in the people, i.e. among the people,—the rest not. (2) The LXX. have understood the original substantially with perfect correctness, inasmuch as, instead of writing word for word τ. κατάλ. σωθῆς. ἐν αὐτοῖς, they give the explanation: τ. κατάλ. αὐτῶν σωθῆς. (3) Paul follows the LXX. in this, only passing over the self-understood αὐτῶν. That the LXX. render יְהוָה by γένεται, and Paul writes ἡ instead, is entirely unessential.

<sup>1</sup> According to Hofmann, חָרִין must be not predicate, but adjective: "an end-making, which actually and truly makes an end," which permits no further extension of the present state of the world; such an end-making will bring in the state of righteousness as with the force of waves. Incorrectly, because thus חָרִין is made to contain something which is not in it (even at Job xv. 1), and because צָדִיקָה is understood with Drechsler contrary to the context, and unsuitably to the figurative שִׁטָּף (comp. viii. 7, xxviii. 15, 18).

nection and object which the declaration here subserves. The words, as Paul has them, mean: "*For utterance-accomplishing and (as matter of fact, through a speedy execution of it) short-cutting in righteousness (is He); for a short-cut utterance (i.e. a saying in which the whole penal decision is summarily included) will the Lord bring to pass on the earth.*" In reference to single expressions, remark: (1) λόγον, which belongs to both participles, is neither *decree* (usually so taken, but this is not its meaning), nor *matter of fact* (Beza, Melancthon, Castalio, Calvin, Koppe, Reithmayr, formerly also Hofmann, *Wessag. u. Erf.* II. p. 213, and various others), which it never denotes with Paul, nor *reckoning*,<sup>1</sup> which, in connection with ποιεῖν, would be contrary to idiom, but *dictum*, an *utterance*, which He has delivered; and this indeed, in the first clause of the verse, which expresses the executive justice of God *in general*, is to be understood quite generally; comp. Erasmus, *Paraphr.*: "quicquid dixit, plene praestet et quidem compendio." In the second clause, on the other hand, which adduces proof of that general description of God with the *concrete case*, the occurrence of which is predicted, *the divine saying of ver. 27, delivered through the prophet*, is intended. (2) συντέμνειν, used of something that is said (speeches, answers, and the like), like συναίρειν, never denotes in Greek anything else than *to cut short* (Plato, *Protag.* p. 334 D, *Ep.* 3, p. 318 B; Aeschines, p. 32. 23; Euripides, *Iph. A.* 1249, *Acol. fr.* v. 2; Lucian, *bis. accus.* 28; Soph. *fragm.* 411, Dind.; 2 Macc. x. 10; Pflugk, *ad Eur. Hec.* 1180), and it is therefore inadmissible to depart from this signification of the συντομία λόγων (Plato, *Phaedr.* p. 267 B). We must, however, observe that in συντέμνων this "*comprising in short*" must be a *matter of fact*, consisting in the short sum-

<sup>1</sup> So now Hofmann, omitting (see critical notes) the words ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ ὅτι λόγον συντετμημ. The λόγον ποιεῖν is supposed to be the *appointment* of an accounting, which is designated by συντελεῖν as a *settlement of account*, and by συντίμνειν as an *abridged process of accounting*. The notion of holding a reckoning is certainly expressed in the Greek writers by the familiar phrases λόγον λαμβάνειν, ὑπὸ τὸν λόγον ἄγειν, λόγον αἰτεῖν, etc., but not by λόγον ποιεῖν, which has quite other significations, and in which λόγος never means *reckoning*. Besides, συντέμνειν with λόγον demands for the latter, according to constant usage, the signification of *speech, saying*.

mary despatch of the matter (comp. LXX. Isa. xxviii. 22; Eur. *Rhes.* 450), like our "*cut it short*;" while, on the other hand, *συντετμημένον* (*perfect*) refers to the concise, short, and stern style in which *the saying itself* is conceived (τὸ ὑπόλειμμα σωθήσεται!).<sup>1</sup> Passages in which *συντέμνειν* denotes *overtake* and the like (as Soph. *Ant.* 1090) have no bearing on the present one. Neither are we to adopt what Tholuck reads into it, that God will accomplish the promise delivered in Isa. x. 20, 21, *only with great limitation of the number of the people*, which would, besides, be not at all suitable to the perfect participle *συντετμημένον*. Moreover, the LXX. cannot have meant *λόγον* of the word of promise, but, according to the sense of the original, only of the penal judicial declaration. (3) ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ does not stand for the *righteousness of faith* (Fritzsche), but is to be referred, according to the context, as in the Hebrew, to the judicial *righteousness* of God. (4) The participles *συντετ.* and *συντέμνων* require only ἐστὶ to be supplied.<sup>2</sup> See Hermann, *ad Viger.* p. 776; Bernhardt, p. 470; Kühner, II. 1, p. 37. And (5) as respects the argumentative force of the γάρ, it lies in the fact that, if God causes such a penal judgment to be issued on Israel, the part of the people remaining spared, which obtains salvation, can only be the ὑπόλειμμα out of the mass, that which *remains over*. Incorrectly Hofmann, in accordance with his erroneous interpretation of vv. 27, 28, explains: So long as this present world-period endures, Israel's final salvation might remain in suspense; "*but Jehovah leaves it not on this footing, He makes an end and settles accounts*

<sup>1</sup> The Vulgate has, with literal correctness, rendered *brevians* and *breviatum*. Van Hengel abides by this signification, but assumes as the sense of *συντέμνων*: *de ipsa tamen minatione nonnihil detrahens*, so that God, in virtue of His righteousness, does not reject all, but saves a small part, consisting of the less refractory; *συντετμημένον* he then makes dependent on ποιήσει: "*faciet, ut dictum suum incisum sit, i. e. ut minatio sua plerosque tantum Judaeorum attingat, de ea detrahens ad salutem pauciorum.*" But so *συντέμνειν* would amount to the sense of *subjecting something in part to deduction*; but it is not employed thus of speeches, but only of things, Thuc. viii. 45. 2 (τὴν τι μισθοφορὰν ξυντέμνειν), Xen. *Hier.* iv. 9 (τὰς ὑαπνάς συντέμνειν).

<sup>2</sup> The *subject*, God, is here understood of itself according to the following context, so that it is unnecessary to parenthesize ὅτι . . . ποιήσει in order to gain *πῶς* as subject, as van Hengel artificially proposes.



*with the world, and the remnant which is then Israel's people returns to Him and attains to salvation."*

Ver. 29. Since the preceding prophecy was not introduced by *καθώς* or *ὥς*, we must here punctuate *καὶ, καθὼς προείρηκεν Ἡσαΐας, εἰ μὴ κ.τ.λ.*, so that Paul adopts as his own<sup>1</sup> the words of Isa. i. 9 (closely following the LXX.): "*And, as Isaiah has prophesied, if the Lord of Zebaoth had not left behind to us a seed* (in the sense of the apostle, this is that very *ὑπόλειμμα* of ver. 27, which, like seed out of which new fruit grows, preserves and continues the true people of God), *we should have become as Sodom, and like to Gomorrha*;" the whole nation (by exclusion from Messianic salvation) would have without exception perished (fallen unto *ἀπώλεια*). — *προείρ.*] Not to be understood, with Baumgarten-Crusius and van Hengel, following Erasmus, Beza, Calvin, Grotius, Michaelis, and others: *has said at an earlier place*, for local specifications of this kind are quite unusual in quotations with Paul, and here such reference would be without significance. It is used in the *prophetic* sense; the prophet has said of the fate of the people in *his* time, with a forecast of its corresponding fate in the present time, what holds good of *Israel's present*; the mass of its people is hardened by divine judgment, and forfeits salvation, and only a holy *σπέρμα* is left to it. Comp. on *προείρ.*, Acts i. 16; Plato, *Rep.* p. 619 C; Lucian, *Jov. Frag.* 30; Polyb. vi. 3. 2. — *ὥς Γόμ.*] Two modes of conception are intermixed: *become like*, and *become as*, LXX., Hos. iv. 6; Ezek. xxxii. 2; Fritzsche, *ad Marc.* p. 140 f. Compare the classical connection of *ὅμοιος* and *ὁμοίως* with *ὥς* and *ὥσπερ*.

Vv. 30-33. *The blame of their exclusion rests upon the Jews themselves, because they strove after righteousness not by faith, but by works; they took offence at Christ.* Observe how Paul here "with the fewest words touches the deepest foundation of the matter" (Ewald).

Vv. 30, 31. From the preceding prophecies, ver. 25 ff. (not with particular regard to ver. 16, as de Wette), Paul now, in order to prepare the transition to the *διατί*; *ὅτι κ.τ.λ.*, ver. 32,

<sup>1</sup> To supply an *apodosis* (Philippi: *οὕτω καὶ νῦν ἔχουσιν*) is therefore completely superfluous, and consequently arbitrary.

draws the *historical result*, and that in the form of question and answer: "What shall we say then? (we shall say) that Gentiles, they who strove not after righteousness, have obtained righteousness, but righteousness which proceeds from faith; while Israel, on the contrary, in spite of its endeavour after the law which justifies, has not attained to this law." Others take ὅτι . . . ἔφθασε to be a *question*, namely either: "What are we to say to the fact, that Gentiles, etc.?" So, following Theodore of Mopsuestia and others, Heumann, Flatt, Olshausen, also Morus, who takes ὅτι as *because*. Or: "What are we therefore to say? Are we to say that Gentiles, etc.?" So Reiche, who is then compelled to consider δικ. δὲ τὴν ἐκ πίστ. as an answer inserted as in a dialogue, and to see in ver. 32 the "removal of the ground of the objection by a disclosure of the cause of the phenomenon, which has now no longer anything surprising in it." But Reiche's view is to be rejected, partly on the ground that the insertion of a supposed answer, δικ. δὲ τ. ἐκ π., is a makeshift and unexampled in Paul's writings; partly because ὅτι . . . ἔφθασε, even with the exclusion of δικ. δὲ τ. ἐκ π., contains complete Pauline *truth*, and consequently does not at all resemble a problematic inquiry, such as Paul elsewhere introduces by τί ἐροῦμεν, and then refutes as *erroneous* (see iv. 1). This, too, in opposition to Th. Schott, who, taking τί οὖν . . . δικαιοσύνην; as a *single independent question* (What shall we now say to the fact, that Gentiles, etc.), then finds the *answer* in δικαιοσύνην δὲ ἐκ πίστεως, but afterwards, no less strangely than groundlessly, proposes to connect διατί immediately, no punctuation being previously inserted, with the proposition Ἰσραὴλ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Finally, it is decisive against Heumann and others, that the answer of ver. 32, ὅτι οὐκ κ.τ.λ., does not concern the *Gentiles* at all (see ver. 30). — ἔθνη] *Gentiles* (comp. ii. 14), not the Gentiles as a collective body. On the part of *Gentiles* righteousness was obtained, etc. — τὰ μὴ διώκ.] *They, whose endeavour* (for they had not a revelation, nor did they observe the moral law) *was not directed towards becoming righteous*, they obtained righteousness, but — and hereby this paradox of sacred history is solved — that which proceeds from *faith*. In

the first two instances *δικ.* is used without any special definition from the Christian point of view; the latter only comes to be introduced with the third *δικ.* — *ἐξ*] comp. iii. 22; Phil. ii. 8. — On the figurative *διώκειν*, borrowed from the running for the prize in the racecourse, as also on the correlate *καταλαμβάνειν*, comp. Phil. iii. 12–14; 1 Cor. ix. 24; 1 Tim. vi. 11, 12; Ecclus. xi. 10, xxvii. 8; on *διώκειν δικαιοσύνην*, Plato, *Rep.* p. 545 A. Observe the *threefold* *δικαιοσύνην*, as in ver. 31 the repetition of *νόμον δικαιοσ.* The whole passage is framed for pointed effect: “Vehementer auditorem commovet ejusdem redintegratio verbi . . . quasi aliquod telum saepius perveniat in eandem partem corporis.” *Auct. ad Hercenn.* iv. 28.

Vv. 31,<sup>1</sup> 32. *Israel, on the contrary, striving after the law of righteousness, has (in respect to the mass of the people) not attained to the law of righteousness.* — *νόμον δικαιοσ.*] *The law affording righteousness.* Quite erroneous is the view of Chrysostom, Theodoret, Calvin, Beza, Piscator, Bengel, Heumann, that it is a *hypallage* for *δικαιοσύνην νόμου*; and that of Rückert and Köllner is arbitrary, that Paul, in his effort after brevity and paradox, has used a *condensed* phrase for *τὸν νόμον ὡς νόμον δικ.* On the contrary, *the justifying law* is in both instances (comp. *δικαιοσύνην*, ver. 30) to be left without any more precise concrete definition, and to be regarded as *the ideal* (comp. also Fritzsche and Philippi), *the reality of which the Israelites strove by their legal conduct to experience in themselves (to possess), but did not obtain.* The *justifying law*! this is the *idea*, which they pursued, but to the reality they remained strangers. If, finally, we chose, with many others (including Bengel, Koppe, Flatt, Reiche, Köllner, Krehl, de Wette), to understand the first *νόμ. δικ.* of the historical *Mosaic law*, and the second of *Christianity*, *διώκων* would be opposed to us; for this, according to ver. 30, expresses not *the endeavour to fulfil the law*, but the endeavour to *possess* the law, as, indeed, *οὐκ ἔφθασε εἰς* must correspond to *κατέλαβε* in ver. 30,

<sup>1</sup> Ver. 31, although belonging to the answer to the *τί οὖν ἰσοῦμεν*, and therefore regarded by many as still dependent on *ὅτι*, is nevertheless better taken as an independent proposition, because thus more emphatic, and because *διὰ τί*, ver. 32, refers only to ver. 31.

and therefore must simply denote *non pervenit* (Vulg.), not: *non praevenit* (Erasmus, Estius, Hammond, and others, including Ewald and Jatho). Comp. on Phil. iii. 16. The reading of Lachmann, εἰς νόμον οὐκ ἔφθασε, which Hofmann follows, is explained by the latter: *Israel was set upon fulfilling a law which teaches what is right (διώκων νόμον δικαιοσύνης), but did not thereby succeed, did not become ἔννομος (εἰς νόμον οὐκ ἔφθασε);* because the law remained for it, like a shadow, ever only near, but unattainable, *thus Israel had not at all come to have its standpoint generally in a law and to live in it,* neither in that of the *Old Testament*, which it sought to follow, nor in that of the *New Testament*, on which it turned its back. An entirely subjective artificial complication of ideas, with invented accessories, and not even historically correct, since in fact the Israelites stood and lived only too much ἐν νόμῳ and as ἔννομοι, but could not withal attain to the νόμος δικαιοσύνης. This δικαιοσύνης is the tragic point of the negative counter-statement, and hence is indispensable in the text. — διὰ τί] sc. εἰς νόμον δικ. οὐκ ἔφθασεν; answer: ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως, sc. ἐδίωξαν νόμον δικ. For, had they started from *faith* in their striving, they would have obtained in Christianity the realization of their endeavour, the νόμον δικαιοσύνης; through faith in Christ, to whom the law already points (iii. 31, x. 5 ff.; John v. 46), they would have become righteous, and would thus in the gospel have *really* attained what floated before them as an *idea*, the *justifying law*. — ὥς ἐξ ἔργ.] ὥς can neither denote a *hypocritical* conduct (Theophylact), nor *presumed* works (Fritzsche), nor *quasi* (van Hengel, following the Vulgate); for, indeed, the Jews really *set out from* the works of the law in their endeavour. On the contrary, it means: Because their διώκειν was *in the way*, in which a διώκειν starting from works is constituted; the (perverted) *kind and quality* of the endeavour<sup>1</sup> is designated, comp. 2 Cor. ii. 17; John i. 14. The ἐξ ἔργ. is by ὥς brought

<sup>1</sup> To this, according to the real sense, Philippi's explanation amounts; taking ὥς, however, of the *subjective conception* of the διώκοντες, equivalent to ὥς φησόμενοι κ.τ.λ. This is inadmissible, because, as with ἐκ πίστεως, so also with ἐξ ἔργων, only the notion of διώκειν can be supplied. Hofmann has, in consistency

into fuller relief; see Klotz, *ad Devar.* p. 757 f. — προσέκοψαν κ.τ.λ.] without γάρ (see critical remarks), but thus coming in all the more strikingly: *they stumbled*, etc.; that is the fatal fact, which befell them in their διώκειν, and caused that they οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως κ.τ.λ. Had they not stumbled at the stone of stumbling, they would have entered on the right line of endeavour ἐκ πίστεως, instead of their perverted one ὡς ἐξ ἔργων νόμου. The simple appropriateness, clearness, and force, with which the προσέκοψαν κ.τ.λ. is thus introduced, must exclude the connection with ἀλλ' ὡς ἐξ ἔργων νόμου (Lachmann), followed also by Th. Schott ("but, as *could not but happen* in consequence of works, *came to ruin* on the stone of stumbling"). The λίθος προσκόμματος, the stone on which one stumbles (trips), is Christ, in so far as occasion for unbelief is taken at His manifestation (especially at His death on the cross, 1 Cor. i. 23). Comp. Luke ii. 34; 1 Pet. ii. 7, 8. The figure is in perfect correspondence with the conception of the διώκειν, and was perhaps selected in anticipation of the passage of Scripture to be adduced. Aptly, moreover, Theophylact remarks: λίθ. προσκ. κ. πέτρα σκανδ. ἀπὸ τοῦ τέλους καὶ τῆς ἐκβάσεως τῶν ἀπιστησάντων ὠνόμασται ὁ Χριστός· αὐτὸς γὰρ καθ' ἑαυτὸν θεμέλιος καὶ ἐδραῖωμα ἐτέθη.

Ver. 33. This προσέκοψαν τῷ λίθῳ τ. προσκ. ensued—and this is the θεία μοῖρα herein—in conformity with the prophetic declaration, according to which Christ is laid as *the stone of stumbling* in Israel (ἐν Σιών, as the theocratic seat of the people), and *faith* on Him would have been that very thing which would have preserved them from the forfeiture of salvation.—Isa. xxviii. 16 and viii. 14 are blended into one declaration, with a free but pertinent variation both from the original and also from the LXX. With *Isaiah*, in the *first* passage, the *theocracy*—the kingdom of Jehovah,<sup>1</sup> whose sacred basis and central seat is the temple—is the stone laid by God; and in the *second*, *God Himself* is the stone of stumbling and the rock with his erroneous understanding of ver. 31, extorted from the words the sense, "*that Israel fancied itself to be in the position of a doing, by virtue of which it was in pursuit of the law of God.*"

<sup>1</sup> See the varying interpretations in Gesenius, Drechsler, Hofmann. The latter understands the house of David.

of offence for His enemies. But *Paul* (comp. 1 Pet. ii. 6–8) justly perceives in the passages *prophecies of the Messiah* (as do also the Rabbins), and, in connection with the Messianic character, of all the glory and triumph of the theocracy, the fulfiller of which is the Messiah. — ὁ πιστ. ἐπ. αὐτῷ] *he who relies on Him*, in the Messianic fulfilment: *he who believes on Christ*. Comp. x. 11; 1 Tim. i. 16; 1 Pet. ii. 6; Luke xxiv. 25. Christ, the object of faith, is conceived of as He to whom faith adheres as its foundation (comp. Bernhardt, p. 250); there is therefore no need of the circumlocution: “fidem in Deo ponit Christo fretus” (van Hengel). See also on Matt. xxvii. 42, and comp. ἐλπίζειν ἐπί, xv. 12. We may add that πᾶς, if it were the genuine reading, would not have the emphasis; but the latter lies upon ὁ πιστεύων, as the opposite of προσκόπτειν. — καταισχυνθήσεται] The LXX. have this verb (καταισχυνθῆ), apparently deviating from the original text, Isa. xxviii. 16, where probably they have merely given an inaccurate translation of יָחַי, according to the approximate sense, and have not adopted another reading, namely יָבִישׁ (Reiche, Olshausen, Hofmann).—In the sense of the Messianic fulfilment of the saying, “he will not be put to shame” means, “*he will not forfeit the Messianic salvation.*” Comp. on v. 5.

REMARK.—The contents of ix. 6–29, as they have been unfolded by pure exegesis, certainly exclude, when taken in and by themselves, the idea of a decree of God *conditioned* by human moral self-activity, as indeed God’s *absolute* activity, taken as such by itself, *cannot* depend on that of the individual. On the other hand, a fatalistic *determinism*, the “*tremendum mysterium*” of Calvin, which, following the precedent of Augustine, robs man of his self-determination and free personal attitude towards salvation, and makes him the passive object of divine sovereign will, may just as little be derived as a Pauline doctrine from our passage. It cannot be so, because our passage is not to be considered as detached from the following (vv. 30–33, chap. x. xi.); and because, generally, the countless exhortations of the apostle to obedience of faith, to steadfastness of faith and Christian virtue, as well as all his admonitions on the possibility of losing salvation, and his warnings against falling from grace, are just so many evidences against that view, which puts aside the divine will of love, and does away the essence of

human morality and responsibility. See also, against the Calvinistic exposition, Beyschlag, p. 2 ff. If we should assume, with Reiche and Köllner, Fritzsche and Krehl, that Paul, in his dialectic ardour, has allowed himself to be carried away into *self-contradiction*,<sup>1</sup> we should thus have a self-contradiction so palpable, and yet so extremely grave and dangerous in a religious and ethical aspect, making the means of grace illusory, and striking so heavily at the Christian moral idea of divine holiness and of human freedom,—that we should least of all suppose *this very* apostle to be capable of it; for, on the one hand, his penetration and his dialectic ability well *might*, just as, on the other hand, his apostolic illumination in particular, and the clearness and depth of his own moral experience *must*, have guarded him against it. But this affords no justification of the practice which has been followed by those of anti-predestinarian views from the time of Origen and Chrysostom (see Luthardt, *vom freien Willen*, p. 14 ff.) until now (see especially Tholuck on vv. 16–18, 20–22, and also Weiss, *ib.*; comp. Gerlach, *letzte Dinge*, 1869, p. 159), of importing into the clear and definite expressions of the apostle in this place, and reading between the lines, the moral self-determination and spontaneity of man as the correlate factor to the divine volition.<sup>2</sup> On the contrary, a correct judgment of the deter-

<sup>1</sup> Fritzsche, II. p. 550: “Melius sibi Paulus consensisset, si Aristotelis, non Gamalielis alumnus fuisset.”

<sup>2</sup> This practice of *importing* is obvious, among the Greek Fathers, especially in Theodore of Mopsuestia, and among modern theologians since the precedent of Arminius (see Beyschlag, p. 9 ff.), but especially in Tholuck's paraphrase of the passages in question. Thus he paraphrases, e.g., ver. 17: “How greatly this is the case, is shown according to Scripture in Pharaoh, of whom, *in spite of his running against the divine will*, it is said, etc.” Again, in ver. 18: “Thus God executes His decree of mercy on those *who desire to become blessed through mercy* [ὅς θέλει!], and hardens those who in their resistance reject such decree of grace” [ὅς θέλει]. It is self-evident that, with such importations and alterations of the sense, no text is any longer sufficiently safe from the subjectivity of its interpreter. See, against such methods, the in the main apt observations of Baur in the *Theol. Jahrb.* 1857, p. 196 ff., and in his *N. T. Theol.* p. 182 ff. Lechler also, *Apost. Zeit.* p. 122 ff., passes an unprejudiced and correct judgment; whilst Weiss, by the mediating suggestion that God may determine, according to His unlimited will, *to what condition He will annex His grace*, can by no means avail against the clearness and definiteness of the text; and Hofmann, by the intermingling of rationalizing attempts to explain the details, cannot remove the difficulties. Philippi (*Glaubensl.* IV. 1, p. 113) rightly leaves the absolute divine freedom in the bestowal of salvation, as Paul dwells on it, intact, and connects with this result the solution which is disclosed by Paul himself in reference to that, at

ministic propositions of vv. 15-23 lies in the middle between the admission, which is psychologically and morally impossible, of a self-contradiction, and the importation, which is exegetically impossible, of conceptions of which the apostolic expression is the stark opposite—somewhat as follows. Seeing that the *mode* of the concurrence, so necessary in the moral world, of the individual freedom and spontaneity of *man* on one side, and the absolute self-determination and universal efficiency of *God* on the other,—which latter, however, as such by no means lacks the immanent law of holiness (against the objection of Beyschlag, p. 20),—is incomprehensible by human reflection, so long, that is, as it does not pass out of the sphere of the *Christian* fundamental view into the unbiblical identity-sphere of the *pantheistic* view, in which indeed freedom has no place at all;<sup>1</sup> as often as we treat *only one* of the *two* truths: “God is absolutely free and all-efficient,” and “Man has moral freedom, and is, in virtue of his proper self-determination and responsibility as *liberum agens*, the author of his salvation or perdition,” and carry it out in a consistent theory and therefore in a onesided method, we are compelled to speak in such a manner, *that the other truth appears to be annulled*. Only *appears*, however; for, in fact, all that takes place in this case is a temporary and conscious *withdrawing of attention* from the other. In the present instance Paul found himself in this case, and he expresses himself according to this mode of view, not merely in a passing reference, vv. 20, 21 (Beyschlag), but in the whole reasoning of vv. 6-29. In opposition to the Jewish conceit of descent and of works, he desired to establish the free and absolute sovereign power of the divine will and action, and that the more decisively and exclusively, the less he would leave any ground for the arrogant illusion of the Jews, that God *must* be gracious to them. The apostle

first sight, onesided theory at the close of this very chapter, and in chap. x. and xi. The doctrine of election of Schleiermacher pours unbiblical notions into the mould of biblical expressions, and finishes with a general *apokotastasis*; whilst in the Hegelian school, to which evil is a necessary element in the absolute process, the positive fundamental doctrines of the gospel as to sin, grace, regeneration, and reconciliation with God, when they are thought to be raised at all to their *notion* [Begriff], find no longer a place. For the history of doctrine in modern times here concerned, see Luthardt, *vom freien Willen*, p. 366 ff.

<sup>1</sup> To say nothing at all of the modern materialism (Vogt, Moleschott, Büchner, and others), according to which spirit is replaced by the exertion of force in brain-substance, nerve-material, change of matter, and in material *substrata* generally. See on it, and its relation to theology, Rosenkranz in Hilgertel, *Zeitschr.* 1864, p. 225 ff.



has here wholly taken his position on the *absolute* standpoint of the theory of pure dependence upon God, and that with all the boldness of clear consistency;<sup>1</sup> but only until he has done justice to the polemical object which he has in view. He then returns (see vv. 30 ff.) from that abstraction to the human-moral standpoint of practice, so that he allows the claims of *both* modes of consideration to stand *side by side*, just as they exist side by side within the limits of human thought. The contemplation—which lies beyond these limits—of the metaphysical relation of essential interdependence between the two,—namely objectively divine, and subjectively human, freedom and activity of will,—necessarily remained outside and beyond his sphere of view; as he would have had no occasion at all in this place to enter upon this problem, seeing that it was incumbent upon him to crush the Jewish pretensions with the one side only of it—the absoluteness of God. The fact that, and the extent to which, the divine elective determination is nevertheless no “*delectus militaris*,” but is immanently regulated in God Himself by His holiness, and consequently also conditioned by moral conditions on the human side, does not enter into his consideration at all for the moment. It is introduced, however, in ver. 30 ff., when the onesided method of consideration temporarily pursued is counterbalanced, and the ground, which had been given up for a while in an apologetic interest to the doctrinal definition of an absolute decree, is again taken away. Comp. also Beck *l.c.*, and Baur, *neut. Theol.* p. 182 ff. But when Beyschlag places chap. ix. under the point of view, that the discussion therein relates not to a decree, *antecedent to time*, for men’s *everlasting* salvation or perdition, but only to their *adoption* or *non-adoption* into the *historical* kingdom of God (thus into Christianity), and that of the *Jews* and *Gentiles* as the two *groups of mankind*, not of *individual* men, and when he finds the true key of exposition in this view; his idea cannot be justified by the simple exegesis of chap. ix., and without anticipating the contents of chap. x. and xi.; and the difficulty *in principle*, which is involved in the entirely free self-determination of the divine will, remains—while it is transferred to the sphere of the action of God *in the historical government of the world*—even thus unremoved.

<sup>1</sup> He says by no means only how God *could* proceed without violating a claim of right (Julius Müller, *v. d. Sünde*, I. p. 541, ed. 5), but how He *does* proceed. Older expositors have also endeavoured to help themselves with this problematic periphrasis. See, *e.g.*, Flacius, *Clav.* II. p. 387.

## CHAPTER X.

Ver. 1. *ἡ* before *πρός* is wanting according to a large preponderance of evidence, and is omitted by Lachm. and Tisch. A hasty grammatical emendation, as *ἐστίν* before *εἰς* is supplied in Elz. — *αὐτῶν*] Elz.: *τοῦ Ἰσραήλ*, against decisive evidence. With ver. 1 a church-lesson begins. — Ver. 3. After *ἰδίαν, δικαιοσύνην* is wanting in A B D E P, min., and several versions (including Vulg.) and Fathers. Omitted by Lachm. But the very emphasis of the thrice-occurring word, so obviously intended (comp. ix. 30), speaks for its originality; and how easily the omission of the second *δικαιοσύνην* might arise, as that of a supposed quite superfluous repetition! — Ver. 5. *αὐτοῦ*] Lachm. and Tisch. 8: *αὐτῆς*, according to A B S\*, 17, 47, 80, Copt. Arm. Vulg. Germ. Damasc. Ruf. But this would involve that, with the most of these, and with yet other witnesses, the preceding *αὐτά* should be omitted, as also Tisch. 8. has done. However, both *αὐτῆς* and the omission of *αὐτά* appear like an emendatory alteration, since the context contains no reference for *αὐτά* and *αὐτοῦ*. In the same light we must also regard the reading *ὅτι τὴν δικαιοσύνην τὴν ἐκ νόμου* (instead of *τὴν δικ. . . ὅτι*), as Tisch. 8. has it, in A D\* S\*, and some min., Vulg., and some Fathers. — Ver. 15. *εἰρήνην, τῶν εὐαγγ.*] is wanting in A B C S\*, min., Copt. Sah. Aeth. Clem. Or. Damasc. Ruf. Omitted by Lachm. and Tisch. 8. Copyist's omission, through the repetition of *εὐαγγ.* If it had been interpolated from the LXX. (Isa. lii. 7), *ἀκούοντες εἰρήνης* would have been written instead of the mere *εἰρήνης*. The article before *ἀγαθά* is, with Lachm., on decisive evidence to be omitted, although it is also wanting in the LXX. — Ver. 17. *Θεῷ*] Lachm. and Tisch. 8: *Χριστῷ*, according to B C D\* E S\*, min., several vss., Aug. Pel. Ambrosiast. There is no genitive at all in F G, Boern. Hilar. But how readily this omission might suggest itself by a comparison of ver. 8! *Χριστῷ*, however, appears to be a more precise definition of the sense of the divine *ἐξῆμα*, the expression of which by *ἐ. Θεῷ* is found already in Syr. and Clem. — Ver. 19. The order *Ἰσρ. οὖν ἔγνω* is supported by decisive evidence; Elz.: *οὖν ἔγνω Ἰσρ.*

Vv. 1–13. *More particular discussion of the guilt of the Jews specified in ix. 32; introduced (vv. 1, 2) by a reiterated assurance of the most cordial interest in their salvation.*

Ver. 1. Ἀδελφοί] Address to the readers, expressive of emotion. Comp. 1 Cor. xiv. 20; Gal. iii. 15. — μέν] without a corresponding δέ; the thought following in ver. 3 loomed before the apostle, as standing in the relation of opposition to his heartfelt interest, of which the solicitude thus remained unfulfilled through the perverted striving after righteousness of the people. — εὐδοκία] does not denote the *wish*, the *desire* (Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, and many, including Rückert, Reiche, Köllner, de Wette, Olshausen). It may mean *pleasure*, *delight* (Bengel: “lubentissime auditurus essem de salute Israelis;” comp. Philippi), Matt. iii. 17, xi. 26; or *goodwill* (Phil. i. 15, ii. 13), *i.e. propensa animi voluntas*. See generally Fritzsche. The latter signification is that most immediately suggested by the connection here; comp. van Hengel, “benevola propensio.” It is indeed the *intention of the will* (Hofmann), but conceived of and designated as the *being well-disposed* of the heart, as it *was* such.—πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν is joined to ἡ δέησις, hence there was no need of the (not genuine) article (Acts viii. 24; Winer, p. 128 f. [E. T. 169 f.]); to the connection with ἐστὶ to be understood, εὐδοκία would not be suitable. Hence: *The goodwill of my heart and my petition to God are on their behalf towards this end, that they might obtain salvation*; σωτηρία is the *goal* which my εὐδοκία wishes for them, and my prayer entreats for them. In this view ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν belongs so necessarily to the completeness of the thought, that we are not to assume a tacit contrast to a κατὰ (Hofmann). The *article* before δέησις represents, according to the context, the personal pronoun (ἡ ἐμὴ δ.); Winer, p. 103 [E. T. 135]; Kühner, II. 1, p. 515. — On the distinction between δέησις and προσευχή, *petition* and *prayer*, see on Eph. vi. 18. Bengel aptly remarks: “Non orasset Paulus, si absolute reprobati essent.”

Ver. 2. Reason assigned *why ἡ εὐδοκία . . . εἰς σωτηρίαν. — ζήλον Θεοῦ*] *zeal for God*. Comp. Acts xxi. 20, xxii. 3; Gal. i. 14; John ii. 17; 1 Macc. ii. 58. This their zeal makes

them *worth* that interest of my heart. — οὐ κατ' ἐπίγνωσιν] knowledge is not that, *according to the measure of* which they are zealous for God. We must here again (comp. on i. 28) note the *composite* expression; for the Jews were not wanting in γνῶσις generally, but just in the very point, on which it depended whether their γνῶσις was the right and practically vital ἐπίγνωσις.

Ver. 3. Confirmatory elucidation of οὐ κατ' ἐπίγνωσιν: “for else they would not, unacquainted with the divine righteousness (see on i. 17), have insisted on their own righteousness, and striven against the divine.” This is just the *actual proof* that their zeal for God is wanting in knowledge. — ἀγνοοῦντες] does not mean any more than at ii. 4, 1 Cor. xiv. 38,<sup>1</sup> anything else than *not knowing*; Reiche, de Wette, Tholuck, Ewald, and several others: *misapprehending*; Hofmann: *overlooking*. The *guilt* of this not-knowing Paul does not further enter into, not so much (comp. Acts iii. 17, xvii. 30) from mild forbearance (Rückert and others), but because he had simply nothing else than the οὐ κατ' ἐπίγνωσιν to explain. — τὴν ἰδίαν δικαιοσύνην] τὴν ἐκ τοῦ νόμου, τὴν ἐξ ἔργων ἰδίων καὶ πόνων κατορθουμένην, Theophylact. Comp. Phil. iii. 9, and see on i. 17. — στήσαι] *stabilire, to make valid*. Comp. iii. 31; Heb. x. 9. — ὑπετάγησαν] The δικ. Θεοῦ is conceived of as a divine ordinance, to which one *subjects oneself* (through faith). The sense is not that of the *passive*, as viii. 20, but that of the *middle*, as in viii. 7, xiii. 1, and frequently, expressing the *obedience*. As to the subject-matter, comp. προσέκοψαν κ.τ.λ., ix. 32.

Ver. 4. *For the validity of the law has come to an end in Christ, in order that every believer may be a partaker of righteousness.* Herewith Paul, for the further confirmation of what was said in ver. 3, lays down the great principle of salvation, from the non-knowledge of which among the Jews that blinded and perverted striving after righteousness flowed. — Τέλος νόμου, which is placed first with great emphasis, is applied to Christ, in so far as, by virtue of His redemptive death (Gal.

<sup>1</sup> In the classical passages also, which are adduced for the signification *misapprehend* (as Xen. *Mem.* iv. 2. 25, 29, *Cyr.* iv. 1. 16; Dem. 151. 7, *et al.*), the sense of *not know* is to be maintained.

iii. 13, iv. 5), the divine dispensation of salvation has been introduced, in which the basis of the procuring of salvation is no longer, as in the old theocracy, the Mosaic νόμος, but faith, whereby the law has therefore ceased to be the regulative principle for the attainment of righteousness.<sup>1</sup> Only this view of τέλος, *end, conclusion* (adopted after Augustine by most of the modern expositors), is conformable to what follows, where the essentially *different* principles of the old and new δικαιοσύνη are stated. For its agreement with the doctrinal system of the apostle, see vii. 1 ff. Contrary to the meaning of the word τέλος (even in 1 Tim. i. 5), and contrary to the inherent relation of what follows, Origen, Erasmus, Vatablus, Elsner, Homberg, Estius, Wolf, Ch. Schmidt, Jatho, and several others, take it as: *fulfilment of the law* ("quicquid exigebat lex moralis præstitit perfectissime," Calovius), which many dogmatic expositors understood of the *satisfactio activa*, or of the *activa* and *passiva* together (Calovius). Linguistically faultless, but at the same time not corresponding to the connection, is the interpretation of Chrysostom, Theophylact, Melancthon, Beza, Michaelis, and others, that the *object* and *aim* of the law was the making men righteous, and that this was accomplished through Christ; or (Theodoret, Toletus, Vorstius, Grotius, Wetstein, Loesner, Heumann, Klee, Glöckler, Krummacher), that Christ was called the *object* and *aim* of the law, because everything in the law, as the παιδαγωγὸς εἰς Χριστόν (Gal. iii. 24), led up to Him; "quicquid præcipiat, quicquid promittat, semper Christum habet pro scopo," Calvin. Observe further, that Χριστός must be the definite historical *person* that appeared in *Jesus*, and not *the promised Saviour generally*, without regard to *whether* and *in whose person* He appeared (Hofmann), an abstraction which would have been impossible to Paul, particularly here, where all righteousness is traced back only to definite faith in contrast to works—as impossible as is the reference combined

<sup>1</sup> The πλήρωσις τοῦ νόμου, Matt. v. 17, does not conflict with the present passage. For the ideal, purely moral import of the law cannot be annulled, and it is exactly this which Christ has freed from its limitations. See on Matt. *l.c.* Comp. also Lipsius, *Rechtfert.* p. 85 ff.

with it, of νόμος to *any law whatever*, no law has validity any longer, if the promised Saviour be at hand. See, in opposition to this, immediately below, ver. 5 ff. — εἰς δικαιοσ. παντὶ τῷ πιστ.] *aim*, for which Christ is the end of the law: *in order that every one who believes may obtain righteousness*. The principal stress lies on πιστ., as the opposite of that which the law required in order to righteousness; see vv. 5, 6, iii. 21 ff.

Ver. 5. Now follows, as far as ver. 10, the *proof* of ver. 4, and that *from Moses himself*. — γράφει τὴν δικ.] *writes concerning righteousness*, John i. 46; Hermann, *ad Eur. Phoen.* 574. As to the use of the *present* tense, comp. the frequent λέγει in scriptural citations. — The passage introduced by the recitative ὅτι is Lev. xviii. 5, almost exactly after the LXX. Comp. Neh. ix. 29; Ezek. xx. 21; Gal. iii. 12. — αὐτά] refers in the original, and so also here, to the προστάγματα Θεοῦ, which Paul supposes as well known; but the principal stress lies upon ποιήσας: he who shall have *done* them, so that thus Moses exhibits the *doing* as the condition of the attainment of ζωῇ (which is referred by Paul not to the happy and prosperous life in Palestine, but to its antitype, the ζωῇ αἰώνιος). — ἐν αὐτοῖς] *i.e.* by the fact, that they are fulfilled.

Vv. 6–8. The righteousness which comes from faith is personified (comp. Heb. xii. 5), so that the following words of Moses, *in which Paul recognises an allegorically and typically prophetic description of this righteousness*, appear as its self-description. An increasing animation, and indeed triumphant tone in the representation, which thus introduces over-against that dark background (ver. 5) the bright picture the more immediately in concrete vividness. Hofmann artificially imports the antithesis, that the righteousness of the law is found *only in a description of the lawgiver*, but the righteousness of faith *itself speaks as one existing and present*. There is the less room for this supposition, since vv. 6 ff. are also *Mosaic* expressions. But that Paul actually regarded the words of Moses as a *prophetic testimony* to the nature of the righteousness of faith, is an opinion sanctioned only by a minority of expositors (Augustine, *de nat. et grat.* 83; Bucer, Balduin, Calovius, Semler, Ch. Schmidt, Reiche,

Köllner, Olshausen, Benecke, Fritzsche, Baumgarten-Crusius, Ewald, Umbreit). The majority, on the other hand, assume that Paul *only clothed* his own thoughts in the words of Moses, and used the latter *as a suitable substratum for the former*. So Tholuck, Flatt, Rückert, Reithmayr, Maier, Philippi: "a holy and charming play of the Spirit of God upon the word of the Lord;" van Hengel and several others, as formerly Chrysostom, Luther,<sup>1</sup> Beza, Calvin, Cornelius a Lapide; Bengel: "suavissima parodia." But against this view is the fact that ver. 5 begins with *γὰρ* a demonstration of the *τέλος νόμου Χριστός*, of which ver. 5 contains only the one, and vv. 6-8 the other, side; both sides, however, unite their probative force in *Μωϋσῆς γὰρ γράφει*. Therefore it is quite wrong (see esp. Rückert, Philippi) to look upon *ἡ δὲ ἐκ πιστ. δικ.* as the opposite to *Μωϋσῆς*, and to suppose that the parallel would be more sharply drawn if Paul had said: But *Christ* speaks thus, etc. No, *δέ* places the righteousness of faith in opposition to the previously mentioned *δικαιοσύνη ἡ ἐκ τοῦ νόμου*; and for these *two* modes of righteousness the testimony of the lawgiver himself is introduced by *Μωϋσῆς γὰρ γράφει*. "For Moses writes of the righteousness of the law, etc.; but the other kind of righteousness, the righteousness of faith, says (in the same Moses) thus, etc." The *Μωϋσ. γ. γρ.* thus holds good not only for ver. 5, but also covers vv. 6-8; therefore the absence of a formula of quotation before ver. 6 is no valid argument against our view. This applies likewise against Hofmann, according to whom that, which the righteousness of faith speaks, is intended to *recall* Deut. *l.c.*;<sup>2</sup> in such a way, however, that the word of which Moses speaks is related to that which the righteousness of faith means, as the

<sup>1</sup> Luther, on Deut. *l.c.*, says that Paul has, *abundante spiritu*, taken occasion from Moses against the *justitiariorum velut novum et proprium textum componendi*.

<sup>2</sup> Hofmann arrives at the sense: "What Israel could not say in respect of the revealed law of God, after possessing it, that should he, to whom the righteousness of faith speaks, not think in respect of the revealed and perfect Saviour." But how could Paul, without any indication whatever, have expected of the reader that he should infer, from mere reminiscence of the Mosaic words, the point of the thought intended, that what the one *could* not, the others *should* not?

O. T. to the N. T.,<sup>1</sup> and thus the former is a prediction of the latter. Groundless is the further objection, that Paul nowhere else thus mixes up a biblical passage with comments. For we are acquainted with comments in the style of the Midrash in Paul's writings (ix. 8 ; Gal. iii. 16, iv. 23, 24) ; and that they are here *interspersed* is unessential, and was very naturally suggested by the opposed ἀναβ. εἰς τ. οὐρανόν and καταβ. εἰς τ. ἄβυσσον. In conclusion, we must further observe that, if Paul had given the biblical words only as the clothing of his own representation, yet we should have to assume, and that for the very sake of the *honesty* of the apostle (which Philippi thinks endangered by our view), that he actually found in the saying the typical reference to the righteousness of faith ; even the holy "play" upon words of the Spirit can be no erroneous play. Theodoret took the right view : διδάσκει πάλιν νόμου καὶ χάριτος τὴν διαφορὰν, καὶ ἀμφοτέρων εἰσάγει Μωϋσέα τὸν νομοθέτην διδάσκαλον. Erasmus, *Paraphr.* : "*utriusque justitiae imaginem Moses ipse depinxit.*" Comp. also Hofmann, *Weissag. u. Erf.* II. p. 217. *The Mosaic declaration itself* is Deut. xxx. 12-14, with free deviations bearing on his object, from the original and the LXX. Moses has there said of the *commandment* of God to Israel to fulfil His law (for the passage speaks of nothing else according to its historical sense) in ver. 11, that this commandment does not transcend the sphere of what is capable of accomplishment, nor does it lie at strange distance ; and he then adds, ver. 12 ff., in order more precisely to depict this thought : *It is neither in heaven nor beyond the sea, so that one must first ascend to the former or sail over the latter* (comp. Bar. iii. 29, 30) *to fetch it, that one may hear and do it ; rather is it quite near, in the mouth and in the heart (and in the hands, an addition of LXX., and in Philo) ; that is, the people itself carries it in its mouth, and it is stamped upon its heart, in order that they may accomplish it* (יִשְׁמְעוּ וַיַּעֲשׂוּ). Paul finds here a type, and therewith an indirect prophecy, of the demand which the righteousness of faith presents, entirely different from that ποιεῖν which is demanded by the righteous-

<sup>1</sup> But for this purpose Hofmann employs an incorrect reference and understanding of *ἐν*, ver. 9.



ness of the law, inasmuch as the righteousness of faith forbids only unbelief in reference to Christ, as though *He* had not come from heaven, or had not risen from the dead, and directs men, on the other hand, to the word of faith, which, through its preachers, is laid in their mouth and heart. The sum and substance of this typically prophetic sense is therefore: "*Be not unbelieving, but believing;*"<sup>1</sup> and here the grand historical points, to which faith as well as unbelief relate, could not be brought into relief more definitely and significantly<sup>2</sup> than by means of the *Χριστὸν καταγαγεῖν* and *ἀναγαγεῖν* (in opposition to Tholuck's objection). According to Fritzsche (comp. Calovius), the sense meant is: no one can become righteous *through works*, "*faciendo et moliendo*," vv. 6, 7; for in fact one must otherwise have been able—since the becoming righteous rests upon the incarnation, death, and resurrection of Christ—to ascend into heaven in order to bring Him down, or to descend into the lower world in order to bring Him up; but (ver. 8) after that salvation has been obtained by Christ, we are to have *faith* only. But in this case, vv. 6, 7 would surely be a warning from the mouth of the righteousness of faith against a *facere et moliri*, which would be of quite another kind than that of the righteousness of the law, and which even would have included *in abstracto*, as a *presupposition*, this very faith in the incarnation, death, and resurrection of Christ. Still less can we, with Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Grotius, and several others (comp. also Reithmayr, Philippi, and Krummacher), find in vv. 6, 7 the denial of the *difficulty*, and then in ver. 8 the assurance of the *facility*, of becoming

<sup>1</sup> The allegorical and typical signification of the apostle finds its correct logical point of connection in the fact that every one who, instead of bearing the *ῥῆμα* of God in his mouth and in his heart, asks, Who will ascend into heaven for us, and bring it to us? puts a question of *unbelief*.

<sup>2</sup> For he who thinks that one must ascend into heaven to bring Christ down, *denies* thereby that Christ has come in the flesh; and he who supposes that one must descend into the lower world to bring Christ up from the dead, *denies* that He arose from the dead. This likewise against Hofmann, p. 436, according to whom it is only meant to be said, that *in order to produce Christ, an impossibility*—namely, an ascent into heaven, or a descent into the lower world—would be requisite. Therein lies the *jolly*, as if that which we *have* were at *unattainable distance*.

righteous. For against this view is the fact, in the first place, that in what Paul subjoins, ver. 9 ff., nothing at all is said of difficulty and facility; secondly—and this is decisive—the fact that vv. 5–8 is to be a *proof* founded on Moses of the statement, τέλος νόμου Χριστός; but it is evident, that not from the *facility* of the Christian δικαιοσύνη, but from its *being essentially different from the old* (the latter resting on *doing*, the former on *faith*), it follows that with Christ, the Mediator of the new δικαιοσύνη, the νόμος must have reached its end. This, too, in reply to Knapp, *Scr. var. arg.* II. p. 558 f., who, besides the erroneous point of view of difficulty and facility, reads otherwise between the lines the most essential points of his interpretation. See, on the other hand, van Hengel, who, however, on his side assumes that Paul desired “*avocare*” unsettled Jewish Christians “*a salutis duce longe quacrendo, quem quisque, qui Christi communione utatur, per fidem in Deo positam possideat, quod, ut ex legis alicujus observatione, sic etiam aliunde afferri non possit.*” The connection with ver. 4 likewise tells against this view, as does also the circumstance that, if only the *longe quacere* were the conception presented, it would not be easy to see why Paul should have inserted at all his explanations τοῦτ’ ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ., and why he should not have retained in ver. 7 the words of the LXX.: τίς διαπεράσει ἡμῖν εἰς τὸ πέραν τῆς θαλάσσης. — μὴ εἶπης ἐν τ. καρδ. σου] LXX.: λέγων, Heb. וְשֵׁן, wherein, according to the connection (“It is not in heaven that one might speak,” etc.), the forbidding sense *indirectly* lies. This Paul expresses *directly*, because his quotation is severed from the connection of the original; and he adds ἐν τ. καρδ. σου, because unbelief has its seat *in the heart*, and the expression “*to speak in the heart*” (as Ps. xiv. 1; Matt. iii. 9; Rev. xviii. 7) was very current in the mention of unholy thoughts and dispositions (Surenhusius, *καταλλ.*, p. 479.) — τίς ἀναβ. εἰς τ. οὐρ.] *Who will ascend into heaven?* In the sense of the apostle, the inquiry is one not expressive of a wish (“*utinam quis sit, qui nos e longinquo in viam salutis ducat,*” van Hengel), nor yet of *despair*, but—correlative of that τῶ πιστεύοντι in ver. 4, and opposed to the ὁ ποιήσας, ver. 5—the inquiry of *unbelief*, which holds the

appearance of Christ from heaven, *i.e.* His *incarnation*, as *not having taken place*, and as an *impossibility*. Therefore Paul adds the Midrashistic interpretation: *that expresses*, that signifies: *in order to bring Christ down*—this is the *object*, which is implied in ἀναβήσεται εἰς τ. οὐρ., and by its addition Paul thus contributes a more precise *explanation* of the question (τοῦτ' ἔστι: *scilicet*), namely, as respects its *tendency*, as respects that at which it aims.<sup>1</sup> Thus more exactly defined, the question would presuppose, that he who puts it does not believe that Christ has come out of the heavenly world and has appeared in the flesh (comp. viii. 3), ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων (Phil. ii. 6, 7; comp. 1 John. iv. 2).<sup>2</sup> Following Melancthon, Castalio, Calvin, and others, Reiche thinks that unbelief *in regard to the session of Christ on the right hand of God* is meant. But if there were here a prohibition of the desire to behold with the eyes this object of faith (Reiche), the second question, which nevertheless is manifestly quite parallel, would be highly inappropriate; for then an existence of Christ in the ἄβυσσος would of necessity be an object of faith, which yet it is not at all. Nor could we see why Paul

<sup>1</sup> Many others (Erasmus, Calvin, Cornelius a Lapide, Bengel, Usteri, Rückert, Glöckler, etc.) regard τοῦτ' ἔστι as the *ground* of the prohibition, and that in the sense: *that is just as much as*, etc. So also Philippi: "Righteousness is for me as distant and high as if it were in heaven and I must fetch it down from thence; . . . that is just as much as if thou wouldst bring down Christ from heaven, as if thou didst deny that He has already come down from heaven and become man;" and afterwards, ver. 7: that is just as much as to deny that He has already risen from the dead. But it is inappropriate to conceive of righteousness itself as the imagined distant (and to-be-fetched) object, because righteousness itself is speaking, and because Paul names *Christ Himself* as the object to be fetched. Inappropriate, too, is the idea of allowing righteousness in any way to be represented as found in Hades, and brought up thence, from whence Christ, indeed, has not brought it with Him. To this connection belongs van Hengel's view: "Haec quaerere nihil aliud est quam Christum indigne tractare, tanquam e locis remotis, at salutis auctor sit, in terram revocandum." In this case the *Christum indigne tractare* is imported. Further, it makes absolutely no difference to the sense of τοῦτ' ἔστι, whether it is written divided (Lachm., Tisch.) or united (τούτ' ἐστιν, Hofmann). The codd. yield no certain basis; see Lipsius, *gramm. Unters.* p. 131 ff. Τοῦτο is the subject, and ἔστι the copula of that which is to be predicated epexegetically of the subject.

<sup>2</sup> The Χριστὸν καταγαγεῖν presupposes the certainty of the personal pre-existence. Comp. Lechler, *Apost. Zeit.* p. 50.

should have said *καταγαγείν* in ver. 6, since the matter would in fact turn only on a *seeing* of Christ in heaven. Moreover, Paul, considering the freedom with which he handles this passage from Moses, would have *transposed* the two questions, in order to avoid the glaring historical *prothlysteron* which occurs, if the first question refers to the session of Christ at the right hand of God, to which van Hengel also refers it. According to Glöckler, the question, Who will go up into heaven? means to ask, Who will accomplish redemption? for the ascension was a necessary requisite for the Mediator; and therefore *τοῦτ' ἔστι* signifies: this would mean *to deny the ascension of Christ*. Consistently, Glöckler then understands the second question as, Who will (voluntarily) go into death? this would mean *to deny the death of Christ*. But by this necessarily consistent view of ver. 7 the whole exposition is overthrown. For ver. 9 proves that ver. 7 refers to the *resurrection* of Christ; nor did unbelief, in truth, *deny* the death of Christ, but took offence at it. Like Glöckler, Lipsius, *Rechtfertigungs*l. p. 102 f., has essentially misunderstood both verses, and Rückert the question of ver. 7. — ἡ τίς καταβ. εἰς τ. ἄβ.;] The colon after ἡ is to be omitted. The question is, in the sense of the apostle, likewise a question of *unbelief*, and that in reference to the fact and the possibility of the *resurrection* of Christ *ἐκ νεκρῶν* (i.e. out of *Schol*, ἄβυσσος). The LXX., following the original, has: τίς διαπεράσει ἡμῶν εἰς τὸ πέραν τῆς θαλάσσης; But *Paul*, in his typical reference to Christ, had sufficient cause and liberty, from the standpoint of the historical fulfilment, to put expressly, instead of *πέραν τῆς θαλάσσης*, even without reflecting that the springs of the sea lie in the lowest depth of the earth (see Ewald, *Jahrb.* III. p. 112), the familiar contrast to heaven, εἰς τ. ἄβυσσον (Job xi. 8; Ps. cvii. 26, cxxxix. 8; Amos ix. 2; Eccles. xvi. 18, xxiv. 5). For Christ is the object of justifying faith, not merely as He who came *from heaven*, but also as He who descended *into Hades*, and came up again thence, and *rose from the dead*.<sup>1</sup> — ἀλλὰ τί λέγει;] But what says it (the righteous-

<sup>1</sup> The *descensus Christi* is in any case the *undoubted presupposition*, which led Paul to substitute the words of our passage for those of the original. The

ness of faith)? An unexact contrast to *μὴ εἶπης*, ver. 6, as though previously the negation had stood with *λέγει*, ver. 6 (*οὐχ οὕτω λέγει· εἰπὲ κ.τ.λ.*). The *interrogative form* serves "ad *attentionem* excitandam," Dissen, *ad Decm. de cor.* p. 186. 347. Comp. Gal. iv. 30. — *ἐν τῷ στόμ. σ. κ. ἐν τ. κ. σ.*] Epexegetis of *ἐγγύς σου ἐστιν*. — *τοῦτ' ἐστι κ.τ.λ.*] This *ῥῆμα*, so designated by the righteousness of faith, signifies *the word of faith*. The genitive *τ. πίστ.* is genit. *objecti* (comp. Acts xx. 32; Heb. v. 13; Eph. i. 13, vi. 15; Gal. iii. 2). Note here *the two articles*; for that *ῥῆμα* intended by the righteousness of faith is not generally "*a word of faith*," whose contents desire to be believed as historical reality (as Hofmann takes it), but the *definite specific κήρυγμα*, whose entire summary contents are faith in Jesus Christ; comp. vv. 4, 9 ff., i. 5, 17. — *κηρύσσομεν*] we preachers of the gospel.

Ver. 9. Not a statement of the contents of the *ῥῆμα*,<sup>1</sup> but assigning the ground of the immediately previous *τοῦτ' ἐστι τὸ ῥῆμα τῆς πίστεως ὃ κηρύσσει*.<sup>2</sup> The force of the argument lies in the fact that, in respect of the *ῥῆμα* published by its preachers, *confession* and *faith* (mouth and heart) must be consentaneous in order to obtain salvation, which is what Moses also means of the *ῥῆμα* (ver. 8). — *ὁμολ. ἐν τ. στόμ. σου*] corresponds to *ἐν τῷ στόμ. σου (ἐστι)* in ver. 8, as afterwards *πίστ. ἐν τ. καρδ. σου* to *ἐν τ. καρδ. σου* in ver. 8. — *κύριον*] as *Lord* (comp. 1 Cor. xii. 3, viii. 6; Phil. ii. 11). "In hac appellatione est summa fidei et salutis," Bengel. It refers to the question *τίς ἀναβ. εἰς τ. οὐρ*, ver. 6; for the whole acknowledgment of the heavenly *κυριότης* of Jesus as the *σύνθρονος* of God is conditioned by the acknowledgment of the preceding descent from heaven, the incarnation of the Son of God; viii. 3; Gal. iv.

passage has therefore more probative force in favour of that doctrine than Güder, *Lehre von der Erschein. Christi unter d. Todten*, p. 20 f., is willing to accord to it.

<sup>1</sup> So van Hengel and others. But by *τῆς πίστεως* the *ῥῆμα* in ver. 8 is already completely defined.

<sup>2</sup> Which is not with Hofmann to be leaped over, so that *ἔστι* refers to *ἐγγύς σου τὸ ῥῆμα ἐστι*, and introduces the reason *why it is that we have this word so near, in the mouth and in the heart*. Hofmann strangely objects to the view taken above, that not *ἐστι*, but *γάρ*, must then have been used. Why so?

4; Phil. ii. 6, *et al.* — ἡγείρεν ἐκ νεκρῶν] corresponds to the question of ver. 7. — σωθήσῃ] corresponds to ζήσεται in ver. 6, but characterizes the latter, according to the doctrinal system of the apostle (i. 16, v. 9, 10, *et al.*), as a deliverance from destruction to the Messianic salvation.—The *confession of the mouth* (of high essential importance for the relations of every time, and peculiarly of that time!) and *faith in the heart* are not separate things, as though one without the other had as its consequence the σωτηρία, but they are mutually dependent requisites. Comp. Knapp, p. 565 ff. — The *resurrection* of the Lord here appears, as suggested by ver. 7, and according to iv. 25 quite justly, as the object of that faith which makes blessed. Without it, His death would not be the atoning death, 1 Cor. xv. 17, 18, nor would He Himself be the Son of God, i. 4.

Ver. 10. Elucidation of ver. 9. With πιστ. and ὁμολ. *Jesus* is not to be supplied as subject (Hofmann), which is not even in accordance with the linguistic usage of the N. T., for 1 Tim. iii. 16 has a singular poetical style; but the contents of the faith and of the confession are understood, according to ver. 9, entirely of themselves. “*With the heart, namely (γάρ), one believes unto righteousness, but with the mouth confesses unto salvation.*” In the style of Hebrew parallelism the thought is thus expressed: “*With the faith of the heart is united the confession of the mouth to the result that one obtains righteousness and salvation.*” The righteousness obtained through faith would, forsooth, fall to the ground again, and would not be attended by salvation, if faith had not the vital force to produce confession of the mouth (which speaks out of the fulness of the heart); see Matt. x. 32; comp. 2 Cor. iv. 13. We have thus here no merely formal parallelism, but one framed according to the actual relation of the dispensation of salvation; and in this case, moreover, Paul observes the *genetic* sequence in καρδιά . . . στόματι, because he is now no longer dependent on ver. 8.

Ver. 11. Now, after that grand proposition: τέλος νόμου Χριστός κ.τ.λ. (ver. 4), has been proved from Moses himself (vv. 5–8), and this proof has received its confirmatory discus-

sion (vv. 9, 10), Paul brings forward, as if *for the solemn sealing of all this*, once more that weighty word of Scripture which he has already adduced in ix. 33. But this scriptural saying (Isa. xxviii. 16) now receives, with the object of closely connecting with it what is further to follow, the significant addition of the *universal* element *πᾶς* (perhaps already with a regard to Joel iii. 5), which indeed is found neither in the LXX. nor in the Hebrew; but in the unlimited *ὁ πιστεύων* in Isaiah, ground and justification for its appearance was found to the apostle's mind, since he had the sacred historical *fulfilment* of the prophecy before his eyes, and therein its more particular definitive character.

Ver. 12. Elucidation of *πᾶς*. — *οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ διαστ.* Ἰουδ. τε καὶ Ἑλλ.] in respect, namely, to the bestowal of blessing on the believing, ver. 11. Comp. iii. 22. — *For the Lord of all is one and the same.* This *κύριος* is *Christ* (Origen, Chrysostom, Calovius, Wolf, Bengel, Böhme, Tholuck, Flatt, Rückert, de Wette, Fritzsche, Philippi, Hofmann, and several others), the *αὐτός* of ver. 11, and the *κύριος* of ver. 13, who is necessarily identical with this *αὐτός*. Were *God* intended (Theodoret, Theophylact, Grotius, and many, including Ammon, Reiche, Köllner, Ewald, Umbreit, van Hengel, Krummacher), it would in fact be necessary first to suggest the *Christian* character of the demonstration (as Olshausen: "God in Christ"). — *κύριος πάντων*] comp. Phil. ii. 11; Acts x. 36; Rom. xiv. 9. — *πλουτῶν*] comp. Eph. iii. 8: "Quem nulla quamvis magna credentium multitudo exhaurire potest," Bengel. *In what He was rich*, the Christian consciousness understood of itself; it is contained also in the previous *κατασχυνθήσεται* and in the subsequent *σωθήσεται*,—namely, in *grace and salvation*. Comp. v. 15, xi. 33, and on 2 Cor. xiii. 13. — *εἰς πάντας*] *for all, for the benefit of all*. See Bernhardt, p. 219; Maetzner, *ad Lycurg.* 85. — The *calling upon Christ*, who nowhere in the N. T. appears as *identical* with the Jehovah of the O. T. (in opposition to Philippi), is not *the worshipping absolutely*, as it takes place only in respect of the Father, as the one absolute God; but rather worship according to that relativity in the consciousness of the worshipper, which is conditioned by the

relation of Christ *to the Father* (whose Son of like nature, image, partner of the throne, mediator and advocate on behalf of men, etc., He is). This is not imported as an Origenistic gloss (Philippi), but is necessarily founded on the dependence and subordination in which even the glorified God-man Christ, in virtue of His *munus regium*, stands in relation to the Father; see on 1 Cor. iii. 23, xi. 3, xv. 28. Comp. Lücke, *de invocat. J. Chr.*, Gott. 1843. He who calls upon Christ is conscious that he does not call upon Him as the absolute God, but as the divine-human Representative and Mediator of God exalted to the divine glory, in whom God's adequate revelation of salvation has been given. To the *mediatorial* relation of Christ Hofmann also reverts.<sup>1</sup> Comp. on Phil. ii. 10, 11; 1 Cor. i. 2.

Ver. 13. Ground assigned for *εἰς πάντας τοὺς ἐπικαλ. αὐτόν*, ver. 12, and that with words of Scripture from Joel iii. 5. This passage (LXX. ii. 32, closely following the LXX.) treats of the coming in of the *Messianic* era; hence Paul might refer *κυρίου*, which in the original points to *God*, justly to *Christ*, who has appeared in the name of God, and continually rules as His Representative and Revealer, and Mediator, whose name was now the very specific object of the *Christian* calling on the Lord. That Paul writes not *αὐτοῦ*, but *κυρίου*, is from no particular motive (against Hofmann); he simply reproduces the words of Scripture, which he presumes to be well known and makes his own.

Vv. 14–21. In order to realize this calling upon the Lord, proclaimers of the gospel had of necessity to be sent forth; nevertheless all did not obey the gospel; in which case neither does *this* excuse avail, that they had not heard the preaching (ver. 18); nor *that*, that Israel did not recognise the universality of the preaching (ver. 19 ff.). Thus, following up 1–13, there is still further set forth *the people's own guilt* in their exclusion.

Vv. 14, 15. Introduction: *In order now that men should*

<sup>1</sup> According to Hofmann, the promise attached to the calling on Jehovah is regarded by the apostle as valid in New Testament times, for those, and those only, who place their confidence of salvation on Jesus and thus call on Him.



call on the name of the Lord, it is necessary that they should have been believing, hearing, preaching, and that the sending forth of preachers should have taken place, which sending forth also the Scripture prophesies. The object of this introduction is not already to cut off every way of escape from the Jews (Chrysostom, Theodoret, and several others, including Köllner), for this is spoken of for the first time in ver. 18 ff.; but the necessity of the evangelical ἀποστολή is first of all to be established generally, in order then to make the disobedience of the Jews stand out with the force of contrast. Grotius and Michaelis see in vv. 14, 15 a Jewish objection, which alleges that the gospel had not been preached to all the Jews in the world, etc.; Paul then answers in ver. 16 ff. But how unsuitably he would have answered! Must he not, before everything else, make good—what he only brought in at ver. 18—that all Jews had heard the announcement of the gospel? The objection here assumed is made by Paul himself in ver. 18.—οὖν] draws an inference from ver. 13: *How shall they accordingly* (in pursuance of the requirement of ἐπικαλεῖσθαι contained in ver. 13) *call on*, etc.? On the future of ethical possibility, see Winer, p. 262 [E. T. 348]. Important codd. and Lachm. have, instead of the futures, the deliberative subjunctive aorists: *How should they*, etc.? The attestation in the case of the different verbs, of which Tisch. 8. likewise reads the subjunctive forms, although he retains instead of ἀκούσωσιν the future form ἀκούσονται, is so unequal, that we can come to no decision. Comp. generally Lobeck, *ad Phryg.* p. 734 f. The subject to ἐπικαλέσονται κ.τ.λ. is those who, according to the passage of Scripture in ver. 13, shall attain to salvation through calling on the name of the Lord; that to κηρύξουσιν and ἀποστάλ., the κηρύσσοντες. The impersonal rendering (Fritzsche, de Wette, Baumgarten-Crusius, Philippi, van Hengel, and several others) has against it the fact that κηρύξ. has not the same general subject as the foregoing verbs.—εἰς ὃν οὐκ ἐπίστ.] *Him, on whom they have not become believing*; see Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 92.—πῶς δὲ πιστεύουσιν κ.τ.λ.] Rightly the Vulg.: “Quomodo credent ei, quem non audierunt.” οὖ is not an adverb of place (Hofmann); for thus after εἰς ὃν

the symmetry of the discourse would only be heterogeneously disturbed. Nor can it denote *de quo* (Luther, Castalio, and many, including Philippi and van Hengel), since ἀκούειν τινός in the sense of ἀκ. περί τινος, without a participle annexed, is entirely foreign both to the N. T. and to Greek prose (Xen. Mem. iii. 5. 9 is a case of attracted genitive); and in Homer only, Od. iv. 114, is the solitary instance of it found.<sup>1</sup> See Kühner, II. 1, p. 309; Buttmann, Progr. üb. d. syntakt. Verbind. der Verba ἀκούειν and ἀκροᾶσθαι, Potsd. 1855, pp. 7, 12, and neut. Gr. p. 144 f. Just as little is the *object*, i.e. the *contents* of the preaching heard, meant by οὗ, which would rather be expressed by ὅν (Eph. iv. 21); but rather the *speaking subject*, who is listened to as he from whom the discourse proceeds (Mark vi. 20, vii. 14; Luke ii. 46, *et al.*; Winer, p. 187 [E. T. 249]), Christ being in this case conceived of as speaking *through His preachers* (see the following); comp. Eph. ii. 17. On the general thought, comp. Plat. Rep. p. 327 C: ἡ καὶ δύναισθ' αὖν, ἥ δ' ὅς, πείσαι μὴ ἀκούοντας; — χωρὶς κηρύσσ[.] without their having a preacher, *apart from a preacher*. Comp. Tittmann, Synon. p. 95; who, however, wrongly explains, οὐ πιστεύσαντες τῷ κηρύσσοντι. — ἀποσταλῶσι] *Whence?* διὰ ῥήματος Θεοῦ, ver. 17, informs us.—The *form* of the argument is a *sorites*, and its conclusion: The appointment of evangelical heralds is the first condition in order to bring about the calling upon the Lord. This retrograde *sorites* thus leads us back to the *source*; and of the ἀποστολή thus suggesting itself as primarily necessary, the *prophetic confirmation* from Isa. lii. 7 (not closely after the LXX.) is then given. This “dulcissimum dictum” (Melancthon), because it speaks of the message of blissful liberation from exile, therein possesses the Messianic character, as concerning the restoration of the theocracy; and therefore is legitimately<sup>2</sup> understood by Paul—in connection with the Messianic idea and its historical fulfilment—as a prophecy of the evangelical preachers. These preach salvation (ḥayy, meaning in Isaiah also not merely *peace*, but the theo-

<sup>1</sup> Comp. the Homeric πυνθάνισθαί τινος, equivalent to περί τινος (Nägelsbach, *Ilias*, p. 104, ed. 3).

<sup>2</sup> Comp. Hengstenberg, *Christol.* II. p. 292.

cratic *saving deliverance*), preach good (טוב); that is, still more generally, *omne quod felix faustumque est*, which is to be received through Christ, the accomplisher of the divine dominion. That the Rabbins also understood the passage in a Messianic sense, and in what way, see Wetstein.—The opposite of the poetical: *how pleasant are the feet* (i.e. how welcome the arrival), etc., at iii. 15; Acts v. 9; Neh. i. 15; see Schaefer, *ad Eur. Or.* 1217; Boeckh, *Expl. Pind.* p. 281; Wunder, *ad Soph. El.* 1357 f. p. 120.

Ver. 16. 'Αλλ'] contrast to the prophetic saying of ver. 15: *But*—notwithstanding that accordingly the blessed sending forth of messengers of salvation did not fail to take place—all did not obey the message of salvation, all did not submit to the requirement (of faith), which the glad news concerning Messiah and His kingdom placed before them; comp. i. 5, xvi. 26; 2 Thess. i. 8. With Theodore of Mopsuestia, who takes ἀλλ' οὐ κ.τ.λ. as a *question* (comp. Theodoret), Reiche thinks that ἀλλ' . . . εὐαγγ. is an opponent's objection, which Paul accordingly repels by the passage from Isaiah. Against this view the presence of the following γάρ would not be decisive—it would rather be quite in its proper place in the reply (Herm. *ad Viger.* p. 829; Hartung, *Partikell.* I. p. 473 f.)—but vv. 18 and 19 (comp. xi. 1, 11), to which Reiche appeals, testify directly against it, because there λέγω is found. Fritzsche, following Carpzov, refers οὐ πάντες to the Gentiles, of whom, however, although van Hengel also understands them to be intended in vv. 14, 15, nothing is said in the whole context; hence it is not to be even taken quite *generally* (Hofmann), but is to be referred textually to the *Jews*, of whom so many, notwithstanding that the lovely feet of the messengers of salvation came to tread amongst them, yielded no result. The *negative* expression for this multitude is a *litotes*, forbearing, but making it felt quite tragically enough, that the opposite of οὐ πάντες should have been found. Comp. iii. 3: ἠπίσθησάν τινες. — γάρ] *prophetic confirmation* of the sad phenomenon (οὐ πάντες κ.τ.λ.), which thus, as already *predicted*, enters into the connection of *divine destiny*, and is not an accidental occurrence. This Hofmann

misapprehends, extending the reference of the γάρ to the following ἄρα ἡ πίστις κ.τ.λ., which is impossible on account of the ἄρα commencing a new sentence, since Paul has not written εἰ γὰρ Ἡσαΐας λέγει κ.τ.λ. . . . ἄρα ἡ πίστις κ.τ.λ., whereby to these latter words would fall the definition of the citation, as Hofmann thinks.—In the lament of the author of Isa. liii. 1 (closely following the LXX., even with the κύριε added by them) over the unbelief of *his* time in the prophetic preaching (ἀκοή, see on Gal. iii. 2), Paul sees—and on account of the Messianic character of the entire chapter justly—a prophecy of the Jewish unbelief of *Christian* times in the *Christian* preaching. Comp. John xii. 38. Following Syr., Calovius, and others, Umbreit and Hengstenberg, *Christol.* II. p. 307, take ἀκοή as the *thing heard*, i.e. “that which is announced to us through the word of God (*by revelation*).” But the very following ἡ πίστις ἐξ ἀκοῆς shows, that Paul did not wish to be understood as meaning the divine communication which the preacher received, but the *preaching* of that word heard by the listeners. The historic aorist corresponds closely to ὑπήκουσαν. We may add that Theophylact rightly remarks: τὸ τίς ἀντὶ τοῦ σπάνιοι κεῖται ἐνταῦθα· τουτέστιν ὀλίγοι ἐπίστευσαν.

