CRITICAL AND EXEGETICAL

COMMENTARY

ON

THE NEW TESTAMENT.

BY

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OBERCONSISTORIALRATH, HANNOVER.

From the German, with the Sanction of the Author.

THE EPISTLES OF PETER AND JUDE.

BY

DR. J. E. HUTHER.

EDINBURGH:
T. & T. CLARK, 38 GEORGE STREET.
MDCCCLXXXI.

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CRITICAL AND EXEGETICAL

HANDBOOK

TO

THE GENERAL EPISTLES

OF

PETER AND JUDE.

BY

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PASTOR AT WITTENFÖRDEN, SCHWERIN.

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THE TRANSLATION OF

THE EPISTLES OF PETER

HAS BEEN EXECUTED BY

D. B. CROOM, M.A.

THE EPISTLE OF JUDE

BY

PATON J. GLOAG, D.D.

PREFACE.

IN revising this Commentary on the Epistles of Peter for the present fourth edition, the work which I had chiefly to consider and subject to a careful examination was the Exposition of the Epistles by von Hofmann. This accordingly I did. — Von Hofmann often seeks to surmount the exegetical difficulties presented in the epistles by a *new* exposition, and, of course, no exception can be taken to this; but it is to be regretted that the interpretations are not unfrequently of so artificial a nature, that they cannot stand the test of an unprejudiced examination, and are consequently little calculated to promote the true understanding of the text.

As regards the origin of the Second Epistle, my renewed investigations have produced no result other than that which I had formerly obtained. I can only repeat what I said in the preface to the third edition of this Commentary: "If I should be blamed for giving, in this edition also, no decisive and final answer to the question as to the origin of Second Peter, I will say at the outset, that it seems to me more correct to pronounce a *non liquet*, than to cut the knot by arbitrary assertions and acute appearances of argument."

Although this Commentary on the whole has preserved its former character, yet it has been subjected to many changes in particulars, which I hope may be regarded as improvements.

I would only add, that in the critical remarks it is princi-

pally Tischendorf's Recension that has been kept in view. Tisch. 7 refers to the *editio septima critica minor*, 1859; Tisch. 8, to his *editio octava major*, 1869. Where the two editions agree in a reading, Tisch. simply is put.

J. ED. HUTHER.

WITTENFÖRDEN, *May* 1877.

THE FIRST EPISTLE OF THE APOSTLE PETER.

INTRODUCTION.

SEC. 1.—THE APOSTLE PETER.

THE apostle's real name was Σίμων (according to another pronunciation Συμεών, Acts xv. 14; 2 Pet. i. 1). A native of Bethsaida on the Sea of Galilee (John i. 45), he dwelt afterwards in Capernaum (Luke iv. 31, 38), where he was married (cf. 1 Cor. ix. 5), and where his mother-in-law lived. In the tradition, his wife is called at one time Concordia, at another Perpetua, and is said (Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 7) to have suffered martyrdom before him. Along with his father Jonas (Matt. xvi. 17; called Ἰωάννης also, John i. 43, xxi. 15) and his brother Andrew, he was by occupation a fisherman on the Sea of Galilee. When the Baptist began his ministry at the Jordan, the two brothers resorted to him. On John's testimony Andrew, and through his instrumentality Peter, attached themselves to Jesus, who gave to the latter the name full of promise, Cephas. From that time forth Peter, and along with him Andrew, remained a disciple of Christ. After he had accompanied Jesus—as there is no reason to doubt—on the journeys recorded by John, chaps. ii. 2–iv. 43, we find him, it is true, again engaged in his earthly calling; but from this there is no reason for concluding that he had forsaken Jesus, who Himself was then living in Capernaum, Matt. iv. 13, 18. At that time he received his call to enter on the service of Christ. On the occasion of the miraculous draught of fishes he was impressed powerfully, and as he never before had been, by the revelation of his Master's

glory; to his words: ἔξελθε ἀπ' ἐμοῦ, the reply is given: ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν ἀνθρώπους ἔσῃ ζωγρῶν.[1] Received afterwards into the number of the apostles, he forthwith gained a prominent place among them. Not only was he one of the three who stood in most trusted fellowship with Jesus, but on himself pronouncing in his own name and in that of his fellows the decisive confession: σὺ εἶ ὁ Χριστός, ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ (cf. John vi. 67 ff.), Jesus confirmed the name formerly given to him, and added the promise: ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ πέτρᾳ οἰκοδομήσω μου τὴν ἐκκλησίαν . . . καὶ δώσω σοὶ τὰς κλεῖς τῆς βασιλείας τῶν οὐρανῶν. Thus a primacy was lent to him which is in harmony with the word of Christ later on: στήριζον τοὺς ἀδελφούς σου (Luke xxii. 32), and the charge of the Risen One: βόσκε τὰ ἀρνία μου (John xxi. 15–17). And for such a calling Peter was peculiarly fitted, by the energy prompting to decisive action, which formed an essential feature of his character; though not until his natural man had been purified and sanctified by the Spirit of the Lord. For, on the one hand, his resolute character betrayed him more than once into vainglorioussness, self-will, and unthinking zeal; and, on the other, he was wanting in the patience and even firmness which might have been expected from him who was surnamed the Rock. Whilst, too, he pressed on swiftly to the end he had in view, as if to take it by storm, confronted with danger he was seized of a sudden with faint-heartedness; his nature was suited more to quick action than to patient suffering. As proofs of this may be taken his walking on the sea and his sudden fear (Matt. xiv. 28–31), his rebuke of Christ (Matt. xvi. 22), his question as to the sufficient measure of forgiveness (Matt. xviii. 21), his inquiring what reward they,

[1] That Luke (v. 1 ff.) and Matthew (iv. 18 ff.) relate the same fact, admits of no doubt; not only are the scenes and the persons identical, but the words in Matthew: ποιήσω ὑμᾶς ἁλιεῖς ἀνθρώπων, agree in sense with those in Luke addressed specially to Peter. Neither is there any *inward* difference (cf. Meyer on Luke v. 1 ff.), for the "point" of Matthew's narrative is not the mere injunction and promise, as in Luke's it is not the "miracle of the draught of fishes," but the call to become fishers of men. Nor does Luke contradict himself, for what is related in v. 8 does not prove that previous to this Peter had had no experience of miracles, since that which produced the impression on Peter—related by Luke—was not necessarily the *first* miracle he witnessed.

the disciples, would have, in that they had forsaken all for Christ's sake (Matt. xix. 27). In still more marked lines does the picture of his distinctive character stand out in the background of Christ's passion, when he first in vain self-confidence promises to the Lord that he would never forsake Him, but would go with Him even unto death, and then on the Mount of Olives is unable to watch with Him; he wishes, thereupon, to save his Master with the sword, and follows Him even to the court of the high priest, but in sudden cowardice denies Him before the men-servants and maids, and as quickly, feeling the whole weight of his guilt, leaves the judgment-hall in tears. On account of these unquestionably serious vacillations in feeling and conduct, he nevertheless cannot be accused of indecision of character. If he showed himself weak on particular occasions, this was the result partly of his sanguine temperament, in which action instantaneously followed on excited feeling, and partly of his great self-confidence, into which he was betrayed by the consciousness of his own strength. The denial of Christ led to his inward purification; all the more that after His resurrection Christ revealed Himself to Peter first among the apostles. And so to the thrice repeated question of the Lord, if he loved Him more than the others, he returned the answer, humble yet full of faith: "Lord, Thou knowest that I love Thee."

After the ascension of Christ, Peter appears standing at the head of the apostles, for it is at his advice that their number is again increased to twelve. After the descent of the Spirit, however, he becomes in reality the Rock, as Christ had ordained him; henceforth the direction and furtherance of the church rests chiefly in his hand. It was his sermon—the first apostolic sermon—by means of which, on the day of Pentecost, three thousand were added to the church of God; and if afterwards he laboured at first in connection with John, it was yet himself who was the real actor (Acts iii. 1, 4 ff., 11 ff.). He healed the lame man, addressed the people, and on both apostles being brought before the ecclesiastical authorities, it was he who was the speaker. He had to execute judgment on Ananias and Sapphira (Acts v. 1–10); and when the whole of the apostles were summoned to appear before the Sanhedrim, it is

he, too, who in the name of all testifies for Christ. Again, in Samaria, whither he went along with John to continue the work begun by Philip, John appears beside him only as an accompanying fellow-worker. — During the time that the churches had rest after the conversion of Paul, Peter journeyed throughout the districts of Palestine bordering on the Mediterranean Sea; in Lydda he healed Aeneas (Acts ix. 32 ff.), and raised up Tabitha in Joppa (ix. 36 ff.). — In accordance with the position assigned to him by Christ, *he* was permitted by God to bring into the church the first-fruits of heathenism; for although Paul was destined to be the Apostle of the Gentiles, it was still Peter who should *first* preach the gospel to the heathen and administer the ordinance of baptism, that thus also he might retain the primacy and be the Rock of the Church. — During the persecution raised shortly before his death by Herod Agrippa I., Peter was cast into prison. After his miraculous release he quitted Jerusalem[1] for a time, but later on again returned thither. The last circumstance which the Acts of the Apostles relates of him is his justification of Paul at the so-called convention of apostles in Jerusalem.

The labours of Paul among the heathen, and the reception of believing Gentiles into the Christian church, occasioned the first division amongst the Christians. What position did Peter then take up? After what he himself had witnessed at the conversion of Cornelius, he could not make common cause with the judaistically-minded Christians; in the proceedings at Jerusalem, too, he placed himself decidedly on the

[1] We are not told where Peter went; Acts xii. 17 only says: ἐπορεύθη εἰς ἕτερον τόπον. The statement of several Fathers, that Peter then betook himself to Rome, and there founded the Christian church, has, without sufficient warrant, been accepted by Thiersch (*die Kirche im apost. Zeitalter*, p. 96 ff.). This is decidedly opposed not only by the Epistle to the Romans, but also by the indefinite expression employed here. Ewald also (*Geschichte des Volkes Israel*, VI. p. 618 ff.) thinks "that the old legend as to Peter's sojourn in Rome during the reign of Claudius, and his meeting here with Simon the magician, was not altogether without foundation," but that the Christian church in Rome had then already been established. — But it is not credible, either that if Peter had visited the church in Rome, Paul should not have made the slightest allusion to the fact in his Epistle to the Romans, or that Peter should have gone to Rome with the intention of there, as in Samaria, opposing Simon; cf. Hofmann, p. 203 ff.

side of Paul, and spoke against the subjugation of the heathen to the law. It was then, on Peter formally recognising the grace given by the Lord to Paul, that an agreement was come to, that Paul and Barnabas should labour among the Gentiles, whilst he himself, along with John and James, should devote themselves to the Jews (Gal. ii. 9)—the field of missionary enterprise being in this way divided among them.—In thus limiting his activity to the Jewish people, Peter detracted in no way from his primacy; for this, which had never in any sense been absolute, remained intact, as is evident from the circumstance that Paul took especial care to assure himself of *Peter's* consent, and acknowledged his foremost position among the apostles (cf. Gal. ii. 7, 8).

That Peter, with all his recognition of Paul's principles, was wholly unfit to undertake the direction of missions to the Gentiles, is proved by his conduct at Antioch, for which he was called to account by Paul. He was not wanting, it is true, in a right perception of the relation in which the gospel stood to the law, so that without any misgivings he entered into complete fellowship with the Gentile-Christians;[1] still, as regarded his own conduct, this perception was not vivid enough to preserve him from the hypocrisy which drew forth Paul's rebuke (Gal. ii. 12). For, when "certain came" to Antioch "from James," Peter withdrew himself from them, fearing those of the circumcision, doubtless because he did not wish to appear in the light of a transgressor of the law. How dangerous his example was, became evident even then; and it is clear further that the Jewish-Christians hostilely disposed to the heathen-converts were only too ready to appeal to the example of Peter in their opposition to Paul. From this, however, it must not be concluded that there was any want of harmony in principle between Paul and Peter, and that by the δεξιὰς ἔδωκαν ἐμοὶ καὶ Βαρνάβᾳ κοινωνίας is to be understood a mere "temporary truce," which they had concluded

[1] As in Gal. ii. 2, 8, 9, 15, τὰ ἔθνη means not Gentile-Christians, but Gentiles, Paul seems, by the expression in ver. 12: μετὰ τῶν ἐθνῶν συνήσθιεν, to have meant heathens also. But even if they were only Gentile-Christians with whom Peter ate, it is not their Christianity, but their Gentile nationality and customs, as distinguishing them from the Jews, which Paul has here in his eye.

with each other in a purely external manner, and whilst holding fast their internal differences.[1]

As to where and with what result Peter worked after Paul commenced his labours, all precise and reliable information is wanting; from 1 Cor. ix. 5 it follows only that he made missionary journeys to various regions. If by Babylon (chap. v. 13) that city itself and not Rome is to be understood, he must have been at the time our epistle was written in Babylon, whence by means of this letter he extended his influence to the churches of Asia Minor, which, in part at least, had been founded by Paul.

The account which the Fathers give of the life of the apostle is pervaded by many mythical traits. The more important his position, the more natural it was for a one-sided Judaeo-Christianity, as well as for the Catholic Church, to draw by invention, intentional or unintentional, the picture of the apostle's labours in their own interests. Without any sifting of the legendary elements, Hieronymus describes the subsequent life of Peter in the following manner: "Simon Petrus princeps apostolorum post episcopatum Antiochensis ecclesiae et praedicationem dispersionis eorum, qui de circumcisione crediderant, in Ponto, Galatia, Cappadocia, Asia et Bithynia secundo Claudii imperatoris anno ad expugnandum Simonum Magum, Romam pergit, ibique viginti quinque annis cathedram sacerdotalem tenuit, usque ad ultimum annum Neronis, id est,

[1] The Tübingen school confessedly considers the first apostles, and Peter in particular, to have been narrow Judaists, and accordingly ascribes to them precisely those views which Paul so decidedly combats in those of his epistles which are undoubtedly genuine. Though compelled to admit that it was not the first apostles themselves who opposed Paul and his gospel at Corinth and elsewhere, Pfleiderer (*der Judaismus*, p. 299), nevertheless, maintains that they supported those who did so. He explains Peter's conduct in Antioch (p. 296) in this way: that the apostle, in order to please the heathen-Christians, adopted there a mode of life freer than was really permissible from his dogmatic standpoint. The fact, on the contrary, was that his mode of life was stricter than was consistent with his principles, for which reason Paul accused him of *ὑποκρισις*. It is more than singular that Pfleiderer should so entirely overlook the dishonour thus brought upon Paul by maintaining that the first apostles preached a *different* gospel from that which he taught. For how could Paul, without grossly violating his own conscience, accept the *δεξιὰ κοινωνίας* offered him by James, Peter, and John, if his *ἀνάθεμα ἔστω* (Gal. i. 7, 8) was applicable to each of them as the preacher of a *ἕτερον εὐαγγέλιον*?

decimum quartum. A quo et affixus cruci martyrio coronatus est, capite ad terram verso et in sublime pedibus elevatis, asserens se indignum, qui sic crucifigeretur ut dominus suus. Sepultus Romae in Vaticano juxta viam triumphalem totius orbis veneratione celebratur" (*De scriptor. eccl.* cap. i. de Petro).

In this narrative the following particulars are mythical:— (1) The episcopate of Peter in the church at Antioch; the saying, too, of Eusebius (*Chronicum ad annum*, iii.), that Peter founded the church at Antioch, must be considered apocryphal, as contradicting Acts xi. 19–22. (2) His personal activity in the regions of Asia Minor; this is doubtless mentioned already by Origen as probable;[1] but it must be regarded simply as an inference from 1 Pet. i. 1, as even Windischmann (*Vindiciae Pet.* § 112 f.) admits. (3) His journey to Rome for the purpose of combating Simon Magus.[2] This story is based on a passage in Justin's *Apologia maj.* c. 26, which speaks of a statue in Rome with the following inscription: **ΣΙΜΩΝΙ ΔΕΩ ΣΑΓΚΤΩ**, which, however, has been discovered to be the dedication not to that Simon, but to the Sabine god Semo Sanctus. (4) The twenty-five years' residence of Peter in Rome (cf. on this Wieseler's *Chronol. des apostol. Zeitalters*, p. 571 ff.). Perhaps also (5) the peculiar manner of his crucifixion, which has been recorded by Origen already (in Euseb. *H. E.* iii. 1: *ἀνεσκολοπίσθη κατὰ κεφαλῆς*); the motive given for it by Hieronymus must certainly be looked upon as an arbitrary addition. As indisputable fact, there remains, in the first instance, only the martyrdom of the apostle, which is corroborated by the unanimous testimony of antiquity, and especially by John xxi. 19;[3] the residence in Rome appears

[1] Euseb. *H. E.* iii. 1: Πέτρος ἐν Πόντῳ κ.τ.λ. κεκηρυχέναι τοῖς ἐν διασπορᾷ Ἰουδαίοις ἔοικεν.

[2] The stories about Peter and Simon M. in the Clementine *Homilies* are mere legendary formations. Even Ewald's opinion, that Peter, after his release, went to Rome for a short time, in order there to oppose Simon M.; that, on his return to Jerusalem, he had visited the districts in the north-east, and there founded the churches to which he later addressed this epistle,—is too destitute of secure historical foundation to be regarded as correct.

[3] The explanation given in this verse of the prophecy contained in ver. 18 is indisputably correct. Mayerhoff is wrong in calling it in question (*Einl. in d. Petr. Schriften*, p. 87) by applying Christ's words to Peter, not to the martyrdom he was about to suffer, but to the apostle himself, as destined to be the leader

more open to doubt, still the reasons which can be urged against it are not sufficient to prove the purely legendary character of the tradition. Although Clemens Rom. (*Ep. ad Corinth.* c. 5) does not say that Peter suffered martyrdom in Rome, yet Dionysius of Corinth (Euseb. *H. E.* ii. 25), Irenaeus (*adv. Haer.* iii. 1), Tertullian (*contra Marc.* iv. 5, and *de praescript. adv. haeret.* c. 36), and Origen (Euseb. *H. E.* iii. 1) do; and so early as by the presbyter Cajus mention is made of the *τρόπαια* of the two apostles Peter and Paul. Doubtless these testimonies are mixed up with many inexact and inaccurate particulars; but this does not justify doubt as to the truth of the circumstance to which Ignatius seems to refer in the words: *οὐχ ὡς Πέτρος καὶ Παῦλος διατάσσομαι* (*Ep. ad Rom.* c. 4). It is less certain that Peter was in Rome at the same time with Paul; nor, as Wieseler wrongly asserts, are all the witnesses of the second century who speak of the martyrdom of Peter in Rome guarantees for it. For, with the exception of the author of the *Praedicatio Pauli*, whose testimony is uncertain, not one of these witnesses speaks of a meeting and a conjoint labour of the two apostles in Rome, although all relate that both of them in Rome had a part in founding the church, and that they suffered martyrdom there. Even the circumstance mentioned by Dionysius of Corinth (Euseb. *H. E.* ii. 25): *ἐμαρτύρησαν κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρόν*,[1] does not prove that at any previous time they had lived together; for this expression allows, as Wieseler himself grants, the possibility of a period of time—provided it be not too long — having elapsed between the deaths of the two apostles. "What remains then as the kernel of ecclesi-

of the church: "He explains to Peter the necessity of a ministry of this kind, by pointing out to him that active support of the needy is a duty imposed by love to Christ." Meyer gives the right explanation of this passage. Cf. *in loc.*

[1] The words of Dionysius: *καὶ γὰρ ἄμφω καὶ εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν Κόρινθον φυτεύσαντες ἡμᾶς ἐδίδαξαν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰς τὴν Ἰταλίαν ὁμόσε διδάξαντες ἐμαρτύρησαν κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρόν*, admit on the whole of but a doubtful inference, the more so that what is said here of Peter's labour in Corinth appears to have arisen only from the fact that there was at an early period in Corinth a party calling itself by Peter's name. A legend such as this could originate all the more easily from the endeavour to bring the two apostles as near as possible to each other; the *κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρόν* may also have arisen from that endeavour.

astical tradition is this: that towards the end of his life Peter came to Rome, that he there laboured for the propagation of the gospel, and that he suffered martyrdom under Nero" (Wiesinger; cf. also Bleek, *Introd. to N. T.* p. 563 ff. [E. T. II. 157 ff.]). As, then, the Epistle of Peter is addressed to Pauline churches (*i.e.* those churches which were either founded by Paul himself, or had sprung from such as had been so founded), and as Peter could hardly feel himself called upon during Paul's lifetime to interfere with the latter's field of missionary operations, it is not at all improbable that he suffered martyrdom later than Paul. This is supported by the circumstance that after Paul's death, and then only, was the fitting time for him to labour in Rome. Had Peter been there earlier, some trace surely of his presence would have been found in Paul's epistles written from Rome. If, then, Paul suffered martyrdom at the earliest in the year 64, the death of Peter must have taken place in the time between 65–67 A.D.[1]

SEC. 2.—CONTENTS, AIM, AND CHARACTER OF THE EPISTLE.[2]

The *contents* of the epistle are in the order of thought as follows: First of all, thanksgiving to God for the hope of the eternal inheritance in heaven, of which the Christians had been made partakers, of which they can with joy be certain, although for a time here they have to suffer tribulation, and of which the glory is so great that the prophets diligently searched after it, and the angels desired to behold it. This is followed by a series of exhortations, which may be divided

[1] According to Ewald, Peter suffered martyrdom before Paul—that is to say, during the persecutions of the Christians by Nero, A.D. 64, whilst Paul, having been released from his Roman captivity, was in Spain.

[2] The epistle is one of those termed already by Origen, the seven ἐπιστολαὶ καθολικαί; for the meaning of the designation, cf. *Introd. to the N. T.*, and Herzog's *Encyclopädie*, VII. p. 497 ff. The most probable view is this: that when the Pauline Epistles were classified together as a whole, the other epistles of the N. T. canon were united together under the title of *catholic* epistles, because they were not addressed to individual churches or particular persons, but as circular letters to Christendom generally, or to a somewhat extensive system of churches, just as Origen termed the apostolic epistle, Acts xv. 22, an ἐπιστολὴ καθολική. The objection may doubtless be raised to this view, that

into *three* classes. The *first* class (i. 13–ii. 10) is linked on to the thought of the glory promised to the Christians, and has sanctification in general as its object. Foremost and as a starting-point stands the summons to a full hope of the future grace (*τελείως ἐλπίσατε*); then follows the exhortation to an holy walk (*ἅγιοι γενήθητε*) in the fear of God the impartial judge, based on a conscious knowledge of the redemption wrought by the blood of Christ (i. 14–21); then, to a pure and unfeigned love of the brethren (*ἀλλήλους ἀγαπήσατε*), as became those who were born of incorruptible seed (i. 15–25); and lastly, laying aside all *κακία*, to desire the pure milk, and firmly cleaving to Christ, as living stones to build themselves up more and more to the spiritual house, in accordance with their calling as Christians (*τὸ λογικὸν ἄδολον γάλα ἐπιποθήσατε . . . ὡς λίθοι ζῶντες οἰκοδομεῖσθε*), ii. 1–10. — The *second* series of exhortations (ii. 11–iv. 6), which are of a special nature, is in connection with the position of the Christians in the world (*παρακαλῶ ὡς παροίκους καὶ παρεπιδήμους . . . τὴν ἀναστροφὴν ὑμῶν ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν ἔχοντες*, vv. 11, 12), and has reference—(1) To the relation to civil authorities (ii. 13–17); (2) To the particular relations of domestic life: (*a*) exhortation to the slaves (*οἱ οἰκέται ὑποτασσόμενοι . . τοῖς δεσπόταις*, 18–25) to obedience towards their masters in patient endurance, even of unjust suffering, based on a reference to the sufferings of Christ; (*b*) exhortation to the women to be subject unto their husbands, and to an holy walk, with reference to the godly women of the O. T., especially Sarah, iii. 1–6; (*c*) exhortation to the men to a discreet treatment of their wives; (3) To the relation to the world persecuting the church; after a short exhortation to unity and love (ver. 8), the apostle

the Epistle to the Hebrews should be included among these, whilst Second and Third John should be excluded from them. But the addition of the former to the Pauline Epistles is explained by its having been believed to have been by Paul; and the inclusion of the latter among the catholic epistles, by the circumstance that, having in later times only come to be regarded as canonical, they were added on to the much more important First Epistle of John. Hofmann's opinion, "that the seven epistles have the above designation because they are writings neither arising from nor pertaining to any personal relation of the writer to those whom he addresses," is contradicted by the term itself, since the expression *καθολικός* contains not the slightest allusion to a relation subsisting between the writer and those to whom he writes.

exhorts not to return evil for evil (vv. 9–14); with meekness to give a reason for their own hope (ver. 15), and in the midst of suffering to give proof of faithful submission to the divine will (vv. 16, 17). These exhortations are based on a reference to Christ, who through suffering entered into His glory (vv. 18–22), and who by His death appeals to believers not to continue their former life, but to lead a new one, even though they should be reviled for it. Lastly, the apostle reminds his readers of the future judgment of Christ (iv. 1–6). —The *third* class of exhortations (iv. 7–v. 9) has special reference to life in the church, and is connected with the thought of the nearness of the end of all things (iv. 7). The several particulars to which prominence is given are: soberness unto prayer (ver. 7), ardent love towards each other (ver. 8), hospitality (ver. 9), a faithful administration of spiritual gifts for the general good (vv. 10, 11), joyful bearing of the sufferings of Christ (vv. 12–19). Hereupon follows an exhortation to the elders to guide the church in a right manner, reference being made to the reward which awaits them (v. 1–4); then a command to the younger to submit themselves to the elder (ver. 5); on this, admonitions to all to an humble behaviour towards each other, and to humiliation before God (vv. 6, 7); lastly, a summons to watchfulness against the temptations of the devil (vv. 8, 9). — The epistle *concludes* with the benediction and a doxology (vv. 10, 11), an observation on this epistle itself (ver. 12), and sundry commissions (vv. 13, 14).

The *aim* of this epistle is stated by the apostle himself (v. 12) in the words: ἔγραψα παρακαλῶν καὶ ἐπιμαρτυρῶν ταύτην εἶναι ἀληθῆ χάριν τοῦ Θεοῦ, εἰς ἣν ἑστήκατε. Accordingly he proposed a παρακαλῶν and an ἐπιμαρτυρῶν, both in close connection with each other, as the immediate juxtaposition of the ideas shows. The occasion of them lay in this, that the readers, as professing Christians, had to endure severe afflictions through the slanders of the heathen. In view of the dangers lying therein, the apostle was careful, on the one hand, to exhort them to patience, by directing their minds to the future κληρονομία, as also to the continuance in holiness, and to a conduct towards each other and towards the heathen such as would lead the latter to see how groundless their

manders were; and, on the other hand, that his exhortation slight not be without a firm basis, to assure them that a state of suffering was the true divine state of grace. Accordingly the epistle bears neither a polemical nor a doctrinal, but an entirely hortatory character. No doubt dogmatic ideas are interwoven in some passages; these, however, are never treated doctrinally, but are always made subservient to the purpose of exhortation.

REMARK.—Schott regards this epistle as, in the first instance, a *letter of consolation*, in which the readers are calmed and comforted, on the one hand, with respect "to the accusations of the heathen, that they as matter of principle denied a moral basis to social life;" and, on the other, as regards their fears, lest the fact of God's permitting persecutions should be a proof to them that they were without the "complete moral certainty of their salvation in Christ." In opposition to this, it is to be remarked that Peter uses παρακαλεῖν only in the sense of "to exhort," and that even if the apostle in the treatment of his subject does introduce some words of comfort, the whole epistle cannot on that account be styled a letter of consolation, the less so that these very words are always made subservient to purposes of exhortation; cf. Weiss, *die petrin. Frage*, p. 631 f.—Several interpreters assume from ἐπιμαρτυρῶν κ.τ.λ., that Peter composed his hortatory epistle with the intention also of formally confirming the preaching of the gospel, aforetime addressed to his readers. Wiesinger says: "Peter in his epistle to Pauline churches has impressed the seal of his testimony on the gospel as preached by Paul." Weiss, while questioning this, in that he does not consider the church to have been Pauline, nevertheless asserts that "the apostle wished by his apostolic testimony to confirm the preaching already delivered to the readers," and for this reason precisely, "that it had not yet been proclaimed to them by an apostle." But although in i. 12, 25 we have it attested, that the true gospel is preached unto them, and in v. 12, that thus they are made partakers of the very grace of God, still this testimony is not made in such a form as to warrant the conclusion that the Apostle Peter considered it necessary to confirm by his apostolic authority the preaching by which the readers had been converted; nor does it imply that the readers had begun to doubt of its truth, because it had come to them—directly or indirectly—from Paul, or even from one who was no apostle. The double testimony is rather to be explained simply thus: the apostle was desirous of preserving his readers from the danger to which they were

exposed, by the trials that had befallen them, of entertaining doubts as to their state of grace, and of confirming them in the confident trust in the grace of which they had been made partakers, apart altogether from the person by whom the gospel had been preached to them.—Hofmann, while justly recognising the hortatory character of the epistle, thinks that Peter's intention in it was "to secure the fruits of Paul's labours in a way possible only to the Apostle of the Circumcision." But in the epistle there is not the smallest hint of any such intention, nor is there any mention made of a difference between the Apostle of the Gentiles and the Apostle of the Circumcision. Besides, if such were his intention, it is impossible to understand how Peter could have written a hortatory epistle of such length. This same objection may be urged against Bleek's idea, that the sole occasion of the epistle was the journey of Silvanus to Asia Minor. — Pfleiderer (as above, p. 419) correctly gives the design of the letter thus: "an exhortation to patience and perseverance under severe persecution from without, as also to a blameless life, by means of which the Christian church might avoid every occasion for a justifiable persecution."—On Schwegler's hypothesis, that the letter was written with the design of effecting a compromise between the followers of Paul and those of Peter, see § 4, Introd. Ewald's view, that this circular letter was composed chiefly with the design "of teaching the true relation to all heathen and heathen rulers," is refuted by the contents themselves, which go far beyond this.

The peculiar *character* of the epistle is due as much to the individuality of its author as to its own hortatory tendency; but not to this, that its author preached a Christianity different from that of the other apostles, that is to say, a narrow Jewish Christianity. The Christianity of Peter, in its *subjective* as in its *objective* side, is the same as that of Paul and John. As regards the *objective* side, there are no conceptions of the person of Christ here expressed lower than in the other books of the N. T. Weiss, who draws a distinction between the historical and the speculative methods of viewing the person of Christ in the N. T., is no doubt of opinion that only the former of these is to be found here, and that therefore Peter's conception is, in this respect, only a preliminary step to those of Paul and John. But although Peter does not speak of the pre-existence of Christ in so many words, yet the

significance which, according to him, Christ had for the realization of the eternal purposes of God toward humanity (i. 2, 3, 7, 8, 10–12, 18–20, ii. 4–10, 21–25, iii. 18–iv. 6, iv. 13, 14, v. 4, 10), goes to prove that he did not regard Christ "as a mere man," distinguished from other men only in that "He was anointed by God at His baptism with the Holy Spirit, and thus equipped for the office of Messiah." Besides, however, there are not wanting hints which point to a higher conception than this. If Christ be not called *υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ*, God is spoken of directly as *πατὴρ τοῦ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ* (chap. i. 3, 2); and the name *κύριος*, which Peter, according to the O. T. usage, frequently applies to God, is by him attributed without any explanation to Christ also. Again, if the Trinity, to which reference is made in chap. i. 2, be only the economical Trinity, still in it Christ is placed in such a relation to God "as could absolutely never, and especially never in the domain of Old Testament faith, be applied to a mere human instrument" (Jul. Köstlin). Still further, in chap. i. 20, *προεγνωσμένου πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου*, where even Weiss is forced to find an idea expressed beyond any that can be explained on the "historic principle," though it be true that here it is not—as Schumann (*die Lehre v. d. Person Christi*, p. 449) assumes—the real, but only, in the first instance, the ideal pre-existence that is affirmed, yet this very ideal pre-existence undeniably points beyond the simple humanity of Christ. It is, too, a mere makeshift for Weiss to assert that the idea was formed in Peter's mind, from the circumstance only, that Christ had already been predicted by the prophets, for *πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου* plainly goes far beyond this. And lastly, even if Weiss' interpretation of *τὸ . . . πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ*, chap. i. 11 (see *Comment. in loc.*), were admissible, it would also follow, from the very fact that Peter spoke of the working of God's Spirit in the prophets, according to its indwelling in Christ, that he had a conception of Christ's nature higher than any Weiss would allow him to have had.

Peter's estimate also of the *work of Christ*, as of His *person*, is in no way different from that of the other apostles. For him, too, it is the death and resurrection of Christ which lays the

foundation of man's salvation, the communication of the Spirit of the glorified Christ by which that salvation is appropriated by man, and the second coming of Christ by which it is completed. No doubt Weiss thinks that Peter attributes to the blood of Christ a redemptive, but not an expiatory power, and that certainly the idea of sacrifice is foreign to him, if that of substitution be not; but this opinion can be justified only by a misconception of the particular points in the passages in question (i. 18, 19, ii. 24, iii. 18).

With respect to the *subjective* side of Christianity, Peter has in reference to it also no peculiar teaching. According to him, it is again faith which is made the condition of a participation in the salvation of Christ; cf. i. 5, 7, 8, 9, 21, ii. 7 (iv. 13), v. 9. True, the πίστις of Peter is not characterized as specifically Christian by any adjunct such as εἰς Χριστόν; but that none other than a faith on Christ can be meant is evident, partly from the reference to the redeeming death of Christ which pervades the whole epistle, and partly from the circumstance, that when God is spoken of as the object of faith (i. 21), the phrase: τὸν ἐγείραντα αὐτὸν (Χριστὸν) ἐκ νεκρῶν καὶ δόξαν αὐτῷ δόντα (comp. Rom. iv. 24), is added to Θεόν by way of nearer definition. It can with no justification be asserted that faith according to Peter is, on the one hand, only the *trust in God* based on the *miracle* of the resurrection, and on the other simply the *recognition* of the Messianic dignity of Christ, and that accordingly he does not, like Paul, make reference to the atonement accomplished by the blood of Christ. For, precisely because Peter regards the death of Christ as the ground of salvation, it is plainly impossible that he should think of this faith by which redemption is obtained, without reference to the death of Christ and its effects. Weiss, though he admits that this faith, according to the view taken of it not merely by Paul and John, but also by Peter, introduces into real community of life with Christ, does so only under this restriction, that Peter's conception is based entirely on the utterances of Christ, and has not as yet been worked into didactic shape;—as if the living faith were not necessarily conscious of community of life with Christ, and as if the matter contained in an epistle written with the view

of imparting instruction must of necessity be brought into didactic form. If, according to Peter, the life of faith be, from its earliest commencement, a life of obedience, there is taught in this nothing different from what Paul more than once affirms (Rom. vi. 17, xv. 18, xvi. 19, 20; 2 Cor. x. 15); but that Peter "makes the idea of obedience so prominent, that faith as the fundamental condition of the possession of salvation *retires completely into the background*" (Weiss), is an unfounded assertion.—Since, then, the epistle is written with the design παρακαλεῖν the Christians, who were *enduring affliction* for their faith's sake, the reference to a future and complete salvation—κληρονομία, σωτηρία, δόξα, χάρις ζωής—forms, along with the exhortation to a pious Christian walk of life, a chief feature in it, and it is therefore quite natural that the ἐλπίς should appear as the centre of its apostolic παράκλησις (chap. i. 3, 13, 21, iii. 5, 9, 15, iv. 13, v. 1, 4, 10). But although it is peculiar to Peter to gaze on the future completion of salvation with a hope that stretched away beyond the present possession of it, yet we must not on that account seek to draw a distinction between him as *the apostle of hope* and Paul as *the apostle of faith;* and still less, with Weiss, attribute to him a different conception of doctrine in that, whilst according to Paul hope is only a single constituent of faith, Peter saw in faith only "the *preliminary step* to hope."

REMARK.—Whilst Weiss considers the doctrinal conception in the epistle as a preliminary step to Paulinism, Pfleiderer, on the other hand, characterizes it as "a Paulinism popularised, and thereby rendered weak and insipid." In reference to this, the following remarks must be made:—(1) Pfleiderer indeed admits that the emphasis laid on the death of Christ as the means of our redemption is a genuinely Pauline feature; at the same time, however, he is of opinion that the death of Christ must be taken here as referring not, as with Paul, to the expiation of the guilt of sin, but only to the removal of a life of sin, and that its *redemptory* effects can only be considered as morally communicated, in order that it may as a powerful example bring about the resolution to an obedient imitation of Christ. But this is clearly incorrect, for it is apparent from an unprejudiced perusal of the passages in question that redemption

from the guilt of sin is viewed as the primary effect of Christ's death, though there is undoubtedly also reference to its final aim in delivering from the power of sin. How can redemption from a life of sin be conceived of without the forgiveness of sin? The very expression ῥαντισμὸς αἵματος Ἰ. Χ. (i. 2) is a proof that our author regarded the forgiveness of sin as the effect of the blood of Christ. The idea that man must earn pardon for himself by his own obedient following of Christ, is totally foreign to this epistle. (2) If Pfleiderer asserts that here we have faith presented in an aspect different from that of Paul, inasmuch as its object is not Christ the historical Redeemer from sin, but Christ the Glorified One, it must be urged in reply, that Christian faith, in the nature of it, has reference at once to the abased and to the exalted Christ,—to the former because He is exalted, to the latter in that He was made low,—and that in this passage also between Paul and the writer of this epistle there was no difference and could be none. (3) In opposition to Pfleiderer's assertion, that *obedience* also has for each of the two a different import, inasmuch as, while Paul considers moral obedience to be the fruit of faith, the author of this epistle looks on morality as a particular element of faith itself, it must be remarked, that if obedience be the fruit of faith, it must in germ be contained in faith, that is, be an element of faith. (4) With respect to the πνεῦμα, Pfleiderer admits that it is for both in *every* way the life-principle of Christianity, only he finds it worthy of notice that in this epistle the communication of the Spirit is not made to stand in any way connected with baptism. But it is clearly a quite unjustifiable demand, that this relation should find expression in the single passage in which reference is made to baptism.—No doubt it cannot be denied that the several particulars of Christian faith, knowledge, and life have received from Paul a fuller development, and as a consequence a clearer definition, than in our epistle; but this can be accounted for as much by the individuality of the two apostles as by the purely hortatory character of this epistle, and is no evidence of the correctness of Pfleiderer's view.—Hofmann justly remarks: "The epistle contains nothing by which its author can be recognised as the advocate of an . . . insipid Paulinism, and nothing either which betrays his dependence on Pauline forms of thought."

The peculiar character of the epistle, by which it is distinguished from the writings of Paul and John, has its origin not in any doctrinal difference, but on the one hand in the individuality of its author, and on the other in its own practical

design. Peter does not mean to *teach*, he is anxious rather to *exhort* in accordance with his practical mind,[1] as far removed from the dialectic bent of Paul as from the intuitive of John. —The epistle bears further a characteristic impress in the O. T. modes of thought and expression peculiar to it.[2] In none of the writings of the N. T. do we find, comparatively speaking, so numerous quotations from and references to the O. T. (comp. chap. i. 16, 24, 25, ii. 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 22–24, iii. 10–12, 13, 14, iv. 8, 17, 18, v. 5, 7). But more than this, the author lives and moves so much in O. T. conceptions, that he expresses his thoughts by preference in O. T. language. When he wishes to set forth the dignity of the Christian church, or to make reference to the future salvation of believers, or to exhort to a walk becoming Christians, he does so for the most part in the manner peculiar to the O. T. Even when he speaks of the death of Christ as the ground of salvation, it is in O. T. language that he lays stress on its significance. And all this without so much as hinting at the specific difference between the O. and N. T. So that all the ideas, more especially, which are in Paul rooted in the clear consciousness of the difference between the two economies: *δικαιοῦσθαι ἐκ τῆς πίστεως*, *υἱοθεσία*, the relation of affection between God and Christians as His children,[3] etc., occupy here an entirely subordinate position. Nevertheless the tone of the *whole* epistle is decidedly Christian, not only in that it is inspired by that spirit to which Christ referred when He said to James and John: "Know ye not what spirit ye are of?" but because there is to be found in it no trace of Mosaic legality, or of the national narrowness peculiar to the Jewish

[1] Strangely enough, Hofmann takes offence at what is here said, although he himself describes "Peter's mind as one which directly apprehended the duty of the moment, as the moment presented it, and set about fulfilling it by word and deed without circumlocution or hesitation,"—proof evidently of a practical mind.

[2] According to Hofmann, it is not the conception, but the manner of expression, that is that of the O. T.; but is not expression determined by conception?

[3] This, too, Hofmann questions, assigning as his reason chap. i. 17; but the expression Father is applied to God in the O. T. also (Isa. lxiii. 16; Jer. xxxi. 9), without the relation of child being conceived in the same way as it is by Paul.

people. The Christian church is a γένος ἐκλεκτόν just in that it is Christian, and not in any way because the greater part of it belongs to the nation of Israel, "into which the others have only been ingrafted." The Mosaic law is not so much as mentioned, nor does the expression νόμος once occur. No doubt it is strongly insisted upon that Christians should live an *holy* life; but the obligation is deduced not from any law, but from the fact that they are redeemed from their ματαία ἀναστροφή by the τίμιον αἷμα of Christ, and are born again of seed incorruptible, while, as the means through which they are to procure their sanctification, the πνεῦμα is mentioned, not the legal letter (a γράμμα). From this it follows that the name "Apostle of the Circumcision" (Weiss), given to Peter, is inappropriate, if it be understood in a sense different from that in Gal. ii. 7, 8. It can nowhere be proved from his epistle that circumcision had for Peter any significance whatever for the Christian life. Rather is he penetrated by O. T. ideas only in so far as they obtain their true fulfilment in Christianity, and no allusion whatever is made to *those* of them which had already found their realization in Christ.—Further, the epistle bears a peculiar character from the traces in it which prove the author to have been an eye-witness and an ear-witness of Christ. Not only does the apostle style himself μάρτυς τῶν τοῦ Χριστοῦ παθημάτων, but the way in which he discourses of the sufferings and glory of Christ is a proof that he speaks from a personal experience, the power of which he himself had directly felt. Nor this alone. Oftentimes in his expressions the very words he had heard from Christ are re-echoed, and hence the many points of accord, especially with the discourses of Christ as these are contained in the synoptic Gospels; cf. chap. i. 4 with Matt. xxv. 34; i. 8 with John xx. 23; i. 10 ff. with Luke x. 24; i. 13 with Luke xii. 35; ii 12 with Matt. v. 10; ii. 17 with Matt. xxii. 21; iii. 13–15 with Matt. x. 28; and v. 10, 11, iv. 13, 14, with Matt. v. 12; v. 3 with Matt. xx. 25, 26; v. 6 with Matt. xxiii. 12.[1]

[1] Hofmann, indeed, disputes that there is here any allusion to the words of Christ; he admits, however, that it is possible that "the expression used by our Lord, Matt. v. 16, was present to the mind of the apostle when writing ii. 12;" and he says: "the ἐν οὐκ οἴδατε ἀγαπᾶτε shows clearly enough that it is written

Lastly, the epistle shows an unmistakeable kinship with various writings of the N. T. Did this consist merely in the occurrence here and there of single cognate thoughts, conceptions, or expressions, there would still be no proof of interdependence. In the whole of the N. T. writings there is contained a gospel substantially one and the same, and there must have prevailed in the intercourse of believers with one another — every allowance being made for diversity in the individual — a common mode of thought and expression, which had its origin chiefly in the writings of the O. T. But the affinity which is apparent between the Epistle of Peter and several of the Epistles of Paul and the Epistle of James, goes far beyond this. Among Paul's writings there are several passages in the Epistles to the Romans and Ephesians to which Peter's epistle stands in a relation of dependence. Almost all the thoughts in Rom. xii. and xiii. are to be found repeated in the Epistle of Peter,— only here they are scattered throughout the whole letter;— and not detached thoughts alone, but whole trains of thought, in which there is a similarity of expression even in what is of secondary moment; cf. from Rom. xii., ver. 1 with 1 Pet. ii. 5, ver. 2 with i. 14, vv. 3–8 with iv. 10, ver. 9 with i. 22, ver. 10 with ii. 17, ver. 13 with iv. 9, more especially vv. 14–19 with iii. 8–12; and from chap. xiii., vv. 1–7 with ii. 13, 14 (see on this Weiss, p. 406 ff.). But echoes of other passages in Romans are to be found; cf. Pet. i. 21 with Rom. iv. 24; Pet. ii. 24 with Rom. vi. 18; Pet. iii. 22 with Rom. viii. 34; Pet. iv. 1, 2 with Rom. vi. 7 (here it is not the clauses only which correspond: *ὁ παθὼν κ.τ.λ.* and *ὁ ἀποθανὼν κ.τ.λ.*, but the subsequent thought of Peter: *εἰς τὸ μηκέτι ἀνθρώπων κ.τ.λ.*, answers to the previous idea of Paul: *τοῦ μηκέτι δουλεύειν κ.τ.λ.*); Pet. v. 1 with Rom. viii. 18; particularly striking is the agreement between Pet. ii. 6 and Rom. ix. 33 (x. 11). — The kinship between the Epistle of Peter and that to the Ephesians is based not on single passages only, but at the same time on the composition of the two writings. If our epistle

by one who has seen the Lord." Hofmann is wrong in denying that the words *μάρτυς τῶν τοῦ Χριστοῦ παθημάτων*, v. 1, bear the meaning here presupposed. See Hofmann *in loc.*

be in superscription and introduction similar to the epistles of Paul, it bears a peculiar resemblance to that to the Ephesians, inasmuch as the thanks expressed in the latter have reference not to the particular circumstances of a special church, but to the common salvation of which the Christians had been made partakers; the formula of thanksgiving, too, is in both literally the same: *εὐλογητὸς ὁ Θεὸς κ.τ.λ.* (thus 2 Cor.). The contents, too, of the epistles present many points of similarity both in the general exhortations to a walk in love towards each other, humility, and meekness, and a renunciation of their former heathenish life in fleshly passions and lusts, and in the special exhortations with respect to domestic relations; further, in the summons to resist the devil, and lastly, in the concluding wish of peace. The following particular passages may be compared with each other: Pet. i. 1 (*ἐκλεκτοῖς . . . κατὰ πρόγνωσιν Θεοῦ . . . ἐν ἁγιασμῷ πνεύματος*) and Eph. i. 4 (*ἐξελέξατο ἡμᾶς . . . πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου, εἶναι ἡμ. ἁγίους*); Pet. i. 5 and Eph. i. 19; Pet. i. 14 and Eph. ii. 3; Pet. i. 18 and Eph. iv. 17; Pet. ii. 4, 5 and Eph. ii. 20–22; Pet. ii. 18 and Eph. vi. 5; Pet. iii. 1 and Eph. v. 22; Pet. iii. 18 (*προσάγειν*) and Eph. ii. 18, iii. 12 (*προσαγωγή*); Pet. iii. 22 and Eph. i. 20, 21; Pet. v. 8, 9 and Eph. vi. 10 ff. It is also worthy of special remark that in both epistles the goal of the Christian is indicated by the word *κληρονομία*, and that in both the angel world is represented as standing in a relation to Christ's work of redemption; cf. Pet. i. 12 and Eph. iii. 10; Peter seems to make reference also to Eph. iv. 8–10.

The similarity between particular passages of Peter's epistle and Paul's other epistles is not of such a nature as to warrant the conclusion that there is a dependence of the former on the latter. If, *e.g.*, Pet. iii. 2, etc., and 1 Tim. ii. 9 treat of the ornaments of women, and the order in which the particular objects are brought forward be in both cases the same, this may doubtless be a merely accidental circumstance. Besides, the nomenclature varies.—On the other hand, the agreement between particular passages in the Epistles of James and Peter is of such a kind that it cannot be regarded as accidental; see Pet. i. 6, 7 and Jas. i. 2, 3 (comp. *ἀγαλλιᾶσθε* and *χάραν ἡγήσασθε; λυπηθέντες ἐν ποικίλοις πειρασ-*

μοῖς and ὅταν πειρασμοῖς περιπέσετε ποικίλοις, and in both passages the identical τὸ δοκίμιον ὑμῶν τῆς πίστεως); further, Pet. ii. 1 and Jas. i. 21 (there: ἀποθέμενοι πᾶσαν κακίαν; here: ἀποθέμενοι πᾶσαν ῥυπαρίαν καὶ περισσείαν κακίας; there: τὸ λογικὸν ἄδολον γάλα ἐπιποθήσατε; here, the not very dissimilar thought: δέξασθε τὸν ἔμφυτον λόγον; there, the aim: ἵνα ἐν αὐτῷ αὐξηθῆτε εἰς σωτηρίαν; here, the similar thought in the participial clause: τὸν δυνάμενον σῶσαι τὰς ψυχὰς ὑμῶν); lastly, Pet. v. 5–9 and Jas. iv. 6, 7, 10, where in both passages there is the same quotation from the O. T., then the exhortation to humble submission to God, and thereon the summons to withstand the devil; besides this, Pet. v. 6 is almost identical with Jas. iv. 10.[1]

The dependence of Peter's epistle on the writings already mentioned, whilst it is acknowledged by almost all interpreters (in recent times more especially by Wiesinger, Schott, and Hofmann; in like manner, too, by Ewald, Reuss, Bleek; Guericke's opinion is doubtful), is denied by Mayerhoff, Rauch, and Brückner. Brückner, while admitting that there still remains the general impression of so many echoes, which always seems to point back to the dependence of Peter's epistles, is nevertheless of opinion that the similarity can be explained simply from the circumstance that cognate ideas in the minds of the apostles called for cognate terms, especially if there be taken into account the power of primitive Christian tradition on early Christian style, and the prevalent modes of expression which had arisen out of conceptions formed under the influence of the Old Covenant. This result, however, he obtains in the following way:—He resolves the similar thoughts into their several elements; and having directed special attention to these, he lays particular stress on the differences he discovers. This process of separation is of necessity misleading, and if it be not employed, the similarity is so great that there can be no doubt as to the dependence of

[1] Although several of the citations from the Epistles to the Romans and Ephesians, and from that of James, might lead to the supposition that the passages in question in Peter's epistle are not dependent on them (cf. Hofmann, p. 206 ff.), yet, as is fully recognised by Hofmann, that in no way alters the matter itself.

the one composition on the other. Weiss has demonstrated this at full length with respect to the relation between the Epistle of Peter and those to the Romans (chaps. xii. and xiii.) and Ephesians. He is wrong, however, when he says that the dependence is on the side of Paul, and not on that of Peter. With regard to Rom. xii. and xiii., it must be remembered—(1) That it is entirely improbable that Paul should, quite contrary to his usual custom, have been at the trouble to collect the thoughts here arranged from an epistle where they occur in a quite different connection; whilst there is in itself nothing improbable in the supposition,—if he were acquainted with the Epistle to the Romans, and more especially the above chapters,—that Peter wrote under the influence of Paul's expression in the different passages of his epistle, where the course of his own thoughts suggested to him the same ideas. (2) That the views of Weiss necessarily lead to a depreciation of the literary capability of Paul. Weiss himself says that Paul's dependence on Peter caused him to place in chap. xii. 6, 7, διακονία, in the narrower sense, which is "*evidently jarring*," between the three spiritual gifts; to introduce in ver. 11, "*without any purpose*," the exhortation τῇ ἐλπίδι χαίροντες; to put the thought in ver. 15 in the *wrong place;* and in ver. 16 to interpolate the idea quite inappropriately.[1] As to the Epistle to the Ephesians, it must be remarked —(1) That no foreign influence can be recognised in it,—when compared with the other Pauline Epistles. Its dissimilarity is to be explained from its own individual tendency as a circular letter. (2) That the special peculiarities by which this Epistle is distinguished from the other letters of Paul, even from that to the Colossians, have nothing whatsoever in common with the Epistle of Peter. In addition to this, let it be noted that the independence of Paul, which is apparent in every one of his epistles, stands in sharpest contradiction with the assump-

[1] Since Weiss himself uses the expressions above quoted, the accusation that he detracts from Paul's independence is certainly not without justification. If he complain that even in this commentary regard is not paid to "the general considerations" (pp. 403–406 in *der Petrin. Lehrbegriff*), we must observe in reply, that general possibilities do not issue in much,—more especially when concrete circumstances prevent that being regarded as a reality which is in itself possible.

tion that the apostle was indebted to those passages in Peter's epistle; whilst, on the other hand, the leaning which Peter had to the O. T. and to the words of Christ, shows that to allow his mode of expression to be shaped by the influence of another was in no way opposed to the peculiar character of his mind, but entirely in harmony with it, as part of a nature "easily determined, receptive, and peculiarly open to personal impressions," Schott.

REMARK. — Weiss, in his essay entitled *Die Petrinische Frage*, written for the purpose of defending his views on the dependence of the Epistles to the Romans and Ephesians, against objections raised to them, substantially repeats what he had formerly said, and hardly adduces anything new. In denying that there subsists any relation of dependence between Rom. vi. 7 and Pet. iv. 12, and between Rom. vi. 2, 18 and Pet. ii. 24, Weiss overlooks the fact that the resemblance rests not alone on the two expressions *ὁ ἀποθανών* and *ὁ παθὼν σαρκί*, and that his interpretation of *ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις ἀπογενόμενοι* is an erroneous one. A more minute examination of the several clauses of chaps. xii. and xiii. of Romans can result merely in the conclusion, that it is not in itself impossible that this epistle was conceived under the influence of Peter's letter. But the priority of the latter is not thereby proved. The hortatory design of this epistle explains why it is that Peter has confined himself to these two chapters, and why in his composition are to be found none "of the developments of Christian doctrinal conceptions peculiar to Paul." Besides, it must be noted that although Peter says nothing of the relation of the *νόμος* and the *ἔργα τοῦ νόμου*, he is completely at one with Paul in the fundamental conception that sinful man can obtain salvation only through faith in Christ. — With respect to the affinity between the Epistle of Peter and that to the Ephesians, Weiss himself admits that "evidence for the originality of the Petrine passages can be led with still less strictness from a comparison of details." Weiss wrongly affirms that the Epistle to the Ephesians is related to that of Peter precisely in those very points which distinguish it from the rest of Paul's writings. For the peculiar and distinctive character of the Epistle to the Ephesians does not consist only in that it is a circular letter (an assertion which, however, is decidedly denied by many critics, and particularly by Meyer; see his commentary, *Einl.* § 1), and that its commencement is of an import more general than that of the other Pauline Epistles, but more especially in the whole

diction, which, in the rich fulness of its expression, bears an impress different from the rest of the apostle's writings. That this peculiarity, however, cannot be traced to a knowledge on the apostle's part of Peter's epistle, needs not to be proved. When Weiss finds it a characteristic of the Epistle to the Ephesians that its "ethical exhortation culminates in advices for the several stations of life," he must have forgotten that exactly the same is the case with the Epistle to the Colossians, which plainly was not written under the influence of Peter's epistle.

The dependence of this epistle on Paul and James is not, as Schott assumes, to be attributed to Peter's intention to show the agreement of his doctrine with that of these two men. For it is precisely their doctrinal peculiarities which are not echoed in the related passages; and altogether a doctrinal intent is nowhere discernible. It must therefore be assumed that Peter, from his familiarity with these epistles, was so penetrated by their prevailing modes of thought and expression, and the connection of their ideas, that recollections of these, although not unconsciously still involuntarily,[1] became interwoven with his style. Such reminiscences, too, would press themselves upon his mind the more readily in the case of the Epistle to the Ephesians, that it was addressed to the same churches in Asia Minor which Peter felt himself urged to confirm and strengthen in their state of grace.[2]

With all this dependence, however, the epistle has still its peculiar impress different from that of the epistles of Paul and James. Although it abound in conceptions which are

[1] Schott's opinion is far-fetched, that Peter's continual references to the Pauline Epistles arose from his tender anxiety lest he should add to "the disquiet and apprehension of his readers, by giving any direct expression to his apostolic individuality, unknown as it was to them." He thinks that for this reason Peter had, "without mentioning his intention, unnoticed, and as it were by chance, here and there, sometimes more distinctly and sometimes less so, allowed his readers to hear the well-known voice of their real pastor."

[2] Hofmann goes too far in maintaining that Peter "purposely" connected his epistle with that to the Ephesians, making the opening passages of the former thus similar to those of the latter, "in order that from the commencement his heathen readers must perceive his intention, and recognise the harmony subsisting between that which was written by the Apostle of the Circumcision and that formerly penned by the Apostle of the Heathen." This assertion arises from the mistaken views which Hofmann has formed as to the design of the epistle.

common to all the apostles, there are yet to be found in it not only particular expressions and terms, but also many ideas, which are foreign to the other writings of the N. T. Thus it is distinctive of this epistle, that the work of salvation is characterized as something after which the prophets searched, and into which the angels desired to look (i. 10–12); that the Christians are called *πάροικοι καὶ παρεπίδημοι* (ii. 11); that the exhortation to an holy walk is based on this, that thereby the heathen would recognise the groundlessness of their accusations (ii. 12, iii. 16); and that the endurance of wrong is termed a *χάρις*. Further, peculiar to this epistle are: the exhibition of Christ's sufferings as a type of their own sufferings for the faith's sake (ii. 21 ff.); the idea that Christ has preached to the spirits in prison (iii. 19, iv. 6); the consolation drawn from the similarity of the affliction of the Christian brethren (v. 9); Sarah, in her subjection to Abraham, held up to women as an example (iii. 6); the comparison drawn between baptism and the flood, and the designation of the former as *συνειδήσεως ἀγαθῆς ἐπερώτημα* (iii. 21); the thought that the sufferings of Christ form the beginning of judgment (iv. 12); the exhortation to the elders (v. 1–3); the term *ἀρχιποιμήν* as (v. 4) applied to Christ, etc. It cannot justly be urged against this epistle that it is wanting in logical development of thought. Since the epistle bears an hortatory character, there is nothing to excite surprise when the author makes a transition from more general to more special precepts, and again from more special to more general, and when he, as the spirit moves him, builds now one exhortation, now another, on this or on that fact of redemption, finding here again occasion for fresh admonitions. But that with all this there is no want of a definite train of thought, is proved by the above summary of contents. The style does not abound in aphorisms, like that of the discourses of Jesus and the Epistle of James, but is distinguished by thoughts connected by means of participles, relative pronouns, copulative particles, as in the Pauline Epistles. A peculiarity, too, is to be found in the frequent condensation of several conceptions into a substantival or adjectival idea by means of the definite article (chap. i. 3, 5, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15,

17, etc.); further, the frequent use of the particle ὡς (chap i. 14, 19, ii. 1, 5, 16, iv. 10, 11, 15, 16, v. 3); lastly, the construction of the participle, both with an imperative either preceding (i. 13, 14, 22, ii. 1, 4, 16) or following it (i. 18, 23, ii. 1, 2, 5, 7), as also its employment in an absolute and independent way, without being joined to a particular finite verb (ii. 18, iii. 1, 7, 9, 16, iv. 8).

Whilst de Wette looks on the epistle as hardly worthy of an apostle, others praise, and rightly too, the freshness and vividness of its style,[1] its "richness in Christian doctrine," and the "noble artlessness which feels itself satisfied and blessed in the simple and believing reception, and calm and quiet possession, of the facts of a divinely given salvation" (Schott).

SEC. 3.—THE READERS OF THE EPISTLE; THE TIME AND PLACE OF ITS COMPOSITION.

Whilst the epistle itself gives no precise information as to who the readers addressed are, its superscription shows them to have been Christians in Asia Minor, more especially those in Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, Asia (by which term proconsular Asia is to be understood), and Bithynia; that is to say, the Christians in regions where Paul and his companions, according to his epistles and the Acts of the Apostles, had first preached the gospel and founded the Christian church.—In ancient times the prevalent view was that the epistle was addressed to *Jewish-Christians.* This opinion was entertained by Eusebius, Didymus, Epiphanius, Hieronymus, Oecumenius, Theophylactus; and among more recent authors, by Erasmus, Calvin, Grotius, Bengel, Augusti, Hug, Bertholdt, Pott, and others. Several interpreters, like Wolf, Gerhard, Jachmann, etc., have modified this view, in so far that they hold the epistle to have been written *principally* (principaliter) no doubt for Jewish-Christians, but in a *certain* sense (quodammodo) for Gentile-Christians also (fidei interna ac loci externa unitate illis con-

[1] Grotius: habet haec epistola τὸ σφοδρόν, conveniens ingenio principis apostolorum. Bengel: mirabilis est gravitas et alacritas Petrini sermonis lectorem suavissime retinens.

junctos). *This* is the position taken up by Weiss. He assumes that the majority of church members were Jewish-Christians, and that these were regarded by Peter as the real body of the congregations; for this reason, and not thinking of the admixture of heathen which had everywhere taken place, the apostle addresses the Jewish-Christians *only*. Weiss' view is very closely bound up with his opinion, that the churches in question had already been founded before the missionary journey of Paul to Asia Minor, by Jews of that region who had been converted at Jerusalem on the day of Pentecost or subsequently to it. This assertion, however, is not only without any foundation whatsoever in history, but is opposed to all that is told us of the Apostle Paul's labours in Asia Minor, in his epistles and in the Acts of the Apostles, inasmuch as there is in neither the smallest hint that when he commenced his work there, a Christian church was in existence anywhere in that land. It is surely inconceivable that Paul should have pursued his missionary work in that region without in any way taking notice of the church already established there, and all the more so if that church had by that time risen to such importance as to draw on itself the persecuting hate of the *heathen*.—The proofs adduced by Weiss, that the epistle was addressed to Jewish-Christian churches, are as follow:—1. The designation of the readers in the superscription of the letter; 2. The style of expression so strongly based on the O. T.; 3. The occurrence of several passages, namely: chaps. i. 14, 18, ii. 9, 10, iii. 6, iv. 3, which point apparently to Gentile, but in reality to Jewish-Christians as readers. The *first* proof falls to the ground when the expression ἐκλεκτοὶ παρεπίδημοι διασπορᾶς Πόντου κ.τ.λ. is correctly understood (see comment. to i. 1). With regard to the *second* proof, however, it must be noted that the references to the O. T. were for Gentile-Christians (who of course cannot be conceived of without some acquaintance with the O. T.) not less intelligible than for Jewish-Christians. Paul himself makes frequent enough allusion to the O. T. in his epistles addressed to Gentile-Christians (cf. *e.g.* 1 Cor. i. 19, 31, ii. 9, 16, iii. 19, 20, etc.).[1]—With respect

[1] Weiss wrongly tries (*die Petrin. Frage*, p. 623) to neutralize the evidential value of this remark, by saying "that it does not touch the very pith of his

to the third proof, the previous condition of the readers in the passages quoted is not in appearance only, but as a matter of fact, characterized as heathenish, and that not positively simply, but negatively also. For in these verses there is not the faintest intimation that the readers before their conversion had stood, as Israelites, in the covenant relation to God to which Paul invariably makes reference when he speaks to Jews or of them. The whole character of the epistle speaks not *against*, but much more *in favour of* the assumption that the churches here addressed, at least the larger part of them, were composed not of Jewish, but of Gentile-Christians. In favour, too, of this view, is the circumstance that these same churches are represented as suffering persecution, not at the hands of the Jews, but of the heathen; which goes to show that the latter did not regard these Christians merely as a sect within Judaism, as would naturally have been the case had they been formerly Jews, or for the most part Jews. The persecuting zeal of the heathen was directed against it only when Christianity began to draw its professors no longer from Judaism chiefly, but from heathendom; and it was not Jewish, but Gentile-Christian churches which were the objects of detestation. Justly, then, did Augustine (*contra Faustum*, xii. 89) already, and Cassiodorus (*de instit. div. lit.* ii. p. 516) later on, Luther and Wetstein, and in recent times Steiger, de Wette, Brückner, Mayerhoff, Wiesinger, Schott, Hofmann, as also Neander, Guericke, Reuss, Lechler, Schaff, Jul. Köstlin, Bleek, and others, pronounce in favour of the opinion that the churches in question must be held to have been composed of Gentile-Christians. The hypothesis of Benson, Michaelis, Credner, and some others, that this epistle is designed for

argument, which consists in this, that Peter expressly quotes the O. T., as Paul does only in i. 16, ii. 6." For, on the one hand, Paul, too, employs O. T. expressions and phrases without adding γέγραπται or the like, *e.g.* in the passage above quoted, 1 Cor. ii. 16. On the other hand, the O. T. expressions employed by Peter without the formula of quotation, are of such a kind as to have been intelligible to the Christians as such, irrespective of whether they formerly had been heathens or Jews; nor do they by any means "presuppose so intimate a knowledge of the O. T. as is conceivable only in those who had formerly been Jews." With regard to their acquaintance with the O. T., cf. Meyer on Rom. vii. 1, where Paul speaks of the Christians, without exception, as γινώσκουσι νόμον.

such Gentile-Christians as had before their conversion to Christianity been "Proselytes of the Gate," is evidently a purely arbitrary one.

As to their *condition*, we gather from the epistle for the most part only, that the churches were at that time exposed to many persecutions at the hands of the heathen, which, however, consisted more in contumelies and revilings than in actual ill-treatment. That these manifold persecutions were instituted by the state cannot, with Hug, Mayerhoff, and Neander, be concluded from the expressions ἀπολογία and κακοποιός in iii. 15, 16. Schott's conjecture, that they were connected with those which arose under Nero, is refuted on the one hand by their character as described in the epistle, and on the other by the testimony of history, which confines the Neronic persecution solely to Rome. A too gloomy picture of the moral condition of the readers must not be drawn from the exhortations given to them relative to the persecutions, although it is not incredible that the shortcomings brought here and there to light by the persecutions may have induced the apostle to compose this epistle; open blame is nevertheless not expressed. Nor is there anything to indicate that the church was disturbed by heretical tendencies, or opposing parties of Jewish and Gentile-Christians.—The notion that Peter was personally acquainted with his readers, is opposed as much by the want of any personal relations on his part to his readers, as by the distinction he makes between himself and those who had proclaimed the gospel to them.

Only one passage (v. 13) has reference to the *place* where the epistle was composed. From the circumstance that Peter sends greetings from the church (not from his wife) in Babylon, it may correctly be inferred that during the composition of the epistle he was in that city. But whether by Babylon is to be understood the Babylon properly so called, on the banks of the Euphrates, or Rome rather, the capital of the world, is a question by no means settled as yet (cf. on this the remarks to the passage). It is not at all improbable in itself that Peter was for a time in Babylon proper, and laboured there as an apostle, the less so that from of old, in that very city,

there were large Jewish communities, which stood in intimate connection with Jerusalem.

In order to settle more precisely *the time of the composition*, it must be observed principally — (1) That the epistle is directed to Pauline churches; (2) That it presupposes the acquaintance of its author with the Epistle to the Ephesians. If these two points, above proved to be correct, are established, the epistle can neither, as Weiss assumes, have been composed at the beginning of Paul's third missionary journey, nor, as Brückner conjectures, at the end of it; its origin must be relegated rather to a later date. Assuming that the Epistle to the Ephesians was written by Paul during his captivity at Rome, Wieseler would place the composition of our epistle in the latter part of that captivity. But the following facts militate against this; on the one hand, that the persecutions of the Christians in the provinces of Asia Minor, which occasioned this letter of Peter, are mentioned neither in the Epistle to the Ephesians nor in that to the Colossians; and, on the other, that in the former there is no reference to those false teachers whose appearance these epistles presuppose. Peter, too, if he had composed his epistle at that time, would certainly not have left the imprisonment of Paul unnoticed, the more especially that he was writing to a Pauline church. The letter can have been composed, then, only after the two years' imprisonment of Paul in Rome. Ewald and Hofmann are of opinion that it was written immediately after his release from captivity. But it is more than improbable that an epistle addressed to a Pauline church was composed when Paul was still alive and engaged in work. If such had been the case, Peter would certainly not have omitted to specify the relation in which he stood to Paul, and the motive which induced him to write to a Pauline church, since by so doing he was evidently encroaching by his apostolic labours on the missionary territory of Paul.[1] Accordingly, it must be assumed that the epistle was not written until after Paul had been removed by

[1] Hofmann's remark is singular: that those only were guilty of an *interference* who attempted to turn away from Paul the Gentile-Christian churches founded by him, and that Peter would only have been guilty of an *encroachment* if he had aimed at forming a number of Gentile-Christian churches.

martyrdom from the field of apostolic labour, and withal at a time when this fact had become known to the churches, otherwise Peter could not have passed it over in silence. We must agree, then, with those critics who place the composition of the epistle in the closing years of Peter's lifetime, at the earliest in the year 66 (as Reuss, Bleek, Wiesinger, Schott). If Peter died under Nero, that is, about the year 67 A.D., the period which extends from the Neronic persecution of the Christians and the death of Paul — especially as he suffered martyrdom soon after the conflagration in Rome, 64 A.D.—to the time when this epistle was composed, is long enough to allow of it seeming natural that Peter in his epistle should leave those two events unnoticed.[1]

All that we learn from the epistle as to the circumstances in which the churches in question were placed, and in particular, respecting the persecutions to which they were exposed, is in harmony with this date. For although the Christians had to suffer persecution even during the time of Paul's missionary labours (cf. 1 Thess. i. 6, ii. 14; 2 Thess. i. 4, etc.), yet this was by no means so generally the case—a statement Hofmann unjustly calls in question—as our epistle seems to presuppose, but took place for the most part then only when the heathen were instigated by the Jews (Acts xvii. 5, xviii. 12), or by particular individuals to whose interests Christianity was opposed (cf. Acts xvi. 16 ff., xix. 23 ff.). And albeit Tacitus records that the Christians, even so early as the burning

[1] The opposite view (Hofmann's), that the epistle was written between the autumn of the year 63 and that of 64, is based on assumptions, the correctness of which cannot be proved. Hofmann supposes that immediately after Paul's release Peter undertook the journey from Jerusalem to Rome, passing through Asia Minor by way of Ephesus, withal "in order that he might restrain those whose enmity towards Paul threatened to produce a dissension which would have been specially injurious to the church of the world's capital;" further, that during this journey he became acquainted with the Epistle to the Ephesians, with which he "purposely" connected his own; and that he took Mark, who was with him when he composed his epistle, away with him from Ephesus, "because, that of all the Jewish converts who, without belonging to the company of the apostle of the Gentiles, were preaching Christ in Rome at the time of Paul's imprisonment, he was perhaps the only one whose conduct towards Peter was influenced by love instead of by jealousy and enmity;" that, immediately upon his arrival at Rome, he wrote his epistle. All these suppositions are purely fictions, nor can the slightest trace of them be found in the Epistle of Peter.

of Rome, were the "odium humani generis" and "per flagitia invisi," they could have begun to be so only after Christianity had shown itself a power capable of advancing on heathendom and convulsing it. This it became only in consequence of Paul's missionary labour; and Weiss is not justified in taking advantage of the fact to support his views as to the early date of composition. On the other hand, the epistle shows that, at the time of its origin, the hostility of the Gentiles towards Christianity had not risen to such a height that the heathen authorities sought to suppress that religion as a *religio nova* fraught with danger to the state, but had confined itself as yet to slanders and the like, to which the heathen population were incited for the reasons given in chap. iv. All this, in like manner, harmonizes with the date above mentioned. Weiss concludes that the epistle belongs to a time considerably earlier, from the following circumstances: "that these sufferings were for the Christians still something new, at which they wondered;" and "that to the heathen it was a thing novel and strange that the Christians should renounce their vicious life;" and from this also, that "the apostle still expresses the *naïve* (!) hope that the heathen, on becoming better acquainted with the holy walk of the Christians, would cease from their enmity, as having arisen from ignorance." The conclusion, however, is unwarranted, the more so that, on the views above expressed as to the origin of the churches of Asia Minor and the date of the epistle's composition, the time during which the churches had existed was even shorter than on the theory supported by Weiss; according to the latter, they had already been in existence for about twenty years; according to the former, for only about fifteen. Under these circumstances, which he has omitted to take into account, Weiss can naturally draw nothing favourable to his own opinions from the expression occurring in chap. ii. 2: *ἀρτιγέννητα βρέφη*. The mention, too, of the *νεώτεροι*, in contrast to the *πρεσβύτεροι* (chap. v. 5), is not evidence that the epistle was composed at an earlier date, for there is no proof that such *νεώτεροι* were no longer to be found in the churches of Asia Minor, say, ten years after the time mentioned by Weiss. But the chief reason which Weiss

adduces as proof that the churches in question were not Gentile-Christian, but Judaeo-Christian communities which had already been in existence before the apostolic career of Paul, and that Peter's epistle had been written before the literary labours of the former had commenced, is his own affirmation, that the doctrinal system of Peter's epistle "is preparatory to that of Paul." This assertion, in itself erroneous and opposed to the real state of the case (cf. more particularly Jul. Köstlin, "Einheit und Mannigfaltigkeit in d. neutest. Lehre," in the *Jahrb. für deutsche Theologie*, 1858), can be brought as evidence of the early composition of the epistle, the less that it in no way admits of proof that Paul became acquainted with the opinions of Peter by means only of this epistle, and that Peter afterwards renounced his own system for that of Paul. From the presence of Silvanus and Mark with Peter at the time he composed this epistle, nothing with any exactitude can be concluded, since the former is mentioned in Acts xviii. 5 as the companion of Paul; the latter, although he was in Rome (Col. iv. 10) during Paul's first imprisonment, and during the second (2 Tim. iv. 11) in Asia Minor, may have been with Peter at any other time.

SEC. 4.—AUTHENTICITY OF THE EPISTLE.

The epistle is one of the writings of the N. T. the authenticity of which is most clearly established from antiquity. Although in the works of the Apostolic Fathers, Clemens Romanus, Barnabas, and Ignatius, there are no formal citations from the epistle, but only echoes of it, the direct reference of which cannot with certainty be established, still, on the other hand, it is undeniable, not only that it is mentioned in the so-called Second Epistle of Peter, but that Polycarp also quotes *verbatim* several passages from it, thus justifying the remark of Eusebius (*H. E.* iv. 14), that Polycarp had already made use of it; we have it likewise on the testimony of Eusebius that Papias did the same in his work, λογίων κυριακῶν ἐξηγήσεις. Irenaeus, Tertullian, Clemens Alex., Origen, Cyprian, quote passages from the epistle with direct reference

to it by name, and that without the smallest hint that there had ever a doubt been entertained as to its genuineness. It is found also in the older *Peschito*, which contains only the three catholic epistles. Eusebius justly, then, numbers it with the Homologumena. In the so-called Muratorian Canon our epistle is doubtless not definitely quoted, but the passage to which reference is made is not of such a nature that it can be used to impugn the authenticity of the epistle.[1] The words of Leontius of Byzantium do not prove that Theodoret of Mopsuestia disbelieved in its genuineness (*contr. Nestor. et Eutych.* iii. 14), on which Theodorus: "ob quam causam, ut arbitror, ipsam epistolam Jacobi et alias deinceps aliorum catholicas abrogat et antiquat." The fact, however, that the Paulicians, according to the testimony of Petrus Siculus (*Hist. Manich.* p. 17), rejected it, plainly does not affect the question.

In more recent times, Cludius (*Uransichten des Christenthums*) was the first to deny the epistle's genuineness—on

[1] The passage runs thus: Epistola sane Judae et superscripti Johannis duas in catholica habentur. Et sapientia ab amicis Salomonis in honorem ipsius scripta. Apocalypsis etiam Johannis et Petri tantum recipimus, quam quidem ex nostris legi in ecclesia nolunt.—Hug, who looks upon the whole document as a translation from the Greek, puts a full stop after Johannis, and connects the words Apocalypsis etiam Johannis with what precedes; he regards tantum as a misunderstood translation of μόνην, and quam quidem (or quidam) = ἥς ταρίξ τινες. Guericke agrees with Hug, only with this difference, that instead of ἥς ταρίξ τινες, he considers ἣν τινες to be the original text. — Wieseler likewise unites the first words with the preceding passage, and then reads: quem quidam, so that the sense is: "Of Peter also we accept as much (as of John, who was previously mentioned, *i.e.* two epistles and an Apocalypse), which some amongst us would not allow to be read in the church."—Dietlein's conjecture and explanation is still simpler (*die kath. Briefe*, Th. I. p. 47). According to it, instead of Apocalypsis, there should be "Apocalypses," and the passage would be translated: "Furthermore, of Apocalypses we accept only those of John and Peter, which (latter) some amongst us would not allow to be read in the church."—Thiersch's change of "tantum" into "unam epistolam," and of the words "quam quidem" into "alteram quidam," is rather too bold. According to Hofmann, the epistle is not alluded to in the Fragment; he, like Hug, accepts an original Greek document, and takes the first half of the passage to say of the Epistle of Jude, and of the two—as stated in the superscription—by John (consequently the first is not included, for it has no superscription), that they are valued in the church as utterances of wisdom written by friends of Solomon (*i.e.* Christ) to his honour; in the second part of the passage he understands the writer to say: we so far accept the revelations both of John and Peter, as, indeed, some of us will not allow them to be read in the church.

grounds, however, entirely insufficient, the weightiest of them being, that in thought and expression it bears a too great similarity to the Pauline Epistles ever to have been composed by Peter. This is what brought Eichhorn to the hypothesis that the epistle was written by some one who had *for a long time* been connected with Paul, and had consequently adopted his current ideas and phrases. But as this cannot be applicable to Peter, and yet as all worth must not be denied to ecclesiastical tradition, Eichhorn goes further, and concludes that Peter supplied the material, but that *Mark* worked it up into the epistle before us.[1] Bertholdt, while justly rejecting this hypothesis, has defended the opinion hinted at already by Hieronymus, and more definitely expressed by Baronius, that the epistle was not originally written in Greek (but in Aramaic; according to Baronius, in Hebrew), and translated by an interpreter (Baronius holds by Mark, Bertholdt by Silvanus) into Greek. But this hypothesis is not less arbitrary than that of Eichhorn; for, on the one hand, it is an assertion incapable of proof that Peter could not have been familiar with the Greek language; and, on the other, as much the entire diction of the epistle as the harmony with the corresponding passages in the epistles of Paul and James, and the whole manner of quotation from the O. T., are evidence against any other than a Greek original. De Wette speaks with some vacillation as to the genuineness.[2] He recognises, indeed, the weight of the external testimony, and thinks it would be hazardous in the face of it to condemn the epistle as spurious; yet still he is of opinion that its character is evidence rather *against* than *for* its genuineness,—especially on account of its want of distinctive features, and the reminiscences of the

[1] Ewald's assertion is no less arbitrary, that Peter, not being able to speak and write Greek fluently, employed Silvanus to write the epistle.

[2] Reuss, too (*Gesch. d. heil. Schriften N. T.*), while no doubt recognising that the tradition of the church from the earliest times unanimously pronounces Peter to be the author, still thinks that there is much in the epistle (more especially its dependence on the Pauline Epistles already mentioned, without any understanding of the system of Paul) which appears strange as coming from Peter. He himself, however, attempts to refute his own objections, though without being able to make up his mind to acknowledge decidedly the authenticity of the epistle.

epistles already repeatedly mentioned. In reply, it must be urged that the epistle is in no wise wanting in individual impress, and that the writings referred to, if Peter had read and become familiar with them, might have left such an impression on him that echoes of them should be discernible without this in any way interfering with a free and independent development of thought, or standing in contradiction to the personal and apostolic character of the composition. That the Tübingen school should hold this epistle to be spurious, was of course to be expected from its views respecting the apostolic and post-apostolic age.[1] The reasons which Schwegler urges against the genuineness are the following:—(1) The want of any definite external occasion, and the general character of its contents and aim.—But such a want is not apparent, and the general character is to be explained, partly by the fact that the apostle was personally unacquainted with the members of the church, and partly by the designation of the epistle as a circular letter. (2) The want of any literary or theological character bearing the impress of individuality.—It has, however, been shown in § 2, that in the epistle there is no want of individuality; but that this must necessarily be as sharply defined as in Paul and John, is an unwarrantable demand. (3) The want of any inner connection of thought.—But the tendency of the epistle is opposed to any such "firm, definite progression of thought" as Schwegler demands, and as is to be found in the Pauline Epistles. (4) It was impossible that Peter, while labouring in the far East at a time and in a region destitute of any means of literary communication, could have had in his hand the later epistles of Paul—supposing these to be genuine—so short a time after their composition.—But in Peter's epistle there are no echoes of the latest of Paul's epistles. It cannot be denied that between the composition of this epistle and that to the Ephesians, a period of time elapsed sufficiently long to allow of the possibility of Peter's having become acquainted with the latter; nor will it be

[1] Pfleiderer's opinion, that the Apostle Peter was in favour of a Judaic Christianity, whilst the epistle expresses a feeble and insipid Paulinism peculiar to later times (see on this § 2, p. 16 f.), must necessarily lead him to deny the authenticity also.

disputed that even before his residence in Babylon Peter might have known it. (5) The impossibility—on the assumption of its having been composed in Babylon—of harmonizing the Neronic persecution, presupposed in the epistle, with the martyrdom of Peter in Rome during that persecution.—But the supposition that the persecution here referred to was the Neronic, finds no support in the epistle; nor is it by any means a necessary assumption for "the friends of the conservative school of historians, and a positive criticism," that the persecution referred to be the Neronic.—For his theory, that the epistle was written in post-apostolic times, and withal under Trajan, Schwegler chiefly depends (here Pfleiderer agrees with him) on this, that the persecution presupposed in the epistle is not the Neronic, but the Trajanic; and for the truth of his assertion he brings the following proofs:—(1) The calm, unimpassioned tone of the epistle as contrasted with the impression which the Neronic persecution made upon the Christians. (2) Under Nero the Christians were persecuted, inasmuch as they were accused of participation in fire-raising, that is to say, on account of a definite crime; but at the time of this letter they suffered persecution as Christians (ὡς χριστιανοί), on whom suspicion was sought to be thrown on account of their general behaviour (ὡς κακοποιοί). (3) It is incapable of proof, and incredible, that the Neronic persecution extended beyond Rome. (4) The epistle takes for granted investigations, with regular trial and under legal forms; whilst the Neronic persecution was a tumultuary act of popular law. (5) The position of Christianity in Asia Minor, presupposed in the epistle, corresponds with the description of it given in Pliny's letter to Trajan.—Of all these, however, this *one point* alone must be conceded, that the persecution referred to cannot be regarded as due directly to the burning of Rome — all the other assertions being based simply on arbitrary assumptions or on false interpretations.[1] It is also entirely out of place

[1] In opposition to Schwegler, it must be remarked—(1) The passionless tone would remain equally admirable in the Trajanic persecution as under that of Nero; any other style would have been hardly becoming an apostle. (2) From the first, and not under Trajan alone, the Christians had to suffer from the very fact of their being Christians. (3) Although the persecution of Nero, *i.e.* the

for Schwegler to understand the formula of salutation (v. 12) symbolically, so as to find in it the expression of the later church tradition "as to the presence of Peter in Rome, along with his ἑρμενευτής Mark," and to assert that v. 2 points to an ecclesiastico-political constitution (!) which had overspread the whole of Christendom, and to the sway of hierarchical tendencies (!) which had already forced their way into it. Schwegler sees the real design of the epistle expressed in the passage v. 12, according to which "it is simply the attempt on the part of one of Paul's followers to reconcile the two opposing schools of Peter and Paul, by putting into the mouth of Peter, as testimony to the orthodoxy of his fellow-apostle Paul, a somewhat Petrine-coloured presentation of the Pauline system." Schwegler seeks to establish this hypothesis, which even Pfleiderer calls in question, thus: that, on the one hand, in the epistle are to be found "almost all the chief conceptions and fundamental ideas" of Paul; on the other, the latter's doctrine of justification is wanting, and thoughts, views, and expressions occur which are peculiar to Petrinism. It is not to be denied that Schwegler, in carrying out his idea, has sought out every point which could in any way be used in its favour; his labour, however, has been in vain—the untenableness of the hypothesis being too apparent. For if the maintenance of the churches in the gospel preached to them be a matter obviously near to the apostle's heart, yet in its whole composition there is no justification for the assertion that the epistle has for its aim a *conciliatory* design which is nowhere apparent in it. How strange that the matter of chief moment should be, not the exhortations of which the epistle is composed, but something entirely different—nowhere expressed in it, not even in ver. 5! How can a Paulinism be conceived of from which the very pith is wanting, the doctrine

one which he himself instituted, did not extend beyond Rome, still in his day the Christians might, through the hatred of the people, have had to endure persecution in the provinces as well. (4) No mention is made in our epistle of any judicial persecution of the Christians according to legal form. (5) The description given in Pliny's letter does not prove that the persecution mentioned here was that under Trajan; in the latter, the Christians were *punished formally with death;* whilst there is nothing in our epistle to show that such took place in the former.

of justification by faith, with its characteristic terminology: δικαιοσύνη and δικαιοῦσθαι? Precisely the absence of this doctrine, and the other points which Schwegler brings forward as evidence of a Petrine colouring, show that the epistle cannot have been composed by one who belonged to the school of Paul, but must be the production of Peter, or of one of his disciples.[1] Lastly, opposed to Schwegler's hypothesis as to the post-apostolic origin of the epistle, is the circumstance that it is hardly conceivable how a forger should have attempted to palm off on *definitely formed churches*, some *fifty* years after his death, a letter professing to have been written by Peter, in which they are comforted in their *present* affliction; and that he should have been so successful, that the fraud was detected by no one in the churches (comp. against Schwegler, in particular Brückner, Introd. § 5*a*).—Although the characteristic traits which Krummacher (*Evangel. Kirchenzeitung*, 1829, No. 49), and after him Guericke, brings as proof of the genuineness, namely, "the manner of exhortation, so human and evangelical, so strong and gentle; the urgent directions to stedfastness of faith in lowliness and patience, with reference to the example and the glory of Christ; the urgent appeals to more watchfulness and sobriety the higher their calling as believers; the repeated summonses to humility; the way in which the general aim is kept in view; the clearness, precision, and emphatic character of the style,"—these characteristic features, although in themselves they do not prove Peter to have been the author of the epistle, still show that it breathes an apostolic spirit such as is not peculiar to post-apostolic writings, and that in its inward structure there is nothing to justify a doubt as to its genuineness.

[1] Namely, the great stress laid on καλὰ ἔργα, on ἀγαθὴ ἀναστροφή, on ἀγάπη (!), on ἀγαθοποιεῖν, on ἐλπίς, as a dogmatic fundamental idea synonymous with πίστις; the symbolizing of the Jewish temple and sacrificial services; the conception of Christians as the true Messianic people; the introduction into the new covenant of the idea of the O. T. priesthood; the expression διασπορά in the superscription.

Instead of this superscription, which A C ℵ have, B reads Πέτρου α΄; in some min. it is: Πέτρου καθολικὴ πρώτη ἐπιστολή, and in G: ἐπιστολὴ καθολικὴ α[1] τοῦ ἁγίου καὶ πανευφήμου ἀποστόλου Πέτρου.

CHAPTER I.

Ver. 6. *εἰ δέον ἐστί*] Tisch. omits *ἐστί*; it is wanting also in B ℵ, Clem. etc.; Lachm. has retained it; the most of the codd. (A C K L P, etc.) read it, indeed, but it is more easy to explain how it was afterwards added, than how it was left out later. — *λυπηθέντες*] The reading λυπηθέντας, in L ℵ and several min., is probably only an error in copying. — Ver. 7. *πολυτιμότερον*] adopted by Griesb. already, instead of *πολὺ τιμιώτερον* in K, etc. — Instead of *τιμὴν καὶ δόξαν* (*Rec.*, according to K L P, etc.), Lachm. and Tisch. read *δόξαν καὶ τιμήν*, which is supported by A B C ℵ, many min., several vss. etc. — Ver. 8. *εἰδότες*] *Rec.* after A K L P, etc., Copt. Clem. Theoph. etc.; Lachm. and Tisch., following B C ℵ 27, etc., Syr. Aeth. etc., read *ἰδόντες*; as both readings give a fitting sense, and as both are attested by high authorities, it cannot with certainty be decided which is the original. Brückner and Hofmann are in favour of *ἰδόντες*, Schott of *εἰδότες*, Wiesinger uncertain. — Ver. 9. After *πίστεως*, Tisch. 7, following B, several min. Clem. Aeth. etc., omits *ὑμῶν*, attested though it be by most of the authorities (A C K L P ℵ, *al.*, etc.); Tisch. 8 has retained. Although it may be superfluous for the meaning, yet its omission is not justified. — Vv. 10, 11. Instead of *ἐξηρεύνησαν* and *ἐρευνῶντες*, Tisch., following A B, has adopted *ἐξηραύνησαν*, and after B* *ἐραυνῶντες*. — Ver. 11. B omits *Χριστοῦ*, which must be regarded as a correction. — Ver. 12. Instead of the Received *ἡμῖν δέ* (K, *al.*, Copt. etc.), Griesb. Scholz, Lachm. Tisch. have rightly adopted the reading *ὑμῖν δέ*, attested by A B C L P ℵ, *al.*, Vulg. etc.[1] — *ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ*] *Rec.*,

[1] Buttmann has retained the *Rec.* *ἡμῖν δέ*, after B, as he asserts. De Wette holds the *Rec.* to be the original reading, it being natural that the apostle should include himself, and *εἷς* rather than *ἃ . . . ὑμῖν* would be expected after *ὑμῖν*; Brückner justly gives preference to the opposing testimony.

after C K L P ℵ, etc., Copt. Theoph. etc. (Tisch. 8); Lachm. and Tisch. 7 omit ἐν, after A B, *al.*, Slav. Vulg. Cypr. Didym. etc. Possibly ἐν was interpolated on account of the usage prevalent elsewhere in the N. T. — Ver. 16. Tisch. 7 reads after γέγραπται: ὅτι ἅγιοι ἔσεσθε, ὅτι; on the other hand, Tisch. 8 omits ὅτι before ἅγιοι, and has after ἔσεσθε: διότι. With the preponderance of authorities ἅγιοι ἔσεσθε, ὅτι is to be read; almost B alone is in favour of ὅτι before ἅγιοι; and for διότι, only ℵ. — γένεσθε] *Rec.*, after K P, etc. — Lachm. and Tisch. rightly read ἔσεσθε, after A B C ℵ, *al.*, Vulg. Clem. Syr.; γένεσθε is a correction after the preceding γενήθητε. In the LXX. ἔσεσθε stands. — In A B* ℵ Clem. Cyr. εἰμι is wanting after ἅγιος; Lachm. and Tisch. have justly omitted it. — Ver. 20. Lachm. and Tisch. rightly read, instead of ἐπ' ἐσχάτων (*Rec.*, after K L P, etc.): ἐπ' ἐσχάτου (A B C ℵ, *al.*, Copt. Syr. utr. etc.). — Instead of ὑμᾶς, A and several min. have ἡμᾶς, which, however, must be considered as a correction. — Ver. 21. πιστεύοντας] *Rec.*, according to C K L P ℵ, etc., several vss. Theoph. Oec.; still the reading πιστούς might be preferred as the more difficult, with Lachm. and Tisch., after A B, especially as πιστὸς εἰς does not occur elsewhere in the N. T.; Wiesinger and Schott also consider πιστούς the original reading, whilst Hofmann gives the preference to the *Rec.* — Ver. 22. The *Rec.* has the words διὰ πνεύματος after ἀληθείας, following K L P, Theoph. etc., which Griesb. already considers suspicious; Lachm. and Tisch. have justly omitted them (following A B C ℵ, many min. etc.). — Lachm. and Tisch. read ἐκ καρδίας (A B, Vulg.); the *Rec.* is ἐκ καθαρᾶς καρδίας (C K L P ℵ, *al.*, nearly all the vss. etc.); καθαρᾶς is certainly very suspicious, since its addition is more easily explained than its omission; cf. 1 Tim. i. 5; 2 Tim. ii. 22; on the other hand, however, see Rom. vi. 17. Hofmann assumes that καθαρᾶς is omitted only by mistake. — Ver. 23. The words εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα, following in the *Rec.* after μένοντος, which in A B C ℵ and other authorities are wanting, were justly omitted already by Griesb. — Ver. 24. Lachm. omits ὡς before χόρτος, after A, several min. Syr. etc. Most of the witnesses are in favour of ὡς, the omission of which is to be regarded as a correction after the text of the LXX. — δόξα αὐτῆς] after A B C K L P, etc., instead of the *Rec.*, to be found almost only in min. *Rec.*: δόξα ἀνθρώπου. In ℵ pr. m. is to be found the reading: ἡ δόξα αὐτοῦ. — After τὸ ἄνθος the *Rec.* has αὐτοῦ, retained by Tisch. 7, after C K L P, etc., Vulg. Copt. Lachm. and Tisch. 8 have omitted it after A B ℵ, etc.; it is certainly suspicious, since it may have been interpolated as an explanation; on the other hand, its omission may be a correction after Isa. xl. 7, LXX.

Vv. 1, 2. The superscription, while corresponding in fundamental plan with those of the Pauline Epistles, has nevertheless a peculiar character of its own. — *Πέτρος*] As Paul in his epistles calls himself not by his original name *Σαῦλος*, so Peter designates himself not by his original name *Σίμων*, but by that given him by Christ, which "may be regarded as his apostolic, his official name" (Schott); otherwise in 2 Pet.: *Συμεὼν Πέτρος*. — An addition such as *διὰ θελήματος Θεοῦ*, or the like, of which Paul oftentimes, though not always, makes use in the superscriptions of his epistles, was unnecessary for Peter. — Peter designates his readers by the words: *ἐκλεκτοῖς παρεπίδημοις διασπορᾶς Πόντου κ.τ.λ.*] he calls the Christians to whom he writes—for that his epistle is addressed to Christians cannot be doubted—"*elect strangers*;" and withal, those who belong to the *διασπορά* throughout Pontus, etc. *ἐκλεκτοί* the Christians are named, inasmuch as God had chosen them to be His own, in order that they might be made partakers of the *κληρονομία* (ver. 4) reserved for them in heaven; cf. chap. ii. 9: *ὑμεῖς γένος ἐκλεκτόν*. — *παρεπίδημος* is he who dwells in a land of which he is not a native (where his home is not); in the LXX. it is given as the rendering of תּוֹשָׁב, Gen. xxiii. 4; Ps. xxxix. 12 (in other passages תּוֹשָׁב is translated by *πάροικος*; cf. Ex. xii. 45; Lev. xxii. 10, xxv. 23, 47, etc.); in the Apocrypha *παρεπίδημος* does not occur; in the N. T., besides in this passage, it is to be found in chap. ii. 11; Heb. xi. 13. — If account be taken of vv. 4, 17 (*ὁ τῆς παροικίας ὑμῶν χρόνος*), and particularly of chap. ii. 11, it cannot be doubted that Peter styled his readers *παρεπίδημοι*, because during their present life upon earth they, as Christians, were not in their true home, which is the *κληρονομία . . . τετηρημένη ἐν οὐρανοῖς*. The expression is understood in this sense by the more modern writers, in particular by Steiger, Brückner, Wiesinger, Weiss, Luthardt (Reuter's *Repertor.* 1855, Nov.), Schott, Hofmann, etc.[1] It is incorrect to refer the word here to

[1] It is inexact to interpret *παρεπίδημοι* simply by "*pilgrims of earth*;" Steinmeyer, on the other hand (*Disquisitio in ep. Petr. I. proœmium*), rightly observes: "quum mansio in terra sempiterna permittatur nemini, in universos omnes vox quadaret, nec in eos solos, qui per evangelium vocati sunt;" but

an earthly home, that is, Palestine, as is done by de Wette, and in like manner by Weizsäcker (in Reuter's *Repert.* 1858, No. 3).[1]

REMARK.—In the O. T. תּוֹשָׁב occurs in its strict signification in Gen. xxiii. 4; Ex. xii. 45; Lev. xxii. 10, xxv. 47 (LXX. *πάροικος*). In Lev. xxv. 23, the Israelites are called גֵּרִים וְתוֹשָׁבִים, in a peculiar connection; God says that such they are *with* Him (עִמָּדִי, cf. Gen. xxiii. 4), in that the land wherein they should dwell belongs *to Him*. The same idea is to be found in Ps. xxxix. 12, where the Psalmist bases his request for hearing on this, that he is גֵּר and תּוֹשָׁב *with* God (עִמָּךְ), as were his fathers; for although in vv. 5–7 the shortness of human life is made specially prominent, yet there is nothing to show that in ver. 12 there is any reference to this. On the other hand, in 1 Chron. xxix. (xxx.) 15, David in prayer to God speaks of himself and his people as גֵּרִים and תּוֹשָׁבִים, because they have no abiding rest on earth (כְּכָל־אֲבוֹתֵינוּ עַל־הָאָרֶץ וְאֵין מִקְוֶה); here it is not the preposition עִמָּד but לְפָנֶיךָ which is used. In the passage Ps. cxix. 19, the relation in which the Psalmist speaks of himself as a stranger is not expressed בָּאָרֶץ, ver. 54; he calls his earthly life מְגוּרֵי, as Jacob in Gen. xlvii. 9, which points evidently enough to the circumstance that the Israelites were not without the consciousness that their real home lay beyond this earthly life; cf. on this, Heb. xi. 13, 14, and Delitzsch *in loc.*

Whilst the expression *ἐκλεκτοῖς παρεπιδήμοις*—wherein not *ἐκλεκτοῖς* (Hofmann) but *παρεπιδήμοις* is the substantival idea—is applicable to all Christians, the following words: *διασπορᾶς Πόντου κ.τ.λ.*, specify those Christians to whom the epistle is addressed (cf. the superscriptions of the Pauline Epistles). — *διασπορά*] strictly an abstract idea, denotes,

when Steinmeyer adds: "quare censemur, *παρεπίδ.* . . . significare . . . in *mundo* viventes, cujus esse desierint, cui ipsi sint perosi," he thus gives an improper application to the word, the more so that the conception *κόσμος*, in an ethical sense, is foreign to the Epistle of Peter. — Weiss weakens the idea by saying: "The Christian is in so far a stranger on the earth, as he is aware of the inheritance reserved for him in heaven; this *knowledge* the unbeliever cannot have, and accordingly he cannot *feel* himself a stranger on earth." It is not the *knowing* and *feeling*, but the really *being*, which is of consequence.

[1] It is still more erroneous to suppose, as Reuss does (*Gesch. der h. Schriften N. T.* § 147, note), that the readers are here termed *παρεπίδ.*, "because they are looked upon as גֵּרִים proselytes, *i.e.* Israelites according to faith, not according to the form of worship." This view, however, is opposed to the *usus loquendi*, since *παρεπίδημοι* nowhere denotes proselytes.

according to Jewish usage: "Israel living scattered among the heathen,"—that is, it is a complex of concrete ideas, 2 Macc. i. 27; John vii. 35; cf. Meyer *in loc.*; Winer, *bibl. Realwörterb.*, see under "Zerstreuung."[1] The question is now: Is the word to be taken as applying only to the Jewish nation? From of old the question has, by many interpreters, been answered in the affirmative (Didymus, Oecumenius, Eusebius, Calvin, Beza, de Wette, Weiss, etc.), and therefrom the conclusion has been drawn that the readers of the epistle were *Jewish-Christians.*[2] But the character of the epistle is opposed to this view (cf. Introd. § 3). Since the Apostle Peter regarded Christians as the true Israel, of which the Israel of the O. T. was only the type (ii. 9), there is nothing to prevent the expression being applied, as many interpreters hold (Brückner, Wiesinger, Wieseler too; Rettberg in *Ersch-Gruber*, see under "Petrus," and others), to the Christians, and withal to those who dwelt outside of Canaan. No doubt *this land* had not for the N. T. church the same significance which it possessed for that of the O. T., still it was the scene of Christ's labours, and in Jerusalem was the mother-church of all Christendom.[3] Some interpreters, like Aretius, Schott, Hofmann, leave entirely out of view the local reference of the word, and take it as applying to the whole of Christendom *ecclesia dispersa in toto orbe*, in so far as the latter represents "a concrete corporeal centre around which the members of the church were locally united," and "has its point of union in that Christ who is seated at the right hand

[1] The LXX. translate נדה (as a collective noun), Deut. xxx. 4, Neh. i. 9, by διασπορά, and as inexactly and even incorrectly זועה, Jer. xxxiv. 17; מזרה, Jer. xv. 7; נצורי ישראל, Isa. xlix. 6.

[2] Taken in this way, the genit. διασπορᾶς must be interpreted as genit. partit., thus: the members of the διασπορά who have become Christians (ἐκλεκτοὶ παρεπίδημοι). Weizsäcker is altogether mistaken (Reuter's *Repert.* 1858, No. 3) in his opinion that the reference is to "the Christians who, in as far as they dwell among the dispersed Jewish communities, are members of the Diaspora."

[3] It is worthy of note that Paul also considers the Christian church to be the Israel κατὰ πνεῦμα, that he looks upon the converted heathen as the branches ingrafted into Israel, that he was ever anxious to keep up the connection between the heathen Christian churches and the mother church in Jerusalem, and that he distinctly terms the church triumphant ἡ ἄνω Ἱερουσαλήμ.

of God" (Schott[1]). Against this, however, it must be urged that Peter, if he had wished the word διασπορά to have been understood in a sense so entirely different from the established usage, would in some way or other have indicated this.—It is entirely erroneous to suppose, with Augustine (*contra Faustum*, xxii. 89), Procopius (*in Jes.* xv. 20), Cassiodorus (*de instit. div. litt.* ii. p. 516), Luther, Gualther, and others, and among more recent authors Steiger, that in the expression used by Peter the readers are designated as heathen Christians, or even with Credner (*Einl.* p. 638), Neudecker (*Einl.* p. 677), as *aforetime proselytes*. The one correct interpretation is, that in the superscription those readers only are described as "Christians who constituted the people of God living, scattered throughout the regions mentioned, who, in consequence of their election, had become strangers in the world, but who had their inheritance and home in heaven, whither they were journeying" (Wiesinger). The reason why Peter employed this term with reference to his readers lies in the design of the epistle; he speaks of them as ἐκλεκτοί, in order that in their present condition of suffering he might assure them of their state of grace as παρεπίδημοι, that they might know that they belonged to the home of believers in heaven. But it is at least open to doubt whether in διασπορᾶς there is any reference to the present want of direct union around Christ (Schott). —*Πόντου, Γαλατίας κ.τ.λ.*] The provinces of Asia Minor are named chiefly in a westerly direction, Galatia westward from Pontus, then the enumeration continues with Cappadocia lying south from Galatia, that is to say, in the east, and goes from thence westward towards Asia, after which Bithynia is mentioned, the eastern boundary of the northern part of Asia Minor. So that Bengel is not so far wrong (as opposed to Wiesinger) when he says: Quinque provincias nominat eo ordine, quo occurrebant scribenti ex oriente. If in Asia, besides Caria, Lydia, and Mysia, Phrygia also (Ptolem. v. 2) be included, and in Galatia the lands of Pamphylia, Pisidia, and a part of Lycaonia,—which, however, is impro-

[1] Schott, however, grants that "Peter considers Jerusalem and the mother church in Jerusalem typically as the ideal centre for all believers under the New Covenant."

bable, — the provinces mentioned by Peter will embrace almost the whole of Asia Minor. — In the N. T. there is no mention of the founding of the Christian churches in Pontus, Cappadocia, and Bithynia. — Ver. 2. *κατὰ πρόγνωσιν κ.τ.λ.*] The three adjuncts, beginning with different prepositions, are not to be taken with *ἀπόστολος*, as Cyrillus (*de recta fide*), Oecumen., Kahnis (*Lehre v. Abendm.* p. 65), and others think, but with *ἐκλεκτοῖς παρεπιδήμοις*, pointing out as they do the origin, the means, and the end of the condition in which the readers as *ἐκλεκτοὶ παρεπίδημοι* were. It is further incorrect to limit, as is prevalently done, their reference simply to the term *ἐκλεκτοῖς*,[1] and to find in them a more particular definition of the method of the divine election. Steinmeyer, in violation of the grammatical construction, gives a different reference to each of the three adjuncts joining *κατὰ πρόγν.* with *ἐκλεκτοῖς*, *ἐν ἁγιασμῷ* with *παρεπιδήμοις*, and *εἰς ὑπακ.* with *ἁγιασμῷ*. But inasmuch as the ideas *ἐκλεκτοῖς παρεπιδήμοις* stand in closest connection, the two prepositions *κατά* and *ἐν* must apply equally to them. *κατά* states that the *ἐκλεκτοὶ παρεπίδημοι* are such *in virtue of* the *πρόγνωσις Θεοῦ*; *κατά* denotes "the origin, and gives the pattern according to which" (so, too, Wiesinger). *πρόγνωσις* is translated generally by the commentators as: predestination;[2] this is no doubt inexact, still it must be observed that in the N. T. *πρόγνωσις* stands always in such a connection as to show that it expresses an idea akin to that of predestination, but without the idea of knowing or of taking cognizance being lost. It is the perceiving of God by means of which the object is determined, as that which He perceives it to be.

[1] Hofmann supports this application as against that to *παρεπιδήμοις*, "because the state of being a stranger, even though taken spiritually, is not a condition to which the prepositional determinations are suited." Hofmann does not state the ground of this assertion; as the idea of being a stranger is identical with that of being a Christian, these are very well adapted to *ἐκλεκτοῖς παρεπιδήμοις*. The mere circumstance that the question here is not one of a nearer definition of election, but of the condition in which the readers were, is opposed to a connection with *ἐκλεκτοῖς*. Cf. 1 Cor. i. 1, where *διὰ θελήματος* stands connected with *κλητὸς ἀπόστολος Ἰησ. Χρ.* and not with *κλητός*; sec 2 Cor. i. 1.

[2] Lyranus: praedestinatio; Erasmus: praefinitio; Beza: antegressum decretum s. propositum Dei; Luther: the foreseeing of God; Gerhard: *πρόθεσις* juxta quam facta est electio; de Wette: *βουλή* or *προορισμός*.

Cf. Meyer on Rom. viii. 29: "It is God's being aware in His plan, in virtue of which, before the subjects are destined by Him to salvation, He knows who are to be so destined by Him." It is incorrect, therefore, to understand the word as denoting simply foreknowledge;[1] this leads to a Pelagianizing interpretation, and is met by Augustine's phrase: eligendos facit Deus, non invenit. Estius translates *πρόγνωσις* at once by: praedilectio; other interpreters, as Bengel, Wiesinger, Schott, would include the idea of love, at least, in that of foreknowledge; but although it must be granted that the *πρόγνωσις* of God here spoken of cannot be conceived of without His love, it must not be overlooked that the idea of love is not made prominent.[2] Hofmann says: "*πρόγνωσις* is —precognition; here, therefore, a work of God the Father, which consists in this, that He makes beforehand those whom He has chosen, objects of a knowledge, as the akin and homogeneous are known, that is, of an approving knowledge." — *πατρός* is added to *Θεοῦ*; the apostle has already in his mind the following *πνεύματος* and *Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*, in order thereby to emphasize more definitely the threefold basis of election. Bengel: Mysterium Trinitatis et oeconomia salutis nostrae innuitur hoc versu. — *ἐν ἁγιασμῷ πνεύματος*] It seems simplest and most natural to interpret, with Luther and most others, "*through the sanctifying of the Spirit*,"—that is, taking *ἁγιασμός* actively, and *ἐν* as denoting the instrumentality. The only difficulty in the way is, that *ἁγιασμός*, a word foreign to classical Greek, and occurring but seldom in the Apocrypha, has constantly the neutral signification: "sancti-

[1] The word has not this signification in the N. T.; it has it, however, in the Book of Judith ix. 6 and xi. 19.—The verb *προγινώσκειν* has the meaning of simple foreknowledge in Acts xxvi. 5 and 2 Pet. iii. 17 (so, too, Book of Wisd. vi. 13, viii. 8, xviii. 6); the sense is different in Rom. viii. 29, xi. 2, and 1 Pet. i. 20.

[2] Schott's assertion, that "*γινώσκειν* is *always* a cognizance of this kind, since he who is cognizant gives himself up in his inmost nature to the object in question, so as again to take it up into his being and to appropriate it to himself,"—further, that "the perceiving of God creates its own objects, and consequently is a *προγινώσκειν*," and that accordingly neither death nor sin *can* be the objects of God's foreknowledge,—contradicts itself by the clearest statements of Scripture; cf. Deut. ix. 24, xxxi. 27; Matt. xxii. 18; Luke xvi. 15; John v. 42; 1 Cor. iii. 20, etc.

fication;"[1] cf. Meyer on Rom. vi. 19. Now, since the word, as far as the form is concerned, admits of both meanings (cf. Buttmann, *ausführl. gricch. Sprachl.* § 119, 20), it is certainly permissible to assume that here—deviating from the general *usus loquendi*—it may have an active signification, as perhaps also in 2 Thess. ii. 13. If the preposition ἐν be taken as equal to "through," there results an appropriate progression of thought from origin (κατά) to means (ἐν), and further to end (εἰς). If, however, the usage establish a hard and fast rule, the interpretation must be: "*the holiness wrought by the* (Holy) *Spirit*," so that the genitive as gen. auct. has a signification similar to that in the expression δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ;[2] in this interpretation ἐν may equally have an instrumental force. No doubt, many interpreters deny that ἐν can here be equal to διά, since the election is not accomplished by means of the Holy Spirit. But this ground gives way if the three nearer definitions refer not to the election,—as a divine activity,—and so not to the ἐκλεκτοῖς alone, but to the state into which the readers had been introduced by the choice of God, that is, to

[1] Cf. Rom. vi. 19, where it is contrasted with ἀνομία; 1 Cor. i. 30, where it is connected with δικαιοσύνη, 1 Tim. ii. 15 with ἀγάπη, and 1 Thess. iv. 4 with τιμή; 1 Thess. iv. 7, where it stands in antithesis to ἀκαθαρσία; and Heb. xii. 14, where, like εἰρήνην (cf. 1 Tim. vi. 11: δίωκε δικαιοσύνην), it depends on διώκετε; in 1 Thess. iv. 3 also it has the meaning referred to. If it be here taken in an active sense, and ὑμῶν be the objective genitive, the subject is wanting; but if ὑμῶν be the subjective genitive, then it is the object which is wanting. Lünemann's interpretation accordingly: "that *you* sanctify *yourselves*," is unwarranted. ἁγιασμός can only be artificially interpreted by "sanctifying" in the passages quoted. A striking example of this is Hofmann's interpretation of 1 Thess. iv. 4. Only in 2 Thess. ii. 13, where the expression, as here, is: ἐν ἁγιασμῷ πνεύματος, does the active meaning seem to correspond better than the neuter with the thought. There is no foundation whatever for the opinion of Cremer, cf. *s.v.*, that—whilst in the Apocrypha the word never has an active signification, but is either "sanctuary" (thus also in the LXX. Ezek. xlv. 4 and Amos ii. 11) or "sanctity"—it is in the N. T. for the most part "sanctifying." —Schott very justly calls in question the active signification of the word; but when, not content with the rendering "sanctification," he interprets: "the condition of holiness being increasingly realized," he confuses the conception by references which are simply imported.

[2] The idea of holiness is here by no means inappropriate, since the readers would not be ἐκλεκτοὶ παρεπίδημοι if they had not become ἅγιοι through the Holy Spirit. It is this ἅγιον εἶναι which is here expressed by ἁγιασμός. Also in 2 Thess. ii. 13, there is no urgent reason for departing from this signification of the word. Hofmann erroneously appeals to 2 Macc. xiv. 36; cf. Cremer, *s.v.*

the ἐκλεκτοῖς παρεπιδήμοις. It is incorrect to attribute to ἐν here a final signification; Beza: ad sanctificationem; de Wette: εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἐν ἁγιασμῷ; the conception of purpose begins only with the subsequent εἰς. — The explanation, that ἐν ἁγ. πν. points out the sphere (or the limitations) within which the readers are ἐκλ. παρεπ. (formerly supported in this commentary), is wanting in the necessary clearness of thought. — εἰς ὑπακοὴν καὶ ῥαντισμὸν αἵματος Ἰησοῦ Χρ.] The third adjunct to ἐκλ. παρεπίδ., giving the end towards which this condition is directed. The preposition εἰς is not to be connected with ἁγιασμός (de Wette, Steinmeyer); for although such a construction be grammatically possible, the reference to the Trinity goes to show that these words must be taken as a third adjunct, co-ordinate with the two preceding clauses. Besides, if there were two parts only, the conjunction καί would hardly be awanting. ὑπακοή is to be construed neither with Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, whether taken as a subjective genitive (Beza: designatur nostrae sanctificationis subjectum, nempe Christus Jesus qui patri fuit obediens ad mortem, where εἰς is arbitrarily rendered by διά), nor, with Hofmann and Schott, as an objective genitive: "obedience towards Christ" (for then this genitive would stand in a relation other than to αἵματος [1]), nor with αἵματος. ὑπακοή must be taken here absolutely, as in ver. 14; cf. Rom. vi. 16. With regard to the meaning of ὑπακοή, many interpreters understand by it faith in Christ; so Luther, Gerhard, Vorstius, Heidegger, Bengel, Wiesinger, Hofmann, etc.; others, on the contrary, take it to signify "moral obedience;" so Pott, de Wette, Schott, etc. Many of the former, however, insist that by it a faith is meant "which of itself includes a conduct corresponding to it" (Hofmann), whilst by the latter it is emphasized that that

[1] Hofmann thinks that since ῥαντισμὸς αἵματος forms one conception, and ὑπακοή can be accompanied by an objective genitive, Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, being the subjective genitive to αἵματος, might at the same time be objective genitive to ὑπακοή. In opposition to this, we observe (1) that it is self-contradictory to say that ῥαντ. αἵματος forms *one* conception, and that Ἰησοῦ Χρ. is dependent on αἵματος; and (2) that it is grammatically inadmissible to take the same genitive as being at once subjective and objective genitive. — This much only is correct, that the nearer definition, which must be supplied to ὑπακοή, has, in sense, to be borrowed from the subsequent genitive Ἰησοῦ Χρ.

moral obedience is meant which springs from faith, so that both interpretations are substantially in accord. It may then be said that ὑπακοή is the life of man conformed in faith and walk to the will of the Lord, which the ἐκλεκτοὶ παρεπίδημοι as such must realize; so that there is no reason why the idea should be limited towards the one side or the other; cf. 1 John iii. 23. The second particular: καὶ ῥαντισμὸν αἵματος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, is closely linked on to ὑπακοή. Some commentators have held that the O. T. type on which this expression is based was the paschal lamb (thus Beda: "aspersi sanguine Christi potestatem Satanae vitant, sicut Israel per agni sanguinem Aegypti dominatum declinavit;" Aretius, etc.). Others think that the ceremonial of the great day of atonement is meant (thus Pott, Augusti, Steiger, Usteri, etc.). Wrongly, however; for although in both cases blood was employed, neither the blood of the paschal lamb nor that of the offering of atonement was used to sprinkle the people. With the former the posts were tinged; with the latter the sacred vessels were sprinkled. Steinmeyer is wrong in tracing the expression to the sprinkling with water (Lev. xix.) of him who had been defiled through contact with a corpse, from the fact that the LXX. have ῥαντισμός only in this passage. For apart from the artificialness of the explanation which Steinmeyer[1] thus feels himself compelled to adopt, the reference to the water of sprinkling is inapt, since mention is made here of a *sprinkling of blood*, and *not of water*. A sprinkling of the *people* with *blood* took place only on the occasion of the *sacrifice of the covenant*.[2]

[1] Since Steinmeyer, from the fact that the LXX. translate the Hebrew מֵי נִדָּה (which is not, in his view, equal to "water of purification," but to "water of impurity") by ὕδωρ ῥαντισμοῦ, concludes that ῥαντισμός does not simply mean aspersio, but ea aspersio, cujus ratio, causa, effectus verbis מֵי נִדָּה descripta sunt, —that is, since that water was tanquam mortis instar, quum in ipsius mortis communionem ita redigeret immundos, ut reducerentur inde in munditiem vitae, ejusmodi aspersio quae in naturam sparsae aquae trahit, atque virtute ipsius sparsos penitus imbuit, he explains ῥαντισμ. αἵμ. Ἰ. Χρ. as a sprinkling with the blood of Christ, qua in mortis salvatoris nostri communionem trahamur.

[2] When Wiesinger remarks: "But in Heb. xi. 22, ἐῤῥαντισμένοι τὰς καρδίας ἀπὸ συνειδ. πονηρᾶς is based on the typical sacrifice of the great day of atonement, although ἐῤῥαντισμένοι is transferred here to persons, and ἀπό points to a cleansing and freeing from the consciousness of guilt," we cannot in this agree with him; nor do either Lünemann or Delitzsch see here any reference to the great sacri-

The O. T. type on which the expression is founded is no otner than the making of the covenant related in Ex. xxiv. 8, to which even Gerhard had made reference, and as, in more recent times, has been acknowledged by Brückner, Wiesinger, Weiss, Schott. This is clear from Heb. ix. 19 (*λαβὼν τὸ αἷμα τῶν μόσχων . . . πάντα τὸν λαὸν ἐῤῥάντισε*) and xii. 24, where *αἷμα ῥαντισμοῦ*, *i.e.* "the blood by means of the sprinkling of which the ratification of the covenant took place," is connected with the immediately preceding *καὶ διαθήκης νέας μεσίτης*. Accordingly, by *ῥαντισμὸς αἵματος Ἰησ. Χρ.* is to be understood the ratification of the covenant relation grounded on the death of Christ, with those thereto ordained; the reference here, however, being not to the commencement, but to the continuance of that relation. For by this expression the apostle does not intend to remind his readers of the end God had in view in their election, but to set before them what the purpose of their election is, which, like the *ὑπακοή*, should therefore be realized in them as the elect strangers. They are then *ἐκλεκτοὶ παρεπίδημοι*, in order that they may constantly render obedience to Christ, and in Him constantly possess the forgiveness of sins.[1] — The *καί* standing between *ὑπακοήν* and *ῥαντισμόν* is taken by Steinmeyer as an explicative; he explains: "in obedientiam, atque in eam praesertim, ut aspergamini sanguine Christi h. e. ut vos in mortis Jesu Christi communionem trahi patiamini." Incorrectly: "inasmuch as the active idea of obedience can never be explained by the passive being sprinkled" (Wiesinger); and the introduction of the idea *pati* is arbitrary. —It is further to be observed that the readers are, by the expression

fice of atonement. The former explains the expression "on the analogy of the sprinkling with blood by which the first Levitical priests were consecrated;" while the latter quotes by way of explanation the passage Heb. xii. 24, where he terms the *αἷμα ῥαντισμοῦ* the antitype of the blood with which Moses sprinkled the people at the institution and consecration of the covenant.

[1] Hofmann is accordingly wrong in maintaining that "what is here meant has taken place once for all for the readers, and is not continually to be done." Nor does this altogether accord with his own interpretation, when he says, "the readers are chosen to *become* obedient to Christ, and partakers of His propitiation for sin." The Christian, on being received into communion with Christ, has been sprinkled with His blood, but still he requires a continual cleansing, and this he receives, if he walk in the light; cf. 1 John i. 7.

last used: *ῥαντ. αἵματος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*, here for the first time characterized directly as Christians, all the previous designations having been equally applicable to the children of Israel. A circumstance which shows clearly enough that Peter regards the Christian church as the true Israel, and that without making it in any way dependent on national connection. — As regards the lexicology, it must be remarked that in classical Greek *ῥαντισμός* never occurs, and *ῥαντίζειν* only in later writers: the usual word is *ῥαίνειν*, *e.g.* Euripides, *Iphig. in Aul.* 1589: *ἧς αἵματι βωμὸν ῥαίνετ' ἄρδην τῆς Θεοῦ*; in the LXX. both verbal forms: *ῥαντισμός*, only in Num. xix., in a somewhat inexact translation, however. — *χάρις ὑμῖν καὶ εἰρήνη πληθυνθείη*] The distinction between *χάρις* and *εἰρήνη* is thus drawn by Gerhard: "pax a gratia distinguitur tanquam *fructus* et *effectus* a sua *causa*." In harmony with this, *χάρις* is regarded by the interpreters for the most part as "the subjective in God" (Meyer on Rom. i. 7); but Paul's use of *ἀπό* and the subsequent *πληθυνθείη* show that by *χάρις* in forms of greeting, is to be understood the gifts which flow from it (the manifestation of grace). *εἰρήνη* specifies this gift more closely according to its nature (see on 1 Tim. i. 2 [1]). *πληθυνθείη*] Luther: "ye have peace and grace, but not yet to the full;" on the salutation form in the N. T., besides here only in 2 Pet. i. 2 and Jude 2; in O. T. in Dan. iii. 31, LXX.: *εἰρήνη ὑμῖν πληθυνθείη*; cf. Schoettgen: *horae hebr. et talm.*, on this passage.

Vv. 3–12. Praise to God for the grace of which the Christians had been made the partakers. The prominence which the apostle gives to *ἀναγεννᾶν εἰς ἐλπίδα ζῶσαν*, as also his designation of them as *ἐκλεκτοὶ παρεπίδημοι*, is occasioned by the present state of suffering in which his readers were, and above which he is desirous of raising them.

Ver. 3. *εὐλογητὸς ὁ Θεὸς καὶ πατὴρ τοῦ κυρ. ἡμ. Ἰ. Χριστοῦ*] The same formula occurs in 2 Cor. i. 3; Eph. i. 3. —

[1] When Schott, in order to preserve the objectiveness of *εἰρήνη*, erroneously understands it to mean "*the state of matters* which to those who are in it occasions inwardly no want or unrest, and externally no harm or disturbance," it must be urged in opposition that the inwardness of a possession does not in any way affect its objectiveness.

εὐλογητός, not: "worthy of praise," but: "*praised*;" in the LXX. the translation of בָּרוּךְ; in the N. T. the word εὐλογητός used only with reference to God. εἴη and not ἐστίν is probably to be supplied, as is done by most commentators, cf. Meyer on Eph. i. 1; Winer, p. 545 [E. T. 732] (Schott; Buttm. p. 120); at least from the fact that in the doxologies introduced by means of relatives, ἐστίν is to be found (cf. Rom. i. 25; also 1 Pet. iv. 11), it cannot be concluded that the indicative is to be supplied in an ascription of praise quite differently constructed, cf. LXX. Job i. 21. The adjunct καὶ πατὴρ κ.τ.λ. to ὁ Θεός is explainable as a natural expression of the Christian consciousness. It is possible "that the whole formula of doxology has its origin in the liturgical usage, so to speak, in the primitive Christian church" (Weiss, p. 401). — ὁ κατὰ τὸ πολὺ αὐτοῦ ἔλεος ἀναγεννήσας ἡμᾶς] The participial clause states the reason why God is to be praised. πολύ gives prominence to the riches of the divine mercy, Eph. ii. 4: πλούσιος ὢν ἐν ἐλέει. κατά is used here in the same sense as in ver. 2. ἀναγεννήσας has its nearer definition in the subsequent εἰς ἐλπίδα ζῶσαν. De Wette joins these intimately connected ideas in a somewhat too loose way, when he thus interprets: "who hath awakened us to repentance and faith, and thereby at the same time to a hope." Similarly Wiesinger, who takes ἀναγεννήσας as a self-contained idea, and connects εἰς ἐλπίδα with it, in *this* sense, "that in the idea of regeneration this particular determination of it is brought into prominence, that it is a new birth to living hope, *i.e.* as born again we have attained unto a lively hope;" thus Schott. This view, however, refutes itself, because it necessitates unjustifiable supplements. More in harmony with the expression is Brückner's interpretation, according to which εἰς denotes the aim of the new birth ("the hope is conceived of as the aim of him by whom the readers have been begotten again;" thus Morus already: Deus nos in melius mutavit, cur? ut sperare possimus). But if the attainment of σωτηρία be conceived as the aim and end of the new birth, the hopes directed to it cannot be so, all the less that this hope forms an essential element of the new life itself. The verb ἀναγεννᾶν is here taken not as an absolute, but as a relative idea, its

supplement lying in εἰς ἐλπ. ζ. (so also Steinmeyer, Weiss, Hofmann). The ἐλπὶς ζῶσα is then to be thought of as *the life* into which the mercy of God has raised or begotten the believer from the death of hopelessness (Eph. ii. 12: ἐν τῷ καιρῷ ἐκείνῳ χωρὶς Χριστοῦ . . . ἐλπίδα μὴ ἔχοντες); the connection is the same as in Gal. iv. 24, where the simple γεννᾶν is also construed with εἰς.[1] This view is justified, not only by the close connection of εἰς with the idea ἀναγεννᾶν, but also by the corresponding adj. ζῶσαν. In this there is no weakening of the idea ἀναγεννᾶν (in opposition to Wiesinger), for ἐλπὶς need not be conceived as representing *one single* side of the Christian life, but under it may be understood the whole Christian life in its relation to the future σωτηρία. It is incorrect to take ἐλπὶς here in the objective sense, as: object of hope; Aretius: res, quae spei subjectae sunt, h. e. vita aeterna; Bengel: haereditas coelestis; so also Hottinger, Hensler, etc. It is used rather in the subjective sense to denote the inward condition of life.—The expression ζῶσα has been variously translated by the commentators; thus Beza explains it as: perennis; Aretius: solida; Piscator: vivifica; Gualther: spes viva certitudinem salutis significat; Heidegger: ζῶσα: quia et fructus vitae edit, et spes vitae est et permanet; quia non languida, infirma est, sed παῤῥησίαν et πεποίθησιν habet et perpetua simul semperque exhilarans est, neque unquam intermoritur, sed semper renovatur et refocillatur; in the first edition of this commentary; "the *hope* of the Christian is pervaded by life, carrying with it in undying power the certainty of fulfilment (Rom. v. 5), and making the heart joyful and happy;" it "has life in itself, and gives life, and at the same time has life as its object" (de Wette). Taken strictly, ζῶσα characterizes the hope as one which has

[1] Against this interpretation Schott urges: that ἀναγεννᾶν does not mean "to awaken," that "a death of despair" is not alluded to, that neither ἐλπὶς nor ἐλπὶς ζῶσα denotes "a life of hope." These reasons are insignificant, for (1) the expression "awakened" is not employed in order to give the full meaning of ἀναγεννᾶν; (2) even on the opposite interpretation their former condition may be considered as a hopeless one, and can undoubtedly be regarded as a death; and (3) it cannot be denied that hope is life. In opposition to Schott's assertion, that ἀναγεννᾶν is *everywhere* a self-contained idea, it is to be noted that the word occurs in the N. T. only here and in ver. 23.

life in itself, and is therefore operative. All else may as a matter of fact be connected with it, but is not contained in the word itself (Weiss, p. 92); more especially, too, the idea that it has the certainty of its own realization (Hofmann); cf. i. 23: λόγος ζῶν; ii. 4, 5: λίθος ζῶν. Gerhard incorrectly interprets ἐλπίς by fides, sive fiducialis meriti Christi apprehensio quae est regenerationis nostrae causa formalis. For apart from the fact that Peter is not here speaking of regeneration at all, ἐλπίς and πίστις are in themselves separate ideas, which cannot be arbitrarily substituted for one another. It is erroneous also, with Luther, Calvin, and others, to resolve ἐλπὶς ζῶσα into ἐλπὶς ζωῆς; ζῶσα denotes not the end, but the nature of the hope. — δι' ἀναστάσεως Ἰησ. Χριστοῦ ἐκ νεκρῶν] is not to be joined with ζῶσαν (Oecum., Luth., Bengel, Lorinus, Steiger, de Wette, Hofmann), but with ἀναγεννήσας, more nearly defined by εἰς . . . ζῶσαν (Calvin, Gerhard, Knapp, Weiss, p. 299; Schott, Brückner[1]); for ζῶσαν does not define a particular kind of hope, but only gives special prominence to an element already contained in the idea ἐλπίς. The resurrection of Christ is the means by which God has begotten us again to the living hope. It is the fact which forms the living ground of Christian hope. Wiesinger joins δι' ἀναστ. somewhat too loosely with ἀναγ., explaining as he does: "He hath begotten us again, and *thus in virtue* of the resurrection of Jesus Christ hath *aided us* to living hope."—As ζῶσαν corresponds to the term ἀναγεννήσας, so does ἀνάστασις in the most exact manner to both of these ideas. By the *resurrection* of Christ the believer also is risen to *life*. It must be remarked the prepositions κατά, ἐν, εἰς, ver. 2, are used to correspond with κατά, εἰς, διά; cf. ver. 5, the use of the prepositions: ἐν, διά, εἰς.

Ver. 4. εἰς κληρονομίαν] co-ordinate with the conception ἐλπίδα; it is nevertheless not dependent on it, but on ἀναγεννήσας, although it denotes the objective blessing to which the ἐλπίς has regard. It is added by way of apposition, in order

[1] Schott and Brückner, while accepting the construction above indicated, apply it, in accordance with their interpretation of ἀναγ. εἰς ἐλπίδα, δι' ἀναστάσεως, both to regeneration and the hope therewith connected, which, however, they term "a single homogeneous fact."

to describe more nearly the substance of the hope with respect to its aim. — *κληρονομία* means, no doubt, in the O. and N. T. (Matt. xxi. 38 ; Luke xii. 13) sometimes *inheritance;* but more frequently it has the signification of "*possession.*" In the O. T. it often serves to denote the land of Canaan and its separate parts, promised and apportioned to the people of Israel (Deut. xii. 9 ; Lam. v. 2 ; Josh. xiii. 14, and other passages) : *ἡ γῆ, ἣν κύριος ὁ Θεός σου δίδωσί σοι ἐν κλήρῳ,* Deut. xxiv. 2, or *ἣν . . . δίδωσί σοι κληρονομῆσαι.* In the N. T., and so here also, by the term is to be understood the completed *βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ* with all its possessions, as the antitype of the land of Canaan (cf. in particular, Heb. ix. 15). As this use of the word is not based on the signification "inheritance," it cannot be maintained, with Wiesinger (Schott agreeing with him), that *κληρονομία* stands here with reference to *ἀναγεννήσας*, "to designate that of which the Christians as *children of God* have expectations."[1] The following words : *ἄφθαρτον καὶ ἀμίαντον καὶ ἀμάραντον*] state the gloriousness of the *κληρονομία.*[2] *ἄφθαρτος* (cf. chap. iii. 4), opposite of *φθαρτός* (ver. 18 equal to *ἀπολλύμενος*, ver. 7), cf. ver. 23 ; Rom. i. 23 ; 1 Cor. ix. 25, xv. 53, 54 ; "not subject to the *φθορά.*" *ἀμίαντος* (Jas. i. 27 ; Heb. vii. 26), "undefiled, undefilable." *ἀμάραντος ἅπ. λεγ.* (*ἀμαράντινος* is similar, chap. v. 4), "unfading ;" in the last expression prominence is given to the *imperishable beauty* of the *κληρονομία.* Steinmeyer's opinion is incorrect, that *ἀμίαντος* has nearly the same meaning as *πολύτιμος* and *τίμιος*, ver. 19. —It is not to be assumed that Peter alludes to the character "of the earthly *κληρονομία* (Weiss, p. 74) of the people of Israel," especially as there is nothing in the expressions *ἀμάραντος* and *ἄφθαρτος* which can without artificial straining admit of such a reference.[3] — *τετηρημένην ἐν οὐρανοῖς εἰς ὑμᾶς*] The

[1] No doubt Rom. viii. 17 might be appealed to in support of this interpretation, yet it would be unwarrantable to maintain that the idea there expressed belongs also to Peter. It must also be observed that even Paul, where he makes use of the term *κληρονομία*, never alludes to that idea,—a circumstance which has its reason in the current usage of the word.

[2] Calvin inaccurately : tria epitheta quae sequuntur ad *gratiae Dei* amplificationem posita sunt.

[3] In *ἀμίαντος*, Weiss sees an allusion to the pollution of Judea by the people of Israel itself or its enemies (Jer. ii. 7 ; Lev. xviii. 28 ; Num. xxxv. 34 ; Ezek.

apostle having up to this time spoken generally, makes a transition, and addresses his readers directly: *ἀναγεννήσας ἡμᾶς*; he thereby assures them that that *κληρονομία* is a possession intended and reserved for them. For the conception here expressed, cf. especially Col. i. 5, and Meyer *in loc.* The perf. *τετηρημένην* (Luth. inexactly: "which is kept") stands here with reference to the *nearness* of the time when their *κληρονομία* will be allotted to believers; ver. 5: *ἑτοίμην ἀποκαλυφθῆναι.*[1]

Ver. 5. As the basis of the thought: *τετηρημένην . . . εἰς ὑμᾶς*, the apostle subjoins to *ὑμᾶς* the additional *τοὺς ἐν δυνάμει φρουρουμένους . . . εἰς σωτηρίαν*, by which is expressed not the condition on which the readers might hope for the heavenly *κληρονομία*, but the reason why they possess expectations of it. The chief emphasis lies not on *ἐν δυνάμει Θεοῦ* (Schott), but on *φρουρουμένους . . . εἰς σωτηρίαν*, inasmuch as the former expression serves only to define the *φρουρεῖσθαι* more precisely. Gerhard incorrectly makes the accusative depend on *ἀναγεννήσας*. The prep. *ἐν* (as distinguished from the following *διά*) points out the *δύναμις Θεοῦ* as the causa efficiens (Gerhard), so that Luther's: "*out of God's power*" is in sense correct; the *φρουρεῖσθαι* is based on the *δύν. Θεοῦ*. Steinmeyer wrongly explains, referring to Gal. iii. 23, the *δύναμις Θεοῦ* as the *φρουρά* within which the Christians as believers (*διὰ πίστεως* equal to *πιστεύοντες*!) are kept, velut sub vetere T. lex carcerum instar exstitit, in quibus *οἱ ὑπὸ νόμον ὄντες* custodiebantur. To assume an antithesis between the *δύν. Θεοῦ* and the *law* in explanation of this passage, is entirely unjustifiable. By *δύν. Θεοῦ* is not to be understood, with de Wette and Weiss (p. 189), the Holy Spirit; He is never in any passage of the N. T. (not even in Luke i. 35) designated by these words. The *means* by which the power of God effects the preservation is the *πίστις*,[2] the ultimate origin of which

xxxvi. 17; Ps. lxxix. 1, where the LXX. has *μιαίνειν*); and in *ἀμάραντος* to the scorching of the country by the simoom. Weiss thinks that *ἄφθαρτος* *may* allude to the *φθείρειν τὴν γῆν*, Isa. xxiv. 3; still he himself does not consider this probable.