Ver. 17. Inference from the prophetic passage, with the view of substantially recapitulating what was said in ver. 14, and then pursuing the subject in ver. 18. — ἀκοή] the same as in ver. 16, *the announcement*, which is heard; comp. on John xii. 38. *From this comes faith*; the heard preaching of the gospel brings about in men's minds faith on Christ; *but preaching is brought about by God's behest* (Luke iii. 2; Matt. iv. 4; Heb. xi. 3), set to work by the fact that God commands preachers to their office. Rightly have Beza, Piscator, Semler, Cramer, Fritzsche, Glöckler, Tholuck, Baumgarten-Crusius, so understood ῥῆμα Θεοῦ. For the *ordinary* interpretation of it, also followed by Hofmann, as the *preached word of God*, is incorrect for this reason, that according to it ῥῆμα Θεοῦ in point of fact would not be different from ἀκοή; and this ῥῆμα Θεοῦ does not point back to ver. 8, but to ἀποσταλῶσι in ver. 15, as the remaining contents of the verse show, so that

the signification *saying* obtains textually the more precise definition of its sense as *best*. But when ἀκοή<sup>1</sup> has been taken in two different senses in ver. 16 and ver. 17, so that in ver. 16 it signifies the preaching, but in ver. 17 the *hearing* (Rückert, de Wette, Philippi, according to whom the preaching is to be analysed into its two *elements*, the hearing and the word of God, comp. Tholuck); or when in διὰ ῥήματος Θεοῦ, instead of "God's word," *divine revelation* has been substituted (Reiche, van Hengel, comp. Olshausen, who explains it as equivalent to διὰ πνεύματος Θεοῦ): these are just makeshifts in order to separate the incorrectly assumed notion of ῥήμα Θεοῦ from that of ἀκοή.<sup>2</sup>—How could Paul infer also ἡ δὲ ἀκοή διὰ ῥήματος Θεοῦ from Isaiah? Certainly not from the mere address κύριε, but rather from the whole attitude of the prophet towards God, as it is expressed in κύριε . . . ἡμῶν,—an attitude in which the prophet stands as the servant and ambassador of God, so that God thus appears as He on whose *saying*, i.e. on whose *command*, the ἀκοή is preached.

Ver. 18. A perhaps possible exculpation for the Jews is suggested by Paul as a *spontaneous objection*, and that in the form of a question to be *negatived*, and is then repelled with words from Scripture. "But I ask: Was it then in any way not possible for them to come to faith ἐξ ἀκοῆς? The preaching surely did not remain unheard by them, surely did not fail to come at all to their ears?" The correct view is simply and clearly given by Chrysostom. Incorrectly Hofmann: After Paul has introduced the *prophet* as speaking, he leaps over to the saying something *himself*, which that prophetic saying suggests to him. Against this may be urged, (1) that not here for the first time, but already in ver. 17, it is Paul who

<sup>1</sup> That ἀκοή may denote *hearkening, listening to*, is undoubted. See Plato, *Theact.* p. 142 D; Diod. xix. 41. But more usually it denotes, even in the classics, either the *faculty of hearing*, or, as here, the *thing heard*. Comp. on Gal. iii. 2.

<sup>2</sup> In which they cannot succeed, however, for ἐξ ἀκοῆς in fact could not be a hearkening in the abstract, but only the *hearkening to the word of God* (the gospel). So also, the *thing heard* would be even in itself the word of God; therefore we are not to explain, with van Hengel: "id vero, quod auditum est, debetur patefactioni divinae."

speaks; (2) that he, in placing himself in contradistinction to the prophet, must have written not merely ἀλλὰ λέγω, but ἀλλ' ἐγὼ λέγω; (3) that ἀλλὰ λ. is not to be taken, with Hofmann, "Well! then I say," since in that case ἀλλά would have the sense of agreement or concession (see Baumelein, *Partik.* p. 16), which is suitable neither here nor in ver. 19.<sup>1</sup> The ἀλλά is the quite customary ἀλλά of *objection*, which is made by oneself or in the name of the opponent; Baumelein, p. 13. — On the following question: *Surely it cannot be that they have not heard?* observe that οὐκ is closely joined to ἤκουσαν, expressing the opposite of ἤκουσαν (Baumelein, p. 277 f.; Winer, p. 476 [E. T. 642]; comp. 1 Cor. ix. 4, xi. 22), and that the interrogative μή supposes the *negative* answer: *by no means has it remained unheard by them*, which negation of the οὐκ ἤκουσαν implies the assertion of the ἤκουσαν. — ἤκουσαν] *sc.* τὴν ἀκοήν. The subject is those who remained unbelieving (οὐ πάντες ὑπήκ., ver. 16), by whom Paul certainly means the *Jews*, although without expressing it directly and exclusively. The reference to the *Gentiles* (Origen, Calvin, Fritzsche, and others, including van Hengel and Krummacher) is quite foreign to the connection; comp. on ver. 15. — μενοῦνγε] *imo vero.*<sup>2</sup> See on ix. 20. — εἰς πᾶσαν κ.τ.λ.] from Ps. xix. 5 (close after the LXX.), where the subject spoken of is the universally diffused *natural* revelation of God; Paul clothes in these sacred words the expression of the going forth (ἐξῆλθεν, *αστ.*) everywhere of the preaching of the *gospel*. Comp. Justin, *c. Tryph.* 42, *Apol.* i. 40. — ὁ φθόγγος αὐτῶν] *their sound*, the sound which the preachers (to these, according to the connection, αὐτῶν refers, which in the psalm refers to heaven, the handiworks of God, day and night) send forth while they preach. In the LXX. it is a translation of צִלְצִל, which some have understood, with Luther, as *their measuring line* (comp. Hupfeld), some, and rightly so, according to the

<sup>1</sup> Hofmann appeals without pertinence to Hartung, II. p. 35. For the *proinde* in challenges or exclamations is here entirely heterogeneous.

<sup>2</sup> Theodore of Mopsuestia aptly says: τὸ μενοῦνγε ἐπὶ λύσει κίχρηται, . . . λύων τὸ ζητούμενον. Comp. on the μὲν οὖν introducing a *correcting* answer, Hermann, *ad Viger.* p. 845; Pflugk, *ad Eur. Hec.* 1261; Kühner, II. 2, p. 711.

parallelism, with the LXX., Symm., Syr., Vulg., and most expositors, as *their sound*. — The answer *μενούργε κ.τ.λ.* (in which, moreover, Paul does not adduce the passage from the Psalms as a *quotation*) confutes the *οὐκ ἤκουσαν* very forcibly, because it argues *a majori*, and even applies to all the Jews of the dispersion. But the conclusion that, according to our present passage, the gospel had at that time *actually* penetrated everywhere (even to China, America, etc.), is simply an arrant mistake, contrary to the nature of the popularly poetical expression, although, in imitation of the older commentators, renewed by Löhe (*v. d. Kirche*, p. 34 ff.), and Pistorius in the *Luther. Zeitschr.* 1846, II. p. 40. The universal extension of the gospel (comp. Col. i. 6, 23; Clem. Cor. i. 5) set on foot by the *apostles* on a sufficiently large scale, is *continually* in course of development. Comp. xi. 25, 26.

Ver. 19. A further possible exculpation,<sup>1</sup> introduced in emphatic conformity with the preceding, and the repelling of it by means of scriptural declarations down to ver. 21. On *ἀλλά* Theodore of Mopsuestia rightly observes: *πάλιν ἐτέραν ἀντίθεσιν ἐπάγει. — μὴ Ἰσραὴλ οὐκ ἔγνω;*] *surely it did not remain unknown to the Israelites?*<sup>2</sup> The “*it*” to be supplied with *ἔγνω* (see Nägelsbach, *z. Ilias*, p. 120, ed. 3) is: *ὅτι εἰς πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν ἐξελεύσεται ὁ φθόγγος αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ.* This universal destination of the preaching of Christ expressed in ver. 18 must have been known by the Jews, for long ago Moses and also Isaiah had prophesied the conversion of the Gentiles—Isaiah likewise, the refractory spirit of opposition thereto of the Jews (vv. 20, 21). This reference of *οὐκ ἔγνω* alone (followed also by de Wette, Fritzsche, and Tholuck) flows purely in accordance with the text from what immediately precedes, and is at the same time naturally in keeping with the contents of the corresponding biblical passages; for the conversion of the Gentiles and the universality of Christianity are

<sup>1</sup> The correctness of which would in turn weaken the blameableness pointed out in ver. 18. Comp. Chrys.

<sup>2</sup> Those previously *meant* (in opposition to Hofmann) are here expressly *named* — which indicates a climax of the increasing *urgency* of the question, and which is the more naturally suggested to Paul, since he has already in view a prophecy directed to the people in contrast to the Gentiles (ver. 21).

one; since the former was prophesied to the Jews, the latter could not be unknown to them; and they could not therefore allege as the excuse for their unbelief: We did not know that Christianity is destined for the whole of humanity—the less could they do so, since Isaiah places before them the true source of their unbelief in their own spirit of resistance. The view of the passage which comes substantially nearest to ours, is that of Thomas Aquinas, Cornelius a Lapide, Piscator, Pareus, Toletus, Calovius, Turretine, Morus, Rosenmüller, Koppe, Benecke, Köllner, Ewald (comp. Tholuck), who supply with οὐκ ἔγνω: *that the gospel would pass over from the Jews to the Gentiles.* So Pelagius and Theodore of Mopsuestia: τὸ τοὺς ἐξ ἐθνῶν προσελήφθαι εἰς τὴν εὐσέβειαν. But this is wrong, in so far as the object to be supplied is not purely borrowed from the preceding, but is already in part anticipated from what follows. Beza has vaguely and erroneously supplied *Deum* with ἔγνω; Reithmayr, on the other hand, thinks no object is to be supplied; while others imagine *the gospel* to be the object (“Have they not learnt to know the gospel, in order to be able to believe in it?”). So Chrysostom, Vatablus, Gomarus, Hammond, Estius, and several others, including Rückert, Olshausen, van Hengel, Beyschlag, Mangold, and, with a peculiar turn, Philippi also; similarly Hofmann and others, taking up the following πρῶτος (see below). In that case—against which there is no objection in itself—μὴ Ἰσραὴλ οὐκ ἔγνω would be so complete a parallel to μὴ οὐκ ἤκουσαν in ver. 18, that here, as there, *the gospel* would have to be supplied. But as this is by no means necessary (in opposition to Hofmann)—since it fully satisfies the symmetry of the discourse, if in both instances ἀλλὰ λέγω has its reference to what immediately precedes—so it is directly opposed by the fact, that the following reply beginning with πρῶτος would not be suitable. For if we were to assume that Paul has given an *indirect* answer (“when he shows that the *Gentiles* believe, he says: How should not, could not *Israel* have believed, if it had willed?” Olsh.), this would only be a makeshift, in which the answer would appear the more unsuitable in proportion to its indirectness, and still leave open the possibility of the οὐκ ἔγνω. Or if we were to



suppose with Rückert, that the thought is: "Want of knowledge is not the cause, but God is now putting into penal execution what He has threatened, and is allowing salvation to pass over to the Gentiles, in order thereby to convert the Jews to a better disposition," the point of the *ἔγνω* would not be entered into at all, and moreover, the essential part of the interpretation would simply be supplied by the reader. This objection is at the same time valid against van Hengel, according to whom it is to be made to appear from the following prophetic quotations that Israel had indeed known, but had shamefully despised, the gospel. Or if, finally, with Philippi, we are to say that the passages from the prophets contained not a refutation, but a *substantiation*, of the fact that verily *Israel*<sup>1</sup> had rejected the gospel (which rejection lies in *οὐκ ἔγνω*), this would be inconsistent with the interrogative form with *μή* (comp. on iii. 5), which necessarily presupposes the *denial*<sup>2</sup> of the *οὐκ ἔγνω* (consequently the affirmative: *ἔγνω*). In entire deviation from the views just given, Reiche thinks that *Ἰσραήλ* is *accusative*, and *Θεός* to be supplied as subject. "Did not God recognise Israel for His people? How could He permit it to be so blinded and hardened?" It is decisive against this view, that to supply *Θεός* as subject, especially after ver. 18, is highly arbitrary, and that the following passages of Scripture would be quite inappropriate. — *πρώτος*] not in the sense of *πρότερος* (which, regarded by itself, might indeed be the case according to the context; see on John i. 15);

<sup>1</sup> Philippi paraphrases: "Is it conceivable that Israel precisely, the chosen people of God, did not recognise the Messianic *σωτηρία* destined in an especial manner for it, or the preaching thereof, while yet the Gentiles attained to this knowledge?" "The adduced passages from the prophets show now that there was *by no means any cause of wonder* over this fact, for thus exactly it had been predicted in the divine word,—namely, that the Gentiles would accept, but Israel would reject, the salvation."

<sup>2</sup> Philippi, indeed, in eds. 2 and 3, proposes, in the event of the *denial* of the question being retained,—which, however, he does not concede,—the expedient, that then the prophetic passages might serve to prove that the fact of the prophecy, which appeared in itself *incredible*, had *nevertheless* occurred in correspondence therewith. But the contents of this thought would be invented, not gathered from the language; and self-contradictory besides, for the *no* would be involved in the question, and in *πρώτος* κ. τ. λ. the *yes*, which had yet occurred in accordance with prophecy.

but, since *Moses* is quoted, with whom the testimony of God in the O. T. begins: *as the first* (who in Scripture comes forward in opposition to this) *speaks Moses*. Of the later testimonies of Scripture, Paul then contents himself with adducing only the bold divine utterances of Isaiah. Theodore of Mopsuestia well gives it: εὐθὺς Μωϋσής. Wetstein, Michaelis, Storr, Platt, Hofmann, connect πρῶτος with οὐκ ἔγνω. But the supposed sense: "Did not Israel first learn to know it (the gospel)?" or, as Hofmann expresses it: "*Was it possibly to stand in such a position, that Israel did not obtain the first experience of it?*" must have been expressed without μή.<sup>1</sup> — ἐγὼ παραζ. κ.τ.λ.] Deut. xxxii. 21, almost exactly after the LXX. God there, in the song of Moses, threatens the idolatrous Israelites, that He on His part (ἐγὼ) will bless a Gentile people, and thereby incite the former to jealousy and to wrath, as they had incited Him by their worship of idols. Paul recognises in this—according to the rule of the constancy of the divine ways in the history of the development of the theocracy—a type of the attaining of the Gentiles to participation in the communion of God's people, whereby the jealousy and wrath of the Jews will be excited. — ἐπ' οὐκ ἔθρει] ἐπ' ἄλλῃ, *in respect to a not-people*; for only the people of God was the real one, the people corresponding to the divine idea of a people; every other is the negation of this idea. Comp. ix. 25; 1 Pet. ii. 10. On the connection of οὐ with nouns, cancelling the notion objectively, see Hartung, *Partikell.* II. p. 129; Grimm on 2 Macc. iv. 13. Often found in Thucydides (Krüger on i. 137. 4). On ἐπί, *over, on the ground*, that is, *on account of*, comp. Demosthenes, 1448. 4: παροξυνόντων ἐπὶ τῷ γεγεννημένῳ, Polyb. iv. 7. 5. — ἀσυνέτῳ] τί γάρ

<sup>1</sup> By taking πρῶτος with ἔγνω, there would result the quite preposterous sense of the question: Surely it is not possibly the case that Israel first remained unacquainted with it? i.e. that the Israelites were the first to whose knowledge the gospel had not come? Hofmann groundlessly refers to Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 214, and explains as though οὐκ did not qualify ἔγνω, but πρῶτος, as though consequently Paul had said: μὴ Ἰσραὴλ οὐ πρῶτος ἔγνω; This would be: Surely Israel has not experienced it only in the *second* place (the Gentile world in the *first*)? With strange incorrectness, Hofmann says that, according to our way of taking πρῶτος, εἶπεν should stand instead of λίγει. Moses speaks and writes (ver. 5) still at this day as πρῶτος in the O. T.

Ἑλλήνων ἀσυνετώτερον ξύλοις καὶ λίθοις προσκεχρηότων ;  
Theophylact. Comp. i. 21.

Vv. 20, 21. Δέ] marking the transition to another prophet, as at ix. 27. — ἀποτολμᾷ κ. λέγει] *is emboldened and says*. The latter is the immediate consequence of the former ; hence here not a Hebraizing mode of expression for the adverbial notion (*he freely speaks out*), but ἀποτολμ. is *absolute* (Hom. *Il.* x. 232, xii. 51, *et al.*). Comp. Winer, p. 437 f. [E. T. 588 f.] ; Buttmann, p. 249 ; and see Maetzner, *ad Antiph.* p. 173 ; Hom. *Il.* i. 92 : θύρσῃσε καὶ ἠῦδα μάντις. — ἀποτολμᾷ] ἐβιάσατο γυμνὴν εἰπεῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ κινδυνεῦσαι ἢ ἀποσιωπῆσαι, Theophylact. Yet the prophet of bold speech is *represented as present*, as previously Moses in λέγει. The citation is Isa. lxv. 1, freely from the LXX., and with undesigned transposition of the two parallel clauses. According to its *historical* sense, the passage refers to the *Jews*<sup>1</sup> who had become apostate from God through immorality and idolatry, on whose behalf the prophet has just begged for grace, to which entreaty Jehovah begins His answer by reminding them how He had given Himself to be found, and revealed Himself with prevenient undeserved kindness to the faithless people. But in the apostate Israel, which was in fact sunk into an *idolatrous* condition (see esp. Isa. lxiv. 6, lxv. 3 ff.), and in the relation to it which Jehovah here affirms of Himself, Paul sees a *typical representation* of the *Gentile world*, which (as ἄθεοι ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, Eph. ii. 12) did not concern itself about God, but to which God has given Himself to be found, and (exepexegetic parallel) to be recognised in His self-revelation (through the gospel). The Gentiles have *accepted* this prevenient divine compassion, but Israel in its obstinate apostasy has *resisted* it ; hence Paul continues in ver. 21 with πρὸς δὲ τὸν Ἰσραὴλ λέγει. The latter clearly indicates that Paul really found in ver. 20 the prophetic reference to the *Gentile world* (of which Israel is the opposite) ; and not, as Hofmann with strict adherence to the historical sense of the original supposes, the *fruitlessness of the divine long-suffering towards Israel, which*

<sup>1</sup> Not to the *Gentiles* (Calvin, Vitringa, Philippi). See, on the other hand, Delitzsch on Isa.

*justifies God's dealing if He now rests not until He has requited its disobedience.* According to this interpretation, *πρὸς τὸν Ἰσραήλ* would have been already said in ver. 20, against which view ver. 21 testifies. — *εὑρέθην*] not: "I have allowed myself to be found" (Reiche and others), but: *I have been found*. On the sense, comp. Acts xvii. 27; and on the connection of *εὔρ.* and *ἐμφ.* *έγεν.*, Wisd. i. 1 f. The *aurists* are, in the sense of the apostle, to be understood of that which has taken place in the Christian present. — *τοῖς ἐμὲ μὴ ἐπερωτ.*] *who inquired not of me*, namely, respecting revelation; comp. Ezek. xx. 1; Dem. 1072. 12. — Ver. 21. *πρός*] not *adversus* (Erasmus, Beza, Calvin, Piscator, Toletus, Grotius, Cramer, Koppe), since in itself—without a more special indication of the text which would yield the hostile sense—it denotes only the simple placing in contrast. Hence, either: *in reference to Israel* (Estius, Wolf, Ch. Schmidt, and others, including Tholuck, de Wette, Fritzsche, Philippi), like Heb. i. 7, 8, Luke xii. 41, xx. 19; or, "*in the case of Israel He declares*" (Köllner, Rückert, Ewald, and others, following Luther and Vulg.). The former view, which is adopted also by van Hengel, is to be preferred *for this reason*, that *δέ* introduces a contrast, not with those to whom the previous passage was *directed*, but with those to whom it *refers* in respect of its figurative application. — *λέγει*] Isaiah, namely. That he speaks in the name of God, is understood of itself. — *ὅλην τὴν ἡμέρ.*] *the whole day*, like viii. 36. Expresses the *unremitting nature* of the love. — *ἀπειθ. κ. ἀντιλέγοντα*] *present participle*, denoting the continuance of the conduct. *ἀντιλέγ.* is not to be explained, with Grotius, Reiche, Fritzsche, van Hengel, and most, as *to be refractory*, which it does not mean, but *to contradict*. The Jews—although God stretched out His saving hands towards them from early morning till evening (comp. Prov. i. 24)—are disobedient, and say: *We will not!* Comp. Matt. xxiii. 37; Tit. ii. 9; 3 Macc. ii. 28; Lucian. *D. M.* xxx. 3; and see on John xix. 12. Also in Achilles Tatius, v. 27 (in opposition to Kypke and Fritzsche), *ἀντιλέγειν* is conceived as *contradiction*; as also *ἀντιλογία*, Heb. xii. 3. Note how opposed the passage is to absolute predestination, and particularly to the Calvinistic "*voluntas beneplaciti et signi.*"

## CHAPTER XI.

Ver. 1. After  $\tau$ . λαὸν αὐτοῦ, AD\*<sup>s</sup> and some Fathers have ὃν προέγνω. So Lachm. in brackets. An addition from ver. 2. — Ver. 2. After Ἰσραὴλ Elz. has λέγων, against decisive evidence. — Ver. 3. τὰ θυσιαστ.] Elz.: καὶ τὰ θυσ., against so important witnesses, that καὶ would appear a connective addition. Comp. the LXX. — Ver. 6. The addition in Elz., εἰ δὲ ἐξ ἔργων, οὐκ ἐστὶ ἐστὶ χάρις· ἐπεὶ τὸ ἔργον οὐκ ἐστὶ ἐστὶν ἔργον, is wanting in A C D E F G P<sup>s</sup>, 47, Copt. Sah. Arm. Vulg. It. Dam. Rufin., and all the Latin Fathers. An old interpolation (found already in B L<sup>s</sup>, Syr. Arr. Chrys.), with a view to the completion of the proof; rejected by Erasmus, Grotius, Wetstein, Griesbach, Scholz, Lachm.; adopted, indeed, by Tisch. 7, but again omitted in ed. 8; after Beza, Bengel, Matthiae, Rinck, defended most thoroughly by Fritzsche and Reiche (in opp. to his Commentary) in the *Comment. Crit.* I. p. 68 ff. But considering the preponderance of the opposing testimony, the completely superfluous character of the proposition in the argument, and the anomalous form in which the words appear in the principal Codex which contains them (B: εἰ δὲ ἐξ ἔργων, οὐκ ἐστὶ χάρις· ἐπεὶ τὸ ἔργον οὐκ ἐστὶ ἔστιν χάρις), and also the other variations in detail (see Tisch. 8), the defences of them are not convincing. See also van Hengel. The argument for retaining them, on the ground that an interpolator would have framed them more closely in conformity with the first half of the verse, is weakened by the fact that very ancient authorities have ἐστὶν instead of γίνεται also in the first half of the verse. — Ver. 7. τοῦτο] Elz.: τοῦτου, against decisive evidence. An emendation in accordance with the usual construction. — Ver. 13. γὰρ] Lachm., Tisch. 8: ὅς, according to A B P<sup>s</sup>, min. Syr. Copt. Damasc. Theodoret. MS.; C has ὅν; Aeth. utr. no particle. With such divided testimony, ὅς is the best supported, and to be preferred; it came to be glossed by more definite particles. — μὲν] is wanting in D E F G, min., which was occasioned by the apparent absence of reference for the μὲν. Lachm., Tisch. 8: μὲν ὅν, according to A B C P<sup>s</sup>, Copt., which has therefore the external attestation decidedly in its favour, but is to be explained from the fact that the unrelated μὲν was glossed by ὅν (a new sentence was

commenced with ἐφ' ὧν); therefore these authorities indirectly pass over to the side of the otherwise weakly accredited Recepta. — Ver. 17. τῆς ρίζης καὶ] This καὶ is wanting in B C S\*, Copt. Omitted by Tisch. 8; but how easily it might be suppressed, owing to the *homocotextu*! In D\* F G, codd. It. Ir., τῆς ρίζης is also wanting from the like cause. — Ver. 19. κλάδοι] So Rinck, Scholz, Lachm., Tisch. 8, according to decisive testimony. But Elz. and Tisch. 7 have οἱ κλάδοι, the article being mechanically introduced in imitation of τῶν κλάδων, vv. 17, 18. Were οἱ original, and had it been desired through its omission to designate the τινὲς τῶν κλάδων in ver. 17 (Matth., Fritzsche), it would have more readily occurred to the mechanical tendency of copyists to insert τινὲς instead of οἱ. — Ver. 20. ὑψηλοφρονεῖ] Lachm. and Tisch. 8: ὑψηλὰ φρονεῖ, according to A B S. Resolution of the word—which is only found besides in 1 Tim. vi. 17—into its elements in conformity with xii. 16. — Ver. 21. μήπω:] is wanting in A B C P S, min., Copt. Damasc. Ruf. Aug. Omitted by Lachm. and Tisch. 8. But the offence which was taken partly at the apparent unrelatedness of μήπω (which is therefore exchanged in Or. for πῶς μᾶλλον and πῶς πλέον), partly at the following future, readily induced the omission. For φείσεται, which Elz. has instead of φείσεται, is very feebly supported by evidence, and has manifestly come in in accordance with the original μήπω; wrongly defended anew by Rinck. See the exegetical notes; comp. also Beng. *Apparat. Crit.* — Ver. 22. In the second clause Lachm. and Tisch. have, instead of ἀποτομίαν, ἀποτομία, and instead of χρηστέτητα, χρηστότης Θεῷ; the former according to A B C S\*, 67\*, Or. Damasc.; the latter according to A B C D\* (S has χρηστέτητος Θεῷ), 67\*\*, Arm. Or. Eus. Damasc. Rightly; the common reading is a hasty grammatical emendation. Θεῷ, too, bears, in its belonging to the reading χρηστότης, the stamp of genuineness. — Ver. 25. παρ' ἑαυτ.] Lachm. and Tisch. 7: ἐν ἑαυτ., according to A B. Damasc. The latter is to be preferred (παρ' ἑαυτ. was introduced through a comparison of xii. 16), and it explains, too, the origin of the *hunc* ἑαυτοῦ in F G; for by the omission of the N the preposition would easily come to be dropped. — Ver. 30. ἐμεῖς] Elz., Scholz: καὶ ὑμεῖς, against decisive evidence. — Ver. 31. Before ἐλεῖθ. B D\* S, Copt. Dam. have ὧν; so Lachm. in brackets, and Tisch. 8. Inappropriate addition, arising from misconception, instead of which some min. have ὅσπερ. — Ver. 32. τοῦ πάπα:] Instead of the first τ. π., D. Ir. *et al.* have τὰ πάντα, and F G πάπα. Also Vulg. It. express the neuter, which, however, is taken from Gal. iii. 22.

CONTENTS :—After the humiliation hitherto expressed, there now follows the *consolation* in respect to the exclusion of a large part of Israel. (1) God has not cast off His people, but has allowed a part of them, according to a gracious election, to attain to salvation, and has hardened the remainder, vv. 1–10. (2) Yet God wills not their final destruction; nay, their unbelief subserves the salvation of the Gentiles, and their conversion will have yet more happy consequences. This is matter for hope, and the Gentile Christians may not therefore give way to self-exaltation, vv. 11–24. (3) For the hardening of a portion of the people will last no longer than until the whole of the Gentiles have become Christians; and then Israel will obtain salvation, vv. 25–32. How unfathomable are the riches, wisdom, and knowledge of God! To Him be glory! vv. 33–36.

Ver. 1. *Λέγω οὖν*] corresponds to the twofold *ἀλλὰ λέγω*, x. 18, 19, but so, that now this *third* interrogative *λέγω* is introduced in an *inferential* form. In consequence, namely, of what had just been clearly laid down in x. 18 ff., as to the guilt of resistant Israel in its exclusion from salvation in Christ—over-against the Gentiles' acceptance of it—the difficult question might arise: *Surely God has not cast off His people?* Surely it is not so tragic a fate, that we must infer it from that conduct of the people?<sup>1</sup> Paul states this question, earnestly negatives it, and then sets forth the real state of the matter. The opinion of Hofmann, that the apostle starts this question *because the scriptural passages x. 18 ff. show that it is to be negatived*, is the consequence of his incorrect interpretation of those scriptural sayings, and is confuted by the fact that the negation is first given and supported *in what follows*, not drawn *from what precedes*, but made good by a quite *different* scriptural proof, ver. 2. — *μὴ ἀπόσωτο κ.τ.λ.*] Comp. Ps. xciv. 14, xcv. 3; 1 Sam. xii. 32; on the form, see Winer, p. 86 [E. T. 111]. Reiche thinks, but erroneously, that the question is not expressed

<sup>1</sup> Namely, as a divine measure of retribution taken in consequence of their spirit of resistance to the message of salvation preached to them. The divine act of casting off from Himself is not viewed as the *cause* (against this is x. 21), but as the penal *consequence*, of the disdaining God's loving will.

sharply enough, and that *ἅπαντα* is to be supplied. *Ἀπόσωτο* has in truth the emphasis, and is placed first on that account; so that Paul's simple idea is, that the *casting off* of God's people, exclusion from the divine decree of the bestowal of salvation, recall of this destination to salvation, may not be inferred from what has gone before. Rightly, too, Bengel remarks: "*Ipsa populi ejus appellatio rationem negandi continet.*" This *ratio negandi* is then, in ver. 2, additionally strengthened by *ὃν προέγνω*. — The *μὴ γένοιτο* expresses horror at the *ἀπόσωτο*, not at the *λέγω* (van Hengel), as though Paul had written simply *ἀπόσωτο* without *μὴ*. — *καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ κ.τ.λ.*] *For I also*, etc., expresses the motive for *μὴ γένοιτο*! For Paul, as a true Israelite of patriotic feeling, cannot, in virtue of his theocratic self-esteem, admit that *ἀπόσωτο*, but can only repel the suggestion with abhorrence. Comp. de Wette and Baumgarten-Crusius. A peculiar *proof* of the *οὐκ ἀπόσωτο* was yet to *follow*. Usually it is thought that Paul proves the negation *by his own example*, since *he* in truth was not cast off. So also Philippi. But apart from the consideration, that the example of a single elected one, however highly favoured,<sup>1</sup> would be far from convincing, we see no reason why Paul should have added *ἐκ σπέρμ. Ἀβρ., φυλ. Βενιαμ.*; moreover, it appears from ver. 2, where he defines the negation, emphatically reiterates it, and then confirms it from Scripture, that he did not intend till ver. 2 to adduce the argument against the *ἀπόσωτο*, which he had *only provisionally* rejected in ver. 1. Without the least indication from the text, Hofmann introduces into *κ. ἐγὼ* the reference: Even I, the apostle entrusted with the calling of the Gentile world (which is supposed to imply a sealing of the sacred historical call of Israel); even I, *as once upon a time a persecutor, deserving of rejection*. — *ἐκ σπέρμ. Ἀβρ., φυλ. Βενιαμ.*] added, in order to exhibit the just and genuine privileges of his birth. Comp. Phil. iii. 5; Acts xiii. 21; Test. XII. Patr. p. 746 f. The tribe of Benjamin was in truth, along with that of Judah, the theocratic core of the nation after the exile. Es. iv. 1, x. 9.

<sup>1</sup> Theodore of Mopsuestia asks: *πῶς γὰρ εἶπεν . . . περὶ τὴν ἀπόσπασταί τὸν Θεὸν τοῦ ἐπὶ τῇ πίστει σιμνωμένου καὶ περὶ ταύτης διδάσκειν ἱπισχυμένον ἱερέως;*



Ver. 2. Ὁν προέγνω] An element which renders the impossibility of ἀπώσατο at once palpable; comp. ver. 29. Others take it as a *limiting* definition, τὸν λ. αὐτοῦ ὃν πρ. being understood of the *spiritual people of God destined to the Christian salvation* (Origen, Augustine, Chrysostom, Luther, Calvin, and others, including Heumann, Semler, Rosenmüller, Flatt, Glöckler). But against this view it is decisive that τ. λαὸν αὐτ. in ver. 1, without any limitation, denotes the Jewish nation, and consequently Paul himself would now completely disarrange the point in question; the whole chapter has for its subject, not the *spiritual* Israel, but the fate of the *nation* in respect to the salvation of Messiah. Hence, too, we are not to supply, with Philippi, p. 554, after ὃν προέγνω the limitation: *as seminary of the spiritual σπέρμα*. — The sense of προέγνω has been understood as variously as in viii. 29, but is to be taken just as there: God *knew* His people as such *beforehand*, before it actually existed; that is to say, it was to Him, to whom the whole future development of sacred history was present in His pretemporal counsel and plan, known and certain: *Israel is my peculiar people!* And consequently God cannot have afterwards rejected Israel; for this would in truth presuppose that which is inconceivable with God (comp. Acts xv. 18), and irreconcilable with the ἀμετάθετον τῆς βουλῆς αὐτοῦ (Heb. vi. 17), namely, that He had been deceived in His προέγνω; comp. ver. 30 ff. To suppose the *qualitas mala* of the people as that which God foreknew (van Hengel) is inadmissible, for the reason that πρόγνωσις must be the premiss of the προορίζειν of the people of God (comp. viii. 29); hence, too, it is not to be objected, with Hofmann,<sup>1</sup> against our view, that God would surely have been able to foresee the fact that, and the time when, His people would cease to be His people. — ἡ οὐκ οἶδατε κ.τ.λ., down to ver. 4, adduces a proof for οὐκ ἀπώσατο from an historical example of Scripture, according to which a case analogous to the present of the resistance of

<sup>1</sup> Who also here (comp. on viii. 29) takes προέγνω as an *act of the will*, by which God has beforehand *constituted* Israel what it, in accordance therewith, actually became. This would amount to the notion of the προειτοιμάζειν in the divine decree (comp. Eph. ii. 10).

the people to God had once occurred, but God has made the declaration that He had (not indeed cast off His people, but) reserved to Himself, in the midst of the depravity of the mass, a number of faithful ones. So (ver. 5) too now there has taken place, not a rejection of the people, but rather a gracious election out of the people. — ἐν Ἁλ[ί]α] belongs to τί λέγει, but is not: *de Elia* (Erasmus, Luther, Beza, Calvin, Piscator, Castalio, Calovius, and others), which would be linguistically erroneous, but: *in the passage treating of Elias*. Comp. Thuc. i. 9. 3, where ἐν τοῦ σκήπτρου ἕμα τῇ παραδύσει εἶρηκεν means: *at the passage, where he (Homer) treats of the yielding of the sceptre, he has said, etc.* Very prevalent is this mode of quotation in Philo, and also in the Rabbinical writings (Surenhusius, καταλλ. p. 493). Comp. also Mark xii. 26; Luke xx. 37, but not Heb. iv. 7. — ὡς ἐντυγχ. τ. Θ. κατὰ τ. Ἰσραήλ] dependent on οὐκ οἴδατε, as a more precisely defining parallel of ἐν Ἁλ. τί λέγει ἡ γρ. Comp. Luke vi. 4, xxii. 61; Acts xi. 16, xx. 20, *et al.*; Göller and Krüger on Thuc. i. 1. 1. On ἐντυγχάνειν (viii. 27, 34; Heb. vii. 25), with dative of the person concerned (frequently in Plutarch, Polyb., Lucian, etc.), comp. Acts xxv. 24; Wisd. viii. 21, xvi. 28. On κατὰ (*accusing*), comp. 1 Macc. viii. 32; 2 Macc. iv. 36.

Ver. 3. 1 Kings xix. 10, 14, freely from the LXX. — ἀπέκτ.] The Israelites, namely, under Ahab and Jezebel. 1 Kings xviii. 4, xiii. 22. — κατέσκαψ.] *have thoroughly destroyed, have razed.* Comp. Soph. Phil. 986: Τροίαν . . . κατασκάψαι. Eur. Hec. 22 (of the domestic altar); Dem. 361. 20; Plut. Popl. 10; 2 Macc. xiv. 38 (τὸ θυσιαστήριον). — τὰ θυσιαστ.] On the plural, as the temple in Jerusalem was the place exclusively destined for worship, the view of Estius suffices: "Verisimile est, Eliam loqui de altaribus, quae passim in excelsis studio quodam pietatis Deo vero erecta fuerant; maxime postquam decem tribus regum suorum tyrannide prohibitaе fuerunt, ne Jerusalem ascendere sacrificii causa. Quamvis enim id lege vetitum esset [see Lev. xvii. 8, 9; Deut. xii. 13, 14] ac recte fecerint Ezechias et Josias, reges Judae, etiam ejusmodi aras evertendo, tamen impium erat eas

subvertere odio cultus Dei Israel." Comp. Grotius, also Keil, on the books of Kings, p. 262, *Archäol.* I. § 89. — ὑπελείφθ. μόνος] in the sense of *Elias*: alone of the prophets; but according to the *application* designed by the apostle, as ver. 4 shows: as the only one of *Thy faithful*. But in this case we are not to assume, as Hofmann and others wish to do, that Paul, in order to suggest this sense, has transposed the original order of the two clauses of the verse—which is rather to be regarded as *accidental*; and this, considering the freedom of citation otherwise used, we need the less hesitate about, since Paul could not, even in the original order, see the reference of the verse which was in his thoughts to be excluded. — On ζητεῖν τ. ψυχ. τινος, to seek after one's life, see on Matt. ii. 20.

Ver. 4. Ἀλλά] But, although Elijah complained that he had been left sole survivor. — ὁ χρηματισμός] the divine oracular utterance (replying to this accusation). Found here only in N. T. (in the Apocrypha, 2 Macc. ii. 4, xi. 17); but see Diod. Sic. i. 1, xiv. 7, and Suicer, *Thes.* II. p. 1532; and respecting χρηματίζω, on Matt. ii. 12. — κατέλιπον κ.τ.λ.] 1 Kings xix. 18, with free deviation, bearing on his object, both from the LXX. and from the original. It means: *I have left remaining*, so, namely, that they are not slaughtered with the rest. Comp. Xen. *Anab.* vi. 3. 5: ὁκτῶ μόνους κατέλιπον (*superstites, vivos reliquerunt*); 1 Macc. xiii. 4. Hofmann incorrectly takes κατέλ. as the *third person plural*, having the same subject as ἀπέκτειναν. A groundless departure from the Hebrew text and from the LXX., according to which God is the subject. And it is *God* who has guided and preserved those who remained over. — ἐμαντῶ] i.e. to myself as my property, and for my service, in contrast to the idolatrous abomination. — οἵτινες κ.τ.λ.] *ita comparatos ut*, etc. — γόνυ] Not a knee has been bowed by them; hence the *singular*, comp. Phil. ii. 10. — τῇ Βάαλ] Dative of *worship*. Bernhardt, p. 86. Comp. xiv. 11. The Phœnician divinity ʾbʿl, the adoration of which was very widely diffused (Keil, § 91) amongst the Jews, especially under the later kings, though not of long subsistence (see Ewald, *Alterth.* p. 304), is most probably to be regarded as the *sun-god* (Movers, *Phœnicier*, I. p. 169 ff.; J. G.

Müller in Herzog's *Encyklop.* I. p. 639 f.), not as the planet Jupiter (Gesenius in the *Hall. Encyklop.* VIII. p. 384 ff.). It is remarkable—seeing that בַּעַל (according to different local and ritual forms also in the *plural*) is a masculine noun—that in the LXX. and in the Apocrypha it has sometimes, and most frequently, the masculine article (Num. xxii. 41; Judg. ii. 13; 1 Kings xvi. 31, *et al.*), sometimes the feminine (Zeph. i. 4; Hos. ii. 8; 1 Sam. vii. 4; always in Jer.; Tob. i. 5, *et al.*). That the LXX. should have thought בַּעַל to be of the common gender, and to denote also *Astarte* (Reiche), is not probable for this reason, that in the LXX. not merely are the masculine Baal and Astarte often mentioned together (Judg. ii. 13, x. 6, *et al.*), but also the feminine Baal and Astarte (1 Sam. vii. 4). The view that the feminine article was assigned to Βάαλ contemptuously (Gesenius, in Rosenmüller's *Report.* I. p. 139), as also Tholuck and Ewald, *Alterth.* p. 302, assume, finds no sufficient support—seeing that בַּעַל was a very well known divinity—in the feminine designation of idols unknown to them in the LXX. at 2 Kings xvii. 30, 31; cannot be justified by comparison of the Rabbinical designation of idols as אֱלֹהִים; and cannot be made good in the particular passages where the LXX. have the masculine or the feminine. To refer the phenomenon solely to an opinion of the LXX., who held בַּעַל to be the name of a god and also that of a goddess, and therefore, according to the supposed connection, used now the masculine and now the feminine article,—the latter particularly, where the word occurs along with עֲתִיקָה (Fritzsche), as in Judg. ii. 13, x. 6, 1 Sam. vii. 4,—is improbable in itself (because of the *unity* of the Hebrew name), and cannot be maintained even in passages like Judg. iii. 7, 2 Kings xxi. 3 (comp. with 1 Sam. xii. 10; Hos. ii. 10, 15), without arbitrariness. An *historical* reason must prevail, and it appears the most feasible hypothesis that Baal was conceived as an *androgynous* divinity (Beyer, *ad Selden. de Diis Syr.* p. 273 f., Wetstein, Koppe, Olshausen, Philippi), although more precise historical evidence is wanting. The feminine article has been also explained by supplying a substantive (εἰκόνη by Erasmus, Luther, Beza, Grotius, Bengel, and others ;

στήλη by Glass, Estius; θρησκεία by Cramer; even δαμάλει by Drusius, after Tob. i. 5, but see Fritzsche on Tob.); but this is both erroneous and arbitrary, because at least the expression must have run τῇ τοῦ Βάαλ, since ὕβ has always the article. This linguistic incongruity van Hengel avoids only by the precarious conjecture that ἡ Βάαλ signifies the *column of Baal*, and ὁ Βάαλ the *god Baal*.—We have to remark, moreover, that the LXX. have in our passage the *masculine* article; but Paul, acquainted with the use also of the *feminine* article, has, in quoting from *memory*, changed the article. According to Fritzsche and Ewald, he had found τῇ in his copy of the LXX.; but τῇ is now found only in more recent codd. of the LXX., into which it has found its way merely from our passage.

Ver. 5. *In this way*, corresponding to this Old Testament historical precedent, *therefore* (in order to make the application of vv. 3, 4), *there has been* (there has come into existence, and actually exists—*perfect*) *also in the present time, in consequence of an election made out of grace, a remnant*, namely, a small part taken out of the hardened mass of the people, *i.e.* the comparatively insignificant number of *believing* Jews, whom God's grace has *chosen* out of the totality of the people. It is related to the latter as a *remainder* (Herod. i. 119; 2 Kings xix. 4) to a whole, from which the largest part is removed (vv. 3, 4, ix. 27, 29), notwithstanding Acts xxi. 20. The *point of comparison* is the notion of the *λείμμα* in contrast to the remaining *mass*; the latter in the typical history has *perished*, but in the antitypical event has *forfeited saving deliverance*. —κατ' ἐκλ. χάρ.] opposed to the presumption in reference to works of the Jewish character; hence, too, the emphatic declaration in ver. 6. It is to be connected not with *λείμμα* as its more precise definition (Hofmann), but with *γέγονεν* as its mode. This is evinced by the following εἰ δὲ χάριτι, *sc.* γέγονεν, where χάριτι is equivalent to the κατ' ἐκλογ. *χάριτος*.

Ver. 6. This thought is not merely *by the way and incidental* (Koppe, Rückert, de Wette, Fritzsche, Maier, and others), but it belongs *essentially* to the development of the

apostle's thought to set forth the mode according to which *λεῖμμα γέγονε*, not only *positively* (κατ' ἐκλ. χάρι.), but also *negatively* (οὐκ ἐξ ἔργ.); because he then, in ver. 7, goes on to argue: ὁ ἐπιζητεῖ Ἰσραὴλ κ.τ.λ., which ἐπιζητεῖν, in fact, took place exactly ἐξ ἔργων, ix. 32. — εἰ δὲ χάριτι] *but if through grace*, sc. *λεῖμμα γέγονε*. — οὐκέτι ἐξ ἔργων] As previously the *individuals* who compose the *λεῖμμα* are conceived as the objects of the divine grace, through which they belong to the *λεῖμμα*; so are *they* also (not *the people generally*, as Hofmann takes it) conceived in this contrasted negative statement as the subjects, who do not owe it to legal works that in them is present the *λεῖμμα* composing the true community of God. On the logical οὐκέτι, see on vii. 17. Of ἐξ ἔργων there can be *nothing more said*. — ἐπεὶ ἡ χάρις κ.τ.λ.] *because* (otherwise) *grace ceases to be grace* (namely, if ἐξ ἔργων *λεῖμμα γέγονε*)—since in truth “*gratia nisi gratis sit, gratia non est,*” Augustine. Ἡ χάρις is the definite grace, which has made the election, and γίνεταί (not equivalent to ἐστί) means: it ceases, *in its concrete manifestation, to become*, i.e. to show itself as, that (comp. on Luke x. 18, *et al.*) which according to its nature it is. Positively expressed: it *becomes* what according to its essence it *is* not; it gives up its specific character.

Ver. 7. *Τί οὖν*] *infers the result* from vv. 5 and 6. Since a *λεῖμμα* has been constituted according to the election of grace, and therefore not possibly from the merit of works: *accordingly Israel* (as regards the mass) *has not obtained that which it strives after* (namely, δικαιοσύνη, as is known from ix. 30 ff.)—for it strives, in fact, ἐξ ἔργων—the election, on the other hand, namely, that chosen *λεῖμμα*, *has obtained it* (for they were the objects of the divine χάρις); *but the rest were hardened*. In this manner the true state of the case is now set forth, in contrast to ἀπώσατο, without its being necessary on this account to refer τί οὖν to the whole preceding vv. 2–6 (de Wette, Fritzsche, Philippi, and others); since the reference to vv. 5, 6 is quite sufficient, and quite in keeping with the logical progression. Reiche (comp. Lachm., who places a note of interrogation after τί οὖν and after ἐπέτυχεν) makes the

question extend to ἐπέτυχεν, to which question of wonder Paul then answers by ἡ δὲ ἐκλ. κ.τ.λ. But the futility of Israel's endeavour has already been long (ix. 31, 32) known to the reader, and is therefore not appropriate as the subject of such a question. Hofmann also takes ὁ ἐπιζητεῖ . . . ἐπέτυχεν as a question, but in the sense whether that which Israel has not obtained is *the same thing* as that to which its quest and striving tends (namely, its own righteousness)? To the self-evident *negation* of this question δέ then relates in the sense of *nevertheless*, and after the second ἐπέτυχεν there is to be supplied, not ὁ ἐπιζητ. Ἰσραήλ, but merely ὁ ἐπιζητεῖ (namely, to be, out of grace, the people of salvation). This complete distortion of the sense falls to the ground from the very fact, that for the second ἐπέτυχεν, since ὁ ἐπιζητεῖ is not appended, no other object can be thought of without the greatest arbitrariness than that of the first ἐπέτυχεν, namely ὁ ἐπιζητεῖ Ἰσραήλ; and also, as respects the contents of the question, from the consideration, that if we should not be able to say that Israel has not obtained that for which it strove, this would stand in contradiction to the universal Pauline dogma of the impossibility of righteousness by the law. — ἐπιζητεῖ does not denote the *zealous* pursuit (Fritzsche, Philippi), but its *direction*, correlative to ἐπέτυχεν. See on Matt. vi. 33; Phil. iv. 17. By the *present*, the *continuance* of the endeavour is admitted.—The τοῦτο (on the *accusative* instead of the customary genitive, see Matthiae, § 328; Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* II. p. 861) has tragic emphasis: *even this* it has *not* reached. — ἡ δὲ ἐκλογή] that is, here “*reliquiae illius populi, quas per gratiam suam Deus elegit*,” Estius. Comp. the use of περιτομή, etc., Lobeck, *ad Phryg.* p. 469.—The πάρωσις, *hardening* (not *blinding*, as Hofmann thinks; see on 2 Cor. iii. 14), is the making unsusceptible in understanding and will as respects the appropriation of salvation in Christ. Fritzsche, *ad Marc.* p. 78; Winzer, *Progr.* 1828, p. 8. The subject who hardens is God. Comp. 2 Cor. iii. 14, and on ix. 8.

Ver. 8. This ἐπωρώθησαν ensued in conformity with that which stands written, etc. That which is testified of the hardening of the people in the time of Isaiah, and as early as

that of Moses, has its Messianic fulfilment through the hardening of the Jews against the gospel, so that this hardening has taken place *καθὼς γέγραπται κ.τ.λ.* This *prophetic* relation is groundlessly denied by Tholuck and Hofmann. The agreement denoted by *καθ.* *γέγραπ.* is just that of prophecy and fulfilment according to the divine teleology. Comp. Matt. xv. 7.—In the citation itself, Isa. xxix. 10 (as far as *κατανύξ.*) and Deut. xxix. 3 (not Isa. vi. 9) are combined into one saying, and quoted very freely from the LXX. Deuteronomy *lc.* has after *ἀκούειν*: *ἕως τῆς ἡμέρας ταύτης*, hence *ἕως τῆς σήμε. ἡμ.* belongs to the quotation; and the words *καθὼς . . . ἀκούειν* must *not* be put in a parenthesis, as Beza, Wolf, Griesbach, and others have done. — *ἔδωκεν*] *He gave*<sup>1</sup> not mere permission (Chrysostom, Theophylact, and many). — *πνεῦμα κατανύξεως*] Heb. *רוח תרופה*, *i.e.* a spirit producing stupefaction, which is obviously a *daemonic* spirit. Comp. 2 Cor. iv. 4; Eph. ii. 2. Elsewhere the LXX. translate *חרומה* by *ἔκστασις* (Gen. ii. 21, xv. 12), or *θάμβος* (1 Sam. xxvi. 12), or *ἀνδρόγυνον* (Prov. xix. 15). They gave the approximate sense of the word differently according to the connection. But that they understood *κατά-νυξις* actually as *stupefaction, intoxication*, is clear from Ps. lx. 5, where they have rendered *יין תרעלה*, *intoxicating wine*, by *οἶνον κατανύξεως*. See in general, Fritzsche, *Loc.* p. 558 ff. This sense of *κατάνυξις* is explained by the use of *κατανύσσεσθαι*, *compungi*, in the LXX. and the Apocrypha to express the deep, inward paralyzing *shock* caused by grief, fear, astonishment, etc., whereby one is stupified and as if struck by a blow (Schleusner, *Theo.* III. p. 256; comp. on Acts ii. 37). In classical Greek neither the substantive nor the verb is found. We may add that every derivation is erroneous, which does not go back to *νύσσειν* (comp. *νύξις*, Plut. *Mor.* p. 930 F); nor is it admissible (since Paul certainly knew that *κατάν.* expressed *חרומה*) to seek explanations which depart from the notion of *חרומה*. So *e.g.* Calvin: "Spiritum vocat . . . *compunctionis*, ubi scilicet quaedam *fellis amaritudo* se prodit, imo etiam *furor* in respuenda veritate." Similarly Luther ("an embittered spirit") and Melancthon. Chrysostom, indeed (and Theophylact),

<sup>1</sup> LXX. Isa. xxix. 10: *πιστότατοι ὑμῶν κύριοι συνήμωτοι κατανύξεως.*



hits the *thing itself* rightly: *κατάνυξιν ἐνταῦθα τὴν περὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἔξιν τῆς ψυχῆς φησὶ τὴν ἀνιάτως ἔχουσιν καὶ ἀμεταθέτως*, but his analysis of the word: *κατανιγῆναι γὰρ οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ ἐμπαγῆναι ποῦ καὶ προσηλωσθαι*, is arbitrarily far-fetched. — *τοῦ μὴ βλέπειν*] A fatally pregnant *oxymoron*. The genit. is that of the aim: eyes, *in order that they may not see*, etc. Linguistically correct is also the rendering of Grotius: eyes *of not-seeing*, i.e. “*oculos ad videndum ineptos*,” Fritzsche, comp. Philippi and van Hengel. But the former view corresponds better at once to the original text (LXX. οὐκ ἔδωκε. . . ὀφθαλμοὺς βλέπειν κ. ὧτα ἀκούειν) and to the telic *τοῦ μὴ βλέπειν*, ver. 10. Comp. Isa. vi. 9, 10; John xii. 40; Acts xxviii. 27. — ἔως τ. σήμ. ἡμέρ.] belongs to the whole affirmation ἔδωκεν κ.τ.λ. Thus *uninterruptedly* God dealt with them. The glance at a *future*, in which it was to be *otherwise* (Hofmann), is here (comp. ver. 10) still quite remote.

Vv. 9, 10. A further Scripture proof of *ἐπωρώθησαν*,<sup>1</sup> and that from Ps. lxxix. 23, 24, quoted with free deviation from the LXX. The composer of this psalm is *not* David (in opposition to Hengstenberg, Hävernick), but some one of much later date; a circumstance which we must judge of analogously to the expression of Christ, Matt. xxii. 43. The suffering theocrat of the psalm is, as such, a type of the Messiah, and His enemies a type of the unbelieving Jews; hence Paul could find the fulfilment of the passage in the *πώρωσις* of the latter. Consequently, in pursuance of this typical reference, the sense in which he takes the words is as follows: “*Let their table become to them for* (let it be turned for them into, comp. John xvi. 20) *a snare, and for a chase, and for a trap, and (so) for a retaliation;*” i.e., *while they feast and drink securely and carelessly at their well-furnished table,*<sup>2</sup> *let the fate of violence overtake them unawares*, just as wild

<sup>1</sup> With the simple *καί*, and, to take which *climactically* (Hofmann) is justified neither by the name of David nor the contents of the passage. It would place a quite uncalled-for emphasis on *Δαυὶδ* (even *David*).

<sup>2</sup> To conceive of the *table* as an *outspread coverlet* (Gesenius, *Thes.* III. p. 1417, Hofmann) in which they *entangle* themselves, is to come very unnecessarily and arbitrarily to the aid of the boldness of the poetical expression.

beasts are surprised in a *snare*, and by the *capture of the chase*, and by a *trap*; and so must *retaliation* alight upon them for that which they have done (in rejecting, namely, faith on Christ). But *what* violent calamity is meant, the sequel expresses, namely: "*Darkened must their eyes become, that they may not see,*" i.e. *they must become spiritually blinded*, incapable of discerning the truth of salvation; and finally the same thing under another figure: "*And bend their back always,*" denoting the keeping them in *bondage*, and that, in the sense of the apostle, the *spiritual bondage* of the unfree condition of the inner life produced by the *πώρωσις*.<sup>1</sup> The *hardening*, therefore, which Paul recognises as predicted in the passage, does not lie in *ἡ τράπεζα αὐτῶν* (Fritzsche),—which is not to be explained "of the *law* and its works, which was Israel's food" (Philippi, following older expositors, also Tholuck),—but in *γενηθήτω εἰς παγίδα κ.τ.λ.*, and is more precisely indicated in ver. 10. The express repetition in ver. 10 of the *becoming blinded*, already designated in ver. 8, forbids our explaining the prophetic images in vv. 9, 10 generally as representations of *severe divine judgments* like Pharaoh's overthrow, in which case the specific *point* of the citation would be neglected (in opposition to Hofmann).—*καὶ εἰς θήραν*] stands neither in the Hebrew nor in the LXX.; but *θήρα* means *chase*, not *net* (Tholuck, Ewald), to establish which signification the solitary passage Ps. xxxv. 8, where the LXX. render תַּרְיָה inexactly by *θήρα*, cannot suffice. It often means *booty* (van Hengel) in the LXX. and in classical Greek; but this is not appropriate here, where the "*becoming for a booty*" is said not of such as men, but of the *τράπεζα*. This shall be turned for them into a *chase*, so that they, in their secure feasting, become like to the unfortunate object of the chase, which is captured

<sup>1</sup> Those who have found in ver. 9 the destruction of Jerusalem predicted (Michaelis, after Grotius, Wetstein, and many), so as to refer *τράπεζα* to the Passover meal, for the celebration of which the Jews were in Jerusalem at the very time the city was invested (Josephus, *Bell. Jud.* vi. 9. 3, 4), or even (Grotius) to the altar in the temple; and those who have regarded ver. 10 (*καὶ τὸν ὠτὸν κ.τ.λ.*) as a prophecy of the servitude of the Jews to Rome (so some of the Fathers); could not have given an explanation more opposed in sense to the connection.

by the hunter.<sup>1</sup> — *σκάνδαλον*] corresponding primarily to the classical *σκανδάληθρον*, *the stick set in a trap* (Schol. *Ar. Ach.* 687), is frequently in the LXX. (see Schleusner, *Thes.* V. p. 38), and so also here, the translation of שְׂרִיט, *snare*, by which we must therefore abide. — *ἀνταπόδομα* is not found in classical Greek, but often in the LXX. and Apocrypha, Luke xiv. 12. — *καὶ τὸν νῶτον κ.τ.λ.*] is to be taken, according to the context, as the expression of the idea of *hardening* (represented as a bending together under the *yoke* of spiritual servitude), not, with Fritzsche, of rendering miserable through the withdrawal of the Messianic salvation. On the masculine *ὁ νῶτος*, see Lobeck, *ad Phrym.* p. 290.

Ver. 11.<sup>2</sup> At this point begins the teleological discussion respecting the *οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ ἐπωρώθησαν*, ver. 7. See the *contents* above. — *λέγω οὖν*] quite as in ver. 1: *I ask therefore*, attaching it by way of inference to the *ἐπωρώθησαν* just supported by Scripture. — *μὴ ἔπταισαν, ἵνα πέσω.*] *But their stumbling had not the aim* (ordained by God) *that they should fall? i.e., by the fact of their stumbling at Christ* (ix. 32, 33), *and refusing faith to Him, has the divine purpose not aimed at their everlasting ἀπώλεια?* This emphasis on *πέσωσι* (*come to be prostrate*) involves the climactic relation to *ἔπταισαν* (*to stumble*), — a relation which Hofmann loses sight of when he makes the question express nothing further than: whether the fall which Israel suffered had been *its own aim?* Photius aptly remarks: *τὸ πταῖσμα αὐτῶν οὐχὶ εἰς κατάπτωσιν τέλειαν γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ μόνον οἶον ὑπεσκελίσθησαν.* Others have found the point of the question not purely in the climax of the two figurative verbs, but in definitions *mentally supplied*, which, however, as such, cannot be admitted. So, in particular, Augustine and many: *only* in order that they should fall, as though it ran *μόνον ἵνα*, as Umbreit still takes it (comp. Hofmann); further Melancthon: “non sic impegerunt Judaei, ut in tota

<sup>1</sup> How very often *ἐήρα*, *ἐηρᾶν*, and *ἐηρᾶσθαι* are used also in classical Greek in the figurative sense, see in Dorvill. *ad Charit.* p. 539; Heind. *ad Plat. Theæt.* p. 143.

<sup>2</sup> On vv. 11–33, see Luthardt, *Lehre von d. letzten Dingen*, p. 106 ff.; von Oettingen, *Synagogale Elegik des Volks Israels*, 1853, p. 133 ff.

*gente nemo sit salvandus*," as though it ran ἵνα πάντες; and yet further, Ewald: "that they might *purely in accordance with the divine design, and therefore without their freedom and their own will*, fall into sin and into destruction," as though it ran ἵνα ἐξ ἀνάγκης, or the like. We must simply abide by the view, that πταίειν is a figure for the taking offence at Christ which refuses faith, and πίπτειν a figure for the being involved in everlasting destruction; comp. Heb. iv. 11, Eccus. ii. 7. In the *former* the *latter* was not present as the aim of God's purpose. — On ἔπταισαν, comp. the proverb: μὴ δις πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν λίθον πταίειν, Polyb. xxxi. 19. 5, xxxi. 20. 1; and on the sense of moral stumbling, Jas. ii. 10, iii. 2; 2 Pet. i. 10; Eur. *Aeg. fr.* ii. 1: πταίσαντ' ἀρετὰν ἀποδείξασθαι. The *subject* is the λοιποί of ver. 7, the mass of the people not belonging to the ἐκλογή. — τῷ αὐτῶν παραπτ.] *through their fault* consisting in the refusal of faith, through their *offence*. Παραπτ. does not refer to πέσωσι (Reiche, Tholuck, and several others),—which the *emphatic* sense of πέσ. forbids; but in substance that πταῖσμα is meant, which is morally characterized by means of παράπτωμα as *delictum* (so rightly Vulg.), as ἁμαρτία (comp. John xvi. 9), according to its stated figurative designation (comp. also iv. 25, v. 15). Quite against the usage of the N. T., Tholuck renders: *defeat* (Diod. xix. 100). — τοῖς ἔθνεσιν] *sc. γέγονεν*. That through the despising of the Messianic salvation on the part of the Jews its attainment by the Gentiles was effected—this experience Paul had learnt to recognise as that which it actually was, as the way which the fulfilment of the divine arrangement, i. 16, took. Comp. Matt. xxi. 43, xxii. 9; Acts xiii. 46, xxviii. 28. — εἰς τὸ παραζ. αὐτούς] *aim*; comp. Calovius: "Assumptio novi populi *directa* fuit ad veteris provocationem ad aemulationem, ut nempe Israelitae . . . seria aemulatione irritati, et ipsi doctrinae ev. animos suos submitterent." Comp. x. 19. With this εἰς τὸ παραζ. αὐτ., exactly the *counterpart* of ἵνα πέσωσι is expressed.

Ver. 12. Δέ] μεταβατικόν, leading over from what has been said in ver. 11 to a very joyful prospect thereby opened into the future. — The *conclusion* is a "felici effectu causae peioris

ad feliciorum effectum causae melioris." — *πλοῦτος*] for the Gentile world (*κόσμος*) became *enriched with the σωτηρία* (ver. 11), through the *παράπτωμα* of the Jews. — *τὸ ἡττημα αὐτ. πλοῦτ. ἐθνῶν*] and *their overthrow riches for Gentile peoples*. Parallel to the foregoing. — *ἡττημα*] is not found in the old Greek, but only in the LXX. Isa. xxxi. 8, and 1 Cor. vi. 7; it is, however, equivalent to the classical *ἡττα*, which is the opposite of *νίκη* (Plato, *Lach.* p. 196 A, *Legg.* i. p. 638 A; Dem. 1486. 3; Xen. *Cyr.* iii. 1. 19, 20), and, corresponding to the signification of *ἡττᾶσθαι*, *profligari*, *vinci*, means *clades*, both in its proper sense, and also generally: *succumbing, decline* (comp. Dem. 1466. 23, *ἡττα τῆς προαιρέσεως*), *loss suffered* (1 Cor. vi. 7), *getting the worse*. See Perizon. *ad Acl. V. H.* ii. 25. Here the proper signification is to be retained, and that, as the contrast of *τὸ πλήρωμα* requires, in a *numerical* respect. So now also Tholuck, likewise Mangold. Through the fact that a part of the Jews was unbelieving, the people has *suffered an overthrow*, has, like a vanquished army, been weakened in numbers, inasmuch, namely, as the unbelieving portion by its unbelief practically seceded from the people of God. Comp. Vulg.: "*diminutio eorum*;" Luthardt: "*loss in amount*." If it be explained as: *loss of the Messianic salvation, which they have suffered* (Fritzsche and others<sup>1</sup>), or: *the loss which the kingdom of God has suffered in their case* (Philippi, comp. Kahnis, *Dogm.* I. p. 573), the former is not appropriate to the contrast of *πλήρωμα*, and the latter introduces the reference to the kingdom of God, as that which has suffered the detriment, the more unwarrantably, inasmuch as the genit. *αὐτῶν* is expressed. The *threefold αὐτῶν* is to be taken with the *like* reference as the genitive of the subject, and applies in each instance to the people Israel as a whole (whose collective guilt also is the *παράπτωμα*), in contrast to the *κόσμος* and the *ἔθνη*—which likewise is not preserved in Philippi's view. This very

<sup>1</sup> So also de Wette; similarly Ruckert: "*the loss of their original dignity and glory as the people of God*;" and Hofmann: "*their hurt, in that they, by virtue of their unbelief, are not what they should be*." Comp. Köllner and Glöckler. Among the older interpreters, Calvin: "*Diminutio honoris sui, qui fuerant populus Dei gloriosus*."

circumstance, and more decisively the utter absence of linguistic proof, tells also against the traditional usual rendering, according to which τὸ ἥττημα is supposed to signify the *minority*: "*paucitas Judaeorum credentium*" (Grotius). So, in substance, Chrysostom, Theodoret, Erasmus, Beza, Estius, Wetstein, Bengel, and many others, including Reiche, Olshausen, Baumgarten-Crusius, Maier, Bisping, Reithmayr; comp. Ewald: "their *remaining behind*." — πόσῳ μᾶλλον τὸ πλήρωμα αὐτῶν] *sc.* πλοῦτος ἐθνῶν γενήσεται; *how much more their becoming full*, that is, how much more will it issue in the enrichment of the Gentiles with the Messianic salvation, if the Jews, after the defeat which they have suffered, shall again be reinstated to their *plena copia*, so that they will then again in their full amount (ver. 26), as an integral whole, belong to the people of God,—which will take place through the conversion of all Israel to Christ (not *would*, as Luther has it<sup>1</sup>). The ἥττημα αὐτῶν is then compensated, and the πλήρωμα αὐτῶν brought in, which, moreover, may take place even with a continuance of the διασπορά. On πλήρωμα generally, see Fritzsche, II. p. 469 ff. Comp. on Eph. i. 10. The *numerical* reference of the πλήρωμα αὐτῶν is suggested by the correlative τὸ πλήρωμα τῶν ἐθνῶν in ver. 25; and in so far the view which takes it of the *full number* of the Jews (Theodoret: πάντες πιστεύσαντες μεζύων ἀγαθῶν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἐγένοντο ἂν πρόξενοι, so most) is correct. Comp. Ewald: "their *full admission*, supplying what is wanting." With this Umbreit mixes up at the same time "the fulfilment of their predestination;" whilst van Hengel sees in the πλήρ. αὐτ., not absolutely the full number, but only the collective body of *those destined by God to conversion*, which, however, is not expressed, but is supplied by the reader. The various views correspond to the varying explanations of ἥττημα. So *c.g.* Fritzsche: the fulness of Messianic salvation, which they will possess; Philippi: the filling up—which takes place through their conversion—of the blank in the

<sup>1</sup> Philippi also explains vv. 12 and 15 not of an actual, but only of a possible πρόσληψις of Israel (p. 554). Vv. 13, 14 are not *in favour of this*, where Paul has in view the intermediate time until the final πρόσληψις of the πληρωμα; and ver. 26 is decisive *against it*.

kingdom of God which arose through their unbelief;<sup>1</sup> Rückert, Köllner: the restoration of Israel to its befitting position; Hofmann: the status, in which they are fully and entirely that which they ought to be (qualitative). Luthardt also takes the correct view.

Vv. 13, 14. Not a parenthetical thought (Reiche), but the connection with the preceding and following is: “*πόσῳ μᾶλλον τὸ πλήρωμα αὐτῶν* I say: but you precisely, the Gentile Christians,—who might think that my office belongs only to you and the Gentiles, and that the conversion of the Jews lies less in my vocation,—*you*<sup>2</sup> I hereby make to know (ὕμῖν λέγω), that I, as apostle of the Gentiles, etc.; for (motive) the conversion of the Jews will have the happiest consequence (ver. 15).” — τοῖς ἔθνεσιν] to the (born) Gentiles, denotes, as an apposition to ὕμῖν, the readers according to their chief constituent element, in virtue of which the Christian Gentile body is represented in them; comp. i. 13. Observe that Paul does not write τοῖς δὲ ἔθνεσιν ἐν ὕμῖν λέγω, as though he intended only a Gentile fraction of the otherwise Jewish-Christian community (in opposition to Mangold). In contradistinction to his readers, the Jews, although his flesh, are to him third persons, whom he, as apostle of the Gentiles, might mediately serve. Baur fails to recognise this, I. p. 371. — ἐφ’ ὅσον] not temporal (*quamdiu*, Matt. ix. 15; 2 Pet. i. 13), but: *in quantum*, *in as far as* I, etc. Comp. Matt. xxv. 40; Plato, *Rep.* p. 268 B; Xen. *Cyr.* v. 4. 68. Just so εἰς ὅσον and καθ’ ὅσον. — μὲν] as so often in Paul without a corresponding δέ. But we see from the following that the train of ideas passing before his mind was this: “I seek indeed, so far as I am one who has the commission of Apostle to the Gentiles (observe the emphatic ἐγώ, in which a noble self-consciousness is expressed), to do honour to my office, but I have in view withal (for see x. 1, ix. 2, 3) to incite my kinsmen to emulation, etc.” — εἴπως] whether

<sup>1</sup> Comp. Melancthon: “Complementum integrae ecclesiae convertendae ex semine Abrahae.” Similarly Origen.

<sup>2</sup> According to the reading ὕμῖν δέ (see the critical notes). This δέ forms a contrast with the perspective just opened by ποσ. μᾶλλ. τ. πλήρ. αὐτῶν in favour of the Jews.

*in any way.* The practical honouring of the office, which consists in a true discharge of it, is an acting, whereby the desired attainment is *attempted*, see on i. 10; Phil. iii. 11; Acts xxvii. 12; Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 220. Less in accordance with the text—since the very εἶπας παραζ. κ.τ.λ. presupposes an *actual* δοξάζειν (2 Thess. iii. 1; John xii. 28). — Reiche and Ewald (after Grotius and many others, including Flatt) take it as: *I boast*, hold my office something high and glorious. Hofmann, indeed, understands an *actual* glorification, but *conditional* by εἰ πῶς κ.τ.λ., so that the latter is not *whether possibly*, but *if possibly*. From this the illogical relation of present and future which thus arises<sup>1</sup> must deter us (Paul must have used the future δοξάσω). — παραζ. and σώσω] future indicative, like i. 10. On σώσω, comp. 1 Tim. iv. 16; 1 Cor. vii. 16, ix. 22. The enclitic μου standing before the noun cannot be emphatic (van Hengel), but represents, at the same time, the dative of interest (whether I shall perhaps rouse to me my flesh to jealousy), like 1 Cor. ix. 27, Phil. ii. 2, Col. iv. 18, *et al.*, and frequently in classical Greek. — αὐτῶν] refers to those intended by the collective τὴν σάρκα. Σάρκα δὲ εἰπὼν γνησιότητα καὶ φιλοστοργίαν ἐρέφηνε, Theophylact. Theodoret quite erroneously thinks that Paul wished to intimate a denial of spiritual fellowship. On the contrary, πλέον αὐτοὺς οἰκειούμενος (Oecumenius), he says μ. τ. σάρκα, which is like τοὺς συγγενεῖς μου κατὰ σάρκα, ix. 3, but more strongly significant. Gen. xxxvii. 27; Judg. ix. 2; 2 Sam. v. 1. Comp. Isa. lviii. 7. Note the *modesty* of the expression τινάς, which, however, was suggested by the experience of the *difficuly* of the conversion of the Jews; comp. 1 Cor. ix. 22.

Ver. 15. By way of inference, like ver. 12; γάρ assigns a *motive* for vv. 13, 14. — ἀποβολή, *casting away*; Plato, *Legg.* xii. p. 493 E, 944 C; Aq. Prov. xxviii. 24. By this is meant their exclusion from the people of God on account of their

<sup>1</sup> Hofmann adduces as an example Xen. *Anab.* iv. 7. 3. But such passages are of a quite different kind (see Brunck, *ad Arist. Plut.* 1064; Maetznor, *ad Lycurg.* p. 251); and to the *necessary* connection expressed in them of the consequence with the condition, the “if in any way” (*possibly*), which would make the condition *problematic*, would be wholly unsuitable. Comp also Kühner, *ad Xen. l. c.* and *Gramm.* II. 1, p. 120.



unbelief, and the opposite of it is their *πρόσληψις*, *reception in addition* (Plato, *Theact.* p. 210 A), by which they, having become believing, are *adopted* by God into the fellowship of His people. The view of *ἀποβολή* as *loss* (Acts xxvii. 22; Plato, *Phaed.* p. 75 E; *Lach.* p. 195 E; Plut. *Sol.* 7) is less suitable to this contrast (in opposition to the Vulg., Luther, Bengel, and others, including Philippi, who understands the loss, which the *kingdom of God* has suffered in their case). — *καταλλαγή κόσμου*] in so far, namely, as the *converted portion* of the Gentiles has attained to *δικαιοσύνη* through faith, and is no longer subjected to the *ὀργή* of God; and *there-with reconciliation* of the Gentile world with God has begun. Comp. v. 11. It is a more precise definition of the notion expressed in ver. 12 by *πλοῦτος κόσμος*. — *ζωὴ ἐκ νεκρ.*] *i.e. life, which proceeds from the dead* (namely, when these arise). The *πρόσληψις* of the still unconverted Jews, Paul concludes, will be of such a kind (*τίς*, not *τί*, is his question), will be of so glorious a character (comp. Eph. i. 18), that it will bring with it the last most blessed development, namely, the life beginning with the resurrection of the dead in the *αἶων ὁ μέλλων*, the *ζωὴ αἰώνιος*, which has the awakening from death as its causal premiss. Hence Paul does not say *ἀνάστασις ἐκ νεκρῶν* (as Philippi objects); for his glance is already passing beyond this event to its blessed *consequence*. The transformation of the living is *included* in this last development (1 Cor. xv. 51), which is here designated *a potiori*; comp. viii. 11. The conclusion of the apostle does not, however, rest on Matt. xxiv. 14 (Reiche after Theodoret), but on the fact of the *καταλλαγή κόσμου*, whose most blissful final development (as it, according to Paul, must necessarily be occasioned by the blissful opposite of the *ἀποβολή*) can be none other than the blessed resurrection-life which will set in with the Parousia (Col. iii. 3, 4; 1 Thess. iv. 14 ff.). The view which takes *ζωὴ ἐκ νεκρ.* in the *proper* sense has been held by Origen, Chrysostom, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodoret, Anselm, Erasmus, Toletus, Semler, Reiche, Glöckler, de Wette, Nielsen, Fritzsche, Rückert, Reithmayr, Bisping, Hofmann, Beyschlag, and others. Approaching it, but taking the resurrection *by way of compari-*

son, stands the view of Ewald: "The final completion of all history down to the last day, and *like the very resurrection itself*, which is expected on this day." Luthardt, too, is substantially in the right, taking, however, *νεκρῶν* in the *ethical* sense: from the *dead Israel* the new bodily life of glorification will proceed. A *heterogeneous* mode of viewing the contrasts, for which the text affords no support. The *non-literal* interpretation of the "*futura quasi resurrectio ex mortuis*" (Melancthon), *i.e.* of the "*novitas vitæ ex morte peccati*" (Estius; so in substance Calvin, Hunnius, Calovius, Vorstius, Bengel, Carpzov, Ch. Schmidt, Cramer, Böhme, Baungarten-Crusius, Maier; also Lechler, *apost. u. nachapost. Zeitalt.* p. 129; Krummacher, p. 172 f.; and Kahnis, *Dogm.* I. p. 574), is to be set aside on the ground that then nothing *higher* than the *καταλλαγή* (and it must be something *far* higher) would be expressed,<sup>1</sup> but only its ethical consequence in the activity of life. Olshausen, too, understands it primarily of the spiritual resurrection, yet thinks that the notion "*plays into the bodily resurrection*" (?). Umbreit finds spiritual *and* bodily revival from death conjoined. Others explain the expression *metaphorically*, as designating *summum gaudium* (Grotius after Occumenius) or *summa felicitas* (Hammond, Koppe, Köllner). Comp. Theophylact (*ἀπειρα ἀγαθῶν*), Beza, Flatt, van Hengel, and now, too, Tholuck, who recurs to the general thought of the *most important position in the history of the divine kingdom* to be occupied by converted Israel. But interpretations of such a non-literal character must be necessitated by the context; whereas the latter by the relation, in accordance with the connection, of *ζωὴ ἐκ νεκρῶν* to the quite *proper* *καταλλ. κόσμου* requires us to abide by the literal sense. Hence we are not to understand, with Philippi, at once both the extensive diffusion of the kingdom of God, and a subjective revivification of Christendom, which had again become dead, "and thus *a glorious flourishing time for the church on earth.*" So, again, Auberlen supposes a *charismatic life of the church*, and depicts it with the colours of the *palingnesia*

<sup>1</sup> Calvin's excuse: "Nam etsi una res est, verbis tamen plus et minus inest ponderis," only shows the baldness of this interpretation.

of the golden age. No such ideas are here expressed ; and it would have been peculiarly necessary to indicate more particularly the *dead state* into which Christendom was *again to fall*, especially after the *καταλλαγή κόσμου* already including within itself spiritual *revival*. And by no means is the supposed flourishing time (the time of *worship* (!) Auberlen calls it, as opposed to the present time of *preaching*) compatible with the nearness of the *Parousia* (xiii. 14 ; 1 Cor. vii. 29, *et al.*), with the *ἀνάγκη* immediately preceding it (1 Cor. vii. 26 ; Matt. xxiv. 29), and with the *πονηρία* of the last period (on Gal. i. 4).

Ver. 16. Δέ] continuative ; but this *πρόσληψις*, how well it corresponds to the character of holiness, which has been associated with the people of Israel from its origin till now ! The two figures are parallel, and set forth the same thought. — *ἀπαρχή*] obtains the genitival definition to be mentally supplied with it through *τὸ φύραμα*, just as in the second clause *ἡ ῥίζα* is the root of the *κλάδοι*. The *ἀπαρχή τοῦ φυράματος* is known from Num. xv. 19–21 to be a designation of the *first of the dough* ; that is, from every baking, when the dough was kneaded, a portion was to be set aside and a cake to be baked therefrom for the priests. See Philo, *de sac. hon.* II. p. 232 ; Josephus, *Antt.* iv. 4. 4 ; Saalschutz, *M. R.* p. 347 ; Keil, *Archäol.* I. § 71 ; and the Rabbinical prescriptions in *Mishn. Surenh.* p. 289 ff. This *ἀπαρχή*, as the first portion devoted to Jehovah from the whole, was designed to impart the character of its consecration to the remainder of the lump. The *article* with *φύραμα* denotes the lump of dough *concerned*, from which the *ἀπαρχή* is separated ; hence *ὅλον* did not require to be expressed (in opposition to Hofmann's objection). Grotius and Rosenmüller take *τ. φύρ.* to be the *corn* destined for the baking, and *ἀπαρχή* to be the *first-fruits*. But (ix. 21) *φύραμα* always denotes a mass *mixed* (with moisture or otherwise), particularly a *kneaded* one, and is in the LXX. (Ex. xii. 34) and in Paul (1 Cor. v. 6, 7 ; Gal. v. 9) the standing expression for *dough*. Estius, Koppe, Köllner, Olshausen, Krehl rightly take it so, but nevertheless understand by *ἀπαρχή* the sacred *first-fruits* (comp. Ex. xxiii. 10) which

were *employed* for *φύραμα*. But in that case *ἀπαρχή* obtains a genitival definition not presented by the text; and this can the less be approved, since *ἀπαρχή φυρίματος*, in fact, was the stated expression from Num. *l.c.* This applies also against Hofmann, who likewise explains the *ἀπαρχή* as the firstling-sheaf, but considers the *φύραμα* to be the dough worked up from the harvest-fruit generally.—The figure is correctly *interpreted*, when by *ἡ ἀπαρχή* we understand the *patriarchs* (Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob), and by *τὸ φύρ.* the *whole body of the people*, to whom the character of holiness—of consecration in property to God—passed over from the former. With the holiness of the *πατέρες*, ix. 4–13 (in accordance with which we are not here to think of Abraham *alone*), is given also the holiness of the theocratic people, their posterity, according to the divine right of covenant and promise. Comp. ix. 4, 5. But this holiness, which Paul looks upon, as respects the national whole, in the light of a *character indelibilis*, is not the inner moral, but (comp. 1 Cor. vii. 14) the theocratic legal holiness (“quod iuribus ecclesiae et promissis Dei frui possint,” Calovius). The expression is taken of the patriarchs by Chrysostom, Occumenius, Erasmus, Beza, Calvin, Estius, Grotius, Calovius, Bengel, and others, including Koppe, Tholuck, Köllner, Olshausen, Fritzsche, Philippi, Maier, de Wette, Krehl, Umbreit, Ewald, Reithmayr, Hofmann (though the latter thinks only of *Abraham*). This is correct, because the second figure (*εἰ δὲ ῥίζα κ.τ.λ.*) is capable of no other interpretation (see below); but to explain the two figures differently, as Toletus and Stolz,<sup>1</sup> Reiche and Rückert,<sup>2</sup> Glöckler, Stengel, Bisping, van Hengel, after Theodore of Mopsuestia and Theo-

<sup>1</sup> Toletus and Stolz suppose the *ἀπαρχή* to be the Jews who first accepted Christianity, and the *φύραμα* to be the remaining part of the nation. The second figure they suppose to denote our first parents and their posterity. So, too, van Hengel.

<sup>2</sup> In substance like Toletus and Stolz. On the first figure Reiche remarks: “As the whole, whereof a firstling gift is consecrated to God, is something excellent, worthy of God, or by the very offering of it is declared to be such, so is also the Jewish people through the fact, that a part of it has been received into God’s fellowship, declared to be a noble people, worthy to be wholly accepted, so soon as it only fulfils the conditions.”

doret,<sup>1</sup> have in manifold ways arbitrarily done, is simply a violation of the parallelism.<sup>2</sup> This holds also against the interpretation of the *Jews who have become believing*, and of the remaining *mass of the people* (Ambrosiaster, Pelagius, Anselm, Toletus, Rosenmüller, Stolz, Reiche, Rückert, Bisping). — ἡ *ρίζα* and οἱ *κλάδοι* are the *patriarchs* and their theocratic bodily descendants, the *Jews*. As the *ἀπαρχή* is related to the *φύραμα*, so is the *ρίζα* to the *κλάδοι*; comp. on the latter, Menander, 711: ἄκαρπός ἐστιν οὗτος ἀπὸ ρίζης κλάδος. The divergent interpretation, which may deserve to be considered in opposition to this usual one, is, that the *ρίζα* is the *first primitive or mother church* consisting of the believing Jews, and that the *κλάδοι* are the *Jews*, in so far as they in virtue of their national position were primarily called thereto. This exposition (substantially in Cornelius a Lapide, Carpzov, Schoettgen; Semler and Ammon suppose οἱ *κλάδοι* to be the Gentile Christians) is still considered possible by de Wette. It is, however, unsuitable; for the (natural) *κλάδοι* must have proceeded from the *ρίζα*, must have their origin from it (comp. Eccus. xxiii. 25, xl. 15), and the *broken-off branches* (ver. 17) must have earlier belonged to the *ρίζα*,—which is not the case, if *ρίζα* is the Christian mother-church of which they were never *κλάδοι*. The true theocracy (the olive tree, comp. Jer. xi. 16; Hos. xiv. 7; Zech. iv. 11; Neh. viii. 15) did not begin in the Christian mother-church (as its root), but in the patriarchs, and Christ Himself was *κατὰ σάρκα* from this sacred root, Matt. i. 1 f. In this view it is clear that the unbelieving Jews, in so far as they rejected Christ, ceased thereby to belong to the true people of God, and fell away from their root. They were now—after the light, and with it judgment, had come into the world (John iii. 19)—*broken-off branches*, *apostate children of Abraham* (John viii. 37, 39, 40), children of the kingdom who were to be cast out (Matt. viii. 12).

<sup>1</sup> Theodore of Mopsuestia and Theodoret explain the *ἀπαρχή* of *Christ*, and the *ρίζα* of the *patriarchs*; while Origen interprets *both* figures as referring to *Christ*.

<sup>2</sup> The identity of the thought expressed by a twofold figure is also confirmed by the fact, that in what follows Paul pursues only the one figure, and entirely drops the first.

Comp. the figure of the vine in John xv. See also Rom. ix. 6 ff.

Vv. 17-24.<sup>1</sup> In pursuance of the figure, a warning to the Gentile Christians against self-presumption, and an exhortation to humility, down to ver. 24. — *τινές*] *some*, a portion of the branches;<sup>2</sup> comp. on iii. 3. — *ἐξεκλάσθ.*] *were broken off* (Plat. *Rip.* p. 611 D), *κλάω* being the proper word for the *breaking* of the young *twigs* (*κλάδοι*); Theophrastus, *c. pl.* i. 15. 1. They were broken off on account of their unsuitness for bearing. — *σὺ δέ*] individualizing address to each *Gentile Christian*. — *ἀγριέλ.* ὦν] *although being of the wild olive*. *ἀγρ.* is here an adjective, like *ἐκ τῆς ἀγριελαίου*, ver. 24. This view is *assured* by linguistic usage (Eryc. 4, in *Anthol.* ix. 237: *σκυτάλην ἀγριελαίου*, Theocr. xxv. 255; see Jacobs, *Delect. Epigr.* p. 33; Lobeck, *Paralip.* p. 376) and *necessary*; for the traditional interpretation: "*oleaster, i.e. surculus oleastri*," is as arbitrary as the apology for the expression when so explained, on the ground that Paul wished to avoid the *proximity* of the distinction between tree and branch, is absurd (in opposition to Hofmann), inasmuch as he would only have needed to employ the genitive instead of the nominative, and consequently to write not a word *more*, if he wished to be thus sparing. The opinion of Reiche, Rückert, Köllner, Philippi, Krehl, Ewald, van Hengel—that the *collective body* of the Gentiles is conceived as an *entire tree*—is inappropriate to the *relation portrayed by the figure*, because the ingrafting of the Gentiles took place at first only partially and in single instances, while the *σὺ* addressed cannot represent heathendom as a whole, and is also not appropriate to the *figure itself*, because in fact not whole trees, not even quite young ones (in opposition to de Wette), are ingrafted either with the stem, or as to all their branches; besides, ver. 24 contradicts this opinion. Matthias also takes the right view. — *ἐν αὐτοῖς*] may grammatically be equally well understood as *among them* (the *branches* of the noble olive tree *generally*) — so Erasmus, Grotius, Estius, and

<sup>1</sup> On vv. 17, 18, see Matthias in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1866, p. 519 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Without indicating the *great multitude* of them, in order not to promote Gentile-Christian self-exaltation (ver. 18).

many others, including Rückert, Fritzsche, Nielsen, Tholuck, Philippi, Maier, Reithmayr, Hofmann—or as: *in the place of the broken-off branches* (Chrysostom, Beza, Piscator, Semler, and others, including Reiche, Köllner, de Wette, Olshausen), which, however, would have to be conceived of, not as ordinarily, *in locum*, but *in loco eorum* (Olshausen has the right view). The first rendering is preferable, because it corresponds to the notion of the *συγκοινωνός*. — *τῆς ῥίζης κ. τ. πύτ. τ. ἐλ.*] of the root (which now bears thee also among its own branches, ver. 18) and fatness (which now goes jointly to thee) of the olive tree. On the latter, comp. Judg. ix. 9. The assumption of a *hendiadys* (of the fat root) (Grotius and others) is groundless and weakening.<sup>1</sup> The sense without figure is: “Thou hast attained to a participation in holy fellowship with the patriarchs, and in the blessings of the theocracy developed from them,”—both which the unbelieving Jews have forfeited.—*Has Paul here, ver. 17 ff., had in view the process, really used in the East, of strengthening to renewed fertility olive trees by grafting scions of the wild olive upon them* (see Columella, v. 9. 16; Pallad. xiv. 53; Schulz, *Leit. d. Höchsten*, V. p. 88; Michaelis, *orient. Bibl.* X. p. 67 ff., and note, p. 129; Bredenkamp in Paulus, *Memorab.* II. p. 149 ff.)? Answer: The *subject-matter*, which he is setting forth, *required* not at all the figure of the ordinary grafting of the noble scion on the wild stem, but the converse, namely, that of the ingrafting of the wild scion and its ennoblement thereby. The thing *thus* receiving illustration had *taken place* through the reception of *Gentile* members into the theocracy; and the *thing that had taken place* he was bound to represent (figuratively depict) *as it had taken place*. “Ordine commutato res magis causis quam causas rebus aptavit,” Origen. But that, while doing this, he had before his mind that actual pomological practice, and made reference to it (Matthias: in order to exhibit the *παραζηλωθῆναι* of the unbelieving Jews,

<sup>1</sup> *τῆς πύττης* would only represent the adjectival notion, if *καί*—omitted by B C S\* Copt. Dam.—were not genuine, as Buttmann in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1860, p. 306, pronounces it. Tisch. 8 omits it. But D\* F G and Codd. of It. omit *τῆς ῥίζης καί* (manifestly through a copyist's error); therefore *τῆς ῥίζης* without *καί* appears as an incomplete restoration.

ver. 13), is not to be assumed for this reason, that here, conformably to the following *καὶ συγκοινωνὸς κ.τ.λ.*, there is conceived as the object of the ingrafting the ennobled fertilization of the *graft itself*; whereas, in the practice referred to, the ingrafted scion was not to receive the fatness from the noble tree, not to *become fertilized*, but to *fertilize*; for "*fœcundat sterilis pingues oleaster olivas, et quæ non novit munera, ferre docet*," Palladius.

Ver. 18. *μὴ κατακ. τῶν κλάδ.*] *Boast thyself not against* (comp. Jas. ii. 13, iii. 14; also in the LXX., not in classical Greek) *the branches*. These are not the *broken-off* branches, of which he has just been speaking (Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Erasmus, Calovius, and many others, including de Wette, Rückert, Ewald), but, according to vv. 16, 17, *the branches of the olive tree generally* (of which *some* have been broken off); without figure, therefore: the *people Israel*, but by no means merely those now composing the *non-Christian Israel* (Hofmann). The *latter*, because the Christian Israelites also still belonged to the branches of the olive tree, must, as well as the *broken-off κλάδοι*, have been more precisely designated (against which Hofmann urges subtleties); moreover, the following warning would not be suitable to the broken-off ones, because they no longer stand in any connection with the root. The *κλάδοι* standing on the root of the patriarchs are the *Israelites*, whether believing or unbelieving; but under the broken-off ones, which are therefore no longer borne by the root, we are to think not generally of all those Jews who at the time had not yet become believers in Christ (vv. 13, 14)—otherwise the apostolic mission to the Jews would in truth have no meaning (in opposition to Hofmann's denial of this distinction)—but only of those who had *rejected* the Christ preached to them (Acts xxviii. 23, 24), and therefore were already no longer in living communion with the patriarchal root, excluded in God's judgment from the theocracy borne by this root (ix. 7, 8). Hence, too, we are not, with Fritzsche, to think in *τῶν κλάδων* merely of the *converted Jews*, as indeed to give a particular warning against pride towards Jewish-Christians was foreign here to the object of the apostle. — εἰ



δὲ κατακ. κ.τ.λ.] *But if the case occur, that thou boastest against them, then know, reflect: it is not thou who bearest, etc.; without figure: Thy theocratic position is not the original theocratic one, but only a derived one, proceeding from the patriarchs and imparted to thee, conditioned by the relation into which thou hast entered towards them; thou therefore standest likewise only in the relation of a branch to the root, which is borne by the latter, and not the converse, and which may not therefore bear itself proudly towards its fellow-branches, as though it were something better. In these words there lies a warning hint beforehand of the possibility which Paul afterwards, vv. 21, 22, definitely expresses.—The οὐ σὺ τ. ρίζ. βαστ κ.τ.λ. is to be taken declaratively. See Winer, p. 575 [E. T. 773]; Buttmann, p. 338. Comp. on 1 Cor. xi. 16. The fact itself is quite independent of the case supposed in εἰ κ.τ.λ., but it is brought to mind.*

Ver. 19. Οὖν] *therefore*; since *this* reason (οὐ σὺ τὴν ρίζαν κ.τ.λ.) forbids thee *κατακαυχᾶσθαι*, thou wilt have something else to allege. — ἐξεκλ. κ.τ.λ.] *branches were broken off* (see critical notes), *in order that I, etc.* This *ἵνα ἐγώ* has the stress of arrogant self-esteem, which, however, is not to be extended also to *κλάδοι*<sup>1</sup> forming the simple subject, and not even standing in the first place (Hofmann: “*branches which were so are broken off*”).

Vv. 20, 21. By *καλῶς* Paul admits the *fact*; but in what follows he points out its *cause*, as one which must prevent haughtiness, and inspire fear and anxiety respecting the duration of the state of grace; assigning the reason in ver. 21. — *καλῶς*] *Good! recte ais.* Demosth. 998. 24; Plat. *Phil.* p. 25 B; Eur. *Or.* 1216; Lucian, *Deor. jud.* 10. — The *τῇ ἀπιστίᾳ* and *τῇ πίστει* placed first with emphatic warning means: *on account of* unbelief, etc. Comp. ver. 30. See on Gal. vi. 12. — *ἑστηκας*] *thou standest*, namely, as a branch upon the olive tree. As the figure is present, both before and after-

<sup>1</sup> Were we to read, with the Rec., *οἱ κλάδοι*, the article would have to be taken *δικτικῶς* of the branches concerned, not the collective branches, from the haughty standpoint of the opponents, as Philippi holds. The simple *καλῶς* of the apostle does not suit this.

wards, it is opposed to the context to take ἔσθηκ. absolutely, as the opposite of πίπτειν (vv. 11, 22, xiv. 4; Fritzsche, Tholuck, Krehl, Philippi—the latter doubtfully).—ὑψηλοφρονεῖν, *to be haughty* (1 Tim. vi. 17), is foreign to classical Greek, which has μεγαλοφρονεῖν; yet see *scholion* on Pind. *Pyth.* ii. 91: ὑψηλοφρονοῦντα καὶ καυχώμενον κατακάμπτει ὁ θεός. The adjective ὑψηλόφρων is found in the classics in a good sense: *high-spirited*.—φοβοῦ] “timor opponitur non fiducia, sed supercilio et securitati,” Bengel. Secure haughtiness fears not the possible loss.—τῶν κατὰ φύσιν] *those according to nature*, not ingrafted.—μήπως οὐδὲ σ. φείσ.] to be referred to the underlying conception: *it is to be feared*<sup>1</sup> (Winer, pp. 469 f., 442 [E. T. 632, 595]; Baumlein, *Partik.* p. 288; Ast, *Lec. Plat.* II. p. 335). The *future* is more definite and certain than the subjunctive. See Hermann, *ad El.* 992, *Aj.* 272, *Med.* p. 357, Elmsl.; Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Rep.* p. 451 A; Hartung, *Partikell.* II. p. 140. At the same time the specially chosen mode of expression with μήπως (Paul does not say directly οὐδὲ σοῦ φείσεται, as Lachmann reads) is sufficiently *mitigating* and *forbearing*.

Vv. 22, 23. An exhortation inferred from ver. 21, and corresponding to μὴ ὑψηλοφρόνει, ἀλλὰ φοβοῦ in ver. 20.—*Behold, therefore, the goodness and the severity of God*, how both divine attributes present themselves before thee side by side. That χρηστ. and ἀποστ. should be without the article is, on account of the following Θεοῦ<sup>2</sup> being anarthrous, quite regular, and does not entitle us artificially to educe (as Hofmann does) the sense of “*a goodness*” (which is here exhibited), etc.

<sup>1</sup> Observe, however, that μήπως κ.τ.λ. is not an actual formal apodosis (in opposition to van Hengel's difficulty, by which he sees himself compelled to adopt Lachmann's reading); that, on the contrary, a formal apodosis, as frequently along with conditional protases (see Winer, p. 556 [E. T. 748]; Buttmann, p. 330), is by *anacoluthon* suppressed, and instead of it the fear μέτως κ.τ.λ. is independently introduced, in keeping with the emotional vividness of the discourse. Consequently: “*For if God has not spared the natural branches, . . . He will, I am apprehensive, also not spare thee.*” Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Symp.* p. 199 E, rightly observes that the suppression of the apodosis after a conditional protasis has “*minimum offensivum in familiari colloquio.*” And such we have here, vv. 19–21.

<sup>2</sup> Comp. Elwert, *Quaest. ad philolog. sacr.*, Tüb. 1860, p. 7 f.

According to the correct reading (see the critical notes), a point is, with Lachmann, to be placed after ἀποτομίαν Θεοῦ; and with the following nominatives, ἀποτομία and χρηστότης Θεοῦ, ἐστὶ is to be supplied:<sup>1</sup> “Towards the fallen there is severity, but towards thee (directed to thee) goodness.” The fallen are the Jews who have refused to believe,—so designated, because they are conceived as branches broken off and thereby fallen from the tree. Comp. ἔσθηκας, ver. 20. In allusion to this, the severity of God is also designated as ἀποτομία (only here in the N. T., but see on 2 Cor. xiii. 10; Kypke, II. p. 179; Grimm on Wisd. v. 21). This reference to the figure, which certainly pervades the whole representation, it is arbitrary to deny (de Wette, Fritzsche).—ἐὰν ἐπιμείν. τῇ χρηστότ.] if thou shalt abide (see on vi 1) by the goodness, i.e. if thou shalt not have separated thyself from the divine goodness (through apostasy from faith), but shalt have remained true to it; comp. Acts xiii. 43. Rightly, therefore, as respects the mode of the ἐπιμένειν τ. χρ., Clemens Alex. *Pedag.* I. p. 140 *Pott.*: τῇ εἰς Χριστὸν πίστει. But it is erroneous, because contrary to the context (for the emphasis lies on ἐπιμείν., and τῇ χρηστότ. is but the repetition of the divine attribute just mentioned) and un-Pauline, to take χρηστότης, with Fritzsche, following Ch. Schmidt, in the sense of human rightness of conduct (iii. 12). Comp. rather on χρηστότ., ii. 4, and on Eph. ii. 7; also Tit. iii. 4.—ἐπεὶ καὶ σὺ ἐκκοπήσῃ] for otherwise thou also (like those broken-off branches) shalt be cut off. The threatening tenor of the discourse suggests unsought the stronger word ἐκκοπ., which is also in ver. 24 retained of the wild olive tree.—Since καὶ κεῖνοι<sup>2</sup> δὲ κ.τ.λ. does not depend on the condition previously to be supplied with ἐπεὶ, but has its own conditional sentence, a point is to be placed (in opposition to Hofmann) after ἐκκοπ.; and with καὶ κεῖνοι δέ a new sentence, still further repressing Gentile self-exaltation, must be begun,

<sup>1</sup> To assume expegetie nominatives absolute (Jacobs, *ad Del. epigr.* v. 43), with Buttmann, *neut Gr.* p. 329, is inappropriate, because the appended ἐὰν ἐπιμείν. κ.τ.λ. can no longer be dependent on ἰδέ, but presupposes an independent sentence.

<sup>2</sup> Such, with Griesb. Lachm. Scholz, Tisch., according to a large preponderance of evidence, is to be the reading, instead of καὶ ἐκεῖνοι.

which *usual* punctuation Lachmann, *ed. maj.*, has again adopted: *And those, too, if they shall not have persisted in unbelief, will be grafted in*,—whereby the reception into the true divine community (vv. 25, 31) is figuratively depicted. The *καί* puts the *ἐκείνοι* on a parallel to the ingrafted wild olive branches (ver. 17). — *δυνατὸς γάρ*] if, namely, the cause has ceased to exist, on account of which God had to break off these branches, the *power* of God (comp. iv. 21, xiv. 4) leaves no doubt, etc. In *πάλιν* the conception is, that by the ingrafting their *restoration to their previous condition* is accomplished. Comp. Winer, p. 576.—We may notice that this is a probative passage *for the possibility of forfeiture* of the state of grace, for the *conversio resistibilis* and for *reiterabilitas gratiae*, and also *against absolute predestination*.

Ver. 24. *Γάρ*] does not serve to assign the reason of *δυνατὸς κ.τ.λ.*, so that *the ability of God* for that reingrafting would be popularly illustrated from the facility of this process, as according to nature (the ordinary view). Against this it may be decisively urged, that—apart from the difficulty which experience attests in the conversion of unbelieving Jews—the power of God is the correlative, not of that which is easy, but precisely of that which is difficult, or which humanly speaking appears impossible (iv. 21, xiv. 4; 2 Cor. ix. 8; Rom. ix. 22; Matt. xix. 26; Luke i. 37, *et al.*); and that *πόσῳ μᾶλλον*, as a designation of greater easiness, must have found in the context a more precise explanation to that effect, if it was not intended to express generally, as elsewhere (comp. Philem. 16, and the similar use of *πολλῷ μᾶλλον*), the greater degree of probability or certainty. Rightly, therefore, have Winzer, *Progr.* 1828, Reiche, Philippi, and Tholuck, referred the *γάρ* to the main thought of the previous verse, to *ἐγκεντρισθήσονται*. Yet they should not have taken this *γάρ* as purely *co-ordinate* with the preceding *γάρ*, but—as must always be done with two such apparently parallel instances of *γάρ*—as *explicative* (see on viii. 6), *namely*, so that after the brief *ground assigned* for *ἐγκεντρισθήσονται* (*δυνατὸς κ.τ.λ.*), the same is now yet more fully *elucidated* in regard to its certainty, and by this elucidation is still further *confirmed*. To this the con-

firmatory reference to ἐγκεντ. in Hofmann substantially amounts. — σὺ] Gentile-Christian. — ἐκ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν . . . ἀγριέλ.] *out of the wild olive, which is so according to nature, which by nature has grown a wild olive.* — παρὰ φύσιν] for the grafting, as an artificial proceeding, alters the natural development, and is so far *contrary to nature* (i. 26). The interposition of ἐξεκοπ. brings out more markedly the contrast between κατὰ φύσιν and παρὰ φ. Very violently the simple words are twisted by Hofmann as follows: ἀγριελαίου is in *apposition* to ἐκ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν; while for the latter there is to be borrowed from ἀγριελαίου the *more general* notion of the *olive tree*, and ἡ κατὰ φύσιν is the tree, which is so *for the branch* in a natural manner. — εἰς καλλιέλ.] *into a (not the) noble olive tree.* The word is also found in Aristotle, *Plant.* i. 6, in contrast to ἀγριέλ. — οὗτοι] the Jews who have refused to believe. — οἱ κατὰ φύσιν] *sc. ὄντες,*<sup>1</sup> *those according to nature.* In *what respect* they are so, the context exhibits, namely, *as the original branches of the holy olive tree, whose root the patriarchs are,* ver. 16. — τῇ ἰδίᾳ ἐλ.] *for they have originally grown upon it, and then have been cut off from it; hence it is still their own olive tree.*

Vv. 25-32. The formal and unconditional promise of the collective conversion of the Jews, and the confirmatory proof of this promise, now follow down to ver. 32. — γάρ] introduces the corroboration of the previous ἐγκεντρισθήσονται: "*they shall be grafted in, I say; for be it not withheld from you,*" etc. — οὐ θέλω ὑμᾶς ἀγνοεῖν] not a mere formula of announcement generally (Rückert), but always of something important, which Paul desires to be specially noticed, i. 13; 1 Cor. x. 1, xii. 1; 2 Cor. i. 8; 1 Thess. iv. 13. That which is *addressed*, under the fervent addition of the ἀδελφοί embracing *all* readers,

<sup>1</sup> Fritzsche takes οἱ as the relative οἷ: how much more shall *these* be grafted into the olive tree, *who*, according to nature, shall become grafted into their own olive tree! Superfluous in itself,—and what diffuse and unwieldy circumstantiality of expression! Hofmann has nevertheless acceded to this reading of οἷ, in which case, through the punctuation οὗτοι, οἷ κατὰ φύσιν (*sc. ἐγκεντρισθήσονται*) ἐγκεντρισθήσονται τῇ ἰδίᾳ ἐλαίᾳ, nothing is gained. How simply and clearly would the thought thus artificially made out have been expressed, if Paul had only left out that alleged relative οἷ!

is the *whole church*, although it stands before the apostle's eyes such as it was, namely, in its *predominantly Gentile-Christian* character. Comp. vv. 13, 28, 30. — τὸ μυστήριον] has not in the N. T. the sense in which profane writers speak of mysteries (something mysterious in itself, comprehensible only by the initiated, and to be concealed from the profane). See on μύειν and μυστήρ., Creuzer on Plotin. *de Pulcr.* p. 357 f.; Lennep. *Etymol.* p. 441; comp. Lobeck, *Aglaoph.* I. p. 85 ff. But it signifies that *which, undiscerned by men themselves, has been made known to them by divine ἀποκάλυψις*, and always refers to the relations and the development of the Messianic kingdom (Matt. xiii. 11). Thus it frequently denotes with Paul the divine counsel of redemption through Christ,—as a whole, or in particular parts of it,—because it was veiled from men before God revealed it (Rom. xvi. 25; 1 Cor. ii. 7–10; Eph. iii. 3–5). Whether the contents of a mystery have already become known through the preaching of the gospel, may be gathered from the scope of the particular passages. That, however, which Paul *here* means by μυστήρ., is something the ἀποκάλυψις of which he is conscious of having received by divine illumination (just as in 1 Cor. xv. 51), and he declares it as a prophet ἐν ἀποκαλύψει (1 Cor. xiv. 6, 30); without presupposing that the church, personally still strange to him, was already acquainted with the peculiar point of doctrine, as is evinced by ἵνα μὴ ᾗτε ἐν ἑαυτοῖς φρόν. He desires, namely, by a disclosure of the μυστήριον, to take care that *his readers*, from their Gentile-Christian standpoint, *should not, under a misapprehension of the divine counsel, hold for truth their own views on the exclusion of the Israelitish people, and therewith be wise in themselves* (ἐν ἑαυτ., see the critical notes), *i.e.* in their own judgment (comp. Jas. ii. 4). What Luther has: “that ye be not proud” (comp. Erasmus, Beza, Calvin, Calovius), is not *directly* expressed, but is rightly pointed out by Theodoret as a *consequence*. Comp. Isa. v. 21; Soph. *El.* 1055 f. — ὅτι κ.τ.λ.] Contents of the μυστήρ., namely, the duration of the hardening of Israel, which will not be permanent. — πόρωσις] See on ver. 7. — ἀπὸ μέρους] is to be connected with γέγονεν, not, as by Estius, Semler, Koppe, Fritzsche, contrary to the construction,

with τῷ Ἰσραήλ. Hardening *has partially befallen* the people, in so far as οὐ πάντες ἠπίστευσαν· πολλοὶ γὰρ ἐξ ἐκείνων ἐπίστευσαν (Theodoret). Comp. xv. 15. It is therefore to be understood *extensively* (comp. οἱ λοιποί, ver. 7; τινές, ver. 17), not *intensively*, as Calvin takes it (attaching it to πώρωσις): *quodammodo*, which was intended to soften the severity of the notion. So taken, it would not modify the conception, but alter it (ver. 7 ff.). Köllner finds in ἀπὸ μ. the statement of *a single ground* of the divine arrangement, leaving it undecided whether other reasons, and what, were in the mind of the apostle: *on the one part* the hardening had been decreed by God over Israel only for the end, that first, etc. But in that case ἀπὸ μ. must have referred to an expressed ἵνα or the like. The *temporal* view, "*for a while*" (Hofmann), is here as contrary to usage as in 2 Cor. i. 14, ii. 5. Paul would have known how to express this sense possibly by τὸ νῦν, or by the classical τέως. — γέγονεν] *from whom?* is known from ver. 8. — ἄχρις οὗ] *usque dum* intraverit. Then—when this shall have taken place—the hardening of Israel shall cease. Calvin's *ita ut* is intended, in spite of the language, to remove the idea of a *terminus ad quem*; and for the same reason Calovius and others employ much artifice in order to bring out the sense, that down to the end of the world the partial hardening will endure, and therefore, too, the partial conversion, but *only* that which is partial. — τὸ πλήρ. τῶν ἐθνῶν] In opposition to Gusset, Wolfburg, and others named by Wolf, also Wolf himself, Michaelis, Olshausen, Philippi, who understand only the *complementum ethnicorum* serving to make up for the unbelieving Jews ("the recruitment from the Gentiles," Michaelis), the *usus loquendi* is not decisive; for according to usage that, with which something else is made full, might certainly be expressed by the genitive with πλήρωμα (Mark viii. 20, and see on Mark vi. 43; comp. Eccles. iv. 6). But how enigmatically, and in a manner how liable to misapprehension, would Paul have indicated the supposed thought, instead of simply and plainly writing τὸ πλήρωμα αὐτοῦ τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἐθνῶν! especially as already, in ver. 12, the analogous expression τὸ πλήρωμα αὐτῶν was used in the sense of "*their full*"

number." Fritzsche also finds too little: *caterva gentilium*, so that only a *great multitude* is meant. Comp. on Eph. iii. 19. We must observe the correlation of ἀπὸ μέρους . . . πλήρωμα . . . πᾶς: a *part* of Israel is hardened, until the Gentiles *collectively* shall have come in, and, when that shall have taken place, then *all* Israel will be saved. The conversion of the Gentiles ensues by successive stages; but when their *totality* shall be converted, then the conversion of the Jews in their *totality* will also ensue; so that Paul sees the latter—which up to that epoch certainly also advances gradually in individual cases—ensuing, after the full conversion of the Gentiles, as the event completing the assemblage of the church and accomplishing itself probably in rapid development.<sup>1</sup> All this, therefore, *before* the *Parousia*, not *by means of it*. Comp. on Acts iii. 20. The expression τὸ πλήρωμα τ. ἐθνῶν is therefore to be taken *numerically*: the *plena copia* of the Gentiles (of whom in the first instance only a *fraction* has come and is coming in), their *full number*. Rightly Theophylact: πάντες, but with arbitrary limitation he adds: οἱ προεγνωσμένοι ἐθνικοί. Just so, in substance, Augustine, Occumenius, and many others, including even van Hengel: "plenus numerus gentilium, quotquot comprehendebant proposita Dei," comp. Krummacher: "only the *elect* among the Gentiles." The *collective multitude* of the Gentiles in the strict sense Hofmann seeks to get rid of, by making τὸ πλήρωμα serve only to emphasize the fact that τὰ ἔθνη is to be thought of "in the full compass of the notion," so that by τὸ πλήρ. τ. ἐθνῶν no *other* full amount is intended than that which would be expressed by τὰ ἔθνη *itself*. Thus there would result as the sense: until no

<sup>1</sup> There would have been no offence taken at the full sense of the πλήρωμα τῶν ἐθνῶν, as well as of the correlate πᾶς Ἰσραήλ, ver. 26, and there would have been no occasion to seek artificial limitations of the fulness of these notions, had it been sufficiently considered that Paul is speaking *apocalyptically*, in virtue of his *prophetic contemplation* of the last sacred-historical development before the *Parousia*. The prophet (comp. e.g. Acts ii. 17, xi. 28) contemplates and speaks of the grand things in the perspective opened to his view in the *bulk* and *summarily*, without being answerable for such utterances according to strict mathematical precision. By a restrictive explaining away and modification of these utterances the prophetic character and spirit suffers a violence foreign to it, against which the simple and clear words do not cease to offer resistance.



people of the Gentile world is any longer found outside the church. This is decidedly at variance with ver. 12, and with the whole context down to its evident concluding verse (ver. 32), according to which not the *peoples as such* (in the lump, as it were), but all *persons* who compose them, must be the subjects of the entrance into the church and of the divine mercy. The above interpretation is a process of *rationalizing*, artificial and far-fetched, and contrary to the language and the context, by interpreting what is said of the *individuals* as applying to the *nations*; just as Beyschlag, p. 75, understands the two great groups of mankind to be thought of here and in ver. 26. — εἰσέλθῃ] namely, into the community prefigured by the holy olive tree, *i.e.* into the people of God. There is not yet mention of the *kingdom of Messiah*; its establishment is later. The passage Col. i. 13 is wrongly employed with a view to supply εἰς τ. βασιλ. Θεοῦ. See *in loc.*

Ver. 26 f. Καὶ οὕτω] And so, namely, after the πλήρωμα τῶν ἐθνῶν shall have come in. The modal character of the οὕτω therefore lies in the *succession of time* conditioning the emergence of the fact (comp. 1 Cor. xi. 28), as it also in the classics, in the sense of *so then*, embraces what has been previously said.<sup>1</sup> See Schweighäuser, *Lex. Herod.* II. p. 167; Thucyd. iii. 96. 2; Xen. *Anab.* iii. 5. 6; Dem. 644. 18, 802. 20. Theodoret rightly says: τῶν γὰρ ἐθνῶν δεξαμένων τὸ κήρυγμα πιστεύουσιν κακῆϊνοι, and that, according to ver. 11, under the impulse of powerful emulation. We may add that this great final result is brought into more important prominence, if we take καὶ οὕτω κ.τ.λ. independently, than if we make it form part of the statement dependent on ὅτι (Lachmann, Tischendorf, Fritzsche, Ewald, Hofmann, and others). — πᾶς Ἰσραὴλ] This notion, so definitely expressed, of the *totality of the people* is in no way to be limited; the *whole* of those are intended, who, at the time that the fulness of the Gentiles shall have

<sup>1</sup> Hofmann, in connection with his incorrect explanation of ἀπὸ μέρους, ver. 25, refers οὕτω to the *temporal limitation* of the Jewish hardening; through the fact that the latter took place in the *first instance only* and thus in its time ceases, there is given to the people the possibility (?), etc. In this way this definitely prophetic element, which lies in the καὶ οὕτω joined to what immediately precedes, is removed, and resolved into something entirely self-evident!

come in, will compose Israel. *All* Israelites who up to that time shall be still unconverted, will then be converted to salvation, so that at that term *entire* Israel will obtain the saving deliverance; but comp., as to the quite unlimited expression, the remark on ver. 25. Limitations from other interests than that of exegesis have been suggested: such as that the *spiritual* Israel, Gal. vi. 16, is meant (Augustine, Theodoret, Luther, Calvin,<sup>1</sup> Grotius, and others, including Krummacher); or only the *select portion of the Jews* (Calovius, Bengel, and several others, including Olshausen: "all those members of the Israelitish people who from the beginning belonged to the true *λεῖμμα*"); or that *πᾶς* is to be taken *comparatively* only of the *greater* number, of the *bulk* (Occumenius, Wetstein, Rückert, Fritzsche, Tholuck). To this comes in substance also Hofmann's explanation: "that the people, *as a people*, will be

<sup>1</sup> "Ego Israelis nomen ad totum Dei populum extendo, hoc sensu: Quum gentes ingressae fuerint, simul et Judaei ex defectione se ad fidei obedientiam recipient, atque ita complebitur salus *totius Israelis Dei, quem ex utrisque colligi oportet.*"—The Reformers were induced to depart from the literal sense of the apostle, not by exegetical, but by dogmatic considerations, and also by their bad opinion of Jewish depravity ("*a Jew or Jewish heart is as hard as stock, stone, iron, or devil, so as in no way to be moved,*" etc., Luther, 1543, who passed a milder judgment at an earlier period). Still the literal interpretation remained predominant amongst the Reformed through the influence of Beza; and through Calixtus and Spener it became so again in the Lutheran Church, in which it had even at an earlier period asserted its claims, through Hunnius, Balduin, and others, in spite of Luther's authority. Melancthon held simply by the *statement* (see his *Enarratio*, 1556): "*futurum esse ut subinde usque ad finem mundi aliqui ex Judaeis convertantur.*" The modest addition which he made at an earlier period (1540), of a possible universal conversion of the Jews, is not found in this, his last exposition of the epistle. Following Luther, Calovius also explains it only of a *successive* conversion of the Jews, which is gradually to ensue up to the end of the world, so that there is merely meant a *magnum numerus* still to be converted. So, too, others in Calovius, and now also Philippi (p. 557 ff.) joins them: Israel is *partially* hardened until the entrance of the *pl. roma* of the Gentiles; and *in this way*, namely, that out of the *only partially* hardened people a *great assemblage* of believing ones *is continually being formed until the end of the days*, will the *entire Israel properly aimed at* by the O. T. divine word, according to the prophetic passage, be saved. It is self-evident that thus all the *elements* which form the points properly so called of this interpretation are forced upon the text, and the result is an historical process recognisable by any one, concerning which it is not easy to see how Paul could introduce it as a *μυστήριον*.—On the history of the exposition of this passage, see, moreover, Calovius, p. 190 ff., and Luthardt.

converted;" but *πᾶς Ἰσραὴλ* is, in fact, not "*Israel as a whole*," but rather *the entire Israel*, as is also meant in 2 Chron. xii. 1 and in all O. T. passages, in contrast to *ἀπὸ μέρους*, ver. 25. Comp. *πᾶς οἶκος Ἰσρ.*, Acts ii. 36, *πᾶς ὁ λαὸς Ἰσρ.*, and the like. This also against Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 404. — *σωθήσεται*] *will be saved*, unto Messianic salvation, by their conversion to Christ. — *καθὼς γέγρ.*] For *πᾶς Ἰσρ. σωθήσ.* Paul finds a *Scripture warrant*,<sup>1</sup> not merely a substratum for his own ideas (Tholuck), in Isa. lix. 20, 21 (not quite closely after the LXX., and, from *ὅταν* onwards, with a bringing in of xxvii. 9; see Surenhus. *καταλλ.* p. 503 f.); to the prophetic sense of this passage the future salvation of all Israel corresponds as result. — *ἐκ Σιών*] for *from God* will the deliverer come; the theocratic central-point and dwelling-place of the divine kingdom is the holy mount of *Zion*. Comp. Ps. xiv. 7, liii. 7, *et al.* See also ix. 33. The LXX. have, following the original, *ἐνεκεν Σιών* (יְהוָה, *i.e.* for Zion). Our *ἐκ Σιών*

<sup>1</sup> Not, however, as though Paul had *derived* his prophecy from Isa. *i.e.*, for the *οἱ πῶροις . . . καὶ οὕτω* he could not derive thence. Rather has he—after having *ἐν ἀποκαλύψει* recognised the declared *μυστήριον*—now also recognised an O. T. prophecy in reference to that constituent of it which is contained in *πᾶς Ἰσραὴλ σωθήσεται*; this, therefore, pertains no longer to the *ἀποκάλυψις*, by which the *μυστήριον* itself was disclosed to him, but is to be ascribed to his own apprehension of the meaning of Scripture. The Messianic prophecy of Isa. lix. 20, 21 (also with the Rabbins a solemn Messianic utterance; see Schoettg. *Hor.* II. pp. 71, 187), refers merely to the Israelites turning from *apostasy*, and appears therefore incapable of warranting *πᾶς Ἰσραὴλ σωθήσεται*. We have, however, to observe that, according to the apostle's view and exposition in ver. 17 ff., it is only those who *reject Christ* among the Jews who have fallen away from the true theocracy (from the olive tree); consequently, if these are converted, *entire Israel* is reconciled, because they who remained and do remain in the theocracy are those who have accepted and accept the preaching of Christ—of whom the *σωτηρία* is therefore self-evident. This mode of apprehending the quotation, corresponding to the contextual view of the state of the matter, excludes the far-fetched and artificial expedient which Fritzsche offers, when he brings out from the *ἀναριθροὺς ἁμαρτίας*, and from *πᾶς ἁμαρτίας* having the article (*aliqua peccata—all sins*), the result that in the first half only the *elect* Israelites, but in the second the *entire people*, are meant.—Following Calvin and others, Glöckler again believes that ver. 27 is borrowed from Jer. xxxi. 31–34; but this must be rejected, because *καὶ αὕτη . . . διαθήκη* stands in Isa. lix. 21, while *ὅταν κ.τ.λ.* stands literally in Isa. xxvii. 9. Philippi also thinks that the contents of the passage in Jeremiah floated before the mind of the apostle. If this were the case, why should he not have cited this well-known leading passage in reference to the new covenant?

is a variation of memory, *occasioned by the reminiscence of other passages* (comp. Ps. xiv. 7, liii. 7, cx. 2); for *ἐνεκεν* Σ. would have been quite as suitable to the apostle's purpose (in opposition to Reiche, Fritzsche, van Hengel); hence to discover intentional reasons for this deviation (Philippi: in order to bring into stronger relief the *claim* of the people as contrasted with the Gentiles) is groundless. Nor was this deviation *more convenient* (Hofmann) for the apostle, namely, in order to designate Christ's place of manifestation; but it involuntarily on his part found its way into the citation freely handled.—*ὁ ρυόμενος*] i.e. not *God* (Grotius, van Hengel), who first emerges in ver. 27, but the *Messiah*. In the Heb. we find מַלְאָכִי, a deliverer, *without* the article, by which, however, no other is intended. The *future coming* of the deliverer which is here predicted is, in the sense of the fulfilment of this prophecy, necessarily that whereby the *πᾶς Ἰσραὴλ σωθήσεται* will be effected; consequently not the *Parousia*, because the conversion of all Israel must be antecedent to this, but rather that specially efficacious *self-revelation of Christ in the preaching of His gospel* (comp. Eph. ii. 17), to be expected by the future, whereby He will bring about that final sacred-historical epoch of the people, the conversion of its totality. Erroneously, however, Augustine, Chrysostom, Theodoret, and Beda have supposed it predicted that Elijah or Enoch would appear before the end of the world as converter of the Jews.—*ἀποστρ. ἀσεβ. ἀπὸ Ἰακ.*] *He will turn away*, i.e. (comp. Bar. iii. 7; 1 Macc. iv. 58) remove, do away with *impieties from Jacob*. By this, in the sense of the apostle, is meant the atoning, *reconciling* work of the Messiah (comp. John i. 29: *ἄρων τ. ἁμαρτ.*), which He will accomplish in Israel by its conversion. Hence there follows, as the correlative to this in ver. 27, the *forgiveness of sins* on the part of *God*, procured through Him, and that as the actually saving essence of the *covenant*, which the people possesses from God.<sup>1</sup> Compare the original text, which, however, instead of *κ. ἀποστρ. ἀσεβ. ἀπὸ Ἰακώβ* has *וְלִשְׁבִי פָּשָׁע בְּיַעֲקֹב*, and *for those turning from apostasy*

<sup>1</sup> How happy a final result! Instead of a rejection of the people of God (ver. 1), the covenant of God with them now subsists in its entire fulfilment!

in *Jacob*. Paul, however, because following generally in this quotation the LXX., retains also its deviation from the original text, but not as if this could have been more welcome to him for his object, for in that respect he might have just as well made use of the words of the original. — *αὕτη*] points to the *following* (comp. 1 John v. 2), so that the sense of ver. 27 is: “*And when I shall have forgiven their sins, this, this remission of sins conferred by me, will be my covenant to them, i.e. they will therein have from me the execution of my covenant.*” Both in the original and in the LXX. *αὕτη* points to the following, in which the words of the covenant (τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἐμὸν . . . οὐ μὴ ἐκλείπη ἐκ τοῦ στόμ. κ.τ.λ.) are adduced; but instead of them, Paul, for the object which he has in view, puts *ὅταν ἀφέλωμαι κ.τ.λ.* from Isa. xxvii. 9, where likewise a preceding demonstrative (τοῦτό ἐστιν ἡ εὐλογία αὐτοῦ) points forward to *ὅταν*. Hence we may not, with others (including Köllner and Hofmann), refer *αὕτη* to the *preceding*, in which case *ἀποστρ. ἀσεβείας ἀπὸ Ἰακ.* is supposed to point to the *moral conversion*, and *ἀφελ. τ. ἁμαρτ. αὐτ.* to the *forgiveness*, on the ground of which that conversion takes place (see Hofmann). According to this view, the essence of the covenant would lie in *sanctification*, not in *reconciliation*, which would be conceived rather as *antecedent* to the covenant,—a view which runs counter to the N. T. doctrine (Matt. xxvi. 26; Heb. ix. 15 ff., x. 29, xii. 24, xiii. 20). — *ἡ παρ’ ἐμοῦ διαθήκη*] *The covenant which preceded from me*, which was made on my part. See Bernhardt, p. 255 f.; Fritzsche, *ad Marc.* p. 182 f.; van Hengel, *in loc.*

REMARK.—The *conversion of entire Israel* promised by Paul as a *μυστήριον* revealed to him, has not yet taken place; for the opinion, that the promise had been fulfilled already in the apostolic age through the conversion of a great part of the people (comp. Euseb. *H. E.* iii. 35; *Judaizantes* in Jerome; Grotius, Limborch, Wetstein), is set aside, notwithstanding Acts xxi. 20, by the literal meaning of *πᾶς Ἰσραὴλ* and of *πλήρωμα τῶν ἐθνῶν*. The fulfilment is to be regarded as *still future*, as the *last step in the universal extension of Christianity upon earth*. In respect of *time* no more special definition can be given, than that the conversion of the totality of the Gentiles must precede

it; whence only this is certain, that it is *still a time very distant*. Paul has certainly viewed the matter as *near*, seeing that he conceived the *Parousia* itself to be near (not merely, perhaps, its *possible*, but its *actual* emergence—in opposition to Philippi),—a conception which was shared by him with the whole apostolical church, although it remained without the verification of the event, as this was conceived of. But the promise of the conversion of the people of Israel is not on that account itself to be regarded as one, the fulfilment of which is no longer to be hoped for,—as though, with the non-verified conception of the *time* of the event, the *event itself* should fall to the ground (Ammon, Reiche, Köllner, Fritzsche); for it is the fact in itself, and not the epoch of it, which is disclosed by the apostle as part of the *μυστήριον* which was revealed to him; and therefore this disclosure rested on the *ἀποκάλυψις* received, not on individual opinion and expectation. The *duration of time* until the *Parousia* was not subject-matter of revelation, Acts i. 7, and the conception of it belongs, therefore, not to that in the apostolic teaching which has the guarantee of divine certainty, but to the domain of subjective hope and expectation, which associated themselves with what was revealed,—a distinction which even Philippi does not reject. The latter, however, endeavours to remove from the category of error the apostolic expectation of the nearness of the *Parousia*, because it was not cherished with that divine certainty; but cannot thereby prevent it, where it is presupposed so definitely, as *c.g.* xiii. 11, or is expressed so unconditionally, as *c.g.* 1 Cor. xv. 51, 52, from being characterized by an unprejudiced mind as a *human* error, which did not, however, exclude occasionally other moods, as in 2 Cor. v. 8, Phil. i. 23. Of such human mistakes and vacillations, which lie outside the range of revealed truth, that truth is independent (against Hoelemann, *neue Bibelstud.* p. 232 ff., and others).—We may further notice that our passage directly controverts the Ebionitish view, now renewed in various quarters (Chr. A. Crusius, Delitzsch, Baumgarten, Ebrard, Außerlen, and others; expositors of the Apocalypse), of an actual restoration of Israel to the theocratic kingdom in Canaan, as to be expected on the ground of prophetic predictions (Hos. ii. 2, 16 ff., iii. 4, 5; Isa. xi. 11, xxiv. 16, chap. lx.; Jer. xxxiv. 33, *et al.*). Israel does not take in the church, but the church takes in Israel; and whenever this occurs, Israel has in the true sense again its kingdom and its Canaan. Comp. Tholuck on ver. 25; Kahnis, *Dogm.* I. p. 576 f.;

Hengstenberg, *Christol.* I. p. 256 ; and see especially Bertheau, in the *Jahrb. f. Deutsche Theol.* 1859, p. 353 ff.

Ver. 28 ff. Yet a final summary gathering up of the sacred-historical relation of Israel to God, and (vv. 29–32) discussion of it ; in which, however, the reference, bearing on the apostle's object, to the statement καὶ οὕτω πᾶς Ἰσραὴλ σωθήσεται does not require the parenthesizing of καθὼς γέγραπται κ.τ.λ. (Ewald), as in ver. 28 the substantive verb is easily and obviously supplied.—The unbelieving Israelites *as such* are the *subject* (αὐτῶν, ver. 27). —κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγ.] The *relation* is thereby designated, according to which they are ἐχθροί. The gospel was preached to them ; but they rejected it, in which relation they are hated of God. In *conformity with* the message of salvation, which reached them, but was despised by them (comp. ver. 25), they must necessarily be ἐχθροί ; since in fact, not accepting the δικαιοσύνη proffered in the gospel, they remained under the wrath of God (ver. 7). According to the context, we must think of the ἀπειθεία of the Jews, ver. 30 ; and therefore neither of their *exclusion from the gospel* (Fritzsche), nor even of the *diffusion* of the latter (Rückert). —ἐχθροί] not *my enemies* (Theodoret, Luther, Grotius, Semler, and others), nor yet *enemies of the gospel* (Chrysostom, Theophylact, Michaelis, Morus, Rosenmüller). That, on the contrary, Θεῷ (see on Gal. iv. 16) is to be supplied, as Θεοῦ with ἀγαπητοί, is evident generally from the connection with vv. 27 and 29 ; and that ἐχθροί is to be explained not in an *active* (Olshausen, van Hengel, Ritschl, and older interpreters), but in a *passive* sense (*to whom God is hostile*), is shown by the contrast of ἀγαπητοί. Comp. on v. 10. —δι' ὑμᾶς] *for your sake*, because you are thereby to attain to salvation, ver. 11. —κατὰ τὴν ἐκλ.] is usually taken : as fellow-members of the nation elected to be the people of God ; comp. ver. 2. But ἐκλογή—differently from the προέγνω, ver. 2—has already been clearly defined in vv. 5, 7 as the elect λείμμα, and hence, with Ewald, is here also to be taken in this sense. Consequently : *in conformity with the fact, however, that among them is that elect remnant.* This be-

living ἐκλογὴ is the living testimony of the undying love of God towards the people. Comp. ver. 5. — διὰ τοὺς πατ.] *for the fathers' sake.* Calvin aptly remarks: "Quoniam ab illis propagata fuerat Dei gratia ad posteros, secundum pacti formam: Deus tuus et seminis tui;" comp. ver. 16; Luke i. 54, 55.

Ver. 29. Confirmation of the second half of ver. 28 by the axiom: "*Unrepented, and so subject to no recall, are the displays of grace and (especially) the calling of God.*" The application to be made of this general proposition is: Consequently God, who has once made this people the recipient of the displays of His grace and has called them to the Messianic salvation, will not, as though He had repented of this, again withdraw His grace from Israel, and leave and abandon His calling of Israel without realization.—On ἀμεταμέλητος, comp. 2 Cor. vii. 10.

Vv. 30, 31. Γάρ] not referable to ver. 28 (Hofmann), introduces that, which, according to the economy of salvation under the divine mercy, will emerge as actual proof of the truth of ver. 29.—ἡπειθήσατε] *have refused obedience, which came to pass through unbelief.* For the elucidation of this, see i. 18 ff.—νῦν δέ] contrast to the time before they become Christian (ποτέ), Eph. ii. 8.—ἡλεήθητε] For the reception into Christianity with its blessings is, as generally, so in particular over-against the preceding ἡπειθήσατε, on God's part solely the work of *mercy*. — τῇ τούτων ἀπειθ.] *through the disobedience of these*; for they are ἐχθροὶ δι' ὑμᾶς, ver. 28. Comp., besides, vv. 11 f., 15, 19 f. The non-compliance of the Jews with the requirement of faith in the gospel brought about the reception of the Gentiles. The latter, the converted Gentiles, are individualized by the address to the Gentile-Christian community of the readers (ὑμεῖς).—ἡπειθήσαν] namely, through rejection of the gospel.—τῷ ὑμετέρῳ ἐλέει] is, on account of the parallelism, to be joined to the following (ἵνα κ.τ.λ.), and the dative to be taken in the sense of mediate agency, like τῇ τούτ. ἀπειθ.: *in order that through the mercy that befell you* (which may excite them to emulation of your faith, ver. 11), *mercy should also accrue to them.*



The position of τ. ὑμ. ἐλ. *before* the introductory conjunction is for the sake of emphasis; comp. 2 Cor. xii. 7; Gal. iv. 10, *et al.*; Winer, p. 522 [E. T. 688]. Hence the parallelism is not to be sacrificed by placing a comma after ἐλέει. Nevertheless such is the course followed—and with very different views of the dative, arbitrarily departing from the datival notion in τῇ τοῦτ. ἀπειθείᾳ—by the Vulgate (“in vestram misericordiam”), Peschito, Erasmus, Luther, Calvin, Estius, Wolf, Morus, Lachmann, Glöckler, Maier, Ewald (“so these also became now disobedient *alongside of* [*bei*] your mercy”), Buttman in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1860, p. 367 (“*in favour of* your mercy, that you might find mercy”), and others.—ἵνα] the divinely ordained *aim* of the ἡπειθήσαν. On the emphatic ὑμετέρῳ in the objective sense, see Winer, p. 145 [E. T. 191]; Kühner, II. 1, p. 486.

Ver. 32. Establishment of ver. 30 f., and that by an exhibition of the *universal* divine procedure, with *the order* of which that which is said in ver. 31 of the now disobedient Jews and their deliverance is *incorporated*. Thus ver. 32 is at once the grand summary and the glorious key-stone—impelling once more to the praise of God (ver. 33 ff.)—of the whole preceding section of the epistle.<sup>1</sup> —συνγκλείω εἰς: *to include in* (2 Macc. v. 5, comp. Luke v. 6), has, in the later Greek (Diod. Sic. xix. 19, comp. xx. 74, frequently in Polybius), and in the LXX. (after the Heb. הִקְפִּי with הָ), also the metaphorical sense: *to hand over unto* or *under a power* which holds as it were in ward. Comp. on Gal. iii. 22, 23. Correspondent, as regards the notion, is παρέδωκε, i. 24. The compound expression *strengthens* the meaning; it does not denote *simul* (Bengel and others).—The *effective* sense is not to be changed, which has been attempted by taking it sometimes as *declarative* (Chrysostom, Theodoret, Grotius, Zeger, Glass, Wolf, Carpzov, Wetstein, Ch. Schmidt), sometimes as *permissive* (Origen, Cornelius a Lapide, Estius, and many others, including Flatt and Tholuck). —εἰς ἀπειθ.] towards God; see

<sup>1</sup> “Note this prime saying, which condemns all the world and man’s righteousness, and alone exalts God’s mercy, to be obtained through faith” (Luther’s gloss).

vv. 30, 31. — τοὺς πάντας] Of Gentiles (ὑμεῖς) and Jews (οὗτοι) Paul has previously spoken; hence οἱ πάντες now comprises the *totality*, namely all Jews and Gentiles *jointly* and *severally*,—"cunctos s. universos, i. e. singulos in unum corpus colligatos," Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* II. p. 521. Comp. on the subject-matter, iii. 9, 19; Gal. iii. 22. So necessarily also the following τοὺς πάντας. The view which understands only the two *masses* of Jews and Gentiles, these two halves of mankind in the gross (usually so taken recently, as by Tholuck, Fritzsche, Philippi, Ewald, Weiss), cannot suit the comprehensive τ. πάντας (as if it were equal to τοὺς ἀμφοτέρους), since it is by no means appropriate to the mere *number of two*, but only to their *collective subjects*. Not even the Jewish ἐκλογή, vv. 7, 28, is to be excepted (Maier, van Hengel), because its subjects were also before their conversion sinners (iii. 23), and therefore subjected to the power of disobedience towards God; for the συνέκλεισε . . . ἀπειθείαν points back, in the case of each single member of the collective whole, to the time *before* conversion and *until* conversion. If we should desire to refer οἱ πάντες *merely* to the *Jews* (van Hengel by way of a suggestion, and Hofmann), who are meant as a *people* in their *collective shape* (consequently not in all individuals; see Hofmann), the close relationship between ver. 30 and ver. 31 would be opposed to it, since the reference of γάρ merely to the apodosis in ver. 31 is quite arbitrary; and, indeed, the bold concluding thought in ver. 32 possesses its great *significance* and its *suitableness* to the following outburst of praise, simply and solely through its *all-comprehensive* contents. And even apart from this, τοὺς πάντας in fact never denotes: *them as a collective whole, as a people*,<sup>1</sup> but, as universally (in 1 Cor. ix. 22, x. 17; 2 Cor. v. 14; Phil. ii. 21; comp. Eph. iv. 13; 2 Macc. xi. 11, xii. 40, *et al.*, and in all the classical writers) *all of them*, as also only in *this* sense does the suitable *emphasis* fall on the repetition in the apodosis. — ἵνα τ. π. ἐλεήσῃ] *in order that He may have mercy upon all*. This divine purpose Paul saw to be already in part attained,—namely, in

<sup>1</sup> οἱ πάντες has, as is well known, the sense of *in all* in the case of *numbers*. See Krüger, § 50. 11. 13; Kühner, II. 1, p. 545.

the case of all already converted; but its general fulfilment lay, to his view, in the development of the future on to the great *terminus* expressed in ver. 25 f. We may observe that our passage is at variance not merely with the *decretum reprobationis* ("hanc particulam universalem opponamus tentationi de particularitate . . .; non fingamus in Deo contradictorias voluntates," Melancthon), but also with the view (Olshausen, Krummacher, and older expositors) that Paul means the *collective body* of the *elect*. See rather ver. 25 f. The ἀποκατάστασις is not, however, to be based on our passage for this reason, that the universality of the divine *purpose* of redemption (comp. 1 Tim. ii. 4), as well as the work of redemption having taken place for the justification of all (ver. 18), does not exclude its final non-realization in part through the fault of the individuals concerned,<sup>1</sup> and cannot do away with either the applicability of the purpose-clause exhibited in principle and summarily in prophetic fashion (comp. remark on ver. 25), nor with the divine judgment on final concrete self-frustrations of the counsel of salvation. And this the less, because such misinterpretations of the universalistic axiom are opposed by the apostle's doctrine of election as a sure corrective. There has been incorrectly discovered in such general expressions a want of consistency on the part of Paul, namely, "undeveloped outlines of a liberal conception" (Georgii in the *Theol. Jahrb.* 1845, I. p. 25).

Ver. 33. The great and holy truth containing the whole divine procedure in preparing bliss (ver. 32),—with which Paul now arrives at the close of his entire *development of doctrine* in the epistle,—compels first an enraptured expression of praise to God from his deeply-moved heart, before he can commence the *exhortations*, which he then (chap. xii.) purposes to subjoin. — ὦ βάθος] θαυμάζοντός ἐστιν ἡ ῥῆσις, οὐκ εἰδότης τὸ πᾶν, Chrysostom. — The *depth* is an expression of *great fulness and superabundance*, according to the very prevalent mode of expressing also in the classics *greatness* of riches by βάθος πλούτου (Soph. *Aj.* 130, and Lobeck, *in loc.*; but comp.

<sup>1</sup> Comp. Gerlach, *d. letzten Dinge*, p. 154 ff.; Schmid, in the *Jahrb. f. D. Th.* 1870, p. 133.

with Ellendt, I. p. 286), βαθὺς πλοῦτος (Ael. *V. H.* iii. 18), βαθὺ πλουτεῖν (Tyrt. iii. 6), βαθύπλουτος, *very rich* (Aesch. *Suppl.* p. 549, *Crinag.* 17), βαθυπλούσιος (Poll. iii. 109). Comp. Dorville, *ad Charit.* p. 232; Blomfield, *Gloss. ad Aesch. Pers.* 471. By this sense we are here to abide, just because πλούτου is added, and without deriving the expression from the conception of subterranean treasure-chambers (van Hengel<sup>1</sup>); and we are not to find in it the sense of *unsearchableness* (Philippi), which is not expressed even in 1 Cor. ii. 10, Judith viii. 14, and is not required by the following ὡς ἀνεξ. κ.τ.λ., since this rather characterizes the βάθος σοφίας καὶ γνώσεως from the point of view of human knowledge, to which it must necessarily be unfathomable, but in a peculiar relation. In its reference to σοφίας κ. γνώσεως, namely, βάθος is the *depth* of wisdom, *i.e.* the fulness of wisdom, which is acquainted with the nature and the connection of its objects not superficially, but exhaustively and fundamentally, and is therefore incomprehensible by human judgment. See on βάθος and βαθύς, as applying to *mental* depth (Plat. *Theact.* p. 183 E; Polybius, xxvii. 10. 3, vi. 24. 9, xxi. 5. 5), Dissen, *ad Pind. Nem.* iv. 7, p. 396; Blomfield, *ad Aesch. Sept.* 578; Jacobs, *ad Anthol.* XI. p. 252. Comp. βαθύφρων, Pind. *Nem.* vii. 1; Plut. *Sol.* 14; βαθύβουλος, Aesch. *Pers.* 138. — πλούτου] is either regarded as opening the series of genitival definitions of βάθος: *O depth* (1) *of riches*, and (2) *of wisdom*, and (3) *of knowledge of God* (so Origen, Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Grotius, Bengel, Semler, Flatt, Tholuck, Köllner, de Wette, Olshausen, Fritzsche, Philippi, Ewald, Hofmann, Mangold, and others); or the two other genitives are *subordinated* to πλούτου (Augustine, Ambrosiaster, Luther, Calvin, Beza, Wolf, Koppe, Reiche, van Hengel, and others), in which case, however, βάθ. πλούτ. is not to be resolved into *deep riches*, but is to be taken: *O depth of riches in wisdom as well as in knowledge of God*; comp. Col. ii. 2; Rom. ii. 4. The decision between these two suppositions is given by what follows, of which ὁ βάθος . . . Θεοῦ is the *theme*. As vv. 33, 34

<sup>1</sup> This idea might have been precluded by the fact that the expression βάθος κ.τ.λ. (Eur. *Hec.* 310) and the like are used.

describe the σοφία and γνῶσις, and vv. 35, 36 the πλοῦτος Θεοῦ, the former view, which also primarily and most naturally presents itself, is to be preferred. Πλοῦτος, however, is usually understood of the divine *riches of grace* (comp. ii. 4, x. 12; Eph. i. 7, ii. 7); see ver. 32. To this ver. 35 aptly corresponds; and see x. 12. But since no genitival definition is appended, we must content ourselves simply with the sense of the word itself; how superabundantly *rich* is God! Phil. iv. 19. Comp. Rückert, Fritzsche, Philippi, Hofmann. — Σοφία and γνῶσις are certainly to be distinguished (comp. on Col. ii. 3), but *popularly*, so that the *former*, the more general, is the *wisdom* of God (comp. xvi. 27; Eph. iii. 10), ruling everything in the best way for the best end; while the *latter*, the more special, is the *knowledge* pertaining to it of *all relations*, and thus especially of the means which He therein employs, of the methods which He has therein to take. To the latter—the γνῶσις—are to be referred αἱ ὁδοὶ αὐτοῦ, *i.e.* *His measures, modes of procedure, αἱ οἰκονομίαι*, Chrysostom (comp. Heb. iii. 10, Acts xiii. 10, according to the Heb. הַדְרֹגוֹת, and also to classical usage); to the former—the σοφία—belong τὰ κρίματα αὐτοῦ, *i.e.* *decisions, resolves* formed, according to which His action proceeds (comp. Zeph. iii. 8; Wisd. xii. 12), as He, *e.g.*, has decided, according to ver. 32, that all should be disobedient, in order that all might find mercy. On account of the deep σοφία of God His κρίματα are unsearchable for men, etc. — ἀνεξερευνήτος, *unsearchable*, is found only in Heraclitus as quoted in Clement and Symmachus, Prov. xxv. 3, Jer. xvii. 9, Suidas; ἀνεξιχνίαστος, *untraversable* (Eph. iii. 8), οὐ μὴδ' ἔχνος ἐστὶν εὐρεῖν (Suidas), corresponds to the metaphorical ὁδοί. Comp. Job v. 9, ix. 10, xxxiv. 24; Manass. 6; Clement, *ad Cor.* i. 20.

Ver. 34. Paul, by way of confirming his entire exclamation in ver. 33 (not merely the second half), continuing by γάρ, adopts the words of Isa. xl. 13 (almost quite exactly after the LXX.) as his own. Comp. 1 Cor. ii. 16; Judith viii. 13, 14; Wisd. ix. 17; Ecclus. xviii. 2 ff.—The first half has been referred to γνῶσις, the second to the σοφία (Theodoret, Theophylact, Wetstein, Fritzsche), and rightly so. Paul goes *back* with his three questions upon the γνῶσις, to which the νοῦς, the

divine reason as the organ of absolute knowledge and truth, corresponds;<sup>1</sup> upon the σοφία, which has no σύμβουλος; and (ver. 35) upon the πλούτος, from which results the negation of τίς προέδωκεν κ.τ.λ. Philippi is opposed to this view, but can at the same time (similarly van Hengel and Hofmann) only bring out in a very far-fetched and indirect manner the result, that ver. 35 also sets forth the divine wisdom and knowledge (so far, namely, as the latter is not bound from without). — τίς σύμβ. αὐτοῦ ἐγένε.] *Who has become His adviser, His counsel-giving helper?* “Scriptura ubique subsistit in eo, quod Dominus voluit et dixit et fecit; rationes rerum universalium singulariumve non pandit; de iis, quae nostram superant infantiam, ad aeternitatem remittit fideles, 1 Cor. xiii. 9 ss.,” Bengel. For parallels in Greek writers, see Spiess, *Logos spermat.* p. 240.

Ver. 35. Description of the βάθος πλούτου by words which are moulded after Job xli. 3, according to the Hebrew, not according to the LXX. (xli. 11), whose translation is quite erroneous.<sup>2</sup> — καὶ ἀνταποδ. αὐτῷ] *and will it be recompensed again to Him?* With whom does the case occur, that he has previously made a gift to God, and that a recompense will be made to him in return for it? Change of construction by καὶ . . . αὐτῷ, here occasioned by the Heb. עָנָה. But for the Greek usage, comp. Bernhardt, p. 304; Kühner, II. 2, p. 936.