[1] Hofmann, in disputing this by saying that the perf. partic. is not *explained* by the nearness of the time when the believers will be in possession of the inheritance, calls in question an assertion which is nowhere here made.

[2] *πίστις* implies the entire and full Christian faith; not simply confidence in God (Weiss), nor the mere "confident assurance of the salvation which is ready

nevertheless is also the gracious will of God.—On *φρουρουμένους*, Vorstius rightly remarks: notatur talis custodia, quae praesidium habet adjunctum.[1] The word by which the apostle even here makes reference to the subsequent *ἐν ποικίλοις πειρασμοῖς*, ver. 6, has its nearer definition in the following *εἰς σωτηρίαν ἑτοίμην ἀποκαλυφθῆναι*, which by Calvin (haec duo membra appositive lego, ut posterius sit prioris expositio, rem unam duobus modis exprimit), Steiger, and others is joined to *ἀναγεννήσας* as a co-ordinate adjunct to *εἰς κληρονομίαν*. It is preferable to connect them with *φρουρουμένους*; the more so that *κληρονομία*, "with its predicates, so fully characterizes the object of hope, that *εἰς σωτηρίαν κ.τ.λ.* would add nothing further" (Wiesinger). The introduction of *ὑμᾶς*, too, is decidedly opposed to the former construction. There is nothing to support the connection with *πίστεως*, in which *σωτηρία* would be regarded as the object of faith. According to the correct construction, the verbal conception is more nearly defined by the addition of the origin, means, and end, cf. vv. 2, 3.[2] The word *σωτηρία* is here—as the conjoined *ἑτοίμη ἀποκαλυφθῆναι* shows—a *positive* conception; namely: the salvation effected and completed by Christ, not simply a negative idea, "deliverance from *ἀπώλεια*" (Weiss, p. 79). It does not follow from the circumstance that *κληρονομία* and *σωτηρία* are synonymous terms, that the former is "only the negative side of the completed salvation."—The verb *ἀποκαλυφθῆναι* is here, as elsewhere, used to denote the disclosure of what is already

to be revealed" (Hofmann); these are single elements which it includes, but which do not exhaust the idea. According to Schott, the apostle has omitted the article, in order to emphasize the fact that he means "that faith which, as to its inmost nature, is not dependent on sight" (!).

[1] Aretius rightly observes: militare est vocabulum *φρουρά*: praesidium. Pii igitur, dum sunt in periculis, sciant totidem eis divinitus parata esse praesidia: millia millium custodiunt eos. Finis est salus. — Bengel also aptly says: haereditas servata est; haeredes custodiuntur, neque illa his, neque hi deerunt illi.

[2] Schott justly calls attention to the relation of *φρουρουμένους* to *τετηρημένην*: "If the reserving of the inheritance for Christians is not to be fruitless, it must be accompanied by a . . . preserving of them on earth for that inheritance." He states the difference between the two expressions thus: "As regards the inheritance, it is only necessary that its existence should not cease. Christians, on the other hand, must be guarded and preserved from influences endangering their state of salvation."

in existence (with God ἐν οὐρανοῖς, ver. 4), but as yet hidden. ἕτοιμος is here, like μέλλων often, joined cum. inf. pass. (see Gal. iii. 23. On the use of the inf. aor. in this connection, see Winer, p. 311 f. [E. T. 419 f.]); μέλλων nevertheless has a less strong force. The *future* salvation lies ready to be revealed, that is to say: ἐν καιρῷ ἐσχάτῳ, by which is denoted the time when the world's history will be closed (not "the relatively last; Bengel: in comparatione temporum V. T.; but absolutely the last time ἐν ἀποκαλύψει Ἰ. Χρ., ver. 7." Wiesinger[1]). When this time will be, the apostle does not say; but his whole manner of expression indicates that in hope it floated before his vision as one near at hand; cf. chap. iv. 7.

Ver. 6. ἐν ᾧ ἀγαλλιᾶσθε] The verb expresses the liveliness of the Christian joy, equivalent to: *exult;* it is stronger than χαίρειν, with which it is sometimes connected (chap. iv. 13; Matt. v. 12; Rev. xix. 7[2]). — ἐν ᾧ refers either to the preceding thought, that the salvation is ready to be revealed (Calvin: articulus "*in quo*" refert totum illud complexum de spe salutis in coelo repositae; so also Estius, Grotius, Calov, Steiger, Jachmann, de Wette, Brückner, Steinmeyer, Schott; similarly Gerhard, who, however, applies it to all that precedes: ἀναγεννήσας, etc.), or to καιρῷ ἐσχάτῳ (Oecum., Erasmus, Luther, Wiesinger, etc.). In the first construction ἀγαλλ.—in form as in meaning—is praesens, and denotes the present joy of the Christians over their future salvation (ἐν ᾧ: over which, cf. chap. iv. 4[3]). In the second construction a double interpretation is possible, inasmuch as ἐν ᾧ may denote either the object or the time of the joy; in the first case the sense is: the καιρὸς ἔσχατος is for you an object of joy, because in it

[1] Schott unjustifiably supposes that the want of the article indicates that "the σωτηρία would take place at a time which, from this very fact, must be regarded as the last."

[2] Steinmeyer, whilst combating the opinion that ἀγαλλ. has a stronger force than χαίρειν, correctly describes the ἀγαλλίασις as affectio fervidior animi hilaris, but χαρά unwarrantably as: *perpetua* illa cordis laetitia, quae neque augeri queat neque imminui.

[3] Brückner explains ἐν ᾧ as above stated, but he understands ἀγαλλιᾶσθε in a future sense, "of that which shall most surely come to pass;" this interpretation is undoubtedly inappropriate, inasmuch as the present assurance of the future salvation, stated in ver. 5, may now indeed be an object of rejoicing, but will not be so then, when that future salvation itself is attained.

the salvation will be revealed; in the second case the sense is: *in* that last time ye shall rejoice (so Wiesinger and Hofmann); here the object of joy is doubtless not named, but it may be easily supplied, and the want of it therefore cannot be urged against this view (as opposed to Brückner). The last of these different views deserves the preference, both on account of the subsequent ὀλίγον ἄρτι . . . λυπηθέντες, which forms a distinct antithesis to ἀγαλλιᾶσθε, and of the idea peculiar to the epistle, that in the present time the Christian has to *suffer* rather than to exult, and only in the future can he expect the full joy;—and the prevalent manner of conjunction, too, precisely in this section of the epistle, by which what follows is linked directly on to the word immediately preceding, cf. vv. 5, 8, 10, shows that ἐν ᾧ applies to καιρῷ ἐσχάτῳ. In this combination, however, it is more natural to take ἐν in the same sense as in that which it has before καιρῷ, rather than in another.[1]—Doubtless the present ἀγαλλιᾶσθε will then have a future force; but this occasions no difficulty, there being nothing uncommon in such a use of the present (cf. also Winer, p. 249 [E. T. 331 f.]).—The present tense strongly emphasizes the certainty of the future joy, rays of which fall even on the present life.[2] — ὀλίγον ἄρτι] ὀλίγον not of measure (Steiger), but of time, chap. v. 10, where it forms the antithesis to αἰώνιος; cf. Rev. xvii. 10; ἄρτι denotes present time. The juxtaposition of the two words is explainable by the apostle's hope that the καιρὸς ἔσχατος would soon begin. — εἰ δέον ἐστί] not an affirmative (Bengel), but a hypothetical parenthesis: si res ita ferat: if it must be so, that is, according to divine decree; cf. chap. iii. 17. Incorrectly Steinmeyer: qui per peregrinationis spatium, *quamdiu necessarium est*, contristati estis.[3] — λυπηθέντες ἐν ποικίλοις πειρασμοῖς] The aorist with ἄρτι

[1] Schott's assertion, that, *as a rule*, ἀγαλλ. is connected by ἐν with its object, is erroneous. In the N. T. the passage, John v. 35, at the most, can be quoted in support of this construction; whilst in Luke x. 21, ἐν accompanies the simple indication of time. In Luke i. 47, ἀγαλλ. is construed with ἐπί c. dat.; John viii. 56, with ἵνα.

[2] It is altogether inappropriate to interpret ἀγαλλιᾶσθε, with Augustine, as an imperative; the exhortations begin only in ver. 13.

[3] The older Protestant commentators, more especially, sometimes employ this passage to combat the arbitrary seeking after suffering; thus Luther says: "It

has reference to the *future* joy: "after that ye have now for a short time been made sorrowful." "It signifies the inward sadness, in consequence of outward experiences" (Wiesinger). —Particula ἐν non solum est χρονική, sed etiam αἰτιολογική (Gerhard). Both meanings pass over into each other, so that ἐν is not to be interpreted as synonymous with διά. — πειρασμοί are the events by which the faith of the Christian is proved or also tempted; here, specially the persecutions which he is called upon to endure at the hands of the unbelieving world, cf. Jas. i. 2; Acts xx. 19. By the addition of the adjective, the manifold nature of their different kinds is pointed out.

REMARK.—When Schott, in opposition to the interpretation here given, maintains the purely present force of ἀγαλλ. on the ground that "it must be the apostle's object to commend by way of exhortation the readers for their present state of mind," it is to be remarked—(1) That the apostle here gives utterance to no exhortation; and (2) That the apostle might perfectly well direct his readers to the certainty of the future joy, in order to strengthen them for the patient endurance of their present condition of suffering. It is perfectly arbitrary to assert, with Schott, that by ἄρτι the *present* trials as transitory are contrasted with the *present* joy as enduring, as also to maintain "that by the aorist λυπηθέντες the suffering is reduced to the idea of an ever-changing variety of individual momentary incidents which, in virtue of the uniform joy, may always lie behind the Christian surmounted" (!).—Schott insists again, without reason, that εἰ δέον [ἐστί] cannot be taken as referring to the divine decree, in that it is "impossible to make the accomplished concrete fact of the λυπηθῆναι hypothetical with respect to the will of God;" for it is not clear why Peter should not characterize the λυπηθῆναι ἐν ποικ. πειρασμοῖς as something hypothetical here, where he does not as yet enter more particularly into the concrete facts. Nor can it be assumed that εἰ δέον (ἐστί) is added in order to remind the readers that the ποικίλοι πειρασμοί should in reality occasion no sadness,—the less so that thus the intimately connected λυπηθέντες ἐν ποικ. πειρασμοῖς are torn asunder.

Ver. 7. ἵνα] states the aim of the λυπηθῆναι ἐν . . . πειρασμοῖς, in order to console the readers with respect to it, "*that*

is not to be our own works which we choose, but we must await what God lays upon us and sends, so that we may go and follow, therefore thou mayest not thyself run after them."

the approvedness of your faith may be found more precious than (that) of gold, which perisheth, yet it is tried by fire, to (your) praise, and glory, and honour at the revelation of Jesus Christ." — **δοκίμιον** here, as in Jas. i. 3 (cf. *in loco*), equal to **δοκιμή**, the approvedness as the result of the trial (Rom. v. 3, 4; 2 Cor. ii. 9, ix. 13; Phil. ii. 22).[1] The strict signification "*medium* of proof" is inappropriate, inasmuch as the aim of the **λυπηθῆναι ἐν πειρασμοῖς** cannot be stated as the glorification of these **πειρασμοί**, but as only that of faith in its approvedness (in opposition to Steinmeyer). Unsuitable, too, is the interpretation "trial" (Brückner, Wiesinger), **τὸ δοκίμιον τῆς πίστεως** being taken for **ἡ πίστις δοκιμαζομένη**, inasmuch as it is not the trial of the faith, but the faith being tried that is to be compared with the gold. This substitution of ideas is not justifiable, inasmuch as the *process* applied to an object cannot be put for the object itself to which it is applied. Only if **δοκίμιον** denote a *quality* of faith, can a substitution of this kind take place. **δοκίμιον** must be taken as: "*approvedness*," and by approvedness of faith, the "approved," or rather "the faith approving itself."[2]

REMARK.—What Schott had formerly alleged with respect to **δοκίμιον** is repeated by Hofmann, only by him it is carried further. By an highly artificial interpretation of Ps. xii. 7, LXX., and by the application of the rule established by him, "that the neuter of the adjective does not stand in the place of an abstract attributive, but expresses the condition of some-

[1] **δοκιμή** in the N. T. has either an active or a passive signification; in the former it means: "the trial which leads to approvedness," as in 2 Cor. viii. 2; in the latter: "the approvedness effected by trial," as in the passages quoted; or better still: "a distinction must be drawn between a present and a perfect force, in that **δοκιμή** has a reflexive sense, either, then, the having approved itself, or the approving itself," Cremer, *s.v.*

[2] Brückner raises the following objections to this interpretation:—(1) That **δοκίμιον** can linguistically only be understood as: means of proof, trial; and (2) That the part. pres., standing in opposition to **χρυσίου** (**δοκιμαζομένου**), does not presuppose the purification of the gold to have already taken place, and that, consequently, the **πίστις δοκιμαζομένη** only can be considered as compared with **χρυσίον δοκιμαζόμενον**. But against this it must be observed that **δοκίμιον** has *only* the signification of "means of proof," not of trial; and (3) That in the above interpretation it is not the already approved faith, but that faith which is being approved, or approving itself in tribulation, which is contrasted with gold which is being tried.

thing as a concrete reality, and in conjunction with a genitive denotes the object thereby named in this its condition," Hofmann makes out that it is here affirmed that "at the revelation of Christ it will be found that the faith of the readers has been subjected to purification, and is in consequence free from dross." This whole interpretation is a pure matter of fancy, for δοκίμιον —a circumstance which both Schott and Hofmann have left unnoticed—is *not* an adjective, but a real substantive; for δοκιμεῖον. —Cremer explains: "δοκ. is not the touchstone only, in and for itself, but the trace left behind on it by the metal; therefore τὸ δοκ. τῆς πίστεως is that which results from the contact of πίστις with πειρασμοῖς, that by which faith is recognised as genuine, equal to the proof of faith." But in opposition to this it must be remarked that fire and not touchstone is here conceived as the means of testing.

—πολυτιμότερον κ.τ.λ.] is by most interpreters closely connected with εὑρεθῇ, by others again (Wolf, Pott, Steinmeyer, Wiesinger, Hofmann) separated from it, and considered as in apposition to τὸ δοκίμιον ὑμ. τ. πιστ. The following facts, however, are decisive against the latter construction: (1) That—as Wiesinger admits—this appositional clause expresses "something understood of itself." (2) That the intention here is not to make an observation on faith, but to state what is the design of sorrow, namely, that the faith which is approving itself may be found to be one πολύτιμος. (3) That thus εὑρεθῇ would be deprived of any nearer definition, in that the subsequent εἰς has reference not to εὑρεθῇ alone, but to the whole idea expressed. Yet it cannot well dispense with a nearer definition (in opposition to Hofmann).—The genitive χρυσίου is, as almost all the interpreters take it, to be joined in sense directly with the comparative: "*than the gold*," so that the δοκίμιον of the faith is compared with the gold. Some commentators, like Beza, Grotius, Vorstius, Steinmeyer, Hofmann, assume an ellipsis (cf. Winer, p. 230 [E. T. 307]), supplying before χρυσίου the words ἢ τὸ δοκίμιον. In opposition it may be urged, however, not precisely "that this is cumbrous" (Brückner), but that the point of comparison is not properly the approval of faith, but the faith in the act of approving itself. Whilst comparing the faith with the gold, the apostle places the former above the latter; the reason of this he states in the

attribute τοῦ ἀπολλυμένου connected with χρυσίου, by which reference is made to the imperishable nature of faith. To this first attribute he subjoins the second: διὰ πυρὸς δὲ δοκιμαζομένου, in order to name here also the medium of proving, to which the πειρασμοί, with respect to faith, correspond. Accordingly Wiesinger and Steinmeyer are wrong in asserting that in the interpretation here given the attribute τοῦ ἀπολλυμένου is inappropriate. — ἀπολλύμενος: φθαρτός, cf. vv. 18, 23; also John vi. 27. For the position of the adjective with art. after an anarthrous subst., see Winer, p. 131 f. [E. T. 174]. — διὰ πυρὸς δὲ δοκιμαζομένου] The particle δέ seems to place this second adjunct in antithesis to the first (ἀπολλυμένου) (thus de Wette: "which is perishable, and *yet* is proved by fire;" so also Hofmann). But opposed to this view is the circumstance that the trial and purification of what is perishable is by no means anything to occasion surprise; it is therefore more correct to find the purpose of the adjunct in this, that by it the idea of the δοκιμάζεσθαι is brought prominently forward. Vorstius remarks to the point: aurum igni committitur non ad iteritum, sed ad gloriam, sic fides cruci ad gloriam subjicitur.—For this comparison, see Job xxiii. 10; Prov. xvii. 3; Zech. xiii. 9. — εὑρεθῇ εἰς ἔπαινον καὶ δόξαν καὶ τιμήν] The verb εὑρεθῆναι, "*to be found to be*," is more significant than εἶναι (cf. Winer, p. 572 f. [E. T. 769 f.]), and has reference to the judicial investigation on the last day of judgment. The words following form an adjunct to the whole preceding thought: ἵνα . . . εὑρεθῇ. Beza rightly: hic agitur de ipsorum electorum laude, etc.; thus: "to *your* praise, glory, and honour." Schott quite arbitrarily interprets ἔπαινος as in itself: "the *judicial* recognition" (as opposed to this, cf. Phil. i. 11, iv. 8); τιμή: "the moral estimation of the person arising therefrom" (as opposed to this, cf. 1 Pet. iii. 7), and δόξα: "the form of glory" (as opposed to this, cf. Gal. i. 5; Phil. i. 11). Steinmeyer incorrectly applies the words not to the persons, but to their faith. δόξα and τιμή in the N. T. stand frequently together; in connection with ἔπαινος, here only. The juxtaposition of these synonymous expressions serves to give prominence to the *one* idea of honourable recognition common to them all. Standing as δόξα does

between ἔπαινος and τιμή, it cannot signify: "the allotment of the possession of glory" (Wiesinger), but it is: "glory, praise." — ἐν ἀποκαλύψει Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ] not: "*through*," but: "*at*," the revelation of Jesus Christ, that is, on the day of His return, which is at once the ἀποκάλυψις δικαιοκρισίας τοῦ Θεοῦ (Rom. ii. 5) and the ἀποκάλυψις τῶν υἱῶν τοῦ Θεοῦ (Rom. viii. 19).

Ver. 8. The longing of the believers is directed to the ἀποκάλυψις Ἰησ. Χριστοῦ, He being the object of their love and joy. This thought is subjoined to what precedes in two relative clauses, in order that thereby the apostle may advert to the glory of the future salvation. — ὃν οὐκ εἰδότες ἀγαπᾶτε] "*whom, although ye know Him not* (that is, according to the flesh, or in His earthly personality), *ye love*." The object of εἰδότες is easily supplied from ὅν, according to the usage in Greek. The reading ἰδόντες expresses substantially the same thought. — Since ἀγάπη, properly speaking, presupposes personal acquaintance, the clause οὐκ εἰδότες is significantly added, in order to set forth prominently that the relation to Christ is an higher than any based on a knowledge after the flesh. — In the clause following—co-ordinate with this—the thought is carried further, the apostle's glance being again directed to the future appearance of Christ. — εἰς ὃν ἄρτι μὴ ὁρῶντες πιστεύοντες δὲ ἀγαλλιᾶσθε] As regards the construction, εἰς ὅν can hardly be taken with ἀγαλλιᾶσθε, the participles ὁρῶντες and πιστεύοντες thus standing absolutely (Frommüller), but, as most interpreters are agreed, must be construed with πιστεύοντες. The more precise determination of the thought must depend on whether ἀγαλλιᾶσθε is, with de Wette, Brückner, Winer, Steinmeyer, Weiss, Schott, to be taken as referring to present, or, with Wiesinger and Hofmann, to future joy. In the first case, ἀγαλλιᾶσθε is joined in the closest manner with πιστεύοντες, and ἄρτι only with μὴ ὁρῶντες (de Wette: "and in Him, though now seeing Him not, yet believing ye exult"); in the second, εἰς ὃν . . . πιστεύοντες δέ is to be taken as the condition of the ἀγαλλιᾶσθε, and ἄρτι to be joined with πιστεύοντες (Wiesinger: "on whom for the present believing,—although without seeing, —ye exult"). In support of the first view, it may be

advanced, that thus ἀγαλλιᾶσθε corresponds more exactly to ἀγαπᾶτε, and that μὴ ὁρῶντες forms a more natural antithesis to ἀγαλλιᾶσθε than to πιστεύοντες; for the second, that it is precisely one of the peculiarities characteristic of this epistle, that it sets forth the present condition of believers as one chiefly of suffering, which only at the ἀποκάλυψις of the Lord will be changed into one of joy; that the more precise definition: χαρᾷ ἀνεκλαλήτῳ καὶ δεδοξασμένῃ, as also the subsequent κομιζόμενοι, have reference to the future; that the ἄρτι seems to involve the thought: "*now* ye see Him not, but *then* ye see Him, and shall rejoice in beholding Him;" and lastly, that the apostle, iv. 13, expressly ascribes the ἀγαλλιᾶσθαι to the future. On these grounds the second view is preferable to the first. The present ἀγαλλιᾶσθε need excite the less surprise, that the future joy is one not only surely pledged to the Christian, but which its certainty makes already present. It may, indeed, be supposed that ἀγαλλιᾶσθε must be conceived as in the same relation to time with ἀγαπᾶτε; yet, according to the sense, it is not the ἀγαλλιᾶσθαι, but the πιστεύειν, which forms the second characteristic of the Christian life annexed to ἀγαπᾶν. It is not, however, the case, that on account of the present πιστεύοντες, ἀγαλλ. also must be taken with a present signification (Schott), since love and faith are the *present ground* of the joy beginning indeed now, but perfected only in the future. The particle of time ἄρτι applies not only to μὴ ὁρῶντες, but likewise to πιστεύοντες δέ; the sense of μὴ ὁρῶντες πιστεύοντες δέ is not this, that although they now do not see, yet still believe—the not seeing and the believing do not form an antithesis, they belong to each other; but this, that the Christians do not indeed see, but believe. On the distinction between οὐκ εἰδότες and μὴ ὁρῶντες, see Winer, p. 452 [E. T. 609]. — χαρᾷ ἀνεκλαλήτῳ καὶ δεδοξασμένῃ] serves to intensify ἀγαλλιᾶσθε. ἀνεκλάλητος, ἅπ. λεγ., "unspeakable," is either "what cannot be expressed in words" (thus ἀλάλητος, Rom. viii. 26), or "what cannot be exhausted by words."[1] δεδοξασμένη, according to Weiss, means: "the joy which already bears within it the glory, in

[1] Steinmeyer gives an unjustifiable application to the word, by saying: "Meminerimus τῶν ποικίλων πειρασμῶν. Si quidem plurimae illae tentatione-

which the future glory comes into play even in the Christian's earthly life;" similarly Steinmeyer: "hominis fidelis laetitia jam exstat δεδοξασμένη, quoniam δόξαν ejus futuram praesentem habet ac sentit;" but on this interpretation relations are introduced which in and for itself the word does not possess. δεδοξασμένος means simply "*glorified*;" χαρὰ δεδοξασμ. is accordingly the joy which has attained unto perfected glory; but "the imperfect joy of the Christian here (Wiesinger, Hofmann), and not the joy of the world, which as of sense and transitory is a joy ἐν ἀτιμίᾳ" (Fronmüller), is to be regarded as its antithesis; so that this expression also seems to show that ἀγαλλιᾶσθε is to be understood of the future exultation.

Ver. 9. κομιζόμενοι τὸ τέλος κ.τ.λ.] gives the reason of that joy; the participle links itself simply on to ἀγαλλιᾶσθε, "*inasmuch as ye obtain*," etc., and supplies confirmation that what is here spoken of is not present, but future joy. It is arbitrary to interpret, with de Wette and Brückner: "inasmuch as ye are *destined* to obtain;" or with Steiger: "inasmuch as even now *in foretaste* ye obtain." Joined with the future present ἀγαλλιᾶσθε, the participle must also be in the present.[1] Cf. with this passage, more especially chap. v. 4. — κομίζειν: "*obtain*" (cf. chap. v. 4), is in the N. T. frequently used of the obtaining of what will be assigned to man at the last judgment; 2 Pet. ii. 13; 2 Cor. v. 10; Eph. vi. 8; Col. iii. 25. Steinmeyer incorrectly explains the word: *secum portare*. — τὸ τέλος, not "the reward" = μισθός (Beza, Vorstius, etc.), neither is it "the reward of victory" (Hofmann);[2] but it is

totidem laetitiae causas afferunt, sine dubio ἡ χαρά eodem sensu ἀνεκλάλητος exstat, quo πυφασμοί nequeunt enumerari."

[1] Winer, in the 5th ed. (p. 403), gives the same interpretation as de Wette; in the 6th (p. 306 [E. T. 429]) and the 7th (p. 330), on the other hand: "as receiving (they are that already in the assurance of faith)." Schott: "since ye are about to, or on the way to, *gather in* (!) like a harvest the end of your faith." Schott is clearly wrong when he asserts that if the apostle had had the future joy in his mind, he must have written κομισάμενοι on account of the δεδοξασμένην, "because the attaining of the end of salvation, which is still in the act of being accomplished, could not be placed parallel with the final glorification which has already taken place," since there is nothing unreasonable in the idea that the joy of the Christians *is* glorified when they receive the end of their salvation.

[2] The expression κομίζειν indeed shows that Peter pictured to himself the τέλος of faith as a trophy, but not that τέλος literally means: "trophy."

the *end* of faith, that to which it is directed; see Cremer, *s.v.* — *τῆς πίστεως ὑμῶν*] refers back to *πιστεύοντες*, ver. 8. — *σωτηρίαν ψυχῶν*] The salvation is indeed one already present; but here is meant the Christians' completed salvation, of which they shall be partakers, *ἐν καιρῷ ἐσχάτῳ* (ver. 5). — On *ψυχῶν*, Bengel remarks: *anima* praecipue salvatur: corpus in resurrectione participat; cf. Jam. i. 21; John xii. 25; Luke xxi. 19.

Vv. 10–12. The design of this paragraph is not to prove the truth of the apostolic doctrine by its agreement with that of the prophets (Gerhard), but to bring prominently forward the glory of the *σωτηρία* before spoken of, by presenting it as the object of prophetic search. Calvin: "salutis hujus pretium inde commendat, quod in eam toto studio intente fuerunt prophetae." Wiesinger also; in such a way, however, that he holds the real tendency to be this, that the readers should recognise themselves as "those favoured ones who, by the preaching of the gospel, had been made partakers of the salvation foretold in the O. T." Schott thinks that here the position of the Christians is compared very favourably with that of the prophets, since the latter had to cling to a bare word referring to an indefinite time; the former, on the other hand, have in their possession of salvation the pledge of a blessed future—indeed, in a certain sense even possess it. — But how much is here introduced!

Ver. 10. *περὶ ἧς σωτηρίας ἐξεζήτησαν καὶ ἐξηρεύνησαν προφῆται*] The *σωτηρία*, to which the search of the prophets was directed, is, as the connection: *περὶ ἧς σωτ.*, shows, the previously mentioned *σωτηρία ψυχῶν*, which is the *τέλος* of faith. Wiesinger and Schott extend the idea so as to include within it the *present* salvation. This is correct thus far, that the future salvation is only the completion of the present; but it is precisely to the completion that the apostle's glance is directed. De Wette is wrong in understanding by *σωτηρία* "the *work* of salvation." — Both verbs express the earnest search. *ἐξερευνᾶν* is in the N. T. *ἅπ. λεγ.* (LXX. 1 Sam. xxiii. 23: חָפַשׂ; 1 Chron. xix. 3: חָקַר). The prefixed *ἐκ* serves to intensify the idea, without hinting that the prophets selected the right time *from* among different periods

(Steiger); see the other passages in the N. T. where the verb ἐκζητεῖν occurs. The aim of their search is more precisely defined in ver. 11. Luther's translation is inexact: "*after* which salvation;" περί means rather: *in respect to, with regard to.* — Calvin justly remarks: quum dicit prophetas sciscitatos esse et sedulo inquisivisse, hoc ad eorum scripta aut doctrinam non pertinet, sed ad *privatum desiderium* quo quisque aestuavit. A distinction is here drawn between the individual activity put forth on the basis of the revelation of which they had been made partakers, and that revelation itself (Wiesinger, Schott, Hofmann).[1] To προφῆται is subjoined the nearer definition: οἱ περὶ τῆς εἰς ὑμᾶς χάριτος προφητεύσαντες] by which some prophets are not distinguished from others, as Hofmann thinks, but all are characterized according to their function. Bengel: Articulus hic praetermissus grandem facit orationem, nam auditorem a determinata individuorum consideratione ad ipsum genus spectandum traducit; sic ver. 12: angeli. — ἡ εἰς ὑμᾶς χάρις] either from the prophets' standpoint: "destined for you" (de Wette, Brückner), or from that of the apostles: "the grace of which ye have been made partakers" (Wiesinger, Schott). The first is the preferable view. χάρις is not to be taken as identical with σωτηρία (as opposed to Wiesinger), but the difference in expression points to a distinction in idea. χάρις denotes both the present and the future, σωτηρία only the future. Hofmann attaches particular importance to the fact that ὑμᾶς and not ἡμᾶς is here used; assuming that by ὑμᾶς the readers must be understood to be *heathen-Christians.* This is, however, incorrect, since Peter nowhere in his epistle makes a distinction between heathen and Jewish-Christians; by ὑμᾶς the readers are addressed not as heathen-Christians, but as Christians in general; cf. also vv. 3, 4: ἀναγεννήσας ἡμᾶς ... τετηρημένους εἰς ὑμᾶς.

Ver. 11 stands in close grammatical connection with the

[1] Steinmeyer denies this distinction, and says, interpreting τίνα ἢ ποῖον καιρόν, ver. 11, by de sola inde indole temporis: neminem latebit, eos saepenumero de crescente piorum hominum desiderio nec non de aucta improborum protervitate verba fecisse; . . . ecce τὰ σημεῖα τοῦ μέλλοντος καιροῦ, quae indagata praedicarunt. According to this, ἐκζητεῖν and ἐξερευνᾶν would be indagata praedicare (!).

preceding, ἐρευνῶντες being conjoined with the verba finita of ver. 10; what follows states the object of the ἐρευνᾶν. — εἰς τίνα ἢ ποῖον καιρόν] τίνα refers to the time itself, ποῖον to its character.[1] Steinmeyer (appealing without justification to Rom. iv. 13) explains ἤ incorrectly: vel potius; vel, ut rectius dicam. — ἐδήλου] not: "*referred* to" (Luth. or significaret, *Vulg.*), but: "*revealed*," as Heb. ix. 8, xii. 17, etc. Vorstius supplies: gratiam illam exstituram, de qua et ipsi vaticinabantur; this is incorrect. εἰς . . . καιρόν is conjoined rather directly—though not as its real object, but as a secondary determination—with ἐδήλου. An object is not to be supplied (neither ταῦτα nor τὴν χάριν ταύτην, Steiger), as ἐδήλου is in intimate union with the participle προμαρτυρόμενον (de Wette, Brückner, Wiesinger, Schott), by which "at once the act of δηλοῦν and its object are exactly determined" (de Wette). — τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ] By this the revealing subject is mentioned: the prophets only expressed what the Spirit within them communicated to them; "the τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς is to be taken as a special act of ἐδήλου" (Wiesinger), cf. besides, Matt. xxii. 43 and 2 Pet. i. 21.[2]—This Spirit is characterized as the τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ Χριστοῦ, not in that it bears witness of Christ (Bengel: Spiritus Christi: testans de Christo; thus also Grotius, Augustine, Jachmann), for Χριστοῦ is the subjective and not the objective genitive, but because it is the Spirit "which Christ has and gives" (Wiesinger); see Rom. viii. 8. The expression is to be explained from the apostle's conviction of the pre-existence of Christ, and is here used in reference strictly to the προμαρτυρόμενον τὰ εἰς Χριστὸν παθήματα κ.τ.λ. directly conjoined with it. Barnabas, chap. v.: prophetae ab ipso habentes donum in illum prophetarunt.

Remark. — By far the greater number of the interpreters rightly see in the term here applied to the Spirit a testimony

[1] Bengel: in quod vel quale tempus; *quod* innuit tempus per se, quasi dicas aeram suis numeris notatam: *quale* dicit tempus ex eventibus variis noscendum.

[2] Hofmann is indeed not mistaken in saying that τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς πν. Χρ. is a designation of the Spirit working prophetic knowledge in the prophets, and not of a constant indwelling of it,—only it must be observed that the expression here employed says nothing as to how or in what manner the Spirit dwelt in the prophets.

to the real pre-existence of Christ. Not so de Wette, who finds in it merely the expression of the view "that the work of redemption is the same in both the O. and N. T., and that the Spirit of God at work in the former is identical with the Spirit of Christ;" and Weiss (pp. 247–249), who explains the name thus: that the Spirit which was at work in the prophets was the same as "that which Christ received at His baptism, and since then has possessed;" similarly Schmid also (*bibl. Theol.* p. 163), "the Spirit of God which in after time worked in the person of Christ."—Weiss seeks to prove, indeed, that "Christ had in the pre-existent Messianic Spirit an ideal, or in *a certain sense* a real pre-existence,"—but in this way reflex ideas are attributed to the apostles, which certainly lay far from their mind. Besides, Weiss himself admits that in 1 Cor. x. 4, 9, reference is made to the pre-existent Christ; but it cannot be concluded from Acts ii. 36 that Peter did not believe it. Schott, too, in his interpretation, does not abstain from introducing many results of modern thought, when he designates τὸ πν. Χρ. here as the Spirit "of the Mediator continually approaching the consummation of salvation (!), but as yet supernaturally concealed in God." Steinmeyer does not touch the question of the pre-existence of Christ; he finds an adequate explanation of the expression in the remark of Bengel, although he takes Χριστοῦ as a subject. gen.

— προμαρτυρόμενον] This verb. compos. occurs nowhere else in the N. T., and in none of the classical writers; the simplex means properly: "to call to witness;" then, "to swear to, to attest;" προμαρτύρεσθαι is therefore: "*to attest beforehand.*"[1] — The object of ἐδήλου . . . προμαρτ. is τὰ εἰς Χριστὸν παθήματα καὶ τὰς μετὰ ταῦτα δόξας] On this Luther remarks, that it can be understood of both kinds of suffering, of those which Christ Himself bore, as well as of those which we endure. The majority of interpreters conceive the reference to be to the former: Oecumenius, Theophyl., Erasmus, Grotius, Aretius, Piscator (cf. Luke xxiv. 26), Vorstius, Hensler, Stolz, Hottinger, Knapp, Steiger, de Wette, Brückner, Steinmeyer,

[1] Schott justly remarks that δηλοῦν and προμαρτύρεσθαι are not identical with προφητεύειν, but that they denote the "action of the Spirit," by means of which "He communicated to the prophets the prophecies after which they were to inquire." But he is evidently mistaken when he asserts that this identification takes place in the above interpretation.—Nor is Schott warranted in supposing that in προμαρ. the apostle emphatically shows that the manner of communication "was a revelation in the form of *speech*, and not an inward vision."

Wiesinger, Weiss, Luthardt, Schott, Frommüller, Hofmann, etc.; but not so Calvin: non tractat Petr. quod Christo sit proprium, sed de universali ecclesiae statu disserit; Bolten and Clericus explain it of the sufferings of the Christians; the same position is taken up in the first edition of this commentary. Since the main tendency of the paragraph, vv. 10–12, is to give special prominence to the glorious nature of the believers' σωτηρία, the latter view *is favoured* by the connection of thought. But, on the other hand, there is nothing opposed to the assumption, that the apostle here mentions the facts on which the σωτηρία is founded, as the substance of the testimony of the Spirit of God in the prophets. The expression τὰ εἰς Χριστὸν παθήματα too, which must be interpreted on the analogy of τῆς εἰς ὑμᾶς χάριτος, goes to show that by it are to be understood *the sufferings which were ordained or appointed to Christ* (Wiesinger). — On the plural τὰς . . . δόξας, Bengel says: Plurale: gloria resurrectionis, gloria ascensionis, gloria judicii extremi et regni coelestis; thus also Grotius, de Wette, Steiger, Wiesinger, Weiss, Schott. But it might be more correct to explain the plural in this way, that as the one suffering of Christ comprehends in it a plurality of sufferings, so does His δόξα a plurality of glories. Hofmann: "by παθήματα is to be understood the manifold afflictions in which the one suffering of Christ consisted, while the manifold glorifyings which go to make up His glory are included under δόξαι." [1] Besides, it must be noted that the suffering of Christ is always designated by the plural παθήματα (with the exception of in Heb. ii. 9, where we have: τὸ πάθημα τοῦ θανάτου), but His glory always by the singular δόξα.—As the παθήματα and δόξαι of Christ are the object of ἐδήλου προμαρτυρόμενον, so by καιρός, to which the ἐρευνᾶν of the prophets was directed, *the* time is referred to when this salvation would actually be accomplished. For this reason, then, ἐξηρεύνησαν, ver. 10, cannot again be repeated in ἐρευνῶντες (Wiesinger, Schott), as if the εἰς τίνα . . . καιρόν referred directly to the appearance of the σωτηρία; the apostle's thought is rather this, that in

[1] Hofmann's opinion, that Peter had chiefly in his mind the passages in Isa. xlix. 6, 7, lii. 15, arises from the fact that he applies ὑμᾶς specially to the Gentiles.

their search as to the time of the sufferings, etc. of Christ, the prophets had before their eyes, as that with respect to which they sought to obtain knowledge, the *σωτηρία* of which believers were to be made partakers.

REMARK.—Definite corroboration of the ideas here expressed is to be found in the Book of Daniel, chap. xii. 4, 9, 10, 13. The fundamental presupposition is, that the "*when*" of the fulfilment was unknown to the prophets; according to ver. 12, all that was revealed to them was, that it would take place only in the times to come. De Wette asserts too much when he says, that searching as to the time cannot be predicated of the genuine prophets of ancient Judaism, but of Daniel only, who pondered over the seventy years of Jeremiah. But although the words of Daniel may have given occasion for the apostle's statement, still that statement is not incapable of justification. If the apostles searched as to the time when the promises of Christ would receive accomplishment, why should it not be presupposed that similarly the prophets, too, inquired into that which the *πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ* testified beforehand to them, more especially as to the *καιρός* of its fulfilment?

Ver. 12. *οἷς ἀπεκαλύφθη*] is linked on by way of explanation to *ἐρευνῶντες*: "*to whom it was revealed*," *i.e.* "in that it was revealed to them." This is to be taken neither as an antithesis to the searching, nor as the result of it, but as an element accompanying—and stimulating—it; see Wiesinger and Schott *in loc.* — *ὅτι οὐχ ἑαυτοῖς ὑμῖν (ἡμῖν) δὲ διηκόνουν αὐτά*] *ὅτι* is not causal here (Luther: "for;" so also Luthardt and Hofmann). Opposed to this is the circumstance that if *ὅτι κ.τ.λ.* be taken as a parenthesis, and the *ἃ νῦν ἀνηγγέλη κ.τ.λ.* following be joined with *ἀπεκαλύφθη* (Hofmann), this sentence is strangely broken up; if, on the other hand, *ἃ νῦν κ.τ.λ.* be united with what immediately precedes (Luther), *ἀπεκαλύφθη* is plainly much too bald. Nor can it be denied that *ὅτι* naturally connects itself with *ἀπεκαλύφθη*, and *ἃ νῦν* is joined with *διηκόνουν αὐτά*. *ὅτι* states, then, not the reason, but the contents of what was revealed to the prophets.[1] — *διακονεῖν*, both

[1] Luthardt interprets: "for there the object was a future one, from which the veil had to be removed by *single* acts of God; here, it is a present one, which accordingly the messengers simply proclaim, in the power of the now ever present Spirit of God,"—how much is imported here! Steinmeyer admits that *ὅτι*

in the N. T. and in the classics, is frequently a transitive verb joined with the accusative, and that in such a way that the accusative denotes either the result of the διακονεῖν, or the thing to which the service is directed (iv. 10). Here, where αὐτά is the accusative dependent on διηκόνουν, the latter is the case; for that which is announced to the Christians is not the result of the prophets' ministrations, but that to which they were directed. That "they did their part in bringing to pass by their ministration the salvation which is now preached" (Wiesinger, and Schott also), is a thought in no way hinted at here, and in which: "*did their part*" is a purely arbitrary addition. The ministration of the prophets consisted not in the bringing to pass of the salvation, but in the proclaiming of that which was revealed to them (Brückner); and this is what is conveyed by αὐτά.—They exercised this ministration, οὐχ, etc., "*not for their, rather for your (our) benefit*," *i.e.* in such a way that its application was to you (us), not to themselves.—On δέ after the negation, as distinguished from ἀλλά, cf. Winer, p. 411 [E. T. 621].[1] The difference in the reading ὑμῖν or ἡμῖν does not essentially affect the meaning, since by ὑμῖν, though the readers of the epistle are indeed addressed in the first instance, all the rest of the Christians are naturally thought of as included. Still, the idea expressed in the ὑμῖν or ἡμῖν δέ is not without difficulty. Taken strictly, the οὐχ ἑαυτοῖς alone was known to the prophets—and along with this likewise, that it was for *others*, *i.e.* for those who lived at the time of its fulfilment. But as these others are the Christians, the apostle directly opposes ὑμῖν δέ to οὐχ ἑαυτοῖς—that is, inserts the

is not to be taken αἰτιολογικῶς, but denies at the same time that it states the argumentum τῆς ἀποκαλύψεως; he assumes an inversion, which is to be resolved thus: οἷς ἀπεκαλύφθη (sc. ταῦτα, namely τὰ παθ. κ. δόξαι Χρ.) οὐχ ἑαυτοῖς, ἀλλ' ὅτι ὑμῖν διηκόνουν αὐτά, and then interprets: h. e. quibus manifestata sunt, non in ipsorum commodum, sed quia nobis ea ministrare jussi erant. But is ὅτι then not still αἰτιολογικῶς? And on what ground should an inversion so very harsh be adopted?

[1] Schott's singular assertion, that "οὐ . . . δέ does not cancel ἑαυτοῖς simply, and put ὑμῖν in its place, but that δέ adds only something new to the preceding *which remains standing*" (in spite of the οὐ!), is based on a misconception of what is said by Hartung, *Partikellehre*, I. 171, to which Schott appeals. "Others than those addressed are not excluded; the latter only are indicated as those for whom the prophecy was intended;" thus Hofmann, too, incorrectly.

definite for the indefinite.—Wiesinger, Schott, Brückner join *αὐτά* closely with the *ἅ* which follows: "the same as that which now is proclaimed to you;" this is, however, incorrect. *αὐτά* is nowhere in the N. T. construed thus with a relative to which it is antecedent; it applies rather to what has been formerly mentioned; here, therefore, doubtless to that of which the *πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ* testified beforehand to the prophets, and what they prophesied of the *χάρις*, of which the readers had been made partakers. It is less fitting to limit the reference to the *τὰ εἰς Χριστὸν παθήματα, ἃ κ.τ.λ.* being joined to it in a somewhat loose way.—It is entirely arbitrary for Hofmann to assert that "Peter does not speak of any prophecies in general, but of the written records in which were contained the prediction of the prophets, who had foretold the extension of grace to the Gentile world;" there is nothing here to lead to the supposition that the apostle makes any reference to written records,—and predictions with regard to the heathen. — By means of the following *ἃ νῦν ἀνηγγέλη κ.τ.λ.*, the apostle insists that what the prophets foretold is that which is now proclaimed to the readers. — *νῦν* emphasizes the present, in which the facts of salvation are proclaimed as having already taken place, as contradistinguished from the time when they were predicted as future. — *διὰ τῶν εὐαγγελισαμένων ὑμᾶς (ἐν) πνεύματι ἁγίῳ*] For the construction of the verb *εὐαγγελίζεσθαι*, c. acc., cf. Gal. i. 9; Winer, p. 209 [E. T. 279].—If the reading: *ἐν πν.* be adopted, the Holy Spirit is conceived of as the power, as it were, encompassing and swaying them; if the other reading, as the moving and impelling cause. Like prophecy (ver. 11), the preaching of the gospel proceeds from the illumination and impulse of the Holy Spirit. — *ἀποσταλέντι ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ*] refers to the events of Pentecost; since then the Holy Spirit has His abode and is at work in the church.[1] Though the same Spirit was already in the prophets, ver. 11,

[1] Weiss's assertion (*Die Petrin. Frage*, above mentioned, p. 642) that, "if there be here an allusion to the outpouring of the Spirit on the day of Pentecost, Paul could not have belonged to those who had preached the gospel to the readers," is without foundation, as it is not said here that the *εὐαγγελισάμενοι ὑμᾶς* belonged to those who received the Holy Spirit at Pentecost, but only that they preached in that Spirit, which was sent from heaven at Pentecost; and this applies to Paul no less than to the other apostles. etc.

He had not yet at that time been sent from heaven. Who the individuals were who had preached the gospel to the readers, Peter does not say. No doubt the form of the apostle's expression does not compel us to think of him as excluded from the *τῶν εὐαγγελ.*; yet it is very probable that Peter, had he intended to include himself, would somehow have given this to be understood. — *εἰς ἃ ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἄγγελοι παρακύψαι*] The relative *ἅ* clearly goes back to *ἃ νῦν ἀνηγγέλη*. It is arbitrary to understand (with Schott) by that which the angels desired to see, "the nature and origin of the moral transformation wrought by the proclamation of the gospel;" or, with Hofmann, to give it this reference, "that Christ has died, and been glorified in such a way that now He can and should be preached to the heathen as having died, and been glorified for them;" it includes not only the *παθήματα* and *δόξαι* of Christ (Wiesinger), but the whole contents of the message of salvation (Brückner), which, as it is a testimony to the facts of redemption, is also a preaching of the *σωτηρία* founded on them, which is *ἑτοίμη ἀποκαλυφθῆναι ἐν καιρῷ ἐσχάτῳ* (ver. 5), and which the believers will obtain (ver. 9).[1] — *ἐπιθυμοῦσι* must not be taken as an aorist (Irenaeus, *c. Haer.* iv. 67; Oecumenius: *ὧν τὴν γνῶσιν καὶ ἔκβασιν καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ ἄγγελοι ἐπεθύμησαν*), for the question is not as to what the angels did at the time of the prophets, but as to what they are *now* doing. That after which they long is the *παρακύψαι εἰς αὐτά*. On the inf. aor. after *ἐπιθυμοῦσιν*, see Winer, p. 310 f. [E. T. 416]. — *παρακύπτειν*, properly, "to bend to the side so as to examine a thing," means when joined with *εἰς* not only: "to look towards," but: "to look into anything," and that in order to obtain a more accurate knowledge of the object in question.[2] The *παρά* of the verb indicates that the angels stand outside the work of redemption, inasmuch as

[1] The Vulg. translates *εἰς ἅ* by in quem (*i.e.* in Spiritum sanctum).

[2] Although Hofmann may not be wrong in asserting that *παρακύπτειν* is used also to denote a cursory glance at anything (cf. Dem. iv. 24, in Pape, *s.v.*), yet in connection with *εἰς* it is chiefly employed in cases where a more accurate knowledge is implied; precisely as Pape also interprets *παρακύπτειν*, "to stand beside a thing, and to bend down so as to see it more distinctly;" cf. further, Ecclus. xxi. 23 (xiv. 23), and in the N. T. besides Jas. i. 25, also John xx. 11 (Luke xxiv. 12; John xx. 5).

it is not for them, but for man (cf. Heb. ii. 16). The addition of this clause brings prominently forward the idea, not that the work of salvation is a mystery,—concealed even from the angels,—but that that which has been proclaimed to the readers is something so glorious that even the angels had a wish and a longing to see what was its fashion, and what the course of its development (cf. Eph. iii. 10). Nor is it implied in *ἐπιθυμοῦσι* that "the angels cannot attain to a knowledge of the economy of salvation" (Schott). It is more than doubtful whether there be here any reference to Ex. xxv. 20, as several interpreters assume. Beza: alludit Ap. ad duos illos Cherubim opercula Arcae insistentes, conversis in ipsam arcam oculis. Piscator: videtur respicere ad Cherubim super arcam foederis, tanquam ad typum.

Ver. 13. The first group of exhortations extends from this verse to the end of the chapter. — Ver. 13. First exhortation, which forms the basis of those which follow. The *τελείως ἐλπίζειν* is the foundation upon which the whole moral-religious life of the Christian must be raised. — *διὸ ἀναζωσάμενοι τὰς ὀσφύας τῆς διανοίας ὑμῶν*] *διό* does not refer back to any *single* thought in what precedes, certainly not to the glory of the *σωτηρία* touched upon in vv. 10 ff. (Calvin: ex magnitudine et excellentia gratiae deducit exhortationem), still less to the thought expressed vv. 5–9: "that the Christian goes through trial towards a glorious destiny" (de Wette), but to the whole of the foregoing lines of thought (Schott), which, however, have their point of convergence in this, that unto the Christian begotten again *εἰς ἐλπίδα ζῶσαν*, the *σωτηρία* is appointed as the *τέλος τῆς πίστεως* (similarly Brückner). — *ἀναζωσάμενοι τὰς ὀσφύας*] a figurative expression taken from the runners (and others) who tucked *up* their dress, so as to prosecute their work with less hindrance. *ἀναζώννυμι, ἅπ. λεγ.* (Prov. xxxi. 17; LXX., ed. *ran Ess* xxix. 17), means to tuck *up*; Luther incorrectly: "therefore *so gird* yourselves" (thus Wiesinger also translates, although he justly says: "The figure taken from the tucking *up* of a long under garment denotes preparedness for something," etc.); cf. the passages, Luke xii. 35 and Eph. vi. 14 (in both passages, however, *περιζώννυμι*). The figure is the more appropriate, that the

Christian is a *παρεπίδημος*, on his way to the future *κληρονομία*. The figurative *τὰς ὀσφύας* finds its own explanation in the epexegetical genitive *τῆς διανοίας ὑμῶν*. Aretius interprets incorrectly: lumbi mentis i. e. ipsa recta ratio renati hominis recte judicans de negotio pietatis; *διάνοια* means here, as in Col. i. 21: the "disposition of mind." The meaning of the phrase applies not only to deliverance from evil desires (Gerhard: quarumvis passionum et cupiditatum carnalium refrenatio praescribitur), but to all and every needful preparation of spirit for the fulfilling of the exhortations following; "it is the figure of spiritual preparedness and activity" (de Wette). The aorist participle points to this spiritual preparedness as the preliminary condition of *ἐλπίζειν* (Schott). — *νήφοντες*] cf. chap. iv. 7, v. 8 (1 Thess. v. 6, 8; 2 Tim. iv. 5). Calvin correctly: non temperantiam solum in cibo et potu commendat, sed spiritualem potius sobrietatem, quum sensus omnes nostros continemus, ne se hujus mundi illecebris inebrient; similarly most interpreters. Otherwise, however, Weiss (p. 95 f.), who supposes an antithesis between *ἀναζωσάμενοι* and *νήφοντες*, inasmuch as the former is opposed "to want of courage and apathy," the latter to "unnatural overstraining and excitement," and "unhealthy exaltation." But no such antithetical relation is (as little as there is in chap. v. 8 and 1 Thess. v. 6, 8, between *γρηγορεῖν* and *νήφειν*) here anywhere hinted at, nor is there anything in the whole epistle to lead us to suppose that Peter considered it necessary "to warn his hearers against the extravagant enthusiasm of a Messianic glory." Rather in *νήφοντες* is prominence given to an important element in the *ἀναζώσασθαι*, without which a *τελείως ἐλπίζειν* cannot exist, namely, the clearness and soberness of mind with which the goal of hope and the way leading thither is kept in view. — *τελείως ἐλπίσατε ἐπὶ τὴν φερομένην κ.τ.λ.*] *τελείως*, *ἅπ. λεγ.*, belongs not to *νήφοντες* (Oecumenius, Benson, Semler, Mayerhoff, Hofmann), but to *ἐλπίσατε*;[1] it

[1] The reasons which Hofmann brings forward for the combination of *τελείως* with *νήφοντες* are not by any means conclusive; for as the chief accent lies on *ἐλπίσατε*, a strengthening of this expression by *τελείως* is entirely appropriate, whilst *νήφοντες* requires no such support. The position of the word, too, is in favour of the connection with *ἐλπίσατε*.

shows emphatically that the hope should be perfect, undivided, unchangeable ("without doubt or faint-heartedness, with full surrender of soul," de Wette; Wiesinger adds further: "excluding all ungodly substance and worldly desire, and including the *μὴ συσχηματ.*, ver. 14;" and Schott: "with reference also to the moral conduct of earnest sanctification"). Weiss (p. 93) finds the *τελειότης* of hope in this, that it does not allow itself to be overcome by suffering—but of suffering there is here no mention. Erasmus, Grotius, Bengel take it unsatisfactorily, only ratione temporis, *i.e.* "ad finem usque." — *ἐλπίζειν*, frequently with *εἰς*, *ἐν*, *ἐπί* c. dat., is construed with *ἐπί* cum. accus. only here and in 1 Tim. v. 5; it means "*to place his hope on something.*" The object connected with it by means of *ἐπί* is not the proper object of hope; the latter stands in the accusative, or is expressed by a verb, either in the infin. or with *ὅτι*; but it is that from which the fulfilment of hope is expected.[1] If, as here, *ἐπί* be construed with the accusative, the disposition of mind with respect to the object is expressed; whilst if it be taken with the dative, the object is presented to us as the basis of hope, that on which it is founded. — *ἐπὶ τὴν φερομένην ὑμῖν χάριν ἐν ἀποκαλύψει Ἰησ. Χριστοῦ*] Several commentators interpret so that the sense runs: "place your hope on the grace which has been shown you by the revelation of Jesus Christ;" thus Erasmus, Luther, Calov, Bengel, Gerhard, Steiger, etc.; according to this, *φερομένην* is the *ἀντίστροφον* of *κομίζεσθαι* (*i.e.* "which has been already offered or communicated to you"), *χάρις*, "the forgiveness of sins effected by Christ," and *ἀποκάλυψις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*, "the revelation of Christ which has already taken place." In the more exact definition of the term *ἀποκάλυψις*,

[1] The expression "to hope for something," confidently to expect it, may lead to the supposition that this meaning is expressed by *ἐλπίζειν ἐπί τι*. In the N. T. this is usually rendered by *ἀπεκδέχεσθαι*. Even in the construction with *εἰς* the thing accompanying it is not the object of hope, cf. John v. 45; 2 Cor. i. 10; only in Ecclus. ii. 9 is the object of *ἐλπίζειν* construed with *εἰς* (*ἐλπίσατε εἰς ἀγαθὰ καὶ εἰς εὐφροσύνην*). Hofmann wrongly attaches importance to whether *εἰς* is followed by a person or a thing, asserting that in the latter case the thing is the object; for it is quite as possible to set one's hope on a thing as on a person. Cremer rightly quotes this passage as one of those in which *ἐλπίζειν* has the meaning of "setting one's hope on something."

these interpreters again diverge from one another; whilst Luther, Calov, Steiger, and others hold it to be "the revelation which has taken place in the gospel;" Bengel, etc., on the other hand, understand it of "the incarnation of Christ." Erasmus gives both: sentit de mysterio evangelii divulgato per quod Christus innotuit, seu de adventu Christi. Steiger, in support of the first view, appeals to Luke ii. 32; Rom. xvi. 25; Gal. i. 16; Eph. i. 17; 2 Cor. xii. 1; Eph. iii. 3; but all these passages do not furnish the proof desired. In no passage is the revelation of the gospel called the ἀποκάλυψις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. But the other view is opposed by the N. T. usus loquendi, according to which ἀποκ. always denotes the future coming of Christ only. It must also be held to be unwarrantable to interpret ἐν ἀποκ. Ἰησ. Χρ. here in a different sense from that given shortly before in ver. 7 (and chap. iv. 13). — Not less opposed to the former interpretation is the present participle φερομένην, since the present may not *arbitrarily* be taken in the sense of the preterite, but must be looked upon as a realization of the future. Steiger is no doubt right in holding that ἡ φερ. ὑμ. χάρις "does not speak of the object of hoping, but the ground on which hope is built." But from this it does not follow that by the phrase "something already accomplished" must be understood, for why should the Christian not be able to set his hopes of salvation on the grace which in the future will be offered to him at and with the return of Christ? Piscator incorrectly explains χάρις: coelestis felicitas et gloria, quam Deus nobis ex gratia daturus est. Aretius, again, is right: benevolentia Dei, qua nos amplectitur in filio: the grace of God from which the Christian has to expect the coelestis felicitas. — With φερομένην, cf. Heb. ix. 16. φέρειν: "*to bring, to present*" (not "*to bring nearer*," Schott), points here to the free grace of God. That is, then: "*place your hope on the grace which will be brought to you at (in and with) the revelation (the second coming) of Christ.*" It is rightly interpreted by Oecumenius, Calvin (who errs in this only, that he takes ἐν for εἰς, *i.e.* usque ad adventum Christi), Beza, Grotius, Estius, Semler, Pott, de Wette, etc.

REMARK.—The more recent interpreters take up different

positions with respect to the view here presented. Wiesinger, Brückner, Schott, Frommüller, Hofmann, *agree with* the interpretation of ἀποκάλυψις, but *are opposed* to that of ἐλπίζειν ἐπί. Weiss and Zöckler (*De vi ac notione voc. ἐλπίς in N. T.* 1856, p. 15 ff.), on the other hand, are against the latter, but in favour of the former. — As regards ἐλπίζ. Zöckler: Ea est vis praepositionis ἐπί c. acc. constructae, ut finem designet s. localem s. temporalem s. causalem, in quem tendat actus verbi. Qui tamen finis s. terminus sperandi ita discernendus est a simplici *objecto* sperandi, ut hoc significet rem, quam sibi obtingere speret subjectum, finis vero ille simul auctor sit, e quo pendeat vel satisfacere votis sperantis, vel deesse;[1] in support of which he justly quotes, in addition to this verse, 1 Tim. v. 5 (to which Wiesinger appeals without any justification), and a not inconsiderable number of passages from the LXX.; cf. Weiss also (p. 36 f.). De Wette interprets ἐλπίζειν correctly, but thinks that inasmuch as the σωτηρία is conceived as a χάρις, it is at once the ground and the object of the hope. With this Brückner agrees, finding "in this intermingling a part of the peculiarity of the thought;" whilst, on the other hand, Weiss sees in it only a makeshift, conveying no clear idea at all. — With regard to the term ἀποκάλυψις, Weiss explains it as: manifestatio Christi, quae fit in verbo evangelii in hac vita (Gerhard). But this interpretation is decidedly opposed to the N. T. usage; in no passage is the revelation, of which by the gospel we become partakers, described as an ἀποκάλυψις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, although ἀποκαλύπτειν is used of the different kinds of revealing. The reference to the gospel is an evident importation. Weiss raises two objections to the correct view—(1) "It is, as a matter of fact, impossible that the Christian should set his hope on the grace that is to be brought at the revelation of Christ;"—but why should this be impossible? How often does it happen that the individual bases his hope for the fulfilment of his wish on an event as yet future, but which he is assured will happen! (2) "That the second coming of Christ is not a revelation of grace at all, but of just judgment;"—but the latter in no way excludes the former; and how could the Christian contemplate the second coming of Christ with calm, yes, even with joy, if there were no grace?

Ver. 14. Second exhortation (extending to ver. 21). — ὡς τέκνα ὑπακοῆς] does not belong to what precedes (Hofmann), but serves to introduce the new exhortation.[2] — ὡς does not

[1] This interpretation is correct. The only point under dispute is "simul."

[2] Hofmann connects not only these words, but the subsequent participial clause also: μὴ συσχηματιζόμενοι κ.τ.λ., with what precedes. This, however, is

here introduce a comparison (as ii. 2, 5, iii. 7), but marks the essential quality of the subject. Lorinus correctly remarks on ii. 14: constat hujusmodi particulas saepe nihil minuere, sed rei veritatem magis exprimere; it corresponds to our "as," *i.e.* as becomes you who should be *τέκνα ὑπακοῆς*. — *ὑπακοή* is used here as absolutely as in ver. 2, and has the same signification as there. The spirit which pervades the life of believers is the spirit of obedience, and therefore they should be *τέκνα ὑπακοῆς*. According to the analogy of similar compounds in the N. T., as *τέκνα φωτός*, Eph. v. 8; its opposite: *τέκνα κατάρας*, 2 Pet. ii. 14; *τέκνα τῆς ὀργῆς*, Eph. ii. 3; particularly *υἱοὶ τῆς ἀπειθείας*, Eph. ii. 2,—the expression *τέκνα ὑπακοῆς* may be explained so as that *τέκνα* shall denote only the relation in which the persons in question stand to the idea of the accompanying genitive; cf. Winer, p. 223 f. [E. T. 298]; Buttmann, p. 141; Meyer on Eph. ii. 2 (thus Grotius, Jachmann, etc.; Fronmüller too). De Wette, Brückner, Schott, Weiss too most probably, p. 172, take *τέκνα* as the "children *of God*," and *ὑπακοῆς* as the genitive of character (as Luke xvi. 8: *ὁ οἰκόνομος τῆς ἀδικίας*; xviii. 6: *ὁ κρίτης τῆς ἀδικίας*). But as it is in ver. 17 that mention is first made of the sonship relation of the Christian, it remains at least doubtful whether the apostle had in this expression that relation in view; at any rate the emphasis here lies not on *τέκνα*, but on *ὑπακοῆς*. — *μὴ συσχηματιζόμενοι*] *μή* occurs here on account of the imperative cast of the whole sentence. Neither *γενήθητε* (Bengel) nor any other similar word is to be supplied to the part., inasmuch as it does not correspond to the *ἅγιοι γενήθητε* but to the *κατὰ τὸν καλέσαντα ὑμᾶς ἅγιον* (Wiesinger); there is here no "departure from the construction" (de Wette). The word *συσχηματίζεσθαι*, occurring in the N. T. only here and in Rom. xii. 2, and nowhere but in later Greek, means: "*to form his σχῆμα like that of another;*"[1] it has reference not

opposed, on the one hand, by the correspondence which exists between *τέκνα ὑπακοῆς* and the subsequent exhortations; and, on the other hand, by *ἀλλά*, ver. 15, which is in antithesis to *μὴ συσχηματιζόμενοι*, and therefore not to be separated from it, as though it commenced a new paragraph.

[1] When, in objection to this, Hofmann urges that *συσχηματίζεσθαι* should here be interpreted not according to Rom. xii. 2, but on the principle of the expression: *συσχ. τοῖς λεγομένοις*; "so to conduct oneself as to give adequate

to the outward conduct merely, but to the whole outward and inward conformation of life, as the connection with the following words shows: *ταῖς πρότερον ἐν τῇ ἀγνοίᾳ ὑμῶν ἐπιθυμίαις.* The *ἐπιθυμίαι, i.e.* the *sinful* desires (not "the satisfied lusts, or a life of pleasure," as de Wette understands), which formerly held sway in them, are the *σχῆμα*, according to which they are not to fashion themselves in their new life.[1] Luther's translation is inexact: "take not up your former position, when ye in your ignorance lived according to your lusts." The *ἐπιθυμίαι* are more precisely characterized as formerly belonging to them *ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ*; *ἐν* specifies not merely the *time* (Calvin: tempus ignorantiae vocat, antequam in fidem Christi vocati essent), but likewise the *origin* (Wiesinger). *ἄγνοια* is used here as in Acts xvii. 30, Eph. iv. 18, ignorance in divine things, and is to be understood, if not exactly of idolatry, at least of heathenism, which is far from the knowledge of the living God and of His will. Paul, in Rom. i. 18 ff., shows how the obscuring of the consciousness of God is the source of moral corruption.

REMARK.—In answer to Weiss, who can see in this passage no proof that the readers were Gentile-Christians, Wiesinger justly remarks, Schott and Brückner agreeing with him: "the *ἄγνοια* of which the Jews (Acts iii. 17; Rom. x. 3) are accused, or which Paul attributes to himself, 1 Tim. i. 13 (the same applies to Luke xxiii. 34; John viii. 19), is of quite a different kind; not an *ἄγνοια* of the moral demands of the law, but the misapprehension of the purpose of salvation manifesting itself also through the law." If Weiss, on the other hand, insists (*Die Petr. Frage*, p. 624) that the invectives of Christ most plainly teach how, in the Jewish conception of the law, at that time its deeper moral demands were misapprehended; it must, as opposed to him, be observed that Christ's attack was specially directed against the Pharisaic conception of it, and can in no

expression to the words used,"—he does not consider that in this verse the verb has the same force as in Rom. xii. 2, for it means: "to conform your *σχῆμα* to that which your words express."

[1] Schott terms this interpretation "inexact;" for "it is not the lusts themselves, but the mode of life which is essentially characterized by these lusts, according to which they are not to fashion themselves;" but does then *ἐπιθυμίαι* mean "the mode of life"? Besides, Schott himself says that the thought is not altogether correctly expressed.

way be applied to the people of Israel as such. Paul, in describing them, expressly allows to the Jews, Rom. ii. 17 ff., the *γινώσκειν τὸ θέλημα*; and an *ἄγνοια*, in the absolute sense here implied, is nowhere cast up to them. — The O. T. distinction between "sins of weakness (בִּשְׁגָגָה, LXX.: *κατ' ἄγνοιαν, ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ*) and insolent sins of disobedience" (בְּיָד רָמָה) (Weiss, p. 175) does not apply here.

Vv. 15, 16. *ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν καλέσαντα ὑμᾶς ἅγιον*] Steiger: "this positive instruction, instead of forming a participial clause of its own, like the preceding (negative), is in animated discourse at once merged into the principal clause;" there is, accordingly, nothing to be supplied; still Oecumenius explains, in sense, correctly: *ἀλλὰ νῦν γοῦν, λέγει, τῷ καλέσαντι συσχηματιζόμενοι, ἁγίῳ ὄντι κ.τ.λ.* — *ἅγιον*] is here a substantive, to which the participle *καλ.* is added as nearer definition (cf. 2 Pet. ii. 1), and that by way of strengthening the exhortation ("as ye are bound to do, since He hath called you"). The behaviour of those called must correspond with the nature of Him who has called them. Schott rightly remarks that the *καλεῖν* must here be taken as "an effectual calling," by which the readers are delivered from their state of estrangement from God, and introduced into one of fellowship with Him. — *καὶ αὐτοὶ ἅγιοι ἐν πάσῃ ἀναστροφῇ γενήθητε*] *καὶ αὐτοί* forms the antithesis to *τὸν ἅγιον*; Schott incorrectly: "as against what God has, on His part, by His calling, done to you and made you." — *ἐν πάσῃ ἀναστροφῇ*] not: in (your) *whole* (de Wette), but in (your) *every* walk.[1] — *γενήθητε*] denotes not the *becoming*, but the *being;* Luther correctly: like Him . . . *be* ye also holy.[2] — Ver. 16. *διότι γέγραπται*] *διότι, i.e. διὰ τοῦτο ὅτι*, "*for this*

[1] For it must be observed that in the case of a collective expression, *πᾶς* is accompanied by the article when the totality is conceived of as forming *one* whole; the article is wanting when it is considered as composed of many; *e.g.* *πᾶς ὁ λαός* means: "the whole people," but *πᾶς λαός*: "all people," when not: "every people," in which case the collective expression is the special idea.

[2] Wiesinger asks why? The reasons are—(1) because both in the LXX. and Apocrypha of the O. T., as also in the N. T., instead of the imper. of *εἶναι*, which is but rarely used, there is very generally the imper. aorist of *γίγνομαι*, in the LXX. translation of הָיָה, הֱיֵה (cf. specially Ps. lxix. 26); (2) because the exhortation "*be* holy" is more suited to the condition of Christians than "become holy."

reason because," indicates the reason for the preceding exhortation, and not simply for the use of the word ἅγιον (de Wette). The apostle goes back to the command given to Israel, as to the reason why the Christians, called as they were by the God of holiness, should be holy in their every walk. The holiness of God laid Israel under the obligation to be holy, since God had chosen them to be His people—the same is the case, as Peter suggests by καλέσαντα ὑμᾶς, with the N. T. church of believers, the true Israel, on whom, though doubtless in a form adapted to them, for this reason the commandments of the O. C. are still binding. Schott justly observes that the passage quoted by Peter is not meant to establish the duty of holiness in itself, but to show that the fact of belonging to God involves as a matter of duty the necessity of an holy walk. The expression, which the apostle quotes, occurs more than once in the book of Leviticus, xi. 44, xix. 2, xx. 7, 26.

Ver. 17. From here to the end of the verse the preceding exhortation is continued; the connection is shown by the copula καί. — καὶ εἰ πατέρα ἐπικαλεῖσθε] corresponding to the ὡς τέκνα ὑπακοῆς, ver. 14. εἰ is here: "particula non conditionalis, sed assertiva, non dubitantis, sed rem notam praesupponentis" (Calvin). The form of the sentence is, however, hypothetical; the sense is: "if you act thus and thus, as ye are indeed now doing." By this form the language is made more impressive than it would have been by a simple causative particle. — ἐπικαλεῖσθαι] *as medium*, means to "*call upon*" (for the meaning "*to name*," as Wiesinger, de Wette, Brückner take it, is supported in the classics only by a doubtful passage in Dio Cass. lxxvii. 7). πατέρα is the accusative of more precise definition (thus Hofmann also); Luther: "since ye call on Him *the* (*i.e.* as, ὡς) Father." The sense is: "if ye look on Him as *Father* who, etc., and ye acknowledge yourselves as His children." [1] It is to be noticed that the ἐπικαλεῖσθε corresponds to the καλέσαντα, v. 15; God has *called* believers,—and they answer with the call to Him, in which they name Him *Father*. This *mutual* relationship lays

[1] It is possible, and as Gerhard and Weiss (p. 172) think probable, that Peter here alludes to the Lord's Prayer.

the Christians under obligations to be *holy* as He is holy.[1] — *τὸν ἀπροσωπολήπτως κρίνοντα τὸ ἑκάστου ἔργον*] a circumlocution for God full of significance, instead of the simple *τὸν Θεόν*, corresponding to the *ἅγιον*, ver. 15. — *ἀπροσωπολήπτως*, a *ἅπ. λεγ.*, formed on the noun *προσωπολήπτης* (Acts x. 34), which is composed of *πρόσωπον* and *λαμβάνειν*; see Meyer on Gal. ii. 6. — The present *κρίνοντα* indicates that impartial judgment is a characteristic function of God. The apostle mentions *τὸ ἔργον* as that according to which the judgment of God is determined; in this connection the plural is generally found (Rom. ii. 6); by the singular the whole conduct of man (outwardly and inwardly) is conceived as a work of his life. — *ἑκάστου*] not without emphasis. It implies that the Christian also—a son of God though he be—will, like all others, be judged according to his work; it is arbitrary to limit the application of the general term *ἑκάστου* to Christians only (Schott); there is no thought here of the distinction between Jew and Gentile (Bengel). — The term *judge*, as applied to God, stands in a peculiar contrast to *πατέρα*. The Christian, while conscious of the love of God shed abroad in his heart (Rom. v. 5), must still never forget that God *judges* the evil, that His love is an *holy* love, and that *sonship* involves obligation of obedience towards a *just* God. — *ἐν φόβῳ τὸν . . . ἀναστράφητε*] corresponding to the *ἅγιοι ἐν πάσῃ ἀναστροφῇ γενήθητε*, ver. 15; the feeling which harmonizes with the thought of the impartial judge is the *φόβος*; thus Peter places *φόβος* first by way of emphasis. *φόβος* is here, indeed, not the *slavish* fear which cannot co-exist with love (see 1 John iv. 18), no more is it the *reverence* which an inferior feels for a superior (Grotius, Bolten, etc.); but it is the *holy awe* of a judge who condemns the evil; the opposite of thoughtless security. Calvin: timor securitati opponitur; cf. chap. ii. 17; 2 Cor. vii. 1; Phil. ii. 12.[2] — *τὸν τῆς παροικίας*

[1] Schott rightly remarks that *ἐπικαλεῖσθαι* is based on the same common relationship as in the preceding verses; but here it is not considered as established by God, but as realized in practice by the readers, *i.e.* as subjectively known and acknowledged by them.

[2] Weiss (p. 170) thinks that the passage, Rom. viii. 15, proves Paul's fundamental views of Christian life to have been different from those of Peter; this opinion, however, is sufficiently contradicted by Weiss himself, who admits that

ὑμῶν χρόνον] specifies the duration of the walk *ἐν φόβῳ*; *παροικία*: "*the sojourn in a foreign country;*" in its strict sense, Acts xiii. 17 (Ezra viii. 34, LXX.); here applied to the earthly life of the Christian, inasmuch as their *κληρονομία* is in heaven, ver. 1. This expression serves to give point to the exhortation expressed, hinting as it does at the possibility of coming short of the home; cf. chap. ii. 11.

Ver. 18. The apostle strengthens his exhortation by reminding his readers of the redemption wrought out for them by the death of Christ. It is an assumption too far-fetched to suppose that this verse serves to show "the causal connection between the protasis and the apodosis of ver. 17" (Schott). — *εἰδότες*] not: "since ye know," but: "considering," "reflecting;" Gerhard: expendentes; cf. 2 Tim. ii. 23 and my commentary on the passage. — *ὅτι οὐ*] The negation is placed foremost in order the more to give prominence to the position. — *φθαρτοῖς, ἀργυρίῳ ἢ χρυσίῳ*] *φθαρτοῖς* is not an adjective here (Luther: "with perishable silver and gold"), but a *substantive: "with perishable things;"* see Winer, p. 491 [E. T. 662]. — Benson thinks that by *ἀργυρίῳ ἢ χρυσίῳ* the apostle alludes to the custom of paying money as a sign of reconciliation, according to Ex. xxx. 12–16; Num. iii. 44–51, xviii. 16; this is possible, but not probable. — *ἐλυτρώθητε*] is here used in its strict signification of, to ransom, or redeem by a *λύτρον* (cf. Matt. xx. 28), as in Tit. ii. 14, whilst in Luke xxiv. 21 this definite application is lost sight of; with the thought, cf. 1 Cor. vi. 20. The ransom is stated in the following verse. — *ἐκ τῆς ματαίας ὑμῶν ἀναστροφῆς*] cf. ver. 14. *μάταιος*, "*empty, without real contents,*" does not occur in an ethical sense in the classics; LXX. Isa. xxxii. 6 translation of נָבָל is not to be limited specially to the idolatry of the heathen (Carpzov, Benson, etc.), still less to the ceremonial

in 2 Cor. vii. 1, "Paul mentions the fear of God as a *peculiar mark* of the Christian's life, and that he often speaks of a fear of Christ." — Schott insists, in the first place, that *φόβος* be understood absolutely (without special reference to God as the judge) as the consciousness of liability to err, but afterwards more precisely defines the expression as that fear which is anxious that nothing should happen which might cause *God*, as the *righteous judge*, to refuse the inheritance to him who hopes to attain it.

service of the Jews (Grotius).[1] — *πατροπαραδότου*] belongs to the whole idea preceding: *ματαίας ὑμῶν ἀναστροφῆς* (see Winer, p. 489 [E. T. 659]). Aretius explains it by innata nobis natura; but this is not appropriate to *ἀναστροφῆς*; correctly Erasmus: quam ex Patrum traditione acceperatis; Steiger: "by upbringing, instruction, and example" (thus also de Wette-Brückner, Wiesinger, Weiss, Schott). This attribute emphatically shows that the *ματαία ἀναστροφή* is peculiar, not to the individual only, but to the whole race, and has been from the earliest times, and consequently is so completely master of the individual that he cannot free himself from it. — There is here no "special reference to Judaeo-Christian readers" (Weiss, p. 181).

Ver. 19. *ἀλλὰ τιμίῳ αἵματι*] *τιμίῳ* forms the antithesis to *φθαρτοῖς*, in so far as the perishable is destitute of true worth. — *αἵματι*] refers not only to the death, but to the bloody death of Christ; cf. Heb. ix. 22. — *ὡς . . . ἀμνοῦ ἀμώμου καὶ ἀσπίλου Χριστοῦ*] *ὡς . . . ἀσπίλου* is in antecedent apposition to *Χριστοῦ* (Wiesinger, de Wette-Brückner), as in chap. ii. 7, where likewise *ὡς ἀσθενεστέρῳ σκεύει* is in similar apposition to *τῷ γυναικείῳ* (*sc.* *σκεύει*). It is incorrect to supply, with Steiger, Schott, and others, "*αἵματι*" before *ἀμνοῦ*, taking *Χριστοῦ* either as an explanatory adjunct (Steiger), or connecting it directly with *αἵματι* (Schott, Hofmann). — *ὡς*] is also here not merely comparative, as, among others, Schott and Hofmann hold, maintaining that "by *ἀμνοῦ* only an actual lamb is meant," but it emphasizes that Christ is a blameless and spotless lamb (Gerhard, de Wette-Brückner).[2] — *ἀμνός* is, as Brückner also assumes, to be understood of a *sacrificial lamb*. This is clear both from the connection—since the ransom by

[1] Although *ματαία ἀναστροφὴ πατροπαράδοτος* does not necessarily apply to the *heathen* (Schott), yet the expression more aptly characterizes their mode of life than the Jewish.

[2] If *ὡς* be taken as instituting a comparison, there then arises the singular thought, that the blood of Christ is as precious as that of a lamb without blemish. Hofmann, indeed, avoids this conclusion by supplying to *ὡς* not *τιμίῳ αἵματι*, but *αἵματι* only, and observes that the shedding of blood *alone* (not the shedding of precious blood) is compared to the slaying of a spotless lamb; but there is not the slightest justification for thus separating *τιμίῳ* from *αἵματι*. The apostle would in some way have indicated it by prefixing at least a simple *αἵματι* to *ἀμνοῦ*.

the *αἷμα* of Christ (Lev. xvii. 11) is here in question—and from the attributes *ἄμωμος* and *ἄσπιλος*, of which the former is used in the O. T. expressly to denote the faultlessness of animals taken for sacrifice (תְּמִים, LXX.: *ἄμωμος*),—to this class lambs also belonged. The precise designation: *a lamb*, was probably suggested to Peter by Isa. liii. 7 (cf. chap. ii. 22 ff.); from this it must not, however, be inferred, with Weiss (p. 227 ff.) and Schott, that there is nowhere here any reference to the idea of sacrifice. For although the passage in Isaiah compares the servant of God to a lamb simply on account of the patience he exhibited in the midst of his sufferings, still it is based so wholly on the idea of sacrifice, and the sufferings of Christ are so expressly presented as propitiatory, that it is easily explainable how, with this passage applied to Him, Christ could have been thought of precisely as a *sacrificial* lamb. Doubtless it is not Peter's intention to give special prominence to the fact that Christ is the *sacrificial* lamb designated by Isaiah's prophecy; for in that case the definite article would not have been wanting (cf. John i. 29, and Meyer *in loc.*); but alluding to the above passage, Peter styles Him generally a *lamb*,—which, however, he conceives as a *sacrificial* lamb. There is no direct allusion (Wiesinger) here to the paschal lamb (de Wette-Brückner, Schott); the want of the article forbids it. Hofmann, though he has justly recognised this, still firmly holds by the reference to the paschal lamb;—only in thus far, however, that he terms the slaying of it "the occurrence" which "was here present to the apostle's mind."[1] But the fact that the blood of this lamb did not serve to ransom Israel out of Egypt, but to preserve them from the destroying angel, is opposed to any such allusion. Further, it must not be left unnoticed that in the N. T. the paschal lamb is always styled *τὸ πάσχα*; and in the passage treating of it in Ex. xii. in the LXX., the expression *πρόβατον* only, and never *ἀμνός*, is employed. — The

[1] Hofmann says: "The meaning is not, that the same was done to Christ as to the paschal lamb, but the recollection of the paschal lamb explains only how Peter came to compare the shedding of Christ's blood with the shedding of the blood of a spotless lamb." — As to whether the paschal lamb should be considered as a sacrificial lamb (Keil on Gen. xii.) or not, is a matter of dispute, which cannot be decided here.

adjunct: *ὡς . . . ἀσπίλου*, serves to specify particularly the blood of Christ as *sacrificial*, and not merely to give a nearer definition of its preciousness (the *τίμιον*), inasmuch as, "according to Petrine conceptions, it is precisely the *innocence* (denoted here by the two attributes) and the *patience* (conveyed by *ἀμνός*) which give to the suffering its *τιμή*" (as opposed to Weiss, p. 281 f.). The *preciousness* of the blood lies in this, that it is the blood *of Christ*; its *redemptive power* in this, that He shed it *as a sacrificial lamb without blemish and fault*.[1] — With *ἄμωμος*, cf. in addition to Lev. xxii. 18 ff., especially Heb. ix. 14. — *ἄσπιλος*] is not to be found in the LXX. and in the N. T. only metaphorically; the two expressions here conjoined are a reproduction of the תְּמִים כָּל־מוּם לֹא יִהְיֶה־בּוֹ, Lev. xxii. 18 ff. (Wiesinger). All the commentators construe *Χριστοῦ* with what precedes, Hofmann only excepted, who separates it therefrom, and connects it with what follows, taking *Χριστοῦ προεγνωσμένου κ.τ.λ.* as an absolute genitive (*i.e.* "in that . . . Christ . . . was foreordained," etc.). But this construction does not specify by whose blood the redemption was accomplished, nor does it give a clear logical connection between the thought of the participial and that of the principal clause.

REMARK. — It must be observed that whilst the power of propitiation, *i.e.* of blotting out sin, is attributed to the blood of the sacrifice, Lev. xvi. 11, the blood of Christ is here specified as the means by which we are redeemed from the *ματαία ἀναστροφή*. From this it must not be concluded, with Weiss (p. 279), that the blood of Christ is not regarded here as the blood of offering, inasmuch "as the sacrifice can have an expiatory, but not a redemptory worth;"—for the two are in no way opposed to each other. The expiation is nothing different from the redemption, *i.e.* ransom from the guilt by the blood freely shed. *The* redemption, however, which is here spoken of, though doubtless not identical with expiation, is yet a necessary

[1] Schott, in opposition to this, asserts: "this blood can *redeem* because it is that of the divine Mediator (*Χριστός*), but *it is valuable* in that it is the blood of an innocent Saint." This is, however, erroneous, since this blood has power to redeem only, because Christ shed it as a sacrifice for propitiation. But it is not clear why this blood should not even have its full worth from the fact that it is the blood of the Mediator.

condition of it,—a circumstance which Pfleiderer also fails to observe, when he says that the passage has reference only "to the putting away of a life of sin, to moral improvement, not to expiation of the guilt of sin."

Ver. 20. *προεγνωσμένου μέν*] is indeed not simply and at once: praeordinatus (Beza), but the foreknowledge of God is, with respect to the salvation He was to bring about, essentially a providing, cf. ver. 2: *πρόγνωσις*. In regard to Christ it was provided (*προεγνωσμένου* refers not directly to *ἀμνοῦ*, but to *Χριστοῦ*) that He should appear (*φανερωθέντος δέ*) as a sacrificial lamb to redeem the world by His blood. The passage does not say that Christ would have appeared even though sin had never entered. — *πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου*] a frequent designation of antemundane eternity, John xvii. 24; Eph. i. 4. This nearer definition specifies the sending of Christ as having originated in the eternal counsels of God, in order thus to give point to the exhortation contained in ver. 17. — *φανερωθέντος δέ*] here of the first appearing of Christ, which in this passage is represented as an emerging from the obscurity in which He was (chap. v. 4, of His second coming); it is incorrect to refer *φανερωθέντος* to the obscurity of the divine counsels (as formerly in this commentary), since *φανερωθέντος* applies as much as *προεγνωσμένου* to the person of Christ. Between the *πρόγνωσις* and the *φανέρωσις* lies the *προφητεία*, ver. 10. Rightly interpreted, *φανερωθέντος* testifies to the pre-existence of Christ.[1] The sequence of the aorist participle on the participle *προεγνωσμένου* is to be explained from this, that by *φανερωθέντος* an historical fact is mentioned. — *ἐπ' ἐσχάτου τῶν χρόνων*] *ἔσχατον*: a substantival use of it, "*at the end of the times.*" This *ἔσχατον* of the times is here conceived as the whole period extending from the first appearance of Christ to His second coming; in like manner Heb. i. 1; otherwise 2 Pet. iii. 3, where by *ἔσχατον* is meant the time as yet future, immediately preceding the second coming of Christ; in like

[1] Schmid rightly says (*bibl. Theol.* II. p. 165): "*προεγνωσμένου* does not deny the actual pre-existence, because *Χριστοῦ* includes a designation which is not yet realized in the actual pre-existence, but will be so only in virtue of the *φανερωθῆναι*."

manner 1 Pet. i. 5.[1] — Note the antithesis: *πρὸ καταβ. κ.* and *ἐπ' ἐσχάτου τ. χρ.*: beginning and end united in Christ. — *δι' ὑμᾶς*] refers in the first instance to the readers, but embraces at the same time all *ἐκλεκτοί*. Believers are the aim of all God's schemes of salvation; what an appeal to them to walk *ἐν φόβῳ τὸν τῆς παροικίας χρόνον*! There is as little here to indicate any reference to the *heathen* (Hofmann) as there was in *εἰς ὑμᾶς*, ver. 10.

Ver. 21. *τοὺς δι' αὐτοῦ* (*i.e.* *Χριστοῦ*) *πιστεύοντας* (or *πιστοὺς*) *εἰς Θεόν*] *τούς*: the same clausal connection as in vv. 4 and 5.—The construction *πιστεύειν εἰς* is very frequent in the N. T., especially in John; Christ is for the most part named as the object; *God*, as here, in John xii. 44, xiv. 1.—This adjunct, by giving prominence to the fact that the readers are brought to faith in God by Christ, confirms the thought previously expressed by *δι' ὑμᾶς*.[2] Nor should it ever have been denied that by it the readers may be recognised as having been heathens formerly. — *τὸν ἐγείραντα αὐτὸν ἐκ νεκρῶν καὶ δόξαν αὐτῷ δόντα*][3] not subjoined aimlessly as an accidental predicate applied by the apostle to God; but, closely linked on to *Θεόν*, the words serve to describe *Θεόν* more nearly *as the object of the Christian faith*. The conviction that God has raised and glorified Christ the Crucified belongs essentially to the Christian faith in God; with the first half of this clause, cf. Rom. iv. 24, viii. 11; 2 Cor. iv. 14; Gal. i. 1; with the second, John xvii. 5, 22; and with the whole thought, Eph. i. 20; Acts ii. 32 f. This adjunct, defining *Θεόν* more nearly, is not meant to declare "how far Christ by His revelation has produced faith in God" (Wiesinger),—the

[1] It is indeed correct that, as Schott says, the end of the times is so, through the manifestation of Christ; but it is an arbitrary assertion to say that *ἐπί* serves to give more prominence and precision to this thought.

[2] Hofmann: "The assertion that Christ was foreordained and made manifest for their sake is actually justified in this, that they have faith in God through Him."

[3] Weiss (p. 243) lays stress on *δόντα* in order to prove the low plane of Peter's conception of the person of Christ; yet Christ also says in the Gospel of John, that God had *given* Him *ζωή*, *κρίσις*, *ἐξουσία πάσης σαρκός*, *δόξα*, etc. Paul, too, asserts that God exalted Christ and *gifted Him* (*ἐχαρίσατο*) with the *ὄνομα τὸ ὑπὲρ πᾶν ὄνομα*; there is a similar passage too in Hebrews, that God has appointed or *made* Him *κληρόνομος πάντων*.

whole structure of the clause is opposed to this,—but what is the faith to which through Christ the readers have attained. — *ὥστε*] not: *ἵνα* (Oecumenius, Luther: "in order that;" thus also the Syr., Vulg., Beza, etc.), nor is it: itaque, as if a "*δεῖ*" or a "*χρή*" were to be supplied to *εἶναι* (Aretius); but: "*so that*," it denotes the fruit which faith in God, who raised up Christ from the dead, has brought forth in the readers, which supplies the confirmation that Christ has appeared for their sake (*δι' αὐτούς*). — *τὴν πίστιν ὑμῶν καὶ ἐλπίδα εἶναι εἰς Θεόν*] Most interpreters translate: "so that your faith and your hope are directed to God;" Weiss, on the other hand (p. 43), Brückner, Schott, Fronmüller, Hofmann, take it: "so that your faith is at the same time hope toward God." The position of the words seems to favour this last translation, since the genitive *ὑμῶν* stands between the two substantives, whilst otherwise either *ὑμῶν τὴν πίστιν καὶ ἐλπίδα* (or *τὴν ὑμῶν πίστ.*), cf. Rom. i. 20, Phil. i. 25, 1 Thess. ii. 12, or *τὴν π. κ. ἐλπ. ὑμῶν*, cf. Phil. i. 20, 1 Thess. iii. 7, would have been expected;—but this is not decisive, inasmuch as in Eph. iii. 5 *τοῖς ἁγίοις ἀποστόλοις αὐτοῦ καὶ προφήταις* occurs. On the other hand, the connection of thought gives the preference to *the latter* view; for, in the former case, not only is it noticeable that "the result is exactly the same as that denoted by *τοὺς πιστούς*" (Weiss), but in it *ἐλπίδα* seems to be nothing more than an accidental appendage, whilst in reality it is the point aimed at in the whole deduction; that is to say, the truth and livingness of faith (in the resurrection and glorification of Christ) are manifested in this, that it is also an hope; cf. vv. 3, 6, 9, 13.[1] Schott is wrong in thinking that *εἰς Θεόν* has reference not only to *ἐλπίδα*, but at the same time to *τὴν πίστιν*; for though by *πίστις* here only *πίστις εἰς Θεόν* can be understood, yet it is grammatically impossible to connect the final *εἰς Θεόν*, which is closely linked on to *ἐλπίδα*, likewise with *τὴν πίστιν ὑμῶν*. —The object of hope is specified in the words *τὸν ἐγείραντα αὐτὸν κ.τ.λ.*; it is the resurrection and attainment of the *δόξα* which is given to Christ; cf. Rom. viii. 11, 17.

[1] Weiss is wrong in saying that, according to Peter's view, faith is but the preparatory step to hope, since it rather includes the latter.

Ver. 22. From ver. 22 to ver. 25 the third exhortation,[1] and its subject is love one of another. Gerhard incorrectly joins this verse with verse 17, and regards vv. 18–21 as a parenthesis. — *τὰς ψυχὰς ὑμῶν ἡγνικότες*] The participle does not here express the accomplished act as the basis of the exhortation, as if it were: "after that ye, or since ye, have purified" (Bengel, Wiesinger), but it stands closely linked on to the imperative, and denotes the duty which must ever be fulfilled (hence the perf.) if the *ἀγαπᾶν* is to be realized (de Wette-Brückner, Schott, Frommüller);[2] Luther inexactly: "make chaste . . . and," etc. — *ἁγνίζειν*, a religious idea denoting in the first instance the outward, and afterwards the inward consecration and sanctifying also (cf. John xi. 55; Acts xxi. 24, 26, xxiv. 18); in passages too, as here, where it expresses moral cleansing from all impurity (here more especially from selfishness), it does not lose its religious significance; cf. Jas. iv. 8; 1 John iii. 3.[3] — *ἐν τῇ ὑπακοῇ τῆς ἀληθείας*] *ἡ ἀλήθεια* is the truth revealed and expressed in the gospel in all its fulness. Calvin's limitation of the idea is arbitrary: veritatem accipit pro *regula*, quam nobis Dominus in evangelio praescribit. — *ὑπακοή*, not "faith" (Wiesinger), but

[1] Hofmann, without any sufficient reason, supposes the third exhortation to begin with ver. 18, although the amplifications contained in vv. 18–21 serve eminently to inculcate the *preceding* exhortation. The expression *εἰδότες* can be joined either with a preceding or a subsequent idea, yet it must be observed that in the N. T. the first combination is more frequent than the second, and that in the latter case *εἰδότες* is always accompanied by a particle, by which it is marked as the first word of a subsequent set of phrases; Hofmann altogether overlooks this. Here undoubtedly *καί* would have been prefixed to *εἰδότες*.

[2] Hofmann declares himself opposed to both of these interpretations, or rather he seeks to unite them after a fashion, by assuming that the participial clause partakes of the imperative tone of the principal clause. He likewise characterizes personal purification, presupposed by that love which is ever and anon manifested, as that which should have been accomplished once for all (as if it were possible to command that something should have taken place); he then adds that he who has not yet dedicated his soul to brotherly love must do so still (!).

[3] Schott leaves this religious reference entirely unnoticed. He states that the original meaning of the word *ἁγνός*, "is that purity of mind which regards one thing only as the foundation and aim of all practical life—the truly moral." Cremer, too, thinks that although originally it had the religious sense "to dedicate," it is (John xi. 55, Acts xxi. 24, 26, xxiv. 18 excepted) as a term. techn. foreign to the N. T., and is here only equal to "to purify," "to cleanse" (without the secondary meaning "to dedicate").

"obedience." The genitive is not the gen. subj.: "the obedience which the truth begets," but the gen. obj.: "obedience to the truth." This ὑπακοή, however, consists in *believing* what the truth proclaims, and in *performing* what it requires (thus Weiss also). — The preposition ἐν exhibits ὑπακοή as the element in which the Christian must move in order to procure the sanctification of his soul. — If the reading διὰ πνεύματος be adopted, the πνεῦμα is not the *human* spirit, but the Spirit *of God;* Luther incorrectly: that the apostle here means to observe that the word of God must not only be heard and read, but be laid hold of *with the heart.* — εἰς φιλαδελφίαν ἀνυπόκριτον] does not belong to the ἀγαπήσατε following, either as denoting the *terminus* of love, and the sense being: diligite vos in fraternam caritatem, *i.e.* in unum corpus fraternae caritatis; or as: διά (Oecumenius), and thus pointing out the "agency by which;" nor, finally, is it embatic: ita ut omnibus manifestum fiat, vos esse invicem fratres (Gerhard);—but it is to be taken in conjunction with ἡγνικότες, and specifies the aim towards which the ἁγνίζειν is to be directed. Sanctification towards love, by the putting away of all selfishness, must ever precede love itself.—φιλαδελφία] love of the brethren peculiar to Christians, cf. 2 Pet. i. 7; Rom. xii. 9, 10; 1 Thess. iv. 9.—With ἀνυπόκριτος, cf. 1 John iii. 18, where true unfeigned love is described.—ἐκ (καθαρᾶς) καρδίας] is not to be joined with what precedes,—it being thus a somewhat cumbrous adjunct,—but with what follows, setting forth in relief an essential element of love; with the expression ἐκ καρδίας, cf. Rom. vi. 17; Matt. xviii. 35 (ἀπὸ τῶν καρδιῶν ὑμῶν); on the *Recc.* ἐκ καθαρᾶς καρδίας, see 1 Tim. i. 5.[1] — ἀλλήλους ἀγαπήσατε ἐκτενῶς] ἀγαπᾶν is not

[1] This participial clause joins itself naturally with what precedes, and is not, with Hofmann, to be taken with what follows (chap. ii. 1); ἀποθέμενοι, as οὖν shows, begins a new sentence. The connection proposed by Hofmann would give rise to a very clumsy phraseology. Were it true that regeneration has nothing to do with brotherly love, then of course neither has it anything to do with the laying aside of those lusts which are opposed to love, spoken of in chap. ii. 1. Hofmann says, indeed, that ii. 1 describes the contraries of ἀπλότης (childlike simplicity), not of φιλαδελφία; but is not the opposite of the one the opposite of the other also? The construction in Rom. xiii. 11 ff. is only in appearance similar to that which Hofmann understands as occurring here.

to be limited, as Wiesinger proposes, "to the manifestation of love in act;" the passages, chap. iv. 8, 1 John iii. 18, do not justify this limitation. — ἐκτενῶς, "*with strained energies;*" it denotes here "*the persevering intensity of love*" (in like manner Weiss, p. 336; Fronmüller, Hofmann); Luther translates "*ardently*;" Schott without any reason asserts that in all the N. T. passages the word is used *only* in the *temporal* sense of duration, and therefore is so to be taken here; Luke xxii. 24, Acts xii. 5, xxvi. 7, 1 Pet. iv. 8, are evidence not *for*, but *against* Schott's assertion. The chief emphasis lies not on ἀγαπήσατε, but on ἐκ (καθαρᾶς) καρδίας and ἐκτενῶς.

Ver. 23. ἀναγεγεννημένοι] gives the ground of the preceding exhortation, by referring to the regeneration from incorruptible seed already accomplished, which, as it alone renders the ἀγαπᾶν ἐκτενῶς possible, also demands it. Luther: "as those who are born afresh;" cf. 1 John iv. 7, v. 1. This regeneration is described, as to the origin of it, by the words which follow, and withal in such a way that here, as in ver. 18, the position is strengthened by placing the negation first. — οὐκ ἐκ σπορᾶς φθαρτῆς, ἀλλὰ ἀφθάρτου] σπορά, strictly, "the sowing, the begetting," is not here used with this active force (Aretius: satio incorrupta h. e. regeneratio ad vitam aeternam. Fronmüller: "the energizing principle of the Holy Spirit"), but it is "*seed*," because, as de Wette says, the epithet suggests the idea of a substance. By σπορὰ φθαρτή is to be understood not the semen frugum, but the semen humanum (de Wette, Wiesinger, Weiss, Schott, Hofmann); cf. John i. 13. — The question arises, in what relation do ἐκ σπορᾶς ἀφθάρτου and διὰ λόγου stand to one another? The direct connection of the figurative expression (σπορά) with the literal (λόγος), and the correspondence which evidently exists between ἀφθάρτου and ζῶντος κ. μένοντος, do not allow of the two ideas being considered as different, nor of σπορά being taken to denote the "Holy Spirit" (de Wette-Brückner). On the other hand, the difference of the prepositions points to a distinction to which, from the fact that σπορά is a figurative, λόγος a real appellative (Gerhard, Weiss, Schott[1]),

[1] Weiss is of opinion that, as an explanation of the metaphor, διά only can be employed with λόγος, not ἐκ, which belongs exclusively to the figure. This is,

justice has not yet been done. The use of the two prepositions is to be understood by supposing a different relation of the same thing (of the λόγος) to the regeneration; in ἐξ we have its point of departure, and not merely its "originating cause" (Hofmann[1]); we have the word of God looked upon as the principle implanted in man working newness of life (ὁ λόγος ἔμφυτος, Jas. i. 21); διά, on the other hand, points to the outward instrumentality by which the new life is effected. — διὰ λόγου ζῶντος Θεοῦ καὶ μένοντος] refers back to ver. 22: ἐν τῇ ὑπακοῇ τῆς ἀληθ.; the Christian is laid under obligation to continued sanctification ἐν ὑπ. τ. ἀλ., inasmuch as he has been begotten again to newness of being, by the word of God, *i.e.* the word of truth. — λόγος Θεοῦ is every word of divine revelation; here especially the word which, originating in God, proclaims Christ, *i.e.* the gospel. Schwenkfeld erroneously understands by it the Johannine *Logos*, which, indeed, even Didymus had considered possible.—On the construction of the adj. ζῶντος and μένοντος, Calvin says: possumus legere tam sermonem viventem Dei, quam Dei viventis; he himself prefers the *second* combination; thus also Vulg., Oecum., Beza, Hensler, Jachmann, etc. Most interpreters give preference, and with justice, to the *first*, for which are decisive both the contents of the following verses, in which the emphasis is laid, not on the abiding nature of God, but of the word of God, and the position of the words — otherwise ζῶντος, on account of the subsequent καὶ μένοντος, must have stood after Θεοῦ. The superaddition of μένοντος arises from the circumstance that this attribute is deduced from the previous one, and is brought in so as to prepare the way for the passage of Scripture (ver. 25: μένει) (de Wette[2]). The characteristics

however, incorrect; διά would doubtless not have been suited to σπορά, but ἐκ might very well have been used with λόγου (cf. John iii. 5), indeed, *must* have been so if the λόγος itself were regarded as σπορά. The two prepositions express, each of them, a different relation.

[1] Also in the passages quoted by Hofmann, John i. 13, iii. 5, Matt. i. 18, ἐκ indicates more than a mere causal action.

[2] Hofmann strangely enough explains the position of Θεοῦ by assuming it to be placed as an apposition between the two predicates to which it serves as basis; he accordingly thinks the words should be written thus: διὰ λόγου ζῶντος, Θεοῦ, καὶ μένοντος (!).

specified by these attributes are applicable to the word of God, not in its form, but in its inner substance. It is *living* in essence as in effect, and it is *enduring*, not only in that its results are eternal, but because itself never perishes. If the subjoined εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα be spurious, then without it the μένειν must not be limited to the *present* life.[1]

Vv. 24, 25. Quotation from Isa. xl. 6, 8, slightly altered from the LXX. in order to confirm the eternal endurance of the word by a passage from the Old Testament.[2] — διότι, as in ver. 16; the passage here quoted not only confirms the idea μένοντος, but it gives the reason why the new birth has taken place through the living and abiding word of God (so, too, Hofm.). The reason is this, that it may be a birth into life that passes not away. — πᾶσα σάρξ] *i.e.* πᾶς ἄνθρωπος; *caro* fragilitatem naturae indicat (Aretius); not "all creature existence," embracing both stones and plants, etc. (Schott), for of a plant it cannot be said that it is ὡς χόρτος. — ὡς χόρτος] is to be found neither in the Hebrew text nor in the LXX. — καὶ πᾶσα δόξα αὐτῆς] instead of αὐτῆς, the LXX. has ἀνθρώπου; in Hebrew, חַסְדּוֹ. Incorrectly Vorstius: Ap. nomine carnis et gloriae ejus intelligit praecipue legem Mosis et doctrinas hominum; Calvin again rightly: omne id quod in rebus humanis magnificum dicitur. — ἐξηράνθη ὁ χόρτος κ.τ.λ. gives the point of comparison, that wherein the σάρξ and its δόξα resemble the χόρτος and its ἄνθος; but it does not emphatically assert that "the relation of the flesh to its glory in point of nothingness is quite the same as that of the grass in its bloom" (Schott). — καὶ τὸ ἄνθος αὐτοῦ ἐξέπεσε] αὐτοῦ, if it be the true reading, is

[1] The word, as the revelation of the Spirit, is eternal, although changeable, according to its form; to the word also applies what Paul says, 1 Cor. xv. 54: this corruptible shall put on incorruption, and this mortal shall put on immortality. Luther admirably says: "The word is an eternal, divine power. For although voice and speech pass away, the kernel remains, *i.e.* the understanding, the truth which the voice contained. Just as, when I put to my lips a cup which contains wine, I drink the wine, although I thrust not the cup down my throat. Thus it is with the word which the voice utters; it drops into the heart and becomes living, although the voice remains outside and passes away. Therefore it is indeed a divine power, it is God Himself."

[2] The context in no way indicates that the apostle had particularly desired to make emphatic "that natural *nationalities*, with all their glory, form but a tie for these earthly periods of time" (Schott).

an addition made by Peter, for it is to be found neither in the LXX. nor in the Hebrew text. By the preterites ἐξηράνθη and ἐξέπεσε the transitoriness is more strongly marked; cf. Jas. i. 11, v. 2. — Ver. 25. Instead of κυρίου, the LXX. have τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμῶν, אֱלֹהֵינוּ. κυρίου can hardly have been written on purpose by Peter "because he had in his mind Christ's word" (Luthardt). James refers to the same passage here cited by Peter, without, however, quoting it *verbatim*. — In the following words the apostle makes the application: τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν] τοῦτο is not used "substantively here," as the predicate of the sentence equal to: that is; *i.e.* eternally abiding word of God is the word of God preached among you (Schott); but it refers back simply to the preceding τὸ ῥῆμα κυρίου, and is equivalent to: this word, of which it is said that it remaineth for ever, is the word which has been preached among you. — τὸ ῥῆμα τὸ εὐαγγελισθέν] Periphrasis for the gospel. In the O. T. it denotes the word of promise, here the gospel. Peter identifies them with each other, as indeed in their inmost nature they are one, containing the one eternal purpose of God for the redemption of the world, distinguished only according to different degrees of development. — εἰς ὑμᾶς] *i.e.* ὑμῖν; in the expression here used, however, the reference to the hearers comes more distinctly into prominence; cf. 1 Thess. ii. 9, and Lünemann *in loc.* — In the last words Peter has spoken of the gospel preached to the churches to which he writes, as the word of God, by which his readers are begotten again of the incorruptible seed of divine life, so that, as such, in obedience to the truth thus communicated to them, they must sanctify themselves to unfeigned love of the brethren.

CHAPTER II.

VER. 1. Instead of ὑποκρίσεις, B reads ὑπόκρισιν; correction after the preceding ὁόλον, with which it is in signification closely linked on. In like manner the reading πᾶσαν καταλαλίαν, ℵ (pr. m.), for πάσας καταλαλίας, is to be taken as an alteration. In A, some vss. πάσας is wanting before καταλαλίας; it could easily have fallen aside, inasmuch as the two preceding words are without adjectives. — Ver. 2. After αὐξηθῆτε, most codd. (A B C K P ℵ, *al.*) etc. read: εἰς σωτηρίαν (accepted by Griesb. Scholz, Lachm. Tisch.). The adjunct is wanting in the *Rec.* (after L and several min.); it may be omitted, inasmuch as an adjunct of this kind is not necessary to the words: ἐν αὐτῷ αὐξηθῆτε. — Ver. 3. The *Rec.* εἴπερ, after C K L P, *al.*, Vulg. (si tamen), is retained by Tisch. 7; on the other hand, Tisch. 8 and Lachm. have adopted the simple εἰ. This is supported by A B ℵ (m. pr. C has corrected εἴπερ), Cyr. Clem. The *Rec.* seems to have made the alteration for the sake of the sense. — Ver. 5. Instead of οἰκοδομεῖσθε (Tisch. 7), A** C ℵ, several min. Vulg. Cyr. read ἐποικοδομεῖσθε (Tisch. 8), which, however, seems to be a correction after Eph. ii. 20. — Lachm. and Tisch. 8 read the prep. εἰς between οἶκος πνευματικός and ἱεράτευμα ἅγιον, after A B C ℵ 5, *al.*, several vss. and K V. The common reading is supported by K L P, many min., Vulg., other versions, Clem. etc.; Tisch. 7 has retained it; de Wette, Wiesinger, Schott, Reiche have in like manner declared themselves in favour of the *Rec.*; de Wette speaks of the interpolation of εἰς "as facilitating a transition, otherwise abrupt, to another conception;" on the other hand, Brückner and Hofmann prefer the other reading, which is attested by weightier witnesses. The εἰς may be omitted, inasmuch as the thought might seem inappropriate that an οἶκος should be built up to an ἱεράτευμα. — τῷ before Θεῷ is doubtful; for it are L P, etc.; against, A B C ℵ, *al.* Lachm. and Tisch. have doubtless correctly omitted it. — Ver. 6. διότι] with Griesb. Scholz, Lachm. Tisch. etc., according to almost all the authorities instead of the *Rec.* διὸ καί, which is to be found only in min. and in Orig. — ἐν τῇ γραφῇ] *Rec.*, after K L P, several min. etc.; Tisch. reads, after A B ℵ 38, 73: ἐν γραφῇ; Lachm. has adopted ἡ γραφή, which is found in C, several

min. Vulg. Hier. Aug. This last reading seems, however, to be only a correction, in order to avoid the difficulty which lies in connecting the verb περιέχει with ἐν (τῇ) γραφῇ. — Instead of ἐπ' αὐτῷ, ℵ (pr. m.) has ἐπ' αὐτόν, which is not supported by other witnesses. — Ver. 7. Instead of the ἀπειθοῦσιν of the *Rec.*, after A K L P, etc. (Tisch. 7, Lachm. Buttm.), Tisch. 8, after B C ℵ, *al.*, has adopted ἀπιστοῦσιν. Perhaps the *Rec.* is a correction after ver. 8. — λίθον] *Rec.*, after C** K L P ℵ (pr. m.), *al.*, Thph. — Retained by Tisch.; in its stead Lachm. has λίθος; this reading is found in A B C* several min. Oec. Since in Greek it is by no means uncommon that the substantive is often put in the same case as the relative which it precedes, λίθον need occasion no surprise; as in addition to this, λίθον is found in the LXX., λίθος seems to have been the original reading, which became changed into λίθον, following the LXX. and the common usage in Greek. — The words λίθος . . . γωνίας καί are wanting in the Syr. ver.; Grotius, Mill, Semler, Hottinger, therefore consider them spurious, for which, nevertheless, sufficient justification is wanting. — Ver. 11. ἀπέχεσθαι] *Rec.*, after B K ℵ, several min. vss. and K V; retained by Lachm. and Tisch., whilst A C L P, several min. read ἀπέχεσθε, which Buttm. has adopted; see on this the commentary; Lachm. adds ὑμᾶς, after the Vulg., as Tisch. remarks: ex errore de C. — Ver. 12. Instead of ἐποπτεύσαντες, *Rec.*, after A K L P, *al.*, ἐποπτεύοντες must be read, with Lachm. and Tisch., after B C ℵ, *al.*, Thph. Oec.; on account of the δοξάσωσιν following, the present could easily have been changed into the aorist. — Ver. 13. ὑποτάγητε οὖν] Lachm. and Tisch. 8 omit οὖν, after A B C ℵ, *al.* Didy. Cassiod.; οὖν (Tisch. 7) is supported only by K L P, many min. etc.; it is possible that οὖν was interpolated in order to obtain a firmer connection of thought. In Cod. ℵ (pr. m.) ἀνθρωπίνῃ is wanting, but is supported by almost all witnesses. — Ver. 14. The *Rec.*, following C and several min., retains μέν after ἐκδίκησιν, which had been rightly rejected already by Griesbach. — Ver. 18. ℵ has after δεσπόταις the pron. ὑμῶν. — Ver. 19. Different adjuncts to χάρις are found in different codd., as Θεοῦ, Θεῷ, παρὰ Θεῷ, παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ, which have been all interpolated later, in order to define the idea more precisely. — Several min. and C have, instead of συνείδησιν Θεοῦ: συνείδησιν ἀγαθήν; in A* both readings are combined: συνείδησιν Θεοῦ ἀγαθήν. — Ver. 20. The *Rec.* has τοῦτο χάρις; this reading Tisch. 8 has retained, as he asserts, following B C K L P ℵ, etc.; on the other hand, Lachm. Buttm. Tisch. 7 read τοῦτο γὰρ χάρις, after A. According to Buttm., this reading is found also in B (ℵ ?). — Ver. 21. The codices vary between the *Rec.* (ed. Elzev.) ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, ὑμῶν, which is found in A B,

C ℵ, several min. Oec. Amb. etc. (Lachm. Tisch. 8); ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, ὑμῶν in K L P, *al.*, Slav. Vulg. Cyr. etc. (Scholz, Tisch. 7, Reiche), and ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, ἡμῶν in several min. etc. (*Rec.*). Tisch. remarks: nil probabilius quam ἡμῶν ὑμῶν in caussa fuisse, cur bis ab aliis ὑμῶν ab aliis ἡμῶν scriberetur. Quod tota oratio ad lectores incitandos instituta est, id emendatori magis ὑμῶν quam ἡμῶν commendabat. According to almost all the authorities, ὑμῶν is the original reading; it is possible that in accordance with it ἡμῶν was changed into ὑμῶν; it is also possible that the application of Χρ. ἔπαθεν to the readers alone seemed inappropriate to the copyist, and that he changed ὑμῶν into ἡμῶν. Wiesinger, Schott, and Hofm. hold ἡμῶν, and Brückner ὑμῶν, to be the original reading; the weightiest authorities decide for ὑμῶν. — ℵ reads ἀπέθανεν instead of ἔπαθεν, supported by general testimony, and in ver. 23, ἐλοιδόρει (pr. m.) instead of ἀντελοιδόρει. — Ver. 24. The αὐτοῦ after μώλωπι (*Rec.*) is supported only by L P ℵ (pr. m.) 40, *al.*, Thph. Oec., whilst A B C K have it not; Lachm. has accordingly omitted it, whilst Tisch., on the other hand, has retained it. Although αὐτοῦ is in itself the more difficult, still, on account of the preponderating evidence against it, it can hardly be regarded as the original reading; its addition can be explained also partly from the endeavour to form this relative clause as similarly as possible to the preceding ὅς . . αὐτός, partly from the circumstance that it is to be found in Isa. liii. 5, LXX.; although Tisch. says: οὗ . . . αὐτοῦ emendatori deberi incredibile est; nec magis credibile αὐτοῦ ex LXX. inlatum esse servato inepte οὗ. Wiesinger, Brückner, Schott, Hofm. hold αὐτοῦ to be original. — Ver. 25. πλανώμενα] *Rec.*, after C K L P, etc., Thph. Oec.; on the other hand, Lachm. and Tisch., following A B ℵ, etc., Tol. Harl. Fulg. have adopted πλανώμενοι, which is probably the original reading; the change into πλανώμενα was very natural on account of the πρόβατα immediately preceding.

Vv. 1, 2. ἀποθεμενοι οὖν . . . ἐπιποθήσατε] The admonition which commences here stands, as οὖν shows, in close connection with what precedes; in ver. 22 the apostle had exhorted to unfeigned love one of another, which love he shows to be conditioned by ἁγνίζειν ἐν τῇ ὑπακοῇ τῆς ἀληθείας, and grounded on ἀναγεγεννημένον εἶναι; from this deducing the ἀποτίθεσθαι πᾶσαν κακίαν κ.τ.λ., he now exhorts ἐπιποθεῖν τὸ λογικὸν γάλα. The apostle's intention, explaining at once the connection of this with the foregoing admonition, and the relation in which the thought of the participial clause ἀποθέμενοι stands to that

of the imperative *ἐπιποθήσατε*, is that the Christians should show themselves *τέκνα ὑπακοῆς* (i. 14), not each for himself, but united together, an *οἶκος πνευματικός* (ver. 5), *γένος ἐκλεκτόν κ.τ.λ.* (ver. 9). Schott acknowledges this reference (unjustifiably denied by Hofmann) to the unity of the church; it explains why the apostle mentions those sins only which stand in direct antagonism to the *φιλαδελφία ἀνυπόκριτος* (i. 22). The participle *ἀποθέμενοι* stands to *ἐπιποθήσατε* in the same relation as *ἀναζωσάμενοι* to *ἐλπίσατε* in chap. i. 13; it is therefore then not equal to postquam deposuistis, but expresses the continued purification of the Christian; comp. Eph. iv. 22; Heb. xii. 1; specially also Col. iii. 8; and for the whole passage, Jas. i. 21. — *πᾶσαν κακίαν κ.τ.λ.*] Calvin: non est integra omnium enumeratio quae deponi a nobis oportet, sed cum de veteri homine disputant Apostoli, quaedam vitia praeponunt in exemplum, quibus illius ingenium designant. *κακία* means here, as in Col. iii. 8, not generally: "wickedness," but specially "*malice*," nocendi cupiditas (Hemming). *πᾶσαν* denotes the whole compass of the idea: "*every kind of malice*." The same is implied by the plural form in the words following *ὑποκρίσεις*, etc.; in *πάσας καταλαλίας* both are combined. The same and similar ideas to those here expressed are to be found conjoined elsewhere in the N. T.; comp. Rom. i. 29, 30. "The admonitions which follow are in essential connection with this comprehensive exhortation; comp. chap. ii. 22 ff.; especially chaps. iii. 8 ff., iv. 8 ff., v. 2 ff." (Wiesinger). For the force of the separate terms, comp. Lexicon. Augustin: *malitia* maculo delectatur alieno; *invidia* bono cruciatur alieno; *dolus* duplicat cor; *adulatio* duplicat linguam; *detrectatio* vulnerat famam. — *καταλαλία* occurs only here and in 2 Cor. xii. 20; in the classics the verb is to be found, never the subst. — Ver. 2. *ὡς ἀρτιγέννητα βρέφη*] is not to be connected with *ἀποθέμενοι*, but with what follows. It does not mark the *childlike nature* of the Christians, but, in view of the goal of manhood yet afar off, is meant (referring to i. 23: *ἀναγεγεννημένοι*) to designate the readers as those who had but recently been born again.[1] In Bengel's interpre-

[1] It must be observed that the expression was used by the Jews also to designate the proselytes; corroborating passages in Wetstein *in loc.*

tation: denotatur prima aetas ecclesiae N. T., a false reference is given to the expression. The particle ὡς is not here either used with a comparative force only; comp. chap. i. 14. — τὸ λογικὸν ἄδολον γάλα ἐπιποθήσατε] γάλα is not here contrasted with βρῶμα, as in 1 Cor. iii. 2, or with στερεὰ τροφή, as in Heb. v. 12; but it denotes the word of God, in that it by its indwelling strength nourishes the soul of man. The term γάλα, as applied by the apostle, is to be explained simply from the reference to ἀρτιγέννητα βρέφη (Wiesinger, Schott, Hofmann). This view results quite naturally from the comparison with chap. i. 22, 23. If Peter had intended to convey any other meaning, he would have indicated it so as to have been understood.[1] — λογικόν] does not state an attribute of evangelical doctrine: "rational;" Gualther: quod tradit rationem vere credendi et vivendi, nor even in the sense that this (with Smaleius in Calov.) might be inferred: nihil credendum esse quod ratione adversetur; but it is added in order to mark the *figurative nature* of the expression γάλα (to which it stands related similarly as in chap. i. 13: τῆς διαν. ὑμ. to τὰς ὀσφύας), so that by it *this* milk is characterized as a *spiritual* nourishment. Luther: "spiritual, what is drawn in by the soul, what the heart must seek;" thus, too, Wiesinger, Schott, Brückner, Frommüller, Hofmann. It has here the same signification as in Rom. xii. 1, where it does not mean "rational" as contrasted with what is external (de Wette). The interpretation on which λογικὸν γάλα is taken as equal to γάλα τοῦ λόγου, lac verbale, is opposed to the usus loquendi (it is supported by Beza, Gerhard, Calov., Hornejus, Bengel, Wolf, and others). Nor less so is the suggestion of Weiss (p. 187), that by "λογικόν is to be understood that which proceeds from the λόγος (*i.e.* Word);" thus γάλα λογικόν would be

[1] Calvin understands γάλα to mean: vitae ratio quae novam genituram sapiat; Hemming: consentanea simplici infantiae vivendi ratio; Cornelius a Lapide: symbolum candoris, sinceritatis et benevolentiae. All these interpretations are contradicted by the fact that γάλα is not a *condition of life*, but *means of nourishment*. It is altogether arbitrary to explain γάλα to be the Lord's Supper (Estius, Turrianus, Salmeron), or as meaning Christ as the incarnate Logos (Clemens Al. in *Paedag.* i. c. 6; Augustin in *Tract.* iii. in 1 *Ep. John*); Weiss, too, is mistaken when he says: "the nourishment of the new-born child of God is Christ Himself, who is preached and revealed in the word."

the *verbal* milk of doctrine.[1] The second adjective: *ἄδολον* (*ἅπ. λεγ.*), strictly "*without guile*," then "*pure, unadulterated*," is not meant to give prominence to the idea that the Christians should strive to obtain the pure gospel, unadulterated by heretical doctrines of man, but it specifies purity as a quality belonging to the gospel (Wiesinger, Schott).[2] It is, besides, applicable, strictly speaking, not to the figurative *γάλα*, but only to the word of God thereby denoted (Schott).[3] — *ἐπιποθήσατε*] expresses a strong, lively desire, Phil. ii. 26. Wolf: Ap. alludit ad infantes, quos sponte sua et impetu quodam naturali in lac maternum ferri constat. The conjecture of Grotius: *ἐπιποτίζετε*, is quite unnecessary. — *ἵνα ἐν αὐτῷ αὐξηθῆτε*] *ἵνα*, not *ἐκβατικῶς*, but *τελικῶς*; it states the purpose of the *ἐπιποθήσατε*. *ἐν* is more significant than *διά*, equivalent to "*in its power*." The verb *αὐξηθῆτε*, used in connection with *ἀρτιγεννητα βρέφη*, denotes the ever further development and strengthening of the new life. Although the aim which the apostle has in view in his exhortation is to mark the destination of Christians to be an *οἶκος πνευματικός*, still it is incorrect to affirm that *αὐξηθῆτε* has reference, not to the growth of the individual, but (with Schott) only to the transforming of the church as such, "to the conception of a building which is being carried up higher and higher to its completion." Apart from the fact that *αὐξάνεσθαι* plainly refers back to *ἀρτιγ. βρέφη*, and is not equivalent to "to be built up," it must be remarked that the church can become what it should be only by individual members growing up each of them ever more and more to the *ἀνὴρ τέλειος*. — *εἰς σωτηρίαν*] omitted in the *Rec.*, states the final aim of all Christian growth. Schott's explanation, that by *σωτηρία* "the final glorious transfiguration of the church" is meant, is only a consequence of his erroneous and one-

[1] Besides, how does this agree with Weiss's opinion, that *γάλα* means Christ Himself? The *verbal Christ? !*

[2] Wolf: lac *ἄδολον* ideo appellari puto, ut indicetur, operam dandam esse, ne illud traditionibus humanis per *καπηλεύοντας τὸν λόγον*, 2 Cor. ii. 17, corruptum hauriatur.

[3] Hofmann rightly observes: "What tends to the Christian's growth may be compared to the pure milk which makes the child to thrive at its mother's breast, and therefore it is termed *τὸ λογικὸν ἄδολον γάλα*."

sided reference of the apostle's exhortation to the church as such.

Ver. 3. *εἰ* [*εἴπερ*] *ἐγεύσασθε, ὅτι κ.τ.λ.*] Based on the Old Testament passage, Ps. xxxiv. 9: *γεύσασθε καὶ ἴδετε, ὅτι χρηστὸς ὁ κύριος*; the words *καὶ ἴδετε* are omitted, not being suitable to the figure *γάλα*. — *εἰ* is here, as in ver. 17, hypothetical indeed: "if," but it does not express a doubt; thus Gerhard correctly explains *εἴπερ*: non est dubitantis, sed supponentis, quod factum sit. Comp. Rom. viii. 9; 2 Thess. i. 6. — *γεύομαι* is used here of inward experience, comp. Heb. vi. 4, 5; it alludes to the figurative *γάλα*, inasmuch as the Christian tastes, as it were, of the kindness of the Lord in the spiritual milk tendered to him. The apostle takes for granted that the Christians had already made inward experience of the goodness of their Lord (*κύριος*; in the Psalms, *God;* here, *Christ*), not merely in the instruction which preceded baptism, or in baptism itself (Lorinus), or cum fidem evangelii susceperunt (Hornejus), but generally during their life as Christians; as the new-born child, not once only, but ever anew refreshes itself on the nourishment offered by a mother's love. With such experience, it is natural that believers should ever afresh be eager for the spiritual nourishment, in the imparting of which the *χρηστότης* of the Lord is manifested: nam gustus provocat appetitum (Lorinus).[1] — *ὅτι*, not equal to quam (Grotius), but: "*that.*" — *χρηστός*, "*kind, gracious,*" not exactly suavis (Grotius: ut a gustu sumta translatio melius procedat); in this sense it would be more applicable to *γάλα* than to *κύριος*. — Several interpreters assume that in *χρηστός* Peter plays upon the word *Χριστός*; but this is more than improbable.

Vv. 4, 5. The structure of this new exhortation is similar to that of the previous sentence, to which it belongs in thought, externally (*ὅν*) as internally, inasmuch as the imperative (*οἰκοδομεῖσθε*) is preceded by a participle (*προσερχόμενοι*), and

[1] Schott insists "that the apostle is not here anxious about the readers' desire in general for the word, but that such desire should be combined with the purpose of finally attaining salvation." But is there anywhere a desire after the word of God without such intent?—Nothing in the context indicates that that in which the *χρηστότης* of the Lord is manifested is "those rare moments of heavenly joy in which this life is a foretaste of eternal glory" (Schott).

an adjunct introduced by ὡς, defining the subject more nearly. —Starting from ὁ κύριος the apostle says: πρὸς ὃν προσερχόμενοι] προσέρχεσθαι (elsewhere in the N. T. always construed with the dative) denotes the going spiritually to the Lord; the Christian does indeed already live in union with Christ, but this does not exclude the necessity of becoming united ever more completely with Him (thus also Hofmann).[1] Luther incorrectly: "to whom ye have come," as if it were the part. praet.; Hornejus well puts it: non actum inchoatum, sed continuatum designat. — λίθον ζῶντα] in apposition to ὅν; it is not necessary to supply ὡς (Wolf). What follows shows that the apostle had in his mind the stone mentioned in the prophecies, Ps. cxviii. 22 and Isa. xxviii. 16 (cf. Matt. xxi. 42; Acts iv. 11; Rom. ix. 33). The want of the article points to the fact that the apostle was more concerned to lay stress on the attribute expressed in λίθος ζῶν, than to draw attention to the fact that in these passages of the O. T. Christ is the promised λίθος. In using this term, Peter had already in view the subsequent οἰκοδομεῖσθε. The church is the temple of God, the individual Christians are the stones from which it is built; but Christ is the foundation-stone on which it rests. In order that the church may become ever more completed as a temple, it is necessary that the Christians should unite themselves ever more closely with Christ. The apostle enlarges on this thought with reference to those predictions.—The explanatory adjective is added, as in ver. 2, to the figurative λίθον; and by it, on the one hand, the expression is marked as figurative, ne quis tropum nesciret (Bullinger); and, on the other, the nature peculiar to this stone is indicated. ζῶντα is to be taken here as in John vi. 51 and similar passages. Flacius correctly: dicitur Christus lapis vivus, non tamen passive, quod in semet vitam habeat, sed etiam active, quia nos mortuos vivificat.[2] — ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων μὲν ἀποδεδοκι-

[1] The single passage, 1 Macc. ii. 16, by no means proves that προσέρχεσθαι πρός has in itself a stronger force than προσέρχ. cum dat. (as against Hofmann). According to Schott, by προσέρχ. is meant: "not the individual Christian's deepening experience of community of life with Christ, but only the conduct of the believer, by which, as a member of the church, he gives himself up to the Lord as present in His church, *in fact to the church itself!*"

[2] De Wette (as opposed to Clericus and Steiger) is right in refusing to see here

μασμένον] a nearer definition, according to Ps. cxviii. 22. What is there said specially of the builders, is here applied generally to mankind, in order that a perfect antithesis may be obtained to the *παρὰ δὲ Θεῷ*. The want of the article *τῶν* does not warrant a toning down of the interpretation to mean "by men," *i.e.* by some or by many men (Hofmann). The thought is general and comprehensive; the article is wanting in order to emphasize the character of those by whom Christ is rejected, as compared with God (Schott). Believers are here regarded "as an exception" (Steiger). — *παρὰ δὲ Θεῷ ἐκλεκτὸν, ἔντιμον*] after Isa. xxviii. 16; Peter has, however, selected two attributes only; "that is to say, he passes over the characteristics of the stone itself, and its relation to the building, giving prominence only to its value in the sight of God" (Steiger). Both adjects. form the antithesis to *ἀποδεδοκ.*; *ἐκλεκτός* is neither equal to eximius (Hemming) nor to *προεγνωσμένος* (Steiger); but: "elect," *i.e.* chosen as the object of love; cf. 1 Tim. v. 21. — *παρὰ Θεῷ*] not: a Deo (Vulg.), but: *ἐνώπιον τοῦ Θεοῦ*, coram Deo, Deo judice, "with God." Worthy of note is the "antagonism between the human judgment and the divine" (Wiesinger), the former given effect to in the crucifixion, the latter in the glorification of Christ. — Ver. 5. *καὶ αὐτοὶ ὡς λίθοι ζῶντες οἰκοδομεῖσθε*] *καὶ αὐτοί* places the Christians side by side with Christ (Wiesinger inappropriately takes *αὐτοί* as also applying to the verb *οἰκοδομ.*). As He is a living stone, so are they also living stones, *i.e.* through Him. The explanation: cum lapidibus comparantur homines, qui, quoniam vivant, vivi lapides nominantur (Carpzov, Morus), is inadequate. Further, *ὡς λίθοι ζῶντες* states the qualities which the readers already possessed, not those which they were to obtain only through the *οἰκοδομεῖσθαι* (Schott); that unto which they should be built is stated in what follows. — *οἰκοδομεῖσθε* is, according to the

any reference to the conception of the saxum vivum as opposed to broken stones (Virg. *Aen.* i. 171; Ovid. *Metam.* xiv. 741). Inappropriate is Schott's opinion: "that *ζῶν* indicates that by the self-unfolding (!) of His divinely human life, Christ causes the church to grow up from Himself the foundation stone." Hofmann would erroneously exclude the second of the above-mentioned ideas from the *λίθον ζῶντα*, although it is clearly indicated by the very fact that through connection with the stone Christians themselves become living stones.

structure of the sentence, not indicative (Hornejus, Bengel, Gerhard, etc.; more recently, Wiesinger, Weiss, Hofmann), but imperative (Beza, Aretius, Hottinger, Steiger, de Wette-Brückner, Luthardt, Schott, etc.). The objection, that the verses following are declarative, may be quite as well used for the imperative force of that which precedes them.[1] If vv. 4, 5 serve as the basis of the foregoing exhortation, this turn of the thought would also be expressed. Several interpreters (as Luther and Steiger) incorrectly regard the verbal form as middle; it is passive: "be ye built up," *i.e.* "*let yourself be built up*," *i.c.* by Christ, as the foregoing *πρὸς ὃν προσερχόμενοι* shows. Corresponding with the reading *ἐποικοδομεῖσθε* super illum, *i.c.* Christum, is generally understood; an unnecessary supplement; the thought is: *that* (not: *on which*) the Christians should let themselves be built up, to that, namely, which the following words state. — *οἶκος πνευματικὸς εἰς ἱεράτευμα ἅγιον*] In the *Rec.* without *εἰς* the two conceptions are co-ordinate, both stating the end of the *οἰκοδομεῖσθαι*: "*to the spiritual house, to the holy priesthood*;" but if the reading *οἰκ. πν. εἰς ἱεράτ. ἅγ.* be adopted, then "*ἱεράτ. ἅγ.* is the further result of the being built up to the spiritual house" (Brückner). Hofmann holds that *οἶκος πν.* is in apposition to the subject contained in *οἰκοδομεῖσθε*, and that *εἰς ἱεράτευμα ἅγ.* alone is directly dependent on *οἰκοδομεῖσθε*; the former view is, however, more expressive, inasmuch as it prominently shows that the Christians should be built up to a spiritual house. *οἶκος πν.* contains the expression of the passive, *ἱεράτ. ἅγ.*, on the other hand, that of the active relation of the church to God (Wiesinger, Schott, Brückner). The dissimilarity of the two ideas seems to be opposed to the reading *εἰς*, since an *οἶκος* cannot be transformed into a *ἱεράτευμα*; but this difficulty disappears if it be considered that the house here spoken of is built of *living* stones. It is clearly not the case that *εἰς* serves only to *facilitate* an other-

[1] The structure of the clause is in favour of the imperative, inasmuch as it is thus brought into conformity with the imperative preceding. When Hofmann asserts that the sentence must necessarily be indicative in form, "because the words subjoined to *χρηστὸς ὁ κύριος* must state that to which the goodness of Christ brings them," he does so without reason, for the clause may also state that to which they should allow the goodness of Christ to lead them.

wise abrupt transition to a new idea (de Wette, Wiesinger).— *οἶκος* means, in the first instance, "house," and not "temple;" nor does the attribute *πνευματικός* mark it as a temple. We must either hold by the conception "house" (Luthardt, Hofmann),[1] or assume that by the house Peter thought of the temple. The latter view deserves the preference on account of the close connection with what follows; comp. the passages 1 Cor. iii. 16, 17; 2 Cor. vi. 16; 1 Pet. iv. 17. — *πνευματικός* is the house raised from "living stones," in contradistinction to the temple built from dead ones, inasmuch as their life is rooted in the Spirit of God, and bears His nature on it.[2] — *ἱεράτευμα* is here not the "*office of priest*" (2 Macc. ii. 17), but the "*priesthood*" (comp. Gerhard: coetus s. collegium sacerdotum); comp. ver. 9; Ex. xix. 6; "not instead of *ἱερεῖς ἅγιοι*, but including the essential idea of a community" (de Wette). It has unjustly been maintained that if the reading *εἰς* be adopted, *ἱεράτευμα* must be understood of the priestly office. *ἅγιον* subjoined to *ἱεράτευμα* does not mark a characteristic of the *ἱεράτευμα* of the New as distinguishing it from that of the Old Testament, but one which belongs essentially to the *ἱεράτευμα* (of course "as ordained by God," Hofmann) as such. Here, too, there lies in the connection of thought a special emphasis on *ἅγιον*, inasmuch as without sanctification the priestly calling cannot be truly fulfilled. — *ἀνενέγκαι πνευματικὰς θυσίας*] is closely conjoined both in form (see Winer, p. 298 f. [E.T. 399 f.]) and purport with what precedes, pointing out as it does the function of the *ἱεράτευμα*. This consists, as under the Old Covenant, in offering sacrifice. The word *ἀναφέρειν*, which is never used by Paul, has not indeed in the classics, but in the LXX., in the Epistle to the Hebrews, and in the Epistle of James, the meaning "*to sacrifice*," strictly speaking "to bring the offering to the altar."—The *θυσίαι* which the N. T. priesthood, *i.e.* the Christian church in all its members, has to offer are called

[1] Luthardt: "*οἶκος* is not equal to *ναός*; nor in the context is a temple alluded to, for the emphasis lies on *πνευματικός*. *οἶκος* is chosen because of *οἰκοδομεῖσθε*: be ye built as a spiritual house! To this is joined: to an holy priesthood."

[2] Schott finds the antithesis *therein*, that in the O. T. temple "the indwelling of God was confined to the Holy of Holies, and visible to the eye" (?); whilst, on the contrary, in the Christian church there is "a real and direct indwelling of God."

πνευματικαί, because they have their origin in the πνεῦμα, and bear on them its nature and essence. Calvin says in what they consist: inter hostias spirituales primum locum obtinet generalis nostri oblatio, neque enim offerre quicquam possumus Deo, donec illi nos ipsos in sacrificium obtulerimus, quod fit nostri abnegatione; sequuntur postea preces et gratiarum actiones, eleemosynae et omnia pietatis exercitia. Cf. with this Rom. xii. 1; Heb. xiii. 15, 16. — εὐπροσδέκτους τῷ Θεῷ] εὐπρόσδεκτος (Rom. xv. 16), equivalent to εὐάρεστος (Rom. xii. 1, xiv. 18; Phil. iv. 18, and other passages). — διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ] belongs not to οἰκοδομεῖσθε (Beda), but either to εὐπροσδ. τ. Θεῷ (Luther: per Christum fit, ut et mea opera a Deo aestimentur, quae alias non culmo digna haberet; Bengel, Steiger, Wiesinger, Hofmann, etc.), or to ἀνενέγκαι (Grotius, Aretius, de Wette, Weiss, etc.).[1] No doubt Heb. xiii. 15 might be appealed to in support of the latter construction; but in favour of the former are—(1) That the ἀνενέγκαι as a priestly function stands in such close connection with ἱεράτευμα ἅγ., that it seems out of place to suppose a medium (διὰ Ἰησ. Χρ.) in addition; and (2) With ἀνενέγκαι πνευμ. θυσίας the idea is substantially completed, εὐπροσδ. being a mere adjunct, to which therefore διὰ Ἰ. Χρ. also belongs.

REMARK.—In this description of the Christians' calling, the apostle's first object is not to state the difference between the church of the Old and that of the New Covenant, but to show distinctly that in the latter there is and should have been fulfilled what had aforetime indeed been promised to the former, but had appeared in her only in a typical and unsatisfactory way. The points of difference are distinctly set forth. Israel had an house of God—the Christian church is called to be *itself* that house of God. That house was built of *inanimate* stones, this of *living* stones; it is a *spiritual* house. Israel was to be an holy priesthood, but it was so only in the particular priesthood introduced into the church; the Christian church is called to be a ἱεράτευμα ἅγιον in this sense, that *each individual in it is called upon to perform the office of priest.* The sacrifices

[1] Brückner and Schott think it is correct to connect διὰ Ἰ. Χρ. not with ἀνενέγκαι only, but with the *entire* thought; but it is self-understood that in the first combination, not the *mere* ἀναφέρειν, but the ἀναφέρειν πνευματικὰς θυσίας κ.τ.λ., must be considered as effected by Christ.

which the priests in Israel had to offer were beasts and the like; those of the Christians are, on the other hand, *spiritual* sacrifices, through Christ well-pleasing to God. — The idea of a universal priesthood, here expressed, is opposed not only to the catholic doctrine of a particular priesthood, but to all teaching with regard to the office of the administration of word and sacrament which in any way ascribes to its possessors an importance in the church, resting on divine mandate, and *necessary* for the communication of salvation (*i.e.* priestly importance).

Ver. 6 gives the ground for the exhortation contained in vv. 4, 5 by a quotation of the passage, Isa. xxviii. 16, to which reference was already made in ver. 4. — διότι] cf. i. 24. — περιέχει ἐν τῇ γραφῇ] an uncommon construction, yet not without parallel, see Joseph. *Antt.* xi. 7: βούλομαι γίνεσθαι πάντα, καθὼς ἐν αὐτῇ (*i.e.* ἐπιστολῇ) περιέχει; indeed περιέχειν is more than once used to denote the contents of a writing, see Acts xxiii. 25; Joseph. *Antt.* xi. 9: καὶ ἡ μὲν ἐπιστολὴ ταῦτα περιεῖχεν. Either ἡ περιοχή (or ὁ τόπος) must, with Wahl, be supplied here as subject; or better, περιέχει must be taken impersonally as equal to, continetur; cf. Winer, p. 237 [E. T. 316]; Buttmann, p. 126. — The words of the passage in the O. T. (Isa. xxviii. 16) are quoted neither literally from the LXX. nor exactly according to the Hebrew text. In the LXX. it is: ἰδού, ἐγὼ ἐμβάλλω εἰς τὰ θεμέλια Σιὼν (instead of which we have here, exactly as in Rom. ix. 33: ἰδού, τίθημι ἐν Σιὼν) λίθον πολυτελῆ (this adject. here omitted) ἐκλεκτὸν ἀκρογωνιαῖον (these two words here transposed) ἔντιμον εἰς τὰ θεμέλια αὐτῆς (the last two words εἰς . . . αὐτῆς here left out) καὶ ὁ πιστεύων (ἐπ' αὐτῷ added) οὐ μὴ καταισχυνθῇ (Rom. ix. 33: καὶ πᾶς ὁ πιστεύων ἐπ' αὐτῷ οὐ καταισχυνθήσεται). Whatever may be understood by the stone in Zion, whether the theocracy, or the temple, or the house of David, or the promise given to David, 2 Sam. vii. 12, 16 (Hofmann), this passage, which certainly has a Messianic character,—inasmuch as the thought expressed in it should find, and has found, its fulfilment in Christ,—is not here only, but by Paul and the Rabbis (see Vitringa, *ad Jes.* I. p. 217), taken to refer directly to the Messiah, who also, according to Delitzsch (cf. *in loc.*), is directly meant by the stone (" this stone is the true seed of David, manifested in

Christ"). Luther, following Oecumenius and Theophylactus, assumes that Christ is called λίθος ἀκρογων. because He has united Jew and Gentile together, and out of both collected the *one* church; this Calvin, not entirely without reason, calls a subtilius philosophari. In the words: καὶ ὁ πιστεύων κ.τ.λ., πιστεύων corresponds to προσερχόμενοι, ver. 4. οὐ μὴ καταισχυνθῇ does not refer to the glory which consists for the believer in this, "that he, as a λίθος ζῶν, will form part of the οἶκος πν." (Wiesinger), but to "the final glory of salvation which is the aim of the present πιστεύειν" (Schott); cf. ver. 2: εἰς σωτηρίαν.[1]

Ver. 7. ὑμῖν οὖν ἡ τιμὴ τοῖς πιστεύουσιν] Conclusion, with special reference to the readers, ὑμῖν, drawn from ver. 6 (οὖν), and in the first instance from the second half of the O. T. quotation, for τοῖς πιστεύουσιν evidently stands related to ὁ πιστεύων ἐπ' αὐτῷ, hence the definite article. On the position of τοῖς πιστ., cf. Winer, p. 511 [E. T. 687]; only, with Winer, it must not be interpreted: "as believers, *i.e. if* ye are believers," but: "*ye who are believers.*" — From the fact that ἡ τιμή echoes ἔντιμον, it must not be concluded that ἡ τιμή here is the worth which the stone possesses, and that the meaning is: "the worth which the stone has, it has for you who believe" (Wiesinger). The clause would then have read perhaps: ὑμῖν οὖν ὁ λίθος ἐστι ἡ τιμή, or the like. ἡ τιμή stands rather in antithesis to καταισχυνθῆναι, and takes up positively what had been expressed negatively in the verse immediately preceding. Gerhard: vobis, qui per fidem tanquam lapides vivi super eum aedificamini, est honor coram Deo (so, too, de Wette-Brückner, Weiss, Schott); ὑμῖν, *sc.* ἐστι: "*yours therefore is the honour;*" the article is not without significance here; the honour, namely, which in that word is awarded to believers (Steiger). — τοῖς πιστεύουσιν] an explanatory adjunct placed by way of emphasis at the end. — ἀπειθοῦσι [ἀπιστοῦσιν] δέ] antithesis to τοῖς πιστεύουσιν; ἀπειθεῖν denotes not only the simple *not* believing, but the resistance against belief; thus also ἀπιστοῦσιν here, if it be the true reading. Bengel wrongly explains the dative by:

[1] Hofmann is wrong in asserting that it is here said "that οὐ μὴ καταισχύνθῇ is meant to *call back to mind* the εἰς σωτηρίαν in ver. 2."

quod attinet; it is the dat. *incommodi* (Steiger, de Wette, etc.). The words: λίθος (λίθον) . . . γωνίας, are borrowed literally from Ps. cxviii. 22, after the LXX. What is fatal for unbelievers in the fact that the stone is become the corner-stone (κεφ. γων. equals λιθ. ἀκρογ.) is stated in the following words, which are taken from Isa. viii. 14: לְאֶבֶן נֶגֶף וּלְצוּר מִכְשׁוֹל[1] In a manner similar though not quite identical, these passages of the O. T. are woven together by Paul in Rom. ix. 33. The words do not denote the subjective conduct of the unbelievers (according to Luther, the occasion of stumbling or offence which they find in the preaching of the cross), but the objective destruction which they bring upon themselves by their unbelief (Steiger, de Wette-Brückner, Wiesinger, Schott, Frommüller); cf. Luke xx. 17, 18, where the *corner-stone* is also characterized as a *stone of destruction* for unbelievers. It is therefore without any foundation that Hofmann asserts "the thought that, to the disobedient, Christ is become the corner-stone seems impossible," if ἀπειθοῦσιν be taken as the dat. incommodi. So that it is in no way necessary to accept a construction so uncommon as that adopted by Hofmann, who considers the two clauses: ὑμῖν . . . οἰκοδομοῦντες to be, with an omitted ὤν, in apposition to the following οὗτος, looking on ἡ τιμή as a kind of personal designation of the stone, and separating the three following expressions: εἰς κεφ. γων., λιθ. προκόμμ., and πέτρα σκανδ. in such a way as to refer the first to believers and the other two to unbelievers, although no such division is anywhere hinted at.

Ver. 8. οἱ προσκόπτουσι] links itself on to ἀπειθοῦσι κ.τ.λ.: "*that is to those who*," etc., not to what follows, as if εἰσι were to be supplied: "they who stumble are those who are," etc. — προσκόπτειν has here the same meaning as that contained in the last words, but the turn of the thought is different; there, it is shown what Christ is become to the unbelievers, namely, the ground of their destruction; here, on the contrary, that they are really overtaken by this destruction; Lorinus explains προσκόπτουσι incorrectly: verbo offenduntur et

[1] Schott rightly observes that κεφαλὴ γωνίας, as the corner-stone, must not be understood, with Gerhard and Steiger, as one on which one stumbles and falls. This is not contained in the idea, corner-stone, in itself.

scandalizantur, id blasphemant et male de illo loquuntur. — τῷ λόγῳ ἀπειθοῦντες] It is better to connect τῷ λόγῳ with ἀπειθοῦντες than with προσκόπτουσι (either: "who at the word are offended," or: "who by the word suffer hurt"). For, on the one hand, the leading idea προσκ. would be weakened by its connection with λόγῳ; and, on the other, the nearer definition requisite is supplied of itself from what precedes; it would, too, be inappropriate "that λόγος should of a sudden take the place of Christ, who in ver. 7 is, as λίθος, the object of προσκ." (Brückner). Wolf: *qui impingunt*, nempe: in lapidem illum angularem, *verbo non credentes:* quo ipso et offensio ipsa et ejus causa indicatur. — εἰς ὃ καὶ ἐτέθησαν] εἰς ὅ not equal to ἐφ' ᾧ, "on account of which;" nor is it equal to εἰς ὅν (*sc.* λόγον or λίθον); Luther: "on which they are placed;" or similarly Bolten: "they stumble at that, on which they should have been laid" (he makes εἰς ὅ refer to the omitted object of προσκ.), but it points rather to the end of ἐτέθησαν.[1] — τίθημι] is here, as frequently in the N. T., "to appoint, constituere" (cf. 1 Thess. v. 9). It is clear from the connection of this verse with the preceding, that εἰς ὅ does not go back to ver. 5 (Gerhard: in hoc positi sunt, videlicet, ut ipsi quoque in hunc lapidem fide aedificarentur). It may be referred either to ἀπειθεῖν (Calvin, Beza, Piscator, and others) or to προσκόπτειν and ἀπειθεῖν (Estius, Pott, de Wette, Usteri, Hofmann, Wiesinger,[2] etc.), or, more correctly, to προσκόπτειν (Grotius, Hammond, Benson, Hensler, Steiger, Weiss),

[1] The application to the *Word* or to *Christ* occurs already in the older commentators; thus Beda says: in hoc positi sunt i. e. per naturam facti sunt homines, ut credant Deo et ejus voluntati obtemperent; and Nicol. de Lyra, applying it specially to the Jews: illis data fuit lex, ut disponerentur ad Christum secundum quod dicitur Gal. iii. lex paedagogus noster fuit in Christo; et ipsi pro majore parte remanserunt incredduli.

[2] Different interpreters seek in various ways to soften the harshness of the idea here presented. Thus Estius, by explaining ἐτέθησαν only of the permission of God; Pott, by paraphrasing the idea thus: "their lot seemed to bring this with it;" Wiesinger, by asserting that "the passage here speaks of the action of God as a matter of history, not of His eternal decrees." But what justifies any such softening down? While Hofmann, in the 1st edition of his *Schriftbeweis*, I. p. 210, says precisely: that God has ordained them to this, that they should not become obedient to His word, but should stumble at it and fall over it; in the 2d ed. I. p. 237, it appears that the meaning only is: "that the evil which befalls them in the very fact of their not believing, is ordained

since on the latter (not on ἀπειθεῖν) the chief emphasis of the thought lies, and εἰς ὃ κ.τ.λ. applies to that which is predicated of the subject, that is, of the ἀπειθοῦντες, but not to the characteristic according to which the subject is designated. The προσκόπτειν it is to which they, the ἀπειθοῦντες, were already appointed, and withal on account of their unbelief, as appears from the τῷ λόγῳ ἀπειθ. This interpretation alone is in harmony with the connection of thought, for it is simply the πιστεύοντες and ἀπειθοῦντες, together with the blessing and curse which they respectively obtain, that are here contrasted, without any reference being made to the precise ground of faith and unbelief. Vorstius correctly: Incredulli sunt designati vel constituti ad hoc, ut poenam sive exitium sibi accersant sua incredulitate. — Following the construction of ver. 7 adopted by him, Hofmann takes οἱ προσκόπτουσιν not as an adjunct referring to what precedes, but as protasis to the subsequent εἰς ὅ, which, according to him, contains the apodosis expressed in the form of an exclamation. This interpretation falls with that of ver. 7. Besides, it gives rise to a construction entirely abnormal, and of which there is no other example in the N. T., either as regards the relative pronoun[1] or the method here resorted to, of connecting apodosis with protasis. The words are added by the apostle in order to show that the being put to shame of unbelievers, takes place according to divine determination and direction.

by God to those who do not obey His message of salvation, as a punishment of their disposition of mind." Schott agrees with this view. But in it the idea of ἐτέθησαν in relation to ἀπειθοῦντες is arbitrarily weakened; since Schott expressly says that unbelievers, by their own state of mind, "appoint themselves to unbelief," he can look on unbelief only in so far as the result of a divine decree, that God has appointed faith impossible with a carnal disposition. But a limitation of this kind is here all the more inappropriate, that Peter in the passage makes no allusion to the disposition which lies at the foundation of unbelief. Hofmann in his commentary says: "it is the word which is preached to them that they refuse to obey, but by the very fact of their doing so they stumble at Christ and fall over Him, as over a stone that lies in the way. Both are one and the same thing, named from different sides; the one time from what they do, the other from what is done to them." Yet these are two different things; the one the cause, the other the effect.

[1] Hofmann, indeed, appeals to Matt. xxvi. 50; but the interpretation of this passage is so doubtful that it cannot be relied upon; cf. the various interpretations in Meyer on this passage; in Winer, p. 157 [E. T. 207 f.]; in Buttmann, p. 217.

Oecumenius[1] is not justified by the context in laying special stress on the personal guilt of unbelief; or Aretius, in answering the question: quis autem illos sic posuit? by non Deus certe, sed Satan tales posuit.

Ver. 9. *ὑμεῖς δέ*] The apostle returns again to his readers, contrasting them with the unbelievers (not "with the people of Israel," as Weiss thinks) he had just spoken of. The nature of believers, as such, is described by the same predicates which were originally applied to the O. T. church of God (cf. Ex. xix. 5, 6), but have found their accomplishment only in that of the N. T. Schott justly remarks that "what in ver. 5 had been expressed in the form of an exhortation, is here predicated of the Christians as an already present condition." — *γένος ἐκλεκτόν*] after Isa. xliii. 20 (עַמִּי בְחִירִי, LXX.: *γένος μου τὸ ἐκλεκτόν*); cf. also Deut. vii. 6 ff.; Isa. xliii. 10, xliv. 1, 2, xlv. 4, etc. This first designation sets forth that the Christians, in virtue of God's love, have been elected to be a people which no longer belongs to this world; cf. chap. i. 1. — *βασίλειον ἱεράτευμα*] after Ex. xix. 6, LXX. (in Hebrew מַמְלֶכֶת כֹּהֲנִים, "a kingdom of priests"); most interpreters take it as simple combination of the two ideas: "kings and priests." Still it is more correct to regard *ἱεράτευμα* as the principal idea (cf. ver. 3), and *βασίλειον* as a more precise definition: "*a royal priesthood*." Several commentators explain: "a priesthood possessing a royal character," inasmuch as it not only offers up sacrifices (ver. 5), but exercises sway (over the world); cf. Rev. i. 6, v. 10 (Wiesinger). Weiss (p. 125), on the other hand: "a priesthood serving Jehovah the King, just as we speak of the royal household." Since all the other predicates express the belonging to God, the second explanation deserves the preference, only it must be modified so far as to include in *βασίλ.* not only the relation of *service*, but that also of *belonging* to and participation in the glory of the king

[1] Οὐχ ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ εἰς τοῦτο ἀφωρισμένοις, εἴρηται· οὐδεμία γὰρ αἰτία ἀπωλείας παρὰ τοῦ πάντας ἀνθρώπους θέλοντος σωθῆναι βραβεύεται· ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἑαυτοῖς σκευὴ κατηρτικόσιν ὀργῆς καὶ ἡ ἀπείθεια ἐπηκολούθησε, καὶ εἰς ἣν παρεσκεύασαν ἑαυτοὺς τάξιν ἐτέθησαν. Thus also Didymus: ad non credendum a semetipsis sunt positi; and Hornejus: constituti ad impingendum et non credendum ideo dicuntur, quia cum credere sermoni Dei nollent, sed ultro eum repellerent, deserti a Deo sunt et ipsius permissione traditi ut non crederent et impingerent.

founded thereon. Schott is not justified in assuming that Peter did not intend to convey the force of the Greek, but that of the Hebrew expression: מַמְלֶכֶת כֹּהֲנִים, namely: "a kingdom which consists of priests." It is inadequate to understand, with Hofmann, by the term: "a priesthood of princely honours," or *βασίλειον* as equal to, magnificus, splendidus (Aretius, Hottinger, etc.), or to find in it the expression of the highest freedom[1] (subject only to God) (de Wette). — *ἔθνος ἅγιον*] in like manner after Ex. xix. 6, LXX. (גּוֹי קָדוֹשׁ). — *λαὸς εἰς περιποίησιν*] corresponding passages in the O. T. are Deut. vii. 6 (עַם סְגֻלָּה), Mal. iii. 17 (סְגֻלָּה), and especially Isa. xliii. 21, LXX.: *λαόν μου ὃν περιεποιησάμην τὰς ἀρετάς μου διηγεῖσθαι* (עַם־זוּ יָצַרְתִּי לִי תְּהִלָּתִי יְסַפֵּרוּ). The words following show that the apostle had this last passage chiefly in his mind; still it must be noted that this idea is contained already in Ex. xix. 5 (*λαὸς περιούσιος*). *περιποίησις* is strictly the *acquiring* (Heb. x. 39); here, what is *acquired, possession;* neither destinatus (Vorstius) nor positus (Calovius) is to be supplied to *εἰς*, they would not correspond with the sense; *εἰς* is here to be explained from Mal. iii. 17, LXX.: *ἔσονταί μοι . . . εἰς περιποίησιν*; on *εἶναι εἰς*, cf. Winer, p. 173 [E. T. 229]; in sense it is equivalent to *λαὸς περιούσιος*, Tit. ii. 14. Schott attributes to this expression an eschatological reference, explaining: "a people destined for appropriation, for acquisition;" this is incorrect, for, understood thus, it would fall out of all analogy with the other expressions. The apostle does not here state to what the Christian church is destined, but what she already is; "her complete liberation from all cosmic powers is not," as Brückner justly remarks, "an acquiring on God's side, but only the final redemption of those whom He already possesses." Schott's assertion, that in the N. T. *περιποίησις* has always an eschatological reference, is opposed by Eph. i. 14; cf. Meyer *in loc.* — Although a difference of idea founded on the etymologies of *γένος*, *ἔθνος* *λαός* is not to be pressed;[2] yet it must

[1] Clemens Al. interprets: regale, quoniam ad regnum vocati sumus et sumus Christi sacerdotium autem propter oblationem quae fit orationibus et doctrinis, quibus adquiruntur animae, quae afferuntur Deo.

[2] Steiger draws the following distinction: *γένος* is the race, people of like descent; *ἔθνος*, a people of like customs; *λαός*, people as the mass. Schott thinks

be observed that by these expressions, as also by *ἱεράτευμα*, Christians are spoken of as a community united together in itself, and although diverse as to natural descent, they, as belonging to God (and all the names employed by the apostle point to this), form *one* people, from the fact that God has joined them to Himself. — *ὅπως τὰς ἀρετὰς ἐξαγγείλητε τοῦ κ.τ.λ.*] *ὅπως* connects itself, after Isa. xliii. 21, in the first instance with what immediately goes before, in such a way, however, that the preceding ideas point towards it as their end. — *τὰς ἀρετάς*] thus the LXX. translate תְּהִלָּה in the above-mentioned passage (in general, in the LXX., *ἀρετή* occurs only as the translation of הוֹד, Hab. iii. 3, Zech. vi. 13; *ἀρεταί* as the translation of תְּהִלָּה, Isa. xlii. 8, 12, xliii. 21, and of תְּהִלּוֹת, Isa. lxiii. 7); accordingly the Alexandrine translators understand by הוֹד and תְּהִלָּה in the passages in question, not the "glory or praise" of God, but the object of the glory, that is, the excellence or the glorious attributes of God. Peter took the word, in this meaning of it, from them.[1] — *ἐξαγγείλητε*] cf. Isa. xlii. 12, LXX.: *τὰς ἀρετὰς αὐτοῦ ἐν ταῖς νήσοις ἀπαγγελοῦσι*; *ἐξαγγέλλειν*; strictly, iis qui foris sunt nunciare quae intus fiunt (Xen. *Anab.* ii. 4. 21), is employed for the most part without this definite application; in the LXX. the translation of סִפֵּר; in the N. T. in this passage only; it is possible that Peter thought of the word here in its original force (Bengel, Wiesinger). — *τοῦ ἐκ σκότους ὑμᾶς καλέσαντος*] *i.e.* *Θεοῦ*, not *Χριστοῦ*; *καλεῖν* is almost uniformly attributed to God. —

that *ἔθνος* includes within it a reference to the intellectual and moral characteristics of the people, and that *λαός* points to its being gathered together under one Lord. In this urging of distinctions—which are not even correctly drawn—is to be found the reason why Schott exchanges the Greek expression *βασιλ. ἱεράτευμα* for the Hebrew, because *ἱεράτευμα* is not analogous to the other three designations, whilst *βασίλειον* is so, as a national community. — Peter certainly, in selecting these expressions, did not reflect on the original distinction of the ideas, but made use of them simply as they were presented to him in the O. T.

[1] It is arbitrary to understand the word to mean only this or that attribute of God; nor must the meaning, as is done by Gerhard, be limited to the virtutes Dei, quae in opere gratuitae vocationis et in toto negotio salutis nostrae relucent. Schott's interpretation is linguistically incorrect: *αἱ ἀρεταί* equal to *τὰ μεγαλεῖα τ. Θ.* (Acts ii. 11), "the great deeds of God." Cornelius a Lapide entirely misses the point in explaining: virtutes, quas Christus in nobis operatur, humilitatem, caritatem, etc.; and Salmeron: virtutes Christi, quas in diebus carnis suae exhibuit.

σκότους, not equivalent to, miseria (Wahl), but is used to designate the whole unhappy condition of sin and lying in which the natural and unregenerate man is, cf. Col. i. 13; here employed, no doubt, with special reference to the former heathenism of the readers. — *εἰς τὸ θαυμαστὸν αὐτοῦ φῶς*] To render *φῶς* by cognitio melior (Wahl), is arbitrarily to weaken the force of the word; it is rather the complete opposite of *σκότος*, and denotes the absolutely holy and blessed nature——as *αὐτοῦ* shows—*of God*. The Christian is translated from darkness to the light of God, so that he participates in this light, and is illumined by it.[1] Schott incorrectly understands by *σκότος*: "heathen humanity left to itself," and by *τὸ . . . αὐτοῦ φῶς*: "the church;" the church lives in God's light, but it is not the light of God. — *καλεῖν* is here applied, as it is by Paul, to the effectual, successful calling of God. — *θαυμαστόν*] (cf. Matt. xxi. 42) denotes the inconceivable glory of the *φῶς Θεοῦ*.

Ver. 10. A reference to Hos. ii. 25, linking itself on to the end of the preceding verse, in which the former and present conditions of the readers are contrasted. This difference the verse emphasizes by means of a simple antithesis. The passage in Hosea runs: וְרִחַמְתִּי אֶת־לֹא רֻחָמָה וְאָמַרְתִּי לְלֹא־עַמִּי עַמִּי־אָתָּה, LXX.: *ἀγαπήσω τὴν οὐκ ἠγαπημένην καὶ ἐρῶ τῷ οὐ λαῷ μου· λαός μου εἶ σύ* (the Cod. Alex. and the Ed. Aldina have at the commencement the additional words: *ἐλεήσω τὴν οὐκ ἠλεημένην*). — *οἱ ποτὲ οὐ λαός*] Grotius, Steiger, Weiss incorrectly supply: *Θεοῦ*. *λαός* is here used absolutely (Bengel: ne populus quidem, nedum Dei populus). *οὐ* belongs not to *ἦτε* to be supplied, but is closely connected with *λαός*, equivalent to "*no-people*." In like manner *οὐκ ἠλεημένοι* as equal to "*not-obtained mercy*." "The meaning is not that they once were not what they now are, but that they were the opposite of it" (Wiesinger). But *οὐ . . . λαός* is a people who, in their separation from God, are without that unity of life in which alone they can be considered by Him

[1] Wiesinger disputes this interpretation, holding that what is meant is "that light which has appeared to the world in Christ;" but is not this light the light of God? — Certainly *φῶς* is here not i. q. *Χριστός*. According to de Wette, *αὐτοῦ* designates the light as the *work* of God, and consequently a different thing from the *φῶς* which He is Himself.

as a people; or, more simply, who do not serve God who is the true King of every people; cf. Deut. xxxii. 21, and Keil *in loc.* De Wette is hardly satisfactory: "they were not a people, inasmuch as they were without the principle of all true nationality, the real knowledge of God," etc.; now they are a *people*, even a people of God, inasmuch as they not only serve God, but are received also by God into community of life with Himself. — *οἱ οὐκ ἠλεημένοι, νῦν δὲ ἐλεηθέντες*] The part. perf. denotes their former and ended condition. Standing as it does here not as a verb, but as a substantive, like *οὐ . . . λαός*, it cannot be taken as a plusquam-perf. part. (in opposition to Hofmann). The aorist part. points, on the other hand, to the fact of pardon having been extended: "once not in possession of mercy, but now having *become* partakers of it" (Winer, p. 322[1] [E. T. 431]).

Vv. 11, 12. A new exhortation: the central thought is expressed in the beginning of ver. 12. The apostle, after describing its peculiarly lofty dignity, considers the Christian church in its relation to the non-Christian world, and shows how believers must prove themselves blameless before it by right conduct in the different relations of human life. The condition necessary for this is stated in ver. 11. — *Ἀγαπητοί*]

[1] In the original passage these words apply to Israel; but from this it does not follow that Peter writes to Jewish-Christians. For if Paul—as he clearly does—applies the passage (Rom. ix. 25) to the calling of the heathen, then Peter surely, with equal right, could use it with reference to the heathen converts. They had been, in its full sense, that which God says to Israel: לֹא־עַמִּי; and they had become that to which He would again make Israel, *His people.* It must be observed, however, that God in that passage addresses Israel as לֹא־עַמִּי, only because it had forsaken Him and given itself up to the worship of Baal, and consequently incurred punishment. Apart from this, Israel had always remained the people of God. — If only Jewish converts were meant here, then Peter would assume that they in their Judaism had been idolaters, which is absolutely impossible, or at least Peter must then have said why they, who as Israelites were the people of God, could not in their former state be regarded as such. Accordingly, *οὐ λαός* is here in no way applicable to Israel, but only to the heathen; and it is not (as Weiss maintains, p. 119) purely arbitrary to apply the passage, in opposition to its original sense, to heathen Christians. Whilst Brückner says only that the words cannot serve to prove the readers to have been Jews formerly, Wiesinger rightly and most decidedly denies the possibility of applying them to Jewish converts; so, too, Schott. — Weiss's assertion is by no means justified by his insisting (*die Petr. Frage*, p. 626) that nothing tenable has been brought forward against it.

This form of address expresses the affectionate, impressive earnestness of the following exhortation. — *παρακαλῶ* (*sc.* *ὑμᾶς*) *ὡς παροίκους καὶ παρεπιδήμους*]; cf. Ps. xxxix. 13, LXX. — *ὡς*, as in i. 14. — *πάροικος*, cf. i. 17, in its strict sense: Acts vii. 6, 29, equal to, inquilinus, he who dwells in a town (or land) where he has no civil rights; cf. Luke xxiv. 18. In Eph. ii. 19 it stands as synonymous with *ξένος*, of the relation of the heathen to the kingdom of God. — *παρεπίδημος*, cf. i. 1. The home of the believer is heaven, on earth he is a stranger. Calvin: sic eos appellat, non quia a patria exularent, ac dissipati essent in diversis regionibus, sed quia filii Dei, ubicunque terrarum agant, mundi sunt hospites; cf. Heb. xi. 13–15. A distinction between the two words is not to be pressed here; the same idea is expressed by two words, in order to emphasize it the more strongly. Luther inexactly translates *παρεπίδημοι* by "pilgrims." — Even if *ἀπέχεσθαι* be the true reading, the words *ὡς παροίκους κ.τ.λ.* must be connected with *παρακαλῶ* (as opposed to de Wette-Brückner, Wiesinger), for they show in what character Peter now regarded his readers (Hofmann)[1] in relation to the following exhortations, and have reference not simply to the admonition *ἀπέχεσθαι*; as Weiss also (p. 45) rightly remarks. Probably, however, *ἀπέχεσθε* is the original reading, and was changed into the infinitive in order to make the connection with *παρακαλῶ* more close. *ἀπέχεσθαι* presents the negative aspect of sanctification, as chap. ii. 1: *ἀποθέμενοι*. — *τῶν σαρκικῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν*] similar expressions in Gal. v. 10; Eph. ii. 3; 2 Pet. ii. 18. The *ἐπιθυμίαι* are *σαρκικαί*, because they have their seat in the *σάρξ*. Wiesinger improperly says that "the lusts which manifest themselves outwardly" are here meant, for *all* *ἐπιθυμίαι* tend to, and do, manifest themselves outwardly, if there be no *ἀπέχεσθαι*. Schott assumes, without reason, that the *ἐπιθυμίαι* are here considered "as something *outside* of the Christian community, and manifesting itself only in the surrounding heathen population;" they are indeed peculiar to the unbelieving world; but the Christian, too, has them still in his *σάρξ*, though he can and should prevent them

[1] In the former exhortations Peter had regarded them as *τέκνα ὑπακοῆς*, as such who call on God as Father, as regenerate.

from having a determining power over him, inasmuch as in the world over which they rule he is a *πάροικος καὶ παρεπίδημος*.[1] This sequence of thought lies plainly indicated in the close connection of the exhortation with what precedes (as opposed to Hofmann). — *αἵτινες στρατεύονται κατὰ τῆς ψυχῆς*] is not a definition of the *σαρκικαί*, but as *αἵτινες*, equal to "*as those which*," shows, explains the nature of the *ἐπιθυμίαι σαρκικαί*, thus giving the reason of the exhortation. — *στρατεύειν* is not: "to lay siege to" (Steiger), but: "to *war*," "*fight against*," as in Jas. iv. 1 (Rom. vii. 23: *ἀντιστρατεύεσθαι*). — *ψυχή* has here its usual meaning; it is neither: vita et salus animae (Hornejus, Grotius), nor: ratio (Pott: libidines, quae nos impellunt ad peragenda ea, quae rationi contraria sunt); nor does it mean: "the *new* man" (Gerhard: totus homo novus ac interior, quatenus est per Spiritum s. renovatus), nor: the soul, "in so far as it is penetrated by the Holy Spirit" (Steiger), nor: "life as determined by the new Ego" (Schott); but it is here simply, in contradistinction to *σῶμα*, the spiritual substance of man of which Peter says that it must be sanctified (chap. i. 22), and its *σωτηρία* is the end of faith (chap. i. 9); thus also de Wette-Brückner, Wiesinger, Hofmann, Fronmüller. In the natural man the *ψυχή* is under the power of the *ἐπιθυμίαι σαρκικαί* (which according to Jas. iv. 1 have their dwelling *ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν*; cf. also Rom. vii. 23); in him who is regenerate, it is delivered from them, yet the *ἐπιθυμίαι* seek to bring it again into subjection, so that it may fail of its *σωτηρία*;—in this consists the *στρατεύεσθαι κατὰ τῆς ψυχῆς*. — Ver. 12. *τὴν ἀναστροφὴν ὑμῶν* (chap. i. 15, 17) *ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν ἔχοντες καλήν*] *ἐν τοῖς ἔθν.*: "among the Gentiles;" for the churches to whom Peter wrote were in Gentile lands. — *ἔχοντες καλήν*: Luther inexactly: "lead a good mode of life;" *καλήν* is a predicate: "*having your mode of life good* (*as one good*);" cf. chap. iv. 8. — *ἔχοντες* (antithesis to *ἀπέχεσθε*, ver. 11) is not here put for the imperative, but is

[1] Calvin interprets: carnis desideria intelligit, non tantum crassos et cum pecudibus communes appetitus, sed omnes animae nostrae affectus, ad quos natura ferimur et ducimur. This goes too far, as it would demand the destruction not alone of the striving against the Spirit, natural to man in his sinful condition, but of the entire life of the soul. Cf. Gal. v. 17.

a participle subordinate to the finite verb; if *ἀπέχεσθαι* be read, there is here, as in Eph. iv. 2, Col. iii. 16, an irregularity in the construction by which the idea contained in the participle is significantly made prominent. — *ἵνα ἐν ᾧ καταλαλοῦσιν κ.τ.λ.*] "*that in the matter in which they revile you as evil-doers they may, on the ground of the good works they themselves have beheld, glorify God*," *i.e.* in order that the matter which was made the ground of their evil-speaking, may by your good works become to them the ground of giving glory to God. — *ἵνα* states the purpose; not for *ὥστε*; *ἐν ᾧ* is not: *ἐν ᾧ χρόνῳ*, as in Mark ii. 19 (Pott, Hensler), for the *καταλαλεῖν* and the *δοξάζειν* cannot be simultaneous; nor is it: pro eo quod (Beza), such a construction has no grammatical justification; but *ἐν* specifies here, as in verb. affect., the occasioning object (cf. chap. iv. 4), and the relative refers to a demonstrative to be supplied, which stands in the same relation to *δοξάζωσι* as *ἐν ᾧ* to *καταλαλοῦσιν*. It is not then *τοῦτο*, but *ἐν τούτῳ*, which is to be supplied (Steiger, de Wette, Wiesinger, Hofmann). If *τοῦτο* were to be supplied it would be dependent on *ἐποπτεύσαντες*; but such a construction is opposed by the circumstance that it is not this participle, but *δοξάζωσι*, which forms the antithesis to *καταλαλοῦσι*. The participle is interposed here absolutely (as in Eph. iii. 4: *ἀναγινώσκοντες*), and *ἐκ τῶν καλῶν ἔργων* is connected with *δοξάζωσι*, the sense being: "*on account of your good works*." Steiger specifies the *καλὰ ἔργα* as that which occasions the *καταλαλεῖν*,—and later the *δοξάζειν τὸν Θεόν*,—but the subsequent *ἐκ τῶν καλῶν ἔργων* does not agree with this; de Wette gives: "the whole tenor of life;" the connection with what precedes might suggest the *ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν σαρκ. ἐπιθυμιῶν*;[1] but it is simpler,

[1] So formerly in this commentary, with the observation: "Of this *ἀπέχεσθαι* Peter says, chap. iv. 3, 4, that it seemed strange to the heathen; for it is precisely this abstinence which gives the Christian life its peculiar character, and distinguishes it from that of the heathen. It became the ground of evil report for this reason, that immoral motives were supposed to be concealed behind it; and this was all the more natural that the Christian had necessarily to place himself in opposition to many of the ordinances of heathen life, and that from a Gentile point of view his obedience to the will of God must have appeared a violation of the law. This prejudice could not be better overcome than by the practice of good works; hence, *τὴν ἀναστρ. ὑμ. . . . καλήν*, and the reference to it in *ἐκ τ. καλ. ἔργων*."

with Hofmann, to understand by it generally the *Christian profession.* — With *κακοποιοί*, cf. ver. 14, iv. 15; John xviii. 30. Brückner, Wiesinger, Weiss (p. 367) justly reject the opinion of Hug, Neander, etc., that *κακοποιός* here, in harmony with the passage in Suetonius, *Vit. Ner.* c. 16: Christiani genus hominum superstitionis novae et *maleficae*, is equivalent to "state criminal." In the mouth of a heathen the word would signify a criminal, though not exactly a vicious man; one who had been guilty of such crimes as theft, murder, and the like (cf. iv. 15), which are punished by the state[1] (cf. ver. 14). — *ἐκ τῶν καλῶν ἔργων*] The *καλὰ ἔργα*, in the practice of which the *ἀναστοφὴ καλή* of the Christians consists, are here presented as the motive by which, when they see them, the heathen are to be induced to substitute the glorifying of God for their evil-speaking; as the Christians too, on their part, are often exhorted to holiness of life, that thus they may overcome the opposition of the Gentiles, cf. chap. iii. 2. Hofmann incorrectly interprets *ἐκ τ. καλ. ἔργων ἐποπτεύοντες*: "if the heathen judge of your Christianity by your good works;" for *ἐποπτεύειν* does not mean "*to judge of.*" With *ἐκ τ. καλ. ἔργων . . . δοξάσωσι τ. Θεόν*, comp. Christ's words, Matt. v. 16, which, as Weiss not without reason assumes, may have here been present to the apostle's mind. — *ἐποπτεύοντες*] "goes back in thought to the *καλὰ ἔργα*, in harmony with the linguistic parallel in iii. 2 and the grammatical parallel in Eph. iii. 4" (de Wette). It makes no essential difference in the sense whether the present or, with the *Rec.*, the aorist be read (see critical remarks). The word occurs only here and in iii. 2, where it is used with the accusative of the object (for the subst. *ἐπόπτης*, see 2 Pet. i. 16). It expresses the idea of seeing with one's own eyes, more strongly than the simple *ὁρᾶν*. There is no reference here to the use of the word as applied to those who were initiated into the third grade of the Eleusinian mysteries. —

[1] Schott's assumption: "that it was the burning of Rome that first increased the universal hatred and aversion of the Christians to a special accusation of criminal and immoral principles," is unwarranted. He attempts to justify it only by charging Tacitus with an error in the account he gives of the accusations brought by Nero against the Christians.

ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ἐπισκοπῆς] ἐπισκοπή is in the LXX. a translation of פְּקֻדָּה, the visitation of God, whether it be to bless (Job x. 12) or to chastise (Isa. x. 3); ἡμέρα ἐπισκοπῆς is therefore the time when God gives salvation, or the time when He punishes, be it in the general sense (Beda: dies extremi judicii), or more specially with reference either to the Christians or the heathen.—The connection of thought seems to point decisively to that time as meant when the καταλαλοῦντες shall be brought to repentance and faith, that is, to "the gracious visitation of the heathen" (Steiger); as ὁ καιρὸς τῆς ἐπισκοπῆς σου, Luke xix. 44, is used with regard to the Jews. This interpretation is to be found already in the Fathers and in many later commentators, as Nicol. de Lyra, Erasm., Hemming, Vorstius, Beza, Steiger, de Wette, Wiesinger, Hofmann, etc. On the other hand, Oecumenius, Wolf, Bengel, etc., apply the ἐπισκοπή not to God, but understand by it the ἐξέτασις of the Christians at the hands of the heathen. But for this there is absolutely no ground. Luther's interpretation: "when it shall be brought to light," is wrong; it is equivalent to that of Gerhard: simplicissime accipitur de visitatione illa divina, qua Deus piorum, innocentiam variis modis in lucem producit. — Akin to this is the view held by some of the scholastics, that ἐπισκοπή is to be understood of the trial of the Christians by affliction; see Lorinus *in loc.*

REMARK.—At variance with this explanation is that given by Schott, who interprets the passage in this way: In order that the heathen may glorify God in the day of judgment, from this that (by the fact that) they slander you as evil-doers in consequence of your good works of which they are witnesses. The idea that the undeserved calumnies of the heathen serve at last to the glorification of God, is in itself right and appropriate as a basis for the exhortation given in the context. The resolution, too, of ἐν ᾧ into ἐν τούτῳ, ὅτι, has grammatically nothing against it; Meyer even allows it to be possible in Rom. ii. 1; cf. Heb. ii. 18, where Lünemann has recourse to a like construction, though with a somewhat inadequate explanation. Still, more than one objection may be urged against this interpretation—(1) A reference is given to δοξάζειν different from what is contained in καταλαλεῖ, inasmuch as it is taken, as in 1 Cor. vi. 20, in the sense of: "by *actions;*" (2) δοξάζειν must be thought of as

something which the heathen bring about "*without knowing or willing*" it, whereas the apostle does not let fall a hint of any such nearer definition; (3) δοξάζειν can only in a loose sense be conceived of as an *act* of the heathen; it is simply the *result* of what they do (of their καταλαλεῖν); and (4) In comparing these words with those of Christ, Matt. v. 16: ὅπως ἴδωσιν ὑμῶν τὰ καλὰ ἔργα καὶ δοξάσωσι τὸν πατέρα ὑμῶν τὸν ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς, the thought cannot be got rid of that Peter had this passage here in his mind. Schott's objection, that "δοξάζειν τὸν Θεόν is a strange and, specially here, a doubly inappropriate expression for conversion to Christianity, whilst the connection of the verb thus taken with ἐξ, as equal to: in consequence of, is a hard and inelegant construction," amounts to very little, since in the acceptation of the passage which he calls in question the verb is by no means made to bear any such meaning.

Vv. 13, 14. The apostle now goes on to name the different relations of life ordained of God in which the Christian should show his holy walk. First of all, an exhortation to obey those in authority. — ὑποτάγητε] the aor. pass. is used here, as it often is, with a middle, not a passive—as Wiesinger thinks —force. It is not: "*be made subject*," but "*make yourselves subject*" (cf. ταπεινώθητε, chap. v. 6).[1] The more liable liberty in Christ was to be misunderstood by the heathen, and even to be abused by the Christians themselves, the more important it was that the latter should have inculcated upon them as one of their principal duties this ὑποτάσσεσθαι (ver. 18, chap. iii. 1) in all circumstances of life. — πάσῃ ἀνθρωπίνῃ κτίσει] κτίσις is here, in accordance with the signification peculiar to the verb κτίζειν: "to establish, to set up," the *ordinance*, or *institution* ("an ordinance resting on a particular arrangement," Hofmann). In connection with the attribute ἀνθρωπίνη, this expression seems to denote an ordinance or institution established by men (so most expositors, and formerly in this commentary). But it must be noted that κτίζειν (and its derivatives) are never applied to human, but only to divine agency; besides, the demand that they should submit themselves to every human ordinance would be asking too much.

[1] Winer is wrong in attributing (p. 245 [E. T. 327]) a passive signification to this ταπεινώθητε, as also to προσεκλίθη in Acts v. 36 but is right in ascribing it to παρεδόθητε, Rom. vi. 17.

It is therefore preferable to understand, with Hofmann, by the term, an ordinance (of God) applying to human relations ("regulating the social life of man"[1]). By the subsequent εἴτε . . . εἴτε, the expression is referred in the first instance to the magistracy; but this does not justify the interpretation of it as equal directly to: "authority," or even: persons in authority (Gerhard: concretive et personaliter: homines, qui magistratum gerunt). That Peter's exposition of the idea had direct reference to persons in authority, is to be explained from the circumstance that the institution possessed reality only in the existence of those individuals.[2] At variance with this view is de Wette's (following Erasmus, Estius, Pott) interpretation of the expression: "to every human creature, *i.e.* to all men." Not only, however, the singular circumlocution: κτίσις ἀνθρωπίνη for ἄνθρωπος,—for which de Wette wrongly quotes Mark xvi. 15 and Col. i. 23,—but the very idea that Christians should be subject to all men,—and in support of it no appeal can be made either to chap. v. 5 or to the following exhortation: πάντας τιμήσατε,—is decisive against this view.[3] The fact that Peter places the general term πᾶσα κτίσις first, is explained most naturally in this way: that it was his intention to speak not of the magistracy merely, but also of the other institutions of human life.—The motive for the submission here demanded is given by διὰ κύριον, *i.e.* Χριστόν (not Θεόν, as Schott thinks), which must be taken to mean: "because such is the will of the Lord," or, with Hofmann: "out of consideration due to Christ, to whom the opposite would bring dishonour." The latter, however, is the

[1] This view avoids the certainly arbitrary interpretation given, for example, by Flavius, who applies the expression specially to life connected with the state. He says: dicitur humana ordinatio ideo quia politiae mundi non sunt speciali verbo Dei formatae, ut vera religio, sed magis ab hominibus ipsorumque industria ordinatae.

[2] It is arbitrary to regard κτίσις (with Luther, Osiander, etc.) as meaning the laws given by the magistrates.

[3] Brückner endeavours, indeed, to defend de Wette's interpretation, yet he decides to understand the expression in question as: "*every ordinance of human civil society*," and solves the difficulty presented by the adjective ἀνθρωπίνη (comp. with Rom. xiii. 1) by remarking that "the ordinances of national life which have been developed historically and by human means possess a divine element in them."

less likely interpretation. Still less natural is it to say, with Wiesinger, that this adjunct points to the *θεῖον* in ordinances under which human life is passed. Incorrectly Huss: propter imitationem Dei i. e. Christi.—In the enumeration which follows, the apostle is guided by the historical conditions of his time. It must be remarked that *ὑποτάσσεσθαι* is inculcated not only with regard to the institutions of the state, but to the persons in whom these are embodied, and this quite unconditionally. Even in cases where obedience, according to the principle laid down in Acts iv. 19, is to be refused, the duty of the *ὑποτάσσεσθαι* must not be infringed upon. — *εἴτε βασιλεῖ*] *βασιλεύς* is here the name given to the Roman emperor; cf. Joseph. *de bello jud.* v. 13, § 6. Bengel: Caesari, erant enim provinciae romanae, in quas mittebat Petrus. — *ὡς ὑπερέχοντι*] *ὡς* here also assigns the reason; *ὑπερέχειν* expresses, as in Rom. xiii. 1, simply the idea of sovereign power; non est comparatio cum aliis magistratibus (Calvin). In the Roman Empire the emperor was not merely the highest ruler, but properly speaking the *only* one, all the other authorities being simply the organs through which he exercised his sway. — Ver. 14. *εἴτε ἡγεμόσιν*] *ἡγεμόνες* praesides provinciarum, qui a Caesare mittebantur in provincias (Gerh.). — *ὡς δι' αὐτοῦ*, etc.] *δι' αὐτοῦ* does not, as Gerh., Aretius, and others take it, refer to *κύριον*, but to *βασιλεῖ*. The *ἡγεμ.*, although *ὑπερέχοντες* too, are so not in the same absolute sense as the *βασιλεύς*. They are so in relation to their subordinates, but not to the *βασιλεύς*. — *εἰς ἐκδίκησιν κακοποιῶν, ἔπαινον δὲ ἀγαθοποιῶν*] is joined grammatically to *πεμπομένοις*, not to *ὑπερέχοντι* also (Hofm., Schott); yet, from the fact that the *ἡγεμόνες* are sent by the *βασιλεὺς εἰς ἐκδίκησιν κ.τ.λ.*, it is implied that the latter, too, has an office with respect to *ἐκδίκησις κ.τ.λ.*[1] — Oecumenius arbitrarily narrows the thought when he says: *ἔδειξε καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Πέτρος τίσι καὶ ποίοις ἄρχουσιν ὑποτάσσεσθαι δεῖ, ὅτι τοῖς τὸ δίκαιον ἐκδικοῦσιν.* The apostle insists rather,

[1] Hofmann is consequently wrong in asserting that in this connection "the duty of submission to him who makes over the exercise of his power to others is derived from and based alone on his possession of that power, whilst submission to those to whom that power has been entrusted originated in, and is founded on, the moral purpose for which that is done."

without reserve, on submission to the ἡγεμόνες, *because* (not *if*) they are sent by the emperor to administer justice.[1] — ἐκδίκησις, here as often: "*punishment*;" ἔπαινος, not precisely: "reward," but: "*laudatory recognition*." — ἀγαθοποιός is to be found only in later authors, in N. T. ἅπ. λεγ. The subs. occurs chap. iv. 19.

Ver. 15. ὅτι] gives the ground of the exhortation: ὑποτάγητε κ.τ.λ. — οὕτως ἐστὶν τὸ θέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ] with οὕτως; cf. Winer, p. 434 [E. T. 584]; Buttm. p. 115: "*of such a nature is the will of God*." Schott gives the sense correctly: "In this wise is it with the will of God." The position of the words is opposed to a connection of οὕτως with ἀγαθοποιοῦντας (Wiesinger, Hofmann). — ἀγαθοποιοῦντας] *sc.* ὑμᾶς; ἀγαθοποιεῖν, in Mark iii. 4; Acts xiv. 17 the word has reference to deeds of benevolence. Here, on the other hand, it is used in a general sense: to do good, with special reference to the fulfilment of the duties towards those in authority. — φιμοῦν τὴν τῶν ἀφρόνων ἀνθρώπων ἀγνωσίαν] φιμοῦν (cf. 1 Tim. v. 18) here in the cognate sense of: "*to put to silence*," Wiesinger; "the ἀγνωσία is here conceived of as speaking; cf. v. 12: καταλαλοῦσι ὑμ. ὡς κακοποιῶν." — ἀγνωσία (except here, only in 1 Cor. xv. 34) is the self-caused lack of any comprehension of the Christian life. Because they are without this, they in their foolishness (hence ἀφρόνων ἀνθρώπων) imagine that its characteristic is not ἀγαθοποιεῖν, but κακοποιεῖν. Beda incorrectly limits οἱ ἄφρονες ἄνθρωποι to those persons in authority; but the reference is rather quite general to the καταλαλοῦντες, ver. 12.

Ver. 16. ὡς ἐλεύθεροι] is not, as Lachm., Jachmann, Steiger, Fronmüller think, to be joined with what follows (ver. 17),[2] but with a preceding thought; either with ἀγαθοποιοῦντας (Beda, Luther, Calvin, Wiesinger, Hofm.), or with ὑποτάγητε (Chrys., Oecum., Gerhard, Bengel, de Wette, Schott, etc.).

[1] Calvin very aptly puts it: Objici possit: reges et alios magistratus saepe sua potentia abuti; respondeo, tyrannos et similes non facere suo abusu, quia maneat semper firma Dei ordinatio.

[2] Hofmann justly says: "We cannot think of joining ver. 16 with ver. 17, for its contents would not suit πάντας τιμήσατε—even should it be connected with this only (Fronmüller), which is quite impossible—not to speak of τὴν ἀδελφότητα or τὸν Θεὸν φοβεῖσθε."

The latter of these connections deserves the preference, not because in the former a change of construction would take place, but because the special point to be brought out here was, that the freedom of the Christians was to be manifested in submission to (heathen) authorities. What follows shows this, inasmuch as those Christians who had not attained unto true freedom, might easily be led to justify their opposition to those in power on the ground of the liberty which belonged to them in Christ. *ὡς ἐλεύθεροι* states the position which the Christians are to take up inwardly towards the authorities; their subjection is not that of *δοῦλοι*, since they recognise them as a divine ordinance for the attainment of moral ends.[1] — *καὶ μὴ ὡς ἐπικάλυμμα ἔχοντες τῆς κακίας τὴν ἐλευθερίαν*] *καί* is epexegetical: "and that," since what follows defines the idea *ἐλεύθεροι* first negatively and then positively. — *ὡς* belongs not to *ἐπικάλυμμα*, but to *ἔχοντες*: "*and that not as those who have.*" — *ἐπικάλυμμα* is the more remote, *τὴν ἐλευθερίαν* the proximate, object of *ἔχοντες*: "*who have the ἐλευθερία as the ἐπικάλυμμα τ. κακ.*" — *ἐπικάλυμμα, ἅπ. λεγ.*; for its original meaning, cf. Ex. xxvi. 14, LXX.; here used metaphorically (cf. Kypke *in loc.*). The sense is: "not as those to whom their freedom serves as a covering for their *κακία*" (cf. 2 Pet. ii. 19; Gal. v. 13), *i.e.* who seek to conceal their wickedness by boasting of their Christian freedom. This is the exact reverse of the Pharisaism of those who seek to conceal the wickedness of the heart by an outward conformity to the law. — *ἀλλ' ὡς δοῦλοι Θεοῦ*] expresses positively the nature of the truly free. True liberty consists in the *δουλεία Θεοῦ* (Rom. vi. 16 ff.); it refers back to the *τὸ θέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ*, and further still to *διὰ κύριον*.

Ver. 17. Four hortatory clauses suggested to Peter by the term *ἀγαθοποιοῦντας*; in the last he returns, by way of conclusion, to the principal theme. In the first three there is a climax.[2] — *πάντας τιμήσατε*] *πάντας* must not, with Bengel, be

[1] It is not probable that Peter here refers, as Weiss (p. 349) thinks, to the words of Christ, Matt. xvii. 27, since they apply to circumstances altogether different from those mentioned here; see Meyer *in loc.*

[2] To distribute these four exhortations over "the two provinces of life: the natural and civil, and the spiritual and ecclesiastical communities" (Schott), is warranted neither by what precedes nor by anything the clauses themselves

limited to those: quibus honos debetur, Rom. xiii. 7,[1] nor to those who belong to the same state (Schott); it expresses totality without any exception. — *τιμᾶν* is not equivalent to *ὑποτάσσεσθαι* (de Wette); but neither is it equal to, civiliter tractare (Bengel); the former is too strong, the latter too weak; it is the opposite, positively stated, of *καταφρονεῖν*, and means: to recognise the worth (*τιμή*) which any one possesses, and to act on the recognition (Brückner, Weiss, Wiesinger, Schott). This exhortation is all the more important for the Christian, that his consciousness of his own dignity can easily betray him into a depreciation of others. It refers to the *τιμή* which is due to man as man, and not first in respect of any particular position he may hold (Flacius: unicuique suum locum et debita officia exhibete.) — *τὴν ἀδελφότητα ἀγαπᾶτε*] *ἀδελφότης*, also in chap. v. 9, corresponding to our: brotherhood, *i.e.* the totality of the Christian brethren, cf. *ἱεράτευμα* vv. 5, 9. The apparent contradiction of Matt. v. 44, here presented, where love to enemies is also enjoined, is to be explained on the following principle: that the *ἀγάπη* is differently conditioned, according as it has different objects. In perfect harmony with its inmost nature, it can exist only between Christians, for only among them is there community of life in God, cf. chap. i. 22. Pott interprets *ἀγαπᾶν* here superficially by "entertain goodwill to." — *τὸν Θεὸν φοβεῖσθε*] cf. chap. i. 17; a command not only of the Old, but of the New Testament, inasmuch as a lowly awe before the holy God is an essential feature of the filial relation to God. — *τὸν βασιλέα τιμᾶτε*] Reiteration of the command (ver. 13) as a conclusion to the whole passage; cf. Prov. xxiv. 21, *φοβοῦ τὸν Θεὸν, υἱὲ, καὶ βασιλέα.* — *τιμᾶτε* has here the same meaning as previously: "show to the king *the*

contain.—Hofmann, who denies the climax, determines the relation of the four maxims to each other in a highly artificial manner. He holds that the second sentence is in antithesis to the first, and the fourth to the third; that the first is akin to the fourth, and the second to the third; that in the first stress is laid on *πάντας*, whilst on the second, on the other hand, it lies not on *ἀδελφότητα*, but on *ἀγαπᾶτε*, and that in the first antithesis it is the *first* member that is emphatic, in the second it is the *last*.

[1] In like manner Hornejus: non de omnibus absolute loquitur, quasi omnes homines etiam pessimi honorandi sint, sed de iis, quibus honor propter potestatem quam habent, competit.

respect which pertains to him as king;" what that is the apostle has explained in ver. 13. Hornejus [1] incorrectly thinks that in the conjunction of the last two commands, he can here discover an indication of the limits by which obedience to the king is bounded.—The difference in the tenses of the imperative, in the first exhortation the imperat. aor., in the three others the imperat. pres., is to be regarded as accidental, rather than as in any way arising from the substance of the command.[2]

Ver. 18. An exhortation to the slaves, extending from this verse to the end of the chapter. — *οἱ οἰκέται*] *οἰκέτης*, properly speaking, "a domestic," a milder expression for *δοῦλος*. It is improbable that Peter employed this term in order to include the freedmen who had remained in the master's house (Steiger). — *οἱ οἰκ.* is vocative; nor is chap. i. 3 (as Steiger thinks) opposed to this. — *ὑποτασσόμενοι*] It is quite arbitrary to supply *ἦτε* (Oecumenius, etc.), or to assert that the participle is used here instead of the imperative. The participle rather shows that the exhortation is conceived of as dependent on a thought already expressed; not on ver. 17 (de Wette), but on ver. 13, which vv. 11 and 12 serve to introduce; *ὑποτάγητε . . . κύριον*, the institution of the household implied in the relation of servant to master, is comprehended in the general term *πᾶσα ἀνθρωπ. κτίσις*. — *ἐν παντὶ φόβῳ*] *φόβος* (*vid.* i. 17) is stronger than reverentia, it denotes the shrinking from transgressing the master's will, based on the consciousness of subjection, cf. Eph. vi. 5.[3] Doubtless this shrinking is in the case of the Christian based on the fear of God, but the word *φόβος* does not directly mean such fear, as Weiss (p. 169) holds and seeks to prove, especially from the circumstance that Peter in chap. iii. 6, 14 condemns the fear of man, forgetting, however, that this fear too may be of different kinds, cf. *in loco*. — *παντί* is intensive. *πᾶς φόβος* is: *every kind of fear;* a fear wanting

[1] Explicat Petr. quomodo Caesari parendum sit, nempe ut Dei interim timori nihil derogetur.

[2] Hofmann's view is purely arbitrary: that in the foremost clause the aorist is put because, in the first place, and chiefly, it is required to honour all; and after this, that the Christian should love his brethren in Christ. Nor can it be at all supported by Winer's remarks, p. 294 [E. T. 394].

[3] Thus, too, in substance Schott: "Fear in general, as it is determined by the circumstances here mentioned."

in nothing that goes to make up true fear. — τοῖς δεσπόταις] cf. 1 Tim. vi. 1, Tit. ii. 9, equals τοῖς κυρίοις, Eph. vi. 5; Col. iii. 22. — οὐ μόνον τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς καὶ ἐπιεικέσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς σκολιοῖς] The moral conduct of the servant, which consists in ὑποτάσσεσθαι towards the master, must remain unchanged, whatever the character of the latter may be; the chief emphasis, however, rests here on ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς σκ. — ἀγαθοί here is equal to "*kind;*" for ἐπιεικής, cf. 1 Tim. iii. 3; it does not mean "yielding" (Fronmüller), but, properly speaking, one who "*acts with propriety,*" then "*gentle.*" — σκολιός, literally, "crooked," "bent," the opposite of *straight,* denotes metaphorically the *perverse* disposition; Phil. ii. 15, synonymous with διεστραμμένος; in Prov. xxviii. 18, ὁ σκολιαῖς ὁδοῖς πορευόμενος forms the antithesis to ὁ πορευόμενος δικαίως (cf. Luke iii. 5). It has the same force in the classics (Athen. xv. p. 695; σκολιὰ φρονεῖν, opp. to εὐθέα φρονεῖν). It denotes, therefore, such masters as conduct themselves, not in a right, but in a *perverse* manner towards their servants—are hard and unjust to them; Luther's "*capricious*" is inexact.[1]

Ver. 19. τοῦτο γὰρ χάρις, εἰ] The ground of the exhortation. τοῦτο refers to the clause beginning with εἰ. — χάρις has not the special meaning "grace" here, as if it were to be explained, either with the older commentators: gratiam concilians; or as if by it were to be understood "the gift of grace" (Steiger: "it is to be regarded as grace, if one can suffer for the sake of God;" so, too, Schott), or "the condition of grace" (Wiesinger: "in the ὑπομένειν is manifested the actual condition of grace"); for this expression is not parallel with κλέος, ver. 12: and how can a summons be issued in a manner so direct, to the performance of a duty, by representing it either as a gift of grace or a proof of a state of grace? Besides, Wiesinger alters the term "grace" into "sign of grace."—Some commentators, on account of ver. 20, explain χάρις as synonymous with κλέος, but without any linguistic justification; thus already Oecumenius (Calvin: idem valet nomen gratiae quod laudis; qui patienter ferunt injurias, ii

[1] That Peter made special reference to heathen masters lies in the nature of the circumstances, but is not to be concluded from the adject. σκολιός (as opposed to Schott).

laude digni sunt). In profane Greek χάρις denotes either the *charm* or the *loveliness*, or also the *favour* which one person has for another (to which are linked on the meanings, expressions of goodwill and thanks). Both senses are to be found in the Scriptures.[1] If the first signification be adopted, the enduring of the adversity of which Peter here speaks is characterized as something lovely; and so Cremer (see under χάρις, p. 576) seems to take it. But it is more natural to hold by the second sense, and to explain "*this is favour*," as equal to "*this causes favour*." Several interpreters explain χάρις as equal directly to "delight," substituting for the substantive the adjective "well-pleasing," and supplying παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ from ver. 20. Thus Gerhard: hoc est Deo gratum et acceptum; de Wette: "Favour with God, *i.e.* well-pleasing before God;" so, too, Hofmann. But both of these are open to objection. Hofmann no doubt gives as the ground of his supplement: "that the slave who lived up to the apostle's injunction has to look for the approval of none." This is, however, surely an unjustifiable assertion. It is not clear why Peter did not add the words supplied if he had them in his mind; χάρις and κλέος in ver. 20 are therefore—in consideration of vv. 12 and 15—to be taken quite generally. The following clause indicates a good behaviour, by which the καταλαλία of the heathen is to be put to silence. — εἰ διὰ συνείδησιν Θεοῦ ὑποφέρει κ.τ.λ.] εἰ refers back to τοῦτο; διὰ συνείδησιν Θεοῦ is placed first by way of emphasis. συνείδησις Θεοῦ is neither "God's knowledge of us" (Morus: quia Deus conscius est tuarum miseriarum; similarly Frommüller: "on account of the knowledge shared by God, since God knows all"), nor is it "conscientiousness before God" (Stolz); but Θεοῦ is the object. genit. (cf. 1 Cor. viii. 7; Heb. x. 2), therefore the meaning is: the (duty-compelling) consciousness of God. Calov: quia conscius est, id Deum velle et Deo gratum esse; so, too, de Wette, Schott, etc. A metonymy does not require to be assumed (Grotius: per metonymiam objecti

[1] χάρις has the first meaning, Ps. xlv. 3; Prov. i. 9, x. 32, etc.; also Ecclus. vii. 19, etc.; in the N. T. Luke iv. 22; Col. iv. 6, etc. The second signification, Prov. xxii. 1, etc.; in the N. T. Luke i. 30, ii. 52; Acts ii. 47, etc. Cf. besides Cremer and Wahl: Clavis libr. V. T. apocryphi.

dicitur conscientia ejus, quod quis Deo debet). Steiger introduces what is foreign to it when he extends the idea so as to include the conscious knowledge of the divine recompense. In *διὰ συνειδ. Θεοῦ* is expressed substantially the same thought as in *ὡς Θεοῦ δοῦλοι*, ver. 16, and *διὰ τ. κύριον*, ver. 13; *διὰ τὴν συνείδησιν* without *Θεοῦ* is to be found in Rom. xiii. 5. — *ὑποφέρει τις λύπας*] *ὑποφέρειν*: "*to bear the burden put on one;*" the opposite of succumbing under a burden, cf. 1 Cor. x. 13, 2 Tim. iii. 11; nevertheless, the apostle seems here to have in mind more the antithesis to being provoked to anger and stubbornness (Hofmann). — *λύπαι* here: outward afflictions. — *πάσχων ἀδίκως*] "whilst (not although) he suffers wrong (from the master, *i.e.* undeserved on the part of the slave)." — It is not suffering itself, but *patient endurance* in the midst of *undeserved suffering*, and that *διὰ συνείδησιν Θεοῦ*, which Peter calls a *χάρις*.—This thought, general in itself, is here applied to the relation of servant to master.

Ver. 20. *ποῖον γὰρ κλέος*] Gerhard: interrogatio respondet h. l. negationi; this interrogation brings out the nothingness, or at least the little value of the object in question; cf. Jas. iv. 14; Luke vi. 32. — *κλέος*, not *sc.* *ἐνώπιον τοῦ Θεοῦ* (Pott), but quite generally, for the thought "refers back to the point of view, stated in vv. 12–15, from which this exhortation is given" (Wiesinger). — *εἰ ἁμαρτάνοντες καὶ κολαφιζόμενοι ὑπομενεῖτε*] The two participles stand in the closest connection with each other, so that *ἁμαρτάνειν* is to be conceived as the cause of the *κολαφίζεσθαι*. Luther's translation is accordingly correct: "if ye suffer punishment on account of your evil deeds;" the only fault to be found with this is, that it weakens the force of the idea *ὑπομένειν*. — *ὑπομένειν* is synonymous with *ὑποφέρειν*; the sense is: "it is no glory to show patience in the suffering of deserved punishment." The view of de Wette, that Peter referred only "to the reluctant, *dull* endurance of a criminal who cannot escape his punishment," misses the apostle's meaning, and is correctly rejected by Brückner and Wiesinger. Steiger remarks justly: "that when any one endures patiently deserved punishment, he is only performing a duty binding on him by every law of right and authority." "*ὑπομενεῖτε* is in the future with reference to

the standpoint of the exhortation" (Wiesinger). — *κολαφίζειν*: apud LXX. non occurrit, in N. T. generaliter pro plagis ac percussionibus. Matt. xxvi. 67; 1 Cor. iv. 11; 2 Cor. xii. 7 (Gerh.); the strict signification is "to give blows with the fist, or slaps on the ear." Bengel: poena servorum eaque subita. — *ἀλλ' εἰ ἀγαθοποιοῦντες καὶ πάσχοντες ὑπομενεῖτε*] The interpretation of Erasmus: si quum beneficiatis et *tamen* affligamini, suffertis, is incorrect, for between *ἀγαθοπ.* and *πάσχ.* there exists the same relationship as between *ἁμαρτάνοντες* and *κολαφιζόμενοι*;[1] Luther correctly: "if ye suffer on account of good-doing;" cf. iii. 17. — *τοῦτο γὰρ χάρις παρὰ Θεῷ*] before these words—*γάρ* is the correct reading —the apodosis taken out of *ποῖον κλέος*: "this is true praise," must be added to what precedes, and these words form the basis of an argument in which *τοῦτο* refers to *εἰ ἀγαθοποιοῦντες . . . ὑπομενεῖτε*. The meaning is: because this *in God's sight* is a *χάρις* (not equal to: in the judgment of God, cf. Luke ii. 52), therefore it is a *κλέος*.

Ver. 21 gives the ground of the exhortation to bear undeserved suffering patiently, by a reference to the sufferings of Christ. — *εἰς τοῦτο γὰρ ἐκλήθητε*] *εἰς τοῦτο* refers to *εἰ ἀγαθοποιοῦντες . . . ὑπομενεῖτε*. Many interpreters incorrectly make it apply only to *suffering* as such; but, as Hemming rightly remarks: omnes pii vocati sunt, ut patienter injuriam ferant.—The construction with *εἰς* occurs frequently; cf. Col. iii. 15; 2 Thess. ii. 14.—In harmony with the connection, *οἱ οἰκέται* is to be thought of as the subject to *ἐκλήθητε*; accordingly it is the slaves in the first instance, not the Christians in general, who are addressed (as in chap. iii. 9, 14, 17); but as this *κληθῆναι* applies to them not as slaves but as believers, it holds true at the same time of all Christians. — *ὅτι καὶ Χριστὸς ἔπαθεν ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν*] *ὅτι*: such suffering is part of a Christian's calling, *for Christ also suffered*: *ἔπαθεν*

[1] Nor is this relation sufficiently perceived by Schott in his explanation: "if they show patience under ill-treatment which accompanies good conduct." In urging against the interpretation given, that "if *ἀγαθοποιεῖν* apply to the labour of servants, then, that which the slave suffers is not caused by his actions," Hofmann has failed to observe (1) that the context does not render the idea of servants' work only necessary; (2) that the well-doing of the Christian was not always in harmony with heathen views; cf. chap. iv. 4.

is here the emphatic word; and with it *καί* also must be joined (which Frommüller erroneously interprets by "even"). Wiesinger incorrectly takes *καί* with *ἔπαθεν ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν* in this sense, that, as Christ suffered for us, "so we should endure affliction for Him, for His sake, and for His honour and glory in the world," thus introducing a thought foreign to the context. The obligation to suffer under which we who are Christ's people are laid, from the very fact that Christ also *suffered*, is for us all the greater that the sufferings of Christ were *ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν* (not: *ἀνθ' ἡμῶν*, but "for our advantage"), and therefore such as enable us to follow the example which He has left us in His sufferings. Inasmuch as *ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν* implies that Christ suffered not for His own sins, but for ours, we are no doubt justified in recognising these sufferings as undeserved, but not in concluding, with Hofmann, that *ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν* is meant to mark *only* the undeservedness of Christ's sufferings. — *ὑμῖν ὑπολιμπάνων ὑπογραμμόν*] *ὑπολιμπάνω*, *ἅπ. λεγ.* Another form of *ὑπολείπω* (used of the leaving behind at death, Judith viii. 7). Bengel: in abitu ad patrem. *ὑπογραμμός* (*ἅπ. λεγ.*): specimen, quod imitentur, ut pictores novitiis exemplaria dant, ad quae inter pingendum respiciant: equivalent in sense to *ὑπόδειγμα*, John xiii. 15 (*τύπος*; 2 Thess. iii. 9). It is not Christ's life in general that is here presented by way of example, but the patience which He showed in the midst of undeserved sufferings.[1] The participle is connected with *ἔπαθεν ὑπ. ὑμ.* as giving the nearer definition of the latter: He thus suffered, as in doing so to leave you an example, withal to the end that, etc.[2] — *ἵνα ἐπακολουθήσητε τοῖς ἴχνεσιν αὐτοῦ*] Sicut prior metaphora a pictoribus et scriptoribus, ita haec posterior petita est a viae duce (Gerhard); with *ἐπακολ.* cf. 1 Tim. v. 10, 24. — *ἴχνος*,

[1] Wherever Scripture presents Christ as an example, it does so almost always with reference to His self-abasement in suffering and death; Phil. ii. 5; John xiii. 15, xv. 12; 1 John iii. 16; Heb. xii. 2. Only in 1 John ii. 6 is Christ presented as an example in the more general sense.

[2] Hofmann wrongly asserts that "*ἵνα* stands only in place of an infinitive clause, as after *ἐντολή* (John xiii. 34), *βουλή* (Acts xxvii. 42)," inasmuch as "*ὑπογραμμός* is no more than a *direction* to do likewise." But this interpretation of *ὑπογραμμός* is erroneous, and therefore *ἵνα ἐπακολουθήσητε* cannot be resolved into an infinitive clause.

besides here, in Rom. iv. 12 (*στοιχεῖν τοῖς ἴχνεσι*) and 2 Cor. xii. 18 (*περιπατεῖν τοῖς ἴχνεσι*).

Ver. 22. The first feature in the exemplary nature of Christ's sufferings: His innocence. — After Isa. liii. 9, LXX.: *ἀνομίαν οὐκ ἐποίησε, οὐδὲ δόλον ἐν τῷ στόματι αὐτοῦ* (Cod. Alex. *οὐδὲ εὑρέθη δόλος ἐν τῷ στ. αὐτοῦ*). Gerhard: nec verbo nec facto unquam peccavit. The second half of the sentence expresses truth in speech. With *δόλος*, cf. chap. ii. 1, John i. 48. For the difference between *εὑρίσκεσθαι* and *εἶναι*, cf. Winer, p. 572 [E. T. 769].

Ver. 23. The second feature: the patience of Christ in His sufferings. A reference, however slight, to Isa. liii. 7, cannot but be recognised. — *ὃς λοιδορούμενος οὐκ ἀντελοιδόρει, πάσχων οὐκ ἠπείλει*] De Wette and Wiesinger rightly draw attention to the climax between *λοιδορ.* and *πάσχων*, *ἀντελοιδ.* and *ἠπείλει*; *λοιδορία* omnis generis injuriae verbales; *παθήματα* omnis generis injuriae reales (Gerhard). — *ἀντιλοιδ. ἅπ. λεγ.*; cf. *ἀντιμετρέω*, Luke vi. 38. — *ἠπείλει* is here used of threat of vengeful recompense. The announcements of divine judgment on unbelievers, to which Christ more than once gave expression, are of a different nature, and cannot be considered as an *ἀπειλεῖν*, in the sense in which that word is here used. Comp. with this passage the exhortation of the apostle, chap. iii. 9. — *παρεδίδου δὲ τῷ κρίνοντι δικαίως*] *παρεδίδου* not in a reflexive sense: "He committed Himself" (Winer p. 549 [E. T. 738]; de Wette),[1] neither is causam suam (Gerhard, etc.) nor *κρίσιν* (from *κρίνοντι*) to be supplied; the supplement is rather *λοιδορεῖσθαι* and *πάσχειν* (Wiesinger, Schott). Luther's translation is good: "He left it to Him."[2] — Didymus arbitrarily understands *παρεδίδου* of Christ's prayer for His enemies;[3] the meaning is rather that Christ

[1] In Mark iv. 29, too, to which de Wette appeals, *παραδιδόναι* has no reflexive force; see Meyer on this passage.

[2] The Vulg. strangely translates: tradebat judicanti se *injuste*; according to which Lorinus interprets: tradidit se Christus sponte propriaque voluntate tum Judaeis, tum Pilato ad mortem oblatus. Cyprian (*de bono patientiae*) and Paulinus (*Ep.* 2) quote the passage as it stands in the Vulg. Augustin (*Tract. in John* xxi.) and Fulgentius (*ad Trasimarch.* lib. I.), on the other hand, have *juste*.

[3] From the fact that Christ's prayer is not mentioned here, de Wette unwarrantably concludes that it was unknown to the writer of the epistle.

left it to the God who judges justly to determine what should be the consequences of the injustice done to Him on those who wrought it. That His desire was only that they should be punished, is not contained in *παρεδίδου* (similarly Hofmann). Consequently the reference formerly made in this commentary to Jer. xi. 20, xx. 12, as illustrative of the passage, is erroneous. With *τῷ δικαίως κρίνοντι*, cf. chap. i. 17: *τὸν ἀπροσωπολήπτως κρίνοντα*, "a direct designation of God, whose just judgment is the outcome of His being" (Wiesinger).

Ver. 24. A further expansion of the *ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν*, ver. 21.—*ὃς τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν αὐτὸς ἀνήνεγκεν κ.τ.λ.*] "*Who Himself bore our sins on His body to the tree.*"—*ὅς*, the third relative clause; though a climax too, cannot fail to be recognised here: He suffered innocently,—patiently (not requiting evil for evil),—vicariously, for us, still it must not be asserted that this third clause predicates anything of Christ in which He can be an example for us (Hofmann); the thought here expressed itself contradicts this assertion.—The phraseology of this verse arose from a reference to the passage in Isa. liii., and the actual fulfilment of the prophecy herein contained. The words of that chapter which were chiefly present to the mind of the apostle, are those of ver. 12, LXX. *καὶ αὐτὸς ἁμαρτίας πολλῶν ἀνήνεγκε* (נָשָׂא); cf. also ver. 11: *καὶ τὰς ἁμαρτίας αὐτῶν αὐτὸς ἀνοίσει* (יִסְבֹּל), and ver. 4: *οὗτος τ. ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν φέρει* (נָשָׂא). The Hebrew נָשָׂא with the accus. of the idea of sin, therefore: "*to bear sin*," is equivalent to, "*to suffer the punishment for sin*," either one's own or that of another. Now, as *ἀνήνεγκε* is in the above-quoted passage a translation of נָשָׂא, its meaning is: "He suffered the punishment for the sins of many."[1]—This suffering of punishment

[1] It admits of no doubt that נָשָׂא in connection with חֵטְא or עָוֹן has the meaning above given; cf. Lev. xix. 17, xx. 19, xxiv. 15; Num. v. 31, xiv. 34; Ezek. iv. 5, xiv. 10, xvi. 58, xxiii. 35, etc. (Lam. v. 7: סָבַל); generally, indeed, the LXX. translate this נָשָׂא by *λαμβάνειν*, but also by *κομίζειν* and *ἀποφέρειν*; in the passage quoted, Isa. liii. 4, by *φέρειν*; in Num. xiv. 33, as in Isa. liii. 12, by *ἀναφέρειν*. This proves how unwarranted Hofmann (*Schriftbeweis*, II. 1, p. 465, 2d ed.) is in saying "that in view of the Greek translation of Isa. liii. 11, 12, it is arbitrary to assume that *ἀναφέρειν* means

is, in the case of the Servant of God, of such a nature that by it those whose the sin is, and for whom He endures the punishment, become free from that punishment; it is therefore a vicarious suffering.[1] Since, then, Peter plainly had this passage in his mind, the thought here expressed can be no other than this: that Christ in our stead has suffered the punishment we have merited through our sins, and so has borne our sins. But with this the subsequent *ἐπὶ τὸ ξύλον*, which means not "on the tree," but "*on to the tree*," does not seem to harmonize. Consequently it has been proposed to take *ἀναφέρειν* in the sense which it has in the phrase: *ἀναφέρειν τι ἐπὶ τὸ θυσιαστήριον* (cf. Jas. ii. 21; Lev. xiv. 20; 2 Chron. xxxv. 16; Bar. i. 10; 1 Macc. iv. 53); cf. ver. 5; where *τὸ ξύλον* would be conceived as the altar (Gerhard: Crux Christi fuit sublime illud altare, in quod Christus se ipsum in sacrificium oblaturus ascendit, sicut V. Testamenti sacrificia altari imponebantur). But against this interpretation, besides the fact that *ἀναφέρ.* is thus here taken in a sense different from that which it has in Isa. liii., there are the following objections: (1) That in no other passage of the N. T. is the cross of Christ represented as the altar on which He is offered;[2] (2) That neither in the O. T. nor in the N. T. is *sin* anywhere spoken of as the offering which is brought up to the

simply to carry." Of course every one knows that in and of itself *ἀναφέρειν* does not mean "to carry;" but from this it does not follow that the LXX. did not use it in this sense in the phrase above alluded to, the more so that they attribute to the word no meaning opposed to its classical usage; cf. Thuc. iii. 18: *κινδύνους ἀναφέρ.*; Pol. i. 30: *φθόνους καὶ διαβολὰς ἀναφέρ.*, see Pape, *s.v. ἀναφέρω*, and Delitzsch, *Komment. z. Br. an die Hebr.* p. 442.—Doubtless נָשָׂא אֶת־עֲוֹן, Lev. x. 17, is said of the priests bearing away sin (making atonement), but there the LXX. translate נָשָׂא by *ἀφαιρεῖν*. Plainly there can here be no allusion to the meaning "to forgive sin."

[1] Weiss is inaccurate when he asserts (p. 265) that the passages, Lev. xix. 17, Num. xiv. 33, Lam. v. 7, Ezek. xviii. 19, 20, allude to a vicarious suffering; these passages, indeed, speak of a bearing of the punishment which the sins of others have caused, but this is suffering *with*, not instead of others, without those who have done the sin being freed from its punishment.

[2] Schott, whilst admitting the above, asserts "that it will hardly be contradicted that in all the passages which speak of Christ's death on the cross as a sacrifice, the cross must be presupposed to be that which served as altar." This is decidedly to be contradicted, the more so that the animal sacrificed suffered death not *upon*, but *before* the altar.

altar.[1] ἐπὶ τὸ ξύλον might be explained by assuming a pregnant construction, as in the Versio Syr., which runs: bajulavit omnia peccata nostra eaque sustulit in corpore suo ad crucem,[2] that is: "*bearing our sins He ascended the cross.*" But the assumption of such a construction is not necessary, since ἀναφέρειν can quite well be taken to mean "*carrying up,*" without depriving the word of the signification which it has in the passage in Isaiah, since "carrying up" implies "carrying." In no other way did Christ bear our sins up on to the cross than by suffering the punishment for our sins in the crucifixion, and thereby delivering us from the punishment. The apostle lays special stress on the idea of substitution here contained, by the addition of αὐτός, which, as in Isa. liii. 11, stands by way of emphasis next to ἡμῶν; but by ἐν τῷ σώματι αὐτοῦ—not "*in*,"[3] but "*on* His body"—we are reminded that His body it was on which the punishment was accomplished, inasmuch as it was nailed to the cross and died thereon. It is quite possible that this adjunct, as Wiesinger assumes, is meant at the same time to serve the purpose of expressing the greatness of that love which moved Christ to give His body to the death for our sins; but that there is in it any special reference to the sacramental words of the Lord (Weiss, p. 273), is a conjecture which has nothing to support

[1] If ἀναφέρειν be here taken as equivalent to "to offer sacrifice," as in Heb. vii. 27, not only would the thought—which Delitzsch (p. 440) terms a corrupt one—arise: per semet ipsum immolavit peccata nostra, but ἐπὶ τὸ ξύλον would then have to be interpreted: "*on the cross.*" Luther: "who Himself offered in sacrifice our sins on His body on the tree."—Here, too, Schott admits what is said above, but seeks to destroy its force as a proof, by claiming for ἀναφέρειν the sense: "to present or bring up in offering," at the same time supplying—as it seems—as the object of offering, the body of Christ, which the expression of the apostle in no way justifies.

[2] Schott brings the baseless accusation against the circumlocution of the Syr. translation, "that in it peccata is to be taken differently in the first clause from the second;" in the former, as equivalent to "the punishment of our sin;" in the latter, as "the sin itself," for peccata has the same meaning in both members, although the bearing of the sins consists in the suffering of the punishment for them. Comp. Num. xiv. 33, where in the expression ἀνοίσουσι τὴν πορνείαν ὑμῶν, the word πορνεία has by no means the meaning "punishment for fornication," although ἀναφέρειν τὴν πορνείαν means as much as "to suffer the punishment for fornication."

[3] So, too, Schott, who interprets ἐν τῷ σώματι as equal to "in His earthly bodily life" (!).

it. The addition of *ἐπὶ τὸ ξύλον* is explained by the fact itself, since it is precisely Christ's death on the cross that has redeemed us from the guilt and power of our sins. Peter also uses the expression *τὸ ξύλον* to denote the cross, in his sermons, Acts v. 30, x. 39. It had its origin in the Old Testament phraseology, עֵץ, rendered *ξύλον* by LXX., denoting the pole on which the bodies of executed criminals were sometimes suspended; cf. Deut. xxi. 22, 23; Josh. x. 26. Certainly in this way attention is drawn to the shame of the punishment which Christ suffered; but it is at least doubtful, since there is no reference to it in any way, whether Peter, like Paul, in Gal. iii. 13, used the expression with regard to the curse pronounced in Deut. xxi. 22 (as Weiss, p. 267, emphatically denies, and Schott as emphatically asserts). Bengel is entirely mistaken in thinking, that by the adjunct *ἐπὶ τὸ ξύλον* the apostle alludes to the punishment of slaves (ligno, cruce, furca plecti soliti erant servi).

Remark 1. The interpretation of many of the commentators is wanting in the necessary precision, inasmuch as the two senses, which *ἀναφέρειν* has in the different phrases: *ἀναφέρειν τὰς ἁμαρτίας* and *ἀναφέρειν τι ἐπὶ τ. θυσιαστήριον*, are mixed up with each other. Vitringa (Vix uno verbo ἐμφάσεως vocis *ἀναφέρειν* exprimi potest. Nota ferre et offere. Primo dicere voluit Petrus, Christum portasse peccata nostra, in quantum illa ipsi erant imposita. Secundo ita tulisse peccata nostra, ut ea secum obtulerit in altari), while drawing, indeed, a distinction between the two meanings, thinks that Peter had both of them in his mind, which of course is impossible. — Hofmann explains *ἀναφέρειν . . . ἐπὶ τὸ ξύλον* on the analogy of the phrase: *ἀναφέρειν τι ἐπὶ τὸ θυσιαστήριον*, without, however, understanding the cross as the altar; the meaning then would be: "He lifted up His body on to the cross, thereby bearing up thither our sins, that is to say, *atoning* for our sins." Although Hofmann admits that Peter had in his mind the passage in Isaiah, he nevertheless denies that *ἀνήνεγκε* has here the same meaning as there. In his *Schriftbeweis*, 1st ed., he gives a similar interpretation, only that there he says: "He took up our sins with Him, and so *took them away from us*." He, however, justly adds that *ἀναφέρειν* has the same meaning here as in Heb. ix. 28. Wiesinger has adopted this interpretation, as also, in substance, Delitzsch, *Hebraerbrief*, p. 442 f. In the 2d edition of the *Schriftbeweis*, Hofmann has withdrawn this explanation; but,

on the other hand, he erroneously asserts that ἀναφέρειν here is "the ἀναφέρειν of Heb. vii. 27." — Schott justly combats Hofmann's view, that the sufferings of Christ for our sins consisted essentially only in *what befell Him* as the result of our sins, and maintains, in opposition to it, the substitution of Christ. His own interpretation, however, of our passage is equally inadmissible, since he attributes to ἀναφέρειν the meaning: "*to bring up or present in offering*;" yet adding to the idea of "*offering*" an object other than ἁμαρτίας which stands with ἀνήνεγκεν, thus giving to the *one* word two quite different references. Schott makes σῶμα Χριστοῦ the object of "offering," taking it out of the supplementary clause: ἐν τῷ σώματι αὐτοῦ; but this he is the less justified in doing, that he explains these words by "*in* His earthly corporeal life." — This is not the place to enter fully into Schott's conception of the propitiation wrought by Christ's death on the cross. Though it contains many points worthy of notice, it is of much too artificial a nature, ever to be considered a just representation of the views of the apostle.—Luthardt interprets: "He bore His body away from the earth up to God. No doubt it was not an altar to which Christ brought His body up; but the peculiarity lies precisely in this, that His body should at the same time hang on the accursed tree." "Away from the earth to God" is evidently an addition; and had Peter wished to emphasize the cross as the *accursed* tree, he would have added τῆς καταρᾶς.[1]

REMARK 2.—This interpretation agrees substantially with that given by de Wette-Brückner and Weiss; yet de Wette's reference to Col. ii. 14 is inappropriate, inasmuch as that passage has a character entirely different, both in thought and expression, from the one here under consideration. Weiss is wanting in accuracy when he says that "Christ ascended the cross, and *there* bore the punishment of our sins," since already in the sufferings which preceded the crucifixion, the bearing of our sins took place. — Nor can it be conceded to these commentators that the *idea of sacrifice* was absent from the conception of the apostle. Its existence is erroneously disputed also in Isa. liii., in spite of the אָשָׁם, ver. 10. No doubt prominence is given, in the first instance, to the idea of *substitution;* but Weiss ought not to have denied that this thought is connected in the mind of the prophet, as in that of the apostle, with the

[1] Pfleiderer (p. 422) is entirely unwarranted in maintaining the sense to be: "that Christ, by His death on the cross, took away, removed our sins, so that they no longer surround our life," and "that by this removal is meant, that *we* free our moral life and conduct from sin" (!).

idea of sacrifice, especially as he himself says that the idea of substitution is that upon which the sin-offering is based, Lev. xvii. 11. And was there any other substitutionary bearing of sin than in the sacrifice? It must not, however, be concluded that *each* word in the expression, and especially ἐπὶ τὸ ξύλον, must have a particular reference to the idea of sacrifice.

ἵνα ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις ἀπογενόμενοι] Oecumenius: ἀπογενόμενοι· ἀντὶ τοῦ, ἀποθανόντες; cf. Rom. vi. 2, 11 (Gal. ii. 19). Bengel's rendering: γίνεσθαι τινός fieri alicujus dicitur servus, ἀπὸ dicit sejunctionem; Germ. "to become without," which Weiss (p. 284) supports, is inappropriate here, since ἀπογίγνεσθαι in this sense is construed with the genitive. For the dative, see Winer, p. 398 [E. T. 532]. ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις corresponds to the foregoing τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν. The use of the aor. part. shows that the being dead unto sin is the condition into which we are introduced by the fact that Christ τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν αὐτὸς ἀνήνεγκεν κ.τ.λ. The actions of the Christians should correspond with this condition; this the apostle expresses by ἵνα . . . τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ ζήσωμεν; cf. Rom. vi. — δικαιοσύνη means here not: justification or righteousness, as a condition of him whose sins are forgiven, but it is the opposite of ἁμαρτία: righteousness which consists in obedience towards God and in the fulfilling of His will. The clause, introduced here by the final particle ἵνα (as in i. 18), does not give the primary aim of Christ's substitutionary death: that, namely, of reconciliation, but further the design: that of making free from the power of sin. Weiss (p. 285) is wrong in thinking that Peter "did not here conceive the redemption as already completed in principle by the blood of Christ," but "accomplished in a purely physiological way, by the impression produced by the preaching of His death and the incitement to imitation which[1] it gave." Thus Pfleiderer also. The refutation of this is to be found in what follows. — οὗ τῷ μώλωπι [αὐτοῦ] ἰάθητε] Isa. liii. 5, LXX.; return

[1] In his *Lehrbuch der bibl. Theol.* (p. 172), Weiss only says: "It follows from ii. 24 that the being released from sin is certainly a consequence, but only the indirect consequence of the death of Christ. Because it has released us from the guilt of our former sins, the further consequence will be, that henceforward we will renounce those sins which He vicariously expiated."

to the direct form of address: μώλωψ is, properly speaking, marks left by scourging (Sir. xxviii. 17, πληγὴ μάστιγος ποιεῖ μώλωπας); therefore, taken strictly, the expression has reference to the flagellation of Christ only; but here it stands as a pars pro toto (Steiger) to denote the whole of Christ's sufferings, of which His death was the culminating point. — By ἰάθητε the apostle declares that, through the suffering of Christ (of course by the instrumentality of faith), the Christians are translated from the sickness of a sinful nature into the health of a life of righteousness.

Ver. 25. ἦτε γὰρ ὡς πρόβατα πλανώμενοι] This explanatory clause (γάρ) points back, as the continuance in it of the direct address (ἰάθητε . . . ἦτε) shows, in the first instance, to the statement immediately preceding οὗ τῷ μώλωπι ἰάθητε, but at the same time also to the thought ἵνα . . . τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ ζήσωμεν, to which that assertion is subservient. For the foregoing figure a new one is substituted, after Isa. liii. 6: LXX. πάντες ὡς πρόβατα ἐπλανήθημεν; if πλανώμενοι be the correct reading, then from it the nearer definition of πρόβατα is to be supplied, the sheep are to be thought of as those which have no shepherd (Matt. ix. 36: ὡσεὶ πρόβατα μὴ ἔχοντα ποιμένα; comp. Num. xxvii. 17; 1 Kings xxii. 17). —For the figure describing the state of man separated in his sin from God, comp. Matt. xviii. 12, 13; Luke xv. 4 ff. — ἀλλ' ἐπεστράφητε νῦν] ἐπεστράφητε is, in harmony with the *uniform* usage of Scripture, to be taken not in a passive (Wiesinger, Schott), but in a middle sense: "*ye have turned yourselves.*"[1] Luther translates: "but ye are now turned." The word ἐπιστρέφειν means to turn oneself away from (ἀπό, ἐκ), towards something (ἐπί, πρός, εἰς), (sometimes equal to: to turn round); but it is not implied in the word itself that the individual has formerly been in that place towards which he has now turned round, and whither he is going (therefore, in Gal. iv. 9, πάλιν is expressly added). Weiss (p. 122) is

[1] Schott's counter-remark: "The question is not here what they did, but what in Christ was imparted to them," has all the less weight, that conversion, though the personal act of the Christian, must still be regarded as effected by Christ. Hofmann maintains, without the slightest right to do so, that in this passage the chief emphasis lies on the readers' *own* act, though at the same time he correctly understands ἐπεστράφητε in a middle sense.

therefore wrong when from this very word he tries to prove that by *ποιμήν* God, and not Christ, is to be understood, although the term sometimes includes in it the secondary idea of "back;" cf. 2 Pet. ii. 21, 22. — *ἐπὶ τὸν ποιμένα καὶ ἐπίσκοπον τῶν ψυχῶν ὑμῶν*] cf. especially Ezek. xxxiv. 11, 12, 16, LXX.: *ἐγὼ ἐκζητήσω τὰ πρόβατά μου καὶ ἐπισκέψομαι αὐτά, ὥσπερ ζητεῖ ὁ ποιμὴν τὸ ποίμνιον αὐτοῦ . . . τὸ πλανώμενον ἀποστρέψω*; besides, with *ποιμήν*, Ps. xxiii. 1; Isa. xl. 11. From the fact that in these passages God is spoken of as the shepherd, it must not be concluded, with Weiss, that *ποιμὴν καὶ ἐπίσκοπος* refers not to Christ, but to God. For not only has God, calling Himself a shepherd, promised a *shepherd* (Ezek. xxxiv. 24, LXX.: *ἀναστήσω ἐπ' αὐτοὺς ποιμένα ἕνα . . . τὸν δοῦλον μου Δαυίδ*, xxxvii. 24), but Christ, too, speaks of Himself as the good Shepherd; and Peter himself, in chap. v. 4, calls Him *ἀρχιποιμήν*. In comparison with these passages, chap. v. 2 is plainly of no account. All interpreters—except Weiss—rightly understand the expressions here used as applying to Christ. The designation *ἐπίσκοπος* would all the more naturally occur to the apostle, as it was, like *ποιμήν*, the name of the presidents of the churches who were, so to speak, the representatives of the One Shepherd and Bishop, the Head of the whole church. — *τῶν ψυχῶν ὑμῶν* belongs, as the omission of the article before *ἐπίσκοπον* shows, to both words; with the expression, cf. chap. i. 9, 22.

CHAPTER III.

VER. 1. *αἱ γυναῖκες*] *Rec.* after C K L P, etc. (Tisch. 7); Lachm. and Tisch. 8 omit *αἱ*, after A B; *αἱ* omitted perhaps in order to mark the vocative. — Almost all authorities (as also ℵ), even Griesb., along with Lachm. and Tisch., support the reading *κερδηθήσονται* instead of *κερδηθήσωνται*. The future conjunct., occurring only in later writers (see Winer, p. 72 [E. T. 89]), is to be found only in min.; it is put here because of *ἵνα*; superfluously, however, as *ἵνα* in the N. T. is often construed cum. Ind., John xvii. 2; Rev. xxii. 14. — Ver. 3. *ἐμπλοκῆς τριχῶν καὶ περιθέσεως*] Lachm. substitutes: *ἐμπλοκῆς ἢ περιθέσεως*, in C. — The most important authorities, however, support the usual reading (Tisch.). — Ver. 4. *πραΰς καὶ ἡσυχίου*] *Rec.* after A C L K P ℵ, most min. Clem. Thph. etc. — Lachm.: *ἡσυχίου καὶ πραΰς*, in B, Vulg. Copt. etc. Instead of *πραΰς*, Tisch. reads *πραΰως*, cf. A. Buttmann, p. 23. — Ver. 5. Millius, without sufficient reason, regards the words: *αἱ ἐλπίζουσαι ἐπὶ τὸν Θεόν*, as spurious, because they are not in the vss. Aethiop. — However, according to A B C, etc., and Lachm. and Tisch., *εἰς* should probably be read for *ἐπί*. The article *τόν*, which is found almost only in min., must be deleted (Lachm. Tisch.), so that the original text probably runs: *αἱ ἐλπίζουσαι εἰς Θεόν*. ℵ reads *αἱ ἐλπ. ἐπὶ τὸν Θεόν* after the word *ἑαυτάς*. — Ver. 6. *ὑπήκουσε*] Lachm.: *ὑπήκουεν*, is insufficiently attested by B, Vulg. — Ver. 7. The *Rec.* *συγκληρονόμοις* (Tisch.) is found in several min. (3, 7, 8, etc.), in Vulg. Syr. Aeth. Arm. Arr., in Thph. Oec. Aug. etc.; it is doubtful if in B.[1] In ℵ we find at first hand: *συγκληρονόμους*, and as correction: *συγκληρονόμοις* (according to Buttm.). In A C K L P, many min., several versions, and Hier., on the other hand, we find the nominative: *συγκληρονόμοι* (Lachm.). The opinion of critics as to which is the original reading, is much divided; almost all commentators prefer the *Rec.*; so, too, Reiche; whilst Hofm. holds an opposite view. According to the handwriting, the nominative appears clearly to be the better attested reading; but for this see the

[1] Birch has given as the reading of B: *συγκληρονόμοι*, but has been accused of error by Majus. Buttm. in his ed. reads *συγκληρονόμοι*, and gives this also as the reading of B. On the other hand, in his Recensus lectt. Cod. ℵ, he gives *συγκληρονόμοις* as the reading adopted by him.

commentary on the verse. — A C** ℵ, several min. Hier. add the adjective ποικίλης to χάριτος, which is probably taken from chap. iv. 10, but which Hofm. nevertheless considers genuine. — Instead of *Rec.* ἐκκόπτεσθαι, after C** K L, several min. and Theoph. (Tisch. 7), Lachm. and Tisch. 8 read, after A B ℵ, etc.: ἐγκόπτεσθαι (Tisch. 8: ἐνκ.), which Hofmann also considers the original reading. Both readings occur in Oec. It cannot be decided with certainty. Buttm., following B, has accepted the dative ταῖς προσευχαῖς in place of the accus. τὰς προσευχάς. Grammatically no objection can be raised ("so that no hindrance be given to your prayers"); but as this reading is only found in B, it can hardly be considered the original one. — Ver. 8. ταπεινόφρονες] after A B C ℵ, etc., Syr. Erp. etc.; accepted even by Griesb. and Scholz instead of the φιλόφρονες of K and several min. In some Cod. both words are placed side by side, which may, according to Hofmann, be taken as the original reading. — Ver. 9. According to almost all authorities: A B C K ℵ, *al.*, Syr. utr. Copt. etc., as also Lachm. and Tisch., εἰδότες should be deleted. — Ver. 10. The *Rec.* gives the pronoun αὐτοῦ after γλῶσσαν (K L P ℵ, etc.); in A B C and several min. it is wanting here, as also after χείλη; Lachm. and Tisch. have accordingly omitted it in both passages. — Ver. 11. After ἐκκλινάτω several Codd.: A B C* have the particle ὁέ (Lachm. Tisch. 7), which in the *Rec.* is wanting after C** K L P ℵ, etc. (Tisch. 8). The omission seems to be a correction. — Ver. 12. οἱ ὀφθαλμοί] The article is wanting in A B C* K L P ℵ, etc.; omitted by Scholz, Lachm. Tisch.; Griesb., too, regards οἱ as doubtful. In the original passage, Ps. xxxiv. 16, LXX., it is wanting. — Ver. 13. ζηλωταί] after A B C ℵ, *al.* (Lachm. Tisch. 8), instead of the *Rec.* μιμηταί in K L P, several min. Oec. (Tisch.). μιμηταί appears to be a correction. τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ having been taken as masc., and ζηλωταί not being suitable thereto, μιμηταί, following such passages as Eph. v. 1, 1 Thess. i. 6, very naturally presented itself; de Wette, Wiesinger, Reiche, Hofmann prefer μιμηταί; Brückner and Schott: ζηλωταί. Instead of ἐὰν . . . γένησθε, B reads: εἰ . . . γένοισθε, as Buttm. notes, without, however, receiving it into the text. — Ver. 14. Instead of ἀλλ' εἰ in A and several min.: εἰ δέ. — μὴδὲ ταραχθῆτε, omitted in B L 43, but yet received into the text by Buttm. — Ver. 15. τὸν Θεόν] *Rec.* after K L P, several min. Thph. Oec. Instead of this, Lachm. and Tisch. read τὸν Χριστόν (considered by Griesb. to be probably the genuine reading); attested by A B C ℵ 7, *al.*, Syr. utr. Copt. etc., Clem. Fulgent. The alteration to τὸν Θεόν is explained by Isa. viii. 13. — After ἕτοιμοι the *Rec.* adds ὁέ; according to Tisch.'s statement, it stands in A K, etc., but not in

B C ℵ, etc.; Buttm. affirms that it is also to be found in B; Tisch. 7 has retained it; Lachm. and Tisch. 8 have not. — In place of *αἰτοῦντι*, ℵ has the correction: *ἀπαιτοῦντι*. — A B C ℵ 5, *al.*, Copt. Syr. etc., have *ἀλλά* before *μετά*, which Lachm. and Tisch. have justly accepted; it may be considered as the original, not only from the testimony of the authorities (it is wanting only in K L P, some min. and versions, in Oec. Beda), but also as being the more difficult reading. — Ver. 16. The reading which is best attested by the authorities is: *ἐν ᾧ καταλαλοῦσι ὑμῶν ὡς κακοποιῶν*, as in A C K ℵ, etc. Instead of the indicative, *Rec.* has the conjunctive: *καταλαλῶσιν*. B, on the other hand, simply has *καταλαλεῖσθε*, which Tisch. has accepted; he is, however, hardly justified in doing so, as it is too insufficiently attested, and appears rather to be a correction for the purpose of making the passage less difficult (cf. Schott and Hofmann). — Ver. 17. *εἰ θέλοι*] justly accepted even by Griesb. instead of the *Rec.* *εἰ θέλει*. — Ver. 18. *ἡμῶν*, following upon *ἁμαρτιῶν* in C** *al.*, Syr. Arr. etc., has been accepted by Lachm. in his small edition; it appears to have been inserted in consideration of *ἵνα ὑμᾶς προσαγάγῃ τ. Θ.* — Instead of the *Rec.* *ἔπαθε* in B K L P, pl. Thph. Oec. Aug. (Tisch. 7), A C ℵ, 5, *al.*, Cypr. Didym., several versions (Lachm. Tisch. 8) have *ἀπέθανε*; de Wette - Brückner explain *ἀπέθανε* to be a gloss, after Rom. v. 6, vi. 10; Heb. iv. 27; to this Wiesinger agrees; it is, however, possible that *ἔπαθεν* arose from chap. ii. 21, as Hofm. also thinks. According to Tisch., the reading of the Codd. A C* G before the verb is. *ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν* vel *ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν*; ℵ has *ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν*; but whether this addition be genuine, cannot with certainty be decided; it may equally well have been left out as superfluous, as added in order to give prominence to the peculiar significance of the death of Christ. — Instead of *ἡμᾶς* (A C K L, *al.*, pl., several versions, etc., Lachm. Tisch. 8), B and several min. have *ὑμᾶς* (Tisch. 7); insufficiently attested. In the original handwriting ℵ has neither *ἡμᾶς* nor *ὑμᾶς*; in the correction: *ἡμᾶς*. In B *τῷ Θεῷ* after *προσαγάγῃ* is wanting, for which reason Buttm. has omitted it. — *πνεύματι*] accepted even by Griesb. instead of *Rec.*: *τῷ πνεύματι*. — Ver. 20. *ἀπεξεδέχετο*] undoubtedly the correct rendering, instead of the *ἅπαξ ἐξεδέχετο*, which is hardly supported by any authority. Tisch. remarks: videtur ex conjectura Erasmi fluxisse, qui sic edidit inde ab ed. 2. — *ὀλίγαι*] *Rec.* after C K L P, many min. Thph. Oec. (Griesb. Scholz); Lachm. and Tisch., on the other hand, following A B ℵ, *al.*, Vulg. Orig. etc., have accepted *ὀλίγοι*. *ὀλίγαι* seems to be a correction, because of the subsequent *ψυχαί*. — Ver. 21. *ὅ*] Rightly accepted by Griesb., instead of the reading *ᾧ* in the ed. Elz. — In K, many

min. Thph. etc., the opening words—evidently as a correction for the sake of simplification—are thus transposed: *ὃ ἀντίτυπον νῦν ὑμᾶς σώζει.*—Instead of the *ἡμᾶς* in the *Rec.* (C K L, Copt. etc., Thph. Oec.), Lachm. and Tisch. have adopted *ὑμᾶς* (A B P ℵ, several vss. and Fathers); doubtless rightly, as the change to *ὑμᾶς* can be explained on the principle that the more general *ἡμᾶς* seemed better suited to the context. Reiche prefers *ἡμᾶς*.—Ver. 22. According to almost all authorities, the article *τοῦ* stands before *Θεοῦ* (*Rec.* Lachm. Tisch. 7); Tisch. 8, however, following B and ℵ, has dropped it.

Ver. 1. From here to ver. 6 an exhortation to wives.—*ὁμοίως*] not simply particula transeundi (Pott); on account of the subsequent *ὑποτασσόμεναι* it stands related rather to the exhortation contained in what precedes; the participle here as in chap. ii. 18.—*αἱ γυναῖκες*] Form of address, like *οἱ οἰκέται* (as opposed to Steiger); *vid. ὑμῶν*, ver. 2; *τῶν γυναικῶν* (instead of *ὑμῶν*) is used here, not because the thought is a general one (de Wette, Wiesinger), nor "because Peter means to say that the heathen men should be won over by their *own* wives" (Schott), but because the apostle wishes clearly to point out how the *wives* too may be able to advance the kingdom of God. The words are addressed generally to *all* Christian wives, though, as the sequel shows, with special reference to those who have unbelieving husbands.—*ὑποτασσόμεναι τοῖς ἰδίοις ἀνδράσιν*] *ἰδίοις* is used here, not by way of contradistinction (Glossa interl.: suis viris, non adulteris, or according to Calvin: ut Ap. castitatis uxores admoneat avocetque a suspectis obsequiis virorum aliorum; so, too, Fronmüller), but only to express the idea of belonging together more strongly than the simple pronoun; cf. also Winer, p. 145 f. [E. T. 191 f.].—With the thought here expressed, cf. Eph. v. 22–24; Col. iii. 18; 1 Tim. ii. 9. It is self-evident,—although many interpreters have discussed the question at considerable length,—that the subjection of the wife to the husband is of quite a different kind from that of the slave to the master. The apostle, however, does not go into the subject further, but contents himself with simply emphasizing that point.[1]

[1] For similar remarks of the ancients, see in Steiger; that of the humorist Philemon (in a Fragment, ver. 123) is particularly significant: *ἀγαθή γυναικός ἐστιν, ὦ Νικοστράτη, μὴ κρείττον' εἶναι τ' ἀνδρός, ἀλλ' ὑπήκοον.*

— *ἵνα καὶ εἴ τινες ἀπειθοῦσι τῷ λόγῳ*] *καὶ εἴ, i.e.* "*even then when*," supposes not only a possible, but a particularly unfavourable case; that is to say, when men who are joined to Christian wives oppose the λόγος, even then may such be gained over by the Christian walk of their wives;[1] *τινες* must be conceived as referring to heathen men with Christian wives. — With *τῷ λόγῳ*, cf. chap. ii. 8. — The expression *ἀπειθεῖν* denotes here, as in chap. ii. 7, not a simple negation only, (Pott: ad religionem christianam nondum accessisse), but an opposition to. — *διὰ τῆς τῶν γυναικῶν ἀναστροφῆς*] *ἑαυτῶν* must be supplied to *γυναικῶν*; it is not wives in general who are here meant, but only the wives of heathen husbands. — *ἀναστροφή*; quite generally: the Christian walk of women, with special reference, however, to their relation to their husbands; it is precisely obedience that most easily wins the heart. — *ἄνευ λόγου*] Huss incorrectly: sine verbo praedicationis publicae (so, too, Fronmüller); the words are used here to emphasize more strongly *διὰ τῆς . . . ἀναστροφῆς*, and must be held to refer to the conduct of wives (de Wette, Wiesinger). Schott wrongly unites *ἄνευ λόγου* with the preceding *τῆς . . . ἀναστροφῆς* into *one* idea; Peter could never have meant to say that the walk of women should be a *silent one*. The apostle's thought is this: if the husbands oppose the Word, the wives should all the more diligently seek to preserve a Christian walk, in order by it to win over their husbands, even without words, *i.e.* "without preaching and exhortation on their part" (de Wette). Oecumenius incorrectly refers these words to the conduct of husbands in the sense: cessanti omni verbo et contradictione. — *κερδηθήσονται*] that is to say, for the faith, and by it for the kingdom of God; cf. 1 Cor. ix. 19 ff.; so, too, Schott indeed, who, however, unjustifiably thinks that the apostle's meaning is, that *the preservation of the marriage relation* is the primary object which is to be attained by the

[1] Hofmann maintains that if the protasis be thus understood, the apodosis is not suited to it, "inasmuch as no other case could be supposed in which the husband could be won, without words, by the conduct of his wife, than that of his being disobedient to the Word," and that the difficulty can only be removed if *εἴ τινες* be interpreted as equal to *εἴπερ τινες*. But the difficulty Hofmann alludes to clearly still remains, though in fact it has no existence if only the idea *ἀπειθοῦσι* receive the precision it is entitled to.

good behaviour of the wives. On the indic. with ἵνα, cf. Winer, p. 269 ff. [E. T. 361].

Ver. 2. ἐποπτεύσαντες τὴν ἐν φόβῳ ἁγνὴν ἀναστροφὴν ὑμῶν] for ἐποπτ., cf. chap. ii. 12. The participial clause here serves as a further explanation of the preceding διὰ κ.τ.λ. — ἁγνός: "*chaste*," in the full extent of the word, not only in contradistinction to πορνεία proper, but to whatsoever violates the moral relation of the subjection of the wife to her husband. This ἁγνεία is determined by ἐν φόβῳ (not equal to, in timore *Dei* conservato: Glossa interl.; Grotius too, Bengel, Jachmann, Weiss, Fronmüller, etc., understand by φόβος here the "fear of God"), as connected in the closest possible way with the *shrinking* from every violation of duty towards the husband;[1] cf. chap. ii. 18.

Ver. 3. ὧν ἔστω] The genitive ὧν does not depend on a κόσμος to be supplied from the predicate ὁ ἔξωθεν . . . κόσμος (de Wette, Wiesinger, Schott, Hofmann); such a construction, arbitrary in itself, is here entirely inadmissible on account of the remoteness of the predicate, from which the idea wanting is to be taken. The genitive is rather ruled by ἔστω. εἶναί τινος expresses, as usual, the relation of belonging to; the sense is therefore: "*whose business let it be*," *i.e.* who have to occupy themselves with.[2] — οὐχ ὁ ἔξωθεν κ.τ.λ.] As often in our epistle, the negative preceding the positive. — ὁ ἔξωθεν is closely joined together with κόσμος. The genitives which stand between, and are dependent on κόσμος, serve to determine the idea more precisely; their position immediately after ὁ ἔξωθεν is explained from the intention of the writer to lay special emphasis on them, since it belongs to women to take pleasure in adorning themselves in this wise. The

[1] Schott unwarrantably maintains that in this interpretation it is not ἀναστροφή which is more precisely defined by the homogeneous adjectival expression ἐν φόβῳ ἁγνή, but ἁγνὴ ἀναστρ. by ἐν φόβῳ.

[2] When Hofmann would advance against this construction that the affirmative subject (ver. 4) is not suitable to it, "since it may be said of the hidden man of the heart, that it should be the woman's adornment, but not that it should be her business, for she herself is that hidden man," it must be observed in reply that it is not ὁ κρυπτὸς . . . ἄνθρωπος in itself, but ὁ κρυπτὸς . . . ἄνθρωπος ἐν τῷ ἀφθάρτῳ κ.τ.λ., which is to be taken as that which should be characteristic of women; as Hofmann also in his expositions says, the adornment of women is not indicated by the simple, but by the compound expression.

whole expression is to be interpreted thus: "*outward adornment wrought by the plaiting of hair, the wearing of gold, or the putting on of apparel.*" — ἐμπλοκή, ἅπ. λεγ. (in the passage specially to be compared with this, 1 Tim. ii. 9, πλέγματα is used), not: "the plaits," but "the plaiting;" it is an active idea, like περίθεσις and ἔνδυσις; "these verbalia describe the vain occupation of worldly women" (Wies.); χρύσια are golden ornaments generally. — The last two members of the clause, united by ἤ, are connected with the first by καί, because they have reference to things which are put on the body.

Ver. 4. As antithesis to what precedes, ἀλλ' ὁ ἔσωθεν κόσμος would have been expected; instead of this, however, the author at once states in what that adornment does consist. — ὁ κρυπτὸς τῆς καρδίας ἄνθρωπος] does not mean: the virtutes christ. quas Spir. s. per regenerationem in homine operatur (Gerhard; so, too, Wiesinger and Fronmüller), for here there is no mention either of the Holy Ghost or of regeneration. It denotes simply the *inner* man, in contradistinction to the *outward* man (so, too, de Wette, Brückner, Weiss, Schott, Hofmann); κρυπτός, antithesis to ἔξωθεν, ver. 3; cf. ὁ ἔσω ἀνθρ., Rom. vii. 22; Eph. iii. 16; ὁ ἔσωθεν, *sc.* ἄνθρ., 2 Cor. iv. 16; cf., too, such expressions as: τὰ κρυπτὰ τῆς καρδίας, 1 Cor. xiv. 25, and τὰ κρυπτὰ τῶν ἀνθρ., Rom. ii. 16. The apostle selected the expression κρυπτός as a contrast to the conspicuous adornment formerly spoken of. τῆς καρδίας is not gen. qualitatis (Schott); καρδία itself denotes no quality; it is the genitive of apposition subjoined, in that καρδία is the seat of the feeling and the disposition. — ἐν τῷ ἀφθάρτῳ] τὸ ἄφθαρτον, substantive (like φθαρτά, chap. i. 18), "*the imperishable*" (incorrectly, Hofmann: ἐν τῷ ἀφθάρτῳ, *sc.* κόσμῳ), in contrast to the perishable ornaments above mentioned. The prepos. ἐν points out the sphere in which the inner hidden man should move. If "ὢν ὁ κόσμος ἔστω" be supplied after ἀλλά, then "ἐν is to be joined with it, so as to show in what, and with what, this their inward hidden man should be their ornament" (Schott; so, too, Hofmann). — τοῦ πραέος καὶ ἡσυχίου πνεύματος] a more exact definition of the ἄφθαρτον; it denotes not the πν. ἅγιον of God, but the spirit of man. The *meek* and *quiet* spirit (here emphasized with special reference

to ὑποτασσόμενοι, ver. 1) is that "imperishable," in which the hidden life of woman should exist and move.[1]—ὅ ἐστιν ἐνώπιον τοῦ Θεοῦ πολυτελές] ὅ does not apply to the whole (Grotius), nor to τῷ ἀφθάρτῳ (Bengel, Pott, Steiger, Schott), since it is self-evident that the ἄφθαρτον is in God's eyes πολυτελές. It is to be taken with the immediately preceding: πνεύματος (de Wette, Wiesinger). Such a πνεῦμα is, in the judgment of God (1 Tim. ii. 3), πολυτελές (Mark xiv. 3; 1 Tim. ii. 9), whilst outward adornment, worthless to the divine mind, possesses a value only in the eyes of men.[2]

Vv. 5, 6. οὕτω γάρ] ground for the exhortation: ὦν ἔστω, etc., by the example of the saintly women of the O. T. οὕτω refers back to what precedes. — ποτὲ καὶ αἱ ἅγιαι γυναῖκες] ποτέ, *i.e.* in the time of the Old Covenant.—ἅγιαι: because they belonged to the chosen people of God (Schott), and their life was sanctified and consecrated to God in faith. — αἱ ἐλπίζουσαι εἰς [ἐπὶ] Θεόν] cf. 1 Tim. v. 5. This nearer definition is subjoined not only because hope in God, *i.e.* in the fulfilment of His promises, was the characteristic mark of the piety of these holy women, rooted as it was in faith, but specially "to explain why it did not, and could not, occur to them ever to delight in empty show" (Hofmann).[3] — With ἐκόσμουν ἑαυτάς, cf. 1 Tim. ii. 9. — ὑποτασσόμεναι τοῖς ἀνδράσιν is linked on to

[1] The two expressions: πραΰς and ἡσύχιος, must not be sharply distinguished; πραΰτης stands contrasted specially with ὀργή (Jas. i. 20, 21) or ζῆλος (Jas. iii. 13, 14), synonymous with ἐπιεικεία (2 Cor. x. 1), μακροθυμία (Col. iii. 12), ὑπομονή (1 Tim. vi. 11), etc.; it is peculiar to him who does not allow himself to be provoked to wrath. ἡσυχία is related to ἀκαταστασία; a ἡσύχιος is he who is peaceable and does not care for noisy life. Bengel interprets: *mansuetus* (πραΰς): qui non turbat; *tranquillus* (ἡσύχιος): qui turbas aliorum fert placide; the contrary would be more correct.

[2] Luther: "A woman should be thus disposed as not to care for adornment. Else when people turn their minds to adornment, they never give it up; that is their way and their nature; therefore, a Christian woman should despise it. But if her husband wish it, or there be some other good reason for adorning herself, then she is right to do so." Calvin, too, rightly observes: Non quemvis cultum reprehendere voluit Petrus, sed morbum vanitatis, quo mulieres laborant.

[3] According to Schott, this addition is meant to express that "the complete development of the Christian church, to which they belonged, was *only as yet* an object of hope;" but this introduces a reference which the words do not contain.

ἐκόσμουν ἑαυτάς, showing wherein lay the proof that they had adorned themselves with the meek and quiet spirit. There is but *one* (de Wette) characteristic indeed here mentioned, but, according to the connection, it is the chief manifestation of that spirit. It is incorrect to resolve (as was formerly done in the commentary) the participle into: "*from this fact, that.*" —Ver. 6. ὡς Σάῤῥα ὑπήκουσε τῷ Ἀβραάμ] A simple comparison of the contents of the two passages is a sufficient refutation of de Wette's supposition that, in the words before us, there is a reference to Heb. xi. 11. — ὡς: particula allegandi exemplum: Bengel. Sarah is mentioned, because, as the wife of Abraham and ancestress of the people of Israel, she had especial significance in the history of redemption.[1] — ὑπήκουσε refers not merely to the single case which the apostle had particularly before his mind, but denotes the habitual behaviour of Sarah towards Abraham: the aor. is used here as in Gal. iv. 8 (de Wette, Wiesinger, Schott). — κύριον αὐτὸν καλοῦσα] she showed herself submissive to the will of Abraham in this, that she called him κύριος. The allusion is here to Gen. xviii. 12 (cf. also 1 Sam. i. 8, LXX.). — ἧς ἐγενήθητε τέκνα] Lorinus: non successione generis, sed imitatione fidei; Pott incorrectly explains the aorist by the future (ἔσεσθε); the translation, too, of the Vulg.: *estis*, is inexact; Luther is right: "*whose daughters ye are become.*" As Paul calls the believing heathen, on account of their faith, children of Abraham, so Peter here styles the women who had become Christians, children of Sarah. — ἀγαθοποιοῦσαι] does not belong to ὑποτασσόμεναι, as if ὡς Σάῤῥα . . . τέκνα were a parenthesis (Bengel, Ernesti, etc.), but to ἐγενήθητε, not, however, as stating *how* they *become* (Weiss, p. 110 f.)[2] or "*have*

[1] Schott applies ὡς to that which directly precedes, in *this* sense: that "the conduct of the holy women was regulated only according to the standard of Sarah." Hofmann *thus:* that Sarah "is mentioned as a shining example of the conduct of holy women." Both are wrong, since neither is alluded to by ὡς.

[2] It must be held, with Wiesinger, Brückner, and Schott, in opposition to Weiss and Fronmüller, that it is more natural to take these words as applying to Gentile-Christian rather than to Jewish-Christian readers. For inasmuch as the latter, before their conversion, were already τέκνα τῆς Σάῤῥας, some allusion must have been made to their not having been so in a *right* manner, and as they now had become. It does not follow from John viii. 39 (as Weiss thinks) that an allusion of this kind was unnecessary.

become" children of Sarah (to the first interpretation the aorist *ἐγενήθητε* is opposed, to the latter the pres. partic.), but as showing the mark by which they proved themselves children of Sarah. It may be resolved into: "since," or: "that is to say if," etc. It is grammatically incorrect to see in *ἀγαθοποιοῦσαι* the result of *ἧς ἐγενήθητε τέκνα*, and to explain: "in this way have they become the children of Sarah, that they are now *in accordance therewith* *ἀγαθοποιοῦσαι* and *μὴ φοβούμεναι*" (Schott). By *ἀγαθοποιεῖν* is to be understood here not specially benevolence (Oecum.);[1] the word denotes rather the whole moral activity of Christian life in its fullest extent, although here, as the connection shows, with particular reference to the marriage relation. — *καὶ μὴ φοβούμεναι μηδεμίαν πτόησιν*] *πτόησις* equals *φόβος* (Pollux v. 122: *συστολή, θόρυβος, ταραχή*), in the N. T. *ἅπ. λεγ.* (Luke xxi. 9, xxxvii. 9, the verb *πτοηθέντες* is connected with *ἔμφοβοι γενόμενοι*); it denotes not the object causing fear, but the fear itself which is felt; and it can be looked on either objectively as a power threatening man, or laying hold of him (as Prov. iii. 25, LXX.: *καὶ οὐ φοβηθήσῃ πτόησιν ἐπελθοῦσαν*; 1 Macc. iii. 25: *ἡ πτόησις ἐπιπίπτει ἐπὶ τὰ ἔθνη*; the synonymous terms *φόβος, τρόμος*, are used also in a like manner), or taken in a sense purely subjective. Most commentators understand *πτόησις* here in the first of these senses, only they do not take the conception strictly by itself, but identify it with that which causes fear; in the first edition of this commentary the second meaning is attributed to *πτόησις*: *φοβεῖσθαι πτόησιν* equal to *φοβεῖσθαι φόβον*: "to experience fear" (Mark iv. 41; Luke ii. 9; cf. Winer, p. 210 f. [E. T. 280]); but this explanation is opposed by the fact "that in such a connection the substantive must be taken not in idea only, but in form also from the verb" (Brückner). The idea here is quite as universal as in *ἀγαθοπ.*; and accordingly it must be conceived as the fear generally which the enmity of the unbelieving world occasions to believers; still, according to the connection, the apostle had doubtless in his mind more particularly the conduct of heathen men towards their Christian wives.—Luther's translation is inexact: "if ye . . . are

[1] Μετὰ τοῦ εὐκόσμου καὶ πρέποντος Χριστιανοῖς κόσμου καὶ ἐλεήμονας αὐτὰς εἶναι παραινεῖ, μηδὲν ὑποβλεπόμενας τὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν αὐτῶν διὰ τοῦτο ἐκλογισμόν.

not so fearful." The rendering of Stephanus is incorrect, *s.v.* *πτόησις*: jubentur mulieres officium facere *etiam, cum* nullus eas metus constringit i. e. sponte et ultro.

Ver. 7. *οἱ ἄνδρες ὁμοίως*] *ὁμοίως*, with the participle following, refers back, as in ver. 1, to *ὑποτάγητε πάσῃ ἀνθρ. κτίσει*, with which the exhortation begins (Hofmann); though there is no *ὑποτασσόμενοι* (cf. ii. 18, iii. 1), there lies something corresponding to it in the fact that the wife on her part possesses a *τιμή* to be acknowledged by the husband. Pott erroneously renders *ὁμοίως* by "vicissim, on the other hand;" nor is it, as de Wette thinks probable, to be expanded: "in like manner, ye men also, hear my exhortation." — *συνοικοῦντες*] *συνοικεῖν* (*ἅπ. λεγ.*) is not a euphemismus de tori conjugalis consuetudine (Hieronym. contra Jovian. lib. I. c. 4; Augustin. in Ps. cxlvi., etc.); the reference is rather to life together at home. — *κατὰ γνῶσιν*] As *γνῶσις* is here anarthrous, it is wrong to understand *γνῶσις* as referring directly to "Christian recognition of the relation of wife to husband" (Brückner, Schott); *κατὰ γνῶσιν* is rather an adverbial expression, in which *γνῶσις* is to be understood generally, as Wiesinger correctly remarks: "according to recognition, *i.e.* so that home life must be regulated by knowledge and understanding" (so also Hofmann). Similar adverbial expressions, formed by a conjunction of *κατά* with an anarthrous subst., occur frequently both in classical and N. T. Greek. It is evident from the context that *κατὰ γνῶσιν* has here special reference to the marriage relation; but from this it does not follow that the interpretation: "*in a judicious, discerning manner*," or Luther's: "with reason," is incorrect (in opposition to Brückner and Schott). De Wette is completely mistaken in rendering *γνῶσις* by: "that knowledge of men and self, in fact, that inward discernment, which is the condition of all *moderation*," as is Bengel also directly by: moderatio.[1] — *ὡς ἀσθενεστέρῳ σκεύει τῷ γυναικείῳ*] is erroneously connected

[1] Oecumenius understands this exhortation in connection with ver. 6 as having a special application to the household: *οἱ ἄνδρες . . . συνοικοῦντες· τουτέστιν· αἴσθησιν λαμβάνοντες τῆς τοῦ θήλεος κουφότητος καὶ τεῦ εὐπαραφόρου ἐν πᾶσι, καὶ εἰς μικροψυχίαν ἐνολίσθου, μακρόθυμει γίνεσθε πρὸς αὐτὰς, μὴ λόγον ἀπαιτοῦντες πικρῶς τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν αὐτῶν εἰς ταμιείαν παρακατιθέντων.*

by Luther and others with *ἀπονέμοντες*; it belongs, however, to *συνοικοῦντες*, which requires a nearer definition. — The word *σκεῦος* is used to designate the wife in 1 Thess. iv. 4 (see Lünemann *in loc.*) with reference to the husband; the same meaning, though with various applications, is here attributed to it by many interpreters. Beza: est femina vas i. e. comes et adjutrix viro ad fideliter coram Deo transigendam vitam adjuncta; Bengel: denotat hoc sexum et totum ingenium temperamentumque foemineum. But this view is incorrect, for *τῷ γυναικείῳ, sc. σκεύει,* is subjoined by way of explanation, and the comparative *ἀσθ.* shows that the husband also is thought of as *σκεῦος*. *σκεῦος* must be taken here in its specific meaning of a utensil (or instrument) serving a particular purpose, and is accordingly to be understood as specially applicable to man, in so far as the latter is used by God for the accomplishment of His will (cf. Acts ix. 15). It is inaccurate, nor can it be justified by Rom. ix. 21 ff., to take the word in the general sense of "creation" (so Wiesinger, and formerly in this commentary). Hofmann understands *σκεῦος* here as referring both to the husband and the wife, inasmuch as "in a life united in marriage, one part is destined to be and to accomplish something for the other;" but the reference to this mutual relation is purely arbitrary.[1] — *ἀσθενεστέρῳ*] Bengel: Comparativus, etiam vir habet infirmitatem; in like manner Steiger: "the less weak is called upon to assist the more weak" (thus also Fronmüller). This view is, however, incorrect; it is the husband rather as the stronger *σκεῦος*—there is no reference made here to his weakness—who is here contrasted with the wife as the weaker (de Wette, Wiesinger, Schott, Hofmann). And, because he is such a *σκεῦος*, it is demanded of him that he live with his wife *κατὰ γνῶσιν*; *ὡς* here also states the reason: because the wife is a *σκ. ἀσθενενέστερον*, it is accordingly incumbent on the man to behave towards her *κατὰ γνῶσιν*. Schott erroneously sees in

[1] Schott arbitrarily asserts that the creature is here termed *σκεῦος*, "as a *vessel* which is destined to *receive into itself*, as its real contents, the realization of the divine will." Even though a vessel containing something can be termed a *σκεῦος*, it does not follow that *σκεῦος* must be understood as meaning this and nothing else.

κατὰ γνῶσιν the determining reason why the man should treat her as a *σκ. ἀσθ.*; but this can the less be maintained, that *κ. γν.* cannot signify: "because he recognises her as such," but states the manner of the *συνοικεῖν.* — *ἀσθενεστέρῳ σκεύει* stands in apposition to *τῷ γυναικείῳ, sc. σκεύει,* and is put first by way of emphasis. — *γυναικεῖος, ἅπ. λεγ.*, Lev. xviii. 22; Deut. xxii. 5, LXX.; Esth. ii. 11, 17. — *ἀπονέμοντες τιμήν*] "*in that ye show honour* (*respect*) *to them;*" *ἀπονέμειν* in the N. T. *ἅπ. λεγ.* — The participle is not co-ordinate with the foregoing (*συνοικοῦντες*), but subordinate to it, since it brings prominently forward one of the chief ways in which the preceding exhortation may be carried into effect. The thought here must not be arbitrarily limited to any special relation (*e.g.* to that of maintenance or of continence, etc.). The husband should, in *every* relation, show the respect due to his wife. — *ὡς καὶ συγκληρονόμοις*[*-οι*] *χάριτος ζωῆς*] serves as ground of the exhortation; if the reading be: *συγκληρονόμοις,* the reference is to the wives; if *συγκληρονόμοι,* to the husbands (in opposition to Pott, who somewhat singularly interprets as equal to *εἰσὶ γὰρ συγκληρονόμοι, sc. αἱ γυναῖκες*). The dative is more in harmony with the structure of the sentence and the thought, and therefore is to be preferred to the nom. supported by the authorities; although the nom. may be defended on the ground that husbands, as *συγκλ.* of their wives, should in turn regard the latter as their *συγκλ.* But since this last is really the point of importance, it can hardly be assumed that the apostle would only have hinted at it—without openly giving expression to it.[1] — *καὶ συγκληρονόμοις*] de Wette-Brückner explain: "as (those who)

[1] In the 2d edition of this Commentary it was said: "Why should not the apostle base his exhortation to the men to honour their wives, by reminding them (the men) that they are called to inherit the *χάρις ζωῆς* along with their wives?" Reiche says: scilicet quia *absurdum* (!) esset, sic argumentari; Brückner maintains that meaning to be "altogether inappropriate and foreign to the purpose of the address." These assertions, however, can by no means be accepted, since the consciousness of being a fellow-heir of salvation with any one may very well lead to a recognition of the *τιμή* which he possesses. Nor is there anything improbable in the circumstance itself, that the apostle, whilst basing the exhortation: *συνοικεῖν κατὰ γνῶσιν,* on the position of the women, should ground the *ἀπονέμειν τιμήν* on the position of the men.—Schott passes too lightly over the whole question.

also (like yourselves) (are) fellow-heirs (*one with another*)." The reference here attributed to *συν*—simply on account of *καί*—is inappropriate, since it is a thought entirely foreign to the context, that the wives are heirs *with each other*. If the reading *συγκληρονόμοις* be adopted, *συν* applies to the husbands, equivalent to "*with you;*" *καί* may stand with reference to the foregoing *ἀσθενεστέρῳ*, adding a second particular to it (Schott); or it may also serve simply to intensify *συν*, since, strictly speaking, it is redundant.[1] If, however, *συγκληρονόμοι* be read, *καί* is to be taken in the latter way, and is not to be explained thus: "by *ἀπονέμοντες* something further is enjoined, which goes beyond the . . . *κατὰ γνῶσιν*" (Hofmann); for *συνοικοῦντες κατὰ γνῶσιν* stands imperatively, whilst *συγκληρονόμοι* does not say what the husbands should be, but what they are. With the idea *κληρονόμοι*, cf. chap. i. 4; the expression *συγκληρ.*, Rom. viii. 17; Eph. iii. 6; Heb. xi. 9. — *χάριτος ζωῆς*] *ζωῆς* states in what the *χάρις*, of which they are and will be *κληρονόμοι*, consists. It is erroneous to resolve the expression into *χάρις ζῶσα* (Erasmus) or *χάρις ζωοποιοῦσα* (Grotius). Hofmann, assuming *συγκληρονόμοι ποικίλης χάριτος ζωῆς* to be the true reading, gives an interpretation different from the above: "as such who, with their wives, share a life of manifold grace, *i.e.* of those divine favours which are experienced in common in every marriage by believers and unbelievers." In this way, however, justice is done to neither of the ideas, nor is it pointed out what the favours in married life referred to are.[2] — *εἰς τὸ μὴ ἐγκόπτεσθαι* (*Rec.* *ἐκκόπτεσθαι*) *τὰς προσευχὰς ὑμῶν*]

[1] On the redundance of *καί* in comparisons, see Winer, p. 390 [E. T. 548]; but this use of it cannot be appealed to, since *ὡς* here is not a comparative particle. Wiesinger thinks that *συν* perhaps contains the reference to a community to which man and wife equally belong; but what this was, would have been indicated by the context, as Eph. iii. 6; such, however, is not the case here. To the expression "strictly" Reiche adds a ?, without ever thinking that, since the same idea is expressed by *καί* and *συν*, one of the two must be redundant, and that "strictly" is only meant to show that *καί* is in so far not purely redundant, that it serves to strengthen the idea expressed by *συν*.