Ver. 36 does not apply to all the three foregoing questions (Hofmann), but simply the *last* of them is *established* by the connective ὅτι (*for truly*) as regards its negative contents: “No one has beforehand given to God,” etc.—All things are *from God* (*primal cause*), in so far as all things have proceeded from God’s creative power; *through God* (*ground of mediate agency*), in so far as nothing exists without God’s continuous operation; *for God* (*final cause*), in so far as all things serve the ends of God (not merely: the honour of God, as many

<sup>1</sup> Comp. Kluge in the *Jahrb. f. D. Theol.* 1871, p. 324 ff.

<sup>2</sup> In the LXX. Isa. xl. 14, Cod. A, as also S, has our words, but certainly through interpolation from the present passage. According to Ewald, Paul probably found them in his copy of the LXX. just after Isa. xl. 13.

think). Comp. 1 Cor. viii. 6 ; Col. i. 16 ; Heb. ii. 10. These passages speak quite *against* the opinion, that in the present passage the relation of *Father, Son, and Spirit* (Olshausen, Philippi, Thomasius, Jatho, Krummacher, following Ambrosiaster, Hilary, Toletus, Estius, Calovius, and others) is expressed—a view which is also quite remote from the connection.<sup>1</sup> The context speaks simply of *God* (the Father), to whom no one can have given anything beforehand, etc., because He, as Bengel aptly expresses it, is *Origo et Cursus et Terminus rerum omnium*. This may be recognised by the exegesis that has the deepest faith in Scripture without any rationalistic idiosyncrasy, as the example of Bengel himself shows. With reason neither Chrysostom, nor Oecumenius, nor Theophylact,<sup>2</sup> neither Erasmus, nor Melancthon, nor Calvin, nor Beza have expressed any reference to the Trinity in their explanations ; but Augustine has this reference, against which also Tholuck, Hofmann, and Gess (*v. d. Pers. Chr.* p. 158) have been sufficiently unbiassed to declare themselves. — δὲ αὐτοῦ] God is *mediate cause* of all things by His *upholding and ruling*. Comp. Heb. ii. 20. To refer, with others, this statement to *creation* (Theophylact : ὁ ποιητὴς πάντων ; comp. Oecumenius, Rückert, Fritzsche), would fail to bring out at least any popular distinction from ἐξ αὐτοῦ, and—which is decisive against such reference—that would be affirmed of the *Father* which pertains to the *Son* (Col. i. 16 ; 1 Cor. viii. 6 ; John i. 2). Theodoret rightly remarks : αὐτὸς τὰ γεγνότα

<sup>1</sup> With the same warrant, or, in other words, with the same arbitrariness, the Trinity might be found, with Origen, in ver. 33 ; and in particular, πλούτου might be referred to the Father, σοφίας to the Son (Luke xi. 49), and γνώσις to the Holy Spirit (1 Cor. ii. 10, 11) ; in consistency with which, moreover, the βάθος, belonging to all three elements, might have been explained of the *mystery* of the Trinitarian relation. This observation is not meant to sound like “ *Gnostic mockery* ” (Philippi) ; such is far from my intention. That the doctrine of the Trinity (that of the New Testament, namely, which is Subordinationian) was vividly before the consciousness of the apostle, no unprejudiced person denies ; but *here* he has neither *stated* nor *hinted at* it, as the third element εἰς αὐτόν shows sufficiently in and by itself, for all things can have their *telic* reference to none other than to the *Father* or (Col. i. 16) to the *Son*.

<sup>2</sup> Theodoret argues from the first two statements the equality of the Father and the Son ; he says nothing concerning the Spirit.

διατελεῖ κυβερνῶν. — εἰς αὐτόν] All things *serve* Him (comp. Heb. ii. 10) as their ultimate *end*. This is explained by Occumenius, Theophylact, and Fritzsche of the *upholding* (συνέχονται ἐπεστραμμένα πρὸς αὐτόν). On the whole, comp. what Marcus Antoninus, iv. 23, says of φύσις: ἐκ σοῦ πάντα, ἐν σοὶ πάντα, εἰς σὲ πάντα, and Gataker *in loc.* — ἡ δόξα] sc. εἴη; as at xvi. 27: the *befitting* glory. Gal. i. 5; Eph. iii. 21.



# CHAPTER XII.

Ver. 2. Instead of the imperatives, which Tisch. also defends, Lachm. has, what Griesb. already approved : συσχηματίζεσθαι and μεταμορφοῦσθαι, according to A B\*\* D F G, min. Theoph. The preponderating evidence of the codd. is in favour of the *infinitives*, while that of the vss. (Vulg. It. Syr. etc.) and Fathers is in favour of the *imperatives*. But, since the frequent practical use of the precept in the direct *paracnetic* form of expression at any rate suggested—especially considering the closely similar pronunciation of the infinitives and imperatives—the writing of the latter rather than the former, the infinitive reading is to be preferred, which is also supported by reading μεταμορφοῦσθαι, although it has συσχηματίζεσθε. — ὁμῶν] is wanting in A B D\* F G, 47, 67\*, Copt. Clem. Cypr. Omitted by Lachm. and Tisch. The preponderance of evidence, as well as the circumstance that ὁμῶν very readily suggested itself to mechanical copyists for repetition from ver. 1, justifies the omission. — Ver. 5. Lachm. and Tisch. 8 : τὸ, according to A B D\* F G P 8, 47\*, Antioch. Damasc. Rightly ; τὸ δὲ καὶ εἶς, not being understood, was exchanged with ὁ δὲ καὶ εἶς, as the antithesis of οἱ πολλοί. — Ver. 11. τῷ καιρῷ] So Griesb., after Erasm. 2, Steph. 3, Mill, and others. But Erasm. 1, Beza, Elz., Matth., Lachm., Scholz, Tisch., and Rinck have τῷ κυρίῳ. The former is found in D\* F G, 5, and Latin Fathers ; the latter in A B D\*\* E L P 8, and most min. vss. and Greek Fathers. See the accurate examination of the evidence in Reiche, *Comm. crit.* p. 70 ff., who decides for κυρίῳ, and in Tisch. 8. Κυρίῳ is certainly the oldest and most diffused reading. Nevertheless, if it were original, we cannot well see why καιρῷ should have been substituted for it ; for δουλ. τῷ κυρίῳ is a very usual Pauline thought (Acts xx. 19 ; Eph. vi. 7 ; Rom. xiv. 18, xvi. 18 ; Col. iii. 24, *et al.*), and would suit our passage very well. It would be far easier to take exception to καιρῷ than to κυρίῳ (as in xiii. 11, instead of καιρόν, the reading κύριον is already found in Clement), especially as the principle itself, τῷ καιρῷ δουλεύειν, might readily seem somewhat offensive to a prejudiced moral feeling. Hardly can κυρίῳ, considering its great diffusion, be a

mere copyist's error (in opposition to Fritzsche). — Ver. 13. *ῥησίαις*] D\* F G, Clar. Boern. codd. Lat. in Rufinus and some Latin Fathers: *μυρίαις* (defended by Mill). Its origin is due to the reverence for martyrs: "lectio liturgica pro tempore ficta," Matth. — Ver. 17. *ἐνώπιον*] A\*\* has *ἐνώπιον τοῦ Θεοῦ, καὶ ἐνώπιον*. F G, Arm. Goth. Vulg. and several Fathers: *οὐ μόνον ἐνώπιον τ. Θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐνώπιον*. Ascetic amplification, after Prov. iii. 4; 2 Cor. viii. 21.—Instead of *πάντων* Lachm. has *τῶν*, according to A\*\* D\* F G, min. It. Harl. Guelph. Tol. Tert. Lucif. Probably, however, this was connected with that amplification. — Ver. 20. *ἐάν οὖν*] A B P 8, min. Copt. Arm. Vulg. Clar. Bas. Dam.: *ἀλλὰ ἐάν* (so Lachm. and Tisch. 8). D\* F G, min. Goth.: *ἐάν*, which is to be preferred, with Griesb.; the other readings aim at furnishing a connection.

## THE SECOND, OR PRACTICAL PART OF THE EPISTLE.<sup>1</sup>

Ver. 1 f. *General exhortation to sanctification*. — *οὖν*] drawing an inference, not from the whole dogmatic part of the epistle, beginning with i. 16 (Calvin, Bengel, and many others, including Reiche, Köllner, de Wette, Philippi, Hofmann),—as also in Eph. iv. 1 and 1 Thess. iv. 1, the *οὖν* which introduces the practical portion is not to be taken so vaguely,—but from xi. 35, 36, where the riches of God were described as, and shown to be, imparted apart from merit. This connection is, on account of *διὰ τῶν οἰκτίρμ. τ. Θεοῦ*, more readily suggested and simpler than that with ver. 32 (Rückert, Fritzsche, and several others). — *διὰ τῶν οἰκτ. τ. Θεοῦ*] *by means of the compassion of God*, reminding you of it. Just so *διὰ* in xv. 30, 1 Cor. i. 10, 2 Cor. x. 1. The exhortation, pointing to the compassion of God, contains the *motive of thankfulness* for compliance with it. "*Qui misericordia Dei recte movetur, in omnem Dei voluntatem ingreditur*," Bengel. — On *οἰκτιρμοί*,

<sup>1</sup> See Pet. Abr. Borger, *Dissertatio de parte epistolae ad Rom. paraenetica*, Lugd. Bat. 1840.—The subdivision of what follows into *ἠθικά* (chap. xii.), *πολιτικά* (chap. xiii.), and *ἱερατικά* (chap. xiv. f.) is, considering the miscellaneous character of the contents, an untenable *formal scheme* (in opposition to Melancthon, Beza, and others). Paul proceeds from the general to the particular, and *vice versa*.

see Tittmann, *Symon*. p. 68 ff. On the *singular*, comp. Pind. *Pyth.* i. 85; Ecclus. v. 6; Bar. ii. 27; 1 Macc. iii. 44. The *plural* conforms, indeed, to מַחֲמִים, but is conceived according to the Greek plural usage of abstract nouns (see Kühner, II. 1, p. 15 f.; Maetzner, *ad Lycurg.* p. 144 f.): the *compassions*, *i.e.* the stirrings and manifestations of compassion. — παραστήσαι] selected as the set expression for the *presenting of sacrificial animals at the altar*; Xen. *Anab.* vi. 1. 22; Lucian, *de sacrif.* 13; and see Wetstein and Loesner, p. 262. Paul is glancing at the *thank-offering* (διὰ τ. οἰκτιρμ. τ. Θ.), and raises the notion of sacrifice to the highest moral idea of self-surrender to God; comp. Umbreit, p. 343 ff. — τὰ σώματα ὑμῶν] not, on account of the figure of sacrifice, instead of ὑμᾶς αὐτούς (so usually; still also Philippi), as if σῶμα might denote the entire person, consisting of body and soul (but comp. on vi. 12). On the contrary, the apostle means quite strictly: *your bodies*, reserving the sanctification of the νοῦς for ver. 2, so that the two verses *together* contain the sanctification of the *whole* man distributed into its parts,—that of the outer man (set forth as the offering of a sacrifice), and that of the inner (as a renewing transformation). Fritzsche also takes the correct view;<sup>1</sup> comp. Hofmann. Other peculiar references of τ. σῶμ. ὑμ. (Köllner: “the *sensuous nature* of man, which draws him to sin;” Olshausen: “in order to extend the idea of Christian sanctification down even to the *lowest potency* of human nature”) are not indicated by the text. The following τ. λογικ. λατρ. is not opposed to our view; for, in truth, bodily self-sacrifice is also an *ethical* act, 1 Cor. vi. 20. Comp. on the subject-matter, vi. 13, 19. — θυσίαν ζῶσαν] as a *sacrifice which lives*. For the moral self-offering of the body is the antitypical πλήρωσις of the ritual sacrificial-service, in which

<sup>1</sup> The ordinary objection brought against this view in its literal fidelity, that the body could not be sacrificed to God without the soul, is just in itself, but does not exclude the supposition that Paul might *formally* separate the bodily self-sacrifice and the spiritual renewal. He passes from the organism of the bodily life, in which the inner is made manifest, over to the latter; comp. 1 Cor. vii. 34. In passages also of the Greek writers, in which σῶμα is apparently used for the personal pronoun (as Eur. *Alc.* 647; see Brunck *in loc.*), σῶμα is simply *body*. Comp. also Soph. *O. C.* 355, *et al.*

the sacrifice *dies*; whereas that ethical sacrifice is no doubt also connected with dying, as to sin namely, in the sense of vi. 2, vii. 4 ff., Col. ii. 20, iii. 5, Gal. ii. 19, but it is precisely out of this *death* that the *being alive* here meant proceeds, which has vanquished death (Gal. ii. 20, *et al.*). Such a sacrifice is also, in the eminent sense of antitypical fulfilment, *ἀγία* (as pure and belonging to God in an ethical relation) and *εὐάρεστος τῷ Θεῷ* (comp. Eph. v. 2). That τ. Θεῷ is not, with Estius, Bengel, and Koppe, to be connected with παραστ., is shown by its very position, as well as by the superfluous character of a τ. Θεῷ with παραστ. — Passages from Porphyry, Hierocles, Philo, Josephus, and the Rabbins, in which likewise moral devotion to God is set forth as self-sacrifice, see in Wetstein and Koppe. On the *asyndeton*, as strengthening the force of the predicative notion, in ἀγ., εὐάρ. τ. Θ., comp. Nägelsbach, *z. II.* p. 50, ed. 3. — τὴν λογ. λατρ. ὑμ.] accusative of *propositio*,—an appositional definition, and that, indeed, not to the mere *θυσίαν* (to the notion of which the wider notion of *λατρείαν* does not correspond), but to the whole *παραστήσαι κ.τ.λ.*, containing, respecting this whole act of presenting offering, *the judgment, what it ought to be*; see Winer, p. 496 [E. T. 669]; Kühner, II. 1, p. 243 f. Luther aptly remarks: “the *which* is your reasonable service.” Comp. Lobeck, *Paralip.* p. 519; Nägelsbach, *z. II.* iii. 51; Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 134. — *λατρεία*] *service of worship*, as in John xvi. 2. See on that passage. Comp. ix. 4. *λογικός*, *rational* (1 Pet. ii. 2; Plato, *Loer.* p. 99 E, 102 E; Polyb. xxv. 9. 2), is not in contrast to *ζῶα ἄλογα* (Theodoret, Grotius, Koppe, and many others), which at most would only be to be assumed if *λατρεία* were equivalent to *θυσία*, but generally to the ceremonial character of the Jewish and heathen worship,—designating the *λατρεία* here meant as a *spiritual service, fulfilling itself in moral rational activity*,—of which nature the *opus operatum* of the Jewish and heathen cultus was not. The Test. XII. Patr. p. 547 calls the sacrifice of the angels *λογικὴν κ. ἀναίμακτον προσφοράν*. On the idea, comp. John iv. 24; Rom. i. 9; Phil. iii. 3; 1 Pet. ii. 5; Athenag. *Lcg.* 13. Melancthon: “*Cultus mentis*, in quo mens fide aut coram intuetur Deum, et vere sentit timorem

et laetitiam in Deo." The opposite is the character of *mechanical* action, the *ἄλογος τριβὴ καὶ ἐμπειρία* (Plat. *Gorg.* p. 501 A).

Ver. 2. *Infinitives* (see the critical notes): *συσχηματίζεσθαι*, *to become like-shaped*, and *μεταμορφοῦσθαι*, *to become transformed*. The two verbs stand in contrast only through the *prepositions*, without any difference of sense in the stem-words. Comp. the interchange of *μορφή* and *σχῆμα* in Phil. ii. 7, also the Greek usage of *σχηματίζειν* and *μορφοῦν*, which denote any kind of conformation according to the context (Plut. *Mor.* p. 719 B: τὸ μεμορφωμένον καὶ ἐσχηματισμένον, Eur. *Iph. T.* 292: μορφῆς σχήματα). Here of *moral* conformation, without requiring us to distinguish *μορφή* and *σχῆμα* as *inner* and *outer* (Bengel, Philippi), or as *appearance to others* and *one's own state in itself* (Hofmann).<sup>1</sup> On the interchange of the infinitive of the *aorist* (*παραστήσαι*) and *present*, comp. on vi. 12. — τῷ αἰῶνι τούτῳ] *to the present age*, running on to the *Parousia*, ἡ ἥρ' (see on Matt. xii. 32), the character (ethical mould) of which is that of immorality (Eph. ii. 2; Gal. i. 4; 2 Cor. iv. 4, *et al.*). *συσχηματίζεσθαι* is also found in rhetoricians with the dative (as also 1 Pet. i. 14), instead of with *πρός* or *εἰς*. — τῇ ἀνακαίν. τ. νοός] whereby the *μεταμορφ.* is to be effected: *through the renewal of the thinking power* (νοῦς here, according to its practical side, the reason in its moral quality and activity; see on vii. 23; Eph. iv. 23). It *needs* this renewal in order to become the sphere of operation for the divine truth of salvation, when it, under the ascendancy of *ἁμαρτία* in the *σάρξ*, has become darkened, weak, unfree, and transformed into the *ἀδόκιμος νοῦς* (i. 28), the *νοῦς τῆς σαρκός* (Col. ii. 18). Comp. on vii. 23. And this renewal, which the regenerate man also needs on account of the conflict of flesh and spirit which exists in him (viii. 4 ff.; Gal. v. 16 ff.) through daily penitence (Col. iii. 10; 2 Cor. vii. 10; 1 Thess. v. 22, 23), is *effected* by means of the life-element of *faith* (Phil. iii. 9 ff.), transforming the inner man (Eph. iii.

<sup>1</sup> According to the latter supposed distinction, Hofmann hits upon the arbitrary definition of the relation of ver. 1 to ver. 2, that ver. 1 contains how the Christian should stand towards God, and ver. 2 how he should present himself to those who surround him.

16, 17; 2 Cor. v. 17), under the influence of the *Holy Spirit*, Eph. iv. 23, 24; Tit. iii. 5. This influence restores the harmony in which the *νοῦς* ought to stand with the divine *πνεῦμα*; not, however, annulling the moral freedom of the believer, but, on the contrary, presupposing it; hence the *exhortation*: *to be transformed (passive)*. As to the *ἀνά* in *ἀνακαίν.*, see on Col. iii. 10. — *εἰς τὸ δοκιμ.*] belongs not merely to *ἀνακαίνωσις τ. νοὺς ὑμ.* as its *direction* (Hofmann), but (comp. Phil. i. 10 and on Rom. i. 20) specifies the *aim* of the *μεταμορφ. τ. ἀνακ. τ. ν. ὑμῶν*. To the man who is not transformed by the renewal of his intellect this *proving*—which is no merely theoretical business of reflection, but is the critical *practice* of the whole inner life—forms no part of the activity of conscience. Comp. Eph. v. 10. The sense: *to be able to prove* (Rückert, Köllner), is as arbitrarily introduced as in ii. 18. He who is transformed by that renewal not merely *can do*, but—which Paul has here in view as the *immediate object* of the *μεταμορφοῦσθαι κ.τ.λ.*—*actually does* the *δοκιμάζειν*, and has thereby the foundation for a further moral development; he does it by means of the judgment of his conscience, stirred and illuminated by the Spirit (2 Cor. i. 12). On *τὸ θέλημα Θεοῦ*, *what is willed by God*, comp. Matt. vi. 10; Eph. v. 17, vi. 6; Col. i. 9; 1 Thess. iv. 3. — *τὸ ἀγαθὸν κ. εὐάγ. κ. τέλ.*] is, by the Peschito, the Vulgate, Chrysostom, and most of the older interpreters, also by Rückert and Reiche, united adjectivally with *τὸ θέλ.* But as *εὐάγ.* would thus be unsuitable to this, we must rather (with Erasmus, Castalio, and others, including Tholuck, Flatt, Köllner, de Wette, Fritzsche, Reithmayr, Philippi, van Hengel, Hofmann) approve the *substantival* rendering (as apposition to *τὸ θέλ. τ. Θεοῦ*): *that which is good and well-pleasing (to God) and perfect*. The repetition of the article was the less necessary, as the three adjectives used substantivally exhaust *one* notion (that of moral good), and that climactically. Comp. Winer, p. 121 [E. T. 159]; Dissen, *ad Dem. de cor.* p. 373 f.; Kühner, II. 1, p. 528.

Ver. 3. The exhortation now passes on to *single duties*, amongst which that of *humility and modesty*, generally (vv. 3–5), and in respect of the individual *χαρίσματα* in particular (vv. 6–8),

is the first—the first, too, compliance with which was indispensable to a prosperous life of the church. And Paul must have known how very necessary this same injunction was in the Roman community. — γάρ] *for*. The *special* requirement which he is now to make serves in fact by way of *confirmation* to the general exhortation of ver. 2. As to λέγω in the sense of *enjoining*, see on ii. 22. — διὰ τῆς χάρ. τῆς δοθ. μοι] Paul does not command δι' ἑαυτοῦ, but *by means of*, i.e. *in virtue of the divine grace bestowed on him*. It is thus that he characterizes—and how at once truly and humbly! (1 Cor. xv. 10)—*his apostleship*. Comp. xv. 15; 1 Cor. iii. 10; Eph. iii. 7, 8. This χάρις was given to *him* (μοι), not in common with Christians generally (ὑμῖν, ver. 6). — παντὶ . . . ὑμῖν] *to every one in your community*; none among you is to be exempt from this exhortation; not: to every one *who thinks himself to be something* among you (Koppe, Baumgarten-Crusius). — μὴ ὑπερφρον. κ.τ.λ.] *not loftily-minded* ought the Christian to be, *going beyond the standard-rule of that disposition which is conformable to duty* (παρ' ὃ δεῖ φρ.); *but his disposition should be such as to have wise discretion* (1 Pet. iv. 7) *for its aim* (comp. Hom. II. xxiii. 305: εἰς ἀγαθὰ φρονέων, Eur. Phoen. 1135: εἰς μάχην φρονεῖν). *Paronomasia*. Comp. Plat. Legg. x. p. 906 B: σωφροσύνη μετὰ φρονήσεως, Eur. Heracl. 388: τῶν φρονήματων . . . τῶν ἄγαν ὑπερφρόνων; and see Wetstein. — ἐκάστῳ ὡς] ἐκάστῳ depends on ἐμέρισε (comp. 1 Cor. iii. 5, vii. 17, and on Rom. xi. 31), not on λέγω (Estius, Köllner)—which view makes the already said παντὶ . . . ὑμῖν to be once more repeated, and, on the other hand, deprives ἐμέρισε of its essential definition. Ὡς designates the *scale according to which* each one ought φρονεῖν εἰς τὸ σωφρονεῖν, and this scale is different in persons differently furnished with gifts, so that for one the boundary, beyond which his φρονεῖν ceases to be εἰς τὸ σωφρονεῖν, is otherwise drawn than it is for another. The *regulative* standard, however, Paul expressly calls *the measure of faith*, which God has assigned. This is the subjective condition (the objective is the divine χάρις) of that which every one can and ought to do in the Christian life of the church. According, namely, as faith in

the case of individual Christians is more or less living, practical, energetic, efficacious in this or that direction,—whether contemplative, or manifesting itself in the outer life, in eloquence and action, etc.,—they have withal to measure their appointed position and task in the church. He, therefore, who covets a higher or another standpoint and sphere of activity in the community, and is not contented with that which corresponds to the measure of faith bestowed on him, evinces a wilful self-exaltation, which is without measure and not of God—not that spirit wherein the Christian *μετριοφροσύνη* consists, the *φρονεῖν εἰς τὸ σωφρονεῖν, ἐκάστῳ ὡς κ.τ.λ.* The *πίστις* is therefore to be taken throughout in no other sense than the ordinary one: *faith in Christ*, of which the essence indeed is alike in all, but the individually different *degrees of strength* (comp. 1 Cor. xiii. 2), and *peculiarities of character* in other respects (vv. 4 ff.), constitute for individuals the *μέτρον πίστεως* in quantitative and qualitative relation. Comp. Eph. iv. 7. This likewise holds in opposition to Hofmann, who with violence separates *μέτρ. πίστεως* from *ἐμέρισε*, and takes it as an accusative of apposition, like *τὴν λογικ. λατρείαν ὑμῶν*, ver. 1; holding *πίστεως* to be the genitive of quality, which distinguishes the measure within which the thinking of the Christian is confined, from that which the natural man sets up for himself. Comp., in opposition to this strange separation, 2 Cor. x. 13, and in opposition to this artificial explanation of the genitive, 2 Cor. x. 13; Eph. iv. 7, xiii. 16; Plat. *Theact.* p. 161 E: *μέτρῳ . . . τῆς αὐτοῦ σοφίας*. Soph. *El.* 229: *μέτρον κακότητος*. Eur. *Ion*, 354: *ἡβῆς μέτρον*. Pind. *Isthm.* i. 87: *κερδῶν μ.*

Vv. 4, 5 ff. Motive for compliance with the previous exhortation.—For the prevalence of the parallel between a human body and a *corpus sociale* (1 Cor. xii.) also among the ancients, see Grotius and Wetstein. — *τὰ δὲ μέλη πάντα κ.τ.λ.*] *i.e.* but the members, all of them, have different activity; thus, e.g., the eyes another than the ears, the feet another than the mouth. Wrongly van Hengel takes the expression, as though *οὐ πάντα* were the reading, so that *only some*—namely, those we possess in pairs—would be meant, *not all*. — *οἱ πολλοί*] *the many*,



*i.e.* the multiplicity of Christians taken together, in opposition to the unity of the body which they compose. Comp. v. 15. — ἐν Χριστῷ] The common element in which the union consists; *out of* Christ we should not be ἐν σῶμα, but this we are *in Him*, in the fellowship of faith and life with Christ. He *is* the Head (Eph. i. 22, 23, iv. 15; Col. i. 18, ii. 19),—a relation which is understood of itself by the consciousness of faith, but is not *denoted* by ἐν Χριστῷ (as if this meant *on Christ*), as Koppe, Rosenmüller, and older interpreters hold. — τὸ δὲ καθ' εἰς] *but in what concerns the individual relation*. In good Greek it would be τὸ δὲ καθ' ἓνα (see on Mark xiv. 19, and Bernhardt, p. 329; Kühner, II. 1, p. 414); but καθ' εἰς, in which κατά has quite lost its regimen, is a very frequent solecism in the later Greek writers (Mark, *l.c.*; John viii. 9; 3 Macc. v. 34). See Lucian, *Soloe.* 9, and Graev. *in loc.*; Thom. Mag. p. 483; Wetstein on Mark, *l.c.*; Winer, p. 234 [E. T. 312]. Τὸ καθ' εἰς is groundlessly condemned by Fritzsche as “commentitia formula.” If καθ' εἰς and ὁ καθ' εἰς were in use (and this was the case), it follows that τὸ καθ' εἰς might be just as well said as τὸ καθ' ἓνα (comp. τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸν and the like, Matthiae, § 283; Kühner, II. 1, p. 272). See also Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 26 f.

Vv. 6-8. *In the possession, however, of different gifts.* This ἔχοντες δὲ χαρίσματα κ.τ.λ. corresponds to τὰ δὲ μέλη πάντα οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει πρᾶξιν, ver. 4.—As regards the *construction*, the view adopted by Reiche, de Wette, and Lachmann makes ἔχοντες a participial definition of ἐσμεν, ver. 5; accordingly, εἴτε προφητείαν and εἴτε διακονίαν depend on ἔχοντες as a specifying apposition to χαρίσματα; whilst the limiting definitions κατὰ τὴν ἀναλ. τ. πίστ., ἐν τῇ διακ., ἐν τῇ διδασκ., ἐν τῇ παρακλ. κ.τ.λ. are parallel to the κατὰ τὴν χάριν δοθ. ἡμῖν, and with εἴτε ὁ διδάσκων the discourse varies, without however becoming directly hortatory. Comp. also Rückert. But usually κατὰ τὴν ἀναλ. τ. πιστ., ἐν τῇ διακ. κ.τ.λ., are regarded as *elliptical hortatory sentences*, whilst ἔχοντες is by some likewise attached to the foregoing (Theodoret, Erasmus, Luther, Castalio, Calvin, Estius, and others, including Flatt, Tholuck, Reithmayr), and with others ἔχοντες begins a new sentence (so

Olshausen, Fritzsche, Baumgarten - Crusius, Philippi, van Hengel, Hofmann, following Beza). The *usual* construction is the only correct one (in which, most suitably to the progressive δέ, a new sentence commences with ἔχοντες), because, under the mode followed by Reiche and de Wette, the alleged limitations ἐν τῇ διακ., ἐν τῇ διδασκ., and ἐν τῇ παρακλ. either express nothing, or must be taken arbitrarily in a variety of meaning different from that of the words with which they stand; and because ἐν ἀπλότῃτι, ἐν σπουδῇ, and ἐν ἡλαρότῃτι, ver. 8, are obviously of a hortatory character, and therefore the previous expressions with ἐν may not be taken otherwise. By way of *filling up* the concise maxims thrown out elliptically, and only as it were in outline, it is sufficient after κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογ. τ. πίστ. to supply: προφητεύωμεν, after ἐν τῇ διακονίᾳ: ὤμεν, after ἐν τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ: ἔστω, the same after ἐν τῇ παρακλήσει; and lastly, after the three following particulars, ἐν ἀπλότῃτι κ.τ.λ., the imperatives of the corresponding verbs (μεταδίδότω κ.τ.λ.). Comp. the similar mode of expression in 1 Pet. iv. 10, 11. — χάρισμα] denotes the different peculiar aptitudes for the furtherance of Christian life in the church and of its external welfare, imparted by God's grace through the principle of the Holy Spirit working in the Christian communion (hence πνευματικά, 1 Cor. xii. 1). On their great variety, amidst the specific unity of their origin from the efficacy of this Spirit, see esp. 1 Cor. xii. 4 ff.—Paul here mentions *by way of example* (for more, see 1 Cor. xii.), in the first instance, *four* of such χάρισμα, namely: (1) προφητεία, the *gift of theopneustic discourse*, which presupposes ἀποκάλυψις, and the form of which, appearing in different ways (hence also in the *plural* in 1 Cor. xiii. 8; 1 Thess. v. 20), was not ecstatic, like the speaking with tongues, but was an activity of the νοῦς enlightened and filled with the consecration of the Spirit's power, disclosing hidden things, and profoundly seizing, chastening, elevating, carrying away men's hearts, held in peculiar esteem by the apostle (1 Cor. xiv. 1). Comp. on 1 Cor. xii. 10. Further, (2) διακονία: the *gift of administration of the external affairs of the church*, particularly the *cure of the poor, the sick, and strangers*; comp. 1 Cor. xii.

28, where the functions of the *diaconia* are termed ἀντιλήψεις. Acts vi. 1 ff.; Phil. i. 1; 1 Tim. iii. 8, 12; 1 Pet. iv. 11; Rom. xvi. 1. The service of the diaconate in the church, which grew out of that of the seven men of Acts vi., is really of *apostolic* origin: Clem. *Cor.* I. 42, 44; Ritschl, *altkath. Kirche*, p. 359; Jul. Müller, *dogmat. Abh.* p. 560 ff. (3) The διδασκαλία, the gift of instruction in the usual form of teaching directed to the understanding (ἐξ οἰκείας διανοίας, Chrysostom, *ad 1 Cor.* xii. 28), see on Acts xiii. 1; Eph. iv. 11; 1 Cor. xiv. 26. It was not yet limited to a particular office; see Ritschl, p. 350 f. (4) παράκλησις, the gift of *hortatory and encouraging address operating on the heart and will*, the possessor of which probably connected his discourses, in the assemblies after the custom of the synagogue (see on Acts xiii. 15), with a portion of Scripture read before the people. Comp. Acts iv. 36, xi. 23, 24; Justin, *Apol.* I. c. 67. — κατὰ τὴν ἀναλ. τ. πίστ.] *Conformably to the proportion of their faith* the prophets have to use their prophetic gift, *i.e.* (comp. ver. 3): they are not to depart from the proportional measure which their faith has, neither wishing to exceed it nor falling short of it, but are to guide themselves by it, and are therefore so to announce and interpret the received ἀποκάλυψις, as the peculiar position in respect of faith bestowed on them, according to the strength, clearness, fervour, and other qualities of that faith, suggests—so that the character and mode of their speaking is conformed to the rules and limits, which are implied in the proportion of their individual degree of faith. In the contrary case they fall, in respect of contents and of form, into a mode of prophetic utterance, either excessive and overstrained, or on the other hand insufficient and defective (not corresponding to the level of their faith). The same revelation may in fact—according to the difference in the proportion of faith with which it, objectively given, subjectively connects itself—be very differently expressed and delivered. ἀναλογία, *proportio*, very current (also as a mathematical expression) in the classics (comp. esp. on κατὰ τ. ἀναλογ. Plato, *Polit.* p. 257 B, *Locr.* p. 95 B; Dem. 262. 5), is here in *substance* not different from μέτρον, ver. 3; comp. Plato, *Tim.* p. 69 B:

ἀνάλογα καὶ ξύμμετρα. Hofmann groundlessly denies this (in consequence of his incorrect view of μέτρον πίστεως, ver. 3), yet likewise arrives at the sense, that prophetic utterance must keep *equal pace* with the life of faith. Paul might, in fact, have written *συμμέτρως τῇ πίστει*, and would have thereby substantially expressed the same thing as *κατὰ τ. ἀναλ. τ. πίστ.* or *ἀναλόγως τ. π.* The old dogmatic interpretation<sup>1</sup> (still unknown, however, to the Greek Fathers, who rightly take *τ. πίστεως* subjectively, of the fides *qua* creditur) of the *regula fidei* (πίστις in the objective sense, fides *quae* creditur), i.e. of the *conformitas doctrinae in scripturis* (see esp. Colovinus), departs arbitrarily from the thought contained in ver. 3, and from the immediate context (*κατὰ τ. χάρ. τ. δοθ. ἡμῖν*), and cannot in itself be justified by linguistic usage (see on i. 5). It reappears, however, substantially in Flatt, Klee, Glöckler, Köllner, Philippi ("to remain subject to the norma et regula fidei Christianae"), Umbreit, Bisping, although they do not, like many of the older commentators, take prophecy to refer to the *explanation of Scripture*. — ἐν τῇ διακονίᾳ] If it be the case that we have *diaconia* (as *χαρίσμα*), *let us be in our diaconia*. The emphasis lies on ἐν. He who has the gift of the *diaconia* should not desire to have a position in the life of the church *outside of* the sphere of service which is assigned to him by this endowment, but should *be active within that sphere*. That by *διακονία* is not intended *any ecclesiastical office generally* (Chrysostom, Luther, Reithmayr, Hofmann), is shown by the charismatic elements of the entire context. On εἶναι ἐν, *versari in*, comp. 1 Tim. iv. 15; Plato, *Prot.* p. 317 C, *Phaed.* p. 59 A; Demosth. 301. 6, *et al.*; Krüger, *ad Dion. Hist.* p. 269, 70. — εἴτε ὁ διδάσκων] Symmetrically, Paul should have continued with εἴτε διδασκαλίαν (*sc. ἔχοντες*), as A. actually reads. Instead of this, however, he proceeds in such a way as now to introduce the different possessors of gifts *in the third person*, and therefore no longer dependent on the *we* implied in ἔχοντες. The change of conception and construction may

<sup>1</sup> Comp. Luther's gloss: "All prophecy, which leads to work and not simply to Christ as the only consolation, however valuable it is, is nevertheless not like faith."

accordingly be thus exhibited: "While, however, we have different gifts, we should, be it prophecy that we have, make use of it according to the proportion of our faith,—be it *diaconia* that we have, labour *within* the *diaconia*,—*be it that it is the teacher*, (he should) be active within the sphere of teaching, etc." After *ὁ διδάσκων*, simply *ἐστὶ* is to be supplied: *if it*, viz. one charismatically gifted, *is the teacher*. The apostle, in the urgent fulness of ideas which are yet to be only concisely expressed, has lost sight of the grammatical connection; comp. Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 331. Hofmann's expedient, that here *εἴτε . . . εἴτε* are subordinated to the preceding *ἐν τῇ διακονίᾳ*, and *ὁ διδάσκων* and *ὁ παρακαλῶν* are to be taken as a parenthetical apposition to the subject of the verb to be supplied ("be it that he, the teacher, handles teaching," etc.), is an artificial scheme forced upon him by his incorrect view of *διακονία*, and at variance with the co-ordinated relation of the first two cases of *εἴτε*.

Ver. 8. *Ὁ μεταδιδούς κ.τ.λ.*] The detailed exposition with *εἴτε* ceases as the discourse flows onward more vehemently, but the series of those charismatically endowed is continued, yet in such a way that now there are no longer mentioned such as possess a *χάρισμα* for a definite function in the church, but such as possess it generally for the activity of public usefulness in the social Christian life. Hence, because with *ἐν ἀπλότητι κ.τ.λ.* the continuance of the exhortations is indicated, we are to place before *ὁ μεταδιδούς* not a full stop, but a comma, or, better, a colon. The reference of these last three points to definite ministerial functions (such as that *ὁ μεταδιδ.* is the *diaconus* who distributes the gifts of love; *ὁ προϊστάμ.* the president of the community, bishop or presbyter; *ὁ ἐλεῶν* he who takes charge of the sick) is refuted, first, by the fact that the assumed references of *μεταδιδ.* (according to Acts iv. 35, we should at least expect *διαδιδούς*) are quite incapable of proof, and indeed improbable in themselves; secondly, by the consideration that such an analysis of the diaconal gift would be out of due place, after mention had been already made of the *διακονία* as a whole; and thirdly, by the consideration that the position of the *προϊστάμενος*, as the *presbyter*, between two

diaconal functions, and almost at the end of the series, would be unsuitable. But if we should wish to explain *προϊστάμ.* as *guardian of the strangers* (my first edition; Borger), there is an utter want of proof both for this particular feature of the *diaconia* and for its designation by *προϊστάμ.* (for the *προστάτης* at Athens, the patron of the *metocci*, was something quite different; Hermann, *Staatsalterth.* § 115. 4). — *ὁ μεταδιδούς*] *he who imparts*, who exercises the *charisma* of charitableness by imparting of his means to the poor. Eph. iv. 28; Luke iii. 11. To understand the imparting of *spiritual* good (Baumgarten-Crusius), or this *along with* the other (Hofmann), receives no support from the context, especially seeing that the spiritual imparting has already been previously disposed of in its distinctive forms. — *ἐν ἀπλότητι*] *in simplicity*, therefore without any selfishness, without boasting, secondary designs, etc., but in plain sincerity of disposition. Comp. 2 Cor. viii. 2, ix. 11, 13, and the classical collocations of *ἀπλοῦς καὶ ἀληθής, ἀπλ. κ. γενναῖος κ.τ.λ.* On the subject-matter, comp. Matt. vi. 2 ff. — *ὁ προϊστάμενος*] *the president*, he who exercises the *χάρισμα* of presiding over others as leader, of directing affairs and the like (comp. *προϊστασθαι τῶν πραγμάτων*, Herodian, vii. 10. 16), consequently one who through spiritual endowment is *ἡγεμονικὸς καὶ ἀρχικὸς* (Plato, *Prot.* p. 352 B). This *χάρισμα προστατικόν* had to be possessed by the presbyter or *ἐπίσκοπος* for behoof of his work (comp. 1 Cor. xii. 28); but we are not to understand it as applying to him exclusively, or to explain it specially of the office of presbyter, as Rothe and Philippi again do,<sup>1</sup> in spite of the general nature of the context, while Hofmann likewise thinks that the presbyter is meant, not as respects his *office*, but as respects his *activity*. What is meant is the *category* of charismatic endowment, under which the work destined for the presbyter falls to be *included*. — *ἐν σπουδῇ*] *with zeal*; it is the earnest, strenuous attention to the fulfilment of duty, the opposite of *φαιδρότης*. — *ὁ ἐλεῶν*] *he who is merciful* towards the suffering and unfortunate, to whom it is his *χάρισμα* to administer comfort, counsel, help. — *ἐν ἰλαρότι*]

<sup>1</sup> So also Jul. Müller, *Dogmat. Abh.* p. 582.

with cheerful, friendly demeanour, 2 Cor. ix. 7, the opposite of a reluctant and sullen carriage. Comp. Xen. *Mem.* ii. 7. 12: *ίλαραὶ δὲ ἀντὶ σκυθρωπῶν*. — Observe, further, that *ἐν ἀπλότ.*, *ἐν σπουδῇ*, and *ἐν ἰλαρότ.* do not denote, like the preceding definitions with *ἐν*, the *sphere* of service *within* which the activity is to exert itself, but the *quality*, with which those who are gifted are to do their work; and all these three qualities characterize, in like manner, the nature of true *σωφρονεῖν*, ver. 3.

Vv. 9–21. *Exhortations for all without distinction*, headed by *love*!

Ver. 9. *Ἡ ἀγάπη ἀνυπόκρ.*] *sc. ἔστω*. The supplying of the imperative (comp. ver. 7), which is rare in the classical writers (Bernhardy, p. 331; Kühner, II. 1, p. 37), cannot occasion any scruple in this so briefly sketching hortatory address. *ἀνυπόκριτος* is not found in classical Greek, but it occurs in Wisd. v. 19, xviii. 16, 2 Cor. vi. 6, 1 Tim. i. 5, 2 Tim. i. 5, Jas. iii. 12, 1 Pet. i. 22. Antoninus, viii. 5, has the adverb, like Clem. Cor. II. 12. — The absolute *ἡ ἀγάπη* is always *love towards others* (see esp. 1 Cor. xiii.), of which *φιλαδελφία* is the special form having reference to Christian fellowship, ver. 10. As love must be, so must be also faith, its root, 1 Tim. i. 5; 2 Tim. i. 5. — The following participles and adjectives may be taken *either* together as preparing for the *εὐλογεῖτε τοὺς διώκ.* in ver. 14, and as dependent on this (Lachm. *ed. min.*); *or*, as corresponding to the personal subject of *ἡ ἀγάπη ἀνυπόκρ.* (so Fritzschke), see on 2 Cor. i. 7; *or*, finally, by the supplying of *ἔστέ* as mere precepts, so that after *ἀνυπόκρ.* there should be placed a full stop, and another after *διώκοντες* in ver. 13. So usually; also by Lachmann, *ed. maj.*, and Tischendorf. The latter view alone, after *ἡ ἀγάπη ἀνυπόκρ.* has been supplemented by the imperative of the substantive verb, is the natural one, and correspondent in its concise mode of expression to the whole character stamped on the passage; the two former modes of connection exhibit a formal interdependence on the part of elements that are heterogeneous in substance. — *ἀποστύγουντες*] *abhorring*. The *strengthening* significance of the compound, already noted by Chrysostom,

Theodoret, Occumenius, and Theophylact, has been groundlessly denied by Fritzsche; it is quite appropriate in passages like Herod. ii. 47, vi. 129; Soph. *Oed. C.* 186, 691; Eur. *Ion.* 488; Parthen. *Erot.* 8. — τὸ πονηρὸν and τῷ ἀγαθῷ are to be taken *generally* of moral evil and good; abhorrence of the one and adherence to the other form the fundamental moral character of unfeigned love. The evil and good which are found *in the object of love* (Hofmann) are included, but not *specially* meant. Comp. 1 Cor. xiii. 6.

Ver. 10. Τῇ φιλαδελφίᾳ] *In respect of* (in point of) *brotherly love* (love towards fellow-Christians, 1 Thess. iv. 9; Heb. xiii. 1; 1 Pet. i. 22; 2 Pet. i. 7). On its relation to ἀγάπη, comp. generally Gal. vi. 10. — φιλόστοργοι] *fondly affectionate*; an expression purposely chosen, because Christians are *brothers and sisters*, as the word is also in classical Greek the usual one for *family affection*. Comp. also Cicero, *ad Att.* xv. 17. — τῇ τιμῇ] in the point of moral respect and high estimation. — προηγούμενοι] not: *excelling* (Chrysostom, Morus, Köllner), nor yet: *anticipating* (Vulgate, Theophylact, Luther, Castalio, Wolf, Flatt), but, in correspondence with the signification of the word: *going before*, as *guides*, namely, with the conduct that incites others to follow. Without the support of usage Erasmus, Grotius, Heumann, Koppe, and Hofmann take προηγείσθαι as equivalent to ἡγείσθαι ὑπερέχοντας (Phil. ii. 3), *sc. ipso potiores ducere alios*, which would be denoted by ἡγείσθαι πρὸ ἑαυτῶν ἄλλ. (Phil. ii. 3). In Greek it does not elsewhere occur with the *accusative*, but only with the *dative* (Xen. *Cyr.* ii. 1. 1; Arist. *Plut.* 1195; Polyb. xii. 5. 10) or *genitive* of the *person* (Xen. *Hipp.* 4. 5; Herodian, vi. 8. 6.; Polyb. xii. 13. 11); with the *accusative* only, as in Xen. *Anab.* vi. 5. 10, προηγ. ὁδόν.

Ver. 11. Τῇ σπουδῇ] *in respect of zeal*, namely, for the interests of the Christian life in whatever relation. — τῷ πν. ζέοντες] *seething, boiling in spirit*, the opposite of ὀκνηροὶ τῇ σπουδῇ; hence τῷ πνεύμ. is not to be understood of the Holy Spirit (Occumenius and many others, including Holsten, Weiss), but of the *human* spirit. Comp. Acts xviii. 25. That this fervent excitement of the activity of thought,



feeling, and will for Christian aims is stirred up by the Holy Spirit, is obvious of itself, but is not of itself expressed by *τῷ πνεύματι*. *Ζέω* of the mental *aestuar*e is also frequent in the classics; Plato, *Rep.* iv. p. 440 C, *Phædr.* p. 251 B; *Soph. Oed. C.* 435; *Eur. Hec.* 1055; and *Pflugk in loc.* See also Jacobs, *ad Anthol.* IX. p. 203; Dorville, *ad Charit.* p. 233. — *τῷ καιρῷ δουλ.*] consigns—without, in view of the whole laying out of the discourse as dependent on *ἡ ἀγάπη ἀνυπόκρ.*, ver. 9, requiring a connective *δέ* (against van Hengel)—the fervour of spirit to the limits of Christian prudence, which, amidst its most lively activity, yet in conformity with true love, *accommodates itself to the circumstances of the time*,<sup>1</sup> with moral discretion does not aim at placing itself in independence of them or oppose them with headlong stubbornness, but submits to them with a wise self-denial (1 Cor. xiii. 4–8). Comp. on the *δουλ.* *τῷ καιρῷ* (*tempori servire*, Cicero, *ad Div.* ix. 17, *Tuscul.* iii. 27. 66) and synonymous expressions (*καιρῷ λατρεύειν, τοῖς καιρ. ἀκολουθεῖν*), which are used in a good or bad sense according to the context, Wetstein and Fritzsche *in loc.*; Jacobs, *ad Anthol.* X. p. 261. On the thing itself, see Cic. *ad Div.* iv. 6: “ad novos casus temporum novorum consiliorum rationes accommodare.”

Ver. 12. *In virtue of hope* (of the future *δόξα*, v. 2) *joyful*. The dative denotes the  *motive* (Kühner, II. i. p. 380). — *τῇ θλ. ὑπομ.*] *in the presence of tribulation holding out*, remaining constant in it. On the dative, comp. Kühner, *loc.* p. 385. Paul might have written *τὴν θλίψιν ὑπομ.* (1 Cor. xiii. 7; 2 Tim. ii. 19; Heb. x. 32, *et al.*, and according to the classical use); he writes, however, in the line of formal symmetry with the other expressions, the dative and then the *absolute ὑπομέν.* (Matt. x. 22; 2 Tim. ii. 12; Jas. v. 11; 1 Pet. ii. 20). — *τ. προσευχῇ προσκ.*] *perseveringly applying to prayer*, Col. iv. 2; Acts i. 14.

Ver. 13. *Having fellowship in the necessities*<sup>2</sup> *of the saints*

<sup>1</sup> How much was Paul himself in this matter, with all his fervour of spirit, a shining model! 1 Cor. ix. 19 ff.; Phil. iv. 12, 13; 1 Cor. iv. 11 ff., viii. 13; Acts xx. 35, xvi. 3, xxi. 23 ff. To the *δουλεύειν τῷ καιρῷ*, in the noble sense here meant, belongs also the having as though one had not, etc., in 1 Cor. vii. 29 ff.

<sup>2</sup> The reading *μνίσαις* yields no sense, although Hofmann commends it and

(comp. xv. 27), *i.e.* so conducting yourselves that the necessities of your fellow-Christians may be also your own, seeking therefore just so to satisfy them. Comp. on Phil. iv. 14. The *transitive* sense: *communicating* (still held by Rückert and Fritzsche, following many of the older interpreters), finds nowhere, at least in the N. T., any confirmation (not even in Gal. vi. 6). The ἅγιοι are the *Christians* in general, not specially those of Jerusalem (Hofmann), who are indicated in xv. 25, but not here, by the *context*. — τὴν φιλοξ.] studying *hospitality*. Comp. Heb. xiii. 3; 1 Pet. iv. 9. A virtue highly important at that time, especially in the case of travelling, perhaps banished and persecuted, Christian brethren. Comp. also 1 Tim. v. 10; Tit. i. 8. That those in need of shelter should not merely be received, but also *sought out*, belongs, under certain circumstances, to the *fulfilment* of this duty, but is not expressed by διώκοντες (as Origen and Bengel hold). Comp. ix. 30; ἀρετὴν διώκειν, Plato, *Theact.* p. 176 B; τὸ ἀγαθὸν διώκειν and the like, Ecclus. xxvii. 8, *et al.*; ἀδικίαν διώκειν, Plat. *Rep.* p. 545 B.

Ver. 14. Τοὺς διώκ. ὑμ.] *who persecute you* (in any respect whatever). The saying of Christ, Matt. v. 44, was perhaps known to the apostle and here came to his recollection, without his having read however, as Reiche here again assumes (comp. on ii. 19), the Gospels.

Ver. 15. Χαίρειν] *i.e.* χαίρειν ὑμᾶς δεῖ, *infinitive*, as a briefly interjected expression of the necessary behaviour desired. See on Phil. iii. 16. On the subject-matter, comp. Ecclus. vii. 34. Rightly Chrysostom brings into prominence the fact that κλαίειν κ.τ.λ., γενναίας σφόδρα δεῖται ψυχῆς, ὥστε τῷ εὐδοκιοῦντι μὴ μόνον μὴ φθονεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ συνήδεσθαι.

Ver. 16. These participles are also to be understood imperatively by supplying ἔσεσθε (comp. on ver. 9), and not to be joined to ver. 15, nor yet to μὴ γίνεσθε φρόν. παρ' ἑαυτ. — τὸ

seeks to acquire for it, by a comparison of Gal. ii. 10 and Phil. i. 4, the sense of *renderings of assistance*, which is a linguistic impossibility. Yet even Theodore of Mopsuestia wished to assign to this reading, which is found in some copies, the sense: ὅτι δίκαιον ὑμᾶς μνημονεύειν πάντοτε τῶν ἁγίων.

αὐτὸ εἰς ἄλλ. φρονοῦντες] characterizes the loving *harmony*, when each, in respect to his neighbour (εἰς, not ἐν as in xv. 5), has one and the same thought and endeavour. Comp. generally xv. 5; Phil. ii. 2, iv. 2; 2 Cor. xiii. 11. According to Fritzsche, τὸ αὐτό refers to *what follows*, so that *modesty* is meant as that towards which their mind should be mutually directed. But thus this clause of the discourse would not be *independent*, which is contrary to the analogy of the rest. — μὴ τὰ ὑψηλὰ φρονοῦντες] *not aiming at high things*,—a warning against ambitious self-seeking. Comp. xi. 20; 1 Tim. vi. 7. — τοῖς ταπεινοῖς] is *neutral* (Fritzsche, Reiche, Köllner, Glöckler, de Wette, Baumgarten-Crusius, Borger, Reithmayr, Philippi, Maier, Bisping, following Beza and Calvin): *being drawn onward by the lowly*; *i.e.* instead of following the impulse to high things, rather yielding to that which is humble, to the claims and tasks which are presented to you by the humbler relations of life, entering into this impulse towards the lower strata and spheres of life, which lays claim to you, and following it. The ταπεινά ought to have for the Christian a force of attraction, in virtue of which he yields himself to fellowship with them (συν), and allows himself to be guided by them in the determination of his conduct. Thus the Christian holds intercourse, sympathetically and effectively, in the lower circles, with the poor, sick, persecuted, etc.; thus Paul felt himself compelled to enter into humble situations, to work as a handicraftsman, to suffer need and nakedness, to be weak with the weak, etc. With less probability, on account of the contrast of τὰ ὑψηλά, others have taken τοῖς ταπειν. as *masculine*,—some of them understanding ταπεινός of *inferior rank*, some of *humble disposition*, some blending both meanings—with very different definitions of the sense of the whole, *e.g.* Chrys.: εἰς τὴν ἐκείνων εὐτέλειαν κατὰβηθι, συμπεριφέρου, μὴ ἀπλῶς τῷ φρονήματι συνταπεινοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ βοήθει καὶ χεῖρα ὀρέγου κ.τ.λ.; similarly Erasmus, Luther, Estius, and others; Grotius (comp. Ewald): “modestissimorum exempla sectantes;” Rückert (comp. van Hengel): “let it please you to remain in fellowship with the lowly;” Olshausen: Christianity enjoins intercourse with publicans and sinners in order to

gain them for the kingdom of Christ;<sup>1</sup> Hofmann: "to be drawn into the host of those who occupy an inferior station and desire nothing else, and, as their equals, disappearing amongst them, to move with them along the way in which they go." — *συναπαγ.*] has not in itself, nor has it here, the bad sense: *to be led astray along with*, which it acquires in Gal. ii. 13, 2 Pet. iii. 17, *through the context*. — *φρόνιμοι παρ' ἑαυτ.*] *wise according to your own judgment*. Comp. Prov. iii. 7; Bernhardt, p. 256 f. One must not fall into that conceited *self-sufficiency of moral perception*, whereby brotherly respect for the perception of others would be excluded. Similar, but not equivalent, is *ἐν ἑαυτ.*, xi. 25.

Vv. 17–19. The *participles*—to be supplemented here as in ver. 16—are not to be connected with *μὴ γίνεσθε φρόν. παρ' ἑαυτ.* — *μηδενί*] be he Christian or non-Christian. Opposite: *πάντων ἀνθρώπων*. The maxim itself taught also by Greek sages, how opposed it was to the *ἀδικεῖν τῷ ἀδικοῦντι* of common Hellenism (Hermann, *ad Soph. Philoct.* 679; Jacobs, *ad Delect. Epigr.* p. 144; Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Crit.* p. 49 B, *ad Philob.* p. 49 D) and to Pharisaism (see on Matt. v. 43)! — *προνοούμενοι*] reminiscence from the LXX., Prov. iii. 4. For this very reason, but especially because otherwise an entirely unsuitable limitation of the absolute moral notion of *καλά* would result, *ἐνώπιον κ.τ.λ.* is not to be joined to *καλά* (Ewald, Hofmann); it belongs to *προνοοῦμ.* Comp. 2 Cor. viii. 21; Polycarp, *ad Phil.* 6. *Before the eyes of all men*—so that it lies before the judgment of all—*taking care for what is good* (morality and decency in behaviour). Verbs of caring are used both with the *genitive* (1 Tim. v. 8) and with the *accusative* (Bernhardt, p. 176), which in the classics also is very frequently found with *προνοεῖσθαι*. Rightly Theophylact remarks on *ἐνώπ. πάντων ἀνθρ.* that Paul does not thereby exhort us to live *πρὸς κενοδοξίαν*, but *ἵνα μὴ παρέχωμεν καθ' ἡμῶν ἀφορμὰς τοῖς βουλομένοις*, he recommends that which is *ἀσκανδάλιστον κ. ἀπρόσκοπον*. — *εἰ δυνατόν, τὸ ἐξ ὑμῶν μετὰ κ.τ.λ.*] to be so punctuated. For if the two were to be

<sup>1</sup> Certainly not here, for the discourse concerns the relations of Christians to one another (not to those who are without).

joined together ("as much as it is possible for you," Glöckler), the injunction would lose all moral character. Still less are we to suppose that εἰ δυνατόν belongs to the preceding (Erasmus, Cajetanus, Bengel), which indeed admits of no condition. Grotius' view is the correct one: "omnium amici este, si fieri potest; si non potest utrimque, certe ex vestra parte amici este," so that εἰ δυνατόν allows the case of *objective* impossibility to avail (how often had Paul himself experienced this!); τὸ ἐξ ὑμῶν (adverbially: *as to what concerns your part*, that which proceeds from you; see generally on i. 15, and Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* II. p. 225) *annuls* any limitation in a subjective respect, and does not *contain* a subjective limitation (Reiche), since we for our part are supposed to be *always and in any case* peaceably disposed, so that only the opposite disposition and mode of behaviour of the enemy can frustrate our subjective peaceableness. — ἀγαπητοί] urgent and persuasive. Comp. 1 Cor. x. 14, xv. 58; Phil. ii. 1, iv. 1. — ἀλλὰ δότε κ.τ.λ.] The construction changes, giving place to a stronger (independent) designation of duty. See Winer, p. 535 [E. T. 720]. Comp. here especially Viger. *ed. Herm.* p. 469. *Give place to wrath* (κατ' ἐξοχήν, that of God), i.e. forestall it not by personal revenge, but *let it have its course and its sway*.<sup>1</sup> The morality of this precept is based on the holiness of God; hence, so far as wrath and love are the two poles of holiness, it does not exclude the blessing of our adversaries (ver. 14) and intercession for them. The view, according to which τῇ ὀργῇ is referred to the *divine* wrath (comp. v. 9; 1 Thess. ii. 16)—as the absolute ἡ χάρις is the *divine* favour and grace (comp. v. 9; 1 Thess. i. 10, ii. 16)—is rightly preferred by most interpreters from the time of Chrysostom down to van Hengel, Hofmann, Delitzsch; for, on the one hand, it corresponds entirely to the profane (Gataker, *ad Anton.* p. 104; Wetstein *in loc.*) and Pauline (Eph. iv. 27) use of τόπον (or χώραν) διδόναι—which primarily denotes to *make place for any one* (Luke

<sup>1</sup> Quite analogous to the sense and sequence of thought of our verse is *Synops. Schar*, p. 95: "*Homo non debet properare, ut vindictamumat* (comp. μὴ αὐτοῦς ἐκδικεῖντες); *melius est, si vindictam committit alii*" (Deo), comp. ἀλλὰ δότε τόπον. τῇ ὀργῇ.

xiv. 9), then to *give any one full play, time and opportunity for activity* (Eph. *l.c.*, comp. Eccus. xiii. 21, xix. 17, xxxviii. 12, xvi. 14; Philo in Loesner, p. 263); and on the other hand it is most appropriate to the following scriptural proof.<sup>1</sup> Non-compliance with the precept occasions the ὀργίζεσθαι καὶ ἁμαρτάνειν, Eph. iv. 26. Comp. on the thought 1 Pet. ii. 23; 1 Sam. xxiv. 13, 16. Others interpret it of *one's own* wrath,<sup>2</sup> which is not to be allowed to break forth. So de Dieu, Bos, Sessler, Cramer, and Reiche: "Wrath produces terrible effects in the moment of its ebullition; give it time, and it passes away." The *Latin* use<sup>3</sup> of *irac spatium dare* agrees indeed with this interpretation, but not the *Greek* use of τόπον δίδοναι—not even in the well-known expression in Plutarch (*de ira colūb.* p. 462) that we should not even in sport δίδοναι τόπον to anger, *i.e.* give it full play, allow it free course. Since this "*giving way to wrath*" (justly repudiated by Plutarch as highly dangerous) cannot be enjoined by Paul, he must have meant by τ. ὀργῇ the *divine* wrath. For the interpretation given by others of the wrath of an enemy, which one is to give place to, to go out of the way of (Schoettgen, Morus, Ammon), must be rejected, since this, although it may be linguistically justified (Luke xiv. 9; Judg. xx. 36), and may be compared with Soph. *Ant.* 718 (see Schneidewin *in loc.*) and with the Homeric εἵκειν θυμῷ, yet would yield a precept, which would be only a rule of prudence and not a command of Christian morals. This applies also in opposition to Ewald: to allow the wrath of the other to expend itself, which, as opposed to personal

<sup>1</sup> Yet it must be admitted, that either of the two other explanations (see below) would not be opposed to the sense of the following passage of Scripture, if only one of them were otherwise decidedly correct.

<sup>2</sup> So Zyro in a peculiar manner in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1845, p. 891 f.: "Give place to wrath, when it comes and seeks to get possession of your mind, and go from it (*turn your back upon it*)." This would be psychologically inappropriate (for wrath is in man, an emotion which indeed is stirred up from without, but does not come thence, comp. Eph. iv. 31; Col. iii. 8; John xi. 33, 38), and at the same time how strange in point of expression!

<sup>3</sup> Livy ii. 56, viii. 32; Seneca, *de ira*, iii. 39. Comp. especially Lactantius, *de Ira*, 18: "Ego vero laudarem, si, cum fuisset iratus, dedisset irae suae spatium, ut, residente per intervallum temporis animi tumore, haberet modum castigatio."

revenge, has no positive moral character (it is otherwise with Matt. v. 39); not to mention that the injury, the personal avenging of which is forbidden, by no means necessarily supposes a *wrathful* offender. — γέγρ. γάρ] Deut. xxxii. 35, freely as regards the sense, from the Hebrew (*to me belongs revenge and requital*), but with use of the words of the LXX., which depart from the original (ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ἐκδικήσεως ἀνταποδώσω), and with the addition of λέγει κύριος. The form of this citation, quite similar to that here used, which is found in Heb. x. 30, cannot be accidental, especially as the characteristic ἐγὼ ἀνταποδ. recurs also in the paraphrase of Onkelos (אֲנִי נִשְׁכָּנִי). But there are no traces elsewhere to make us assume that Paul made use of Onkelos; and just as little has the view any support elsewhere, that the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews followed the citation of Paul (Bleek, Delitzsch). Hence the only hypothesis which we can form without arbitrariness is, that the form of the saying as it is found in Paul and in Heb. x. 30 had at that time acquired currency in the manner of a formula of warning which had become proverbial, and had influenced the rendering in the paraphrase of Onkelos. The λέγει κύριος Paul has simply added, as was frequently done (comp. xiv. 11) with divine utterances; in Heb. x. 30 these words are not genuine.

Ver. 20. Without οὖν (see the critical notes), but thus the more in conformity with the mode of expression throughout the whole chapter, which proceeds for the most part without connectives, there now follows what the Christian—seeing that he is not to avenge himself, but to let God's wrath have its way—has rather to do in respect of his enemy.—The whole verse is borrowed from Prov. xxv. 21, 22, which words Paul adopts as his own, closely from the LXX. — ψώμιζε] *feed* him, give him to eat. See on 1 Cor. xiii. 1; Grimm on Wisd. xvi. 20. The expression is affectionate. Comp. 2 Sam. xiii. 5; Bengel: “manu tua.” Ecclus. vii. 32 — ἀνθρακας πυρὸς σωρεύς. ἐπὶ τὴν κεφ. αὐτοῦ] figurative expression of the thought: *painful shame and remorse wilt thou prepare for him*. So, in substance, Origen, Augustine, Jerome, Ambrosiaster, Pelagius, Erasmus, Luther, Wolf, Bengel, and others,

including Tholuck, Baumgarten-Crusius, Rückert, Reiche, Köllner, de Wette, Olshausen, Fritzsche, Philippi, Reithmayr, Bisping, Borger, van Hengel, Hofmann; comp. Linder in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1862, p. 568 f. Glowing coals are to the Oriental a figure for *pain that penetrates and cleaves to one*,<sup>1</sup> and in particular, according to the context, for *the pain of remorse*, as here, where magnanimous beneficence heaps up the coals of fire. Comp. on the subject-matter, 1 Sam. xxiv. 17 ff. See the Arabic parallels in Gesenius in Rosenmüller's *Report.* I. p. 140, and generally Tholuck *in loc.*; Gesenius, *Thesaur.* I. p. 280. Another view was already prevalent in the time of Jerome,<sup>2</sup> and is adopted by Chrysostom, Theodoret, Oecumenius, Theophylact, Photius, Beza, Camerarius, Estius, Grotius, Wetstein, and others, including Koppe, Böhme, Hengstenberg (*Authent. d. Pentat.* II. p. 406 f.),—namely, that the sense is: *Thou wilt bring upon him severe divine punishment.* Certainly at 4 Esr. xvi. 54 the burning of fiery coals on the head is an image of painful divine punishment; but there this view is just as certainly suggested *by the context*, as here (see esp. ver. 21) and in Prov. *l.c.*, the context is *opposed to it*. For the condition *nisi recipiscat* would have, in the first place, to be quite arbitrarily supplied; and how could Paul have conceived and expressed so *unchristian a motive* for beneficence towards enemies!<sup>3</sup> The saving clauses of expositors regarding this point are fanciful and quite unsatisfactory.

Ver. 21. Comprehensive summary of vv. 19, 20.—“*Be not overcome* (carried away to revenge and retaliation) *by evil* (which is committed against thee), *but overcome by the good* (which thou showest to thine enemy) the evil,” bringing about the result

<sup>1</sup> Not for *softening* (from the custom of softening hard meats by laying coals upon the vessel), as Glückler, following Vorstius and others, thinks, nor for *inflaming to love* (Calovius and others). The Jesuit Sanctius (see Cornelius a Lapide *in loc.*) even found in the figure an indication of the *blush of shame*. So again Umbreit, p. 353; comp. also van Hengel.

<sup>2</sup> “*Carbones igitur congregabis super caput ejus, non in maledictum et condemnationem, ut plerique existimant, sed in correctionem et poenitudinem,*” Jerome.

<sup>3</sup> Augustine, *Propos.* 71: “*Quomodo quisquam diligit eum, cui propterea cibum et potum dat, ut carbones ignis congerat super caput ejus, si carbones ignis hoc loco aliquem gravem poenam significant?*”



that the enemy, put to shame by thy noble spirit, ceases to act malignantly against thee and becomes thy friend. "Vincit malos pertinax bonitas," Seneca, *de benef.* vii. 31. Comp. *de ira*, ii. 32 ; Valer. Max. iv. 2, 4. On the other hand, Soph. *El.* 308 f. : ἐν τοῖς κακοῖς | Πολλή 'στ' ἀνάγκη κἀπιτηδεύειν κακά. We may add the appropriate remark of Erasmus on the style of expression throughout the chapter : "*Comparibus membris et incisiss, similiter cadentibus ac desinentibus sic totus sermo modulatus est, ut nulla cantio possit esse jucundior.*"

## CHAPTER XIII.

Ver. 1. ἀπὸ] Lachm. and Tisch. 8: ὑπὸ, which Griesb. also approved, according to preponderant evidence. But ἀπὸ also retains considerable attestation (D\* E\* F G, min., Or. Theodoret, Dam.), and may easily have been displaced by a ὑπὸ written on the margin from the following. After εἰσας Elz. has ἐξουσία, which, according to a preponderance of evidence, has been justly omitted since Griesb. as a supplement; and τοῦ also before the following Θεοῦ is too feebly attested. — Ver. 3. τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἔργῳ, ἀλλὰ τῷ κακῷ] commended by Griesb., adopted by Lachm., Tisch., Fritzsche, according to A B D\* E F G P 8, 6. 67\*\*, several vss., and Fathers. But Elz., Matth., Scholz have τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔργων, ἀλλὰ τῶν κακῶν. A presumed emendation in case and number. — Ver. 5. ἀνάγκη ὑποτάσσεσθαι] D E F G, Goth. It. Guelph. Ir. have merely ὑποτάσσεσθαι. Commended by Griesb. A marginal gloss, as the reading ἀνάγκη (or ἀνάγκη) ὑποτάσσεσθαι (Lect. 7, 8, Aug., Beda, Vulg.: *necessitate subtili estote*; so Luther) plainly shows. — Ver. 7. οὖν] is wanting in A B D\* 8\*, 67\*\*, Copt. Sahid. Vulg. ms. Tol. Damasc. Cypr. Aug. Ruf. Cassiod. Omitted by Lachm., Tisch., Fritzsche. Rightly; for there was no ground for its omission, whereas by its insertion the logical connection was established. — Ver. 9. After καὶ ψεῦδες Elz. has οὐ ψευδομαρτυρήσεις, against decisive evidence. Inserted with a view to completeness. — ἐν τῷ] bracketed by Lachm., is wanting in B F G, Vulg. It. and Latin Fathers. But its striking appearance of superfluousness might so readily prompt its omission, that this evidence is too weak. — Ver. 11. The order ἡδὴ ἡμᾶς is decisively supported. So rightly Lachm. and Tisch. 8. Yet the latter has instead of ἡμᾶς: ὑμᾶς, according to A B C P 8\*, min. Clem., which, however, appeared more suitable to εἰδοότες and more worthy of the apostle. — Ver. 12. καὶ ἐδόξα.] Lachm. and Tisch.: ἐδόξα. ὅτι, which also Griesb. approved, according to important witnesses; but it would be very readily suggested by the preceding adversative connection.

Vv. 1-7.<sup>1</sup> The proud love of freedom of the Jews (see on John viii. 33; Matt. xxii. 17), and their tumultuary spirit thereby excited, which was peculiarly ardent from the time of Judas Gaulonites (see Acts v. 37; Josephus, *Ant.* xviii. 1. 1) and had shortly before broken out in Rome itself (Suetonius, *Claud.* 25; Dio Cassius, lx. 6; see *Introd.* § 2, and on Acts xviii. 2), redoubled for the Christians—among whom, indeed, even the Gentile-Christians might easily enough be led astray by the Messianic ideas (theocracy, kingdom of Christ, freedom and *κληρονομία* of believers, etc.) into perverted thoughts of freedom and desires for emancipation (comp. 1 Cor. vi. 1 ff.)—the necessity of civil obedience, seeing that they, as confessing the Messiah (Acts xvii. 6, 7), and regarded by the Gentiles as a Jewish sect, were much exposed to the suspicion of revolutionary enterprise. The danger thus lay, not indeed exclusively (Mangold, Beyschlag), but *primarily* and *mostly*, on the side of the Jewish-Christians, not on that of the Gentile-Christians, as Th. Schott, in the interest of the view that Paul desired to prepare the Roman church to be the base of operations of his western mission to the Gentiles, unhistorically assumes. And was not *Rome*, the very seat of the government of the world, just the place above all others where that danger was greatest, and where nevertheless the whole Christian body, of the Jewish as well as of the Gentile section, had to distinguish itself by exemplary civil order? Hence we have here the—in the Pauline epistles unique—*detailed and emphatic inculcation of obedience towards the magistracy*, introduced without link of connection with what precedes as a *new* subject.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For good practical observations on this passage, see Harless, *Staat u. Kirche*, 1870.

<sup>2</sup> It is vain to seek for connections, when Paul himself indicates none. Thus, e.g., we are not to say that the mention of *private* injuries leads him to speak of behaviour towards the heathen *magistracy* (Tholuck and older expositors). He does not in fact represent the latter as hostile. Arbitrarily also Th. Schott (comp. Borger) thinks that the discourse passes from subordination under God, to whom belongs vengeance, to subordination under the executors of the divine *ἐξδίκησις*. As though Paul in xii. 19 could have thought of *such* an *ἐξδίκησις*! Just as arbitrary, without any hint in the text, is the view of Hofmann: Paul makes the transition from the social life of *men* in general to their conduct in *political* organization, *which also belongs to the good, wherewith one is to overcome the evil*.

Baur, I. p. 384 f., thinks that Paul is here combating *Ebionitic dualism*, which regarded the secular magistrate as of non-divine, *devilish* origin. As if Paul could not, without any such antithesis, have held it to be necessary to inculcate upon the Romans the divine right of the state-authority! Moreover, he would certainly not merely have kept his eye upon that dualism in regard to its practical manifestations (Baur's subterfuge), but would have combated it in *principle*, and thereby have grasped it at the root.—The partial resemblance, moreover, which exists between vv. 1-4 and 1 Pet. ii. 13, 14 is not sufficient to enable us to assume that Peter made use of our passage, or that Paul made use of Peter's epistle; a view, which has been lately maintained especially by Weiss, *Petrin. Lehrbegr.* p. 416 ff., and in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1865, 4; see, on the other hand, Huther on 1 Pet. *Introd.* § 2. Paul doubtless frequently preached a similar doctrine orally respecting duty towards the heathen magistracy. And the power of his preaching was sufficiently influential in moulding the earliest ecclesiastical language, to lead even a Peter, especially on so *peculiar* a subject, involuntarily to echo the words of Paul which had vibrated through the whole church. Compare the creative influence of Luther upon the language of the church.