[2] There is no warrant for the opinion that the apostle's exhortation must apply also to such husbands as have unbelieving wives, since a case so special might well have been passed over. If the apostle had wished to make reference to this, he would in some way have alluded to it; cf. ver. 1 ff.

ἐγκόπτειν, strictly, incidere, then intercidere, from which arises the further meaning impedire (Hes. ἐμποδίζειν, διακωλύειν); ἐκκόπτειν, pr. excidere, whence stirpitus delere; cf. Job xix. 10, LXX.: ἐξέκοψε δὲ ὥσπερ δένδρον τὴν ἐλπίδα μου; the idea of the latter word is stronger than that of the former, but the thought in both readings remains substantially the same, since both expressions denote the ceasing of prayer. Wiesinger incorrectly understands the meaning of the term ἐγκόπτ. to be: "prayer in the meantime there still is, but the way is closed to it." In like manner de Wette, following Bretschneider: ne viam praecludatis precibus vestris, remarks: "Prayer is by sin *hindered* from mounting up to the throne of God;" and such is in substance Hofmann's view.[1] This idea would, however, have been more definitely expressed. The apostle does not say that the *power* and the *hearing* of prayer are hindered, but that the prayer itself is (this also in opposition to Reiche). In harmony with the connection of this last clause, by τὰς προσευχὰς ὑμῶν is to be understood either the joint prayer of married persons (Weiss, p. 352),[2] or the prayers which those here addressed offer up, as the husbands of their wives (or, further, as heads of households). Depreciation of the wife, in spite of union with respect to the κληρονομία, necessarily excludes prayer from married life.[3] Schott: "Where the husband does not recognise that the union of natural life in marriage is also union in the state of grace, there can naturally be no expression of the spiritual and Christian fellowship of marriage, no prayer in common."

Ver. 8. Exhortations of a general character follow, without

[1] In this interpretation the reference to the coming of prayer *to God* is a simple importation. Hofmann adds to the interpretation, that "the sighs of the wife bar the road to the husband's prayers, by accusing him to God before his prayer, thus rendered worthless, reaches Him." But this is a thought altogether foreign to the context.

[2] Although in ver. 7 it is the husbands who are addressed, still, as the verse treats of their behaviour towards their wives, ὑμῶν can well apply to both.

[3] Hieronymus, Oecumenius, etc., apply the words according to 1 Cor. vii. 3, ad honorem impertiendum uxoribus a viris, qui sit abstinentia a congressu, ut orationi vacare possint (Lorinus), which is connected with the false interpretation of συνοικοῦντες; Nicol. de Lyra says more correctly: cum vir et uxor non sunt bene concordes, minus possunt orationi vacare. The Scholion in Matthæi, p. 199, is inadequate: ὁ γὰρ περὶ τὴν οἰκίαν θόρυβος τῶν κατὰ Θεὸν ἔργων ἐμπόδιον.

regard to the various conditions of men, yet in connection with chap. ii. 11 ff. They deal with the relations of the Christians towards each other, and towards those who are inimically disposed to them. — τὸ δὲ τέλος] here adverbially: "*finally, lastly;*" in the classics τέλος δέ occurs frequently. Pott explains erroneously, by appeal to 1 Tim. i. 5: pro κατὰ δὲ τὸ τέλος summa cohortationum mearum jam eo redit (in like manner Erasmus, Grotius, Wolf, Steiger, etc.). Oecumenius marks the transition very well thus: τὶ χρὴ ἰδιολογεῖσθαι; ἁπλῶς πᾶσι φημί· τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο ὁ σκόπος ἐφορᾷ τῆς σωτηρίας. — πάντες] emphatically, in contrast to what preceded: slaves and masters, husbands and wives. — ἔστε or some such word is usually supplied here; it is more correct, however, to consider the following adjectives, etc., as standing in a dependence similar to that of the participles formerly; only that the apostle has in his mind, instead of the particular ὑποτάγητε κ.τ.λ. in ii. 13, the more general exhortation to obedience toward God. — ὁμόφρονες] in the N. T. ἅπ. λεγ. (Theognis, 81, ὁμόφρονα θυμὸν ἔχοντες); frequently τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖν, Rom. xii. 16, xv. 5; 2 Cor. xiii. 11; Phil. ii. 2; similar expressions, 1 Cor. i. 10; Eph. iv. 3; Phil. iii. 16; Luther: "*like-minded.*" — συμπαθεῖς] "*sympathizing,*" in N. T. ἅπ. λεγ.; the verb, Heb. iv. 15, x. 34; for the explanation, comp. Rom. xii. 15. Oecumenius explains: συμπάθεια· ὁ πρὸς τοὺς κακῶς πάσχοντας ὡς καὶ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς ἔλεος; where, however, it is incorrect to limit the application to suffering only. Bengel: ὁμόφρ.: mente, συμπαθεῖς: affectu in rebus secundis et adversis. — φιλάδελφοι] "*brotherly,*" Luther; also ἅπ. λεγ.; the substantive occurs in chap. i. 22. — εὔσπλαγχνοι] to be found, besides here, in Eph. iv. 32, "*compassionate;*" in classical Greek: qui robustis est visceribus, as in Hippocr. p. 89 C; and figuratively equal to εὐκάρδιος, ἀνδρεῖος; in the sense of compassionate it does not occur in the classics. — ταπεινόφρονες] ἅπ. λεγ.; the ταπεινοφροσύνη (humility) as well before God (Acts xx. 19) as towards our neighbour (chap. v. 5, Phil. ii. 3, where it is joined with σπλάγχνα οἰκτιρμοῦ); here, with the latter reference. — Calvin: humilitas praecipuum conservandae amicitiae vinculum. Hofmann justly questions whether "ὑποτάσσομαι,

the leading idea of the series of exhortations which here comes to a close, is, as it were, echoed in *ταπεινόφρ.*" (Wiesinger). For a panegyric on humility, see Lorinus *in loc.* In the classics *ταπεινόφρων* means "mean-spirited and faint-hearted." The word *φιλόφρονες* (spurious here) is explained by Gerhard: qui studeat facere ea quae alteri amica sunt et grata. The first three expressions show the loving relation in which Christians stand to each other; the last two (or three), the conduct of Christians towards all without distinction (Hofmann).

Ver. 9. Behaviour towards the hostile world. *μὴ ἀποδιδόντες κακὸν ἀντὶ κακοῦ*] the same phrase occurs Rom. xii. 17, 1 Thess. v. 15; comp. Matt. v. 43 ff. — *ἢ λοιδορίαν ἀντὶ λοιδορίας*] comp. chap. ii. 23. Nicol. de Lyra: non reddentes malum pro malo in *factis* injuriosis, nec maledictam pro maledicta in *verbis* contentiosis. — *τοὐναντίον δὲ εὐλογοῦντες*] *i.e.* in return for *κακόν* and *λοιδορία*; *εὐλογεῖν* in the N. T., when used of *man*, is equal to bona apprecari, opposed to *καταρᾶσθαι*; cf. Matt. v. 44; Luke vi. 28; Rom. xii. 14; 1 Cor. iv. 12; Jas. iii. 9. Taken in this sense (Wiesinger, Brückner, Hofmann[1]), it expresses simply the opposite of the preceding *λοιδορίαν ἀντὶ λοιδορίας*. It is more in harmony with the context, however, to understand it as referring equally to *κακὸν ἀντὶ κακοῦ*; in which case it will have a wider sense, and be equivalent to "wishing well and showing kindness by word and deed" (Fronmüller). This is supported by the subsequent *εὐλογίαν*; nor does the N. T. usage stand in the way, in so far as in 2 Cor. ix. 5, 6, at least, *εὐλογία* denotes something accomplished by human action, though Hofmann strangely seeks to lessen its force by understanding it of "a personal greeting." — *ὅτι εἰς τοῦτο ἐκλήθητε*] comp. chap. ii. 21. — *ἵνα εὐλογίαν κληρονομήσητε*] From chap. ii. 21 it is natural to take *εἰς τοῦτο* as referring to what precedes (*εὐλογοῦντες*)

[1] Schott no doubt insists that the blessing of man is accomplished in word only and not in deed, but he does not say whether it means a wish expressed in prayer (bona apprecari), or whether any operation through the word is to be understood, for he renders *εὐλογεῖν* by "to bestow good in word." If the former be implied, then it is wrong to say: "that God's blessing is in truth accompanied by deeds, but man's must stop short at the word." If the second, then man's blessing is also in deed.

(Oecumenius, Grotius, Calvin, Steiger, de Wette-Brückner, Fronmüller, Reiche, Hofmann, etc.); in which case ἵνα would belong either to εὐλογοῦντες, ὅτι . . . ἐκλήθητε thus forming a parenthesis, or to ἐκλήθητε. But in the first case the close connection of the clauses is broken, whilst in the second the somewhat inadequate idea arises, that we are called upon to bless, *in order that* we ourselves may obtain a blessing. It is therefore better to take εἰς τοῦτο with the subsequent ἵνα (Luther, Beza, Bengel, Wiesinger, Schott, etc.); comp. chap. iv. 6; John xviii. 37; Rom. xiv. 9. The consciousness that we, as Christians, are called to obtain a blessing, should be an incitement to us to bring blessing to others; the more so, that otherwise we shall fall short of the blessing to which we are called. On εὐλογίαν Bengel rightly remarks: benedictionem aeternam, cujus primitias jam nunc pii habent. If εἰδότες before ὅτι be the correct reading, it must be taken as in chap. i. 18.

Vv. 10–12. Quoted from Ps. xxxiv. 13–17, LXX., and strengthening the foregoing exhortations by a reference to the divine judgment. In the original the first clause forms an interrogation, to which the following clauses, in the second person imperative, give the answer.—ὁ γὰρ θέλων ζωὴν ἀγαπᾷν, καὶ ἰδεῖν ἡμέρας ἀγαθάς] The translation of the LXX., an inexact reproduction of the Hebrew,[1] runs: τίς ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ὁ θέλων ζωὴν, ἀγαπῶν ἡμέρας ἀγαθάς; Peter's deviation from it by the conjunction of θέλων ἀγαπᾷν is striking. — θέλων is not used adverbially here, equivalent to "fain;" but neither must another conception be substituted for ἀγαπᾷν; de Wette: "he who will *show*[2] love for life" (*i.e.* a yearning desire

[1] In the original Hebrew the passage is:

מִי־הָאִישׁ הֶחָפֵץ חַיִּים
אֹהֵב יָמִים לִרְאוֹת טוֹב.

[2] Similarly already the *Glossa interl.*: qui vult ostendere, se dilectionem habere. — Lorinus thinks that the combination of the two words serves to intensify the idea: si recte dicitur quis concupiscere, desiderare (Ps. cxviii. 20[1], quidni velle, quod est verbum generale, amare? Innuit duplicatio non solum vehementiam desiderii amorisve, sed infirmitatem quoque carnis revocantis subinde voluntatem, ne ita velit acriter et assiduo. But in Ps. cxviii. 20 (Vulg.: concupivit anima mea desiderare justificationes tuas) the connection is different from here.

after it). The idea "show," besides being an arbitrary introduction, is inappropriate, inasmuch as it is love of life itself, and not the showing of it, that is here in question. Wiesinger is more happy: "He who is really in earnest as to the love of life." *θέλων* is then to be explained on the principle that love of *ζωή*, no less than the possession of it, is conditioned by a certain course of conduct on the part of man. Bengel, appealing to Eccles. ii. 17, interprets still better: qui vult ita vivere, ut ipsum non taedeat vitae; *i.e. who will have life so that he can love it;* so, too, Schott; similarly Hofmann, only that the latter unnecessarily understands *ἀγαπᾷν* to mean simply "to enjoy a thing."— *καὶ ἰδεῖν ἡμέρας ἀγαθάς*] with *ἰδεῖν* in this connection, comp. Luke ii. 26; Heb. xi. 5; John iii. 3. — The passage in the Psalms has evidently reference to earthly happiness; according to de Wette, on the other hand, the apostle had the future and eternal life in view here; this, however, is not the case, for in the passage before us the reference is likewise to the *present* life (Wiesinger, Schott, and Brückner), only it must be observed that for the believer happiness in this life consists in something different from that of the man of the world; to the former, days of suffering also may be *ἡμέραι ἀγαθαί*. If this be correct, *γάρ* cannot refer to the thought immediately preceding, but only "to the whole exhortation, vv. 8, 9" (Wiesinger, Schott). — *παυσάτω κ.τ.λ.*] The LXX., keeping to the Hebrew original, here and in what follows preserve the second person.—*πανέιν*, "*to cause to cease, to hold back;*" in classical Greek never joined with *ἀπό*; the subsequent genitive *τοῦ μὴ λαλῆσαι* stands in conformity with the use of the verb among the Greeks; comp. Winer, p. 305 [E. T. 409]. — *κακόν* has a wider range than *δόλος*; there is no ground for limiting the application of the term here *simply* to words of reprimand (de Wette). With *δόλος*, comp. chap. ii. 1, 22. — Ver. 11. *ἐκκλινάτω δὲ κ.τ.λ.*] *ἐκκλίνειν ἀπό*; comp. Rom. xvi. 17. The same thought in the same words, Ps. xxxvii. 27; comp. further, Isa. i. 16, 17; Rom. xii. 9. — *δέ*, if it be genuine, serves to bring into prominence the new idea, distinct from the preceding. — *ζητησάτω κ.τ.λ.*] *διώκειν* (comp. 1 Tim. vi. 11, etc.), stronger than *ζητεῖν* (comp. Matt. vi. 33; Col. iii. 1). — The first half contains the general thought, the

second emphasizes one more special. Although the exhortations of the apostle refer more particularly to the conduct of Christians towards their persecutors, yet they are not confined to this, but go beyond it (in opposition to Schott). — Ver. 12. *ὅτι ὀφθαλμοὶ κυρίου κ.τ.λ.*] *ὅτι* is inserted by the apostle in order to mark more precisely the connection of thought. The exhortations are founded on a reference to the manner of God's dealings. On the first hemistich Bengel remarks: inde vitam habent et dies bonos. The apostle omits the words *τοῦ ἐξολοθρεῦσαι ἐκ γῆς τὸ μνημόσυνον αὐτῶν* in the Psalm, added to *πρόσωπον . . . κακά* (not because, as de Wette thinks, he considered them too strong), and thus deprives the last member of the verse of a nearer definition. Calvin, Grotius, Beza, de Wette, accordingly take the *ἐπί* of this member in a sense different from that which it has in the first, namely, as conveying the idea of "punishment," equivalent to "against;" this, however, is arbitrary. Hensler, Augusti, and Steiger find in all three members the expression of "attentive observation" only; but this view—itself, according to the thought, inadequate—is opposed by the particle *δέ*, which indicates rather a contrast, and is not to be translated, with Hensler, by "but also." If, now, the antithesis be not contained in *ἐπί*, it can be sought for only in *πρόσωπον*, which, though in itself doubtless a vox media (comp. Num. vi. 25, 26; Ps. iv. 7), is nevertheless in this passage of the Psalms to be thought of as one full of wrath, and, as such, was present to the mind of the apostle. Strictly speaking, indeed, this should have been expressed; but not necessarily so, since the antithesis between this and the preceding member of the verse makes it sufficiently apparent. A similar interpretation is given by Wiesinger, Brückner, and Schott.

Ver. 13 serves further to emphasize the exhortation to well-doing, and at the same time introduces the following paragraph, in which Peter calls upon the Christians to suffer persecutions patiently. — *καί*] unites what follows with what precedes. A new reason, the truth of which is attested by the thought contained in ver. 12, is added in ver. 13 to the argument advanced for the preceding exhortation of ver. 12. The sense is: Do good, for to the good God is gracious, with

the wicked He is angry; *and* those who do good, for this very reason none can harm. — *τίς ὁ κακώσων ὑμᾶς*] an impressive and passionate question (stronger than a simple negative), in which must be noted the form *ὁ κακώσων*, *sc.* *ἐστί* instead of *κακώσει*, as also the sharp contrast between *κακοῦν* and the subsequent *ἀγαθοῦ*. "Do harm," as a rendering of *κακοῦν* (Wiesinger, de Wette), is too weak. The word is used for the most part of *ill-treatment* (Acts vii. 6, 19, xii. 1, xviii. 10), and denotes here, with reference to the preceding *κακά*, such evil-doing as is really harmful for him who suffers it. It is possible that the apostle had in his mind Isa. l. 9, LXX.: *ἰδοὺ κύριος κύριος βοηθήσει μοι, τίς κακώσει με*. The interrogative form expresses the sure confidence of the apostle, that to those who do good no one either will or can do harm. Steiger's interpretation is too pointless: "and indeed who then will seek to do you harm, as you imagine, if you really," etc.;[1] for the reservation must be added that every proverb has this peculiarity, that it is not without exception (Benson), or that the statement in the oratio popularis must not be taken too strictly. The strong and consoling expression of an unshaken faith is thus reduced to a somewhat empty commonplace.[2] — *ἐὰν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ζηλωταὶ γένησθε*] *τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* was taken by some of the older interpreters (Lorin., Aret., etc.) to be the gen. masc., probably on account of the article (as distinguished from the anarthrous *ἀγαθόν*, ver. 11). Weiss also thinks that by it Christ perhaps may be understood. Most commentators, however, correctly regard it as the neuter; comp. ver. 11. The article is put, inasmuch as in this term all the single virtues, formerly mentioned, are

[1] Gualther's paraphrase is not less insipid: quis est, scilicet tam impudens et iniquus, qui vos affligat, si beneficentiae sitis aemulatores? Wiesinger's interpretation also is inappropriate: "If ye follow my exhortations, it is to be hoped," etc.—The words do not hint that "the trials which the readers had endured were not altogether undeserved on their part" (Wiesinger).

[2] Schott's interpretation, according to which *κακοῦν* is "to make evil-doers in the judgment of God," is altogether wide of the mark. Although *κακοῦν*,—corresponding to the Hebrew הִרְשִׁיעַ,—as applied to a judge, may mean: "to condemn," or properly: "to declare a person a *κακός*," it does not follow therefrom that it may also have the meaning of "causing *God* to declare a person a *κακός*."

included; it stands first by way of emphasis. — *ζηλωταί*; comp. 1 Cor. xiv. 12; Tit. ii. 14. If the reading *μιμηταί* be adopted, its connection with the neuter is somewhat singular, still the verb *μιμεῖσθαι* does occur with names of things; comp. Heb. xiii. 7; 3 John 11.

Ver. 14. *ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ πάσχοιτε*] *ἀλλά* expresses the antithesis to the negation contained in the preceding question: "*but even though you should suffer;*" cf. Winer, p. 275 [E. T. 367]; a species of restriction which, however, is not intended to weaken the force of the foregoing thought. No doubt the possibility of suffering is admitted, yet in such a way that the Christian is considered blessed on account of that suffering. *πάσχειν* is not identical with *κακοῦσθαι*, but, as Bengel rightly remarks: levius verbum quam *κακοῦσθαι*. Every Christian has a *πάσχειν*, but he need never fear a *κακοῦσθαι*.[1] — *διὰ δικαιοσύνην*] recalls Matt. v. 10. *δικαιοσύνη* is here (cf. chap. ii. 24) synonymous with *τὸ ἀγαθόν* and *ἡ ἀγαθὴ ἐν Χριστῷ ἀναστροφή*, ver. 16. — *μακάριοι*] *sc.* *ἐστέ*. Even suffering itself contributes to your blessedness. — *τὸν δὲ φόβον κ.τ.λ.*] These and the words which begin the following verse are "a free use" (Schott) of the passage, Isa. viii. 12, 13, LXX.: *τὸν δὲ φόβον αὐτοῦ* (*i.e.* *τοῦ λαοῦ*) *οὐ μὴ φοβηθῆτε, οὐδὲ μὴ ταραχθῆτε· κύριον αὐτὸν ἁγιάσατε*. The thought here is not quite the same, the sense of the Old Testament passage being: do not share the terror of the people, and do not be moved by what alarms them. If *φόβος* be here taken *objectively*, then *φόβος αὐτῶν* is "*the fear emanating from them*," or "the fear which they excite" (de Wette, Brückner); cf. Ps. xci. 5: *οὐ φοβηθήσῃ ἀπὸ φόβου νυκτερινοῦ*; cf. also in this chap. ver. 6. If, on the other hand, it be taken in a *subjective*

[1] These words also are wrongly explained by Schott, since he takes *ἀλλ'* as quickly denying the previous statement, and introducing a new turn of thought, separates *εἰ καί* from each other, and connects *καί* with *πάσχοιτε* in the sense of "even." For the first, Schott appeals to Hartung's *Partikell.* II. p. 37; for the second, to Hartung, I. p. 140, note; but without any right to do so. For, as to the *former*, he overlooks that *ἀλλ'* here follows on a sentence *negative* in meaning; and as to the *latter*, that *καί* has here a position, in which a separation of it from *εἰ* could not for a moment be thought of. The apostle would have expressed the idea: "if for righteousness' sake you should have to experience (not only not happiness and blessing, but) even suffering," by *εἰ διὰ δικαιοσύνην καὶ πάσχοιτε*.

sense, then *αὐτῶν* is equal to "of them," therefore: "do not fear with the fear of them, *i.e.* do not be afraid of them" (Schott and Hofmann also). In both cases the meaning is substantially the same. Wiesinger is inaccurate when he takes *φόβος* subjectively, and interprets *αὐτῶν* as de Wette does.

Ver. 15. *κύριον δὲ τὸν Χριστόν*] *κύριον*, in Isaiah equivalent to *τὸν Θεόν*; a substitution of this kind is frequently found in the N. T., where reference is made to passages in the O. T., and can be easily explained on the principle that a consciousness distinctively Christian was asserting itself; "*κύριον* is placed first, as antithesis to *αὐτῶν*" (Wiesinger). Schott denies that *κύριον* stands in apposition to *τὸν Χριστόν*, holding that *κύριον* is to be taken rather as a predicate of the object, equivalent to, "*as Lord;*" for this reason, that *κύριος* stands here without the article, and that the simple conjunction of *κύριος* and *Χριστός* does not occur. But against the first objection the expression *κύριος ὁ Θεός* may be urged, and against the second the verse Luke ii. 11. It is more natural, and at the same time more in harmony with the passage in the O. T., to connect *κύριος* directly with *τὸν Χριστόν*: "*but . . . the Lord, the Messiah.*" — *ἁγιάσατε*] in antithesis to *φοβηθῆτε* and *ταραχθῆτε*; "*hold,* i.e. *honour, fear as holy*" (de Wette); the sanctifying comprehends within it the fear of God; cf. Isa. viii. 18, xxix. 23; it thus forms the contrast to the fear of man; where the former is, the latter must give way. — *ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ὑμῶν*] added by the apostle in order to mark the inward nature of the *ἁγιάζειν*. — *ἕτοιμοι*] Whether *δέ* be the original reading or not, this clause is undoubtedly intimately connected in thought with that which precedes it. Without *δέ* this being ready is conceived as a proof of the *ἁγιάζειν Χρ.*; with *δέ* the thought is this, that the *ἁγιάζειν Χρ. κ.τ.λ.*, which banishes all fear of man, should not exclude the *ἀπολογία* before men (de Wette, Wiesinger). Hofmann takes the particle here as equal to "rather;" but against this is the fact that here *κύριον . . . ὑμῶν* would have to be taken as a simple parenthesis, inasmuch as *δέ* would refer only to what precedes, and a second antithesis would then be added to the already antithetical *κύριον δὲ κ.τ.λ.* — *ἀεὶ πρὸς ἀπολογίαν παντὶ τῷ κ.τ.λ.*] *ἕτοιμος πρός*, cf. Tit. iii. 1. — "The injunction

exempts neither time (*ἀεί*) nor person (*παντί*)" (Steiger). — To limit its application to a judicial examination is arbitrary, and militates against *παντί*. — *ἀπολογία* not equal to satisfactio (Vulg.), but here rather quaevis responsio, qua ratio fidei (more correctly spei) nostrae redditur (Vorstius; Phil. i. 7, 16; Acts xxvi. 2). — *παντὶ τῷ αἰτοῦντι κ.τ.λ.*] The dative depending on *ἀπολογίαν*, cf. 1 Cor. ix. 3; for *αἰτέω* with double accusative, cf. Winer, p. 212 f. [E. T. 281]. *λόγον αἰτεῖν*: "*to demand account of*," only here, cf. chap. iv. 5; Rom. xiv. 12. — *περὶ τῆς ἐν ὑμῖν ἐλπίδος*] *περί*: as to its nature and ground. — *ἐλπίς*, not equivalent to *πίστις* (Calvin: spes hic per synecdochen pro fide capitur), but the hope of the Christian looking, on the ground of faith, into the future salvation.[1] — *ἀλλὰ μετὰ πραΰτητος καὶ φόβου*] If *ἀλλά* be the true reading, as there can hardly be any doubt it is, it will serve to make more sharply prominent the way and manner, in which the *ἀπολογία* should be conducted; de Wette: "as it were: *but remember*." — *μετά*, to be connected not with *ἕτοιμοι*, but with *ἀπολογίαν*; *πραΰτητος* opposed to passionate zeal. *φόβου* is to be applied directly neither to God (Aretius: reverentia et timor Dei; thus Weiss also, p. 169), nor to men before whom testimony is to be borne (according to some: the civil authorities); but it denotes the being afraid—based, of course, on the fear of God —of every unseemly kind of *ἀπολογία*, and stands especially opposed to all arrogant self-confidence (Wiesinger).

Ver. 16. *συνείδησιν ἔχοντες ἀγαθήν*] These words are taken by several interpreters (Bengel, Steiger, de Wette, etc.) with *ἁγιάσατε*, ver. 14, as co-ordinate with *ἕτοιμοι*; Wiesinger construes them with *ἕτοιμοι*, as subordinate to it. The latter is to be preferred, for *συνείδ. ἐχ.* denotes "the point essentially important, to being ever prepared to give an answer in a right manner" (Wiesinger). But it is better still to assume that it —like *μετὰ πραΰτητος*—belongs in a loose way to *ἀπολογίαν*, equivalent to "*with good conscience*," *i.e.* in that your walk does

[1] That this "account" had special reference to the removal of the suspicion that the kingdom of Christ was of this world, is nowhere alluded to in the context (de Wette, Schott). And Schott is hardly justified in giving the apostle's exhortations special application "to the divinely ordained ordinances of natural social life."

not give the lie to your confession.[1] Calvin says correctly: quia parum auctoritatis habet sermo absque vita. — *ἵνα ἐν ᾧ κ.τ.λ.*] The construction is here the same as in chap. ii. 12; see the exposition of this passage, where, too, Schott's interpretation of *ἐν ᾧ*, equal to "in this, that," is considered. The conjunctive of the *Rec.* *καταλαλῶσιν* would represent the case as possible, equal to "*in which they may possibly slander you.*" — *ἵνα*, as a final particle, refers to the whole preceding thought, especially to *συνείδ. ἔχ. ἀγαθήν.* — *καταισχυνθῶσιν*] comp. 2 Cor. vii. 14; "*that they may be put to shame*," *i.e.* since their slanders are openly proved to be lies. — *οἱ ἐπηρεάζοντες κ.τ.λ.*] The subject stands, by way of emphasis, at the end of the sentence. *ἐπηρεάζειν*, "to revile," Matt. v. 44; Luke vi. 28. Hensler distinguishes, without any ground, the *ἐπηρεάζοντες* from the *καταλαλοῦντες*, as different persons; the former he considers to be the accusers of the Christians, who bring the slanders of others before the judge. — *ὑμῶν τὴν ἀγαθὴν ἐν Χριστῷ ἀναστροφήν*] *i.e.* "*the good life which you lead in Christ* (*i.e.* as Christians)."

Ver. 17. *κρεῖττον γάρ*] *γάρ* gives the ground of the exhortation contained in *συνείδ. ἔχ. ἀγ.*; the explanation of this *κρεῖττον* is contained in chap. ii. 19 ff. — *ἀγαθοποιοῦντας . . . πάσχειν*] The connection between these two ideas is the same as that between *ἀγαθοποιοῦντες καὶ πάσχοντες*, chap. ii. 20, the participles giving not simply the special circumstances, as Hofmann asserts, but the reason of the suffering; this Schott denies as regards the first member: *ἀγαθοποιοῦντας*.[2] — The parenthetical clause: *εἰ θέλοι τὸ θέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ*, belongs to *πάσχειν*; the optative denotes the possibility: "*if such should be the will of God.*" — On the pleonasm: *θέλοι τὸ*

[1] Hofmann says, "that it should not be joined with *ἀπολογία*, for the meaning is that they should do that whereunto they must be prepared with eagerness, and a good conscience which they should bring to it." To this it is to be replied, that the *ἀπολογία* itself is precisely the thing for which they are to be ready. It is evidently arbitrary "to supplement an imperative (which?) to *ἀλλά*, and to connect *συνείδησιν ἔχοντες ἀγ.* with it."

[2] It must, indeed, be noted that those sufferings which the believers, as such, have to endure from the unbelieving world, overtake them because of their *ἀγαθοποιΐαν*; Christians who, though confessing Christ, at the same time live entirely like the children of the world, are well liked by the world.

θέλημα, see Winer, p. 562 [E. T. 755]. The thought here is not quite the same as that of chap. ii. 20. There, chief stress is laid on *ὑπομένειν*, to which no special prominence is here given. But, as in the former case the exhortation is enforced by reference to Christ, *i.e.* to His sufferings, so is it here also, in the following paragraph on to the end of the chapter, only that in this passage the typical character of His sufferings is less emphasized, whilst the exaltation which followed them is brought specially forward.

Ver. 18. First, mention of the death of Christ by way of giving the reason. — *ὅτι καὶ Χριστὸς ἅπαξ περὶ ἁμαρτιῶν ἔπαθε [ἀπέθανε]]* *ὅτι* is connected with the idea immediately preceding, and gives the ground of the *κρεῖττον*; *καὶ Χριστός* (as in chap. ii. 21) places the sufferings which the Christians have to bear, as *ἀγαθοποιοῦντες*, side by side with the sufferings of Christ, *περὶ ἁμαρτιῶν*, so that *καί* must be taken as referring not to *ἔπαθε [ἀπέθανε]* only (as is done by most commentators, among them de Wette), but, as the position of the words (*περὶ ἁμαρτ. before ἔπαθε*) clearly shows, to *περὶ ἁμαρτιῶν ἔπαθε [ἀπέθανε]* (Wiesinger, Brückner, Schott). Hofmann's application of it to the whole "statement here with respect to Christ" is open to objection, from the fact that in what follows there are elements introduced which go too far beyond the comparison here instituted. Christ's sufferings were on account of sin, and such also should be the sufferings of the Christians.[1] This does not preclude the possibility of His sufferings having had a significance different from what theirs can have. This peculiar significance of Christ's sufferings is marked by *δίκαιος ὑπὲρ ἀδίκων*, or, as Schott holds, by *ἅπαξ*. *ἅπαξ* gives prominence to the fact that in relation to His subsequent life (*θανατωθείς . . . ζωοποιηθείς*) Christ's suffering took place but once, as in Heb. ix. 27, 28 (Hofmann: "once it took place that He died the death He did die, and what followed thereon forms, as what is enduring, a contrast to what passed over but

[1] The subsequent *δίκαιος* proves that the sins for which Christ suffered were not His own sins; thus also the believer's sufferings should not arise out of his own sins, he should not suffer as a *κακοποιῶν*, but as an *ἀγαθοποιῶν*. Rejecting this application, Hofmann finds the point of comparison in this, "that we should let the sins which those who do us wrong commit, be to us the cause of sufferings to us" (?).

once"); doubtless not without implying the secondary idea, that the sufferings of Christians take place only once also, and come to an end with this life.[1] — *περὶ ἁμαρτιῶν*, which states yet more indefinitely the purpose of Christ's sufferings: "*on account of sin*," finds a more precise definition in what follows. — *δίκαιος ὑπὲρ ἀδίκων*, "as the just for the unjust;" comp. Rom. v. 6: *ὑπέρ*, equivalent to, in commodum, is not in itself, indeed, equal to *ἀντί*; but the contrast here drawn between *δίκαιος* and *ἀδίκων* suggests that in the general relation, the more special one of substitution is implied (Weiss, p. 261); comp. chap. ii. 21. The omission of the article is due to the fact that the apostle holds it of importance to mark the character of the one as of the other. — *ἵνα ἡμᾶς προσαγάγῃ τῷ Θεῷ*] gives the purpose of *ἔπαθεν* [*ἀπέθανε*], which latter is more closely defined by that which immediately precedes and follows; *προσάγειν* does not mean "to sacrifice;" (Luther, Vulg.: ut nos offerret Deo), neither "to reconcile;" but "*to bring to*," i.e. "*to bring into communion with God*," which goes still beyond the idea of reconciliation; the latter presupposes Christ's death for us; the former, the life of Him who died for us. Weiss maintains, without sufficient reason (p. 260), that the word here points to the idea of the Christians' priesthood (chap. ii. 5). The verb occurs here only; the substantive *προσαγωγή*, Rom. v. 2; Eph. ii. 18, iii. 12.[2] — *θανατωθεὶς*

[1] Oecumenius finds in *ἅπαξ* an allusion to: *τὸ τοῦ παθόντος δραστήριόν τι καὶ ἐνεργόν*, or to the *brevity* also of the sufferings. Gerhard unites all three elements by saying: ut ostendat (Ap.) passionis Christi brevitatem et perfectionem sacrificii et ut doceat Christum non amplius passioni fore obnoxium. — According to Pott, it is also meant to express the contrast to the frequent repetition of the O. T. sacrifices,—an application entirely foreign to the context. According to Schott, *ἅπαξ* indicates that Christ suffered once for all, so that any further suffering of the same kind is neither necessary nor possible. This is no doubt correct, but it does not follow that Peter—whose words combine the typical and specifically peculiar significance of the sufferings of Christ—should not have had in his mind the application of *ἅπαξ* to believers, as above stated. It is with *ἅπαξ* as with *περὶ ἁμαρτιῶν*; it is impossible for believers to suffer *περὶ ἁμαρτιῶν* in the *same* sense that Christ suffered *περὶ ἁμαρτιῶν*.

[2] It is certainly very doubtful whether the purpose also of the death of Christ, here stated, "admits of application to us," in that "it should likewise be our object, by the manner in which we endure undeserved sufferings, to bring those by whom we are wronged to bethink themselves, and to lead them to a knowledge of Christ" (Hofmann).

μὲν σαρκί, ζωοποιηθεὶς δὲ πνεύματι] This adjunct does not belong to *ἔπαθεν* (de Wette), but to *προσαγάγῃ* (Wiesinger); it is subjoined, in order to show prominently how the *προσάγειν* can take place through Christ; the chief stress is laid on the second member. According to Schott, both participles are to be considered as "an exposition of *ἅπαξ*;" this assumption is contradicted, on the one hand, by the distance between them and the latter word; and, on the other, that they must necessarily be attached to a verb. — The antithesis between the two members of this sentence is strongly marked by *μὲν . . . δέ*. The datives *σαρκί, πνεύματι*, state with reference to what the verbal conceptions *θανατωθείς, ζωοποιηθείς* holds good; "they serve to mark the sphere to which the general predicate is to be thought of as restricted" (Winer); comp. 1 Cor. vii. 34: *ἁγία καὶ σώματι καὶ πνεύματι*; Col. ii. 5: *τῇ σαρκὶ ἄπειμι, τῷ πνεύματι σὺν ὑμῖν εἰμι*. Schott explains — somewhat ambiguously — the datives "as general more precise adverbial definitions," which state "what is of determinative importance in both facts," and "the nature of the actual condition produced by them." — *πνεύματι* is by some understood instrumentally; incorrectly, for *σαρκί* cannot be taken thus; the two members of the clause correspond so exactly in form, that the dative in the one could not be explained differently from the dative in the other, as Wiesinger, Weiss, von Zezschwitz, Brückner, Schott, and Fronmüller justly acknowledge. — *σαρκὶ . . . πνεύματι*; this antithesis occurs frequently in the N. T.; with reference to the person of Christ, besides in this passage, in Rom. i. 3: *κατὰ σάρκα . . . κατὰ πνεῦμα ἁγιωσύνης*, and 1 Tim. iii. 16: *ἐν σαρκὶ . . . ἐν πνεύματι* (cf. also chap. iv. 6). — The antithesis of the two conceptions proves it to be erroneous to assign to the one term a sphere different from that of the other, and to suppose *σάρξ* to mean the body of *Christ*, and *πνεῦμα* the Spirit of *God*. Antithesis clare ostendit quod dicatur in alia quidem sui parte aut vitae ratione mortificatus, in alia autem vivificatus (Flacius). It must be observed that both are here used as *general* conceptions (Hofmann), without a pronoun to mark them as designations applicable only to Christ; for which reason *σάρξ* cannot relate exclusively to the human, and *πνεῦμα* to the divine

nature of Christ.[1] As *general* conceptions (that is, as applicable not to Christ alone, but to human nature generally), *σάρξ* and *πνεῦμα* must, however, not be identified with *σῶμα* and *ψυχή*.[2] For *σάρξ* is *that* side of human nature in virtue of which man belongs to the earth, is therefore an earthly creature, and accordingly perishable like everything earthly; and *πνεῦμα*, on the other hand, is *that* side of his nature by which he belongs to a supernatural sphere of existence, is not a mere creature of earth, and is accordingly destined also to an imperishable existence.[3] — Wiesinger (with whom Zezschwitz agrees) deviates from this interpretation thus far only, that he understands *πνεῦμα*, not as belonging to the *nature* of man, "but as that principle of union with God which is bestowed upon man at regeneration." This deviation may arise from the reluctance to attribute a *πνεῦμα* to man as such (also in his sinful condition); as, however, according to Peter, the souls of the

[1] Accordingly, interpretations like those of Calvin are incorrect: caro hic pro externo homine capitur, spiritus pro divina potentia, qua Christus victor a morte emersit; Beza: *πνεύματι, i.e.* per divinitatem in ipso corporaliter habitantem, equal to *ἐκ δυνάμεως Θεοῦ*, 2 Cor. xiii. 4; Oecumenius: *θανατωθεὶς μὲν τῇ φύσει τῆς σαρκός, τοῦτέστι τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ, ἀναστὰς δὲ τῇ δυνάμει τῆς θεότητος.* It is equally incorrect, with Weiss (p. 252), to understand *σάρξ* as meaning "the human nature of Christ" (instead of which he no doubt also says: "the *earthly* human nature of Christ"), and *πνεῦμα* as meaning "the pre-existent divine *πνεῦμα* communicated at baptism to the man Jesus" (which, as Weiss maintains, constitutes, according to Peter, the divine nature of Christ). Weiss, for the sole purpose of representing the apostle's doctrinal conception as still in a very undeveloped state, imputes to Peter a view of the person of Christ which—as he himself says—is possessed of "a duality which somewhat endangers the unity of His person." Nor has Wichelhaus hit the true explanation when he says: "Peter here considers Christ as, on the one hand, a true man in body and soul liable to all suffering . . .; and, on the other hand, in so far as He was anointed by the Holy Ghost."

[2] *σάρξ* and *σῶμα* are proved to be two distinct conceptions by the fact that after the resurrection man will have a *σῶμα*, but no *σάρξ*. The difference between *πνεῦμα* and *ψυχή* is clear from passages such as Matt. vi. 25. If in other passages *πνεῦμα* be used as synonymous with *ψυχή* (comp. *e.g.* John xii. 27 with John xiii. 21), this is explained by the two-sidedness of the human soul.

[3] To Weiss's remark, that Peter terms that side of human nature by which man is rendered capable of religious life *ψυχή*, it must be replied that the *ψυχή* possesses such capacity for this very reason, that even under the power of the *σάρξ* it has never ceased to be spiritual. In place of *πνεύματι*, *ψυχῇ* would not be at all appropriate here, in the first place, because *ψυχή* forms no antithesis to *σάρξ*, and then because the idea of what is celestial, peculiar to *πνεῦμα*, would not find expression in it.

departed are *πνεύματα* (ver. 19), it is thus presupposed that an unregenerate man also possesses a *πνεῦμα* during his earthly existence. It must also be observed that *σάρξ* and *πνεῦμα* are here not *ethical* antitheses, but are contrasted with each other as *natural* distinctions. — *θανατωθεὶς . . . ζωοποιηθείς*] *θανατόω* incorrectly interpreted by Wahl here, as in other passages of the N. T., by capitis damno, morti addico; for although it may sometimes occur in this sense in the classics, still in the N. T. it means only *to kill*. By *θανατωθεὶς σαρκί*, then, the apostle says of Christ, that He was put to death in His *earthly* human nature (which He along with all the rest of mankind possessed [1]), *i.e.* at the hand of man by the crucifixion. — *ζωοποιέω* does not mean "to preserve alive," as several commentators explain, *e.g.* Bellarmin (*de Christo*, lib. iv. cap. 13), Hottinger, Steiger, and Güder;—this idea, in the Old as in the New Testament, being expressed by *ζωογονεῖν* and other words (see Zezschwitz on this passage); but "*to make alive*" (de Wette, Wiesinger, Weiss, Zezschwitz, Schott, Köhler,[2] Hofmann, and others); it often applies to the raising up of the dead; cf. John v. 21; Rom. iv. 17; 1 Cor. xv. 22, etc. In this sense alone does *ζωοποιηθείς* answer the preceding *θανατωθείς*. Bengel: vivificatio ex antitheto ad mortificationem resolvi debet. The *latter* idea assumes the anterior condition to have been one of death, whilst the *former*—in contradiction to *θαναT.*—would presuppose one of life. Christ then, according to the apostle, entered into the actual state of death, that is, in so far as the *σάρξ* pertained to Him, so that His life in the flesh came to an end;[3] but from death He was brought back again to life, that is, was raised up, as far as the *πνεῦμα* pertained to Him, so that the new life was purely pneumatical. But the new life began by His reuniting Himself as *πνεῦμα* to His *σῶμα*, so that

[1] Schott is wrong in maintaining that the antithesis to what is here said should be, "that Christ was quickened according to His *glorified* human nature;" the antithesis to "*earthly*," however, is not "*glorified*," but "*celestial*."

[2] "Zur Lehre von Christi Höllenfahrt," in the *Zeitschrift für luth. Theol. u. Kirche*, by Delitzsch and Guericke, 1864, H. 4.

[3] Schott substantially agrees with this interpretation, but thinks that the above expression does not say decidedly enough that "this was an entire cessation of His life." However, this "*entire*" is saying too much, since *σαρκί* evidently points to a limitation.

thus this σῶμα itself became pneumatical.[1] — According to Bengel, with whom Schmid (*bibl. Theol.*), Lechler, and Fronmüller agree (comp. also Hahn, *neutest. Theol.* I. 440), ζωοποιηθείς does not refer to the resurrection of Christ, but to His deliverance from the weakness of the flesh, effected by His death, and, based upon this, his transition to a higher life (which was followed by the resurrection).[2] Against this, however, is to be observed: (1) That the going of His πνεῦμα to the Father, connected with His death (Luke xxiii. 46), is, as little as His ascension, spoken of in Scripture as "a becoming quickened;" (2) That as in θανατωθείς the whole man Christ is meant, the same must be the case in ζωοποιηθείς; and (3) That this view is based on what follows, which, however, if rightly interpreted, by no means renders it necessary. Buddeus is therefore entirely right when he says: vivificatio animae corporisque conjunctionem denotat.[3]

Ver. 19. With this verse a new paragraph—extending to ver. 22 inclusive—begins, closely connected by ἐν ᾧ (*i.e.* πνεύματι) with what precedes, and in which reference is made to the glory of Him who was quickened according to

[1] Hofmann says, not quite accurately (*Schriftbeweis*, II. 1, p. 473): "the antithesis θανατ. κ.τ.λ. denotes the end of life in the flesh, and the commencement of life in the spirit." For spiritual life was in Christ during His life in the flesh, and after it, before His resurrection. At His death He committed His πνεῦμα to His Father; it was therefore in Him before, and continued to live after His death. — Hofmann remarks correctly, however: "As it was the Christ living in the flesh who, by being put to death, ceased to be any longer in that bodily life in which from His birth He had existed, so His quickening of that which was dead is a restoration of a spiritual nature to a bodily life."

[2] Bengel: Simul atque per mortificationem involuero infirmitatis in carne solutus erat, *statim* vitae solvi nesciae virtus modis novis et multis expeditissimis sese exserere coepit. Hanc vivificationem necessario celeriter subsecuta est excitatio corporis ex morte et resurrectio e sepulcro. — Schmid: "The πνεῦμα is a principle which He possessed in a special manner, . . . this, in consequence of death, is set free from the trammels of sensuous bodily nature, it now enters upon its full rights, and develops in its fulness that ζωή which was in Him."

[3] Schott explains, indeed, ζωοποιηθείς rightly in itself, but he objects to the identification of ζωοποίησις with ἀνάστασις, and thinks that the former is the fundamental condition of the latter, which is the "side of the resurrection concealed and as yet hidden in the depths" (?). But where does the apostle make any allusion to any such distinction between two sides in the resurrection of Christ?

the Spirit. It may appear singular that in this passage Peter should make mention of those who were unbelieving in the days of Noah, and of baptism as the antitype of the water of the deluge; but this may be explained from the circumstance that he looks on the deluge as a type of the approaching judgment. It must be observed that it is not so much the condemnation of the unbelieving, as the salvation of believers that the apostle has here in his mind.—ἐν ᾧ καὶ κ.τ.λ.] "*in which* (*spirit*) *He also went and preached unto the spirits in prison* (*to them*), *which sometime were unbelieving when*," etc. The close connection of these words with what immediately precedes—by ἐν ᾧ, *sc.* πνεύματι—favours the view that ἐκήρυξε refers to an act of Christ which, as the ζωοποιηθεὶς πνεύματι, He performed after His death, and that with reference to the spirits ἐν φυλακῇ of the unbelievers who had perished in the deluge. This is the view of the oldest Fathers of the Greek and Latin Church; as also of the greater number of later and modern theologians. Augustin, however, opposed it, and considered ἐκήρυξεν as referring to a preaching by Christ ἐν πνεύματι long before His incarnation, in the days of Noah, to the people of that generation, upon whom the judgment of the deluge came because of their unbelief.[1] This view, after being adopted by several theologians of the Middle Ages, became prevalent in the Reformed Church. In recent times, it has been defended more especially by Schweizer, Wichelhaus, Besser, and Hofmann. The chief arguments which those who maintain it advance in opposition to that first mentioned, are the following:—(1) The idea that Christ preached to the spirits ἐν φυλακῇ would be an isolated one occurring nowhere else in Scripture; and, further, preaching such as this, if conceived as judicial, would have been entirely useless, whilst, looked on as a proclamation of salvation, it would stand in contradiction to the uniform teaching of Scripture regarding the state of man after death. To this,

[1] It must be observed, that whilst Hofmann considers the preaching of Christ as having taken place through Noah, Schweizer most decidedly disputes this, and is of the opinion that it was addressed to Noah himself as well as to his contemporaries. In support of this, he very rightly appeals to the fact that Noah is not here—as 2 Pet. ii. 5—termed a κῆρυξ. But he does not say by whom this preaching must be considered to have taken place.

however, it must be replied, that isolated ideas are to be found expressed here and there in Scripture, and that the reconciliation of the idea of a salvation offered to the spirits ἐν φυλακῇ with the other doctrines of Scripture, can at most be termed a problem difficult of solution; nor must it be forgotten that the eschatological doctrines comprehend within them very many problems. (2) This view does not correspond with the tendency of the entire passage from ver. 17 to ver. 22, and therefore does not fit into the train of thought. But this assertion is to the point only if those who make it have themselves correctly understood the tendency of the passage, which in this instance they have not done. (3) It cannot be understood how Peter comes so suddenly to speak of the spirits in prison. But, in reply, it may be urged, with at least equal justification, that it is not easy to understand how Peter comes so suddenly to speak of an act of Christ *before* His incarnation. (4) The want of the article before ἀπειθήσασι compels us to translate this participle not: "which sometime were unbelieving," but: "when they sometime were unbelieving." This, however, is not the case, since the participle, added with adjectival force to a substantive, is often enough joined to the latter without an article. If Peter had put the words πορευθεὶς ἐκήρυξε before τοῖς . . . πνεύμασι, no difficulty would have presented itself in the translation under dispute ("the sometime unbelieving spirits in prison"). The translation to which preference is given is grammatically untenable.[1] — Finally, appeal has been made to the fact that καί is placed after ἐν ᾧ, indeed even to ἐν ᾧ itself; but a correct explanation offers no justification for so doing. Besides the close connection of the relative clause with that immediately preceding, the following points favour the interpretation attacked:—(1) The correspondence of the πνεύματι to be supplied to ἐν ᾧ with the subsequent πνεύμασιν; (2) πορευθείς, which must be taken in the same sense as the πορευθείς

[1] Hofmann, indeed, says that since the expression is not τοῖς ἀπειθήσασι, the translation should not be "those spirits in durance, which sometime were disobedient;" but he grants that, from a grammatical point of view, it remains doubtful "whether ποτέ signifies the past as related to the time of Christ's preaching, or the past as regards the present of the writer."

in ver. 22; (3) The fact that *ποτέ* does not stand with *ἐκήρυξε*, but in ver. 20 with *ἀπειθήσασιν*, which shows that the *ἀπειθεῖν* took place previous to the *κηρύσσειν*; and, lastly, (4) The circumstance that had Peter closed his sentence with *ἐκήρυξεν*, it could have occurred to no one that Peter was here speaking of a preaching of Christ which took place in a time long gone by. — *ἐν ᾧ*] is not equivalent to *διό* (*αἰτιολογικῶς* with reference to *ἔπαθε*, Theophylact); but whilst *ᾧ* refers back to *πνεύματι*, *ἐν ᾧ* states in what condition Christ accomplished that which is mentioned in what follows,—He accomplished it not *ἐν σαρκί* (for after the *σάρξ* He was put to death), but *ἐν πνεύματι* (for after the *πνεῦμα* He was made alive). *ἐν* stands here in a position similar to that which it holds in Rom. viii. 8, where, however, *σάρξ* and *πνεῦμα* form an ethical antithesis, which here is not the case. Hofmann wrongly attributes to *ἐν* here an "instrumental force" equivalent to "by means of;" he is induced to do solely by his explanation of the *πνεύματι* to be supplied. Although it is evident that *πνεύματι* here must be taken in no sense different from that of the foregoing *πνεύματι*, Hofmann nevertheless holds it to be identical with the *πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ* mentioned in chap. i. 11, while he himself says that the *πνεύματι* subjoined to *ζωοποιηθείς* cannot be understood of the Holy Ghost.[1] — Peter says, then, that Christ, in the Spirit according to which He was made alive, preached to the spirits *ἐν φυλακῇ*, which cannot be understood to mean anything else than that He did it as a *πνεῦμα* (in His pneumatical condition). Frommüller erroneously interprets: "in the existence-form of a spirit separated from the body;" for the quickened Christ lives not as a simple spirit, but is in possession of a glorified spiritual body. — *καὶ τοῖς ἐν φυλακῇ πνεύμασι πορευθεὶς ἐκήρυξεν*] By *τὰ . . . πνεύματα* are to be understood, neither angels (Heb.

[1] Hofmann says that the accusation made against him, that he effaces the distinction between *πνεῦμα* as a term used to designate the precise nature of Christ, and *πνεῦμα* as the third Person in the Trinity, is the result of that confusion of ideas by which "in the Spirit" and "as a Spirit" are understood to mean the same thing. But it must be replied that rather is the identification of two different ideas, contained in his interpretation, the result of the confusion of ideas, leading him as it does to hide the difference by defining *πνεῦμα* as "the Spirit of Christ's life."

i. 14[1]) nor "men living upon the earth" (as Wichelhaus explains), but the souls of men already dead, as in Heb. xii. 23, which in Rev. vi. 9, xx. 4, Wisd. iii. 1, are called *ψυχαί*. *ἐν φυλακῇ* designates not only the place, but denotes also the condition in which the *πνεύματα* are. Hofmann wrongly—because in opposition to the uniform usage in the N. T.—denies all local reference to the expression, and would therefore translate *ἐν φυλακῇ* by "in durance." The meaning is, that the *πνεύματα* were in prison as prisoners.[2] The expression occurs in the N. T. with the article and without it, and its more precise force here is clear from the passages: Rev. xx. 7; 2 Pet. ii. 4; Jude 6. It does not denote generally the kingdom of the dead (Lactant. *Inst.* I. 7, c. 21: omnes [animae] in una communique custodia detinentur), but that part of it, which serves as abode for the souls of the ungodly until the day of judgment.[3] The dative depends, indeed, on *ἐκήρυξεν*, not on *πορευθείς*; but the addition of the latter word gives prominence to the fact that Christ went to those spirits, and preached to them in that place where they were. Hofmann is not altogether wrong when, in support of his own view of the passage, he says: "the operation of the spirit of Christ, by which Noah was made the organ of His proclamation, might be termed a 'going and preaching' on the part of Christ" (comp. especially the passage, Eph. ii. 17: *ἐλθὼν εὐηγγελίσατο*; see Meyer *in loc.*, to which Hofmann might have appealed). But that *πορευθείς* cannot be so taken here is shown by the *πορευθείς* in ver. 22, with which it must be identical in sense.[4] *ἐκήρυξε* is the same verb as that so

[1] Baur (*Tüb. theol. Jahrb.* 1856, H. 2, p. 215) understands it to mean the *ἄγγελοι ἁμαρτήσαντες*, 2 Pet. ii. 4, who, according to Gen. vi. 1 ff., had fallen previous to the deluge. This interpretation is sufficiently contradicted by ver. 20.

[2] The interpretation of Wichelhaus—who by circumlocution explains *τὰ ἐν φυλ. πνεύματα* as equal to *οἱ ἀπειθοῦντες προύμενοι, φρουρουμένοι εἰς ἡμέραν τοῦ κατακλυσμοῦ*—is altogether erroneous.

[3] Justin (*Dial. c. Tryph.* c. 5): *τὰς μὲν τῶν εὐσεβῶν (ψυχὰς) ἐν κρείττονί που χώρῳ μένειν, τὰς δ' ἀδίκους καὶ πονηρὰς ἐν χείρονι τὸν τῆς κρίσεως ἐνδεχομένας χρόνον.*

[4] Luthardt so thoroughly recognises the vis of this *πορευθείς*, that he says he should interpret the passage as Hofmann does, if the *πορευθείς* did not prevent him from doing so.—Besides, it is certain that the coming of the Holy Spirit is at the same time a coming of Christ; but it must not be overlooked that in the N. T. it is nowhere indicated as being a coming of Christ *ἐν πνεύματι*.

often used in the N. T. of the preaching (not the teaching) of Christ and His apostles. Usually it is accompanied by an object (*τὸ εὐαγγέλιον, τὴν βασιλείαν τοῦ Θεοῦ, Χριστόν*, or the like); but it is frequently, as here, used absolutely, cf. Matt. xi. 1; Mark i. 38, etc. — It cannot be concluded, with Zezschwitz, from the connection of this relative clause with *ζωοποιηθεὶς πνεύματι*, that *ζωοποίησιν* illam spiritualem quasi fundamentum fuisse concionis idemque argumentum; nor does the word itself disclose either the contents or the purpose of that preaching; but since *Christ* is called the *κήρυξας* without the addition of any more precise qualification, it must be concluded that the contents and design of this *κήρυγμα* are in harmony with the *κήρυγμα* of Christ elsewhere. It is accordingly arbitrary, and in contradiction to Christ's significance for the work of redemption, to assume that this preaching consisted in the proclamation of the coming judgment (Flacius, Calov., Buddeus, Hollaz, Wolf, Aretius, Zezschwitz, Schott, etc.), and was a praedicatio damnatoria.[1] Wiesinger justly asks: "This concio damnatoria—what does it mean in general, what here especially?"—It is unjustifiable to deny, with some commentators, that the apostle regarded this *πορευθεὶς ἐκήρυξε* as an actual reality.[2]—*καί*, following *ἐν ᾧ*, must not be explained, as Schweizer does, in this way, that Peter, wishing to hold up Christ to his readers as a pattern of how they should conduct themselves under suffering, adduces two examples, vv. 19 ff., His death on the cross, and His preaching; the whole structure of the clauses, as well as

[1] Hollaz: Fuit praedicatio Christi in inferno non evangelica, quae hominibus tantum in regno gratiae annunciatur, sed *legalis* elenchthica, terribilis eaque tum verbalis, qua ipsos aeterna supplicia promeritos esse convincit, tum realis, qua immanem terrorem iis incussit. This interpretation, which has its origin in dogmatic views, Zezschwitz seeks to found on exegesis by characterizing the idea of judgment as the leading conception of the whole passage, to which, however, the context gives no warrant, and also by maintaining that otherwise Peter would have used the word *εὐαγγελίζειν*, or a compound of *ἀγγέλλειν*. It is certainly correct when Schott and Kühler say that *κηρύσσειν* is not in itself equal to *εὐαγγελίζειν*; but it does not follow that it may not be applied to a message of salvation. It must be remembered that Christ's aim, even as a preacher of judgment, ever was the accomplishment of salvation, as he declared Luke xix. 10; John xii. 47.

[2] Thus Picus-Mirandola says: Christus non veraciter et quantum ad realem praesentiam descendit ad inferos, sed solum quoad effectum. Cf., too, J. R. Lavater, *de descensu Christi ad inf.* lib. I. c. 9.—Many interpreters unwarrant-

their contents, contradicts this. Nor can it be explained, as Hofmann assumes, "from the antithesis between us whom Christ wished to bring to God, and those who as spirits are in durance." This would hold good only if, in ver. 18, it were affirmed that Christ did the same to us as to those spirits, that is, preached to us. It is likewise incorrect to take *καί* as equivalent to "even" (Wiesinger, Fronmüller); for a distinction between these spirits and others is nowhere hinted at. *καί* is put rather in order to show prominently that what is said in this verse coincides with the *ζωοποιηθεὶς πνεύματι* of ver. 18. Zezschwitz: ut notio, quae in enunciatione *ἐν ᾧ* latet (*ζωοπ. πνεύματι*) urgeatur.

Ver. 20. The words which begin this verse: *ἀπειθήσασίν ποτε*, characterize the spirits who are in prison according to their former conduct. The participle must not, with Wiesinger, be resolved into: "although, notwithstanding the fact that they had been disobedient;" an adversative relation of this kind must have been more plainly expressed.[1] — According to the uniform usage of the N. T., the word *ἀπειθεῖν* has here also the meaning of *unbelief* involving resistance; cf. chap. ii. 7, 8, iii. 1, iv. 17. The translation: "to be disobedient," is too inexact, for the word forms the antithesis to *πιστεύειν*. — *ὅτε ἀπεξεδέχετο κ.τ.λ.*] serves not only to specify the time when these spirits were unbelieving, but also to mark the guilt of the *ἀπειθεῖν*. — *ἀπεκδέχεσθαι*, according to N. T. usage, equivalent to: "*patient waiting*," is here used absolutely, as in Rom. viii. 25 (comp. *ἐκδέχεσθαι*, Heb. x. 13;

ably weaken at least *ἐκήρυξε*, in so far as to make it synonymous with "showed Himself," or, at any rate, they say that the preaching of Christ was potius realiter, quam verbaliter. This the author of the article, "Die Höllenfahrt Christi," in the *Erlanger Zeitschrift für Protest.* 1856, should not have sanctioned. Schott is not free from this arbitrary method of interpretation, in that he characterizes *κηρύσσειν* "as a bearing witness to oneself, not only in word, but also in deed," and calls "this bearing witness to and showing forth of Himself by Christ in the glory of His mediatorial person," a concio damnatoria.

[1] Hofmann has now justly given up his former explanation: "without being obedient." Walther's interpretation is evidently entirely arbitrary: "to the spirits, *i.e.* the devils and the damned in general, *particularly* to those damned who," etc. But neither is there a warrant for inserting *οἵων* (Bengel: subaudi *οἵων*, i. e. exempli gratia, in diebus Noe; subjicitur generi species maxime insignis).

thus Schott also). The narrative itself shows the object to which this waiting of God's long-suffering was directed. Its duration is not to be limited to the seven days mentioned in Gen. vii. 4 (de Wette), for this is in keeping neither with the ἀπεξεδέχετο ἡ . . . μακροθυμία, nor the subsequent κατασκευαζομένης κιβωτοῦ, but embraces the whole period of 120 years mentioned in Gen. vi. 3. — The time specified by ὅτε κ.τ.λ. is still more precisely defined in the subsequent ἐν ἡμέραις Νῶε and the κατασκευαζομένης κιβωτοῦ; in such a way, however, that these adjuncts contain a reference to the exhortation to repentance then given, for Noah was not like the others, an unbeliever, but a believer, and the preparation of the ark gave unmistakeable testimony to the approaching judgment. — "κιβωτός without the article, the expression used by the LXX. for תֵּבָה, equal to ark, *arca*; comp. Matt. xxiv. 38; Luke xvii. 27; Heb. xi. 7" (Wiesinger).

REMARK 1.—Some of the interpreters who do not apply this passage to the descensus ad inferos, as Luther (in his *Auslegung der Ep. Petri*, 1523), the Socinians, Vorstius, Amelius, Grotius, etc., explain ἐκήρυξε as referring to the preaching of *the apostles*, assuming that the unbelievers in the time of Noah are mentioned only as types of the unbelievers in apostolic times. τὰ ἐν φυλακῇ πνεύματα they understand to mean the heathen alone, or those along with the Jews. Amelius: πνεύμ. hic in genere denotant homines, quemadmodum paulo post ψυχαί· ἐν φυλακῇ: in captivitate erant tum Judaei, sub jugo legis existentes, tum quoque gentiles, sub potestate diaboli jacentes. Illos omnes Christus liberavit; praedicationem verbi sui ad ipsos mittens et continuans et Apostolos divina virtute instruens.

REMARK 2.—Even interpreters who apply this passage to the descensus ad inferos, and understand ἐκήρυξε of the preaching of salvation,[1] are guilty of much arbitrariness, and especially in designating more precisely those to whom the preaching is addressed. Several of the Fathers, as Irenaeus, Tertullian,

[1] It must further be remarked that several commentators: Athanasius, Ambrosius, Erasmus, Calvin (in his *Instit.* lib. II. 2, c. 16, § 9), understand Christ's preaching as at once a praedicatio salvifica and praed. damnatoria. Calvin, however, does hold by the idea of κηρύσσειν, when he says: Contextus vim mortis (Christi) inde amplificat, quod ad mortuos usque penetraverit, dum piae animae ejus visitationis, quam sollicite exspectaverant, praesenti aspectu sunt potitae; contra reprobis clarius patuit, se excludi ab omni salute.

Hippolytus; many of the Scholastics; further, Zwingli, Calvin (in his Comment.), and others,—hold those to have been the pious, especially the pious of the O. T.[1]—Marcion thinks the κήρυγμα was addressed to those who, though in the O. T. termed ungodly, were actually better than the O. T. believers.—Clemens Al. supposes the δίκαιοι κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν, who, however, were still without faith and in the trammels of idolatry.—Several commentators assume that not all unbelievers in the days of Noah are meant, but those only who, at first indeed unbelieving, had still repented at the last moment when the flood came upon them; this is the view of Suarez, Estius, Bellarmin, Luther (zu der Erklärung der Genesis, 1536, und zu Hosea IV. 2, v. J. 1545),[2] Peter Martyr, etc. Bengel says: Probabile est, nonnullos ex tanta multitudine, veniente pluvia, resipuisse: cumque non credidissent, dum expectaret Deus, postea, cum . . . poena ingrueret, credere coepisse, quibus postea Christus eorumque similibus se praeconem gratiae praestiterit. Wiesinger agrees with this interpretation, at least in so far that he assumes that the moral condition of the individual (at the time of the flood) was not in every case the same, but extremely varied; although, on the other hand, he finds fault with it on the ground "that, in contradiction to the context, it limits the ἐκήρυξε only to a part." Schott remarks, as against Wiesinger, "that although some may in respect of moral condition have differed from the majority, or still have repented in the last moment, yet these were not among the spirits in durance who listened to Christ's preaching."

REMARK 3.—The view commonly accepted is that this preaching by Christ took place *before* His resurrection, whilst His body lay in the grave. Many even of the older dogmatists of the Lutheran Church, however, hold it to have been accomplished *after* His quickening, that is, in the time between this and His going forth from the grave. Quenstedt says: Christus θεάνθρωπος totaque adeo persona (non igitur secundum animam

[1] Calvin's exposition is singular: he interprets φυλακή equal to specula vel ipse excubandi actus; τὸ ἐν φυλ. πν. equals: the spirits of those who were on the watch-tower, *i.e.* in the expectation of salvation, or also in anxietas expectationis Christi, and then continues: Postquam (Ap.) dixit, Christi se mortuis manifestasse, mox addit: quum increduli fuissent olim, quo significat nihil nocuisse sanctis Patribus quod impiorum multitudine paene obruti fuerunt. Exemplum vero ex tota vetustate prae aliis illustre deligit, nempe cum diluvio submersus fuit mundus. He removes the scruple, that the dative ἀπειθήσασι is not in harmony with this explanation, by observing that the apostles sometimes employ one case in room of another.

[2] On Luther's vacillation in interpreting this passage, see Köhler as above, and Schweizer as above, p. 7.

tantum nec secundum corpus tantum) post redunitionem animae ac corporis ad istud damnatorum *τοῦ* descendit; he fixes the time when this happened: illud momentum, quod intercessit inter *ζωοποίησιν* et *ἀνάστασιν* Christi stricte ita dictam. Hollaz: distinguendum inter resurrectionem externam et internam; illa est egressio e sepulcro et exterior coram hominibus manifestatio; haec est ipsa vivificatio; so, too, Hutter, Baier, Buddeus, etc. In like manner Schott: "in the new spiritual life which in that mysterious hour of midnight He had put on, and before appearing with it on the upper world by His resurrection, He descended." — The verse does not indeed say that the *ἐκήρυξε* belongs to this very moment, but it does certainly point to the preaching having taken place after Christ's restoration to life, as de Wette, Brückner, Wiesinger, Zezschwitz, have rightly acknowledged; for referring as *ἐν ᾧ* does to the *πνεύματι* connected with *ζωοποιηθείς*, it is arbitrary to find in *πορευθείς ἐκήρυξε* mention made of an act of Christ which took place after the *θανατωθείς* indeed, but yet before the *ζωοποιηθείς*. As, then, both expressions apply to Christ in His entire person, consisting of body and soul, what follows must not be conceived as an activity which He exercised in His spirit only and whilst separated from His body. In addition to this, if according to His intention His preaching was to be indeed a preaching of salvation, it must have had for its substance the work of redemption, completed only in the resurrection. Weiss (p. 232) objects that *πνεῦμα* is not equal to *σῶμα πνευματικόν*, and this is undoubtedly true; but it cannot prove anything against the view that Christ as the Risen One, that is, in His glorified body, preached to the spirits in prison, inasmuch as in *this* body the Lord is no longer *ἐν σαρκί*, but entirely *ἐν πνεύματι*. — Thus the passage says nothing as to Christ's existence between His death and resurrection. If Acts ii. 31 presuppose the going of the dead Christ into Hades, the common dwelling-place of departed souls, *this* descensus ad inferos must not be identified with the one here mentioned, as also Wiesinger, Brückner, and Schott rightly observe; so that by drawing this distinction the disputed question, too, whether Christ descended into Hades, quoad animam or quoad animam et corpus, finds its correct solution. It must further be added that this passage gives no support whatever either to the doctrine of the Form. concordiae, that in Hades Christ "overcame the devil, destroyed the power of hell, and despoiled the devil of his might," or to that of the Catholic Church of the limbus Patrum and Purgatory.

Connected with the words *κατασκευαζομένης κιβωτοῦ* are

the thoughts which follow, in which stress is laid, not so much on the judgment which overtook unbelievers in the flood, as on the deliverance of the few.: *εἰς ἣν ὀλίγοι. — διεσώθησαν δι' ὕδατος*] The preposition *διά* is to be explained not as equal to *ἐκ* (Acts xxviii. 4: *ὃν διασωθέντα ἐκ τῆς θαλάσσης*), nor as if it were *ἐν* (in medio aquarum), nor equivalent to non obstante aqua (Gerhard), nor even as a preposition of time (eo tempore, quo aquae inundaverant); but is to be taken either locally or instrumentally. *δι' ὕδατος* is then either: "*through the water*," or equivalent to: "*by means of water*." The former view (Bengel, Steiger, de Wette, Brückner, Wiesinger, formerly Hofmann also) seems to be confirmed by the verbum compos. *διεσώθησαν*. But *διασώζειν*, both in the LXX. and in the N. T. (cf. Matt. xiv. 36; Luke vii. 3, etc.), is often used as a strengthened form of *σώζειν*, without the peculiar force of *διά* being pressed. And thus it must be taken here, inasmuch as it contradicts the historical narrative in Genesis, to say that Noah and his family were saved by passing through the water. *διά* has accordingly here an instrumental force, so that *δι' ὕδατος* indicates water as the medium through which the Noahites were delivered.[1] And this interpretation is alone in harmony with the context, inasmuch as the apostle in what follows gives special prominence to the fact that the N. T. deliverance is likewise effected by means of water. If water was the means of deliverance to Noah and those with him, "in so far as it bore those hidden within the ark, and thus preserved them from destruction, comp. Gen. vii. 17, 18" (Weiss, p. 313; thus also Wolf, Pott, Jachmann, Schott), this implies recourse to a pregnant construction, inasmuch as the apostle unites the two thoughts in one: "*they were saved by going into the ark*," and "they *were saved* δι' ὕδατος." Hofmann seeks to avoid the assumption of a pregnancy by explaining *ὕδωρ* here as the water "which *began* to overflow the earth," and which compelled Noah to enter with those

[1] Wiesinger has expressed himself in favour of the first version, but then remarks: "the writer conceives the water *at the same time* as the saving element;" Fronmüller, too, combines both interpretations: "in which few souls sought shelter, and were saved through the water and by it;" this is evidently altogether unwarrantable.

belonging to him into the ark, in support of which he appeals to Gen. vii. 11, 13. But although these passages state that both the entering into the ark and the beginning of the deluge took place on the same day, still the latter event is not indicated as the motive of the former. According to the narrative in Genesis, it was the command of God which moved the Noahites to enter the ark, and as soon as they had done so, and God had closed the ark, the deluge commenced; cf. Gen. vii. 1, 16, 17. — Further, on Hofmann's interpretation water can be regarded only in a very loose sense as the medium of deliverance; nor would it be in keeping with the subsequent parallelism. It must be noted that ὕδατος is anarthrous, and although by the term no other water can be understood than that of the flood, yet Peter's object here is not to show that the *same* water which destroyed some served as the means of deliverance for others, but merely to state that the deliverance of Noah and those with him was effected *by water*, in order that this water then may be recognised as the type of the saving water of baptism (comp. Schott). — ὀλίγοι, τοῦτ' ἐστιν ὀκτὼ ψυχαί] τοῦτ' ἐστιν κ.τ.λ. justifies the use of the expression ὀλίγοι; so much stress is laid on this particular, very probably in order to point out, on the one hand, the great number of those who perished, and on the other, the proportion to be looked for at the final judgment.

Ver. 21. ὃ καὶ ὑμᾶς [ἡμᾶς] ἀντίτυπον νῦν σώζει βάπτισμα] ὅ does not apply to the thought expressed in the previous verse, as Gerhard, who adopts the reading ᾧ, explains: isti conservationi tanquam typo spiritualis conservationis baptismus velut ἀντίτυπον respondet (in like manner Beza, Hornejus, Morus, Hottinger, Hensler, etc.), but it refers back to ὕδατος, and, withal, so that by it water generally is to be understood, and not that particular water through the medium of which the Noahites were saved; water saved them, and it is water by which you too are saved. The general term receives a more precise definition in the adjectival ἀντίτυπον, by means of which the water which now saves is contrasted as *antitype*[1] with the water which saved Noah and those with him.

[1] Raphelius: τύπος res aliud quid praefigurans, ἀντίτυπος res illa praefigurata. ἀντίτυπος has another meaning in Heb. ii. 24, where the τύπος is the ἀληθινόν.

What this antitypical water is, is stated by the subjoined *βάπτισμα*, which as an apposition must be explained in the sense: "*as baptism*" (comp. Winer, p. 491 [E. T. 663]). Differently Hofmann; he would take the apposition in the sense of: "*a baptism namely;*" he says: "in the explanatory apposition the apostle substitutes the term 'baptism' for 'water,' without, by the anarthrous *βάπτισμα*, directly indicating Christian baptism. What kind of baptism he means is stated by the apposition subjoined to *βάπτισμα*." On this it must be remarked that *βάπτισμα* would certainly convey to the readers only the idea of a definite Christian baptism, and that the apposition following is not fitted to mark the term baptism, indefinite in itself, as the specifically Christian baptism, but only to point out in what way baptism possesses in itself the saving power attributed to it. — Without any cogent reason, Steiger interprets *βάπτισμα* as equivalent to "*baptismal water.*" The direct conjunction which takes place here ceases to occasion surprise, if it be considered that the typical character of the deluge, as regards baptism, consists not only in the sameness of the elements, but in the similarity of the relation of the water to those saved. If *δι' ὕδατος* be rendered "through the water," an incongruity will arise, disturbing to the parallelism, and which attempts have been made to overcome by supplying intermediate ideas. According to de Wette, the antitypical character of baptism consists in this: "that in it the flesh must perish and, as it were, *be judged;* whilst, at the same time, through faith in the resurrection of Christ, pure spiritual life is attained, and the believer saved." By these and such like supplements, which the apostle himself in no way suggests, elements are introduced foreign to his conception.[1] — The present *σώζει* is put here

[1] Schott, indeed, justly remarks "that the antitypical nature of baptism, and therefore the typical nature of that to which baptism corresponds as antitype, consists precisely in what is asserted of both, namely, in their saving power and effect." He thinks, however, "that the antitypical nature of the water applies to what was essentially peculiar to the great flood." What this is he explains by saying that "the flood was a judgment which destroyed mankind from the earth, so that from out of it only a small number, belonging to the church of believers, were saved;" that is, "it was a judgment of extirpation in such a way that it was the means of effecting a salvation."

neither instead of the preterite nor the future; it denotes rather the effect which, from the moment of its accomplishment, baptism produces on the persons who submit to it. The latter resemble the Noahites whilst by means of water they were being preserved in the ark from destruction (*ἀπώλεια*). — The antithesis which exists between *ὑμᾶς* and the preceding *ὀλίγοι*, indicates that the proportion saved by baptism to the unbelieving is but small. *ὀλίγοι* has accordingly a *typical* significance. It is more doubtful whether the same is the case with the ark; Oecumenius already saw in it the church, whilst others regard it as a symbol of Jesus Christ. Thus Hemming: quemadmodum aqua per se non salvavit Noe, sed mediante arca, ita aqua baptismi per se non salvat, sed mediante arca, h. e. Christo Jesu. — *οὐ σαρκὸς ἀπόθεσις ῥύπου, ἀλλά*] Apposition to *βάπτισμα*, which, however, does not state the nature of baptism generally, but only in what sense it effects *σώζειν*. This is stated first negatively, in order thereby to mark more distinctly the standpoint. Almost all commentators take *σαρκός* as a genitive depending on *ῥύπου*, and preceding it only for the sake of emphasis. Bengel, on the other hand, joins it—as genit. subj.—directly with *ἀπόθεσις*: "carni adscribitur depositio sordium; ideo non dicitur: depositio sordium carnis." The sense would then be: baptism does not consist in this, "that the *flesh lays aside its uncleanness*." This explanation, corresponding as it does to the position of the words, is well suited to the idea *ἀπόθεσις*, which does not necessarily presuppose the activity of the subject, but can be used when the subject is, strictly speaking, passive; comp. 2 Pet. i. 14, the only other passage in which the word occurs in the N. T. Hofmann is accordingly mistaken in asserting that "the laying aside of uncleanness cannot be regarded as an act of the flesh." — An antithetical allusion to the Jewish washings can hardly be here assumed (cf. Justin M. *dial. c. Tryph.* p. 331: *τί γὰρ ὄφελος ἐκείνου τοῦ βαπτίσματος* (the Jewish washing), *ὃ τὴν σάρκα καὶ μόνον τὸ σῶμα φαιδρύνει; βαπτίσθητε τὴν ψυχήν*).[1] — *ἀλλὰ συνειδήσεως ἀγαθῆς ἐπερώτημα εἰς Θεόν*]

[1] Augustin's opinion (*contr. Faust.* c. 12 et 13), with which Beda and others agree, is quite inappropriate. It is, that the apostle here alludes to the baptism

The positive, as contrasted with the negative character of baptism. συνειδήσεως ἀγαθῆς can be either the subjective or the objective gen.[1] ἐπερώτημα, a ἅπ. λεγ. in the N. T. (in the O. T. only once, LXX. Dan. iv. 14, as a translation of שְׁאֵלְתָּא), is used in classical Greek only in the sense of "*question*." Holding by this meaning, commentators have explained it as—(1) the *question concerning a good conscience addressed to God* (thus Wiesinger, who, however, prefers the translation "*inquiry*" to "question"), or (2) "the *question of a good conscience directed to God*" (Gerhard, Steiger, Besser). The first of these renderings is not in harmony with the nature of baptism, inasmuch as the person to be baptized already knows how the good conscience is to be obtained. From the second there results only an incomplete idea, necessitating arbitrary supplements.[2] Now, as ἐπερωτᾶν, which doubtless means only "*to ask a question*," is used also of such questions as would obtain something from the person asked (Matt. xvi. 1; Ps. cxxxvii. 3, LXX.), the meaning has been assigned to ἐπερώτημα: "*the inquiring desire*," "*the inquiring request*." Some commentators here take συν. ἀγ. as a *subj.* gen., and interpret: "*the request of a good conscience addressed to God*"

of the heretics. Calvin's assertion, too, that this negative apposition emphasizes the fact that baptism, as an outward form, is of no use, introduces a foreign idea into the words of the apostle.

[1] This is denied, indeed, by several commentators, specially by Hofmann and Schott, because a good conscience does not precede, but is the fruit of baptism. But this assertion presupposes the identification of the *good* conscience with that conscience which by Christ is reconciled with God, and is released from the feeling of guilt. For this, however, the N. T. phraseology gives no warrant. According to it, συνείδησις ἀγαθή rather means: "the consciousness of pure intentions," or "the consciousness of sincerely willing that which is good" (Heb. xiii. 18: καλὴν συνείδησιν ἔχομεν, ἐν πᾶσι καλῶς θέλοντες ἀναστρέφεσθαι; cf. also 1 Pet. iii. 16; Acts xxiii. 1; 1 Tim. i. 5, 19, iii. 9). If baptism is really to bring a blessing to the person baptized, he must surely desire it with a good conscience.

[2] Gerhard: quomodo deus erga baptizatum affectus sit, etc.; Steiger: "for the salvation of which he who receives baptism would be assured;" Besser: Art thou not my father? am I not thy child? The interpretation given in the *Erlanger Zeitschrift*, 1856, p. 293 ff., is evidently altogether erroneous: "the proof of the good conscience attained in baptism is the ἐπερώτημα εἰς Θ., *i.e.* the question: Am I not saved by my baptism from the judgment on an unbelieving world?" Apart from all else, the matter here treated of is not a question which is only put after baptism, since baptism itself is designated as the ἐπερώτημα.

(thus Bengel, with whom Schmid, *Bibl. Theol. des N. T.* p. 199, agrees: salvat nos rogatio bonae conscientiae, i. e. rogatio, qua nos Deum compellamus cum bona conscientia, peccatis remissis et depositis [1]); but this also gives rise to an incomplete idea, inasmuch as the contents of the request are not stated. On this rendering of ἐπερώτημα, it is better to regard the gen. as an *object.* gen., thus: "*the request addressed to God for a good conscience;*" Lutz, Lechler, Weiss, Weizsäcker (Reuter's *Repert.* 1858, H. 3), Hofmann, Schott; Wiesinger, too, is inclined to agree.[2] But to this also objections which cannot be overlooked arise: (1) Although the reception of baptism be founded on the desire for a reconciled conscience, yet it does not follow that baptism itself can be described as the expression of this desire; (2) Taken thus, the proper meaning of ἐπερώτημα is entirely lost sight of; the word is used in a sense in which it occurs nowhere else,—a proceeding which is all the more open to question that the apostle had certainly other words at his command wherewith to give the idea of request; (3) The object which the recipient of baptism requests, namely, "the reconciled conscience," is inadequately expressed by συνείδησις ἀγαθή, for here no stress is laid on the essential element —the forgiveness of sin; lastly, (4) In this interpretation εἰς Θεόν is only of secondary importance, whilst the passages, chap. i. 21 and iii. 18, show that the chief emphasis lies on εἰς Θεόν.[3]

[1] To this interpretation of Bengel, Hofmann rightly objects: "that ἐπερώτημα cannot well mean something which presupposes the reception of baptism;" but if the "peccatis remissis et depositis" be not looked upon as belonging to the idea of a good conscience, Hofmann's objection loses its validity.

[2] The same view is to be found already in Seb. Schmidius, only that he regards ἐπερ. as meaning the petitio addressed to God by him who baptizes, and συν. ἀγ. as the gift which he implores for the person baptized; evidently this is entirely arbitrary.

[3] Hofmann, in support of the interpretation here called in question, appeals to the circumstance, "that the petition for the cleansing of the conscience from past sins forms the only suitable antithesis to the putting away of filth contracted outwardly." But it must be remarked in opposition, that however suitable this antithesis may appear in itself, it does not follow that the apostle had it in his mind in the way here stated. It is rather improbable that he had, since in this positive nearer definition of baptism its application to *cleansing* is in no way alluded to.—The explanation given in *Weissagung und Erfüllung*, II. p. 234: "the *happiness* of a good conscience *asked* of God," he passes over in silence in his *Schriftbeweis*, II. 2.—The interpretation given by Winer in the

—Even from early times interpreters have attempted to explain *ἐπερώτημα* in this passage, not according to common, but according to juristic usage, taking it as equal to *σύμφωνον*, stipulatio mutua, contract (Luther: "covenant"), referring at the same time to the act of question and answer, which took place at baptism: *ἀποτάσσῃ τῷ Σατανᾷ; ἀποτάσσομαι· συντάσσῃ τῷ Χριστῷ; συντάσσομαι·* abrenuntias? abrenuntio; credis? credo (Tertull. lib. de resurr. carn.: anima non lavatione, sed responsione sanciter). Aretius interprets: Deus in baptismo nobis promittit, quod velit nos filiorum loco habere propter Christum; contra nos promittimus, nos serio victuros pie; haec est mutua stipulatio; this interpretation, however, is erroneous, as even in legal phraseology *ἐπερώτημα* does not mean a "*reciprocal*" contract. De Wette's is likewise wrong: "by metonymy, because questions were addressed to the individual who took the vow, *ἐπερωτᾶσθαι* acquired the meaning promittere, spondere, and *ἐπερώτημα* that of sponsio;" for *ἐπερώτημα* is not derived from *ἐπερωτᾶσθαι*, but from *ἐπερωτᾶν*, and therefore never had or could have had the signification: "*solemn pledge.*" Further, it has been not unjustly remarked, in opposition to this view, according to which *συν. ἀγ.* is considered as an *object.* gen., that it would have been better to have spoken of *ἀναστροφὴ ἀγαθή* as that which has to be vowed.[1] Brückner has substantially corrected de Wette by pointing out that in the language of the Byzantine lawyers *ἐπερωτᾶν* is used in the sense: "to conclude a treaty, a contract, stipulari," taking *συν. ἀγ.* as a *subject.* gen. But his exposition suffers from an uncertain wavering, for he too declares *ἐπερώτημα* to be synonymous with "*treaty*," indeed with "*vow*," which is certainly not the case. The facts are these: a contract was concluded in the form of question and answer: spondesne? spondeo (comp. Puchta, *Curs. der Instit.* v. 3, p. 97); by the question, on the one side, the agreement was proposed; by the reply, on the other, it was

5th ed. of his *Gr.*: "The inquiry of a good conscience after God, *i.e.* the turning to God, the seeking Him," does not occur in the subsequent editions, nor is there any justification for it.

[1] Estius, Beza, Grotius, Semler, Pott, Hensler, etc., interpret similarly to de Wette.

concluded. *ἐπερώτημα* is then this question by which the conclusion of a contract began, not then the contract itself, and still less the pledge which was taken rather by him who replied. The questioner bound himself by his question to accept that which he who gave the reply promised. If, then, the designation of baptism as *συνειδήσεως ἀγ. ἐπερώτημα εἰς Θεόν* is to be explained from legal procedure, it can only be spoken of as such, inasmuch as the person baptized, by the reception of baptism, enters into a relation—as it were of contract—with God, in which he submits in faith to God's promise of salvation. Nor can it be denied that this is really in harmony with the nature of baptism, more especially if it be considered that in the legal proceedings, connected with the conclusion of a contract, the respondent pronounced his spondeo in the expectation that the interrogator would fulfil the conditions previously stipulated, to which he had pledged himself. This explains the expression *συνειδήσεως ἀγαθῆς*, which points to the circumstance that the recipient of baptism, in submitting to it, has the honest purpose faithfully to fulfil the conditions under which the divine assent is given. This interpretation is distinguished from those above mentioned by its concrete precision. No doubt *ἐπερώτημα* in this juristic sense is to be found only in writings of a later date; but since this form of concluding a contract belonged to an earlier time, it may be assumed that the word had previously been in use thus in legal phraseology.[1] The adjunct: *δι' ἀναστάσεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*, by referring back to *ζωοποιηθεὶς δὲ πνεύματι*, brings the apostle again to his former train of thought. The words are not appended in a loose way to *ἐπερώτημα* for the purpose of stating how this is effected, as Grotius, Pott, Hensler, Zezschwitz, Hofmann, Schott, and others assume;[2]

[1] After the explanation here given, it is evidently incorrect when Hofmann says that "*ἐπερώτημα* could only be the question addressed by him who closes an agreement, to the person who is to consent to it." The very opposite is the case. The question is not addressed from the former to the latter, but from the latter to the former; that is, then, not from God to the person baptized, but from the person baptized to God.

[2] 1 Kings xxii. 7: *ἔτι εἷς ἔστιν ἀνὴρ εἰς τὸ ἐπερωτῆσαι δι' αὐτοῦ τὸν κύριον*, has been appealed to in favour of this construction. Erroneously, since *δι' αὐτοῦ* applies to a person. Between it, therefore, and *δι' ἀναστάσεως* no parallel can be drawn.—

they are rather conjoined with the verb of the clause *σώζει*, inasmuch as they state that through which the *βάπτισμα* exercises its saving effect (de Wette, Wiesinger, Weiss). The former construction is the less justifiable, that it is more natural to unite the concluding adjunct with the leading idea than with the secondary thought which specifies the nature of baptism. It is still less appropriate to connect the words directly with *συνειδήσεως ἀγ.* (as against Frommüller).

Ver. 22. *ὅς ἐστιν ἐν δεξιᾷ τοῦ Θεοῦ*] This brings to a close the whole train of thought with reference to Christ, from ver. 18 and onwards, inasmuch as to His sufferings, death, resurrection, and going to the spirits in prison, there is now added, His sitting down at the right hand of God. This expression, which points out the present condition of the glorified Redeemer, occurs likewise in Rom. viii. 34, Col. viii. 1, and in other passages of the N. T. — *πορευθεὶς εἰς οὐρανόν*] corresponds to *πορευθείς*, ver. 19. — *ὑποταγέντων . . . δυνάμεων*] added in order to give prominence to the unlimited sway of Christ (Eph. i. 21, 22; Col. ii. 10; 1 Cor. xv. 27; Heb. ii. 8), extending even over all heavenly powers, whatever their name or office. — The expressions *ἐξουσίαι* and *δυνάμεις* are—with the exception of in this passage—used only by Paul as names of angels (with *δυνάμεις*, cf. Ps. ciii. 21, clxviii. 2, LXX.); and in the same sequence. *ἄγγελοι* is not here the general term to which *ἐξουσίαι* and *δυνάμεις* (*καὶ . . . καί*, equivalent to cum . . . tum) are subordinate, but the three conceptions are co-ordinate, and connected by the repeated copula. This is shown by Rom. viii. 38, where, instead of *ἐξουσίαι*, the name *ἀρχαί* is used. For the various names, comp. Meyer on Eph. i. 21; Col. i. 16. — *ὑποταγ.* expresses, not enforced, but voluntary subjection.

With regard to the relation of this whole passage to what precedes, *ὅτι καὶ Χριστὸς . . . ἔπαθεν* shows that in the first instance confirmation is given to the thought that it is better to suffer for well than for evil doing, by reference to the

According to Hofmann, *εἰς* states that which the person baptized *appeals* to in support of his desire for the remission of sin. The passages, however, which he quotes (1 Cor. i. 10 and Rom. xii. 1) by no means prove that the prep. *εἰς* has this signification.

sufferings of Christ, similarly as is done in chap. ii. 21. But as the last-mentioned passage passes beyond the limits of the typical,—that is, first by the addition of ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν to ἔπαθεν, and then by the statements of ver. 24,—the same takes place here. There, reference is made to the redeeming death of the abased Christ; here, to the living work of the glorified Christ. The chief separate points have already been stated. The allusion of baptism appears indeed to be a digression, yet it belongs essentially to the train of thought; for after that mention had been made of Christ's work among the spirits in prison in His exalted condition, it was necessary to call attention likewise to His redeeming work on earth, the effects of which are communicated through baptism. That Peter speaks of *this* medium (not that of the word, etc.) is explained by his reference to the deluge as the type of the approaching judgment, and to the water by which Noah and those with him were saved, and which appeared as a τύπος of baptism.[1]

[1] Since that which is stated in this paragraph does not keep within the limits of the typical, it may very well—in spite of Hofmann's assertion to the contrary—be described as a digression.

CHAPTER IV.

VER. 1. ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν] *Rec.* after A K L P ℵ (corr.; after m. pr.: ἀποθάνοντος ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν), *al.*, is wanting in B C, several min. Sahid. Vulg. Aug. Fulgent. etc.; omitted by Lachm. and Tisch. Perhaps it is inserted in order to complete the idea; Reiche considers ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν to be the original reading; so, too, Hofm. The *Rec.* has ἐν σαρκί before πέπαυται, after K, several min. etc. In A B C L ℵ, etc. etc., the preposition is wanting. Even Griesb. recommends its omission; Lachm. and Tisch. omit ἐν. Buttm. has retained ἐν, as, according to his statement, it occurs in B. Wiesinger inclines to explain the reading σαρκί from what precedes; Reiche, on the other hand, explains ἐν σαρκί from what follows. The authorities, as well as the idea itself, decide for the omission of ἐν. — Ver. 3. ἡμῖν] *Rec.* after C K L P, *al.*, Oec. Hier., can hardly be genuine; it is wanting in A B, *al.*, Syr. utr.; omitted by Lachm. and Tisch. Steiger's remark, that "it is pleasing to us to observe how the apostle does not think higher of his own former conduct than of that of the others," does not prove the genuineness of ἡμῖν. The reading ὑμῖν, too, in ℵ and several min., must be regarded as a correction; it lay to hand to insert a dative in order to complete the sentence. — Following K L P, several min., etc., the *Rec.* has τοῦ βίου after χρόνος, which is wanting in A B C ℵ, etc. etc. Tittmann brackets it, Lachm. and Tisch. rightly omit it. — βούλημα] after A B C ℵ, etc. Clem. Theoph. (Lachm. Tisch.), instead of the *Rec.* θέλημα, which occurs only in K L P, several min. Oec. — The aorist κατεργάσασθαι is attested only by K L P, Oec.; it is accordingly better to read the perfect with Lachm. and Tisch.: κατειργάσθαι, after A B C ℵ, *al.*, Clem. The change could easily have taken place from the fact that the aorist form of the word is the prevailing one in the N. T. (*e.g.* Rom. vii. 8; 1 Cor. v. 3; 2 Cor. vii. 11, etc.). — Ver. 5. Instead of τῷ ἑτοίμως ἔχοντι κρῖναι, Buttm. reads: τῷ ἑτοίμως κρίνοντι, a reading which is attested only by B. — Ver. 7. εἰς τὰς προσευχάς] The article τάς is very suspicious; Lachm. has omitted it; Tisch. has now again adopted it, with the remark: articulus non intellecta ea quam

habet vi omittendus videbatur. It is wanting in A B ℵ, and several min., and seems to be inserted here following chap. iii. 7. — Ver. 8. *πρὸ πάντων δέ*] The omission of *δέ* in A B, 13, Arm. Tol. etc., is a correction in order to connect the participle clause directly with the preceding verbb. fin. — *ἡ ἀγάπη*] *Rec.* after several min. and Theoph. — *ἡ*, however, is spurious, after A B K L P ℵ, etc. Lachm. and Tisch. have omitted the article; Griesb. regards it as at least suspicious. — *καλύπτει*] after A B K, *al.*, Copt. Arm. etc., Clem. Rom. Syr. etc. (Lachm. Tisch., much recommended by Griesb.); instead of the *Rec.* *καλύψει*, after L P ℵ, which is easily explained from Jas. v. 20. — Ver. 9. *γογγυσμῶν*] *Rec.* after K L P, Oec.; on the other hand, A B ℵ, *al.*, m. Syr. Arm. Vulg. Cyr. etc., are in favour of the singular, adopted by Lachm. and Tisch.: *γογγυσμοῦ*. The plural from Phil. ii. 14. — Ver. 13. *καθό*] instead of the *Rec.* *καθώς*, rightly accepted by Griesb. after almost all authorities. — Ver. 14. *τὸ τῆς δόξης*] Scholz and Lachm. add *καὶ δυνάμεως*, which occurs in A P ℵ (*τῆς δυν.*), several min. etc. In B K L, many min. and Fathers, the adjunct is wanting; Tisch. too has omitted it. It may quite as well have been omitted later as superfluous, as added by way of strengthening. — *ἀναπαύεται*] Instead of this, A and several min. have *ἐπαναπαύεται*, after Luke x. 6; some other authorities read *ἀναπέπαυται*, after 2 Cor. vii. 13. — The genuineness of the words: *κατὰ μὲν αὐτοὺς βλασφημεῖται, κατὰ δὲ ὑμᾶς δοξάζεται*, is at least doubtful; it is supported by K L P, etc., Harl. Tol. etc., Thph. Oec. Cypr.; whilst it is opposed by A B ℵ, *al.*, Syr. Aeth. Copt. etc., Tert. Ambr. Beda (Lachm. and Tisch.). Whilst de Wette and Wiesinger declare the adjunct to be suspicious, and Schott looks upon it as spurious, Hofm. considers it genuine, because, in his opinion, without it the proper connection of ver. 15 with what precedes would be wanting. — Ver. 15. Instead of *ἀλλοτριοεπίσκοπος*, Lachm., following B, writes: *ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος*; on it Tisch. observes: videtur elegantiae causa ejectum *ο*. — Ver. 16. *ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι τούτῳ*] is the reading of A B ℵ, *al.*, Syr. utr. Erp. Copt. etc., Cypr. Ephr. Oec. (Lachm. Tisch.). There is less evidence for the *Rec.* *ἐν τῷ μέρει τούτῳ*, which occurs in K L P, etc., and probably arose out of 2 Cor. iii. 10, ix. 3. — Ver. 17. Instead of *ἡμῶν*, A** *al.*, Aeth. Slav. Thph. etc., read *ὑμῶν*. — Ver. 19. *ὡς πιστῷ κτιστῇ*] *Rec.* according to K L P, almost all min., several vss. and Fathers (Tisch. 7). Lachm. and Tisch. 8 have omitted *ὡς*, after A B ℵ, several min. Copt. Aeth. Arm. Vulg. Athan. It is difficult to decide which is the correct reading; *ὡς* may have been inserted, following Peter's habitual mode of expression; on the other hand, it may have been omitted in order to make *πιστῷ*

κτίστῃ purely terminative. — αὐτῶν, after A G K ℵ, etc. etc., is to be preferred to ἑαυτῶν. — Instead of ἀγαθοποιΐᾳ, which occurs in B K L P ℵ, pl. *al.*, Theoph. Oec., and is accepted by Tisch. Lachm., after A, *al.*, Vulg. etc., reads the plural ἀγαθοποιΐαις.

Ver. 1. Χριστοῦ οὖν παθόντος [ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν] σαρκί] In these words the apostle returns to chap. iii. 18, in order to subjoin the following exhortation. — σαρκί is not: "*in* the flesh" (Luther), but: "*according to the flesh;*" comp. iii. 18. This is made prominent because the believer's sufferings, too, under persecutions, touch the flesh only; comp. Matt. x. 28. παθόντος is not to be limited to the suffering of Christ *before* His death, but comprehends the latter also. It is, however, incorrect to understand, with Hofmann, παθόντος at once as identical with ἀποθανόντος, and in connection with σαρκί to explain: "that Christ by His life in the flesh submitted for our sake to a suffering which befell Him—that for our sake He allowed His life in the flesh to come to an end" (!). — καὶ ὑμεῖς τὴν αὐτὴν ἔννοιαν ὁπλίσασθε] καί with reference to Christ: "*ye also:*" the disciple must be like the master. It lies to hand to translate ἔννοια (besides here, only in Heb. iv. 12) as equivalent here to "disposition of mind" (de Wette; Weiss, p. 288); but ἔννοια means always "*thought, consideration*" (Wiesinger, Schott).[1] There is here also no reference to the mind of Christ in His sufferings. τὴν αὐτὴν ἔννοιαν refers back to the πάσχειν σαρκί of Christ Himself, so that the sense is, that since Christ suffered according to the flesh, they too should not refuse the thought of like Him suffering according to (or on) the flesh. ὅτι gives the ground of the exhortation. Hofmann, Wiesinger, and Schott take ὅτι as explaining τὴν αὐτ. ἔννοιαν. Incorrectly; for the πέπαυται ἁμαρτίας will not admit of an application to Christ, inasmuch as the expression does not presuppose generally a former "relation to sin," but former sinning itself. — The verb ὁπλίζεσθαι, in the N. T. ἅπ. λεγ., is in classical writers often construed with the accus. (Soph. *Electra*, v. 991: θράσος ὁπλίζεσθαι); while applied to every kind of equipment, *e.g.* of ships, it here refers to the Christian's calling as one of conflict. — ὅτι ὁ παθὼν ἐν σαρκὶ

[1] Reiche erroneously appeals in support of this meaning: "disposition of mind," to the passages in Prov. v. 2, xxiii. 19, LXX., and Wisd. ii. 14.

πέπαυται ἁμαρτίας] In Luther's translation: "for he who suffers on the flesh, he ceaseth from sin," the present is incorrectly substituted for the preterite tense: *ἐν σαρκί*; correctly: "*on* the flesh." Hofmann's rendering is wrong: "*in* the flesh," which, compared with the *ἐν σαρκί* preceding, would imply "that whilst Christ's life in the flesh ended with His suffering, our sufferings took place with continued life in the flesh" (!). The reading *σαρκί*, "according to the flesh," conveys the same idea; cf. Winer, 384 (E. T. 513). — *πέπαυται ἁμαρτίας*] The mid. *παύομαι* is in the classics frequently joined with the genitive, *e.g. Il.* vii. 290: *παυσώμεθα μάχης*; *Herod.* i. 47: *τῆς μάχης ἐπαύσαντο*; *Herodian.* vii. 10, 16: *τῆς τε ὀργῆς ὁ δῆμος ἐπαύσατο*. In this way *πέπαυται* here is explained by most interpreters as equivalent to: "he has ceased from sin, that is, he has given up sinning." The word may also be taken as the perf. pass. according to the construction *παύειν τινά τινος*, equivalent to: "to cause one to give up, to desist from a thing." *πέπαυται ἁμαρτίας* would then mean: "he has been brought to cease from sin, to sin no more" (Schott: "brought away from sinful conduct"). Hofmann erroneously asserts that "*παύειν τινὰ ἁμαρτίας* would in a quite general way mean: action such as brings it about that the individual is ended with sin;" that is to say, in the sense, that his *relation* to sin is at an end.[1] For the genitive with *παύειν* denotes always a condition or an activity of him who is the object of *παύειν*. — It makes no essential difference in the thought whether *παύειν* be taken here as a middle (Weiss) or as a passive (de Wette, Wiesinger). The idea: "*through Christ* immunitatem nactus sum," is expressed here neither in the one case nor in the other (Wiesinger). — The clause here has the form of a general statement, the meaning of which is, that by suffering as to the flesh a ceasing of sin is effected.[2] This idea, in many respects a true one, may

[1] Thus, too, Schott: "He who has experienced the *παθεῖν σαρκί* is delivered from his former *relation* to sin." But Schott admits that "a release from sin must be thought of, in so far as sin determined the conduct and *made it sinful*."

[2] Genuinely catholic is the remark of Lorinus on *πέπ. ἁμαρτίας*: Peccatorum nomine absolute posito gravia intelliguntur, quae vocamus mortalia; nam desinere atque quiescere a levibus et venialibus, eximium privilegium est, praeterque Deiparam definire non possumus, an alii ulli concessum.

according to the connection be defined thus: he who suffered on account of sin, that is, on account of his opposition to sin, has in such wise broken with sin that it has no more power over him (Weiss). It is incorrect, with several of the earlier commentators, as also Schott, to understand *παθών* in a spiritual sense, either of the being dead with Christ in baptism, according to Rom. vi. 7 (Schott), or of the putting to death of the old man (Gerhard: qui carnem cum concupiscentiis suis in Christo et cum Christo crucifigit, ille peccare desinit; Calvin: passio in carne significat nostri abnegationem). Opposed to such an interpretation is the subjoined *σαρκί*, by which *this* *παθών* here is expressly marked as identical with the *παθών*, used with reference to Christ; and the apostle in no way hints that that *παθών* is employed in a spiritual sense. It is evidently entirely a mistake to understand by *ὁ παθών* Christ, as Fronmüller does,—*πέπ. ἁμαρτ.* being thus in no way appropriate (doubtless Jachmann explains: "because Christ hath removed sin for Himself, that is, hath shown that it is possible to be without sin" (!)); nor is it less so to assume, finally, with Steiger, that here "the apostle unites together the different persons, the head and the members in their unity," so that the clause would contain the double idea: "Christ suffering as to the body made us free from sin," and: "we, by participating through faith in the sufferings of Christ, die unto sin." Hofmann, too, unjustifiably gives the clause the double reference—to Christ and to the Christians; to Christ, "in as far as He by His bodily death was finished with sin, which He took upon Himself for the purpose of atoning for it;" to the Christians, "in so far as he is spiritually dead whilst still alive in the body, and so is translated into a life in which he goes free from the guilt and slavery of sin." In these interpretations thoughts are supplied to which the context makes no allusion.[1]

Ver. 2. *εἰς τὸ μηκέτι κ.τ.λ.*] The words may be connected either with the exhortation *ὁπλίσασθε* or with *πέπαυται ἁμαρτίας*. De Wette, Brückner, Wiesinger, Schott, and Hofm. justly prefer the former connection, inasmuch as the infinitival

[1] Reiche regards the entire sentence as spurious, because of the difficulty and indistinctness of the thought.

clause expressive of a purpose stands related more naturally to the imperative, than to a subordinate clause containing a general statement (otherwise Zezschwitz and the former exposition in this commentary). Still, it is incorrect to connect εἰς here with ὁπλίζεσθαι, as in the common phrase: ὁπλίζεσθαι εἰς τὸ μάχεσθαι (Schott). Had the apostle meant this, he could not have separated by a parenthesis words which so directly belong to each other; εἰς can only add the nearer definition of the aim to which ὁπλιζ. is directed. — ἀνθρώπων ἐπιθυμίαις, ἀλλὰ θελήματι Θεοῦ] The datives are to be explained either as τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ ζῆν, chap. ii. 24 (Brückner, Wiesinger), or they express the pattern according to which (Hofm.); as in Acts xv. 1, Gal. v. 16, 25, etc. Gerh.: praecipit ut normam vitae nostrae statuamus non hominum voluntatem, sed Dei voluntatem. The latter view is to be preferred on account of the idea τὸν . . . βιῶσαι χρόνον. "ἀνθρώπων and Θεοῦ are antitheses, as are also the manifold lusts of men and the one uniform will of God" (Wiesinger). The notion that by ἐπιθυμίαι are to be understood the lusts, not of the readers, but of those only by whom they were surrounded (Schott, Hofm.), must be rejected as arbitrary. — τὸν ἐπίλοιπον ἐν σαρκὶ βιῶσαι χρόνον] With ἐν σαρκί, comp. 2 Cor. x. 3, Gal. ii. 20; Phil. i. 22, 24. σάρξ expresses as little here as in ver. 1 an ethical conception; it denotes the earthly human nature to which the mortal body belongs. — The verb βιοῦν is ἅπ. λεγ. in the N. T. The form βιῶσαι is to be found in the Attic writers, but it is less common than the 2 aor.: βιῶναι. — ἐπίλοιπος, in like manner, ἅπ. λεγ.: "*the remaining time in the flesh*;" an idea similar to ὁ τῆς παροικίας χρόνος, chap. i. 17. With the whole thought, comp. Rom. xii. 2.

Ver. 3. A fuller explanation is now given of the thought expressed in the previous verse, that the Christians should no longer live after the lusts of men, but according to the will of God; hence γάρ. — ἀρκετός] Matt. vi. 34, x. 25; correctly Wiesinger: "the expression is here a μείωσις." Gerhard: in eo quod ait "sufficit" est quidam asterismus sive liptotes, qua mitigat Ap. exprobrationis asperitatem. Schott introduces a foreign application when he explains: "in it you have enough to repent of and to make amends for." The construction as

in Isocrates (in *Panegyr.*): *ἱκανὸς γὰρ ὁ παρεληλυθὼς χρόνος, ἐν ᾧ τι τῶν δεινῶν οὐ γέγονε*; comp. *ἱκανούσθω*, Ezek. xliv. 6, xlv. 9. *ἐστι* simply is to be supplied, not, with Steiger, "should be." — *ὁ παρεληλυθὼς χρόνος*] points back to *μηκέτι*; in contrast to *τὸν ἐπίλοιπον . . . χρόνον*. — *τὸ βούλημα τῶν ἐθνῶν κατείργασθαι*] The infinitive is, in free construction, dependent on *ἀρκετός*, as it also stands with *ἀρκεῖ*; cf. Winer, p. 298 f. [E. T. 401 ff.]. The inf. perf. is selected "to designate the former life of sin, which has once for all been brought to a close" (Schott). — *τῶν ἐθνῶν*] is not evidence that the epistle was addressed to aforetime Jews. When Jachmann says: "the apostle could never say of the heathen, that they lived according to the will of the heathen," it must be observed, that if the readers were formerly heathen, the *βούλημα τῶν ἐθνῶν* was undoubtedly their own *βούλημα*, but that *ἐθνῶν* is explained by the fact, that they were now heathen no longer (as opposed to Weiss). — *πεπορευμένους*] must be referred to *ὑμᾶς*, to be supplied in thought to *κατειργάσθαι*. If the right reading be *ἡμῖν* after *ἀρκετὸς γάρ*, Peter would include himself, and *ἡμᾶς* would have to be supplied. The Vulg. is indefinite: his qui ambulaverunt. Beza's view is inappropriate, that Peter refers here not only to the readers of the epistle (whom he considers to have been Jewish-Christians), but also to their ancestors, *i.e.* the former ten tribes of Israel. With *πορεύεσθαι ἐν*, cf. Luke i. 6; 2 Pet. ii. 10. — *ἀσελγείαις*] "*excesses of every kind*," embracing specially unchastity; cf. Rom. xiii. 13; 2 Cor. xii. 21; Gal. v. 19; 3 Macc. ii. 26, etc.; Buddeus considers it to mean nothing else than: obscoenitas et stuprorum flagitiosa consuetudo; Lucian has the expression: *ἀσελγέστεροι τῶν ὄνων*. — *ἐπιθυμίαις*] in the plural denotes *fleshly* lusts in themselves; although not limited to sensual desires only, it yet includes these chiefly. — *οἰνοφλυγίαις*] *ἅπ. λεγ.* in the N. T.; the verb *οἰνοφλυγεῖν*, LXX. Deut. xxi. 20, Heb. סֹבֵא; Luther: "intoxication;" better: "*drunkenness*." Andronicus Rhodus, lib. *περὶ παθῶν*, p. 6: *οἰνοφλυγία ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμία οἴνου ἄπληστος*. Philo (*V. M.* 1, § 22) calls *οἰνοφλυγία* an *ἀπλήρωτος ἐπιθυμία*. — *κώμοις*] besides here, only in Rom. xiii. 13, Gal. v. 21, where, as here with *πότοις*, it is joined with *μέθαι*: commissa-

tiones, properly: "*carousals;*" cf. Pape, *s.v.* — *πότοις*] *ἅπ. λεγ.*; chiefly applied to social drinking at the banquet; Appian, *B. C.* I. p. 700: *ὁ δὲ Σερτώριος . . . τὰ πολλὰ ἦν ἐπὶ τρυφῆς, γυναίξι καὶ κώμοις καὶ πότοις σχολάζων.* — *καὶ ἀθεμίτοις εἰδωλολατρείαις*] designates heathen idolatrous practices specially. *ἀθέμιτος*, in the N. T. occurring, besides in this passage, only in Acts x. 28, gives marked prominence to that in the nature of *εἰδωλ.* which is antagonistic to the divine law. Bengel: quibus sanctissimum Dei jus violatur.[1] This description is only applicable to such persons as were formerly heathen, not to the Jews; to the latter only in the days before the Assyrian and Babylonian captivities. Weiss (p. 113), in opposition to this, wrongly appeals to Rom. ii. 17 ff.; for the reproach there made against the Jews bears an impress entirely different from the description here given; nor is the *ἱεροσυλεῖν* in that passage identical with the practice of idolatry. It is altogether arbitrary to take the expression *εἰδωλολατρείαι* here in a wider sense, so as to exclude from it idolatry *proper;* and it is further opposed by the expression *ἀθεμίτοις.*

Ver. 4. *ἐν ᾧ ξενίζονται*] Many interpreters apply *ἐν ᾧ* directly to the thought contained in the following clause: *μὴ συντρεχόντων . . . ἀνάχυσιν*; Pott: *ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ξενίζ., ὅτι μὴ συντρέχετε*; incorrectly; *ἐν ᾧ* is connected rather with what precedes. Still it can hardly be right to explain, that as the perfects *κατειργάσθαι* and *πεπορευμένους* point to the fact, that they no longer live as they had lived, this was the matter of wonderment (de Wette, Wiesinger, Schott,[2] and in this commentary). It is more natural to take it thus—*ἐν ᾧ* equivalent to: "on the ground of this" (that is, because ye have thus lived), and the absolute genitive following as equal to: "inasmuch as ye run not with them," so that the sense is: "on account of this, that ye thus walked in time past, your country-

[1] Schott unjustifiably maintains that the *εἰδωλολατρείαι* are termed *ἀθέμιτοι* not in themselves, but on account of the immoral, voluptuous ceremonies connected with them. The adject. is added because they form an antithesis, in the strictest sense, to God's holy prerogative. It is unwarrantable to assert that *εἰδωλολατρεία* could only be termed *ἀθέμιτος* when practised by the Jews, not when by the heathen.

[2] It is true that "a surprise calling forth displeasure" (Schott) is meant; but this does not lie in the word itself.

men think it strange when ye do so no longer" (Hofm.); with *ἐν ᾧ*, comp. John xvi. 30 and Meyer *in loc.* The genitive absolute assigns, as it frequently does, the occasioning cause (Winer, p. 195 [E. T. 259]). The word *ξενίζεσθαι* (in its common meaning is equivalent to: "to be a guest;" thus it is used frequently in the N. T.) here means: "*to be amazed*," "*to feel astonishment;*" comp. ver. 12; Acts xvii. 20.[1] — *μὴ συντρεχόντων ὑμῶν*] "*μή* refers the matter to the amazement of the heathen." *συντρέχειν*, Mark vi. 33 and Acts iii. 11: *to run together*, confluere; here: "to run in company with any one." — *εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν τῆς ἀσωτίας ἀνάχυσιν*] states the aim of the *συντρ.* With *ἀσωτία*, comp. Eph. v. 18; Tit. i. 6: "*lewd* and *dissolute* conduct." The word *ἀνάχυσις* is to be found in Aelian, *de an.* xvi. 15, used synonymously with *ἐπίκλυσις*, and *Script. grace. ap. Luper.* in Harpocr. with *ὑπέρκλυσις*; it means, accordingly: the overflowing. This sense is to be kept hold of, and *τρέχειν εἰς ἀσωτίας* to be explained of the haste with which dissoluteness is allowed to break forth and to overflow. According to Hofm., it denotes the doings of those who are in haste to pour out from them their indwelling lasciviousness, so that it overflows and spreads in all directions. From the explanation of Strabo, iii. p. 206 A: *λέγονται ἀναχύσεις αἱ πληρούμεναι τῇ θαλάττῃ κοίλαδες ἐν πλημμυρίσι*, it is unjustifiable to derive the meaning "sentina, mire" (2d ed. of this commentary), or "flood" (3d ed.), or "stream" (Schott).[2] — *βλασφημοῦντες*] characterizes their amazement more nearly as one which prompts them to speak evil of those whose conduct causes them astonishment (not "Christianity," as Hofmann thinks). Schott justly remarks that "it is not the being struck with amazement in itself which is, strictly speaking, of significance here, but that definite form of it expressed by *βλασφημοῦντες*, placed last for the sake of emphasis."

Ver. 5 points to the judgment which awaits the evil-

[1] The object. to *ξενίζεσθαι* is either in the dative, as ver. 12 (*Polyb.* iii. 68. 9: *ἐξενίζοντο τῷ τὶ συμβεβηκὸς εἶναι παρὰ τὴν προσδοκίαν*), or is subjoined by means of *διά τι* or *ἐπί τινι*.

[2] Hesych. and Suidas interpret *ἀνάχυσις* also by *βλακεία*, *ἴκλυσις*; thus Gerhard: virium exolutio, mollities; according to de Wette it means: profusio, wantonness; but it is better to keep to the above signification.

speaking heathen: *οἱ ἀποδώσουσι λόγον*] *ἀποδ. λόγον* (Matt. xii. 36; Heb. xiii. 17; Acts xix. 40). Antithesis to *αἰτεῖν λόγον*, chap. iii. 15. — *τῷ ἑτοίμως ἔχοντι*] "that is, the Saviour risen, and seated at the right hand, chap. iii. 22," de Wette. — The expression: *ἑτοίμως ἔχειν*, "*to be ready*," with the exception of here, only in Acts xxi. 13; 2 Cor. xii. 14. — *κρῖναι ζῶντας καὶ νεκρούς*] As often in the N. T. of the last judgment, which by *ἑτοίμ. ἔχ.* is pointed out as near at hand; comp. ver. 7. *ζῶντας καὶ νεκρούς* does not denote some dead and some alive, but the aggregate of all, whether they be living or already dead when the day of judgment comes; comp. Acts x. 42; 2 Tim. iv. 1.[1] It is erroneous to understand by the quick and the dead the Christians only (Wichelhaus, Schott), or those who speak evil only. Peter, by naming Him to whom the evil-speakers shall render an account, the Judge of the quick and the dead, implies thereby that they are not to remain unpunished, whether they die before the day of judgment or not. And this, as a testimony to the justice of God, should serve to comfort the Christians under the calumnies which they had to endure, and exhort them not to be led aside by them to a denial of their Christian walk. — It must further be observed, that this passage adds the last to those elements of the glory of the exalted Saviour mentioned at the close of the last chapter, namely, the office of judge which He will execute at the end of the days.

Ver. 6. This verse, which has been explained in very diverse ways,[2] is meant, as the *γάρ* following upon *εἰς τοῦτο* shows, to give the ground or the explanation of a statement going before. The question is: Which statement is it? The sound of the words serves to suggest that in *νεκροῖς* we have

[1] Gerhard: *vivos*, quos judex veniens reperiet vivos, *mortuos*, quos ex sepulcris in vitam revocabit. Several commentators erroneously understand the words *ζῶντας καὶ νεκρούς* in a figurative sense; Joh. Huss: *vivos* in gratia ad beatitudinem, *mortuos* in culpa ad damnationem; Bened. Arias: *vivos* adhuc in carne illa Adami: *mortuos* in Christo.

[2] Lorinus enumerates twelve different interpretations; nor does that complete the number. Many commentators are uncertain, and confess that they do not understand the true meaning of the verse; thus also Luther, who even thinks it possible that the text has been corrupted. Reiche, too, is inclined to regard the passage as a gloss added by a later hand.

a resumption of the νεκρούς immediately preceding, and that what is said in this verse is to be regarded as the ground of the thought that judgment will be pronounced, not only upon the living, *but upon the dead also.* This assumption seems to be corroborated by the καί before νεκροῖς. The fact—to which Peter appeals—on which this thought is based is expressed in εὐαγγελίσθη. But it is precisely this idea, that the gospel was preached to the dead,—to all the dead,—which has induced the interpreters to deviate from the explanation lying most naturally to hand. It is entirely unjustifiable, with Zezschwitz (thus Alethaeus already, and Starkius in Wolf), to connect the verse with vv. 1 and 2, regard vv. 3–5 as a digression, and understand under νεκροῖς the *Christians* who are already dead when the day of judgment arrives. γάρ certainly must refer back to ver. 5; according to Schott, it applies to the whole homogeneous statement of ver. 5; according to Bengel, to τῷ ἑτοίμως ἔχοντι; in their opinion, likewise, νεκροῖς is to be understood of Christians already dead. This determination of the expression, however, is arbitrary, as no mention is made in ver. 5 of the Christians.[1] It lies more to hand to take the νεκροῖς as meaning the *evil-speakers* mentioned in ver. 5. On this interpretation, the apostle tells the Christians who were being evil spoken of not to forget that those calumniators who died *before* the judgment would not on that account escape punishment. Still, it is difficult to see why the apostle should give such special prominence to this,—more especially with the further remark, that the gospel was preached unto them, ἵνα . . . ζῶσι κ.τ.λ. Wiesinger justly remarks: "that the author should so expressly accept the assumption of their death, does not well agree with the ἑτοίμως ἔχειν, and not with the subsequent πάντων δὲ τὸ τέλος ἤγγικε." — Hofmann, whilst correctly recognising that by νεκροῖς the apostle here does not denote Christians only, or unbelievers only, gives a closer definition of the term by applying it to those of the dead to whom, during their lifetime, the gospel had been preached. At the same time,

[1] It is evidently still farther fetched to understand νεκροῖς as meaning the believers of the O. T., as is done by several of the earlier commentators—Bullinger, Aretius, etc.

however, he assumes that the thought here expressed "serves to confirm or explain the whole statement that the slanderers, without exception, whether living or dead, must render account to the Lord." But, on the one hand, the apostle in no way alludes to the limitation of the idea here too supposed; and, on the other, it is incorrect to understand by *ζῶντας καὶ νεκρούς*, ver. 5, the calumniators only. If all arbitrariness is to be avoided, then *νεκροῖς* must here be taken in the same wide sense as *νεκρούς* in ver. 5. Any limitation of the general idea is without justification,—indicated, as such is, neither by the want of the article before *νεκροῖς*,[1] nor by the circumstance that the slanderers are the subject in ver. 5. Accordingly, it cannot be denied that the apostle gives expression to the thought that the gospel has been preached to all, who are dead, at the time when the last judgment arrives. With the view of chap. iii. 19, 20, which is in harmony with the words, this thought need occasion no stumbling. In that passage, it is true, the *ἐκήρυξεν* applies only to the spirits of those who perished in the flood. But they alone are mentioned there not because the *κήρυγμα* was addressed exclusively to them, but because the apostle recognised in the deluge the type of baptism.[2] Accordingly, though there be a close connection of thought internally between what is here said and chap. iii. 19, 20, it is nevertheless erroneous, with Steiger, König, Güder, Wiesinger, Weiss, p. 228 f., to take *εὐηγγελίσθη* as applying only to those there named. — *εὐηγγελίσθη*] is put here impersonally: "*the gospel was proclaimed:*" neither *ὁ Χριστός* nor *ἡ διδαχὴ τοῦ Χριστοῦ* (Bengel, Grotius, Pott, etc.), nor anything similar, is to be supplied.

εἰς τοῦτο . . . ἵνα (comp. chap. iii. 9; John xviii. 37, and other passages) points to the design of the fact stated in *εὐηγγελίσθη*; on this the chief accent of the sentence lies. The apostle bases the thought, that the Lord stands ready to

[1] The phrases: *ἐγείρειν, ἐγείρεσθαι, ἀναστῆναι ἐκ νεκρῶν* (see Winer, p. 117 [E. T. 153]), go to prove that the expression *νεκροί*, when applied to *all* the dead, has not necessarily the article prefixed to it. Elsewhere, too, *νεκροί* has no article; cf. Luke xvi. 30; Acts x. 42; Rom. xiv. 9.

[2] Erroneous is the opinion of several commentators (Pott, Jachmann, König, Grimm in *theol. Studien und Kritiken*, 1835), that these only are named by way of example, because they were specially ungodly.

judge the dead also, not alone on the circumstance that the gospel has been preached to them too, but that it has been preached for the purpose which he states in what follows. This purpose is expressed in the sentence consisting of two members: *ἵνα κριθῶσιν μὲν κατὰ ἀνθρώπους σαρκι, ζῶσιν δὲ κατὰ Θεὸν πνεύματι.* According to the grammatical structure, *κριθῶσιν* and *ζῶσιν* are co-ordinate with each other, and both are equally dependent on *ἵνα.* In sense *ἵνα* applies, however, only to *ζῶσιν,* inasmuch as the first member must be regarded as a parenthesis. The construction here is similar to that which is frequently to be found in classical writers in clauses connected by *μὲν . . . δέ* (see Matthiae, *ausf. griech. Gr.* 2d ed. p. 1262). This conjunction, as Hartung (*Lehre v. d. Partikl.,* Part II. p. 406) remarks, discloses the contrast. The aorist *κριθῶσιν* shows the judgment to be one which, at the commencement of the last judgment, is by their very death executed upon those who are then dead, and this quite independently of whether the gospel was preached to them before or after death. It is accordingly erroneous to understand this judgment (*κριθῶσιν*) to mean the judgment of repentance (Gerhard), or that of the flood (de Wette); it is the judgment of death, as nearly all expositors have rightly acknowledged. Hofmann, with only an appearance of rightness, asserts that the expression of the apostle can be appropriately applied only to those who did not suffer this judgment of death till after the gospel had been preached to them. The apostle could express himself thus as regards those also with whom this was not the case, all the more readily that they were not set free from the condition of death immediately on hearing the gospel preached, nor then even, when they had received it in faith. Accordingly, the interpretation is: "*in order that they, after the flesh, indeed, judged by death, may live according to the spirit*" (Wiesinger). The antithesis *σαρκὶ . . . πνεύματι* is here in the same sense as in chap. iii. 18. Güder's opinion, that *σάρξ* here denotes the sinful bias which the dead possess, is unwarranted; nowhere in Scripture is *σάρξ* attributed to the already departed. — *κατὰ ἀνθρώπους* means neither: "by men," nor: "according to the judgment of men;" but: "*according to the manner of men, as is peculiar to them.*" — The

second member: *ζῶσι δὲ κατὰ Θεὸν πνεύματι*, corresponds as to form entirely with the first clause, only that here the verb is present, because it mentions the future condition aimed at. *ζῆν* is antithetical to *κριθῆναι*, and denotes the *eternal* life which in the judgment is awarded to those who in faith have received the gospel. It is more nearly defined by *κατὰ Θεόν*, which (corresponding to the *κατὰ ἀνθρώπους*) can only mean, "*according to the manner of God, as corresponds with the character of God.*"[1] — This final clause states the purpose which this *εὐαγγελίζεσθαι* should serve; whether, and in how far, the object is attained is not said.

Ver. 7. Here begins the third series of exhortations, which has special reference to life in the church, and is linked on to the thought of the nearness of the end of all things (see Introd. § 2). — *πάντων δὲ τὸ τέλος ἤγγικεν*] *δέ* marks clearly the transition to another train of thought. It is accordingly incorrect to connect the clause with what precedes (Hofmann). *πάντων τὸ τέλος*, equal to: "*the end of all things*," refers back to the foregoing *ἑτοίμως ἔχοντι κρῖναι*; with the judgment comes the *τέλος*. *πάντων*, placed first by way of emphasis, is not masc. (Hensler: "the end of all men") but neut.;[2] comp. 2 Pet. iii. 10, 11; with *τέλος*, Matt. xxiv. 6, 14. — *ἤγγικε*] comp. Rom. xiii. 12; Jas. v. 8; Phil. iv. 5. That the apostle, without fixing the time or the hour of it, looked upon the advent of Christ and the end of the world,—in its condition hitherto,—therewith connected, as near at hand, must be simply admitted.[3] — *σωφρονήσατε οὖν καὶ νήψατε*] The first exhortation, grounded (*οὖν*) on the thought of the nearness of

[1] Hofmann interprets *κατὰ Θεόν* incorrectly by: "because of God," to which he adds the more precise definition: "since it is God who gives this life, so that it is therefore constituted accordingly." — Jachmann's view is very singular; he holds that *κατὰ Θεόν* means "with reference to their divine part;" nor, he thinks, should this occasion surprise, for, as the sensuous nature of man is in biblical language personified by *ὁ ἄνθρωπος*, so too his invisible, divine nature might be personified by *ὁ Θεός*.

[2] Oecumenius gives two interpretations: *τὸ τέλος· ἀντὶ τοῦ, ἡ συμπλήρωσις, ἡ συντέλεια· ἢ τέλος ἠγγικέναι τῶν πάντων προφητῶν· τοῦτο δὲ ἀληθεῖ λόγῳ, ὁ Χριστός, ἡ πάντων γὰρ τελειότης, αὐτός ἐστιν.* The second is evidently false.

[3] According to Schott, *ἤγγικε* means as much as: "not only is there nothing more between the Christian's present state of salvation and the end, but the former is itself already the end, *i.e.* the beginning of the end."

the end of the world. *σωφρ.*; Vulg.: estote *prudentes;* in this sense the word is not in use in the N. T.; it means rather temperateness of spirit, *i.e.* the governing omnium immoderatorum affectuum; with the passage comp. 1 Tim. ii. 9; Tit. ii. 6 (Hemming: *σωφροσύνη*, equal to affectuum et voluntatis harmonia), in contrast to the licentiousness of the heathen described in ver. 2 (Wiesinger). — *νήψατε*] Vulg.: vigilate, inexactly; *νήφειν* has here the same meaning as in chap. i. 13. It is not enough to understand both expressions of abstinence from sensual indulgence. — *εἰς* [*τὰς*] *προσευχάς*] not: in orationibus (Vulg.), for *εἰς* states the aim of the *σωφρ.* and *νήφειν*, but: "*unto prayer*," that is, so that you may always be in the right frame of mind for prayer. If *τάς* be genuine, it is to be explained on the supposition that the apostle took the prayers of Christians for granted. — A mind excited by passions and lusts cannot pray. The plural points to repeated prayer (Schott). Schott, without any warrant, would understand by it the prayers of the church only. — The fact that both ideas are synonymous, forbids any separation, with de Wette and Hofmann, of *σωφρονήσατε* from *νήψατε*, and the conjoining of *εἰς τ. προσευχάς* with the latter term only.

Ver. 8. *πρὸ πάντων δέ*] cf. Jas. v. 12. — *τὴν εἰς ἑαυτοὺς* (*i.e.* *ἀλλήλους*) *ἀγάπην ἐκτενῆ ἔχοντες*. The second exhortation. The participle shows that this and the first exhortation belong closely together. Luther translates inexactly: "have ... a burning love." Love one to another, as the characteristic sign (John xiii. 35) of Christians, is presupposed; the apostle's exhortation is directed to this, that the love should be *ἐκτενής* (Bengel: amor jam praesupponitur, ut sit vehemens, praecipitur). — For *ἐκτενής*, cf. chap. i. 22. There is nothing to show that the apostle gave expression to this exhortation with special reference to the circumstance "that in the case of his readers brotherly love was united with danger and persecution" (Schott). — *ὅτι* [*ἡ*] *ἀγάπη καλύπτει πλῆθος ἁμαρτιῶν*] A proverbial saying, after Prov. x. 12: שִׂנְאָה תְּעוֹרֵר מְדָנִים וְעַל כָּל־פְּשָׁעִים תְּכַסֶּה אַהֲבָה (the second half is incorrectly translated by the LXX. *πάντας δὲ τοὺς μὴ φιλονεικοῦντας καλύπτει φιλία*): "Love covereth (maketh a covering over) all sins." The sense of the words is evident from the first half of the

verse; whilst hatred stirs up strife and contention (by bringing the sins of others to the light of day), love, with forgiving gentleness, covers the sins of others (and thus works concord).[1] — In its original meaning, accordingly, the proverb has reference to what love does as regards the sins of others; love in its essential nature is forgiveness, and that not of some, but of many sins; 1 Cor. xiii. 5, 7; Matt. xviii. 21, 22. In this sense Estius, Luther, Calvin, Beza, Piscator, Steiger, Wiesinger, Weiss (p. 337 f.), Schott, Fronmüller, etc., have rightly interpreted the passage, which then, serving as the basis of the preceding exhortation,[2] is intended to set forth the blessed influence of love on life in the church. Hofmann unjustly denies this (Beza: caritatem mutuam commendat ex eo, quod innumerabilia peccata veluti sepeliat, ac proinde pacis ac concordiae sit fautrix et conservatrix. Wiesinger: "Only by the forgiving, reconciling influence of love, can the destructive power of sin be kept away from church life"). Steiger (with whom Weiss and Fronmüller agree) explains: "the apostle recommends the Christians to *extend the limits of brotherly love* and *to strengthen themselves in it*, because true love covers a *multitude* of sins;" but this is not to the point, inasmuch as the covering of many sins is peculiar to the ἀγάπη itself, and constitutes the reason why it should be ἐκτενής. Several expositors (Grotius, etc.) understand the words to have the same meaning here as in Jas. v. 20 (see Comment. *in loc.*), that is, that love in effecting the sinner's conversion, procures the divine forgiveness for his many sins; but, on the one hand, "the apostle does not here regard his readers as erring brethren, of whom it might be the duty of some to convert the others" (Wiesinger); and, on the other,

[1] As opposed to the view that Peter had this passage in his mind, de Wette asserts, that in "that case the apostle must have translated from the Hebrew the passage incorrectly rendered by the LXX. This, however, is in itself improbable, as he would then have written πάσας τὰς ἁμαρτίας, or rather, πάντα τὰ ἀδικήματα (cf. Prov. xvii. 9)." But though it may be questioned whether Peter quoted directly from it, there can be no doubt, as even Brückner, Wiesinger, and Weiss admit, that the proverbial phrase arose out of that passage.

[2] Hottinger: ὅτι indicare videtur (better: indicat) incitamentum aliquod, quo christianis amor iste commendatur.

"there is here not the slightest indication that the expression is not to be understood directly of the covering of sins as such, but of reclaiming labours" (Weiss). — Oecumenius already (ὁ μὲν γὰρ εἰς τὸν πλησίον ἔλεος, τὸν Θεὸν ἡμῖν ἵλεων ποιεῖ), and after him many Catholic expositors (Salmeron, Cornelius a Lapide, Lorinus, etc.), and several Protestants also (the latter sometimes, whilst distinctly defending the Protestant principle against Catholic applications of the passage [1]), understand the maxim of the blessing which love brings to him who puts it into practice. But if Peter had wished to express a thought similar to that uttered by Christ, Matt. vi. 14, 15, he would assuredly not have made use of words such as these, which in the nature of them bear not upon personal sins, but on those of others.[2]

Ver. 9. In this and the following verses two manifestations of love are brought prominently forward, in which its *ministering* nature is revealed. First: φιλόξενοι εἰς ἀλλήλους] cf. Rom. xii. 13; Heb. xiii. 2; 3 John 5; 1 Tim. iii. 2, etc. The chief emphasis lies on the words which serve more closely to define the statement: ἄνευ γογγυσμοῦ, "*without murmuring*," *i.e.* murmuring at the trouble caused by the hospitality shown to brethren. The same thing is said in a more general way, Phil. ii. 14: πάντα ποιεῖτε χωρὶς γογγυσμῶν καὶ διαλογισμῶν; cf. 2 Cor. ix. 7: μὴ ἐκ λύπης, ἢ ἐξ ἀνάγκης.

Ver. 10. Second manifestation of love. It is presupposed that each one has received a χάρισμα: ἕκαστος καθὼς ἔλαβε

[1] Vorstius: intelligit Ap. caritatem in causa esse, ut non tantum proximi nostri peccata humaniter tegamus, verum etiam ut Deus nobis ex pacto gratuito nostra peccata condonet, non quod propter meritum seu dignitatem caritatis id fiat, sed quia caritas erga fratres conditio est, sine qua Deus nobis ignoscere non vult.

[2] De Wette gives a peculiar combination of the various interpretations: "As the love which is required of us is a *common* love, so the writer refers to the *common* sins still defacing the whole of Christian social life, but which, as single blemishes (!), are overshone, and made pardonable in God's eye, by the light of that love which penetrates all; that is, in that this love produces mutual reconciliation and improvement." On this Brückner remarks, that what is true here is the thought that reciprocalness is a characteristic not of love only, but of all her actions, *i.e.* "He whose love covers the sins of others, sees in like manner his own sins covered by the love of others." But this makes "the interpretation only more artificial, and removes it still farther from the simple phraseology of our passage" (Weiss). — Clemens Al. and Bernhard of Clairvaux (*Sermo 23 in Cant.*) understand ἀγάπη to mean the love of Christ (!).

χάρισμα] καθώς, not equal to ὅς, but pro ratione qua, prouti (Wahl), "*according as.*" — χάρισμα] as in Rom. xii. 6; 1 Cor. xii. 4, 28; not an office in the church. Every man should, according to the kind of gift he has received (not: according to the measure of it, ἐν τούτῳ τῷ μέτρῳ, ἐν ᾧ ἔλαβε vel ut Paulus: ὡς ὁ Θεὸς ἐμέρισε μέτρον χαρισμάτων, Rom. xii. 3. Pott: still less can καθώς be referred to the manner of receiving; Lorinus: sicut *gratis* accepimus, ita gratis demus), administer it for his brethren, εἰς ἑαυτούς, *i.e.* for their benefit, and therefore for that of the entire community. διακονεῖν (a transitive verb, as in chap. i. 12): vocula emphatica; innuit Ap. quod propter dona illa nemo se debeat supra alios efferre, aut dominium in alios affectare, sed aliorum ministrum sese sponte constituere (Gerhard). — ὡς καλοὶ οἰκονόμοι ποικίλης χάριτος Θεοῦ] With ὡς, cf. chap. i. 14: as is peculiar to the καλοῖς οἰκονόμοις, which, from their vocation, Christians should be. With οἰκονόμοι, cf. 1 Cor. iv. 1; Tit. i. 7. According to de Wette and Weiss, there is here an allusion to the parable of the talents, Matt. xxv. 14. — καλός] expression of irreproachable excellence; see 1 Tim. iv. 6; 2 Tim. ii. 3. The Lord of the Christians, as the οἰκονόμοι, is God; the goods which He entrusts to their stewardship are His ποικίλη χάρις; χάρις is here the sum of all that has fallen to the share of believers through the *grace* of God; the individual manifestations of it are the χαρίσματα, the homogeneous character of which is marked by the singular, and their variety by ποικίλη here subjoined with reference to the preceding καθὼς . . . χάρισμα.

Ver. 11. Species duas generi subjicit (Vorstius). From the general term χάρισμα, Peter selects two special functions for greater prominence. — εἴ τις λαλεῖ] λαλεῖν is here the preaching in the church, which includes the προφητεύειν, διδάσκειν, and παρακαλεῖν, mentioned in Rom. xii. 6–8. Pott is inexact in paraphrasing εἴ τις λαλεῖ by εἴ τις ἔχει τὸ χάρισμα τοῦ λαλεῖν (so, too, Schott: "if any one have the gift and vocation to speak"), for λαλεῖν is not the gift, but the exercise of it. It is arbitrary to limit the application of the term to the official duties of the elders (Hemming: si quis docendi munus in ecclesia sustinet), for in the assemblies

every one who possessed the necessary *χάρισμα* was at liberty to speak. — *ὡς λόγια Θεοῦ*] *λαλείτω ἃ λαλεῖ* must be supplied; or better still, with Wiesinger: *λαλοῦντες*; cf. *ἕκαστος . . . διακονοῦντες* above; *λόγια*—as in classical Greek, chiefly of oracular responses—is applied in the N. T. only to the utterances or revelations of God; either to those in the O. T., as in Acts vii. 38, Rom. iii. 2, or those in the N. T., as Heb. v. 12. The idea, prophecies, is too narrow. This exhortation presupposes that whoever speaks in the congregation, gives utterance, not to his own thoughts, but to the revelations of God, and it demands that he should do so in a manner (*ὡς*) conformable to them. — *εἴ τις διακονεῖ*] *διακονεῖν* must not be understood as applying to the official work of the appointed deacons only; it embraces quaevis ministeria in ecclesia ab docendi officio distincta (Gerhard; so, too, Wiesinger, who here cites Rom. xii. 8 and 1 Cor. xii. 28), but it refers specially to the care of the poor, the sick, and the strangers, either official, or according to the free-will of individual members of the church. — *ὡς ἐξ ἰσχύος κ.τ.λ.*] *sc. διακονείτω*, or better *διακονοῦντες*: "*so ministering, as of*," etc. Here, too, it is presumed that the person ministering is not wanting in that strength which God supplies, and the exhortation is, that he should exercise his ability in a way corresponding with the fact, that he received the strength necessary thereto from God, and not as "of himself possessing it." *χορηγεῖν*, besides in this passage, occurs only in 2 Cor. ix. 10. (*ἐπιχορηγεῖν* is to be met with frequently, *e.g.* 2 Pet. i. 5.) — *ἵνα*] as stating their purpose, refers back to the exhortations in vv. 10 and 11, with special reference to the determinative clauses introduced by *ὡς*. — *ἐν πᾶσιν*] "*in all things*" (Wiesinger), *i.e.* "in the practice of all the gifts, the exercise of which was connected with matters relating to the churches" (Schott); not equivalent to *ἐν πᾶσιν ἔθνεσιν* (Oec.), or "in you all" (de Wette: "as His true instruments"); cf. 1 Tim. iii. 11. — *δοξάζηται ὁ Θεός*] "*in order that God may be glorified*," i.e. that He obtain the praise, since it will be evident from your conduct that you as His *οἰκονόμοι* have received (*καθὼς ἔλαβε*) all things (*τὰ λόγια, τὴν ἰσχύν*) from Him. — *διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*] belongs to *δοξάζηται*, and points out that not the

ability only, for the λαλεῖν and διακονεῖν, is communicated to the Christian through the agency of Christ,[1] but that all actual employment of it is effected by Christ. It is mistaken, with Hofmann,—who is not justified in appealing to Rom. xvi. 27 and Heb. xiii. 21 in support of his assertion,—to connect διὰ Ἰ. Χρ. with the following relative clause. Such a view is opposed not only to the natural construction, but to the thought, since God did not receive His δόξα and His κράτος first through Christ. — As a close, the doxology: ᾧ, may be referred either to Θεός (Oecumenius Calvin, Bengel, de Wette, Brückner, Wiesinger, Weiss, Schott, Hofmann) or to Ἰ. Χριστοῦ (Grotius, Calov, Steiger). The first is the correct application, since ὁ Θεός is the subject of the clause and ἡ δόξα points back to δοξάζηται. Comp. chap. v. 11. The doxology states the reason of the ἵνα δοξάζηται ὁ Θεός (Schott); because God *is* (ἐστιν) the glory and the power, therefore the endeavours of the church should be directed to bring about a lively acknowledgment of this, to the praise of God. — Identical with this is the doxology, Rev. i. 6 (cf. also Rev. v. 13).

Ver. 12. Exhortation with reference to the sufferings under persecution. ἀγαπητοί] see chap. ii. 11. — μὴ ξενίζεσθε] cf. ver. 4; Nicol. de Lyra translates incorrectly: nolite a fide alienari; Luther correctly: "*let it not astonish you.*" — τῇ ἐν ὑμῖν πυρώσει] The construction cum dat. occurs also in classical Greek; πύρωσις, besides in this passage, to be found only in Rev. xviii. 9, 18, where it is equal to, incendium. The LXX. translate צָרַף and even בָּחַר by πυρόω; the substantive, Prov. xxvii. 21, is an inexact translation of כּוּר in the sense of "refining furnace;" Oec. correctly: πύρωσιν τὰς θλίψεις εἰπὼν, ἐνέφηνεν ὡς διὰ δοκιμασίαν ἐπάγονται αὐτοῖς αὐταί. The word, however, does not in itself contain the reference to purification, this is introduced only in what follows; Gualther: confert crucem igni, nos auro. — ἐν ὑμῖν] "*among, with you;*" not equal to "affecting some in your midst" (de Wette), but "the readers are regarded as a totality, and the πύρ. as present in the midst of them" (Wiesinger). — The definite purpose of the πύρωσις is brought out in the subsequent

[1] Calvin: quia quicquid habemus ad ministrandum virtutis solus ipse nobis suggerit.

words: *πρὸς πειρασμὸν ὑμῖν γινομένῃ. πειρασμός* here means the trial with intent to purify (elsewhere it has also the secondary signification of designed temptation to sin); cf. chap. i. 7. — *ὡς ξένου ὑμῖν συμβαίνοντος*] *ξένου* points back to *μὴ ξενίζεσθε*. Luther: "as though some *strange thing* happened unto you;" *i.e.* something strange to your destination, unsuited to it.[1]

Ver. 13. *ἀλλὰ . . χαίρετε*] Antithesis to *ξενίζεσθε*; non tantum mirari vetat Petrus, sed gaudere etiam jubet (Calvin); the measure of the joy is indicated by *καθὸ κοινωνεῖτε τοῖς τοῦ Χριστοῦ παθήμασι.* — *καθό*, not equivalent to, "that," nor to, quando (Pott), but to, quatenus, in quantum; cf. Rom. viii. 26, 2 Cor. viii. 12. — *τὰ τοῦ Χριστοῦ παθήματα* is inexactly interpreted by Vorst. as: afflictiones Christi membris destinatae, nempe quas pii propter justitiam et evangelium Christi sustinent; they rather mean the sufferings which Christ Himself has endured. Of these the believers are partakers (*κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτοῖς*), for the world shows the same enmity to them as to Christ, since it is *He* who is hated in them; cf. my commentary to Col. i. 24, and Meyer to 2 Cor. i. 5, 7 (so, too, Wiesinger, Weiss, p. 293 f., Schott). Steiger[2] is wrong in thinking of the inward suffering endured by the Christian, whilst, by the power of Christ's death, he dies unto sin. — The object to be supplied in thought to *χαίρετε* is the *πύρωσις* previously mentioned by the apostle. — *ἵνα καί*] states the design of *χαίρειν*: the Christians are to rejoice now, in order that they may *also* (*καί* lays stress on the future in relation to the present) rejoice *ἐν τῇ ἀποκαλύψει*, etc.; for this future joy is conditioned by that of the present, as the future partaking of the *δόξα* of Christ by the present sharing of His *παθήμασι*.[3] Schott unreasonably opposes as "gram-

[1] Schott here again supposes that in consequence of persecutions the leaders had become perplexed as to the moral truth of their state of salvation. This the context in no way justifies. What causes astonishment is rather the fact that the church belonging to the glorified Christ is exposed to the obloquy of the world.

[2] "The *κοινωνεῖν τ. παθ.* consists in the inward fellowship of the sufferings of Christ, in the participation in that strength which arises from the justifying confidence in their value, and which causes us even to die unto sin."

[3] Weiss (p. 291 ff.), while denying that Peter has the Pauline idea of community of life with Christ, supplements, as an intermediate thought that

matical pedantry" the application of *ἵνα* to the preceding *χαίρετε*, for he remarks, it is the sufferings themselves which hold out to us the future joy. But he omits to consider that the *κοινωνεῖν τοῖς τ. Χρ. παθ.* holds out future happiness to him only who finds his joy in it. Schott incorrectly appeals in support of his construction to John xi. 15. — It is not correct to explain, with Gerhard, etc., *ἵνα, ἐκβατικῶς.* — *ἐν τῇ ἀποκαλύψει κ.τ.λ.*] not "because of," but "at" (Luther: "at the time of") the revelation; cf. chap. i. 17. The expression: *ἀποκάλ. τῆς δόξης Χριστοῦ* (with which compare Matt. xxv. 31), is to be found only here. By it the apostle indicates that he who is now a partaker of the sufferings of Christ, and rejoices in them (Col. iii. 4), will one day be partaker of His glory, and in it rejoice everlastingly. *ἀγαλλιώμενοι* is added to *χαρῆτε* by way of giving additional force to the idea (chap. i. 8; Matt. v. 12): quia prius illud (gaudium) cum dolore et tristitia mixtum est, secundum cum exsultatione conjungit (Calvin).

Ver. 14. In order to strengthen the exhortation: *μὴ ξενίζεσθε . . . ἀλλὰ χαίρετε*, Peter adds the assurance: *εἰ ὀνειδίζεσθε κ.τ.λ.*; cf. chap. iii. 14 and Matt. v. 11. — Pott, without any reason, explains *εἰ* by *καίπερ.* — *ἐν ὀνόματι Χριστοῦ*] The explanation: propter confessionem Christi (de Wette), is inaccurate, for *ὄνομα* is not: confessio; the meaning is the same as that in Mark ix. 41: *ἐν ὀνόματι, ὅτι Χριστοῦ ἐστέ*, thus: "*because ye bear the name of Christ, and therefore belong to Him.*" Schott: "for the sake of your Christian name and Christian profession;" Steiger: "as servants of Christ." — *μακάριοι*] *sc. ἐστε.* — *ὅτι τὸ τῆς δόξης* [*καὶ δυνάμεως*] *καὶ τὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ πνεῦμα*] *δόξα*: glory in its highest sense, heavenly, divine glory.[1] According to Greek usage, *τὸ τῆς δόξης* may be a circumlocution for *ἡ δόξα*; see Matth. *ausf. Gr. Gram.* 2d ed. § 284; but this form of expression does not occur elsewhere in the N. T. (Winer, p. 104 [E. T. 135]); nor is

participation in the sufferings of Christ is the necessary mark of the true disciples. But this is to give a much too superficial conception of the relation; and could Peter have thought it possible to be a disciple without community of life?

[1] Bengel erroneously understands δόξα pro concreto, and that, ita ut sit appellatio Christi, adding: innuitur, Spiritum Christi eundem esse Spiritum Dei Patris.

it easy to understand why the apostle should not simply have written ἡ δόξα. Accordingly, it is preferable to take τό with the subsequent πνεῦμα, and to assume an additional πνεῦμα (as is done by the greater number of commentators, de Wette, also Brückner, Wiesinger, Schott); the Spirit of Glory is, then, the same as that which is also the Spirit of God (καὶ τὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ πν. subjoined epexegetically). But in consideration of ὀνειδίζεσθε, He is styled the Spirit of δόξα, *i.e.* to whom δόξα belongs (Calvin: qui gloriam secum perpetuo conjunctam habet; cf. Eph. i. 17), and who therefore also bestows it. τὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ is added in order to show that this Spirit of δόξα is none other than the Spirit of God Himself. It must be allowed that, on this interpretation, there is an inexactness of expression, καί being evidently out of place; cf. Plato, *Rep.* viii. 565: περὶ τὸ ἐν Ἀρκαδίᾳ τὸ τοῦ Διὸς ἱερόν; cf. Winer, p. 125 [E. T. 165]. — Hofmann proposes, therefore, to supply to τό not πνεῦμα, but ὄνομα, from what precedes. But if Peter had had this thought in his mind, he would certainly have given definite expression to it; and it is self-evident, too, that on him who is reproached ἐν ὀνόματι Χριστοῦ, as a bearer of it, that name rests. — ἐφ' ὑμᾶς ἀναπαύεται] after Isa. xi. 2, where the same expression is used of the πνεῦμα τ. Θεοῦ (in like manner ἐπαναπαύεσθαι, Num. xi. 25; 2 Kings ii. 15, LXX.; of εἰρήνη, Luke x. 6). The accus. ἐφ' ὑμᾶς is to be explained as with ἔμεινεν, John i. 32; Wahl: demissus in vos requiescit in vobis; it points to the living operation of the Spirit on those upon whom He rests. The thought contained in these words gives the reason (ὅτι) of what has been said: not, however, the logical reason (Aretius: crux, quam bonus fert pro Christo, *indicat*, quod Spir. Dei in illo quiescat; similarly, too, Hofmann: "they should consider themselves happy, that they are reproached for bearing the name of Christ; every such reproach *reminds them* of what, by bearing it, they are"); but the actual reason, that is, inasmuch as this resting of the Spirit of δόξα, on those who are reproached ἐν ὀνόμ. Χριστοῦ, is a sealing of their eternal δόξα. It is inappropriate to insert, with Calvin, a nihilominus, so that the sense would be: in spite of that reproach, the Spirit of God still dwells in you; the more so that the reproach of

unbelievers was called forth by the very fact, that the life of the Christians was determined by the Spirit which rested upon them. — In the additional clause found in the *Rec.*, and connected with what goes before: *κατὰ μὲν αὐτοὺς βλασφημεῖται, κατὰ δὲ ὑμᾶς δοξάζεται,* the subject can hardly be *πνεῦμα Θεοῦ* taken from the explanatory clause immediately preceding, but is more probably *ὄνομα Χριστοῦ* from the previous clause, and on which the principal stress is laid. Schott wrongly thinks that this addition interrupts the connection of thought; but Hofmann is equally in error in holding the opposite opinion, that it is of necessity demanded by the *γάρ*, ver. 15; for *γάρ* may be equally well applied to the idea that the Spirit of God rests on those who are reproached *ἐν ὀνόματι Χριστοῦ*, as to this, that the name of Christ is glorified *καθ' ὑμᾶς*. Since the rendering of *κατά* by "with" (as formerly in this comment.), or by "on the part of" (Hofmann), cannot be supported,[1] the meaning "with regard to" (de Wette) must be maintained. The interpretation will then be: "*by their . . . your conduct,*" or "*according to their . . . your opinion.*"

Ver. 15. With reference to the assumption contained in what precedes—whether expressed in the clause *εἰ ὀνειδίζεσθε . . . ἀναπαύεται*, or in the doubtful adjunct *κατὰ δὲ ὑμᾶς δοξάζεται*—the apostle by way of explanation adds the following warning: *μὴ γάρ τις ὑμῶν πασχέτω ὡς φονεὺς κ.τ.λ.*] The particle *γάρ* does not here assign a reason, it gives an explanation: "*that is to say,*"[2] "that is, let none of you suffer as a murderer;" *ὡς φονεύς*, *i.e.* because he is a murderer. The two special conceptions, *φονεύς* and *κλέπτης*, are followed by the more general *κακοποιός*, in order that every other kind of crime may be therein included. These three conceptions

[1] Although Hofmann appeals for this signification to chap. iv. 6, still, in interpreting that passage, he himself takes *κατά* in a sense other than it is supposed to have here. — Pott uses the circumlocution *κατὰ τὴν γνώμην αὐτῶν* for *κατὰ αὐτούς*; whilst he explains *κατὰ δὲ ὑμᾶς* by quod autem ad vos attinet, *i.e.* vestra autem agendi ratione, although *κατά* must have the same meaning in both clauses.

[2] Calvin: Particula causalis hic supervacua non est, quum velit Ap. causam reddere, cur tantum ad societatem passionum Christi hortatus sit fideles et simul per occasionem eos monere, ut juste et innoxie vivant, ne justas sibi poenas arcessant propria culpa. — Erasmus rightly remarks: non enim cruciatus martyrem facit, sed causa.

belong very closely to each other, for which reason ὡς is not repeated. On the other hand, the fourth conception, ἀλλοτριοεπίσκοπος, is, by the prefixed ὡς, distinguished from the others as entirely independent. Etymologically, this word denotes one who assumes to himself an oversight of other people's affairs with which he has nothing to do. The consciousness of a higher dignity could easily betray the Christian into such a presumption, which must make him all the more odious to strangers. Oecumenius takes the word as equivalent to ὁ τὰ ἀλλότρια περιεργαζόμενος; Calvin, Beza, etc., to, alieni cupidus, appetens; Pott, to, "a disturber of the public peace." But all these interpretations are not in harmony with the etymology of the word.

Ver. 16. Antithesis to the foregoing. — εἰ δὲ ὡς Χριστιανὸς (*sc.* τὶς πάσχει) μὴ αἰσχυνέσθω] The name Χριστιανός, besides here, is to be found only in Acts xi. 26, where its origin is mentioned (cf. Meyer *in loc.*), and Acts xxvi. 28. — ὡς Χρ., *i.e.* because of his being a Christian, synonymous with ἐν ὀνόματι Χριστοῦ, ver. 14. Calvin: non tam nomen quam causam respicit. — μὴ αἰσχυνέσθω: "*let him not consider it a disgrace;*" cf. Rom. i. 16; 2 Tim. i. 8, 12. — δοξαζέτω δὲ τὸν Θεόν] cf. Acts v. 41. Bengel: Poterat Petr., antitheti vi, dicere: honori sibi ducat, sed honorem Deo resignandum esse docet. — ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι τούτῳ] goes back to πάσχειν ὡς Χριστιανός; de Wette regards it as synonymous with the reading: ἐν τῷ μέρει τούτῳ, 2 Cor. iii. 10, ix. 3: "in this matter," "in this respect;"[1] ὄνομα can, however, be retained in its strict sense (Wiesinger), in which case it will mean the name Χριστιανός; ἐν will then designate this name as the reason of the δοξάζειν (see Winer, p. 362 [E. T. 484]). Hofmann, who gives the preference to the reading ἐν τῷ μέρει τούτῳ, "in this respect," refers the word to what follows, thus attributing to δοξαζέτω an application different from that of μὴ αἰσχυνέσθω. When, then, he states that the cause for praise arises from this circumstance, that the Christian's sufferings are *appointed by God*, he is introducing a thought in no way alluded to, and still less expressed, by the apostle.

[1] Schott interprets μέρος artificially as, "that *piece* of life apportioned to Christians, which consists in suffering."

Ver. 17. The apostle's exhortation: *μὴ αἰσχυνέσθω, δοξαζέτω δέ*, is based on a reference to the judgment which threatens the unbelieving. The connection of thought is the same here as in vv. 4 and 5. — Calvin differently: Nam haec necessitas totam Dei ecclesiam manet, ut—Dei manu castigetur: tanto igitur aequiori animo ferendae sunt pro Christo persequutiones. But in this, as in the following verse, the chief stress is laid not so much on the first as on the second half. It is purely arbitrary for Pott to assert that *ὅτι* is superfluous. — *ὅτι ὁ καιρὸς τοῦ ἄρξασθαι τὸ κρίμα*] Luther's translation: "it is time," is inexact. The article before *καιρός* must not be overlooked; thus: "*for it is the time of the beginning of the judgment*, that is, *in which the judgment is beginning*;" *ἐστί* is to be supplied; the genitive is directly dependent on *ὁ καιρός* (cf. Luke i. 57), and not "on *καιρός* taken out of the subject, *ὁ καιρός*" (Hofmann). By *κρίμα* is to be understood the definite judgment (*τό*), that is, the final judgment, which Peter, however, here thinks of, not in its last decisive act, but in its gradual development. It begins with the Christians (Matt. xxiv. 9 ff.) in the refining fire of affliction, ver. 12, and is completed in the sentence of condemnation pronounced on the unbelieving world at the advent of Christ. In opposition to the apostle's manner of expressing himself, Hofmann maintains that reference is here made *only* to the judgment of the unbelieving world, the beginning of which Peter recognised in the fact that God permitted it to persecute the Christians, to do unto them that which makes itself ripe for judgment (!). — *ἀπὸ τοῦ οἴκου τοῦ Θεοῦ*] *ἀπό* is here pregnant: the judgment takes place first in the *οἶκ. τοῦ Θεοῦ*: thence it proceeds further on; with the construction *ἄρχεσθαι ἀπό*, cf. Acts i. 22, viii. 35, x. 37.[1] — *οἶκος τοῦ Θεοῦ* is the church of believers; 1 Tim. iii. 15 (chap. ii. 5, *οἶκος πνευματικός*). — *εἰ δὲ πρῶτον ἀφ' ἡμῶν*] By these words the apostle passes over to the chief thought of the verse. Either *τὸ κρίμα ἄρχεται* may be supplied, and *πρῶτον* regarded as a pleonasm intensifying

[1] Schott thinks that Peter really intended to write: "for the time is come, that the judgment of the world must begin, but its beginning *must* be at the house of God." But why then did Peter not write as he intended? Schott introduces an idea into the second clause, which Peter has in no way expressed.

the idea ἄρχεται; or it may be assumed, with de Wette, that the expression arose from a mingling of the two thoughts, εἰ δὲ ἀφ' ἡμῶν τὸ κρίμα ἄρχεται and εἰ δὲ πρῶτον ἡμεῖς κρινόμεθα. The first is more probable; πρῶτον presented itself to the apostle, because he wished to lay stress on the fact that the Christians had to suffer only the beginning of the judgment, not its close.[1] — ἀφ' ἡμῶν corresponds with the preceding οἶκ. τ. Θεοῦ. The sense is: If God does not exempt us, the members of His house (His family), from judgment, but permits it to take its beginning at us, how should the unbelievers be exempted? (cf. Luke xxiii. 31). — τί τὸ τέλος τῶν κ.τ.λ.] *sc.* ἔσται. — τὸ τέλος, not: "the reward," but: *the final term, the end,* to which the ἀπειθοῦντες τῷ εὐαγγ. (*i.e.* those who in hostility oppose the gospel of God) are going. Schott explains τὸ τέλος (antithetically to πρῶτον) as the final judgment itself, and the genitive τῶν ἀπειθούντων as a concise, nearer definition ("the part of the judgment which falls to the lot of the unbelievers"). But as little as πρῶτον means initiatory judgment, so little does τὸ τέλος final judgment. — On the interrogative form of the clause, Gerhard rightly remarks: exaggeratio est in interrogatione; cf. Luke xxiii. 31. The echo[2] in this verse of passages of the Old Testament, like Jer. xxv. 29, xlix. 12, Ezek. ix. 6, can the less fail to be recognised, that the words which follow are borrowed from the Old Testament.

Ver. 18. Strengthening of the foregoing thought by quotation of the O. T. passage, Prov. xi. 31, after the LXX., whose translation, however, is inexact (cf. Delitzsch *in loc.*). — ὁ δίκαιος "is he who stands in a right relation to God" (Schott), that is, the believer who belongs to the οἶκ. τ. Θεοῦ; ὁ ἀσεβὴς καὶ ἁμαρτωλός, the unbeliever (ὁ ἀπειθῶν τῷ τ. Θ. εὐαγγ.). μόλις σώζεται is not, with Gerhard, to be referred to the fact, that for the pious non nisi per multas tribulationes ingressus in regnum coeleste pateat, but

[1] Schott's interpretation, that πρῶτον should be taken as a substantive (equal to "a first"), and that a general verb, expressive of what takes place, should be supplied out of ἄρξασθαι (ἀπό being at the same time zeugmatically repeated), contradicts itself by its artificialness.

[2] Calvin: Hanc sententiam ex trita et perpetua Scripturae doctrina sumpsit Petrus; idque mihi probabilius est. uam quod alii putant, certum aliquem locum notari.

that it is difficult (*μόλις, scarcely, with great difficulty*) to stand in the judgment (ver. 17), and to attain *σωτηρία.* — *ποῦ φανεῖται*] "*where will he appear?*" that is, he will not stand, but will be annihilated. The same thought as in Ps. i. 5.

Ver. 19. The exhortation contained in this verse is closely connected with vv. 17 and 18, in such a way, however, "that it brings to a close the whole section which treats of suffering for the sake of Christ" (Hofmann); Hornejus: clausula est qua totam exhortationem obsignat. — *ὥστε*] as in Rom. vii. 4, and often elsewhere, with a finite verb following (Winer, p. 282 f. [E. T. 377]) "*therefore.*" — *καί* does not belong to *οἱ πάσχοντες*, equivalent to "those also who suffer," with reference to those who do not suffer (Wiesinger, Hofmann), for there is no allusion in the context to any distinction between those who suffer because of their Christian profession and those who have not so to suffer,[1] but it is united with *ὥστε*, and applies to the verb, "*and just for this reason*" (cf. Winer, p. 408 [E. T. 544 ff.]). Incorrectly, Bengel: *καί* concessive cum participio i. q. *εἰ καὶ πάσχοιτε.* — *οἱ πάσχοντες*] namely, the believers. — *κατὰ τὸ θέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ*] that is, *πρὸς πειρασμόν*, ver. 12. Wiesinger: "looking back to ver. 17, inasmuch as they as Christians are overtaken by the judgment God pronounces on His house." Besser incorrectly takes it as referring to their subjective behaviour under suffering. — *ὡς πιστῷ κτιστῇ παρατιθέσθωσαν κ.τ.λ.*] Gerhard: *ὡς* exprimit causam, propter quam, hi qui patiuntur animas suas apud Deum deponere debeant, nimirum quia est earum creator et fidelis custos. If *ὡς* be the correct reading, then from the foregoing *τοῦ Θεοῦ* an *αὐτῷ* must be supplied, to which *ὡς πιστῷ κτιστῇ* applies. — *κτιστής* is not possessor (Calvin), but the creator; *ὁ κτίσας*, Rom. i. 25. It is used here in its strict sense, and not with reference to the new creation (Steiger, Schott connect both together); cf. Acts iv. 24 ff.: "this prayer is an actual example of what is here demanded" (Weiss, p. 190). In the N. T. *κτίστης* is *ἅπ. λεγ.*, in the O. T. it occurs frequently; Judith ix. 12; 2 Macc. i. 24. *πιστός*: Oecumenius, equivalent to: *ἀσφαλὴς καὶ ἀψευδὴς κατὰ τὰς ἐπαγγελίας*

[1] Schott explains *καί* by the contrast between "the individual sufferers" and "the church;" but nothing in the context alludes to this.

αὐτοῦ, καὶ οὐκ ἐάσει ἡμᾶς πειρασθῆναι ὑπὲρ ὃ δυνάμεθα; cf. 1 Cor. x. 13. — With *παρατίθεσθαι*, cf. Acts xiv. 23, xx. 32 : "*to commit to the protection of any one.*" — *ἐν ἀγαθοποιΐᾳ*] *ἀγαθοποιΐα, ἅπ. λεγ.*; the adjec., chap. ii. 14. This addition shows that the confident surrender to God is to be joined, not with careless indolence, but with the active practice of good. Oecumenius erroneously paraphrases the word by *ταπεινοφροσύνη*.

CHAPTER V.

VER. 1. A B, several min. read οὖν after πρεσβυτέρους (Lachm.); K L P, etc., Copt. Thph. etc., on the other hand, τούς (*Rec.* Tisch. 7); ℵ has both, *i.e.* οὖν τούς. This reading, accepted by Tisch. 8, is perhaps the original one; οὖν may have been omitted, because the subsequent exhortation does not appear to be a conclusion from what goes before. — Ver. 2. ἐπισκοποῦντες] is wanting only in B ℵ, 27, 29, Hier. etc.; it is adopted by Lachm. and Tisch. 7, and omitted by Tisch. 8. — After ἑκουσίως, A P ℵ, several min. vss. etc., Lachm. and Tisch. 8 have: κατὰ Θεόν. The words are wanting in the *Rec.* after B K L, etc., Oec. etc.; Tisch. 7 had omitted them; they are probably a later addition, in order to complete the idea. — μηδὲ αἰσχροκερδῶς] *Rec.* after B K P ℵ, etc., Vulg. Copt. Thph. Beda (Lachm. Tisch. 8); Tisch. 7 reads, instead of μηδέ, μή, after A L, 68, *al.*, Syr. etc., Oec.; this, however, appears to be a mere alteration on account of the preceding μή and the subsequent μηδέ. — Ver. 3. Following B, Buttmann has omitted the entire third verse; but as all authorities retain it, it cannot be regarded as spurious. — Ver. 5. ὑποτασσόμενοι] *Rec.* according to K L P, etc. Thph. Oec.; is omitted in A B ℵ, 13, etc., several vss. etc. Lachm. and Tisch. are probably right in omitting it, as it appears to be a correction introduced in order to make the sense plainer, perhaps after Eph. v. 21. Wiesinger and Schott are against the *Rec.*, Reiche is in favour of it. — Instead of ὁ Θεός, Buttm. has, following B, adopted Θεός (without article). — Ver. 6. ἐν καιρῷ] In A and the most of the vss. ἐπισκοπῆς follows here; adopted by Lachm., erroneously, however, as it is a later addition after chap. ii. 12. — Ver. 8. Following the most numerous and best authorities, Griesb. already has justly erased the ὅτι of the *Rec.* before ὁ ἀντίδικος. — τίνα καταπίῃ] *Rec.* after A, *al.*, Vulg. Syr. Cyr. etc. (Tisch. 7); in its place K L P ℵ, *al.*, mult. Cop. etc. read τινὰ καταπιεῖν (Lachm.: τινά; Tisch. 8: τίνα); B has the inf. only, without τινα. The commentators (as also Reiche) prefer the *Rec.*; it appears, too, to be the more natural reading; but that very fact makes it suspicious. The reading of B is evidently a

correction, as τινα seems to be inappropriate. — Ver. 9. B ℵ have the art. τῷ before κόσμῳ (Tisch. 8); in the *Rec.* it is omitted, after A K L P, etc. (Tisch. 7). — Ver. 10. ἡμᾶς] *Rec.* according to K, several min. Vulg. Syr. etc.; in place of it the most important authorities, A B L P ℵ, very many min. and several vss. support ὑμᾶς, which is accepted by Lachm. and Tisch., and rightly declared to be genuine by de Wette, Wiesinger, Schott, Reiche. The codd. A K L P have the name Ἰησοῦ after Χριστῷ (*Rec.* Lachm. Tisch. 7); in B ℵ there is only Χριστῷ (Tisch. 8). The *Rec.* runs: καταρτίσαι ὑμᾶς, στηρίξαι, σθενώσαι, θεμελιώσαι. Although these optatives convey an appropriate idea, still there is too little evidence for their genuineness; in the three last verbs the optative occurs only in min. several vss. Thph. and Oec.; in the first verb it is found also in K L P. As, however, the future καταρτίσει, etc., occurs in almost all authorities, it is to be preferred. Erasmus reads καταρτίσαι and then στερίξει. In similar passages of the N. T. the optat. is *mostly* used (thus undisputedly in Rom. xv. 13; Heb. xiii. 21; 1 Thess. v. 23, etc.), and this explains how, in employing the future, a change could have been made to the optative; cf. 2 Cor. ix. 10; Phil. iv. 19. There is less force in the reason given for the use of the indicative, viz. that it is better suited to the subsequent doxology (Bengel), in opposition to which de Wette rightly refers to Heb. xiii. 21. — The pronoun ὑμᾶς is wanting in the A B ℵ, etc., and is omitted by Lachm. and Tisch.; its genuineness is at least doubtful; not less so is that of θεμελιώσει, which, however, Tisch. has retained, following K L P ℵ, etc., whilst it is omitted in the A B, Vulg. etc. (Lachm.). — Ver. 11. ἡ δόξα καί] does not occur in A B, 23, Aeth. Vulg.; omitted by Lachm. and Tisch.; perhaps a later addition, after chap. iv. 11. — τῶν αἰώνων is erased by Tisch. 7, after B, 36, 99, Copt. Arm.; but retained by Lachm. and Tisch. 8, who follow A K L P ℵ, the majority of min. several vss. etc. — Ver. 12. Lachm. omits the article τοῦ before πιστοῦ, appealing to B. Tisch., however, remarks on this: errabat circa B. The omission, for which certainly there is too little warrant, may be explained by the transcriber having construed ὑμῖν with πιστοῦ. According to Tisch., however, it is not certain whether B has the article or not; according to Buttm., it does not occur in B. — Instead of ἑστήκατε (*Rec.*), Lachm. and Tisch. 8, after A B ℵ, many min. etc., read στῆτε. This reading would seem to be favoured by the fact that it is the more difficult one, and that the *Rec.* may have arisen out of Rom. v. 2; but the idea itself decides in favour of ἑστήκατε, which is retained by Tisch. 7, following K L P, etc., Theoph. Oec. — The reading ἐν ᾗ (instead of

εἰς ἦν) in A is evidently a correction for the sake of simplicity. — Ver. 14. Instead of Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ (in *Rec.* K L P ℵ, *al.*, pler. Vulg. Copt. etc., Thph. Oec.) Lachm. and Tisch. have adopted Χριστῷ only (A B, etc., Syr. Aeth. etc.). The final ἀμήν (*Rec.* in G K ℵ, etc.) is likewise wanting in A B, etc., and is therefore omitted by Lachm. and Tisch. — The subsequent addition of Ἰησοῦ and ἀμήν is undoubtedly more easy of explanation than the subsequent omission of it.

Ver. 1. New exhortations in the first place to the πρεσβύτεροι and the νεότεροι as far as ver. 5; then to all, without distinction, vv. 5–9. — πρεσβυτέρους οὖν τοὺς ἐν ὑμῖν παρακαλῶ] πρεσβύτεροι are the presidents of the congregations. The name is employed here probably not without reference to age ("the elders") (see ver. 5), though this is disputed by Hofmann, who, however, fails to give any reason for so doing. The article is awanting "because πρεσβ. is considered as definite of itself" (Wiesinger), and not "because Peter had not a more accurate knowledge of the constitution of the churches" (Schott). If the reading οὖν be adopted, these and the following exhortations connect themselves, as conclusions drawn from it, with the preceding conception ἀγαθοποιΐα, for the passages 1 Thess. iv. 1 and Matt. vii. 15 do not prove that οὖν expresses "only the continuance of the exhortation" (Hofmann). The reading ἐν ὑμῖν, without τούς, is opposed by the want of the article before πρεσβυτέρους. — ὁ συμπρεσβύτερος καὶ κ.τ.λ.] Peter adds these designations of himself, in order thus to give the more weight to his παρακαλεῖν. He calls himself συμπρεσβύτερος because of his office. What the elders were for the individual congregations, that were the apostles for the whole church, since they had the superintendence of the entire system of congregations.[1] By this name Peter, in humble love (Gualter: nota humilitatem Petri qui minime jus primatus in se cognovit), places himself on an equal footing with the elders proper; Bengel: hortatio mutua inter aequales et collegas imprimis valet. It is less natural to assume, with Hofmann, that in thus speaking of himself Peter

[1] Hofmann: "The apostles were the overseers of the universal church of Christ; each of them therefore in so far shared in the administration of all the single congregations, inasmuch as these were in the universal church."

"would emphasize the share he had in responsibility for the weal and woe of the congregations." — *καὶ μάρτυς τῶν τοῦ Χριστοῦ παθημάτων*] By *τὰ τοῦ Χριστοῦ παθήματα* must not be understood the sufferings which the apostle had to undergo in following Christ, but those which Christ Himself endured; cf. chap. iv. 13. Yet Peter calls himself a *μάρτυς*, not only because he was an *eye-witness* of them (cf. Acts x. 39) (Aretius: oculatus testis, qui praecipuis ejus aerumnis interfui), but also because he *proclaimed* those sufferings which he himself had seen[1] (cf. Acts i. 8, 22, xiii. 31). This he did, in the first place, by his words, but at the same time also by his sufferings (a fact which Hofmann should not have denied), in which he was a *κοινωνὸς τῶν τοῦ Χρ. παθημάτων* (chap. iv. 13) (Wiesinger, Schott). What follows seems also to refer to this.[2] — De Wette thinks that whilst by "*συμπρεσβ.*" Peter puts himself on an equality with the elders, he by the second designation places himself *above* them. But if this had been his intention, he would hardly have included both under the *one* article; the elders, too, were equally called to be *μάρτυρες τῶν Χρ. παθ.*, although Peter, as an eye-witness, occupied "a special position" (Brückner). — *ὁ καὶ τῆς μελλούσης . . . κοινωνός*] Several of the older commentators incorrectly supply "*τοῦ Χριστοῦ*" to *δόξης*; it is not merely the glory of Christ which is meant, but the *δόξα*, which, at the revelation of *that* glory, shall be revealed in all those who are His; cf. Rom. viii. 18; Col. iii. 4; 1 John iii. 2. — *κοινωνός* means simply the participation in that glory. Although it is not equivalent to *συγκοινωνός* (Phil. i. 7), still the apostle has in his soul the consciousness of being a fellow-sharer with those to whom he is speaking. — The particle *καί*, "also," unites the two ideas: *μαρτὺς τῶν . . . παθημάτων* and *κοινωνὸς τῆς . . . δόξης* together; because the apostle is the former, he will also be the latter. Yet this does not compel the adoption, with Hofmann, of the reading "*ὅ*" (equal

[1] It cannot be denied that, in accordance with its almost uniform usage in the N. T., the word *μαρτύς* possesses this secondary meaning (as opposed to Hofmann).

[2] Wiesinger: "The antithesis *ὁ καὶ τῆς μελλ. ἀποκ. δόξης κοινωνός* presupposes the *κοινωνεῖν τοῖς τ. Χρ. παθ.*"

to διʼ ὅ, "wherefore") instead of ὁ. Although μάρτυς, which is closely connected with συμπρεσβύτερος, has no article, it does not follow that κοινωνός can have none either. The N. T. usage is opposed to the interpretation of ὅ by διʼ ὅ, Gal. ii. 10; cf. Meyer *in loc.*; cf. also Winer, p. 135 [E. T. 178].

Ver. 2. ποιμάνατε τὸ ἐν ὑμῖν ποίμνιον τοῦ Θεοῦ] The work of directing the church is often in the N. and O. T. represented by the figure of pasturing (cf. Acts xx. 28; John xxi. 16; Jer. xxiii. 1–4; Ezek. xxxiv. 2 ff.), and the church by that of a flock (Luke xii. 32). τοῦ Θεοῦ is added here very significantly. By it the flock is designated as belonging, not to the elders who tend it, but to God as His peculiar property. Luther takes a too narrow view of the idea of tending,—he limits it to the preaching of the gospel. It applies rather to all and everything that is done by the elders, for the welfare of the individual as well as for that of the entire congregation. τὸ ἐν ὑμῖν must not be separated from ποίμνιον, as if it were equal to quantum in vobis est (cf. Rom. i. 15), i. e. intendite omnes nervos (Calvin); it rather forms *one* idea with ποίμνιον. The greater number of commentators understand ἐν in a local sense, either: in vestris regionibus (Pott), or: "*with* you, within your reach" (Luther, in the commentary, Hensler, de Wette, Besser, Schott,[1] etc.). Since ἐν ὑμῖν, as a more precise local definition, stands somewhat significantly, and "the churches only are the place where the elders are, and not *vice versa*" (Hofmann), ἐν ὑμῖν must, according to the analogy of κεῖσθαι ἔν τινι, be interpreted: "*that which is committed to you*" (Luther's translation, Bengel, Steiger), or: "*that which is placed under your care* (hand)." ἐν ὑμῖν then serves to give point to the exhortation. — ἐπισκοποῦντες, cf. the critical notes. It must be observed that ἐπισκοπ. is here placed in conjunction with ποιμάνατε, as in chap. ii. 25: ποιμήν and ἐπίσκοπος. This participle, with the adverbs belonging to it,

[1] Schott's opinion, that in ἐν ὑμῖν *this* antithesis to τοῦ Θεοῦ is expressed, "that the church, belonging to heaven, is *yet at present* in the bodily and visible vicinity of the elders, and surrounded by them," must be rejected as purely arbitrary.—Gerhard's interpretation: qui vobiscum est, videlicet cum quo unum corpus, una ecclesia estis, brings out an idea which is in no way indicated by the apostle.

states what should be the character of the ποιμαίνειν.[1] The verb (which, except here, occurs only in Heb. xii. 15), equivalent to: "*to give heed*," denotes the labours of the elders in caring for the congregation, but with the implied meaning of oversight. The still closer definition follows in three adjuncts, each of which consists of a negative and a positive member. The thought is aptly given by Calvin: Dum Pastores ad officium hortari vult, tria potissimum vitia notat, quae plurimum obesse solent, pigritiam scilicet, lucri captandi cupiditatem et licentiam dominandi; primo vitio opponit alacritatem aut voluntarium studium, secundo liberalem affectum, tertio moderationem ac modestiam. — ἀναγκαστῶς (an expression foreign to Greek usage, and occurring only here, which Hofmann erroneously denies) and ἑκουσίως (this adverb occurs in the N. T., besides in this passage, only in Heb. x. 26; the adjective in Philem. 14) are opposed to each other, in such a way that the former characterizes the work as undertaken from outward motives only, the latter as from inward. The same antithesis occurs in Philem. 14: κατὰ ἀνάγκην . . . κατὰ ἑκούσιον (similarly the antithesis of ἄκων and ἑκών, 1 Cor. ix. 17); with ἑκουσίως, cf. Ex. xxxvi. 2. The position, etc., must be regarded as the outwardly inciting or compelling motive. Bengel is incorrect: id valet et in suscipiendo et in gerendo munere; to the former there is in this case no allusion. — According to the *Rec.*, ἑκουσίως is yet further strengthened by κατὰ Θεόν (cf. chap. iv. 6; 2 Cor. vii. 9, 10), equal to κατὰ τὸ θέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ. — αἰσχροκερδῶς (the adverb occurs here only, the adjective 1 Tim. iii. 8; Tit. i. 7; Tit. i. 11: αἰσχροῦ κέρδους χάριν); "the apostle places the impure motive side by side with the unwillingness of ἀναγκ." (Wiesinger). — προθύμως (in the N. T. the adverb occurs here only; more frequently the adjective and substantive) as antithesis to αἰσχροκερδῶς: "*out of love to the thing itself;*" Luther: "from the bottom of the heart."[2]

[1] It is doubtless correct that the adverbs do not simply define more nearly the term ἐπισκοποῦντες, in and for itself considered; but it is wrong to make them co-ordinate with this idea (as against Hofmann); closely joined with ἐπισκοποῦντες, they, with this participle, are connected with ποιμάνατε.

[2] Hofmann: "With a joyous devotion—which excludes all secondary considerations—to the work which has to be done."

Ver. 3. *μηδ' ὡς κατακυριεύοντες τῶν κλήρων*] *i.e.* "not as those, who," etc. With *κατακυρ.* cf. for meaning and expression Matt. xx. 25–28; 2 Cor. i. 24; it is not equal to *κυριεύειν* (Steiger), but the prefixed *κατα* intensifies the idea of *κυριεύειν*: "to exercise a sway, by which violence is offered to those who are under it."[1] — *κλῆρος*, properly speaking, the lot, then that which is apportioned by lot, then generally, that which is allotted or assigned to any one, whether it be an office, a possession, or anything else. Here it is the congregation (*τὸ ποίμνιον*) that is to be understood; not as though *κλῆρος* in itself meant the congregation, but the churches are thus designated, because they are assigned to the elders as a possession, in which to exercise their official duties. The plural is put, because different elders filled offices in different congregations (Calov, Steiger, de Wette, Wiesinger, Schott, etc.). Compare the passage in Acts xvii. 4, where it is said of those converted by Paul and Silas: *προσεκληρώθησαν τῷ Παύλῳ καὶ τῷ Σίλᾳ.* It is incorrect to supply *τοῦ Θεοῦ*, as is done by Beza, etc., and to derive the expression from the O. T., where the congregation of Israel is termed the *κλῆρος* (נַחֲלָה) of God, Deut. ix. 29, LXX. But it is equally incorrect when Hofmann applies *κατακυριεύοντες*, not to the *πρεσβύτεροι*, but to others, and, taking *ὡς* as instituting a comparison, understands *κλῆροι* to signify "the estates belonging to some one himself," translating accordingly: "not as those who exercise rule over estates belonging to themselves." The apostle's idea thus would be: "the elders are not to treat the church as an object over which they exercise right of possession, and do with as they please."—How should the apostle have thought of bringing forward a comparison so far-fetched? — and how arbitrary it appears to interpret *ὡς* differently in this passage from in chap. i. 14, ii. 2, 5, 11, 12, 13, etc.; to allow the article *τῶν* to take the place of the possessive pronoun, and to attribute a meaning to *κλῆροι* which it often has in profane Greek, but never either

[1] Thus Hofmann interprets, correctly. He is mistaken, however, in maintaining that *κατα* here does not imply an hostile antithesis, since a violent rule is one by which he who is ruled over is injured in his rights.

in the O. or in the N. T.![1] — *ἀλλὰ τύποι γινόμενοι τοῦ ποιμνίου*] The antithesis here is a different one from that in the passage quoted from Matt. The elders, as the leaders of the church, necessarily possess a kind of *κυριότης* over it; but they are not to exercise this in a manner opposed to the character of Christian life in the church (which would be a *κατακυριεύειν*), but by being examples to the congregations, shining before them in every Christian virtue (1 Tim. iv. 12; Tit. ii. 7); cf. 2 Thess. iii. 9; Phil. iii. 17.

Ver. 4. Assurance of the future reward for the faithful fulfilment of the exhortation just given. — *καί*] simply connects the result with the exhortation (cf. Winer, p. 406 [E. T. 542]), and is not to be taken *αἰτιολογικῶς* for *ἵνα*. — *φανερωθέντος τοῦ ἀρχιποιμένος*] With *φανερ.* cf. Col. iii. 4; 1 John ii. 28; Christ is here termed *ἀρχιποιμήν* (*ἅπ. λεγ.*, chap. ii. 25: *ὁ ποιμήν*; Heb. xiii. 20: *ὁ ποιμὴν ὁ μεγάς*) as He "to whom the elders, with the flock they tend, are subject" (Hofmann). — *κομιεῖσθε* (cf. chap. i. 9) *τὸν ἀμαράντινον τῆς δόξης στέφανον*] The greater number of commentators consider *ἀμαράντινος* as equal to *ἀμάραντος* in chap. i. 4; but the direct derivation of the word from *μαραίνεσθαι* is hardly to be justified. It comes rather from the substantive *ἀμάραντος*, and therefore means, as Beza explains: ex amaranto videlicet, cujus floris (inquit Plinius) summa natura in nomine est, sic appellato quoniam non marcescit. Accordingly the figure present to the mind of the apostle was an amaranthine wreath; thus also Schott.[2] It is at least uncertain whether *στέφανος* here (as frequently in the writings of Paul) is thought of as a *wreath of victory* (thus the greater number of commentators), since among the Jews, also, wreaths of flowers and leaves were in use as tokens of honour and rejoicing (cf. Winer's *bibl. Realwörterbuch, s.v.* Kränze). — *τῆς δόξης* is the genitive of apposition; cf. 2 Tim. iv. 8; Jas.

[1] The opinion of Oecumenius: *κλῆρον τὸ ἱερὸν σύστημα καλεῖ, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν ἡμεῖς* (*i.e.* the priesthood), which many Catholic commentators have followed, requires no refutation; and as little does that of Dodwell, who understands *κλῆροι* to mean church property.

[2] Perhaps, however, Hofmann may be right when he supposes that *ἀμαράντινος* stands in the same relation to *ἀμάραντος* as *ἀληθινός* to *ἀληθής* and *ὑγιεινός* to *ὑγιής*, and that accordingly the word should be written *ἀμαραντινός*.

i. 12; Rev. ii. 10: the δόξα is the unfading crown which they shall obtain.

Ver. 5. ὁμοίως] cf. chap. iii. 1, 7; here also ὁμοίως is not a mere particle of transition (Pott). The exhortation to humility, expressed in this verse, corresponds to those addressed to the elders, wherein they are admonished to submit themselves to the duties of their office with humility, and without seeking their own advantage. — νεώτεροι ὑποτάγητε πρεσβυτέροις] Who are these νεώτεροι? Certainly not the whole of the members of the congregation (in contrast to the elders), as Beda, Estius, Pott, Wiesinger, etc., assume, but either the younger members generally, or such of them as were employed in many ministrations, suitable neither for the elders nor the deacons. The first assumption (Luther, Calvin, Aretius, Gerhard, etc.) is opposed by the circumstance that πρεσβυτέροις here seems to have the same official signification as above in ver. 1 ff. If this be so, then it is plainly inconsistent to take the expression νεώτεροι as specifying only a particular time of life. The second (Weiss, p. 344 ff., Schott, Brückner), founded chiefly on Acts v. 6, 10, is contradicted by the fact, that there is no historical testimony for the existence of an office, such as it takes for granted. If νεώτεροι indicate only a particular time of life, then the like may be said of the accompanying πρεσβυτέροις. The difficulty which arises from the same name being employed first as an official title, and then to denote a particular age, is solved, in a measure at least, by supposing that since the word contained both references, the apostle might, as he proceeded in his exhortation, lose sight of the one in the other.[1] — The special exhortation is followed by the general: πάντες δὲ ἀλλήλοις] If ὑποτασσόμενοι is to be erased after ἀλλήλοις, the words may then be taken either with what precedes (Lach. *gr. Ausg.*, Buttmann, Hofmann) or with what follows. In the first case there is something fragmentary in the structure of the clause, while the second, adopted by almost all commentators (formerly

[1] The view that πρεσβυτέρους indicates an office, but νεώτεροι a time of life (de Wette), is opposed by the circumstance that "it remains incomprehensible why the exhortation, which is surely meant to apply to the whole church, should be addressed to the younger members only" (Hofmann).

also in this commentary), is opposed by the dative ἀλλήλοις, which is too easily passed over with the remark that it is the dative of reference, equivalent to: "for each other," or "with reference to each other." All the passages which Winer (p. 202 [E. T. 270]) brings forward to prove that the dative is used of everything with reference to which anything takes place, are of a different nature. πάντες denotes the whole of the members of the church without distinction. — τὴν ταπεινοφροσύνην ἐγκομβώσασθε] In interpreting the word ἐγκομβώσασθε, commentators have not unfrequently, but erroneously, started from the meaning of the substantive ἐγκόμβωμα,[1] understanding (certainly without justification) it to signify "a beautiful dress," and rendering: "*adorn* yourselves with humility;" thus Calvin, etc.; or else, whilst correctly explaining the word as the apron worn by slaves, they find in the verb itself the reference to humility in behaviour; thus Grotius, Hornejus, Steiger, de Wette, etc.[2] — Rather, however, must that sense of the verb be retained which is to be had by deriving it from κόμβος, "a band:" "to tie on, or fasten anything by means of a κόμβος, *i.e.* a band." Since, now, it is used for the most part of the fastening of a garment, it lies to hand to take the expression here as having the same sense with ἐνδύεσθαι (cf. Col. iii. 12), yet so that the idea of making fast is more strongly brought out in the former than in the latter: "to clothe oneself firmly, wrap oneself round with ταπεινοφρ;" Bengel: induite vos et involvite, ut amictus humilitatis nulla vi vobis detrahi possit (thus also Wiesinger, Schott). Other interpreters hold by the one or the other meaning only, *i.e.* either by that of clothing (Oecumenius: ἐνειλήσασθε καὶ περιβάλλεσθε) or that of making fast (Luther:

[1] Steph. *s.v.* ἐγκομβόω: illigo, involvo; Hesych. enim ἐγκομβωθείς exponit δεθείς et ἐγκεκόμβωται affert pro ἐνείληται. — Ἐγκόμβωμα vestimenti genus est; scribit enim Poll. 4, 119, τῇ δὲ τῶν δούλων ἐξωμίδι προσκεῖσθαι καὶ ἱματιδίον τι λευκόν, quod ἐγκόμβωμα s. ἐπίβλημα nominari.

[2] Hofmann holds by this reference (although he does not derive the meaning of the verb from that of the substantive). He says that the verb, of itself, has that sense, since he who prepared himself for the duties of a servant girded himself with a garment fastened by means of a band. This conclusion would be established if ἐγκομβοῦν were used only of the putting on of a slave's apron, which, however, is not the case.

"hold fast by humility;" Erasmus: humilitatem vobis fixam habete). Similar exhortations to humility towards one another: Eph. iv. 2; Phil. ii. 3; Rom. xii. 16. The exhortation is strengthened by the quotation of the Old Testament passage, Prov. iii. 34, after the LXX., where, however, *κύριος* stands instead of *ὁ Θεός*. The same quotation is to be found in Jas. iv. 6, where, as here, there is first of all the injunction to submit to God, and then that to resist the devil; cf. also Luke i. 51.

Ver. 6. Conclusion drawn from the Old Testament passage, *ταπεινώθητε οὖν ὑπὸ κ.τ.λ.*] see Jas. iv. 6; not: "become humble," as Wiesinger interprets, on account of the passive (for if the meaning must be passive, in accordance with the form, it ought to be: "be made humble"), but in a middle sense: "*humble yourselves.*" Ver. 7 shows that this self-humbling here refers to the lowly and submissive bearing of afflictions (otherwise in Luke xiv. 11). — *τὴν κραταιὰν χεῖρα*] Old Testament expression denoting the power of God which rules and judges all; cf. Deut. iii. 24, LXX.; it does not refer here to the laying on of afflictions only (de Wette), but to the being exalted out of them (so, too, Brückner); cf. Luke i. 51: *ἐποίησε κράτος ἐν βραχίονι αὐτοῦ· διεσκόρπισεν ὑπερηφάνους . . . καὶ ὕψωσε ταπεινούς.* The purpose of this subordination: *ἵνα ὑμᾶς ὕψωσῃ*, is the glory which follows upon the sufferings; *ἵνα* is not put *ἐκβατικῶς* (Pott), but *τελικῶς*.—*ἐν καιρῷ*] Matt. xxiv. 45: "tempore statuto;" Erasmus: ut vos extollat, cum erit opportunum, cum judicabit id vobis expedire vel in hoc saeculo, vel in die judicii; this last is here the principal point of view.

Ver. 7 is closely connected with ver. 6; hence the participle. The idea and expression are taken from Ps. lv. 22, LXX. (*ἐπίῤῥιψον ἐπὶ κύριον τὴν μέριμνάν σου καὶ αὐτός σε διαθρέψει*), although somewhat altered; *πᾶσαν τὴν μέριμναν ὑμῶν*:[1] "*your whole care;*" the singular unites all individual cares together into one uniform whole. Hofmann, without reason, assumes that in this passage *μέριμνα* does not mean care itself, but the object which causes care. The context shows that the care

[1] Gerhard: "*μέριμνα* significat curam sollicitam et dubiam, quae mentem in partes divisas velut dividit, a *μερίζειν τὸν νοῦν*."

specially meant here is that which is occasioned by the sufferings; cf. Matt. vi. 25; Phil. iv. 6. — ὅτι αὐτῷ κ.τ.λ.] "*for He careth for you;*" the same construction of the verb with περί occurs frequently in the N. T., *e.g.* John x. 13; ἐπ' αὐτὸν, ὅτι αὐτῷ, "are intentionally brought together" (Wiesinger).

Ver. 8. νήψατε (chap. iv. 7), γρηγορήσατε, cf. 1 Thess. v. 6; placed in juxtaposition by asyndeton "in nervous conciseness, in virtue of which ὅτι, too, is omitted before ὁ ἀντίδικος" (Wiesinger). Temperance and watchfulness are specially necessary, in order to remain faithful amid all the temptations of suffering. The reason is given in what follows. — ὁ ἀντίδικος ὑμῶν διάβολος] Hensler's explanation: "slandering opponents," requires no refutation. — διάβολος is a substantive, in explanatory apposition to ὁ ἀντίδ. ὑμῶν, which latter is used, in this passage only, to designate the devil (corresponding to the Hebrew שָׂטָן, which, however, the LXX. always translate by διάβολος). The word denotes strictly *an opponent in a court of justice;* but it occurs also in a general sense as "*adversary.*" Schott would retain the original application, after Zech. iii. 1 ff., Rev. xii. 10, in that "the devil will, as it were, compel God to declare in condemnatory judgment that the Christians have forfeited salvation;" but there is no allusion to the divine judgment here, the καταπίνειν is rather indicated as the aim of the devil. — ὡς λέων ὠρυόμενος][1] ὠρύεσθαι peculiariter dicitur ἐπὶ λιμῷ κλαιόντων λύκων, ἢ λεόντων, ἢ κυνῶν (Hesych.), cf. Ps. civ. 21. — περιπατεῖ (Job i. 7, ii. 2) ζητῶν τίνα καταπίῃ] περιπατεῖν and ζητῶν belong strictly to each other, so that the comparison with the lion applies to both (Steiger). The efforts of the devil are directed against Christians, who, as such, do not belong to him; as long as they remain faithful to their Christian calling, he can do them no harm (1 John v. 18), therefore he is on the look-out *whom* (according to the reading: τίνα καταπίῃ) he may devour, or if he may devour *any one* (according to the reading: τινὰ καταπιεῖν), by alluring to unfaithfulness.[2] —

[1] Augustin (Sermo 46 de divers. c. ii.): Christus leo propter fortitudinem, diabolus propter feritatem; ille leo ad vincendum, iste leo ad nocendum.

[2] Hofmann irrelevantly remarks that ζητεῖν, followed by an interrogative, means: to consider a thing; the word above is evidently stronger than that.

καταπίνειν, "*devour*," denotes complete destruction. Chrysostom (Homil. 22, ad popul. Antioch.): circuit quaerens, non quem mordeat vel frangat, sed quem devoret.

Ver. 9. *ᾧ ἀντίστητε στερεοὶ τῇ πίστει*] cf. Jas. iv. 7; Eph. vi. 11 ff. *τῇ πίστει* does not belong to *ἀντίστητε* (Bengel), but to *στερεοί*; not as the dat. instrum. (Beza, Hensler), but as the dative of nearer definition: "firm in the faith;" cf. Acts xvi. 5; Col. ii. 7; cf. Winer, p. 202 [E. T. 270]. It is only a firm faith that can resist the devil. — *εἰδότες τὰ αὐτὰ τῶν παθημάτων . . . ἐπιτελεῖσθαι*] Almost all interpreters assume that the construction here is that of the accus. c. inf. Hofmann nevertheless denies this, remarking that in the N. T. *εἰδότες* (in the sense of "knowing") never takes the accus. c. inf., but always the particle *ὅτι*, and that when *εἰδότες* is followed by the accus. c. inf., it signifies "to understand how to do a thing."[1] If this be correct, *ἐπιτελεῖσθαι* must have an active meaning, *τὰ αὐτὰ τῶν παθ.* be the accusative after it, and the dative *τῇ . . . ἀδελφότητι* be dependent on *τὰ αὐτά*. Explaining *ἐπιτελεῖσθαι* on the analogy of the phrase: *τὰ τοῦ γήρως ἐπιτελεῖσθαι* (Xen. *Mem.* iv. 8. 8), and seeing in *τὰ αὐτά* the idea of measure expressed, Hofmann translates: "knowing how to pay for your Christianity the same tribute of affliction as your brethren in the world." This explanation cannot be accepted without hesitation. For, on the one hand, from the fact that in other parts of the N. T. *εἰδότες* does not take the accus. c. inf., it cannot be concluded that here it does not do so either, the more especially that the construction of the accus. c. inf. occurs comparatively rarely in the N. T.; and, on the other hand, the phrase: *τὰ . . . τῶν παθ. ἀποτελ.*, is not analogous with the expression: *τὰ τοῦ γήρως ἐπιτελ.*, since in the former there is no conception corresponding to *τοῦ γήρως*. Hofmann inserts, indeed, as such, the idea of the Christian calling, but it is purely imported, and nowhere hinted at in the text. Accordingly, *ἐπιτελεῖσθαι*—grammatically considered —*can* have a passive signification, not, indeed, equivalent to: "are completed" (Thuc. vii. 2; Phil. i. 6, and other passages), for this idea would not be suitable here, but rather: "are being

[1] Cf. the passages quoted by Hofmann: Matt. vii. 11; Luke xi. 13, xii. 36; Jas. iv. 17; Phil. iv. 12; 1 Tim. iii. 5; 2 Pet. ii. 9.

accomplished" (thus Herod. i. 51, in connection with τὰ ἐπιτασσόμενα; Thuc. i. 138: ἐπιτελέσαι ἃ ὑπέσχετο). This idea is, in truth, not very appropriate either; it seems to be more fitting to take the verb in a middle sense, as equivalent to: "are accomplishing themselves;" and to translate: "knowing (or better rather: considering) that the same sufferings are accomplishing themselves in the brethren." This rendering is to be preferred to all others. The Vulg. translates ἐπιτελ. by fieri; Luther by "befall;" both are too inexact renderings of the sense.[1] In the explanation above given, τὰ αὐτά is used as a substantive, as frequently happens with the neuter of adjectives (Winer, p. 220[2] [E.T. 294]), and is put here to emphasize the sameness of the sufferings (thus de Wette, Wiesinger); τῇ . . . ἀδελφότητι is to be taken as the more remote object; on no condition can the dative be understood as equivalent to ὑπό in passives. With the idea ἀδελφότητι, cf. chap. ii. 17.—The addition, ἐν κόσμῳ, alludes to the reason of the afflictions (Steiger). Wiesinger justly remarks: "in the world, the dominion of the Evil One, the Christian can and dare expect nothing else." Possibly it may contain at the same time a reference to the ἀδελφότης, which the Lord has already taken to Himself ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου. The thought that the brethren have to bear the same afflictions, serves to give strength in resisting the devil, since the consciousness of bearing similar afflictions in common with all Christian brethren, encourages to patient endurance.

Vv. 10, 11. Promise of blessing and doxology. — ὁ δὲ Θεός, placed by way of emphasis at the beginning. That which has gone before has told the readers what they should do; in contrast to this (δέ), the apostle now says what God will do (Schott); with the expression: Θεὸς πάσης χάριτος, cf. 2 Cor. i. 3: Θεὸς πάσης παρακλήσεως. God as the author of all grace; χάρις conceived as a possession. Like the whole promise of blessing, this very designation of God serves to comfort and strengthen the readers in their afflictions. — ὁ καλέσας ὑμᾶς, κ.τ.λ.] cf. 1 Thess. ii. 12 (2 Thess. ii. 14); that

[1] The translation of Wichelhaus: "*to be laid upon*," is entirely unjustifiable.

[2] Hofmann erroneously appeals to Hartung's *Gr.* II. p. 238, in support of the interpretation: "the same measure of suffering."

is: to participation in His (God's) own δόξα. The participation is here thought of as future, although for believing Christians it is even now present in its beginning (2 Pet. i. 4). In this calling there is already contained the pledge of the promises that follow: καταρτίσει κ.τ.λ. — ἐν Χριστῷ belongs to καλέσας, more nearly defined by ὑμᾶς εἰς etc. (de Wette, Wiesinger, Schott), not to δόξαν (Hofmann). God possesses the glory not first in Christ, as Hofmann says, but He has had it from all eternity, although in Christ it is first revealed. Gerhard interprets incorrectly: propter meritum Christi. ἐν is by several interpreters inaccurately taken as equivalent to διά; but though ἐν denote instrumentality, this is of a more inward nature than that expressed by διά. The sense is: by God having brought you into union with Christ (thus also de Wette, Wiesinger, Schott). The connection of ἐν Χρ. with ὀλίγ. παθόντας following (Glossa interl.: sicut membra in illo patientes; Nicol de Lyra) has nothing to commend it.—ὀλίγον παθόντας] ὀλίγον, as in chap. i. 6: "a little while." — παθόντας is to be joined with καλέσας κ.τ.λ. (Steiger, de Wette, Wiesinger), but in such a way that in sense it does not apply so much to καλέσας, as to the obtaining of the δόξα of God, since the aorist must not arbitrarily be interpreted as a present. Hofmann rightly observes: "Peter subjoins this aorist participle as if it had been preceded by εἰς τὸ δοξάζεσθαι."[1] Lachmann and Tischendorf (om. ὑμᾶς after καταρτίσει) have connected these words with what follows, as also the Vulg. translates: modicum passos ipse perficiet (so also Wichelhaus). Many, particularly among the older commentators, even retaining the ὑμᾶς, have adopted this construction; Luther: "The same will make you, that suffer a little while, fully prepared," etc. Opposed to this, however, is as much the fact that the καταρτίζειν does not take place *after* the afflictions only, but during them, as that the present affliction and the future glory belong closely together; cf. ver. 1.—If, as is highly probable, the ὑμᾶς after καταρτίσει be spurious, it must be supplied out of the ὑμᾶς that precedes. — αὐτός] is

[1] Schott's explanation, that "to the apostle as he looks from the present, in so far as it already contains their completion, back on the present of actual reality, the sufferings appear as past," is inappropriate.

placed emphatically: the God . . . , who hath called you, *He* will, etc., *the same* God; the calling already contains the guarantee for the καταρτίζειν, κ.τ.λ. — καταρτίσει, κ.τ.λ.] καταρτίζειν, Luke vi. 40; 1 Cor. i. 10; Heb. xiii. 21; Luther rightly translates: "*fully prepare;*" Bengel: ne remaneat in vobis defectus. — στηρίζειν, 2 Thess. ii. 17, iii. 3, and other passages. Bengel: ne quid vos labefactet. — σθενοῦν, ἅπ. λεγ. Bengel: ut superetis vim omnem adversam. — θεμελιοῦν (see the critical notes); in its proper sense, Matt. vii. 25; Luke vi. 48; figuratively: Eph. iii. 18 (τεθεμελιωμένοι synonymous with ἐῤῥιζωμένοι); Col. i. 23 (synonymous with ἑδραῖοι). — The future expresses the sure expectation that, as the apostle wishes, God will perfect, etc., the believers.—If καταρτίσαι be read, this form must not be taken as the infinitive (Pott), but as the optative.[1]—The heaping up of expressions connected by asyndeton is rhetorical, and arises from the natural impulse of an agitated heart to find full expression for its feelings.—Ver. 11. The same doxology as in chap. iv. 11. It sets the seal on the hope just expressed.

Vv. 12–14. Concluding remarks; first, ver. 12, as to the letter itself. — διὰ Σιλουανοῦ . . . ἔγραψα] There is no reason to doubt that this Silvanus is the well-known companion of the Apostle Paul. Whilst in the Acts he is named "Silas," Paul, like Peter, calls him "Silvanus." He was sent from the convention of apostles, along with Paul, Barnabas, and Judas Barsabas, as bearers of the epistle to Antioch. After this he accompanied Paul on his second missionary journey. He is not mentioned afterwards, nor is it known at what time he came to Peter. διὰ . . . ἔγραψα does not designate Silvanus either as the translator or the writer of the epistle, but simply as the bearer of it. διά has here the same sense as in the subscriptions of the Epistles to the Romans, the Corinthians, etc.; it is synonymous with διὰ χειρός, Acts xv. 23. — "It is evident that the choice of Silas for this (mediatory) mission was a particularly happy one, as he had been Paul's companion in former times, and had assisted him in founding the greater

[1] Erasmus, by first reading καταρτίσαι and then στηρίξει, etc., understands this and the subsequent words as substantives: perficiet fultura confirmatione, fundatione.

part of the churches here addressed" (Wieseler). — *ὑμῖν τοῦ πιστοῦ ἀδελφοῦ*] *ὑμῖν* can be joined either with the following *ἔγραψα*, or with *πιστοῦ ἀδ.* If the latter combination be adopted (it is more simple if *τοῦ* be erased as spurious, but is also possible if *τοῦ* be retained; equivalent to: "who is the faithful brother unto you"), the apposition indicates that an intimate relation subsisted between Silvanus and the churches to which Peter writes. The connection with *ἔγραψα*, however, is the more natural one, *ὑμῖν* being inserted between, as in Gal. vi. 11. — *ὁ πιστὸς ἀδελφός* is the name given to Silvanus, because generally he had proved faithful in the performance of every service for the church of Christ. There is no reason why the expression should be referred specially to his relation to the churches of Asia Minor only (as formerly in this commentary), or particularly to that in which he stood to Peter (Hofmann). Still, it is not improbable that Peter, by this designation, alludes to the confidence he has, that he will also prove faithful in the service which is now required of him. — The following words: *ὡς λογίζομαι*, may be applied either to the opinion just expressed on Silvanus (Brückner, Wiesinger, Schott, Wichelhaus), or to the subsequent *δι' ὀλίγων ἔγραψα* (Steiger, Hofmann). It is hardly possible to come to a definite conclusion. At any rate, *λογίζομαι* does not express an uncertain conjecture; cf. Rom. iii. 28, viii. 18; Heb. xi. 19. In the *first* case, by the confirmation which it contains of the opinion just uttered, it serves to strengthen the confidence of the churches in Silvanus; in the *second*, the apostle indicates that, considering the importance of his subject and the yearning of his heart, he looks on his letter as a short one.[1] This last appears the more probable. — *δι' ὀλίγων*] equal to *διὰ βραχέων*, Heb. xiii. 22: "in few words;" cf. Thucyd. iv. 95. — *ἔγραψα*] refers to this epistle, which the

[1] Hofmann's opinion is purely arbitrary, "that since the individual churches received the epistle, intended as it was for so wide a circle, only in a transcription of a transcription, and had again to send it on, a modest remark, that he had not made his letter too long in order to venture to ask them to take this trouble, was not inappropriate." Nothing alludes to the taking of any such trouble. — Fronmüller's view is also incorrect. He thinks that *ὡς λογίζ.* should be taken with *διὰ Σιλουν. ἐγρ.*, in the sense of: "I count upon your receiving this epistle by Silvanus,"—for there is no question here of the receiving of it.

apostle is on the point of closing, and not, as Erasmus, Grotius, etc., altogether unwarrantably assume, to a former one which has been lost;[1] cf. Philem. 19, 21. — *παρακαλῶν καὶ ἐπιμαρτυρῶν*] Although by these two words the apostle indicates two distinct subjects, still these are not to be separated in such a way as to be applicable to *different* parts of the epistle (de Wette, Brückner);[2] but the *παράκλησις* and the *ἐπιμαρτύρησις* are throughout the whole letter closely bound up together. As the contents of the *ἐπιμαρτυρεῖν* are stated, but not those of the *παρακαλεῖν*, the chief stress is laid on the former, the latter (*παρακαλῶν*) being placed first, in order thereby to give prominence to the character of the *ἐπιμαρτύρησις*. Contrary to its common usage, de Wette interprets *ἐπιμαρτυρῶν*: *in addition to, i.e.* testifying in addition to the exhortation. *ἐπιμαρτυρεῖν* simply means: to bear witness to anything (opp. *ἀντιμαρτυρεῖν*, see Pape and Cremer, *s.v.*; in the N. T. *ἅπ. λεγ.*; *ἐπιμαρτύρεσθαι* occurs in the LXX. and in the Apocr., but not *ἐπιμαρτυρεῖν*); Bengel is therefore wrong in interpreting: testimonium jam per Paulum et Silam audierant pridem: Petrus *insuper testatur*; so, too, is Hofmann in saying that in *ἐπιμαρτυρεῖν* it is presupposed that the readers themselves already know and believe what Peter testifies. — *ταύτην εἶναι ἀληθῆ χάριν τοῦ Θεοῦ*] Contents of the *ἐπιμαρτύρησις*: "*that this is the true grace of God;*"[3] *ταύτην* does not refer to that of which the apostle has written, but its more precise definition follows in the subsequent relative clause. Peter accordingly sets forth, in conclusion, that

[1] In this interpretation *ὡς λογίζομαι* is applied to the writing of the former epistle. Erasmus: per Silvanum . . . qui non dubito, quin epistolam bona fide reddiderit. Similarly Pott: antehac et, si recte memini ("if I remember aright!") per Silv. epistolam vobis scripsi. Differently Wetstein: scripsi, ut ipse sentio et apud me, omnibus rite perpensis, statuo, ita etiam alios hortor, ut idem mecum profiteantur: doctrinam Christi esse veram.

[2] "The first statement of the contents of the epistle applies to chap. i. 13–v. 9; the second, to i. 3–12; and one or two passages in the hortatory portion, as i. 18–20, 25, ii. 9 f., iii. 18, iv. 12 f."

[3] Hofmann lays stress on the want of the article before *χάριν*, and therefore interprets: "that it is real grace of God, that that is in truth grace from God, wherein they have come to stand;" but if Peter had meant this, he would not have written *ἀληθῆ*, but *ἀληθῶς*. In this interpretation also the rule of assimilation is wrongly applied.

his epistle testifies to the readers that *that* grace in which they already stood is the true grace, from which, therefore, they should not depart (cf. with this, chap. i. 12, 25, ii. 10, 25). No doubt this was the χάρις which had been brought to them by means of the preaching of Paul, but it does not follow that the purpose of Peter's ἐπιμαρτύρησις was to set, for the readers, the seal on that preaching. It is not the preaching which is here in question, but the χάρις in which the readers stood, quite apart from the person through whose instrumentality it was brought to them. Had Peter intended to bear a testimony to Paul, he would surely have done so in clear terms; nor does anything in the epistle allude to an uncertainty on the part of the readers as to whether Paul had preached the true gospel to them. χάρις is not: doctrina evangelii (Gerhard); but neither is it: "the *state* of grace" (de Wette), for with this the adjunct τοῦ Θεοῦ would not harmonize. But it denotes the objective divine grace, into the sphere of which the readers have entered by means of faith; cf. Rom. v. 2. — ἀληθῆ] stands here as the leading conception, not with any polemical reference to an erroneous doctrine (for there is no trace of any such polemic in the epistle), but is intended by the apostle to mark in itself the truth and reality of this χάρις, in order that the readers may not be induced by the persecutions to abandon it. — εἰς ἣν ἑστήκατε] for this construction, cf. Winer, p. 386 f. [E. T. 516 ff.]. If the reading στῆτε be adopted, this adjunct expresses the exhortation to continue in *that* grace. Here, however, the nearer definition necessary to ταύτην is wanting; for as the ἐπιμαρτύρησις is not something added on to the epistle (ἔγραψα), ταύτην χάριν cannot be *the* grace of which I have written to you.

Ver. 13. Salutation. — The notion that ἡ . . . συνεκλεκτή denotes the apostle's wife (Bengel, Mayerhoff, Jachmann, etc.) finds no support from 1 Cor. ix. 5; it is contradicted by the ἐν Βαβυλῶνι[1] inserted between. By far the greater number of commentators rightly consider it to mean: "*the church in*

[1] According to several commentators, συνεκλ., though not meaning definitely Peter's wife, yet refers to some other excellent woman of the church. Wolf even thinks it may be understood as a proper name.

Babylon" (ℵ has the word ἐκκλησίᾳ after Βαβυλῶνι; Oec. u. Vulg. *ecclesia*). According to Hofmann, ἐκκλησία is not to be supplied to συνεκλεκτή, "but the churches to which the apostle writes are, as such, ἐκλεκταί, and the church from which he sends greetings is, as such, a συνεκλεκτή, as she from whom the Apostle John sends salutations is an ἀδελφὴ ἐκλεκτή" (2 John 13). But in John's Epistle, ver. 1, κυρία, and ver. 13, ἀδελφή, are put along with ἐκλεκτή; accordingly, it does not follow that συνεκλεκτή, without the additional idea ἐκκλησία, would of itself mean a church. The συν refers to the churches to which Peter sends the salutation of the former, cf. chap. i. 1.[1] According to Eusebius (*H. E.* c. 15), Papias already was of opinion that the name Babylon is here used figuratively, and that by it *Rome* is to be understood. The same view is adopted by Clemens Alex., Hieronymus, Oecumenius, Beda, Luther, and by most of the Catholic interpreters;[2] in more recent times by Thiersch, Ewald, Hofmann, Wiesinger, Schott, etc. The principal reasons brought forward in support of this view are—(1) The tradition of the primitive church, which speaks of the apostle's stay in Rome, but makes no mention of his having lived in Babylon; (2) The designation of Rome as Babylon in Revelation, chap. xiv. 8, xviii. 2, 10; (3) The banishment of the Jews from Babylon in the time of the Emperor Claudius, according to Joseph. *Ant.* i. 18, c. 12. But these reasons are not conclusive, for—(1) The tradition has preserved altogether very imperfect and uncertain notices of the apostles; (2) In Revelation this designation is very naturally explained from the reference to O. T. prophecy; (3) The account of Josephus does not lead us to understand that all the Jews were banished from Babylon and its vicinity (see Mayerhoff, p. 128 ff., and Wieseler, p. 557 f.).[3] Although

[1] It is far-fetched when Schott says that ἡ συνεκλ. ἡ ἐν Βαβ. is not written here, but ἡ ἐν Βαβ. συνεκλ., because the very fact of her being in Babylon (*i.e.* Rome) makes the church a συνεκλεκτή, *i.e.* the real associate of the churches who read the epistle; namely, in as far as thus reference is made to a like condition of suffering.

[2] Lorinus remarks: Omnes quotquot legerim interpretes catholici romanam intelligunt ecclesiam. Calvin says of this interpretation: hoc commentum Papistae libenter arripiunt, ut videatur Petrus romanae ecclesiae praefuisse.

[3] Hofmann maintains that it is "indiscoverable how Peter had come to know

de Wette's rejoinder, that "the allegorical designation is unnatural in a letter, especially in the salutation," may be going too far, still it is improbable that Peter, in simply conveying a greeting, would have made use of an allegorical name of a place, without ever hinting that the designation was not to be taken literally. This could admit of explanation only if, at the time the epistle was written, it had been customary among the Christians to speak of Rome as Babylon; and that it was so, we have no evidence. Accordingly, Erasmus, Calvin, Gerhard, Neander, de Wette-Brückner, Wieseler, Weiss, Bleek, Reuss, Frommüller, etc., have justly declared themselves opposed to the allegorical interpretation. The view that by Babylon is meant the Babylon in Egypt mentioned by Strabo, i. 17 (Pearson, Calov, Vitringa, Wolf), has nothing to commend it, the less so that this Babylon was simply a military garrison.[1] — *καὶ Μάρκος ὁ υἱὸς μου*] The correct interpretation of *υἱός μου* is given already by Oecumenius: *Μάρκον υἱόν, κατὰ πνεῦμα καλεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ σάρκα.* It is undoubtedly the well-known companion of Paul who is meant. Since, according to Acts, Peter was acquainted with his mother, it is probable that Mark was converted to Christianity by Peter. The idea that Peter here speaks of a son of his own after the flesh, named Mark (Bengel, Hottinger, Jachmann, etc.), could receive support only if *συνεκλεκτή* were used to designate the apostle's wife.

Ver. 14. *ἀσπάσασθε ἀλλήλους ἐν φιλήματι ἀγάπης*] Paul uses a similar expression, Rom. xvi. 16; 1 Cor. xvi. 20; 2 Cor. xiii. 12; 1 Thess. v. 26. The members of the church are by turns to greet one another (not each other in Peter's name) with the kiss of charity, thus testifying to their brotherly love for each other (see Meyer on 1 Cor. xvi. 26). Instead of the Pauline: *ἐν ἁγίῳ φιλ.*, there is here: *ἐν φιλ. ἀγάπης*, "*with the kiss of love*," *i.e.* the kiss, which is the type and expression of Christian brotherly love. — The final bene-

the two Pauline Epistles to the Romans and Ephesians," if he wrote his epistle in Babylon. But the composition of the epistle in Rome is not by any means proved by so uncertain an assertion.

[1] It is clearly quite arbitrary when some scholars, like Capellus, Spanheim, and Semler, understand Babylon here as a name for Jerusalem, or even for the house where the apostles were assembled on the day of Pentecost.

diction is likewise similar to those in the epistles of Paul; only that in these χάρις stands in the place of εἰρήνη (Eph. vi. 23, 24, both occur; cf. too, 3 John 15). By the addition of τοῖς ἐν Χρ., the πάντες are designated according to their nature as such, who live in union with Christ, and to whom, therefore, the benediction here pronounced belongs.

THE SECOND EPISTLE OF THE APOSTLE PETER.

INTRODUCTION.

SEC. 1.—OCCASION, CONTENTS, AND CHARACTER OF THE EPISTLE.

THE epistle on its own testimony professes to have been written by the Apostle Peter (chap. i. 1, 14, 16–18, iii. 1, 15) subsequent to his first epistle (chap. iii. 1; comp. also i. 16), and addressed to the same churches. Its occasion and aim are stated in chap. iii. 17, 18. The author is in anxiety as to the false teachers who were about to appear,—he nevertheless pictures them as actually present,—and therefore he wishes to warn his readers against them, that they might not be led astray, and exhorts them to grow in grace and in the knowledge of the Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. The false teachers against whom the epistle is directed are the Libertines (chap. ii.) and the deniers of the Parousia of Christ, and the destruction of the world connected therewith (chap. iii.). It is commonly assumed that in chap. iii. the persons meant are the same as those described in chap. ii. But an identity of this kind is nowhere suggested; indeed, the way and the terms in which the ἐμπαῖκται are introduced in chap. iii. seem rather to indicate that by the latter—although mention is also made of their sensual life (κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας αὐτῶν ἐπιθυμίας πορευόμενοι)—different individuals are intended from those portrayed in chap. ii. (Weiss).—De Wette's opinion, that the author had in his eye "vicious persons" simply, and not "false teachers,"

is erroneous, it being abundantly evident from vv. 18, 19 that the persons described in chap. ii. based their actions on a definite principle; moreover, they are expressly termed ψευδοδιδάσκαλοι, ver. 1. It is also equally erroneous to take them to be Gnostics, properly so called, or more particularly, with Grotius, followers of Carpocrates. Bertholdt calls them Sadducee Christians; but this term is wanting in the necessary precision. Cf. my Introduction to Jude's Epistle.

The epistle falls into two principal divisions, each consisting of two parts. In the first part of the first division (chap. i. 1–11), the author reminds the Christians of the blessings, more especially the ἐπαγγέλματα, of which by the power of God they had been made partakers, linking on to this the exhortation to give abundant proof of the virtues which are the fruits of faith,—those especially in which he that is wanting is like unto one blind, and he only who possesses can enter into the eternal kingdom of Christ.—In the second part (chap. i. 12–21), the author, as the Apostle Peter, mentions first, what had induced him to give the exhortation at this particular time, and then refers his readers to the certainty of Christ's advent, confirmed as it was both by the divine words which himself had heard at the Saviour's transfiguration and by the prophecies of the Old Covenant. —In the first part of the second division (chap. ii.), the author portrays the immoral character of the Libertines. He begins by announcing their coming, future as yet; calls them deniers of the Lord who would seduce many, but would not escape punishment (vv. 1–3); then he proves the certainty of their punishment by the examples of the fallen angels, those who perished in the flood, and the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah, not forgetting, however, in the last two cases to call to remembrance Noah and Lot, just men both, and therefrom to draw the conclusion as to the righteousness of God (vv. 4–9). In vv. 10–22 follows the more minute description of the sensual character of the false teachers.—The author commences the last part of this division by stating the design of this second epistle, and then goes on to mention the scoffers who would walk after their own lusts, and would deny the advent of the Lord (chap. iii. 1–4); this he follows up by a refutation of

the arguments on which the denial is based, foretelling the coming destruction of the world by fire, and representing the apparent delay of the judgment as an act of divine patience (vv. 5–10); and to this he subjoins the exhortation to an holy walk, in expectation of the new heaven and the new earth (vv. 11–13).—The epistle concludes with the mention of the Apostle Paul's epistles, coupled with the warning against wresting the difficult passages contained in them. Finally, the author gives forth exhortations by way of caution, in which he makes apparent the design of the epistle; on this follows the doxology.

The fundamental idea which runs through the whole epistle is that of the *ἐπίγνωσις Χριστοῦ*, which consists essentially in the acknowledgment of the *δύναμις καὶ παρουσία* of Christ. Advancement in this *ἐπίγνωσις*, as the ground and aim of the exercise of all Christian virtue, is the prominent feature of every exhortation. Hence the *τίμια ἐπαγγέλματα* are designated as that by which *κοινωνία* with the divine nature is effected, and which must move the Christian to show all zeal in supplying the Christian virtues. The author is therefore at pains to prove the certain fulfilment of those promises, and to refute the sceptical doubts of the false teachers.

As regards its structure, the epistle has encountered much adverse criticism from the opponents of its authenticity. Mayerhoff reproaches it, more especially, with a clumsy and illogical development; but it cannot fail to be observed that there is a clear and firm line of thought, by which all particulars are joined together and form a well-arranged whole (cf. Brückner, *Einl.* § 1 a; Hofmann, p. 121 ff.). The thoughts which form the commencement of the epistle prepare the way for the warnings against the false teachers, and have as their aim the concluding exhortations which point back to the heresy. The prominence given to the thought that *τὰ πρὸς ζωὴν καὶ εὐσέβειαν* are bestowed upon us (i. 3), and the exhortation to furnish the Christian virtues (i. 5–11), are all aimed at the false teachers, who would indulge in *ἀσελγείαις*, and by whom the *ὁδὸς τῆς ἀληθείας* would be brought into disrepute (ii. 2); whilst the emphasis laid on the *ἐπαγγέλ-*

ματα (i. 4), as also the reference to the incidents of the transfiguration as a proof of the δύναμις καὶ παρουσία of Christ (i. 16–18), point to the prophetic announcement of the coming of the ἐμπαῖκται who would deny the advent of the Saviour (iii. 3 ff.). Still it is surprising that the whole of the second chapter may be omitted without the connection of thought being in any way injured thereby. For, inasmuch as the *scoffers* are characterized as men who walk κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας αὐτῶν ἐπιθυμίας, the moral exhortations introduced in i. 3, 4, and to which iii. 1.2 has retrospect, may be applicable to them also; and although ii. 1 is closely connected with i. 19–21 by the words: ἐγένοντο δὲ καὶ ψευδοπροφῆται ἐν τῷ λαῷ, yet μνησθῆναι τῶν προειρημένων ῥημάτων ὑπὸ τῶν ἁγίων προφητῶν (iii. 2) can equally be joined with them. It may accordingly be conjectured that chap. ii. was afterwards added, either by the writer himself, or by some later hand; but again, opposed to such a supposition is the circumstance that chap. ii. in no way disturbs the unity of the whole.

Besides several echoes of the Pauline Epistles and the First Epistle of Peter, this letter, as is well known, presents in the second chapter, and in one or two passages of the first and third, a striking resemblance to the Epistle of Jude, which cannot possibly be considered accidental. Rather must one of these epistles be regarded as the original, of which the author of the other made use. In former times the prevalent view was that the Second Epistle of Peter was the original, thus Luther, Wolf, Semler, Storr, Pott, etc.; but afterwards the opposite opinion obtained most favour, thus already Herder, Hug, Eichhorn, Credner, Neander, Mayerhoff, de Wette, Guericke; and in more recent times it has been supported by Reuss, Bleek, Arnaud, Wiesinger, Brückner, Weiss, and F. Philippi;—that is to say, not only by opponents of the authenticity of the Second Epistle of Peter, but by defenders of it also (Wiesinger, Brückner, Weiss). A different judgment, however, is passed by Thiersch, Dietlein, Stier, Luthardt, Schott, Steinfass, Frommüller, Hofmann. Appeal is made chiefly to this circumstance, that at the time when the Epistle of Jude was composed the false teachers were already present, while in Second Peter their appearance is looked upon as

future, and is the subject of prophecy. But this, as Weiss has shown, is an argument only in appearance, and is in no way capable of proof. That the passages Jude 17 and 18 have no reference to 2 Pet. ii. 1–3 and iii. 2, 3, is plain from this, that had Jude seen in the appearance of the Libertines the fulfilment of the prediction contained in Second Peter, he would have styled them, not *ἐμπαῖκται κ.τ.λ.*, but rather *ψευδοδιδάσκαλοι*. For in Second Peter it is not the Libertines described in chap. ii. that are called *ἐμπαῖκται*, but the deniers of the Parousia spoken of in chap. iii., whom Jude does not even mention. Nor is it easy to see why Jude, if in vv. 17 and 18 he really had in his mind the prophecy given by Peter, should not have directly said so, but should rather have spoken of the actual word of the actual Peter as *τὰ ῥήματα τὰ προειρημένα ὑπὸ τῶν ἀποστόλων τοῦ κυρίου*. In favour of the view that the Second Epistle of Peter is dependent on the Epistle of Jude, is the latter's entirely individual manner of thought and diction, which bears the distinct impress of originality;[1] whilst in Second Peter, on the other hand, there is apparent the endeavour to tone down the expression by simplification, addition, or omission. Further, the circumstance that the more the expression in Peter's second epistle coincides with that of Jude, the more does what is otherwise peculiar to the epistle tend to disappear.[2] And finally, the absence of any tenable reason which might have induced Jude to collect together separate passages from a larger apostolic writing, in order to compose therefrom a new epistle, which, seeing that the former was already in existence, must have had the less significance that it omits from the

[1] Herder: "See what a thoroughly powerful epistle, like a fire-wheel running back into itself; take now that of Peter, what introduction he makes, how he tones down, omits, confirms," etc.—"Jude has always the most precise and the strongest expression." Even Schott grants, in opposition to Dietlein, "that the Epistle of Jude bears the impress of much greater literary originality on the part of the writer than that of Second Peter;" and that "it must be allowed to possess a by far greater intellectual originality and pithiness."

[2] This Weiss brings very decidedly forward: "It plainly appears that wherever in the parallel passages it strikingly coincides with that of Jude, the expression is to be found nowhere else in Second Peter; but wherever it deviates from that of Jude, or becomes entirely independent, it is at once in surprising conformity with the form of expression in this or the First Epistle of Peter."

delineation important particulars which are contained in Second Peter.[1]

In discussing the question as to which is the original epistle, two points must be remembered,—(1) "That in neither have we a slavish dependence or a mere copy, but that the correspondence of the one with the other is carried out with literary freedom and licence" (Weiss); and (2) The circumstance that this question is not identical with that as to the authenticity of the Second Epistle of Peter; Wiesinger, Weiss, Brückner, defend its authenticity, although they question its priority. —The reasons which Schott adduces for the priority of the Epistle of Jude are simple assertions, which a closer examination by no means justifies, inasmuch as they are either plainly arbitrary, or presuppose artificial interpretations and pure inventions. Steinfass thinks, strangely enough, that to accept the originality of Jude's Epistle is somewhat hazardous for that composition itself, and not only for Second Peter, inasmuch as, on the assumption, he takes the repeated reference to the Pseudo-Enoch to be an offence, many examples a redundancy, much conciseness constraint, and the whole arrangement pretty much confusion. Frommüller bases his argument for the priority of Second Peter specially on this, that it is inconceivable that Peter, the prince of the apostles, should have borrowed expressions, figures, and examples from one who was plainly less gifted than himself. Hofmann would completely settle the whole question by asserting that Peter composed his second epistle soon after his first, that is to say, *before* the destruction of Jerusalem, while Jude wrote *after* (ver. 5!) that event. But when, nevertheless, quite superfluously, he by way of proof goes into particulars, he on the one hand bases his arguments on many unjustifiable assertions, as, for example, that Peter exhorts to an holy walk, but Jude to the aggressive maintenance of the Christian faith, or that Jude was dealing only with some unworthy members of the church in the present, whilst Peter had in view teachers who were to arise in the future; and, on the other hand, the proofs he adduces have also to be supported by erroneous interpretations and judgments purely subjective.—If, now, following the course of thought in the Epistle of Jude, we consider the individual passages in

[1] When Luthardt thinks to explain this by observing "that Jude could certainly assume that his readers were acquainted with Second Peter, in which enough had already been said as to the παρουσία," he entirely overlooks the fact that the latter epistle treats equally at length of the false teachers, and that consequently Jude might have left his entire letter unwritten.

their relation to what is similar to them in Second Peter, these results are obtained:—In the opening of his epistle, Jude introduces his opponents without any bias as τινὲς ἄνθρωποι, without even hinting that they are those whose appearance Peter had before predicted. The first description of them by τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμῶν χάριτα μετατιθέντες εἰς ἀσέλγειαν is peculiar to Jude. It is in no way probable that the expression ἀσέλγεια is taken from the passage 2 Pet. ii. 2. The following δεσπότην ἀρνούμενοι is found in Peter also, but to whom it originally belongs cannot be concluded from the nearer definitions connected therewith. The fact that the particular features by which Jude characterizes his opponents are to be found in 2 Pet. ii. 1–3, others being here added, however, and with a less original turn of expression, tends to show rather that the Epistle of Jude had exercised an influence on that of Peter than *vice versa* (Wiesinger). In the one epistle as in the other, the examples of divine judgment follow the first and special description of the adversaries. Yet these are not in both the same, and in Peter's epistle, in the second and third cases, there is added to the mention of the punishment of the ungodly a reference to the deliverance of the just, more especially of Noah and Lot. The order in which the examples of judgment are brought forward is in Peter's composition chronological, and in so far eminently natural; still the selection of the first is striking, since in Gen. vi. 2 ff. there is no mention made of a punishment of the angels. Now, as there is nothing in the connection of thought here which could have determined Peter to bring forward this example, he must have been moved to do so by something external to it, that is, by the influence which the Epistle of Jude had upon him. The order of examples of judgment in Jude is of so singular a nature, that so far from showing even the faintest trace of a dependence on Peter, it is rather on the assumption of any such quite incomprehensible. How could it ever have occurred to Jude, supposing he drew from Second Peter, to place the case of the unbelieving Israelites first, and to omit that of the flood? Jude's manner of presentation is based on a conception so entirely original, that it cannot possibly have been suggested to him by that in Second Peter. It is difficult to see what could have moved Jude to avoid the two-sided character of Peter's examples, if it really lay before him—it was equally well suited to his purpose. Noticeable, also, is the latter's prevailing tendency to generalization. The last two examples adduced by Jude have reference to a quite definite sin, the ἐκπορνεύειν καὶ ἀπέρχεσθαι ὀπίσω σαρκὸς ἑτέρας; Peter, on the other hand, deals only with the general distinction

between godly and ungodly; and whilst Jude characterizes the conduct of the angels as it lay to his hand in the tradition, or in the Book of Enoch itself, Peter contents himself with the more general ἁμαρτησάντων, and avoids all distinct reference to that tradition. But whence had he, then, the σειραῖς ζόφου κ.τ.λ., if he did not write under the influence of Jude's epistle? After the examples of judgment there follows, in both epistles, the description of the libertines, according to their sensual walk and their despising and defamation of the supernatural powers. Amidst much that is similar there are nevertheless many points of disagreement, so that, in general, it may be open to dispute in which epistle the more original expression prevails. This is, however, not the case as regards the difference between Jude 9 and 2 Pet. ii. 11, for instead of Jude's concrete description according to apocryphal tradition, we have again in Peter, as in the mention of the angels formerly, an entirely general expression, which, however, must refer to something special. It has indeed been asserted (Schott, Hofmann) that Peter's expression finds its explanation in Zech. iii. 1; but if the apostle had this verse in view, he would have made more distinct reference to it; nor, again, could any reason be assigned why Jude should have alluded, not to the fact recorded in that passage, but to one entirely apocryphal. This also speaks decidedly in favour of the priority of Jude's epistle. Dietlein asserts with regard to Jude 10, as compared with 2 Pet. ii. 12, "that the higher degree of pure elaboration proves Jude to have been the reviser;" but this is unjustifiable, as even Steinfass admits. Wiesinger and Brückner rightly say, that here also, in the whole mode of expression, the priority of Jude's epistle is recognisable.—In Jude the woe follows, breaking in upon the text, and as the basis of it the comparison of the Libertines with Cain, Balaam, and Korah. To this is added a more minute description of them in a series of figurative expressions, coupled with Enoch's prophecy of judgment. In the Epistle of Peter, subjoined to φθαρήσονται, ver. 12, is the reference to the reward of the ἀδικία of the Libertines, and on this a description of the ἀδικία itself,—the false teachers being then at the end classed along with Balaam. It is only after this that several figurative designations follow, which are based on their propagandist doings. The grouping is accordingly different in each of the epistles; and otherwise, with much that is coincident in detail, there are many divergencies. The train of thought is in both epistles equally suited to the subject-matter, only it is somewhat strange that Jude, if he had the Epistle of Peter before him, should ever have thought of

interrupting the connection of ideas here existing between vv. 12 and 13 by a woe. This paragraph clearly shows that the dependence of the one author on the other is not to be looked upon as of such a nature that the later changed, and arranged with designed elaboration, the writings of the earlier, but only, that in the description of the same object the manner of presentation of the latter had wrought with manifold determination upon that of the former. The divergencies which here occur are more easily explained on the assumption that the Epistle of Jude, and not that of Peter, was the earlier. Were it otherwise, it would certainly be difficult to understand how Jude left unnoticed not only the characteristic *ὀφθαλμοὺς ἔχοντες μεστοὺς μοιχαλίδος*, but also the repeatedly recurring *ὀπισάζοντες*, and the references generally to the propagandist designs. With regard to this difference, that Jude speaks of Cain, Balaam, and Korah, whilst Peter mentions Balaam only, it is more natural to suppose that Peter, leaving the other two unnoticed, refers simply to Balaam because the latter appeared to him a particularly fitting type of the Libertines (on account of their *πλεονεξία*, to which special prominence is given, and to which the *μισθοῦ* of Jude alludes; whilst, in the case of the others, there is no such distinctive trait), than to assume that Jude added the two other illustrations to that of Balaam which he had before him in the Epistle of Peter. The priority of Jude's epistle may be recognised in this also, that the somewhat striking expression *μισθοῦ* is, in the composition of Peter, supplemented by the explanatory: *ὃς μισθὸν ἀδικίας ἠγάπησεν*. Highly characteristic, too, is the relation of the two clauses Jude 12*a* and Peter ii. 13*b*, especially in their corresponding expressions: *σπιλάδες* in Jude, and *σπῖλοι καὶ μῶμοι* in Peter, and *ἐν ταῖς ἀγάπαις ὑμῶν* there, and *ἐν ταῖς ἀπάταις αὐτῶν* here. In spite of the different expressions, the influence of the one on the other is unmistakeable; and it is equally plain that it was not Jude who wrote under the influence of Peter, but Peter under that of Jude. For what could have induced Jude to substitute for the clear expression of Peter the uncommon *σπιλάδες*,—which, besides, has a different meaning,—and to change the much more general idea *ἀπάταις* into the special conception *ἀγάπαις*? Whatever may be thought of Weiss' opinion, that Peter allowed himself to be guided simply by the *sound* of the words, we must certainly agree with him when he says that "Schott's attempt to save the originality of Peter's epistle rests on the entirely untenable assumption that the Petrine passage has reference to the love-feasts."—His omission of the passage from Enoch, quoted by Jude, can be easily

enough explained, inasmuch as it was Peter's predominating desire to allow what was apocryphal to recede, especially when by doing so no essential thought was omitted, and in chap. ii. 1, 2, distinct enough reference had been already made to the future judgment. But it is difficult to see what possible reason Jude could have had for inserting the passage from the Apocrypha in addition to what he found in Peter. — In what follows, each epistle goes its own way, and there are to be found but few traces of any influence of either on the other. Those few are as follows:—(1) The κατὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας αὐτῶν πορευόμενοι in Jude 16, 17, and Pet. iii. 3, and the ἐμπαῖκται closely connected herewith. With regard to this last expression, it is more than improbable that Jude borrowed it from Peter's epistle, it being there applied to the deniers of the Parousia, whom Jude does not even mention. Peter, on the other hand, might easily have adopted this designation from the Epistle of Jude, as very applicable to those who called the advent in question, the more so that he had already spoken of the Libertines as ψευδοδιδάσκαλοι. Thus, too, is explained the addition from Jude's epistle of κατὰ τὰς . . . πορευόμενοι, which otherwise, as applied by Peter to a *special* heresy, is somewhat surprising. (2) The term ὑπέρογκα, Jude 16 and Pet. ii. 18; Jude employs it without any nearer definition, but Peter in relation to ἐλευθερίαν ἐπαγγελλεσθαι. This, too, speaks for the priority of Jude's composition; for it is not conceivable that Jude, in adopting the expression, would have left unnoticed its nearer definition presented by Peter; whilst, on the other hand, the latter might easily have borrowed it from Jude's epistle, as well suited to the end he had in view. — The result, then, of an unbiassed comparison can be no other than this, that the Second Epistle of Peter was composed under the influence of what Jude had written, and not *vice versa*. This has been proved by Brückner, Wiesinger, and Weiss in their investigations, which have, in part, been conducted with more attention to particular detail.

SEC. 2.—THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE EPISTLE.

Eusebius (*H. E.* ii. 23, iii. 5) rightly includes this epistle among the antilegomena, its genuineness having been called in question by many. Origen already expressly says (Eusebius, *H. E.* vi. 23): *Πέτρος . . . μίαν ἐπιστολὴν ὁμολογουμένην καταλέλοιπεν· ἔστω δὲ καὶ δευτέραν, ἀμφιβάλλεται γάρ.* In spite of this verdict, Origen—only, however, in the writings

which we possess in Latin translation—treats it as a genuine composition of the apostle, citing it several times; see *Homil. in Josuam* vii., *Homil.* iv. *in Levitic.*, *Homil.* viii. *in Numer.*, and *Comment. in Ep. ad Romanos*, viii. 7. — If in his *Comment. in Ev. Johannis* he speak only of the First Epistle of Peter as catholic, saying, with reference to 1 Pet. iii. 18–20: *περὶ τῆς ἐν φυλακῇ πορείας μετὰ πνεύματος παρὰ τῷ Πέτρῳ ἐν τῇ καθολικῇ ἐπιστολῇ*, it can at most be concluded from this, only that he refused to apply that name to the second epistle, perhaps because it had not found general acceptation, but not that he himself had any doubts as to its genuineness. — Origen's contemporary, too, Firmilianus of Caesarea, seems to have known the epistle, and to have regarded it as genuine; for when, in his Epistle to Cyprian (*Epp. Cypr.* ep. 75), he says that Peter and Paul have condemned the heretics in suis epistolis, this seems, as far as Peter is concerned, to be applicable to his second epistle only, as in the first there is no mention of any such persons. — It cannot be definitely asserted that Clemens Alexandrinus commented on this epistle in his *Hypotyposes*. According to Eusebius (*H. E.* vi. 14): *ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὑποτυπώσεσι ξυνέλοντα εἰπεῖν, πάσης τῆς ἐνδιαθήκου γραφῆς ἐπιτετμημένας πεποίηται διηγήσεις· μὴ δὲ τὰς ἀντιλεγομένας παρελθών· τὴν Ἰούδα λέγω καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς ἐπιστολάς· τήν τε Βαρνάβα καὶ τὴν Πέτρου λεγομένην ἀποκάλυψιν· καὶ τ�ὴν πρὸς Ἑβραίους δὲ ἐπιστολὴν κ.τ.λ.*, Clement commented on the whole of the N. T. writings, the antilegomena included, and therefore Second Peter, which Eusebius designates as an *ἐπιστολὴ ἀντιλεγ.* To this, however, the remark of Cassiodorus is opposed (*de instit. div. script.* c. 8): in epistolis canonicis Clemens Al. i. e. in ep. Petri prima, Joannis prima et secunda et Jacobi (or rather Judae) quaedam attico sermone declaravit, etc. — Cum de reliquis epistolis canonicis magna nos cogitatio fatigaret, subito nobis codex Didymi . . . concessus est, etc. But as Cassiodorus expressly says in the Praefatio: ferunt itaque scripturas divinas V. et N. Testamenti ab ipso principio usque ad finem graeco sermone declarasse Clementem Alex., it may be concluded from this that he did not possess a complete copy of the *Hypotyposes*, but one only in which several epistles of the N. T., and among these Second

Peter, were awanting. Whilst Brückner says that the remark of Cassiodorus is no certain refutation of the statement made by Eusebius, Weiss declares himself convinced that the epistle was not commented on by Clement. — Neither in the writings of Tertullian nor of Cyprian is there to be found any trace of an acquaintance with the epistle, though both of them know and quote First Peter. — The epistle does not stand in the older *Peshito*, nor is it mentioned in the *Muratorian Canon*. Previous to Clemens Al. it is sought for in vain in the apostolic and in the older church Fathers. As to whether in these writers certain echoes of the epistle are to be found which point to an acquaintance with it, Guericke, even, expresses himself very doubtfully: "The allusions, in the case of some of the apostolic Fathers, are not quite certain; but, on the other hand, Justin M., Irenaeus, and Theophilus, do really *appear* to have made unmistakeable reference to it." Thiersch (p. 362, *d. a. Schr.*) denies still more decidedly a reference in the earlier church Fathers to this epistle. "The two thoughts only," says Thiersch, "'that one day is with the Lord as a thousand years,' and that 'the end of the world will come as a conflagration,' had at a very early period obtained general diffusion throughout the church;" but he himself shows that these two ideas did not necessarily originate in this epistle. Most of the recent critics agree with Thiersch. Entirely opposed to this, however, is the judgment of Dietlein; he fancies he finds, not only in the three Fathers already mentioned, but in Polycarp, Ignatius, Clemens Romanus, Barnabas, and Hermes, not in some few passages merely, but "scattered in large numbers throughout the writings of each of them," indisputable references to our epistle. In his endeavour to discover these, however, Dietlein has failed to observe that the writers of ecclesiastical antiquity all drew [1] from the same

[1] Even with regard to Philo, Dietlein says: "The coincidence between Philo and the N. T. and primitive ecclesiastical writers is by no means always fortuitous.—Both draw abundantly from the same storehouse of views and expressions, only the use they make of these is very different."—This remark is very just; but why does not Dietlein apply what he says as to Philo to the relation between the primitive Christian writers and those of the N. T.? Is it because the application is in no way different? But, according to his own account, the material which the former drew directly from the latter was often applied in a

store of conceptions, expressions, and phrases, and that a correspondence must necessarily take place, without the dependence of any one upon another following therefrom. By far the most of the passages in those apostolic Fathers to which Dietlein appeals attest only a community of conception and expression, but not a dependence on Second Peter, the less so that the harmony consists almost only in accidental phrases and the like, and not in such ideas as are peculiarly characteristic of our epistle; nor has Dietlein been able to show a single sentence in which there is an exact verbal agreement.

In the Epistle of Barnabas, the words, chap. xv.: ἡ ἡμέρα παρ' αὐτῷ (that is, κυρίῳ) χίλια ἔτη, doubtless call up 2 Pet. iii. 8; but the thought to which they give expression is there *entirely different* from that here. Besides, it must be particularly observed—to this Thiersch calls attention—that the conception of the days of the Messiah as a Sabbath of a thousand years is found in the Mischnah, *Tractat. Sanhedrin* 97*b*, in connection with Ps. xc. 4; as also that the authenticity of the Epistle of Barnabas is by no means so certain as Dietlein presupposes. — All the other passages in this epistle to which Dietlein appeals (especially in chap. i. and ii., in the salutation and the conclusion of the epistle) show points of similarity only, which by no means prove the existence of definite references.[1] — So, too, with the passages from the Epistle of Clemens Romanus (chap. vii. init. comp. with 2 Pet. i. 12 and iii. 9; chap. viii. comp. with 2 Pet. iii. 9, 16, 17; chap. ix. comp. with 2 Pet. i. 17, etc.; chap. xi. with 2 Pet. ii. 6, 7, etc.), and from that of Polycarp (chap. iii. comp. with 2 Pet. iii. 15, 16; chap. vi. fin. and vii. init. with 2 Pet. iii. 2, etc.).[2] Had Polycarp really been acquainted with

very diverse manner; and though the difference here be not so great as in the above case, it is only natural it should be so, if the different circumstances be considered.

[1] When Barnabas, in the introduction to his epistle, thus states the purpose of it: ἵνα μετὰ τῆς πίστεως τέλειαν ἔχητε καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν, this so entirely corresponds with the contents of the epistle that he certainly cannot have made Second Peter his guide; that he makes use of the verb σπουδάζειν is all the less objectionable, that the word is a very common one. The enumeration of the virtues (chap. ii.) is entirely different from that which occurs in 2 Pet. i. 5–8, and the words: magnarum et honestarum Dei acquitatum abundantiam sciens esse in vobis, have a very feeble similarity to: τὰ μέγιστα ἡμῖν καὶ τίμια ἐπαγγέλματα δεδώρηται, 2 Pet. i. 4, especially as the connection of thought is of quite another kind.

[2] Dietlein finds specially in Clement a mass of references to Second Peter;

Second Peter, and had he wished to refer to it, it is impossible to understand why he does not quote even *one* sentence from it literally, as he certainly does from First Peter. — Still less than that of the above-mentioned Fathers is the dependence of Ignatius on Second Peter capable of proof, even in a single passage. — As regards Justin Martyr, the earlier critics have traced back the expression in the *Dialog. cum Tryph.* c. 89 (p. 308, Morelli's edition): *συνήκαμεν γὰρ τὸ εἰρημένον, ὅτι ἡμέρα κυρίου ὡς χίλια ἔτη, εἰς τοῦτο συνάγειν*, to 2 Pet. iii. 8 as their original source; but the words here have the same meaning as in the Epistle of Barnabas, and, besides, differ still more markedly from those of Second Peter. — Indeed, Justin himself seems to hint that the words are not taken from an apostolic writing; for he cites them as a saying not unknown to Trypho, whilst he expressly mentions the book of the N. T. from which a quotation immediately following is taken: *καὶ ἔπειτα* (*i.e.* "and then," *i.e.* "and further") *Ἰωάννης . . . ἐν ἀποκαλύψει . . . προεφήτευσε.*—Subsequently, indeed, Justin designates the false teachers as *ψευδοδιδάσκαλοι* (a word which occurs, no doubt, in the N. T. only in Second Peter), and that, similarly as in 2 Pet. ii. 1, in connection with the false prophets among the Jews; but this need occasion no surprise, since in after times the name was not uncommon, and the application of it must have suggested itself at once to him in conversation with a Jew. — Nor in Hermas either is there any quotation properly so called from Second Peter. Still appeal has been made to various expressions (in Vis. iii. 7, iv. 3) which no doubt may be traced back to that Epistle; and yet more is this the case in Vis. vii. Whilst, however, Wiesinger admits the dependence on Second Peter, and Brückner is inclined to agree with him, Weiss remarks, that in the Greek text, now brought to light, the supposed references in Hermas lose every semblance of similarity. On the other

but it is here precisely that the way in which he strains the most natural phrases and expressions becomes apparent. There is no foundation for the assertions, that the expression: *ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐσμεν σκάμματι* (which the words *καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἡμῖν ἀγὼν ἐπίκειται* follow) had its origin, by association of ideas (!), in the *ἐφ' ὅσον εἰμὶ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σκηνώματι* of Peter; that Clement was stimulated by Peter to write the remarks in chap. vii. and xi.; that when he wished to account for the very special reverence in which Paul was held, he, in doing so, did not act without reference to 2 Pet. iii. 15! By what right are expressions such as *ὑπακοή, μετάνοια, δικαιοσύνη, ταπεινοφροσύνη*, etc., stamped as peculiarly Petrine? — Dietlein attaches special importance both to the fact that Polycarp mentions Paul, and to the manner in which he does so, as also to his controversy with the heretics, who denied the *ἀνάστασις*. Yet here, too, it is presupposed that similarities are due entirely to direct reference; and, moreover, no account whatever is taken of the relation in which Polycarp stood to Clement.

hand, Hofmann maintains that in *Sim.* vi. c. 2 ff., the peculiar connection of τρυφή with ἀπάτη, etc., as also the singular calculation, for how long a time pain would follow one day of luxurious living, can only be explained by a reference to Second Peter; and further, that the vision of the seven virtues (*Sim.* iii. c. 8) could have had 2 Pet. i. 5–7 as a pattern. Both of these assertions are very questionable.—In Theophilus (*ad Autol.*) it is two passages principally that recall our epistle; in the one it is said of the prophets (l. II. c. 11, ed. Wolfii, Hamb. 1724): οἱ δὲ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἄνθρωποι πνευματοφόροι πνεύματος ἁγίου καὶ προφῆται γενόμενοι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐμπνευσθέντες καὶ σοφισθέντες ἐγένοντο θεοδίδακτοι καὶ ὅσιοι καὶ δίκαιοι; in the other (l. II. c. 1), with reference to the Logos: ἡ διάταξις τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ φαίνων ὥσπερ λύχνος ἐν οἰκήματι συνεχομένῳ. The similarity of the former passage with 2 Pet. i. 21, and of the latter with 2 Pet. i. 18, is indisputable; but that the one had its origin in the other remains certainly doubtful, the points of difference being not less marked than those of agreement. The conception formed of the prophets is in both cases the same no doubt, but it was also the view generally prevalent, and is found even in Philo; cf. the exposition of 2 Pet. i. 21; the manner of expression, too, is not a little different. As regards the other passages, it must be observed that there is agreement, neither in the figure employed (ἐν οἰκήματι συνεχομένῳ instead of ἐν αὐχμηρῷ τόπῳ), nor with respect to the object spoken of. — In Irenaeus the thought, that one day is with the Lord as a thousand years, is again found, and that in two passages (*Adv. Haeres.* v. 23 and 28), but in neither of them is it hinted that the words are taken from an apostolic writing. If it had not its origin in some collection of proverbs then in circulation, it is very probable that Irenaeus borrowed it from Justin, since he too uses the expression: ἡμέρα κυρίου (not παρὰ κυρίῳ). — Dietlein, indeed, thinks that instances of reference on Irenaeus's part to Second Peter may be richly accumulated, the more the finding of them is made an *object of study* (!). But Irenaeus nowhere mentions the epistle, nor does he anywhere make a quotation from it,—a circumstance more surprising in his case than in that of Polycarp, if he really knew the epistle, and considered it to be an apostolic writing. Cf. Brückner, *Einl.* § 4.

The result of an unbiassed examination is, that in Ignatius there are to be found no references to Second Peter; in Clemens Rom., Barnabas, and Polycarp, none in any way probable; in Justin Martyr, Hermas, and Theophilus, none certain; and further, that Irenaeus cannot be looked upon as

a guarantee for the existence and authority of the epistle in the church. If, then, the apostolic Fathers had already made use of this composition, more especially in the manner in which Dietlein holds that they did, it would be impossible to explain not only how the doubts, spoken of by Origen, arose, but also the circumstance that the epistle is mentioned neither by Tertullian nor by Cyprian. Dietlein's assertion, that the older Fathers of the church, in making more frequent reference to the Pauline Epistles than to the Petrine, did, in doing so, but follow the hints which Peter himself gave in chap. iii. 15, 16, explains nothing; for, on the one hand, no such hint is contained in that passage; and, on the other, the first epistle must have shared the same fate as the second, which is not the case. — Thiersch, as already remarked, whilst admitting that it cannot be proved that any of the early church Fathers made reference to Second Peter, at the same time allows that none of the reasons which explain the subordinate position held by the antilegomena as compared with the homologoumena, are applicable to this epistle. He is therefore driven to account for the fact that this epistle was not included among the subjects of regular anagnosis, by saying that this was due to the fear lest a too early disclosure—as made in his words of thunder (?)—of the evil, in its whole scope, would have had the effect of hastening on the outbreak of it, more especially at a time when all minds were being stirred to their very depths, as was the case when the canon of the homologoumena was fixed. But this reason is in itself very improbable, for there could certainly have been no better weapon against the advancing evil, than the word of an apostle, and especially of Peter. Thus, too, the reflection is cast upon Peter that he was here wanting in true apostolic wisdom, inasmuch as he composed an epistle which could have no other than a disturbing influence. And what, then, is to be said of Jude, who made into a special epistle the sharpest passages, and those likely to exercise that influence most strongly!

The circumstance that the epistle is not mentioned by the earliest Fathers of the church remains all the more surprising, when it is considered how important the polemic it contains

against errors of the worst kind must have made it appear to them. Wiesinger thinks that the exception taken to it by Hieronymus on linguistic grounds (see below), as well as the dogmatic objections raised to it, would be less likely to recommend for use an epistle so special in its contents. But opposed to this is—(1) That if the churches to whom it is addressed did receive it from Peter, they would hardly have compared it in the matter of style with the first epistle; (2) That it affords no ground for dogmatic objection; (3) That the special character of its contents is precisely of such a nature as to promote its use, rather than to be an obstacle in the way of it. Weiss justly maintains that the question, how it can be explained that there are no certain traces of the epistle in the second century, is as yet unsolved, in that what has been urged in the way of solution by the defenders of the genuineness, is in a great measure arbitrary and insufficient.

After the time of Eusebius, the epistle was generally treated as canonical; yet Gregory of Nazianzum already says (*Carm.* 33, ver. 35): *καθολικῶν ἐπιστολῶν τινὲς μὲν ἑπτὰ φάσιν, οἱ δὲ τρεῖς μόνας χρῆναι δέχεσθαι*; and Hieronymus (*s. de Script. eccl.* c. 1), who himself holds the genuineness of the epistle, remarks that its Petrine origin is denied by most, and withal propter styli cum priore dissonantiam. — Although it was not in the Peschito, Ephraem Syrus made no doubt as to its genuineness; meantime, and notwithstanding, doubt long maintained itself in the Syrian Church, as may be seen from the words of Cosmas Indicopleustes (*Christ. topographia*, lib. vi.): *παρὰ Σύροις δὲ εἰ μὴ αἱ τρεῖς μόναι αἱ προγεγραμμέναι οὐχ εὑρίσκονται, Ἰακώβου καὶ Πέτρου καὶ Ἰωάννου· αἱ ἄλλαι γὰρ οὔτε κεῖνται παρ' αὐτοῖς.*

In the Middle Ages all doubts were silenced, but at the time of the Reformation they immediately revived. Erasmus already said that, juxta sensum humanum he did not believe that the epistle was the composition of Peter; and Calvin is of opinion that there are several probabiles conjecturae, from which it can be concluded that the epistle is the work rather of some one other than Peter. — The older Lutheran dogmatists are not inclined to insist positively on its genuineness, on the ground that the church does not possess the

power, quod possit ex falsis scriptis facere vera, ex veris falsa, ex dubiis et incertis facere certa, canonica et legitima (Chemnitz, *Ex. Conc. Trid.*, ed. 1615, Francof., p. 87 ff.). Although the later writers on dogmatics gradually obliterate, more and more, the distinction between homologoumena and antilegomena, and our epistle in ecclesiastical use is treated increasingly as a canonical writing, yet doubt did not wholly disappear. Indeed, since Semler it has grown to such an extent that Schwegler (*d. nachapost. Zeitalt.* Bd. 1, p. 491) feels warranted in saying: "From Calvin, Grotius, Scaliger, and Salmasius, to Semler, Neander, Credner, and de Wette, the voices of all competent authorities have united in doubting and rejecting it." — This is, however, saying too much, for there has never been any want of competent authorities to defend its genuineness. Still, the general voice had certainly become always more unfavourable to the epistle, — till in recent times new defenders of its authenticity appeared.[1] Many critics hold that genuine and spurious parts may be distinguished in the epistle; thus Berthold in his *Einl. z. N. T.* and C. Ullmann in his work, *Der 2 Brief Petri kritisch untersucht*, Heidelb. 1821. The former regards the second chapter as spurious, the latter the third also. The first of these two views is refuted by the fact that not the second chapter alone, but likewise several passages of the third, bear a similarity to Jude's epistle; and against that of Ullmann are the circumstances that the first chapter has by no means the character of a completed whole, while, as § 2 proves, there is a firm line of thought running through the epistle, and binding into a unity its several parts, from beginning to end.

In discussing the question of the authenticity of our

[1] As defenders of its authenticity may be specially named: Nitzsche (*Ep. Petri posterior auctori suo imprimis contra Grotium vindicata*, Lips. 1785), C. C. Flatt (*Genuina secundae ep. Petri origo denuo defenditur*, Tub. 1806), J. C. W. Dahl (*De authentia ep. Petri poster. et Judae*, Rost. 1807), F. Windischmann (*Vindiciae Petrinae*, Ratisb. 1836), A. L. C. Heydenreich (*Ein Wort zur Vertheidigung der Aechtheit des 2 Br. Petri*, Herborn 1837), Guericke (who in his *Beiträge* had expressed doubts as to the authenticity); besides these, Pott, Augusti, Hug, etc.; and in most recent times, Thiersch, Stier, Dietlein, Hofmann, Luthardt, Wiesinger, Schott, Weiss, Steinfass; Brückner is not quite decided.

epistle, it will be necessary to consider its relation to First Peter. If this latter be held to be spurious, there is of course no need of any further investigation, for, appealing as the second does to the first, it must share its fate. But since First Peter must be regarded as genuine, a comparison of it with our epistle is of the highest importance.

The doubts as to the authenticity of the second epistle, which result from a comparison of the two writings with each other, are founded not on a dissonantia styli only (Hieron.), but also on a diversity (although not a contradiction) in the mode of conception. No doubt those who call the authenticity in question have not unfrequently gone too far in the production of alleged differences, but that such do exist cannot be denied. Of these the following are the most important:—The prominent feature in both epistles is, indeed, the Parousia of Christ, but the manner in which it is spoken of is in each different; in the first epistle the prevailing conception is the ἐλπίς; in the second, on the other hand, it is the ἐπίγνωσις,—the former expression not occurring in the second epistle, nor the latter in the first. In the first epistle the day of the second advent is looked upon as imminent; in the second, mention is indeed made of a sudden, but not of the near arrival of that day; rather is it expressly indicated as *possible* that it would not come till farther on in the future. In the first epistle the *chief stress* is laid on the glorification of believers which shall accompany the return of Christ; in the second epistle prominence is principally given to the catastrophe which shall overtake the whole creation in connection with the advent, that is, to the destruction of the old world by fire, to give place to the new heaven and the new earth. In addition to this, the advent is in the first epistle designated by the word ἀποκάλυψις, and in the second by παρουσία.

The existence of this difference cannot, as opposed to Hofmann too, be called in question. Even if, as Wiesinger strongly urges, the passage iii. 14, 15 indicate that the Parousia will be the glorification of believers, still the form under which this is represented as taking place is different from that of the first epistle. When Schott asserts that "the second epistle in no

way, and least of all 'expressly,' alleges the possibility of a later realization of the Parousia," the statement loses its justification in presence of ver. 8. Weiss's objection, that by ἐπίγνωσις is not to be understood a "theoretical knowledge perfecting the Christian life," is out of place here, for ἐπίγνωσις and ἐλπίς are certainly different ideas; and even if Weiss be correct in saying that the expectation of the near Parousia is not abandoned in the second epistle, the difference in question would not be removed.

Whilst in the first epistle the saving truths of the death and resurrection of Christ form the basis of the ἐλπίς and of the Christian's moral life, in the second epistle these are nowhere mentioned. Nor in the latter epistle is there any trace to be found of the ideas peculiar to the former (cf. Introduction to the epistle); and, on the other hand, the conceptions characteristic of this epistle, as the view expressed in chap. i. 19; further, the idea of the κοινωνία with the divine nature secured by means of the ἐπαγγέλματα, and the belief that the world was framed by God, and would perish again by fire, are nowhere hinted at in the first epistle.

These remarks, too, maintain their full force against the objections taken to them; for the question here is, not as to how these differences (not contradictions) are to be explained, on the assumption of an identity of authorship, but as to the fact, which cannot be called in question, that they actually do exist. Is it beside the question for Schott, in reply to the remark that in the second epistle the *death and resurrection* of Christ are not mentioned, to adduce a mass of citations from it for the purpose of showing, what is no doubt true, that *the person* of Christ is very decidedly brought forward as the guarantee of a completed salvation, and the efficient origin of an holy walk; and all the more that, in proportion as the person of Christ is insisted upon, the stranger does it seem that an apostle like Peter should pass over those facts in silence?

As regards the *style* and *mode of expression* in both epistles, it should not be left unnoticed that Peter's literary character, as seen in his first epistle, is not, like that of Paul or John, so sharply defined and original, that each of his productions reveals its authorship. And just as little must it be forgotten, that the

first epistle in many passages recalls the epistles of Paul, that the second is, to no inconsiderable extent, dependent on Jude, and that consequently the peculiar character of Peter's style is difficult to determine, the more so that his writings are only of small extent.[1] Still many linguistic differences are to be found, which even in Hieronymus' time attracted attention, and which cannot be overlooked. It is not to be denied that the freshness of expression of the first epistle, and its richness in combinations of thought, are here wanting. Whilst in the first epistle one thought follows directly upon another in lively succession, the connection in the second epistle is not unfrequently effected by means of conjunctions which point back to what precedes, or by a formal resumption of what had previously been said, cf. chap. i. 8, 9, 10, 12, 15, iii. 7, 10, 12. And whilst, too, in the first epistle there is a richness and variety in the use of prepositions expressive of manifold relationships, a conspicuous uniformity in this respect prevails throughout the second epistle. Many peculiarities which are characteristic of the diction of the first epistle (cf. Introd. to first epistle, § 2), are foreign to the second. In the use also of several single expressions

[1] In opposition to what is said above, Schott maintains not only that the Epistle of Jude is dependent on Second Peter, but also that Second Peter contains echoes of the Pauline Epistles. He thinks that ἰσότιμος, i. 1, arose from Eph. ii. 19; ἀποφυγόντες . . . φθορᾶς, i. 4, from Rom. viii. 20 ff.; and the passage i. 12 ff. from Rom. xv. 14, etc. The epistle, further, is supposed to show a special dependence on the Pastoral Epistles, i. 3–11 being only an adaptation of Tit. ii. 12–14, etc. Schott attaches particular importance to this, that leading and fundamental ideas in the epistle are employed in the same prominent manner only here and in the Pastoral Epistles, as εὐσέβεια, εὐσεβής, ἀσεβής, σωτήρ, σώζειν, μιαίνω with its family, ἐπίγνωσις, βλασφημεῖν, ἐπαγγέλλομαι; a dependence, too, on the Epistle to the Hebrews he considers hardly less evident. — All these assertions, however, are unwarranted. As a matter of course, there are ideas expressed in Second Peter which correspond to those contained in other epistles; but this arises from the oneness of the Christian faith, and is no proof of a special reference to any of those epistles. As regards the individual leading and fundamental ideas of the Pastoral Epistles and of Second Peter, adduced by Schott, ἀσεβής (ἀσέβεια) is to be found equally in the Epistle to the Romans; σωτήρ occurs in other N. T. writings; σώζειν is not used in Second Peter, and as little is μιαίνω; ἐπίγνωσις and βλασφημεῖν are terms which are to be found often enough in the N. T.; ἐπαγγέλλομαι in 2 Pet. ii. 19 has not the meaning which it has in First Timothy; the terms εὐσεβής, εὐσέβεια *alone* are almost the only ones which are peculiar to these epistles.

there is an established difference: κύριος, when used without more precise definition, is in the second epistle a designation of God, cf. chap. ii. 9 (11), iii. 8, 9, 10; in the first epistle, on the other hand, except in quotations from the O. T., it is used of Christ, cf. chap. ii. 3, 13. In the first epistle the name Χριστός, when not joined with Ἰησοῦς, is frequently treated as a proper name, cf. i. 11, 19, ii. 21, iii. 16, 18, iv. 1, 13, 14, v. 1; in the second epistle, on the other hand, Χριστός never occurs except in connection with Ἰησοῦς. And these divergencies are all the more fitted to excite surprise, if, as Hofmann assumes, the second epistle was written very soon after the first.

1. The objection raised against the last remark, that the combination of Χριστός with Ἰησοῦς occurs also in the first epistle (Wiesinger, Schott, Brückner), is without force, since this is not, and never could have been, denied. And it signifies equally little that, as Hofmann shows, in the second epistle (with the exception of i. 1) Ἰησ. Χριστός also is never to be found alone, but always in connection with ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν, etc.; since it cannot be denied that Χριστός is used by itself—often in the first, but never in the second epistle.—Of still less consequence are the remarks of Hofmann as to the use of κύριος. When Schott asserts that Χριστός, with or without the article, wherever it stands in the first epistle, denotes the Mediator as such, but that in the second epistle there is nothing to lead to the mention of the Mediator, it must be remarked, in reply, that in the second epistle Christ is designated as the Mediator distinctly enough by the name σωτήρ.

2. Besides the differences here mentioned, Mayerhoff brings forward many others. In doing so, however, he has gone much too far. Thus he lays stress on the fact that in the first epistle the exhortations are commenced concisely with the imperative; in the second, on the other hand, with a circumlocutory expression, *e.g.* i. 12, 13, 15, iii. 1, 2, 8. But in the first epistle the latter manner of beginning could not occur, inasmuch as the apostle does not there remind his readers of what they had formerly heard from him, as he does in the second epistle; nor, in the second epistle, is the imperative without circumlocution by any means wanting. Further, Mayerhoff speaks of it as peculiar to the second epistle, that ἐν is inserted with a substantive, as in chap. i. 4; yet the same takes place in the first epistle. Of many of the phenomena which are supposed to be peculiar to the first epistle, Mayer-

hoff himself admits that they are to be found also in the second, only less frequently. To the assertion, that in the two epistles the conception of the Christian religion is not the same, it must be replied that the various expressions denote the different sides of the Christian life. As against Mayerhoff, cf. the discussions of Schott, Brückner, Weiss.

No doubt their diversity in thought may be traced to a difference in the tendency of the two epistles, nor is the diction either of the second by any means unjustifiable;[1] yet it does appear strange that, if Peter wrote this letter from the situation on which the second epistle is based, he should have done so in such a manner that it would present so many diversities in character from that of the first epistle. Nevertheless, there are between the two writings many points of coincidence which cannot be overlooked. In both attention is directed chiefly to the Parousia of Christ, and to preparation for it by an holy walk. In both the readers are expressly shown that to be Christians, as they were, is to be in the right and true state of salvation, and they are exhorted at once to give proof of it by an holy behaviour, and to confirm themselves in it. Both epistles, further, have this in common, that they are strongly dependent on the O. T. (on this see Schott and Weiss). In the mode of expression, also, there are to be found many points of coincidence. Thus it may be noted that in i. 4 the ideas *καλεῖν* and *ἀρετή* are connected together in a manner which, though not identical with 1 Pet. ii. 9, is yet similar to it; that as in 1 Pet. i. 19 the adjectives *ἄμωμος* and *ἄσπιλος* stand together, so in 2 Pet. iii. 14 *ἄσπιλος* and *ἀμώμητος* are conjoined, with which also the expression ii. 13: *σπῖλοι καὶ μῶμοι*, corresponds; that the word *ἀπόθεσις* is to be found only in these two epistles. It is also worthy of remark that the introductions and the conclusions in both the epistles show an unmistakeable likeness. The commencement points, in the case of each, to the future kingdom of God; 1 Pet. i. 4: *εἰς κληρονομίαν*; 2 Pet. i. 11:

[1] It is only these two points, here distinctly expressed, which Hofmann brings forward in order to remove all objections, arising from the different characters of the two epistles, to the view that both are the productions of the same author.