Ver. 1. *Πᾶσα ψυχῇ*] In the sense of *every man*, but (comp. on ii. 9) of man conceived in reference to his soul-nature, in virtue of which he consciously feels pleasure and displeasure (rejoices, is troubled, etc.), and cherishes corresponding impulses. There lies a certain *pathos* in the significant: *every soul*, which at once brings into prominence the *universality* of the duty. Comp. Acts ii. 43, iii. 23; Rev. xvi. 3. — *ἐξουσίαις ὑπερεχ.*] *magistrates high in standing* (without the article). *ὑπερεχ.* (see Wisd. vi. 5; 1 Pet. ii. 13; 1 Tim. ii. 2; 2 Macc. iii. 11) is added, in order to set forth the *ὑποτάσσ.* — *ὑπέρ* and *ὑπό* being correlative—as corresponding to the standpoint of the magistracy itself (comp. the German: *hohe Obrigkeiten*); the *notion* of obedience follows.—*There is no magistracy apart from God* expresses in general the *proceeding of all magistracy whatever from God*, and then this relation is still more precisely defined, in respect of those magistracies which exist in *concreto* as

a *divine institution*, by ὑπὸ Θεοῦ τεταγμ. εἰσίν; comp. Hom. *Il.* ii. 204 ff., ix. 38, 98; Soph. *Phil.* 140, *et al.*; Xen. *Rep. Lac.* 15. 2. Thus Paul has certainly expressed the *divine right* of magistracy, which Christian princes especially designate by the expression “by the grace of God” (since the time of Louis the Pious). And αἱ δὲ οὐσαι, *the extant*, actually *existing*, allows no exception, such as that possibly of tyrants or usurpers (in opposition to Reiche). The Christian, according to Paul, ought to regard any magistracy whatever, provided its rule over him subsists *de facto*, as divinely ordained, since it has not come into existence without the operation of God’s will; and this applies also to tyrannical or usurped power, although such a power, in the counsel of God, is perhaps destined merely to be temporary and transitional. From this point of view, the Christian obeys not the human caprice and injustice, but the will of God, who—in connection with His plan of government inaccessible to human insight—has presented even the unworthy and unrighteous ruler as the οὐσα ἐξουσία, and has made him the instrument of His measures. Questions as to special cases—such as how the Christian is to conduct himself in political catastrophes, what magistracy he is to look upon in such times as the οὐσα ἐξουσία, as also, how he, if the command of the magistrate is against the command of God, is at any rate to obey God rather than men (Acts v. 29), etc.—Paul here leaves unnoticed, and only gives the main injunction of obedience, which he does not make contingent on this or that form of constitution.<sup>1</sup> By no means, however, are we to think only of the magisterial *office* as instituted by God (Chrysostom, Occumenius, and others), but rather of the magistracy in its concrete persons and members as the bearers of the divinely-ordained office. Comp. οἱ ἄρχοντες, ver. 3, and vv. 4, 6, 7; Dion. Hal. *Antt.* xi. 32; Plut. *Philop.* 17; Tit. iii. 1; also *Martyr. Polyc.* 10.—Observe, moreover, that Paul has in view Gentile magistrates *in concreto*; consequently he could not speak more specially of that which *Christian* magistrates have *on their part* to do, and which Christian subjects in their duty of obedience for God and right’s sake are to *expect* and to

<sup>1</sup> Comp. Jul. Müller, *dogmat. Abh.* p. 651.

require from them, although he expresses in general—by repeatedly bringing forward the fact that magistrates are the servants of God (vv. 3, 4), indeed *ministering servants* of God (ver. 6)—the point of view from which the distinctively Christian judgment as to the duties and rights of magistrate and subject respectively must proceed.

Ver. 2. [Ὡστε] Since it is instituted by God. — ὁ ἀντιτασσ.] Note the correlation of ἀντιτασσ., ὑποτασσ., and τεταγμ. The latter stands in the middle.—ἐαυτοῖς] *Dativus incommodi*: their resistance to the divinely-ordained magistracy will issue in *their own self-destruction*; comp. ii. 5; 1 Cor. xi. 29. According to Hofmann (who in his *Schriftbew.* II. 2, p. 443, even imported a contrast to τῷ κυρίῳ, as in xiv. 6, 7), ἐαυτοῖς is to be viewed as in contrast to the *Christian body as such*; the punishment to be suffered is a judgment which lights on the doers *personally*, and is not put to the account of their *Christian standing*. This explanation (“*they have to ascribe the punishment to themselves solely*”) is incorrect, because it obtrudes on the text a purely fictitious antithesis, and because the apostle lays down the relation to the magistracy quite *generally*, not from the *specific point of view* of *Christian standing*, according to which his readers might perhaps have supposed that they had become foreign to the political commonwealth. Had this comprehensive error in principle been here in Paul’s view, in how entirely different a way must he have expressed what he intended than by the single expression ἐαυτοῖς, into which, moreover, that alleged thought would have first to be imported! — κρίμα] *a judgment*, is understood of itself, according to the connection, as a *penal judgment*. Comp. ii. 2, 3, iii. 8; 1 Cor. xi. 29; Gal. v. 10; Mark xii. 40. *From whom* they will receive it, is decided by the fact that with οἱ δὲ ἀνθεστηκότες, according to the context, τῇ τοῦ Θεοῦ διαταγῇ is again to be supplied. It is therefore a *penal judgment of God*, as the *executors* of which, however, the ἄρχοντες are conceived, as ver. 3 proves. Consequently the passage does not relate to *eternal* punishment (Reiche and others), but to the *temporal* punishment which God causes to be inflicted by means of the magistrates. Philippi prefers to leave κρίμα without more special definition (comp.

also Rückert) ; but against this is the consideration, that ver. 3 can only arbitrarily be taken otherwise than as assigning the ground of what immediately precedes.

Ver. 3. Οἱ γὰρ . . . κακῶ] Ground assigned for *ἐαυτοῖς κρῖμα λήψονται*.<sup>1</sup> — τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἔργῳ] *The good work and the evil work*<sup>2</sup> are personified. We are not here to compare ii. 7 or ii. 15 (Reiche, de Wette). — φόβος] *a terror*, i.e. *formidandi*. For examples of the same use, see Kypke, II. p. 183. Comp. Lobeck, *Paralip.* p. 513 ; just so the Latin *timor*, e.g. Propert. iii. 5. 40. — δέ] the simple *μεταβατικόν*. The proposition itself may be either *interrogatory* (Beza, Calvin, and others, including Lachmann, Tischendorf, Ewald, Hofmann), or as protasis in *categorical* form (see on 1 Cor. vii. 18, and Pflugk, *ad Eur. Med.* 386). So Luther and others, including Tholuck and Philippi. The former is more lively, the latter more appropriate and emphatic, and thus more in keeping with the whole character of the adjoining context. — ἔπαινον] *praise, testimony of approbation* (which the magistrate is wont to bestow ; see also Philo, *Vit. M.* i. p. 626 C) ; not any more than in ii. 29, 1 Cor. iv. 5, *reward* (Calvin, Loesner, and others). Grotius rightly remarks : “ Cum haec scriberet Paulus, non saeviebatur Romae in Christianos.” It was still the better time of Nero’s rule. But the proposition has a *general* validity, which is based on the divinely-ordained position of the magistracy, and is not annulled by their injustices in practice, which Paul had himself so copiously experienced. Comp. 1 Pet. ii. 14.

Ver. 4. Θεοῦ . . . ἀγαθόν] Establishment of the preceding

<sup>1</sup> For if resistance to the *ἐξουσία* were not to draw the divine punishment after it, the relative position of rulers and subjects would necessarily be such, that in *good* behaviour people would have to stand in fear of them (which would in fact annul the divine ordinance) ; the converse, however, is the case with them, viz., they are a terror to *evil* deeds. The γὰρ consequently establishes neither, generally, the duty of obedience to the magistracy (Philippi), nor the sense imported by Hofmann into *ἐαυτοῖς*. If the bearers of magisterial power were a terror to *good* works, the maxim of resistance (to obey God rather than men) would assert its right, and we should have to say with Neoptolemus in Soph. *Philoct.* 1235 (1251) : *ἔν τῳ δικαίῳ τὸν σὸν οὐ παρβῶ φόβον*.

<sup>2</sup> Beyond the *work*, and to the *intention*, the prerogative of the magistrate does not extend. Comp. Harless *l.c.*

thought—that the well-doer has not to fear the magistrate, but to expect praise from him—by indicating the relation of the magistracy to *God*, whose servant (διάκονος, *feminine*, as in xvi. 1; Dem. 762. 4, and frequently) it is, and to the *subjects*, for whose benefit (defence, protection, blessing) it is so. The σοί is the ethical relation of the Θεοῦ διάκον. ἐστὶ, and εἰς τὸ ἀγαθόν adds the more precise definition. — οὐ γὰρ εἰκῇ] *for not without corresponding reason* (frequently so in classical Greek), but in order actually to use it, should the case require. — τὴν μάχαιρ. φορεῖ] What is meant is not the *dagger*, which the Roman emperors and the governing officials next to them were accustomed to wear as the token of their *jus vitae et necis* (Aurel. Vict. 13; Grotius and Wetstein *in loc.*); for μάχαιρα, although denoting *dagger* = παραξιφός in the classics (see Spitzner on Hom. *Il.* xviii. 597; Duncan, *Lxx.* ed. Rost, p. 715), means in the N. T. always *sword*, viii. 35, according to Xen. *r. eq.* xii. 11 (but comp. Krüger, Xen. *Anab.* i. 8. 7), differing by its curved form from the straight ξίφος; and also among the Greeks the *bearing of the sword* (Philostr. *Vit. Ap.* vii. 16) is expressly used to represent that power of the magistrates. They bore it themselves, and in solemn processions it was borne before them. See Wolf, *Cur.* On the distinction between φορέω (the continued habit of bearing) and φέρω, see Lobeck, *ad Phryg.* p. 585. — Θεοῦ γὰρ διάκ. κ.τ.λ.] ground assigned for the assurance οὐκ εἰκῇ τ. μ. φ., in which the previously expressed proposition is repeated with emphasis, and now its *penal* reference is appended. — ἔκδικος εἰς ὀργὴν κ.τ.λ.] *avenging* (1 Thess. iv. 6; Wisd. xii. 12; Eccles. xxx. 6; Hierodion, vii. 4. 10; Aristænet. i. 27) *in behalf of wrath* (for the execution of wrath) *for him who does evil*. This dative of reference is neither dependent on ἐστίν, the position of which is here different from the previous one (in opposition to Hofmann), nor on εἰς ὀργήν (Flatt); it belongs to ἔκδικος εἰς ὀργ. Εἰς ὀργήν is not “superfluous and cumbrous” (de Wette),<sup>1</sup> but strengthens the idea.—We may add that our passage proves (comp. Acts xxv. 11) that the abolition of the

<sup>1</sup> The same opinion gave rise to the omission of εἰς ὀργ. in D\* FG, 177. *et al.* Clar. Beern. And the fact that it is found in EN\* 1. 2. 4. *et al.* Chrys. Theo-



*right* of capital punishment deprives the magistracy of a power which is not merely given to it in the O. T., but is also decisively confirmed in the N. T., and which it (herein lies the sacred limitation and responsibility of this power) possesses as God's minister; on which account its application is to be upheld as a principle with reference to those cases in law, where the actual satisfaction of the divine Nemesis absolutely demands it, while at the same time the right of pardon is still to be kept open for all concrete cases. The character of being unchristian, of barbarism, etc., does not adhere to the *right itself*, but to its *abuse* in legislation and practice.

Ver. 5. The *necessity* of obedience is of such a character, that it is not merely *externally* suggested (by reason of the punishment to be avoided), but is based also on *moral* grounds; and these two considerations are exhibited by *διό* as the result of all that has been hitherto said (vv. 1-4). It is clear, accordingly, that *ἀνάγκη* is not specially the *moral* necessity, but is to be taken generally, as it is only with the second *διά* that the *moral* side of the notion is brought forward. — *διὰ τὴν ὀργήν*] *on account of the magistrate's wrath*, ver. 4. — *διὰ τὴν συνείδ.*] *on account of one's own conscience*, *διὰ τὸ πληροῦν τὰ προσήκοντα*, Theodoret. It is with the Christian the *Christian* conscience, which as such is bound by God's ordinance. Hence 1 Pet. ii. 13: *διὰ τὸν κύριον*. Aptly Melanchthon: "Nulla potentia humana, nulli exercitus magis muniunt imperia, quam haec severissima lex Dei: necesse est obedire propter conscientiam." Both definitions given with *διά* belong, however, to *ἀνάγκη* (*sc. ἐστὶ*), which bears the emphasis, like Heb. ix. 23.

Ver. 6. *For on this account you pay taxes*—this is the *confirmation* of ver. 5, *from the actually subsisting payment of taxes*; *γάρ* retains its sense assigning a reason, and the emphatic *διὰ τοῦτο* (*from this ground*) is exactly in accordance with the context: *ὅτι οὐ μόνον διὰ τὴν ὀργήν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν συνείδησιν ἀνάγκη ἐστὶν ὑποτάσσεσθαι*. At the basis of the argument lies the view, that the existing relation of tax-paying is *a result of the necessity indicated in ver. 5*, and con-

doret, *before ἔκδικας*, which Rinek approves, is to be explained by an incorrect restoration of the dropped-out word.

sequently the confirmation of it. If διὰ τοῦτο be referred to vv. 1-4: "ut magistratus Dei mandatu homines maleficos puniant, proborum saluti prospiciant," Fritzsche (comp. Calvin, Tholuck, de Wette, Borger), ver. 5 is arbitrarily passed over. It follows, moreover, from our passage, that the *refusal of taxes* is the practical rejection of the necessity stated in ver. 5. Others take τελεῖτε as *imperative* (Heumann, Morus, Tholuck, Klee, Reiche, Köllner, Hofmann). Against this the γάρ, which might certainly be taken with the imperative (see on vi. 19), is not indeed decisive; but Paul himself gives by his οὖν, ver. 7, the plain indication that he is passing for the first time in ver. 7 to the language of summons, which he now also introduces, not with the present, but with the aorist. — καί] also denotes the *relation corresponding* to ver. 5. It is not "a downward climax" (Hofmann: "even this most external performance of subjection"), of which there is no indication at all either in the text or in the thing itself. The latter is, on the contrary, the immediate practical voucher most accordant with the experience of every subject. — τελεῖτε] Paul does not in this appeal to his readers' *own recognition* of what was said in ver. 5 (the summons in ver. 7 is opposed to this), but to what *subsists as matter of fact*. — λειτουργοὶ γὰρ Θεοῦ κ.τ.λ.] justifies the fundamental statement, expressed by διὰ τοῦτο, of the actual bearing of the payment of taxes: *for they are ministering servants of God, persevering in activity on this very behalf* (on no other). The thought in ver. 4, that the magistracy is Θεοῦ διάκονος, is here *by way of climax* more precisely defined through λειτουργοί (which is therefore *prefixed* with emphasis) according to the *official sacredness* of this relation of service, and that conformably to the *Christian view* of the magisterial calling. Accordingly, those who rule, in so far as they serve the divine counsel and will, and employ their strength and activity to this end, are to be regarded as persons whose administration has the character of a divinely consecrated *sacrificial service*, a *priestly nature* (xv. 16; Phil. ii. 17, *et al.*). This renders the proposition the more appropriate for confirmation of the διὰ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ., which is a specifically religious one. — λειτουργοὶ Θεοῦ] is predicate, and

the subject is understood of itself from the context: *they*, namely *magisterial persons* (οἱ ἄρχοντες). Incorrectly as regards linguistic usage, Reiche, Köllner, Olshausen take προσκαρτ. to be the subject, in which case certainly the article before the participle would be quite indispensable (Reiche erroneously appeals to Matt. xx. 16, xxii. 14). — εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο] *Telic* direction not of λειτουργγ. (Hofmann), but of προσκαρτ.: *for this very object*, by which is meant not the administration of *tax-paying* (Olshausen, Philippi, and older interpreters), but the just mentioned λειτουργεῖν τῷ Θεῷ, in which vocation, so characteristically *sacred*, the magistracy is continually and assiduously active, and the subject gives to it the means of being so, namely, taxes. Thus the payment of taxes is placed by Paul under the highest point of view of a religious conscientious duty, so that by means of it the divine vocation of the magistracy to provide a constantly active *sacrificial cultus* of God is promoted and facilitated. If εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο was to be referred to the administration of taxes, this would not indeed be “nonsensical” (Hofmann), but the emphatic mode of expression αὐτὸ τοῦτο would be without due motive, nor could we easily perceive why Paul should have selected the verb προσκαρτ., which expresses the moral notion *perseverare*. The reference of it to the nearest great thought, λειτουργοὶ κ.τ.λ., excludes, the more weighty and appropriate that it is, any other reference, even that of Hofmann, that αὐτὸ τοῦτο points back to the same proposition as διὰ τοῦτο.—Instead of εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο, Paul might have said αὐτῷ τούτῳ (xii. 12); he has, however, conceived προσκαρτ. absolutely, and given with εἰς the definition of its aim. Comp. on the absolute προσκαρτερεῖν, Num. xiii. 20; Xen. *Hell.* vii. 5, 14.

Ver. 7. Hortatory application of the actual state of the case contained in vv. 5, 6: *perform therefore your duties to all* (comp. on 1 Cor. vii. 3), etc.—a brief summary (ἀπόδοτε . . . ὀφειλ.) and distributive indication of that which is *to be rendered* to all magisterial persons generally (πᾶσι), and to individuals in particular (tax officers, customs officers, judicial and other functionaries), both *really* (φόρος, τέλος) and *personally* (φόβος, τιμή). — πᾶσι] to be referred to *magistrates*, not

to *all men generally* (Estius, Klee, Reiche, Glöckler, comp. also Ewald); this is manifestly, from the whole connection—and especially from the following specification, as also from the fact that the language only becomes general at ver. 8—the only reference in conformity with the text. — τῷ τὸν φόρον] *sc. ἀπαιτοῦντι*, which flows *logically* from ἀπόδοτε πᾶσι τ. ὄφ. (Winer, p. 548 [E. T. 737]; Buttmann, p. 338), and is also suitable to τ. φόβον and τ. τιμήν; for, in fact, the discourse is concerning *magistrates*, who—and that not merely as respects the notions of that time—do certainly, in accordance with their respective positions of power and performances of service, *demand* fear and honour. — φόρος and τέλος are distinguished as *taxes* (on persons and property) and *customs* (on goods). See on Luke xx. 22. — φόβος, τιμή, *fear* (not merely reverence), *veneration*. The higher and more powerful the magisterial personages, the more they laid claim, as a rule, to be *feared*; otherwise and lower in the scale, at least to be *honoured* with the respect attaching to their office.

Vv. 8-14. *General exhortation, to love* (vv. 8-10), and to a *Christian walk generally* (vv. 11-14).

Ver. 8. Μηδενὶ μηδὲν ὀφείλετε] negatively the same thing, only generally referred to the relation to *everybody*—and therewith Paul returns to the *general* duty of Christians—which was before said positively in ver. 7: ἀπόδοτε πᾶσι τὰς ὀφειλάς. By this very parallel, and decisively by the subjective negations, ὀφείλετε is determined to be *imperative*: “*Leave toward no one any obligation unfulfilled, reciprocal love excepted*,” wherein you neither can, nor moreover are expected, ever fully to discharge your obligation. The *inexhaustibility* of the duty of love, the claims of which are not discharged, but renewed and accumulated with fulfilment, is expressed. Comp. Origen, Chrysostom, Theodoret, Oecumenius, Theophylact, Augustine, Beza, Grotius, Wetstein, Bengel (“*amare debitum immortale*”), and many others, including Tholuck, Rückert, Reithmayr, de Wette, Philippi, Ewald, Umbreit, Hofmann. The *point* lies in the fact that, while ὀφείλετε applies to those *external* performances to which one is bound (“*obligatio civilis*,” Melancthon), in the case of the ἀγαπᾶν it means

the higher *moral* obligation, in virtue of which with the *quotidie solvere* is connected the *semper debere* (Origen). The objections of Reiche to the imperative rendering quite overlook the fact, that with εἰ μὴ τὸ ἀλλήλ. ἀγ. the ὀφείλετε again to be supplied is to be taken not objectively (remain owing mutual love !), but *subjectively*, namely, from the consciousness of the impossibility of discharging the debt of love. But Reiche's own view (so also Schrader, following Heumann, Semler, Koppe, Rosenmüller, Böhme, Flatt, and by way of suggestion, Erasmus), that ὀφ. is *indicative*: "all your obligations come back to love," is decidedly incorrect, for οὐ must then have been used, as *c.g.* in Plato's testament (Diogenes Laert. iii. 43): ὀφείλω δ' οὐδενὶ οὐδέν. The passages adduced on the other hand by Reiche from Wetstein are not in point, because they have μὴ with a *participle* or *infinitive*. Fritzsche (comp. Baumgarten-Crusius and Krehl): Be owing no one anything; only "*mutuum amorem vos hominibus debere censete*." Thereby the whole thoughtfulness, the delicate enamel of the passage, is obliterated, and withal there is imported an idea (*censete*) which is not there. — ὁ γὰρ ἀγαπ. κ.τ.λ.] A summons to unceasing compliance with the command of love having been contained in the preceding εἰ μὴ τὸ ἀλλήλους ἀγαπᾶν, Paul now *gives the ground* of this summons by setting forth the *high moral dignity and significance* of love, which is nothing less than the fulfilment of the law. Comp. Gal. v. 14; Matt. xxii. 34 ff. — τὸν ἕτερον] belongs to ἀγαπᾶν: *the other*, with whom the loving subject has to do (comp. ii. 1, 21; 1 Cor. iv. 6, vi. 1, xiv. 17; Jas. iv. 12, *et al.*). Incorrectly Hofmann<sup>1</sup> holds that it belongs to νόμον: *the further, the remaining* law. For the usage of ἕτερος and ἄλλος in the sense of *otherwise existing* (see thereon Krüger, *Xcn. Anab.* i. 4. 2; Nägelsbach, *z. Ilias*, p. 250 f.) is here quite inapplicable; Paul must at least have written καὶ τὰς ἑτέρας ἐντολάς (comp. also Luke xxiii. 32; Plato, *Rep.*

<sup>1</sup> Who objects with singular erroneousness to the ordinary connection with ἀγαπ., that Paul would surely (!) have written ὁ γὰρ τὸν ἕτερον ἀγαπᾶν τὸν νόμον πεπλήρ. As though the very order ὁ ἀγαπᾶν τὸν ἕτερον were not the most common of all (viii. 38, 37; 1 Cor. ii. 9; Gal. ii. 20; Eph. v. 28, *et al.*)! Quite as common is the use of νόμος without the article for the (comp. ver. 10) Mosaic law; see on ii. 12.

p. 357 C, and Stallbaum *in loc.*). But most intelligibly and simply he would have written τὸν πάντα νόμον, as in Gal. v. 14. It is impossible to explain the singular ὁ ἕτερος collectively (with an irrelevant appeal to Rost, § 98, B. 3. 5); ἕτερος νόμος could only be another (second) law (comp. Rom. vii. 23), and ὁ ἕτερος ν., therefore, the definite other of two; Kühner, II. 1, p. 548. — πεπλήρωκε] present of the completed action, as in ii. 25; in and with the loving there has taken place (comp. on Gal. v. 14) what the Mosaic law prescribes (namely, in respect of duties towards one's neighbour, see vv. 9, 10; inasmuch as he who loves does not commit adultery, does not kill, does not steal, does not covet, etc.). But though love is the fulfilment of the law, it is nevertheless not the subjective cause of justification, because all human fulfilment of the law, even love, is incomplete, and only the complete fulfilment of the law would be our righteousness. Rightly Melancthon: "Dilectio est impletio legis, item est justitia, si id intelligatur de *idea*, non de tali dilectione, qualis est in hac vita."

Ver. 9. Ἀνακεφαλαιοῦται] συντόμως καὶ ἐν βραχεί τὸ πᾶν ἀπαρτίζεται τῶν ἐντολῶν τὸ ἔργον, Chrysostom. But ἀνα is not to be neglected (is *again* comprised; see on Eph. i. 10), and is to be referred to the fact that Lev. xix. 18 *recapitulates*, summarily repeats, the other *previously* adduced commands in reference to one's neighbour. Comp. Thilo, *ad Cod. Apocr.* p. 223. — The arrangement which makes the *fifth*<sup>1</sup> commandment follow the *sixth* is also found in Mark x. 19, Luke xviii. 20 (not in Matt. xix. 18), Jas. ii. 11, in Philo, *de decal.*, and Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* vi. 16. The LXX. have, according to Cod. A, the order of the Masoretic original text; but in Cod. B the sixth commandment stands immediately after the fourth, then the seventh, and afterwards the fifth; whereas at Deut. v. 17, according to Cod. B, the order of the series is: *six, five, seven* in the LXX., as here in Paul. The latter followed copies of the LXX. which had the same order. The deviations of the LXX. from the original text in such a case can only be derived from a diversity of *tradition* in de-

<sup>1</sup> [Reckoning according to the Lutheran mode of division.]

termining the order of succession in the decalogue, not from *speculative* reasons for such a determination, for which there is no historical basis.<sup>1</sup> — On ἀγαπ. ὡς ἑαυτόν,<sup>2</sup> see on Matt. xxii. 39.

Ver. 10. Since all, that the law forbids us to do to our neighbour, is morally *evil*, Paul may now summarily conclude his grounding of the commandment of love, as he here does. — ἐργάζεσθαι with τίνι τι instead of τινά τι is also found, though not frequently, in the Greek writers; comp. 2 Macc. xiv. 40; Eur. *Hec.* 1085 and Pflugk *in loc.*; Kühner, II. 1, p. 277. — πλήρωμα νόμου ἢ ἀγάπῃ] ὁ γὰρ ἀγαπῶν τὸν ἕτερον νόμον πεπλήρωκε, ver. 8. Other interpretations of πλήρωμα ("id quod in lege summum est," Ch. Schmidt, Rosenmüller; "plus enim continet quam lex, est everriculum omnis injustitiae," Grotius; see on the other hand Calovius) are opposed to the context. Comp. Gal. v. 14, where the point of view of the fulfilment of the law by love is still more comprehensive. Observe, moreover, that πλήρωμα is not equivalent to πλήρωσις, but in the love of one's neighbour that whereby the law is fulfilled has *taken place* and is *realized*.—The commentary on this point, how love works no ill to one's neighbour, is given by Paul in 1 Cor. xiii. 4–7.

Ver. 11. For compliance with the preceding exhortation to love, closing with ver. 10, Paul now presents a further weighty *motive* to be pondered, and then draws in turn from this (vv. 12 ff.) other exhortations to a Christian walk generally. — καὶ τοῦτο] our *and that*, i.e. *and indeed, especially as you*, etc. It adds something *peculiarly worthy of remark*—here a further motive particularly to be noted—to the preceding. See on this usage, prevalent also in the classics (which, however, more

<sup>1</sup> This also against Hofmann, who thinks that the order of succession in our passage might be founded on the fact that the relation of man and woman according to the order of creation is earlier than that of man and man, etc. An arbitrarily invented reason, which indeed must have occasioned the transposition of the fourth commandment to a place after the sixth.

<sup>2</sup> Of the reading σεαυτόν (Lachm., Tisch.), although preponderantly attested, we must judge as in Gal. v. 4. In the Greek writers also the emendation σεαυτ. is very frequently found in the codd. instead of ἑαυτ., where by the latter the second person is meant. See especially Kühner, *ad Xen. Mem.* i. 4. 9.

frequently use *καὶ ταῦτα*), Hartung, I. p. 146; Baeumlein, *Partik.* p. 147. Comp. 1 Cor. vi. 6, 8; Eph. ii. 8; Phil. i. 28; Heb. xi. 12. That to which here *τοῦτο* points back is the injunction expressed in ver. 8, and more precisely elucidated in vv. 8–10, *μηδενὶ μηδὲν ὀφείλετε, εἰ μὴ κ.τ.λ.* The repetition of it is represented by *τοῦτο*, so that thus *εἰδότες* attaches itself to the injunction which is again present in the writer's conception, and hence all supplements (Bengel and several others, *ποιεῖτε*; Tholuck, *ποιῶμεν*) are dispensed with. The connection of *τοῦτο* with *εἰδότες* (Luther, Glöckler) complicates the quite simple language, as is also done by Hofmann, who makes *τὸν καιρὸν* the object of *τοῦτο εἰδότες*, and brings out the following sense: "*and having this knowledge of the time, that, or, and so knowing the time, that.*" Even in Soph. O. T. 37<sup>1</sup> *καὶ ταῦτ'* is simply *and indeed*; the use of *τοῦτο* as *absolute* object is irrelevant here (see Bernhardt, p. 106; Kühner, II. 1, p. 266), because *τοῦτο* in the sense of *in such a manner* would necessarily derive its more precise contents from *what precedes*. That which Hofmann means, Paul might have expressed by *κ. τοῦτο εἰδ. τοῦ καιροῦ*; Kühner, II. 1, p. 238. — *εἰδότες*] not *considerantes* (Grotius and others), but: *since you know* the (present) period, namely, in respect of its awakening character (see what follows). — *ὅτι ὥρα κ.τ.λ.*] Epexegetis of *εἰδόν. τὸν καιρὸν*: *that, namely, it is high time that we finally* (without waiting longer, see Klotz, *ad Devar.* p. 600) *should wake out of sleep.* *ἤδη* does not belong to *ὥρα*, but to *ἡμᾶς ἐξ ὕπνου ἐγ.*, and by *ὑπνος* is denoted figuratively *the condition in which the true moral activity of life is bound down and hindered by the power of sin.* In this we must observe with what right Paul requires this *ἐγερθῆναι ἐξ ὕπνου* of the *regenerate* (he even includes himself). He means, forsooth, the *full* moral awakening, the ethical elevation of life in that *final* degree, which is requisite in order to stand worthily before the approaching Son of man (see immediately below, *νῦν γὰρ κ.τ.λ.*); and *in comparison with this* the previous moral condition, in which much of a sinful element was

<sup>1</sup> Hofmann (citing ver. 42) professes to have compared Wunder *in loc.*, who, however, makes no remark upon the *καὶ ταῦτ'* of the passage, p. 18, ed. 3.



always hindering the full expression of life, appears to him still as *ὑπνος*, which one must finally lay aside as on awakening out of morning slumber. The Christian life has its new epochs of awakening, like faith (see on John ii. 11), and love to the Lord (John xiv. 28), and the putting on of Christ (ver. 14). This applies also in opposition to Reiche, who, because Christians were already awakened from the ethical sleep, explains *ὑπνος* as an *image of the state of the Christian on earth, in so far as he only at first forecasts and hopes for blessedness*,—quite, however, against the Pauline mode of conception elsewhere (Eph. v. 14; 1 Thess. v. 6 ff.; comp. also 1 Cor. xv. 34). — *νῦν γὰρ κ.τ.λ.*] Proof of the preceding *ᾠρα κ.τ.λ.* The *νῦν* is related to *ἤδη* not as the line to the point (Hofmann, following Hartung), but as the *objective* Now to the *subjective* (present in consciousness); comp. on the latter, Baeumlein, *Partik.* p. 140 ff. *νῦν* is related to *ἄρτι* (comp. on Gal. i. 10) as line to point. — *ἡμῶν*] Does this belong to the adverb *ἐγγύτερον* (Beza, Castalio, and others, including Philippi, Hofmann), or to *ἡ σωτηρία* (Luther, Calvin, and others, following the Vulgate)? The former is most naturally suggested by the position of the words; the latter would allow an emphasis, for which no motive is assigned, to fall upon *ἡμῶν*. — *ἡ σωτηρία*] *the Messianic salvation*, namely, in its completion, as introduced by the *Parousia*, which Paul, along with the whole apostolical church, regarded as near, always drawing nearer, and setting in even before the decease of the generation. Comp. Phil. iv. 5; 1 Pet. iv. 7; see also Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 426. Not recognising the latter fact,—notwithstanding that Paul brings emphatically into account the short time from his conversion up to the present time of his writing (*νῦν*),<sup>1</sup>—commentators have

<sup>1</sup> *νῦν*, as well as *ἐγγύτερον ἡμῶν* and *ἡ σωτηρία*, the latter in the *final-historical* sense, is to be left textually in the clear and definite literal meaning, in contradistinction to which inexact and vacillating generalizations of the concrete relation expressed by Paul, which mix up the nearness of time with the *ethical* approach, appear inadmissible. This applies also against Hofmann, according to whom the expectation of the near return of Christ is not found at all in the Epistle to the Romans (see Hofmann on Col. p. 181); and Paul is here supposed to say that salvation came near to them, at the time when they became believers, through the very fact of their becoming believers (?), but that now, after that they are believers (?), it stands so much (?) the nearer to them.

been forced to very perverted interpretations; *e.g.* that deliverance *by death* was meant (Photinus and others), or the destruction of Jerusalem, a fortunate event for Christianity (Michaelis, following older interpreters), or the preaching among the Gentiles (Melancthon), or the *inner σωτηρία*, the spiritual *salvation* of Christianity (Flacius, Calovius, Morus, Flatt, Benecke, Schrader, comp. Glöckler). Rightly and clearly Chrysostom says: ἐπὶ θύραις γὰρ, φησὶν, ὁ τῆς κρίσεως ἔστηκε καιρός. Comp. Theodore of Mopsuestia: σωτηρίαν δὲ ἡμῶν καλεῖ τὴν ἀνάστασιν, ἐπειδὴ τότε τῆς ἀληθινῆς ἀπολαύομεν σωτηρίας. But the nearer the blessed goal, the more wakeful and vigilant we should be. — ἡ ὅτε ἐπιστ.] *than when we became believers*;<sup>1</sup> 1 Cor. iii. 5, xv. 2; Gal. ii. 16; Mark xvi. 16; Acts xix. 2, and frequently.

Ver. 12. Τοῦ ὕπνου corresponds here as correlate ἡ νύξ, *i.e.* the time before the *Parousia*, which ceases, when with the *Parousia* the day arrives. νύξ and ἡμέρα are accordingly figures for the αἰὼν οὗτος and μέλλων, and ἡμέρα is not *equivalent* to σωτηρία (de Wette), but the day *brings* the σωτηρία. Comp. Heb. x. 25. — The image is *appropriate*; for in regard to the knowledge, righteousness, and glory which will have a place in the future αἰὼν, this approaching blessed time will be related to the imperfect present time as day to night. Theodore of Mopsuestia aptly remarks: ἡμέραν καλεῖ τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ Χριστοῦ παρουσίας καιρὸν . . . νύκτα δὲ τὸν πρὸ τούτου χρόνον. — προέκοψεν] not: *is past* (Luther), but: *has made progress, processit* (see Gal. i. 14; Luke ii. 52; 2 Tim. ii. 46; Lucian, *Solocr.* 6; Joseph. *Bell.* iv. 4. 6), so that the day is no longer distant. It is very possible that Paul conceived to himself the time of the approach of the *Parousia* as the *time of twilight*, with which conception both the preceding ὥρα ἡμῶς ἤδη κ.τ.λ. and the following ἀποθώμεθα aptly agree. — ἀποθώμεθα] as one puts off *garments*. This way of conceiving it (in opposition to Fritzsche and Hofmann) corresponds to the correlate ἐνδυσώμεθα, comp. on Eph. iv. 22. The ἔργα τοῦ σκότους, *i.e.*

<sup>1</sup> Incorrectly Luther: "*than when we believed it.*" He appears, with Erasmus, to have thought of the belief, that salvation was to be obtained *under the law, by works.*

the works, *whose element*, wherein they are accomplished, is *darkness* (comp. Eph. v. 11), the condition of spiritual want of knowledge and of the dominion of sin, are regarded as *night-clothes*, which the sleeper has had on, and which he who has risen is now to *put off*. — ἐνδυσώμεθα] of the putting on of *arms* (ὅπλα, as vi. 13), which in part are *drawn on* like garments. Comp. Eph. vi. 11; 1 Thess. v. 8. — τοῦ φωτός] not *glittering* arms (Grotius, Wetstein), but in contrast to τοῦ σκότους: *arms* (i.e. dispositions, principles, modes of action) *which belong to the element of* (spiritual) *light*, which one has as πεφωτισμένος by *virtue* of his existence and life in the divine truth of salvation. τοῦ φωτός has the *spiritual* sense, as also previously τοῦ σκότους, as being in the *application* of that which was said of the νύξ and ἡμέρα; but the *metaphorical* expressions are *selected* as the correlates of νύξ and ἡμέρα. — The Christian is a *warrior* in the service of God and Christ against the kingdom of darkness. Comp. Eph. vi. 11, 12; 2 Cor. vi. 7, x. 4; 1 Thess. v. 8; 1 Tim. i. 18; Rom. vi. 13. For profane analogies, see Gataker, *ad Anton.* p. 58.

Ver. 13.<sup>1</sup> Ὡς ἐν ἡμέρᾳ] *as one walks in the day* (when one avoids everything unbecoming). This in a moral sense, Paul desires, should be the *ruling principle* of the Christian, who sees the day already dawning (ver. 12). — εὐσχημόνως] *becomingly*, 1 Thess. iv. 12; 1 Cor. vii. 35, xiv. 40. It is *moral decorum* of conduct. — κώμοις κ.τ.λ.] The *datives* are explained from the notion of the *way and manner in which* the περιπατεῖν, i.e. the inner and outward conduct of life, ought not to take place (Kühner, II. 1, p. 382), namely, not *with revellings* (κώμοις; see respecting this, on Gal. v. 21; Welker in Jacobs, *Philostr.* i. 2, p. 202 ff.) and *carousals* (comp. Gal. v. 21), etc. The *local* view (Philippi) is less in keeping with the particulars mentioned, and that of *dativus commodi* (Fritzsche, comp. van Hengel) less befits the figurative verb. — κοίταις] *congressibus venereis* (comp. on ix. 10), Wisd.

<sup>1</sup> This verse, which once struck Augustine's eye and heart on his opening the Bible, decided him, already prepared by the preaching of Ambrose, to final repentance and to baptism. *Confess.* viii. 12, 28 f. See Bindemann, *d. heil. Augustinus*, I. p. 281 f.

iii. 13, and see Kypke, II. p. 185. — ἀσελγείαις] *wantonnesses* (especially of lust). See Tittmann, *Symon*. p. 151. On the sense of the *plural*, see Lucian, *Amor.* 21: ἵνα μηδὲν ἀγνοῇ μέρος ἀσελγείας. — ζήλῳ] *jealousy* (1 Cor. i. 11, iii. 3); neither *anger* (Fritzsche, Philippi, and others), which is not denoted by ζήλος (not even in 1 Cor. iii. 2; 2 Cor. xii. 20; Gal. v. 20), nor *envy* (Photius, Luther, and others), which is less in accordance with the preceding (κοίτ. κ. ἀσελγ.), whilst *strife* and *jealousy* follow in the train of the practice of lust.—The three particulars adduced stand in the internal connection of cause and effect.

Ver. 14. Ἐνδύσασθε τ. κύρ. Ἰ. Χρ.] This is the specifically *Christian* nature of the εὐσχημόνως περιπ. But the expression is figurative, signifying the idea: *Unite yourselves in the closest fellowship of life with Christ, so that you may wholly present the mind and life of Christ in your conduct.* In classical Greek also ἐνδύεσθαι τινα denotes *to adopt any one's mode of sentiment and action.* See Wetstein and Kypke. But the *præsens efficacia Christi* (see Melancthon) is that which distinguishes the having put on Christ from the adoption of other exemplars. Comp. Gal. iii. 27; Eph. iv. 24; Col. iii. 12; and on the subject-matter, viii. 9; 1 Cor. vi. 17; Photius in Oecumenius: πῶς δὲ αὐτὸν ἐνδυτέον; εἰ πάντα ἡμῖν αὐτὸς εἶη, ἔσωθεν καὶ ἔξωθεν ἐν ἡμῖν φαινόμενος. Observe further, that the having put on Christ *in baptism* was the entrance into the sonship of God (Gal. iii. 27), but that in the further *development of the baptized one* each new advance of his moral life (comp. on ver. 11) is to be a new putting on of Christ; therefore it, like the putting on of the new man, is always *enjoined* afresh. Comp. Lipsius, *Rechtfertigungsl.* p. 186 f. — καὶ τῆς σαρκὸς κ.τ.λ.] *and make not care of the flesh unto lusts*, i.e. *take not care for the flesh to such a degree, that lusts are thereby excited.* By μὴ the πρόνοιαν ποιεῖσθαι εἰς ἐπιθ. together is forbidden, not (as Luther and many) merely the εἰς ἐπιθ., according to which the whole sentence would resolve itself into the two members: τῆς σ. πρόνοιαν μὲν ποιεῖσθε, ἀλλὰ μὴ εἰς ἐπιθ. In that case μὴ must have stood after ποιεῖσθε (see xiv. 1); for a *transposition* of the negation is not

to be assumed in any passage of the N. T. — τῆς σαρκός] is emphatically prefixed, adding to the putting on of the Lord previously required, which is the *spiritual* mode of life, that which is to be done *bodily*. The σάρξ is here not equivalent to σῶμα (as is frequently assumed; see on the other hand Calovius and Reiche), but is that which composes the material substance of man, as the source and seat of sensuous and sinful desires, in contrast to the πνεῦμα of man with the νοῦς. Paul *purposely chose* the expression, because in respect of care for the *body* he wishes to present the point of view that this care nourishes and attends to the σάρξ, and one must therefore be on one's guard against caring for the latter *in such measure* that the lusts, which have their seat in the σάρξ, are excited and strengthened. According to Fritzsche, Paul *absolutely* forbids the taking care for the σάρξ (he urges that σάρξ must be *libidinosa caro*). But to this the expression πρόνοιαν ποιήσθε is not at all suitable. The flesh, so understood, is to be *crucified* (Gal. v. 24), the body as determined by it is to be *put off* (Col. ii. 11), its πράξεις are to be *put to death* (Rom. viii. 13), because its φρόνημα is enmity against God and productive of death (viii. 6, 7). The σάρξ is here rather the living *matter of the σῶμα*, which, as the *seat* of the ἐπιθυμίαι, in order to guard against the excitement of the latter, ought to experience a care that is to be *restricted* accordingly, and to be *subordinated* to the moral end (comp. on σάρξ, 1 Cor. vii. 28, xv. 50; 2 Cor. iv. 10, 11, vii. 1, 5, xii. 7; Gal. ii. 20, iv. 13, 14). In substance and in moral principle, the ἀφειδία σώματος (Col. ii. 23) is different from this. Chrysostom aptly observes: ὥσπερ γὰρ οὐ τὸ πίνειν ἐκώλυσεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μεθύειν, οὐδὲ τὸ γαμεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀσελγεῖν, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ προνοεῖν τῆς σαρκός, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἰς ἐπιθυμίας, οἶον τὸ τὴν χρεῖαν ὑπερβαίνειν. Moreover it is clear in itself, that Paul has added the second half of ver. 14 in view of what is to be handled in chap. xiv., and has thereby prepared the way for a transition to the latter.

## CHAPTER XIV.

Ver. 3. *καὶ ὁ*] Lachm. and Tisch.: *ὁ δὲ*, according to ABCD\*<sup>κ</sup>\*  
 5. Clar. Goth. Clem. Damasc. Mechanical repetition from ver.  
 2. — Ver. 4. *δυνατὸς γὰρ ἔστιν*] ABCD\*FG<sup>κ</sup> have *δυνατεῖ γάρ*  
 (commended by Griesb., adopted by Lachm. and Tisch.); D\*\*\*  
 Bas. Chrys.: *δύνατος γάρ* (so Fritzsche). The original is certainly  
*δυνατεῖ γάρ*; for *δυνατίω* is found elsewhere in the N.T. only in  
 2 Cor. xiii. 3, and was there also in codd. exchanged for more  
 current and better known expressions. — *ὁ Θεός*] ABC\*P<sup>κ</sup>.  
 Copt. Sahid. Arm. Goth. Aeth. Aug. *et al.*: *ὁ κύριος* (so Lachm.  
 and Tisch.), the origin of which, however, is betrayed by *dominus*  
*jos* in Syr. Erp. It was here (at ver. 3 the connection furnished  
 no occasion for it) written on the margin as a gloss, and sup-  
 planted the original *ὁ Θεός*. — Ver. 5.] Instead of *ὅτι μὲν*, ACP<sup>κ</sup>,  
 Vulg. codd. of It. Goth. and some Fathers have *ὅτι μὲν γάρ*; so  
 Lachm. (bracketing *γάρ*, however) and Tisch. 8. But the testi-  
 mony in favour of the mere *ὅτι μὲν* is older, stronger, and more  
 diffused; as is frequently the case, *γάρ* was here awkwardly  
 inserted to connect the thought. — Ver. 6. *καὶ ὁ μὴ φρονῶν τὴν*  
*ἡμέραν, κυρίως οὐ φρονεῖ*] is wanting in ABC\*DEFG<sup>κ</sup>, 23.  
 57. 67.\*\* Copt. Acth. Vulg. It. Ruf. Ambrosiast. Pel. Aug.  
 Jer. al. Lat.; Chrys. and Theodoret have it *in the text*. Con-  
 demned by Mill, omitted by Lachm. and Tisch. Rightly,  
 since the evidence for omission is so decisive, and since the  
 interpolation was so very readily suggested by the sense of a  
 want of completeness in the passage, in view of the following  
 contrast, that the explanation of the omission from *homocalcu-*  
*lation* (Rückert, Reiche, de Wette, Fritzsche, Tholuck, Philippi,  
 Tischendorf, and several others)—however easily it might have  
 been occasioned thereby (especially as *καὶ* before *ὁ ἐσθίων*, which  
 Elz. has not, is undoubtedly genuine)—appears nevertheless  
 insufficient. Among the oldest witnesses, Syr. is too solitary  
 in its support of the words not to suggest the suspicion of an  
 interpolation in the text of the Peshito. — Ver. 8. *ἀποδείκνυται*]  
 Lachm. both times has *ἀποδείκνυται*, according to ADEF GP  
 min. But Paul has in *no* other place *ἐάν* with pres. indic. (in

Gal. i. 8 only K and min. have the indic.), and how easily might a slip of the pen take place here! — Ver. 9. Before ἀπέθανε Elz. and cholz have καὶ, against decisive testimony. — After ἀπέθανε Elz. has καὶ ἀνέστη (which is wanting in A B C S\*, Copt. Arm. Aeth. and Fathers), and afterwards, instead of ἐζήσεν, ἀνέζησεν (against largely preponderating evidence). Further, F G, Vulg. Boern. Or. Cyr. (twice) Pel. Ambr. Fulgent. have not ἐζήσεν at all, although they have ἀνέστη (therefore ἀπέθανε καὶ ἀνέστη); D E, Clar. Germ. Ir. Gaud. have even ἐζήσε. καὶ ἀπέθανε καὶ ἀνέστη, but D\*\* L P S\*\* Syr. p. and several Fathers: ἀπέθανε καὶ ἀνέστη καὶ ἐζήσε. The origin of all these variations is readily explained from ἀπέθανε καὶ ἐζήσεν (Lachm. and Tisch.), the best attested, and for that very reason, among the many differences, to be set down as original. First, ἐζήσεν was glossed by ἀνέστη, comp. 1 Thess. iv. 14. Thus there arose, through the adoption of the gloss *instead of* the original word, the reading ἀπέθανε καὶ ἀνέστη; and by the adoption of the gloss *along with* the original word, in some cases ἀπέθανε καὶ ἐζήσε καὶ ἀνέστη, in some cases ἀπέθανε καὶ ἀνέστη καὶ ἐζήσεν (so Matth.)—whence there then arose, by an accidental or designed repetition of the AN, the ἀπέθ. καὶ ἀνέστη καὶ ἀνέζησεν of the Recepta (very feebly attested, and diffused by Erasmus). Finally, the transposition ἐζήσε καὶ ἀπέθανε καὶ ἀνέστη was formed, after ἀπέθανε καὶ ἀνέστη was already read, by mistaken criticism, inasmuch as there was a desire to restore the original ἐζήσε, but the non-genuineness of ἀνέστη was as little known as the proper place for ἐζήσε, and hence the latter, explained of the earthly life of Jesus, was placed before ἀπέθ. — Ver. 10. Χριστοῦ] A B C\* D E F G S\* and several vss. and Fathers: Θεοῦ. So Lachm. and Tisch., also Fritzsche. Rightly; Χριστοῦ was introduced from the preceding, and perhaps also (comp. Rufinus) through comparison of 2 Cor. v. 10. — Ver. 12. δώσει] Lachm.: ἀποδώσει, according to B D\* F G 39. Chrys. But this compound is the usual expression with λόγον. — Ver. 14. αὐτοῦ] Elz.: ἑαυτοῦ, instead of αὐτοῦ (see exegetical notes). So again Tisch. 8, but only according to B C S, Chrys. Dam. Theophyl. A reflexive more precise definition. — Ver. 15. ὅς] Lachm. and Tisch.: γάρ, which Griesb. also commended, according to decisive testimony. — Ver. 18. Instead of the Rec. ἐν τοῦτοις, Lachm. and Tisch. have ἐν τούτῳ, according to A B C D\* F G P S\*, 5. Vulg. It. Copt. Sahid. Ruf. Aug. But the Rec., sufficiently attested by D\*\*\* E L S\*\*, and almost all min., Syr. utr. Goth. Chrys. Theodoret, Tert., is the more to be defended, since ἐν τούτῳ might very easily have intruded through the immediately preceding ἐν πνεύματι ἀγάπῃ. It was less likely that τούτῳ should

be converted into *ταύταις* on account of the plurality of the particulars contained in ver. 17. The latter is rightly retained by Beng. Matth. Reiche, Fritzsche, van Hengel, and various others. — Ver. 19. *διώκωμεν*] The reading *διώκωμεν*, adopted by Tisch. 8, although in A B F G L P 8, is an old error of the pen, attested by no version, abandoned rightly also by Lachm. *ed. maj.* (in the *ed. min.* he had adopted it, written *ἄρα*, and taken the sentence interrogatively). — After *ἀλλήλ.* D E F G, Vulg. It. and a few Fathers have *φυλάττωμεν*. A supplement. — Ver. 21. *ἡ σααδ. ἡ ἀσδ.*] omitted by Tisch. 8, is wanting in A C 67.\*\* Syr. Erp. Copt. Aeth. and some Fathers, including Origen. The former is suspicious as an addition from ver. 13, the latter as a gloss. However, in the case of synonyms, one or the other was often omitted, as *e.g.*, in ver. 13, *πρόσκομμα* (and therewith *ἦ*) is wanting in B, and the evidence in favour of omission is not here sufficiently strong to condemn the words. Instead of *προσζ. ἡ σααδ. ἡ ἀσδ.*, 8\* has merely *λυπεῖται*, a gloss in itself correct according to ver. 15. — Ver. 22. After *πίστιν* Lachm. and Tisch. 8 have *ἦν*, according to A B C 8, Copt. Ruf. Aug. Pel. A double writing of *IN*, or explanatory resolution, to which the weight of evidence of almost all vss. and Greek Fathers especially is opposed. — On the doxology, xvi. 25–27, not belonging to the end of chap. xiv., see critical notes on chap. xvi.

As elsewhere (Acts xv. 1, 5; Gal. iii. 1 ff.; Col. ii. 16 ff.), so there were even in the predominantly Gentile-Christian community at Rome, among the *Jewish-Christian* minority<sup>1</sup> belonging to it, persons who sought still to retain the standpoint of pre-Christian legalism. But these Jewish-Christians in Rome had not, as elsewhere, come forward as the defenders of circumcision, or generally in an aggressive anti-Pauline attitude. Hence Paul speaks of them in so forbearing and mild a way, and keeps direct polemics entirely in the background. They were men not of hostile, but only of prejudiced minds, whose moral consciousness lacked the vigour to regard as unessential a peculiar asceticism, according to which they *ate no flesh* (ver. 2), *and drank no wine* (ver. 21), *and still held to the observance of the Jewish feast-days* (ver. 5), passing judgment withal, as is usually the case with men of a separatist bias, on those who were more free, but only earning the contempt of these in

<sup>1</sup> Comp. Beyschlag in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1867, p. 615.



return. In presence of this asceticism, and in respect of its main feature, namely, abstinence from flesh and wine, the question arises: Was it based generally (Origen, Chrysostom, Theodoret, Jerome, Calovius, and many others, including Reiche and Köllner) on the *Mosaic*-Jewish ordinances respecting meat and drink? *or*, in particular (Clement of Alexandria, Ambrosiaster, Augustine, Michaelis, *Ann.*, Flatt, Neander, Reithmayr, Tholuck, Philippi), on the dread of heathen *sacrificial* flesh and *sacrificial* wine (comp. the apostolic decrees, Acts xv.)? *or* on both (Erasmus, Toletus, and others, including Rückert, Borger, de Wette)? Against the *first* of these three possibilities it may be urged that vv. 2 and 21 do not allow us to assume any limitation of the abstinence at all, but require it to be understood of flesh and wine generally; while, on the other hand, the law does not forbid all flesh and does not forbid wine at all, and the Rabbins forbid only the flesh slaughtered by the Goyim and the wine of the Goyim (see Eisenmenger, *entdeckt. Judenth.* II. pp. 616 ff., 620 ff.). To assume now, with Chrysostom, Oecumenius, and Theophylact, that those persons had abstained from *all* flesh *for the reason* that they might not be blamed by the others on account of their despising swine's flesh, or from contempt towards the Gentiles (*τινές* in Theodoret), would be completely arbitrary, indeed opposed to the text; for they themselves were on one side the censurers, on the other the despised, ver. 3. Against the *second* opinion, that the abstinence in question referred only to the *flesh offered in sacrifice to idols* (Acts xv.) and the *wine of libation* (see Mischn. Surenh. IV. pp. 369, 384; Eisenmenger, *l.c.* p. 621), it may be urged that the whole section contains not a word on the sacrificial character of the flesh and wine, while yet we are bound to conclude from 1 Cor. viii. and x. that Paul would not have passed by this essential aspect of the matter without touching on it and turning it to account. Hence also the *third* view, which combines these, cannot be approved. In fact, the Jewish-Christian abstinence in question appears rather to be a *supra-legal* anxiety, such as was nothing rare in Judaism at that time (Philo, in Eusebius, *Præp. ev.* viii. *fin.*; Josephus, *Vit.* 2, 3;

Grotius on ver. 2; Ritschl, in the *theol. Jahrb.* 1855, p. 353), under the influence of *Essenic* principles (see Ritschl, *altkath.* K. pp. 184, 187). It appears certainly as an *ἐθελοθρησκεία*, brought over from Judaism into Christianity by persons of Essenic tendencies, and fostered by the ethics of Christianity, which combated the flesh.<sup>1</sup> By its adherents, however, among the Jewish-Christians of Rome at that time, it was not maintained in opposition to justification by faith, but was so practised without pretentiousness and polemics (and in particular without separation from a common table with the Gentile Christians), that the wisdom of the apostolic teaching deemed it inappropriate to enter into special conflict with such a remnant of an Essenic *Ἰουδαϊζεν*, or to speak of it otherwise than with the most cautious forbearance. Baur, I. p. 381 ff., declares those persons to be *Ebionite* Christians (according to Epiphanius, *Hæc.* xxx. 15, the Ebionites abstained from all use of flesh, because flesh originated from generation; see Ritschl, p. 205). But against this view it may at once be urged,<sup>2</sup> that complete abstinence from *wine* on the part of the Ebionites is nowhere expressly attested; and further, that, if the weak brethren at Rome had been persons who regarded the use of *flesh* as on principle and absolutely sinful, as was the case with Ebionitism, Paul would not have expressed himself so mildly and tolerantly respecting an error which would have been fundamental, dualistic as it was and opposed to justification by faith. Moreover, the Ebionites date only from the destruction of Jerusalem (see Ullhorn, *d. Homil. u. Recogn. d. Clem.* p. 387 ff.); hence the Roman weak brethren could only be termed Ebionitic in so far as their abstinence had the same root with the asceticism of the Ebionites, viz. Essenism. That among the numerous Roman Jews, who had arrived as prisoners of war from Palestine, there were various Essenes who thereafter became

<sup>1</sup> Respecting the Apostle Matthew, Clement of Alexandria, *Paedag.* ii. 1, p. 174 Pott., informs us that he ate only vegetables, no flesh; and of James, the brother of the Lord, Augustine, *ad Faust.* xxii. 3, relates that he had used neither flesh nor wine. Comp. Hegesippus in Eusebius ii. 23. But see Ritschl, p. 224 f. The Peter of the Clementines also practises this abstinence.

<sup>2</sup> Whether the Ebionites of Epiphanius may be derived from Essenism (the ordinary view, ably defended by Ritschl in opposition to Schliemann) or not.

Christians, cannot be subject to any well-founded doubt (comp. Ritschl, p. 233 f.). And the less reason is there to call in *question* not merely the Ebionitic, but also the *Essenic*, root of the phenomenon (Th. Schott). To refer it to the general interest of *world-denying holiness* does not suffice for the explanation of the several passages, and in particular does not explain the *observance of days* and the *impure* character which was attributed to the use of flesh (ver. 14). Hence, too, we are not, with Hofmann, to abide by the mere general conclusion, that doubt prevailed as to whether it was compatible with the holiness of the church of God to use such food as man had not assigned to him *from the beginning*, and as the Christian should *for this very reason* rather dispense with than enjoy for the sake of good cheer. Thus the matter would amount to an odd theoretic reflection, without any connection with historical concrete antecedent relations,—a view with which we can the less be content, since the observance of days cannot exegetically be got rid of as a point which had likewise occasioned dispute (see on ver. 5). Eichhorn takes the weak brethren to be *earlier, mostly Gentile-Christian* adherents of *ascetico-philosophic, chiefly Neo-Pythagorean principles*. There was certainly at that time diffused among the Gentiles, through the influence of the Neo-Pythagorean philosophy, an abstinence quite analogous to that Jewish one, as we know from Senec. *Ep.* 108, Porphyry. *De abstin.*, and others (see Grotius on ver. 2, and Reiche, II. p. 463 f.); but, on the other hand, that view is at variance partly with ver. 5 (comp. Col. ii. 16, 17), partly with xv. 8, 9, where Paul sedulously brings into view the theocratic dignity of the *Jews*, while he bids the Gentiles praise God *on account of grace*—which is most in harmony with the view that the despised weak ones are to be sought among *the former*. It may be also conjectured *a priori* that our ascetics, if they had arrived at their habit by the path of philosophy, would hardly have behaved themselves in so passive and unpretentious a manner and have been merely regarded by Paul just as *weak ones*.<sup>1</sup> We may add that vv. 5, 6 do

<sup>1</sup> Against Eichhorn's view also, as it seems to me, the passage in Origen militates: ὅρα δὲ καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν τοῦ αἰτίου τῆς τῶν ἐμψύχων ἀποχῆς τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ

not justify us in assuming *two parties* among the Roman weak brethren, so that the *κρίνοντες ἡμέραν παρ' ἡμέραν*, ver. 5, are to be distinguished from the *λάχανα ἐσθίοντες*, ver. 2,—the former as the stricter and probably Palestinian, the latter as the freer and probably Hellenistic, Jewish-Christians (so Philippi). As the observance of the feast days, especially of the Sabbaths, was essentially bound up with the Essenic tendency, the assumption of such a separation cannot be justified exegetically (from the *κρίνειν*). Just as little is there exegetical ground for the view that the community addressed and instructed in xiv. 1 ff. is notified as being *Jewish-Christian* in its main composition; whereas xv. 1 ff. betrays a *Gentile-Christian minority*, which had been more exclusive and intolerant towards the weak than the great body of the church, the relation of whom to the weak the apostle has in view in chap. xiv. (Mangold, p. 60 ff.)

Vv. 1–12. *Summons to brotherliness towards the weak ones* (ver. 1). *First point of difference between the two parties, and encouragement in relation to it* (vv. 2–4). *Second point of difference, and encouragement in relation to it* (ver. 5). *The right point of view for both in their differences* (ver. 6), and *reason assigned for it* (vv. 7–9); *reproof and disallowance of the opposite conduct* (vv. 10–12).

Ver. 1. Δέ] passing over from the due limitation of care for the flesh (xiii. 14) to those who, in the matter of this limitation, pursue not the right course, but one springing from weakness of faith.—τὸν ἀσθενοῦντα τῇ πίστει] That *πίστις* here also denotes *faith in Christ*, is self-evident; the *infirmary*, however, is not conceived of—according to the general πάντα δυνατὰ τῷ πιστεύοντι (Mark ix. 23; 1 Cor. xiii. 2)—in a general sense and without any more precise character, but, in conformity with the context (see vv. 2, 14, 22, 23), as a

Πυθαγόρου καὶ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀσκητῶν. Ἐκτείνει μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὴν περὶ ψυχῆς μετεμσματομίνης μῦθον ἰμψύχων ἀπείχονται. . . ἡμῖς δὲ καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτο πράττωμεν, ποιῶμεν αὐτὸ, ἐπὶ ὑποπιάζομεν τὸ σῶμα καὶ δουλαγωγῶμεν κ.τ.λ. (c. Cels. 4), where Origen distinguishes expressly the Pythagorean abstinence as something fundamentally (ideally) different from the Christian, and traces the latter to an idea, which quite merited the lenient treatment of the apostle and makes the continuance of this asceticism in the Christian Church very readily intelligible.

want of that *ethical* strength of faith, in virtue of which one may and should have, along with his faith, the *regulative principle of moral conviction and certainty* corresponding to its nature and contents. In this more definite and precise sense those ascetics were *weak in faith*. Had they not been so, the discernment of conscience and assurance of conscience, analogous to faith, would have enabled them to be free from doubt and scruple in respect to that which, in the life of faith, was right or wrong, allowable or not allowable, and to act accordingly; and consequently, in particular, to raise themselves above the *adiaphora* as such, without prejudice and ethical narrowness. It is therefore evident that the *ἀσθένεια τῇ πίστει* carries with it defectiveness of moral *γνώσις*, but this does not justify the explaining of *πίστις* as equivalent to *γνώσις* (Grotius and others), or as equivalent to *doctrine* believed (Beza, Calvin). — *προσλαμβάνεσθε*] *take to you*, namely, to the intercourse of Christian brotherly fellowship. The opposite would be an *ἐκκλείσαι θέλειν* (comp. Gal. iv. 17), whereby they, instead of being attracted, might be forced to *separation*. So in substance, Erasmus, Grotius, Estius, Semler, Reiche, Köllner, Fritzsche, Rückert, de Wette, Tholuck, Philippi, Hofmann, etc. But others take it as: *interest yourselves in him*, “of furthering, helpful support” (Olshausen, comp. Chrysostom), which, however, *προσλαμβάνεσθαι τινα* does not mean. Acts xxviii. 2 is appealed to, where, however, *προσλ.* is *to take to oneself*,—a meaning which is here also required by *προσελαβετο*, ver. 3, as well as by xv. 7, comp. also xi. 15. — *μὴ εἰς διακρίσεις διαλογ.*] *not to judgments of thoughts*. *διακρίσεις διαλογ.* is a *result*, which in the case of the enjoined *προσλαμβ.* must *not* be come to, so that thus *μὴ εἰς διακρ. διαλ.* contains a *negative more precise definition* of *προσλαμβάνεσθε*, in the sense, namely: *not in such a manner* that the *προσλαμβάνεσθαι*, which you bestow on the weak, *issues in judgments passed on the thoughts*. Those persons formed their ideas under the influence of conscience; such scruples should be indulgently treated by the stronger, and criticisms passing judgments on them should not be instituted, whereby the *προσλαμβάνεσθαι* would be abused. Thus *διάκρισις*, *dijudicatio*, retains its usual signi-

fication (Heb. v. 4; 1 Cor. xii. 10; Plato, *Legg.* vi. p. 765 A. xi. p. 937 B; Lucian, *Herm.* 69); and *διαλογισμός* likewise (Matt. xv. 19; Mark vii. 21; Luke ix. 46, *et al.*; Rom. i. 21; 1 Cor. iii. 20). Nothing is to be supplied, but *εἰς* is simply to be taken in the sense of the *result* (as just previously *εἰς ἐπιθ.*, xiii. 14), not even as *usque ad* (Reiche). Substantially in agreement with this view of *διακρίσ.* *διαλογ.* are Chrysostom, Grotius, and others, including Köllner, de Wette, Baumgarten-Crusius, Reithmayr, Fritzsche, Krehl, Tholuck, Hofmann, likewise Reiche, who, however, makes the prohibition apply to *both* parties, which is opposed to the text, since the exhorted subject is the church, *in contradistinction to its weak members*, while the weak alone are the object of the exhortation. Augustine aptly, *Propos.* 78: "non dijudicemus cogitationes infirmorum, quasi ferre audeamus sententiam de alieno corde, quod non videtur." Others take *διακρίσεις* as *doubts*, which are not to be *excited* in the thoughts of the weak. So Luther, Bengel, Cramer, Ernesti, Morus, Böhme, Ammon, Flatt, Klee, Olshausen, Philippi, Umbreit. But *διάκρισις* *never* means doubt,<sup>1</sup> and therefore is not to be explained with Ewald, who takes the words as an addition by way of exclamation: "*may it not come from doubts to thoughts!* may such an one not become uncertain in his conscience!" Following the Vulgate, Beza, Camerarius, Er. Schmid, Toletus, Estius, Glückler, and others, *διάκρ.* has also been explained as *dispute*, which is not unfrequently its meaning in the classics (Plato, *Legg.* vi. p. 768 A; Polybius, xviii. 11. 3). But dispute *concerning* thoughts would be at least far from clearly expressed by the mere genitive (instead of *περὶ διαλογ.*); and the notion *disceptatio* (*ζητήσις, συζήτησις*) is nowhere denoted in the N. T. by *διάκρισις*. Rückert takes it as *separation*: "But be on your guard lest the consequence thereof may possibly be this, *that thoughts and sentiments are severed*, become more abruptly parted." *Διάκρισις* may certainly bear this meaning (Job xxxvii. 16; Plato, *Phil.* p. 32 A); but in that case the article

<sup>1</sup> Neither in the N. T. nor elsewhere in Greek. Theodoret on ver. 22 f. is appealed to, but there *διάκρισις* is to be taken as *distinction*; as also in Occumenius on ver. 20.

must have stood before *διαλογ.*, and the climactic sense (*more abruptly*) would be gratuitously imported.

Ver. 2. More particular discussion of the subject, and in the first place, *exhibition of the first point of difference between the two parties.* — ὃς μὲν] without a corresponding ὃς δέ, instead of which there is at once put the definite ὁ δὲ ἄσθ.: *the one* (i.e. the strong) *believes*, etc.; *but the weak*, etc. Comp. Kühner, *ad Xen. Anab.* ii. 3. 15; Fritzsche, *ad Marc.* p. 507. — πιστεύει φαγεῖν πάντα may mean: *he is convinced that he may eat all things*, so that the notion ἐξεῖναι is implied in the relation of the verbal notion to the infinitive (Lobeck, *ad Phryn.* p. 753 f.; Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 235); so Tholuck, Borger, and older interpreters. But more agreeable to the τῇ πίστει, ver. 1, and to the contrast ὁ ἄσθεν., is the rendering: *he has the confidence, the assurance of faith, to eat all things*; Winer, p. 302 [E. T. 405]. Comp. Dem. 866. 1, and generally Krüger, § 61. 6. 8. To supply ὥστε (van Hengel) is in accordance with the sense, but unnecessary. — λάχανα] excludes, according to the connection, *all* use of flesh, not merely that of Levitically unclean animals, or of flesh sacrificed to idols, or on feast and fast days,—limitations of which nature are introduced by most interpreters (including Reiche, Köllner, Neander, Tholuck, Philippi). The weak in faith eats *no* flesh, but *vegetables* are his food. Comp. Wieseler in Herzog's *Encyklop.* XX. p. 595.

Ver. 3. Prohibition for each of the two parties. The self-consciousness of strength misleads into looking down with *contempt* on the weak; the narrowness of weakness is unable to comprehend the free thinking of the strong one, and *judges* it. — κρινέτω] defined by the connection as a *condemning* judgment, *pronouncing against* the true Christian character, as in ii. 1 and frequently. — ὁ Θεὸς γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] ground assigned for μὴ κρινέτω; hence αὐτόν is to be referred to τὸν ἐσθίουτα (i.e. him who eats all things), not with Reiche (following Calvin and others) to both, the strong and the weak, against which ver. 4 is also decisive. — προσελάβετο] *has taken him to Himself*, namely, *into His fellowship* (comp. ver. 1) through Christ; not: *into His house* as servant (see on ver. 4), as

Vatablus, Reiche, and Hofmann hold. — In ὁ Θεὸς γὰρ κ.τ.λ. is contained the *contrariety* to God of this κρίνειν, and its consequent *impiety*; and

Ver. 4 then adds what a *presumptuous intermeddling* such a κρίνειν is. In this the emotion rises to an animated apostrophe, addressed to the *weak in faith* who passes judgment, not to *both* parties, as Reiche and Tholuck think; for κρίνων corresponds to the κρίνέτω of ver. 3. — σὺ τίς εἶ] comp. ix. 20. It discloses the presumption, without however standing in the relation of apodosis to the preceding ὁ Θεὸς αὐτὸν προσελάβετο (Hofmann), which is nowise indicated and is forbidden by the fact that the following relation of domestic slave points to Christ as Master. — ἀλλότριον οἰκέτην] who is not in *thy* domestic service,<sup>1</sup> but in that of *another*. This other is Christ (see ver. 6), not God, who is rather distinguished from the master by δυν. γὰρ κ.τ.λ. — τῷ ἰδίῳ κυρίῳ] to *his own master*. The dative denotes the relation of subordination to the interest of the ἴδιος κύριος (Bernhardy, p. 85). His own master, and no *other*, is interested therein; whence the incompetence of the κρίνειν is obvious.—The figurative *standing and falling* is either explained of *standing firm* (Ps. i. 4; Luke xxi. 36), and of *being condemned* (causa cadere) in the *divine judgment* (Calvin, Cornelius a Lapide, Grotius, Estius, Wolf, and others, including Reiche, Köllner, Borger, Tholuck, Philippi), or, as in 1 Cor. x. 12, of *continuance and non-continuance in the state of true Christian faith and life*. So in substance, Erasmus, Beza, Vatablus, Toletus, Bengel, Semler, and others, including Platt, de Wette, Fritzsche, Rückert, Maier, Baumgarten-Crusius, Umbreit, van Hengel, Hofmann. The use of πίπτειν would not tell against the former (Hofmann), for it would have its warrant as contrast to the σώζεσθαι in the

<sup>1</sup> οἰκίτης is nowhere else found in Paul; in the N. T. it occurs in Luke xvi. 13, Acts x. 7, 1 Pet. ii. 18. It is a more restricted notion than δούλος; the οἰκίτης is a *house-servant* (Dem. 1359 ult.; οἰκίτης διάκονος), more closely bound to the family than other slaves; hence: οἰκίτας τε καὶ δούλους, Plat. *Legg.* vi. p. 763 A, comp. ix. p. 853 E; so, too, οἰκίτης, *housemaid*; both together, οἰκίταις, *domestics*. The fact that these words are used in the classics also of the members of the family themselves (as Xen. *Anab.* iv. 5. 35, vi. 1), is here irrelevant; but see Wesseling, *ad Herod.* p. 621.



divine judgment figuratively set forth by the standing (Soph. *Trach.* 84, and see Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* II. p. 568); but the second explanation is to be preferred, partly because the unwarranted κρίνειν denied to the more free the possession of a right Christian frame of life, partly because of the following δυνατεῖ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. For to make to stand in the judgment, *i.e.* without figure, to acquit and pronounce righteous,<sup>1</sup> is not the work of divine power, but of grace. But according to His power (against Reiche's objection to this, see Eph. iii. 20) God effects an inner strengthening, so that the Christian stands in that which is good, and even he who thinks more freely does not succumb to the dangers to which the nature of his Christian faith and life is exposed by the very fact of his freer principles, but perseveres in the true Christian state. For this Paul looks to God's power, and promises it. When Tholuck, on the ground of the reading ὁ κύριος, finds the thought, that the Judge will even find out sufficient reasons for exculpation, this is a pure importation into the text. — δυνατεῖ] See on 2 Cor. xiii. 3. Comp. Clem. *Hom.* i. 6.

Ver. 5. *Second point of difference*, as is evident from the contents themselves, and in particular from the general laying out of the representation, which is quite similar in form to ver. 2. Hence we are not here to find, with Hofmann (who defends the reading ὅς μὲν γάρ), merely the first member of a chain of thought which is intended to make good the correctness of the proposition δυνατεῖ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.,<sup>2</sup>—so that Paul does not pass over to another controverted point. The fact that he does not thereupon enter at length on the question of *days*, but returns immediately in ver. 6 to the question of *food*, indicates that the latter formed in the church the controversy most prominent and threatening in an ascetic

<sup>1</sup> Not, according to the *mediate* turn, departing from the preceding and hence unwarranted, which Philippi now gives to the sense of the figurative expression: to uphold in judgment, so far as God upholds in that which is good, which alone subsists in the judgment.

<sup>2</sup> This was in fact only an auxiliary sentence, which, as obvious in itself, might have been omitted. Were the reading ὅς μὲν γάρ correct, Paul would be introducing that which he has to say of the *second* matter of controversy, in the form of a *confirmation* of that which is just adduced respecting the *first*.

point of view.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, what he had said on the point of *food* might so readily of itself find its application in an analogous manner to the question of *days*, that an entering into equal detail in regard to both points was not required. — κρίνει ἡμ. παρ' ἡμ.] he sets his judgment on day before day, i.e. he is for preferring one day to another, so that he esteems one holier than another. This refers to the Jewish feast and fast days<sup>2</sup> still observed by the weak in faith. The classical ἡμέρα παρ' ἡμέραν, in the sense *alternis diebus* (Bernhardy, p. 258; Lobeck, *ad Aj.* 475), does not apply here (in opposition to Fritzsche, who imports into our passage the notion that the people had ascetically observed, in addition to the Sabbath, the second and fifth days of the week). Of so surprising a (pharisaical, Luke xviii. 12) selection of days there is no single trace in the Epistles to the Galatians (not even ἡμέρας, iv. 10) and Colossians, and hardly would it have met with such lenient treatment at Paul's hands. But the Jewish observance of days, continued under Christianity, so naturally agrees with the Essenic-Jewish character of the weak in faith generally, that there is no sufficient ground for thinking, with Ewald, of the observance of *Sunday* (at that time not yet generally established), and for seeing in vv. 5 and 6 only an *example illustrating* the preceding, and not a real point of difference (comp. Hofmann). On κρίνειν τι, in the sense of to declare oneself for something, i.e. *aliquid probare, eligere*, comp. Aesch. *Agam.* 471 (κρίνω δ' ἄφθονον ὄλβον), *Suppl.* 393 (κρίνε σέβας τὸ πρὸς θεῶν); Plat. *Rep.* p. 399 E; Xen. *Hell.* i. 7. 11; Is. *ser. Paneg.* 46. On παρὰ, in the sense of preference, Xen. *Mem.* i. 4. 14, and Kühner *in loc.*; but in Soph. *Aj.* 475, παρ' ἡμᾶρ ἡμέρα is (in opposition to Valckenaer, *Schol.* II. p. 153 ff.) to be otherwise understood; see Lobeck *ad loc.* — κρίνει πᾶσαν ἡμέραν] not *omnem diem judicat diem* (Bengel, Philippi), but corresponding to the first half of the verse: he declares himself for each day, so that he would have each esteemed equally

<sup>1</sup> It must have been a matter of practical offence, especially at the *agapae*.

<sup>2</sup> Comp. Col. ii. 16; Gal. iv. 10. To think *merely* of fast days (Mangold, comp. Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 414) is an arbitrary limitation, without any ground in the text.

holy, not certain days *before* others. — ἕκαστος κ.τ.λ.] Here too, as in the case of an *adiaphoron*, no more than in ver. 2, an objective decision, who is or is not in the right ; but rather for both parties only the requisite *injunction*, namely, that each should have a *complete assurance of faith* as to the rightness of his conduct, without which persuasion the consciousness of the fulfilment of duty is lacking, and consequently the *adiaphoron* becomes sinful (vv. 20, 23). — πληροφ.] Comp. iv. 21. — ἐν τ. ἰδίῳ νοῦ] *i.e.* in the moral consciousness of his own reason (vii. 23), therefore, independently of others' judgment, assured in himself of the motives of action.

Ver. 6. The right point of view, according to which each must have his own full persuasion, expressed not imperatively, but indicatively, as *the Christian axiom* in these matters, which conditions and regulates that *πληροφορία*. — ὁ φρονῶν τὴν ἡμέραν κ.τ.λ.] *he who directs his carefulness to the day*, exercises this carefulness *in his interest for the Lord*, namely, in order thereby to respond to his relation of belonging to the Lord. Τὴν ἡμέραν with the article denotes textually the day *concerned*, that which comes into consideration conformably to the κρίνειν ἡμέραν παρ' ἡμέραν, not the day *as it happens* (Hofmann). By κύριος most understand *God*, others (as Estius, Rückert, Köllner, Fritzsche, Philippi) *Christ*. The former appears to be correct, on account of εὐχαρ. γὰρ τ. Θεῷ; but the latter is correct, on account of ver. 9. The absence of the article is not at variance with this. See Winer, *de sensu vocum κύριος et ὁ κύρ.*, Erl. 1828 ; *Gramm.* p. 118 [E. T. p. 154] ; Fritzsche, *ad Marc.* p. 573. — κυρίῳ ἐσθίει] using his Christian freedom in regard to the use of flesh in the interest of the Lord, which definite ethical direction of his ἐσθίειν he attests by his εὐχαριστεῖν τῷ Θεῷ therein. This refers to the *prayer at table*, and, as is also the case with the subsequent εὐχ. τ. Θ., not to that offered *after* the meal (Hofmann), but to that *before* it ; comp. Matt. xv. 36, xxvi. 26 ; Acts xxvii. 35 ; 1 Cor. x. 30, xi. 24 ; 1 Tim. iv. 4. The *thanksgiving to God* consecrating the partaking of food presupposes the conviction that one does the ἐσθίειν in the capacity of belonging to *Christ*, and conformably to this specific relation ; for anything that is opposed to

*Christ the Christian cannot thank the Father of Christ.* — καὶ ὁ μὴ ἐσθ. κ.τ.λ.] The opposite of the preceding point (the observance of days) Paul has not added (see critical notes), because he has not at the beginning of ver. 6 planned his language antithetically; and it is only on the mention of the second more important point that the conception of the opposite occurs to him, and he takes it up also. To append the antithesis also to the first clause of the verse, was indeed not *necessary* (Philippi); but neither would it have been *confusing* (Hofmann), especially as the selecting of days and its opposite, as well as the eating and not-eating, were for those respectively concerned equally matters of *conscience*. — κυρίῳ οὐκ ἐσθίει] *for the Lord he refrains from the eating* (of flesh), persuaded that this abstinence tends to serve the interest of Christ. — καὶ εὐχαρ. τῷ Θεῷ] That which was previously conceived as the *reason* (γάρ) is here conceived as the *consequence* (καί); and so he utters his *thanksgiving table-prayer to God*, namely, for the other, vegetable food, which forms the meal to be enjoyed by him. He is enabled to do so by the conviction that his οὐκ ἐσθίειν has its holy ethical reference to the *Lord*.

Vv. 7-9. Proof for the threefold κυρίῳ, ver. 6, and that generally *from the whole subjective direction of the life of Christians towards Christ*. Paul does not mean the *objective* dependence on Christ (Rückert, Reiche, Ernesti, *Urspr. d. Sünde*, II. p. 19), because it would not prove what was said in ver. 6, but would only establish the obligation thereto. — ἐαυτῷ ζῇ] so that he believes *that his life belongs to himself*, that he lives for his own interest and aims. 2 Cor. v. 15. Comp. the passages in Wetstein and Fritzsche. The dative is thus to be taken in the ethically telic sense, and so, too, in ἐαυτῷ ἀποθνήσκει; for also the *dying* of the Christian—in so ideal a manner is Paul conscious of the moral power and consecration of fellowship of life with Christ—is a *moral act* (Bengel: "eadem ars moriendi, quae vivendi") in the relation of belonging to Christ, in which the Christian at death feels and knows that he has stood with his life, and is now also to stand in his dying. Such is the conscious ἐν κυρίῳ ἀποθνήσκειν, Rev. xiv. 13. Comp. Phil. i. 20; Rom. viii. 38. —

Ver. 8 contains the positive counterpart, proving the negative contents of ver. 7, and is likewise to be understood as a *subjective* relation. — On τὲ γὰρ . . . τέ, *for as well . . . as also*, see Hartung, *Partikell.* I. pp. 88, 115; Baeumlein, *Part.* p. 219. — τοῦ κυρίου ἐσμεν] *the Lord's property are we*. This now derives the *sum* of the entire specifically Christian consciousness from its previously adduced factors.—In the threefold emphatic τῷ κυρίῳ (τοῦ κυρίου) observe the “divina Christi majestas et potestas” (Bengel), to which the Christian knows himself to be completely surrendered.

Ver. 9. Objective historical relation, on which this subjective attitude towards Christ, ver. 8 (ἐάν τε οὖν κ.τ.λ.), is founded. — ἔζησε] *became alive*, to be understood of the *resurrection life*. Comp. Rev. ii. 8, xx. 4, 5; Rom. v. 10; 2 Cor. iv. 10. The *aorist* denotes the *setting in* of the state; Kühner, *ad Xen. Mem.* i. 1. 18. Wrongly Olshausen (so also Schrader) thinks that the *earthly* life of Jesus is meant, so that there occurs a *hysteron proteron*; in which view he overlooks, first, that the mutual reference of the two elements in protasis and apodosis is only formal,<sup>1</sup> and secondly, that it was not Jesus' *life and death*, but rather His *death and life* (resurrection), which led to His attainment of the heavenly κυριότης. Comp. viii. 34, vi. 9, 10; Phil. ii. 8, 9; Luke xxiv. 26; Matt. xxviii. 18. — ἵνα] *destination in the divine counsel*. This aimed, in the death and resurrection of Christ, at the establishment of His *munus regium*, and that over the *dead* (in Scheol, Phil. ii. 10) and *living*; hence Christians are conscious of belonging to Him in living and dying (ver. 8). Unsuitably to ἐζήσεν, since the raising up of the Lord is certainly, in the apostle's view, the *work of God* (i. 4, iv. 24, vi. 4, viii. 11, and many

<sup>1</sup> Paul, namely, does not say: Christ *died*, in order that He might be Lord over the *dead*, and *lived*, in order that He might be Lord over the *living*; but He *died and became alive* (both together had the end in view), in order that He might rule over *dead and living* (both together). Fritzsche also, although rightly understanding ἔζησε of the resurrection life, urges the mutual reference of ἀπέθανε and νεκρῶν, and of ἔζησε and ζώντων: By the *death* of Jesus, God desired to *make known* that He was Lord over the *dead*, and by the new *life* of Christ, that He was Lord over the *living*. But this merely declarative view is quite arbitrary; moreover, the ζῶν in ἔζησε would be quite another than the ζῶν of the ζώντων.

other passages), Hofmann sees in *ἵνα Christ's own purpose* expressed.

Ver. 10. Σὺ δέ] discloses the contrast to the κυριότης of Jesus. — The first σὺ addresses the *weaker*, the second the *freer* Christian, as is clear from ver. 3. — γάρ] justifies the censure of presumption which lies in the preceding questions: *for all*, etc., and therefore in both cases thou as well as he. — παρὰστος., *we shall stand before*; “stare solent, quorum causa tractatur,” Grotius; Acts xxvi. 6; Matt. xxv. 33. — τῷ βίμ. τ. Θεοῦ (see critical notes): *for God* will cause the judgment to be held (John v. 22) by Christ (ii. 16; Acts x. 42, xvii. 31). So the judgment-seat upon which Christ will sit (2 Cor. v. 10; Polycarp, *ad Phil.* 6; Matt. xxv. 31) is *God's*. — Note how decisive is the testimony of such passages against any limitation of the universality of the final judgment.<sup>1</sup>

Ver. 11. Scripture proof for the πάντες παραστησόμεθα κ.τ.λ., ver. 10. The *point* of its bearing on the matter lies in the *universality*, as is clear from the reference of πᾶν and πᾶσα, ver. 11, to πάντες above, ver. 10. Thus the proposition of ver. 10, πάντες γὰρ κ.τ.λ.—although in and by itself it required no scriptural proof—receives, nevertheless, a hallowed confirmation, which makes the injustice of the previously censured judging and despising the more apparent, because it encroaches on the universal final judgment of God.—The citation is Isa. xlv. 23, quoted very freely with deviations, partly of memory, partly intentional, from the LXX., and abbreviated. In Isaiah, God certifies upon His oath that all men (including the Gentiles) shall render to Him adoring homage. This divine utterance—Messianic, because promising the universal triumph of the theocracy—is here taken by Paul in the light of that highest *final historical* fulfilment which will take place at the judgment of the world. — ζῶ ἐγώ] Instead of κατ' ἐμᾶυτοῦ ὁμνῶ, as the LXX. following the Hebrew have it, Paul uses, by a variation of memory, a frequently-occurring verbal formula of the divine oath: יְהוָה יָחַד (Num. xiv. 21, 28; Deut. xxxii. 40, *et al.*; Dan. xii. 7; Ruth iii. 13; Judith ii. 12).—

<sup>1</sup> This applies also in opposition to Gerlach, *d. letzten Dinge*, p. 108 ff. Comp. i. 6, 16, iii. 6; 2 Cor. v. 10; Gal. vi. 7 ff.; Acts xvii. 31.

λέγει κύριος] is added by Paul according to the elsewhere familiar O. T. formula. Comp. xii. 19. — ὅτι] *that*, because in ζῶ ἐγώ is involved the *assurance* on oath, *that*, etc. Comp. 2 Chron. xviii. 13; 1 Sam. xiv. 44; Judith xi. 7 and Fritzsche *in loc.* — ἐμοί] *to me*, as the Judge (so in the sense of the apostle), *for homage and submission.* — ἔξομολογ. τ. Θεῷ] departing from the LXX., which, following the Hebrew, has ὁμείται πᾶσα γλ. τὸν Θεόν, for the reading of Cod. A of the LXX. (also  $\Sigma$  on the margin), ἔξομολογήσεται instead of ὁμείται, was probably—seeing that the Septuagint has very frequently undergone similar alterations of the text from N. T. citations—first introduced from our passage, and not a reading which Paul found in his copy of the LXX. (Fritzsche), as is too rashly inferred from Phil. ii. 11. The variation itself is—as was allowed by the freedom in the handling of Messianic proof-passages—*intentional*, because Paul required, instead of the oath of God, a more *general* conception, which, however, lies at the basis of that special conception; for the swearing is the actual acknowledgment and glorification of God as the Judge. The correct explanation is: *and every tongue shall praise God* (as the Judge), and therewith submit to His judicial authority—parallel in sense to ἐμοὶ κάμψει πᾶν γόνυ. ἔξομολογεῖσθαι with the dative always denotes to *praise* (xv. 9; Matt. xi. 25; Luke x. 21; frequently in the LXX. and Apocrypha, see Biel and Schleusner, *s.v.*): it only denotes to *confess*, as in later Greek, with the *accusative* of the object, Matt. iii. 6; Jas. v. 16; Tob. xii. 22. Hence the explanation of Er. Schmid, Reiche, Köllner, following Chrysostom, Oecumenius, Theophylact, is erroneous: to *confess sins*, which would only then be admissible if the parallelism obviously suggested the supplying of τὰς ἁμαρτίας.—With the reading τῷ βήματι τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ver. 10, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodoret, Oecumenius, Luther, Calvin, and many others, including Philippi, have found in τῷ Θεῷ a proof for the *divinity of Christ*. There would rather be implied the idea, that it is *God*, whose judgment *Christ* is entrusted by the Father to hold; and this thought is contained also in the reading τ. β. τ. Θεοῦ, ver. 10.

Ver. 12. What *follows* from the preceding (from πάντες

γὰρ . . . onward). — The emphasis is neither on *περὶ ἑαυτοῦ* (so usually) nor on *τῷ Θεῷ* (Philippi), but on the *ἕκαστος* for that purpose prefixed, which corresponds to the emphatic *πάντες, πᾶν, πᾶσα*, vv. 10, 11; hence it *alone* bears the stress, not sharing it with *περὶ ἑαυτ.* and *τῷ Θεῷ* (Hofmann). *Each of us, none excepted, will respecting himself, etc.* How at variance with this, therefore, to judge or to despise, as though one were not included in the subjection to this our *universal* destiny of having to give a personal account to God! — *δώσει*] purely future in sense, like the preceding futures.

Vv. 13–23. *Christians ought not, therefore, mutually to condemn one another, but rather to have the principle of giving no offence, ver. 13. Further elucidation of this principle, and exhortations to compliance with it.*

Ver. 13. *Μηκέτι* (no more, as hitherto) *ἀλλήλους κρίνωμεν* is deduced (*οὖν*) from *ἕκαστος ἡμῶν κ.τ.λ.*; but *κρίνωμεν* here refers, as *ἀλλήλ.* shows, to *both* parties. — *κρίνατε*] *antanaclasis*: the same word, in order to make the contrast striking (for to the *κρίνειν* which is *against one's duty* that which is *in accordance with duty* is opposed), is repeated, but with the modification of reference and of sense, that it addresses the *freer* Christians (for it was they who gave the offence), and means in general: *let this be your judgment, your moral maxim in this point.* On the infinitive with the article after a preparatory demonstrative, comp. 2 Cor. ii. 1; Xen. *de Rep. Lac.* 9. 1, and see Haase *in loc.*; Breitenbach, *ad Xen. Oec.* 14. 10. — *πρόσκομμα* and *σκάνδαλον*: both quite synonymous in the metaphorical sense: *moral stumbling-block*, an occasion for acting contrary to conscience. But *τιθέναι* refers to the original *proper* sense of the two words. Comp. on ix. 32, 33, xi. 9; LXX. Lev. xix. 14; Judith v. 1. The twofold designation is an earnest and exhaustive expression of the idea; hence to attempt a real distinction between the synonyms, which differ only figuratively (*stone . . . trap*), is arbitrary.

Ver. 14. Discussion of the preceding injunction, giving information regarding it. Paul grants, namely, *in principle*, that the freer brethren are *right*, but immediately adds an *exception* which arises *in practice*, and, in assigning the reason



for this addition, declares (ver. 15) the not attending to the exception a proof of want of love. — καὶ πέπεισμαι ἐν κυρ. 'Ι.] More precise definition of the preceding οἶδα. — ἐν κυρ.] *i.e.* in my fellowship with the Lord; οὐκ ἄρα ἀνθρωπίνης διανοίας ἢ ψῆφος, Chrysostom. — κοινόν] corresponding to the βέβηλον of the Greeks: *profane*, ἀκάθαρτον (Chrysostom), Acts x. 14, 28, xi. 8; Heb. x. 29. Thus the eating of flesh was held to be unholy and unclean, and therefore a thing at variance with the holiness of a Christian's position. Comp. Ezek. xlii. 20; 1 Macc. i. 47, 62. — δι' αὐτοῦ] Since the *reflexive* αὐτοῦ (with the rough breathing) is generally doubtful in the N. T. (comp. Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 97 f.), and here the *personal* αὐτοῦ (with the soft breathing) is quite sufficient and appropriate in sense, the latter is to be preferred (Bengel, Matthaei, Lachmann, Tischendorf, 7, Hofmann); not, however, to be referred to Christ (Theodoret, Bisping, Jatho, and others), but to be explained: *through itself, i.e.* through its nature. In δι' αὐτοῦ is thus implied the *objectively* existing uncleanness, in contrast (see below) to that which subjectively accrues *per accidens*. On account of the laws relating to food of the O. T., Olshausen thinks that the thought of the apostle is intended to affirm that "*through Christ and His sanctifying influence the creation has again become pure and holy.*" This arbitrary importation of a meaning (followed by Bisping) is overthrown by the very circumstance that the abstinence of the Roman ascetics was by no means founded on the law—which did not in fact forbid the *use of flesh generally*—but was of a supra-legal Essenic character. Moreover, Paul was clear and certain, so far as concerns the O. T. laws of food, that they had outlived the time of obligatoriness appointed for them by God, and were abolished by God Himself, inasmuch as in Christ the end of the law had come, and the *temporary* divine institute had given place to the *eternal* one of the gospel as its fulfilment, Matt. v. 17. Comp. on x. 4; Col. ii. 16 ff.; also on Acts x. 15, 16. — εἰ μὴ] not equivalent to ἀλλά, but *nisi*, which, without taking δι' αὐτοῦ also into account, applies merely to οὐδὲν κοινόν. Comp. on Matt. xii. 4; Gal. ii. 16. — ἐκείνῳ κοινόν] *ἐκ.* with emphasis, as in 2 Cor.

x. 18, Mark vii. 15, 20, and very frequently in John. The uncleanness is in such a case *subjective*, coming into existence and subsisting actually for the individual through the fettered condition of his own conscience.

Ver. 15. *Γάρ*] According to this reading critically beyond doubt (see the critical notes),—which, however, Philippi, on account of the sense, regards as “absolutely untenable,”—the apostle specifies *the reason, why he has expressly added* the exception *εἰ μὴ τῷ λογίζ. κ.τ.λ.* The *γάρ* belonging to the principal sentence is, according to a very prevalent usage (see Baeumlein, *Partik.* p. 85), taken into the prefixed accessory sentence, so that the argumentative thought is: “not without good moral ground do I say: *εἰ μὴ . . . κοινόν*; for it indicates a want of love, if the stronger one has not regard to this relation towards the weaker.” — *διὰ βρώμα*] *on account of food, i.e.* because of a kind of food, which he holds to be unclean and sees thee eat. — *λυπεῖται*] *not: is injured*, which would consist in the *ἀπόλλυσθαι* (Philippi, contrary to N. T. usage), but of *moral affliction, i.e.* vexation of *conscience*, which is occasioned by the giving of a *σκάνδαλον* (ver. 13). Analogous is Eph. iv. 30. To understand it of the *making reproaches on account of narrow-mindedness* (Grotius, Rosenmüller, Ewald), is gratuitously to import the substance of the thought, and does not correspond to the connection (vv. 13, 14, 20, 21). — *οὐκέτι κατὰ ἀγάπ. περιπατεῖς*] *i.e.* *in that case thou hast ceased to bear thyself conformably to love.* This is the actual state of things which subsists, when what is expressed in the protasis occurs; the *λυπεῖται*, namely, is conceived as *the fault of the subject addressed*.<sup>1</sup> On *εἰ . . . οὐκέτι*, comp. vii. 20, xi. 6; Gal. iii. 18. To take the apodosis *interrogatively* (Hofmann), is—considering the definite character, quite in keeping with the context, of the *λυπεῖται* which is occasioned by the offence given—quite unwarranted, and does not suit the words.”—

<sup>1</sup> Note that the presents *λυπεῖται* and *περιπατεῖς* coincide in *time*, as indeed the two regarded practically coincide in *reality*. For that, which causes to the weak one distress of conscience *διὰ βρώμα*, is simply the unsparing conduct of the strong one no longer under the guidance of love.

<sup>2</sup> According to Hofmann, *οὐκέτι κ.τ.λ.* is designed simply to submit to the person addressed the question *whether he really allows himself to be induced—*

The ἀπόλλυε is the possible result of the λυπεῖται: *destroy him not, bring him not into destruction*, namely, through his being seduced by thy example to disregard his conscience, and to fall out of the moral element of the life of faith into the sinful element of variance with conscience. That we are to explain it of the eternal ἀπώλεια, is clear from ὑπὲρ οὗ Χ. ἀπέθανε; for in order to redemption from *this* Christ offered up His life—therefore thou oughtest not to thrust back into ἀπώλεια thy (so dearly bought) brother through the loveless exercise of thy free principles. Comp. 1 Cor. viii. 11, 12. “Ne pluris feceris tuum cibum, quam Christus vitam suam,” Bengel.

Ver. 16. Μὴ βλασφημείσθω] namely (comp. 2 Thess. ii. 3; 1 Tim. iv. 12), *through your fault*.—ὑμῶν τὸ ἀγαθόν] *your good κατ’ ἐξοχὴν*, i.e. ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ, ver. 17. So also Ewald and Umbreit. It is the sum of the μέλλοντα ἀγαθά, Heb. ix. 11, x. 1. How easily it might come to pass that a schism, kept up by means of condemnation and contempt, on account of eating and drinking, might draw down on that jewel of Christians—the object of their whole endeavour, hope, and boast—calumnious judgments at the hands of unbelievers, as if maxims respecting eating and drinking formed that on which the Christian was dependent for attaining the blessing of the kingdom! In opposition to the context in ver. 17, following the Fathers (in Suicer, *Thes.* I. p. 14), de Wette holds that *faith* is meant;<sup>1</sup> Luther, Calovius, and others, including Philippi: the *gospel*; Origen, Pelagius, Beza, Calvin, Grotius, Bengel, and many others, including Flatt, Borger, Fritzsche, Tholuck, Nielsen, Baumgarten-Crusius, Reithmayr, Maier, Bisping, with irrelevant appeal to 1 Cor. x. 30: *Christian freedom*; van Hengel generally: *quod in vobis Romanis through the weakness of his fellow-Christian in falling into concern on account of a particular food—to alter his conduct so as to behave with a want of love*. In that case, the apostle must at least have expressed himself by the future περιπατήσεις (wilt thou then no longer behave in conformity with love?), or by εἰμι; περιπατεῖν, or, most clearly, because implying a *negative* answer: μὴ οὐκέτι κ. ἂν. περιπατήσης (thou wilt not thus cease, etc.?). comp. x. 18; 1 Cor. ix. 4.

<sup>1</sup> Among the Fathers, Chrysostom’s view is very vacillating and indefinite: ἢ τὴν πίστιν φησὶν, ἢ τὴν μέλλουσιν ἐλπίδα τῶν ἐπαθλῶν, ἢ τὴν ἀπηρτισμένην εὐσίβειαν· μὴ χρῶ κακῶς τελειότητι σου, μηδὲ ποίει ταύτην βλασφημείσθαι. Theodoret explains definitely of *faith*; so also Photius.

*bonum est*; better Hofmann: that which, as *their essential good*, gives Christians *the advantage over non-Christians*,—a view, however, which leaves the precise definition of the notion unsettled. With ὑμῶν, Paul, after having previously addressed a single party in the singular, turns to *all*; hence we are not, with Fritzsche, to think in ὑμ. of the strong believers only (and in βλασφ. of the weak believers). Note, further, the emphasis of the *prefixed* ὑμῶν (comp. Phil. iii. 20): the possession belonging to *you*, to you Christians, which you *must* therefore all the more guard against slander from without.

Ver. 17. Motive for complying with the μὴ βλασφημ. κ.τ.λ., with reference to the contents of the possible slander.—ἡ βασιλ. τ. Θεοῦ] is not anywhere (comp. on Matt. iii. 2, vi. 10; 1 Cor. iv. 20; Col. i. 13), and so is not here, anything else than the *Messiah's kingdom*, the erection of which begins with the *Parousia*,<sup>1</sup> belonging not to the αἰὼν οὗτος, but to the αἰὼν μέλλων (1 Cor. vi. 9, 10, xv. 24, 50; Gal. v. 21; Eph. v. 5; Col. iv. 11; 1 Thess. ii. 12; 2 Thess. i. 5); not therefore the (invisible) *church*, the *regnum gratiarum*, or the earthly *ethical kingdom of God* (Reiche, de Wette, Philippi, Lipsius, following older expositors), *res christiana* (Baumgarten-Crusius), and the like. "*The Messianic kingdom is not eating and drinking*;" i.e., the essential characteristic of this kingdom does not consist in the principle that a man, in order to become a member of it, should eat and drink this or that or everything without distinction, but in the principle that one should be upright, etc. Less accurate, and, although not missing the approximate sense, readily liable to be misunderstood (see Calovius), is the view of the Greek Fathers, Grotius, and many others: the kingdom of God is not *obtained* through, etc. Comp. on John xvii. 3.—βρῶσις, *eating*, i.e. *actus edendi*, different from βρῶμα, *food*, ver. 15 (comp. Tittmann, *Synon.* p. 159), which distinction Paul always observes (in opposition to Fritzsche); see on Col. ii. 16.—δικαιοσύνη κ. εἰρήνη] can, according to the entire context (comp. esp. ver. 15), and specially according to ver. 18 (δουλεύων τῷ Χ.) and ver. 19 (τὰ τῆς εἰρήνης), be taken only in the *moral* sense, and

<sup>1</sup> μιτὰ τὴν ἀνάστασιν, Theodore of Mopsuestia.

therefore as *ethical uprightness* and *peace* (concord) with the brethren; not in the *dogmatic* sense: *righteousness* and *peace* (of reconciliation) *with God* (Calvin, Calovius, and many others, including Rückert, Tholuck, and Philippi; de Wette blends the two meanings). But that these virtues presuppose faith in Christ as the soil from which they sprang, and as the fundamental *principium essendi* of the kingdom, is self-evident from the whole connection. — *χαρὰ ἐν πνεύμ. ἁγ.*] forms one phrase. Comp. 1 Thess. i. 6. It is the *holy joyfulness*, the morally glad frame of heart *which has its causal basis and subsistence in the Holy Spirit*, who rules in the Christian; comp. Gal. v. 22, also Phil. iv. 4. It is present even in tribulation, 2 Cor. vi. 10, and does not yield to death, Phil. ii. 17. The transitive explanation of the joy *which the Christian diffuses over others* (Grotius, Koppe, Reiche, and others) is supported neither by the simple word nor by N. T. usage elsewhere.

Ver. 18. Not an explanation, *why he has mentioned by name these three particulars*, as those in which the kingdom consists (Hofmann), but a *confirmation of the contents of ver. 17*; and how greatly must this confirmation have conduced to the recommendation and support of the precept *μὴ βλασφημ. κ.τ.λ.* of ver. 16 as established by ver. 17! — *ἐν τούτοις*] (see the critical notes) refers to the just mentioned three great moral elements. He who *in these* (not therefore possibly in *βρῶσις* and *πόσις*, and the like unspiritual things) serves Christ, etc. On *ἐν* with *δουλεύειν*, denoting its moral life-sphere, comp. vii. 6. — *εὐάρεστ. τ. Θεῷ*] “testimonium, quod expresse affirmat bona opera renatorum placere Deo,” Melancthon. — *δόκιμος τοῖς ἀνθρ.*] *approved<sup>1</sup> by men*; such is the relation according to its moral nature,—a fact not annulled by abnormal manifestations, in which misapprehension, perversion of the moral judgment, and the like are at work. “Paulus hic de *sincero* judicio loquitur,” Calvin.

Ver. 19. *Exhortation*, inferred from the doctrinal proposition, ver. 17; not a *question* (Buttmann). — *τὰ τῆς εἰρ.*] *what*

<sup>1</sup> So *δόκιμος* in all N. T. passages (not: *worthy, esteemed*, and the like); see Buttmann, in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1860, p. 368, who however prefers the reading *δακίμοις* in B G\* 77 (a copyist's error).

*belongs to peace*, composes the *substance of peace*, not different in matter of fact from τὴν εἰρήνην. See Bernhardy, p. 325 f.; Kühner, II. 1, p. 230. — τῆς οἰκοδομῆς] figurative designation of *perfecting* (here *active*) in the *Christian life*. Comp. 2 Cor. x. 8, xiii. 10; 1 Cor. xiv. 4. According to the context in each case, the individual, as here, or the church, or the whole Christian body, is a building of God (of which Christ is the foundation, 1 Cor. iii. 11; Eph. ii. 20, 21), on which the work of building is to proceed until the *Parousia*.—εἰς ἀλλήλ.] οἰκοδομεῖτε εἰς τὸν ἕνα, 1 Thess. v. 11.

Ver. 20. Prohibition of the opposite of τὰ τῆς οἰκοδομῆς τῆς εἰς ἀλλήλ. — κατὰλυε] *pull down*. Comp. 2 Cor. v. 1; Gal. ii. 18; Matt. xxvi. 61. — τὸ ἔργον τοῦ Θεοῦ] here, according to the context, the *building* of God, by which, however, is represented not what is mentioned in ver. 17 (the δικαιοσύνη κ.τ.λ., so Fritzsche, Baumgarten-Crusius); nor yet the *faith* of one's fellow-Christian (Theodoret, Reiche), or his eternal *salvation* (Chrysostom, Oecumenius, Theophylact); nor *all blessings vouchsafed through Christ* (Kühner, comp. Borger); but, according to ver. 15, the *Christian as such*, in so far as his Christian life, his *Christian personality*, is God's work (viii. 29, 30; 2 Cor. v. 17; Eph. ii. 10). Aptly Estius says: "fratrem, quem Deus fecit fidelem." Accordingly, what was expressed in ver. 15 by μὴ ἐκείνου ἀπόλλυε, ὑπὲρ οὗ Χ. ἀπέθανε, is here expressed by μὴ κατὰλυε τὸ ἔργον τ. Θεοῦ; but it is differently conceived and presented, in such a way that the brother is thought of there in his relation of redemption to Christ, here in his relation of spiritual origin to God. The *importance* of the latter conception is rightly pointed out by Calovius: "non levis est culpa, sed horribilis θεομαχία, opus Dei destruere." — πάντα μὲν καθαρὰ κ.τ.λ.] the same thought as in ver. 14, repeated in order to enter further into the μὴ ἔνεκεν βρώματος. "All (all food) *indeed is clean* (not immoral to enjoy in and by itself), *but it is sinful for the man who eats amidst offence*," who nevertheless uses a food, *although he experiences moral offence* in the using it—so that he thus *against his conscience* imitates the freer Christian. Comp. 1 Cor. viii. 9, 10. This reference of the ethical dative τῷ

ἀνθρώπῳ τῷ διὰ προσκ. ἐσθ. to the *weak in faith* (Chrysostom, Luther, Beza, Carpzov, Semler, and others, including Rückert, Köllner, Philippi, Tholuck, Hofmann) is confirmed by the parallel in vv. 13, 14, and admirably suits the connection, inasmuch as ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ. unfolds the *way and manner in which* ἐνεκεν βρώματος destruction may befall the work of God. Hence we must reject the explanation (Pelagius, Grotius, Bengel, and others, including Reiche, de Wette, Nielsen, Baumgarten-Crusius, Fritzsche, Reithmayer, Krehl, Umbreit, van Hengel) of the *strong in faith*, who acts wrongly in eating *under offence given*, i.e. although to the offence of the weak. For in that case we should have here no reference at all relevant to the κατάλυσις of the ἔργον τ. Θεοῦ, but only the vague remark that it is wrong to eat to the offence of others. — ἀλλὰ] after μέν; see Vigerus, *ed. Herm.* p. 536; Hartung, *Partikell.* II. p. 403 f.; Baeumlein, p. 170. — κακόν] not *hurtful* (Rückert), nor yet *bad* in the sense of what *is not good for him* (Hofmann), but *sinful*, the ethical contrast of καθαρά. The subject (it) is to be understood of itself from what precedes, namely τὸ καθαρόν, the pure in itself. Others supply πᾶν (Reiche), τὸ βρῶμα (Grotius), τὸ ἐσθίειν (Rückert), τὸ πάντα φαγεῖν (Fritzsche, Philippi). Hofmann also renders incorrectly, as though it ran, κακὸν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ διὰ προσκόμματος ἐσθίειν. — διά] as in ii. 27.

Ver. 21. Maxim for the strong in faith, which results from the preceding ἀλλὰ κακόν κ.τ.λ.: “*It is excellent, morally right and good, to eat no flesh, and to drink no wine, and (generally) to do nothing whereby thy brother takes offence,*” etc. Comp. 1 Cor. viii. 13. On μὴ, as joined to the infinitive with the article, see Baeumlein, p. 296. The article belongs only to μὴ φαγ. κρ. With the second μῆδέ, the general ποιεῖν is simply to be supplied<sup>1</sup> (Winer, p. 542 [E. T. p. 729]; Buttmann, p. 336), and ἐν ᾧ also refers back to the eating of flesh and drinking of wine. Rückert and Köllner (following Luther,

<sup>1</sup> The *zeugmatic* breviloquence, which leaves the reader to supply, after special notions (such as φαγεῖν and πινεῖν here), a more general word, is found also from Homer onward among the Greek writers (see Nägelsbach, *z. Ilias*, p. 179, ed. 3). Comp. generally, Krüger, § 62. 3.

Grotius, Flatt) are mistaken in holding that *καλόν* is to be taken *comparatively*, and that the comparison lies in *ἐν ᾧ κ.τ.λ.*; in which case we should have very arbitrarily to assume that the apostle, instead of following it up with an *ἢ κ.τ.λ.* (see on Matt. xviii. 8), had been led away from the construction. According to Hofmann, we should read *μηδὲ ἔν*. But this would in fact denote, not, as Hofmann thinks, *nor yet anything at all*, but *neque unum*, or *ne unum quidem* (see on 1 Cor. vi. 5; John i. 3), which would be unsuitable here. Quite unfounded withal is the objection against the reading *ἐν ᾧ*, that *προσκόπτειν* with *ἐν* is not elsewhere found; for *προσκόπτει* is to be taken by itself (absolutely), and *ἐν ᾧ* means *whereby*, as *ἐν* is also to be understood in Ecclus. xxx. 13; see Fritzsche on Ecclus. p. 167. On the absolute *προσκοπτ.* comp. Ecclus. xxxiv. 17, xiii. 23, also John xi. 9, 10. —The following *threefold* designation of the same thing, namely, of the giving occasion for conduct opposed to conscience (comp. ver. 13), is explained by the *urgency* of the sorrowful thought.—*ἀσθενεῖ*] not: *becomes* weak, but, as it always denotes: *is* weak, i.e. morally powerless to withstand temptation and to follow his moral conviction,—not different in substance from the two preceding *figurative* designations already employed in ver. 13.—Further, that in ver. 21 not a merely problematic extension of abstinence is expressed, as those suppose who hold the abstinence on the part of the weak not to refer to all flesh, and to refer to wine either not at all, or only to the wine of libation (see introd. to the chapter, and on ver. 2), is evident from ver. 2, where abstinence from *all* flesh is expressed; and hence here, alongside of the *μὴ φαγεῖν κρέα*, the *μηδὲ πιεῖν οἶνον* admits of no other conclusion than that the weak in faith drank *no* wine, but held the use of it likewise (see ver. 14) to be defiling.

Vv. 22, 23. *Σὺ πίστιν ἔχεις*] may be viewed either *concessively* (Luther, Beza, and many others, including Scholz, Tischendorf, Fritzsche, Tholuck, Hofmann) or *interrogatively* (Calvin, Grotius, Calovius, and most moderns). Comp. on xiii. 3. The latter (already in Occumenius, and probably also Chrysostom) corresponds better to the increasing animation of



the discourse. Paul hears, as it were, how the strong in faith opposes him with an *ἐγὼ πίστιν ἔχω*, and he replies thereto: *Thou hast faith?* Thou partakest of the confidence of faith grounded on Christ, respecting the allowableness of the eating and drinking (vv. 2, 21), which is here in question?—*Have it for thyself* (*ἀρκείτω σου τὸ συνειδός*, Chrysostom) *before God*, so that God is the witness of thy faith, and thou dost not make a parade of it before men to the offence of the weak. “Fundamentum verae prudentiae et dissimulationis,” Bengel. — *ἔχε*] not: *thou mayest have it* (Reiche), which deprives the imperative expression of its force. — *κατὰ σεαυτὸν*] *for thyself alone*; see Kühner, II. 1, p. 414. Comp. Heliodorus, vii. 16: *κατὰ παντὸν ἔχε καὶ μηδενὶ φράζε*, also the classical *αὐτὸς ἔχε*, keep it for thyself. — *μακάριος . . . κατακέκριται* forms a two-fold consideration, which must influence the strong one not to abuse his strong faith to the prejudice of the weaker; namely, (1) he has in truth on his side the high advantage, which is expressed by *μακάριος . . . δοκιμάζει*; on the other hand, (2) the danger is great for the weak one, if he through the example of the strong one is tempted to a partaking contrary to his conscience (*ὁ δὲ διακρινόμενος κ.τ.λ.*). How shouldest thou not content thyself with that privilege, and spare this peril to the weak! On the formal mutual relation of *κρίν.*, *διακρίν.*, and *κατακρίν.*, comp. 1 Cor. xi. 31, 32, where, however, the definition of the sense is not as here. — *μακάριος*] for the *Messianic blessedness*, which has been acquired for him through Christ, does not become lost to him through conscientious doubts in the determining of his action. — *κρίνων*] not equivalent to *κατακρίνων*, as, since Chrysostom, most interpreters think; against which the climax *κρίνων, διακρινόμενος, κατακέκριται* is decisive. It means: *he who does not hold judgment upon himself*, i.e. he who is so certain of his conviction, that his decision for this or that course is liable to no self-judgment; he does not institute any such judgment, as the anxious and uncertain one does. — *ἐν ᾧ δοκιμάζει*] *in that which he approves*, i.e. “agendum eligit” (Estius). Luther aptly renders: *in that which he accepts*. Comp. 2 Macc. iv. 3; Dem. 1381. 6; Plato, *Legg.* p. 579 C; Diod. Sic. iv. 7. — Ver. 23: *But he who*

*καὶ* (διακρίν., *qui dubius hæret.*, see on iv. 20), as to whether, namely, the eating is really allowed or not, *is, if he shall have eaten, condemned*, eo ipso (comp. on xiii. 8; John iii. 18) *liable to the divine penal judgment*, the opposite of μακάριος; comp. ἀπόλλυε, ver. 15. The matter is apprehended from the point of view of morally ideal strictness. Actual *self-condemnation* (Chrysostom, Theodoret, Grotius, and others, including Hofmann) would have required a more precise designation. — ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως] *sc. ἔφαγε.* — πᾶν δὲ κ.τ.λ.] may be still connected with ὅτι: *because he ate not from faith, but all, that comes not from faith, is sin.* If it is taken *independently*, however, the sense is more emphatic. In the conclusion, which proves the κατακέκριται, πᾶν δὲ . . . ἁμαρτ. ἐστίν is the major, and οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως *sc. ἔφαγε* the minor premiss.—πίστις is here also none other than faith according to its *moral* quality ("conscientiam informans et confirmans," Bengel), *i.e.* faith in Christ, so far as it brings with it the moral confidence as to what in general, and under given circumstances, is the right Christian mode of action. Respecting the conduct of the *Christian*, Paul lays down the axiom which regulates it generally, and more especially in *adiaphora*, that all which does not proceed from that confidence of faith as the moral spring of action is sin; to express a moral fundamental law *beyond* the Christian sphere of life, is foreign to his intention. Hence it was an alien proceeding to draw from this *general* expression, indirectly or directly,—in disregard of the *native* law of conscience (ii. 14, 15),—the inference, *and that* works and even the virtues of unbelievers were a *all* of *the* sins (Augustine, *c. Julian.* iv. 3, *et al.*; Luther; *Agg.* *form.* c. p. 700; Calovius, and others). Very correctly (the *Chrysostom*: ταῦτα δὲ πάντα περὶ τῆς προκειμένης ὑποθέσεως of *ἐρητύω* Παύλῳ, οὐ περὶ πάντων. But against the abuse of this *is-*sage, as though it made all accountability dependent on *subjective* moral conviction,<sup>1</sup> see Jul. Müller, *con d. Sde*, I. p. 285, ed. 5; comp. also Delitzsch, *Psychol.* I. p. 136

<sup>1</sup> In this view, the objective will of God would cease to be the *standard* of accountability. The bloody deed of Simeon, *e.g.*, would have been exempt from responsibility.

CHAPTER XV.<sup>1</sup>

Various writers formerly, from the days of Semler,<sup>2</sup> disputed, not that Paul was the author of chap. xv. and xvi. (as to the doxology, xvi. 25-27, see, however, the critical notes on chap. xvi.), but *that chap. xv. and xvi. along with chap. i.-xiv. compose one epistle*. Semler himself thought that Paul had given to the bearers of the letter—of which Phoebe was *not* the bearer—a list, which they might exhibit, of the teachers whom they were to visit on their journey by way of Cenchreae (where Phoebe dwelt) and Ephesus (where Aquila dwelt), and to whom they were to hand a copy of the letter. This list was in his view chap. xvi., of which, however, vv. 25-27 had their original place after xiv. 23 (which also Paulus, Griesbach, Flatt, Eichhorn assumed); and chap. xv. was an open letter to those same teachers, with whom the travellers were to confer respecting the contents.—Paulus (*de originib. ep. ad Rom.*, Jen. 1801, and in his *Kommentar z. Gal. u. Rom.* 1831, Introd.) held chap. xv. to be an appended letter for those who were enlightened, and chap. xvi. to have been a separate leaf for the bearer of the letters, with commendations to the overseers of the church and commissions to those whom they were particularly to greet from Paul. Griesbach (*curae in hist. text. Gr. cyp. P.* p. 45, and in his *Opusc.* ed. Gabl. vol. ii. p. 63; comp. in opposition to him, Gabler himself in the Preface, p. xxiv.), whom in the main Flatt followed, saw in chap. xv. an appendix for the further discussion of the last subject, subjoined after the conclusion of the letter, while chap. xvi. consisted originally of various appended leaflets. A similar hypothesis was constructed by Eichhorn (*Einleit.* III. p. 232 ff.), who, however, regarded xvi. 1-20 as not belonging to Rome at all, but as a letter of commendation for Phoebe, probably destined for Corinth, but taken along with

<sup>1</sup> Comp. Lucht, *üb. d. beiden letzt. Kap. d. Römerbriefs, eine krit. Unters.*, Berlin 1871.

<sup>2</sup> Keggemann, *praes. Semler de duplici ep. ad Rom. appendice*, Hal. 1767, and afterwards in Semler's *Paraphrase*, 1769. See in opposition to him, Koppe, *Exc.* II. p. 400 ff., ed. Ammon, Flatt, and Reich.

her to Rome. Among all the *grounds* by which these varied assumptions have been supported, there are none which are valid, not even those which appear the least to rest on arbitrary assumption. For the statement that Marcion did not *read* chap. xv. and xvi. amounts to this, that he, according to his fashion (see Hahn, *d. Ev. Marcion's*, p. 50 ff.), *excised* them.<sup>1</sup> See, besides, Nitzsch in the *Zeitschr. f. histor. Theol.* 1860, I. p. 285 ff. Further, that Tertullian, *c. Marc.* v. 14, designates the passage xiv. 10 as to be found *in clausula* of the epistle, is sufficiently explained from the fact that he is arguing against *Marcion* and hence refers to *his* copy. Comp. also Rönisch, *d. N. T. Tertullian's*, p. 350. Again, the repeated formulae of conclusion before the final close of the letter (xvi. 20, 24; xv. 33 is merely the concluding wish of a section) are most readily and naturally understood from the repeated intention of the apostle actually to conclude; which was to be done first of all at xvi. 16, but was frustrated through the intrusion of the further observation ver. 17 ff., and was deferred till ver. 20, after which, however, some further commissions of greeting were introduced (vv. 21–23), so that not until ver. 24 did the last wish of blessing—and now, for the complete conclusion of the whole, the ample doxology, vv. 25–27—finish the epistle. Most plausible are the two difficulties felt in reference to chap. xvi.; namely, (1) that Paul would probably not have had so many acquaintances in Rome, where he had not yet been at all, as he greets in chap. xvi., especially seeing that, in the epistles subsequently written *from* Rome, he mentions none of them; and (2) that Aquila and Priscilla could hardly at that time have been in Rome (xvi. 3), because they not long before were still dwelling in Ephesus (1 Cor. xvi. 19), and were at a later period likewise in Ephesus (2 Tim. iv. 19). This has been regarded as the most serious difficulty by Ammon (*Praefat.* p. 24)—who held chap. xvi. to be a letter of

<sup>1</sup> Origen on xvi. 25: "Caput hoc (viz. xvi. 25–27) Marcion, a quo scripturae evangelicae et apostolicae interpolatae sunt, de hac epistola penitus abstulit; et non solum hoc, sed et ab eo loco, ubi scriptum est (xiv. 23): omne autem, quod non ex fide est, peccatum est, usque ad finem cuncta *dissecuit*,"—which *dissecuit* cannot denote a mere *mutilation* (Reiche and others), but must be equivalent in sense to the preceding *abstulit*. The validity of this testimony cannot be overthrown by the silence of Epiphanius on this omission of Marcion, as a merely negative reason against it. Marcion's stumbling-blocks, as regards chap. xv., were probably vv. 4 and 8 in particular. Altogether Marcion allowed himself to use great violences to this epistle, as he, for example, extruded x. 5–xi. 32; Tertullian, *c. Marc.* v. 14. Comp. generally, Hilgenfeld, in the *Zeitschr. f. hist. Theol.* 1855, iii. p. 426 ff.

commendation written by the apostle for Phoebe to Corinth after the imprisonment at Rome—and recently by Dav. Schulz (in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1829, p. 609 ff.), Schott (*Isag.* p. 249 ff.), Reuss (*Gesch. d. h. Schrift.* § 111), Ewald, Laurent, Lucht. Schulz regards chap. xvi. as written from Rome to Ephesus; while Schott's judgment is as follows: "Totum cap. xvi. compositum est fragmentis diversis<sup>1</sup> alius cujusdam epistolae brevioris (maximam partem amissae), quam Paulus Corinthi ad coetum quendam Christianum in Asia Minori versantem dederat, ita ut, qui schedulas singulas haec fragmenta exhibentes sensim sensimque deprehendisset, continua serie unum adjiceret alteri." Reuss (so also Hausrath and Sabatier) sees in xvi. 1–20 a letter with which Phoebe, who was travelling to *Ephesus*, was entrusted to the church there; while Ewald (comp. Mangold, also Ritschl in the *Jahrb. f. D. Theol.* 1866, p. 352) cuts out only vv. 3–20, but likewise regards this portion as having originally pertained to an epistle of the apostle to the Ephesians, which, according to ver. 7, was written from the Roman captivity; as, indeed, also Laurent (*neutest. Stud.* p. 31 ff.) extracts from vv. 1–24 a special commendatory letter for Phoebe, written by the apostle's own hand to the Ephesians, assuming at the same time marginal remarks;<sup>2</sup> and Lucht assigns the commendation of Phoebe, and the greetings by name in vv. 3–6, to a letter to the Ephesians, but the greetings following in ver. 7 ff. to the editor of the Epistle to the Romans. But (1) just in the case of Rome it is readily conceivable that Paul had many acquaintances there, some of whom had come from Asia and Greece, and had settled in Rome, whether permanently or temporarily (several perhaps as missionaries); while others, like Aquila, had been banished as Jews under Claudius, and then had returned as Pauline Christians. (2) It is by no means necessary that Paul should have known the whole of those saluted by sight; how many might, though personally unknown, be saluted by him! (3) The fact that Paul at a later period, when he himself was a prisoner in Rome and wrote thence (in my judgment, the Epistle to the Philippians here *alone* comes into consideration; see Introd. to Eph. and Col.; the *Pastoral Epistles*, as non-apostolic, must be disregarded), does not again mention any one of those here saluted, may have arisen from the

<sup>1</sup> These being vv. 1–16, vv. 17–20, vv. 21–24, vv. 25–27.

<sup>2</sup> And that to such an extent, that of the 16th chapter nothing further is supposed to have been written by Paul for the *Romans* than vv. 21, 23, 24. See, in opposition, Ritschl, *l.c.*, and Lucht, p. 22 f.—Weisse would have chap. xvi. together with chap. ix.–xi. directed to Ephesus,

altered circumstances of the time; for between the composition of the epistle to Rome and the apostle's sojourn in Rome there lies an interval of three years, during which the majority of those referred to might have obtained other places of destination. Besides, the *salutation* which Paul in the Epistle to the Philippians offers to others (iv. 22) is merely a quite summary one. (4) There exists no ground at all for denying that Aquila and Priscilla might, after the writing of our First Epistle to the Corinthians (1 Cor. xvi. 19), have returned from Ephesus to Rome and have informed the apostle of their sojourn and activity there. (5) The greeting from *all churches* in ver. 16 is suitable enough for an epistle addressed to the church of the *capital city of the empire*; and the *first-fruits of Asia*, ver. 5, was *everywhere* a distinguishing predicate, so that it does not presuppose one living precisely in Ephesus.<sup>1</sup> (6) Were vv. 3–20 a portion cast adrift of an epistle to the *Ephesians*, or even a separate small letter to the Ephesians, it would not be easy to see how it should have come precisely *to this place*; it must have from the outset lost every trace of the tradition of its original destination to such an extent, that no occasion was found even afterwards, when an epistle to the Ephesians was already in ecclesiastical use, to subjoin it to *that* epistle. From all this there just as little remains any sufficient ground for severing, in opposition to all testimony, chap. xvi., as there is for severing chap. xv., having otherwise so close an external and internal connection with chap. xiv., from the Epistle to the Romans, and giving up the unity of the latter as handed down.

It was reserved at last for the criticism of Baur to contest the *apostolic origin* of chap. xv. xvi. (in the *Tüb. Zeitschr.* 1836, 3, and *Paulus*, I. p. 394 ff., ed. 2; comp. also in the *theol. Jahrb.* 1849, 4, p. 493 ff.; Schwegler, *nachapostol. Zeitalt.* p. 123 ff.; Volkmar, in the *theol. Jahrb.* 1856, p. 321 ff., and *Röm. Kirche*, 1857, p. 3). Baur finds in the last two chapters a *making of advances towards the Jewish Christians*,<sup>2</sup> such as does not suit the tenor of the rest of the epistle. In this view he objects particularly to vv. 3, 8, 14 in chap. xv.; vv. 9–12 is a mere accumulation of Bible passages to pacify the Jewish Christians; ver. 15 is irrelevant, ver. 20 no less so; the state-

<sup>1</sup> Comp. besides, on the arguments numbered 1–5, van Hengel, II. p. 783 ff.

<sup>2</sup> The two chapters are supposed, forsooth, to belong to a *Pauline writer*, “*who, in the spirit of the author of the book of Acts, wished to oppose to the sharp anti-Judaism of the apostle a softening and soothing counterpoise in favour of the Judaists, and in the interests of unity.*” The 15th chapter is supposed to have its original in 2 Cor. x. 13–18.—Hilgenfeld has not adhered to Baur's view.

ment of ver. 19 : from Jerusalem to Illyricum, is unhistorical, derived from a later interest; vv. 22, 23 do not agree with i. 10-13; vv. 24, 28, intimating that Paul intended to visit the Romans only on his route to Spain, are surprising; vv. 25, 26 have been taken by the writer from the epistles to the Corinthians for his own purpose, in order to win over the Jewish Christians; the long series of persons saluted in chap. xvi.—a list of notabilities in the early Roman church—was intended to afford proof that Paul already stood in confidential relations to the best known members of the church, in connection with which several names, among them the *συγγενεῖς* of the apostle as well as Aquila and Priscilla, and their characterization are suspicious; vv. 17-20 are unsuitably placed, and without characteristic colouring; the position of the final doxology is uncertain; the entire complaisance towards the Jewish Christians conflicts with Gal. i. and ii. But this same (so-called) complaisance (according to Volkmar, “with all manner of excuses and half compliments”) is assumed utterly without ground, especially seeing that Paul had already in an earlier passage expressed so much of deep and true sympathy for his people (comp. ix. 1 ff., x. 1, 2, xi. 1, 2, 11 ff., *et al.*); and whatever else is discovered to be irrelevant, unsuitable, and unhistoric in the two chapters is simply and solely placed in this wrong light through the interest of suspicion; while, on the other hand, the whole language and mode of representation are so distinctively Pauline, that an interpolation so comprehensive would in fact stand *unique*, and how *singular*, at the same time, in being furnished with such different conclusions and fresh starts! See, further, Kling in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1837, p. 308 ff.; Delitzsch in the *Luther. Zeitschr.* 1849, p. 609 ff.; Th. Schott, p. 119 ff.; Wieseler in Herzog’s *Encyklop.* XX. p. 598 f.; Mangold, p. 67 ff.; Riggenbach in the *Luther. Zeitschr.* 1868, p. 41 ff. —Nevertheless Lucht, *l.c.*, has once more come into very close contact with Baur, in proposing the hypothesis that the genuine epistle of Paul, extending to xiv. 23, existed in an incomplete state; that thereupon, one hand, summing up the main points of the epistle in the (un-Pauline) doxology, added the latter after xiv. 23; while another further continued the theme broken off at xiv. 23, and subjoined an epilogue, along with greetings, to the Romans. In this way *two editions* arose, of which one (A) contained chap. i.-xiv. and xvi. 25-27; while the other (B) contained chap. i.-xiv. and xv. 1-16, 24; A and B were then supplemented from one another. That which Paul himself had appended after xiv. 23, was removed from it by the

Roman clergy, and laid up in their archives (out of consideration for the ascetics, namely); but subsequently it, along with fragments of an epistle to the Ephesians, which had also been placed in the archives, had been worked in by the composer of chap. xv. and xvi. This entire hypothesis turns upon presuppositions and combinations which are partly arbitrary in themselves, and partly without any solid ground or support in the detailed exegesis.

Ver. 2. After *ἕκαστος* Elz. has *γάρ*, against decisive witnesses. — Ver. 4. Instead of the second *προεγράφη*, B C D E F G *8*\*, 67\*, 80, most vss., and several Fathers have *ἐγράφη*. Approved by Griesb., adopted by Lachm., Tisch., Fritzsche. Rightly; the compound is an intentional or mechanical repetition. — Not so strongly attested (though by A B C\* L *8*) is the *διό* repeated before *τῆς παρακλ.* in Griesb., Lachm., Tisch. 8, which, since the article again follows, became easily added. — Ver. 7. *ἡμῶς*] Elz.: *ἡμῶς*, against A C D\*\* E F G L *8*, min., most vss., and several Fathers. A correct gloss, indicating the reference of *ἡμῶς* to the Jewish and Gentile Christians. — Ver. 8. *γάρ*] approved by Griesb., adopted also by Lachm. and Tisch. But Elz. and Fritzsche have *οἱ*; against which the evidence is decisive. Moreover, *λέγω οἱ* is the customary form with Paul for more precise explanation, and hence also slipped in here. — *γενεῖσθαι*] Lachm.: *γενέσθαι*, according to B C\* D\* F G, Arm. Ath. But how readily one of the two syllables *FE* might be passed over, and then the familiar (comp. also Gal. iv. 4) *γενέσθαι* would be produced! — Ver. 11. After *πάλιν* Lachm. has *λέγει*, according to B D E F G, 1, and several vss.; manifestly an addition in accordance with ver. 10. — *ἐπανέστυτε*] Lachm. and Tisch.: *ἐπανεσάτωσαν*, according to ABCDE*8*, 39, Chrys. ms. Dan. Both readings are also found in the LXX., and may be borrowed thence. The circumstance that after *αἰνεῖτε* the form *ἐπανέστυτε*, as more conformable, readily offered itself, speaks in favour of *ἐπανεσάτωσαν*. — Ver. 15. *ἀνέλεξαί*] is wanting indeed in A B C *8*\*, Copt. Aeth. Cyr. Chrys. Ruf. Aug. (omitted by Lachm. and Tisch. 8), and stands in 3, 108, after *μέρους*; but why should it have been added? On the other hand, its omission was readily suggested, since it had just appeared for the first time in ver. 14, and since it seemed simply to stand in the way of the connection of *ἀπὸ μέρ.*; hence also that transposition in 3, 108. — Ver. 17. *καύχων*] Rightly Lachm. and Tisch.: *τῇ καύχῳ*. The reference of the preponderantly attested article was not understood. — Ver. 19. *ἀγίω*] So A C D E F G, min., and most vss. and Fathers. Adopted also by Griesb., Lachm., and Scholz.



But Elz. (so also Matth., Fritzsche, Tisch. 8), in accordance with  $\aleph$  and D\*\* LP, most min., Syr. Chrys., and others, has Θεοῦ. In B, Pcl. Vigil. there is merely πνεύματος. So Tisch. 7. Since there is absolutely no reason why ἄγ. or Θεοῦ should have been omitted or altered, probably the simple πνεύματος is the original, which was only variously glossed by ἄγ. and Θεοῦ. — Ver. 20. φιλοτιμούμενον] Lachm.: φιλοτιμούμαι, according to B D\* F G P. To facilitate the construction. — Ver. 22. τὰ πολλὰ] B D E F G: πολλάζεις, so Lachm. An interpretation in accordance with i. 13. — Ver. 23. πολλῶν] Tisch. 7: ἰκανῶν, according to B C, 37, 59, 71, Dam. A modifying gloss, according to an expression peculiarly well known from the book of Acts. — Ver. 24. After Σπανίαν Elz. and Tisch. 7 have ἐλεύσομαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς, which is omitted by Griesb., Lachm., and Tisch. 8. A contrast to ver. 22, written at the side, and then introduced, but rejected by all uncials except L\*\*, and by all vss. except Syr. p.; attested, however, among the Fathers by Theodoret, Theophylact, and Oecumenius, and preserved in nearly all the cursives. This old interpolation occasioned the insertion of an illustrative γάρ after ἐλπίζω (so Elz., Tisch., and also Lachm.), the presence of which also in principal witnesses (as A B C  $\aleph$ ), in which ἐλεύσ. πρ. ὑμ. is wanting, does not point to the originality of these words, but only to a very early addition and diffusion of them, so that in fact those witnesses represent only a half-completed critical restoration of the original text, whilst those which omit both (as F G) still contain the original text or a complete purification of the text. — Instead of ὑρ' ὑμῶν, Lachm. and Tisch. 7 have ἀφ' ὑμῶν, according to D E F G, min., which presents itself as genuine, and is explained by ὑρ' ὑμῶν on account of the passive. B has ἀπὸ ὑμῶν. — Ver. 29. Χριστοῦ] Elz.: τοῦ εὐαγγελίου τοῦ Χ., against decisive evidence. A gloss. — Ver. 31. διακονία] Lachm.: δωροφορία, according to B D\* F G, which, however, Paul, considering the delicacy of designation here throughout observed, can hardly have written; it appears to be an explanation. — The repetition of ἵνα before ἡ διακ. (in Elz.) is, according to A B C D\* F G  $\aleph$ , 80, justly also omitted by Lachm. and Tisch. — Instead of ἡ εἰς Lachm. has ἡ ἐν, according to B D\* F G, 213. Both prepositions are suitable to the sense; but the omission of the article in the majority of witnesses enables us to perceive how ἡ ἐν arose. This omission, namely, carried with it the alteration of εἰς into ἐν (G6, Chrys. really have merely ἐν), and then ἡ ἐν arose through an only partial critical restoration. — Ver. 32. ἔλθω] A C  $\aleph$ \*, Copt. Arm. Ruf.: ἔλθων with omission of the subsequent καί. Too weakly supported; an emendation of style, yet

adopted by Tisch. 8. — Instead of Θεοῦ, B has κυρίου Ἰησοῦ (so Lachm); D E F G, It.: Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ; \*<sup>8</sup>: Ἰησοῦ Χρ. But the apostle never says διὰ θελήματος Χριστοῦ, but always τ. δ. Θεοῦ (comp. i. 10; 1 Cor. i. 1; 2 Cor. i. 1, viii. 5, *et al.*), as throughout he uses θελήμα constantly of *God*, when there is mention of His omnipotence or gracious will; where said of Christ, the θελήμα is for him only the *moral* will (Eph. v. 17). Hence those readings are to be regarded as unsuitable glosses after vv. 29, 30. — καὶ συναναστ. ὑμῶν] has been omitted by Lachm. on the authority of B only, in which he is followed by Buttmann. From i. 12 συμπαρακληθῆναι would have been employed as an addition, and not συναναστ.; D E have ἀναψύξω μετ' ὑμῶν (2 Tim. i. 16). — Ver. 33. The omission of the ἀμύν (bracketed by Lachm.) is too weakly attested.

Vv. 1-13.<sup>1</sup> More general continuation of the subject previously treated: *Exhortation to the strong to bear with the weak, according to Christ's example* (vv. 1-4); *a blessing on concord* (vv. 5, 6); *and a summons to receive one another as brethren, as Christ has received them, Jews and Gentiles* (vv. 7-12). *Blessing* (ver. 13).

Ver. 1. *Connection*: To the preceding exposition of the perniciousness of the eating indicated in xiv. 23, Paul now subjoins the general *obligation*,<sup>2</sup> which is to be fulfilled by the strong, over against (δὲ) that imperilling of the weak. The contrast of δυνατοί and ἀδυνατοί is just as in chap. xiv.; the τῇ πίστει of more precise definition in xiv. 1 is so fully understood of itself after the preceding discussion, that we have here no right either to *generalize* the contrast (Hofmann: of the soundness and frailty of the *Christian state* of the subjects *generally*), or to single out the δυνατοί as a *peculiar*

<sup>1</sup> According to Lucht, p. 160 ff., the entire passage vv. 1-3 is *post-apostolic*, not merely in the mode of its presentation, but also in that of its view. In comparison with chap. xiv., all is delineated too generally and abstractly; the example of Christ has in no other place been applied by Paul as it is here in vv. 3-7; the citations are after the manner of a later point of view; the argument in vv. 9-12 is not free from Jewish-Christian prejudices, etc. All of these grounds, which do not stand the test of an unprejudiced and unbiased explanation of details—evil legacies from Baur's method of suspicion.

<sup>2</sup> In opposition to Hofmann, who, assigning to the concluding verses of the epistle (xvi. 25-27) their place after xiv. 23, places ἀφιλόκομον in connection with τῷ δὲ δυναμίνῳ κ.τ.λ., xvi. 25; see on xvi. 25-27.

*extreme party*, which in their opposition to the weak had gone further and had demanded more than the remaining members of the church who did not belong to the weak (Mangold, employing this interpretation in favour of his view as to the Jewish-Christian majority of the church, as if the *δυνατοί* had been a Gentile-Christian minority). Against this, *ἡμεῖς* is already decisive, whereby Paul, in agreement with xiv. 14, 20, has associated himself with the strong, making his demand as respects its positive and negative portions the more urgent. — *τὰ ἀσθενήματα*] the actual manifestations, which appear as results of the *ἀσθενεῖν τῇ πίστει* (xiv. 1). The word is not found elsewhere. These *imbecillitates* are conceived as a *burden* (comp. Gal. vi. 2) which the strong *take up and bear* from the weak, inasmuch as they devote to them, in respect to these weaknesses, patience and the helpful sympathy (2 Cor. xi. 29) of ministering love.<sup>1</sup> Thus they, in themselves strong and free, become servants of the weak, as Paul was servant of all, 1 Cor. ix. 19, 22. — *μὴ ἑαυτοῖς ἀρέσκειν*] *not to please ourselves* (1 Cor. x. 33); “quemadmodum solent, qui proprio judicio contenti alios secure negligunt,” Calvin. This is *moral selfishness*.

Ver. 2. *εἰς τὸ ἀγαθ.*] *for his benefit*. Comp. 1 Cor. x. 33; 1 Thess. ii. 4. A more special definition thereof is *πρὸς οἰκοδομήν*, *in order to build up*, to produce Christian perfection (in him). See on xiv. 19. According to Fritzsche, *εἰς τὸ ἀγαθ.* is *in respect of what is good*, whereby immoral men-pleasing is excluded. But its exclusion is understood of itself, and is also implied in *πρὸς οἰκοδομήν*. On the interchange of *εἰς* and *πρὸς*, comp. iii. 25, 26.

Ver. 3. Establishment of this duty by the pattern: *for Christ also*, etc. — *ἀλλὰ, καθὼς κ.τ.λ.*] *but, as it is written, the reproaches of those reproaching thee fell on me*. After *ἀλλὰ* a comma only is to be placed, and nothing is to be supplied, neither *sibi displicuit* with Erasmus, nor *fecit* with Grotius and

<sup>1</sup> *βαστάζουσιν* can the less indicate, as the subjects of the present exhortation, persons who were distinct from those addressed by *προσλαμβάνεσθαι*, xiv. 1 (Mangold), because in fact *προσλαμβάνεσθαι* recurs in ver. 7. How frequently does Paul give different forms to the same injunctions! Mangold also lays an incorrect stress on the *δε*, with which chap. xv. opens, as though, according to our view, *οὖν* should have been used.

others, nor ἐγένετο (Borger) and the like. Had Paul desired to express himself in purely *narrative* form, he would have written instead of σέ: Θεόν, and instead of ἐμέ: αὐτόν. But he retains the scriptural saying, which he adduces, literally, enhancing thereby the direct force and vivacity of the discourse. Comp. 1 Cor. i. 31; Winer, 534, 556 [E. T. pp. 719, 749].—The passage is Ps. lxix. 10 (literally after the LXX.), where the suffering subject is a type of the Messiah (comp. xi. 9; John ii. 17, xv. 25, xix. 28).—*That the reproaches of the enemies of God fell on Christ, i.e. that the enemies of God vented their fury on Christ*, proves that Christ was bent on pleasing *not Himself* (for otherwise He would have abstained from taking these His sufferings upon Himself; comp. Heb. xii. 2, 3, Phil. ii. 6–8), but *men*, inasmuch as He in order to their redemption surrendered Himself, with full self-renunciation of His αὐτάρκεια, to the enmity against God of His adversaries. Calvin and others: “Ita se Domino devovisse, ut descinderetur animo, quoties sacrum ejus nomen patere impiorum maledicentiae videret,” so that the idea of self-denying *devotion to the cause of God* (so also de Wette and Philippi) is expressed. But according to the connection, it is the devotion of Christ, not for the cause of God, but for the *salvation of humanity* (see ver. 2), into fellowship of suffering with which He entered, that is to be proposed as an example. Comp. Matt. xx. 28. — ονειδισμός belongs to later Greek. See Lobeck, *ad Phrym.* p. 512.

Ver. 4. In *O. T. words* Paul had just presented the example of Christ as an encouragement, and not without reason: *for all that was previously written*, etc. This reason<sup>1</sup> might, in truth, cause the example of Christ set before them to appear all the more inviting and involving the more sacred obligation to follow it. — προεργάφη] προ clearly obtains its definition

<sup>1</sup> Even if the closing verses of chap. xvi. had their critically correct position at the end of chap. xiv., we still could not, with Hofmann, put the γάρ in our passage into relation to the designation of God contained in those concluding verses. This—even apart from the fact that xvi. 25–27 is an independent doxology—would be impossible on account of the already interposed vv. 2 and 3, and after the καὶ γίγνεται just preceding (to which every reader must have referred the προεργάφη, ver. 4). Comp. 1 Cor. x. 11.

through the *ἡμετέραν* in the second clause, prefixed with emphasis; hence: all that was written *before us, before our time*,<sup>1</sup> by which is meant the collective contents of the O. T. Wrongly, therefore, Reiche and Hofmann think that it refers to the *Messianic oracles* written *before their fulfilment*. On διδασκ. comp. 2 Tim. iii. 16 — διὰ τῆς ὑπομ. κ. τ. παρακλ. τ. γρ.] *through the perseverance and the comfort which the Scriptures afford to us*. That τ. ὑπομ. is to be connected with τῶν γραφ. (in opposition to Melancthon, Grotius, Ammon, Flatt, van Hengel, and others), is clear from the fact, that otherwise τ. ὑπομ. would stand severed from the connection, as well as from ver. 5: ὁ Θεὸς τῆς ὑπομ. κ. τ. παρακλ. The ὑπομονή is here also, according to ver. 3, and conformably to the connection with παράκλησις, self-denying *endurance* in all *sufferings* (see on v. 3), opposed to *ἐαυτῷ ἀρέσκειν*; and the γραφαί are conceived as "*ministerium spiritus*" (Melancthon). Incorrectly Hofmann understands the ὑπομονή τ. γρ. as the *waiting upon Scripture* (namely, upon that *which stands written in it*), upon its *fulfilment*. Thus there is substituted for the notion of ὑπομονή that of ἀποκαταδοκία (viii. 19), or ἀναμονή (Synmachus, Ps. xxxviii. 8, lxx. 6), which even in 2 Thess. iii. 5 it by no means has (see Lünemann); and how strangely would the only once used τῶν γραφ. be forced into two entirely different references of the genitive! — τὴν ἐλπίδα ἔχωμεν denotes *having the hope* (i.e. the definite and conscious Christian hope of the Messianic glory); for to promote *the possession* of this blessed hope by means of patience and comfort in Christians, is the object for which the contents of the O. T. were written for the instruction of Christians. Accordingly neither is ἔχωμ. to be taken as *teneamus*, with Beza and others; nor is ἐλπ., with Reiche and others, of the *object of hope*. Against the latter (see on Col. i. 5) militates the fact that ἐλπίδα ἔχειν never denotes anything else than the subjective *spem habere*. Acts xxiv. 15; 2 Cor. x. 15; Eph. ii. 12; 1 Thess. iv. 13; 1 John iii. 3, *et al.*; Wisd. iii. 18; Xen. *Mem.* iv. 2.

<sup>1</sup> The *compound* is then followed (see critical notes) by the *simple* expression, — a frequent interchange also in the classics; see Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Phaed.* p. 59 B.