εἰς τὴν αἰώνιον βασιλείαν Ἰησ. Χριστοῦ; and as at the close of First Peter the purpose of the letter is stated by the παρακαλῶν κ.τ.λ., v. 12, so in Second Peter the design of the composition is given by: φυλάσσεσθε . . . αὐξάνετε, where the φυλάσσεσθε . . . ἵνα μὴ ἐκπέσητε τοῦ ἰδίου στηριγμοῦ corresponds in a particular manner with the στηρίξαι and the ἐπιμαρτυρῶν, ταύτην εἶναι ἀληθῆ χάριν τοῦ Θεοῦ, εἰς ἣν ἑστήκατε, in First Peter.

Like the opponents of the authenticity in bringing forward differences, its defenders have not unfrequently overstepped all bounds in the production of supposed points of coincidence. Of this Schott has been especially guilty. He goes so far as to say that even 2 Pet. i. 1 "is an armoury from which all doubts concerning the Petrine origin of the second epistle are repelled," and everywhere, wherever in thought or conception any resemblance between the two epistles is to be seen, he seeks to show that the second makes reference to the first, without in any way distinguishing what in conception is Christian and common from what is characteristic and peculiar; and Brückner has accordingly justly protested against many of the arguments advanced by Schott. But even Weiss often goes too far, as when, with reference to the doctrine of redemption, he maintains that the ideas of calling and of election in 2 Peter (i. 10) seem to be synonymous as in 1 Peter, whilst the fact is that no such combination occurs in the latter epistle; when he compares the κοινωνία θείας φύσεως (2 Pet. i. 4) with the thought that the calling is the motive to become like unto him who calls, after 1 Pet. i. 15; when he thinks that the θεία δύναμις of Christ, which gives all that is necessary for the new life, corresponds with the divine δύναμις which preserves unto salvation (1 Pet. i. 5); further, when he lays stress on the fact that in both epistles the δικαιοσύνη constitutes the central point of Christian moral life, whilst elsewhere also in the New Testament the essence of such life is often enough expressed by δικαιοσύνη; when he considers that the falling a prey to φθορά (2 Pet. i. 4, ii. 12, 19) recalls the antithesis between φθαρτόν and ἄφθαρτον in the first epistle; when he states that in the second epistle (i. 7) the φιλαδελφία forms the climax of the Christian virtues in harmony with 1 Pet. i. 22, since there it is not φιλαδελφία, but ἀγάπη which is spoken of as the climax, and φιλαδελφία is also made prominent elsewhere in the N. T. With regard to the doctrinal phraseology, Weiss, in the first instance, adduces a number of points of divergence, and then lays stress on the fact that many

and, in part, striking points of agreement are to be found. But here again Weiss goes too far; the most of the substantives, adjectives, and verbs which he brings forward as significant of the agreement of the two epistles, being in current use in N. T. language. As regards substantives, with the exception of ἀρετή, the term γνῶσις (1 Pet. iii. 7 and 2 Pet. i. 5) only can be adduced as of importance, for τιμή and δόξα occur elsewhere together; in like manner τέκνα, in a metaphorical sense, is to be found elsewhere; it is plainly incorrect to say that δύναμις in 2 Pet. ii. 11 is used of angels as in 1 Pet. iii. 22; in the latter passage it denotes the angels themselves, but not so in the former. How the adjectives adduced by Weiss should ever have a special significance it is not easy to see, used as they often enough are elsewhere. The same is the case with most of the verbs; ἀναστρέφεσθαι ἐν and αὐξάνειν ἐν at most can be brought forward as of importance in this connection. And in referring to kindred expressions, Weiss again goes too far. The following at most are to be noted here as worthy of attention: ἰσότιμος in the second, and πολύτιμος in the first; ἄθεσμος there, ἀθέμιτος here; the already mentioned ἄσπιλος καὶ ἀμώμητος in the first, and ἄσπιλος καὶ ἄμωμος in the second, but hardly ἀκατα-παύστους ἁμαρτίας and πέπαυται ἁμαρτίας.

In spite of all points of accord, real and asserted, the verdict of Weiss comes only to this, that if these be taken into account there will be an inclination to see in the divergencies no hindrance to an identity of authorship; that the points of agreement are more than those of divergence; and that the old complaint as to the complete difference of style, was founded on very great exaggeration. Similar, though more moderate, is the judgment of Brückner. Schott, however, expressly admits that the outward form of the second epistle as a whole shows, at first sight even, quite other features from those of the first epistle. The question as to how the undeniable difference in thought and expression is to be explained, has been variously answered. On the assumption of the authenticity of the epistle, it will not do to explain the difficulty by supposing that Peter wrote "in advanced old age, and when at the very gate of death" (Guericke), for the period between the composition of the first and the second epistles can have been, comparatively speaking, only a brief one, at most four years—a time certainly too short to account for the difference.

Hieronymus tries to make the dissimilarity of style intelligible by assuming that Peter made use of different interpreters for each of his epistles. But this hypothesis of the use of interpreters is without any valid reason, and, besides, is inadequate to the end it is meant to serve. It is certainly more correct to find the ground of the diversity in the different tendencies of the two epistles. The purpose of the first is to lay down to the readers their true course of conduct in the midst of the persecutions they had to suffer; that of the second, on the other hand, is to protect them against the heresies of the Libertines which threatened them.[1] These different tendencies must naturally lend to each of the epistles its own peculiar character. Yet even Schott admits that this alone is insufficient for the solution of the problem. Schott thinks it can be solved only in this way: that Peter in his first epistle, "for the sake of his readers—to whom he was unknown—and in his own interest, of set purpose kept his individuality assiduously in the background, and sought with the utmost possible fidelity all through the epistle to write in a manner to which the Gentile-Christians and the Pauline churches were accustomed. For this reason he elaborated his first epistle with special care, even as to form; but after he had entered into near personal relations with his readers, he had not the same occasion as in the first epistle to keep his own individuality out of sight." This manner of answering the question under discussion, which Weiss justly calls "hyperartificial," needs certainly no refutation. As, then, the difficulty is not to be removed either by separating, with Weiss, the two epistles by an interval of more than ten years,—for the assumption, that the first epistle was written before the letters of the Apostle Paul to the churches of Asia Minor, is an untenable hypothesis,—it must be admitted, with Brückner and Weiss, on the

[1] Hofmann thinks that the different tendencies of the two epistles are erroneously stated here. He holds that the first epistle contains "nothing as to what are usually termed persecutions of Christians," and that in the second epistle there is "no warning against teachers of false doctrine, to whom the readers were exposed, or who already had appeared in their midst." Both assertions are false. To what is said above must be added only, that the two epistles, relating as they do to different circumstances, point to the exhortation to lead "an holy and godly life."

supposition of the authenticity, that there is presented here a problem which has not yet been satisfactorily solved. And the difficulty is increased if it be considered that in the two epistles quite different conditions of the churches are presupposed; for whilst in the first there is no trace of any dread of heretical trouble, there is wanting in the second all reference to persecutions to which the readers were exposed,—a circumstance which is not to be passed over so lightly as Hofmann does.

The shorter the time between the composition of the two epistles, the more surprising is this phenomenon; the longer, the easier is it of explanation. For Weiss, who assumes an interval of over ten years, there is here hardly any difficulty, more especially as he thinks that Peter, after the composition of the first epistle, was personally present in the churches, and in that case did not need to mention the persecutions which had induced him to compose his first letter. Brückner reserves for himself a way of escape from the difficulty caused by this and other surprising phenomena, by holding that as to the close of Peter's life the received tradition may be wrong. Schott, on the other hand, attaches no importance to these divergencies, although in his opinion the first epistle was written in the year 65, and the second in the year 66. For he assumes, on the one hand, that when Peter wrote his second epistle the persecutions were past; and, on the other, that even in the first there are references to errors already present, which Peter, "from his tender and fine feeling of the delicate relation in which he stood to a Pauline church as yet in reality unknown to him," did not wish expressly to censure. Both assumptions are erroneous; for the persecutions which were the occasion of the first epistle are there clearly characterized as persecutions which, after they had arisen, continued (see Introd. to Ep. 1); and as regards the heresies supposed to have been in existence when the first epistle was composed, Weiss justly remarks: "There is nothing to be discovered in it either of the connection with the heresy combated in the second epistle, which Brückner artificially brings out, nor of its clearly marked features, which Schott professes to have found." It is not in any way to be inferred from the First Epistle of Peter, as Schott asserts, "that it shows a greater spread and inward intensity of the evil combated in the Epistle to Timothy," or that 1 Pet. iv. 2–4 attests that "a comparatively large section of the readers was prepared, by a liberal concession to immorality in social life, to gain undisturbed security for themselves as professing Christians;" or that in

iii. 18 ff., iv. 5, 6, 17, 18, it is hinted "that the spiritualistic explaining away of the resurrection of the flesh led the readers to deny also a final judicial decision connected with the return of Christ in the body." Schott, in what he here says, is moving, not on the ground of true exegesis, but in the region of the most arbitrary fiction.

The less success has attended all efforts to overcome the difficulties which, on the assumption of the authenticity, lie in the relation of the two epistles to each other, the more justifiable does doubt as to the authenticity appear. It has, no doubt, been asserted that a Falsarius would have followed the first epistle so closely as to have avoided these differences; but it is equally conceivable that a pseudonymous author could have written under the influence of Peter's epistle indeed, yet still in his own peculiar style, and without being anxiously careful lest the origin of his composition should thus be betrayed. On this assumption the existence both of similarity and divergence is explained. Several considerations have been urged against the authenticity of the epistle:—

1. The intention of the author to make himself known as the Apostle Peter. To this it may be replied that, looked at from the situation in which the epistle was written, and which it presupposes (i. 13, 14), this so-called intention is neither unnatural, nor need it excite surprise. If Peter, conscious of his approaching death, felt himself impelled to write a last word to the churches with which he had before this become connected, reminding them of his former preaching, and warning them against doubts as to the second coming of Christ, it was certainly not out of place for him to mention himself, his relation to the churches, and more especially that event in his own life by which the glory of Christ was revealed to him in a manner so special. 2. The remark the author makes on the epistles of Paul and the other Scriptures. In itself, the fact is not strange that the epistle bears testimony to an acquaintance with the epistles of Paul, for that some of the latter were known to Peter is evident from the first epistle; nor do the words (chap. iii. 16) imply that the author possessed a *formally* completed collection of them. But the expression: ὡς καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς γραφάς, is certainly striking. For although it is

arbitrary to understand by it the *whole* of the other books of the New Testament, yet the expression must have reference to writings which were already in general use in the churches. It is at least open to question whether this could have been said, in Peter's time, of writings of the New Testament. Several interpreters (Luthardt, Wiesinger) understand by the term the oldest writings; on this point see the exposition. 3. The use made of the Epistle of Jude. It is certainly going too far to brand this as a plagiarism (Reuss); nor can it be said that to make use of another's work was in itself unworthy of an apostle. Still it is surprising that an apostle should have incorporated in his epistle, as to the substance of it, a non-apostolic letter.[1] De Wette's accusations are, however, unjust: that in Second Peter the simple expression of Jude is partly changed by rhetorical and artificial circumlocution, partly disfigured and singularly superseded, and that a vacillating line of thought takes the place of one firm and definite. The circumlocutions and additions of Second Peter do not bear on them the character of artificialness. If alterations in the latter composition are to be found (cf. Jude 12 with 2 Pet. ii. 13; Jude 12, 13, with 2 Pet. ii. 17), these cannot be said to be distortions (or, according to Schwegler, confusion and misunderstanding); and if the original course of ideas be not firmly maintained owing to the introduction of new relations (cf. 2 Pet. ii. 5, 7–9), and a transposition be resorted to (cf. 2 Pet. ii. 13–17, comp. with Jude 11–13), yet the firmness of the line of thought does not in any way suffer thereby. Incorrect, too, is de Wette's assertion, that "the heretics combated in Second Peter are mere nonentities, and a spurious copy of the seducers in Jude;" as also that of Schwegler, that they are characterized not after life, not from direct knowledge of them, but according to the vague representation of tradition. Not, however, without weight is the circumstance on which de Wette lays stress, that the false teachers are represented at

[1] Weiss takes a too low estimate of the use made of Jude's epistle when he says: "Second Peter intentionally *seeks support* in the highly realistic and vivid description given by Jude of his opponents; and that even apart from this intentional connection, an expression may *involuntarily* here and there have presented itself to the author's pen from an epistle so important, and which he had probably just read."

one time as about to appear in the future, at another as already present. Wiesinger rejects the view, that while in ii. 1–3 the future seducers are meant, ver. 10 ff. has reference to those already present, and assumes that the future ἔσονται applies only to the relation of these seducers *to the readers*, and their work among them. Weiss combats this assumption, and in opposition to it defends that rejected by Wiesinger. If it be conceivable that the Libertines already present are "the beginning of the end," and therefore not yet the ψευδοδιδάσκαλοι, ver. 1, still it must not fail to be observed that in the epistle itself no single word definitely points to any such distinction. Even less satisfactory is it to say, with Dietlein, that the first germs of opposition were already in existence; or, with Luthardt and Schott, to hold that if the author speaks of the false teachers as already present, he does so only in appearance, arising from the circumstance that he passes from the prediction to the description of them. It may perhaps be most correct to assume that the author, in the first instance, quotes the prophetic word in and for itself simply; and that he afterwards, in the description of the Libertines already in existence, hints that the predictions had begun to be fulfilled. Brückner seems to hold a similar opinion; only he unites this view with that of Wiesinger, and thus deprives it of its necessary clearness. — If the authenticity be rejected, the difficulty seems to disappear. It would then lie to hand to explain the vacillation by saying, that the author thought to combat the heresies of his time, with better result, by representing them as already predicted by Peter, and by allowing himself, in the description of them, to be guided by a composition in which they were treated as actually in existence. But it can hardly be conceived that the author should fail to perceive how incongruous his conduct was. — Worthy of remark, further, is the endeavour of the author to obliterate all apocryphal traces to be found in Jude.[1] The

[1] Schwegler sees in this also a proof that the epistle was not written until the end of the second century, inasmuch as the dislike to quote apocryphal writings was still foreign even to an Irenaeus, a Clement, or an Origen. If importance must be attached to this, the epistle plainly cannot have been written till after the time of Origen, which is impossible.

total omission of these would have argued nothing against the Petrine authorship; but it is only the words of Enoch (Jude 14, 15) that are left out. The passage relating to the angels: *τοὺς μὴ τηρήσαντας . . . οἰκητήριον*, is—inasmuch as the case of the angels must not be omitted—changed into the more general: *ἀγγέλων ἁμαρτησάντων*, whilst the punishment that befell them is given in almost the same words. The reference to the apocryphal narrative of the contest between the archangel Michael and the devil is likewise not wholly destroyed, but only effaced,—a more general term being employed, which, however, causes the thought itself to lose its clearness and precision.[1]

4. The heretical denial of the second advent of Christ, and of the final judgment of the world connected therewith. Although, already in Paul's lifetime, many errors in the teaching as to the last things—as, for example, the denial of the resurrection—had begun to grow up, there is nothing in the other writings of the New Testament to show that the Parousia of Christ was called in question; yet the denial of it is so naturally connected with that of the resurrection, that it could quite easily have found expression even while Peter was yet alive. On the other hand, it cannot be questioned that the reasons assigned by the false teachers (2 Pet. iii. 4) are such as seem to belong rather to a time later than that of the Apostle Peter, although the words by no means imply that the Parousia had for *many* generations already been looked for in vain (Schwegler). And, further, there are the facts that the so-called Second Epistle of Clemens Rom. combats the same heresy,—although in an advanced state of development,—and that one similar, at least, is mentioned in the Epistle of Polycarp.

5. The view expressed in this epistle as to the origin and the destruction of the world. The opinion of Mayerhoff and Neander, that this view "is in harmony neither with the

[1] Wiesinger and Brückner think that Enoch's prediction of judgment was omitted only because there was no appropriate place for it in the connection of thought in this epistle, and that the change in the two verses, 4 and 11, does not show a desire to efface what is apocryphal; that Peter only generalized the special fact mentioned by Jude, ver. 9, presupposing at the same time an acquaintance on the part of his readers with the apocryphal incident referred to. But does not such a presupposition contain what must appear unsuited to an apostle?

practical, simple mind of Peter, nor with the N. T. development of doctrine," reaches certainly too far; it can only be said that it does not find expression elsewhere in the New Testament. Yet the conception that the world arose into being out of the water by the word of God, points back to the history of creation in Genesis; and that of its destruction by fire, though not indeed expressed, has nevertheless the way prepared for it in passages of the O. T., such as Isa. xvi. 15, Dan. vii. 9 sq. (cf. 1 Cor. iii. 13; 2 Thess. i. 8), so that a more precise development of it by Peter is not inconceivable. In opposition to the appeal to the passage in the *Clementine Homilies*, xi. 24: λογισάμενος ὅτι τὰ πάντα τὸ ὕδωρ ποιεῖ κ.τ.λ., Brückner remarks that it must not be overlooked that in Clement it is water, and in Peter God's word, to which precedence is given.

When Credner thinks to prove the spuriousness of the epistle by saying, that an apostle would never have made reference to one of the *mythical* additions in the gospels like the narrative of Christ's transfiguration; and Reuss, by asserting that "the apparent aim of the epistle is to defend the teaching as to the last things, according to the *Judaco-Christian* conception of it, and that as much against unbelief as against a *spiritualizing* interpretation," their views must be simply rejected. Not less unjustifiable is it, however, for Bleek to base his verdict of rejection on the circumstance that in i. 18 the mount of transfiguration is called τὸ ὄρος τὸ ἅγιον, inasmuch as the place is not even mentioned in the gospels, or more nearly described.

If the numerous difficulties and doubts above mentioned do not render the authenticity of the epistle absolutely impossible, many of them are yet of such a nature that the spuriousness of the epistle appears to be hardly less probable than its genuineness, especially as the only positive evidence for the latter is the statement of the author himself, that he is the Apostle Peter. On the other hand, many reasons seem to speak against its pseudonymity. Guericke insists that the passages characteristic of the epistle are, "living, spiritual, and truly apostolic;" but, apart from the circumstance that, *e.g.*, the want of any reference to the essential facts of salvation does seem strange in the case of the Apostle Peter, this

in no way excludes the possibility of a non-apostolic origin. He further says that it is not apparent what purpose a Falsarius could have had in writing; but this is refuted by the epistle itself, which clearly enough states its design. Further, it has been remarked that the epistle, if it be written under a false name, is a palpable fraud, and to this its own moral character is opposed. But, in reply to this, the fact may be brought forward that men of earnest moral character have often thought more effectually to combat heresy by assuming a pseudonym. Thiersch asserts that it was in the period which followed the labours of Paul and preceded those of John that that Libertinism made its appearance in the Pauline churches; but from this it does not follow that the heresy did not maintain itself for a considerable time, so that after Jude had already combated it in his epistle, a later attack on it would have been no longer timely.

Weiss, too, has attempted to prove the hypothesis of a pseudonym untenable. He urges, in the first instance, that it is afflicted with an evil contradiction. For the author appears to play his role at one time cleverly, at another very awkwardly, inasmuch as, with all his endeavours to make himself pass for the apostle, he sometimes forgets his part, and thus betrays his pseudonymity; and, whilst the connection with Jude is made in full harmony with his design, it is carried out in direct opposition to it. Weiss in his remarks has omitted to observe that, like many of the opponents of the authenticity too, he attributes to the author various intentions, which the words of the epistle in no way entitle him to do.[1] Again, Weiss seeks to show that, on the assumption of a pseudonymous author, there is no uniform purpose discoverable in the epistle. But as far as its purpose is concerned, it is irrelevant whether the epistle was composed by the apostle or not. If

[1] The author is supposed to have forgotten his part, from this circumstance, that whilst in the beginning of it he does not name a special class of readers, *in order thus to hide the interpolation* of his epistle, he indirectly mentions them in iii. 1. But there is no proof that the author intentionally, and for prudential reasons, omitted to name the class of readers whom he addressed. The same holds good with regard to the assertion that he intentionally chose the prophetic form, ii. 1 ff. and iii. 3, in order that this epistle might contain *the* prophecy to which Jude in ver. 17 refers.

the three passages in the epistle—the polemic against the Libertines described according to the Epistle of Jude, that against the deniers of the Parousia, and the recommendation of Paul's writings—form a united whole, it is not clear how they should do so less if they had an author other than Peter. Finally, Weiss seeks to show that no suitable time can be adduced for the composition of the epistle if it be pseudonymous. But this difficulty is not less than that which arises in specifying the time in the life of Peter when he wrote the epistle; and if it be difficult to show how a pseudonymous composition could have found acceptation in the church, it is not less hard to explain how a genuine composition of the Apostle Peter could have remained for so long a time unused in the service of the church. If, then, the grounds for and against the authenticity are thus evenly balanced, there is here presented a problem which is not yet solved, and which perhaps cannot be solved, so that the guardedness with which Brückner, Wiesinger also, and even Weiss, with all his inclination to regard the epistle as genuine, express themselves on the question, deserves only acknowledgment.

If the epistle be not genuine, the question arises *by whom*, *when*, and *where* it was written. — Mayerhoff seeks to show that it was composed by a Jewish-Christian in Alexandria in the middle of the second century. That the author was a Jewish and not a Gentile-Christian the whole character of the epistle shows; but that he lived in Alexandria, cannot be concluded from the reasons brought forward by Mayerhoff.[1] The date, too, to which he assigns the composition of the epistle is certainly too late, inasmuch as the description of the heretics contains no reference to Gnostic views properly so called. It

[1] These reasons are—(1) The standpoint of γνῶσις, and the speculation as to how the world originated and how it will be destroyed. But the γνῶσις spoken of in our epistle is entirely different from the γνῶσις of Alexandrine-Jewish speculation; and that the view here expressed as to the beginning—unjustly called a *speculation*—of the world, had its origin precisely in Egypt, is not proved. (2) The use made of the Epistle of Jude; but that the latter was composed in Alexandria is at least very doubtful. (3) The coincidence between this epistle and the so-called Second Epistle of Clement of Rome, in opposing the same heretical tendency; but, as there is no proof that the quotation occurring in this epistle was taken from the εὐαγγέλιον κατ' Αἰγυπτίους, it is also doubtful whether this fragment had its origin in Egypt.

would be more appropriate to look upon it as a production of the first century. — Schwegler considers Rome to have been the place, and the end of the second century, at the earliest, the time of the epistle's composition. In Rome, he thinks, endeavours were made, by carrying out a Petrinism and a Paulinism, to realize the idea of the catholic church. In Rome, therefore, it was that—like so many other writings which have reference to these two schools—this epistle was composed. Its object—an entirely conciliatory one—is this, as is evident from chap. iii. 15, 16, and i. 14, 16 ff., "to bring about from the standpoint of Petrinism a final and permanent peace between the opposing views of the followers of Peter and those of Paul." In confirmation of this, Schwegler asserts that the peculiarities of the Petrine system are apparent throughout the epistle, whilst that which is specifically Pauline entirely recedes. But if a doubt arise even here as to how a so decided follower of Peter—who, according to the view of Schwegler, must as such have necessarily stood in opposition to him—could have been the eulogist of Paul, it must excite most legitimate astonishment to see what are the reasons he brings forward in support of his view.[1] The evidence, too, which he leads for the late date of composition possesses no value.[2] The chief point, the so-called conciliatory tendency of the epistle, is a pure hypothesis, which has

[1] These reasons are—the employment of expressions peculiar to Judaco-Christian modes of thought: *εὐσέβεια, ἅγιοι ἀναστροφαί, ἀρετή, ἁγία ἐντολή κ.τ.λ.* (but almost all these expressions are to be found in the N. T. writings, which, according to Schwegler, favour Paulinism); the high place given to the *λόγος προφητικός* (as if Paul had set little value on it); the countenance given to angelological mysticism (which he thinks is proved by chap. ii. 10, 11!); the demand for a tradition as a standard in the interpretation of Scripture (said to be contained in chap. i. 20!); *ὄγδοος κήρυξ δικαιοσύνης*, as applied to Noah; and the reference to the Gospel of the Hebrews (in support of which chap. i. 17 is quoted).

[2] Thus, when, among other things, Schwegler brings forward as a reason for this, the writer's acquaintance with such N. T. Scriptures as he supposes to have been composed only after the middle of the second century, *i.e.* the Pastoral Epistles, the Gospels of John and of Mark. He concludes that the author was acquainted with the Pastoral Epistles, from the fact that some expressions occur only in these and in the epistles of Peter; as also with the Gospel of John, by asserting that the writer, in chap. i. 14, had the passage, John xxi. 18, 19, in his mind; and, finally, with the Gospel of Mark, by supposing that chap. i. 12-15 contains allusions to that gospel (!).

no support in the epistle itself; for neither in the passages quoted by him, nor in any others, are the differences between Petrinism and Paulinism touched upon, much less adjusted or surmounted. No doubt Paul is spoken of in terms of praise; but, according to the connection of the passage, only for the purpose of warning the churches to which the epistle is addressed, lest they should be led astray by the heretics, who wrested and changed many statements of the apostle for their own purposes.[1]

[1] Heydenreich rightly observes: "For that (conciliatory) purpose, the little which chap. iii. says in passing of Paul would not have sufficed; if the writer had been chiefly anxious to show such a union, he would have adapted the construction and contents of the whole epistle to the conciliatory design."

Πέτρου ἐπιστολὴ β'.

According to A and B, the Inscriptio is simply: *Πέτρου β'.*

CHAPTER I.

Ver. 1. *Συμεών*] B, several min. and vss. read, according to the usual form: *Σιμών* (Lachm.), which is evidently an alteration.— Ver. 3. After A ℵ, etc., Tisch. 8 reads: *τὰ πάντα*, instead of the *Rec.* *πάντα*, according to almost all authorities (Lachm. Tisch. 7). — *διὰ δόξης καὶ ἀρετῆς*] A C P ℵ, many min., Copt. Arm. Vulg., etc., read: *ἰδίᾳ δόξῃ καὶ ἀρετῇ*, which Griesb. thinks probable; accepted by Lachm. and Tisch., approved of by the modern commentators and Reiche; the *Rec.* in B (Buttm. has, however, put a ? to B) K L, *al.*, Thph. Oec. appears to be a correction. — Ver. 4. The *Rec.* is: *τὰ μέγιστα ἡμῖν καὶ τίμια*; this occurs only in some min., however much the position of the single words varies in the different codd., etc. Buttmann has, following B: *τὰ τίμια κ. μέγ. ἡμῖν*; Lachm. and Tisch. 7, following C, read: *τὰ μέγιστα καὶ τίμια ἡμῖν*; so, too, A, only instead of *ἡμῖν*: *ὑμῖν*. Tisch. 8, following K L ℵ, and many min., has accepted *τὰ τίμια ἡμῶν καὶ μέγιστα*. It cannot be determined which reading is the original one. — *ἐν κόσμῳ*] *Rec.*, according to C K, several min., Thph. Oec. (Tisch. 7); on the other hand, A B L ℵ, etc., attest *ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ* (Lachm. Tisch. 8). — Ver. 5. *αὐτὸ τοῦτο δέ*] *Rec.*, sufficiently corroborated by B C* K L P, *al.*, pl. Syr. Oec. — In C** ℵ, several min., Thph., there is *αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο*. Lachm., according to A, reads: *αὐτοὶ δέ*, which can only be considered a correction. Tischendorf has rightly retained the *Rec.* Schott arbitrarily supposes that the original reading might be: *καὶ αὐτοὶ τοῦτο δέ*. — Ver. 8. Instead of *ὑπάρχοντα*, which is attested by almost all authorities, Lachm., according to A, Vulg. etc., has accepted *παρόντα*, which probably arose from the subsequent *πάρεστι*. — Ver. 9. *ἁμαρτιῶν*] *Rec.*, according to B C L P, *al.*, Thph. Oec. (Lachm.); in its place Griesb. Scholz, Tisch., etc., according to A K ℵ, *al.*, Damasc., have *ἁμαρτημάτων*, which most likely

is the original reading; the alteration is easily explained by Heb. i. 3, as well as by *ἁμάρτημα* being in the N. T. of rarer occurrence. — Ver. 10. *σπουδάσατε βεβαίαν ὑμῶν τὴν κλῆσιν καὶ ἐκλογὴν ποιεῖσθαι*] *Rec.*, according to B C K L P, *al.*, pl. Theoph. Oec. etc. (Tisch.); in A ℵ, several min., and many vss. the words *ἵνα διὰ τῶν καλῶν ὑμῶν ἔργων*, are inserted between *σπουδάσατε* and *βεβαίαν* (evidently a later explanatory addition), in which the inf. is changed into temp. finit.: *ποιεῖσθε* (Lachm.; in the small ed.: *ποιῆσθε*). — Ver. 12. *οὐκ ἀμελήσω*] *Rec.*, after K L, *al.*, Thph. Oec. (Griesb. Scholz); on the other hand, A B C P ℵ, *al.*, Copt. Sahid. Vulg., etc., are in favour of *μελλήσω*, which is justly accepted by Lachm. and Tisch., approved of by de Wette-Brückner, Wiesinger, and Schott, whilst Reiche prefers *οὐκ ἀμελήσω*, ut modestius et urbanius. — According to the testimony of B C K L ℵ, *al.*, pl., several vss., etc., *ἀεὶ ὑμᾶς* (Griesb. Scholz, Tisch.) should be put in place of the *Rec. ὑμᾶς ἀεί*, following A, Vulg. etc. (Lachm.). — Ver. 17. Tisch. 7 reads, after B: *ὁ υἱός μου ὁ ἀγαπητός μου οὗτός ἐστιν*, and remarks, with reference to the *Rec.*: *οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ υἱός μου ὁ ἀγαπητός* (after A C K L ℵ, etc., Lachm.): at ita locis parall. omnib. quorum nullo *οὗτ. ἐστ.* postponitur neque Graec. ullus testis *μου* repetit. Tisch. 8 has accepted the *Rec.* — Ver. 18. According to B C* etc., Tisch. 7 reads: *ἐν τῷ ἁγίῳ ὄρει*; but the *Rec.*: *ἐν τῷ ὄρει τῷ ἁγίῳ* (Tisch. 8) is too strongly supported by A C*** K L P ℵ, *al.*, Vulg. ever to be regarded as spurious. — Ver. 21. According to B C K P, *al.*, Copt., etc., Tisch 7 has *ποτέ* after *προφητεία*, and Tisch. 8, following A L ℵ, etc., *ποτέ* before *προφητεία*; this order of words is the more natural, but for that very reason can hardly be considered the original one. — The *Rec. οἱ ἅγιοι Θεοῦ* occurs only in several min., some vss. Oec. Vulg. — A has *ἅγιοι τοῦ Θεοῦ* (Lachm.); K L ℵ, *al.*, *ἅγιοι Θεοῦ* (Griesb. Scholz). Tisch. has adopted in its place: *ἀπὸ Θεοῦ*, according to B, *al.*, Syr. Copt.; Wiesinger, Schott, and Steinfass prefer this reading; Brückner, too, inclines to it; no doubt it was the one which was most likely to give rise to alterations; still it is too little supported by B, etc. Reiche considers *ἅγιοι Θεοῦ* to be the original reading.

Vv. 1, 2. ***Συμεὼν Πέτρος***] The form most in harmony with the Semitic language: ***Συμεών***, as a name of Peter, is to be found, besides here, only in Acts xv. 14; otherwise, cf. Luke ii. 25, iii. 30; Rev. vii. 7; Acts xiii. 1. From the addition of the name itself, as little as from its form, can anything be concluded as to the genuineness (in opposition to Dietlein, Schott, Steinfass) or the non-genuineness of the epistle. The

two names *Σίμων Πέτρος* are directly conjoined also in Matt. xvi. 16; Luke v. 8, etc.; elsewhere, too, the apostle is called: *Σίμων ὁ λεγόμενος Πέτρος*. The addition of *Συμεών* serves to mark the author as a Jewish-Christian.[1] — *δοῦλος καὶ ἀπόστολος Ἰ. Χρ.*] cf. Rom. i. 1; Tit. i. 1 (Phil. i. 1). *δοῦλος* expresses the more general, *ἀπόστολος* the more special official relation; cf. Meyer on Rom. i. 1; Schott unjustly denies that *δοῦλος* has reference to the *official* relation. According to de Wette, the author has here combined 1 Pet. i. 1 and Jude 1. — *τοῖς ἰσότιμον ἡμῖν λαχοῦσι πίστιν*] *ἰσότιμος* is inexactly translated in the Vulgate by coaequaliter; it is not equivalent to *ἴσος* (Acts xi. 17: *ἴση δωρεά*), but means: "*having equal honour or worth.*" De Wette's interpretation is as incorrect: "to those who have obtained the same right to participate in faith with us." The use of the words *τιμή, τιμάω*, in Peter's epistle, does not prove that the expression has here reference specially to the divine privileges of the kingdom (Dietlein). By this word the author gives it to be understood, that the faith of those to whom he writes, has the same worth as that of those whom he designates by *ἡμῖν*; both have received one and the same faith (as to its objective contents) (Brückner, Besser, Wiesinger); Hornejus: dicitur fides aeque pretiosa, non quod omnium credentium aeque magna sit, sed quod per fidem illam eadem mysteria et eadem beneficia divina nobis proponantur. — The connection shows that by *ἡμῖν* all Christians (de Wette) cannot be understood; the word must only refer, either to Peter (Pott), or to the apostles (Bengel, Wolf, Brückner, Steinfass, Fronmüller), or to the Jewish-Christians generally (Nic. de Lyra, Dietlein, Besser, Wiesinger, Schott, Hofm.); the last is the correct application (cf. Acts xi. 17, xv. 9–11). Wiesinger: "That the faith of the apostles should have a different value from that of those who through their preaching had become believers, is an idea totally foreign to the apostolic age." — *λαχοῦσι* points out that faith is a gift of grace; Huss: sicut sors non respicit personam, ita nec divina electio acceptatrix est personarum (cf. Acts i. 17).—On the breviloquence of

[1] Bengel, assuming the authenticity of the epistle, observes not inaptly that Peter adds *Συμεών*, extremo tempore admonens se ipsum conditionis pristinae, antequam cognomen nactus erat.

the expression, cf. Winer, p. 579 [E. T. 778]. — *ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ τοῦ Θεοῦ κ.τ.λ.*] Luther translates: "in the righteousness, which our God *gives;*" thus *δικαιοσύνη* would here mean *that* gift of God's grace which is the result of faith, whether it is to be understood of the state of justification (Schott), or the Christians' manner of life conformed to the commandments of God (Brückner). If this view be adopted, however, *δικαιοσύνη* cannot be connected with *πίστιν*, for though *ἐν* may be regarded as equal simply to cum, or be taken in the sense of, being furnished with (thus Brückner formerly), it would always denote that *πίστις* is contained in *δικαιοσύνη*, which certainly does not correspond with the relation in which the two stand to each other; faith is not bestowed on the Christian in righteousness, but righteousness in faith. Hofmann joins *ἐν δικ.* directly with *πίστιν*, and understands by *δικαιοσύνη* here: "the righteousness which makes Christ our Saviour; that in which the world has the propitiation for its sins." This interpretation assumes that *Θεοῦ* is predicate to *Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ* (see below); besides, it is opposed by the circumstance that the context makes no allusion to any such nearer definition of the idea, whilst it is arbitrary to render *πίστιν ἐν δικ.*: "that faith which *trusts in* the righteousness of Jesus Christ." Schott, Steinfass, and now, too, Brückner, connect *δικ.* with *ἰσότιμον*; the position of the words, however, is opposed to this, for were *ἐν δικ.* the closer definition of *ἰσότιμον*, it must have been placed directly beside it. Besides, a somewhat obscure thought results from this combination. The simple addition of *ἐν δικ.* does not assert that the faith of the one has equal value with the faith of the other in this, that in both cases it effects a *δικαιοσύνη*. *δικαιοσύνη* is here not a gift, but an attribute of God, or a characteristic of His dealings. Still the expression must not be taken as equivalent either to "kindness" (Eman. a Sa., Pott), or to: "faithfulness," as regards the promises given by Him (Beza, Piscator, Grotius); for although *δικαιοσύνη* may sometimes come near to the above meanings, it is never identical[1] with them, cf. Meyer on Rom. iii. 25. Still less

[1] De Wette thinks that the author, in approximation to the Pauline views, may perhaps have understood the righteousness of God as bringing in righteous-

warrant is there for Dietlein's view, that righteousness is here "as a *kingdom*, the totality of the divine action and revelation in contrast to this world full of sin and of uncompensated evil." Wiesinger (and thus also Fronmüller) understand by δικαιοσύνη, "the righteousness of God and Christ, which has manifested itself in the propitiation for the sins of the world;" in opposition to which Brückner correctly remarks, that Christ's work of atonement is not an act of His righteousness; further, "the righteousness of God which demands the death of the sinner" (Fronmüller), may be considered as causing the death of Christ, but not as producing faith. δικαιοσύνη, in harmony with ἰσότιμον, is rather that righteousness of God—opposed to every kind of προσοπωλησία—according to which He bestows the same faith on all, without respect of persons (cf. Acts x. 34 f.). ἐν is in meaning akin to διά, but it brings out more distinctly than it, *in what* the obtaining of the πίστις ἰσοτ. is grounded. The author's thought is accordingly this: "in His righteousness, which makes no distinction between the one and the other, God has bestowed on you the same like precious faith as on us."[1] — τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμ. καὶ σωτῆρος Ἰ. Χρ.] Many interpreters (Beza, Hemming, Gerhard, and more recently Schott and Hofmann) take τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμ. and σωτῆρος as a double attribute of Ἰησοῦ Χρ. Others (Wiesinger, Brückner, Fronmüller, Steinfass) separate the two expressions, and understand τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμῶν of God the Father; and rightly so, although in the similar combination, ver. 11, iii. 18, there be but *one* subject. For Θεός differs from κύριος in this, that it is never conjoined with Χριστός as a direct attribute, whilst κύριος is very often thus employed, as in the very next verse; see my commentary to Tit. ii. 13. There need be no hesitation in taking the article which stands before Θεοῦ with σωτῆρος also, as a second subject,—a statement which Schott and Hofmann have wrongly called in question; cf. (Winer,

ness,—or salvation,—or as redemptive righteousness, otherwise termed *grace*; and the righteousness of Christ as that *love* by which He undertook the work of salvation. But δικ. means neither grace nor love; and besides, it is altogether arbitrary to give the expression a different meaning with respect to Christ from that which it has when applied to God.

[1] Hofmann most unwarrantably maintains that, in this interpretation, it is taken "in a sense which cannot be justified."

p. 118 [E. T. 162]) Buttmann, p. 84 ff. Dietlein, in his interpretation, adopts a middle course: "of our God and Saviour; and when I speak of God the Saviour, I mean the Saviour Jesus Christ." But only this much is correct here, that the close conjunction points to the *oneness* of God and Christ of which the author was assured. — Ver. 2. *χάρις . . . πληθυνθείη*] as in 1 Pet. i. 2. In this passage *ἐν ἐπιγνώσει τοῦ Θεοῦ κ. Ἰησοῦ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν* is added. Here, too, *ἐν* is not, cum, but states in what the increase of grace has its origin, and by what it is effected (de Wette). This is the knowledge of God and Jesus, our Lord; cf. on this John xvii. 3; 2 Pet. ii. 20. Calvin: Dei et Christi agnitionem simul connectit, quia rite non potest, nisi in Christo, Deus agnosci. Although the *ἐπίγνωσις* here spoken of includes in it *acknowledgment*, yet it is erroneous to distinguish between *ἐπίγνωσις* and *γνῶσις*, by holding the former to be equivalent to *acknowledgment*; cf. the further discussions on the term *ἐπίγνωσις* in Wiesinger and Schott, which, however, especially in the case of the latter, are not without the mixing up of thoughts foreign to the idea. It is wrong to interpret *ἐν* by *εἰς*; Aretius: ut colant Deum, quemadmodum sese patefecit in Scripturis et ut coli vult. According to Dietlein, the thought intended to be expressed is that "grace and peace grow and increase from within the soul, outwards, and in thus growing they became ever more and more knowledge of the revealed God" (!).

Ver. 3. The first paragraph, extending as far as ver. 11, contains exhortations. The first of these is expressed in vv. 5–7, and to it vv. 3 and 4 serve as an introduction. — *ὡς*] Lachmann connects *ὡς* directly with what precedes, and puts a full stop after *φθορᾶς* at the end of ver. 4; thus also Vulg., Beza, Erasmus, Hornejus, Grotius. This combination, however, is against the analogy of the N. T. epistles, in which the superscription closes with the benediction (in the Epistle to the Galatians alone a relative clause is subjoined, ending, however, with a doxology that marks the conclusion), and is also opposed to the contents of vv. 3, 4, which serve as the basis for ver. 5 (Wiesinger). Gerhard and others consider *ὡς* as equivalent to *καθώς* (which Gerhard explains by *ἐπεί*, *i.e.*

"postquam" vel "siquidem"), and supply *οὕτως* to ver. 5; arbitrarily: *ὡς* belongs much more to the genitive absolute (not pleonastically, Pott). The objective reason expressed in this phrase for the exhortation contained in ver. 5 is by *ὡς* characterized as a subjective motive; Winer: "convinced (considering) that the divine power," etc.; Dietlein: "in the consciousness that;" so, too, de Wette, and the more recent commentators generally; the construction in 1 Cor. iv. 18, 2 Cor. v. 20, is similar; cf. Matthiä, *ausf. Gr.* 1825, § 568, p. 1120. — *πάντα . . . δεδωρημένης*] The Vulg. incorrectly: quomodo omnia vobis divinae virtutis sunt, quae ad vitam et pietatem, donata est (another reading is: sunt); and Luther: "since everything of His divine power, that pertains unto life and godliness, is given us;" *δεδωρημένης* is here not passive, but middle (cf. Gen. xxx. 20, LXX.; Mark xv. 45), and *τῆς θ. δυνάμεως* does not depend on *πάντα*, but is the subject (thus all modern commentators). — According to the position of the words, *αὐτοῦ* refers back to *Ἰησ. τ. κυρίου ἡμῶν* (Calvin, Schott, Steinfass), and not to *Θεοῦ*;[1] if it be applied to *Θεοῦ* (de Wette-Brückner, Wiesinger), then *θείας* (which occurs here only and in ver. 4; Acts xvii. 29: *τὸ θεῖον*, as subst.) is pleonastic. Dietlein and Fronmüller refer *αὐτοῦ* to God and Jesus, which linguistically cannot be justified.[2] — *τὰ πρὸς ζωὴν καὶ εὐσέβειαν*] the *ζωὴ καὶ εὐσέβεια* are not spoken of as the object, but: *τὰ πρὸς ζωὴν κ.τ.λ.* For the attainment of the former is conditioned by the Christian's conduct; but in order that it may be put within his reach, everything is granted him which is *serviceable* to *ζωή* and *εὐσέβεια* (cf. Luke xix. 42: *τὰ πρὸς εἰρήνην σου*). The difference between the two ideas is in itself clear; *ζωή*: "blessedness," indicates the condition; *εὐσέβεια*: "godliness" (except in Acts iii. 12, occurring only in the Pastoral Epistles and Second Peter), the conduct. Grotius incorrectly interprets *ζωή* as equivalent to vita *alterius*

[1] Hofmann, indeed, applies it also to Christ, but by passing over ver. 2 to ver. 1, where, as already observed, he considers that it is not God and Christ, but Christ alone who is referred to.

[2] The application to Jesus is also supported by the fact, that otherwise this whole argument would contain no reference to Him; the application to both contains the correct idea, that the gift imparted by Jesus is the gift of God the Father.

seculi, and εὐσέβεια as pietas in *hoc* seculo. Both together they form the antithesis to ἡ ἐν κόσμῳ ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ φθορά. πάντα is by way of emphasis placed first, in order to show distinctly that *everything*, which is in any way serviceable to ζωή and εὐσέβ., has been given us by the divine *power* of the Lord. Hofmann is wrong in defining this πάντα as faith, hope, and charity, for this triad does not pertain πρὸς εὐσέβειαν, but is the εὐσέβεια itself. — διὰ τῆς ἐπιγνώσεως τοῦ καλέσαντος ἡμᾶς] states the medium through which the gift is communicated to us; with ἐπίγνωσις, cf. ver. 2. God is here designated as ὁ καλέσας ἡμᾶς, since it is only by the knowledge of the God *who calls us* that the πάντα τὰ πρ. ζ. κ.τ.λ. are appropriated by us,—the calling being the actual proof of His love to us. The subject to καλεῖν is not Christ (Vorstius, Jachmann, Schott, etc.), but God (Aretius, Hemming, de Wette, Hofmann, etc.), as almost always in the N. T.[1] Of course καλεῖν does not mean the mere outward, but the inward, effectual calling. — ἰδίᾳ δόξῃ καὶ ἀρετῇ] δόξα denotes the being, ἀρετή the activity; Bengel: ad *gloriam* referuntur attributa Dei naturalia, ad *virtutem* ea, quae dicuntur moralia; intime unum sunt utraque. It is arbitrary to understand δόξα as meaning: "that side the nature of the Almighty One that liveth, which is directed outwards," and by ἀρετή: "the holy loving-kindness of God" (as opposed to Hofmann). — The nature of God represented as the instrumentality, as in Gal. i. 15: καλέσας διὰ τῆς χάριτος αὐτοῦ; cf., too, Rom. vi. 4. A wrong application is given to the words, if they be taken as referring to the miracles of Christ. It must be observed that this ἐπίγνωσις itself, too, is to be looked upon as wrought by Christ in us.

Ver. 4 must not, as a simple intervening clause, be enclosed in parentheses; for although ver. 5 is the principal clause

[1] De Wette (with whom Brückner agrees) is accordingly wrong in supposing that τοῦ καλίσαντος ἡμ. stands in place of the simple pron. αὐτοῦ, and is inserted because by this circumlocution of the active subject the address gains in matter and range. — Schott's remarks, in which he attempts to justify his assertion that τοῦ καλίσαντος applies to Christ, are only in so far correct, that καλεῖν might indeed be understood of an activity of Christ; cf. Matt. ix. 13; Mark ii. 17; on the other hand, it is certain that ὁ καλίσας is *never* applied to Christ, but *always* to God.

standing related to the participial clause in ver. 3, still the latter is determined, in the thought of it, by ver. 4. — δι' ὧν] ὧν does not refer to the immediately preceding ἰδίᾳ δόξῃ κ. ἀρετῇ (Dietlein, Wiesinger, Brückner, this comment.), for it cannot be said that Christ has given us the ἐπαγγέλματα through the δόξα κ. ἀρετή of His Father, but to πάντα τὰ πρὸς κ.τ.λ. (Hofmann). Beza inaccurately interprets δι' ὧν by ex eo quod. — τὰ τίμια ἡμῖν καὶ μέγιστα ἐπαγγέλματα] ἐπάγγελμα, besides here, occurs only in chap. iii. 13, where it is used in connection with the new heaven and new earth in the future. By it is to be understood, not the promises of the prophets of the O. C. fulfilled in Christ for us, nor those things promised us, of which we are made partakers in Christ (Hornejus: bona et beneficia omnia, quae Deus per Christum offert et exhibet omnibus, qui in ipsum credunt; Wiesinger, Schott); but, according to ver. 12 ff., chap. iii. 4, ix. 13, the prophecies of the παρουσία of Christ and the future consummation of His kingdom, as contained in the gospel (Brückner). Dietlein is wrong in saying that ἐπαγγέλματα are not only promises of what is future, but announcements of what is present and eternal. He goes still farther astray when he substitutes for this idea the different one: "the granting of favours which proclaim themselves." The word ἐπαγγέλλειν (except in 1 Tim. ii. 10, vi. 21) has constantly in the N. T. the meaning: "*to promise*," never simply: "to proclaim." These promises are called "*precious*," not because they are "no mere empty words" (Schott), but because they promise that which is of the greatest value (Hofmann). The dative ἡμῖν from its position should be connected more probably with τίμια than with δεδώρηται. — δεδώρηται] is here also not passive (Dietlein), but middle (all modern interpreters). Gualther erroneously explains it: donatae i. e. impletae sunt. What is here referred to is the communication, not the fulfilment of the promises, which are a free gift of divine grace. — The subject to δεδώρ. is not ὁ καλέσας (as formerly in thi

[1] Schott's assertion, that ἐπαγγέλματα, according to the form of the word, must mean: "promised *things*," is opposed by chap. iii. 13; but why the promises as such should not, as Wiesinger supposes, be the means of effecting the κοινωνία θείας φύσεως, it is difficult to understand.

commentary), but the same as that to the foregoing δεδωρημένης. — ἵνα διὰ τούτων] Calvin, de Wette-Brückner, Hofmann, understand τούτων to refer to τὰ πρὸς ζωὴν κ.τ.λ. as the leading thought; this construction Wiesinger justly calls "a distortion of the structure, justifiable only if all other references were impossible." Incorrect also is the application to δόξῃ καὶ ἀρετῇ (Bengel). From its position it can apply only to ἐπαγγέλματα (Dietlein, Wiesinger, Schott), and not in like manner to δόξῃ καὶ ἀρετῇ (Frommüller). διά has here its proper signification, not equal to "because of them" (Jachmann), nor to "incited by them;" as elsewhere the gospel is spoken of as the objective means through which the divine life is communicated, so here the ἐπαγγέλματα, which, according to the conception of Second Peter, form the essential element of the gospel. — γένησθε θείας κοινωνοὶ φύσεως] not: that ye *may become* partakers, but: that *ye might be*, etc. (Wiesinger). The aorist shows that the author does not look upon the κοινωνία, which for the Christian is aimed at in the bestowal of the promises, as something entirely future (Vorstius: quorum vi tandem divinae naturae in illa beata immortalitate vos quoque participes efficiemini), but as something of which he should even now be partaker.[1] The thought that man is intended to be partaker of the divine nature, or to be transfigured into the divine being,—which is accomplished in him through faith in the promises,—is, though in other terms, often enough expressed in the N. T. (Heb. xii. 10; 1 Pet. i. 23; John i. 12, 13, and many other passages). Hemming justly remarks: vocat hic divinam naturam id quod divina praesentia efficit in nobis i. e. conformitatem nostri cum Deo, seu imaginem Dei, quae in nobis reformatur per divinam praesentiam in nobis. When Hofmann urges the expression φύσις against this view, because a distinction must be drawn between the φύσις *of man* and the personal life of man, the former remaining even in him who

[1] Hornejus: incipit ea in hac vita per gratiam, sed perficietur in altera per gloriam; si enim jam hic in ista imbecillitate divinae naturae consortes sumus per fidem, quanto magis illic erimus per adspectum et si hic per gratiam id adipiscimur, quanto magis illic per gloriam, ubi Deus ipse erit omnia in omnibus.

is regenerate always the same, until this *σῶμα* is changed from a *σῶμα ψυχικόν* to a *σῶμα πνευματικόν*, he fails to observe that it is not the *human*, but the *divine φύσις* that is here spoken of, and in God there can be no difference made between natural and personal life. The expression *φύσις* is here quite inappropriately pressed by Hofmann. As opposed to the mystic "deification," it must be remarked, with the older interpreters, that the expression *φύσις* conveys the thought, not so much of the substantia, as rather of the qualitas. Grotius' interpretation dilutes the idea: ut fieretis imitatores divinae bonitatis. The second person (*γένησθε*) serves to appropriate to the readers in particular that which belongs to all Christians (*ἡμῖν*).[1] — *ἀποφυγόντες τῆς ἐν [τῷ] κόσμῳ ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ φθορᾶς*] These words do not express the condition on which the Christian becomes partaker of the divine nature, but the negative element which is most intimately connected with the positive aim. Accordingly, the translation is incorrect: "if you escape" (Luther, Brückner); *ἀποφυγόντες* is to be translated: "escaping, eluding;" the aor. part. is put because the verb is closely conjoined with the preceding aorist *γένησθε*. It is to be resolved into: in order that ye might be partakers of the divine nature, in that ye escape the *φθορά*.[2] With *φθορά*, cf. chap. ii. 12, and especially Rom. viii. 21; Gal. vi. 8 (see Meyer on the last passage). By it is to be understood not simply perishableness, but more generally corruption. The term *φθορά* is here more nearly

[1] Hofmann arbitrarily objects to this interpretation, that a change of persons could not take place in a clause expressive of a design; rather does it simply depend on the will of the writer, where he wishes it to take place. When the writer of a letter wishes to state the purpose of anything which has been imparted to all, should he not in particular apply it to those to whom he addresses his letter? — Augusti strangely presses the change of persons, by applying *ἡμῖν* to the Jews, *γένησθε* to the heathen-converts, and understanding *θεία φύσις* of the divine descent of the Jews.

[2] Bengel: haec fuga non tam ut officium nostrum, quam ut beneficium divinum, communionem cum Deo comitans, h. l. ponitur. Dietlein: "*ἀποφ.* contains no demand and condition, but only the other side of the fact: Ye have entered the kingdom of the divine nature, therefore ye have left the kingdom of the worldly nature." — By transferring *γένησθε* to the future, Schott gives an erroneous (linguistically) interpretation of *ἀποφυγόντες* as future also: "Ye shall become partakers of the divine nature, as such who have (*shall have*) precisely thus escaped *τῆς . . . φθορᾶς*."

defined as *ἡ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ φθορά, i.e.* the corruption which dwells in the (unredeemed) world, and to which all thereto belonging is a prey. The further more precise definition: *ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ*, states that this *φθορά* has its origin in the evil lust, opposed to what is divine, which has its sway in the world (1 John ii. 16, 17). — *ἀποφί*, here c. gen.; chap. ii. 18, 20, cum accus. constr. — The sequence of thought in vv. 3, 4 is: Christ hath granted us everything that is serviceable to salvation and holiness, and that by the knowledge of God who hath called us by His glory; through it he has given us the most glorious promises, the design of which is the communication of the divine life.

Vv. 5, 6. *καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο δέ*] *καὶ . . . δέ*, equivalent to "*but also*," "*and also*;" cf. Winer, p. 412 f. [E. T. 553 f.]; Buttmann, p. 312. *καί* adds something new to what goes before; *δέ* brings out that what is added is to be distinguished from what precedes.[1] — Neither *περί* nor *κατά* nor *πρός* is to be supplied to *αὐτὸ τοῦτο*, which stands here absolutely, equivalent to *δι' αὐτὸ τοῦτο*: "*for this very reason*," cf. Winer, p. 134 f. [E. T. 178], and refers back to the thought contained in *ὡς πάντα . . . δεδωρημένης*, and further developed in the clauses following: "since ye have been made partakers of all that, therefore," etc. Grotius: Deus fecit quod suum est, vos quoque quod vestrum est faciete. Dietlein takes *αὐτὸ τοῦτο* as a simple accusative dependent on *ἐπιχορήσατε* (thus also Steinfass); but this combination, which would make *τοῦτο* refer to the subsequent *ἐν τῇ π. ὑμ. τὴν ἀρετήν*, or to *τ. ἀρετήν* alone, is opposed by the *αὐτό* beside it, which looks back to what has gone before. Nor does Dietlein fail to see this, for he explains: "the announcements given are now to be produced in the form of Christian virtues;" this, however,

[1] Hofmann, without any reason, ascribes two different meanings to *καὶ . . . δέ*, by saying that "*καὶ . . . δέ* is either equal to 'but now,' or else to 'but also;' in the first case *καί* adds something further, which *δέ* points out to be something different, and must be added to what precedes by way of explanation; in the second case *δέ* adds something different, and *καί* intimates that it is added on to what precedes, which cannot do without it." *καὶ . . . δέ* has in itself always the same signification; *δέ* only emphasizes the new element added by *καί*, whether this be merely a different one from what goes before, or altogether antithetical to it.

results in a "straining" (Brückner) of the thought. — As regards the connection of clauses, the apodosis belonging to ver. 3 begins with ver. 5, not, however, in quite regular construction. Hofmann, on the other hand, holds that the apodosis conveying the exhortations begins already with *ἵνα* in ver. 4. He looks upon *ἵνα* as depending on *ἐπιχορηγήσατε*, and considers that the two participial clauses, *ἀποφυγόντες κ.τ.λ.* and *καὶ . . . παρεισενέγκαντες*, are to be closely connected with each other, and both together joined with the imperative; accordingly he translates: "Considering that His divine power hath given us all that is serviceable to life and godliness . . . ye should, in order thereby to become partakers of the divine nature, having escaped the corruption in the world occasioned by lust, but for that very reason giving all diligence, supply virtue in and with your faith." But opposed to this view is: (1) The intolerable cumbrousness of the construction; (2) The circumstance that although a dependent clause may precede the clause on which it depends, this may take place only when the clearness of the style does not thereby suffer, *i.e.* when the periods are so constructed that the dependent clause cannot, by any rule of language, be taken with a preceding clause,—but this is plainly not the case here; (3) The aorist *γένησθε*, instead of which the present would have been written; and finally, (4) The impossibility of here applying *διὰ τούτων* to anything that goes before. This becomes the more obvious if the preceding secondary clause be considered as standing after the imperatival clause *ἐπιχορηγήσατε . . . ἀγάπην. — σπουδὴν πᾶσαν παρεισενέγκαντες*] cf. Jude 3: *πᾶσαν σπ. ποιούμενος* (Jos. Arch. xx. 9. 2: *εἰσφέρειν σπουδήν*); *παρά* points out that believers on their side (de Wette, Wiesinger, Schott) should contribute their part, namely, the *σπουδή*, to what has here been given them. That *παρά* has not here the implied idea of secrecy, is self-evident; but it is also unjustifiable when Hofmann asserts that *παρεισφέρειν σπουδήν* means "the application of diligence, which endeavours after something already given in a different manner." — *ἐπιχορηγήσατε ἐν τῇ πίστει ὑμῶν τὴν ἀρετήν*] *ἐπιχορηγεῖν*, either "contribute," *i.e.* your contribution to the work of salvation (de

Wette), or more probably, according to the use of the word elsewhere in the N. T. (2 Cor. ix. 10; Gal. iii. 5; cf. also 1 Pet. iv. 11), "*to supply*" (Brückner, Wiesinger, Hofmann); it is here placed as correlative to the term δεδώρηται, ver. 4, and denotes "the gift which the believer gives in return for the gift of God" (Wiesinger, although the meaning of the word does not quite justify him in doing so, adds: "or more accurately, by which he again presents to God his own gift in the fruit it has produced"). Dietlein's interpretation is erroneous: "to perform in dance." This meaning the word never has. Even χορηγεῖν sometimes means "to lead a dance," but not "to perform anything in dance." The original meaning of ἐπιχορ. is: "to contribute to the expenses of a χόρος." Schott's assertion is arbitrary, "that ἐπιχορηγεῖν signifies a supplying of what is due to one in virtue of an official or honorary position." — Pott incorrectly explains the preposition ἐν by διά; de Wette inadequately by "*in, with*, of that which is already present, and to which something else should be added." The sense is: since you have πίστις, let it not be wanting in ἀρετή. It is not meant: that to the πίστις, as something different from it, ἀρετή should be added; but ἀρετή belongs to πίστις, and for this reason the Christian must put it into practice. The same relation is preserved in the members which follow.[1] πίστις is presupposed as the origin (Oecumenius: θεμέλιος τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κρηπίς) of all Christian virtues, and in the first instance of the ἀρετή, by which Oecumenius understands τὰ ἔργα; Gerhard: generale nomen omnium operum et actionum bonarum; Calvin: honesta et bene composita vita; it is best explained by strenuus animae tonus ac vigor (Bengel): "*moral efficiency*" (de Wette, Wiesinger, Schott, etc.).[2] — ἐν δὲ τῇ ἀρετῇ τὴν γνῶσιν] ἡ γνῶσις is not here ἡ τῶν τοῦ Θεοῦ ἀποκρύφων μυστηρίων εἴδησις (Oecum.), nor is it "the knowledge of God which the Christians possess"

[1] Steinfass remarks: "ἐν conceives the accusatives as involute accusatives, and as elements of the previous datives;" this certainly is correct, but must be supplemented thus far, that the element of the preceding conception, expressed by the accusative, stands forth as a special grace, and thus becomes, as it were, the complement of it.

[2] Hofmann: "that disposition which shows itself in the doing of what is right and good."

(Dietl.); but as the matter in hand here is the practical proof of the Christian temper, it must be understood as denoting the perception of that which the Christian as such has to do in all relations of life, and of how he has to do it (Besser, Wiesinger, Schott, Hofmann; Brückner, in agreement with this: "discretion").[1]—Ver. 6. The three virtues here named are: the *ἐγκράτεια*, the *ὑπομονή*, and the *εὐσέβεια*. — *ἐγκράτεια*, besides here, in Acts xxiv. 25 and Gal. vi. 22 (Tit. i. 8: *ἐγκρατής*; 1 Cor. vii. 9, ix. 25: *ἐγκρατεύομαι*), denotes the control of one's own desires; *τὸ μηδενὶ ἀποσύρεσθαι πάθει* (Oecumenius); cf. on Tit. i. 8.[2] Compare this with the passage in Jes. Sir. xviii. 30, where under the superscription *ἐγκράτεια ψυχῆς* there is the maxim: *ὀπίσω τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν σου μὴ πορεύου, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ὀρέξεών σου κωλύου.* — *ὑπομονή* is enduring patience in all temptations. Besser aptly recalls the proverb: abstine, sustine. — With *εὐσέβεια*, comp. ver. 3; Dietlein, without sufficient justification, explains it here as: "the godly awe and respect in the personal, *domestic* relations of life." If *εὐσέβεια* do not apply only to our relation to God (*e.g.* Dio Cass. xlviii. 5: *διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφὸν εὐσέβειαν*), the other object of it must in this case be definitely stated.

Ver. 7 adds *φιλαδελφία* and *ἀγάπη* to the virtues already named. These are to be distinguished thus, that the former applies specially to the Christian brethren, the latter to all — without distinction; 1 Thess. iii. 12: *ἡ ἀγάπη εἰς ἀλλήλους καὶ εἰς πάντας* (Gal. vi. 10); with *φιλαδελφία*, cf. 1 Pet. i. 22. While the apostle calls the love which is extended to all *ἀγάπη*, he gives it to be understood that what he means is not the purely natural well-wishing, but Christian love springing from the Christian spirit. Dietlein,

[1] Besser is undoubtedly right in trying to prove that Luther's "modesty" has another signification than that in which the word is at present employed; still that expression does not altogether coincide with *γνῶσις*, which Luther understands as meaning that "circumspectness" which knows how to maintain *the right moderation* in all things.

[2] Hofmann unwarrantably disputes this interpretation by saying that *ἐγκρ.* is "that quality by which a person denies himself all that is unprofitable;" for the denying oneself that which is unprofitable, for which there is no desire, surely gives no proof whatever of *ἐγκράτεια*.

without sufficient reason, thinks that φιλαδελφία is only the opposite of that which is forbidden in the eighth and ninth commandments, whilst the ἀγάπη is the complete antithesis to what is forbidden in the tenth commandment. In this way the conception φιλαδελφία is unjustifiably disregarded,—a proceeding to which the language of Scripture gives the less sanction, that where love in all its depth and truth is spoken of, the word φιλεῖν is not unfrequently used; cf. John v. 20, xvi. 27, etc. — Although the different virtues here are not arranged according to definite logical order, yet the way in which they here belong to each other is not to be mistaken. Each of the virtues to be shown forth forms the complement of that which precedes, and thus gives rise to a firmly-linked chain of thought. ἀρετή supplies the complement of πίστις, for faith without virtue is wanting in moral character, and is in itself dead; that of ἀρετή is γνῶσις, for the realizing of the moral volition is conditioned by comprehension of that which is needful in each separate case; that of γνῶσις is ἐγκράτεια, for self-control must not be wanting to volition and comprehension; that of ἐγκράτεια is ὑπομενή, for there are outward as well as inward temptations to be withstood; that of ὑπομονή is εὐσέβεια, for only in trustful love to God has the ὑπομονή firm support; that of εὐσέβεια the φιλαδελφία, for "he that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he has not seen?" (1 John iv. 20); that of φιλαδελφία the ἀγάπη, for without the latter the former would degenerate into poor narrow-heartedness. Thus, in that the one virtue is the complement of the other, the latter produces the former of itself as its natural outcome; Bengel: praesens quisque gradus subsequentem parit et facilem reddit, subsequens priorem temperat ac perficit.[1]

Ver. 8. Reason for the foregoing exhortation. — ταῦτα] *i.e.*

[1] According to Dietlein, the three first graces, including πίστις, correspond to the first table of the law, the three first petitions of the Lord's Prayer, the first article of the Creed, and to *faith* in the Pauline triad; the three following graces to the first half of the second table of the law, the fourth petition in the Lord's Prayer, the second article of the Creed, and the second grace in the Pauline triad; the two last graces to the second half of the second table of the law, the three last petitions of the Lord's Prayer, the third article of the Creed, and the third

the virtues above mentioned. — *γὰρ ὑμῖν ὑπάρχοντα καὶ πλεονάζοντα*] For *ὑπάρχειν* c. dat. cf. Acts iii. 6; *πλεονάζοντα* intensifies the idea *ὑπάρχοντα*; for *πλεονάζειν*, cf. my commentary to 1 Tim. i. 14; it means either: "to be present in abundance," strictly, to exceed the measure (abundare), or: "to become more, to increase (crescere)." Here the first of these two meanings seems to deserve the preference; though not so in the judgment of Brückner, Wiesinger, Schott, Steinfass, Hofmann. The participles may be resolved into "in that," "since" (Dietlein), or "if" (Brückner, Wiesinger, Schott); the latter is to be preferred, inasmuch as this verse refers back to the exhortation ver. 5, and in "ver. 9 the opposite is assumed as possible" (Brückner); thus: "*for if these virtues exist in you, and that in rich measure;*" Luther in his translation has combined the two translations. — *οὐκ ἀργοὺς οὐδὲ ἀκάρπους καθίστησιν*] *ὑμᾶς* is to be supplied. Hornejus: λιτότης est, cum ait: non inertes neque infructuosos pro operosos et fructuosos; Dietlein: "the *οὐκ* and *οὐδέ* belong to the adjectives, not to *καθίστησιν*." — For *ἀργός*, cf. 1 Tim. v. 13; Tit. i. 12; *οὐκ ἀργός*, equivalent to "*active;*" *ἄκαρπος* cannot mean only "without fruit," but "barren" also; cf. Eph. v. 11 (as against Schott). — *καθίστησι*: the present is not put here for the future (Hornejus). According to Dietlein, Wiesinger, and Schott, *καθίστημι* should mean "to cause to appear, to exhibit," so that the sense would be: "he who possesses these virtues, he thereby *appears* as bringing forth fruit with regard to the *ἐπιγν. τοῦ κυρίου Ἰ. Χρ.*," by which is meant that his knowledge manifests itself as an active one; this is, however, incorrect, for: (1) A meaning is thereby attributed to *καθίστημι* which it *never* has, either in the classics or in the N. T. (not even in Jas. iii. 6, iv. 4, and Rom. v. 19); it means "to set *up*," but not to set *forth*, to exhibit, to manifest, etc. (2) It gives a meaning to *εἰς* such as that word has nowhere

grace of that triad. Certainly there is here a good deal that coincides, but this by no means warrants a consistent parallelism of all the individual points, which can only gain an appearance of correctness by an arbitrary narrowing or extending of the ideas and their applications.—It is worthy of remark that the series begins with *πίστις* and ends with *ἀγάπη*; in that, then, ver. 11 points to the future, *ἐλπίς* is added, so that the well-known triad is here alluded to (Schott).

else, since the object with which it is to be taken is always to be thought of as the *end*, and that even in the more loose connection in which εἰς is equal to "with regard, with respect to." (3) It is a somewhat idle, because a self-evident reflection, that if knowledge produce the above-named virtues, it thereby manifests itself as a knowledge that is not inactive.[1] It is also inaccurate to translate with Luther: "where such is present in abundance in you, it will let you be neither idle nor unfruitful in the knowledge," etc., for εἰς is not equal to ἐν. The verb καθίστημι denotes in connection with an adjective: reddere, to make into, to set one up as; cf. Pape, *s.v.*; and the preposition εἰς expresses the direction, so that the thought is: those virtues make you (or more exactly, place you as) active and fruitful with regard to knowledge, *i.e.* by them you are advanced with regard to knowledge; cf. Col. i. 10: ἐν παντὶ ἔργῳ ἀγαθῷ καρποφοροῦντες καὶ αὐξανόμενοι εἰς τὴν ἐπίγνωσιν τοῦ Θεοῦ (cf. Meyer *in loc.*); de Wette: "The author considers all these virtues only as steps to the knowledge of Jesus Christ; and this knowledge he regards not merely as theoretical, but as one to be obtained practically, a living into Him, and, at the same time, perfect;" thus, too, Brückner, Fronmüller, Steinfass.

Ver. 9 gives in negative form an explanation of the preceding verses. — ᾧ γὰρ μὴ πάρεστι ταῦτα] antithesis to ταῦτα . . . πλεονάζοντα, ver. 8. The possession of these graces furthers knowledge, for he who does not possess them is τυφλός, that is, in so far as he is, and remains, without the true knowledge of Jesus Christ. μή is explained thus, that the idea which lies at the basis is: "he who is so constituted, that he is without these virtues" (Hofmann), or so that he must be judged as being without them.[2] — τυφλός ἐστι, μυωπάζων] μυωπάζειν (ἅπ. λεγ.) means: to be a μύωψ, *i.e.* one short-sighted:[3] accordingly μυωπάζων serves more

[1] This third reason also contradicts Hofmann's interpretation, which he expresses thus: "The believer possesses the knowledge of Christ. If then, in aiming at it, he be neither inactive nor unfruitful, he makes this aiming the rule of all his actions, but so that they should be its work, its fruit."

[2] Schott unwarrantably maintains, on the interpretation of ver. 8 here adopted, that the translation must be: "he *becomes* blind."

[3] Aristotle interprets sec. 31: μυωπάζοντες: οἱ ἐκ γενετῆς τὰ μὲν ἐγγὺς

nearly to define the term τυφλός as one who can see only what is near, not what is far off. Schott correctly explains μυωπάζων by "*weak*-sighted." The older commentators, following Oecumenius, for the most part take μυωπάζειν as synonymous with τυφλώττειν; thus Calvin, Hornejus, etc.; but the identification in meaning of these two terms cannot be justified, whilst it gives rise to an intolerable tautology. The translation of the Vulgate: manu tentans (similarly Erasmus: manu viam tentans; Luther: "and gropes with the hand;" Calvin: manu palpans), has arisen probably from the gloss: ψηλαφῶν, perhaps with reference to Deut. xxviii. 28, 29; Isa. lix. 10. Wolf interprets the word, after Bochart (Hierozoic l. l. c. 4), by καμμύειν oculos claudere;[1] but μυωπάζειν is not derived from μύειν τὰς ὤπας, but from μύωψ. A μύωψ, however, is not one who arbitrarily closes his eyes, but one who, from inability to see far enough, is obliged to blink with his eyes, in order to see a distant object. The same applies to Dietlein, who translates: "one who closes his eyes," by which he conceives a *voluntary* closing of the eyes, precisely that which is opposed to the meaning of the word. If, then, μυωπάζων mean a short-sighted person, the question arises: What is that near at hand which he sees, and that far off which he does not see? The first expression is generally understood as applying to earthly, and the second to heavenly things. Hofmann, on the other hand, explains: "he sees only what is present to him: that he is a member of the Christian church; but how he has become so, that lies outside his horizon." Here, however, the first thought is purely imported, and the second has only an apparent justification in the clause which follows. — λήθην λαβών] ἅπ. λεγ. equal to oblitus; Vulgate: oblivionem accipiens; cf. ὑπόμνησιν λαβών, 2 Tim. i. 5 (cf. Joseph. *Ant.* ii. vi. 9; Wetstein, Lösner, Krebs *in loc.*); taken strictly, the translation is: "*having received the* λήθη." Hofmann justly remarks: that this aoristic clause is not only co-ordinate with

βλέποντες, τὰ δὲ ἐξ ἀποστάσεως οὐχ ὁρῶντες· ἐναντία δὲ πάσχουσιν οἱ γεμῶντες τοῖς μυωπάζουσιν· τὰ γὰρ ἐγγὺς μὴ ὁρῶντες τὰ πόρρωθεν βλέπουσιν.

[1] Τυφλὸς μυωπάζων is dicitur, qui ideo caecus est, quia sponte claudit oculos, ut ne videat.

the preceding, but is added to it by way of explanation. He is wrong, however, when he thinks that it is intended to elucidate *μυωπάζων*. By it the author refers not to the *consequences* (Steinfass, and formerly here), but rather to the *reason* of the blindness, or, more strictly, short-sightedness, which manifests itself in the want of the Christian graces. Dietlein arbitrarily emphasizes this forgetting as a *voluntary* act. This is justified neither by the expression itself nor by the connection of thought. — *τοῦ καθαρισμοῦ τῶν πάλαι αὐτοῦ ἁμαρτημάτων*] "the (accomplished) cleansing *from* the former sins;" not as Winer formerly, in the 5th ed. p. 214, conjectured: "the purification, *i.e.* the removal of sins;" cf. Heb. i. 3. As *πάλαι* shows, *καθαρ.* does not here mean a continuous (to be obtained by repentance perhaps, etc.), but a completed process. Not, however, the (ideal) *καθαρισμός* of sins for the whole world of sinners, accomplished through Christ's death on the cross;—*αὐτοῦ* is opposed to this; but the cleansing, *i.e.* forgiveness, procured by the individual in *baptism* (thus to Brückner, Schott, Hofmann; Wiesinger less aptly applies it to the calling), so that *πάλαι* denotes the time preceding baptism; cf. 1 Cor. vi. 11.

Ver. 10. Resumption of the exhortation. — *διὸ μᾶλλον*] *διό* is usually taken as referring to the truth expressed in vv. 8, 9, and *μᾶλλον* interpreted as equal to "all the more." The meaning is then: that this truth should still more incite to zeal (thus Brückner, Wiesinger, Schott, etc.). Dietlein, on the other hand, takes *μᾶλλον* as "ushering in an antithesis," equal to "rather;" thus also Hofmann. The former supplies the thought: "instead of following a virtueless endeavour after a so-called *ἐπίγνωσις*," for which, however, in the context there is no warrant. The latter more correctly applies it to what immediately precedes, in this sense, "the readers should do the opposite of that which Peter calls a forgetting that they have received the pardon of sin."[1] That the particle *μᾶλλον* frequently expresses an antithesis cannot be denied; cf. 1 Cor. v. 2: but as little can it be questioned that it may

[1] Hofmann interprets *διό* in harmony with his conception of ver. 2: "for this reason, because he only, who is possessed of the aforenamed graces, is capable of putting his knowledge into practice."

serve to express intensification; cf. Meyer on 2 Cor. vii. 7. In this way both interpretations are possible. Still that which is usually given appears to be preferable, inasmuch as it seems more natural to apply the very significant thought of this verse to vv. 8, 9, than only to the subordinate idea immediately preceding. — *ἀδελφοί*] makes the exhortation more urgent. — *σπουδάσατε . . . ποιεῖσθαι*] The exhortation here points back to ver. 5: *σπουδὴν π. παρεισενέγκ.* The relations of *κλῆσις* and *ἐκλογή* are thus stated by Gerhard: *vocatio*, qua in tempore ad regnum gratiae vocati estis; *electio*, qua ab aeterno ad regnum gloriae electi estis; in like manner Wiesinger, Frommüller, etc.; cf. Lünemann also on 1 Thess. i. 4. But *ἐκλογή* can also denote the election effected by the *κλῆσις*, *i.e.* the separation of those who are called from the world, and the translation of them into the kingdom of God. And this latter view is supported not only by the position in which the two ideas stand to each other, but by the connection of thought (Grotius, Brückner, Schott, Hofmann[1]); for the summons *βεβαίαν ποιεῖσθαι* can apply only to something which has been realiter accomplished in man, not to the decree of God in itself unchangeable and eternal. For this reason Calvin feels himself compelled unwarrantably to paraphrase *σπουδ. βεβ. . . . ποιεῖσθαι* by: studete ut re ipsa testatum fiat, vos non frustra vocatos esse, imo electos.[2] — For *βεβαίαν*, cf. Heb. iii. 6, 14. The making sure takes place then, when the Christians, by a conduct such as is directed in vv. 5, 8, do their part to remain the called and elected people; the opposite of this is expressed in ver. 9. — The reading: *ἵνα διὰ τῶν καλῶν ὑμῶν ἔργων βεβ. κ.τ.λ.* reproduces the thought in substance correctly. — *ταῦτα γὰρ ποιοῦντες*] *ταῦτα* refers not to the foregoing virtues, as Hofmann thinks, but to that which immediately precedes; "the plural shows that the apostle considered this making sure a very many-sided act" (Dietlein). — *οὐ μὴ πταίσητέ ποτε*] *πταίειν* means in Jam. ii. 10, iii. 2: "to offend" (Vulg.: non peccabitis); here as in

[1] Grotius: date operam, ut et vocatio quae vobis contigit per evangelium et electio eam secuta, qua facti estis Dei populus, ratae sint.

[2] Besser too is wrong: "the apostle exhorts in these words, that what is stable *with God*, be also stable *with us*."

Rom. xi. 11: "*to forfeit salvation;*" thus also Hofmann. It is unjustifiable to combine the two ideas (de Wette: "to fall and so to fail of salvation"). The double negation *οὐ μή*, and the *ποτέ* placed at the end, strengthen the statement.

Ver. 11. *οὕτω γάρ*] Resumption of the *ταῦτα ποιοῦντες*; Dietlein's interpretation is erroneous: "precisely when ye in all humility renounce every arrogant striving after distinction;" for there is no reference here to any such striving. — *πλουσίως ἐπιχορηγηθήσεται ὑμῖν ἡ εἴσοδος εἰς κ.τ.λ.*] The conjunction of *εἴσοδος* and *πλουσίως ἐπιχορηγηθήσεται* is surprising. It is incorrect to attribute to *πλουσίως* a meaning different from that which it always has (thus Grotius: promptissimo Dei affectu; Augusti: "in more than one way"). It is, however, also erroneous to make *πλουσ. ἐπιχορ.* apply not to *εἴσοδος* itself, but to the condition which is entered upon after the *εἴσοδος*, "the higher degree of blessedness" (de Wette).[1] *ἐπιχορ.* represents *the entrance into the eternal kingdom of Christ* as a gift; *πλουσίως* as a gift abundantly; in so far as that entrance is not in any way rendered difficult, or even hindered; the opposite is the *μόλις*, 1 Pet. iv. 18. Schott is not quite accurate in applying *πλουσίως* to the "secure *certainty* of the entrance." Wiesinger adopts both the interpretation of Gerhard: divites eritis in praemiis coelestibus, and that of Bengel: ut quasi cum triumpho intrare possitis. Dietlein here inaptly brings in with *ἐπιχορηγ.* "the conception of a chorus in solemn procession." It is to be noted that as *ἐπιχορηγήσατε*, ver. 5, points back to *δεδώρηται* in ver. 4, so does this *ἐπιχορηγηθήσεται* here to *ἐπιχορηγήσατε*. The Christian's gift in return must correspond with the gift of God, and the return-gift of God again with that of the Christian.

Ver. 12. *διό*] not: "therefore, because the *whole* duty consists precisely in the not forgetting" (Dietlein), for no expression was given to any such thought here, but: because

[1] Steinfass: "This passage treats of the way, of the admission to it, and not of the blessedness which awaits the believer at the end of it." He is right, only that it is not even the way that is treated of, but merely the admission (or more correctly, the entrance) to it.

to him alone,[1] who in the supplying of virtues reaches an ever more complete knowledge of Christ, is an entrance into the everlasting kingdom of Christ ministered. — μελλήσω] The same form elsewhere only in Matt. xxiv. 6; de Wette interprets it here: "I will *ever have a care*;" Schott translates: "I will always be in the position;" but there is nothing which renders necessary here a translation different from that in the other passage. Hofmann justly says that it is a circumlocution for the future of ὑπομιμνήσκειν, as in Matt. for ἀκούειν, and that ἀεί must be joined with μελλήσω. — Luther, following the *Rec.* οὐκ ἀμελήσω: "therefore I will not cease." — περὶ τούτων] *i.e.* of all that which has been already mentioned. It is not to be limited to any one thing; and therefore not, with de Wette, to "the kingdom of God and its future;" nor, with Wiesinger, to "the manifestation of faith in its fruits;" and still less can τούτων be understood, with Hofmann, of the virtues mentioned in vv. 5–7. In this verse the author promises his readers that he will ἀεί, *i.e.* at every time, as the opportunity presented itself (Hofmann in all probability incorrectly: "when I address you"), remind them of this. By what means is not said; but that he does not refer to this epistle is shown by the so strongly expressed future. — καίπερ εἰδότας] Calvin: Vos quidem, inquit, probe tenetis, quaenam sit evangelii veritas, neque vos quasi fluctuantes confirmo, sed in re tanta monitiones nunquam sint supervacuae: quare nunquam molestae esse debent. Simili excusatione utitur Paulus ad Rom. xv. 14. Cf. also 1 John ii. 21; Jude 5. — καὶ ἐστηριγμένους ἐν τῇ παρούσῃ ἀληθείᾳ] "*and made firm*, i.e. *are firm in*," etc.; not: "although ye are supported, *i.e.* have won a firm position *by* standing on the present truth" (Dietlein). ἐν τῇ παρ. ἀληθ. is the complement of ἐστηρ., and states not the means by which, but the object *in* which, the readers have become firm. — παρούσῃ stands here in the same sense as τοῦ παρόντος (that is, εὐαγγελίου) εἰς ὑμᾶς,

[1] Hofmann takes exception to this "*only*;" wrongly; for although the apostle merely says: "that he who would live up to his exhortations would undoubtedly find an entrance open to the everlasting kingdom of Christ;" still, that is as much as to say that he who does not do so will not find that entrance; consequently the "*only*" is understood of itself.

Col. i. 6.[1] De Wette, with not quite strict accuracy, interprets *παρούσῃ* as equal to *παραδοθείσῃ*, Jude 3. Vorstius, Bengel, etc., incorrectly take it as referring to the fulfilment in the gospel of the Old Testament promises; and Schott, instead of to truth in an objective sense, "to the relation of fellowship with God, in which they stood as Christians."

Vv. 13, 14. *δίκαιον δὲ ἡγοῦμαι*] "*I consider it right and reasonable*" (Dietlein: "as a duty"); cf. Phil. i. 7; ver. 14 states the reason. — *ἐφ' ὅσον εἰμὶ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σκηνώματι*] *σκήνωμα*, like *σκῆνος*, 2 Cor. v. 1, "*the tabernacle*," a figurative designation of the human body; cf. Wisd. ix. 15: *τὸ γεῶδες σκῆνος*. There can hardly be here any direct reference to the nomadic life in tents (Hornejus). — *διεγείρειν ὑμᾶς ἐν ὑπομνήσει*] "*to stir you up by reminding you*, i.e. *to encourage you*." The same combination takes place in chap. iii. 1; *διεγείρειν* is to be found elsewhere only in the Gospels, and there in its strict signification. — *ἐν ὑπομνήσει* points back to *ὑπομιμνήσκειν* in ver. 12, which, in the aim of it, *διεγείρειν* serves to define more nearly. In de Wette's opinion, these words are written with special reference to the advent of Christ; but there is nothing to indicate any such limitation of them. It cannot, with Dietlein, be concluded that this letter is linked on to the First Epistle of Peter, from the circumstance that in 1 Pet. v. 8, 9, *γρηγορήσατε* is to be found followed by *στερεοί*. — Ver. 14. *εἰδώς*] "*since I know*," gives the reason for the *δίκαιον ἡγοῦμαι*, ver. 13. — *ὅτι ταχινή ἐστιν ἡ ἀπόθεσις τοῦ σκηνώματός μου*] The expression *ἀπόθεσις* is to be explained by "a mingling of the figure of a garment and that of a tent" (de Wette). — *ταχινή* is taken by most commentators (as also by Wiesinger and Brückner) to mean "soon." Accordingly some (de Wette, Fronmüller, and others) think that in the subsequent words the writer does not refer to the prediction of Christ contained in John xxi. 18 ff., but to a later revelation vouchsafed to Peter (such as is mentioned by Hegesippus, *De Excid. Jerosolym.* iii. 2, and by Ambrose, *Ep.* 33); but Bengel already

[1] Steinfass says: "The antithesis to *παρούσῃ* is Peter's absence;" it is hardly probable that the writer thought of this antithesis.

translated ταχινή ἐστιν correctly by repentina est; observing: Praesens; qui diu aegrotant, possunt alios adhuc pascere. Crux id Petro non erat permissura. Ideo prius agit, quod agendum erat.[1] In chap. ii. 1 also, ταχινός means "*sudden, swift*" (Vulg. velox), not "soon." Peter says here that he will end his life by a sudden (*i.e.* violent) death; so too Steinfass, Schott, Hofmann; the adjective ταχινή states, not the time, but the manner of the ἀπόθεσις. Accordingly the assumption of a later revelation has no foundation in this passage.[2] — The particle καί after καθώς, for the most part left unnoticed, shows that the words καθὼς κ.τ.λ. are added in confirmation of Peter's certainty as to his sudden death, equivalent to "*even as indeed.*" With ἐδήλωσεν, cf. 1 Pet. i. 11.

Ver. 15. σπουδάσω δὲ καί] "*but I will, moreover, also zealously take care, that;*" καί connects this sentence with ver. 13; it belongs to σπουδάσω, not to what follows. — ἑκάστοτε] ἅπ. λεγ. "*on every occasion,*" quotiescunque usus venerit (Bengel); it belongs to ἔχειν κ.τ.λ., and must not be connected with σπουδάσω. — ἔχειν ὑμᾶς . . . ποιεῖσθαι] The construction of σπουδάζειν with the accus. cum inf. only here; ἔχειν with the infinitive means: "*to be able.*" — τὴν μνήμην ποιεῖσθαι, here only: "*to call up the memory* (recollection) *of this,*" that is, *in you;* similarly μνείαν ποιεῖσθαι (Rom. i. 9; Eph. i. 16, etc.). — τούτων as in ver. 12. Dietlein, altogether arbitrarily, understands it of the memory of the history of Christ as He appeared in the flesh.—Peter promises to his readers, that as it was his intention in ver. 12 to remind them of the truths stated in vv. 3–11, he would also endeavour that after his death they should always be able to remember them. By what means he would do this is in this passage as little stated as in the μελλήσω . . . ὑμᾶς ὑπομιμνήσκειν, ver. 12. The reference here is not to the first and second epistles;[3] this

[1] Besser: "The Lord had communicated to him that a quick and sudden putting off of the tabernacle of the body awaited him."

[2] Even if ταχινή meant "soon," it would not be necessary to understand this here; for as John xxi. 18 expressly says: ὅταν δὲ γηράσῃς, Peter could, if writing this epistle in his old age, appeal to those words of Christ as corroborating his expectation of a speedy death.

[3] Dietlein: "Peter finds it necessary, in the first place, to stir up their remembrance during his lifetime, and secondly, to secure it for the time after

in like manner is opposed by the future *σπουδάσω*. The words *δὲ καί* following on *σπουδάσω* seem to imply that the author would do something else besides the *ὑπομιμνήσκειν*, whereby his readers after his death would be put in a position to remember what he had now written to them. This additional something may, however, be regarded as the *ἔχειν ὑμᾶς . . . τὴν τούτων μνήμην ποιεῖσθαι* itself in relation to *ὑμᾶς ὑπομιμνήσκειν*; that is to say, the latter states what *he*, the former what *they*, should do. It is most probable that the author in *μελλήσω ὑπομιμνήσκειν* and *σπουδάσω* expresses his intention of continuing for the future also to write to his readers as time and opportunity presented themselves. It is entirely arbitrary to take the promise as referring to copies of his letters (de Wette), or to the composition of the Gospel of Mark, which is supposed to have been done under Peter's superintendence (Michaelis, Pott, Fronmüller, etc.), or to the appointing of faithful teachers, cf. 2 Tim. ii. 2.

Ver. 16. *οὐ γὰρ σεσοφισμένοις μύθοις ἐξακολουθήσαντες*] *γάρ* shows that this verse, in which allusion is made to the erroneous teachers, gives the reason for the *σπουδάσω*. The connection of thought is perfectly plain, so soon as it is observed that all that has gone before has been said in close relation to the "promises" (ver. 4). — *σεσοφισμένοις μύθοις*, Luther inexactly: "clever fables;" *σοφίζειν* means in 2 Tim. iii. 15: "to make wise;" this meaning is inappropriate here; in the classics it occurs in the sense: "to contrive cleverly;" thus Aristophanes, *Nub.* 543: *ἀεὶ καινὰς ἰδέας σοφίζομαι*; accordingly *σεσοφ. μῦθοι* are: "*cleverly contrived fables;*" Pott: fabulae ad decipiendos hominum animos artificiosae excogitate atque exornatae;[1] cf. chap. ii. 3, *πλαστοὶ λόγοι*. The interpretation of Aretius is, on the other hand, incorrect: fabulae falsam habentes sapientiae et veritatis speciem. The expression *μῦθοι* is to be found in the N. T. only here and in the

his death; he wishes to provide for the latter also, at all times, *i.e.* he will not stop short at the epistle he has already written, but will make use of the present opportunity for writing a second."

[1] Dietlein thinks that the expression *σεσοφισμένοις* contains a double reproach, *i.e.* not only by the termination *-ίζειν*, but also in as far as the word *σοφία* means what is bad; however, the termination *-ίζειν* is by no means always used in a bad sense, nor does *σοφία* in itself mean what is bad, except only in connection

Pastoral Epistles. As the author makes no special allusion of the kind, it is at least doubtful if he refers to any *definite* myths; either those of the heathen with reference to the appearances of the gods upon earth (Oecumenius, Estius, Bengel, etc.), or to those of the Gnostics as to the emanation of the aeons (Dietlein), or to the Gnostic myth of the *Sophia* (Baur), or to the apocryphal legends of the birth and childhood of Christ, especially in the *Ev. Infantiae Jesu* (Jachmann), or to false myths as to Christ embellished in the spirit of the Jewish Messianic beliefs (Semler), or "apocryphal, didactic, and historical traditions, as these were appended by a later Judaism to the histories of the O. T., especially to the most ancient" (Schott, similarly Steinfass), or to the practice of heathen lawgivers, who, according to Josephus, appropriated to themselves the fables of popular belief, borrowing from them their accounts of the gods (Hofmann). The words express, indeed, an antithesis, but this is of an entirely general kind; either in order to bring out that the apostolic preachers are not like those others who seek the support of myths,—perhaps with special reference to the false teachers alluded to in chap. ii. and iii.,—or, what is less probable, in order to meet the reproaches of these teachers (Wiesinger), and the contrast serves to give the more prominence to the positive statement. — ἐξακολουθήσαντες] The verb, besides here, only in chap. ii. 2 and 15. The preposition ἐξ does not precisely indicate the error (Bengel), but only the going forth from a particular point; in common usage, however, this secondary meaning often entirely recedes; cf. the passage below, quoted from Josephus, *Ant.* prooem. § 4. By this negative statement the author denies not only that his message was based on myths, but that in it he followed a communication received from others (Schott). — ἐγνωρίσαμεν ὑμῖν τὴν τοῦ κυρ. ἡμ. Ἰ. Χρ. δύναμιν κ. παρουσίαν] Several interpreters understand this of

with τοῦ κόσμου τούτου (1 Cor. i. 20), ἀνθρωπίνη (1 Cor. ii. 13), etc. Besides, σοφίζειν is mostly employed so as to contain the secondary meaning of cleverness (see Pape, *s.v.*); consequently Hofmann is wrong in rendering σεσοφισμένος simply by "*conceived*," asserting that the word means nothing else. Cf. with our passage Joseph. *Ant.* prooem. 4: οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι νομοθέται τοῖς μύθοις ἐξακολουθήσαντες τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἁμαρτημάτων εἰς τοὺς θεοὺς τῷ λόγῳ τὴν αἰσχύνην μετέθησαν κ.τ.λ.—

the First Epistle of Peter; in which case the plural is surprising, for the author had already spoken of himself in the singular. Hofmann's objection to this view is, that although in his former epistle Peter refers to the power and coming of Christ, he did not first make it known to the readers. But the passages 1 Cor. xv. 1 and Gal. i. 11, show that γνωρίζειν may also be used of a proclamation, the substance of which had already been communicated to those to whom it was made. Many commentators take the words as referring to the whole preaching of the apostles, understanding ὑμῖν, not of the readers specially, but of the Gentile-Christians generally; thus Wiesinger, and more decidedly Hofmann. It must be observed, however, in opposition to this, that γενηθέντες and the subsequent ἡμεῖς ἠκούσαμεν must refer to the same subject as ἐγνωρίσαμεν. The most probable explanation is, that the author, remembering that he was not the only witness of the transfiguration, passed from the singular to the plural, and in so doing made use of ὑμῖν in its extended sense. — παρουσία is not here the *nativitas Christi*, His human birth (Vatablus, Erasmus, Hornejus, Pott, Jachmann, etc.), nor "His presence during the time He appeared on earth" (Schmid); but, in harmony both with the N. T. usage (chap. iii. 4; Matt. xxiv. 3, 27; 1 Cor. xv. 23; 1 Thess. ii. 19, etc.) and the connection of thought (vv. 4, 17, iii. 4): the return of Christ to judgment (Estius, Semler, Knapp, Dietlein, de Wette-Brückner, Hofmann, and the more modern interpreters generally [1]). δύναμις, however, denotes the fulness of might of the glorified Lord, as it will be more especially revealed in His παρουσία. It is not correct to combine both ideas into one, and with Hornejus to explain: potens adventus; or with Bengel: majestas praesentissima. — ἀλλ' ἐπόπται . . . μεγαλειότητος] An antithesis, affirmatively stated, to what goes before. ἐπόπτης, ἅπ. λεγ. (1 Pet. ii. 12, iii. 2: ἐποπτεύω), is the term. techn. for him who had reached the highest degree of initiation into the Eleusinian mysteries. Keeping to this, Bengel here interprets: ad intima arcana admissi; de Wette, too, thinks that the expression has here the secondary meaning

[1] Fronmüller only interprets: "His appearing with miraculous powers in the flesh, along with His expected appearance in glory."

of being initiated, of intimacy. It is no doubt chosen purposely with reference to the fact that the μεγαλειότης of Christ, which Peter and the other two disciples beheld, was a mystery hidden from the others. Grotius, Pott, and others take it as synonymous with αὐτόπτης, Luke i. 2. The connection demands that ἐπόπται γενηθέντες should be referred to the fact of the transfiguration (ver. 17). Hofmann is wrong in supposing that Peter here thought of the appearance of the Risen One and His ascension. The assertion is refuted not only by the close connection in which ver. 17 stands to this verse, but by the word μεγαλειότης, which in no sense is expressive only of "*greatness*." As the form in which Jesus showed Himself to His disciples after His resurrection was the same as that in which they had seen Him before it, they were not then in any way ἐπόπται of his μεγαλειότης; nor is there the slightest hint that there is here allusion to any fact other than that mentioned in the following verse. — τῆς ἐκείνου μεγαλειότητος] that is, the glory in which at His transfiguration Christ showed Himself to the three disciples. Incorrectly Calvin: exemplum unum prae aliis eligit memorabile, in quo Christus coelesti gloria ornatus conspicuam divinae magnificentiae speciem tribus discipulis praebuit. The apostle rather regards the transfiguration glory of Christ as the type—and therefore the proof—of the glory of Christ at His παρουσία.

Ver. 17. λαβὼν γὰρ . . . δόξαν] γάρ: "that is;" explanation of the immediately preceding: ἐπόπται γενηθέντες. The participle does not require any such supplement as ἦν or ἐτύγχανε, nor is it put instead of the finite verb. For the principal thought is, not that Christ was transfigured, but that Peter was a witness of this transfiguration, which was typical of the δύναμις καὶ παρουσία of Christ. The finite verb belonging to the participle λαβών is wanting. Its absence is most naturally accounted for by supposing, that the addition of φωνῆς ἐνεχθείσης κ.τ.λ. caused the author to forget to notice that he had not written ἔλαβε γάρ. How after writing λαβών he intended to proceed, cannot be definitely said; what is wanting, however, must be supplied from that which goes before, not from what follows. Winer, p.

330 [E. T. 442], incorrectly supplies the necessary complement from ver. 18, since he says that Peter should have continued: *ἡμᾶς εἶχε ταύτην τὴν φωνὴν ἀκούσαντας*, or in a similar manner. But it is still more arbitrary to borrow the supplement from ver. 19 (as is done by Dietlein and Schott). — *παρὰ θεοῦ πατρός*] *πατήρ* is applied here to God in His relation to Christ, with reference to the subsequent *ὁ υἱός μου*. — *τιμὴν καὶ δόξαν*] "Honour and glory," as in Rom. ii. 7, 10; *δόξα* denotes not the brightness of Christ's body at the transfiguration (Hornejus, Gerhard, etc. Steinfass would understand *both* expressions of the shining figure of Christ). Hofmann is unwarranted in finding in *λαβὼν κ.τ.λ.* a confirmation of his opinion that it is the resurrection and ascension that are here referred to, inasmuch as God first conferred honour and glory upon Christ, by raising Him from the dead and exalting Him. To this it may be said that by every act of God which testified to His glory, Christ received *τιμὴ καὶ δόξα*, *i.e.* "honour and praise." — *φωνῆς ἐνεχθείσης αὐτῷ τοιᾶσδε*] states through what Christ received "honour and praise:" the expression *φωνὴ φέρεταί τινι*, here only; Luke ix. 35, 36, *φωνὴ γίγνεται*; so also Mark i. 11; Luke iii. 22 (cf. John xii. 28, 30); *αὐτῷ*: the dative of direction, not: in honorem ejus (Pott). — *ὑπὸ τῆς μεγαλοπρεποῦς δόξης*] *ὑπό* is neither equivalent to "accompanied by" (Wahl), nor to "from . . . out of" (Winer, 5th ed. p. 442 f.): the preposition, even where in local relations it inclines to these significations, always maintains firmly its original meaning: "under;" here, as generally in passives, it signifies "by;" thus, too, Winer, 6th ed. p. 330 [E. T. 462], 7th, 346: "when this voice was borne to Him by the sublime Majesty." *ἡ μεγαλοπρεπὴς* (*ἅπ. λεγ.*) *δόξα* means neither heaven nor the bright cloud (Matt. xvii. 5);[1] it is rather a designation of God Himself (Gerhard, de Wette-Brückner, Wiesinger, Frommüller, Hofmann); similarly as, in Matt. xxvi. 64, God is called by the abstract expression *ἡ δύναμις*. With *μεγαλοπρεπής*, cf. Deut. xxxiii. 26, LXX. — *οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ υἱός μου ὁ ἀγαπητός*] So in

[1] Schott, indeed, interprets *ὑπό* correctly, but yet thinks that *τῆς μεγαλ. δόξης* means the cloud; "not indeed the cloud in itself, but as the manifestation which God gave of Himself" (!).

Matthew; only with the addition *αὐτοῦ ἀκούετε*, and instead of *εἰς ὅν*: "*ἐν ᾧ*." In Mark ix. 7 and Luke ix. 35 (where, instead of *ἀγαπητός*, there is "*ἐκλελεγμένος*"), the words *εἰς ὃν ἐγὼ εὐδόκησα* are entirely wanting. The reading adopted by Tisch. 7: *ὁ υἱός μου ὁ ἀγαπητός μου οὗτός ἐστι*, corresponds to none of the accounts in the Gospels; cf. with it the O. T. quotation from Isa. xlii. 1 in Matthew (chap. xii. 18): *ὁ παῖς μου . . . ὁ ἀγαπητός μου, εἰς ὃν εὐδόκησεν ἡ ψυχή μου.* — The construction of *εὐδοκεῖν* with *εἰς* does not occur elsewhere in the N. T.; there is no warrant for the assertion that *εἰς* points "to the historical development of the plan of salvation" (!) (Dietlein).

Ver. 18. *καὶ ταύτην . . . ἐνεχθεῖσαν*; the author is anxious to show prominently that he has been an ear-witness of that divine voice, as well as an eye-witness of the *μεγαλειότης* of Christ. — *ἐξ οὐρανοῦ ἐνεχθ.* is added by way of emphasis, in order to lay stress on the fact that Christ received that testimony directly from heaven. — *ἐν τῷ ὄρει τῷ ἁγίῳ*] From the epithet *τῷ ἁγίῳ* it must not, with Grotius, be concluded that the reference here is to the hill on which the temple stood, and that what is alluded to is not the transfiguration, but the incident recorded in John xii. 28. Without any reason, de Wette asserts that that epithet (instead of which Matt. xvii. 1 has: *ὑψηλόν*) betrays a view of the case more highly coloured with the belief in miracles than that of the apostles, and belonging to a later period; Calvin already gives the correct interpretation: montem *sanctum* appellat, qua ratione terra sancta dicitur, in qua Mosi Deus apparuit; quocunque enim accedit Dominus, ut est fons omnis sanctitatis, praesentiae suae odore omnia sanctificat; Dietlein: "the 'in the holy' is added, not to designate the mountain, but in order to distinguish it on account of this event;" so, too, Brückner and the modern commentators generally.

Ver. 19. *καὶ ἔχομεν βεβαιότερον τὸν προφητικὸν λόγον*] "*and we have as one more stable* (surer) *the word of prophecy.*" The second testimony for the glory of Christ in His second coming is "the word of prophecy." This Luther understands to mean the "gospel;" Griesbach: "New Testament prophecies;" Erasmus: "the heavenly testimony mentioned in

ver. 18." But the connection with what follows shows that it is the Old Testament promises which are here meant. On the singular Bengel rightly says: Mosis, Esaiae et omnium prophetarum sermones unum sermonem sibi undequaque constantem faciunt; non jam singularia dicta Petrus profert, sed universum eorum testimonium complectitur; only that here reference is made specially to the promise with regard to the δύναμις καὶ παρουσία of Christ. — The expression προφητικός, besides here, only in Rom. xvi. 26: γραφαὶ προφητικαί. — The article τόν marks this as a definite prophecy, well known to the readers. With regard to it the author says: ἔχομεν βεβαιότερον; for the force of βέβαιος, cf. especially Rom. iv. 16; Heb. ii. 2, 9, 17; 2 Cor. i. 6. βεβαιότερον is neither to be connected directly with the object, nor is the comparative to be taken as synonymous with the positive or with the superlative. Luther trebly inaccurate: "we have *a* stable prophetic word." — How then is the comparative to be explained? Oecumenius says by the relation in which the fulfilment stands to the promise, in this sense, that the truth of the latter is confirmed by the former, and that accordingly the prophetic word has now become more sure and stable than it was formerly (thus, too, Fronmüller). But the promise here in question still awaits its fulfilment. De Wette's view is more suitable. According to it, the comparative is put with reference to the event mentioned in vv. 17, 18, so that the thought would be: "and the prophetic word is more stable to us (*now*) from the fact that we saw and heard that" (thus, too, Schmidt, II. p. 213, Brückner, Dietlein, Schott[1]). Wiesinger combines this view with that of Oecumenius. There are objections to this view; de Wette himself raises them: (1) That any more precise allusion to this sense by a νῦν or an ἐκ τούτου is wanting; (2) That in what follows the thought stated is neither held fast nor developed. These, however, are easily removed, when it is considered that there is no intention here of giving prominence to the point of time, and that in what follows the reference is precisely to the prophetic word

[1] Hofmann, too, interprets thus, only that he looks upon the fact, by which the word of prophecy is made "more sure," not as being Christ's transfiguration, with the divine testimony, but His resurrection and ascension.

confirmed by the above-mentioned fact; cf. Brückner. It is incorrect to take the comparative here as implying that the word of prophecy is placed higher than something else, for this could only be that event mentioned in vv. 16, 17.[1] But the very stress laid on it and on the ἐπόπται γενηθέντες τῆς ἐκείνου μεγαλειότητος, is opposed to this view. How inappropriate would it be, if in comparison with it the word of prophecy should be brought prominently forward as more stable and sure! The nominative to ἔχομεν is not the apostles generally (against Hofmann), hardly either can it be Peter and his readers; but, as the close connection of this verse with what precedes shows, the subject to ἔχομεν is no other than that to ἠκούσαμεν. The author does not, indeed, here appeal to any of Christ's own prophecies of His second coming. But this is to be explained, not by assuming that these were unknown to him, nor because "the rapid succession of the advent on the destruction of Jerusalem, foretold in them, had not taken place" (de Wette), but simply because the writer's aim here was to point to the testimonies regarding Christ and what related to Him (and thus not to those of Christ Himself) (thus, too, Brückner). — ᾧ καλῶς ποιεῖτε προσέχοντες] "*whereunto to take heed, ye do well*," as Heb. ii. 1: "to give heed to something with a believing heart." The searching into the word of prophecy is only the consequence of this. The same construction of καλ. ποιεῖν cum Part. Acts x. 33; Phil. iv. 14; 3 John 6 (Joseph. *Ant.* xi. 6. 12: οἷς [γράμμασι Ἀμάνου] ποιήσατε καλῶς μὴ προσέχοντες). — ὡς λύχνῳ φαίνοντι ἐν αὐχμηρῷ τόπῳ] The comparative particle ὡς points to the nature and significance of the λόγος προφ.; it is in the sphere of spiritual life, the same as a λύχνος in outward world of sense. — φαίνοντι, not: qui lucebat (Bengel); it is rather the present, an attribute of λύχνῳ. αὐχμηρός (ἅπ. λεγ.), literally: parched, dry, then: dirty, dingy (opposed to λαμπρός, Arist. *de colorib.*[2]) It is used with the latter meaning here. αὐχμηρὸς τόπος has indeed been explained as a desert,

[1] Steinfass, indeed, thinks that the μῦθοι are referred to; Gerhard has already proved the incorrectness of this assumption.

[2] Hofmann's entirely unwarranted assertion: "It is in vain to appeal to the fact, that in Aristotle αὐχμηρός occurs as antithesis to λαμπρός; the antithesis to λαμπρόν there is ἀλαμπές; on the other hand, αὐχμηρός, in its original meaning of

or a "place overrun with wild scraggy wood" (Hofmann); but this would make sense only if the idea of darkness or night were added in thought (as by Steinfass), for which, however, there is still no warrant. — ἕως οὗ ἡμέρα διαυγάσῃ] ἕως οὗ (generally construed with ἄν), c. conj. aorist, expresses the duration of the act until the arrival of a future event which is looked upon as possible; that is: "*until the day breaks*," etc., "not until the day shall have dawned" (de Wette), cf. Matt. x. 11, 23, 39 ff. Some commentators (Bengel, etc., Schott too, and Hofmann) join ἕως οὗ with φαίνοντι; incorrectly; it belongs rather to προσέχοντες, which in the context has the accent. Taken with φαίνοντι it would be a somewhat superfluous adjunct, if it be not at the same time applied, according to the thought, to προσέχοντες, as is done by Dietlein, though without any linguistic justification. — διαυγάζειν, ἅπ. λεγ., used frequently in the classics of the break of day, when the light shines *through* the darkness; Polyb. iii. 104: ἅμα τῷ διαυγάζειν. — καὶ φωσφόρος ἀνατείλῃ] φωσφόρος, ἅπ. λεγ., is not meant to designate the sun (Hesychius, Knapp, etc.), but the morning star; many interpreters (Besser, etc.) incorrectly understand by it Christ. The adjunct καὶ φωσφόρος ἀνατείλῃ serves only further to complete the picture—that of the morning which precedes the full day. — ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ὑμῶν] belongs not to προσέχοντες (Schott), far removed from it, to which it would form a somewhat dragging supplement; nor is it to be taken with the subsequent τοῦτο πρῶτον γινώσκοντες (Hofmann). For, on the one hand, the observation that the reference here is to a heart knowledge, would have a meaning only if γινώσκοντες contained an exhortation to such knowledge; and, on the other, the position of the words is opposed to this connection. Consequently ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις can be joined only with the clause immediately preceding, ἕως οὗ κ.τ.λ. (de Wette-Brückner, Wiesinger, Fronmüller). As to the reference of the figure, commentators are much divided among themselves. De Wette understands αὐχμηρὸς τόπος of "the time

'dry,' is antithetical to στίλβειν;" is contradicted by the passage itself to which he appeals, and which runs thus: ποιεῖ δὲ διαφορὰν καὶ τὸ λαμπρὸν ἢ στίλβον εἶναι τὸ μιγνύμενον ἢ ποὐναντίον αὐχμηρὸν καὶ ἀλαμπές (Arist.: περὶ χρωμάτων; Becker, II. 793); and how should στίλβος mean "wet"?

previous to Christianity, which still continues for those who were not in the faith, and to whom the readers belonged." But opposed to this is the fact that in vv. 1, 12, the author speaks of his readers as believing Christians. Gerhard (with whom Brückner formerly concurred) takes the reference to be to the former condition of the readers, when as yet they did not believe. Against this, however, is the present ᾧ καλῶς ποιεῖτε προσέχ. The only adequate meaning to attach to τόπος αὐχμ. is: the world in its present condition (Wiesinger, Brückner, in the 3d ed. of de Wette's *Commentary*). The world is the dark place which is illumined only by the light of the divine (more precisely: the prophetic) word; therefore the Christians do well to give heed to this word, since otherwise they would be in darkness. In taking exception to this view, Hofmann says that it is "a mistake to identify the place where the light shines with that where those are, for whom it is lit up." In his view the meaning should be, that to him who looks into the final future, to which the prophetic word points, this word will perform a service similar to that of a light in a . . . pathless region at night,—this service, namely, "that the believer does not stand helplessly before the future, which lies before us like a confusion which is enveloped in night." But against this explanation it must be urged, that the figure employed by Peter would be appropriate only if the place in which the λύχνος shines were compared with that in which the believers are, and that the reference to the uncertain future is purely imported. — The words: ἕως οὗ κ.τ.λ., show that for the believer another condition of matters will commence. The time when the day dawns in the hearts of the Christians, and the morning star arises, and when consequently they can do without the light, has been variously determined. According to Dorner, it is "a time within the development of the Christian life in the individual; that time, namely, when what is matter of history shall become living knowledge, influencing entirely the whole life" (*Lehre v. d. Pers. Christi*, 2 ed. part I. p. 104). But such a separation of the development of the Christian life of his readers into two periods can the less be assumed here, that the author would thus accuse them of still possessing a purely outward Christianity, and it can hardly be supposed that

he should have considered the word of prophecy as unnecessary for the advanced Christian. Early commentators already correctly applied the words to the Parousia. It is erroneous, however, to understand them of that event itself, for with the advent the morning passes into the perfect day. The point of time which Peter has in view is that immediately preceding the second coming, the time when the *σημεῖον* of the Son of man appears (Matt. xxiv. 30), when believers are to lift up their heads because their *ἀπολύτρωσις* draweth nigh (Luke xxi. 28), when accordingly the morning star which ushers in the day shall arise in their hearts; similarly Wiesinger and Brückner.[1]

Ver. 20. *τοῦτο πρῶτον γινώσκοντες*] *τοῦτο* refers not to anything said before, but to the clause following: *ὅτι κ.τ.λ.*; cf. chap. iii. 3. — *πρῶτον*, i. q. *πρῶτον πάντων*, 1 Tim. ii. 1; erroneously Bengel: prius quam ego dico, anglicé: "before that." — *γινώσκοντες*: "*whilst ye recognise*, bring yourselves to the conscious knowledge that" (de Wette); cf. Jas. i. 3; Heb. x. 34. Without any warrant Pott supplies *δέ*, and takes the participle as equivalent to "*δεῖ γινώσκειν ὑμᾶς*;" the participle, as such, is rather to be joined closely to *καλ. ποιεῖτε προσέχ.* By *τοῦτο πρ. γιν.* the author directs the attention of his readers to the point to which they in their *προσέχειν* (ver. 19) should pay special attention; what that is the words following say: *ὅτι πᾶσα προφητεία . . . γίνεται*; *πᾶσα . . . οὐ* is a Hebraism for *οὐδεμία*, cf. Rom. iii. 20; 1 Cor. i. 29, etc. *προφητεία γραφῆς* is undoubtedly to be understood of the prediction of the Old Testament, either the prophecy contained in Scripture, or that to which the Scripture gives expression. For the construction of *γίνεται* c. gen., cf. Winer, p. 184 [E. T. 244]; Buttm. p. 142; according to Buttmann, the genitive definition of the thing with *εἶναι* or *γίνεσθαι* frequently denotes a permanent attribute; thus here: prophecy is of such a kind that it, etc.; the more precise definition depends on the meaning of the words: *ἰδίας ἐπιλύσεως*. Instead of *ἐπιλύσεως*,

[1] The difficulty of this verse is not diminished by the connection of the words *ἐν τ. καρδ. ὑμ.* with *προσέχ.*, and of *ἕως οὗ ἡ ἡμέρα κ.τ.λ.* with *φαίνοντι* (Schott), since, if these words *ἕως οὗ* are not to be almost meaningless, the question remains, what *that* morning is to which they refer. Schott, indeed, passes lightly over this difficulty by saying: "It is left to the reader to transfer this metaphor correctly to the dawn of the future day of perfect consummation."

Grotius would read: *ἐπηλύσεως*, and Heinsius: *ἐπελεύσεως*, so that the sense would be: the *προφητεία* non est res proprii impetus s. instinctus; but these changes have been justly rejected by Wolf already as arbitrary. Not less unwarranted is it to understand, with Hammond, *ἐπίλυσις* originally de emissione cursorum e carceribus, deducing therefrom the thought: that the prophets non a se, sed a Deo missi currerent; or, with Clericus: de solutione oris; or, with Lakemacher, to derive *ἐπίλυσις* from *ἐπιλεύθω* (*ἐπέρχομαι*), instead of from *ἐπιλύειν*, thus obtaining the idea: that prophecy is not accessus proprie aut talis, quae virtute quadam mentis humanae propria et naturali proveniat et ad hominem quasi accedat (cf. Wolf *in loc.*). The notion that *ἐπίλυσις* is equal to dissolutio (Hardt: omnis promissio non est dissolutionis sed indissolubilis, immutabilis, etc.; similarly Storr, *Opp.* II. 391 ff.) has been refuted already by Wolf. — *ἐπίλυσις* means: solution, explanation, interpretation; thus Mark iv. 34: *ἐπιλύειν*; Gen. xl. 8, Aquila: *ἐπιλυόμενος* (פֹּתֵר), *ἐπίλυσις* (פִּתְרוֹן); Gen. xli. 12, LXX., according to some codd.: *τὰ ἐνύπνια ἡμῶν, ἀνδρὶ κατὰ τὸ ἐνύπνιον αὐτοῦ ἐπέλυσεν*, *Phil. de vita contempl.* p. 901 A. — Almost all expositors understand *ἐπίλυσις* as the interpretation of the *προφητεία* made aforetime; but *ἰδίας*, however, has been variously applied—(1) It has been taken to refer to the *προφητεία* itself; Werenfels (cf. Wolf): *προφητεία οὐκ ἔχει τὴν ἑαυτῆς ἐπίλυσιν*, that is, *οὐκ ἐπιλύει ἑαυτήν*; thus also Wahl, Dietlein, Brückner. The positive idea here to be supplied is: but "the interpretation is to be looked for only from God" (Brückner; Dietlein arbitrarily finds the further idea contained here, that prophecy must not be treated as allegory). (2) To the prophets themselves; Oecumenius: *ᾔδεσαν* (*οἱ προφῆται*) *μὲν καὶ συνίεσαν τὸν καταπεμπόμενον αὐτοῖς προφητικὸν λόγον, οὐ μέντοι καὶ τὴν ἐπίλυσιν αὐτοῦ ἐποιοῦντο* (similarly Knapp, de Wette); and the thought to be supplied here is: the interpretation is then not an easy, but a difficult matter (de Wette: "the author makes this remark in order to excuse the difficulty of the interpretation, and to take away the pretext for unbelief or scoffing"). (3) To the readers or to man generally. This is the view most generally adopted; it is that of Beda, Erasmus, Luther, Aretius, Gerhard, Pott,

Steiger, Schmid, Besser, Wiesinger, Schott, Hofmann, etc.; and the positive thought to be supplied is: only the Holy Spirit can expound the prediction (Luther: "act accordingly, and do not think that you can interpret Scripture according to your own reason or cunning; Peter has forbidden it, you are not to interpret, the Holy Spirit must interpret, or it must remain uninterpreted"). But opposed to all these interpretations is—(1) The necessity of supplying the positive thought which really contains the point of the remark, but to which the apostle does not give expression; (2) The connection of thought, according to which ver. 20 is subjoined as a confirmation of the ᾧ καλῶς ποιεῖτε προσέχοντες. If the thought here expressed were intended to give a *caution* with respect to the προσέχειν, or to form, as Wiesinger says, a condition preliminary and necessary to it, this must in some way have been referred to. Besides, it must be noted that εἶναι or γίνεσθαι, c. gen., implies a relation of dependence, and in such a way that the genitive denotes that on which something else depends.[1] Now it may, indeed, be said that the "understanding" of prophecy, but not that prophecy itself, depends on the interpretation of it. The rendering: "prophecy is not a matter of private interpretation" (or even: "it does not permit of private interpretation," Hofmann), takes too little account of the force of the genitive.[2] For these reasons ἐπίλυσις must necessarily be understood rather of an "interpretation" on which the προφητεία is based, on which it depends. But this is the explanation of the problematic future itself, or

[1] Certainly, also, the above construction can merely express the relation of belonging to, as in Heb. xii. 11; but in that passage the ideas παιδεία and χαρᾶς (λύπης) stand in an altogether different relation to each other, from that in which προφητεία here stands to ἐπίλυσις.

[2] Hofmann's remark is indeed very apodictic, that "the first of these counter reasons is null, and that accordingly the second is so too, because τοῦτο πρῶτον γινώσκοντες means a perception, which must be combined with the attending to the word of prophecy . . . but a perception, the substance of which could only be expressed negatively, because meant only to *guard* the prophecy against an interpretation brought about by the conclusions of the individual intellect;" but the objection to this is the same as that to the second counter reason above. If the author wished the τοῦτο . . . γινώσκοντες to be understood in the sense of *guarding against*, he would at least have added a δέ. — It is not easy to understand why the author, if he had wished to express the thought which his words are supposed to contai.., did not write: ὅτι ἐπίλυσις προφητείας οὐ γίνεται ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, or something similar.

of the figure under which it presented itself to the prophets (thus, too, Gerlach and Fronmüller).[1] The passage above cited makes the matter clear. Gen. xl. 8 : the words, in which Joseph predicted to the prisoners what lay before them, form the προφητεία ; this presupposes an ἐπίλυσις, interpretation, of the dream by Joseph, and of this Joseph says that it belongs to God. Thus, too, he speaks to Pharaoh : the interpretation is not in me, Gen. xli. 15, 16 ; cf. Dan. chap. ii. — The thought accordingly is this : no prophecy of Scripture arises out of, or depends on, private (of him who utters the prophecy) interpretation of the future. Taken thus, the verse stands in close and correct connection both with what precedes, for it states why the λόγ. προφ. is βέβαιος *whereunto it is right to take heed*, as unto a light in a dark place (namely, because it is based on no human interpretation) ; and at the same time with what follows, which serves to explain and confirm the thought (inasmuch as it more precisely defines the idea, and by the positive statement confirms the negation).[2] Brückner incorrectly, therefore, objects to this interpretation, that although it may be in harmony with ver. 21, it cannot with propriety be connected with ver. 19 ; and if Brückner and Wiesinger further urge against it that it arbitrarily supplies the object of ἐπίλυσις, it must be replied, that object is rather supplied of itself out of the connection with προφητεία. The present γίνεται alone seems to be inappropriate, but this may be explained by supposing that the thought is conceived in the form of a general statement ; this Brückner has recognised, whilst Wiesinger leaves it unnoticed.[3]

Ver. 21. οὐ γὰρ θελήματι ἀνθρώπου] These words correspond with the preceding ἰδίας ἐπιλ. οὐ γίνεται ; "*not from or by the will of a man ;*" cf. Jer. xxiii. 26, LXX. : ἕως ποτὲ ἔσται

[1] Bengel's interpretation is similar : ἐπίλυσις dicitur interpretatio, qua ipsi prophetae res antea plane clausas *aperuere* mortalibus, only that here no definite distinction is drawn between προφ. and ἐπίλυσις.

[2] On the other hand, in the usual way of understanding this passage, ver. 21 is most inappropriately connected with ver. 20, since no explanation is given of the idea that the interpretation of the prophecy, because it is not the work of man, can only be expected from the Holy Spirit.

[3] Steinfass thinks that the author refers to Daniel, chap. xii., and that ἐπίλυσις means the answer given in ver. 12 to Daniel's question in ver. 8, by which the indefinite statement of time is definitely fixed. This singular opinion is, however, contradicted by the single expression πᾶσα.

. . . ἐν τῷ προφητεύειν αὐτοὺς τὰ θελήματα τῆς καρδίας αὐτῶν. — ἠνέχθη ποτὲ προφητεία] Vulg.: allata est; the verb as in vv. 17, 18 (cf. also 2 John 10). De Wette's translation: "is delivered or uttered," is inexact, inasmuch as the idea of a set discourse is not directly contained in the verb. Steinfass's interpretation of προφ. is wrong from a linguistic point of view: "gift of prophecy." — ποτέ belongs closely to the negative οὐ, equal to "*never*." The sense of the clause is: "the cause in which προφητεία has its origin is not the free will of man, determining itself thereto." — ἀλλ' ὑπὸ πνεύματος ἁγίου φερόμενοι κ.τ.λ.] The form of this, which does not exactly correspond with that of the preceding clause, serves to bring into greater prominence the passivity of the prophets. — φερόμενοι: "*borne along*" (as by the wind, *e.g.* the ship was driven, Acts xxvii. 15, 17). The impelling power is the πνεῦμα ἅγιον. Joseph. *Ant.* iv. 6, 5, says of Balaam: τῷ θείῳ πνεύματι . . . κεκινημένος; cf. the expressions in the classics: θεοφορεῖσθαι, θεοφόρητος. Macrob. i. 23: feruntur divino spiritu, non suo arbitratu, sed quo Deus propellit. Calvin correctly remarks: impulsos fuisse dicit, non quod menti alienati fuerint (qualem in suis prophetis ἐνθουσιασμόν fingunt gentiles), sed quia nihil a se ipsis ausi fuerint, tantum obedienter sequuti sunt Spiritum ducem. — ἐλάλησαν] Hornejus: intellige tam voce, quam scripto. "Men it was who spoke; but their speaking had the active reason of its origin, and its starting-point in God" (Schott). — ἀπὸ Θεοῦ ἄνθρωποι] In this expression, considered to be genuine, ἀπὸ Θεοῦ denotes the starting-point of the speaking: "men spoke from God." The prophets are thus significantly called simply ἄνθρωποι, in reference to the ἀνθρώπου going before. They were but men; prophets they became only by the πνεῦμα Θεοῦ.[1] The *Rec.* ἅγιοι Θεοῦ ἄνθρωποι is only a circumlocution for prophets, who are called ἅγιοι ἄνθρ. because they were in the service of God, inasmuch as they were the instruments of His πνεῦμα ἅγιον, cf. 1 Tim. vi. 11.

[1] Into this verse also Dietlein inserts much that is foreign, by saying in explanation of it: "not only are man and God placed in antithesis to each other, but over against the designs of man and the unreal world of human thoughts and conceptions (!) stands the Spirit of God, which so powerfully takes hold of the prophets only because that which He teaches possesses historical reality, or else will do so in time."

CHAPTER II.

VER. 2. *ἀσελγείαις*] according to almost all authorities, instead of the *Rec.* *ἀπωλείαις*, which only occurs in some min. — Ver. 4. *σειραῖς*] *Rec.* after K L P, etc. (Tisch. 7); A B C ℵ (Lachm. Tisch. 8) have *σειροῖς*, where it is uncertain whether this is to be regarded as an uncommon form for *σειραῖς* (perhaps by mistake), or another form for the more usual *σιροῖς* (Pape: "*σιρός*, written also *σειρός*: a pit, specially for preserving corn"). The lect. is peculiar in A and ℵ: *σειροῖς ζόφοις*, in which *σειροῖς* is evidently an adjective, equal to "hot." Commentators take no notice of these various readings; Reiche rejects them; so, too, Hofmann, who says simply, that the reading *σίροις* has no claim to attention. — In place of the *Rec.* *τετηρημένους* (in several min., Thph. Oec.), Griesb. Tittm. Tisch. (Reiche) have accepted *τηρουμένους*, after B C* K L P. — Lachmann reads *κολαζομένους τηρεῖν* (A C** ℵ, etc., Syr. Erp. Copt. Vulg. etc.); this appears, however, to be taken from ver. 9; Tisch.: "fluxit e v. 9." — Ver. 6. The word *καταστροφῇ* is wanting in B C* 27, *al.*, Copt. — Ver. 8. *ὁ δίκαιος*] Lachm. omits *ὁ*, after B,—without sufficient reason. — Ver. 9. Tisch. 7 reads *πειρασμοῦ* (*Rec.*, according to almost all authorities); on the other hand, Tisch. 8 has *πειρασμῶν*, after ℵ, corr. and several min. Tischendorf's observation on *πειρασμοῦ*: quod multo magis usu venit, does not justify the reading accepted by him in ed. 8. — Ver. 11. *παρὰ κυρίῳ*] *Rec.* after B C K L P ℵ, etc., Thph. Oec. (Tisch. 8). — Lachm. and Tisch. 7 are hardly correct in omitting it; it is wanting in A, *al.*, Syr. Erp. Vulg. etc. — Ver. 12. Instead of *γεγεννημένα* (*Rec.* after A* B C P, *al.*, m. etc., Scholz, Lachm. Tisch. 7), A** K L ℵ, *al.*, read: *γεγενημένα* (Tisch. 8). Whilst the *Rec.* has *φυσικά before γεγ.* (K L, *al.*, pl. Oec.), Lachm. and Tisch. have placed it *after γεγ.* (A B C P ℵ, *al.*), and rightly; the transposition is easily explained by assuming that it was thought necessary to connect *γεγεννημένα* directly with the: *εἰς ἅλωσιν* belonging to it. Mill, without reason, regards *γεγεν.* as a Scholion, which has come into the text by way of explanation of *φυσικά*. Dietlein considers the *Rec.* to be the original reading. — *καταφθαρήσονται*] *Rec.*, after C**

K L, etc., Thph. Oec. (Griesb. Scholz); on the other hand, A B C P ℵ (pr. m.), 7, *al.*, Aeth. Arm. Syr. etc., support *καὶ φθαρήσονται* (Lachm. Tisch.). This reading is to be preferred: *καί* gives peculiar point to the idea; since this was overlooked, and *καί* only regarded as being in the way, it might easily have been changed into *κατα*. — Ver. 13. *ἀπάταις*] *Rec.* after A* C K L P ℵ, *al.*, Copt. etc., Thph. Oec. (Griesb. Scholz, Tisch.). In its place A** B, Syr. Arr. Vulg. Ephr. etc., have *ἀγάπαις*; approved of by Erasmus, Luther, Camerarius, Grotius, etc.; adopted into the text by Lachm.; though hardly justly, for in *one* passage (either here or Jude 12) *ἀπάταις*, as de Wette also thinks, is probably the original reading; if so, then rather here than in Jude, all the more that *ὑμῶν* (in Jude) may be adapted to *ἀγάπαις*, but not so much *αὐτῶν*; B has *ἀγάπαις* in both passages; C, on the other hand, *ἀπάταις*, which is explained by the one having stood originally in the one passage, and the other in the other. Elsner, Wolf, Wetstein, Bengel, de Wette, and the modern commentators generally, are in favour of *ἀπάταις* in this passage; so, too, Reiche. — Ver. 14. The reading *μοιχαλίας* in A ℵ, several min., Copt. Vulg. etc., instead of *μοιχαλίδος*, can only be looked upon as a correction for the sake of simplification. — *ἀκαταπαύστους*] *Rec.* after C K L P ℵ, etc. (Griesb. Scholz, Tisch.); instead of which Lachmann reads *ἀκαταπάστους*, following A B, a word which does not occur elsewhere, and which Reiche accordingly declares to be an error in transcription; Buttmann, p. 57, thinks it is not unlikely that the original reading was: *καταπάστους*, *i.e.* "*polluted, defiled*," that then, by mistake, an *α*, perhaps taken from the previous *και*, had been added, out of which *ἀκαταπαύστους* arose. The reading occurring in several min.: *ἀκαταπαύστου*, gives indeed an appropriate meaning, but cannot be regarded as original. — *πλεονεξίας*] the reading attested by A B C K L P ℵ, etc. (Griesb. Scholz, Lachm. Tisch.), instead of the *Rec.* *πλεονεξίαις*, which is a mere correction. — Ver. 15. Tisch. 7 reads *καταλιπόντες*; *Rec.* after B*** C K L P; Tisch. 8, on the contrary, has *καταλείποντες*, following A B* ℵ, etc. — Griesb. already has rightly omitted the article *τὴν* before *εὐθεῖαν*; it is opposed by almost all authorities. —Ver. 17. Instead of the *Rec.* *νεφέλαι* (L, etc., Thph. Oec.), Griesb. correctly has admitted: *ὁμίχλαι* into the text, following A B C ℵ, etc.; so, too, Scholz, Tisch. Lachm. On the other hand, Dietlein, though without sufficient reason, considers the *Rec.*, which is evidently taken from Jude 10, to be original; so, too, Reiche. — *εἰς αἰῶνα*] according to A C L P, etc., Thph. Oec. — Lachm. and Tisch. have omitted it (following B ℵ); it seems to have been added from Jude 13; Reiche, however, regards it as

original. — Ver. 18. The prepos. ἐν before ἀσελγ. in the ed. Elz. occurs in a few min. Theoph. Oec. only. — ὀλίγως] accepted by Griesb. already, in place of the *Rec.*: ὄντως, according to the testimony of A B, *al.*, Syr. utr. Copt. etc., Aug. Hier.; so, too, by Scholz, Lachm. Tisch. — ἀποφεύγοντας] after A B C ℵ, many min. Syr. Arm. Vulg. etc. (Lachm. Tisch.), instead of the *Rec.*: ἀποφυγόντας, according to K L P, etc. Reiche seeks to prove the originality of the *Rec.* from internal reasons, but these are insufficient; he prefers also ὄντως to ὀλίγως. — Ver. 19. Tisch. 7 has τούτῳ καί (*Rec.* according to A C K L P, etc.); on the other hand, Tisch. 8 has τούτῳ, and omits καί, following B, etc.; the greater number of authorities are in favour of the *Rec.* — Ver. 20. A C L P ℵ, etc., read ἡμῶν after κυρίου (Lachm. Tisch. 8); the *Rec.* omits ἡμῶν, according to B K (Tisch. 7). — Ver. 21. ἐπιστρέψαι] *Rec.* according to K L, *al.*, Thph. Oec. (Griesb. Scholz, Tisch. 7, de Wette, etc.); B C P, etc., read ὑποστρέψαι (Tisch. 8); A ℵ, on the other hand, has εἰς τὰ ὀπίσω ἀνακάμψαι ἀπό. This latter reading is probably only an explanatory gloss; but whether ἐπιστρ. or ὑποστρ. be the original reading or not, it is difficult to decide with certainty; since the verb has not here the simple meaning of "turning back," but of "turning back again to what has gone before," a meaning in no way peculiar to the expression ἐπιστρέφειν itself, without any nearer definition, it lies to hand to look upon ὑποστρέψαι as a correction. Lachm. has adopted εἰς τὰ ὀπίσω ὑποστρέψαι ἀπό; but no codex has this reading. — Ver. 22. In A B ℵ (pr. m.), Sahid. (Lachm. Tisch.) δέ is awanting; it is probably added in order to connect ver. 22 more closely with ver. 21. — In the place of κύλισμα (A K L P ℵ, etc., Lachm.), B C* 29 (Tisch.) have the form κυλισμόν.