28; Polyb. i. 59. 2. Comp. Lobeck, *Aglaoph.* I. p. 70. But that the ἐλπὶς refers to the *conversion of the world of nations* is a misunderstanding of Hofmann's, which is connected with his erroneous reference of γάρ, ver. 4 (see on ver. 4). It is the hope of *eternal salvation* which, warranted and fostered by the influence of Scripture imparting patience and consolation, can and should merge and reconcile all separate efforts of αὐτάρεσκαia, which divide men, into the mutual unanimity of Christian sentiment. Comp. Eph. iv. 3, 4.

Ver. 5. Δεῖ leading over to the *wish* that *God* may grant them the concord which it was the design of the previous *exhortation*, vv. 1-4, to establish.—The characteristic designation of God as *the author of the perseverance and of the consolation*,<sup>1</sup> is intended not merely to supply an external connection with ver. 4, but stands in an internal relation to the following τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖν, since this cannot exist if men's minds are not patient and consoled, so that they do not allow themselves to be disturbed by anything adverse in the like effort which must take place in their mutual fellowship (ἐν ἀλλήλ.). Through this identity (τὸ αὐτό, comp. on xii. 16) of purpose and endeavour there exists in a church ἡ καρδία καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ μία, Acts iv. 32.—On the form δῶν, instead of the older Attic δοῖν, see Lobeck, *ad Phryg.* p. 346; Külmer, I. p. 644.—κατὰ X. 'I.] *conformably to Christ*. Either Christ is conceived as the regulative *ideal* of the frame of mind, according to which each is to adjust himself for his part in the common τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖν; or: *according to the will of Christ* (comp. John xvii. 21), like κατὰ Θεόν, viii. 27. The first is to be preferred, since the *model* of Christ, ver. 3 (comp. ver. 7), is still the conception present to the apostle's mind. Comp. Col. ii. 8; Phil. ii. 5; κατὰ κύριον, 2 Cor. xi. 17, is somewhat different.

Ver. 6. 'Εν ἐνὶ στόματι] By this the preceding ὁμοθυμαδόν is not *explained* (Iticbe)—which is an impossible notion—but ὁμοθ. specifies the source of the ἐν ἐνὶ στ., and is to be closely

<sup>1</sup> Calvin aptly remarks: "Solus sane Deus patientiae et consolationis auctor est, quia utrumque cordibus nostris iustillat per Spiritum suum; verbo tamen suo velut instrumento ad id utitur."

joined with it: *unanimously with one mouth*, not: *unanimously, with one mouth*. It is otherwise, *e.g.*, with Dem. 147. 1: ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἐκ μιᾶς γνώμης, where the explanatory addition has a place. If God is so praised, that each is led by the like disposition to the like utterance of praise, then all dissension is removed, and the unanimity of the fellowship has found in this σύμφωνος ὑμνοῦν (Theodore of Mopsuestia) its holiest expression. On ἐν ἐνὶ στόματι (instrumental), comp. the classical ἐξ ἑνὸς στόματος, Plato, 640 C, p. 364 A; *Legg.* i. p. 634 E; *Rep. Anthol.* xi. 159. — τοῦ κυρίου κ.τ.λ.] belongs simply to πατέρα, not also to Θεόν (in opposition to Grotius, Bengel, and others, including Rückert, Reiche, Tholuck (?), Fritzsche), and καί adds epexegetically the specific more precise definition. So throughout with this description of God habitually used by the apostles, as 2 Cor. i. 3, xi. 31; Eph. i. 3; Col. i. 3; 1 Pet. i. 3. This is clear from the passages, in which with πατ. the genitive (Ἰησοῦ X.) is *not* subjoined, as 1 Cor. xv. 24; Eph. v. 20; Col. iii. 17; Jas. i. 27, iii. 9. See on 1 Cor. v. 24; 2 Cor. xi. 31; Eph. i. 3. It ought not to have been objected, that the form of expression must either have been τὸν Θεὸν ἡμῶν κ. πατέρα Ἰ. X. or τὸν Θεὸν τὸν πατ. Ἰ. X. Either of these would be the expression of *another* idea. But as Paul has expressed himself, τὸν binds the conceptions of *God* and “*Father of Christ*” into unity. Comp. Dissen, *ad Dem. de cor.* p. 373 f.; Kühner, *ad Xen. Mem.* i. 1. 19, *ad Anab.* ii. 2. 8. Rightly Theodoret: ἡμῶν Θεὸν ἐκάλεσα τὸν Θεὸν, τοῦ δὲ κυρίου πατέρα.

Ver. 7. Διό] in order, namely, that this object, ver. 6, may be attained, that its attainment may not be hindered on your part.<sup>1</sup> — προσλαμβ.] See on xiv. 1. That not the *strong* alone (Hofmann), but *both* parties, and thus the readers *collectively*, are addressed, and that subsequently ὑμᾶς refers to both (not merely or principally to the Gentile-Christians, as Rückert and Reiche think), follows from ἀλλήλους; and see vv. 8, 9. — προσελάβετο] “*sibi sociavit*,” Grotius. Comp. xiv. 3. — εἰς

<sup>1</sup> Hofmann incorrectly (in accordance with his incorrect reference of ver. 1 ff. to xvi. 25–27) renders: “*for the sake of the hope*,” which you may learn from Scripture.

δόξαν Θεοῦ] belongs to προσελάβ. ὑμᾶς, beside which it stands, and to which, in accordance with vv. 8, 9 ff., it is alone suitable. Hence it is not to be connected with προσλαμβ. ἀλλήλ. (Chrysostom, Occumenius, Erasmus, and others); and just as little with the latter *immediately*, but with προσελάβ. ὑμᾶς only *mediately* (as Hofmann splits the reference). But it means: *that God might be thereby glorified*, not: “ut aliquando divinae gloriae cum ipso simus (sitis) participes,” Grotius (so also Beza, Piscator, Calovius, Klee, Benecke, Glöckler), which is condemned by vv. 8, 9 ff. as opposed to the context. Comp. Phil. ii. 11; Eph. i. 12.

Vv. 8, 9. A more precise explanation—which furnishes a still more definite motive for compliance with the προσλαμβ. ἀλλ.—respecting ὁ Χριστὸς προσελάβ. ὑμ. εἰς δόξ. Θεοῦ, first in respect of Jewish-Christians (ver. 8), and then of Gentile-Christians (ver. 9), and that in such a manner that the connection of the former with Christ appears as the *fulfilment of their theocratic claim*, but that of the latter as the *enjoyment of grace*;—a distinction so set forth, not from the Jewish-Christian narrowness of the author (Lucht), but designedly and ingeniously (comp. xi. 28, 29), in order to suggest to the Gentile-Christians greater esteem for their weaker Jewish brethren,<sup>1</sup> and humility. —λέγω γάρ] *I mean, namely*, in order more particularly to explain myself respecting the προσελάβετο ὑμᾶς κ.τ.λ.; otherwise in xii. 3. But comp. 1 Cor. i. 12; Gal. iv. 1, v. 16. Frequently thus in the Greek writers. —διάκονον γεγεν. περιτ.] διάκ. has emphasis, in order to bring out the original theocratic dignity of the Jewish-Christians. Christ has become *minister of the circumcised*; for to devote His activity to the welfare of the Jewish nation was, according to promise, the duty of His Messianic office. Comp. Matt. xx. 28, xv. 24. —ὑπὲρ ἀληθ. Θεοῦ] more particularly explained at once by what follows; hence: *for the sake of the truthfulness of God*, in order

<sup>1</sup> The contrast of Jewish and Gentile Christianity is so essentially and radically connected with the difference respecting the use of food, that it is wholly groundless to ascribe the treatment of that contrast in our passage to the supposed editor of the epistle (Lucht), who has worked up the Pauline portion of the letter, following xiv. 23, into conformity with a later, entirely altered state of things.



to justify and to demonstrate it through the realization of the hallowed promise given to the fathers; comp. 2 Cor. i. 20. Thus the *προσελάβετο ὑμᾶς* in respect of the *Jewish-Christians* redounded εἰς δόξαν Θεοῦ; but it redounded to this quite otherwise in respect of the *Gentile-Christians*, ver. 9. — ὑπὲρ ἐλέους] contrast to ὑπὲρ ἀληθ. Θεοῦ, ver. 8: *on behalf of mercy*, i.e. *for mercy*, which God has evinced towards them by His making them joint partakers in redemption. The references of ὑπὲρ in the two cases are thus not alike. — δοξάσαι, ordinarily understood as dependent on λέγω, may neither denote: *have praised* (namely, at their adoption), as Reiche, Rückert, de Wette, Bisping would explain it, which not merely introduces an irrelevant idea, but also runs counter to the usage of the aorist infinitive (even 2 Cor. vi. 1, see *in loc.*); nor: *have to praise* (Tholuck, Philippi, and most), for there is no mention of a *duty* according to the parallelism of the two verses, since λέγω γάρ has not here the sense of commanding (see on xii. 3, ii. 22); nor, finally, is it an infinitive *without reference to time* (I say, that the Gentiles *praise*), as Winer, p. 311 f. [E. T. p. 417], and Fritzsche, after the Vulgate, Luther, and others, take it, which would have required the *present* infinitive, because λέγω does not here express the notion of *willing*, hoping, and the like (see Lobeck, *ad Phryg.* p. 749), but simply that of affirming with statement of the object. Moreover, the *aorist* infinitive necessarily leads to *this*, that δοξάσαι is parallel to the preceding βεβαιῶσαι, and consequently is not governed by λέγω at all, but is connected with εἰς τὸ, as Castalio and Beza have rightly perceived; comp. also Bengel ("*glorificarent*") and van Hengel. Hence: "in order that He might ratify the promises of the fathers, *but that the Gentiles, on behalf of mercy, might praise God.*" The former, namely, ὑπὲρ ἀληθείας Θεοῦ εἰς τὸ βεβαιῶσαι κ.τ.λ., was the *proximate* design of Christ's having become minister of the circumcised; and the *more remote* design, which was to be attained through the passing of salvation from the Jews to the Gentiles (comp. Gal. iii. 14), consisted in this, *that on the other hand the Gentiles should praise God on account of mercy.* Incorrectly, Hofmann takes δοξάσαι as *optative*:

Paul *wishes* that the Gentiles, etc. In this way the εἰς δόξαν Θεοῦ, ver. 7, would be something which *was* still only *to* set in, although it *had* set in long ago (comp. ix. 24, 25, and see xv. 16-24). Without ground, Hofmann imports into the simple τὰ ἔθνη the idea of "*the Gentile world as a whole*;" it can in fact according to the context denote only the Gentile portion *of those*, whom Christ προσελάβετο εἰς δόξαν Θεοῦ.—Observe, moreover, how logically correct is the contrast of ὑπὲρ ἀληθ. and ὑπὲρ ἐλέους (in opposition to Olshausen, Fritzsche); for although God had promised the future πρόσληψις of the Gentiles also (in the prophets), He nevertheless cannot have promised it *to the Gentiles themselves*, as He has given the Messianic promise *to the Jews themselves* and chosen them for His people, in accordance with which, He, by virtue of His truthfulness, was bound to His word, and consequently the *Jews*, not the Gentiles, were *de jure* the children in terms of the covenant and heirs of the kingdom; comp. ix. 4, 5; Acts iii. 25; see also Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 397. — καθὼς γέγραπ.] This praising by the Gentiles takes place in conformity with (as a fulfilment of) Ps. xviii. 50, which passage is quoted after the LXX. The *historical* subject of the passage, *David*, is a type of *Christ*; hence neither the *Gentile-Christian* (Fritzsche), nor the *apostle of the Gentiles* as the organ of Christ (Hofmann, comp. Reiche), nor any *messenger of salvation generally* to the Gentile world (Philippi), is in the sense of the apostle the subject of the fulfilment of the prophecy, but only *Christ* can be so. The *latter* says to God that He, as present among the Gentiles (whom He has made His own through their conversion), will magnify Him. This, however, is a plastic representation of *the praise of the Gentiles themselves*, which in fact takes place ἐν ὀνόματι κυρίου Ἰησοῦ and δι' αὐτοῦ (Col. iii. 17). Comp. already Augustine: "tibi *per me* confitebantur gentes." Bengel aptly says: "Quod in psalmo Christus dicit se facturum, id Paulus gentes ait facere; nempe *Christus facit in gentibus*, Heb. ii. 12." — διὰ τούτου] included as a constituent part of the citation, but without reference to the matter in hand in Paul's text. — ἐν ἔθνεσι] to whom He, through the Spirit, by means of the preaching of the gospel has come, and has placed

them in communion with Himself.—As to *ἐξομολογ.* with the dative, comp. on xiv. 11. It presupposes, as well as *ψαλῶ* and the corresponding verbs, vv. 10, 11, the divine *ἔλεος*, which had been vouchsafed to the Gentiles, as motive.

Ver. 10. *Πάλιν*] *Again*, namely, in another passage containing the same thing. Comp. 1 Cor. iii. 20; Matt. iv. 7, v. 33. — *λέγει*] *sc. ἡ γραφή*, which is to be taken from *γέγραπται*, ver. 9. — The passage is Deut. xxxii. 43, closely following the LXX., who, however, probably following another reading (*יְבַרְכֵּךְ* in Kennicott), deviate from the Hebrew.<sup>1</sup>

Ver. 11. Ps. cxvii. 1 (closely following the LXX., but see the critical notes) contains a twofold parallel summons to the praise of God, addressed to all *Gentile peoples*.<sup>2</sup> In this case *αἰνεῖν* and *ἐπαινεῖν* are not different in *degree* (Philippi), but only in form, like *praise* and *berpraise* [*loben* and *beloben*].

Ver. 12. Isa. xi. 10, with omission of *ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐκείνῃ* after *ἔσται*, literally after the LXX., who, however, translate the original inaccurately. The latter runs: “*And it comes to pass at that day, that after the root-shoot of Jesse, which stands as a banner of peoples* (*לְיִשְׁרָאֵל עֲנִיָּה*), *Gentiles shall inquire*,” see Umbreit in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1835, p. 553, and the explanation in reference thereto, p. 880 f.; Drechsler and Delitzsch, *in loc.* But the words of the LXX., as Paul has quoted them, run as follows: “*There shall be the root-shoot of Jesse and (i.e.*

<sup>1</sup> The original, according to the present reading, does not mean: “*Rejoice, ye tribes, His people*” (de Wette and others; comp. Luther: “all ye who are His people”), since *גְּוִיִּם* cannot denote the tribes of the Jewish people; but, as the Hiphil *הִרְבִּינוּ* allows, either with the Vulgate: “*laudate, gentes, populum ejus*” (so Gesenius, *Thes.* I. p. 272, and Umbreit, p. 358; comp. Kamphausen, *Lied Mos.* p. 219 f.); or: “*make to shout for joy, ye Gentiles, His people*,” which, however, does not fit the connection; or (with Aquila and Theodotion, comp. Hofmann), *Shout for joy, ye Gentiles, ye who are His people*. The latter is to be preferred, because *הִרְבִּינוּ* in the sense of *Kal*, in the few passages where it is so found, is not joined with the accusative, but either is joined with the dative (ף)—as Ps. lxxxi. 2—or stands absolutely (Ps. xxxii. 11).

<sup>2</sup> The Messianic fulfilment of this summons is recognised by Paul in the magnifying of God on the part of the Gentiles converted to Christ from all nations. This fulfilment he looks upon already as *present* (for see ver. 7), not merely as a fact of the *future*, “when the Gentile world as a united whole” magnifies God (Hofmann).

and indeed, explanatory) *He who arises (raises himself) to rule over Gentiles; on Him shall Gentiles hope.*" This passage and its entire connection are Messianic, and that indeed in so far as the idea is therein expressed, that the promised descendant of David, the ideal of the theocratic king, will extend His kingdom over Gentiles also, and will be the object of their desire (according to the LXX. and Paul: of their believing *hope*). This prophecy likewise Paul sees fulfilled through the magnifying of the divine mercy by the already converted Gentiles (vv. 7, 9). Observe that ἐθνῶν and ἔθνη are *without the article*, and hence do not denote "*the Gentile world*" (Hofmann). — ἡ ῥίζα is here, according to the Heb. שֹׁטֶם, the *root-shoot*; comp. Ecclus. xlvii. 22; Rev. v. 5, xxii. 6; 1 Macc. i. 10; Ecclus. xl. 15. He is the root-shoot of *Jesse*, because Jesse is the root from which He springs, as the ancestor of the Messianic king, David, Jesse's son, sprang from it. *This* descendant of Jesse is the Messiah (comp. Isa. xi. 1, liii. 2), who (according to the original text) is a banner for peoples, and consequently their leader and ruler. Christ has *entered on* this dominion at His *exaltation*, and He carries it out by successive stages through the *conversion of the Gentiles*. — ἐπ' αὐτῶ] of the *resting* of hope upon Him (Hemsterh. ad *Act. Eph.* p. 128), 1 Tim. iv. 10, vi. 17; LXX. Isa. xlii. 4. Comp. πιστεύειν ἐπ' αὐτῶ, ix. 33, x. 11. The *contents* of the hope is the *attainment of eternal salvation*, which will be fulfilled in them at the *Parousia*.

Ver. 13. As vv. 1-4 passed into a blessing (vv. 5, 6), so now the hortatory discourse, begun afresh in ver. 7, passes into a blessing (δέ), which forms, at the same time, the close of the entire section (from chap. xiv. onwards). — ὁ Θεὸς τῆς ἐλπίδος] *God, who produces the hope* (of eternal glory), namely, through His Spirit; see the closing words of the verse. This description of God (comp. on ver. 5) attaches itself formally to ἐλπιοῦσιν, ver. 12,<sup>1</sup> but rests upon the deeper substantive reason, that the becoming filled with joyfulness and peace here wished for is not possible without having hope as its basis,

<sup>1</sup> An attachment which, since ἡμᾶς then addresses the *church*, does not suit the view which holds the latter to be a *Jewish-Christian* one (Mangold).

and that, on the other hand, this becoming filled produces the rich increase of hope itself (εἰς τὸ περισσ. κ.τ.λ.). — *πάσ. χαρᾶς κ.τ.λ.*] *with all, i.e. with highest joyfulness.* Comp. Theile, *ad Jac.* p. 8; Wunder, *ad Soph. Phil.* 141 f. *χαρά* and *εἰρήνη* (peace through concord), as xiv. 17. — *ἐν τῷ πιστεύειν*] *in the believing*, to which without *χαρά* and *εἰρήνη* the fruits would be wanting, and without which no *χαρά* and *εἰρήνη* could exist. Comp. xiv. 17. — *εἰς τὸ περισσ. κ.τ.λ.*] Aim of the *πληρῶσαι κ.τ.λ.*: *in order that ye, in virtue of the power (working in you) of the Holy Spirit, may be abundant in hope*, may cherish Christian hope in the richest measure (comp. 1 Cor. xv. 58; 2 Cor. viii. 7; Phil. i. 9; Col. ii. 7).

Vv. 14–33.<sup>1</sup> The apostle has now come to an end with all the instructions and exhortations, which he intended to impart to the Romans. Hence he now adds, up to ver. 33, an *epilogue* (which, however, he then follows up in chap. xvi. with commendations, greetings, etc.). In this epilogue, which in substance corresponds to the introduction, i. 8–16, and by no means applies only to the section respecting the weak in faith (Melancthon, Grotius), but to the whole epistle, he testifies *his good confidence towards the readers, and justifies his in a partial degree bold writing by his Gentile-apostolic calling* (vv. 14–16) *and working* (vv. 17–21), *which latter had also been usually the hindrance to his coming personally to Rome* (ver. 22). This observation leads him to his *present plan of travel*, the execution of which will bring him, in the course of his intended journey to Spain, to Rome, after he has been at Jerusalem (vv. 23–29). *For this impending journey* he finally begs the *prayers of the Romans on his behalf* (vv. 30–33), and then concludes with a *blessing* (ver. 33).

Ver. 14. *Πέπεισμαι δέ*] *but I am of the conviction*; viii. 38, xiv. 14. The *δέ* is the simple *μεταβατικόν*, leading over to the concluding portion of the epistle. — *καὶ αὐτὸς ἐγώ*] *et ipse*

<sup>1</sup> According to Lucht, vv. 14–33 contain much that is Pauline and various matters historically correct, but also incorrect statements, and, on the whole, a non-Pauline tendency. The parallels with passages in the Epistles to the Corinthians are to be explained simply by dependence on the latter, etc., p. 185 ff. These are self-deceptions of a fanciful criticism, against which it is vain to contend.

*ego*; comp. on vii. 25. The apostle is, independently of the general advantageous estimation in which the Roman church stood with *others* (i. 8), *also for his own personal part* of the conviction, etc. The emphasis lies on *αὐτός*. If the thought were: "*even I*, who have hitherto so unreservedly exhorted you" (Philippi, comp. de Wette, Fritzsche, and older interpreters), *ἐγώ* would have the emphasis (comp. *καὶ ἐγὼ αὐτός*, Acts x. 26); but *καὶ αὐτός* corresponds entirely to the following *καὶ αὐτοί*, *et ipsi*, i.e. *even without first of all requiring influence, exhortation, etc., on the part of others*. Comp. afterwards *καὶ ἀλλήλους*. Thus, accordingly, Paul denotes by *κ. αὐτὸς ἐγώ* the *autonomy* of his judgment, but with a subtle indication of the judgment *of others* as coinciding therewith. Comp. Bengel: "Non modo alii hoc de vobis existimant." Paul intends therewith to obviate the idea as if he for his part judged less favourably of the church, with reference to the fact, not that he had *written* this letter generally (Hofmann), but that he had written it in part *πολυμνηρότερον*. This is shown by the contrast, ver. 15. — *ἀγαθωσύνης*] *goodness, excellence generally* (*that you also of yourselves are very excellent people*), not equivalent to *χρηστότης* (as Thom. Mag. p. 391 states), not even in Gal. v. 22. Comp. 2 Thess. i. 11; Eph. v. 9; Eccles. ix. 18. The word is not found in the Greek writers. — The *three predicates*, *μεστοί κ.τ.λ.*, advance in co-ordination from the general to the particular. — *καὶ ἀλλήλ.]* *also to admonish you among one another*, without having need for a third, who should admonish you. On *νουθετεῖν*, in which the notion of its being well-meant, though not involved in the word of itself, is given by the connection or (as in Isocr. *de pace*, 72) by express contrast, see on 1 Cor. xiv. 14, Eph. vi. 4. Paul does not express in this verse something *more* than he strictly *means* (Reiche), but that which he *really* believes of the Roman church, *taken as a whole*; at which favourable conviction he—apart from the universally-diffused good report of the church (i. 8)—has arrived by means of experiences unknown to us, and perhaps also in virtue of his feeling assured that he might draw from the individuals and influential persons with whom he was acquainted a conclusion

respecting the whole. But *the fact that he does express it*,—this commendation,—rests on his apostolic *truth*, and on that *wisdom of teaching* which by good and real confidence attracts a zeal of compliance.

Ver. 15. *More boldly, however* (than so good a confidence appears to imply), *I wrote to you in part*, etc. “Quasi dicat: σπεύδοντα καὶ αὐτὸν ὀτρύνω,” Grotius. — *τολμηρότερον*] adverbially, Thuc. iv. 126. 3; Polyb. i. 17. 7; Lucian, *Icarom.* 10. The *comparative sense* is not to be obliterated (Bernhardy, p. 433; Winer, p. 228 [E. T. p. 304]), but may not be derived from *the lesser right of the apostle*<sup>1</sup> to write to a church not founded by him (Hofmann); comp. Bengel, who introduces the further idea: “*cum potius ipse venire deberem.*” It must, in fact, especially seeing that the more precise definition ἀπὸ μέρους is added, be necessarily a specification of the *mode*, expressing the *how* of the ἔγραφα. The repetition of ἀδελφοί flows from the earnestness of feeling. Comp. 1 Cor. i. 10, 11; Gal. v. 11, 13; Jas. v. 7, 9, 10. — ἀπὸ μέρους] belongs not merely to *τολμ.* (“*paulo liberius*,” Grotius, following the Peschito), but, as its position shows, to *τολμ. ἔγραφα* together: *partly, i.e. in particular places*, I wrote more boldly. This refers to passages like vi. 12 ff., 19, viii. 9, xi. 17 ff., xii. 3, xiii. 3 ff., 13, 14, xiv. 3, 4, 10, 13, 15, 20, xv. 1, *et al.* In ἀπὸ μέρους is implied the contrast, that he has *not* written *τολμηρότερον* *all* that he has written (comp. xi. 25; 2 Cor. i. 14), but only a *part* thereof. Hofmann has now exchanged his earlier incorrect view, “*provisionally and in the meantime*” (*Schriftbew.* II. 2, p. 95), for another also incorrect (similarly Th. Schott), namely *piecemeal*, in contrast to a *complete exposition of Christian truth*, thus equivalent to ἐκ μέρους, 1 Cor. xiii. 10 (not also in 1 Cor. xii. 27). Besides, this arbitrarily imported contrast would suit no epistle less than the Epistle to

<sup>1</sup> This lesser right is assumed quite without warrant. Paul certainly wrote to other churches of Gentiles not founded by him (Colossians, Laodiceans); and how could he, as the *apostle of the Gentiles*, be of opinion that he thereby *was taking any special liberty*? He had to glorify his *office* (xi. 13), in doing which his care for *all* churches (2 Cor. xi. 23) certainly suggested no limitation of epistolary intercourse to such as *he himself had founded*, as if it were a *boldness* in him needing excuse, when he also wrote to *others*.

the Romans, which treats the *whole* gospel in the *most complete manner*. According to Lucht, the expression in this passage is only the product of a post-apostolic effort to *wipe away* the "bad impression" of the epistle on the highly esteemed church, which had in fact been founded by Peter (comp. Theodore of Mopsuestia). — ὡς ἔπαναμ. ὑμᾶς] *as again reminding you*,<sup>1</sup> i.e. in the way and manner of one who reminds you, etc. See Bernhardy, p. 476; Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 263; Kühner, II. 2, p. 649 f.; 1 Thess. ii. 4; Heb. xiii. 17. ἔπαναμ. denotes *in memoriam revocare*. See Plat. *Legg.* iii. p. 688 A; Dem. 74. 7. Comp. ἐπανάμνησις, Dion. Hal. *Rhet.* x. 18. Theodore of Mopsuestia: εἰς ὑπόμνησιν ἄγειν ὧν μεμαθήκατε. — διὰ τὴν χάρι.] i.e. *in order to comply with* the apostolic office, with which God has favoured me. See ver. 16.

Ver. 16. Εἰς τὸ εἶναι κ.τ.λ.] Specification of the object aimed at in τὴν δοθεῖσάν μοι ὑπὸ τ. Θεοῦ. — λειτουργόν] Comp. on xiii. 6. Paul sets forth the service of his apostolic office, in the consciousness of its hallowed dignity, not merely as a public οἰκονομία (Ewald: "steward of the people"), but as a priestly *service of offering*, in which Ἰησοῦ Χ. expresses the λειτουργός as *ordained by Christ*. That Christ should be conceived of as *He to whom the offering is presented* (Reiche), is contrary to the conception of offering, which always refers to *God* as the receiver of it. Comp. xii. 1; Eph. v. 2; Phil. ii. 17. But neither is Christ to be conceived of (as by Bengel and Rückert) as *high priest* (a conception not of Paul, but rather of the Epistle to

<sup>1</sup> In opposition to Baur's erroneous explanation of ἔπαναμ., "further therein to remind," and its reference to *what follows*, see Mangold, p. 69, who, however, on his part, in virtue of the assumption of the Jewish-Christian character of the church, limits the ἀπὸ μέρους arbitrarily to those portions of the epistle (especially chap. ix. and x.) in which, in the interest of the Gentile-Christian apostolate, *Jewish-Christian pretensions* had been combated. It is just such entirely doctrinal discussions as chap. ix. x. which answer least to the character of πολυμρότερον, which presupposes the ready possibility of offence being given. The exculpation implied in ver. 15 is not calculated for a Jewish-Christian church (Mangold, p. 72), but rather for a church as yet strange to the apostle and held in very good repute, towards which he felt himself not in a like relation as e.g. to the Galatians and Corinthians, but in one more delicate and calling for more forbearance. Artfully and gently, too, is the ὡς ἀναμν. κ.τ.λ. added, as if what was written πολυμρότερον was only meant to be a help to *their memory*. Ἀνάμνησις δ' ἐστὶν ἐπιρροή φρονήσεως ἀπολυπούσης, Plat. *Legg.* v. p. 732 B.



the Hebrews, and applying to Christ as the *sole Atoner*, in which case the idea of inferior priests is out of place), but as Lord and Ruler of the church, who has appointed His apostle, i. 5. Lucht oddly thinks that the writer did not venture to call Paul, in consequence of his disputed position, *ἀπόστολος*, but only *λειτουργός*. — *εἰς τὰ ἔθνη*] *in reference to the Gentiles*; for these, as converted by the apostle, are to form the offering to be presented. — In the sequel, *ἱεουργοῦντα τὸ εὐαγγ. τ. Θεοῦ* contains the more precise explanation of *λειτουργ.* 'I. X., and *ἵνα γένηται ἡ προσφορά τῶν ἐθνῶν κ.τ.λ.* that of *εἰς τὰ ἔθνη*; hence the latter belongs not to *ἱεουργ.* (Th. Schott, Hofmann), but to what precedes, and is not (with Buttmann) to be omitted on the authority of B. — *ἱεουργ. τὸ εὐαγγ. τ. Θεοῦ*] *in priestly fashion administering the gospel of God, i.e. "administrans evang. a Deo missum hominibus, eoque ministerio velut sacerdotio fungens,"* Estius; comp. Chrysostom, Erasmus, and most older interpreters, also Rückert, Tholuck, Fritzsche, de Wette, Philippi. This usage of *ἱεουργ.* is confirmed by passages like Herodian. v. 3. 16; Joseph. *Antt.* vi. 6. 2; also by 4 Macc. vii. 8, where *ἰδίῳ αἵματι* is to be connected with *ἱεουργοῦντας τὸν νόμον* (in opposition to Hofmann, who will not admit the priestly notion in the word), not with *ὑπερασπίζοντας* (see Grimm, *Handb.* p. 329 f.); comp. Suicer, *Thes. s.v.*; Kypke *in loc.*; also *ἱεουργός*, Callim. *fr.* 450; *ἱεούργημα*, Joseph. *Antt.* viii. 4. 5; *ἱεουργία*, 4 Macc. iv. 1; Plat. *Legg.* p. 774 E; Pollux, i. 29. Without warrant, Hofmann insists on adhering to the conception of "*administering holy service.*" The *gospel* is not indeed the *offering* (Luther and others), which is presented, but the divine *institute*, which is administered—is in priestly fashion served—by the presenting of the offering. As to *εὐαγγ. Θεοῦ*, see on i. 1. — *ἡ προσφορά τῶν ἐθνῶν*] the *offering* of the Gentiles, *i.e.* the offering which the Gentiles are, Heb. x. 10; Eph. v. 2. The Gentiles converted, and through the Spirit consecrated as God's property, are the offering which Paul, as the priest of Jesus Christ, has brought to God. Observe, however, the stress laid on the prefixed *γένηται*: in order that *there may prosper* (see on this use of *γίνεσθαι* as regards offerings, Kühner, *ad Xen. Anab.* vi. 4. 9), in

accordance with which *ἐνπρόσδ.* is then *attributive* (as *well-pleasing*), and *ἁγιασμ. ἐ. πν. ἁγ.* is subordinated to the latter as its ground: *sanctified through the Holy Spirit*, which is received through the gospel in baptism, Gal. iii. 2, 5; Tit. iii. 5; Eph. v. 26. A contrast to the ceremonial consecration of the Levitical offerings. Comp. xii. 1.

Ver. 17. How readily might what was said in ver. 16 carry with it the appearance of vain self-boasting! To obviate this, the apostle proceeds: *I have accordingly* (in pursuance of the contents of ver. 16) *the boasting* (τὴν καύχησιν, see the critical notes) *in Christ Jesus in respect of my relation to God; i.e., my boasting is something which, by virtue of my connection with Christ* (whose λειτουργός I am, ver. 16), *in my position towards God* (for I administer God's gospel as an offering priest, ver. 16), *properly belongs to me.* The ἔχω is prefixed with emphasis: *it does not fail me*, like a something which one has not really as a possession but only ventures to ascribe to himself; then follows with ἐν X. 'I. and τὰ πρ. τ. Θ., a twofold more precisely defined character of this ethical possession, *excluding everything selfish*.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, we are not to explain as though ἐν X. 'I. bore the main stress and it ran ἐν Χριστῷ οὖν τὴν καύχησιν ἔχω κ.τ.λ. (which is Fritzsche's objection to the reading τὴν καύχ.); and καύχησις is neither here nor elsewhere equivalent to καύχημα (*materies gloriandi*), but is *gloriatio* (comp. 1 Cor. xv. 31), and the article marks the *definite* self-boasting concerned, *which Paul makes* (vv. 16, 18). Reiche connects ἐν X. with τ. καύχησιν, so that τὸ καυχᾶσθαι ἐν X. is to be explained as *the boasting oneself of Christ* (of the aid of Christ). Comp. also Ewald. Admissible linguistically, since the construction καυχᾶσθαι ἐν (v. 3, ii. 17, 23; Phil. iii. 3) allowed the annexation *without* the article; but at variance with the sequel, where what is shown is not the *right* to boast of the help of Christ (of this there is also in ver. 16 no mention), but *this*, that Paul *will* never *boast himself* otherwise than as simply the instrument of Christ, that he thus has Christ only to thank for the καυχᾶσθαι, only through Him is in the

<sup>1</sup> Not exactly specially "the consciousness of superior knowledge or singular spirituality," Hofmann. Comp. generally 1 Cor. xv. 10.

position to boast. — τὰ πρὸς τ. Θεόν] Comp. Heb. ii. 17, v. 1. Senler and Rückert take the article in a limiting sense: *at least before God*. But the “at least” is not expressed (τὰ γε πρ. τ. Θ., or πρὸς γε τ. Θ., or τὰ πρ. τ. Θ. γε), and Paul has indeed actually here and elsewhere frequently boasted *before men*, and with ample warrant, of his sacred calling.—We may add that this whole assertion of his calling, vv. 17–21, so naturally suggested itself to the apostle, when he was on the point of extending his activity to Rome and beyond it to the extreme west of the Gentile world, that there is no sufficient ground for seeking the occasion of it in the circumstances and experiences of the *Corinthian* church at that time (so especially Rückert, comp. also Tholuck and Philippi); especially since it is nowhere indicated in our epistle (not even in xvi. 17), that at that time (at a later epoch it was otherwise, Phil. i. 15 ff.) anti-Pauline efforts had occurred in Rome, such as had emerged in Corinth. See *Intro.* § 3.

Ver. 18. Negative confirmation of what is asserted in ver. 17. The correct explanation is determined partly by the connection, to be carefully observed, of οὐ with κατεργ., partly by the *order of the words*, according to which οὐ κατεργάσατο must have the emphasis, not Χριστός (Theodoret and others, including Calovius, Olshausen, Fritzsche, Tholuck). Hence: “*for I will not (in any given case) embolden myself to speak about any of those things (to boast of anything from the sphere of that) which Christ has not brought about through me, in order to make the Gentiles obedient to Him, by means of word and work.*” That is, affirmatively expressed: *for I will venture to let myself be heard only as to such things, the actual fulfilment of which has taken place by Christ through me, etc.*; I will therefore never pride myself on anything which belongs to the category of those things, which *have not been put into execution* by Christ through me.<sup>1</sup> This would be an untrue

<sup>1</sup> The objection of Hofmann: “The non-actual forms no collective whole, as a constituent element of which a single thing might be conceived,” is a mere empty subtlety. Had Paul, *e.g.*, boasted that Christ had wrought many conversions through him when he was in Athens, he would have spoken about something which would have been a single instance out of the category of the *non-actual*, namely, of that which Christ has *not wrought*. The view of Hofmann

speaking of results, as if the Lord had *brought them about* through me—which nevertheless had *not taken place*.—εἰς ὑπακ. ἔθνων] namely, through the adoption of faith in Him; comp. i. 5.—λόγῳ κ. ἔργῳ] applies to κατειργ. . . . ἔθνων.

Ver. 19. *In virtue of what powers* Christ, by means of word and work, has wrought through the apostle as His organ: (1) ἐν δυνάμ. σημείων κ. τερ.,—this refers back to ἔργῳ; (2) ἐν δυν. πνεύματος,—this applies to λόγῳ and ἔργῳ together, and is *co-ordinated* to the above ἐν δυν. σημ. κ. τερ., not *subordinated*, as Beza, Glückler, and others think, whereby the language would lose its simplicity and half of its import (the δύναμις πνεύμ. would pass into the background). According to Hofmann, who reads in ver. 20 φιλοτιμοῦμαι (see the critical notes), a new sentence is meant to begin with λόγῳ κ. ἔργῳ, the verb of which would be φιλοτιμοῦμαι. This yields, instead of the simple course of the language, a complicated structure of sentence which is in nowise indicated by Paul himself, as he has not written ἐν λόγῳ κ. ἔργῳ (conformably to the following). Besides, the εὐαγγελίζεσθαι by word and deed (thus the *preaching* through *deeds*), would be a modern conception foreign to the N. T. The ἔργα accompany and accredit the preaching (John x. 38, xiv. 11), but they *do not preach*. Comp. Luke xxiv. 19; Acts vii. 22; 2 Cor. x. 11. If φιλοτιμοῦμαι is to be read, then with Lachmann a new sentence is to be begun with ver. 20, so that all that precedes remains assigned to the *efficacy of Christ*, which is not the case with the view of Hofmann, although it is only in entire keeping with the language of *humility* which Paul here uses. The *genitives* are those of *derivation*: *power, which went forth from signs and wonders* (which Paul, as instrument of Christ, has performed), and *power, which went forth from the (Holy) Spirit* (who was communicated to the apostle through Christ) *upon the minds of men*. Comp. on ἐν δυν. πνεύμ., 1 Cor. ii. 4, 5.—

himself amounts to the sense, that the apostle wished to set aside all *his own*, which was not a work of Christ performed through him, with the object of *converting the Gentiles*. But thus, through the contrast of his *own* and the *work of Christ*, the emphasis would be transposed, resting now on Χριστός, as if it ran  
 ὃν οὐ Χριστός κατειργάσατο δι' ἑμοῦ.

σημεῖα κ. τέρατα] not different in substance; both *miracles*, both also denoting their *significant* aspect. See Fritzsche, p. 270 f. The collocation corresponds to the Heb. מִפְּסָקִים וּמִלֵּאוֹת, hence usually (the converse only in Acts ii. 22, 43, vi. 8, vii. 36, comp. ii. 19) σημεῖα stands first, and where only one of the two words is used, it is *always* σημεῖα, because Πῶς was the *striking* word giving *more immediately* the character of the thing designated. Contrary to the constant usage of the N. T., Reiche understands not outward miraculous facts, but *mental miracles*, which the preaching of the gospel has produced in the hearts of the newly-converted. Even 2 Cor. xii. 12 is not to be thus understood; see *in loc.* Miracles belonged to the σημεῖα τοῦ ἀποστόλου (2 Cor. *l.c.*), hence there is already of itself motive enough for their mention in our passage, and there is no need for the precarious assumption of a reference to pseudo-apostolic jugglers in Rome (Ewald). — ἐν δυνάμ. πνεύμ. ἁγ.] is related, not “awkwardly” (Hofmann), to ὧν οὐ κατεργ. Χριστός; for Christ has, for the sake of His working to be effected *through the apostle* (δι’ ἐμοῦ), given to him the Spirit. Very unnecessarily, and just as inappropriately,—since ὥστε must comprise *all* the preceding elements,—Hofmann forces ἐν δυν. πν. ἁγ., by means of an *hyperbaton*, into special connection with ὥστε. — ὥστε κ.τ.λ.] *Result*, which this working of Christ through Paul has had in reference to the extension of Christianity. — ἀπὸ Ἱερουσ.] From *this* spot, where Paul first entered the *apostolical* fellowship, Acts ix. 26 ff. (he had already previously worked three years, including the sojourn in Arabia, at *Damascus*; see on Gal. i. 17, 18), he defines the *terminus a quo*, because he intends to specify the greatest extension of his working *in space* (from south-east to north-west).<sup>1</sup> — καὶ κύκλῳ] enlarges the range of the *terminus a quo*:

<sup>1</sup> Yet he does not say “from Arabia” (Gal. *l.c.*), because it was very natural for him significantly to place the beginning at that spot where all the other apostles had begun their work and the apostolic church itself had arisen—in doing which, however, he, by adding καὶ κύκλῳ, does nothing to the prejudice of history. The less is there to be found in ἀπὸ Ἱερουσ. an inconsistency with the statements of the Epistle to the Galatians. This in opposition to Lucht, who sees also in μέγχι τ. Ἰλλυρ. an *incorrect* statement, and attributes to both points a *special design*.

*and round about*, embracing not merely Judaea, but, in correspondence to the magnitude of the measure of length, Arabia and Syria also. Of course, however, κύκλω is not included in the dependence on ἀπό, but stands in answer to the question *Where?* inasmuch as it adds to the statement *from whence* the working took place, the notice of the *local sphere*, which had been jointly affected by that local beginning as its field of action: *from Jerusalem, and in a circuit round*, Paul has fulfilled the gospel as far as Illyria. Flacius, Calovius, Paulus, Glöckler, following Chrysostom, Theodoret, and others, refer κύκλω to the *arc* which Paul described in his journey from Jerusalem by way of Syria, Asia, Troas, Macedonia, and Greece to Illyria. According to this, κύκλω would specify the *direction* in which he, starting from Jerusalem, moved forward. So also Hofmann. This direction would be that of a *curve*. But κύκλω never denotes this, and is never merely the opposite of *straight out*, but always *circumcirca* (comp. Judith i. 2; Mark iii. 34, vi. 6, 36; Luke ix. 12; Rev. iv. 6; very frequently in the Greek writers); and the addition, "*and in the arc of a circle*," would have been very superfluous and indeed like an empty piece of ostentation, seeing that in truth the *straight* direction from Jerusalem to Illyria passes for the most part through water. No reason also would be discoverable for Paul's adding the καί, and not merely writing κύκλω, in order to express: from Jerusalem *in a circular direction as far as Illyria*.—μέχρι τοῦ Ἰλλυρ.] The idea that Paul, as has recently been for the most part assumed, did not get to Illyria *at all*, but only *to the frontier* of this western region during a Macedonian bye-journey, throws upon him an appearance of magnifying his deeds, for which the silence of the Acts of the Apostles, furnishing, as it does, no complete narrative, supplies no warrant. Now, since in ver. 23 Illyria may not, without arbitrariness, be excluded from the regions where he has already laboured, because this country would otherwise have still afforded scope for labour, we must assume that Paul had really made an intermediate journey to Illyria. From what starting-point, cannot indeed be shown; hardly so soon as Acts xviii. 11, but possibly during the journey mentioned in Acts xx. 1-3

(see Anger, *temp. rat.* p. 84), so that his short sojourn in Illyria took place *not long before* his sojourn in Achaia, where he at Corinth wrote the Epistle to the Romans. Tit. iii. 12 can only be employed in confirmation of this by those who assume the authenticity of the Epistle to Titus, and its composition thus early (see Wieseler, Philippi). — πεπληρωμένοι τὸ εὐαγγ. τ. X.] *have brought to fulfilment* (comp. Col. i. 25) the gospel of Christ. This πληροῦν has taken place in an *extensive* sense through the fact that the gospel is spread abroad everywhere from Jerusalem to Illyria, and has met with acceptance. Analogous is the conception: ὁ λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡύξανε, Acts vi. 7, xii. 24, xix. 20. So long as the news of salvation has not yet reached its full and destined diffusion, it is still in the course of growth and increase; but when it has reached every quarter, so that no place any longer remains for the labour of the preacher (ver. 23), it has passed from the state of growing increase into the *full measure of its dimensions*. This view of the sense is alone strictly textual (see ver. 23), while closely adhering to the literal signification of εὐαγγ., which denotes the message itself, not the act of proclamation (Th. Schott, Mangold); and hence excludes the many divergent interpretations, namely: (1) That of Beza, Piscator, Grotius, Bengel, de Wette, Rückert, in substance also Köllner, Tholuck, van Hengel, and permissively, Reiche, that εὐαγγ. is equivalent to *munus praedicandi evang.*, which it does not mean; similarly Ewald: the executed *commission* of preaching. (2) That of Luther, Flacius, Castalio, and others: “that I *have fulfilled everything with the gospel*,” which is opposed to the words as they stand, although repeated by Baur. (3) That of Theophylact, Erasmus, and others, including Reiche and Olshausen: πληρ. τὸ εὐαγγ. denotes *completely to proclaim* the gospel. But the “*completely*” would in fact have here no relevant weight at all (such as at Acts xx. 27); for that Paul had not *incompletely* preached the gospel, was understood of itself. Others arbitrarily take it otherwise still, e.g. Calvin: “*praedicationem ev. quasi supplendo diffundere; coeperunt enim alii priores, sed ipse longius sparsit;*” Krehl: that I have *put* the gospel *into force and validity*; Philippi: that I have *realized* the

gospel, have introduced it into life (the gospel appearing as *empty*, before it is taught, accepted, understood); Hofmann, with comparison of the not at all analogous expression *πληροῦν τὸν νόμον*: the message of salvation misses its destination, if it remain *unproclaimed*—whereby *πληροῦν* would be reduced simply to the notion of *κηρύσσειν*.—The whole of the remark, ver. 19 f., connected with ver. 24, is to be explained, according to Baur, I. p. 307, simply from the intention (of the later writer) to draw here, as it were, a geographical line between two apostolic provinces, of which the one must be left to Peter. In opposition to *such* combinations, although Lucht still further elaborates them, it is sufficient simply to put into the scale the altogether Pauline character and emotional stamp of the language in vv. 19–33, in its inner truth, simplicity, and chasteness.

Vv. 20, 21. *But prosecuting it as a point of honour to preach in this way*, the οὐτω is now first negatively stated: *not where Christ was named*, then positively: *but, agreeably to the word of Scripture*, etc. Hence οὐχ ὅπου, not ὅπου οὐκ. — φιλοτιμ.] dependent on με, ver. 19. On φιλοτιμεῖσθαι, *to prosecute anything so that one seeks one's honour in it*, comp. 2 Cor. v. 9; 1 Thess. iv. 11; see Wetstein and Kypke. This full signification (not merely the more general one: *zealously to prosecute*) is to be maintained in all passages, including the classical ones, and admirably suits the context. The matter was a special *point of honour* with the apostle in his working;<sup>1</sup> 2 Cor. x. 15, 16. — ὠνομάσθη] *His name*, as the contents of confession, *has been named*, namely, by preachers and confessors. See ver. 21. — ἵνα μὴ κ.τ.λ.] *i.e.*, in order not simply to continue the work of conversion already begun by others. Comp. 1 Cor. iii. 10. The *reason* why Paul did not desire this, lay in the high consciousness of his *apostolic destination* (Acts xxvi. 17, 18), according to which he recognised the greatest and most difficult work, the *founding* of the church, as the *task of the apostle*, and found his *apostolic honour* in the solution of this task.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Lucht here conceives the writer to be dependent even on a mistaken understanding of 2 Cor. x. 15, 16.

<sup>2</sup> The objection of Baur, ii. p. 399, that in truth, if this had been really Paul's



Others, as Reiche, specify as the reason, that he had sought on account of his freer system of doctrine to avoid polemical controversies. This would be a principle of practical prudence, corresponding neither to the apostolical *idea*, nor to Paul's magnanimous *character* in following it out. — καθὼς γέγρα.] Isa. lii. 15, closely cited after the LXX., who took מַלְאֲכֵי in each case as *masculine*. The passage runs according to the original: “*What was never told to them, they see; and what they have never heard, they perceive;*” and the subject is the *kings*, who become dumb before the glorified Servant of God, not the *nations* (Hengstenberg, *Christol.* II. p. 305; Philippi). But the actual state of the case—seeing that, along with the kings, their peoples also must see the glory of the Servant of God—allowed the apostle here to put the *nations* as the subject, the *Gentile-peoples*, to whom, through him, the Servant of God as yet unknown to them is made known, *i.e.* Jesus Christ, in whom the Messianic fulfilment of that prophetic idea concerning the Servant of God, as the ideal of Israel, had appeared realized.<sup>1</sup> — περὶ αὐτοῦ] addition of the LXX. — ὄψονται] *they shall see*, namely mentally, in knowledge and faith, *it* (that which the preaching now brings before them). — οὐ οὐκ ἀκηκ.] namely, the news of Him (the gospel). — συνήσουσι] *shall understand it* (this news). Comp. Matt. xiii. 23, xv. 10.

Ver. 22. Διό] because, namely, my apostolic mode of working, just described (vv. 20, 21), did not yet permit me to depart from the districts mentioned, inasmuch as there was still work to do in founding. Comp. Beza: “*dum huc et illuc avocor, interpellatus et ita prohibitus.*” Incorrectly Bengel, Reiche, and others: because in Rome the foundation was laid by others. Ver. 23 is decisive against this. — τὰ

principle, the Epistle to the Romans itself would stand in contradiction to it, is invalid, since that principle referred only to his working as *present in person*; whence he thought of visiting the Romans only as διαπορεύμενος (ver. 24), on his intended journey to Spain. But to address *letters* to a church of a Pauline stamp, which had nevertheless been founded by others, such as, in fact, he wrote to the Colossians and Laodiceans, was not excluded by the above principle, the point of which was rather the *personal presence at the founding of churches, and the oral proclamation of salvation.*

<sup>1</sup> Comp. Schultz, *alltestam. Theol.* II. p. 263 ff.

πολλά] more than πολλάίς, i. 13 (πολλά): *in the most cases* (πλείστα, Plat. *Hipp. maj.* p. 281 B), *as a rule*, not “so often” (Th. Schott). The Vulgate renders correctly: *plerumque*. See Schaefer, *ad Bos. Ell.* p. 427; Ast, *ad Plat. Legg.* p. 62 f. Paul has had *other* hindrances also, but *mostly* such as had their ground in the above regulative principle of his working. Hofmann understands ἐνεκοπτ. of *external hindrances*; so that Paul means that he, even if he would, could not come otherwise than in pursuance of that principle, to Rome (whither that principle did *not* lead him). This is at variance with the following νυνὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ., which in μηκέτι τόπου ἔχων ἐν τ. κλ. τ. expresses the removal now of the hindrance meant by ἐνεκοπτ. — τοῦ ἐλθεῖν] genitive dependent on the verb of hindering. See Bornemann, *ad Xen. Anab.* i. 7. 20; Fritzsche, *ad Matth.* p. 845.

Vv. 23, 24.<sup>1</sup> *But since I have now no longer room* (scope, i.e. *opportunitatem*, see on xii. 19; Kypke, II. p. 190) *in these regions* (from Jerusalem to Illyria, ver. 19). Paul had in all these countries founded churches, from which Christianity was now spreading through other teachers, and especially through his own disciples, over the whole; and consequently he considered his apostolic calling to be fulfilled in respect of the region mentioned. His further working was to belong to the far west, where Christ was not yet named; hence he meditated, in the next instance, transferring his activity in founding churches to Spain—a design, indeed, which Lucht denies that the apostle entertained, and imputes it to a *later* conception of his task, in accordance with which the plan of a journey to Spain was *invented*. Probably the comprehensive maxim, that

<sup>1</sup> With the omission of ἐλίσσεται πρὸς ὑμᾶς after Σπανίαν, and of γάρ after ἰλπίζω (see the critical notes), the course of the passage flows on simply, so that νυνὶ δὲ, ver. 23, is connected with ἰλπίζω, and all that intervenes is parenthetical. If ἐλίσσ. πρὸς ὑμᾶς only be struck out and the γάρ be retained, with Lachmann, Hofmann, Tischendorf, 8, a striking interruption of the construction results. To parenthesize ἰλπίζω γάρ . . . ἐμπλησθῶ (Lachmann, followed by Buttmann, *l.c.* p. 252, comp. also Hofmann) is not suitable to the contents of the continuation, ver. 25. Ewald extends the parentheses from ἰλπίζω γάρ even to λειτουργῆσαι αὐτοῖς, ver. 27. But considering the entirely calm tenor of the whole passage, the probability of such large parentheses, with all their intermediate clauses, is just as slight as the probability of an *anacoluthia* (Tisch. 8).

he had no longer a sphere of activity where Christianity might be planted at the principal places of a district by his personal exertions, was connected with the expectation of the nearness of the *Parousia*, before which the πλήρωμα of the Gentiles, and in consequence of this also all Israel, had to be brought in (xi. 25). — ἐπιποθίαν] not *summum desiderium* (Beza), but see on iv. 11. The word is not found elsewhere; but comp. ἐπιπόθησις, 2 Cor. vii. 7. — τοῦ ἐλθεῖν] genitive dependent on ἐπιποθ. — ἀπὸ πολλ. ἐτ.] *now for many years*; comp. Luke viii. 43. — ὥς ἄν] *simulatque, so soon as*. See on 1 Cor. xi. 34; Phil. ii. 23. It is a more precise definition to *what follows*, not to the preceding ἐλθεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς (Hofmann), because otherwise Paul must have had in mind the *plan of the journey to Spain for many years*, which cannot be supposed either in itself or on account of Acts xvi. 9. This applies also against Tischendorf in his 8th edition. — Σπανίαν] The usual Greek name is Ἰβηρία (Herod. i. 163; Strabo, iii. 4. 17, p. 166), but Σπανία (although in the passages in Athenaeus and Diodorus Siculus the variation Ἰσπανία is found) was probably also not rare, and that as a *Greek form* (Casaubon, *ad Athen.* p. 574). The *Roman form* was Ἰσπανία (1 Macc. viii. 3). It is *the entire Pyrenaean peninsula*. See Strabo, *l.c.*—That this project of a journey to *Spain* was not executed, see *Introd.* § 1. Primasius aptly remarks: “Promiserat quidem, sed dispensante Deo non ambulavit.” Already at Acts xx. 25 a quite different certainty was before the apostle’s mind, and in his captivity he no longer entertained that plan of travel, Philem. 22, Phil. ii. 24. — διαπορευόμε.] “quia Romae jam fundata est fides,” Bengel. — ἀφ’ ὑμῶν] (see the critical notes): *from you away*. — προπεμφθ. ἐκεῖ] comp. 1 Cor. xvi. 6, 2 Cor. i. 16, and on Acts xv. 3. As was his wont on his apostolical journeys, Paul hoped (“quasi pro jure suo,” Bengel) to obtain an accompaniment on the part of some belonging to the church from Rome to Spain, by which we must understand an escort *all the way thither*, since Paul would without doubt travel *by sea* from Italy to Spain, the shortest and quickest way. ἐκεῖ, in the sense of ἐκεῖσε, according to a well-known attraction. See John xi. 8, *et al.*,

and on Matt. ii. 22. — ἀπὸ μέρ.] “non quantum vellem, sed quantum licebit,” Grotius. It is a limitation *out of compliment*. Comp. Chrysostom. But the reservation of *later complete* enjoyment (Hofmann) is an idea imported: πρῶτον denotes *in the first place* (before I travel further), as Matt. vi. 33, vii. 5, viii. 21, and frequently. — ἐμπλησθῶ] of *spiritual satisfaction* through the enjoyment of the longed-for personal intercourse (ὑμῶν). Comp. Hom. *Il.* xi. 452; Kypke, *II.* p. 191. The commentary on this is given at i. 12.

Ver. 25. *Νυνὶ δέ*] is not, like the above *νυνὶ δέ* (ver. 23), to be regarded as *resumptive*, as Buttmann and Hofmann, in consequence of the reading ἐλπίζω γάρ, ver. 24, take it,—a view with which what was previously said of the journey to Spain by way of Rome does not accord,<sup>1</sup> and the passage itself assumes a very stiff, contorted form. Observe, rather, that the first *νυνὶ δέ*, ver. 23, was said in contrast to the *past* (ἐνεκοπτόμην κ.τ.λ.), but that the second *νυνὶ δέ*, ver. 25, commencing a new sentence, is said in contrast to the promised *future*. “So I design and hope to do (as stated in ver. 24): *but at present* a journey to Jerusalem is incumbent upon me; after *its* accomplishment I shall then carry out that promised one by way of Rome to Spain (ver. 28).” This *νυνὶ δέ* is more definite than if Paul had said, “*but beforehand*” (which Hofmann with this view requires); for he thinks that *now* he is *just on the point of* travelling to Jerusalem, whereas “*but beforehand*” would admit a *later* term of the πορεύομαι. — διακονῶν τοῖς ἁγ.] *in service for the saints* (Christians in Jerusalem), consequently not delaying the Romano-Spanish journey in his own interest. The *present* participle (not *future*, as Acts xxiv. 17, and see Bornemann, *ad Xen. Anab.* vii. 7. 17) designates the very travelling itself as part of the service. See Markland and Matthiae, *ad Eur. Suppl.* 154; Heindorf, *ad Phaed.* p. 249 f.; Dissen, *ad Pind.* p. 81.—The intention, ascribed to the apostle, of protecting himself in rear by the collection-

<sup>1</sup> Hofmann imports the connection: The participial sentence, ver. 23, is intended to express, “*under what circumstances Paul is now setting out on a journey to Jerusalem,*” instead of coming to Rome, *whither he would otherwise at this time see himself destined and impelled.* This is certainly not expressed.

journey, before he passed into the far west (Th. Schott), is a purely gratuitous assumption.

Ver. 26. More precise information respecting the διακονῶν τοῖς ἁγ. : "*Placuit enim Macedonibus,*" etc. On εὐδόκ., *they have been pleased*, comp. Luke xii. 32 ; 1 Cor. i. 21 ; Gal. i. 15 ; Col. i. 19 ; 1 Thess. ii. 8. — κοινῶν. τινὰ ποιήσ. κ.τ.λ.] *to bring about a participation, in reference to the poor, i.e. to make a collection for them.* The contributor, namely, enters into fellowship with the person aided, in so far as he κοινωνεῖ ταῖς χρεαῖς αὐτοῦ, xii. 13 ; κοινωνία is hence the characteristic expression for *almsgiving*, without, however, having changed its proper sense *communio* into the active one of *communication* ; "*honesta et acquitatis plena appellatio,*" Bengel. Comp. 2 Cor. ix. 13 ; Heb. xiii. 16. The added τινὰ, *of some sort or other*, corresponds to the freedom from constraint, and the consequent indefiniteness, of the amount to be aimed at. On the collection itself, see 1 Cor. xvi. 1 ff. ; 2 Cor. viii. 9 ; Acts xxiv. 17. — τοὺς πτωχοὺς τῶν ἁγ.] *the poor among the saints* at Jerusalem. These were thus not all of them poor. Comp. Kühner, II. 1, p. 290. Of the community of goods there is no longer a trace in Paul. Philippi incorrectly holds that the πτωχοὶ τῶν ἁγίων are the *poor saints generally*. Since the genitive is in any case partitive (even in the passages in Matthiae, § 320, p. 791), the expression must at least have been τοὺς (not τῶν) ἐν Ἱερουσ.

Ver. 27. Information, why they did so, by way of more precisely defining the mere εὐδοκήσαν previously expressed.<sup>1</sup> "*They have been pleased, namely, to do it, and* (this is the added element) *their debtors they are.*" — The Gentiles have acquired a share (ἐκοινωνήσαν) in the spiritual possession of the Christians of Jerusalem (αὐτῶν), in so far as the *mother church* of Christianity was in Jerusalem, so that thus the spiritual benefits of Christianity, which in the first instance were destined for and communicated to the Jews and subsequently passed over also to the Gentiles, have been diffused *from Jerusalem forth* over the Gentile world (which march of diffusion so begun continues), as indeed in Antioch itself the

<sup>1</sup> "Est egregia ἀναφορὰ simul cum ἐπανορθώσει," Grotius.

first church of Gentile Christianity was founded from Jerusalem (Acts xi. 20). — τοῖς πνευματικ.] for the benefits of Christianity (faith, justification, peace, love, hope, etc.) proceed from the *Holy Spirit*, are τὰ τοῦ πνεύματος δῶρα: comp. on Eph. i. 3. — τοῖς σαρκικοῖς] for the earthly possessions concern the *material and physical phenomenal nature* of man, which is his bodily form of existence. Comp. 1 Cor. ix. 11. — The *conclusion* is a *majori*, which they have received, *ad minus*, with which they are under obligation to requite it. Comp. Chrysostom. By λειτουργῆσαι, Paul places the almsgiving of love under the sacred point of view of a *sacrificial service* (see on xiii. 6, xv. 16), which is performed for the benefit of the recipients. Comp. 2 Cor. ix. 12; Phil. ii. 30, ii. 25. — That farther, as Chrysostom, Calvin, Grotius, and many, including Rückert and Olshausen, assume, Paul intended “courteously and gently” (Luther) to suggest to the Romans that they should likewise bestow alms on those at Jerusalem, is very improbable, inasmuch as no reason is perceivable why he should not have ventured on a direct summons, and seeing, moreover, that he looked upon the work of collection as concluded, ver. 25. Without any particular design in view (Th. Schott thinks that he desired to settle the true relation between the Gentile Christians and the apostle to the Gentiles), he satisfies merely his own evident and warm interest.

Ver. 28. Τοῦτο] This work of service for Jerusalem. — κ. σφραγισ. κ.τ.λ.] and when I shall have sealed to them this fruit, i.e. shall have confirmed the produce of the κοινωνία, ver. 26, to them, secured it as their property. σφραγίζ. in the *figurative* sense: to confirm, to ratify (see on John iii. 33); for by delivery of the moneys they were, on the part of the apostle, confirmed to the recipients as the fruit collected *for them*, after the manner of the law of possession, as with seal impressed.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The act of handing over itself, namely, was the σφραγίς of the collection for the recipients. Before the delivery the moneys were indeed destined for them, but not yet *de facto* assured to them as property on the part of the apostle, the bearer. Theodore of Mopsuestia well explains the σφραγισάμ. by ἀποκομίσας καὶ διδωκώς, and adds, by way of assigning the reason: εἰ γὰρ καὶ τῇ γνώμῃ πάντων διδωκότων τίλεις ἢ ὁ παρὼς, ἀλλὰ τῇ χρείᾳ ἀτελής, εὖπω διεχμίνων ἄνθρωποι οὐκ ἔτι κεν ἐτίκην. Without any ground in the text, Hofmann introduces *bearers appointed*

The expression chosen has a certain *solemnity*; the apostle is *moved* by the thought that with the close of the work of love to which he refers he was to finish his long and great labours in the East, and was to take in hand a new field in the far West. In these circumstances, an unusual thoughtful expression for the concluding act offers itself naturally. But that which Fritzsche finds in it (rendering of an account and other formalities) neither lies in the simple figurative word, nor was it doubtless intended by Paul, considering his apostolical dignity. Others take σφραγισ. in the *proper* sense, either thus: "*when I have brought over the money to them, sealed*" (Erasmus, Cornelius a Lapide, Estius), which, however, the words do not express at all, and how paltrily unapostolic the thought would be! or, referring αὐτοῖς to the Greek Christians (so already Theodoret): "*when I have made them secure with letter and seal respecting the right delivery of their collection*" (Glöckler, and so already Michaelis), against which, apart from the unsuitableness of the sense, it is decisive that αὐτοῖς brooks no other reference than αὐτῶν and αὐτοῖς, ver. 27 (comp. τοῖς ἁγίοις, ver. 25). This also against Reithmayr, who brings out even a *depositing* for the almsgivers *in God's treasury*!

Ver. 29. Paul is convinced that his advent to the Romans will not be without rich blessing from Christ; he will bring with him a *fulness* (*copia*, see on Eph. iii. 19) of Christ's blessing. On the matter itself, comp. i. 11. — ἐν is to be explained: *furnished with*. See Bernhardt, p. 209, and on 1 Cor. iv. 21. Quite contrary to the words, Chrysostom, Oecumenius, Calvin, and others: "Scio me . . . vos inventurum repletos omnibus donis spiritualibus," Estius. — ἐρχόμενος with the same verb ἐλεύσομαι; see Kühner, II. 2, p. 656, and *ad Xen. Mem.* iv. 2. 21. Comp. on 1 Cor. ii. 1; Phil. ii. 2.

*on the part of the church*, whom the apostle himself conducts to Jerusalem, thereby designating the gift to the recipients as one *destined for them with his knowledge and will*. Hofmann's objection, that the interpretation given above rather suggests that it should be termed an *unsealing* than a *sealing*, is a cavil running counter to the figurative usage elsewhere of σφραγίζειν and σφραγίς, and which might just as aptly be applied to Hofmann's own explanation.

Vv. 30, 31. Even now (comp. Acts xx. 22, 23, xxi. 10 ff.) Paul anticipates that persecutions await him in Judaea on the part of the *unbelieving* (ἀπειθούντων, *inobedientium*, who refuse the ὑπακοή πίστεως; comp. xi. 30, 31; John iii. 36; Acts xiv. 2); but even on the part of the Palestinian *Christians* (τ. ἀγίοις), he is not sure of a good reception for his διακονία, because he, the *anti-Judaic apostle* (comp. x. 21; Acts xxi. 21), had set on foot and conducted a *Gentile-Christian* collection. Hence the addition of the *exhortation* (παρακαλῶ) to the readers, subjoined by the continuative δέ, and how urgent and fervent! — διὰ] belonging to παρακ.: by means of a moving reference to Christ, as xii. 1, 2 Cor. x. 1. — The ἀγάπη τοῦ πνεύμ. is the love wrought by the *Holy Spirit* (Gal. v. 22); it Paul calls in specially by way of inciting his readers to compliance. — συναγων. μοι ἐν ταῖς προσευχ.] *to contend along with me in the prayers which you make*, hence: *in your prayers*. A very correct gloss is ὑμῶν (after προσευχ.) in codd. and vss.; not one *disfiguring the sense*, as Reiche thinks, who explains: *in my prayer*. So also Ewald. Paul might certainly, according to the sympathy of the fellowship of love, claim the joint striving of the readers in *his* prayers; but ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ, which would otherwise be superfluous, points most naturally to the conclusion that the προσευχαί are those of *the readers*; comp. 2 Cor. i. 11; Col. iv. 12. The ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ πρὸς τὸν Θεόν is closely, and without the article, attached to ταῖς προσευχαῖς (similarly to προσεύχεσθαι ὑπὲρ, Col. i. 9, *et al.*): *in the prayers which you address to God for me* (for my welfare). Fervent prayer is a *striving* of the inner man against the hostile or dangerous powers, which it is sought to avert or overcome, and for the aims, which it is sought to attain. Comp. on Col. *l.c.* — ἵνα ῥυσθῶ ἀπὸ κ.τ.λ.] Aim of the joint striving: *in order that I may be delivered from*, etc. See on Matt. vi. 13. It did *not* pass into fulfilment; even now the counsel of his Lord, Acts ix. 16, was to be accomplished. — ἡ διακ. μου ἡ εἰς Ἱερουσ.] *my rendering of service destined for Jerusalem*. See vv. 25, 26. Comp. 2 Cor. viii. 4, ix. 1.

Vv. 32, 33. [ἵνα] Aim of ver. 31, and so *final aim* of συναγωνίσασθαι κ.τ.λ., ver. 30. Comp. Gal. iv. 5. — ἐν χαρᾷ] *in*



*joyfulness*.<sup>1</sup> But as a prisoner he came to Rome, whither the will of God (διὰ θελήμ. Θεοῦ) led him, nevertheless, otherwise than it had been *his* desire (comp. i. 10). — *συναναπαύσωμαι*] *refresh myself with you*, namely, through the mutual communication of faith, of inward experiences, of love, of hope, etc. Comp. *συμπαράκληθῆναι*, i. 12. — In the closing wish, ver. 33, the designation of God as ὁ Θεὸς τῆς εἰρήνης, the God who brings about peace, was the more naturally suggested, as the forebodings of the opposite of εἰρήνη which he was going to encounter had just been before the apostle's mind. Hence we have neither to assume a reference to the differences in xiv. 1 ff. (Grotius and others), nor to take εἰρήνη of the peace of reconciliation, v. 1 (Philippi), or in the wide sense of *salus* (Fritzsche). Comp. rather 1 Cor. xiv. 33; 2 Cor. xiii. 11; Phil. iv. 9; Rom. xvi. 20; 1 Thess. v. 23.

<sup>1</sup> It would even with the reading *ἐλθέω* (see the critical notes), which Hofmann follows, belong to *this* word, beside which it stands, not to *συναναπ.* (Hofmann).

## CHAPTER XVI.

Ver. 3. Πρίσταν] Elz.: Πρίσιν. λαν, against decisive evidence. After Acts xviii. 2; 1 Cor. xvi. 19 (Elz.). — Ver. 5. Ἀσίας] Elz. has Ἀχαΐας, against almost equally decisive evidence; but it is defended by Ammon and de Wette on the testimony of the Peschito, and because 1 Cor. xvi. 15 might certainly give occasion for changing Ἀχ. into Ἀσ. But the reading Ἀχ. might readily also have come into the text through the mere marginal writing of the parallel passage 1 Cor. *loc.*, especially if it was considered that Paul wrote his letter in Achaia; hence the greatly preponderant external attestation in favour of Ἀσ. retains its validity. — Ver. 6. ὑμᾶς] approved by Griesb., adopted also by Lachm. and Tisch. 8, according to A B C\* s\* min. Syr. utr. Arr. Copt. Aeth. But Elz., Scholz, Tisch. 7, Fritzsche have ἡμᾶς. Since Paul in the context sends greeting to persons who stood in a peculiar relation to *himself*, and thereby the alteration of ὑμᾶς into ἡμᾶς was very easily suggested, the more does the external evidence turn the scale in favour of ὑμᾶς, especially as the reading ἐν ὑμῖν in D E F G, Vulg. It. Ruf. Ambrosiast. attests the original εἰς ὑμᾶς (of which it is an interpretation). — Ver. 7. οἱ . . . γέγον.] D E F G: τοῖς πρὸ ἐμοῦ. Gloss, following on a mistaken reference of the relative to ἀποστολῆς. — Ver. 14. The order of the names: Ἑρμῆν, Πατρίβαν, Ἑρμᾶν (so Lachm. and Tisch., also Fritzsche) is rendered certain by A B C D\* F G P s, min. vss. Ruf. — Ver. 16. πᾶσαι] is wanting in Elz., but is justly adopted by Griesb., following Mill, and by later editors on decisive evidence, and because it might easily give offence. — Ver. 18. καὶ ἐὺλογίας] is wanting in D E F G, min. It. Omitted through the *homocolecheton*. — Ver. 19. ἐφ' ὑμῖν] The ordinary reading of τὸ before ἐφ' ὑμῖν has the greatest preponderance of evidence against it. Lachm. and Tisch.: ἐφ' ὑμῖν ὧν χαίρω, as A B C L P s\*, min. Dam. Ruf. read. Rightly: the sequence of the words in the *Recepta* (χαίρω ὧν first) is the *ordinary* one. — After ver. 20, ἀμὴν in Elz. is condemned by decisive testimony. — Ver. 21. ἀσπάζονται] Decisive witnesses have ἀσπά-  
ζονται. Commended by Griesb., adopted by Lachm., Tisch., and

Fritzsche. The plural came to be introduced on account of the plurality of persons. — Ver. 24 is wanting entirely in  $\Lambda B C \Sigma$ , 5, 137, Copt. Aeth. Vulg. ms. Harl.\* Ruf.; it is found after ver. 27 in P, 17, 80, Syr. Arm. Aeth. Erp. Ambrosiast. Omitted by Lachm. and Tisch. 8; rejected also by Koppe and Reiche, who think that it is an interpolated repetition of the benediction, ver. 20, which, after the transference of vv. 25–27 to the end of chap. xiv., was added in order not to leave the epistle without a conclusion. But the witnesses for *omission* are precisely those which have the doxology vv. 25–27 in the ordinary place, either merely in this place (as  $B C \Sigma$ , 137), or likewise also after chap. xiv. (as  $A P$ , 5); and the witnesses for the *transposition* of the verse to the end are likewise not those, which have the doxology merely after chap. xiv. or not at all. Hence we may with safety conclude that ver. 24 was omitted or transposed *for the reason* that copyists stumbled partly at the fact that Paul, contrary to his manner elsewhere, should have joined a blessing and a doxology together, and partly at least at the circumstance that he should have placed the latter *after* the former (all other epistles conclude with the blessing).