Ver. 1. From here onwards: a description of the false teachers, who were to arise in the church, and a warning against them. — ἐγένοντο δὲ καὶ ψευδοπροφῆται] δέ: antithesis to what goes before. καί: "*also*," that is, besides the true prophets mentioned in chap. i. 21. The expression: ψευδοπροφήτης, already in the O. T. LXX., *e.g.* Jer. vi. 13, frequently in the N. T., not after the analogy of ψευδολόγος: "one who prophesies falsely," but: "*one who falsely gives himself out for a prophet*," on the analogy of ψευδάδελφος, ψευδαπόστολος. — ἐν τῷ λαῷ] *i.e.* among the people of Israel. These words are in form a principal clause, but in thought a secondary clause: as there were false prophets in Israel, so

will there be also among you, etc.—*ὡς καὶ . . . ψευδοδιδάσκαλοι*] *ἔσονται*; designates the *ψευδοδιδάσκαλοι* as such, who would arise only in the future. They are afterwards pictured as actually present; see on this, the Introd. § 2, p. 281. The expression *ψευδοδιδ.* is in the N. T. *ἅπ. λεγ.*; Wiesinger and Brückner interpret: "such as teach lies;" Dietlein and Fronmüller: "*such as lyingly pretend to be teachers.*" The analogy of *ψευδοπροφ.*, with which it is here contrasted, makes the last the preferable interpretation (thus, too, Hofmann). Both result in the same sense (Schott); what the *ψευδοπροφῆται* were in the O. T., the *ψευδοδιδάσκαλοι* are in the N. T. — *οἵτινες*] equivalent to quippe qui, "*such as.*" — *παρεισάξουσι*] cf. Jude 4: "*to introduce by the side of,*" with the secondary idea of secrecy.[1] — *αἱρέσεις ἀπωλείας*] *αἱρέσεις*, according to N. T. usage, "*party-divisions,*" cf. 1 Cor. xi. 19 (synonymous with *σχίσματα*); Gal. v. 20 (synonymous with *διχοστασίαι*); also Tit. iii. 10, which have their origin in false doctrine; thus Brückner, Wiesinger, Schott, etc.; Hofmann, too, says that the word is to be taken in no sense different from that which it has elsewhere in the N. T., but then interprets it as equivalent to "particular systems of opinion," thus attributing to it a meaning which it has nowhere else. Others take *αἵρεσις* here to mean "false doctrine, heresy" (Bengel, de Wette, Fronmüller). This interpretation is better suited to the connection, and especially to the verb *παρεισάγειν*. In the N. T., doubtless, the word has not this meaning, yet Ignatius already uses it with this force. *ἀπωλείας* (which is not to be resolved into the adject. "destructive") designates the heresies as those which lead to *ἀπώλεια*; cf. vv. 2, 3. — *καὶ τὸν ἀγοράσαντα . . . ἀπώλειαν*] Winer (5th ed. p. 399 f.) translates: "since they also, denying the Lord, draw upon themselves swift destruction;" but the connection of *καί* with *ἐπάγοντες*, so far removed from it by *τὸν ἀγοράσαντα κ.τ.λ.*, cannot be justified. Fronmüller connects the member of the clause beginning with *καί* not with the relative clause *οἵτινες*, but with *ἔσονται ψευδοδιδάσκαλοι*. This construction was

[1] Hofmann is wrong in asserting that in classical Greek *παρεισάγειν* has not the secondary meaning of secrecy; the verb occurs both with this secondary meaning and without it, see Pape, *s.v.*

formerly supported in this commentary, with the remark, however, that a particular species of false doctrine was not, as Fronmüller assumes, indicated here, but that the participial clause more nearly defined the ψευδοδιδάσκαλοι, καί being here put in the sense of: "*and withal;*" this construction, however, is anything but natural. The καί must undoubtedly be connected with the clause immediately preceding, though not as a simple copula, but in the sense of "*also;*" thus de Wette and Wiesinger,[1] taking καί as an intensification, equivalent to "*even:*" "whilst they deny even the Lord who bought them." On the other hand, Hofmann does not admit any such intensification, and takes καί as equivalent to "*also,*" in the sense of addition, and interprets: "with their particular systems they break up the unity of the church, which, however, they do not do without at the same time denying the Lord." But, on this interpretation, it is not clear why the author did not put the finite verb instead of the partic. ἀρνούμενοι; the thought, too, that they break up the unity of the church, is simply imported. The participle shows that this clause is meant to serve as an explanation or a more precise definition of what goes before. De Wette's view, accordingly, is to be preferred to that of Hofmann; it is, however, also possible that Schott is right in assuming an irregularity of the construction, in that the author, led astray by the participle ἀρνούμενοι, wrote the participle ἐπάγοντες instead of the finite verb ἐπάξουσι; in which case καί must be taken as a simple copula. — The participle ἐπάγοντες is connected in a loose fashion with what precedes, in the sense: "*by which they,*" etc. The ψευδοδιδάσκαλοι are more precisely characterized as: τὸν ἀγοράσαντα αὐτοὺς δεσπότην ἀρνούμενοι; with ἀρνούμενοι, cf. Jude 4; Bengel correctly: doctrina et operibus. By δεσπότην Christ is here meant; the author speaks of Him thus, in order to lay stress on the fact that they deny that Christ is the *Lord;* ἀγοράσαντα αὐτούς is added by way of emphasis: they deny the Lord who "*bought*" them, *i.e.* pro-

[1] Winer (6th ed. p. 314 [E. T. 441], 7th ed. p. 329) says: "Both participles, ἀρν. and ἐπάγ., are connected with παρεισάξουσιν; they are not, however, co-ordinate with each other, but ἐπάγοντες is annexed to the clause οἵτινες . . . ἀρνούμενοι;" he does not state how καί is to be understood

cured them for Himself by paying the purchase price. This does not only serve to emphasize more strongly what is reprehensible in the *ἀρνεῖσθαι*, but points out also that they deny the act to which allusion is made, and by which He has become their Lord. With *ἀγοράζειν*, cf. 1 Cor. vi. 20, vii. 23; Rev. v. 9; the blood of Christ must be thought of as the purchase price. — *ἐπάγοντες ἑαυτοῖς ταχινὴν ἀπώλειαν*] With *ἐπάγ. ἑαυτοῖς*, cf. ver. 5, as also Acts v. 28. *ἑαυτοῖς* indicates that they prepare an *ἀπώλεια* not only for others (*αἱρέσεις ἀπωλείας*), but for *themselves*.—With *ταχινήν*, see chap. i. 14, not: a *speedy* *ἀπώλεια*; Hornejus correctly: inopinatam et inexspectatam; the destruction will come over them *suddenly*, and before they are aware of it (Schott, Frommüller, Hofmann).

Ver. 2. *καὶ πολλοὶ ἐξακολουθήσουσιν*] The activity of these *ψευδοδιδάσκαλοι* would not be without result; cf. 2 Tim. ii. 17. With *ἐξακολ.* cf. chap. i. 16. — *αὐτῶν ταῖς ἀσελγείαις*] *i.e.* their *ἀσέλγειαι* will serve as a rule to many, so that they give themselves up to them; cf. Jude 4. The connection of erroneous doctrine with sensual excesses is shown in vv. 18, 19. — *δι' οὓς ... βλασφημηθήσεται*] *δι' οὕς*, not: "by whom;" Vulg.: per quas; but: "*on account of whom;*" they (either the *ψευδοδιδάσκαλοι*, or those led astray by them, or both) by their *ἀσέλγειαι* give those who are not Christians occasion for *βλασφημία* against the *ὁδὸς τῆς ἀληθείας*; cf. 1 Tim. vi. 1; Rom. ii. 24. *ἡ ὁδὸς τῆς ἀληθείας* (Barnab. c. v.: via veritatis), a designation of Christianity or of the Christian religion (cf. on the expression *ὁδός*, Acts ix. 2, xix. 9, 23, xxii. 4, xxiv. 14, xvi. 17, xviii. 25), in so far as it is the form of life in harmony with divine truth (not leading to the truth).

Ver. 3. *καὶ ἐν πλεονεξίᾳ*] *i.e.* as it were encompassed by covetousness, living in it, governed by it; it is incorrect to translate *ἐν* by *διά*. *πλαστοῖς λόγοις*] *ἅπ. λεγ.*, *i.e.* "*with deceitfully invented words,*"[1] which are not in accordance with truth; incorrectly Hofmann: "artfully contrived doctrines."—*ὑμᾶς ἐμπορεύσονται*] "*they will seek gain of you;*" Gerhard: quaestum ex vobis facient, ad quaestum suum vobis abutentur; thus, too, Wiesinger, Schott, de Wette-Brückner; cf. also Winer, p. 209

[1] Plato, *Apol. Socrat.*: *πλάττειν λόγους*; Artemidor. i. 23: *πλάσσειν δίκει ... ἀγαθὸν ῥήτορσι ... διὰ τὸ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα δεικνύειν τὰς τίχνας ταύτας.*

[E. T. 279]; this meaning of the verb c. acc. in classical Greek is sufficiently assured.[1] The *πλαστοὶ λόγοι* are not, as Hofmann supposes, "to be thought of as the merchandise which they bring to the market, in order to be repaid for such instruction," but as the means by which they carry on the *ἐμπορεύεσθαι*. Steinfass translates *ἐμπορεύεσθαι* as equivalent to: to buy, and *ὑμᾶς* as the direct object of purchase; thus Pott too: vos sectae suae conciliare conantur. It is undeniable that the object traded in may stand in the accusative (cf. Prov. iii. 14, LXX.), but the context here is opposed to this, partly on account of the *ἐν πλεονεξίᾳ*, partly because *this* thought is already contained in the preceding verse. Frommüller incorrectly renders the word by "to deceive." — By deceitful words as to Christian freedom, etc., they sought to delude others, and, in accordance with their covetous desires, to make gain of them; cf. vv. 13, 14, and Jude 16. — *οἷς τὸ κρῖμα ἔκπαλαι οὐκ ἀργεῖ*] *οἷς*: dat. incommodi; refers to the subj. in *ἐμπορεύσονται*. *τὸ κρῖμα* is the judgment of God ordering the *ἀπώλεια*. *ἔκπαλαι* is not to be combined with *τὸ κρῖμα* into one idea, equal to: *κρῖμα ἔκπαλαι αὐτοῖς προγεγραμμένον*; cf. Jude 4 (Pott, de Wette); such a mode of combination is to be found nowhere in the N. T. It belongs rather to *οὐκ ἀργεῖ*. There is not, as de Wette insists, any contradiction involved in this connection, especially as *οὐκ ἀργεῖ* is a positive idea; strictly: "*is not inactive, does not tarry;*" the idea of *haste* is not implied in it (de Wette). *ἔκπαλαι* sets forth prominently that for a long time the judgment has, as it were, been approaching, that is, ever since it was given and pronounced; it is living, and will come in due time. It is possible that *ἔκπαλαι* refers to the judgments mentioned in ver. 4, formerly put into execution (Dietlein, Scott, Wiesinger), which, however, Hofmann disputes. — *καὶ ἡ ἀπώλεια αὐτῶν* (ver. 1) *οὐ νυστάζει*] *νυστάζειν*, strictly: "*to nod*," then: *to slumber* (only elsewhere in Matt. xxv. 5; there, however, in its literal meaning), is used in the classics in a

[1] Cf. Athenag. xiii. 569: *Ἀσπασία ἐνεπορεύετο πλήθη γυναικῶν*. Philo in *Flacc.* p. 984: *ἐνεπορεύετο τὴν λήθην τῶν δικαστῶν*. J. Chrysostom: *τὴν πενίαν τοῦ πλησίου ἐμπορεύεσθαι*. The translation of the Vulg. is inexact: de vobis negotiabuntur, as also that of Luther: "they will trade with you."

figurative sense; Plato, *de repub.* iii. 405 C: *μηδὲν δεῖσθαι νυστάζοντος δικαστοῦ.* Steinfass inexactly: "to become sleepy."

Ver. 4. From here to ver. 6 three examples of divine judgment; cf. Jude 5 ff. — First example: the fallen angels, Jude 6. — *εἰ γάρ*] The apodosis is wanting; Gerhard supplies: *οὐδ' ἐκείνοις φείσεται.* In thought, if not in form, the latter half of ver. 9 constitutes the apodosis (Winer, 529 f. [E. T. 712 f.], de Wette-Brückner, Wiesinger, and the more modern writers generally). The irregularity of the construction is explained by the fact that the third example is dwelt on at much length. — *ὁ Θεὸς ἀγγέλων ἁμαρτησάντων οὐκ ἐφείσατο*] The nature of the sin is not stated; otherwise in Jude.[1] What sin the apostle refers to is only faintly hinted at by the circumstance that the example of the flood immediately follows. It is less likely (against Wiesinger) that ver. 20 contains any reference to it, for in that verse other sins are conjoined with the *ὀπίσω σαρκὸς . . . πορεύεσθαι.* — *ἀλλὰ σειραῖς ζόφου . . . τηρουμένους*] "*but (when he) having cast (them) down into Tartarus, hath delivered them over to the chains of darkness, as being reserved unto the judgment.*" *σειραῖς ζόφου* is mostly taken in connection with *ταρταρώρας* (*sc.* *δεδεμένους*) (de Wette: "but cast them down into hell with chains of darkness"); but, since the added *ζόφου* shows that the *σειραί* are designated as fetters, which belong to the darkness of Tartarus (not: "fetters which consist in darkness" (Schott), nor: "fetters by which they were banished into darkness," as Hofmann explains), the enchaining could only have take place there, and therefore (with Calov, Pott, Steinfass, Hofmann, Wahl, *s.v.* *παραδίδωμι*) it is preferable to connect the words with *παρέδωκεν* (as opposed to de Wette, Brückner, Dietlein, Wiesinger, etc.).[2] — Instead of *σειραῖς ζόφου*, Jude has: *δεσμοῖς ἀϊδίοις*; *ζόφος* is not Tartarus itself, but the darkness of Tartarus; the word is to be found only here and in Jude. — *ταρταροῦν* does not

[1] Frommüller is wrong in asserting that the apostasy of Satan is meant here; it cannot be doubted that the sin meant here is the same as that of which Jude speaks, and it is not that apostasy; see my Comment. on Jude.

[2] When Brückner says: "the expression becomes more drastic if the act of casting into Tartarus be completed only by the binding with chains," this supports the construction to which he objects. Schott translates altogether unwarrantably: "but has *fastened them down* into the depths with chains of darkness."

mean: tartaro adjudicare (Crusius, *Hypomn.* I. p. 154), but: "*to remove into Tartarus*" (cf. Homer, *Il.* viii. 13: ἤ μιν ἐλὼν ῥίψω εἰς τάρταρον ἠερόεντα). The expression τάρταρος occurs nowhere else either in the N. T. or LXX. It is not equal to ᾅδης, which is the general term for the dwelling-place of the dead. Nor does the author use it as synonymous with γεέννα, for that is "the place of final punishment, the hell fire" (Fronmüller), but it is used to designate "the place of preliminary custody." — παρέδωκεν here, as often, used with the implied idea of punishment. — εἰς κρίσιν τηρουμένους] κρίσις is the final judgment (κρίσις μεγάλης ἡμέρας); "*as those who are reserved for the judgment;*" Luther inexactly: "in order to reserve them." — On the reading: παρέδωκεν εἰς κρίσιν κολαζομένους τηρεῖν, the infin. τηρεῖν is dependent on παρεδ., and κολαζ. states, not: the purpose for which, but the condition in which, they are reserved for judgment; the Vulg. therefore translates inexactly: tradidit cruciandos, in judicium reservari. Dietlein, in opposition to all reliable authorities, insists on reading: τετηρημένους, which, moreover, he incorrectly paraphrases: "as those who once should have been kept;" it must rather be: "as those who (until now) have been kept."

Ver. 5. Second example: the flood; this is peculiar to the author of this epistle; cf. the corresponding section in Jude. καὶ ἀρχαίου κόσμου οὐκ ἐφείσατο] The clausal formation is the same as that in ver. 4. Subaudienda est particula: εἰ (Gerhard). The words which follow on this tell in what the οὐκ ἐφείσατο consisted: κατακλυσμὸν κ.τ.λ.; there is no mention here of a "destruction" (Schott) of the world. — ἀρχ. κόσμος, *i.e.* mundus antediluvianus. — ἀλλ' . . . ἐφύλαξε] The thought of the deliverance of the righteous is connected with that of the destruction of the ungodly; cf. ver. 7. — ὄγδοον belongs not to κήρυκα (Heinsius, Lightfoot, and Schwegler in his *nachapost. Zeitalter*, I. p. 515; cf., as opposed to him, Hilgenfeld, *Clement.* p. 185), but directly to Νῶε; Luther correctly: Noah with seven others; cf. Winer, p. 234 [E. T. 312]; Buttmann, p. 26. There is nothing to show that the number eight has a mystical meaning here (Dietlein).[1]

[1] "Peter looked upon Noah as the bearer of the eight, and saw in the church saved from the flood a holy eight, making a final close to the old world."

The mention of it naturally arose from the recollection of the event; at the same time, however, it marks the small number of the saved contrasted with that of those who perished (Bengel, Schott, etc.). Besides, Noah and those with him, as also Lot afterwards, are taken by the author as types of the *εὐσεβεῖς* (ver. 9), on whom the judgment of God will not come. — *δικαιοσύνης κήρυκα* is added as the reason of God's preservation (*ἐφύλαξε*) (thus, too, Wiesinger). By *δικαιοσύνη* is to be understood here, not the condition of being justified (Wiesinger), but a believing and godly bearing towards God; otherwise in Heb. xi. 7. — *κατακλυσμόν*] Matt. xxiv. 38, 39; Gen. v. 17, LXX. Heb. מַבּוּל: the verb *κατακλύζειν*, chap. iii. 6. — *κόσμῳ ἀσεβῶν*] antithesis to *δικαιοσύνης κήρυκα*; the world is thus named, inasmuch as it had become the dwelling-place of ungodly humanity. — *ἐπάξας*] on this form of the aorist, see Buttmann, *Ausf. Gr.* § 114, *s.v.* *ἄγω*.

Remark.—With regard to its position, Dietlein insists that this verse is intimately connected with ver. 4, so that "the judgment of imprisonment on the angels must be considered as one and the same event with the Noachic flood;" that the judgment on the *ἀρχαῖος κόσμος*, vv. 4, 5, must be distinguished from the judgment of God within the *second* world (ver. 6); and that the latter only, not the former, must be regarded as the example, strictly so called; thus, too, Schott. But the whole structure and mode of expression of this section is opposed to any such division; for (1) The clauses are simply co-ordinate (as ver. 5 is joined to ver. 4, so is ver. 6 to ver. 5, merely by *καί*); (2) The *ἀρχαῖος κόσμος* is mentioned *only* here, not in ver. 4; (3) What is stated in ver. 6 is not brought prominently forward as an event taking place in the *new* world; (4) In the idea of the *κόσμος ἀσεβῶν* the angels cannot be included, since the flood came on the ungodly *men* only; and it is arbitrary and strange to assume that the flood buried mankind "in the depths, and those spirits which in sin had taken up their abode with them" (Schott). It is arbitrary to regard the judgment on Sodom as the *only* proper example, since no other position is given to the judgments mentioned in vv. 4, 5 than to that in ver. 6. The chief reason for the division lies in ver. 9, which consists of two members, due, however, to the two foregoing examples. From the fact that only one of the members applies to ver. 4, it does not follow that there no special example can be intended, the

less so that the leading idea is not "the deliverance of the righteous," but "the confinement of the ungodly." Equally little is proved by the repetition of the verb: *οὐκ ἐφείσατο*, which serves rather to mark off the *ἀρχαῖος κόσμος* from the *ἀγγελ. ἁμαρτ.*, not to unite them into *one* idea. Even Brückner has rejected the view of Dietlein and Schott. Hofmann, too, while questioning it, approaches it very closely when he says: "The judgment of the flood was also a judgment upon those spirits which had become involved in the sin and in the fate of the race of men then living."

Ver. 6. Third example: The overthrow of Sodom and Gomorrah; cf. Jude 7. — This verse also is still dependent on *εἰ*. Schott, without any adequate reason, asserts that the author "has even here forgotten the construction of his expression in the protasis with *εἰ*." — *πόλεις Σοδόμων καὶ Γομόρρας*] The gen. as apposition. — *τεφρώσας*] Suidas: equivalent to *ἐμπρήσας, σποδώσας*: "*by burning them to ashes, by reducing them to ashes.*" — *καταστροφῇ κατέκρινεν*] not equal to eversione s. subversione damnavit i. e. unditus evertendo punivit (Gerhard, Dietlein, Schott), but *καταστροφῇ* is the dative of reference; see Buttmann, p. 144; cf. *κατακρ. θανάτῳ*, Matt. xx. 18; Pott correctly: in cineres redigens damnavit ad eversionem; thus also Wahl, de Wette, Wiesinger, Steinfass, Frommüller, Hofmann; only it must be here remarked that *κατακρίνειν* includes within it the punishment, the putting into execution of the judgment of condemnation—which Hofmann, without reason, denies, cf. Rom. viii. 3. — It is incorrect to connect *καταστροφῇ* with *τεφρώσας* (Bengel). — *καταστροφή*, in the N. T. besides here, only in 2 Tim. ii. 14; there, however, in a figurative sense; the same word occurs in the narrative of the destruction of the cities of the plain, Gen. xix. 29, LXX. — *ὑπόδειγμα μελλόντων ἀσεβεῖν τεθεικώς*] Jude 7; with *ὑπόδειγμα*, not equal to "example," but to "*type*," cf. Jas. v. 10; Heb. iv. 11, etc. The perf. *τεθεικώς* corresponds with the *πρόκεινται*, Jude 7; Hofmann correctly: "God has made them, as the perf. shows, a lasting type of those who ever afterwards should live a godless life." [1]

[1] Hofmann attaches particular importance to the circumstance, that the judgment which was effected by water was followed by another, which was effected by fire.

Ver. 7. Contrast to the divine justice in punishing, which is not to be found in Jude. Wiesinger: "The expansion of the thought, introduced by the mention antithetically of Noah, ver. 5, gains, by the co-ordination (*καί*) of the deliverance of Lot, independent value, and prepares the way for the double inference, ver. 9." — *καί*] has not here an adversative force (Jachmann), but is simply the copulative particle. — *δίκαιον Λώτ*] *δίκαιος* here like *δικαιοσύνη*, ver. 5. — *καταπονούμενον*] besides here, in Acts vii. 24 (2 Macc. viii. 2, where, however, it is doubtful whether the reading should be *καταπονούμενον* or *καταπατούμενον*); Pott, *Schol. Soph. in Trachin.* v. 328, verba: *ἀλλ' εἶεν ὠδινοῦσα* exponit per *καταπονουμένη*. — *ὑπὸ τῆς . . . ἐῤῥύσατο*] *ὑπό* belongs not to *ἐῤῥύσατο*, but to *καταπον.*; cf. Winer, p. 330 [E. T. 461];—with *ἡ ἐν ἀσελγ. ἀναστροφή*, cf. 1 Pet. i. 17. — *ἀθέσμων*, besides here only in chap. iii. 17: homines nefarii, qui nec jus nec fas curant (Gerhard).

Ver. 8. Explanation of the *καταπονούμενον*. — *βλέμματι γὰρ καὶ ἀκοῇ*] is to be joined neither with *δίκαιος* (Vulg.: adspectu et auditu justus erat), nor with *ἐγκατοικῶν* (Gerhard), but with the finite verb; it was by seeing and hearing that Lot's soul suffered, and is added in order more strongly to emphasize Lot's painful position among the ungodly. — *ψυχὴν δικαίαν ἀνόμοις ἔργοις ἐβασάνιζεν*] "*he vexed his righteous soul by the ungodly works*," *i.e.* his soul, because it was righteous, felt vexation at the evil which he was obliged to see and hear. "*ἐβασάνιζεν* serves to show that the pain at the sight of the sinful lives arose out of personal activity, out of inclination of the soul to the good, out of positive opposition to the evil" (Dietlein). The earlier interpreters have for the most part missed the correct idea; Calvin, Hornejus, Pott, de Wette, and the modern commentators generally, have interpreted correctly.[1]

Ver. 9. This verse in thought, though not in form, constitutes the apodosis to the preceding clauses beginning with *εἰ*. The thought, however, is expressed in a more extended and

[1] Cf. Xenophon, *hist. Graec.* I. 4, p. 407: *ὥστ' ἐνίους καὶ τῶν τυπτομένων, νομίμων δὲ ὄντων ἀνθρώπων, ἀδημονῆσαι τὰς ψυχὰς, ἰδόντας τὴν ἀσέβειαν*; only it must be observed that Lot was vexed at the godlessness in itself, not because he personally had to suffer by it.

general manner; the special application follows in ver. 10. — *οἶδε*] Knowledge is conceived at the same time as a divine power. — *κύριος*] *i.e.* God, ver. 4. — *εὐσεβεῖς*, like Noah and Lot. — *ἐκ πειρασμοῦ ῥύεσθαι*] cf. 1 Pet. i. 6. — *ἀδίκους δέ*] like the fallen angels, etc. — *εἰς ἡμέραν κρίσεως κολαζομένους τηρεῖν*] *κολαζ.* is not used here with a future force: cruciandos (Bengel, Calvin, Winer, who, in his 5th ed. p. 405, resolves the clause thus: *ἀδίκ. τηρεῖ* (*ὥστε*) *κολάζειν*, and others), but it must be taken as a real present; it refers to the punishment which they suffer even before the last judgment unto which they are kept (*τηρεῖν*); cf. on ver. 4. Thus also Wiesinger, Schott, Brückner.

Ver. 10. Compare Jude 8. — *μάλιστα δέ*) in close connection to what immediately precedes. The author passes from the general, to those against whom this epistle is specially directed. Dietlein introduces a foreign reference when he says: "the apostle means the false teachers in contrast to such ungodly persons as did not base their ungodliness on theoretically developed error." — As in Jude, the false teachers are characterized in two respects. Whilst in vv. 1–3 they are spoken of as yet to appear, they are here described as already present. — *τοὺς ὀπίσω . . . πορευομένους*] cf. besides Jude 8 also 7, and the commentary on the passage. — *σαρκός* stands here without *ἑτέρας*, and must therefore be taken more generally. Buttmann (p. 160) wrongly translates *σάρξ* here by "lusts." — *ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ μιασμοῦ*] *μιασμοῦ* is not to be resolved into an adjec.: cupiditas foeda, impura (Wahl);[1] but it is the objective genitive, and states that to which the *ἐπιθυμία* is directed (de Wette-Brückner, Wiesinger, Schott, etc.). — *μιασμός*, *ἅπ. λεγ.*, equivalent to pollutio. According to Schott, *μιασμός* is here used subjectively, "what to themselves is dishonouring to the human body, that they make the object of their wild lust." — *καὶ κυριότητος καταφρονοῦντες*] cf. Jude 8, and the

[1] Hofmann also renders the idea by "impure desire, filthy lust," which, taking *μιασμοῦ* as an attributive genitive, he interprets more closely thus: "a lust which brings defilement with it, since it pollutes not only him who gratifies it, but him also on whom it is gratified;" but in this interpretation the two expressions, "impure lust" and "lust which pollutes," are erroneously taken as identical.

exposition. — τολμηταί] The author drops the construction hitherto adopted, and begins a new clause; the word is a ἅπ. λεγ. equal to "insolent, daring;" Luther: "thürstig" (i.e. *bold*, from the root tarr; in old High German, gaturstig; cf. Pischon, *Erklär. der hauptsächl. veralteten deutschen Wörter in der Luth. Bibelübers.* Berl. 1844, p. 7). — αὐθάδεις] to be found, besides here, only in Tit. i. 7.—Most modern expositors understand the two words substantively; but as αὐθάδης is strictly an adject., it can here also be taken as such; thus Schott. It is improbable that they form a passionate exclamation (Schott). They may be either connected in a loose way as subject with οὐ τρέμουσι, or they may be regarded as an antecedent apposition to the subject of τρέμουσι (Hofmann). — δόξας οὐ τρέμουσι βλασφημοῦντες] For δόξας see Jude 8. The particip. stands here as in chap. i. 19. Vulg. strangely: sectas non metuunt (introducere, facere) blasphemantes.

Ver. 11. Compare Jude 9. What Jude says specially of the archangel Michael is here more generally affirmed of angels. In this its generality the thought is hardly intelligible; the necessary light is obtained only by comparing it with Jude (de Wette). If the priority of this epistle be assumed, the thought here expressed must have reference to Zech. iii. 2 (thus Schott, Steinfass, Hofmann). — ὅπου] cannot stand here as assigning the reason, as it sometimes does in the classics, since it refers back not to τολμηταί, but to δόξας οὐ κ.τ.λ.; but neither is it equal to "whilst even, since even;" this use can nowhere be established. It is meant rather to indicate the similarity of the relationship (with respect to the δόξαι).[1] The adversative relationship lies not in the particle, but in the thought. — ἄγγελοι] according to the parallel passage, not *evil*, but *good* angels. — ἰσχύϊ καὶ δυνάμει μείζονες ὄντες] The comparative expresses the relation in which they stand either to the τολμηταί or to the δόξαι. The latter reference deserves the preference, since— and to this Hofmann has called attention, *Schriftbew.* I. p. 460

[1] It corresponds to "*where*" in passages such as: some laugh, where others weep; thus here, these rail where the angels οὐ φέρουσιν κ.τ.λ. It must not be interpreted, with Hofmann, as equal to καθ' ὧν.

—it is understood of itself that angels are more powerful than men (Wiesinger, Schott, Steinfass). — *οὐ φέρουσι . . . κρίσιν*] *φέρειν κρίσιν* (Jude: *ἐπιφέρειν κρίσιν*) does not mean "to endure a judgment" (Luth.), but "*to pronounce a judgment.*" — *βλασφημόν*, with an eye to *βλασφημοῦντες*. — *κατ' αὐτῶν*] not adversum se (Vulg.), but *αὐτῶν* goes back to *δόξας* (Calvin, Beza, Hornejus, Wolf, de Wette, and all the more modern interpreters, with the exception of Fronmüller), by which are to be understood here—as in Jude—the diabolical powers. The opposite interpretation, according to which the meaning should be that the wicked angels are not able to bear the judgment of God on their blasphemy (Luther, Fronmüller, etc.), is opposed not only to the language (*βλάσφημος κρίσις* equal to *κρίσις βλασφημίας*) but to the context. — *παρὰ κυρίῳ*] These words, the genuineness of which is doubtful, may not be explained with Bengel: apud Dominum . . . reveriti, abstinent judicio; for, as Hofmann justly remarks, *παρὰ κυρ.* "belongs to that which is denied, and does not explain why that does not happen which is denied." "The conception is, that angels appear before God, and, before His throne, tell what evil spirits are doing in the world." Cf. Winer, p. 369 [E. T. 493].

Ver. 12. Compare Jude 10. With all their similarity the two passages are nevertheless very different. The characteristics are still further described in Jude 10, but here the punishment is promised to these men. — *οὗτοι δέ*] antithesis to *ἄγγελοι*; the predicate belonging to it is *φθαρήσονται*. — *ὡς ἄλογα ζῶα . . . φθοράν*] Parenthetical thought in close relation to *φθαρήσονται*; Grotius: ita peribunt illi, sicut pereunt muta animantia. — *γεγεννημένα φυσικά* can hardly be translated: "born as *sensuous* beings to," etc. (Wiesinger, and formerly in this commentary). *φυσικά* is meant rather to bring out that the irrational animals are, according to their *natural* constitution, born to *ἅλωσις*. Hofmann takes *φυσικά* as a second attribute added to *γεγεννημένα* by asyndeton, equal to: "by nature determined to *ἅλωσις*," etc. But the only objection to this is that *γεγεννημένα* alone cannot well be considered as a special attribute. As regards the sense, it makes no difference whether *φυσικά* be placed before (*Rec.*) or

after γεγενν. — εἰς ἅλωσιν καὶ φθοράν] According to Luther, a twofold rendering is possible: "First, those who take and strangle; second, who are to be taken, strangled, and slaughtered;" the latter is the only correct interpretation. The general interpretation is, "for taking and destroying;" Schott on the other hand translates, "for taking and *consuming*;" and Hofmann, in like manner, who holds that both are active ideas, "that they may be taken and *consumed*." This interpretation of φθορά, however, is arbitrary, and all the more unwarranted, that in the subsequent ἐν τῇ φθορᾷ αὐτῶν, φθορά cannot have this special meaning. According to N. T. usage, what is meant by φθορά here is the destruction to which the beasts are destined; cf. Col. ii. 22. — ἐν οἷς ἀγνοοῦσιν βλασφημοῦντες . . . φθαρήσονται] With regard to the construction, cf. Winer, p. 583 [E. T. 784]. According to the usual interpretation, ἐν οἷς is dependent on βλασφημοῦντες, and is to be resolved into: ἐν τούτοις, ἃ ἀγνοοῦσιν, βλασφ. (Winer decides in favour of this; so, too, Wiesinger, and Buttmann, p. 128). But ἐν οἷς may also be dependent on ἀγνοοῦσιν, and be resolved: ταῦτα, ἐν οἷς ἀγνοοῦσιν, βλασφημοῦντες. There is no other instance to be found of the construction βλασφημεῖν ἐν, although βλασφημεῖν εἰς occurs frequently. Buttmann accordingly says that by ἐν here (not the object strictly speaking, but) "rather the sphere is denoted, within which the evil-speaking takes place;" nor is the combination of ἀγνοεῖν with ἐν common, "yet it is not without example in later writings;" it is to be found in *Test. XII. patr.* in *Fabricius cod. pseudepigr. V. T.* p. 717. That ἀγνοεῖν, in the sense of it, may be joined with ἐν, is shown by the German expression, "to be ignorant *in* a matter." Besides, in both constructions the sense is substantially the same. According to the connection with what precedes (ver. 10) and Jude 8 and 10, the δόξαι are to be understood as that which was unknown to them, and to which their slanders had reference. On account of this irrational evil-speaking, that will happen to them which is expressed in the words: ἐν τῇ φθορᾷ αὐτῶν καὶ φθαρήσονται. φθορά has been understood here to mean moral corruption; thus de Wette-Brückner, Steinfass, Frommüller; erroneously, however, for the word must have the same meaning in this

passage as it had formerly; then, in this case, *αὐτῶν* does not refer to the Libertines, but to the *ζῶα* before mentioned, and *καί* is to be explained from the comparison with these. They (the Libertines) whose *irrational* slander of that of which they are ignorant, makes them like unto the *irrational* brutes, will also suffer *φθορά*, like the latter, who by nature are destined thereto. Entirely different from this, however, is the interpretation given by Hofmann. He resolves *ἐν οἷς* into *ἐν τούτοις ἅ*, and takes *ἐν τούτοις* with *φθαρήσονται*; that which, without knowing it, they speak evil of, is, according to him, the things of sense; he understands *ἐν τῇ φθορᾷ αὐτῶν* to be in more definite and explanatory apposition to *ἐν τούτοις*, and *φθορά* actively, equivalent to "abuse." In his view, then, the idea here expressed is that the Libertines by abusing, after their lusts, the things of sense, believing them to have nothing in common with God, fall a prey to destruction. The objections to this interpretation are, first, that *ἐν οἷς* is not applied to any of the verba near it, but to the *remote* *φθαρήσονται*; secondly, that a meaning is attributed to the second *φθορά* different from that of the first,—the one is taken as equivalent to "consumption," the other to "abuse,"—and that neither of these significations belongs in any way to the word; thirdly, that the reference to the things of sense is in no way alluded to in the context; fourthly, that *ἐν τῇ φθορᾷ* cannot possibly be in apposition to *ἐν τούτοις*; and lastly, that, on this interpretation, we should have had *ἀγνοοῦντες βλασφήμουσι* instead of *ἀγνοοῦσιν βλασφημοῦντες*.[1]

Ver. 13. *κομιούμενοι μισθὸν ἀδικίας*] is subjoined by way of explanation to what precedes.[2] — Cf. 1 Pet. i. 9. — *μισθὸν ἀδικίας*] not equivalent to *μισθὸν ἄδικον* (Wolf), but: "*the*

[1] Schott agrees with Hofmann in regard to the application to things of sense, and to the interpretation of the meaning of the first *φθορά*, but differs from him in other points. He states the idea contained in the verse thus: "As irrational beasts, which . . . made to be taken and consumed . . . come to destruction, so these people shall perish; since they rail at those matters which they do not comprehend, they themselves shall perish in and with the destruction of those things against which they rail." This interpretation is quite as unwarrantable as that of Hofmann.

[2] Hofmann considers the reading *ἀδικούμενοι*—but little attested, however—instead of *κομιούμενοι* to be the original, because the more difficult one. Tisch. 8, on the other hand, says: *ἀδικούμενοι*, si aptum sensum praebere judicabitur,

reward for unrighteousness." — ἡδονὴν ἡγούμενοι] This and the following participles, as far as the end of ver. 14, are connected with what precedes, as descriptive of the ἀδικία; it is less probable that, as Hofmann assumes, a new period begins with ἡδονὴν ἡγούμενοι and ends with ver. 16. The three kinds of ἀδικία here spoken of are: 1, luxurious living; 2, fornication; 3, covetousness. De Wette: "*they who count it pleasure.*" — τὴν ἐν ἡμέρᾳ τρυφήν] ἐν ἡμέρᾳ is by Oecumenius interpreted as equal to καθ' ἡμέραν, but this is not in accordance with the usage. Several interpreters (Benson, Morus, Fronmüller, Hofmann) take ἡμέρα here as in contrast to the night. This, however, is inappropriate, for it is not easy to see why they should not regard the τρυφή in the night as a pleasure. Gerhard is better: per τὴν ἡμέραν intelligitur praesentis vitae tempus; Luther, "*temporal luxurious living*" (de Wette-Brückner, Wiesinger, Schott). It stands by way of contrast to the future, to which the fut. κομιούμενοι refers. — σπῖλοι καὶ μῶμοι] is either to be connected with what follows: "*who as* σπ. καὶ μῶμοι *riot*" (de Wette-Brückner, Wiesinger), or they are independent expressions of displeasure, like τολμηταὶ αὐθάδεις formerly in ver. 10, and κατάρας τέκνα afterwards (Schott, Fronmüller) subjoined to what precedes by way of apposition (Hofmann); the latter is most in harmony with the animated form of address. Instead of σπῖλοι, Jude has σπιλάδες; σπῖλοι (less commonly σπίλοι) is equivalent to "spots of dirt," cf. Eph. v. 27. — μῶμοι: ἅπ. λεγ., commonly: blame, shame; here: "blemishes."[1] — ἐντρυφῶντες ἐν ταῖς ἀπάταις αὐτῶν] ἐντρυφῶντες points back to τρυφήν, and may not therefore be taken, with Hofmann, in the weakened meaning of, "to take delight in anything," which it probably

omnino praeferendum erit. Nescio an "decepti circa μισθὸν ἀδικίας" verti liceat. Hofmann interprets the accus. μισθόν as an accus. of apposition, cf. 2 Cor. vi. 13, and then translates: "evil happens to them as the reward of evil;" but though ἀδικεῖν occurs in this wider signification, as in Luke x. 19 and often in Revelation, still ἀδικία never does. — Buttmann has accepted not ἀδικούμενοι, as in B, but κομιούμενοι.

[1] Hofmann arbitrarily defines these expressions more precisely as: "spots which defile the purity of the church, blemishes which attach to her, to her shame;" they are rather spoken of thus, because both defilement and shame cleave to them.

has in Isa. lv. 2, LXX.; it is not to be connected with the following ὑμῖν in the sense of: illudere, ludibrio habere, but means, as it commonly does: "*to riot*;" ὑμῖν belongs to συνευωχούμενοι. — ἐν ταῖς ἀπάταις αὐτῶν is explained from vv. 3 and 14; they practised deceit in this way, that they succeeded in procuring earthly advantage to themselves, by praising their vain wisdom (Wiesinger, Fronmüller); since ἐντρυφᾷν denotes the actual rioting, ἐν ταῖς ἀπάταις αὐτῶν cannot state the object of their ἐντρυφᾷν, that is, "the lies with which they practise deceit" (Hofmann; or, according to Schott: "their deceiving appearance of wisdom"). The opinion of Wolf and others, that ἀπάται means the love-feasts, inasmuch as they—in opposition to their real nature—are abused by these individuals to their own profit, requires no refutation. — συνευωχούμενοι ὑμῖν] is subordinate to what precedes. They rioted in their deceits, that is to say, by enjoying themselves at the feasts of those among whom they had obtained an entrance by deceit. — Luther's translation is mistaken: "they make a show of your (ὑμῶν instead of αὐτῶν) alms (incorrect interpretation of ἀγάπαις), they revel with what is yours" (instead of: "with you").

Ver. 14 has no parallel in Jude. — Description of the sensual lust of the eye of the false teachers. — ὀφθαλμοὺς ἔχοντες μεστοὺς μοιχαλίδος] The adulterous lust is depicted in their eyes; in the expression: μεστοὺς μοιχαλίδος, the lust after the μοιχαλίς, revealing itself in the eyes, is designated as a being filled of the eye with it, since they look at nothing else but this. The interpretation of Hornejus is not to the point: quasi dicat, tam libidinosos eos esse, ut in ipsorum oculis quasi adulterae habitent, seu ut adulteras semper in oculis ferant. — Hofmann explains μεστός τινος by reference to Plato, *Sympos.* 194 B, here equivalent to: "to be entirely engrossed, preoccupied with something." — It is wrong to suppose (as Dietlein does) that it is here in any way stated that a female member of the house, into which they had forced themselves, had already fallen a victim to their seduction. Calvin even[1]

[1] Calvin: Isti vos ac coetum vestrum foedis maculis aspergunt: nam dum epulantur vobiscum, simul luxuriantur in suis erroribus, amores meretricios et perditam incontinentiam oculis gestuque exprimunt.

had connected this verse closely with the preceding, as Schott and Hofmann do; but it is not easy to understand why the persons here described should have had adulterous desires only at the feasts. — *καὶ ἀκαταπαύστους ἁμαρτίας*] "*not satiated, unsatisfied in sin*," *i.e.* eyes, in which is reflected the restless desire after ever fresh sin; in *ἁμαρτία* the reference is chiefly to sensual sins. — *δελεάζοντες*] ver. 18, and Jas. i. 14: "*to allure, to entice;*" quasi pisces hamo captare (Beza). — *ψυχὰς ἀστηρίκτους*] *ἀστήρικτος* (chap. iii. 16), not: "wanton" (Luther), but: in fide et pietatis studio nondum satis fundatus et formatus (Gerhard). — This idea is doubtless connected more closely with what precedes than with what follows (Hofmann), so that the sense is: they entice them, so as to satisfy their fleshly lusts on them. — *καρδίαν . . . ἔχοντες*] Third vice:[1] covetousness. The construction of the verb *γεγυμνασμένην*, c. gen., occurs also in the classics (Philostratus: 2. 15: *θαλάττης οὔπω γεγυμνασμένοι*; 3. 1: *Νέστορα πολέμων πολλῶν γεγυμν.*; 10. 1: *σοφίας ἤδη γεγυμνασμένον*): "*a heart practised in covetousness;*" Calvin is quite unwarranted in interpreting *πλεονεξία* here by: cupiditates; cf. ver. 3. — *κατάρας τέκνα*] cf. Eph. ii. 3; 2 Thess. ii. 3: "*men, who have incurred the curse;*" an expression of profoundest displeasure; similar to *σπῖλοι καὶ μῶμοι*, ver. 13. It is doubtful whether it is to be connected with the preceding or with the subsequent passage; the first combination is preferable, because in it the language is more passionate. In the other case the construction, from ver. 10 med. onwards, might be taken thus: *τολμηταὶ αὐθάδεις*, as introducing the section down to *τρυφήν*, ver. 13; *σπῖλοι καὶ μῶμοι* that from there to *ἔχοντες*, ver. 14; and *κατάρας τέκνα* that as far as *παραφρονίαν*, ver. 16.

Vv. 15, 16. Comparison with Balaam; cf. Jude 11. The comparisons with Cain and Korah are wanting here. — *καταλιπόντες εὐθεῖαν ὁδὸν κ.τ.λ.*] with *εὐθ. ὁδ.* cf. Acts xiii. 16; the

[1] Hofmann erroneously says that this states "not a third, but a second characteristic of their nature, the avaritia, along with the luxuria," for in the first half of this verse they are accused of something which is identical neither with luxuria nor with avaritia, and this even if *ὀφθαλμ. ἔχοντες* be closely connected with the preceding passage.

words connect themselves closely with *ἐπλανήθησαν*, to which then the subsequent participial clause is added by way of a more precise definition. With *ἐξακολουθ.* cf. chap. i. 16, ii. 2. The conjunction of this verb with *τῇ ὁδῷ* is explained by the circumstance that *ὁδός* is here taken in a figurative sense: manner of life, conduct.—The form *Βοσόρ*, Heb. בְּעוֹר, arises from a peculiar pronunciation of ע; Grotius is wrong in regarding the word as the corrupted name of the country, פְּתוֹרָה, Num. xxii. 5. Several commentators: Krebs, Vitringa, Wolf, Grotius, etc., assume that there is here an allusion to the counsel which Balaam gave to the Midianites to the corrupting of the Israelites (Num. xxxi. 16; Rev. ii. 14) (so, too, Dietlein); but, according to ver. 16, the reference is rather to the intended cursing of the people of Israel, to which certainly Balaam, for the sake of reward, was inclined; hence: *ὃς μισθὸν ἀδικίας* (see ver. 13) *ἠγάπησεν.* Although such inclination on his part is not definitely mentioned in Num. xxii. 1–20, still, judging from the narrative of the ass, it is to be presupposed; cf., too, Deut. xxiii. 5. Corroboration from the rabbinical writings, see Wetstein. — Ver. 16. *ἔλεγξιν δὲ ἔσχεν ἰδίας παρανομίας*] "but he received (suffered) rebuke (blame) for his trespass;" his *παρανομία* (not equivalent to vesania (Vulg.), but synonymous with *ἀδικία*) consisted in this, that he was willing, for the sake of the reward, if God permitted it, to curse Israel, and for this reason went to Balak. *ἰδίας* stands here in place of the pers. pron. *αὐτοῦ.* Dietlein presses *ἰδίας*, by translating: "belonging to him," and adds by way of explanation: "to him who must be looked upon as the prototype of the false prophets." Wiesinger, on the other hand, sees the significance of *ἰδίας* in this, that "he who was a prophet to others, had to suffer rebuke of an ass for his own *παρανομ.*" But neither the one nor the other is alluded to in the context. — That which follows states in what the *ἔλεγξις* consisted. — *ὑποζύγιον*] properly: a beast that bears a yoke, here as in Matt. xxi. 5, designation of the ass. — *ἄφωνον*] in contrast to human speaking. — *ἐν ἀνθρώπου φωνῇ φθεγξάμενον*] does not state the reason of the *ἐκώλυσε*, but emphasizes the miraculous nature of the occurrence (*ἄφωνον . . . φωνῇ*). — *ἐκώλυσε τὴν τοῦ προφήτου παραφρονίαν*] Schott under-

stands Balaam's *παραφρονία* to be his striking of the ass; Wiesinger: "his folly, in setting himself against the angel;" but it is more correct to understand by it the aforenamed *παρανομία*, which the angel opposed. Hofmann rightly observes: "the signification of the verb does not imply that it is left undone, but simply that opposition is offered to what is done or is intended to be done; cf. 1 Thess. ii. 16."[1] The word *παραφρονία*, "*folly*," *ἅπ. λεγ.* (the verb in 2 Cor. xi. 23), unusual in the classics also, instead of which *παραφροσύνη* or *παραφρόνησις*; see Winer, p. 90 [E. T. 118]. — *τοῦ προφήτου*] (cf. Num. xxiv. 4) stands in emphatic antithesis to *ὑποζύγιον ἄφωνον*.

Ver. 17. Description of the teachers of false doctrine from another point of view, in as far as by making a false show of freedom they seduce others to immorality. First, a double comparison, of which the second only occurs in Jude 12. — *οὗτοί εἰσι πηγαὶ ἄνυδροι*] The point of comparison lies in the deceptiveness of a *πηγή*, which is without water; it awakens an expectation which it does not fulfil (as a contrast, cf. Prov. x. 11; Isa. lviii. 11). — *πηγή* here (which Hofmann wrongly disputes) means, as in John iv. 6: a spring well; fontes enim proprie sic dicti non carent aqua (Gerhard). — *καὶ ὁμίχλαι ὑπὸ λαίλαπος ἐλαυνόμεναι*] *ὁμίχλη* properly mist, here clouds of mist, as the plural already goes to prove, as well as the fact that it is not the mist, but the misty *clouds*, which must be regarded as foretelling rain. — *λαίλαψ*, according to Aristotle (*lib. de mundo*), equal to *πνεῦμα βίαιον καὶ εἰλούμενον κάτωθεν ἄνω*; Mark iv. 37. The point of comparison is the same here as in the previous figure, only that by *ὑπὸ λαίλ. ἐλαυν.* their want of consistency (not: their punishment) is more pointedly referred to.[2] — *οἷς . . . τετήρηται*] so, too, in Jude 13; it connects itself with *οὗτοι*, not with

[1] Formerly in this commentary *ἐκώλυσεν* was explained thus: that although Balaam's *παραφρονία* was not exactly prevented by the ass, still, by the conduct of the latter, a beginning was made to prevent it.

[2] Wiesinger inappropriately remarks: "However empty in itself the conduct of these men may be, still for the Christian community it has the effect of a storm which cleanses it;" for their conduct is not compared to a storm, but to clouds of mist; nor is reference made to their effect on the Church, but to that of the storm on the clouds of mist.

ὁμίχλαι, as Hofmann maintains, for how can this relative clause express "the dissolving of vapour into nothing"?

Ver. 18. Cf. Jude 16. — ὑπέρογκα γὰρ ματαιότητος φθεγγόμενοι] The γάρ does not serve to explain the figurative words, ver. 17 (as formerly in this commentary), for, as Hofmann justly says, "the description of their conduct contained in this verse goes far beyond those figurative statements as to their nature." It must be referred either, with Wiesinger, to the judgment expressed in ver. 17, — οἷς . . . τετηρ. being included,—or, as is done by Hofmann, to the relative clause only; the former is probably the more correct view.[1] — ὑπέρογκος, "swelling;" in the classics used also of style. ματαιότης gives the nature of the swelling, high-sounding speeches ("the proud words," Luther); Luther aptly: "since there is nothing behind them." The word φθεγγόμενοι (besides in Acts iv. 18, to be found only here and in ver. 16) is here the more appropriate that it is used chiefly of loud speaking. — δελεάζουσιν] Cf. ver. 14. — ἐν ἐπιθυμίαις σαρκὸς ἀσελγείαις] ἐν is commonly taken as equivalent to διά, and ἀσελγ. as an apposition to ἐπιθ.: "through the lusts of the flesh, through debauchery" (de Wette, Brückner, Wiesinger, probably Schott too); but thus there is a felt want of a καί, or of a second ἐν, and the ἐπιθυμίαι of the seducers, too, are not to be considered as the means of allurement. Hofmann explains: "by means of fleshly lusts, which they awaken in them, through acts of wantonness, the enjoyment of which they hold out to them;" but here relations are introduced to which the text makes no allusion. It is therefore better to take ἐν ἐπιθυμίαις σ. as designating the condition of the seducers, and ἀσελγείαις as the dat. instrum.: "in the lusts of the flesh (*i.e.* taken in them, governed by them) they allure by voluptuousness those who," etc.; Steinfass correctly: "it is part of their ἐπιθ. σαρκ. that they seek to allure the members of the church;" he is wrong, however, when he explains the ἀσελγείαις as that to which they allure them. Luther translates wrongly: "through lasciviousness to fleshly lust;"

[1] Bengel: Puteus et nubes aquam pollicentur; sic illi praegrandia jactant, quasi lumina ecclesiae; sed hi putei, hae nubes nil praebent; praegrandia illa sunt vanitatis.

ἐν ἐπιθυμίαις is not equal to *εἰς ἐπιθυμίας*. — *τοὺς ὀλίγως ἀποφεύγοντας*] *ὀλίγως*, *ἅπ. λεγ.*, is hardly to be found elsewhere. It expresses both time and measure, and corresponds to the English: "*hardly, just*" (thus also Schott). Wiesinger and Hofmann understand it only of measure, equivalent to "little;" Hofmann understands it of space: "they are a little way escaped from those who walk in error." The pres. of the verb shows that they are, as it were, still in the act of flight from their former condition, and are not yet firmly established in the new; cf. ver. 14: *ψυχὰς ἀστηρίκτους*. — *τοὺς ἐν πλάνῃ ἀναστρεφομένους*] not an adjunct co-ordinate with what goes before; Luther: "and now walk in error;" but the accus. is dependent on *ἀποφεύγοντας*, and *οἱ ἐν πλάνῃ ἀναστρεφόμενοι* are those from whom the persons who are being seduced have separated themselves, those who are not Christians, especially the heathen, who lead a life *ἐν πλάνῃ* (Wiesinger, Schott, Brückner, Fronmüller, Hofmann); Steinfass incorrectly understands by the expression the *ψευδοδιδάσκαλοι*.

Ver. 19. *ἐλευθερίαν αὐτοῖς ἐπαγγελλόμενοι*] Explanation of the *ὑπέρογκα ματ. φθεγγόμενοι*; the high speeches have as their contents the praise of liberty. — *ἐπαγγελλόμενοι*; they assure, promise, those who submit to their guidance that they will conduct them to true liberty. — *αὐτοὶ δοῦλοι ὑπάρχοντες τῆς φθορᾶς*] A sharp antithesis to *ἐλευθ. ἐπαγγελλ.*: "*though they themselves are slaves of φθορά.*" By *φθορά* moral corruption is generally understood, but elsewhere in the N. T. the word never has this meaning; it should rather be taken in the same sense as that which it has in ver. 12. In Rom. viii. 21 it denotes the opposite of *δόξα*, which Hofmann wrongly denies. Schott erroneously takes it to mean "the things of sense;" but these, though they be given up to *φθορά*, yet cannot be directly defined as *φθορά* itself.[1] The chief emphasis lies on *δοῦλοι*. The general statement: *ᾧ γάρ τις ἥττηται, τούτῳ καὶ δεδούλωται*, serves to show that the term is applied to them not without justification. The verb *ἡττᾶσθαι* (with the exception of in this passage and in

[1] Hofmann, appealing to 1 Cor. xv. 50, understands *φθορά* here also as meaning "the corruptible;" but in that passage the context itself proves that the abstract idea is put in place of the concrete, which is not the case here.

ver. 20, to be found only in 2 Cor. xii. 13) is in classical Greek often used as a passive and construed with *ὑπό*, and, in harmony with its meaning, frequently with the genitive, and sometimes also with the dative. The latter is the case here: "*to whom any one succumbs.*" The dat. with *δεδούλωται* expresses the relation of belonging to: *to him he is made the slave, i.e.* whose slave he is. Schott arbitrarily asserts that *ἥττηται* with the dat. brings out that the being overcome "is voluntary and desired on principle."

Ver. 20 gives an explanation (*γάρ*, equal to: namely) of the statement contained in ver. 19, that those there described are the *δοῦλοι τῆς φθορᾶς*, after that the general remark: *ᾧ . . . δεδούλωται* has been applied to them. Almost all interpreters hold that in this verse the same persons are the subjects as in ver. 19; so that the *ἀποφυγόντες* refers to those with the description of whom the author has throughout the whole chapter been engaged. Bengel, Fronmüller, Hofmann are of a different opinion. They assume that *ἀποφυγόντες* refers to those who are led astray, and that the latter accordingly, and not the seducers, are to be regarded as the subject of the clause. In favour of this view may be urged the term *ἀποφυγόντες*, which seems to refer back to the *ἀποφευγόντας* in ver. 18. But, on the one hand, it is certainly unnatural to consider those to be the subjects here who are the objects in ver. 18, especially as ver. 19 has the same subject as ver. 18; and, on the other, it would be more than surprising if the apostle did not, from here onwards, continue the description of those of whom the whole chapter speaks, but should, all of a sudden, treat of entirely different persons,—and this without in any way hinting at the transition from the one to the other; in addition to this, there is the circumstance that *ἡττῶνται* corresponds much too directly with *ἥττηται*. — *εἰ γάρ*] The reality, as frequently, expressed hypothetically. Without any reason, Grotius would read: "*οἱ γάρ*" instead of *εἰ γάρ*. — *ἀποφυγόντες*] The participle is not to be resolved by "although," but by "*after that.*" — *τὰ μιάσματα τοῦ κόσμου*] *τὰ μιάσματα*, a form occurring only here; ver. 10: *μιασμός*. — *τοῦ κόσμου*, here in an ethical sense, as composed of those who walk (ver. 18) *ἐν πλάνῃ*, or,

with Wiesinger: "as the dominion over which sin rules," "*the defilements which belong to the world.*" Without sufficient reason, Hofmann takes *τὰ μιάσματα τ. κ.* in a personal sense, and thinks that it means, in the first instance, "those individuals who are the abomination and blemishes of the non-Christian world, and that *τούτοις δέ* refers to the *Christians* whom Peter designates as the *σπίλοι κ. μῶμοι* of the church." But nothing in the context hints at this, and it is arbitrary to understand by *τούτοις* other *μιάσματα* than those designated by that word itself. — *ἐν ἐπιγνώσει τοῦ κυρίου . . . Χριστοῦ*] *i.e.* by their having come to the knowledge of Christ. — *τούτοις* (*i.e.* *μιάσμασι*) *δὲ πάλιν ἐμπλακέντες ἡττῶνται*] *ἐμπλακέντες* is valde emphaticum; *ἐμπλέκεσθαι* enim dicuntur, qui tricis et laqueis implicantur (Gerhard). The particle *δέ* places in antithesis either the two participles: *ἀποφυγόντες* and *πάλιν ἐμπλακέντες*, or the first participle and the finite verb *ἡττῶνται*; the former construction is to be preferred as the more correct. — *γέγονεν αὐτοῖς . . . τῶν πρώτων*] The same words are to be found in Matt. xii. 45; Luke xi. 26;[1] *τὰ πρῶτα*: *the former condition*, in which they were before their conversion; *τὰ ἔσχατα*: *their subsequent condition*, into which they have come after their falling away, *i.e.* the condition of complete slavery to the *φθορά*, from which there is no hope of redemption: with the thought, cf. Heb. x. 26, 27.

Ver. 21. *κρεῖττον γὰρ ἦν αὐτοῖς*] The same use of the imperf. where we should employ the conjunct., Mark xiv. 21: *καλὸν ἦν αὐτῷ*; cf. on the constr. Winer, p. 265 [E. T. 352]. — *μὴ ἐπεγνωκέναι τὴν ὁδὸν τῆς δικαιοσύνης*] *ἡ ὁδὸς τῆς δικαιοσ.* is not: "the way to virtue," or "the way of salvation which leads to the moral condition of righteousness" (Schott), but a designation of Christianity in so far as a godly righteous life belongs to it; cf. ver. 2.[2] — *ἢ ἐπιγνοῦσιν*] The dat. instead of the accus., dependent on

[1] There is a similar passage in *Past. Herm.* iii. 9: quidam tamen ex iis maculaverunt se, et projecti sunt de genere justorum et iterum redierunt ad statum pristinum, atque etiam deteriores quam prius evaserunt.

[2] In Steinfass' observation: "By the *δικαιοσύνης* of the *ὁδὸν δικαιοσύνης* righteousness is understood as being not the end, but the wayfarer," the first is right, but the second wrong.

αὐτοῖς; by an attraction not uncommon in Greek. — *ἐπιστρέψαι*] is to be taken here in the sense of: "*to turn back to the former things;*" cf. ver. 22, as in Mark xiii. 16; Luke xvii. 31, where it is connected with *εἰς τὰ ὀπίσω*; in Luke viii. 55, nevertheless, it is used in the same sense without adjunct; see critical remarks. — *ἐκ τῆς . . . ἐντολῆς*] With *παραδοθείσης αὐτοῖς*, cf. Jude 3. — *ἡ ἁγία ἐντολή* is the law of the Christian life, cf. 1 Tim. vi. 14; here mentioned because the passage treats of the moral corruption of the false teachers.

Ver. 22. The two proverbial expressions which form the close bring out how contemptible is the conduct just described. — *συμβέβηκε αὐτοῖς*] "*it has happened to them,*" "*has befallen them.*" — *τὸ τῆς ἀληθοῦς παροιμίας*] The same construction, Matt. xxi. 21: *τὸ τῆς συκῆς*; *παροιμία* denotes a figurative speech or mode of expression generally. *ἀληθοῦς* is added in order to bring out that the proverb has here too proved true; the author employs the singular *παροιμίας*, because the two proverbs following have one and the same meaning. — *κύων ἐπιστρέψας . . . ἐξέραμα*] The verse of the O. T. Prov. xxvi. 11, LXX., runs: *ὥσπερ κύων ὅταν ἐπέλθῃ ἐπὶ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἔμετον μισητὸς γενῆται, οὕτως ἄφρων τῇ ἑαυτοῦ κακίᾳ ἀναστρέψας ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἁμαρτίαν*; in spite of the similarity, it is yet doubtful whether the writer had this passage in his eye; probably he took this *παροιμία*, like that which follows,—which can be traced to no written source,—from popular tradition. — *ἐπιστρέψας*] is not to be taken as a verb fin., but the predicate is, after the manner of proverbial expression, joined without the copula to the noun (Winer, p. 331 [E. T. 443]): "a dog that has returned to its *ἐξέραμα*" (*ἅπ. λεγ.*: "*what has been vomited*"). — *ὗς λουσαμένη . . . βορβόρου*] *ἐπιστρέψασα* may be supplied from what precedes, but thus this second *παροιμία* would lose its independence; breviloquence is natural to proverbs (Winer, p. 547 [E. T. 735]); *εἰς*, according to the sense, points sufficiently to a verb of motion to be supplied: "*a sow that has bathed itself, to the κύλισμα βορβόρου.*"[1] — *κύλισμα* (*ἅπ. λεγ.*), equal to

[1] Steinfass interprets erroneously: "A sow that was bathed, in order the better to wallow in the mire."

κυλίστρα: the place for wallowing. The genit. βορβόρου (ἅπ. λεγ.) shows the nature of the κυλίσμα where the swine wallow; the other reading, κυλισμόν, indicates the act of wallowing. — Similar passages are to be found in the Rabbis. Cf. Pott *in loc.*

CHAPTER III.

VER. 2. Instead of the *Rec.* ἡμῶν, the reading, according to almost all authorities (Lachm. Tisch.), should be: ὑμῶν. — Ver. 3. In place of ἐπ' ἐσχάτου in K L P, etc., Syr. utr. Oec. etc. (Griesb. Scholz), A B C** ℵ, *al.*, Sahid. Chrys. etc., read: ἐσχάτων (Lachm. Tisch.); the *Rec.* is probably a correction after Heb. i. 1; cf. also Jude 18. — ἐν ἐμπαιγμονῇ] has been rightly adopted into the text by Griesb. Scholz, etc.; it is attested by A B C P ℵ 27, etc., Syr. utr. Arr. etc. Its omission (in K L, etc., *Rec.*) is easily explained by its having seemed superfluous on account of the subsequent ἐμπαῖκται. — Tisch. has placed αὐτῶν *before* ἐπιθυμίας, following A ℵ, several min. Oec.; however, B C K L P, *al.*, m. Theoph. etc., are in favour of placing it *after* ἐπιθ. (Griesb. Scholz, Lachm.). — Ver. 7. Instead of the *Rec.* τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ, after A, Vulg. Copt. etc. (Lachm. Buttm. Tisch. 8), C L ℵ, *al.*, perm. Syr. utr. etc., read: τῷ αὐτοῦ λόγῳ (Griesb. Scholz, Tisch. 7). According to Buttm., the reading in B is uncertain. On internal grounds it is difficult to decide which is the original reading; Hofmann, however, declares the reading αὐτῷ to be absurd. — Ver. 9. κύριος] instead of the *Rec.* ὁ κύριος; the most important authorities omit the article. — εἰς ἡμᾶς] *Rec.* K L, etc.; instead of ἡμᾶς, A B C ℵ, etc., have ὑμᾶς; and instead of εἰς, A ℵ, etc., read διά. Tisch. 7 has adopted εἰς ὑμᾶς, and Lachm. and Tisch. 8 δι' ὑμᾶς; the reading: εἰς ὑμᾶς, is best attested. Reiche considers that of the *Rec.* to be the original reading: ob testium majorem numerum (?) et quia hic modestius et convenientius erat, se ipsum includere; the most of the modern commentators prefer εἰς ὑμᾶς; Hofm., however, holds the *Rec.* to be the original reading. Semler looks upon all the three readings as mere interpretamenta. — Ver. 10. In B C, Cyr., the article is wanting before ἡμέρα; Lachm. and Tisch. have omitted it. — After κλέπτης the *Rec.* has ἐν νυκτί (after C K L, etc.), already justly omitted by Griesb. as a later supplement from 1 Thess. v. 2 (so, too, Tisch.). — Before οὐρανοί the *Rec.*, after A B C (Lachm. Tisch. 7), has the article οἱ; in K L ℵ it is wanting (Tisch. 8). — In place of λυθήσονται, *Rec.*, after A K L (Tisch. 7), Lachm. and

Tisch. 8 have adopted the sing. *λυθήσεται*, following B C ℵ; perhaps it is a correction according to the common usage. — Instead of the *Rec.* *καταικαήσεται* in A L, etc., B K P, etc., read *εὑρεθήσεται*; Lachm. and Tisch. have retained the *Rec.*; the latter observes (8): dubium non est, quin *εὑρεθήσεται* edere jubeamur, at hoc vix ac ne vix quidem potest sanum esse; *οὐχ* sive *οὐκέτι* si praepositum esset, non haerendum esset. The greater number of commentators have left unnoticed the reading *εὑρεθήσεται*; not so Hofmann; Buttm. reads: *ἃ ἐν αὐτῇ ἔργα εὑρεθήσεται*; but *ἃ* instead of *τά* occurs in no codex. Cod. C reads *ἀφανισθήσονται*. See further in the exposition. — Ver. 11. *τούτων οὖν*] *Rec.* after A K L ℵ, etc., Vulg. Thph. Oec. (Lachm. Tisch. 8); in its place B has *τούτων οὕτως*, and C *τούτων δὲ οὕτως*; Tisch. 7 had accepted the version of B. — Ver. 12. Instead of *-ήσεται*, Lachm., following C, Vulg. etc., reads: *τακήσεται*; probably a correction, because of the preceding future. — Ver. 13. *γῆν καινήν*] *Rec.* according to B C K L P, etc. (Lachm. Tisch. 7); in its place Tisch. 8 reads *καινὴν γῆν*, according to A ℵ; this appears to be a correction, after the preceding *καινοὺς . . . οὐρανούς*. — *κατὰ τὸ ἐπάγγελμα*] *Rec.* according to B C K L P (Tisch. 7); instead of *κατά*, A, etc., read *καί*; and in place of *ἐπάγγελμα*, A ℵ, etc., have: *ἐπαγγέλματα*; Lachm. has adopted *καὶ τὰ ἐπαγγέλματα*; and Tisch. 8: *κατὰ τὰ ἐπαγγέλματα*. — Ver. 15. According to A B C K P ℵ, etc., instead of the *Rec.* *αὐτῷ δοθεῖσαν* (L, etc.), the reading should be, as in Lachm. and Tisch.: *δοθεῖσαν αὐτῷ*. — Ver. 16. After *πάσαις*, Tisch. 8, following K L P ℵ, reads the article *ταῖς*; Tisch. 7 and Lachm. omit *ταῖς*, after A B C, *al.* — In place of the *Rec.* *ἐν αἷς* (Tisch. 8), after A B ℵ, Lachm. and Tisch. 7 read: *ἐν οἷς*; on this see the commentary. — Lachm. has retained the *ἀμήν*, which closes the epistle, according to A C K L P ℵ, *al.*; Tisch., following B, has omitted it, remarking: solet omnino a testibus plerisque addi ad finem epistolarum; ter tantum (Rom., Gal., Jud.) non satis auctoritatis est, ut omittatur *ἀμήν*. Pauci addunt *ἀμήν* 3 Joh.

Ver. 1. Not the commencement of a new epistle (Grotius), but of a new section, directed against the deniers of the advent of Christ. — *ταύτην ἤδη . . . ἐπιστολήν*] "This epistle I write to you, as already the second." Pott: *αὕτη ἤδη δευτέρα ἐστὶν ἐπιστολή, ἣν γράφω ὑμῖν*. Fronmüller incorrectly explains *ἤδη* by: "now being near my death." The epistle first written is the so-called First Epistle of Peter. — *ἐν αἷς*] applies both to this and the First Epistle of Peter (Winer, p. 128 [E. T. 177]). The prepos. *ἐν* does not stand here in place of *διά*

(Gerhard), but refers to the contents. — *διεγείρω . . . διάνοιαν*] for the phrase: *διεγείρειν ἐν ὑπομνήσει*, cf. chap. i. 13. — *ὑμῶν* belongs to *διάνοιαν*. — *εἰλικρινῆ*, cf. Phil. i. 10.

Ver. 2. Cf. Jude 17; in Jude mention is not made of the apostles, but only of the prophets. — *μνησθῆναι*] Infin. of purpose: "*in order that ye may remember*," equivalent to *εἰς τὸ μνησθῆναι* (Vorstius). — *τῶν προειρημένων ῥημάτων ὑπὸ τῶν ἁγίων προφητῶν*] This applies evidently to the Old Testament prophets; and with especial reference to the prophecies which relate to the *παρουσία* of Christ (cf. ver. 4 and chap. i. 19).[1] The Vulg. wrongly translates: ut memores sitis eorum quae praedixi verborum a sanctis prophetis (or sanctorum prophetarum). — *καὶ τῆς τῶν ἀποστόλων ὑμῶν ἐντολῆς τοῦ κυρίου καὶ σωτῆρος*] On the commonly accepted reading *ἡμῶν*, a double interpretation has been given; some, making *ἡμῶν* depend on *ἐντολῆς*, for the most part regard *τῶν ἀποστόλων* as in apposition to *ἡμῶν*, thus: "of our, the apostles', command" (Luther: "the commandment of us, who are the apostles of the Lord;" thus, too, Calvin, Hornejus, Wolf, Pott, Dietlein, etc.); whilst Bengel more correctly takes *ἡμῶν* as in apposition to *ἀποστόλων*, as in Acts x. 41: *μάρτυσι . . . ἡμῖν*; for otherwise *ἡμῶν* must have stood before *ἀποστόλων*; cf. also 1 Cor. i. 18. Others, again, hold that *ἡμῶν* is dependent on *ἀποστόλων*; thus de Wette: "the commandment of our apostles of the Lord, *i.e.* of the apostles who have preached to us, and are sent from the Lord." But against this interpretation is the circumstance, that whilst he elsewhere in the epistle designates himself as an apostle, the author of the epistle would thus make a distinction between himself and the apostles.[2] On the true reading: *ὑμῶν*, the gen. *τοῦ κυρίου* does not, as was for the most part formerly assumed, depend on *ἀποστόλων*, but on *ἐντολῆς* (Brückner,

[1] Of course *τὰ προειρημένα ῥήματα* does not mean "what has been said before," but "the words aforetime spoken," and Hofmann did not require to insist upon it; the more so that the contrary is not asserted in the commentaries against which his argument is directed.

[2] De Wette thinks, indeed, that here the non-apostolic writer has involuntarily betrayed himself; but, as Stier justly observes, it can indeed hardly be supposed that the writer should have "so grossly failed to keep up the part" which he had distinctly assumed.

Wiesinger, Schott, Steinfass); either in the sense: "the commandment . . . of the Lord of the apostles, *i.e.* the commandment of the Lord, which the apostles have proclaimed;" or: "*τοῦ κυρίου* is added by way of supplement to *ἐντολ.*," and the expression is to be left as it stands originally: "*your command of the apostles, of the Lord,* i.e. *which the Lord has given*" (Brückner; thus also Wiesinger, Schott); the latter is to be preferred. No doubt the parallel passage in Jude runs: *ὑπὸ τῶν ἀποστόλων τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν*; but the whole epistle, and especially this passage of it, shows that the author of our epistle, even if he had Jude's composition before him, in no way bound himself slavishly to individual expressions in it. According to Wiesinger, Schott, Steinfass, by the *ἀπ. ὑμ.* Paul and his fellow-labourers are meant; this, too, is more probable than that the apostle included himself among them. — By *ἐντολή* is here, as little as in chap. ii. 21, to be understood the gospel or the Christian religion (or, as Dietlein thinks: "the announcement, *i.e.* the historical proclamation, of those predictions of the prophets, partly fulfilled, partly yet unfulfilled, which was entrusted to the apostles"); but *ἐντολή* means here, as it always does, the commandment; according to de Wette: "the commandment to guard against the false teachers," after 1 Tim. iv. 1 ff. But it is more appropriate, and more in harmony with the connection of thought, to understand by it the command to lead a Christian life, in expectation of the second coming of Christ (Wiesinger, Schott, Brückner); cf. chap. ii. 22, i. 5 ff., iii. 12.

Ver. 3. *τοῦτο πρῶτον γινώσκοντες*] cf. chap. i. 20. — *γινώσκοντες*] refers in loose construction (instead of an accus.) to the subject contained in *μνησθῆναι*. — *ὅτι ἐλεύσονται κ.τ.λ.*] Cf. Jude 18.[1] — *ἐν ἐμπαιγμονῇ*] gives sharp prominence to the conduct of the *ἐμπαῖκται*. The word is a *ἅπ. λεγ.*; Heb. xi. 36: *ἐμπαιγμός*; with the constr. *ἔρχεσθαι ἐν*, cf. 1 Cor. iv. 21. — *κατὰ τὰς . . . πορευόμενοι*] Jude 18 and 16; *ἰδίας* is added so as to strengthen the pronoun *αὐτῶν*.

Ver. 4. The scoffing words of the *ἐμπαῖκται*. — *καὶ*

[1] Hofmann unwarrantably assumes that by that, of which the writer would have his readers to be specially mindful, he does not mean only the contents of the sentence depending directly on *γινώσκοντες*, but still more than that.

λέγοντες· ποῦ ἐστιν ἡ ἐπαγγελία τῆς παρουσίας αὐτοῦ] The question ποῦ ἐστιν expresses the negation; "quasi dicunt: nusquam est, evanuit; denique vana est et mendax;" cf. 1 Pet. iv. 18. The same form of speech with ποῦ ἐστιν: Ps. xlii. 4, lxxix. 10; Mal. ii. 17; Luke viii. 25.—αὐτοῦ, *i.e.* Christi, cujus nomen ex re ipsa satis poterat intelligi (Grotius). Gerhard assumes that the scoffers did not mention the name of Christ per ἐξουθενισμόν; thus also Wiesinger, Hofmann. According to the connection (ver. 2), the ἐπαγγελία meant is that of the O. T. (cf. chap. i. 19 ff.[1]). In what follows we have the thesis of the scoffers in opposition to the ἐπαγγελία, and the basis of it. The thesis is: πάντα οὕτως διαμένει ἀπ' ἀρχῆς κτίσεως; its basis is indicated by the words: ἀφ' ἧς (*sc.* ἡμέρας) οἱ πατέρες ἐκοιμήθησαν. On the assumption that the ἀφ' ἧς οἱ πατ. ἐκοιμ., as used by the scoffers, means the period marking off the commencement of the διαμένει, and that ἀπ' ἀρχ. κτ. serves only as a more precise definition of it (Brückner, Schott), then by οἱ πατέρες must be understood "the ancestors, the first generations of the human race." But on this view ἀφ' ἧς κ.τ.λ. is an entirely superfluous determination (Wiesinger), nor would there thus be any indication of the ground on which the scoffers based their thesis; if, however, this be contained in ἀφ' ἧς κ.τ.λ., the reference in οἱ πατέρες can be only either to the fathers of the Jewish people, to whom the ἐπαγγελία was given, cf. Heb. i. 1 (Wiesinger), or those of the generation to which the scoffers belong (de Wette, Thiersch, Frommüller, Hofmann). Now, since the falling asleep of the fathers of Israel, before its fulfilment, could not well be brought as a proof that the promise was of none effect, inasmuch as it referred to a time beyond that in which they lived (cf. 1 Pet. i. 10 ff.), preference must be given to the second view. Wiesinger, indeed, says that the time of the composition of the epistle does not agree with this; but as the tarrying of

[1] This Hofmann disputes, saying: "by the promise is not to be understood the Old Testament promise, nor by the future the future of Christ, since those who speak thus are members of the Christian church; but with respect to the Old Testament prophecy, they speak of Jehovah's coming, and, with respect to Christ's prophecy, of His own coming. ἡ ἐπαγγελία τῆς παρουσίας τοῦ κυρίου might comprehend the one as well as the other;" the context, however, is in favour of the interpretation which Hofmann disputes.

the *παρουσία* had already been the occasion of wonder in the church, and Christianity, when this letter was composed, had now been in existence for at least thirty-five years, it is quite possible that even at *that time* those who held Libertine views could have supported their denial of the Parousia by the fact that the expectation cherished by the early Christians had remained unrealized, thus calling forth the prophecy here made. At any rate, it is a point not to be overlooked, that the words here used are represented as to be spoken at a time then still in the future. Ver. 8, which otherwise would stand totally unconnected with ver. 4, also favours this view.[1] The connection of the two members of the verse is certainly a loose one, since on none of the different interpretations does *ἀφ' ἧς κ.τ.λ.* stand in close connection with *διαμένει*. The thought which has been somewhat inadequately expressed is: Since the fathers fell asleep, nothing has changed,—the promise has not been fulfilled,—a proof that everything remains as it has been since the creation. With *ἐκοιμήθησαν*, cf. 1 Cor. vii. 39, xv. 6, and other passages. — *οὕτως* does not require any supplement properly so called: "the scoffers point as it were with the finger to the (sacred) *status quo* of the world" (Steinfass). — *διαμένει* does not mean "has remained," nor is it "will remain," but the present expresses the continuous, uniform duration; *δια* strengthens the idea *μένειν*. — *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς κτίσεως*: "since creation took its beginning."

Ver. 5. Refutation of the assertion: *πάντα οὕτω διαμένει*, by the adducing the fact of the flood.[2] *λανθάνει γὰρ . . .*

[1] Dietlein's interpretation is altogether wrong. According to it, *οἱ πατέρες* means: "One generation after another always standing in the relation of fathers to the race succeeding it." Peculiar, but certainly quite unjustifiable, is the opinion of Steinfass, that the scoffers, with reference to the promise contained in the Book of Enoch, understood *οἱ πατέρες* to mean "the prophetical, or more definitely, the eschatological patriarchs, beginning with Enoch and extending down to Daniel."

[2] Schott disputes this, and maintains that the scoffers appealed to the fact of the flood in support of their opinion, "in as far as it did not form a definite close of the earthly development of the world, by an annihilation of the world," and that now what the writer wished to bring forward against it was why that judgment of destruction was executed simply by means of a flood, and consequently was not an absolute annihilation, but only a change of form; but how much here must be read between the lines, and to which no allusion is made.

θέλοντας] γάρ is not equivalent to δέ, but designates the thought which follows as the reason for their scoffing: "Thus they speak because;" cf. Winer, p. 423 [E. T. 568]. — τοῦτο belongs either to λανθάνει or to θέλοντας; in the first case it refers to what follows: ὅτι κ.τ.λ.; in which case θέλοντας will mean: "willingly, on purpose" (Brückner, Wiesinger, Frommüller, Hofmann; cf. Winer, p. 436 [E. T. 586]; Buttmann, p. 322. Luther: "but they wilfully will not know"); in the second case τοῦτο refers to the contents of the preceding statement, and θέλειν means "to assert;" "*for, whilst they assert this, it is hidden from them that*" (Dietlein, Schott). The position both of τοῦτο separated from ὅτι by θέλοντας, and of θέλοντας separated by τοῦτο from λανθάνει, favours the second construction; that θέλειν can be used in the sense of "to assert," is clear from Herodian, v. 3. 11: εἰκόνα τε ἡλίου ἀνέργαστον εἶναι θέλουσι; the word marks the assertion as one based on self-willed arbitrariness, and as without any certain foundation. — ὅτι οὐρανοὶ ἦσαν ἔκπαλαι] οἱ οὐρανοί, the plural according to the common usage. — ἔκπαλαι; cf. chap. ii. 3, not: "of old, formerly," but: "from of old," *i.e.* jam inde a primo rerum omnium initio (Gerhard). — ἦσαν belongs in the first instance to οὐρανοί; yet the subsequent γῆ is to be taken as applying to it also. — καὶ γῆ ἐξ ὕδατος καὶ δι' ὕδατος συνεστῶσα] συνεστῶσα expresses the idea of originating out of a combination; συνίστημι is often employed thus by the Greeks in the intransitive tenses, though the reference contained in συν sometimes disappears almost entirely. The prepositions ἐξ and διά must not be regarded as synonymous; ἐξ refers to the substance, διά to the means. A twofold significance is thus attributed to the water in the formation of the earth, which is also in harmony with the Mosaic account of the creation, where the original substance is distinctly spoken of as ὕδωρ, and in the formation of the earth water is mentioned as the instrumental element (Brückner). There is, accordingly, no foundation for the assertion of de Wette, that the author conceived the origin of the world, according to Indo-Egyptian cosmogony, as a species of chemical product of water. Many interpreters, as Bengel, Wiesinger, Schott, Frommüller, Hofmann, as also Winer, p. 390 [E. T. 441],

explain ἐξ ὕδατος by saying that the earth arose out of the water "in which it lay buried." But this interpretation is refuted by the meaning of the verbal idea συνεστῶσα, which belongs to ἐξ ὕδατος; thus, too, an element would be introduced which would be of only secondary importance.[1] Although συνεστῶσα belongs grammatically only to γῆ, yet in thought it has been applied to οὐρανοί also; thus Brückner, Wiesinger, Schott, and in this commentary. This reference may be justified thus far, that οὐρανοί is understood of the second day's work of creation, the visible heavens; but it is necessary only if κόσμος, ver. 6, is to be taken as meaning the heavens and the earth. De Wette arbitrarily refers the preposition ἐξ only to the earth, and διά to the heavens; the latter in the sense of: "through the water, between the water." τῷ τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγῳ] draws emphatic attention to the fact that the active cause of the creation of the world was the Word of God; to this τῷ τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγῳ, the τῷ αὐτοῦ λόγῳ, ver. 7, corresponds.

Ver. 6. δι' ὧν κ.τ.λ.] The question is, to what has ὧν retrospect? The answer depends on the meaning attached to: ὁ τότε κόσμος. To appearance this phrase must be regarded as identical with οὐρανοὶ καὶ γῆ, vv. 5 and 7 (vv. 10, 13), and in support of this view appeal may be made also to the τότε as distinguished from νῦν, ver. 7. On this interpretation, accepted by most expositors (as also in this commentary), δι' ὧν can refer only either to ἐξ ὕδατος and τῷ τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγῳ (Gerhard, Brückner, Besser, Wiesinger, in this commentary also), or to ὕδατος alone (Calvin, Pott, etc.)[2]—the plural being explained from the circumstance that the water was formerly spoken of both as substance and as medium. The objection

[1] The interpretation of Hornejus shows to what eccentricities commentators sometimes have recourse: dicitur autem terra consistere ἐξ ὕδατος, *i.e.* ἐκτὸς ὕδατος seu πρὸς ὕδατι, extra aquam s. ad aquas; δι' ὕδατος, *i.e.* μετὰ s. ἐν μέσῳ ὕδατος cum aqua s. in media aqua.—The opinion of Steinfass, too, that "συνεστῶσα is to be limited to the creation and existence of human beings, animals, and vegetables," finds no justification in the words of the epistle.

[2] With this reference Burnet (*Archaeol. Philos.* p. 467) agrees, yet he incorrectly explains δι' ὧν by: eam ob causam, or: propter illam (aquam); for he strangely assumes that whilst the former world was ex aqua et per aquam constituta, this constitutio perished by the flood, so that therefore the κόσμος that now is, is no longer, ex aqua et per aquam, but aliter constitutus.

to this explanation, however, is that in the account of the flood there is nothing to show that it caused the *destruction* both of the heaven and of the earth, and that the earth only but not the heaven was submerged; Hofmann accordingly understands by ὁ τότε κόσμος, "the world of living creatures," as Oecumenius already had done: τὸ ἀπώλετο μὴ πρὸς πάντα τὸν κόσμον ἀκουστέον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μόνα τὰ ζῶα. On this view (where νῦν only, ver. 6, seems to cause difficulty) ὧν refers to οὐρανοὶ καὶ γῆ (Oecumenius, Beza, Wolf, Hornejus, Frommüller, Steinfass, Hofmann).[1]

Ver. 7. οἱ δὲ οὐρανοὶ καὶ ἡ γῆ] The νῦν, which applies also to ἡ γῆ, cannot, if by ὁ τότε κόσμος is to be understood the world of living beings, be taken as an antithesis to τότε, but it refers simply to the present continuance of heaven and earth. — τῷ αὐτῷ [αὐτοῦ] λόγῳ] points back τῷ τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγῳ, ver. 5; if the reading αὐτοῦ be adopted, this adjunct gives expression to the thought that, like as the originating of the heavens and the earth was dependent on the Word of God, so also is their preservation to annihilation by fire. If, however, αὐτῷ be the true reading, the idea seems to be implied that the reservation of the heavens and the earth unto judgment is based already on the words of creation.[2] Though this idea be surprising, it can certainly not, with Hofmann, be said to be paradoxical. It is, however, also possible that αὐτῷ is only meant to show that the word by which this keeping of the heavens and the earth takes place, is the Word of God equally with that by which they were created. — τεθησαυρισμένοι εἰσί] "*are stored up*," like a treasure, which is kept against a particular time, cf. Rom. ii. 5. Dietlein is of opinion that in the word the idea of use must be kept hold of; he defines it thus: "that heaven and earth are to serve as the material for punishment, in such a manner, however, that they at the same time perish themselves;" but this is justified neither by the reference (Rom. ii. 5), nor by the context.

[1] Beda likewise applies ὧν to heaven and earth, but interprets (evidently erroneously) διά thus, that these are not the causa, but the objectum perditionis; *i.e.* δι' ὧν as equivalent to in quibus partibus aere et terra.

[2] Dietlein: "The sense is this, that the same λόγος which created the world, assigned also to the post-Noachic world its time and its judgment."

— *πυρὶ τηρούμενοι κ.τ.λ.*] "*In that they are reserved for the fire against the day*," etc.; *πυρί* is more appropriately joined with *τηρούμενοι* (Brückner, Fronmüller) than with *τεθησαυρισμένοι εἰσί* (Wiesinger, Schott, Hofmann); this last term does not require the adjunct, since in itself it corresponds to the *ἦσαν . . . συνεστῶσα*, and it is only in the second member of the sentence that mention can be made of the future destruction by fire; otherwise, too, *τηρούμενοι* would be somewhat superfluous. The thought alluded to in *πυρὶ τηρούμενοι* is further developed in ver. 10. Nowhere in the O. T. or N. T. is this idea so definitely expressed as here; yet from this it does not follow that it is to be traced to Greek, more particularly to the Stoic philosophy, or to Oriental mythology. The O. T. makes frequent reference to a future change in the present condition of the world ("Heaven and earth shall pass away," Ps. cii. 26, 27), in connection with the appearance of God to judgment; cf. Isa. xxxiv. 4, li. 6; especially Isa. lxvi., where in ver. 22 a new heaven and a new earth is expressly spoken of; thus, too, Job xiv. 12. Equally is it more than once set forth that God will come to judgment in the destroying fire, Isa. lxvi. 15, Dan. vii. 9, 10, etc.; how easily, then, from passages such as these could the conception which finds expression here arise,[1] the more especially that it was promised that the world would never again be destroyed by a flood, and the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah by fire appeared to be a type of the future judgment of the world. —Conceptions as to the world's destruction similar to those in the O. T. are to be found in the N. T. Matt. v. 18 (24, 29), Heb. xii. 27; of fire accompanying the judgment, 1 Cor. iii. 13, 2 Thess. i. 8; of the new heaven and the new earth, Rev. xxi. 1. — *εἰς ἡμέραν . . . ἀνθρώπων*] The final end against which heaven and earth remain reserved for fire; *ἀπώλεια*: the opposite of *σωτηρία*, cf. Phil. i. 28 (chap. ii. 3). —Dietlein erroneously understands *τῶν ἀσεβῶν ἀνθρώπων* as a designation of the whole of mankind, in that, with the exception of the converted, they are ungodly. To any such

[1] When Schott denies this, and asserts in opposition that the passages Isa. lxvi. 15 ff., together with Mal. iii. 1–3, iv. 1, are "the *complete* statements of that event," surely no judicious expositor will agree with him.

exception there is here no reference; the phrase has reference rather to the ungodly in contrast to the godly.

Ver. 8 refers to the reason given in ἀφ' ἧς, ver. 4, on which the scoffers based their assertion; it points out that the delay, also, of the Parousia is no proof that it will not take place. — ἓν δὲ τοῦτο] "*this one thing*," as a specially important point. — μὴ λανθανέτω ὑμᾶς] "*let it not be hid from you*;" said with reference to ver. 5. — ὅτι μία ἡμέρα κ.τ.λ.] a thought that echoes Ps. xc. 4. The words lay stress on the difference between the divine and the human reckoning of time. It does not designate God as being absolutely without limitations of time (cui nihil est praeteritum, nihil futurum, sed omnia praesentia; Aretius), for it is not the nature of God that is here in question, but God's reckoning of time which He created along with the world, and the words only bring out that it is different from that of man.[1] For this purpose the words of the Psalms were not sufficient: χίλια ἔτη ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς σου ὡς ἡ ἡμέρα ἡ ἐχθές; and therefore on the basis of them the author constructs a verse consisting of two members. — παρὰ κυρίου] "*with God*," *i.e.* in God's way of looking at things. Since, then, time has a different value in God's eyes from that which it has in the eyes of men, the tarrying hitherto of the judgment, although it had been predicted as *at hand*, is no proof that the judgment will not actually come.[2]

Ver. 9. Explanation of the seeming delay in the fulfilment of the promise. — οὐ βραδύνει κύριος τῆς ἐπαγγελίας] The genitive does not depend on κύριος (Steinfass), but on the verb, which here is not intransitive, as if περί (Hornejus), or ἕνεκα (Pott), or some such word were to be supplied, but

[1] Hofmann is consequently equally incorrect when he says that the passage in the Psalm asserts that "for God time is no time," but here that "for Him it is neither short nor long."

[2] The following thoughts are not expressed here, although they may be inferred from what is said: "In one single day of judgment God can punish the sin of centuries, and can adjust that great inequality which, by so long a duration, has been introduced into eternity" (Dietlein); and "in *one* day a mighty step onwards may be taken, such as in a thousand years could hardly have been expected; and then again, if retarded by the will of God, the march of development will, for a thousand years hardly move faster than otherwise it would have done in a *single* day" (Thiersch, p. 107).

transitive; although elsewhere it governs the accusative (Isa. xlvi. 13, LXX.: *τὴν σωτηρίαν τὴν παρ' ἐμοῦ οὐ βραδυνῶ*), it can, in the idea of it, be likewise construed with the genitive.[1] — *βραδύνει* means not simply: "differre, to put off," for the author admits a delay, but it contains in it the idea of tardiness (Gen. xliii. 10), which even holds out the prospect of a non-fulfilment; Gerhard: discrimen est inter tardare et differre; is demum tardat, qui ultra debitum tempus, quod agendum est, differt. Cf. with this passage, Hab. ii. 3 (Heb. x. 37) and Ecclus. xxxii. 22 (in Luther's translation, xxxv. 22), LXX.: *καὶ ὁ κύριος οὐ μὴ βραδύνῃ, οὐδὲ μὴ μακροθυμήσει.* — *κύριος* here, as in ver. 8, is God, not Christ, as Schott vainly tries to prove. — *ὡς τινές βραδύτητα ἡγοῦνται*] "*as some consider it tardiness;*" that is, that, contrary to expectation, the promise has not yet been fulfilled; Grotius: et propterea ipsam quoque rem promissam in dubium trahunt. *τίνες* denotes not the scoffers, but members of the church weak in the faith. — *ἀλλὰ μυκροθυμεῖ εἰς ὑμᾶς*] *μακροθυμεῖν* c. *ἐπί*: Matt. xviii. 26, 29; Luke xviii. 7, etc.; c. *πρός*: 1 Thess. v. 14; c. *εἰς* only here: "*with reference to you.*" — *εἰς ὑμᾶς*] not: "towards mankind called of free grace" (Dietlein), nor towards the *heathen* (Schott), but in *ὑμᾶς* the readers are addressed to whom the epistle is written, the more general reference to the others being understood as a matter of course. The reason of the non-fulfilment hitherto lies in the long-suffering love of God; the nearer definition lies in the words which follow. — *μὴ βουλόμενος*] The participle in an explanatory sense: "*in that he is not willing.*"[2] — *τινὰς ἀπολέσθαι*] *τινάς*, namely, such as still lead a sensual life. — *ἀλλὰ πάντας εἰς μετάνοιαν χωρῆσαι*] *χωρεῖν* here similarly as in Matt. xv. 17 (*Aeschyl. Pers.* v. 385: *εἰς ναῦν*; cf. Wahl, *s.v.*), "*but come to repentance,*" or perhaps more correctly: "enter into repentance;" not as Dietlein

[1] To combine *τῆς ἐπαγγελίας* with the subsequent *ὡς τινες βραδύτητα ἡγοῦνται*, so as to make the genitive dependent on *βραδύτητα* (Hofmann), produces a very clumsy and artificial construction.

[2] According to Dietlein, *βούλεσθαι* expresses a "determination of the will;" *θέλειν*, "willing as a self-determination;" this is incorrect, *βούλεσθαι* rather means willing, arising with and from conscious reflection; *θέλειν*, on the other hand, is willing in general, arising also from direct inclination.

thinks: "take the decisive step to repentance;" Calvin would, quite incorrectly, take χωρεῖν either as equivalent to recipere, so that κύριος would be the subject, or as an intrans. verb equal to colligi, aggregari. — With the thought, cf. 1 Tim. ii. 4; Ezek. xviii. 23, xxxiii. 11.[1]

Ver. 10. ἥξει δὲ [ἡ] ἡμέρα κυρίου ὡς κλέπτης] ἥξει δέ stands first by way of emphasis, in contrast to what precedes: "*but come will* the day of the Lord." These words express the certainty of the coming of the day of judgment, and ὡς κλέπτης its unexpected suddenness; cf. 1 Thess. v. 2 (Matt. xxiv. 43): τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμέρας, ver. 12, shows that κυρίου is here also equivalent to Θεοῦ (not to Χριστοῦ; Schott).— ἐν ᾗ [οἱ] οὐρανοὶ ῥοιζηδὸν παρελεύσονται] This relative clause states "the event of that day, which makes it essentially what it is" (Schott). ῥοιζηδὸν, ἅπ. λεγ., equivalent to μετὰ ῥοίζου, is best taken in the sense peculiar to the word: "*with rushing swiftness*" (Wiesinger, Schott, Hofmann; Pape, *s.v.*); Oecumenius understands it of the crackling of the destroying fire; de Wette, on the other hand, of the crash of the falling together. With παρελεύσονται, cf. Matt. xxiv. 35, v. 18; Luke xvi. 17; Rev. xxi. 1. As to *how* the heavens shall pass away, see ver. 12. — στοιχεῖα δὲ καυσούμενα λυθήσονται] στοιχεῖα cannot refer to the so-called four elements, "inasmuch as the dissolving of fire by means of fire is unthinkable" (Brückner), and it is arbitrary to limit the idea to three (Hornejus), or to two (Estius) elements; as now the position of the words shows that the expression has reference neither to the earth afterwards named, nor to the world as made up of heaven and earth (Pott: elementa totius mundi tam coeli quam terrae; thus, too, Brückner: "the primary substances of which the world, as an organism, is composed;" similarly Wiesinger, Schott), it must be under-

[1] In order to deprive this passage of all force against the doctrine of predestination, Calvin remarks: sed hic quaeri potest: si neminem Deus perire vult, cur tam multi pereunt? Respondeo, non de arcano Dei consilio hic fieri mentionem, quo destinati sunt reprobi in suum exitum: sed tantum de voluntate, quae nobis in evangelio patefit. Omnibus enim promiscue manum illic porrigit Deus, sed eos tantum apprehendit, ut ad se ducat, quos ante conditum mundum elegit; Beza, Piscator, etc., also apply this passage to the electi only.

stood of the constituent elements of the heavens, corresponding to the expression: *αἱ δυνάμεις τῶν οὐρανῶν*, Isa. xxxiv. 4; Matt. xxiv. 29 (cf. Meyer *in loc.*). This view is justified by the circumstance that in the preceding *οἱ οὐρανοὶ . . . παρελεύσονται* no mention has as yet been made of the destruction of heaven and earth by fire. At variance with this view, Hofmann understands the expression *στοιχεῖα* here as a designation of the stars, arbitrarily asserting that *στοιχεῖα* "cannot be only original component parts, but must also be prominent points which dominate that by which they are surrounded,"—appealing to Justin (*Apolog.* ii. c. 5, and *Dial. c. Tr.* c. 23), who speaks of the stars as *στοιχεῖα οὐράνια*. To this view it may be objected, that the author could not picture to himself a burning of the stars, which appeared to him as fiery bodies; neither do any of the corresponding passages of Scripture allude to this. — The verb *καυσοῦσθαι* only here and in ver. 12: "*to burn;*" in the classics: "to suffer from heat;" the participle expresses the reason of the *λυθήσονται*: "will be dissolved by the burning." *λύειν*, in the sense of: to destroy, to bring to nothing, Eph. ii. 14; 1 John iii. 8,—very appropriate here if *στοιχεῖα* be the original elements. — *καὶ γῆ καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ ἔργα κατακαήσεται*] *τὰ ἔργα* are neither the wicked works of man (after 1 Cor. iii. 15), nor his works in general (Rosenmüller, Steinfass, Hofmann); the reference may be either to the opera naturae et artis (Bengel, Dietlein: "the manifold forms which appear on the earth's surface, in contrast to the earth as a whole;" thus also Brückner, Wiesinger, Schott, Frommüller); or the expression may be synonymous with that which frequently occurs in the O. T.: *ἡ γῆ καὶ τὸ πλήρωμα αὐτῆς*, that is to say, the creations of God which belong to the earth, as they are related in the history of creation, cf. Rev. x. 6. Hofmann wrongly urges against this view, that on it *τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ* would be sufficient; for even though this be true, it does not follow that the addition of the word *ἔργα* would prove that it is "the works of men" that are here meant. With reference to the reading *εὑρεθήσεται*, instead of the *Rec.* *κατακαήσεται* (see critical remarks), Hofmann regards it as original, and considers the

words καὶ τὰ . . . εὑρεθήσεται as an interrogative clause subjoined to the preceding affirmative clause. Of course an interrogative clause may be subjoined to an affirmative; but when Hofmann, in support of his interpretation, appeals to 1 Cor. v. 2, he fails to observe that the relation between the statement and the question there is entirely different from that which is supposed to exist here.

Vv. 11, 12. τούτων οὖν πάντων λυομένων] τούτων πάντων refers to all the things before mentioned, and not only, as Hofmann thinks, to the immediately preceding ἔργα. As regards the reading οὕτως, instead of the *Rec.* οὖν, it is indeed not supported by the preponderance of authorities; it deserves, however, the preference because it (equivalent to: "as has before been stated") is more significant than the reading οὖν. The present λυομένων is explained by Winer, p. 321 [E. T. 430]: "since all this is in its nature destined to dissolution; the lot of dissolution is, as it were, already inherent in those things" (thus also Dietlein, de Wette-Brückner, Wiesinger); but it is more correct to find expressed in the present the certainty of the event, which is, no doubt, as yet future (similarly Schott), especially as the passing away of all things, as it is formerly described, is in consequence not of their nature, but of the will of God as Judge. Hofmann denies, indeed, any reference to the future, remarking: the present participial clause brings out that this is the fate of the subject; but this fate is one which is realized only in the future. — ποταποὺς δεῖ κ.τ.λ.] As regards its arrangement, this period, as far as the end of ver. 12, is divided by many into two portions, of which the first closes either with ὑμᾶς (Pott, Meyer in his translation) or with εὐσεβείαις (Griesbach, Fronmüller), and forms a question to which the second half supplies the answer. But opposed to this construction is the word: ποταπούς, which in the N. T. is never used as indirect interrogation, but always in exclamation. Consequently the whole forms *one* clause, which has a hortative sense (so, too, Hofmann),[1] and before which may be supplied for the sake of

[1] Hofmann, however, does not urge the N. T. usage of ποταπούς in favour of this construction, but "the want of purpose and coldness of dividing the thought into question and answer."

clearness: "consider therefore." The sense is: "since all that passes away, consider what manner of persons you ought to be;" Gerhard: quam pie, quam prudenter vos oportet conservari; yet ποταπός (in classical writers generally ποδαπός) is not equivalent to quantus (Bretschneider, de Wette-Brückner), but to qualis. — ἐν ἁγίαις ἀναστροφαῖς καὶ εὐσεβείαις] The plural marks the holy behaviour and the piety in their different tendencies and forms of manifestation. These words may be taken either with what precedes (so most commentators) or with what follows (thus Steinfass); the latter is to be preferred, since the force of ποταπούς would only be weakened by this adjunct. — προσδοκῶντας καὶ σπεύδοντας τὴν παρουσίαν τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμέρας] not: "so that," but: "*since ye . . . in holy walk . . . look for.*" — Most of the earlier interpreters arbitrarily supply εἰς to σπεύδοντας; Vulg.: exspectantes et properantes in adventum; Luther: "hasten to the day." Others attribute to the word the meaning: "to expect with longing," but this force it never has; in the passages quoted in support of it the word rather means: "to prosecute anything with zeal," *e.g.* Pind. *Isthm.* v. 22: σπεύδειν ἀρετάν; Isa. xvi. 5, LXX.: σπ. δικαιοσύνην; but then the object is always something which is effected by the action of the σπεύδοντος; the original signification of hastening, hurrying, is to be kept hold of here. That by which this hastening is to be accomplished is to be gathered from ver. 11, namely, by an holy walk and piety. The context nowhere hints that it is to be accomplished *only* by prayer[1] (Hofmann, following Bengel). — The expression: τὴν παρουσίαν τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμέρας, occurs nowhere else; with ἡ τ. Θεοῦ ἡμ., cf. ver. 10 and Tit. ii. 13; to παρουσίαν Steinfass arbitrarily supplies "τοῦ Χριστοῦ." — δι' ἣν οὐρανοὶ κ.τ.λ.] A resumption of what is said in ver. 10. — δι' ἣν may be referred either to τὴν παρουσίαν (Steinfass, Hofmann) or to τῆς τ. Θ. ἡμέρας; in both cases the sense remains sub-

[1] De Wette gives substantially the correct interpretation: "They hasten the coming of the day, in that by repentance and holiness they accomplish the work of salvation, and render the μακροθυμία, ver. 9, unnecessary;" and Wiesinger further adds: "and positively bring it on by their prayers" (Rev. xxii. 17).

stantially the same. It is to be taken neither as equivalent to per (like διά, c. gen.), nor in a temporal sense (Luther: "in which"); but it denotes here, as it always does, the *occasioning* cause, equal to "on account of" (Brückner, Wiesinger, Schott; cf. Winer, p. 373 [E. T. 498]). Dietlein translates correctly, but arbitrarily explains the phrase by: "in whose honour as it were." — πυρούμενοι] cf. Eph. vi. 16; Dietlein falsely: "in that they *will* burn;" the part. is present, not future. — τήκεται] de Wette: "τήκεται must not be taken strictly as meaning *to be melted*, as if στοιχ. were to be conceived of as a solid mass, it can be regarded as synonymous with λύεσθαι;" the reference to Isa. xxxiv. 4, LXX.: καὶ τακήσονται πᾶσαι αἱ δυνάμεις τῶν οὐρανῶν (cf. Micah i. 4), cannot fail to be recognised.[1] Gerhard: cum tota mundi machina, coelum, terra et omnia quae sunt in ea sint aliquando peritura, ideo ab inordinata mundi dilectione cor nostrum abstrahentes coelestium bonorum desiderio et amore flagremus.

Ver. 13. καινοὺς δὲ οὐρανοὺς καὶ γῆν καινήν] This verse, which does not depend on δι' ἣν (Dietlein), but is joined in an independent manner to what goes before, forms the antithesis to the thought last expressed, and serves to strengthen the exhortation contained in vv. 11, 12. — By καινοὺς . . . καινήν the heaven and the earth of the future are distinguished as to their character from those of the present, and prominence is given to their glorified condition; cf. 2 Cor. v. 17. — The same idea of a new heaven and a new earth is expressed in Rev. xxi. 1. — κατὰ τὸ ἐπάγγελμα αὐτοῦ] cf. Isa. lxv. 17, lxvi. 22. — αὐτοῦ] *i.e.* Θεοῦ; the O. T. promise, principally at least, is meant. προσδοκῶμεν, which looks back to προσδοκῶντας, ver. 12, significantly designates the new heaven and the new earth as the aim of the certain hope of believers. — ἐν οἷς δικαιοσύνη κατοικεῖ] A similar thought is contained in Isa. lxv. 25; cf. also Rev. xxi. 3–27. Erasmus incorrectly refers ἐν οἷς to the subject contained in προσδο-

[1] Although this passage does not finally settle the dispute, whether an entire destruction, an annihilation, or only a transformation of the state of the world is to be looked for, whether the world is to be destroyed by fire, quoad substantiam suam, or quoad qualitates suas, still it gives more support to the second than the first idea, since, in spite of the strong expressions which the writer makes use of, it is not decidedly stated that the world will be dissolved into nothing.

κῶμεν; it plainly goes back to καινοὺς οὐρ. κ. γῆν καιν. δικαιοσύνη, not equivalent to gloria et felicitas coelestis, utpote verae justitiae praemium (Vorstius), but the vera justitia itself, *i.e.* the holy conduct, completely in harmony with the divine will, of those who belong to the new heaven and the new earth.[1] Hofmann widens the idea too much, when he says that "δικαιοσύνη is to be understood not as applying only to the right conduct of men, but in the sense of integrity of nature generally."

Ver. 14. διὸ, ἀγαπητοὶ, ταῦτα προσδοκῶντες] The participle does not give the explanation of the διό: "wherefore, because we expect this" (Wiesinger, Schott), but the waiting for it belongs to the exhortation (Dietlein, Brückner, Steinfass). — σπουδάσατε ἄσπιλοι . . . ἐν εἰρήνῃ] ἄσπιλοι, cf. 1 Pet. i. 19: ἀμώμητοι, besides here only in Phil. ii. 15, "*unblamable*" (Deut. xxxii. 5: τέκνα μώμητα); reverse of the false teachers: σπῖλοι καὶ μῶμοι, chap. ii. 13. — αὐτῷ] not equal to ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, nor is it the dat. comm. (Schott); and as little: "with reference to him" (Hofmann); but: "*according to His* (*i.e.* God's) *judgment.*" — εὑρεθῆναι] refers not to the future time of the judgment, but to the present time of the expectation. — ἐν εἰρήνῃ] This adjunct does not belong to προσδοκῶντες, as Beza considers probable, but to εὑρεθῆναι ἄσπιλοι κ.τ.λ.; it gives the life-element, in which the Christian must move (so, too, Brückner); cf. Eph. i. 4: ἐν ἀγάπῃ; 1 Thess. iii. 13: ἐν ἁγιωσύνῃ, if he would be found an ἄσπιλος: εἰρήνῃ is here not "concord" (Pott, Augusti), nor is it "the good conscience," but peace, in the full meaning of the word; the addition is explained from ver. 15. Dietlein incorrectly takes ἐν εἰρήνῃ as the object to be supplied to ἄσπιλοι καὶ ἀμώμητοι, which are here used not as relative, but as absolute adjectives; at the same time, too, he limits εἰρήνη, in the conception of it, to "peace of the church, especially to peace in relation to the

[1] In the Book of Enoch also, similar conceptions are to be found; chap. xc. 17: "and the former heavens, they shall pass away and be dissolved, and new heavens will appear;" chap. liv. 4, 5: "In that day will I cause mine elect to dwell in their midst, and I will change the heavens," etc.; "I will also change the earth," etc.; l. 5: "the earth shall rejoice, the righteous shall dwell therein, and the elect shall go and walk therein;" x. 17: "The earth shall be purified from all corruption, from all crime, from all punishment, and from all suffering."

church authorities." Not less erroneous is it to regard, with Steinfass, *ἐν εἰρήνῃ* as the opposite "of all division between the Jewish and the Gentile elements." The interpretation of de Wette: "to your peace," equivalent to *εἰς εἰρήνην* (Beza: vestro bono, clementem illum videlicet ac pacificum experturi), cannot be justified on linguistic grounds.

Vv. 15, 16. *καὶ τὴν τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν μακροθυμίαν*] See ver. 9: "the long-suffering of our Lord, which consists in this, that He still keeps back the last judgment." It is open to question whether *ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν* means God (de Wette, Dietlein, Fronmüller) or Christ (Wiesinger, Schott, Steinfass); what goes before favours the former (vv. 14, 12, 10, 9, 8), the N. T. usage the latter; in both cases the sense is substantially the same. — *σωτηρίαν ἡγεῖσθε*] antithesis to: *βραδυτῆτα ἡγοῦνται*, ver 9: "the *μακροθυμία* of the Lord account for salvation," *i.e.* as something which has your salvation as its aim, that is, by your making such use of the time of grace, that the fruit of it is the *σωτηρία*. — *καθὼς καὶ ὁ ἀγαπητὸς ἡμῶν ἀδελφὸς Παῦλος κ.τ.λ.*] The reference here to Paul is evidently meant to emphasize the exhortation given; it is, however, more particularly occasioned by the circumstance, that many persons had been guilty of wresting the apostle's words, and against this the apostle wishes to warn his readers. — *ὁ ἀγαπητὸς κ.τ.λ.*] designates Paul not only as a friend, or a fellow-Christian, but as one with whom Peter feels himself most intimately connected in official relationship. Hofmann, on the other hand, presses the plural *ἡμῶν*, and thinks that by it the apostle, with a view to his Gentile readers, would unite the Jewish-Christians with himself, so as to show that the apostle of the Gentiles was a beloved brother to them as well as to him. The adjunct: *κατὰ τὴν δοθεῖσαν αὐτῷ σοφίαν*, acknowledges the wisdom which has been granted to him, of which also the utterances which the apostle especially has in his eye are the outcome. — *ἔγραψεν ὑμῖν*] Which epistle or epistles are meant? According to Oecumenius, Lorinus, Grotius, etc., as also Dietlein and Besser: it is *the Epistle to the Romans*, on account of chap. ix. 22 (*ἤνεγκεν ἐν πολλῇ μακροθυμίᾳ*) and chap. ii. 4; according to Jachmann: *the Epistle to the Corinthians* (chiefly on account of 1 Ep. i. 7–9),

in consideration of the words: *κατὰ . . . σοφίαν*; according to Estius, Bengel, Hornejus, Gerhard, etc.: *the Epistle to the Hebrews*, on account of ix. 26 ff., x. 25, 37. These different opinions assume that *καθώς* applies only to the last thought expressed in this verse. But there is no reason for any such limitation, since this exhortation is joined in the closest manner possible to that which precedes it in ver. 14. Wiesinger rightly rejects the supposition that *καθὼς ἔγραψε* refers still farther back, namely, to the whole section relating to the Parousia (de Wette, with whom Brückner agrees, and Schott). — Since the document to which the author alludes is, by *ἔγραψεν ὑμῖν*, indicated as one addressed to the same circle of readers as Second Peter, the reference here cannot be to the above-named epistles, nor yet to the Epistle to the Thessalonians (de Wette), but only to the Epistle to the Ephesians (Wiesinger, Schott, Hofmann: to this Steinfass adds the First Epistle to Timothy and the Epistle to the Colossians; Frommüller, the last-named epistle and that to the Romans). In support of this may be urged the character of this epistle as a circular letter, and the echoes of it to be found in First Peter. It must also be observed, that although the precise thought expressed in the beginning of this verse is not to be found in that epistle, yet the epistle itself is certainly rich in ethical exhortations with reference to the Christian's hope of salvation.[1] It is plainly entirely arbitrary to assume, with Pott and Morus, that the apostle here refers to an epistle which we do not now possess.

Ver. 16. *ὡς καὶ ἐν πάσαις* [*ταῖς*] *ἐπιστολαῖς*] *sc. ἔγραψεν.* By this adjunct the epistle of Paul, referred to in *ἔγραψεν ὑμῖν*, is definitely distinguished from his other epistles; but what is true of the former is asserted also of the latter, *i.e.* that they contain the same exhortations, a statement, however, which is more precisely limited by *λαλῶν ἐν αὐταῖς περὶ τούτων.* The

[1] Schott must be considered mistaken in appealing to this, that "it is precisely the Epistle to the Ephesians, ii. 11–iii. 12, which contains the most exact development of the idea expressed here in ver. 9 and ver. 15, that the divine direction of history, with a view to the completion of salvation, has given the peculiar significance to the present time, to lead into the church the *heathen world*, which will be the subject of the future completion of salvation;" of all this absolutely nothing is here said.

difference in the reading, that is, whether the article is to be put with πάσαις or not, is of trifling importance for the meaning, since it is unwarranted to suppose that πάσαις ταῖς marks the epistles of Paul as forming a *formally completed* collection (Wiesinger),—the article only showing that the epistles of Paul were already known as such. — λαλῶν ἐν αὐταῖς περὶ τούτων] λαλῶν is not for: ἐν αἷς λαλεῖ (Pott), but it means: "*when in them* (*i.e.* in his epistles) *he speaks of these things.*" περὶ τούτων can only have the same reference as καθώς, ver. 15; that is, then, not strictly to the teaching as to the Parousia as such, but chiefly "to the exhortation given in ver. 14 f." (Wiesinger), and what is connected with it. — The remark in what follows alludes to that which occasioned the mention of Paul's epistles. — ἐν οἷς or αἷς ἐστι δυσνόητά τινα] It can hardly be decided which is the true reading: οἷς or αἷς. Schott thinks that for the sense it is immaterial, since, if αἷς be read, the τινά must be limited to the passages where Paul happens to speak περὶ τούτων; and if ἐν οἷς, the reference can be to those things or questions not generally, but only in the way in which they are discussed by Paul. Reiche holds a different view; in his opinion, ἐν οἷς refers to those things in themselves, ἐν αἷς to the epistles generally; this can, however, hardly be correct, for it is scarcely conceivable that the author should let fall a remark closely conjoined with what had gone before, which departs so entirely from the connection of thought. Besides, ἐν αἷς deserves the preference not only on account of the external authorities, but because of the following: ὡς τὰς λοιπὰς γραφάς (Wiesinger, Brückner, Reiche, Hofmann; Schott otherwise). τινά is generally regarded as the subject, and δυσνόητα as the predicate belonging to it; the position of the words, however, decides that δυσν. τινά must be taken together as subject (Schott, Hofmann). By δυσνόητα must not be understood, with Schott, "the things which in themselves are opposed to the human mind," but the expressions in which Paul speaks of them; Steinfass correctly: "τινά are words, not objects;" for to the things the verb στρεβλοῦσιν is not suited. What the apostle meant can only be gathered from the connection; consequently the reference here cannot be to utterances of the Apostle Paul with respect to

the Parousia itself (Schott), and therefore not to any statements of his, such as are to be found in 1 Thess. iv. 13 ff.; 1 Cor. xv. 12–58. Still less does the connection *appear* to justify the assumption that "the Pauline doctrine of freedom" (Wiesinger) is meant. Since, however, Paul's statements with regard to Christian freedom stand in close relation to the final completion of salvation, and the idea of it forms such a characteristic feature of Paul's teaching, which could only too easily be distorted by misunderstanding, it is certainly possible, indeed it is probable, that the author had it chiefly in mind in using this somewhat indefinite expression.[1] — ἃ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς καὶ ἀστήρικτοι στρεβλοῦσιν] ἀμαθής, ἅπ. λεγ., according to de Wette, equivalent to "unteachable, with the implied idea of stubbornness and of unbelief." This is incorrect, ἀμαθής means only "*ignorant;*" no doubt the secondary idea given by de Wette may be connected with this (as in the passages quoted, Joseph. *Antiq.* i. 4. 1, and iii. 14. 4), but here it is not to be presupposed, since the idea ἀστήρικτος connected with ἀμαθής, although denying strength of faith, does not deny faith itself; with ἀστήρικτοι, cf. chap. ii. 14. Most interpreters assume that the reference here is to the seducers, the Libertines and deniers of the Parousia formerly mentioned; but as a designation of them the expressions are too weak; chap. ii. 14, too, is opposed to this (Schott). — στρεβλοῦν, ἅπ. λεγ., strictly: "to turn with the στρέβλη." Here it means: "*to distort the words,*" *i.e.* to give them a sense other than they actually have; equivalent to διαστρέφειν (cf. Chrysostom on 2 Cor. x. 8: οὗτοι πρὸς τὰς οἰκείας διέστρεψαν τὰ ῥήματα ἐννοίας); the word is to be found in another figurative sense in 2 Sam. xxii. 27, LXX. — ὡς καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς γραφάς] This addition is somewhat surprising, not only because all more precise statement of the γραφαί referred to is wanting, but because by it στρεβλοῦν, which formerly had refer-

[1] According to Hofmann, it is passages such as Eph. ii. 5 f., Col. ii. 12, that are meant, "for with these and similar statements the teaching of a Hymenaeus and a Philetus could be combined,—that the resurrection was already past, and that no other resurrection than that which takes place in regeneration is to be looked for. — This doctrine, combined with the other, that the world of sense has nothing related to God, would produce that justification of immorality predicted in chap. ii."

ence only to the *δυσνόητά τινα* in the epistles of Paul, is here extended to entire writings; for to interpret *γραφαί* by "passages of Scripture" (de Wette), is arbitrary. — It is very improbable that the reference is to the O. T. Scriptures (Wiesinger, Schott, Steinfass), since the author would certainly have defined them more nearly as such[1] (Brückner); probably, then, other writings are meant, which, at the time of the composition of this epistle, served, like the epistles of Paul, for the instruction and edification of the Christian churches; it is possible, therefore, that these included other writings of the N. T.; but that they were only such, cannot be proved. That the words presuppose a collection of N. T. writings properly so called, is without any reason asserted by de Wette (Brückner). — *πρὸς τὴν ἰδίαν αὐτῶν ἀπώλειαν*] *ἰδίαν* serves to intensify *αὐτῶν*: "*to their own destruction*" (cf. chap. ii. 1); the wresting of Scripture has this consequence, inasmuch as they make use of the distorted expressions, in order to harden themselves in their fleshly lust.

Vv. 17, 18. Concluding exhortation and doxology. — *ὑμεῖς οὖν*] Conclusion from what goes before. — *προγινώσκοντες*] "*since ye know it beforehand;*" *i.e.* that such false teachers as have been described will come; not: "that the advent of Christ will take place," nor: "that the consequences of the *στρεβλοῦν* will be the *ἀπώλεια*" (Schott). — *φυλάσσεσθε, ἵνα μή*] Since *φυλάσσεσθε* is nowhere else construed with *ἵνα μή, ἵνα κ.τ.λ.* is not to be taken as an objective clause, but as one expressive of purpose; "consequently special emphasis lies on *φυλάσσεσθε*" (Schott). — *τῇ τῶν ἀθέσμων πλάνῃ συναπαχθέντες*] The *ἄθεσμοι* (cf. chap. ii. 7) are the aforementioned *ἐμπαῖκται* and Libertines. — *πλάνη* is not: "seduction" (Dietlein: leading astray of others), for the word never has this meaning (not even in Eph. iv. 14); nor would the *συν* in the verb agree with this, but, as in chap. ii. 18: "moral-religious error;" with *συναπαχθέντες*, "carried away along with," cf. Gal. ii. 13, and Meyer on Rom. xii. 16. — *ἐκπέσητε τοῦ ἰδίου στηριγμοῦ*] With *ἐκπίπτειν*, cf. Gal. v. 4, and Meyer *in*

[1] Although in other parts of the N. T. *αἱ γραφαί* always means the O. T. Scriptures, still the addition of *λοιπαί* proves that other Scriptures are here referred to; it would be different were *λοιπάς* not added.

loc. — *στηριγμός, ἅπ. λεγ.*, is the firm position which any one possesses (not: the fortress; Luther); here, therefore, the firm position which the readers as believing Christians take up; cf. i. 12; antithesis to the *ἀμαθεῖς καὶ ἀστήρικτοι*, ver. 16. Dietlein explains the word quite arbitrarily of the "remaining at peace in the church."—Ver. 18. *αὐξάνετε δέ*] Antithesis to the *ἐκπέσητε*; the remaining in the firm position can take place only where the *αὐξάνειν* is not lacking. Calvin: ad profectum etiam hortatur, quia haec unica est perseverandi ratio, si assidue progredimur. Hofmann incorrectly connects this imperative with *φυλάσσεσθε*, to which it is supposed to be related as a further addition; this view is opposed by *δέ*. — *ἐν χάριτι καὶ γνώσει τοῦ κυρίου κ.τ.λ.*] does not state "the means and the origin of the growing" (Schott), but that in which they should grow or increase; *αὐξάνειν*, without any nearer definition, would be too bald in presence of the *ἵνα μὴ . . . ἐκπέσητε κ.τ.λ.* With regard to the two ideas: *χάρις* and *γνῶσις*, Aretius says: illud ad conversationem inter homines refero, quae gratiosa esse debet; hoc vero ad Dei cultum, qui consistit in cognitione Christi; this explanation is wrong; *χάρις* can be only either the grace of God, so that the sense of the exhortation would be, that they should seek to acquire the grace of God in ever richer measure (Hornejus, etc.); or—and this is preferable—the state of grace of the Christians (according to Calvin, etc.: the sum of the divine gifts of grace). — The *γνῶσις* is here specially mentioned, because the author regarded it as the living origin of all Christian activity.— The genitive: *τοῦ κυρίου κ.τ.λ.*, is taken by de Wette, Brückner agreeing with him, with reference to *χάρις*, as the subjective, with reference to *γνῶσις*, as the objective genitive; in like manner Hofmann. This twofold reference of the same genitive is inconceivable;[1] if it belong to *both* ideas, it can only be the gen. auctoris (Dietlein, Steinfass); but since it is more natural to explain it in connection with *γνῶσις* as gen. objec., *χάρις* must be taken as an independent conception. — Finally, the doxology, applied to Christ; Hemming: testimonium de divinitate Christi, nam cum tribuit Christo aeternam

[1] Hofmann, indeed, appeals to Rom. xv. 4; Tit. ii. 13; 1 Pet. i. 2; but these passages do not prove what they are meant to prove.

gloriam, ipsum verum Deum absque omni dubio agnoscit. — The expression: *εἰς ἡμέραν αἰῶνος*, is to be found only here; Bengel takes *ἡμέρα* in contrast to the night: aeternitas est *dies*, sine nocte, merus et perpetuus; this is hardly correct; most interpreters explain the expression as equivalent to tempus aeternum, synonymous with *εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα*, 1 Pet. i. 25, or with *εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας*, Rom. xvi. 27; this is too inexact; *ἡμέρα αἰῶνος* is the day on which eternity, as contrasted with time, begins, which, however, at the same time is eternity itself. — *ἀμήν*] cf. Jude 25.

THE EPISTLE OF JUDE.

INTRODUCTION.

SEC. 1.—AUTHOR AND READERS OF THE EPISTLE.

THE author to his name Jude subjoins the particular designations: *Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ δοῦλος* and *ἀδελφὸς δὲ Ἰακώβου*. The first of these designations is no evidence against his apostleship, as Arnaud correctly observes (see Philip. i. 1; Philem. 1); but the second is, inasmuch as it is not credible that an apostle, in order to make himself known, should have named himself according to his relationship to another, whether that other be an apostle or not. It is true, in order to prove the identity of the author of this Epistle with the Apostle Jude, whom Matthew (x. 3) names *Λεββαῖος* (*Rec.* adds: *ὁ ἐπικληθεὶς Θαδδαῖος*), and Mark (iii. 18) *Θαδδαῖος*, the fact has been appealed to that Luke (Acts i. 13; Luke vi. 16) calls him *Ἰούδας Ἰακώβου*; but it is arbitrary to supply to *Ἰακώβου, ἀδελφός*, instead of the usual supplement *υἱός*; see Meyer on Luke vi. 16. It is to be observed, against Winer (*bibl. Realw.* under the word *Judas*), who will supply *ἀδελφός*, because in Matt. x. 3 and Mark iii. 18, Lebbäus is directly united by *καί* with James as an apostolic pair, that this is properly only the case in the first passage; but in that very passage where a brotherly relationship exists, as with Peter and Andrew, and with John and James, this is expressly stated; whilst Philip and Bartholomew, Thomas and Matthew, Simon and Judas Iscariot are united together by *καί*, without any assertion that these pairs so united were brothers. The very mode and

manner, then, in which James, the son of Alphæus, and Jude are placed together in the apostolic lists, proves that they were not brothers. — Further, if it be possible that an apostle could refer to the apostles generally, as is done in this Epistle (vv. 17, 18), yet that mode of expression is more natural in the mouth of one who was not an apostle than in the mouth of an apostle. — Jude does not more definitely state who this *James* was, whom he calls his brother. But doubtless he was *that* James who, from an early period, stood at the head of the church in Jerusalem. — Since, then, from preponderating proofs (see Introd. sec. 1, to commentary on the Epistle of James), it is to be assumed that this James, who was called the brother of the Lord, is not identical with the Apostle James the son of Alpheus,[1] it is also not to be doubted that Jude is not a brother of the latter, but of the former, and consequently likewise a brother of Jesus. That, nevertheless, he does not call himself the brother of Jesus cannot appear strange, since the bodily relationship to the Lord must retire before the spiritual relationship, which he expresses by the appellation Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ δοῦλος; it is the same reason which induced James in his Epistle not to designate himself as a brother of the Lord. — We possess only very uncertain

[1] Thiersch (*Herst. des. hist. Standp.*, etc., p. 430 f.) rightly observes: "If ever a critical view concerning historical persons was artificial and unnatural, assuredly that is which regards *the brothers of the Lord* as the cousins of Jesus, the sons of Cleopas and a Mary, a sister of the mother of Christ. Herder's argument against this view is so obvious and striking, that it is almost unintelligible how such an hypothesis, which does violence to a series of passages, should even down to our times be maintained by critics." — If, on the contrary, Dietlein ("Review of Arnaud's Researches," etc., in the *allg. Repert. von Reuter*, August 1851) maintains the idea of the Messianic family, in order to reckon among the ἀδελφοί, besides the cousins, also the uncle, etc. of Jesus, history is thereby subordinated to hypothesis. The same is the case when Schott maintains that "it is opposed to the spirit of the N. T. history of salvation, that an actual brother of the Lord should attain to such a high position in the church, as James obtained as chief of the church of Jerusalem;" and when he declares that "it is a historical necessity that the actual brothers of Jesus should retire into the background." The other proofs by which Schott, who considers the so-called "brothers of Jesus" as his actual brothers, will attempt to prove that the James and Jude here mentioned belong not to them but to the apostles, are not here, but in the commentary to the Epistle of James, discussed; so also with regard to the view of Hofmann, who likewise regards the author of this Epistle and his brother James as the Apostles Jude and James.

notices of the personal history and labours of Jude (for an account of them, see Arnaud), which are the less to be considered as historical, since they are not only frequently contradictory, but also in them the author of the Epistle and the Apostle Jude are confounded together.

The readers, for whom this Epistle was primarily intended, are described only in the most general terms, and neither their locality nor their condition is definitely stated. There is no indication that the Epistle was written only to Jewish Christians. Arnaud, indeed, with truth remarks: "Jude expounds his proofs in a manner peculiar to the Jews. From the beginning to the end he uses their mode of speech and their manner of expressing an idea; he employs images and comparisons, makes allusions, and uses myths, traditions, and examples which were familiar to them." But all this might have its reason in the individuality of the writer, without being conditioned by a regard to the readers. Most expositors assume that the readers resided in Asia Minor; on the contrary, Schmidt, Credner, Augusti, Arnaud, and Wiesinger are of opinion that they are to be sought for in Palestine. The question cannot with certainty be decided.

SEC. 2.—OBJECT AND CONTENTS OF THE EPISTLE. TIME AND PLACE OF ITS COMPOSITION.

The *object* of the Epistle is the confirmation of the readers in the gospel published to them by the apostles, in opposition to certain intruders, who, abusing the liberty of the gospel, gave themselves up to immoral excesses, and even to blaspheming the divine majesty. De Wette, Schwegler, Arnaud, Reuss, Bleek, Brückner, and Hofmann consider them to be only vicious men. On the contrary, Dorner (*Entwicklungsgesch. der Lehre von der Person Christi*, Thl. I. p. 104) observes: "The opponents of Jude are not only corrupt in practice, but also heretical teachers." They are not indeed described as actual false teachers; but yet from vv. 4, 8, 18, 19, we can hardly think otherwise than that their libertinism was conjoined with dogmatic (perhaps Gnostic) errors: on which

account also Brückner states that "they had points which bordered on the dogmatic;" and Hofmann says that "they screened their immoral conduct by blasphemous assumptions." Weiss (*Petrin. Frage* II. in *Stud. u. Krit.* 1866, H. 2) calls them "Libertines on principle." [1] That they attached themselves to a particular definite Gnostic system, for example, that of the Carpocratians (Clemens Alexandrinus), cannot be proved. Their tendency appears to have been related to the error of the Nicolaitanes and the Balaamites (Rev. ii.); (Thiersch, Wiesinger, Schott). Jude opposes to them simply the apostolic gospel, without particularly characterizing the points of their contradiction to it.

It is peculiar to this Epistle, that passages occur in it which appear to be taken from the apocryphal book of Enoch, or, if this should not be the case, at least to have arisen from an apocryphal tradition of Enoch; as the quotation contained in vv. 14, 15; the statement about the sin of the angels and their punishment, ver. 6; the description of the false teachers, ver. 8; also the reference (ver. 9) to the apocryphal tradition of the contest of Michael with the devil is peculiar.[2] This admixture of apocryphal traits can, on an unprejudiced consideration, only serve to strengthen the conviction that the Epistle does not proceed from an apostle.

The *train of thought* is as follows: After the address, in which the readers are only generally characterized as Christians, the author states that he esteemed it necessary to exhort them to continue in the faith delivered to them (ver. 3), and that because of certain intruders, whom he designates as lascivious men and deniers of Jesus Christ, whose condemnation was certain (ver. 4). That this condemnation will come upon them, he confirms by three examples: that of the people

[1] See also Ritschl, *Abhandl. üb. die im Br. des Judas charakterisirten Antinomisten in d. Stud. u. Krit.* 1861, part I. p. 103 ff. The opinion of Ritschl, that these heretics had retained only abstractly their principle that grace establishes freedom to practise immorality, has been justly rejected by Wiesinger as unwarrantable.

[2] Hofmann disputes this, maintaining that in Jude there occurs only an interpretation or expansion of what is stated in Scripture, and which is as justified as that which occurs in Acts vii. 22 f., xiii. 21; Gal. iv. 28; Heb. xi. 37; 2 Tim. iii. 8; although he grants that more is signified in Jude than in these passages.

delivered from Egypt, that of the fallen angels, and that of the cities of Sodom and Gomorrha (vv. 5–7). These intruders are then described by two characteristics, namely, as defilers of the flesh and as despisers and blasphemers of heavenly dignities; the greatness of their sin is brought prominently forward by comparison with the conduct of Michael in his contest with the devil, and a woe is denounced upon them as those who walk in the way of Cain, Balaam, and Korah (vv. 8–11). In the following verses (vv. 12, 13) the author proceeds with his description, adducing their debauchery at the Agapae, and representing in various figurative expressions their vain and impudent conduct, by which he is reminded of the judgment which awaits them, quoting for this purpose a saying of Enoch as a prophecy which holds good of them (vv. 14, 15). To this succeeds some additional characteristics of those erroneous teachers, to which an exhortation to the readers is added to be mindful of the words of the apostles who have prophesied of the appearance of such mockers (vv. 16–18). After Jude, with another glance at his opponents, has exhorted his readers to keep themselves by faith and prayer in the love of God, and to wait for the mercy of Christ (vv. 19–21), he gives a short direction how to behave toward those who have been already perverted (vv. 22, 23). A doxology forms the conclusion of the Epistle (vv. 24, 25).

The Epistle contains no other data for the determination of the *time* of its composition than the description of the heretics and the exhortation to attend to the preaching of the apostles; but from these it may be inferred that it belongs not to the earlier, but, as most expositors assume,[1] to the later apostolic age; although "there is no necessity, with Reuss, to assign it to the extreme limits of the apostolic literature" (Brückner). Although in the Pastoral Epistles the immoral life of the heretics there attacked is censured, yet libertinism does not appear to have attained to the same stage of development as with the opponents of Jude; and Jude would hardly have appealed to the preaching of the apostles as a thing of the

[1] The reasons by which Schott endeavours to prove that the Epistle was written at the end of the year seventy, or the beginning of the year eighty, are too uncertain to enable us to draw this conclusion with certainty.

past, if the apostles were yet at the height of their apostolic activity. Bertholdt, Guericke, Stier, Arnaud, and others think, from the fact that there is no mention of the judgment of God on Jerusalem, that it is to be inferred that the Epistle was written before the destruction of that city, since Jude would certainly not have omitted this most fearful and most significant judgment, if it had already taken place, particularly as he mentions almost all the most noted examples of divine judgments. But this conclusion is very uncertain, especially as the hypothesis on which it is founded is incorrect. Jude takes at random only *some* of many examples, and indeed such —at least this is evidently the case with the judgment on the angels, and with that on Sodom and Gomorrha—as refer to a definite kind of sin, which is not applicable to the judgment on Jerusalem. He mentions neither the deluge nor the first destruction of Jerusalem. From the relation which exists between this Epistle and the apocryphal book of Enoch, nothing certain regarding the period of composition can be inferred, particularly as the opinion concerning that relation is by no means settled; for whilst early critics assert the origin of this book, at least in its original condition, to pre-Christian times, and assume later interpolations, as Lücke (*Einleitung in die Offb. Joh.*, etc.), Ewald, Weizsäcker (*Untersuchungen über die evangel. Geschichte*), Köstlin (*Tübing. theol. Jahrbb.* 1856), especially Dillmann (*das Buch Henoch übersetzt und erklärt*, 1853), and others; Hofmann and Ferd. Philippi (in his book, *das Buch Henoch, sein Zeitalter*, etc., 1868) attempt to prove that it belongs to the Christian age, and was composed by a Jewish Christian; the reasons, however, adduced by them are not sufficient to cause us to regard the result of their examination as well founded.

Mayerhoff (*Einl. in die Petrin. Schriften*, p. 195) supposes the *place of composition* to be Egypt, because Clemens Alexandrinus first quotes it, because the images employed in ver. 12 refer to a country which bordered on the sea, and was frequently exposed to drought by the east and south winds, and because the book of Enoch was first used in Egypt. But Schwegler has correctly rejected these reasons as insufficient.

SEC. 3.—AUTHENTICITY OF THE EPISTLE.

Eusebius reckons this Epistle, as indeed all the Catholic Epistles, except First John and First Peter, among the Antilegomena. The earliest Fathers who mention it are Tertullian (*de habit. mul.* c. 3) and Clemens Alexandrinus (*Strom.* iii. p. 431, *Paedag.* iii. 8, p. 239, ed. Sylb.), who has also commented on it. Origen often quotes it, and distinguishes it by special praise; *Comm. on Matt.* xiii. 55: *Ἰούδας ἔγραψεν ἐπιστολὴν, ὀλιγόστιχον μὲν, πεπληρωμένην δὲ τῶν τῆς οὐρανίου χάριτος ἐῤῥωμένων λόγων.* He, however, indicates that its genuineness is doubted by many. Jerome also mentions these doubts, saying that many rejected it on account of the quotation from the apocryphal book of Enoch; he himself, however, considered it as genuine. It is wanting in the Peshito (but not in the MS. in the Bodleian Library at Oxford; see Guericke, *Einl.* p. 42); but, on the other hand, it is mentioned in the Muratorian Canon. Since the fourth century it has been generally acknowledged as a genuine canonical writing. As the author does not call himself an apostle, criticism in more recent times was more inclined to consider it authentic than some other writings of the N. T. Even de Wette observes, that there is no reason why Jude should not be the author of this Epistle; neither its use of the book of Enoch, nor its probable acquaintance with the Epistle to the Romans, nor its harsh style, though betraying a familiarity with the Greek language, are opposed to this.—Schwegler judges otherwise. He infers from vv. 17, 18 that the Epistle belongs to the post-apostolic times, although in point of doctrine its character is very simple and undeveloped. He thinks that the forger chose the name of Jude, the brother of James, in order to indicate the community of principle with this latter person. In opposition to this it is to be observed, that, had the Epistle been written in the interests of Jewish Christianity against Pauline, we should surely have found indications of this; and a forger would hardly have attributed his writing to Jude, a person otherwise so entirely unknown. The above-mentioned verses by no means point

to a *post*-apostolic age, since they rather suppose that the readers have heard the preaching of the apostles. The fact that we find no definite references to this Epistle among the early Fathers, and that its genuineness at a later period was not wholly undoubted, is easily accounted for, partly from its special tendency (particularly from doctrine being so little referred to), partly from the apocryphal traits with which it is pervaded, and partly from the fact that the author did not belong to the apostles.

Ἰούδα ἐπιστολή.

Instead of this superscription (in A C K) there is found in B only *Ἰούδα.*

Ver. 1. Instead of *Ἰησ. Χρ.* (*Rec.* after A B L ℵ, etc., several vss. etc., Lachm. Tisch. 8) Tisch. 7 had adopted *Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ*, after K P, etc., without sufficient justification. — *ἡγιασμένοις*] *Rec.* after K L P, etc.; instead of this *ἠγαπημένοις*, in A B ℵ, 5, *al.*, Syr. utr. Erp. Copt. etc., Orig. Eph., is adopted by Lachm. and Tisch. It is true that there are exegetical difficulties connected with the latter reading, but it is too strongly defended by authorities to be on that account considered spurious. Reiche, Schott, Hofmann have declared for it, Wiesinger against it; Brückner is undecided. — Ver. 3. *τῆς κοινῆς σωτηρίας*] *Rec.* after K L P, *al.*; Tisch. 7 has retained this reading; Lachm. and Tisch. 8, on the contrary, read *κοινῆς ἡμῶν σωτηρίας*, for which A B C ℵ, 5, *al.*, Syr. Erp. Sahid. Theoph. Lucif. testify. The weight of authorities is in favour of this latter reading; it is possible that *ἡμῶν* was omitted, in order to give to the idea a universal character. — Ver. 4. Instead of the usual form *χάριν*, Lachm. and Tisch., after A B, read *χάριτα*, which occurs in classical writers only among the poets (see Buttmann, *Ausf. gr. Sprachl.* § 44. *Anm.* 1) [E. T. 13]. — *τὸν μόνον δεσπότην καὶ κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰ. Χρ.*, with Griesbach, Scholz, Tittmann, Lachm. Tisch., after the testimonies of A B C ℵ, 10, Lect. 1, 3, Erp. Copt. Sahid. etc., Eph. Didym. Chrys. — The *Rec.* has after *δεσπότην* the word *Θεόν* (in K L P, etc., Syr. utr. Thph.), which, however, is a later addition, the more definitely to distinguish *δεσπότην* from *κύριον ἡμῶν*. In later MSS. many other variations are found, namely: *Θεὸν καὶ δεσπότην τὸν κύρ. ἡμ. Ἰ. Χρ.*, or *δεσπότην καὶ Θεὸν τὸν κύρ. ἡμ. Ἰ. Χρ.*, or *Θεὸν δεσπότην καὶ κύρ. ἡμ. Ἰ. Χρ.* — Ver. 5. After *εἰδότας* the *Rec.* has *ὑμᾶς*; Lachm. and Tisch. have omitted it; it is wanting in A B C** several min. etc., but is found in K L ℵ, etc. It may have been omitted on account of the preceding *ὑμᾶς*. — *τοῦτο* (*Rec.* after K L, etc.) appears to be an explanatory correction instead of the original *πάντα*, for which A B C** ℵ, etc., Vulg. etc., testify; also Reiche considers *πάντα* as the

original reading. ℵ has ἅπαξ *after* κύριος, so also several versions, yet after ὅτι κύριος. Two reasons co-operated for this displacement: (1) because ἅπαξ did not appear to suit εἰδότας, and (2) because the following τὸ δεύτερον appeared to require a word corresponding with σώσας. Tisch. on this observes: quae quidem lectio omnino praeferenda esset alteri, nisi incredibile esset ἅπαξ locum post εἰδότας a quopiam correctore nactum esse. Reiche remarks: loco, quem vulgo occupat, testium auctoritate servari debet.—The *Rec.* ὁ κύριος is found in K L, most min. some vss. and Fathers; Tisch. 7 has retained it; Tisch. 8 reads, after C* ℵ, κύριος without the article. A B, several min. etc., have Ἰησοῦς instead of κύριος (on this Tisch. 8 remarks: articulum om. et A B et reliqui qui Ἰησοῦς praebent); Lachm. and Buttm. have adopted ὁ Ἰησοῦς; C** and Lucif. read ὁ Θεός. The reading Ἰησοῦς (instead of κύριος) is indeed very strange, but might for this reason be changed into the other readings. — Ver. 6. Instead of τε after ἀγγέλους (Tisch.), A, some min. etc., have δέ. Lachm. has δὲ in the text-edition; but, on the other hand, in the larger edition he has rightly again adopted τε. — Ver. 7. τούτοις τρόπον] *Rec.* after K L, etc.; a correction instead of τρόπον τούτοις (Lachm. Tisch.) in A B C ℵ, many min. etc. — Ver. 9. Instead of ὁ δὲ Μιχ. ὁ ἀρχάγγελος, ὅτε, Lachm., against the testimony of A C K L ℵ, etc., has adopted, after B, ὅτε Μιχ. ὁ ἀρχ. τότε. — Ver. 12. A B, 13, *al.*, m. edd. Syr. utr. (Copt. ?) etc., read after οὗτοί εἰσιν the relative οἵ, which Griesbach considers as probably genuine, and Lachm. and Tisch. have rightly adopted into the text;[1] the omission must be considered as an explanatory correction. — ἀγάπαις] instead of which A C and some min. read ἀπάταις; a correction after 2 Pet. ii. 13. — ὑμῶν] Lachm. has in the small edition αὐτῶν, after A, etc., but in the larger edition the *Rec.* ὑμῶν, which is sufficiently attested by B C K L ℵ, etc.; the reading αὐτῶν, which Stier without reason considers as original, is explained from 1 Pet. ii. 13. — Instead of ὑπὸ ἀνέμων, ℵ reads πνεύματι ἀνέμῳ; an evident correction. — παραφερόμεναι] is already by Griesb. Scholz, etc., after almost all authorities, rightly adopted into the text instead of the *Rec.* περιφερόμεναι. — Ver. 13. ἄγρια κύματα is in ℵ instead of κύματα ἄγρια, which is attested by all authorities. — Buttmann has, after B, adopted πλανῆτες instead of πλανῆται, and ζόφος instead of ὁ ζόφος; as the other authorities, so also ℵ testifies for the reading of the *Rec.* — εἰς αἰῶνα] after A B C ℵ, etc., instead of the

[1] Reiche incorrectly observes that Buttmann has not adopted οἱ, and has adduced B as a witness for the reading of the *Rec.* On account of the difficulty which the article presents, Reiche considers the reading of the *Rec.* as the original.

Rec. εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα. — Ver. 14. Instead of the form προεφήτευσε, attested by almost all authorities, Tisch. has, after B*, adopted ἐπροφήτευσε. — ἁγίαις μυριάσιν] after A B K L, etc., instead of the *Rec.* μυριάσιν ἁγίαις in C; in ℵ the reading is μυριάσιν ἁγίων ἀγγέλων. — Ver. 15. ἐλέγξαι] after A B C K L ℵ, etc., instead of the *Rec.* ἐξελέγξαι. — After ἀσεβεῖς the *Rec.* has αὐτῶν, found in K L, some min. vss. and Fathers; retained by Tischendorf,[1] and defended by Reiche; on the other hand, it is wanting in A B C (Lachm.); its spuriousness is scarcely to be doubted. — ἀσεβείας αὐτῶν is wanting in ℵ; ἀσεβείας in C; the omission is easily explained. — Tisch. 8 inserts after τῶν σκληρῶν the word λόγων, after C ℵ, and many min.; it is wanting in most authorities (Tisch. 7); it appears to have been added from a regard to the preceding τῶν ἔργων. — Ver. 18. After ἔλεγον ὑμῖν Tisch. 7, after A C K L, etc., has ὅτι (*Rec.*); Tisch. 8 has omitted it after B L* ℵ; so also Lachm. in his larger edition, but hardly correctly. — Instead of the *Rec.* ἐν ἐσχάτῳ χρόνῳ (K L P, some min. and Oecumenius), which is an explanatory correction, Lachm. and Tisch. have rightly adopted ἐπ' ἐσχάτου τοῦ χρόνου; the article τοῦ is found in A ℵ, *al.*, etc.; its omission is easily explained, because ἐσχάτου was taken for an adjective. — ἔσονται] Whilst Lachm. in his small edition instead of it reads ἐλεύσονται, he has in the large edition rightly adopted the reading of the *Rec.* The reading ἐλεύσονται (in A C** etc.) is a correction after 2 Pet. iii. 3. ℵ has *primo manu* ἔσονται; on the other hand corrected ἐλεύσονται. — Ver. 19. After ἀποδιορίζοντες the *Rec.* has ἑαυτοῖς (C, Vulg. Aug.); an evident correction. — Ver. 20. Instead of the Rec. τῇ ἁγιωτ. ὑμῶν πίστει ἐποικοδομοῦντες ἑαυτούς (K L P, *al.*, pl. Syr. etc.), Lachm. and Tisch. read ἐποικοδομοῦντες ἑαυτ. τῇ ἁγ. ὑμ. π. (A B C ℵ, *al.*, several vss. etc.). — Vv. 22, 23. The readings are here very various. The *Rec.* has καὶ οὓς μὲν ἐλεεῖτε διακρινόμενοι· οὓς δὲ ἐν φόβῳ σώζετε, ἐν τοῦ πυρὸς ἁρπάζοντες. This reading is found in K L P (only τοῦ before πυρός is omitted); A reads καὶ οὓς μὲν ἐλέγχετε διακρινομένους, οὓς δὲ σώζετε ἐκ πυρὸς ἁρπάζοντες, οὓς δὲ ἐλεεῖτε ἐν φόβῳ; Lachm. and Tisch. have adopted this reading, only that instead of ἐλεεῖτε they read, with B: ἐλεᾶτε. — B deviates in this, that in ver. 22 it reads not ἐλέγχετε, but ἐλεᾶτε (so also ℵ); in ver. 23 it omits the first οὓς δέ, and instead of ἐλεεῖτε has the form ἐλεᾶτε; C agrees on the whole with A, yet C** has in ver. 22 ἐλεᾶτε, as B, and in ver. 23 the words οὓς δὲ ἐλεεῖτε are wanting in C. The reading of A is held as the original by Brückner, Wiesinger, Schott, Reiche, because the

[1] Tisch. 8 has it likewise in the text, although he says in the notes: omisimus cum A B C ℵ, etc.

other readings can be most easily explained from it; Hofmann, on the contrary, prefers the reading in ℵ, which is found also in B, only with the inadvertent omission of the words οὓς δὲ after διακρινομένους; whilst de Wette thinks that the original reading is preserved in C. The reading in B probably lies at the foundation of the reading in K L P; the twofold ἐλεᾶτε was naturally objectionable, and therefore the words οὓς δὲ ἐλεᾶτε were left out, διακρινομένους changed into the nominative, and ἐν φόβῳ placed before σώζετε. For further observations, see the exposition. — Ver. 24. Instead of ὑμᾶς (ed. Elz.; A C L ℵ, *al.*, perm. several vss. Theoph. etc., Lachm. Tisch. 8), Tisch. 7 had, after K P, *al.*, etc., hardly correctly adopted αὐτούς; A has ἡμᾶς. — Ver. 25. μόνῳ Θεῷ is correctly adopted by Griesbach, after A B C ℵ, 6, *al.*, Syr., etc., instead of the *Rec.* μόνῳ σοφῷ Θεῷ; σοφῷ is evidently borrowed from Rom. xvi. 27, and is without reason defended by Reiche. — διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν is likewise adopted by Griesbach (after A B C, etc.), whilst the words are wanting in the *Rec.* — The *Rec.* between δόξα and μεγαλωσύνη has καί after K L P, etc., which is correctly omitted by recent critics; on the other hand, the words πρὸ παντὸς τοῦ αἰῶνος, wanting in the *Rec.*, are attested by almost all authorities. — The subscription of the Epistle is in B: Ἰούδα; in C: Ἰούδα ἐπιστολὴ καθολική; and in A: Ἰούδα ἐπιστολή.

Vv. 1, 2. The superscription is in form similar to that of the Epistles of Paul and Peter: Ἰούδας Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ δοῦλος κ.τ.λ.] δοῦλος, as its position and Rom. i. 1, Phil. i. 1, Jas. i. 1 (see also Tit. i. 1), show, denotes not the general service of believers to Christ (Schott), but the special service of those appointed to the gospel ministry. The more definite statement of office is here wanting; as the author is not the Apostle Jude (see Introd. sec. 1), so that his position in the Christian church is to be regarded as similar to that which a Barnabas, an Apollos, and others occupied, who, without being apostles in the narrower sense of the term, yet exercised a ministry similar to the apostolic. — With the first appellation the second ἀδελφὸς Ἰακώβου is connected by δέ (see Tit. i. 1), which, although not precisely a contrast (Schott), yet marks a distinction. This appellation serves not only to indicate who this Jude is (Arnaud), but likewise to justify his writing. Jude does not call himself "the brother of the Lord," because his bodily relation to Christ

stepped behind his spiritual, perhaps also because that surname already specially belonged to James. — *τοῖς ἐν Θεῷ πατρὶ ἠγαπημένοις* [*ἡγιασμένοις*] *καὶ κ.τ.λ.*] According to the reading *ἡγιασμένοις*, *ἐν* expresses not the mere instrument of holiness, but holiness as consisting *in* fellowship with God. The participle is either *substantive*, co-ordinate to the following *Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ τετηρημένοις κλητοῖς*, or *adjective*, which is more probable on account of the similar participial form, *τετηρημένοις*. — According to the reading *ἠγαπημένοις*, *ἐν Θεῷ πατρί* may denote the sphere within which the readers are *ἠγαπημένοι*, namely, by the writer. Against the opinion of de Wette, "that in this objective designation the subjectivity of the author cannot be mixed," Col. i. 2 might be appealed to, where Paul names the readers of his Epistle *ἀδελφοί*, that is, the brethren of himself and Timotheus (see also 2 John 1 and 3 John 1); but in relation to what follows: *καὶ Ἰησ. Χρ. τετηρημένοις*, this view is correct. — In the Vulgate, *τοῖς ἐν Θεῷ πατρί* is taken as an idea by itself: his qui sunt in Deo Patre, etc.; and then to this idea the two attributes are added: *ἠγαπημένοις* and *Ἰησ. Χρ. τετηρ. κλητοῖς*. Apart from its harshness, not only is it opposed to this construction that by it the parallelism (incorrectly denied by Schott) of the two members of the clause—which is strongly indicated both by the form of the sentence and also by *ἐν τῷ πατρί* in reference to the following *Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ*—is destroyed, but also *ἠγαπημένοις* would then be without any proximate statement. The same is also the case when it is assumed, with Rampf and Schott, that the participles *ἠγαπημένοις* and *Ἰ. Χ. τετηρημένοις* are equally subordinate to *ἐν Θεῷ πατρί*, and explained as expressing "the living ground on which the called possess that which is expressed in the two participles" (Schott). The supplying of *ὑπὸ Θεοῦ* or *παρὰ Θεῷ*, necessary for this view, is at all events arbitrary; moreover, the juxtaposition of *τοῖς ἐν Θεῷ πατρὶ Ἰησ. Χριστῷ τετηρημένοις* is extremely harsh. — It is incorrect to take *ἐν* as equivalent to *ὑπό* (Hensler); *ἐν* is rather to be retained in its proper signification, in which it is entirely suitable to the idea *ἀγαπᾶσθαι*, as the love which proceeds *from* any person dwells *in* him, the *κλητοί* as they are loved *by* God so are

they loved *in* God. Hofmann incorrectly explains it: "who have been accepted in love *by* God;" for *ἀγαπᾷν* never has this meaning, not even in the passages cited by Hofmann: 1 Thess. i. 4; 2 Thess. ii. 13; Col. iii. 12. — God is called *πατρί* in His relation to *Christ*, not to *men*: see Phil. ii. 11; Gal. i. 1; and Meyer on the latter passage. — *καὶ Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ τετηρημένοις κλητοῖς*] The dative *Ἰησ. Χριστῷ* is not dependent on an *ἐν* to be supplied from *ἐν Θεῷ πατρί* (Luther: preserved in Jesus Christ). Hofmann indeed appeals for this supplement to Kühner, *Gr.* II. p. 477; but incorrectly, as this is rendered impossible by *ἠγαπημένοις* intervening. What Kühner says could only be the case were it written: *ἐν Θεῷ πατρὶ καὶ Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ ἠγαπημένοις*. Also *Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ* is not the causative dative with the passive, instead of *ὑπό* with the genitive, but the dative commodi: *for Christ* (Bengel, de Wette, Wiesinger, Schott, and others). The participle *τετηρημένοις* is used neither instead of the present participle, as Grotius thinks, nor is it here to be understood of the act completed before God (de Wette, Wiesinger); but it simply denotes that which has taken place up to the time when the Epistle was written; thus: "to the called, who have been kept for Christ;" namely, in order to belong to Him in time and in eternity (so also Schott).[1] The idea *τετηρ.* is completely explained from the falling away from Christ which had taken place among so many; see ver. 4; comp. also John xvii. 11; 1 Pet. i. 5. — Although *ἐν Θεῷ πατρί* cannot be grammatically connected with *τετηρημένοις*, and although it primarily belongs to *ἠγαπημένοις*, yet it indicates by whom the preservation has taken place; Hornejus: quos Deus Pater . . . Christo . . . donavit et asservavit huc usque, ne ab impostoribus seducerentur et perirent. — *κλητοῖς*] a designation in the Pauline sense of those who have not only heard the gospel, but have embraced it by faith; see Meyer on 1 Cor. i. 24. Ver. 2. *ἔλεος κ.τ.λ.*] The word *ἔλεος* is used in the formula of salutation only here and in the Pastoral Epistles. The addition *καὶ ἀγάπη* is peculiar to Jude. The relation of the

[1] Arnauld incorrectly explains it: aux appelés gardés par J. Chr., c'est-à-dire: à ceux qui ont été appelés à J. Chr. par la prédication de l'Evangile et que J. Chr. garde fidèles.

three terms is thus to be understood: ἔλεος is the demeanour of God toward the κλητοί; εἰρήνη their condition founded upon it; and ἀγάπη their demeanour proceeding from it as the effect of God's grace. Accordingly ἀγάπη is used here as in Eph. vi. 23 (see Meyer *in loco*); only here the love is to be limited neither specially to the brethren (Grotius), nor to God (Calov, Wiesinger). Still ἀγάπη may also be the love of God to the κλητοῖς; comp. ver. 21 and 2 Cor. xiii. 13 [14] (so Hornejus, Grotius, Bengel, de Wette-Brückner, Schott, and others). No ground of decision can be derived from πληθυνθείη. With the reading ἡγαπημένοις the second explanation merits the preference, although the position of this expression *after* εἰρήνη is somewhat strange. On πληθυνθείη, see 1 Pet. i. 2; this form is apparently derived from Dan. iii. 31.

Vv. 3, 4. Statement of the reason which determined Jude to write this Epistle: comp. on this 2 Pet. i. 12 f., iii. 1 f.— ἀγαπητοί] found at the beginning of an Epistle only here and in 3 John 2. — πᾶσαν σπουδὴν ποιούμενος κ.τ.λ.] *Giving all diligence to write unto you of the common salvation, I felt constrained to write to you, exhorting you to contend for the faith once delivered to the saints.* Pricaeus, Lachmann, Buttmann put a comma after the first and after the second ὑμῖν, so that περὶ . . . σωτηρίας is connected with ἀνάγκην ἔσχον, and παρακαλῶν, etc., is separated from γράψαι. Most expositors, on the contrary, as Erasmus, Luther, Calvin, de Wette, Wiesinger, etc., connect περὶ σωτηρίας with the preceding γράφειν, and unite παρακαλῶν with γράψαι. Not only the position of the words, but also the train of thought decides for this latter arrangement; for since, according to ver. 4, the ἀνάγκη, inducing the author to write this Epistle, consisted in the appearance of wicked men, so it is evidently more suitable to connect γράψαι with παρακαλῶν ἐπαγωνίζεσθαι, having special reference to it, than with the general idea περὶ τῆς κοινῆς σωτηρίας, particularly as the contents of the Epistle are anything but a treatise concerning the common salvation.[1] The preceding participial clause states in what

[1] The translation of the Vulgate: omnem solicitudinem faciens scribendi vobis de communi vestra salute necesse habui scribere vobis deprecans supercertari,

condition Jude was when the *ἀνάγκην ἔχειν* came upon him; the *σπουδή* to write already existed when the entrance of certain ungodly men constrained him not to write generally *περὶ τῆς κοινῆς σωτηρίας*, but to compose such a hortative Epistle as the present. Some expositors incorrectly think that the *ἀνάγκη* had its reason in the *σπουδή* (Erasmus: tantum mihi studium fuit, ut non potuerim non scribere vobis); others, that to the *σπουδή* the *ἀνάγκη* supervened as a new point; so Hornejus: cum summum mihi esset studium scribendi ad vos aliquid de communi nostrum omnium salute, etiam necessitas insuper scribendi imposita fuit, quae autem illa sit, statim addit (so also Calvin and others). De Wette (with whom Brückner agrees) considers that Jude by the first clause expresses that "he had been engaged on the composition of a longer and more comprehensive Epistle (the loss of which we have to lament), when he was for the time called away from that work in order to write the present Epistle;" but the expression *πᾶσαν σπουδὴν ποιούμενος* does not necessarily involve *actual* writing.[1] — *σπουδὴν ποιεῖσθαι* is only found here in the N. T. (2 Pet. i. 5: *σπουδὴν πᾶσαν παρεισφέρειν*; prologue to Ecclus.: *προσφέρειν τινὰ σπουδήν*); the meaning is: *to be eagerly solicitous about something;* it may refer both to mental activity and to external action; here the former is the case. Luther's translation: "After I purposed," is too flat; Meyer's is better: "since it lies pressingly upon my heart."— *πᾶσαν* serves, as frequently, for the strengthening of the idea.—The participle *ποιούμενος*, in connection with the aorists *ἔσχον γράψαι*, is to be taken as the imperfect participle. Stier incorrectly translates: "when engaged in it I *would* take diligence." It expresses the activity which took

etc., may also be punctuated in both ways. Lachmann has, in his larger edition of the N. T., punctuated it as he has done in the Greek text; in other editions of the Vulgate, on the contrary, the other punctuation is found.

[1] De Wette incorrectly appeals for this supposition to Sherlock (in Wolf), who thus explains it: dilecti, animus mihi erat, scribere ad vos de communibus doctrinis et spe evangelii ad fidem vestram et Jesu Christi cognitionem amplificandam; jam vero coactum me video, *ut hoc institutum deseram* et ad cavendum praesens periculum, vos exhorter, ut serio teneatis eam quae vobis tradita est, doctrinam, contra falsos doctores, quos clanculum audio irrepsisse. What de Wette regards as accomplished, or in the act of being accomplished, Sherlock considers only as intended.

place, when the action expressed by the finite verb occurred, and therefore must not be resolved, with Haenlein, into the perfect or pluperfect. — *περὶ τῆς κοινῆς ἡμῶν σωτηρίας*] states on what Jude intended to write. On *κοινῆς*, comp. Tit. i. 4; 2 Pet. i. 1. There is no reason to refer the idea, with Semler, to the Jews and Gentiles, as the object *common* to both. — *σωτηρία*, not the *doctrine* of salvation (Jachmann), but the *salvation* itself, acquired by Christ for the world, and applied to believers. The explanation of Beza: de iis *quae ad* nostram omnium salutem *pertinent*, deviates from strict precision, as *σωτηρία* itself is indicated by Jude as the object of writing. Schott incorrectly explains *σωτηρία, state of salvation, possession of salvation.* — *ἀνάγκην ἔσχον*] Comp. Luke xiv. 10, xxiii. 17; 1 Cor. vii. 37. The explanation of Grotius is inaccurate: nihil potius habui, quod scriberem, quam ut, etc. The translation of Luther is too flat: "I considered it necessary;" for in *ἀνάγκην ἔχειν* is contained the idea of an objective necessity founded on duty, circumstances, etc. (de Wette, Wiesinger, Schott). The meaning here is: the entrance of false teachers constrained me, made me to recognise it as necessary. On the one hand, Semler inserts a strange reference, paraphrasing it: accidit interea *inopinato*, ut statuendum mihi . . . esset; and, on the other hand, Schott, who, in order to emphasize the contrast between the two members of the sentence, finds in *ἀνάγκ. ἔσχον* the thought expressed that Jude wrote this Epistle *unwillingly, contrary to his inclination.* — *γράψαι ὑμῖν παρακαλῶν*] *παρακαλῶν* is closely united to *γράψαι*, as indicating the kind of writing to which the author felt constrained by circumstances; therefore no comma is to be put after *ὑμῖν.* — *ἐπαγωνίζεσθαι τῇ . . . πίστει*] *ἐπαγωνίζεσθαι*, a *ἅπ. λεγ.*, as *συναθλέω*, Phil. i. 27, connected with the dative of the object which is contended for; Stier: "to fight for the faith;" comp. Ecclus. iv. 28: *ἀγωνίζειν περί.* — *πίστις* is not = doctrina, *system of doctrine;* nor yet does it here denote the subjective quality of the believing disposition; but that which is believed by Christians (*τοῖς ἁγίοις*), the objective contents of faith. Schott is incorrect in explaining it: "the conduct arising from faith;" for the notion of conduct does not suit *παραδοθείσῃ.* The explanation: *the way*

of salvation (Hofmann), is also wanting in correctness; it is not proved by Gal. iii. 23. — As the subject to παραδοθείσῃ, by whom the communication or transmission was effected, *God* (Bengel) is not here to be thought of, but the *apostles*, as ver. 17 shows; 2 Pet. ii. 21; Luke i. 2 (comp. also 1 Cor. xi. 2, 23, xv. 3); yet the author does not name them, because "he is not concerned here with the personal instruments, but with the mode and manner of transmission contained in ἅπαξ" (Schott). τοῖς ἁγίοις are not the apostles (Nic. de Lyra), but Christians. — ἅπαξ brings prominently forward the fact that as it once took place, so there is now an end to the παράδοσις; Bengel: nulla alia dabitur fides. Jachmann incorrectly explains it by ἤδη, *olim, jam*, appealing to ver. 5 and Heb. vi. 4. According to Hofmann's view, ἅπαξ is used "with reference to the preceding intention of Jude to present to the readers a writing having the common salvation as its object;" but this reference is not indicated.[1]

Ver. 4. Compare 2 Pet. ii. 1–3. — παρεισέδυσαν γάρ] the reason of ἀνάγκην ἔσχον. παρεισέδυσαν marks the entrance of false teachers into the church as a secret and unauthorized creeping in of such as do not properly belong to it, but are internally foreign to it (comp. Gal. ii. 4: παρείσακτοι, explained by the scholiasts by ἀλλότριοι); it is synonymous with παρεισέρχεσθαι; comp. 2 Tim. iii. 6. — τινες ἄνθρωποι] In the same indefiniteness the false teachers are also mentioned in 1 Tim. i. 6. Arnaud observes: le mot τινες a quelque chose de méprisant, comme dans Gal. ii. 12; so also Wiesinger and Schott; this is possible; but the appeal to Gal. ii. 12 is unjustified. That the expression ἄνθρωποι is used in order to bring forward the fact that they "with their entrance into the church remained in their natural state" (Schott), is highly improbable. Hofmann unnecessarily separates τινες from ἄνθρωποι, taking ἄνθρωποι, οἱ κ.τ.λ., as in apposition to τινες. — οἱ πάλαι προγεγραμμένοι εἰς τοῦτο τὸ κρίμα] By the participle with the article a peculiar circum-

[1] When Hofmann maintains that ver. 4 could only have been written by an apostle, he evidently proceeds too far; for why could not also another besides an apostle have cherished the design to address a writing to Christians respecting the common faith?

stance worthy of remark concerning these men is brought forward (Winer, p. 127 [E. T. 167]); but not, as Schott, after Rampf, arbitrarily maintains, "a mark perfectly clear to the readers is given for the *recognition* of those who are meant;" the article being equivalent to isti, *those notorious men.* — προγεγραμμένοι] The preposition προ in this verb indicates either *antea, earlier, before;* thus always in the N. T.; see Gal. iii. 1 (comp. Meyer *in loc.*); Rom. xv. 4; Eph. iii. 3; or *palam.* If it has this last meaning, then προγράφειν signifies "to announce something publicly by writing;" thus in an entirely special sense *proscribere;* accordingly Wolf explains it: qui dudum sunt accusati et in hoc judicium (εἰς τοῦτο τὸ κρίμα) vocati. Yet this is inaccurate, as the peculiar idea of proscribere is not retained; for, if retained, it would not suit εἰς τ. τ. κρίμα. Yet more arbitrarily Wahl explains προγράφειν by *designare.* Oecumenius, Hornejus, and others have correctly taken προ here as a preposition of time. According to Isa. iv. 3, LXX.: οἱ γραφέντες εἰς ζωήν, the sense might be: those who are written before (as in God's book of fate, and consequently *destined*) εἰς τοῦτο τὸ κρίμα (Calvin: haec metaphora inde sumpta est, quod aeternum Dei consilium, quo ordinati sunt fideles ad salutem, Liber vocatur); but the term πάλαι is unsuitable, as it is never in the N. T. used of God's *eternal* counsels. προγράφειν is here rather to be understood entirely as in the adduced passages of the N. T.; and with de Wette a pregnancy of expression is to be assumed; thus: *those who are already before by writing destined to this judgment.* Hofmann explains προγεγραμμένοι according to John i. 46 compared with v. 46 (γράφειν τινα = γρ. περί τινος): "those of whom it is written before;" and then εἰς τοῦτο τ. κρ. = "in reference to this judgment;" but with regard to the former it is to be remarked, that the form of expression here is different from John i. 46; and with regard to the latter, that by it a weakening of the preposition in its direct connection with προγεγράμμένοι takes place.[1] Oecumenius refers this to the prophecies concerning future false

[1] Luther's translation: "there are certain men crept in, of whom it is written before, to this punishment," by which προγεγρ. is separated from εἰς τ. τ. κρ., is contradicted by the natural verbal connection.

teachers contained in the Epistles of Paul and Peter. Grotius, Schott, Hofmann, and others point particularly to 2 Pet. ii. But *πάλαι* combined with *προγεγρ.* evidently points back to an earlier period,[1] so that only older prophecies can be meant, namely, the prophecies and types of the O. T., and perhaps particularly the prophecies contained in the Book of Enoch: see ver. 14 (so also Wiesinger). Against Calvin and Beza, who find the idea of the decretum aeternum here expressed, Bengel remarks: non innuitur praedestinatio, sed scripturae praedictio. — *εἰς τοῦτο τὸ κρίμα*] Although *κρίμα* in itself is not equivalent to *κατάκριμα*, yet here a condemnatory judgment is meant; *τοῦτο*, namely, that which Jude has in view, and which is indicated in the following verse; Stier: "for *this* judgment, which I now announce to them;" Arnaud: il y a *τοῦτο*, parceque cette punition est l'objet qui l'occupe. It is incorrect, with Wiesinger and Hofmann, to refer *τοῦτο τὸ κρίμα* to *παρεισέδυσαν*, as something including judgment in itself; or, with Schott, to the "damnable error of those men," specified in the words *τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ κ.τ.λ.*; for neither the entering in nor the error can in themselves be called a *κρίμα*. — *ἀσεβεῖς*] to be taken by itself; not to be united with *οἱ προγεγραμμένοι* (against Tischendorf, who has placed no comma before *ἀσεβεῖς*). The ungodliness of these men is further indicated, according to its nature, by the participial clauses which follow (comp. 2 Pet. ii. 6). — *τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμῶν χάριν κ.τ.λ.*] *who pervert the grace of our God into lasciviousness.* *χάρις*, not = doctrina gratiae (Vorstius), nor evangelium (Grotius), nor fides catholica nobis gratis data (Nicolas de Lyra); but *grace* itself as the proffered gift of God in the forgiveness of sin and redemption from the law; so also Wiesinger, Frommüller, Hofmann. It is incorrect to explain the idea by "the life of grace" (de Wette-Brückner), or by "the ordinances of grace" (Schott). *ἡμῶν*, belonging to *τοῦ*

[1] Schott and Hofmann contest the fact that *πάλαι* points to an earlier period. *πάλαι*, which "generally indicates the past in contrast to the present" (Pape), may certainly be used when that past is not distant (comp. Mark xv. 44); but, on the one hand, this use of the term is rare; and, on the other hand, it is not here applicable, as the reference to the past generally is already contained in the *προ* of the compound verb; *πάλαι* here can only be put to mark this past as lying in the distance.

Θεοῦ, is to be understood as an expression of the feeling of sonship; Bengel: nostri, non impiorum. — In *μετατιθέντες εἰς ἀσέλγειαν, ἀσέλγ.* is either the purpose of the change of the grace of God, or that into which grace is changed. In the former case *μετατίθημι* here would in itself have a bad subsidiary meaning (de Wette: "who pervert the grace of our God for the purpose of licentiousness"); but it never elsewhere so occurs in the N. T. Accordingly, the second explanation is better (Brückner), according to which the meaning is: they have converted the *χάρις*, which God gave to them, into something different, namely *ἀσέλγεια*; inasmuch as liberty was converted by them into lasciviousness; comp. Gal. v. 13; 1 Pet. ii. 16; 2 Pet. ii. 19. — *καὶ τὸν μόνον δεσπότην καὶ κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰ. Χρ. ἀρνούμενοι*] In 2 Pet. ii. 1 the epithet *δεσπότης* is used of Christ; this favours the combination of *τὸν μόνον δεσπότην* as an attribute with *Ἰησ. Χρ.* (so de Wette, Schmidt, Rampf, Wiesinger, Schott, Fronmüller, Hofmann). But, on the one hand, in every other place this word denotes *God*; and, on the other hand, *δεσπότης* would hardly be distinguished from the word *κύριος*, if both were to be referred to Christ;[1] add to this that *μόνος* elsewhere expresses the unity of the divine nature; comp. Jude 25; John v. 44, xvii. 3; Rom. xvi. 27; 1 Tim. i. 17, vi. 15, 16; Rev. xv. 4; against which view Schott incorrectly urges 1 Cor. viii. 6 and Eph. iv. 5. For these reasons, it is more probable that *τὸν μόνον δεσπότην* is not an appellation of Christ, but a designation of God (Brückner); comp. 1 John ii. 22: *ὁ ἀρνούμενος τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν υἱόν* (also Enoch xlviii. 10 is to be compared: "they have denied the Lord of the spirits and His Anointed"). No argument against this explanation can be drawn from the want of the article before *κύριον*; see author's commentary on Tit. ii. 3 (Winer, p. 121 ff. [E. T. 162]),[2] which is in an unjustifiable manner denied by Hofmann. The

[1] Hofmann gives the distinction of these two ideas as follows: "Christ is our *δεσπότης*, as we are His property bound to His service; He is our *κύριος*, as His will is the standard of ours." But if this be correct, it is not in favour of Hofmann but against him, because Jude would then in an incomprehensible manner make the weaker idea to follow upon the stronger.

[2] When Wiesinger and Schott appeal for their explanation to the fact that the relation to God is already expressed in the preceding clause, and that there-

denial may be considered as either practical (comp. Tit. i. 16) or theoretical. Since throughout this Epistle the carnal and godless disposition of these men is brought forward, it is most probable that Jude at least had the first kind of denial specially in view. At all events, such explanations as those of Grotius: "abnegabant Jesum, quia eum dicebant hominem natum ex homine," are to be rejected, as Jude never reproaches his adversaries with such a definite erroneous doctrine.

Ver. 5. From this verse to ver. 7 we have three examples, as representations of the judgment which threatens those mentioned in ver. 4. Compare with this 2 Pet. ii. 4-6. — *ὑπομνῆσαι δὲ ὑμᾶς βούλομαι*] *δέ* is used metabatically (as a mere particle of transition); not in order to put *ὑπομνῆσαι* in contrast to *παρακαλῶν* (ver. 3), which is only to be justified by the explanation of Schott, that "Jude intends not properly to *exhort* the readers, but by *παρακαλεῖν* he means only that he will *remind* them." *ὑμᾶς* is not the subject, but the object to *ὑπομνῆσαι*; comp. 2 Pet. i. 12 (Rom. xv. 15). — *εἰδότας* [*ὑμάς*] *ἅπαξ πάντα*] *εἰδότας* is either in an adversative sense = *καίπερ εἰδότας* (de Wette); or, which is to be preferred on account of *ἅπαξ*, the statement of the reason of *ὑπομνῆσαι*, Nicolas de Lyra: commonere autem vos volo et non docere de novo; et subditur ratio; Bengel: causa, cur admoneat duntaxat: quia jam sciant, semelque cognitum habeant; so also Wiesinger and Schott. — *ἅπαξ* is not to be united *per hyperbaton* with *σώσας*; also not = first, so that *δεύτερον* corresponding to it would be = secondly, and both referred to *εἰδότας* (Jachmann); but *ἅπαξ* belongs to *εἰδότας*, and *τὸ δεύτερον* to *ἀπώλεσεν*. Hornejus incorrectly explains *ἅπαξ* by: jampridem et ab initio (Arnaud: vous qui l'avez su une fois); it has here rather the same meaning as in ver. 3, rendering prominent that a new teaching is not necessary (de Wette, Stier, Wiesinger, Fronmüller, Schott, Hofmann). — *πάντα*; accord-

fore it would be unsuitable to express it here again, it is to be observed that in that clause the relation to Christ is also indicated, since the grace of God is communicated through Christ; also, there is no reason why Jude should not have indicated *μετατιθέναι* as a denial both of Jesus Christ and of God. Whilst Schott grants that the expression "*the* only master" may only refer to God, he so interprets the article *τόν* before *μόνον δεσπ.* that he explains it as equivalent to "he who is."

ing to Nicolas de Lyra = omnia ad salutem necessaria; better: everything which is an object of evangelical teaching, here naturally with particular reference to what directly follows, to which alone the τοῦτο of the *Rec.* points.[1] — ὅτι ὁ κύριος (Ἰησοῦς) λαὸν . . . σώσας] ὅτι belongs not to εἰδότας πάντα, but to ὑπομνῆσαι. — With the reading (ὁ) Ἰησοῦς (Stier calls it: "without example, and incomprehensibly strange") Jude here would speak from the same point of view as Paul does in 1 Cor. x. 4 (comp. also 1 Pet. i. 11), according to which all the acts of divine revelation are done by the instrumentality of Christ, as the eternal Son and revealer of God. The name Ἰησοῦς, by which Christ is designated in His earthly and human personality, is, however, surprising; but Jude might have so used it from the consciousness that the eternal Son of God and He who was born of Mary is the same Person (comp. 1 Cor. viii. 9; Phil. ii. 5). With the reading κύριος—certainly the more natural—which de Wette-Brückner and Hofmann prefer, whilst Wiesinger and Schott consider Ἰησοῦς as the original—a designation of God is to be understood. — λαόν] That by this the people of Israel is meant is evident; the article is wanting, because Jude would indicate that Israel was saved as an entire people, with reference to the following τοὺς μὴ πιστεύσαντας.[2] — τὸ δεύτερον] is to be retained in its proper meaning, and to be explained neither, with Nicolas de Lyra and others, as = *post* (Arnaud: de nouveau, ensuite, après), nor, with Grotius and Wolf, as = *ex contrario*. It indicates that what was said in the preceding participial sentence, namely, the divine deliverance of the people from Egypt, is considered as a first deed, to which a second followed. The definite statement of what this second is, is usually derived from the preceding σώσας, and by it is accordingly understood a second deliverance; but there are different views as to what deliverance is meant. In this commentary the deliverance of

[1] Schott, indeed, explains πάντα correctly; but he erroneously thinks that ἅπαξ with εἰδότας indicates "this knowledge is meant as a knowledge effected by a definite *individual* act," and that ἅπαξ is to be understood of the instruction given in Second Peter.

[2] Calvin observes: nomen populi honorifice capitur pro gente sancta et electa, ac si diceret, nihil illis profuisse, quod singulari privilegio in foedus assumpti essent; but were this correct, a αὐτῶν would at least have been added.

the people from the wilderness was designated as this second deliverance, which certainly occurred to the people, yet only so that those who believed not did not attain to it, but were destroyed by God in the wilderness (so in essentials, Stier, Brückner, Wiesinger). On the other hand, Schmidt (*bibl. Theologie*, II.), Luthardt, Schott, Hofmann understand by it the deliverance effected by Christ; whilst they regard as the punishment falling on unbelievers, the destruction of Jerusalem, or the overthrow of the Jewish state. But both explanations are arbitrary; for, first, it is unauthorized to refer τὸ δεύτερον only to σώσας and not to ἐκ γῆς Αἰγύπτου σώσας; and, secondly, in the principal sentence a deliverance is not at all indicated.[1] Whilst, then, Jude thinks on the deliverance from Egypt as a first deed, he does not mention a deliverance, but the destruction of those who believed not, as the second deed following the first. But this second is not indicated as a single deed, and therefore by it is to be understood generally what befell the unbelieving in the wilderness after the deliverance from Egypt; what this was is expressed in the words τοὺς μὴ πιστεύσαντας ἀπώλεσεν. It is arbitrary to refer this, with Ritschl, only to the history recorded in Num. xxv. 1–9; and still more arbitrary to refer it, with Fronmüller, to the Babylonish captivity (2 Chron. xxxvi. 16 ff.). Compare, moreover, with this verse, Heb. iii. 16–19. — τοὺς μὴ πιστεύσαντας] On μή, with participles, see Winer, p. 449 f. [E. T. 606 f.]; comp. ver. 6: τοὺς μὴ τηρήσαντας. It is to be observed that in the corresponding passage, 2 Pet. ii., instead of this example, the deluge is named.

Ver. 6. A second example taken from the angelic world. As God spared not the people rescued from bondage, so neither did He spare the angels who left their habitation. This also was an admonitory representation for Christians, who, in the face of the high dignity which they possessed by redemption, yielded themselves to a life of vice. — ἀγγέλους

[1] Against Winer's explanation, p. 576 [E. T. 775]: "the verb connected with τὸ δεύτερον should properly have been οὐκ ἔσωσε (ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ.); the Lord, after having saved, *the second time* (when they needed His helping grace) refused them this saving grace, and left them to destruction." But there is nothing indicated in the context of a state of being in want of grace.

τε τοὺς μὴ τηρήσαντας κ.τ.λ.] is, according to the construction, as the τε indicates, closely connected with the preceding. — ἀγγέλους without the article considered generally; the participle connected with the article indicates the definite class of angels who are here meant. — For the understanding of this verse the following points are to be observed:—(1) By the twofold participial clause τοὺς μὴ . . . ἀρχήν and ἀπολιπόντας . . . οἰκητήριον, something sinful is attributed to the angels (2 Pet. ii. 4: ἁμαρτησάντων), on account of which the punishment expressed by εἰς κρίσεν . . . τετήρηκε was inflicted upon them; (2) The two clauses μὴ . . . ἀλλὰ . . . so correspond, that the second positive clause explains the first negative clause; and (3) what Jude says of the angels corresponds with the doctrine of the angels contained in the Book of Enoch. — τοὺς μὴ τηρήσαντας τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀρχήν κ.τ.λ.] ἀρχή must here denote something which the angels by forsaking τὸ ἴδιον οἰκητήριον did not preserve, but gave up or slighted. But by ἀπολ. τὸ ἴδ. οἰκητ., according to the Book of Enoch xii. 4,[1] is meant their forsaking of heaven, and their descent to earth in order to go after the daughters of men (so also Hofmann); but not, as Hornejus and others think, the loss of the heavenly dwelling, which they drew upon themselves by conspiring against God; which would militate against the first observation. — By ἀρχή expositors understand either *the original condition* (origo: Calvin, Grotius, Hornejus,[2] and others), or *the dominion which originally belonged to them* (Bengel, de Wette, Wiesinger, Schott, Hofmann;

[1] "Announce to the watchers of heaven, who forsook the high heaven and their holy eternal abodes, and have corrupted themselves with women;" xv. 3: "Wherefore have ye forsaken the high and holy and eternal heaven, and have slept with women?" . . . lxiv.: "These are the angels who have gone down from heaven to earth;" and other passages. Gen. vi. 2 lies at the foundation of this tradition, the explanation of which is to this day contested. Whilst Hofmann explains the expression בְּנֵי הָאֱלֹהִים as a designation of the angels, Ferd. Philippi decidedly rejects this explanation.

[2] Hornejus, after John viii. 44, designates as the original condition here meant, veritas i. e. innocentia et sanctitas. Stier thinks "that the original condition was at the same time the *ground* of their nature and condition in *God*, or, as it is now perhaps called, the principle of their true life. They preserved not themselves in God, whilst they surrendered and lost the proper pure ground of their glorious being."

Brückner thinks that the meaning *dominion* passes over into that of *origin*). According to the first explanation, the term is too indefinite, both in itself and in reference to the second parallel clause. It is in favour of the second explanation, that in the N. T. angels are often designated by the name ἀρχή, ἀρχαί; as also the prevailing idea among the Jews was, that to the angels a lordship belongs over the earthly creation. By this explanation, also, the two clauses correspond; instead of administering their office as rulers, they forsook their heavenly habitation, and thus became culpable. The explanation, according to which ἀρχὴ ἑαυτῶν denotes not the dominion of the angels, but the dominion of God, to which they were subjected, is both against linguistic usage and against the context. — εἰς κρίσιν . . . τετήρηκεν] Statement of the punishment. This also corresponds with the expression in the Book of Enoch, where in chap. x. 12 it is said: "Bind them fast under the mountains of the earth . . . even to the day of judgment . . . until the last judgment will be held for all eternity.[1] — τετήρηκεν is in sharp contrast to μὴ τηρήσαντας: the perfect expresses an action begun in the past and continued in the present. The *mode* of retention is more precisely stated by δεσμοῖς ἀϊδίοις ὑπὸ ζόφον] By ἀϊδίοις the chains by which they are bound are designated as eternal, and incapable of being rent. — ὑπὸ ζόφον] ζόφος only here and ver. 13, and in the parallel passages 2 Pet. ii. 4 and 17; comp. also Wisd. xvii. 2;[2] usually σκότος, the darkness of hell; ὑπό is explained by conceiving the angels in the lowest depths of hell, covered with darkness.[3] In τετή-

[1] Comp. also x. 4: "Bind Azâzêl, and put him in darkness," xiv. 5, xxi. 10, etc. In the Midrasch Ruth in the Book of Zohar it is said: Postquam filii Dei filios genuerunt, sumsit eos Deus et ad montem tenebrarum perduxit, ligavitque in catenis ferreis, quae usque ad medium abyssi magnae pertingunt.

[2] Comp. also Hesiod. *Theog.* v. 729, where it is said:

Ἔνθα θεοὶ Τιτῆνες ὑπὸ ζόφῳ ἠρόεντα
Κεκρύφαται, βουλῇσι Διὸς νεφεληγερίταο
Χώρῳ ἐν εὐρώεντι.

[3] There is an apparent difference between what is here said and the representations of the N. T. elsewhere, according to which Satan and his ἄγγελοι have even now their residence in the air (Eph. ii. 2, or in the upper regions, ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις, Eph. vi. 12), and although already judged by Christ (John xvi. 11), yet as κοσμοκράτορες exercise power over unbelievers, and also lay snares for believers,

ρηκεν is not contained the final doom which will only take place at the general judgment; therefore: *εἰς κρίσιν μεγάλης ἡμέρας*] *μεγ. ἡμέρα*, without any further designation, used of the last judgment only here; the same adjective, as an attribute of that day, in Acts ii. 20; Rev. vi. 17, xvi. 14.

Ver. 7. Third example: the judgment on Sodom and Gomorrha and the cities about them, which, however, is not co-ordinate with the preceding two, but is closely connected with the last-mentioned, "whilst here both times a permanent condition is meant, which a similar sin has had as its consequence, whereas *ἀπώλεσεν* (ver. 5) states a judgment of God already past" (Hofmann's *Schriftb.* I. p. 428). — *ὡς*] is not to be connected with the following *ὁμοίως*, ver. 8; nor is *ὅτι*, ver. 5, to be connected with *ὑπομνῆσαι . . . βούλομαι* (de Wette) = *how* instead of "that;" it refers rather to what directly precedes = *like as* (Semler, Arnaud, Hofmann, Brückner, Wiesinger, Schott, and others; Luther: *as also*), whilst ver. 7 confirms *ἀγγέλους . . . τετήρηκεν* by the comparison with what befell Sodom and Gomorrha: God retains the angels kept unto the day of judgment, even as Sodom and Gomorrha *πρόκεινται δεῖγμα κ.τ.λ.* With the connection with *ὑπομν. βουλ.* (ver. 5) a preceding *καί* would hardly be necessary, also the words *τὸν ὅμοιον τούτοις* indicate the close connection with ver. 6. — *Σόδομα καὶ Γόμορρα*] frequently adduced in the O. and N. T. as examples of the divine judgment; see, for example, Rom. ix. 29. — *καὶ αἱ περὶ αὐτὰς*

in order to bring them again into subjection. Expositors, in general, have attempted to reconcile this by referring this continued activity of the devil to the special permission of God; Calvin otherwise: porro nobis fingendus non est locus, quo inclusi sint diaboli; simpliciter enim docere voluit Ap., quam misera sit eorum conditio . . . nam quocunque pergant, secum trahunt sua vincula et suis tenebris obvoluti manent. Dietlein remarks on 2 Pet. ii. 4: "Not only Tartarus, but also the chains of darkness, are to be understood in a local and corporeal sense, but not of such a locality, or of such an imprisonment in that locality, as would require an exclusion from our locality, or an incapability of movement through our locality." But all these artificial explanations are to be rejected, inasmuch as Jude does not speak of Satan and his angels, but of a definite class of angels, to whom, in agreement with the Book of Enoch, he refers Gen. vi. 2. This is correctly observed by Hofmann, Wiesinger, and Schott, with whom Brückner appears to agree; on the other hand, F. Philippi (p. 140) observes: "Jude speaks here of the original fall of the angels from pride, not of their union with earthly women."

πόλεις] according to Deut. xxix. 23; Hos. xi. 8: Admah and Zeboim. — τὸν ὅμοιον τρόπον τούτοις ἐκπορνεύσασαι] τούτοις may grammatically be referred to Σόδ. κ. Γόμ. (or, by synesis, to the inhabitants of these cities; so Krebs, Calvin, Hornejus, Vorstius, and others); but by this construction the sin of Sodom and Gomorrha would only be indirectly indicated. Since, also, τούτοις cannot refer to the false teachers, ver. 4, because, as de Wette correctly remarks, the thought of ver. 8 would be anticipated, it must refer to the *angels* who, according to the Book of Enoch, sinned in a similar way as the inhabitants of those cities (thus Herder, Schneckenburger, Jachmann, de Wette, Arnaud, Hofmann, and others). — ἐκπορνεύσασαι, the sin of the inhabitants, is designated as the action of the cities themselves. The verb (often in the LXX. the translation of זָנָה; also in the Apocrypha) is in the N. T. a ἅπ. λεγ. The preposition ἐκ serves for strengthening the idea, indicating that "one by πορνεύειν becomes unfaithful to true moral conduct" (Hofmann), but not that "he *goes beyond* the boundaries of nature" (Stier, Wiesinger, and similarly Schott). — καὶ ἀπελθοῦσαι ὀπίσω σαρκὸς ἑτέρας] The expression ἀπέρχ. ὀπίσω τινός is found in Mark i. 20 in its literal sense; here it has a figurative meaning; comp. 2 Pet. ii. 10, πορεύεσθαι ὀπ.; Jer. ii. 5; Ecclus. xlvi. 10. — Arnaud: ces mots sont ici un euphémisme, pour exprimer l'acte de la prostitution. In ἀπο is contained the turning aside from the right way. Oecumenius thus explains the import of σὰρξ ἑτέρα: σάρκα δὲ ἑτέραν, τὴν ἄῤῥηνα φύσιν λέγει, ὡς μὴ πρὸς συνουσίαν γενέσεως συντελοῦσαν; so also Brückner and Wiesinger. Stier, Schott, Hofmann proceed further, referring to Lev. xviii. 23, 24, and accordingly explaining it: "not only have they practised shame man with man, but even man with beast" (Stier). Only this explanation corresponds to σαρκὸς ἑτέρας, and only by it do the connection of ver. 7 with ver. 6, expressed by ὡς, and the explanation: τὸν ὅμοιον τρόπον τούτοις, receive their true meaning. The σάρξ of men was ἑτέρα σάρξ to the angels, as that of beasts is to men. In the parallel passage, 2 Pet. ii. 6, the sin of the cities is not stated. — πρόκεινται δεῖγμα πυρὸς αἰωνίου δίκην ὑπέχουσαι] πρόκεινται: *they lie before the eyes as a* δεῖγμα; not: "inasmuch as the

example of punishment in its *historical attestation* is ever present" (Schott); but: inasmuch as the Dead Sea continually attests that punishment, which Jude considers as enduring. There is a certain boldness in the expression, as properly it is not the cities and their inhabitants who are *πρόκεινται*. The genitive *πυρὸς αἰωνίου* may grammatically depend both on *δεῖγμα* and on *δίκην*. Most expositors (particularly Wiesinger, Schott, Brückner) consider the second construction as the correct one; but hardly rightly; as (1) *δεῖγμα* would then lose its exact definition; (2) *πῦρ αἰώνιον* always designates hell-fire, to which the condemned are delivered up at the last judgment (see Matt. xxv. 41); (3) the juxtaposition of this verse with ver. 6, where the present punitive condition of the angels is distinguished from that which will occur *after* the judgment, favours the idea that the cities (or rather their inhabitants) are here not designated as those who even now suffer the punishment of *eternal fire*.[1] But Jude could designate the cities as a *δεῖγμα* of eternal fire, considering the fire by which they were destroyed as a figure of eternal fire. Hofmann correctly connects *πυρὸς αἰωνίου* with *δεῖγμα*, but he incorrectly designates *δεῖγμα πυρ. αἰων.* as a preceding apposition to *δίκην*: "it may be seen in them (*δεῖγμα* = exhibition) what is the nature of eternal fire, inasmuch as the fire that has consumed them is enduring in its after-operations;" by this explanation *πῦρ αἰώνιον* is deprived of its proper meaning. With *δίκην ὑπέχουσαι* the fact is indicated that they have continually to suffer punishment, since the period that punishment was inflicted upon them in the time of Lot;[2] corresponding to what is said of the angels in ver. 6. — *δεῖγμα* in N. T. *ἅπ. λεγ.* (Jas. v. 11, and frequently:

[1] Wiesinger incorrectly observes that "by this connection we must also assume that those angels also suffer the punishment of eternal fire," since precisely the contrary is the case. Wiesinger arrives at this erroneous assumption by taking *δεῖγμα* as equivalent to *example*. It is also entirely erroneous when it is asserted that *πυρὸς αἰωνίου δίκη* is an evident type of hell-fire, since *πῦρ αἰώνιον* is itself hell-fire. To be compared with this is 3 Macc. ii. 5: *σὺ . . . Σοδομίτας . . . πυρὶ . . . κατίφλιξας, παράδειγμα τοῖς ἐπιγινομένοις κατασταθείς*; and Libanius in reference to Troy: *κεῖται παράδειγμα δυστοχίας πυρὸς αἰωνίου.*

[2] There is no necessity to derive this representation from Wisd. x. 7, and the various phenomena which lead to the supposition of a subterranean fire at the Dead Sea (see Winer's *bibl. Realw.*; *todte Meer*).

ὑπόδειγμα), not = example, but *proof, testimony, sign.* ὑπέχειν likewise in N. T. ἅπ. λεγ.; 2 Macc. iv. 48, ζημίαν ὑπέχειν (2 Thess. i. 9, δίκην τίειν).

Ver. 8. Description of the sins of the false teachers; comp. 2 Pet. ii. 10.— ὁμοίως] *i.e.* similarly as Sodom and Gomorrha, etc. — μέντοι] expresses here no contrast (so earlier in this commentary: "notwithstanding the judgment which has come on those cities on account of such sins"), but it serves, as Hofmann correctly observes, appealing to Kühner's *Gramm.* II. p. 694, "simply for the strengthening of the expression, putting the emphasis on ὁμοίως; those men, says Jude, actually do the same thing as the Sodomites."— καὶ οὗτοι] refers back to τινες ἄνθρωποι, ver. 4. — ἐνυπνιαζόμενοι] only here and in Acts ii. 17, where it is used of prophetical dreams, according to Joel iii. 1. This meaning does not here suit, for Bretschneider's explanation: "falsis oraculis decepti vel falsa oracula edentes," is wholly arbitrary. Most expositors unite it closely with the following σάρκα μιαίνουσι, and understand it either: de somniis, in quibus corpus polluitur (Vorstius), or of voluptuous dreams, appealing to Isa. lvi. 10 (LXX. ἐνυπνιαζόμενοι κοίτην, an inaccurate translation of the Hebrew חֹזִים שֹׁכְבִים), or of unnatural cohabiting (Oecumenius). Jachmann (with whom Brückner agrees) understands it generally = "sunk in sleep, *i.e.* hurried along in the tumult of the senses," appealing to the parallel passage, 2 Pet. ii. 10 (ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ). Similarly Calvin: est metaphorica loquutio, qua significat, ipsos tam esse habetes, ut sine ulla verecundia ad omnem turpitudinem se prostituant. But in all these explanations the expression is only referred to the first clause of the following sentence; but this is opposed to the construction: it refers to *both* clauses,—else it would have been put directly with μιαίνουσι, — and denotes the condition in which and out of which they do those things which are expressed in the following clauses. It is unsatisfactory to keep in view only the negative point of ἐνυπνιάζεσθαι, the want of a clear consciousness (Hornejus: tam insipientes sunt, ut quasi lethargo sopiti non tantum impure vivant, etc.; Arnaud: qui agissent sans savoir ce qu'ils font); the positive point is chiefly to be observed, which consists in living in the arbitrary fancies of their

own perverted sense, which renders them deaf to the truths and warnings of the divine word (so in essentials, Stier, Fronmüller, Wiesinger, Schott, Brückner, Hofmann[1]). The reference to Isa. xxix. 10, LXX.: *πεπότικεν ὑμᾶς κύριος κατανύξεως*, is unsuitable (against Beza, Carpzov, and others), as here the discourse is not about a punitive decree of God. — *σάρκα μὲν μιαίνουσι*] not *their* flesh, but generally *the flesh*, both their own and that of others: the thought refers back to ver. 7: *ἐκπορνεύσασαι*, etc. — *κυριότητα δὲ ἀθετοῦσι, δόξας δὲ βλασφημοῦσιν*] announces a new side of their sinful nature. As this verse is in evident connection of thought with ver. 10, where the words *ὅσα δὲ φυσικῶς . . . φθείρονται* refer back to *σάρκα μὲν μιαίν.*, so *κυριότης* and *δόξαι* can only be here such things as suit the words *ὅσα οὐκ οἴδασιν*. It is thus incorrect to understand them of political powers (Erasmus, Calvin, Grotius, Wolf, Semler, Stier, and others), or of ecclesiastical rulers (Oecumenius[2]), or of human authorities generally, the two words being either taken as designations of concrete persons, or one of them as a pure abstraction; Arnaud: par *κυριότητα* il faut entendre l'autorité en général et par *δόξας* les dignités quelconques, les hommes méritant, par leur position, le respect et la considération. — Both expressions are to be understood as a designation of supermundane powers. Almost all recent expositors agree in this, although they differ widely in the more definite statement. These different explanations are as follows:—(1) *κυριότης* is taken as a designation of God or Christ, and *δόξαι* as a designation of the good angels (Ritschl); (2) the good angels are understood in both expressions (Brückner); (3) *κυριότης* is understood in the first explanation, but *δόξαι* is explained of the evil angels (Wiesinger); (4) both expressions are understood as a designation of the evil angels (Schott). In order first correctly to determine the idea *κυριότης*, the rela-

[1] "Those here spoken of are wakeful dreamers, so that they, when they should perceive with their wakeful senses, have only dreams, and what they dream they esteem as the perception of the wakeful spirit."

[2] Oecumenius, however, wavers, thinking that by *κυριότης* may also be understood *ἡ τοῦ κατὰ Χριστὸν μυστηρίου τελευτή*, and by *δόξαι* also *ἡ παλαία διαθήκη καὶ ἡ νέα*; on 2 Pet. ii. 10 he observes: *δόξας, ἤτοι τὰς θείας φησὶ δυνάμεις, ἢ καὶ τὰς ἐκκλησιαστικὰς ἀρχάς.*

tion of ver. 8 to what goes before is to be observed. The judgments which have befallen the people (ver. 5), the angels (ver. 6), and the cities (ver. 7), are by Jude adduced as a testimony against the Antinomians (*οὗτοι*, ver. 8) mentioned in ver. 4, evidently because these persons are guilty of the same sins on account of which those judgments occurred. Since *σάρκα μιαίνουσι* evidently points back to *ἐκπορνεύσασαι*, ver. 7, and further to *ἀσέλγειαν*, ver. 4, it is most natural to refer *κυριότητα ἀθετοῦσιν* to *μὴ πιστεύοντας*, ver. 5, and, further, to *τὸν μόνον δεσπότην . . . ἀρνούμενοι*, ver. 4. Consequently, by *κυριότης* — if one takes *τὸν μόνον δεσπότην* as a designation of God — is to be understood the *Godhead;* or, if one understands *τ. μ. δ.* as a predicate to *Ἰησ. Χρ.*, *Christ.* If, now, it is assumed that *δόξαι* is an idea corresponding to *κυριότης*, and to be taken along with it, then by it the good angels are to be understood. But it must not be overlooked that the clause *δόξας δὲ βλασφημοῦσιν* is separated from the preceding clause by *δέ*; and that ver. 9 leads to a different understanding of *δόξαι*. When in ver. 9 it is said of the archangel Michael that he dared not *κρίσιν ἐπενεγκεῖν βλασφημίας* against the *devil*, this *βλασφημίας* evidently refers back to *βλασφημοῦσιν*, ver. 8, consequently the two ideas *δόξας* and *διάβολος* are brought together, so that from this the preference must be given to the explanation which understands by *δόξας* the diabolical powers, or the *evil* angels. That not only *δόξαι*, but also *κυριότης*, is a designation of evil powers, Schott incorrectly appeals to the fact that in 2 Pet. ii. 10, and also here, the unchaste, carnal life of the false teachers is connected with their despising or rejection of *κυριότης*; for although it is presupposed that the recognition of the reverence for *κυριότης* might restrain these men from the abuse of their fleshly nature, yet it does not follow from this that only evil spirits can be meant, since also the recognition of the reverence for the divine power restrains from the abuse of the corporeal senses which were created by God. To the identification of *κυριότης* and *δόξαι* — whether good or evil angels are to be understood — not only is the form of the expression opposed, Jude not uniting the two clauses by *καί*, but, as already remarked, separating them by

δέ,[1] but also the difference of the conduct of the Antinomians, whilst they despise (*ἀθετοῦσιν*; 2 Pet.: *καταφρονοῦσιν*) the *κυριότης*, but blaspheme the *δόξαι*. The clearer this separation and distinction are kept in view, the less reason is there against deriving the exact meaning of *δόξαι* from ver. 9 (2 Pet. ii. 10 from ver. 11), and consequently against understanding by it *evil* angels (comp. Hofmann); only it must not be affirmed that Jude has used the expression *δόξαι* as a *name* for the evil angels as such, but only that, whilst so naming angels generally, he here means the evil angels, as is evident from ver. 9. That these may be understood by this designation cannot be denied, especially, as Wiesinger points out, as Paul in Eph. vi. 12 names them *αἱ ἀρχαί, αἱ ἐξουσίαι, οἱ κοσμοκράτορες*, and says of them that they are *ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις*. — *ἀθετοῦσιν . . . βλασφημοῦσιν*] The first expression is negative, the second positive; the Antinomians manifested the despising of *κυριότης* by the carnal licentiousness of their lives, whilst they fancied themselves exempt by *χάρις* (ver. 4) from the duty of obedience to the will of God (or Christ) as the *κύριος* requiring a holy life; but their blasphemy of the *δόξαι* consisted in this, that on the reproach of having in their immorality fallen under diabolical powers, they mocked at them as entirely impotent beings.

Remark.—According to Ritschl's opinion, the actions which Jude here asserts of the Antinomians represent directly only the guilt of their forerunners (namely, the Israelites, ver. 5; the angels, ver. 6; and the Sodomites, ver. 7), and his expressions can therefore only be understood in an indirect and metaphorical sense. To this conclusion Ritschl arrives (1) by explaining the second clause of ver. 10, that the Antinomians understood relations to be understood spiritually *φυσικῶς ὡς τὰ ἄλογα ζῶα*, *i.e.* that they considered the blessings promised in the kingdom of heaven as the blessings of sensual enjoyment; (2) by so understanding the relation of ver. 8 to the preceding, that *δόξας βλασφ.* is to be referred back to ver. 7, *κυριότ. ἀθετ.* to ver. 6, and *σαρκὰ μιαίν.* to ver. 5. According to his view, Jude finds the guilt of the Sodomites (ver. 7) to consist in this, that by the design of

[1] Also in 2 Pet. ii. 10, *δόξας οὐ τρέμουσιν βλασφημοῦντες* is separated from *κυριότητος καταφρονοῦντας* by the intervening *τολμηταὶ αὐθάδεις*.

practising their lust on the angels, they blasphemed them; the guilt of the angels (ver. 6) in this, that they undervalued their own dominion; and the guilt of the Israelites (ver. 5) in this, that they had criminal intercourse with the impure daughters of Moab. Over against this, the guilt of the Antinomians consisted in this—(1) that they regarded immorality as a privilege of the kingdom of God, which they have in common with the angels; (2) that by referring their immoral practice to the kingdom of God, they showed a depreciation of the dominion which belongs to Christ, or to which they themselves are called; and (3) that by their ἀσέλγεια they were guilty of the defilement of those connected with them in the Christian church. But both the explanation of the second clause of ver. 10, where there is no mention of the blessings of the kingdom of heaven, and the statement of the relation of ver. 8 to what goes before, is incorrect, since in ver. 7 the Sodomites and the other cities are reproached, not with an evil intention, but with an actual doing; in ver. 6 the not preserving their ἀρχή and the forsaking of their οἰκητήριον are indeed reckoned as a crime to the angels, but specially on this account, because they did it — as τὸν ὅμοιον τρόπον τούτοις, ver. 7, shows—for the sake of ἐκπορνεύειν; and lastly, in ver. 5 the criminal intercourse with the daughters of Moab is not indicated as the reason of their ἀπώλεια, but their unbelief (μὴ πιστεύσαντας). For these reasons Wiesinger has correctly rejected the explanation of Ritschl as mistaken.—The view of Steinfass, expressed on 2 Pet. ii. 10, that the blasphemy of the δόξαι by the Antinomians consisted in their wishing to constrain the angels by charms to love-intrigues, is, apart from all other considerations, contradicted by the fact that neither in 2 Peter nor in Jude is there any reference to charms and love-intrigues with the angels.

Ver. 9 places in a strong light the wickedness of this blasphemy (comp. 2 Pet. ii. 11). They do something against the δόξαι, which even Michael the archangel did not venture to do against the devil. — ὁ δὲ Μιχαὴλ ὁ ἀρχάγγελος] Michael, in the doctrine of the angels, as it was developed during and after the captivity by the Jews, belonged to the seven highest angels, and was regarded as the guardian of the nation of Israel: Dan. xii. 1, הַשַּׂר הַגָּדוֹל הָעֹמֵד עַל־בְּנֵי עַמֶּךָ; comp. x. 13, 21; in the N. T. he is only mentioned in Rev. xii. 7. In the Book of Enoch, chap. xx. 5, he is described as "one of the holy angels set over the best part of the human race,

over the people." — *ἀρχάγγελος* only here and in 1 Thess. iv. 16 (Dan. xii. 1, LXX., *ὁ ἄρχων ὁ μέγας*); see Winer's *bibl. Reallex.: Angel, Michael.* — *ὅτε τῷ διαβόλῳ κ.τ.λ.*] This legend is found neither in the O. T. nor in the Rabbinical writings, nor in the Book of Enoch; Jude, however, supposes it well known. Oecumenius thus explains the circumstance: *λέγεται τὸν Μιχαὴλ . . . τῇ τοῦ Μωσέως ταφῇ δεδιηκονηκέναι· τοῦ γὰρ διαβόλου τοῦτο μὴ καταδεχομένου, ἀλλ' ἐπιφέροντος ἔγκλημα διὰ τὸν τοῦ Αἰγυπτίου φόνον, ὡς αὐτοῦ ὄντος τοῦ Μωσέως, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μὴ συγχωρεῖσθαι αὐτῷ τυχεῖν τῆς ἐντίμου ταφῆς.* According to Jonathan on Deut. xxxiv. 6, the grave of Moses was given to the special custody of Michael. This legend, with reference to the manslaughter committed by Moses, might easily have been formed, as Oecumenius states it, "out of Jewish tradition, extant in writing alongside of the Scriptures" (Stier).[1] According to Origen (*περὶ ἀρχῶν*, iii. 2), Jude derived his account from a writing known in his age: *ἀνάβασις τοῦ Μωσέως*.[2] Calvin and others regard oral tradition as the source; Nicolas de Lyra and others, a special revelation of the Holy Ghost; and F. Philippi, a direct instruction of the disciples by Christ, occasioned by the appearance of Moses on the mount of transfiguration. De Wette has correctly observed that the explanation is neither to be derived from the Zendavesta (Herder), nor is the contest to be interpreted allegorically (*σῶμα Μωσέως* = the people of Israel, or the Mosaic law). — *διακρινόμενος διελέγετο*] The juxtaposition of these synonymous words serves for the

[1] Schmid (*bibl. Theol.* II. p. 149), Luthardt, Hofmann (*Schriftbeweis*, I. p. 340), Schott, Wiesinger (less definitely) think that the conflict consisted in Michael not permitting the devil to exercise his power over the dead body of Moses, but withdrawing it from corruption; for which an appeal is made to the fact that "God had honoured Moses to see in the body a vision of His entire nature" (Hofmann), and also that "Moses was to be a type of the Mediator conquering death" (Schott), and that Moses appeared with Christ on the mount of transfiguration. In his explanation of this Epistle, Hofmann expresses himself to this effect, that Satan wished to prevent "Moses, who shared in the impurity of death, and who had been a sinful man, from being miraculously buried by the holy hand of God (through Michael)."

[2] See on this apocryphal writing, F. Philippi (*das Buch Henoch*, p. 166–191), who ascribes the composition of it to a Christian in the second century, and assumes that he was induced to it by this 9th verse in the Epistle of Jude; this at all events is highly improbable.

strengthening of the idea; by διελέγετο the conflict is indicated as a verbal altercation. — οὐκ ἐτόλμησε] *he ventured not.* — κρίσιν ἐπενεγκεῖν βλασφημίας] Calovius incorrectly explains it by: ultionem de blasphemia sumere; the words refer not to a blasphemy uttered by the devil, but to a blasphemy against the devil, from which Michael restrained himself. — κρίσιν ἐπιφέρειν] denotes a judgment pronounced against any one (comp. Acts xxv. 18: αἰτίαν ἐπιφέρειν). — κρίσιν βλασφημίας] is a judgment containing in itself a blasphemy. By βλασφ. that saying—namely, an invective—is to be understood by which the dignity belonging to another is injured. Michael restrained himself from such an invective against the devil, because he feared to injure his original dignity; instead of pronouncing a judgment himself, he left this to God. Herder: "And Michael dared not to pronounce an abusive sentence." — ἀλλ' εἶπεν· ἐπιτιμήσαι σοι κύριος] *the Lord rebuke thee:* comp. Matt. xvii. 18, xix. 13, etc. According to Zech. iii. 1–3, the angel of the Lord spoke the same words to the devil, who in the vision of Zechariah stood at his right hand as an adversary of the high priest Joshua (LXX.: ἐπιτιμήσαι κύριος ἐν σοὶ διάβολε).

Ver. 10. Description of the false teachers with reference to ver. 8 in contrast to ver. 9; comp. 2 Pet. ii. 12. — They blaspheme, ὅσα μὲν οὐκ οἴδασι, *what they know not:* the supermundane, to which the δόξαι, ver. 8, belong, is meant. Hofmann: "they know about it, otherwise they could not blaspheme it; but they have no acquaintance with it, and yet in their ignorance judge of it, and that in a blasphemous manner" (comp. Col. ii. 18, according to the usual reading). Those expositors who understand κυριότητα and δόξας of human authorities, are at a loss for an explanation of the thoughts here expressed; thus Arnaud: il est assez difficile de préciser, quelles étaient ces choses qu'ignoraient ces impies. — ὅσα δὲ φυσικῶς ἐπίστανται] a contrast to what goes before; corresponding to σάρκα μιαίνουσι, ver. 8, only here the idea is carried farther. Jachmann explains it: "the passions inherent in every one;" but this does not suit ἐπίστανται. De Wette correctly: *the objects of sensual enjoyment;* to which the σάρξ (ver. 8) especially belongs. By

φυσικῶς (ἅπ. λεγ. = *of nature*) ὡς τὰ ἄλογα ζῶα is prominently brought forward the fact that their understanding is not raised above that of the irrational animals, that to them only the sensual is something known. There is no distinction between εἰδέναι and ἐπίστασθαι, as Schott thinks, that the former denotes a comprehensive knowledge, and the latter a mere external knowing ("they understand, namely, in respect of the external and sensual side of things, practically applied"); but these two verbs obtain this distinctive meaning here only through the context in which they are employed by Jude (comp. Hofmann). — ἐν τούτοις φθείρονται] ἐν, more significant than διά, designates their entire surrender to these things. — φθείρονται; Luther, *they corrupt themselves;* better: *they destroy themselves;* namely, by their immoderate indulgences. In Luther's translation the words ὡς τὰ ἄλογα ζῶα are incorrectly attached to this verb.

Ver. 11. The author interrupts his description of these ungodly men by a denunciation on them, which he grounds by characterizing them after the example of the ungodly in the O. T. (comp. 2 Pet. ii. 15 ff.). — οὐαὶ αὐτοῖς] The same denunciation frequently occurs in the discourses of Jesus: "at once a threatening and a strong disapproval" (de Wette). With this οὐαί Jude indicates the judgment into which the Antinomians have fallen; it refers back to vv. 5–7; Wiesinger incorrectly understands it only as a mere "exclamation of pain and abhorrence."[1] This denunciation of woe does not occur with an apostle; frequently in the O. T. — ὅτι τῇ ὁδῷ τοῦ Κάϊν ἐπορεύθησαν] On the phrase: τῇ ὁδῷ τινος πορεύεσθαι, comp. Acts xiv. 16. (Acts ix. 31: πορ. τῷ φόβῳ τ. κυρίου.) τῇ ὁδῷ is to be understood locally (see Meyer on the above passages), not "instrumentally" (Schott), which does not suit ἐπορεύθησαν. — ἐπορεύθησαν; preterite (Luther and others translate it as the present), because Jude represents the judgment threatened in

[1] Hofmann correctly observes: "οὐαί has evil in view, whether it be in the tone of compassion which bewails it (Matt. xxiii. 15), or of indignation which imprecates it (Matt. xi. 21)." As not the first but the second is the case here, Hofmann should not have rejected the explanation of de Wette.

οὐαὶ αὐτοῖς as fulfilled (de Wette-Brückner). Schott incorrectly explains it: "they have set out, set forth." Many expositors find the similarity with Cain to consist in this, that whereas he murdered his brother, these by seduction of the brethren are guilty of spiritual murder; so Oecumenius, Estius, Grotius (Cain fratri vitam caducam ademit; illi fratribus adimunt aeternam), Calovius, Hornejus, Schott, and others. But this conversion into the spiritual is arbitrary, especially as the desire of seduction in these men is not specially brought forward by Jude. Other expositors, adhering to the murder committed by Cain, think on the persecuting zeal of these false teachers against believers; so Nicolas de Lyra: sequuntur mores et studia latronis ex invidia et avaritia persequentes sincerioris theologiae studiosos. As the later Jews regarded Cain as a symbol of moral scepticism, so Schneckenburger supposes that Jude would here reproach his opponents with this scepticism; but there is also no indication of this in the context. De Wette stops at the idea that Cain is named as "the archetype of all wicked men;" so also Arnaud[1] and Hofmann; but this is too general. Brückner finds the point of resemblance in this, that as Cain out of *envy*, on account of the favour shown to Abel, *resisting the commandment and warning of God*, slew his brother, so these false teachers resisted God, and that from envy of the favour shown to believers. But in the context there is no indication of the definite statement "*from envy*." It is more in correspondence with the context to find the *tertium compar.* in this, that Cain in spite of the warning of God followed his own wicked lusts; Frommüller: "The point of comparison is acting on the selfish impulses of nature, in contempt of the warnings of God."—καὶ τῇ πλάνῃ τοῦ Βαλαὰμ μισθοῦ ἐξεχύθησαν] πλάνη, as a sinful moral error, denotes generally a vicious life averted from the truth; comp. Jas. v. 20; 2 Pet. ii. 18 (Ezek. xxxiii. 16, LXX. translation of פָּשַׁע). ἐκχεῖσθαι in the middle, literally, to issue forth out of something, construed with εἴς τι; figuratively, *to rush into something, to give oneself up with all his might to*

[1] Arnaud: J. compare seulement, d'une manière très générale, ses adversaires à Cain, sous le rapport de la méchanceté.

something (Clemens Alexandrinus, p. 491, 3; *εἰς ἡδονὴν ἐκχυθέντες*; several proof passages in Wahl, Elsner, Wetstein); it is less suitable to explain the verb according to Ps. lxxiii. 2, where the LXX. have *ἐξεχύθη* as a translation of שָׁפְכוּ = *to slip* (Grotius: errare). The dative *τῇ πλάνῃ* is = *εἰς τὴν πλάνην*; Schott incorrectly explains it as dativus instrumentalis, since *ἐξεχύθησαν* requires a statement for the completion of the idea. The genitive *μισθοῦ* is, with Winer, p. 194 [E. T. 258], to be translated: *for reward* (see Grotius *in loco*); so that the meaning is: "they gave themselves up for a reward (*i.e.* for the sake of earthly advantage, thus from covetousness; Luther: 'for the sake of enjoyment') to the sin of Balaam;" thus most interpreters, also Brückner, Wiesinger, Hofmann. De Wette, on the contrary, after the example of Erasmus, Vatablus, and others, explains *Βαλαάμ* as a genitive dependent on *τοῦ μισθοῦ*; the dative *τῇ πλάνῃ*, as = by means of the error; and *ἐξεχύθησαν* as an intransitive verb = "to commit excesses, to give vent to." Accordingly, he translates the passage as follows: "By (by means of) the error (seduction) of the reward of Balaam, they have poured themselves out (in vice)." So also Hornejus: deceptione mercedis, qua deceptus fuit Balaam, effusi sunt.[1] But this construction is extremely harsh, the ideas *πλάνη* and *ἐξεχύθησαν* are arbitrarily interpreted, and the whole sentence, so interpreted, would be withdrawn from the analogy of the other two with which it is co-ordinate.[2] Schott construes the genitive with *πλάνῃ*, whilst he designates it "as an additional, and, as it were, a parenthetically added genitive for the sake of precision," and for this he supplies a *πλάνῃ*: "the error of Balaam, which was an error determined by gain." This construction, it is true, affords a suitable sense, but it is not linguistically justified: it is entirely erroneous to take *μισθοῦ* as in apposition to *Βαλαάμ* = *ὃς μισθὸν ἠγάπησεν*, 2 Pet. ii. 15 (Fron-

[1] Calvin: dixit (Ap.), instar Bileam mercede fuisse deceptos, quia pietatis doctrinam turpis lucri gratia adulterant; sed metaphora, qua utitur, aliquanto plus exprimit; dixit enim *effusos esse*, quia scilicet instar aquae diffluentis projecta sit eorum intemperies.

[2] "The parallelism of the three clauses requires that *τῇ πλάνῃ ἐξεχύθησαν* should remain together, accordingly the genitive is equivalent to *ἀντὶ μισθοῦ*" (Stier).

müller, Steinfass). — De Wette, chiefly from Rev. ii. 14, finds the point of resemblance in this, that "Balaam as a false prophet and a seducer to unchastity and idolatry, and contrary to the will of God, went to Balak, and that he is also particularly considered as covetous and mercenary." But there is no indication that the men of whom Jude speaks enticed others to idolatry. Hofmann observes that this clause calls the sin of those described as "a devilish conduct against the people of God, the prospect of a rich reward being too alluring to Balaam to prevent him entering into the desires of Balak to destroy the people of God;" but in this explanation also a reference is introduced not indicated by the context. That Jude had primarily in view the covetousness of Balaam, *μισθοῦ* shows; blinded by covetousness, Balaam resisted the will of God; his resistance was his *πλάνη*, in which, and in the motive to it, the Antinomians resembled him (Brückner, Wiesinger); whether Jude had also in view the seduction to unchastity (comp. Num. xxxi. 16; Frommüller), is at least doubtful; and it is still more doubtful to find the point of resemblance in this, that the Antinomians "had in view a material gain to be obtained by the *ruin of the church of God*" (Schott). — *καὶ τῇ ἀντιλογίᾳ τοῦ Κορὲ ἀπώλοντο*] *ἀντιλογία, contradiction;* here, seditious resistance. *ἀπώλοντο* does not mean that "they lost themselves in the *ἀντιλ.* of Korah," but "that they perished;" accordingly, *τῇ ἀντιλογίᾳ* is the instrumental dative. The point of resemblance is not, with Nicolas de Lyra, to be sought in this, that the opponents of Jude formed propter ambitionem honoris et gloriae sectas erroneas; or, with Hornejus, that they assumed the munus Apostolorum ecclesiae doctorum; or, with Hofmann, that they, as Korah ("whose resistance consisted in his unwillingness to recognise as valid the law of the priesthood of Aaron, on which the whole religious constitution of Israel rested"), "desired to assert a liberty not restricted;" but it consists in the proud resistance to God and His ordinances, which the Antinomians despise. By Schott's explanation: "that they opposed to the true holiness a holiness of their own invention, namely, the holiness alleged to be obtained by disorderly excess," a foreign

reference is introduced.[1] The gradation of the ideas *ὁδός*, *πλάνη*, *ἀντιλογία*, in respect of definiteness, is not to be denied; but there is also a gradation of thought, for although the point about which Cain, Balaam, and Korah are named is one and the same, namely, resistance to God, yet this appears in the most distinct manner in the case of Korah.

Ver. 12. A further description of these false teachers; comp. 2 Pet. ii. 13, 17. — *οὗτοί εἰσιν [οἱ] ἐν ταῖς ἀγάπαις ὑμῶν σπιλάδες*] In the reading *οἱ*, *ὄντες* is either, with de Wette, to be supplied; thus: "these are they who are *σπιλάδες* in your *ἀγάπαις*;" or *οἱ* is to be joined to *συνευωχούμενοι* (comp. vv. 16, 19; so Hofmann). That by *ἀγάπαις* the love-feasts are to be understood, is not to be doubted. Erasmus incorrectly takes it as = charitas, and Luther as a designation of alms. — The word *σπιλάδες* is usually explained = *cliffs* (so also formerly in this commentary). If this is correct, the opponents of Jude are so called, inasmuch as the love-feasts were wrecked on them (de Wette-Brückner, Wiesinger), *i.e.* by their conduct these feasts ceased to be what they ought to be; or inasmuch as they prepared destruction for others, who partook of the love-feasts (Schott, and this commentary). It is, however, against this interpretation that *σπιλάς* does not specially indicate *cliffs*, but has the more general meaning *rocks* (Hofmann: "projecting interruptions of the plain"), and the reference to being wrecked is not in the slightest degree indicated.[2] — Stier and Fronmüller take *σπιλάδες* as = *σπῖλοι*, 2 Pet. ii. 13; this is not unwarranted, as *σπιλάς*, which is properly an adjective (comp.

[1] Ritschl finds the point of resemblance between the Antinomians and the three named in this, "that they, as these, undertook to worship God in a manner rejected by Him." But it is erroneous that "the Korahites exhibited their assumption of the priesthood by the presentation of an offering rejected by God;" it is incorrect that by *ὁδός* is indicated "the religious conduct" of Cain; and it is incorrect that the utterance of the curse willed by Balaam is to be considered as a religious transaction. Moreover, in the description of the Antinomians there is no trace indicating that their view was directed to a particular kind of worship.

[2] The explanation of Arnaud: les rochers continuellement battus par les flots de la mer et souillés par son écume (after Steph.: *σπιλάς*), is unsuitable; since, when the Libertines are called cliffs, this happens not because they are bespattered and defiled by others, but because others are wrecked on them.

σποράς, φυγάς, λογάς), may be derived as well from σπῖλος = filth (comp. γῆ σπιλάς = clayey soil; so Sophocles, *Trach.* 672, without γῆ), as from σπίλος = a rock (comp. πολυσπιλάς). In this case σπιλάδες may either be taken as a substantive = what is filthy, spots (these are spots in your *agapé*; so Stier and Fronmüller), or as an adjective, which, used adverbially (see Winer, p. 433), denotes the mode and manner of συνευωχεῖσθαι (so Hofmann). The former construction merits the preference as the simpler. — Apart from other considerations, σπῖλοι καὶ μῶμοι in 2 Peter are in favour of taking σπιλάδες here in the sense of σπῖλοι. — συνευωχούμενοι] The verb εὐωχεῖσθαι[1] has not indeed by itself a bad meaning, signifying *to eat well, to feast well*, but it obtains such a meaning here by the reference to the *agapé*. The συν placed before it may either refer to those addressed, *with you*, see 2 Pet. ii. 13, where ὑμῖν is added to the verb (Wiesinger, Schott, Fronmüller, Hofmann); or to those here described by Jude, *feasting together*, i.e. *with one another*. Against the first explanation is the objection, that according to it the εὐωχεῖσθαι in their *agapé* would render those addressed also guilty (so formerly in this commentary); but against the second is the fact that the Libertines held no special love-feasts with one another, but participated in those of the church. The passage, 2 Pet ii. 13, is decisive in favour of the first explanation. — The connection of ἀφόβως is doubtful; de Wette-Brückner, Arnaud, Schott, Fronmüller unite it with συνευωχούμενοι; Erasmus, Beza, Wiesinger, Hofmann, with ἑαυτοὺς ποιμαίνοντες. In this commentary the first connection was preferred, "because the idea συνευωχ. would otherwise be too bare." This, however, is not the case, because if the verse is construed, as it is by Hofmann, it has its statement in what goes before; but if σπιλάδες is taken as a substantive, as it is by Stier and Fronmüller, then συνευωχ. is more precisely determined by the following ἀφόβως . . . ποιμαίνοντες, whilst it is said that

[1] An explanation of this word is found in Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, lib. iii.: ἔλεγε (namely, Socrates) δὲ καὶ ὡς τὸ εὐωχεῖσθαι ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων γλώττῃ ἡσθῆναι κάλοιτο. Τὸ δὲ εὖ προσκεῖσθαι, ἔφη, ἐπὶ τῷ ταῦτα ἡσθῆναι, ἅτινα μήτε τὴν ψυχὴν, μήτε τὸ σῶμα λυποῖ, μήτε δυσεύρετα εἴη; ὥστε καὶ τὸ εὐωχεῖσθαι τοῖς κοσμίως διαιτωμένοις ἀνεπίφθονον. However, εὐωχεῖσθαι sometimes occurs in classical Greek in a bad sense.

they so participate in the *agapé* that their feasting was a ἀφόβως ποιμαίνειν ἑαυτούς. Erasmus takes the latter words in a too general sense: suo ductu et arbitrio viventes; Grotius, Bengel, and others give a false reference to them after Ezek. xxxiv. 2, understanding "that these feed themselves and not the church" (comp. 1 Pet. v. 2), and accordingly Schneckenburger thinks specially on the instructions which they engage to give; but this reference is entirely foreign to the context. According to de Wette, it is a contrast to "whilst they suffer the poor to want" (1 Cor. xi. 21); yet there is also here no indication of this reference. — *νεφέλαι ἄνυδροι*] is to be understood no more of the *agapé* (de Wette, Schott), but generally. *νεφ. ἄνυδρ.* are light clouds without water, which therefore, as the addition *ὑπὸ ἀνέμων παραφερόμεναι* makes prominent, are driven past by the wind without giving out rain; comp. Prov. xxv. 14. This figure describes the internal emptiness of these men, who for this reason can effect nothing that is good; but it seems also to intimate their deceptive ostentation [1]; the addition serves for the colouring of the figure, not for adducing a special characteristic of false teachers; Nicolas de Lyra incorrectly: quae a ventis circumferuntur i. e. superbiae motibus et vanitatibus. — In the parallel passage, 2 Pet. ii. 17, two images are united: *πηγαὶ ἄνυδροι καὶ ὁμίχλαι ὑπὸ λαίλαπος ἐλαυνόμεναι.* — According to the reading *περιφερόμεναι*, the translation would be: "driven hither and thither;" *παραφερόμεναι* denotes, on the other hand, *driven past*. A second figure is added to this first, by which the unfruitfulness (in good works) and the complete deadness of these men are described; in the adjectives the gradation is obvious. — *δένδρα φθινοπωρινά*] are not a particular kind of trees, such as only bare fruit in autumn, but trees *as they are in autumn*, namely, destitute of fruit (de Wette-Brückner, Wiesinger, Schott, etc.). It is arbitrary to desert the proper meaning of the word, and to explain *φθινοπωρινά* according to the etymology of *φθίνειν* by arbores quarum fructus perit illico = frugi-

[1] Calvin: vanam ostentationem taxat, quia nebulones isti, quum multa promittunt, intus tamen aridi sunt. Bullinger: habent enim speciem doctorum veritatis, pollicentur daturos se doctrinam salvificam, sed veritate destituuntur et quovis circumaguntur doctrinae vento.

perdae (Grotius; so also Erasmus, Beza, Carpzov, Stier: "which have cast off their fruit in an unripe state"). — ἄκαρπα] not: "whose fruit has been taken off" (de Wette), but "which are without fruit" (Brückner). Whether they have had fruit at an earlier period, and are now destitute of it, is not said. "The impassioned discourse proceeds from marks of unfruitfulness to that of absolute nothingness" (de Wette). δὶς ἀποθανόντα] Beza, Rosenmüller, and others arbitrarily explain δίς by plane, prorsus. Most expositors retain the usual meaning; yet they explain the idea *twice* in different ways; either that those trees are not only destitute of fruit, but also of leaves (so Oecumenius, Hornejus, and others); or that they bear no fruit, and are accordingly rooted out; or still better, δίς is to be referred to the fact that they are not only *fruitless*, but *actually dead and dried up*.[1] That Jude has this in his view, the following ἐκριζωθέντα shows. Several expositors have incorrectly deserted the figure here, and explained this word either of twofold spiritual death (Beza, Estius, Bengel, Schneckenburger, Jachmann, Wiesinger, Schott), or of death here and hereafter (so Grotius: neque hic bonum habebunt exitum, neque in seculo altero), or of one's own want of spiritual life and the destruction of life in others. All these explanations are without justification. ἐκριζωθέντα is in close connection with δὶς ἀποθανόντα; thus, trees which, because they are dead, are dug up and rooted out;[2] thus incapable of recovery and of producing new fruit (Erasmus: quibus jam nulla spes est revirescendi). This figure, taken from trees, denotes that those described are not only at present destitute of good works, but are incapable of producing them in the future, and are "on this account rooted out of the soil of grace" (Hofmann). It is incorrect when Hofmann[3] in the application refers δὶς ἀποθανόντα to the fact that those men

[1] Fronmüller, incorrectly: "trees which have at different times suffered fatal injury by frosts or from insects."

[2] Fronmüller, linguistically incorrect: "trees which still remain in the earth, but which are shaken loose by their roots."

[3] "If, when they became Christians, a fresh sap from the roots, by which they were rooted in the soil of divine grace, appeared to establish them in a new life out of their heathen death in sin, yet this new life was to them only a transition into a second and now hopeless death."

were not only in their early heathenism, but also in their Christianity, without spiritual life. There is no indication in the context of the distinction between heathenism and Christianity. Arnaud observes not incorrectly, but too generally: tous ces mots sont des métaphores énergiques pour montrer le néant de ces impies, la légèreté de leur conduite, la stérilité de leur foi et l'absence de leurs bonnes oeuvres.

Ver. 13. Continuation of the figurative description of those false teachers. The two images here employed characterize them in their erring and disordered nature. — *κύματα ἄγρια θαλάσσης κ.τ.λ.*] Already Carpzov has correctly referred for the explanation of these words to Isa. lvii. 20; the first words correspond to the Hebrew גַּלִּים נִגְרָשׁ; the following words: *ἐπαφρίζοντα τὰς ἑαυτῶν αἰσχύνας*, to the Hebrew יִגְרְשׁוּ מֵימָיו וָטִיט, only Jude uses the literal word where Isaiah has the figurative expression. — *ἐπαφρίζειν*] properly: *to foam over*. Luther well translates it: *which foam out their own shame*. — *αἰσχύνας*, not properly *vices* (de Wette); the plural does not necessitate this explanation, but their disgraceful nature, namely, the shameful *ἐπιθυμίαι* which they manifest in their wild lawless life; not "their self-devised wisdom" (Schott). — From the fact that the Hebrews sometimes compared their teachers to the sea (see Moses, *theol. Samar.*, ed. Gesenius, p. 26), it is not to be inferred, with Schneckenburger and Jachmann, that there is here a reference to the office of teachers; this is the more unsuitable as the opponents of Jude hardly possessed that office. — *ἀστέρες πλανῆται*] These two words are to be taken together, *wandering stars*; that is, stars which have no fixed position, but roam about. The analogy with the preceding metaphors requires us to think on actual stars, with which Jude compares his opponents; thus on comets (Bretschneider, Arnaud, Stier, de Wette, Hofmann) or on planets (so most of the early commentators, also Wiesinger). The latter opinion is less probable, because the *πλανᾶσθαι* of the planets is less striking to the eye than that of the comets. It is incorrect "in the explanation entirely to disregard the fact whether there are such *ἀστέρες πλανῆται* in heaven or not" (so earlier in this commentary, after the example of Schott), and to assume that Jude, on account of their ostenta-

tion (Wiesinger, Schott), designates these men as stars, and by *πλανῆται* indicates their unsteady nature. De Wette incorrectly assumes this in essentials as equivalent with *πλανῶντες καὶ πλανώμενοι*, 2 Tim. iii. 13. Bengel thinks that we are in this figure chiefly to think on the *opaqueness* of the planets; but such an astronomical reference is far-fetched. Jachmann arbitrarily explains *ἀστέρες = φωστῆρες*, Phil. ii. 15, as a designation of Christians. Several expositors also refer this figure to the teaching of those men, appealing to Phil. ii. 15 and Dan. xii. 3; so already Oecumenius: *δοκοῦντες εἰς ἄγγελον φωτὸς μετασχηματίζεσθαι . . . ἀπεναντίας μόνον τοῦ κυρίου φέρονται δογμάτων* (Hornejus, and others); but the context gives no warrant for this. — *οἷς ὁ ζόφος τοῦ σκότους εἰς αἰῶνα τετήρηται*] This addition may grammatically be referred either to what immediately precedes, thus to the *ἀστέρες πλανῆται*, or to the men who have been described by the figures used by Jude. It is in favour of the first reference (Hofmann: "Jude names them stars passing into eternal darkness, comets destined only to vanish") that a more precise statement is also added to the preceding figure; thus the addition *ὑπὸ ἀνέμων παραφερόμεναι* to *νεφέλαι ἄνυδροι κ.τ.λ.* But it is against it that the expression chosen by Jude is evidently too strong to designate only the disappearance of comets, therefore the second reference is to be preferred (Wiesinger; comp. ver. 6), which also the parallel passage in 2 Pet. ii. 17 favours. The addition of the genitive *τοῦ σκότους* to *ὁ ζόφος* serves to strengthen this idea.

Vv. 14, 15. The threatening contained in the preceding verses is confirmed by a saying of Enoch. — *ἐπροφήτευσε δὲ καὶ τούτοις*] *καί* refers either to *τούτοις*: "of these as well as of others;" according to Hofmann, of those who perished in the deluge; or it is designed to render prominent *ἐπροφ. τούτοις* in reference to what has been before said: "yea, Enoch also has prophesied of them." Hofmann, in an entirely unwarrantable manner, maintains that there can be no question that *καί* puts its emphasis on the word before which it stands. — *προφητεύειν* generally with *περί* here construed with the dative, as in Luke xviii. 31, *in reference to these.* — *ἕβδομος ἀπὸ Ἀδὰμ Ἐνώχ*] *ἕβδομος* has hardly here the

mystical meaning which Stier gives it: "The seventh from Adam is personally a type of the sanctified of the seventh age of the world, of the seventh millennium, of the great earth Sabbath." Also in the Book of Enoch, he is several times expressly designated as "the seventh from Adam" (lx. 8, xciii. 3); not in order to characterize him as the oldest prophet (Calvin, de Wette, and others), but to mark his importance by the coincidence of the sacred number seven (Wiesinger, Schott). The saying of Enoch here quoted is found, partly verbally, at the beginning of the Book of Enoch (i. 9): "And behold He comes with myriads of saints to execute judgment on them, and He will destroy the ungodly and judge all flesh concerning all things which the sinners and ungodly have committed and done against Him."[1] These words are taken from a speech in which an angel interprets a vision which Enoch has seen, and in which he announces to him the future judgment of God.

The question, from what source Jude has drawn these words, is very differently answered by expositors. It is most natural to conceive that he has taken them from the Book of Enoch; but then this presupposes that this book, although only according to its groundwork, is of pre-Christian Jewish, and not of Jewish Christian origin, which is also the prevailing opinion of recent critics. Hofmann, who denies the pre-Christian composition of the book, says: "Jude has derived it, in a similar manner as the incident between Michael and Satan, from a circle of myths, which has attached itself to Scripture, amplifying its words." Yet, on the other hand, it is to be observed that it is difficult to conceive that oral tradition should preserve such an entire prophetic saying. F. Philippi thinks that Enoch in Gen. v. 22 is characterized as a prophet of God, and as such prophesied of the impending deluge; and that Jude, by reason of a deeper understanding of Gen. v., could add the exposition already become traditionary, and speak of a prophecy of Enoch, *the reality of which was confirmed to him by the testimony of the Holy Ghost;* or that this prophecy of Enoch was imparted to the

[1] The passage thus stands in de Sacy's version: et venit cum myriadibus sanctorum, ut faciat judicium super eos et perdat impios et litigat cum omnibus carnalibus pro omnibus quae fecerunt et operati sunt contra eum peccatores et impii.

disciples by Christ Himself, when the already extant tradition concerning Enoch might have afforded them occasion to ask the Lord about Enoch, perhaps when he was engaged in delivering His eschatological discourses. But both opinions of Philippi evidently rest on suppositions which are by no means probable. As an example of the method by which the older expositors sought to rescue the authenticity of the prophecy, let the exposition of Hornejus suffice: haec quae Judas citat, ab Enocho ita divinitus prophetata esse, dubium non est; sive prophetiam illam ipse alicubi scripsit et scriptura illa vel per Noam ejus pronepotem in arca, vel in columna aliqua tempore diluvii conservata fuit sive memoria ejus traditione ad posteros propagata, quam postea apocrypho et fabulosa illi libro autor ejus inseruerit, ut totum Enochus scripsisse videretur.

ἐν ἁγίαις μυριάσιν] comp. Zech. xiv. 5; Deut. xxxiii. 2; Heb. xii. 22; (*μυριάσιν ἀγγέλων*) Rev. v. 11. — Ver. 15. *ποιῆσαι κρίσιν*] see Gen. xviii. 25; John v. 27. — *τοὺς ἀσεβεῖς*] The pronoun *αὐτῶν*, according to the *Rec.*, would refer to the people of Israel. — *ὧν ἠσέβησαν*] the same verb in Zeph. iii. 11; 2 Pet. ii. 6; here used as transitive; comp. Winer, p. 209 [E. T. 279]. The frequent repetition of the same idea is to be observed: *ἀσεβεῖς, ἀσεβείας, ἠσέβησαν*, and finally again *ἀσεβεῖς*; a strong intensification of ungodliness. — *τῶν σκληρῶν*] *σκληρός*, literally, dry, hard, rough; here in an ethical sense, *ungodly*, not equivalent to *surly* (Hofmann); in a somewhat different sense, but likewise of sayings, the word is used in John vi. 60. — *κατ' αὐτοῦ*] is by Hofmann in an unnecessary manner attached not only to *ἐλάλησαν*, but also to *ἠσέβησαν*, in spite of Zeph. iii. 11, where it is directly connected with *ἠσέβησαν*, which is not here the case. The sentence emphatically closes with *ἁμαρτωλοὶ ἀσεβεῖς*, which is not, with Hofmann, to be attracted to what follows.

Ver. 16. A further description of the false teachers attached to the concluding words of the prophetic saying: *τῶν σκληρῶν ὧν ἐλάλησαν κατ' αὐτοῦ*; comp. 2 Pet. ii. 18, 19. — *οὗτοί εἰσι*] as in vv. 10 and 19 with special emphasis. — *γογγυσταί*] *ἅπ. λεγ.* in N. T.; the verb is of frequent occurrence; Oecumenius interprets it: *οἱ ὑπ' ὀδόντα καὶ ἀπαῤῥη-*

σιάστως τῷ δυσαρεστουμένῳ ἐπιμεμφόμενοι. Jude does not say against whom they murmur; it is therefore arbitrary to think on it as united to a definite special object as rulers (de Wette), or, still more definitely, ecclesiastical rulers (Estius, Jachmann). Brückner correctly observes that "the idea is not to be precisely limited." Everything which was not according to their mind excited them to murmuring. The epithet μεμψίμοιροι (ἅπ. λεγ.), *dissatisfied with their lot*, gives a more precise statement; denoting that they in their pretensions considered themselves entitled to a better lot than that which was accorded to them. The participial clause, κατὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας αὐτῶν πορευόμενοι, is added to the substantive, which, whilst it unfolds the reason of their dissatisfaction and murmuring, at the same time expresses a kind of contrast: they were dissatisfied with everything but themselves. Calvin: qui sibi in pravis cupiditatibus indulgent, simul difficiles sunt ac morosi, ut illis nunquam satisfiat. The view of Grotius is entirely mistaken, that Jude has here in view the dissatisfaction of the Jews of that period with their political condition.— καὶ τὸ στόμα αὐτῶν λαλεῖ ὑπέρογκα] ὑπέρογκα only here and in the parallel passage, 2 Pet. ii. 18. Luther: "proud words" (verba tumentia, in Jerom. *contra Jovian.* i. 24); comp. Dan. xi. 36, LXX.: καὶ λαλήσει ὑπέρογκα; such words are meant which proceed from pride, in which man exalts himself, in contrast to the humility of the Christians submitting themselves to God. To this the parallel passage (2 Pet. ii. 18) also points, where the expression ὑπέρογκα refers to boasting of ἐλευθερία. A participial clause is again added to this assertion, as in the former clause, likewise expressing a kind of contrast: θαυμάζοντες πρόσωπα ὠφελείας χάριν. The expression θαυμάζειν πρόσωπα is in the N. T. ἅπ. λεγ.; in the O. T. comp. Gen. xix. 21, LXX.: ἐθαύμασά σου τὸ πρόσωπον; Heb. נָשָׂא פָּנִים; in other passages the LXX. have λαμβάνειν τὸ πρ. In Lev. xix. 15 the LXX. translate נָשָׂא פָּנִים by λαμβ. τὸ πρ.; on the other hand, הָדַר פָּנִים by θαυμάζειν τὸ πρόσωπον. Whilst in the first passage the friendly attitude of God toward Abraham is expressed, in the second passage it has the bad meaning of partiality. It has also this meaning here: it is to be translated *to render*

admiration to persons (Herder: to esteem; Arnaud: "admirer, honorer"). In this sense *θαυμάζειν* occurs in Ecclus. vii. 29 (comp. Lysias, *Orat.* 31, where it is said of death: *οὔτε γὰρ τοὺς πονηροὺς ὑπερορᾷ, οὔτε τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς θαυμάζει, ἀλλ' ἴσον ἑαυτὸν παρέχει πᾶσιν*). This partial treatment of persons consisted in the flattering homage of those who hoped for some advantage from them, as *ὠφελείας χάριν* shows. It is unwarranted, with Hofmann, to interpret *θαυμάζειν πρόσωπα*: "to gratify and to please a person." Proud boasting and cringing flattery form indeed a contrast, but yet are united together. Calvin: magniloquentiam taxat, quod se ipsos fastuose jactent: sed interea ostendit liberali esse ingenio, quia serviliter se dimittant. — *θαυμάζοντες* is not parallel with *πορευόμενοι*, but refers in a loose construction to *αὐτῶν*; by this construction the thought gains more independence than if *θαυμαζόντων* were written. — *ὠφελείας χάριν*] belongs not to the finite verb, but to the participle.

Vv. 17, 18. Jude now turns to his readers, comforting[1] and exhorting them in reference to the ungodly above described; see 2 Pet. iii. 2, 3. — *ὑμεῖς δέ*] an emphatic contrast to those above mentioned. — *μνήσθητε*] presupposes the words meant by Jude known to the readers, as learned from the apostles. — *τῶν ῥημάτων τῶν προειρημένων*] *ῥῆμα*; the word as an expression of thought. The *προ* in *προειρημένων* designates these words not as those which predict something future, but which were already spoken before (so also Hofmann). — *ὑπὸ τῶν ἀποστόλων κ.τ.λ.*] Jude would hardly have so expressed himself were he himself an apostle, which several expositors certainly do not grant, explaining this mode of expression partly from Jude's modesty and partly from the circumstance that, except himself and John, the other apostles were already dead. — Ver. 18. *ὅτι ἔλεγον ὑμῖν*] *ὑμῖν* here renders it probable that Jude means such sayings as the readers had heard from the mouth of the apostles themselves; yet the words which follow are not necessarily to be considered as a literally exact quota-

[1] Why Jude should not have intended to comfort his readers by reminding them of what the apostles had, at an earlier period, said of the appearance of these men, as he here describes them, cannot be perceived (against Hofmann).

tion, but may be a compression of the various predictions of the apostles concerning this subject.[1] — *ἐπ' ἐσχάτου [τοῦ] χρόνου*] a designation of the time directly preceding the advent of Christ. In the reading *τοῦ χρόνου, ἐσχάτου* is the genitive neuter, as in Heb. i. 1. — *ἔσονται ἐμπαῖκται*] only here and in 2 Pet. iii. 3, a word occurring only in later Greek; the LXX. have translated תֵּעַלּוּלִים by *ἐμπ.*, as they render הִתְעַלֵּל by *ἐμπαίζειν*. *Mockers*, that is, men to whom the holy (not merely the *resurrection*, Grotius) serves for mockery. *λαλεῖν ὑπέρογκα* is a *ἐμπαίζειν* of the holy (which Hofmann without reason denies); this is naturally united with a surrender to their own lusts; therefore *κατὰ τὰς ἑαυτῶν ἐπιθυμίας πορευόμενοι τῶν ἀσεβειῶν*] *τῶν ἀσεβειῶν*, an echo of the saying of Enoch, is placed emphatically at the close, in order to render prominent the character and aim of *ἐπιθυμίαι*. — That the apostles in their writings frequently prophesied of the entrance of heretical and ungodly men into the church, is well known; comp. Acts xx. 29; 1 Tim. iv. 1; 2 Tim. iii. 2 ff.; yet *ἐμπαίζειν* is not elsewhere stated as a characteristic mark of these men; this is only the case in 2 Pet. iii. 3, where, however, the mockery is referred only to the denial of the advent of Christ.

Ver. 19. Final description of the false teachers, not specially, but according to their general nature. — *οὗτοί εἰσιν*] parallel with ver. 16. — *οἱ ἀποδιορίζοντες*] the article marks the idea as definite: "these are they who," etc. — *ἀποδιορίζειν*, a word which occurs only in Aristotle's *Polit.* iv. 8. 9, is here very differently explained; with the reading *ἑαυτούς* it would most naturally be taken as equivalent to *separate*; thus, "who separate themselves from the church, whether internally or externally" (Wahl); without *ἑαυτούς* it is explained either as = *to secede* (Fronmüller), or = to cause *separations and divisions*, namely, in the church (Luther: "who make factions;" de Wette-Brückner, Wiesinger; so also in this commentary).

[1] Entirely without reason, Schott maintains that the intervening words: *ὅτι ἔλεγον ὑμῖν*, prove that Jude will here give a verbal quotation, and that this must be a *writing* earlier directed to the readers. *ὅτι* ἐλ. *ὑμ.* simply introduces the statement of the contents of the *ῥήματα*, which were earlier spoken by the apostles. The plural is not to be referred to *one* apostle, and the verb does not in the least degree indicate that this word was *written*.

Neither explanation is, however, justified from the use of the word *διορίζειν*. It is still more arbitrary, with Schott, to explain it: "who make a distinction, namely, between the pneumatical (Pneumatikern), as what they consider themselves, and the psychical (Psychikern), as what true Christians regard them;" for there is no indication of such a distinction made by them. If we base the explanation on the significance of *διορίζειν*, the word may be understood as = to make definitions. But in this case what follows must be closely connected with it, by which the mode and manner of their doing so is stated, namely, that they do so as psychical men, who are without the *πνεῦμα*. Hofmann gives to the verb the meaning: "to determine (define) something exactly in detail," and then assumes that the preceding genitive *τῶν ἀσεβειῶν* depends on *οἱ ἀποδιοριζόμενοι*, which may well be the case, because a participle standing for a substantive may as well as a substantive govern the genitive. According to this explanation, Jude intends to describe those men as persons "who make impieties the object of an exercise of thought exactly defining everything, and so are the philosophers of impieties." This explanation is condemned by the harsh and artificial construction which it requires.[1] — *ψυχικοί, πνεῦμα μὴ ἔχοντες*] *πνεῦμα* is not man's natural spirit,[2] for Jude could not deny this to his opponents; and to explain *μὴ ἔχοντες* in the sense: "I might say that they have no spirit at all" (Fronmüller), is completely arbitrary. It is rather to be understood of *the Holy Spirit* (de Wette-Brückner, Wiesinger, Hofmann); the want of the article and of an epithet, such as *ἁγίου* or *Θεοῦ*,

[1] Certainly the dependent genitive may precede the governing substantive; but this union is here rendered impossible by the intervening *οὗτοι*. A participle also, taken as a substantive, may sometimes govern a genitive; but this is only found with the neuter, and then only rarely. Add to this that *οὗτοί εἰσιν* here corresponds to the *οὗτοί εἰσιν* in vv. 16 and 12, and accordingly must stand at the beginning of the sentence.

[2] Schott explains *πνεῦμα* as "spiritual life in *the* distinctive character of its being, that it is self-controlled in personal self-consciousness and self-determination," and so equivalent to "free personality of the spirit" (!); but this free personality, Schott further observes, is not denied to them in the sense as "if they were actually deprived of it," but only that it "does not attain permanence and reality in actual performance." This distorted interpretation is contradicted by the fact that Jude simply denies to them *πνεῦμα ἔχειν*.

is no objection against this interpretation, since the simple word *πνεῦμα* is often used in the N. T. as a designation for the objective Holy Spirit. It is erroneous to affirm that by this interpretation the conclusion of the description is too flat, for nothing worse can be said of a man who desires to be esteemed a Christian than that he wants the Holy Spirit. Moreover, only so understood does *πνεῦμα μὴ ἔχοντες* correspond to the preceding *ψυχικοί*, to which it is added as an explanation; *ψυχικοί* they are, inasmuch as their natural spiritual life left to itself is under the unbroken power of the *σάρξ*; see 1 Cor. ii. 14, 15; Jas. iii. 15.

REMARK. — Schott attempts to prove that the three verses, 12, 16, and 19, beginning with *οὗτοι*, refer to the threefold expression contained in ver. 11, namely, in this manner: that the Antinomians, in showing themselves to be *σπιλάδες* in their *ἀγάπαις* (ver. 12), resembled Cain; that in being *γογγυσταὶ μεμψίμοιροι*, and out of greed for material gain indulging in mercenary flattery (ver. 16), they resembled Balaam; and that in establishing a self-invented ungodly sanctity in opposition to the divinely appointed and divinely effective Christian sanctity (ver. 19), they resembled Korah. This juxtaposition, however, is anything but appropriate, resting, on the one hand, on incorrect explanations; and, on the other hand, on the arbitrary selection of separate points. It is incorrect to affirm that the similarity of the Antinomians with Cain consisted in this, that what he did *corporally* they did *spiritually*; there is contained in this rather a distinction than a similarity. It is arbitrary to bring forward only the last clause of ver. 16, which reproaches the Antinomians with flattery, and which may also be found in Balaam; whereas the other expressions in the verse do not suit in the least degree. And lastly, it is erroneous so to interpret ver. 19 that the Antinomians were accused of the setting up of a false sanctity; even were this correct, yet the sanctity claimed by them is of a totally different nature from that to which Korah and his company laid claim.

Vv. 20, 21. Exhortation to the readers respecting themselves. — *ὑμεῖς δέ, ἀγαπητοί*] as in ver. 17, in contrast to the persons and conduct of those mentioned in the last verse. — *ἐποικοδομοῦντες κ.τ.λ.*] The chief thought is contained in the exhortation *ἑαυτοὺς ἐν ἀγάπῃ Θεοῦ τηρήσατε*, to which the preceding *ἐποικοδομοῦντες . . . προσευχόμενοι* is subordinate,

specifying by what the fulfilment of that exhortation is conditioned. Yet it is asked, whether *προσευχόμενοι* is connected with *ἐποικοδομοῦντες*, or is annexed as an independent sentence to the following imperative; and whether *ἐν πν. ἁγίῳ* is to be united with *ἐποικοδ.* or with *προσευχόμενοι*. These questions are difficult to decide with perfect certainty. Wiesinger and Schott apparently correctly unite *ἐν πν. ἁγ.* with *προσευχόμενοι*, and these taken together with what follows. Hofmann, on the other hand, unites *ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ* with what goes before, and *προσευχόμενοι* with what follows. In this construction, however, the structure of the participial clause becomes too clumsy; also *ἐν πν. ἁγ.* becomes superfluous, as *ἐποικοδομεῖν ἑαυτούς* cannot take place otherwise than *ἐν πνεύματι ἁγ.* It is true, Hofmann observes that *ἐν πν. ἁγ.* is superfluous with *προσευχόμενοι*, and that Jude could not intend to say *how* they should pray, but *that* they should pray. But this is erroneous, for *τηρεῖν ἑαυτούς* here mentioned depends not only on this, that one should pray, but that one should pray rightly, that is, *ἐν πν. ἁγ.* Wiesinger correctly observes, that the first clause gives the general presupposition; the second, on the other hand, the more precise statement how *τηρήσατε* has to be brought about. — *τῇ ἁγιωτάτῃ ὑμῶν πίστει*] Both the adjective and the verb show that *πίστις* is here meant not in a subjective (the demeanour of faith, Schott), but in an objective sense (Wiesinger: "appropriated by them indeed as their personal possession, yet according to its contents as *παραδοθεῖσα*;" so similarly Hofmann). — *ἐποικοδομοῦντες ἑαυτούς*] When verbs compounded with *ἐπί* are joined with the dative, as here, this for the most part is used for *ἐπί τι*, more rarely for *ἐπί τινι* (see Winer, p. 400 f. [E. T. 535]). If the first is here the case, then *ἐποικοδομεῖν τῇ πίστει* is to be interpreted, with Wiesinger: "building on *πίστις*, so that *πίστις* is the foundation which supports their whole personal life, the soul of all their thinking, willing, and doing" (so also hitherto in this commentary);[1] comp. 1 Cor. iii. 12: *ἐποικοδομεῖν ἐπὶ τὸν θεμέλιον τοῦτον*. If, on the

[1] *πίστις* is the foundation, the *θεμέλιος* on which Christians should build themselves (more and more), by which the representation at the bottom is that they are not yet on all sides of their life on this foundation.

other hand, the second is here the case, then it is to be explained, with Hofmann, "their faith is the foundation which supports their life; and accordingly, in the further development of their life it should ever be their care that their life rests upon this foundation;" comp. Eph. ii. 20: *ἐποικοδομηθέντες ἐπὶ τῷ θεμελίῳ τῶν ἀποστόλων.* The first is, however, to be preferred, because, as already remarked, with these verbs the dative mostly stands for *ἐπί τι.* Both explanations come essentially to the same thing. — *ἑαυτούς* is not here = *ἀλλήλους*; the discourse is indeed of a general, but not precisely of a mutual activity; *ἑαυτούς* with the second person creates no difficulty; comp. Phil. ii. 12. — *ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ προσευχόμενοι*] The expression *προσευχ. ἐν πν. ἁγ.*, it is true, does not elsewhere occur, but similar combinations are not rare (*λαλεῖν ἐν πν. ἁγ.*, 1 Cor. xii. 3; see Meyer *in loc.*); it means so to pray that the Holy Spirit is the moving and guiding power (Jachmann, unsatisfactorily: "praying in consciousness of the Holy Ghost"); comp. Rom. viii. 26. — *ἑαυτοὺς ἐν ἀγάπῃ Θεοῦ τηρήσατε*] *Θεοῦ* may either be the objective genitive (Vorstius: charitas Dei passiva i. e. qua nos Deum diligimus; so also Jachmann, Arnaud, Hofmann, and others), or the subjective genitive, "the love of God to us" (so de Wette, Schott, Wiesinger, Fronmüller); in the latter case the thought is the same as in John xv. 9, 10; this agreement is in favour of that interpretation, nor is the want of the article opposed to it (against Hofmann). This keeping themselves in the love of God is combined with the hope of the future mercy of Christ, which has its ground, not in our love to God, but in God's love to us; comp. Rom. v. 8 ff. — *προσδεχόμενοι τὸ ἔλεος τοῦ κυρίου κ.τ.λ.*] On *προσδεχ.*, Tit. ii. 15. — *τὸ ἔλεος τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν* is the mercy which Christ will show to His own at His coming. Usually the idea *ἔλεος* is predicated not of the dealings of Christ, but of God; in the superscriptions of the Pastoral Epistles and of the Second Epistle of John, it is referred to God and Christ. — *εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον*] may be joined either with *ἔλεος* (de Wette), or with *προσδεχόμενοι* (Schott), or with *τηρήσατε* (Stier, Hofmann); since the imperative clause forms the main point, the last-mentioned combination deserves the preference, especially as both in

προσδέχεσθαι and in ἔλεος Ἰησ. Χρ. the reference to ζωὴ αἰώνιος is already contained. The prominence here given to the Trinity, πνεῦμα ἅγιον, Θεός, Ἰησοῦς Χριστός, as frequently in the N. T., is to be observed. With the exhortation contained in vv. 20, 21, Jude has accomplished what he in ver. 3 stated to be the object of his writing.

Vv. 22, 23. The exhortations contained in these verses refer to the conduct of believers toward those who are exposed to seduction by the ἀσεβεῖς (ver. 4) (de Wette); not toward the false teachers themselves (Reiche), for these are of such a kind (ver. 12) that the church should have nothing to do with them. The best attested text is that which codex A affords: καὶ οὓς μὲν ἐλέγχετε διακρινομένους· οὓς δὲ σώζετε ἐκ πυρὸς ἁρπάζοντες, οὓς δὲ ἐλεεῖτε (Lachmann and Tischendorf, ἐλεᾶτε) ἐν φόβῳ; see critical remarks. — οὓς μὲν . . . οὓς δέ instead of τοὺς μὲν . . . τοὺς δέ, see Winer, p. 100. According to this reading, three classes of the seduced are distinguished, and toward each a special conduct is prescribed. It is, however, asked whether, as Brückner, Wiesinger, Schott, Reiche, and others assume, there is a gradation from the curable to the incurable (a dubitantibus minusque depravatis ad . . . insanabiles, quibus opem ferre pro tempore ab ipsorum contumacia prohibemur: Reiche); or conversely from the incurable to the curable. In reference to the first class it is said: οὓς μὲν ἐλέγχετε διακρινομένους] The verb ἐλέγχειν denotes to *rebuke some one's sins by punishing him.* The object for which this is done is not indicated in the word itself; it may be to lead the sinner to the acknowledgment of his sins, and thus to repentance, comp. 1 Cor. xiv. 24; 2 Tim. iv. 2; Tit. i. 13; or it may also be condemnation, comp. particularly Jude ver. 15 (John xvi. 8; Tit. i. 9). The explanation of Oecumenius is incorrect: φανεροῦτε τοῖς πᾶσιν τὴν ἀσέβειαν αὐτῶν. Those who are to be punished are denoted διακρινομένους. Both the translation of the Vulgate: *judicatos*, and the interpretation of Oecumenius: κακείνους εἰ μὲν ἀποδιΐστανται ὑμῶν ἐλέγχετε, are incorrect. διακρίνεσθαι signifies in the N. T. either *to contend*, which is here unsuitable, or *to doubt*, and is opposed to πιστεύειν; comp. Matt. xxi. 21; Mark xi. 23; Rom. iv. 20; especially Jas. i. 6.

This last passage shows that, although not equivalent to ἀπιστεῖν, it denotes the condition in which ἀπιστία has the preponderance over πίστις, the latter being a vanishing point.[1] It is evident that Jude does not consider the διακρινόμενοι as *weak believers* (Schott), because, with reference to them, he will employ no other method than ἐλέγχειν (not παρακαλεῖν, or something similar); those seduced are in his view such as (punishment apart) are to be left to themselves.[2] In reference to the second class it is said: οὓς δὲ σώζετε ἐκ πυρὸς ἁρπάζοντες] Their condition is not stated, but it is to be inferred from the conduct to be observed towards them. Toward those belonging to this class a σώζειν is to be employed, but of such a nature as is more precisely stated by ἐκ πυρὸς ἁρπάζοντες. ἐκ πυρός is not from the fire of *future* judgment (Oecumenius, Fronmüller), but πῦρ is the present destruction, in which they already are (Brückner, Wiesinger, Schott); ἁρπάζειν denotes hasty, almost violent, snatching out, and indicates that those are already in extreme danger of perdition; comp. Amos iv. 11; Zech. iii. 2. Distinguished from the διακρινομένοις, the second class are to be considered as those who have not yet lost the faith, but have, through fellowship with the Antinomians, been enticed to their licentious life; these are to be *rescued*. σώζετε is evidently in contrast to ἐλέγχετε, and denotes them to be such as one may certainly hope to rescue, provided one snatches them with violence, and tears them out of this fellowship. In reference to the third class, Jude prescribes ἐλεεῖν (on the form ἐλεᾶτε, see Winer, p. 32 [E. T. 104]). This verb in the N. T. *never* means only "to have compassion" (Schott), but always to *compassionate one with helpful love*, as also ἔλεος is always used only of *active* compassion; so that with ἐλεεῖτε the exact contrary is said to what Luther finds expressed, when he explains it: "let them go, avoid them, and have nothing to do with them." By this

[1] When Hofmann says, "that διακρίνεσθαι cannot have this meaning requires no proof," he makes an entirely groundless assumption.

[2] In the reading of the *Rec.*: οὓς μὲν ἐλεεῖτε διακρινόμενοι, we are obliged to explain διακρίνεσθαι as = *distinguished*. Luther: "and make this distinction, that ye compassionate some;" or, more exactly, "compassionate the one, making a distinction," namely, from others. But διακρινόμενοι must be passive, since not διακρίνεσθαι, but only διακρίνειν, has the meaning *to distinguish*.

is denoted rather the helpful and saving benevolence by which the erring are again to be brought back to the right way. As this ἐλεεῖν makes a fellowship necessary with those upon whom it is exercised, Jude defines the same more precisely by ἐν φόβῳ; accordingly, they must not be wanting in *foresight*, lest they suffer injury themselves,[1] and he adds the participial sentence as an explanation of this ἐν φόβῳ: μισοῦντες καὶ κ.τ.λ.[2] This exhortation shows that Jude considers the third class as those who are indeed already involved, but who, by active compassion, may again be re-established; it is not so bad with them as with those toward whom only ἐλέγχειν is to be employed; but also it is not yet so bad as with those who can only be rescued by hastily snatching them.

Hofmann considers the reading of ℵ: καὶ οὓς μὲν ἐλεᾶτε διακρινομένους οὓς δὲ σώζετε ἐκ πυρὸς ἁρπάζοντες, οὓς δὲ ἐλεᾶτε ἐν φόβῳ, as the correct one. In his explanation of this reading he distinguishes not three, but only two classes, assuming that only the first, but not the second οὓς δέ stands opposed to οὓς μέν; and that this latter οὓς δέ is to be considered rather as a resumption of the object mentioned in οὓς μέν. This opinion is, however, erroneous, since, according to it, the third οὓς is understood differently from the first and second οὓς, namely, as a pure relative pronoun; and since, in a highly arbitrary manner, "ἐν φόβῳ is explained as a consequence, united with an imperative ἐλεᾶτε to be taken from οὓς ἐλεᾶτε:" "whom ye compassionate, them compassionate with fear." Also the explanation of the first member of the sentence: "the readers are to compassionate the one with distinction," is to be rejected, since it has against it N. T. usage, according to which διακρίνεσθαι is never used as the passive of διακρίνειν in the sense of "to distinguish."

The addition μισοῦντες καὶ τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς σαρκὸς ἐσπιλωμένον

[1] Schott is entirely mistaken when he says that ἐλεεῖν denotes here "a compassion which has, and may have, its definite peculiarity no longer in an impulse to help, but only in a fear of acting wrongly, and in consequence of receiving injury;" in other words, a compassion which is no compassion.

[2] According to the reading of the *Rec.* ἐν φόβῳ belongs to σώζετε. Some expositors (Grotius, Stier, and others) incorrectly explain it of the fear of the persons to be rescued; correctly Arnaud: c'est à dire, prenant garde que, tout en cherchant à les convertir, ils ne vous séduisent pas vous-mêmes. Reiche incorrectly, with the reading A, separates ἐν φόβῳ from ἐλεᾶτε, and joins it with μισοῦντες, whilst it would attract to it a very superfluous addition.

χιτῶνα[1] is correctly explained by Oecumenius: προσλαμβάνεσθε . . . αὐτοὺς . . . μετὰ φόβου, περισκεπτόμενοι μήπως ἡ πρόσληψις τούτων . . . λύμης ὑμῖν γένηται αἰτία. — καί, *even*, gives greater emphasis to the thought. The expression τὸν χιτῶνα is to be understood in a literal, and not in a figurative sense (Bullinger: exuvias veteris Adami, concupiscentias et opera carnis). χιτῶν is the under garment worn next the skin, and which, by means of its direct contact with the flesh unclean by unchastity, etc., is itself soiled (σπιλόω only here and in Jas. iii. 6); comp. Rev. iii. 4. — This garment is to the author the symbol of whatever, by means of external contact, shares in the moral destruction of those men. Calvin: vult fideles non tantum cavere a vitiorum contactu, sed ne qua ad eos contagio pertingat, quicquid affine est ac vicinum, fugiendum esse admonet.

Vv. 24, 25. Conclusion of the Epistle by a doxology. — τῷ δὲ δυναμένῳ] The same commencement of the doxology in Rom. xvi. 28. — ὑμᾶς] Were αὐτούς the correct reading, we could hardly do otherwise than refer it to the last-mentioned οὓς δέ, to which it is unsuitable, as they are not ἄπταιστοι, who, as such, require only φυλάσσειν. That Jude actually wrote αὐτούς: "in the flight of devotion may have turned from his readers, and spoke of them in the third person" (de Wette), is highly improbable. — ἀπταίστους] ἄπ. λεγ., literally, who strikes not against; then figuratively, who stumbles not, does not offend; here in the moral sense as πταίω, Jas. ii. 10, iii. 2; Vulgate: sine peccato. — καὶ στῆσαι κατενώπιον τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ ἀμώμους] Schott correctly remarks on καί: The second effect is the ultimate result of the first, so that καί might be rendered by *and so, and accordingly*. δόξα is here the glory of God, as it will be manifested at the day of judgment. On στῆσαι ἀμώμους, comp. 1 Cor. i. 8; Col. i. 22; 1 Thess. iii. 13. The meaning is: "who can effect it that ye may appear as ἄμωμοι before His judgment-seat." — ἐν ἀγαλλιάσει] mentions the condition in which Christians will

[1] Both in the reading of the *Rec.* and in the reading of C this addition is surprising; one may regard it, with Jachmann, as the adversative reason of σώζετε (though ye hate); or, with de Wette, as the real reason (since ye hate, for which de Wette appeals to 1 Cor. v. 6!).

then be found; comp. 1 Pet. iv. 13. — Ver. 25. *μόνῳ Θεῷ*] see ver. 4; John v. 44; Rom. xvi. 27; 1 Tim. i. 17. — *σωτῆρι ἡμῶν*] marks, in connection with *διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χρ.*, the essential Christian element in the idea of God; on *σωτήρ* as a designation of God, comp. 1 Tim. i. 1. Schott incorrectly joins *μόνῳ Θεῷ* with *σωτῆρι ἡμῶν*, as if it meant: "to Him who alone is God, in such a manner that He is our Saviour;" and the reason which he assigns: "because *μόνος Θεός* is never used by itself, but always occurs as a designation of God relative to other attributes," is contradicted by John v. 44; also by 1 Tim. i. 17 and Jude ver. 4.— *διὰ Ἰησ. Χριστοῦ*] belongs to *σωτῆρι ἡμῶν* (Schott), not to *δόξα κ.τ.λ.* (Wiesinger); in this latter case it would be put after *ἐξουσία*. — *δόξα, μεγαλωσύνη κ.τ.λ.*] *δόξα* and *κράτος* occur frequently in the New Testament doxologies (see 1 Pet. iv. 11); *μεγαλωσύνη* and *ἐξουσία* only here; *μεγαλωσύνη* corresponds to the Hebrew גְּדֻלָּה; comp. Deut. xxxii. 3, LXX.: *δότε μεγαλωσύνην τῷ Θεῷ ἡμῶν.* — *πρὸ παντὸς τοῦ αἰῶνος*] By these words, wanting in the *Rec.*, the idea of eternity is expressed in the most comprehensive manner. Not *ἔστω*, but *ἐστί* (de Wette, Schott), is to be supplied; comp. 1 Pet. iv. 11. — *ἀμήν*] the usual conclusion of doxologies, as in Rom. i. 15; 1 Pet. iv. 11, etc.; it stands in the Epistles to the Galatians and Hebrews, probably also in 2 Peter, as here, at the end of the Epistle.

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