*On the doxology, vv. 25–27.* This is found (1) *at the end of chap. xvi.*, in  $B C D^* E \Sigma$ , 16, 66,<sup>1</sup> 80, 137, 176, codd. in Ruf. codd. in Erasm. Syr. Erp. Copt. Aeth. Vulg. ms. and ed. Clar. Germ. Ruf. Ambrosiast. Pel. and the other Latin Fathers. (2) It is found *at the end of chap. xiv.* in  $L$  and almost all min.; further, in the Greek lectionaries, the Arab. vss., in Polyglots, Syr. p. Goth. (?) Slav. ms. and ed. codd. in Ruf. Chrys. Theodoret, Damasc. Theophyl. Oecum. Theodul. (3) It is found *at both places* in  $A P$ , 5, 17, 109, lat. Finally (4), it is *not found at all* in  $D^{***2} F G$  (where, however, after chap. xiv., a gap of six lines is left), codd. in Erasm. codd. in Jerome,<sup>3</sup> Marcion. See the complete examination of the evidence in Reiche, *Comm. crit.*, and Tisch. 8, also Lucht, p. 49 ff.—Among the *critics and*

<sup>1</sup> A transcript of the first Erasmian edition, which, however, has on the margin the observation, that *ἐν τοῖς παλαιῶς ἀντιγράφοις* this doxology stands at the end of chap. xiv.

<sup>2</sup> In  $D$ , namely, the doxology *from the first hand* stands after chap. xvi., but the *emendator* indicates it as to be deleted, without assigning it to the end of chap. xiv.

<sup>3</sup> Jerome on Eph. iii. 5: "Qui volunt prophetas non intellexisse, quod dixerint . . . illud quoque, *quod ad Rom. in plerisque codd. invenitur*, ad confirmationem sui dogmatis trahunt legentes: ei autem, qui potest vos roborare, etc." But that already *before Marcion* the doxology was wanting in codd., there is no certain trace.

*exegetes*, (1) the ordinary position in chap. xvi. has been maintained by the Complut. Erasm. Steph. Beza (ed. 3-5), Calvin, Bengel, Koppe, Böhme, Rinck, Lachmann, Köllner, Scholz, Fritzsche, de Wette, Rückert, Reithmayr, Philippi, Tischendorf, Tholuck, Ewald, van Hengel, and others. (2) The position after xiv. 23 has been approved by Grotius, Mill, Wetstein, and Semler, following Beza (ed. 1 and 2); Griesbach and Matthiæ removed it to that place in their critical texts; and Morus, Paulus, Eichhorn, Klee, Schrader, Hofmann, Laurent, and others agree thereto. (3) The verses were *rejected as spurious* by Schmidt, *Eial. in's N. T.* p. 227, Reiche, Krehl, Lucht.—Now the question is: *Is the doxology genuine?* and if it is, *has it its original position at the close of chap. xiv. or of chap. xvi.?* We answer: I. *The doxology is genuine.* For (a) the witnesses for entire omission are, as against the preponderance of those who have it in one of the two passages or in both, much too weak, especially as the transposition and double insertion are very capable of explanation (see below). (b) The language and the entire character of it are highly Pauline,—a fact which even opponents must admit, who accordingly assume its compilation out of Pauline phrases.<sup>1</sup> (c) The contents of it admirably suit the entire contents of the epistle. (d) The internal reasons adduced against it by its assailants are completely untenable. It is maintained (see especially Reiche, and comp. Lucht): (α) That at each place, where the doxology appears, it is unsuitable. But it appears as disturbing the connection only after xiv. 23, and it is not at all unsuitable after chap. xvi., where it rather, after the closing wishes more than once repeated, forms with great appropriateness and emphasis the main conclusion which now actually ensues. (β) That it has not the simplicity of the Pauline doxologies, is pompous, overloaded, etc. It is certainly more bulky and laboured than others; but no other Pauline doxology stands at the end of an entire epistle where the great power of thought in the writing concentrated itself in feeling—no other at the end of a section, the purport and importance of which can be compared with that of the entire Epistle to the Romans. Hence it can by no means appear strange that such a doxology has obtained the character of overflowing fulness from the whole recollection of what had been written,—a collective recollection which, so far from being fitted to beget in a rich and lively disposition only an ordinary and plain thanksgiv-

<sup>1</sup> Un-Pauline constituent elements and modes of representation, which Lucht believes are to be found generally in the two last chapters, have no existence in reality; the grounds of offence are disposed of by the exposition.

ing to God, is fitted rather to produce an outpouring of fervour and fulness of thought, under the influence of which the interest of easy expression and of simple presentation falls into the background. (γ) That the whole conception is uncertain, many expressions and combinations are obscure, unusual, even quite unintelligible; and (δ) that the conjunction of εὐαγγ. μου καὶ τ. κήρυγμα Ἰ. Χ. is un-Pauline and unsuitable; as is in like manner φανερωθέντος, which verb is never used by Paul of the utterances of the prophets,—groundless occasions of offence, which are made to disappear by a correct explanation. On such internal grounds Reiche builds the hypothesis, *that in the public reading the merely epistolary last two chapters were omitted; that the public reading thus ended at xiv. 23; and the doxology spoken at the end of that reading was written first on the margin, afterwards also in the text, consequently after xiv. 23, whence copyists, on recognising its unsuitable position, removed it to the end of the epistle. It is thus the work of an anagnostes, who compiled it clumsily from Pauline formulas, and that in imitation of the conclusion of the Epistle of Jude.*<sup>1</sup> In opposition to this whole view, it is particularly to be borne in mind: (1) that the assumption that only the doctrinal part of the epistle was publicly read is a pure fancy, and is as much at variance with the high reverence for what was apostolic, as with the circumstance that, according to the lectionaries, these very chapters xv. and xvi. consist wholly of sections for reading; (2) that at least xv. 1-13 would have been included in the reading, and the doxology must thus have obtained its place after xv. 13; (3) that the presumed custom of uttering a doxology when the reading of an apostolic writing was finished, does not at all admit of proof; (4) that a Pauline doxology would have been chosen for imitation more naturally than that of Jude 24, 25, as indeed, conversely, Jude *l.c.* would more naturally presuppose an acquaintance with our passage; (5) that τὸ εὐαγγ. μου was not at all suitable to the person of an anagnostes; and indeed an *imitative* reader was hardly in the position and mood to pour forth an expression of praise in so overflowing a gush, and thereby in anacoluthic construction. But when Lucht refuses a Pauline character to the doxology, in respect not merely of form and diction, but also of the thought which it contains, and recognises in it a gnosticizing and conciliatory stamp, this judgment rests on misinterpretations in detail and on presuppositions, which lie altogether outside the range of the N. T., along with a recourse

<sup>1</sup> In the *Comment. crit.* p. 116, Reiche is of opinion that it may have been added "a homine privato, qui ingenio suo indulgeret."

to the rejection of the genuineness not merely of the Pastoral epistles, but also of the so-called epistles of the captivity.—II. *The position of the doxology after xvi. 24 is the original one.* For (a) the external witnesses for this view are preponderant, not indeed in number, but in value. See above, and compare Gabler, *Præf. ad Griesb., Opusc.* p. 24. (b) Its position at the end of chap. xvi. was quite fitted to excite offence and to occasion a transposition, *partly* because no other epistle of the apostle concludes with a doxology; *partly* because here even the usual formal conclusion of an epistle (the apostolical blessing) immediately precedes; *partly* because ἡμᾶς στερήζαι seemed specially to refer back to the section respecting the weak in faith. The latter point was decisive at the same time as to the place to which—the connection between chap. xiv. and xv. as a unity being far from sufficiently appreciated—the doxology was referred, namely after xiv. 23, where there is the last direct mention of the weak, while xv. 1 then turns directly to the strong. Several other defenders of the ordinary position (see especially Koppe, *Exc.* II. p. 404; Gabler, *l.c.* p. 26; Bertholdt, *Einleit.* VI. § 715; Hug, *Einl.* II. p. 397, with whom Reithmayr agrees) thought, indeed, that the omission of at least chap. xvi. in the reading of the letter had occasioned the beautiful and weighty doxology, which it was desired should not be excluded from the reading, to be placed after chap. xiv.—not after chap. xv., either (Bertholdt, Hug) because chap. xv. has already a conclusion, or because the supposed reference of στερήζαι to the weak in faith pointed out that place. But the whole supposition that an integral portion of the epistle was omitted in reading is entirely incapable of being established. Not more plausible is the theory to which Rinck has recourse (comp. already Zeger and Böhme): “*In codd. ex recensione Marcionis perscriptis librarios, ipso fortasse Marcione auctore, clausulam ex fine epistolæ assuise, et postquam quod decrat a correctoribus suppletum esset, alios hanc clausulam iterasse, alios hinc, alios illinc, alios utrinque egerisse*” (*Lucubr. crit.* p. 135). Marcion himself and his disciples rejected (Origen, *interpr. Ruf.*), indeed, the doxology on account of its contents (see especially ver. 26, ὁ δὲ τὸ γὰρ ζῆλον περὶ ζήτων); but the orthodox certainly did not concern themselves with Marcionitic copies; indeed, Origen says expressly, that in the copies “*quæ non sunt à Marcione temerata,*” the doxology is found differently placed either after chap. xiv. or after chap. xvi. Ewald, regarding vv. 3–20 as the fragment of an epistle to the Ephesians, believes that a reader somewhere about the beginning of the second century observed the heterogeneous character of

that portion, but then excised too much, namely chap. xv. and xvi. Such a copy, in his view, Marcion had; but now that chap. xiv. was without a proper conclusion, at least the doxology xvi. 25-27 came to be appended thereto by other copyists. But apart from the above opinion respecting vv. 3-20 in itself (see, in opposition to it, the critical notes on chap. xv.), it would not be at all easy to see why they should not have removed *merely* vv. 3-20 from the copies, and why, instead of this, chap. xvi. should have been entirely excised, and even chap. xv. in addition. To explain this, the smaller importance of this chapter—which, moreover, is assumed without historical warrant—does not suffice.—Further, if the genuineness of the doxology itself, as well as its customary position, is to be esteemed assured, it follows at the same time from what we have said (1) in respect of the *duplication* of the doxology after chap. xiv. and xvi. in critical authorities, that it proceeds from those who, while aware of the difference as to the place of the words, were not able or did not venture to decide respecting the original position, and hence, taking the certain for the uncertain, inserted the words in *both* places; (2) in respect of the *entire omission* in authorities, that it is the work of an old precarious criticism, which drew from the uncertain position the conclusion of non-genuineness, along with which there operated the consideration, that the doxology was unsuitable after xiv. 23 as interrupting the connection, and after xvi. 24 as having its place even after the concluding wish.

---

Vv. 1, 2. *Recommendation* (συνίστημι, comp. 2 Cor. v. 12, *et al.*; see Jacobs, *ad Anthol.* IX. p. 438; Bornemann, *ad Xen. Symp.* iv. 63, p. 154) of *Phoebe*, who is held to be the bearer of the epistle,—a supposition which there is nothing to contradict. In the twofold predicate, ἀδελφ. ἡμῶν (*our*, i.e. my and your Christian *sister*) and οὖσαν διάκ. κ.τ.λ., there lies a twofold motive, a more general and a more special one, for attending to the commendation. — διάκονον] *feminine*, as Dem. 762. 4: διάκονον, ἥ τις ἐχρήτο. The designation by the word διακόνισσα, not used in classical Greek, is found only subsequently, as frequently in the *Constitut. apost.* See, on these *ministrae*, as they are called in Pliny, *Ep.* x. 97, the female attendants on the poor, sick, and strangers of the church, Bingham, *Orig.* I. pp. 341-366; Schoene, *Geschichts-*

*forsch. ſüb. d. kirchl. Gebr.* III. p. 102 ff.; Herzog, in his *Encycl.* III. p. 368 f. Very groundlessly Lucht, because this service in the church was of later date (but comp. xii. 7; Phil. i. 1), pronounces the words *οὐσαν . . . Κερχρ.* not to belong to Paul, and ascribes them to the supposed editor. Respecting the *χῆραι*, 1 Tim. v. 9, see Huther *in loc.* — *Κερχρεαί*, eastern port of Corinth, on the Saronic Gulf. See Wetstein. Comp. on Acts xviii. 18. — *ἵνα αὐτῇν, κ.τ.λ.*] Aim of the commendation. — *ἐν κυρίῳ*] characterizes the *προσδέχεσθαι* as *Christian*; it is to be no common service of hospitality, but to take place *in Christ*, i.e. so that it is fulfilled in the fellowship of Christ, in virtue of which one lives and moves in Christ. Comp. Phil. ii. 29. — *ἀξίως τῶν ἀγίων*] either: *as it is becoming for saints* (Christians) *to receive fellow-Christians* (so ordinarily), or: “*sicut sanctos excipere oportet*,” Grotius, Chrysostom. The former (so also Fritzsche and Philippi) is the correct explanation, because most naturally suggesting itself, as modal definition of the action of receiving. — *καὶ γὰρ αὐτῇ*] *nam et ipsa*, for *she also* on her part (not *αὐτῇ, hæc*). — *παραστάτις*] a *directrix, protectress* (Lucian, *bis accus.* 29; Dio Cass. xlii. 39; Dindorf, *Soph. O. C.* 459, and *Proef. ad Soph.* p. LXI.; Lobeck, *Paralip.* p. 271). She became (i.e. *se præstitit*, Kühner, *ad Xen. Anab.* i. 7. 4) a *patrona multorum* through the exercise of her calling. Paul might, indeed, have written *παραστάτις*, corresponding to *παραστήτε* (Xen. *Mem.* ii. 1. 32; Soph. *Trach.* 891, *O. C.* 559; comp. *ἐν νόσοις παραστάτις*, Musonius in *Stob. fl.* p. 416, 43); but he selects the word which is conformable to her official position, and more honourable. — *καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐμοῦ*] *and of myself*, my own person (see on vii. 25). Historical proof of this cannot be given. Perhaps Paul had once been ill during a sojourn with the church of Cenchreæ.

Vv. 3–16. The apostle's *salutations*.

Vv. 3, 4. *Πρίσκα* (2 Tim. iv. 19) is not different from *Πρίσκιλλα*; comp. on Acts xviii. 2. — Her husband<sup>1</sup> Aquila

<sup>1</sup> That Paul names the wife *first*, is not to be regarded as accidental. Probably the preponderant Christian activity and estimation were on her side. Hence here, where both *are saluted* (comp. 2 Tim. iv. 19), the precedence of the wife,—a distinction for which in 1 Cor. xvi. 19, where both *salute*, no occasion was given. On the precedence given to the wife in Acts xviii. 18, see *in loc.*



was a native of Pontus (Acts xviii. 1), and Reiche incorrectly conjectures that he was called *Pontius Aquila*, which name Luke erroneously referred to his native country;<sup>1</sup> for, looking to the close connection in which Aquila stood with Paul, and Paul again with Luke, a correct acquaintance with the matter must be presumed in the latter. This married couple, expelled from Rome as Jews under Claudius, had been converted at Corinth by Paul (see on Acts xviii. 1), had then migrated to Ephesus (Acts xviii. 18, 26; 1 Cor. xvi. 19), are now again in Rome, but, according to 2 Tim iv. 19, were at a later period once more in Ephesus. — ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ] Distinctive character of συνεργούς; for labour for the gospel lives and moves in Christ as its very element. Comp. vv. 9, 12. — Ver. 4. The marks of parenthesis are to be omitted, because the construction is not interrupted. — οἵτινες κ.τ.λ.] Note the peculiar grounds assigned (*quippe qui*) for this and several following greetings. — ὑπέρ] not *instead of*, but *for*, in order to the saving of my life. — τὸν ἑαυτ. τράχηλ. ὑπέθηκαν] have submitted their own neck, namely, under the executioner's axe. In the absence of historical information we can just as little decide with certainty on the question whether the expression is to be taken *literally*, that is, of a moment when they were to be actually executed but in some way or other were still saved, or (so the expositors) *figuratively*, of the incurring of an extreme danger to life—as on the question where the incident referred to took place? whether at Ephesus, Acts xix. ? or 2 Cor. i. 8 ? or at Corinth, Acts xviii. 6 ff. ? or elsewhere ? or, generally, in the midst of labour and tribulation shared with Paul ? Wetstein, Heumann, and Semler think of *vail* (ὑπέθηκαν would then be: *they gave pledge*; see Lobeck, *ad Phryn.* p. 468). Possibly; but the nearest conception which offers itself as the words stand is that of *τραχηλοκοπεῖν* (Plut. *Mor.* p. 398 D), whether it be thought of as a reality or as a figure. The latter, however, is, as being said of *both*, the most probable. The readers *know* what was meant. — τῶν ἐθνῶν] On account of this sacrifice for me, the apostle of the

<sup>1</sup> Aquila also, the translator of the Bible, was, as is well known, from Pontus (Sinope).

Gentiles. The notice contemplates the inclusion of the *Roman* church, which in fact was also a *Gentile* church.

Ver. 5. *Καὶ τὴν κατ' οἶκ. αὐτ. ἐκκλ.*] *and the church which is in their house.* Considering the size of Rome, it may be readily conceived that, besides the full assembly of the collective church, particular sectional assemblies were also formed, which were wont to meet in the houses of prominent members of the church. Such a house was that of Aquila and Priscilla, who had also in Ephesus given their dwelling for a similar object, 1 Cor. xvi. 19; Col. iv. 15; Philem. 2. Such house-churches are related therefore to the collective community, to which, as such, the epistles are directed, simply as the part, which has in addition its own special greeting, to the whole. Others (following Origen, Chrysostom, Theophylact, etc., with Koppe, Flatt, Klee, Glöckler) hold that *the inmates of the household* are intended. An arbitrary assumption of an unexampled hyperbole in the use of *ἐκκλησία*. That all the following saluted persons, up to ver. 12, were *members of the house-church of Aquila and Prisca* (Hofmann), is an arbitrary assumption, which is rendered very improbable by the repeated *ἀσπάζασθε*, forming in each case a fresh beginning, — *Ἐπαίνετον*<sup>1</sup>] Unknown like all the following down to ver. 15, but see the note on *Ῥοῦφον*, ver. 13. The traditions of the Fathers made most of them bishops and martyrs (see Justiniani, *Comm.*, and Braun, *Sch. sacr.* i. 2. 29 ff.), and the Synopsis of Dorotheus places most of them among the seventy disciples. That Epänetus had come to Rome *with* Aquila and Prisca (Hofmann), is very precariously conjectured from his being mentioned immediately after that couple. — *ἀπαρχὴ τῆς Ἀσ. εἰς Χ.*] *first-fruits of Asia* (partitive genitive, see on viii. 23) *in reference to Christ*, i.e. that one of the Asiatics, who had first been converted to Christ.<sup>2</sup> — *Ἀσ.* is the western portion of Asia Minor, as in Acts ii. 9; 1 Cor. xvi. 19; 2 Cor. i. 8.

<sup>1</sup> On the accentuation of the name, as well as that of *Ἐραστος*, ver. 22, see Lipsius, *gramm. Unters.* p. 30. The name itself is also frequently found in the Greek writers.

<sup>2</sup> With the reading *ἀπαρχὴ τῆς Ἀχαΐας* it was necessary, in order not to fall into variance with 1 Cor. xvi. 15, to take *ἀπαρχή* as a *first-fruit*, *one of the first converted*, — certainly an explanatory makeshift, which weakens greatly the

Ver. 6. *How far Mary had toiled much for the Romans* (εἰς ὑμᾶς), was as well known to the readers and to the apostle himself, who awards to her on that account the salutation of acknowledgment and commendation, as it is unknown to us. It may have happened abroad (as van Hengel and others think) or in Rome itself through eminent loving activity, possibly in a special emergency which was now past (hence not κοπιᾷ, but the *aorist*). Reiche refers ἐκοπ. to *activity in teaching*, for which, however, since the text annexes no definition (as in 1 Tim. v. 17), and since Mary is not more specially known, there is no reason, and generally, as respects public teaching (1 Cor. xiv. 34, 35), little probability. On εἰς, comp. Gal. iv. 11.

Ver. 7. Ἰουλίαν] is taken by Chrysostom, Grotius, and others, including Reiche, as *feminine* (*Junia*, who is then to be regarded probably as the wife or sister of Andronicus); but by most of the more recent expositors as a *masculine* name, Junias, equivalent to Junianus (therefore to be accented Ἰουλιᾶς). No decision can be arrived at, although the following description, ver. 7 (in opposition to Fritzsche), commends the latter supposition. — συγγενεῖς] is explained by many (including Reiche, de Wette, Hofmann) as *member of the same race or people* (according to ix. 3). But the explanation *kinsmen* is to be preferred, partly because the word itself, without other definition in the context, immediately points to this (Mark vi. 4; Acts x. 24, *et al.*); partly because it is only in this sense that it has a significance of special *commendation*; especially as in Rome there were *many* Jewish-Christians, and hence one does not see how the epithet was to be something *characteristic* in the particular case of those *named*, if it signified only *kindred* in the sense of belonging to the same *people*. We know too little of the apostle's kindred (comp. also Acts xxiii. 16), to reject this explanation on account of vv. 11, 21, or to venture to employ it in throwing suspicion on the genuine-

significance of the notice, and by which 1 Cor. *l.c.* would also be affected. Not less forced would be the combination, by which we should regard Epaphroditus as an inmate of Stephanas' house, who had been converted at the same time with him (Tholuck, yet only permissively, following older interpreters).

ness of the chapter (Baur). But Reiche's reason—that Andronicus and Junias are expressly designated as Jews, because it would just be non-Jews who were saluted—is quite futile, since the nationality of those previously saluted is unknown to us, and Aquila and Prisca were likewise Jews.<sup>1</sup> Just as groundlessly, Hofmann thinks that in an epistle to the *Gentile-Christian* church the *kinsmen* of the apostle would be *Jews*. This is purely arbitrary, and yields, besides, for the designation of the persons intended an element, which, in the case of the *actual* relatives of the Jewish-Christian apostle, is quite obvious of itself, and the mention of which, moreover, in presence of the Gentile-Christians, would have been somewhat indelicate.—Where and in what manner they *had been imprisoned with Paul*,<sup>2</sup> is, owing to the incompleteness of the information in the book of Acts (comp. on 2 Cor. vi. 5), entirely unknown. Clement, 1 Cor. v., states that Paul had *seven times* borne fetters. Ewald, in connection with his view that we have here a fragment of an epistle to the Ephesians, assumes that Andronicus and Junias, while Paul was imprisoned in *Rome*, lay at the same time confined in *Ephesus*; and Lucht perceives only the anachronism of a forger.—ἐπίσημοι ἐν τ. ἀποστ.] ἐπίσημος, like *insignis*, a *vox medicæ* (comp. Matt. xxvii. 16), here in the good sense: *distinguished*, i.e. *most honourably known by the apostles*. Comp. Eur. *Hec.* 379: ἐπίσημος ἐν βροτοῖς, *Hippol.* 103; Polyb. x. 3. 3, xv. 34. 3; Lucian, *merc. cond.* 28. So Beza, Grotius, and others,

<sup>1</sup> Probably Mary also—the name already points to this—was a Jewess; indeed, Epænetus himself appears to have been a Jew (against Hofmann), since he is characterized generally as the first-fruits of *Asia*, not as ἀπαρχὴ τῶν ἰβνῶν of this country, and according to history, the Christian first-fruits of a country inhabited also by Jews were, as a rule, Jews. Comp. Acts xviii. 6, xxviii. 24 ff.

<sup>2</sup> The expression itself places the relation of their captivity under the figurative conception of captivity in *war* (vii. 23; 2 Cor. x. 5; Eph. iv. 8). Comp. Lucian, *Asin.* 27; Photius, *Bibl.* p. 133, 8. As the Christians, and peculiarly the teachers and overseers in the service of Christ, their commander-in-chief, are συστρατιῶται amongst one another (see on Phil. ii. 35, Philem. 2), so also are they, in captivity with one another, συναχιμάλωτοι (see on Col. iv. 10, Philem. 23). An arbitrary play of interpretation occurs in Hofmann: those *whom Christ has won from the world and made His own*, just as the apostle himself. Aptly Chrysostom points out the *fellowship of suffering* with Paul, implied in συναχιμάλ., as the most glorious crown of these men.

including Koppe, Flatt, Reiche, de Wette, Fritzsche, Philippi, van Hengel, Hofmann, and rightly; for ἀπόστολος is used by Paul only in 1 Cor. xv. 7 in the wider sense (comp. Acts xiv. 4, 14), nevertheless even there with such restriction that James and the twelve are *included* in the reference. Hence we must not, especially considering our entire ignorance of the two persons, explain, with Origen, Chrysostom, Luther, Calvin, Estius, Wolf, and many others, including Tholuck, Köllner, Rückert, Reithmayr, Ewald: *distinguished among the apostles* (in other words, distinguished apostles). That Andronicus and Junias were held in peculiar honour by the apostles, does not exclude their repute with the Christians generally, but rather points, for their especial commendation, to closer relations which they had with the apostles. Lucht misinterprets the expression οἱ ἀπόστ. of the *original apostles* in contrast to Paul. — πρὸ ἐμοῦ] That they had been converted exactly at Pentecost (Grotius, Koppe), is just as little capable of proof, as that they had been the first preachers of the gospel in Rome (Wolf). — γεγόνασιν ἐν Χ.] not: became *apostles* in Christ (Reithmayr, following Origen), but: became *Christians*, entered the fellowship of Christ, attained to the ἐν Χριστῷ εἶναι. They were thus ἀρχαῖοι μαθηταί (Acts xxi. 16). “Venerabiles facit aetas, in Christo maxime,” Bengel. On γίνεσθαι ἐν, see Nägelsbach, z. *Ilias*, p. 295, ed. 3; comp. on Phil. ii. 7.

Vv. 8, 9. Ἀμπλιᾶν] the abbreviated Ἀμπλιάτον, as codd., vss., and Fathers actually read, a name which (in form like Donatus, Fortunatus, etc., see Grotius) was frequent; see Gruter, *Ind.* — ἐν κυρίῳ] gives to the ἀγαπ. μ. the specific *Christian character*; comp. on ver. 2. — τ. συνεργ. ἡμῶν] ἡμῶν refers, since Paul speaks always of himself in the *singular* here, to the readers along with himself, comp. ver. 1, not to those named in vv. 3-8 (van Hengel). He was probably a stranger who was at this time in Rome, and united his activity with that of Roman Christians towards the extension and furtherance of the gospel, whereby he was a fellow-labourer of the apostle and of the readers. — The name Στάχυς: *Inscr.* 268.

Ver. 10. Ἀπelles (comp. Hor. *Sat.* I. v. 100) is not to be confounded with the celebrated Apollos (Acts xviii. 24; 1 Cor.

i. 12, iii. 4), as Origen, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Grotius, and others have done. Whether he was a freedman remains an open question, owing to the frequency of the name, which also occurs of freedmen. — τὸν δοκιμὸν ἐν X.] *i.e. the tried Christian*. Christ, the personal object of his believing fidelity, is conceived as the element wherein he is approved. Comp. φρόνιμος ἐν X., 1 Cor. iv. 10, and similar passages. — τοὺς ἐκ τῶν Ἀριστοβούλου] *those of the people* (perhaps: *slaves*) of Aristobulus, comp. 1 Cor. i. 11. That Paul means the *Christians* among them, is self-evident; in the similar salutation, ver. 11, he adds it redundantly. *Aristobulus* himself was therefore *no* Christian; unless he (so Grotius) had been already dead, in which case he *might* have been a Christian.

Vv. 11, 12. *Narcissus* is by Grotius, Michaelis, and Neander, held to be the powerful freedman of Claudius (Suet. *Claud.* 28; Tacit. *Ann.* xi. 29 ff., xii. 57). It is possible, although *Narcissus*, according to Tacitus, *Ann.* xiii. 1, was already dead (see Wieseler, *Chronol.* p. 371 ff.). A decision, however, cannot be arrived at; but, considering the frequency of the name, the suspicion of an anachronism (Lucht) is groundless. — The three women, ver. 12, perhaps deaconesses, are otherwise unknown. Note how *Persis* is distinguished above the two previously named women; as also how delicately Paul has not added μου, after τὴν ἀγαπητήν, as with the men's names, vv. 8, 9, although he means *his* sentiment of love towards *Persis*. Observe, also, the distinction between κοπιώσας (*present*) and ἐκοπίασεν. The particular circumstances of the case are unknown to us.

Ver. 13. Rufus may be the son of Simon of Cyrene, Mark xv. 21. Comp. *in loc.* The fact that in Mark, who probably wrote in Rome, the man is assumed to be well known, would agree with the eulogy here: τὸν ἐκλεκτὸν ἐν κυρίῳ, *the elect one in the fellowship of the Lord, i.e. who is distinguished as a Christian*.<sup>1</sup> For if these words denoted merely *the Christian*,

<sup>1</sup> Ὁν ἐκλεκτός, *exquisitus*, in the sense of *excellens* (comp. 1 Tim. v. 21; 1 Pet. ii. 4; 2 John i. 13; Wisd. iii. 14; Bar. iii. 30), because it is just the *selected* that is wont to be the eminently qualified, see Schleusner, *Thes.* II. p. 289. But Hofmann explains as if it ran τὸν ἐκλεκτὸν μου; who is to me a choice Christian

"who in fellowship with the Lord is chosen to blessedness" (Reiche), they would not—as is, nevertheless, the case with all the remaining predicates—express a *special* element of commendation. — καὶ ἐμοῦ] pregnant, delicate, and grateful hint of the peculiar love and care which Paul (*where and how*, is entirely unknown<sup>1</sup>) had enjoyed at her hands. Comp. ver. 2; 1 Cor. xvi. 18; Philem. 11; and see on 1 Cor. i. 2.

Vv. 14, 15. Hermas was not, as already Origen declared him to be, the composer of the book ὁ ποιμήν,<sup>2</sup> which, according to the Canon Muratorianus, is said to have been composed by a brother of the Roman bishop Pius I., and in any case belongs to no earlier period than the second century. — κ. τ. σὺν αὐτῷ ἀδελφ.] It is possible, but on account of the more general designation deviating from ver. 5, not probable, that those named here as well as in ver. 15 were members, well known to the apostle, of two ἐκκλησίαι in Rome (so Hofmann), according to which view by *the brethren with them* would be meant the remaining persons taking part in these assemblies, for the most part doubtless unknown to him. It is possible also that some other Christian associations unknown to us (Fritzsche and Philippi think of associations of trade and commerce) are intended. We have no knowledge on this point. Reiche thinks of two *mission-societies*. But πάντες, ver. 15, points to a considerable number, and there is no trace in the Book of Acts of so formal and numerous mission-societies; they were doubtless still foreign to that period. Probably also Paul would have given some thoughtful indication or other of this important characteristic point.—The whole of the names in vv. 14, 15 are found in Gruter and

*brother*; he calls the ordinary interpretation unapostolic (wherefore?), and groundlessly appeals to τὴν ἀγαπητήν, ver. 12. In the case of the latter the loving subject is, according to a very common usage, self-evident.

<sup>1</sup> Hofmann entertains the conjecture, which is in no way capable of proof, that Rufus lived with his mother in Jerusalem when Paul himself sojourned there; and that then Paul dwelt in the house of the mother, and enjoyed her motherly care.—If, again, the demonstration of love intended falls in a *later* period of the apostle's life, his expression in our passage is the more *courteous*; hence it by no means requires the above precarious combination.

<sup>2</sup> The critical discussions as to this work, quite recently conducted by Zahn, and Lipsius in particular, have no bearing here.

elsewhere.—Julia appears to have been the wife of Philologus; the analogy of the following *Νηρέα κ. τὴν ἀδελφὴν αὐτοῦ* makes it less probable that the name denotes a man (*Julius*, comp. on ver. 7).

Ver. 16. The series of greetings which Paul has to offer *from himself* is concluded. But he now desires that his readers should also exchange greetings *among one another, reciprocally*, and that with the loving sign of the holy kiss. The subject of this greeting is thus *every member of the church himself*, who kisses another (see on 1 Cor. xvi. 20), not *Paul*, so that *meo nomine* should be supplied (Bengel, Koppe). This is forbidden by *ἀλλήλους*. Comp. 1 Cor. *l.c.*; 2 Cor. xiii. 12; Justin, *Ap.* i. 65. The case is otherwise with 1 Thess. v. 26 (see Lünemann *in loc.*).—The ancient custom, especially in the East, and particularly among the Jews, of uniting a greeting with a kiss, gave birth to the Christian practice of the *ἅγιον φίλημα* (1 Pet. v. 14: *φίλημα ἀγάπης*; *Const. ap.* ii. 57. 12, viii. 5. 5: *τὸ ἐν κυρίῳ φίλημα*, Tertullian, *de orat.* 4: *osculum pæcis*), termed *ἅγιον*, because it was no profane thing, but had Christian consecration, expressing the holy Christian fellowship of love.<sup>1</sup>—*πάσαι*] From *many* churches greetings had been doubtless entrusted to the apostle for the Romans, since he had certainly not previously withheld from them his project of travelling to Rome (perhaps also, of writing thither beforehand). Concerning the *rest*, what Erasmus says holds good: “Quoniam cognovit omnium erga Romanos studium, omnium nomine salutat.” The *universal* shape of the utterance by no means justifies us in pronouncing this greeting not to be the apostle’s, and deriving it from 1 Cor. xvi. 19, 20 (Lucht); it rather corresponds entirely to that cordial and buoyant consciousness of fellowship, in which he did not feel himself prompted *narrowly* to examine his *summary* expression. Others arbitrarily limit *πάσαι* to the *Greek* churches (Grotius), or simply to the churches in *Corinth* and its ports (Michaelis,

<sup>1</sup> That Paul actually desires that the reciprocal greeting by a kiss on the part of all should take place after the reading of the epistle, ought not to have been disputed (Calvin, Philippi). A ceremony indeed he does not desire; but he summons not merely to *love*, but to the *kiss* of love.



Olshausen, and others), or at least to those in which Paul had been (Bengel).

Vv. 17-20. A *warning*, added by way of supplement, *against the erroneous teachers* who were then at work. This very supplementary position given to the warning, as well as its brevity, hardly entering at all into the subject itself (comp. on the other hand, the detailed treatment in chap. xiv. xv. of a less important contrast), evinces that Paul is *not* here speaking, as Wieseler, following older interpreters, holds, against such as *already were actually making divisions in Rome*. He would have treated so dangerous an evil in the doctrinal connection of the epistle and at length, not in such a manner as to show that it only occurred to him at the close to add a warning word. Hence this is to be regarded as directed against an evil *possibly setting in*. Doubtless he was apprehensive from the manifold experience acquired by him, that, as elsewhere (comp. Gal. iii. 6, 11 ff.; Col. ii. 8 ff.; Phil. iii. 2 ff., 18, 19; 2 Cor. xi. 13 ff.), so also in Rome, *Jewish scalots for the law*<sup>1</sup> might arise and cause divisions in their controversy with Pauline Christianity. This occasioned his warning, from which his readers knew to what kind of persons it referred,—a warning, therefore, against *danger*, such as he gave subsequently to the Philippians also (Phil. iii.), to whom the evil must have been all the nearer. Paul might, however, the more readily consider it enough to bring in this warning only supplementarily and briefly, since in Rome the Gentile-Christian element was the preponderant one, and the mind of the church in general was so strongly in favour of the Pauline gospel (vv. 19, 20, vi. 17), that a permanent Judaistic influence was at present not yet to be apprehended. How, notwithstanding, an anti-

<sup>1</sup> The brief indications, vv. 17, 18, do not suggest philosophical *Gentile-Christians* (Hammond, Clericus), but (see on ver. 18) *Judaizers*, against whom Paul offers his warning. Hofmann prefers to abide by the *generality* of the warning, whether the troubles might be of Gentile origin or might arise from doctrines of Jewish legalism. But this view does not satisfy the concrete traits in vv. 17, 18, 20. See the correct interpretation already in Chrysostom and Theodore of Mopsuestia. The latter says: λίγαι δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀπὸ Ἰουδαίων, εἰ ἀπανταχόσε περιϊόντες τοὺς ἀπὸ ἐθνῶν πιστεύοντας τῆς νομικῆς ἔχισθαι παρατηρήσεως πείθειν ἐπιτρέποντο.

Pauline doctrinal agitation took place later in Rome, see Phil. i. 15 ff. Moreover, the *precautionary* destination of our passage, and that in presence of the greatness of the danger, is sufficient to make us understand its contents and expression as well as its isolated position at the close. At least there does not appear any necessity for setting it down as an original constituent portion of an epistle addressed to a church founded by Paul himself, namely, to the church of the Ephesians (Ewald, Lucht).

Ver. 17. Σκοπεῖν] *to have in view*, in order, namely, to guard against; comp. βλέπετε, Phil. iii. 2; but σκοπεῖν, *speculari*, is stronger, comp. also Phil. iii. 17. — τὰς διχοστ.] comp. Gal. v. 20; 1 Macc. iii. 29; Dem. 423. 4; Plat. *Legg.* i. p. 630 A; Dion. Hal. viii. 72. The article denotes those anti-Pauline divisions and offences, σκάνδαλα,—*i.e.* temptations to departure from the true Christian faith and life, *well known* to the readers,—which at that time arose in so many quarters in Pauline churches, and might readily threaten the Romans also. — ἐκκλίνατε ἀπ' αὐτῶν] *turn away from them*, shun them, go out of their way. Comp. 1 Pet. iii. 11; Ps. cxix. 102; Eccus. xxii. 11; Thucyd. v. 73. 3; more usually with the accusative. Grotius rashly concludes: “non fuisse tunc conventus communes aut presbyterium Romae; alioquin voluisset tales excommunicari.” Paul rather counsels a rule of conduct for each individual member of the church, leaving the measures to be adopted on the part of the church, in case of necessity, to the church-government there (which was one regularly organized, in opposition to Bengel, see xii. 6 ff.). The disturbers, besides, against whom they are warned, are in fact viewed not as members of the church, but as intruders from without. Comp. Acts xv. 1; Gal. ii. 4.—The reference to *the doctrine received* certainly implies a church having Pauline instruction, but not exactly one founded by Paul himself (Ewald), like that at Ephesus. Comp. vi. 17; Col. i. 23.

Ver. 18. Reason assigned for the injunction of ver. 17. — οἱ τοιοῦτοι] “*hi tales*; notatur substantia cum sua qualitate,” Bengel. — οὐ δουλ.] Note the position of the negation; the thought is: *to the Lord they refuse service, but their own*

*belly they serve.* Thereby they belonged to the category of the ἐχθροὶ τοῦ σταυροῦ τ. Χρ., Phil. iii. 18.—On τῇ κοιλίᾳ δουλεύειν, τῇ γαστρὶ δουλεύειν, *abdomini servire* (Seneca, *de ira* cf. vii. 26), as a designation of selfishness, bent only on good cheer in eating and drinking, comp. on Phil. iii. 19; Jacobs, *ad Anthol.* IX. p. 416. For this object the sectaries sought to make use of the influence and following which they obtained. Comp. Lucian, *de morte Peregr.* 11 ff. Behind their teaching, although this was not itself of an Epicurean nature (Hofmann), there lurked, hypocritically concealed, the *tendency to epicurean practice.* — διὰ τῆς χρηστολ. κ. εὐλογ.] *by means of the kind* (having a good-natured sound) *and fair-set language*, which they hold. On χρηστολ. comp. Jul. Capitol. *vit. Pertin.* 13; Eustath. p. 1437, 53, and the classical λόγοι χρηστοί, λέγειν χρηστά κ.τ.λ.; on εὐλογία, language finely expressed (here: fine phrases), Plat. *Rep.* p. 400 D; Lucian, *Lexiph.* 1; Aesop. 229. The two words characterize *contents* (χρηστολ.) and *form* (εὐλ.); hence it is preferable to take εὐλογ. in the above signification than in the ordinary one of *praise, extolling* (Philippi). Comp. Luther: *stately language.* — τῶν ἀκάκων] *of the guiltless* (Heb. vii. 26), who themselves have nothing evil in their mind, and are prepared for nothing evil. See Wetstein *in loc.*; Ruhnken, *ad Tim.* p. 56; Schaefer, *ad Greg. Cor.* p. 342.—The assertion that Paul appears too severe in the accusation of his opponents (Rückert) cannot be made good. He writes from long and ample experience.

Ver. 19. Not a second ground assigned for, or justification of, the warning of ver. 17 (Tholuck, de Wette, Philippi; comp. also Reithmayr and Hofmann); for this use of a second really co-ordinated γάρ is nowhere to be assumed in the N. T. See on the contrary, on viii. 6. Nor is it to be taken, with Fritzsche: “nam vos *innocentibus* qui facile decipiuntur hominibus annumerandos esse, ex eo intelligitur, quod vos *Christo obediētes* esse nemo ignorat;” for the latter is exactly the opposite of ready liability to seduction. Nor with Rückert: for the general diffusion of the news that you are such good Christians will soon bring those men to Rome, that they may sow their tares; which is not expressed. Nor yet again with

Calvin and others, Reiche, and Köllner: for you are indeed good Christians, whereat I rejoice; but I desire, etc.—against which the expression, especially the want of *μεν* and the presence of *οὖν*, is decisive. In order to a correct understanding, one should note the emphatically prefixed *ὑμῶν*, which stands in correlation—and that antithetic—with *τῶν ἀκάκων*. Hence (as also Philippi admits, comp. van Hengel): “not without reason do I say: the hearts of the *guileless*; for you they will not lead astray, because you do not belong to such as the mere *ἄκακοι*, but *distinguish yourselves so much by obedience* (towards the gospel), that this has become universally known; *respecting you therefore* (here, too, *ἐφ’ ὑμῶν* stands first emphatically; see the critical notes) I rejoice,<sup>1</sup> yet desire that you may be wise and pure,”—a delicate combination of *warning* with the expression of firm *confidence*. Strangely, Lucht, comparing Acts xx. 29, assigns ver. 19 to an epistle to the Ephesians. — *εἰς τὰ ἀγαθ.*] *in reference to the good*, which you have to do. By this general expression Paul means specially fidelity towards the pure gospel. — *ἀκεραίους εἰς τὸ κακόν*] *pure in reference to evil*, so that you keep yourselves *unmixed* with it, free from it. Comp. Phil. ii. 15, Matt. x. 16; and see respecting *ἀκεραῖος* generally, Ruhnken, *ad Tim.* p. 18.

Ver. 20. Encouraging promise; hence *συντρίψει* is not with Flatt to be taken as optative, contrary to linguistic usage, nor is the erroneous gloss of the reading *συντρίψαι* (A, 67<sup>22</sup>, Theodoret, Occ., Jer., Ambros., Rup.) to be approved.—Paul regards the sectaries, because they are servants not of Christ, but of their belly (ver. 18), *as organs of Satan* (comp. 2 Cor. xi. 15); hence his figurative expression of the thought, founded on Gen. iii. 15: “*The God of peace will grant you* (when the authors of division appear amongst you) *shortly the complete victory over them.*”—As *Θεὸς τῆς εἰρήνης* (*pacificus*) God appears

<sup>1</sup> In the reading of the *Recepta* defended by Hofmann, *χαίρω οὖν τὸ ἐφ’ ὑμῶν*, *χαίρω* would not have to be supplied after *τὸ* (as Hofmann very oddly thinks); but *τὸ ἐφ’ ὑμῶν* sc. *ὅτι* would, according to a well-known usage (see Bernhardt, p. 329; Krüger, § 68. 41. 9; Schaefer, *ad Bos. Ell.* p. 277; Kühner, II. 1, p. 434), be a more precise definition to *χαίρω*: I rejoice, *as to what concerns you*. In this case, *ἐφ’ ὑμῶν* would be by no means dependent on the notion *χαίρω*, but the latter would stand absolutely.

in contrast to those *ποιούντες τὰς διχοστασίας* (ver. 17). Comp. on xv. 33.—The bruising of Satan and treading him under feet takes place *in God's power*; hence ὁ Θεὸς κ.τ.λ. Comp. 1 Macc. iii. 22 (and Grimm *in loc.*), iv. 10, *et al.*—*ἡ χάρις κ.τ.λ.*] *The grace of our Lord*, etc.; therewith, as with the usual concluding blessing of his epistles, Paul would close. But he has as yet delivered no special greetings from those around him at Corinth, whether it be that they are now for the first time entrusted to him, or that he now for the first time observes that he has not yet mentioned them in what precedes (as after ver. 16). This induces him now further to add vv. 21–23 after the conclusion already written down in ver. 20; then to repeat the above blessing in ver. 24; and finally, after recalling anew all which he had delivered to the Romans, in a full outburst of deeply moved piety to make the doxology, vv. 25–27, the final close of the entire letter.

Ver. 21. *Τιμόθ.*] It may surprise us that he is not brought forward at the head of the epistle as its joint writer (as in 2 Cor. i. 1; Phil. i. 1; Col. i. 1; 1 Thess. i. 1; 2 Thess. i. 1), since he was at that time with Paul. But it is possible that he was absent just when Paul began to compose the epistle, and hence the apostle availed himself in the writing of it of the hand of a more subordinate person, who had no place in the superscription (ver. 22); it is possible also that the matter took this shape for the inward reason, that Paul deemed it suitable to appear with his epistle before the Roman church, to which he was still so strange, in all his unique and undivided apostolic authority. — *Δούκιος*] Not identical with *Luke*, as Origen, Semler, and others held;<sup>1</sup> but whether with Lucius of Cyrene, Acts xiii. 1, is uncertain. Just as little can it (even after Lucht's attempt) be ascertained, whether *Ἰάσων* is the same who is mentioned in Acts xvii. 5. *Σωσίπατρος* may be one with *Σώπατρος*, Acts xx. 4; yet both names, *Σωσίπ.* and *Σώπ.*, are frequently found in the Greek writers. — *συγγενεῖς*] as vv. 7, 11. Why it should be reckoned

<sup>1</sup> Considered probable also by Tiele in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1853, p. 753 ff.—In the *Constit. ap.* vii. 46. 2, Lucius is mentioned as the name of the bishop of *Cenchreae* appointed by Paul.

'more than improbable" (Hofmann) that Paul had at that time three kinsmen in Rome (vv. 7, 11), and three in his neighbourhood at the time of writing, it is not at all easy to see.

Ver. 22. *Tertius*, probably an Italian with whom the readers were acquainted, was at that time with Paul in Corinth, and wrote the letter, which the apostle dictated to him. The view that he made a fair copy of the apostolic draught (Beza, Grotius) is the more groundless, since Paul was wont to dictate his epistles (1 Cor. xvi. 21; Gal. vi. 11; Col. iv. 16; 2 Thess. iii. 17). In his own name Tertius writes his greeting; for it was very natural that, when he called the apostle's attention to his personal wish to send a greeting, his own greeting (which Grotius and Laurent, without sufficient ground, relegate to the margin) would not be dictated by the apostle, but left to himself to express. In ver. 23, Paul again proceeds with his dictation. Quite groundlessly, Olshausen (following Eichhorn) thinks that Paul wrote the doxology immediately after ver. 20, and did so on a small separate piece of parchment, the other blank side of which the scribe Tertius used, in order to write on it in his own name vv. 21-24. But how incontestably *ὁ συνεργός μου*, ver. 21, points to Paul himself! — *ἐν κυρίῳ*] To be referred to *ἀσπ.*; the *Christian* salutation, offered in the consciousness of living fellowship with Christ. Comp. 1 Cor. xvi. 19.

Ver. 23. *Γάιος*] Perhaps the same who is mentioned in 1 Cor. i. 14; it may at the same time be assumed, that the person mentioned in Acts xx. 4 (not also he who appears in Acts xix. 29) is not a different one, against which the circumstance that he was of Derbe is no proof. But considering the great frequency of the name (see also 3 John 1; *Constit. ap.* vii. 46. 1; *Martyr. Polyc.* 22), no decision can be given. Origen: "Fertur traditione majorum, quod hic Cajus fuit episcopus Thessalonicensis ecclesiae." — *ξένος*, *guest-friend*, is in the Greek writers not merely the person entertained, but also, as here, the entertainer (see Sturz, *Lex. N. n.* III. p. 218; Duncan, *ed. Rost.* p. 799). Paul lodged with Caius, as during his first sojourn in Corinth with Aquila, and then with Justus

(Acts xviii. 1-7). — καὶ τῆς ἐκκλ. ὅλ.] Whether this be a reference to the circumstance that Caius gave his house for the meetings of the church (Grotius), or to the fact that, while the apostle lodged with him, there were at the same time very numerous visits of persons belonging to the church of Corinth, whom Caius hospitably received,—a view which corresponds better to the thoughtfully chosen designation—in any case ξένος does not stand to τῆς ἐκκλ. ὅλ. in the same strict relation as to μου. Comp. ver. 13, τὴν μητέρα αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐμοῦ. If the lodging of those *coming from abroad* (Hofmann, following Erasmus and others) were meant, τῆς ἐκκλ. ὅλης would have been understood of the collective *Christian body*, and the *hyperbolic* expression would appear more *jesting* than thoughtful. Comp. rather on ἡ ἐκκλησία ὅλη, 1 Cor. xiv. 23, also v. 11, xv. 22. Nor is the expression suitable to the *Roman* church, in so far, namely, as Paul converted many of its members during their exile (Märcker), because it would be too disproportionate. — "Εραστός] Different from the one mentioned in Acts xix. 22 and 2 Tim. iv. 20; for the person sending greeting here was not, like Timothy, a travelling assistant of the apostle, but *administrator of the city-chest*, city-chamberlain in Corinth (*arcarius civilatis*, see Wetstein); unless we should assume—for which, however, no necessity presents itself—that he had given up his civic position and is here designated according to his *former* office (Pelagius, Estius, Calovius, Klee, and others, comp. also Reiche). For another, but forced explanation, see Otto, *Pastoralbr.* p. 55. The name Erastus was very frequent. The less are we, with Lucht, to discover an error in Acts xix. 22 and 1 Tim. iv. 20. Grotius, moreover, has rightly observed: "Vides jam ab initio, quamquam paucos, aliquos tamen fuisse Christianos in dignitate positos." Comp. 1 Cor. i. 26 ff. — Respecting *Quartus* absolutely nothing is known. Were ἀδελφός a *brother according to the flesh*, namely of Erastus, Paul would have added αὐτοῦ (comp. ver. 15); hence it is to be understood in the sense of *Christian brotherhood*, and to be assumed that the relations of this Quartus suggested to the apostle no more precise predicate, and were well known to the readers.

Ver. 24. In 2 Thess. iii. 16, 18, the closing blessing is also repeated. Wolf aptly observes: "Ita hodiernum, ubi epistola *vale* dicto consummata est, et alia paucis commemoranda menti se adhuc offerunt, scribere solemus: *vale iterum*."

Vv. 25-27. As a final complete conclusion, we have now this *praising of God*, rich in contents, deep in feeling (perhaps added by the apostle's own hand), in which the leading ideas contained in the whole epistle, as they had already found in the introduction, i. 1-5, their preluding keynote, and again in xi. 33 ff. their preliminary doxological expression, now further receive, in the fullest unison of inspired piety, their concentrated outburst for the ultimate true consecration of the whole. No one but Hofmann, who assigns to these three verses their place after xiv. 23 (see the critical notes), could deny that they form a *doxology* at all. According to him, τῷ δὲ δυναμένῳ is to be connected with ὀφείλομεν, xv. 1, and to be governed by this verb (thus: *to Him, who is able . . . we are debtors*, etc.). This is, however, nothing less than a monstrosity of exegetical violence, and that, first, because the verses carry on their front the most immediate and characteristic stamp of a doxology (comp. especially Jude 24, 25), in which even the ἀμήν is not wanting (comp. ix. 5, xi. 36); secondly, because the fulness and the powerful pathos of the passage would be quite disproportionate as a preparatory basis for the injunction that follows in xv. 1, and would be without corresponding motive; thirdly, because in ver. 25 ὑμᾶς stands, but in the supposed continuation, xv. 1, ἡμεῖς, which is an evidence against their mutual connection; and lastly, because the δέ, xv. 1, stands inexorably in the way. This δέ, namely, could not be the *antithetic* δέ of the *apodosis* and after *participles*, especially after absolute participles (Klotz, *ad Deut.* p. 372 ff.; Külmer, II. 2, p. 818; Baumlein, *Partik.* pp. 92 f., 94), but only the *resumptive* (Külmer, II. 2, p. 815; Baumlein, p. 97); and then Paul must have written not ὀφείλομεν δέ, but either αὐτῷ δὲ ὀφείλομεν, which αὐτῷ would reassume the previously described subject, or he must have put his δέ in ver. 27 along with μόνῳ σοφῷ Θεῷ, and therefore somewhat thus: μόνῳ δὲ σοφῷ Θεῷ . . . ὀφείλομεν.



Ver. 25. *Στηρίζαι*] *to make firm and steadfast.* Luke xxii. 32; Rom. i. 11; 1 Thess. iii. 2; 2 Thess. ii. 17, *et al.* The description of God by *τῷ δυναμένῳ ὑμᾶς στηρίζαι* corresponds to the entire scope of the epistle. Comp. i. 11 (in opposition to Lucht). — *ὑμᾶς*] *ὑμῶν τὰς καρδίας*, 1 Thess. iii. 13. — *κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγ. μου*] is closely connected with *στηρ.* (*to strengthen in respect of my gospel*), so that we are not to supply *in fide* (Koppe, de Wette, van Hengel) or the like (Reiche: “in the religious and moral life”); but the sense is not different from *στηρ. ἐν τῷ εὐαγγ. μου* (comp. 2 Thess. ii. 17; 2 Pet. i. 12), namely: *so to operate upon you that you may remain steadfastly faithful to my gospel*, and not become addicted to doctrines and principles deviating from it. More far-fetched is the explanation of others (taking *κατά* in the sense of the *rule*): “so to strengthen you, that you may now live and act according to my gospel,” Köllner (comp. Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Wolf, Koppe, Tholuck); or (*κατά* of the *regulative modal character*): *after the fashion of my gospel* (Hofmann).—The expression *τὸ εὐαγγελ. μου*, *the gospel preached by me*, cannot, seeing that in Rome Pauline Christianity was in the ascendant, be accounted, on an impartial consideration of the apostolic consciousness, and in comparison with ii. 16 (see also 2 Thess. ii. 14; 2 Tim. ii. 8; Gal. ii. 2), as in itself surprising, least of all when we attend to the added: *καὶ τὸ κήρυγμα Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*. This, namely, far from aiming at a conciliatory comparison with the preaching of the *other apostles* (Lucht), is a more precise definition of *τὸ εὐαγγ. μου*, proceeding from the humble piety of the apostle. As he wrote or uttered the latter expression, he at once vividly felt that *his gospel* was withal nothing else than *the preaching which Christ Himself caused to go forth (through him as His organ)*; and by making this addition, he satisfies his own principle: *οὐ γὰρ τολμήσω λαλεῖν τι ὧν οὐ κατειργάσατο Χριστὸς δι’ ἐμοῦ λόγῳ κ. ἔργῳ*, xv. 18. Comp. on the thought, Eph. ii. 17; 2 Cor. xiii. 3. This *humility*, amidst all the boldness in other respects of his apostolic consciousness, suggested itself the more to his heart, because in connection with a praise of *God*. With this view of the genitive agree substantially Rückert, de Wette,

Fritzsche, Baumgarten-Crusius, Ewald. The more usual explanation: the preaching *concerning Christ* (Erasmus, Luther, Calvin, and many others, including Köllner, Tholuck (?), Reithmayr, Philippi), yields after τὸ εὐαγγ. μου somewhat of tautology, and forfeits the thoughtful correlation between μου and Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. The personal *oral* preaching of *Christ Himself* during *His earthly life* (Grotius, Wolf, Koppe, Böhme, Hofmann), to which Paul never expressly refers in his epistles (not even in Gal. v. 1), is not to be thought of. — κατὰ ἀποκάλυψιν μυστηρ. κ.τ.λ.] co-ordinated to the preceding κατὰ . . . Χριστοῦ, and likewise dependent on στηριξαι. In the exalted feeling of the sublime *dignity* of the gospel, in so far as he has just designated it as the κήρυγμα of *Jesus Christ*, the apostle cannot leave the description of its character without also designating it further according to its grand and *sacred contents* (not according to its *novelty*, as Hofmann explains, which lies neither in the text nor in the connection), and that with a theocratic glance back upon the *primitive* counsel of salvation of God: *as revelation of a secret kept in silence in eternal times* (comp. Col. i. 26; Eph. iii. 9, i. 4; 1 Cor. ii. 7). Note the *bipartite* character of the designation by the twofold κατὰ, according to which Paul sets forth the gospel, (1) *ratione subiecti*, as his gospel and κήρυγμα of *Christ*, and (2) *ratione obiecti*, as the *revelation of the primitive sacred mystery*. — The second κατὰ is to be taken quite like the first (comp. Col. ii. 8); but Paul designates *the divine decree of the redemption of the world*<sup>1</sup> as μυστήριον (comp. generally on xi. 25), in so far as it, *formed* indeed by God from eternity (hidden in God, Eph. iii. 9), and in the fulness of time accomplished by Christ, was first *disclosed*<sup>2</sup> through the gospel, *i.e.* laid open to human contemplation (Eph. iii. 4, 8, 9, vi. 19); hence the *gospel* is the actual ἀποκάλυψις of this secret. The article was not

<sup>1</sup> The bestowal of blessing on the *Gentiles* (Eph. iii. 6) is an essential *feature* of the contents of the μυστήριον; but to refer the latter in our passage to this *alone* (Beza, Bengel, Philippi, Tholuck, and others) is not justified by the context.

<sup>2</sup> This disclosure made to men *through the preaching* of the gospel (i. 17; Gal. iii. 23) is meant according to the context, and not "*mihi data patefactio*" (van Hengel), which Paul elsewhere, when he *means* it, actually *expresses*. Comp. Gal. i. 16; Eph. iii. 3; 1 Cor. ii. 10; Eph. iii. 5; Gal. i. 12.

requisite with ἀποκ., since the following genitive has no article, and, besides, a preposition precedes (Winer, p. 118 f. [E. T. p. 155]; comp. 1 Pet. i. 7). But μυστηρίου, if it was to be in itself the *definite* secret, must have had the article (Eph. iii. 3, 9; Col. i. 26); hence we must explain “*of a secret*,” so that it is only the subsequent concrete description which expresses *what* secret is meant: “*in respect to the revelation of a secret, which was kept silent in eternal times, but now has been brought to light*,” etc. Among the *varying* explanations, the only one linguistically correct is that of Fritzsche (comp. Köllner, Rückert, Tholuck, and Philippi), who makes κατὰ ἀποκ. μυστ. dependent not merely on στηρίζαι, but on τῷ δὲ δυναμ. ὑμᾶς στηρ. taken together, and takes κατὰ as *in consequence of*, thus namely: “*qui potest vos corroborare in . . . secundum patefactionem arcani, h. e. postquam facta est patefactio arcani, i. g. ἐπεὶ ἀπεκαλύφθη μυστήριον*,” more exactly Rückert, Philippi, Tholuck: *in correspondence with the revelation*, etc. But no necessity exists for taking κατὰ here in another sense than previously (as *c.g.* there is such a necessity, obviously, with κατ’ ἐπιταγὴν immediately below); on the contrary, after the words, “*who is in a position to strengthen you in respect of the gospel*,” the idea “*secundum patefactionem arcani*” would be superfluous and self-evident, and therefore the weighty mode of its expression would be without motive and turgid. It would be otherwise if κατὰ ἀποκάλυψιν κ.τ.λ. were intended to establish not the *ability* of God, but His *willingness*. Incorrectly, in fine, Olshausen and older expositors think that τὸ γεγενημένον should be supplied: “*which preaching has taken place through revelation of a secret*,” etc. This Paul would have known how to *say* properly, had he meant it. — χρόνους αἰών.] *Period in which the σεσιγ. took place*; Acts viii. 11, xiii. 20; Josh. ii. 20; Winer, p. 205 [E. T. p. 273]; Köllner, II. 1, p. 386. From the very beginning down to the time of the N. T. proclamation reach the χρόνοι αἰώνιοι, which are meant and *popularly* so designated. Bengel: “*tempora primo sui initio aeternitatem quasi praeiviam attingentia*.” Comp. 2 Tim. i. 9; Tit. i. 2. As at almost every word of the doxology, Lucht has taken offence at the expression

χρόνοις αἰών.<sup>1</sup> And Reiche incorrectly understands the course of eternity *down to the time of the prophets*. For by ἀποκάλ. μυστηρ. κ.τ.λ. Paul wished to designate the *New Testament gospel* (κήρυγμα Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ), which therefore had *not* been preached *before* Christ; but he thinks of the prophetic predictions as the *means* used (ver. 26) for the making it known, and justly, since in them the publication has not yet taken place, but there is contained merely the still obscure preindication and preparatory promise (i. 2) which were only to obtain their full and certain light through the far later ἀποκάλυψις of the mystery, and consequently were to serve as a medium of faith to the preaching which announces the secret of salvation. Comp. Weiss, *bibl. Theol.* p. 293. Suggestively Bengel remarks: "V. T. est tanquam horologium in suo cursu tacito; N. T. est sonitus et pulsus aeris." The *silence* respecting the secret was first put an end to by the preaching of the N. T., so that now the φανέρωσις came in its place; and up to that time even the *prophetic* language was, in reference to the world, as yet a *silence*, because containing only συνεσκιασμένως (Theodoret) what afterwards ("*a complemento*," Calovius) was to become through the *evangelical* preaching manifest, brought clearly to light (comp. i. 19, iii. 21; Col. iv. 4; 1 Pet. i. 10, 11, 20; Tit. i. 2, 3; 2 Tim. i. 10).

Ver. 26. Contrast of χρόνοις αἰών. σείση. — *But which has been made manifest in the present time, and by means of prophetic writings, according to the commandment of the eternal God, in order to produce obedience of faith, has been made known among all nations.* In this happy relation of the present time, with regard to that which the χρόνοι αἰώνιοι lacked, how powerful a motive to the praise of God! — φανερωθέντος δὲ νῦν] Comp. Col. i. 26, νυνὶ δὲ ἐφανερώθη, in the same contrast; but here the *stress* lies, in contradistinction to the immediately preceding σείση, on φανερωθ. Reiche's observation,

<sup>1</sup> The fashion, in which he professes to explain the separate elements from a Gnostic atmosphere, is so arbitrary as to place itself beyond the pale of controversy. Thus, *e.g.*, χρόν. αἰών. is held to refer to the Gnostic aeons, σείση. to the Gnostic *Sige*, διὰ γραφ. προφητ. to the γνώσις of *allegorical explanation of Scripture*.

that the *φανέρωσις* is never attributed to the prophets, is not at all applicable; for it is not in fact ascribed to the prophets here, and *φανερῶθ.* is not even connected with *διὰ γραφ. προφ.*, which *τε*<sup>1</sup> undoubtedly assigns to the *following* participle *γνωρισθ.*<sup>2</sup> The mystery has, namely, in the Christian present been *clearly placed in the light*, has been made an object of knowledge (comp. on i. 19), a result obviously accomplished through the gospel (comp. Col. i. 26; Tit. i. 3); and with this *φανέρωσις*, in and by itself, there was connected in further concrete development the *general publication* of the secret, as it is more precisely designated by *διὰ τε γραφῶν . . . γνωρισθ.* This general publication was, namely, one which took place (1) *by means of prophetic writings* (comp. i. 2), inasmuch as, after the precedent of Jesus Himself (John v. 39; Matt. v. 17; Luke xxiv. 27, 44), it was brought into connection with the prophecies of the O. T. testifying beforehand (1 Pet. i. 11), the fulfilment of the same was exhibited, and they were employed as a proof and confirmation of the evangelical preaching (comp. also Acts xvii. 11), and generally as a medium enabling the latter to produce knowledge and faith. (2) It took place *at the command of God* (x. 17; Tit. i. 3), whose servants (i. 9) and stewards of His mysteries (1 Cor. iv. 1) the apostles are, conscious of His command (Gal. i. 1, 15). (3) It was made *in order to produce obedience towards the faith* (comp. on i. 5),

<sup>1</sup> *Τί* is wanting indeed in D E 34, 87, Syr. Erp. Copt. Aeth. Arm. Slav. Vulg. Clar. Germ. Chrys. and some Latin Fathers; but this is to be regarded as a hasty deletion, occasioned by the fact that, without precise consideration of the sense and of the following connection, *διὰ γραφ. προφ.* was mechanically attached to *φανερῶθ.* as nearest in position, and the necessity in point of construction for its belonging to *γνωρισθ.*, widely separated by the intervening notices, was not perceived. In order thereupon to supply the want of connection between the two participles, which arose through the omission of the *τί*, an *et* was inserted before *κατ'* in versions (Syr. Erp. Aeth.).

<sup>2</sup> This, too, against Hofmann, who makes *διὰ γραφ. προφ.* be added to *νῦν* by means of *τί*, in the sense of "*just as also*." But the *τί* must have added to the *νῦν* something homogeneous, supplementing (Baumlein, *Partik.* p. 211; Kühner, II. 2, p. 787), not a notion dissimilar to it. Generally, it would not be easy to see why Paul should not have placed his *τί* only after *κατ' ἐπιταγὴν*, and thereby have given to the second participial sentence—which, according to Hofmann's explanation, follows without connecting particle—a connecting link in conformity with the sense.

and that (4) *among all nations*. — τοῦ αἰωνίου Θεοῦ] αἰών. is not a faint allusion to χρόνοις αἰωνίοις (Reiche); but stands in a very natural and apt relation of meaning thereto, since it is only as *eternal* (Baruch iv. 8, 22; Hist. Susann. 42) that God could dispose of the eternal times and of the present, so that what was kept silent in the former should be made known in the latter. — εἰς π. τ. ἔθνη] Consequently the publication was not confined to the Jews, but was accomplished *among all Gentile peoples*; comp. i. 5. As to εἰς of the direction, comp. John viii. 26, and see on Mark i. 39, xiv. 9.

Ver. 27. Μόνῳ σοφῷ Θεῷ διὰ Ἰησοῦ X.] to be closely connected (without a comma after Θεῷ): *to the through Jesus Christ only wise God*, i.e. *to the God who through Christ has shown Himself as the alone wise*, so wise, that in comparison with Him this predicate can be applied to no other being (comp. Luke xviii. 19; John xvii. 3; 1 Tim. vi. 15, 16, i. 17; 2 Macc. i. 25), the *absolutely* wise. Comp. Plato, *Phaedr.* p. 278 D; Diog. Laert. i. 12; Philo, *de migr. Abr.* I. p. 457. 4. The connection: "to the alone wise God *be the glory through Christ*" (Pesch., Chrysostom, Luther, Beza, Calvin, Estius, Grotius, Morus, van Hengel, and several others), is inadmissible because of  $\phi$ , which indeed is omitted by Beza and Grotius after the *Complut.* edition, but is critically so certified (it is wanting merely in B) that it can only appear to have been omitted with a view to relieve the construction; although Rückert also sees himself forced to omit it, and Ewald (comp. Märker, p. 8), while retaining the  $\phi$ , so translates as if it ran  $\phi$  διὰ Ἰ. X. ἡ δόξα. Thus, too, Hofmann connects the words, seeking through the dative μόνῳ σοφῷ Θεῷ to bring them into government with ὀφείλομεν, xv. 1 (see on vv. 25–27). Instances of such a prefixing of parts of sentences having an emphasis before the relative are found, indeed, in the Greek writers (Schaefer, *App. ad Dem.* IV. p. 462; Stallbaum, *ad Plat. Phaedr.* pp. 238 A, 363 A; comp. on Acts i. 2); yet in the N. T. we have no passage of this kind (wrongly Hofmann adduces 1 Pet. iv. 11, Heb. xiii. 21, as bearing on this); and it would not be easy to perceive any special reason why Paul should have so uniquely laid stress on διὰ Ἰ. X. — The de-

scription of God, begun on the side of His *power* in ver. 25, passes over at the conclusion of the doxology into the emphasizing of His *wisdom*, to which the representation of the gospel as ἀποκάλυψις μυστηρίου . . . γνωρισθέντος involuntarily led him in a very natural process of thought; for so long as the mystery was covered by silence, the wisdom of God in its highest potency was not yet brought to light,—a result which took place by the very means of that ἀποκάλυψις. Comp. xi. 32–34. This at the same time applies against Reiche, who believes μόνῳ σοφῷ to be unsuitable here and to be taken from Jude 25 var. (the spurious addition σοφῷ, Jude 25, as also in 1 Tim. i. 17, has manifestly flowed from our passage). — διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ] *i.e.* through the appearance and the whole work of Jesus Christ. Thereby God caused Himself to be practically recognised as the alone wise. Comp. xi. 33 ff.; Eph. iii. 8 ff. Similarly, in Jude 25, διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ κ.τ.λ. is connected, not with the following δόξα, but with the preceding σωτήρι ἡμῶν. Too narrowly, Fritzsche limits διὰ Ἰ. Χ., in accordance with Col. ii. 3 (but see *in loc.*), to the contents of His *teaching*. It is precisely the *facts* which bring to light the wisdom of the divine measures in the execution of the plan of redemption through Christ,—the death and the resurrection and exaltation of Jesus (iv. 24, 25, viii. 34, *et al.*), —that form the sum and substance of the conception of our διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. — ᾧ] In the lively pressure of the great intermediate thoughts connected with the mention of the gospel, vv. 24, 25, the syntactic connection has escaped the apostle. Not taking note that τῷ δὲ δυναμένῳ and the resumptive μόνῳ σοφῷ Θεῷ are still without their government, he adds, as though they had already received it at the beginning of the over-full sentence (through χάρις δὲ τῷ δυναμένῳ κ.τ.λ. or the like), the expression—still remaining due—of the praise itself by means of the (critically certain) *relative*, so that now the above datives are left to stand as anacoluthic. Comp. Acts xxiv. 5, 6, and the remark thereon. See also Winer, p. 528 [E. T. p. 710]; Buttmann, *neut. Gr.* p. 252. Others, indeed, think that Paul allowed himself to be induced by the intermediate thoughts to turn from the doxology to

*God* at first designed, and to direct the tribute of praise to *Christ* instead, the Mediator and Revealer of the wisdom of God, so as thereby *mediately* to praise God Himself. See especially Philippi, also Reithmayr, Baumgarten-Crusius, and Tholuck (doubtfully). Such doxologies as if to God, are found addressed to *Christ* doubtless in Heb. xiii. 21, 2 Tim. iv. 18, Rev. i. 6, and later in Clement *et al.*, but in the really apostolical writings nowhere at all (see on ix. 5); and that Paul here still, even after the intermediate observations, retained the idea of praising *God*, so that that  $\phi$  must accordingly be referred not to Christ, but to *God*, is quite clearly proved by the resumptive  $\mu\acute{o}\nu\omega\ \sigma\omicron\phi\tilde{\omega}\ \Theta\epsilon\tilde{\omega}$ . For a formally quite similar anacoluthon<sup>1</sup> in the doxology, see *Martyr. Polyc.* 20:  $\tau\tilde{\omega}\ \delta\upsilon\upsilon\alpha\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omega\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha\varsigma\ \eta\mu\acute{\alpha}\varsigma\ \epsilon\iota\sigma\alpha\gamma\alpha\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\iota\nu\ \epsilon\nu\ \tau\tilde{\eta}\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \chi\acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\tau\iota\ \kappa.\ \delta\omega\rho\epsilon\acute{\iota}\ \epsilon\iota\varsigma\ \tau\tilde{\eta}\nu\ \alpha\iota\omega\acute{\nu}\iota\omicron\nu\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \beta\alpha\sigma\iota\lambda\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha\nu\ \delta\iota\alpha\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \pi\alpha\iota\delta\omicron\varsigma\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \mu\omicron\nu\omicron\gamma\epsilon\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma\ \text{'}\text{I}\eta\sigma\omicron\upsilon\ \text{X}\rho\iota\sigma\tau\omicron\upsilon\ ,\ \phi\tilde{\iota}\ \eta\ \delta\acute{o}\xi\alpha,\ \tau\iota\mu\acute{\eta},\ \kappa\rho\acute{\iota}\tau\omicron\varsigma,\ \mu\epsilon\gamma\alpha\lambda\omega\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu\eta\ \epsilon\iota\varsigma\ \alpha\iota\omega\acute{\nu}\alpha\varsigma.\ \text{---}\ \eta\ \delta\acute{o}\xi\alpha\text{] } sc. \epsilon\acute{\iota}\eta,\ \text{not}\ \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\acute{\iota},\ \text{according to 1 Pet. iv. 11 (Hofmann), where the connection is different and }\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota\nu\ \text{must be written (Lachm.), and its emphasis is to be noted. The article designates the befitting honour, as in xi. 36.}$

<sup>1</sup> For the suggestion that in this passage from the *Martyr. Polyc.*  $\tau\tilde{\omega}\ \delta\upsilon\upsilon\alpha\mu.$  is dependent on the preceding  $\epsilon\kappa\lambda\omicron\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\varsigma$  (Hofmann), is simply a violent and very unsuitably devised evasion. Dressel has the unbiassed and correct punctuation.

THE END.